LIVES OF LORD CASTLEREAGH
SIR CHARLES STEWART
PEEFACE.
THE slightest examination of the following pages must
be sufficient to convince every one that it has been con-
structed on a different principle from any of the nume-
rous biographies of eminent men which have recently
issued from the press, and partakes in many parts more
of the character of general history than personal narra-
tive. This plan was not adopted without consideration,
I and the reason of it was this : —
That the principal object of history is the narrative
of events — of biography, the delineation of character, — is
a common observation, which, in the general case, is un-
doubtedly well-founded. But in its application to par-
ticular instances it requires considerable modification.
If the interest x>f a character consists in the genius by
which its productions have been distinguished, or the
vigour by which its thoughts have been expressed, no
narrative of surrounding events is required, and any
such would be misplaced. Every one would regret a
page given to contemporary events in the biography of
Michael Angelo, Tasso, Newton, or Johnson ; but it is
VI PREFACE.
otherwise with statesmen or warriors who have become
celebrated, not for the brilliancy of their imagination,
the justice of their thoughts, or the energy of their ex-
pressions, but for the great public events in which they
have borne a part. The biography of such men is to be
found in the narrative of the national changes to which
they contributed, and a mere personal narrative would
convey no sort of idea, either of their real character or
the importance of their actions upon the fortunes of
mankind. What would the lives of Alexander be with-
out the graphic account in Quintus Curtius of the pas-
sage of the Granicus or the battle of Arbela 1 Caesar's
Commentaries would not have remained to this day the
admiration of ages if they had not contained full details
of the Gallic and civil wars ; and no Life of Napoleon,
Wellington, or Maryborough, has the least chance of
oeing permanently read if it does not supply full details
of their military exploits. Lord Castlereagh and Sir
Charles Stewart have weighed too powerfully on the
course of contemporary events to permit of a faithful
portrait of their lives being presented but by a narra-
tive of the public consequences of their actions.
Such a narrative was, in an especial manner, called
for on account of another circumstance. Both having
espoused the anti-popular side in domestic politics, and
stood forth as the most formidable antagonists of the
movement party both at home and abroad, have been
exposed to a greater amount of public obloquy than
.usually falls to the lot of those who, like them, prefer
the discharge of public duty to the earning of temporary
popularity. While this obloquy long injured their repu-
PREFACE. Vll
tation at home, it was indirectly assailed by a numerous
party abroad, who sought to represent the overthrow of
Napoleon as the result of a general popular movement,
of which the great body of mankind were entitled to
the whole credit, while hardly any was to be assigned
to the courage and ability of individual men, how ele-
vated soever their sphere of action. This opinion has
been so generally diffused that it has passed, in a
manner, into an axiom. Yet is it in some respects
erroneous. The world, indeed, rose up in arms after
the French Eevolution ; but it was for long rather to
support than resist the domination of France ; and of
the 1,500,000 warriors who, in 1813, were in arms in
Europe, 900,000 drew the sword for Napoleon. The
Power which could give its followers £1,200,000,000
sterling in contributions and plunder during twenty
years, had no difficulty in drawing the multitude after
it. It was not till it began to decline that the mul-
titude fell off and ranged themselves on the other side.
The reaction was then great and powerful ; but the
utmost it could at first do was to equal the action. The
defence was equal to the attack, but no more ; and it
was the equal balance of these opposite forces which gave
such importance to the actions of their respective leaders.
It was the strenuous efforts of individual men sustain-
ing and directing the acts of the masses on their side,
which first caused the tide to turn and gave permanent
success to the arms of freedom. The more the latest
and best informed works on the subject — those of Thiers,
Sir George Cathcart, Sir Eobert Wilson, Marshal Mar-
mont, Baron Muffling, General Koch, and Sir Charles
viii PREFACE.
Stewart— are studied, the more clearly will this appear,
and the more evident will it be that, in recent as well
as ancient times, there is much truth in the opinion of
SrJlust, that it was the " strenuous virtue of a few
citizens which has done everything, and thus it was
that poverty conquered riches, few men numbers."
In detailing the influence of the two brothers, who
form the object of this biography, on the course of public
events, it seemed indispensable to narrate these events
fully, and make no reference to any other works. This
is a rule which authors and reviewers familiar with the
subject, and surrounded with the books relating to it, are
sometimes apt to forget. They think it enough to refer
to public events as narrated in some other collective or
general work, and deem it repetition to say anything of
it in their own pages, forgetting that these authorities
are not accessible to one in a hundred of their probable
readers, and that what future times desire in a historical
or biographical work is not merely detached narratives
of particular events or personal incidents, however de-
scriptive of character ; but, in addition, such a complete
story as will supersede the necessity of referring, for
ordinary purposes, to any other narrative on the subject.
No biography or history has the least chance of surviv-
ing, except as a book of reference, which is not con-
structed on this principle; and though the Author is
far from anticipating any exception to the general fate
of such productions for these Memoirs, yet he is per-
suaded that it is thus that every lasting biography of
this nature must be framed.
The loss of a large, and perhaps the most valuable, part
PREFACE. IX
of the Castlereagh Papers on the voyage to India with the
gentleman to whose care they had been intrusted for die
compilation of a biography, has immensely augmented
the labour of this work, by leaving only in many place"
fragments of correspondence, without the connecting
links or relative answers. Enough, however, remains in
the Castlereagh and Londonderry archives to bring out
in a clear light the character of both the eminent men to
whom it relates, and establish the importance of their
public acts on an imperishable basis. The Author seizes
this opportunity of expressing his deep gratitude to the
present Marchioness, Frances Anne, as well as to the
Marquess of Londonderry, for the liberality and kindness
with which they have put the invaluable treasures in
their possession at his disposal, and his regret that the
plan of his work, and the necessary limits within which
it required to be kept, has prevented him from laying a
still greater number of them before the public.
A. ALISON.
FOSSIL HOUSE, October 15, 1861.
CONTENTS OF VOL. I.
CHAPTER I.
LINEAGE AND EARLY LEFE OF LORD CASTLEREAGH AND SIB CHARLES STEWART
— IRISH REBELLION AND UNION.
§ Page
1. Lineage of the Londonderry family, . . . •" '. ' . 1
2. Family of the first Marquess, . . ',' . \ . ' . ' 2
3. Character of the two brothers in childhood, . .' /. . 3
4. Striking anecdote of Charles Stewart, . . . V . ^
5. He enters the army in 1791, ...... 4
6. Superior interest of military to civil biography, ... 6
7. Character of the first Lord Londonderry, . . ' . . <T
8. Noble anecdote of Lord Castlereagh on Strangford Lough,
9. His early life at Cambridge, . . ' .-' . . . 9
10.1 His travels abroad, and first parliamentary contest, . . . 10
11. Severe parliamentary contest in the county of Down, - . ' . 12
12. Lord Castlereagh enters the militia, and marries the daughter of the Earl
of Buckinghamshire, ..•• j . --»' • . . . 16
13. His declaration in favour of Reform, . ' .-. .. . • . . 17
14. His debut in the Irish Parliament, . . . . 18
15. Dangers of Ireland in 1793, and Lord Castlereagh's views on it, . 19
16. Lord Castlereagh's views on the subject, . ' ' . • . 20
17. 18. Lord Castlereagh's views of the French \var in 1793, . . 21, 22
19. Value of the political opinions expressed in these letters, . . 23
20, 21. Lord Castlereagh's views of affairs in Ireland in 1794, . . 24, 25
22. Changes in the Irish Government at this period, and appointment of
Lords Westmoreland and Fitzwilliam, . . ' . • '.;- 26
13. Lord Fitzwilliam's liberal policy and his dismissal ; succeeded by Lord
Camden, . . . . v . . ' . " 27
4. Declaration of Earl Camden against further concessions, . ' ;~
5. Appointment of Lord Castlereagh as Keeper of the Seal, . v-
5. Origin of the Irish revolutionary troubles, and wretched former govern-
ment of the country, . '« . .' : . ' .-
. Armed volunteers of 1782, . • .'• . . ' ; .-
. Organisation of the United Irishmen in 1791,
Real objects of this movement, . " i • .
VOL. I. b
lii CONTENTS.
< P»s8
80. Division of Catholics and Protestants, and rise of Orangemen, 34
81. Great extent and organisation of the conspiracy, . 35
82 Mission of Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor to Paris in
1797, . 36
88. Objects of the conspirators, . ...
84. Small regular forces of the Government,
85. Savage conduct of the Irish militia and volunteers, ... 41
86. Treaty between the Irish rebels and the French Government, 43
87. Renewed attempt of the French in 1797, and battle of Camperdown, 44
38. First rising of the rebels in 1797, ..... 46
89. Violent designs and proceedings of the rebels, ... 47
40. Arrest of the Executive Committee, ..... 48
41. Lord Edward Fitzgerald's arrest and death, .... 49
42. Death of Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Captain Ryan, ... 50
43. His character, ...... . .51
44. Breaking out of the rebellion, ...... 52
45. Reinforcements from England, and successes of the royal forces, . 54
46. Battle of Vinegar Hill, ....... 55
47. Lord Castlereagh's humane injunctions to General Lake in regard to the
rebels, ........ 56
48. Earl Camden is succeeded by Lord Cornwallis, ... 58
49-51. Lord Cornwallis's picture of the state of Ireland at this period, . 59-61
62. Amnesty proposed by Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh, . 62
63. Violence and passions of the extreme Protestant party in Dublin, . 63
54. Efforts of Lords Cornwallis and Castlereagh on the side of mercy, . 64
55. Landing of the French in Killala Bay, ..... 65
56. Defeat of the British at Castlebar, ..... 67
67. Surrender of the invaders to Lord Cornwallis, ... 68
58. Good effects of this abortive invasion, ... . .69
59. Results of the rebellion, ...... 72
60. Renewed clangers of French invasion, ... .73
61. Views of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh on the Irish Govern-
ment» ...... 75
62. Mr Pitt's projects for pacifying Ireland, . 76
63. Appointment of Lord Castlereagh as Secretary for Ireland, in lieu of Mr
Pelham, .... 78
64. Great difficulties of the duties with which he was charged, . . 80
65. Adaptation of Lord Castlereagh's character for the task, . . 81
66. Opposition to it in Dublin, . 82
67. Mr Pitt's views on the Union and Catholic emancipation, . 83
68. Alarming opposition to the Union, . 88
69-71. Articles of the proposed Union, and Lord Castlereagh's views regard-
^S1*- 85-87
72. Importance of this memoir, . . gg
73. Trial and death of Wolfe Tone, . 88
74. First movement towards the Union, . 90
75. Rapid progress of the resistance to the Union, 91
76. Views of the Catholics on the question, 92
77. General union of the Protestants against the measure, 92
78. Memoir by Lord Castlereagh on the subject, . 93
79. Views of Government and Lord Castlereagh on Catholic emancipation, 95
CONTENTS. xiii
Page
80. Increased resistance to the measure, ..... 96
81. Lord Castlereagh's advice to Government on the language to be assumed
in bringing forward the measure, .... 98
82. The Union is passed in the British House, . . : 'V ' . 99
83. The Union is rejected by the Irish Parliament, . . . 100
84. Effect of this defeat on Mr Pitt, Lord Cornwallis, and Lord Castle-
reagh, ........ 101
85. The English Government resolves to persevere, . . .108
86. The rejection of the Union strengthens Lord Castlereagh's views against
immediate emancipation, . -i . . . 103
87. He continues to assist the determination of Government on the subject, 105
88. Efforts of the Opposition during the recess, .... 106
89. Renewed preparations of French for invading Ireland, . . 107
90. Disturbed and alarming state of the island, . . .'- . 108
91. Military force in Ireland at this time, »«yr* ' . ; . HO
92. Increasing difficulties with the militia and yeomanry, '•'.'"' . 112
93. Lord- Lieutenant's favourable journey in the north, . , . 112
94. Naval preparations of the French for the invasion of Ireland, *• 113
95. Changes in the project of Union at the instance of Lord Castlereagh, 115
96. The measure is carried in the Irish House, .... 116
97. Treasonable efforts of the Opposition, and" dismissal of Lord Down-
shire, . •' '. . . . . . . 117
98. Fresh difficulties in the way, . . , -^t '''»"' . 118
99. Increasing difficulties attending the measure, which is at length passed, 120
100. Its reception in Parliament and the country, •'-.< . . 122
101. Difficulties on the part of Government in the creation of peerages, . 123
102. Its settlement by concession of Ministers, .... 126
103. Difficulty in regard to the Catholic claims, . ". :. . 127
104. Increased difficulties attending the Catholic question, . . 128
105. Difficulties of the King and Cabinet on the subject, . . 130
106. Mr Pitt's views on the occasion, . . . . . 132
107. Illness of the King, which precludes all further discussion of the Catho-
lic claims at this time, . . . . . » 134
108. Lord Hardwicke, the new Lord-Lieutenant, • . • . . 135
109. Patriotic conduct of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh, . 135
110. Beneficial effects of the Union, ..... 137
111. Lord Hardwicke succeeds Lord Cornwallis in Dublin, and Lord Castle-
reagh remains in London, . i. . • '•»'• " Y 138
112. Obloquy to which Lord Castlereagh was exposed from the magnitude of
his public services, . 'i .' " * • •'«•' • ' 139
CHAPTER II.
ORD CASTLI .;?AGH, FROM HIS RESIGNATION OF OFFICE IN IRELAND IN 1801, TO
THE ACCESSION OF THE WHIGS TO POWER IN APRIL 1806.
'.. Lord Castlereagh's debut in the British Parliament, .
'-4. His measures in Parliament regarding Ireland, 142, 143
. Woeful picture of Ireland by the Earl of Clare, . • I*5
XIV CONTENTS.
§ Pagfl
6. Lord Castlereagh's able memoir on the Catholic claims, . . 147
7-12. His memoir on the Catholic claims, . . . .147-151
13. Which was eminently characteristic of Lord Castlereagh, . .. 152
14. His views for the adjustment of tithes, .... 152
15. Returns relating to the Roman Catholic clergy, . . . 154
16. His plan for endowing the clergy, . . . . .155
17-21. Lord Castlereagh's memoir on the Defence of Ireland, . .155-159
22. Renewed insurrection, . . . u . . .160
23. Death of Chief-Justice Kilwarden, ..... 162
24. Trial and execution of Emmett, . . :. . . 163
25. Lord Castlereagh's appointment as President of the Board of Control, 164
26. Critical situation of Great Britain at this time, . •.' •' . 165
27. And of India, . . . . . . .166
28. His memoir on the relations of France and England in 1802, . 167
29. Negotiations previous to renewal of the war, . ."j. . . 169
30. His memorandum to the Cabinet on the negotiation with France, . 170
31. Grounds stated by Lord Castlereagh for renewing the war, . . 172
32. Lord Castlereagh's early intimacy and cordiality with Lord Wellesley, 173
33. The assistance he rendered him with the Court of Directors, . 1 74
34. His success with the Directors in regard to Lord Wellesley's measures, 176
35. Threatened reduction of the army, ..... 177
36. Lord Wellesley's testimony to his discharge of the duties of President of
the Board of Control, ...... 178
37. His disinterested conduct in public appointments, ... , 180
38. Lord Castlereagh's opinion of Lord Wellesley, * . . 180
39. Lord Castlereagh's diplomatic intercourse with Persia, . . 181
40. Lord Castlereagh's acknowledgment of Lord Wellesley's conduct and
promotions on the Mahratta war, .... 183
41. Change of Ministry, and return of Mr Pitt to office, . . .184
42. Forces of Great Britain to resist invasion at this time, . . 186
43. His plan for the destruction of the Boulogne flotilla, . . 187
44. Mr Pitt's foreign policy at this time, . . . . .188
45. Great difficulty in the way of forming a coalition against France, . 189
46. Mr Pitt's treaties with Austria and Russia, . . . .190
47. Terms of the last treaty of alliance, . .. . . 1 91
48. To which Austria at length accedes, . ." . . . 192
49. Negotiations of France and England with Prussia, . . .193
50. Efforts of Britain to engage Prussia in the alliance by sending an army
to Germany, ....... 194
51. Lord Castlereagh's military measures, . . ... .195
52. The British expedition lands under favourable circumstances, . 196
53. Battle of Austerlitz, and change of Prussia's policy, . . . 197
54. Return of the British expedition largely reinforced from Hanover, . 199
55. Great views of foreign war now formed by Lord Castlereagh, . 199
56. Magnitude of Lord Castlereagh's propositions already made, . . 201
57. Peace of Presburg, . . . .,,.'. . . . . 203
58. Death of Mr Pitt, . . . . . . .'204
59. Change of Ministry, and accession of the Whigs to power, . . 204
60. Mr Fox in va,in endeavours to make peace, . • . . . 206
61. Failure of the warlike expeditions of the Whig Government, . . 206
62. Fall of the Whig Cabinet, and return of Lord Castlereagh to power, . 209
CONTENTS. XV
CHAPTER III.
LORD CASTLEREAGH, FROM HIS RESTORATION TO THE WAR OFFICE IN APRIL 1807,
TO HIS RESIGNATION OF IT IN SEPTEMBER 1809.
§ Page
1. New Tory Administration, in which Lord Castlereagh is again Secretary
for War, ........ 212
2. Treaties in consequence concluded with the Allied powers, . . 213
3. But the succour is promised too late to save from Friedland and Tilsit, 214
4. The secret articles of Tilsit become known to the British Ministry, . 216
5. Copenhagen expedition, and capture of the Danish fleet, i- •. 218
6. Great impression produced by this stroke in Europe, . . 219
7. Arguments of Opposition against the expedition, • . . . 220
8-10. Lord Castlereagh's answer, . . . . . 221-223
11. Vindication of the Copenhagen expedition furnished by Napoleon to his
historians, . . '-'. "•-''. • V \ ' '.' '. 224
12. Judicious placing of the British army, after Copenhagen, in Sweden, 226
13. Lord Castlereagh's plan of an attack on South America, ' .' . 227
14. His plan for detaching it from the Spanish Crown, . . . 228
15. His early conferences regarding it with Sir A. Wellesley, . . 229
16. Lord Castlereagh's plans in regard to South America, • . ' . 230
17. The success of the Copenhagen expedition hastens Junot's march to
Lisbon, . . . . . ' ' .' . . 232
18. The Prince Regent of Portugal and fleet sail for Brazil, .' ' . 233
19. Great naval force at the disposal of Napoleon, . . . 234
20. State of the land forces, . • . . . . .236
21. Lord Castlereagh's system for supplying the army with troops and the
defence of the country, . ' . * . .- . 237
22. Merits of this system, . . . . ' . . .238
23. Advantages of the ballot for the local militia, . . . . 239
24. True principles on the subject for Great Britain, . '\ '' . 240
25. Great success of Lord Castlereagh's measures for recruiting the army, 242
26. Breaking-out of the Spanish war, . . . • . ; 243
27. Lord Castlereagh's disposition of. the land force and transports of Great
Britain for active operations, V . •.'' . . 244
28. His projected operation against Boulogne, . .' . . 245
29. Which is abandoned, and an expedition to Portugal is resolved on, . 245
30. Portugal is selected as the battle-field by Lord Castlereagh, . . 247
31. Choice of a Commander-in-chief, ' '. ' . . ". . 249
32. Landing of the expedition, and battle of Vimeira, . . .u'- 251
33. Convention of Cintra, which, in the circumstances, was expedient, . 253
34. Advance of Sir John Moore into Spain, .<* .' '.:* '. 255
35. Great effects of Sir J. Moore's advance against Soult, ;' . 256
36. Lord Castlereagh disapproves of the abandonment of Spain by the British
army, . •• -. • .'" ' •;•-' . . . . 257
37. Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Moore and Bairti for the disposal of
the army, which retreated to Corunna, . . /*"*;
38. Lord Castlereagh resolves to persevere in the Peninsular contest, . 260
XVI CONTENTS.
§ Page
39. Lord Castlereagh's measures for increasing the military force of the
country, . ; , . . * . . 262
40. His plan for increasing the regular army, .... 263
41. Which is, with one modification, adopted by Government, . . 266
42. Difficulties regarding Sir John Cradock iu Portugal, . . . 267
43. Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Sir A. Wellesley, . . . 269
44. Force collected in Portugal under Sir A. Wellesley, . . . 270
45. Lord Castlereagh's and Napoleon's opposite plan of operations, . 37-1
46. Complete discomfiture of Napoleon's left naval wing by Lord Castle-
reagh, ........ 272
47. Extreme difficulty of getting specie in the Peninsula, and Lord Castle-
reagh's efforts to obtain it, ..... 273
48. Strange proposition of Marshal Soult, which is declined by Castlereagh
and Sir A. Wellesley, ...... 274
49. Lord Castlereagh on the passage of the Douro, . . . 276
50. Lord Castlereagh authorises the British advance into Spain, . . 277
51. Lord Castlereagh's striking speech in Parliament on the battle of Talavera, 278
52. Advantages gained by the advance to Talavera and subsequent retreat,
which is approved by Castlereagh, .... 278
53. Lord Castlereagh's measures for the defence of Portugal, . . 280
54. Lord Castlereagh had divined for long the naval projects of France
against Great Britain, . . . . . .281
55. Lord Castlereagh's plan to defeat Napoleon's naval confederacy, . 282
56. Plan of the Walcheren expedition ; vast importance of it, . . 284
57. Reasons for preferring the Scheldt to the Peninsula, . . . 285
58. Lord Castlereagh's early Cabinet Memorandum regarding a Walcheren
expedition in 1807 and 1808, ..... 287
59. The Cabinet hesitates, and requires the opinion of military men on the
subject, ........ 289
60. Great delay of the Cabinet in making up their mind on the subject, 290
61. Immense force employed at last on the expedition, . . . 291
62. French forces there, and defenceless state of Antwerp, . . 292
63. Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Lord Chatham for the conduct of the
expedition, ... ... 293
64. The troops at length embark, and reach the coast of Holland, . 295
65. First successes, ....... 296
66. Ruinous halt of the British army to besiege Flushing, which is taken, 298
67. Steps and letters of Napoleon on hearing of the expedition, . . 299
68. Napoleon's plan of defence of the Scheldt, . . . . 300
69. Ease with which Antwerp might have been taken at first, and even after
the fall of Flushing, ...... 302
70. Arrival of the British at Batz, and abandonment of the advance, . 303
71. Rejoicings at Antwerp, and vainglorious boasting of Bernadotte, . 304
72. Rapid and fatal progress of the Walcheren fever, which compels the eva-
cuation of the island, ...... 305
73. Cause of the failure of the expedition, ..... 306
74. Great dissatisfaction in England at the failure of the expedition, . 308
75. Intrigue in t^ie Cabinet to overturn Lord Castlereagh, . . 309
76. Lord Castlereagh challenges Mr Canning, who is wounded, and they both
resign, ........ 311
77. Mr Canning's conduct was unjustifiable, though the duel was equally so, 312
CONTENTS. xvii
Page
78. Resume" of Lord Castlereagh's achievements at the War Office, . 313
79. Real causes of this decision of the Cabinet ; Lord Castlereagh was in
advance of the age, . . . . . . 315
80. Causes of the general distrust of Lord Castlereagh at this time, . 316
CHAPTER IV.
SIR CHARLES STEWART FROM HIS SERVICE WITH THE EXPEDITION TO THE
HELDER IN 1V99, TO HIS RECEIVING THE THANKS OF PARLIAMENT IN 1809.
1. Resume" of Sir Charles Stewart's life from 1798, . . . 318
2. His services in 1799 in Holland, ..... 318
3. He is appointed Aide-de-Camp to the King, and Under-Secretary of State
for Ireland, . . • • f t . » ;. . . . 319
4. First operations in Portugal, . . . . 320
5. His advance into Spain with Sir John Moore, . . . 321
6. Gallant actions near Sahagun, and retreat of the army towards
Galicia, . ' . . . , . . . 322
7. Gallant action near Benavente, ..... 323
8. Disastrous march to Corunna, . , . ; .. -•. . 324
9. Horrors of the retreat, . » • ' . . . . • ' ,. • . 325
1 0. Battle offered at Lugo, and march to Corunna, . . . 326
11. Arrival of the army at Corunna, . . . . . 327
12. Preparation for the battle of Corunna, . . *. •. . 328
13. Battle of Corunna, . . . ... . . 329
14. General Stewart sails to Lisbon as Adjutant-General of Sir A. Wellesley's
army, . . . . . . - . . 330
15. State of affairs when he landed in Portugal, . . . . - 331
16. Universal joy in Lisbon on their arrival, . . . v 331
17. Advance to the Douro, ... . . 332
18. Soult's incipient revolt against Napoleon, .... 333
19. Its reception by Napoleon and Sir A. Wellesley, . . . 333
20. Advance of Sir A. Wellesley to the Douro, . . . .334
21. Passage of the Douro, . . . . . . 335
22. Pursuit of the French out of Portugal, . . . . 336
23. Operations in Spain are determined on with Cuesta, . . . 337
24. Plan of operations, . . . . . . . . 338
25. Interview with Cuesta, and appearance of the Spanish army, . . 339
26. Advance to Talavera, and preparations for a battle there, ... . 340
27. The French forces unite, and again approach Talavera, . . 341
28. Position of the troops at Talavera, . . « ',;'» . • . 342
29. Bloody combat on the evening of the 27th July, . . ..' 343
SO. Battle of Talavera, . . ... . . . 344
31. Desperate attack of the French on the centre and right, . . 345
32. Victory of the British, . . . „ •• . .,..•• . 346
33. Results of the battle, . . . ...... .346
34. Picturesque anecdotes during the battle, . . . . . 347
35. Position of the British army after the battle, . . . . . 348
XV1I1 CONTENTS.
§ Pags
36. Cuesta abandons the British wounded, .... 349
37. Sir Arthur retreats by the bridge of Arzobispo to the south of the
Tagus, . . . ... . 350
38. Noble conduct of Sir A. Wellesley, ..... 351
39. Continued disasters of the Spaniards, and retreat of the British into the
valley of the Guadiana, ...... 352
40. Return of General Stewart on leave to England, . . . 353
41. General Stewart's exposition of Sir A. Wellesley's plans, . . 354
42. Thanks of the House of Commons to General Stewart, . « 356
43. General Stewart's answer, .'..'.. 357
44. He is made a Knight of the Bath, . . . . 358
45. Rapid rise of General Stewart, owing mainly to his ability and good con-
duct, . . . . . . . 358
CHAPTER V.
FROM THE RETURN OF GENERAL STEWART TO THE PENINSULAR ARMY IN MARCH
1810, TO THE EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH FROM PORTUGAL.
1. State of the Peninsula when General Stewart returned to it in March 1810, 359
2. Disasters in Spain which had led to the new position taken by Wellington, 360
3. Improved condition of the British army, .... 361
4. Lord Wellington's position and prospects at this time, . . 362
5. Position and strength of the French forces, .... 362
6. Desponding feelings in the army, ..... 363
7. Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo by the French, . . .364
8. Unsuccessful skirmish of advanced posts, .... 366
9. Severe fight with Craufurd's division, . . . . . 367
10. Results of the combat, and siege of Almeida, .... 368
11. Siege and fall of Almeida, ...... 369
12. Gloomy aspect of affairs in the British army, .... 371
13. Political difficulties of Wellington's situation, .... 372
14. Massena, by Napoleon's positive orders, invades Portugal, . . 373
15. Approach of both armies to Busaco, . . . . 374
16. Description of the position of Busaco, ..... 374
17. Massena is goaded on to attack, ..... 376
18. Battle of Busaco, ....... 376
19. Defeat of the attack on the British left, .... 377
20. Results of the battle on both sides, ..... 378
21. Great service of Sir Charles Stewart in this battle, . . . 379
22. Massena turns the British position, ..... 380
23. Wellington retires to Torres Vedras, .... „••« 381
24. Horrors of the retreat, ...... yi 382
25. Sir Charles Stewart's description of the lines of Torres Vedras, . 383
26. Description of the first line, . . . . . .383
27. Weak points of the line, ...... 385
28. Massena resolves to blockade the lines only, .... 386
29. Improved situation of Wellington, ..... 387
CONTENTS. XIX
| Page
30. Depressed condition of the French army, .... 388
31. Wellington's foresight of Massena's designs, .... 389
32. Movements of Wellington on the retreat of the French, . . 391
33. Wellington declines to attack Massena at Santarem, . . . 391
34. Improved health and spirits of the troops, .... 392
35. Wretched condition of the French army, .... 393
36. Wellington's difficulties, . . . . . . 394
37. Firmness of Wellington at this juncture, .... 395
38. Napoleon's plan for a fresh invasion of Portugal, . . . 396
39. Massena's difficulties as to crossing the Tagus, . . . 397
40. Soult's operations in Andalusia, ..... 397
41. Great successes of Soult in Estremadura, .... 398
42. Napoleon's order to Massena at this period, .... 399
43. Operations of the French and English for crossing the Tagus, . 400
44. Massena's retreat, . . . . . 401
45. Gloomy state of the British army at this period, . . . 401
46. First operations of Wellington in pursuit, .... 403
47. Action at Eedinha, ....... 403
48. Which is carried by the Allies, ..... 404
49. Continuance of the retreat, . . . . » :" .'< 405
50. Combat at the bridge of the Ceira, . .. . . . . 405
51. Continuance of the retreat across the Ceira, . . ; . • 406
52. Difficulties of the pursuit, . . -." , ..•; « 407
53. Concluding combat at Sabugal, : .. . . . '• . . 407
54. State of the French army when it re-entered Spain, . . .409
55. Material losses of the French army during the campaign, . . 410
56. Wellington's views of the campaign, and share Sir Charles Stewart had
in it, \ . ' . . . ... . .. . . . 410
CHAPTER VI.
SIR CHARLES STEWART, FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL IN
MAT 1811, TO THE FALL OF CIUDAD HODRIGO AND HIS RETURN TO ENGLAND
IN JANUARY 1812.
1. Renewed plan for the invasion of Portugal, . ;» /j * - • 412
2. Wellington's movements to regain Badajos, . ... :'••;•' * 413
3. Wellington undertakes the siege of Badajos, . . -•,••• . 414
4. Position of the troops covering the blockade of Almeida, . . 415
5. Description of Fuentes d'Onore, . ...'./> . . » 416
6. Massena's reasons for resuming the offensive, . . . .* 417
7. Necessity of relieving Almeida and Badajos, . '.&>:•, . - '.' 418
8. Forces on both sides, . . . > - •"•" • • 418
9. Attack of Massena on Fuentes d'Onore, . . .* . 419
10. Arrival of the Imperial Guard, and renewal of the battle, . . 421
11. Preparations for battle on the 5th by Wellington, . . • 422
12. Battle of Fuentes d'Onore, . . . r .
13. Desperate conflict in Fuentea d'Onore, . » . - 424
XX CONTENTS.
§ Page
14. Massena retreats without a further attack, .... 425
15. Lord Londonderry's reflections on this battle, . . . 426
16. This was a turning-point in Sir Charles Stewart's fortunes, . . 427
17. Massena's orders to Brennier to evacuate Almeida, . . . 428
18. Blowing up of Almeida, and escape of Brennier, . . . 429
19. Wellington despatches troops and stores for Estremadura, . . 431
20. Operations for the first siege of Badajos, . . . . 432
21. Progress of the siege, which is suspended, . . . 433
22. Forces on both sides, . . . . '•• '. . 434
23. Description of the field of battle, ..... 435
24. Battle of Albuera, . . . . . . 436
25. Gallant attack of Stewart's division, ..... 437
26. Gallant advance of Houghton's brigade, .... 438
27. Glorious charge of the Fusilier brigade under Cole, which regains the day, 439
28. Victory of the British', . . . . . . .440
29. Results of the battle on both sides, ..... 441
30. Soult retires to Llerena, and Beresford resumes the siege of Badajos, 442
31. Siege-train of Wellington, and stores, ..... 443
32. Description of Badajos, ...... 444
33. Fort St Christoval, . . . . . 444
34. Commencement of the siege, ...... 445
35. Repulse of the storm of Fort St Christoval, .... 446
36. A second assault on Fort Christoval is resolved on, . . . 447
37. Second assault of St Christoval, which is repulsed, . . .447
38. Raising of the siege, and forces on both sides, . . .448
39. Wellington offers battle to Soult and Marmont, which is declined, . 449
40. The French generals decline the conflict, .... 450
41. Both armies are put into cantonments, .... 450
42. Habits of the army when in these cantonments, . . . 451
43. Movement of the army to new cantonments on the Tagus, its reinforce-
ment, and plan of operations, . . . . 452
44. Ciudad Rodrigo is revictualled, and Wellington establishes a distant
blockade, ........ 453
45. Marmont resolves to re victual Ciudad Rodrigo, . . . 453
46. Wellington's preparations, and advance of the enemy, who relieve Ciudad
Rodrigo, . . . . . . . 455
47. Approach to El Bodon, ...... 456
48. Sir Charles Stewart's account of the action, .... 456
49. Glorious cavalry action under Alten and Sir Charles Stewart, . 457
50. Retreat of the British to Guinaldo, and their dangerous position, . 458
51. Splendid appearance of the French army here collected, . . 459
52. Marmont declines battle, . . . . . . 460
53. Retreat of the British, and its reasons, .... 461
54. Retreat of the British, and assembling of their whole army, . . 461
55. The French decline the conflict, ..... 462
56. The French go into winter-quarters, ..... 463
57. Wellington's projects at this time, ..... 464
58. Brilliant success of General Hill at Aroyo de los Molinos, . . 464
59. Wellington approaches Ciudad Rodrigo, .... 466
60. Dislocation of the French armies in Spain, .... 466
61. Investment of Ciudad Rodrigo and its difficulties, . . . 467
CONTENTS. XXI
§ Page
62. Description of the fortress, ...... 468
63. Wellington resolves on an attack on the place, . . . 469
64. Storm of the greater Teson, ...... 470
65. Rapid progress of the siege, . • . . . . . . 470
66. The rampart is breached from a distance, . . . .472
67. Splendid appearance of the bombardment, .... 472
68. A practicable breach is made, ...... 473
69. Plan of the assault, ....... 474
70. Aspect of the trenches before the assault, .... 476
71. The assault of the place, ...... 477
72. Fearful disorders after the place was taken, .... 478
73. Great results of this conquest, . . . . . . 479
74. Both armies are placed in cantonments, .... 479
75. Return to Britain of Sir Charles Stewart, and death of Lady Stewart, 480
CHAPTER VII.
LORD CASTLEREAGH, FROM HIS RESIGNATION OF OFFICE IN SEPTEMBER 1809, TO
THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR IN MARCH 1813.
1. Important career of Lord Castlereagh when out of office in Parliament, 482
2. Regency question, ....... 483
3-5. Lord Castlereagh's speech in support of the restrictions, . 484, 486
6. Ferment in the country against the Peninsular war, . . . 487
7-11. Lord Castlereagh's speech on the Spanish war of 1809, .-•-.-'• . 488-493
12. Growing despondence on the Peninsular war in the country, . 494
13. Grounds of Lord Castlereagh and Wellington's confidence in the war in
the Peninsula, . ' -. •. ; . . . 495
14. Immense difficulty of getting specie for the British army, . ' . 497
15. Appointment of the Bullion Committee, . . 'l •>». '•'-• ". 498
16. Bullion Report, . '.' . . . . -. •- ; '.499
17. Mr Vansittart's counter-resolutions, . . • . ^ . . 500
18-29. Lord Castlereagh's argument against the Bullion Report, . . 501-512
30. Result of the debate, . . . . . .512
31. Reflections on this speech, . . : . - .' . ' ; v 513
32. WThat if the report of the committee had been adopted, . . 514
33. 34. Lord Castlereagh's speech on the battle of Albuera, . 515, 516
35. Great distress in Great Britain at this time, . . . v 517
36. The Orders in Council issued by the British Government, . . 518
37. Their disastrous effects in Great Britain, . . •.<•' . 519
38. Effect of the American Non-intercourse Act, . V • . ' •' • • . 520
39. Events which led to Lord Castlereagh being appointed Foreign Secretary, 521
40. Assassination of Mr Perceval, . . . . : . . 521
41. Debate on the Orders in Council, .'• V ;•» '• ,: . 523
42-44. Lord Castlereagh's reply, . .' » •" -•.•• •„ .524-526
45. Repeal of the Orders in Council, V "V • »• . ' . 527
46. Situation of Europe when Lord Castlereagh returned to power, . 528
47. Great change produced by Lord Castlereagh's accession to office, . 529
48. Forces of Great Britain at this time, and their distribution, . . 530
XX11 CONTENTS.
§ Pag«
49. Military forces at Wellington's disposal, and Lord Castlereagh's great
efforts to increase it, "•.'. . . ". . . 531
50. Napoleon's proposals of peace to Britain, and Lord Castlereagh's answer, 531
51. Lord Castlereagh's cautious policy as to Italy, .... 533
52. Diplomatic relations with Russia, ..... 534
63. Treaty between Russia and Turkey, ..... 535
54. Lord Castlereagh's efforts to effect a treaty between Sweden and Russia, 537
55. Peace with Sweden on condition of her getting Norway, . . 538
56. Chances of the approaching Russian campaign, . . . 539
57. Alexander's half promise of the throne of France to Bernadotte, . 541
CHAPTER VIII.
FROM THE APPOINTMENT OP SIR CHARLES STEWART AS MINISTER AT THE COURT
OF PRUSSIA IN MARCH 1813, TO THE ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ IN JUNE FOL-
LOWING.
1. Opening of the year 1813, and aspect of Germany, . . . 542
2. Situation of Germany, and treaties with Prussia at this period by Great
Britain, < ....... 543
3. Sir Charles Stewart's important services with the Government, . 544
4. Requirements of a diplomatic envoy to the Court of Prussia, . . 545
5. Sir Charles Stewart combined all the requisites, . . .545
6. Situation of the French and Allied armies at this period, . . 546
7. Lord Walpole's secret mission to Vienna, and views of Austria at this
period, ........ 548
8. Sir Charles Stewart lands in Prussia; feelings of the people, . . 548
9. Schwartzenberg's mission to Paris, ..... 549
10. Conference of Maret and Schwartzenberg, .... 550
11. Aspect of affairs at Vienna, ...... 551
12. Secret negotiation between Austria and the King of Saxony, . . 552
13. Secret negotiation with Bavaria, ..... 553
14. Napoleon's proposals to Austria, ..... 554
15. 16. Secret conferences of M. de Narbonne with Metternich, . 554, 555
17. Conclusion of this conference, . . . . . 556
18. Answer of Metternich to Napoleon's proposals to Austria, . . 557
19. Positions of the French and Allied armies at this period, when Sir Charles
Stewart joined the Allied headquarters, .... 558
20. Forces of Napoleon, ....... 559
21. Forces and positions of the Allies, ..... 561
22. Accession of Bernadotte to the Confederacy, . . . .561
23. Sir Charles Stewart's first steps in Germany, .... 563
24. Offers to surrender Spandau for bribes, ..... 563
25. State of affairs at Dresden on Sir Charles's arrival, . . . 564
26. Interview of Sir Charles Stewart with the King of Prussia, . . 566
27. Death of Kutusoff, and forward movement of the Allies towards Leipsic, 567
28. New commercial tariff, and conclusion of a treaty of alliance with Russia
and Prussia, ..... . . 668
CONTENTS. XX111
§ Page
29. Mutual advance of the opposite armies, .... 569
30. Combat of Weissenfels, and death, of Bessieres, . . . 570
31. Movements before battle of LUtzen, ..... 571
32. Battle of LUtzen, . ... . . . .573
33. Leipsic is carried bj the French, ..... 574
34. Success of the Allies on the French right, and desperate conflicts there, 675
35. Great successes of the Allies in the five villages, . . . 577
36. Crisis of the battle, which turns to the advantage of the French, . 578
37. Last effort of Napoleon, which arrested the Allies, . . . 578
38. The Allies resolve to retreat, and Blucher's nocturnal irruptions into
Marmont's lines, ....... £80
39. Results of the battle, and forces on both sides, . . . 581
40. Retreat of the Allies to Dresden, . . . .» .583
41. The Allies resolve to retire to Bautzen : its strategic advantages, . 584
42. Evacuation of Dresden by the Allies, and its entry by the French, . 585
43. Stern reception of the magistrates by Napoleon, . . : • . . 585
44. Passage of the Elbe by the French, . . . . - . 586
45. The King of Saxony is reconciled to Napoleon, .. . . 587
46. Bolder tone assumed with the Cabinet of Vienna, . . . 588
47. Metternich's proposals on hearing of the battle of LUtzen, . - . .. 589
48. Metternich's proposals for a general peace, . . .,».,. . 590
49. Which are repudiated with scorn by Napoleon, . .. , . 591
50. Secret despatch of Stackelberg to Nesselrode intercepted, . . 591
51. Napoleon's change of plan in consequence of this discovery, . . 592
52. Napoleon's immense preparations for the prosecution of the war, . 593
53. His measures to augment the reserve on the Rhine, . . . 594
54. His vast measures for fortifying and strengthening the Elbe, . 595
55. Forces of the Allies, ....... 595
56. Force and position of the Allies at Bautzen, .... 596
57. Advance and composition of the French army, . . . 597
68. Napoleon's reception of the Austrian proposals, . . . 597
59. Opening of a direct negotiation between France and Russia, . . 598
60. Combat of Konigswartha, and defeat of the French, . . . 599
61. Description of the field of battle by Sir Charles Stewart, . . 600
62. French force, and plan of attack, ^ . . . 601
63. Commencement of the battle and progress of the French on the Allied
left, . . . . . ....'. . , 602
64. Progress of the action on the Allied right and centre, . . 603
65. Renewal of the battle on the day following, . ... ;>. .. . . 604
66. Decisive attack of Ney with the French left wing on the Allied right, 605
67. Final and decisive attack of Ney and Marmont upon Blucher, . 606
68. Napoleon's movements in pursuit of the Allies, ... . . 607
69. Sir Charles Stewart's description of the retreat, . . . 607
70. Combats during the retreat, . . , ., ,.. . . . 608
71. Death of Duroc, . . V. . " , . .... 609
72. Napoleon's last conversation with him, . . . ...» 610
73. Continuation of the retreat, and combat at Haynau, . . ,» 611
74. The Allies move towards Bohemia, . .• , . . • 612
75. Reasons which led both parties at this period to desire an armistice, . 613
76. Reasons against it ; but it is at length concluded, . - •• 614
77. An armistice is agreed to by both parties, • , .. • • «• ^15
XXIV CONTENTS.
§ Page
78. Conclusion of an armistice, . .:'* . . . . 616
79. Further discussions of Napoleon direct with Austria, . . . 617
80. Conclusion of the armistice of Pleswitz, - • ," •. . . 618
81. Thiers's reflections on this armistice, . . . .' 619
82. Review of the Allied army, . . . . . .620
83. Honour conferred on Sir R. Wilson, . . . . . 620
CHAPTER IX.
V
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. JUNE 4 — AUGUST 18, 1813.
1. Vast importance of the matters treated at the Congress of Prague, . 622
2. Sincerity of Austria and her views, ..... 623
3. Forces of Russia and Prussia, ...... 623
4. Great advantages which this state of affairs gave to Napoleon, . 624
5. Lord Castlereagh's view of the alliance, . 625
6. Importance of Bernadotte to the alliance, .... 626
7. His equivocal attitude towards the Allies, .... 627
8. Sir Charles Stewart's account of him in his published work, . . 629
9. His private correspondence on the subject, .... 630
10. His real views and designs, ...... 632
11. His real and secret views at this period, .... 635
12. State of negotiations at Prague, ..... 636
13. Napoleon's line of policy in consequence, .... 637
14. Preliminary difficulties in point of form stated by France, . . 638
15. The Emperor Francis comes to Gitschin in Bohemia, and Metternich to
Dresden, ........ 639
16. Explicit explanation between Metternich and Nesselrode, . . 640
17. Napoleon's fresh delays, . . . . . .640
18. Signature of the Treaty of June 15, by England, Russia, and Prussia, 641
19. Sir Charles Stewart's efforts with Bernadotte renewed, . . 643
20. Interview of Metternich with the Allied sovereigns, . . . 644
21. Napoleon invites M. de Metternich to Dresden, . . . 645
22. Interview of Metternich with Maret, . . . . .646
23. Interview of Metternich with Napoleon, . . . 647
24. 25. Metternich's answer, ..... 648, 649
26, 27. Conferences continued, ..... 651, 652
28. Great sensation produced by this interview, .... 653
20. Renewal of the conference between Metternich and Maret, . . 654
30. News of the battle of Vitoria, and its great effect, . . . 656
81. Napoleon's reasons for fixing on the Elbe as his line of defence, . 657
32. Napoleon's measure for fortifying the Elbe at Koenigstein and Dresden, 658
33. His works at Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg, . . . 659
34. His measures regarding Hamburg and Werben, . . . 660
35. Immense exactions of Davoust at Hamburg, .... 661
36. Forces which Napoleon had collected by the middle of August, . 662
37. Plan of operations agreed on by the Allies at Trachenberg, . . 663
38. Forces of the Allies at the resumption of hostilities, . . . 664
CONTENTS. XXV
§ Page
39. Napoleon's plan of operations for the campaign, . . . 665
40. Plan of the campaign of the Allies, ..... 665
41. State of the negotiations with Austria, .... 666
42. Intrepid conduct of Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart in regard
to an Austrian subsidy, . . . . . .668
43. Change of policy on the part of Bernadotte, .... 670
44. Treacherous attack on the free corps of Lutzow and the poet Korner, 672
45. Sir Charles Stewart's gloomy views of the negotiations, . . 673
46. Napoleon's delay in sending plenipotentiaries to Prague, . . 674
47. Fresh difficulty raised by Napoleon as to the form of the conferences, 676
48. Secret conference of Metternich and Narbonne, . . . 677
49. M. de Narbonne in vain tries to persuade Napoleon of his danger, . 678
50. Napoleon goes to Mayence to meet the Empress, . . . 680
51. Final proposals of Austria, . . . . . 681
52. Noble conduct of M. de Caulaincourt, .... 682
53. Termination of the congress, and declaration of war by Austria against
France, ........ 683
54. Napoleon tries in vain to engage Austria in a further secret negotiation, 684
55. Fresh effort of M. de Caulaincourt to bring about a peace, . . 685
56. Last proposals of Napoleon, which are rejected by the Allies, . 685
57. Last effort of Caulaincourt to induce Napoleon to make peace, . 686
58. Enthusiasm of the Allies at the Austrian declaration of war, . . 686
59. Sir Charles Stewart's confidential conversation with Metternieh, . 687
60. Grand review of the Austrian army, . . . . .688
61. Advance of money to the Austrians by Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles
Stewart, ...... »/' . 689
62. Difficulties about a commander-in-chief, .... 690
63. French review, . . . . . ... . 691
64. Reflections on these conferences, . . . . .692
LIVES OF LORD CASTLEREAGH
SIR CHARLES STEWART,
CHAPTER I.
LINEAGE AND EAKLY LIFE OF LOED CASTLEEEAGH AND SIR
CHAELES STEWAET — IRISH REBELLION AND UNION.
THE family of Londonderry is a branch of the ancient CHAP.
one of Sir William Stewart of Garlies in Scotland, from
whom the Earls of Galloway in that country are alsoT. i- t
i f, Lineage of
descended. A younger son of that family, in the time of the London-
derry fa-
James I. of England, received a grant of land from that miiy.
monarch in the county of Donegal, and, in consequence,
settled on his estate of Balylawn Castle in Ireland. The
family during several generations became gradually en-
riched— partly by ability and prudence, partly by fortunate
marriages — insomuch that the representative of it, Alex-
ander Stewart of Mount Stewart, in the county of Down,
was elected member of Parliament for the city of Lon-
donderry in 1730. Robert Stewart of Balylawn Castle
was elevated to the peerage, on 18th November 1789,
by the title of Baron Stewart ; and was soon after created
Viscount Castlereagh on 6th October 1795, and Earl of
Londonderry on 9th August 1796. The family was
VOL. i. A
IRISH REBELLION
CHAP.
I.
1 Burke' s
Peerage,
race Lon-
donderry ;
Castlereagh
Corresp. i.
1-3.
2.
Family of
the first
Marquess.
2 Burke's
Peerage,
voce Lon-
donderry.
advanced a step farther iu the peerage by the elevation
of its head Robert, the father of the subject of this me-
moir, to the dignity of a marquess on 22d January 1816.
All these successive steps had been conferred by Tory
administrations ; so that, from political connections not
less than personal and traditional principle, they belonged
to the Conservative party in the State.1
Robert, the elder brother, who first succeeded to these
dignities on the decease of his father, was born on 1 8th
June 1769, the same year with the Duke of Wellington,
and on a day of the year destined to be rendered memor-
able by the battle of Waterloo. Charles William Vane, ;-'
the second son, came into the world on 18th May 1778.
The mother of the eldest was Sarah Frances, daughter
of Francis, Marquess of Hertford ; and of the second,
Frances, eldest daughter of Charles, first Earl Camden.
By his second marriage Lord Londonderry had no less
than eight children, of whom seven were daughters, many
of whom married into families of high rank. In parti-
cular, the eldest daughter, Frances Anne, married Lord
Charles Fitzroy ; Caroline, the second, married Thomas
Wood, Esq. of Garmost, M.P. for the county of Brecon ;
Georgiana, the third, married George Canning, Esq.,
afterwards Lord Garvagh ; Emily Jane, the fifth, married
Viscount Hardinge, the celebrated Commander-in-chief
in India and in Great Britain ; and the sixth, Octavia,
married Edward, second Lord Ellenborough. Thus, both
by their -paternal and maternal descent, as well as by the
connections formed by their sisters, both brothers were
allied to families of high rank, many of them distinguished
by great public services. But it may with truth be said,
that they conferred more distinction by these alliances
than they received ; and that the proudest of their rela-
tions, ere long, were glad to refer to their connection
wit.h the Stewart family as the brightest jewel in their
coronets.2
Robert the father, the first marquess, was a man of
AND UNION.
a remarkably strong mind — sound, practical, and saga- CHAP.
cious. In addition to the honours bestowed on him by
the Crown, which were mainly on account of the eminent „ 3.
• i Till i i Character
services of his son, he added largely to the family fortune of the two
by his prudent and yet spirited management. The mothers childhood?
of both sons were women of ability — a peculiarity almost
always observable in those who have given birth to men
of distinction. From a very early period the character
of the two brothers exhibited a marked difference — a
circumstance which might be ascribed to their different
mothers, were it not that the same is often observed in
families where there has been only one father and mother,
and education and early circumstances have been exactly
the same. Young Lord Castlereagh was, from the first,
patient and persevering, firm in resolution, and unwaver-
ing in conduct, but with abilities which marked him out
for the highest destinies. Charles Vane, from his earliest
years, was bold, ardent, and impetuous ; high-spirited, but
generous ; quick in taking offence, but ready to forgive.
The future hero shone forth from the very first even in
his boyish actions. Yet though their characters were
thus different, the tenderest friendship existed between
them, which continued with the most eminent advantage
to both through the whole of life.
Charles Vane was sent at six years of age, by his
grandfather, Lord Cam den, to Eton, where he remained striking
eight years. A striking incident early in life evinced the Charles
peculiar character of the young man. In the month of '
June 1791, George^rst Earl of Waldegrave, one of the
scholars at Eton, was drowned in the Thames. He had not
completed his tenth year. He was an intimate friend and
companion of Stewart's ; and the following affecting ac-
count of the melancholy incident, and Stewart's conduct
on the occasion, was given in a letter to his father by
his tutor and intimate friend : — " Poor little Waldegrave
was buried yesterday. My dear friend Stewart had
nearly been drowned in attempting to save him. He
4 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, dived after him till he was very much exhausted, and
obliged to come to the bank to take breath. After a
J79i. little time he dived again, when he saw the body lying
at the bottom. The sight was nearly fatal to him ; for
such was his grief that he was deprived of his senses and
rose to the surface insensible, when he floated apparently
dead. He sank twice, and would inevitably have per-
ished also, had not Mr Charles Carter [who afterwards
kept boats at Eton], on the third occasion, by a great
effort, caught him by the hair, and dragged him into a
punt." In this courageous act and generous disregard of
self is to be recognised the same chivalrous spirit which,
in after days, headed the charge against the Imperial
Guard on the Esla, and strove to save the honour of
Christendom by effecting the liberation of Abd-el-Kader,
detained a prisoner in violation of his capitulation by
Louis Philippe.
His preference for the profession of arms, having, be-
He enters ^re the expiration of this period, become decided, he
inei7^.y entered the army on 3d April 1791 as ensign in the
108th Regiment. He was promoted to the rank of lieu-
tenant in the same regiment on 8th January 1793, and
received a company in it on 7th August 1794. His
quickness and intelligence in military matters having by
this time become known, he was in the same year ap-
pointed Deputy- Assistant Quartermaster-General to the
force under General Doyle, which landed on the Isle
Dieu in France, and subsequently joined the corps under
Lord Moira, which crossed from Ostend to the army
under the Duke of York, then actively engaged with
the French in Flanders. When this force was driven
out of the Low Countries, he was attached to General
Crawford's mission to the headquarters of the Austrian
army, which still kept the field on the left bank of the
Rhine, and was actively engaged in the early part of
1795. He then received his first wound, having been
struck by a musket-ball under the left eye, when bravely
AND UNION. 5
charging, at the head of some heavy Austrian cavalry, a CHAP.
detachment of French hussars by whom they were hard _
pressed. After the retreat of the Austrian army from 1795.
the Low Countries he returned to England, and was ap-
pointed aide-de-camp to his grandfather Lord Camden,
then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. On the 31st of July
1795 he succeeded to the majority of his regiment, then
numbered the 106th. After this his promotion was very
rapid. On 4th August 1796 he was appointed major of
the 5th Dragoons; and on 1st January 1797 he became
lieutenant-colonel of the same regiment. He was on duty
as aide-de-camp to Lord Camden in Dublin when the
insubordination broke out in that corps which led to its
being disbanded. But he immediately repaired to his
post, and his conduct in striving to check that disgraceful
mutiny was so meritorious, that it not only effaced, so far
as he was concerned, this calamitous event, but drew forth
the highest commendation from the Government and the
Commander-in-chief.* When the regiment was disbanded,
he was attached to the 18th Light Dragoons, at that time
a skeleton, but which afterwards, under his able direction,
became one of the most distinguished cavalry regiments
in the service.
As long as mankind shall esteem the destroyers of
their species more than their preservers, which will pro-
bably be to the end of the world, no human ability will
* " DEAR CHARLES, — I am surprised I should not have heard from you in
consequence of the strong measures which are about to take place in the 5th
Dragoons. In Lord Cornwallis's representation of their state of insubordination
and indiscipline he does you great justice, and says that, meritorious as your
conduct is, it is impossible that you, •with all the rest of the officers in
combination against you, can restore the regiment to discipline. I find it is
likely the regiment is to be broke, and I could not satisfy myself without in-
quiring from the Duke of York how the regiment was to stand. He means to
advise the King that it shall be broke, but that you shall remain on pay till
you are appointed to a lieutenant-colonelcy in another regiment of dragoons,
which will take place very soon. The Duke said that, so far from this event being
of any detriment to your military objects, your exertions have been very great,
and do you great credit. I thought it would be satisfactory to you to hear
this." — EARL CAMDEN to the HON. LIEUT.-COL. CHARLES STEWART, January
11, 1799 ; Castlereayh Correspondence, ii. 89.
6 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, be able to make the biography of statesmen and philo-
sophers so interesting to the majority of readers as that of
warriors. The reason is not so much that the human
mind in general is naturally inclined to cruelty, or takes
delight in tales of horror or suffering, as that those Mrho
ci^ilhbi°- are engaged in spreading such calamities among mankind
are necessarily exposed to greater vicissitudes of fortune,
and undergo more thrilling and heart-stirring adventures,
than those who, in the cool shade of peace and retire-
ment, cultivate the arts, or reflect on the truths which are
finally to bless or improve mankind. Plutarch's Lives
are almost entirely taken up with the warriors or con-
querors of antiquity ; and in modern times no biographies
are so popular, or produce so widespread and lasting an
impression, as those which, like Southey's Life of Nelson,
or Macaulay's sketch of Olive, portray the career of the
most successful warriors by sea or land. On this account
it is not to be expected that the life of Lord Castlereagh
can present so many heart-stirring incidents as that of
his brother, the fellow-soldier of Wellington and Blucher.
Yet there is an interest of no ordinary kind in tracing the
early development of a mind for whom great things were
destined, and seeing how the character was formed which
bridled Napoleon in the plenitude of his power, and res-
cued from slavery a suffering world.
If it be true, as has been often said, that the boy is the
chapter father of the man, it is of the highest importance to trace
LordeLon- out the records of early life which evince the first dispo-
lerry* sition of men who have played an important part on the
great theatre of the world. Owing to the unfortunate
loss by shipwreck of a great part of the Castlereagh
papers, and nearly all of those which relate to his early
life, the materials for such a picture in the case of the
elder brother are by no means abundant. Yet there is
enough to show that in his case the aphorism holds good,
and that the peculiar type of Lord Castlereagh's mind
AND UNION.
had become apparent at a very early period of life. CHAP.
His father was a bright example of every manly and L
Christian virtue. In domestic life he exhibited an in- 1797
tegrity of character and sweetness of disposition which
early communicated itself to his offspring. Never was a
family more united, happier in themselves, or that re-
tained those feelings more completely through life, than
that of the first Lord Londonderry. Tenderly attached
to all his children, he was especially so to his eldest
son Robert, who, on himself being advanced to the
rank of an earl in 1797, became Viscount Castlereagh.
He was, literally speaking, the delight and pride of his
later days. For his conduct, both in public and private,
Lord Castlereagh had in his father the best model of a
true patriot. His kindness and benevolence to the poor
of all descriptions around his residence, and especially on
his own estate, was unbounded, and shone forth with pecu-
liar lustre during the severe scarcity of 1799 and 1800.
Large quantities of provisions were then imported by
him from distant places, and retailed at a nominal price
at his own town of Newton-Ards. It was thus alone
that great numbers were preserved from perishing of
famine. His public charities were on the largest scale,
and much beyond what is usual with persons of his for-
tune. In gifts to the Presbyterian meeting-house in his
neighbourhood he expended £250 a-year. To give work
to the labouring poor, he always employed an extra and
unnecessary number of hands in his grounds both summer
and winter. With his tenantry he established relations
so kindly that they almost amounted to the concession of
the tenant right, so much the object of contention in
subsequent times. On one occasion he voluntarily reduced
the rental of a small part only of his estate in the Ards,
on a representation that they were too high, £900 a-year. x
It may easily be believed that with these dispositions hereaghcor-
was adored by his tenantry and all the poor, of whatever 72?'
persuasion and creed, in his neighbourhood.1 As a senator,
8 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, his conduct was equally honourable and patriotic. In
L the several parliaments in which he sat as a representa-
1786. tive, his conduct was regulated on every occasion by the
purest motives and the most scrupulous regard to integrity.
Young Robert Stewart, who will be called by his his-
o •*
Nobie'anec- torical name of LORD CASTLEREAGH, inherited all his
imi Castie- father's benevolence of heart and sweetness of disposition,
reaghon but with that, as in his brother Charles, was united a
Strangford '
ixjugh. firmness and resolution of character which nothing could
use. ' either ruffle or intimidate. Of the latter feature in his
character, a memorable instance occurred in early youth.
He received the rudiments of his education at a public
school in Armagh. While there, on the 5th August
1786, he went out alone in a boat, with a schoolfellow,
Henry Sturrock, a boy of twelve years of age — Castle-
reagh being just turned of seventeen — to sail on Strang-
ford Lough. When at the distance of three miles from
the shore, the boat was upset by a sudden squall of
wind. Lord Castlereagh was a very indifferent swim-
mer ; little Sturrock was utterly ignorant of that art,
and incapable of supporting himself a moment on the
surface. When they were thrown into the water, Castle-
reagh got hold of his young friend ; and such was his
fortitude and presence of mind, that he contrived to
keep both himself and the boy above water for more
than an hour, at the end of which time they were
picked up by the Rev. Mr Cleland and Mr Sturrock, the
young boy's father, who, missing the boat on the beach,
put off to their assistance. When taken up, Castlereagh
had lost the use of his limbs from the cold of the water,
and was nearly blind; but his right hand still firmly
> Come, ch. grasped little Sturrock, who was totally senseless. This
reagrSr- interesting and characteristic anecdote is commemorated
re.p.i.4,5. jn an inscription upon a picture of the Lough of Strang-
ford in the " Temple of the Winds," at the family-seat.1*
* This inscription, placed by the first Lord Londonderry, is in these terms :
" This view of Strangford Lough is for ever memorable for the providential
AND UNION.
It is very remarkable that an incident of precisely the CHAP.
same character, as already mentioned, marked the opening
of life in young Charles Stewart at a still earlier period. 1786.
In the autumn of 1786 Lord Qastlereagh was sent to g
St John's College, Cambridge, under the tuition of the His early
Rev. Mr Pearce, afterwards Dean of Ely. When there, bridge,
says Dr Bushby, " That he applied himself with great
diligence and success to the appointed studies of that
place, appears from his recorded positions in the classes
after every examination. In that college, an examination
of the students took place every half-year, in the ele-
ments of mathematics, in certain portions of classical
authors, and in logic and moral philosophy. Mr Stewart's
name was among the first on every occasion ; and, at
the third examination, in December 1787, being the last
which he passed, he was the first in the first class. . . .
I have not been able to ascertain the cause why he left
college so soon — whether it was to travel abroad, or that
some opportunity was offered in Ireland for his entering
Parliament. I have inquired of a good many persons
who remember him here, and they all agree in the same
account of him, testifying as to his gentlemanly appearance
and manners, his diligence in study, and the propriety of
his conduct in all respects. . . . His most intimate
and almost inseparable companion was the present Mar-
quess of Bristol, who was also greatly distinguished as a
escape, on August 5, 1786, of Robert Stewart, aged seventeen years, and of
Henry Sturrock, a boy of twelve, who, sailing on the lake, and being overset in
a thunderstorm nearly three miles from the shore, floated on the water more
than an hour, till they were taken up in a boat by the activity and collected
conduct of the Rev. Mr Cleland, who happened to accompany the Rev. Mr
Sturrock to the Temple, and missing their vessel, fled to the beach, put off
to their assistance, and saved them as they were in the instant of perish-
ing. Robert Stewart had lost the po^er of his limbs, from the coldness of
the water, and almost his sight. Henry Sturrock was totally senseless :
the former an indifferent swimmer — the latter never swam before in his
life, and, when he attempted it after his recovery, was found incapable of sup-
porting himself a moment on the surface. Let not these particulars of a deliver-
ance almost miraculous pass without just emotions of gratitude to the Almighty
Preserver, and let it teach a due reliance on His Providence in the greatest of
dangers." — Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 4, 5.
10 1TUSH REBELLION
CHAP, reading man in that year* All contemporary accounts
L _ from his college friends agree in the same character.
1786. A picture of his mind at that period, still more curious
and interesting, is yet extant in several letters to a near
iDrBughbyand dear female relative and friend much more advanced
LoJdol *n 7ears > some °f wnich» without violating the confidence
!le7^nAug- ever due to domestic and private communications, may,
o, 1840; . . , ,.
Castiereagh without impropriety, be given to the world as the earliest
^on-esj . recor(jg Q£. ^e opening of a mind destined to do such
great things in after life.1*
The reason of Lord Castiereagh being taken from col-
His travels lege at the early age of eighteen, was the anxiety of his
i£? father to secure for him a place in the Irish Parliament
— an entrance into which was anticipated for his own
county at no distant period. In the mean time he was
sent to make the grand tour, then, as now, considered with
justice as an indispensable requisite for the completion of
the education and forming the manners of any young man
intended for public life. In 1788 and 1789, accordingly,
he went abroad and visited Paris, Geneva, Rome, Vienna,
and the principal European cities. Neither the studies
and habits of Cambridge, however, nor the attractions of
the highest foreign society to which his rank, fine figure,
* " LORD CASTLEREAGH [aged seventeen] to LADY E. PRATT.
" October 28, 1786.
" MY DEAREST LADY ELIZABETH, — Being now completely settled at St John's,
Cambridge, I sit down, this being the first night I ever spent in my own house,
to thank you for your letter and neckcloths. As I know you wish to hear
something of the reception we met with at Sudbourne (Lord Hertford's), I have
the pleasure to tell you it was everything we could wish. Lord H. received
us most cordially. The first day, when we arrived, we found him in the par-
lour. After sitting some time, my father and I went upstairs to take off our
boots. When we came down, we found dinner on the table, and Lady Horatio
Lincoln and Elizabeth in the room. Lord H. did not introduce us to any of
them, so that we sat the whole time of dinner in the most formal manner you
can imagine. For my own part, if I had been ever so well inclined to speak
to them, I did not in the least know who they were : so that we sat in pro-
found silence. However, after dinner, that formality wore off, and we were
all very soon acquainted."
" HOLYHEAD, Wednesday, 28th May 1787.
" As soon as we got into Wales, such was the enchantment that we could
hardly force ourselves through it. We passed four days in it delicioxisly :
the weather has been charming, and the country in its highest beauty. We
AND UNION. 11
and elegant manners, gave him an easy entrance, diverted CHAP.
his mind from politics, to which he evinced an early and
unmistakable propensity. Instead of joining in the usual 1788.
pleasures or amusements of his age and rank, he was
continually studying the newspapers, devouring the de-
bates in Parliament, and watching with intense anxiety,
in common with the whole civilised world, the progress
of the French Revolution, the deceitful dawn of which
was beginning to be overcast with clouds. Above all, he
evinced on all occasions the most earnest solicitude for
the amelioration of the institutions of his own country,
then overloaded with the abuses which ever attend the
representative system among a people not fitted for its
reception. There exists a most valuable letter of his to
a confidential friend in January 1793, throwing an im-
portant light upon the condition of Ireland at that period,1
and the reasons which rendered Lord Castlereagh
ardent a supporter of a parliamentary reform in Ireland
next morniug breakfasted in Llangollen, passing through that heavenly
country along the banks of the Dee. It was more divine a thousand times
than when I travelled it before. I went to inquire after Miss Butler and Miss
H. : they desired to see us, and we went and stayed three or four hours with
them. Our reception was the kindest possible. They inquired particularly
for you and Lord C. They were attached to you, they told me, at first sight,
and wish much for your return. We left them with regret, very much enter-
tained with the singularity of their mode of thinking, and surprised, as you
were, with their perfect ease and unaffected manner with strangers. We stayed
long on Penmaen-Mawr, till we were worn out, rolling great stones down that
immense precipice. Nothing can be more magnificent than seeing them bound-
ing down, till at last all dashed to dust."
" BIRMINGHAM, Friday niyht, 1787.
"We went two miles to-day out of our way to see Shakespeare's tomb. I
was well repaid. On it is this inscription : —
" ' Stay, Passenger ! Why goest thov by so fast ?
Read, if thov canst, whom enviovs Death hath plast
Within this monvment : Shakspeare ; with whome
Quick natvre dide : whose name doth deck ys Tombo
Far more than cost ; sieth all yt he hath writt
Leaves living art bvt page to serve his witt.
Obiit 23 April 1616 ; set. 53.'
" I have still some faint hopes left that this was the production of some
Irish friend ; for much as 1 am inclined to love this country's generosity, I
have not so far expanded my heart as to incline to share that most unrivalled
figure of speech with you." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to LADY ELIZABETH PRATT,
Birmingham, Friday night, April 14, 1793.
12
IRISH REBELLION
CHAP.
I.
1790.
11.
coiitest in
the county
of Down.
July 1790.
and the union with Great Britain. It is now for the first
time given to the public. *
The marked predilection for political life which Lord
Castlereagh evinced, and those abilities for the discharge of
its duties, which were conspicuous in his character, in-
duced his father to take the earliest opportunity of bring-
ing him into Parliament, which at that time, to natives
of Ireland, was the one sitting in College Green, Dublin.
An opening occurred ere long in his own county, that of
* " DUBLIN, 26</i January 1793.
" MY DEAREST LORD,— I have been in some measure remiss in fulfilling my
promise. My father wrote so fully to you on the politics of Ireland that I
can only afford a repetition of his statements. By your letter of the 20th to
him, which arrived last night, it is plain the news of our most important
proceedings have not reached you. When they do, they will prove that
your speculations in regard to the probable result of our session have not
been well founded ; for it is now evident that, so far from reform in general
meeting with resistance, and particularly that of the representation, from
the Parliament of this country, the whole is in train ; and the latter espe-
cially supported by those immediately interested in resisting it — I mean the
great borough proprietors. This, my dear Lord, is sufficient to show that
your ideas upon Irish politics, though abstractly sound, are not the result
of an accurate local knowledge of the country. Most assuredly you cannot
entertain stronger ideas on the wisdom of resisting all changes than those
gentlemen have uniformly done, and, added to an equal disposition, they
have the most weighty of all inducements to decide their opposition — viz.,
personal interest. Yet these old sages have discovered that reform is a
wise and necessary measure ; and they, very prudently, would rather effect
it themselves than let others plunge the country in confusion, or suffer the
work to fall into other hands. Depend upon it, my dear Lord C., you must
change your system with respect to Ireland ; there is no alternative, now her
independence is admitted, but to govern her by reason, or unite her to Great
Britain by force. A middle path will not do. A government of gross cor-
ruption— for it is not a government of influence — extinguishing every possi-
bility of parliamentary authority, will be no longer quietly endured. Give
Ireland such a government as your own. When she abuses it, depend upon
it you will then find a union a much more practicable measure ; but as to con-
tinuing the present system, depend upon it it is no longer possible. Those
whose daily bread is the corruption complained of, think so ; is not that suffi-
cient proof? It would require less force to unite the two kingdoms than to
govern as heretofore. In the former case a short struggle might effect it, but
in the latter it will require a perpetual military coercion ; therefore, let them,
if they will, run riot for a little time. I myself hope that this will not be the
case, although there is certainly more danger than there would have been had
the concession taken place some years sooner. But, at all events, let their
misconduct, not their reasonable demands, be the ground of forcible inter-
ference. Under the spirit of the constitution they are justified in demanding
change. When they have power they may abuse it — so may you ; but when
they are wild enough to do so, then your correction may be more reasonably
AND UNION. 13
Down, in the north of Ireland, which led to an election CHAP-
contest of the severest kind, attended with important and L_
lasting consequences to the Stewart family. That great 17y0'
county had been hitherto mainly in the hands of the Mar-
quess of Downshire, whose family have there extensive
estates ; and that nobleman was desirous, when an elec-
tion occurred in July 1790, of securing both seats for his
nominee. This attempt was resisted by the Independent
proprietors, who were anxious to emancipate the country
applied. I am afraid the question for your decision now is (what I always
imagined it would be on the first critical occasion that presented itself) not
what instructions you should send to Mr Hobert,* but what orders to my Lord
Howe — provided it is your determination to resist and not to guide the storm.
I am sure if that moment has not yet arrived it is not far distant ; for I doubt
exceedingly whether even your corruption, powerful though it may be, will
be capable of prevailing upon Parliament to throw Ireland into confusion or
to persuade gentlemen that it is better to purchase their boroughs and their
emoluments than their estates. It is for you to determine whether you will
embark in the reconquest of Ireland at the same time that you proceed against
France and its principles.
" Your policy towards Ireland has been temporising. You have made it
necessary for her to seize systematically an ungenerous moment to carry her
object. Yet even at this moment there is but one voice, that when England
draws the sword, that of Ireland is unsheathed with it. The wildest revolu-
tionists have not held other language. You have attempted to support a
system which your first difficulty compels you to abandon. Instead of con-
cession, every point has been a matter of conquest, and discontent has been
the consequence, when gratitude might have been the national feeling. You
have tied the hands by closing the mouths of all your real friends in this
country, and relied upon a parcel of sharks, who, now alarmed, for higher in-
terests forsake you. So far have you pushed matters that, as landlords, we
have no longer any influence in restraining the exertions of our tenantry to
effect that which we cannot seriously tell them should be denied.
" But to forget what is past, let us consider what is to be done! Claims
are coming from all ranks, both Catholic and Protestant. The rational prin-
ciple appears to be to concede what shall conciliate a sufficient number to
guard against tumult, and at the same time does not go to destroy the frame-
work of the constitution. There appears to me this strong distinction between
the dissatisfaction of the two sects, that the Protestants may be conciliated at
the same time that the constitution is improved ; the Catholics never can, by
any concession which must not, sooner or later, tear down the Church or make
the State their own. I believe that reform will effect itself either now or in
a few years. If that be the case, and the election franchise is given to that
body, a few years will make three-fourths of the constituency of Ireland Catho-
lics. Can a Protestant superstructure long continue supported on such a base ?
With a reformed representation and a Catholic constituency, must not every-
thing shortly follow? Can the Protestant Church remain the Establishment
of a State of which they do not comprise an eighth part, which will be the
* The Irish Secretary.
14 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, from the influence of one family, and united their suffrages
in favour of Mr Stewart (Lord Castlereagh) and Mr Ward,
1790. though the former was so young that he only attained the
legal age of twenty-one during his canvass. The contest
was carried on by both parties with the greatest keenness,
and attended with enormous expense on either side.
That which fell on Lord Londonderry was no less than
£60,000 — a clear proof how much some reform in the
case when the Catholics are coequal in political rights ? At present they form
the half, being as numerous as the Dissenters. This makes all the difference
in the world ; for enemies within and without the State tell very differently.
The one destroys by legislation, the other by rebellion. You observe that we
paint too strongly the danger of Protestant resentment and underrate Catho-
lic anger. Although inferior in numbers, I consider the Protestants infinitely
the more formidable body. They have thought longer on political subjects,
and are excited to a higher pitch than the Catholics; besides, I do not think you
are likely to appease the latter by any concession you are about to make to them.
Nothing short of coequal rights will satisfy them, and these you cannot yield
if you wish to preserve your Church and State ; for in order to preserve the
Church, the patronage of the Crown rmist be employed in its support. Therefore
although the Catholics may have equal rights, they cannot have equal enjoy-
ments. Here a new grievance presents itself, which nothing but the destruc-
tion of your Episcopacy and the partition of the State can redress. Depend
upon it, they will struggle as much for the practical enjoyment, as they now
do for the theoretical privileges, of the constitution ; therefore you cannot
encourage them with any hope of satisfying them unless you tolerate State
dissolution. You have made an unwise alliance with that body, if it is not
irretrievable. I think you had yet better decline the consummation. Rather
strengthen the combination upon its own principles, and keep a hostile prin-
ciple out of it. Give them anything rather than the franchise, for it forces
everything else. Property will feebly resist a principle so powerful. The
Dissenters having carried their reform, will have no interest in pulling down
your Church, for they cannot expect to set up their own. They hate tithes,
so do the Episcopalians. I think you are unnecessarily alarmed lest a coalition
should take place between the Levellers and the Catholics. If the Govern-
ment is purged a little, you will find very few Levellers, if any, from principle.
The mob, when released from law, let their religion be what it may, are Level-
lers. These Government need not dread, if it be supported by its own charac-
ter, and by the men of weight acting upon principle apparently more pure than
its accustomed guardians. But, at all events, you must make friends somewhere,
and to decide which shall be preferred, is only to recollect that the petition of
grievances on the part of the Catholics must, from the nature of things, com-
prehend every article contained in that of the Protestants, with the addition of
several peculiar to themselves ; and that the closing prayer is, give us the Govern-
ment at once, or give us the franchise as the means of conquering it. If you
give the franchise, reflect on the multitude of reformers you create ; for as
long AS the representation stands as it now is, the privilege is inefficient. This
might be good policy, if you could hope to damp the ardour for reform in the
Protestants alarmed for their ascendancy, but that moment is passed. They
have taken the step, and they claim emancipation for the Catholics and repre-
AND UNTON. 15
representative system was at that time required in Ireland. «HAP.
Lord Castlereagh was returned with Lord Downshire's L
nominee, so that success was equally divided.* But it 179°-
was considered a great triumph to have rescued one seat
from the preponderating influence, in a great county, of
one family. This struggle occasioned great excitement in
Ireland, and first brought Lord Castlereagh, who was the
popular candidate, into public notice. His courteous
manner and ready elocution on the hustings and else-
sentation for all, though I am persuaded, were they gratified themselves, they
would give you very little trouble on behalf of their Catholic allies. The Pro-
testants and Catholics are by the ears in four counties, the Catholics in large
parties breaking open houses in search of arms. The army the other night
killed forty-seven, and took several prisoners. The number killed was at first
stated as fewer, but several have since died of their wounds. The county-
Down have drawn up strong resolutions in favour of reform. To give you
some idea of the spirit which prevails, — Hillsborough went there and made a
long speech against reform, but when the question was put, although the meet-
ing was prodigiously numerous, and attended by many of his own party, he
could carry with him but two votes, the one a revenue officer, the other a
boy. He left them in a violent rage. They talk here of a farther adjournment
and of a new lord-lieutenant. If I may judge of Lord B.'s f opinions from
conversations I have had with him, he inclines to resist everything. For this
reason I fear one will not have to lament his departure. My dear lord, I have
scrawled this in a coffee-room surrounded by drunken men, so that you must
expect it to partake of the surrounding confusion. — I am, &c.,
" R. STEWART.
"P.S. — The convention at Dungannon goes on. It will be composed of dele-
gates from every county in Ulster, elected by parochial electors deputed by the
parishioners. Many respectable gentlemen, all the men of consequence in
my county, are accepting delegations, in order that that they may not fall into
worse hands. They wish to go no farther than thank Parliament for admit-
ting the principle of reform, convey the wishes of the people, and wait the re-
sult of their labours. I still think, if Parliament appears to hang back, they
may enter into specifics and proceed. R. S." — Londonderry Papers, MS.
Nothing can be more characteristic of Lord Castlereagh's mind than thia
early and very remarkable letter written in his twenty-fourth year. It por-
trays a mind eminently practical, yet reflecting ; noways averse to reform of
real grievances, but anticipating the consequences of such concessions, and
looking the future boldly in the face, whatever present obloquy the measures
adopted might cause. It may be added, that many of the remarks in this
remarkable letter, written in the confusion of a coffee-house, have proved
prophetic.
* The poll lasted forty-two days, and the numbers at its close stood thus :
—Hon. A. Hill, 3534 ; Hon. R. Stewart., 3114; Hon. E. Ward, 2958; George
Mathers, 2223. It is no wonder Lord Castlereagh (Hon. R. Stewart) was a
reformer at this period — Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 359, note.
t Buckingham.
16 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, where during the contest excited much attention, and
'• caused him to be looked up to as one of the most rising
1790. young men of the day. This contest, however, was at-
tended with very serious consequences to his family ; for
its expenses were so great as to stop the building of a
large family mansion which his father at that time pro-
jected. The kind-hearted and patriotic nobleman, how-
ever, had no hesitation in making this sacrifice for his
son and the independence of his county. To pay off the
expenses of the election, he sold off a valuable collection
^ °^ famity portraits, and lived for the remainder of his
. i. e, 7. life in a rambling house, made up of an old barn with a
few rooms added.1
Shortly after this severe struggle, which ended thus
Lord c'astie- favourably in effecting a fair division of the seats for the
thegmiiitil™ county of Down between the Downshire and Stewart
tLdTuduer families, Lord Castlereagh, still the Hon. Mr Stewart only,
of Buckfng- entered the militia, which at that time was everywhere
raised jn consequence of the breaking out of the war with
France, in February 1793; and, on 26th April of that
year, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the London-
derry Militia, by his uncle the Right Hon. Thomas Conolly,
the lieutenant-colonel commandant of the regiment. In the
following year a still more important event took place, at-
tended through life with the most important consequences
both to his fortune and happiness. This was his marriage to
the Lady Emily Anne Hobart, youngest daughter and co-
heiress of John, second Earl of Buckinghamshire, which took
place on 1 7th March 1 794. To personal charms of no or-
dinary kind, and a commanding figure, this accomplished
lady united a grace of manners and amiability of disposition,
which rendered her the ornament of every society in which
they moved, while they fitted her to take her proper place
m tne elevated Court circles to which his high position in
Pu^c life ultimately raised him.2 It was not less material
Peerage, to his domestic happiness, that her congenial disposition
and kindness of feeling rendered her his constant partner
AND UNION. 17
in all the acts of kindness and generosity by which Lord CHAP.
Castlereagh's private life was always distinguished.
It may seem strange to those who have been taught to ]79o.
regard Lord Castlereagh as the ally of despots, and the H;S deciar
uncompromising enemy of the liberties of the people, to f^our of
learn that, on occasion of the Downshire election, he not Reform-
only declared himself an advocate for parliamentary re-
form, but gave a written pledge to that effect on the
hustings. Possibly, when it is recollected that the election
in which he was then engaged cost his father £60,000,
it was not unnatural that he should have felt that some
change in the mode of conducting elections was desirable.
His character, however, was too disinterested, and his
principles of action too elevated, to permit it to be for
a moment supposed that any such considerations influ-
enced his opinions either then or at any subsequent time.
The true reason of his supporting parliamentary reform
in 1790, when this election took place, and opposing
it in after life, was that, nominally the same, the poli-
tical constitution of Ireland was at that period entirely
different from that of either England or Scotland. This
arose from the exclusion of Roman Catholics from the
suffrage, which was only removed by Mr Pitt's Act in 1793.
As the great majority of the Irish tenants belonged to the
Church of Rome, this invidious exclusion not only shut
out the greater part of the people from any share in the
election of members of Parliament, but it threw the com-
mand of the popular branch of the Legislature entirely into
the hands of the Protestant landlords, for the most part
the holders of the forfeited estates of the old Catholic
proprietors, and who, both on that account, and from the
effects of religious divisions, were too often animated by hos-
tile feelings towards their Catholic tenantry, and actuated
by an adverse interest. Lord Castlereagh felt too strongly
the injustice and evil consequence of this line of demarca-
tion not to be the steady supporter of reform till it ivas
removed. When this was done by the Act of 1 793, admit-
VOL. I. B
18 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, ting all Catholic freeholders to the franchise, he declared
_ he was satisfied, and would go no farther. This change of
1793. opinion, or rather change of circumstances and consistency
of opinion, took place in 1793, four years before he took
office in 1797; and when in the Irish House of Commons
he generally voted with the Opposition. In these views,
he had the concurrence and support of his private friend,
but political opponent, Mr Ponsonby, also destined to
future eminence, who declared at the same time that he
1 Castie- would support the cause of parliamentary reform in Ire-
resp. i. 7-9. land, but by no means consent to a change in the English
House of Commons.1
In the interval, which lasted four years, between his
His debut entry into the Irish House of Commons and his admission
Pariilmrent. into public office, Lord Castlereagh was an active member
of the Legislature, and took an especial and warm interest
in every measure which promised to extend the resources
or open a field for the industry of his country. He was a
warm supporter of the Act of 1793, which gave Catholic
freeholders the right of voting for members of Parliament,
and expressed the greatest satisfaction at the success of
that measure. Throughout life he continued the steady
and consistent supporter of the Catholic claims for a re-
moval of all their remaining disabilities both in and out
of Parliament. And when the question came on in the
House of Commons in Dublin, whether Ireland had a right
to trade to India notwithstanding the monopoly of the
English East India Company, he espoused the popular
side, and supported it with a vigour of thought and power
of reasoning which commanded general attention, and
2 Castle- elicited warm expressions of approbation from several
resp.i.M. distinguished members of the House, in particular Lord
Charlemont.2
At first Lord Castlereagh generally voted with the
Opposition in the first Parliament ; but more stirring times
were now approaching, and the violence of the popular
party in Ireland at once detached nearly all persons of
AND UNION. 19
property from their side, and induced the Government CHAP.
to recruit their ranks by those young men who might
seem to be best qualified by their character and abili- i?93-
ties to make head against the dangers with which the Dangers of
country was threatened. The French Revolution hav- {793"^
ing drawn England, notwithstanding all Mr Pitt's efforts L<micastie.
resign s
to avert the calamity, into a war with France, defensive views on ;t.
measures became necessary in Ireland, as in other parts
of the empire. How to effect this object, however, in
consistency with the general safety of that part of the
King's dominions, was no easy matter; for not only had
the system of volunteers in 1782 proved eminently haz-
ardous, but, under the impulse communicated everywhere
to democratic ambition by the French Revolution, the
whole discontented parties in Ireland — Catholics, Presby-
terians, Dissenters, and Republicans — had united together
for the purpose of extorting from Government, in a moment
of peril, and when embarrassed with a formidable foreign
foe, concessions which would entirely change the constitu-
tion, and convert it from a mixed monarchy into a separate
republic, or a monarchy in which the real power was vested
in the people. This alarming state of matters awakened,
as well it might, the anxious attention of Lord Castlereagh,
and first led him to modify the views as to the practica-
bility of disarming discontent by concession, which he had,
at his first entrance into public life, been led to form.
Government resolved, on Mr Pitt's suggestion, to disband
the volunteers, and call out the militia on the same
footing as in England and Scotland. Of this measure
Lord Castlereagh cordially approved, although it was a
bold and dangerous one, and might have led to an imme-
diate collision, for which the country, as usual after a long
peace, was very little prepared. His views on the subject
are fully explained in the following very interesting letter
to Earl Camden, of 17th April 1793, in which the manli-
ness of his character in taking his share in the odium of a
necessary but unpopular measure is strongly evinced : —
20 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. " The militia being an unpopular measure, although my
L opinion was strongly against the policy of the moment
!793. they had chosen for arranging it, yet I wish to bear my
LordCastie- ^^ snare of any odium which may attend it. The mea-
reagh's gure beincr decided on, I shall strive to reconcile my friends
views on »
the subject. to it, convinced it will prove a most valuable advantage
to Ireland when effectually and respectably established.
Whatever other obligations we may owe to our present
Government — whatever favours may be extended to us in
consequence of the Convention now sitting in London upon
Irish affairs — I shall always acknowledge, as an important
advantage, their having completely suppressed our volun-
teers. Those armed associations, when headed by men of
property, although highly unconstitutional, were harmless ;
but of late the danger from them has become imminent.
They were in the hands of low men, who arrayed them
avowedly for the purpose of intimidating Government into
a reform. They were providing themselves with ammuni-
tion, and might have been led into any excess by their
Jacobin leaders. Since the proclamation appeared against
the town of Belfast, I have not heard that any corps have
appeared under arms ; nor will they, I am persuaded, if
Government continue to act with the same firmness. Our
militia will be a considerable charge on our falling revenue :
notwithstanding that, as the bill was passed with such a
general concurrence, it will be carried into effect. How-
ever, the necessity for it may be less pressing, from a
change of circumstances on the Continent. My opinion
has invariably been, that the country could never have
any security against sedition as long as volunteering was
tolerated, nor its internal peace be firmly established till
cStiereagii a mi^tia to°k place. I was apprehensive that the experi-
to Eari ment was a hazardous one at so critical a period. How-
April 3,' ever, it has succeeded, and I hope the whole benefits will
London- be drawn from so fortunate an event.1 I trust, however,
penif MS. that one happy change which has taken place in the aspect
of Irish affairs, will not induce the Administration to with-
AND UNION. 21
hold indulgences which it was in their contemplation to CHAP.
grant at a moment of more danger. Let us, for God's
sake, have a liberal settlement. It will, I am persuaded, 1793.
unite more cordially the two countries, will deprive a
vindictive Opposition of their ground of attack, and attach
to Government many men who now wish them well, but
cannot act with them as a party, on constitutional points."
Foreign affairs at this period came every day more
strongly to rivet the attention of the nation; and Lord Lord ckstie-
Castlereagh, it may well be believed, was no unconcerned vS of the
spectator of the events on the Continent. Among the
rest, the surrender of Toulon to Lord Hood, on August 7,
excited greatly his attention ; and on the 25th of Sep-
tember he wrote thus on the subject to Lord Carnden :—
" While at Ords the news of the surrender of Toulon
reached me. Certainly, if we were desired to choose an
advantage after Brest, it would be the harbour now in our
hands. The only question is, whether the terms on which
it has been obtained do not detract from the value of the
acquisition. It is idle, perhaps, to discuss this, for certain
it is that Lord Hood could not reduce it by force, and
therefore could not expect it to surrender at discretion.
However, we may be thankful that so important a propor-
tion of their navy is in our possession at this moment.
If their troops drive us from this place, we shall never
suffer their ships to fall into their hands. We are pledged
to restore them when a settled monarchy is re-established ;
and even if this should happen, it will, I trust, be a gov-
ernment too much exhausted to be very formidable to us.
The only thing, my dear lord, which really dispirits me
is, the unprecedented struggle of order against anarchy,
and the unfortunate facility with which France recruits her
army as fast as the sword exterminates it. A few days
transforms their ragamuffins into troops, which are not con-
:emptible even when opposed to the best soldiers in Europe.
They make up in madness and numbers what they want in
Uscipline. This is by no means the case with the Allies.
22 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. The havoc of war and disease is not so soon replaced.
L Unless civil war reduces the French, I see no end to their
1793. resources ; for as long as there is a mob to rob proprietors,
the whole capital of the nation will be directed against
their assailants. While there is money to distribute, or
paper to represent it, in a country where manufactures
are idle, soldiers will not be wanting. In fact, it is a
battle between a fair honest gentleman and a sharper
with loaded dice.
" Yet still the battle is inevitable, and must be per-
ontinued. sisted in as long as Brabant is exposed, or the French
Jacobins in a state to reduce the governments of Europe
to their own level. Their mode of carrying on war is so
new and alarming, that were their attention not distracted
by internal defences, I should tremble lest they should
set a force in motion which nothing could withstand. It
is astonishing to me how they organise, victual, and arm
the infinite number which they send into the field. Our
government in Ireland cannot accoutre the small force it
has to direct ; we were obliged to leave our cartridges at
home, or carry them in our pockets, for want of belts.
Since civil discord is more to be reckoned on than exter-
nal operations, I am in hopes that Lord Hood's moderate
declaration may kindle fresh flames against the Conven-
tion. It is by holding forth to the people the combined
powers in the most terrifying point of view that they keep
alive the enthusiasm which supports them. His conduct
seems calculated to recall them from despair ; and his
letters are sufficiently grounded not to seem to have
authority to pledge his nation to any specific form of
government when applied to France : he only covenants
to restore Toulon when required by a regulated monarchy.
The part of the campaign which remains is, in my mind,
the most formidable. It is the season when France can
feed, and consequently set in motion, the greatest num-
ber of forces ; besides, their strength becomes the accumu-
lated effect and discipline of many months, which crumbles
AND UNION. 23
away iri the winter season. God forbid that it should CHAP.
close with another Jemappes ; it might give us a warmer
winter in this country than I ever hope to see. A defeat 1793«
in a pitched battle is fatal to the Allies. Their strength
in the field once overthrown, their country is overcome :
not so with their opponents ; a defeat is soon repaired,
and its effects counteracted, by the endless fortifications
which protect their frontiers. In short, my dear lord, I
do not like a retreat to which we have been driven,
because I know it produces a mechanical effect upon
our enemy, and gives them a most formidable confidence
in themselves. The present moment seems so critical
that I cannot be at rest. The tranquillity of Europe is
at stake, and we contend with an opponent whose strength
we have no means of measuring. It is the first time that
all the population and all the wealth of a great kingdom
has been concentrated in the field : what may be the re-
sult is beyond my perception. ... I know no one now
alive so capable of advising mankind upon government as
yourself; the more so, as I am convinced what comes
from you would be received with a confidence no other
politician could give it. Everything that has happened
in France is the consequence of their first system : it will c^tierea
be acted over again in these countries if ever we should
be mad enough to adopt similar principles. I am afraid
I wear you out, my dear lord ; reflections on these sub-
jects when indulged in are endless. I wish to God I
could enjoy them with you on the water at Brighton !"]
The value of this letter, as affording a measure of the
political wisdom and foresight of Lord Castlereagh, will value of the
f . . i • 1 political
not be properly appreciated unless it is compared with opinions ex-
the results with which the world unfortunately has theslTieners.
had too good reason to become acquainted, and it is
also recollected that it was the production of a man of
twenty-four, in the third month of the war, and when
nearly all his contemporaries, even of the very highest in-
tellectual grade of all parties, were entirely at fault in
24 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, regard to the probable results of the French Revolution.
L At the time when Lord Castlereagh in confidence penned
1793. these lines to his grandfather, Earl Camden, Mr Burke
had just published his Reflections on the French Revo-
lution, in which he prophesied that France, parcelled out
by the fury of faction into little separate republics,
" might henceforth be blotted out of the map of Europe."
Mr Fox was maintaining in Parliament that Europe had
no cause to apprehend danger hereafter from the aggres-
sion either of France or Russia, and that " the French
Revolution was the most stupendous monument of human
wisdom ever raised on the basis of public virtue in any
age or country." For long after, Mr Pitt repeatedly said
in his place in Parliament that lie confidently anticipated
the extinction of the power of France by the failure of
their finances, and the breaking down of the system of
assignats. Which of these great men was really right 1
During the years 1793 and 1794 Lord Castlereagh
Lordc'as- served regularly with his militia regiment, and was on
vieewsSofS that account in a great measure withdrawn from the
ireTancUn scene of parliamentary strife. In the interval a con-
1791 siderable relaxation was made in the penal code, and
the Roman Catholic freeholders were admitted to the
franchise — a change of which Lord Castlereagh entirely
approved, but which he justly foresaw rendered necessary
a union of the two countries, and the repeal of the re-
maining Catholic disabilities unavoidable ; of both of which
measures he was ever after a firm and consistent supporter.
These first approaches to a more liberal policy in regard to
Ireland were attended with a very beneficial effect, which
is strongly portrayed in the following letter to Lord
Camden, of date 17th October 1794 : — " The situation of
the country has greatly changed within the last two years.
I am happy to tell you that the situation of this part of
the empire has since that time much changed for the
better. The turbulent spirit of the people, no longer
agitated by conventionisin and volunteer associations, has
AND UNION. 25
sensibly abated. The militia army is faithful and effi- CHAP.
cient. There is but one feeling towards England, and L
scarcely a dissentient in the House of Commons as to 1794-
the original necessity of the war and its present vigorous
prosecution. Some slight reflections are, however, thrown
out against it, which make me very anxious that it should
be fully discussed and understood. The investigation of
v O
the subject in the English Parliament, I am persuaded,
has answered the best purposes in carrying forward the
affections of the people. Here the question is little un-
derstood. Many imagine we are at war merely because
Great Britain is at war — that is, as they conceive, because
Mr Pitt chose it ; they imagine that England was the
first aggressor — that she is united with all the despots of
Europe to enslave France. They have not had the
dangers of Jacobin and revolutionary politics explained
to them as the people of England have. They believe
France anxiously desires peace, and is disposed to ob-
serve it when made. Such is the delusion into which
they have been led by the Jacobin writers.
" The unwillingness of Government to investigate the
question of the war will not convict them. Never did Continued,
administration stand on ground so strong, and never, in
my mind, was it so much their policy to provoke discus-
sion and to brave all opposition by giving all documents
and challenging all investigation. But that openness of
conduct which Mr Pitt invariably adopts in the British
Parliament is not as yet a part of the Irish system. The
Ministers of this country think everything is to be done
in Parliament by a majority, and out of it by a good
dinner. They are so much in the habit of being wrong
that they never can persuade themselves that they are in
the right. They are so much used to fight upon bad,
that they do not know the value of good grounds. They
resort to the same miserable cavil, and are as much
afraid of discussion as if it must prove inevitable con-
demnation. However, we shall go on very well, and
26 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, give our enemies a warm reception if they visit us. Our
L army contains 2000 regulars and 16,000 militia. We
1794- are to raise £1,800,000, which is a large sum in this
ctotona h country, being near two years' income, but still we are
*°Earl to accomplish it without laying heavy burdens on the
Camden, . , . ,
Oct. 17, people. I am very anxious to obtain leave of absence
1794 ; MS. r *" J. . . y
London- for three weeks, to indulge myself in seeing you before 1
Papers, am forced to return to my regiment, but whether I shall
be able to effect it is uncertain/'1
The Marquess of Buckingham, Lord-Lieutenant, had a
Changes in rupture with the Irish Parliament on the Regency ques-
Goverrnnenttion, in consequence of which he resigned, and was suc-
plrfod, and ceeded by the Earl of Westmoreland, whose appointment
appoint- was the giprnai for fierce contests between the Govern-
ment of
Lords west- ment and the people. The Dissenters of the north, stimu-
moreland i • r i e
and Fitz- lated by the passions consequent on the bursting forth of
the French Revolution, coalesced with the Roman Catho-
lics, whose causes of discontent were of much older stand-
ing and better founded, and both united in a loud and
menacing demand for reform. This cry was the more
formidable that it was joined in by the armed volunteers,
who, since the disastrous era of the American war, had
assumed a most alarming attitude in Ireland. The as-
pect of affairs in 1793 became so threatening that the
English Government deemed it advisable to make a
change, and Earl Fitzwilliam was sent over to succeed
Lord Westmoreland. The former nobleman came over
avowedly as the organ of a conciliatory policy ; and his
mission was in conformity with the opinion so strongly
expressed by Lord Castlereagh in the letters already
quoted, to concede Catholic emancipation and such a
i-eagii Cor- measure of Parliamentary reform as might be consistent
ii8p'' ' with the preservation of order and of the monarchical
constitution in Church and State.2
His arrival, heralded by the journals and associations
which supported these objects, excited great interest, and
for a while stilled the violence of party. These favour-
AND UNION. 27
able dispositions were increased by the appointment of CHAP.
Mr Grattan to an important place in the Administration ;
and he announced, in an eloquent speech, the intentions 1793-
of the Government, which were all that the liberal party Lord2Fitz-
could wish. Such was the general enthusiasm excited ^bera™ s
by this declaration that, on the motion of Mr Grattan, P?u?7 and
<i _ his dis-
the House of Commons voted £3,000,000 to the English missa.\ -,
succeeded
Government to carry on the war — a very large sum to by Lord
be given by a country the revenue of which was only
£1,800,000 a-year. It soon appeared, however, that
these flattening prospects were not likely to be realised.
The Protestant party in Great Britain took the alarm at
the strong expressions used by Mr Grattan as to the
entire concession of the Catholic claims, against which
the Orangemen of the north of Ireland and the great
majority of the inhabitants of Great Britain were equally
united. So strong did this feeling become that the
English Government deemed it necessary to draw back.
They accordingly declared that the promises of Earl
Fitzwilliam, as announced by Mr Grattan, had been made
without any authority, and that he had unadvisedly
pledged them to a course which was inconsistent with
the maintenance of the Protestant constitution in Church
and State, and the permanent connection of Great Bri-
tain and Ireland. The consequence, of course, was, that
Lord Fitzwilliam was recalled, and with him Mr Grattan
and the whole Liberal Administration went out of office.
He was succeeded by Earl Camden as Lord-Lieutenant,
and Mr Pelham, afterwards Lord C Inch ester, as Chief
Secretary. This was not done till after the liberal grant
of £3,000,000 had passed both Houses of the Irish Par-
liament. It must be confessed that the good faith of.
1 Castle-
the British Government would have been more conspicu- reagh cor-
ous if the disavowal had preceded the demand for that 11. '
sum.1 4
The altered policy of Government appeared on the
first night of the official appearance of Mr Pelham
28 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, as Chief Secretary in Parliament. Lord Camden, the
*• new Lord-Lieutenant, was friendly to the extension of
1793. the elective franchise to the Roman Catholic voters, but
decidedly opposed to the Catholics being allowed seats
in Parliament ; and he was averse, after the franchise had
^en conceded by Mr Pitt's Act in 1793, to any further
concessions, concession at a time when the minds of men were so
much heated as they were in every country, and espe-
cially in Ireland, by the doctrines set afloat by the
French Revolution.* The tone of Government soon
was made manifest. Mr Grattan brought forward the
Catholic question — that is, the right of Catholics to sit
in Parliament ; and Mr Pelham immediately rose in
reply, and stated, with great heat and emphasis, that
" concessions to the Catholics seemed only to increase
* Earl Camden's real opinion on Irish politics at this time was expressed in
the following confidential letter, dated 4th February 1793, to Lord Castlereagh,
in answer to the long one, already quoted, by Lord Castlereagh, of 26th January
1793 : — " I am sorry to confess my ideas on the state of your country are very
gloomy ; and I have no conception, in these times, when rights are pushed to the
utmost extremity, and reform knows no bounds, of giving to any nation, and less
to one of the description of yours, whose characteristic is certainly not modera-
tion, the sort of latitude which the questions about to take place in Ireland
will give them. I inherit, and, upon consideration, am clearly of your father's
opinion, that Ireland must be our province, if she will not be persuaded to a
union ; and if she would, she ouyht and would enjoy complete and reciprocal
benefits with this country. This is my opinion, but in the present state of
politics there, it would be dangerous either to maintain that opinion or
to act upon it ; and the desirable thing at present is, to quiet and satisfy
the minds of moderate men such as you and your father ; for you give a
credit to those of a more violent disposition, who will unite with you till
you are alarmed, and will then have gained strength and consequence enough
to do without you. At the same time that we in England give you that
SATISFACTION, we should take great care not to give from ourselves that de-
gree of command and influence in Ireland which is essential both to your
prosperity and our consequence. The reform of Parliament must now be
carried, and if it can be done with moderation, I am by no means sure it may
not be attended with advantage ; but I think it should be undertaken, if that be
possible, by the joint efforts of both the Government and Opposition. As the
Protestants will then be indulged, the Roman Catholics must have, from their
numbers and the promises they have received, some concessions ; and if you
give a certain latitude to them of voting for members, the intelligible griev-
ance of having no representation will be done away ; and I should hope they
would be indulged no farther, and by no means be suffered to sit in the House
of Commons." — LORD CAMDEN to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Berkeley Square, Feb-
ruary 4, 1793: MS. Londonderry Papers.
AND UNION. 29
their demands ; that what they now sought was incom- CHAP.
patible with the existence of a Protestant constitution : L
that concession must stop somewhere ; it had already 1793.
reached the utmost limit — it could not be allowed to pro-
ceed— and here he would plant his foot, and never
consent to recede an inch farther." The debate, which
was conducted with great warmth, continued till eight on
the following morning, when the motion was lost by a
considerable majority. From that moment a rupture
became unavoidable, for both parties were equally de-^astie-
termined, and the sword alone could determine between resp. i. i-j.
them.1
Probably, in this emphatic and determined announce-
ment, Mr Pelham, in his turn, had exceeded his instruc- APPoint-
tions, or misunderstood the real object of Government,
for he soon after withdrew from his duties and returned K
to England. The urgency of affairs required that some Aug^*1'
one should forthwith be appointed to discharge the duties 179lj-
of that arduous and important office. From his intimate
acquaintance with Lord Castlereagh, who, in the same
year, for the first time assumed that title by the promo-
tion of his father to the rank of earl in 1796, Lord
Camden at once turned his eyes to that young nobleman
to hold the office of Keeper of the Privy Seal, which
happened to be vacant, and with it, discharge, ad interim,
during Mr Pelham's absence, the duties of Chief Secretary.
This appointment took place in February 1797, and this Fe^ 17,
at once introduced him into public life, from which he
never receded till his dying hour. Though not dis-
charging the duties of his office, Mr Pelham continued
to hold it till April 1799, when he resigned; and, on the April 17,
recommendation of Lord Cornwallis, Lord Castlereagh was
appointed Chief Secretary. From the time of his ap-
pointment as Lord Keeper, however, Lord Castlereagh
discharged the whole duties of Secretary, and they were
of a most arduous kind ; for they occurred during the Re-
bellion of 1798, and the French invasion in the same year
30 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. — the most critical and perilous era of Irish history. The
L recent revelations which have come out, especially in the
1793. Castlereagh and Cornwallis Correspondence, and Wolfe
Tone's Memoirs, have demonstrated that this crisis was of
ferlgf8 a much more violent and dangerous kind than was ever
imagined by the world generally at the time; and its
difficulty and importance will not be adequately appre-
12, is. ciated without a brief sketch of the designs and resources
of the Irish revolutionary leaders at that period.1
The first germs of the Irish Rebellion appeared in 1 778,
origin of when, in consequence of the withdrawal of nearly the
revolution- whole English corps from the island, during the exigencies
of the American war, a favourable opportunity seemed to
present itself for overturning the Government and dis-
solving the connection with England. As not unusual in
such cases, the first advances of revolution were made
under the veil of loyalty, and it was under the pretext of
preserving the empire that the most effectual steps were
taken for its dismemberment. The state of Ireland and
its government, at that period, was as deplorable as can
well be conceived. The grossest corruption pervaded
every department of the State. The state of the repre-
sentation, which excluded the Catholics alike from the
elective franchise and the right to sit in either House of
Parliament, gave the government at the Castle of Dublin
the entire command of the legislature, and enabled them
to quash any attempt at inquiry or redress by decisive
majorities in both Houses. Parliament met only once in
two years, and a perpetual Mutiny Bill relieved them from
any necessity of assembling the House more frequently.
The real interests of the country were seldom attended to
by this packed oligarchical minority, which had got pos-
session of the powers of Government. In a word, Ireland
at that period, though its constitution in form was the
same as that of England, exhibited a picture of a country
combining all the evils of despotism with all the deep-
AND UNION. 31
seated corruption of unchecked representation, and jus- CHAP.
tified the saying of the Czar Nicholas on the Polish consti- Ij
tution established bj the Congress of Vienna — " I can 1778.
understand a despotism, for I myself am born and com-
pelled to act in it ; I can understand a republic, for the ' Ma:r(iui?
' Custme, iv.
world has afforded many examples of such ; but a con- 126 > Corn-
stitutional monarchy, governed by corruption, I do not resp. H. 337.
understand ; I had enough of it in Poland/' l
So widespread and general was the corruption of the
Irish Government at this period, that it had come to Armed
unite nearly all classes, except the dominant minority, ibafi782. •.
a league for its removal. In an incredibly short space
of time, forty-two thousand volunteers were in arms in
the island ; and as the Government imprudently allowed
the popular leaders to get the entire command of the
movement, and the corps all appointed their own officers,
these forces soon became extremely formidable. Lord
Charlemont was chosen general, and for a time the per-
sons enrolled were extremely assiduous in discharging
their military duties, and ere long acquired a surprising
degree of efficiency. The object of this was to over-
awe the Government, and render the force an object of
dread before its real purpose was revealed. Gradually,
however, when efficiency had been attained, the real pur-
pose was disclosed. Politics came to engross its at-
tention more than arms. Delegates were appointed to
discuss public affairs, who met in Dublin, and began to
exercise the functions, as they imitated the form, of Par-
liament. So little were the secret designs of the popular
leaders understood at this period, that the names of several
stanch Conservatives, though true patriots, were to be found
among the delegates. Among the rest were those of the
Hon. Robert Stewart, afterwards the first Lord London-
derry, and father of the object of the present biography, and
Mr Corry, who became Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The persons at the head of the movement were the Hon.
Frederick Harvey, son of the Earl of Bristol, Bishop of
32 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. Deny, and the Right lion. Henry Flood. The former pre-
T- late, in 1783, travelled with an escort of twenty volunteers,
1783. and had sentries at his door, like a general officer ; the
latter came to the House of Commons in full uniform, on
29th November 1783, to propose a scheme framed by the
Convention, which had declared its sittings permanent till
the motion was disposed of. It was rejected by a majority
of 158 to 49. This check prevented an immediate out-
break ; and several of the reasonable and just demands of
the delegates having at the same time been conceded by
! Cornwallis the British Parliament, particularly that which related to
SaT-6 wolf tne removal °f th® restrictions on the importation of Irish
Tone's Me- produce into Great Britain, the Convention gradually sank
moirs, ii. , , , , . , _ ,, . .
J97. in importance ; and, during the peace which followed the
American war, was hardly ever heard of.1
This spirit of resistance to the British Government,
Organisa- though for the time lulled, was not extinct. The machinery
u°nnitedthe of the delegates and Convention was still kept up, and
tne leaders calmly waited the arrival of more favourable
times to renew their agitation. The French Revolution
speedily accomplished this object. Under the influence
of the prodigious excitement which it occasioned over all
the world, the spirit of resistance to the English Govern-
ment revived, and became more intense than ever in Ire-
land. A society of " United Irishmen" was established
in Belfast in 1791, the ostensible object of which was to
bring about parliamentary reform — the real one, to establish
a republic independent of Great Britain. By the rules of
this body, which bore the true revolutionary type, no
meeting of primary members was to consist of more
than twelve ; and five of these primary meetings were
represented by a member in the committee, which was
invested with the entire direction of their affairs. From
each of these committees a deputy was to attend in a
superior body ; one or two deputies from these composed
a county committee; two from every county committee
constituted a provincial one; and this last elected five
AND UNION. 33
persons to superintend the whole business of the union. CHAP.
This provisional government was elected by ballot, and the L
names of its members were only communicated to the 1791.
secretaries of the provisional committees, who were officially
intrusted with the scrutiny of votes. Thus, though the
sway of the ruling committee was unbounded and its
agency universal, its members and its seat of government
were alike concealed, and the great object of revolutionary
government was attained, that of vesting absolute authority
in unknown hands. The military organisation was arranged
in the same way. A committee, consisting of twelve, iAnn ^
chose a sergeant; ten sergeants chose a captain; ten cap- ]j[98, 154-
tains a colonel. The signs of being united are, The Fitzgerald,
hands clasped. Answer, The right hand to the left hip. castiereagh'
The words, "Be steady." Answer, " I am determined to m**p'''
free my country or die — liberty ! liberty I " l
Liberation from tithes and dues to the Protestant
clergy, and the restoration of the Roman Catholic faith ReaUbje
as that of the nation, formed the objects held out to the movemen
multitude by this association. Parliamentary reform was
the lure presented to the higher orders as the inducement
most likely to enlist persons of station and influence on
the Liberal side under their banners. The real objects
of the chiefs of the conspiracy were very different. They
were to overthrow the Protestant government and mon-
archical constitution, separate Ireland altogether and
permanently from Great Britain, and establish a demo- 2
cratic Hibernian republic in close alliance with the great Tone's
democracy in France. These ulterior objects might long 371^378 ;
lave remained unknown, and have been only guessed at
rom their actions, so stringent were the precautions taken
igainst their discovery, were it not for the imprudent zeal
>f the biographers of the leaders of the movement, who, reash.c.or-
~ . resp. 1. 189 ;
•linded by enthusiasm for the objects of their narrative, Comwaiiis
r- • -i -i o /• •. T • 1 * • v • Corresp. ii.
ave furnished proofs of it which a more judicious reserve 338.
-rould have suffered to remain in obscurity.2
This great and formidable movement was at first shared
VOL. i. c
34 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, in alike by the Presbyterians of the north and the Roman
L Catholics over the whole country ; and if the United
J798. Irishmen had remained as steadily united as they were
at first, it might, in a moment of difficulty or disaster,
Catholics jiave je(j j.Q fae severance of Ireland from Great Britain,
ana rro-
testants, and an^ fts permanent subjection to the tyranny of the French
Orangemen, democracy. But fortunately this catastrophe was pre-
vented by the divisions in Ireland itself. For once reli-
gious dissension produced a beneficial result — it saved
the empire from dismemberment. The necessity under
which they lay of forwarding the ambitious views of the
Romish priesthood, introduced the apple of discord into a
body of men banded together for revolutionary purposes,
and who, if they had held together, would have probably
proved irresistible. " It is," says Lord Castlereagh, " a
Jacobinical conspiracy throughout the kingdom, pursu-
ing its object chiefly with Popish instruments ; the
heated bigotry of this sect being better suited to the
purpose of the republican leaders than the cold, reasoning
Lord disaffection of the northern Presbyterians." l The open
Ca*tiereagh avowaj Of tneir intention to suppress the Protestant faith,
re-establish the Romish creed in its stead, before long
*ne Protestants in every part of the country ;
Cor. i. 219. who, seeing the dagger at their throats, had no resource
but to abandon the Catholics, and enter into a league for
their common defence. This led to the ORANGE ASSO-
CIATION, intended to support the Protestant faith, and
which, as a necessary consequence, fell into a close alliance
with, and entire dependence on, Great Britain. Such
was the effect of this change, that in the province of
Ulster alone, where the United Irishmen at first boasted
they had 150,000 of their associates, there was soon an
overwhelming majority of the Orange party, and it thence-
forth became the principal seat of the loyal minority, who
aimed at upholding the Protestant faith and British con-
nection. There can be no doubt that this division in
the ranks of the once United Irishmen had a material
AND UNION. 35
effect on the future fate of the insurrection. But, in the CHAP.
first instance, it very seriously added to the difficulties of
Government, and augmented the embarrassment with 1798.
which Lord Castlereagh had to contend. The passions of
the loyal defenders of the throne were soon as violently
excited as those of their opponents, and the horrors of a i
bellum plus quam civile ere long broke out, with all its 1798, iss
wonted atrocities on both sides.1
The organisation of the rebels was as complete as their
numbers were formidable. Government was aware that Great ex-
a widespread conspiracy pervaded the country, but they organisation
were by no means informed as to its arrangements or sp
extent. They had received only some vague information
of a seditious confederacy when there were already
200,000 men sworn in throughout the country, in great
part armed after a rude fashion, and all animated with
the strongest passions which Jacobinical fervour coupled
with religious zeal could awake. " An executive coun-
cil managed their affairs/' and was implicitly obeyed from
one end of the kingdom to the other. " To that body
was intrusted the charge of gaining to their cause men
of influence and talent, of preparing the lower classes to
pay obedience to their appointed leaders, and of working
upon the passions of the multitude by the distribution
of seditious publications. As early as 1792, emissaries
were sent to different regiments to try to seduce the non-
commissioned officers and privates. Itinerant committees
travelled through the country, to provide prisoners with
pecuniary means for their defence ; to endeavour to bribe
or intimidate witnesses ; to induce under-sheriffs to return
disloyal panels ; and to terrify any well-disposed jury-
Man who might happen to be sworn/' So general were
hese feelings, that before the schism between the Roman
Catholics and Protestants which afterwards took place,
lany of the Presbyterian clergy in Belfast openly dis-
layed their hostility to England by praying for the a
access of the French arms.2
36 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. The designs of the leaders of this insurrection from the
L _ first were fixed, and they were, as already mentioned, to
1797. effect the entire severance of Ireland from Great Britain,
MissSnof and tne establishment of a democratic republic in the
Lord ECU former country. But these designs were for long care-
geraid and ftQiy concealed, lest they should deter persons of rank
Arthur / . ' . / . v
O'Connor and influence from joining them ; and parliamentary
i797ans 1 reform, liberation from tithes to the Protestant clergy,
and the re-establishment of the ancient faith, were
held forth as the only objects of the association. Mean-
while, however, the secret and real leaders were in close
and active communication with the French Government,
with a view to obtain the support of the arms of the great
republic in their endeavour to effect their liberation.
May 1797. In the summer of 1797, when the English Government
were embarrassed by the monetary crisis and the mutiny
in the fleet, two secret agents were despatched to
France to concert measures with the French Directory.
The persons selected for this important mission were
Lord Edward Fitzgerald, son of the first Duke of Lein-
ster, and Arthur O'Connor, son of the member for
Philipstown and of Lord Longueville's sister. When
persons of such rank and consideration were the leaders
in the conspiracy, it need not be said how formidable it
had become, and what difficulties the British Government
must have had in combating it. They brought with them
for the information of the French Government a detailed
memoir, drawn up in French, containing a full abstract of
the conspiracy, the forces of the insurgents, and the most
effectual means by which the severance of Ireland from
Great Britain might be effected. They boasted that
150,000 United Irishmen were ready to take up arms in
» Cornwaiiis Ulster alone ; that 100,000 excellent troops might imme-
SgTcastie. diatel7 be f°™ed in Ireland; that the English had
resg'hiC296 ou^ 25'000 regular troops there ; that the Irish militia
5TI.' '' ' was 20,000 strong, nearly the whole of which would join
an invading force if they had once a rallying point j1 and
AND UNION. 37
that the great thing would be to accompany the debarka- CHAP.
tion of the French troops by a proclamation stating that L
they came to free the Irish, not to enslave them, and 1797.
that France would make no peace with Great Britain, in
which the independence of Ireland, as a separate state,
was not expressly guaranteed.*
* "Dans la province d'Ulster il y a 150,000 Irlandois, unis, organises, et en-
role's : une grande partie est enregimente"e ; un tiers pourroit sortir de la pro-
vince, et tous y vont avec activite. . . . Si le de"barquement se feroit au
rnidi, la marche seroit plus difficile et plus longue, mais on traverseroit cepen-
dant un pays ami, et dont le peuple s'empresseroit de se re"unir a l'arme°e Fran-
?oise. Killybegs seroit un excellent lieu de debarquement : il n'y a point de
troupes dans le voisinage ; tous les habitans sont unis, et les comte"s Tyrone, Fer-
managh, et Monaghan sont au nombre des meilleurs. Le dernier a eprouve
de tres longues persecutions. . . . Le pays depuis Sligo jusqu'a Lough Allen
et Carrick-on-Shannon est tres bien dispose". L'auteur de ce memoire a pris des
arrangements avec ses amis tels qu'on pourrait, dans deux ou trois jours, ras-
sembler jusqu'a 10,000 hommes, et tomber sur Enniskillen, ou tel autre place
convenable. . . . Le systeme d'union est e"galement dans le comte" Gal-
way et y fait journellement des progres. Le comte" Roscommon insurgeroit
entierement, ce qui facilitoit les operations de Qalway. Des places designed ci-
dessus, celles ou nous avons le plus d'armes sont Louth, Armagh, Westmeath,
Kildare, le Comte" Royal, et la ville de Dublin. Meath est bien organise", et dans
toutes ces places on ne trouve pas moins que 100,000 Irlandois unis et prtsts a
marcher. . . . Les pretres Catholiques, qui ont cesse d'etre alarme" par
les calomnies repandues sur 1'irreligion des Fransois, ont adopt6 les principes
du peuple dont ils dependent; ils sont en general bons rdpublicains : ils ont
rendu des grandes services en propageant avec un zele discret le systeme
d'union ; et ils ont determine" le peuple a preter lo serment impose par la force
[sans le forcer?] de renoncer en rien k ses principes et b, ses projets. En un
mot, le pays renferme beaucoup d'hommes propres a former de grandes et de
puissantes arrne"es. II ne manque que les moyens necessaires pour les mettre
Bur pied, des armes de toute espece, des chevaux, de 1'argent, et des offlciers
ge'ne'raux. . . . La cavalerie qui se trouve dans ce pays monte a environ 6000
hommes, sans compter les volontaires. La moitie" de ceux-ci sont Irlandois, et
se re"uniroient certainement a leurs compatriotes, s'il y avoit quelque apparence
de succes. D'apres cela, nous penserions qu'il faudroit actuellement plus de
5000 hommes de troupes Francoises si nous ne croyons pas que le nombre doive
etre porte" a 10,000, avec un train considerable de 1'artillerie volante. . . . Nous
de"sirons que 1'expgdition soit commande"e par le Ge"neYal Hoche, et qu'on lui
adjoint les officiers Irlandois que le Gouvernement juge a meViter sa confiance
par leur fide"lite" et leurs talents. ... II faudroit que le general publia une pro-
clamation au nom du Gouvernement, dans laquelle il de"clareroit que les Fran?ois
viennent en qualite" d'allie pour de"livrer et non pour conqueYir 1'Irlande. Cette
proclamation devoit aussi engager les Irlandois a proce"der de suite a 1'^tablisse-
ment d'un gouvernement national, et on annoncerait 1'intention d'agir comme
le fit Rochambeau en Amerique. Cette proclamation produiroit uu tres grand
effet. . . . Ce qui pourroit contribuer efficacement a ddjouer les machinations
du Gouvornement Anglais, seroit de proposer cette inde"pendance comme uno
des conditions de la paix a titre d'echange ou d'indemnite. Une proposition
38 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. The intentions of the conspirators, in regard to the
L means of effecting this object, were sanguinary in the
1797. extreme, and such as would pass for incredible if they
ob'eS'of were not unhappily paralleled in every age and country
the con- by men who peril their cause on the dreadful chances
and usages of civil war. The resolution of the conspira-
tors was to put every Orangeman to death ; and as they
styled every Protestant an Orangeman, this was equiva-
lent to a declaration of extermination against the whole
Protestants in the country.* The imagination can scarce-
ly figure the state of exasperation which could lead to
the adoption, with deliberate forethought, of such extreme
measures ; but the terrible examples of the Tyrone rebel-
lion in Ireland in 1641, of the Spanish- American Revolu-
tion in 1819, and of the Indian Revolt in 1857, prove that
it is not only the usual but the inevitable result of civil
\var in every age and country ; and there exists mournful
aussi authentique ne pourroit 6 tre ni caehe'e ni de*guisee : le courage du peuple
se reveilloit et la tyrannie qu'on exerce aujourd'hui en Irlande perdroit son em-
pire. Cette proposition ne causeroit pas au reste une tres grande surprise puisque
dans tous les cercles a Dublin, ministeriels ou autres, il en est deja question.
. . . Je n'ai jamais entendu ^valuer au-dessus de 25,000 homines le total des
troupes Anglais et Ecossais qui se trouvent dans 1'Irlande, sur 1'opposition des
quelles il faudroit compter. De ce nombre 12 regiments sont arrives en dernier
lieu, et il peuvent etre arrives d'autres. . . . La milice d'Irlande se
monte a 18,000 a 20,000 hommes, les plus beaux et les plus discipline's de
Tarmge Britannique. On pourroit compter sur eux s'ils avoient un point de
ralliemeut. Les volontaires sont presque tous a cheval et bien months. Nous
sommes certains que la majorite" d'entre eux serait pour nous, et qu'il n'y aurait
contre nous que quelques corps du Nord, qui sont du parti d'Orange. Le total
des volontaires peut se monter a 20,000 hommes. . . . L'artilleYie Irlandaise
est considerable, mais elle consiste presque entierement de ceux qui nous sont
devou6. Voila une esquisse de la situation de nos affaires."' — Memoire au
Gouvemement Franfais, Avril 1797 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 296-301.
* " In the county of Wexford it is perfectly a religious frenzy. The priests
lead the rebels to battle. On their march they kneel down and pray, and show
the most desperate resolution in their attack. They put such Protestants as
are reported to be Orangemen to death, saving others upon condition of their
embracing the Catholic faith. It is a Jacobinical conspiracy throughout the
kingdom, pursuing its object chiefly with Popish instruments; the heated
bigotry of this sect being better suited to the purpose of the republican
leaders than the cold, reasoning disaffection of the northern Presbyterians.
The 'number of the insurgents is great — so great as to make it prudent to
assemble a very considerable force before any attempt is made to penetrate that
very difficult and enclosed country." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to MR WICKHAM,
June 12, 1798 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 219.
AND UNION. 39
evidence that it was the principle both adopted and CHAP.
acted upon by the Irish rebels, and of course, in retalia-
tion, by the Royalists, in 1798.* 1798.
Had the Government possessed a sufficient military
force, it would have been a comparatively easy matter to
have combated and put down this conspiracy, how wide- of
spread and formidable soever. But, unfortunately, this
was very far indeed from being the case ; and it was
this deficiency which both rendered the insurrection most
formidable, and clothed it with its worst horrors. From
the correspondence of Lord Cornwallis, now published
(who succeeded Earl Camden as Lord-Lieutenant in Ire-
land), it appears that the regular force at the disposal of
Government was inconceivably small. The English Minis-
try were far from being aware of the magnitude of the
danger which awaited them ; and though they had been
so, they really had not the men to send to the threatened
point. They knew that the Directory had 200,000 men
ranged along the northern and western coast of France
ready for embarkation, under the command of General
Buonaparte, the General-in-Chief, with Desaix, the com-
mander of the cavalry, and Generals Baraguay d'Hil-
liers, Kleber, Kellerman, Randon, Kilmaine, and other
renowned chiefs under him.f They did not know where
the blow was destined to fall, and it was necessary to
" Every man that was a Protestant was called an Orangeman, and every one
was to be killed, from the poorest man in the country. The women were as bad
as the men. The rebels thought it no more sin to kill a Protestant than a dog.
Had it not been that they were so soon quashed, they would have fought with
each other for the property of the Protestants: they were beginning before the
battle of Vinegar Hill. Ever since the rebellion, I never heard one of the
rebels express the least sorrow for what was done ; on the contrary, I have
heard them say, that they were sorry, whilst they had the power, they did not
kill more, and that there were not half enough killed." — Confession of Jas.
Eeaghan, a Roman Catholic rebel, before execution, 24th August 1799 ; Castle-
reagh Correspondence, ii. 422.
t Of the army-list troops ordered for the expedition, 275,000 mounted and
dismounted cavalry, infantry, and artillery, all are within twenty-four hours'
forced march of the coast. General Buonaparte was the geiieral-in-chief,
Desaix second in command, and Baraguay d'Hilliers and Kleber among the
generals of division. — Secret Papers from France, Feb. 1798 ; Castlereayh
Correspondence, i. 166.
40 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, be prepared at all points, and especially at those in the
T- south of England likely to be first assailed. The dis-
1798. persion of the French fleet, which took refuge in Bantry
Bay in November 1796, and the glorious victory of
Camperdown in the succeeding year, had alone prevented
the descent in some part of the British Isles in those
years. In these circumstances it was perfectly im-
possible for the British Government, even with the aid
of the British militia, which all volunteered for service
beyond St George's Channel, to have anything like a
regular force of the requisite amount in Ireland. Yet,
after making every allowance for these difficulties, it is
with no small astonishment that we learn now, from
authentic sources, that, at the period when the rebellion
broke out, and even after that event, eight skeleton
regiments, four weak battalions, and a brigade of the
Guards, constituted the whole British forces stationed
in Ireland ! On the native Irish force, excepting the
cS-™wa!i's mounted yeomanry, it will immediately appear, that no
413« reliance whatever could be placed.1"5' Yet such were
the necessities of the British Government, that even with
* " Situated as I am for my sins in the direction of the affairs of a country,
nine-tenths of the inhabitants of which are thoroughly disaffected to the
Government, with a militia on which no dependence whatever can be placed, and
which Abercromby too justly described by saying that they were only for-
midable to their friends, and with the constant threats of foreign invasion, how
hard it is for me to say what troops I can spare. But this is not my only
difficulty ; as great part of what is supposed to be disposable, is in fact an
ideal force. You will see by the enclosed statement that the eight skeleton
regiments which are on this establishment are too weak to be of any use
here, or to render service elsewhere ; and even their wretched numbers are
composed chiefly of raw recruits. The brigade of Guards cannot, I conclude,
be disposed of for the service of India. There remain, then, the four regi-
ments which were sent in the last spring from Britain : the Royals, consisting,
when they landed, of about 300 men ; the 2d and 29th, which corps, when they
were with me in the late business, brought about 450 each into the field ;
and the 100th (Huntley's), which produced 600 under arms. ... I have
now put you in possession of all my wealth, and told you all my dangers. . . .
You will easily conceive that, with a hostile fleet hovering on our coast, and
two "civil wars (one in Wexford and Wicklow, and the other in Mayo)
raging in the country, I am at this moment pretty well occupied." — MAR-
QUESS CORNWALLIS, Dublin Castle, Sept. 25, 1798 ; Cornwallis Correspondence,
ii. 413.
AND UNION. 41
the pressing dangers and miserable force at the disposal CHAP.
of the Irish Government, the Ministry in London were
anxiously urging the return of some regiments from Ire- 1798.
land to send out to India. *
This extreme disproportion of the regular British inili- 35
tary forces to the necessities of Ireland, threatened at Savage
..... . , . . conduct of
once with foreign invasion and domestic revolt, was at- the Irish
tended with an evil of another and a most serious kind, Volunteers.
which tended, almost as much as the sanguinary measures
of the rebels, to stamp its horrid and melancholy charac-
ter on the Irish Rebellion, and was made the foundation
on which the most atrocious falsehoods and calumnies
against Lord Castlereagh were rested. As the British
soldiers in this country were a mere handful, and disaffec-
tion was so widespread, and in many places universal, it
became a matter of absolute necessity to send the Irish
militia and yeomanry into the endangered points and
disaffected districts. These troops had all the courage
which is inherent in the Irish race, but they were in
many cases more inclined to take part with the rebels
than to act against them, and in almost all were infected
with the savage passions and spirit of revenge which is
the invariable attendant of civil conflicts, and which al-
ways appears with the greatest vehemence where reli-
gious fanaticism is mingled with political exasperation.
The licentiousness of the Irish troops, both militia and
volunteers, soon became, in consequence of the sanguinary
excesses of the rebels, and the unbounded exasperation
of the Orangemen and Eoman Catholics at each other,
so extreme, that the locating of these " defenders of
order " in the disturbed districts speedily led to a great
* " The eight regiments on this establishment are mere skeletons, yours
(the 89th) is by far the strongest ; the 30th is the only other corps that has
250 men ; several of them have not half that number — the 2d and 29th being
about 450 men each under arms, and the 100th (by far the best of the whole)
600. The Royals have on paper only 300. By taking the three serviceable
regiments he may ruin Ireland, but I am afraid he cannot save India." — MAR-
QUESS COBNWALLIS to MAJOR-GENERAL Ross, Sept. 30, 1798 ; Cornwallis Corre-
spondence, ii. 414.
42 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, and most alarming increase of the disturbances, and to
L cruelties noways inferior to those "which disgraced the
other side. So generally was this experienced that, when
petitions were sent to Government for protection, it was
often requested that Irish militia should not be sent.*
This state of matters excited the utmost anxiety in the
breasts both of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh,
and they did everything in their power, on every occasion,
to terminate them. General, afterwards Sir Ralph, Aber-
cromby condemned these atrocities in the strongest terms,
saying they "must render the army formidable to every
one but the enemy." But the extremely small amount of
the regular force in the island, and the absolute necessity
of occupying so many different posts, often very remote
and far removed from each other, for long rendered this
impossible ; and fearful deeds of cruelty were perpetrated,
when the disturbances began, with equal impunity on
each side. From this cause has arisen the profound
and ineradicable hostility of the Irish Ribbonmen and
Orangemen at each other which still animates the mem-
bers of these unhappy factions, and, even in these times,
Castie- has crossed the ocean with their descendants, and almost
periodically,
with blood.1
resp. i/i89. periodically, on the 1 2th July, stains the plains of America
* " This country is daily becoming more disturbed. Religious animosities
ncrease, and I am sorry to say they are encouraged by the foolish violence of all
the principal persons who have been in the habit of governing this island ; and
the Irish militia, from their repeated misbehaviour in the field, and their ex-
treme licentiousness, are fallen into such universal contempt and abhorrence
that, when applications are made for the protection of troops, it is often re-
quested that Irish militia may not be sent." — MARQUESS CORNWALLIS to
MAJOR-GENERAL Ross, Sept. 30, 1798; Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 414
In the trial of some privates in the — — Militia for murdering a Catholic,
the court-martial found the prisoners guilty, and pronounced sentence of death,
accompanied with this recommendation : — "But it appearing that the deceased
had belonged to a yeomanry corps which had been disbanded, and that he had
not joined any other, the Court are of opinion that at the time the crime was
committed the prisoners did not think they were doing an improper act in
putting a person that they thought a rebel to death ; and, from their former
good conduct, the Court submit to his Excellency whether they are not fit
objects for mercy, and be sent to serve in a regiment abroad for life." —
Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 421.
AND UNION. 43
The leaders of the insurrection, Lord Edward Fitz- CHAP.
gerald, Mr Arthur O'Connor, and Mr Wolfe Tone, as
already mentioned, sent an agent over to Paris, who i?96-
reached it by way of Hamburg in June 1796, and Treafy6'be.
there concluded a treaty with the French Directory, ^h^beis
The conditions of the treaty were, that the French Go-??dthe
J ' French Go-
vernment should, in the autumn of that year, despatch a
considerable expedition to Ireland, in order to assist the
people of that country in their endeavours to throw off
the yoke of England. The expedition set sail accordingly
in December 1796, and appeared in Bantry Bay, but so Dec. 1795.
shattered by a tempest, and in such small numbers, that
it was deemed unwise to effect a landing, and it returned
in consequence in disgrace to France with the loss of seven
vessels. The facility, however, with which the arma-
ment reached the coast of Ireland, despite the blockade
of the British fleets, revealed the precarious footing on
which the Irish connection depended ; and had it not been
for a storm of unusual severity even on that iron-bound
coast, and the want of any proper concert with the Irish
malcontents, who were not made acquainted with the in-
tended place of debarkation, the most disastrous results
might have followed the descent even of the few thousand
men who formed the military force of that expedition.*
* It was resolved by the Irish Executive to accept the tenders of aid made
to it by the French Government. " In consequence of this determination of
the Executive, an agent was despatched to the Directory, who acquainted
them with it, stated the dispositions of the people, and the measures which
caused them. He received fresh assurances that the succours should be sent
as soon as the armament could be got ready. About October 1796, a messen-
ger from the Republic arrived, who, after authenticating himself, said he came
to be informed of the state of the country, and to tell the leaders of the
United Irishmen of the intention of the French to invade it speedily, with
15,000 men, and a great quantity of arms and ammunition; but he neither
mentioned the precise time nor the place, doubting, we suppose, our caution
and secresy. Shortly after his departure, a letter arrived from a quarter which
there was reason to look upon as confidential, stating that they would invade
England in the ensuing spring, and possibly Ireland. The reason of this con-
tradiction has never been explained ; but the consequence of it, and the mes-
senger not having stated the intended place of landing, was that, when the
armament arrived in December 1796 at Bantry Bay, they came at a time and
in a port we had not foreknown." — Memoir of the State Prisoners; Castlereagh
Correspondence, i. 366, 367.
44 HUSH REBELLION
CHAP. Taught by the disastrous issue of this attempt the
many difficulties with which the proposed descent on the
1797. Irisn coast was beset, the Directory resolved to make the
Rented next effort on a larger scale, and with the aid of a power-
fhf French ^ fe^, which might be capable of protecting the arrna-
a"d7bauie men^ across the Channel. To make the arrangements
of camper- necessary for this purpose, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Mr
Arthur O'Connor, and Mr Wolfe Tone went over to Paris
in June 1797, bearing with them the French memoir as
to the state of the country, and the arrangements made
i AntGt c ; for a general rising, from which liberal extracts have
§32, note. a}rea(jj been given.1 A second and more formal con-
vention was concluded by these more elevated function-
aries, by which the aid of a powerful naval as well as
military force was promised, but the number was not
specified, as the Irish Executive had come to conceive
apprehensions of a French armament on the scale which
the Directory were desirous to send."* As it was, how-
ever, the troops were embarked at the Texel to the
* " A small force only was asked for, because the Executive, faithful to the
principle of Irish independence, wished for what they deemed just sufficient
to liberate their country, but incompetent to subdue it. Their most deter-
mined resolution, and that of the whole body (as far as its opinion could be
collected), always has been, in no event to let Ireland come under the dominion
of France ; but it was offered to pay the expenses of the expedition. The num-
ber required was 10,000 men at the most, and at the least 5000. The Execu-
tive inclined to the larger number ; but, even with the smaller, the general
opinion among them was, that there could be no doubt of success. As to the
quantity of arms, by the first agent, 40,000 stand were specified ; but, by the
second, as much more as could be sent. The Executive also instructed its
agents to negotiate for a loan of money, if it could be had in France ; but, if
not, to negotiate for that purpose with Spain: the sum was £500,000." After
the negotiations for a general peace at Lille were broken off, our agent " re-
ceived positive assurances that the Irish never should be abandoned until a
separation was effected, and that they should be left entirely at their own option
to choose their own form of government. About the same time a person came
over, informing us that a considerable armament was ready, and embarked in the
Texel, destined for Ireland, and only waiting for a wind. The troops were
afterwards disembarked ; but we are ignorant of the reason why they never
sailed. . . . We know nothing of further communications from any foreign
State, nor of the future plan of operations of the French ; but we are con-
vinced they will never abandon the purpose of separating this country from
England, so long as the discontents of the people would induce them to
support an invasion." — Memoir of O'Connor, JEmmctt, and M'Nevin, State
Prisoners ; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 368, 370.
AND UNION. 45
number of 15,000, and everything was ready for a de- CHAP.
scent as soon as the way was cleared across the Channel _
by the fleet, under De Winter, specially intrusted with 1797.
that duty. But the British fleet, with Lord Duncan at
its head, lay between. The Dutch fleet, under De Winter,
came out of the Texel, and the battle of Camperdown Oct. n,
took place, which utterly destroyed the hopes of the Re- '
publicans in that quarter, and, in the most perilous year of
its existence, saved England from the danger of foreign
invasion. If we are to give credit to the poetic bio-
grapher of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, that nobleman, on
his way to Paris to negotiate the treaty with the Direc-
tory, dined at a nobleman's in London, in company with
Mr Fox, Mr Sheridan, and several leading English Whigs,
to whom he deems it probable the designs of the con- reagh cor
spirators were divulged. It is to be hoped his combined j
Irish zeal and poetic fervour has led Mr Moore to estimate
unduly the views of these illustrious English statesmen *• *6»» 16G-
on this occasion.1*
At length the battle of Camperdown deprived the
United Irish of their best-grounded hopes, yet they were
* " In order to settle all the details of their late agreement with France, and,
in fact, to enter into a formal treaty with the Directory, it was thought im-
portant by the United Irishmen to send some agent whose station and charac-
ter should, in the eyes of their new allies, lend weight to his mission, and to
Lord Edward Fitzgerald the no less delicate than daring task was assigned.
About the latter end of May he passed a day or two in London, and dined at a
member of the House of Lords, as I have been informed by a gentleman pre-
sent, where the company consisted of Mr Fox, Mr Sheridan, and several other
distinguished Whigs, all persons who had been' known to concur warmly in
every step of the popular cause in Ireland, and to whom, if Lord Edward did
not give some intimation of the object of his present journey, such an effort
of reserve and secrecy was, I must say, very unusual to his character." —
MOORE'S Life of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, i. 165, 166.
Emmett and the other State prisoners say on this subject : — " After the in-
tended descent [on Ireland] had failed, it occurred to some members of the
Opposition and their friends in the City, and to some of the most inconsider-
ate of the United Irish, that one more attempt should be made in favour of
parliamentary reform. . . . No greater connection than that of private acquaint-
ance and friendship ever subsisted beween any of the members of the Opposi-
tion and the United Irishmen, except in this instance, and for the accomplish-
ment of this purpose. In consequence of these joint efforts, a meeting was
held at the Exchange, which declared in favour of reform." — Memoir of
Emmett, O'Connor, and M'Nevin, State Prisoners ; Castlereagh Corresp. i. 367.
46 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, not discouraged, but resolved to proceed alone. Having
*• in vain endeavoured to urge the Directory to send them
1797. assistance, some of the more zealous leaders commenced
Firstling a rising in the March following ; but it was not general,
In i797ebel8 or attended with much danger. General Lake, on 13th
March is, March in that year, issued a proclamation, ordering
1797> a general search for arms, of which, according to the
rebel accounts, there were 100,000 in Ulster alone; but it
was not successful, as the quantity found, from the facility
of concealing them in bogs and peat-stacks or the like,
May 17. was by no means great. On May 1 7, a proclamation, of-
fering a general amnesty, was published to all who should
surrender and deliver up their arms within a month ; but
it too failed in producing any pacification. In effect, the
search for arms was productive of the very worst results,
and contributed more than any other circumstance to
spread hatred at the English rule in the whole island.
The regular military force being so small, it was only
by the militia and yeomanry that the search could in
general be made ; and it was just setting one portion
of the population, in the highest state of exasperation, to
lord it over the other. The living at free quarters, and
the domiciliary visits in search of arms, conducted by
these zealous but over-excited and disorderly bands, were
too often executed with an amount of harshness and
cruelty which awakened an uncontrollable thirst for ven-
geance. Above all, the custom, which soon became too
common, of inflicting military flogging in order to compel
the disclosure and surrender of arms, excited universally
the most indignant feelings, and has more than any other
circumstance fixed hatred at the British Government in
Ireland. So inherent is this abominable practice in the
British military establishment, that it has continued down
to times when it might have been expected to have given
way to the increasing humanity of the age. It excited
the horror of all Europe from its frequent use in sup-
pressing a recent revolt in the Ionian Islands ; and when
AND UNION. 47
the truth conies to be told in regard to the Indian revolt, CHAP.
it will be found that it was inflicted in India under cir-
cumstances, and with a frequency and severity, for which i?93-
not even the massacres of Cawnpore and Delhi can afford
any apology.*
In January 1798, Arthur O'Connor, one of the leaders
of the insurrection, went to London, in order to carry on violent
a regular correspondence between the United Irish and proceedings
the " London Corresponding Society," which, like them,oftherebel3'
was deeply engaged in treasonable designs. The mem-
bers of this society were in the habit of meeting in an
inn, in London, to discuss matters deemed too dangerous
to be brought forward at the public meetings. O'Connor,
and an Irish priest named O'Coigley, were constant at-
tenders of these meetings ; and at them, among other
projects, a general rising in the metropolis and through-
out the country was contemplated, involving the murder
of the King, the royal family, and many members of both
Houses of Parliament. Meanwhile the system of predial
outrage and violence revived, and attained such a height,
that the whole of several counties of Ulster and Leinster
were proclaimed as in a disturbed state by the Lord-
Lieutenant.1 So daring did the rebels become, that ini
open day a body of 200 of them took forcible possession 3
of Cahir, and the search for arms was made from house
to house with as much rigour as by the military authori-
* " We speak from an intimate knowledge of the dispositions and hearts of
our countrymen, when we declare the deepest conviction that the penal laws,
which have followed in such rapid and doleful succession, that the house-burn-
ings, arbitrary imprisonments, free quarters, and, above all, the tortures to extort
confessions, neither have had, nor can have, any other effect than exciting the
most deadly rancour in the hearts of almost all the people of Ireland against
those of their countrymen who have had recourse to such measures for main-
taining their power, and against the connection with Britain, whose men and
whose means have been poured in to aid them. The matchless fidelity which
has marked the Union, the unexampled firmness and contempt of death dis-
played by so many thousands at the halberts, in the field, in the jail, and at
the gibbet, exempt us from claiming any belief on our personal credit. If
the hearts of the people be not attached by some future measures, this nation
will most assuredly be again and more violently disturbed on the next com-
ing of a foreign force."— Memoir of State Prisoners; Castlereagh Correspon-
dence, i. 371.
48 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. ties. At length, on 19th February, the Irish com-
_ mittee passed a formal resolution to pay no attention
1798. to any offers from either House of Parliament, and to
eb> 19> agree to no terms but a total separation from Great
Britain.
This resolution, which was an open act of rebellion,
Arrest 'of brought matters to a crisis, and Government determined
cutiTO*6" to meet it in the most energetic manner. It was some
Marchl^' time, however, before they knew where to strike at the
1798- leaders ; and though they were aware that a formidable
conspiracy was on foot in the metropolis, they were
ignorant where its head was to be found. At length,
having obtained the necessary information from one of
their own leaders, the whole Leinster Executive Com-
mittee, fourteen in number, with the exception of Lord
Edward Fitzgerald, were arrested on the 12th March. His
lordship was accidentally absent from the meeting, and
thus avoided apprehension at that time. He continued,
however, notwithstanding the arrest of his confederates,
indefatigable in his efforts to promote what he deemed the
good cause ; and having established a new executive com-
mittee, the plan of a general rising was arranged with the
war committee, and fixed for execution on the 23d May.
The signal for a general rising was to be the stoppage every-
where of the mail-coach. The authorities made several
humane efforts to induce Lord Edward to save himself by
withdrawing from the country; but his fidelity to his com-
rades and devotion to the cause led him to decline them
all. The various barracks and posts of Dublin, the camp
at Laughlomlow, and the artillery, were to be simultane-
ously attacked on that day as soon as the signal was given.
^tiarrative Government, however, were informed of their designs, as
of Lord well as of the place of concealment of Lord Edward ; and,
-TjQWflm 1 y
Fitzgerald's on fae iQth May, four days before the insurrection was
Arrest ; J J .
to have broken out, preparations were made for arresting
him, along with several other leaders, in the house of
one Murphy, in Thomas Street, Dublin.1
AND UNION. 49
A reward having been offered by Government for the CHAP.
apprehension of Lord Edward, he had taken every pre- *•
caution to avoid detection. He had narrowly escaped w*-
seizure when passing with some of his confederates along Lord4E;
Watling Street, when Mr Lake, a very active member
the Union, was taken, and this had made him doubly
cautious in the place of his concealment. From the room
in which he slept in Murphy's house there was a private
staircase to the roof, which adjoined those of some other
houses, in which the means of further retreat had been
provided. His uniform had been sent there, and he was
to have taken the command of the insurrection, fixed for
the 23d. A Secretary of State's warrant was addressed to
town-majors Sirr and Swan, and Captain Ryan, directing
them, with eight soldiers, to proceed to the place of his
concealment. On reaching the house, Major Sirr and the
soldiers remained at the door to keep off the mob, while
Captain Ryan and Major Swan ascended the staircase
and entered Lord Edward's room. Major Swan was the
first, and on seeing his lordship, who had not time to
reach the hidden stair, he said aloud, " You are my pri-
soner." Lord Edward immediately aimed a blow at him
with a double-edged dagger which he held in his hand,
and wounded him slightly. Swan thereon called out,
"Ryan, Ryan, I am basely murdered." Upon hearing
this Ryan ran in, and, seizing Lord Edward, threw him
back on the bed ; but in doing so received a terrible
wound in the bowels from Lord Edward's dagger. Ryan
was unarmed, but a man of uncommon resolution ; and,
notwithstanding the wound he had received, which was
extremely severe, he kept his hold of his prisoner during
above five minutes that the contest lasted, in the course i
of which he received fourteen wounds from Lord Edward's ^ic
dagger. This frightful scene lasted till Major Sirr at cj'n-es^i.
length came in, attracted by the noise, with five soldiers ;l Moore's'
T -IT-IT T -Hi T i • -i ' t 11 t i Fitzgerald,
md, seeing Lord Edward still brandishing his double-edged ii. 371-373.
lagger, he fired his pistol at him, and wounded him on
VOL. i. D
50 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, the dagger-arm. Though thus wounded, and with his
L dagger fallen from his hand, he still continued a des-
•— . . OO
1793. perate resistance, and was only overpowered and secured
at last by the soldiers crossing their muskets on his breast,
and forcing him down.
Both the principal actors in this terrible tragedy were
Death of gallant and determined men ; both acted from the highest
Fitzgerald sense of public and patriotic duty, and both came to an
MidjDaptain untime}y eu& Captain Ryan, who was a brave and dis-
June4. tinguished officer under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, in the
103d Regiment, was so severely wounded that, notwith-
standing the most assiduous attention from Lord Camden,
Lord Castlereagh, and the medical officers of the castle,
he died on the 30th May. " Every loyal man in the city,
not immediately occupied by military duty, attended the
body of their beloved fellow-soldier to the grave. The
funeral was attended by fifteen hundred gentlemen in
uniform, and an infinite number of lamenting friends
1 Dublin swelled the mournful procession."1 * His noble antagonist
Julie™1' did not l°ng survive him. After his apprehension, he was
1798- carried, in the first instance, to the castle, where he re-
ceived the kindest attention from Lord Castlereagh and
the other members of the Government ; but ere long it
was judged necessary by the law officers to convey him to
prison, where he received every accommodation that cir-
cumstances would admit. He was from the first, however,
very much depressed in spirits ; and when he heard of the
death of Captain Ryan, and saw that a charge of murder
could not be avoided, he became desperate, tore off, it is
said, the bandages from his wounds, and died on June 4.
His remains were interred privately in Werburgh Church ;
but they were attended, in thought, by many millions of
* His widow received a pension of £200 a-year from the Irish Government,
which was certainly richly deserved, for his character was universally respected,
and his seizure of Lord Edward was a mortal stroke to the conspiracy. The
base wretch who betrayed the latter for gold received £1000, but his name
has never transpired. He was, however, one of the Union, or he could not
have been so accurate and correct in his information. — Castlerfagh Correspond-
ence, i. 462-468.
AND UNION. 51
his admiring countrymen, to whom his memory is still the CHAP.
object of interest approaching to adoration. Yet must L
the sober judgment of history, while it respects and does 1798.
justice to his previous character, and appreciates the purity F^^fd,
of the motives by which he was actuated in his last enter- JV Sjj1-3^;
<t Castlereagh
prise, pronounce a very different verdict on the conduct J^6^'-
which led to his untimely death.1
Lord Edward Fitzgerald, the son of the Duke of Lein-
ster, and the nephew of the Duke of Richmond, was anis
brave and estimable, but rash and misguided man. Hetei
had served with reputation in the 19th Regiment, during
the American war, and on many occasions had displayed
equal valour and conduct. At Gibraltar, where he had
latterly been stationed with his regiment, he was univer-
sally esteemed by his acquaintances and beloved by his
friends. A bill of attainder was passed against him after
his death, notwithstanding the opposing influence of the
highest personages, including that of the Sovereign him-
self; but it was justly thought that when so many other
inferior conspirators suffered, justice could not permit the
leaders to escape. It was reversed in 1819. His in-
fluence was great with the conspirators. " The Irish
nation/' says his associate M'Nevin, " could not sustain
a greater misfortune in the person of any one individual
than befell it in the loss of Fitzgerald at that critical
moment. With unquestioned intrepidity, republicanism,
and devotion to Ireland — with popularity that gave
him unbounded influence, and integrity that made him
worthy of the highest trust — had he been present in
the Irish camp, to organise, discipline, and give to the
ralour of his country a scientific direction, we should
lave seen the slaves of the monarchy fly before the re-
rablicans of Ireland, as they did before the patriots of
Vmerica." * Moore, in his Life of Lord Edward Fitz-
'erald, admits that the seizure of that nobleman and the
* M'Nevin was the author of the Memoir to the French Directory, already
ven, chap. i. § 32, note.
52 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, death of Ryan saved Dublin, and ruined the prospects of
L the conspirators.1 It is impossible sufficiently to lament
i'98- the calamitous combination of circumstances which brought
VfisT* two sucn men> both officers of the British army, who were
worthy to have stood side by side on the fields of Tala-
vera or Vitoria, into fierce and mortal strife in their own
country. Yet must impartial justice make this distinction
between them, that the one died in the courageous dis-
charge of his duty to his sovereign and his country ; the
other in the prosecution of a frantic project of revolution,
2 Ryan's from whicn a war Of extermination was undoubtedly to
.Narrative; »
Castiereagh \)Q anticipated in the outset, and certain ruin to the
Corresp. i. «i 1-1 • • •
462. cause of freedom, whichever side proved victorious, in
the end.2
Notwithstanding this loss, which was an irreparable one
Breaking to the rebellion, it broke out, under the direction of new
Seifion! leaders, with great violence, on the day appointed, being
May 23> the 23d May. The Government, under the able direction
of Lord Camden and Lord Castiereagh, were so well on
their guard in the metropolis that the rising was effectually
prevented there, and the public tranquillity was hardly
disturbed during the whole day. The mail-coaches, how-
ever— the preconcerted signal — were stopped in several
parts of the country, and instantly the outbreak took place
in several counties at the same time. It was particularly
violent in the south, in Kildare, Tipperary, Wexford, Wick-
low, Carlow, Meath, and King's County ; and in Limerick
and Antrim in the north. As usual in such cases, the
rebels had a very great advantage in the first instance.
The insurrection being universal in several districts, and
the troops stationed in them extremely scattered, in many
cases disaffected, and in all very few in numbers compared
to their assailants, it was impossible to prevent several
small detachments being cut off. Martial law was at once
May 24. proclaimed by the Government ; and the most vigorous
measures were taken to reinforce the royal troops in the
disaffected districts; but before the requisite aid could
AND UNION. 53
arrive, several calamitous checks had been experienced. A CHAP.
large body of rebels surrounded the village of Prosperous,
in Kildare, and massacred the whole soldiers, sixty-nine 1798.
in number, who defended it. A conflict of doubtful issue May 24>
ensued between a body of 600 rebels and a detachment of May 26.
militia, under Sir James Duff, in Wexford, in which both
parties claimed the advantage. On the day following,
5000 rebels, under John Murphy, Roman Catholic curate
of Bouvalogue, encountered at Oulart, in the same county,
110 of the North Cork Militia, of whom the command-
ing officer and four privates alone escaped. Wexford was
next attacked, and, being abandoned by the Royalists, fell
into their hands, with a considerable train of artillery.
This last success was of great importance, as putting the
rebels in possession of a seaport, by means of which they
could communicate with and receive succours from France.
They here sullied their victory by the massacre of a hun- , ComwaUis
dred prisoners in cold blood. Bishop Troy issued a pas-
toral letter to his diocese denouncing the rebellion ; but, ca
i • i rr- •> • • • i Corresp. i.
as usual, with efforts made m opposition to the current, 164,209.
it produced no effect.1*
* "Kesolve, we beseech you, to deliver up your arms of every kind, with-
out delay or reluctance, to those appointed to receive them. Unite with all
your loyal and peaceable fellow-subjects to put down and crush the wicked
spirit of insurrection, so disgraceful to the character of Irishmen. It has
already produced the most horrid effects. Assassinations, murders, atrocities
of every kind, have been committed. Lose not a moment to manifest your
detestation of the principles and causes leading to such consequences." —
BISHOP TROY to the Roman Catholic Clergy of the Diocese of Dublin, May 27,
1798 ; Castiereagh Correspondence, i. 210, 211.
" The rebels still continue in force in the counties of Wicklow, Wexford,
Kildare, Carlow, Meath, and King's County. It is difficult to bring them to
any decisive action. They commit horrid cruelties, and disperse as soon as the
troops appear. Should the insurrection confine itself within the present
limits, a short time will dispose of it. There are some unpleasant appearances
in certain parts of the north ; but as yet all is, in fact, quiet in Ulster, Mun-
ster, and Connaught. . . . The spirit of the country rises with its diffi-
culties. Should the rebellion prove only partial, aided by the reinforcements
expected from England I look with confidence to the issue, which, if fortunate,
cannot fail to place this kingdom, and, of course, the empire, in a state of
security much beyond that in which it has stood for years past." — LORD
'JASTLEREAGH to MR WiCKHAM, May 31, 1798; Castiereagh Correspondence,
. 212.
54 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. Now thoroughly alarmed, and aware that they had,
L with the usual apathy of a central government to dangers
1798. not immediately threatening themselves, underrated the
Reinforce- perils °f Ireland, the English Cabinet at length made
mentsfrom ^he most vigorous efforts to meet the crisis. Upon the
England,
and sue- urgent representations of Lord Castlereagh that the mill*
royal tary force at the disposal of the authorities in Ireland was
wholly inadequate to meet the pressing demands for assist-
ance which were coming upon them from every part of the
kingdom, the English Government sent over considerable
reinforcements of regular troops both to the south and north
of Ireland.* The successive arrivals of these reinforce-
ments ere long changed the face of affairs, and inclined
the balance to the side of Government, though the rebels
fought with the utmost resolution, and in some encounters
with advantage on their side. The mutual exasperation
of the parties, as in all civil conflicts, was hourly on the
increase ; and before a week was over, quarter was scarce-
ly ever given on either side. Colonel Walpole, with a
hundred men, was surprised on his line of inarch near
Tubberneering, and cut off, with his whole party; Gorey
and Carlow fell into the hands of the rebels, and affairs
wore a very threatening aspect in that vicinity. But these
advantages were gained over small bodies of the regular
troops only. When they were in greater strength, the
usual superiority of disciplined over tumultuary forces ap-
peared. Lord Mountjoy, with the Dublin Militia, repulsed
June 5. a large body of rebels with great slaughter at New Ross,
after an obstinate conflict of ten hours' duration, in the
course of which that gallant officer was unfortunately
* "In addition to the reinforcement of 3000 infantry and 1000 cavalry
already under orders, and in part, I hope, arrived in Ireland, his Majesty's
Ministers have this day advised the King to send 5000 more infantry (2000 of
the Guards), without delay, to such parts of the kingdom as his Excellency, in
his despatches of to-day, seems to point out as standing most in need of rein-
forcements— viz., the Guards to Waterford, embarking at Portsmouth (I hope,
on Wednesday or Thursday next), and the remaining 3000 from Scotland to the
north of Ireland." — MB WICKHAM to LORD CASTLEREAGH, June 8, 1798;
Cattlereagh Correspondence, i. 215.
AND UNION. 55
killed. Ou the following day 250 Protestants, embracing CHAP.
both sexes and all ages, were put to death at Sculla-
bogue to revenge this defeat; and on 9th June a body 1798.
of nearly 30,000 rebels made a furious attack upon Ark-
low, held by General Needham with 1600 men ; but that \F°™™™*
<f Corresp.
officer disposed his men with such skill that, after a con- »• 346;;
test which lasted the whole day, they were obliged to 1793, lee.'
retire.1
At length the reinforcements so urgently pressed for
by Lord Castlereagh haying arrived in the county of Battle of
Wexford, and the partial successes of the rebels having nm!8"
induced them to collect in a large body and hazard a June 21<
general battle, an opportunity occurred of crushing them
by a decisive blow. The rebel forces, much augmented
by some regiments or parts of regiments of militia
which had joined them, after some days' marching and
countermarching, during which they took up their ground
with such skill that General Lake,* who commanded
the royal forces, was unable to bring them to action,
at length took post on VINEGAR HILL, in a very strong
position, and stood firm. They had 14,000 men, most of
them well armed, and 13 guns. General Lake had
10,000; but the superiority of the royal troops in quality
more than compensated this disadvantage in numbers.
Lake attacked the position in front with his infantry,
while his light troops and cavalry, when the action was
fairly engaged, assailed its flanks. The rebels stood
their ground at first with great resolution, and the result
of the contest seemed for a brief period doubtful ; but
when the horsemen were seen ascending the heights on conwp. a.*
their flanks, they were seized with a sudden panic, broke relg^cor.6
and fled.1 The royal troops, regulars, and militia, behaved Lake's223 ;
extremely well in the action ; but they were so exasper- j^y^
ated by the cruelties which the rebels had exercised upon i«S 166. '
such of their number as had fallen into their hands, that
* Afterwards Lord Lake, the hero of Delhi and Laswaree, and so renowned
u India.
56 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, they gave no quarter in the pursuit, and the number of
L slain was painfully great. The victory was complete, the
1798. rebel army entirely dispersed, and their whole artillery
and ammunition captured, with the loss only of one
officer killed and four wounded. On the same day
Wexford was taken by General, afterwards so renowned
as Sir John Moore. *
This victory was a mortal stroke to the rebellion, and,
Lord ckstie- in its ultimate results, one of the most fortunate events
humane which ever occurred to Ireland, by closing the door to
tojGenerais uwoirtctioo and opening that to union and conciliation.
rS-d' to But, *n *ne ^rst instance, it increased to a most painful
the rebels, degree the embarrassment of Government, from the num-
ber of prisoners taken on the field or shortly after, and
the extreme difficulty of coercing the passions of the
militia and yeomanry, to whose courage and conduct the
success had in a great degree been owing. Lord Castle-
reagh's injunctions to General Lake in the first moments
of victory had been to strike decidedly against the
leaders, but spare the misguided followers — a policy
which, to the end of the world, will be found to be the
only effectual, as it is the only just, way of dealing with
re volutions, f But it was more easy to issue these
humane and wise directions from the Castle of Dublin
* " The troops behaved excessively well in action ; but their determination
to destroy every one they think a rebel is beyond description, and wants much
correction."— GENERAL LAKE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, June 21, 1798.
t I sincerely congratulate you upon your successes at Vinegar Hill. I
consider the rebels as now in your power ; and I feel assured that your treat-
ment of them will be such as shall make them sensible of their crimes, as well
as of the authority of Government. It would be unwise, and contrary, I know,
to your own feelings, to drive the wretched people, who are mere instruments
in the hands of the more wicked, to despair. The leaders are just objects of
punishment; and the situation of the rebel army such, that you may fairly
make the terms you give them rather an act of voluntary clemency than
conditions extorted by the rebels with any prospect on their part of success-
ful resistance." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to GENERAL LAKE, June 22, 1798;
Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 223, 224.
General Lake wrote in reply : — "I believe the lower order of people are heartily
sick of the business, and are abusing their leaders most completely, and will
bring in their arms in a day or two ; in short, I have every reason to hope
that a few days will settle the business here. I have taken Hay, one of their
AND UNION. 57
than to cany them into execution in the insurgent CHAP.
counties, where the broken remains of the rebels were L
pursued by the Irish militia and yeomanry, excited even l^9S-
to madness by the savage cruelties of the insurgents when
they had the power, and resolved now to wreak their
vengeance in the most indiscriminate manner on all those
connected with the insurgent cause. Lord Camden as
well as Lord Castlereagh did their utmost to restrain this
relentless and barbarous conduct on the part of the Irish
troops employed, but for long with very little effect ;
and it was not till the arrival of additional regiments of
English regulars and of British militia or fencibles, which
had volunteered their services in Ireland, had enabled
the Government at length to supersede in a great degree l Cornwallis
the employment of native Irish troops in this cruel civil g^1^ '.'•
war, that the disorders were in any material degree re- Castlereagh
i • Corresp. i.
pressed, and the authority ot law, over victors as well as 226.
vanquished, restored in that distracted island.1*
commanders, yesterday. He will be tried this evening, and most probably
executed. If I hear of any assembly of men, you may depend upon their hav-
ing a complete drubbing ; but I strongly suspect they will not try the chance
of another. The carnage yesterday was dreadful. The rascals made a toler-
able good fight of it. ... I have every reason to think matters will be settled
shortly to the satisfaction of Government. I believe we shall have most of
their generals. Roach has been tried this day, and will be executed, as will
Keugh, who was both general, adviser, governor of the town, &c. I really feel
most severely the being obliged to order so many men out of the world ; but
I am convinced, if severe and many examples are not made, the rebellion can-
not be put a stop to." — GENERAL LAKE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Wexford, June
22 and 23, 1798 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 224, 225.
* " His Excellency the Lord-Lieutenant highly approves of your issuing
the most j ositive orders against the infliction of punishment, under any pre-
tence whatever, not authorised by the orders of a general officer, in pursuance
of the sentence of a general court-martial." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to LIEUTENANT-
GENERAL Lift JAMES STEWART, BART., June 25, 1798; Cornwallis Correspon-
dence, ii. 353.
" It shall be one of my first objects to soften the ferocity of our troops,
svhich, I am afraid, in the Irish corps at least, is not confined to the private
soldiers. I shall immediately authorise the general officers in the different
listricts which have been the seat of warfare to offer (with certain exceptions)
o the deluded wretches who are still wandering about in considerable bodies,
,nd are committing still greater cruelties than they themselves suffer, the per-
nission of returning quietly to their homes, on their delivering up their arms,
nd taking the oath of allegiance ; and I shall use my utmost exertions to
uppress the folly which has been too prevalent in this quarter, of substituting
.)S HUSH REBELLION
CHAP. Henceforward the insurrection, once so general and
L formidable, was reduced to scattered bands of despera-
1798. does wandering over the country or seeking refuge in its
r/cam- woods or morasses. As this was the greatest triumph of
den is sue- garj Camden's administration, so it was the last. On
ceeded by •
Lord Com- the very day before the battle of Vinegar Hill was
wallis. J J , ,
June 20. fought, and, of course, not in time to take any part
in the arrangements which led to it, Marquess Corn-
wallis arrived in Dublin, and immediately assumed the
direction of affairs as Lord- Lieutenant. The reasons
of this change are obvious. Though Government in
England had the highest opinion of Lord Camden's
principles and talents, yet it was universally felt that
in the crisis which had arisen it had become indispen-
sable to concentrate the civil and military authority
in the same hands — on the principle which led the
Romans in similar circumstances to appoint a dictator.
This was in an especial manner the case in Ireland at
this time, when the war had degenerated into a Vendean
contest with small parties of rebels, especially in Wicklow,
the northern parts of Wexford, Kildare, and the borders
of Meath and Dublin counties ; and the royal troops,
especially the militia and yeomanry, were in such a state
of exasperation that it was at once the first duty and
most difficult task of Government to get them restrained.
Add to this that the English Government were ex-
tremely desirous to extract the religious element out of
this terrible warfare, and bring it back to its original
1 Ca&tia- and real character of a Jacobin revolt ; l and it was
reagh Cor- i i i -i • i IT MI
resp. i. thought that this new character could more easily be
given to the contest by a new Lord-Lieutenant than by
the word Catholicism instead of Jacobinism, as the foundation of the present
rebellion." — MARQUESS COENWALLIS to the DUKE OF PORTLAND, Home Secre-
tary, June 28, 1798 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 355.
"_The villains spring up like mushrooms ; but I am in hopes they must be
completely tired out shortly. We shall get in the arms in this country
shortly. . . . The horrid cruelties the rascals have committed are beyond
all imagination." — GENERAL LAKE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Weyford, June 25,
1798 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 226.
AND UNION. 59
one who was pledged, especially by what had occurred CHAP.
at the outset of his administration, to resist further _ _^
concessions to the Roman Catholics. 1798-
Lord Castlereagh, in pursuance of the earnest recom-
mendation of the British Government, was continued byLordc'om-
the new Lord-Lieutenant in the office of Lord Keeper, tur^oVthe0
and discharged, as before, until his appointment as secre-j**1,^^
tary, the whole duties of the latter office. Of the difficul- this period.
. July 8,
ties with which he had to contend, and the great capacity 1798.
with which they had been met by him, a strong picture
is presented in a private and confidential letter by Mar-
quess Cornwallis to the Duke of Portland, which has
recently been published in his Correspondence : — " I am
anxious to put you in possession of the best opinions which
I have yet been able to form for extricating this country
from the immediate danger with which it is threatened.
No actual force at this moment exists in arms against
us, except in the county of Wicklow and the northern
boundary of Wexford, and in the county of Kildare, and
borders of the counties of Meath and Dublin. In the
former the rebels act sometimes in small parties, but
often in a considerable body, amounting, I believe (after
due allowance for exaggeration), to at least 5000 men,
the greater part of whom are armed only with pikes.
The difficulty of coming up with an army of this kind,
Avithout artillery and baggage, in that wild and mountain-
ous country, has hitherto prevented our striking any seri-
ous blow ; and the ignorance of our officers who have com-
manded small detachments, has afforded the rebels some
encouraging advantages. I am, however, at present ar-
ranging a plan of attacking them, which I hope will
succeed so far as to disperse them, and to intimidate
them so much as to prevent their assembling again in
great numbers, which will to a certain degree have its
sffect in encouraging our friends and disheartening our
enemies throughout the whole country ; but I am not so
-anguine as to hope to reduce the county of Wicklow to
60 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, a peaceable state in a short time by force of arms. The
warfare in Kildare and the adjoining border of Meath is
1798. conducted, on the part of the enemy, entirely by small
parties, which attack escorts and detachments, burn
houses, murder those who will not join them, and retire
to the bogs. The rest of Ireland may, I am afraid,
be rather said to be in a state of present inactivity,
than of any friendly or even peaceable intentions to-
wards us. The Irish militia are totally without dis-
cipline— contemptible before the enemy when any seri-
ous resistance is made to them, but ferocious and cruel
in the extreme when any poor wretches, either with
or without arms, come within their power : in short, mur-
der appears to be their favourite pastime. Under these
circumstances, I conceive it to be of the utmost advantage
that we should put an end to hostilities, provided that
measure can be effected by the submission, delivery of
arms, and apparent penitence of the rebels, who have been
defeated in every action of consequence, who have lost
many leaders by the hands of the executioner, and who,
from all accounts, are in general heartily tired of the
business in which they are engaged.
M " The proclamation circulated by the generals com-
ntinued. nianding in those districts which either are or have been
in a state of insurrection, has, by the reports which I
have received, been attended with very considerable
effect ; but it has been represented to me that the
greater number dare not desert their leaders, who have
it in their power to destroy them if they should return
to their houses, and these leaders are rendered desper-
ate, by not having a hope held out to them that even
their lives would be spared. ... In the procla-
mation of general pardon throughout the country, which
I have now asked leave from his Majesty to issue (with
the approbation and concurrence of the Lord Chancel-
lor), I propose to exclude from security of life only those
who have been guilty of cool and deliberate murder, and
AND UNION. 61
to leave the leaders liable to banishment for such term as CHAP.
the safety of the State may require, to be extended in
some instances to banishment for life ; and it is proposed, 1798.
after the report of a secret committee shall have been
received, to require the surrender of three or four of the
most dangerous persons, who are now supposed to be out
of the country, within a reasonable limited time, under
pain of an act of attainder. . . .
" The principal persons of this country, and the mem-
bers of both Houses of Parliament, are, in general, averse concluded.
to all acts of clemency ; and, although they do not express,
and perhaps are too much heated to see, the ultimate
effects which their violence must produce, would pursue
measures that could only terminate in the extirpation of
the greater number of the inhabitants, and in the utter
destruction of the country. The words Papists and
Priests are for ever in their mouths, and by their un-
accountable policy they would drive four-fifths of the
community into irreconcilable rebellion ; and in their
warmth they lose sight of the real cause of the present
mischief — of that deep-laid conspiracy to revolutionise
Ireland on the principles of France, which was originally
formed, and by wonderful assiduity brought nearly to
maturity, by men who had no thought of religion but to
destroy it, and who knew how to turn the passions and
prejudices of the different sects to the advancement of
their horrible plot for the introduction of that most dread-
ful of all evils, a Jacobin revolution. ... I should be
very ungrateful if I did not acknowledge the obligations c^nwS
which I owe to Lord Castlereagh, whose abilities, temper, £ Duke of
0 *• ' Portland,
and judgment, have been of the greatest use to me, and July z,
who has, on every occasion, shown his sincere and un- Com'waiiis
prejudiced attachment to the general interests of the ii.°356p359.
British empire."1
Such was the policy which, in the moment of victory
)ver a formidable and bloodthirsty rebellion, Marquess
Jornwallis and Lord Castlereagh concocted for its final
G2
IRISH REBELLION
CHAP,
L
and Lord
reagh Cor-
™"|; j:,orn
MM*),
extirpation, and the alleviation of its horrors. It may
safely be said that their conduct on this occasion, and iu-
deed throughout the whole of this fearful contest with the
rebels, was a model of firmness and clemency, such as can
alone extirpate from a state, when once introduced, the
terrible evils of civil war. The mingled wisdom and
' . 1
humanity of this becomes the more striking from the
melancholy contrast which it presents to the fearful severi-
ties at first exercised during the Indian revolt fifty years
after. It was the earnest wish of both Lord Cornwaiiis
and Lord Castlereagh " that the measure [the amnesty
proposed] should have," in the words of the latter, " all
the grace possible, and pushed as far as compatible with
the public safety." There was an amnesty accordingly
agreed to by the Government, but it was not of the liberal
kind recommended by them, and prepared with the con-
currence of the Irish Chancellor. On the contrary, the
exceptions from it, as it was finally sanctioned by the
English Cabinet and published by the Lord-Lieutenant,
were so numerous as in a great measure to take away
from the grace of this act of mercy. As it was, however,
it did great good ; and the more so that, as Lord Castle-
reagh had earnestly entreated, it was issued " pending
the rebellion" — not, as in other cases, after its termina-
tion. The views of both Lord Cornwaiiis and Lord
Castlereagh on this subject are well stated in a letter
by the latter to the English Government, on July 30,
which is given below.1 *
* " I am very happy to find that the determination of the Lord-Lieutenant
as to the Bill of Pardon has been such as will relieve the Duke of Portland
from all anxiety on this subject. . . . It is the wish of the Lord-Lieuten-
ant that the measure should have all the grace possible, and that the principle
of pardon should be pushed as far as may be at all compatible with the public
safety. At the same time, his Excellency feels it necessary to advert to the
peculiarity of this act of grace being granted pending the rebellion. In every
other instance, the Bill of Pardon has followed the struggle, and the principal
object in view has been the quieting of the minds of those who had been
engaged in the treason. In the present case, the rebellion, though crushed in
a military sense, is yet in organised force ; and, in many parts of the kingdom,
disturbances still exist, and the people retain their arms with an obstinacy that
AND UNION. 63
Such as it was, the amnesty, following as it did upon CHAP.
the battle of Vinegar Hill, and the repeated defeats of _
the rebels in the field, had the best effect. Numerous 1798-
individual pardons were granted, which took persons im- violence
plicated out of the too wide excepted classes, and nearly ™ dtv™siou
restored the act of grace to the proportions which had extreme
f * Protestant
been originally proposed by the Lord- Lieutenant and party in
Lord Castlereagh. "Although/' said Lord Cornwallis,
on July 9, " there is no enemy here to oppose a large
body of our troops in the field, we are still engaged in
a war of plunder and massacre ; but I am in great hopes
that, partly by force and partly by conciliation, we shall
bring it to a speedy termination/'1 The chief difficulty 1 Comwaiii
which the Lord-Lieutenant experienced in this work of ii.0"^'
pacification arose from the violence and passions of the
high Tory party about the Castle of Dublin, who had
hitherto ruled Ireland. " The numbers of the rebels in
each quarter," said he, on July 1 3, " are, from the best
accounts that I receive, very small : they have very few
arms, and, except as a band of cruel robbers, house-burners,
and murderers, are very contemptible. Their importance,
however, is purposely exaggerated by those who wish to
urge Government to the continuance of violent measures,
or, according to a fashionable phrase of some men of
great consequence here, to keep Government up to their
indicates the cause is not yet abandoned. Under this impression, his Excel-
ency is of opinion that the pardon must be granted upon a principle of pre-
:aution as well as of clemency ; and that, although it might be highly dan-
;erous, by the terror of severe punishment, to drive numerous classes of men,
lowever deeply implicated in the treason, to despair, yet that it is still neces-
ary for the safety of the State to keep the leaders under the restraint of the
iw, holding out to them such a principle of compromise as shall not drive
hem to take up arms as the only means of preserving their lives, but shall
save Government at liberty to look to its own safety." — LORD CASTLEREAGH
i MR WICKHAM, July 30, 1798; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 243, 244. The
sceptions from the amnesty were persons in custody before its publication ;
lose guilty of murder or conspiracy to murder; yeomanry who have deserted,
1 administered illegal oaths ; persons having had direct communication with
ic enemy; the county delegates; and the captains of forces actually in the
'-Id. The greater part of these exceptions were forced upon Lord Cornwallis
• the English Government in London.
64 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, traces. I apprehend that I am suspected of not being
disposed to set my neck stoutly to the collar. ... I
1798. have been under the necessity of acting from a convic-
tion that, as far as it concerns the great mass of the
deluded people, amnesty is more likely to succeed than
extirpation ; and, even in respect to the leaders of small
note, to suggest that banishment for seven or ten years
would answer all the purposes to the State of banishment
for life or hanging, which latter is the most favourite kind
of punishment." " I have every reason to be highly
satisfied with Lord Castlereagh, who is really a very un-
common young man, and possesses talents, temper, and
judgment suited to the highest stations, without preju-
36i, 3o2. dices, or any views that are not directed to the general
benefit of the British empire." l
54 The firm and resolute policy pursued by Lord Corn-
Efforts' of wallis and Lord Castlereagh at length produced the de-
Comwaiiis sired effect. The bands which still infested the country
on the gradually fell off; the principal leaders surrendered on
condition of their lives being spared ; and at length, in the
beginning of August, tranquillity was restored in every
quarter. Lord Cornwallis firmly resisted every proposal
to negotiate with any body of rebels having arms in their
hands;* and this determined conduct, coupled with the
amnesty, produced a general submission. There remained
the difficult and melancholy task of disposing of the pri-
soners who had been taken in open rebellion, and to whom
no hopes of lenity had been held out. Their number
was very considerable ; and the Government had no small
* " Lord Cornwallis has always declined entering into any formal treaty with
rebels in arms ; and he cannot but express his great disapprobation of your
having accredited by your signature a proposal, highly exceptional and assum-
ing in its terms, coming from leaders to whom the proclamation sent to you
for publication did not apply. ... It is his Excellency's command that
you do return to them forthwith the proposal in question, and put an end to
the armistice immediately ; but, as there may have arisen some delay in the
merciful intentions of his Excellency being made known, he is willing to ex-
tend the time for receiving their submission for twenty-four hours from the
communication of your reply." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to GENERAL WILFORD,
July 18, 1798 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 367.
AND UNION. 65
difficulty in making the selection of who should be spared, CHAP.
and who left for execution. As usual, the extreme Pro- _
testant party urged upon the Lord-Lieutenant the most i?98-
rigorous measures ; and it required all his firmness, sup-
ported by Lord Castlereagh, to resist their importunities.
He did so, however, and the number of persons executed
was, by the humane endeavours of these two, very much
diminished ; and valuable disclosures were made in return,
though, on some occasions, they stood alone of all the
persons in the Government on the side of mercy.*
Before the State trials at Dublin were ended, however,
an event occurred in the west of Ireland, which demon- Landing of
strated that the apprehensions of the extreme Tory party i
in Dublin were not so unfounded as Lords Cornwallis and JjJ; 22.
Castlereagh seemed to suppose. On the 22d August a
small body of French, not more than eleven hundred in
number, effected a landing in Killala Bay, in the west of
Ireland ; and although their number was so inconsiderable
that no danger was to be apprehended from them if the
* " A proposition of an extraordinary nature was brought to me on the night
of the 24th from a number of the State prisoners, and the greater part of
the men of consequence amongst them, offering to make acknowledgment of
then- offences, and to submit to banishment for life to any country in amity
with his Majesty, provided that Byrne and Oliver Bond, who were then under
sentence of death, and Neilson, who is not yet tried, but who is likely to be
condemned, might be included in the offer, and be allowed to share the same
fate with them. I confess that I thought this a question of the greatest import-
ance, and one that deserved the most mature consideration, and Lord Castle-
reagh was of the same opinion ; but we doubted whether it would be possible
to find a third man in this place that would agree with us ; and I was sensible
of the danger of taking a step, without some legal or political support, that
would irritate almost to madness the well-affected part of this kingdom.
There was but little time for deliberation, as Byrne was to be hanged on
the 25th, and Oliver Bond this day. The Chancellor, who, notwithstanding
all that is said of him, is by far the most moderate and right-headed man
amongst us, was absent. I sent therefore, yesterday morning, as professional
men, for Lords Carleton and Kilwarden, the Attorney and Solicitor-General,
and the Prime Serjeant, when Lord Castlereagh submitted to them the
paper, with the signatures above mentioned." They gave their opinion in
the most decided manner against the measure ; and as " I could not act in
apposition to them, though not convinced by their arguments, the transaction,
to my concern, is now at an end." Bond was respited, however, in spite of
;he most vehement resistance, and the confession received. — LORD CORN-
VALLIS to DUKE OF PORTLAND, July 26, 1798 ; Cornwallis Correspondence,
i. 370-378.
VOL. I. E
66 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, troops remained steady, yet it soon appeared that they
T- were not all by any means to be depended on, and that a
1798. very trifling success on the part of the invaders would soon
involve the whole country again in the horrors of rebel-
lion. The expedition was under the command of Gene-
ral Humbert ; and as their descent upon the coast was
wholly unexpected, they effected their landing without
opposition or difficulty. They immediately organised a
provisional government, and set about raising troops.
They published two proclamations — one from the French
General, and another from Napper Tandy, an Irish leader
— both well calculated to excite and encourage the peas-
antry. * From the first moment of their appearance the
i Comwaiiis excitement was extreme amongst the country people, who
391^394' "' flocked to them from all quarters ; and, what was much
SSl'sp!*? more alarming, the strongest symptoms of disaffection
appeared in some of the regiments, especially of militia
and yeomanry, sent to oppose them/f
* General Humbert's proclamation bore : — " United Irish ! The soldiers of
the Great Nation have landed on your shores, amply provided with arms, am-
munition, and artillery, to aid you in breaking your fetters and recovering
your liberties. Napper Tandy is at their head : he has sworn to break your
chains or to perish in the attempt. To arms, freemen ! — to arms ! the trum-
pet calls you ; do not let your brethren perish unrevenged. If it is their des-
tiny to fall, may their blood cement the glorious fabric of freedom." Napper
Tandy's proclamation set forth : — " What do I hear ? The British Government
talks of concessions ; will you accept them ? Can you for a moment entertain
the thought of entering into terms with a government which leaves you at the
mercy of the English soldiery, which massacres inhumanly your best citizens
— with a Ministry which is the pest of society and the scourge of the human
race. They hold in one hand the olive branch : look well to the other ; you
will see in it the hidden dagger. No, Irishmen ! you will not be the dupe of
such base intrigues. Feeling its inability to subdue your courage, it seeks
only to seduce you ; but you will frustrate all her efforts. Barbarous crimes
have been committed on your country ; your friends have fallen victims of their
devotion to your cause ; their shades surround you ; they call aloud for ven-
geance. Irishmen ! declare a war of extermination against your oppressors —
the eternal war of liberty against tyranny." — NAPPER TANDY, see Hardenberg's
Memoirs, vi. 223-225.
t " I think it absolutely necessary to state, for your lordship's information,
that it is impossible to manage the militia ; their whole conduct has been this
day of action most shameful, and I am sorry to say that there is a strong
appearance of disaffection, particularly in the Kilkenny, as Lord Ormonde has
reported to me. His lordship's conduct has constantly been most merito-
rious, but his men are not obedient to his orders. The Louth regiment are
AND UNION. 67
No sooner did Government receive intelligence of this CHAP.
unexpected invasion, than they made every possible ex-
ertion to crush it. Troops were directed as quickly as 1798-
possible to the menaced district ; but, unfortunately, they Defeat'of
consisted chiefly of Irish militia and volunteers, whose fidel- ^cS
ity, doubtful before, became absolute treachery on the field Aus- 27<
of battle. General Hely Hutchinson,* who commanded in
the district, by great exertions got together nearly 4000
men and eleven guns, with 1700 of which he took post at
Castlebar, near Killala, on the evening of the 26th August.
The remainder were detached in two columns, under Sir
Thomas Chapman and General Taylor, to cut off the ene-
my's retreat to Killala and Ballina, where they had landed.
At midnight General Lake arrived, and took the command
of the army; and at daybreak intelligence was received that
the French were advancing. They had only two 4-pounders,
and from thirty to forty mounted men, besides the infantry.
The result must be given in General Hutchinson's words :
" Nothing could exceed the misconduct of the troops,
with the exceptions of the artillery, which was admir-
ably served, and of Lord Roden's Fencibles, who appeared
at all times willing to do their duty. There is too much
^eason to imagine that two of the regiments had been
Dreviously tampered with, the hope of which disaffection
nduced the French to make the attack, which was certainly
me of the most hazardous and desperate ever thought
>f, against a very superior body of troops, as their re-
reat both on Killala and Ballina was cut off by Sir
^omas Chapman and General Taylor. When the troops
ill into confusion without the possibility of rallying
lem, there was scarcely any danger. Very few men at
lat time had fallen on our part ; the French, on the
mtrary, had suffered considerably. They lost six offi-
11 disposed and in good order." — GENERAL LAKE to LORD CORNWALLIS,
gust 28, 1798; Comwallis Correspondence, ii. 391.
* Brother to Lord Donoughmore, and commander of tlie British army in
7pt after Sir Ralph Abercromby's death.
G8
IRISH REBELLION
CHAP.
I.
1798.
1 General
Hutchin-
H HI tO
Marquess
Cornwallis,
Sept. 21,
1798;
Cornwallis
Corresp. ii.
409, 410.
57.
Surrender
of the
invaders to
Lord Corn-
wallis.
Sept. 8.
cers and from 70 to 80 men, which was great, con-
sidering how short a time the action lasted, and the
smallness of their numbers. . . . The French were
about 700, having left 100 at Ballina, and 100 at Kil-
lala. They had with them about 500 rebels, a great
proportion of whom fled after the first discharge of
cannon. ... I am convinced, had our troops continued
firm for ten minutes longer, the affair must have been
over to our entire advantage ; but they fired volleys,
without any orders, at a few men before they were within
musket-shot. It was impossible to stop them, and they
abandoned their ground immediately afterwards."1*
Whatever faults the Irish may have, want of courage,
beyond all doubt, is not among the number, and therefore
there could be no doubt that this flagrant misconduct was
owing to disaffection and a secret concert with the enemy.
As such it came like a thunderbolt upon the Govern-
ment, and revealed the depth of the abyss, on the edge of
which they stood. Lord Cornwallis made the most vigor-
* The account of another witness is still more graphic : — " General Hutchin-
son was witli about 1500 men at Castlebar, and he had settled the ground on
which he meant to resist an attack. Between six and seven [in the morning]
the French appeared. They came on in three columns of near 800 each, as
they had armed many of the country people, and with two curricle guns. They
advanced with rapidity, firing their cannon obliquely on all parts of our line.
Their fire was returned with much effect by our artillery, which did execution.
The French continued advancing, and began a rapid charge with the bayonet
in very loose order. At this moment the Galway Volunteers, the Kilkenny
and Longford Militia, ran away. Lord Ormonde exerted himself to stop his
men. He first begged and beseeched — he then upbraided and swore at them.
He ran two of them through the body, and burst into tears. Lord Granard in
vain exerted himself with the Longford ; they behaved as ill. The 6th Regi-
ment, of 120 men, and the Frasers, behaved well ; and had the rest done the
same, the day had been completely ours. One of the French columns made
for our flank, which, I suppose, first disconcerted the militia. I hear that
a person who was prisoner with the French reports that, had our troops
sustained the attack for a minute longer, the French would have turned
about. A detachment of Lord Roden's behaved gallantly. I fear there was
disaffection in the two militia regiments ; they are Catholics, and were many,
if pot most of them, sworn United Irishmen. They are both fine regiments in
appearance — fine men, and well drilled — capable in point of body, youth, and
agility, and habilite, to face any troops. I am confident treachery will como
out." — EDWARD COOKE, ESQ., to WM. WICKHAM, ESQ., August 31, 1798 ; Corn-
wallis Correspondence, ii. 392, 393.
AND UNION. 69
ous efforts to arrest the danger. He hurried in person to CHAP.
the spot, taking with him every disposable man of the regu-
lars and English militia which he could collect. Such was 1798-
the zeal with which these troops hastened to the front, that
some of them, in particular the carbineers, marched eighty
miles in twenty-seven hours ! By this means Lord Corn-
wallis was enabled to collect such a force around the inva-
ders, that, seeing the contest hopeless, and their retreat
cut off, they surrendered at discretion. This was a most Sept. 8.
important advantage in itself, but it became still more so
from its consequences. The rebels lost now their last
hope, that of succour from France. They became, in con-
sequence, desperate. The leaders were all either in custody
or had fled the country:* and their followers, dispersed
and dejected, returned to their homes, in their external
conduct in general peaceable and submissive. Their
deadly feeling of hostility to the Saxon, however, nour-
ished in secret, was noways abated. It led some years
after to a fresh attempt at insurrection ; and it has in-
duced that inextinguishable passion for predial outrage
and murder which has so long been the disgrace of Ireland,
° t 7 Corresp. i.
and gone so far to render unavailing all the prodigal gifts 323, 339.
of nature to that beautiful but unhappy land.1
Another good effect resulted from this abortive attempt
at invasion, which, though not so obvious at the beginning, Good effects
was not less important in the end. The forces which ar- abortive
rived from England soon after the landing at Killala and m
* Napper Tandy was far from realising his promise to conquer or die.
" During the action with the Tom, he squatted on the deck, with a pint
bottle of brandy, which he emptied twice. The French officers on board, all
except General Ray, agreed in accusing Tandy of cowardice, imbecility, and
wickedness, and wrote a letter of impeachment against him to the Minister of
Marine. The names they gave him were infdme, imbecile, scelerat. To show
low the finances of France are, and how they meant to make their Irish
riends pay their expenses, their generals went out on that little expedition,
md all the money they could muster among them was about twenty or
hirty louis-d'ors. One of them, to my own certain knowledge, had but five
uineas in all." Napper Tandy escaped into Belgium, from whence he reached
Tamburg. — MB WICKHAM to LORD CASTLEEEAGH, October 25, 1798 ; Castle-
eayh Correspondence, i. 407, 408.
70 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, the disaster at Castlebar were known in London, were
T- so considerable as to enable the Government almost en-
1798. tirely to dispense with the services of the Irish militia
in quarters where any danger was threatened; and this
alone delivered the inhabitants from a most unruly and
licentious body of men, and spread universally the con-
viction that the country could be preserved from insur-
rection, and the empire from dismemberment, only by the
aid of powerful forces from England. The delusion of Ire-
land being able to defend itself was at once dispelled. The
conduct of the militia, both in action at Castlebar and
during the flight from that place, had been so bad that it
was evident no reliance whatever could be placed on them.*
* " The conduct of the Longford and Kilkenny, and that of the carbineers
and Frasers in action, on the retreat from Castlebar and Tuam, and the depre-
dations they committed on the road, exceed, I am told, all description. Indeed
they have, I believe, raised a spirit of discontent and disaffection which did not
before exist in this part of the country. Every endeavour has been used to pre-
vent plunder in our corps, but it really is impossible to stop it in some of the
regiments of militia with us, particularly the light battalions." — CAPTAIN
TAYLOR to LORD CASTLEREAGH, August 31, 1798 ; Cornwallis Correspondence,
ii. 394.
" I have little doubt of the Killala expedition proving a second edition of
the [landing in] Fishguard Bay [Pembrokeshire] ; but I dread the indiscipline
of the Irish militia : friends or foes are all the same to them, and they will
plunder indiscriminately, advancing or retreating; and, from what I have
heard, no effort is made to restrain them. The dread the inhabitants have of
the presence of a regiment of militia is not to be told : they shut up their
shops, hide whatever they have, and, in short, all confidence is lost wherever
they make their appearance." — to LORD CASTLEREAGH, August 29, 1798;
CastlereayTi Correspondence, i. 342.
Lord Cornwallis issued at this period the following energetic proclamation to
the troops : — " It is with very great concern that Lord Coruwallis finds himself
obliged to call on the general officers and the commanding officers of regi-
ments in particular, and in general on the officers of the army, to assist him
in putting a stop to the licentious conduct of the troops, and in saving the
wretched inhabitants from being robbed and in the most shocking manner ill-
treated by those to whom they had a right to look for safety and protection.
Lord Cornwallis declares that, if he finds that the soldiers of any regiment have
had opportunities of committing these excesses from the negligence of their
officers, he will make those officers answerable for their conduct ; and that, if
any soldiers are caught either in the act of robbery or with the articles of plun-
der in their possession, they shall be instantly tried, and immediate execution
shall follow their conviction. A provost-marshal will be appointed, who will,
with his guard, march in the rear of the army, and who will patrol about the
villages and houses in the neighbourhood of the camp." — General Orders,
Ballinamore, August 31, 1798 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 395.
AND UNION. 71
From necessity, therefore, the system was adopted of CHAP.
moving these militia and fencible regiments from Ireland
into Great Britain, and supplying their place by English 1798.
and Scotch regiments, which volunteered from the sister
island. Infinite good resulted from this exchange. The
Irish regiments, detached from the passions and disorders
of home, rapidly improved in conduct and discipline, and
became worthy to wear the British uniform : thence arose
the saying, which for half a century has been current in
the army, that the only way to make the Irish good
soldiers is to send them out of their own country. The
British regiments of regulars and militia, which were
sent over in great numbers in exchange, exhibited a
striking contrast to the license and disorders of the Irish
ones which had departed, and lessened the aversion at
the British connection by showing that the inhabitants of
England were not all the monsters in human form which
had been represented. They won regard and esteem
wherever they went, by the strictness of their discipline
and the gentleness of their manners.* Above all, the
result of this contemptible invasion, which had been hin-
dered from producing the most alarming consequences
solely by the intervention of British soldiers, went far
to lessen the confidence of the dominant party in Ireland
in their own strength, and diminish their aversion to
a closer and more indissoluble connection with Great
* This opinion was strongly expressed in a letter of Lord Cornwallis to the
Duke of Portland. " The orderly behaviour of the British [militia] regiments
in their quarters, and their conciliating manners towards the people of this
country, form so striking a contrast to the conduct of the Irish militia, and
impress the inhabitants with so favourable an opinion of the manners and dis-
position of their fellow-subjects in the sister kingdom, that, exclusive of any
consideration for the defence of this island, in a political view I regret their
departure." — MARQUESS CORNWALLIS to DUKE OF PORTLAND, August 23, 1799 ;
Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 126.
" The necessity of keeping a considerable number of British troops here is
obvious, and I should recommend that every means might be taken to induce
some regiments of English militia to relieve those which are now serving in
Ireland." — MARQUESS CORNWALLIS to DUKE OF PORTLAND, December 15, 1798 ;
Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 19.
72 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. Britain ; and on that account it was regarded bj Lord
Castlereagh as a fortunate event.*
1799. The suppression of the rebellion, and defeat of the
Results of French invasion intended to revive it, left the Govern-
thejebei- menfj at liberty to conclude the important and arduous
duty of disposing of the State prisoners. This was a
very serious and most laborious undertaking; for, be-
tween the landing of the French and February 1799, no
less than 380 persons had been tried by court-martial, of
whom 134 had been capitally convicted, and 90 executed.
Large as this number was according to the more humane
ideas of recent times, it fell greatly short of what the
loyal party demanded, who besieged the Irish Govern-
ment with representations as to the danger of " the
ruinous system of lenity," and even made some impres-
sion on Mr Pitt and the Ministry in London. Lord
Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh, however, stood firm,
and persisted in the humane and conciliatory policy. The
surrender of the French and suppression of the re-
bellion enabled them to dispense with the extreme
system of courts-martial, unavoidable during insurrec-
tion ; and the numerous prisoners who still remained
were handed over to the civil power to be disposed
of by the judges on the circuits. This led to colli-
sions between the civil and military authorities, which
required all the patience and prudence of the Lord-Lieu-
tenant to adjust. The labour undergone by Lord Corn-
wallis in revising and considering the cases was enor-
mous ; for they were all, in serious cases, submitted to his
revisal, and their number was very great. Exclusive of
" The force that will be disposable when the troops from England arrive,
cannot fail to dissipate every alarm ; and I consider it peculiarly advantageous
that we shall owe our security so entirely to the interposition of Great Britain.
I have always been apprehensive of that false confidence which might arise
from an impression that security had .been obtained by our own exertions.
Nothing would tend so much to make the public mind impracticable with a
view to that future settlement, without which we can never hope for any per-
manent tranquillity." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to MR PITT, September 7, 1798 ;
Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 337.
AND UNION. 73
those tried at the assizes, that upright nobleman decided CHAP.
personally on 400 men, out of which 81 were exe- L
cuted ; 418 persons were banished or transported! In 1799.
this laborious working out of the lenient system he
was cordially supported by Lord Castlereagh, but they
two stood nearly alone in these humane efforts, and in-
curred no small blame from the home Government,
as well as nearly all in authority in Dublin, for per-
sisting in it.* The devastation produced by the rebel-
lion, though it was only partial in the country, was
very great. The claims for damages sent in to Govern-
ment, after the rebellion was over, amounted to no less
than £1,023,000, of which £515,000 was from the
county of Wexford. The total damage done by the March e,
insurrection was estimated at £3,000,000. At least comwaiiis
i . i , , . • i i • Corresp. 111.
thirty thousand persons on the two sides perished m9o.
this melancholy conflict. af
What, more than any other circumstance, tended to
nourish the belief in England that Lord Cornwallis and Renewed
Lord Castlereagh had carried the lenient system too far, French °
was the slow progress made, or rather the total want of mvasion-
any progress at all, in really conciliating the affections of
any part of the disaffected population. Notwithstanding
the amnesty, the great number of prisoners convicted
whose lives had been spared, and the removal of the more
obnoxious militia regiments to Great Britain, it was pain-
fully evident that not a step in advance had been made,
either in awakening the gratitude or lessening the hos-
tility of the United Irishmen ; while, on the other hand,
the feelings of indignation excited in the breasts of the
* " At present there is a general, I may say universal, persuasion [in Lon-
3on] that lenient measures have been carried too far ; and it is a fixed opinion,
iccompanied by a disposition to attribute the calamities with which Ireland
s now threatened to a departure from the system adopted by Lord Camden."
-MR WICKHAM to LORD CASTLEREAGH, London, March 4, 1799 ; Cornwallis
Correspondence, iii. 90.
1* They were estimated by Moore, in his Life of Lord Edward Fitzgerald,
mch higher— at 20,000 on the part of the royalists and 50,000 on that of the
sbels ; but he had no data for the computation. — MOORE'S Fitzgerald, ii. 349;
astlereayk Correspondence, i. 466.
74 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, extreme Orange party, especially in Dublin, knew no
bounds.* Thus the danger seemed imminent of losing
1798. one party in the State without gaining the other. Add
to this that it was well known by secret but certain in-
formation that the French Government, awakened when
it was too late to a sense of the inestimable value of the
opportunity they had let slip, were making the utmost
efforts to regain it, and that the invasion of the west of
Ireland would probably be renewed in spring, not with
eleven hundred, but thirty thousand meu.t It did not
lessen the terrors of such a descent, that it was to be
headed by Generals Buonaparte, Hoche, Desaix, and the
most renowned generals of France. To add to the em-
barrassments of the Lord-Lieutenant at this time, the
British Government, having learned that an expedition to
Egypt, with a view to an ultimate blow at India, was in
* " In truth, my lord, I must plainly tell you that the unaccountable con-
duct of the present Lord-Lieutenant, which has rendered him not only an
object of disgust, but of abhorrence, to every loyal man I have conversed with
since my return from England, has induced many persons to oppose a union,
who, if uninfluenced by resentment against the Marquess Cornwallis, would
have given no opposition." — DR DUIGENAN to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Dec. 20,
1798; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 90.
t " If Ireland should be attacked again, it was to be with from 20,000 to
30,000 men ; but which, from the late havoc among their shipping and sea-
men, is next to an impossibility. The grand object of the French is, as they
term it themselves, London. Delenda est Carthago is their particular end.
Once in England, they think they would speedily indemnify themselves for all
their expenses, and recruit their ruined finances. The navy of England,
crossing them in all their monstrous views, is peculiarly obnoxious to them.
One of their most particular reasons for attacking Ireland, with a view to
sever it from England, is to strike a mortal blow at the navy of Great Britain,
by cutting off, as they say, England's right arm — the seamen and provisions
for the navy. The British navy, in case they should be able to carry their
horrid schemes into practice, is to be partly burnt and partly carried into
the ports of France ; thus clipping, as they say, for ever, the wings of the
English A Igerines. In case of the failure of the expeditions to Ireland and to
the East Indies, and in case of a peace with the Continental powers, an attack
will be made on England. The French Directory will sacrifice 100,000 men
in the attempt, and they are to live at free quarters, as Buonaparte did in
Italy, with this difference, that very little restraint will belaid on the soldiery,
either as to pillage or morality. The means for landing these men are the
various kinds of shipping and email craft in the different ports of France and
Holland, from the Texel to Havre-de-Grace ; and the time will be the long
and stormy nights in the winter season." — Secret Memoir from a French
Officer; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 410.
AND UNION. 75
the contemplation of the French Directory, sent to Lord CHAP.
Cornwallis to know how many regiments he could spare
for service in these distant regions ! In despair at the 1798.
numerous difficulties from friends, foes, and Government,
with which he was surrounded, and the failure of all at-
tempts to pacify the country, or reconcile its parties to * Comwai
each other, Lord Cornwallis was on the point of resign- 35™**
ing his appointment.1
These accumulated evils, which, so far from being
lessened, were materially increased, after the defeat of the views of
French invasion, and the proof thereby afforded of the wains an
narrow escape which the nation had made from civil war J^J
and possible dismemberment, more than ever confirmed ^nme^r"
Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh in the opinion that
if Ireland was to be rendered of any value to Great Bri-
tain, or even preserved as an integral part of the empire,
it was absolutely necessary that the system of govern-
ment in the island should be changed, and that it should
be ruled on imperial principles, without reference to the
ascendancy of any one party over another in the country
itself. The reason of this cannot be better explained
than in Lord Cornwallis's own words, in a letter to
Mr Pitt : — " It has always appeared to me a desperate
measure for the British Government to make an irrevo-
cable alliance with a small party in Ireland (which party
has derived all its consequence from, and is, in fact, en-
tirely dependent upon the British Government) to wage
eternal war against the Papists and Presbyterians of this
kingdom, which two sects, from the fairest calculations,
compose about nine-tenths of the community. If the
danger of such an act should strike his Majesty's Minis-
ters, as I trust to God it will, in the same forcible light,
it comes then to be considered whether a union with the
Protestants will afford a temporary respite from the spirit
of faction and rebellion which so universally pervades this
sland, and whether the Catholics will patiently wait for
vhat is called emancipation from the justice of the united
76 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. Parliament. If we are to reason on the future from the
past, I should think that most people would answer these
1798. questions in the negative, even if it could be supposed that
there would be no mischievous intervention on the part of
the English Opposition, from which quarter I am con-
vinced that you will not flatter yourself with the hope of
such conscientious forbearance. Upon this view of the
i Lord subject, if it is in contemplation ever to extend the privi-
^5d*p/t't leges of the Union to the Roman Catholics, the present
1798 l-7' aPPears to be the only opportunity which the British
Cornwallis Ministry can have of obtaining any credit from the boon
418, 419."' which must otherwise in a short time be extorted from
them."1
In these opinions Mr Pitt fully concurred ; and his
Mr Pitt's anxiety on the subject was such, that it absorbed his
ratifying01 whole attention even amidst the pressing exigencies of the
Ireland. French war.* He was determined, like Lord Cornwallis,
to concede emancipation to the Roman Catholics ; but
there was no small danger, if it was made an integral part
of the plan of union, that the whole measure would be
lost by the opposition of the Irish Protestants in Parlia-
ment, coupled with the violence and recklessness of the
Catholics themselves in the country. For this reason,
though with much regret, and after great consideration,
he resolved to bring forward, in the first instance, the
projected union, " unencumbered with any condition as to
emancipation," and to trust to the influence of time to
calm the passions now so strongly excited. His ideas were
identical with those expressed by Lord Cornwallis at this
time in a letter to the Duke of Portland. f He had a
' " Mr Pitt is eager and anxious to the greatest degree with respect to Ireland,
and it is the subject on which he contemplates most, and is the most uneasy.
... I read your last letter to Mr Pitt, who was much pleased with its
liberality. He entirely approves your conduct, and so, as far as I learn, does
every one. . . . My mind is quite reconciled to the measure [union], and
I am very happy again." — EARL CAMDEN to LORD CASTLEREAGH, October 11,
1798; Castlereagh Correspondence, i. 391.
t " The quick succession of important events during the short period of
my lieutenancy has frequently diverted my attention from the pursuit of
AND UNION. 77
long interview with the Earl of Clare, Lord Chancellor of CHAP.
Ireland, on this subject, at which his views were fully and
forcibly expressed. They embraced an immediate union 1798.
of the two countries, and after that, such a measure of
emancipation as might satisfy the just demands of the
Roman Catholics, and terminate by equitable measures
the seditious spirit of their clergy. His plan on this deli-
cate matter was to make some State provision for the
Roman Catholic clergy, and oblige every Catholic priest
to take a licence from the Crown for performing ecclesi-
astical functions, on pain of banishment if he officiated
without it.*
that great question, How this country can be governed and preserved, and
rendered a source of strength and power, instead of remaining a useless and
almost intolerable burden, to Great Britain. Sorry am I to say that I have
made no further progress than to satisfy myself that a perseverance in the
system which has hitherto been pursued can only lead us from bad to worse,
and, after exhausting the resources of Britain, must end in the total separa-
tion of the two countries. The principal personages here who have long been
in the habit of deriding the counsels of the Lord-Lieutenants, are perfectly
well-intentioned, and entirely attached and devoted to the British connection,
but they are blinded by their passions and prejudices, talk of nothing but
strong measures, and arrogate to themselves the exclusive knowledge of a
country of which, from their mode of governing it, they have, in my opinion,
proved themselves totally ignorant. ... I have at all times received the
greatest assistance from Lord Castlereagh, whose prudence, talents, and temper
I cannot sufficiently commend. No man will, I believe, be so sanguine as to
think that any measures which Government can adopt would have an immedi-
ate effect on the minds of the people ; and I am by no means prepared to say
what those should be which slowly and progressively tend to that most desir-
able object. I have hitherto been chiefly occupied in checking the growing evil ;
but so perverse and ungovernable are the tempers here, that I cannot flatter
myself that I have been very successful. With regard to future plans, I can
only say that some mode must be adopted to soften the hatred of the Catho-
lics to our Government. Whether this can be done by advantages held out to
them from a union with Great Britain, by some provision for their clergy, or
by some modification of tithe, which is the grievance of which they complain,
I will not presume to determine. The first of these propositions is undoubt-
edly the most desirable, if the dangers with which we are surrounded will ad-
mit of our making the attempt ; but the dispositions of the people at large,
and especially of the north, must be previously felt. The Chancellor [of
Ireland] is much disposed to this measure." — MARQUESS CORNWALLIS to DUKE
OF PORTLAND, Sept. 16, 1798 ; Comwallis Correspondence, ii. 404, 405.
* " MY DEAR LORD,— I have seen Mr Pitt, the Chancellor [Eldon], and the
Duke of Portland, who seem to feel very sensibly the critical situation of our
damnable country, and that the Union alone can save it. I should have hoped
that what has passed would have opened the eyes of every man in England to
the insanity of their past conduct with respect to the Papists of Ireland ; but I
78 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. Towards the success of these great measures, which
were sure to encounter the most violent opposition from
1798. the whole of the extreme Protestant party which had
AppSt. hitherto governed Ireland, it was indispensable that Gov-
Lord cLtie ernmen* should have the aid of a man, holding the import-
reagh as ant and responsible situation of Secretary, whose views
Secretary for . r . . . ^
Ireland, in \fQTe entirely in unison with theirs. Mr Pelham, who
Peiham. still nominally held that office, conscientiously entertained
°v> ' opinions adverse to any further concession to the Roman
Catholics ; and in consequence, his removal before the
measure was brought forward was a matter of neces-
sity. Government was considerably embarrassed in the
choice of his successor. Lord Cornwallis, to whom the
great abilities and judgment of Lord Castlereagh were
well known, wrote in the strongest terms to Mr Pitt and
the Duke of Portland, recommending his appointment to
that office : — " I know," said he to the latter, " that with
some few exceptions it has been a rule that the Irish
Secretary should not be an Irishman ; but still exceptions
have been made, and in no case could they have been with
more propriety admitted, than to bring forward at so mi-
can very plainly perceive that they were as full of their Popish projects as
ever. I trust, and I hope I am not deceived, that they are fairly iucliiied to
give them up, and to bring the measure forward unencumbered with the
doctrine of emancipation. Lord Cornwallis has intimated his acquiescence in
this point ; Mr Pitt is decided upon it, and I think he will keep his colleagues
steady. Most fortunately, we have a precedent in the Articles of the Union
with Scotland, which puts an end to all difficulty on the only point insisted
on by Lord Cornwallis, of which they are equally tenacious here. By one of
the Articles it is stipulated that every member of the Parliament of Great
Britain shall take the oath of supremacy, &c. on his taking his seat, unless
it shall be otherwise provided for by Parliament. So that it cannot admit of a
question, that a similar provision should be made for Ireland, which Mr Pitt is
perfectly satisfied shall be done. He is also fully sensible of the necessity of
establishing some effectual civil control over the Popish clergy, which he
thinks will be best effected by allowing very moderate stipends to them,
and obliging every priest to take a licence from the Crown for performing
ecclesiastical functions, on pain of perpetual banishment if he shall officiate
without it. ... If I have been in any manner instrumental in persuading
the Ministers here to bring forward this very important measure, unencum-
bered with a proposition which must have swamped it, I shall rejoice very
much in the pilgrimage which I have made." — EARL CLARE, Lord Chancellor
of Ireland, to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Oct. 16, 1798 ; Castlereagh Correspondence,
i. 393, 394.
AND UNION. 79
portant a crisis a man of Lord Castlereagh's talents, who CHAP.
possesses the general esteem of his countrymen, and who
i.
knows too well the real interests of Ireland to suppose 1798«
that they can be promoted by any measures that are not
equally favourable to the welfare and prosperity of Great
Britain."1 And to Mr Pitt he wrote on the same day : lLordCom-
" I have just received a letter from Mr Pelham, notifying the Duke
his resignation. I need not, I am sure, repeat my ear- NovOT7,lan '
nest wishes in favour of Lord Castlereagh." ' Mr Pitt, clmwaiiis
at first, was unwilling to break through the rules hitherto 428resp' "'
observed, that the Secretary for Ireland should be a 2 ibid.
British subject, both to secure a due attention to the im-
perial interests, and to avoid the hostility or suspicion of
partiality which would probably attach to any Irishman,
in the present divided state of the country, appointed to
that office. But the high opinion which he entertained,
and which was confirmed from so many quarters, of Lord
Castlereagh's judgment, talents, and temper, soon over-
came these scruples, and the appointment was conferred
on him.*
Lord Castlereagh was now fairly launched on the
stream of political life, and his appointment gave the
greatest satisfaction to Lord Cornwallis.f In the outset
»f his career a task of no ordinary difficulty lay before
* " When I first conversed with Mr Pitt upon your continuing Secretary
vas Mr Pelham to remain in England), I found a prejudice in his mind, as
ell as in that of others, against an Irishman occupying that office. The line
>u have adopted, and the perfect impartiality you have shown, have so much
ken off that prejudice in Pitt's mind, that he appeared, when I saw him at
ralmer, to have totally overcome those prejudices to which I have alluded,
d to wish that the decision was taken by Pelham not to return, and to
point you." — LOBD CAMDEN to LORD CASTLEREAGH, August 31, 1798 ;
istlereagh Correspondence, i. 325.
t " Lord Castlereagh's appointment gave me great satisfaction, and although
idmit the propriety of the general rule, yet as he is so very unlike an
shman, I think he has a just claim to an exception in his favour. . . .
len I found a man in the actual execution of the duty possessed of all the
iessary qualifications, with a perfect knowledge of the characters and con-
:tions of the principal personages in this country, I felt it to be my duty,
this very important moment, to press his appointment in the strongest
ns." — LORD CORNWALLIS to the DUKE OF PORTLAND, November 20, 1798 j
nwallis Correspondence, ii. 439.
80 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. him. He was brought into high office expressly to carry
*• through the great measure of the Union in the Irish
1798. House of Commons, of which, ex officio, he had now be-
Great4diffi- come leader. To accomplish this immediately after the
tSutii rebellion, and when its embers were still smouldering in
with which niany parts of the country, seemed almost an impossibi-
lity. To the reluctance which an ancient and high-
spirited people always feel against being absorbed and,
as it were, merged in a greater State, was to be added
the condition of the country and the unprecedented ex-
asperation which prevailed on both sides. The rebels
openly declared their determination to exterminate the
Orangemen ; the Protestants loudly called for continued
executions, and strongly expressed their dissatisfaction if
any rebel was pardoned. Add to this another difficulty
of a peculiar kind which was attached to this question, and
which augmented to a most serious degree the obstacles
with which it was beset. The English and Protestant
party, by whose loyalty and assistance the rebellion had
been put down, were the most determined opponents of
the Union. They were so not "only from the strong and
estimable feeling of nationality, but from other motives
of a less disinterested kind. They had long regarded
the country as an appanage to be farmed out for their
exclusive advantage ; and they entertained the most serious
apprehensions, not without reason, that a union with
Great Britain would be the signal for an immediate stop-
page of their separate influence, and a sharing with England
of the emoluments, offices, and honours which had hitherto
been exclusively enjoyed by themselves. Religious zeal
added to these already grave causes of discord ; and the
Protestant leaders generally regarded a union with Eng-
land as the first step in a series of changes which would,
in their ultimate effects, lead to the resumption of the
church lands and the establishment of the Romish faith
in Ireland. The Catholics too, it was feared, might
be brought to concur in the same views ; and, in the
AND UNION. 81
transports of their animosity against the "Sassenach," CHAP.
unite with their present antagonists to expel the stranger, _ L
in the hope that their preponderance of numbers would 1798.
ultimately secure for them the command of their country.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, it was indispensable
to make the attempt ; for Ireland had now been brought Adaptation
to such a state by long mismanagement, and the present castie-
violence of parties at each other, that it was impossible to ch^acter
go on with the existing system of government unless forthetask-
something was done to arrest its downward progress. Ire-
land, as Lord Cornwallis observed, would, if the present
course was persevered in, so far from being a source
of strength, become an element of weakness, which might
in the end prove fatal to the empire. The character and
disposition of Lord Castlereagh qualified him in a peculiar
manner to contend with these difficulties. To the strongest
and most intense patriotic feelings he united a calm judg-
ment, a temper the suavity of which nothing could ruffle,'
a resolution which nothing could deter. He anxiously
desired to heal the wounds and restore the shattered for-
tunes of his country, but his good sense told him how
alone this most desirable object could be accomplished ;
he saw it was not to be done, either by continuing the old
system of governing Ireland by means of a Protestant
)ligarchy, ruling by corruption, and applying the influence
>f administration exclusively to their own purposes, or
he new one of severing the country by a Jacobin insur-
ection from the neighbouring island, and constituting a
libernian Republic in alliance with France, ruled by
elegates chosen by Ribbon Lodges and Catholic priests,
'he only way in which it seemed possible to avoid this
isastrous alternative was by forming a union with Great
ritain, which might in the end amalgamate the two
untries, and, setting aside separate interests, unite the
dour of the Celtic character to the steady energy of
agio-Saxon enterprise. To attain this end was the
sat object of Lord Castlereagh ; and it was not less so
VOL. i. F
82 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, of the Government, which intrusted to him the arduous
duty of carrying it through against a hostile majority
J798. of the Irish House of Commons.
No sooner was it whispered about the Castle of Dublin
Opposition that a union with Great Britain was in contemplation,
Dublin. than the most violent opposition to it broke out in all
quarters, and those hitherto deemed the most secure and
influential. The barristers in the four courts were the
first to take the alarm ; and as the opinion of so able
and influential a body of men, hitherto the strongest sup-
porters of Government, had necessarily great weight, it
occasioned no small embarrassment to the Administration.
The shopkeepers and tradesmen in Dublin were equally
decided on the question. They naturally anticipated a
serious diminution of their profits and business if the
Parliament were removed from College Green, and the
capital reduced merely to the viceregal residence, or pos-
sibly the rank only of a first-rate provincial town. The
great commercial towns of Cork, Limerick, and Belfast,
were more favourably disposed, as the advantages of a
closer union with England were obvious to the great trad-
ing and mercantile interests ; but even there the violence
of party and sectarian spirit had produced a very serious
division. The great body of the Catholics stood aloof,
and took little share, one way or the other, in the contro-
versy. They regarded it as a quarrel among their oppres-
sors, from which they had some hopes advantage might in
the end accrue to themselves. But among the great body
of the Protestant noblemen and landed proprietors in the
country, who had hitherto been accustomed to direct the
Government in Dublin, the opposition was of the most
serious and impassioned description. *
* " It would be hazardous to give any opinion so early on the public dispo-
sition towards a union. . . . As far as we have gone, I see nothing to dis-
courage us. There certainly is not that positive prepossession in its favour
which can be expected to render it a very popular question, but there is as
little appearance of indignant resistance. The bar continues to feel most
warmly upon it; even in this body the steps that have been taken seem to
AND UNION. 83
Mr Pitt's views in regard to the Union, and the import- CHAP.
ant measure of Catholic emancipation, which was so closely L
connected with it, were distinctly stated in a letter to 1798.
Lord Cornwallis on November 17:" You will observe that, Mr |[t't,g
in what relates to the oaths to be taken by members of™^80111]16
•> _ Union and
the United Parliament, the plan which we have sent copies Catholic
[of, is founded on] the precedent I mentioned in a former tion.
letter of the Scotch Union ; and on the grounds I before
mentioned, I own I think this leaves the Catholic question
on the only footing on which it can safely be placed. Mr
Elliott, when he brought me your letter, stated very
strongly all the arguments which he thought might in-
duce us to admit the Catholics to Parliament and office ;
but I confess he did not satisfy me of the practicability
of such a measure at this time, or of the propriety of at-
:empting it. With respect to a provision for the Catholic
ilergy, and some arrangement respecting tithes, I am
lappy to find a uniform opinion in favour of the pro- 1 Mr p;tt
»osal among all the Irish I have seen ; and I am more to Lord
i i •,! rp Cornwallis,
nd more convinced that those measures, with some enec- NOV. 17,
1798 •
ial mode to enforce the residence of all ranks of the comwaiiis
rotestaut clergy, offer the best chance of gradually put- 2>™esp< "'
ng an end to the evils most felt in Ireland." l
As time went on the opposition to the measure,
pecially from the bar and citizens of Dublin, became Alarming
• ily greater ; and although the leading men of the king- °o the tlon
• m were divided in opinion on the subject, and some of Union-
e most influential, when consulted, declared in its fa-
1 e had their effect : there is more disposition to reason the point, and less
t iring it to a question of arms. Perhaps it is too much to expect to divide
t learned body; I do not despair, however, of having a respectable min-
c 7. Opposition from the citizens of Dublin is not less to be expected.
1 re is every reason to hope that a different sentiment prevails at Cork ;
tl 3rotestants and Catholics in that city (who seldom agree on any point) are
b alive to the great commercial benefits they would derive from it ; the
s; is said to be the feeling of Limerick : these towns cannot fail extensively
t< fluence the province of Munster. There appears no indisposition on the
p; of the leading Catholics ; on the contrary, I believe they will consider any
ti fer of power from their opponents as a boon." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to
M VICKQAM, November 23, 1798 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 443.
84 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, vour, yet there was soon reason to apprehend disturbances
of the most serious kind if it were persisted in. The
1798. " Lawyers' corps of yeomanry," on 30th November, were
ordered by their commander, Captain Saurin, "to as-
semble on Sunday next, to take into their consideration
Lord a question of the greatest national importance/' 1 The
to^ukToY meeting did take place, and strong resolutions condem-
Novhw,' natory of the Union were passed ; but a majority of
Conwaiiis the bar> though decidedly against the measure, had the
Corresp. ii. good sense not to countenance, by their presence, a pro-
ceeding so very questionable as that of armed men de-
liberating on public measures. At this critical juncture
the Government was much embarrassed by a demand
made by the English militia regiments in Ireland, whose
time of service, for which they had volunteered, had ex-
pired, and who, thoroughly disgusted with duty there,
now insisted on returning to their own country. This
demand at such a crisis, when the loyal party were
violently excited on account of the projected Union,
justly filled the Lord-Lieutenant with alarm ; and he did
not fail to represent to the English Government, that if
this wish were carried into effect, Ireland would again be
involved in civil war, and all hopes of carrying the
Union must be given up. The Government accordingly
issued a pressing circular to the commanders of English
militia regiments in Ireland, urging them to prevail on
their men to agree to remain a little longer, which had,
Cornwaiiis m most cases, the desired effect : and, at the same time,
Corresp. 11. i T • i •!• •
455 ; Castle- as many of the Irish militia regiments as could be spared
^ . , _ A j. — /^ j_ T> _ " J. -^ * Jl j. 1_ _ /~y 1 . _ _ _ 1 T _. 1 _1_ 9. £?•
sp.
Cat
'lsp.\. 450. were sent to Great Britain and the Channel Islands.2 *
But still the opposition was so threatening, and the agita-
* " I could not suffer myself to defer, even for a single day, my most earnest
nstances to your Excellency, to employ the most immediate and efficacious
measures to represent to the commanding officers of those corps [the English
militia regiments in Ireland] the extreme importance of their extending the
time of their service, and that, great as has been the advantage which has
been derived from their gallantry and liberality, the withdrawing themselves at
this moment could not but be productive of dangers, of a magnitude to which
they could never have attained but from the strength and confidence which
AND UNION. 85
tion, especially in Dublin, so great, that in the beginning CHAP.
of December Lord Castlereagh was sent over by Lord _
Cornwallis to London to give the English Government 1798-
personal explanations on the subject.*
The principal articles of the proposed Treaty of Union
transmitted by the Duke of Portland to Lord Cornwallis, Article's of
and received on 16th November, were the same as those*
ultimately adopted, and will be found below, t They con-J
tained (Art. 4) a clause regarding the oath to be taken by vj^™"t
members entering the United Parliament, evidently intend-
their gallantry could only have been capable of giving to the inhabitants of
Ireland." — DUKE OP PORTLAND to MARQUESS CORNWALLIS, November 21, 1798 ;
Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 446.
' " I certainly should not recommend the immediate removal of any of the
militia regiments, and I have no difficulty in declaring that, although the
French appear for the present to have laid aside the intention of making any
further attempts against Ireland, I think this country would be exposed to the
most imminent danger of becoming again a scene of bloodshed and rebellion,
ind that all thoughts of uniting the two kingdoms must be given up if
.hat force should now be withdrawn. Lord Castlereagh has informed your
Trace of the spirit of opposition to the great measure now in agitation which
las already manifested itself. I do not flatter myself with the hopes of obtain-
ng any very disinterested opinion upon the subject on this side of the water,
s I have not the smallest doubt that every man whom I might consult would
ivise such measures as he thought would best suit his private views, without
aving the smallest consideration for the public welfare. " — LORD CORNWALLIS
DUKE OF PORTLAND, December 1, 1798 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 454.
t The articles were as follow : —
1. The kingdoms to be united, and the succession to remain as fixed by the
.isting laws.
2. The British Parliament to be unchanged. The Irish portion to be settled
• an Irish Act.
3. Irish peers to enjoy the same privileges as Scotch peers.
4. All members of the United Houses to take the oaths now taken by British
imbers ; but such oaths to be subject to such alterations as may be enacted by the
ited Parliament.
). The continuance of the present Irish Church Establishment to be a fun
nental article of the Union.
!. The tariff in the French commercial treaty with England in 1786, to be
: pted as between England and Ireland. Special provision to be made with
: irence to the export of salt provisions and linen to Great Britain and the
i >nies.
. Revenue and debts. — The accounts to be kept separate. Ireland to pay
* of the annual charges. i Afterwards
The Courts of Justice to be untouched. A final appeal to the House of fil.1(j
Will
is.
The Great Seal of England to remain ; as also the Privy Council in Ireland,
< Ise a committee of Privy Council there. The Lord-Lieutenant to remain,
1 not to be mentioned in the Act. — Cornwallis Correspondence, ii. 435.
86 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, ed, at some future period, to admit the Roman Catholics
L to both Houses of Parliament, though it was not deemed
1798. advisable to hazard the Union by making it an absolute
condition at present. Lord Castlereagh's anxiety on this
subject was extreme, and he lost no opportunity of enforc-
ing these views in the strongest manner on the British
O C-3
Government. In a memoir dated November 12, they
were stated with equal effect and justice: — "If the
Catholic and Republican party can convince the Protest-
ant landholders that it is for their interest to join with
them in endeavouring to effect it [a separation from Great
Britain], the thing is done. Great Britain, with all her
naval superiority, could not long keep this country, almost
half as large as her own, in the manner of garrison, by
mere military force, and contrary to the will of the in-
habitants, supported, as they would be, by every nation
that envies her gigantic greatness ; i. e., by all the mari-
time powers, led on and animated by France. The pre-
sent astonishing wealth and power of England are, it
must be remembered, in a good measure factitious, i. e.,
the effect of superior industry, enterprise, and art. They
seem to be at their very acme of perfection. But advan-
tages and acquirements of so very fluctuating and transi-
tory a nature, if they cannot advance and increase, must
recede and decline. Ireland, if united, would mightily
tend to support, but if disunited and dissatisfied, would
act as a dead weight about the neck of the sister country,
to plunge her with more rapidity into the gulf of medio-
crity, if not of utter ruin, and to give room for the alter-
nate scale of France to emerge from under the vast
pressure of its antagonist's commercial superiority.
" The new, dangerous, and dashing spirit (to use a
Continued, vulgar phrase), that actuates the councils of that political
phenomenon, the French Republic, will, in the long run,
force her competitor to adopt a somewhat similar line of
conduct, in order to make head against her ; to venture
upon, what, in ordinary cases and in common times, would
AND UNION. 87
be regarded as very precipitous and hazardous measures. CHAP.
If the salvation of the two countries depends on their
being further united, the matter must be finished in a 1798-
session. We must not sit down with our arms across,
and muse and talk on the subject for a century, as the
Scotch and English did before they sanctioned a mea-
sure which has raised them to what they now are in the
scale of nations. Long before a century shall pass away,
democracy shall either have expired on the soil that
gave it birth, or its Gallic apostles have carried their
propaganda into every corner of Europe. There is no
medium. The ambition of the ephemeral leaders in a
small republic is circumscribed and kept within bounds
by its very impotence. But as, in this case, the vast
resources and active energies of the most numerous, stir-
ring, and formidable people in Europe are wielded by
men of the very first abilities and the most towering ambi-
tion, without which their situations were unattainable,
it would be unreasonable to suppose that they should
ever remain quiet for any length of time, that they should
ever cease to foster rebellion in the neighbouring coun-
tries, or avail themselves of the strong party in their
favour, which, if it does not always appear everywhere, is
ready to start up on every prospect of assistance and
success.
" Already have they developed the scheme by which
they mean to subjugate Europe, and climb to universal Concluded.
(I can't call it monarchy, but) democracy, though, were
I to give it its true name, I should rather call it des-
potism, for no countries are more severely used than
those subject to a republic. In the short period of
i few years, no fewer than five newly-created republics
lave started up, in order to defend, together with the
Ihine, the most vulnerable parts of the frontier from the
Mediterranean to the ocean. Nor is it by way of defence
lerely that these new states appear formidable — though in
his light they are truly so, as the continental powers must
88 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, march either across them or the Rhine to attack France —
_ they are, besides, so many craters, which the grand volcano
ws. (a better name than the great nation) has thrown up on
its sides, to deluge with its doctrines and reduce under its
onMUni°on dominion (or protection, as it is called) every neighbouring
Castiereagh state that weakness may render an easy conquest, or that
442^443. '' superior spirit and power may encourage to arrest its am-
bitious progress, or circumscribe its overgrown power/'1
This memoir is very remarkable, as containing a proof
importance how early Lord Castiereagh had discerned the real danger
memoir, of the French Revolution as a standing menace to the
independence of every neighbouring state, and the neces-
sity of the Irish Union as a means of enabling Great Bri-
tain to aid in checking its ambitious designs. It affords
the key to his whole future career when called to the helm
during the most perilous period of the contest with that
power; and those who charge Lord Castiereagh with being
an esprit borne, behind the light of the age, are recom-
mended to search for a memoir at this period, or for long
after, evincing so clear and prophetic an insight into futu-
rity as this presents.
A mournful tragedy occurred at this period, which hap-
Triaiand pily closed the long catalogue of Irish military trials con-
WoifeTone. sequent on the rebellion. Mr Wolfe Tone was a person
NOV. 12. Of a Yery different stamp from most of the leaders of the
Irish rebellion. He was more akin to Robespierre, Dan-
ton, Marat, and the other chiefs of the French Revolution.
He had all their audacity and recklessness of consequences,
all their sanguinary projects for exterminating their ene-
mies, but at the same time all their delusive philanthropic
views as to the ultimate regeneration of their country.
He was one of the ablest and most determined leaders of
the Irish rebellion, and one to whom, in justice to others,
no mercy could be extended. Arrested and brought to
trial before a court-martial in Dublin, he made an eloquent
defence, in which be endeavoured to prove that, having
accepted a commission in the French service, he was no
AND UNION. 89
longer answerable to the English treason law. This de- CHAP.
fence was justly overruled by the court ; but their conduct T-
in not allowing him to read part of the written defence he !798.
had prepared was not equally justifiable, and therefore it °v' '
is given below.* He was convicted, and sentenced to
death ; and his Memoirs, published by his son, prove that if
death should ever be inflicted for purely political offences,
it was rightly adjudged in his case. On the morning of
his execution, however, having obtained a razor, he cut his NOV. 12.
throat in prison, and, in spite of every effort to prolong his
life, he died soon after. This melancholy event caused
a great sensation, and, like many a similar catastrophe,
produced in the end a beneficial result. It brought the
civil and military powers fairly into collision; and had
a material effect in terminating the sittings of the latter,
which, in truth, from the suppression of the rebellion, were
no longer necessary. It tended also, in some degree, to
reconcile many hitherto averse to it to the Union, by de-
monstrating at once the accumulated social and political
evils which had brought men of such stamp into a league co£™wa"
for the overthrow of the Government, and the narrow 433;
i . -I i . reagh Cor-
escape which the nation had made from general massacre reap. i. 445.
and miseries unutterable in the attempt to bring it about.1 f
* The suppressed passage was as follows :• — " I have laboured, in consequence,
to create a people in Ireland, by raising three millions of my countrymen to
the rank of citizens. I have laboured to abolish the infernal spirit of religious
persecution by uniting the Catholics and Dissenters. To the former I owe
more than can ever be repaid ; the services I was so fortunate as to render
them they rewarded munificently ; but they did more : when the public cry
was raised against me, when the friends of my youth swarmed off and left me
ilone, the Catholics did not desert me — they had the virtue even to sacrifice
:heir own interests to a rigid principle of honour ; they refused, though strongly
irged, to disgrace a man who, whatever his conduct towards the Government
night have been, had faithfully and conscientiously discharged his duty towards
hem ; and in so doing, though it was in my own case, I will say they showed an
astance of public virtue and honour of which I know not whether there exists
nother example." — Wolfe Tone's Defence, Nov. 10, 1798; Cornwallis Cor-
^spondence, ii. 433.
"f " Tone is to be tried to-morrow. I am afraid these perpetual court-martials
•hile the courts are sitting will become a subject for debate — they are of con-
srsation." — E. COOKE, ESQ. to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Nov. 9, 1798 ; Castlereagh
'orrespondence, i. 432.
" Whilst the rebels were in the field in force, the necessity of punishment by
90
IKISH REBELLION
wards the
Union.
CHAP. In the midst of these heartburnings and difficulties, the
_ great measure of the Union was brought forward by Lord
1798- Castlereagh; and the reception it met with, in the very
. 74- outset, gave an earnest of the extraordinary difficulties
First move- ° *
t to- which it would have to encounter before it could be brought
to a successful issue. Future times, relieved of the greatest
difficulty with which the British Government had to con-
tend at this critical period, will find it difficult to credit
the general burst of indignation with which a measure was
received which had no other object but to " extend to
Ireland all the advantages of order, commercial prosperity,
and security, which the British portion of the empire
enjoyed, by a legislative incorporation/'1 Not only the
great features, but all the details, down to the minutest
particulars of this grand measure, were worked out by
Lord Castlereagh, both in their original conception in the
Cabinet and in the subsequent contest in the Legislature;
1 Castle-
reagh Cor-
resp. i. 14.
military tribunals was so obvious as not to admit of a question ; indeed, the
degree of public danger was then such as to preclude the ordinary courts of law
from sitting. Latterly the rebellion has degenerated, particularly in the counties
of Wicklow, Wexford, Kildare, Westmeatb, and Dublin, into a petty warfare,
not less afflicting to the loyal inhabitants, though less formidable to the State.
In those counties the number of persons taken in the commission of the most
shocking crimes, still acting upon treasonable and systematic principles, has
been such as to render it impossible to trust to the usual administration of
justice for the punishment of the offenders : indeed, in Wicklow and Wexford
it has been found altogether impracticable to hold the assizes. The two juris-
dictions being in activity at the same time, could not well fail to clash sooner or
later, as has happened in Tone's case. His conviction will be effected with eqxial
certainty by civil as by military law, his trial being had in the metropolis, where
the courts are open ; and, under the circumstances of the case, it is not of that
description upon which it would be expedient to bring the matter to issue:
but it certainly deserves to be well considered, should the country remain
unsettled for any length of time, whether both jurisdictions are not requisite.
... It was before resisted upon the principle that there was less violence done
to the constitution in giving indemnity to those who have acted illegally for
the preservation of the State, than in enacting laws so adverse to the usual
spirit of our Legislature. ... I trust, however, that the internal situation of
the country may improve, now the prospect of foreign assistance is in a great
measure at an end, and that we may be saved an alternative so unpleasant as
that qf yielding to this tormenting evil, rather than risk the adoption of a strong
remedy, or of being driven to extend the powers of a military code to civil
crimes, if crimes can be called civil which are invariably committed in arms." —
LORD CASTLEREAGH to MB WICKHAM, Nov. 16, 1798; Castlereagh Correspond-
ence, L 446, 447,
AND UNION. 91
and it is not going too far to assert, that it was mainly CHAP.
owing to the courage, perseverance, judgment, and talent,
as well as tact and temper with which he supported it, 1798.
that its ultimate success, fraught as it was with the best * Ibld>
interests of the empire, is to be ascribed. l
For some little time after it had become generally
known that a proposal for uniting the two countries wasRapidpro-
about to be brought forward, there was a sort of stupor fiance16
in the public mind on the subject, and hopes were even ^^
entertained at the Castle that it would pass without any
very serious opposition ; but they were soon undeceived.
The barristers of the four courts, as already noticed, were
the first to take it up, which they did warmly and almost
unanimously. Several able pamphlets appeared against
the measure from the pen of gentlemen, supporters of the
Government on ordinary occasions, particularly Sir Jonah
Barrington, Judge of the Court of Admiralty, and Mr
Bushe, afterwards Solicitor-General and Chief-Justice of
Ireland, and Mr Jebb, M.P. These productions quickly
blew the embers into a flame. The violence rapidly
increased, and soon became excessive. The general
strain of the argument against the measure was, that
absenteeism would extend, the interest of the debt to
England increase, their manufactures be ruined by the
removal of all protection against British manufactures,
the proprietors and shopkeepers in Dublin be impover-
ished, and the country drained of all its money to enrich
the neighbouring island. What much strengthened the
side of the opponents of the measure was, that the
strongest arguments in favour of it could not be brought 2 Mr cwke
forward, they being founded on the misgovernment of the £ Jtk^
country under former administrations ; which would not \c5agi79^?c'
only have sounded strange in the mouth of the supporters castiereagh
. . Corresp. 11.
of the present administration, but gone far to vindicate 43-45.
the rebellion in the eyes of those at a distance. 2
While this vehement struggle was commencing among
the Protestants, the great body of the Roman Catholics,
92 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, who, from their influence in the counties, might be likely
to cast the balance one way or other, remained inactive,
and to appearance indifferent. They were not so, how-
ever, in reality, but they were distracted by opposite
considerations. On the one hand, they felt that a union
with a country of such influence and resources as Great
Britain would immediately weaken, and in the end pro-
bably extinguish, the ascendancy of that Protestant
oligarchy which had hitherto ruled the country ; and
thus remove many of the most serious evils under which
it has so long laboured, and restore the Catholics to that
rank and position to which, by their great preponderance
in numbers, they were entitled. On the other hand,
this very circumstance rendered the far-seeing Catholic
leaders very doubtful of the policy of supporting the
measure. Their great numerical superiority, with the
growing tendency of the age towards popular institutions,
rendered it next to certain that in a separate legislature
they would have a majority, and, as long as they were
kept separate, give them the entire command of Ireland.
Thus the Catholic body were irresolute and divided.
Lord Fingall and the higher part of their number in-
clined to the support of the measure, but in so feeble and
languid a way that little was to be expected from their
co-operation ; and the utmost that could reasonably be
hoped for was, that they would be neutral in the ap-
proaching conflict.1
The most formidable opposition to the measure was
found among the barristers and citizens of Dublin, the
country gentlemen over all Ireland, and the lower ranks
of the Orangemen and Protestants of the north. With
most of them it was not mere resistance, but absolute hor-
ror.* The opposition of these classes was the more to be
* " When I warn you of the universal disgust, nay horror, that Dublin, and
even all the lower part of the north, have at the idea of the Union, I do not do
it with any idea that my opinion would have a weight in turning Government
from their design, but from a wish that they should know what they have to
contend with ; for I confess to you, that I fear more the effect the measure
AND UNION. 93
apprehended that they were the very ones which had CHAP.
stood most resolutely by the Government in. the late L
crisis ; that their representatives had hitherto formed a 1798-
decided, and in fact the ruling majority in the Irish
Parliament ; and that, apart from the influence of the
Crown and that of a few disinterested patriots, there was
no counter-influence in the country which could be relied
on except the lukewarm and doubtful support of those who
had so recently been arrayed in open rebellion against
them. It must be admitted that a more arduous and
hazardous undertaking could hardly be figured than such
a one at such a crisis ; and the difficulty was much
enhanced by the circumstance that whatever might be
the prospective and ultimate advantages of the measure,
it threatened, in the first instance at least, to inflict a
great and serious injury on many of the most important
vested interests of the country.
In a very able memoir on this subject submitted at
this time to the Duke of Portland as Home Secretary by Memoir by
Lord Castlereagh, the reality and magnitude of these ^a^lf e
threatened interests was very clearly brought out. The the 8ubJ'ect-
classes which he stated as likely to be injured by the
direct effects of the Union, were the borough proprietors,
the primary and secondary interests in counties, the
barristers, the purchasers of seats in the present Parlia-
ment, and the inhabitants of Dublin. He estimated the
loss directly accruing to these classes from the Union at
£1,455,000.* With truth did he add: " If the above
will have on the minds of the people, particularly those that were the best
affected, than I do the measure itself."- — J. C. BERESFORD, ESQ., to LORD
CASTLEREAGH, December 19, 1798 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, ii. 51.
* "It is evident that borough property must suffer a diminution of value
by the proposed arrangement. There being but one member for each county
intended, thirty-two individuals, whose weight now returns them to Parlia-
ment, must stand absolutely excluded. The primary interests, though not
threatened with exclusion, are exposed to new contests. The barristers in
Parliament look to it as depriving them of their best means of advance-
ment, and of their present business in the courts, if they support it, the
attorneys having formed a combination for this purpose. The purchasers are
averse to it, as being a surrender without advantage of the money paid for
94 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, statement approaches towards the truth, there is a most
L formidable principle of resistance existing in the nature
1799. of the arrangement, which, connected with the general
strength of opposition and supported by local clamour,
it is difficult for the weight of administration or the merits
of the measure itself to overcome. What measure of
national advantage could prevail on the individuals of
whom Parliament is composed to sacrifice a million and
a half of their own private property for the public
benefit "? National calamity or popular authority might
compel them to do so ; but the danger must be more
imminent, and their preservation be more obviously and
immediately connected than it is, or else the popular
authority must be very strong in favour of the measure,
before they will yield their private to their public feel-
their present seats. The individuals connected with Dublin, right or wrong,
consider a union as tending to lower the value of their property.
" Some estimate may be made of the amount of value thus supposed to operate
against the measure. It is proposed to alternate 108 boroughs. Taking an Irish
seat at £2000, and an English seat at £4000, the loss of value on an Irish
borough would be about one-half, or £7000 on each — making, in the gross,
£756,000. Estimating a county seat at an equal value, where the superior
pride of the situation counterbalances its uncertainty, the loss on thirty-two
seats extinguished amounts to £224,000. The superior value of the other
seat cannot, as in the boroughs, operate as a set-off, as it does not in the
case of counties belong to the same individual ; it can only counterbalance,
in a certain degree, to the person possessing the leading interests, the superior
risk and expense to which he will be exposed. It is difficult to estimate the
private interests of the hamsters, but it must be pretty considerable, as they
are about thirty in number, many of whom purchased their seats — say £4000
each — taking their seats and prospects of situation together, which gives a re-
sult of £200,000. The purchasers into the present Parliament are very
numerous; supposing only fifty at £1500 each, seats being peculiarly cheap,
gives £75,000. The Dublin influence it is difficult to estimate ; it arises out
of property and houses, lands, canal shares, &c., which the owners very falsely
conceive would suffer in Dublin — call it £200,000. The calculation will then
stand thus : —
Boroughs, . . . £756,000
Counties, .
Barristers, .
Purchasers,
Dublin, .
224,000
200,000
75,000
200,000
£1,455,000"
— Memorandum relative to Opposition to the Union, ly LORD CASTLEREAQH, sent
to DUKE OF PORTLAND, Feb. 1, 1799 ; Castlereagh Corresp., ii. 150, 151.
AND UNION. 95
ings. Without presuming to recommend any alteration CHAP.
of the plan of representation decided on, it may be ob- _ L
served that, holding as it does a fair hand between the 1799.
popular and borough influence, like all compromises, by
its impartiality it pleases neither of the parties. If the
obstacles above alluded to are so serious as to retard, if
not defeat, this great measure, it is worth looking at the
possibility of diminishing or removing some of them.
The borough objection may be removed at once by pe- p
cuniary compensation ; the county impediment, by giving F^. 1,
a second member. The other three classes cannot be
reconciled by any change in the distribution of the 151^152.
representation."1
Deeply impressed with the numerous difficulties with
which the measure was beset, and the hourly increasing views of
strength of the opposition which was getting up against SentTnd
it, Lord Castiereagh clearly perceived and strongly im- ^r^c0^t
pressed upon Government the absolute necessity, what- Catholic
•111 r c emancipa
ever might be done afterwards, of making the conces- tion.
sion of the Catholic claim to seats in Parliament no
part of the measure of Union. It was difficult enough
to carry it without such a clog ; with it, the attempt
would be altogether hopeless. The Duke of Portland
and Mr Pitt, while intending to grant emancipation, in
the end entirely concurred in this opinion.* Lord
Castiereagh saw that under the existing franchise the
Roman Catholics, from their superior numbers, would
* " I wrote to the Lord-Lieutenant yesterday on the subject of his conversa-
tion with Lord Kenmare, in which I deprecated, in the strongest terms, any
encouragement being given to the Catholics to hope for any alteration in their
situation, as long as the Parliament of Ireland should continue in its present
state. The more I consider that proposition, the more I am convinced that
it never ought to be attempted, unless a union takes place ; that, in the present
circumstances — I mean the state of Ireland's present independence — it would
3e equally injurious to the orderly Catholics, who are now possessed of landed
ind personal property, and to the Protestants ; and that it would once more
leluge the country with blood ; and that what is called Catholic emancipation
&nnot be attempted with safety to the persons of either persuasion but
hrough the medium of a union, and by the means of a United Parliament."
-T)UKE OF PORTLAND to LORD CASTLEREAGH, January 29, 1799; Castiereagh
fvrrespondence, ii. 147.
.06 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, soon acquire the command of a purely Irish Parliament ;
and the moment they did so, nothing but an immediate
1793. civil war between them and the Protestants was to be
anticipated, for the Catholics had the real and imaginary
wrongs of more than a century to avenge. It would be
otherwise in a United Parliament, for there the Catholics
would be in as decided a minority as the Protestants would
be in one in Ireland only. Therefore, it was that union
reagh ° must precede emancipation, and the former measure
142453'. "' be unclogged by the latter, if success in either was to be
looked for.1
Meanwhile the excitement rapidly increased, and the
increased opposition became more formidable as the time ap-
res^tanc. proacne(j when the measure was to be brought forward
measure. jn pariiament. Every effort was made on both sides to
gain votes in the House of Commons in Dublin, by means
of Government influence and imperial considerations on
the one side, and appeals to religious enthusiasm and
national traditions on the other. The bankers and mer-
Dec. is. chants of Dublin met on the 18th December, the Lord
Mayor in the chair, when strong resolutions condemnatory
of the measures were passed unanimously, on the motion
of Mr Latouche, seconded by Mr Beresford.* In se-
veral other counties equally hostile demonstrations were
made, especially in the north, the stronghold hitherto of
* " Resolved, that, since the renunciation, in the year 1782, of the power
of Great Britain to legislate for Ireland, the commerce and prosperity of this
kingdom have eminently increased.
" Resolved, that we attribute these blessings, under Providence and the
gracious favour of our beloved Sovereign, to the wisdom of the Irish Parlia-
ment.
" Resolved, that we look with abhorrence on any attempt to deprive the
people of Ireland of their Parliament, and thereby of their constitution and
immediate power of legislating for themselves.
" Resolved, that, impressed with every sentiment of loyalty to our King,
and affectionate attachment to British connection, we conceive that to agitate
in Parliament a question of legislative union between this kingdom and Great
Britain would be highly dangerous and impolitic.
" Resolved unanimously, that the Lord Mayor be requested to sign these
resolutions, in the name of the bankers and merchants of Dublin, and that
the same be published in all the public papers." — Castlereagh Correspondence,
ii. 48.
AND UNION. 97
Protestantism and attachment to the British connection. CHAP.
Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh in vain exerted L
themselves to the utmost to win over, or at least neutral- !7"-
ise the influence of, the Protestant magnates, who had
hitherto been the chief supporters of Government ;
they were only partially successful. The Marquess of
Downshire was a decided opponent ; and his nominee
in the county of Down, the colleague of Lord Castle-
reagh, voted against the measure when it was brought
forward in Parliament. Lord Fingall and the Roman
Catholics stood aloof in moody silence, neither sup-
porting nor resisting the measure. So strongly was
Lord Castlereagh impressed with the difficulties, all but
insuperable, of the attempt, that he wrote to the Duke of
Portland on January 2, that nothing but a firm resolu-
tion on the part of Government to carry it through at all
hazards, and a general conviction that this was the case,
could overcome these difficulties.* Nor were ruder ap-
pliances calculated for ruder minds awanting ; for, in
answer to a secret letter of Lord Castlereagh of the
same date, Mr Wickham, on the 7th January, de-
spatched a considerable sum of money to be at the Lord-
Lieutenant's disposal.!
* "Nothing but an established conviction that the English Government
vill never lose sight of the Union till it is carried, can give the measure a
'.hance of success. The friends of the question look with great anxiety for
>tr Pitt's statement. It is not only of the last importance, from the ability
7ith wliich the subject will be handled, but from the opportunity it will
fford him of announcing to this country the determined purpose of Govern-
icnt in both kingdoms to be discouraged neither by defeat nor difficulty,
ut to agitate the question again and again till it succeeds. This principle is
ic foundation of our strength, and cannot be too strongly impressed on this
de of the water. I have stated it without reserve to several, and it has
liversally been received by them as a pledge of our success, and that, with
purpose so manly, our friends cannot hesitate to stand by us." — LORD
LSTLEREAGH to DUKE OF PORTLAND, January 2, 1799; Castlereagh Corre-
ondence, ii. 81.
•)• " Immediately on the receipt of your lordship's letter, marked ' most
•-ret,' I waited on the Duke of Portland at Burlington House, who, without
s of time, wrote both to Mr Pitt and Lord Grenville on that part of the
ter which seemed to press the most, and I have the satisfaction to inform
ir lordship that a messenger will be sent off from hence in the course of
VOL. I. G
98 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. As the day of conflict in the Irish Parliament ap-
*• proached, which was towards the end of January, the
1799. efforts on both sides and the universal excitement
Lordc'astie- became every hour greater. " We are making/' said
a!iv?ce8to kord Castlereagh, " every exertion to collect our strength
Govern- On the first day of the session. Much depends in this
mentonthe •'. _ . . . . , .,
language to country, at all times, on first impressions; it is, therelore,
in brining important to assume a tone of confidence, and to avow
mcI?Jrc.the at the outset, boldly, the measure to which the speech
alludes. Decided language on the address will strengthen
us in our future proceedings. It is better to provoke the
discussion than to wait for the attack. I shall endeavour
prevail on the Chancellor to make one of his strong
speeches in the Lords, which, thrown into circulation,
' Castie- win have its effect." l Thus early did Lord Castlereagh
reagh Cor- * °
reap. ii. 85. give proof of that resolution of character and fixity of
purpose by which through the whole of life he was so
eminently distinguished. The advice he gave was fol-
lowed, as, in the circumstances, it was undoubtedly the
most wise ; and it was resolved to bring forward the out-
lines of the measure on the first night, and recommend it
in the King's speech. Meanwhile Mr Pitt exerted him-
self personally to win over, or at least neutralise, the
most important opponents of the measure, especially the
Marquess of Downshire, but with very little effect ; and
set himself seriously to work to carry out Lord Castle-
reagh's suggestion as to the union of the exchequer of
to-morrow, with the remittance particularly required for the present moment ;
and the Duke of Portland has every reason to hope that means will soon be
found of placing a larger sum at the Lord-Lieutenant's disposal." — MR WICK-
HAM to LORD CASTLEREAGH, January 7, 1799 ("private and most secret");
Castlereayh Correspondence, ii. 82. The sum sent over on this occasion was
.65000 : the numbers of the notes are still to be found in the State Paper
Office. — Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 34. Lord Castlereagh answered on
January 10 : — " I have only a moment to acknowledge the receipt of your
letters of the 7th. The contents of the messenger's despatches are very
interesting. Arrangements, with a view to further communications of the
same nature, will be highly advantageous, and the Duke of Portland may
depend on their being carefully applied." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to MR WICK-
HAM, January 10, 1799; Comwallis Correspondence, iii. 34.
AND UNION. 99
the two countries, and their gradual approximation to an CHAP.
equality in matters of taxation.* L
At length the eventful day arrived when the measure 1799.
was brought forward in the House of Commons in both ^ 8T2T- .
Ine Union
countries. It was announced in the King's speech in the is Passed
in the
British House, in terms which left no doubt that it British
was the settled determination of Government at all
hazards to carry it through.t The subject was formally
brought forward by Mr Pitt on the 31st of the same
month, when he moved eight resolutions in favour of the
Union. The Opposition was so ill advised as to move an
amendment, which was done by Mr Sheridan ; but the
resolutions were carried by a majority of 140 to 15. In
the House of Lords the question of an address, the echo
of the speech, was carried without a division ; and upon a
conference of the two Houses, a joint address was pre-
sented to the King, and most graciously received. So x^'un'-
far as Great Britain was concerned, therefore, the question Ann- 'Reg- '
was carried without difficulty, and both Parliament and us.'
the country were nearly unanimous on the subject.1
* " I received this morning your letter, enclosing a paper respecting the
contribution of Ireland to the general expense, the suggestions of which, I
think, entitled to great attention, particularly that (which is a very material
iddition to the ideas before stated) relating to the gradual equalisation of
;axes, and consequent abolition of all distinction in matters of revenue. . . .
r. had a very long conversation with Lord Downshire, who is full of alarm
rom the consequence of pressing the measure. I urged to him every degree
•f argument and persuasion that I thought most likely to weigh with him ;
>ut I cannot be sure that I succeeded in anything but convincing him that,
i all events, the Union will be persisted in. I endeavoured in vain to obtain
positive assurance from him that he would go himself immediately, or write
) his friends to support, but could not bring him to a point, and he left me
iparently undecided and embarrassed." — MR PITT to LORD CASTLEREAGH,
inuary 17, 1799 ; Castlereayh Correspondence, ii. 116.
t " GEORGE K. — His Majesty is persuaded, that the unremitting industry
:th which our enemies persevere in their avowed design of separating Ire-
id from this country cannot fail to engage the particular attention of Par-
ment ; and his Majesty recommends it to the House to consider of the most
ectual means of finally defeating this design by disposing the Parliament of
th kingdoms to proceed in the manner which they shall judge most ex-
lient for settling such a complete and final adjustment as may best tend to
prove and perpetuate a connection essential for their common security, and
consolidating the strength, power, and resources of the British empire. " —
NSARD'S Parliamentary History, January 22, 1798.
100 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. But it was not here that the real difficulty lay. It is
L seldom that the greater power makes any objection to
1799. absorbing the lesser ; the difficulty is to get the lesser
,L 8T3T- to consent to its absorption by the greater. The fer-
The Union . . J
is rejected ment continued to increase in many parts or the king-
™. dom. It had been deemed necessary to bring in a
bill authorising the Lord -Lieutenant to suspend the
Habeas Corpus Act, and proclaim martial law in dis-
turbed districts ; and this was actually done in Antrim by
General Nugent, and in Mayo by the Lord- Lieutenant.
The Irish Parliament met on the 22d January, and in
consequence of the mention of the Union in the King's
speech, a most animated debate ensued on the subject.
It began at four P.M., and lasted twenty-one hours, not
being closed till one on the following day — when the ad-
dress as a whole was carried by a majority of ONE, the
numbers being 106 to 105.* Great hopes were enter-
tained by the Government that this majority, how slender
soever, would decide the question ; but they were not of
long duration. Two nights afterwards, on January 24,
in committee on the address, Sir Lawrence Parsons
moved the omission of the paragraph relating to and
approving of the Union ; and after another long debate,
the motion was carried by a majority of five, the numbers
being 109 to 104. Immense was the excitement pro-
duced, and the rejoicings held on this, as it was deemed
at the time, decisive victory. Dublin was thrice illu-
minated : the blaze of bonfires was seen far and wide on
* It is a most singular circumstance how many great questions in modern
history have been carried in the first instance by a majority of one only, and
that slender majority, though often afterwards overcome, has generally proved
ominous of the ultimate result. The Irish Union, as seen above, was carried
by a majority of one, and ultimately proved successful. The Revolution of
France in 1789 was carried by a majority of one on June 10, 1789 — the num-
bers being 247 to 246. The Reform Bill, on its first introduction, was carried
by a majority of one, the numbers being 301 to 300, on March 1, 1830. Sir
Robert Peel displaced Lord Melbourne and introduced the free-trade system
on June 4, 1841, by a majority of one — the numbers 315 to 314, the largest
division on record iu Parliamentary History. — See Histoire Parlementaire de
la France, i. 430; Ann. Reg. 1831, 27.
AND UNION. 101
the mountains in the country. In the House of Peers CHAP.
there was a majority, though not a large one, in favour
of the Union ; but as this had been anticipated, it was 1799.
far from counterbalancing the defeat in the Commons.
Still, as the Commons on the first division had decided
by the smallest majority in favour of the Union, and the
Lords were in its favour, there was some ground for as-
serting that, upon the whole, the measure had made
some progress. The ability with which Lord Castlereagh
conducted this debate, and the mingled firmness and1Cagtle
suavity of his manner, attracted universal notice, and reaghcor-
called forth the warmest expressions of satisfaction both 7*.
from the Lord-Lieutenant and the British Government.1*
Lord Castlereagh, who was only beginning political
life, and had not yet learned, as he afterwards did, the Effect of
great number of " waverers " and waiters on Providence on Mr Pitt,
on any serious crisis in which the result is uncertain, had ^aiilf ami"
anticipated a very different result, and transmitted a few ^°ri|1(Jastle"
days afterwards to the Duke of Portland a very curious
* " Mr DEAR LORD, — The conduct you have observed respecting the Union,
in the two extraordinary debates you have had to sustain, has been so per-
fectly judicious, and so exactly what could have been wished, that I should
do the rest of the King's servants, as well as myself, great injustice, was I to
defer our fullest assurances of the satisfaction it has given us, and of the
important advantages we anticipate — I should say, with more propriety, which
have been derived— from the temper, the firmness, and the spirit you dis-
played on both these important and most trying occasions ; for I must attri-
bute to them the happy termination of the business on Thursday and the
lefeat and total rout of Mr George Ponsonby's motion — an event which, if
mproved, as I have no doubt it will be, I look to as being capable of affording
;reater facility and security to the completion of the Union, than if the
ddress had been carried by no greater majority than we had latterly reason to
xpect." — DUKE OF PORTLAND to LORD CASTLEREAGH, January 29, 1 799 ;
^astlereagh Correspondence, ii. 145.
" I cannot omit to observe that the whole of Lord Castlereagh's conduct
iroughout the course of the proceeding has been so judicious and correct,
lat it is the decided opinion of the King's servants that the line he has
therto observed cannot be too strictly adhered to." — DUKE OF PORTLAND to
QRD CORNWALLIS, February 3, 1799 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, ii. 155.
" I cannot describe to you the pleasure I feel at finding that all your exer-
>ns have been justly appreciated here, and that you stand as high as possible
the esteem and confidence both of the Ministers and of the public." — MR
,LIOT to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Burlington House, February 4, 1799 ; Castle-
igh Correspondence, ii. 161.
102 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, analysis of the yote, showing in what way he had been so
much disappointed.* The different characters of the
1799. leaders on this great question were strongly evinced by
the way in which they took their first serious defeat.
Marquess Cornwallis, who, with many great and good
qualities, was not equal to his colleagues in the Govern-
ment in political firmness, was in despair at the result,
and almost abandoned all hope of ever being able, under
any circumstances, to effect the deliverance of the coun-
try.t Mr Pitt and Lord Castlereagh, on the other hand,
regarded it only as a temporary check, the result of an
extraordinary combination of private interests, such as
might never arise again ; and, so far from desponding,
were only the more confirmed in their resolution to
persevere in bringing it forward till it ultimately proved
successful.;]:
The conduct of Government did not belie their firm
* Voted with Government on the address or reports, . 113
Friends absent, . . . . . .39
Voted against, who had promised to vote for, . . 22
Voted against, or absent, ..... 129
Of whom may be bought off, . . .20
Vacancies, ...... 7
•h " The late experiment has shown the impossibility of carrying a measure
which is contrary to the private interests of those who are to decide upon it,
and which is not supported by the voice of the country at large ; and I think
it is evident that, if ever a second trial of the Union is to be made, the Catho-
lics must be included." — MARQUESS CORNWALLIS to DUKE OF PORTLAND,
January 26, 1799 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 52.
" For myself I see no hope of deliverance, but feel that I am doomed to
waste the remainder of my life, and sacrifice the little reputation which the
too partial opinion of the world had allowed me, in this wretched country,
where nothing can prosper." — LORD CORNWALLIS to GENERAL Ross, January
28, 1799 ; Ibid., iii. 56.
£ " We have failed for the present, and yet I am persuaded, setting aside
the question of private interest, which is strong against us, a material progress
has been made in establishing the measure. Considering the many classes of
selfish politicians that were against us, our strength, notwithstanding the de-
gree to which we were betrayed by some avowed friends and abandoned by
others, was considerable, and our party sensibly brought up in tone on the
second day. Though we lost the question by a few votes, I am persuaded
firmness will carry the measure, and that within a reasonable time. The op-
position is more of a private than a public nature, though the local clamour
of Dublin gives it a popular aspect." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to the HONOURABLE
SYLVESTER DOUGLAS, February 4, 1799 ; Castlereayh Correspondence, ii. 160. Mr
Pitt wrote at the same time to Lord Cornwallis : " I am certainly much disap-
pointed and grieved to find that a measure so essential is frustrated for the
AND UNION. 103
determination. It was after having received intelligence CHAP.
of the defeat in Dublin that Mr Pitt brought forward L
the resolutions already mentioned, pledging the British 1799.
Government to proceed. Their measures in Ireland were The Englis
not less decided. On January 26, the Duke of Port-Gov?m-
4 ment re-
land wrote to Lord Cornwallis, again expressing the solves to
unaltered determination of Government to go on with
the measure, and empowering him to dismiss any per-
son, how elevated soever in office, who had been in-
strumental in opposing it.* He added, after enumerat-
ing several noblemen, in particular the Marquess of Ely,
whose conduct could not be overlooked — " You will take
care that it be understood that the measure neither is
nor never will be abandoned, and that the support of it
will be considered as a necessary and indispensable test ' • Conmaiii
(Jorresp.
of the attachment on the part of the Irish to their con- m. *7.
nection with this country." l
This rude defeat, however, while it in no degree lessen-
ed Lord Castlereagh's confidence in the ultimate success The rejec-
of the cause, rendered him more than ever alive to the u^ol
absolute necessity of separating altogether the question of Lord^tie
the Union from that of Catholic emancipation, and push- r(ragh's
views
ing the former through by the whole weight of Govern- against
11 i ic i s~vi i immediate
ment before the latter was brought forward. Clogged emancipa-
with concession to the Catholics, it was evident the
Union would never pass the Irish Parliament ; or if it
did, it would, in the present temper of men's minds, lead
to a union with France, not Great Britain. Accord-
time by the effect of prejudice and cabal ; but I have no doubt that a
steady and temperate perseverance on our part will, at no distant period, pro-
luce a more just sense of what the real interest of every man who has a stake
n the country requires, at least as much as his duty to Ireland and the
empire at large. You will, I hope, approve our own determination to proceed
lere on Thursday, in opening the resolutions stating the general outline and
•rinciples of the plan." — MB PITT to LORD CORNWALLIS, January 26, 1799 ;
Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 57.
* " I cannot too strongly impress upon your Excellency's mind the deter-
lination of his Majesty's Ministers to propose this measure without delay to
le Parliaments of both kingdoms, and to support it with all the weight and
lergy of Government." — DUKE OP PORTLAND to LORD CORNWALLIS, January
1, 1799 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 47.
104 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, ingly, on 28th January, he wrote to the Duke of Port-
l- laud : " It is plain that upon a mere principle of pursuing
1799. power, ambition, and revenge, it is the interest of the
Catholics to obtain political equality without a union ;
for as the general democratic power of the State is in-
creasing daily by the general wealth and prosperity, and
as the Catholics form the greater part of the democracy,
their power must proportionably increase whilst the king-
doms are separate and the Irish oligarchy is stationary
or declining. The Catholics, therefore, if offered equality
without a union, will probably prefer it to equality
with a union ; for, in the latter case, they must ever be
content with inferiority — in the former, they would pro-
bably by degrees obtain ascendancy. In addition to the
usual supporters of emancipation, many of the anti-Union
party will now take up the Catholic cause, the better to
defeat the question of Union. Were the Catholic ques-
tion to be now carried, the great argument for a union
would be lost, at least as far as the Catholics are con-
cerned. It seems therefore, more important than ever
for Government to resist its adoption, on the grounds that
without a union it must be destructive ; with it, that it
may be safe. . I am of opinion that the measure here-
after, to insure its success, must be proposed on a more
enlarged principle ; but if the immediate object of Gov-
ernment is to resist the Catholic claims, rather than to
renew the question of Union, I must doubt the policy of
at present holding out to them any decided expectations.
It might weaken us with the Protestants, and would not
strengthen us with the Catholics, whilst they look to
carry their question unconnected with Union. ... I
should despair of the success of the measure at any
i Castic- future period, so weighty is the opposition of the country
%$£°r' gentlemen in our House, were I not convinced that their
140-143. repu'gnance turns more upon points of personal interest
than a fixed aversion to the principle of union." l *
* This letter of Lord Castlereagh is very remarkable. It distinctly shows,
aud on irrefragable grounds, the necessity of postponing the question of eman-
AND UNION. 105
Although the question of Union could not be compe- CHAP.
tently brought forward in the Irish House of Commons
a second time in the same session of Parliament, yet it 1799.
•was incidentally mentioned, and fiercely debated, on many He *jj^
collateral points, on all of which occasions Lord Castle- tinye,s*°
assist the
reagh proclaimed with unflinching firmness the determina- determina-
tion of Government to go on with the measure, and bring Govem-
it forward again and again till it was finally carried. He subject!1
did this particularly with great effect on the 13th April,
on occasion of a debate on a matter connected with the
excise, and a report on the Regency Bill. On this occa-
sion his lordship moved and carried, after an animated
debate, the adjournment of further proceedings on the
subject till the 1st August. This was a great point
gained, and it gave time for more extended discussion,
the application of Government influence to the leading
members of the Opposition, and the calming of the pas-
sions so violently roused by the first introduction of the
measure. The remainder of the year was occupied iu
unremitting exertions on the part of the Government to
overcome or neutralise local opposition, and insure a
successful result when the proposal should be brought
forward in the next session of Parliament. Among other
steps taken to accomplish this object, was a tour by the
Lord-Lieutenant and the Viceregal Court to the north
of Ireland, which afforded opportunities both for the pre-
senting of petitions from several boroughs and a few
counties in favour of the measure, and private confer-
ences, of a still more interesting kind, with several of the
leading noblemen and landholders who had hitherto been
instrumental in opposing it.1 These latter were occupied, L Cagtle
however, almostly entirely, not as the vulgar supposed, £ea=h.P°j;-
n the actual proffer of bribes, but the more delicate, 75.
hough still more effectual promise of titles, or steps in
ipation till that of union was settled, and prognosticates the circumstances
•hich might hereafter convulse the nation by the efforts of the Catholics to
squire unrestrained dominion in a separate Parliament, as was done by
'Connell and the cry for a repeal of the Union forty years afterwards.
106 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, the peerage to those already enjoying such honours. The
L long list of promotion to the peerage which followed the
1799. passing of the Union, proved at once how far this refined
species of seduction had been adopted, and how generally
it had proved successful.
It well behoved the Government to make these efforts
Efforts' of to facilitate the passing of this measure, for the Opposition
tion durTng were indefatigable in their endeavours in every imagin-
ess§ able way to thwart it. During the recess of Parliament
several different plans were taken into consideration in
order to accomplish this object. That first adopted was,
to raise a large sum to purchase seats in the House for
persons who should oppose the Union ; and it was stated
that £100,000 had been subscribed for in this way,
including £1000 from Lord Downshire, and £500 from
each of the Ponsonbys. The money, however, was never
called up, or, if paid, returned, probably as there was no
prospect of a dissolution to bring it into play. The next
was, to employ a number of able men to write it down in
the public press and elsewhere ; and this, which was cer-
tainly a most legitimate species of warfare, was practised
with considerable success. The third was of a more ex-
ceptionable character, and was so extraordinary, that it
would be incredible if not attested by the authority of the
biographer of one of the leading opponents of the Union.
It was for every man to select his antagonist, and chal-
reShc'or- leng° him ; which was justified on the allegation that
resp. ii. 76. ^his had been the determination adopted at a meeting of
the friends of Government at the Castle ! l * Happily this
* "The Opposition contemplated a third plan, which would have been
merely acting on the principle laid down at the Castle. ... A meeting of the
friends of Government had been convened, and the persons who were to
support the several articles of the Union were brought forward. Several mem-
bers spoke on this occasion, and among them was Mr F. George Daly ; he was
one of the boldest, particularly active, and quite decided. He declared (these
were his words) that hia line had been taken ; that each of them must select
his antagonist, and that he had chosen his antagonist already." — Life of Grattan,
by his son HENRY GRATTAN, M.P., i. 73, 74. It is scarcely possible to believe
that such a system was either proposed by the one party or held up for imi-
tation by the other ; but the fact of such a story being current, and stated on
respectable authority, shows the excitement of the public mind at the time.
AND UNION. 107
sanguinary system of tactics was never carried out on CHAP.
either side, if it had been ever seriously proposed ;
though some painful personal encounters took place in 1799.
consequence of intemperate words spoken in the heat of
debate.
The Irish Government, however, was threatened, dur-
ing the summer and autumn of 1799, with a more seri- Renewed
ous warfare than an exchange of shots with the Opposi- ofe^rlnc
tion members in Parliament. The French Directory,
awakened when it was too late to the importance of
aiming a serious blow at Great Britain through the vul-
nerable side of Ireland, was making active preparations in
the harbours, both of Holland and of the Channel, for its
invasion. The officers who had returned to France after
having been made prisoners in the Killala expedition,
spoke in the most contemptuous terms of the troops to
which they had been opposed, and did not hesitate to
affirm that, if they had landed with 6000 men instead of
1200, they would have taken the country and kept it.
Certainly, if all the troops in Ireland, numerous as they
were, had acted as the Irish militia regiments engaged
actually did, there can be no doubt that their views were
not unfounded.* During the whole summer of 1799, the
French Government, pressed as they were with war in
Switzerland and Italy, never ceased to make the utmost
efforts to equip a maritime force, capable of conveying
and defending on the passage a large body of troops ; and
* " I should not be at all surprised if the French should make an attempt
to throw some forces into Ireland, if it were only in the hope of increasing the
disorder which they may naturally suppose must exist during the agitation of
the question of the Union. I know, besides, notwithstanding the language
that some of them might hold in Ireland, that most of the officers who had
returned to France, prisoners from the expedition under General Hardy, enter-
tain a very mean opinion of the troops to which they were opposed, and are
impressed with the idea, which they will not fail to inculcate at the Luxem-
bourg, that had they landed 6000 men instead of 1200, they should have
secured the country. The vanity natural to Frenchmen makes them per-
suaded of the truth of what they say ; and I have reason to know the officers
who passed through this town on their way to Dover, one and all, maintained
;hat, had the second expedition effected its landing, the island could have
>een their own." — MR WICKHAM to LORD CASTLEREAGH, January 1], 1799 ;
7astlereagh Correspondence, ii. 93.
108 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, though different places were assigned by public rumour
for the destination of these armaments, yet it was well
1799. known to Government, from secret information, that the
real one was Ireland. Notwithstanding the disaster at
Camperdown, eight sail of the line and five frigates were
ready for sea at the Texel ; and at Brest there were seven-
teen line-of-battle ships, six frigates, six corvettes, and
twenty-seven transports armed en flute. Great numbers
of smaller craft were in preparation or ready for sea in
Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Cherbourg, Rochefort, and
other harbours along the French coast ; and it was evi-
dent that the design was to collect the whole transports
and smaller craft in Dunkirk and Boulogne, to be conducted
under convoy of the Texel fleet to Brest, from whence,
with the united navies of France and Holland, a descent
on the south or west coast of Ireland was to be at-
tempted. *
What rendered the preparations of the French Govern-
ment the more formidable was, the distracted and alienated
fng ?taterf state of men's minds in almost the whole of the country,
i'eb!si799. in consequence of the suppression of the rebellion and the
Union agitation. The first had made lasting enemies of
* " Tous les petits batimens de guerre qu'on a rassemble" a Dunkerque
n'etoient que pour les retirer des autres ports, d'ou on fait eulever tous lea
marins et conduire a Brest, escortes par la force amide. On fait e"galeuient
enlever h, tous les ports tous les agres et autres utensiles ne"cessaires a 1'arme-
inent, qu'on fait transporter aussi b, Brest. On a ^galement enleve" tous les
agres des quatre frigates qui sout a Dunkerque, pour les faire suivre la me'me
destination, et tous le transport se fait par terre, de maniere qu'aujourd'hui
tout paroit se diriger vers ce port, ou il y a environ dix gros vaisseaux arme"s
ou prets a 1'etre, aiusi que plusieurs frigates, et tout conspire a faire croire
qu'il va y avoir une expedition pour Ireland." — Secret Information from
Prance, January 28, 1799 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, ii. 167.
" Brest, February 2. — Orders are received to send a division to Rochefort,
where it is to be joined by the ships and frigates from L'Orient," consisting
of three sail of the line and five frigates. Each of the line-of-battle ships has
700 sailors on board, besides soldiers : they are equipped for four mouths.
Brest, February 7. — Two more line-of-battle ships, the Cisalpin and Berwick,
have joined the Rochefort squadron. " Other ships are getting ready daily,
and extraordinary exertions are making to equip them with as little eclat as
possible ; as it is apprehended they are intended to be stolen out successively
as they are armed, to rally at some other port of which the egress may be
more easy. ... At Brest seventeen line-of-battle ships, six large frigates,
and six corvettes, with twenty-seven transports en flute." — Secret Information ;
Castlereagh Papers, ii. 165-167.
AND UNION. 109
the Revolutionists and Catholics, the last had alienated the CHAP.
Orangemen and Protestants. Lord Cornwallis's humane
and generous policy of forgiveness and conciliation had 1799.
by no means produced the result he expected from it.
Men's minds were too much excited to be calmed down
by anything but fear. Nothing short of the entire de-
struction of their opponents would satisfy either of the
parties, whose hostility distracted the country. On the
14th February Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Duke of
Portland : " It is with much pain I am to acquaint your
lordship that the lenient measures adopted by the Legis-
lature, at the instance of his Majesty, towards the close
of the last session, have not been productive of those
good effects in recalling the people to a sense of their
allegiance which was due to, and might have been ex-
pected from, so merciful an interposition in their favour.
The same spirit of disaffection continues to pervade the
lower orders ; and though the rebellion is less openly
persisted in, it does not fail to show itself in various
outrages and depredations, not less destructive, and in-
finitely more embarrassing, than open insurrection. The
province of Ulster is, upon the whole, more exempt from
disturbance than any other portion of the kingdom ; but
even in this quarter the disaffected are not inactive ; and
in the county of Antrim during the last month, the
houses of several loyal persons have been by night en-
tered and stripped of arms. In the other provinces the
treasonable disposition exists in its full force, and a
general insecurity prevails. ... In the west the old
system of houghing cattle has been of late revived, and
carried to an extent which threatens the most serious
consequences, not only to this kingdom, but to the em-
pire." On the 13th February he wrote to General
Ross : "The whole of the south is prepared to rise at
the moment that a French soldier sets his foot on shore ;
and the people in Connaught are houghing all the cattle
and sheep, for what purpose God knows, except to ruin
all the men of property, and destroy the supplies for our
110 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, navy and colonies. How far a militia composed of
L these very men, and, in spite of all my objections,
1799. almost entirely dispersed in the cabins of the country,
can be depended upon to fight the battles of Great Bri-
tain, it is not difficult to determine. The patriotic Irish
gentlemen, who are so enraged at the insolent inter-
ference of England in the management of their affairs,
if ever they dare to go to their country-houses, barricade
their ground-floor, and beg for a garrison of English militia
or Scotch feucibles. That the French will persevere in
-jastie- their attempts to invade Ireland there can be no doubt ;
ugh cor- anci if they should succeed, which God forbid, in estab-
. . >]> ii. *^
us ; Com- lishing a war in this country, I shall be most happy to
resp. iii. eo. have you with me, and shall take immediate steps to
effect it."1
While this was the state, verging on open rebellion, of
Military the revolutionary party, and the great bulk of the peas-
ireiandat antry in the south and west of Ireland, the force which
this time. j.jie Qovernment had to meet it was seriously weakened.
Numerically speaking, indeed, the military force in the
country was very considerable ; it amounted, on paper,
to 42,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry; but of this large
force only 15,000 were English regiments of the line.
The remainder consisted of English and Scotch militia
and fencibles, and Irish militia and yeomanry. The
British militia were entirely to be trusted, and had ren-
dered the very best service, both by their conduct in
the field, and their orderly conduct in quarters ; but the
regiments were all worn out by the harassing duties to
which they had been subjected in that distracted country,
and were perpetually applying to be sent home ; and as
the period for which they had volunteered their services
beyond the Channel had in almost every instance expired,
it was no easy matter to know how their demands were
to be refused. Generally, it was only by the personal
influence and solicitation of their commanding officers that
they were prevailed on to stay. As to the Irish militia,
they were so ill-disciplined and irregular in their habits,
AND UNION. Ill
that they could not be relied on for any military opera- CHAP.
tion ; and their conduct at Castlebar had proved that, in
many regiments at least, their fidelity to the Government i?"-
was by no means to be trusted to, and that in the event of
any considerable body of French effecting a landing, they
would, in all probability, range themselves by their side.
As to the yeomanry, all that could be expected from it
was to keep the country quiet in the rear of the regular
troops.* Even this was by no means an easy duty ; for
Government had certain information that there were
20,000 men prepared to rise at a moment's notice in the
neighbourhood of Cork ; and that, in the event of an in-
yasion from even a small body of French, a general insur-
rection in the whole south and west would at once ensue.f
Lord Cornwallis justly described the state of Ireland on
24th July, when he stated that the forces remaining in
Ireland, exclusive of artillery, amounted to 45,419 ; "a
force sufficient to preserve the peace — totally inadequate :
to repel foreign invasion."1
Serious as these dangers were, they were much aggra-
* " It is most earnestly to be wished that you may succeed with the Scotch
fencibles, as the precarious tenure on which we hold the English militia makes
me very uneasy. The Leicestershire regiments (Duke of Rutland's), which,
three months ago, so handsomely agreed to stay without any limitation of
time, have now desired to return to England, and have with difficulty been
prevailed upon to remain here till the 1st of June. The Irish militia, besides
their total want of all idea of discipline and subordination, from their being
dispersed in small detachments over the whole face of the country, without
officers or non-commissioned officers who are capable of taking any care of
them, are certainly not to be depended upon, even in point of fidelity, in the
event of a serious invasion of this country ; and all that can be expected from
the yeomanry is, that they will for a time, if no material disaster happens,
keep the country from rising behind us." — LORD CORNWALLIS to HENRY
DUNDAS, March 14, 1799 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 76.
•f* There are 20,000 rebels organised at Cork and its neighbourhood, and
they are determined to make a rising on the evening of Easter Sunday next,
svhen they expect the French. A feint is to be made at Killala, but the prin-
;ipal attack is to be made about Cork. The whole country is organising with
nore activity than ever ; and great numbers of the militia soldiers are sworn
.Iready to join them. The militia are not to be trusted, and a sharp eye should
>e kept on them. The country is preparing for rebellion more strongly than
ver, and in greater numbers. They expect the Dutch, and particularly the
paniards, to come to their assistance. There is not a Catholic who would not
ill a Protestant as soon as he would a rat. — Information of Joseph Holt,
ie of the leaders of the insurgents ; Castlereagh Correspondence, ii. 186.
112 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, vated by the new and alarming cause of discord which had
L arisen from the agitation of the Union question. This had
1799. not only alienated a large section of that portion of the
inJSin community which had hitherto supported Government,
i'ifhtie68 kut ** nac^ Sone ^ar to sna^e tne l°yalty °f tne militia regi-
miiitiaand ments best affected to the Crown. The Merchant Guild
of Dublin, an ultra-Protestant incorporation, issued an
address, calling on all classes and sects to unite against
the measure, and returning their warmest thanks to their
" Roman Catholic fellow-citizens in Dublin" for their manly
and patriotic conduct. Petitions were got up from the
freeholders in thirty-eight counties against the measure,
in pursuance of a circular signed by Lords Downshire
and Charlemont, and Mr Ponsonby. A union of par-
ties was strongly recommended, and in a great mea-
sure accomplished. Many persons wore, especially in
Westmeath, orange and green cockades, to indicate that
a junction of the most opposite parties was preferable to a
i Comwaiiis union with the sister kingdom. A universal ferment pre-
i7<^ei7im' vailed, and Lord Cornwallis was desponding in the extreme
as to the ultimate issue of the contest.1 *
The cause of the Union gained considerably by the
Lord-Lieu- Lord-Lieutenant's journey to the northern counties in the
favourable autumn of 1799. The commercial cities and towns there
th^noith? na(^ become fully sensible of the importance of the change
to their interests, and vied with each other in demonstra-
tion of interest in it. " At Antrim," says Lord Corn-
wallis, " Coleraine, Newtown Limavady, and all the places
through which I passed, addresses were presented, and
the words 'principal inhabitants' were always inserted,
as well as the Corporation. At Londonderry my recep-
* " The indefatigable exertions, aided by the subscriptions, of the auti-
Unionists, have raised a powerful clamour against the measure in many parts
of the kingdom, and have put the capital quite in an uproar ; and I am sorry to
say, some of our unwilling supporters in Parliament have taken advantage of
these appearances to decline giving any further support. God only knows how
the business will terminate ; but it is so hard to struggle against private inte-
rests, and the pride and prejudices of a nation, that I shall never feel confident
of success till the Union is actually carried." — LORD CORNWALLIS to GENERAL
lloss, February 4, 1800; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 177.
Corresp
139
AND UNION. 113
tion was cordial and flattering beyond expression. The CHAP.
county as well as the city addressed ; the town was
universally illuminated, and 'success to the Union' re- 1799.
sounded from every quarter. From thence I made an
excursion to Strabane and Lifford, where the corpora-
tions and principal inhabitants expressed the most de-
cided sentiments in favour of the Union/' x In a word, 1 Lord
• if, . . , . f> i Cornwallis
it was evident from this tour, that the cause of the to Duke of
Union had made very great progress among the mer-oct. 22, '
cantile and middle classes in most of the towns, who comwaiiis
were fully alive to the commercial advantages which it V?'
promised to extend to the country. But that by no 14°-
means lessened — on the contrary, it greatly increased —
the intense hatred with which it was regarded in Dublin
and by the Protestant magnates, who, in return for their
support to Government, had hitherto enjoyed the whole
local patronage in their respective districts ; for it por-
tended the rise of an influence in the community which
would probably prove fatal to that which they had so
long enjoyed.*
The efforts of both parties for and against the Union
were on the point of being cut short by a descent of the Naval pro-
French on the coast of Ireland, for which various prepara- S^Vrench
ions had been made by the Directory both at Paris and ^^n of
he Hague. The plan adhered to was a union of the Ireland-
leets in all the harbours of Holland and the Channel,
'hich, it was hoped, might be effected during the mists
nd long nights of autumn or winter ; and arrangements
ere in progress for collecting a force of thirty-five sail
? the line, and eighteen frigates, to cover the passage
> Ireland. Eight sail of 'the line, two of 56 guns each,
id five frigates, were in readiness at the Texel ; four
* " It will be considered that we have [against us in Parliament] a minority
isisting of 120 members well combined and united, that many of them are
n of the first weight and talent in the House, that 37 of them are members
counties, that great endeavours have been used to inflame the kingdom,
t petitions from twenty-six counties have been procured, that the city of
alin is almost unanimous against it ; and with such an opposition so cir-
istanced and supported, it is evident much management must be used,
that Government must avoid putting itself in the wrong." — LORD CASTLE-.
GH to JOHN KING, ESQ., March 7, 1800; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 206.
VOL. I. H
114 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, more were getting ready at Rotterdam, and five at
L Amsterdam ; there were fourteen ready at Brest, three
1799. at Rochefort, and two at Cherbourg.* Several attempts
to get across by detached vessels or small light squad-
rons were defeated by the ceaseless vigilance of Sir
John Borlase Warren and Sir Edward Pellew, who com-
manded the British naval armaments, to whose care
the defence of the Channel and its coasts was intrusted.
But their efforts, how great and meritorious soever, effect-
ed and could effect nothing decisive : the fleets at the
Texel and in the Dutch ports remained untouched — a
standing menace to Ireland and the southern coasts of
o
Britain. At length, however, an effectual remedy was
applied to this evil, and security afforded to the British
Isles, by the consequences of an event, the importance of
which has only now come, from the publication of the
official correspondence of the period, to be duly appreci-
ated. This event was the expedition under the Duke of
Aug. 27. York to the Helder in 27th August 1799. Though that
expedition failed in effecting the ostensible and principal
object for which it was intended, that of extricating Hol-
land from the French yoke, it yet successfully achieved a
secondary one of still greater importance with reference
to the independence and security of the British Islands.
The expedition landed at the Helder in North Holland
seilS?";1' a^er a snarP conflict, in which the British lost 500 men,
1799 Si • on *he ^fth August. By this success the British troops
jommi, ' were brought into the rear of the Texel, which is scarcely
Xii 1 SQ * *
defended on the land side, and became masters of the
207'. "' fleet there, consisting of eight ships of the line, three of
56 guns, eight of 44, and six of 32 guns.1 This powerful
* " Les Francais, apres bien des instances, ont obtenu du Directoire Batave
de faire sortir d'Hollande six vaisseaux de ligne, deux frigates, ainsi que deux
barques canonieres, pour faire, a ce qu'on assure, une descente en Irelande. On
croit. qu'ils se joindront a quelque flotte de Brest ou de Rochefort. ... A
Amsterdam on re"pare le Vischer, ou Vanguerde, 76, qui portera 80 canons, et
un autre du meme grandeur, ainsi qu'un autre de 68 vient d'etre mouille" ; un
second de 68 en reparation, avec les Etats-Ge'ne'raux de 64. A Rotterdam
deux de 74 en construction, et deux de 64 en reparation." — Secret Information,
January 7 and 12, 1799; Castlereagh Correspondence, ii. 200, 201.
200
AND UNION. 115
armament was conveyed in safety to the British harbours, CHAP.
and from that moment all thoughts of a descent in force T-
on Ireland were laid aside by the French Government, 1799.
and the war in the Channel was confined to contests of
frigates or small vessels, in which the superior skill and
prowess of the British sailors almost uniformly gave them
the advantage.
Before the project of a union was again brought for-
ward by Government in the Irish Parliament, it under- changes i
went several modifications, on the suggestion of Lord ^ifnSn
Castlereagh, calculated to render it more acceptable to
the opponents of the measure in Ireland. These altera-
tions consisted chiefly of details regarding the adjustment
of the public debt of the two countries respectively, and
the very delicate matter of admitting the Roman Catho-
lic peers, who were only six in number, to vote for the
representative peers in the British Parliament. These
changes were the subject of a long correspondence be-
tween the English Government and Lords Cornwallis and
Castlereagh, by whom the liberal side in all these ques-
tions was warmly supported. By their temper and con-
ciliatory measures the objections of most of the support-
ers of this measure were removed ; and the Catholics, as a
body, satisfied with the disposition of Government, were
content to remain neutral, or give it a lukewarm support,
without any distinct pledge in words as to future removal
)f the disabilities under which they laboured being given
>y the English Government. Lord Castlereagh expressed
timself as full of hope that these alterations would
isure the success of the measure when next brought
)rward in Parliament. Lord Cornwallis was by no means
pally sanguine, and seemed extremely doubtful whether
lything could overcome the repugnance of the ruling J^ ^
rotestaut interests in the country to a measure so comwaiiis
.... •• . 1 Corresp. in
tely to prove fatal to their long-established oligarchical us, 149.
imination in the island.1 *
' " Your Grace and Mr Pitt will, I trust, both have an opportunity of
isfying Lord Clare's feelings in respect to the line hereafter to be pursued
116 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. At length the eventful day, big with the future desti-
L nies of the British empire, and for which both parties had
isoo. made the utmost efforts, arrived. The Articles of Union
Thenfeasure na(^ been most carefully gone over between Lord Castle-
is carried in reagh and Mr Pitt, and the former had the satisfaction
the Irish &
House. of informing the latter, immediately before they were
brought forward, that, as amended, they had obtained the
cordial concurrence of the leading friends of the measure
in Ireland.* The task now devolved on Lord Castlereagh
of introducing the measure to the House, and it was one
of such serious difficulty and responsibility, that his posi-
tion excited grave apprehensions in the breasts of his
friends. " I pity from my soul," said one of them, " Lord
Castlereagh ; he has a phalanx of mischievous talent, and a
towards the Catholics before lie leaves London. Of course no further hopes
will be held forth to that body by the Irish Government without specific direc-
tions from your Grace ; and I fairly confess I entertain very great doubts
whether any more distinct explanation than has already been given, would at
present be politically advantageous. It is enough to feel assured that we are
not suffering them to form expectations which must afterwards be disap-
pointed, under the disadvantage of having dexterity, if not duplicity, imputed
to Government in the conduct of the measure. The more I consider the terms
of union you are prepared to offer to Ireland, the more confident I feel that
the measure must ultimately succeed. I shall have a strong case to state to
the Irish Parliament ; I wish I could appeal to an audience solely intent
upon the public question." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to the DUKE OF PORTLAND,
November 28, 1799; Cornwallia Correspondence, iii. 147.
Lord Cornwallis was by no means equally sanguine. "It is a sad thing
to be forced," said he, " to manage knaves, but it is ten times worse to deal
with fools. Between the one and the other, I entertain every day more doubt
of our success in the great question of Union. We have a lukewarm, and, in
some instances, an unwilling majority ; the enemy have a bold and deeply
interested minority, which will, I am afraid, even after our friends are reckoned,
run us much nearer than most 'people expect." — LORD CORNWALLIS to
GENERAL Ross, December 28, 1799 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 153.
" I do not feel very bold : every day- produces some symptoms of defection,
and I hope our friends in England will be prepared for the worst." — LORD
CORNWALLIS to GENERAL Ross, December 24, 1799 ; Ibid., iii. 152.
* " The Articles of Union having now been gone through by our leading
friends, I can venture to assure you that the arrangement affords them all the
fullest satisfaction. The question of expense they consider as most satisfac-
torily and liberally settled between the two countries, and the only alteration
they seem to wish is the introduction of some words in the clause which
I have the honour to enclose, which may more distinctly explain, on the face
of the resolution, the particular circumstances which would warrant the sub-
stitution of common taxes in lieu of proportionate contributions." — LORD
CASTLEREAGH to MR PITT, January 13, 1800 ; Cornwallis Correspondence,
iii. 159.
AND UNION. 117
host of passion, folly, corruption, and enthusiasm, to con- CHAP.
tend with. The Catholics yesterday came to some absurd
resolutions. Grattan has, you know, the confidence of isoo.
40,000 pikemen : he is to be introduced to the House
to-night. The passions of the bar and many of the coun-
try gentry give them a favourable accolade" l Great l H. Aiex-
• • r\ • • /~i ander,Esq.,
prices were given by the Opposition for seats : Mr (irat- to Mr pei-
tan gave £2400 for his ; and as much as £5000 was freely is,
offered. Dublin was in the most violent state of agita- _
tion, and though it was known Government would have a 161t
majority, yet as it was in part made up of unwilling sup-
porters, it was very doubtful whether, though at first car-
ried, the measure might not be ultimately defeated, as it
had been on the former occasion. Lord Castlereagh
moved the address in a most manly speech, and Sir L.
Parsons proposed an amendment, to the effect that the
House declined the Union. The debate lasted eighteen
hours, and was conducted with great ability by Mr Plun-
kett, Mr Grattan, Mr Bushe, Mr Ponsonby, and many
others on the part of the Opposition. The result, how- p"*
ever, though not so favourable as Lord Castlereagh had
anticipated, gave a decided victory to Government :
J . . ,. , Corresp. iii.
:he amendment was rejected by a majority of 42, the 160-164.
lumbers being 138 to 96.2
This division was decisive of the question ; the more
specially as eighteen seats which required to be filled up Treasonable
3r the most part returned Government supporters. The the osppo-
tpposition went great lengths on this defeat, calling on dismissal''1
le counties to come forward and save the country ; but ^Ow0nrgdhire
D serious disturbance took place. The efforts made Jan- 27-
7 the Opposition were such, however, as to intimidate
)t a few of the Government supporters, and excite
me alarm for the final success of the measure in the
east of Lord Castlereagh himself. Every species of
imidation was resorted to — political, moral, and per-
lal — to check the majority, and petitions from twenty-
counties were presented against it. A treasonable
idbill was thrown off and widely circulated, call-
118 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, ing on the yeomanry of Ireland to rise and save the
country ; and it was asked whether 60,000 Irishmen, with
i8oo. arms in their hands, would stand tamely by and see the
constitution of their native land sacrificed. To such a
length did the excitement go, that the Marquess of Down-
shire, not content with speaking on all occasions in the
most vehement strain against the measure, and sending
round a circular to the counties calling on them to peti-
tion against it, took steps to get a petition to the same
effect signed in his regiment of militia. This impru-
dent step, tending as it did to the subversion of military
discipline and the arraying of the armed force against
the Government, was immediately and decidedly met by
Lord Cornwallis. He at once deprived him of the com-
mand of the regiment, and he was soon after informed
that his Majesty had no further occasion for his services
as lord-lieutenant of the county of Down. This spirited
waiiL to0™ act, which was entirely approved by the English Govern-
, nient, and was, as Lord Cornwallis justly observed, " en-
tirely in unison with the Irish character," produced the
iiis very \)Q^ effect • and, by showing both the firmness of
(Jorresp. in. <* 'JO
178, 179. Ministers and their confidence in the cause, powerfully
contributed to ultimate success.1 *
As the measure went on in both Houses of Parliament,
Fresh diffi- the difficulties and the anxiety increased, and it became
the way. even doubtful whether it would ultimately pass. In the
Lords, indeed, the majority of Government was very great
on the first resolution in favour of the Union, being 75
* Lord Downshire had transmitted to Carlow, where his regiment was
quartered, the draft of a petition against the Union ; and the writers of the
letters transmitting it — Captain Boyd of the Down Militia and " Jeffry Fore-
sight"— asserted that officers and privates, whether freeholders or not, even
those who were under age, were indiscriminately called upon to sign it.
The soldiers, as might be expected, were in many cases ignorant of the con-
tents of the paper presented to them for signature. Some imagined it was
a petition in favour of the Union, others that it was a request that the
Union should not be carried out of the country. Lord Downshire asserted that
the only object was to get such of the men as were freeholders to sign the
county petition, and there seems no reason to doubt that this was his lord-
ship's view. But even in that view the act was improper, and of bad example,
and was rightly and at once met by Government." — See Cornwallis Corre-
spondence, iii. 179.
AND UNION. 119
to 26 ; but in the Commons things wore a different CHAP.
aspect for several weeks. Every resolution was made the
subject of a separate debate and division ; and the whole isoo.
contest fell on Lord Castlereagh, who had singly to sustain
the conflict with a phalanx of concentrated ability arrayed
on the other side. The orators who then led the Opposi-
tion in the Irish Commons — Mr Grattan, Mr Plunkett,
Mr Ponsonby, Mr Bushe — were the most eloquent that
Ireland had ever produced, and they had the immense
advantage of speaking to a willing sympathetic audience
in the House, and in the presence of an excited and
enthusiastic public in the country. Lord Castlereagh
had no effective support in debate in the Lower House,
and although he had a majority of votes, the hearts of
the greater part of the members were on the other side.
The ability, temper, and judgment with which he led the
Ministerial party, and sustained the debate in those ardu-
ous circumstances, was above all praise, and called forth
the applause even of his opponents.* Nor was one
quality awanting which, important in all public crises,
was especially so in Ireland at this time. His personal
courage was undoubted ; his moral intrepidity equal to
any emergency. On one occasion, when Mr Grattan May 26-
had said that " Lord Castlereagh's assertion, that the
measure was agreeable to the sense of the people, was
* " Lord Castlereagh entered into a full examination and refutation of the
Speaker's argument on the former night, wherein he had endeavoured to show
that if the Union had taken place before the war, this kingdom would have
been more in debt by ten millions. His Lordship showed the fallacy of this
statement with great force and perspicuity, and established to the satisfaction of
the committee the positions he had laid down in his original speech." — LORD
CORNWALLIS to DUKE OF PORTLAND, February 25, 1800 ; Cornwallis Corre-
spondence, iii. 199.
" Mr Ponsonby was replied to by Lord Castlereagh with great and confessed
ibility. His Lordship entered fully into a detailed state of the public mind
Tom the time the question was first moved. He showed that when the people
vere left to themselves there was a general disposition to acquiesce in the
neasure, and, among the loyal and well-informed classes, to approve it ; and
hat the public expressions adverse to the measure had been brought about
>y manoeuvre and artifice. Seventy-four declarations had been made in favour
f a union by public bodies in the kingdom, of which nineteen were from free-
olders of counties." — LORD CORNWALLIS to DUKE OF PORTLAND, March 5,
800; Ibid., 203.
120 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, contrary to known fact ; and that the assertion that
he was exciting the people to future treason and rebel-
1800. lion was a direct and manifest untruth, if the expression
of prophetic treason was in the slightest degree im-
puted to what he had delivered;" "Lord Castlereagh rose
with great coolness," says Lord Cornwallis, "in reply.
He said that he never should enter into personal alterca-
tion in that House ; that he despised that parade of
parliamentary spirit which led to nothing, and which
denied in offensive terms what had been never uttered ;
that if any personal incivility were used to him it was
not in Parliament he should answer it, and that he should
carefully avoid making himself an object for the interfer-
ence of the House. Lord Castlereagh's reply gave very
general satisfaction, and was considered as a signal proof
of his ready judgment as well as of his abilities." " It
raised him much in the estimation of the House, and the
general feeling was that he had completely shaken off the
attack upon his adversary. He felt, however, that all
was not quite settled and explained as he could wish, and
i Lord Com- rather wanted to send Grattan a message, and his friends
Duke of have with great difficulty dissuaded him. The fact is,
. Kfag, that the whole House was completely satisfied : he rose
27S,qi80oT in their opinion. There was no rumour that it was ex-
Comwaiiis pected he should go further. We thought he would let
Corresp. in. r o
240-242. himself down by doing so, and that it would be quitting
the high ground on which he stood." l
99 Notwithstanding all these efforts, however, it became
increasing a very doubtful matter whether the measure would be
attending carried. The majority fell off in an alarming manner on
Surerwnich several occasions ; twelve of those who had voted with
JiJ/^ Government at first deserted them afterwards. Both
June 7. parties made the utmost use of influence ; but on the
side of Ministers it consisted chiefly in the promises of
offices, titles, and promotion, which were freely held out ;
on that of Opposition, in the actual bestowing of large
bribes. £5000 was given for a single vote by them;
the bargain was sometimes struck while the debate was
AND UNION. 121
going on.* During all this protracted and arduous con- CHAP.
test, which went on in the House and in committee for L
four months, Lord Castlereagh was constantly at his post. isoo.
He was firmly supported by the Government in Eng-
land, who declared their determination never to abandon
the measure,! and by Lord Cornwallis, who, though
by no means sanguine of success, acted with all the
resolution of a British soldier in the discharge of what
he often deemed a hopeless duty. At length their efforts
and their perseverance were attended with the success
which in a good cause seldom fails to crown the united
efforts of talent and perseverance. After dragging for
several months its weary way through the House of Com- j Marqucss
mons, during which it was debated at every step, and every £°^^8f
clause or resolution how minute soever was made the Portland,
subject of a separate division, the Union Bill at length isoo ; Com-
passed the Commons by a majority of 65, the numbers resp.'m. 256.
being 1 53 to 88. l In the Lords, to which it was immediately
* " We have undoubted proofs, though not such as \ve can disclose, that
they are enabled to offer as high as £5000 for an individual vote ; and .1
lament to state that there are individuals remaining amongst us that are likely
to yield to this temptation. A not less formidable principle we have to contend
against is the effect produced by their system of intimidation on the minds
of our timid and lukewarm friends. The Opposition have shown their deter-
mination to rouse the disaffection of the country, and to hunt the people at
the Government, and have not confined their efforts to the people alone : both
yeomanry and militia are held forth to shake the constancy of our friends.
Your Grace is fully apprised of the case of the Downshire regiment." — LORD
CASTLEREAGH to DUKE OP PORTLAND, February 7, 1800 ; Cornwallis Corre-
spondence, iii. 182.
" Our situation is critical : twelve of our supporters deserted to the enemy
on the last division ; one was bought during the debate. The enemy, to my
certain knowledge, offer £5000 ready money for a vote. If we had the means
and were disposed to make such vile use of them, we dare not trust the
jredit of Government in the hands of such rascals. How it will end, God
>nly knows ! I think there are not more than four or five of our people that
•an be either bought off or intimidated ; but there is no answering for the cou-
age or integrity of our senators."— LORD CORNWALLIS to BISHOP OF LICH-
IELD, February 8, 1800; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 183, 184.
"t* " I authorise and instruct you to declare that no disappointment will ever
iduce his Majesty or his servants to recede from or to suspend their endea-
ours; but that it is his Majesty's fixed and unalterable determination to
irect, session after session, the proposition of Union to be renewed to Par-
iment, until it is adopted by the good sense of the nation." — DUKE OF
DRTLAND to LORD CORNWALLIS, February 12, 1800 ; Cornwallis Correspond-
ice, iii. 191.
122 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, carried, the majority was still greater, being 69. At the
termination of this great debate, it is consolatory to have
isoo. the testimony of Lord Castlereagh to the fact that, with
a few exceptions, the conduct of the whole supporters
of Government had been in the highest degree energetic
and honourable.1*
The crisis had passed before the measure was finally
its reception carried ; and as the result had for some time been fore-
mentaand seen, it excited much less attention when it at length
he country. came to pass than had been anticipated. Every pre-
caution was taken by Government against an outbreak
in Dublin ; but none such occurred. A conciliatory dis-
position, honourable to all parties, was evinced in the
House when the measure had finally become law. Mr
Dawson, member for the county of Monaghan, who had
hitherto been an active opposer of the Union, rose in his
place after it had passed, and declared in the fullest
manner to the House that, as it had now received the
approbation of Parliament and was to become the law
of the land, he would not only think it his duty to pay
obedience to it himself, but should exert himself to in-
duce his constituents to reconcile themselves to its pro-
visions. He was followed by Lord Maxwell, member for
i Lord Com- the county of Cavan, and some others, who severally
wallis to
Duke of expressed their determination to carry the Act of Union
June 9*, ' into execution to the utmost of their power. Lord
Castlereagh, as well he might, did not fail to speak in
' ^ne hignest but not undeserved terms of eulogy of such
no^e anc^ truly patriotic conduct on the part of his old
16, isoo ; political opponents.1 So far did these feelings go, that
Ibid. iii. , 111- t 11
288. they came to be shared in some degree even by the
populace of Dublin, hitherto the most decided opponents
* "At the close of this important struggle, it is but justice to our friends to
represent to your Grace that their zeal and fidelity has far exceeded what I
could'have formed any expectation of. Some, perhaps, embarked not with the
most cordial feelings to the measure ; but all, since the defection of the Bag-
wells, &c. , have acted with perfect honour, and many of them with a degree
of energy which I trust will recommend them to his Majesty's favour." — LORD
CASTLEREAGH <o DUKE OF PORTLAND, June 9, 1800 ; Cornwallis Correspondence,
iii. 256.
AND UNION. 123
of the Union ; and Lord Cornwallis, in driving through CHAP.
the streets of Dublin, had the satisfaction of hearing the
expressions burst from the crowd — " There he is, God isoo.
bless him :" "a grateful sound," he justly observes, " to
one who had governed the country for two years by
martial law."
The Union was now carried, and with much less irrita-
tion and disturbance at last than had been anticipated ; Difficulties
but a long account remained for Government to settle of
with those by whose efforts this had been effected : to
when they came to do so, Lord Cornwallis and Lord ^
Castlereagh experienced scarcely less difficulty than they
had done in urging the measure through Parliament.
They experienced the usual ingratitude shown by the
holders of power to those by whom great services have
been rendered which are no longer required. Aware
that the measure could never be forced through with the
existing Irish Parliament but by influence, and that
often of the grossest kind, Lord Castlereagh as well as
the Lord-Lieutenant had all along warned the English
Government that this was the only way in which the
desired object could be effected, and they had received
repeated pledges to support whatever measures might
be deemed necessary, or promises to insure success.* In
a private verbal conference with Mr Pitt, Lord Cornwallis
had mentioned sixteen peerages or advancements in the
peerage, as required to insure the support of the requi-
site number of influential landholders ; and no objection
had been stated, nor indeed could any such have been
advanced, as fourteen peerages had been conferred on
a less important occasion in I796.f No sooner was
* When Lord Castlereagh was in England, he went through the list of the
Irish peers with Mr Pitt, with a view to the representative peerage, when the
latter did not ask it for Lord Grandison, and rather scouted the idea of Lord
Sheffield when Lord C. stopped at his name ; and he consented to eighteen new
Deers, and did not absolutely limit us to that number, although our conduct
las been reprobated for sending over a list of sixteen." — LORD CORNWALLIS to
GENERAL Ross, July 11, 1800; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 277-
t " Every despatch written during the last eighteen months fully apprised
he English Ministers that the measure could only be carried by the force of
124 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, the bill passed, therefore, than Lord Cornwallis sent to
*• the Duke of Portland a letter enclosing a list of the
isoo. peerages, sixteen in number, which he had promised
to the supporters of the measure, being all persons of
fortune adequate to support this dignity, and whose
services entitled them to expect it. But either Mr Pitt
had not communicated to the Duke of Portland what
had passed on the subject, or insurmountable difficulties
had been experienced in the highest quarter when the
list came to be examined, for his Grace returned a
me 13. cold answer, making difficulties at every step, and de-
clining to recommend one-half of the names submitted
to his Majesty for approval. The conduct both of Lord
Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh upon this was dignified
and decided. They both wrote immediately to the Duke
of Portland, saying, in respectful but firm language, that
if Government was unable to make good the promises
they had made on their behalf to their supporters, they
could no longer retain office under them. The private
letters of both at this crisis breathe a warm and very
natural feeling of indignation at such a return being
made for the services they had rendered to their country.*
influence, and now to disavow promises would gain no popularity for them-
selves, while it would disappoint their supporters and disgrace the Irish Go-
vernment."— Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 266. The sum ultimately awarded
to the sufferers by the Union in the form of boroughs disfranchised, seats lost
in Parliament, and the like, was £1,260,000. Lord Downshire, for seven seats,
got £52,500 ; and Lord Ely, £45,000.— Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 323, 324.
* "After having passed two painful years of difficulty and anxiety, my pro-
spect had begun to brighten. The spirit of rebellion was almost universally
subsiding, and the great and important measure of Union was not only carried
by a majority in Parliament, but received throughout the nation, and even in
the metropolis, with less ill-humour than could have been expected ; and many
of the most respectable, although not during the contest the least violent, of the
anti-Unionists, had declared that they no longer wished to be ranked amongst
the opposers of Government. But your Grace's despatches of the 12th and
13th, as far as my personal feelings are concerned, have placed me in a more
distressing situation than I have yet experienced. In the most severe trials I
have hitherto been able to conduct myself with a firmness becoming a man of
honour and integrity ; but now my condition is so much altered, that I must
either say to those whom I am about to disappoint that I will not keep my
word with them, or acknowledge that I have pretended to have powers which
I did not possess, and that I must declare my engagements to be void because
his Majesty's Ministers have refused to fulfil them. . . . The whole num-
ber of peerages recommended are sixteen. In June 1796, at the period of the
AND UNION. 125
This spirited conduct had the desired effect. Govern- CHAP.
inent were in no condition to withstand so serious a dis- L
ruption of their Irish administration, or to exhibit to the 18°°-
world the spectacle of men who had rendered the great-
general election, one viscount and fourteen barons were created in England ;
which circumstance, in addition to these favours being indispensable to the
success of the measure, led me to suppose that sixteen would not be thought
an unreasonable number on so important an occasion as that of uniting the two
kingdoms. ... I am so overcome by your Grace's letter that I know not how
to proceed in the mortifying detail. There was no sacrifice that I should not
have been happy to make for the service of my king and country, except that
of my honour. The mischief, however, will not end with my disgrace ; but
the confidence in the English Government will be shaken, and the ill-humour
of our disappointed supporters will greatly retard the benefits which might
have been expected from the measure, and will not tend to strengthen the
hands of my successor. . . . His Majesty will, I am persuaded, see the
necessity of my having entered into embarrassing engagements according to
the various circumstances which occurred during the long and arduous con-
test ; and if any of them should appear so strongly to merit his disapprobation
as to induce him to withhold his consent to their being carried into effect, he
will be pleased to allow me to retire from a station which I could no longer
hold with honour to myself or with any prospect of advantage to his service." —
LORD CORNWALLIS to DUKE OF PORTLAND, June 17, 1800; Comwallis' Corres-
pondence, iii. 262-266.
Lord Castlereagh's language was even more decided. " If the Irish Govern-
ment is not enabled to keep faith with the various individuals who have acted
upon a principle of confidence in their honour, it is morally impossible that
either Lord Comwallis or I can remain in our present situations ; ... it will
remain a breach of faith, as injurious to the character of Government as to
our own, having given an assurance which we were not enabled to fulfil." —
LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD CAMDEN, June 18, 1800; Castlereayh Correspond-
ence, iii. 327.
" I should hope, if Lord Comwallis has been the person to buy out and
secure to the Crown for ever the fee-simple of Irish corruption, which has so
long enfeebled the powers of Government and endangered the connection,
that he is not to be the first sacrifice to his own exertions ; nor is the pre-
sent the first occasion upon which the King's Ministers will, I trust, think it
expedient to conciliate popular opinion, by failing towards those who have
served them to the best of their abilities." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to MR COOKE
(Secretary to the Duke of Portland), June 21, 1800; Ibid., iii. 333.
" Lord Comwallis was always desirous to carry the Duke of Portland's
judgment and concurrence with him on every point ; but the Union could not
lave been effected but by a person intrusted with unlimited authority ; and
t would have been fatal to the measure if the objections, or even the disin-
lination, of Ministers to any proposed arrangement had transpired." — LORD
JASTLEREAGH to MR COOKE, June 25, 1 800 ; Comwallis Correspondence, iii. 267.
" For my personal gratification, nothing could be so desirable as my quit-
ing my present station ; but I am afraid that my abrupt departure, under the
larked disapprobation of the English Government, would be attended with
;tal consequences in this country. You may be assured that I will act with
sniper, and bear everything but what would absolutely dishonour me, for the
,ke of the public." — MARQUESS CORNWALLIS to GENERAL Boss, June 24
500 ; Ibid., iii. 268, 269.
126 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, est services to their country receiving no other reward
than indignities which obliged them to resign their offices.
isoo. The Duke of Portland gave way accordingly, and the
its rettie- Cabinet agreed to confirm all Lord Cornwallis's engage-
ment by ments, while the only concession made on his part was,
concession * • i i • i •
of Ministers, that one of them was prevailed on to relinquish his claim
to the representative peerage.* A large number of offices
of emolument were at the same time conferred on various
subordinate supporters of Government in the struggle,
and others promised. The great and acknowledged ser-
vices of Lord Castlereagh fully entitled him to demand a
British peerage for his father the Earl of Londonderry;
but both he and his father had the disinterestedness to
relieve the Crown of the embarrassment which was felt
in creating so many peers, by waiving their present claim
to that honour, in return for which the King, in the
strongest terms, declared his determination to confer it
on the family at any future time when performance of
the promise might be requested.t The title, accordingly,
was not bestowed at that time, but it was so at an after
Jan. 22, period, when the great services of Lord Castlereagh had
?816> established yet higher claims to promotion. The father
Burke' s
Peerage, then had the proud satisfaction, rarely enjoyed in this
donderr^. world, of being advanced in dignity by the public services
of his son.1
* Sir John Blaqueemo. „' tifrMtA&f^
f " Lord Londonderry and Lord Castlereagh, who never brought forward
any pretensions of their own, are perfectly willing to wait for that mark of his
Majesty's favour, to which I thought it my duty to state their pretensions,
until it shall suit his Majesty's convenience ; but it will be impossible for me
to throw back the Marquess of Drogheda on the list of representative peers
without being guilty of a breach of a positive engagement." — MARQUESS CORN-
WALLIS to the DUKE OF PORTLAND, July 7, 1800; Cornwallis Correspondence,
iii. 274.
" His Majesty is pleased to authorise your Excellency to assure Lord London-
derry and Lord Castlereagh, that at any time that it may be the wish of Lord
Londonderry, or of any of his descendants when in possession of the title, to
have a British peerage conferred on them, the sense his Majesty has of Lord
Castlereagh's most distinguished and meritorious services will ever be remem-
bered by his Majesty, and his Majesty will be ready to fulfil their wishes in such
a manner that, should it not take place in the lifetime of Lord Londonderry,
his posterity, by his present or any future countess, would derive the same
benefit from it as if the creation had taken place in the lifetime of the present
earl." — DUKE OF PORTLAND to LORD CORNWALLIS, June 27, 1800; Ibid., 273.
AND UNION. 127
The difficulty with the supporters of the Union was CHAP.
now surmounted : but another of a more serious kind re- L
niained behind, which ultimately proved fatal, not only to 180°-
the Irish Government, but to Mr Pitt's Administration. Difficulty
The Roman Catholics, it has been seen, remained nearly thf cl^hoi
neutral during the struggle between the Protestant oli- claims-
garchy and the English Government, slightly inclining
only to the support of the Ministry. During the rebellion,
however, the Earl of Fingall and the leading Catholics
had preserved their faith to Government inviolate during
the most trying circumstances, when their co-religionists
were maintaining a desperate struggle with those whom
they deemed usurpers of their rights and possessions. The
British Government had carefully abstained from giving
them any distinct pledge that their demands would be ac-
ceded to ; and both Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh
had been cautious not to implicate either their superiors
or themselves in any engagement on the subject. But
many things in politics, as in other matters, are only the
more distinctly understood from not being openly ex-
pressed. It was well known to the Catholic leaders, and
indeed to their whole followers, that both Lord Corn-
wallis and Lord Castlereagh were decidedly favourable
to their claims ; indeed, that they regarded their early
concession as an indispensable preliminary to the paci-
fication of Ireland, and the development of the full bene-
fits which they anticipated from the Union.* The latter
had, by the directions of the Lord-Lieutenant, drawn up
* " Our time has been so much occupied of late by the most important of all
wssible subjects, as you will probably have been informed by Lord Castlereagh,
hat I trust you will forgive tis for detaining him till next week, before which
t will be impossible for us to take into consideration the different propositions
especting the provisions for Roman Catholic and Dissenting clergy, and the
ther very important questions, relative to the Roman Catholics in general,
ad tithes." — DUKE OF PORTLAND to LORD CORNWALLIS, September 25, 1800 ;
'ornwallis Correspondence, iii. 293, 294.
"I cannot help entertaining considerable apprehensions that our Cabinet
ill not have the firmness to adopt such measures as will render the Union
i efficient advantage to the empire. Those things which, if now liberally
anted, might make the Irish a loyal people, will be of little avail when they
e extorted on a future day. I do not, however, despair." — LORD CORNWALLIS
GENERAL Ross, October 8, 1800 ; Ibid., iii. 294.
128 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, and transmitted to Mr Pitt a long and most able memoir
L on the subject, embracing every argument that has since
isoo. been or could be advanced on behalf of the Catholics.*
The Premier's own opinion entirely went along with these
views, and he awaited only a suitable time for bringing
them forward in the Cabinet. But it was not so easy a
matter to say when that proper time would arrive. Not
only was the Cabinet and the country divided upon the
subject, but it was well known that objections of a nature
which, it was feared, might prove insurmountable, existed
in the very highest quarter against any such measure.
Thus Mr Pitt, Lord Cornwallis, and Lord Castlereagh,
were placed in the painful predicament of having tacitly
allowed the Roman Catholics of Ireland, and, of course, of
the whole empire, to expect a measure of relief to follow
the settlement of the Union, which, when the time for per-
formance arrived, they found themselves unable to realise.
This situation, so irksome to men of honour, soon be-
relted came so painful to Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh,
g8 tnat nothing but a high sense of public duty induced them
the catholic f-0 remajn jn office. On the 1 7th December, Lord Cas-
question.
tlereagh sailed for England, in order to lay the whole
particulars of the case before Government, and Lord
Cornwallis was left in a situation which he himself de-
scribed to General Ross as " as unhappy as you can con-
ceive." f A strong sense of public duty, however, and an
anxious desire to carry through a great measure which
* " The tract which Lord Castlereagh submitted to your Grace on the great
Catholic question is so clear and able, and so entirely comprises every material
argument that can, in my opinion, be urged on that important measure, that I
shall not trouble your Grace with any further reasoning on a subject of which
you are so fully in possession." — LORD CORNWALLIS to DUKE OF PORTLAND,
December 1, 1800; CornwaUis Correspondence, iii. 306. It is not to be found
in Castlereagh Correspondence.
f " Lord Castlereagh sailed last night for England, and Elliot follows in a
few days, so I shall be left to transact all public business with Cooke. My
situation is altogether as unhappy as you can conceive, and I see no hope of
relief, and yet I cannot in conscience and in duty to my country abandon the
Catholic question, without which all we have done will be of no avail. It was
said, when I determined to free myself at the first outset from the trammels
of the ruling party here, that I should not be able to carry on the Govern-
ment. No prediction ever proved more false ; and you may be assured that
AND UNION. 129
could alone develop the full beneficial effects of the Union, CHAP.
induced both to remain at their posts some little time
longer. Lord Castlereagh arrived in London on the 22d isoo.
December, and immediately entered into close commu-
nication on the subject with the Duke of Portland and
Mr Pitt, to whom his able tract in favour of the Catholics
had previously been communicated. He found, however,
the difficulties in the way of an adjustment much greater
than he had previously anticipated. Not that there was
any doubt on the part of either of these Ministers on the
subject, though they had never pledged themselves to
any time or specific course of action ; but it had been
ascertained that insurmountable difficulties lay in the way
of its settlement in other quarters. The King had very
recently become acquainted with what was in agitation,
and he was deeply affected by it ; for his own resolution
was fixed never to make any further concessions to the
Catholics, and he knew the strength of Mr Pitt's deter-
mination too well not to entertain apprehensions that
the collision might break up the Cabinet. What passed
on these important occasions is fully explained in a long
letter of Lord Castlereagh to Mr Pitt on 1st January
1801, in which the views entertained by Mr Pitt, Lord
Cornwallis, and himself, are so clearly stated, that any 330-332.
paraphrase or abridgment is superfluous.1 *
,11 the powerful opposers of the measure in favour of the Catholics would join
a giving their approbation as soon as it is effected." — MARQUESS CORNWALLIS
•) GENERAL Ross, December 18, 1800 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 313.
* " When I left Lord Cornwallis, he certainly was prepared for some differ-
nce of opinion in the Cabinet on the principle of the measure itself, and for
mch caution on the part of his Majesty's Ministers in general, with respect to
ic period when they might think themselves justified in prudence in proposing
' Parliament so important an alteration of the Test laws ; but he did not
iprehend, from anything that had hitherto passed on the subject, that their
ntiments were adverse to the principle of the measure connected with the
nion, much less that they were prepared to oppose the question on its merits,
d to declare their determination to resist hereafter any further concession
the Catholics. As this impression on his Excellency's mind was in a great
;asure the result of what passed with reference to this subject when I was
England in the autumn of 1799, I think it necessary to recall to your recol-
tion that, after the details of the Union had been completed, I was directed
the Lord-Lieutenant to represent to you the state of parties as they stood
VOL. I. I
130 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. It appears that Mr Pitt, either not anticipating any
serious opposition to the measure of relief to the Catho-
isoi. Hcs which he had in contemplation, or wishing to post-
Difficfities Pone the dreaded moment of explanation with his royal
and cabSt master> na(l n0^ made him aware of what had passed on
?^tthe sub- the subject with Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh ;
at that time in Ireland, and particularly to request that you would ascertain
what was likely to be the ultimate decision of his Majesty's Ministers with
respect to the Catholics, as his Excellency felt it to be of equal importance
to the future quiet of Ireland, to his own feelings, and to the credit of
Administration in both countries, that he should so conduct himself towards
that body as to preclude hereafter any well-founded imputation, or even any
strong impression on their minds, that they had been deceived. The statement
I then made was, as I recollect, nearly to the following effect : that we had a
majority in Parliament composed of very doubtful materials ; that the Pro-
testant body was divided on the question, with the disadvantage of Dublin
and the Orange societies against us; and that the Catholics were holding
back under a doubt whether the Union would facilitate or impede their object.
I stated it as the opinion of the Irish Government that, circumstanced as the
parliamentary interests and the Protestant feelings then were, the measure
could not be carried if the Catholics were embarked in an active opposition to
it, and that their resistance would be unanimous and zealous if they had reason
to suppose that the sentiments of Ministers would remain unchanged in
respect to their exclusion ; while the measure of Union in itself might give them
additional means of disappointing their hopes. I stated that several attempts
had been made by leading Catholics to bring Government to an explanation,
which had, of course, been evaded; and that the body, thus left to their own
speculations in respect to the future influence of the Union upon their cause,
were, with some exceptions, either neutral or actual opponents ; the former en-
tertaining hopes, but not inclining to support decidedly without some encour-
agement from Government — the latter entirely hostile, from a persuasion that
it would so strengthen the Protestant interest as to perpetuate their exclusion.
I represented that the friends of Government, by flattering the hopes of the
Catholics, had produced a favourable impression in Cork, Tipperary, and Gal-
way ; but that, in proportion as his Excellency had felt the advantage of this
popular support, he was anxious to be ascertained, in availing himself of the
assistance which he knew was alone given in contemplation of its being aux-
iliary to their own views, that he was not involving Government in future
difficulties with that body, by exposing them to a charge of duplicity; and he
was peculiarly desirous of being secure against such a risk before he per-
sonally encouraged the Catholics to come forward, and to afford him that
assistance which he felt to be so important to the success of the measure.
In consequence of this representation, the Cabinet took the measure into
their consideration; and having been directed to attend the meeting, 1 1
was charged to convey to Lord Cornwallis the result, and his Excellency
was referred by the Duke of Portland to me for a statement of the opinions of
his Majesty's Ministers on this important subject. Accordingly, I communi-
cated to Lord Cornwallis that the opinion of the Cabinet was favourable to the
principle of the measure ; that some doubt was entertained as to the possibility
of admitting Catholics into some of the higher offices; and that Ministers antici-
pated considerable repugnance to the measure in many quarters, and particu-
AND UNION. 131
and it was only in the beginning of January that he was CHAP.
made aware of it. He expressed himself warmly on this
point at the time ; * and there can be no doubt that his i801-
larly in the highest ; but that, as far as the sentiments of the Cabinet were con-
cerned, his Excellency need not hesitate in calling forth the Catholic support, in
whatever degree he found it practicable to obtain it. ... The instructions which
I was directed to convey to Lord Cornwallis were to the following effect : that
his Excellency was fully warranted in soliciting every support the Catholics could
afford; that he need not apprehend, as far as the sentiments of the Cabinet were
concerned, being involved in the difficulty with that body which he seemed to
apprehend ; that it was not thought expedient at that time to give any direct
assurance to the Catholics ; but that, should circumstances so far alter as to in-
duce his Excellency to consider such an explanation necessary, he was at liberty
to state the grounds on which his opinion was formed for the consideration of
the Cabinet. In consequence of this communication, the Irish Government
omitted no exertion to call forth the Catholics in favour of the Union. Their
efforts were very generally successful, and the advantage derived from them
was highly useful, particularly in depriving the Opposition of the means they
otherwise would have had in the southern and western counties of making an
impression on the county members. His Excellency was enabled to accomplish
his purpose without giving the Catholics any direct assurance of being gratified,
and throughout the contest earnestly avoided being driven to such an expe-
dient, as he considered a gratuitous concession after the measure as infinitely
more consistent with the character of Government. The Union being carried,
I was directed by the Lord-Lieutenant, when last in England, to recall the
attention of his Majesty's Ministers to the Catholic question, and to impress on
their minds the anxiety his Excellency felt that they should not suffer them-
selves to be anticipated in the purposed Act of Grace by the Opposition. On
my return to Ireland, I apprised his Excellency that sentiments unfavourable
to the concession had been expressed by the highest law authority, and that
the Cabinet at large did not feel themselves enabled, in his Majesty's absence,
and without sounding opinions in other quarters, to take a final decision on so
momentous a question ; but I did not feel myself warranted, from anything
that had passed, to disappoint the hopes his Excellency had been led so dis-
tinctly to form, and which he still continued to entertain, should the ultimate
decision of his Majesty's Ministers accord with the statement of the question to
which I have alluded. You will easily conceive that, in addition to the public
regret his Excellency will experience at the abandonment of a measure which
he considers to be essential to the future interests of the empire, he will feel a
peculiar degree of pain in finding himself placed in those awkward circum-
stances, with respect to the Catholics, to which he foresaw the transaction in
tself was so likely to lead, and which he took every possible precaution to
,void." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to MR PITT, January 1, 1801 ; Castlereagh Cor-
•espondence, iv. 8-12.
* " I cannot but regret that, on the late unhappy occasion, I had not been
reated with more confidence previous to formirig an opinion, which, to my
reatest surprise, I learned on Thursday from Earl Spencer, has been in agita-
on ever since Lord Castlereagh came over in August, yet of which I never
id the smallest suspicion till within these very few weeks ; but so desirous
as I to avoid the present conclusion, that — except what passed with Earl
jeucer and Lord Grenville about three weeks past, and a hint I gave to Mr
icretary Dundas on Wednesday sevenight — I have been silent on the subject,
132 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, complaints of having been treated without sufficient confi-
dence, were in a great measure well founded. But the
isoi. eyil was done, and could not be undone ; and the result was
that the English Cabinet was brought into a dilemma from
whence Mr Pitt saw no means of extrication ; for on the
one hand he was impelled, by a sense of public duty to
the empire and a regard to his own honour, to make good
the engagements tacitly undertaken with his approbation
by Lord Cornwallis, and on the other he experienced an
insurmountable difficulty in doing so in the unconquerable
repugnance and known firmness of character of the sove-
reign. In these circumstances he adopted the only course
Feb. 5. open to a man of principle and honour ; he resigned his
situation as Prime Minister, and his resignation was with
i comwaiiis tne deepest regret accepted by his Majesty. With Mr Pitt,
343*344 •"' Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, Lord Camden, Mr Dundas,
and Mr Windham, tendered their resignations, which were
Corresp. iv.
37, 38. also accepted, thereby entirely rooting out the party favour-
able to the Catholics from the Cabinet.1
10(5 The motives of Mr Pitt in taking this decisive step,
Mr Pitt's and leaving the helm at a time when Great Britain,
. threatened with the Northern Coalition, may be truly
said to have been in the crisis of the war, must have been
of the most weighty kind ; and they are thus stated, in a
confidential letter by Lord Castiereagh to Lord Cornwallis,
four days after the resignation : — " Mr Pitt, from a con-
viction, I conclude, that the King's mind could not give
way, and seeing the danger of the State falling into the
hands of Opposition, has used his utmost influence with
his friends to lend themselves to the new arrangement.
He will take the first opportunity of the question being
regularly before the House to state his opinion at large
upon it ; but he does not think that it will be expedient,
either with reference to the success of the question itself
and, indeed, hoping that Mr Pitt had not pledged himself on what I cannot,
with my sentiments of religious and political duty, think myself at liberty to
concur." — The KING to the HON. HENRY DUNDAS, February 7, 1801 ; Corn-
wallis Correspondence, iii. 333.
AND UNION. 133
or the predicament in which the King stands, for him to CHAP.
press the measure under the present circumstances. The
inclination of his mind, after having argued the question, 180L
is not to vote at all. He is of opinion that to try the
question now would only pledge people against it ; that
we should have no chance of success in the Lords ; but
a still stronger reason operates on his mind for not so
pressing it, which he particularly desires that I may
represent to your Excellency — namely, the conviction
that, were the question carried in both Houses, it
would be deprived of all its benefits, and the King
would, at all risks, refuse his assent. Under these con-
siderations, it is his wish that your Excellency, without
bringing forward the King's name, should make the Ca-
tholics feel that an obstacle which the King's Ministers
could not surmount precluded them from bringing for-
ward the measure whilst in office ; that their attachment
to the question was such that they felt it impossible to
continue in Administration under the impossibility of
proposing it with the necessary concurrence, and that
they retired from the King's service, considering this
line of conduct as most likely to contribute to the
ultimate success of the measure ; to represent to them
!iow much their future hopes must depend upon strength-
ening their cause by good conduct ; in the mean time,
hat they ought to weigh their prospects as arising from
he persons who now espouse their interests, and compare
hem with those which they could look to from any other
uarter ; that they may naturally rely on the zealous
.ipport of all those who now retire, and of many that
nnain, when it can be given with any prospect of suc-
)ss ; in the mean time, that Mr Pitt would do his utmost
' establish their cause in the public favour, and thus
•epare the way for its ultimate success ; but that they
ust distinctly understand that he would not concur in a
peless attempt at this moment to force it ; and that he
ist at all times repress, with the same decision as if he
Id an adverse opinion, any unconstitutional conduct in
134 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, the Catholic body. This will give your Excellency the
T- outline of that communication which he thinks himself
isoi. alone authorised to make to them. To look to any speci-
fic time to which they might attach their hopes, is so
indefinite and so delicate a consideration, as your Excel-
Ienc7 ™^ ^^ *s scarcely to be touched upon. From
to Lord wnat has already passed, the prospect of a change of senti-
Cornwallis, ,. i T^
Feb. 9, ments on the part of the King seems too hopeless to be
Castiereagh held out, in fairness to the Catholics, as any solid ground
g)rre»p. iv. ^ ^Q^Q . an(j j^ death js ^hat solution of the difficulty
which all parties must equally deprecate." l *
A melancholy proof was soon afforded of the violence
niness of of the struggle which had existed in the King's mind be-
whichpfe- tween his religious scruples regarding the Catholics and
fSeradi8- his attachment to Mr Pitt. On the 12th February his
thTcathoiic Majesty became unwell ; and, after an indisposition of ten
claims at days, the symptoms of mental alienation became so de-
this time. J J r
cided that Dr Willis was sent for, and two persons were
appointed by him to sit up in his chambers during the
night. His symptoms were not so much those of entire
derangement as of mental oppression and anxiety. He
spoke calmly and without undue excitement all the time,
and often found relief in a copious flood of tears. Great
care was taken to prevent the malady from increasing ;
and in the beginning of March his recovery was so far
advanced that the daily bulletins regarding his health
were discontinued, and he soon entirely recovered. But
this dreadful event, which threw both the Government
and the nation into the utmost perplexity, was conclusive
Portland to against any further agitation of the Catholic question at
ianlsf0™" this time. To do so, as Mr Pitt justly observed, would
isoi 23' ke to hold himself up to the nation as the murderer of
Cornwaiiis njs sovereign.2 In the first moments of consternation at
Corresp. in. •»*•••
341-343. its occurrence, that Minister offered to resume office with-
out making the concession of the Catholic claims a con-
* In a postscript to this letter it is added, " Mr Pitt has seen the first part
of this letter."
AND UNION. 135
dition of his doing so. But matters had gone too far to CHAP.
render such an arrangement feasible, and the recovery of
the King in the beginning of March removed the necessity 1801-
of any such seeming sacrifice of principle. Mr Adding-
ton, therefore, remained Premier ; and Lord Cornwallis
and Lord Castlereagh held office in Ireland only till their
successors were appointed.
It was no easy matter, however, to say who these suc-
cessors would be, for such was the sense entertained
the disturbed state of Ireland, and the difficulties ofn^Lord-
governing the country, now that the settlement of the Lieutenant*
Catholic claims was indefinitely adjourned, that no one
could at first be found who would take the situation.
Lord Proby and several other noblemen were talked of,
but they all declined ; at length, however, Lord Hardwicke March 17.
agreed to accept it, and the Right Honourable Charles
Abbot, afterwards Lord Colchester, was appointed Chief
Secretary in room of Lord Castlereagh. Neither of these
elevated functionaries, however, entered upon the discharge
of their duties till the May following, as the critical situ-1w^£>orn~
ation of Ireland rendered any change of its local admi- Duke of
i • • Portland,
nistration hazardous till the probable irritation among the Feb. 19,
1801 •
Catholics, from the disappointment of their hopes, had Com^aiiis
in some degree subsided, and the new Ministers were 339^esp' "'
firmly seated in their respective offices at headquarters.1
Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh acted a truly
patriotic and disinterested part on this occasion. Al- Patriotic
though their minds, from the very beginning, were en-
tirely made up no longer to hold office in Ireland when
their hopes of a favourable settlement with the Catholics reash-
were at an end, and although their situation was to
;he last degree painful, after the disappointment they
lad met with, they yet, at the earnest request of Govern-
nent and their own successors, continued at their posts
or two months longer from a sense of public duty."*
* " No consideration could induce me to take a responsible part with any
dministration who could be so blind to the interest, and indeed to the imme-
136 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP. The intervening period was actively employed by them
in explaining to the leading Catholics the real nature
i80i. of the difficulties which had obstructed the settlement of
the question, and the course which was earnestly recom-
mended to them by their friends in the Administration.
For this purpose Mr Pitt had prepared a memorandum,
which he transmitted to Lord Cornwallis, describing his
view of the present position of the question, and the
course which he had chalked out for himself, and recom-
mended to them with a view to the ultimate attainment
of the object of their desires.* This memorandum, which
diate security of their country, as to persevere in the old system of proscrip-
tion and exclusion in Ireland. My sentiments on this head are sufficiently
known ; and I have heard from pretty good authority that my successor is
fixed, and I have some reason to guess that Lord Hobart is the person. I feel
it, however, to be my duty to my country not to quit my station angrily, and
to employ such reasonable space of time as it may suit Government to take
in sending over a successor, in endeavouring to tranquillise the minds of the
Catholics, to persuade them to wait with patience for the accomplishment of
then- wishes." — LORD CORNWALLIS to GENERAL Ross, February 15, 1801 ;
Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 337.
* " The leading part of his Majesty's Ministers finding insurmountable ob-
stacles to the bringing forward measures of concession to the Catholic body
whilst in office, have felt it impossible to continue in administration under the
inability to propose it with the circumstances necessary to carrying the measure
with all its advantages, and they have retired from his Majesty's service, con-
sidering this line of conduct as most likely to contribute to its ultimate success.
The Catholic body will, therefore, see how much their future hopes must
depend upon strengthening their cause by good conduct. In the mean time
they will prudently consider their prospects as arising from the persons who
now espouse their interests, and compare them with those which they could
look to from any other quarter. They may with confidence rely on the zealous
support of all those who retire, and of many who remain in office, when it can
be given with a prospect of success. They may be assured that Mr Pitt will
do his utmost to establish their cause in the public favour, and prepare the
way for their finally attaining their objects. And the Catholics will feel
that, as Mr Pitt could not concur in a hopeless attempt to force it now, he
must at all times repress, with the same decision as if he held an adverse
opinion, any unconstitutional conduct in the Catholic body. Under these
circumstances it cannot be doubted that the Catholics will take the most loyal,
dutiful, and patient line of conduct; that they will not suffer themselves to
be led into measures which can by any construction give a handle to the
opposers of their wishes, either to misinterpret their principles or to raise an
argument for resisting their claims ; but by their prudent and exemplary
demeanour they will afford additional grounds to the growing number of
their advocates to enforce their claims on proper occasions until their objects
can be finally and advantageously attained." — Memorandum by MR PITT, sent
to LORD CORNWALLIS, March 9, 1801 ; Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 347.
AND UNION.
137
CHAP.
I.
1801.
precisely coincided with that already given, which Lord
Castlereagh had drawn up " almost at his dictation," was
communicated by Lord Cornwallis to Lord Fingall. Dr
Troy and the leading Irish Catholics on this occasion
professed themselves entirely satisfied, and declared their
resolution to walk by the advice given, and quietly
await the time when their friends in power might again
bring forward their claims with some prospect of success.
They faithfully acted up to these professions ; but unfor-
tunately the lead of the Catholic body ere long slipped
out of their hands. Revolutionary projects were again
entertained and in part acted upon by less scrupulous
leaders ; and the agitation for the repeal of the Union for
a quarter of a century prevented all the beneficial effects
from taking place, which were, with reason, anticipated
from its adoption !
Such as it was, however, and grievously as it has been
thwarted in its operation by the violent strife of parties Beneficial
of which Ireland almost ever since has been the theatre, union.0 *
the measure of the Union has produced effects in the
highest degree important to the real interests of Ireland,
and amply justifying the strenuous exertions which Lord
Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh made to bring it about.
Statistical results of unquestionable accuracy demonstrate
this. It appears that between the years 1801 and 1825
the exports of Ireland to Great Britain had considerably
more than doubled, and the imports from Great Britain
increased in a similar proportion.* In articles of agri-
* IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BETWEEN IRELAND AND GREAT BRITAIN.
110.
Years.
1801,
1805,
1809,
1813,
1817,
1821,
1825,
Imports to Ireland
from Great Britain.
£3,270,350
4,067,717
5,316,557
6,746,353
4,722,706
5,338,828
7,048,936
Exports from Great
Britain to Ireland.
£3,537,725
4,288,167
4,588,305
5,410,296
5,696,616
7,117,452
8,531,365
After 1825 no similar return can be given, as the trade between Great
ritain and Ireland was assimilated to the coasting trade of Great Britain
self. — PORTER'S Progress of the Nation, 342, 3d edit.
138 IRISH REBELLION
CHAP, cultural produce, which form the staple of the country,
the change has been still more remarkable, and indeed so
isoi. great as to appear almost fabulous. Thus, for example,
the pigs exported, which, at the Union in 1801, were only
1968, had increased in 1825 to 65,919, and in 1846
had swelled to the enormous number of 480,827 ! The
cattle exported to England, which in 1801 were 31,543,
in 1825 were 63,519, and in 1846, 186,483. The ton-
nage employed in the trade to Great Britain, which in
1801 was 582,033, had swelled in 1810 to 763,488,
and in 1849 had reached 2,159,954 tons. The export
of grain from Ireland to Great Britain, which in 1815
was 821,192 quarters, in 1825 was 2,203,962 quarters,
and in 1845, 3,251,901 tons. It is evident, therefore,
that during the half-century immediately following the
Union, the material interests of Ireland had enormously
benefited, to an extent perhaps greater than those of any
other country in Europe during the same period; and
this decisively demonstrates the immense benefits which
those patriots had conferred upon their country, who, in
the face of the most strenuous opposition, forced its
adoption. What, then, would it have been if the great
p^oCTes8Sof measure of Catholic emancipation had at the same time
lkfedftion8' been carried out, and subsequent agitators deprived of
342-346. their strongest topics of inflammation by the removal of
the last remaining real object of complaint ! l
Lord Cornwallis continued in Dublin till the middle
Lord Hard- of May, when, the city and country being quiet, it was
cee<iseLOTd deemed safe for him to give place to his successor.
£°DuWbi!n,s On the 17th of that month Lord Hardwicke arrived and
ctaiereagh entered upon his duties as Lord-Lieutenant, Mr Abbot
L^£iSin being his Chief Secretary. Lord Castlereagh remained
May 17. in London in close and daily communication with Mr
Pitt, who soon conceived the very highest opinion of
his principles and capacity. He sat for the county
of Down in the United Parliament, where he also gave
proof of his great information and abilities. The at-
AND UNION. 139
traction between him and Mr Pitt was irresistible : their CHAP.
minds were in many respects similar, and the views
bj which both were animated were the same. Without 180]-
Mr Pitt's matchless powers of eloquence, Lord Castle-
reagh had all his devoted love to his country, his admir-
able temper, his vast administrative powers, his just and
impartial view of public affairs, his cool and imper-
turbable courage. Both were born to be the rulers of
men and the arbiters of nations ; and it was the good
fortune of the latter to carry out and bring to a trium-
phant conclusion the system of policy of which the former
laid the foundation. Mr Pitt thus spoke of him at this
period in the House of Commons : — " The noble lord
has this night given proof that there are among us talents
of the first rate, which talents, whether in or out of office, l Cagt]e
will always be ready for exertion, as occasion may arise, reagh cor-
against the most bitter enemy of human happiness that Pari. Hist.'
ever yet appeared in this world — Jacobinism."1"*
Lord Castlereagh was not yet thirty-one years of age,
and already he had, in the most important particulars, Obloquy to
rendered essential service to his country. He had en-
countered and vanquished a formidable Jacobin revolt,
aided by treachery at home and assistance from abroad ; {
he had terminated the rule of the corrupt oligarchy which
had so long oppressed the country, and laid the only
possible foundation for its future prosperity in an indis-
soluble union with Great Britain. Though thwarted at
the moment in his endeavours to extract from it the
deadly poison of religious rancour, he had materially ad-
vanced the cause of religious peace by the efforts he had
made in its behalf. It might naturally be supposed that
* The fatigue and anxiety of mind with which Lord Castlereagh was
ippressed at this time threw him into a fever in London of several weeks'
ontinuance, and excited the serious apprehensions of his friends. On April
2, Lord Coruwallis wrote to General Ross, " I have been for some days xinder
reat anxiety about Lord Castlereagh ; " and again, on May 7, " I have been,
ud indeed am still, very uneasy about Lord Castlereagh, who has had a return
f his fever. They tell me there is no danger, but I have no idea of a fever of
) long continuance without danger." — Cornwallis Correspondence, iii. 357, 359.
140 IRISH REBELLION AND UNION.
CHAP, such acts would have secured him the lasting gratitude
and esteem of all classes in his country. It was quite
1801« the reverse, and he reaped from his efforts and great
services nothing but hatred and rancour. The revolu-
tionists could never forgive him for having crushed their
insurrection, and for ever blasted their hopes of a
Hibernian republic in close alliance with France, and
with themselves at its head. The Protestant oligarchy
were exasperated at him for having terminated their
withering rule ; defeated corruption by its own weapons ;
and successfully enlisted the selfish principles against
them. They were fain to lay upon him the severity and
cruelties which in fact had arisen from the license of their
own supporters. The Catholics have come to see that
the union with Great Britain which he brought about has
been fatal to the exclusive domination which they hoped
to establish in a purely Irish Parliament by their numeri-
cal majority, and that they must be content to be ruled
like their other fellow-subjects, not to rule them. Their
main efforts, accordingly, have been directed to undo the
union which he had effected. The English aristocracy
were jealous of such great things having been done by
one who was not of themselves, and the dangerous pre-
cedent being established of the chief direction of Irish
affairs being placed in the hands of an Irishman by birth.
All parties were alike exasperated against the youthful
statesman who had thus boldly interposed between them,
and, disregarding all separate interests, pursued only the
ultimate advantage of the country. It is to this com-
bination of parties the most opposite and irreconcilable
that the prejudice which has so long existed against his
memory is to be ascribed, and that the firmest foundation
for its ultimate vindication is laid. " The present and
the future," says Sir Joshua Reynolds, " are rivals ; he
who pays court to the one must lay his account with being
discountenanced by the other."
CHAPTER II.
LOED CASTLEREAGH FEOM HIS RESIGNATION OF OFFICE IN
IRELAND IN 1801, TO THE ACCESSION OF THE WHIGS TO
POWER IN APRIL 1806.
THE resignation of Mr Pitt, and with him of the whole CHAP.
Irish Administration, on the Catholic question, in February
1801, withdrew Lord Castlereagh from the theatre of his 1801-
former exertions and usefulness. But it was a fortunate Lordc'astie-
circumstance for the general interests of the country that deffin the
he was then removed from the scene of local strife and 5rirsh
Parliament.
ambition, and launched into the wide career, more suit-
able to his talents, which the large concerns of the em-
pire at headquarters presented. His mind, naturally
grasping in details, and yet capacious in generalisation,
qualified him to acquire, with surprising rapidity, a
thorough acquaintance with the great imperial questions
of the day ; and his intimate acquaintance with Mr Pitt
imbued him with a complete knowledge of the views of
that great statesman, especially on the all-important sub-
ject of the contest with the French revolutionary power.
This was a matter of the very highest importance, and
leeply affected his entire future life and history. It will
lereafter appear that Lord Castlereagh's whole policy,
rhen he became in a manner the arbiter of Europe in
814 and 1815, was a carrying out of the views of Mr
*itt, as developed in the formation of the European Con-
ideracy in 1805 ; and it was at this time that these
142 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, views were first fully impressed upon him. How seldom
n- in this world is wisdom and patriotism thus privileged to
isoi. leave its mantle to a successor, and find in a kindred soul
and a congenial character the fitting depositary and des-
tined accomplisher of its greatest designs !
Though no longer, after Lord Hardwicke's appointment,
Hismea- officially connected with Ireland, Lord Castlereagh did
Parliament not lose sight of the interests of his country; and his
ire?andng g^at information and calm views led to his being in-
trusted with the principal measures regarding it under Mr
Addington's Administration. The two most important
of these in the session of 1801, were the Act for the con-
tinuing of the Act for the Suppression of Rebellion in
Ireland, and the suppression of the Habeas Corpus Act.
Both were intrusted to Lord Castlereagh, and they came
on in March and April. He said : " It is a painful duty
to call on the House to re-enact a law such as this. Every
man must feel a reluctance at bringing forward any mea-
sure which is to trench, as I admit this does, on the natural
rights of the subject. It was reserved for the modern
principles of Jacobinism to make it compulsory on the
Government of Ireland to give existence to a system of
judicature founded upon martial law. Such a system
became necessary at a period when all law was suspended,
when all duties were violated, and when the safety of the
chief magistrate and the Government depended upon its
vigorous application. If there be now the same necessity
for continuing that measure, I am sure the House will
not forget its duty or abandon the safety of the consti-
tution by refusing to sanction it. This is an act of ne-
cessity which cannot longer be delayed.
" The rebellion broke out in May 1798, and the Gov-
Continued. ernment then published a proclamation of martial law.
They proceeded from May 1798 to May 1799 exercis-
ing martial law wherever rebellion existed, without any
express enactment for that purpose, on the principle that
they were authorised by the King's prerogative, provided
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 143
they did not transgress the necessity of the case. No- CHAP.
thing could have induced them to alter the strict consti-
tutional system, but that they felt they must deny to a isoi.
great part of the country the advantages of the civil law
unless it was incorporated with the martial law. The
two systems could not coexist ; for how could the martial
law be executed if it was liable to be thwarted by the
civil law 1 Though it was put down in the field, the
spirit of Jacobinism infused itself into the country, which
it afflicted in a manner still more distressing, because
not liable to be in the same manner attacked by the
King's forces. Rebellion is not less rebellion because it
is less open ; because it aims at thwarting the adminis-
tration of civil justice in the courts of law, not combating
the soldiers in open warfare. By the energy of the
King's forces it has been driven from the open field ; but
if martial law is not permitted, the same system of terror
will prevail, and the Government cannot expect from the
loyal and well affected an allegiance which it is in-
capable of protecting. Such has been the necessity of
the case that it has superseded all formal authority.
From the moment when martial law was first proclaimed
it has never yet been suspended. During the last year
no less than 207 persons have been tried, of whom 63
were tried under the bill authorising martial law, and 34
3ondeumed to death. The noble lord intrusted with the
jovernment of Ireland would never have exercised such
jowers if a necessity for them did not exist, and unfor-
unately that necessity is noways abated.
" The whole disturbances of Ireland are directed, first,
.gainst the persons and property of the well affected, Concluded.
nd, secondly, against the courts of justice ; therefore the
louse must feel, unless there be some mode of bringing
lose persons who are engaged in acts of rebellion sum-
larily to trial, that we are subjecting our friends to cer-
lin destruction. You will see from the report of the
)inmittee, that the rebels have their own courts-martial
144 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, against the well affected. It is impossible to keep up
n> any system of coercion, if you can only have the ordinary
1801- tedious process of the municipal law against persons guilty
of rebellion, when the persons who sat on the juries of the
offenders are themselves liable to be put to the bar of the
summary rebel courts, which adjudge with the rapidity of
lightning, and execute without mercy. The system of
rebellion in Ireland, now transmuted from contests in the
field to secret assassination and threatenings, is one un-
paralleled in history, unknown in any other age or coun-
try. The only gleam of hope arises from this considera-
tion, that it is greatly circumscribed in the sphere of its
operation. Last year it was confined to three counties,
Antrim, Limerick, and Wicklow, and the people have
generally shown great readiness to aid in the suppression
of these disturbances. The law is not to be carried into
execution except in case of actual rebellion ; and every
case under it is brought under the special revision of the
Lord-Lieutenant and law officers of the Crown ; and the
jurisdiction of the courts-martial is confined to crimes in
furtherance of rebellion. While the rebellion exists it
must be met by energetic measures, and I know of none
capable of arresting it but martial law. I know that
rebellion has too many friends in every part of the em-
pire, and I do not expect that it will disappear during
the war ; but at present I propose to continue the Act
only for three months, for which period also the suspen-
sion of the Habeas Corpus Act is to be sustained." The
motion was strongly opposed by Sir Lawrence Parsons
and the United Jacobin and anti-Union party in the
House ; but it was supported in an eloquent and convinc-
i Pari. Hist, ing speech by Mr Pitt, and passed by a large majority,
Kfl4.'10 °'the numbers being 8 4 to 8 — in the only division which
took place on the question.1 *
* Mr Pitt said, in this debate, in words not less just than eloquent : " This is
indeed a measure at once unexampled in the necessity by which it is called for,
and in the lenity by which it is distinguished. In former times, when it was
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 145
When the Irish question went up to the House of CHAP.
Lords, the Earl of Clare drew in sombre colours a picture IL
of the state of Ireland during the rebellion, even in those lm-
quarters where it did not actually break out. " The county
of Limerick/' said he, " in which I reside, is almost the
only one which remained quiet during the revolution, yet e Earl of
a dangerous insurrection suddenly broke out there after
it was over. It was begun by an atrocious murder com-
mitted under my own roof. One of my servants was put
to death, under circumstances of unexampled inhumanity,
merely because he was an Englishman ; and, to show
the extreme barbarity to which the Irish people had
arrived, the murderer was a man who had been in the
service of my father and myself for thirty years, and been
uniformly treated by both with the utmost kindness.
The wretch had stolen arms from my house and distri-
buted them among the rebels. When he was led out to
execution, he confessed to the priest who attended him,
that a list of twenty persons whom it was resolved to
murder had been made out, and that his master was
among the number ; yet I myself was the only indivi-
dual who gave employment and bread to the poor of the
neighbourhood, and without my aid they must have been
reduced to extreme misery. The people are not actuated
Pound necessary to resort to martial law, the contests were soon decided in the
ield. They did not, as at present, pervade every part of the machine of Govern-
nent, every artery of the social system ; they did not enter into all the con-
erns of the community, poison all the comforts of private life, and all the
ources of public security. The mischief and the danger came armed together
ito the field ; and, the battle won, the victors and the vanquished again en-
>yed, though in different proportions, the comforts and the advantages of the
>cial state. In this case, however, the danger is of another and a more ma-
jnant species. Here, under the baneful influence of Jacobinism, your enemies,
iough defeated in the field, only separate ; the vital principle of enmity to
der and social comfort still remains, confined, indeed, in scantied bounds,
d with diminished means, though with undiminished rancour. The prero-
tive of exercising martial law, which was adequate to a sudden attack and
a passing danger, is not adequate to contend with a rebellion founded on
.nciples so secret, so disseminated, so powerful, and so persevering. To
date the defects of martial law, founded only on prerogative, it is necessary
improve and enforce it by legislative provisions." — Parl. Hist., xxxv. 1026
VOL. I. K
14G LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, by anything resembling a rational motive, but a mere
TL thirst for blood. If the noble earl (Fitzwilliam) will
isoi. visit his estates in the county of Wicklow, he will find
that these statements are not exaggerated ; he will find
nothing but traces of desolation and renewal of horrors.
Happy, thrice happy, should I be if I could once more
go out unarmed ! At present my servant brings me my
arms as regularly as my hat. To think of repressing this
spirit by concession and indulgence is absurd. Acts of
that kind, although well meant, have already had a mis-
chievous tendency. The rebels have a system of laws
the most severe and most promptly executed. It is far
more efficient than the civil code, and can only be counter-
acted by martial law. If the bill for continuing martial
law is not adopted, scenes rivalling in atrocity those
which marked the year 1641 will be the consequence.
Nothing would be seen over the country but pillage,
murder, and conflagration. The conduct of Marquess
Cornwallis has been merciful in the extreme. He released
many rebels from prison, and granted others a free par-
don on giving up their arms. He spent four hours every
day in examining the minutes of courts-martial, and never
permitted any individual to suffer but after the most
minute investigation. Yet this lenity and merciful con-
duct produced much evil ; it was ascribed to fear, and
encouraged licentiousness. Such had been the complete
organisation of treason and rebellion, that the municipal
law, unsupported by the military, not only could not be
exercised with effect, but the mere attempt to administer
justice was defeated and perverted to the worst purposes.
lparl- Hist. All jurymen who give a conscientious verdict, or witnesses
XXXV., J.^oJ.~ . _
1234. a true evidence, are marked, and their names sent to the
provincial committees for proscription and murder." 1
The mind of Lord Castlereagh, eminently judicious and
practical, and set on redressing real grievances or guard-
ing against impending dangers, not following out visionary
ideas, was no sooner released from the cares of office than
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 147
ft set itself to prepare the way for the redress of the CHAP.
chief evils which afflicted his country at the moment.
These were, the religious rancour consequent on the ex- 1801-
elusion of the Catholics from Parliament, the vexation Lord6cagt]e.
produced by the drawing of tithes in kind by the Pro- reash'? able
<f w < memoir on
testant clergy, and the constant danger impending over the Catholic
the island, and excitement kept up in the minds of the
people, by the chance, it might be said the probability, of
a French invasion. Upon each of these points he drew
up and submitted to Government a detailed memoir,
containing all the arguments on the subject that have
been since, or can possibly be, adduced, stated with re-
markable clearness and force, and particularly remarkable
from the calm statesmanlike views which they exhibit of
the question, and the practical remedies which they pro-
pose, or dangers which they seek to obviate. They are
all given at length in the Castlereayli Correspondence,
and are highly valuable, not merely as characteristic of
the author's mind, but as containing the best arguments
that can be adduced on the subjects of which they treat.
On the Catholic question Lord Castlereagh observes : —
' At the Revolution, the See of Rome was in full autho- His memoir
ity, and the unceasing efforts of the Catholic powers on cathdic
he Continent were steadily and systematically directed to clairas>
he establishment of Popery within these realms. Instead
f a family on the throne attached to the principles of the
Reformation, and to the preservation of the church estab-
shment, we had a succession of princes playing the game
f our enemies, aiming at absolute power, and favouring
opery as the instrument best suited to their purpose. To
medy the danger from the throne, the succession was ai-
red ; to defend the constitution, at a moment of struggle,
)m its enemies, numerous at home, and powerfully sup-
rted from abroad, the principle of exclusion, taken up
the Reformation was at the Revolution fortified ; and
Ireland, where the danger was most pressing, it was
lowed up in Queen Anne's reign by every penal measure
148 LOED CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, which could be devised to break down the property, and
n- of course to reduce the authority, of the Catholic body.
isoi. " Circumstances have since so far altered as to induce a
Contfnued. marked change of policy in the government of that branch
of the empire, where Catholic authority can alone afford
any reasonable ground of jealousy to the State. Not
only all restrictions on the industry of that sect and
their means of acquiring property have been taken off, but
important constitutional privileges have been extended to
them, in which the British Catholics have not been in-
cluded. They now, therefore, are become a powerful
body in the empire — in number not less than three mil-
lions— growing fast into wealth, and of course into local
influence, and already in possession of a considerable pro-
portion of political consequence. The question then is :
Circumstanced as the empire is in wealth and population
— circumstanced as it is with relation to the Continent, and
united as it now is into one kingdom — can you safely per-
mit their numbers and their property to work their natural
effects in the usual channels of the constitution ? Can
you continue them precisely in their present predica-
ment ? Or have you the means of throwing them back
to the point of depression they stood in at the commence-
ment of the century ?
9 " The present state of things cannot be permanent in
Continued, its nature ; for so long as it is persevered in, that portion
of the United Kingdom will be kept in a perpetual state
of irritation and contest on a constitutional and religious
question, whilst the party opposed to the State will every
day be gaining authority in proportion as they acquire
wealth, and, if we may judge from experience, rapidly
gaining supporters amongst the Protestants themselves.
If, then, the present arrangement is rather provisional than
conclusive in itself, and if it is of all courses the worst, on
a point so much calculated to excite the public feeling, to
pursue a fluctuating and indefinite policy, what other
system can be taken up ? Can we, without a new struggle,
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 149
and a necessity more distinct and pressing than what at CHAP.
present exists, either justify in principle, or reconcile the "•
Protestant body to inflict anew upon the Catholics the isoi.
penalties and forfeitures which the temper of the times
has so lately removed ? or can we think it possible, in
cool blood, to reduce them to their former poverty and
weakness ? And yet nothing else will enable us to act
upon the principle of exclusion with any prospect even of
temporary repose.
" The Union being now accomplished, and the estab-
lishments of the empire being placed upon the natural Continued,
support of a correspondent population, it is worth consi-
dering, so long as the Continental game is not played
against us upon a religious principle, whether, in suffering
the sectarian authority to operate within rather than with-
out the constitution, the danger is not diminished'? Should
it be thought that the Dissenting interests of the empire
at large (the Catholics being so admitted) have not
weight, through their lawful operation, to shake the Estab-
lishment, there can be no question that, in a state of ex-
clusion, they are more naturally open to an alliance with
Jacobinism, the enemy of the present day, than in a state
of comprehension. The Union has afforded us the means
of trying this experiment with less risk than seems to
attach to an opposite line of conduct. If it succeeds, it
will relieve us from great embarrassment ; if it fails, the
3vil will in time, as the accomplishment of Irish inde-
pendence has already done, work out its own cure. The
safety of the State must always rest upon the attachment
>f the great mass of its proprietors, who are attached to
bs establishments ; and as it did at the Revolution, when
lie necessity is felt it will not fail to accomplish its own
reservation. There is little chance of any Roman Ca-
lolic being called to his Majesty's counsels ; if there was,
personal disability for office on account of religion is
-ecisely the present ground of complaint, and is calcu-
ted to keep alive the same species of contest which
150 LORD CASTLEREAGH S INDIAN
CHAP, it is our object to get rid of, and without an adequate
IL motive.
isoi. " Should the measure of, concession be decided on, the
continued, advantages of its proceeding from Government will na-
turally suggest themselves. Much benefit might arise from
the boon being attributable to that settlement under which
we are hereafter to live. It would make the Catholics
in Ireland feel that their exclusion has been the necessary
consequence of a separate constitution, and that their ad-
vantages have arisen out of an incorporation with Great
Britain. It is idle to hope that Dissenters of any descrip-
tion can ever be so zealously attached subjects as those
who are of the Established religion ; but the question is,
What system, without hazarding the powers of the State
itself, is best calculated, if not warmly to attach, at least
to disarm the hostility of, those classes in the community
who cannot be got rid of, and must be governed ? This
latter consideration is of most pressing necessity with
regard to Ireland. That kingdom must, in fact, be con-
sidered as a country of sectarists ; and if we are to indulge
an expectation that it may be redeemed from its pre-
sent miseries, it must be by the adoption of some system
which, without relaxing the energy of Government, shall
relieve the public mind from its fundamental principles of
perpetual struggle. Unless the power and stability of the
united government shall afford the means in safety of adopt-
ing some means of compromise amongst the contending
factions, the difficulty of governing the country will rapidly
increase, as every year adds materially to the relative im-
portance of the Dissenting interests. If the same internal
struggle continues, Great Britain will derive little beyond
an increase of expense from the Union. If she is to
govern Ireland upon a garrison principle, perhaps, in
abolishing the separate Parliament, she has parted as well
with her most effectual means as with her most perfect
justification. In uniting with Ireland, she has abdicated
the colonial relation ; and if, hereafter, that country is to
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 151
prove a resource rather than a burden to Great Britain, CHAP.
an effort must be made to govern it through the public
mind. 18°l-
" It is obvious that the government of Ireland has dif-
ficulties incidental to it, which will require a much greater concluded.
proportion of Ministerial attention than Scotland did sub-
sequent to the Union. Scotland at that day was thinly
inhabited, the people poor and industrious, and of habits
so peculiarly regular, that, with the exception of the two
rebellions which sprang from a feeling of attachment to
the exiled family, it may be said to have almost governed
itself. Ireland, on the contrary, is highly populous ; acquires
wealth more rapidly than civilisation : it is inhabited by
dissenters from the Establishment, split into factions, and
those factions committed against each other, with all the
rancour of past injuries as well as present distinctions.
The law is imperfectly obeyed, and very ill administered
by the magistrates, who are too frequently partisans rather
than judges. In short, the tranquillity of the country is
alone preserved, even in the degree in which it exists, by
the perpetual intervention of the hand of Government, ex-
ercising the most summary powers. Gradually to correct
these evils will require the persevering attention of a firm
and impartial Government. The Union has removed a
great impediment to a better system ; but the Union will
do little in itself unless it be followed up. In addition to
the steady application of authority in support of the laws,
[ look to the measure which is the subject of the above
)bservations, to an arrangement of tithes, and to a pro-
-ision for the Catholic and Dissenting clergy, calculated
u its regulations to bring them under the influence of the
ftate, as essentially necessary to mitigate, if it cannot
xtinguish, faction, to place the Established Church on its reagh Cor-
lost secure foundation, and to give the necessary autho- sIT-ioo.
ty as well as stability to the Government itself/'1
Nothing can paint the peculiar type of Lord Castle-
;agh's mind more clearly than this memoir. He had just
152 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, been engaged in a strenuous effort to procure for the
n' Catholics the liberation from restriction for which he here
isoi. contends, and he had been unsuccessful in the attempt,
which was He had lost office in consequence ; and from the known
and insurmountable repugnance of the Sovereign to the
measure, he had to all appearance forfeited his whole
hopes of political advancement in the endeavour. In the
first moments of disappointed hope and blasted ambition,
he sits down to write a calm statesmanlike paper on the
subject, which he submits in private to the Government,
and which is for the first time brought to light long after
his death, when his private documents come to be examined
by his biographer ! He neither makes it the subject of
invective on the hustings, nor of declamation in the news-
papers, nor of debate in Parliament. His observations
are among the very best, his reasonings the most conclu-
sive, that ever have been made on this vexed and oft-
debated subject ;- but having addressed them to what he
deemed the proper quarter, he is content to let them
slumber in forgotten obscurity in his repositories. Calm
and passionless in this his first great disappointment in
life, he exhibited neither the irritation of thwarted poli-
tical ambition nor the rancour of excited religious intol-
erance. He views the question, in its practical and poli-
tical aspect, as deeply affecting the strength and security
of the empire, without a vestige of the animosity with
which it was at the time debated on both sides by others.
He sums up the arguments and delivers his opinion with
the temper and moderation of a judge on the bench — not
the zeal of a party to the suit, or the vehemence of an
advocate at the bar.
A general plan for the commutation or adjustment of
His views tithes, so as to avoid the evils arising from their being
fitment of drawn in kind by a Protestant incumbent from the Ca-
tithes. tholic parishioners, strongly attracted the attention of Lord
Castlereagh. This was a perpetual source of irritation
and contention in Ireland ; for although, from the extreme
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 153
smallness of the holdings, seldom exceeding a few acres, CHAP.
into which the country was divided, the payment in
general was a perfect trifle, seldom exceeding a shilling, 180L
often requiring two or three holdings to be massed to-
gether to amount to twopence, yet this was as nothing as
regarded the irritation with which its collection was at-
tended. The importance attached by those engaged in
them, in religious disputes, is almost always not in the
direct but the inverse ratio of the weight of the interest
or question really at stake. Aware of this, and a spec-
tator of the many painful disputes, often ending in blood,
which the drawing of tithes by the Protestant clergy oc-
casioned, Lord Castlereagh turned his anxious attention
to this subject, and prepared an elaborate memorial on
it which has fortunately been preserved among the Cas-
tlereagh papers. His plan was to have the amount of
tithes in each parish ascertained, either by private arrange-
ment, arbitration, or judicial authority, and this being
done, to lay it as a direct burden on the landlord.
This was exactly the system adopted in 1631 in Scot-
land, by Charles I. ; but it had been then found to
be attended with the serious inconvenience, not foreseen
at the time, that the fixed money payment became
in progress of time, from the fall in the value of the
precious metals consequent on the discovery of South
America, to be much below, often not a third of, the value
of the tithes abandoned. To guard against this danger
Lord Castlereagh proposed to introduce a principle which
' shall give the Church, at proper intervals, a fair advance
n proportion to the improvement in other incomes ;" and
or this purpose he desired to have the average value
>f the arable land in each parish ascertained at stated
itervals by valuation by proper officers or the tax-office
3turns, and the proportion due to the Church fixed 1 Cagt]e
ccordins; to such valuation. Such was Lord Castle- reagh cor
resp. iv.
^agh's plan, which has been only partially carried out 193-213.
y subsequent legislation ; l but which contains, it may
154
LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP.
II.
1801.
15.
Returns re-
lating to the
Roman
Catholic
clergy.
1 Castle-
reagh Cor-
resp. iv.
97-99.
safely be affirmed, the only just and practicable mode of
adjusting the rights of parties in this vexed and difficult
question.*
A general plan for the establishment of the Roman
Catholic clergy and their connection with the State, by
granting salaries from Government to the bishops and
priests of that establishment, had, long before his resigna-
tion of office, occupied the attention of Lord Castlereagh.
With this view he prepared and sent round to every
diocese and parish in the kingdom queries which brought
in very valuable returns as to the condition of the clergy
of that persuasion in the country. From them it appeared
that there were at that time (1800) 1800 Roman Ca-
tholic clergymen in the country, of whom 1400 were
secular and 400 regular. The benefices were 1026, and
each required two incumbents, though by no means the
whole of them had it. There were 4 archbishops and 21
bishops. The highest income was that of the Bishop of
Cork, which was £550 a-year : the lowest that of the
Bishop of Kilfenora, which was £100 a-year. The average
incomes of the bishops was £300 a-year : of the parish
priests, £65 a-year. The highest was £240 a-year : the
lowest, £15 a-year. The clergy dined on an average
half the year in private houses.1 The incomes both of
the bishops and clergy, secular and regular, were derived
* Lord Castlereagh thought that, without going through all this operation ot
arbitrations, valuations, and judicial authority, the whole question might be
settled by an imposition at once of an assessment of a shilling an acre on all
improved, arable, pasture, meadow, and wood lands of the kingdom. Taking
the whole acres in the country at 15,000,000, and two-thirds of that, or
10,000,000, as the improved and assessable portion, this would yield to the Church
an income of £50,000 a-year above what it at that time enjoyed, which might
stand against bad debts and the expense of collection. This, said he, "would
be light in operation, but productive in effect. It would be a relief to the
poor, and an encouragement to agriculture. It would still draw the support
of the Church from the soil, to which immemorial prescription had confined it,
but it, would draw it in a more equitable proportion. It would remove a
monstrous burden from the industry of the husbandman and the shoulders of
the peasantry, not to impose it on the manufacturers of stock, but to deal
out a reasonable share of it to them." — LORD CASTLEHEAGH'S Memoir on
Tithes; Castlereayh Correspondence, iv. 212.
AND WAR ADMINISTKATION. 155
entirely from marriage-licences, christenings, burials, and CHAP.
chapel contributions ; no part from tithes or territorial
possessions. isoi.
To remedy this glaring inequality, and put a period, at
least to a certain degree, to the entire dependence of the His plan
clergy of all grades upon their flocks, Lord Castlereaghingthe
proposed to settle upon them all a certain income from c ergy'
Government in proportion to their rank, from £750 to
the archbishop, to £25 to the least provided of the parish
priests. The average payment to the parochial clergy
was to have been £40 a-year — about the income paid by
the State to the parochial clergy in France. The sum to
be allotted to these payments was £212,000 a-year. The
object of this payment was not to encourage the Roman
Catholic faith, or render the clergy of that establishment
independent of their flocks, but simply to acquire a certain
hold over them, to elevate in some degree the class of
persons who might enter the church, and to counteract
the close alliance between the parish priests and their
flocks, which necessarily arose from the former being
entirely dependent upon the latter. This plan has been
never yet carried into effect : and it is still strongly
opposed by many conscientious persons, on the principle
that it is wrong to contribute to the support of a delusive
and pernicious species of faith. But there can be no
doubt that, in a political point of view, it was highly expe-
dient, and it is a lasting subject of regret that it has not
been adopted ; and if a particular faith, though open to
exception, is found irrevocably established in the majority l Castle-
J J J reagh Cor-
>t a country, the best thing that can be done is to con-resp.iii.
lect it with the Government and render it as little hurt- iv. 400.'
ul as possible.1
The defence of Ireland against foreign invasion also en-
aged the anxious attention of Lord Castlereagh, even LordCastie-
fter he ceased to be officially connected with it, especially mofron the
fter the threatening aspect of foreign affairs in the latter ireiaud! °
art of the peace of Amiens rendered & renewal of the
156 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, war with France probable. He began with a very im-
IL portant observation, of application at all, and especially
J80i. at the present time. " It is a common observation amongst
historians that a powerful invasion of an insular state is
generally successful ; and, if a judgment may be formed
from the history of England, the observation is by no
means unfounded. The reason, I think, is obvious : such
a state trusts to keeping its enemies at a distance, and is
unprepared at home ; it is assailable on all sides — is gene-
rally unprovided with fortresses ; and, from the necessity
of guarding various points of probable attack at the same
time, the distribution of its forces must render the collec-
tive operation of them at the moment most favourable for
resistance impracticable. Ireland, it is true, seems to dif-
fer in one material circumstance from the description of
state to which this observation applies : she has power-
ful protection to expect from the forces of a great em-
pire of which she forms a part. But I rather think
that even this advantage may be found insufficient to
counterbalance the disadvantages of her insular situation
in her present state of defence ; and a very few words
may be sufficient to show that the chief circumstances of
strength and security on which the other great division
of the empire may with confidence rely, may prove
inadequate to the defence of Ireland.
" The navy of the empire is justly considered as the
Continued, safeguard or bulwark of England ; but the confidence
thus reposed in it must necessarily have reference to the
internal situation of the country : the determined hos-
tility which an invading army would there experience
from the people in every quarter would render an open
communication between it and the Continent indispens-
ably necessary. The invasion, then, of England, would
not be attempted without a superiority at sea. In
Ireland no such necessity would exist. An invading
army, capable of opposing the force to be spared from
the protection of the different provinces against insur-
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 157
rection would not find reinforcements or supplies from CHAP.
the Continent necessary: disaffection would abundantly
furnish both. It would indeed, I fear, find itself ex- 180L
posed to but few of the difficulties attendant on opera-
tions in an enemy's country ; and it might attain its
object without a superiority at sea. This marked differ-
ence in situation between the two countries, whether
disregarded or not by us, has certainly not been over-
looked by France. She has long considered Ireland as
the vulnerable part of the empire, and would inevitably
have proved it so, had not her efforts for the purpose been
in some instances frustrated by chance, and in others crip-
pled by scantiness of means. However, it should be con-
sidered that, although she has hitherto found great diffi-
culty in raising troops sufficient for her various enterprises,
she may now be glad to engage in any enterprise in which
she can find employment for her troops. It would be
idle to indulge a hope that we are exempt from the danger
of a future rebellion because the last was in the course
of a few months suppressed. It is true we are not
threatened with any appearance of insurrection at the
present time, but it is equally true that the great mass
of our population is disaffected to the Government ; and
where public security rests on so combustible a base, an
accidental spark may at any time produce a destructive
explosion. Upon the whole, I think it cannot be denied
that, if there be a country on earth in which precautionary
measures of every sort against external and internal ene-
mies are indispensably necessary, Ireland is that country ;
md if ever there was a period in which such measures
vould seem to be peculiarly requisite, the present is that
>eriod.
" Let us see, then, whether precautionary measures
ssential to the security of the country have not hitherto Continued.
een neglected, and in what manner the neglect may
e remedied. First, as to fortresses : So destitute are
e of places of strength of any description, that even our
158 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, depots throughout the kingdom would, in the event of
IL invasion, probably fall into the enemy's hands, or be sur-
1801. prised by the rebels, at the moment when the use of them
would become indispensably necessary ; that is, when our
disposable force should be ordered from its present sta-
tions, where it affords them protection, to form an army
in the field. The capital I consider as in a peculiar
degree insecure. An attempt to defend it would be
vain, and to command it without a citadel would be
impracticable. The public and private treasure in the
National Bank, amounting to above a million in specie
alone, the ordnance, small arms, and stores of every
description, would offer a temptation to sudden insur-
rection scarcely to be resisted by the rebels, when co-
operating with an invading enemy ; and the advantage
of seizing the persons conducting the executive govern-
ment, securing them as hostages, or compelling them to
seek safety by flight, would be too obvious to be over-
looked. It would, indeed, reduce the loyal inhabitants in
general to the necessity of submitting without resistance.
" Immense sums have been expended, in the course
Continued, of the last few years, in the purchase of houses for the
accommodation of the troops, as well as in building
barracks ; but it unfortunately happens that these bar-
racks are in general situated in large towns, where the
fidelity of the troops is liable to be tampered with.
The situations chosen, too, are commonly such as pre-
clude all possibility of erecting defences round them with
effect, should the yeomen and other loyal inhabitants
find it necessary to resort to them for security, in the
event of the troops stationed in them taking the field.
Indeed they are in general so completely commanded,
that assailants would have the advantage in point of
situation over troops attempting their defence. The
fashion of the present day, I know, is to decry fortifica-
tions in general, whether justly or not is immaterial to
the present subject ; for opinions may be right in the
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 159
abstract and absurd in the application. Had the Em- CHAP.
peror Joseph lived, however, he would have lamented
having yielded to an opinion of their inutility ; and i$°i-
the business of St Jean d'Acre, as well as the defence
which Alexandria has enabled the French to make in
Egypt, affords an argument in favour of their being some-
times useful. I will readily admit that fortresses would
be of no use in England ; but this admission leads me
into another comparison of the circumstances of the two
countries. There, as I have said, there is no real danger
of invasion ; here, it may be expected almost every
hour : there, the mass of the people wish to uphold the
Government, and have not any idea of insurrection ;
here, the majority of them wish to pull it down, and
think of nothing else : there, the army may live among
the people without danger of corruption ; here, the efforts
to corrupt it have been incessant, and our security rests
in a great measure on keeping them apart. An attempt
might as well be made to convert a thistle into a pro-
ductive corn-stem, as a real Irish Jacobin into a loyal
subject ; although, certainly, in process of time, when a
considerable part of the present generation shall have
passed away, the prevailing national propensity may, by
means of the Union, be changed.
" The erecting of great fortresses, and the fortifying of
large towns, I am aware, would be enormously expensive, Concluded.
and would require a great length of time to accomplish.
Citadels, however, and other places of moderate extent,
would not be subject to these objections, and might be
of incalculable service. One of these, in the vicinity of
Dublin, I conceive to be indispensably necessary ; and
one or more in each of the other provinces I should think
equally requisite. Perhaps strong lines or field-works,
enclosing temporary barracks, might be erected with
effect; and might, in the first instance, answer for any
immediate exigency ; these might, as time and circum-
stances should permit, be strengthened and converted
160 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, into fortresses. This idea of field-works, however, I haz-
n> ard without much consideration. In choosing situations
1801. for fortresses, I take for granted a communication with
the sea, or with the great rivers navigable to it, would
be the first object of attention. Everything at the com-
mencement of a campaign would depend on gaming time,
and on keeping up the means of communication with
England. In Continental wars, in general, each army
has a friendly country to retreat to. Here, in our present
state of defence, a single defeat might leave to us only
the alternative of submission or inevitable destruction.
In short, I am persuaded so much depends on establishing
safe assembling and retreating posts communicating with
England, that, destitute of them, the country may be lost
without a struggle ; and by means of them, even if lost
for a time, it might, and I trust would, be recovered. I
assume the proposition that Ireland would be fought for
by England to the last extremity ; for it is pretty generally
admitted, that if one country were to fall the other could
not stand ; indeed, a powerful French-Irish army, within
agt]c a few hours' sail in open boats of the British shore, would
agh cor- be a circumstance requiring a very strong heart, and at
339-351. the same time a very weak head, to contemplate with
indifference."1*
An event occurred in Ireland after Lord Castlereagh
Renewed had ceased to be connected officially with it, which
tiou. ' proved on what a slippery foundation the public security
at that time rested, and how well-founded were his'
apprehensions of the probable effects of a considerable
invasion by French troops. Although the country as a
whole was tranquil, there were some ardent spirits in the
capital who were far from being appeased, and the zeal
of whom brought about an attempt at rebellion, which,
though in itself contemptible, so far as the means at their
disposal were concerned, proved not a little formidable
* This memoir, though not signed by Lord Castlereagh, evidently developed
his views, and was drawn up by his authority.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 161
from the revelation which it afforded of the narrow basis CHAP.
on which the Government, even in the metropolis, rested. n-
In July 1803, secret information was given to the Govern- isos.
ment that an insurrection in Dublin was in preparation ;
and an explosion, which suddenly took place on the 1 6th July ie,
of that mouth, in the public streets, the authors of which
were shrouded in mystery, told but too plainly that the
collection and transmission of ammunition for that purpose
were going forward. The garrison of the city consisted of
3000 men— a force perfectly adequate to put down any
attempt at open rebellion ; but it appeared, from what
followed, that there was a deplorable want of vigour
and unity in the manner in which the civil and military
authority was directed. The rising was determined on
the night of the 22d, and at two in the morning of the July 22.
23d, the Kildare leaders, deeming the chance of success
hopeless, left the city. The insurgents, however, whose
numbers never exceeded 300, assembled, took posses-
sion of Thomas Street and James Street, and sent out
detachments in different directions to rouse the inhabit-
ants. The troops in the garrison were under orders to
hold themselves in readiness ; but there was no one who
undertook the responsibility of assembling or leading them
against the centre of the insurrection ; and few of the yeo-
manry had arms, and none of them ammunition. Mean-
while the greatest alarm prevailed at the Castle, for the
protection of which — besides the usual guard, at all times
sufficiently strong — the 2d Regiment, 600 strong, under
Major Donnellan, was brought from the old Custom-House,
where it had been quartered ; but no attempt was for a
considerable time made to attack the rebels in the centre
of their strength. At length, about eleven o'clock, a party
of the 21st, escorting an officer of the regiment from his
lodgings to the barracks, fell in with part of the mob in
Thomas Street, and being attacked, instantly fired and
dispersed them. The fugitives received a volley from
the guard on the Coombe in their flight, and irnme-
VOL. I. L
162 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, diately dispersed. The troops from the barracks, how-
"• ever, did not receive any orders to march till ten at
1803. night, and did not appear in the street till half-past one
on the morning of the 24th, two hours before which
i Mr Ma«- time the insurgents had been entirely dispersed.1 The
counter 'the rising was put down, not by any concerted measure
insurrec- emanating from a government having 3000 soldiers at its
tion ; Castle- t °
reagh Cor- disposal, but by a few discharges by detachments or
316-3231 escorts which accidentally met the insurgents in the
streets ! *
A deplorable catastrophe has thrown a melancholy
Death of interest over this abortive and contemptible attempt at
justice insurrection. During the short time that the mob were
iwarden. .Q pOSSessj0n Of the central parts of the city, and send-
ing out parties in different directions to excite the inha-
bitants to insurrection, one of these parties accidentally
met Lord Chief-Justice Kilwarden's carriage, who was
returning through Thomas Street from the country, ac-
companied by his daughter. The judge announced his
name, and begged for mercy ; but his age and charac-
ter, and the tears of his daughter, were alike unable to
soften the hearts of those fiends in human form. They
dragged him from the vehicle, declaring that they must
have his life, but that they would spare the lady. She
was allowed to pass uninjured through the column, but
the unresisting nobleman, and a relative with him, were
assailed with clubs and pikes — the savages violently con-
tending, as in Paris during the massacres of September
1792, for the distinction of stabbing their passive vic-
tims. The young lady, in the utmost agony, made
her way to the Castle, and related the terrible adven-
ture ; and, meanwhile, some humane persons having
arrived at the scene of the murder, found Mr Wolfe,
his lordship's friend, lying dead on the pavement, and
Lord Kilwarden stretched beside him, but still breath-
ing.. He was carried to the nearest watch-house, where
he expired in great agony in half an hour. A by-
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 163
stander, shocked at the scene, exclaimed that the mur- CHAP.
derers should be executed next day. Rallying his strength n-
at these words, the dying judge exclaimed : " Murder
nft
must be punished ; but let no man suffer for my death reagh
but on a fair trial and by the laws of his country/' With 275-278'.
these words he expired.1
The author and instigator of this insane attempt at re-
bellion was Robert Emmett, a young man who possessed Trial and
that mixture of ardour, sanguine disposition, and enthu- 1 °
siasm, so often found in conspirators, and which prompts
them to engage in the most desperate enterprises with-
out the smallest calculation of the proportion which their
means bear to the end they have in view. In conjunction
with one Russell, a religious enthusiast, a bricklayer, a
woollen manufacturer, and another desperado named Red-
mond, a man in extreme poverty, he formed the design of
subverting the Government, and separating Ireland from
Great Britain ! The whole arsenal of the conspirators
consisted of a few thousand pikes, a quantity of gun-
powder, hand-grenades, and military dresses, with eight
thousand copies of a proclamation, wet from the press,
calling on the people to rise and establish a provisional
government ! Passing at once, as is so often the case in
similar circumstances, from the extremity of confidence to
the depths of despair, Emmett and his associates fled on
the insurrection being put down, and with so little precau-
tion to prevent the discovery of their depot, that it was
found out by Lieutenant Coultman of the 9th, who, with
twelve men, made himself master of the whole. Emmett
escaped to the mountains of Kildare ; but he was tracked
by the police, returned to Dublin, and was there seized,
condemned, and executed with Russell. The other con-
spirators, too contemptible for notice, were pardoned.
With them terminated this abortive and feeble attempt ^e.^o'-
at rebellion, which would not deserve any notice, even in Ann. Reg.
biography,2 were it not for the proof it affords of the 312.'
insecure basis on which the public safety at that time
164 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, rested in Ireland, and the contrast it exhibits to the
n< vigour and capacity with which, under the administration
1802. of Lord Camden and Lord Castlereagh, a rebellion tenfold
more serious had been fronted and put down.*
The great capacity of Lord Castlereagh, and in parti-
Lord c'astie- cular the high estimation in which he was held, both by
Mr Pitt and Lord Cornwallis, as well as all the members
a of Mr Addington's Administration, led to his being offered,
July0!?1' in Jul? 1802' the situation of President of the Board of
180i Control by that Government. As it was unconnected
with Ireland or the Catholic question, the offer was
accepted; and on 17th July 1802, he kissed hands on
his appointment to that elevated office with a seat in the
Cabinet. This promotion made a total and immediate
change in his objects in life and subjects of thought, and
brought him for the first time on the destined theatre of
his usefulness and his glory. Removed at once from the
various but important and engrossing concerns of a part,
he was put in contact with the necessities of the whole
empire ; and his seat in the Cabinet brought under his
immediate notice, not merely the interests, in themselves
sufficiently great, of our Eastern dominions, but the entire
state of Europe, then in one of the most important
crises of its history. From this time forward his main
attention was directed to foreign affairs ; and his bio-
* Among the strange effusions of Emmett's disordered imagination was
found, in the magazine of the conspirators' arms, beside the proclamation for a
provisional government, the following paper : — " I have little time to look
at the thousand difficulties which still lie between me and the completion of
my wishes. That these difficulties will disappear, I have ardent and, I trust,
rational hope ; but if it is not to be the case, I thank God for having gifted
me with a sanguine disposition. To that disposition I run from reflection ;
and if my hopes are without foundation— if a precipice is opening under my
feet from which duty will not suffer me to run back — I am grateful for that
sanguine disposition which leads me to the brink, and throws me down, while
my eyes are still raised to the vision of happiness that my fancy formed in the
heavens." — Caslkreayh Correspondence, iv. 266. The spirit of resolution, like all
other ardent passions when carried to excess, borders on insanity, and often
runs into it ; but it is only on that account the more dangerous, for it prompts
men to engage in enterprises which sometimes prove successful, from their
very absurdity having caused no precautions to be taken against them.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 165
graphy becomes the diplomatic history of Europe, down CHAP.
to the period of his death, twenty years afterwards.
At the time when Lord Castlereagh entered the 1802-
Cabinet as President of the Board of Control, the affairs CritSi
of Great Britain were in the most critical situation, and sj,tuati°n .of
11 Great Bri-
all the wisdom of the statesman was most required to t?in at this
guide with safety the vessel of the State through the
shoals with which it was surrounded. The definitive
treaty with France had been signed on the 27th March
preceding ; but it was felt by the Government, and
indeed obvious to all Europe, that the pacification was
but a truce, and that the seeds of a future and still
more serious war had been already sown in the very con-
ditions with which the peace was accompanied. In pos-
session of what she had already begun to call her "natural
limits," that is, of the whole territory included between
the Rhine, the Alps, and the ocean — with the forts in
Flanders, the basis of aggressive war in Germany, and the
passes of Savoy, the keys of Italy, in her hand — France
was already much stronger than any State of Europe taken
singly; and it was evident, from experience, that such
were the difficulties of getting the Continental powers to
draw together, that nothing but a long series of disasters
could still their jealousies, or produce a real coalition for
their common independence. Malta, the strongest for-
tress and most important station in the Mediterranean,
was itself an apple of discord, which it was obvious must
ere long lead to a renewal of hostilities — for we were
bound by the treaty to abandon it at no very distant
period ; and yet how could this be done with any security
for Egypt, and with it our whole Eastern dominions ?
The views of the First Consul on that important " mid-
way station " were scarcely disguised ; and his menacing
attitude to the Swiss cantons proved that Europe not
less than the East was threatened by his ambition.
Yet, was Great Britain singly to renew the conflict, and
plunge a nation just beginning to taste the blessings of
166 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, peace into a new war, probably longer, more exhaust-
n- ing} and more bloody than the one which had just been
1802. concluded \
If the position of Great Britain at home was critical,
Amio7f'in- still more perilous was the situation of our Eastern dom-
inions. In truth, the state of affairs was there so hazard-
ous that any post might bring intelligence of a decisive
and fatal nature. Already that system of conquest and
annexation had been begun by the British in Hindostan
which, though often disclaimed at home and forbidden by
the East India Directors, has been always forced upon
their viceroys abroad by the necessities of their situa-
tion, and seems to be the condition of existence to an
alien domination founded on foreign or domestic conquest.
One acquisition had rendered unavoidable, and in a
manner forced on, another, in Hindostan as in Europe,
until it had become evident that the career of conquest
could be stopped only in the one by the Himalaya,
in the other by the polar snows. Already, by treaty
Sept. 6, signed on September 6, 1801, a large part of the king-
dom of Oude, including the rich alluvial plain of the
Doab between the Jumna and the Ganges, containing
32,000 square miles, had been ceded to the British;
and in consequence of the discovery, in the archives
of Tippoo at Seringapatam, of decisive evidence of the
July 31. hostile designs of the Nawab of the Carnatic, his heir
had been compelled to cede 27,000 more to the East
India Company. These great stretches, which established
the English power in a solid manner in the centre of
Hindostan, and on the high-road from Calcutta to Delhi,
had excited the utmost alarm in India, and given rise
to a close alliance of the powerful Mahratta states to
expel the presumptuous strangers from the peninsula, who
threatened soon to lord it over all its native and legiti-
mate rulers. This formidable confederacy, which could
bring 200,000 well-trained horsemen into the field, might
soon be expected to be on the hands of the Company,
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 167
with whom the contest would be one of life or death. CHAP.
The conflict was already imminent, and preparations were n-
making for it on both sides, when Lord Castlereagh was 1802.
appointed to the head of the Board of Control in July
1802. And thus, by a singular coincidence, and yet the
result of the same general causes in both instances, he
found himself at the same time called on to prepare
resistance to the career of aggressive ambition in Europe,
and moderate its excesses or secure its acquisitions in
Asia. Nor were the intermediate states in a less critical
position, or less requiring the vigilant eye of the Eastern
statesman. The Turkish empire, threatened at once by
the Muscovites on the north, and the great rebellion of the
Wahabee in Arabia on the south, seemed on the point
of dissolution ; and the Persians, hard pressed by the
Russians, who had surmounted the Caucasus and were
besieging Erivan, promised soon to cease to be the barrier
of Hindostan, and rather become the advanced post of
the Cabinet of St Petersburg against our much-coveted
Eastern dominions.
The most urgent of these various and complicated
questions then pressing for consideration, was the state His
of our relations with France : and Lord Castlereagh's relations of°
views regarding it at this period are the more im- Engla
portant from his close and cordial intimacy with Mr1802*
Pitt, then on the neutral benches, and unfettered either
by the obligations of cabinets or the aspirations of op-
position. They were thus expressed in a secret memoir,
drawn up by him, and laid before the Cabinet shortly
after the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace
with France ; and his words, prophetic of the future, are
applicable to other times than those which followed the
peace of Amiens : " Unless we are prepared almost to
invite fresh encroachments by our tameness and apparent
insensibility, we ought, without menace in respect to the
future, or even too strong a tone in respect to the past,
which is to be avoided if we are not prepared to resist
1G8 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, what has taken place, fairly to give France to understand
n- that, although we have made many sacrifices for peace,
1802. amongst which we reckon our acquiescence in the changes
in question, we cannot submit beyond a certain point ; and
that, if she entertains the same desire of peace which we
feel, she must abstain from encroachments which tend to
alter both her maritime and continental relations with the
other powers of Europe. Connected with this, some strong
naval and military establishments, and a vigorous system
of finance, are as indispensable to give even to the peace
we have concluded any chance of permanence as they
are essential to our safety, in the event of hostilities being
suddenly recommenced. And the frame of our establish-
ments should be so contrived as to admit of a rapid
extension at the outset of the war, so as to place us at
once in security at home, whilst we are enabled to reap
the full fruits of our maritime superiority in striking an
early blow against the colonies of the enemy. In addition
to making France feel, in our communications, how neces-
sary moderation is on her part to the preservation of
peace, we ought to adopt a vigilant system of conduct
on the Continent, with a view of accelerating as far as
we can the adjustment of those arrangements (viz., the
indemnities) which alienate the several powers of the
[German] empire, in particular, from each other. We
i Lord ought to endeavour to bring them, if possible, to under-
rea'h's MC- s*an(^ eacn other ; to watch in concert the operations of
1802 ™ ^e Drench Government ; and to be prepared to make a
Castie'reagh common effort for their own preservation, if the encroach-
Corresp. v. . ,. _ T-, -i -i -i i
29, so. ing policy of 1 ranee should leave them no other alterna-
tive."1*
* Such were Lord Castlereagh's ideas in 1802, while still at peace with
France, and just entering on his career as a statesman in connection with that
country. It is interesting to observe how identical they are with those of the
Duke of Wellington expressed in 1 832, when the entente cordiale with that coun-
try was at its height. " The union between France and England," says he, " is
calculated to preserve peace at the moment, but not in the end. Our rulers
have been cajoled by the French King. The objects of the French alliance
are exclusively French. It tends not merely to the establishment of French
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 169
The negotiations which led to the rupture of the peace CHAP.
of Amiens in 1803 were among the most important and
delicate in which a British Government was ever engaged, 1803-
not only on account of the vast interests at stake in the Nego^fa'_
issue, but also from the circumstance, unusual at least in ^°0°ss^e"
the European transactions of Great Britain, that in form, renewal of
* the war.
though not in substance, we were in the wrong. By the
terms of the preliminary articles Malta was to be restored
to the Knights of the Order of St John of Jerusalem, to
whom it had belonged before its conquest by the French,
and placed under the guarantee of a third neutral power ;
and Russia had been chosen by the contracting parties to
undertake this serious responsibility. France summoned
England, soon after the preliminaries were signed, to
make good this engagement, and restore this important
fortress to the Knights. The conduct of the First Con-
sul, however, in the interim, had been so aggressive, that
the British Government with reason declined to make
the required cession ; and Russia, glad of a pretext for
escaping from the perilous guarantee, made such difficul-
ties about undertaking it as were equivalent to a refusal.
Napoleon invaded and conquered Switzerland without the
shadow of a pretext ; and General Sebastiani was sent by
him into Egypt to make inquiries, which terminated in
a report published in the Moniteur, evidently point-
ing to a reoccupation of that country by the arms of
France. This led to representations and complaints on
the part of our Government, which soon assumed an angry
character. Lord Castlereagh's opinion, given in confidence
influence, but of French rule and supremacy. We cannot dissolve it but at
the risk of a war, and that, too, a war as costly as the last, without its chances
of ultimate success. The object of France is dominion to be acquired by any
means, but especially by fomenting disturbances in foreign nations ; ours ought
to be to keep all other nations independent of France. Since every measure
adopted in consequence of our alliance with France must be inconsisteut with
our interests, the peace which that alliance gives us is hollow ; and if terminated
suddenly, as it probably might be, the more unexpectedly that event should
occur the more disastrous must be the war which would ensue on its rup-
ture."— DUKE OF WELLINGTON to MR RAIKES, November 14, 1832; Raikes's
Diary, i. 162.
170 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, to the Cabinet, was a model of political wisdom, charac-
"• terised by that mixture of firmness and moderation which
isos. distinguished all his political measures.*
The progress of this angry negotiation, and the in-
iiis memor- creasing subjects of difficulty which it came to embrace,
the Cabinet from the continued encroachments, in one direction or
tutlon with "another, of the First Consul, brought Lord Castlereagh,
Trance. wjien a Cabinet Minister, still closer in contact with the
diplomatic intercourse of the two countries. It is curious
to observe how easily his master-mind caused itself to be
felt in the public affairs of the State, and how entirely,
within a few months of his obtaining a seat in the Cabinet,
while still holding only the office of President of the
Board of Control, he took the lead even on the most
intricate points of European politics. It is not less re-
markable how clearly he seized the salient point of the
question, and the mingled temper and judgment with
* " Upon the whole, I see the possible and probable advantage of a distinct
pledge not to submit to further encroachment on the part of France, inasmuch
as it may determine her not to make the attempt. At the same time, I can-
not but hesitate, where so much is at stake, and where everything may alter-
nately hinge upon a question of time and resources rather than any effort of
arms, in taking a step which may plunge us again singly in a war, without any
other means of offence against France than those which touch her colonies,
a species of attack which but remotely affects her present power, and is in
itself inadequate to shake the sources of her authority and the stability of her
military empire, whilst it bears much more severely upon our resources than
it does upon hers. I am the more disposed to act with caution on this point
(though I am by no means prepared to say it may not be wise), because I do
entertain, in the event of its not having the effect of deterring France from her
purpose, very great doubts as to the mode and time which ought to be chosen
for renewing the contest. . . . What I desire is, that France should
feel that Great Britain cannot be trifled with, at the same time that I should
wish to leave the line of conduct which ought to be pursued upon circumstances
as they arise entirely open : and I should prefer explaining myself, both to
France and the Continental powers, in private communications rather than by a
parliamentary pledge. Whether anything has been said to France with refer-
ence to her late encroachment in the course of the negotiation, I know not ;
but I should think, now the peace is concluded, that we ought to explain our-
selves very frankly with respect to our general desire of peace, provided her
system was such as to permit us to adhere to it ; and I should think it doubly
necessary, if there is any reason to apprehend that Buonaparte has similar
views with respect to Holland with those which were realised at Lyons with
regard to the Cisalpine Republic." — LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Memorandum, July
1802 ; Cattlereagh Correspondence, v. 3 6, 37.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 171
which he proposed to combat and come to issue with the CHAP.
First Consul on the real point at issue between the par- "•
ties — viz., the occupation of Malta. " I am inclined to isos.
think/' said he, in a memorandum addressed to the Ca-
binet, " the battle ought still to be fought on the propo-
sition before transmitted — namely, the permanent occu-
pation of Malta ; qualifying it, if any facility arises
therefrom, by leaving the Order in possession of the civil
government of the island. To act up to principle, as laid
down in former despatches, I think we must insist upon
permanent possession of a naval station. . . . My
opinion is, that with Malta for seven years, Lampedosa for
ever, Holland and Switzerland evacuated, and the Turkish
empire and Naples under the avowed protection of Russia,
if not formally guaranteed by her, you would stand well
at home, and well with reference to France, provided
you have obtained suitable reparation on the two points
affecting the honour of the country. . . . Lord Whit-
worth,* therefore, should be recalled to this ultimatum, and
ordered to come away, in case he should not be able im-
mediately to sign an arrangement substantially on the basis
of that proposition." This ultimatum, it is well known,
was presented without success ; and in Lord Castlereagh's
Papers is a very curious account of the famous ebullition reagirs me-
of wrath by the First Consul, which completely justified
the British Government in their determination, with the
declared views of Buonaparte, not to part with Malta.1 1
* The plenipotentiary at Paris.
t "Buonaparte sent for Lord "Whitworth, told him that we must evacuate
Malta or it was war, talked of invasion, &c. ; and in the course of his conversa-
tion, although he denied any immediate wish to go to Egypt at the risk of
war, avowed that it was an object France could not lose sight of, and that
sooner or later it must belong to her, either by the consent of the Turkish
Government, or by the dissolution and dismemberment of the Ottoman empire.
" Upon the receipt of this communication we recurred to our former grounds
of [complaint], which the French Government had studiously endeavoured to
pass and evade ; adhered to our former declaration of not entering into further
discussion relative to the evacuation of Malta till we had received the explana-
tion and satisfaction we desired ; and added, that after the distinct avowal
made by the First Consul of the ulterior views of the French Government in
respect to Egypt, in confirmation of the many causes of suspicion and jealousy
172 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP. The grounds for renewing the war in 1803 were stated
by Lord Castlereagh in a minute addressed to the Cabinet,
ii.
1803. which was adopted by the Ministers, and made the reasons
umis ^or J^ifymg tnat steP' This minute we present in a con-
stated i.y densed form. Between the preliminaries and the definitive
reagh for treaty Buonaparte put himself at the head of the Italian
theewar.g Republic, annexed the island of Elba to France, and it then
1 80^5
became known that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France.
Notwithstanding these, the treaty was ratified ; but it was
then declared that peace could not last if the conduct of
France was such as it had been since the signature of the
preliminaries. The same state of things continued from
the ratification of the treaty to the representation from
Switzerland ; and during this period the British Govern-
ment was animated by a sincere desire to execute the
treaty. This was manifested in their acquiescing in the
mode of election of the Grand Master of Malta, in their
reception of the Neapolitan troops and General Vial, in
their restoring French subjects to all privileges within
the country, and putting their commerce on the footing
of other foreign nations. On the other hand, the con-
duct of France showed no signs of moderation. Her
troops continued to occupy Holland in breach of the
treaty of Amiens ; Piedmont was annexed to France
without the condition in the treaty as to a suitable
indemnity being provided to Sardinia being fulfilled ;
iLord Parma and Placentia were claimed by France under
reagi^s me- a secret article with Spain ; the Government of Por-
^thTle™ tugal was insulted by General Lannes, and the dismissal
thTwarl °f D'Almeida insisted on by France ; Switzerland was
Castlereagh ultimately told that, if she did not submit to the will
Corresp. v. «| 7
62-69. of the lirst Consul, a French army would enter the
country.1 Nor was the direct conduct of France towards
before existing, we could not avoid requiring some substantial security
against those views ; and that we conceived it would be difficult, if not im-
possible, to find any security that could be deemed satisfactory other than the
military occupation of Malta." — Detached Memorandum by LORD CASTLE-
REAGH ; Castlereayh Correspondence, v. 50.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 173
this country more calculated to inspire confidence. Se- CHAP.
questrations were not taken off British property in con-
formity with the treaty ; prohibitions against the imports 1802.
of British produce continued as during the war ; British
vessels were detained, and no redress given ; angry re-
presentations made with respect to the press and French
emigrants in this country ; and libels published in the
Moniteur directly levelled at the British Government.
The position of Lord Castlereagh in the Cabinet, the LordCastie-
head of the Board of Control, brought him immedi- intfm^ :
ately in contact with Lord Wellesley, then exercising
the high and responsible duties of Governor-General in
India. The period when this intercourse began, as al-
ready noticed, was the most critical one which had yet
occurred in our Eastern annals, when the regulation of
the recently ceded districts of Oude and the Carnatic
was in progress, and the great Mahratta confederacy was
forming, which it required the whole firmness of the
Governor-General, aided by the military talents of his
brother, General Wellesley, then unknown to fame, and of
General (afterwards Lord) Lake, to withstand. In these
critical circumstances, Lord Wellesley had much need of
the active support and ardent co-operation of the Presi-
dent of the Board of Control to aid him in his arduous
undertaking : nor were either awanting. From the very
first there sprang up the most cordial feeling and inti-
macy between him and Lord Castlereagh ; and on every
occasion the latter rendered him all the assistance in his
power, both in supporting his projects and shielding him
from the shortsighted and dangerous interference on
many occasions of the East India Directors. He gave
proof in the very outset of the disinterested principles on
which he had determined to discharge his duties at the
Board of Control, by declining all patronage connected
with his office, which he left exclusively to the Governor-
General. The first correspondence between these two
great men is not the least interesting point in the biogra-
174 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, phj of both ; and it becomes doubly important in a gene-
IL ral point of view, as it first brought Lord Castlereagh
1802. into contact with General Wellesley, and led to that
high estimation of his talents which ended in his appoint-
ing him to the command of the British army in the
Peninsula. *
In those days, in the beginning of the century, the
only communication with India was by means of sail-
ing vessels going round by the Cape of Good Hope,
* A month after Lord Castlereagh's appointment to the Board of Control,
he thus expressed himself in a letter to Lord Wellesley : —
" I avail myself of the first tranquil day I have had to address myself to your
Lordship, and to express the very particular satisfaction I derive from feeling
myself placed in a situation which connects me in close official habits with
your Lordship ; from which I promise myself not less advantage in my public
capacity, than the gratification to my individual feelings, from former inter-
course, from common connections, and from the zeal we shall both feel in the
same object. I venture to flatter myself that I shall have the good fortune to
possess, as I shall endeavour to deserve, your unqualified and unreserved confi-
dence ; and I trust it is unnecessary to assure you that my utmost exertions
shall be employed to give stability to your administration, and to co-operate
with you in the conduct of Indian affairs with that cordiality which can alone
render our united exertions successful.
" Whatever circumstances may have occurred in the course of your official
intercourse with this country not altogether satisfactory, and however your
Lordship may feel many strong motives inclining you to return to Europe,
yet I am led to hope that nothing will induce you to deliver up the govern-
ment to other hands till you have fully completed all those arrangements,
equally connected with the most important and brilliant features of your
own administration as with the conclusion which has been put to the late
war [with Tippoo Saib by the taking of Seringapatam]. In whatever degree
the pecuniary affairs of the Company may have felt the pressure of the con-
test, it is connected with your Lordship's distinguished reputation, in which
every friend of yours, and of the country, must feel a deep interest, that you
should be the individual to lay the foundation of that system and of those
measures which are in peace to accomplish the prosperity of those possessions
which you have so successfully preserved and improved in war ; and I feel
the strongest persuasion that the same energy of mind which led you so hap-
pily to conceive, and so effectually to execute, the many arduous measures con-
nected with the late contest, will, when applied to another state of things, be
as fruitful in drawing from peace the resources of which it is susceptible, as
you have proved yourself in war competent to direct those resources to their
true and legitimate purpose. Your Lordship's reputation as a statesman
during a period of war has been established on the most solid foundation ; it
only remains to exhibit the qualifications which belong to less arduous times
to perfect in result, as well as in the estimation of those who are now inclined
to watch your progress with a critical eye, the character of your administra-
tion:"— LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD WELLESLEY, Doneira, August 10, 1802 ;
Welletley Despatches, iii. 82.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 175
which in general took six months to make the voyage. CHAP.
The Governor-General was then, practically speaking, IL
despotic, at least in immediate operations, for it took iso-2.
twelve months to review his decisions; and before thatThe^-igt_
time elapsed, the measures adopted were for the most ance, he_
. . rendered
part irrevocable. It is to this circumstance, perhaps, him with
,,.,,,, ,. , .,. c .r the Court of
coupled with the extraordinary ability or a succession Directors.
of Governors- General and commanders, that the ex-
traordinary growth and long-continued triumphs of our
Eastern empire are to be ascribed. The principal duty
of the President of the Board of Control — and it was a
most important one — was to support the Governor-
General against the Court of Directors in those mea-
sures which experience had taught the former were
necessary, but to which the latter, proceeding on less
information or more narrow views, might be inclined to
refuse their assent. It may easily be believed that the
great object of contention between them was money, and
the wars which threatened to spend money. The East
India Directors, looking chiefly to the dividends on their
stock, and extremely nervous about anything which
threatened to diminish them, were inspired with a per-
petual dread of wars, and could never be brought to
understand the position of their Indian dominions, where
a small body of aliens had acquired an extraordinary
dominion over ten thousand times their number of na-
tives, and to whom conquest, or at least successful
resistance to attack, was essential to existence. This
divergence between the views of the Governor-General
in India and the Directors at home had been of long
standing ; but it had greatly increased during Lord
Wellesley's administration, in consequence of the intrepid
spirit and decided disposition of that illustrious man. The
Directors dreaded his victories more than his defeats ; for
from the former they anticipated an increased expendi-
ture— from the latter, a salutary check to ambition. This
jealousy of Eastern triumphs had been brought to a climax
176 LORD CASTLEREACH'S INDIAN
CHAP, by the capture of Seringapatam and annexation of Tippoo
IL Saib's kingdom to the British dominions; and to such a
1802. pitch did the discord arise that, when Lord Castlereagh
1 Weiiesiey entered upon office, he found Lord Wellesley on the point
Desp. iii. . . * , . . . , *
36, 41, 49. of resigning his situation.
It required all Lord Castlereagh's mingled firmness and
His success suavit j of manner to overcome these difficulties, and obtain
Director* from the Directors a sanction for those measures, in appear-
^rcrwei*-0 ance bold, in reality prudent, which Lord Wellesley had
measures commenced, and which Lord Castlereagh at once saw were
indispensable to the safety of our Indian Empire. * The
annexation of Tippoo Saib's dominions in the Carnatic,
and the Doab and part of Oude in Central India, were
the first subjects which he found in dispute, and to both
the Directors were decidedly hostile. At length, though
with no small difficulty, he obtained their sanction in each
case.t Other subjects, however, still remained in dispute,
which, as they affected private interests, were not so easily
adjusted, and engrossed much of his attention during this
and the succeeding year. Among many others were the
foundation of a college at Calcutta for the education of the
* " Your Lordship is aware how difficult and delicate a task it is for the
person who fills my situation, particularly when strong feelings have once been
excited, to manage such a body as the Court of Directors so as to shield the
person in yours from any unpleasant interference on their part. I am san-
guine in hoping that those impressions, which never should have led them for
a moment to forget your substantial services, will pass away, and the remainder
of your government be rendered perfectly satisfactory both to your Lordship
and to them." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD WELLESLEY, Nov. 15, 1802;
Wellesley Despatches, iii. 92, 93.
•f* " As far as my own opinion is concerned, I have no hesitation in stating
that your Lordship would have been inexcusable upon the case made out (how-
ever, the transaction may furnish plausible grounds of statement in debate),
had you suffered our interests in the Carnatic to rest on their former footing,
and that such a procedure would have not only left our security in that quarter
as imperfect as probable treachery could well make it, but would have shown
a weakness and facility in our counsels, after the disclosures had taken place,
which could not fail to have encouraged every other ally to trifle with our
forbearance. I shall therefore feel no difficulty in giving the measure my
full support ; but beyond this I entertain a strong conviction that the transac-
tion in itself will bear discussion, and ultimately establish itself as equally just
and politic in the opinion of Parliament." — LORD CASTLEREAGII to LORD
WELLESLEY, Sept. 27, 1802: Wellesley Despatches, iii. 38, 39.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 177
Company's servants ; the appointment of meritorious CHAP.
young men to official situations in India by the Governor- n-
General, without reference to the home authorities, which 1802-
was thought to interfere with their own patronage ; and
the encouragement given to the private trade, which, it
was feared, would encroach on their monopoly. It was
with no small difficulty, and only by means of the polished
courtesy by which his manner and correspondence were at
all times distinguished, that these subjects of contention
were adjusted, and the measures of the Governor-General
in India, suggested by the necessities of the public service
under his direction, reconciled with the demands of the
Directors at home, mainly prompted by their private in-
terests. At length, however, the difficult task was accom-
plished ; the College of Fort- William sanctioned, and the reagh cor-
question of patronage adjusted. Lord Wellesley was NOV'. 15,
always the first to acknowledge his obligations to Lord A^^T*
Castlereagh for the assistance he rendered him on these S^,8^-
Z/t louo ;
delicate matters, which was the more effective from his weiiesiey
T • i ' ' f • Desp. in.
disinterested renunciation of all patronage for himself con- 39-43.
nected with his own office.1
Other matters, not more difficult of adjustment, but still
more important in their consequences to our Eastern do- Threatened
minions, soon engrossed his attention. The first of these °
was the strength of the King's troops in India, which both
the Directors and the Cabinet at home wished to be re-
duced to ten thousand men, and which Lord Wellesley was
desirous of augmenting to twenty thousand in contempla-
tion of the impending Mahratta war. The second was the
obtaining in Europe adequate supplies of silver to meet
the daily increasing requirements both of the public ser-
vice and of commercial undertakings in India ; and the
third was the devising of means to stop the increase, and,
if possible, effect the gradual reduction of the public debt,
the magnitude of which was exciting well-founded appre-
hensions. Of the importance of these matters at that crisis
in India, some idea may be formed from the fact that, at
VOL. i. M
178 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, the period when these reductions were in contemplation,
IL our Indian empire was threatened by the combined hos-
1802. tility of the whole Mahratta powers, which it required
the genius and daring of Wellesley and Lake, and the
heroic courage of the British troops, to surmount. The
crisis was of the most violent kind; and the threatened
reduction of the British troops would probably have
occasioned the loss of our whole Eastern dominions.
But such were the necessities of the Cabinet, owing to
the sweeping and ill-judged reductions made, as usual,
on the conclusion of the peace of Amiens, and so loud
the clamours of the East India Directors for a reduc-
tion of expense, that it was with no small difficulty, and
only by the united efforts of Lord Wellesley and Lord
Castlereagh, that the threatened reduction was averted,
and the British troops in India retained in sufficient
strength to achieve the victories of Assaye, Delhi, and
Laswaree. *
Of the manner in which Lord Castlereagh discharged
ordWei- his important duties at the Board of Control at this
monytT" eventful crisis in Eastern story, no more convincing proof
arge'of can be figured than has been furnished by the best of all
President testimonies, that of Lord Wellesley himself : " The whole
confrT'1 course>" savs he> " °f mv public service, as far as it was
connected with the public acts of that most excellent and
* " It will be satisfactory to you to learn that we have provided for 50,000
seamen for the ensuing year, and 110,000 regulars, exclusive of India. The
King's troops destined for the peace establishment of India, exclusive of 2000
for Ceylon, are to consist of three regiments of cavalry, of 640 rank and file
each, and fifteen regiments of infantry, at an establishment of 1000 rank and
file each. With a view of keeping this force as complete as possible, a relief of
a full regiment will proceed annually from Europe. This, with a regular supply
of 1200 recruits, and the men to be procured from the battalions to be brought
home in each year, will, it is hoped, accomplish this important purpose. . .
I trust your Lordship will feel satisfied with this arrangement. A proposition
had been made by the late chairman to reduce the King's troops serving in India
to two regiments of cavalry and seven of infantry, of 1200 men each. I felt my-
self bound to resist so improvident a reduction upon every principle ; and I am
to acquaint you that the present Chairs have consented, and I have no doubt
the -Court will acquiesce in the proposed establishment." — LORD CASTLEREAGU
to LOKD WELLESLEY, December 17, 1802 ; Wellesley Despatches, iii. 96, 97.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 179
able personage, affords one connected series of proofs of CHAP.
his eminent ability, spotless integrity, high sense of hon- IT-
our, comprehensive and enlarged views, sound practical 1802.
knowledge, ready despatch of business, and perfect dis-
cretion and temper, in the conduct of the most arduous
public affairs. He came to the chief conduct of the
affairs of India at a most critical period, when the British
Government was engaged in that contest with the Mah-
ratta chiefs which, under the happy auspices of Lord
Lake and General Wellesley, terminated so gloriously,
and completed the destruction of the French power in
the Bast. Although he differed with me in some points
connected with the origin of the war, he most zealously
and honourably assisted me in the conduct of it, and gave
me his powerful support in Parliament against all the
assaults of my enemies. He at once saw the great
objects of policy which I contemplated, and which have
since been so happily accomplished ; and, with a gene-
rosity and vigour of mind not often equalled, he gave me
every aid in the pursuit of a plan not his own, and, after-
wards, every just degree of honour and praise in its ulti-
mate success. In my published despatches your Lordship
will find abundant proofs of your brother's merits of every
description, especially in the transactions in the Carnatic,
in Oude, and other complicated affairs, and in his liberal
support of the College of Fort-William. But I must add
one circumstance, which does not appear in these de-
spatches. During the whole of my administration, he
lever interfered in the slightest degree in the vast patron-
ige of our Indian empire ; and he took especial care to iesiey to e
ignify this determination to the expectants by whom he
yas surrounded, and to me. In his published despatches,
lany examples occur of great abilities and statesmanlike
. Corresp. i.
lews ; and they are all written in a style much more 100.
•orthy of imitation than of censure."1
So zealous was Lord Castlereagh for the interests of
le public service, and so utterly was he destitute of those
180 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, favouritisms or partialities which so often influence the
"• conduct of those who have public appointments at their
1802. disposal, that, not content with declining all patronage
HisdiL- himself, he wrote to the Governor-General stating that,
tere»te(icon-ag j^ con\fr not avoid giving letters of recommendation
iluct in pub- o o
lie appoint- an(j introduction to the Government of India, he particu-
ments.
larlj requested that " attention should be paid only to
the merits and qualifications for office of the persons in-
1 Castle- troduced."1 He gave the most convincing proof of his
reagh Cor- .. . c
reap. i. ii7. determination to attend only to the interests ot the pub-
lic in his appointments to office, in the selection of Lord
William Bentinck for the important situation of Governor
of Madras.* Beyond all doubt it was in a great degree
owing to the discerning and patriotic spirit in which all
appointments were made in India at this time, both by
him and Lord Wellesley, that the foundation was laid of
that wonderful body of public servants, unequalled in
any other age or country, who brought our Indian em-
pire through all the dangers with which it was afterwards
assailed. It is to be hoped the race will not be termi-
nated either by the injudicious rigour of competitive
examinations, or by the pressure from without, now that
India has been brought under the direct government of
the House of Commons.
Lord Castlereagh entertained, as well he might, the
Lord Castie- very highest admiration of the Governor-General of India.
Amidst the endless mass of petty jealousies and unworthy
intrigues which private correspondence brings to light in
regard to lesser men, it is refreshing to see the cordial
unanimity which prevailed between these great ones; their
entire absence of any jealousy or rivalry for fame, power,
* " Lord William Bentinck has been appointed to that important situation
(the Governorship of Madras), and will embark in the month of February to
take charge of that Government. The character his Lordship bears for honour,
integrity, and diligence, and the excellent understanding which he undoubt-
edly possesses, lead me to form very sanguine expectations of his success." —
LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD WELLESLEY, December 17, 1802; Wellesley De-
spatches, iii. 97.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 181
or patronage; and the complete devotion of both to the CHAP.
real interests of the country, and them alone. At this "•
period Lord Castlereagh's opinion of Lord Wellesley was 1802.
thus expressed in a letter to the latter : " I can truly
assure your Lordship I look with confidence to the wind-
ing up of your government being marked with as much
solidity as its progress has been brilliant and command-
ing ; and, in the two great features of retrenchment of
expense and conduct towards the native powers, I am
satisfied, when the government passes from your Lord-
ship's hands, that we shall have as little to desire as to
regret : for however earnest your Lordship may feel to
place our interests and authority in that quarter, before
you leave India, upon the surest and most lasting foun-
dation, your mind is too much alive to the true principles
of British policy to purchase any advantage at too high 4i!sp'
a price/' l
In addition to the concerns of our Indian empire, in
themselves weighty enough at that period to engross any
ordinary man, Lord Castlereagh, when at the head of the
Board of Control, was engaged in an uninterrupted and
very anxious correspondence with our ministers and diplo-
matic agents, both at the courts of Ispahan, Bagdad, and
elsewhere in Central Asia. Fortunately for him, the
British interests in Persia were in the hands of a very
able man, Mr Harford Jones, for whom Lord Castlereagh
had a great and well-deserved regard. The circum-
stances, however, were extremely critical ; for Persia,
writhing under the grasp of the great northern power,
was on the point of losing Erivan, and with it the most
mportant northern provinces of her empire ; and al-
;hough the danger from Russia to our Eastern dominions
vas clearly foreseen, it was impossible for Great Britain,
hreatened with invasion by Napoleon in Europe, and
ngaged with the Mahratta confederacy in India, to render
'ersia any material assistance. In these circumstances it
squired all the firmness and address of Lord Castlereagh
182 LORD CASTLEREAGH S INDIAN
CHAP, to prevent that power from succumbing at once in the
n. conflict ; and the correspondence of Mr Harford Jones
1802. with him occupies a large and interesting part of the
Castlereagh Correspondence* Nor was Turkey in a less
critical state ; for the insurrection of the Wahabees in
Arabia threatened to tear from it nearly the whole of the
Asiatic dominions, from which its chief resources to ward
off the impending attack of Russia were derived. Lord
Castlereagh clearly perceived, and strongly expressed in
his correspondence, his sense of these impending dangers ;
but his efforts to avert them were necessarily confined to
letters and encouragements : material resources he had
none at his disposal to aid in preserving the equilibrium
of the East.
The glorious termination of the Mahratta war by the
victories of General Lake and General Wellesley, excited,
as might have been expected, the warmest interest in Lord
Castlereagh's breast : and he conveyed his sentiments to Lord
* A very curious memoir, by a French officer in India to his Government, is
thus proponed in a letter from Mr Harford Jones, which subsequent events
have rendered prophetic : " The power of England in India, or rather, in the
East, is formed by her possessions in Hindostan, the Deccan, Ceylon, the isles
of Sunda, and the Factory in China; the isles of Penaug and St Helena, her
allies and tributaries. The Mohammedan and Hindoo princes who are under
the influence of India are, 1. The Peishwa, and such of the Mahratta Confed-
eracy as acknowledge his authority ; 2. The Soubadar of the Deccan ; 3. The
Soubadar of Oude ; 4. The Nabob of Arcot ; 5. The Nabob of Surat ; 6. The
Rajah of Mysore ; 7. The Rajah of Tanjore ; 8. The Rajah of Travancore. All
these princes are more or less under the influence of this power, and they
would not deserve to be mentioned if their names did not furnish occasion to
publish the infamous methods which the English Government have employed
to seize upon their possessions and treasures. No Indian prince has ever had
connections, either of a political or commercial nature with that Government,
which have not become fatal to him. It is, nevertheless, the English Govern-
ment which unceasingly vociferates against the pretended ambition and
tyranny which we exercise over the weak states which border on our empire.
The power of the English in India is the most precious portion of the British
Empire. It equals in extent, population, and riches, the first powers in the
world; but you would form a very erroneous opinion of its strength or
solidity if you should calculate these from her possessions. It is consoling
to me to be able to assure you that this source of wealth, so dangerous to our
peace and happiness, may be diverted and dried up more easily than is con-
ceived."— French Memoir, given in by LORD CLANCARTT to LORD CASTLEREAGH,
July 4, 1805 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, v. 408.
AND AVAR ADMINISTRATION. ] 83
Wellesley in language equally appropriate and eloquent. CHAP.
" The convoy," said he, " which sailed ten days since will
have conveyed to your Lordship, and to the gallant army is°4-
employed by you in the field, the thanks and acknowledg- Lord4(Ltie-
meuts of Parliament for the splendid and important ser- j^fwiedg-
vices which have been rendered to the country in the j1011* °f, .
* Lord Wei-
late glorious campaign. In the hope of being able to lesiey's
. TIT- -11 IT' • -conduct and
acquaint your Lordship with the King s sentiments and promotions
determination in regard to the individuals most conspicu-
ously engaged in this brilliant career of victory, I delayed
writing from day to day till the ships had actually sailed.
The packet now under despatch will probably outstrip
the convoy, and thus enable me to be the first to offer to
your Lordship my cordial congratulations on the series of
events, than which none have ever occurred in the military
history of our country more proudly calculated to confirm
and even exalt the reputation and glory of the British
arms. The whole of this campaign, in the conception of
the plan, in the preparation of the army for the field,
in the application of it to the vulnerable and important
points of the enemy's territory, and, above all, in the
conduct of the army in the day of battle, must ever be
deemed a chef d'ceuvre of military energy, foresight, and
science, and cannot fail in this age of arms to augment,
by the confidence which it is calculated to inspire, our
security not only in the East, but in every quarter of the
empire, at home and abroad. What mark of favour the
King may ultimately destine for your Lordship it is not
for me to anticipate — none can exceed the fair and just
reward of your distinguished and honourable claim ; but
I do presume, in confidence, to hope that the two illustri-
ous officers, whose achievements have never been surpassed,
will on this occasion be upheld by the most marked
and conclusive proofs of the estimation in which their May^w and
services are held."1 These anticipations were soon realised : Weiiesiey
by Lord Castlereagh's advice Lord Wellesley was advanced 573-576.'
a step in the peerage, by being created a marquess; General
184 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP. Lake was made a peer, while for the victor of Assaye
"• was reserved only the honour of a knight of the Bath.
1804. They did well to begin quietly ; the steps in the peerage
were not numerous enough for his victories ; and he who
was destined to fight his way up to a dukedom required
to commence with the first military order.
Contemporary with the receipt of this brilliant intelli-
change'of gence was an important change in the administration of
S'dlSm Great Britain. Mr Addington, whose Government had
tooffice'" f°r a considerable time been declining in strength, and
May 16> whose majority in the House of Commons had fallen to
forty, felt himself unequal to the task of guiding the
vessel of the State through the shoals by which it was
beset, under the immediate risk of an invasion from France,
against which Power war had recently before been declared.
In this crisis the King, on the recommendation of the
Cabinet, sent for Mr Pitt, and that noble statesman, in
that moment of exaltation, instead of aiming at the com-
pleting of party triumph or the abasement of political
opponents, counselled his Majesty to form a united ad-
ministration, without the exclusion of any of the Opposi-
tion. This advice was strongly enforced during a pro-
tracted conference of three hours in the King's cabinet by
Mr Pitt; and his Majesty, though perfectly aware of the
small chance of any coalition ministry holding together,
agreed to do so, but on the express condition that Mr Fox
was to be excluded. This stipulation proved fatal to the
project of a united Ministry. Mr Fox, indeed, emulating
the generosity of his rival, strongly recommended his
friends to accept office ; but they very naturally and hon-
ourably declined to join the administration if their chief
was excluded. The result was, that^ord Granville, Lord
^Spencer, and Mr Windham, kept aloof, and declined Mr
s offer of taking them into the Cabinet ; and, after
several days spent in anxious suspense, the Government
was formed exclusively of Tories, with Mr Pitt and Lord
Eldon at its head. The Catholic question, which had
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 185
brought the famous Tory Government to an abrupt termi- CHAP.
nation, was, by common consent, kept in abeyance, crushed
by the greater terrors of French invasion. Lord Castle- 1804-
reagh retained his former office of President of the Board
of Control*
When Mr Pitt resumed the helm he found the nation
again involved in war with France, and that on a scale
much beyond what had ever been before. Napoleon had
* "In the Commons the majority of Government was materially reduced, while
the minority exceeded two hundred. Under these circumstances his Majesty's
Ministers, dubious how long they might be enabled to retain a majority in Par-
liament, and under a strong conviction that against such a combination of
numbers, talent, and connection, it was no longer to be expected that they
could continue to administer the government with that energy and effect
which the public interests at such a moment required, were of opinion they
would best discharge their duty by availing themselves of the first occasion
which the King's recovery afforded them, of advising his Majesty to form an
administration which might be likely to unite in Parliament greater strength
in support of his Government. This advice was certainly offered in the confi-
dent hope that the King would turn his attention to Mr Pitt. This expecta-
tion was not disappointed, and the Lord Chancellor was desired by the King to
learn Mr Pitt's sentiments upon the formation of a new Government. Mr Pitt,
under the present circumstances of the empire, considered it as his duty to
bring under the King's consideration the expediency of forming an arrange-
ment which should embrace the leading men of all parties, as best calculated
to keep down factious discussions during the war, and to afford the King the
repose and tranquillity so essential to his health. In a personal interview with
the King, of three hours, he pressed the proposition upon his Majesty's most
serious attention. The result was an acquiescence on the part of the King in
the leading men of all parties (Mr Fox excepted) being included. Upon this
being made known, Mr Fox urged his friends to lend themselves to the arrange-
ment. This they declined, unless he was also to hold office ; and, upon Lord
Granville, Lord Spencer, and Mr Windham being applied to by Mr Pitt, they
also refused to accept of office if Mr Fox was to be proscribed. Mr Pitt having
made every effort in the hope of disarming hostility to the King's Government,
and having gone greater lengths than was congenial to the feelings and senti-
ments of a large portion of the public, and of many of his best friends, did not
hesitate a moment in proceeding to submit to his Majesty the best arrangement
for the administration of his affairs which his means of selection, thus narrowed,
would afford. I transmit to your Lordship the appointments as far as they
have hitherto gone." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to LOKD WELLESLEY, May 18, 1804 ;
Wellesley Despatches, iii. 571, 572.
List of the Cabinet. — Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon ; Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, Mr Pitt; President of the Council, Duke of Portland; Privy Seal,
Lord Westmoreland; Foreign Secretary, Lord Harrowby; Home Secretary,
Lord Hawkesbuiy ; Colonies and War, Lord Camden ; Admiralty, Lord Mel-
ville ; Ordnance, Lord Chatham ; Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, Lord Mul-
grave ; President of the Board of Trade, Duke of Montrose ; President of the
Board of Control, Lord Castlereagh. — Wellesley Despatches, iii. 573.
186 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, gained immensely in strength during the two years that
IL the peace of Amiens lasted ; and, in the absence of Conti-
1803. neutal war, the whole of the force was directed against this
Fores' of country. The camp at Boulogne, since so famous, was
ainCto resist an'eady formed. Hanover was overrun by a French corps
invasion at under Marshal Mortier, and the whole of Great Britain
tins time. .
June 23, was bristling with volunteers, who, in the hour of their
country's danger, were arming in its behalf. Lord Castle-
reagh, at this crisis, gave the following account to Lord
Wellesley of the defensive preparations and feeling of the
country : " Nothing can exceed the spirit of the nation,
as well as of the Parliament, on the subject of the war.
The degree of concurrence is far beyond what could have
been hoped for, and the only difficulty Government has to
contend against in either House is the charge of not calling
even more largely on the resources of the country. . . .
The budget of £13,000,000 is in progress, with every pro-
spect of being carried through with a very slight resist-
ance. If we can accomplish that grand desideratum of
providing, even in war, against the accumulation of debt,
it will place us indeed on high ground. . . . The
plan of raising 50,000 men, to be officered by officers of
the line, is in progress. When this army is raised, we
shall then have at home 50,000 regulars, 90,000 militia,
and 50,000 of this description of force, which will be ap-
plicable to the defence of either island — in all, 190,000
men, exclusive of yeomanry, and local levies of a more
irregular class, which will be carried to a very consider-
citiereagh a^e extent.* It is also hoped that a draft for the line
*?_ L?rd. from the other descriptions of force may be obtained, so
Wellesley, r *
June 23, as to complete the regular army. This will increase our
weiiesiey line at home to 70,000, which will give us a disposable
522?' ' force of at least 40,000, without weakening internal de-
fence improvidently." l
Lord Castlereagh remained only three years at the
* This anticipation was more than realised. The volunteers in 1804 were
340,000.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 187
head of the Board of Control, though they were the most CHAP.
important and glorious our empire ever knew. In July IL
1805, he was transferred by Mr Pitt to the head of the 1805-
War Department on the resignation of Earl Camden, His plan for
whose strength was not equal to the increasing duties of & of the
that arduous office. His new duties brought him im- ^Iff1"5
mediately into contact with Lord Nelson, Lord Keith,
Sir Sidney Smith, and a number of other distinguished
officers, who had been for some time engaged in prepara-
tions for an attack on the flotilla at Boulogne ; as also
with a number of ingenious projectors, who brought
forward various plans for the accomplishment of its de-
struction by means of congreve rockets and other newly
invented projectiles. In these Lord Castlereagh, whose
disposition and turn of mind was essentially warlike,
took a warm interest ; and he prepared and wrote out
with his own hand a memorandum containing minute
instructions for the conduct of the attack, from which the
greatest hopes were entertained.* The attack, as is well
* " It appearing from the report and survey of the Ordnance Engineers, that
a station may be taken by the rocket launches within two thousand yards of the
centre of the basin, and about twelve hundred yards distant from the enemy's
batteries, it is proposed to make an attempt to set fire to the flotilla by suc-
cessive discharges of rockets from twelve launches, each carrying forty-eight
rockets. In order that the rocket launches may arrive at their proper station,
the attack must be made when none of the enemy's flotilla are advanced in
the road, or if advanced they must be previously driven in. It seems desir-
able, if possible, to conduct the attack so as to avoid the necessity of disposting
the enemy's advanced guard. With this view, it is proposed that the British
squadron, with the exception of light vessels occasionally appearing off for the
purpose of observation, and making daily reports of the enemy's position,
should be withdrawn for the three or four days preceding the attack. When
everything is prepared and the weather favourable, if the enemy's vessels are
reported not to be without the harbour, the squadron, consisting of such number
of vessels as may be requisite to protect the launches and to annoy the
enemy with shells after the rockets have been discharged, to sail from Walmer
Roads so as to arrive off Boulogne at half ebb, which will secure the attack
from interruption from the enemy's boats till the following flood. The period
of low water seems to be the most favourable for discharging the rockets ; the
enemy's flotilla will then be most exposed to combustion. When the neces-
sary preparations have been made, should the enemy's vessels be reported to
be at anchor in the roads, in order to avoid the loss of the season, it will be
necessary to proceed off Boulogne with a squadron of sufficient numbers and
strength to dispost them, as this may be found ultimately necessary ; all the
188 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, known, failed, not from anything erroneous in the plan
u- drawn up by Lord Castlereagh, nor from anything in the
i»o3. position of the flotilla which placed it beyond the reach
of injury, but solely from the attacking vessels not
being able to get so near as to enable them to send their
projectiles with sufficient effect into the inner basins, where
the enemy's ships were crowded together. With the im-
proved gunnery and greatly enlarged power of throwing
shells which has now been attained, it is probable that
a similar attack would have been attended with success.
The reason is, that supposing the range of the mortars to
be as great, and the practice as good, in the land batteries
as in the vessels afloat, the mark presented by a large
squadron crowded into a small space is so much larger
than a single vessel or a series of single vessels at the
distance of two or three miles, that the chances of the
single detached vessels inflicting far greater damage on
their crowded opponents than they received themselves
are such as in a manner to insure success.
But Lord Castlereagh was ere long called to more
important combinations than those for the destruction
of the Boulogne flotilla ; and those great principles of
policy were embraced by Mr Pitt, which, unceasingly
requisite arrangements for carrying the same into execution to be immediately
made. In either case, whether the attack is to be effected by surprise or
force, an active bombardment, directed against the basin, should immediately
follow the discharge of the rockets, with the view of distracting the enemy's
attention, and preventing them from putting out any fire which may have
taken place. The attack to be made as soon after dark as the tide will permit,
when the lights in the houses at Boulogne may serve as a direction, both for
the launches rowing in, and for directing the rockets. A steady officer to be
appointed to each launch, who is to be answerable for placing the boat in a
proper position, and discharging the rockets in the direction of the basin. A
directing boat to lead in, taking a station two thousand yards from the centre
of the basin (this point to be previously laid down on the chart with the
utmost precision, and ascertained by land or sea marks), about twelve hundred
yards to the south-west of the imperial battery. The directing boat having
dropped an anchor at the proper station, each launch is, in succession, to row
round that boat, and having discharged their rockets immediately to retire.
Fresh launches to follow each other at such intervals as will not unnecessarily
expose them to the concentrated fire from the enemy's batteries, before they
can take their station and discharge their rockets." — Memorandum by LORD
CASTLEREAQH, September 24, 1805 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, v. 106, 107.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 189
pursued during the next ten years, at length brought the CHAP.
contest to a triumphant issue. Dear-bought experience
had convinced that great minister both of the tremendous 1803-
strength of the French revolutionary power and of the
vanity of the expectation that any stay to its conquests
was to be looked for from the failure of its finances.
Napoleon's system of making war maintain war had
rendered him superior, while victorious, to any, even the
severest, embarrassments of the treasury, by placing the
whole resources of the enemy at his disposal. The bad
success of the war which Austria had previously waged
with him had rendered it evident that she was no longer
a match for the French power. Although Russia pre-
sented a most powerful reserve, yet she was too far off
to be able to render much assistance in the commence-
ment of the struggle ; and the armies of the two powers
had separated on no very amicable terms after the disas-
ter of 1 799. The strength of France was now immensely
increased by the formation of the Confederation of the
Rhine and the extension of Napoleon's power over the
•whole of Italy. It was no longer to be expected that
any single state in Europe could either cope with France
or provide any effectual check to its ambition. It was
by a COALITION alone that the object could be attained,
or any security afforded for the independence of even the
greatest European powers. That a confederacy of the
great powers, if seriously gone into and resolutely sup-
ported, could achieve the object, was very evident ; but
there were obstacles all but insurmountable in the way of
its formation.
Prussia would naturally form the right wing of such a
confederacy, Austria the centre and left, and Russia the Great dim-
reserve ; and if the military strength of the whole could Uyn
be brought into action, it would be superior to that of SSEL
France, even aided by the troops of the Rhenish Confeder- ^Se
ation and Northern Italy. But it had hitherto been
found impossible to bring Prussia into any such common
190 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, measures. Ever since the Cabinet of Berlin withdrew
n- from the contest by the peace of 1794, it had observed
1803. a strict neutrality, and abstained from any hostile de-
monstration, even when during the successes of Suwar-
row in Italy it would, beyond all doubt, have been
attended at no risk with decisive success. Jealousy of
Austria and the dread of being left single-handed to
combat France when defeat had driven the other con-
federates from the field, was the cause of this backward-
ness ; but it presented the most serious obstacle in the
way of any joint measure for the preservation of Euro-
pean independence. This is not to be wondered at :
neutrality is the natural resource of the weak in presence
of a conflict with the strong.
Russia, conscious of greater strength, and farther re-
Mr Pitt's moved from the scene of danger, was disposed to enter
Austria and into any coalition which should have for its object to put
a bar to the further encroachments of France, and, if
possible, reduce her to such limits as experience had
shown were alone consistent with the peace and indepen-
dence of Europe. Mr Pitt had availed himself to the
utmost of these favourable dispositions ; and had at
length, by great exertions, brought Austria and Russia,
threatened by a common danger, into common measures
of defence. This was first done by a secret convention
NOV. 6, signed at Parma on November 6, 1804, which was
only of a precautionary and defensive nature. By it
these two powers agreed, in the event of France making
any farther strides in Italy in addition to the incorpor-
ation of Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Placentia, to
bring on either part very large forces into the field.
Austria was to furnish 235,000; Russia, 115,000 men;
and in the event of success, the frontier of the former
power was to be advanced to the Adda in Italy, and she
* Thiers, v. was to obtain Salzbourg and the Brisgau in Germany.1
Nothing followed, however, on this treaty; and it was
unknown till brought to light by the historian of the Con-
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 191
sulate and Empire. But in the April following, when the CHAP.
forces on the Channel were fully concentrated, and an inva-
sion of Britain was almost daily expected, Mr Pitt effected a 1805-
treaty between Austria, Russia, and Great Britain, which Apnl 1L
proved of the utmost importance, and formed the basis of 360, sd; '
the great coalition which, after sustaining numberless TrTit'&^viii.
reverses, at length effected the deliverance of Europe.1 33°*
By this important treaty, it was agreed by the high 47
contracting parties that the forces of the Confederacy — Terms of the
last treaty
which at that period embraced only Great Britain, Rus- of alliance.
sia, Austria, and Sweden — should be fixed at 500,000
men ; and the objects of the League were declared to be
to compel — 1. The evacuation of the country of Hanover
and of the north of Germany ; 2. The establishment of
the independence of the republics of Holland and Swit-
zerland ; 3. The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia
in Piedmont, with as large an accession of territory as
circumstances would admit ; 4. The security of the king-
dom of Naples, and the evacuation of the Italian pen-
insula, including the island of Elba. To enable the
different contracting parties to fulfil their onerous en-
gagements, Great Britain engaged to furnish subsidies to
them all in proportion of £1,250,000 for every 100,000
men brought into the field. By separate articles, signed
by England and Russia only, it was agreed that the
objects of the alliance should be attempted as soon as
400,000 men could be got in a state of readiness, of
which Austria was expected to furnish 235,000 ; Russia,
115,000 ; and Hanover, Sardinia, and Naples, the re-
maining 35,000. By a separate article, Russia engaged
to march 60,000 men towards the frontiers of Austria,
and 80,000 to those of Prussia, and, if necessary, to
bring 180,000 men into the field, instead of the 115,0001Caf?r
. P . . . reagh Cor-
originally provided, under the same conditions as to sub-resp./i. 2;
sidies from England. The allies also bound themselves viii. 330 ;
to make common cause against any power which should m^m'.
ally itself with France in the approaching contest.1
192 LORD CASTLEEEAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP. Great difficulty, however, was experienced in getting
Austria to accede to the latter treaty, in consequence of
isos. the extremely embarrassed state of its finances, which
TO wtfch rendered so considerable an armament from its own re-
kngth'aat sources a matter of impossibility. The most energetic
accedes, efforts were made by Mr Pitt, on the part of Great Britain,
and M. Novosittzoff, on that of Kussia ; but the Austrian
Minister at St Petersburg, Count Stadion, so forcibly
represented the exhausted state of the imperial finances,
that it was only by the British Government agreeing to
advance a subsidy of £3,000,000, one-half to be imme-
diately paid down as a mise en campagne, that the
accession of the Cabinet of Vienna to the League was
obtained. When she did accede, however, it was effec-
tively, for she engaged to embody no less than 320,000
men. By a subsequent convention, signed at Helsing-
Aug. si, borg on the 31st August in the same year, Sweden
acceded to the alliance. England agreed to pay £1800
a-month for every 1000 men engaged in the common
cause, and the Cabinet of Stockholm promised to bring
12,000 men into the field in Pomerania. Thus was the
foundation laid of the grand alliance, which afterwards
wrought such wonders for the deliverance of Europe ;
and, at the same time, a clause was inserted in the treaty
of alliance, providing alike against any attempt to control
public opinion or impose an obnoxious Government on
France, and any misapplication of the strength of the
coalition to the purposes of separate aggrandisement on
the part of any of the coalesced powers. A congress
^"rtio'ft was to be held at the conclusion of the war, to provide
vni. 660,
350 ; Pari. in a more effectual manner than had yet been done for
Deb. vi. 11, . •>
17. the independence or nations, and the peace and security
of Europe.1 *
* " The Emperor and King being disposed to form an energetic concert, with
the sole view of insuring to Europe a solid and lasting peace, founded upon
the principles of justice, equity, and the law of nations, are aware of the
necessity of a mutual understanding at this time with regard to those prin-
ciples on which they will act, as soon as the events of the war may render it
1 See trea-
ties in
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 193
Still Prussia held aloof, and it was a matter of the high- CHAP.
est importance to obtain her accession to the coalition.
Mr Pitt judged wisely, that it would have a material effect 18°5-
in terminating her irresolution, if a powerful army was Negotfa.
organised in her vicinity in the north of Germany ; and p°™c°ef and
Great Britain, resting on the King's dominions in Hano- England
ver, the fidelity of which was well known, was to concen- Prussia.
trate considerable forces on the Continent, and evince a
determination at length to take her part in the great
fields of Continental warfare. The Cabinet having ac-
quiesced in these views, it was determined to act accord-
ingly; though, unhappily, from inexperience in war, and a
total ignorance of the value of time in military opera-
tions, the preparations were by no means made with the
rapidity which the urgency of the case required. Mean-
while, Napoleon was more expeditious. He despatched
Duroc to Berlin, with an offer, on his part, to cede Hano-
ver, then in the occupation of his troops, to Prussia, if she
would join his alliance and make common cause against
England, Austria, and Russia. The bait was too tempt-
ing to be refused, and a formal treaty was on the point
of being drawn out, when Napoleon drew back, and
offered, instead, the temporary possession of Hanover
as the price of neutrality. Matters were in this pre-
carious state, and the conduct of the Cabinet of Berlin
still undecided, when the Austrian troops crossed the
Inn, and commenced the invasion of Bavaria, which was
necessary. These principles are in no degree to control public opinion in
France, or in any other countries where the combined armies may carry on
their operations, with respect to the form of government which it may be proper
to adopt, nor to appropriate to themselves, till peace shall be concluded, any
of the conquests made by one or other of the belligerent parties ; to take
possession of the towns and territories which may be wrested from the com-
mon enemy in the names of the country or State to which they of right
belong, and, in all other cases, in the name of all the members of the League ;
and, finally, to assemble, at the conclusion of the war, a general congress, to
discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations on a more definite basis
than has been possible heretofore, and to insure this observance by a federa-
tive system, founded upon the situation of the different States of Europe." —
Parliamentary Debates, v., App. 6, 7.
VOL. I. N
194 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, shortly followed by the breaking-up of the camp at Bou-
n- logne, and the march of the mighty army, 132,000 strong,
isos. assembled there for the invasion of England, towards the
Au8' 23 Rhine. After crossing that river, the corps commanded
by Bernadotte, to which an important part in the pro-
jected operations against the Austrians was intrusted, by
Napoleon's express orders, to shorten its march, violated
the neutrality of the Prussian territory by marching
through its province of Anspach. This palpable disre-
gard of neutral rights, and open expression of contempt
for the Prussian power, excited such indignation at
Berlin, that it had wellnigh thrown them at once into
the arms of the alliance. Still, however, the old system
of temporising continued ; a paltry compensation of
60,000 florins (£6000) was not disdained; and the
Government, in the mean time, contented themselves with
putting the army on the \var footing, and intimating to
1 Castie- France that they could no longer refuse a passage to the
resp.vuC*. Russians through Silesia, since the French had made one
for themselves through Anspach.1
The better to improve upon those dispositions of the
Efforts of Prussian Cabinet, and get them, if possible, to join heart
SgiS^*0 an(^ soul with th® alliance against France, the British
t^aiifanL Government resolved on sending a very considerable force
by sending to the north of Germany. The preparation of this force
Germany, was intrusted to Lord Castlereagh, as War Secretary, and
he exerted the utmost vigour in the necessary arrange-
ments, which he projected on a great scale, though, unfor-
tunately, the late period at which the determination of
the Cabinet was taken, and the extreme rapidity of Na-
poleon's conquests, rendered the expedition too late to be
of any material service in the issue of the campaign. Had
it been sent out a month earlier, and the Cabinet of
Berlin taken its final resolution, the disasters of the cam-
paign might have been all remedied or averted ; the com-
2 Ca*tie- bined forces of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain
reap. vi. 4, 5. been arrayed in the open field against France, and Aus-
terlitz had been Leipsic.2
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 195
Though too late to be of any material service, the pre- CHAP.
parations of Great Britain were on a scale of uncommon
magnitude, and gave an earnest of the strength with which isos.
she was capable of descending into the arena of Conti- T ^i- 4.
LordCastle-
nental warfare. The force sent out, or speedily raised in reagh's
• iT-i • -I -i • i -ITT i military
Hanover, when it arrived exceeded that with which Wei- measures.
lington fought at Waterloo. Lord Castlereagh's arrange-
ments were to send out 10,000 British infantry, in the first
instance, to Hanover, to expel the trifling force of 2000
French, which alone was left in that country, and raise
the country. Five thousand more troops were to follow
as soon as possible ; and for the whole service he contem-
plated sending from 30,000 to 35,000 infantry, and from
8000 to 10,000 cavalry.* Twenty thousand Russians
were daily expected at Stralsund ; a Swedish auxiliary
force of 12,000 men, and a Danish one of 26,000, were
assembled. The object of this army, which it was cal-
culated might be raised to 70,000 or 80,000 men, was to
raise Hanover, Brunswick, and the north of Germany,
determine by the sight of material support the indecision
of Prussia, and, in the event of success, aid in the deliver-
ance of Holland, after expelling the French from Germany.
Visionary as these projects may appear when it is recol-
lected that the battle of Austerlitz and peace so soon
after followed, there is nothing more certain than that
they were not only within the bounds of possibility but
probability, and that but for the fatal precipitance which
led the Austrians and Russians to fight in Moravia, they
would in all likelihood have been realised.!
* " As a general outline, it has occurred to me to suggest whether, taking the
gross force now at home at 180,000 rank and file, of which about 70,000 is
militia, a corps of from 30,000 to 35,000 infantry, and from 8000 to 10,000
cavalry, might not be immediately selected and appropriated to this service."
— LORD CASTLEREAGH to DUKE OF YORK, September 1805; Castlereagh Cor-
respondence, vi. 9. '
+ " It may be presumed that 20,000 Russians are by this time assembled at
Stralsund ; and from Mr Pierrepoint's last letters, it is probable that the
Swedish subsidiary corps may have been extended from 4000 to 12,000 men by
a subsequent engagement. The Danes are assembling a corps of 26,000 men
in Holstein, and we have reason to believe that they have an understanding
with Russia favourable to the common cause. Prussia shows no disposition to
circum-
196 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP. The Cabinet having adopted these views, and it having
n- been notified to them that no obstacle would be opposed
isos. by the Prussian Government to the march of the Russian
£2: . , troops on their way to Stralsund through the Prussian
The British * T . • i T • •
expedition territories, the expedition embarked in three divisions ;
favourable the 'first of which, consisting of the King's German Le-
gion, &c., set sail on the 16th October. The other divi-
sions and cavalry sailed some time after ; but it was not till
the 10th December that the last put to sea, and having met
with adverse winds, it was obliged to put back, and did
Dec. 22. not finally sail till the 22d December. Meanwhile, great
events in other quarters were on the wing. On the 20th
October General Mack surrendered at Ulm with 30,000
men to Napoleon ; on the 21st, Nelson destroyed the
combined fleet of thirty-three sail of the line at Trafalgar ;
and on the 3d November, the Emperor of Russia, hav-
ing repaired to Berlin to concert measures for the de-
active measures of hostility ; and it is to be hoped that the approaching inter-
view between the King and the Emperor will have ascertained at least her
neutrality. If so, and if she has not entered into engagements with France
for the occupation of Hanover, there seems little probability of any serious
obstacle being opposed to the immediate entrance of a light corps by the Elbe,
directed, in the first instance, to the expulsion of the few remaining French,
and the reoccupation of the Electorate ; secondly, to the reassembling and ex-
tension of the Hanoverian army ; and, thirdly, to the formation of a concert
between the force at Stralsund and the Danes, to be supported from hence as
circumstances may point out. The corps to be landed in the first instance
should be sufficiently strong not only to effect the object and provide for its
own safety against any inconsiderable attack, but such as will also effectually
encourage the loyal Hanoverians confidently to declare themselves. For this
purpose it seems desirable that not less than 10,000 men should be sent, and
that it should consist, in addition to the German Legion, of about 5000 British
infantry.. . . A corpsof 10,000 men now sent into Hanover may,it is presumed,
be doubled in number by 1st of March, which, joined to 20,000 Russians, 10,000
Swedes, and 26,000 Danes, would produce an active army of from 70,000 to 80,000
men at the opening of the campaign ; to which might certainly be added not less
than 20,000 from hence ; making in the whole an active force of not less than
100,000 men for the deliverance of Holland in the first instance, and to be sub-
sequently directed against the enemy as circumstances may point out. Should,
however, the leading objects above stated, from unforeseen events, be disap-
pointed, and the corps be obliged to retire, there is every reason to hope that
the numbers of the German Legion may, even during a limited stay in the
Hanoverian territory, be so rapidly and largely augmented as to render the
expedition highly expedient even with a view to this limited result." — LORD
CASTLEREAGH'S Memorandum for the Cabinet, September 1805; Caatlereagh
Correspondence, vi. 6-8.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 197
liverance of Europe -with the King of Prussia, swore CHAP.
eternal friendship to that monarch, and received the "•
same oath from him, over the tomb of the Great 1805-
Frederick. Everything looked auspicious at this junc-
ture for the Grand Alliance : the open accession of
Prussia to it was only a question of time ; the British
troops were arriving in considerable numbers on the Elbe ;
already the French had evacuated Hanover, and the
people in great numbers were flocking to the British
standards ; the French naval power was in the mean time
broken ; and though Napoleon in person was victorious,
and had advanced to Vienna in pursuit of the Austrian
army, yet the Russian forces under Kutusoff were rapidly
advancing through Moravia to their support, and the
Archduke Charles, with 90,000 undiscouraged veterans,
was rapidly advancing from Italy through the Tyrol to
cut off his retreat. Prussia, with an equal force, was pre-
pared to descend on his line of communications through
Bavaria, and the whole north of Germany was ready
to rise and double the strength of the British army,
already landing there. Napoleon, who, with his usual
daring policy, had plunged into the heart of Austria in
pursuit of his beaten enemy, was on the verge of de-
struction— the Allies had nothing to do but retreat, and
draw him on in Moravia to surround him with forces l Castie-
triple his own, and restore alone, by a victory like that of resf. vi.°:i~7.
Leipsic, the balance of European power.1
In these desperate circumstances, the French Emperor
was saved, and ten years' additional and terrible warfare Battle of
was imposed on the European states before their deliver-
ance was effected, by the gallant imprudence of Russia ^0
and the treacherous prudence of Prussia. Instead of
retiring before the invader, and giving time to the Arch-
duke Charles and the Prussian forces to descend on his
line of communication with France, as they were about to
do, the Austrians and Russians gave battle at Austerlitz,
where they were totally defeated, and compelled instantly
198
CHAP, to sue for peace, which they obtained only by a great sacri-
"• fice both of territory and in money. So far had Prussia
1805. g0ne jn at length taking a decided part, and entering into
the alliance, that Count Haugwitz was despatched from
Berlin to Napoleon's headquarters, with the Prussian ulti-
matum, and a declaration of war if not acceded to, which
was to have been commenced on 15th December; and
the Prussian army, 80,000 strong, concentrated in Silesia,
was prepared to have instantly marched on Napoleon's
communications. Haugwitz arrived at Austerlitz shortly
before the battle, and prudently awaited its issue before
delivering his despatches. After the result, seeing that all
was lost, and fearful that Prussia, if she took a decided
part, would be exposed alone to the French Emperor's
blows, he suddenly changed his ground, and wrote out,
during the night before he had an interview, a new and
totally different address to the Emperor. This was a
warm congratulation on his victory ! Napoleon was
not deceived. He was no stranger to the nocturnal oaths
at the tomb of the Great Frederick, or the part which
Prussia was prepared to have played in the approaching
drama ; but he concealed his wrath, and skilfully turned
it to the best advantage for his separate views against
Great Britain. Assuming the expression of the most in-
dignant feelings, he held out to the Prussian diplomatist,
as the only mode of averting the punishment which their
perfidy merited, the immediate abandonment of the system
of neutrality, and a cordial alliance with France. As a
lure to induce her to accede to these terms, the possession
of Hanover till a general peace was held out. Impelled
at once by terror and cupidity, the Prussian Cabinet,
though not without serious doubts and compunction on
the part of the King, agreed to the terms proposed ; and
Dec. is. on the 15th December — the very day on which hostilities
were to have commenced — Haugwitz signed a treaty of
alliance with France. By this treaty Prussia was to be
put in immediate possession of the Electorate of Hanover,
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 199
as well as the whole Continental dominions of the King of CHAP.
Great Britain, with the Margravate of Bayruth, in return for "•
which she was to cede Anspach to Bavaria, and Neufchatel !805.
and Cleves to France. By a further secret treaty, con-
cluded on the 15th January, Prussia agreed to close the
rivers in Northern Germany against the English, and re-
nounce the promised exchange from Bavaria. A more «e8P;,vi-,5j
6 ; Harden-
disgraceful instance of tergiversation and perfidy is
recorded in history ; for, at the moment when these treaties Bign'on, v.
were signed, Prussia was in terms for a close alliance, both h. 149.
offensive and defensive, with Russia and Great Britain.1
This strange and unexpected turn of affairs necessarily
imposed an entire change in the British policy in Northern Retum'of
Germany. Hanover being overrun with French troops, expedition
and Prussia in alliance with France, there was nothing Sedyfrom"
more for the British expedition to do, and it' would be Hanover-
exposed for no object to the most serious peril by remain-
ing in Germany. Orders were, therefore, given for its
recall, and the whole returned in safety to the British
shores. But although the grand object of the expedition
thus failed in consequence of unexpected events over which
the British Government had no control, the minor and
contingent object which Lord Castlereagh had in view in
its preparation was fully attained. During the time when
the British forces were in Germany, the loyal inhabitants
of Hanover flocked in great numbers to their standard, re
The German Legion, which went out four, returned above
ten thousand strong, and the foundation was thus laid off^}1*0. ,
Lord Keith,
that magnificent corps which did such good service after- Dee. 29,
j - ^ r A • * ij f f 1805, ibid.
wards in the war, and was signalised in every field of fame 94.
from Vimeira to Waterloo.2
But this turn of affairs, and the consideration which it
led Lord Castlereagh to give to our resources for foreign 55.
war with land forces, led to far more important results
than the mere doubling the strength of the German Legion,
It showed him, and he was the first to perceive, of what
immense importance the British disposable force, properly
200 LORD CASTLERE AGE'S INDIAN
CHAP, directed, might be rendered, even in Continental military
"• warfare. From a minute which he submitted to the Ca-
1805. binet at this time, it appeared that, after providing amply
for the home defence and O'ir foreign possessions, a force
of 60,000 native British troops might be spared for active
operations, which, with the addition of Hanoverian troops,
might easily be raised to 70,000 or 80,000 men. * All ex-
perience has taught us that such an army was capable, in a
single field, of combating the whole force which Napoleon
could collect. It equalled the strength of either army at
Austerlitz, Jena, or Eylau. The opinion, therefore, gene-
rally entertained of the weakness of the British on land,
and of their inability to contend, on that element, with the
French, was founded on misapprehension. It arose from
the niggardly use hitherto made of the British forces by
land, from the military inexperience of the Government.
Mr Pitt, with all his talents, had never seen this great
truth, and thence the bad success hitherto of his military
operations. They had been almost entirely confined to
little expeditions of three or four thousand men each, to
pick up sugar islands, or excite a momentary alarm on the
enemy's coasts. Lord Castlereagh was the first to perceive,
and the first to evince in practice, the vast advantage which
* The following official state of the British army when this Continental ex-
pedition was resolved on (21st October 1805), is of value both as a historical
document, and as bearing on the present and future security of the British
islands : — Excluding India,
Total rank and file, artillery and militia, . . 256,609
Of which at home, 181,447
Foreign stations, 75,162
The general distribution, supposing 50,000 men were taken for active ser-
vice abroad, would stand thus : —
At home, regulars, 55,251
„ militia, 74,749
130,000
Remain for foreign possessions, .... 63,000
Active operations, 63,000
Which force of 63,000 might, it is presumed, before spring, receive an addi-
tion of 1 0,000 Hanoverians, in which case the active army, after fully providing
for the foreign possessions and home defence, will exceed 70,000 men. — LORD
CASTLEREAGH'S Minute for the Cabinet, October 21, 1805. — Castlereagh Corre-
spondence, vi. 28.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 201
an insular power enjoyed, which, itself from its situation CHAP.
beyond the reach of attack, and with a navy capable of IL
conveying them to any point of the enemy's coasts, had 1805.
60,000 admirable troops at its disposal, to co-operate with
the allied forces on the Continent, or distract the enemy's
attention by separate attacks. Such a body was equivalent
to at least 120,000 chained to the slow and oppressive
operation of land marching. There was no Continental
war which, properly directed, it might not determine in
favour of the Allies. Lord Castlereagh clearly perceived,
and embodied in a very able Cabinet minute, these views,
but unfortunately they were in advance of his age. They
were directly adverse to the principles of the Whigs, who
soon after succeeded to power; and, during the nicely-
balanced campaign which followed in Poland, they were
not acted upon. The battle of Friedland and treaty of
Tilsit were the consequence.*
The preparations made by Lord Castlereagh for sup-
porting the common cause in the north of Germany, if the Magnitude
contest had continued, were on a very extended scale, °
and amply justified the sanguine views which he enter- £
tained'as to the efficiency of a powerful body of British^
troops acting together, and judiciously thrown in on the
theatre of Continental warfare. From a memorandum
made out by him, on 29th December, of the late arma-
ments, it appeared that 12,000 men had sailed from the
Downs on or before the 5th November, and arrived safe
* In the Cabinet minute above quoted, Lord Castlereagh said — " Lord Castle-
reagh has not thought it necessary to delay submitting the above to the con-
sideration of his Majesty's servants till the line which the Court of Berlin meana
to pursue shall be finally disclosed. The system of Prussia may influence
materially the course of our future military operations; but war on the Con-
tinent having now actually commenced, and thereby a prospect being opened
to this country of employing its arms offensively, whether we act separately or
conjointly — whether our efforts be directed to operations on a large or on a
limited scale — whether to objects strictly Continental, or to those more point-
edly British — the measure of rendering our active force disposable at the
shortest notice, and of placing it in a condition to move as a whole, should its
services be called for, seems in every view expedient." — LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
Minnie for the Cabinet, October 30, 1805; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 28, 29.
202 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, in the Elbe. A second expedition, also of 12,000 men,
"• sailed from Cork oil 29th October, but from contrary winds
1805. could only sail from the Downs on the 10th December,
and was forced to put back by adverse weather, and so
did not reach its destination till the 25th December.
The cavalry and artillery, 6000 strong, sailed on the
28th November, and arrived safe on 4th December.
Altogether, not less than 34,000 men, of all arms, had
sailed from England, and arrived safe in Northern
Germany in the months of November and December.
The last division, indeed, was very late of arriving, but
that was owing to no tardiness in preparation, but to
adverse winds, against which, at that time, nautical skill
had not the means of prevailing, for it embarked at Cork
in the end of October. Had Prussia remained faithful
to her engagements, and Austria not rushed headlong
on destruction at Austerlitz, this powerful reinforcement
would have appeared in ample time to act with decisive
effect on the great theatre of military operations ; for it
appears from authentic instruments that, so late as the
13th December, five days after the issue of the battle of
Austerlitz was known at Berlin, the Cabinet there was
resolved still to act on the convention of 3d November
with Russia, and " that the Prussian army would enter
Bohemia on the 21st December, and proceed by the short-
est road to the flank and rear of the French army."*
* " Three official letters of the 13th of December, from the Austrian minister
at Berlin to Count Stahremberg, state that the news of the battle of Austerlitz
was received at Berlin on the 8th, and that a Council of State was assembled in
consequence thereof on the 9th ; that it was resolved to send Colonel Pfiihl, the
King's aide-de-camp, to the combined armies, in order to agree upon a plan of oper-
ation with the two Emperors ; that orders would be sent to Count Haugwitz, at
Vienna, not to deviate in the least from his instructions grounded on the con-
vention of Potsdam, of the 3d of November, the term of which has already ex-
pired on the llth December ; and that the Prussian army would enter Bohemia
on the 21st December, and proceed by the shortest road to the flank and rear
of the French army. On the moment of Colonel Pfiihl's being ready to leave
Berlin, a letter from Count Haugwitz, dated Vienna, the 6th, brought the most
malignant exaggeration of the events at Austerlitz, as well as of the armistice,
complaining, moreover, of the Austrian plenipotentiary's departure from Vienna,
whom he supposed to be going to sign a separate peace. This brought every
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 203
The battle of Austerlitz, followed, as it soon after was, OUAP.
by the treaty of Presburg between France and Austria, IL
virtually dissolved the alliance; for it left Russia and isos.
Sweden alone, on continental Europe, to continue the
contest. There can be no doubt that it was the ter-
giversation of Prussia which mainly brought about this
disastrous pacification; for, calamitous as had been the
result of the battle of Austerlitz, nothing was yet de-
cided, and, had the beaten army simply retreated into
Hungary, and allowed the Archduke Charles, and the
Prussian army, to fall on the enemy's communication, the
conqueror would have been brought into the most immi-
nent danger. Prussia ran no risk in so doing; for, sup-
ported by Russia in rear, and the Anglo-Hanoverian
army on her right, she was more than a match for France.
But when Prussia drew back, and concluded a separate
treaty with France on 15th December, Austria had no
alternative but to do the best she could for her separate
interests, which she did by signing the treaty of Presburg
on the 27th. Mr Fox, in fervid, but not undeserved
language, characterised the conduct of the Cabinet of
Berlin on this occasion in Parliament. " The conduct
of Prussia/' said he, " has been a union of everything
that is contemptible in servility, with everything that is
odious in rapacity. Other nations may have been reduced
by the fortune of war to cede many of their provinces;
but none, except Prussia, has been reduced to the lowest
1 berg, i
stage of degradation, that of being compelled to become 50-59.
the ministers of the rapacity and injustice of a master." 1
Great as was the importance of this treaty to couti-
former arrangement to a momentary stagnation. However, upon the most
active remonstrances of the Austrian and Russian ministers, and on receiving
another despatch from the Prussian minister, Finkenstein, dated Teschen, 8th
of December, it was at last resolved that nothing should be changed in the
decision of the last Council of State, and Colonel Pfiihl set off accordingly." —
LORD CASTLEREAGH to the DUKE OP YORK, Jan. 3, 1806; Castlereagh Corre-
spondence, vi. 102. Such were the extraordinary vacillations of the Court of
Berlin at this time, which ended by ratifying Count Haugwitz's treaty of
alliance with Napoleon, and declaring war against Great Britain !
204 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, nental Europe, its influence was considerably lessened by
IL an event which happened soon after in Great Britain.
1806. This was the death of Mr Pitt, which took place in the
neighbourhood of London on 23d January 1806. He
' long been in a declining state of health, and had in
1806. ' vain sought relief from the waters of Bath; and upon a
frame thus exhausted the news of the battle of Auster-
litz fell with crushing severity. He saw in it the ruin of
all his hopes. After a melancholy survey of the map of
Europe, he turned away, saying, " Henceforth we may
close that map for half a century/' and, a few days after,
expired, not less the victim of patriotic duty than the
soldier who dies on the field of battle. But the event
proved that he had entertained too desponding a view of
the fortunes of his country, and had not sufficiently ap-
preciated the strength of the principle of resurrection
against oppression which was destined to arise from the
effects of the very treaty which he deplored as so cala-
mitous. He left his mantle to a worthy successor; and,
1 Gifford's before ten years had elapsed, his hopes were more than
iii'. 347-360.' realised, and the whole objects for which he had contended
had been attained.1
But, though destined to triumph in the end, the prin-
change'of ciples of Mr Pitt received a rude, and, to appearance, a
and*cci»- f^l shock, in the commencement, from his death. The
whi°f to6 remamder of the Tory party felt themselves unequal to
power the task of forming an Administration. Lord Hawkes-
Jan. 28.
bury, to whom the Premiership was offered, declined the
onerous task of forming a Ministry; and, indeed, the
crisis was such that it required a very strong party,
in point of numbers as well as ability, to meet it. A
new Government was formed, composed entirely of the
Whigs, under the auspices of Mr Fox and Lord Gran-
ville.* The former was really, though not in form, the
* The composition of the Whig Ministry was as follows : — Lord Chancellor,
Lord Brskine ; President of the Council, Earl Fitzwilliam ; First Lord of the
Treasury, Lord Granville; Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Henry Petty
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 205
head of the Administration, though he held only the sub- CHAP.
ordinate situation of Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In
reality, however, this was the most important situation in 1806-
the Cabinet at this crisis ; for the Whigs had so uniformly
condemned the war as unnecessary and unjust, that an
immediate change of policy was looked for on their ac-
cession to power, and the entire pacification of Europe
was anticipated from their exertions. Lord Castlereagh,
of course, quitted office with his political friends, and his
efforts during the short period that the other party was
in power were confined to a very active and energetic
opposition, in which Mr Perceval and he took the lead,
the one taking the department of domestic, the other of
foreign affairs. The chief points on which the Opposition
exerted themselves were in resisting the new plan of
finance brought forward by Lord Henry Petty, which
is memorable as the first step towards the encroachment
on the sinking fund, and Mr Windham's new scheme for
recruiting the army by enlistment for limited service.
On both these occasions Lord Castlereagh stood promi-
nently forward, and, without aspiring to the palm of
eloquence, evinced such powers of argument and debate
as raised him much in the opinion of the House and of
the country. But, important as these topics were, it was
not on them that the attention of the nation was fixed.
Foreign affairs, the means of resisting the colossal power
of Napoleon, were the universal objects of interest, and
it was to them that the mind of the nation was turned
with the most intense anxiety. As the system of Mr
Fox was to abstain altogether from Continental inter-
ference, and, if possible, bring the war to an immediate
conclusion, which principles were embraced by a con-
siderable and highly respectable portion of the com-
Lansdowne) ; Foreign Affairs, Mr Fox ; Home Office, Earl Spencer; War and
Colonies, Mr Windham ; Lord Privy Seal, Lord Sidmouth ; First Lord of the
Admiralty, Lord Howick ; Master-General of the Ordnance, Earl Moira ;
/hief Justice, with a seat in the Cabinet, Lord Ellenborough 4.nnual
legister, 1806, p. 26.
206 LORD CASTLEREAGHS INDIAN
CHAP, raunity, it is fortunate that he became invested with
IL power, and in a situation to bring them to the test of
1806. experience. The history of the next two years is a
commentary, by way of contrast, upon those of Mr Pitt
and Lord Castlereagh.*
Mr Fox's projects, though entered upon in good faith,
Mr FOX in and with a sincere desire of adjustment, led to no result.
voursetoea Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris with the proposals of
e' the English Government, but, after a long negotiation, it
was found impossible to come to terms, and the confer-
ences were broken off. Italy was the ostensible ground
of rupture ; but it was the pretext merely : the real
cause was the irreconcilable difference between the pre-
tensions of the Powers. France was not disposed to
stop short in the career of Continental aggrandisement,
in which she had hitherto been so successful, and openly
aspired to the unlimited command of Italy; Great Bri-
tain was not sufficiently humbled to submit to such pre-
tensions, and thus a continuance of the war became
unavoidable. The details of this negotiation, in which
Lord Castlereagh had no part, are foreign to this bio-
graphy: suffice it to say, that it entirely failed in its
object, and that the great and eloquent peace advocate
closed his life honourably for himself, by nailing the
nation's colours to the mast. But the fact is important,
as indicating how unavoidable, from the aspiring views of
France, the contest had become, since its most decided
opponent, when invested with the means of closing, was
obliged to continue it.
61 If the failure of Lord Lauderdale's pacific mission, and
Faiiureof of Mr Fox's efforts to terminate the war, illustrate the
the warlike . /••»«• T»-
expeditions wisdom of Mr Pitt s and Lord Castlereagh's policy in
whig GOV- continuing it, the result of the military measures of the
Whig Government demonstrate not less clearly the justice
* Lord Castlereagh's arguments on the Finance Question will be found in
Parliamentary Debates, viii. 1004-1018, and on Mr Windham's Military Sys-
tem in the same work, vi. 652-676, and 967-990.
eminent.
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 207
of the combination which the latter formed for its prosecu- CHAP.
tion. His system, as already shown, was to hold 60,000 IL
British troops available for Continental operations, and, 18°6-
without dividing them,, to throw them in in that quarter
where the opposing parties were nearly balanced, so that
they might act with decisive effect. This was the system
on which he had begun to act in the close of 1805, when
the contest was for the time cut short by the battle of
Austerlitz. The Prussian war ensued in the autumn of
the following year ; and the battle of Jena punished the
rashness, following on a long course of vacillation, with
which the Cabinet of Berlin had undertaken that struggle.
In the course of the winter which followed, however, the
scales again hung even between the contending parties.
For the first time in his life, Napoleon was defeated at
Eylau, in a pitched battle, and retreated, with terrible
loss, from the neighbourhood of Konigsberg to Warsaw.
There cannot be a doubt that if Lord Castlereagh's system
had then been acted upon, and 50,000 English troops,
landed in the north of Germany, had formed the nucleus,
with Hanoverian reinforcements, of an army of 70,000
men, placed directly on the line of the French communi-
cations, the indecision of Austria would have been termi-
nated ; a similar army would have been formed on its
side, and Napoleon have been destroyed. The Gov-
ernment, however, faithful to the opposition principle
of changing everything, went into the other extreme,
and, instead of concentrating an imposing force to act
on the French communications when hard pressed by
the Russians in Poland, refused to send either a man or
a guinea to aid the Emperor Alexander in his heroic
struggle, but sent out instead little eccentric expeditions
in every direction : one to the Dardanelles, without either
adequate force or preparation, to undergo defeat before
Constantinople ; one to Egypt, to perish under the charges
of the Mameluke cavalry ; and one under Whitelocke, to
the Rio de la Plata, to incur unheard-of disgrace in Buenos
208 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP. Ayres.* A more deplorable division of force at the deci-
sive moment is not recorded in history ; for, beyond all
1807. doubt, if the forces thus wasted in desultory and eccentric
operations had been concentrated in the proper quarter,
they would have brought the war to a glorious termination
in this very year.
* In the Castlereagh Correspondence is to be found a very interesting letter,
from theHon. Captain Blackwood of the Ajax,to Lord Castlereagh, which throws
great light on the unfortunate expedition to the Dardanelles, under Sir John
Duckworth. " To-morrow we sail, under the command of Sir John Duckworth,
with five sail of the line and two bombs, to join Sir Thomas Louis off the
Dardanelles, who has three sail of the line and two frigates waiting our arrival,
to attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles, hitherto considered as im-
passable, push up to Constantinople, and there endeavour not only to awe the
Porte into concessions to Russia, but to give us up her navy to take care of till
we have a peace with France, and to send Sebastiani away from Constantinople
— terms which I cannot see how so limited a force as we have ought to expect
to obtain, particularly as we have not a land-troop to take possession of and
hold the forts in the Dardanelles, or a single resource within ourselves more
than cruising ships generally have. At nil events, if we do gain them, it will be
more owing to the character and fear the Turks entertain of our navy, than to
any physical advantage such a force can have over a nation possessing such
strong posts, with as many men as they choose to call for, so many ships in
readiness, and with such entire resources as they have within themselves ;
whilst we, shut up in the Sea of Marmora, cannot have any. It is, however, our
duty, whether we succeed or not, to make the attempt ; and, so far, if I may
judge by the promptness with which Sir John Duckworth appears to act/we are
fortunate in having him as the chief. I cannot, however, be blind to the diffi-
culties of the undertaking ; and that, if the Ottoman Government acts with any
vigour, they may not only set our utmost efforts at defiance, but also render
our situation in the Sea of Marmora a very perilous one.
"Government, however, thinks so differently, that their orders to Lord Col-
lingwood were to send only five sail of the line in place of eight, which latter his
Lordship, not so entirely despising our enemy, sent ; with which, if we had
5000 troops, some more bombs, and store-ships to supply exigencies, and to
possess ourselves of the forts in the Dardanelles, or destroy the works, which
would be preferable, as it would leave that force disposable ; and, so long as we
keep the command by sea, the Turks could not repair their works or replace
their guns ; consequently, the communication kept open. None of these points,
however, which I feel persuaded your Lordship will agree with me ought to
have been attended to, seem in any shape to have been weighed ; we shall
therefore have to take the bull by the horns, which now, from the armament
caused by the Russian war, I conceive will be the more formidable. . . .
" Our ships are uncommonly fine ones; and as the admirals and captains have
generally seen service, it will not be arrogant to anticipate as much success as
such a force has a right to expect. Though forcing so strong a passage as I un-
derstand the Dardanelles are, is a very serious undertaking — so much so, that the
Russians have hitherto, under the impression of its impossibility, never dared
to attempt it — yet, were these passages the only difficulty, I conceive that, aided
by a fresh wind, they may be surmounted. But what, according to the view
I have of the service, and what ought to be provided against, is how, after our
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 209
The services of Lord Castlereagh, however, were soon CHAP.
required for more important public duties than forming
one of an active Opposition by whom the measures of 18°7-
Government were watched. The reign of the Whig Minis- Fali of 'the
try was not of long duration. They split upon the rock
which had proved fatal to Mr Pitt's Administration in
1801, and had more or less influence in the dissolution reash to
power.
arrival off Constantinople, without any additional ordnance, in the face of bat-
teries well placed on all sides, a superior fleet, who, though they may decline
coming out to fight us, would be ready and fully equal to seize any advantage
the batteries might gain over us in the loss of masts and yards, which must be
calculated on — how, without masts, ships, or cordage, to replace deficiencies,
we are to succeed in bringing the Turks to our terms, is an enigma difficult to
be. solved ; add to which, whether successful or not, we must hold in view the
means of retreat : but possibly Government holds information that if our squad-
ron does but appear no resistance will be made ; which, though it will leave us
no laurels to gain, I wish may be true. Of this, however, I feel persuaded, that
if such information is not in the hands of Government, it must be more owing
to the supineness and ignorance of our enemy in applying the ample means of
resistance they have, than to anything eight sail of the line, two frigates, and two
bombs can do. I wish that the genius of Lord Nelson would, in this arduous
task before us, assist the judgment of Sir John Duck worth, which, with every de-
ference due to his talents, I think the service would be benefited by." — CAPTAIN
BLACKWOOD to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Feb. 2, 1807 ; Castlereagh Correspondence,
vi. 155-157. This letter is very remarkable, for it is an exact anticipation ab
ante of the events which so soon ensued. The expedition, as Captain Blackwood
had foreseen, forced the passage of the Dardanelles, but failed in the Sea of
Marmora in effecting the object of the expedition, from the cause he had pointed
out. Captain Blackwood's own ship, the Ajax, was consumed by accidental
fire a few days before entering the Straits.
On March 6, off the Dardanelles, Captain Blackwood again wrote to Lord
Castlereagh : — " On the 18th February we succeeded, with no very great loss,
in not only forcing the passage of the Dardanelles, strongly defended by ships
as well as batteries, and in the most formidable parts not more than a mile and
a quarter wide, but also in burning the whole of the former. We repassed the
Dardanelles yesterday, having succeeded, I may confidently say, in no one ob-
ject but that of convincing the Turks a British squadron could force the pas-
sage ; by which they have so entirely found out their weak points of defence,
that I am inclined to think no other squadron will ever effect the same again ;
and that, had we not availed ourselves at the period we did of the means of
retreat, such was the increase of batteries, that in one week more I question whe-
ther some would have succeeded in getting back ; and as it was, many have
got most roughly handled by the immense stone shot, weighing from 300 to
800 Ib. each." — Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 161.
Sir John Duckworth, in a memorandum relative to this expedition, said —
" If it had been thought proper to join with the expedition a body of troops
sufficient to have occupied the Chersonesus, the fortifications of the Dardanelles
could have been destroyed ; and, being assured at all events of a safe retreat,
Sir John Duckworth might have gone to the greatest extremes." — SIB JOHN
DUCKWORTH ; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 167.
VOL. I. O
210 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S INDIAN
CHAP, of every Cabinet down to the settlement of the question
"• iu 1829. The Whig Ministry, desirous of following out
1807. their principles, and deeming it of essential importance to
unite the sympathies of the whole country in the single-
handed contest in which they were now engaged, brought
forward a bill, the object of which was to open the higher
situations in the army and navy to persons of the Catholic
persuasion, without making any change on their eligi-
bility to either House of Parliament. The draft of the
bill, which related to other matters connected with the two
services as well as this, was submitted to his Majesty in
the usual way by the Cabinet ; but his attention was not
specially drawn to the change it was meant to effect in
this particular, and he seems to have been unconscious of
what was intended. No sooner, however, did he become
aware, from the debates on the subject in the House of
Commons, of the tendency of the bill in this respect, than
he expressed his repugnance to it in the strongest terms,
declaring that he had not previously been made aware of
the existence of any such clause in the bill, and that no
consideration whatever would induce him to give his con-
sent to it. Finding the King thus determined, and on a
subject on which they were well aware his conscientious
convictions were so strong that there was no chance of
this being modified or removed, the Ministers agreed to
give up the point, and in the mean time withdraw the
obnoxious clause from the bill. But this did not satisfy
the King, whose religious scruples were now thoroughly
awakened ; and, dreading a renewal of the attempt to
compel him to surrender his opinion, he required from his
Ministers a written pledge that they would never again
bring forward any such proposal. To this proposal, which
in effect was to tie up their hands on this important sub-
ject during the whole remainder of the King's reign, the
Cabinet conceived that they could not, in consistency with
their known opinions, accede ; and the consequence was,
that' they were informed their services were no longer re-
AND WAR ADMINISTRATION. 211
quired. An entire change of Ministry ensued — the new CHAP.
one being composed exclusively of the Tory party — Mr
*^>
Percival being First Lord of the Treasury, and Lord 1807>
Castlereagh again restored to his arduous duties as Secre-
tary at War.*
* The following was the composition of the new Cabinet : — President of the
Council, Earl Camden ; Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon ; Lord Privy Seal,
Earl of Westmoreland ; First Lord of the Treasury, Duke of Portland ; Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, Mr Percival ; Home Secretary, Lord Hawkesbury ;
Foreign Secretary, Mr Canning ; War and Colonies, Lord Castlereagh ; Presi-
dent of the Board of Trade, Earl Bathurst ; First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord
Mulgrave ; Master-General of the Ordnance, Earl of Chatham. Not in Cabinet :
— Secretary at War, Sir James Pulteney ; President of Board of Control, Mr
Dundas ; Vice-President of Board of Trade, Mr Rose ; Lord- Lieutenant of
Ireland, Duke of Richmond.
" The King considers this struggle as for his throne ; and he told me but
yesterday, when I took the Great Seal, that he did so consider — that he must
be the Protestant king of a Protestant country, or no king. He is remarkably
well, firm as a lion, placid and quick beyond example in any moment of his life.
The late Ministers are satisfied that the King — whose state of mind they were
always doubting — has more sense than all the Ministers put together — they
leave him with a full conviction of that fact." — LORD ELDON to REV. DR Twiss,
April 1, 1807 ; CAMPBELL'S Lives of Chancellors, vii. 207.
}
CHAPTER III.
LORD CASTLEREAGH FROM HIS RESTORATION TO THE WAR
OFFICE IN APRIL 1807 TO HIS RESIGNATION OF IT IN SEP-
TEMBER 1809.
CHAP. WHEN the Tories were restored to power, which was on
ITL the 8th April, the affairs of the Continent were in a very
1807- critical state ; but the period of decisive co-operation on
New^ory *he part of the British Government had passed. Hos-
Administra- tilities on an extended scale were imminent, but it was
tion, in
which Lord too late to send a British expedition out, in time either
Castlereagh . _* . „
is again to take part in them, or effect a diversion in favour of
for^u-a1? the Russian arms. The first care of the new Ministry
1807. 8> was to resume the project of co-operation on an extended
scale, and en masse, with the Russians, who had main-
tained through the winter so heroic a struggle with the
superior forces of Napoleon ; and if these efforts had
been made two months before, when the intelligence
of the battle of Eylau arrived, they might have been
attended with decisive effect ; for the scales of war then
hung even between the contending parties, and 30,000
British troops thrown into the balance would, beyond a
doubt, have inclined it to the allied side. As it was,
not a day was lost by Mr Canning and Lord Castlereagh
in reversing the policy of their predecessors, and sending
, , immediate succours to the allied powers.1 So early as
1 Parl. Deb. f *
x. 103,104; April 2, before they had even taken their seats in Par-
297^ 298.' liament as Ministers, they despatched £100,000 in money
to the King of Prussia, which was immediately followed
LORD CASTLEREAGH'S WAR ADMINISTRATION. 213
bj £200,000 worth of military stores; and earnest ne- CHAP.
gotiations were set on foot to concert vigorous measures IIT-
for the prosecution of the war. iso?.
This change of policy on the part of the British
Government was immediately followed by treaties, cal- Treaties in
ciliated, if the war had lasted, to have effected an im- conceded
portant change in its fortunes. One was signed at Bar- ^i-edthe
tenstein in East Prussia, on the 25th of April, between ^^
Russia and Prussia, by which it was stipulated that
neither of the contracting parties should make peace
without the concurrence of the other ; that the Con-
federation of the Rhine should be dissolved, and a new
confederacy of the German powers formed under their
natural protectors, Austria and Prussia ; that the Cabi-
net of Vienna should be requested to accede to this
treaty, and, in the event of their doing so, the Austrian
dominions should be restored to what they had been in
1805, so as to extend in Italy to the Mincio, and include
the Tyrol in Germany ; and that England should be
invited to accede, and furnish arms, ammunition, and
money to the belligerent powers, and disembark a strong
auxiliary force at the mouth of the Elbe to co-operate
with the Swedes and menace the flank and rear of the
French army, while Austria operated on its communi-
cations, and Russia and Prussia engaged it in front.
Sweden had, six days before, agreed to employ 12,000 April 19.
men in Pomerania. Great Britain formally gave in her
adhesion on 17th June, and engaged to send 20,000 men June 17. ,
as soon as possible to Stralsund to co-operate with the
Swedes ; and, on the 23d of the same month, a relative
agreement was concluded between Great Britain and
Sweden, by which the Swedish contingent was to be
raised to 18,000, and taken entirely into British pay,
and the whole conditions of the alliance of llth April
1805 were renewed. Soon after a treaty was signed be-
tween Great Britain and Prussia, by which the former
engaged to furnish a subsidy of £1,000,000 for the
214 LORD CASTLEREA.GH S
CHAP, campaign of 1807, with the promise of further succours,
m- if necessary, to carry into full effect the provisions of the
1307. Convention of Bartenstein. Thus was Lord Castle-
reagh's project for the winter campaign of 1805 so
rudely obstructed by the battle of Austerlitz, again in
course of being carried into execution, and the foun-
dation laid for a grand alliance, which, if it could have
been held together, would, beyond all doubt, have put
a bridle in the mouth of France, and restored independ-
ence to Europe. And it was observed with just pride
by Mr Canning, that "It was not the least honour-
1 .**««». able part of these transactions to Great Britain, that the
viu. 603; ,
Schoeii, ix. treaty with Prussia was signed when that power was al-
Deb. ix. ' most bereft of its possessions, and agreed to by Frederick-
102) To!*' William in the only large town that remained to him of
his once extensive dominions." l
But this change of system came too late to counter-
But the sue- balance the disasters which had been incurred, or assuage
mUedtoo° the ill feeling which had been produced. Alexander had
fr^Frfed6- been profoundly irritated by the ill-judged refusal of the
Stand British Cabinet to guarantee a loan he was desirous of
negotiating, after the battle of Eylau, in London, and by
the desertion of his cause by Great Britain, the power of
all others most interested in asserting its independence.'5'1
* "The firmness and perseverance with which his Majesty, during eight
months, maintained and defended a cause common to all sovereigns, are the
most certain pledges of the intentions which animated him, as well as of the
purity and loyalty of his principles. Never would his Imperial Majesty have
thought of deviating from that system which he has hitherto pursued, if he
had been supported by a real assistance on the part of his allies. But having,
from the separation of Austria and England, found himself reduced to his own
resources, having to combat with his own means the immense military forces
which France has at her disposal, he was authorised in believing that, in con-
tinuing to sacrifice himself for others, he might ultimately come to compro-
mise the fate of his own empire. The conduct of the British Government in
later times has been of a kind completely to justify the determination which
his Majesty has now taken. The diversion on the Continent which England
so long promised has not to this day taken place ; and even if, as the latest
advices from London show, the British Government has at length resolved
on sending 10,000 men to Pomerania, that succour is nowise proportioned
either to the hopes we were authorised to entertain, or the importance of the
object to which these troops were destined. Pecuniary succours might, in
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 215
Ignorance of the entire change of policy adopted bj the CHAP<
Whigs led him to believe that England had stood aloof TIL
because she was determined never again to incur the 1807.
hazards of Continental warfare ; and he had no confi-
dence in the change of Ministry producing any alteration
in this selfish insular policy. The transport service had
been totally dismantled since the Whigs came into office
— a wretched economy, which saved only £4000 a-month,
and disabled Great Britain from sending any succours to
the Continent till it was restored, which could not be
effected for two months. Thus the precious interval, big
with the fate of Europe and the world, was allowed to
pass, without any effort being practicable on the part of
Great Britain to aid the common cause ; and during that
time the most disastrous events had occurred on the
Continent. Russia and Prussia, left to themselves, were
crushed at Friedland ; the negotiations at Tilsit followed ;
and the Emperor of Russia, soured by and deeply hurt
at his desertion, during the most critical period of the
struggle, by Great Britain, attended very naturally only
to his separate interests, and concluded a treaty in many
respects advantageous to himself, but to the last degree
disastrous to Europe and Great Britain. The 20,000
men whom Great Britain had engaged to send out, could
not, in consequence of these circumstances, sail from the
some degree, have compensated the want of English troops; but not only did
the British Government decline facilitating the loan which the Imperial Court
had intended to negotiate in London, but when it did at length resolve upon,
making some advances, it appeared that the sum destined for this, so far from
meeting the exigences of the Allies, would not even have covered the indis-
pensable expenses of Prussia. In fine, the use which England, instead of co-
operating in the common cause, has made of its forces in South America and
in Egypt — the latter of which was not even communicated to the Imperial
Cabinet, and was entirely at variance with its interests, at a time when, by
giving them a different destination, the necessity of maintaining a Russian
army on the Danube might have been prevented, and the disposable force on
the Vistula proportionally increased — sufficiently demonstrates that the Em-
peror of Russia was virtually released from his engagements, and had no course
left but to attend to the security of his own dominions." — Note, GENERAL
BUDBERQ to LORD LEVESON GOWER, Tilsit, June 30, 1807 ; Parliamentary
Debates, v. Ill, 112.
216 LORD CASTLERE AGE'S
CHAP. British harbours till the end of July, a fortnight after the
m- treaty of Tilsit had been signed, and the subjugation of
iw7. the Continent, to all appearance, irrevocably effected.
July 14! Despatched, as Lord Castlereagh would have done had
the transports not been all dismantled or dispersed by
his predecessors, in the middle of April, they would have
• D i r> u turned the tide at Friedland, and terminated the war
1 ran. Deb.
ix. 1035, eight years before it actually closed. That saving of
1036 ; Hard. * °
ix. 425. £48,000 by the Whig Ministry at this time has lost
Great Britain at least £400,000,000 sterling.1 *
Although, however, the expedition under Lord Cath-
The secret cart arrived on the shores of the Continent too late, from
SJt'be0- these causes, to avert the catastrophe of Friedland and
to the™ m subjugation of Tilsit, yet it did come in time to effect a
Ministry. most important advantage for the separate interests of
England, and disarrange, in an essential particular, the
French Emperor's long-laid plans for our subjugation. To
unite the whole naval forces of continental Europe in a
league against Great Britain was the grand object of his
policy ; and he calculated that by so doing he might, taking
the French ships of the line at sixty, accumulate in a few
years one hundred and eighty sail, to wrest from England
* "When the new Ministry came into office," said Mr Canning, then Foreign
Minister, "on July 31, 1807, they found the transport system totally dis-
mantled. This originated in the economical system of Lord H. Petty ; but
it was a false economy, evidently calculated, at no distant period, to render
necessary a profuse expenditure. The mandate of dismissal came from the
Treasury, and was applicable to all transports but those necessary to maintain
the communication with Ireland, Jersey, and Guernsey. The saving produced
by this order did not amount to more than £4000 a-month ; and it dispersed
60,000 tons of shipping, left by the preceding Ministry to then- successors.
Ministers thus, in the beginning of April last, had not a transport at their dis-
posal ; and, from the active state of trade at the time, it required several
months before they could be collected. If they had existed, a military force
would in that very month have been sent out, and 20,000 British troops would
have turned the scale at Friedland. This ill-judged economy was the more
criminal that, by having a fleet of transports constantly at command, and
threatening various points, 20,000 men could easily paralyse three times that
number of the enemy. The Whigs had apparently parted with their transport
force for no other purpose but to register their abandonment of the Conti-
nent." These facts Mr Windham, on the part of the Whig Government, did
not deny, alleging only that " the absurdity of sending British troops to the Conti-
nent required no reply." — Parliamentary Debates, ix. 1035-1038.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 217
the sceptre of the ocean. Then, and not till then, did he CHAP.
intend, having gained the command of the Channel, to
carry into effect the invasion of the British Islands. As 18°7-
the Danish fleet consisted of twenty ships of the line,
manned by admirable sailors, it was of essential conse-
quence to the project to obtain possession of it as soon
as possible, and the plan fallen upon to give this design
the appearance of justice was this: It was agreed between
France and Russia that the mediation of the former power
should be offered to adjust the differences of the latter
with the Cabinet of St James ; and in the event of the
mediation not being accepted, Russia was to make com-
mon cause with Napoleon with all its forces by sea and
land : " Or/' in M. Bignon's words, " if, having accepted
the mediation, peace was not concluded by the 1st
November, on terms stipulating that the flags of every
power should enjoy a perfect and entire equality on every
sea, and that all the conquests made from French posses-
sions since 1805 should be restored — in that case also,
Russia shall demand a categorical answer by the 1st
December, and the Russian ambassador shall receive a
conditional order to quit London. And in the event of
the English Government not having made a satisfactory
answer to the Russian requisitions, France and Russia
shall jointly summon the three Courts of Copenhagen,
Stockholm, and Lisbon to close their harbours against
English vessels, recall their ambassadors from London,
and declare war against Great Britain." In return for
these advantages, it was agreed that the families of the
houses of Bourbon and Braganza should be replaced in
the Spanish peninsula by princes of the family of Napo-
leon ; and the Ottoman empire was to be partitioned —
Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bulgaria being allotted to Russia
— while Greece, Macedonia, and the whole sea-coast of
Dalmatia, should be ceded to France. To evince her
gratitude for so many concessions, France engaged to
throw no obstacles in the way of the Russians acquiring
218 LORD CASTLEREAGHS
CHAP. Finland from Sweden, and became bound by no act, direct
m- or indirect, to augment the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, or
1807. do anything which might lead to the re-establishment of
the kingdom of Poland.*
" Scarcely," says Lord Londonderry, " had the dis-
Copenhagen astrous campaign of the allied sovereigns of Russia and
anTctptu're Prussia against France in 1807 been terminated in the
Lhtt" month of July by the peace of Tilsit, when the British
Government found means to obtain positive informa-
tion of the hostile plans projected against this country,
Russia, unfortunately, acceded to the Continental System
of Napoleon, and engaged to assist in compelling the
minor powers, and even Austria herself, to pursue a like
course. It was discovered that one of the first objects of
France would be to secure the Danish fleet. A powerful
armament was in consequence equipped with extraordi-
nary despatch ; and its commanders, Lords Cathcart and
Gambier, were instructed to demand the surrender of all
the ships of war, upon an engagement that they should be
restored to Denmark on the conclusion of a general peace.
The Danish Government having rejected all proposals for
an amicable accommodation, the British army invested
Copenhagen ; and, after the city had sustained a bombard-
ment of three days, from the 2d to the 5th of September,
a capitulation was concluded, and all the ships of war, with
the naval stores of every kind in the royal arsenals, were
given up to the British forces, which, early in October,
i Castle- returned to England with their prizes." l The fleet thus
r«phvU68. taken and extricated from the grasp of the enemy was
* Lord very large, and its loss was the first great blow which the
DcJ' Ann. ambitious designs of Napoleon received.2 It consisted of
eai'&M7' eighteen sail of the line, fifteen frigates, six brigs, and
twenty -five gunboats, besides two sail of the line and
* These secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit are given on the authority of
M. Bignon, long the French ambassador at Berlin — to whom Napoleon be-
queathed, with a large legacy, the task of writing the diplomatic history of his
reign, which he has done in his elaborate work in fourteen volumes — and
of M. Thiers, in his admirable History of the Consulate and the Empire. — See
BIGNON, vi. 336, and v. 347, 348 ; and THIERS, Consulat et U Empire, vii. 648,
649, and viii. 449, 450.
WAR ADMINISTRATION.
219
three frigates which were destroyed as not being worth
removal. The victory was unprecedented. Trafalgar
itself could not present so splendid an array of prizes.
The naval stores brought away were of proportional
magnitude ; and the guns taken, including those mounted
on the ramparts and praams, were 3500.
" Blood and fire," said Napoleon, when the intelligence
of the event reached Paris, " have made the English
masters of Copenhagen. " The imperial conqueror might
well vent his wrath against the authors of this vigorous
step, for it deprived him of half the fruit he expected to
derive from the victory of Friedland. Crippled by twenty
sail of the line in the naval forces which he expected
to array against Great Britain in Northern Europe, an
immediate assault was out of the question. The slower
method of blockade could alone be resorted to. His
original plan was to have attacked England with one
hundred and eighty sail of the line, among whom the
Danish fleet was taken at fifteen; but the capture of that
fleet disconcerted this project, and the Continental block-
ade was resorted to in a more stringent manner than
ever.* The Milan decree against British commerce, which
* " After Russia," says General Jomini, speaking in the person of Napo-
leon, " had joined my alliance, Prussia, as a matter of course, followed her
example ; Portugal, Sweden, and the Pope, alone required to be gained over,
for we were well aware that Denmark would hasten to throw herself into our
arms. If England refused the proffered mediation of Russia, the whole mari-
time forces of the Continentals were to be employed against her, and they
would muster one hundred and eighty sail of the line.* In a few years this
force could be raised to two hundred and fifty. With the aid of such a fleet
and of my numerous flotilla, it was by no means impossible to lead a Euro-
pean army to London. One hundred sail of the line employed against her
colonies in the two hemispheres would have sufficed to have drawn off a large
portion of the British navy, while eighty more assembled in the Channel would
have sufficed to assure the passage of the flotilla and avenge the outraged
rights of nations. Such was my plan at bottom, which only failed of success
from the faults committed in the Spanish war."
* Viz. : — French ships of the line, 60
CHAP.
III.
1807.
Great im-
pression
produced by
this stroke
in Europe.
Spanish
Russian
Swedish
Danish
Dutch
Portuguese
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
40
26
15
15
M
10
IOMINI, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 449.
220 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, soon after ensued, was the indication of the change of
IIL tactics produced by the taking of Copenhagen. But
1807. though the ultimate effect of this vigorous stroke was
in the highest degree favourable to Great Britain, yet its
immediate results were extremely prejudicial to her inter-
ests. Public opinion on the Continent, entirely guided
by the enslaved press of France, was almost unanimous
against her. Copenhagen had been attacked and the
fleet taken without any declaration of war or any angry
negotiations before the British pennants appeared off the
shores of Zealand. There was ample ground, not only
for political declamation but for well-founded complaint,
on the face of the transaction, and before the secret
articles of the treaty of Tilsit, known to the British
Government, were brought to light. Accordingly, they
formed the subject of impassioned invective both in Par-
liament and by a large part of the press in England ; and
a painful feeling of doubt as to the justification of the
measure came to pervade a considerable and respectable
portion of society in the British Islands. It was made
the subject of debate directly, or on incidental petitions,
no less than fourteen times in the next session of Parlia-
ment. The following abstract of Lord Castlereagh's
defence of the measure will afford the best view of the
grounds on which it was vindicated, and of his now
matured power as a parliamentary orator.
In the King's speech at the opening of Parliament, the
Arguments vindication of the expedition was rested on the assertion
tion^fnst that Ministers were in possession of the secret articles of
iion.expedi' the treaty of Tilsit, by which it was stipulated that the
Danish fleet was to be employed against this country.
" If so," said Mr Ponsonby, the leader of the Opposi-
tion, " why are they not produced 1 It is said that
Denmark has always been hostile to this country, and
would gladly have yielded up her fleet at the first sum-
mons. What grounds are there for such an assertion 1
True, the ships at Copenhagen were in a certain state of
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 221
preparation, but not more so than they have been for the CHAP.
last half-century. Is it probable that Denmark would m-
have risked her East and West India possessions, the 18°7-
island of Zealand itself, and Norway, from an appre-
hension that Holstein and Jutland would be overrun by
French troops 1 When the Copenhagen expedition set
out, there were three hundred and fifty Danish ships in
the British harbours, with cargoes worth £2,000,000 ; and
when the British consul applied on the subject to the
Chamber of Commerce at the Danish capital, he received
an answer that there was not the slightest room for appre-
hension, as the Danish neutrality was not likely to be dis-
turbed. But even supposing it could be proved beyond a
doubt that Buonaparte intended to have seized the fleet
at Copenhagen, and had a force at his command adequate
for that purpose, as he afterwards did with the fleet at
Lisbon, are we to justify our robbery upon the plea that
the enemy meditated a similar spoliation, and that it is but
fair to be beforehand with him ? Is it not a principle of
morality, applicable alike to nations and individuals, that
one wrong will not justify another, and that, unless in ex-
treme cases, even self-defence will not justify a deviation
from the laws and usages of war I Better, far better
would it be to have had to combat the Danish fleet
manned by disaffected seamen, and fitted out by a re-
luctant government, than to have as now the fleets of l Pari. Deb.
France and Russia to fight manned by the indignant and 355-358.
exasperated sailors of the North/'1
To these arguments it was replied by Lord Castle-
reagh and Mr Canning : " It is needless to ask for
additional documents to justify that great and saving'
measure, the expedition to Copenhagen. It was evident
that after the battle of Trafalgar had annihilated all
hopes of present naval ascendancy, and the victory of
Friedland had laid all Continental nations at his feet, all
the efforts of Buonaparte would be turned to effect a
naval confederacy against Great Britain. Were any proof
222 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, necessary to show that such was his object, and that he
ITI- would pursue it by all the methods in his power, it would
1807. be found in the use to which on every occasion he has
turned his Continental conquests. Has it not been always
to compel the people whom he has subdued to furnish
auxiliaries to co-operate with him in hostilities against
the nations which still required to be subjugated ? Ac-
tuated by these motives, is it to be supposed that that
profound statesman and consummate general would not
proceed in the same manner in carrying out the great
object of his life — the destruction of the maritime strength
and resources of this country ? that after his great land
victory, when he had all the Continental nations at his
command, he would hesitate to accomplish the inviting
object of adding the Danish navy, lying in a manner
within his grasp, to his resources'?
"If any doubt could remain on this subject, it would be
Continued, removed by the open declarations and subsequent conduct
of the French Emperor himself. Immediately after the
battle of Friedland he announced his intention of uniting
all the navies of Europe in one great confederacy against
this country ; and all his subsequent conduct has been
but the carrying out that design. It was not confined to
Denmark — it extended also to Portugal : and before the
1st September he publicly demanded of the Portuguese
ambassador, in presence of all the envoys of foreign
courts, whether he had transmitted his order to the
Court of Portugal to shut their ports against the British
flag, and confiscate all the property of its subjects within
the Portuguese territory ; and having done so, he imme-
diately turned to the Danish minister and asked if he
had transmitted the same order to his Court. This was
done on the 16th August, the very day when the British
expedition landed on the coast of Zealand, and before the
destination of that armament could have been known.
The Cabinet of Lisbon transmitted official intelligence to
the Court of Great Britain that a formal demand had
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 223
been made on them for the surrender of their fleet and CHAP.
the closing of their harbours against British ships ; and IIT*
upon their failure to comply with the last and most ini- i80'-
quitous of these requisitions, a notice appeared in the
Moniteur that ' the house of Braganza had ceased to
reign/ Can it be doubted after this how it would have
fared with the house of Denmark if they had not yielded
obedience to a similar mandate ?
" It is idle to suppose that the Court of Copenhagen
could, even with the support of Great Britain, have with- Concluded,
stood the united armies of France and Russia ready to
pour down upon her. The Great Belt, frozen in winter,
would have rendered the seizure of the Danish fleet a
matter of certainty. And that fleet of twenty sail of the
line, manned by the bold and hardy sailors of the North,
would have formed an addition to the already formidable
forces of the Continental confederacy, on which England,
with all her maritime strength, could not look with indif-
ference. These twenty line-of-battle ships would speedily
be joined by those of Russia and Sweden, amounting to
at least as many more. The Russian fleet in the Euxine,
consisting of twelve line-of-battle ships, has already pro-
ceeded to Lisbon to join the Portuguese navy, which,
together, will make up twenty ships of the line. Spain
could furnish a like number. A maritime force would
be united against this country, consisting of fifty sail of
the line, drawn from Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest,
with two wings of forty each, supplied by his northern
and southern confederates. Distracted, as even the great
navy of Great Britain is, by the necessity of maintaining
squadrons in every quarter of the globe to protect her
distant possessions, it is certain that she could not pro-
duce any force in the Channel at all equal to the enor-
mous weight of enemies thus accumulating against her. l Parl Deb
The seizure of the Danish fleet, and consequent paralysis ^267-287,
of the right wing of the hostile armament, had thus be- 350-333!
come a matter of absolute necessity.1 Self-preservation
224 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, is the first law of nature ; and that law loudly called for
m- the Copenhagen expedition, which has so happily para-
1807. lysed the designs of the confederates in the quarter
where they were most formidable — the north seas."*
Powerful as these arguments were, and ably as they
vindication vfGTG enforced by Lord Castlereagh and Mr Canning, it
Copenhagen is doubtful if they would, if taken by themselves alone,
furmshe'r ^iave satisfied the doubts or stilled the conscience of the
by Napoleon nation on this Question, so completely had the decisive
to his his- *• r J
advantage gained by the measure obliterated the percep-
tion of the danger it had removed. But, fortunately for
the cause of historic truth, the vindication at length
came, and in the most conclusive of all ways, for it was
furnished by our enemies. Napoleon's rage knew no
bounds when he heard of the success of the expedition,
and he affected the utmost indignation at the proceed-
ing ;f but his own acts, not less than his words, soon
afforded it the best vindication. On the 16th August,
as Lord Castlereagh noticed in the House of Commons,
he publicly asked the Portuguese minister, in presence of
all the ambassadors of Europe at the Tuileries, whether
he had transmitted the orders to his Court to close their
harbours against the British and join the confederacy
against England, and immediately turned to the Danish
minister and asked him if he had done the same. Nor
did the matter rest on verbal injunctions ; for, finding
that the Portuguese Government hesitated as to imme-
diate obedience to these mandates, he despatched Junot
from Bayonne with a powerful army to seize the fleet,
which was only extricated from his grasp by the vigorous
measures of the British Government, and the departure
* Ministers were supported on this question by a majority of 253 to 108 in
the Commons, and of 105 to 48 in the Peers. — Parliamentary Debates, x. 383.
t " The success of the attack on Copenhagen," says Fouche", " was the first
derangement of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in virtue of which
the navy of Denmark was to have been at the disposal of France. Since the
catastrophe of Paul, I had never seen Napoleon in such a transport of rage.
That which struck him most in this vigorous coup-de-main was the prompti-
tude and resolution of the English minister." — Mcmoires de Foucht, ii. 37.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 225
of the royal family of Portugal with the fleet to the Bra- CHAP.
zils in the spring following. The Russian fleet from the IIL
Black Sea, consisting of twelve sail of the line, soon after 1807-
came through the Mediterranean, and cast anchor in the
Tagus, evidently to co-operate in the great naval crusade,
where it fell into the hands of the British in consequence
of the victory of Vimeira and capitulation of Lisbon.
Finally, the chosen historians of Napoleon, M. Bignon
and M. Thiers, published the secret articles of the treaty
of Tilsit above given, which placed beyond a doubt the
intention on the part of the French Emperor to seize the
Danish fleet, and rendered the vindication of the expedi-
tion complete.1 And thus had Lord Castlereagh and 'Thiers,
Mr Canning, in addition to the bold and decisive course v'
which extricated the Danish fleet from the grasp of
France, the credit of having magnanimously withheld the
secret articles in their possession from publication, lest
their appearance should compromise the persons from
whom they had been obtained, and borne undeserved
obloquy for a long course of years, till their triumphant
vindication came from the hands of their enemies.*
* Although the Emperor Alexander professed in public the greatest indig-
nation at the Copenhagen expedition, yet he, in secret, was by no means dis-
pleased with its success. "An English officer of literary celebrity (Sir R.
Wilson) was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his
most secret councils, to convey to the British minister the Emperor's expres-
sion of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt at the skill and
dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the pur-
poses of France by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her Ministers were invited
to communicate freely with the Czar as with a person who, though obliged
to yield to circumstances, was nevertheless as much as ever attached to the
cause of European independence." — SCOTT'S Napoleon, vi. 24. To the same
purpose Lord Londonderry observes : — " On the 7th of November a manifesto
was issued, declaring the adhesion of Russia to the principles of the armed
neutrality and the Continental System. In consequence, Lord Gower, the
English ambassador, left St Petersburg, and Tolstoi set out as Russian envoy
for Paris. Nevertheless, Alexander, who had no scruple to play a double
part in politics, gave secret assurances to the British Cabinet that he wished
to continue in good understanding with it. At the same time, the Czar
failed not to take advantage of the clause in the treaty of Tilsit directed
against Sweden. He desired the co-operation of King Gustavus against Eng-
land, and, this being refused, a Russian army prepared to invade Finland. . . .
Finland, rent in one campaign from the Swedish monarchy, was annexed
VOL. 1. P
226 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. The use which Lord Castlereagh made of the military
IIL force at the entrance of the Baltic, after the taking of
1807. Copenhagen, was hardly less important than that cap-
Judilfous ture itself. The Russians having declared war against
Ih^Kii Sweden, in order to secure, by the acquisition of Fin-
cTcnh^-" ^an(^' ^ir share of the spoils of Tilsit, it became of
|en,in great importance to prevent the Swedish fleet at Carls-
crona, consisting of twelve sail of the line, from falling
into their hands, and being rendered a part of the gene-
ral naval confederacy against Great Britain. The transfer
of the troops employed in the Copenhagen expedition
to Gottenburg, on the opposite coast of Sweden, accom-
plished this object. They inspired the chivalrous King
of Sweden with confidence to continue firm in the British
alliance; and though they could not prevent Finland
from being torn from the Swedish Crown and annexed to
Russia, they effectually closed the Sound against hostile
vessels, and retained the Swedish naval forces in alliance
with Great Britain. In this manner was our supremacy
in the Baltic effectually secured, and the Russian fleet, of
fifteen sail of the line, at Cronstadt, blockaded and shut
out from any active part in the projected hostilities by
sea against England. Thus, by the direct consequences
of the Copenhagen expedition, was not only the whole
Danish fleet of twenty sail of the line and fifteen frigates
extricated from the enemy's grasp, but the Swedish fleet
of twelve was secured in our alliance, and the Russian
of fifteen neutralised and kept in check by a compara-
tively small British squadron in the Baltic. In this way
the whole right wing of Napoleon's crusade against this
country, consisting of nearly fifty sail of the line, was
destroyed or paralysed, and Great Britain secured from
the greatest naval danger which had threatened her since
the beginning of the war. The tone of Russia was ren-
dered, in secret, more conciliatory by this decisive stroke ;
to the'dominions of the Autocrat of all the Russias." — Castlereagh Correspond-
ence, vi. 208, 209.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 227
and the Czar did not conceal his hidden satisfaction at the CHAP.
Danish fleet being wrested from Napoleon, provided he was IIL
secured from molestation in his designs upon Finland.* 18°7-
Following out his strong impression as to the danger
which Great Britain would incur from the concentration '
of all the naval forces of the world against her under the
direction of Buonaparte, Lord Castlereagh had, ever since °.n s°Vth
*t ° € America.
the battle of Jena, in 1806, been revolving in his mind
the means of attacking and severing from Old Spain her
vast colonies in South America. They were the nursery
of the most formidable maritime force with which Great
Britain had to contend, and the one which in time past
* " Russia does not show any disposition either to resent or to complain of
what we have done at Copenhagen. The Emperor wants to be assured on
two grounds — 1st, That the principles on which the measure has been under-
taken do not apply to Russia ; and, 2d, That we are not, by the evacuation
of Zealand, about to uncover Sweden to an attack from France, and, by letting
a French army into Sweden, expose Russia to be menaced on the side of Fin-
land. The tone of the Russian Cabinet has become much more conciliatory
to us since they heard of your operations, partly, perhaps, from alarm for Cron-
stadt, partly from the natural respect that attaches to a vigorous exertion
against that power which they may dread but must hate. The opinion of
those best disposed and informed at that Court is, that if we could maintain
our position in the Baltic, the counsels of Russia would rapidly improve — at
least, that she would not, in that state of things, lend herself to France as a
hostile instrument against us." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD CATHCART, Sep-
tember 22, 1807; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 183.
" We have accomplished a British object of the first importance in getting
the Danish fleet ; but the northern powers will reproach us with having pur-
chased a separate advantage at their cost — indeed, such is already the unofficial
language of those in confidence in Russia — if the entry of French troops into
Zealand, and subsequently into Sweden, should immediately follow our evacu-
ation of that island. . . . We are, above all things, anxious to preserve
our character for good faith untainted ; but, as far as it can be done consis-
tently with the engagements entered into, we are desirous of converting our
present position in Zealand into an instrument for keeping the French out
of it. ... Jf good faith prevents us from using our position at Copen-
hagen to bring Denmark to terms, we have only to submit and be grateful for
what has been gained." — Ibid., 184, 185.
" Should your Majesty's endeavours to put an end to the war with Den-
mark fail of success, your Majesty's servants are humbly of opinion that the
defence of Sweden ought to be looked to by a corps posted in Sweden, rather
than by an attempt to reoccupy and retain the island of Zealand. In order
to give the fullest effect to this measure, they humbly beg leave to recom-
mend that a respectable force may be employed in this service, and that Lord
Cathcart should be directed, for the present, to remain in the personal
command of it." — LORD CASTLEREAG^ to the KINO, October 9, 1807; Castle-
reagh Correspondence, vi. 193.
228 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, had most seriously endangered the national independence.
IIL It was the combined fleets of France and Spain which, in
1807. 1784, had ridden triumphant in the British Channel, and
held Plymouth in blockade. It was the squadrons of the
same powers which, in 1805, had recently menaced in a
still more serious manner the national independence, and
but for Sir R. Calder's victory, and the disobedience of
his orders by Admiral Villeneuve, in steering after it to
Cadiz instead of Brest, would have rendered Napoleon the
master of the British Channel, and given him the means
of effecting a landing on our shores with 150,000 men.
The trade which Spain carried on at this time with her
transatlantic colonies was immense, and much exceeded
that which at that period, and for long after, Great Britain
enjoyed with her colonial possessions. It amounted to
iHumboidt,£15,000,000 of exports and as many imports.1 It justly
EgJagJk iv. occurred to Lord Castlereagh. as a most perilous condi-
153, 154. j.-OQ Of things, that this great trade, necessarily conducted
by such an amount of shipping, should be entirely in the
hands of a power which had become the willing vassal of
France, and had joined her great maritime resources to a
state which had already arrayed the whole naval forces of
Europe from' Cronstadt to Cadiz against this country.
Deeply impressed with these ideas, Lord Castlereagh
His plan for had long revolved in his mind the means of severing these
from'tneg ' important colonial possessions from the Spanish Crown.
'Sown!1 The present time seemed to be eminently favourable for
such an enterprise; for the greater part of the fleets of
France and Spain had been destroyed at Trafalgar; and
the attention of Napoleon having for long been fixed on
his Continental operations against Austria, Prussia, and
Russia, he had neither enjoyed the leisure nor had the
means of re-establishing his marine from the vast conquests
he had effected in Northern Europe. There was no time
to lose in effecting this object; for, when the power of the
Frenjch Emperor over the whole Continent, including Rus-
sia, was established by the victory of Friedland and treaty
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 229
of Tilsit, there would no longer remain a land enemy to CHAP.
combat ; and the whole resources of Europe would to a In-
certainty be turned to the great object of the French Em- 18°7-
peror's life — the increase of his naval means, and the sub-
jugation of this country, either by the withering effects of
a Continental blockade, or by a great naval victory, and
subsequent descent with an overwhelming land force on
our own shores.
The first thing which Lord Castlereagh did in pur-
suance of these views, was to consult his intimate friend — on His early
whose sagacity and sound information he had the greatest regarding6!**
reliance — Sir Arthur Wellesley, as to the means of carrying
it into execution. The earliest trace in his correspondence
which is to be found on the subject, is in a communication
to Sir Arthur on 2d November 1806, only sixteen days
after the battle of Jena, when the Whigs were in office,
but when the decisive victory of Napoleon rendered it
evident that the Continental war would speedily be at an
end, and the naval one against this country be resumed.
The plan submitted to Sir Arthur was to attack New
Spain, combined with a descent upon Manilla, and thus to
acquire a base for general and more extensive operations
against the Spanish colony.* Sir Arthur, however, pro-
nounced it impracticable at that season of the year, and
practicable only in July. He drew out several memo-
randums at that time, going in detail into the project,
which are an enduring monument of his widespread in-
formation and practical sagacity. This project continued
to occupy the attention of Government, and General Mi-
randa was consulted on the subject; but these plans proved
abortive, and terminated only in disaster, owing to the
unfortunate attack on Buenos Ayres in 1807.
* " Upon the whole, I believe that, with a view to the conquest of New Spain,
the best mode of disposing of the 4000 men (3000 now at Buenos Ayres and
1000 destined to go to India) would be to send them to the general rendezvous
at Jamaica in the proper season. The best season for going to Mexico is from
November to May. The rains cease in November and commence in May.' —
SIR A. WELLESLET'S Minute, Nov. 2, 1806 ; Supplementary Despatches, vi. 38.
230 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. The Whigs having been displaced from the helm in the
m- spring of 1807, and Lord Castlereagh intrusted again with
1807. the duties of War Minister, he entered warmly into the
LonKLtio- plan °f detaching South America from Old Spain. Sir
7iaui' L re- Arthur Wclleslej had reported that there were in Vene-
zue^aJ Guiana, and the adjacent territories, 13,000 Spanish
troops ; so that the attack on them should not be made by
less than 10,000 men, including 6000 British infantry and
1 400 British cavalry. He added, that these colonies would
be the most valuable that Great Britain or any other
country ever possessed ; but that, as the slave-trade would
be abolished, they would be attended with little present
advantage.* Being convinced that these colonies would
gladly throw off their connection with Old Spain, Lord
Castlereagh determined to undertake operations on a
great scale, with a view to their entire severance from the
mother country. With this view he resolved, in spring
1808, after part of the troops employed in the Copen-
hagen expedition had returned, to send 8000 men from
Cork to join General Spencer's corps, 5000 strong, just
come from the Baltic, and lying on the coast of Old Spain.
If circumstances did not afford an opening then, the whole
force was to proceed to the West Indies, and commence,
with a force increased to 15,000 or 16,000 men by re-
inforcements there and from Halifax, operations against
Mexico and the Rio de la Plata. The breaking out of the
Spanish war, which occurred at this very time, gave an
* " There is no doubt that the territories under the Captain-General of the
Caraccas are the most fertile in the world, and might turn out to be the most
valuable colony that Great Britain or any other nation ever possessed; but Great
Britain would not derive any additional benefit from them at present as a market
for her manufactures and produce, as the number of inhabitants is not very
large. There is no very easy communication between that country and other
parts of South America; and there is reason to believe that large quantities of
British produce are already conveyed into the kingdom of Terra Firms, by the
means of neutrals and the contraband trade. The benefit to be derived from
the possession of these countries would be gained by the extension and im-
provement of their cultivation, of which, as the slave-trade will be abolished,
there are no hopes. On this ground, therefore, the possession of the colony
would bo of little positive advantage to Great Britain." — SIB ARTHUR WEL-
LESLEY'S Memorandum, Feb. 15, 1807; Supplementary Despatches, vi. 59, 60.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 231
entirely different direction to this force, and it was the CHAP.
expedition thus assembled which landed shortly after IIL
in Portugal, and fought the battle of Vimeira. But the isos.
papers in the Secretary of State's office prove that the
plan of detaching the American colonies from Old Spain
had been fully matured by Lord Castlereagh before the
Peninsular broke out, and that what was afterwards done
by a subsequent Government, in 1823, was only the exe-
cution of what he had then projected. The revolutionising
of South America has proved so frightful an evil for those
beautiful regions and the cause of freedom throughout
the world, that no one is now desirous of undertaking the
responsibility of occasioning it ; and if Mr Canning had
lived to this day, it is probable he would have suppressed
his boast of " calling a new world into existence." But
there can be no doubt that the merit of the project, if
merit it be, belongs to Lord Castlereagh, rather than to his
brilliant rival, although there is one difference most im-
portant with reference to the morality of the proceeding
between the circumstances in which they respectively acted
— Lord Castlereagh proposed to effect his object during a
period of war with Spain by open hostility, and with the
King's troops — Mr Canning set about the same design
when in perfect amity with the Spanish Government, by
means of enlistment of British veterans, connived at by
the British authorities, and arms secretly furnished from
the royal stores of England.*
* " According to the plan proposed by Lord Castlereagh, provision must be
made for the operations, as stated underneath, to be performed by the corps
now about to sail from Cork ; by the troops under General Spencer, now off
Cadiz ; and by the troops under General Prevost, now at Halifax. If a detach-
ment of the troops should go to the La Plata, it will be necessary to provide
the naval means to assist in the operations to be performed at Monte Video.
If the expedition should not go to the La Plata, and the result of the affairs in
Spain should be a great undertaking against the Spanish territories in the Gulf,
it will be necessary to provide naval means as stated in the 1st, 3d, and 4th
articles. If Government should determine to attack New Spain, a force of from
16,000 to 17,000 men ought to be provided, including 2000 cavalry. My opinion
is, that it is expedient to commence the operations against the Spanish colonies
at Caraccas. First, The military difficulties are not so great in these territories
as they are in the territories in the Gulf; secondly, We have the means of com-
232 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. The success of the Copenhagen expedition was prolific
IIL of events in the south of Europe, even more important
isos. in their ultimate consequences than the paralysis of the
n.c Access right wmg °f the French naval armament in the north,
"enha en Enraged at finding the Danish fleet extricated from his
KM"" SrasP' anc^ ^s whole designs in the Baltic in consequence
junot's disconcerted, and aware, from the rapidity and weight of
Lisbon. that stroke, of the quality of the antagonist with whom
he had to deal, Napoleon resolved to be, if possible, be-
forehand with the fleets of the Spanish Peninsula. He
had already resolved upon this seizure, and bought the
consent of Russia to the dethronement of the Peninsular
princes by agreeing to the Czar's seizing Finland, Walla-
chia, and Moldavia ; but he dreaded the despatch of a
British fleet to the Tagus, and the seizure of the Portu-
guese fleet, before his land troops, setting out from Bay-
onne, could reach Lisbon. It was of the utmost moment
for him to secure the Portuguese squadron, because Lisbon
was the rendezvous assigned for the Russian fleet of twelve
sail of the line, under Admiral Siniavin, which was pro-
ceeding thither from the Black Sea to co-operate in the
NOV. 3. general design. Early in November Clarke, War Minister,
by Napoleon's desire, wrote a letter to Junot, enjoining
him to use the utmost expedition in his march, to press
on with ceaseless activity, wholly regardless of the want of
provisions, loss of life, or any other difficulties, and whether
Portugal had or had not declared war against England,
but at all hazards to arrive at Lisbon so as to seize the
fleet there before the English squadron could arrive.
But how urgent soever were the orders of the Emperor,
and rapid the movements of Junot, Mr Canning and Lord
Castlereagh were beforehand with him. The instructions
municating with the people of the country through Miranda, and of explaining
at an early period the object of our operations ; thirdly, We can commence our
operations at an earlier period of the year ; and, fourthly, Success in the Caraccas
will remove many of the difficulties attending our operations in other parts,
and in case of failure there would not be much difficulty in withdrawing." —
Memorandum, SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, June 6, 1808 ;
Supplementary Despatches, vi. 73, 74.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 233
sent out to Lord Strangford, the British ambassador at CHAP.
Lisbon, were to urge the Prince Regent's Government to IIL
emigrate to Brazil rather than submit to the exactions of 1808-
the French Government; and the recommendation wasTheprinc
attended to with heroic resolution. In the first instance, ^fuTgaf
indeed, under the pressure of immediate and irresistible ^ j?oeret
danger, the Portuguese Government, on the approach of Brazil.
Junot, yielded to all the demands of the French Govern- NOV. 5.
ment, insomuch that the British ambassador, Lord Strang-
ford, was directed to demand his passports and leave
the city, which he did amidst the tears of the inhabitants.
But the continued advance of Junot, who was now rapidly
approaching from Abrantes, the entry of a large body of
Spanish troops into the Alentejo, and, above all, the omin-
ous announcement in the Moniteur that the " house of
Braganza had ceased to reign/' soon convinced them that
even the most abject submission could not avert the stroke
which threatened them, and that their only safety was in
flight. Lord Strangford at the same time having relanded,
and assured the Prince and his Council that the English
Government regarded his former hostile acts as the result
only of necessity, and that every facility would be rendered
by the English fleet off the mouth of the river to aid their
escape, the bolder counsels prevailed, and it was resolved
to set sail for the Brazils. The fleet, so anxiously coveted
by Napoleon, was little in a state to undertake such a
voyage ; but by the strenuous exertions of Sir Sidney
Smith, who brought his squadron to the mouth of the
harbour, aided by the vigour of the British sailors, eight
sail of the line, three frigates, five sloops, and a number of
smaller vessels, were fitted out in a few days ; and on the
27th November the melancholy cortege embarked and set
sail for South America. Hardly had they weighed anchor
when the French advanced guards came in sight, and,
meeting with no opposition, mounted the ramparts just in
time to see the last sail vanishing in the offing. With
such energy had Junot obeyed the orders of Napoleon to
234 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, hurry on with all possible expedition, that when he entered
IIL Lisbon the troops he had amounted only to 1400 foot
isos. soldiers and a few horsemen, the poor remains of 25,000
*'
'' men who had set out from Bayonne six weeks before.
oIi- There were 14,000 regular troops in Lisbon, but the de-
^ Par*ure °f the Court had banished all thoughts of resist-
i»o7 2so' ance ' an(^ Jun°t> with h*8 handful of soldiers, more like
28i. ' spectres than men, quietly took possession of his import-
ant conquest.1
By this means a blow was struck at the naval confe-
cireat naval deracy against Britain, second only to that delivered at
disposal oF Copenhagen in magnitude and importance, and the naval
Napoleon. resources Of an entire kingdom were extricated from the
grasp of France. But even after this second advantage
had been gained, the situation of Great Britain, both as
to naval and military defence, was very alarming. The
resolution of the French Emperor to combine the whole
naval force of the Continent against this country, after
the disasters he had sustained at sea, and the loss of
the Danish and Portuguese fleets, still brought a force
to threaten Great Britain, considerably superior at the
point of attack to any which could be ranged in defence,
dispersed as the British navy of necessity was over the
whole world in defence of its numerous colonies. From a
return laid before the Cabinet at this time, at Lord Cas-
tlereagh's request, by the Privy Seal, it appeared that the
European confederacy at the command of Napoleon had
121 sail of the line, of which 88 were ready for sea, ex-
clusive of 23 in ordinary and 40 building. On the other
hand, although the British had 206 sail of the line in all,
yet there was only 107 in commission or manned, and
even the crews of this number were got together with
extreme difficulty, and many of the ships were very im-
perfectly manned. So scattered was this force, that not
more than 40 sail of the line could by possibility have
been collected in the Channel and the North Sea to combat
nearly double that number of enemies, who might with
ease be concentrated. Those who are led away by the
WAR ADMINISTRATION.
common illusion that the naval contest was terminated at
Trafalgar, and that Great Britain thenceforth had the
undisputed command of the waves, would do well to cast
their eyes on the tables quoted below, extracted from
Lord Westmoreland's Report to the Cabinet in January
1808, before the Spanish war broke out. The great dif-
ference between the number in commission and the total
possessed by Great Britain, arose from the severe compe-
tition of the merchant service, which, so far from being a
nursery for the navy, was its most formidable rival ; and
the extremely high price of the necessaries of life, which
rendered the limited pay of the men in the royal service
a most inadequate compensation for the sailor's services.*
* The fleet of the enemy appears to consist of : —
Ready. Ordinary.
Building.
French, .
25 20
27
Spanish, .
14
...
Dutch,
4 3
2
Russian, .
20
11
Danish, .
2
...
Turkish, .
11
...
Russia, in Euxine,
12
...
88
Force of the enemy divided into parts : —
23
40
North. Line. South.
Line.
Mediterranean.
Line.
Texel and Flushing, 15 Brest,
13
Cadiz,
14
Building, . . 13 St Omer, .
1
Carthagena,
6
Russian, at Cronstadt, 13 Vigo,
3
Toulon, .
5
Do., at Archangel, 6 Rochefort,
6
Russian,
5
Danish, . . 2 Russian, at Lisbon
Turkish, .
12
(Euxine fleet),
10
In North Sea, . 49 In centre,
33
Mediterranean, .
42
British naval squadron to oppose : —
North. Ocean and Channel.
Mediterranean. Total.
Baltic, . 5 32
27 64
British ships detached in colonies : —
East Indies, Cape, and St Helena,
.
11
America, ....
3
Brazil, . ,_
.
6
— 20
84
Eighteen sail of the line would require to be added to the British squadron
to put them on an equality with the enemy, even after the Danish and Portu-
guese fleets had been taken from them. — EARL OF WESTMORELAND'S Cabinet
Memorandum, January 1808; Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 107-109.
CHAP.
HI.
1808.
236 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. It may safely be affirmed, that if the Copenhagen and
IIL Portuguese expedition had not deprived the enemy of
isos. 30 sail of the line, ready for sea, and admirably manned,
Great Britain would at this period have been greatly
outnumbered at sea, and the national existence put in the
utmost hazard.
Nor was the condition of the army at the same period
•Hate of the more encouraging, for although there were 203,000 men
in the regular force, and nearly 80,000 in the militia, yet
of this great force no less than 97,000 were on foreign
service or returning from it ; and of the 106,000 at home,
at least 25,000 required to be deducted for Ireland and
the Channel Islands, leaving about 80,000 in Great
Britain, of whom not more than one-half, or 40,000,
could be considered as available for active service abroad.*
To this was added the alarming fact, that the troops
of the regular army actually round their colours were
nearly forty thousand less than had been voted by Parlia-
ment. This state of things — the natural result of general
prosperity and wellbeing among the working-classes,
which rendered recruiting for the line and the militia
* British regular forces in November 1807, with their stations : —
FOREIGN SERVICE.
Gibraltar, Malta, and Sicily, . . . 28,18.9
East Indies and Cape, .... 31,533
West Indies and Australia, .... 22,129
North America, ..... 5,660
Spencer's and Beresford's corps, in Baltic, . . 9,863
Total on foreign service, . . 97,374
AT HOME.
Great Britain, . . 48,627
Ireland,
Guernsey,
Returning from South America,
Cavalry,
Total at home,
„ abroad,
27,278
7,136
5,897
17,000
105,938
97,374
Total, .... 203,312
— LORD WESTMORELAND'S Memorandum, January 1808; Castlereagh Corre-
spondence, viii. 110.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 237
difficult, with the small pay allowed to the soldiers — at- CHAP.
tracted the serious attention of Lord Castlereagh, upon m-
whom, as Minister at War, the duty of providing a remedy isos.
for the difficulty mainly devolved, and he submitted
several memorandums to the Cabinet on the subject.
They formed the foundation of the military system of
Great Britain during the remainder of the war, which
furnished such a powerful body of recruits for the service
of the Peninsular campaigns ; and they are of lasting in-
terest and importance to the country whenever exposed
to similar dangers.
The system of Lord Castlereagh, submitted to and
adopted by the Cabinet, consisted of three parts : — 1. A Lordckstie
sedentary or local militia, to be raised by ballot, consisting SSi?*
of at least 300,000 men, in proportion to the population of I
the different counties in Great Britain. 2. A regular militia JjJ^j
of 80,000 men in Great Britain and 40,000 in Ireland, to t°rf the coun-
be raised in the different counties, in proportion to their
numbers ; the counties being bound to make up the al-
lotted number by the ballot, or pay a fine for every man
deficient ; or an equal force consisting of second battalions
of troops of the line, officered by regular officers, but not
liable to be called on to serve beyond their own country.
3. A regular army, at least 220,000 strong, liable to
be sent anywhere, to be kept up by ordinary recruiting
and volunteering from the militia, and by an establish-
ment for the reception of boys, to be educated for two
or three years before they were admitted into the ranks.
4. Of volunteers of the best description, furnishing their
own clothes, but not their arms, which were to be supplied
by Government ; of these it was thought 100,000 might
be raised. 5. Of trained men, to be taught the use of the
firelock and ordinary drill, but not as yet organised in
battalions, but intended to fill up vacancies in the local
or regular militia when they should occur ; these might be
estimated at 400,000 men. In all, 1,380,000 of land and
sea forces for the two islands. And to provide for the great
238 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, deficiency of the regular army, he proposed that two-fifths
rn- of the regular militia for Great Britain and Ireland should
be allowed to volunteer into the line, the deficiency to be
supplied by the ballot in the several counties. This mea-
sure was calculated at 45,000 men ; and, having been
v .adopted by the Cabinet, it actually produced 41,786
12-126. trained and excellent soldiers for the regular army.1*
The principles thus laid down by Lord Castlereagh
leritsof were acted upon by the Government, and formed the
em' basis on which the whole defence of the country during
the remainder of the war was founded. The distribution
of the armed force thus made, corresponds v.ery nearly to
the regular army, landwehr, and landsturm of Prussia and
other German states, which proved so efficacious, during
the war of 1813 and 1814, in recruiting the allied armies.
There was this difference, however, and it was a very
great one — that under the British system the regular
army was kept up entirely by volunteering recruits, en-
listed from the militia or the people, either for life or a
long course of years ; whereas in Germany it was main-
tained, as in France, by a compulsory levy of persons be-
tween eighteen and twenty-one, in each year, whose period
of necessary service extended only to three years, though
such as pleased were encouraged to enlist anew of their
own accord for a longer period. There can be no doubt
that, to produce the one thing needful for the Continental
* The following was the amount of force which Lord Castlereagh calculated
under his system could be relied on in an emergency for the defence of the
country in the British Islands : —
Navy, marines, and sea fencibles, . 150,000
Line, .
Militia, Great Britain and Ireland,
Volunteers, Great Britain, . .
Do., Ireland, . .
Local militia, Great Britain, .
Trained men, do., . .
230,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
300,000
400,000
Total, . . 1,380,000
Besides this, it was proposed that the whole remaining male population, cal-
culated at 2,000,000 more, should be organised for civil service in defence of
the State.— LORD CASTLEUEAQH'S Memorandum to the Cabinet; Castlereagh
Correspondence, viii. 113-127.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 239
armies — namely, the concentration of a large force, to be ' CHAP.
permanently stationed at home, or at least in Europe — the IIL
Continental system was the most advisable. But it is isos.
otherwise in the British empire ; and it was not without
good reason that, while he retained the ballot for the
home forces, whether regular or militia, Lord Castle-
reagh adopted the voluntary system for the regular
army. A conscription may do very well in countries
where the demand for labour is so limited that wages of
ordinary labour are from sixpence to one shilling a-day,
and the pay of the soldier implies no diminution of habit-
ual comforts : how will it answer in one where the wages
are from two to three shillings, and the common soldier
has not half his nominal pay to purchase his own enjoy-
ments "? Still more, how is the conscription system, under
which the soldiers are changed every three years, to work
in an empire where nearly half of the regular army is
employed on distant colonial service, where the regiments
are seldom removed more frequently than once in ten
years ; and the great cost of transporting men to the
distant possessions, as well as the fearful mortality of
young soldiers on their first arrival, renders more fre-
quent changes impossible ?
But, for the same reasons, the system Lord Castlereagh
adopted of making the local and regular militia be raised Advantage
by ballot, appears to have been equally wise and advis- forttheb
able. It is the object of such a force to provide a power- milltia"
ful and well-trained armed reserve, ready to be called
out when required by the nation's danger, but not impos-
ing a lasting burden on the finances of the State. This
can only be done by a militia raised by ballot, and exer-
cised for a month or six weeks in the year, but not other-
wise interfering with the permanent employment of the
men drawn. As such it will never be felt as a hardship,
but rather be hailed as a gratification by the working-
classes ; the exchange of daily and obscure toil for the
dress, the occupation, and ease of a soldier's life being
240 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, always felt as an enjoyment by civilians. The evil of the
IIT* ballot for the regular militia was in practice very little felt
1808. jn the country, as the men were drawn for service during
the war, which gave them a lasting occupation ; and so
large a portion of them was composed of substitutes,
who entered the militia for a bounty, and as a step to
the line, in which they ultimately landed, that it in effect
was little more than a disguised mode of carrying out
the voluntary system. For this very reason, however, a
regular militia, if raised, as it has always been since the
peace, by voluntary enlistment, should always be on con-
dition of the men being embodied for a considerable time,
as five or seven years certain. The ballot is excellent for
drawing forth the real strength of the country, and is
never felt as a burden when it is for a month or six
weeks' service in the year only ; but if the men enlist of
their own accord, it is necessary to give them the certainty
of employment for a considerable time. To dismiss them
after six or nine months' embodiment only, is to make
them lose one employment without gaining another, and
render unpopular the whole service in which such a risk
is undergone. It is to this cause that the awful deficiency
in the numbers raised for the regular militia, which in 1859
amounted to 60,000 men, according to the statement of
General Peel, the War Minister, is to be ascribed.
This matter has now, in consequence of the endangered
True prin- position of the country since the restoration of the Napo-
tftutjjct leonic dynasty in France, become one of the very highest
BriSrn.at importance, and the principles by which it should be
regulated are simple, and when once stated must com-
mand general assent. The fundamental principle is, that
all classes should be called on to contribute to the public
defence, and that in the way least burdensome and most
equitable for each. With this view it is indispensable
to divide the armed force into three classes, gradually
ascending from the very lowest to the highest grades of
society. 1. The local militia, to be raised by ballot in
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 241
the several counties, clothed and paid by Government, and CHAP.
governed by officers of its appointment. 2. Volunteers m-
who pay for their own accoutrements, and serve without isos.
pay, and in return have the privilege of electing their own
officers up to, but not above, the rank of major. 3. The
regular militia and army, which are to be kept perman-
ently embodied, and differing only in the former being not
bound to leave the British Islands except by their own con-
sent. The regular army to be raised by volunteers, either
direct, or from the regular or local militia, for which they
would both serve as a nursery. Perhaps the more advis-
able course would be to have second battalions of regular
regiments instead of regular militia, not bound to serve
out of the country, from which the first battalions might be
formed by voluntary enrolment. In that way you would
get a superior class of officers. By some such system as
this the safety of the country may be absolutely secured,
as long as the courage and public spirit of all classes con-
tinue. Without it the nation will at all times be exposed
on the first breaking out of a war to serious reverses,
which, if assailed by a powerful and ambitious foreign
enemy, may lead to its entire subjugation.*
* The regular army should be kept up by recruits having "the option of
entering for general service, either limited or unlimited in point of time.
The former would be thrown principally into the second, the latter into the
first battalions. The embarrassment and endless complexity of performing
colonial and distant services by troops serving on short and determinable en-
gagements would thus be in a great degree avoided, while the army would
at the same time have the benefit of inviting into its ranks those who may
be averse to enlist into it without some limitation of time. The second
battalions, though chiefly composed of men whose service was limited in point
of time, would nevertheless be liable to be employed in any part of the world
should occasion require it ; and should it be found at any time necessary,
during war, to levy suddenly by ballot a large body of men for the regular
army, it would not be difficult at the moment to appropriate either garrison or
a limited selection of second battalions to receive them, from whence, though
originally entering only for home service, they would gradually engage for a
more extended description of service.
" The regular militia, liable to service out of their counties, would be con-
stituted and raised precisely as at present, with only the additional facility of
procuring men by enlistment from the sedentary militia. A corps of this
description seems an indispensable ingredient in the army of a State which
must reduce its military force suddenly in time of peace, and call it forth as
VOL. I. Q
242 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. The military measures of Lord Castlereagh were
m- adopted by the Cabinet, and proved eminently successful.
1808. One half of the militia establishment were allowed to
Great sue- volunteer into the line, which produced at once 33,000
CMti°ef-Lordgood soldiers, who were speedily replaced by the ballot in
me£es tue regular militia. The result was an increase of 23,000
hT "the™*" effective men to the army after supplying the usual casu-
wroy- alties ; and, including artillery, the regulars and regular
militia were raised on 1st February 1808 to 31 0,000
men, of whom 93,000 were on foreign, and 217,000 on
! Duke of home service. This, the Duke of York justly remarked,
York's Me- was a much larger force than " the country at any former
morandum, * *
Feb. i, period possessed ; l and the composition of the regular
army, particularly of the infantry, has been so much im-
proved by the late drafts from the militia, that the
respective battalions average about 700 rank and file
suddenly upon the recurrence of war. Without such a force, capable of being
rapidly disembodied and reassembled, we should be either too strong an army
in peace or too weak in war. To compose the entire army on constant pay of
regular troops would be to subject the country to an enormous half-pay list ;
and to leave such a chasm in our military force to be filled up on the breaking
out of a war, before we could arrive at our standard strength, as to doom the
country for the three or four first campaigns either to weakness at home or in-
activity abroad."
The volunteers should be very much reduced in number when the local
militia is called out ; but they may always be kept up at 100,000 at very
trifling expense.
The local militia should not be of " less than 200,000 for England, with a
corresponding proportion for Scotland. It is perhaps too hazardous either to
train or to arm the people of Ireland indiscriminately, where the men so brought
together are not permanently subjected to the constraint of military discipline.
Perhaps an extension and regenerating of the volunteer corps, under an
obligation to pass a certain number of days in each year on permament duty,
might for the present be more applicable to the situation of the country.
. . . The sedentary militia in Great Britain to be chosen by ballot for a
service of three years, out of the trained men ; to be regimented and of-
ficered as the militia now is ; to be trained in war as the regular militia now
is in time of peace ; and to be liable to service out of their counties only in case
6f invasion or rebellion." — LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Memorandum to the Cabinet,
December 1807 ; Castlereayh Correspondence, viii. 122-124. Such were Lord
Castlereagh's principles on this all-important subject, and they were in them-
selves so reasonable and suitable to the circumstances of the country, that
they are very nearly the same as those now (1860) in operation. The country
has never since been endangered but by their abandonment during the periods
of mental hallucination which never fail to seize upon its inhabitants after
any considerable period of unbroken peace.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 243
each. The force at home, including the new militia CHAP.
levies, will exceed by nearly 25,000 men the greatest m-
amount of force which has hitherto been stationed in isos.
Great Britain and Ireland for its home defence/'
It was fortunate for Great Britain, and for the
26
cause of European freedom, that Lord Castlereagh Breaking
had at this juncture taken these decisive measures Spanish"*
to augment the strength of the regular army ; for the war-
period was approaching when it was to be tried to the
uttermost, and when the cause of general independence
was to rest on its sabres and bayonets. So far from
being deterred by the bad success of his attempt to gain
possession of the Portuguese fleet from pursuing further
his ambitious designs on the Peninsula, Napoleon was
only stimulated thereby to urge them on with greater
activity, and thus secure himself from being anticipat-
ed, as he had been at Copenhagen and Lisbon, in his
designs against the Spanish monarchy. Troops were
marched through Germany and France with the utmost
expedition towards the Pyrenees ; the advanced corps at
Bayonne were pushed forward without a moment's delay
towards Madrid ; and the imperious demand for the
delivery of the Prince of Asturias was followed by the
insurrection in the Spanish capital of May 2, which was May 2.
soon extinguished in blood, and roused the whole nation
by a unanimous and instinctive impulse to arms. De-
prived of their regular army by the treacherous fore-
thought of the French Emperor, who had stationed it in
Jutland intending to make it instrumental in seizing the
Danish fleet — without a government, and with their chief
fortresses in the hands of the enemy — the Spanish people
unanimously rose against their oppressors, elected juntas
in the different provinces, and separately began a mortal
war with the invaders. Success, as might have been ex-
pected under such circumstances, was various, and victory
was often largely intermingled with disaster ; but upon
the whole the insurgents maintained their ground; and at
244 LORD CASTLE RE AGH'S
CHAP, length the defeat and surrender of Dtipont with 20,000
m- men, in the defiles of the Sierra Morena, acted as a
1808. thunderbolt which first broke the spell which had hitherto
bound the world, and speedily sent the French armies in
disgrace behind the Ebro.
Foreseeing the approach of a crisis of this description,
Lord^wtie- Lord Castlereagh had so disposed the military force of
po*?tiondcf" Great Britain, with the transports necessary for their
force^nd conveyance, as to be able to take immediate advantage of
oToTa?8 **• ^e 8Jstem adopted by his predecessors of breaking
Britain for Up the whole transport service in order to save £4000 a-
mions. month, and thereby chaining the British forces, at the
most critical time, when they might have decided the
contest, to their own shores, was given up and succeeded
by one which rendered them instantly available. Not
only had he the whole forces of Great Britain and
Ireland deemed disposable quartered in the southern
counties of the two islands, within a short distance of the
ports of embarkation, but a fleet of transports was there
collected, available at a moment's notice, capable of con-
veying them at once to whatever point might be selected
for attack. Add to this that a fleet of transports was
lying at Gottenburg capable of bringing away the British
troops under General Moore, left at Gottenburg, and which
was afterwards of essential service in transporting the
Spanish corps under the Marquis de Romana, from their
place of exile in Jutland, to the theatre of more honour-
able warfare in the north of Spain. Thus, at length, the
British forces, brought up to an unprecedented state of
strength and efficiency, were disposed in the situation
which Lord Castlereagh had so long desired, and which
more than tripled their real strength, for they were
capable of being suddenly transported to an unforeseen
i Caitle- . . c i j • • • • i ij i • ,i
Cor- point or attack, and inspiring widespread dread m the
r?!' enemy by the uncertainty where the blow was likely to
fall.1
, The knowledge of Napoleon's intention to unite the
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 245
whole naval forces of the Continent in a league against CHAP.
Great Britain, and of the thorough organisation for effect- m-
ing this object which the secret articles of the treaty of isos.
Tilsit had put at his disposal, suggested to Lord Castle- His JJ^
reagh, in the first instance, an attack on Boulogne, now in ed ?Pe™tion
against Bou-
a great measure stripped of its defenders, who were on }°%**
the road to the Pyrenees. To effect at this propitious
moment the destruction, at little risk, of the flotilla which
had so seriously menaced the existence of Great Britain,
was certainly a most important object ; and he went
so far as to write to the Duke of York to make pre-
parations for the expedition, in which 20,000 men, drawn
from England and Cork, embracing the whole Guards
excepting one battalion, were to be engaged. * Had the
war taken a different turn, and the energy of Castlereagh,
aided by the genius of Wellington, not fixed its theatre
in subsequent years in the Peninsula, it might have been
matter for serious regret that this design was not carried
into execution. But the feelings of the nation, now
roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by the glorious
efforts of the Spanish patriots, rendered any operation
distasteful which was not calculated immediately to
assist them.
It became evident, too, from the progress of events,
that even with a view to the insular security of Britain which* is
and breaking up the great naval confederacy formed by
Napoleon against it, more might be done by vigorous
assistance tendered to the Peninsular powers than even resolvedon*
by the total destruction of the Boulogne flotilla. For
* " MY DEAR LORD, — I take the earliest opportunity to acknowledge the
receipt of your Lordship's two letters of yesterday by a special messenger —
the first, marked ' most secret,' desiring that the corps under orders at Cork
may ba augmented to 5000 rank and file, and suggesting Sir David Baird being
appointed to the command of them : the second, marked ' most secret and
confidential,' proposing that a force between 12,000 and 15,000 men should be,
without delay, held in readiness to embark, with a view to an operation against
Boulogne ; of which force you mention the whole of the Guards, except one
battalion to be left in London, composing a part." — DUKE OF YORK to LORD
CASTLEREAQH, July 25, 1808 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 177.
246 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, the Russian fleet from the Euxine, in pursuance of the
agreed-on plan of operations, had arrived in the Tagus,
m.
1808. where it was blockaded by the British squadron : five
sail of the line belonging to France, the poor remains of
the fleet which had combated at Trafalgar, were in Cadiz,
also blockaded ; and by ranging Spain on the side of
Great Britain, twenty -three sail of the line, in good con-
dition, would be withdrawn from the French alliance and
added to the naval forces of Great Britain. Thus, by
supporting the Peninsular war, the whole left wing of the
fleet destined to effect our subjugation would be paralysed
as completely as the right wing had been by the Copen-
hagen expedition, and the naval forces of the enemy
reduced to those of France and Holland, with which
those of England were well able to cope. Influenced by
these considerations, which were in themselves obviously
well-founded, Lord Castlereagh, after consulting with the
Duke of York, who furnished a most able memorandum
on the subject to the Cabinet, resolved on sending a
powerful force to the Peninsula, and directing it in one
body against Lisbon, where Junot lay with his corps ; and
there was reason to hope he might either be cut off or
compelled to enter into a capitulation for the surrender
of the capital, the Russian fleet, and the entire evacua-
tion of the country.*
* This memorandum of the Duke of York, which was a very able paper,
was as follows, and bears the strongest evidence to the vigour and success with
which Lord Castlereagh had, since his accession to the War Office, augmented
the military resources of the country : — "August 1, 1808. — It may, I think,
be stated without fear of dispute, that the army of this country is at the pre-
sent moment larger, more efficient, and more disposable than at any former
period of our history. Great and unusual exertions have been made to pro-
cure the men ; and the circumstances of the war have allowed a sufficient
time to discipline and form them ; but these extraordinary measures are not
often in our power, and cannot in any case be frequently resorted to. It
becomes, therefore, a consideration of the utmost importance in what
manner this force can be most effectually employed to the advantage and
honour of the country and the King in support and furtherance of the great
cause in which we are engaged.
" The weakness and apathy of all the powers on the Continent have
rendered them incapable of opposing, or subservient to the views of, France ;
and k is this country alone from which any effectual opposition can be made
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 247
The die was now cast, and it was resolved by the Ca- CHAP.
binet to go into the opinion of Lord Castlereagh and the IIL
Duke of York, and assist the war in the Peninsula by a isos.
large British force acting in one mass under the direction of Portug;i is
its own generals, and in distant co-operation only with the selected M
Spanish forces. Portugal was the country which naturally
presented itself as the fit theatre for the proposed descent,
against the inordinate ambition of the French ruler, and upon which the rest
of Europe can alone depend for support and assistance in the restoration of
civil government and the ancient order of things. . . . Since the un-
fortunate campaign of 1806, and the total subversion of the Prussian empire
and of the Germanic body, resources no longer exist in that quarter for pro-
viding such a body of troops as could cope with France, or sufficient time to
enable the people of those countries, however zealously and loyally inclined,
or however great then* hatred of the yoke under which they are groaning, to
come forward and unite in defence or support of the common cause.
" The situation of Spain forms a new epoch. The recent events in that
country evince a determination on the part of the people to resist the usurpa-
tion of the enemy to the last extremity, and to maintain at all risks the
established laws and religion of their empire. The Spaniards are the first
people that have risen in one mass, and that have enthusiastically united in
support of their own cause against the common enemy ; they are the first
nation upon the Continent that appear to have made their country's cause in-
dividually their own ; and, actuated as they are by one national spirit and
determined animosity against their invaders, there is no doubt really fair
ground for hope of their success. But though we cannot but admire, we must
not be misled by the enthusiasm of these brave men, or expect them to per-
form impossibilities. And it becomes our duty, therefore, in our cordial en-
deavours to assist them to the utmost, to examine into the actual situation
of the country where this convulsion took place, and to be guided in our
plans of operation, which we may, on cool and mature reflection, judge most
competent to insure ultimate success, rather than risk misfortune by the hasty
adoption of partial measures, which, either from eagerness or jealousy, may be
strongly urged upon our attention.
" At the commencement of the insurrection, Spain was deprived of the whole
force of the kingdom. The troops that remained were the Guards at Madrid,
the garrisons in the different fortresses upon a low establishment, and the
depot battalions belonging to the regiments on service in the north of Europe
rnd in the colonies. . . . The troops of the enemy in detached bodies
occupied most of the principal fortresses and posts of the empire, and measures
,vere taken to augment this force to a more considerable extent; and the
mly advantage which Spain still possessed was, that her population, not hav-
ng suffered by the disasters common to the rest of the Continent, remained
till entire. In this state of things, the utmost that could be reasonably ex-
•ected from the most enthusiastic efforts of the people was, that by dint of
lumbers some detached and scattered bodies of the enemy should be destroyed,
nd that by this means some of the provinces might be so cleared as to admit of
rapid formation of the peasantry and an incorporation of them with the weak
•attalions of the line. This appears to have been the real situation of the
ountry at the period of our latest advices, and the formation of the levies to
248 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, because it was occupied by a French corps in a manner
m- cut off from immediate assistance from France ; because it
isos. presented an admirable base for future operations, resting
on the sea, and eminently capable of defence; because the
British forces would there be supreme and unfettered by
the jealousies, or beyond the reach of the follies, of the
Spanish provincial juntas ; and because success against the
capital would at once give us the command of the Rus-
sian fleet lying in the Tagus, and immediately raise the
whole country in insurrection against the invaders. It was
determined, agreeably to Lord Castlereagh's suggestions,
have been so ably and actively entered upon as, in the province of Andalusia
alone, to have held in check a considerable division of the enemy supposed to
exceed 10,000 men. To these successes, as well as to their national jealousy
against this country, may be attributed their present disinclination to receive
any other support from us than ammunition, arms, and money, and the par-
tial co operation of small detached corps. The most sanguine, however, can
scarcely yet venture to flatter himself, from any advantages already obtained
by the patriots, that their final success can be considered as certain.
" We must therefore look to the possibility of a reverse, and of the patriots
being under the necessity of calling upon us for more substantial aid. But,
should we at this period unfortunately have given way to their prior wishes of
dividing and frittering away our force, we should no longer have it in our
power to furnish that effectual support which their necessities would then re-
quire, which could alone, in my opinion, bring the contest to a favourable
termination. We should be prepared, therefore, to direct the whole force we
are now capable of sending to some one given point, persuaded that the calls of
the Spaniards will very shortly be loud and urgent, and that by acting in one
solid body we shall not only use our own force to the greatest advantage, but
shall afford them one firm point of appui to which the whole kingdom may
safely look, and upon which they should then be called upon to form as the
Bole point of direction for the permanent re-establishment of their empire.
This position being admitted— and it is the only true one that suggests itself
to my mind — I feel it an indispensable duty to the army and to the country to
give my strongest opinion against any partial employment or distribution of
our force into detached commands, which will not only subject these auxiliary
divisions to be commanded by, and to follow the fortunes of, the several pro-
vincial generals, to whose corps they may be attached ; but, as they would be
thus acting in defiance of every military principle against a skilful and power-
ful enemy, I should greatly fear that no exertions on our part could prevent
the contest ending in misfortune and defeat. — FREDERICK." — Castlereagh
Correspondence, viii. 179-183. This is a very remarkable letter, foreshadowing
the whole course of the Peninsular struggle, and clearly developing the prin-
ciple by which Wellington at length brought it to a successful termination ;
and the more so, when it is recollected it was written by the Duke of York
on August 1, 1808, before either the defeat of Dupont or the battle of Vimeira,
and when the entire nation was reeling in delirious transports at the popular
character and enthusiastic feelings excited by the Spanish insurrection.
WAR ADMINISTRATION.
249
to make the force sent, in the very outset, 40,000 men;
and fortunately the wise precaution taken by him of having
a large fleet of transports constantly at command, in the
service of Government, rendered it possible to send off
even this large force at the shortest notice, and to any
quarter which might be deemed advisable. With such
success had Lord Castlereagh's measures for strengthening
and concentrating the army been attended, that there were
66,000 men capable of being thrown at once on any part
of the Peninsula — a British force double of that which
Marlborough led to victory. *
The materiel of a great army, therefore, was ready,
md transports prepared to carry it at once to any point
.vhich might be selected. But a difficulty, at all times
serious, and more especially so in the British army at
hat time, arose, Who was to be the Commander-in-chief \
The great number of respectable veteran generals whose
xperience in war was not equal to their years, in conse-
uence of the contest having hitherto been chiefly at sea,
endered the selection a matter of equal delicacy and
ifficulty. Lord Castlereagh, whose principle invariably
ras to select the ablest man for any important service,
ad become, both from his situation as head of the Board
F Control, and from his conduct in the Copenhagen expe-
ition, fully aware of the great qualities of Sir Arthur
fellesley ; and he had, in consequence, been in direct com-
FORCES.
Infantry,
Officers and
Men.
Artillery,
and
Drivers.
Cavalry,
Officers
and Men.
Total
Officers
and Men.
Horses.
Trans-
ports.
Ton,
erving in Portugal, . .
rnder orders to embark, .
34,397
12,550
2748
1027
1805
3100
38,950
16,677
2917
4238
393
207
99,385
49,330
isposable in Mediterra- )
nean, J
46,947
10,000
3775
800
4905
258
55,627
11,058
7155
258
600
36
148,715
18,615
itto at Halifax, . .
4,000
400
4,400
23
7,385
otal British equipped, .
janiards .from Baltic, . .
60,947
10,000
4975
5163
71,085
10,000
7413
659
41
174,715
11,841
-
70,947
4975
5163
81,085
7413
700
186,556
CHAP.
III.
1808.
31.
of ;
)UKE OF YORK'S Minute, Sept. 15, 1808; Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 1 85.
250 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, munication with him for some time past, as already men-
IIL tioned, as to the best means of counteracting the views of
1803. Napoleon against Spanish South America. He had des-
tined him for the command of any expedition employed
on that service. He accordingly at once suggested him
for the command ; and in order to hold it, he had, on the
28th April preceding, been promoted to the rank of Lieu-
tenant-General. But there were many other lieutenant-
generals and full generals of much longer standing in the
service ; and the authorities in the Horse Guards, wedded
to the system of seniority, and pressed by political or family
interest at home, objected to so young an officer being put
at the head of the whole army, as it would prevent so many
other officers of merit, but older standing, from serving in
its ranks. It could not be denied that there was much
force in the last objection, especially as an officer of the
highest merit, Sir John Moore, stood in that situation ;
and the force which he commanded in Sweden was intended
to join in the Peninsular operations. The utmost, accord-
ingly, which Lord Castlereagh could effect was to obtain
for Sir Arthur the command of the expedition which was
to sail from Cork, and formed the vanguard of the whole,
until he was superseded by senior officers arriving with the
second and third divisions coming from Great Britain and
Sweden. He got the command, accordingly, of the first
detachment, consisting of thirteen regiments, for the most
June 14. part embarked from Cork, on the 14th June; but he was
only fourth in command of the whole. Sir Hew Dalryin-
ple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir John Moore, who also had
command, were his superior officers. Some of his friends
having expressed to Sir Arthur surprise that he who had
! j^ Ca8. commanded great armies in India, received the thanks of
^reagh to Parliament, and been second in command in Zealand,
Sir H. Ual-
rvmpie, should now accept service in so subordinate a situation,
' he made the memorable reply, " I was nimukwallah, as
we say in the East, I have ate of the King's salt,1 and
therefore I consider it my duty to serve with zeal and
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 251
promptitude when or wherever the King, or his Govern- CHAP.
ment, may think it proper to employ me/'* IIL
Although Lord Castlereagh failed in obtaining for Sir isos.
Arthur the chief command, yet he wrote a confidential 32.
letter to Sir H. Dalrymple, strongly recommending him thTexped
for any service or situation which required particular bauie^f
vigour, judgment, and ability.t But Sir Arthur hadVimeira"
gained great success, and commenced his immortal ca-
reer, before he was superseded in the command by that
officer. The expedition which he commanded, muster-
'ng not quite 10,000 sabres and bayonets, set sail from
3ork on the 12th July, and disembarked in Mondego July 12-
Bay on the 31st. The division under General Spencer, July si.
Tom Cadiz, came up, 5000 strong, on the 5th, and
.he united force, consisting of 13,000 effective men,
.et out towards Lisbon. On the 19th August they were
einforced by Anstruther's brigade, and on the 20th by
Ickland's, which augmented his force to 16,000 men,
nth 18 guns, and 180 horse ; and Junot, having con-
entrated 14,000 men, including 1200 horse, and 26
uns, advanced to the encounter.* The advanced guard
* " I have received your private letter of the 21st of July, for which I am
uch obliged to you. 1 shall be the junior of the Lieuteuant-Generals ;
>wever, I am ready to serve the Government wherever, and as they please." —
B ARTHUR WBLLESLET to LORD CASTLEREAGH, August 8, 1808 ; GURWOOD,
. 59.
t " Permit me to recommend to your particular confidence Lieutenant-Gene-
l Sir Arthur Wellesley. His high reputation in the service as an officer
mid in itself dispose you, I am persuaded, to select him for any service that
juired great prudence and temper, combined with much military expen-
se. The degree, however, to which he has been for a length of time past in
5 closest habits of communication with his Majesty's Ministers with respect
the affairs of Spain, having been destined to command any operation that
cumstances might render necessary for counteracting the views of France
.inst the Spanish dominions in South America, will, I am sure, point him
; to you as an officer of whom it is desirable for you, on all accounts, to
ke the most prominent use which the rules of the service will permit." —
RD CASTLEREAGH to SIR HEW DALRYMPLE, July 15, 1808; GURWOOD, iv. 18.
- In this march the same difficulties which were afterwards so severely
erienced in the Crimea were at once felt. Sir Arthur wrote to Lord
tlereagh on the 8th August — " I have had the greatest difficulty in organ-
g my commissariat for the march, and that department is very incompe-
;, notwithstanding the arrangements which I made with Huskisson upon
252 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, of the two armies met at Rolica on the 17th, and at
m- Vimeira on the 21st, on both of which occasions the
isos. French, after a fierce struggle, were overthrown, and on
Aug. 21. ^e |as^ jg guns an(j 4QQ prisoners were taken. As soon
as this success was achieved, Sir Arthur proposed to move,
the same evening, with the part of his ariny which had
been least engaged, 9000 strong, direct on Torres Ved-
ras, destined to celebrity in after days, by which means
he would have cut off Junot's retreat to Lisbon, and
driven him to a disastrous and eccentric retreat to
Abrantes or Badajoz, in the course of which half, if not
the whole of his army would have perished. But Sir
H. Burrard, who had come up and assumed the com-
mand after the battle, deemed this movement too hazar-
dous, and the troops were ordered to bivouac on the
field of battle. The consequence was, that Junot, by a
night march, regained the Lisbon road, and fell back to
that capital without further molestation, but weakened
93-98. by 3000 men, and half his artillery, in the two disas-
trous battles he had sustained.1*
This opportunity having been lost by the undue pru-
the subject. This department deserves your serious attention. The exist-
ence of the army depends upon it ; and yet the people who manage it are
incapable of managing anything out of a counting-house. I shall be obliged
to leave Spencer's guns behind for want of means of moving them ; and I
should have been obliged to leave my own if it were not for the horses of the
Irish Commissariat. Let nobody ever prevail upon you to send a corps to
any part of Europe without horses to draw their guns. It is not true that
horses lose their condition at sea." — SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLE-
RRAQH ; Lavaos, August 8, 1808; GURWOOD, iv. 59.
* " I recollect that on the 21st August Sir A. Wellesley urged Sir H. Burrard
to advance, giving, as a reason, that his right was some miles nearer to Torres
Vedras than the enemy ; that he had four brigades that had not been en-
gaged ; and that Torres Vedras was the pass by which the enemy must retire
to Lisbon ; and that, in his opinion, by that movement no part of the French
army would reach Lisbon." — LORD BURGHERSH'S Evidence before Committee of
Inquiry ; GoRWOOD, iv. 214.
" About the close of the action, when it was evident that the enemy must
be everywhere repulsed, Sir Arthur came up to me and proposed to advance :
I understood he meant the movement to be from our right, and towards
Torres Vedras. ... I answered that I saw no reason for altering my
former resolution of not advancing." — SIR HARRY BURRARD'S Evidence before
Court of Inquiry ; GURWOOD, iv. 205.
rw. iv.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 253
dence of the second in command, nothing remained but CHAP.
to accede to the proposal for an armistice, to be fol-
lowed by the evacuation of the country, which was
shortly after made by Marshal Junot. It was concluded Con\3ention
accordingly on the 30th August, and immediately after ^fjjj^
followed by the entire evacuation of the country by the the circum-
<* •- « « . stances, was
French troops. This convention, which acquired an un- expedient,
enviable celebrity under the name of the " Convention of
Cintra," excited the most violent discontent in Great Bri-
tain, where the previous victory, and the surrender of Du-
pont in the defiles of the Sierra Morena to Castanos, had
excited unbounded enthusiasm and the most extravagant
expectations. A Court of Inquiry was in consequence
appointed to sit on the subject. Sir Arthur, who found
his situation uncomfortable under generals who were
obviously not equal to the crisis, was not sorry when he
was summoned home to give evidence before the Court ;
and, by doing so, he avoided the disasters of the Co-
ninna retreat. From the very first, however, he en-
tirely approved, except in some subordinate details re-
garding the French plunder, of the Convention, and his
•easons, which were afterwards stated at length before
he Court of Inquiry, were early given in a long letter
o Lord Castlereagh, which presented them with irre-
istible forced The view he took was obviously well
* " I think it but just to inform your Lordship that I concurred with the
iommander of the Forces in thinking it expedient, on the 22d of August,
aat the French army in Portugal should be allowed to evacuate that kingdom
•ith their arms and baggage, and that every facility for this purpose should
e afforded to them.
" I deemed this to be expedient in the relative state of the two armies on
le evening of the 22d, considering that the French army had then resumed
formidable position between us and Lisbon; that they had the means of
tiring from that position to others in front of that city, and, finally, of
•ossing the Tagus into Alentejo, with a view to the occupation in strength
' the forts of Elvas, La Lippe, and, eventually, Almeida. As Lieutenant-
eneral Sir John Moore's corps had been diverted from the occupation of the
mition at Santarem, which had been proposed for them, there were no means
prevent, and no increase of numbers could have prevented, the French
my from effecting these objects.
" The British army, after waiting for and receiving its reinforcements,
254 LORD CASTLEREAGHS
CHAP, founded. By the Convention the British got immedi-
ate possession of the forts, arsenals, and dockyards of
i»o8. Lisbon, with all the fortresses in the kingdom occupied
bj the French troops ; twelve Russian sail of the line
fell into our hands ; the troops who capitulated were to
be transported to Rochefort, a long way from the Penin-
sular field of action ; the immense moral advantage was
gained of exhibiting a French Marshal and corps enter-
ing into a capitulation, and an entire kingdom liberated
from their arms by a single victory. Add to this, that
the British army was, by the Convention, immediately
put in possession of the capital, containing ample sup-
plies, of which it stood much in need, and a strong
fortified position and harbour, forming the best possible
would thus have been precluded from the use of the Tagus for some time
longer; and, as it depended for its supplies of provisions and ammunition upon
its communication with the fleet, which, in the end of August, would have
become most precarious by the coast, it would have been involved in diffi-
culties for the want of necessaries, which would have been aggravated by the
increase of its numbers. To these circumstances, which affected the immedi-
ate situation of the army and its existence in Portugal, there were other con-
siderations to be added respecting its future operations. I considered it
most important that the British army in Portugal should be at liberty, at
an early period, to march into Spain. Not only no arrangements for the
march into Spain could be made till the French had evacuated Elvas and
Almeida, and we should have possession of the Tagus and the Douro, but the
army must have attacked and taken these places by regular sieges, before his
Majesty could Lave restored the government of his ally, or could have moved
his troops to the assistance of the Spaniards. I need not point out to your
Lordship the difficulties of these operations, their increase in the season in
which they would have been undertaken, or the time which they would have
lasted. These circumstances, affecting the situation, the objects, and the
future operations of the army, were to be attributed to the fact that the enemy
occupied, in a military point of view, the whole of Portugal, having every
stronghold in their hands ; that their situation on the evening of the 22d
of August enabled them still to avail themselves of these possessions, and to
strengthen them as they might think proper ; and I conceived that an army,
whose retreat was open, and which possessed such advantages, had a fair claim
to be allowed to have the facility of withdrawing from the country." — SIR
ARTHUR WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, London, October 6, 1808; G0R-
WOOD, iv. 148, 149. These considerations nre so important and obviously well
founded, that they render it doubtful whether the cause of the Peninsula
would have been as much benefited even by the successful march of Sir
Arthur Wellesley to Torres Vedras, and consequent cutting off of Junot from
the capital, and forcing him back to Almeida or Elvas, as it was by the sub-
sequent capitulation which at once put the whole resources of Portugal at his
disposal, and rendered it the basis of all his future operations.
in.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 255
"basis for future operations. In this opinion Lord Castle- CHAP.
::eagh entirely concurred, though, in order to satisfy the
public mind, and gain an opportunity of making the
pounds of it generally known, he acquiesced in the pro-
Driety of having a Court of Inquiry.
This sitting of the Court of Inquiry in London, in
vhich they all, of course, required to be examined at Advance of
ength, of necessity excluded all the three generals who Moore n
lad in such rapid succession been intrusted with the into Spam'
lommand of the army in Portugal from any share in the
irst operations in Spain, which were intrusted by Lord
^astlereagh to Sir John Moore. Sir Arthur, in private
orrespondence with him, chafed at the delay which took
•lace in commencing the forward movement. On the 1st
September he said, that if he were Commander-in-chief in
lir Hew Dalrymple's place, he would have 20,000 men
i Madrid in a month ; and about the same time he
•rote to Lord Castlereagh that things were not prosper-
ig, and that he felt an earnest desire to quit the army,
lough he would do whatever the Government wished/""
he generals in command in Portugal used the utmost
Torts to get the preparations for the march into Spain
xrnpleted as rapidly as possible ; but so miserably
:anty were . the means of transport, that a very long
me elapsed before they could be put in motion. At
ngth, however, they set out, converging towards the Dec. 11.
>int of junction on the plains of Leon from three quar-
* " The army has halted in its position, with the only difference that we
^e a corps in Torres Vedras, instead of three miles from that town. In
>rt, in ten days after the action of the 21st, we are not farther advanced, or
leed, as I believe, so far advanced as we should and ought to have been on
i night of the 21st. I assure you, my dear Lord, matters are not prospering
•e ; and I feel an earnest desire to quit the army. I have been too success-
with this army ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation with satis-
:ion to the person who shall command it, and, of course, not to myself.
wever, I shall do whatever the Government may wish." — SIR ARTHUR WEL-
LET to LORD CASTLEREAGH, August 30, 1808 ; GURWOOD, iv. 118.
; I do not know what Sir Hew Dalrymple proposes to do, or is instructed to
but if I were in his situation, I would have 20,000 men at Madrid in less
u a month from this time." — SIR ARTHUR WELLESLET to the HONOURABLE .
VRLES STEWART, September 1, 1808 ; GURWOOD, iv. 121.
256 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, ters : Sir John Moore himself, with the infantry and
m- cavalry, coming up from Abrantes and Salamanca ; Sir
isos. John Hope, with the artillery, from Madrid, which he
had reached by the circuitous route of Badajoz, rendered
necessary to avoid the direct road by Ciudad Rodrigo,
which had become almost impassable for carriages ; and
Sir David Baird, with a fresh expedition who had landed
at Corunna, from Ireland. They were concentrated on
the 20th December at Mayorga in Leon, and Sir John
21^233-!' Moore, who had less than 25,000 effective British
campltgn troops under his command, advanced against Marshal
is? BJ' Soult, who lay in unsuspecting security with 16,000 in
the valley of the Carrion.1
It belongs to another part of our biography to give
Greafef- some military details of the short but memorable cam-
fectsofSir paiom which followed, in which the Honourable Colonel
J. Moore s *
advance Charles Stewart, Lord Castlereagh's brother, bore a dis-
tinguished part. Suffice it to say, that the advance of
Sir John Moore, though not expressly enjoined by Lord
Castlereagh, was fully approved by him, and coincided
exactly with the military policy, at once bold and prudent,
which he always adopted. The advantages of the step
were obvious. It verified the saying of Napoleon six
months before, that a victory by the Allies on the plains
of Leon would paralyse every French army in the Penin-
sula. It at once stopped the advance in La Mancha,
Valencia, and Aragou, and caused Napoleon himself, with
his Guards and Cuirassiers, and 50,000 chosen troops,
to remeasure his steps in the depth of winter over the
Guadarama snows. Without doubt the English army was
exposed to hazard, and in the end sustained serious losses,
by this gallant movement. But its effects were immense ;
and, not less than Wellington's subsequent stand at
Torres Vedras, it was a turning-point in the Peninsular
war. It prolonged the contest which the success over
Massena determined. But for it the struggle would
have been over, Andalusia overrun, and Portugal con-
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 257
quered, before three months were over. And this was CHAP.
effected by Moore with 25,000 men against the French IIT-
Emperor, who had 250,000 men effective and present with 18<>8-
the eagles in the Peninsula,""" Such was the effect of the
skilful direction of a small force to the vital point of the
enemy's communications, and of the skilful use made by
Castlereagh of the immense advantage which an insular
power, itself secure from attack, possesses in being able
at pleasure to direct its forces to that quarter.
But although cordially approving the advance to the
Carrion, and acquiescing in the necessity of the subse- Lord c'astie-
}uent retreat into the fastnesses of Galicia, when Napo- approves" of
eon directed 70,000 men against the British force, not ft
-hird part of the amount, Lord Castlereagh was far from
haring the desponding views of Moore as to the hopeless-
less of any further struggle in the Peninsula.t On the
ontrary, he had adopted, and was prepared resolutely to
ct on, the often expressed opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley,
* Viz., Eight corps, .,;.., . „ . 319,690
Present under arms, . *'.'• . . 247,834
Horses, . - , . . . 56,567
Detached, . '. , . . . . 32,536
In hospital, ..... 37,419
Imperial Muster Rolls, in NAPIER, i. , Appendix 28.
t " Every effort," said Sir John Moore, in writing to Lord Castlereagh,
hall be exerted on my part, and that of the officers under me, to unite the
ny ; but your Lordship must be prepared to hear that we have failed, for,
uated as we are, success cannot be commanded by any efforts we can make
;he enemy are prepared to oppose us. If the French succeed in Spain, it
I be in vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The Portuguese are with-
• ; a military force, and from the experience of their conduct under Sir Arthur
illesley, no dependence is to be placed on any aid that they can give. The
tish must, in that event, I conceive, immediately take steps to evacuate the
t ntry. Lisbon is the only port, and therefore the only place whence the
{ ly can embark with its stores. Elvas and Almeida are the only fortresses
< the frontiers. The first is, I am told, a respectable work. Almeida is de-
i ive, and could not hold out beyond ten days against a regular attack. I
1 3 ordered a dep6t of provisions, for a short consumption, to be formed
t e, in case this army should be obliged to fall back ; perhaps the same
s ild be done at Elvas. In this case we might retard the progress of the
e ay while the stores are embarking, and arrangements were made for taking
c he army. Beyond this the defence of Lisbon or Portugal should not be
t ght of." — SIR JOHN MOORE to LORD CASTLEREAGH, November 24 and 30,
1 ; MS. Castlereagh Papers, and CHAMBERS'S Scottish Biography, iv. 32, 33,
v -e the letters are quoted.
rOL. I. R
258 LORD CASTLEREAGH S
CHAP, that "Portugal might be successfully defended against
m- any force the enemy could bring against it, and that
1808. the maintenance of that position bj the British would be
* sir A. the greatest support to the common cause in Spain." l
to Lad7 Acting on this principle, Lord Castlereagh had prepared
Am-n^r811' the most powerful succours to enable the British to
wood) S^e. maintain their ground in Galicia or Portugal, or both,
even after the disastrous retreat to Corunna had reduced
the army under Moore to two-thirds of its former amount.
Thirteen thousand men were embarked or in course of
embarkation when the despatches from Sir J. Moore and
Sir D. Baird caused the embarkation to be stopped, and
the transports sent out empty to bring away the troops.
Mr Canning, who had fully gone into Lord Castlereagh's
bold views on this subject, afterwards said, in his place
as Foreign Minister in Parliament, that the sending out
these empty transports instead of the reinforcements,
cost him a greater pang than he had ever experienced in
the whole course of his political life.'*
Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird, as might well
be supposed, were most anxious for definite instructions
how to dispose of an army when it had become evident,
from the magnitude of the French force, consisting in all
of 60,000 men, directed against it, that it was impossible
to keep their footing longer in the north of Spain.f Un-
* " The troops which had been embarked on board the transports in Eng-
land," said Mr Secretary Canning, " were disembarked in consequence of a
distinct requisition that he wanted a certain number of transports, and the
transports from which these troops had been disembarked were sent out pur-
suant to that requisition. It was an afflicting circumstance that it had become
necessary to retard these troops, and send out their transports for the purpose
of bringing away the British army, which had been fitted out for the purposes
of reinforcement and assault. But at this distance from the scene of action,
Ministers could not venture to refuse to send out those transports. The send-
ing them out empty cost Government a severe pang. No resolution ever gave
me more pain. Every dictate of the head, every feeling of the heart, was tor-
tured by it. But Ministers had no alternative, and they were compelled to
submit to the hard necessity. The troops so embarked, and in course of em-
barkation, were 13,000 men." — Parliamentary Debates, xii. 1089.
f " As Sir David Baird so pressingly demands instructions, it appeared to the
Cabinet advisable to direct him in the only case in which it is possible to give
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 259
able, during the pressure of the retreat, to give a full CHAP.
description of the state of the army, he sent General m-
Charles Stewart " as the officer best qualified to give you
every information you can want, both with respect to our
actual situation and the events which have led to it. rf ^ in\
f-r -if »«ii structions to
.Had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I Moore and
should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The the disposal
Spanish armies were then beaten. I was sensible, how- which re1"7'
ever, that had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the Kn^.0
cause would have been imputed to their retreat. It was
for this reason that I made the march to Sahagun. As a
diversion it succeeded. I brought the whole disposable
force of the French against this army, and it has been
allowed to follow it without a single movement being
made to favour my retreat. The people of the Galicias,
though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of
the French through their mountains. They abandoned
their dwellings at our approach, and drove away their
carts, oxen, and everything that could be of the smallest
aid to the army. The consequence has been that our
sick have been left behind ; and when our horses and
mules failed, which, on such marches and through such a
country, was the case to a great extent, baggage, ammu-
nition, stores, and even money, were necessarily destroyed
or abandoned." l General Stewart fully confirmed these » sir j.
disastrous details ; and the result was, that although they ix^Castie-
had previously determined to send the army round from coSnna,
Corunna to Lisbon or Cadiz, so as to take up a new de- ^09 ^3'
fensive line resting on one or other of these places, the Castiereagh
' _ Corresp.
Cabinet, at Lord Castlereagh's suggestion, sent out dis- vii. 26, 27.
cretionary power to Sir John Moore to bring the army
home or take it round to Lisbon, as he might deem it
expedient. The instructions arrived after Sir John
him from hence any instructions, to go with his army to Portugal, and not, in
the event of his being obliged to re-embark, to bring it immediately home. " —
LORD CASTLEKEAGH to the EARL OF CHATHAM, November 25, 1808 ; Castiereagh
Correspondence, vii. 15.
260 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. Moore's lamented death, and Sir David Baird brought
m- it home.*
1809. Sharing with the whole country the grief felt for the
Lorf Castle- untoward termination of the first Spanish campaign, Lord
reagh re- Castlereagh was nowise daunted by it, nor in the least
solves to , i . i . -i . .
persevere in shaken m his determination to continue the contest with
lar contest, the utmost vigour in the Peninsula. After the return of
the army from Corunua he had frequent, almost daily,
conferences with Sir Arthur Wellesley, and his brother,
* "You will receive enclosed the orders which have been transmitted to
Major-General Sherbrooke, now ready to sail from Portsmouth ; also instruc-
tions from his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Mr Frere,
directing him to ascertain, without loss of time, the sentiments of the Span-
ish Government upon the proposed concert in the south of Spain, the neces-
sary preliminary to which must be, that we should have the free use of Cadiz,
with a participation in the garrison thereof, as the only fortified position under
the protection of which our army can be assembled with advantage, and xipon
which it may retire in case of disaster." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR JOHN
MOORE, January 14, 1809 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 28.
" Lord Castlereagh having brought the despatch received from Lieutenant-
General Sir John Moore under the consideration of your Majesty's confidential
servants, they beg leave humbly to recommend to your Majesty that the orders
sent to Sir John Moore, with respect to the disposal of his army, in the event
of his re-embarkation from Galicia, should be rendered so far discretionary as
to leave it to that officer to decide, according to the state and condition of his
troops, whether they can, with advantage to your Majesty's service, be imme-
diately employed in the execution of those orders, or must return home to be
refitted and prepared for service." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to the KING, January
21, 1809 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 30.
Lord Castlereagh's letter to Sir David Baird on the battle of Corunna and
death of Sir John Moore, was conceived in a generous and worthy spirit. " I am
commanded by his Majesty to convey to you the satisfaction his Majesty feels in
this additional instance of the superior discipline, firmness, and valour which
distinguish his army wherever brought into engagement with the enemy, and
which reflects high honour on the officers who command the troops ; and I am
particularly commanded to desire that you will convey to Lieutenant-General
Hope, and the general officers of the army, that his Majesty entertains a just
sense of their intrepid and meritorious exertions in supporting the glory of the
British arms in the battle of Corunna ; and you will also convey to the rest of
the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, his Majesty's acknowledg-
ments of their brave and spirited conduct on that occasion. His Majesty feels
the strongest regret for the loss of so distinguished and meritorious an officer
as Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, which he considers as a national loss ;
and whilst his Majesty sensibly regrets the circumstance which compelled
you to quit the field early in the action, when you were displaying your
accustomed valour in leading the troops into action, it affords his Majesty
satisfaction to have observed that your despatch is signed with your own
hand, which his Majesty considers as a circumstance encouraging the hope of
recovery.!' — LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR DAVID BAIRD, January 24, 1809;
Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 31, 32.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 261
General Charles Stewart, who had, with signal gallantry, CHAP.
gone through the whole campaign with Moore, and was IIL
able to give them the most valuable information. Both im
these officers concurred in the opinion that Portugal
might be successfully defended by such a force as Great
Britain could without difficulty afford to station in that
country, and that in this way the fairest opportunity
would be afforded for supporting or reviving the war in
Spain. The policy of engaging in such a contest, and
that with the whole disposable military forces of Great
Britain, was still more apparent at this juncture, from the
evident approach of a war between France and Austria,
and the departure of Napoleon from Astorga with his
Guards in the beginning of the Corunna retreat, to com-
bat the new enemy that was arising on the banks of the
Danube. In these views Mr Canning entirely concurred ;
and the result was a determination of the Cabinet to
renew the contest in the Peninsula, taking Portugal and
Lisbon as a base. Lord Castlereagh accordingly adopted
a minute on the defence of Portugal, drawn by Sir
Arthur Wellesley, which was laid before the Cabinet,
and immediately acted upon. It forms a noble monu-
ment of foresight and wisdom.* Reinforcements were
* " I have always been of opinion that Portugal might he defended, what-
ever might be the result of the contest in Spain ; and that in the mean time the
measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the
Spaniards in their contest with the French. My notion was that the Portu-
guese military establishments, upon the footing of 40,000 militia and 30,000
regular troops, ought to be revived, and that, in addition to these troops, his
Majesty ought to employ an army in Portugal, amounting to about 20,000 Bri-
tish troops, including about 4000 cavalry. My opinion was that, even if Spain
should have been conquered, the French would not have been able to overcome
Portugal with a smaller force than 100,000 men ; and that, so long as the con-
test should continue in Spain, this force, if it could be put in a state of activity,
would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might have eventually decided
the contest. . . .
" The British force employed in Portugal should, in this view of the ques-
tion, not be less than 30,000 men ; of which number 4000 or 5000 should be
cavalry, and there should be a large body of artillery. The whole of the army
in Portugal, Portuguese as well as British, should be placed under the com-
mand of British officers. The staff of the army, the commissariat in particular,
must be British ; and these departments must be extensive, in proportion to
the strength of the whole army which will act in Portugal, to the number of
262 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, sent as rapidly as possible to Lisbon, which raised the
IIL force that had been left there to nearly 20,000 men ;
and as a matter of course Lord Castlereagh appointed Sir
Arthur Wellesley to the supreme command, and all his
recommendations as to the raising and equipping the
Portuguese force were carried into effect. Sir Arthur
accordingly embarked from England on the 14th, and
landed at Lisbon on the 22d April, taking General
Charles Stewart with him as the Adjutant-General of the
army. The personal biography of the latter, which com-
mences in the next chapter, forms an interesting link
between the great military designs of Lord Castlereagh
arid their marvellous execution by the genius and the
indomitable spirit of Wellington.
Having thus launched Sir Arthur Wellesley into a fresh
Lord c'astie- career in Portugal, Lord Castlereagh was not unmindful
meLures for of the necessity of the most vigorous measures to support
theFmmtary him in it. In the first moments of alarm consequent on
couCntr^.the *^e Corunna retreat, he despatched 5000 men at once to
the Tagus, either to remain there or proceed to Cadiz, as
detached posts which it will be necessary to occupy, and with a view to the
difficulties of providing and distributing supplies in that country. In regard
to the detail of these measures, I recommend that the British army in Portugal
should be reinforced, as soon as possible, with some companies of British rifle-
men ; with 3000 British or German cavalry ; that the complement of ordnance
with that army should be made thirty pieces of cannon, of which two brigades
of 9-pouuders ; that these pieces of ordnance should be completely horsed ; that
twenty pieces of brass 12-pounder ordnance, upon travelling carriages, should
be sent to Portugal, with a view to the occupation of certain positions in that
country ; that a corps of engineers for an army of 60,000 men should be sent
there, and a corps of artillery for sixty pieces of cannon. I understand that
ihe British army now in Portugal consists of 20,000 men, including cavalry.
It should be made up 20,000 infantry at least, as soon as possible, by addi-
tions of riflemen and other good infantry, which by this time may have been
refitted after the campaign in Spain."* — Memorandum, March 7, 1809 ; Castle-
reagh Correspondence, vii. 39-41.
* It is proper to notice that this very remarkable minute is printed in the second edition,
in eight volumes, of the Wellington Despatches as Lord Wellington's. It is not to be found
in the first edition, in twelve volumes, at all. On the other hand, the late Marquess of Lon-
donderry has printed it in the Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 39, as Lord Castlereagh's.
Judging from internal evidence, the author would be inclined to ascribe it to the Duke ; but,
knowing Lord Londonderry's extreme accuracy and scrupulous regard to the authorship of
papers, he consulted his esteemed friend Mr Montgomery Martin on the subject, who found
the original in Wellington's handwnting among his papers. It is probable the Marquess of
Londonderry was misled in claiming it for his brother by its being adopted by him in a
CabinetJdinute, signed by him as War Minister.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 263
circumstances should require.* He immediately after CHAP.
submitted a draft of a plan by which he proposed to aug- IIT-
ment the strength of the regular army, which deserves 1809.
particular notice, as it was in all substantial particulars
acted upon by Government, and formed the basis of the
system by which the military force of the country was
organised, and its strength drawn forth during the whole
remainder of the war. Lord Castlereagh's memorandum
began with these words : " Under the present circum-
stances of the war, and the amount of your Majesty's dis-
posable force employed in operations on the Continent,
your Majesty's confidential servants consider it their in-
dispensable duty humbly to recommend to your Majesty
to call the attention of Parliament, immediately on its
meeting, to the adoption of such measures for increasing
the regular army as may enable your Majesty adequately
to sustain the contest abroad, without thereby unduly
exposing the security of your Majesty's dominions at
home. . . . Your Majesty's confidential servants are
fully aware of the magnitude of the exertion which your i Lord Cag_
Majesty's subjects are thus called upon to make ; but ^e^ to
they humbly conceive that it is not more than commen- J^22' '
surate with the exigency of the crisis for which your Ma- Castiereagh
jesty's Government consider themselves bound in duty to viii. 193.
your Majesty to make every exertion to provide." x
Lord Castlereagh's plan was that the whole regiments
of the line, with the exception of the 60th (Rifles), which His plan for
was to be of six, should consist of two battalions of the I
effective strength of 800, 1000, or 1200 respectively,
These first battalions would give, he calculated, 100,000
* " It appearing of the utmost importance that a British corps should be in
readiness in the Tagus to proceed to Cadiz at the shortest notice, in case cir-
cumstances should render the Spaniards desirous of receiving the aid of Brit-
ish troops for the security of that place (and it is highly desirable that the
amount of force now under the orders of Sir John Moore should not be broken
in upon for this object), your Majesty's confidential servants are therefore in-
duced humbly to recommend that the 5000 infantry now under orders should
forthwith proceed to the Tagus." — LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Memorandum, Jan-
uary 1809 ; Castiereagh Correspondence, viii. 193.
264 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, disposable men, who were to be liable to serve in any part
m> of the world. The second were in every instance to
1809. amount to 1000 men, to be raised by ballot, but to be
not liable to serve beyond the British and Channel
Islands. This force, he observed, would be inferior to
that raised for the militia service in Great Britain and
Ireland during the late war, but it would " possess this
marked superiority over the present militia, that it
would be commanded by officers of the army, whose
habits and feelings would naturally introduce among
their men a predilection for the regular service, and
that its services would be equally applicable to Ireland
as to Britain." In addition to this, " I would recommend
that the ten royal veteran battalions should be retained,
with the power of placing such of their officers as may
from time to time become, through age and infirmities,
unfit for duty, on a retired pay becoming their respec-
tive ranks, and referring to their last years devoted to
their country. I would place all the rest of the force
of the country in local militia, yeomanry cavalry, and
volunteer corps ; the latter composed of officers and men
who are willing to enrol themselves in corps of not less
than 600, under engagements to subject themselves to
such drills as may be deemed necessary to fit them to
act with regular troops, to serve, in case of emergency,
in any part of Great Britain, and to support themselves
entirely at their own expense (arms excepted), till called
out on permanent duty, when they should receive mili-
tary pay, and be in every respect amenable to martial law.
The local militia to be formed upon the same military
principle as the other parts of the army. The result
would prove, I conclude, as follows : The militia becomes,
what it ought constitutionally to be, the basis of our
national force. The local militia assumes the uniform,
colours, and every other article of equipment of the regi-
ment of the line belonging to its county. In short, it
adopts "the county regiment as part of itself, and gives
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 265
every encouragement to its men to enlist into this corps. CHAP.
Let the men of the second battalion receive the same IIL
encouragement to extend their services into the first 18°9-
battalion, and their places be immediately supplied by
volunteers at a low bounty from the local militia. I say
by volunteers, because I do not believe there would be
found any difficulty in filling up these vacancies ; but if,
contrary to expectation, there should be any, a ballot
must be resorted to, because the very essence of the plan
I venture to submit for consideration is the absolute
certainty of the second battalions being kept complete
as long as their services are required. It would by these
means present the fairest prospect of placing the recruit-
ing of regiments on the most certain and respectable foot-
ing, without at all preventing their employing the means
now in practice, if they found it desirable. My opinion of
the eligibility of this, or of some plan of the same nature,
has been long formed ; and the experience of each year
more and more convinces me that every measure adopted
for the increase of our military force which does not place
it on an assured and permanent footing is elusory, and
inadequate to the object. After the long and repeated
warnings we have had, it will be most unpardonable if we Fe'£u^'
are not prepared to repel the attack of our enemy by ^^rea h
efforts commensurate with the difficulties and dangers corresp.
v 11 1 19 4--
with which we are threatened, and the importance of the 197'.
objects for which we contend." * l
Such was Lord Castlereagh's plan for the permanent
* The force which Lord Castlereagh calculated this plan would produce was
as follows : —
Regulars, first battalion exclusive of six battalions of
60th infantry, . . 100,000
Second battalions offered by him,
Local militia, at least
Volunteer cavalry, . . :
Volunteers, . • .
100,000
200,000
32,000
100,000
Total, . . . 532,000
— LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Memorandum, February 6, 1809 ; Castlereagh Cor-
respondence, viii. 196.
266 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, military establishment of the country, and experience has
m- now abundantly tested its wisdom and expedience. It
1809. was, with one modification, adopted by Government, and
,r,.4}: formed the basis of the noble military force which car-
>V hich is, t J
with one ried Wellington in triumph through the Peninsular cam-
modifica- r '
tion, adopt- paigns, and brought the war at length to a glorious
verument. termination. The only change made was, that instead
of the system of second battalions being thoroughly, it
was only partially, established, and the old system of the
regular militia kept up by ballot from the counties, was
adhered to. The regular army, however, was kept up
at its required level, and all the losses of the Peninsular
campaigns supplied by the annual volunteering from the
regular militia, while it in its turn was adequately sup-
plied without having recourse to the ballot from the
local militia, which was raised partly by that means,
partly by voluntary enlistment. There can be no doubt,
however, that the substitution of second battalions of the
regiments of the line for the regular militia would have
been a very great improvement, and that in any similar
crisis which may occur the nation would do well to adopt
it. The reason is, that by making these local second
battalions a part of the regular army, you would get a
much superior class, both of officers and men, to that
which could possibly be hoped for if the regiments en-
tered were mere temporary corps leading to no durable
employment or prospects to either. You would get young
men intending to make arms their profession, instead of
broken-down tradesmen or hangers-on on great families,
for the former ; and real soldiers, instead of the riff-raff of
great towns, for the latter. Lord Castlereagh's plan of
making the militia — the constitutional force of Great
Britain — the basis of the whole military establishment ;
raising the first or local force, only called out twenty-
eight days in the year, and therefore not interfering
with other employments, by ballot; the local regulars or
second battalions by enlistment from them, supplemented,
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 267
if necessary, by the ballot ; and the disposable regulars CHAP.
or first battalions by enlistment from the second, — met
all the requirements of a powerful and efficient system 1809.
of military defence. For it leads to the army being
regarded, not as a means of providing for needy de-
pendants, or a harbour for the destitute in the chances
of life, but as a profession in which duty is to be per-
formed and honour acquired ; it brings forward the men
abreast of their officers in the necessary apprentice-
ship to this noble service ; and it lays the foundation, in
long previous knowledge and acting together, for that
mutual confidence and reliance on each other in danger,
which, more than either discipline or drill, contribute to
the strength of old soldiers.
Although the appointment of Sir Arthur Wellesley to
the chief command in Portugal was so obviously called Difficulties
for by the circumstances, yet it was with no small diffi- s1fjohng
culty, and only by very great temper and address, that p^ugai.m
the momentous choice was made. Sir Arthur being one
of the youngest Lieutenant-Generals, there were many
who insisted, as his seniors, on their right to be preferred.
Sir John Cradock's claims, in particular, were very strong
and urgent ; for not only was he much higher in point
of military rank than Sir Arthur Wellesley, but he was
at the moment actually in command in Portugal, and
had conducted himself with great firmness and judgment
during the very trying time in the preceding winter,
when he had been left with only 13,000 men at the
time of Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna. The word-
ing of Lord Castlereagh's letter to the King, recom-
mending an officer so much younger to supersede this
respectable veteran, shows how strongly the difficulty was
felt.* To surmount it, Lord Castlereagh proposed to
* " Your Majesty's confidential servants having had under their consideration
the amount of force (in infantry amounting to about 18,000 men) which will
be assembled in Portugal upon the arrival of Major-General Hill's corps from
Cork, and the return of Major-General Sherbrooke and Major-General Mac-
kenzie's from Cadiz, . . . beg leave humbly to propose to your Majesty, that
268 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, confer upon Sir John Cradock the situation of Governor
IIL of Gibraltar, one of the most dignified and lucrative under
1809. the Crown ; and he accompanied this, not only with the
ti^atifto pleasing assurance on the part of Government of their entire
£ ' FeT" satisfaction with his past services, but with the observa-
^ ^d to tion, to which the desperate situation of aifairs at that
March 12,' period in the Peninsula gave an air of probability, that,
jastiereagh though removed for the moment to a less active scene, it
ere jong })ecome far otherwise,1 and, as in 1782, be
Sir John Cradock should be appointed to succeed Sir Hew Dalrymple in the
command at Gibraltar, and that the chief command in Portugal should be
intrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesley. In submitting the latter appointment to
your Majesty's approbation, your Majesty's servants have not been unmindful
of the inconvenience that might arise in case of any considerable increase of
this force, from Sir Arthur Wellesley's being so young a Lieutenant-General.
But as any material increase of the army in Portugal cannot be at present
looked to as probable, either from the state of the regiments at home, or the
immediate circumstances of the war, they humbly conceive that your Majesty's
service (without prejudice to the claims of the distinguished officers in your
Majesty's army, who are his seniors in rank) may have the benefit of Sir Arthur
Wellesley's being employed where he has had the good fortune of being suc-
cessful, and that it will remain open for your Majesty's future consideration to
make a different arrangement of the command, if, under all the circumstances,
it shall appear to your Majesty proper to confide it to a general officer of higher
rank." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to the KING, March 26, 1809; Castlereagh Corre-
spondence, vii. 43.
To Sir John Cradock, Lord Castlereagh wrote at the same time : — " In pro-
posing to you the command at Gibraltar, I feel that it is, in the first instance,
transferring you to a less active scene ; but the time may not be very distant
when the picture may be reversed, and the eyes of the country be turned, as
they were in the year 1782, to Gibraltar, as the point of contest between the
two powers, where as much solid service may be rendered, and as much per-
sonal glory acquired, as at the head of an army. It is with this view, and under
a conviction that if Spain is conquered Gibraltar will be seriously attacked,
that the command is offered to you, and it is done so under the conviction
that this trust cannot be placed in better hands; and his Majesty has very
graciously authorised me to intimate to you that he proposes to give you the
local rank of General at Gibraltar. ... It would neither be kind nor manly
in me not to avow that the advice the King's Ministers have felt it their duty
to offer to the King on the present occasion, has been dictated by the peculiar
value they are disposed to attach to Sir A. W.'s services generally, and particu-
larly in Portugal. You will believe me sincere when I assure you, with re-
spect to yourself, in addition to much personal confidence, they feel very strongly
indeed ; with respect to the whole of your conduct in Portugal, which, in times
and under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, has in every instance met with
their unqualified approbation, and, I can truly say, fulfilled every wish and
expectation I had or could have formed, when you were selected for the com-
mand." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR JOHN CRADOCK, March 30, 1809 ; Castle-
reagh Correspondence, vii. 44, 45.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 269
the battle-field between the two nations. The patriotic CHAP.
veteran believed or affected to believe the pleasing illu- ITL
sion, and retired to Gibraltar without further complaint. ISOQ.
At the same time, Major-General, afterwards Sir Row-
land Hill, was appointed second in command ; Generals
Sherbrooke, Mackenzie, and others, destined to future
fame, to the direction of brigades; and General Beres-
ford to the charge of the Portuguese forces.
Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley for the conduct of the war were as follows: — LordCastie-
" Your attention will be directed, in the first instance, to Stions
prepare and equip the British army for the field. You \
will, in the next place, direct your utmost exertion to the ^
bringing forward the Portuguese army, and rendering it
capable of co-operating with his Majesty's troops. In
furtherance of the latter object, in addition to the ar-
rangements already made, you will make such requisi-
tions from time to time, either to the Portuguese Govern-
ment or to the Government at home, as upon communi-
cation with General Beresford you may deem requisite
for rendering the Portuguese troops fit for service. The
defence of Portugal you will consider as the first and
immediate object of your attention. But, as the security
of Portugal can only be effectually provided for , in con-
nection with the defence of the Peninsula in the larger
sense, his Majesty on this account, as well as from the
unabated interest he takes in the cause of Spain, leaves
it to your judgment to decide, when your army shall be
advanced on the frontier of Portugal, how your efforts
can be best combined with the Spanish, as well as the
Portuguese troops, in support of the common cause. In
any movements you may undertake, you will, however,
keep in mind that, until you receive further orders, your
operations must necessarily be conducted with especial
reference to the protection of that country."1 Sir Jolnpcastie-
Stuart, also, who had the command of the troops in Sicily, resp.vii? 74.
20,000 strong, of whom 10,000 were deemed disposable,
270
LORD CASTLEREAGH S
CHAP.
III.
1809.
received orders to be ready to co-operate, in the manner
that might be deemed advisable, in the east of Spain.*
Such was the vanity and self-sufficiency of the Spanish
Government, that, even after all the disasters of the cam-
paign, the fall of Madrid, the Corunna retreat, and the fall-
ing back of their armies from Castile towards the Sierra
Morena, they declined the proffered assistance of the Bri-
tish Government, which Lord Castlereagh had sent to
Cadiz ; and General Sherbrooke, who had arrived there,
was not allowed to land, and returned to Lisbon. They
were more afraid of the heretic English than the hostile
French ! This extraordinary ebullition of jealousy was,
however, in the end attended with good effects. It led
to the concentration of the whole British troops in the
Peninsula in Portugal, where, on Sir A. Wellesley's arrival,
they amounted to 23,455 men, of whom 4270 were ca-
valry .t Such was the force with which this great general
commenced his career in the Peninsula, which he only
left five years afterwards to carry his victorious arms
into France. When he began the struggle, Spain was
occupied by 250,000 French, of whom 150,000 were dis-
posable, and might be brought into the field.
* " Every day's intelligence makes me additionally desirous of hearing that
a British force has shown itself on the side of Catalonia, where its services
would be of the utmost importance. I hope the Court of Palermo will feel
that, even to their ultimate views in Italy, the completion of the great work in
Spain is of more consequence than an imperfect attempt in Italy, which, with-
out the co-operation of some important military power, can hardly expect per-
manently to deliver itself, assisted only by a small British corps, with very
limited means of furnishing either arms or military stores for arming the
people." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR JOHN STUART, November 1, 1808; Castle-
reagh Correspondence, vii. 1.
•f These forces were as follows : —
Infantry —
Guards, "'.'•'' 2,427
Line, . 11,589
Do. from Cork, 4,139
24th Foot, 780
— 18,935
Cavalry, . . 4,270
Waggon Train, . 250
Total, . . ,.'. . . 23,455
— State, April 2, 1809 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 48.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 271
One great advantage, however, had already, notwith- CHAP.
standing this disproportion, been gained to the hide- IIL
pendence and security of Britain by the progress of 1809-
the Peninsular war, and that was, the destruction of the
whole left wing of the great naval confederacy which it
had occasioned. Unmarked amidst the blaze of Welling- °
° plan ol ope-
ton's career, and forgotten from the lustre of Trafalgar, rations.
this was a matter of the very highest importance, which,
if events had fallen out otherwise than they did, might
have come to exercise a decisive influence on the fortunes
of England. After Trafalgar Napoleon had still, includ-
ing the Dutch and Spanish, one hundred sail of the line
at his disposal ready for sea ; and to this force the treaty
of Tilsit, which gave him the prospect of the entire com-
mand of the naval force of the Baltic, added fifty more. He
was building twenty or twenty-five sail of the line yearly;
and in a few years he expected to have one hundred and
eighty sail of the line ready for sea, manned by the whole
sailors of continental Europe ; and with these, he has him-
self told us, he meant to have fought what he called his
battle of Actium, in which England must have been over-
thrown, and which would have terminated, by our subjuga-
tion, the long duel between the two nations.* He had no
intention of precipitating hostilities ; deeply laid, his design
was intended to be cautiously executed, and no attempt
made to carry it into effect till his force had become so
overwhelming, that, as with his land forces on entering Rus-
sia, success had become a matter of absolute certainty.
* " I was resolved," said Napoleon, " to renew at Cherbourg the wonders
of Egypt. I had already raised in the sea my pyramid — I would also have
had my Lake Mareotis. My great object was to concentrate at Cherbourg all
our maritime forces, and in time they would have been immense, in order to
be able to deal out a grand stroke to the enemy. I was establishing my ground
so as to bring the two nations, as it were, body to body. The ultimate issue
could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen
millions of English. I could have terminated the contest by a battle of A ctium.
When, by these means, England came to wrestle hand to hand with France, and
the advantage she derived from her insular situation was at an end, she must
necessarily have fallen. The nation which depends on a population of seven-
teen millions must, in the end, sink before that which has the command of
forty." — LAS CASES, v. 8-14.
272 .LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. Till this point of superiority was gained, the maritime war
m- was to be defensive only. The idea was grandly conceived,
1809. and it was on the very verge of being realised. The
battle of Friedland, and treaty of Tilsit, which gave
him the entire command of the Continent, seemed to
render it a matter of certainty. But great as was the
conception and the means of its realisation, it was met
by a conception as grand, a combination as effective.
This was, to take advantage of the insular position and
naval superiority of Great Britain at the moment, and
wield a considerable military force in such a manner
against first one, then another part of the enemy's domi-
nions, as might destroy or neutralise his different naval
establishments, and thus render abortive all his combina-
tions. Thirty or forty thousand men skilfully disposed
would be amply sufficient for this purpose, and would
keep three hundred thousand on the alert, for no one
could tell where the blow was first to fall.
The success which had already attended this counter
Complete plan of operations was entirely due to Lord Castlereagh,
and had been such as to justify the most sanguine hopes
for the future. Thirty thousand men sent to the Baltic had
cLtiereagh. ta^en tne Copenhagen fleet, consisting of twenty sail of
the line and fifteen frigates, retained in our alliance the
Swedish fleet of twelve more, and thus so completely neu-
tralised the Russian naval force, that Jive English sail of
the line, in addition to the Swedish, sufficed to keep them
blockaded in Cronstadt. Thus was the right wing of
Napoleon's great naval confederacy taken or paralysed.
The same troops, transported to the Peninsula, had still
more completely destroyed his left wing. The vigorous
measures adopted with the Court of Lisbon had extricated
ten Portuguese sail of the line from his grasp ; the victory
of Vimeira had put twelve Russian sail of the line into
the hands of the British ; and five French sail of the line,
the remnant of Trafalgar, had been obliged to surrender at
Cadiz to' the Spaniards. The whole Spanish fleet, number-
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 273
ing twenty-four sail of the line, had been withdrawn from CHAP.
the French alliance. Altogether, the Peninsular war had IIT-
already cost Napoleon fifty sail of the line, in addition to 1809-
as many lost to him for efficient service in the Baltic from
the results of the Copenhagen expedition. Within two
years after the treaty of Tilsit, which seemed to put the
whole naval forces of the Continent at his feet, Napoleon
had lost a hundred sail of the line, his two wings were
completely destroyed, and all this mainly by the opera-
tions of LAND FORCES. The danger of invasion was re-
moved for a very long period from Great Britain, if not
altogether taken away. This too had been done at the
very time when the conquests of France had attained
their highest point of elevation. Such, in so short a
time, had been the results of Lord Castlereagh's counter-
acting system of warfare,* immediately after Napoleon's
star had been highest in the ascendant !
In the midst of these great undertakings, when each
party was straining every nerve to augment their mili- Extreme
tary and naval resources, and, of course, a correspond- gettLgty °
ing expenditure was going forward on both sides, a new ^rpenTn-
difficulty of the most formidable kind arose, which ^ ^
embarrassed the British Government more than any tifeagh's
J efforts to
other down to the very end of the war. This was the obtain it-
difficulty of getting specie to carry on the Continental
operations. By the suspension of cash payments, indeed,
the difficulty arising from the absorption of the precious
metals in foreign warfare was entirely at an end, so far
as domestic industry was concerned ; but, for military
* The account of these successes stands thus : —
Line. Frigates.
Taken at Copenhagen, . 20 15
Preserved of Swedish fleet,
Neutralised of Russian,
Withdrawn from Lisbon to Brazils,
Taken at Lisbon,
Taken there of Russian,
Taken at Cadiz,
Withdrawn from Napoleon of Spanish,
12 8
17 9
8
2
12
5
24 12
Lost to Napoleon in two years, . . 100 44
VOL. I. S
274 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, operations abroad, it was absolutely necessary to have
m- specie ; and it was with the utmost difficulty, and at a
1.809. very heavy cost, that it could be obtained. This diffi-
culty became almost insurmountable in the spring of
1809, in consequence of the vast preparations making
in France, Italy, and Germany, for the Austrian war, in
addition to the demand for money, already so great from
the requirements of the Spanish contest on both sides.
Gold, as the most valuable and portable metal, rapidly
rose in value, as compared with silver or copper. A
new guinea, or a napoleon, was eagerly bought for 28s.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, who felt all his movements, and
especially his means of transport, grievously fettered by
this scarcity of gold and silver, was extremely urgent
on the subject ; and Lord Castlereagh, who was perfectly
aware of the necessity of providing a supply of these
essential articles, made the utmost efforts, by means of
his agents in every direction, to obtain them.*
A very strange offer, as is well known, was made in
strange pro- a circuitous way, and with great caution, by some of
Knhai0 the chief officers of Marshal Soult's army, which had
penetrated from Corunna to Oporto, to seize their ge-
neral, throw off their allegiance to the Emperor, make
Wel" Peace W^n England, and dethrone Napoleon, t The
" The scarcity of specie is become the subject of much anxiety. The
supply sent by the Rosamond and Niobe (which left this country early in
June), of dollars, doubloons, and Portugal gold, to the amount of about
£230,000 sterling, arriving so immediately after that you received from Cadiz,
will have relieved your wants for the present ; but as there is not more than
£100,000 which can now be sent from hence, in addition to what you have,
till dollars arrive from South America (the period of which is uncertain), it
becomes a subject of the most serious consideration for you to concert with
the Commissary-General how you can realise the funds necessary for your army
in the Peninsula by bills on England."— LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR ARTHUR
WELLESLEY, London, July 1J, 1809 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 95.
" Huskisson will write to you on the subject of money. A considerable
sum is on its way to the Tagus ; but so great is the pressure, that I have to
recommend your drawing all possible aid both from Cadiz and Gibraltar— in
short, wherever a bill upon England can be realised."— LORD CASTLEREAGH to
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, June 11, 1809 ; Ibid., vii. 84.
t Soult, wholly ignorant of this conspiracy, was at the same time dreaming
of procuring the crown of Portugal for himself, and becoming, like Murat,
the monarch of a kingdom dependent upon France. — See THIERS, xi. 72-75.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 275
proposal was in itself sufficiently tempting, the more CHAP.
especially as a war had by this time broken out be- IIL
tween France and Austria, and the whole disposable 18°9-
forces of the Emperor were required for the seat of war
on the Danube. Sir Arthur accordingly lost no time
in transmitting the information and offer, which was
communicated through an officer named Argenton, to
Lord Castlereagh, who immediately laid it before the
Cabinet, by whom it was seriously considered. But,
although fully alive to any such movement, which might
be the prelude to a general breaking up of the military
power which had so long oppressed the Continent, the
Cabinet adopted the opinion of Lord Castlereagh, that
in an affair of such delicacy and importance the utmost
caution was necessary ; that this offer was so strange that
doubts might be entertained of its sincerity ; and that the
only safe course was to leave the matter in the hands of
the General on the spot, to be dealt with as to him
might seem advisable. This advice was unanimously
adopted, and discretionary powers on the subject were
sent out to Sir Arthur Wellesley, who very wisely steered
clear of the business, and prosecuted the war without
soiling his hands by the contact of treason.*
* " The despatch which relates to the communication from Captain Argenton
has occupied the immediate attention of his Majesty's Government. They are
fully impressed with the important consequences which might be expected to
flow from the revolt of any considerable part of the French army at the pre-
sent moment, which, if it should be followed, would afford the surest means
)f dissolving the power against which we are now contending. But in pro-
)ortion as they feel all the importance of this view of the subject, they cannot
lisguise from themselves the doubts that must attach to the proposition in
>oint of sincerity, the obstacles that stand in the way of its successful execu-
ion, and, finally, to the difficulties which present themselves at the outset in
sconciling the measures to be taken with our present relations with the Go-
ernments of Spain and Portugal. With this general view of the subject, I
oa. to signify to you his Majesty's approbation of the caution with which you
ave received the overture alluded to ; and I am to desire that you will con-
nue to observe the same prudent line of conduct, taking care that any ar-
ngement which you may adopt with the French army, so far as it affects
e interests of Spain or Portugal, shall be made subject to the ratification and
ncurrence of their respective Governments. With the above restriction, his
ajesty is pleased to confide to your discretion to decide according to circum-
mces on the spot, by what course the objects his Majesty has in view can
st be promoted. You will not fail to hold in mind that nothing short of
276 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. The short but brilliant campaign which followed, com-
IIL mencing with the splendid passage of the Douro, and
isoa ending with the entire expulsion of the French, with the
Lord4c'astie- loss of their whole artillery and baggage, from the north
°f Portugal, will be recounted in the chapter relating
to Sir Charles Stewart, who bore a distinguished part
in that operation. Lord Castlereagh was extremely re-
joiced at Sir Arthur's early success, and exerted him-
self to the very utmost to strengthen his hands, and
supply the numerous wants of his army, now launched
into active operations, nearly the whole of which, in con-
sequence of the penury to which the country had been
reduced by the French exactions, had to be furnished
from the British Islands.* He obtained the consent of
the King to a reinforcement of 5000 men being sent to
Sir Arthur from the regiments stationed in Jersey and
Guernsey, which was accordingly despatched, and arrived
in time to put his army in a condition to advance into
Spain, and gain the memorable victory of Talavera. In
conveying to Sir Arthur and the troops under his com-
mand his Majesty's thanks for this gallant achievement,
he said — " The rapidity of your movements to the north-
ward, if not attended with the complete reduction of
Soult's corps, has, it is to be presumed, for a length of
time disqualified the remains of his army from acting
the most unequivocal proofs of determination to turn their arms against Buona-
parte could induce the Spaniards to permit a French army (more especially
one which has acted in the manner Soult's corps is reported to have done in
Galicia) to retire unmolested through Spain, with the power to change its
purpose at any moment on its march, to take up new and perhaps more advan-
tageous positions, or even to concentrate themselves with other corps, the better
to prosecute their operations in other parts of Spam." — LOUD CASTLEREAGH to
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, May 16, 1809 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 65, 66.
* " DEAR WELLESLEY, — Accept my congratulations and thanks for what you
have already accomplished, and my best wishes for your future success and
personal glory. I am doing what I can to promote it by strengthening you
from hence, and shall press everything forward as much as possible. If you
want another regiment of cavalry very much, Bend transports for 800 horses to
Cork, in which I will send you the 1st Dragoons, unless events should require
us to give it another destination." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR ARTHUR WEL-
LESLEY, May 26, 1809; Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 71.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 277
offensively against Portugal, and left you at liberty to CHAP.
prosecute operations against Victor. The decision and m-
skill with which the British army has been led, and the 1809.
animated bravery displayed by the officers and troops
in the passage of the Douro, cannot fail to confirm the
confidence which they are entitled to feel in their own
superiority over the enemy, and to prepare the way for i Lord cas-
future successes. The result of the present operation, sfrAfw^i-
under the relative circumstances of the two armies, has g681^^11110
in no respect fallen short of what might have been ex- Castiereagh
i i r* T T T TT Uorresp.
pected from the talents or the General and the gallantry vn. 75.
of the troops." 1
It had been, as already shown, a part of the instructions
to Sir A. Wellesley, not to extend his movements beyond Lord ckstie-
the Portuguese frontier unless he had previously obtained S the* °
the consent of the British Cabinet. After the success vaiwfinto
on the Douro, and the disabling of Soult's army, LordSpain-
Castiereagh deemed the time arrived when such extended
operations might with advantage be undertaken ; the more
especially as Napoleon in person was engaged in a struggle
for life or death with the Austrians on the Danube, which
absorbed all the reinforcements he could spare ; and that
he already contemplated a diversion of the most important
kind, on a great scale, with the British forces in Flanders.
He accordingly sent authority to Sir Arthur to extend his
operations into Spain, in order that he might be enabled
to co-operate the better with the Spanish armies against
the common enemy, beyond the provinces immediately
adjacent to the Portuguese frontier, provided he should be
of opinion that the doing so was material, in a military
point of view, to the success of operations, and not incon-
sistent with the safety of Portugal. Fortified with this 2 Lord Cag.
authority, Sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the frontier, gj^fwei-
advanced to Talavera, and fought the memorable battle !j5sly^?y
there, in which General Charles Stewart, Lord Castle- Castiereagh
Corresp.
reagh s brother, bore a distinguished part, as will appear vii. 71.
in a subsequent chapter.2
278 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. This battle, "which roused to the very highest pitch the
m- military enthusiasm of Great Britain, and produced a pro-
1809. found impression on the world, excited in the greatest
Lord Castle- degree the heroic and chivalrous spirit of Lord Castle-
striSg reagh. In supporting the motion of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer for the thanks of Parliament to Lord Welling-
ton and the officers and soldiers who had combated at
Talavera, the noble lord pronounced an eloquent eulogium
i8io. ' on the General and soldiers who had achieved this great
i Pari. Deb. success, which will be given in a subsequent chapter.1
Although the glorious victory which called forth this
Advantages glowing panegyric was followed by a retreat to Portugal,
e *n consequence of the concentration of all the French forces
Penmsula against Lord Wellington's army, yet a
re- very great advantage, which in the end proved the salvation
i« approved of the Peninsula, had been gained by this forward move-
€ ment. That very concentration had defeated all the
projects of the enemy. Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia,
Estremadura, obtained a breathing time to recruit their
armies and repair their losses. Galicia, Asturias, and
part of Leon were permanently freed ; the projected
attack upon Portugal postponed for a year ; and leisure
thus gained for Wellington to form the lines of Torres
Vedras, which at length opposed a permanent barrier
to the French progress. The British General, too, had
obtained one piece of information of essential service
for the future success of the war. He had seen the
Spanish armies, acted with them, and learned how utterly
incapable they were of carrying on any combined opera-
tions, or acting with steadiness or efficiency in the field of
battle.* This knowledge, which all the private letters
from the troops engaged amply confirmed, was of the
* " My public letter will give you some idea of my situation. It is one of
some embarrassment ; but I think I shall get the better of my embarrassments,
I hope, without fighting another desperate battle, which would really cripple
us so much as to render all our efforts useless. I certainly should get the better
of everything if I could manage Cuesta, but his temper and disposition are so
bad that that is impossible. . . . We are miserably supplied with provisions,
and I don't know how to remedy this evil. The Spanish armies are now so
numerous that they eat up the whole country ; they have no magazines, nor have
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 279
utmost importance, because it dispelled those extravagant CHAP.
and unfounded ideas as to the capabilities of the Spanish IIL
armies, which the victories they had at first gained, when 1809-
acting with regular troops, and their incessant boasting
since that time, had engendered in the public mind, and
caused expectations, impossible to be realised, to be formed
as to the result of joint operations. Lord Castlereagh,
who was fully informed and perfectly aware of all these
particulars, entirely approved of Wellington's retreat to
Portugal in the autumn of 1809, and gave his sanction to
the movement in his official instructions. *
we, nor can we collect any, and there is a scramble for everything. I think the
battle of the 28th is likely to be of great use to the Spaniards, but I don't think
them yet in a state of discipline to contend with the French, and I prefer infi-
nitely to endeavour to remove them from this part of Spain by manoeuvre to
the trial of another pitched battle. The French, in the last, threw their whole
force upon us ; and although it did not exactly succeed, or will not succeed
in future, we shall lose great numbers of men which we can but ill afford ; and
we cannot attempt to relieve ourselves from the weight of the attack by bring-
ing forward the Spanish troops, owing to their miserable state of discipline, and
their want of officers properly qualified. The troops are entirely incapable of
performing any manoauvre, however simple ; they would get into irretrievable
confusion, and the result would probably be the loss of everything." — LORD
WELLINGTON to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Talavera, August 1, 1809; C ostler ear/h
Correspondence, vii. 100.
" The Spanish artillery are, as far as I have seen of them, unexceptionable ;
but it is lamentable to see how bad the infantry is, and how unequal to a contest
with the French. They are armed, I believe, well ; they are badly accoutred,
not having the means of saving their ammunition from the rain ; not clothed, in
some instances, at all. . . . Their discipline appears to be confined to placing
them in the ranks three deep at very close order, and to the manual exercise.
Bassicourt's corps, which was supposed to be the best in Cuesta's army, and
was engaged on our left in the mountains in the battle of Talavera, was kept
in check throughout the day by one French battalion. This corps has since run
away from the bridge of Arzobispo, leaving its guns, and many of the men,
according to the usual Spanish custom, throwing away their arms. This practice
of running away and throwing off arms, accoutrements, and clothing, is fatal to
everything excepting a reassembly of the men in a state of nature, who as regu-
larly perform the same manoeuvre the next time an occasion offers. Nearly
two thousand ran off on the evening of the 27th, from the battle of Talavera,
not a hundred yards from the place where I was standing, who were neither
attacked, nor threatened with any attack, and who were frightened only by the
noise of their own fire. They left their arms and accoutrements on the ground,
their officers went with them ; and they and the fugitive cavalry plundered the
baggage of the British army which had been sent to the rear. Many others went
whom I did not see." — LORD WELLINGTON to LORD CASTLEREAGH, August 25
1809 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 110, 111.
* " I am commanded to signify to you his Majesty's entire approbation o
your proceedings as stated in your despatches. The considerations which de-
termined you to decline undertaking any further operations till the wants of
280 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. Foreseeing that any co-operation with the loose and
m- undisciplined armies and impracticable haughty generals
1809. of Spain was at present not to be thought of, and antici-
- pating ere long a serious struggle for the defence of
for Portugal, the next care of Lord Castlereagh was to con-
»feportunai cer^ measures W^n Lord Wellington for its protection,
Sept. 14, and the measures necessary to secure the retreat of his
troops in case of disaster. With this view, he wrote to
him on 1 4th September in the following terms — remark-
able as showing how clearly he foresaw and was provid-
ing for the Torres Vedras campaign : — " As the return
of the British army to Portugal will afford you an oppor-
tunity of turning your undivided attention to the defence
of that kingdom, I have to request that you will, as early
as possible, transmit to me, for the information of his
Majesty's Government, a full report upon that subject,
stating your opinion of its defencibility, with what force
British and Portuguese, and at what annual expense.
You will consider the question of maintaining Portugal in
the distinct cases ; first, of the utmost effort the enemy
can be expected to make against it by any probable dis-
position of the military force now in the Peninsula ;
secondly, of the French force being largely reinforced,
your army shall be fully and satisfactorily supplied, and every arrangement made
which may appear to you necessary for the protection of your army against
similar embarrassments in future, has received his Majesty's entire approba-
tion."— LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, August 12, 1809;
Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 101.
" I am commanded to signify to your Lordship his Majesty's approba-
tion of the conduct you have pursued, as detailed in your despatches of the
2d, 8th, and 21st August. The considerations which have influenced your de-
termination to fall back on the frontier of Portugal, not only appear to have
warranted that decision, but to have rendered it indispensable for the supply
of the army ; and if the Spanish Government have to regret the loss of your
support, they can only attribute it to their own want of resources, or to their
inability to call them forth. The judgment which marked your determination
at the critical moment the step was taken to retire behind the Tagus ; the suc-
cess and ability with which your retreat, encumbered with the wounded, has
been conducted, through a country difficult in itself, and destitute of supplies ;
and the determination you have shown to regulate your operations with as much
attention to the safety and health of your troops as to their reputation and glory,
have received his Majesty's entire approbation." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD
WELLINGTON, September 14, 1809; Castlereayk Correspondence, vii. 119, 120.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 281
should a peace in Germany leave Buonaparte at liberty to CHAP.
turn his efforts in that direction. You will also state IIL
your opinion upon the practicability of embarking the 1809.
British army in the Tagus (regard being had to its local
circumstances), in the event of its being obliged to fall
back for that purpose in the presence of a superior
enemy. And further, you will suggest such measures
as may appear to you necessary to be adopted within
the country, either with a view to its defence, or which,
in the event of its evacuation by the British army be-
coming necessary, should precede such an evacuation, with
a view to the interests of the Prince Regent, and to
the counteraction of the designs of the enemy ; and in
the former alternative you will state at what expense,
and within what period of time, the measures you would
recommend for placing Portugal in an adequate state
of defence could be carried into effect/' l This despatch, * Castie-
prophetic and suggestive of the lines of Torres Vedras resp. viiT
and the development of Sir Arthur Wellesley's memor- 120>121>
able minute on the defence of Portugal of 7th March
1809, already given, was the LAST which, as Minis-
ter at War, he ever addressed to Lord Wellington.
Within a few days after he resigned his office, in conse-
quence of an intrigue which involved him in a personal
conflict with Mr Canning, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the particulars of which, as well as of the great expedition
in which it originated, must now be given.
Gifted beyond any of his contemporaries, except the
Duke of Wellington, with the prophetic eye of genius, Lordc'astie-
and ever looking forward to the future rather than en- d!vfnedafor
grossed with the present, Lord Castlereagh had long JSpro-
anticipated the greatest danger to Great Britain from the j^*^
naval forces of the enemy. While nearly all his con- |^ntst
temporaries were reposing on the pleasing illusion that Britain.
England was unassailable on that side, and that the Nile
and Trafalgar had given her the undisputed command of
282 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, the seas, he measured with a steady eye the real naval re-
m- sources of his opponent, and had early divined the secret
iso9. designs of Buonaparte to form a great naval confederacy
which should concentrate the whole maritime strength of
the Continent against this country. To this purpose he
clearly saw his conquests at land were mainly directed ;
and the extraordinary success with which they had been
attended gave too much reason to fear that his hopes in
this respect were not only likely to be realised, but
rapidly approaching realisation. The practice which he
had long carried out, whenever he got the command of a
maritime country, of seizing the whole shipwrights, naval
carpenters, and naval stores which it contained, and
marching them off to the dockyards, joined to the terror
of the famous Berlin and Milan decrees, left no room for
doubt that it was against Great Britain that the whole
forces of the Continent were to be hurled, and that this
was to be done by a forced coalition of the entire mari-
time power of the Continent, and a naval crusade against
these islands. And the knowledge which Government
possessed of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, left
no room for doubt that preparations for carrying this
great design into execution would immediately be
commenced.
To meet this grand design of Napoleon, which he him-
Castie- self has since often told us was the great object of his
t an life, Lord Castlereagh's plan of operations consisted of
n-8 two parts. The first was, to take advantage of our pre-
sen£ maritime superiority to effect such a blockade of the
enemy's harbours as might inflict on him as much injury
as his Continental blockade was likely to inflict on this
country.""" The second was, to make such use of the
* " The more I have had time to reflect on our future prospects in this war,
the more impressed I am with a conviction that neither peace nor independ-
ence can be the lot of this nation, till we have found the means of making
France feel that her new anti-social and anti-commercial system will not avail
her against-a power that can, for its own preservation, and consequently legiti-
mately, counteract at sea what she lawlessly inflicts and enforces on shore. I
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 283
considerable military force at the disposal of this country CHAP.
as might, by transporting it from place to place by sea, 1IL
compensate its inferiority upon the whole to the land 1809.
troops of the enemy ; and, by thus rendering it superior,
at unexpected points, on sudden attacks, to any local
force that could be opposed to it, effect the destruction
of his principal naval establishments before his forces, toil-
ing by land journeys, could concentrate in sufficient num-
bers successfully to resist. The Orders in Council were the
result of the first ; the great expeditions, which, for the
first time in the war, signalised his war ministry, were the
carrying out of the second. This new system, obviously
founded in reason, but so much at variance with the plan
of operations hitherto pursued that it passed at the time
for Quixotic and impracticable, required no small amount
of moral courage for its conception, and political influ-
ence for its execution. But Lord Castlereagh possessed
both ; and the success which had hitherto attended his plan
was such as to justify the most sanguine hopes of the
advantages which might result from its further and more
extended adoption. For by the Copenhagen expedition
he had completely paralysed the naval forces accumulat-
ing in the enemy's hands in the Baltic ; .and by aliment-
ing the Peninsular war, he had withdrawn the whole
fleets of Spain and Portugal from their grasp. Stripped
of its two wings, the French naval centre alone pre-
sented a formidable object of attack ; but circumstances
had now occurred which warranted the opinion that it
might be assailed with every prospect of success.
So early as the year 1797, a very able memorandum
had been laid before the Cabinet by desire of Mr Pitt
wish you would turn in your mind, whether we are of necessity bound to
postpone measures in furtherance of this great purpose, with reference to the
American question ; or whether, even upon the reservation of the late Go-
vernment, the right of retaliation may not be exercised by us without preju-
dice to these discussions. . . . The detail of such an arrangement will re-
quire much consideration : the general principle is sufficiently obvious." —
LORD CASTLEREAGH to MR PERCEVAL, October 1, 1807; Castlereagh Corre-
spondence, viii. 87, 88.
284 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, and Mr Dundas, pointing out the expedience of finding
m- employment for the enemy's force at home, and suggest-
1809. ing the island of WALCHEREN as a favourable point of
pian5ofthe attack.* The eagle eye and military genius of Lord
kVaicheren Qastlereagh made him at once seize the same idea which,
sxpedition ;
rast import- since that time, had become recommended by a great
m<» of it. . . , . TIT'
variety or other considerations. Antwerp had now become
the chief naval establishment of Napoleon — the great
fortified harbour where the larger part of the armament
destined for the invasion and subjugation of Great Britain
was to be assembled. Cherbourg was to be the centre,
and Brest the left ; but the great bulk of the forces were
to be collected in the Scheldt. It was there that the
Prince of Parma, one of the ablest generals whom
Europe ever saw, collected his naval and military forces
for the invasion of England in the time of Queen Eliza-
beth. Napoleon, with his usual penetration, had long
discerned its paramount importance. He had already
constructed magnificent docks capable of holding forty
sail of the line at Antwerp, and he projected still greater
works on the opposite side of the Scheldt, where the
* " Practice and experience seem to unite with the actual circumstances of
Britain and of its enemy, in pointing out that, as we can no longer divide the
armies of France by Continental wars, we ought to attempt the destruction of
the armaments in the havens where they are preparing for invasions, and thus
oblige the French Directory either to find new plunder from their own subjects
or from among their oppressed allies to support their armies, or to run the risk
of those armies turning on the upstart rulers of their devoted country. . . .
" The island of Walcheren, in Zealand, recommends itself for the destination
of a conjunct expedition, and the armament can be covered in its operations
by the North Sea fleet. The situation of this island, with regard to the mouths
of the Scheldt, is such that, in the event of obtaining it, we could completely
command the navigation of that river, and render the possession of the other
Zealand islands, and the countries bordering on them, of no value, because
we could control the former Dutch and Austrian Netherlands. Flushing,
situated on the southern extremity of the island, is the best naval port on
the north coast of the Netherlands, and the place from which attempts to
attack Britain could be best made, because it could send out large transports
and men-of-war to protect flat-bottomed boats and the port also, which, in
the hands of Britain, would dispose the Dutch, if restored to them, more
than any other circumstance, to return to their former state, or to yield readily
any of their foreign possessions in exchange for this key to their country." —
Memoir by. JOHN BRUCE, framed by desire of Mil PITT, December 25, 1797;
Castlereayh Correspondence, vi. 245, 246.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 285
Tete de Flandre was situated. Five-and-thirty sail of the CHAP.
line were already finished, or building, there ; materials m-
for half as many more were ready in its arsenals ; and 1809.
the Emperor anticipated nothing less, as we know from
himself, than to issue from the Scheldt at the head of
fifty sail of the line. It was evident, therefore, that as
Antwerp was the point from whence the decisive blow
against Great Britain was to be directed, so it was there
that the thrust was to be parried, and the counter stroke
fatal to all his projects delivered. And no time could be
figured so favourable for the execution of such a design
as the present ; for two hundred and fifty thousand of
Napoleon's best troops were engaged in Spain, and every 1 M, Can_
disposable man in France and Germany had been hurried ning'?
... speech,
to the Danube to make head against Austria, which had V^L Deb.
• QQO
declared war, crossed the Inn on the 9th April, and com- 347.
menced a most formidable contest on the Bavarian plains.1
Doubts at first passed through Lord Castlereagh's
mind, whether a great expedition, if sent at all, should not Reasons for
be sent to Spain instead of the Scheldt ; as there could thfschewt
be no doubt that if strongly reinforced Sir Arthur Wei- ^i1*611"
lesley would have driven the French from Madrid, and
possibly expelled them from the Peninsula. But on
fuller consideration there were several reasons which
led him to conclude, and as the event proved wisely,
that the former was the most advisable point of attack.
In the first place, the entire deliverance of the Peninsula,
and the chasing of the French across the Pyrenees, how-
ever important in themselves, could not have effected the
overthrow of Napoleon's power. There was no likelihood
that France could be conquered from the side of Spain,
how material soever success there might be as a diver-
sion ; it was from the Rhine alone that the mighty de-
liverance could be looked for, and nothing was so likely
to lead to this result as a successful expedition against
Antwerp, which, by determining the irresolution of Prus-
sia, might bring the whole strength of Germany into the
286 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
field. In the second place, the direction of our forces to
the Scheldt was recommended by this most important
consideration, that if it proved successful it would inflict
an irreparable wound on the naval strength of the enemy.
Thenceforward, England might view with a smile the
flotilla at Boulogne, and the threats of invasion ; the
Channel would prove an impassable barrier during the
whole remainder of the war, and the contest, so far as
she was concerned, be at once determined in her favour.
In the third place, experience had now proved that the
state of discipline in the Spanish armies was so defective,
and the means of providing any large army with provi-
sion so inconsiderable, that nothing could be more hazard-
ous than to attempt operations in the interior of Spain
with a powerful British force ; and as the Spanish forces
were incapable of acting with regular troops, any combined
operation would probably be attended with disaster. The
result of the Talavera campaign afforded decisive evidence
that these apprehensions were too well founded ; and
we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion,
that if the whole Walcheren expedition had been sent to
him he could have got no further than he did, nor even so
far, from the utter impossibility of feeding a larger body
of men than he had under his command in the interior of
Spain.*
* " Before I quit this part of the subject, it may be satisfactory to you to
know that I don't think matters would have been much better if you had sent
your large expedition to Spain instead of the Scheldt. You could not have
equipped it in Galicia, or anywhere in the north of Spain. If we had had
60,000 instead of 20,000, in all probability we should not have got to Talavera
to fight the battle, for want of means and of provisions. But if we had got to
Talavera we could not have gone further, and the armies would probably have
separated for want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle, but cer-
tainly afterwards. Besides, you will observe that your 40,000 men, supposing
them to be equipped and means to exist of feeding them, would not compen-
sate for the deficiency of numbers, of composition, and of efficiency, in the
Spanish armies ; and that, supposing they had been able to remove the French
from Madrid, they would not have removed them from the Peninsula, even in
the existing state of the French force. . . .
" Much of this deficiency of numbers, composition, discipline, and efficiency,
is to be attributed to the existing Government in Spain. They have attempted
to govern the kingdom in a state of revolution by an adherence to old rules
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 287
Strongly impressed with the importance of an attack CHAP.
upon this great maritime arsenal of the enemy, Lord In-
Castlereagh no sooner came into office, in April 1807, 1809.
than he prepared and laid before the Cabinet a detailed Lord8castie-
memorandum on a Walcheren expedition, which he re- reagh'» .
early Cabi-
garded as at once the means of depriving the enemy ofnetMem°-
, . 11 • • randum
the right arm of his naval strength, and as an incentive regarding
to the north of Germany and Holland to take up arms eren exp'e-
and join Prussia, then bravely combating with France isoTand
after the battle of Eylau. This memorandum, which is1808-
very minute and detailed, shows how early he had de-
scried the vulnerable quarter of Napoleon's power, and the
accurate information he had obtained regarding it.* The
battle of Friedland, however, and treaty of Tilsit, neces- °ct- 10,
sarily adjourned the execution of the design ; but no
sooner had the war in the Peninsula broken out, and
absorbed a large part of the military force of the enemy,
than he again laid a still more urgent memorandum before
the Cabinet, giving minute plans for the conduct of the
expedition, and points to be attacked, and strongly urged
that the preparations should be pushed forward with the
utmost activity, and he suggested Sir John Moore for the
command. f After the death of that lamented officer,
and systems, and with the aid of what is called enthusiasm. . . . People are
very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through the Revolution,
and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world :
but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was
the name only, but that force was the instrument, under the system of terror,
which brought forward those great resources which first stopped the allies ;
and that a perseverance in the same system of applying by force every indivi-
dual, and every description of property in the country, to the service of the
army, lias since conquered Europe. After this statement, you will judge for
yourselves whether you will employ any, and what strength of army in the
support of the cause of Spain. Circumstances with which you are acquainted
have obliged me to separate myself from the Spanish army ; and I can only
tell you, that I feel no inclination to join in co-operation with them again on
my own responsibility, and that I shall see my way very clearly before me
indeed before I do so ; and I do not recommend you to have anything to do
with them in their present state." — LORD WELLINGTON to LORD CASTLEREAGH,
Merida, August 25, 1809; Castlereagh Correspondence, vii. 112, 113.
* See Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 247-250.
"t* " Upon the whole, it seems necessary that the line of operations to be
288 LOKD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, and the return of the troops from Corunna, he was
IIL not discouraged, but again urged upon the Cabinet an
1809. expedition on a great scale against Walcheren and Ant-
3J11' werp, accompanied by the most minute particulars as
to the transport, and other details connected with the
project. This memorandum, which is given at full length
in the Castlereagh Correspondence, is very minute, speci-
fying the exact number of transports which would be re-
quired, and the amount of tonnage of each vessel.* It
would have been well if the Government had been equally
impressed as Lord Castlereagh was with the value of time
in war, and the inestimable importance of combining the
operations of allied forces so as to produce a simultaneous
impression on many different quarters. His plans were all
laid for this object ; and if the Cabinet could have been
prevailed upon to have gone into them at once, the war
would in all probability have been brought to a glorious
termination in that campaign. The Austrians crossed
the Inn and entered Bavaria on the 9th April ; on the
22d the battle of Echmiihl was fought ; and on the 22d
May Napoleon was defeated, and reduced to the last ex-
tremity, at Aspern, at the very time when Soult was fly-
ing in disorder from Oporto. Everything, therefore, re-
commended the adoption of immediate and vigorous
operations on a great scale : the prize was immense, the
danger less than at any former period, and there was
every reason to hope that a powerful demonstration on
the Scheldt, in addition to the destruction of the enemy's
naval armaments there, would at once determine the irre-
adopted, after a landing is effected, against the three fortified posts [of Flush-
ing, Rammekens, and Campveere] should be examined and reported on, by
Sir John Moore and the officer who is to command the artillery, in case the
service is ordered to be undertaken. All the requisite preparations should be
prosecuted with the utmost activity in the interim, as if the attack was abso-
lutely resolved on." — Memorandum for the Cabinet; Castlereagh Correspondence,
vi. 253.
* LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Memorandum, April 1, 1809; Castlereagh Cor-
respondence, vi. 254. It was stated in this memorandum that Government had
226,000 tons of transports at their command.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 289
solution of Prussia, and raise a flame which would bring CHAP.
the whole military strength of Northern Germany to bear IIL
upon Napoleon, already reduced to the greatest straits in 1809.
the island of Lobau in the Danube.
Instead of this, the Cabinet did what a council of war
almost always does in similar circumstances — it declined The Ca'bi-
to fight. Struck with the magnitude of the force pro-
posed by Lord Castlereagh to be employed upon the ser- tiTdplnio
vice — which amounted to 30,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, ^J
2000 artillery, and 30 ships of the line, being nearly thesubJect-
whole disposable force of the empire, when Sir Arthur
Wellesley had 20,000 in Portugal — they paused, and re-
quired the opinions of men of military experience on the
practicability of the operation, before they would venture
upon sanctioning it. The opinions accordingly were
taken, in pursuance of a circular sent round by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, and, as might have been expected, were
extremely various ; the majority, however, and nearly
all the old officers, represented it as an undertaking
attended with great hazard, and against the chances of
success in which were to be set, in the event of failure,
the probable, if not certain, destruction of the whole dis-
posable force of the empire.1 Sir Home Popham strongly
and energetically urged the vast importance of the expe- ll*j. vi.°r"
dition, the great risk of delay, and the inevitable hazard266"274*
with which it would be attended if postponed until the
autumnal months.* Unfortunately, at this very time,
when the united operation of talent and experience was
beyond any other time required in the military admini-
stration of the country, the Duke of York was obliged May is.
* " I again venture to press on your Lordship how important it is to save
even an hour, and to seize the favourable moment which is presented to us for
accomplishing an undertaking not inferior in national importance to any on
•which the resources of this empire have ever been employed. . . . You will,
I am sure, excuse the anxiety I express upon the present occasion. I see the
season advancing fast ; and if we are imperceptibly led on till the midsummer
fine weather is past, we shall have the most dreadful of all difficulties, the
elements, to encounter." — SIR HOME POPHAM to LORD CASTLEREAGH, June 13,
1809 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, vi. 274.
YOL. I. T
290 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, to resign his situation as Cominander-in-Chief, in conse-
IIL quence of the outcry raised against him from the dis-
1809. closures made as to the participation of his artful mis-
tress, Mrs Mary Ann Clarke, in the disposal of commis-
sions at the Horse Guards. His Royal Highness was
succeeded by Sir D. Dundas, a respectable veteran, but
past the period of active exertion, such as the extremity
of the crisis imperatively required. What was still more
unfortunate, Lord Castlereagh was constrained, by the
weight of the highest influence, to offer the command to
the Earl of Chatham, the Master-General of the Ordnance,
whose services in that department led the Sovereign to
suppose that the son of the great earl, Mr Pitt's brother,
would signalise his command by exploits worthy of the
long-established fame of his house.
So much time was lost by the Cabinet in making up
Great delay their mind, and taking the opinion of military officers
nctinmak^ on the proposed expedition, that it was not till the
mfndpontheir!4th June that it was finally resolved on, and Lord
the subject. Chatham suggested to his Majesty for the command;
and even then the Cabinet hesitated, without further
investigation, to go into the proposal which Lord Castle-
reagh had so anxiously urged upon them in the first
week of April preceding.* This delay was the more re-
prehensible on their part, as both the military and naval
armaments could have been got ready by the 10th of
June, and as they had been informed that the whole
• * " Lord Castlereagh begs leave to acquaint your Majesty that your Majesty's
confidential servants, having considered the information which has been col-
lected relative to an operation against the enemy's naval resources in the
Scheldt, are humbly of opinion that, by employing an adequate force of not
less than 35,000 men, the attempt may be made with every prospect of success,
provided the practicability of a landing at Sandfleet can be assured. Till this
point can be further investigated, they are desirous to postpone receiving your
Majesty's final commands upon the measure, requesting, in the mean time, your
Majesty's permission to proceed, with as much secrecy and expeditimi as pos-
sible, with all the preliminary arrangements, which, when completed, will con-
tribute to render the troops equally applicable to any other service." — LORD
CASTLEREAOH to the KING, June 14, 1809; Castlereayh Correspondence, vi.
275, 276.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 291
maritime preparations would certainly be complete bj CHAP.
that time, so far back as tlie 16th May preceding.1 The m-
battle of Wagram was not fought till the 6th July, so isoo.
that if the expedition had sailed on the 1 6th June, the reSfco
period assigned by the Admiralty, it would have been in ™SP- vi-
ample time to affect the war on the Danube. Lord
Castlereagh, who, endowed by nature with real mili-
tary genius, was perfectly aware of the value of time
in war, was in despair at this disastrous delay; but all
his efforts to terminate the procrastination of the Cabi-
net were for long unavailing ; and it was not till the
19th June that orders were given to the ordnance de-
partment to get the artillery and siege equipage ready,
nor till the 28th July, three weeks after the battle of July 28.
Wagram had been fought, that the expedition set sail.
This long delay was, of course, fatal to one great object of
the expedition, which was to rouse Prussia and Northern
Germany into action ; and it would be inexplicable, did
not subsequent events reveal the existence of an intrigue
in the Cabinet at this time to overturn Lord Castlereagh,
which will be immediately detailed. The intensity of
feeling excited by this intrigue rendered the Ministry
alike blind to the great design of the Minister at War,
and insensible to the value of time in carrying it into
execution.
Although, however, the long hesitation of the Cabinet
in finally determining on the expedition was fatal to it as immense
a diversion to Austria, and a means of resuscitating the pioy
war in Germany ; yet, considered in reference to the se-
parate interests of Great Britain, and as likely to leadjuly28
to the destruction of the enemy's naval forces in the
Scheldt, the delay could hardly be considered as an
object of regret. Such were the necessities of Napoleon's
situation at that time, after he had been brought to the
brink of ruin by the result of the battle of Aspern, that,
so far from having been able in this interval to make any
efficient preparations for the defence of Antwerp, he had
292 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, been under the necessity of drawing off every disposable
m- sabre and bayonet from the Low Countries to support
1809. himself on the banks of the Danube. In the meanwhile,
the forces of Great Britain, both by sea and land, seemed
to augment in an almost miraculous manner, and were
accumulated at the decisive point by the officers of both
services in the most able way. The armament, when
it did at last set sail, was the most formidable in point
of numbers, equipment, and efficiency, both by sea and
land, which ever was conveyed across the ocean from the
beginning of time, and, beyond all doubt, fully adequate
to the success of the undertaking. The naval forces
consisted of 35 sail of the line, 2 of 50 guns, 21 frigates,
33 sloops, and 82 gunboats — an armament considerably
greater than that which conquered at Trafalgar. The
land forces amounted to 39,143 men, of whom 3032
1 Castle- m '
reaghCpr- were artillery, and 2657 cavalry, with 150 mortars and
209,' 210'. heavy guns; the infantry, including 2867 foot guards,
being 33,000.'
To resist this formidable armament, the forces at Ant-
62
French werp, and in the fortifications defending the approach to
e- it, were of the most contemptible description when the
Antwearp.°f fleet first appeared on the coast of Zealand. In truth,
Napoleon, entirely engrossed with the war on the Dan-
ube and in the Peninsula, both of which were daily
assuming more colossal proportions, was by no means
aware of the danger which his naval establishments in
the Scheldt were running, and he trusted to the timi-
dity of the English in land operations, for that security
which he could no longer hope to insure by his own
exertions. Antwerp, in particular, was in the most de-
fenceless state ; not one-half of the bastions were armed ;
the ditch, in most places dry, was in some filled up ; two
old breaches had never been repaired; the garrison con-
sisted only of 2500 men — a force wholly inadequate to
man the works — even of this small body, only one-half
were regular soldiers. Such had been the demand of the
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 293
Emperor for sabres and bayonets on the Danube and in CHAP.
Spain, that the Minister at War had no troops that he
could send to the Scheldt. In truth, no one contem- 1809-
plated an attack in that quarter ; and although they had
received some vague accounts of armaments in the Bri-
tish harbours, they took it for granted they were in-
tended to recruit the army in Spain, and never for a
moment contemplated an attack upon the territory of
the great nation. The island of Walcheren was not in
quite so defenceless a state as Antwerp; but it was in no
condition to stand against such a formidable army as was
now about to be directed against it. Flushing, its principal
fortification, was slenderly fortified, except on the side of1T .
the sea, where it was very strong, and garrisoned onlyc°n. et'
by 3000 men, composed of Prussian deserters, colonial xi/20M62.
troops, and a battalion of Irish.1
Aware of the defenceless state of the fortifications of
the Scheldt, and of the importance of striking the con- Lord c'astie-
templated blow with the greatest possible expedition, stSons
T
Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Lord Chatham were Chatham
to advance with the utmost rapidity, and direct his ^°urc[h0ef ^"
forces against the decisive point of Antwerp without a expedition,
moment's delay.* He concluded with the emphatic de-
* " MY LORD, — The importance of checking the naval power which the enemy
is so rapidly accumulating in the Scheldt, and of making a powerful diversion
in favour of the Austrian arms at the present moment, has determined his
Majesty to direct the efforts of his naval and military forces to that quarter.
Your Lordship will consider the operation in question as, in its execution, more
immediately directed against the fleet and arsenals of France in the Scheldt.
The complete success of the operation would include the capture or destruc-
tion of the whole of the enemy's ships either building at Antwerp or afloat in
the Scheldt, the entire destraction of their yards and arsenals at Antwerp,
Terneuse, and Flushing, and the rendering, if possible, the Scheldt no longer
navigable for ships of war.
"As the accomplishment of these important objects, in their fullest extent,
must in a great measure depend upon the rapidity with which the enterprise
is carried into execution, it has been deemed advisable to appropriate such an
amount of force to this service as may enable you, at the same time that you
occupy Walcheren and South Beveland, to advance at once a considerable corps
against Antwerp, which may be reinforced so soon as Flushing is invested, if
not actually reduced. As the attainment of the entire of the objects which
his Majesty has in view may ultimately be disappointed, should the enemy
have the means of assembling in such strength upon Antwerp as to render
294 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, claration that the expedition, in the first instance at least,
m- was to be regarded as a coup-de-main, in which every-
1809. thing would depend on celerity of movement ; and that
the retaining or retiring from the advanced position of
Antwerp, when gained, would be matter for future con-
sideration and instructions. With how much wisdom
these instructions were framed, and how admirably cal-
culated they were, if they had been literally complied
with, to have secured, with very little loss, the whole
objects of the expedition, will be abundantly proved in the
sequel, and is confirmed by no less an authority than that
of Napoleon himself. Unfortunately, the same views were
by no means shared by all the members of the Cabinet;
and the Board of Admiralty, with the caution character-
istic of boards and old men, insisted that Walcheren
should be taken before the expedition moved further.*
perseverance on your Lordship's part inconsistent with the security of your
army, your Lordship will, in that case, use your utmost endeavours, in concert
with the navy, to secure as many of the objects above pointed out as the cir-
cumstances of the moment will permit ; and, as the possession of the island of
Walcheren and the port of Flushing may, in themselves, under certain con-
tingencies, be acquisitions of the utmost consequence in the further prosecution
of the war, I am to signify to your Lordship the King's commands that, in the
event of your being obliged to retire from the more advanced positions on the
Scheldt, you do maintain the island of Walcheren till his Majesty's further
pleasure is signified.
" The state of the campaign on the Continent does not, at the present mo-
ment, permit his Majesty's Government to contemplate the possibility of com-
mencing operations with a British army from a point so much in advance
towards the frontier of France as Antwerp ; neither is there any allied force
as yet in the field in the north of Germany of sufficient magnitude, with whom
an advance from thence could be combined ; nor has it been deemed consistent
•with the celerity of movement, on which the success of the intended attack
may depend, to send the army equipped upon a scale which would qualify it
to enter immediately upon a campaign. The expedition must therefore be
considered as not, in the first instance, assuming any other character than that
of a coup-de-main. While the operation is in progress, other prospects may
open themselves, and events occur, which may induce his Majesty's Govern-
ment to extend their views." — LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Instructions to LORD
CHATHAM, July 1809 ; Castlereayh Correspondence, vi. 290-292.
* " It is the opinion of the sea Lords of the Admiralty that, in the first in-
stance, the island of Walcheren should be taken. They do not take upon them
to say where the landing should be made, or how the military force should be
distributed : this should be arranged between the General and Sir Richard
Strachan." — Admiralty Minute, June 9 ; Castkreagh- Correspondence, vi. 279.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 295
There could be no doubt that it was necessary to occupy CHAP.
the island of Walcheren generally, in the first instance,
in order to secure the passage of the troops in the chan- i§09.
nels leading to the Scheldt on either side; but there was
not the slightest occasion to take Flushing before pro-
ceeding further, as the troops could get up, and, in point
of fact, did so, when it was still in the hands of the
enemy. It was the unfortunate determination of the
naval and military officers employed to reduce Flushing
before proceeding further, instead of, as Lord Castle-
reagh had directed, doing both at once, for which there
were ample forces, which was the sole cause of the
ultimate miscarriage of a descent devised with so much
wisdom and ability, and for the successful termination
of which such ample forces, both by sea and land, had
been put at the disposal of the officers commanding.
Devoured with anxiety to expedite operations in a
matter where so much depended on not incurring a mo- The troops .
ment's delay, Lord Castlereagh strongly urged, on 21
June, that the embarkation of the troops should commence
forthwith,""' in which case the expedition might have been
afloat at latest on the 5th July. But he found it im-
possible to push on the different services at a pace
corresponding to his own clear and fervent impressions,
and the expedition did not begin to embark for a month
after, and reached the coast of Walcheren only on the
29th July. The fleet, entering the Bast Scheldt, moored
at the entry of the Weere Gat, and landed 15,000 men
in a few hours, who easily put to flight 2000 of the gar- July so.
* " Lord Castlereagh would humbly propose to your Majesty that the
regiments most remote from the points of embarkation should be immediately
put in motion. It is intended to embark at Portsmouth in the ships of the
line about 17,000 men, a proportion of which force, in order to mark the opera-
tion as destined to the westward, will be moved from the eastern district ;
and as the troops from Essex will require fourteen days for their march and
embarkation, it is presumed that the embarkation and equipment of the whole
force, including ordnance stores, &c., may be completed within that period,
counting from Monday next.5' — LORD CASTLEREAGH to the KING, June 21,
1809 ; Castlereayh Correspondence, vL 281,
296 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, risen of Flushing, sent under General Osten to oppose
ln* them, and soon got possession of the whole island except
1309. the fortresses of Middleburg and Flushing, which were
invested, and the former of which immediately surren-
dered. At the same time, Lord Huntly, with 7000
men, appeared off the island of Cadsand, lying to the
south of the southern branch of the Scheldt, so that, if
they had gained it, the British at the very outset would
have became masters of both mouths of the Scheldt.
Unfortunately the commander, descrying a force on the
beach, which, though only 1500 men, looked stronger
than it really was, did not venture to hazard a landing.
This was much to be regretted ; for it is now known that
if the whole 7000 had landed and been reinforced by
the troops in the east channel, which were entirely dis-
posable, they could have made themselves masters of the
whole batteries on the southern bank of the Scheldt, and
206. ' arrived without resistance at the Tete du Flanclre, directly
opposite to Antwerp.1
As it was, the expedition met in the outset with great
First sue- success, and, beyond all doubt, had the means of achieving
the whole objects for which it was destined with very
little resistance. Batz is an important fort at the ex-
tremity of South Beveland, where the two branches of
the Scheldt unite, and within thirty miles of Antwerp.
North and South Beveland were inundated with troops
under General Ross, and 25,000 men could in a day
have been concentrated to advance from these islands to
that fortress. The position of the French fleet in the
Western Scheldt off Flushing was now very perilous ; for
the British naval force in its front was greatly superior to
it, so that it could not remain in its present position ;
and, on the other hand, the guns of the fort at Batz,
which might at any moment fall into the hands of the
invaders, commanded the passage up the western branch
of the river into the central stream. In these circum-
stances, which seemed all but desperate, it was rescued
cesses.
WAE ADMINISTRATION. 297
from immediate danger by the vigour and capacity CHAP.
of its commander, Admiral Missiessj, who, before the m-
British were aware of what he was intending, succeeded iso9.
in getting his ships through the perilous strait, and above July 31.
Fort Lillo, which was of such strength as to defy any
attack by a merely naval force. But the danger was
only adjourned, not removed. Two days after, Hope, Aug. 2.
with his division, 7000 strong, appeared before Batz,
which was evacuated by its garrison during the night ;
while the English ships succeeded in ascending both
branches of the river to the same point. Antwerp, with
the whole fleet and arsenals, was in the most imminent
danger. " Had the whole British army," says Thiers,
"followed Hope's division, by the way of South and
North Beveland, they would have been in a few days
before Antwerp, which was fortified indeed, but only by
old fortifications half fallen down, garrisoned barely by i Thiers,
2000 men, without a gun on the ramparts, and the au-
thorities were panic-struck by the unexpected appearance
of the enemy." All the French authorities concur in j!ai^u
.... > i°o9
this : Antwerp, with its magnificent fleet and arsenal, was Castiere
«* i- v» • • i- 4-N i • i • Corresp.
at the mercy or the British. Complete success was within soi.
their grasp, and might have been attained in three days.1*
At this decisive moment Lord Chatham, who, though a
man of capacity and information, was advanced in years,
* " General Pigot, who is my brother-in-law, commands at Litchfield ; by
such means I got a long interview with General Monnet at Litchfield last
December. He told me in plain terms what the real situation of Flushing and
Walcheren was ; that if the British troops had immediately attacked Antwerp,
they must have succeeded in taking that place, and in the destruction of the
French fleet. They sent him, he said, to Flushing 3000 men from Antwerp, of
such troops as they had, the same as his garrison was composed of, men of all
nations, who would not obey his orders, and who had fired on him and his
officers. He told me that the men of the city of Antwerp and all the neigh-
bourhood, they collected from report, might have amounted to 35,000 men ;
that was the most : few if any of them had seen service, and they had no
officers to command them. He said Lord Chatham had been led by his spies
into error as to their discipline, number, and strength' ; for he might, at any
time from the appearance of our fleet on the coast to the hour of his depar-
ture from Flushing, have taken Antwerp." — HENRY VERNON, ESQ., to LORD
CASTLEREAGH, Februai-y 1, 1810; Castlereayh Correspondence, vi. 328.
298 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, of indolent habits, and imbued with the ideas of the old
m- methodical school in war, deemed it indispensable to re-
1809. duce Flushing before proceeding farther. He thought it
i was essential to the safety of the expedition that he
of the should secure this important fortress and harbour as a
base for future operations, and a covering point for em-
barkation in case of disaster. These were in truth im-
portant objects of the campaign had it been likely to last
for any considerable period; but, heading as he did an
expedition intended for a coup-de-main, it was wholly
unnecessary to waste time on any such point, and
security was much more likely to be gained by a rapid
advance, and the immediate attainment of all the objects
of the expedition. So it was, however, that the resolution
was taken and immediately acted upon ; Lord Castle-
reagh's instructions to push on with the utmost celerity to
Antwerp were disregarded ; the troops were retained
inactive in North and South Beveland and Walcheren,
and the siege of Flushing was undertaken in form. Suc-
cess was easily obtained there ; ground was broken before
the fortress on the 5th August, after some inconsiderable
actions. On the llth, the frigates of the fleet passed
the batteries of Flushing, exchanging a warm cannon-
Aug. 12. ade with the guns on shore ; on the day following, Sir
Richard Strachan, at the head of ten sail of the line,
Aug. 13. passed also; and on the 13th, a tremendous cannonade
and bombardment were commenced from the ships and
frigates, and sixty heavy guns and mortars, with which
the land batteries were armed. The fire was kept up on
the following day with uncommon vigour, in the course
of which great part of the garrison was killed or wounded,
and the town was set on fire in several places. On the
Szw*1 l^th, General Monnet capitulated, with 5800 men who
Chatham's still remained of the garrison, which had been reinforced
(Vnn^Reg. by 3000 additional men from Antwerp. So far, all was
[S' 4S prosperous;1 but General Rousseau, by preventing the de-
barkation of the troops in the island of Cadsand, and
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 299
General Monnet, by detaining them fourteen days before CHAP.
Flushing, had ruined the principal objects of the ex-
pedition.
Great was the consternation in the Government at
Paris when the telegraph announced the descent ofstepsand
40,000 men at the mouth of the Scheldt ; " and then," ^e°0fa
says Thiers, " was seen in a striking manner the dangers °? Bearing
J J of the ex-
of a policy which, when 300,000 men were in Spain, pedition.
100,000 in Italy, and 300,000 in Germany, had not a
soldier left to protect Antwerp, Lille, or Paris."1 In the l Ti»ers, si.
first moments of alarm, the only thing they could think
of was to call out the National Guard in the maritime
provinces of the Low Countries, and to appoint Berna-
dotte to the command at Antwerp. But they were
extremely apprehensive of incurring the Emperor's dis-
pleasure in these steps, as he was known to be ex-
tremely reluctant to make any appeal to popular feel-
ing, and Bernadotte was personally obnoxious to him.
The consequence was that they did for some time nothing
efficient one way or other, except urging the King of
Holland to assume the command at Antwerp, and throw-
ing the gendarmes and customhouse officers of the neigh-
bourhood into the place. If Lord Chatham had been
aware how matters stood, he might with ease have taken
it, even after the long and unwise delay incurred in the
reduction of Flushing. As it was, the imperial wrath
exhaled in several angry letters to the War Minister and
the members of the Government at Paris, blaming them
for not calling out the National Guard and appointing
Bernadotte to the command. In these letters the great-
ness of his apprehensions and the anger he displayed
revealed in the clearest manner the importance of the
blow which had been struck, and the important results,
fatal to all his projects against England, with which, 2 Th;erg x.
if it had been executed with the same ability with which ^'l«f'
it had been conceived, it would have been attended.2 m.
One very curious letter, characteristic of his deep-rooted
300 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, distrust of volunteers or half-disciplined forces, deserves
m> a place in the text. " Do not attempt to come to blows
1809. with the English. ' A man is not a soldier.' Your na-
tional guards, your conscripts, organised in provisional
demi-brigades, huddled pell-mell into Antwerp, for the
most part without officers, with an artillery half-formed,
opposed to the bands of Moore, who have been engaged
with the troops of our old army, will infallibly be beaten,
and will furnish the English with a matter of boast which
will escape them if they do not make themselves masters
of our fleet, which I hope they have not done, or of Ant-
werp, which I am sure they will not be able to do. We
must oppose to the English nothing but the fever, which
will soon devour them all, and soldiers protected by em-
bankments and inundations while they are receiving
» Napoleon instruction and organising themselves. In a month, the
auMimste jjjjgjjgjj wQj j^ obliged to take to their ships covered
Aug"io, yrifa confusion, decimated by the fever, and I shall have
Thiers xi gaine(i by their expedition an army of 80,000 men, which
225, 2-26. win render me essential service if the war should continue
in Austria."
68 In conformity with these principles, Napoleon's orders
Nian°of°deS *° General Monnet were to defend Flushing to the last
fence of the extremity, for the double purpose of confining the English
in Walcheren during the unhealthy season, and gaining
time for preparing the defence of Antwerp. He enjoined
him not to lose a moment in cutting the dykes and lay-
ing the whole island under water. He ordered the fleet
at the same time to be withdrawn entirely to Ant-
werp, and even above it, if necessary ; to spread the
inundations on shore wherever it was required, but to
take care not to sink hulks in the narrow places, as he
had no intention of blocking up the navigation of the
Scheldt in the attempt to defend it. He ordered Berna-
dotte, whom he appointed to the command at Antwerp,
to collect the provisional deini-brigades and gendarmerie,
and the Dutch troops of the King of Holland, whose
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 301
united force he estimated at 25,000 men ; and to take CHAP.
up a position around Antwerp in situations as much as
possible covered by redoubts and inundations ; but care- 1809«
fully to avoid a battle, leaving it to the fever to dispose
of the English. Behind this, he directed the formation
of a second army, composed entirely of national guards,
arranged in five divisions, commanded by as many mili-
tary senators, who were to watch the left bank of the
Scheldt from the Tete du Flandre, a suburb of Antwerp,
to the western extremity of the island of Cadsand. This
second army was to be furnished with eighty guns drawn
from the fortresses in Flanders, and worked by ten com-
panies of artillery sent from France, and was to be under
the orders of Marshal Bessieres. Well knowing that
armies never produce of effective men one-half of what
is demanded and expected, Napoleon, in addition to these,
directed the formation of a third army on the Meuse,
composed of conscripts hurried from every part of the
nation, and all the convalescents who could be drawn from
the hospitals on the Rhine, in Germany, and in the in-
terior of France. The better to impose upon France and
Europe, always an essential point in the Emperor's policy,
he directed the army collected on the right bank of the
river to be called the " army of Antwerp," that on the
left, the army of the " Tete du Flandre," and the third,
the " army of reserve." He ordered, at the same time,
an article to be inserted in the Moniteur, detailing in the
minutest manner the measures of defence adopted, the i Napoleon
magnitude of the force in process of formation, which ^ Miuistre
was estimated at 80,000 men, and the certain approach- ^
ing discomfiture of the insane islanders who had hazarded isoy ;
Thiers xi
themselves on the territory of the great nation only to 465.
incur certain humiliation and defeat.1
Under these magniloquent declarations was concealed
the real terror of the Emperor, which the magnitude of
his defensive preparations, simultaneously ordered, too
clearly revealed. They decidedly proved the importance
302 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, of the blow struck bj Lord Castlcreagh and the wisdom
m- of the direction given to it. The troops ordered by the
1809. Emperor for the defence of Antwerp existed, at the time
wnen ne £ave n^s orders, in a great measure only in his
which Ant- fruitful and sanguine imagination ; and if the instructions
have been given to Lord Chatham had been duly executed, that
firsthand fortress would have been taken and the fleet destroyed
tile "an 'of before 5000 men could have been collected for its defence.
Flushing. jja(j jje confcented himself with merely observing Flushing
with 10,000 men, after the fort of Batz, only thirty miles
from Antwerp, was taken, in the beginning of August, and
advanced with 30,000 either by the island of Cadsand
and the left bank of the river, or the fort of Lillo and the
right bank, the fortress and the whole fleet must in-
fallibly have been taken, almost without resistance. The
French military writers are unanimous on this point.
Even after Flushing was taken, on the 16th August,
although the difficulty of the enterprise was much aug-
mented, if a rapid advance with a concentrated force of
30,000 men had been made, Antwerp must have fallen,
and the whole objects of the expedition have been at-
tained. In five days after that event, on the 22d August,
they might have been before the gates of Antwerp with
their whole forces and guns, the very day on which Na-
poleon's orders for the formation of the armies for its
defence were dated from Schonbrunn, near Vienna. At
this time there were scarcely any guns mounted on the
ramparts of Antwerp ; and not 15,000 effective men, and
these mostly of the most wretched description, were col-
lected, with only twenty-four guns ill-harnessed, for its
i Thiers, xi. defence.1 Could they have withstood a larger British
' force than fought at Waterloo'? If ever a glorious vic-
torJ and decisive success were within the grasp of the
British army, it was on this occasion ; and Waterloo itself
did not confer a more decisive advantage than that with
which it would have been attended.
Instead of stretching out their hands to seize the
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 303
trophy thus presented to their grasp, the British com- CHAP.
inanders, after the fall of Flushing, lost much precious IIL
time in a violent altercation which got up between the J809.
military and naval commanders, as to whether the bulk of Arri™j of
the army, with the artillery and baggage, should be trans- ^^'f^
ported by sea or land to the fort of Batz, of which abandon-
General Hope was master. After a long debate, Lord advance.
Chatham decided on moving them by water, instead of
traversing North and South Beveland on foot, as Hope's
division had done ; and the difficult operation was suc-
cessfully accomplished, chiefly in frigates and vessels of
light draught, by the skill and energy of Sir Richard
Strachan and the officers and sailors under his command.
But the extraordinary difficulty of transporting a fleet
consisting of between two and three hundred sail by the
two branches of the Scheldt through an intricate and
difficult navigation, was such that it was not till the 25th
August that the whole armament was collected at Batz.
By this time the period of easy if not possible success had
passed. The forces of the enemy were daily increasing
by the successive arrival of national guards at Antwerp,
and the completion of the formidable obstructions to pre-
vent the ascent of the Scheldt, which Admiral Missiessy
had formed in its bed. Their number was much exag-
gerated by false reports studiously furnished to Lord
Chatham's spies by the counter-spies of the enemy. On
the other hand, the effective forces of the British were
seriously diminished since they had landed in Walcheren.
As Napoleon had predicted, the fever of the country had
proved the best ally of the French, and far more formid-
able than the sword of the enemy. Fifteen thousand
men were already in hospital at Flushing and Middle-
burg, the victims of the dreadful fever which never fails
in the autumnal months to desolate those low and marshy
flats, and the effect of which was much aggravated
by the long inactivity of the troops in unhealthy situa-
tions during the siege of Flushing. Not more than
304 LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP. 24,000 effectives remained out of upwards of 40,000
IIL \vlio had landed, and some of them required to be left
1809. behind to guard the communications. Possibly a Wel-
lington, a Maryborough, or a Clyde, would, even with this
diminished force, have pushed on and accomplished the
whole objects of the expedition ; but the enterprise would
have been difficult and attended with hazard. What
would have been easy with a fresh army on the 25th
July, had become a very different matter with a weakened
and sickly army and a greatly increased enemy on the
25th August. So Lord Chatham and a council of war,
held at Batz on the 27th, decided. It was there deter-
mined— and, in the circumstances, probably wisely — that
any farther advance had now become impossible, and
r^Ju * that nothing remained to be done but to withdraw the
Chatham s
Despg^Aug. troops to the island of Walcheren, which it was resolved
Fari. Deb. to retain till further orders were received from Govern-
ment.
Great were the rejoicings at Antwerp when the retro-
Rejoicings grade movement of the British was ascertained. Passing
La vaine-rp' from the extreme of terror to that of exultation, they
£stingof gave way to the most extravagant rejoicings for the
S.rga2s!te' ignominious retreat of the presumptuous invader from
their shores. In reality, the troops there had had scarce
any share in the triumph, which was due entirely to the
firmness of others on the one side, and the spread of
disease on the other; but, like many other men, having
done the least, they boasted the most. Bernadotte,
in whom extravagant vanity was mingled with brilliant
abilities, was the first to set the example of this self-
laudation. "The success," says Thiers, "was in reality
due exclusively to the firmness of General Rousseau,
who prevented the disembarkation in the island of
Cadsand on the 1st August; the resistance of General
Monnet, who caused the invaders to lose a precious
interval of time in the reduction of Flushing ; in fine,
the sangfroid of Admiral Missiessy, who saved the
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 305
fleet by his skilful manoeuvres. Nevertheless, Marshal CHAP.
Bernadotte, ever ready to sound his own applauses, ad- IIL
dressed a new order of the day to his troops, to con- 1809.
gratulate them on the victory they had gained over the
English — an order of the day which met with no better
reception from the Emperor at Schonbrimn than that
which he had addressed to the Saxons after the battle of 244-246. Ml
Wagram."1*
The English Government for a short time thought of
retaining possession of the island of Walcheren, which, Rapid and
being defensible by ships, might, it was believed, resist ^1 of°the
all the attacks of the enemy; and its situation, hermeti- £ch^ch
cally closing the Scheldt, promised to neutralise all the compels the
J . 3 x . . evacuation
advantages which Napoleon expected to derive from his of the island.
armaments in the upper part of that river. Possibly the
thing might have done, had it not been for the unhealthi-
ness of the climate ; and, if so, it would have proved an
infinite source of annoyance to the French Emperor,
who could ill brook part of the territory of the great
nation remaining in the hands of an enemy. But the
extreme sickness of the troops, much exceeding any-
thing which had been anticipated, ere long rendered its
retention impossible. The pestilential gales of autumn,
in that low and marshy swamp, soon thinned the ranks
more rapidly than the sword of the enemy could have
done. The disease most prevalent — which was ascribed
by the medical officers to the badness of the water, the
dampness of their lodgings, immoderate consumption of
unripe fruit, habits of intoxication, and exposure to night
air — assumed the form of a typhoid fever, which spread
with alarming rapidity. Sixteen thousand were ere long
in hospital, and all who were seized with the malady
were lost to the expedition ; for it was a peculiarity of the
complaint, as of most others of an aguish character, that
the patient never recovered as long as he remained in
* In -which all that his corps of Saxons did, was to run away on the evening
of the first day of the battle.
VOL. I. U
30G LORD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAJ>. the same atmosphere, and that removal to Britain was
m> indispensable to convalescence. Even with that the pro-
1809. gress of amendment was in general distressingly slow,
and great numbers, even of such as survived, bore the
malady about them for years, and could be distinguished
in the ranks by their wan visages and emaciated figures.
In these circumstances it was evident that if they re-
mained much longer in the island the whole armament
Sept. 2. would perish or be disabled ; and the British Cabinet, on
kfp^rton 2d September, unanimously and wisely adopted the
Srheren opinion of the Council of War that it should be aban-
ii? 3' doned, and the whole expedition, naval and military, re-
turn home. This was accordingly done ; and the great-
~ '
Corresp. vi. . .. _^ .
337-341; est armament which ever sailed from the Eiiiropean shores
left the scenes of their early triumphs, baffled, discomfited,
and covered with confusion.1
The expedition, which terminated in this disastrous
rpo
cause of the result, ably and wisely conceived in the general plan by
;. Lord Castlereagh, and composed of the largest forces
by sea and land which ever sailed from the British Isles,
failed entirely from errors in the execution. Thrice over
the opportunity of decisive success was presented to the
British Commander-in-Chief, and thrice over he failed to
seize it. First, in not landing half his force in the island
of Cadsand, when Lord Huntly, with his division, ap-
peared off it, while the other half occupied Walcheren ;
had he done so, the right wing of the army might have
advanced to the Tete du Flandre, and occupied Antwerp,
then defenceless, and garrisoned only by 2000 men.
Secondly, in not taking advantage of the extraordinary
good fortune of the light vessels of the fleet being able
to penetrate to Batz, almost in sight of Antwerp, by the
eastern mouth of the Scheldt, within three days after the
troops landed, and not pushing the land troops direct
on that point, so as to seize the batteries and render the
straits impassable, by which the French fleet moored off
Flushing could alone ascend the river to that fortress.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 30 7
Tins would have secured the destruction of the whole ves- CHAP.
sels afloat, in itself an object of the very highest moment. IIT-
Thirdly, and above all, if the descent on Cadsand was l^°9-
abandoned, in not pushing on to Antwerp at the very
first with the whole force not required for the blockade
of Flushing — a measure perfectly practicable, as the flo-
tilla had got up to Batz while that fortress was still in
the enemy s hands. This would, at very little cost of
life, and with very little difficulty, have secured the whole
objects of the expedition ; the troops, kept in a constant
state of activity and excitement, would have, as long as
it continued, proved to a great degree inaccessible to the
fever; and they might have been brought away covered
with laurels before the unhealthy period had reached its
worst. It is to the neglect to do any of these things that
Napoleon ascribed the failure of the expedition, which
otherwise would have been certain of success.* And
this, in the last resort, was owing to the military and
naval commanders neglecting Lord Castlereagh's instruc-
tions to regard the expedition as a coup-de-main, in
which success was to be attained by vigour and celerity
* Napoleon's words, which are of the very highest importance in this mat-
ter, were as follow : " The fleet," said he, " when the expedition arrived on the
coast of Holland, was moored off Flushing. The great object of Chatham
should have been to cut off the fleet from A ntwerp, which would necessarily
have led to the destruction of both, for Antwerp had only a garrison of 3000
men. This might have been done by pushing forward a corps of 6000 men
through South Beveland to Batz the day the expedition landed; the fleet
would then have been cut off from Antwerp, and both it and the fortress
must have surrendered. But the moment that the fleet got up to Antwerp,
which it did soon after the siege of Flushing began, the failure of the expedi-
tion was certain." — NAPOLEON, in Montholon, ii. 261, and i. 219. " I am of
opinion," said he to O'Meara, " that if you had landed a few thousand men at
first at Williamstadt, and marched direct to Antwerp, you might, between
consternation, want of preparations, and the uncertainty of the number of the
assailants, have taken it by a coup-de-main ; but after the fleet got up it was
impossible."— O'Meara, i. 255. It is easy, doubtless, to be wise after the event,
but Lord Castlereagh was here wise before the event ; for the plan of operations
which Napoleon said would have been successful — viz., pushing on at once
to Batz, and then across to Santlivet, so as to cutoff the fleet from Antwerp —
was precisely the one for carrying out his coup-de-m.ain which Lord Castle-
reagh had recommended in his detailed instructions to the Commander of
the Forces.
308 LORD CASTLEREAGH S
CHAP, of movement, and pursuing it according to the slower
m- rules of methodical warfare.
1809. The public dissatisfaction at this calamitous issue of
eauiis- au expedition, on which the hopes of the nation had so
satisfaction }onor been set, was the more intense in Great Britain,
in England &
at the fail- that its commencement had been, beyond all expectation,
expedition, successful; and that the victories of Sir Arthur Wellesley
in the Peninsula, with a force not half of that at the dis-
posal of Lord Chatham, and against an enemy infinitely
superior, had, not without reason, led the people to be-
lieve that their soldiers were invincible, and that the fall
of the French empire was rapidly approaching. These
discontents were worked up to a perfect pitch of frenzy
by the accounts daily received of the rapidly increasing
sickness and mortality in the isle of Walcheren, and
the gaunt figures and woeful visages of such of the
troops as returned from that scene of suffering. Igno-
rant of, or incapable of appreciating, the real causes
which had led to its failure, the people burst forth in
loud complaints against the authors of the expedition,
which, it was said, conceived in folly, and suggested by
infatuation, had been planned in ignorance, and executed
with incapacity. Upon the head of Lord Castlereagh,
as Minister-at-War, and known to have been its principal
author, the vials of the public wrath were, in an especial
manner, discharged ; and this, coupled with the simul-
taneous retreat of the army in Spain to Estremadura,
after the battle of Talavera, and the fearful sickness and
mortality of the troops there, spread abroad a general
opinion of his unfitness for the lead in military arrange-
ments and combinations. It is not surprising it was so :
the English people as yet knew war only in its holiday
dress ; they were ignorant of the slow steps by which the
summits of military greatness are reached, of the fearful
waste of life at which the conquests of the French em-
pire were purchased, and that the mortality they deplored
in Walcheren and Spain was not a tithe of that which
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 309
annually attended the march of the imperial legions. CHAP.
But the spread of these opinions in the nation, which m-
were aggravated by the violence of the daily press, caused isos.
an intrigue to come to light in the Cabinet, discredit-
able only to its authors, but which now reached maturity,
and exercised an important influence on the career of
Lord Castlereagh, and was not without its effect on the
fortunes of the British empire.
Unknown to that statesman, and without giving him
the slightest reason to suspect its existence, a party had intrigue in
been formed in the Cabinet inimical to him, and the to^cniTm
object of which was to get him removed from his position ^
as Minister -at- War, and Lord Wellesley substituted in
his room. This was arranged by the whole Cabinet,
with the exception of his Lordship, as early as the 4th of Apri| 4.
April 1809. Mr Canning then said that the views which
he entertained regarding the future conduct of the war
were so utterly at variance with those adopted and hither-
to acted upon by Lord Castlereagh, that they could no
longer, with advantage to the public service, form mem-
bers of the same Government, and that one or other must
be called upon to resign. He professed, at the same time,
his own willingness to retire. The Duke of Portland,
with his whole Ministry, seem to have acquiesced in this
opinion ; but, dreading the loss of the oratorical talents
of Mr Canning, they requested him to withhold his
proffered resignation, and suggested the most profound
secrecy on the intended removal of Lord Castlereagh.
This injunction was strictly obeyed, and Lord Castle-
reagh remained in entire ignorance that his removal had
been resolved on, although it was quite fixed, and the
King's pleasure had been taken upon the subject. He
continued in this state of ignorance till the beginning of
September, when Mr Canning threatened, if the removal
was any longer delayed, to resign himself. This brought
matters to a crisis, and on the 7th September the painful sept. 7.
duty was devolved on Lord Camden of communicating to
310 LORD OASTLEREAGHS
CHAP, his early and dear friend, whom he had in a manner in-
m> troduced into public life, the determination of the Cabinet
18°9- to call upon him to resign. He did not, however, make
him aware how long his removal had been resolved on, or
that he had been allowed to conduct the war in Portugal,
the Talavera campaign, and Walcheren expedition, after
his removal had been determined on. Lord Castlereagh,
conceiving that the change had been resolved on merely
to strengthen the Ministry by the substitution of some
other person in his room, agreed to resign, but declined
to accept the situation of President of the Council, which
was pressed upon him by Lord Camden. *
So far all was well ; and, contrary to what might have
been expected in the circumstances, this extraordinary
secret intrigue had arrived at the desired result without
* " October 26. — Lord Camden having expressed a great anxiety to talk
with me, I called on him this morning, when he entered fully into Lord
Castlereagh's business, so far as he had been concerned in it ; and after going
through his narrative, showed me some letters which had passed between him
and the Duke of Portland, respecting the arrangement pressed for by Mr Can-
ning, either for a new division of the departments, or for the Marquess of Wel-
lesley to be named for that of War. Lord Camden admits the communication
to have been made to him as early as, Mr Canning states, the end of April; but
so far from his being at liberty to acquaint Lord Castlereagh with it, it was made
to him under the most solemn injunction of secrecy, respecting which he was
so uneasy, that, on the 29th June, he wrote to the Duke of Portland to know
whether he was in any mistake about that, to which the Duke answered the
same day that he was not, stating that he had most strongly enjoined him to
secrecy, in the hope that matters might be so arranged as to avoid the neces-
sity of anything being said to Lord Castlereagh on the subject; his Grace taking
upon himself, in the clearest terms, whatever blatne might attach to the con-
cealment. A further correspondence took place between Lord Camden and
the Duke of Portland in July, begun by the latter on the same subject ; his
Grace continuing to press for silence till the end of the Walcheren expedition,
upon the same ground as before. And at length, when disclosure became in-
dispensably necessary, Lord Camden made it to Lord Castlereagh on 7th Sep-
tember, without, however, letting him know how early the matter had been
decided on, not conceiving it necessary that his Lordship's feelings should be
wounded by a knowledge that his removal from office had been acquiesced in
by his colleagues before the expedition had been set on foot, and that he had
been allowed to conduct the whole of it when his death-warrant was in their
possession. Lord Castlereagh, then, having been led to believe that the mea-
sure was only now adopted to strengthen the Government, agreed to resign,
and declined to accept any other office offered him, Lord Camden having
pressed his own, the Presidentship of the Council, upon him." — ROSE'S Diary,
ii. 421, 422. A very entertaining and valuable work.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 311
having been discovered, or the real motives of the pro- CHAP.
ceeding suspected. But this lull in the political tern- m-
pest was not of long duration. The story of the way in 1^09-
which it came out must be given in Mr George Rose's
words : " It was not till Lord Castlereagh was shown the
correspondence of Mr Canning by Mr Perceval, that he
expressed any resentment or unpleasant feeling on
subject. It was from that he learned how early his re- both resign
moval had been consented to by his Majesty and his col-
leagues, and it was in that that he met with passages
which induced him to challenge Mr Canning — a proceed-
ing which I still think, even admitting some misconcep-
tion on the part of Lord Castlereagh, his Lordship was
utterly unjustified in adopting. If he had determined to
call out any one, the Duke of Portland was the only de-
linquent to whom he should have resorted ; and he had
no motive whatever, but an anxious desire to reconcile
matters in the best way he could, and, if possible, prevent
any breach among the Ministers — constantly hoping that
an accommodation might be effected in some way or
other, and at last thinking that his (Duke of Portland)
own resignation could afford an opportunity for such an
arrangement as might, to a certain extent at least, be
satisfactory to Lord Castlereagh. That, however, was
defeated by Mr Canning urging a separate arrange-
ment, as is proved by the extracts of the correspondence
which I made from the papers Mr Canning put into my
hands on the 16th September."1 The result was, that1!*-**".
T i /~i 1 i •• i 111 • Diary, n.
Lord Castlereagh, conceiving that the whole was an in- 4-22, 423.
trigue of Mr Canning's to get him removed from office in .
order to facilitate his own advancement, and that he him-
self had been ill-used by being allowed so long and at so
critical a juncture to retain the responsibility of office
when his removal had been not only resolved on by the
Cabinet, but submitted to his Majesty and approved by
him, sent Mr Canning a challenge. The parties met and
exchanged shots. Mr Canning's fire did not take effect ;
312 LORD CASTLEREAGH S
CHAP, but that of Lord Castlereagh inflicted a severe flesh
m- wound on the thigh of his adversary, which fortunately
1809. did not prove mortal. Both parties, as a natural conse-
i Castle quence> resigned their situations in the Cabinet : Lord
reagh cor- Welleslcy succeeded Mr Canning as Foreign Minister, and
?2S,P73.' Lord Liverpool undertook the arduous duties of Minister-
at-War.1
Without pretending to justify the barbarous practice of
Mr Can- duelling, now happily almost gone into desuetude, it may
ducfwaT" safely be affirmed that Lord Castlereagh was the ag-
grieved party on this occasion, and that Mr Canning's
conduct, so far as the concealment was concerned, was
indefensible. Such, accordingly, was the opinion openly
expressed at the time by persons the most opposed to
each other in ordinary politics.* The mere fact of part
of the Cabinet, or indeed the whole excepting one mem-
ber, entering into a concerted plan to get that one ex-
cluded from his situation, is not in itself a matter for re-
prehension. It may sometimes be a duty which public
servants owe to the service to adopt this painful step
with an old comrade. But it is one thing as a matter
of duty to take steps for the removal of a public ser-
vant from a situation of responsibility for which he is
deemed unfit ; it is another and a very different thing
to allow him to remain in power during an arduous and
critical time, when, simultaneously, decisive steps, un-
known to him, have been taken for his dismissal. To do
this is at once a dereliction of public duty, and a treach-
ery to private friendship : the first, because it is a reten-
tion in office of a person deemed unfit to be intrusted
* "Tuesday, October 31. — The Duke of Cumberland again rode up to me in
Hyde Park, and talked of the probability of the Government going on, of
which he expressed rather a sanguine expectation, but very much disliked
Lord Liverpool being at the War Department. He had seen Mr Canning, and
read all the papers he put into his hands ; after which, he said, he had a strong
impression that that gentleman's conduct was utterly unjustifiable, and that he
was persuaded he now regrets the step he had taki n, of which I entertain no
doubt. His Royal Highness desired me to read Cobbetfs paper of last Satur-
day, in-which he attacks Mr Canning with (jreat severity ; this, however, I feel
no disposition to read." — ROSE'S Diary.
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 313
with its duties ; the last, because it is subjecting that CHAP.
person to the responsibility of measures which it is not m-
intended he shall either bring to maturity or reap the IBOS.
credit of their success.
This resignation threw Lord Castlereagh out of office
for two years and a half, during which time his energies Resume of
could be exerted only on behalf of his country by his mgV>
efforts in Parliament. During this period his biography mentJtt
necessarily turns into an abstract of his parliamentary
speeches ; and on no occasion did the services he rendered
to the public interests stand forth more pre-eminent. But
before entering on that, a rapid summary of what he had
already done may tend to show how far Great Britain was
indebted to his exertions. He entered upon the direction
of the War Office in April 1807, on the verge of the battle
of Friedland and treaty of Tilsit, when the victories of
Napoleon had enabled him to array the whole forces of the
Continent, with the exception of Sweden, against us, and
when our alliance even with Russia, the last and most
faithful of our supporters, had been broken by the un-
happy refusal of the Whig Government to render her
any, even the most trifling, assistance, during the critical
months, when the scales of fortune hung even, which im-
mediately succeeded the battle of Eylau. When removed
froai office in September 1809, he had succeeded, by his
unaided efforts, not only in securing the independence of
his country and arresting the torrent of Napoleon's victo-
ries, but he had set in motion that chain of events which
in their final results produced his decline and fall. He
had, by land forces skilfully directed, and by taking proper
advantage of the means of descent on decisive points which
the command of the sea afforded, wrested from the enemy,
during this short period, a hundred sail of the line, and
forty frigates, of which a third had been brought as prizes,
or to be detained in security, to the British shores. He
had deprived the French Emperor of both the wings of the
vast naval armament which he was preparing for our de-
LOUD CASTLEREAGHS
CHAP, structiou, and which it was the principal object of his life
IIL to render irresistible. He had planned and fitted out the
1809. greatest expedition of land and sea forces which the world
had ever seen, and which, if it had been directed in the
field with the same skill and vigour with which it had
been planned in the Cabinet, would have cut Napoleon's
naval centre through the middle, destroyed one-half of his
remaining maritime resources, and for ever determined the
war in our favour, by reducing to a mere fraction the fleets
of the enemy. He had resuscitated the contest on the
Continent, brought the British legions to contend on terms
of equality with the French on their own element, and
fanned a flame in the Peninsula destined never to be
extinguished till the Imperial eagles were chased with dis-
grace beyond the Pyrenees. He had fitted out an army,
and appointed a commander, whose exploits had already
recalled the days of Crecy and Agincourt. He had estab-
lished a military system for the defence of the country,
based on the local, and gradually ascending through the
regular, militia to the line, which amply provided for the
national defence, and furnished an inexhaustible stream of
recruits to supply the waste of life in the Peninsular cam-
paigns, and left a disposable force of 60,000 to second
the efforts of their immortal general. The military system
of Prussia and Austria is in great measure founded on this
model. By the example which he set in Spain, he had
revived the spirit of resistance in Germany, and brought
Napoleon to the brink of ruin on the field of Aspern. He
had adopted a plan for the defence of Portugal, which,
conceived and executed by Wellington, proved the salvation
of that country, and in its ultimate results led to the deliver-
ance of Europe. Never was a Minister who, in so short
a time, had conferred such benefits on his country, or so
quickly raised it from a state of imminent danger to one
of comparative security and imperishable glory. What
was the return which his countrymen made to him for
these inestimable services ? Was it that he was crowned
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 315
with laurel, and honoured with a civic ovation for having CHAP.
saved the State 1 It was that he was overwhelmed with _
obloquy, and by a unanimous vote of the Cabinet declared 1809.
unfit to retain the office of WAR Minister !
This extraordinary decision was generally ascribed at
the time to the ambitious and intriguing disposition of Real causes
Mr Canning, which could not brook a rival, and took
advantage of the excitement produced by the failure of the
Walcheren expedition to overturn, as he thought, a for- [£afjv^nac
midable competitor for power. But without disputing the of the as
influence which these circumstances may have had in pro-
ducing the movement which occasioned Lord Castlereagh's
temporary fall, it is evident that more general and power-
ful causes contributed to the result than the efforts of any
individual, how ambitious or powerful soever, for his own
advancement. The fall of Lord Castlereagh was the work
of the whole Cabinet, and was very generally approved at
the time by a large portion at least of the people, who,
judging only from the failure of the Walcheren expedition,
and the retreat of Wellington from Talavera, deemed the
Minister in fault under whose war administration these
untoward results had occurred. These ideas were in an
especial manner embraced by Mr Canning, who, although
he in public supported Lord Castlereagh's continued war-
fare, was in secret distrustful of it, and inclined to the
Whig system of shutting ourselves up in our island, leaving
the Continent to its fate. Having no turn himself for
military affairs, and being from early association inclined
to the Liberal side, he was more influenced by the brilliant
oratory of Mr Fox against Continental exclusion, than the
sober historical references of Lord Castlereagh in its favour.
It is not surprising that it was so. Judging from the mere
surface of things, the case was against the War Minister;
and it was not till years after his death that the triumphant
vindication of his memory was furnished by the final re-
sult, and correspondence and documents published by his
enemies. In truth, Lord Castlereagh was the object of
316 LOKD CASTLEREAGH'S
CHAP, general obloquy from his opponents, and secret distrust
IIL from his friends, because he was in advance of the age in
1809. which his public career commenced, and time had not jet
brought the irresistible logic of experience to support his
views and confound the predictions of his rivals.
He first originated the system of La Grande Guerre
Causes'of against France. Striking out alike from the policy of
the general . .
distrust of petty sugar-island conquests pursued by Mr Pitt, and the
reaehCaTtle entire abandonment of Continental alliances recommended
• .
me> by Mr Fox and practised by Lord Grey, he assailed at
once with the whole combined naval and military force of
the country the vital and accessible points of the enemy's
territory. The signal success with which this new system
was attended in Portugal and at Copenhagen, where it
discomfited the most cherished maritime projects of the
French Emperor, were inadequate at the time to reconcile
the nation to a change of system so entirely at variance
with the previous policy of the country and the strongest
recommendations of its ablest statesmen. Men were startled
by the adoption of a warfare so different from any which
Mr Fox had recommended, or Mr Pitt had practised ; they
could not get over the constant assertions of the Opposi-
tion, that it was-in vain to attempt to contend with France
on the Continent, and that the only way was to husband
our resources for the defence of our own shores. The
repeated defeats experienced in the former years of the
war with small expeditions, appeared to give too much
countenance to these ideas. In this state of general
opinion, the sending 70,000 British troops at once to
the Continent seemed little short of an act of insanity,
which the retreat from Talavera and repulse at Walcheren
must for ever condemn as fatal, if pursued, to the best
interests of the country. They were ignorant of what time
has since revealed, that both of these abortive expeditions
were conceived on the justest principles, and on the verge
of the most splendid success; that but for the tardiness
of Lord Chatham, and disregard of Lord Castlereagh's
WAR ADMINISTRATION. 317
instructions, the last would have led to the destruction of CHAP.
half the remaining naval resources of the enemy ; the 1IL
first, but for the obstinacy of Cuesta, have brought the 18°9-
allied standards in triumph to Madrid. In a word, the
new and resolute mode of warfare originally conceived by
Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart, and afterwards
executed by Wellington, met with the same reception,
when first introduced, that the discovery of Watt did from
practical mechanics, and its application to sailing vessels
from philosophers. There is nothing excites such animo-
sity among men, as disturbing settled ideas; and the in-
tensity of the feeling is in general exactly in proportion
to the justness of the new ones.
CHAPTER IV.
KIR CHAELES STEWART, FROM HIS SERVICE WITH THE EXPE-
DITION TO THE HELDER IN 1799 TO HIS RECEIVING THE
THANKS OF PARLIAMENT IN 1809.
CHAP. WHILE Lord Castlereagh was engaged in the arduous
IV- duties of Secretary for Ireland during the critical periods
1798. Of tne Rebellion and Union, and the still more important
sumfeof cares of War Secretary during the Copenhagen expedi-
ewartf8 ti°n and the Peninsular and Walcheren campaigns, his
98fr°m brother, Sir Charles Stewart, was occupied in making
himself master of those practical details connected with
his profession, without the command of which the greatest
military native genius will generally be found awanting in
the hour of trial. The first important duty on foreign
service in which he was engaged was with the expedition
which was sent to Holland in 1797, to co-operate with
the grand attack of the Allies on the French Republic,
then directed by the feeble hands of the Directory during
the absence of Buonaparte in Egypt. The regiment to
which he was attached, the 18th Dragoons, was, when he
joined it in January 1797, a mere skeleton; but under
his active direction it rapidly improved in discipline and
increased in numbers, and it was one of those selected
for foreign service on this occasion.
The service was one of the most important which had
is ^eWices occurred since the commencement of the war. The Bri-
olhfifa'11 tish force, to which a Russian one of still greater nume-
rical amount was to be joined, was charged with the task
SIR CHARLES STEWART. 319
of delivering Holland from the thraldom of the French CHAP.
Republicans, who had in the most shameful manner
abused the rights of conquest, and rendered the whole 1799.
inhabitants ripe for revolt. The campaign on which they
entered was of unparalleled extent, for it stretched from
the banks of the Po over the Alps, and down the whole
course of the Rhine to the marshes of Holland. During
the whole of the short but active campaign which followed,
Sir Charles was incessantly on horseback, and with the
outposts, which were almost entirely formed of the troop-
ers of his regiment. In this arduous duty he was fre-
quently under fire, and exposed to the greatest danger.
In such a service it was scarcely possible he could long
remain unhurt ; and he narrowly escaped with his life
during an affair of the outposts near Shogenbrugh on the
1 Oth October in the same year. One musket-ball struck his
head ; and another, nearly at the same instant, came with
great violence against his breast. The lattejr would in all
probability have proved fatal, had it not fortunately been
turned aside by the brass tube of the glass which hung
round his neck.
He returned to England with the expedition, which had
partially accomplished the objects for which it had been He is 'ap-
sent out, as, independently of proving an important diver- xTae-de-
sion to the Austrian forces in Germany, it brought away J^ In!!'9
the entire Dutch fleet at the Texel, consisting of eight sail ^£r s*f'
of the line and several frigates. He was not again state for
engaged in active service till the Peninsular war broke
out ; but in the interim both honours and important
offices fell to his lot. On 25th September 1803 he was
promoted to the rank of colonel, and soon after appointed
aide-de-camp to the King, a situation of distinction, as a
reward of merit, but not attended with active duties.
Ere long, however, he was transferred to more important
duties of an administrative kind. He was appointed
Under Secretary of State for Ireland, an arduous and
responsible situation, especially at that time, when the
320 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, island was still smarting under the wounds received, and
rr' agitated by the passions awakened, during the Rebellion of
1803. 1 798, and the outbreak in Dublin in 1803. As his known
firmness and resolution of character had procured for him
in perilous times this important situation, so the mingled
steadiness of his administration, and courtesy of his
manners, secured to him during the whole time that he
held it — which was till the Peninsular war broke out in
1808 — the respect and regard of all classes of the com-
munity. This period of his life was signalised by an
event of great importance. During his residence at the
Castle of Dublin he became intimate with the Earl of
Darnley's family, and on the 8th August 1808 he was
married to an elegant and accomplished lady, Lady
Catherine Bligh, fourth daughter of that nobleman, by
whom he had a son, who afterwards became the fourth
Lord Londonderry.
But more stirring times were approaching; and the
First opera- trumpet of war, which sent forth a loud blast from the
sm P°r Spanish peninsula, called Colonel Stewart alike from his
pacific duties and the endearments of home to more ani-
mating dangers in the field. No sooner had Government
determined on sending out an expedition to Portugal than
he relinquished his high situation in Ireland, and pro-
ceeded to that country with the force commanded by
Sir John Moore, in M'hich he had obtained the command
of a brigade of hussars. The armament to which he was
attached, which consisted of ten thousand men, was the
second, in order of time, which sailed from the British
shore, and proceeded to Mondego Bay, there to await
orders from Sir Hew Dalrymple, who was the Commander-
in-Chief. Adverse winds, however, rendered landing there
impossible at that time ; arid as it was of the highest
importance that the latter should be informed as soon as
possible of the approach of so powerful a reinforcement,
Sir John Moore looked anxiously round for an officer upon
whose spirit and steadiness he could rely to carry the
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 321
information. His choice fell upon Colonel Stewart, who CHAP.
forthwith set out on his mission, which was not a little IV*
perilous, as the intervening country was for the most part isos.
inundated with the enemy's light troops. It was per-
formed, however, with perfect success. The first part of
the journey was made in a frigate : when it neared the
shore he got into an open boat, which landed him with no
small difficulty at the village of >3t Nazarath, at a consi-
derable distance from the British headquarters. Thither
the journey had to be performed on foot ; but after
undergoing great fatigue, and surmounting severe hard-
ships, he reached the place of his destination, four days
after the battle of Vimeira had rendered the approach of
the succour, in the mean time at least, of comparatively
little importance.
After this, Colonel Stewart remained with the army
in Portugal, of which, after the recall of Sir Harry His advance
* * Q
Burrard, and the return of Sir Arthur Wellesley on leave with sir'"
to give evidence on the convention of Cintra, Sir JohnJohnMoore*
Moore assumed the command. An advance into Spain
having been resolved on to support the movements of the
Spanish armies, which after their surprising successes
were converging in pursuit of the French towards the
Ebro, Colonel, now Major-General, Stewart was attached
to the division which, under the command of Sir John
Hope, afterwards Earl of Hopeton, advanced towards
Madrid. Major-General Stewart with his brigade of
hussars covered the advance of the column ; and the ar-
rangements were made with such foresight and judgment
that the troops arrived at Navalcarnero, within twenty
miles of Madrid, little fatigued, in the best order and in
the highest spirits. The general point of rendezvous for
the army was Salamanca, in the vicinity of which it was
expected the decisive blow would be struck. Thither,
accordingly, after leaving Navalcarnero, Hope's divi-
sion proceeded by the road of the Escurial, General
Stewart with his hussars still covering the advance. The
YOL. T. X
322 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, junction with the main body at Salamanca having been
IV- effected, Sir John Moore, after considerable hesitation,
isos. determined to advance. Whilst forming the advanced
guard, General Stewart came with his brigade of cavalry
upon a French detachment lying at Rueda, between Tor-
desillas and Nava, which he succeeded in surprising, and
where he took a large supply of cotton. On entering
Villapondo he again surprised a French major of cavalry,
who was proceeding with an escort to join his regiment,
and, with his followers, was made prisoner.
The army, 25,000 strong, having made a forward
Gallant movement on Sahagun, threatened the communications of
SS^on"6" the French army. The greatest enthusiasm for a brief
of th^Siy period pervaded the British troops. In several skir-
towariis mishes between the cavalry of the British and that of
Orahcia. _ . "
Dec. 1808. the French, the superiority of the former was strikingly
evinced, particularly on the 20th December, when Lord
Paget defeated a considerable body of the French hussars,
and made a hundred and fifty-seven prisoners. But as it
was known that Napoleon in person was hastening at the
head of 50,000 men from Madrid, across the Guadarama
Pass, to attack them in flank and threaten their rear,
while Soult with 18,000 lay in their front, this bold
line of action was of necessity abandoned ; and, to the
infinite mortification of the soldiers, orders were given
to retreat towards Galicia. General Stewart with his
brigade of hussars, consisting of the 10th, 18th, and 8th
German dragoons, were intrusted with the arduous duty
of covering the rear, and they were soon brought in
contact with the very best horsemen in the French army,
deLon's°pen- consisting of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, which
war [ 250 kad come up with the Emperor in person. This brought
254.' on a most brilliant cavalry action near Benavente, in which
General Stewart particularly distinguished himself.1
The rearguard had halted for the night in the little
town of that name, under the shadow of the magnificent
old castle, second to none in Europe, which it contains,
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 323
belonging to the Duke of Ossuna. Near it flows the CHAP.
little river Esla, over which a bridge had been thrown IV-
at some little distance, which was broken down to secure 18°8-
the troops from surprise during the night. The night Gaiiit a
passed over without alarm ; but early next morning a 3°™.
large body of the enemy's horse, mustering six hundred Dec- 28-
sabres, were seen trying a ford not far from the ruins of
the bridge, and they were soon afterwards crossed and
formed on the British side of the stream. The English
hussars under General Stewart, deeming the ford impass-
able, were somewhat scattered in their night-quarters ;
so that two hundred men, composed of the detachments
forming the outposts, alone could be got together at first
to check the progress of the enemy, who were already
formed, and preparing to attack the British rearguard.
Notwithstanding the disparity of force, this small body
under Colonel Otway gallantly advanced, and repeatedly
charged the leading squadron, so as to impede the forma-
tion and check the advance of the enemy. Meanwhile,
the 10th, forming part of the brigade, was rapidly formed
in, the rear, concealed by some houses ; and while they
were mustering, the pickets in front continued charging
and retiring so as to cause the enemy's horsemen to
advance, which they did as if to certain victory. Sud-
denly, when they were sufficiently near, the pickets
halted ; the reserve wheeled out from behind their cover ;
and General Stewart at the head of the pickets, and
Lord Paget leading the 10th, with a loud cheer, at full
speed bore down upon the enemy. The shock was very
violent — for the cavalry of the French were the hussars
of the Imperial Guard, second to none in that noble
array for prowess and hardihood — and for a few seconds
they stood their ground stoutly. In the melee, General
Stewart, who was in the front, had his sword struck out of i,,
' * m Pen. War,
his hand; but it was immediately replaced by that of i. 467;
Lieutenant-Colonel Hosy.1 After a vehement struggle, the 254-256!
Imperial Guard broke, and fled in haste across the Esla,
324 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, leaving General Lefebvre Desnouettes and seventy prisou-
TV- ers in the hands of the victors, besides sixty killed and
isos. wounded. The entire casualties of the British were only
fifty men.*
After this affair the army continued its retreat ; and
Disastrous the British troops, little inured as yet to hardship, and
c^ui'™. unaccustomed to retreat before the enemy, became in
great part reckless and insubordinate, and the national
vice of intoxication appeared in its most frightful colours.
Proportionally arduous was the duty of the rearguard,
the cavalry of which was under General Stewart, who
was charged at once with the task of repelling the enemy
and that of collecting and forcing on the numerous iso-
lated men who had left their ranks, and, in great part in
a state of drunkenness, overspread the rear. Indefati-
gable were his efforts during this calamitous retreat to
preserve order and repel the enemy ; and he was ad-
mirably seconded by the troops under his command,
especially the German horsemen, who exhibited the
steadiness and orderly habits for which the troopers of
Germany are so celebrated. But the condition of the
army soon became so calamitous, that no efforts of the
rearguard or their gallant commander could avert the
most grievous losses. Upon the cavalry of the rear-
guard, which was incessantly in motion, from daybreak
to nightfall, following the troops or reclaiming stragglers,
the hardships of the retreat fell with double force. Horses
broke down at every step ; and it was a piteous thing to
see these noble animals sinking under their riders, or lying
on the ground unable to rise even at the well-known
voices of their masters. General Stewart was engaged in
Jan. 3. a sharp affair of the rearguard near Cacabelos, in which,
after at first gaining some success, the French cavalry
264°267.u were at length repulsed with heavy loss, by some com-
panies of the 95th Rifles,1 supported by the pickets of the
* The gallant conduct of General Stewart and the 18th Hussars on this
occasion wag specially noticed in the general orders of April 9, 1814.
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 325
hussars. After this the country became so rocky that CHAP.
cavalry were of no further use, and they were all sent to IV-
Lugo, where they awaited the assembling of the army, as isoa.
Sir John Moore had resolved to give battle there.
Thither, accordingly, the troops by degrees arrived, but
dreadfully harassed by the forced marches which were Horrors of
made before reaching that place, some of which were as
much as forty miles on a stretch in a single day and
night. " The men/' says Lord Londonderry, " dropped
down by whole sections on the wayside and died, some
with curses, others with the voice of prayer, in their
mouths." Of the women who followed the army, " some
were taken in labour on the road ; and in the open air,
amidst showers of sleet and snow, gave birth to infants
who, with their mothers, perished as soon as they had
seen the light. Others, carrying perhaps each of them
two children on their backs, would toil on, and when they
came to look to the condition of their precious burdens,
they would find one or both frozen to death. I am well
aware that the horrors of this retreat have been again
and again described, in terms calculated to freeze the
blood of such as read them ; but I have no hesitation in
saying that the most harrowing accounts which have yet
been laid before the public fall short of the reality. . . .
The resources of the army wasted away at every mile.
First, whole waggon-loads of clothing, arms, shoes, and
other necessaries, which had just arrived from England
for the purpose of refitting Roman a's army, were met, and
after the men had helped themselves to those articles of
which they stood most in need, the residue was destroyed.
Next, two bullock-carts, loaded with dollars to the amount
of £25,000, were found to be immovable. The casks
which contained the money were stove in, and the treasure
thrown from the road over a precipice. Everything was
now done as if our case was absolutely desperate, and as
if the utmost that could be expected, or even desired,
was to escape with our persons at the expense of the
326 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, whole of our materiel. Even guns were now abandoned
rr- as fast as the horses which dragged them knocked up ;
1809. and the very sick and wounded were left behind in the
267°269 '' wagg°ns of which the bullocks or mules could proceed no
further."1
It was in this desperate flight, trying to any army, but
Battle' especially to one at that time so little inured to suffering
Lugo, and as the British, that the army arrived at Lugo, which Sir
Comnn* John Moore had already fixed upon as the place to give
battle. As the troops successively arrived there, and
took up their ground in the order in which they were to
engage, the spirits of the men revived, and the instinct of
military honour and subordination returned. A success-
ful affair of the rearguard with the advanced-guard of
Jan. 5. the enemy, near Constantino, on January 5, in which the
horse-artillery and 28th and Rifles greatly distinguished
themselves, contributed powerfully to restore the spirits
of the soldiers ; and before they had been twenty-four
hours in rest at Lugo, the aspect of the army was so much
changed that they hardly seemed the same men. The
old sturdy British resolution not to be beaten reappeared
when a pitched battle was supposed to be at hand. Arms
were burnished up, accoutrements cleaned, swords sharp-
ened, locks and cartouche-boxes looked to, countenances
brightened ; and the stragglers from the rear, to a sur-
prising number, came up and resumed their place in the
ranks. Notwithstanding all the losses of the retreat,
the detachment of a light brigade, and the number of
sick and wounded — who had been sent on, some to Vigo,
some to Corunna, for embarkation — 19,000 men were
assembled on the night of the 6th, on the ground which
the English General had selected for a decisive battle.
The enemy's masses soon made their appearance ; and on
the 7th they came up in such numbers that every one
believed the trial of strength was at hand. General
Stewart never doubted it ; and every arrangement was
made by him for the approaching battle. The cannonade
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 327
at times became extremely warm on both sides, and an CHAP.
immediate onset was hourly expected. But daylight IV>
gradually slipped away without the enemy making any 1809.
forward movement with his infantry. That night and
the next day passed in a like inaction ; and at nightfall
on the 9th, as it was known that Victor's corps had
reached Villa Franca, so as to be within reach and give
the enemy a vast superiority, fires were lighted along the
whole line so as to impose on the French, and at mid-
night the retreat was resumed, the troops taking the road 259-276. '
to Oorunna.1
General Stewart, with his indefatigable hussars, covered
that painful march ; but the chief difficulties they had to Arrival of
contend with were now over. The day's rest at Lugo ltecorunna
had restored the strength of the men : the sick, wounded, Jan* n*
women, and children, were in advance ; and the enemy,
held in awe by their frequent repulses by the rearguard,
and the formidable aspect of the army at Lugo, kept at a
respectful distance. The troops reached Corunna, accord-
ingly, with comparatively little loss, at least at the hands
of the enemy ; and they were received with the most
generous hospitality by the inhabitants of that town, who
did everything in their power to alleviate their sufferings.
But the most dismal apprehensions, in which General
Stewart fully participated, seized the minds of the soldiers.
The bay, instead of being as they expected crowded with
transports, was deserted; a few fishing-boats alone broke
the wide expanse of the melancholy main ; and it was
evident to all that fight they must in their present disas-
trous plight, with the sea in their rear, and no possibility
of escape in case of disaster. Notwithstanding the ut-
most efforts which the admiral had made, it had been
found to be impossible to get the transports round from
Vigo Bay, where they had, in conformity with previous
arrangements, been assembled. Bitterly did the troops
now regret that they had not fought in some of the strong
positions through which they had passed in the course
328 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, of their retreat, when an array could with ease check a
IV- force double its own amount. But fight now they must,
1809. -with exhausted frames, dismounted cavalry, on compara-
tively unfavourable ground, and no retreat open in case of
disaster. Such were the sentiments with which General
Stewart and his companions in arms lay down to rest,
277-279.'' wrapped in their cloa'ks, on the ground chosen for the
fight on the morrow.1
Sir John Moore h
tions which circumstances would admit for the approach-
Sir John Moore had made, however, the best disposi-
'
fat&flf ing battle ; and his heroic end, joined to the courage of his
ina' troops, threw a ray of glory over this long series of dis-
asters. None of the insubordination or desponding feelings
which had been so conspicuous in the retreat appeared
when they at length halted and faced the enemy. The
ancient and long-established confidence of the British in
battle with the French at once reappeared, and was
attended with the same memorable results. The strag-
glers came in in great numbers, and again took their old
places in the ranks ; chasms were filled up with old faces ;
confidence increased with augmented numbers ; and the
discipline and regularity with which the troops took up
their ground afforded the happiest presage of what would
be the result should the enemy venture to attack them.
The four next days were spent by the French in bring-
ing up their guns and columns from the rear — by the
British in embarking the cavalry, heavy artillery, sick, and
wounded, on board the transports, which happily made
their appearance on the morning of the 15th. Mean-
while the British rearguard, about 14,000 strong, kept
the ground they had taken up to defend, which consisted
of a series of low heights lying in a semicircular form
around the village of Elvina, about a mile in front of
Corunna, and barring all access from the land side into
that town. A magazine, containing 4000 barrels of
gunpowder recently brought from England, was blown
up on the night of the 14th, with a terrific explosion.
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 329
At length, on the morning of the 16th, when prepara- CHAP.
tions for embarking the troops had commenced, and IV-
several regiments were already on the beach, the enemy 1809.
were seen approaching the British position in four strong
columns, containing not less than 20,000 combatants.
Two of these columns moved against Moore's right, a third * Sir Chas-
1 1 M 11 1 SteWart t0
advanced against the centre, while the fourth threatened Lord Castie-
the left, so as to prevent any succour being sent from it 18, ifodT*
to the centre and right, where the serious attack was i. 280-283. '
intended to be made.1
Lord William Bentinck's brigade, consisting of the 4th,
42d, and 50th regiments, with the Guards in support, Battle of
under General Warde, formed the right, against which ja^ie!'
the main attack of the enemy was directed. The French
came on with their wonted impetuosity, nothing doubting
that they were advancing to certain victory. The British
advanced posts were quickly driven in ; and the enemy's
main body, in admirable order and with loud shouts,
came up immediately behind. Their great superiority
enabled them to overlap and extend far beyond the
British right, which ran the most imminent risk of being
turned. But this danger was averted by the 4th Regi-
ment, which, advancing a little to meet the enemy, threw
back its right wing so as to front the column pressing
round their flank. Justly delighted with this able move-
ment, Sir John Moore rode off to the centre of the
field, deeming the right able to take care of itself.
The advance of the French, who had carried the village
of Elvina, was then checked by a brilliant charge of the
50th ; while the 42d, supported by the Guards, drove
back and followed to a considerable distance a heavy
column which advanced against it. It was while ani-
mating the 42d to this charge that Sir John Moore re-
ceived his death-wound ; and Sir David Baird, the second
in command, being about the same time carried off the
field severely wounded, the command devolved upon Sir
John Hope, who, though successful at all points, did not
330 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, conceive himself at liberty to depart from the plan pre-
IV- viously arranged of embarking the troops, which was car-
1809. ried into effect next day, without further molestation from
the enemy.1
General Stewart returned with the troops to England,
Gen. stew- where the great reputation acquired by the brilliant
Listen w° actions in which he had been engaged, and his skilful
GeieSof direction of his brigade of cavalry during the retreat,
£iet;sWel~ won f°r him tne most flattering reception from all ranks,
Ktwy- from the Sovereign downwards. This circumstance,
joined to the influence of his brother, Lord Castlereagh,
who was in the Cabinet as Secretary for War, procured
for him a still more important appointment when a
second expedition to the Peninsula was determined on.
He was appointed Adjutant-General of the army — a
situation for which his great administrative as well as
military abilities pointed him out as peculiarly qualified.
This situation, one of the highest on Sir Arthur Wel-
lesley's staff, had the advantage of bringing him con-
stantly, and on the terms of the closest intimacy, in
contact with that great commander — a circumstance to
which much of his subsequent career is to be ascribed.
They embarked from Portsmouth on Saturday, April 16,
1809, with a stiff breeze ; and before they had been long
at sea they narrowly escaped shipwreck. The vessel, in
striving to pass a bank which runs out from St Catharine's
Point into the sea, missed stays, and was in consequence
brought within a stone's throw of the breakers, which were
directly ahead, the wind blowing hard upon them. Every
individual on board expected instant shipwreck, but it
reaghCastle Proved otherwise. Suddenly the wind, which had hitherto
ulog1- iind ^een blowing full on shore, changed, and relieved them from
i. 302, 303. their imminent danger. The voyage proceeded without
other accident, and they landed at Lisbon on 22d April.2
Sir Arthur Wellesley brought out with him reinforce-
ments to the amount of 10,000 men ; and they were all
needed, for the state of affairs when he arrived in
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 331
Portugal was most disastrous. After the embarkation CHAP.
of the army at Corunna, the French troops divided ; IV-
Marshal Nej with his corps remaining at that town and 1809.
Ferrol to overawe Galicia ; while Marshal Soult with his, Statetf
25,000 strong, commenced an invasion of the north of ^ffa,ir87h.e.n
_ he landed m
Portugal. The remnant of British forces left at Lisbon, Portugal.
i i 11 • i -April ^.^.
not more than 10,000 strong, were wholly inadequate to
oppose any resistance to so formidable an invader ; the
Portuguese new levies were not in a condition to take the
field ; and the tumultuary bands assembled at Oporto,
though burning with zeal and by no means destitute of
courage, could not be relied on in a contest in the field
with the French veterans. They had no confidence
whatever in their officers ; and excepting when commanded
by Englishmen, could not be brought so much as to face
the enemy. The consequence was, that they were totally
defeated in an attempt to defend Oporto. That city, the
second in the kingdom and the centre of the commercial
wealth of the country, had fallen into the hands of the
French ; and the moment was hourly expected when
advices should arrive of Marshal Soult proceeding to the 1
southward, and advancing to plant his eagles on the towers sos-aos!'
of Lisbon.1
" No words," says Lord Londonderry, " would be ade-
quate to convey the faintest idea of the delight exhibited Universal
by all classes of persons as soon as the arrival of Sir boVon their
Arthur Wellesley at Lisbon became known. All dayamval>
long the streets were crowded with men and women, con-
gratulating one another on the happy event ; and at night
the city was illuminated, even in the most obscure and
meanest of its lanes and alleys. In the theatres, pieces
were hastily got up, somewhat after the fashion of the
masks anciently exhibited among ourselves, in which
Victory was made to crown the representative of the
hero with laurels, and to address him in language as
far removed from the terms of ordinary conversation as
might be expected from an allegorical personage. But
332 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, it was not bj such exhibitions alone that the Portu-
IV- guese nation sought to evince its confidence in its former
1809. deliverer, and its satisfaction at his return. Sir Arthur
Wellesley was immediately nominated Marshal-General
of the armies of Portugal ; by which means, whilst the
care of training and managing the whole of the interior
economy rested still with Beresford, the fullest authority
to move the troops whithersoever be would, and to em-
1 I , mill. i. . . . „ . "i-ii •
303, 304. ploy them in any series ot operations in which he might
desire to embark, devolved upon him." l
From the time when General Stewart landed with Sir
Advance to Arthur Wellesley at Lisbon, to that when from ill health
:>ouro. mos{. reluctantly compelled to return home for a
short time, his personal biography is part of the history
of England. Constantly at headquarters, and enjoying
the entire confidence of the Commander-in-Chief, he bore
a part in all the actions which have rendered memorable
the first years of the Peninsular war ; and to his talent,
energy, and courage, no small part of their success was
owing. These qualities were called forth in the very
highest degree in the outset of the campaign ; for it at
once fell on the Adjutant-General of the army to take
the labouring oar in the innumerable arrangements and
preparations necessary before the campaign could be
opened, which Sir Arthur was desirous to do with the
greatest possible expedition. All things being at length
in readiness, the whole disposable force was assembled at
Coimbra in the first week of May, and was reviewed by
the General-in-Chief on the 5th of that month. Without
the Portuguese (about 6000 strong) there were 17,000
men, besides the detached corps, 2700 more, of whom
one half were cavalry. The English and German troops
a Generai made a magnificent appearance, and were such, in General
iSd cLue- Stewart's words, " as any general might be proud to com-
Magh9 niand." On the following day the troops all moved for-
1809, MS. ward in the direction of the Douro, and commenced their
career of victory.2
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 333
Soult, meanwhile, after having made his way with very CHAP.
little difficulty to Oporto, had remained there inactive,
while the Portuguese bands under Silviera and others
were rapidly closing up in his rear, intercepting his com- SoulJs';n.
munications, and in some instances making prisoners of ^f/te!^"st
his depots of sick and wounded. Great was the surprise Napoleon,
felt at the time at this inactivity in a commander of such
vigour and ability, and who knew well that his favour
and prospects with the Emperor mainly depended on his
rapidly performing his allotted task of driving the English
into the sea, and planting the French eagles on the tow'ers
of Lisbon. But the real cause of his tardiness is now
well known. At this period Soult, as already mentioned,
seriously entertained the design of making himself inde-
pendent, and setting up for himself in the north of Por-
tugal. His design was to carve out for himself a sove-
reignty separate from either Spain or Portugal, having its
capital in the north of the latter country, and including
in its dominions the whole of Portugal north of the Douro,
with the Spanish province of Galicia. To this extraor-
dinary scheme it is now certain that Soult's otherwise
inexplicable inactivity after the capture of Oporto, and1We]i;ng.
before the arrival of Wellington, is to be ascribed. He j2LVr'°2!
Castlereagh,
was unwilling to take any steps which might compromise ^Tjj£
his popularity with his future subjects, which the capture mon'fs Me-
of Lisbon by force of arms unquestionably would have le,
done.1
The project was more near succeeding than is generally
supposed. Napoleon was no stranger to the designs of its reception
his lieutenant ; but, with a prudence very little in ac- aL ^A^
cordance with his general character, and of which his Wellesley-
history does not afford another example, he dissembled
his wrath. The truth was, that, with a war with Austria
just impending, and one with Spain yet unconcluded, he
had no desire to get into a fresh imbroglio with one of his
own lieutenants. Mysterious hints of what was going for-
ward were also given to Sir Arthur Wellesley and General
334 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. Stewart ; but, as already mentioned in the Memoir of
IV- Lord Castlereagh, they wisely declined to mix themselves
1809. in any degree with the plot ; and the intelligence they
sSwart*to received of the disaffected state of the French army
LordCastie- oniy strengthened their determination to commence active
1809 Ivis °Perati°ns without any delay, and expel them by force of
arms from the Portuguese territory.1
At dawn on the morning of the 7th May, the British
Advance of army broke up from Coimbra, and advanced in two
icLy'to e columns towards Oporto. The design was, that Beresford
thel)ouro. ^^ ^ Portuguese, about 6000 in number, might reach
Amarante, by Vizeu and Lam ego, at the same time that
the British columns, some 16,000 strong, should show
themselves in front of Oporto, thus threatening the
enemy's line of retreat at the same time that his main
position was attacked. The French forces were believed
to be nearly equally divided, one half being under Soult
in person at Oporto, and the other at Amarante to secure
its communications and line of retreat, and guard the
important bridge at that place. The advanced guards of
the two armies first came in contact near the convent of
May 11. Grijon on the llth. In this affair, Sir Arthur in person,
with a greatly inferior force, defeated a body of 5000
French infantry and 1700 horse. Greatly encouraged
by this early success, ever of such importance in war,
the British army continued to advance towards the Douro.
The French rapidly withdrew as they came On, burning
the houses and destroying the crops as they retired ; and
when, early on the 12th, the British vanguard reached
the banks of that great river, they found the southern
bank entirely deserted by the enemy, and his forces,
a Lend. i. J S \ '
335-337. amply supported by artillery, strongly posted m the
convents and buildings on the northern bank.2
At ten in the morning, the British advanced-guard, con-
sisting of Generals R. Stewart's and Murray's brigades,
with- two squadrons of the 14th under Lord Paget,
arrived at the village of Villa Nova, on the borders of the
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 335
river, where they were joined by Hill's corps, which had CHAP.
come up from the sea-shore. The bridge was destroyed,
and every boat and barge had been moved to the oppo- 18°9-
site side of the river by Soult. Fortunately, Colonel passfge' Of
Waters of the Portuguese service, by whom the destruc-
tion of the bridge had been reported, found a single bark
some hundred yards distant, concealed in some bushes.
Into it this gallant officer instantly threw himself and
proceeded to the opposite shore, where he was fortunate
enough to find four large barges lying in the mud, and
also concealed in some bushes. These he quickly brought
over to the other side, and in them three companies of the
Buffs, headed by General Paget, instantly embarked, and,
pushing boldly across without a moment's delay, took pos-
session of some houses on the opposite bank. General R.
Stewart, who witnessed this bold stroke, instantly brought
up fresh troops to the assistance of those on the other
side, and planted some guns on a promontory, which
galled the enemy, who were now crowding in great num-
bers to assault the defenders of the houses, After a
severe action the Buffs succeeded in keeping their ground ;
and soon after General Murray, a little higher up the
river, got over two squadrons of the 14th and two bat-
talions of the Germans. The enemy, seeing the passage
now made good at two points, retreated from all his posi-
tions on the river, and abandoned Oporto entirely. They
took the road to Amarante, closely followed by the 14th
Dragoons under General (Charles) Stewart and Colonel
Harvey, the latter of whom lost an arm in single combat
with one of the French troopers. General Stewart led
several brilliant charges against the enemy's rearguard,
on whom they inflicted a serious loss, until they were i General
recalled to Oporto by the Commander-in-Chief. With LordcLue-
such haste was the retreat of the French conducted, and ™a£h>10
' May 19,
so complete the surprise, that Sir Arthur Wellesley J809, MS.;
vi i'-ii i i' • i i i Lend. i.
dined at their headquarters on the dinner which had 337-340.
been prepared for Marshal Soult.1
336 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. This brilliant exploit of passing a broad and deep
IV- river in the face of an enemy of equal strength arrayed
1809. on the opposite side, made a great sensation in Europe.
FursuH of General Stewart came in for his full share of credit for the
out ^POT- achievement, and was specially mentioned with becoming
tug*1- praise -in Sir Arthur's despatches.1 The advantage thus
i8o™'stafe gained was followed up with as much vigour as it had
Papers. keen commeuce(j During the night the whole artillery-
waggons and commissariat stores were got over; and early
on the morning of the 13th the advanced-guard, under
General Murray, set out in pursuit. Meanwhile orders
were despatched to Beresford — who, with his Portuguese,
after forming a junction with Silviera, who commanded
another body of native militia, had gained possession of
the bridge of Amarante in the enemy's rear — to move
upon Chaves and obstruct the retreat by that line, while
Murray and Stewart headed the pursuit on the roads to-
wards Amarante and Braga. Soult was retiring with the
utmost haste upon Amarante, when he heard of its cap-
ture by Beresford. His position seemed altogether des-
perate. But, abandoning all his guns, and destroying
the greater part of his stores at Penafiel, he led his army
by rugged mountain-paths over the craggy summit of the
Sierra Catalina, and gained the great road by Braga to
Chaves. Upon hearing this, Sir Arthur wisely stopped
the advance of the greater part of his troops, judging,
as he himself said, " that a body of men which chooses
to abandon its guns, ammunition, and everything which
constitutes an army, must necessarily escape in a moun-
tainous country from a pursuing force which is burdened
with all these encumbrances." The pursuit, however,
May 16. 1$%$ continued by the advanced-guard ; and on the 16th
sSwaTL they came up with the rearguard of the enemy at Sala-
rca"h?May" nionde, on the road to Chaves. The latter were totally
™iH09'., defeated, with the loss of 500 men and all the plunder
MS.; Loud. *
i. 347-354. they had taken at Oporto.2 After this disaster, Soult,
finding himself again anticipated by Beresford at Chaves,
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 337
abandoned the highroad and fled across the mountains CHAP.
from Montalegre to Orerise in Galicia, with his troops IV-
suffering the greatest hardships, and in a state of dis- 1809.
organisation exceeding that of Sir John Moore in the re-
treat to Corunna.
After these brilliant operations the army returned to
Coimbra, where Sir Arthur was joined by 5000 fresh Operations
troops from England. Though they fell short by a half ^JET
of what were necessary to have enabled him to commence cuestl^
operations in Spain towards Madrid with any reasonable
prospect of success, yet they added much to the strength
of the British army, and their arrival diffused the most
lively satisfaction among the troops. A forward offensive
movement into Spain began in connection with Cuesta, who
commanded the Spanish forces which had retired into
Estremadura after the capture of Madrid by Napoleon.
Great difficulty was experienced in concerting any plan of
operations with that commander, who was an impracticable
and irascible old man, as well as in adjusting the contend-
ing pretensions of the British generals who were senior in
rank to Marshal Beresford, but found themselves momen-
tarily placed under his orders, in consequence of his local
rank as commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army,
when they acted together. General Stewart, as adjutant-
general of the army, exerted himself, in conjunction with
the Commander-in-Chief, to the utmost, to soothe these
unhappy jealousies ; but all their efforts could not pre-
vent one officer of distinction, General Murray, from relin-
quishing his command, and returning to England. These
difficulties having been at length surmounted, a plan of
operations with no small difficulty arranged with Cuesta,
and the troops refreshed by rest from their late fatigues,
the army resumed its march on the 6th June, taking the SJJ^ to
road up the valley of the Tagus by Thomar to the Spanish LordCastie.
r <f o j i reagh, June
frontier. On the day following, headquarters reached 14, 1809,
., , , • 111-1 A. ' MS.; Lond.
Abrantes, and the troops were assembled there, mustering j. 359-361
not quite twenty thousand effective sabres and bayonets.1
VOL. i. Y
338 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. Cuesta represented to the English general that the
IV- enemy's force to be encountered in the attempt to dislodge
1809. him from Madrid consisted of Victor's corps, 26,000
Plan of strong, which lay at Merida and Caceres, 13,000 foot
operations. and ^QQQ j^^ un(ier g^g^i at Ciudad Rodrigo, and
4000 at Madrid — in all, 49,000 men, but separated from
each other by considerable distances and a range of moun-
tains, the direct roads over which were impracticable for
artillery or carriages.* Still, to advance against such a
force with only 20,000 British soldiers, was obviously a
very hazardous undertaking, especially as the Spaniards
under Cuesta, it was well known, could not be relied on.
The Spanish general, however, who had all the pride and
self-confidence of his nation, contended strongly for a
united forward movement — a project to which both Sir
Arthur and General Stewart made the greatest possible
objections. Considerable delay occurred in consequence
of this divergence of views ; and, meanwhile, the soldiers,
whose spirits had been highly elated by the passage of the
Douro, became very impatient for action, and loudly com-
plained that some mark of the Sovereign's favour had not
been bestowed on their chief and those who had distin-
guished themselves on that occasion. The three weeks' rest,
however, which were gained while the plans were under
consideration, were of great service in bringing up rein-
forcements from the coast, and improving the strength
both of the men and horses ; and certain forward move-
ments were made with part of the troops so as to menace
Victor's flank. That general in consequence, dreading
the convergence of the two armies against his single
corps, withdrew his whole army across the Tagus, and
commenced his retreat towards Madrid, followed by
Cuesta. Upon hearing of this Sir Arthur resolved to
June 30. enter Spain, which he immediately did in two columns,
the one moving upon Placencia by Coria, another upon
* Sebastian! with his corps was really to the south of the Tagus in La
Jtancha,
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 339
the same point bj Moraza. It was easy to see that CHAP.
these movements would soon lead to important opera- IV-
tions, for advices were received that Victor had halted ISOQ.
in his retreat at Talavera de la Reyna, where he had
taken up a strong position ; and that King Joseph, with i General
5000 men from Madrid, and Sebastiani, with 17,000 from ScLtie-
La Mancha, were moving on the same point, while Soult j^1^
and Ney in the north had united their forces, and occu- 1809> MS. ;
. . Lend. i.
pied Orense, threatening a renewed invasion of the north 371-375.
of Portugal.1
The army commenced its march on 30th June, by Cas-
tello Branco, and arrived at Coria on 5th July. Cuesta interview
was approaching from the south with 38,000 men; but Tnd ap^ar-
the greater part of them were new levies upon whom no Sp
reliance could be placed. The two armies came
communication on the 10th, at Placencia, where Sir
Arthur had a personal conference with Cuesta, whose
irritability, naturally great, was much increased by having
been kept, with all his troops, four hours under arms
awaiting the arrival of the English general, who unfortun-
ately had missed his way by the fault of his guides. The
appearance of the men and horses was far from inspiring
any confidence in their efficiency in the field. " With the
exception," says General Stewart, " of the Irish brigade,
and a battalion or two of marines from Cadiz, and the
remnants of their grenadier battalions, the infantry was
little better than armed peasants, armed partially like
soldiers, but completely unacquainted with a soldier's duty.
This remark applied fully as much to the cavalry as the
infantry. The horses of many of them were good, but
their riders manifestly knew nothing of movements or
discipline ; and they were, on this account, as well as on
the score of miserable military equipment, quite unfit for
general service. The artillery, again, was numerous, but
totally unlike, both in order and arrangement, that of other
irmies ; and the generals appeared to have been selected
iccording to one rule alone — namely, that of seniority.
340 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. They were almost all old men, and, except O'Donaghoe
IV- and Largas, evidently incapable of bearing the fatigues or
1809. surmounting the difficulties of one hard campaign. Cuesta,
after the interview was over, retired to rest, quite over-
powered with fatigue. He returned to supper, however,
at eleven, and sat till past midnight, perfectly silent,
neither taking the least part in the conversation, nor,
i General apparently at least, paying any attention to it. Those
Stewart to aroun(j }^m assured us that this manner was not assumed,
.Lord Uastle-
i5agi809Uly ^ut perfectly natural, and always the same. He governed
MS. his followers by a system of silence and terror, of which
they all stood wonderfully in awe."1
Offensive operations having been agreed on at this
Advance to conference between the two generals, Sir Arthur re-
amfprep'ar- turned to his own headquarters on the following day,
bS tfhcre. and orders were immediately given for the troops to ad-
vance towards Talavera. The plan arranged was that
Cuesta, with his whole force, should press on Victor in
front, while Venegas, who commanded a Spanish army in
La Mancha, threatened his left, and Sir Arthur his right
flank. General Stewart thought the French general would
not fight where he stood, but he proved to be mistaken.
July 20. On the 20th the army reached Oropesa, where it halted
for a day, and was reviewed by Cuesta. The splendid
appearance, exact discipline, and martial bearing of the
troops, exhibited a very different spectacle from the
melancholy one which his own men had presented some
days before. The troops of both armies were now arranged
in the order in which they were to attack the enemy, who
was known to be in position in great strength close to
Talavera, a short distance in front, though not yet in sight.
The Spanish army advanced on the highroad to that town ;
the British by a parallel road through the mountains in
the direction of San Roman. When the Spanish ad-
vanced-guard approached Talavera, the French horsemen
showed themselves outside the town, and the Spanish
cavalry, who were greatly superior in numbers, had several
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 341
admirable opportunities to charge. Of these, however, CHAP.
they did not avail themselves, but hung back — a circum- IV<
stance which created not a little disappointment in the 18°9-
breasts of Sir Arthur, General Stewart, and the other July22'
officers who were witnesses of the discouraging exhibition.
The French stood firm in front of Talavera as long as the
Spaniards alone were in sight ; but no sooner did the heads
of the red-coated columns begin to show themselves on
their right than they retired precipitately, and took up
their defensive position on the eastern bank of the Al-
berche, in rear of that town. Sir Arthur approached to
the edge of the stream, which was fordable at nearly all
points; and as Victor's corps alone was as yet on the
ground, he was extremely anxious to begin the attack
next day before the enemy's strength was doubled by the
reinforcements which were coming up. Nothing, however,
could overcome the procrastinating habit of the Spanish
general ; and when at length he was brought, late on the
evening of the 23d, to agree to an attack with the united i General
force on the following morning, and the British advanced-
guard moved on at two for that purpose, it was discovered, jj^f
to their infinite mortification, that the enemy had de- tjJT ,
' f , MS.; Lend.
camped during the night, and not a vestige of their army 389-397; i.
was to be found on the ground they had occupied on the 499. '
preceding evening.1
On the morning of the 24th, General Stewart was sent 27
forward with two squadrons of cavalry to reconnoitre, and The French
• •• i , i • i i'ii forces unite,
he came up with the enemy s rearguard, with which he and again
had a sharp action near St Olalla. From the prisoners TaEwera.
taken on that occasion, he ascertained the route which the July 25<
retiring columns of the enemy had taken, which was to
Torrijos, on the road to Toledo. Meanwhile, Cuesta fol-
lowed close upon the retiring French army, fondly hoping
that they were in full retreat to Madrid or the Ebro ; but,
in truth, they were only falling back to the fixed-on point
of junction of the three armies of Victor, Sebastiani, and
Joseph in person, which were converging to one point.
342 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. They met, accordingly, behind the Guadarama, on the 25th,
IV- and constituted an imposing mass of fifty thousand men
i8oa present with the eagles, under Victor, Jourdan, and Sebas-
tiani, three of the most experienced chiefs in the French
army. No sooner was the junction effected than they
wheeled about, and advanced against Cuesta's advanced-
guard, which had got in pursuit as far as St Olalla. It
398-401'' immediately fell back in such confusion that a total rout
Saiey taT*1" would have ensued if Sir Arthur had not hastily moved
reah?Aug"uP Sherbrook's division, which protected them. This
i, 1809; done, that general withdrew over the ford into the camp
Gurw. iv. . .... .
504. at Talavera, leaving Mackenzie's division in possession of a
convent and wood on the right bank of the Alberche.1
Cuesta's position was now extremely perilous, for he
Position of was threatened in front by an army greatly superior to his
own, both in numbers and efficiency ; and in his rear was
a river into which, if attacked, he would infallibly be
driven, and where he would lose all his guns and baggage.
From this strait he was delivered by the quickness and
decision of the British general, who, early next morning,
drew the Spanish troops across the Alberche, and placed
the whole army, Spanish as well as British, on an ex-
tremely advantageous position, having the right leaning
on the town of Talavera, where the Spaniards were posted,
and their other flank stretching to a rocky hill, the lowest
ridge of the Sierra de Gata, which covered the extreme left.
The Spanish troops were, for the most part, stationed among
some olive groves, and along a road the embankment of
which formed an excellent parapet. The British stood in
the open field, their right touching the Spanish left, and
leaning on an eminence, on which a redoubt had been begun,
their left on a craggy mount protected by a deep ravine,
at the bottom of which ran a rivulet. The French, when
they arrived, drew up directly opposite to them, and their
forces were massed in formidable proportions against the
British left, where it was evident the principal attack
would be made. Numerically, the Allies were superior :
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 343
the French haying 50,000 men, of whom 7500 were cavalry, CHAP.
with 80 guns; the Allies 60,000, of whom 9000 were IV-
cavalry, with 100 guns. But in the quality of the troops 18°9-
the French had a decided superiority, for their soldiers 1 Gunv iv
were homogeneous, and all well disciplined : whereas of the 50f ; wei-
. _ i i rt • i i ' lesley Desp.
Allies, only the British soldiers, not quite 20,000 strong, Nap**, H.
*4fl 1 T J\T\ f\
of whom 3000 were horse, with 30 guns, could be relied i. m, m.
on for the shock of battle.1
The Allies, however, were not permitted to take up
their position without sustaining a most serious conflict.
About three o'clock General Mackenzie's division, which evening of
was still on the right bank of the Alberche to support the jjjy.7'
retreat of the Spaniards, was suddenly attacked with the
utmost fury by two strong French columns formed by
Lapisse's division of Victor's corps. So vehement was
the onset, that the 87th and 88th Regiments, which
were first attacked, were thrown into confusion, and the
division pierced through the centre. Sir Arthur and
General Stewart, who hastened to the spot, found every-
thing in such disorder that it was with great difficulty
they could distinguish in the smoke their own troops from
the enemy. Quickly, however, the 31st, 45th, and 60th
were got in hand, who covered the withdrawal of the
broken regiments, and the retreat was conducted in a
regular manner to the height on the British left, where the
troops took up their ground and stood firm. They were
immediately assailed there with the utmost impetuosity by
the French columns, who advanced at the pas de charge,
under cover of a tremendous cannonade. Mackenzie's men
having been moved into the rear to re-form, they were
met by Hill's division, who held their ground, and stood
the onset nobly. The 48th and 29th, after pouring in a
destructive volley, rushed forward with the bayonet, and
drove the enemy down the ridge, to the summit of which
they had attained. " It was," says General Stewart, " a
splendid charge, and it was one upon the issues of which
much might have hung ; for had the height in question
344 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, been carried, the strength of our position became at once
IV- exposed. It was not, however, made without a heavy loss
1809. to the brave troops engaged, for the enemy fought nobly;
and we had to lament, when darkness put an end to the
Weiiesiey to contest, about 800 in killed and wounded, among whom
J^hfjdy were several very valuable officers." Both Sir Arthur
cfuri8^ and General Stewart were personally engaged in this ter-
Lot'd5*}5' r^8 strife, and by their energy and decision powerfully
405, 406. contributed to the important success with which it ter-
minated.1
The troops on both sides slept on their arms; and at
Battle of daylight on the morning of the 28th, two strong columns
juiyV28?' of French troops, the grenadiers of Euffin's division,
advanced to the attack of the British left, who occupied
the hill there. " Desperate and numerous," says General
Stewart, " were the efforts which they made to render them-
selves masters of the summit. But nothing could exceed
the gallantry and steadiness of the brave men who opposed
them. The brigades of Generals Tilson and R. Stewart
were here : they permitted the enemy again and again
to arrive within a few paces of the ridge, and then drove
them back in admirable style with the bayonet, till, dis-
heartened by so many repulses, they at last retreated
altogether, leaving the ground covered with their dead.
Had our cavalry been at this moment sufficiently forward
in the plain arid valley, they might have produced a ter-
rible impression upon these fugitives, for the enemy retired
in great confusion, and opportunities of making charges
occurred such as could not have been by any possibility
overlooked : but unfortunately they were too far in the
rear. The broken masses were thus enabled to re-form
themselves, and to withdraw, in something like order, with-
in their lines/' Their loss, however, was enormous; and
406,n407; their troops appeared to be dispirited and dismayed in so
Napier, n. muc|1 fa^ ftiey ma(je no farther movement ; for the next
three hours no firing was heard on any part of the field.2
i This pause, however, was but the prelude to a still
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 345
more serious attack. Having now ascertained the CHAP.
strength of the British position, and the resolution of
the troops who defended it on the left, and rightly 1809-
judging that if the English could be driven off" the field Desperate
it would be no difficult matter to dispose of the Span- ^French
iards, the enemy arrayed their whole force in four weigh ty^nttj.'eeand
columns, with which they advanced, three against therisht-
centre and right, and one round the extreme left, of
the British line. The attack was preceded by a tre-
mendous fire from all their guns, eighty in number, which
were brought forward to the front, and nearly over-
powered the thirty pieces which Sir Arthur had to oppose
to them. Under cover of this terrible discharge, and
preceded by a cloud of tirailleurs, which kept up an
incessant and biting fire as they advanced, the columns
on the French left advanced with a quick and yet steady
pace, till they were close upon the British. Still not a
musket was fired from that martial array : steady, and
with the coolness which discipline alone can give, the
men stood, with their pieces in their hands, ready to fire
the moment that the word was given. No sooner was
it heard than a crashing volley broke from the whole
line, which staggered the heads of the columns, and,
taking advantage of the momentary confusion, the British
rushed forward, and attacked the enemy with the bayonet.
Campbell's division, on the right, took thirteen guns in
close hand-to-hand fight ; and as the French were prepar-
ing to regain them, they were charged in flank by a
Spanish regiment of horse, and again overthrown. Mean-1 Weiiing-
while the Guards in the centre, emulating the gallant morandum
conduct of the 7th and 53d, which had gained these Gu™aiv.ra;
glorious successes, rushed forward, and, overthrowing |™;2teto
the columns in their front, not only drove the broken L°rd Castie-
•J reagh, July
enemy down the hill which they had just mounted, but, 3T°' ^°9.;.
* J J Napier, n.
pursuing them up the opposite side, got into the centre 401, 402;
of their line.1 We have Wellington's authority for the sssT e'
assertion, that this gallant but imprudent advance all but
346 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, lost the battle. The Guards were met by the enemy's
IV> reserve in firm order, who threw in a tremendous fire
1809. jn their front, while strong batteries poured in destruc-
tive volleys both of grape and canister on either flank.
They were quickly driven back, and, the disorder spread-
ing to the Germans who stood next them in the line, the
whole centre was for some minutes thrown into confusion,
and the battle was all but lost.
32 In effect, it would have been lost with a general of less
victory of quickness and decision than Sir Arthur Wellesley. But
the British. * TIT if i i i* -i si -i
no sooner did he see the forward rush of the Guards,
than, foreseeing the result, he moved forward the 48th Re-
giment, and that splendid corps, advancing through the
throng of fugitives with admirable steadiness, opened and
let them through, and, again closing, moved against the
flank of the pursuing French, and threw in so destructive
a volley, that they were constrained to pause. Relieved
by this timely succour, the Guards and Germans halted,
re-formed, and returned to the charge, and the enemy,
assailed now in front and flank, were, after an obstinate
struggle, driven back. This was their last effort ; for their
right column had been paralysed by a brilliant cavalry
charge. The whole infantry now retreated across the
Alberche, about three miles in the rear, and the battle
ceased at all points. A frightful accident occurred after
the firing had ceased. The dry grass on which the troops
409°4ii-' ha(^ f°ught took fire in consequence of the ignition of
tnoTi' '"•' some cartridges which were lying about, and great num-
508; Napier, J O
ii. 403-406; bers of the brave men who had fought on either side, and
Kausler, ,.. • i i 1-1 i i
538. were lying intermingled, were scorched, and some burnt
to death.1
33 Such was the battle of Talavera — one of the most
Results of glorious which the British ever fought. For two days
the battle. & . T.--I • i i • -11
twenty thousand British, with thirty guns, had com-
bated and finally defeated five-and- forty thousand French
with .eighty pieces of artillery ; for the Spaniards, who
occupied the strong ground near Talavera on the ex-
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 347
treme right, were scarcely engaged at all, save in a dis- CHAP.
tant cannonade. Well knowing that they were incap- IV- .
able of moving in order under fire, the French wisely let 18°9-
them stand where they were, and directed their whole
force against the British. The loss of the latter was
very severe: it amounted to 1000 killed and 4000iLond. ;.
wounded on the 28th alone ; including the previous day, \™'BJQ?"
the loss was 6268. The Spanish loss was very trifling ; JSfoi,.
but the French is now known, from the returns in the ^dcltL
War Office at Paris, to have been 8794. The British re^h,
took seventeen guns and nine caissons from the enemy, iww, MS.
and two hundred and eighty-nine prisoners.
As the courage and prowess displayed on both sides in
this memorable battle were of the very highest order, so Picturesque
also was the respect mutually inspired in the breasts of during the
the gallant antagonists. During the cessation from the ba
battle in the heat of the day, Sir Arthur Wellesley, with
General Stewart, General Murray, and the other officers
of his staff, was seated on the top of the hill which had
been so obstinately contested, surveying the whole field of
battle; he was nowise moved by a message brought him
by Colonel Donkin from the Due d' Albuquerque, that
Cuesta was betraying him. He knew his man well ; how
irascible and obstinate he was, yet true as steel, and pas-
sionately hostile to the French. Meanwhile the soldiers on
either side, overcome by the heat, struggled down to the
rill which ran in the hollow between the two armies to
drink. " Not a shot was fired," said Lord Castlereagh, in
recounting the scene in the House of Commons, " not a
drum was beat ; peaceably the foes thus drank from the
opposite banks of the same rill ; and not unfrequently !£lJS*"
the hands which had so recently before been dyed ins]p^ch1>
mutual slaughter, were extended and shaken across the*8'0; Parl-
~ Deb. XY.
water in token of their mutual admiration of the valour 293.
and constancy displayed on both sides/' l
Had Sir Arthur Wellesley possessed 20,000 addi-
tional English troops, or even 5000 British horse, he
348 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, would have tried the bold game of advancing at once
IV' to Madrid, the more especially as the great army which
1809- had stood the shock at Talavera was broken up : the
35
sition of King, with Sebastiani and the reserve, 20,000 strong,
^Scrh having taken the road to Madrid, now threatened by
Uttic. yenegag) from ^ew Castile, on the one side, and Sir
Robert Wilson on the other, who had pushed on to with-
in seven leagues of the capital, and entered into com-
munication with it. But the diminished strength of his
army, and the threatening aspect of the forces which
were accumulating in his rear, forbade any such attempt.
The loss of 6000 men at Talavera had not been compen-
sated to the extent of one-half by Craufurd's division,
consisting of the 43d, 52d, and 95th Regiments, which,
by great exertions, and marching sixty -two miles in
twenty-six hours, had succeeded in reaching headquar-
ters the day after the battle. Including this seasonable
reinforcement, the British troops were barely 18,000
sabres and bayonets. Victor had more than that num-
ber directly in his front ; and Soult, Ney, and Mortier,
who had concentrated every disposable man, were already
crossing the mountains separating Leon from Estrema-
dura, and advancing with 35,000 men to cut off his
communication with Lisbon. Provisions were every day
becoming more scarce ; already the distribution of meat
had ceased, and the troops were put on half rations, made
up partly of beans, partly of rye ; while 4000 wounded
encumbered the hospitals of Talavera, for whose tending
and even maintenance no provision whatever had been
made, or \vas perhaps possible, by the Spaniards, in
the distracted state of their country. In these circum-
stances Cuesta proposed that the Allied force should be
divided, half to remain at Talavera, and the other half to
proceed with a portion of his men against Soult and Ney
in rear. But Sir Arthur, deeming such a division too
perilous to be thought of, as it was evident no reliance
whatever could be placed on the Spanish troops, and
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 349
each half of the British force would be exposed to certain CHAP.
destruction when combating alongside of their inefficient _ IV>
allies, wisely rejected this proposal, and insisted that the 1809-
English troops should be kept together. But he gave the
Spanish general the choice of remaining where he was,
or proceeding to the rear to combat Soult and Ney.
Cuesta, deeming his men more likely to succeed in posi- stewartato
tion than in motion, preferred the former, and in conse- J^jjj£
quence Sir Arthur set out on the 3d August, taking with ^0^nd
him the whole British army, but leaving 2000 wounded, \> 414-417;
Orurw. iv.
who could not bear carriage, in Talavera, under charge of 524-534.
the Spanish general.1
From intercepted letters obtained by Cuesta, immedi-
ately after the British army had begun its march, it ap- Cuesta '
peared that, while Soult, Ney, and Mortier had received theVitfsh
orders to press on with the utmost expedition, so as to wou
threaten the British communications, King Joseph would,
with Victor's and Sebastiani's corps and his guards, again
resume the offensive, and threaten Talavera, then probably
stripped of the English. This intelligence so alarmed the
Spanish general, that he instantly commenced the evacua-
tion of Talavera, leaving the British wounded, intrusted at
at his own request to his care, to their fate, although no
enemy was as yet in sight ! With such celerity was this
resolution acted upon, that the evacuation was instantly
commenced, and under circumstances of the most heartless
selfishness. " Though literally encumbered," says General
Stewart, " with cars and waggons, the old Spaniard re-
fused to spare us more than seven for the transportation
of the brave men who had fought and bled for his country.
The abandonment of the town was, as may be imagined,
a most heartrending scene. Such of our poor soldiers
as were in a condition to move at all, crawled after us,
some still bleeding, and many more with their wounds
open and undressed ; whilst those whose hurts were too
severe to permit of this, lay upon their pallets, and im-
plored their comrades not to desert them. By indefati-
350 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, gable exertions, and by sacrificing a great quantity of
1V- baggage, Sir Arthur Wellesley got together forty cars,
iso9. which enabled us to bring forward in all about 2000 men ;
but there were still some hundreds left behind, all of
whom, had Cuesta acted with humanity or honour, might
have been preserved. . . . During the night of the
3d, the Spaniards came pouring in upon us like a flock
417, 4\8. of sheep ; and a scene of noise and confusion ensued, of
which no words could convey an adequate conception/' l
Sir Arthur, as might well be supposed, was highly
Sir Arthur indignant at this unworthy desertion, and remonstrated
thSdg^of strongly against it, both in private and in his public de-
j^tS'iu'th spatches, but in vain. The deed was done, and could
ofth-eTaguB. no^ j-^ un(Jone, and he soon after received intelligence
which rendered it evident that a change of direction in
the march of the British troops, or an immediate battle
with Soult and Ney, was inevitable. Advices were re-
ceived that Soult had passed the Teitar stream, and was
already at Naval-Moral on the highroad to the bridge of
Almaraz, with 30,000 men. If the retreat was continued
by this road, therefore, they would have to fight their
way through these corps with little more than half the
number of British troops, half-starving, worn out with
fatigue, and encumbered with a large train of wounded.
Wisely deeming the risk of such an encounter too great
to be hazarded with the only army in the Peninsula now
capable of making head against the enemy, Sir Arthur
altered his line of retreat, and, defiling rapidly to the left,
passed the bridge of Arzobispo with the whole British
army, which was rapidly followed by the Spaniards.
Both armies assembled on the south of the Tagus on the
following day ; and, having by great exertions surmounted
the mountains to Toralida, through roads deemed im-
Aug. 7. passable for artillery, they reached Deleitosa on the 7th,
where at length the wearied men got a few days of repose.
During this melancholy retreat the troops were in the
lowest spirits ; no bread had been served out from the
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 351
beginning to the end of that march, and the men had CHAP.
tasted none for three whole days. In addition to suffer-
ing from hunger, they had a rough and precipitous inoun- 1809-
tain road to follow ; the country on either side was en-
tirely laid waste ; and it was only by strenuous exertions l General
that the guns could be dragged up the steep ascents.
Such was the state of the British army, not quite 17,000 re2agh0tug-
strong, when, threatened by 60,000 excellent troops under MS. ; Lend.
i 421 422-
Soult, Ney, Mortier, and Victor, they took up their ground durw!v.6&.
on the southern bank of the Tagus.1
. The conduct of Sir Arthur Wellesley at this perilous
crisis was above all praise. It was universally supposed Noble con-
in the army that the united French forces would cross A.
the Tagus, and fall on the wearied and dispirited remnant ley*
of the British host, and not a few looked upon affairs as
utterly desperate, and all chance of successful resistance
to the French power in the Peninsula as taken away.
Sir Arthur was not insensible to the danger, and was well
aware of the gloomy feelings which pervaded his army, but
he never for a moment despaired. On the contrary, his
language was calculated to inspire confidence in all around
him. " He saw," says General Stewart, " and felt the
difficulties of his situation keenly enough, perplexed as
he was by being kept a good deal in the dark as to the
steps which the enemy were preparing to take, and ha-
rassed and annoyed by the continued supineness of the
Spanish authorities ; but he was far from regarding the
game as lost. On the contrary, he spoke and acted, on all
public occasions, as if events were taking the very course
which he had expected them to take ; and he satisfied
every one either that he had provided, or that he was
perfectly competent to provide, against any accident or
contingency which might chance to occur." But though
he spoke thus to those around him, and impressed even
those most in his confidence with such ideas, he was very
far, in his inmost thoughts, from entertaining such senti-
ments. He had felt the weakness of the military force in
352 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, point of numbers which Great Britain could furnish to his
IV* standards ; he had seen the Spanish troops, and learned
1809. by dear-bought experience how unfit they were either to
combat in the field, or furnish any efficient material aid
to his army. He saw plainly that the contest would
come to rest entirely upon his own men ; and, contem-
plating a defensive struggle in Portugal, he was secretly
arranging with his engineers the construction of those
21-33 69-
71. ' memorable lines in front of Lisbon, which first brought to
a stand the hitherto irresistible legions of France.1
Events ere long occurred which too clearly demon-
Continued strated the inefficient condition of the Spanish troops, and
how perilous would be any combined operations in which
retrca*onfdthe ^ieJ W6re to ^ear a Part- For a month after the passage
British into Of the Tagus, the British army remained unmolested in its
the valley of _ *
the Gua<li- quarters, during which Sir Arthur and General Stewart
were incessantly occupied in improving the materiel of the
force and procuring supplies, and the soldiers rapidly re-
covered from their fatigue. But during this time an un-
broken succession of disasters had befallen the Spaniards.
First, the strong rearguard left by Cuesta at the bridge
of Arzobispo was attacked and defeated by Victor ; next,
Sir Robert Wilson was worsted at Puerto de Banos, and
thrown back with his Portuguese into Portugal ; and then
Venegas was beaten at Almonacid. Soon after, his succes-
sor General Areizaga sustained a dreadful defeat at Ocana
in La Mancha, which laid open the road to Andalusia to
the victorious legions. The Due del Parque, who had gained
a transient success, was defeated at Alba de Tormes. The
English general, seeing the whole Spanish forces routed
and dispersed the moment the pressure of the English
army upon the French was taken away, justly deemed his
situation too critical to be longer maintained so far in
advance in Spain ; and as his troops were becoming very
unhealthy, he resolved to retire to what it was hoped
would prove more advantageous quarters on the banks of
the Guadiana. The army accordingly broke up from
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 353
Deleitosa on the 20th August, and retired without mo- CHAP.
lestation bj Truxillo, Medellin, and Merida, to Badajos, IV-
in which latter town headquarters were established. But 1809.
the hopes of improving the condition of the troops in a Augi 2(X
sanitary point of view bj this change proved eminently
fallacious. The sandy plains adjacent to the Guadiana,
though perfectly dry at that season, were to the last degree
unhealthy ; the parched soil yielded up poisonous exhala-
tions to the ardent rays of the sun, and the intermittent
fevers, which are so great a scourge in warm climates of
all plains over which water has flowed, soon proved more
fatal to the soldiers than the sword of the enemy had been.
The hospitals were quickly crowded ; and at one period
nearly eight thousand, almost the half of the entire force,
were on the sick list. " I consider it," says General
Stewart, " as no reproach upon any officer in the service,
when I here record my conviction that there was but one
who did not absolutely despair at this juncture — and that
one was Sir Arthur Wellesley. But Sir Arthur was far
from despairing : he had already declared his conviction
that, even in the event of Spain's subversion, Portugal
could be defended. Into Portugal he accordingly pre-
pared to remove, where, in comfortable cantonments, the
health of his sick might be restored, and the strength of m*m'
his weary and convalescents re-established."1 This inten-l^'f.A- ,
J Wellesley s
tion was carried into effect in the beginning of December, *?esP|>;ch'
and at the same time the formidable line of intrench- isob; '
ments he had long projected was commenced in front of 364. '
Lisbon.2
Among the numerous victims of the pestilential climate
of Estremadura in the autumnal months was General Return'of
Stewart. He was seized with a severe intermittent fever ste^rt on
in the end of September ; and, after struggling with it for EngLn°d.
some weeks, the symptoms became so confirmed, that his
physicians declared his life would fall a sacrifice if he did
not return home. Though most reluctant to leave his
revered chief even for a single week, he was compelled to
VOL. i. z
354 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, submit ; and he embarked for England accordingly on sick
lv- leave at Lisbon on the 26th October, and landed at
1809. Portsmouth on the 3d November. His health, as is ge-
nerally the case with persons labouring under malaria
fever, rapidly improved in the course of the voyage, and
was soon re-established after his return to his own coun-
try. He was received with the utmost distinction by the
Sovereign and all the members of the Government ; and
as he was the first officer high on Sir Arthur's staff who
had returned to this country, he was able to render essen-
tial service to the cause of the Peninsula, by explaining to
the Cabinet personally, and especially to his brother, Lord
Castlereagh, one of the secretaries of state, the views of
the English general in regard to the progress of the cam-
paign, and his plans for the systematic defence of Por-
tugal. The effect of these communications was very great,
and they went far to dispel the gloomy anticipations which
the retreat of the British army had spread in the Cabinet,
as well as the country, and inspire them on solid grounds
with a portion of the confidence of the Commander-in-
Chief.
General Stewart in these conferences represented to
General the Cabinet that Sir Arthur's plans for the ultimate de-
ex^sition liverance of the Peninsula, so far from being thwarted
wSiesty's or roade hopeless by the events which had recently
plans. occurred, had only been thereby rendered more likely
to be attended with ultimate success. Already, by the
victory of the Douro, and the advance to Talavera, the
career of conquest on the part of the enemy had been
checked, and he had been compelled to relinquish his
hold of part of his ill-gotten conquests. The whole north
of Portugal, Galicia, Asturias, and part of Leon, had
been entirely delivered — the part of the Peninsula which,
from its adjoining Portugal, it was of most importance
should be cleared of the enemy. The advance to Madrid
was only checked by a concentration of troops from all
quarters which had been attended with these results. It
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 355
is true the British army had now retired since the battle CHAP.
of Talavera to the Portuguese frontier, and the overthrow
of Ocana would probably be followed by the invasion 1809.
and occupation of Andalusia ; but our chances of ultimate
success in the conflict, so far from being lessened, would
be materially improved by that circumstance. Being
spread over the whole centre of the Peninsula from the
Pyrenees to Gibraltar, the enemy would be unable to
make head against the combined British and Portuguese
force, which would soon be 50,000 strong, but by a simi-
lar concentration of force and a parallel abandonment of
a conquered province. A second invasion of Spain, an-
other victory like Talavera, would necessitate the evacua-
tion of the whole provinces to the south of the Sierra
Morena, as the first had done of those to the north of
the Douro. If an effort were made, which was not im-
probable, to expel us from Portugal, the Commander-in-
Chief had no fears for the result. The mountain ridges
of that country, slightly improved by art, afforded posi-
tions which might be rendered unassailable by any but a
very large army ; and such a host would be alike unable
to find in the country, or bring with them from Spain,
supplies sufficient to maintain them for any length of
time. Everything, therefore, depended on keeping a
respectable force in Portugal, and securing a place of
asylum where, provided with supplies from Lisbon in the
rear, it might bid defiance to the invader, till famine and
disease compelled him to retrace his steps. Such a
defensive position had been already selected, and was in
course of being strengthened in front of Lisbon, and he
had no doubt of being able to maintain his ground there 1 Lord Cas-
O CT7 * lorAQfrn c
• 1111 A • 1 • S~*4 HcrtJoigU B
till the changes of time or another war in Germany speech,
„, , , f , ., . , , -,1-1 Parl. Deb.
afforded an opportunity- of striking a blow with advantage xv. 290.
in the centre of Spain.1 ' .
Great was the effect of these able representations by
Sir Charles Stewart of Sir Arthur Wellesley's views on
the British Cabinet, and, coupled with what they knew of
356 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, his distinguished services, both administrative and mili-
Iv< tary, in the Cabinet and in the field, led them to propose
isio. for him, on the 2d February 1810, the distinguished
Thanks of honour of receiving in person the thanks of Parliament,
the House Qn ^ne 5^ February, accordingly, General Stewart ap-
of Commons •> ' ° J r
to General peared before the House, and the Speaker (the Hon.
Feb. 5,' Charles Abbot), in the eloquent language and dignified
manner for which he was so celebrated, thus addressed
him : " Brigadier-General Charles Stewart ; amongst the
gallant officers to whom this House has declared its grati-
tude for their distinguished services in Spain, your name
has the honour to stand enrolled. During the progress of
the two last campaigns in Spain and Portugal, whoever has
turned his eye towards the bold and perilous operations
of our armies in Leon and Galicia — whoever has contem-
plated the brilliant passage of the British troops across
the Douro, an exploit which struck the enemy himself
with admiration as well as dismay — must have remarked
throughout these memorable achievements the energy and
enterprise with which you have rapidly advanced in the
career of military fame, and by which you have now
fixed your name for ever in the annals of your country as
a chief sharer in those immortal laurels won by British
fortitude and valour in the hard-fought battle of Tala-
vera. Upon the great commander under whom it was
then your pride and felicity to serve, his Sovereign, this
House, and the voice of an applauding empire, have con-
ferred those signal testimonies of honour and gratitude
which posterity will seal with its undoubted approbation ;
and it is no mean part of the merits for which you are
this day to be crowned with our thanks, that you were
chosen by such a commander to be the companion of his
councils, and the sure hand to which he could intrust the
prompt and effectual direction of his comprehensive and
victorious operations.1 To you, Sir, I am therefore now
xv. 3ib. e ' to deliver the thanks of this House ; and I do, accord-
ingly, in the name and by the command of the Commons
CAMPAIGN OF 1808 AND 1809. 357
of the United Kingdom, thank you for your distinguished CHAP.
exertions on the 27th and 28th July, in the memorable ^
battle of Talavera, which terminated in the signal defeat isio.
of the forces of the enemy."
Whereupon General Stewart said : " Mr Speaker, I 43
feel myself totally inadequate to express the high sense General
I entertain of the distinguished honour that has been answer.
conferred upon me — an honour far exceeding any little
services I may have rendered in the fortunate situation
in which I have been placed. If a sentiment of regret
could at such a moment arise in my mind, it would be
that, from the circumstance of a severe indisposition, I
stand alone here on the present occasion, the army being
still on service, and that I am not accompanied by my
gallant brother officers, equally members of this House,
who are far more eminently entitled to its thanks, and to
the applause of their country, than myself. If I sought
to arrogate anything beyond the most anxious zeal for
the public service, and a sincere love for the profession I
belong to, it is an ardent desire to follow in the footsteps
of my great and gallant commander, to whose sole abili-
ties and exertions we stand indebted, not only for the
battle of Talavera, but for all those successes which have
rendered him alike an ornament to his country and a
terror to her foes. To follow his bright example, to
emulate his achievements, and to be thought worthy of
his confidence, I shall ever consider as the surest passport
to the greatest distinction that can be conferred on a
soldier — I mean, the approbation of this honourable
House. I must now offer my sincerest acknowledg-
ments to you, Sir, for the very marked kindness which
you have shown me, in expressing to me the thanks of
this House, by condescending to enumerate my humble
services in the partial manner you have done ; and I beg
to assure you, it will be my anxious study to avail myself ^Parf.De
of all occasions to merit the honour which has this day sii.
been conferred upon me/' l
358 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. After this shining proof of public esteem and grati-
rr- tude, it may seem superfluous to refer to other mani-
isio. festations of the same feelings even in the most exalted
Heis4made stations. The favour of the Sovereign, however, went
thSthof al°ng wikh ^ie approbation of the country. He was
Feb. 17.' created, shortly after receiving the honour, a Knight
Companion of the Bath — an honour which, though it
could give no additional rank to one who was " Honour-
able" by birth, was valuable as being a mark of military
distinction, and became doubly so from being conferred at
the time when his illustrious General, for the victory of
Talavera, in which they both bore a part, was made
Viscount Wellington.
Thus did General Stewart, at the age of thirty-one —
Rapid rise a period of life when an officer generally esteems himself
Stewart, fortunate if he has attained the rank of Lieutenant-
I7to1i^am Colonel — receive the thanks of the House of Commons in
gtocUoT-'1 Person> for distinguished services in the field, rendered as
duct. Adjutant-General of Sir Arthur Wellesley's army in the
Peninsula. Doubtless, fortune had contributed much, with
good conduct and ability, to this rapid elevation ; it was
not every one who was born of a noble and influential family
connected with the Administration, and brother to a lead-
ing Cabinet Minister. But fortune in a free country
never can do more than confer the opportunities of dis-
tinction : the capacity to seize and improve them belongs
to individual ability alone. Fortune gave the opportunity
on the banks of the Esla, but valour headed the charge :
it was capacity, not influence, which won, at Sir Arthur
Wellesley's request, for General Stewart the honourable
post of Adjutant-General to the Peninsular army. But
what must have been the feelings of that parent whose
good fortune it was to see at once one son directing in
arduous times with unswerving hand the councils of his
country in foreign affairs, and another receiving the thanks
of the House of Commons for the intrepid wielding of its
sword in the field !
CHAPTER V.
FROM THE RETURN OP GENERAL STEWAET TO THE PENINSU-
LAR ARMY, IN MARCH 1810, TO THE EXPULSION OF THE
FRENCH FROM PORTUGAL.
No sooner was General Stewart's health re-established in CHAP.
the spring of 1810, by the influence of a cooler climate
and his native air, than he returned to share the toils 181°-
and dangers of his chief on the Peninsular plains. For- state'of the
tunately for him, the intervening period during which he J^oJ^
had been absent had been one of comparative repose, f^jfj®~t
unsignalised bj one event of importance. The campaign i1n8M(arch
which had just been closed had been so hard fought, its
advantages so equally divided, and the difficulties on
both sides of finding the means of transport or the re-
sources necessary for active operations had been such,
that neither party had been willing to renew the contest.
Satisfied with having repelled the British invasion of
Spain, the French generals were content to overlook
their ignominious expulsion from Portugal, and submit to
the reoccupation by the Spanish forces of Galicia and
Asturias. They looked for brighter fields of fame, as yet
untouched fields of plunder, in the beautiful provinces
recently the theatre of their disgrace, to the south of the i s;r Chas.
Sierra Morena. The British were so much weakened by ScLtL
sickness in the pestilential plains of Estremadura, and so ^a^j»4
inferior in number to the forces of the enemy when i809,MS.;
Lond. i.
united together, that they were unable to renew active 449-451.
operations.1 Taking advantage of this forced state of
360 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, inaction, Sir Arthur Wellesley, now created Viscount
v- Wellington of Wellington and Talavera, had removed his
isio. array from the unhealthy shores of the Guadiana, and
established it, after a march of three weeks, along the
frontier between the rivers Tagus and Douro, with the
headquarters first at Vizeu, and afterwards at Celorico.
The motives which had led to this change of position
Disasters in on the part of the English general were not merely those
hadTedto" founded on the necessity of a move for the health of his
position troops. The aspect of aifairs in Spain had much to do also
. w^n tQe determination. Since the retreat of the British
army to the banks of the Guadiana and their subsequent
removal into Portugal, an unbroken series of disasters
had befallen the Spanish forces in every part of the
Peninsula. Saragossa in Aragon, and Gerona in Cata-
lonia, had both fallen after sieges immortal indeed in
history, but which had most seriously crippled the means
of resistance at this time : the Spanish army in Estre-
madura had sustained a dreadful defeat at Medellin ;
that in La Mancha had been, as already mentioned,
totally annihilated at Ocana ; and the victorious French
army, under Joseph and Soult, had cleared the defiles of
the Sierra Morena without resistance, occupied Seville,
and already commenced the blockade of Cadiz. Though
the advantage was great of preserving this stronghold,
yet it had been gained by an almost entire abandonment
of the contest in the rest of Spain : and Wellington had
already received information that three French corps,
numbering 70,000 combatants, would soon assemble in
the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo with a view to
the siege and destruction of that fortress, previous to a
. serious invasion of Portugal by Almeida, through the
e- mountainous country which separates the valley of the
Aaril'i2 Douro froin that °f tne Tagus.1 It was to be prepared
isio, MS.; for and to meet this impending danger that Wellington
449, 450. moved his army during the winter from the sands of the
Guadiuna to the high grounds around Almeida, leaving
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 361
General Hill with a comparatively small force on" the CHAP.
south of the Tagus to cover the Alentejo and keep up v-
the communication with Badajos, which was still in the isio.
hands of the Spaniards.
" The first good effect," says General Stewart, " result-
ing from this change of situation showed itself in the improved
rapid recovery of the sick, and the no less rapid restora- the British
tion to full strength of such as were already convalescent. army*
As the troops contrived, for the most part, to obtain
comfortable quarters, neither the cold of winter nor the
variable temperature of the spring were felt by them.
Provisions, likewise, proved abundant ; and forage, if not
so plentiful as could have been desired, was at least less
scanty than it had been in Spain. ... In the mean-
while, Lord Wellington was devoting a large share of
his attention to the fortification and proper armament
of the lines at Torres Vedras ; whilst the greatest ex-
ertions were made both by him and Beresford to put the
regular army and the militia of Portugal into a state of
efficiency. Reinforcements accordingly came in to him
every hour, respectable, not from their numbers alone,
but from their discipline, till he saw himself at last at
the head of 27,000 British, and full 31,000 Portuguese
troops of the line. The fortress of Almeida, likewise, upon
which, as well as upon Ciudad Rodrigo, much reliance
was placed for baffling and retarding the advance of the
French army, let it begin when it might, was put in a
state of excellent defence. . . . That Ciudad Rodrigo
would hold out for any length of time, no one in the
present stage of affairs ventured to hope. The Spaniards
were, indeed, full of protestations : they spoke of burying
themselves under the ruins of the place, and rivalling
r ° * Lend. i.
the glory of Saragossa and Gerona ; but as yet they were 450-453.
not invested."1
The position occupied by Lord Wellington during this
period of apparent inaction and real preparation was the
celebrated one of Guarda, which, so long ago as the time
362 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, of Lord Galway and the war of the Succession, was
v- deemed the most defensible and important of all which
i8io. lay on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and barred the
Lord Wei- approach to the capital of an enemy from the eastward.
''owtSmand ^e Allied troops (for the Portuguese regulars were now
prospects jn iine and in some instances brigaded with the British)
at this time. . '
occupied the summit of the mountain-ridge called the
Sierra de Estrella, extending from Coimbra to Guarda, and
which gradually melts away into the immense plains of
Castile. By this means they commanded and barred the
two great roads which enter Portugal from Spain, the one
of which runs to the north and the other to the south of
the Sierra, and which are the only ones in the country on
which an invading army can move its artillery and stores.
The advanced posts were pushed forward much farther, and
occupied positions beyond Almeida on the banks of the
rivers Agueda and Coa. The right rested on the Tagus,
and was protected by Hill's corps, which was posted at
Abrantes and guarded the passage of that river; and the
left, though undefended in a military point of view, was
deemed sufficiently secure by the rugged and inhospitable
nature of the country in that quarter, of which Soult's
t . corps in the preceding year had had such bitter experience.
453-455. ' This position, which was forty miles in length, was guarded
by 27,000 British and 30,000 Portuguese troops.1
Wellington's position was undoubtedly advantageous ;
Position and but he had need of all its strength, for it was likely to
£ iSmch be taxed to the uttermost by the force which Napoleon
was accumulating against it. Having completed the
routing and dispersion of all the Spanish armies in the
field in other parts of the Peninsula, the French Emperor
had now accumulated an overwhelming force to accom-
plish its final pacification by driving the English into the
sea. It consisted of three entire corps — viz., that of
Ney, composed of three divisions ; that of Reynier, of
two ; and that of Junot, also of two. Besides these,
General Kellermann had arrived in Valladolid with 9000
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 363
infantry and 2000 cavalry, and the whole were under CHAP.
the command of Marshal Massena, whose reputation, v-
always great, had been raised to the highest point by isio.
his undaunted courage at the battle of Aspern. The
whole army was 85,000 strong, of whom at least 68,000
might be reckoned on as present with the eagles ; and the
troops, deeming victory and plunder secure, were in the
highest spirits and eager for the conflict. Wellington
could not collect above 40,000 on any one point for active
operations ; and with such an inferior force he was well
aware it was impossible he could hazard a battle in the
open field, the more especially as fully half his men were
Portuguese who had never yet been tried in a serious
conflict. But he wisely remained on his mountain-ridge .
J . 01 Joseph.
as near the frontier as possible; hoping that he might, by Mem.;
availing himself of strong positions, protract the campaign 455-457';
till the approach of the bad weather rendered a serious seT-s'e?."*
approach to the capital impossible.1
A consciousness of this great superiority of force on
the part of the enemy, as well as the disastrous termina- Desponding
tion of the war in Austria, which had been closed by the
thunderbolt of Wagram, excited a very general feeling of
despondence in the British troops. All were indeed
resolute to do their duty to the last, and dispute every
inch of ground with the enemy ; but it was with a heavy
heart that they looked forward to the future, and they
entered on the campaign rather with the constancy of
martyrs resolute to maintain their principles at the stake,
than the confidence of heroes marching to assured victory.
Lord Wellington, also, though he abated nothing of his
confident language and demeanour, had to contend with
obstacles which would have overwhelmed any ordinary
man, from the extreme difficulty of getting supplies of
specie to make the necessary purchases for the army.
But in the midst of these anxieties, and though he did
not in reality think they would be required, his provident
care had provided ample shipping at Lisbon to bring
364 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, away the troops if it should become absolutely impossible
v- to maintain his footing permanently on the Portuguese
isio. territory. Besides four sail of the line and twenty-three
frigates, there lay in the Tagus transports capable of
conveying away forty thousand men, with all their guns
and carriages — a naval force adequate to bringing away,
not only the entire British army with all its materiel, but
the Portuguese also. Three concentric lines of defence,
one within the other, had been constructed around Lis-
bon, the inmost of which, resting on the Castle of Belem
and the heights overhanging the harbour, was so strong
that it could be made good against any force of the
enemy while the troops were embarking. In these im-
portant duties, even more of an administrative than a
Stewart to' military kind, Lord Wellington found an invaluable coad-
righ^May " jutor in General, now Sir Charles, Stewart, K.C.B., whose
MS.- o2tie- talents, like those of his illustrious chief, lay not less in
iT^/^si ^ie c*v^ arrangementg requisite for success in a protracted
2ti?. ' ' campaign, than in the conduct of troops on the field of
battle.1
Having at length completed his preparations, and got
siege and up his siege train, the providing of draught horses for
capture of i . , , j° , V- J-/Y: i. nr xl
ciudad which had been his great dimculty, Massena, at the
the French7, head of two corps, commenced the siege of Ciudad Rod-
rigo. The sixth and eighth corps and reserve cavalry
collected around Ciudad Rodrigo, alone mustered 51,562
M vii< men, of whom 10,190 were horse, besides 5943 horses
nbi ; Marm. '
iv.20. and 1900 carriages for the artillery and baggage.2* The
second corps, under Reynier, which also was under
* Wellington's information was nearly the same, viz. : —
Sixth corps, . . . . . 31,611
Eighth corps, ..... 25,956
Total, . . 57,567
of whom 9572 were horse. — GURWOOD, vi. 248.
The number of men stated in the text is taken from the field state of Mas-
sena's army for the 30th June 1810, published by Koch in his able life of
Massena. Marmont, in his Memoires, makes them 59,665. But this seems to
be owing to his giving the effectives, while Koch gives only those present
under arms. Compare KOCH, vii. 567, with MARMONT, iv. 20.
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 365
Massena's orders, was 16,000 strong, and was on the CHAP.
south of the Tagus, threatening Badajos and Hill's corps,
which covered the Alentejo. Besides these, Serras's isio.
division, 10,000 strong, in Leon, observed the province
Entre Douro e Minho, and effectually prevented any suc-
cour being sent from that quarter to the menaced points
at Guarda. The main French army, 52,000 strong, took
up a position in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, to cover the
siege. The place had been invested since the middle of
April ; and ground was broken before it, and the siege
commenced in earnest, in the beginning of June. Opi- June 5.
nions at this juncture were much divided in the British
army as to whether an attempt should be made to raise
the siege. On the one hand, it was a painful thing to
see a fortress, garrisoned by 6000 brave men, who made
a most gallant defence, taken, as it were, under the eyes
of a powerful army, which recently had gained a glorious
victory ; and such a calamity, if occurring, could not fail
seriously to weaken the confidence now generally felt in
British prowess and perseverance throughout the Penin-
sula. On the other hand, the covering force was nearly
a half more than any body by which Lord Wellington
could assail it, and it was a homogeneous force, admirably
disciplined and equipped ; whereas, of the Allied troops
one half were Portuguese, but recently raised. Above
all, the British force was the only one in the Penin-
sula capable of at all making head against the enemy,
and defeat would necessarily draw after it total ruin to
the Allied cause ; whereas the French army, great as it
was, could only be regarded as the advanced-guard of an
armed host four times as numerous, ready to repair dis- JJ
aster. Influenced by these considerations, and especially J1^
the last, Wellington, after much deliberation, and with™™
a heavy heart, resolved to leave Ciudad Rodrigo to its Lnrerp.
fate. He remained firm accordingly in the position of i8io;
Guarda, with the headquarters at Alverca ; * and the
Spanish fortress, seeing no prospect of relief, capitulated,
3G6 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, after a noble defence, and enduring a month of open
trenches, on the 1 Oth July.
isio. in common with nearly all the officers of the army, Sir
Unsuccess- Charles Stewart had deeply regretted the inactivity of
ofadv^ccd1 our armj during this siege ; and there were not awanting
Htsi! those who affirmed, that the caution of our Commander-
July 11. '
in-Chief had needlessly sacrificed a brave garrison and
important fortress, and tarnished the honour of the British
arms. But an event soon occurred which demonstrated
that Wellington was right, and that a more daring course
might, without any adequate gain, endanger the whole
objects of the war. On the morning after Ciudad Rodrigo
fell, General Craufurd, with 600 light horse, made an
attempt to cut off 200 of the enemy's infantry, and 30
horse, who were lying in advance of the other outposts.
The cavalry were quickly put to flight ; but though the
hussars, led by Colonel Talbot of the 14th, rode bravely
up to the very muzzles of the enemy's muskets, they
were unable to make any impression on the infantry, and
the little party of the French got off without loss, while,
on the side of the British, Colonel Talbot and six other
men were killed, and twenty-two wounded. In this little
affair the French, in Wellington's words, " behaved with
the utmost gallantry ;" and it was only by the hussars of
the German Legion coming out of Barquilla being taken
for the enemy, that another charge, which probably
would have proved successful, was prevented from taking
place. As it was, this untoward incident, though bitterly
^Wellington regretted at the time, had in the end a beneficial effect,
£ve°rdooi ky showing the troops the quality of the enemy with
is'o13' wnom *ney na(^ to deal, and the risk with which any
Gum. vi. advance into the open country round Ciudad Rodrigo
i. 482, 483.' would have been attended, especially considering the
greatly superior force of the enemy's cavalry.1
After the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo the enemy remained
for ten days quiet, making their final preparations for the
invasion of Portugal ; and on the 21st, all things being
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 3G7
in readiness, they moved forward. The advanced-guard, CHAP.
consisting of 10,000 infantry, 2500 horse, and 40 guns, v-
pushed on in the direction of Almeida, which was evi- 181°-
dently the next object of attack. General Craufurd, agevefefight
gallant and experienced soldier, but somewhat too fond of
fighting, who commanded the light division, and had the jjjj°an-24
direction of the advanced posts, had received positive orders
not to fight in advance of the Coa ; but when the enemy
approached he could only prevail on himself to retire
slowly, and contesting every defensible position, in order
to retard their advance as much as possible. This brought
on a smart action between the French advanced-guard
and the light division on the 24th July. " The skirmish,"
says Sir Charles Stewart, who witnessed it, " was the more
interesting, as it is impossible to conceive any piece of
ground better adapted for a rencontre of the kind — an
extensive plain, intersected continually by hedges, stone
walls, and enclosures, stretching all the way from Villa-
mula to the Coa ; and it was through this that our sol-
diers fell back, retaining with obstinacy each successive
fence, till the superior numbers of the enemy compelled
them to abandon it. During the continuance of this skir-
mish, the French cavalry made more than one attempt to
cut off portions of the British infantry, and they were not
always unsuccessful. . . . The skirmishers being now
driven in, the French prepared to follow up their suc-
cesses by rigorously assaulting Craufurd's position. They
bore down with a dense column upon his centre, where the
95th, with two Portuguese regiments, were posted ; and,
in spite of a desperate resistance, particularly from the
95th and one of the foreign battalions, pierced it. By this
time our cavalry had withdrawn to the opposite side of
the Coa, and, our infantry being in some disorder, affairs
assumed rather an unpromising aspect : Craufurd accord-
ingly determined upon a retreat ; but it was undertaken
under trying and ticklish circumstances, and it was not
executed without a heavy loss both in killed and prisoners.
368 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. The only route open to General Craufurd's division was
_ b j a bridge across the stream, which, as it lay upon a
1810. level considerably beneath the ground now occupied by
the enemy, was unavoidably exposed to a heavy fire from
most of their guns. Thither, however, it was necessary
to proceed ; and thither regiment after regiment was
moved, covered in succession by the corps in the rear,
and last of all by a body of skirmishers. The French
made several brave attempts to force the bridge ; they
charged towards it repeatedly as our people were descend-
ing, and endeavoured to push a body of their cavalry across
1 Lond. i. in our rear ; but, the opposite bank rising abruptly, and
\veiifngton being covered both with artillery and infantry, they were
wdiesily, ou eacn occasion stopped. At length the firing ceased ;
isiit 2Gur anc^ Craufurd, having halted on his new ground till even-
vi. 288. ing? retreated under cover of the darkness to a position
within four leagues of Alverca." l
Though the steadiness of the troops engaged in this
Results' of combat excited the admiration of all who witnessed it, yet
mdriegeoi? was it an event much to be regretted, for it cost the lives
Almeida. of 4 Officers an(j 28 men killed, and 25 officers and 218
men wounded — a proportion of 1 to 7, most unusual in
modern war,* and which too clearly proved how nobly the
British officers had exposed themselves to bring off their
men. It illustrated the wisdom of Wellington's orders not
to fight in advance of the Coa, and the great hazard of
fighting at all, where it was possible to avoid it, with a river
to cross by a single bridge, or a free passage only in the
rear. Had the men engaged been less steady, the retreat
less orderly, beyond all doubt the greater part of Craufurd's
division would have been taken or destroyed. As it was,
Wellington deemed the superiority of the enemy in num-
bers, and especially in cavalry, too decided to hazard a
general action, even to save Almeida, and he accordingly
resolved to retire to a position of great strength, and more
* 1 to 25 is the usual proportion in the British, 1 to 30 in the French, 1 to
35 in the Russian army.
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 369
contracted, on which he had long had his eye, some leagues CHAP.
in the rear, with the headquarters at Celorico. Thither,
accordingly, the army retreated, without being at all dis- isio.
quieted by the enemy, who, to the great surprise of all in
the British army, remained inactive, and to appearance
undecided what to do, for several weeks. Almeida, which
was uncovered by the retrograde movement, was mean-
while invested, but the active operations of the siege were
not commenced. The real reason of this delay, however,
is now known. Massena, seeing the strength of the force
by which he was to be opposed, was desirous of being
reinforced by Reynier's corps from Estremadura, whose
place was to be supplied in that province by Mortier's
corps from Seville. Joseph and Soult had opposed this,
as endangering their recent and important conquests in
Andalusia. The dispute was referred to Paris ; and the
Emperor, seeing that the vital point of the contest lay i Napoleon
in Portugal, gave his decision in favour of Massena. Say6^'61"'
Reynier's corps accordingly joined Massena, while Mor- isio '>h,g
tier's broke up from Seville, and came up to Estremadura Mem. vii.
to watch Hill, who was in the neighbourhood of Elvas, i. 563.
and threaten the Alentejo.1
No sooner did Reynier's corps, 16,000 strong, cross the
Tagus to join the invading army under Massena, than the siege alid
indecision of the French movements ceased. On the 14th meidL
of August they sat down before Almeida, the reduction of
which was a necessary prelude to further operations; and
on the 25th, the first batteries were armed, but they were
at such a distance as only to reach the outworks of the place.
The fortress, which was of great strength, and amply pro-
vided, was garrisoned by two regiments of Portuguese
militia and one of the line, under Brigadier-General Cox,
in officer upon whose steadiness entire reliance could be
placed. As it was much stronger than Ciudad Rodrigo,
i still more prolonged resistance was anticipated than the
gallant one which that comparatively weak fortress had
aade ; and it was on this that Wellington's main reliance
VOL. i. 2 A
370 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, was placed, because, if the place could hold out for a few
v- weeks, the heavy rains of autumn would set in, and further
isio. movements in the field, on the part of the investing army,
would be rendered impossible. To encourage the defence,
and, if an opportunity should present itself, either interrupt
the siege, or throw in some succour to the beleaguered gar-
rison, he moved forward to the ground he had previously
occupied, and approached close to the outposts of the
besieging army. But the hopes which he entertained of a
prolonged defence were disappointed. On the evening of
the 26th, when the enemy were throwing shells, still at
very long range, into the fortress, one of them blew up the
principal magazine of the place. This was a serious mis-
fortune, for nearly all the guns were blown into the ditch,
and great part of the artillerymen killed or wounded ; but
the garrison might still have prolonged the defence some
time longer ; and subsequent events showed that, whether
it had occurred or not, they would have capitulated, and
were already in terms with the French general. No sooner
had the explosion taken place, than the whole officers in
the place, with the Portuguese second in command at their
head, waited on General Cox, and insisted on his instantly
surrendering. Cox, like a gallant soldier, refused, adding
his resolution, if matters became desperate, to cut his way
through the French lines, and join Lord Wellington. The
officers remonstrated, and withdrew in sullen discontent ;
sir chas kut Cox found, on going out to the troops, that matters
Become hopeless ; for they had already all laid down
reagh, Aug. their arms, and not a man would obey his orders. Cox had
30 1810
MS.; Lond. now no alternative but to close with the French general's
WeUinguJn offer of a capitulation, and next day he formally surreri-
£j£°rpdooi, dered. Massena entered the town immediately, and the
isio' Ind treacnerj was then made manifest.1 The garrison being
to General paraded before him, he dismissed the militia to their
Hill, Sept. | .
i, mo ; homes, on a promise they would not serve against the
389-399.1' French during the war, and offered the regular soldiers
service under the banners of Napoleon. They all accepted
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEBRAS. 371
the offer, and were immediately enrolled in the French CHAP.
legions ; while the commander of artillery, who informed _. v-
Massena of the state of the place, was made a colonel by 181°-
that general.
The sudden and unexpected fall of Almeida, especially
when accompanied by such grave indications of treachery Gloomy
on the part of the Portuguese garrison, was a most
serious misfortune, and embarrassed the English general
to a degree which he had never yet experienced since
the beginning of the war. Not only was the frontier
fortress, on which he had relied to retard the enemy till
the autumnal rains set in, lost, and its artillery and provi-
sions, which were very extensive, placed at Massena's dis-
posal, but the circumstances attending the capitulation
were such as to shake the confidence hitherto placed in
the Portuguese troops. The most desponding views, in
consequence, came to pervade the British army, and from
it the gloom spread rapidly to the Government and the
press at home. The Spanish armies were all defeated and
dispersed ; a hopeless resistance was only maintained in
detached mountains and fortresses, rather from the cha-
racteristic obstinacy of the nation than from any expec-
tation of ultimate success. The French armies in the
Peninsula amounted to 250,000 men present with the
eagles; and of this immense force, one-fourth, or 60,000,
were concentrated for the immediate invasion of Portugal.
The entire troops at the disposal of Wellington were little
nore than 50,000, and one-half of these were at a dis-
:ance, under Leith and Hill, at Thomar and on the
Cagus ; so that not more than 28,000 could be concen-
rated in a single field to give battle to the enemy, who
•ould bring at least 60,000 in a mass against him. The
lisproportion was too great to risk a general battle, un-
ess in a very strong position and under the most favour-
ble circumstances, and amply sufficient to spread the
lost desponding views as to the ultimate issue of thesie.
ampaign throughout the Allied army.1
372 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
It added much to the difficulties of Wellington at this
critical juncture, that Lord Castlereagh, who hitherto had
been his firmest support in the Cabinet, was no longer a
member of the Government, in consequence of his unfor-
g- tuoate rupture and duel with Mr Canning, already noticed ;
ton's situa- an^ ^Q General-in-Chief 's correspondence was in conse-
tion.
quence carried on with Lord Liverpool. It is no impeach-
ment of the firmness and patriotism of that eminent and
judicious statesman to say, that he and his colleagues at
that time shared those desponding views, and that they
had come to regard the attempt to defend Portugal as
visionary. Judging by past experience, and at a dis-
tance from the scene of action, there can be no doubt
that those opinions were well founded, and such as any
rational man, forming his judgment upon the information
which they possessed, would have adopted. Without, there-
fore, actually forbidding the attempt to defend Portugal,
they contented themselves with throwing all responsibility
connected with it on the general, and urging upon him
the necessity, as his primary object, of looking to the safety
of the British army intrusted to his keeping, and the means
of bringing it off safe to England in case of disaster.* The
Portuguese Government, at best weak and timorous, was
still less to be relied on ; and the chief object they seemed
to have was, to thwart every proposal for the common
cause which came from the English general. In these
arduous circumstances, threatened by a powerful enemy
double his own strength in front, and with a desponding
* " Lord Wellington found himself at this critical juncture beset with many
other difficulties besides those which originated in the insufficiency of his own
force and the tremendous superiority of the enemy. All responsibility was
thrown upon him. The instructions which he received were generally so ex-
pressed as to leave him ground for doubt respecting the course which would be
most agreeable to his employers; whilst hints are thrown out, that he ought to
look above all things to the preservation of the forces intrusted to him. In few
words, the Ministers were alarmed at the crisis to which affairs had arrived, and
their conduct partook of their fears. Nor was the Government of Portugal to
be.depended upon ; and a thousand impediments were thrown in the way of
every useful suggestion, provided it happened to come from the English general
or his friends."— LONDONDERRY'S Peninsular War, i. 505, 506.
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 373
Government and lukewarm ally in rear, it was fortunate CHAP.
for Wellington that he possessed in the Adjutant-General
of his army, Sir Charles Stewart, a counsellor and friend, 181°-
who, sharing his inmost thoughts, and inspired with equal
firmness, brought to his aid the resources of administrative
talents of the highest kind, and a degree of energy which
proved equal to the serious emergency which had arisen.
Napoleon meanwhile incessantly urged Massena to
commence the invasion of Portugal forthwith and in good Massena, by
earnest ; the harvest having now been cut down, and the po*u°iven *
season arrived when he deemed it practicable to make vLtesPor-
the attempt, without incurring any serious risk as to pro- tuga1'
visions. In pursuance of these orders, that Marshal at
length broke up from Almeida and advanced into Portu-
gal, though by a different route from that which Lord
Wellington supposed he would have taken ; while the
latter retired before him leisurely and in the best order,
driving^ the cattle, and carrying off, so far as possible,
all the provisions in the country through which he
retired. Reynier, with his entire corps, moved down
the valley of the Mondego on the Ponte de Murcella,
which was the point of rendezvous assigned by Welling-
ton to his troops, and where he designed, if practicable,
to give battle, with a view to stop his further advance.
Junot and Ney's corps marched in parallel columns to
the right ; the former by the hill-road from San Felices
through Trancoso — the latter by Celorico, and across
the Mondego upon Vizeu. His object in following this
course was to turn the position of Ponte de Murcella,
which was eminently favourable for a lesser force engag-
ing a greater. No sooner did Wellington learn that he
ivas marching upon this line, which abandoned all co-
)peration with the troops in Estremadura, threatening
he Alentejo, than he marched upon Cortico, near Ponte
le Murcella, intending to give battle there. It was
ivident to all the army, from this movement, that the
British general had no intention of abandoning Portugal
374 SIH CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, without a struggle, and that he was only looking about
for some ground where he might meet the enemy on
18K>. something like equal terms, and neutralise his superi-
ority, especially in cavalry, which had hitherto rendered
any conflict in the level country so hazardous.1
This advantageous ground ere long presented itself,
Approach of even sooner than was generally anticipated. The three
to° BuTaTo?* French corps, which had hitherto advanced in three sepa-
Sept'2o> rate columns between the Mondego and the Douro, now
united together and moved in one immense mass along
the road to Vizeu, on the right bank of the Mondego ;
thus turning the position of Ponte de Murcella. This
road was execrable, insomuch that it was reckoned in
the British army altogether impassable for artillery and
wheel - carriages. Accustomed, however, to make all
physical difficulties yield to energetic determination and
an iron will, the French troops pushed on upon this line,
with all their enormous train of carriages, withou^ inter-
mission, and so densely massed together as to defy all
annoyance or attack. As Reynier was united with the
main body, the entire army, 60,000 strong, was ap-
proaching. The badness of the roads, however, com-
pelled them to halt four days at Vicize to repair the
damage done to the artillery. Lord Wellington instantly
Sept. 25. took advantage of this delay to move his whole army
Sept. 26. across the Mondego ; while Hill's and Leith's corps were
l-lSt"1 a^so moved to the same river, where they arrived on
Beph's Aiem. the same day. The whole force, 50,000 strong, were, by
vn. 174 ; ^ *
Wellington these flank movements, concentrated on the position of
erpoolsept. BusACO, barring the direct road to Lisbon — a field which
GUFW. vi'. became the theatre of a battle so important, that a de-
scription of the ground must be given in Sir Charles
Stewart's own words.2
" The position of Busaco consists of one huge moun-
Description tain, which extends from the edge of the Mondego to the
tionhofp°si g^at Oporto road, and supports upon its summit the
convent of Busaco, inhabited by monks of the order of
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 375
La Trappe. It measures nearly sixteen miles in width CHAP.
from the right, where it eases itself off by gradual falls
towards the Mondego to the left, where it ends in a 181°-
variety of tongues of land, each as lofty, craggy, and
rugged as itself. It is covered in front by gorges
of indescribable depth, and defiles barely passable for
sheep. The principal inconvenience attending it as fight-
ing ground for our army arose out of its extent ; for it
was manifestly too capacious to be occupied aright by
60,000 men." It was, however, liable to be turned on
the British left by the Mealhada road, and every one
expected to see the efforts of the enemy made in that
quarter. " Strange to say, however, Marshal Massena
made no effort of the kind. On the contrary, he led
his columns through the passes above described, and up
the face of heights approximating very nearly to the per-
pendicular, and thus devoted them to destruction, from
the hands of men posted, as has been already mentioned,
on their summits." Wellington gave orders that no affairs
of advanced posts should take place, and that the out-
posts in the plain below should retire to the foot of the
mountain, and then up its sides, as the enemy ap-
proached ; being desirous that they should come upon
the whole strength of the Allied army unexpectedly and
at once in a situation where the immense superiority
of their cavalry could be of no avail. In obedience to
these orders the advanced posts retired, but in the finest
order, skirmishing and firing as they withdrew. While
doing so, Lieutenant Hoey, aide-de-camp to Sir Charles
Stewart — who, always in the post of danger, was with the
rearguard — was killed at his General's side by a cannon-
shot. Meanwhile Hill and Leith were in full march over i JMI\. „.
the Mondego, and by daybreak on the 27th the wtM^^^^te
stood in battle array on the summit of the mountain. ^sep
Hill's division stood on the extreme right, on the summit •??» 181°.;
o f (jriinv. vi.
of the slopes shelving down to the Mondego ; l next Leith's 414.
corps, then Picton with the third division, then Spencer
376 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, with the first, then Craufurd with the light division, and,
on the extreme left, Cole with the fourth. The cavalry
isio. \vere massed together in the plains in front of Mealhada,
where alone they had ground on which they could act,
and the artillery were placed on all advantageous spots
along the line on the top of the ridge, so as to command
the debouches from the glens on the rugged summits.
Massena was too experienced a general not to see the
Masscn'a is danger of attacking a powerful army in such a position,
fo attack!1 especially when the approaches to it were such that
neither cavalry nor artillery could be brought up to the
conflict till the gorges were won ; but he was goaded on
to the conflict by the clamour of the generals and officers
around him, who, ignorant of the quality of the troops
with whom they had to deal, demanded, with loud cries,
to be led to the assault. General Pelet, who was Mas-
seua's first aide-de-camp, affirms that Ney wrote to the
Commander-in-Chief to the effect that, if he was in his
place he would overwhelm the English, but that, in the
1 Massena's circumstances, he would counsel a retreat to the Agueda.1
192™' This bitter irony determined the General, and orders were
given for the attack on the day following at daybreak.
The truth was, Ney was as well aware as Massena of the
hazard of an attack on Wellington's army in such a
position ; but he was as yet ignorant of the quality of
» Joseph's British troops : and, well knowing the impetuosity of the
Mem. vii. 111 • r- -n
175. Jiiinperor, and what he expected from the armies of ror-
tugal, he deemed it indispensable to make the attempt.2
At six on the morning of the 27th the French troops
Battle of commenced the attack, and they did so with a gallantry
Seft?zi. which drew forth rounds of hearty applause from their
enemies, as well as their friends. Ney, with three divi-
sions, mustering 23,000 combatants, advanced against
the British left by the great road leading to the con-
vent of Busaco, guarded by the light division ; Reynier
with two divisions, 15,000 strong, moved against their
right, and came up a wooded ravine, at the head of which
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 377
stood Pict oil's men. Both attacks were made with great CHAP.
spirit ; but the latter, which was led by three of the most
distinguished regiments in the French service, the 32d, 181°-
36th, and 70th, under General Merle, was the one
chiefly relied on. They pushed forward with such vigour,
driving the British and Portuguese skirmishers before
them, that they not only gained the summit of the gorge,
but deployed in good order on the summit. The danger
was imminent ; for, had the French been supported, they
might have maintained themselves on the ground they
had won, and, by breaking through the Allied line of i
defence, possibly gained the day. But fortunately they
were not supported ; and meanwhile the 45th British
and 8th Portuguese met them with a bravery equal to1^1^
their own, and stood their ground with undaunted valour, so, isio;
Ere long the 88th came up ; and the gallant Irish, with 447-450;'
loud shouts, charged and drove the enemy headlong over 7,°8. ' '
rocks and cliffs down the descent.1
The other attack, under Ney in person, directed against
the British left, met with no better success. The column, Defeat'of
headed by Loison's division, rapidly advanced up the road onMe'Bri
in the wooded hollow, which leads direct to Busaco ; tlsh left'
and the British sharpshooters, driven before them, soon
issued forth on the crest, breathless with the steep ascent,
and in disorder. Craufurd, who was there with his di-
vision, had placed his artillery most advantageously, so
as to play upon the enemy during their progress up
the hollow ; and his guns, to which they had none to
reply, played upon them with very great effect. No-
thing, however, could stop the upward advance of the
French troops, and they emerged breathless, but in good
order, on the summit. But Craufurd stood there with the
43d, 52d, and 95th, in line ; they lay concealed in a
hollow till the enemy were within a hundred yards ;
and then, springing up and advancing a few steps,
threw in a slow deliberate running fire from right to
left along the whole line, which made fearful chasms in
378 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, the ranks of the enemy. No sooner was this volley
v~ delivered than the whole, with a loud and simultaneous
wio- cheer, rushed forward with the bayonet — Sir Charles
Stewart, with the commanders of the regiments, leading.
" The enemy/' says Sir Charles Stewart, " unable to
retreat, and afraid to resist, were rolled down the steep
like a torrent of hailstones driven before a powerful wind ;
and not the bayonets only, but the very hands of some of
our brave fellows, became in an instant red with the blood
of the fugitives. More brilliant or more decisive charges
than those executed this day by the two divisions which
bore the brunt of the action, were never perhaps wit-
1 T A **
8, 9°Lord nessed ; nor could anything equal the gallantry and in-
t^LordSton trepidity of our men throughout, except perhaps the
Liverpool, hardihood which had ventured upon so desperate an
IScpt. ol/»
i8iO;Gurw. attack." After this second repulse, the enemy, at all
vi. 446,447; .
MassenVs ' points, retreated into the plain at the foot of the moun-
1M-197.1 tain, and the British and Portuguese remained in undis-
turbed possession of its summit.1
The loss of the French in killed and wounded in this
20
Results of battle, by their own admission, was 4486 men, and 223
both sides°n generals or officers, including Generals Merle, Foy, and
2 Massena's Maucunne.2 This loss, now ascertained from the official
199, 200. sources, was nearly as large as what Wellington, in his offi-
cial despatch, estimated — viz., at 1800 killed and 3000
wounded ; while that of the Allies was only 1300. This dis-
proportion arose from the great disadvantages under which
the French laboured in making the attack, and the murder-
ous effect of the fire of the British in line upon the dense
masses of the French in column. But great as was this ad-
vantage, it was as nothing to the moral effect of the defeat
upon the two armies. This cannot be given better than
in the words of the Duke of Wellington on one side, and
General Koch, the able biographer of Massena, on the
other. " This movement," said the former, in his official
despatch announcing the battle, " has afforded me a
favourable opportunity of showing the enemy the descrip-
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 379
tion of troops of which this army is composed. It has CHAP.
brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy
for the first time in an advantageous situation ; and they isio.
have proved that the trouble which has been taken with
them has not been thrown away, and that they are
worthy of contending in the same ranks with British
troops in this interesting cause, which they afford the
best hopes of saving." While mutual confidence and
cordial co-operation were thus established between the
British and Portuguese, disunion and acrimony, the usual
attendants on bad success, broke out in the French
ranks. " This check," says General Koch, " in the out-
set of the campaign, surprised our troops without dimi-
nishing their courage ; but it developed the seeds of the
division which existed between the General-in-Chief and
his lieutenants. The former complained of the little
vigour displayed by the Duke of Elchingen (Ney) in his
attack, his inattention to the orders he had received,
and of the faulty direction given to the column of
Marchand. The Duke maintained that he had done
the best he could, or was possible, in the circumstances ;
and he allowed his ill-humour to exhale in insulting ex-
pressions and ill-founded accusations. Those who blamed
the battle, as well as those who found themselves its i vveiiing-
victims, were never wearied of repeating envious criti- i° ve,0p;^d
cisms, the echo of which has been prolonged even to our^1.30'
day. Nevertheless, the evil was not so great as it might f/g™^'^
have become ; and the two armies maintained the posi- Mem. ^ '
tions they had held before the fight, like two fatigued vii. 200.'
athletes who take breath before the final struggle." l
In this glorious and most important battle Sir Charles
Stewart was actively engaged, and rendered the most im- Great s'er-
portant service to the Commander-in-Chief. Wellington charies 'r
said in his despatch : " I have throughout received the f£s
greatest assistance from the general and staff officers. I
am particularly indebted to the adjutant and the quarter-
master-generals." The former of these officers was, liter-
380 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, ally speaking and in every sense, his " adjutant " during
v- the whole engagement. Ever on horseback beside his
isio. chief, he flew to the menaced points to carry out his in-
structions, and encouraged the troops wherever the danger
was greatest, and in this way he was with their respective
generals, at the head both of Craufurd's and Leith's divi-
sions when they repulsed, by their glorious charges, the
formidable attacks of Loison and Merle. The great ser-
vices rendered by his courage and energy on these trying
occasions served strongly to cement the cordial friend-
ship which grew up between him and Lord Wellington,
by whom, both in conversation and correspondence, he
was constantly called " Charles/'
Although the battle of Busaco, in its final results, was
one of the most important ever fought in any age by the
British troops, yet its immediate consequences were far
from being equally satisfactory. Hurled down, indeed,
from the summit of the ridge with heavy loss, the French
general abandoned all thoughts of a fresh attack, but he
sent out scouts in every direction to see whether the for-
midable position could not be turned. In this he proved
successful. At noon on the following day, a peasant
brought information to the French headquarters that
there was a road practicable for artillery from Mortagoa
to Boialva, over the Sierra de Caramula, on the extreme
French right, by which the army with all its carriages
might pass over and get into the great road from Oporto to
Coimbra, and thus entirely turn the British position. To
attempt to do so was a hazardous operation, for it exposed
the flank of the army, in long and straggling array, en-
cumbered by several thousand waggons and all its sick
and artillery, to an attack from a powerful and wary
adversary, from whose position, on the mountains above,
the whole movement would necessarily become visible.
But between incurring that hazard, and a retreat either
to the Agueda and Ciudad Rodrigo, or Oporto, there was
no alternative ; and the knowledge which Massena had of
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 381
the violence of Napoleon's temper, and the confident ex- CHAP.
pectations he had formed of decisive success from the v>
invasion of Portugal, forbade all thoughts of a retrograde 181°-
movement, except in the very last extremity. lie re-
solved, therefore, to run the risk, and sent forward imme-
diately two regiments of horse to occupy the summit of
the Sierra. When they reached it a magnificent view
opened on their astonished eyes of rich plains, hanging
orchards and vineyards, sparkling streams, and a splendid
champaign country, extending from the foot of the moun-
tain to Coimbra. Overjoyed at this discovery, Massena
despatched Junot with two divisions at nightfall, to occupy
the pass in force ; and at break of day Ney was to march
with his entire corps, to be immediately followed by the 2017262™'
whole army.1
Wellington has frequently said that he expected the
battle of Busaco would have stopped the advance of the Wellington
French into Portugal, and that, if their general had been Torres °
directed by the true principles of the military art, he Vedras-
would have retired after that check.2 Influenced by this a Gurw. \\.
belief, and supposing that the pass on his left, over which 556'
Massena was preparing to move, was impassable for an
army, he did not occupy it; and when, on the evening
of the 28th, he saw the French army defiling in that
direction, he wisely made no attempt to disturb them, but
gave orders for the whole force to break up and retire
by Coimbra towards Lisbon. His policy was now to
leave nothing to chance. Behind him were the lines of
Torres Vedras, now completed, and mounted with six
hundred guns. He withdrew, therefore, rapidly towards
this stronghold, driving the whole corn and cattle of the
country as he retired, accompanied by nearly the whole toSt
inhabitants ; and at the same time he wrote to the Mar- ^isio6?*'
quis de la Romana to come across from Estremadura and ^TV'-j
. . -, . i . 450 ; Lond.
join him there, which that gallant officer immediately did>>- n,i2;
. Belmas i
with 4000 men.3 It was a joyful day for the Spanish 132.
troops when they entered Portugal, for they immediately
382 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, received the same rations as the British — viz., a pound
v' of bread, a pound and a half of biscuit, and a pound of
i8io. meat a-daj: a wonderful change to men who, however
inured to abstemious habits, had previously been literally
starving.
There can be no doubt that this retreat, and the order
24
Horrors of to the Portuguese to evacuate their houses and retire
eat' with the army before the French approached, was abso-
lutely necessary, and largely contributed to the ultimate
success of the campaign ; but, in the first instance, it led
to very great confusion and suffering, and excited the
warmest feelings of commiseration in the British officers
and soldiers who witnessed it. Sir Charles Stewart has
left the following graphic picture of it and its attendant
horrors : " Crowds of men, women, and children — of the
sick, the aged, and the infirm, as well as of the robust
and the young — covered the roads and the fields in
every direction. Mothers might be seen with infants at
their breasts hurrying towards the capital, and weeping
as they went ; old men, scarcely able to totter along,
made way chiefly by the aid of their sons and daughters ;
whilst the whole wayside soon became strewed with bed-
ding, blankets, and other species of household furniture,
which the weary fugitives were unable to carry farther.
During the retreat of Sir John Moore's army numerous
heartrending scenes were brought before us ; for then,
as now, the people, particularly in Galicia, fled at our
approach ; but they all returned sooner or later to their
homes, nor ever dreamed of accumulating upon our line
of march, or following our fortunes. The case was dif-
ferent here. Those who forsook their dwellings, forsook
them under the persuasion that they should never behold
them again ; and the agony which such an apprehension
appeared to excite among the majority exceeds any at-
tempt at description. ... It could not but occur to us
that, though the devastating system must inevitably bear
hard upon the French, the most serious evils would, in
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 383
all probability, arise out of it, both to ourselves and our CHAP.
allies, from the famine and general distress which it threat-
ened to bring upon a crowd so dense, shut up within the isio.
walls of a single city. At the moment there were few
amongst us who seemed not disposed to view it with
reprobation ; because, whilst they condemned its appar-
ent violation of every feeling of humanity and justice,
they doubted the soundness of the policy in which it 12, is."
originated." 1
Driving this agitated and weeping crowd before them,
the British army, under its indomitable chief, now ap- sir chkries
proached the lines of Torres Vedras — the chosen strong- description
hold and battle-field on which the fate, not of Lisbon it- °J{ Torres68
self, but of the Peninsula, was to be decided. Sir Charles Vedras-
Stewart, who rode along its entire extent almost every
day for the next two months, has given the following
account of these celebrated lines : " Along the neck of
the peninsula, at the extremity of which Lisbon is built,
there extend several ranges of high and rugged hills, in-
tersected here and there by narrow passes, and covered
for the most part by deep ravines and defiles, in the usual
acceptation of the term impassable. Along this, at the
distance of perhaps twenty-five English miles from the
city, Lord Wellington had selected two lines, one con-
siderably in advance of the other, but both of tremen-
dous strength ; and he had bestowed upon their forti-
fication so much of care, and diligence, and science, as to
place them almost equally beyond the reach of insult from
any assailing force, however numerous and well supplied.
The system pursued on this occasion was quite novel, and
the works erected were altogether such as were not to be
met with, under similar circumstances, in any part of the
world.
"The first line rested its right upon the acclivities of
Alhandra, on the summits of which several formidable pescrip-
redoubts were erected, and was flanked by the fire of a S line!*
dozen gunboats at anchor in the Tagus. The faces of these
384 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, hills were all carefully scarped ; the road which led
through them was destroyed ; and it was with perfect
laio. justice concluded that here at least our position might be
pronounced impregnable. On the left of these heights lay
a ravine or gully, called the Pass of Maltao, the gorge of
which was effectually blocked up by two formidable re-
doubts, whilst it was completely commanded on one hand
by the hills of Alhandra, and on the other by those of
Armeda. The latter, like the former, were scarped, and
otherwise rendered inaccessible ; and they communicated
with the centre of the position, which was a huge moun-
tain, crowned by a redoubt more extensive than any other
on the line. As this mountain overhung the village of
Sobral, its castle kept completely at command the great
road which conducts from thence to Lisbon, and rendered
it utterly hopeless for any body of men so much as to
attempt a passage in that direction. On the left of this
redoubt, again, some high and broken ground looked down
upon Zebreira, and stretched, in formidable shape, to-
wards Pataneira. Just behind that village there is a deep
glen, succeeded by other hills, which cover the roads from
Ribaldeira to Exara and Lisbon ; whilst, on the left of the
whole, was a lofty mountain, which crowded up all the
space between these roads and Torres Vedras." The
works ended at the extreme left at the mouth of the
Zezambre, on the sea, distant twenty-five miles from the
other extremity on the Tagus. " Along this line were
erected, at convenient distances, no fewer than one hun-
dred and eight redoubts, differing in dimensions according
to the extent of the ground allotted for them and the
purposes which they were severally intended to serve ;
and the whole were armed with a train of four hundred
and twenty pieces of ordnance of the heaviest calibre."
In addition to this, the ascents, by nature, were all steep,
Lend. ii. arid, and rocky.1 Sloping vineyards for the most part
«k** covered the front; and wherever these obstacles were
awahting, strong palisades were erected, ditches cut, and
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 385
slopes scarped, so as to impede to the greatest degree CHAP.
the advance of an attacking army. v-
Notwithstanding all this, these lines, though among the 181°-
strongest which combined nature and art had ever formed, weSpom
were not without their weak points, which Sir Charles ofthee>
Stewart observed, and anxiously pointed out to the Corn-
mander-in-Chief. They were thus explained by himself
at the time in a letter to his brother : "In some places
the redoubts have been unavoidably placed at such con-
siderable intervals from each other, that, should there be
no powerful reserves at hand, and movable columns to
block up the chasms, the enemy might, without much dif-
ficulty, and with little loss, penetrate between them.
This is particularly the case at the extremities, in the
space between Mafra and the sea on the left, and between
Torres Vedras and the Tagus on the right ; and unfor-
tunately they are precisely the places where an attack is
most likely to be made. The centre is completely covered
by the great redoubt on Monte Junto, and the works
ramifying from it on either side ; but the flanks are not
equally covered, and if assailed must depend upon the
valour of those who occupy them."1 To obviate as much
as possible this danger, Wellington had constructed a fine
road, which ran along the position behind the lines over
its whole extent, so as to afford the means of moving Ms-
troops or artillery rapidly from one part to another ; and
a line of signals was erected so as to give instant informa-
tion to headquarters of any attack which might be made
in any quarter. Still, with all these precautions, the
Jommander-in-Chief was not without uneasiness as to the
effect of a sudden attack in great force on one part of a
ine of such extent. The outposts were pushed far into
he plain towards the French videttes ; the utmost vigi-
ince was enjoined on all the guards and sentinels : and 3
he General himself rode almost every day along the whole 486, 487;'
• it i • , n* , • . • Koch, vii.
ne, accompanied by his stair, to inspect in person every 229-231.
art of the preparations.2
VOL. i. 2s
386 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. Slowly following the retreating army, without giving
it any serious molestation, Massena at length approached
isio- these stupendous lines. They took the French entirely
Mamma re- by surprise, for they had heard only a vague rumour be-
r?'T !? *v fore that some earthworks had been thrown up in front
blockade the A
lines only. Of Lisbon, but of their magnitude or strength they
had not formed a conception. After carefully reconnoit-
ring them along their whole extent, the French general
formed a decided opinion that it was hopeless to attempt
to carry them by storm. The army had been consider-
ably weakened by the effects of disease and fatigue since
the battle of Busaco, and five thousand sick and wounded
encumbered the hospitals which had been hastily formed
at Coiinbra. Heavy artillery was awanting to combat
that which was so plentifully arrayed on the British re-
doubts ; and it was even doubtful if the ammunition of
the army would suffice for so desperate a shock as might
be expected in the assault. On the other hand, a retreat
was not to be thought of; for, independent of the dangers
and privations by which it would inevitably be attended,
the wrath of the Emperor at the failure of the expedition
was more to be dreaded than any efforts of the enemy.
Still his present situation was full of danger, which was
daily increasing ; for the invading host had plunged into
the country, according to Napoleon's fashion, without
magazines of any kind, and relying entirely on the re-
sources they might find in it, and these were almost
entirely wasted by the passage of two great armies over
it, and the efforts made by the British to drive the whole
cattle and provisions that were portable into their own
lines. Pressed by so many difficulties, the French general
232°C233V"' remained motionless and undecided in front of the British
tTilorffi v- lines> sending off the most pressing letters to the Emperor,
loTsio0;64' rePresenting his situation and difficulties, and praying for
PiSTV"'.! reinforcements, especially in artillery and ammunition.1
; l.iiinl. i -I i
ii.28, 29. But meanwhile the dangers of his situation were hourly
increasing ; his communications with Spain and France
CAMPAIGN OP TORRES VEDRAS. 387
in rear were entirely cut off; the whole provisions in the CHAP.
vicinity of the army were soon exhausted, and the famish- v-
ing soldiers were obliged to straggle twenty and thirty isio.
miles off to extract them at the point of the bayonet
from the wretched inhabitants ; and Colonel Trant, having
collected 5000 militia, and made an attack on Coimbra
directly in his rear, captured the whole sick and wounded
it contained, amounting to 5000 men.
The great reliance of Massena in this long tarrying in
so dangerous a situation, was on the expected failure of improved
supplies for the British army. Napoleon had strongly
impressed upon him the difficulty of getting provisions
in Portugal, and forbade the invasion before the harvest
was reaped and stored in the barns. When, therefore,
the French general saw a British army, containing above
70,000 mouths, and driving before them a helpless crowd
of at least as many more, retreat into the immediate vicin-
ity of a city containing 250,000 inhabitants, and already
burdened with the crews of a hundred ships lying in
the Tagus, it is not surprising that he entertained sanguine
hopes that necessity or want of provisions would soon
compel the British, as it had done himself at Genoa, to
capitulate, or evacuate the country. But, in reasoning in
this manner, both the Emperor and his lieutenant forgot
the essential difference which the command of the sea
made in the two situations. Utterly sterile and unpro-
ductive to other nations, the ocean is, as General Jomini
long ago observed, prolific of life and strength to the
British; it is their true base of military operations.
The provident care of the English Government and Lord
Wellington had secured supplies, not only in sufficient
quantities, but abundance, as well for the whole fighting
men assembled in front, as for the crews of the ships,
the inhabitants of Lisbon, and the immense crowd of
rural inhabitants who had been driven forward into the
lines. Vessels laden with grain in great quantities daily
arrived in the Tagus from Barbary, Egypt, and the Le-
388 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, vant, which amply supplied the wants of the capital ; and
v- between the British army and the poor inhabitants, with
i8io. whose support they charged themselves, a hundred and
thirty thousand rations were, in the latter days of the
occupation, daily served out from the British stores.
Reinforcements also came pouring in on all sides : six
battalions of English troops arrived from England, four
from Cadiz, mustering 7000 bayonets. This seasonable
addition raised the British force, exclusive of the Portu-
guese, on paper, to 41,000, of whom 33,000 were present
in the field. The Portuguese were 30,000 men, and the
Spaniards 4000, so that there were 67,000 good troops
amply supplied with provisions, occupying impregnable
lines armed by 420 guns! In addition to this the troops
were all fresh, comfortably hutted, amply supplied with pro-
visions, and in excellent spirits. The victory of Busaco,
and evident strength of their present position, had dis-
tne sinister forebodings among them which the
continuance of the retreat had produced ; and the
10, i8io, cheerful confidence in the future which the chief always
11. so. ' expressed, and his staff repeated, communicated itself to
the men, and produced a universal exhilaration.1
In all these respects the situation of the French army
Depressed was diametrically the reverse of that of the British.
thedFrenchf Having ventured into the heart of Portugal without ma-
gazines or supplies, they were in a short time reduced
to great straits from want of provisions. Rest there was
none for the wearied troops. Large bodies of foragers
were obliged to be sent out every day to ransack the
country for provisions ; and as the intermediate and nearer
districts became exhausted, the men had to go farther
off, until they were to be seen twenty and thirty miles
distant from the French lines. In spite of the .extra-
ordinary power of extracting resources which long prac-
tice had given the French soldiers, they were at length ut-
terly at fault, from the entire consumption of the stores of
the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Portuguese militia, under
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 389
Silviera and Bacillar, above 20,000 strong, was drawing CHAP.
round their rear, and entirely cut off all communication v-
with Spain. Though little formidable in the open field, isio.
these desultory bands did essential service by intercepting
communications, cutting off foragers and convoys, and de-
stroying isolated men. In these operations they were
cordially assisted by the whole peasantry of the country,
whose resentment had been roused to the highest pitch by
the long-continued exactions of the French, and the cruelty
with which their demands were enforced. Massena made
the utmost efforts to throw a bridge over the Tagus, in 238-257;"'
order to cross his army over, and carry the war into the j0es™Ph,evii.
Alentejo; but he was constantly defeated by the activity MarmoitJ
and vigilance of the British flotilla, which had removed all j
the boats on that river. At length, having exhausted
every possible means of subsistence, he suddenly broke is, isio;
up on the night of the 14th November, and withdrew his 299.
whole army in the direction of Santarem.1
Sir Charles Stewart has recorded, as a circumstance
extremely remarkable, and almost inexplicable, the accu- weiiing-
rate prophetic knowledge which Lord Wellington, through- ^t o°fr°"
out this memorable campaign, had of the designs of his
opponent, and the skill with which, from the very first
anticipating what he would do, he adopted the very mea-
sures best calculated to counteract them. " The first
measure," says he, " which our chief adopted was this :
he caused an excellent road to be made on the south side
of the Mondego, which extended all the way from Celorico
to Ponte de Murcella, and beyond it to Coimbra. His
next step was to throw his divisions and brigades along
the great gorge extending from Celorico to the Alva ; and
he so arranged them as that, when the army began to
move, the troops followed one another by stages, in the
utmost regularity, and without any of that bustle which a
march en 'masse unavoidably occasions. Possessed of these
advantages, Lord Wellington saw clearly enough that it was
in his power, in the event of Massena's advance by any
390 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, single road, to cross the Mondego with his whole force, and
v- to throw himself, whenever he chose, between the enemy
isio. and Coimbra. As soon, therefore, as Massena's designs were
satisfactorily ascertained, he fixed with a master's eye upon
the banks of the Dao and the Criz as the proper spots at
which to cast impediments in the way of the French, whilst
he should perform the arduous and enterprising operation
of throwing the entire of his infantry, artillery, and stores,
by wretched fords, and still more wretched bridges, across
a river of no ordinary dimensions or difficulties. All was
accomplished in the very order and manner which he had
in his own mind chalked out. The bridges on the Dao
and the Criz were then destroyed with astonishing celerity.
Craufurd and Pack, with the advanced-guard, were thrown
across at Santa Comba Dao ; and the rest of the army
accomplished a very brilliant manoeuvre with the utmost
accuracy and perfection ; for not a gun got out of its place
during the continuance of the march; and when the mo-
• ment of inquiry arrived, everything was found in the exact
spot which it had been intended to occupy. But the most
extraordinary feature of all remains yet to be noticed.
From the instant when he fixed upon the position of
Busaco, Lord Wellington expressed his firm conviction that
he would be attacked there ; and he adhered to that opinion
in opposition to the sentiments of every functionary by
whom he was surrounded." This was the more remarkable,
that the attacking us there was unquestionably a course
which the enemy ought not to have pursued. " Instead of
dashing themselves madly against us, they ought to have
continued to take ground to their right, and so gone round
a stupendous mountain, which the slightest exercise of mi-
litary penetration might have shown that they need not
hope to pass Hence I speak of Lord Wel-
lington's prescience as something quite out of the ordinary
course of events, inasmuch as Busaco was a position simply
23-26. ' " and solely because the enemy thought fit, by attacking, to
give to it that character."1
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 391
When it was first discovered, on the afternoon of the CHAP.
15th November, that the enemy had retreated in the pre- v-
ceding night, the surprise in the British lines was extreme, isio.
It had been known on the preceding day that Drouet, with Move3f'ents
a reinforcement, estimated at 15,000, though really con- of weiijng-
c J ton on the
sisting of only 10,000 men, was on his way to join retreat of
•\/T iii-i o. i i , the French.
Massena, and had arrived on that day at Sabugal, and
it was thought the French general was only waiting for
this accession of force to commence an attack on the Bri-
tish position. When it was found that they really were
retreating, Wellington never doubted that they were going
to attempt the passage of the Tagus, and carry the war
into the provinces to the south of that river. He there-
fore instantly wrote to Admiral Berkeley, who commanded
the fleet in the Tagus, to send up the whole launches and
boats of the vessels, in order to pass over Hill's corps to
the left bank of the river, or impede the enemy in any
attempt at crossing ; and in the meanwhile a pursuit was
commenced with the light troops. The enemy retired by
the road along the right bank of the Tagus towards San-
tarem, a very strong position, where it was soon discovered
they intended to make a stand. That position could only i weiiing-
be turned by a very large army ; and it was occupied by L^wpooT,'1
the French in such strength that it was evident they could fg0^'.16'
not be dislodged but by a general attack. Wellington, ftjTyjJJj
therefore, advanced his headquarters to Cartaxo, where u. &, 53.
they remained for the next two months.1
The question of attacking Massena in the new posi-
tion which he had taken up was anxiously discussed Wellington
at headquarters. After mature deliberation, Wellington atTac^M as-
decided that the attempt would be too hazardous ; and ££,"* s
that as success without risk to the Allied cause was now
to all appearance certain, it was not his part to trust
anything to chance. The advantages the enemy had
gained by this change of position were indeed great, for
he had possessed himself of a district rich in corn and
abounding in cattle ; and his communications with Spain
392 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, were in some measure reopened. Yet the time would
v> inevitably come when their stores would be exhausted,
181°- and they would be forced either to attack the British in
their impregnable lines, or retire into Spain without a
combat. Guided by these considerations, Lord Welling-
ton determined to remain on the defensive, and wait till
time and famine compelled them to retreat ; and in the
» Loud. ii. mean time, in imitation of the enemy, he strengthened
Wellington his new and more advanced position with redoubts, and
Liverpool, commenced the construction of a fresh fortified position
isii; covering Lisbon on the south of the Tagus, to which he
?7fT479: might retire, as he had done to Torres Yedras, in the
friGki°nt( event of his adversary, in overwhelming strength and
330, 331.' joined by Soult from Andalusia, transferring the war, as
he expected he would, into that quarter.1
Meanwhile the troops lay in their huts in the new
improved position around Cartaxo, and their health and spirits
ppfritsof soon became excellent. When not on duty, the officers
ro°P8- went out fishing and shooting, as if they had been in
England. The desponding feelings which had been
general when the retreat was going on, disappeared when
the plan of their chief became apparent ; and it was evi-
dent that they possessed in their rear a stronghold which
could never be forced, to which they could securely retire
in the event of an overwhelming force being brought
against them. Provisions were abundant in the camp ;
the health of the soldiers, generally speaking, was ex-
cellent; and every facility was given to their enjoying
themselves as much as possible. Among other expedi-
ents to enliven the vacant hours was a military pageant
at the investing Marshal Beresford with the Order of the
Bath, which went off with the utmost eclat. " Seldom,"
says Sir Charles Stewart, " has an army, occupying
ground in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so many hours
of relaxation, or contrived to unite so completely the
pleasures of country life with the serious business of war.
It -is probably needless to add, that so great a show of
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 393
security in their leader had the best possible effect upon CHAP.
the temper of the troops, or that the morale of the army
was sustained not more by a contemplation of things as isio.
they really were, than by a conviction that they must
be going on prosperously, otherwise so much relaxation
could not abound." The only real difficulty which was en-
countered arose from the number of pacific inhabitants
who had been driven to take refuge in the lines, great
part of whom required to be fed from the public stores,
and among whom contagious disorders soon broke out
which carried off great numbers.1
In all these respects the situation of the French army 35
presented a painful contrast to that of the British. Wretched
rm i i t i • i tit- ci condition of
Though they had gained much by their retreat to oan- the French
tarem and the fruitful meadows of the Zezere, yet the re- army'
sources even of that rich country could not long avail
them. They were compelled £o trust entirely to foraging
and requisitions to obtain supplies of any sort, either for
men or horses. Every day it became necessary to extend
farther the circuit over which the marauding war was
carried on. One-half of the army was daily told off, and
regularly employed in these foraging expeditions, which
soon proved not less ruinous to the discipline of the
troops than it was vexatious and destructive to the in-
habitants. In spite, however, of all their rigour and
searching exactions, the want of everything soon became
extreme. " Their ammunition, their medicines, their
shoes, their clothing, and provisions, were all at the
lowest ebb ; whilst their linen, an article upon which the
welfare of an army depends in no ordinary degree, was
almost entirely exhausted." Fresh supplies of any sort
could be got only by straggling twenty or thirty miles in
the flanks and in the rear ; and great numbers of the de-
tached bodies or isolated men engaged in these expedi-
tions were cut off by the Portuguese militia, or the J..^"*1- '•.
J 3.J1; Loud.
enraged peasantry whom despair had roused to arms. ".67.
On their side, the French were not a whit behind their
394 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, enemies in savage barbarity ; and numbers of the pea-
v- santrj were tortured and hung for not revealing stores of
i8io. provisions which really did not exist.
But all this notwithstanding Wellington had his own
Of? o
Welling difficulties to contend with ; and though of a different
cuhL.1 kind, they were perhaps even more formidable than those
which assailed the French Marshal. The Government at
home and the House of Commons were by no means
equally convinced with him of the possibility of suc-
cessful resistance to the enemy. The strong apprehen-
sions which they had felt during the retreat in the pre-
ceding autumn, though to a certain degree dispelled by
the successful stand made at Torres Vedras, returned
with redoubled force when Massena halted in his retreat
at Santarem and Wellington, instead of attacking him,
resumed the system of procrastination, and prepared as
for a lengthened campaign in the heart of Portugal.
The Government were aghast at the prospect of intermin-
able war carried on in an inland country, and at an
enormous expense ; nor did they see their way to any
satisfactory result even after every imaginable expense
had been incurred. Owing to the extreme difficulty of
getting specie, the whole remittances to the army cost
fifty per cent more than the sum which reached the
English general; and even when the remittances did
come, which was never till long after they were due, they
were seldom a fourth part of what the wants of the troops
required. The English system of paying for all supplies
of every sort and levying no contributions, was infinitely
more burdensome in the outset, though less exasperating
in the end, than the French, of taking everything by force
and paying for nothing. Of Spain, all in England de-
spaired, and not without reason ; and few had confidence
. in the ability of Portugal, even with all the assistance of
336-340 ;' Great Britain, to continue the contest with their gigantic
96,D97.n' opponent.1 The regency of Portugal was at once un-
popular, imbecile, and disaffected ; and Wellington found
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 395
to his cost that instead of meeting with support, he in CHAP.
general experienced nothing but opposition and thwart-
ing from the Portuguese authorities, to whose preserva- 181°-
tion his own efforts were directed.
ST
Everything, in these circumstances, depended on the Firmness of
firmness and resolution of the Commander-in-Chief ; but, J £j£.
happily, these were of a kind which were proof against any ture<
danger, how great soever. No one was more aware of
the difficulties of his situation than Wellington, especially
after the destruction of all the Spanish armies enabled the
enemy to direct their whole disposable force against him ;
but he never hesitated under the responsibility, or quailed
under the danger, with which a perseverance in the course
he had laid out for himself would be attended. " There
is no doubt," said he to Sir Charles Stewart, " that the
task which I have undertaken is herculean, particularly
now that the Spanish armies are all annihilated, and that
there is nothing in the shape of an army in the field but
ourselves. I think I am, however, in such a situation that
I can retire and embark whenever I please ; and if that
be the case, the longer I stay the better for the cause,
and the more honourable to the country. Whether I shall
be able to hold my ground at last must of course depend
upon the numbers and the means by which I shall be
attacked ; and, adverting to the difficulties of subsistence
even for small numbers in this country, I hope that I shall
not be attacked by more than I shall be able to manage.
The necessity of keeping my rear open to the Tagus is a
difficulty ; and I should be able to effect my object with
greater ease, if I was not under the necessity of effecting
everything, not only without loss, but without risk, or even
the appearance of risk, in order to please the good people
of England/'1 These were Wellington's sentiments in l ixmd. a.
97 93
August 1810; but the difficulties of his situation were
terribly increased from the causes which have been men-
tioned. Such was the penury of the Portuguese Govern-
ment, in consequence of the devastation of the country
396 SIR CHAELES STEWART.
CHAP, and the occupation of a large part of it by the enemy,
v> that their whole army would have perished if they had
isio. not been fed from the English magazine ; the pay to all
the troops was nearly a year in arrears ; above 10,000
regular soldiers, and double that number of militia, de-
serted ; and in such a train of difficulties was the Govern-
ment involved, that they were engaged in a conspiracy to
drive the English leaders from the country, and place the
Duke of Brunswick at the head of affairs.
While Wellington was thus systematically pursuing his
Napoleon's plan of operations, and calmly awaiting the action of fa-
FreTh inva- mine and disease to drive the invaders from the Portu-
Portugai. guese territory, Napoleon was busy organising a fresh plan
of attack, even more formidable, and which, if earlier
adopted, might have led to very different results from
what actually occurred. The Emperor, who had been
made acquainted by General Foy, despatched from Mas-
sena's headquarters, with the whole necessities of that
Marshal's situation, and the difficulties with which he had
to contend, resolved now upon a double attack upon Por-
tugal, both to the north and south of the Tagus. With
this view, while he strained every nerve to reinforce Mas-
sena's army by means of the corps of Drouet, he advanced
a large body of the Imperial Guard, under the Duke of
Istria (Bessieres), containing 12,000 sabres and bayonets,
in the same direction. He sent, at the same time, the
most positive orders to Soult to leave the siege of Cadiz,
and his much-loved fields of plunder in Andalusia, and
invade the Alentejo from the side of Estremadura with
the whole disposable force which he could collect from
the three corps which had been carried beyond the
i Napoleon Sierra Morena. Estimating Massena's force, even after all
De?i5', tne l°sses it; nad undergone, still at nearly 50,000 com-
B8iJai5 i batants, these reinforcements would raise it to 70,000;*
Koch35vii an(* ^ to ^ese were ac*ded 20,000 invading the Alen-
soo, ijoi.' tejo, it was difficult to see how Wellington, with a force
not in all mustering 60,000 combatants, could success-
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 397
fully withstand such formidable masses, acting on con- CHAP.
centric lines and in concert.
On the 29th December Drouet arrived at Massena's is10-
outposts with 9000 men. He was the bearer of the first Massena's
despatches which that Marshal had received since hej^jjj^
crossed the frontier on the 16th September. The posi-™gthe
* ^ 1 agus.
tive orders of the Emperor to carry the war to the south
of the Tagus, compelled Massena, much against his will,
to attempt the passage of the river. But in the interim,
Wellington, who was fully alive to the importance of pre-
venting that movement, had been beforehand with him,
and not only strengthened Abrantes, so as to put it al-
together beyond the reach of a coup-de-main, but so
disposed Hill's corps along the left bank of the river, that
the passage at any point would be extremely difficult.
In obedience to the Emperor's orders, however, Massena
resolved to make the attempt, and it was anxiously and
long debated at the French headquarters whether the
bridge should be established at Punhete or Santarem.
Reynier strongly supported the latter place, because, close
to it, and under cover of guns placed on the heights of
Bonavista, there was an island, on which a lodgment might
be made. But General Eble objected that he had not
animals of transport sufficient to convey the bridge equi-
page there by land, and that it would be highly danger-
ous to attempt to convey it by water under the fire of the
English guns. Perplexed with so many difficulties, the
French general determined to defer the operation till
Soult came up with the fifth corps from Andalusia, so as
to dislodge Hill from his commanding position on the 304-329. v"
southern bank of the river.1
The military viceroy of Spain to the south of the
Sierra Morena had no inclination to exchange his isolated SouitVope-
operations in his own rich domains for a hazardous war-
fare to the north of those provinces. The positive orders
of the Emperor, however, compelled Soult to do some-
thing, but he studiously made it as little as possible.
398 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. Napoleon's orders were forthwith to suspend all opera-
v- tions in Andalusia except the blockade of Cadiz, and
1811- direct the entire fifth corps with the siege train upon
Abrantes, in order to facilitate Massena's passage of the
Tagus. Soult represented to the Minister at War, with
truth, that such an operation would be hazardous in the
extreme, if not impossible, as long as Olivenza, Badajos,
Campo Mayor, and Elvas, remained in the hands of the
enemy, and that it was indispensable to begin with the
reduction of these fortresses. He engaged, however,
to make his appearance in Estremadura with 20,000
infantry and 3000 horse, and with these ; if joined by
15,000 under Drouet detached from old Castile, he pro-
niised not only to reduce these strongholds but to make
iucursions into the Alentejo to support Massena, and
even give a good account of Lord Wellington if he should
attack him with his whole force.1
The operations of Soult against the fortresses were
Great sue- attended in the outset with extraordinary success. Oli-
souitin venza was blockaded on the llth January; and on the
dur™ma 22d, the garrison, 4280 strong, was obliged to capitulate,
isi i.22' the negligence of the Spaniards having left it wholly
without provisions. After this success, Soult moved for-
ward Mortier's corps to form the siege of Badajos, which,
being a place of much greater strength, and garrisoned
by 9000 men, was expected to make a resolute defence,
and at all events to detain the enemy before its walls
until Wellington was in a situation to detach a corps for
its relief. These hopes, however, were miserably disap-
pointed. Ground was broken before the walls on the
28th January, and on the llth February the outwork of
Pardaleras was taken by assault. The operations were,
after this, retarded by the flooding of the Guadiana and
the Gebora, which covered the army of Mendizabel, which
Lord Wellington, after the death of Romana, had de-
tached from his army to co-operate in the defence. But
the floods having fallen, the French forthwith forded
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 399
both rivers, and, having established a mortar battery CHAP.
which threw a few shells into the camp under the guns v>
of the place which Mendizabel held, the Spaniards aban- 18n-
doned the position, and were immediately after at- Feb< 18'
tacked by Girard and Latour Maubourg, and totally
defeated. The siege was now resumed, and, the Gover-
nor having been unfortunately killed, the command
devolved on Imaz, a man of a very different stamp.
A breach of the most imperfect kind having been
effected, he immediately proposed to capitulate, and
surrendered with 9000 men on the llth March. This
untoward event was the more inexcusable and to be re-
gretted, that before it took place the Governor had been
informed that Beresford was approaching with 12,000
men to raise the siege ; so that if he had held out a
few days longer this important fortress would have been
saved. The treachery which had surrendered this
stronghold was made manifest by what immediately after
occurred at Campo Mayor, which, though garrisoned only
by two hundred men with five guns, being under the J Mem. de
command of Major Tallaia, a gallant Portuguese officer, sw, sfe;
only surrendered on 23d March after a regular siege, 73.76. "'
and having exhausted all means of defence.1
Meanwhile, on the north of the Tagus, Massena with
his wearied and famishing army was struggling between Napoleon's
the necessities of his situation and the positive orders of Si^ at
the Emperor. On the 5th February, General Foy re- this Perio(L
turned with a reinforcement of 1862 foot and 140 horse,
bearing with him a despatch of great value, as unfolding
both the views of Napoleon on the prosecution of the
campaign, and the ulterior designs which rendered him so
desirous for its continued prosecution. " The Emperor,"
said Berthier, " attaches the greatest importance to your
continuing to keep the English in check, and having
bridges on the Zezere and the Tagus. The season is about
to become favourable for military operations, and you
will easily find means to harass the English and cause
400 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, them to experience considerable losses. The position of
v- the English army in Portugal keeps London in a con-
i8ii. tinual agony ; and the Emperor considers it of the ut-
most importance to hold the English in check, still con-
triving to draw them on so as to cause them to experience
losses in affairs of the advanced-guards, until you are in
a condition to engage them in a general battle. I have
reiterated the orders to the Duke of Treviso (Mortier)
to march on the Tagus with the fifth corps. Your bridges
being established on the Zezere, the most natural line of
operations will be by the left bank of that river. The
Emperor has sent despatches to Count D'Erlon (Drouet)
to give no rest to Silviera, Trant, or Wilson, to retake
Guarda, Ponte Murcella, and Coimbra, and to use the
utmost efforts to keep open the communications with the
army of Portugal. He has also decreed the formation of
an army of reserve in the north of Spain, and has given
orders to its commander, the Duke of Istria (Bessieres),
i Berthier to hold a corps of 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of
to Massena, -.. •• • T» i • IAI-T n i« i
Jan. 15, (Jiudad Kodngo and Almeida, ready to relieve the two
vii. 305,306. divisions of the ninth corps which is to pass under the
orders of the Prince of Essling." 1
In pursuance of these peremptory orders, preparations
Operations for crossing both the Zezere and the Tagus were made
French and ^ith the utmost vigour. General Ebl6 had by inde-
fatigable efforts collected and built one hundred and
twenty boats at Punhete, and got together the materials
for three bridges, of which one was intended for the
Zezere, and the two others for the Tagus. But mean-
while Wellington was not idle. By the end of January,
when the French preparations for the crossing of the
latter river were completed, the left bank was so defended
by batteries of heavy artillery that all crossing below
Punhete had been rendered impossible. Attempts were
then made to effect the passage above that town ; and to
avoid the fire of the English batteries, Ebl6 constructed
fifty carts, on which the boats were conveyed, by a passage
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 401
cut through a rocky mountain, to the point selected for CHAP.
embarkation at Montalvao. But the vigilance of Beres-
ford defeated his projects, for he erected batteries op- 18n-
posite to the point where the passage was to be attempt-
ed, and stationed signals along the whole line so as to
enable him to bring a powerful force to any point. De-
feated in this project, Massena next attempted to effect
the passage at Santarem ; but there too he found the , ,
Jvocn vii
opposite bank so strongly guarded, and the difficulty of 307-309 ;
the crossing, owing to shoals in the river at that point, 76, 77.
such, that the design was abandoned as impracticable.1
But matters had now reached a point in the French
army which rendered an early decision indispensable ; MassenVs
for in a very few weeks, if they remained in their pre- rcl
sent quarters, both men and horses would die of famine.
On the night of the 5th March, accordingly, Massena sud-
denly, and with great secrecy, commenced his retreat from
Santarem; and with such skill was the movement con-
ducted, that it was not till noon on the following day that
their departure was discovered. The British immediately
broke up and advanced in pursuit, and headquarters were
the same evening established in the same town, while dis-
positions were made for following the enemy, both on 2 Ceiling-
the main road, which their principal column had taken, Li^e^pooif
and also on all parallel routes by which part were retir- ^^ 14»
ing. The French, however, " retired from the country as £urw-Tvii;
0 ' oJ4; Loud.
they had entered it/' as Wellington said — " in a solid »• 78, 79;
» rr> T i' i ' f i • t • Koch, vii.
mass, affording little opportunity for harassing them in 336-338.
their retreat with any but a force equal to their own.2
It is remarkable that at the time when this retreat was
45
finally commenced, the British army was in hardly less Gloomy
difficulties than the French, in consequence of other and British army
lot less powerful causes. Not only was the Government ^Jf18 pe~
it home beyond measure alarmed at the expense of the
Contest, and doubtful of its ultimate success, but they had
arried their desponding views so far that Wellington, in
'bedience to their wishes, had made preparations with
YOL. i. 2 c
402 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
« HAP. Admiral Berkeley for the embarkation of the troops in
certain events. In the British army, indeed, there was
isii. no Want of anything, owing to the provident care of Wel-
lington, the vigour of the commissaries, and the liberal
expenditure of the Government ; but the expenditure had
now reached such a point that it was doubtful whether it
could continue much longer. The Portuguese troops, not
supported by an equally powerful exchequer, were in the
most miserable state. Like the French, they were literally
starving, and but for the supplies from the British maga-
zines they would nearly all have died of famine. The
commissariat was inefficient, the Government lukewarm or
treacherous ; and at the crisis of the contest, some of the
members of the regency, instead of attending to the wants
of their forces, were busied in writing anonymous letters
to Lord Wellington. From the combined operation of
these causes, the Portuguese army had become during the
winter not only relaxed in discipline and efficiency, but
extremely reduced in numbers. Desertion went on to an
alarming extent. In the middle of March it was reduced
to less than a half of the amount it had reached at the
battle of Busaco, and many regiments had scarce a third
of their complement on paper around their standards.
As to the militia, it exhibited more than the usual in-
efficiency of this species of force. It was set down on
paper at 45,000 ; but the fact was, there never had
been so many as 25,000 actually in the field. When
Massena began his retreat, and Wellington his pursuit, the
entire force of the former had been reduced to 40,792
men, with 7619 horses and 53 guns. No less than
» See Tables 19,000 men and 4597 horses had been lost since the in-
ws/sso?11' vasion commenced, of whom 4071 were prisoners of war,
* WeUmg- including those taken at Coimbra.1 Wellington's army
ton s Me- e '
morandum, present under arms at the same time consisted of 29,497
Feb. 23
isii ; ' British and 29,000 Portuguese, but of these upwards of
299. >vu' 5000 were at Lisbon, Elvas, and Cadiz, leaving about
52,000 present on the two banks of the Tagus.
t>
2
CAMPAIGN OP TORRES VEDRAS. 403
When the retreat commenced from Santarem, the CHAP.
French retired with such precipitation that it was some v-
days before their rearguard could be overtaken. Wei- isn.
lington, however, threw forward his divisions with such Firsf^era.
skill that the enemy, to avoid being turned, were obliged tj<»«ofWei-
J ' o lington m
to evacuate all the positions in the mountains which they pursuit.
successively took up, and, being unable to gain time suffi-
cient to construct a bridge over the Mondego, they were
thrown back from Coimbra and Upper Beira, for which
they were making, and obliged to fall back upon the old
and wasted line by Ponte de Murcella. By these means
Coimbra and the northern provinces were saved from their
ravages, and a communication with the latter, long closed,
was opened up. Ammunition -waggons were blown up,
and guns destroyed and abandoned in many places ; and
as the troops had no provisions with them, and were
obliged to forage in an exhausted country for the com-
monest food, the sufferings of the men were extreme. But
as the British followed them over the same wasted line,
and the march was so rapid and the means of transport
so scanty that the supplies from the rear could not keep
pace with them, the pangs of want were also felt in their
army. Rapid pursuit was often rendered impossible from
the want of animals to carry the necessary food for the
troops ; and the French were frequently saved from disas-
ter by the extent of the howling wilderness they had
created around them. " The line of the enemy's march/' ! Lond i;
says Sir Charles Stewart, " could be everywhere traced by ^2 ; w^"
» . lington to
the smoke of cottages, hamlets, and towns, which they Lord Liver-
i • i 11 P°°l' Marcl1
reduced to ashes; and even those which escaped the 13, i8ii;
ravages of the flames were left in a state of total dilapida- sis, 347.'
tion and absolute destitution."1
The first place where Massena's rearguard showed a
47
disposition to make a stand was at Redinha, on the llth '
March. On the 9th, at Pombrel, the leading brigade came
up with the enemy, and made two hundred prisoners ; and
on the evening of the llth, the two armies were so near
404 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, that arrangements were made for bringing the French to
v- action; and six divisions, mustering 27,000 combatants,
i8ii. were brought up for that purpose. In the night, how-
ever, the enemy retired, covered by a large body of cav-
alry, the entire 6th corps of infantry, and part of the 8th ;
March 12. and when day broke on the morning of the 12th, a strong
rearguard only was visible guarding the entrance of a
defile in front of the village of Redinha. It consisted of
Ney's corps, which had been forced by Massena to stand
firm there, in order to give the artillery and carriages of
the army time to retire through the defile. At four in
y^sto™ the morning, Wellington put all the forces which he had
to Srf °n in hand, consisting of the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and light
J^erpooi, divisions, with the cavalry and some light guns, to turn
March 13, * i
isn; on each flank the rearguard at the entrance of the defile.
34.5, 346 ;' The Allied troops advanced in beautiful order, in three
361*362. lines against the enemy in front, while the two wings
moved forward in similar array to turn their flank.1
Ney, with this rearguard, stood firm and disputed the
which is pass, repulsing all attacks for several hours ; but at
thTAmes. length the increasing masses of the Allies, which were
threatening his flank, obliged him to withdraw, and
Redinha was occupied by the British. The French
again showed front on some high and rocky ground on
the other side of the village ; and, as the position could
only be reached by crossing a narrow bridge, or a ford
adjoining it, both of which were under the fire of the
enemy's guns, some delay was experienced before they
could be passed in sufficient force to enable the position
ton to^rd to be carried. At length, however, a force equal to the
Mardfit' attack having got over, Picton moved forward and drove
GuVw. vii. ^e enemJ in splendid style from the rocky height on
Lo'n/!?; wnicn his left rested; upon which Ney, with the main
79, si); ' body, retired towards Condeixa ; and night having come on,
365, 366.' Wellington's men bivouacked on the ground they had won ,
close to the outposts of the enemy.2
In the position to which Massena now retired, which
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 405
was singularly strong, he collected three entire corps, CHAP.
forming his whole army, with the exception of the second v-
corps, which was at Espinhel ; and Wellington, deeming isn.
an attack in front likely to induce too great a loss of continuance
life, resolved to dislodge them by turning their flank. jj,*6 re~
With this view he moved Picton's diA^sion through the
mountains on the enemy's left, which, after a long and
fatiguing circuit, succeeded in reaching their communica-
tions in rear of Condeixa. Upon seeing this Ney instantly
threw his troops into columns of march, and began his re-
treat through that town, which was committed to the
flames. This retreat, though in the circumstances un-
avoidable, highly irritated Massena, who declared it was
done without his knowledge or consent. But Ney, how-
ever vacillating and irresolute in devising measures to
avert future danger, never failed to recover his presence
of mind in presence of it. At the head of a solid mass of
10,000 men, which formed the rearguard, he retreated
slo\\'ly, and in the best order, taking advantage of every i weiiing-
position where it was possible for a few hours to arrest Lu-en>^oird
the pursuers, and arranging his troops so skilfully, that, JJaw* u>
when one rearguard fell back, it was only to re-form and Gurw>- vii-
. _ 1 . . 346 ; Koch
again present a menacing front to the enemy in pursuit, vii. 374;
under cover of another already drawn up and prepared so" si."'
to dispute the passage.1
Once only during this part of the retreat the Allies
pressed so closely on the rearguard that a considerable Combat at
disaster was sustained by the retreating army, and a still of theCwa.
greater was on the point of being suffered. Ney had left M
two divisions on the British side of the bridge which
crosses the stream of the Ceira, to cover the passage of
the army over that narrow defile. Wellington instantly
saw his advantage, and, giving orders to all the troops to
advance in double-quick time, and the guns at the trot,
succeeded in reaching the column before half of them had
got over. The position held by the rearguard was very
strong ; but Wellington made the attack with such vigour,
406 SIK CHAIILES STEWART.
CHAP. Picton's, Campbell's, and the light division under Sir
v- William Erskine, that the enemy were driven back in
isii. great confusion towards the Ceira. In the confusion
several French regiments disbanded, and threw them-
selves into the river, the colonel of the 39th Regiment
was taken, and that regiment lost its eagle, though it
was lost in the scuffle, and not captured by the Allies.
Ney, upon hearing the tumult, returned to the rear-
guard, with which he made good the bridge till nightfall,
when the rearguard withdrew across it, and immediately
Destroyed the arches. The French in this disastrous
affair lost 700 men, chiefly drowned : and what was still
. i r A • • r. i J J-
ii. si. worse, several ot their regiments were broken and dis-
persed.1
The heavy rains which fell at this time rendered the
Continuance Ceira not fordable, and the bridge being broken down, it
treltlcross was some time before another could be erected. On the
the Ceira. j t^j^ however, the passage was effected, and the advanced
posts of the army reached the Sierra de Murcella, the
enemy haying taken up a superb position on the oppo-
site side of the Alva. Ney was in the centre, and
Junot on his right, and Reynier should have taken post
on his left, which would have presented a very strong
line of defence. But instead of joining the other corps
there, Reynier had retired far to the rear, and taken
up more comfortable quarters at a distance behind, on
the Sierra de Moita, a branch of the Sierra d'Estrella.
Ney felt extremely uneasy in this situation, and he
wrote to Massena, at eight in the morning of the
1 7th : " It is indispensable to retire, not only on account
of the separation of the corps of the army, but because
the soldiers are dying of hunger, and disperse in quest
of food. I await with the utmost impatience the order
to retire, for every moment of delay may induce the
ruin of the army, which has hitherto escaped as if by a
miracle. I give you fair notice, that if in the course of
the day I do not receive an order to retreat, I shall set
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 407
out to-morrow morning with the 6th corps, and take a CHAP.
position at Galices." Meanwhile the English divisions of _
Pack and Erskine crossed the Alva in front, while the isn.
right, consisting of three divisions, passed over the un-
occupied portion of the Sierra de Murcella, and turned
the position of the French, which obliged Ney to retire.
He bitterly blamed Reynier for not being at hand to sup-
port him on this occasion. " He put me in the greatest
embarrassment ; I will be obliged/' said he, " to set out
instantly instead of to-morrow morning. This conduct «JQhierJ'xjL
<f oUo ; Koch,
of General Reynier is frightful" Ney fell back accord- vji. 394-396;
ingly, and the position the French had in Portugal was 372, 373.'
lost.1
" All Massena's precautions," says Sir Charles Stewart,
" would have failed to preserve him, had it been possible Difficulties
to transport stores and provisions as rapidly as our troops suit. e
were capable of marching ; but on the 19th it was found
that the columns had outstripped their supplies, and a
halt of some days was necessary to give the latter time to
overtake them."1 On this occasion at least the French J,lLond-ii-
derived a material benefit from the abominable way in
which they had carried on the war ; they were sheltered
in the solitude which themselves had made. The whole
country, far and wide, through which the army passed,
having been laid waste, and not only the whole provisions a weiiing-
but every animal it contained carried off, it became a mat- jJ^lJSf
ter of absolute impossibility to overtake them, except with ^^ 27»
provisions and the means of transport brought up from ^9u8T'j™;d
the rear ; and this in a country so wasted was a matter of H. 82.
time and difficulty.2
The retiring invaders were now approaching the fron-
tier, and one action more signalised the British arms Concluding
in this memorable retreat. This took place on the 3dsabugaia
April at Sabtigal on the Coa. On that occasion theApn13'
French 2d corps, commanded by Reynier, was seen in
position with its right immediately above the bridge and
town of Sabugal, and its left extended along the road to
408 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. Alfayates, so as to command all the approaches from the
fords of the Coa towards the upper part of the town.
i8ii. " Wellington made his dispositions," says Sir Charles
Stewart, " to attack it in front, flank, and rear at the
same moment ; and but for the unfortunate occurrence of
a sudden shower of rain, it would have been, in all proba-
1 Lond. ;;. bility, annihilated."1 The tempest rendered it impossible
to see anything, and the Allied troops, pushing forward in
the dark, came upon the left of the main body, which it
was intended they should have turned. The light troops
were, in consequence, driven back upon the 43d Regi-
ment, and the enemy, seeing that the column was not
strong, sallied forth and attacked it in a solid mass,
supported by cavalry and artillery. The 43d, how-
ever, by a steady and well-directed fire in line, repel-
led the onset ; but having advanced in pursuit, they
were themselves taken in flank on the left by a fresh
column of infantry, and on their right by a body of
hussars. They retired upon this, and took post behind a
wall, from which they a second time repulsed both the
horse and foot of the enemy, and, advancing a second
time in pursuit, they made themselves masters of a how-
itzer. The French renewed the attack with a fresh col-
umn, supported by cavalry, upon which the British again
retired to their post, when they were joined by the two
battalions of the 52d and the 1st Portuguese Ca§adores.
Supported now by something like an equality of force,
the British a third time issued forth, and a furious com-
bat ensued, chiefly for the possession of the howitzer.
The French drove back the 43d and the other brigade,
who carried with them the piece they had taken, and
a Welling. took position in an enclosure on the top of a hill, where
LforaT* *ke enemJ were making preparations to attack them,
Apni9, ' when the head of the other column, consisting of Pic-
Gurw. vii. ton's light infantry, Colville's brigade, and Dunlop's
ii.434,435! column, appeared and opened fire on them.2 Finding
himself now overmatched, Reynier sounded a retreat,
vii
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 409
his entire corps fell back, and the whole army crossed CHAP.
the Coa, and retired into Spain, leaving the howitzer, the
object of so much contest, and three hundred prisoners, isn.
in the hands of the British, in this the last, and not the
least glorious action of the campaign.
Thus ended the third French invasion of Portugal.
54.
The result cannot be better given than in the words of state of tho
M. Thiers : " The appearance of the army when it re- my wh«mu
entered Spain was profoundly affecting, and not less sp'ain!*6
strange than the campaign had been. When the cannon
sounded, the soldiers were found in their ranks as firm and
docile to the voice of their chiefs as on a parade, especi-
ally in Ney's corps, which, during that retreat, preserved
the most admirable consistency. With that exception,
they were half dispersed, running here and there in quest
of provisions. They were to be seen on all sides march-
ing in disorderly crowds, loaded with plunder, mingled
with long files of wounded borne by asses, with artillery
and baggage -waggons drawn by oxen, for the greater part
of the horses had died from want of nourishment. Hardly
did there remain horses enough to manoeuvre the guns in
presence of the enemy, and the cavalry were in such a
state of exhaustion that the riders could not venture to
give their steeds the rein for a charge. The soldiers,
blackened by the sun, thin, covered with rags, without
shoes, but still bold and audacious in language, did not
support their distress with the resignation which some-
times dignifies misfortune. They vented their ill-humour
on all the world, for so many sufferings undergone to no
purpose ; they broke out against their immediate supe-
riors, the generals-in-chief, the Emperor himself. Massena,
who, in the opening of the campaign, was surrounded
with such a blaze of glory, had lost his prestige by the
fault of the commanders of corps under him, who had
not spared him in their discourse, and unfortunately also
by his own fault.1 Old, worn-out, having need of a repose sii/eia.
which he had not once enjoyed for twenty years, he had
410 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, had the weakness to seek consolation in some pleasures
v- little suited to his age, and of which those, least of all,
isii. should be rendered witnesses whom he was called on
to command."
The material losses of the French army during this
Materiki disastrous campaign were on a level with the calamities
French ar- * to which it was exposed and the sufferings which it en-
thecam-ng dured. We have the authority of General Koch, the
paign< able biographer of Massena, for the assertion, that the
army was reduced to nearly half its amount on commenc-
ing the invasion, when it recrossed the Agueda and re-
entered Spain. The army, after the fall of Ciudad Rod-
rigo, consisted of 59,965 men, of whom 55,000 actually
entered Portugal; and it had 17,000 horses for the
cavalry, artillery, and equipages. During the retreat,
they were reinforced by 7300 under Drouet, and 1860
with Foy — in all, 64,160. On returning to Spain it
consisted only of 34,161 foot-soldiers and 3400 cavalry,
with 5868 horses for the artillery and baggage ; exhibit-
ing a loss in effective men of 26,000 soldiers and 11,000
, Koch vii horses ! Yet was this disastrous campaign not without
Ptawjiist Sl°ry to the French arms ; for Massena retired sixty
NOB. vii./ leagues over a desolate and wasted country, followed
VIII., and , & . JJ
ix. by an army equal to his own, with the loss only of one
howitzer and one eagle wrested from his men in fight.1
" If Imaz had not sold Badajos," said Wellington, on
Welling- 20th March, " I think the Peninsula would have been
Irfth/cam8 safe. I should have relieved the south of Spain at all
^a^'s*rnd events, and the war would have been placed on a new
C1J*S- s.tey- footing. I am not certain that I shall be not able to do
art had in it.
something of the kind even now ; but I wait to decide
what plan I shall adopt, till I hear the result of General
Graham's operations against Victor." As it was, the
campaign had saved the Peninsula, though Imaz's treach-
ery at Badajos required to be washed out in torrents of
British blood. In these glorious and most momentous oper-
ations Sir Charles Stewart bore his whole share, except-
CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS. 411
ing in the French retreat, when he was confined to bed CHAP.
by fever, and only rejoined the Commander-in -Chief on
the Spanish frontier. The glory of them necessarily re- 1811-
dounded chiefly to the Commander-in-Chief. A subordi-
nate officer's duty consists in the faithful and energetic
carrying out of the orders of his superiors ; a staff-officer's
in being the right hand of the general. The Adjutant-
General of the army, Sir Charles Stewart, was in every
sense the Adjutant of the Commander-in-Chief; and if
we would read aright the story of the great services i Wellin
which, during the Peninsular campaign, he rendered to H"ntoj^r
his country, we must study the annals of those memor- weiiesiey,
• IT i • • IT March -M,
able victories and deep combinations by which Wellington isii;
then laid the foundation of the deliverance of Europe, and 317™'
in which he bore so important a part.1
CHAPTER VI.
SIE CHARLES STEWART FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE CAMPAIGN
IN PORTUGAL IN MAY 1811 TO THE FALL OF CIUDAD ROD-
RIGO AND HIS RETURN TO ENGLAND IN JANUARY 1812.
CHAP. TAUGHT by the disastrous issue of the preceding cam-
VL paign in Portugal, Napoleon lost no time in transmitting
181 L to Massena detailed orders for the renewal of the war in
Renewed that country on a new and more judicious plan. The
FnvLfonohfe basis of these operations, which were prescribed at a time
Portugal. wiien he was not aware of the entire evacuation of the
disputed territory by the French troops, was, that Coimbra
and the t£te-du-pont at Murcella should be fortified, Al-
meida dismantled, Wellington attacked and driven into
his lines at Torres Vedras, where he was either to be
assailed, if Massena was in sufficient strength to do so, or,
at all events, kept in check, so as to be prevented from
sending detachments into Estremadura, while the French
general should send out foraging parties to Oporto, so as
to lay all the northern provinces of Portugal under con-
tribution. Having by these means restored the discipline
and efficiency of his army, he was in September, after the
harvest had been gathered in, to commence a fresh ad-
vance upon Lisbon, in conjunction with a powerful force
fitted out by Soult from the army of Andalusia. For this
purpose the whole army of Massena, aided by the Imperial
Guard under Bessieres, which was to advance from Valla-
dolid to its support, was to move forward along the right
bank of the Tagus, and form a junction with a powerful
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 413
detachment from the army of the centre, which was to CHAP.
move upon Alcantara, and unite with the army of Portu-
gal at Abrantes. At the same time Soult, with the whole isn.
force he could spare from Andalusia, was to advance into
the Alentejo from Badajos to the same point, and threaten
Lisbon from its southern and comparatively defenceless
side. The united strength of the three armies would
amount to 80,000 men — a force with which it would be
easy to drive the English into the sea. " Recollect, Mar-
shal," the letter concluded, " that you are in presence of
an army which represents a power against which the least
advantage is, politically speaking, of the utmost import-
ance. They speak in Spain of a war with Russia : in the
first place, there is no foundation for the report ; in the ^sena* to
next, if it was true, that would have no influence on the fF'1 J,
. loll; Koch,
war in Spain. The Emperor is strong enough to make vn. 460-463.
head against them all" J
Wellington was too sagacious not to anticipate that, if
Portugal was again to be invaded, it would be on the plan
detailed in this despatch ; and accordingly he attached
the utmost importance to the possession of Badajos, g,m Bada"
which, if maintained by the Allies, would effectually pre-
vent this co-operation between the armies of the north
and the south. It has been seen, accordingly, with what
mortification he received the account of the surrender of
that fortress, and how rapidly he had taken measures,
after the retreat of Massena commenced, to prevent it
falling into the hands of the enemy. He had detached
Beresford with the second and fourth, and Hamilton's
Portuguese division, the 13th Light Dragoons, and two
mgades of artillery, to raise the siege of that town ; and
»n the 25th March that general came up with a convoy
rhich was making for Badajos, and by a brilliant charge
lade himself master of it, though our troops, having
dvanced too far in pursuit, and got under the guns of
'le fortress, were thrown into disorder. The convoy
ipped out of their hands in consequence, and, with the
414 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, exception of a single howitzer and a few ammunition-
Y3L waggons, got into the fortress. Great difficulty was then
i811- experienced in crossing the Guadiana so as to invest
April 5 & 6. Badajos ; and during the time consumed in making the
necessary preparations, the enemy had time to repair the
breaches made by Soult's guns, and throw considerable
supplies into the fortress. This done, Mortier retired to
Seville, leaving it to its own resources, having previously
thrown 400 men into Olivenza, in order to retard the ad-
vance of the Allies against the principal fortress. Beres-
ford intrusted the attack of this fort to General Cole,
April 11. who sat down before it on the llth April ; and on the
15th, a practicable breach having been made, the place
surrendered at discretion. Having thus cleared the way,
Cole threw a small garrison into Olivenza, and hastened
to return to Beresford, who meanwhile had established
a bridge of casks over the ford at Juramenha, so as to
render it practicable for artillery. The guns and small
86L88d'lir siege-train were immediately crossed over, and a tete-du-
arttotx>rd 'Pon^ garrisoned by 1500 men, established for the pro-
Castiereagh, tection of the bridge ; and the bulk of his force having
1811, MS. been established in an intrenched position at Santa Mar-
tha, the investment of Badajos was rendered complete.1
Matters were in this state when Lord Wellington,
3 .
Wellington having finished the expulsion of the army of Massena
the BiegeCof from Portugal, and deeming it incapable of resuming
offensive operations for a month or six weeks to come,
resolved to take advantage of the breathing time afforded
to wrest Badajos from the enemy. Having disposed
everything for a cautious defensive campaign in the north
accordingly, and for the blockade of Almeida, which it
was expected would soon fall from want of provisions, he
hastened in person to Beresford's headquarters, and took
the command of the siege. It was indispensable to the
success of this operation that it should be conducted with
the utmost expedition ; for in less than three weeks, it was
Well known, from the time of trenches being opened, Soult
CAMPAIGN OP 1811 IN SPAIN. 415
would make his appearance from Andalusia with a force CHAP.
sufficient to raise the siege. Thus sixteen days of open VL
trenches, and for making the whole preparations for the i»n.
assault, was all that could be allowed. Wellington, how-
ever, did not despair of carrying the place in that short
time, and with the limited means at his disposal. He
gave orders, accordingly, for the immediate commence-
ment of the siege, and ground was broken before the
castle, and the outworks of the Pardaleras and Fort Chris-
toval, on the 22d April. In conjunction with Sir Charles April 22.
Stewart and all his staff, the Commander-m-Chief was
busily engaged in the arrangements for the siege, when
advices reached him from Sir Brent Spencer of such a
formidable concentration of troops in the neighbourhood
of Ciudad Rodrigo, as indicated a determination on the
part of Massena, not only to raise the blockade of, and
revictual, Almeida, but to relieve Badajos by a serious
irruption into the northern provinces of Portugal. Sen-
sible of the danger, Wellington hastened from the banks
of the Guadiana to those of the Agueda, and arrived just
. , • i i • i i • l Lond. ii.
in time to meet the danger with which his troops were 89, 90.
there threatened.1
Wellington, on arriving there, found the troops in the
positions which he had assigned to them, which are thus Position of
distinctly explained by Sir Charles Stewart : " Between Cover?n°gPth«
the Dos Casas and the Turones rivers there extends a AhSa.^
range of heights, which formed on the present occasion
the main feature in our position. Our right, though
placed directly upon Nava d'Aver, might be said in strict-
ness to rest upon the Coa ; for the country between the
Coa and the village being extremely impracticable, little
danger was to be apprehended from any attempt made in
that quarter. Our centre extended along the heights just
alluded to, between the villages of FUENTES D'ONORE and
Villa Formosa ; while our left, which embraced Fort Con-
ception and Valdelamula, circled round by Almeida, so
as to complete the blockade of that important place, at
416 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, the same time that it appuyed upon ground extremely
VL favourable, With respect to the arrangement of the
i8ii. troops a few words will suffice. On the extreme right of
the line General Houston, with the 7th division, took
post, the cavalry being formed next to him, though some-
what in advance. After the 7th came the 1st division,
thrown considerably forward, and upon very advantage-
ous ground, and communicating on its left with the 3d,
which again held connection with the light, as it did with
the 6th and 5th. The 5th division, under Sir William
Erskine, formed the extreme left of the line ; whilst the
blockade of Almeida was, in an especial manner, commit-
ted to the 6th division, under General Campbell. Every
division and brigade was, however, in a situation to move
at a moment's warning, and by short and direct paths, to
any part in the entire line which might be threatened ; and
hence, though to external appearance our flanks were far
removed from one another, the space of three hours would
9o,°9i. "' have brought the most distant battalions in position to
the same ground at any given point."1
" Fuentes d'Onore," which gave its name to the san-
Description guinary battle which ensued, " was not, strictly speaking,
embraced in our position; and though occupied by the
light troops of the 1st and 3d divisions, supported by the
7th Regiment, it was held merely as an advanced post. . . .
It stands at the bottom of a valley, and on the bank of a
small rivulet or brook. On either side are rising grounds,
and through it passes the main road to Caseja, Gallegos,
and thence to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the Ciudad Rodrigo
side an extensive morass is bounded, at some distance, by
a thick wood ; and though the ground certainly rises there,
as it does in rear of the village, still the troops which
advance in a hostile attitude from that quarter must pass
over a considerable tract where they will be exposed to
a heavy and destructive fire from almost every point.
The village itself is crossed in various directions by walls,
which afforded excellent cover for infantry, and were not
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 417
altogether profitless against artillery; whilst in its rear CHAP.
arise some rocky heights, which at once covered the troops vr-
whilst in possession of the place, and afforded them a safe isn.
place of retreat in case they should be driven out. Above
these rocky heights was our main line arrayed, from whence,
in case of need, reinforcements could be continually sent
to the troops in the village; whilst, in the event of the
village itself being carried, the conquerors would find
that their labours, so far from being completed, were only
beginning. To sum up all in a few words : it would be
extremely difficult to conceive a post so well adapted to
give to its defenders a superiority quite unusual over any
force which might attack them — so easy of defence from
its local situation, so secure in point of retreat, and withal
so extremely important to the line which it was designed
to cover, as furnishing an arena of contest quite distinct
from the main position, and totally independent of it.
This post became, as soon as Massena was in a condition
to renew hostilities, the theatre of operations hardly less
sanguinary or less glorious than the hills of Busaco or the
plains of Talavera."1 The only objection to this position i Lend. ii.
was, that the Turones, a river with steep banks, in most 9Z
places impracticable for artillery or cavalry, ran parallel
to the rear of the line, and towards the right and centre
the army had but one line of retreat practicable for wheel-
carriages — viz., the Castlebom road — and the Coa was in 370™ '
its rear, the banks of which were precipitous throughout.2
Massena was urged by every motive which could in-
fluence either a general or a soldier to assail the British
in this position, and again carry the war into the Portuguese resuming0'
territory. He had incurred, as has been seen, the high^e°ffen"
displeasure of the Emperor for his conduct of the preceding
campaign, and he had himself been deeply mortified by its
calamitous results. His army, though disorganised and in
want of everything when it left Portugal, had been much
'estored by a few weeks' rest and the stores found in
}iudad Rodrigo. Marshal Ney, whose insubordination had
VOL. i. 2 D
418 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, been such a source of vexation in the preceding campaign,
VI- after being superseded by Massena, had been recalled to
i8ii. France by the Emperor, and replaced by Marshal Mar-
mont, an officer of superior abilities, and of a much more
tractable disposition. Add to this that Napoleon had,
soon after the former orders, sent a despatch which, in
truth, left him no alternative but immediately to resume
hostilities.
Everything, therefore, urged the French marshal to make
New ssitycf another effort to restore affairs in the Peninsula; and
Aimliaf in addition to it, affairs on the frontier had become so
8J08' pressing as not to admit of an instant's delay. Wellington
had just gone to take the command of three divisions to
the south of the Tagus, with which he had undertaken the
siege of Badajos. Almeida, closely blockaded, was already
in great want of provisions, and must ere long capitulate
if not relieved and revictualled. On the other hand, a
successful irruption into Portugal, now that the Com-
mander-in-Chief and part of the army were absent, would,
in the first instance, relieve Almeida, and, in its ultimate
results, in all probability render unavoidable the with-
drawing of the troops from the banks of the Guadiana,
the raising of the siege of Badajos, and the restoration, by
a last success, of the lustre of the Imperial arms over all
Europe. Impressed with these ideas, and in truth having
no longer a choice on the subject, Massena concentrated
his army, and having with infinite difficulty collected a
convoy of provisions to revictual Almeida, he recrossed
474-481. the Agueda, and on the 1st May advanced towards
Almeida.1
The forces with which the opposite generals had to
Forces on contend, when the campaign was renewed at this time, were
both «ides. ag follows . Massena had 42,123 men and 8476 horses,
of which 39,479 were present with the eagles, with 42
guns. In addition to this, he might reckon on the co-
operation of Marshal Bessieres, who, with his part of the
Imperial Guard, 15,000 strong, was at no great distance
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 419
in the rear, and in point of fact took no inconsiderable CHAP.
part in the campaign which followed. Wellington's force, VL
after the large deductions made to the south with Beres- isn.
ford, was only 29,000 of all arms, including Portuguese,
of whom not more than 1600 were cavalry1 — a vast dis- 1 Loud. H.
• 103
proportion, considering the homogeneous nature of the
French army, contrasted with the varied character of the
Allied; that a considerable part of the enemy's cavalry
consisted of the horsemen of the Imperial Guard, the very
best troops in their whole army; and that the Allies re-
quired to make a deduction of at least 3000 men to main-
tain the blockade of Almeida, the relief of which was the 2 iwa.
first object of the invasion.2
Towards the evening of the 3d, the 6th French corps,
now under the command of Loison, made its appearance Attack of
in three lines on the heights, which on the east overhang SS? °E
Fuentes d'Onore. They immediately opened a heavy JiJyT5'
fire upon the village from the heights above, and soon
after made a determined attack with a strong column of
infantry upon it. The assault was met in the most gal-
lant manner by Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, at the head
of a battalion of light companies. The French, under
General Ferrey, however, were formed in three columns of
attack, and they pressed on with such vigour and superior
numbers that that gallant battalion was obliged to give
ground. Williams was wounded, and a few men made
prisoners. The light infantry battalion of Nightingale's
brigade, commanded by Major Dick of the 42d; the light
infantry battalion of Howard's brigade, commanded by
Major M'Donnel of the 92d; and the light infantry bat-
talions of the King's German Legion, commanded by Major
Aly of the 5th ; and the second battalion of the 83d,
under Major Carr, — were upon this brought up, and main-
tained a desperate fight with the assailants, skilfully
availing themselves of every cover which the cross-walls
and buildings afforded. The French, however, gradually
gained ground, and Ferrey had reached the centre of the
420 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, village, when the 7 1 st Highlanders, under Colonel Cadogan,
VL advanced to the charge. " Now my lads," said Cadogan,
isn. " Jet us show them how we can clear the Galloivgate"*
With these words, and loud cheers, the Highlanders rushed
forwards. The French bravely stood their ground, and for
the first and perhaps the last time in the Peninsula were
the bayonets actually crossed. The struggle, however, was
only of a few seconds' duration — the French were driven
back literally at the bayonet's point; and so violent was
the shock that some who stood their ground were spiked
and borne back some paces on the British bayonets !
Ferrey was by this vehement onset driven out of the vil-
lage ; but Massena soon after brought up fresh troops, and
Ferrey having arranged four columns of attack, a fresh
assault was made, which for the time proved irresistible.
The British were in their turn expelled from the village ;
but Wellington, having observed the victorious French
emerging on the opposite side, fell upon them when dis-
ordered by success, and with the aid of the 71st, 79th,
and 24th, under Colonel Cameron of the 79th, drove them
back into the village, where a desperate hand-to-hand
encounter took place in the streets. " The French," says
Sir Charles Stewart, " fought with great gallantry, and
more than once stood to be bayoneted by our soldiers in
the main street of the village ; but their success, whenever
obtained, lasted but a moment, and they were instantly
i Lend. ii. swept away by a desperate charge from the men whom
Koch, vii'. they believed that they had overcome. The 71st, which
n nacl repeatedly attacked and overthrown columns of French
troops on the road, were tempted, towards dusk, by the
appearance of what they conceived to be a gun on the
ourw. vii. opposite acclivity, to rush across the rivulet and become
515; Thiers, .rr .. . J\ . , _T . . ...
xii. 656. the assailants in their turn. .Nothing could be more im-
petuous, and yet more orderly, than this charge ; they
* Alluding to a well-known street in Glasgow, where the barracks are situated,
and where the 71st had recently before been quartered, and obtained great
numbers of recruits.
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 421
literally bore down everything before them; .... and CHAP.
though severely galled by a murderous fire of musketry and VL
grape, they regained Fuentes d'Onore in triumph with isn.
their trophy." It proved, however, to be only a tumbril.*
After this desperate shock the French army remained
quiet for a day, leaving the British in possession of their Arrival' of
hard-won conquest. They were awaiting the arrival ofGuSf^
Marshal Bessieres with the redoubtable horsemen of the Settle!
Guard, eight hundred strong, who, on the evening of the
4th, made their appearance on the ground with six guns,
and excited a great sensation in both armies. At three
on the following morning the French columns were all
in motion, and at six they had reached the British light
troops, and commenced the attack at all points. The
weight of the enemy's attack was directed, under Loison,
with the 6th, Ney's old corps, on the British right, beyond May 5.
Nava d'Aver, where the ground, being level, afforded an
advantageous field for the employment of their numerous
and magnificent cavalry. Montbrun, with the reserve
cavalry and a powerful artillery, was placed in the rear
and on the left of the 6th corps, with orders to charge
whenever a suitable opportunity might occur ; and on
the right of the same corps stood the 9th corps under
Drouet, who, along with Ferrey's division detached from
the 6th corps, was to make a false attack on Fuentes
d'Onore, in order to distract the attention of the enemy,
and hinder him from sending succours to his right, where
the principal effort was to be made. Meanwhile the
convoy intended for the relief of Almeida, escorted by
twelve hundred men, was to be held in readiness to
* A keen contest arose on this conflict in Fuentes d'Onore as to the crossing
of bayonets, which was carried on in the pages of that able journal, the Army
and Navy Gazette, in consequence of a statement similar to that given above
having been given in the author's History of Europe, chap. Ixiii. § 91. It was
closed by the statement of an officer (Grattan) who saw the thing, and which,
coupled with Lord Londonderry's testimony above given, who was also an eye-
witness, is decisive of the point. The author was in error in saying that it was
the Imperial Guard which was borne backward at the bayonet's point in the
shock, for it was Bessieres's cavalry of that body which alone was in the battle.
422 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, advance on the right, under cover of General Rejnier
VL with the 2d corps, by Fort Conception, on the extreme
i8ii. British left, and penetrate into the beleagured fortress
i French *u tnat direction. The commanders of all the corps
General Or- were wamcd that the general-in-chief would be found
ders, May 4,
1811 ; with Junot at the head of the 8th corps, in rear of
532-535. ' Loison, and that the Imperial Guard, which had hitherto
remained at Gallegos, would take a part in the action.1
Wellington was only partially informed of these move-
Preparations ments and preparations on the part of the enemy, which,
the5fhby°nfor the most part, had been executed in the dark on the
Wellmgton< preceding night, and with all imaginable secrecy. He
had become sensible, however, that though Fuentes
d'Onore might be attacked, the principal effort would
not be made in that quarter, and that his extreme right
towards Nava d'Aver would be chiefly threatened ; and
on the evening of the 4th he moved the 7th division,
under General Houston, to that quarter; and as the
enemy were seen rapidly advancing large bodies to their
left, opposite to the British right, the light division, with
the cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton, moved parallel to
them on the morning of the 5th, and still further strength-
ened the British right, now become the obvious point of
attack. But in the last arm the enemy had a great and
i Welling- alarming superiority, for the French had concentrated on
L^pS* ^iat w^no twenty-nine squadrons, containing 3200 sabres,
}5^ .8> having among them 800 of the cavalry of the Imperial
SSTViii Guard, while the whole Allied cavalry in the field, iuclud-
516 ; Koch, <f
vii. 531, ing Portuguese, was only 1600, and in the number and
532 ; Lond. . 1 „ i • »•« i • •
ii. 104, 105. weight or metal in artillery they enjoyed a similar
advantage.1
The first attack was made on Sontag's brigade, which
Battle of held the wood on the extreme British right, and after a
d'Onore. gallant and obstinate resistance it was carried, and the
May 5> retiring troops driven out in some disorder ; while, at the
same time, Don Julian Sanchez's guerillas, who were on
the right of all, fell back in great confusion. Seeing
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 423
this, and deeming it necessary to move in order to cover CHAP.
the retreat of the foot-soldiers, as well as to hinder them- VI-
selves being outflanked, the cavalry descended from a isii.
commanding position, in which they had been drawn up,
into the plain. They were immediately charged in the low
ground by the enemy's horse ; but the assailants were driven
back by the leading squadron of the British horse under Sir
Charles Stewart, who made Colonel La Motte, of the 13th
Chasseurs, prisoner in single combat. The enemy, how-
ever, succeeded in establishing themselves on the heights
which had been abandoned, and from them opened so
heavy a fire from some pieces of horse-artillery which they
brought up, that the position of the troops on that part
of the line was no longer tenable, and a retrograde move-
ment to draw the foot-soldiers out of the range became
indispensable. A retreat, accordingly, was commenced,
but how to effect it on level ground, and in the face of a
powerful cavalry, to which the Allies had nothing of equal
strength to oppose, was a matter of no small difficulty.
The light division, which had advanced to support the
cavalry, now hard pressed, finding the post already eva-
cuated, wheeled to the right, and moved towards Hous-
ton's division, which was slowly retiring, firing all the
way. During this movement, however, they were re-
peatedly and fiercely charged by Montbrun's dragoons,
and one small body formed by the rallying of the skir-
mishers in front, who had not time to get into the regi-
mental square, was broken, thirty men cut down, and
several prisoners taken, among whom was Colonel Hill of
the 3d Guards. The main body, however, retreated in
squares in the finest order, alternately halting and firing ;
and the Chasseurs Britanniques exhibited a rare example
of discipline and valour by taking post behind a long
ruined wall, where they received a charge of cavalry in
line, which they repulsed by a steady and well-directed
fire, which secured the retreat of the division, which be-
fore that had been endangered. The horse-artillery guns
424 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, too, under Norman Ramsay, though often enveloped in
VL a whirlwind of cavalry, emerged, "bounding," says Napier,
i8ii. " like things of no weight, out of the throng," got clear off,
and, wheeling about, renewed their fire. Massena, seeing
the efforts of the cavalry checked by the steadiness of the
infantry and the fire of the guns, sent for the artillery of
the Guard, which had not yet engaged, to advance and
open fire. But the commander refused to obey the order,
on the ground that he could only follow those of his own
superior, the Duke of Istria (Bessieres); and an hour was
lost in consequence before four pieces, sent up by Massena,
could arrive at the scene of action. When they did come,
they opened a terrible discharge on the retreating regi-
ments of Houston, and his squares of bayonets were often
i Welling- lost sight of amidst the forest of uplifted sabres ; but
Liverpool, they pursued their way steadily and unbroken, and at
length both divisions, covered by the cavalry under
Cotton, were withdrawn in safety to the banks of the
Turones, and took up their ground on a new position
535538'-' selected by Wellington, extending along a line of heights
Briai. by running between the Dos Casas and the Turones, at right
Gleig, 11.
379, note, angles to both streams, and across the latter to rrenada,
still covering the approach to Almeida.1
While this severe action, attended with various success,
13
Desperate and an entire change of position on the part of the
Fuentesm British, was going forward on their right, the village of
puentes d'Onore, on their left, was the theatre of a
conflict as desperate as any which occurred in the whole
Peninsular war. The attack there was made by General
Ferrey in front, supported by Claperede's division of the
9th corps in flank. The village was held by the 79th
and 71st Highlanders, with the 24th Regiment, the whole
under Colonel Cameron, supported by the same light
infantry battalions which had so nobly held it during
the first attack. In spite of all their efforts, however,
these brave troops were driven from house to house and
from wall to wall, till the French had got possession
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 425
of the whole lower part and centre of the village, the CHAP.
British holding only the upper part. Upon seeing this,
Wellington brought forward the 74th Highlanders under 18n-
Major Manners, and the 1st battalion 88th, under Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Wallace ; and these fresh regiments, with 107°° w"i-
the 71st and 79th Highlanders, by a headlong charge, SliL-
drove the French entirely out of the village, which per- jj00^ ^
manently remained in their possession, with the exception ^rw-Kv0'^h
of a small portion of the lower part, where the French vii. 529 ;
regained their ground, and the firing continued till night- sso. '
fall.1
It was now five o'clock, and Massena, successful on his
.14
left, and partially so in the centre, though repulsed on his Massena re-
right, was meditating a fresh attack on the new Britisli ™TaSfurther
position, stretching on the crest of the ridge between the attack*
Dos Casas and the Turones, when a report from General
Eble of the Engineers made him hesitate as to whether
ammunition enough for a second battle remained, espe-
cially for the artillery. In consequence of this, the attack
was suspended till the following morning at five, and mean-
while the convoy of provisions intended for the relief of
Almeida was ordered to return from Marialva to Alameda,
and the caissons were sent back to Ciudad Rodrigo to
be replenished. In the evening Wellington was not idle.
Fatigued as his men were by a day's fighting, he set them
to work to strengthen their position by earthworks ; and
with such diligence was this done that before dark the
mattock and the spade had raised very considerable
defences. In the course of the night a violent scene
ensued between Massena and Bessieres : the latter con-
tending that the order for the caissons ordered back to
Ciudad Rodrigo should be recalled, as the horses draw-
ing them would infallibly be lost from fatigue, if it was
insisted on ; the former complaining that any such change
would deprive him of a victory which was already within
his grasp. The matter was decided by the discovery
that the troops, without a fresh supply, had only half
426 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, rations for the following day. The consequence was, that
VL the caissons set out at daybreak, with orders to bring up,
I8ii. not ammunition, but bread ; all thoughts of renewing
the battle or relieving Almeida were laid aside, and the
army retreated at all points towards Ciudad Rodrigo,
after remaining a day inactive on the field, during the
• ^k, as if to give him some ground for claiming the
540-543. ' victory, which he took credit for in a proclamation to his
troops.1
The battle of Fuentes d'Onore was the most critical
Lord Lon- in which Lord Wellington was engaged in the whole war,
refleSs8 and in which the chances of irreparable defeat were most
battk? against the British army. Sir Charles Stewart has left
the following judicious reflections on this battle : " Mas-
sena's superiority to us, both in cavalry and artillery, was
very great; whilst the thick woods in our front afforded
the most convenient plateau which he could have desired
for the distribution of his columns unseen, and therefore
disregarded. Had he rightly availed himself of this ad-
vantage, he might have poured the mass of his force upon
any single point, and perhaps made an impression before
we could have had time to support it. Had he com-
menced his attack with a violent cannonade, it must
have produced some havoc, and probably considerable
confusion, in our line. He might then have moved for-
ward his cavalry en masse, supporting it by strong
columns of infantry ; and had either the one or the other
succeeded in piercing through, our situation would have
been by no means an enviable one. . . . Had he
thrown his cavalry round our right flank — a movement
which we should have found it no easy matter to prevent
— crossed the Coa, advanced upon our lines of communi-
cation, and stopped our supplies, at the moment when,
with his infantry, he threatened to turn us ; then pushed
upon Sabugal and the places near, he might have com-
pelled us to pass the Coa with all our artillery at the
most disadvantageous places, and cut us off from our
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 427
best and safest retreat. There was, indeed, a time during CHAP.
the affair of the 5th, when his design of acting in this VL
manner was seriously apprehended ; and Lord Wellington 18n-
was in consequence reduced to the necessity of deciding
whether he should relinquish the Sabugal road or raise
the blockade of Almeida. But Lord Wellington's pre-
sence of mind never for a moment forsook him. He felt
no distrust in his troops ; to retain his hold over a secure
and accessible line of retreat was therefore to him a
consideration of less moment than to continue an opera-
tion of which the ultimate success could now be neither
doubtful nor remote ; and he at once determined to ex-
pose Sabugal rather than throw open a communication
with Almeida. It was a bold measure, but it was not
adopted without due consideration, and it received an
ample reward in the successful termination of this hard- io9°niid!'
fought battle." 1
" Throughout these operations," said Wellington in his
official despatch to Lord Liverpool, "I have received This w^ a
the greatest assistance from Sir Brent Spencer and allp^ntnmSir
the general officers of the army, and from the adjutant ^rt'Tfor-6*
and quartermaster-general, and the officers of their re- tuues*
spective staffs."2 The Adjutant-General, Sir Charles 2 Gurw. vii.
Stewart, had borne a distinguished part in them ; so much
so, indeed, that they proved a turning-point in his for-
tunes. He had been in the battle wherever danger was
greatest : he had been beside the 71st in the desperate
)ayonet-fight in Fuentes d'Onore on the 3d ; and along-
side of Sir Stapleton Cotton, he had, with a few English
quadrons, stemmed the furious onslaught of Montbrun's
astly superior cavalry, and gained time for the infantry
o fall into square and commence their methodical retreat
n the 5th. The gallantry with which he had unhorsed and
lade prisoner Colonel La Motte of the 13th French Chas-
3urs, in single combat, had attracted universal notice; but
le experienced and discerning eye of Wellington had ere
iis discovered in him talents of a peculiar kind, admirably
428 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, fitted for a high situation, partly diplomatic, partly mili-
VL tary, which, it was foreseen, might ere long require to be
i8ii. filled up at the northern courts. Chivalrous and high-
bred in his manners, he was as well calculated to in-
sure the favour of the sovereigns and elevated officers
with whom he might be there brought in contact, as, from
his just military coup d'ceil, he was to command the
respect of the generals, and by his personal gallantry
and daring, to win the confidence of the private soldiers
with whom he might be called upon to act. Fortune, or
rather his own high deserts, were in consequence prepar-
ing for Sir Charles Stewart a more elevated sphere of
action than he had hitherto enjoyed ; and it was among
the rocks of Busaco, and the cavalry fight of Fuentes
d'Onore, that the qualities were developed which shone
forth with such lustre in the redoubts of Dresden and on
the field of Leipsic.
But though the battle of Fuentes d'Onore was attended
s with such important consequences personally to Sir Charles
to Stewart, as well as generally to the war, it was at the
. moment attended by an event in the highest degree morti-
May 10. fying. For some days after the battle it was not positively
known whether the attempt to raise the blockade of Al-
meida would not be resumed, and the army was busily
employed in strengthening the defensive position they had
assumed at the close of the fight to maintain it. On the
May 10. 10th, however, unequivocal symptoms of a retreat on the
part of the French army were manifest, as there was only
a screen of light troops left in their position. The British
officers and soldiers in consequence deemed the capture of
Almeida now certain, as it was known it had only provi-
sions to the 15th; and they looked forward to this
conquest with great complacency, both as a trophy of
the campaign, and as affording a solid basis for future
operations. In these expectations the Commander-in-
Chief fully concurred, and he only awaited the surrender
of this fortress to hasten to the south and prosecute his
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 429
long-cherished, designs against Badajos. But an unex- CHAP.
pected event dashed all these hopes, and deprived the VL
English general of the triumph for which he had fought isii.
so hard, and which he was so well entitled to expect.
No sooner had he come to despair of raising the siege by
main force, than the French general sent orders to the
governor of the fortress, General Brennier, to blow up the
works, and make the best of his way off by Barba del
Puerco. This order was made out in triplicate, and
delivered to three trusty messengers : the two first went
disguised, and never reached their destination ; the third.
Andre Tillet, a chasseur of the 6th Light Infantry, set
out in uniform, armed only with his sabre, and he reached
Almeida in safety. Brennier immediately set himself to
work, with zeal and ability, to execute his instructions.
The prescribed salvoes of guns were fired at the appointed
time, warning Massena that his orders had been received, i Koch, \ii.
without attracting attention in the British camp ; and at ^"|4^ '
half-past eleven, on the night of the llth, a tremendous UV1*5
r . ° Wellington
explosion was heard far and wide, and soon after it was to Lord Liv-
i • i • i -n T i i i • »erpool, May
whispered m the Jknglish army that the garrison ofi4, isii;
Almeida had blown up the place, and was marching in 548.w
good order towards Barba del Puerco.1
The bridge over the Agueda at this place was the
obvious line of retreat for the garrison, and where, accord- BiowLg up
ingly, the 2d French corps was in readiness to receive it. and^ap?'
Although, however, Brennier's measures were taken with of Brennier-
equal skill and foresight, and executed with decision, he
did not get back unscathed. General Campbell, a zealous
and gallant officer who had greatly distinguished himself
at the battle of Talavera, had been intrusted, with the
6th division, which he commanded, with the blockade of
the place, and at his own earnest request he had received
the entire direction. Unfortunately, he misapprehended
the direction in which the escape of the garrison would
be attempted ; and instead of occupying in force Barba
del Puerco, commanding the bridge over the Agueda
430 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, leading direct from the fortress to the French lines, he
YL -watched with attention only the right face of the town,
isii. from which no movement was likely to be made. So
obvious was this misconception, that on the llth the
4th Regiment from Erskine's division was ordered up
to occupy the heights above that place : but it was too
late ; the enemy had already passed. Marching under
the best direction, without a light and in profound si-
lence, between the British pickets, they contrived to
pass undiscovered for two hours, until the explosion at
Almeida awakened every one in the army. They were
then discerned, and a small body of cavalry attacked
them on the right, while Pack on the left was redoub-
ling his pace to reach Barba del Puerco before them.
It was a race in the dark who should first get there ;
and when the French uniforms in the grey of the dawn
were first seen emerging from the gloom, General Heu-
delet, who commanded the troops placed near the bridge
to receive them, advanced in double-quick time, and met
the leading companies, whom they conducted across the
bridge in safety. But the rearguard was not equally
fortunate. Brennier had purposely put the waggons and
baggage in the rear, in order to serve as a decoy to
draw off the first of the pursuers, and this succeeded
' with some Portuguese squadrons, who broke, and began
plundering ; but some British horse soon came up, and
Pack occupied in force the heights overhanging a gorge
on the other side through which they had to pass before
reaching the bridge. Heudelet's chasseurs lent them a
powerful hand here, and the fusillade was soon extremely
i Koch, vii. warm between the tirailleurs on the opposite sides ; but
Lond.rYi.; meanwhile a heavy plunging fire was kept up from the
wtiiinUm top of the rocks on the column below, which sustained
to Lord Li v- very heavy loss.1 Two hundred and thirty French were
erpool, May * <f
14,1811; driven over a precipice with forty Portuguese, the most
SIB, 549. ' of whom perished miserably ; two hundred privates and
ten officers were made prisoners ; and fifty were slain on
CAMPAIGN OP 1811 IN SPAIN. 431
the spot. Altogether the enemy lost above three hundred CHAP.
and fifty men, being about a third of their number, but VI-
the rest got clear off, after an exploit conducted with isn.
equal skill and gallantry, which gave great vexation to
Wellington, but attracted general admiration in both
armies.
Almeida, when it was entered by the British troops,
was found to be in an extremely dilapidated state. Two Wellington
of the five bastions of which the works consisted were troopsaifd
indeed entire, from the accidental circumstance of the Es
mines intended to be sprung having missed fire ; but the ra"
other three were in a state of total ruin, and it was evident
that considerable time and no small amount of labour and
money would be required to put them in a posture of
defence. Though deeply mortified at this result of his
operations, Wellington and all his staff felt that it had
now become comparatively of little importance for the
future progress of the war. The recent victory had
secured the north-eastern frontier from further insult, at
least for a considerable time ; and it was to the south,
on the frontier of Badajos, that all eyes were now turned,
as the destined theatre of important events. No sooner,
accordingly, did Almeida fall than Wellington despatched
the 3d and 7th divisions, under Picton and Houston,
towards the Guadiaua to reinforce Beresford, who, with
a very inadequate force, was charged with the double
duty of reducing that fortress and covering the siege
operations against Marshal Soult, who, in obedience to the
Emperor's orders, was advancing with a powerful army
from Andalusia, not only to raise the siege, but to co-
operate by an incursion into the Alentejo in the re-
newed attack on Portugal, of which Massena's advance to
Fuentes d'Onore was a principal part. The remainder
of the army was put into cantonments on the Agueda
and the Coa, at Frenada, Fuentes d'Onore, Aldea de
Ponte, and Gallegos, in such a situation as to observe
Oiudad Rodrigo and cover the frontier, and left under
432 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, command of Sir Brent Spencer ; while Wellington hiin-
VI- self, with Sir Charles Stewart and the whole etat-major,
isii. set out from Villa Formosa on the 15th of May, and
1/7-128."' travelled with the utmost expedition towards Elvas.1
It was high time that Wellington should proceed to
operations the south to take the command there, for affairs during
f rst his temporary absence in the north had become threaten-
s. ^ JQ t^e ex^reme g0 far ^^ as 22d April, in conse-
quence of directions given by the Commander-in-Chief
himself, measures had been commenced for the siege of
Badajos. Fascines, gabions, and other implements for
it, had been prepared, although the approaches had
been considerably retarded by a sudden rise of the river
on the 24th, which swept away the bridge of casks
which had been thrown across it. On the 29th, how-
ever, the communication was restored by means of flying
Mayi. bridges, and on the 1st May the bridge of casks was
May 4. replaced more firmly than ever. On the 4th, General
William Stewart invested the fortress on the left bank of
the river, but the investment on the southern side was
Way a not completed till the 8th, and then only with consider-
able difficulty, owing to the extreme inadequacy of the
siege stores which were at the disposal of the General.
The heavy artillery for the reduction of Fort Christoval,
an indispensable preliminary to an attack on the body of
the place, consisted of three twenty-four pounders, with
three hundred rounds to each gun; and two howitzers,
with two hundred rounds to each. Mortars there were
none. Five hundred intrenching tools, two thousand
sandbags, two hundred gabions, and a few planks, consti-
tuted the whole siege materiel provided for the reduction
of one of the strongest fortresses in the south of Europe !
2 Jones's rfhe besieging corps consisted of one British brigade, two
24-27; ' battalions of Portuguese of the line, and a battalion of
i2°3n, 124. militia — in all, four thousand men.2 In addition to that,
the ground upon which the working-parties had to com-
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 433
mence their labour proved extremely hard and rocky ; CHAP>
insomuch that, though four hundred men were employed VI-
on the trenches, ten men only were able to work under isu.
cover when daylight appeared ! It may be conceived
what progress was made in a siege attended with such
difficulties, and with such means.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Marshal Beresford
and his troops persevered most resolutely in the attack. Progress of
On the 10th a sortie of the besieged took place, which, whichfse'
although attended at first with some success, was ulti- suspende(L
mately repulsed. The besiegers, however, following up
their advantages with too much eagerness, got within the
range of the guns of the fort over the glacis, in conse-
quence of which, in a few minutes, four hundred brave
men were struck down without any advantage to the
Allies. Notwithstanding this loss, serious to so small a
besieging force, the approaches continued to be vigorous-
ly pushed forward; on the llth the three heavy guns
opened their fire in the hope of effecting a breach in the
smaller flank of Fort St Christoval, while the two how-
itzers strove to keep down the fire of the place. Nothing
but defeat could be anticipated from such disproportion-
ate means ; and so it turned out, for before evening the
three guns were silenced, and one of the howitzers ren-
dered unserviceable. Still persevering even with means
which rendered success hopeless, Beresford was renewing
his efforts and constructing a fresh battery to breach the a
fort, when he learned that Soult was approaching with so Joseph, vii.
powerful a force from the south as would strain the whole H. 125, m\
force at his disposal, including those engaged in the siege,
to repel. He instantly took his line, and orders were £" isg,ton'
given to disarm all the batteries, send the stores back to .1811 '> ..
Gurw. vn.
a place of safety, and march every disposable man to the 573, note;
defensive position at Valverde, there to await the attack 391.
of this fresh enemy.1
In effect, Soult, having collected 14,000 admirable
droops in Andalusia, had advanced into Estremadura
VOL. i. 2 E
434 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, where he formed a junction with Latour Maubourg, who
VL brought to his standard about 5000 men ; he then
ion. found himself at the head of 16,000 chosen infantry
Forcef'on and 3000 of the finest horse ; and with this force, and
both sides. 4Q guns> he advanced to raise the siege. The French
marshal was full of confidence, and boasted in his letters
to Berthier that he would soon have 35,000 men and
5000 horse with 50 guns in Estremadura, with which he
would give battle to the whole English army, whom
he had no doubt he should conquer. The Allied army
had at first been ordered to assemble at Valverde, at no
great distance from Badajos; but as that position left one
road to that fortress open, it was determined on the
15th to make the rendezvous a little farther on, at
ALBUERA, which better covered the approaches to it.
Thither, accordingly, Marshal Beresford directed his steps ;
but in consequence of this change of position, to be taken
farther in advance than had been originally ordered, and
of the extraordinary rapidity of Soult, who came up by
forced marches of eighteen miles a-day, the French were
first assembled on the field of battle, and had occupied in
force an extensive wood, of which the British commander
had intended to have taken possession. The Allied troops
came up to the ground irregularly, and some of them
after very forced and fatiguing marches. Blake with his
Spaniards did not arrive till three in the morning of the
16th, when he appeared with troops sadly jaded by a long
and fatiguing night-march ; Cole's division only app'eared
at nine on that day, after the battle had begun ; Kemp's
brigade and Madden's cavalry never came up at all. It
was more by accident than anything else that there were
troops enough to hold the position on the evening of the
1 5th till the remainder of the army successively came up
and took their ground. The entire force of the Allies
who took part in the action which followed were 7500
British, 8000 Portuguese, and 12,000 Spaniards — in all
nearly 27,000 men. But the cavalry was very weak,
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 435
being not more than half the French, and the guns were CHAP.
only thirty-eight. On the whole, although the Allies had VL
the numerical superiority, yet, considering the homoge- isn-
neous character and perfect composition of the French i29-i3i"'
force, and their decisive advantage in cavalry and artil-fji*1^.
lery, the two armies were very equally matched ; and sSsTixj".1'
thence, and from the desperate valour of the British and Bedford to
1 Wellington,
French forces engaged, resulted one of the most bloody May 18 ;
and memorable battles in the whole war, or indeed in 573, in. '
modern times.1
" The position," says Sir Charles Stewart, " selected for
the army was behind the little river Albuera, where the Description
road from Seville to Badajos and Olivenza, after passing 0[iattfee.ld
the stream by a bridge close to the village, separates into
two branches. Here the ground rises from the river in
gentle undulations, which, extending to the right, afford
no single point d'appui more favourable than another,
but tempt him who has already arranged his line along
their summits to draw it out from hill to hill, and eminence
to eminence." It was here that the Allied armies, with
the exception of the 4th division, under Cole, which did not
arrive till after the action had begun, were all assembled
by four o'clock on the morning of the 16th. The French
lay on the ground directly opposite to them ; and as the
two armies were quite concentrated, and the ground be-
tween them practicable at all points for all arms, it was
evident that a desperate shock might be anticipated. The
Allied army was drawn up in two lines, having the rivulet
of the Albuera in its front : the Spaniards were posted
on the heights on the right ; General William Stewart's
division in the centre ; Hamilton's Portuguese on the left ;
Alten's brigade of Germans held the village and bridge
of Albuera in front of the whole ; and in rear of the
centre, after the battle had begun, came up Cole's iron
4th division. The Spaniards on the right were brave
troops, but so undisciplined that they could not be trusted
;o move under fire ; and it had never been thought of to
436 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, strengthen this part of the position, which consisted of
YL heights, with field-works. On the side of the French,
i8ii. Qirard's corps lay on the left, opposite to the Spaniards,
on the Allied right ; Godinot's division was in the centre,
130-132?' fronting the village of Albuera ; while between the two
101*392; the redoubtable cavalry of Latour Maubourg lay, with a
fair field before them for charging. General Werle's divi-
sion, with the light cavalry of General Briche', were in
BM^J? reserve ifl ^6 second line ; while the numerous guns under
seph, vii. Ruty were advantageously massed on the left of the line,
400; Thiers, » i
xii. 687. either to support attack or cover retreat as circumstances
might require.1
The position chosen by Beresford was strong and well
Battle of selected ; but, unfortunately, he had not occupied, even
May I™.' with light troops, a wooded spur in advance of his right,
which ran out towards the heights occupied by the French.
The consequence was, that behind this projecting eminence
the enemy were enabled to form their columns unseen by
the British, and assail unawares and suddenly the right
of their line. Soult skilfully availed himself of this ad-
vantage. About nine in the morning of the 16th, hav-
ing got all his troops well in hand, he moved forward
Godinot's corps against the bridge of Albuera in two
heavy columns, while part of Latour Maubourg's cavalry
formed on their left an imposing mass. All eyes were
instantly turned in that direction, and every preparation
was made to resist the onset where it seemed to be
directed. But, meanwhile, Girard's corps, reinforced by
the main body of Latour Maubourg's horse, concealed by
the spur above mentioned, was formed on the French
left, close to the Spaniards, who, as already mentioned,
stood on the right of the position. The attack was
made with the utmost impetuosity and loud cries ; but
the Spaniards, though worn down by fatigue, and starv-
ing to such a degree that they were deserting in great
numbers to avoid dying of hunger, and had eaten nearly
all their horses, yet opposed a stout resistance. Incap-
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 437
able of moving, they could not change their front to meet CHAP.
the flank French attack ; but they stood firm on their VL
ground, and, if they had had the shelter of the rudest 18n-
field-works, they might perhaps have held it. As it was,
however, after a rapid exchange of volleys for a few
minutes, they were obliged to retire, which they did in
tolerable order. This success, however, was very im- l Lend. a.
132 133*
portant to the French, for it not only made them masters Briai. ii.'
of the heights on the right, which were the key of the Bedford
Allied position, but it laid bare the only good road, that !°n j\iayUg"
to Valverde, by which the Allies could retire, and ex- ^ 18n .;.
' J ^ liurw. vn.
posed them to the risk of being hemmed in between the ^74» note ?.
Albuera stream and the enemy's columns, with no line 399, 460.
of retreat practicable for artillery.1
Upon this, Beresford, after having made the most gal-
lant efforts, though in vain, to bring back the Spaniards Gallant at-
to the charge, ordered up General William Stewart's divi- gtewwt'i
sion to the right, to endeavour to regain the heights. dlvlslon-
These splendid troops passed in close array through the
throng of the retreating Spaniards, and having at length
gained room to deploy, the first brigade, consisting of the
Buffs, the 66th, the 2d battalion 48th, and 31st, under
Colonel Colbourn, advanced in line up the hill to dislodge
the enemy, who were still in column on the summit.
" Their advance," says Sir Charles Stewart, " was spirit-
ed, and their fire admirably directed ; but before they
could approach within charging distance, the enemy's
cavalry broke in upon their right. One wing of the Buffs
was now directed to be thrown back." But before the
movement could be completed, the Polish lancers were
ipon them, by whom they were violently driven back-
vards on Houghton's brigade, which was in support.
Jnfortunately, it was in the act of deploying when this
ras done, and at first, in consequence, could afford no
dequate assistance. The consequence was that Stew-
rt's brigade " suffered terribly, as well by a tremendous
re of grape which was poured upon them as from the
438 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, the cavalry, which rode through and cut them up at their
VL leisure. The Buffs, 66th, and 48th were, indeed, annihi-
i8ii. lated, and the 31st escaped a similar fate only because,
isTm!' being on the left, it had time to form, and was thus en-
abled to show a regular front to the enemy." l
Undismayed by this terrible spectacle, Houghton's
Gallant ad- brigade, consisting of the 57th, 1st battalion 48th, and
Houghton's 29th, bravely advanced through a fearful fire to the
brigade, theatre of conflict, where the 31st, still unbroken and in
line, maintained a desperate contest against fearful odds.
Nothing could exceed the gallantry with which they ad-
vanced under their heroic leader, who fell pierced by
several balls, supported by the 3d brigade under the
Hon. Colonel Abercrombie, consisting of the 28th, 34th,
and 39th. The enemy, however, were now firmly estab-
lished in great strength on the heights, from which it
seemed impossible to dislodge them. The strife here was
long and bloody in the extreme, for neither party would
recede ; and the dauntless antagonists, standing within
half-musket-shot, interchanged, without flinching, destruc-
tive volleys with each other. Though greatly superior in
number at this point, the loss of the French was far
heavier than that of the British ; for the former, being
in column, presented a mark on which the shot nearly all
took effect ; whereas the latter, being in line, sustained a
loss which, though great, was not in proportion so serious.
But despite all their efforts, under Colonel Inglis of the
57th, and Major Way of the 29th, who headed them
with the utmost gallantry, disaster, widespread and dis-
heartening, was here rapidly overtaking the British arms.
a , , .. The dragoons of Montbrun, with the Polish lancers, rode
•* Jjoml. 11.
134, 135 ?_ slashing and stabbing in every direction, except where
689; Beres- some of the regiments still stood firm, over the field:
li^gton, great numbers of prisoners had been taken, six stand of
isii ?8' colours — those belonging to the Buffs, 66th, and 48th,
!' regiments — were lost, and a whole brigade of artillery
had fallen into the enemy's hands.2
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 439
All seemed lost, and the battle wore so unpromising CHAP.
an aspect that the British commander was taking mea- VL
sures to secure a retreat, when a happy inspiration seized 1811-
a young staff-officer attached to the Portuguese army, Glorias
reserved for great destinies in future days, Colonel, after- p^ffe^
wards LORD HARDINGE, Quartermaster - General of the gjj ™J?
Portuguese forces. Determined to make one eifort more regains the
to snatch victory from the enemy's grasp, he took upon
himself to order up the fusilier and a Portuguese brigade,
under General Cole, which, as already observed, had only
reached the field of battle after the action had been
already engaged, having marched all night from the neigh-
bourhood of Badajos, and were in reserve behind the
centre to the right, to endeavour to regain the fiercely-
contested heights. These noble troops, though sorely
fatigued with their night-march, advanced in the finest
order, and with unshrinking resolution, into the despe-
rate melee, under their heroic leaders, Cole and Myers,
in line against the French columns. All that remained
unbroken of the troops which had already been engaged
here joined the line, the fusiliers steadily pressing on,
firing all the way, in front, the remains of Stewart's divi-
sion in flank. The result must be given in the words
of the eloquent French historian : " These troops," says
M. Thiers, " advanced ; the one deployed in line, the
other formed en potence on the flank. The division
Girard thus found itself assailed in front and flank by
the steady and murderous fire of the British infantry. In
a few minutes nearly all the officers were killed or i Thiew, xii
wounded. To have replied on equal terms to the double 689) 69°
fire of the English, it would have been necessary to have issiThta
ieployed, and formed two sides of a square ; but the two Briai.9? ;
livisions were so near that this was impossible, and they |9et;£t«
vere obliged to retire to escape from a butchery as ruin- ^"iT °u
ms as it was useless."1 The steady ceaseless fire of is11;
, -iii A i i* "urw. vii.
he fusiliers, admirably supported by Abercrombie s 575.
•rigade and the Portuguese under Colonel Harvey,2 swept
440 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, away every attempt at extending into line ; the British
VT- soldiers, raising loud shouts as they saw the enemy's con-
181 !• fusion, pressed incessantly forward, and at length drove
them headlong down the hill.*
28 The battle was now gained, but the French general
victory of abiy an(j gallantly covered the retreat. Latour Mau-
the British. J , j • Ml J j • 1 J
bourgs dragoons rapidly advanced in close order, and
threatened in the most formidable manner the right flank
of the fusiliers, while Ruty quickly disposed his guns on
some heights in the rear, so as to cover the retreat.
Menaced in this manner both in front and flank, the vic-
torious brigade was obliged to halt, and endure for some
time the iron tempest, on the top of the hill. There,
however, it stood firm, and its standards waved in proud
defiance to the defeated enemy, whose masses, dark and
threatening still, did not venture to make another attack
on the blood-stained eminences. Farther to the left,
several attacks were made by Godinot's division on the
village of Albuera, in the direction of the bridge ; but they
were all defeated by the steadiness of the Portuguese regi-
ments and Alten's light Germans, who lined the walls and
approaches to it. Several bodies of horse showed them-
i Lond. ii. selves here ; but their efforts, which were not in such force
SresSto as those made by Latour Maubourg's heavy dragoons on
Mafisf011' the riSht' were a11 baffled by the 13th Dragoons and
Gurw' vii Colonel Otway's horse, supported by General Lumley's
^o1-"1*' Brigade, who, moving parallel to the enemy's squadrons,
i. 395. effectually prevented any impression being made in that
quarter.1
* By a singular coincidence, on the very day on which these lines were
written, the author received the following letter from one of the few survivors
of the Fusilier brigade, who was present at this sanguinary battle : " Reading
in your History of Europe the account of Albuera, you say that General Cole's
division was ' still fresh when it came into action.' So far from this, we were
at Badajos at eleven the preceding night, marched all night, and arrived on the
ground just when the Polish lancers had driven the Spaniards and Houghton's
division back. We were immediately ordered to charge by Colonel Hardinge."
The writer of this letter has nine clasps, and was one of the forlorn hope at
San, Sebastian, and was noticed by General Blakeney as one of the best soldiers
in the army.
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 441
Such was the battle of Albuera, one of the most glori- CHAP.
ous in which the British arms had ever been engaged, and
in which the merits of the island warriors and their an- 18n-
cient rivals in military fame were most signally tried. It &*S» of
was extremely bloody on both sides ; more so, indeed, ^^°
than any battle of any nation during the whole Peninsular sides-
war. The loss on either part was immense. Out of
7500 British troops engaged, 4158 were killed, wounded,
or prisoners ; the Portuguese lost 389, and the Spaniards
1980— in all, 6527. The French lost still more : their
Ccisualties were no less than 8000 men. The instances
of daring and heroic courage exhibited by the British in
this battle never were exceeded. Beresford showed a
noble example. " During the hottest of the action," says
Sir Charles Stewart, " he exposed himself with a degree
of intrepidity which could hardly fail of spreading an
example of heroism around. He repeatedly dragged the
Spanish officers from their ranks, compelling them to
lead their men forward, and show them the way ; and
when individually charged by a Polish lancer, he grappled
his adversary by the throat, and threw him from his
saddle." l " Our artillery was admirably served ; its fire \Lond. a.
was very destructive, and the men stood to their guns till
many of them were sabred ; indeed, there was not an
officer or soldier in any department of the army who failed
this day in doing more than his duty. The bravery of
the 57th and 31st fell in no degree short of that of their
comrades the fusiliers. These regiments, having ascended
the height, stood their ground nobly against all the
efforts of a column of French grenadiers. The enemy's
fire thinned their ranks, but never once broke them ; for,
at the close of the action, the dead and wounded were
found in two distinct lines upon the very spots which they
had occupied whilst alive and fighting. They fought, too,
in every imaginable order which infantry can be called
upon to assume. They resisted cavalry in square, de-
ployed again into line, received and returned repeated
442 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, volleys whilst a few yards only divided them from their
VI- opponents, and at last carried everything before them by
181L a charge with the bayonet. All this could not, of course,
be done without a prodigious slaughter on both sides ; in-
deed, the killed and wounded lay in masses so compact
that full 7000 bodies occupied the space of a few hun-
dred feet ; and our artillery, when advancing towards the
close of the day, were compelled to pass over them, deaf
to their cries, and averting their gaze from the brave fel-
i Lond. ii. lows thus laid prostrate in the dust." l All the guns taken
were regained before the close of the battle, except one
howitzer, and four of the standards lost were wrested from
the enemy.
30 If any doubt could have existed as to the party entitled
Souit retires to claim the honours of this hard-won fight, it was soon
to Llerena, 11 t i t i «» i -n r •
andBeres- dispelled by the conduct of the .French after it was
the s'iegeTf8 over. On the day following, the British, though not half
Badajos. ^ those who had fought on the preceding day, displayed
their standards planted in the ground, as so many tro-
phies, on the summit of the hill where so many brave men
on both sides had fallen, and the French did not venture
to disturb them. On the 1 8th Soult retired to Solano, a
considerable distance to the rear, and in two days after
he marched to Llerena, where ample pasture was to be
found for his horses, abandoning all thoughts of disturbing
the siege of Badajos. Upon this Beresford sent back
Hamilton's Portuguese division, which had suffered very
little in the battle, to observe that fortress on the south,
while he himself, with the remainder of the army, took
post at Almendralejo, to watch the enemy. Matters
were in this state when Lord Wellington, with his whole
May 19. staff, arrived at Elvas on the 1 9th, and received full and
authentic accounts of the desperate shock which had taken
place between the two armies. Though much concerned
at the serious loss which had been sustained in the Eng-
lish ranks, which was the more to be regretted as the
weak numbers and inefficient condition of the Portuguese
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 443
troops had made the weight of the contest to fall almost CHAP.
entirely upon the British troops, he did not abandon his
design of reducing Badajos. On the contrary, approving 1811-
of all Beresford had done, as soon as the two divisions
which he had ordered up from the banks of the Coa
arrived at Elvas, he resumed the siege operations with
more ample means, and on a greater scale, than had
been practicable for Beresford's comparatively limited
resources. On the 25th there were collected around the May 25.
place 10,000 British and Portuguese regulars, 3000 Spa-
niards, and 2000 Portuguese militia, with 40 heavy guns.
On that day Houston's division drove in all the enemy's
posts on the right bank of the Guadiana, and invested
Fort Christoval, while a flying bridge was thrown across x Lond ..
the river, as at the last attack. On the left bank, where J^' l43'
Thiers, xn.
the Portuguese were already established, the third divi- 691, 692 ;
, . f Brial.i.398,
sion, which marched from Campo Mayor, was stationed on 399.
the 27th, and the besieged were thus shut in on every side.1
The siege-train which Wellington had collected, though
much more considerable than that which had been at the siege-train
disposal of Marshal Beresford, was wholly inadequate. " It i, J3F*1
amounted," says Sir Charles Stewart, "to 40 pieces, among stores>
which were 4 ten-inch and 6 eight-inch howitzers. Of
mortars we possessed none : 8, therefore, out of the 10
howitzers were directed to be used as such. The en-
gineers' stores comprised 3500 intrenching tools, 60,000
sandbags, 600 gabions, a very few fascines, and an ex-
tremely inadequate quantity of splinter-proof timber and
planks ; whilst, independently of the officers, there were
attached to the department 169 men of the line to act as
overseers, 48 carpenters, 48 miners, and 25 rank and file
of the corps of royal artificers. To oppose this force,
there was understood to be in Badajos and in its outworks
a garrison of 3000 men, amply provided with food and
other stores for two months' consumption. Their arti Her v, „
r " ' 2 Lond. ii.
too, was of a very excellent description." It numbered full iw, u*.
150 pieces, from which a fire might, at almost any point,
444 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, be thrown out, infinitely superior to that which we could
VL bring against it."
isii. « The large and fortified town of Badajoz," continues
the same author, " stands upon the left bank of the Gua-
djanaj having one-fourth of its enceinte washed by the
river, which varies from about 300 to 500 yards in width,
and secures all the space which it embraces from insult.
Towards the land side its defences consist of eight regu-
larly constructed fronts, connected by a good covered-way
and glacis. The ravelines are, however, unfinished ; but
the fronts possess whole revetments, and the escarpe of the
bastions is thirty feet in height, though that of the curtains
is considerably lower. In advance of these fronts are two
detached works — namely, the Pardaleras, a crown work,
about 200 yards distant; and the Pecurina, a strong re-
doubt, 400 yards removed from the glacis. On the north-
east side again, where an angle is formed by the junction
of the river Revellas with the Guadiana, there is a hill
measuring perhaps 120 feet in height, the summit of which
is crowned by an old castle ; and the walls of that castle,
naked, weak, and only partially flanked, form part of the
enceinte of the place. ... It was against this point
that our engineers determined to conduct one of their
1 Loud. ii. ,,...,, _ .
145, 146. attacks, and it was here that they seemed to possess the
best, if not the only, chance of ultimately succeeding." l
" On the opposite bank of the Guadiana, and in a direct
Fortst line with this ancient building, stand the heights of St
Christoval, which measure in altitude little less than the
hill of the castle itself, and may, from the peculiar shape
and bearing of the latter eminence, be said completely to
command it. The castle hill, it will be observed, forms a
sort of inclined plane, which eases itself off towards the
edge of the water ; and hence a spectator from the sum-
mit of the heights of St Christoval is enabled to see with
perfect accuracy anything which may happen to be going
on within the walls of the castle. To hinder an enemy
from availing himself of this advantage, a square fort of
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 445
above 300 feet per face has been constructed. It is CHAP.
strongly and regularly built, with a stone scarp twenty feet _
in height ; and it is capable, from the rocky nature of the 18n-
ground on which it stands, to offer a stout resistance, even
when methodically besieged. Between it and the town,
however, the communication is far from being good, inas-
much as it is carried on entirely by means of a long bridge,
subject to be enfiladed, or by the still more precarious
and insecure instrumentality of boats. Against this fort
was the second attack directed ; and the obstacles to be
encountered soon proved to be as serious as, from the x
general appearance of the place, might have been ex- 146, 147.'
pected."1
All things being in readiness, so far as the limited means
at the disposal of the Commander- in- Chief would permit, Comme'nce-
ground was broken before both the castle and Fort St ™eege.°
Christoval on the night of the 31st May, Wellington May31'
commanding in person. The former operation passed un-
discovered, and the men were under cover before they
were detected by the enemy ; but the latter were detected
almost immediately after it began, and an incessant fire of
round-shot and grape was kept up in the direction of the
river. The working parties, however, bravely stood the
storm, and by morning four distinct batteries, at different
distances from the place, were marked out, and in part com-
pleted. On the 3d the guns opened, and a heavy fire was
kept up on both sides for several days without intermis-
sion, or any sensible advantage being gained on either side.
By the continuance of this fire several guns, and nearly
ill the howitzers, were rendered unserviceable, without
my perceptible effect being produced on the walls of the
astle, except that they were a little shaken. Two bas-
ions, however, at length fell on the side of Fort Christoval,
nd filled the ditch with their ruins. Various reasons
oncurred to induce Lord Wellington to hazard an assault June 6.
ithout delay on this fort ; for reports were coming in from
11 quarters as to the enemy moving in great force to the
44G SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, relief of the place; and a gallant action of the cavalry,
VL under General Lumley, who was in advance of the covering
i8ii. army at Usagre, on the very day when the reinvestment
took place, left no doubt that a decided movement by both
Marrnont and Soult was in progress to raise the siege.
The inference was soon confirmed by later advices. It
was ascertained that Drouet, with seventeen battalions and
several squadrons, had set out from Salamanca, and that
the whole of Marmont's army was preparing to follow.
Soult lay in strength at Llerena and Villa Garcia, and the
e- united force could have reached Albuera by the 12th, in
e suc^ stren»tn as *° render the further prosecution of the
" sieSe impossible. In these circumstances there was not
43> 44- a moment to lose in determining on the assault on Fort St
Christoval, and it took place on the night of the 6th June.1
35 " The forlorn hope," says Sir Charles Stewart, " ad-
yanced about midnight," under the guidance of Lieutenant
the storm of _ , . . i i i T-I • -r\
Fort st Jb oster of the engineers, and commanded by Jbnsign Dyas
of the 51st, "and directed their operations against the
part which appeared most assailable, namely, the right
salient angle of the fort. By the fire of our batteries
the palisades had all been destroyed ; and as the counter-
scarp was little more than four feet in depth, it proved
no obstacle to the assailants. They sprang into the ditch,
and marched straight to the foot of the breach. But
here a sad reverse awaited them. The enemy, labouring
incessantly between dusk and the hour of attack, had
removed the rubbish, and the escarp was found to stand
a . clear nearly seven feet from the bottom of the ditch. The
t<m to Lord forlorn hope had no scaling-ladders, and, seeing this, they
juneT™' were about to return, when the stormers, 155 in number,"
1 ft 1 1 •
Gurw. viii. led by Major M'Intosh of the 85th, " came up, and, hav-
£ Charles ing ladders, resolved to try an escalade. The ladders,
L^rTcasUe- nowever> proved to be four feet too short, and the con-
reagh, June sequence was, that the whole party was repulsed, with
MS. the loss of twelve killed and ninety-seven wounded."2
' The English general now saw that, however pressing the
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 447
necessity of expedition, the siege could not be brought to CHAP.
a successful issue without the aid of a more powerful artil-
lery than he had yet had at command. All that could isii.
be got, however, \vere seven iron guns, which were brought A Sef06,;d M.
from Elvas on the 8th ; and with these, and the whole ^-s"^^?11
pieces mounted which remained serviceable, numbering is resolved
only seven guns and two howitzers, an incessant fire was
kept up on the breach and its defences. Little progress
was made against either, and the breach seemed nearly
as difficult of access as ever; but as certain intelligence
had now been received that Soult and Marmont were
rapidly approaching, and would certainly form a junction
and raise the siege on the 12th or 13th, it was resolved
to try the fortune of a second assault. " We came to the
conclusion," says Sir Charles Stewart, " that Badajos must
either be reduced at once or not at all ; because we could
hardly pretend to continue the siege in presence of Mar-
mont's and Soult's armies combined ; and as little could
we hope to fight them to advantage to the south side of the
Guadiana, keeping the city in a state of blockade. That
we might not, however, be exposed to greater hazard than
was necessary, General Spencer/' who had been left on
the Agueda with four divisions, " received directions to
move by Penamacor to Castello Branco, which place he was ! k°?2: »•
<* . 157-181 ;
Commanded to reach on the 1 2th, and to hold himself in Jones's
Sicffcs i*
'eadiness to form a junction with our corps at the shortest 278.
lotice."1
The second storm of St Christoval took place on the
37
light of the 9th June. The assaulting column consisted i
f two hundred, twenty-five of whom formed the forlorn \
ope, guided by Lieutenant Hunt of the engineers, and ^pulsed
gain led by Ensign Dyas. Major M'Geechy commandedjune9>
'ie storming party. At the signal given the men leapt
at of the trenches and ran across the open ; but on
lis occasion they were distinctly seen by the enemy,
ho opened a heavy fire of grape upon them from every
m which could be brought to bear. The brave Lieu-
448 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, tenant Hunt fell dead on the glacis, and though the
VL troops leapt with their wonted gallantry into the ditch,
isii. jet the loss of the person who should have guided them
proved fatal to the enterprise. The stormers got to the
foot of the rampart with scaling-ladders twenty-five feet
in length ; but in the darkness, and without a guide, they
i Lond. ii. applied them, not to the breach, but to a bastion near it,
j<meo?.; which was comparatively uninjured. The consequence
weiun4Jon was, that they were repulsed with the loss of 40 killed
to Lord and 100 wounded. During the entire siege the loss of
i>\ verpool ,
June is, the Allies had been no less than 9 officers and 109
1 Q-i -i .
Gurw'. viii. men killed, and 25 officers and 342 men wounded or
12, 13. -, i
made prisoners.
On the day following this second repulse a despatch
Raising of was intercepted and brought to Wellington, which clearly
anVforees revealed the designs of the enemy, which was to collect
2d«. their whole force in Estremadura for the purpose of rais-
june 11. jng fae sjege Of Badajos, and pursuing their advantages
by an incursion into the Alentejo ; and on the same
morning advices were received from General Spencer
in the north, leaving no doubt of the advances of the
army of Portugal in the same direction, which expected
to be at Merida by the 15th. The united forces of the
two armies was nearly 60,000 effective men ; while the
British, even all united, though on paper 49,000 strong,
could not bring 30,000 into the field, there being no less
than 12,500 in hospital, and 7000 unavoidably absent on
detachment. The Portuguese again were only 25,000
on paper, of whom only 14,000 were in the field. Thus,
though there was a great numerical superiority on the part
line's1;' °f ^ie French over the Allies, the advantage in point of
i^a4™nt' real strength was still greater, for the Spaniards were equal
Wellington ^0 nothing, and the Portuguese, through the extreme im-
Liverpooi, becility of the regency and nearly all the authorities en-
3 ' gaged, were in a very inefficient state. Thus the weight of
1' the contest, as at Talavera and Albuera, would fall upon
the British ;2 but, though perfectly aware of this circum-
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 449
stance, and feeling keenly the heavy loss sustained in CHAP.
English soldiers, Wellington gallantly resolved to offer VI-
battle to the united armies of the two marshals. isn.
A great game now lay before the French generals, if
they had had nerve to play it. Sir Brent Spencer's Wellington
division had not arrived from Beira, when Soult and Mar- tos'ouit and
mont were already united near Merida, and by a rapid
advance they might have overtaken Wellington before he cline<L
arrived with an overwhelming superiority of force. Wel-
lington, after raising the siege, halted some days at Al-
buera, in hopes of getting an opportunity of attacking
Soult by himself ; but this was prevented by the latter
refusing his left, and moving to Almendralejo to join
Marmont. Seeing this, and that he could not prevent
their junction, the English general crossed the Guadiana
on the 17th, the very day of the junction of the two
French marshals, and took the route to Elvas and
Campo Mayor. He halted, however, between these
places, and took post on the two banks of the Caya,
where he was joined by Spencer, and the whole army was
assembled. The ground here was in part broken and
unfavourable for the action of cavalry, in which arm the
French had a great superiority, amounting to more than
double. The situation of Wellington was very critical ;
his army, sorely reduced by the sword, sickness, and de-
sertion, was fatigued by its long campaign, and somewhat
discouraged by the failure both at Almeida and Badajos.
The Portuguese army was in a most inefficient state.
"Without pay, without provisions, without sufficient
means of transport, the troops seemed to be rapidly
'ailing back into their original disorganisation; whilst
.he commanders were involved in continual disputes and l Loud. a.
Barrels, as well with one another as with the regency xii. Wers
nd the court of Brazil." l
In these circumstances the firm countenance of Wel-
ngton saved his army from destruction, and deprived the
'rench generals of the fairest opportunity they had yet
VOL. i. 2 F
450 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, enjoyed of overwhelming the British. On the 20th June
VL the whole army, including Spanish divisions, took up a
i8ii. position on very favourable ground, on both banks of the
The French Caya, and remained there till the 26th, offering battle to
lecfiS'the *he enemJ- "Wellington/' says Sir Charles Stewart,
conflict. « anticipated a general action. He spoke of its probable
occurrence, and took all the precautions to insure a vic-
tory which his genius pointed out ; and as he possessed
sources of information to which no other individual had
access, there can be little doubt that he came to that con-
clusion on grounds perfectly reasonable. As to myself,
I own that I considered the enemy had gained a great
deal by the successful resistance of Badajos, more perhaps
than in the present state of the campaign they had any
right to expect ; and as their troops stood at least as
much in need of repose and reorganisation as ours, it
appeared somewhat improbable that they would, for the
sake of harassing us, deny to themselves that of which
'Lend,;;, they strongly experienced the want."1 Sir Charles
171 172 . .
Stewart proved right in his anticipations : the French
generals declined the combat.
Both parties now put their armies for a short time
Both armies into cantonments — a measure rendered indispensable by
clnton'- mt° the fatigues they had undergone, and the heat of the
weather, which had become excessive. Wellington, satis-
fied with having a second time saved Portugal, and made
head against the united strength of the two armies, upon
whose co-operation Napoleon had reckoned for its con-
quest, justly deemed it indispensable to give his wearied
soldiers some weeks of repose. Soult, as soon as Bada-
June 27. jos was put in a sufficient posture of defence, withdrew
3 Lend ii his troops to Seville, where he speedily drove back the
173-iso; guerrillas under Blake, who had threatened that city.
r. 49; ' Marmont, on his part, also falling back, spread his divi-
4or<C 4io ; sions in summer quarters on both banks of the Tagus,
SSrSI."' having the bridge of Almaraz as their centre of com-
munication,2 the fortification of which speedily assumed so
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 4.51
formidable a consistency as to put them beyond the reach CHAP.
of a coup-de-main.
During the short intervals of rest in active service of isn.
a soldier's life, the enjoyments of peace and of rural orHabftg'of
social life are perhaps more keenly enjoyed than in any ^e*"|^
other situation. The following letter from Sir Charles these can-
T i ex • i • tonments.
to Lady otewart at this time, gives a pleasing picture of
the life of the officers during this period of repose, and
the manner in which they were received by the hospitality
of their chief : " At headquarters we have been fortu-
nate enough to become possessed of an excellent pack,
which affords us much amusement, and occupies the time
which otherwise might hang heavy on our hands ; and
into these minor considerations no man enters more
heartily than our leader. It is during this summer that
he has, for the first time, instituted the custom of throw-
ing off at settled points, on established days in every
week, when the army is not in the field ; and the inci-
dents replete with mirth, to which these meetings give rise,
are too numerous to be recorded, though they will be long
remembered. In our quarters, too, we live gaily and well.
A spirit of hospitality and good-fellowship everywhere
prevails, and in the midst of war, both private theatricals
and agreeable parties are of continual recurrence. This
system, while it deteriorates in no sensible degree from
the discipline and efficiency of the troops, spreads abroad
among those who are under its influence the very bestiSirCharleg
dispositions and temper ; and all learn to love the pro- ^"*% to
fession, even in the most trying moments, from a recol- Stewart,
'ection of the many enjoyments of which it has been the isn, MS.
lource." l
But while the thoughts of all in the army save those
n the immediate confidence of the Commander-in-Chief
^ere set upon their amusements, and it was thought that
o further operations would be attempted till the hot
?ason had passed away, the mind of that great man was
xed upon an enterprise of the utmost importance, and
452 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, which in the end proved successful. This was nothing
VL less than the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, an essential
isii. preliminary to any offensive operations in Spain. To
Movement effect this, however, it was indispensable that the enemy
of the should be taken by surprise ; and to secure this the siege-
army to new *
canton- train required to be moved to the vicinity of the fortress
ments on the 11- • i TI i •
Tagus, its without his being aware of its approach. I1 or this purpose
ment, and Lord Wellington began openly, and in an ostentatious
rations. °pe" manner, embarking a siege-train, which had recently ar-
rived from Woolwich, at Lisbon, in vessels which set sail
from the Tagus professedly for Cadiz. Once at sea, and
during the darkness of the night, the artillery was tranship-
ped into smaller vessels, which steered for Oporto, while the
larger vessels continued their course on to Cadiz and Gib-
raltar. From Oporto the siege equipage was moved, in a
quiet way, by the Douro, as far as Lamego, where it was
landed and dragged by oxen, with infinite difficulty and
over execrable roads, to Celorico, on the frontier, where it
was carefully concealed among a multitude of baggage-
waggons. Such was the hostility of the whole rural popu-
lation to the French, that, strange to say, not a rumour
of these preparations reached Marmont. The siege-train
having arrived and been placed in safety, Wellington
broke up from his cantonments on the Caya, and, taking
July 21. a northerly direction, crossed the Tagus at Villa-Velha,
and, the better to conceal his real design, took up new
cantonments, in which the army remained for a week, on
either bank of that river. There they were joined by
four regiments of foot and one of horse — the 26th, 32d,
1 Lend. ii. 68th, and 77th infantry, and 12th Dragoons; while
Briai.i.4io, General Graham arrived from Cadiz, and brought to the
mont, h'"" army the aid of great experience, high military talents,
Wenwton anc* a brilliant reputation. He received the command as
to Lord Liv- second in the army around headquarters, General Hill
erpool, Aug. II-I/.-IT
T.isii; being at the head of a detached corps, 10,000 strong, to
178, 174^ the south of the Tagus.1 Finding himself now, by these
reinforcements, at the head of 40,000 men in hand, which
CAMPAIGN OP 1811 IN SPAIN. 453
he deemed adequate to cope with Marmont singly, and at CHAP.
the same time undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, VI-
even with the limited means at his disposal, Wellington, isn.
in the first week of August, broke up from the valley of Aug. i.
the Tagus, and advanced first to Sabugal, and two days Aug. s.
after to Fuente Guinaldo, and the whole army was col- Aug. 10.
lected in a loose and extensive line, extending from Villa
Viciosa on the right to Gallegos on the left, menacing
Ciudad Rodrigo on either bank of the Agueda.
It was impossible that the moving and concentrating
of so large an army should not become known to the Ciudad' RO-
French generals ; but, in ignorance of the siege-train SaiLd6,
which had been secretly conveyed to the neighbourhood, ]™l^ejgta.
they imagined that a blockade only was in contemplation, ^!ishest a
» j ' distant
and that if the place could but be supplied with provi- blockade,
sions, it would be placed beyond the reach of danger.
With such diligence did Marmont exert himself on this
subject, that on the very day before the British army
arrived before the place a convoy of provisions for two
mouths entered it. This great supply rendered all hopes
vain of an immediate reduction of the fortress by block-
ade, and the information which was at the same time
received as to the strength of Marmont's army and those
which he could rally to his standard, rendered it ex-
tremely hazardous to attempt its reduction by open force.
It was impossible to attempt the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
with a force, including the late reinforcements, little inorei96, 197-
than half that of the enemy ; and Wellington, therefore,
wisely resolved to confine himself to a distant observation wJmngLln
of the place, and to keep his men together, in the hope that erp^oi,dAug
want of provisions would ere long compel the enemy to ^j^Mj
separate, and that he might possibly strike a blow before 223-226.
they had time to reassemble.1
This state of things continued, without any event of 45
importance on either side, through the whole remainder of Marmont
resolves to
August and the first half of September ; the British keep- "j™*
ng up a blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, which, though dis- drigo.
454 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, tant, was sufficient to prevent any further introduction
VI- of provisions into the place ; and Marmont's array being
i8ii. quartered in echelon, from the Tagus to the Col de
Banos, with detachments as far as Tamames, in order
to levy contributions all the way to Salamanca. At the
end of this period, reinforcements under Dorsenne, 15,000
strong, including 12,000 infantry and 500 horse of the
Imperial Guard, joined the French army, conveying along
with them a huge convoy of provisions sufficient for the
supply of Ciudad Rodrigo for eight months. On the
other hand, towards the end of September, provisions be-
gan to grow scarce in the place, and it was known that
they could not by any effort hold out, unless relieved, be-
yond the 1 Oth October. In these circumstances Marmont
resolved to concentrate his forces, and, availing himself
of his great superiority of numbers, openly force the in-
troduction of the convoy into the fortress. Orders ac-
cordingly were given to the troops to close up with all im-
aginable expedition from the rear ; and the convoy, which
was of huge dimensions, was placed in the centre of the
long column. Wellington, however, had not been idle in
the interim since his troops returned to the banks of the
Coa and the Agueda. On horseback, with Sir Charles
Stewart and his staff, nearly every day from sunrise till
dusk, he had in person carefully studied the ground, both
that on which the enemy would probably approach escort-
ing the convoy, and that on which his own defensive
struggle was to be maintained. His force was altogether
inadequate to maintaining the blockade in presence of
the concentrated French army ; but he was in hopes,
despite its great inferiority, of being able to maintain
. himself in a position he had selected near Fuente Gui-
1 Marmont, A
vi. 63, 64; naldo, and which he had strengthened by considerable
Lend. ii. , - 1 . . ' .
206 208 ; field-works, and thus await an opportunity of striking an
412! '' 'unexpected blow in the course of the winter, which was
approaching.1
The appearance of the French army, with its great
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 455
convoy, is thus described by Sir Charles Stewart : " Wei- CHAP.
lington early determined to make his retreat by the great
road which leads from Ciudad Rodrigo to Fuente Gui- isn.
iialdo. The divisions upon the more advanced chain Wellfn'_
accordingly received orders, in case of an attack, to retire, ton's Pre-
. . . parations,
after having well disputed their ground, towards Fuente and advance
^ . ,, &TT . r oftheene-
(iumaldo. Here it was expected that a more resolute my, who
stand would be made under cover of the redoubts and ciudld Rod-
other works which had of late been thrown up ; whilst, rigo*
in the event of further falling back, everything was so
settled that the movement could be executed at any mo-
ment, and with comparative security. Such was the order of
the Allied army when, on the 24th of September, a con-
siderable body of the enemy showed themselves in the plain
before Ciudad Rodrigo. They came from the Salamanca
and Tamames roads, and were accompanied by a count-
less number of waggons, cars, and loaded mules. Their
progress was slow and apparently cautious ; but towards
evening the convoy began to enter the place, under cover
of about fifteen squadrons of cavalry, which passed the
Agueda, and a large column of infantry, which halted
upon the plain. Still no symptoms were manifested of a
design to cross the river in force, or to attempt anything
further than the object which was thus attained ; for the
advanced cavalry withdrew at dusk, and all bivouacked
that night near the town. In the morning, however, as
soon as objects became discernible, one corps of cavalry,
amounting to at least five-and-twenty squadrons, sup-
ported by a whole division of infantry, appeared in
motion along the great road which, leading from Ciudad
Rodrigo to Guinaldo, leaves El Bodon on the left ; whilst
another, less numerous, perhaps, but, like the former,
strongly supported by infantry, marched direct upon
Espeja. They both moved with admirable steadiness and
n*eat regularity ; and as the sun happened to be out,
• 11 •/. 11 • Loud. n.
ind the morning clear and beautiful, their appearance 208, 209.
vas altogether very warlike and extremely imposing.1
456 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. " As it was not for some time ascertained whether strong
VL reconnoissances only, or the advance of the whole French
1811- army, were intended, and as Lord Wellington felt great re-
JcLh to luctance to abandon the heights of El Bodon and Pastores,
uniess threatened by numbers which it would have been
useless to oppose, our troops neither shifted their ground
nor made at first any general disposition to cover the
points threatened by concentration. The enemy's columns,
on the contrary, pushed on, not disregarded certainly, but
as certainly without drawing us into any premature dis-
closure of our intentions, till the larger mass, which was
moving towards Guinaldo, reached the base of some rising
ground which was held by a portion of the third division.
These troops instantly formed ; and, though they consisted
of no more than one British brigade, under General Col-
ville, and one Portuguese regiment of infantry, the 9th,
some pieces of Portuguese artillery, and four squadrons of
General Alten's cavalry, they contrived to arrest, for a con-
siderable space of time, the further advance of the assail-
ants." This state of things led to the combat of El Bodon,
one of the most brilliant, as Wellington justly observed, of
the whole war, and in which Sir Charles Stewart, in com-
1 Lend. ii.
209, 210. mand, as adjutant-general, of the cavalry, bore a conspicu-
ous and most honourable part.1
" As soon," says he, " as it became distinctly manifest
sir Charles that an attack was in serious contemplation, our troops
accolmt of prepared to meet it with their accustomed gallantry and
the action. coo|ness ^he infantry wheeled into line; the cavalry
mounted and made ready to move wherever their presence
might be required ; whilst the artillery, redoubling their
exertions, poured forth a shower of grape and case shot,
which exceedingly galled and irritated the enemy. . . .
The attack was begun by a column of cavalry, which
charged up the heights in gallant style, cheering in the
usual manner of the French, and making directly for the
guns. Our artillerymen stood their ground resolutely, giv-
ing their fire to the last; but there being nothing immedi-
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 457
ately at hand to support them, they were at length com- CHAP.
pelled to retire, and the guns fell for a moment into the
hands of the assailants. But it was only for a moment ; isu.
for the 5th Regiment was ordered instantly to recover
them. They marched up in line, and firing with great
coolness ; when at the distance of only a few paces from
their adversaries, they brought their bayonets to the
charging position, and rushed forward. I believe this is
the first instance on record of a charge with the bayonet,
being made upon cavalry by an infantry battalion in
line ; nor, perhaps, would it be prudent to introduce the
practice into general use ; but never was charge more
successful. Possessing the advantage of ground, and
keeping in close and compact array, the 5th literally
pushed their adversaries down the hill ; they then re-
took the guns, and, limbering them to the horses, which
had followed their advance, drew them off in safety."
While this was going on in one part of the field, re-
peated attacks were made in another upon the handful Glorious
of cavalry under General Alten's orders, who, assisted ^uncfe
with his usual gallantry by Sir Charles Stewart, manfully s^char!
stood their ground against the squadrons, four times more Stewart-
numerous, of Montbrun's dragoons. " On all such occa-
sions," says Sir Charles Stewart, " the assailants outnum-
bered the defenders by at least four to one, and they
came on with the reckless bravery which is exhibited only
by men accustomed to conquer ; but nothing could exceed
the steadiness of our cavalry, and their excellence became
I only the more apparent on account of the great odds to
which they were opposed. There were present in this
rencontre two squadrons of the 1st Hussars of the King's
jerman Legion, with a similar number of the llth Light
Dragoons, between whom it was impossible to determine
vhich performed feats of the greater gallantry. Indeed,
can personally attest that the single source of anxiety
xperienced by the officers in command, arose from an
pprehension lest these brave fellows should follow the
458 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, broken multitudes down the cliffs and precipices into
VI- which they drove them. To hinder this were the efforts
jail, of others and myself mainly directed, and it was not
without considerable exertions that we succeeded. The
action had continued in this state for some time, the
enemy continually assaulting our front and left, and we as
continually repulsing them, when Captain Dashwood, an
active officer of the Adjutant-General's department, sud-
denly discovered a heavy column moving towards the rear
of our right, round which it had penetrated unobserved,
j .. and therefore unresisted. Not a minute was to be lost ;
212, 213. ' for even a moment's indecision would have enabled the
French to accomplish their object of surrounding us." x
Wellington's position was now in the highest degree
Retreat of precarious. The retreat of the troops which had occu-
toGJnaido,pied the heights of El Bodon to the fortified position of
dangerous Fuente Guinaldo in the rear, a distance of several miles,
position. wag noj. accomplished without some loss and great danger.
The four squadrons of British horse, pursued by an over-
whelming force of hostile cavalry, were compelled to retire
in haste to avoid being surrounded and cut off; and Col-
ville's brigade of infantry, consisting of the 5th, 77th, and
83d, were exposed uncovered to the charge of Montbrun's
dragoons. They retreated, however, in square, and in
perfect order, repelling every charge when the enemy
came near them by a rolling fire, and reached the posi-
tions unscathed. With truth did Wellington say in his
official despatch, that the conduct of the 5th under Major
Ridge, and of the 77th under Colonel Bromhead, afforded
a memorable example of what the steadiness and discipline
415,416; . of the troops, and their confidence in their officers, can
213,214'; effect in the most difficult and trying circumstances.
toSSf*00 While this was going on on the right of the line, large
Sept^Q*1' masses °f tne enemy's infantry and cavalry bore down on
i§! iy»rw' ^e ^ > ^ut ^ey were successfully opposed by the 1 4th
*)5. and 16th Dragoons,2 who charged them with the greatest
gallantry whenever an opportunity offered, and with such
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 459
success, that the retreat of this part of the line to the CHAP.
fortified positions in the rear was effected without a gun VL
being taken, a square broken, or squadron dispersed. isn.
Before midnight on the 25th the three central divisions
were safely collected in the position of Fuente Guinaldo.
But they were only 14,000 men, the wings being not yet
come up, and they had the prospect of being assailed at
daybreak by 50,000, including 13,000 of the Imperial
Guard.
" The night of the 25th," says Sir Charles Stewart,
" was spent by us, as it is customary for soldiers to spend Splendid
a night upon which they have reason to expect that a day on
of battle will rise — that is to say, the superior officers lay |"
down in their cloaks upon the floors of the houses, whilst ^
the men slept on their arms round large fires, which
blazed along the range of the position. Long before
dawn, however, all were astir and in their places, and
the different regiments looked anxiously for the moment
which should behold the commencement of a game as
desperate as any which they had been yet called upon to
play. But instead of indulging our troops as they ex-
pected, Marmont contented himself with making an exhi-
jition of his force, and causing it to execute a variety of
nanceuvres in our presence ; and it must be confessed that
i spectacle more striking has rarely been seen. The large
>ody of cavalry which followed us to our position, and had
>ivouacked during the night in the woods adjoining, were
rst drawn up in compact array, as if waiting for the sig-
al to push on. By-and-by nine battalions of infantry, at-
3nded by a proportionate quantity of artillery, made their
ppearance, and formed into columns, lines, echelons, and
uiares. Towards noon twelve battalions of the Imperial
uard came upon the ground in one solid mass ; and as
ich soldier was decked out with feathers and shoulder-
lots of a bloody hue, their appearance was certainly
iposing in no ordinary degree. The solid column, how-
er, soon deployed into columns of battalions — a move-
460 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, ment which was executed with a degree of quickness and
VL accuracy quite admirable ; and then, after having per-
i8ii. formed several other evolutions with equal precision, the
Guards piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac. Next
came another division of infantry in rear of the Guards,
and then a fresh column of cavalry, till it was computed
that the enemy had collected on this single point a force
of not less than 25,000 men. Nor did the muster cease
to go on as long as daylight lasted. To the very latest
moment we could observe men, horses, guns, carriages,
tumbrils, and ammunition-waggons, flocking into the en-
, Lond j. campment, as if it were the design of the French general
215-217. to bring his whole disposable force to bear against the
position of Fuente Guinaldo." l
59 The fate of the Peninsula was now in Marshal Mar-
Marmont mont's hands. By his own admission he had 40,000
declines .,.. PIT • t n i •
battle. men, including 13,000 ot the Imperial Guard, in one
battle-field, within cannon-shot of the English army.
Wellington stated the French army at 60,000 men, with
125 guns, including 22 battalions of the Imperial Guard;
and if the enemy's force be stated at a medium of 50,000
men and 100 guns, it will probably be near the truth.
Wellington had at the very utmost 15,000 men, in a
position only strengthened by a few field-works. But the
French generals, despite their immense superiority of force,
were afraid to engage the British in a pitched battle in a
favourable position ; and Marmont, accordingly, spent the
day in making a parade of this force, as in a review,
before their enemies, while he himself was studying the
English position. To the latest hour of his life he never
ceased regretting that he had not fought instead of re-
connoitring only on that occasion, for so favourable an
t M opportunity never again occurred. The Imperial Guard,
iy. 66; ' and a considerable part of the forces in the Peninsula,
MS, 800."* were soon after withdrawn to take part in the war against
Russia.2
- The English general had his own reasons for stand-
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 461
ing firm under such hazardous circumstances before the CHAP.
enemy. By so doing he imposed upon them, and made VI-
them believe a much larger force was assembled to dis- isn.
pute any further advance on their part than was actually Retrea't of
the case. In addition to this, there was a pressing, and, JJj ®sritish'
in fact, insurmountable reason, for holding the position Basons,
during this day ; for had he not done so, Craufurd, with
the light division, would have been cut off. Wellington
had ordered him to retreat from his advanced position
on the Vadillo by Robleda to Guinaldo ; but that general,
mistaking the position of the enemy, had deemed it neces-
sary to make a long circuit through the mountains. The
French, however, were already in possession of the pass
through them, and Wellington was obliged to send him
orders to retrace his steps, and come by the Robleda road.
This occasioned a delay of twelve hours, and it was not till
next morning that he reached the position. He preserved,
too, by this intrepid course, his own moral influence and
that of his army, which otherwise might have been injured i
by the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo so soon following on that 41 6.
of Badajos.1
This object having been gained, there was no reason
for prolonging the risk, and he resolved to retreat in theRetieatof
night to a position in the rear, where his junction with his and Jsem-'
remaining flank divisions might be effected more quickly. ul^wLio
Accordingly, orders were given to move at midnight ; and §^'27.
with such expedition were the directions obeyed, that at
daybreak on the morning of the following day, when the
French tirailleurs approached the British outposts, they
?ound to their great surprise that the army had decamped
luring the night, and was already far advanced on the
•oads by Nava d'Aver and Bismula, to a new position
vhere Wellington had resolved to make a stand, and
yhere the whole army under his immediate command could
>e collected. This position was on a range of heights, or
ather acclivities, between Rendoa and Soito, which of-
3red an extremely favourable ground for defence, the Coa
4()2 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, covering both flanks, and a retiring angle of the river form-
VL ing its point d'appui. The approaches were difficult and
i8ii. exposed, and the natural defences shielded it much more
effectually than the one at Guinaldo had done. Yet was
the position in one respect full of danger : there was no
secure retreat in case of disaster. " With a river," says
Sir Charles Stewart, " like the Coa in our rear, it would
have been absolutely necessary either to repel at all
points the enemy's attacks, however formidable, or to
perish ; for the line once broken could not be withdrawn
without suffering a loss which in our case must have
^Lond. ii. proved fatal."1 The selection of such a position for a
pitched battle, which in other circumstances would have
been a grave military error, was vindicated in Welling-
ton's case by the well-grounded confidence which he felt
in the quality of his troops, and the fact that the whole
force to the north of the Tagus were here, for the first
time since the attack on Badajos, assembled. The 5th
division passed the Agueda at Navas Freas, and formed
the right of the line ; to its left was drawn up the 4th ;
the light stood above Soito ; the 3d in front of Pouca
Tarenha; the 1st and 6th at Rendoa, where the ground
was peculiarly strong ; the 7th, with the cavalry in a
second line, in the rear — in all, 30,000 infantry, 2500
2 cavalry, and 46 guns : and with such a force, Wellington
416, 417; might well be excused by feeling confident against the
iv. eeTe?. army, fully a half greater, by which he expected to be
assailed.2
Every one in both armies now expected that a pitched
The French battle was at hand, the more especially as the retreat of
confl?ct.tie the retiring columns had been severely pressed by Mar-
mont's advanced- guard, with whom a sharp action had
taken place at Aldea del Ponte, in which, although the
British at first had the advantage, they were ultimately
worsted in consequence of the gallant rearguard pursuing
their advantages too far, and being driven back by a much
superior body of the enemy. But it fell out otherwise :
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 463
Marmont, who had declined to attack fifteen thousand CHAP.
at Guinaldo, had not resolution to hazard this attack on VL
double the number in the stronger position of Soito. He isn.
withdrew his troops accordingly during the night of the
27th ; and on the morning of the 28th, Sir Charles
Stewart, who went forward to reconnoitre, found only a
rearguard of cavalry in possession of Aldea del Ponte,
which they had won the evening before.
Though Marmont committed a great and irreparable
mistake in not attacking the English at Fuente Guinaldo The French
on the 26th, yet he was not to be blamed for not pro- wlnte"-
secuting his advantages or advancing into Portugal atquaT
that time. He had neither provisions nor stores neces-
sary for such a forward movement. His object was in
the first instance merely to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, and
after that was done to make such a reconnoissance as
would enable him to see whether any preparations had
been made for a regular siege of that fortress. It was
only from finding the Allied army so scattered that he was
tempted to bring up his whole force at Fuente Guinaldo,
and had so fair an opportunity, which he let slip, of
striking a decisive blow there. Finding the enemy all
concentrated at Soito on the 27th, he gave up all thoughts
of any further offensive movement at that time, and, re-
tiring into Spain, distributed his great army into winter-
quarters. Dorsenne with the Imperial Guard moved
)ack to Salamanca and Valladolid ; while Marmont, with
he army of Portugal, went into cantonments around
^laceucia, and in the valley of the Tagus. On his side
he English general, finding the enemy withdrawn, passed
he Coa with the bulk of his troops, leaving only the 4th i Marmout,
nd light divisions to observe Ciudad Rodrigo and di
barge the duty of light posts. The remainder of the army ^
as put into cantonments, headquarters being established to Lord LI v-
!; Frenada,1 But the billets were exceedingly small and 9, isi'i; '
commodious, the rain fell in torrents, and the unhealthy aag. '
itumnal months having now set in, the sick increased in
464 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, an alarming degree. Fevers and agues were very general;
VL scarce a regiment could show two-thirds of its numbers
isii. on parade ; and the sick in the hospitals of the British
alone swelled to the enormous number of sixteen
thousand.
During the period of apparent rest which followed, the
Welling- active mind of the British chief enjoyed no relaxation,
jeou«tthu' and he was incessantly engaged in projects to turn to the
best account the favourable aspect which affairs were
assuming from the events in progress in the north of
Europe. During the autumn, Napoleon withdrew 60,000
of his best troops, including the whole Imperial Guard,
from the Peninsula, to take a part in the war in Russia,
Wellington, feeling the pressure upon him thus relieved,
revolved in his mind various plans for offensive opera-
tions. Among the rest, he entertained a design of
making an attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo by escalade ; but
the rising of the waters in the rivers which required to be
crossed rendered this design impracticable. So closely,
however, was that fortress watched, that Don Julian
Sanchez, a guerilla chief, who had thrown himself into
it when it was besieged by Massena, and cut his way out
when its surrender was approaching, made prisoner of
the governor-general, Regnaud, by a well-devised ambus-
cade, when riding unguardedly outside the walls. He
became a frequent and acceptable guest at Lord Wel-
lington's table, who received him with the courteous
hospitality with which Marmont had entertained Colonel
1227-236. ' Gordon, and which brave and chivalrous nations owe to
each other.1
But these projects ere long were succeeded by another
Brilliant which was conducted with the greatest ability by General
Genersai°f Hill. When Marmont withdrew with the bulk of his
Aroy<>ade army to the neighbourhood of Placencia, he left a corps
OctM2°7inos' °f kis army at Merida, which first moved to the neigh-
bourhood of Zafra, but afterwards to that of Caceres,
for the purpose of levying contributions. Deeming that
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 465
corps so far detached from support that it might be CHAP.
possibly surprised, Wellington ordered General Hill to
take the field and move against it. These instructions 1811-
that able officer executed with the most consummate
ability. Selecting from his corps a small body of troops
about 5000 strong, he set out on the 22d October from
his cantonments, and advanced with every precaution
against being discovered, and with such success, that on
the evening of the 27th he arrived at Alcuesca, in the
neighbourhood of Aroyo de los Molinos, where Girard lay
utterly ignorant of the danger with which he was threat-
ened. Hill forbade any fires to be lighted or drums
beat ; and though the secret of his approach was well
known to the peasantry in the neighbourhood, yet they
kept it with religious fidelity. The attacking columns set
out at midnight, consisting of the 7lst and 92d High-
landers, and 1st battalion 50th, under Colonel Howard,
supported by the 28th, 34th, and 39th, under Colonel
Wilson, a Portuguese regiment, and a brigade of cavalry,
and reached Aroyo de los Molinos at daybreak wholly
undiscovered. The 71st and 92d charged into the town
with loud cheers, the bands leading and playing the well-
known Jacobite air, " Heigh, Johnny Cope, are you wak-
ng yet?" Surprised in this manner, the French offered,
is might have been expected, no very resolute resistance,
nd Hill having detached a part of his force to take them
a flank after they were driven out of the town, they
^ere compelled to take refuge in the adjoining moun-
lins, where the Highlanders, at home among the rocks,
ursued them, and made great numbers of prisoners,
he result was, that out of 2000 infantry and 600
)rse, of which the column consisted, not more than ' Hiir*
Desp. Oct.
)0 escaped, including Girard, who was wounded. The so, isn ;
iole guns and above one thousand men were made 373, note/
isoners, with the loss only of seven officers and sixty- 286-2a£
ir men, including the Portuguese.1
But all these projects were subordinate to Wellington's
VOL. i. 2 G
4GG SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, main design, which was to attempt, in the depth of
VI- winter, the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo by main force,
isii. Notwithstanding all the vigilance exerted in the distant
blockade, supplies had been frequently thrown into that
f°r^ress > an(i ft was evident that all hopes of reducing it
were at an end, unless it could be done by a rapid siege
before the distant armies of France could assemble for its
relief. He was not without hopes of achieving this object,
as the difficulty of procuring supplies had obliged Mar-
inont to quarter his army at a considerable distance from
the Portuguese frontier, and in situations far apart from
each other : and the badness of the roads rendered the
transport of carriages and artillery in winter a matter of
great difficulty. To this was to be added another con-
sideration of not less moment. Not only had the finest
part of the army which had recently threatened the
British at Fuente Guinaldo been recalled into France, but
the Emperor had detached two strong divisions of infantry
and one of cavalry, containing 15,000 combatants, from
Marmont's army, to take part in Marshal Suchet's ex-
petition against Valencia, and at the same time dislo-
78-so. cated the whole army of the north, and of Portugal, by
ordering the latter to Old Castile.1
60 Marshal Marmont set out in person in obedience to
Dislocation these orders on the 5th January 1812 for Old Castile,
of the J
French ar- leaving only Brennier's division in the valley of the Tagus,
mies in , _, n i .<•» i /« . i • i
Spain. to keep an eye on Jiistreniadura, and General (Jiausel with
the 2d division at Avila. An attentive observer of all
that was passing, Wellington built upon this auspicious
state of things his expectation, by a sudden movement,
of gaining a great advantage over the enemy, and
wresting from him the great frontier fortress of Spain,
which was all that remained to him of the conquests
of the army of Portugal. Directing General Hill, there-
^ore' ^° a^vance 11POD Merida, as well to alarm Drouet
and Soult as to draw off part of the enemy's force from
Ballasteros in Andalusia,1 he made himself ready to invest
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 467
Ciudad Rodrigo in form, now that it was left to its own CHAP.
resources. VIt
How great soever might be the advantages which "Wei- 1812-
lington enjoyed in the dispersion of the French troops, he investment
had his full share of difficulties in preparing for the siege. R
The fortress to be attacked stood on the brink of a rapid ^s ^
•*• ties.
river, surrounded by a vast plain without any defensible
position, water, or even cover for the troops. It was im-
possible to place an army there for any considerable time
without exposing it to hardships which must soon prove
fatal to its health. The town is situated upon one of three
eminences which stand upon the right bank of the Agueda,
and rise abruptly from the plain, which is in a high state
of cultivation. " This plain is bordered," says Sir Charles
Stewart, " on the north and west by a range of rugged
mountains, and on the south-east by a similar range still
more rugged and impervious. The former of these ranges
consists of cliffs and crags, separated from one another
here and there by wide passes, through which several ex-
cellent roads conduct to Salamanca and into Castile ; the
latter can boast only of the Pass of Perales, a defile so
precipitous as to be perfectly useless in a military point of
view, because perfectly impassable. Both are at the dis-
tance of several miles from the walls, and hence both are
equally unavailing for the purposes of a blockading force ;
whilst neither offers a position at all favourable or com-
modious to an army intended to cover the progress of a
siege." The whole country is " deficient in springs and
pools, and the only source from which water can be pro-
cured by the inhabitants is the Agueda." This circum-
stance alone imposed a very serious difficulty upon the
>esieging army, for the mass of the troops required to be
stablished at a distance from the river, from whence
rater could only be brought at great difficulty and ex-
ense. In addition to this, should the siege be once
sriously undertaken, it must either be brought to a suc-
3ssful issue, or, in the event of its being raised, the
468 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, whole artillery and stores would be lost : for the nature
VL of the country, and the badness of the roads, rendered
1812. any attempt to withdraw them in presence of a superior
enemy hopeless; and the banks of the Agueda and Coa are
, Lond .. not only extremely rugged and difficult, but these rivers
193-196. are liable to sudden floods, which sweep away bridges and
render fords impassable.1
62 " Ciudad Rodrigo," says Colonel Jones, " is built on a
5ethri?tion ™s™& ground> °n the right bank of the Agueda, and has
tress. a double enceinte all round it. The interior wall is of an
old construction, thirty-two feet high, and generally of
bad masonry, without flanks, and with weak parapets and
narrow ramparts. The exterior enclosure is a modern
fausse-braie of a low profile, and is constructed so far
down the slope of the hill as to afford but little cover to
the interior wall ; and from the same cause of the rapid
descent of the hill, the fausse-braie itself is very imper-
fectly covered by its glacis. On the east and south sides
there are ravelins to the fausse-braie ; but in no part
are there any countermines nor a covered way. With-
out the town, at the distance of 300 yards, are the
suburbs, which are enclosed by a bad earthen retrench-
ment hastily thrown up by the Spaniards during the siege
of 1810. The French, too, since they had been in pos-
session of Ciudad Rodrigo, had made strong posts of three
convents, one on either side of the suburbs, and one in
the centre ; and they had also converted into an infantry
post the convent of Santa Cruz, situated just beyond the
glacis on the north-western angle of the place. The
works of the suburbs, though slight, were sufficient to re-
sist a coup-de-main. The ground outside the place is
dry and rocky, except on the northern side, where there
are two hills called the lesser and larger Teson. The one,
at 180 yards from the works, rises nearly to the level of
the ramparts, and the other, at -6 00 yards' distance, con-
siderably above them. The French had erected a redoubt
upon the highest of these hills, which required to be
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 469
taken before any attack was made on that side. This CHAP.
redoubt was supported by two guns and a howitzer placed VL
in battery on the top of the fortified convent of San 1812-
Francisco, at the distance of 400 yards from it ; and a
large proportion of the artillery of the place, particularly : Joneg,g
mortars and howitzers placed behind the rampart of theses in the
fausse-braie, was in battery to fire upon the approach i. 82, 83.' '
from the hill." l
After mature deliberation and close personal inspec-
tion, Wellington determined to hazard an attack upon Wellington
the town, notwithstanding all the difficulties with which I^att^kon
such a measure was attended. " If we don't succeed in the place-
taking the town," he wrote to Lord Liverpool on the 7th
January, " we shall at least bring back upon ourselves all
the force which has marched away; and I hope we may
save Valencia, or, at all events, afford some time to the
Galicians and Asturians to organise a resistance to the
invasion with which they are threatened. If we take the
place, we shall, I hope, make a fine campaign in spring."
His preparations for this step in advance had been long,
though in profound secrecy, going forward. He had, in
the most unostentatious manner, repaired the ruined parts
of Almeida, and laid up in that town the siege-train
which, as already mentioned, he had brought by the
Douro from Lisbon, with a trestle-bridge equipment, with
a large number of gabions and fascines. He had caused
several hundred light carriages to be constructed to con-
vey these stores from Almeida to the Agueda. To pre-
vent Soult from taking any part in the defence of the
place, he had directed General Hill — who, since his suc-
cessful exploit at Aroyo de los Molinos, had become the
object of unbounded terror to the French — to move with toTt^Gen.
15,000 men from Portalegre by Merida to the south- ^'"g^
ward, so as to threaten Andalusia ; the siege of Tarifa j^T'J"5'
was begun ;2 and the troops which had been concentrated m<mt, iy.
3n the 8th December were sent back to their canton- i. 422. '*'
nents on the 10th, and the report was spread abroad
470 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, that all offensive operations were, for the present at least,
VL abandoned.
1812. Wellington collected his army on the 7th January,
stor^ofthe crossed the Agueda on the 8th, and instantly commenced
dm* ^e investment of the place. The approaches and siege
Jan. s. operations were conducted with unheard-of rapidity.
Ground was broken on the night of the day on which the
investment took place ; and as it was essential that the
redoubt on the greater Teson should be carried, orders
were given for an attack on it by escalade that very night.
Not dreaming of an assault so soon, the scaling-ladders
had not been issued thus early ; but the soldiers, eager
for the affray, immediately set about constructing them,
and, with the sides of some cars which were broken up
for the occasion, and a few ropes taken from the baggage
waggons, the want was soon supplied. Three hundred
men of the 52d and 95th, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne (now Lord Seaton), were
then ordered out for the assault ; while two firing
parties were sent forward to keep up a heavy discharge
on the flanking works, for the purpose of drawing off
the attention of the garrison. Under cover of this
fusillade the stormers were to descend into the ditch,
cut away the palisades, and mount with the aid of
their rude ladders into the redoubt. The attack was
iLoniii. made with such resolution that the troops would not
wehfnfton wa^ till tne paKsades were cut away, but, springing
IT ^ Jan" over' rushed up the ladders with such rapidity that two
9 1812 ; officers and forty-seven men, with three guns, were cap-
Gurw. vin. *
519. tured, the remainder of the garrison being put to the
sword.
Advantage was quickly taken of this success to forward
Rapid pro- the operations. Seven hundred men were immediately
«5.° e pushed up the hill, of whom three hundred formed a
Jan. 10. lodgment close to the redoubt, while four hundred kept
up the communication with the rear. The enemy
directed all their fire against the outwork which had been
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 471
lost ; but the soldiers worked with such vigour that before CHAP.
sunrise they were entirely under cover. The first parallel VL
was immediately laid out, and before sunrise on the 10th 1812.
the workmen there too were completely sheltered. By
the 13th, at noon, not only was the first parallel com-
pleted, but three batteries, capable of containing thirty-
two heavy guns, were erected. The guns were all
brought up, and the ammunition lodged in the magazines.
Matters were in this state, and the troops were already
beginning to talk of opening their fire, when information
was received that Marmont, who it was thought had
gone with the divisions towards Valencia, but who in
reality was in person in the north near Valladolid, was
returning in haste with four divisions to raise the siege.
This information was erroneous ; for, so far from having
stopped the march of his divisions towards Valencia,
Marmont did not even hear of the investment of the
place until the 15th. Then, however, calculating that it
could hold out for three weeks, he gave orders for his
nearest divisions to concentrate on Salamanca ; sum-
moned Dorsenne to his aid with part of the army of the
north ; recalled Bonnet from the Asturias ; ordered Foy's
division, which Montbrun had left to cover his rear, to
join him ; and directed that general himself to return by
forced marches from Valencia. These measures, he cal-
culated, would produce 32,000 men on the Agueda to
raise the siege, by the 27th inst., and 40,000 by the 1st
February. But this information, though premature, led
to the most important results. Fearful of the approach of
a large army, which might compel him to raise the siege,
Wellington, contrary to all the ordinary rules of scientific * Land H.
attack, ordered the batteries already constructed in the first Brian. '
parallel to be armed, and the gunners to fire alone upon Wellingto
the body of the place, without attempting to silence the Jjj^jj
enemy's flanking fire, or ruin his defences.1 By adopting J^JJ1
bins unusual course, he hoped in a few days to breach the 525.
-ampart, and by a rapid attack carry the place in a third
472 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, of the time which would have been required by the ordi-
VL nary and tedious process.
1812. These orders were faithfully executed. The fire, though
The rampart kept up at the distance of six hundred yards, and from
fromTdS twenty-five pieces only, was so effectual that the rampart
tance* soon began to crumble, and at length came down. The for-
tified convent of Santa Cruz, which, as already mentioned,
commanded the captured redoubt, had been surprised on
Jan. 13. the night of the 13th, by detachments of the Guards, with-
out the loss of a man, and proved of the utmost service in
covering the progress of the sap, which, was immediately
commenced and brought forward to the first parallel. A
sally by the besieged, directed against the advanced works,
at the moment the guard of the trenches was being
charged, at first met with some success, but was at length
repulsed without having done much mischief. At the
same time the arrangements for covering the siege were
made with the utmost diligence ; and, from the troops
being more healthy than they were when assembled last
autumn at Soito, they produced a much larger force. A
considerable part of Hill's army crossed the Tagus at
Villa-Velha, and drew near to the right, while the bri-
gades in the rear were closed up so as to be able to con-
centrate at the shortest notice at any point where they
might be required. In this way the Adjutant-General's
returns showed that a force of 38,000 infantry and 2500
i Lend cavalry might in a few hours be assembled at any
251-253; point which might be assailed — a force sufficient to cover
Brial. i. * . . , -if
42'>, 426. the siege even against the united force of Marniont and
Dorsenne.1
The appearance of the works and the town when the
Splendid fire began from the breaching batteries is thus described
of thTbom- by Sir Charles Stewart : " There had been mounted,
bardmeat. Curing ^e earlier part of the morning of the 14th, twenty-
five heavy 24 -pounders in the batteries already con-
structed in the first parallel. With these a fire was
directed to be opened, partly upon the point intended to
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 473
be breached, partly upon the convent of San Francisco, CHAP.
another fortified post which, from the left of the redoubt, VT-
enfiladed our projected communication between the first
and second parallels. At four o'clock in the afternoon it
began; and of a spectacle more strikingly magnificent it
has rarely been the good fortune even of a British soldier
to be a witness. The evening chanced to be remarkably
beautiful and still. There was not a cloud in the sky, nor
a breath of wind astir, when suddenly the roar of artillery
broke in upon its calmness, and volumes of smoke rose
slowly from our batteries. These, floating gently towards
the town, soon enveloped the lower parts of the hill, and
even the ramparts and bastions, in a dense veil; whilst the
towers and summits, lifting their heads above the haze,
showed like fairy buildings, or those unsubstantial castles
which are sometimes seen in the clouds on a summer day.
The flashes from our guns, answered as they promptly
were from the artillery in the place, the roar of their
thunder reverberating among the remote mountains of the
Sierra de Francisca — these, with the rattle of the balls
against the masonry, and the occasional crash as portions
of the wall gave way, proved altogether a scene which, to
be rightly understood, must be experienced. I confess that
I have seldom been more powerfully, and yet singularly,
iffected than I was by this magnificent combination
sights and sounds; and the chances are that I shall never 21,1812,
. . ., MS. ; Lend.
igam enjoy another opportunity of experiencing similar H. 255-257.
ensations." l *
The breaching batteries were at first mainly directed 68
gainst that part of the rampart which had been brought Apracti-
1 ,. i • i <> i • cable breach
own by the French in 1810, and which, from having is made.
een recently repaired, had not as yet acquired the solidity
r the other parts of the works. The top of it soon
•umbled and came down, but the middle and lower parts
* These and the succeeding eloquent passages are taken verbatim from Sir
arles Stewart's letters to Lord Castlereagh from the spot, from which his
•rrailve of the Peninsular War was afterwards compiled.
474 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, were so effectually covered by the fausse-braie that little
VT- or no injury was experienced bj it ; and serious doubts
1812. began to be entertained by the engineers whether it would
be possible to make a practicable breach till that covering
had been blown in. Preparations, accordingly, were made
for pushing the approaches nearer ; and, preparatory to
this, a heavy fire was directed on the San Francisco
convent, which in a few hours was reduced to a heap
of ruins, and, along with the adjoining suburb, taken
possession of shortly after dusk by a party of the 40th.
No sooner was the enemy dislodged from this fort than
the approaches were pushed forward with the utmost
vigour ; and on the evening of the 1 7th, they were
advanced to within a hundred and eighty yards of the
rampart. From the new parallel so heavy a fire was
kept up, both on the old breach and an old tower which
was near it on our left, that the former was deemed
practicable, while the latter fell with a tremendous crash,
and opened a large aperture. Pits were then dug along
the glacis, in which riflemen were placed, as was afterwards
so much done at Sebastopol, with orders to keep up an
active fire on the embrasures, while an incessant shower
of grape and canister was thrown on the breaches, so as
to render any repairing of them impossible. By mid-day
of the 18th, the town was reconnoitred by Major Sturgeon
of the engineers, who reported that the greater and
lesser breaches were were both practicable. Wellington
upon this directed the place to be summoned ; and the
governor having returned a gallant answer, declaring his
1 5*263 "' reso^u^on to b°lcl out, he determined on an assault on the
Briai.i! 427; evening of the 19th, which he announced to the army in
iv.a84.°n the laconic order, " Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by
assault this evening at seven o'clock."1
The plan of attack, which was drawn up by Lord
Plan of the Wellington and his staff in the trenches, in the midst of
a terrific cannonade, was as follows : The attack was
to' be made by the divisions which happened to be in the
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 475
trenches at the time, and as they were the light and CHAP.
third division, the honour devolved on them. The third VI-
division, consisting of the 45th, 74th, and 88th, forming 1812.
M'Kinnon's brigade, on the one hand, and of the 5th
77th, 83d, and 94th, forming Campbell's brigade, on the
other, were to attack the main breach. They were to be
preceded by the light companies, under Major Manners,
as a storming party ; and they were to be headed by
parties carrying woolpacks and scaling-ladders, to enable
the soldiers to cross the ditch and mount the walls.
These troops were regularly formed in the second parallel,
General M'Kinnon leading, and Colonel Campbell in sup-
.port, with a Portuguese brigade in reserve. To aid this
main attack a feint was to be made on the right by Major
O'Toole, with five companies of the 95th rifles, and the
light companies of the 83d and 94th, the whole guided
by Major Sturgeon. The smaller breach on the left was
to be stormed by the light division, consisting of two
battalions of the 52d, one of the 43d, two of the 95th, and
two of Cagadores. This attack was to be led by Vande-
leur's brigade, which, issuing from the left of the convent
of San Francisco, was to advance first against the breach
in the fausse-braie, and then upon that in the ramparts.
A.S soon as they reached the summit of the fausse-braie,
.hey were to detach to their right, in order to communi-
•ate with M'Kinnon's brigade, and flank the attack on the
»rincipal wall ; and as soon as they had reached its
umniit, they were to turn to the right and join in the
lain assault. As soon as this was done they were to
ndeavour to burst open the Salamanca Gate, near which
le rest of the division was placed, which was to rush in
id secure the place. Three hundred volunteers, under
"ajor Napier, were to head this assaulting column ; and
'.ey were preceded by the bearers of bags and ladders, JJ^jJlJ?
ho were not to carry their arms. Positive orders were g^j ™
med that not a shot was to be fired by the stormers 261, m.
.ring the assault.1 To aid the main attack, others
476 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, were to be made by Pack's Portuguese brigade on the
VI- outwork of St Jago and the convent of La Caridad, and
1812. they were to be rendered real or feigned, as circum-
stances should direct.
As these orders appeared in an early part of the day,
Aspect'of ample time was given for both men and officers to be fully
apprised of the duties they were severally expected to
assault. perform. " They were not inattentive," says Sir Charles
Stewart, " to their instructions ; and exactly at the mo-
ment specified, each column took its station in readi-
ness to obey the signal of advance. It would be no easy
matter to describe the state of a soldier's feelings during
the pause which ensued. The evening was calm and
tranquil, and the moon in her first quarter shed over the
scene a feeble light, which, without disclosing the shape
or form of particular objects, rendered their rude outline
distinctly visible. There stood the fortress, a confused
mass of masonry, with its breaches like shadows cast upon
the wall, whilst not a gun was fired from it, and all within
was as stifl and motionless as if it were already a ruin,
or that its inhabitants were buried in sleep. On our side,
again, the trenches, crowded with armed men, among
whom not so much as a whisper might be heard, pre-
sented no unapt resemblance to a dark thunder-cloud, or
to a volcano in that state of tremendous quiet which
usually precedes its most violent eruptions. But the
delay was not of long continuance ; at a few minutes past
seven o'clock the word was quietly passed that all things
were ready, and the troops poured forward with the cool-
ness and impetuosity of which British soldiers alone are
capable, and which nothing could successfully oppose. No
i Lond. ii. piece of clock-work, however nicely arranged, could obey
sKhatL tne wiN °f its maker more accurately than the different
Lwd'castie c°lumils obeyed that night the wishes of their chief ; and
reagh.jan. his orders were in consequence executed, at every point,
MS. with the same precision and regularity as if he had been
manoeuvring so many battalions upon a revue plateau."
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 477
All these attacks in the end proved successful, but not CHAP.
until a desperate resistance had been encountered and VL
if the place
Jan. 19.
overcome. M'Kinnon's brigade, amidst a heavy fire of 1812
grape and musketry, rushed swiftly over the glacis, leapt The
down the counterscarp, reached the foot of the great j
breach, and, in spite of the most resolute resistance,
reached the summit. There they were joined by Ridge
at the head of the second battalion of the 5th Regiment,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell with the 94th Regi-
ment, who, having escaladed the fausse-braie farther to
the right, had made their way along it. Both united,
pressed fiercely on. The enemy, however, fell back
from the main wall, behind a retrenchment, in front of
which a ditch of considerable width had been dug, and
as the assailants were attempting to pass it, a mine was
suddenly sprung, by which the foremost and bravest, and
among others the heroic M'Kinnon, who was in the very
front, leading them on, were blown into the air and killed.
Undaunted, however, by this terrible catastrophe, the
survivors held their ground amidst the ruins, and were,
;oon after, joined by Major OToole's column, led by
Vlajor Sturgeon, from the right ; but though the summit
>f the breach was held, the retrenchment could not be
Dreed, and the foes there remained, exchanging fire with-
ut an advantage being gained on either side. In the
lean time, however, decisive success was won in other
narters. The light division, under Craufurd, issued from
le convent, Major Napier heading the storming party of
le lesser breach, Lieutenant Gurwood* leading the for-
rn hope, and Craufurd himself being with them, in the
ry front, alongside of General Vandeleur and Colonel
)lborne of the 52d.t The whole of those brave officers
;re struck down, severely wounded, Craufurd, unfortu-
tely, mortally so. The loss of those leaders caused the
Since the distinguished Editor of the Wellington Despatches.
Since Lord Seaton, and who, at the head of the 52d, did such good
ice in repelling the attack of the Old Guard at Waterloo.
478 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, troops to pause for a few minutes ; but then, with a shout
VL which was heard over the whole lines, above the roar of
1812. musketry and cannon, they again sprang forward, and
won the summits ; part, turning to the right, took the
defenders of the main breach in flank ; while part, turn-
ing to the left along the ramparts, reached and forced
open the Salamanca Gate. At the same time the cry of
victory was heard in other quarters. M'Kinnon's and
Campbell's men again rushed up the great breach, which
at last, by their joint efforts, was forced ; while the Por-
ton te0 Lor'd tuguese under Pack, who had converted his false attack
jlnt^o,01' int° a real one' escaladed the ramparts in their front.
Gurw! viii. The enemy then submitted at all points ; and, to the
S>n'd51f ' h°nour °f th® British soldiers be it said, no slaughter of
2;4-266; the unresisting took place : for out of 1800 who were in
Uriah i.
427,428. arms when the assault began, no less than 1500 were
made prisoners.1
But although the honour due to the troops engaged in
Fearful dis- the assault was not stained by blood unnecessarily shed
on the occasion, it was tarnished by the other lamentable
excesses which so often follow in a town taken by as-
sault, and which in this instance were felt as peculiarly
severe, from the circumstance that the inhabitants, on
whom they chiefly fell, belonged to a friendly and allied
power. The national vice of intoxication here broke out
in a fearful manner, and led to the most revolting excesses.
The firing, which had ceased when the breaches were
carried, was soon renewed in various quarters, not regu-
larly, as if the troops were engaged in street fighting,
but by dropping shots, showing that the soldiers had
spread through the town, and were firing off their pieces
in triumph or drunkenness, or to extort plunder. With
these were mingled the groans of the wounded, the shouts
of the soldiers, and the screams of the women who had
been seized in the tumult. Many houses burst into flames,
while the spirit-cellars were emptied ; and under a cloud
of darkness rendered more terrible by the lurid light which
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 479
the conflagration cast around, for several hours every en- CHAP.
ormity save murder was committed. At length, however,
the disorders abated, partly from the efforts of the officers 1812-
of all ranks, who were indefatigable in their endeavours
to arrest them, partly from the drunken dropping down
asleep, and the removal of the wounded to the hospitals ;
and by dawn on the following day, order was restored to ]_ Lond. ;;.
a degree which a few hours before could scarcely have Briai. 1.429.
been hoped for.1
Six officers and one hundred and forty men were killed
in the Allied army, and sixty officers and five hundred Great re-
men wounded, in this assault ; the casualties during the conquest!'1'8
siege were nine officers and two hundred and seventeen
men killed, eighty-four officers and one thousand men
wounded. But if the loss was severe the gain was great,
and never in the face of a superior army was a greater
blow struck by any nation. The immediate fruits of the
victory were three hundred and twenty-one pieces of
cannon, nearly the whole of which were serviceable, em-
bracing the whole siege-train of the army of Portugal,
and an immense quantity of ammunition and military
stores of every description. But these results, important
as they were, formed but a small part of the advantages
gained by the success. The great thing was that it
secured the most exposed frontier of Portugal, barred
lie great road to Lisbon, and rendered the British army
Available, without further guard of the north-east frontier,
or other offensive operations elsewhere.
Such was the energy which the British general evinced
i securing his conquest, that within two days after it Both armies
ad been achieved, Ciudad Rodrigo was put in a respect-
ble state of defence, the breaches repaired, the trenches ments-
lied up, the lines effaced, and the place rendered cap-
ole of resting on its own resources. Marmont heard of
le commencement of the siege on the 15th at Valla-
)lid, where he had arrived on the llth, and on the
1st he had collected 20,000 men, and got them on to Jan. 21.
480 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. Salamanca. He then received the unwelcome intelligence
VL of the fall of the place, which struck him with unbounded
1812. astonishment, and excited, when he learned it, the utmost
indignation in the breast of Napoleon. The thing, how-
ever, was done, and could not be undone; and as his army
was not provided with anything requisite to undertake a
winter campaign, Marmont halted his troops, and, sending
them back to their cantonments, contented himself with
leaving two divisions, and some horse, in the valley of the
a Marmont Tagus, to keep an eye on Badajos, which he partly
iv. 84, 8,1 ;' deemed would be the next object of attack. Wellington,
Wellington , . . , A i • i i « 11
toLordLiv- on his side, recrossed the Agueda with his whole army,
s^TskT replaced his troops in their cantonments, and again estab-
trurw. vin. ^j^ headquarters at Frenada, within the Portuguese
frontier.1
The beginning of the year 1812 was the turning point
Return' to *Q the ^e °f Sir Charles Stewart. Hitherto, his services
Ik Charles as Adjutant-General to the Peninsular troops, how irn-
stewart portant and well known soever to the officers of the army,
and death f , , , . ,,
of Lady had been shrouded, in a manner, from the general eye in
Feb. 8.' the blaze of Wellington's glory. But now he was to
be placed singly on a great theatre, and to exercise
alone an important influence on the fortunes of Europe.
This change, as so often occurs in human affairs, began
with misfortune. The fatigues and anxiety consequent
on the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo induced a return of the
intermitting fever which he had taken on the banks of
the Guadiana, and had compelled his temporary return
to England in the spring of 1811 ; and he became so
seriously ill that Lord Wellington, much against both
their wishes, insisted on his return. He embarked for
Britain, accordingly, in the beginning of February 1812 ;
and he had hardly landed on its shores, when he learned
the death of the beloved partner of his life, who breathed
her last on the 8th February, after a short illness, leaving
only one descendant, the present Marquess of London-
derry. This melancholy event made a material differ-
CAMPAIGN OF 1811 IN SPAIN. 481
ence on his position, and in the end opened the way to CHAP.
a great and auspicious change in his fortunes ; but, in the
first instance, it was the cause of heartfelt grief to Sir 1812-
Charles Stewart, for the deceased was a person endowed
with every virtue, and who had inspired an attachment
as strong as she felt towards her soldier husband. It was
some consolation in this bereavement that he shortly
after received the honour of a Knight Grand Cross of the Feb. 20.
Bath from his sovereign, in recognition of his eminent
services as Adjutant-General of the army in the Penin-
sula, and was soon appointed to an important military
and diplomatic situation at the court of Prussia, then
in the most eventful crisis of its history, the duties of
which gradually withdrew his mind from the memory of
his domestic loss.
VOL. i. 2 H
CHAPTER VII.
LORD CASTLEREAGH, FROM HIS RESIGNATION OF OFFICE IN
SEPTEMBER 1809, TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR IN
MARCH 1813.
CHAP. THE resignation by Lord Castlereagh of the situation of
VIL War Minister in September 1809, already recounted, in
1809. consequence of his duel with Mr Canning, and the dis-
covery that the majority of the Cabinet had combined
LordCwtie- ^or ^s overthrow, of course led to the cessation of his
reagh when official duties, but did not interrupt his public services.
out of office
inPariia- He remained, though without office, a member of the
House of Commons, and that too during the most trying
and momentous period of British history. As an ordi-
nary legislator, he had still the means of following out his
views and asserting his principles ; and he was, perhaps,
enabled to do this the more effectually from his time
being no longer consumed or his attention distracted by
a multitude of official cares. By discharging his duty as
a member of the House of Commons, he was enabled to
render the most important services to his country; and
never was a time when they were more called for, for
never had there been a period when the Opposition was
more powerful, or were pledged to measures more certain
to prove disastrous, if not fatal, in their consequences to
the country. It was easy to see how this came about, even
with the many able and clear-headed men who then led
the Opposition in Parliament. It was party-spirit which
did the whole. That important and often salutary element
LORD CASTLEREAGH. 483
in a free constitution, was then in a state of unprece- CHAP.
dented activity, in consequence of the shipwreck of the VIL
Whig party, when apparently firmly seated in power, on 181°-
the Catholic question, and it now had acquired a degree
of violence which led to a vigorous assault on the whole
policy of Government, both foreign and domestic, with
scarcely any regard to the real merits of the questions at
issue, but a desire only to make them a subject of contest,
which might lead to the overthrow of the Ministry.
Four questions stood pre-eminent in the parliamentary
debates of that period, in all of which Lord Castlereagh
took a leading part, and which present in a favourable
light his oratorical powers. These were the Regency, the
Peninsular War, the Orders in Council, and the Bullion
Question.
The first of these questions, and not the least impor-
tant in a constitutional point of view, was that of the Regency
Regency of the Prince of Wales. The venerable monarch ques
who had so long swayed the sceptre of these islands, had
been so seriously afflicted by the death of his favourite
daughter, the Princess Amelia, in September 1810, that
he had experienced a recurrence of the mental disorder
which had plunged the nation into such consternation in
1788. The physicians having pronounced the disease, if
not incurable, likely to be of long endurance, it became
necessary to make a proper provision for the discharge of
the royal functions during his incapacity. This was done
by a bill brought forward by Ministers, which proposed
to vest the office in the Prince of Wales while the malady
of the sovereign continued. So far, all were agreed; but
there was a great diversity of opinion as to the founda-
;ion on which the authority should be vested, and the
•estrictions with which it should be accompanied. Strange
.0 say, the two parties took sides here diametrically the
•everse of what might have been anticipated from their
>revious principles. The Whigs contended, as they had
'.one in 1788, that the Prince was entitled to the office
484 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, jure divino, in virtue of his right of succession to the
vu- throne, without any restrictions : the Tories maintained
isio. that the office should be conferred by the two Houses
of Parliament, and under such restrictions as to them
should seem meet. Great efforts were made by the
Whigs to limit the restrictions; as they anticipated from
the Prince of Wales, if unconstrained master of his own
actions, an immediate summons to form an administration.
To prevent such a change, Ministers exerted their whole
strength in support of the restrictions. The debate took
place on 31st December 1810, on certain resolutions
proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pledging
the House to confer the office subject to certain restric-
tions. The Opposition contended that these limitations
tended to cripple the royal power at a time when its full
exercise was required, and that they implied an ungracious
and unfounded distrust of the royal personage to whom
it was proposed to tender the Regency. In answer to
these objections, Lord Castlereagh said : —
" With respect to distrust of the Prince of Wales, I can
Lord castle- with perfect truth declare, that such a feeling does not
speecVin exist in my mind ; on the contrary, my conviction is,
tile restrit that were the full regal authority intrusted to his Royal
Highness, it would be exercised with the utmost forbear-
ance and moderation on his part. Were I providing for
an interest of my own, I would not hesitate a moment in
acting on that conviction ; but as a representative of the
people, I do not feel myself at liberty to act on principles
of personal confidence. I have a public duty to perform,
which requires me to provide for a constitutional emer-
gency on constitutional grounds. Under these impressions,
I am bound to declare that the security we must look for
is that of legal enactments, and that, in the discharge of
a public trust, it is impossible for me to recognise any
other as adequate. In like manner, and with equal sin-
cerity, I disclaim any inference being drawn from my vote,
that I impute dangerous views to the possible advisers
TO THE OPENLNG OF THE GERMAN WAR. 485
of the Prince during the short period that it is proposed CHAP.
to extend the restrictions. But it is not sufficient that vu'
such should be my trust and conviction at the present 181°-
moment : I am bound to provide such securities as should
render any abuse of the royal powers at any future time,
under the precedent now established, impossible.
" Regencies have been appointed at many different
times in English history, and by many different authori- Continued.
ties : sometimes by the preceding monarch, as in the
case of the Custodes Regni; sometimes by the three
branches of the Legislature, as has been done in the
Regency Acts since the Revolution, when the three
branches were entire ; and by the Lords and Commons
alone, when, as in the present instance, the third estate
was in temporary abeyance. But in none of these cases
was a regent ever appointed without restrictions. The
restrictions varied, as might be expected, with the circum-
stances of the case and the temper of the times : some-
times, as in the minority of Richard II. and Henry VI.,
they consisted in the authority being invested in a council,
in which the king's brothers were included, but with the
title only of ' Protector/ In more modern times — viz.,
in the Act of Queen Anne, the 24th George II., and the
5th of his present Majesty — the Acts establishing an in-
terim government were passed when the Legislature was
Bntire, and pains were always taken that the kingly
Dower should be exercised under some control. In the
irst case, a council was to govern in the king's absence
vithout a regent at all ; in the two latter, during the
eventual minority of the infant king, the regent was to
xercise the royal powers, but, as expressed in the face
f these Acts, ' under the restrictions and limitations
herein presented/ which were so stringent that, so far
*om leaving him the authority of king, they deprived
im of the power of choosing his own ministers without
le consent of a certain portion of his council.
" The restrictions proposed are to be imposed only for
486 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, a year, which will not materially weaken the royal
VIL powers ; the interval is not so long as to deprive him of
isio. the influence derived from favours and expectation : and
Continued. sure I am that the power of the Regent, under the restric-
tions imposed by law, would be greatly stronger than if
left unfettered, when he might be called on to exercise a
forbearance which might create jealousy and dissatisfac-
tion on the part both of his ministers and his supporters.
Upon these grounds, I am of opinion that full regal
powers should not at once be conferred upon the Re-
gent, and that the proposed mode of limiting his au-
thority, by restricting the limitations to a single year,
is preferable to the course formerly adopted of parcel-
ling out the royal power among many councillors. The
principle of restriction is justified, so far as it is con-
fined to the protection of the reversionary interest of the
King in his government, preserving at the same time to
the Regent the most enlarged exercise of the powers of
the crown which is consistent with this consideration.
Upon these grounds I object to the fifth resolution,
which separates the household of the King from the
executive government, and vests the appointment of the
former in the Queen. This separation does not appear to
fall within the conservative principle I have mentioned.
I deprecate a contest between the splendour of the
crown and that of the Regent : I wish the latter to show
himself as deriving everything from the monarch to
whom everything is to revert the moment his Majesty is
restored to health. I object to the appearance of the
Regent being anything per se ; it ought to be marked
that he was an individual authorised to represent the
King still upon the throne. It is open to Parliament to
limit his powers or withhold them from him as they
think fit ; but whatever power or dignity the regent
should assume, it ought to be the King's and not his own.
On these grounds, I think the project of a separate house-
hold for the Regent objectionable, both on the ground
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 487
of economy and influence. But the transfer of such a CHAP.
branch of the influence of the crown to the Queen is still vn-
more objectionable, as tending to mix her Majesty un- isio.
necessarily with politics, and as carrying upon the face of
it a dark influence which, if exercised adversely to the
Regent's government, might seriously weaken it, while, if
thrown in aid of a separate household of his own, it might
prove a most dangerous and unconstitutional increase of
the influence of the crown."1 These views prevailed with^ari. peb.
the Legislature ; and the bill, imposing restrictions on the 5-27?'
Regent for a year, passed by a majority of only three ing
either House — the numbers in the Commons being 21 7 747.' '
to 214, and in the Lords 105 to 102.2
It must be confessed that the Peninsular contest at this
period presented a fair subject for parliamentary invec- Ferment iu
tive, and that, judging by the past, it promised little chance ^St°S'
of success. The great preparations and brilliant prospects
of the campaign of 1809 had terminated in nothing but
disaster. Austria, defeated at Wagram, had concluded a
humiliating peace, attended by the loss of a fourth of her
dominions, and withdrawn altogether from the theatre of
European warfare ; the great expedition to Walcheren,
which was to have brought back the Scheldt fleet as its
trophy, had returned to the British shores sorely weakened
by disease, without having accomplished anything worthy
rf its strength, and the expectations which had been
brmed of it ; while Wellington, whose career had begun
n so brilliant a manner on the Douro and at Talavera, had
>een driven to a calamitous retreat to the sands of Estre-
nadura, where half the army was soon in hospital. There
ras enough here to augment the terrors of the timid, and
rrest the attention of the most inconsiderate ; and it did
ot require the eloquence of Lord Granville, Lord Grey,
nd Mr Whitbread, to get up a strong opposition in the
Duntry to any further prosecution of the Continental
ar. The vast strength of France, the unparalleled ge-
ius of its military chief, the insanity of making any
488 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, attempt to contend with him on land, were in every
VIL mouth, and loudly re-echoed by a great majority of the
isio. press, ever disposed to inflame, rather than moderate, the
passions of the moment ; and to such a length did the
general ferment go, that it was even taken up by the
public bodies in the country, and the Common Council of
London presented a petition to the King on the subject,
which is one of the most curious instances of popular
error on record in the whole annals of history. The
Opposition, as well they might, made the most of this, to
them, auspicious state of things ; the powerful eloquence
of Mr Canning, in consequence of his absence from Eng-
land after his duel with Lord Castlereagh, was no longer
at hand to support the Government ; and it required all
the firmness of the latter to make head against the tor-
rent, and prevent the Peninsular contest being at once
abandoned, during the first moments of despair conse-
quent on the retreat from Talavera. Lord Castlereagh
acted a noble and truly patriotic part on this occasion.
Though out of office, and having been undermined in the
Cabinet by a secret and unworthy intrigue, he did not
attempt to avenge his wrongs upon his former colleagues ;
he did not join the ranks of Opposition, or change his
public conduct to gratify private feelings. He gave Gov-
ernment a generous and effective aid, and, supported by
Wellington in the field, maintained the contest against
the surging multitude at home and abroad, who were
striving to bring it to a termination.
The debate came on on February 1, 1810, on occasion
Lord c'astie- of the Chancellor of the Exchequer moving a vote of
speech8 on thanks to Lord Wellington and the army which fought at
^Spanish rp^em General Tarleton had then opposed the vote,
im and even condemned in no measured terms the conduct
of Lord Wellington on this occasion. Upon this Lord
Castlereagh rose and said, — " The gallant general has felt
himself called on, in the discharge of a public duty, not
only to refuse a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington, but
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 489
even to lend his countenance to the attempt to convert a CHAP.
vote of thanks into the heaviest censure which could be V1L
passed on a most meritorious officer. I must protest, in 181°-
the outset, against the practice of referring to the whole
operations of a campaign on a question confined to the
merits of a single but glorious and memorable action.
But while I protest against such a principle, I feel I should
be doing great injustice to Lord Wellington if I declined
to enter on the merits of the campaign as a whole, which
were such as to confer the highest lustre on that noble
officer. In April 1809 Lord Wellington found himself at
the head of 25,000 men in Portugal. His instructions
directed him to rescue and defend that country, but with
liberty to combine and co-operate in the execution of a
plan for joint operations with any of the Spanish armies
on the frontier, looking, however, to the defence of Portu-
gal as the grand object of the expedition, and the most
important duty he had to perform. Soult at that period
occupied the northern provinces of Portugal, while Victor,
after having beaten Cuesta at Medellin, menaced the south
of that kingdom. The wish to drive the enemy out of
Portugal attracted his attention to the North ; the entrea-
ties of Cuesta were for combined operations against Victor:
and his anxiety to carry into full effect the spirit of his in-
structions rendered the option difficult. He decided for
the North, in the first instance, leaving General Mackenzie,
with 12,000 men, to watch Victor on the Abrantes frontier.
It is unnecessary to dwell on the brilliant manner in
which the exploit of crossing the Douro, and expelling
the French from Portugal, was performed, because, how-
ever it might be cavilled at by some in this country, ample
justice has been rendered to it by the general voice of
Europe, and even that of his enemy.
" The principle upon which Lord Wellington acted, and
was instructed to act, in the campaign, was, in the first Continued.
instance, to provide for the defence of Portugal by the
expulsion of the French from that country, and, having
490 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, done that, to co-operate with Cuesta in Spain, so far as
VIL could be done without endangering the defence of Por-
i8io. tugal. In marching on Talavera he expected to be able
to give Victor such a shock that he could not easily re-
cover from it, and prevent him co-operating in any future
attack on the north of Portugal. Before leaving Abrantes
he had received intelligence of the battle of Aspern, and
this necessarily opened still more extensive views, by
proving that Napoleon, hard pressed in Germany, was
in no condition to send reinforcements to Spain, and that
now, if ever, Spain might be expected to make an effort
for the recovery of her liberties, and might do so with
every prospect of success. He advanced accordingly to
Talavera ; and the victory which he had there gained
secured to Spain the line of the Tagus, compelled the
enemy to evacuate Galicia and Asturias, and enabled our
Allies to rescue from his grasp the fleet at Ferrol, which
was now safely moored at Cadiz. Had Lord Wellington
not been prevented by Cuesta's infatuation from attacking
Victor on the 23d July, there is every reason to believe
that the Allied army would have gained a glorious vic-
tory, and effectually prevented that junction of Soult and
Ney with Victor which afterwards took place, and ren-
dered a retreat necessary to the Portuguese frontier.
Lord Wellington, therefore, in advancing to Talavera, so
far from proceeding rashly, or without due information,
acted precisely on an accurate knowledge and judicious
view of the state of affairs, and did the greatest possible
service to the common cause, by drawing the whole French
disposable force upon himself in the heart of Spain, and
thus gaining time for the formation and disciplining of
fresh armies in its circumference.
" The battle of Talavera itself was not merely a sterile
9
Continued, triumph, unattended by any result, as is said by the gen-
tlemen opposite. On the contrary, it was attended by
the most important and beneficial consequences. It com-
pelled the concentration of the corps of Soult, Ney, and
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 491
Mortier in the north-west of Spain, who advanced to CHAP.
Placeucia with 34,000 men to threaten Lord Wellington's VIL
rear, of which the remnant of Soult's corps, which had isio-
advanced to Oporto, formed only 4000. The remainder
was composed of Ney's corps, drawn from the Asturias,
and Mortier's, from the neighbourhood of Burgos, all of
which districts were entirely stripped of troops from the
effect of Lord Wellington's advance. Had the Spaniards
done their duty, this united force could not have been
brought to bear upon the British army. Its advance had
been foreseen and guarded against by Lord Wellington.
His army could only be reached by an enemy approaching
from the north-west, either by the Puerto Pico or the
Puerto de Banos. Marshal Beresford, with 13,000, was
stationed at the former, and the Spaniards undertook to
hold the latter ; but, unfortunately, instead of doing so,
they abandoned it, and thus let in the united forces of
Soult, Ney, and Mortier, into the theatre of operations on
the Tagus. But though this unfortunate circumstance
rendered the retreat to Estremadura necessary, yet still
the advance to Talavera had been attended with two great
and durable results. It had stayed the invasion of the
south, and liberated all the north of Spain from the
enemy. The French were now confined to the centre of
Spain, where the resources of the country were nearly
exhausted, and they would find it impossible to carry on
the system of making war maintain war, which they had
hitherto so successfully pursued.
" A battle more glorious or distinguished than that of
Talavera itself, was not to be found in the annals, not Continued.
merely of England, but of modern Europe. Unlike many
3ther actions which are gained by a lucky accident or
fault on the part of the enemy, it was a fairly fought
ield, in which the prize was at length won by persevering
irmness and indomitable courage against vastly superior
lumbers. By the same unfortunate fatality, however,
vhich had attended all the operations of the Spanish
492 LOUD CASTLEEEAGH.
CHAP, armies, this glorious victory thus hard won could not be
VIL adequately improved. The attack was commenced by
181°- the French, at one o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th
July ; and it was in the twilight of that day that the
exploit in the recovery of his former position was per-
formed by General Hill, which must be still fresh in
every recollection. Night intervened, and the two armies
remained in their respective positions in sight of each
other, awaiting the return of daylight to renew the con-
flict. It was during this awful interval that the distin-
guished general at the head of the British army en-
joyed some repose, and found it in a manner which
none but a really great man could enjoy during the in-
termission of an obstinate and sanguinary battle. From
this repose Lord Wellington arose on the morning of
the 28th to a renewal of the engagement, and a fur-
ther display of his own ability and the intrepidity
of his gallant army. The contest was then continued
till twelve o'clock, when an interval of two hours' rest
from the work of destruction was employed by the
troops on both sides in removing their respective dead
from the scene of action ; and then it was that those
hands, which before were uplifted for mutual destruc-
tion, met at one stream which intervened between their
respective positions, and were shaken in token of their
reciprocal admiration of the bravery, skill, and firmness
displayed on both sides. I congratulate the country
upon the restoration of that generous feeling and high
spirit which has heretofore characterised the conduct of
soldiers in civilised warfare. I congratulate the world
upon the circumstance, that in these days the rage of
war has riot subdued the generous feelings which are the
ornament of human nature, and that if some of our
troops fall into the hands of the enemy they fall into
the hands of foes who know how to respect them. To
say that such an effort of bravery and skill, such an
acquisition to British glory, is not calculated to call forth
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 493
the admiration of the House, is to attempt to introduce CHAP.
a feeling which I trust will never find a place in the vn-
British House of Commons. isio.
" The loss on that day has been much dwelt on, and
none can lament the brave men who perished on that Concluded.
occasion more sincerely than I do. But, sharing as I do
to the very utmost that feeling, I must at the same time
deprecate that careful searching into the details of loss,
which is calculated to unnerve the military energy of the
country. If such feelings become general, how shall we
be able to resist the French or maintain the national
independence, hitherto upheld by the strenuous efforts of
our soldiers ! But in truth, the loss, heavy as it is, has
been greatly exaggerated. The returns, which I shall
move for on a future day, will demonstrate this. In the
mean time, I may observe that our whole loss in Portugal
and Spain during the campaign, including the 1500
wounded who fell into the enemy's hands at Talavera,
fell short of 8000 men. Of these 5000 were the killed
and wounded at the battle there ; while the loss of the
French in that battle alone did not amount to less than
10,000 men. Soult, notwithstanding all the eulogiuins
on his military conduct pronounced by the gentlemen
opposite, did not carry off a single piece of cannon, and
but a third of his army, from the north of Portugal. The
gallant chief who commanded the army has indeed
fought for his title at Talavera ; but he fought for it
also in Asia and Europe, in all of which quarters he had
jeen victorious. While all must lament the loss with
vhich his last and crowning victory has been attended,
et it be remembered what advantages that loss has pro-
luced. Compare the estimation in which the British
rmy is now held, and the character it has won, with
.7hat they were when the Peninsular war began, and the
lighty step in national renown which has been made
ill be at once apparent. "We now appeared in the eyes
f Europe, not merely, as heretofore, as a great naval, but
494 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, a great military power ; we were recognised as such by
VI1- the enemy, who had at last experienced our might in our
isio. victories, and those often when, with inferior numbers, we
defeated the best and most experienced of his troops." In
reply, Mr Whitbread " congratulated the noble Lord who
had just spoken on the display of eloquence which he
had made, and Lord Wellington on the able panegyrist
whom he had found, which, if not contradicted by the
i parj Deb. J
xv. 239-295! despatches themselves, might have amounted to a defence
of his whole conduct while in office/' 1
No division took place in the House of Commons on
12 .
Growing this debate, and the vote of thanks to Lord Wellington
ence°onthe and the officers and soldiers under his command passed
wlrTnu" nem- con- But in the House of Lords a division took
country, place on the general question of the conduct of the war,
and the Ministers were supported by a majority of 32,
the numbers being 65 to 33. So considerable a minority
in a house constituted as the House of Peers at that
time was, indicated a serious and growing feeling of de-
spondence in the public mind, as to ultimate success in
the Peninsular war, which immensely augmented the diffi-
culty of carrying it on. Ministers were never sure of a
majority in the House of Commons on the subject ; and even
the most sanguine among them had serious misgivings as
to the expedience of continuing a contest which absorbed
nearly the whole disposable military force of the country,
was attended with enormous expense, the issue of which
was extremely doubtful, and in which, if defeat was sus-
tained, irreparable ruin to the national independence
might be apprehended. It seemed hardly possible to
expect that Lord Wellington, with an army not exceed-
ing 60,000 effective men, of whom one-half were Portu-
guese, could by possibility maintain his ground in the
Peninsula against a military power which had forces ten
times as numerous at its disposal, and before which the
great military monarchies of Austria and Russia had
sunk. It is now known from the publication of the
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 495
Duke of Wellington's despatches, that these apprehen- CHAP.
sions were largely shared by the Government, and that, vn-
though they did not resolve on abandoning Portugal and
withdrawing altogether from the contest, they threw
upon him the responsibility of continuing it. Nor is it
surprising that they did so. Judging from the past and
the lessons of experience, there were no solid grounds for
the belief that the struggle in the Peninsula could come
to any other termination but that which had already
attended similar efforts in Flanders, and under Sir John
Moore in the north of Spain. Before we blame them for
hesitating sorely on this point, we are bound to look, not
merely to the result, but to the grounds which then ex-
isted for anticipating a different result from what in simi-
lar circumstances had too often before taken place.
The grounds on which Lord Castlereagh and Lord
Wellington believed the contrary, and on the strength of
which the one maintained the contest in the field, and the
other in the senate at home, were those contained in the W(;iling-
ton s con-
memorable minute of 7th March 1809, on which the
sequent conviction and conduct of both had been founded, the P
Lord Castlereagh, whose official position for several years
at the head of the War Office had made him thoroughly
acquainted with the military strength and resources of the
country and of its enemy, was too well informed not to
know that it was in vain for Great Britain, with its
limited population, and vast colonies to defend, to think
of coping alone with France on the continent of Europe.
But he was not the less resolute to maintain the contest.
He was well acquainted with the strength of the positions
for defence which the mountain ridges of Portugal afforded,
and the extreme difficulty of finding supplies for a large
army in the interior of the Peninsula, for any length of
time, from the resources of the country itself. He had
iuthorised, as War Minister, the erection of the stupendous
ield-works at Torres Vedras, which afterwards proved an
mpassable barrier to French ambition. From these cir-
4.06 LORD CASTLEKEAGH.
CHAP, cumstances he was led to expect that, if not permanently
vn> maintained, the war might at least be prolonged for a con-
i8i°- siderable time in Portugal. Much was to be anticipated
from simply gaining time in the conflict. He was well
aware of the oppressive manner in which the Continent,
and Germany in particular, had been treated by the
French ruler, and the immensity of the exactions, both in
money and supplies, which had for years been extorted
from its suffering inhabitants ; and he entertained a san-
guine hope that this arbitrary and ruinous system would
in the end work out its natural result, and produce a
general insurrection of the Continent against French
domination. Everything depended on prolonging the
contest in the Peninsula till this auspicious change took
place ; and the very desolation and ruin of the country,
by rendering supplies difficult, if not impossible, for a
large army, afforded the fairest prospect of being able to
do so with ultimate success. Great Britain, resting on
the sea as its base of operations, could experience none
of the difficulty in obtaining supplies which might be
anticipated for the French. Even in the most unfavour-
able point of view, and supposing Lord Wellington to
be ultimately driven from Portugal, it would be no small
matter to avert such a calamity for any considerable time,
and postpone, if we could not entirely prevent, the
imminent danger to the independence of Great Britain
which would necessarily arise from the whole navy of
Spain again falling under the power of France, and
Napoleon acquiring the vast naval resources which that
country derived from the immense trade which it carried
on with its transatlantic possessions.*
* In the course of the debate on Lord Palmerston's motion respecting the
army estimates, on March 4, 1811, Lord Castlereagh gave the following details
on the measures he had adopted for the increase of the army during the time
he had held the seals of the War Office : " It having fallen to my lot," said he,
" officially to propose all the onerous measures which have been adopted since
the year 1805 for levying men, it is gratifying to find that these efforts have
achieved the great object to which they were progressively directed ; that the
zeal, and perseverance of the nation, in cheerfully submitting to these burdens,
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAE. 497
The difficulty of carrying on the war in the Peninsula, CHAP.
and the embarrassment of Government in conducting it, VIL
was immensely augmented by another circumstance. This 181°-
was the combined effect of the British system of paying Immense
for everything they required, while the French paid forjjjj|i£gyof
nothing, and the enormous and ruinous cost at which sPecJ5^.r,
e' the British
specie, which alone would pass on the Continent, had to army-
be bought by the British Government. Such was the
effect of the drain of gold and silver to the Continent,
that the whole specie in Great Britain was bought up and
sent there, where it could be sold at a great profit. So
arge and overpowering was this demand, that a guinea in
jondon was selling for twenty-eight or thirty shillings,
,nd even at more extravagant prices. It was with the
itmost difficulty that specie could be got at all in the
iritish Islands, and never in anything like sufficient quan-
ties to meet the wants of the army abroad. The letters
f Wellington, accordingly, to Government at this period
-e full of the most energetic complaints of the want of
>ecie, and the absolute impossibility of maintaining the
tntest if it was not sent out in larger quantities than all
e efforts of the British Government had hitherto ren-
Ted practicable. Nevertheless, the expenditure in the
1 minsula had gone on rapidly increasing, until, in the
>se of 1810, it had reached the enormous amount of
20,000 a-month, or £5,040,000 a-year. This vast
E oenditure excited, as well it might, the most serious 1Gurw. vi.
^7 1 I fi
a orehensions in Ministers. Their private letters toies.
\ illiugton were in the most desponding tone.1
This state of matters was so unprecedented and alarm-
is >een rewarded by the powerful army which it now possesses, unexampled
; n y former period of our history, and which has now left to Parliament only
1 h asier task of upholding what by past labours had been created. What has
1 >e stated as to the present state of the army by the noble Lord (Palmerston)
•• best proof of this. It consists of 211,000 regulars, 24,000 artillery, and
0 militia, in all respects in as efficient a state as the line. Compare this
its state in 1805— viz., regulars, 155,000; militia, 90,000; artillery, 14,000
s showing an increase, after supplying all the waste of war, of 56,000 re-
, and a decrease of 10,000 militia." — Parliamentary Debates, xix. 215.
)L. I. 2 I
498 LOED CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, ing that it awakened the most gloomy presentiments in the
VIL minds of the Cabinet; and so doubtful were they of the
isio. result, that they were often on the point of abandoning
Appoint- tne Peninsula, and ordering Wellington, with his whole
BuiHo°nfthe armJ> nome- In order to allay the public apprehension,
Committee, and get to the bottom, if possible, of this mysterious affair,
then very little understood, and even now, after half a
century's additional experience, not nearly so generally
appreciated as its vital importance deserves, Government
consented to the appointment of a select committee to
inquire into the subject, take evidence, and report. The
committee was chosen with the utmost impartiality, and
comprehended the leading men on both sides of the House ;
in particular Mr Homer, Mr Ricardo, Mr Tierney, Mr
Ponsonby, Mr Canning, Mr Vansittart, Lord Castlereagh,
Mr Lushington, and many others. They examined the
Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank of England,
and all the leading bankers and merchants in London, as
to the facts of the case, and their opinion on the causes
to which the present anomalous and alarming condition of
the currency was owing. Mr Horner was the chairman,
who drew up the report, which was a very able and closely
argued pleading on the side of the majority. They spared
no pains in the obtaining and sifting of evidence; and
much was expected from the verdict of a body composed
of men of such distinction, and whose judgment was based
on so extensive and valuable a mass of evidence. Yet,
strange to say, the committee thus constituted and enlight-
june «, ened, concluded with a report not only directly contrary
1810< to the most elementary principles of political economy, but
recommending measures which, if carried into execution,
would beyond all doubt have, at the most critical period
of the contest, at once destroyed the power of Great
Britain, and terminated the struggle in favour of France.
Lord Castlereagh was in the minority, and strongly com-
1 Parl. Deb. ° . J. •,
xvii. ccii. bated the resolutions ; and never did he render a more
Appendix'.11' decisive service to his country than by successfully resist-
ing their adoption by Parliament.1
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAE. 499
The committee began by stating what was undoubtedly CHAP.
true, that during the whole of 1809 and the months VIL
which had elapsed of 1810, the price of gold had been isio.
£4, 9s. to £4, 12s. per ounce, instead of the standard Bullion Re-
Mint price of £3, 17s. 10-Jd., which corresponded to apolt'
guinea being worth 25s. or 26s. During the same period
the exchanges with Hamburg and Amsterdam were de-
pressed as low as from 16 to 20 per cent below par, and
that on Paris still lower. " So extraordinary a rise,"
they added, " in the market price of gold in this country,
coupled with so remarkable a depression of the exchanges
with the Continent, very early, in the judgment of the
committee, pointed to something in the domestic currency
is the cause of both appearances. It will be found from
he evidence that the high price of gold is ascribed by
lost of the witnesses entirely to an alleged scarcity of
hat article, arising out of the unusual demand for it on
lie Continent of Europe. This unusual demand for gold
pon the Continent is described by some of them as being
liefly for the use of the French armies, though increased
so by that state of alarm and failure of confidence which
ads to the practice of hoarding. Your committee think
at in the sound and natural state of the British cur-
i ncy, the foundation of which is gold, an increased de-
i md for gold from other parts of the world, however
\. 3at, and from whatever cause arising, can have no effect
i producing here, for a considerable period of time, a
i ,terial rise in the market price of gold. But before
t y proceed to explain the ground of that general opinion,
b y wish to state some other reasons which alone would
b e led them to doubt whether, in point of fact, such a
>i land for gold as is alleged has operated in the manner
51 posed. Mr Whitmore, indeed, the Governor of the
B k of England, stated that, in his opinion, it was the
ii i price of gold abroad which had carried our gold coin
)i of the country, but he did not offer to your committee
;u proof of the high prices. The committee are of
500 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, opinion that there is at present an excess in the paper
VIL circulation of this country, of which the most unequivocal
isio. symptom is the very high price of bullion, and next to that
the low state of the foreign exchanges, and that this ex-
cess is to be ascribed to the want of a sufficient check and
control in the issue of paper from the Bank of England,
and originally to the suspension of cash payments, which
removed the natural and true control. No safe, certain,
and constantly adequate provision against an excess of
paper currency, either occasional or permanent, can be
found but in the convertibility of all such paper into
specie. Your committee, however, are of opinion that the
suspension of cash payments cannot be safely removed
at an earlier period than two years from this date (June
10, 1810) ; but that an early provision should be made by
xviLAp-6 Parliament for terminating, by the end of that period, the
j>endix,20 - Opera^jon Of ^e several statutes which have imposed and
continued that restriction."1
Such were the views of a majority of the committee,
Mr vlisit- including Mr Horner, who was its chairman, and drew up
the report, Mr Huskisson, Mr Lushingtou, Mr Tierney,
MF Ponsonby, and the whole Whig party. Mr Canning
also concurred in the report, with the exception of that
part of it which recommended the termination of the
bank restriction within two years, which he thought should
be deferred till the termination of the war. On the other
hand, Mr Vansittart proposed certain resolutions in the
committee, which, although rejected by the committee,
were afterwards brought forward in the House of Commons,
and came on for debate in May 1811. In that debate
Lord Castlereagh took a very prominent part in support
of Mr Vansittart's resolutions, and as they form the
ground-work on which his argument was rested, the ma-
terial part of them will be found in the note below.*
* The resolutions of Mr Vansittart were as follows : —
I. That the unfavourable state of the exchanges, and tlie high price of bul-
lion, do not appear, in any of the instances referred to, to have been produced
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 501
Lord Castlereagh said : " It is essential to the best CHAP.
interests of the empire that this question should not only VLL
be decided speedily, but that it should be decided upon isn.
considerations so ample in all their bearings, that the
judgment of the House may finally take the public mind
along with it. For nothing can be so fatally injurious as to ^{{-
have a question of this sort kept in suspense in a country p°rt-
by restrictions upon cash payments by the Bank of England, or by any excess
in the issue of bank-notes ; inasmuch as all these instances, except the last,
occurred previous to any restriction on cash payments, and because the price
of bullion has frequently been highest, and the exchanges most unfavourable,
when the issues of bank-notes were the least.
II. That during seventy-eight years, ending with 1st January 1796, and pre-
vious to the restriction, the price of standard gold was under the Mint price
twenty-eight years, aud above the Mint price forty-nine years. In the three
last years of the American war, the price of gold was £4, 2s. 6d. per ounce,
although the bank-notes in circulation were reduced during the same period
from £9,160,000 to £5,995,000.
III. That, in consequence of the extraordinary violence and rigour with
which the war against this country has been conducted by the French Govern-
ment, the ordinary trade of this country has been greatly deranged, and an
export of the precious metals, which alone would be taken on the Continent in
exchange, substituted for the export of our manufactures. That in addition to
this, the naval and military expenditure of the United Kingdom in foreign
parts has been very great during the last three years, especially in Spain ; and
that the price of grain has been higher, and the importation larger, during that
time than at any period since the scarcity of 1801.
IV. That the amount of currency necessary for carrying on the transac-
tions of the country must bear a proportion to its trade, income, and expendi-
ture ; and that the average value of the exports and imports, income and ex-
penditure, and bank-notes of Great Britain, for three years before 1797, stood
thus : —
Imports and exports, average of three years, . . £48,752,000
Revenue, including loans, 37,169,000
Expenditure, . . ..'.;,.. .' . 42,855,000
Bank-notes, . . . .'..... . 10,782,000
Coined in reign of George III., . . . . 57,274,617
V. That the same averages on three years ending 5th January 1811 stood
bus: —
Exports and imports, .. " . .' (. . . £77,971,000
Revenue, . . . .' . • . • •» ''*•,:' " '•' . . 62,763,000
Loans, ., . . 12,673,000
Expenditure, . . . . ..".". 82,205,000
Bank-notes in circulation, 19,549,000
Gold coin very much diminished.
VI. That the situation of the kingdom, in respect to its political and com-
ercial relations with foreign countries, is sufficient, without any changes in the
ternal value of its currency, to account for the unfavourable state of the ex-
anges and the high price of bullion.
VII. That although it is important that the restriction on payments in cash
502 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, whose power in war and prosperity in peace mainly
VIL depend upon its public and private gold. It must be
1811. conceded that the non-convertibility of the bank-note
into cash upon demand is an abandonment for the time
of the standard coin as the medium of our payment,
although bank-notes were not at first a legal tender.
They were merely declared inconvertible. True, the gold
coin did not for long disappear ; the Government merely
left bank-notes to work their own way in circulation, and
the experience of fourteen years has not furnished a single
instance of payment in coin being insisted on when notes
were tendered. Guineas were circulated in considerable
numbers at par with bank-notes ; and if they have latterly
in a great measure disappeared or risen greatly in price,
the cause is to be found in the extraordinary crisis of our
commerce with the Continent, together with the magni-
tude of our military expenditure abroad, giving a new
and excessive value to the precious metals, of universal
circulation, as compared to bank-notes, which of course
would pass only in this country.
" It is obvious that the law, which declares the stand-
Continued, ard coin the only legal tender on the part of the Bank of
England in discharge of their notes, proceeded upon the
supposition of a natural state of things. It never could
have been intended, under extraordinary circumstances,
to enforce impossibilities ; and the rights of persons under
that law must be considered as circumscribed, as every-
thing else is, by the limits of possibility. It cannot be
the right of a portion of the community, by being the
first to press forward for payment, to obtain a benefit
which cannot be partaken of by others similarly entitled,
but more distant. A modification of the right becomes,
should be removed as soon as the political and commercial relations of the
country shall render it compatible with the public interest, it would be highly
inexpedient and dangerous to fix a definite period for the removal of the re-
striction on cash payments prior to the time already fixed by 44 George III.
cap. 1, or six months after a general peace. — Parliamentary Debates, xix.
VO-74.
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAE. 503
therefore, necessary for the purposes of justice, and for CHAP.
the interests of the whole. The power of applying that VIT-
modification must rest with the Legislature, and the only 18u.
question which can arise is, whether, at the moment the
thing was done, an adequate necessity existed for a tem-
porary suspension of the money system of the country.
If so, Parliament is competent in this, as in all other in-
stances, to provide for the public interest. Parliament
did so provide in 1 797 ; the necessity was of a description
which admitted of no alternative ; and it is of the very
essence of the contract on which a circulation such as ours
rests, that it should be subject to such a modification. I
admit that, like the suspension of the Habeas Corpus
Act, or the proclamation of martial law, it is a surrender
for a time of the sound and legitimate regulations of our
ordinary system ; the object being, by such temporary
surrender, to preserve the system itself from ultimate
destruction.
" When I speak of our circulation in a sound state, I
mean a circulation composed of bank paper and coin in Continued.
such proportions as will enable any man at pleasure to
convert his notes into coin. I do not consider a circula-
ion purely metallic or purely of notes, as of this descrip-
ion. The former is only the device of barbarous ages,
md wholly incompatible with the wants of a commercial
ountry such as this ; and the latter is defective, because,
.owever well administered, when not convertible into coin,
: leads, from ignorance, misstatment, and public alarm, to
istrust and discredit. I admit a mixed circulation, such
3 existed before the Bank Suspension Act, is the only
>und and natural state of our currency. Yet the com-
ittee must perceive that even in that, its most perfect
ate, it must depend on the habits of the country and the
ate of foreign markets, in what proportions the coin
ill remain in the country, or what danger may attend
5 abstraction. If coin is little in demand — if debts
e usually discharged in paper, except for the smaller
504 LORD CASTLEREAGII.
CHAP, payments — if guineas are little sought after, unless when
VII< the credit of any particular paper is suspected, and even
18U. then the holders of it are more desirous of exchanging
it for paper of undoubted security than for gold — it is
plain the quantity of coin circulating within the country
will be proportionally small. The various banking estab-
lishments will frame the scale of their cash balances
upon the accustomed demand for guineas ; less coin will
exist in the hands of private individuals : and although
the Bank of England may, upon principles of provident
caution, not allow their stock of guineas to be diminished,
yet the collective coin of the whole system will be less ;
and in the same proportion will it be exposed to be
affected either by those causes which may suddenly revive
an internal demand for coin, or by those external influ-
ences which, by drawing away the precious metals first
in the shape of bullion and next of coin illicitly exported,
must have a tendency to create distrust in a system
when the coin is not in such abundance as to bear any
very considerable reduction. That such may be our situa-
tion, if the country flourishes and credit improves, may be
inferred from observing the distinct character which the
habits of the people in different parts of the island
have given to the country before the Bank Restriction
Act passed, and the marked preference shown to bank-
notes over coin in Scotland. Indeed, it is not a little
remarkable that during the last twenty years, there has
not been a single instance of a bank in Scotland proving
ultimately insolvent. The Ayr Bank indeed failed ; but
its creditors were, in the end, all paid in full.
" I regard the present measure, nevertheless, as only
Continued, an exceptional measure intended to meet an exceptional
case. Hitherto, the effects of the measure have been
such as in every respect to justify its adoption. In all
former wars, the country invariably declined in its com-
merce, in its revenue, and even in its industry, as the
w.ar continued. In this war, on the other hand, while
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR, 505
our exertions both by land and sea have been beyond all CHAP.
precedent great, the country has risen in manufactures, VIT-
internal improvement, revenue, and commerce, with a isn.
velocity which has never before been experienced in a
period of profound peace. In the American war, a ter-
mination would with certainty have been predicted from
the decline of our resources during its continuance ; in
this war we feel that our resources are augmenting, and
that there is no necessary limit to our exertions in point
of time, so long as the injustice of the enemy shall leave
us no other rational choice but perseverance in the con-
test. What is this difference so remarkable, so important,
owing to \ Principally to the Bank having been enabled
to do its duty by the country without trembling, as it
must otherwise have done, for its own safety. Instead
of ruinously, so far as the public interests are con-
cerned, contracting its issues at every moment of tem-
porary pressure or alarm to prevent itself from being
drained of its gold, it has been enabled on every emer-
gency to support public credit with a steady hand. And
thus the productive labour of the country, its true and
real wealth, has not only been kept up, but enabled to
extend itself ; whereby the taxes, how heavy soever, have
been paid with facility, the loans raised on moderate
terms, and the whole machine provided without betray-
ing a symptom of decline.
" Let us consider what is the exceptional case which
22
this confessedly exceptional measure was intended to Continued,
meet. The ruler of France has determined, at the hazard
even of inflicting commercial ruin upon those over whom
he rules, to exclude your trade from the Continent. He
absolutely shuts every harbour against your goods. Ad-
mitting that he has not been able to do this altogether,
and that some do still find their way in, still, by excluding
our manufactures to a great extent, he necessarily, in a
most serious degree, turns the balance of trade against us.
Failing our manufactures taken in exchange, our importa-
506 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, tions from the Continent must all be paid in gold. Hence
VIL an obvious cause of an unfavourable state of the ex-
i8ii. changes. In ordinary times, the immediate effect of such
an unfavourable exchange would be a reduction of the
price to the foreign consumer, resulting from the advan-
tage of the exchange to him tending to force out a greater
proportion of our manufactures ; the quantity of bills
would, thereby be augmented, and the precious metals
would, to a comparatively small amount, be sent abroad.
So long as goods could be got to settle the account, the
price of bullion would not rise materially above its natural
price. But now, goods cannot be sent as in ordinary times.
It is not price, as is usually the case, which limits the
quantity of our exports : it is the risk and difficulty of
introducing them to the Continent, where they sell at an
advance of more than 100 per cent. What must be the
result ? Either that our exports must be reduced, or the
precious metals be sent out as the kind of export which
most readily finds its way to the Continent. Is it not
obvious that this must drain the country of its bullion
and coin 1 Is it difficult to understand why the price of
bullion rises without referring it to a fall in the value of
bank-notes 1 And if the rise becomes such as the ex-
change now indicates, is it not certain that the gold coin
will be melted down and exported \
" The result seems to be, that, although in ordinary
Continued, times, even in cases of war, your gold coin may maintain
itself in circulation, and the banking system of the country
proceed in its accustomed course, yet that in other times
such as we live in this is impossible, and it becomes indis-
pensable to counteract the system of the enemy by one
of corresponding energy. If you do not, the Bank must be
either shut up or contract its issues to such an extent as
to give an artificial value to the paper currency from its
scarcity, equivalent to the rise in the price of gold. This
may check the gold from going out of the kingdom, but
at what sacrifice 1 At the risk of that terrible convulsion
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 507
to which lowering suddenly the value of all property in CHAP.
the country to a still greater amount must necessarily VIL
lead. The committee have laid it down that the Bank wii.
ought to be guided in the amount of their issues by the
state of the exchanges and the price of gold. This
must mean that they are to counteract the influence of
the exchange by this means, and thus keep, it is said, by
forcible means, our currency upon a level with the cur-
rency in the Continent. If this is done, the quantity of
the circulating medium is not to depend on the wants of
the community ; it is not to depend upon its accustomed
amount, with such additions from time to time as the
augmented extent of our transactions may require, but it
is to be regulated by a reference to our external inter-
course, and to exchanges influenced by accidental causes,
foreign wars, or events within the power of the enemy.
Could you hold out a more powerful motive to the ruler
of France to continue and multiply his restrictive efforts
against our trade, than by showing him in this manner
that by excluding our manufactures, and consequently
draining us, as the only other means of exchange, of our
gold, he can acquire a decisive influence over our pros-
perity, and destroy, by effecting a depreciation, half the
property of the country ?
" The assertion that the bank issues have become ex-
cessive, and thence the drain of gold to the Continent, is Continued.
bunded upon an erroneous and deceptive statement of
he case. It is true the issues of the Bank of England
lave increased since 1797 in the proportion of 10 to
9, and probably those of other banks have advanced in
similar proportion. But it by no means follows from
lat circumstance that the issue is either excessive or
ayond what is required for the wants of the country,
n army is not overfed if its rations are increased in
•oportion to the number of mouths required to be filled,
we compare the number of bank-notes now in circula-
)n, including the issue of the private banks, with what
508 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, they were in 1797, we shall find that it has hardly borne
VII- a proportion to the vast increase which has since taken
place in trade, manufactures, agriculture, and revenue.
The figures brought forward by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer demonstrate this, and show, in particular,
that the increase of taxation, the load which the country
is compelled to bear, has been much greater than that
of the notes which enables the country to bear it. The
country possesses considerable security against over-issues,
from the rapidity with which any excess is known to re-
turn to the bank. And the reality of this return is clearly
evinced by what invariably happens a few days after the
dividends are paid at the bank, generally amounting to
several millions sterling. It reduces itself so rapidly, that
after a few days there is scarce any addition perceptible
to the amount of the circulating medium.
" It may be admitted that the advance in the issue of
Continued, bank-notes occasions a rise in the price of all kinds of
produce, and this it is said must be injurious by checking
the export of manufactures. It may be admitted that
the facility of obtaining discounts may at first give an
undue impulse to speculation, and occasion what is called
overtrading, but is that an evil in all circumstances I
What else is it but this adventurous spirit of commercial
enterprise, which has enabled our merchants to contend
against the decrees of the enemy, and to find out in the
midst of war new channels for our superabundant pro-
duce ? The evil will correct itself. The sagacity of the
leaders, sharpened by experience, will ere long keep the
borrower in check, and in the progress of time, though
individuals may suffer, the nation will be benefited.
The rise in prices, so much dwelt on on the other side,
and represented as the greatest of public calamities, is,
in truth, just the reverse. It is the mainspring of na-
tional prosperity, and the circumstance which has mainly
enabled us to maintain the long and costly war into
which we have been driven. An abundant circulation, by
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 509
causing an advance of prices, favours speculation and CHAP.
fosters industry, by making the price of produce keep vn-
ahead of the cost of production ; a restrained circulation, isn.
by lowering prices, causes every mercantile speculation to
issue in loss, and discourages reproduction, by causing it to
terminate in disaster. Which of the two is most likely to
support industry, or enable the nation to bear the burdens
which are by unavoidable circumstances thrown upon it ?
" While I admit that the increased issue of paper has
had the effect of raising prices of commodities of all sorts, Continued.
I utterly deny that it has had the effect of depreciating
paper in exchange for the precious metals. No man can
say that the bank-note passes for less than its nominal
value ; that you will only get 1 7s., for example, for a
£l-note. It is true a guinea is worth 28s., or a £5-note
of the Bank of England will buy only £4, 5s. of gold ;
but that is not because paper is depreciated, but because
gold is appreciated — because the circumstances of trade,
the war in the Peninsula, and an impending contest in
the North, have caused a run for gold to meet the ne-
cessities of the Continent. That this is the true solution
of the phenomenon is evident from the circumstance, that
the difference is equally conspicuous in the price of gold
as compared with silver — in a guinea being worth 28s.
as well as a £5-note of the Bank only £4, 5s. in gold.
It is the excessive demand for gold to meet the neces-
sities of the Continent which is the real cause of the
enhanced value of that metal, which arises, like that
of diamonds, from its portability and capability of con-
cealment. Can it be imagined that the Bank of Eng-
land is bound to purchase and keep gold to meet its own
notes, and also to supply the necessities of the whole
world 1 It is true the Bank, by contracting its issues
and refusing discounts, and thus bringing ruin on all
private, commercial, and banking establishments, might
without delay, I have no doubt, pay off all its outstanding
lebts in gold. I have no doubt, also, notwithstanding
510 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, the present disturbed state of the world, that by con-
VIL tracting its issues to three or four millions of notes, the
i8ii. Bank might continue to pay uninterruptedly in cash ; the
unnatural value thus given to the circulating medium from
its scarcity counterbalancing the extraordinary demand
for gold to send abroad. But the effect must be, that the
nation, for all practical purposes, would be left without an
adequate circulating medium, the Bank would suffer in a
comparatively small degree, but the nation would be ruined.
" Sir F. Baring, an authority entitled to the very
Continued, highest respect, declares ' that he does not consider bank-
notes to be depreciated ; ' and the Continental merchant
referred to in the report says, ' Bank-notes may not re-
present what is on the face of them, because that some-
thing has risen in value, but something in fact equally
real, though not equally available to equalise the balance
of trade. What is called depreciation of the notes, is
not the consequence of an over-issue, but of the enemy's
measures ; and it has not recovered for that reason, not
because they are not convertible into cash.' Doubtless, as
long as cash could be procured on demand and exported,
the exchange and price of gold could never rise. But
where is the gold to come from to equalise this account,
when our extraordinary expenditure within the last two
years for corn, foreign freights, and Government expendi-
ture alone, exclusive of the price of our ordinary imports,
is estimated at from twenty to twenty -five millions sterling,
leaving a balance upon our whole payments, commercial
and political, of from eight to seventeen millions against
us. With such a balance against us, how is it possible for
the banks or any other body to add to its stock of gold,
so as to make a recurrence to cash payments ? With such
a balance against us, which must be provided for, how or
where are we to purchase it abroad, or retain it in circu-
lation, if we have got it ? Are you prepared to withdraw
your army from the Continent, to let down your expen-
diture, and abandon your allies, in order to bring the
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 511
exchanges round, and call back the precious metals. I CHAP.
can understand such a system, whatever I may think of vn-
it. But to continue your exertions against the enemy, isn.
and at the same time break down the system of currency,
by which alone it has or can be supported, is the most
impracticable thing that ever was attempted.
"The advantages are great of a local circulation of 28
adequate and not superfluous amount, and duly secured, Continued,
undisturbed in its operations by being directed to the
liquidation of foreign demands. See this advantage in
the most striking manner in the internal state of the
empire at this moment. We feel the inconveniences of
an adverse exchange in our foreign commerce, but it does
not affect our internal prosperity in the slightest degree.
The enemy may disturb us in the disposal of our surplus
produce, in our external expenditure and supplies from
the Continent, but he cannot affect our internal in-
dustry for our own markets in the smallest degree. How
small, comparatively speaking, is the external question,
and how absurd would it be for us to suffer our im-
mense transactions at home to be deranged, by at-
tempting to conform them to all the violent fluctuations
which the enemy's lawless power can give to the Conti-
nental exchanges, and through it to the price of bullion !
We have, happily, through the integrity and wealth of
our Bank, and a state of credit between man and man
unexampled in any other State, succeeded in realising a
system which the enemy cannot shake, and which, if
preserved, is likely, under Providence, to carry us safely
;hrough all our difficulties. Let us recollect the successive
efforts which have been made by its opponents to shake
his mighty empire, first by arms and invasion, next by
racobinical principles and rebellion, latterly through the
xtinction of commerce. All these have failed, and he
ow rests his last hopes on shaking our safety through the
estruction of our established currency, the instrument of
ur prosperity, and the source of all our power. It is
512 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, well known that when the report we are now considering
vn- was received in Paris at the close of last session, the
iBii. ruler of France was on the point of abandoning his Con-
tinental System. But when he read that document he
resolved to continue it, for he believed that he had at
last struck us in a vulnerable point — that what had an-
noyed France had ruined Britain.
,29 " Let it be recollected that I thoroughly admit a recur-
rence to cash payments, when circumstances will permit,
to be essential to public credit. I rest my justification
of the existing system upon the plea alone of an over-
ruling necessity — a necessity not arising from an ordinary
state of war, but arising out of the extraordinary and new
principles on which the present contest has been con-
ducted by the enemy. When the necessity ceases, I trust
the system now in operation will cease with it ; and I am
sanguine in my belief that, with industry and commerce
so flourishing, the return to our former habits, the drain
of war being at an end, will not be a work of difficulty,
and need not be a work of time. But, in the mean time,
as it has been our policy in conducting the war to annoy
the enemy abroad rather than await his attack on our
own shores, so let us preserve that system of currency
which enables us to confine his violence to the Continent,
and to deny to him the power of interfering with or
shaking the most vital branch of a system under which
* Pari. Deb. we flourish as a nation, and through the fruits of which
six 986-
ion. we are enabled to maintain the contest on behalf of the
world as well as ourselves." l
Upon a division after this debate, Mr Horner's resolu-
^0
Result of the tions, which went to the adopting the report of the corn-
May 9 and mittee, were lost by a majority of 76, the numbers being 75
is, i8ii. to 151 : an(j the counter-resolutions of Mr Vansittart were
2 Parl. Deb. ' . .
xix. 919- carried by a majority of 40, the numbers being 82 to 42.
xx. 73, 74- The material parts of Lord Castlereagh's speech on this
occasion have been transcribed thus at length, because
they exhibit a favourable specimen of his peculiar style of
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 513
oratory — calm, weighty, and argumentative — as well as CHAP.
of his turn of mind, combining in a rare degree the
principles of philosophy with the dictates of experience. 1811-
This is the more remarkable from the contrast which it Reflections
exhibits to the views adopted at the same time by the
numerous and weighty body who composed the majority
of the committee. It embraced all the leading political
economists of the day — those whose writings had given
the Edinburgh Review its great and deserved celebrity.
The report was drawn up by Mr Homer. It had the
cordial concurrence of Mr Huskisson, Mr Ricardo, Mr
Ponsouby, Mr Tierney, and, except on the one point of
resuming cash payments in two years, of Mr Canning. It
was supported by the whole strength of the Whig party,
united to that body, already respectable from their talents,
who might be called the English doctrinaires, who after-
wards, under the guidance of Sir Robert Peel, wrought so
great a change in the commercial policy of Great Britain.
Yet, strange to say, their doctrine was not less at vari-
ance with the principles of political economy than the
3vidence, nearly unanimous, of the whole practical men
vho were examined on the subject. It set at defiance
he general principle that price is regulated by the pro-
>ortion between supply and demand, and that the inte-
ests of commerce will cause an article in request to leave
ie country where it is cheap, and flow into the country
here it is dear ; it ignored the evidence of all the prac-
cal men, who ascribed the irresistible tendency to gold
• go abroad to its being more in request on the Conti-
mt than in this country, and consequently bearing a
gher price ; it repudiated the idea that the unfavour-
le state of the exchanges indicated an outward ten-
ncy in the precious metals greater than the inward
mand. Its authors had embraced one dogma to which
iy ascribed the whole — viz., that the over-issue of notes
; home had driven the notes abroad ; and they were
i olute in their determination to ascribe everything to
/OL. I. 2 K
514 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, that, and that alone. Lord Castlereagh was held up as
VIL wedded to the old school, and behind the light of the
i8ii. age, because he refused to adopt this dogma, and in pre-
ference supported the simple principle that the coin was
sent abroad because it bore a higher price there than it
did at home. Which of these two opinions has been con-
firmed by the event, and is now generally adopted among
men 1 Probably there is no man whose opinion is not
warped by party or swayed by interest, who will not
admit that Castlereagh was perfectly right, and his oppon-
ents entirely in the wrong, on the occasion. In truth, his
words descriptive of the effects of the untimely resumption
of cash payments have proved prophetic. They have been
too fatally realised by the result ; and his opinions, origi-
nal when uttered, but since confirmed by the seal of time,
have received that vindication of all others the most deci-
sive. At the time they were uttered they were denounced
as paradox ; they are now regarded as platitude.
But this is not all. Not only has subsequent experi-
what if the ence during the long peace completely established the
ittee16 truth of his principles, but the events of the war have
proved not less decisively the vast importance of their
having been uttered and given effect to by the Legislature
at the time they were. The report of the committee,
recommending the compulsory resumption of cash pay-
ments within two years, was dated 8th June 1810. The
final debate on it took place on 15th May 1811. Had
the recommendation of the committee been adopted on
the first occasion, the crash would have come in England
in the first week of June 1812, when Wellington was pre-
paring to cross the Agueda to commence the Salamanca
campaign, and Napoleon's forces were all converging to-
wards the Niemen for the invasion of Russia ; if on the
second, it would have come on the eve of the triumphant
march of the English general to Vitoria, immediately
after the battle of Lutzen, and on the eve of the armistice
of- Pleswitz in Germany. We have only to figure the
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 515
monetary crises of 1825, 1838, 1847, and 1857, hap- CHAP.
pening on any of these occasions, to form a conception of V1L
what must have occurred if the recommendation of the isn.
Bullion Committee had been carried into effect. Ruin,
irrecoverable ruin, to British credit and finances, must
have been the result, and with it the destruction of the
whole system of European opposition to French domina-
tion on the Continent, at the very moment when it had
been organised with the fairest prospect of success ! If
ever a country was saved by the efforts of individual men,
it was by Mr Vansittart and Lord Castlereagh on this
occasion.
Ill health prevented Lord Castlereagh from taking a
part in the debate on the Peninsular triumphs, and the Lord Castie-
vote of thanks to Lord Wellington for the campaign ofspe!chS<m
1810, when several of the Opposition, and in particular of6
Mr Whitbread, so honourably retracted their former stric-
ures on his military conduct. But on 7th June 1811,
»n occasion of the thanks of Parliament being moved to
reneral Beresford for the victory of Albuera, he said :
Lord Wellington was under the necessity of showing a
•ont to the enemy both at Badajos and Almeida, and it
ill to General Beresford to decide whether he should
ait for the reinforcements under Wellington, which he
lew were approaching, or act with promptitude on the
ornent, trusting to his own resources. He took the
: inly and judicious step. A more glorious battle than
1 at which ensued never was fought by the British, as was
1 ) fatally proved by the loss, which was as great, consi-
( ring the numbers engaged, as even in the desperate
s uggle at Assaye. The intercepted letter of Soult
| >ved how severely he had suffered : the British army
r lained in possession of the field, and was enabled to
a ance a corps against the retreating enemy. Deeply
a every one must lament the heavy loss sustained in
t. memorable battle, yet we should err if we compared
it ith the results merely of the battle itself. The true
5 1C LORD CASTLEREAOH.
CHAP, test was to weigh it against the advantages of the whole
VIL campaign ; and if this was done, it would be found that
i8ii. in no campaign had the sacrifice of human life been so
small compared with the results produced by it. Lord
Wellington had proved himself to be as sparing of the life
of the soldier as he was careful of his health ; and, checking
his propensity to seek for glory, he bent his \vhole efforts to
economising the existence of those placed under his com-
mand. The proportion of loss during the whole Penin-
sular campaign between the British and French armies,
was immeasurably in favour of the former. Glorious as
the struggle in Portugal had been, a great feature would be
awanting if, after its conclusion, a trial of strength between
the rival nations had not taken place upon the frontier.
0 " Up to the present moment, France has made but little
Conceded, real impression upon Spain. After all her victories, she
has never been able to send forward one Spanish regiment
to assist in the subjugation of the country. Whatever
defects may exist in her military system, we must all re-
collect that Spain is not divided : she is not conquered.
The same peculiarities, it may be defects, in her national
character, which render her unmanageable in the hands of
her friends, and incapable of efficient military co-operation,
render her only the more indomitable towards her enemies.
No nation has ever proved more true to herself than Spain,
under circumstances the most adverse, has done. What
might not be expected from her soldiers if they were taken
into British pay, and disciplined by British officers, as the
Portuguese have been ! That alternative has never yet
been presented to them, and it is doubtful whether but for
that advantage the Portuguese would have offered the
same resistance to the enemy that the Spaniards had done.
But I do not wish to draw any invidious comparisons :
both nations are fighting for their liberties ; they have both
displayed great energies ; and I will only repeat what has
been already said, that this great contest must be run
out, and we must do our utmost in it. No man can predict
tain at this
time.
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 517
the final result ; but the best way in which we can dis- CHAP.
charge our duty to posterity, and that which we owe to the VTL
present, is by doing our best, and leaving the rest in the isn.
hands of Providence. No one can doubt that the war as
at present maintained is a great burden, but is any man 1 Pari. Deb.
prepared to say that the time has arrived when it should 527.
be abandoned1?"1
Lord Castlereagh strongly felt that at this juncture
(June 7, 1811) the war had become burdensome; for the Great dis-
fact was, that it had become so to such a degree that even Great Bri-
the most sanguine were beginning to be inspired with
desponding views in regard to its ultimate result. This
arose, not so much from any want of success in the field,
or doubts as to our ability to maintain the Peninsular
contest and to defend Portugal, as from the exhausting
effects of the struggle upon the industry and commerce of
the country, and the multitudes of persons who had been
reduced to short time, or thrown out of employment alto-
gether, in consequence of the combined effect of Napoleon's
Continental System, and the British retaliatory policy of
the Orders in Council. It is well known that immediately
ifter entering Berlin, in October 1806, in consequence of
;he battle of Jena, Napoleon, irritated by the blockades
)f the harbours in the north of Germany, which Mr Fox
tad proclaimed without, as he said, any sufficient force at
ea to maintain it, issued the famous Berlin Decree, which
eclared all British goods found anywhere on the Con-
nent, in the territories in alliance with France, or occupied
y French armies, liable to confiscation, and ordered them
> be instantly committed to the flames; and this was
llowed next year by a decree in similar, and still more
ringent terms, issued from Milan, on the Emperor's re-
rn from the Polish war, after the battle of Friedland and
3aty of Tilsit. These decrees by no means remained a
ad letter. They were instantly acted upon with the
most rigour in every place subject to the control of the
ench armies ; and as that embraced at that period the
518 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, whole territory from Cadiz to the Niemen, this amounted
VIL to an entire exclusion of British commerce, except in re-
i8ii. gard to that part of it, comparatively trifling, which could
be introduced by smuggling.
It was very natural that the British Government, seeing
The Orders such extreme measures adopted by the enemy, and the
IssueTby industry of its people so much injured by their effects,
Gov?m-lsh should have thought of retaliating in kind, and causing
the subjects of the French Emperor to feel in their own
persons the evils that the novel and outrageous method
of war which he had adopted was causing them to ex-
perience. By so doing they might hope either to oblige
him to return to the usual system of hostility between
belligerent nations ; or, if he persevered in it, to excite
so widespread and intense a feeling of indignation against
his government as might eventually lead to his over-
throw. It was with this view that the British Orders in
Council were issued, which in effect declared every vessel,
with its cargo, good prize on the high seas, bound for any
harbour under the French power, which had not touched
at a British harbour. Thus Napoleon confiscated the
vessels and their cargo if they had come from England,
and the British Government confiscated them if they had
not. It was difficult to see how neutral vessels or cargoes
could avoid confiscation at the hand of one or other of
these powers, or how any trade from foreign parts could
by possibility be carried on. In fact, it would have been
totally extirpated had not the licensing system been in-
troduced, which, in consideration of large sums paid to the
belligerent powers, granted licences from both to particular
parties, securing them from capture or detention. As Lord
Castlereagh was Minister at War, not for Foreign Affairs,
at the time when this ruthless system of hostility was
introduced, he was not peculiarly responsible for it ; but its
energetic character entirely coincided with his disposi-
tion ; and although the-Orders in Council were the work
of. the whole Cabinet, he was too manly not to take
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 519
his full share of the responsibility connected with their CHAP.
adoption. VIL
Had there been no neutral powers whose trade was isn.
considerable to be affected by these measures, it was pos- Thei?7diS!
sible that the retaliatory system of the British Government tro«seffec
•/ •/ in vrrGftt
might have proved effective, and that Napoleon, finding Britain.
he suffered more than his enemies from these extreme
measures, might have been led to abandon them. But
nothing is more certain than that, if continental Europe
was affected, England was injured in a still greater degree.
This might have been anticipated when a struggle who was
to starve first began. The commercial emporium, the
manufacturing state, which exported its produce to all
other countries, suffered more from a stoppage of trade
than the other nations, which each in a lesser degree shared
its advantages. In the one case the misery was concen-
trated in the centre ; in the other it was diffused over the
circumference. Sugar and coffee rose 100 per cent in
the Continental markets, but bread and beef rose nearly as
much in the British. Wheat was 105s. a-quarter, meat Is.
i-pound in England. Worse than this, the great diminu-
ion of the foreign trade deprived a great part of the work-
ng classes of the means of purchasing provisions at these
extravagant rates. The exports of the empire, which, in
809, in consequence of the withdrawing of the French
'oast Guards from the north of Germany, after the battle
f Aspern, had risen to £46,000,000, sank in 1811 to
29,000,000, lower than they had been since the renewal
? the war. The consequence was, that distress in all the
anufacturing districts was universal and intense beyond
1 precedent ; and the unhappy operatives, ascribing their
isery to the introduction of machinery, formed combina-
)ns in many places for its destruction ; and the disorders
ence arising were quelled only by the interposition of
3 military, and repeated melancholy exhibitions on the
iffold.
Experience soon showed that the greater part of this
520 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, distress was owing, not so much to Napoleon's Conti-
VIL nental System as to the British Orders in Council passed
i8ii. in retaliation of it. The American Government, find-
OQ
Effect of the ing their vessels exposed to certain confiscation from
winter- one or °ther of the exasperated belligerents, adopted
course Act. ^he course of withdrawing altogether from the scene
of danger. They passed a Non-intercourse Act, which
prohibited all commercial intercourse with either of
the contending parties, and caused the American flag
almost to disappear from the ocean. The effect of this
decisive step upon the commerce and industry of Great
Britain was beyond all measure disastrous. The British
exports to North America were then £15,000,000 — worth,
as Mr Brougham stated in the debate which ensued on
the subject, all other foreign markets put together. It was
the closing of this immense vent for our manufactured
produce which was the cause of the unparalleled depression
of our foreign trade during the year 1811; and although
British energy and enterprise had opened several new
and circuitous channels of commerce, yet they were far
from compensating those which had been lost ; and the
finances of the country, as a necessary consequence, were
far from being in a prosperous state. In a word, the
empire was in a more dangerous situation than it had
been since the war began. Allies, except the Spaniards
and Portuguese, we had none on continental Europe ; and
although the war then still lingered in the Peninsula, and
Wellington as yet showed an undaunted front to the
enemy, yet it was rather from confidence in his abilities
and the valour of his troops, and a stern resolution not to
be beaten, than from any general hope that it would ulti-
mately prove successful, that the contest was maintained.
Such was the state of affairs, when an unexpected
series of events restored Lord Castlereagh to office, and
that too in the all-important appointment of Foreign Sec-
retary, which he thereafter held to the time of his death.
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 521
To understand how this came about, it must be premised CHAP.
that Marquess Welleslej, who had succeeded Mr Canning vn-
in the Foreign Office on the latter's leaving office in Sep- 1812-
tember 1809 in consequence of the duel with Lord Events'
Castlereagh, having become dissatisfied with the support
which Mr Perceval's Cabinet gave to the war in the Pen-
insula, and, above all, the want of specie to provide for pointe
the wants of the army, of which Lord Wellington so cretary.
loudly complained, had tendered his resignation in the
first week of 1812. The Prince Regent, however,
earnestly entreated his lordship to resume office at least
in the mean time ; and as there was a prospect of a new
Ministry being formed upon the expiry of the restrictions
upon the Prince Regent, which came to an end in the
February following, the request was acceded to, and
Marquess Wellesley withdrew his resignation. The an-
ticipated change of Ministry, however, did not take place
at that time, although the Prince Regent tendered the
government to the Whig leaders, in consequence of the
difficulty of forming an extended administration in the
arduous state of public affairs. The result was that the
Tories were continued in power, and Lord Wellesley,
upon this, a second time tendered his resignation, which
•was accepted. Lord Castlereagh was immediately selected j^ 28»
as his successor, and entered upon the duties of his new
appointment in the beginning of March, at the very time
when his brother, Sir Charles Stewart, returned, from ill
health, from the important situation which he held in the
Peninsular army.
A dreadful and unexpected event occurred soon after,
which to all appearance gave the Whigs a permanent lease Assassina-
of power. On the 1 1th May, as Mr Perceval was enter- Perceval/
ing the lobby of the House of Commons, he was shotMay11'
:hrough the heart by a person of the name of Bellingham,
rvho thought he had been injured by some of that
ninister's measures in his commercial transactions in the
Baltic some years before, and unduly refused redress at the
522 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, hands of Government. The man was evidently labour-
VIL ing under a mental hallucination, but not to the extent
- o
1812. Of rendering him irresponsible for his actions ; and he
was condemned and executed with a precipitance which
bespoke rather the aroused indignation of an offended
people than the calm administration of public justice.
This tragic event, to all appearance, opened to the Whigs
the certain path to power ; for not only were the inclina-
tions of the Prince Regent, founded on early predilection
and long friendship, known to be strongly in favour of
that party, but the Prime Minister in power, and the
most resolute opponent of the Catholic claims, on which
the formation of the Ministry in a great degree depended,
was no more. The Prince, in consequence, immediately
sent for Lord Wellesley, and charged him with the duty
of forming a Government on the principle of taking in the
ablest men on both sides. This mission, however, as is
generally the case with undertakings of the kind, was
found to be impracticable, from irreconcilable differences
of opinion on material points between the leading states-
men on opposite sides ; and Earl Moira was then sent for.
This mission, it was generally thought, would prove success-
ful, as he was commissioned to form an exclusively Whig
Administration. Contrary, however, to expectation, it
too failed, after depending a considerable time, in conse-
quence of the Whig leaders insisting upon having the
nomination to certain household situations in the palace,
which the Prince Regent was not inclined to concede to
them. The consequence was, that the Prince Regent im-
mediately intrusted Lord Liverpool with the formation of
an Administration composed entirely of his own party.
This was quickly arranged. All the present Ministers were
i Pari. Deb. retained in their places, including Lord Castlereagh in
xxiii 256
381-423 ;' the important one of Minister for Foreign Affairs. With
i. 437 Ann. that office he was intrusted with the still more arduous
Sib?812' and vital one of Leader of the House of Commons ; l and
he held both situations from that time till his death, ten
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 523
years afterwards. Thenceforward the history of Great CHAP.
Britain becomes chained to his biography.
The first important subject which was brought before 1812-
Parliament after the interregnum and lull of public busi- Debatl'on
ness produced by the negotiations for the change of^ec^ec
Ministry, was the repeal of the Orders in Council. This June 16-
vital question was intrusted to Mr Brougham ; and it
could not have fallen into the hands of an abler or more
zealous advocate. The subject itself had become one of
universal and overwhelming moment ; for in consequence,
on the one hand, of the Continental System for the exclu-
sion of British manufactures, so rigidly enforced by the
French Emperor, and, on the other, of the Non-intercourse
Act passed by the American Legislature, the exports of
the country had sunk in an alarming degree, and, as
already mentioned, had amounted in the last year only to
£29,000,000. This state of affairs was not lost on Mr
Brougham. The facts on which he rested, and which
would admit of no dispute, were of the gravest character,
and proved that the question was not only vital to the
interests of the empire, but that the greater part of the
danger came from a quarter within the reach of remedy,
to all appearance at least, from the British Parliament.
He strongly contended that the alarming decline in our
exports was owing not so much to the hostility of Napo-
leon, inveterate as it was, or the Continental System,
widely extended as his victories had caused it to become,
as to the British Orders in Council, which had given rise
to the American Non-intercourse Act, and lost to us the
North American market. This would be regained only
by repealing the Orders in Council, and thus reopening
on the other side of the Atlantic the harbours of our best
and most growing customers. " It is not," said Mr
Brougham, " a figure of speech, but the simple truth, to
iffirm that, circumstanced as the two countries are, there
s not an axe falls in the woods of America which does
lot put in motion some shuttle, or wheel, or hammer, in
524 LOUD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP. England. Is it the miserable, shuffling, doubtful traffic
VIL in the north of Europe and the Mediterranean, which we
1812. prefer to the sure, regular, and increasing North Ameri-
can trade — a trade placed beyond the reach of the
enemy's power, and which supports at once all that
remains of the liberty of the seas, and gives life and
vigour to the main pillar within the realm — the commerce
and manufactures of England 1 Look to the other side
of the picture. If you continue the cessation of inter-
course with America much longer, the inevitable conse-
quence will be that the Americans will be driven to the
necessity of supplying themselves with manufactures.
They have the means of doing so within their own
bounds ; coal and water-carriage in abundance are to be
found in their country ; and the vast fortunes already ac-
cumulated in their seaport towns prove that they are
noways deficient in the true commercial spirit. We can
have no jealousy of America, whose armies are yet at the
plough, or making, since your policy has so willed it,
awkward attempts at the loom ; whose assembled navies
could not lay siege to an English man-of-war. The
nation is already deeply embarked in the Spanish war ;
let us not then run the risk of adding another to the
1 p.arl- Peb- already formidable league of our enemies, and reduce
xxin. 486- j? •'»•«• /N
522. ourselves to the necessity of feeding Canada with troops
from Portugal, and Portugal with bread from England." *
Amidst some exaggeration, which seems inseparable
Lord c'aatie- from Lord Brougham's oratory, there was much truth in
reply.8 these eloquent words. Lord Castlereagh took the only
June 16. maniy ancj patriotic course in these circumstances ; he at
once gave the Orders in Council up. From the beginning,
they had been a political, not a commercial measure ; and
•when it appeared that the commercial evils attendant on
them outstripped the political advantages, the time had
come when they should be abandoned. The noble lord
accordingly said : " No question more vital, both to the
national security and the commercial interests of the
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 525
country, ever came before Parliament. There can be no CHAP.
doubt that a case of grave distress to the manufacturing VIT-
classes has been made out in the evidence, and there is isia,
reason to fear that if the North American market is not
speedily opened that suffering will be augmented. Even,
however, if the repeal of the Orders in Council would oc-
casion the abrogation of the American Non-intercourse
Act, it does by no means follow that the original impo-
sition of these Orders was not called for by necessity,
and justified by expedience. Was it to be expected
that Great Britain was tamely to have submitted to the
iniquitous decrees of France without any attempt at
retaliation ? As against France, the retaliating system
adopted has perfectly succeeded. Severely as our com-
merce has suffered in the struggle, hers has suffered
still more considerably. From the official accounts
published by the French Government, it appears that
even with their population of forty millions, the total
amount of their manufactures for the home market and ex-
portation taken together was only, in 1810, £54,000,000,
while that of Great Britain and Ireland, for both, with
a population of only 17,000,000, was £66,000,000.
With the exception of the year 1811, which, from tem-
porary causes, was one of great depression, the preceding
years, when the Orders in Council were in operation, were
periods of extraordinary and unprecedented prosperity.
The average of our exports to continental Europe for
three years before the passing of the Orders in Council was
£17,500,000 ; for three years subsequent, £23,000,000.
Can more convincing proof be desired that the machina-
tions of the French Emperor for our destruction have not
only failed in their object, but recoiled upon himself?
" It is therefore not the effect of the Orders in Council
or the Continental System of the enemy which has caused Continued.
the distress so severely felt in this country during the
last years, but the interruption of our commercial inter-
course with America, in consequence of the Non-inter-
526 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, course Act passed in that country. But though this may
vn- now be admitted, it affords no argument against the
1812. original expedience of those measures : on the contrary,
quite the reverse. Such an extreme measure on their
part was not in the ordinary course of events, and it was
not to be calculated upon. The American Government
might have seen that the Orders in Council were adopted
by the English Cabinet as a measure of retaliation only ;
that they were issued after the Berlin Decree, under the
pressure of necessity ; and that if these defensive mea-
sures proved, as doubtless they did, injurious in a very
high degree to the interests of American commerce, their
enmity should have been directed against France, the
primary cause of this destructive system of hostility, in-
stead of this country, which was driven to it only in self-
defence. No pains were spared, when this system was of
necessity adopted, to render it as little as possible oppres-
sive to neutral powers ; an instance of which disposition is
to be found in the Order of 1809, limiting the blockade
to France and the countries under her immediate control.
The licence system, when properly understood, was no de-
parture from the principle of the Orders in Council : not
a fifth of them were intended to evade these orders : four-
fifths of them arose from the necessity under which the
enemy was laid of escaping the stringent effect of our
measure. We did, however, offer to forego all the advan-
tages of the licence system, and revert to the strict
Order of 1807, if the Government of the United States
would repeal the Non-intercourse Act ; but hitherto they
have shown no disposition to embrace such an offer.
" The Prince Regent long ago issued a declaration,
Concluded, bearing that as soon as the Berlin and Milan Decrees were
repealed, the British Government would withdraw the
Orders in Council ; and the French Cabinet have recently
communicated to the American Government a resolution,
apparently consenting to abandon these Decrees if the
British Orders in Council were at the same time repealed.
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR, 527
That declaration, however, is not sufficiently explicit to CHAP.
authorise the British Government to act upon it, and it vn-
seems to be virtually abrogated by the sweeping declara- 1812.
tion recently made by the Duke of Bassano (Maret), that
the Berlin and Milan Decrees will remain in force till the
maritime pretensions of this country shall be abandoned.
But the British Government is fully disposed to receive
the olive branch tendered, whether in good or bad faith,
by the French ruler ; she is willing, for a time, to sus-
pend the Orders in Council, if the American Government
will repeal the Non-intercourse Act. The sincerity of
France will thereby be put to the test, and a breathing
time gained in the midst of this mortal hostility, during
which an opportunity will be afforded for a return to a
more civilised species of warfare. If this experiment fails,
and France persists in her frantic system of warfare, we
must return to our retaliating system ; but if driven to do
so, we shall at least have the consolation of reflecting that
we have shown every disposition to concede all the just
demands of the neutral powers. And such a return
would, it is hoped, not again lead to any interruption of
the amicable relations between this country and her trans- l Pari. Deb.
atlantic offspring, which it is the curse of both countries we.1'
should ever have been broken."1
No division took place upon this able and interesting
debate, it being understood on both sides of the House Repeal of
that Government had resolved to take the matter into hTcSuncU.
their own hands, and that an unconditional repeal of the June 23-
3rders in Council would soon appear. This expectation
vas not disappointed. On the 23d June an Order ap-
>eared in the London Gazette repealing the Orders in
Council unconditionally, but with the declaration, that if
he American Government did not, after due notice, re-
eal the Non-intercourse Act, this revocation should
ecome null, and the original Orders revive. The Arne-
can Government, however, did not accept the olive
ranch thus tendered to them. Before intelligence of this
528 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, conciliatory measure had crossed the Atlantic, war was
vu- already declared by them, not against France, the original
i«i2. aggressor in the injury to neutrals, but against Great Bri-
tain, which had acted only in self-defence. The party in
America, unhappily too numerous, which was set on fo-
reign conquest and external aggression, deemed the oppor-
tunity favourable for conquering the Canadas, when Great
Britain, as they thought, was at the last extremity in the
war with Napoleon.
Lord Castlereagh, on assuming the helm of foreign
situation affairs in the beginning of March 1812, found affairs,
wheniXd both in the Peninsula and in Northern Europe, in the
SuXeTt? most interesting and critical situation. Wellington had
power. sjx weeks before stormed Ciudad Rodrigo, and prepara-
tions were making for an attack on Badajos. Napoleon
was directing all his disposable forces in France, Germany,
and Italy towards the Vistula ; and Alexander, calm but
resolute, was gathering up the forces of his mighty empire
to resist the Western crusade. The first care of Lord
Castlereagh on his accession to office was to write to Sir
Henry Wellesley, Lord Wellington's brother, Minister at
Cadiz, in the kindest manner, offering to continue him in
his appointment, which was accepted.* Although Lord
Castlereagh's courteous feelings made him allude to the
* " I shall not detain you by expressing my regret that the public service
has been deprived of Lord Wellesley's talents at a moment when, in many
points of view, and in none more than with reference to the great cause of the
Peninsula, they were of so much value ; neither shall I attempt to describe
how sensible I am of the great change it must operate in your feelings to have
to conduct the duties of your situation with one so much less conversant with
the subjects in discussion, and so much less entitled to your personal confi-
dence. But I trust we are sufficiently known to each other to authorise me
to assure you, with the utmost sincerity, that it will afford me the greatest
personal gratification if I should be so fortunate as to succeed in reconciling
you to remain under the change that has unfortunately taken place. I do not
feel entitled to expect that my wishes can be conclusive on that point ; but I
look to the interest the public have in not being deprived of your experienced
services at the present moment, and to the importance the Prince Regent
attaches to your continuing to represent his Royal Highness in the Spanish
Embassy, for reconciling you to remain at Cadiz." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to SIR
HENRY WELLESLEY, Foreign Office, MarchB, 1812; Castlereayh Correspondence
viii.^45, 246.
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 529
change in the Foreign Office as a matter of regret to Sir CHAP.
Henry, jet there can be no doubt that it was in reality a VII>
source of secret congratulation both to him and Lord 1812.
Wellington. Great as Lord Wellesley's abilities un-
doubtedly were, they were not of the commanding kind
of Lord Castlereagh's, nor so well qualified to contend
with the almost hopeless difficulties with which the em-
pire was beset in the beginning of 1811. All his efforts,
seconded by those of Lord Wellington, had been unable
to induce the preceding Administration to make efforts
commensurate to the occasion, or worthy of the strength
and majesty of the empire. His position in consequeuce
had become so painful to him, that he could no longer
endure it, and it was the strength of this feeling, as already
mentioned, which had led to his resignation. Lord Wel-
lington was not less chagrined than his illustrious brother
at the disregard of their combined representations, which,
from terror of public clamour about expense, had been
lisplayed by the late Cabinet, and his feelings exhaled in
)itter complaints against the "Republic of a Cabinet,"
vhich could not be induced to do anything really worthy
f the occasion — an opinion which will probably, to the
nd of the world, be shared by all who in arduous cir-
timstances are brought in contact with a Board, or other
nail body of men, not thoroughly subjugated by one
)mmanding spirit.
When matters were in this state between the British
47.
overnment and their Foreign Minister and illustrious Great '
eneral, it was a most fortunate circumstance that a change
ok place at this crisis of the war, which at once restored J
. igleness of direction to the Cabinet, and an adequate £
( gree of support to the General in the field. Although,
j Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Castlereagh was not
i mediately brought in contact with the Commander-in-
( ief, and the official correspondence of the latter was
T h the Earl of Liverpool, yet he soon communicated the
i >ress of his mind to the whole Ministry, and gained
,TOL. i. 2 L
ession to
iffice.
530 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, that ascendancy over his colleagues which a superior, and,
VIT- above all, courageous mind, never fails to acquire in the
.1812. presence of danger. His own disposition led him de-
cidedly to adopt the system of la grande guerre, which
he had commenced when turned out of office by the
Whigs in 1806. He was fully sensible of the immense
importance of prosecuting the war in the Peninsula in
the most vigorous manner at this period, when the greater
part of the forces, and the chief attention of the enemy,
were fixed on a Russian war of unexampled magnitude ;
and a favourable opportunity was presented during the
double strain on the French empire of regaining the lost
footing in Spain, and possibly chasing the enemy alto-
gether over the Pyrenees.
Fortunately for Great Britain and the cause of Euro-
Forces of pean independence, the military force at the disposal of
its Cabinet at this time greatly exceeded what they had
i- been at any former period of the contest. After provid-
-ng amp}y for the defence of the British Islands, upwards
of 100,000 men could be spared for foreign service, of
whom 60,000 or 70,000 could be assembled at one point,
and under a single general. Great Britain at that period
had a military force of 646,000 men, of whom 194,000
were effective regulars, 84,000 regular militia, and 369,000
volunteers, or local militia. So successful had been the
military system introduced by Lord Castlereagh when War
Minister in 1806, already given, that, notwithstanding
the bloody war in the Peninsula which had been waged,
the military force was 50,000 greater than it had been at
the commencement of the period. Lord Castlereagh now
saw his project realised of carrying on la grande guerre
against Napoleon, and having 60,000 men ready and dis-
posable to carry the war into any part of the enemy's
dominions which might be deemed advisable.
He was not slow, after his return to office, in the begin-
ning of March 1812, in carrying his designs into execution,
and preparing to turn to the best advantage the extraor-
TO THE OPENING OP THE GERMAN WAR. 531
dinarj imprudence committed by Napoleon in accumulat- CHAP.
ing his forces against Russia before he had terminated VTL
the war in Spain. The utmost efforts were made in i8]2.
every direction to purchase specie to send out for the use Milit^'.
of the army ; and although the price paid was always forces at
... / *• L. J Welling-
high, sometimes as much as 29s. for a guinea, a consider- ton's dis-
able sum was collected, and forthwith forwarded. The Crd bastie-
efforts at the same time made to augment the army, espe- e1fogrtsStfea
cially in cavalry, in which arm it had hitherto been increase >*•
very deficient, were on the greatest scale, and such as put
a force at the disposal of the British general superior
to any Great Britain had ever before had in the field.
From a return of the armies in the Peninsula and the
Mediterranean, on 25th June 1812, when Lord Welling-
ton crossed the Agueda and led his forces into Spain, he
had under his command 51,000 English troops, of whom
6546 were cavalry, in the finest condition ; while the
Portuguese were 36,452 men, of whom 2500 were horse.
This was independent of nearly 40,000 in Gibraltar,
Cadiz, Sicily, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. This great
Force, which, of course, had received a considerable dimi-
lution during the Salamanca campaign, was further fed
>y 20,000 reinforcements, which were sent out between
he beginning of June and the middle of November. In
word, England now, for the first time in the war, ap-
eared on the theatre of contest on a scale worthy of her
resent strength and ancient renown. And if we would
ad whom we have to thank for the preparation of this
• • i »> • -, l Castle-
•eat military lorce, and the decisive use made or it under reagh cor-
rellington's guidance in the memorable campaign which 248,' 249'.
llowed, we have to turn to Lord Castlereagh.1
That statesman had soon his sincerity and firmness put 50.
the test. Napoleon, when on the eve of setting out ^-opolais *r
• the Russian campaign, made proposals of peace to^^°and
1 eat Britain. The terms now offered were, — " That
,
reagh s
ince should renounce all extension of her empire on answer.^
side of the Pyrenees ; that the reigning dynasty in and 23.
532 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP. Spain should be declared independent, and the country
m' governed by the national constitution of the Cortes ; that
1812- the independence and security of Portugal should be gua-
ranteed, and the house of Braganza reign in that king-
dom ; that the kingdom of Naples should remain in the
hands of the present ruler (Murat), and that of Sicily
with its existing king ; and that Spain, Portugal, and
Italy should be evacuated by the French and British
forces, both by sea and land ; and that all other points in
dispute between the parties should be arranged on the
footing that each is to keep what the other cannot take
away." To these proposals Lord Castlereagh replied, in
the name of the British Government, that if by the term
" reigning dynasty " the French Government meant the
royal Government in Spain as now vested in Joseph
Buonaparte and the Cortes established under his au-
thority, and not the rule of Ferdinand VII., the true
monarch of that country, and the Cortes assembled under
his authority, no negotiation could be admitted on such
a basis. The Continental historians generally represent
this offer on the part of the French Emperor — which in
effect gave up the whole objects in dispute, on account
of which the war had been renewed in 1803 — as insincere
on his part, and intended only to sow dissension between
Great Britain and her Continental allies, by spreading
the belief that she was willing to listen to proposals for
separate accommodation. But a little consideration must
show that he was perfectly sincere at that time in desir-
ing a peace with England. Not that he had in one iota
abated his hostility against that power, or swerved from
his determination ultimately to effect its subjugation, but
that he was desirous to wait the proper time for doing so.
He recollected the narrow escape he had made in 1809
from having Madrid taken, and the fleet at Antwerp
destroyed, while he was hard pressed by the Archduke
Charles on the banks of the Danube, and he would
gladly have avoided a repetition of the risk. He desired
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 533
nothing more than to see Wellington's sword sheathed, CHAP.
and the fleets of Great Britain motionless in their har- VIL
hours, while he was beating down the last champion of 1812-
Continental independence, and preparing, as at Tilsit, a
fresh crusade of the whole maritime force of the Con-
tinent against this country.
It will be seen from the considerable British force sta-
tioned at this period in the neighbourhood of Italy, Lordcastie-
amounting, in Sicily, Corfu, and Malta, to not less than cautious
30,000 men, that operations on an extensive scale were \ "* *
contemplated in the Italian peninsula, with a view to aid
the diversion in favour of Russia going on under Welling-
ton in Spain. Such a design necessarily implied a move-
ment on the part of the inhabitants of Italy, who were
now entirely subjugated by, and their resources applied
to the support of, the French Emperor. There could be
no doubt of the importance of such an attempt in the
great contest, from the Niemen to Cadiz, which was
now approaching ; but, on the other hand, it would, if
successful, involve several diplomatic difficulties, and bring
Great Britain abreast of many delicate questions of inter-
national law. Revolutionary interests and passions might
be awakened in the course of the struggle, alike inconsistent
with the engagements of England with the ancient gov-
ernments, and the general policy of the Allies with a view
to the future peace and independence of Europe. Lord
Castlereagh in consequence wrote a letter to Lord Wil-
iain Bentinck, who had at once the highest military and
liplomatic situation in the Mediterranean, which is a
nodel of combined wisdom and liberality in a British
Minister. It held out the chance of his being called on
o aid a liberating movement in the Italian peninsula,
nd authorised his doing so ; but at the same time strongly
lutioned him against taking the initiative in any such
lovement, or intervening at all in the internal affairs of
lat country ; and urged the policy of presenting to the
habitants of the mainland, in Sicily, which was under
534 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, our immediate control, a model of a constitutional mon-
V1I- archy, under the ancient sovereigns, abreast of the wishes
1812. of the age, and containing the requisite safeguards against
corruptions and abuse. Subsequent events have rendered
this remarkable despatch at once interesting and pro-
phetic.*
As to Russia herself, the principal in the terrible duel
Diplomatic on the Niemen which was approaching, the diplomatic
with Russia, relations of Great Britain, even when war with France was
evidently approaching, were for some time not such as were
desirable and might have been expected. The Emperor
Alexander had been profoundly hurt by the ill-judged
refusal, on the part of the Whig Administration, in spring
1807, to give him any assistance. Little acquainted with
* " MY DEAR LORD, — In transmitting to your Lordship the enclosed confiden-
tial papers, my object is to put you in possession of the language which has been
held here in the name of the royal family in Sicily on the subject of the events
which have lately taken place there under your influence, the manner in which
these communications have been received by me, and the report which has
been made to the Sicilian Government of the feelings entertained by his Royal
Highness's Government of the conduct of our allies in that quarter. . . .
" I have not thought it necessary in my public letter to allude to the propo-
sitions submitted by you to the hereditary prince, in answer to his demand
that the troops at your disposal should be employed in Italy; but it may,
nevertheless, be expedient that your Lordship should understand that this
Government could not indeed approve of your originating any measure which
might look like an invitation to the Neapolitans to proceed to the election of a
sovereign, although the issue of such election might probably be the restoration
of the family of Bourbon. We have not acknowledged the usurped dynasty of
Naples, and therefore in our eyes Ferdinand II. is the rightful sovereign of that
country ; and your Lordship will carefully avoid any language which might
directly imply the contrary.
" It would certainly be very desirable that the Neapolitans should rise against
their present masters, and in favour of the rights of their former sovereign ;
and in order to excite such a spirit, I am aware how important it is that they
should be taught to expect a correction of former abuses ; but on many
accounts it would be preferable that the restoration of Ferdinand II., however
voluntary on the part of his continental subjects, should be in fact a restora-
tion rather than an election. The improvements which are likely to be adopted
in the Sicilian constitution will pave the way for this event, and serve as a pledge
of what they may expect ; and under the corrections and alterations which
some of the articles are susceptible of, and appear to require, there is a fair
prospect of Sicily holding out to Italy and to Naples the safe and honourable
example of a reformation without violence, and a regenerated constitution
under the sanction, and .with the aid, of the legitimate sovereign." — LORD
CASTLEREAQH to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK, Foreign Office, September 26, 1812;
CastLereagh Correspondence, viii. 275, 276.
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 535
the usages of a constitutional monarchy, he was not aware CHAP.
of the entire change of policy, both foreign and domestic, vn-
with which a change of ministry is often attended. He 18i2-
could not be brought to put any trust, therefore, in assur-
ances of support from this country, and resolved to defend
himself, and retire, if necessary, into Siberia, rather than
submit to the demands of the French Emperor. These
demands were, the entire and rigorous execution of the
Continental System against Great Britain ; acquiescence
in the spoliation of the Emperor Alexander's sister, the
Duchess of Oldenberg ; and the dismissal of the defensive
armaments raised in Russia. But of these the cordial
entrance of Russia into the Continental System was by
far the most important; and if the Czar would have
gone in to that, peace could have been concluded and
intimacy re-established even at the eleventh hour. It
is a striking proof of the extreme distrust which had been
sown in the Emperor's mind by the ill-judged parsimony
of the British Government in 1807, that even now, when
his empire was put in extreme hazard from the necessity
of upholding, in some degree, the commercial connection
with Great Britain, he declined to receive any assistance
from its Government.
But although, from the resolution of the Russian Em-
peror to defend himself alone, Great Britain was, in the Treaty be-
first instance, debarred from rendering any material assist- s[TandRu
ance in the terrible struggle which was approaching, yet, ^y ^
in the alliances which she contributed to form for him,
she rendered the most effective assistance. When the war
3etween these two great potentates broke out, Russia was
still engaged in the contest with Turkey, which had begun
.oon after the treaty of Tilsit. It was obviously of the
ery highest importance that it should be terminated, and
he Russian force there, full 60,000 strong, rendered avail-
ble to withstand the formidable invasion which threatened
hem from the westward. This, however, at first was no
asy matter. It seemed clear at first sight that it was for
536 LORD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP, the interest of Turkey, so far from terminating hostilities
VIL with Russia, to prosecute them with redoubled vigour,
1812. now that so powerful an ally as the French Emperor was
hastening to her assistance. Napoleon has repeatedly
since said that this was so obviously for the interest of
the Turks, and their folly in coming to an understanding
with Russia at this crisis was so great, that it exceeded
all the bounds of human calculation, and relieves him
from all responsibility regarding its effects. So it would
probably have proved, if it had not been for the dupli-
city and bad faith of Napoleon himself. But these
were of such a kind as when once made known could not
be forgiven, and now came to fall with decisive effect
against him. Lord Castlereagh, in conjunction with the
Russian Government, revealed to the Divan the secret
articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in which the two contract-
ing powers had agreed on the partition of Turkey — Russia
getting Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, and Bulgaria ;
and France, Albania, Greece, and the islands of the
Archipelago. Alexander offered Egypt to Napoleon on
condition of Russia getting Constantinople ; but to this
the French Emperor would not agree. Austria disclosed
the offers made to her of getting Servia and Bosnia, on
condition of winking at the scheme of plunder; and
Czerny George gave similar information as to the first of
these provinces. The Turkish Government were struck
with consternation at this intelligence; and they arrived
at the conclusion, not without reason, that, as the two
great Continental powers were thus set upon their de-
tiesTn M^r- struction, their only chance of safety lay in balancing the
22?' 397; one against the other, and that instant destruction would
Ssoso1;' f°U°w ^ie concentration of the whole military strength
sis^ii"'' °f Europe in the hands of Napoleon. Influenced by
vi. 336; these views, they concluded a peace with Russia on
Thiers, vii.
648,649, 28th May 1812; and this was soon after followed by
449/456. one with Great Britain, which was concluded by Lord
Castlereagh on 18th July following.1 As an immediate
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 537
consequence of this pacification, fifty thousand Russians, CHAP.
under Admiral Tchichagoff, instantly broke up from the VIL
banks of the Danube to take a part in the approaching is 12.
contest on the Sarmatian plains.
On the other flank of the great campaign which was ap-
proaching, Lord Castlereagh laboured not less assiduously, i^ord Castie-
and with equal success, to secure for the Russians the effoftsSto
support of which they stood so much in need to withstand treTtVbe-
the accumulated forces of Western Europe. Sweden was ^^en and
a power which, though by no means of the first order, yet Russia-
would become one of great importance in the approaching
conflict, from its geographical position on the flank of the
contending parties, and the well-known military talents of
the fortunate chief who had now obtained the direction
of its affairs. Bernadotte had been chosen by the Swedes
of their own free will, rather against than in pursuance of
the wishes of Napoleon ; but, being extremely ambitious,
he no sooner found himself on the steps of the throne than
he resolved to make the most of his old connection with
the French Emperor to obtain Norway, the grand object
of his ambition. For this purpose, when it had become
evident that a war between Napoleon and Russia was ap-
proaching, he offered the former to put his whole resources
at his disposal if he would guarantee him the possession of
this much-coveted kingdom. This, however, would have im-
mediately induced a rupture with Denmark ; and, although
t is probable the French Emperor would have been as
ittle disquieted at the thoughts of partitioning an ancient
illy as he had been at the thoughts of delivering over his
riends the Turks to the tender mercies of the Russians,
et political considerations of the highest importance for-
ade such a step. Denmark was still nearer to the scene
f the approaching conflict than Sweden, and the situation
f her dominions, having in a manner the command of the
itrances into the Baltic, rendered her alliance of great
iportance as a check both on Russia and England. He
)clined the offer of alliance, therefore, at the price of
538 LOltD CASTLEREAGH.
CHAP. Norway, but reiterated, in the most menacing manner, his
VIL threats of instant hostilities if the harbours of Sweden
1812. were not shut, and war declared against Great Britain.
Deterred by these threats, Bernadotte no longer hesi-
tated, and war was declared against Great Britain on 1 8th
November 1810. But notwithstanding this constrained
compliance, the refusal of Norway rankled in the breast of
the Crown Prince, and induced him to look out on the
earliest opportunity for fresh alliances. He still continued
underhand to permit a commercial intercourse with Great
Britain, at which the French Emperor was so much irri-
i Hard xi. toted tnafc> in January 1812, the French troops entered
113-135; Pomerania, confiscated all the British goods in the har-
Schoell, ix. . ...
96-ioi; bours, levied enormous contributions on the inhabitants,
340.' and began to seize the whole revenue for the imperial
treasury.1
Lord Castlereagh was not slow in turning these events
Peace with to the best account at the Court of Stockholm, on his
condition"^ accession to the Foreign Office, in the beginning of March.
Norweay.ng HG lost no time in despatching a very able minister, Mr
Thornton, to that capital, to co-operate with the Russian
diplomatists in the attempt to detach Bernadotte alto-
gether from the French connection, and bring him in good
earnest to the side of the alliance. Mr Thornton was
well received by the Crown Prince, who professed the
most anxious desire to restore amicable relations with
Great Britain ; but he made no concealment of his de-
termination to make the cession of Norway, upon an
indemnity being provided to Denmark, the price of his
actively joining the Russians. Lord Castlereagh felt the
greatest repugnance at thus handing over a whole king-
dom, without the consent of its inhabitants, to a new
master, although, as we were at war with Denmark, and
she had resisted all offers of accommodation, there was
nothing contrary to the law of nations in so doing. But
the circumstances were so critical that there was no
alternative. The accession of Sweden, or at least its
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 539
neutrality, was indispensable to Russia, and might deter- CHAP.
mine the fate of the campaign, and the emancipation of vn-
the Continent from French subjugation. This could be isi'2-
gained on no other terms. Russia took the lead in the
arrangement. On the 5th and 8th April 1812, treaties
were concluded between the Courts of St Petersburg and
Stockholm, by which the two contracting parties mutually
guaranteed each other's possessions ; and it was stipulated
on the one hand that, in the event of a war with France,
Sweden was to assist Russia with a corps of 30,000 men,
who were to operate in conjunction with 20,000 Russians
in the north of Germany ; and in return, that the Emperor
of Russia was to guarantee Norway to Sweden, upon
Denmark receiving an adequate compensation in Pome-
rania. In the event of the latter power refusing to accede
to this arrangement, Russia was to aid Sweden with 35,000
men to co-operate in the conquest of Norway. These
treaties were kept at the time a profound secret, but they
were in confidence communicated to the British Govern-
ment, and they received from Lord Castlereagh a favour-
able reception, though he did not make England a party
to them. Peace, however, was concluded soon after be-
tween Great Britain and Sweden, at Orebro, on 12th July. |?P- L 431;
. ~ B'gn. x.
Amicable relations were immediately established between 4o§;Thiers,
_. Till T *'''• 4/6-
the two powers, and the fewedisn harbours opened to 491.
British vessels.1
Thus everything combined to induce a struggle of un-
heard-of magnitude and importance between France and chance's of
Russia in Eastern Europe. Napoleon wielded a host of probing
inparalleled magnitude and surpassing efficiency. Never
ince the beginning of the world had such an array fol-
owed the banners of a single chief. Absolute master of
France, Italy, and the half of Germany, with Austria and
'russia as his attendant vassals, he led on four hundred
housand admirable soldiers, of whom eighty thousand were
orse, with thirteen hundred guns ! Russia was far from
aving an equal array to oppose to this crusade. Her whole
540 LORD CASTLEREACH.
CHAP, regular forces on the frontier hardly amounted to two
VIT- hundred and twenty thousand men. There was the great-
181'2- est danger that on this, as on former occasions, terror of
the mighty conqueror might achieve more than his phy-
sical force, great as it was, would be able to effect ; and that
the Russian Emperor, seeing his empire pierced to the
heart, and Moscow or St Petersburg in the hands of the
invader, might deem the contest hopeless, and bend his
neck in silence to the stroke of fate. But, on the other
hand, if the first spring of the foe was withstood, and the
Czar adhered firmly to his declared resolution to retire
to Siberia rather than submit, dangers of a still more
appalling kind might await the ruthless invader. During
the advance the army might be straitened and starved
from the effect of its immense numbers. If forced to carry
on the war in winter, it would certainly perish from the
severity of the climate.
Though Russia in conscious strength combated alone in
her own territory, she had powerful allies on the circum-
ference of her enemy's dominion. Wellington at the head
of sixty thousand British and Portuguese veterans threat-
ened the French forces on the Douro, and would probably
conclude a glorious campaign by driving them over the
Ebro ; the peace with Turkey had liberated fifty thousand
Russians from the banks of the Danube, who might soon
threaten the rear of the invading force ; while thirty thou-
sand Swedes and as many Muscovites menaced his left
flank. Thus, brilliant as it was in many respects, the
situation of the French Emperor was full of peril ; and
though Russia was exposed to the greater hazard in the
outset, it might be doubted whether France might not be
exposed to the most formidable peril in the end.
It does not belong to this biography to give any account
Alexander's of the Russian campaign, great and interesting as its events
of thethrone were, as neither Lord Castlereagh nor Sir Charles Stewart
tof Berna6 were personally brought in contact with them. But there
dotte. js one circumstance in the course of it which has recently
TO THE OPENING OF THE GERMAN WAR. 541
been brought to light, which was so intimately connected CHAP.
with the subsequent career of both, that it calls for espe- VIL
cial notice. After the retreat of the Russians from the 1812-
intrenched camp at Drissa, where it had been originally
intended to have made a stand, the Emperor retired to
Moscow, to electrify the nobles by his presence and hasten
the armaments preparing there, and thence he went to St
Petersburg, and from it to Abo, at the head of the Gulf
of Finland, where he had arranged a meeting with the
Crown Prince of Sweden to concert their joint operations
against the French Emperor. Lord Cathcart, the ac-
credited ambassador of Great Britain at the Russian
Court, was present at the meeting, while Sir Robert
Wilson, the gallant military commissioner of that power,
was cognisant of all the proceedings. Matters of the very
highest importance were there brought under discussion.
Alexander let drop hints which indicated an intention,
if the events of the war proved favourable, of declaring
the throne of France vacant, and bestowing it on Berna-
dotte. When the Crown Prince asked, after the Emperor
had announced his intention of declaring the throne of
France vacant, " To whom, then, would it be given 1 " he
replied, with pointed emphasis, and bowing towards Ber-
nadotte, "Au PLUS DiGNE."1 These three words determined ' Wilson's
the entire future policy of the Crown Prince. They filled camjwipi
him with the hope of ascending the throne of France, and cf 18l2»113-
caused him to shape his course so as to compass the double
objects of overthrowing Napoleon, and yet keep himself
so much out of view on the overturn as not to embitter the
feelings of the French people towards him. In the pur-
suit of this double object he more than once brought the
common cause into the utmost jeopardy, and all but made
shipwreck of the coalition, and the cause of European
reedom. He unquestionably, as will appear in the sequel,
vould have done so, had it not been for the resolution and
noral courage of two men — and those men were Sir Charles
>tewart and Lord Castlereaeh.
CHAPTER VIII.
FROM THE APPOINTMENT OP SIR CHARLES STEWART AS MINISTER
AT THE COURT OF PRUSSIA, IN MARCH 1813, TO THE ARMISTICE
OF PLESWITZ, IN JUNE FOLLOWING.
CHAP. MEMORABLE beyond any other that ever occurred in the
VIIL history of mankind, the year 1813 opened with prospects
IBIS, yery different from those which signalised its termination,
opening of The close of the preceding year, indeed, had witnessed
isiiTSid tne f%nt fr°m Russia of the remnant of the greatest
aspect of hogt which had ever been arrayed against the liberties of
Germany. f .
nations, and all Germany resounded with the awful catas-
trophe, the punishment of improvidence and ambition,
which had cut off or reduced to captivity nearly five
hundred thousand of the best and bravest troops in Chris-
tendom. But in that terrible struggle the victors had
suffered nearly if not quite as much as the vanquished ;
and the exhaustion of a campaign of unexampled extent
and activity was felt even more severely by the former
than the latter, owing to the great inferiority of force
with which they commenced and carried on the struggle.
Although the triumph of Russia had been great, and the
shock to Napoleon immense, the victorious power was
little qualified to take an important part in the prosecution
of the war ; and if the world gazed with wonder on forty
thousand French in rags and misery, of whom only fifteen
thousand had been at Moscow, who alone recrossed the
Niemen after the disastrous campaign, the secret could
not long be concealed that the Russians, who followed
\
SIR CHARLES STEWART. 543
them in an equal state of destitution and exhaustion, did CHAP.
not exceed thirty-five thousand.
Yielding rather to the loudly-proclaimed voice of his isis.
army and his country, and irresolute and undecided to the Situa^n of
very last, the King of Prussia had at length taken the Germany,
J o and treaties
decided step. By a treaty signed at Kalish on the 28th™thPrus-
February, between the Emperor of Russia and the King period by
of Prussia, it had been provided that, to carry on the war tab*
with vigour against Napoleon, an alliance, offensive and e '
defensive, should be established between the two powers,
the former of which was to bring 150,000 men into the
field, the latter 80,000, independent of the garrisons of
the strong places. The convention was to be kept secret
for two months in order to give Prussia time to arm in
her defence ; but, in the mean time, it was to be privately
communicated to England, Austria, and Sweden ; and the
Emperor of Russia engaged never to lay down his arms
till Prussia was reinstated in such a position in all respects
as it was before the year 1806. This was soon after March 23.
followed by a convention intended to effect the deliverance
of Germany from the thraldom of French ambition, which
declared the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine,
and organised all the lesser German states, with the ex-
ception of Hanover, in five sections, each with a military
governor at its head, to prepare the means of defence
against the common enemy. These were the diplomatic
acts of the sovereigns ; but the enthusiasm of the people,
especially in Prussia, far outstripped their comparatively
cautious proceedings, and it was soon evident that, if arms x Marteng
md ammunition could only be supplied in sufficient quan- xii; £64'
* and oup.
ities, the whole male population of the monarchy, capable ii5-.234 ;
Thicrs xv
)f bearing arms, might soon be arrayed in defence of their 328, 332. '
While these great changes were going forward in North-
rn Europe, and during the greater part of the eventful
ear 1812, Sir Charles Stewart remained in London, or its
icinity ; but he was no idle or unconcerned spectator of
544 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, events. On the contrary, he never served the common
vm- cause more efficiently than he did during this eventful
1812. period. His brother Lord Castlereagh, then Minister for
sir Charles Foreign Affairs, though second to none in zeal and ability
hn"oruii8t f°r Prom°ting it, so far as diplomatic or administrative
services measures were concerned, was in a great degree destitute
with the . . ... fe~, . , . .
Govern- of the acquaintance with military affairs which practical
meat. . , . j i_ i. j •
experience alone can give ; and he had, m consequence, not
as yet fully appreciated the importance, or probabilities
of success, of the novel mode of combating the hitherto
invincible military forces of France which Lord Wellington
had adopted. The other members of the Cabinet were
still more desponding ; and it was with no small difficulty,
as already shown, that the British chief had persuaded
them to continue the contest during Massena's invasion.
Even after the signal and momentous defeat of that inroad,
it was no easy matter to get the Government to continue
the struggle, at least on such a scale as to afford any chance
of important success. In these circumstances, it is difficult
to over-estimate the importance of a military counsellor
and friend, such as Sir Charles Stewart, being constantly
with Lord Castlereagh, communicating to him the views
of his chief, and explaining the grounds on which his well-
founded hopes of ultimate success were founded. It was
very much in consequence of these important communica-
tions, which were gladly communicated by Lord Castle-
reagh to the Cabinet, that the efforts of Britain in the
Peninsula, instead of being relaxed during the crisis of
1812, were augmented; that the British army in the field,
exclusive of Portuguese, was raised to 40,000 men, Ba-
dajos taken, Salamanca won, Madrid delivered, and a
foundation laid in the liberation of the south of Spain
for the entire deliverance of the Peninsula in the suc-
ceeding year.
To take proper advantage of the extraordinary burst of
popular feeling in Prussia, and aid in directing the efforts
of the inhabitants in the most efficacious way for the objects
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 545
of the alliance, it was indispensable that an accredited CHAP.
minister should be immediately despatched to Berlin, to VIIL
take such measures, and make such reports, as might turn 1813-
the resources of the two countries to the best account in Require-
defence against the common enemy. To effect this object dMomatic
a very peculiar combination of qualities was required. The e£v<2r to
•*• *• A the Uourt
minister should be one in the confidence, and possessed of of Prussia.
the secret views of the British Government in its relations
with all the Continental powers ; who was intimate with
the military system of Lord Wellington, and could both
communicate to their generals the principles of warfare
which in his hands had proved so successful, and form a
channel of communication between them and that re-
nowned commander. He required also to be one whose
high-bred manners, varied accomplishments, and former
history, were likely to render him acceptable to the northern
sovereigns. By a singular train of circumstances this rare
combination, at the very time it was required, was found
in the brother of the existing Foreign Minister of Great
Britain.
Sir Charles Stewart, having served early in life with
the German armies in Flanders and on the Rhine, was sir Charles
acquainted with their modes of warfare, and personally com^Ld
known to many of their generals ; having acted at the head q!!isitesr.e
)f the staff during four eventful campaigns with Lord
Wellington, and enjoyed in the highest degree his confi-
lence, he was of all men the best qualified to communicate
o others the system of warfare which in his hands had,
)r the first time, proved a barrier to the ambition of
Bvolutionary France; and, attached not less by the ties
f blood than by the most tender and endearing friend-
lip to his brother Lord Castlereagh, he had become the
jpository of his inmost views and ideas in regard to the
ar with that aspiring power. His manners, too, at once
linently courteous and high-bred, his person and coun-
lance singularly fine and handsome, were such as to
;ure for him as ready a reception in the palaces of sove-
VOL. I. 2 M
54G SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, reigns, as his military experience and talents did in the
vm- councils of generals. So obviously did these circumstances
1813. point out Sir Charles Stewart as the proper person to be
the Minister at the Court and headquarters of the King
of Prussia, that when the appointment was bestowed upon
him it was universally felt to be no more than his due,
and that, on this occasion at least, the office had descended
upon the man as the most deserving, not the man been
elevated to the office as the most favoured.*
At the period when Sir Charles Stewart entered on
situation of his important mission, destined to involve him in such
and AflM eventful duties, to open to him a career of so much glory,
the situation of the French and Allied armies in the north
of Europe was as follows : The wreck of Napoleon's
Grand Army, not exceeding 40,000 combatants, of whom
one-half had never seen the Kremlin, but had been picked
up in the course of the retreat, had in the last stage of des-
titution and misery crossed the Niemen and Vistula, and
taken up their cantonments on the left bank of the latter
river — having their right at Warsaw, their centre at Thorn,
and their left on the Baltic, at Dantzic. Some Russian
troops in pursuit had already entered the Prussian terri-
* Sir Charles Stewart's letter of appointment was in these terms : —
" FOREIGN OFFICE, April 9, 1813.
" The successful progress of the Allied armies in the north of Germany has
determined the Prince Regent to intrust an officer of suitable rank with the
superintendence of his military interests in that quarter, and his Royal High-
ness has been graciously pleased to select you for this important service.
" It is his Royal Highness's pleasure that you should consider yourself
specially charged with the military superintendence, so far as Great Britain is
concerned, of the Prussian and Swedish armies ; and with the correspondence
which relates to the supply and operations of these armies, including the auxili-
ary corps which may act under the orders of the Prince Royal of Sweden. In
order to give greater weight to your representations, his Royal Highness has
been pleased to accredit you to his Prussian Majesty, to whose headquarters
you will in the first instance proceed, for the purposes of presenting your cre-
dentials, and of discussing, in concert with Lord Cathcart, ambassador to the
Emperor of Russia, the plan of operations to be executed by the respective
armies. Whilst his Majesty's ambassador to the Court of Russia shall con-
tinue with the armies, it is his Royal Highness's pleasure that the British
mission to the Court of Berlin and Stockholm should correspond with his
Lordship as well as with this office. CASTLEBEAGH."
— MS. Londonderry Papers.
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 547
tory, and Wittgenstein's advance-guard was in possession CHAR
of Konigsberg. The Emperor Alexander had joined the VIIL
Grand Russian Array, now not numbering more than isis.
35,000 combatants, so dreadfully had its ranks been
reduced by the fatigues and sufferings of the winter march
and campaign. Crossing the Vistula at Plock, to avoid
Warsaw, which was still in the hands of the enemy,
he advanced to, and established his headquarters at,
Kalisch. The headquarters of Murat, whom Napoleon
had left in charge of the Grand Army, were at Posen ; but
he soon resigned the command and retired to Naples,
and Eugene Beauharnais succeeded him in that arduous
task. The latter immediately appointed General Rapp
governor of Dantzic, with a garrison of 28,000 men, com-
posed of the stragglers and broken remains of a hundred
regiments, but whom his vigour and resolution soon suc-
ceeded in reorganising in a tolerably efficient form. Four
other fortresses in Poland — Thorn, Modlin, Zamosc, and
Czenstochau — were also garrisoned and put in as good a
state of defence as possible, and the same was done with
the fortresses in the rear, on the Oder — viz., Stettin, Cus-
trin, Glogau, and Spaudau ; but the garrisons of these
strongholds consisted for the most part of invalids, or
those slightly wounded. Schwartzenberg with his Aus-
trians was in cantonments on the right bank of the Pilica
covering Galicia, and Reynier with his Saxons had just
retired from Kalisch on the approach of the Emperor
Alexander. Eugene, with the remnant of the Grand
Army, at first flattered himself he should be able to main-
:ain the line of the Oder ; but on the approach of the
Russians he became sensible that this was impossible, ^'jji Ger-
und, abandoning it to the feeble garrisons thrown into its Pi*11?'}.11-
° ° . 114 ; Thiers,
brtresses, withdrew with all his forces in the field behind xv. 328-340.
he Elbe.1
Previous to this the Prussians had revolted from the
Vench connection, and joined their forces to those of
he Russians, and Lord Walpole had been sent by Lord
548 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. Castlereagh on a secret mission to Vienna, to endeavour
VIIL to discover the views of Austria on the present state of
isis. public affairs and the side it was disposed to take in the
LortMVai- contest for European freedom. With such address was
!n?8sh>netoret kne missi°n managed that his Lordship was a considerable
Vienna, and time in the suburbs of that capital in communication with
views of . *•
Austria at Prince Metternich before his presence came to the ears of
Count Otto, the French minister at the Court of Vienna.
The moment he heard of it he remonstrated with Met-
ternich and insisted on his removal, and the English envoy
was obliged to withdraw. Before he did so, however, he
had become possessed of the secret views of the Austrian
Cabinet, which were by no means to venture upon the
hazardous step of an immediate war with France, for
which neither the finances nor the military preparations
of the empire were then equal ; but to prepare in the
meanwhile for all eventualities, so as to be able to inter-
pose with decisive effect in a future stage of the conflict,
and impose the acceptance of reasonable conditions on
the French Emperor. Lord Walpole on leaving Vienna
repaired te Kalisch, where he met Lord Cathcart, who
had hastened from St Petersburg to the headquarters of
the Russian Emperor, and who ably and worthily repre-
sented Great Britain at the court of that great sovereign,
March 2. from whence he soon after proceeded to London to com-
municate to the British Government the important infor-
('tltlir'll't
113, 114. ' mation he had obtained in regard to the secret views of
both Imperial Cabinets.1
Sir Charles Stewart embarked on his mission as ac-
sir Charles credited minister to the King of Prussia from Yarmouth,
Unfa in on April 13, 1813. The vessel soon reached Cuxhaven,
SeHngVof and ran up the Elbe with great rapidity amidst the
the people, enthusiastic cheers of the people, who crowded to the
water's edge on every pier or projecting point to hail the
representative of England — the power to which all eyes
were invariably turned whenever resistance to France was
in contemplation. On the 19th he landed at Hamburg.
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 549
Everywhere the cry was for arms. Resolute to shake CHAP.
off the yoke of the French, the people were universally VIIL
enrolling themselves in volunteer corps or in the ranks isis.
of the regular army, or landwehr ; but there was a sad
deficiency of arms to take advantage of this patriotic
and warlike enthusiasm. Such was the demand for mili-
tary weapons and accoutrements, that all the munificent
prodigality of England, which was poured forth with
unexampled profusion, was unable to keep pace with it.
For the great and indispensable work of meeting these
universal and pressing requisitions, the administrative
powers of Sir Charles Stewart found an ample field for
exertion ; and by his indefatigable efforts, joined to those
of Lord Castlereagh at home, the wants of the popula-
tion were supplied with a rapidity which could hardly
have been anticipated. To these efforts, by which the
universal arming and equipment of the Prussians, both
1 London-
m the lost and the present provinces of the monarchy, deny's war
was so quickly effected, much of the subsequent success £4. e"
of the campaign is to be ascribed.1
While these things were passing in the north of Ger-
many, Prince Schwartzenberg was at Paris, intrusted by schwar'tzeu-
the Emperor Francis with a most important mission to
the Court of Napoleon. For this task he had been re-
moved from the command of the army which had acted
igainst the Russians in the preceding campaign ; and as
le had been an intimate friend of the Emperor of Austria,
nd the principal party who had been intrusted with the
egotiations relative to the marriage of the Archduchess
larie Louise, it was thought he was the best person to
Dnvey to the Empress Regent the views of her father in
igard to the pacification of Europe. Schwartzenberg
•rived before the Emperor had set out to return to the
•my ; but he had never succeeded in obtaining a private
idience of any length with him, so justly had he antici-
ited the object of his mission, and so determined was
to resist it. After his departure to resume the
550 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, command of the army oil the Elbe, the Austrian Prince
vm- succeeded in obtaining several private interviews of the
1813. Empress. But he entirely failed in the object of his
mission. He found the Empress strongly impressed
with the power of Napoleon, and with unbounded con-
fidence in his star, but as thoroughly convinced that
she herself would run extreme risk, if a rupture were
to break out between France and Austria. To all the
representations which the Austrian ambassador could
make in regard to the danger which Napoleon ran by
continuing the contest, the only reply which he could
obtain was, that the power of the Emperor was im-
mense, and that she had the fullest confidence in his
genius ; that she did not understand war or anything
regarding it ; and that all she entreated was that, having
888-397'. been sent there as a pledge of peace, she should noc be
exposed to the horrors of revolutionary hostility.1
Foiled in his endeavours to make an impression on the
Conference Imperial Cabinet through this channel, Schwartzenberg
slwajtzend next attempted to attain the same object through the
Duke de Bassano (Maret), with whom he had been on
terms of such intimacy during the negotiations which pre-
ceded the marriage, that he was enabled to approach him
at once in the most confidential manner. To this expe-
rienced diplomatist he opened himself in several secret
conferences in the most unreserved manner, enlarging on
the immensity of the losses which the Emperor had sus-
tained in the Moscow campaign, the inexperience of the
young troops in course of formation to replace those which
had been lost, the profound feelings of hostility by which
Germany was agitated, and the impossibility of avoiding
the greatest disasters but by such timely concessions as
might enable Austria to throw her weight into the balance
in favour of France, by openly contending along with her
for a just and equitable pacification. To all these con-
siderations M. de Bassano turned a deaf ear, alleging the
marriage which had united the two imperial crowns as
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 551
a sufficient security for the fidelity of Austria to its CHAP.
engagements under any circumstances which could pos- vm-
sibly occur. " The marriage ! " exclaimed Schwartzen- isis.
berg, for a moment losing patience ; " policy has made it
— policy may unmake it." These words revealed to the
experienced diplomatist the pensfe intime of Austria,
and the depth of the abyss upon the edge of which Na-
poleon stood. But knowing that the mind of the latter
was made up, and that he was resolved to stand the
chance of a contest rather than make any concession, he
deemed it better not to communicate them to his master,
and Schwartzenberg returned to Vienna in despair at
the determination of the French Emperor, and without
having accomplished any of the objects for which he had
been sent to Paris.
While everything was conspiring to produce a hostile
result in the French capital, affairs at Vienna did not by Aspect of
any means wear a more pacific aspect. M. de Narbonne, vienL!'
the French ambassador, in vain contended there against
the settled determination of the Emperor and Prince
Metternich, and the loudly expressed opinions and feel-
ings of all ranks of the people. But there were many
reasons which inclined the Emperor and his able Minister
to adopt a more cautious and moderate policy. The
military establishment of Austria was still on a very re-
duced scale, and the finances of the empire were in still
greater embarrassment. The Emperor was deeply inte-
rested by the marriage which had united the two imperial
louses in the preservation of the empire of France, and
t would have been the cause of the greatest regret to
rim to see his grandson deprived by the folly of his
ather of the first crown in Christendom. For these rea-
ons, despite the ancient rivalry of France and Austria,
nd the deep wounds which had been inflicted on the
itter power by the former since the Revolution broke
ut, the Imperial Cabinet had no wish to precipitate
ostilities, or even engage in them at all, if the bless-
552 SIR, CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, ing of an equitable pacification, such as was likely to
vm- prove durable, could be attained in any other way. Their
1813. object was, by appearing on the field in the character of
armed mediators, and with the understanding rather than
the threat that they would join their arms to the power
which accepted the terms for which they contended, and
act against the one which refused to accede to such an
arrangement as might in some degree restore the balance
of power in Central Europe, to induce the Emperor of
France to accept such reasonable conditions as might
eradicate the germ of future and desolating hostilities,
invariably consequent on the undue preponderance of any
one great military power. On these terms they were
desirous to keep Napoleon on the throne of France, and
iThiers, xv. _ . ,.. , _._-.___.,,
399,400. secure to him a greater dominion than Louis XIV. had
ever enjoyed.1
When Austria, Russia, and Prussia were making such
Secret ne- efforts, some by military preparations, some by diplomatic
letwee°n movements, to effect the deliverance of Germany, it was
the8Kingacrf scarcely possible, and, were it possible, would not have
Saxony. been creditable, that the lesser states of Germany itself
should remain strangers to the movement. The Cabinets
of Dresden and Munich, however, were by no means dis-
inclined to entertain the proposals communicated to them
in secret by the Cabinet of Vienna. These proposals were,
that Saxony was to renounce the throne of the Grand Duchy
of Warsaw, which was of no real value to it, and afforded
a constant cause of embroilment with Russia, and to pro-
vide an indemnity for it in some other possessions nearer
home. Metternich was also very desirous to obtain the
removal or direction of the Saxon corps forming part of
the army of Prince Schwartzenberg. The military force of
Saxony, though not large, was by no means to be despised,
especially in the equal balance of the contending powers
in the contest which was approaching. To favour the secret
negotiations between Austria and Saxony which had been
commenced, and deliver Austria from all uneasiness in
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 553
that quarter, an armistice was concluded between the CHAP.
Russians under Sacken and the Austrian general, and then vm-
a secret convention, in virtue of which the Austrians were 1813.
to retire into Galicia, whither they were not to be fol-
lowed by the Russians, and the Polish corps of Ponia-
towski was to be transported across the Austrian states
r J Tlners,xv.
to Dresden, there to be at the disposal of the Emperor 403-405.
Napoleon.1
With Bavaria the Cabinet of Vienna had also opened
secret negotiations ; but it was not so easy to arrange Secret ne-
matters with that power, for Austria had nothing to offer with B^-
her in exchange for the rounding of the Austrian frontiers va
on the Inn, and the probable cession of the Tyrol, which
was the object the Imperial Cabinet had most at heart.
Notwithstanding this, the current of German feeling rose
so strong in Bavaria, as in Saxony, that the Government
was in a manner forced to lend an ear to these secret pro-
posals. They led to no result at the moment, however,
because the preparations of Austria were as yet so in-
complete, and her inclination to pacific mediation so de-
cided, that she neither could nor would at that period
draw the sword, and of course the lesser powers, whose
dominions were filled with French troops, could not de-
clare themselves till the Cabinet of Vienna had done so.
The King of Saxony, however, solemnly engaged to join
he Confederacy as soon as Austria did so ; and, in the2MS. Loni
nean time, to withdraw his forces from French control, £aP,ersj.
7 Cathcart,
,nd in some degree regain his freedom of action, he re- i2?;
ired to Prague, in the Austrian territories, but without 405, 40«. '
ny overt act of hostility against the French Emperor.2 *
* Lord Castlereagh's views at this juncture are well explained in the fol-
wing despatch to Lord Cathcart, the ambassador at the Court of Russia : — -
The great object on the present occasion is to induce the Emperor of Russia
give confidence to all the Germanic powers, who are by any means capable of
ing detached from Buonaparte, and I have no doubt his Imperial Majesty
>uld himself be disposed to take that line ; but if those whom he employs are
t hearty, or not believed to be sincere in that policy, the views of the mon-
:h will be lost in the distrust of his agents. . . . The general principle of
ing confidence to all powers which can be induced to take a part in reducing
534 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. It was in the midst of these complicated and iinport-
vni- ant negotiations that M. de Narbonne, the French ambas-
1813. sador, arrived at Vienna with Napoleon's final proposal
Na Jiton's to Austria. Unfortunately, the terms which M. de Nar-
Aubptn?al:i to bonne came authorised to propose, so far from being in
the remotest degree favourable to the independence of
Germany, were diametrically the reverse. They amounted
in substance to this : that Prussia should be entirely de-
i gir Chag stroyed, and partitioned between Saxony, which was to
Stewart to receive the greater portion, and Austria, which was to be
Lord Castle- . n \
reagh. May indemnified for all its losses, and the permanent cession
MS. ; ' of the Tyrol to Bavaria, by the restoration of the whole
V' of Silesia, and the acquisition of a considerable portion
of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.1
How tempting soever these offers might be to the Aus-
- trian Cabinet, they had moderation and good sense enough
Mrede6Nar- to elude accepting them. Metternich turned all his efforts
bonne with £0 extracting from M. de Narbonne more in detail the
Metternich.
specific terms which Napoleon was inclined to propose or
accept. With this view, after enumerating the immense
losses which the French had sustained in the Moscow
campaign, and describing the universal feeling in Germany,
which was to take advantage of the crisis to effect the
the power of France, and restoring the independence of Germany, which I have
above adverted to, is what I can alone recommend as an answer to all the sup-
positions you suggest in your private letter of the 24th November.
" It seems utterly impossible at the present moment to prescribe to you any
precise scheme, or even to express our particular wishes. Whatever scheme of
policy can most immediately combine the greatest number of powers and the
greatest military force against France, so as to produce the utmost effect
against her, before she can recruit her armies and recover her ascendancy, is
that which we must naturally desire most to promote. And I should there-
fore wish that you would not discourage any Russian plans which you think cal-
culated to produce this effect, from any supposition that we may be entangled
in any political schemes of our own. Our great object is to take the north of
Europe out of the hand.s of Buonaparte ; and whatever plan can be devised for
insuring success in this main point will not meet with opposition here, because
it is not of our suggestion, or does not quite fall in with all our private views.
.... The letter you enclosed from Vienna supposed that Court precluded
from following her wishes by engagements into which she had been reluctantly
forced; but I still think there must be means sufficient to remove those
scruples if well applied." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD CATHCAUT, January 15,
1813} Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 303-305.
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 555
entire liberation of the country from French domination, CHAP.
he went on to add that he himself was far from being VIIL
swept away with the torrent, that he was well aware of 1813-
the immense resources which still remained to the French
Emperor, and that he had no inclination to revive the
hostile policy from which the monarchy had already suf-
fered so much. Still, continued he, we must not shut our
eyes to self-evident truths. Austria, though powerful, is
not omnipotent; and if she is to attempt modifying the
passions which are now so powerfully moving the whole
of Germany, she must be able to show that she is acting
with a view to obtaining peace on such moderate and
equitable terms as may convince the majority of the Ger- 409.
man people of the expedience of supporting them.1
Descending then to more specific proposals, the Aus-
trian minister enforced the impossibility of maintaining continued,
any longer the chimera of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw,
irretrievably condemned by the campaign of 1812 ; and
descanted on the necessity of reconstituting the second-
rate powers, and especially Prussia, the only real sub-
stitute for Poland, for ever destroyed, on an enlarged
scale ; on the impossibility of continuing the Confede-
ration of the Rhine — an institution decidedly adverse
:o the spirit of the country, and more burdensome
>han useful to Napoleon ; on the difficulty of bringing
,he belligerent powers to consent to the annexation of
lamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, and the other Hanse towns,
o the French dominion. " We shall have difficulty
nough," added Metternich, " to prevent them from speak -
ag of Holland, Spain, Italy. England will probably insist
pon them ; and if she should yield on Holland and Italy,
ssuredly she will not do so on Spain. But let us not
implicate affairs by considering what she may demand :
' it should become necessary, we shall put England aside,
id treat without her. We may even succeed in detach-
g Russia from Prussia if we present to them acceptable
Tms, and in that event France will find us again faithful
556 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, allies. But for Heaven's sake explain yourselves. Make
vm- known to us your "wishes, and afford us the means of re-
1813- maining your allies by giving us a reasonable cause to
409/4io.xv' defend — a cause we need not be ashamed to proclaim to
" i
our people."
To all these proposals M. de Narbonne, who as yet was
Conclusion without definitive instructions, and who was sent rather to
ference.con feel his way as to the designs of Austria than reveal those
of France, replied only by renewing his assurances as to
the boundless resources of France, and the necessity of
yielding much to the iron will of the Emperor. Mean-
while, however, he had divined the secret views of the
Austrian diplomatist, which were, to make the transition
from the state of an ally to that of an armed mediator;
and, in the interim, to arm with all possible rapidity, in
order to be able to assume the latter character with dig-
nity and effect. The views of Metternich were not at
bottom much at variance with those of M. de Narbonne,
who was profoundly convinced of the impossibility of up-
holding in its full extent the French domination in Ger-
many; and if the matter had been left to them alone, it
would probably have been brought to an accommodation.
But unfortunately a third party soon intervened on the
scene whom it was not so easy a matter to coerce. On
April 9. the 9th April, the final instructions of Napoleon arrived,
which had been despatched from Paris on the 29th March.
These enjoined the French ambassador to insist that, as
the Cabinet of Vienna desired peace, they should forthwith
take the only steps which could secure it, and these were,
to assume at once the principal place in the contest,
and prepare to support it by the preparation of ade-
quate forces. With this view she was required to be
prepared to throw 100,000 men on the flank of the bel-
ligerent parties on the frontiers of Silesia; and if the
Allies would not agree to the terms proposed, to invade
that province, and keep it for herself, while she left to
Napoleon the task of driving the Russians, Prussians,
CAMPATGN OF isis. 557
Swedes, and English beyond the Vistula. So peremptory CHAP.
were the instructions of the Emperor, that M. de Narbonne VITL
felt he would best discharge his duty by reading them
without commentary to the Austrian diplomatist, which
he accordingly did.1
Metternich, in answer, asked, What proposals of peace
did the French Emperor intend to tender to the Allied Answer of
powers if they agreed to suspend hostilities I To this 2 N^ch
question M. de Narbonne had no reply to make ; for le0°Saiss u>°
Napoleon, according to his uniform system, preserved aAustria-
studious silence upon that point in order to be in a situa-
tion to take advantage of any eventualities which might
arise in his favour. As Narbonne could not give any
specific information on this material subject, Metternich
asked for two days to consider the grave and important
communication which had been made to him. At the
close of that time he assured the French ambassador,
with the most sincere air and friendly manner, that the
Austrian Cabinet entirely concurred with the French
Emperor in thinking that Austria could never, in the
:ircumstances, assume a secondary position, or limit her
iction to what had taken place in 1812. "Austria,"
aid he, " has foreseen this, and prepared for it. That
3 the cause of the extensive armaments which have
een made, and which, independent of the troops returned
-om Poland, and of the corps of observation in Galicia,
ill soon provide for her a hundred thousand men in
oheniia. Austria has no views at variance with those
? the Emperor Napoleon, as to the manner in which
le should present herself to the belligerent powers,
le will propose to the powers to halt, to conclude an
mistice, and to name plenipotentiaries. If they agree
this, then will be the time to propose terms of peace ;
d on that subject she impatiently awaits the further
nmunicatious promised by the French Government,
on the contrary, they should refuse to entertain any
)posals of peace, then will be the time to act, and
558 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, to determine on the mode of employing the forces of
IIL Austria conjointly with those of France. This state of
1813. things evidently demonstrates the insufficiency of the pre-
sent treaty of alliance, and the necessity of modifying it
according to the change of circumstances. It is plain,
therefore, that it is necessary to give a new direction to
the Austrian auxiliary force on the frontiers of Poland,
and bring it, along with the Polish corps in whose com-
pany it has been, into the Austrian territory, in order to
prevent its being employed contrary to the views of the
two powers. I am perfectly satisfied with the explana-
tions now given, and hasten to say how much satisfaction
it gives me to be entirely in unison with the French
Cabinet, and with how much pleasure I would revert to
our former position of allies rather than the recent one
1 Thiers, sv. *
4t6, 417. of mediator, which has in a manner been forced upon
us."1
Such was the situation of diplomatic affairs, which
Positions of eventually became of such moment in this war, at the
wd Allied time when Sir Charles Stewart joined the headquarters
This period, of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, which
chl° stew- ne did at Dresden on the 26th April. Napoleon was
theAmed st^ at Mayence, engaged with almost superhuman activity
headquar- fn urging forward, organising, and providing for the wants
of the immense army of recruits which he had succeeded
in raising and equipping since his return from Moscow,
to supply the losses of that terrible campaign. The
cavalry, in particular, which had lost nearly all its horses
during the Moscow retreat, was the object of his par-
ticular attention ; and every horseman of the Guard, in
addition to the steed on which he himself was mounted,
had two led horses with him, to remount the cavaliers of
the Guard who were awaiting them dismounted behind
the Saale. The genius and spirit of the French nation
3 Marmont, ° A
v. 7-10 ; seconded the efforts of the Emperor to a wish, and
indeed they never could have met with the success which
actually attended them,2 if they had not been seconded
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 559
by the unanimous wishes and efforts of all classes of the CHAP.
people. vm-
Napoleon calculated upon being able to bring up isis.
150,000 men from the Rhine to the Saale, behind which ForJs°of
river Eugene had collected 40,000 men, the poor remains NaP°leon-
of the immense host which had been engaged in the
Russian wrar. Forty thousand had already joined him
under Lauriston in March ; and he reckoned on as many
more coming up from Italy. Now, after making all allow-
ance for the ineffectives, he hoped to be able to debouch
from the Thuringian Forest with 200,000 men. This
was a much larger force than the Allies could by possibi-
lity oppose to them, for the largest calculations made the
united force of the Russians and Prussians not to exceed
130,000 men. The army was thus distributed : Ney
commanded one corps of five divisions, 48,000 strong,
the headquarters of which were at Wurzburg, but its
advanced-guard occupied Erfurth ; * Marmont commanded
another of four divisions, 27,000 in number, which was
farther in the rear, being organised at Hanau ; Bessieres
was at Eisenach with six battalions of the Old, and six-
teen of the Young Guard, which had been brought up
from Spain only 15,000 sabres and bayonets; Bertrand
was at Cobourg with his corps, consisting of three divi-
sions, numbering 20,000, one of which was the Wurtem-
3erg contingent ; Oudinot, with his corps and a Bava-
•ian division, 25,000 in all, was at Saalfeld ; and Eugene,
nth, the remains of the army of 1812, consisting of
Victor's corps, which had never been beyond Smolen-
ko, with the corps of Lauriston and Macdonald, was on
he left bank of the Elbe, with his left at the junction of
'lat river and the Saale, his centre at Bernberg, and his
ght stretching out to the Hartz Mountains. The united
>rce of these corps under Eugene, after leaving 28,000
* The numbers here given are those only actually present with the eagles,
ic numbers on paper were: Ney, 60,000; Marmont, 40,000; Guard, 40,000;
rtrand and Oudinot, 50,000; Eugene, 80,000; small German contingents
,000 -in all, 280,000.
SCO SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, men in Dantzic, and 32,000 in the fortresses on the Elbe
VIIL and the Oder, amounted to 62,000. The entire forces of
1812. which Napoleon could dispose in the beginning of May
amounted on paper to 280,000 men ; but those effective
and present with the eagles were only 200,000. In addi-
tion to this, there were three armies of reserve forming,
one in Italy, one at Mayence, and one in Westphalia,
but the nearest of them could not be on the theatre of
war before the middle of June. Still there were, after
making every deduction, 170,000 effective men who
might be relied on for the first shock of war on the plains
of Saxony, in the beginning of May ; and this accordingly
is the estimate alike of M. Thiers, Sir Charles Stewart,
and Sir George Cathcart, who were on opposite sides,
and had access to the best sources of information. The
Tbierefxv. proportion of cavalry in these forces was very small,
447'- 4L^nd — much below what is usual ; but the artillery, which
7LCitihn amounted to 450 pieces, was in first-rate order; and the
cart, 119, . .
120. Guard and old troops in the army were inferior to none
in the world in courage and discipline.1 *
* Sir Charles Stewart, soon after his arrival in Hamburg, which he reached
on 19th April, wrote to Lord Castlereagh the following account of the position
and strength of the contending armies : —
" DRESDEN, 26th April.
" Buonaparte is supposed to have arrived at Erfurth (if not more advanced),
and I learn the amount of French force assembled on this side the Rhine is
rated at 160,000 men — far superior to the Allies in numbers, but infinitely
inferior as to their composition, particularly from want of cavalry. So bad is
the description of these new troops, that a French general was heard to say,
' Que f erous-nous avec ces cochons de lait ? '
"The general position of the Allied army is along the Saale. General
Blucher's corps on the left attends to the mountains which bound Saxony on
the side of the Thuringian Forest. His headquarters are at Altenberg. Count
Wittgenstein is in the centre, with General D'York on the right, about Dessau.
To the northward is General Bulow's division, observing Magdeburg. Kutu-
sofFs corps is some miles in front of this place (Dresden) ; and Milaradowitch
forms his advance at Chemnitz. The reserves of the armies are here. Yester-
day 15,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry defiled before the sovereign.
" The Prussian army amounts at present to about 60,000 or 70,000 men. It
is raising to 130,000, besides militia. I doubt, from what I hear, that the Rus-
sian force now up conies as high as 60,000. The French extend from Cobourp,
in the Thuringian Forest, by Meiningen and Eisenach to Halberstadt, where
the vice-king's headquarters now are."
On the 27th April Sir Charles had an audience of the King of Prussia, and
CAMPAIGN OP 1813. 5G1
The forces which the Allies could accumulate to meet CHAP.
this enormous body of men were greatly inferior in point vm-
of numbers. The general position and force of the Allied isis.
armies when hostilities, after a short pause, were renewed, Fo
were as follow : — The Kino; of Prussia had pushed P08'4™8 of
the Allies.
forward all the regular troops which were disposable to
Zwickau, in Saxony, but they did not exceed 25,000
men, under the command of General Blucher. They
were in communication with a Russian corps, 15,000
strong, under Winzingerode, which lay between Merse-
burg and Altenburg, with parties extending to Weimar.
The Russian general, Wittgenstein, had formed a junc-
tion with the Prussian corps of D' York ; and their united
force, 40,000 strong, had crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and
was moving in the direction of Halle. General Bulow,
with 10,000 men, was observing Magdeburg, in which
there was a strong French garrison ; and Tettenborn,
with a light corps of 4000 foot and 3000 Cossacks, wase; Oath-
at Celle, in the neighbourhood of Bremen. Thus the n$| Tilers,
whole force of the Allies on the line of the Elbe
somewhat under 100,000 ; but they were so widely scat-
;ered, and had so long a line of country to defend, that reagh, April
t was certain that not more than 70,000 could be as- MS.
enabled at any one point for a general battle.1
Besides these forces, however, the Allies reckoned on
he support, on their extreme right, of a prince of wide Accession of
3lebrity, at the head of a powerful army, though muchtoCtheCon-
)0 far off to be of any service in the hostilities that ei
ere immediately to commence. This was Bernadotte,
rince Royal of Sweden, who, as already mentioned, had
;en gained to the Allied cause. It had been agreed
at he was to make common cause with the Russians in
e war against Napoleon ; and it was owing to this con-
ation that Baron Steingel, in the preceding campaign,
] sen ted his credentials. Upon that occasion his Majesty expressed the very
i .test satisfaction which this early demonstration of the sympathy and friend-
t of Great Britain afforded him.— MS. Londonderry Papers.
VTOL. I. 2 N
562 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, had been detached from Finland, and brought up to
VIIL the Dwina to reinforce Wittgenstein. The amicable rela-
isis. tions thus established had been since successfully im-
proved by Lord Castlereagh on the part of Great Britain,
who, through the able minister at Stockholm, Mr Thorn-
ton, arranged a convention by which the forces of Sweden
were to be brought forward in an efficient way for the
support of the common cause. By this convention, which
March 13. was concluded at Oerebro on the 13th March, it was
stipulated that Sweden was to bring 30,000 men into
the field, which were to be reinforced by 20,000 Russians,
and the whole were to act in Germany under the com-
mand of the Prince Royal. To defray the expense of
this armament, England engaged to pay Sweden a sub-
sidy of £1,000,000 a-year, by equal instalments monthly,
and to cede Guadaloupe to her. The implied condition
of this treaty was the annexation of Norway to Sweden ;
for though it was not expressly provided for, it was not
obscurely alluded to in the clause of the treaty which
provided that England " should not only oppose no
obstacle to the perpetual annexation of Norway to Swe-
den, but should facilitate in that respect the views of the
King of Sweden, not only by good offices, but by employ-
ing, if necessary, a naval co-operation in concert with the
Swedish and Russian troops." Force, however, was not
to be employed, unless the King of Denmark had pre-
viously declined to join the alliance. In virtue of this
treaty 7000 Swedes had already arrived at Stralsund,
and 10,000 more, under the Prince Royal in person, were
s™avte2;5i- sh°rtly expected at the same place, to co-operate with
Lond. 6, 7 ; Tettenborn and the Prussian and Hanoverian levies in the
Thiers, xv.
453, 451. north of Germany, on the extreme right of the Allied line
of operations.1*
* Lord Castlereagh was well aware of the objections to the assignment of
Norway to Sweden as the price of the latter power joining the Allies, but ho
vindicated it on its true ground, that of absolute necessity. On the 28th April
he wrote to Lord Cathcart in the following terms : — " Neither Russia nor
Great Britain (were it even politic) can now break with Sweden without a loss
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 5G3
Sir Charles Stewart's attention was in the first instance, CHAP.
after landing in Germany, directed to the formation and vm-
organisation of the Hanoverian levies. In proportion as isia.
the French, in the course of their retreat, withdrew from
this country, the inhabitants spontaneously organised
themselves in battalions to resist the common enemy.
It was at first proposed to concentrate them on one point ;
but Sir Charles wisely advised that the rudiments, at
least, of military discipline should be learned in the
parishes where the recruits were obtained, both as less
expensive, and as less likely to attract the notice of the
enemy, and give him the means of striking a serious
blow. His advice was immediately acted upon, and with
the happiest effect. His next object was to ascertain from
headquarters the real sentiments of Bernadotte, who was
hourly expected at Stralsund, and with this view he
sent Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, an officer of zeal and
ability, to the Prince Eoyal's headquarters. At the
same time he directed the issue to the Hanoverian
levies of 5000 stand of arms, in addition to those
already furnished from the British supplies, which had
i
an important effect in stimulating the ardour of that 10.
brave and loyal people.1
A circumstance occurred at this time not a little
24
mrious, as indicating the opposite principles on which offers to
he war was about to be carried on by the contending
>arties, and on which occasion Sir Charles Stewart bnbei
Dudly spoke out the sentiments of his Government,
''horn had lately capitulated, with its garrison of 3000
" character ; and the only object now is, to render the alliance useful to the
>mmon cause. We never have disguised from ourselves the embarrassments
the Norwegian point ; but it was an engagement made in the day of adver-
y, for the preservation of Russia. That it has essentially contributed to
re her, and, with Russia, the rest of Europe, cannot be doubted ; and this
ist not be forgotten iu the day of prosperity, either for our own conven-
ice, or to conciliate the sentiments of powers that were then seeking their
ety in the connection of France. We must have a clear case of good faith
the part of Russia, as well as on our own, or we cannot go to Parliament for
>sidy." — LORD CASTLEREAQH to LORD CATHCART, April 28, 1813 ; Cattle-
gh Correspondence, viii. 382, 383.
564 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, men, to the Russian general, Langeron ; and Spandau, in
ym- the neighbourhood of Berlin, was closely blockaded, and
IBIS, had made proposals of surrender to the Allies, which had
been referred to Count Wittgenstein. The recovery of
this stronghold was a great object to the inhabitants of
the capital, as well from its close vicinity as because it
was supposed to contain, on the information of the French
themselves, an enormous quantity of plunder, which had
been lodged in the place by Eugene Beauharnais, the
viceroy of Italy, and which the Prussians were fearful
he might, by capitulation, acquire the right to carry out
of the country. Meanwhile intimation came in from
various quarters that there was a more expeditious way
of becoming master of the place than either siege or
blockade, and that the commanders of this and some
other fortresses would not be proof against adequate
offers of money. The matter was communicated to Sir
Charles Stewart, as the supplies for this as other services
were, in the utter destitution of Prussia, looked for from
England ; but he at once declared " that any such mea-
sures on the part of Great Britain were wholly out of the
* sirChas. question : that if the Allied armies could drive the
IStewart to ^
Loni castie- French over the Rhine the fortresses would not long
reagh, April
25, '1813, hold out ; and that we had now but one object to look
Lond.lT. to, which was to annihilate Buonaparte by force of arms,
and not by treachery or gold/'1
There can be no doubt that this answer was the one
state"of which befitted the representative of a great nation con-
i Je'sraean on ducting war on honourable principles ; and as such it re-
£2**'" ceiye(i tne cordial approbation of the British Government.
But the expectations which Sir Charles had been led to
form as to the speedy driving the French over the Rhine,
from the sanguine expectations of Hamburg and Berlin,
were soon dispelled. On arriving at the Allied head-
quarters at Dresden on the 26th April, he found matters
in a very different and much less promising state. He
was .admitted to an audience with Baron Hardenberg on
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 5G5
the following morning, and nothing could be more flatter- CHAP.
ing or gratifying than his reception by that distinguished VIIT-
minister, or encouraging than the assurances which he
gave him as to the determination of both sovereigns to
carry on the war with unanimity and vigour till the great
object of effecting the deliverance of Germany was
effected. Prussia was now implicated beyond the possi-
bility of change in the grand scheme of hostility against
France ; unless the armies of the latter were driven
across the Rhine, nothing but partition and ruin could
be anticipated by its sovereign or inhabitants. But the
immediate prospect of effecting the removal of these
calamities was far from being satisfactory. Near Stettin
a slight reverse had been sustained ; and a letter had
been intercepted from Eugene to Marshal Ney, which
disclosed a plan of attacking Blucher, who was now at
Altenburg, so far in advance as to be unsupported. The
united force of the two French generals was 50,000 men ;
and others to a greater amount were pressing through
the Thuringian Forest. In a word, it was evident that
Napoleon's force was much greater than had been sup-
posed ; and that, so far from meditating a retreat across
the Rhine, he was contemplating a triumphant march to
the Oder and the Vistula. In these circumstances, it
was with no small joy that the Allied sovereigns learned
Tom Sir Charles Stewart that Great Britain was prepared
;o furnish the sinews of war in the most liberal manner ;
ind that, in addition to the £2,000,000 stipulated by the
reaty of alliance to be given to Russia and Prussia, she g
^as to give £500,000 for the charge of the Russian fleet
laced in deposit in the British harbours, and £2,000,000 28,gi8i3,pl1
. M. . -,-, . MS.; Lond.
lore to sustain the military operations or the Prince n-is.
',oyal of Sweden in the north of Germany.1
These gratifying assurances insured for Sir Charles
tew art the most flattering reception from the King of
russia, at an audience with which he was honoured on
ie following day, when he presented his credentials. On
566 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, this occasion his Majesty dwelt with earnestness on the
vm- immense efforts which Prussia had already made, and
IBIS. Was preparing to make, for the prosecution of the war,
intdStew of adding, that the forces which she as yet had on foot were
stewarTles not a na^ °^ tuose which she was prepared ultimately to
Hi? 'of6 bring into the field. The following morning brought the
Pmssia._ agreeable intelligence of the fall of Spandau — a success of
no small importance, both as letting loose the blockading
force and quieting the apprehensions of the inhabitants
of Berlin. But grave events were on the wing ; and in-
telligence arrived on the same day which rendered an
immediate concentration of the Allied forces necessary,
and gave unmistakable tokens of a great battle approach-
ing. An officer arrived from Sir Robert Wilson, who
was with the advance at Chemnitz, announcing that the
enemy, in great strength, were moving upon the Allied
left, and that their advanced-guard had reached Jena,
while the Emperor himself was at Erfurth.* It was
known that the entire force of the enemy was 170,000,
Stewart to while the Allies could not, at the very utmost, collect
Je°agdh? April more tnan 80,000 at any one point ; while the French
i f°rce> being ail drawn from Mayence and the Rhine, was
rta t comparatively concentrated in one line of advance.1 But
1 19-122.' notwithstanding this great disparity of force, no fears
were entertained, either at the Allied headquarters or in
* " An officer is just arrived from Wilson at Chemnitz. The enemy are
moving on our left : their advance has reached Jena. In consequence of
their approach, the Allied army are more closely concentrating on the Saale
between Merseburg on the right and Altenburg on the left. Wittgenstein
has removed from Dessau to the former place. Milaradowitch is thrown for-
ward towards Plauen to strengthen the left ; and the movements are indi-
cative of a serious event, of which, from the enthusiasm prevailing, there
can be no doubt, although, as you will see by Buonaparte's document, he
reckons his forces at 200,000 men, and he states himself 170,000 collected
here. I hope the Allies will force him to fight in the plain ; but the misfor-
tune is, the country near the Thuringian Forest is exactly what will enable
him, if he is beat, to get off well without being annihilated by the Cossack
cavalry ; and having his fortresses on the Rhine, he does not risk so much as
the Allies in a battle, who, if worsted, would have difficulty, with only one
good bridge here over the Elbe, and Magdeburg, &c., in the hands of the
enemy. However, there is nothing to fear." — SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD
CASTLEREAGH, April 29, 1813 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 387, 388.
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 567
their armies, of the result ; for not only was their self- CHAP.
confidence at the very highest point, from the successes VIIL
of the preceding campaign, but they were aware that 1813-
more than half the French army was composed of raw
young conscripts, little calculated either to brave the
fatigues of long marches and wet bivouacs, or to with-
stand in regular battle the veterans of the Moscow cam-
paign.
Old Marshal Kutusoff had been taken ill, and died
27
in his progress through Silesia ; but the loss of this Death of
veteran abated nothing of the confidence of the Allies,
After much deliberation, the command -in -chief was
bestowed on Count Wittgenstein, whose successful cam-*0^8-
° Leipsio.
paign on the Dwina, and great services at the passage
of the Beresina, had procured for him a high military
reputation. As the Emperor of Russia and King of
Prussia, however, were at headquarters, his command
was little more than nominal, and he stood in the un-
pleasant predicament of bearing the responsibility of
operations of which he had by no means the uncontrolled
direction. He was, though by no means a consummate
general, of a daring intrepid disposition ; and he readily
went into the project, then the favourite one at head-
quarters, to advance before the enemy had recovered the
consternation produced by the catastrophe of the last
campaign, and give them battle, however superior they
might be in number, with whatever forces could be
assembled for the purpose. Though this was the general
opinion, however, and the one which was immediately
acted upon, yet there were not wanting others, among
whom was Sir Charles Stewart, who viewed the matter
in a different light. They pointed out that the enemy
were greatly superior in guns and foot-soldiers, but pro-
portionally inferior in cavalry : that this advantage
vould be lost if they advanced to the Saale to meet
hem, because the Thuringian Mountains in the rear
vould afford the enemy a secure place of retreat, where
568 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, the Allied horse could not follow them ; whereas the Allies
vm- themselves, if worsted, would have no line of retreat but
1813. by the bridge of Dresden, as the others, especially that
at Magdeburg, were in the hands of the enemy. Witt-
genstein and the Allied generals were not insensible to
i Lond H_ these considerations, but they deemed them overbalanced
ciiCi20- by *ne importance of striking a decisive blow in the
Jra'ilii? outset °f *ne campaign; and as they were confident of
34i. ' victory, they felt little solicitude about the line of retreat
in case of disaster.1
Sir Charles Stewart's first acts on the great theatre of
New com- German affairs were of a diplomatic, not a military cha-
tarTff!aand racter. An edict had already appeared before his arrival
o?T treat" on the 20th April, which declared the abolition of all the
^i^'rustia restraints under which the commerce of the north of Eu-
and Prussia. r0pe j^ B0 }ong laboured, from the rigorous application
of the Continental System ; but the tariff of duties which
had been substituted in its room, drawn up from inte-
rested motives or in ignorance, was so high as to amount
to a total prohibition of British manufactures, as well as
of the export of Prussian corn. Sir Charles, immediately
after his arrival, made representations to Baron Harden-
berg on the subject, which were promptly attended to.
Assurances were given, which were immediately carried
into effect, that the tariff should be provisionally sus-
stewartto pended till an arrangement, conjointly with Russia, could
reagh, April be agreed upon. Shortly after, he had the satisfaction
MS. ; Lend, of signing the formal treaty of alliance between Great
pendix) NO" Britain, Russia, and Prussia, the preliminaries of which
Treaf in* bad already been signed by Lord Cathcart with the Em-
Martens, peror Alexander, by which Russia engaged to keep
234 ; and 200,000 men in the field, exclusive of garrisons, Prussia
548™ "' half as many, in consideration of £2,000,000 instantly
advanced by Great Britain.1 *
* Lord Castlereagh's general views of the principles on which the alliance
should be conducted were well explained by him in a letter to Lord Cathcart
on Apcil 8. " On the political part of the arrangement," said he, " I foresee
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 569
But the sovereigns and their ministers were soon called CHAP.
by the loud trumpet of war from these diplomatic labours
to the dangers and the glories of the field. The French 1813-
90
demonstrations of offensive operations were not confined Mutual' ad-
to the main army in front of Dresden. On the Lower ™p^°ef the
Elbe, General Puthod advanced to the margin of that*"1"68-
river with 8000 infantry and 3000 horse, while Davoust
moved forward on the same quarter from Bremen, in the
direction of Rottenburg on Harburg. But this was a
diversion merely intended to deceive the Allies as to
the real points of attack. The main effort was to be
made by the Emperor Napoleon himself in the great
plain which stretches from the Saale to the Elbe, and
comprises the finest part of Saxony. The force with
which he made this advance in all amounted, according
to Thiers, whose estimate is founded on the returns in
little difficulty. To make war and to treat together is so obviously the policy of
xll parties, that I apprehend no hesitation on the part of either power ; neither
jan I suppose you will experience any great reluctance, even on the part of
Prussia, to gratify the Prince Regent by abating the nuisance of which those
mall territories enclaves in Hanover amount to. The larger arrangements, at
east in the north, are in principle understood. The reintegration of Prussia
a extent of power is not, of course, intended to supersede the indemnities for
)enmark in case she joins ; and in the application of these principles hereafter,
re may hope that Great Britain and Russia will see justice done.
" The political arrangement of Europe in a larger sense is more difficult at
lis early moment to decide on. So much depends on events that it is per-
vps better not to be too prompt in encountering litigated questions. The
ain features we are agreed upon : that, to keep France in order, we require
•eat masses ; that Prussia, Austria, and Russia ought to be as great and power-
i as they have ever been ; and that the inferior states must be summoned to
sist or pay the forfeit of resistance. I see many inconveniences in premature
Delusions, but we ought not to be unprepared.
" As an outline to reason from, I send you, as a private communication, a
spatch on which the confederacy in 1805 was founded; the Emperor of
ssia probably has not this interesting document at headquarters (interesting
s to my recollection, as I well remember having more than one conversation
,h Mr Pitt on its details before he wrote it) : some of the suggestions may now
inapplicable, but it is so masterly an outline for the restoration of Europe,
t I should be glad your Lordship would reduce it into distinct propositions,
'. to learn the bearings of his Imperial Majesty's mind upon its contents.*
unofficial communication of this nature, between two powers that have no
tialities to indulge, may prepare them the better to fulfil their duties at a
1 ire moment." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to LOKD CATHCART, Foreign Office,
il 8, 1813; CastlereagJi Correspondence, viii. 355, 356.
This important state paper will be found in History of Europe, c. xxxix. § 50, note.
570 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, the French Depot de la Guerre, to nearly 200,000 men,
VIIL but of these not more than two-thirds could by possi-
1813. bility be collected in one field. This immense body-
formed by the junction, behind the Saale, of Napoleon
descending from the Thuringian Forest, and Eugene as-
cending from Magdeburg — could not advance along one
road without being spun out to an inordinate length,
and accordingly it pressed on in two columns towards
the Elbe. Ney, Marniont, and the Imperial Guard,
moved on the great road from LUTZEN towards Leipsic ;
while, on their right, Bertrand and Oudinot remained
in reserve on the Upper Saale, with orders to move
from Naumburg on Stossen ; and on the left Eugene,
with the corps of Lauriston and Macdonald, was to de-
bouch from Merseburg, and move direct by the road of
Mackranstadt on Leipsic. On their side the Allies made
corresponding movements, and instead of awaiting the
enemy behind the Elbe, they advanced to meet him in the
Saxon plains. Their forces were spread over the whole
country from the Elbe to the Saale, the grand headquar-
ters being at Altenburg. Wittgenstein, with the Russians,
\vas at Zwickau ; Kutusoff's corps some miles in advance
of Dresden ; Milaradowitch, with his advance, at Chemnitz.
The Prussians, again under Blucher, formed the extreme
ciart!8' left of the Allied line, which leaned on the broken ridges
122, 12:5 ; which formed the Thuringian Forest, with their head-
Thiers, xv.
463, 464 ; quarters at Altenburg ; D'York was farther to the right
Marmont, " *? ' t i> i i
v. H, is. towards Dessau ; while on the extreme right Bulow ob-
served Magdeburg.1
When the hostile arrays were in this manner advancing
combat of by common consent against each other, they necessarily
fe]s,"aud~ soon came into collision. It took place for the first time
. a^ Weissenfcls, and was attended by a melancholy event,
which overspread the French army with mourning. On
the evening of the 30th April, some battalions of Ney's
corps had gallantly borne the charges of Winzingerode's
cavalry, which was making a reconnoissance towards Weis-
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 571
senfels ; and as they were young troops who had met the CHAP.
enemy for the first time, Napoleon rose early on the vm-
following morning and set out for the front, attended i«is.
by Ney, Mortier, Bessieres, Sotilt, Duroc, and Caulain-
court, to encourage the conscripts by his presence, and
animate them by his praise. Ney's men, being destitute
of cavalry to form the vedettes and precede the march of
the regular bodies, were moving in squares with a thick
line of tirailleurs in front, when, on the edge of the steep
banks of the ravine of the Rippach, they were met by
AVinzingerode's horse, which occupied in force the oppo-
site bank. The division Souham, which was in advance,
had just crossed the ravine, and was extending into a
line of squares to open fire upon the enemy's squad-
rons, when Marshal Bessieres, who was in the suite of
Napoleon, though out of his proper place, being com-
mander of the cavalry of the Guard, having gone a little
to the right to observe the enemy somewhat nearer, wras
struck by a cannon-ball, which at one blow laid him dead
on the field. An old companion in arms of Napoleon in
the Italian campaigns, he had been wounded in the
oattle of Wagram, but on that occasion he escaped with
i severe contusion. Brave, loyal, and devoted, Bessieres
lad been a faithful friend to the French Emperor, and
lad often had the courage to tell him useful but disagree-
Me truths. He was deeply regretted by him and the
.'hole army. "Death is approaching us," said Napoleon, 4™e4r6s£xv-
rhen he saw his old companion in arms struck down, JJ"™mt, v.
s he put spurs to his horse and moved quickly on, cathcak,
,., ,,1, . , -i- is*; Lond-
nile the mangled corpse was carried away on a military 20.
oak.1
This mournful catastrophe was the immediate forerun-
ir of a desperate shock. From the direction taken by Movements
e main columns of the enemy, and especially the line of Lotm. &
march of the powerful French centre under Napoleon May 2-
person, it was evident that they were converging
*rards Leipsic, from whence they would roll on in a
572 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, concentrated mass towards Dresden. To counteract this
V1IL movement, and in the hopes of engaging the enemy's
isis columns in detail, and of crushing the most advanced
before the supports came up, Wittgenstein proposed a
plan of operations to the Emperor Alexander which was
approved of bj that monarch, and immediately carried
into execution. This was to move the whole army across
the Elster during the night of the 1st May, and advance
directly against the right flank of the French columns
as they pressed on for Leipsic. Milaradowitch, with the
Russian Guards, grenadiers, and reserve cavalry, forming
the flower of their army, who was at Zeitz, was to cross
the Elster there, and descend its left bank ; Blucher from
Borna, and Wittgenstein with his own corps of Russians,
and D'York with his Prussians from Rotha, were to march
at the same time to Pegau, on the same river, where they
also were to cross. The effect of these movements was
to bring nearly all the Allied army, with the exception of
Kleist, who was left in reserve at Leipsic, early in the
morning of the 2d May, into the open level country lying
a few leagues to the west of Leipsic, having their right on
the village of Werben on the Flossgraben, and their left
at Dombseu, a small village situated on a similar stream
which falls into the Saale, near Weissenfels. The country
here is, upon the whole, level, though with some inequality
of surface, and for the most part under a rude and imper-
fect tillage. A considerable ridge or undulation rose in
the centre, between the line of approach of the two armies,
and in a great degree veiled their movements and approach
from each other. The Emperor Alexander and King of
Prussia, with Lord Cathcart, were already at Pegau,
at five in the morning of the 2d May, where they were
anxiously awaiting the arrival of the troops to cross the
bridge and surmount the defile there. As soon as the
troops had crossed, the Emperor Alexander was con-
ducted by Wittgenstein to the top of a hill a little in
advance, from whence there was an extensive view, com-
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 573,
manding among other objects a bivouac where an ad- CHAP.
vanced corps of the enemy had rested on the preceding VIIL
night. Wittgenstein was so little aware of the magnitude 1813-
of the force which the enemy had concentrated upon this
point, that he promised to put his Majesty in possession
of the corps he saw before him before an hour was over.
Shortly after, the King of Prussia rode up, and the sove-
reigns and their staff dismounted, and took post on the
summit of the hill near a rude cairn, the monument of l^iS^
war in former days, in the confident hope of seeing this Tgier]'.f y
promise realised by the troops, which were coming up L»nd. 21!
rapidly on all sides.1
But a very different future from what they anticipated
awaited the Allied sovereigns on this eventful day. Napo- Battle of
leon, assuming everywhere a vigorous offensive, had al- M^,yT.'
ready pushed Eugene, who, in the course of the 1st, had
arrived at Mackranstadt, straight on towards Leipsic,
directing him to send Lauriston's corps direct on that
town, while Macdonald's was to advance to the right
:owards Zwickau. The division Durutte, with Latour
Vtaubourg's cavalry and a strong body of artillery, was
i little in the rear of these corps, in order to support
,ny which might require aid, while Napoleon himself
Dllowed along the great road from Liitzen in reserve
•ith the Guard. Foreseeing, however, what was really
le fact, that the Allies, during this advance of his con-
3ntrated force upon Leipsic, might ascend the course of
le Elster, and cross over so as to threaten his right and
7 O
ike him in flank in the middle of his movement, the
rench Emperor retained Marshal Ney in the environs of
iitzen, and established his corps in a group of villages
that neighbourhood, of which the principal was called
aia, which became the theatre of the most obstinate
nflict in the battle which ensued. Marmont, Bertrand,
d Oudinot, with their respective corps — the first on the
nks of the Rippach, the second a little behind him, the
t still on the margin of the Saale — had orders to range
574 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, themselves as they successively came up on the right of
vm. Ney, to co-operate with him in defending the right flank
1813. from the attack with which they were threatened, and
having done so, to advance in a solid mass to the Elster,
between Zwickau and Pegau. Thus, Ney's corps, grouped
around Kaia, was the central pivot on which the whole
army turned; the one half in prosecuting its offensive
onward movement towards Leipsic, the other half in
covering the advance of the first from the expected at-
tack on the right. On the other hand, the three .Allied
corps of Blucher, Wittgenstein, and D'York, headed by
Blucher, nearly 70,000 strong, had advanced in the night,
as already mentioned, across the Elster, and were mov-
ing straight upon the French right, under Ney, strongly
posted in the villages of Kaia, Eisdorf, Raima, Gross and
Klein Gorschen. Thus the two armies during the morning
o o
had respectively passed each other, Napoleon's left being
, Lond 21 in advance and threatening Leipsic, held by Kleist's corps;
22; Cath- while the whole remainder of the Allied army, which,
cart, 129, •"
iso; with Milaradowitcn in reserve, who, however, could not.
468e47iV be up till late in the evening, might amount to 80,000
356-359!' sabres and bayonets, was turning the French right, and
threatening their communications.1
Napoleon started from Liitzen at ten o'clock, accom-
LeipS'is panied by his Marshals, and went at the gallop to his
^e^' wnere Lauriston's corps under Eugene, supported
by Durutte's reserve and the Guard, were already en-
gaged in an attack on Leipsic, defended by Kleist's
Prussians. The fusillade was then already extremely
warm, and the wooded banks of the Elster, and its many
branches, afterwards known by so terrible a catastrophe
to the French army, were the theatre of many desperate
and bloody conflicts. Kleist's men, animated by the
strongest feelings of patriotism and indignation against
the French, fought with the greatest resolution, and for
long defended the approach to the town against all the
efforts of the enemy. But the contest was too unequal—
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 557
one corps against three, supported by the flower of the CHAP.
French army — to be long maintained with success. Mai- vn
son's division, forming the advance of Lauriston, at length 1813-
overcame all obstacles, and penetrated into the town, across
the bridges and marshy banks of the Elster, along with
the retiring Prussians. But while he was enjoying at a
distance the prospect of this success, which he surveyed
through a telescope, and which recalled the triumphs of
his earlier years, Napoleon was startled by a tremendous
cannonade which suddenly broke out on the right, and
soon became so terrible as to bespeak a desperate conflict.
After listening for a few seconds to the increasing roar,
he quickly turned to Ney, who was by his side, and said,
" While we are trying to turn them they are turning us ;
but there is no harm done — they will find us prepared for
them at all points." He then ordered that Marshal to
return at the gallop to his corps, to establish himself and
maintain himself to the last man in the five villages,
which he might easily do, as he had 48,000 men under
lis orders, and would be powerfully supported on both
lanks and in rear. Ney instantly set out as directed,
,nd immediately the Emperor ordered a general conver-
ion of his army to meet the new danger which threat-
ned it. Lauriston received orders to keep hold of Leip-
c, but occupy it only with one of his divisions, and to
love the two others to his rear, so as to be at hand to
ipport the left of Ney ; while Macdonald was to march
i the same direction, and establish himself at Eisdorf, l r^md. 22;
i the Flossgraben, in the same vicinity. The Guard 469^470 •'
id Durutte's division followed in the same direction, 128-130.'
ith Latour Maubourg's horse.1
Perilous as this operation was when attempted at such
time, and in presence of such an enemy, it could no success of
iger be postponed, for the progress of the Allies on onethe ""
3 right had already become most alarming. Blucher's J^JJ^
•ce, 24,000 strong, was the leading corps, which came
it into action. It made a violent attack on the village thcre-
576 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, of Gross Gorschen, which, defended by Souham's division
VIIL of Nej's corps, was carried without much difficulty ; for
1813. the Prussians, headed by Blucher, whose vigour seventy-
two winters had noways diminished, fought with the ut-
most resolution, being animated, not merely by hatred of
the French, but by the presence of the two sovereigns
who watched the progress of the conflict from a neigh-
bouring eminence. Great was the joy in the breasts of
the Emperor and King when they beheld this auspicious
commencement of the conflict, and saw, from the hasty
march of the corps forming the French centre across the
plain towards their right, that this attack had entirely dis-
concerted the French Emperor's assault on the Allied
right. But it soon became evident that the conflict in
the villages was to be more serious than had been at first
anticipated, and that, so far from having to deal with an
isolated corps in the villages, it was supported by at least
half the French army. Though driven from Gross Gor-
schen, which lay in the front, the enemy still occupied in
strength the villages of Klein Gorschen and Rahna, which
were situated in a little valley, while the heights beyond
were covered with a numerous artillery, and the whole
corps of Ney, still 45,000 strong, in battle array. At
the same time Marmont's corps, headed by that Marshal
himself, having crossed the Rippach, debouched from
Starsiedel, in front of Winzingerode, who was coming up
with his Russians on the other side. Marmont arranged
his men in squares, united to the right of Souham, and
covered flie rallying of Girard's division of Ney's corps,
which had fallen into confusion at the Allied attack.
But Blucher, transported with ardour, and confident of
victory, undeterred by these obstacles, continued the
47^47^8^ assai1^ ; and, himself heading Ziethen's Prussians, carried
Marmoiu, foQ villages of Klein Gorschen and Rahna, thus making
Lond! 23- himself master of three out of the five villages which con-
130, 131! stituted the great central fortress, upon the possession of
which the issue of the battle depended.1
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 577
Matters were in this state, and to appearance eminently CHAP.
favourable to the Allies, when Nej arrived. Blucher now VIIL
encountered an adversary worthy of himself; and rein- isis.
forcements coming up on both sides from all parts, the GreaJ5!ic_
battle became concentrated in and around the five villages, ff.'P ?f t}™
o ' Allies in the
where it raged with the utmost violence. Both parties five
brought up their reserves, and the slaughter on either side
was terrific. Ney pushed forward his remaining division,
which had hitherto been in reserve behind Kaia ; Mac-
donald came up and ranged himself on his left ; while
Marmont, with his divisions still in square, stood on his
right, and with admirable steadiness supported the fire of
a hundred and fifty guns directed against them. En-
couraged and reinforced by these additional forces, Ney's
men, many of whom were conscripts, who had then been
under fire for the first time, retook Rahna and Klein
Gorschen, and drove back the Prussians into Gross Gor-
schen, their first conquest. But Blucher, who had the
Prussian Guards and reserves in hand, advanced at the
head of these admirable troops, and shouting " Vorwarts ! "
as he led them on, succeeded a second time in expelling
;he French and establishing himself in these villages.
31ucher himself was wounded in the arm ; but without
luitting the field he pressed on, and carried for the first
hue Kaia, while his cavalry charged with the utmost
ehemence the divisions of Compans and Bonnet, of
larmont's corps, who in square steadily resisted the
5saults, but suffered grievously under the fire of artil-
ry. The victory seemed gained ; and if the Russian
uards and grenadiers had been at hand to support
'.ucher, and secure the advantage won, it would have
en so. It was now six o'clock, and the Allies, by sheer ^
*ce and hard fighting, had won more than a mile of ^hS
Dund ; * of five villages, which formed the key of the JJJ^[t;
Id of battle, four were in their hands, though they had 20, 21; '
, . „ ,TT. . •, , Wilson, i.
1 herto engaged only the corps of Wmzmgerode an a 355.
'. icher, which only mustered 40,000 combatants, while
i. 2 o
578 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. D'York and Wittgenstein, with 18,000 men, aiid the
vm- Russian Guards and reserves, 12,000 more, had not as
isis. yet fired a shot.
Blucher now saw that the decisive moment had come,
crisis of the and that a vigorous attack directed against the enemy's
* I . . * o o *
turns'^ the centre would secure the victory. He urged the Emperor
the Trench! and King to take advantage of the propitious movement,
and, by a united effort of the whole reserves, pierce the
enemy's line, and win the day. After some delay, arising
from the time lost in consulting and transmitting the
orders of such elevated personages, the advice was taken,
and Wittgenstein and D'York were ordered to the front.
They advanced accordingly with loud hurrahs as to cer-
tain victory, passed over the ruins of Klein Gorschen and
Rahna, and through the burning edifices of Kaia, and
attacked the remains of Ney's corps, half destroyed, and
Marmont's men, who were drawn up in square on the
other side of those villages. The steady squares, by a roll-
ing fire, long repulsed both the attacks of the infantry and
the charges of the cavalry ; but still the Allies gained
ground. Marmont's squares fell back to a new position
in the rear, a little in front of Starsiedel. Meanwhile
Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg was disputing the village of
Eissdorf with the leading division of Macdonald's corps
on Ney's left flank : but after a successful assault on that
\ (\n *f
r's, xv. village, from which the French were expelled, he found
cithern,' himself in presence of, and outflanked by, Prince Eugene
lin'/IV Beauharnais, who had now come up from this side of
24 J .w^- Leipsic, and it was only by the most heroic efforts that
son, i. 357, , ...
358. he succeeded in maintaining himself in that village until
nightfall.1
Hitherto the battle, though variously checkered, had
Last effort been upon the whole decidedly to the advantage of the
whkh are-on' Allies : and in the villages in the centre, in particular,
Ames.the where the contest had been most obstinate, and success
"U was of most importance, their progress had been very
marked. But the time had now arrived when the aspect
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 579
of affairs changed. The obstinate and bloody conflict in CHAP.
the villages had gained for Napoleon what he alone wanted VIIL
— time. At first, when the Emperor arrived on the !813-
field near the villages, he had only the division Ricard,
the fifth of Ney's corps, in hand, and several battalions of
conscripts were dispersing and flying on all sides. " Young
men," said Napoleon, " I reckoned on you to save the
empire, and you fly!" Animated by these words, the
regiments rallied, and the conflict continued with great
obstinacy, on both sides, and varied success, till the Guard,
18,000 strong, the reserve artillery, under Drouot, and
cavalry, came up, flanked by the two remaining divisions
of Macdonald's corps, and the whole of Bertrand's. These
great reinforcements speedily changed the face of affairs.
Napoleon saw that the decisive moment had arrived, and
that, by a vigorous effort in the centre, he might regain
the ground which had been lost, and snatch victory from
the enemy's grasp. He took his measures accordingly.
Drawing up the Old Guard in six squares, like so many
fortresses to guard the centre, he caused the squares of
the Young Guard to deploy into columns of attack,
and ordered them to advance against the enemy in
the villages, supported by the fire of the eighty guns
of the Guard under Drouot, which were placed in an
oblique position on the French right, on an eminence
a little in advance of Starsiedel. These measures, in-
stantly ordered, were executed with vigour and unity.
The sixteen battalions of the Young G uard, led by Marshal
Mortier and General Dumoutier, rallying the broken re-
mains of Ney's corps, advanced against Blucher and Witt-
genstein's men, by this time sorely weakened by fire, and
wearied by a night and a day of uninterrupted marching
and fighting, and drove them out of the smoking ruins
Kaia; while, at the same time, on the French left, M
*_— j -
ionald's divisions outflanked Prince Eugene of Wirtem- cart, iai
)erg, and drove him, though reinforced, into Eissdorf ; * 24, 25.
md, on their right, Marmont's corps also outflanked
580 SIR CHARLES STEWAKT.
CHAP, the enemy, and, with the aid of Bertrand's men, sensibly
VI1I> gained ground in the open country towards Starsiedel.
1813. In the centre the Allies still occupied the ruins of the
villages which had been so obstinately disputed, but
they were evidently outnumbered and outflanked on
either wing.
Matters having assumed this serious aspect, a council of
The Allies war was held at the Allied headquarters, which were still
retrelt, and on the summit of the hill where, as already mentioned, they
n^turnai had taken post at the beginning of the battle. Opinions
intSa"- W6re there much divided as to the course which should be
mont's lines. pursue(j JSlucher was clear to renew the battle in the
centre with the whole Russian Guard, in room of which
Milaradowitch — who, with 12,000 men, could come up
during the night — would serve as a reserve. But Witt-
genstein, and Diebitch, his chief of the staff, answered
that, as they were outnumbered and outflanked on either
side, there would be the greatest risk in renewing the
conflict on the following day : to which the chief of
artillery added a reason still more convincing — viz., that
there were not supplies of ammunition adequate to a
second day's battle. The Allied sovereigns, swayed by
these arguments, and in secret conscious that they were
overmatched, if not defeated, ordered a retreat at all
points towards Dresden, the headquarters being with-
drawn during the night to Pegau. Indignant at his
advice not being followed, Blucher asked and obtained
leave to make an attack with the Prussian cavalry,
headed by the Garde d cheval, on the enemy's lines.
The attack was made, accordingly, about eleven at night,
by Blucher, at the head of five thousand horse. This
sally, however, produced no lasting results. The Prus-
t^iTs00'' s^an norse were brought up by a deep ravine, in which
487ie™88^ tney £ot entan^e(^' and the fire of the dense masses of
Lend. 24'; infantry who, on the first alarm, stood to their arms;1 and
132, 133! the incident only added another to the numerous proofs
which the annals of war afford, that a conquering army is
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 581
never nearer disaster than in the first moments of repose CHAP.
after victory.*
In this well-fought battle, in which victory, after long IBIS.
inclining to the Allied side, at last veered round to the Results' of
French, the former had only 82,000 men in all at their ^d fo"es'
disposal, of whom 12,000, under Milaradowitch, never l
came up till next morning ; so that the battle was fought
with 70,000 only, while Napoleon had 120,000 in hand,
* Sir Charles Stewart, on 6th May, transmitted the following account of this
battle to Lord Castlereagh : —
" The headquarters of General Count Wittgenstein, commander-iu-chief of
the Russian army, were removed from Delitzch to Lindenau, near Leipsic, on
the 27th ult. General Kleist entered Halle, with his corps d'armee, where he
was received with enthusiasm. The corps of General Milaradowitch removed
from Penig to Altenburg on the 29th. General Blucher was at Borna, and
the left wing of the Allied army extended towards Hoff. General Bulow, on
the right, was at Rotha. On the 30th, Count Wittgenstein transposed his head-
quarters to Zwickau. An affair had taken place between the Prussians and the
enemy, at Merseburg, in which the former sustained some loss. The enemy
showed an intention of passing the Saale at various points. He constructed a
bridge at Rosbach for this purpose, and appeared to extend himself into the
plain on the right bank of the river. This was the ground on which it was
imagined Count Wittgenstein would give battle. The advanced-guard of the
enemy, during the passage of the Saale, had affairs at Naumburg and Weissen-
fels, in which the Prussians conducted themselves with the utmost intrepidity.
The enemy's chief force was supposed to be at Naumburg, but a strong column,
under General Bertrand, was moving on Altenburg.
" On the 30th, the Allied force was concentrated between Altenburg and
Leipsic ; the corps of General Blucher at Rotha ; and the corps of Generals
Wittgenstein and D'York at Zwickau and Zeitz ; the corps of General Winzin-
gerode at Liitzen ; and that of Kleist at Lindenau.
" On the 1st May, the corps at Liitzen, about 18,000, was attacked by a very
superior force, and driven back on Zwickau, retiring, however, in good order.
On the morning of the 2d, the corps of Generals Blucher, Wittgenstein, D'York,
ind Winzingerode formed a line of battle on the left bank of the Elster ; the
•ight at Zwickau, the left extending towards Pegau and Zeitz, where General
Vlilaradowitch's corps was placed. The corps of General Tormazoff, comprising
he Russian Guards, was in reserve behind Pegau.
" The first attempt in the morning was made by the Allies to cut off some
f the enemy's troops in two detached villages called the ' Geras,' but failed from
•ant of combination. They then advanced in line, and found the enemy
;rongly posted in an advantageoxis position bounding the plains before Liitzen,
id in villages of which Great and Little Gorschen, the Geras, and Kreutsdorf
ere the principal. It was reported that Buonaparte had declared to his army
lat he would fight a battle without the aid of cavalry, and he seemed evidently
' have taken up a position with this view, occupying in force the small villages
luded to, the flank and communications between them being supported by
ics of artillery and strong columns of infantry, thus manifesting a determi-
tion to force the Allies to contend with him upon his own ground, and all
582 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, of whom at least 110,000 took a part in the fight. It
vm- was this great superiority of force which, by enabling the
1813. French Emperor to outflank them at both sides, in the
end compelled them to retreat. The loss of the French
was, by their own admission, 18,000 men, and that of
the Allies about the same, or rather less. Of this great
loss, no less than 12,000 had fallen on the corps of
Marshal Ney, which had suffered so severely that the
Emperor was obliged to put the whole division of Du-
rutte under his orders to fill up the void, and leave the
entire corps behind at Liitzen, in his subsequent advance,
his hopes of victory rested upon the success of this project. The enemy showed
himself in different directions, advancing only to retire, and draw the Allies
into the positions he had chosen and improved by every aid of art.
" A very brisk cannonade commenced the action on both sides. The villages
of Gross and Klein Gorschen were soon set on fire, and taken by the Allied
troops, but not without loss. Heavy bodies of cavalry were sent to the left to
prevent the enemy from turning that flank ; and the Allied troops were frequently
drawn within the enemy's fire without producing the effect their exertions
merited. The villages alluded to, when taken, afforded no solid advantages, as
the enemy were equally strongly posted, barricaded, and intrenched in adjoin-
ing ones.
" The cavalry of the Allies (more especially the Prussians) advanced often
so rapidly upon the French infantry that they could not get back to the strong
villages from whence they had debouched, and they consequently received the
charges of the enemy in squares. Great slaughter ensued, and the Prussian
cavalry inspired their allies the Russians with the greatest confidence and
admiration. The action • continued in a struggle for the different villages of
Liitzen, the Go'rschens, and Geras, which were taken and retaken several times,
the Gorschens remaining, however, always in the hands of the Allies. Towards
the close of the day, however, a very strong column arrived from Leipsic,
belonging to Beauharnais's corps, which threatened the right of the Allies, and
prevented their making further progress. They remained on the ground they
had so gallantly fought over, masters of the field of battle. The Emperor of
Russia, the King of Prussia, the Princes of Prussia were present, animating the
troops by the greatest display of personal exertions and bravery.
" The result of the battle was the capture of sixteen pieces of cannon, some
standards, and some hundreds of prisoners. The battle lasted from ten o'clock
in the morning till dark. It is very difficult to obtain any correct information
as to the loss of the enemy. That of the Allies may be estimated at about
12,000 Prussians and 3000 Russians how de combat. The main efforts in the
action fell upon General Blucher's corps, who was himself wounded, as well as
the chief of the Prussian Etat Major, General Scharnhorst, the latter severely.
Many most distinguished officers were killed and wounded, among the former
the Prince of Hesse Homburg."— SIB CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEHEAGH,
Dresden, May 6, 1813 ; MS. Londonderry Papers. This is the best account of
the battle, and the most intelligible in a few words, which is anywhere to be
met with.
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 583
to provide for the wounded. Prince Leopold of Hesse CHAP.
Homburg was killed ; the Prince of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, vm-
and the celebrated General Scharnhorst, were among the
wounded. The Prince died next day ; Scharnhorst ling- c
ered till the 28th June, when he expired, universally re- ;"35133';
r J Thiers, xv.
gretted, for he was one of the officers to whom Prussia 493, 494 ;
was most indebted for the marvellous resurrection of her 359.s°n
military force in this year.1
After this desperate shock, the Allied armies retired
early on the morning of the 3d to Borna and Altenberg, Retreat of
from whence they continued their retrograde movement
on the succeeding day towards Meissen and Dresden. They
were not in the smallest degree disquieted. in this retreat ;
the great losses sustained by the French in the battle,
and their immense inferiority in cavalry, rendering pur-
suit impossible. Though the Allies, however, were not mo-
lested in their retrograde movement, yet there was neces-
sarily a certain degree of confusion from the withdrawing
on two roads of such large bodies of men, and long trains
of artillery, wounded, and baggage. " Much disorder/'
says Sir Charles Stewart, "was observable. The roads
were choked up with the immense train of carriages and
baggage of every description. On one road alone 13,000
waggons passed in succession." Precautionary measures
were immediately adopted to prevent the Allied army
from being attacked in crossing the Elbe. It soon became
evident that the line of that river was to be abandoned.
Napoleon, on his part, with reason, proud of his glorious
victory, wrote in the most sanguine terms to Paris, Mun-
ich, and Stuttgard, announcing, with much exaggeration,
his triumph, and declaring that he was about to march
Dn Dresden and Berlin with 140,000 men, and would
speedily drive the Russians beyond the Vistula. In
act, he prepared so far to carry his boasts into effect,
liat he immediately put 80,000 men under the com-
nand of Marshal Ney, who, on the 4th, entered Leipsic
.t the head of his troops in great pomp, and iinmedi-
584 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, ately directed his steps towards Torgau, to secure the
vnr- fidelity, which had become more than doubtful, of the
1813. Saxon governor there. * Meanwhile the Emperor himself,
with a much larger force, followed the Allied armies to
the gates of Dresden. By bringing up all his reinforce-
y^catif ments> ne was enabled to advance at the head of 140,000
cart, 133, men against the Saxon capital. Two hundred and twenty
xv. 492-495'. thousand in all under his banners approached the banks
of the Elbe.1
Long experience had demonstrated that an inferior
The Allies army can never, for any length time, maintain the line of
retire °o a river against a superior one ; and in the case of the
XraTegic Elbe, as the French were masters of Torgau, Magdeburg,
advantages. an(j Wittenberg, it was obviously hopeless to make the
attempt. The Allied sovereigns, accordingly, had no
thought of endeavouring to maintain themselves either
in Dresden or on the line of the great river which flows
through it ; but in withdrawing beyond its walls they
were looking out for a favourable ground on which to try
a second time the fortunes of war. The environs of BAUT-
ZEN afforded such a battle-field. It was a strategic point
already celebrated in the seven years' war, and the im-
portance of which was well known to the great Frederick.
The left to an army facing eastward rests on the Reisen-
gebirge or Giant Mountains, the lower slopes of which
were covered by a thick and impenetrable forest, alto-
gether impervious to cavalry or guns, and nearly so to
foot soldiers. To the northward of this woody ridge
stretched a wide champaign country, level when compared
with the Bohemian Mountains, but yet by no means flat,
but for the most part made up of low hills and undulat-
ing eminences, intersected by various streams which de-
scended from the mountains into the plain, and being
* Ney's force was raised to this amount by adding to his own corps and
Durutte's division (commanded by Reynier) Victor's corps, which had been
left at Magdeburg, and Sebastiani's force (formed by Puthod's division and his
own cavalry) from the Lower Elbe.
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 585
often shut in by rocky banks or steep declivities, afforded CHAP.
very defensible positions. This position covered the main VUL
communication of the Russians with their rear in Poland, 1813.
from whence they not only drew the chief supplies of their
army, but expected to be largely reinforced by reserves,
under Prince Labanoff and Count Ostermann Tolstoy.
What was of not less importance, it brought the Allied
army close to a neutral territory belonging to Austria, a
power too great to be disregarded by either party, which : Cathcart,
effectually prevented their left flank being turned, and If^aries
brought them into a convenient situation for carrying Stewart to
. . ,, . JO LordCastle
on those secret negotiations, from which, m the event reagh, May
of the French Emperor refusing to treat on reasonable MS.
terms, they anticipated open and important succour.1
The French armies, after a few trifling combats with
the Allied rearguard, arrived on the summit of the Evacuation
beautiful amphitheatre of hills which lie on the west-by?he8deu
ern side of Dresden. It was with joy that the inhabi-
y
fcants soon beheld the Russians retiring into the town, ^ F8rench-
traversing the streets, and issuing on the opposite side.
Presently the two bridges of boats which they had con-
itructed, and the wooden arches in the centre of the
;reat one, which had been inserted to supply the place of
he stone one which Davoust had blown up on the first
pproach of the Allied forces, were seen to be in flames,
nd it was evident that the whole city on the left bank
f the Elbe was already evacuated. The French columns
amediately after entered under Eugene Beauharnais, JJf n^at'^>
id were met by a deputation from the municipality, ^M4";
hich came to implore the clemency of the conqueror. 498, m\
ugene forwarded them to Napoleon, who shortly after 6. ' s
rived at the gates of the city.2
Napoleon awaited the deputation on horseback at the
te with a threatening look. He had not forgotten the stemrecep-
thusiastic reception given by the inhabitants to the magistrate*
lied sovereigns ; and he received the magistrates there -j^^0"
. e with a severe air, reminded them of their tergiversa-
586 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, tion, and the ungrateful return they had made for all the
VI1L benefits he had heaped upon them ; and added that if he
1813. acted only by the laws of war he would subject them to
the last severities of military execution. He was willing,
however, to forget the past, and again restore them to
his favour in consideration of the fidelity, age, and virtues
of their sovereign. Let them therefore receive him with
the respect which was becoming ; restore again, but for
him alone, the triumphal arches they had so impru-
dently raised to the Emperor Alexander ; and retain in
their hearts a profound sense of the clemency with which
they had been treated, for but for his interposition they
. would have undergone all the horrors of a town carried
by assault. The least wavering in their duty, the
slightest indication of a return to the enemy, would be
followed by the most terrible calamities. With these
\vords he dismissed the trembling magistrates and en-
tered the city, in which the French maintained the most
T-Thiers, xv. exact discipline. The Emperor was lodged in the King's
cathcan' palace, while, by a strange anomaly, the King of Prussia
i. 67. ' still remained in the house he occupied in the new town,
on the right bank of the river.1
Next morning the Emperor was on horseback by day-
Passage of break, and descended the Elbe with a strong body of
the French7 infantry and the whole artillery of the Guard, to Pries-
nitz, where he had resolved to force a passage. The
eighty guns of the Guard having been first established on
V the heights on the left bank, a severe fire began between
them and fifty Russian guns on the opposite bank. But
the French fire was superior both in position and weight
of pieces, and under cover of it three hundred Voltigeurs
were rowed across, and soon succeeded by others who
established themselves on the right bank. The superi-
xv
5oi, 50-i ; ority of the French fire then enabled them to throw a
Odel. i. 78, _ . • ... , „ . ,. . .
79 ; Lend, bridge across, which, under cover of the discharge from
9 1 ) o f\ , \ir • i
son, ;;'. 7/ Drouot's guns, was completed before night, and the pas-
sage began in great force.2 At the same time, the Allies,
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 587
having gained all that they desired — namely, time for CHAP.
their immense trains of artillery and baggage to defile on VI1L
the other side — withdrew at all points from the right bank -isis.
of the river ; and the French, having re-established the
broken arches of the great bridge at Dresden, the passage
went on there regularly as well as at Priesnitz and Meissen.
Napoleon was well aware of the secret negotiations
which had been going on between the Allied sovereigns The king of
and the King of Saxony, which, indeed, the sudden de* neonatal *
parture of the latter from Ratisbon for Prague, and his NaP°leon-
taking refuge there under the protection of the Emperor
of Austria, had rendered patent to all the world. But
though he never paused in his ambitious projects, yet he
could when he chose put an effectual bridle upon his
wrath. The great importance of regaining Saxony for an
ally, and securing the points of Torgau and Dresden, so
likely to prove pivots on which military operations would
turn in the campaign, induced him on this occasion to
dissemble with the King, and feign ignorance of what he
really knew in regard to the proceedings of the Saxon
monarch. He pretended, therefore, to be ignorant of the
double-dealing of that potentate, and to see in him only
i loyal sovereign misled by bad councils, and yielding to
,he pressure of temporary necessity. He despatched,
lowever, at the same time, one of his aides-de-camp to
5rague with a formal summons, under pain of dethrone-
uent, to return immediately with all the cavalry and
rtillery under his immediate orders to Dresden, and in-
tantly to surrender Torgau with the 10,000 Saxons who
ere within its walls to General Reynier, who was at its
ites ready to receive the keys. This summons termi- 1 sir Chag
ated the indecision of the Saxon sovereign. He did all st^art to
Ijord Oast !o-
iat was demanded of him, returned to Dresden with «»g!j» ^ay
16, 1813,
s fine cavalry and horse-artillery, and sent orders to MS. ;
Thiers xv
eneral Thielman, who commanded in Torgau, to deliver 593, 594. '
up immediately to the French troops.1
This important success also enabled Napoleon to as-
588 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, sume a bolder tone in his diplomatic communications with
VIIL the Cabinet of Vienna at this period. Immediately after
18)3. his entry into Dresden, accordingly, he despatched orders
Boidw tone to ^- ^e Narbonne there, to insist peremptorily on a
whS categorical explanation from Austria on the conduct her
cabinet of Government meant to pursue in regard to the treaty of
alliance with France, of which they were delaying to im-
plement the obligations. Narbonne went with the note
to Metternich, in order to enforce verbally the demands
contained in it. " Hitherto," said the French minister,
" I hare feigned to be satisfied with the excuse you made
for not going on with your engagements, and to overlook
the extent of your armaments, which you would be the
first to inform us of, if they were made in our interest.
But I am now forced by the events in Galicia to demand
from you a categorical explanation, and to insist upon
knowing once for all whether you are or are not our ally,
and whether you will adhere to your engagements under
the treaty of 14th March 1812. If you still adhere to
it, it is absolutely necessary that you should put the
Austrian contingent under the orders of the Emperor
Napoleon, and obey his orders by giving up all thoughts
of disarming the Polish corps." " We are still your
friends," replied M. de Metternich, "but we are also
mediators : and as long as our part as mediators is not
played out, it would be inconsistent to appear on the
theatre as armed belligerents. I pray you, therefore, do
not in the mean time put us in a false position, and throw
away our influence by asking us at present to abandon
the character of mediators. If I refuse you 30,000 men
just now, it is because I wish to put at your disposal
150,000 when we are at one about the terms of the
peace which may be acceptable to Europe." Finding
himself thus eluded by the artful Minister, M. de Nar-
bonne demanded and obtained an audience of the Em-
peror, but he adhered to the statement of his able
Premier. Narbonne upon this demanded a second in-
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 589
terview with Metteruich, and he at last drove the latter CHAP.
into an admission " that the armaments going forward VIIL
were intended only to give full effect to the mediation ; 1813-
that the alliance, though subsisting as a principle, could
not come into operation as a rule of action, as long as
the rdle of mediation was not exhausted." Though this
answer was far from being satisfactory to the French
minister, he could get nothing more from the Austrian ; , gir ^^
and to soften the refusal of any further explanation, the Stewart to
* JL/ord Uastle-
latter agreed that the Polish corps should not be dis- r«agh, May
armed in its progress through Bohemia on its way to MS. ;
Saxony, on condition that the passage should be as expe- 509,ersio. "
ditious as possible.1
The impression produced by the battle of Lutzen at
Vienna, however, soon became such, that it all but stopped Mettemich's
liese angry recriminations, by giving an entirely differ- E^g of°n
intturn to the negotiations. The Allied party at thetLh^ea£leof
Austrian capital at first loudly proclaimed the battle as
victory, and the Russian general did the same, with
)me countenance from the Emperor Alexander, though
le King of Prussia, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles
tewart, described it in its true colours. Metternich at
ice saw how the fact stood ; but he was skilful enough
: )t only to allow the French diplomatist to gain nothing
T that circumstance, but to turn it to his own advantage.
'. Q immediately repaired to M. de Narbonne, and assured
1 n that the victory of Napoleon in no degree surprised
1 n, for he fully expected it, and it was the basis of
i his calculations ; that it was now evident the Eng-
1 i, Russians, and Prussians must abate two-thirds of
t ir demands, but that the remaining third contained
[ posals so reasonable and essential to the peace of Eu-
r e, that it was indispensable that the French Emperor
ii lis turn should accede to them ; that it became the
liating power to enter upon its functions immediately,
else it would be too late ; and that with this view he
)osed to send immediately two envoys to the head-
590 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, quarters of the belligerents, with such proposals as seemed
vin- reasonable ; and for this purpose he proposed to send the
1813. Comte de Bubna, who he knew would prove agreeable, to
the headquarters of Napoleon, and Count Stadion, so well
known for his anti-Gallican principles, to those of the
Allies. He added, that, so far from the known preposses-
sions of that negotiator being prejudicial to the interests
of Napoleon, they would prove eminently beneficial, because
they would enable him to state, and dispose the Allied
lrrhiers,xv. J , /. i • ITT
614, 515. sovereigns to hear from him, many rude and disagreeable
truths, which could in no other way reach their ears.1
M. de Narbonne having requested to know what were
Metteniich's the conditions which Austria intended to propose to the
ForTgene- belligerents, M. de Mettemich at once complied, adding
rai peace. ^^ fa faft nQ£ desire ^o impose them as conditions on
the French Emperor, but only to submit them for his
consideration. They were as follows : The suppression
of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and its restoration to
Prussia, under the exception of certain cessions to Austria
and Russia ; the abandonment of the Confederation of
the Rhine ; and the renunciation by France of the Hanse
towns — that is, Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen. No-
thing was to be said of Holland, Italy, or Spain, for fear
of raising up insurmountable difficulties, nor of a maritime
peace, in order to remove all obstacles to the conclusion
of a Continental one, which was the most urgent matter.
Such were Austria's proposals to France after the Moscow
disaster had been slightly effaced by the Saxon victory !
They left France still Westphalia, Lombardy, Naples, as
5i6 Tsir ' vassal kingdoms ; Holland, Belgium, the Rhenish Pro-
art"! iJ>rd vinces, Piedmont, Tuscany, the Roman States, as French
j^eTo*gh' departments ' With truth did Metternich say, that Louis
isis, MS. XIV., in his wildest dreams, never conceived such a do-
minion.2
M. de Narbonne replied, that Napoleon vanquished
would never for a moment listen to such terms ; victori-
pus, it was in vain to propose them to him. He agreed
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 5.91
in the mean time to transmit them to the Emperor, in CHAP.
return for which concession Metternich agreed to allow vm-
the King of Saxony to return to Dresden, which he 3 sis.
accordingly did two days after, having previously asked Which'are
and obtained from Austria a promise of the most absolute 3^1!
secrecy as to his promise of adhesion to her projects of j^***0"
armed mediation. On receiving the proposals of Austria,
Napoleon perceived at once the error he had committed
in winking at the armaments of that power, excused on
the ground of giving weight to her mediation, and saw at
length that she was going to turn this armed mediation
against his interests. He felt accordingly, and expressed
in his private correspondence with Narbonne, the most
profound indignation against the Cabinet of Vienna, for
thinking for a moment of such terms, or venturing to
propose them to him. In his official answer to them,
however, he was more moderate ; and, without expressly
acceding to the terms proposed, he received them in such
a way as did not preclude the hope of future accommo-
dation. His mind, however, was in reality made up ; he
would not submit to anything which he deemed, however
unreasonably, humiliation. Yet was it not humiliation to
France which was proposed, for she had no interest in the
possessions in the north of Germany, and was rather i gir Chag.
weakened than strengthened by their being tacked to her {JSeiiL
empire. It was Napoleon alone who was thwarted by 4eaf«i/uue
the cession of the Hanse towns, and abandonment of the MS. ; Fain,
Confederation of the Rhine ; but, rather than submit to isis, 184 ;
such a slight, he was willing to imperil the French em- 51™ 5-20*'
pire.1
An accidental circumstance at this time contributed
still further to sow the seeds of distrust between Napo- secret de-
leon and the Cabinet of Vienna. A courier was arrested suckeiiLg
at Dresden, the bearer of despatches from M. de Stack el- ^aS!,.
berg, the Russian minister at Vienna since Austria had cePted-
assumed the part of a mediator, to M. de Nesselrode, the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, which proved that
592 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP. Metternich, while holding out the olive branch to Napo-
vm- leon, was in reality doing the same, in perhaps warmer
1813. terms, and with more sincerity, to Russia. He there said
that Austria could not take any decided step as yet, from
being fettered by the treaty of 14th March 1812, the
danger of a war with France, and the incompleteness of
their preparations ; but implied that, in the event of the
Allies acceding to the terms proposed, Austria would, if
they were refused by France, join her forces to those of
the Coalition. This was accompanied by a letter from
the King of Saxony to Thielman, desiring him to keep
the gates of Torgau shut against both the contending
parties. In reality there was nothing in this despatch of
Stackelberg which revealed anything more than a desire
on the part of Metternich to act to Russia, equally as
France, in the real character of a mediator; but Napoleon
had never thought they would really act up to that cha-
racter. He had hitherto clung to the idea that, when
matters came to a crisis, the Emperor of Austria would
remain faithful to the family alliance. He expressed
himself accordingly to those around him in terms of
such extreme indignation against the " traitors," as he
styled them, who had betrayed him, that the univer-
sal belief was that no pacific relations with the Cabi-
net of Vienna would long be practicable. So strongly
was he impressed with the idea that Austria was no
longer to be trusted, that he resolved to adopt what had
all along been the advice of Talleyrand and Cambaceres,
i Thiers, xv. and address himself on the subject of a pacification di-
521-524 •
Fain, i. 178. rectly to the Emperor of Russia, putting Austria entirely
aside.1
Full of this project, he adopted a plan which was the
Napoleon's basis of all his operations for the remainder of this event-
ful year. This was, by one means or another, to prolong
°f the war or the negotiation till his reserve armaments
were jn readiness and had come up into line, which he
estimated at 200,000 men, and who, in addition to the
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 593
300,000 which he had already in the field or soon to CHAP.
join, would form a mass of half-a-million of combatants, VIIL
at the head of whom, from Dresden as a central point, is13-
he would be in a situation to dictate the terms of peace
at once to Vienna, Berlin, and St Petersburg. Having
adopted this plan, he commenced a series of despatches
to M. de Narbonne, at Vienna, prescribing an entirely
different course of conduct from that which he had
hitherto pursued. The tenor of all these despatches
was to use the most conciliatory language to Austria, to
feign entire satisfaction at her professions, to admit, in
Metternich's words, that the treaty of 1812 was nOiNaoleon
longer applicable to existing circumstances, and, so far J° Nar\ r
, PTI bonne, May
from denying the extent of the armaments of France, to 12,1813;
admit them to their full extent, and give, if desired, their 526, 527.
exact amount.1
Having thus taken his resolution to throw off Austria,
and, if he could not come to a direct understanding with Napoleon's
Russia, to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour, Na- preparations
poleon, in every quarter, commenced the most gigantic gecutionpof
preparations. His first step was to send for his step-sou, the war>
Eugene Beauharnais, whom he thanked for his fidelity
and fortitude in the command of the army during the
last stages of the Russian retreat, and announced that he
was about to prove his gratitude by a splendid settlement,
that of the Duchy of Galicia, on his daughter, the publica-
tion of which would immediately appear in the Moniteur.
After this preface, he stated that he was about to send
him on a special mission to Italy, the object of which was
that he should immediately take the command, not only
of his own viceroyalty of Lombardy, but of Piedmont
and Tuscany, and from the whole united raise a powerful
irrny, the elements or skeletons of which already existed
n those provinces. With regard to Murat, he had more
lifnculty, for that brave and chivalrous, but weak and
-acillating priiice, had had his vanity profoundly morti-
ied by some lines inserted in the Moniteur in regard to
VOL. i. 2 P
594 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, his incapacity to command the army after the Russian
vin- retreat, and he had fallen into a state of depression and
1813. despair which incapacitated him for any active exertion
in a separate command. He therefore recalled him from
Naples, whither he had retired, to command the cavalry
of the arraJ> an(* ordered him to put 20,000 of his troops
disposition of Prince Eugene. " When Austria,"
19,1813; said he to Eugene, "shall see 100,000 combatants on
Thierg xv.
530,531. ' the Adige, she will feel that it is for her to make up to
us, not us to her." l
To augment the main central army, on which he had
His me'a- to depend for operations in the field, the French Emperor
ment theUg took equally decisive measures, which were attended with
extraordinary success. He recalled sixty skeleton bat-
talions, and as many skeleton" squadrons from Spain,
which were to be filled up to their full complement by
conscripts from the interior, made to converge from all
parts of France to the frontier fortress of Mayence.
From this source he calculated on getting in two months
70,000 troops. In Westphalia and at Hamburg, from the
exertions of Jerome Napoleon and Marshal Davoust, he
reckoned on 112 battalions, mustering 90,000 comba-
tants. These, with 28 second battalions, organised at
Erfurth by Victor, as many coming up from Bremen under
Vandamme, and 10,000 Danes, would form a mass of at
least 130,000 sabres and bayonets, of which the command
was to be given to Marshal Davoust, and which were in-
tended to operate on the Lower Elbe. Thus he reckoned,
in addition to the 300,000 already under his orders in
Saxony or on the road to it, on 100,000 in Italy, 70,000
at Mayence, and 130,000 between Magdeburg and Ham-
burg — in all, 600,000 men. It was with this enormous
Sec the force that he prepared to avenge the disasters of the Rus-
sian campaign, and restore his prestige and ascendancy
i*1 Germany, and over Europe.2 Extraordinary as it may
331-333. appear, the result proved that these calculations of the
French Emperor were by no means overcharged, and
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 595
that the number of men whom, from first to last, he CHAP.
brought up around his standards, rather exceeded than ym-
fell short of what he had anticipated. isis.
Not content with these immense preparations, Napo-
leon gave the most extensive orders, and set on foot the His vast
most gigantic works, for the defence of the line of theSyi"
Elbe. He directed the construction of two additional ti
bridges, one at Dresden itself, and one at Priesnitz, toElbe-
facilitate the passage of troops ; commenced the restora-
tion of the fortifications of Dresden, which had been in
a great degree dismantled ; directed the construction of
tetes-de-pont on both banks, and ordered additional works
at Torgau, Wittenberg, Dessau, and Hamburg. At the same
time he set on foot such vigorous measures for the restora-
tion of his cavalry, in which arm he had as yet been so
inferior to the enemy, that he reckoned, within six weeks,
on having 16,000 horsemen fully equipped, of which
4000 were those of the Guard, and 3000 those of the
~ - . ... -ii ! Thiers, xv.
King of {Saxony, now, by his reconciliation with that 535, 536.
monarch, again put at his disposal.1
Meantime the Allies were slowly retiring, and in good
order, to their chosen battle-field at Bautzen on the Spree, Forces of
on the Bohemian frontier. The entire force at their dis-
posal on this occasion amounted to only 88,000 men ;
and of these not more, at the very utmost, than 80,000
could be collected on one field ; while, inclusive of the
large force of fully 80,000 tinder Ney at Torgau and
Wittenberg, threatening Berlin, Napoleon had 160,000,
whom he could assemble on one field of battle. This
great disproportion of force was owing to the immense
losses which the Russian army had undergone, by fatigue,
sickness, and the sword, during a campaign of unexampled
activity, which had now continued with scarce any inter-
mission for ten months, which had so reduced their ranks,
that few of the battalions mustered more than 250 or 2 Lo*d^Q>
300 bayonets.2 The French had sustained equal or cart, 144.
greater losses ; but the difference — and it was a most
596 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, important one — lay here, that the victories of the Allies
VIIL had drawn them away from their resources and their
IBIS, reinforcements, while the defeats of the French had
brought them nearer to theirs.
On the evening of May 12th, the headquarters of the
Force and Allies were at Bautzen. Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles
Stewart were in attendance on the sovereigns to whom they
respectively were accredited, and, along with Sir Robert
Wilson, were present in the whole of the important opera-
tions which followed, so that we have the immense advan-
tage of authentic narratives regarding them, from the high-
est functionaries, entirely worthy of credit, and possessing
the best sources of information. Their army was, on the
16th, reinforced by 15,000 Russians, under Barclay de
Tolly, who had been let loose by the capitulation of Thorn,
but this addition did not do more than make up the loss
sustained iii the battle of Liitzen, and the entire force
present under arms did not at the very utmost exceed
80,000 men. Indeed, Sir George Cathcart estimated the
effective force of Allied combatants under arms in the
field, at 70,000. The Allied sovereigns, after much
deliberation, had made choice of a position about two
miles in the rear of the line of the Spree, near Bautzen,
extending along rising ground, and having the left in the
woody recesses of the Bohemian Mountains, where it
could not be turned ; the right, which was in the plain,
was secured by several villages, ponds, and enclosures ;
while the front was covered by a swampy rivulet fringed
by osier and alder trees, affording good cover to light
troops, and offering considerable obstacles to the passage
of cavalry and artillery. The French Emperor, seeing
sheath38' that the Allies had obviously chosen their ground to
?!??' -it?' make a stand, halted his advance during the 13th and
144 ; Ihiers,
Fs^o'd ^Our f°Mowing days, awaiting the closing up of his corps ;
i. 94-96 ; ' and during this interval the Allies strengthened their posi-
26, 27!' "' tion in several places by field-works, and repaired and
armed an old field-redoubt on the summit of a hill,1 origin-
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 597
ally constructed by the great Frederick a little before the CHAP.
battle of Hochkirchen. vm-
Marshal Macdonald first came up in front of this for- isis.
midable position, having Oudinot on his right, who rested Advfnr;eand
on the wooded Bohemian hills, forming the support of the ^™hpeosition
Allied left. To the left he was soon supported by Mar- French
niont, who again was in line with Bertrand with an Italian "
and Wiirtemberg as well as a French division. Napoleon
no sooner heard that a general battle was imminent than he
ordered up Ney and Lauriston, supported by Reynier from
Torgau and Luckau, with orders to move on Hoyerswerda
on the flank and rear of the Allied position, with their
united force, mustering 60,000 combatants. Victor was ,
1 iv i f TIT- i T T-> Cathcart,
left before Wittenberg as a standing menace to Berlin ; 1*4 ;
with that exception, his whole disposable force, including S4o^543.xv'
the Old and Young Guard, was directed on Bautzen.1
Napoleon was just setting out for the army, on the
evening of the 1 6th, when M. Bubna arrived at his head- Napoleon's
quarters at Dresden, with the proposals of mediation theTustrial
by Austria, and an autograph letter from the Emperor Pr°P08aj8-
Francis to his son-in-law. The French Emperor received
the Austrian envoy in the coldest manner, and broke out
into one of his violent fits of passion against what he called
the perfidy of the Imperial Court. Without being deterred
by these declamations, M. Bubna quietly drew the Em-
peror's letter to Napoleon from his portfolio and read it
entire. This letter, which bore the proof of sincerity on its
face, produced a great impression on Napoleon, without,
however, altering in one iota his preconceived determina-
tion to make no concessions. He listened calmly, however,
to the terms suggested, which, to spare his pride, were not
stated as conditions which he was to accept, but as sug-
gestions of what his reason might approve. When Bubna
was done, he replied that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
had perished at Moscow, so there was no need to say
anything on that subject. He professed himself willing,
to the surprise of M. de Bubna, to admit deputies from
598 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, the Spanish insurgents to the conference. He expressed,
vm- however, the greatest repugnance to making any conces-
1813. sions which might tend to the restoration or reconstitu-
tion of Prussia, alleging it would amount to a reward
for perfidy which it was too much to expect from him ;
objected decidedly to the renunciation of the title of Pro-
tector of the Confederation of the Rhine, as a concession
which, without making any real change on the balance of
power, could be insisted on only for the purpose of humi-
Stewart to lia^Dg n^m '> an^ insisted the Hanse towns must be
ae retained till a general peace, to be exchanged against
26, isis; the French colonies in the hands of England. The con-
Thiers, xv. i.-ii -i i i ' • i • i
551, 552. f erence, which lasted two hours, broke up without any
definite conclusion being arrived at.1
This opening of a pacific intercourse with Austria by
Opening of no means diverted Napoleon from his main design, which
was to open a direct negotiation with the Emperor of
Russia. To effect this, he adroitly made use of M. de
Russia. Bubna, who wrote a letter to Count Stadion, the envoy of
Austria to the Russian headquarters, corrected by the
Emperor himself, in which he said that the French Em-
peror, noways intoxicated by his recent success, was willing
to agree to a suspension of arms, and a congress at Prague,
in order to put a stop to the effusion of blood ; and that,
with that view, he was ready instantly to send commis-
sioners to the advanced posts to negotiate the terms of a
suspension of hostilities. M. de Bubna was so much imposed
upon by the apparently pacific disposition of the French
Emperor, that he fell at once into the snare, and wrote to
M. de Stadion that, to all appearance, the mission proposed
by Napoleon would be the forerunner of a general peace.
Napoleon announced in this letter, that he was about to
make choice of M. de Caulaincourt to be his commissioner
at the Russian headquarters, as he knew that he would be
agreeable to his Imperial Majesty, and this was done with
the full consent of M. de Bubna. Having thus put matters
ostensibly in a pacific train both with Austria and Russia,
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 599
the French Emperor, having first given the necessary orders CHAP.
for arming and securing the tetes-de-pont over the Elbe, vm-
and provided accommodation for the immense multitude !8i3.
of wounded who were expected to be refluent on the next i Sir ^^
few days to the Saxon capital, set out in person, preceded ScLtL-
by his Guard, on the evening of the 1 8th, for Bautzen, ^h,^*7
juOj J.Olt>.
where he arrived on the morning of the 19th, and imme-MS-;
diately mounted on horseback, and began reconnoitring 552-55'*.
the enemy's position.1
Before this the Allies had gained an advantage over
part of Bertrand's corps in the neighbourhood of Konigs- Combat of
wartha on the evening of the 18th. How careful soever t^SI*1
the French Emperor had been to conceal the march of the ^French.
left wing under Ney to turn the right flank of the enemy, May 18<
he had been unable to prevent some accounts of it from
reaching the Allied headquarters. Having received this
intelligence, and learning that Ney's advanced column
under Lauriston, and a division of Bertrand's corps de-
tached to communicate with him from the main army,
were not properly supported, they conceived the design of
surprising them, which was immediately put in practice,
and attended with entire success. For this purpose, a
force of 20,000 men, consisting of the corps Barclay de
Tolly and D'York, was put under the command of the
former general, and set out at nightfall on the 18th. Bar-
clay fell in with Bertrand's detached division, consisting
of 9000 Italians, near Konigswartha, and after a sharp
action totally defeated them, with the loss of 2000 men
and six guns, of whom 1000, including three generals of
division, were made prisoners. They were only saved
from total destruction by the opportune arrival of General
Kellermann, sou of the Duke of Valmy, with Ney's cavalry,
who extricated them by a vigorous charge. At the same
time, the remainder of the corps under D'York came into
collision with the advanced-guard of Ney, under Lauris-
ton, 20,000 strong, which was advancing near Weissig.
A fierce conflict ensued, in which the Prussian cavalry
600 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, made several brilliant charges, and both parties sustained
VIIL a loss of nearly 2000 men, without any decisive advantage
1813. being gained by either. The combat continued with
4o;°cath-' varied success till eleven at night on the 19th, when
iS^Thlera, Barclay, finding himself decidedly overmatched by the
559f5odei. hourly-increasing masses of the enemy, withdrew with his
i. IDS. 109. corps to the lines of Bautzen.1
The French, on the same day, made an attack on the
Description village of Bautzen, occupied by Milaradowitch with
13,000 men, as well as the high ground on its left, but
es they were gallantly repulsed by the Russians, aided by
part of Kleist's corps, which came up to its support. It
was not intended, however, to hold the town or the course
of the Spree when seriously attacked by the enemy, but
only to throw an impediment in the way of his advance.
Sir Charles Stewart has left the following graphic de-
scription of the ground on which the army was posted,
which was in many places extremely strong: " Some
commanding heights, on which batteries had been con-
structed near the village of Teukowitz, separated from
the chain of mountains by streams and marshy ground,
formed the defence of the left of the position. They were
occupied by Wittgenstein's and Milaradowitch's corps of
Russians. Beyond, and in front of it, the advanced-guards
of these corps occupied several heights, on which batteries
had been erected. The line then extended to the right,
through villages which were strongly intrenched, crossing
at right angles the great roads leading from Bautzen to
Hochkirch and Gorlitz ; thence in front of the village of
Burchwitz, to three or four conical hills of considerable
elevation, which rise abruptly, and were crowned with
artillery, as was the high ridge of Kreckwitz, which ad-
joined them. These heights formed the right of the Allied
position, which was extremely strong. The ground in the
centre was flat and favourable for cavalry, except in a few
places where it was intersected by water -courses and
marshes. Earthworks, however, had been constructed, to
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 601
strengthen this part of the line ; and in front of it ran a CHAP.
deep rivulet, which curled round the right of the position.
On the extreme right the country was flat and woody, 1813-
intersected by the roads above mentioned leading towards
Silesia and the Oder. Barclay de Tolly, with his Russians,
stood here, with his extreme right somewhat thrown back,
and D'York's and Kleist's Prussians, in echelon, in reserve,
in the form of a semicircle, to guard against a turning
by Ney's columns. Blucher's Prussians formed on the
heights of Kreckwitz. Then came Wittgenstein's Rus-
sians, commanded by RiefFskoi, with Milaradowitch's
corps on the left ; the Guards, Grenadiers, and whole
Russian cavalry were in reserve, in the centre; and
Prince Eugene of Wiirtemberg, with 3000 Russians, was
placed on the extreme left, in the wooded hills. The 27,
,,,. , ,, -I • -i i -ii MS.; Lond.
whole line was about four miles in length, and about 43, 44.
80,000 men stood prepared to defend it, with 200 guns."1
On the other side Napoleon, on the morning of the
20th, had assembled 150,000 men, not as yet all in one French
field, but all intended to take part in the general action p°i"n of at-
which was approaching. Oudinot's corps formed thetack'
extreme right, and next him was Macdonald with his
corps, both destined to attack the enemy's left. Next
to Macdonald were Marmout and Bertrand with their
respective corps, which were nearly opposite to the
Russian centre. These four corps mustered 72,000
combatants ; and the whole Guard under Napoleon in
person, 15,000 strong, was in the rear of the centre at a
village called Forstgen. These forces were sufficiently
formidable, and might be considered as about a match
for the 80,000 of the Allies which stood before them.
But they were only meant to engage the attention of the
enemy, and prevent him from sending succour to his
right, where the real attack was to be made by Ney with
his own corps, Lauriston's, and Reynier's, in all, 60,000
combatants. Macdonald had the command of his own
corps and Oudinot's on the right ; the centre was under
602 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, the command of Soult, who had been summoned by the
VIIL Emperor to the theatre of German war, and was 55,000
1813. strong, including the Guards and reserve cavalry in the
rear. The whole force in front of the Allies, exclusive of
Ney's wing, was 87,000 strong, including the Guards and
reserve. All these troops were in line in front of Baut-
i Lond 43j zen, opposite to the Allied position, except Ney's corps,
can ?5^ which had been, during the preceding night, at Makers-
xva;56o'ers' ^or^' a^ou^ fifteen miles from the extreme right of the
SGI ; Mar- Allies, so that he could not arrive on the ground and
mont, v. •»•«.«••«! 'iii • •
104, 105. deal the decisive blow till late in the evening or early on
the following morning.1
The battle began about noon on the 20th with a vigor-
Commence- ous attack by Oudinot on the extreme left of the Allied
position on the wooded hills. Milaradowitch had antici-
pated an attack in this quarter, and strengthened Prince
Eugene of Wiirtemberg, who occupied them by ten bat-
May 20- talions of light troops under Ostermann, and some Cossacks
and artillery. As these were Russian veterans, the con-
flict was very warm in this quarter, and for long success
was doubtful. At length, however, the French, headed
by Oudinot in person, succeeded in scaling the heights of
the Tronberg, the highest hill in that quarter, and driving
back the Russians to Klein Kunitz. At the same time,
heavy columns of attack were formed to the left, on the
banks of the Spree, by Macdonald and Marmont, who
crossed that river, forcing the stone bridge over it, which
was strongly barricaded and obstinately defended. The
combat here, too, was long and bloody, and carried on
under the immediate eye of Napoleon himself, who was
stationed beside a windmill on an eminence on the right
of the road leading to Bautzen. In this conflict, which
was of several hours' duration, Sir Charles Stewart, with
his gallant comrade Sir Robert Wilson, who was constantly
by his side, eminently distinguished himself. Gradually,
however, Napoleon brought up a decided superiority of
force; large bodies of cavalry, infantry, and lancers, in-
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 603
eluding those of the Guard, were deployed in front of CHAP.
Bautzen, and heavy columns of infantry were displayed VIIL
on the esplanade before it, while every rising ground was
covered by a numerous and magnificent artillery, which
thundered with fatal effect on the masses of Russians and
Prussians by which the position was defended. At length, i Lond. 44,
after a desperate struggle, the rampart of Bautzen was cfrt, it*"
forced. Milaradowitch, finding the place enveloped by^fjn^ar~
superior forces, then withdrew, according to his orders, ^5 ;5™ers'
and the town itself was occupied, and the whole line of^61; wn-
the Spree, up to the foot of the hills, put in possession is.'
of the French.1 *
While this bloody conflict was going on on the French
right, Kleist, on their left centre, had a still ruder Progress of
shock to sustain. Bertrand's corps there came into action <m tfo
Allied right
* " I had scarcely finished my letters, when a heavy cannonade on the right and centre,
mounted Sir Charles Stewart, James, and myself. We rode forward and
found that Barclay was vigorously attacked on the right, and that the action
was commencing near Bautzen. When we arrived there, which we did, as the
French would say, venire a terre, we found the left of our line in a warm fire,
and that the enemy was passing the Spree on the right of Bautzen, to take the
town in reverse, and act in the rear of Milaradowitch. ... In a few
moments the enemy appeared on this side the river, and drove back rapidly
all the tirailleurs, &c., who opposed. Not an instant was to be lost. The
point was the key of the position of the advanced-guard, and the most pre-
judicial results must have been the consequence of its premature occupation.
Sir Charles [Stewart] agreed with my opinion. I brought back the guns and
the retiring battalion. We then advanced at the head, caps in hand, and
accompanied with loud cheers. The enemy fell back, but again we were
obliged to retire, by fresh succours sustaining the fugitives. Again and again
we rallied and charged ; and, finding about forty Prussian lancers, we dashed
in among the enemy's infantry, while our own pressed forward to help our
inferiority. The enemy threw their fire upon us before they gave way, and in
flying singed us ; but we were revenged. It was my lot to strike the arms out
of three men's hands ; one at the level, whom a Russian yager instantly stabbed
with the bayonet. A few were spared — a good many taken ; and if we could
have procured but one squadron, I would have engaged for at least five hun-
dred prisoners. The importance of the success was not, however, to be mea-
sured by the numbers slain or taken. It was the preservation of the ground
that was of chief moment ; and that was saved until Kleist was enabled to
reinforce the point with guns, infantry, and cavalry : here he gloriously main-
tained himself for some hours against all the enemy's multiplied and powerful
attempts to batter and storm him from the post. It was hot work : little
more than pistol-shot distance for near two hours ; and, considering that we
were conspicuous a cheval, and in glittering kits, it is wonderful that no
marksman fired with unerring aim ; but this is another proof that ' every
bullet has its billet.' " — WILSON'S Private Diary, ii. 17, 18.
604 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, in the afternoon, and commenced a furious attack on
V1IL Kleist's Prussians in front, while Mannont, who had
1813. passed Bautzen and established himself in the centre of
the Allied line, took them in flank. The Prussians made
a gallant resistance ; but Marmont's flank attack at length
became so formidable that he deemed it necessary to
i Lond. 45, retire, which he did in the best order, to the second and
cart,*}*?," strongest line of defence. Thus the French had made
iv8&62h,ier8' tnemselves master of the whole of the Allied front line ;
563 ; Mar- fo^ on ^he other hand, they had retired, according to the
mont, v. . . .
105, 106 ; preconcerted plan, to the line in rear, which possessed still
Wilson, ii. r m * s * '
25. greater advantages for defence, without any loss either in
guns or prisoners.1
At daybreak on the following morning the Emperor
Renewal of of Russia and King of Prussia were on horseback and
thedayte°nin the field accompanied by their respective staffs and
Diplomatic attendants. Napoleon was equally early
astir ; and the two imperial and ro3ral suites were
within cannon-shot of each other. Presently a loud
rattle broke out in the wooded heights on the Allied
left, and vast volumes of white smoke were seen rising
out of the ravines by which they were intersected,
over the black pines which clothed the overhanging
heights. It was Oudinot, whose corps, preceded by a
cloud of tirailleurs, was renewing the conflict on the
ground which had been so obstinately contested on the
preceding day. The cannonade soon became extremely
warm along the whole line, and the Emperor of Russia
and King of Prussia, as they rode with their suites along
the whole line, had to endure a very heavy fire of artil-
lery which was directed against them. Three Russian
battalions of grenadiers, since made Guards for their
bravery on this day, were brought forward in line with as
much regularity as the broken ground would permit, and
they succeeded, by their steady valour, in driving back
the enemy to a considerable distance on the left, and
maintained their ground during the whole day against
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 605
very superior numbers. An attack was at the same time CHAP.
made on Blucher's position in the village of Kreckwitz VIIL
and the heights behind it, which were most obstinately 1813-
defended by the Prussians in the centre. But these i Sir Chas
efforts were all of a secondary nature, and intended only Stewart to
Lord Castle-
June
to engage the attention of the enemy in these quarters, jeaf^3J
and prevent them from sending succour to the extreme MS-; L'°n(i.
right of the Allies, where Barclay de Tolly was now cart, 162 ;
beginning to feel the pressure of the overwhelming force 546-e565.xv'
under Ney.1
In effect, the three corps constituting the French left
wing under that Marshal had begun early in the morn- Decisive at-
ing to cross the Spree at Klix, and were pressing round ^th the ey
the extreme right of the Allies with irresistible force. J-^onfho
Barclay, whose entire force did not exceed 15,000, kept Allied right-
them in check, and delayed their advance as long as pos-
sible ; but towards ten o'clock Lauriston and Reynier's
corps came up in such strength, that it became impossible
for him to maintain his ground any longer. He was con-
strained, therefore, to fall back, which he did, contending
every inch of ground, and at length concentrated his force
in a strong position on the extreme right, resting on
some heights to the right of Wurschen. There he held
the assailants for a considerable time in check ; but Ney,
having at length got his whole force of 60,000 men,
moved forward about eleven o'clock, and carried the vil-
lage of Preititz by storm. Barclay de Tolly was by this
success put into the greatest peril, being almost enve-
loped by an enemy's force four times his own. Nor was
this the whole extent of the danger ; Blucher's Prussians
were grouped together with a formidable artillery on three
conical hills in front of Kreckwitz, and he was obviously
prepared to defend himself to the last extremity ; but
Ney's advance, which was made agreeably to his orders
upon the steeple of Hochkirch, was now bringing him
iirectly in the rear of the Prussian general, who, if he
persisted in maintaining his position on the heights, as,
GOG SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, from his indomitable courage, there was every probability
vm- of his doing, would also rim the most imminent risk of
1813. being surrounded; for to aid Ney's movement, Bertrand's
corps moved against him in front, while Marmont's, taking
ground to his left, threatened him in flank. Sensible of
i Lend. 45 ; fae danger, Blucher directed some of Kleist's battalions
Cathcart, '
163, 164 ; and two of the Prussian Guard upon Preititz, who re-
Marmont.v. • -, •> ••>•> i i i i • -r» -XT
106,107; gamed the village, and thus cleared his rear. But JNey
574*575^' brought up fresh troops, and again made himself master
of it, thus closing the rear.1
Napoleon no sooner heard the sound of Ney's guns in
Final and rear of Kreckwitz, thus menacing the rear of Blucher, than
facT ofVey he ordered a general attack on the Prussian general in the
centre. For this purpose he put under Marmont's com-
mand, in addition to his own formidable guns, the whole
artillery of the Guard. With their united batteries, num-
bering one hundred and twenty pieces, " I opened upon
them a fire," says Marmont, " which made the very earth
tremble." Under cover of this tremendous fire Bertrand's
corps advanced to the attack of the fortified heights ;
upon which Blucher, disdaining the shelter of his works,
sent his cavalry against them, who, charging, forced the
French to form squares, and thus arrested their advance.
Blucher, however, finding himself assailed on one side by
Marmont and Bertrand, and on the other by part of
Ney's corps, sent the most urgent messages to the head-
quarters for reinforcements to enable him to hold his
ground. The only answer that he received was, that the
«SirChas. * M i j j xi . TJ -.LV
Stewart to reserves were all already engaged, that rreititz was again
reagh, June lost, and that unless he immediately retreated he would
Ms'^Thierg, De made prisoner. With a heavy heart the veteran mar-
677- Sth- S^ was compelled to obey, and give orders to his men
1*6' Mar ^° evacua^e ^ne h^8 ^67 ^a^ so l°no an^ valiantly de-
mon't, v. fended. They descended in dark and massy columns,
i. 124, 1-27 ; while their guns on the summits continued to thunder
\v iison, n. ^.^ ^doubled fury against the enemy, so as to conceal
the movement.2 In the course of retiring they passed
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 607
close bj the village of Preititz, in possession of Ney's CHAP.
troops, without being disquieted by them ; and the Allied vm-
sovereigns, seeing "their right decisively turned, and too isis.
happy to escape without further loss in such critical cir-
cumstances, gave orders to fall back at all points. The
retreat, covered by the numerous and magnificent cavalry
of the Allies, to which the French had nothing adequate
to oppose, was conducted in the best order, and without
any loss in guns or prisoners.
The day after the battle Napoleon prepared to follow
up his success with the utmost vigour, and he deemed Napoleon's
himself sufficiently strong to make a considerable detach- "n
ment in order to electrify Germany and punish Prussia
by the capture of Berlin. With this view, when the re-
mainder of the army marched on in pursuit of the Grand
Army of the Allies, he left behind Oudinot's corps, which
had suffered most in the battle, with orders, after a re-
pose of a few days, to move on the Prussian capital. To
this corps he added eight battalions drawn from Magde-
burg, and a thousand horse from Dresden, making alto-
gether a force of 24,000 men, which he deemed adequate
to the important object he had in view. Meanwhile,
without giving his troops an hour of rest, he prepared to
follow the main army of the Allies in person. Lauriston
and Reynier, whose corps had suffered least in the battle
of the preceding day, were in advance ; after them came
Ney, Marmont, Bertrand, and Macdonald ; after which
followed the Guard, horse and foot. Deducting the losses
in the battle, and the separation of Oudinot, he had still x Odel ;
135,000 men under his immediate command, which w ould }jfc™ c'^r
be raised to 150,000 by the closing up of Victor fromssa.sb;
the rear, who was daily expected — a force considerably 46.
more than double that which remained to the Allies.1
" The dauntless personal courage of the Emperor Alex- 69
ander and the King of Prussia," says Sir Charles Stewart, sir Charles
Stewart s
who was by their side during the whole battle, " who description
never quitted the field, made the greatest impression on treat! re
608 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, all around them ; and had not reasons of importance,
VI1L coupled with prudential considerations, prompted them to
1813. relinquish their ground, the most ardent and anxious de-
sire was evinced by them, by renewed attacks, to maintain
the position. It is very difficult for an observer, unac-
quainted with much of the detail, to do justice by de-
scription to this battle, and the extraordinary efforts
made on the occasion. The determination, however,
having been taken to put the army in a new position, the
troops moved off, about seven o'clock in the evening, for
the ground around Weissenberg. The enemy immediately
opened a tremendous fire from the heights of Kreckwitz
and the village of Cannewitz on the retiring columns ;
but every gun was withdrawn from the batteries, and the
troops retired as on a field-day. The corps of Barclay,
D'York, Blucher, and Kleist, marched off from their right
to Weissenberg ; those of Wittgenstein and Milaradowitch
by their left to Hochkirch. The retreat was made in
echelon, covered by the cavalry, and conducted in the
most perfect order. Kleist's corps formed the rear-
guard of the corps moving on Weissenberg, and a battery
of forty pieces of cannon, placed by Count Wittgenstein
on the heights of Wurzen, checked the enemy's advance.
Milaradowitch covered the retreat on the line of Hoch-
kirch. Wittgenstein on all occasions displayed great
personal courage ; but he did not possess the general con-
fidence of the Russian army, perhaps because he was not
'SirChas a Russian- 'While Kutusoff was living,' said they, 'there
Stewart to was a great and scientific mind to guide the whole : but
Lord Castle- fo '
reagh, June the talents of the new chief are not yet made manifest ;
1 1813
MS. and no implicit reliance can be placed on the great direct-
ing power.' " *
The Allied army continued its retreat on the 22d, in
Combats two columns, on the great road to Buntzlau and Lowen-
berg. About noon the rearguard took a position at the
entrance of the defile of Reichenbach, to gain time for the
carriages to defile, and defended it with obstinacy and
I
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 609
success for some hours, when, the object having been gained, CHAP.
the retreat was continued in the best order towards Gor- VIIL
litz. Napoleon, with the vigour of twenty-five, directed 1813-
the movements in person, and General Bruyeres, an ex-
cellent cavalry officer, and old fellow-soldier of the Em-
peror in Italy, was killed by his side. A desperate
cavalry action took place in the plains beyond Reichen-
bach with various success, which began by a charge
headed by Lefebvre Desnouettes at the head of the Polish
lancers and the red lancers of the Guard, and ere
long became so general that the whole 12,000 cavalry
of Latour Maubourg were engaged. A mournful tragedy j Lond 50
occurred in Napoleon's staff soon after witnessing one of ^ cath-
these charges under a heavy fire of cannon-shot, which 1 69 -Thier
must be given in the words of one, and not the least dis- 583.
tinguished, of the survivors on the occasion.1
" Bruyeres," says Marmont, " had just been killed when
I was standing speaking to Duroc, Duke of Friuli, with Death of
whom I was. intimately acquainted, when I observed that Dl
his countenance exhibited a melancholy expression, which
I had never before witnessed. The event which imme-
diately followed has engraven the whole particulars on
my memory, and almost makes one believe in the truth of
presentiment. Duroc, sad and preoccupied, bore a mourn-
ful expression in his whole figure. I moved along some-
times speaking to him, and he said, ' My friend the Em-
peror is insatiable for fighting ; we shall all find our
graves here ; that is our destiny/ Caulaincourt, who
was riding beside him, nodded assent. ' He has had
victory after reverses ; now is the time to make peace,'
continued Duroc ; ' but he is not changed ; he is insati-
able for battles ; the end of this can be nothing but
disaster/ After in vain endeavouring to combat these
melancholy ideas, I went to receive the Emperor's or-
ders, who directed me to encamp my corps on the
east of the ridge which we had just passed. Napo-
leon, after arriving in the village of Makersdorf, was
VOL. i. 2 Q
610 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
.MAP. riding through a hollow way, when a cry was heard,
vm- * Kirgener is dead ! ' Hearing these words, Napoleon
1813. exclaimed, ' Fortune is determined to have much from
us to-day.' Hardly were these words out, when a
second cry arose, 'Duroc is dead!' 'That is not pos-
sible/ said Napoleon ; ' I was speaking to him this mo-
ment.' Unhappily, it was not only possible, but true.
A cannon-shot, discharged from a great distance, had
struck a tree near Napoleon, and, starting off, killed suc-
cessively Kirgener, an excellent officer of engineers, and
Duroc, the grand-chamberlain of the palace. The first
was struck dead on the spot ; for the second was reserved
i Marmont, a more melancholy end, for he was struck in the body,
ThS xl0'311^ I"8 entrailg protruded out. It was evident that the
£!i,3',5-84,i.r wound was mortal : but the dying warrior was put on a
Oclel. i. 147- , * *•
149. litter, and wrapped in cloths steeped in opium, to lessen
the agony which he endured." l
Napoleon was profoundly afflicted by this catastrophe,
Napoleon's which threatened to cut off one of his earliest companions
sationwith in arms, and one of the most esteemed and upright
officers of his palace. He hastened to the hovel to which,
as the nearest shelter, he had been carried. He took
him kindly by the hand, and, pressing it warmly, said,
" My friend, there is another world, where we shall meet
again, and find the term of our toils ! ' With a voice
scarce audible from emotion, Duroc answered, "From
the bottom of my heart, I thank you ; I intrust to you
my only child, a daughter, whom you will protect. May
you live long to conquer the enemies of France, and
repose at length in a necessary peace. As for myself,
I have lived as a man of honour, I die the death of a
soldier ; I have nothing to reproach myself with. I
again commend my daughter to your care." Then seeing
99 ; Mar- ' Napoleon still lingered, holding his hand, he said, " With-
uT; Thiers, draw, Sire, withdraw ! This spectacle is too painful for
685 584' y°u-"2 Napoleon rose up and withdrew, saying, " Adieu,
my friend ; we shall see each other again, it may be ere
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 611
long." In a short time after he expired. " Death/' said CHAP.
he to Marmont, " has no terrors for me, if I suffered less VIIL
agony."1 is is.
After this catastrophe, the retreat was continued in two
columns, the one by Buntylau, Haynau, and Leignitz, the Continua-
other by Lauban, Lowenberg, and Jauer, upon the well- retreat, and
known fortress of Schweidnitz, in Upper Silesia. The
baggage, which was of enormous extent, preceded theMay26>
columns, and the artillery and cavalry closed the march
in such strength, that no loss in equipage or materiel
was sustained. At Haynau, on the 26th, Blucher, who
commanded the rearguard, conceived and executed one
of the most brilliant strokes with cavalry which modern
times have witnessed, since the invention of fire-arms
deprived that arm of much of its former importance.
Sir Charles Stewart, who was engaged in it, gave the
following account of this operation : " The Prussian
general withdrew the rearguard through the defile of
Haynau, but still defended the entrance of the village by
the tirailleurs of the rearguard. While a warm fire was
going on between them and the advanced-guard of the
enemy, he skilfully drew up five regiments of horse behind
the village of Baudmansdorf, in ambuscade, entirely con-
cealed from the enemy. They were formed obliquely to
the line of retreat of the main column, but very near it.
When all was ready, the infantry, consisting of three
battalions which had been left in the village, retired
through it, and after retreating some way halted, and
faced about in a strong position some miles in the rear,
which they made a show of defending with the utmost
tenacity. Ney's advanced-guard, which followed, seeing
this, deployed, and was advancing to the attack, when,
at a preconcerted signal, the burning of a windmill, the
cavalry, hitherto hidden, suddenly emerged and bore
down upon them. Owing to the eagerness of the troops
engaged, the signal was given before the enemy was
sufficiently advanced, and thus the success was not so
612 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, complete as it would otherwise have been. But as it
vm- was, the French in advance, who had no time to form
1813. square, were ridden through and dispersed in a minute ;
1500 prisoners and 13 guns taken, with a loss to the
Allies of only 100 men. Unfortunately, Colonel Dolfs,
Stewart to' who led this brilliant attack, was killed at the head of
nwh, J*une his men in the beginning of the charge." M. Thiers
MS.; i^nd-adds to this narrative, on which the French and Britisli
cl'thcart, annalists are entirely agreed, that the troops dispersed
Thiew7xv were *ne ^es^ °f Lauriston's divisions, that of General
537,538. Maison, and that Ney himself narrowly escaped being
made prisoner in the course of the melee.1
This surprise, which gave the utmost displeasure to
The Aiiies Napoleon, rendered his troops more cautious, and con-
wards Bohe- siderably relaxed the vigour of the pursuit. He con-
ceived that the Allies were retiring on Breslau, and
despatched Ney with his corps to anticipate them on
that point, and he entered that fortress on the 1st June.
A fresh success gained by the Allies on the 27th, in the
neighbourhood of Gottesberg, when they made prisoners;
500 of the French, contributed still further to retard the
movements of the enemy. But the Allied sovereigns had
no intention of retiring on Breslau : they had resolved
on a flank movement to bring them nearer to the Bohe-
mian frontier. They had made choice of a strong posi-
tion, having its right resting on Schweiduitz, and its left
on the Bohemian Mountains, where they had formed an
intrenched camp, which they were prepared to defend to
the last extremity. If driven from this position, they
June were to have retired to the neighbourhood of Neisse,
Ms.^Lnd. where a second intrenched camp had been prepared.
Cathc7art r^n*s ^an^ march completely abandoned their communica-
171, 172'; tions with the Oder and Poland, and established a new
base resting entirely on Austria.2
Many cogent reasons now existed which urged both
parties to a temporary suspension of arms. The loss on
both sides, since hostilities were renewed on the Saxon
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 613
plains by the battle of Liitzen, had been not less, includ- CHAP.
ing the sick and worn-out, than 50,000 men : and each vm-
had powerful reinforcements preparing in the rear, which 1813.
would supply these losses, and render them stronger than Reajfs
ever for the fight. Napoleon rested with confidence on ™h/uch ler
<-> JL both parties
the 300,000 men now forming in reserve in France, Italy, »* *his Pe;
and Germany, which, when arrived in line, would more an armistice.
than double his disposable forces. It was to gain time
for the arrival of these immense reinforcements, on which
he relied to terminate in his favour the indecision and
secure the fidelity of Austria, that all his efforts were
directed, and no method seemed so likely to accomplish
it as proposing an armistice, and gaining time by the
evasions and delay of diplomacy. The Allies had no
such gigantic reserve forces to look to ; but reasons
equally pressing existed to induce them to accede to an
armistice. The Prussian levies, though brave and full of
enthusiasm, were as yet by no means generally organised,
and six weeks or two months would be of the last im-
portance in bringing them into the field. Large reinforce-
ments also were expected at the Russian headquarters,
though they could not all arrive before the beginning of
August. Fifteen thousand of the Guards, and Sacken's
corps, 8000 strong, had reached Kalisch ; while La-
banoff's corps, between 30,000 and 40,000 strong, was
coming up in successive columns. The withdrawal of the
blockading corps from before Glogau would raise the
Prussian force to 25,000 men. Thus above 70,000
veteran troops might be relied on ; which, with the Prus-
sian volunteers and levies, would probably produce, in six
weeks, 120,000 or 130,000 fresh troops to reinforce the
Grand Army. In the mean time, much was to be gained
by a suspension of hostilities, even if it were only for a
few weeks, to an army worn out with fatigue and inces-
sant marching or fighting for above a month past, and
whose effective numbers did not, at the very utmost, now
exceed 60,000 combatants. That the Allied sovereigns
614 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, mainly relied on the eventual co-operation of Austria,
vm- was evident from their having abandoned their principal
1813. line of communication by Kalisch with the rear : for if
Austria declared against them they would be in a cul-
stewart "' de-sac, driven up by Napoleon against the hostile Bohe-
mian frontier, from which extrication would have been
nex^ *° impossible. An event had already occurred
55,56; which foreshadowed these dangers, for the French had
Cathcart, .
172, 173 ; taken eight hundred men, ten guns, and a large quantity
589-591. v' of ammunition moving from the Oder towards Liegnitz,
and ignorant of the events which had occurred.1
When so many pressing reasons existed on both sides
Reasons for a suspension of arms, it may appear surprising that
anJ difficulty should have existed in getting its terms
eluded °on arranged> *ne more especially when the negotiations
which had been commenced before the battles are taken
into consideration. But it fell out otherwise, and a war
d toute outrance was on the point of breaking out when
the chiefs of both parties were desirous of an accommoda-
tion. The reason was, that the Prussian officers — at the
head of whom was General Gneisenau, who had succeeded
General Scharnhorst as chief of the staff, and who was a
man of great ability and an ardent turn of mind — antici-
pated the most serious dangers from the conclusion of an
armistice, which they feared, not without some reason,
might terminate in their being left exposed to the whole
wrath of the French Emperor, while Russia, whose honour
was vindicated and independence secured, withdrew from
a burdensome strife in which she no longer was vitally
concerned. It was known at the Prussian headquarters
that Napoleon had made overtures to the Emperor for a
ssirChas. separate peace, and it was feared a suspension of hos-
LordCMtie- tilities would lead to their being renewed and possibly
3ofi8i3,ay accepted. " It is difficult to give," said Sir Charles
54S55^°nd' Stewart at this time, " an adequate idea of the anxiety
592iei593V' whicn prevails with respect to the decision of Austria."2
The Allied armies have thrown -themselves upon her
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 615
frontiers ; they have abandoned their main line of com- CHAP.
munication by Kalisch ; have placed themselves absolutely VIIL
in a cul-de-sac ; and if Austria does not declare for them isi3.
it is easy to see what the result must be. On the other
hand, if she declare in their favour, the situation of
Buonaparte will be equally critical. Two attempts to
treat separately with Russia have, it is said, been made
and rejected/'
The necessity of the case, however, ere long prevailed
over these difficulties, and Alexander triumphed over theAnarmis-
seductions of Napoleon as he had done over his arms.5oCbybotued
A return from Wittgenstein of the Russian troops inParties-
camp on the 27th showed only 35,000 effective men,
and the Prussians 23,000 — in all, 58,000 ; and though
large reinforcements were coming up, they could not be
in line for some weeks to come. It is no small proof of
the constancy and fortitude of the Emperor Alexander,
that in these circumstances he faithfully adhered to his
engagements with his Allies ; and it cannot be doubted
that Napoleon never committed a greater fault than in
suspending hostilities when his army was flushed with
victory, nearly three times the strength of the enemy,
and in a position which cut them off from their base, and
drove them up against the mountain frontier of Austria.
It was determined, therefore, at the Allied headquarters,
to send a message with proposals for an armistice to the
French headquarters, and at the same time despatch M.
de Nesselrode to Vienna to lay before the Austrian
Cabinet the perilous predicament of the Allied army, its
diminished strength and hazardous position, the impossi-
bility of remaining much longer on the Bohemian frontier,
and the imminent risk that, if the Cabinet of Vienna de-
layed for any length of time to declare itself, the Rus-
sians would be compelled to make a forced retreat into
Poland, which would infallibly produce the dissolution of
the confederacy, the destruction of Prussia, and the loss
to Austria of the only chance she might ever have of
616 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, saving Europe and herself. M. de Nesselrode was
vm- further instructed to apprise the Austrian Government
1813- that proposals for a separate negotiation had been made
to Kussia, that the Emperor Alexander had refused as
sSiStu,' Jet *° list-en to them, but that he might be reluctantly
Lord cafie- compelled to act otherwise, and that he could do so in a
reagh, June
4, 1813; few hours, for he had only to grant an audience to M. de
Thiers, xv. i j t • • •
593,594. Caulamcourt, who was at the advanced posts soliciting a
private interview.1
Charged with these momentous despatches, so well
Conclusion calculated to terminate the delays and overcome the
mi«tic^ apprehensions of the Austrian Cabinet, Count Nesselrode
May29' set out on the 29th May for Vienna, and on the same
day the Russian general Schouvaloff, and the Prussian
general Kleist, were sent to meet M. de Caulaincourt
at the advanced posts. Caulamcourt referred them to
Berthier, who forthwith informed the Emperor. Napo-
leon at once consented to the principle of an armis-
tice, for the reason and with the secret designs already
explained ; but he was desirous to extract as much ad-
vantage as he could on his own side from this concession,
so obviously beneficial in the first instance to the Allies.
He therefore insisted at first that the cessation of hos-
tilities should be at least for two months, and that
during all that time the French garrisons in the fortresses
on the Oder and the Vistula should be maintained by
provisions purchased from the adjacent country. He was
willing to extend the armistice from Breslau to Ham-
burg, but on condition that these towns were ceded to
him, whether these towns had or had not been recon-
quered by the French troops. These terms met with
violent resistance from the Russian and Prussian commis-
sioners ; and Caulaincourt, who conducted the negotiations
on the part of France, confessed that "the feeling of jus-
tice supported the Allies under their defeats, and that
Napoleon would have a violent struggle to maintain if he
persisted in his resolution to yield nothing to Europe."
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 617
The Allied commissioners were resolute not to abandon CHAP.
Breslau, become the second capital of the Prussians, or vm-
Hamburg, which would be a tacit recognition of its form- 1813-
ing part of the territory of France, or to prolong the
armistice beyond a month. At length, after a prolonged 1Thierssvr<
conference of ten hours, it was found impossible to come f?r4)cSeS
to terms, and M. de Caulaincourt was obliged to refer Stewart to
=> Lord Castle-
the matter to Napoleon in person, who was at J\eumarkt,reagh, juu«
at the gates of Breslau, but without having yet entered MS.
that city.1
Napoleon was extremely irritated at these demands
on the part of the Allied commissioners, insomuch, that Further <iis-
at first it seemed as if the negotiation would be entirely N
broken off. He replied that a suspension of arms was
noway necessary to him ; that if it was not agreed to, he
would march forward and drive them beyond the Vistula ;
that nothing would make him abandon Hamburg or the
half of Silesia, and that if he consented to let the Allies
retain the other half, including Breslau, it was only in
order to demonstrate his moderation to Europe after
two such victories. In regard to the duration of the
armistice, he was determined that it should be at least
two months. Matters looked very unpromising from the
obstinacy of both parties in maintaining their respective
claims, when M. de Bubna returned from Vienna, and gave
a much more favourable picture of the disposition of
the Cabinet of Austria than could have been previously
hoped for. In truth, Metternich and the Emperor Francis
were overjoyed at the favourable reports which he had
brought of the dispositions of Napoleon, and in particular
at his willingness to admit the Spanish insurgents to the
conference. They were both sincerely desirous of peace,
and beyond anything anxious to escape without drawing
the sword. Actuated by these feelings, they had so far
modified the proposals formerly submitted to the French
Emperor as to postpone the restitution of the Hanse
towns, the question of the Confederacy of the Rhine, and
618 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, that of the maritime rights of neutrals, till the conclusion of
VIIT- a general peace. These new proposals, so well calculated
1813. to soothe the pride of Napoleon, and adjourn to a future
period all questions likely to irritate it, were accompanied
by a second autograph letter conceived in the kindest
terms from the Emperor Francis to him, which concluded
with these words : " On the day on which I gave you
my daughter, your honour became my own. Have trust
in me, and I will ask nothing derogatory to your glory."
To these assurances, M. de Bubna brought the declara-
tion from Metternich that Austria was bound by treaty to
no one, and the official guarantee, that if Napoleon ac-
cepted the modified terms now proposed, Austria would
597-55)9'. xv' renew with him the treaty, offensive and defensive, of
14th March 1812.1
These assurances on the part of the Austrian Cabinet
80
Conclusion were perfectly sincere when made, for when M. de Bubna,
mil!ke"f who arrived at Liegnitz on 30th May, left Vienna, iritelli-
JunT^' gence had not arrived in that capital of the separate
negotiation which the French Emperor was endeavouring
to open with the Emperor of Russia. .Napoleon, without
a moment's delay, was informed of these proposals on the
part of Austria, by Maret, to whom they had been com-
municated by M. de Bubna. The information reached him
June 2. on the 2d June, and he immediately resolved, in conse-
quence, to make some concessions, in order to obtain the
delay of at least seven weeks, for which he was so anxious,
thinking himself now secure at their expiration of the
co-operation of Austria. Information at the same time
arrived, that Davoust was at the gates of Hamburg, and
would certainly be in possession of it before the nighb of
1st June. This gave him the means of resolving the ques-
tion of demarcation on the principle of Uti possedetis,
and he accordingly inserted a clause, fixing the line in
the Hanse towns at what the fate of arms should have
decided on the 3d at midnight. The armistice was to
last till the 20th July, with six days more for denouncing
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 619
it, which in effect brought its duration to within a week CHAP.
of two months. As to Breslau, it was to be included VIIL
in a neutral territory of twelve leagues square. These 18T3-
terms were despatched by Napoleon on the evening of
3d June to Caulaincourt, with orders, if they were not
instantly acceded to, to resume hostilities. At the same
time he forwarded a secret letter, in cypher, to M.
Maret, at Liegnitz, in which he said : " Gain time ; do
not commit yourself to M. de Bubna ; bring him with
you to Dresden, and retard as long as possible the time
when we must accept or refuse the Austrian terms. I
am about to sign the armistice, and when that is done, all
the time which we require will have been gained. If, how-
ever, they persist in demanding terms unsuitable for my
honour, I will furnish you with themes by means of which
you may prolong the discussions with M. de Bubna, and
secure me the few days necessary to drive the Allies to
a distance from the Austrian territories." Thus author-
ised, the armistice was signed at Pleswitz on the 4th
June, on the terms which Napoleon proposed ; the
Allied commissioners having instructions to yield on Lond. A'PP.
other points, provided Breslau did not remain in the p.°368. '
hands of the French.1
" Such," says M. Thiers, " was this deplorable armistice,
which it was certainly right to accept if peace was in- Thief's re-
tended, but which should have been absolutely rejected
if war was to be continued ; for Napoleon, at the time he tlce*
agreed to it, had it in his power to destroy the Allies.
So far, however, from agreeing to it because he wished
for peace, he desired it to gain two months to complete
his armaments, and to be in a situation to refuse the con-
ditions of Austria. This fault, which preceded so many
others, was a part of those extravagantly ambitious pro-
jects which precipitated the close of his career. It oc-
casioned, however, in all but Prussia, a general joy, because
it was thought to be the harbinger of a general peace.
Napoleon, in sending his troops into cantonments, decreed
620 SIR CHARLES STEWART.
CHAP, the formation of a colossal monument on the summit of
vm- Mont Cenis," to commemorate the generous efforts of the
isis. French and Italian people who ran to arms in 1813 to
resist the Coalition. " The idea bore the impress of his
genius ; but for his own sake, for that of the French
people, it would have been better to have sent to Paris a
i Thiers xv treaty abandoning the Confederation of the Rhine, Ham-
603. burg, Illyria, and Spain, with the inscription * The
sacrifices of Napoleon to the French people.' " l
A review of the Allied army took place during the
Review of retreat, on the 27th May, at Jauer. The corps which
passed before the Emperor Alexander presented huge
gaps, though reinforcements had come up from the rear
since the battle of Bautzen, which in some degree com-
pensated the chasms made in the ranks on that bloody
day. The Russians in the whole army, indeed, were only
35,000 ; a melancholy proof of the vast ravages which
war, fatigue, and the sword had made in the once colos-
sal forces of the Czar. These were, however, bronzed
veterans, inured to war, cool under fire, patient of fatigue,
enduring of suffering, steady beyond any others in Europe
in disaster, but without the fire or dash of the French or
Prussian soldiers. The Prussians, though in many cases
Jet unsteady in the ranks, and scarcely masters of military
Lord Ca«tie- discipline, exhibited the fire and ardour which shone forth
reagh, June
7;i8i3, so conspicuously in the actions which followed, and which
MS.; Lend. r J .
ei. mainly contributed to the glorious termination of the
war.2
" On this occasion," says Sir Charles Stewart, " a dis-
Honour tinguislied honour was conferred upon a most meritorious
sir fTw™ officer in front of the camp of Jauer." The Emperor ordered
a grand review of the troops in camp. His Majesty rode
along the line, and was received with enthusiasm by the
soldiers. Observing a favourable moment, when he was sur-
rounded by his generals and staff officers, and in front of
the troops, his Imperial Majesty called Sir Robert Wilson
to him, and addressed him in the following gracious
CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 621
speech : " Sir Robert Wilson, I have duly appreciated CHAP.
the services, gallantry, and zeal, which have distinguished VTIL
you throughout the war ; in testimony of which I have 1813-
determined to confer upon you the third class of the
order of St George." So saying, as if desirous of doing
it in the most gratifying manner, the Emperor directed
General Augerausky to take his cross from his neck, and
delivered it to Sir Robert Wilson. Then turning to Sir
Charles Stewart, while General Augerausky gave him the
cross and ribbon, he said : " General, I give this to Sir
Robert Wilson, for a long series of distinguished services
through the campaign, through the war." The Emperor
continued some time to speak in the same strain, with his
hand on Sir Robert's shoulder. " Sir Charles Stewart,"
says Sir Robert Wilson, " behaved most generously and
kindly on this occasion, saying all that could be said, and
perhaps exaggerating my merits." He lost no time in
transmitting to the Foreign Office a full account of this
interesting scene, in duplicate of a letter addressed to
Lord Cathcart.* " The gracious mode, the well-chosen
moment, and the pride experienced by a British officer,
in seeing one of his companions in arms thus decorated in
front of the Imperial army, justify me in recording this
incident in detail." l If it was a grateful task to Sir l Lond. 52,
Charles Stewart to witness the honour bestowed on a R.
noble fellow-soldier, it is not less pleasing to his biogra-
pher to record the generous enthusiasm which led him to
speak in such terms of a worthy companion in arms, but
a most determined political opponent.
* See SIR C. STEWART to LORD CATHCART, May 27, 1813 ; WILSON'S Diary, i.
4.58.
CHAPTER IX.
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. JUNE 4 — AUGUST 18, 1813.
CHAP. REMARKABLE beyond any other in European history, from
IX- the magnitude of the interests which came under its dis-
1813. cussion, and the vast consequences which followed from
VastVm- its determinations, the Congress which met at Prague,
IhTmaTtefs a^er ^e armistice signed on the 4th June at Pleswitz,
theaconat was distinguished by the great military and diplomatic
gress of ability to which the management of these vast concerns
was intrusted. The genius and profound dissimulation
of Napoleon was there met by the cautious prudence of
Metternich and the indomitable resolution of Castlereagh ;
the moral firmness of Caulaincourt and diplomatic skill
of Maret, were matched against the ardent patriotism of
Hardenberg and the disguised ambition of Nesselrode.
The British minister was not personally present at the
deliberations, but he was admirably represented by Lord
Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart, who were fully in his
confidence, and communicated to the Allied Plenipoten-
tiaries the impress of his resolution. The interests at
stake were nothing less than these — the permanent en-
slaving, or the immediate emancipation of Europe ; and
in the decision of that all-important question, Austria
possessed a preponderating, it may be said a decisive,
influence. For, if her forces were added to those of
Napoleon, and the great central bastion of Bohemia put
into his hands, no one could doubt that his military
means, already victorious in two great battles, would
ARMISTICE OF TLESWITZ. 623
prevail in the strife ; and, on the other hand, if the CHAP.
Cabinet of Vienna joined their armies to those of the IX-
Allies, there was a fair prospect of reducing the formid- isis.
able numerical superiority to which his recent successes
had been owing, and at length driving his legions across
the Rhine.
Austria was perfectly sincere in this great debate ; for 2
she was actuated by the most pressing and imperious ofsincerity°f
11 • " i f oil i i rf -i i Austria, anl»
all passions — that of fear, bhe had sunered so much her views,
from France in preceding wars that she was naturally
desirous of turning the present crisis as much as could
be to her own advantage, and, if possible, regaining
some part of the territory which she had lost in these
disastrous contests. But she was anxious to do this
without drawing the sword. She wished to take ad-
vantage of her situation as armed mediator, and in a
manner umpire, between the contending parties ; but she
was by no means prepared to take an active part in hosti-
lities. She had still an undefined dread of the awful
power from whom she had suffered so much, and of the
conqueror whose victorious sword had struck so deep into
her vitals. Add to this that her preparations for war
1 Cathcart,
were in so incomplete a state that a war with JN apoleon i. 177.
would be attended with very great hazard.1
The forces which Russia and Prussia could bring into
the field did not exceed 80,000 men; and although as Forces 'of
many more were engaged in the blockade of fortresses PTMH*.
on the Elbe and the Oder, yet they were fully engaged
where they were, and were for the most part landwehr,
who could not be relied on for operations in the open
field. Bernadotte had 20,000 on the Lower Elbe but
they would be quite occupied with the troops of Davoust
in Hamburg, while Bulow's 12,000 Prussians in the
neighbourhood of Berlin were absolutely required for
the defence of that capital against the threatened attack
of Marshal Oudinot from the side of Luckau. Thus the
Allies, even including the whole disposable forces of
624 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP. Austria, could not, at the very utmost, bring more than
IX- 170,000 men at once into the field to oppose 300,000
1813. whom Napoleon would shortly have under his banner, and
as many more on whom he could rely if his much-wished-
for delay of two months were obtained. It was hazard-
ous in such circumstances to precipitate immediate hosti-
lities, for the Allies would in that case be at once met
by a superiority of nearly two to one ; but it became still
more so to delay them for a considerable period, for in
that time the superiority might be expected to be not less
than three to one.
This state of affairs presented singular advantages to
Great kd- a chief possessed of the sagacity and decision which
w^ichgthis characterised Napoleon. In addition to the ordinary and
f^^Naef"to well-known superiority which a single powerful sovereign
Napoleon, has in negotiating with a coalition of separate cabinets,
O O JT 7
actuated by individual and often discordant interests, he
enjoyed this peculiar and decisive advantage, that he was
not only superior in force to all united, but immeasurably
so to any one when taken separately. It was universally
felt that the Coalition could only make head against the
French Emperor by holding together ; but it was by no
means equally clear that they would hold together, or all
remain proof against the powerful means of seduction
which he had it in his power to apply to each. It was
already known that he had made offer to Austria of the
whole province of Silesia as the price of her co-operation,
and it was by no means certain that her Cabinet would re-
sist the temptation of regaining that ancient and valuable
province, the more especially when the family alliance of
the two imperial houses, and the backward state of her
present military armaments, was taken into consideration.
To Russia he had likewise made overtures for a separate
peace ; and it lay with the Emperor Alexander at once to
terminate a bloody and exhausting war, in which he had
no longer a direct interest, by a glorious and lasting peace.
The sincerity and ardour of Prussia in the cause could
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. G25
not for a moment be doubted, and everything which CHAP.
heroism and patriotic ardour could effect might confidently **•
be anticipated from its loyal and suffering inhabitants ; isis.
but its military resources, drawn now from not more than
five millions of inhabitants, were evidently unequal to a
contest, single-handed, with a power wielding those of
eighty millions, if the Confederation of the Rhine and
Italy is taken into consideration. Bernadotte could, as
a matter of course, draw off' his forces, and take shelter
in his remote peninsula the moment the Coalition was
dissolved ; and the army of England was too deeply en-
gaged in the Peninsular contest to be in a situation to
offer any but an indirect aid to any contest in Northern
Europe.*
Deeply impressed with these considerations, and well
aware that none of the powers in Europe were capable of Lordt-kstio-
making head against France in its present powerful mili- vlewof the
tary state of organisation singly, Lord Castlereagh directed alhance-
his main attention to holding together the often disunited
members of the Coalition. Prussia had for ten years
looked on with indifference while Austria maintained the
contest. Austria did the same when she was engaged ; and
both those powers joined their forces to those of Napoleon
* Lord Castlereagh's anxiety on the subject of the Alliance holding together,
and on the line Austria was to take, had by the end of June become extreme.
On the 22d June he wrote to Sir Charles Stewart — " We are in great anxiety to
hear from you upon the armistice. Its extension to the 20th July puzzles and
alarms us for the temper of Austria. We have done everything to prevail upon
the Prince Royal to manage matters with your parties, and I trust all may be
arranged before the resumption of hostilities." And again, on the 30th June,
he wrote to Lord Cathcart — " In the present wavering state of Austrian poli-
tics, I have deemed it advisable to direct your Lordship to endeavour to bring
the Court of Vienna to a private explanation of its views. It is not for Great
Britain to goad other powers into exertions which they deem inconsistent with
their own safety; but it is material we should know on what we have to reckon,
as well as to evince the disposition we feel, as far as our means will permit, to
sustain the Continental powers in accomplishing their own, as well as the ge-
neral safety; and as a proof that such is our disposition towards Austria, your
Lordship is authorised to make them an advance, if actually en lutte against
France. The rapid progress of the British arms in Spain will, I trust, prove
that we are not disposed to be inactive, and that it is not by pecuniary efforts
ilone that we are ready to contend for a better order of things." — Castlereagh
Correspondence, viii. 408, 411.
VOL. I. 2 R
626 AHMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, when Russia was attacked by a gigantic crusade of Western
IX- Europe. In truth it might be said that Napoleon had
isis. conquered Europe by means of Europe itself — that he had
caused its rulers to forge their own chains. All this Lord
Castlereagh clearly saw, and his correspondence discovers
the constant presence of it to his mind. But it was a
very different matter to carry it practically into execu-
tion, and still those jealousies, so much inflamed by recent
disasters, arising from the abandonment of those prin-
ciples in a great and unwieldy coalition. This was the
more difficult in this instance, as England, however deeply
interested in the issue, was not directly represented by
any member of the Congress, which was carried on exclu-
sively by the representatives of Austria, Russia, Prussia,
and France.
In one quarter, however, Great Britain did exercise a
importance more direct influence on the alliance, and Sir Charles
of Berna- _. , .111
dotte to the fetewart was the representative by whom her power was
lce' there wielded. Though not a first-rate power in the Co-
alition, and having contributed little as yet to the accom-
plishment of its views, Sweden was an important link in
its composition, and might come to exercise a material
influence on its fortunes. The Swedish soldiers, though
not numerous, were second to none in Europe in valour
and steadiness, and had more than once interposed with
decisive effect in the most important wars in Germany.
The military chief who had been elected by the National
Diet to succeed on the demise of the present sovereign,
was not only possessed of distinguished abilities in war,
but he openly aspired to the command of the army on
the Lower Elbe, which was to be charged with the defence
of Berlin, and which it was proposed to raise to 80,000
combatants. Add to this, that the attitude of Sweden
during the crisis could not fail to exercise a material influ-
ence on that of Denmark, hitherto the firm ally of France,
but which, shaken by the catastrophe of 1812, and in
terror of Russia, had recently made advances, showing a
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. G27
disposition on fair terras to join the alliance against Na- CHAP.
poleon.*
Bernadotte's language and actions were not a little 18^13-
equivocal, and such as begat natural and well-founded His equivc-
• • • i i PI*" *i m cal attitude
suspicions, in appearance at least, of his sincerity. 1 o- towards the
wards the Emperor Alexander his confidential letters Allie3>
were in the highest degree not only attached but adu-
latory, and it was difficult to doubt their sincerity, as it
mainly depended on that autocrat whether he was to
obtain the important addition of Norway to his domin-
ion.t His talents, both for action and composition, were
* On March 23, 1813, Lord Castlereagh addressed the following letter to the
Prince Royal of Sweden: — " General Hope has conveyed to me the substance
of the many interesting conversations he has had with your Royal Highness.
He has further flattered me by repeating the gracious notice your Royal High-
ness was pleased to take of my endeavours to unite the councils and interests
of our respective states. I trust, the auspicious prospect which awaits your
Royal Highuess's approaching operations may enable me, in the discharge of my
public duties, more intimately to cultivate your Royal Highness's confidence,
and to secure your esteem. My first wish is to see your Royal Highness at
the hea'd of a powerful army, liberated from all the embarrassments of a first
landing, and enabled, without the necessity of losing much precious time in
securing your rear, to take that prominent part in the advanced operations of
the Allied armies to which your name and service in the expectation of Europe
at this moment destine you. The magnificent career of the Russian troops,
sweeping everything before them, in the midst of a severe winter, from Moscow
to the Elbe, has opened to your Royal Highness new facilities. The combina
tions required to assemble your army from distant points may now, I trust, be
brought within narrow limits, and the Russian auxiliary force be saved the in-
convenience of a re-embarkation. If Denmark should still refuse to accommo-
date to the general interests (which I think now possible), I trust your Royal
Highness will soon extinguish that portion of her military resources which is
to be found in her Continental provinces, and which can alone, while Zealand
is blockaded, give any cause for jealousy to your movements. I shall deeply
lament this or any other delay which may retard the moment when your opera-
tions may assume a more enlarged character. I shall not lose sight of any
suggestions which were recommended either by your Royal Highness's wishes
or judgment; and when it is not acted upon, you will, I am sure, attribute it
to the variety of the many services which now press upon the resources and mi-
litary force of Great Britain." — LORD CASTLEREAGH to the PRINCE ROYAL OF
SWEDEN, March 23, 1813; MS. Londonderry Papers.
•f Le Prince Royal de Suede a S. M. I. I'Empereur de Russie : —
" Extremement occupe^ il m'a etc" impossible d'e'crire de ma main cette longue
lettre, mais je ne puis, Sire, resister au plaisir de re'ite'rer £ V. M. 1'assurance
jue je desire vivement que les circonstances actuelles jettent les bans d'une
anion e"ternelle entre la Russie et la Suede. II faut venger 1'Europe et la
;auver. Voila, Sire ! notre vocation. Elle sera remplie. Je 1'attends des prin-
:ipes de V. M. et les qualites e'minens qui ont fixe" sur elle mes premiers regards
G28 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, alike remarkable, and none possessed in higher perfection
IX- the art, so important to the rulers of men, of carrying
isi3. away the judgment by a flow of easy and impassioned
oratory. Judging from his conversation and the style
of his political letters, both public and confidential, there
was no man in Europe who was more strongly impressed
with the vital importance of the great cause in which they
were engaged, and of the absolute necessity of a thorough
oblivion of all separate interests, and of a sincere and
et les yeux du monde. Que de voeux, que de soupirs, sont dans ce moment
presses vers le camp Imperial Russe ! V. M. I. u'appartient pas settlement a
la Russie mais a 1'univers : ce fut le langage que j'ai eu 1'homieur de lui tenir
il y a des mois ; et articles affaires ont etc" loin d'etre dans 1'dtat on elles ee
trouvaient alors : maintenant la Prusse fait cause commune avec V. M. I. ;
1'Autriche est du moius neutre, et 1'Allemagne nous appele, elle s'arme, nous
attend et nous conjure de rester unis. Agre"ez, Sire ! mes voeux et mes senti-
mens pour tout ce qui vous interesse. (Signe") CHARLES JEAN."
Enclosed in the preceding : —
" Les grands evenemens qui se precipitant ne vous permettent plus de re-
venir sur le passe ; que le souvenir d'opinions contraires soit enseveli pour
jamais ! Le present nous appartient; et en fondant une nouvelle Spqque sur
confiance mutuelle il deviendra une gage nouvelle d'un avenir heureux. La
nouvelle de 1'armistice conclu le 5 de ce mois m'est parvenu hier, et j'attends
a chaque moment la copie de cet acte. Quelqu'onereux qu'il soit, rien est perdu
si ce premier pas vers un accommodement avec 1'ennemi commun u'est suivi
d'un autre plus decisif encore oil il pourra cimenter par la plume les avantages
qu'il sera acquis par 1'epde. La position militaire de 1'Empereur Napoleon est
trop aventure"e pour qu'il ne doive tout tenter en favour de la paix, et sa tac-
tique est plus active dans les ne"gociations que sur le champ de bataille. La
tactique de V. M. I. et celle de S. M. le Roi de Prusse, peut dejouer toutes
ces tentatives, et 1'Europe peut etre encore sauv^e si nous parvenons, Sire, a
la defense. Deja V. M. I. a vu 1'ancienne capitale de son empire consumee
par les flammes au milieu des cohortes ennemies qui etaient venues des bords
du Rhin pour le conquerir. En cddant alors aux insinuations pacifiques de
1'Empereur Napoleon, V. M. n'aurait appercu des ruines du Kremlin que
1'Europe en fers. Elle resista aux intrigues et aux menaces ; et la Russie fut
delivra et les espe"rances rendues au Continent. Que le meme marche dans
ce moment soit couronnd du mSme succes. Plus la crise actuelle est import-
ante, plus la concorde et la perseverance doit devenir 1'apanage des Puis-
sances Alli6es. Que tout inteYet particulier s'ajourne devant les grandes in-
terets de la cause dont nous sommes les dgfenseurs, et mon coeur et mes
calculs m'assurent que nous en soutirons avec gloire.
" V. M. I. et le Roi de Prusse etant de'cide's a remettre encore au sort des
armes la grande question de la liberte Europden, a moins que 1'Empereur
Napoleon ne se prete a des conditions qui assurent une garantie durable a la
pacification, je pi'opose a V. M. que si 1'armee combinee n'aurait pas recu des
renforts assez considerables avant 1' expiration de I'armistice, elle reste derriere
1'Oder, jusqu'k ce qu'elle soit <§gale en nombre a celle de 1'ennemi. En attend-
ant je pourrai prendre 1'offensif si V. M. I. et le Roi de Prusse mettertl de
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 629
trustful union of all the powers, and employment of their CHAP.
whole means to forward the great objects of the alliance IX-
and secure the deliverance of Europe. Yet amidst all isia.
these boundless and dazzling professions there was some-
thing in his demeanour which did not escape the practised
eye of Sir Charles Stewart, and awakened from the very
first strong suspicions of his sincerity, or at least of his
disposition to go all the length in favour of the alliance
which his eloquent words would lead every one to imagine.
" I dined/' says Sir Charles Stewart, " on the day of
my arrival at Greifswald, with the Prince Royal ofsirCh'aries
Sweden, and had two long conferences with his Royal accS of
Highness. His engaging manners, spirited conversation, Jj,™]-^
facility of expression, and the talent which displayed work-
itself in all he said, convinced me on my first interview
that he was no ordinary man. It was, however, my duty
not to permit myself to be dazzled by his brilliancy, but
to endeavour, if possible, to ascertain through the glitter
that surrounded him what were his real views, and how
far the warmth of his expressions and splendour of his
designs would be borne out by the reality of his services
suite a ma disposition les corps dont 1'^tat suit ;* en ajoutant a cette force
30,000 Sue"dois je me trouverai a 1'ouverture de la campagne avec plus de
60,000 homines, non compris un corps de 15,000 hommes que je laisserai pour
masquer les Danois et les Frangais a Hamburg et Lubeck. C'est ainsi, Sire,
que nous devons dissiper les nuages momentane's qui ont obscurci la se're'nite'
de nos relations ; c'est ainsi que le Continent attend encore de les forces de votre
empire et de la loyaute de vos principes la tranquillity et 1'ind^pendance qu'il
re"clament. Les peuples de 1'Allemagne ne demandent qu'uu guide ; la Cour
d'Autriche ne pourra pas rester indiffeYente a la vocation brillante qui lui
presente a la fois sa propre surete", sa gloire, ses destinies, et les voaux des peuples
oppresses. Tous les elements pour reussir existent encore : se"pares, ils ne
tourneront qu'au profit de notre ennemis ; unis, ils sauveront le monde. Oui,
Sire ! accepter la paix en ce moment dicte"e par 1'Empereur Napoleon c'est
ooser la peine sdpulchrale pour 1'Europe ; et si cet malheur arrive, il n'y a que
'Angleterre et la Suede qui peuvent rester intacts." — LE PRINCE ROYAL DE
>UEDE a L'EMPEREUR DE RDSSIE, Stralsund, 10 Juin 1813, MS.
* Corps de M. Lieut. -General Bulow, 25,000
„ Lanjeron, 6,000
„ Comte de Walmoden 6,000
„ Woronzoff, ... 4.000
Bataillons dpars, 6,000
47,000
G'30 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, to the general cause. The cautious line he had adopted
IX- and maintained during the last campaign had been of
1813. the utmost service to the Allies, and nothing had yet
occurred in his demeanour which could be made the
subject of reproach. But it must be owned there was
nothing to justify confidence. It remained to be seen
whether the future would wear a more promising aspect.
The unequivocal proof of his sincerity would have been
to have boldly and unreservedly committed his new
subjects against his old friends ; and it was not possible
to believe him fully in earnest until we should see him
fairly in action at the head of his Swedes, with French
troops for his opponents. He was on the eve of setting
out for Trachenberg, the Allied headquarters, at the
moment of my arrival. The impression on my mind,
from his conversation, is exactly conveyed by a phrase, of
which I availed myself when recording what passed—
' He clothed himself in a pelisse of war, but his under
garments were made of Swedish objects and peace/ What
further confirmed me in this opinion was, that a cele-
stewart to brated and distinguished general officer who was at that
rea't0 jSune Per>i0d one of rny colleagues at the Swedish headquarters,
9, 1813 ; emphatically assured me — ' Le zele du Prince se mont-
Lond. 76, . J .
77. rera toujours plus a rnesure qu il se croira moms neces-
saire.'"1
Sir Charles Stewart, at the time when his very inter-
His private esting work on the German war was published (1830),
ence6on°the did not deem himself justified in giving men at large the
suspicions which he was led at this period to form as to
Bernadotte's sincerity in the cause ; but these reasons
for reserve no longer exist, and his private correspond-
ence at this period with Lord Castlereagh goes a great
deal farther, and shows that he had come at this period,
not only to entertain the gravest doubts on the subject,
but that a variety of facts had occurred which tended
strongly to confirm them. The Secretary of State, Baron
AYinterstedt, General Aldercreutz, General Count Lowen-
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 631
hehn, and in general all the Swedish officers of rank, were CHAP.
not only most able, but honest and sincere men, devoted IX:
to the cause of their country and of Europe ; but no one 1813-
could be long at the Swedish headquarters without per-
ceiving that behind this, and probably unknown to them,
there were secret influences at work, and that the Crown
Prince himself was very far from having forgotten his
French origin, or detached himself from his French con-
nections. Mademoiselle Georges, the celebrated actress,
had recently taken her departure from Stralsund, where
she had been in daily communication with Colonel Comps,
his confidential adviser, under an escort of horse, and
gone to Vandamme's headquarters, where she was reported
to have said, " There is nothing to fear from the Prince
Royal." Her known intimacy as a political agent, both
with Napoleon and Bernadotte, added additional weight
to any expressions which, even in the most casual way,
dropped from her. In all projected military arrange-
ments, as to which the Prince was abundantly ready
with his suggestions and eloquent in their support, it
was observed that it was always proposed to keep the
Swedes in reserve, and, as far as possible, prevent them
from being ever brought into collision with the French
troops.*
* " The Prince Royal's chief favourite is Colonel Comps, his foster-brother,
and a Frenchman. It is not very unnatural to suppose that this man should
lean to French interests ; it is suspected he is in the pay of Buonaparte ; and it
is certain no man more completely controls Bernadotte. The Swedish gene-
rals immediately about him are good men, but without talent, and are led by
the French officers who form the staff. To give you an idea of the mode in
which communications may be carried on, Mademoiselle Georges has been
here for some time, and in daily communication with Colonel Comps. When
she was sent away, they sent her with an escort to the French advanced posts.
She was immediately taken to Vandamme, and he is known afterwards to have
said to the Danish general, with whom he was acting — 'Ah ! ne craignez rien
du Prince Royal. Mademoiselle Georges m'a re'pandu qu'il ne fera rien.'
Now, if this anecdote is correct — and I can entertain little doubt of it — I leave
you to determine to what length of communication such facilities as the one
cited may have afforded. You will know, I conclude, from Mr Thornton,
everything relating to the late correspondence with Vandamme, and I feel a
delicacy in adding much more on the subject of politics here, which I should
be inclined to, if you had not had recently such an able exposition from General
632 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP. Sir Charles Stewart was naturally led to fear at the
IX- time that Bernadotte was playing false to the Allies, or,
1813- at least, that he was still mainly influenced by his early
HI* rea'i feelings and associations, and that he would temporise as
views and jQI)g as possible in order to avoid being brought into actual
collision with the land of his birth, and lose his chance
Hope. If I differ from him in my views, I am not so vain as to desire them
to be more considered, but I feel it right to give you the impression of a new
mind upon the events occurring on the theatre in which I have been momen-
tarily introduced." — SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEREAQH, July 8,
1813 (Secret and Confidential), MS.
" The Prince Royal strikes me as being thoroughly French, cceur et Vame.
His engaging manners, his spirited conversation, his facility of expression, and
the talents which are perceptible, even on a first interview, made no great im-
pression on me, because I was prepared to meet all this. I rather regarded
him as a highly finished actor ; and I doubt if he is, in the long run, a charac-
ter either to admire or confide in. On the contrary, I should even be disposed
to watch him narrowly ; and the shifts and adroitness he can display and
possesses, would make me, when sure of him, on the qui vive. Characters
operate differently on different men. I should say Bernadotte has little
sterling worth in his composition ; and though I am free to admit his conduct
during the last campaign was of vital importance to the Allies, and though we
have hitherto nothing to reproach him with, still he awakens in my mind
suspicion rather than confidence. I may judge Bernadotte harshly, but I
never can look up to him, nor shall I ever think him sterling till I see him
spill Swedish in drawing French blood.
" Our conversation turned on every subject in a short space. He recapitu-
lated to me all he had done for the common cause, railed at length on the
perfidy of Russia, and declared that nothing but his faith in England kept him
here, and what might be the event at the conclusion of the armistice must
depend on his interview at Trachenberg. I gave him all the merit I conceived
he was entitled to for his forbearance last year. But I told him explicitly, I
thought he had lost an opportunity in not saving Hamburg, which would not
easily occur again, of rendering himself the supporter of the common cause in
the north of Germany, by which he would have secured the unbounded con-
fidence of the Allies, without even a risk to the Swedish army. He certainly
was not pledged to attempt it ; he had just cause to complain of Russia : but
there was nothing like a great man taking boldly advantage of the moment ;
and in this I thought, and should ever think, he had failed. He took this in
good part, and justified himself plausibly. He then reverted to the actual
crisis, and hinted that if peace was made, England must transport his troops
to attack Zealand, and that England and Sweden united could carry on the
war. Certainly, throughout the whole of his conversation, I evidently re-
marked a disposition principally to secure Swedish objects ; of the troops
to be put under his orders, including Winzingerode, he rather seemed to think
insignificantly, and gave me the idea as if he felt events would arrest these
arrangements.- He said if he had an army of 80,000 men agreeably to his
letter to the Emperor, it must be independent of the Grand Army ; to ad-
vance when he thought right, and retire when he deemed it prudent to do so.
He could not commit his fate to the direction of other men having other
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 633
of succeeding to the throne of France on the downfall of CHAP.
Napoleon. He was well aware, too, in what a precarious IX-
position Bernadotte was placed, and how readily a soldier isis.
of fortune, with an ancient crown hardly settled on his
head, might be influenced by another soldier of fortune
wielding a still more powerful sceptre, and seeking to
objects. I told him I concluded the Emperor and King of Prussia would
enter into complete arrangements with him, and fix on combined plans of
operation, for concerting which the conferences of Trachenberg had been set
on foot, than which nothing could be more advantageous to the common
cause, and if I was so fortunate as to see him on his return, I trusted I would
find all the arrangements had been to his satisfaction. The Prince then asked
me about the treaties of concert and subsidy with Russia and Prussia. I com-
municated the substance of them to him frankly; and when he asked my opinion
whether the armistice would be prolonged, I said I did not think it coxild be,
under our treaty, without the consent of England. He thought as I did on this
subject, but remarked that Russia and Prussia in their proceedings thought more
of themselves than either Sweden or England. He denied that Sweden had
accepted the late mediation of Austria ; and while he was impressing on my
mind the renewal of the war with vigour, I plainly perceived he had no con-
fidence in this being the issue of events ; and if I can read into his secret
thoughts, there is little desire it should be so. Forced to take a part, lest
Russia and Prussia should leave him in the lurch, he clothes himself in a
pelisse of war, while his under garments are formed of Swedish objects and
peace. By attaining the former, he raises himself ; by the latter, he is not
committed against that nation, the love of which is inherent. England will
retain him as long as it is for his advantage to be retained ; but there is no
natural link between him and his present allies. If I have given you these
ideas unnecessarily, burn this letter ; you know I write to you in the candour
of my heart. I should not forget to mention that the news had arrived of
the division in the House of Commons on the Swedish treaty. You have
fought this admirably ; the Prince was in raptures, and you are his greatest
favourite. I owe it to you, that notwithstanding the openness with which I
expressed my feelings, as to his not having saved Hamburg, and how much I
thought was now expected of him, he dismissed me at parting as he received
me at coming, with two very warm kisses." — SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD
CASTLEREAGH, Stralsund, July 8, 1813 (Private and Secret), MS.
Sir Charles Stewart's views at this time as to the Coalition holding together
were very gloomy. On June 6, he wrote from Reichenbach, the place of the
sovereigns' congress : " The news we send home is not the best; and from what
I see, I fear political treachery and the machinations of those that are in the
wind, more than any evils from Buonaparte's myrmidons. We must keep
a sharp lookout, especially since our refusal of Austrian mediation. We are
not considered, from all I see, as in the Cabinet. The accounts from Ham-
burg and Stralsund are bad. I fear the Swedes will go, and Buonaparte get
20,000 Danes in the north. However, we shall turn him yet, if we can con-
fine him to fair fighting. The Prince Royal has not been managed as he
should have been by Russia ; and if the Emperor does not turn his tone, Ber-
nadotte will yet seize Finland. The disorder in the Russian army is great ;
Prussians are infinitely better. They have everywhere distinguished them-
634 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, detach him from the league of his enemies by still more
TX- dazzling offers than they had it in their power to present
1813. to him. But though subsequent events, as will appear in
the sequel of this biography, abundantly proved that these
apprehensions were to a certain extent well founded, yet
there is nothing in his conduct or words which warrants
the belief that he ever intended to be openly unfaithful to
the alliance, or make that common cause with Napoleon
which Sir Charles Stewart, from his dubious conduct, was
led to apprehend. The truth is, that he was personally
hostile to the French Emperor. He had owed him
nothing in his elevation to the throne, which was entirely
owing to himself; and, since that event, he had been pub-
licly insulted by him in the bulletins. He was too clear-
sighted, also, not to see the extreme peril of the course
upon which Napoleon was now entering, and the impolicy
in linking himself, in any degree, with his tottering for-
tunes. But while Bernadotte had not the slightest inten-
tion of allying himself to him, he was extremely desirous
to avoid taking any open or active part against him. He
desired, like Austria, to take advantage of the crisis to
secure Norway for Sweden, but he was extremely averse to
committing himself to any contest d toute outrance witli
France, or engaging his troops in any action which might
engender a feeling of animosity between the two countries.
In addition to the obvious motive of wishing to do this in
order to spare the lives of his soldiers, drawn from a thinly
peopled country, and suffering under nothing so much as a
want of inhabitants, and the anxiety to do nothing which
might put in hazard his popularity with his new subjects
selves, and will do much in a little time. You cannot send them too much
ammunition and arms. Russia rides the bear over them, but they are obedi-
ent and patient, and I will pledge my faith for them. Although the Germans
will not burn their Moscow and lay waste their country, still they will be true;
and Prussia will not be the first power to withdraw from the English alliance.
I cannot help thinking the great personages of the drama will here meet,
and Metternich will try some family alliances to aid the objects of peace. If
things turn to a congress, and a negotiation is required, pray send a very able
man. Depend upon it he will be required. " — SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD
CASTI.EREAGH, Reichenbach, June 6, 1813, MS.
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. G35
or endanger the crown not yet settled upon his head, there CHAP.
were two other circumstances which in an especial manner
made him desirous to avoid becoming a principal in the 1813-
strife.
The first of these was, that notwithstanding his warm
and adulatory professions of admiration for the Emperor His real
Alexander, he was in reality much irritated by the conduct views at
of that monarch. This he evinced in an unmistakable thls peri
manner in conversation with Sir Charles Stewart, as appears
from the letter quoted above. He was highly dissatisfied
with the support which he had received from the Cabinet
of St Petersburg in his demand for Norway, even although
Alexander had united with Great Britain in agreeing to
throw no obstacles in the way of that acquisition ; and, as
Austria had recently made offers to Denmark to support
her in the retention of Norway, on condition of her acceding
to her proposals of an armed mediation, and a negotiation
had for some time been going on between the Cabinets of
St Petersburg and that of Copenhagen with a view to the
latter joining the Coalition, he was fearful, not without
reason, that the condition of that accession would be the
retention of Norway. In these circumstances, the Crown
Prince conceived that he had no need to put forth his
strength for the interests of a power which was evincing
no steadiness in the support of his peculiar objects. It was
for this reason that he had not interfered to oppose the
Danes who assisted Vandamme in recovering Hamburg.
He knew that such an event would render the breach
between them and the Allied sovereigns irreparable. In
addition to this, there was another reason still more cogent,
which rendered him anxious not to irritate the feelings of
the French against him. His vivid imagination and san-
guine temperament had already prefigured to him not only
the fall of Napoleon as a probable event, but his own
election by the French to succeed him, as by no means an
improbable one. He had thus come to indulge in what
Frederick the Great called " the most entrancing dream of.
636 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, a sovereign, that of being King of France." Extravagant
IX- as these ideas may now seem, it will appear in the sequel
isis. that they were by no means without foundation. It has
been already mentioned that the Czar had encouraged
I MHTS, *
xvi. 11, 12. these hopes, and that Bernadotte had some grounds for
his elevated aspirations.1
While these jealousies, arising from clashing political
state oV designs, were endangering the common cause in the north
of Germany, interests still more vital were in hazard,
dangers still more pressing were imperilling the alliance
at the conferences consequent on the armistice of Pleswitz.
It has been already mentioned that, in agreeing to that
armistice, and even urging it upon the Allied sovereigns,
Napoleon had no intention whatever of yielding to the
terms proposed by Austria, or abating, save in regard to
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, one iota from his own pre-
tensions, but that his only object was to gain time, and, if
possible, not less than two months, to complete his hostile
preparations, and bring forward the vast reserve forces
which he was preparing in Italy, Germany, and on the
Rhine. " Nevertheless," says Thiers, " although this was
his fixed determination, as now appears from his orders,
diplomatic communications, and secret admissions made to
his confidential ministers, yet it was indispensable not to
let this resolution be divulged, either to the Allied powers
or the generals or marshals around him, of whose zeal
and fidelity he stood much in need. Such a revelation of
his inmost thoughts would at once have determined Austria
against him, spread despair among his allies, and thoroughly
disheartened his officers, and indeed the whole army. The
armed force was already more than lukewarm in his cause.
Ever ready to combat at the call of honour, they did not
the less deplore the fatal obstinacy which led him to shed
so much blood for a cause which they were no longer well
able to understand. They knew well that, after the dis-
asters of Moscow and the Beresina, they stood in need of
some, signal victories to restore the tarnished lustre of their
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 637
arms. But after Liitzen and Bautzen this was done, and CHAP.
nothing more for that purpose could be required. If the IX-
army were to know that they were now required to continue 1813.
the contest, and shed their blood, not for the independence
of France, or to assert the honour of her arms, but for
Lubeck, Hamburg, Bremen, and the vain title of Protector
of the Confederation of the Rhine, they could not be ex-
pected to evince their wonted enthusiasm in his cause.
And what might be looked for if they knew that the peace
which he rejected, and to resist which he was involving
them in endless toils and sufferings, would have secured
to the Emperor, Belgium, the Rhenish Provinces, Hol-
land, Piedmont, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, and the entire xvi. 5, G.
command of Italy1?"1
Aware of the prevalence of these ideas both among his
superior officers and soldiers, and yet determined not to Napoleon's
yield to them, Napoleon adopted two principles for the JoiLy^n
regulation of his conduct, which swayed it throughout the ™°snec~e.
whole of the armistice, and indeed through all the re-
mainder of his reign. The first was, to avail himself of
every expedient which, without revealing his secret designs,
might prolong the conferences, and gain for him time to
complete his preparations and bring up his forces. By
stickling for forms, and availing himself of every possible
technical objection, it was not difficult to effect this object.
The second was, to inform none but his most intimate
counsellors of his real intentions, or the conditions of the
peace for which he was to contend ; and to hold out to all
others, even those apparently most in his confidence, that
the terms which Austria proposed were such as no French-
man could for a moment admit. Maret alone was admitted
to his inmost thoughts, and knew that the whole contest
was about Hamburg and the Hanse towns. He wrote
meanwhile in secret cipher to the Minister of War at
Paris, and to Prince Eugene in Italy, that he had signed
this armistice because he was desirous of gaining time to
complete his preparations against Austria, to whom he was
638 ARMISTICE OF PLESWIT7.
CHAP, about to give, not receive, the law; and in the mean time
IX- to spare no efforts so as the army of Italy might by the
1813. end of July menace Austria in Italy, and that of Mayence
threaten Bavaria on the Maine. They were enjoined " to
i Napobon act so that the days should count double, for hardly two
Camba-ce months remain to complete the preparations which are
indispensable. The armistice, without doubt, may pos-
sibl}r lea(^ to a peace ; but, even in that event, we should
same date; not relax a moment in our preparations for war; for it is
7, s. ' only by being prepared at all points that the peace can be
rendered secure or durable."1
The better to carry out these projects, lie returned as
Preliminary soon as the armistice was signed to Dresden. The first
difficulties -, • • -11 •> ,-\ • M
in point of object was to insure delay, and this was easily accom-
plished. M. de Bubna, the Austrian envoy, in vain waited
for hours every day in the antechambers of the Palais
Marcolini, in the faubourg Frederickstadt, which Napo-
leon had selected for his residence in Dresden, soliciting
an interview of the Emperor. The preliminary point
which furnished a pretext for these delays, was the ques-
tion whether the plenipotentiaries of the different powers
should treat directly with each other, or address their
communications mutually to Austria as the mediating
power. Metternich strongly supported the latter course as
the one most respectful and advantageous to the mediating
power ; Caulaincourt and Maret as strongly maintained
the reverse, alleging, with some truth, that the character
of ally of France, which Austria still bore, was inconsis-
tent with that of mediator between powers engaged in a
negotiation, and that the propositions on Napoleon's side
should come from France, and Austria and France
, united, and be addressed directly to the Allied plenipo-
tentiaries. Above two weeks were lost in the vain inter-
change of notes on this point, and at length the difficulty
June 26,' was avoided by the agreement that, to preserve the inde-
1813; Fain, . J . .
ii. i'29-iso. pendence essential to the character of a mediator, the
alliance should be considered as suspended, not broken ; 2
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 639
an equivocal expression, which Napoleon justly considered CHAP.
equivalent to its entire dissolution. IX-
The Cabinet of Vienna and the Allied sovereigns were so isis.
strongly impressed with the obvious desire to procrastinate, The Em-
evinced by the stress laid by the French plenipotentiaries SSElfi
on these senseless formalities, that both resolved to adopt a^m in
VI 1 • 1 l*"161111^
every measure likely to cut short the negotiations Bnd«?d Metter-
terminate the delays, which it was evident were all likely Dresden.
to turn out to the advantage of the French Emperor. In
great alarm, Metternich advised the Emperor Francis to
hasten from Vienna to the Castle of Gitschin in Bohemia,
to be at hand for the conduct of the conferences ; while
the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia took up their
residence at Trachenberg, at no great distance. The
Austrian Emperor's movements had been much hastened
by another circumstance. The Emperor Alexander, who
was well informed of the vast extent of the prepara-
tions of the French Emperor, and the inestimable im-
portance of even a few weeks' delay to his interest, had
despatched on his side his Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Count Nesselrode, to meet Metternich, and represent to
him the imminent danger to Austria and Germany of
the conclusion of a separate peace with Russia, which
Napoleon was eagerly soliciting him to conclude, and
which could be arranged in a few hours by simply ad-
mitting M. de Caulaincourt to a conference with the Czar.
Such was the alarm excited by the communication of the
object of Nesselrode's mission, made by Count Stadion,
and the obvious danger of Austria being left in the lurch 3/35'."'
by a separate treaty between France and Russia, that ™±QS: ^
within twenty-four hours of the arrival of the despatch Chas- stew-
-fT- T i TI T-» • i art to Lord
at Vienna, the J^mperor rrancis, to the great astonish-
ment of his court, took his departure for Bohemia, and isis, MS.
established himself at the Castle of Gitschin.1
Immediately after his arrival there, Metternich, who
was now seriously alarmed at the perilous position of his
country, came to a sincere and truthful explanation, in a
640 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CIJAP. verbal conference -with Nesselrode, of the real views and
IX- wishes of the Cabinet of Vienna. He explained to him
1813. that the Emperor Francis, actuated alike by his affection
ex- f°r hig daughter and grandson, and the interests of his
11 Pe°ple> was sincerely desirous to avoid hostilities, and was
Mettemich not without hopes of securing the independence of Ger-
and Nessel- i M i • « i • i
rode. many, and possibly regaining some of his lost provinces,
without recurring to the sad alternative of war ; that, in
addition to this, Austria, not less than the French Em-
peror, had need of time to complete and bring forward
her armaments, which as yet were far from being com-
plete or ready for action. For these reasons the Cabinet of
Vienna would honestly and in good faith work out the
character of mediator before they assumed any other ;
that they would faithfully act on this principle during the
whole continuance of the armistice ; that they could not
possibly, situated as they were, pass from the part of an
ally to that of an enemy without going through the inter-
mediate state of a mediator, and consequently they could
not take an active part till the whole resources of media-
tion were exhausted; but that, when this was done, if
the French Emperor still resisted the terms which they
should propose, they would, on the expiry of the armi-
stice, join their forces to those of the Allies, to rescue
Europe from the domination of Napoleon. Contrary to
usual diplomatic usages, but moved by the gravity of
the circumstances, M. de Mettemich, in addition to
xvi. 22,s 23 ; these official assurances, gave Nesselrode the Emperor's
f4o°i4i. word of honour that he would make good these engage-
ments.1
In conformity with this declared intention of accepting
Napoleon's and acting up to the character of a mediator, Mettemich,
fresh delays. Qn t^e j.^ June, the very day after Napoleon had estab-
lished himself in Dresden, presented a note to him by M.
de Bubna, in which he stated that "Russia and Prussia
had accepted the Austrian mediation, and were in course
of -submitting their proposals to her, and that he invited
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 641
France to do the same." * Napoleon kept the note till CHAP.
the 15th, without returning any answer; and when he IX-
did make a reply, it was one which, without stating any isis.
proposals of accommodation on the part of France, simply
contended M. de Bubna's authority to make such a com-
munication, and objected to the assumption of the char-
acter of mediator by Austria, while she still, in form at
least, retained that of an ally. Several notes were in
consequence exchanged, and much time lost in discussing
this preliminary point.
Warned by Sir Charles Stewart of the dilatory policy 18
which Napoleon was commencing, Lord Castlereagh lost Signature of
• -i • i i -i i -i i the Treaty
no time in drawing more closely the bonds between of June 15,
Great Britain and the two main pillars of the alliance, RoMvud'
Russia and Prussia. On the 15th June the definitive1*1
treaty of alliance was signed between these two powers
in pursuance of the conventions, already mentioned,
agreed to in the spring preceding. By this treaty, which
was signed by Lord Cathcart on the part of England,
M. Nesselrode on that of Russia, and M. de Hardenberg
on that of Prussia, it was finally stipulated that Great
Britain should advance two millions sterling to the two
allied powers, two -thirds to Russia and one -third to
Prussia ; in consideration of which the former was to
maintain an army of 160,000, the latter one of 80,000
men, in the field. In addition to this, a measure of still
greater importance was, upon the suggestion of Lord
* The points of difference between Austria and the Allies, at this time, are
thus stated by Sir C. Stewart : " I saw a letter of the Prussian minister (Hum-
boldt) to the Austrian Court, dated the 1st June. He says that Francis will cer-
tainly declare against Buonaparte unless he accepts the terms of peace proposed
by Austria, which differ from those proposed by the Allies, inasmuch as the
latter require — 1 . Aggrandisement to Austria ; 2. Aggrandisement to Prussia ;
3. The separation of the Duchy of Warsaw from France ; 4. The cassation
of the Rhenish Confederacy ; 5. The re-establishment of the old dynasty of
Spain ; 6. The independence of Holland. Austria, according to his statement,
would be satisfied with the three first stipulations. The two former he appre-
hends Buonaparte would make no difficulty about. The latter, he is certain, he
will never consent to ; so he looks upon the continuance of the war as inevit-
able, and urges Prussia accordingly." — SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLE-
REAGH (Private and secret), June 6, 1813, MS,
VOL. I. 2S
642 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP. Castlereagh, agreed to, and immediately acted upon, \vliich
IX> came to exercise a most important influence upon the
isis. future fate of the war. This was an emission of paper
money to the extent of £5,000,000, guaranteed by the
three powers, of which England was to engage for one
half, and in which all the purchases for the army and the
pay of the troops were made. Guaranteed by these
great powers, this paper currency soon got into general
circulation. Immense was the effect of this admirable
measure, which, being limited in amount, and not exceed-
ing the wants of the case, exhibited the strength of the
assignats which enabled the French Republic to resist the
assault of the European powers, without the weakness
which led to the total destruction of realised capital in
that great country. As Great Britain was looked for-
ward to as the eventual paymaster of this paper, and her
credit alone gave it currency, so it was to Lord Castle-
reagh's strenuous and indefatigable efforts that the adop-
tion of the scheme by the Allied powers was owing. He
was earnestly set upon its success, and turned to good
i See Treaty account on this decisive occasion the principles he had
m Martens, . -, -,•,••,-,• i
xii. 568; embraced, and the experience he had gained, during the
26i, 262. ' discussions on the report of the Bullion Committee in
Parliament three years before.1 *
* " Baron Hardenberg proposed to me, in addition to the treaty of subsidy
and concert, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia. L
acquainted him that I had no instructions on this head. M. de Nesselrode
also put into our hands his plan for the federative paper ; and although not re-
duced to an official shape, yet it appears to me advantageous thus early to en-
close you a copy of it — firstly, because we have not been furnished with the ideas
promised from Mr Vansittart ; secondly, because there are many of its articles
not only objectionable, but positively contrary to the instructions received
from you. . . .
" The 3d article, relating to the entire responsibility of England to give a
fictitious credit to the paper, has been drawn from a knowledge that, such is
the state of the finances of Russia and Prussia, it is well ascertained they could
never, under the stipulation even of six months after a peace, redeem their
portion. The 10th article, permitting this paper to be exchanged against ex-
chequer bills, is positively contrary to the instructions in your private letter
of 9th April to Lord Cathcart."— SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLE-
REAGH, WUrzen, May 17, 1813 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 391.
Lord Castlereagh replied : — " My dear Charles, — I return the financial projets,
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 643
While these important negotiations were going on at CHAP.
Gitschin and Dresden, Sir Charles Stewart was actively IX-
engaged in organising and improving the efficiency of 1813-
the troops raised in Hanover. They amounted tO
20,000 men, and, considering the short period during
which they had been embodied, they presented a very
<f > j r j renewed.
creditable appearance, and formed an important part of
the army which was to be commanded by the Prince
Royal. He kept constantly urging the Prince to adopt
vigorous measures for the prosecution of the war ; but
" I could perceive," says Sir Charles, "that he had
no confidence in the issue of events being fortunate for
the Allied cause ; and if I could read aright, he had little
desire that this should be the case. His Royal Highness
proceeded as usual to the map, and discoursed eloquently
and scientifically of the great combined operations to be
engaged in. This was as it ought to be ; but I wanted
to see his army in motion ; and in pressing this object, he
eluded me by saying it would not be prudent to collect
his masses too early, as the enemy would become aware of
their points of concentration, but he assured me that
10,000 men had marched. Whenever the Prince Royal
conversed, it was with the greatest affability and cordiality.
It is impossible to resist the fascination of his eloquent
expressions, or be indifferent to his insinuating tone and
with such remarks as Mr Vansittart has been enabled to make upon them.
The scheme itself of a federative paper originally appeared to us full of diffi-
culty in the execution ; but, anxious to encourage a great exertion, we did not
hesitate to agree to bear our share if the system could be reduced to practice ;
but it is too much to expect that we should take the whole, with all its pos-
sible abuses, upon ourselves. There would be nearly equal difficulty in intro-
ducing a British paper into circulation in Germany, under the present circum-
stances, with one jointly issued by the combined powers. If it should be found
that the credits of the three powers cannot be advantageously combined in the
same paper, we might undertake to be answerable for an issue not exceeding
750,000 thalers per month in a paper, for the reimbursement of which Great Bri-
tain should be separately liable, till the whole sum of £2,500,000 was issued,
which would be in about twenty months ; but our responsibility cannot be
pushed beyond the original limits, nor ought we to bear more than our share
of the progressive monthly expenditure of the armies." — LORD CASTLEREAGH
to SIR CHARLES STEWART, June 22, 1813; CastlereagTi Correspondence) viii. 406,
407.
G14 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, manner ; and when armed, as he always is, with a bottle
IX- of eau-de-Cologne in one hand and a white handkerchief
in the other, inundating everything around him with the
perfume, it requires some steadiness to be quite collected
or insensible to the elegant flattery of an extraordinary
man, who always addresses you as mon ami, and admits
you seemingly into his entire confidence. To myself indi-
vidually he was always particularly kind ; and when I
mentioned the possibility of my being at his headquarters
during any interesting operations, he assured me I should
be always bien venn, intimating, however, at the same
feagh, July time, that he would never agree to any convention or
MS. treaty to have British officers, especially general ones,
placed near his person."1
The evident determination to procrastinate evinced by
interview of Napoleon, and the success which had hitherto attended
with the'0 his efforts to effect it, induced the Allied sovereigns to
solicit a personal conference with M. de Metternich, which
June 20. wag rea(ji}y accorded, and took place at Oppontscha on the
20th June. The Austrian diplomatist was overwhelmed
by caresses and solicitations from the belligerent sove-
reigns, who represented to him in the strongest manner
that peace with Napoleon was impossible, because his
government was founded on the principle of universal
conquest, and could not exist without it; and that now
was the time for Austria to declare herself, and in one
short campaign, by joining her forces to those of the Allies,
recover all her lost provinces, and avenge the disasters of
twenty years. There was no necessity to enforce these
views on M. de Metternich ; they were sufficiently evident
and familiar to his far-seeing understanding. But he was
not by any means shaken by their earnest representations
in his resolution to persevere in his character of a mediator
before he assumed that of a belligerent. He felt that
Austria at that moment had ties with Napoleon arising
from family connection and public treaties which could
not be rudely severed. He knew that, whatever he said
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 645
to the contrary, her own military preparations were far CHAP.
from complete, and would require at least six weeks more
for their entire development. Recent events had shaken isis.
his confidence in the ability of Russia and Prussia to resist
on the German plains the restored military strength of
Napoleon ; and if they were overthrown, nothing but total
ruin to the Austrian monarchy was to be apprehended
from the wrath of the victor. Influenced by these con-
siderations, Metternich announced to the Allied sove-
reigns, without contesting any of their representations, in
repeated interviews, that the part of Austria was taken,
and that they must exhaust the rdle of a mediator before \ Thiers,
they took up that of a belligerent. He explained to them
the terms which he intended to propose to the French
Emperor, and engaged solemnly, as he had done to Nessel-
rode, that if they were declined the whole forces of Austria MS.'""
should forthwith be joined to those of the Coalition.1
No sooner did Napoleon hear of the conferences at
Oppontscha, and frequent meeting of Metternich with the Napoleon
Allied sovereigns, than he came to see that his system of^Mett^
procrastination could not be safely carried on further with- Dresden.
out some modification. He became fearful that the Allied
sovereigns would come to an understanding with the
Emperor of Austria, and assail him with their united forces
as soon as the armistice expired on the 20th July, when
his own preparations were far from being complete. It had
become indispensable to make, in semblance at least, some
concession to Austria, in order to open the way for negotia-
tions, by which further time might be gained. To achieve
this object, he resolved to invite M. de Metternich to
Dresden, to have a personal conference with himself and
his ministers. By this course, not only would time be
gained, but, what was almost of equal importance, an in-
sight might be obtained into the views of the coalesced
oowers, and the terms which Austria was to propose to the
contending parties. He sent, accordingly, an invitation to
VI. de Metternich to come to Dresden, with a view to a
646 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, personal interview, which the latter received at Gitschin,
IX- within a few hours after his return from the conferences
isis. at Oppontscha. Metternich immediately accepted the in-
vitation, and set out at once for Dresden, bearing with him
, Fain .. a second autograph letter from the Emperor Francis to
32, 33'; Napoleon, in which he again conjured him, in the warmest
ei, ei and most affectionate terms, to make peace " the last and
only glory which it remained for him to acquire."1
The Austrian minister arrived at Dresden on 25th June,
interview and on the following day had his first interview with the
nichwith Duke de Bassano (Maret). Skilfully anticipating his
Jw!e26. adversary's attack, the French minister, after the first
ceremonies of politeness were over, began lamenting the
delay which had already taken place in the negotiations,
which he ascribed to the ambiguous declarations and du-
bious character of Austria. He renewed again all the
objections already stated to the same party being an ally
and a mediator, and to the propositions of the contending
parties being addressed to the mediating power instead of
being communicated directly to each other. M. de Met-
ternich recapitulated all the answers already repeatedly
made to these objections, and listened patiently to Maret's
replies ; but though no result followed from this discussion,
the object of the French Emperor was gained, for two days
more were lost in this trifling dispute. When this pre-
liminary point was exhausted rather than decided, and
delay was no longer practicable, the Emperor agreed to
receive M. de Metternich in person, and the interview took
place in the Palace Marcolini, at two o'clock in the after-
noon, on the 28th June. It proved the most important
aThiers &u^ interesting °f the many important and interesting
am. 62/63; interviews which Napoleon had during his eventful career,
34, 35. ' and fortunately its particulars were recorded at the time
by persons of the very highest credit and authority.2 *
* The substance of this memorable conference is given by Baron Fain, Napo-
leon's private secretary, in his work on the German Campaign, from what he
collected at the time at the French headquarters; and again by M. Thiers, in his
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 647
M. de Metternich, on tins memorable occasion, was ushered CHAP.
in through an antechamber filled with foreign ministers and IX<
engaged in the war of Russia. In fine, however, he did
sign it, and I engaged, in consequence, in the Russian
war, which the elements rendered unfortunate, and now
seventeenth volume of the Consulat et F Empire, from a copy of notes made at the
same time by M. de Metternich himself. The account in the text is taken from a
comparison of both, with some additional matter gleaned by Lord Londonderry.
officers of all grades, all in the deepest state of anxiety and 1813-
suspense, to the Emperor's private apartment. Berthier, inteXw
who ushered him in, said as he did so, in a whisper — Juh^
" Well, do you bring us peace ? Be reasonable : let us J^ 28
terminate this war, for we have much need it should stop,
as well as yourself/' From these words the Austrian
diplomatist instantly drew the conclusion, which was not
ill founded, that whatever the Emperor himself might
wish, those around him ardently desired an accommoda-
tion. When he entered the inner room he found Napoleon
standing with his hat under his arm, and his sword by his
side — calm and polite, but having the look of one who
was boiling over with feelings which he had the greatest
difficulty in restraining. His first words were — " Here
you are, then, M. de Metternich, at last. You have come,
very late ; for twenty-four days have elapsed since the
armistice was signed, and nothing has yet been done. All
this has arisen from the delays of Austria. I have long
been sensible that I could not rely on my relations with
that power. No extent of obligation or kind deeds has
been able to overcome your inveterate hostility towards
me. I have three times restored his throne to the Emperor
Francis. I have even committed the fault of espousing
his daughter in the hope of attaching him ; but nothing
has been able to awaken in him more favourable senti-
ments. Last year, reckoning on him, I concluded a treaty
by which I guaranteed his dominions as he did mine. If
he had told me that such a treaty did not suit his views,
I should not have insisted on it, and I should not have
648 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, he is the first to hesitate ; he no longer desires what he
IX- seemed formerly most anxiously to wish, and interposes
1813. between my enemies and myself, as he says, to effect a
negotiation — in effect, to arrest the course of my victories
and to snatch from my hands adversaries whom I was on the
point of destroying. If you no longer desire my alliance,
if it hangs heavy on you, if it is dragging you towards a
war which is repugnant to you, why not tell me so at
once ? I would no longer insist on the alliance — your
neutrality would suffice ; and in the hour when it is an-
nounced, the Coalition is dissolved. But, under pretence
of inducing peace by interposing your mediation, you have
armed ; and, now that your armaments are terminated, or
nearly so, you pretend to dictate conditions to me, which
in effect are those of my enemies. In a word, you come
forward as those who are ready at a moment's warning to
declare war against me. Explain yourself! Is it war
which you desire 1 Are men, then, utterly incorrigible \
Are the lessons of experience wholly lost upon them I
The Russians and Prussians, in spite of the cruel expe-
rience they have had, have dared to confront me ; and I
have beaten them — beaten them well, whatever they may
say to the contrary. Are you determined, you too, to have
your turn I Well, be it so : I assign you a time and place
for the encounter, and it is Vienna in October next"
This impassioned harangue, which Napoleon poured forth
with great and increasing violence, did not for a moment
shake the coolness of the Austrian diplomatist. " Sire ! "
replied he, " we have no wish to engage in war, but we
desire to put a period to a state of things which has become
intolerable to Europe — to a state of things which menaces
every one, and your Majesty at every moment, with a
universal bouleversement. Your Majesty is as much in-
terested in it as we are ; for, if fortune should one day
prove treacherous — and in that fatal mutability of things
there is no saying how soon she may do so — it is by
no -means impossible that you may incur fatal chances."
answer.
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 649
" But what do you wish," replied Napoleon — " what have CHAP.
you come to ask of me ? " "A peace/7 replied Metternich, IX-
" necessary, indispensable, of which you have as much 1813.
need as we; which secures your situation as well as our
own." He then, with infinite delicacy, and insinuating,
rather than openly demanding, expressed the terms pro-
posed— viz., the abandonment of the Grand Duchy of
Warsaw, and the reconstitution of Prussia from it ; the
relinquishment of Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen; and
the relinquishment of the title of Protector of the Con-
federation of the Rhine. It was with the utmost difficulty
that Napoleon heard it out. "Oh!" said he, when the
Austrian minister concluded, " I see what you would be
at. To-day you demand only some ports of Illyria, to
furnish harbours to Austria ; parts of Westphalia and the
Grand Duchy of Warsaw, to reconstitute Prussia; the
towns of Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, to restore the
commerce of Germany, and to re-establish its pretended
independence ; the abolition of the Protectorate of the
Rhine — a vain title, as you call it. But I know what you
desire in secret. You Austrians desire to get Italy entirely
to yourselves ; your friends the Russians desire Poland ; the
Prussians are set on Saxony ; the English on Belgium and
Holland. And if I yield to-day, you will to-morrow demand
of me those the objects of your most ardent desires. But
before you get them, prepare to raise millions of men, to
shed the blood of many generations, and to come to treat
at the foot of Montmartre. O Metternich ! how much
has England given you to propose such terms to me f "
When Napoleon pronounced the last words he was in
such a state of indignation and passion that he was in a Continued.
manner beside himself. Without losing his presence of
mind at the Emperor's anger, Metternich replied : " There
is no question put now of such demands, nor could they
be insisted on but after a disastrous war imprudently pro-
longed. There may be a few heads turned in St Peters-
burg, London, and Berlin, in which such thoughts may
650 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, be germinating, but there are none at Vienna. There
IX- nothing is asked but what is really desired, and nothing
1813. more ; and the true way to extinguish the pretensions of
those madmen is to accept peace — an honourable peace —
for that which I offer to you is not only honourable, but
glorious/' A little mollified by these words, Napoleon
replied : " If the question is only the cession of a few
territories, I may be induced to yield ; but if the Coalition
pretends to dictate the law to me, to constrain me to sub-
mit, to deprive me of my prestige, to tarnish my glory, I
tell you at once I would rather die than consent to such
terms. Your sovereigns have not the feelings of soldiers ;
they cannot conceive what they are. If they are defeated,
they retire beaten to their capitals, and that is an end of
it. I am a soldier. I have need of honour and glory. I
cannot reappear lessened in the midst of my people. I
must remain great, glorious, admired." " But if that is the
case, when is war ever to terminate," replied Metternich,
" if your defeats, equally with your victories, are a motive
for continuing the conquest 1 Victorious, you wish to reap
the fruit of your victories ; vanquished, you must strive to
raise yourself again ! Sire ! are we then for ever to remain
with arms in our hands ; for ever depending, as you do,
on the chance of battles?" " But," replied Napoleon, " I
do not belong to myself alone, but to that noble nation of
which I admire the courage, and which at my voice has
with generous prodigality poured forth its blood. Can I
requite such devotion by personal calculations, by weak-
ness I I must, on the contrary, strain every nerve to
preserve for it the greatness it has so nobly bought by
such heroic efforts." " But, Sire," replied M. de Metter-
nich, "that brave nation, whose gallantry all admire, has
itself need of repose. I have just traversed your army ;
your regiments are composed of children ; you have anti-
cipated the regular levies, and called to arms a generation
not yet formed ; if that generation is destroyed by the war
in which you are engaged, where will you find a new one
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 651
to supply its place \ Will you descend to a still younger CHAP.
brood of children V IX-
These words, which touched Napoleon on the tender- isis.
est point — the failure of men capable of bearing arms in his
dominions — roused him beyond all control. " He became contmued-
pale with rage ; his visage was totally changed/' says M.
Thiers ; " and either by design or accident he let fall his
hat, which, notwithstanding his habitual politeness, M. de
Metternich did not pick up. Going straight up to him,
the Emperor said, ' You are not a soldier, sir ! you have
not even the soul of a soldier : you have not lived in
camps, or learned to despise your own life or those of
others when their sacrifice is necessary. What are two
hundred thousand men to me \ I can afford to spend a
hundred thousand men every year' These words pro-
foundly moved M. de Metternich, who exclaimed, ' Let us
open, Sire ! let us open the windows, that Europe in a
body may hear you ; and if it does so, the cause I am
pleading will not suffer/ ' After all/ exclaimed Napoleon,
* the French, of whose blood you are so chary, have not so
much reason to complain of me. I have lost, it is true,
200,000 men in Russia, and among them are 100,000
French soldiers of the very best kind ; these I deeply re-
gret. As to the others, Italians, Poles, and Germans, I
care nothing for them/ ' That/ rejoined Metternich, * is
not a reason to assign to a German/ * You pleaded the
cause of the French/ replied the Emperor, * and I an-
swered for them. In Russia I was baffled by nothing but
the weather; I could foresee and surmount everything
except nature ; I can conquer men, but not the elements.
On the field of battle I was constantly victorious ; if I have
lost cannons it was from the effect of the cold alone, which
destroyed the horses/ He descanted for above an hour
on this topic, pouring forth his thoughts without waiting
for an answer, walking up and down the room with ex-
treme rapidity, and kicking his hat, which still lay on the
ground, into a corner of the apartment. At length he
652 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, reverted to the main object of the conference, and dwelt
IX- upon the enormity that Austria, whom he had three times
J813. pardoned, and in favour of whom he had committed the
grevious fault of marrying an archduchess, should dare
to think of hostilities against him. * It may have been a
fault/ rejoined Metternich, * for Napoleon the warrior and
conqueror ; it was no fault for Napoleon the politician
and founder of an empire/ * Fault or no fault, you are
determined then to declare war against me. Be it so.
What are your means for carrying it on ? You pretend
to have 200,000 men in Bohemia, and at the very utmost
you have only 100,000, and of these not 80,000 will ever
appear in line/
" With these words, which in reality were, as the event
Concluded, proved, entirely well-founded as to the Austrian numbers,
he led M. de Metternich into his working cabinet, and
showed him his statistics and notes of the numbers of the
Austrian forces. ' You see/ said he, * that I am acquainted
with everything; you need not attempt to frighten me
by chimeras : M. de Narbonne has covered Austria with
his spies ; I know everything as well as you do yourselves.
You have not 100,000 in Bohemia. You pretend to
have 350,000 men under arms, of whom 200,000 are in
Bohemia, 100,000 marching to Italy, 50,000 in Bavaria !
Bah ! These are the calculations of men who know armies
only on paper ; you must not try to deceive me. Even
if you had 350,000 nominally under arms, you would not
have more than 100,000 in Bohemia, 50,000 moving to-
wards Italy, and 30,000 in Bavaria. Take my advice,
keep out of this quarrel, in which you would run great
risks for trifling advantages. You wish Illyria; keep
apart and I will cede it to you. Keep neutral, and I will
fight beside you and without you. I will give Europe the
peace which you desire, and give it equitably to all. But
the peace which you would impose upon me by means of
your mediation is a constrained peace, which would exhi-
bit me to the eyes of the world as one conquered, to
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 653
whom the law has been dictated — the law when I have CHAP.
just gained two dazzling victories. You would have Italy; 1X-
Russia, Poland ; Sweden, Norway ; Prussia, Saxony ; Eng- isia.
land, Holland and Belgium. Peace is only a pretext ; you
are intent on dismembering the French empire. And
Austria thinks she has only to declare herself to crown
such an enterprise ! You pretend here with a stroke
of the pen to make the ramparts of Dantzic, Glo-
gau, Magdeburg, Wesel, Mayence, Antwerp, Alessandria
— in fine, all the strong places in Europe — sink before
you. And I, obedient to your .voice, am to evacuate
Europe, of which I still retain the half ; recall my legions
across the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees ; subscribe a
treaty which would be nothing but a vast capitulation ;
and place myself at the mercy of those of whom I am at
this moment the conqueror ! And it is when my stand-
ards still float at the mouths of the Vistula and on the
banks of the Oder — when my victorious armies are at the
gates of Berlin and Breslau — when I am in person at the
head of 300,000 men, — that Austria, without striking a
blow, without drawing a sword, expects me to subscribe
such conditions ! And it is my father-in-law that has
matured such a project!' M. de Metternich still held out
for the terms originally proposed as the basis of the nego-
tiation. 'You persist then/ cried Napoleon, 'in bidding ^"el-rs .
me defiance ; you will give the law to me : be it so ; tokjf^j)'
it be war, and the field of combat Vienna/ With these XK. 192-194;
Gapefigue.
words he dismissed Metternich, and the conference broke *. HI.
up."1
"This memorable interview," says M. Thiers, speaking
from the information of M. de Metternich, "did not for- Great sensa-
mally decide the question of peace or war, as will imme- ducJTby
diately appear ; but it virtually did so by revealing, in a J£r.
manner so inopportune, the hidden thoughts and fixed
resolutions of Napoleon. It lasted six hours ; and it
was so dark when it closed, that the speakers could
hardly see one another. Before they separated, Napoleon,
654 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, having a little recovered his temper, and wishing not to
IX- separate on angry terms from M. de Metternich, fixed a
1813. fresh meeting for the following day. The length of the
interview had excited the deepest anxiety in the numerous
persons in the antechamber. The anxiety of every visage
was even more strongly marked than when M. de Metter-
nich entered. As soon as he came out, Berthier ran up
to him to learn what had passed, and eagerly asked if
he was satisfied with the Emperor \ * Perfectly so/ re-
plied the Austrian minister ; ' he has taken a load off my
1Thiere> C T V 1 4. I.'
xvi. 72,73. conscience : for 1 swear to you your master has lost his
senses.'"1
Although, however, the French Emperor had undoubt-
edly lost his senses during the heat of this debate with
Metternich, jet, as was generally the case with him when
°ne of these fits of transport was over, he soon regained
them. Hardly had he separated from the Austrian min-
ister, when he felt the most poignant regret at the issue
of the conference, which, by threatening to terminate the
mediation, was likely to lead to a renewal of hostilities
as soon as the armistice came to an end, and long before
his preparations were complete. He made Maret accord-
ingly run after M. de Metternich, and fix an hour on the
following day for a resumed discussion on the terms of
the mediation, and the duration of the armistice. The
Austrian diplomatist received with great satisfaction these
renewed advances. Independent of the anxious desire
which, in common with his imperial master, he felt to
avoid hostilities, and gain his objects by a pacific arrange-
ment, he felt that delay was indispensable to himself not
less than to Napoleon. His military preparations were
even more incomplete than those of the French Em-
peror ; and the latter had in reality rather exaggerated
than diminished the force of effective men he could at
the moment bring into the field. * Both parties accord-
* In a secret memoir addressed at this period by Prince Schwartzenberg to
the Austrian Emperor, dated 28th June 1813, the following reasons were given
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 655
inglj met on the following day (29th) with a sincere CHAP.
desire to come to an accommodation, at least so far as
the mode of conducting the negotiations was concerned ; 1813-
and matters were so far accommodated on this point,
that another meeting was fixed for a fresh interview
with Napoleon in person on the 30th June. They met June so.
accordingly ; and on this occasion the Emperor showed
himself as pacific and accommodating as before he had
been stern and uncompromising. He dictated a proposal
for the conduct of the negotiations to Maret, which he
at once modified according to Metternich's suggestion,
and concluded with a proposal for the prolongation of
the armistice. This was the real object upon which his
heart was set, and with scarce any difficulty the terms
were arranged between them. These were, that the
armistice should be prolonged from the 25th July, its
present term, to the 10th August, which in effect was an
extension to the 16th August, as six days' warning of the
for prolonging the armistice : — " The Bohemian army would not be more than
complete on the 20th June. The vast and unexpected preparations of France
render an increased armament on the part of Austria necessary. Every unap-
propriated regiment of the line, the landwehr, and the Hungarian insurrection,
must be called out and put into activity. Even if the difficulty of clothing
and arming them is got over, it is impossible to bring them to Torgau and
Presburg from the south-eastern provinces before the 14th August, and the
other troops in proportion. Besides the troops raised in Bavaria, 66,000 under
the Viceroy have crossed the Tagliamento, and large reserves are collecting at
Wiirtzburg and Fulda. As these measures menace Vienna, it is necessary to
assemble a force at Klagenfurth, and near the capital, to counterbalance them.
All this must be done without detachments from the Bohemian army. Car-
riages cannot be got to supply Russia with the provisions she requires from
Bohemia ; and as the extension of the French line on the Elbe may render it
necessary that part of the Allied force should move into that province, it is
most desirable that there should be sufficient horse for supplying such a force,
and that, in the mean time, the wants of the Allies should be supplied from
Galicia." Count Metternich's principal object in the negotiations at Dresden
in the end of June, was to secure the prolongation of the armistice till the
16th August, for the reasons stated in Prince Schwartzenberg's report. He
was desirous also that Count Stadion should accompany the Emperor to
Trachenberg, who was to be instructed to do his utmost to strengthen and
confirm the Prince Royal of Sweden in co-operation with the Allies. Count
Metternich now declared that the Emperor Francis's determination was to sup-
port the cause for which the Emperor Alexander had made such noble efforts.
— Heads of the Arrangements touching the Armistice and Negotiations, July
1813; MS. Londonderry Papers.
656 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, resumption of hostilities was to be given. Metternich
IX- engaged to obtain the consent of the Emperor of Russia
isis. and King of Prussia to the extension, though he was well
aware that it was decidedly contrary to their wishes.
Napoleon held out for the 1 6th August, independent of
'SirChas. ,1 • i i i ., .,, fr , . ,
Stewart to the six days, and made a great merit with Metternich
y" with agreeing to the 10th instead. But in truth he was
MSvThiers, overjoyed at the prolongation which he got, and, instantly
*vi.- 7?.' 7.?,; changing his tone, loaded M. de Metternich with caresses,
if am, 11. 48-
46. and dismissed him to his imperial master at Gitschin with
the warmest assurances of affection and regard.1
The intelligence of this prolongation of the armistice
News of the gave the greatest satisfaction at the French headquarters,
battle of . , ,. \
yitoria, and where it was universally regarded as a harbinger of peace,
effeft.eat and an immense advantage to their arms if war was re-
Juneso. newe(jt Proportionally great was the displeasure with
which it was regarded by the Allied sovereigns, who had
less to gain than either Napoleon or Francis by delay,
and who looked upon it, not without reason, as a conces-
sion to the declared wishes of the French Emperor of the
most sinister augury. The dissatisfaction thence arising
was very great, and might have been attended by the most
serious consequences, had not news arrived on the very
next day of such importance as gave an entirely new turn
to men's thoughts, and completely dispelled any feelings
of irritation with which the news of the extension of the
armistice had been attended. This was the news of the
BATTLE OF VITORIA, gained in Spain by Lord Welling-
ton on the 21st June, the intelligence of which was, by
great exertion, forwarded to Germany, and received in both
camps on the afternoon of the 29th of that month. The
impression in both was extreme. " In the Allied camp,"
says Sir Charles Stewart, " the impression was strong and
universal, and produced, in my opinion, the resumption of
hostilities." " Metternich," says Baron Fain, " could not
fail, on his return to Gitschin, to learn the details of
this, victory from the mouths of the English themselves ;
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 657
and we shall soon see the fatal influence which it exer- CHAP.
cised on the progress of the negotiations." Nor is it sur- IX-
prising that the French and English diplomatists on the isis.
spot should thus concur as to the influence of this great
victory on the progress of the negotiations. The Penin-
sular contest was now decided. It was no longer a con-
summate general maintaining with inferior means a pain-
ful defensive contest, but a victorious chief at the head of
the military force of three nations, who, after expelling
the. enemy from the soil which they had polluted, was
preparing to cross the frontier, and carry his triumphant
standards into the heart of France. A hundred thousand
men, collected round the standards of Wellington, only
awaited the fall of the frontier fortresses to descend like
a torrent from the Pyrenees, and inundate the valley of
the Garonne. The charm of Napoleon's invincibility was
at an end. Disaster had overtaken his arms alike in the
south and the north of Europe : and the only question
i i i Lond- 88 5
Austria had now to consider was, whether she should vo-Fain,ii.8o;
luntarily link herself to a sinking empire and a falling iffi™
cause.1
No sooner was Napoleon assured of the extension of
the armistice, arid thereby secure of sufficient time to get Napoleon
up his great reinforcements from the rear, than he set
with his wonted vigour to organise the means of defence
against the Allies. He had no choice but between the fence-
line of the Elbe and that of the Rhine ; for the inter-
mediate " position of the Saale," of which so much was
said in Germany, was as liable to be turned by Bavaria
as that of the Elbe by Bohemia, and though a very
strong line of defence, supported by the Thuringian
Forest on one flank and the Hartz Mountains on the
other, against an army of eighty or a hundred thousand
men, yet it presented no adequate means of resistance to
an assailant who had the command of two hundred and
fifty thousand. The Rhine, it is true, was his real base
of operations ; but to retire to it was to abandon at once
VOL. i. 2 T
658 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, all for which he was contending. If his eagles recrossed
ix- the great frontier stream of France, the whole Confedera-
1813- tion of the Rhine was given up, the hostility of Austria
rendered certain, and the war, with all its horrors and
sufferings, brought home to the soil of France. For these
reasons he judged, and, in the circumstances, wisely, to
adopt the Elbe as his defensive position, and strain every
nerve to maintain it against the utmost efforts of the
Allies. This great river, issuing from the Bohemian
Mountains between the fortified rocks of Koenigstein and
Lilienstein, supported in its course by the bastions of
Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and resting
at its northern extremity on the fortified position of
Hamburg, all of which were in the hands of the French,
presented a position eminently capable of defence, and
affording peculiar facilities to a commander like Napo-
leon, issuing from a fortified central stronghold, and pre-
xvi. 30,' 3J. pared to strike redoubtable blows on the right hand and
the left.1
Having thus resolved on maintaining himself on the
Napoleon's line of the Elbe, Napoleon set to work with more even
fbrtSfybg0r than his wonted vigour to strengthen his position upon
KoeSgSetn & After his return to Dresden, on the 10th June, he
and Dres- commenced a series of journeys in different directions, to
inspect with his own eyes the state of the fortifications,
and put them all in the most formidable state of defence.
The fortresses of Koenigstein and Lilienstein, situated
on precipitous rocks on either side of the Elbe, first
attracted his attention, and he provisioned the former
with victuals sufficient to maintain an army of a hundred
thousand men for ten days. Lilienstein was almost an
entire creation, and he soon put it in a formidable posture
of defence, and committed its defence to General Rogniat
with two thousand men. His plan was to use these two
fortresses as points d'appui, to cross the river, and de-
bouch in the rear of the Allied armies, if they ventured
to descend from Bohemia on the rear of the French army
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. G59
at Dresden. To facilitate such a movement, and secure the CHAP.
Saxon capital from insult during its operation, he added IX-
greatly to its fortifications, which had been nearly com- 1813-
pletely dismantled, at the earnest request of the citizens.
Of the old rampart there remained only the bastions,
which he strengthened and armed with artillery. The place
of the curtains was supplied by wet ditches and strong
palisades ; and in front of the faubourgs he erected
strong palisades, with large redoubts in front armed with
heavy artillery. On the right bank, where the Neustadt,
or new town, was situated, fortifications of a similar kind
were erected, connected with the other side, in addition
to the old bridge, by two new ones erected for the occa-
sion. To these means of defence were added immense
magazines of provisions capable of supporting 30,000
men for several months, in addition to the 16,000 sick
and wounded who already encumbered the hospitals.
He designed to make this fortress, thus strengthened,
the pivot of his offensive operations, from whence he
could direct his blows at pleasure against the enemy,
either on the right or left bank of the river ; and he * r°del- V
...... 256 ; Fain,
calculated that 30,000 men could maintain themselves H. 24 ;
there for fifteen days, against any force the Allies could 35-33!'
bring against it.1
Torgau and Wittenberg were the next of the fortresses
on the Elbe which attracted the Emperor's attention. His works
Several thousand Saxon peasants were immediately em-
ployed night and day in strengthening the fortifications ^ Magde-
of these places, which it was calculated would be in a
complete posture of defence in seven or eight weeks.
Vast hospitals were at the same time formed in both
towns, especially the former, for the reception of the sick
and wounded of the immense host which would be as-
sembled around them. Magdeburg was in so perfect a
state of defence, that nothing was awanting to add to its
strength. The whole care of the Emperor was, therefore,
directed to forming in it a double set of establishments,
GGO ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, alike indispensable to the success and health of the troops.
1X- The first of these was to provide buildings for the re-
1813. mounting and equipping of great part of the cavalry of
the army, in particular the division of General Bourcier ;
and the second to render it the grand depot for the hos-
pitals of the army. Napoleon expressed his intention, in
his usual vigorous way, by saying that " he meant to con-
vert Magdeburg entirely into stables and hospitals ; " and
he was very nearly as good as his word. The numerous
convents, hospitals, and other public edifices of that town
afforded every facility for carrying this design into
execution. In addition to this, he proposed to station
twenty thousand men in this central fortress, of whom
five or six thousand were to form its garrison, and four-
ooFoinv!'' teen or fifteen thousand were to compose a movable
J-3-27; Odel. . . _.. . . . . ._ .
j. 256 ; column, intended as long as possible to keep the field m
37-39!' * '' its vicinity, and preserve the communication between the
fortresses on the Upper and the Lower Elbe.1
The principal fortress on the lower part of the river
His mea- was Hamburg, which had been immensely strengthened
ingeHam-rd by Marshal Davoust, who had extracted enormous con-
Wefiend tributions from its suffering inhabitants — the means of
compelling them to forge their own chains. It was not a
regular fortress like Magdeburg, but formed part of a vast
intrenched camp, which, in the hands of Marshal Davoust,
who had (including the Danish contingent) 40,000 men
at his command, formed a very formidable position. But
between Madgeburg and Hamburg there was a long in-
terval, undefended by any strong place, which gave the
Emperor much uneasiness. After repeated surveys and
consultations with General Haxo, he made choice of Wer-
ben, a town on the Elbe, nearer Magdeburg than Ham-
burg, at the corner of the elbow which the Elbe makes
when turning from the north to the west, and at the point
of its course nearest to Berlin. He ordered there the
immediate construction of a citadel, composed of earth-
works and palisades, where 3000 men might be lodged,
ARMISTICE OF TLESWITZ. 661
and maintain themselves for a long time. These plans CHAP.
were meant to put in practice the maxim of Napoleon,
that the line of a river was never to be defended but 1813-
offensively ; that is, by taking possession of all its pas-
sages, and taking advantage of them to threaten the
enemy alike on his own bank, and, if a crossing was xvi. 40/41 .
effected, on the side to which his troops had passed.1
Napoleon had ordered Marshal Davoust " to take a
cruel vengeance for the revolt of the inhabitants of Ham- immense
burg, Lubeck, and Bremen, to shoot immediately all the DaTotaut
old senators, the officers and soldiers of the Hanseatic Hamburs-
Legion, the functionaries who had not contrived to
escape, and then to make out a list of five hundred of the
chief merchants, and to 'displace property,' in his own
words, by confiscating their whole effects." 2 These bar- 2 see orders
barous orders, which, if literally executed, and followed as ^vi. 41' 4 2.
they of course would have been by reprisals, would have
substituted for the humanity of European the barbarity
of Eastern war, fortunately proved in great part incapable
of execution. The most part of the delinquents who had
been designed for execution had escaped into the Danish
territory before the French had regained possession of the
city ; and after the first ebullition of the imperial wrath,
Napoleon was not sorry of a pretext for substituting for
the shedding of blood enormous contributions in money
from the unfortunate inhabitants. The humanity or pru-
dence of Marshal Davoust retarded the commencement
of the bloody execution till the dark fit had passed away
from the Emperor's mind ; and it was well it did so, for
a few days after the capture of the town he wrote to
the Marshal : " If the day following your entry you had
shot several, it would have been well ; but now it is too
late. Pecuniary exactions are much more worth." 3 3 Nap°ieon
A 1 • 1 1 1 • 1 • • iTir-iii-i t0 Marshal
Accordingly, by his directions, the Marshal levied a con- Davoust,
tribution of 50,000,000 francs (£2,000,000) on the cityisia?'
of Hamburg, which at that period contained less than 43.iers' x
80,000 inhabitants ! an exaction equivalent to what
662 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP. £10,000,000 sterling would be on Manchester, or Glas-
IX- gow, or Liverpool. As it was evidently impossible for
1813. such an enormous sum to be paid, even by the most dis-
tant instalments, in specie or paper, its contribution was
thus allocated : 10,000,000 francs (£400,000) instantly
in specie; 20,000,000 francs (£800,000) in bills ; and
the balance in articles of food, clothing, and military
furnishings. The inhabitants of Hamburg, struck with
consternation with these enormous exactions, made the
most vehement remonstrances against them, and earnestly
Bnm^Lab l>esougnt a remission of a large part ; but the Marshal
114 ; Cape- was inexorable, and the disconsolate citizens had to sub-
ngue, x. <J71; .
Fain, ii. 47- mit in silence to their hard fate, which for ten years
xvi'. 43,e44. after blasted the prosperity of their once flourishing
community.1
It appears from the official returns in the War Office
Forces ' of Paris, given by M. Thiers, that the forces which Napo-
poieon had leon had collected for the campaign were enormous ;
tSem?ddiley nmch beyond what at the time was either suspected or
of August. deemed possible by the Allied powers. They amounted
to the immense number of 400,000 combatants on the
Elbe, of whom 60,000 were horse, with 1000 guns, be-
sides 20,000 in Bavaria, and 80,000 in Italy; all in the
field, and irrespective of the blockaded garrisons on the
Oder and the Vistula, who were 100,000 men. In addi-
tion to this, the non-effectives in the rear, who, though
not ready for the field at the moment, might be expected
to become so in the course of the campaign, so as to fill
up chasms and supply casualties, were 200,000 more.
In all, 700,000 combatants ; of whom, making the largest
xvi. 55.' allowance for non-effectives, 500,000 might be reckoned
on as available for the purpose of an active campaign.2
The plans of the Allies were fully arranged at Trachen-
berg by the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia in person,
together with the Crown Prince of Sweden, who hast-
ened thither, and took an active part in the deliberations.
The operations agreed on were as follows, and calculated
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 663
with no small ability to meet the circumstances under CHAP.
which they were placed. Immediately upon the declara- IX-
tion of war by Austria against Napoleon, which, after the is is.
result of the conference of Metternich with Napoleon, Plan307f ope.
on 28th June, was reckoned upon as certain, a f°rce^atie°endsonb
reckoned at 100,000 men, composed of Russians and *£« Allies at
T-» i 7 • f • ^* Trachen-
rrussians, the elite of their respective armies, was to berg.
march out of Silesia through the chain of mountains which
forms the northern boundary of Bohemia, and to proceed
secretly and suddenly westward along their southern base,
through the dominions of the Emperor Francis, towards
the left bank of the Moldau, there to join the Austrian
army, and from that new base to act upon Napoleon's
communications in Saxony, and in rear of the line of the
Elbe. Meanwhile a force of 80,000 Russians and Prus-
sians, partly composed of landwehr, was to remain in
Silesia, under the command of General Blucher, to keep
possession of that province, and cover the great line of
communication through Poland with Russia. On this
road large but still distant reserves were coming up from
Russia to support that commander, whose instructions
were to avoid a general action in the mean time, especi-
ally against superior numbers. The Army of the North,
which was 80,000 strong, composed of some regular
Russians and Cossacks, large bodies of Prussians, chiefly
landwehr, and Hanoverian levies, was intrusted in the
first instance with the defence of Berlin ; and if the
operations of the Grand Army should transfer the seat
of war to the left bank of the Elbe, they were then to
cross that river, and co-operate in a general attack on
the enemy. In the mean time his Cossacks and light
troops, about 10,000 in number, were to cross the river
and threaten the enemy's communications, at the same
time endeavouring to excite insurrections in Hesse, West-^at^art,
phalia, and all the German provinces between the Elbe Lond. 372.
and the Rhine.1
The Allied army, which was in a condition to take the
664 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, field in July 1813, was 50,000 short of the French; it
IX- amounted at the very utmost to 340,000 or 350,000 men ;
1813. \vhile the latter had 390,000 combatants arrayed around
rcefof their eagles. This deficiency, which was by no means ex-
ife're- pected, and threatened the Allied cause with the most
™Fiitiei0f seri°us danger, arose chiefly from the Austrian troops
ready for the field being somewhat less than had been re-
presented to the Allied sovereigns ; those in Bohemia ready
for action, instead of 150,000, which Metternich held out,
were only 90,000.* This arose from the prostration of
the military strength of Austria after the battle of Wag-
ram, which the embarrassed state of its finances had pre-
vented its Government from restoring before the Russian
catastrophe, and the great distance of the most warlike
province of the empire, which long retarded the forma-
tion and concentration of its military force when war was
determined on in July 1813. Great part of the troops
also which were brought up were raw levies, little quali-
fied to withstand the shock of Napoleon's corps d'elite.
The cavalry alone was in excellent condition, and pre-
sented a magnificent body of men, which did good service
in the campaign which followed. The Prussian troops,
great part of whom were landwehr, recently called from
the plough, were full of enthusiasm, and universally ani-
mated by the most determined spirit ; but although these
heroic resolves might carry them through the dangers of
* Cathcart estimates the Austrian force which was ready for the field, ns
low as 45,000 men ; but Sir Robert Wilson, the British Commissioner at the
Austrian headquarters, states that he saw 60,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry
(ii. 83) reviewed on the 19th August at Prague; whilst Kleinau's corps, and
three divisions of light troops along the frontier, were absent. He estimates
the Austrian army in Bohemia at this time at 115,000 men (ii. 86). His
experience as a practical soldier, and his intimate acquaintance with the staff
of the Austrian army during this campaign, which gave him constant access
to the real working field-states (as contradistinguished from the official bul-
letins) of that force, render his authority upon this point decisive. Sir Charles
Stewart, whose long experience as Wellington's Adjutant-General rendered
him peculiarly qualified to judge as to numbers, entirely confirms Wilson's
estimate See LOND. 106. This would make the disposable Austrian field
force 90,000 at least. Even after all the loss at Leipsic, Austria had (on the
29th October 1813) 106,000 men in the field.— WILSOX, ii. 206.
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 665
the field, it was much to be feared they would not be CHAP.
equally efficacious in enabling them to undergo the IX-
fatigues of a campaign, or withstand the contagion of isis.
the hospital or the bivouac. The main strength of the
Allied force was to be found in the Russians, who were
120,000 strong, of whom 15,000 were cavalry, with
300 guns. A considerable part of their force was com- * Wil*on> i!*
s3 L so ; catn-
posed of iron veterans, who had gone through the cam- cart, 191-
paign of 1812, and might be confidently relied on in any 96. '
emergency.1
Relying on his great numerical superiority, Napoleon's
plan of operation was framed, as already noticed, on the Napoleon's
following principles. Resting on the fortresses of Lilien- Icon's for*3
stein, Koenigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and
Magdeburg, which gave him the entire command of the
river, and enabled him to debouch at pleasure with an
overwhelming force on either bank, he was resolved to
await calmly in his central, and in great part impregnable,
position, the time when the Allies, occupying the exterior
circle, would "commit some fault of which he would
instantly take advantage to fall on and destroy them."
Master of all the passages over the river, and with a
disposable force greater than that to which he was
opposed, he had it in his power at any time to direct a
greatly superior body of troops against any of the three
armies which menaced him ; and they had no point
d'appui in case of disaster, while he, in case of reverse,
had a secure refuge under the guns of the fortress from
which his troops had issued.
Perfectly aware of Napoleon's system of military
tactics, and the important use he would not fail to make pianohhe
of the central fortresses and interior line of communica- °
tion which he had at his command, the plan of the
campaign adopted by the Allies at Trachenberg was the
best that could possibly have been adopted to meet his
designs, and was of the following import. All the three
armies were simultaneously to assume the offensive : the
666 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP. Grand Army in Bohemia, 180,000 strong, taking the
IX- lead, and threatening the enemy's communications by a
descent into Saxony, on the direct line from Dresden to
Mayence. But to avoid the obvious danger of an attack
on one of them by Napoleon in person at the head of an
overwhelming force, their commanders received orders,
whenever they became aware, from the activity of the
operations, and the presence of the Imperial Guard and
reserve cavalry in any quarter, that the Emperor himself
was present, immediately to retire, and continue falling
back so long as the pursuit was vigorously continued.
Meanwhile, the other armies, relieved of the Emperor's
attack in person, were to press on, and use the utmost
endeavour to intercept his communications. In this
way it was hoped the advantage to be derived from his
command of the river and central fortresses would be
in a great degree neutralised, or rather turned to his
detriment : because the elite of his army, obliged in this
manner to cross and recross the river, and fly from one
menaced point to another, would become worn out by
constant marches and counter-marches ; and their sup-
plies, how great soever in the outset, would be exhausted
ere long, from their foraging being necessarily confined
to a comparatively limited sphere within the exterior
circle. On the other hand, these dangers were to be
i4asi8if u^' apprehended in a much inferior degree by the Allies, as
MS.; Lend, their communications with the rear were all open, and
byr,'iv.348. supplies to any amount might be obtained from the fer-
tile fields of Silesia, Poland, Bohemia, and Bavaria.1
When such military preparations "were going on on
state of the both sides, it is evident that it was more a work of dis-
wlfrAus0-118 simulation than anything else to carry on negotiations
June 1813. either at Reichenbach or Prague, and that both France
and Austria, under colour of pacific intentions, were in
reality only striving to gain time for their warlike pre-
parations. Yet was the negotiation between the Allies
and Austria for long by no means on the amicable foot-
IX.
ARMISTICE OF PLESW1TZ. 667
ing which was desirable ; on the contrary, it was at one CHAP.
period on the point of miscarrying, on account of the
refusal of England to give any subsidy to the Court of
Vienna, and the doubts entertained of the good faith of
Bernadotte in consequence of his allowing Hamburg to
fall into the hands of the French without striking a blow.
The truth was, the British Government entertained at
this period serious doubts as to the intentions of Metter-
nich, chiefly from the part he had taken in promoting the
family alliance between the imperial families of France
and Austria, and the adherence of the Cabinet of Vienna
to that of the Tuileries during the eventful crisis of the
Russian war. For these reasons, the British Govern-
ment, in the first instance, refused to give any subsidy to
Austria, even if she took a part in the war ; and this .
refusal gave great umbrage to the Cabinet of Vienna,
especially considering the large sum Great Britain was at
the same time advancing to Russia, Prussia, and Sweden.
Fortunately, Sir Charles Stewart had by this time come
to the Allied headquarters at Reichenbach, and he made
Lord Castlereagh fully aware of the mischievous effects
which their declinature was producing on the prospects of
the alliance, and the necessity of an immediate advance
to enable Austria to take the field. The letter which he
wrote to his brother at this crisis is highly valuable, and
throws an important light both on the critical state of
the European alliance at this period, and the great share
which both brothers had in cementings its fortunes. *
* " DEAREST CASTLEREAQH, — Count Hardenberg has arrived from Vienna,
and Mr Humboldt. I have had many conversations with both. Both have
hopes ; but I will not vouch for the solidity of the basis on which they are
rested. It seems now that Metternich is valiant, and that the Emperor
Francis is the timid person. To wind him up to a proper key — to pat him on
the back and to commit him, decidedly is the present aim. To accomplish
this, it is necessary to hold the stoutest language : to declare that even with-
out him the war will be carried on ; to clench treaties for succour more bind-
ing with England ; and, in short, to look only to war. Upon this policy they
are now acting. How it will answer is in the womb of time. His Imperial
Majesty, Francis, does not see things so advantageously as is desirable ; and
when it is pointed out to him that a movement in Buonaparte's rear with the
668 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP. But although both Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles
IX- Stewart, who were on the spot, were agreed as to the
1813. absolute necessity of an immediate advance of money to
intrepfd enable Austria to take the field, yet that necessity was
L^JcaA- not e<lua% apparent to the British Cabinet at home, who,
cart and sir already embarrassed by the enormous expense of the Pen-
Chiw. Stew- J J • i i
art in re- insular war, found their resources seriously diminished
Austrian11 by the monetary and commercial crisis in which, from the
universal hostility on the Continent, the British commerce
Austrian force would annihilate his son-in-law, he rather looks to his reigning
in those limits which peaceable arrangements may bring about.
" Count Stadion declared yesterday that the Emperor Francis had positively
refused a meeting with Buonaparte, which the latter had urged. If this is the
case, the visits of the Russian Emperor and the King of Prussia will be
equally declined. . . . The arrival of the news of the armistice at Leipsic
was very mal apropos. A great victory would have been gained then by
Woronzoff. When it was received, the Prussian officers were so indignant that
they tore off their pelisses and trampled them under foot. Count Stadiou
received reports yesterday from Count Bubna at Dresden, which positively
assert that the loss of the French army since the opening of the campaign
amounts at least to 60,000 men. Buonaparte is anxious to have it believed
that it only depends on him to negotiate separately with Russia. In my
official despatches, you will see the progress and conclusion of our treaties. I
shall always lament the dilatory proceedings attending their completion.
They should have been finished at Dresden or Grossberg, and we could then
have done it without difficulty, and should have been then free from the accom-
panying explanations. But this I could not rectify. Although you may not
now carry us through our signatures, still if we had not concluded, the alterna-
tive would have been an incapacity in Prussia to continue her preparations, the
direct loss of Austria, and Russia looking to her own frontier. As it is, we
have the hope Buonaparte will spurn the propositions made. We could not
wait for orders from home. We give our game the last chance, and if the worst
happen we need never be a party to the pacific negotiation ; and if we are left
in the lurch, it is not without having done our utmost. The loss of a part of
our subsidy need not signify.
" With regard to the numbers to be kept up by the Allies, Prussia to tho
last would have inserted 100,000 men, and Russia alone prevented this. It
may be said Prussia was engaged by her former treaty with Russia to furnish
80,000 men, and that we get no more by our subsidy. But the fact is, that it
would be quite impossible for Prussia to make good the losses she has sus-
tained since the commencement of hostilities, and to bring up her effective in
the field to 80,000 men without England's aid. But with what has been
given I am sure she will be brought up to the very utmost mark. I cannot con-
ceal from you that Lord C.'s [Cathcart] extraordinary partiality to Russia will
never let him see a greater exertion in another quarter than he can accoir.-
plish ; therefore, the lower number was inserted in the treaty even after tho
higher had been three times inserted. I was obliged to be obedient as to 80,000,
as Russia would not go higher. I fear you will be much disappointed ; but I
act under orders. I hope my hussar proceedings as to an advance will not
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 669
had come to be involved. The strenuous representations, CHAP.
in consequence, of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had IX-
compelled Lord Castlereagh, much against his will, to 1813-
refuse, in the most positive manner, any, even the most
inconsiderable, advance to Austria; and even in regard to
the payments to Prussia, they were directed to be made in
the most cautious manner. The necessities of Austria,
however, were still more pressing, and a certain advance
of money was indispensable to enable her to put her troops
in motion. Matters were thus very near coming to a fix ;
and the danger was imminent that, at the decisive moment,
Austria, needy and sullen at the refusal of aid she had
experienced, would draw off, or even unite her forces to
those of the enemy. In this extremity, the moral courage
of Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart was put to the
test, and fortunately it proved equal to the crisis. On the
16th June they signed a secret article to the treaty of juneis.
Reichenbach, without any direct authority from the British
Cabinet, but which theyfelt assured would not be disavowed,
by which it was stipulated that, in the event of Napoleon
declining the terms of accommodation proposed by Austria,
" she [Austria] should, in the event of her taking a part
in the war, receive £500,000 in bills upon London, and
the like sum in military stores and accoutrements ; that
she should bring 200,000 men into the field, and be re-
stored to the condition in which she was in 1803, or, at
any rate, at the Peace of Presburg ; and that the Pope
electrify you. The fact is, Prussia cannot go on just now without a lift ; the
machine is really at a stand for want of oil.
" It may be right to put you in possession of the arguments that are used
by those who do not press Austria so much forward as we would desire. It is
said the positive refusal of England to give any subsidy has created in Metter-
uich great dissatisfaction ; that even the name of a small subsidy, in the event
of their acting, would be of immense importance. The non-interference also
of Sweden, up to the present time, upon whom they say we have expended our
millions, and her suffering Hamburg to fall, is urged as a reason for Austria
keeping back ; she having originally stipulated, as one of the conditions that
would induce her to take a part, the employment of a large Swedish army
on the Lower Elbe."— SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Reichen-
bach, June 16, 1813 (Most private and secret), MS.
670 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, should be reinstated in his dominions." This clause had
IX- been drawn up under Count Stadion's eyes, in the treaty
1813. between Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, but without
the signature of any one on the part of Austria. The
Emperor Francis declined to sign it, as long as any hope
remained of Napoleon's acceding to the terms proposed
i Hard 'xii> by him for a general pacification. But at length, when
I8 2;57hoe11' these hopes had entirely vanished from the determined
Lond. 3fi8, resolution of the French Emperor, he gave his consent to
Appendix, r °
NO. in. the secret article on 27th July, and thereby conditionally
incorporated Austria with the Grand Alliance.1
Fortunately about this time a ray of light broke in from
change of the quarter where it was least expected, and which con-
p^of°Ber-e tributed to remove the indecision of Austria, and cement
ltte> the union of the Allied powers. Bernadotte, whose back-
wardness in the general cause, especially in regard to
Hamburg, had given rise to serious suspicions, not only
in the breast of Sir Charles Stewart, but of the Allied
sovereigns, suddenly changed his policy, and professed his
willingness, not merely to repair to Trachenberg to concert
measures with them, but to act with his whole force upon
the lines most important to the Allied cause.* The cause
of this sudden and auspicious change was, that secret in-
formation was received at this period that, in the event
of the resumption of hostilities, one of Napoleon's first
measures would be directed against Berlin and the Prince
Royal of Sweden. For this purpose, the corps of Ber-
trand, Oudinot, and Reynier, with one of cavalry, mustering
* " MY DEAR STEWART,— The Prince Royal having entered into the most ex-
tended plan of co-operation which could be desired by the Emperor and King
of Prussia, and having offered to act with the means within his reach upon the
line of operations most interesting to them, I trust, my good friend, you will
do everything in your power to cause every man of new or old troops to be
placed at his absolute disposal, which are on this side of the line of demarcation.
Whatever the quality of the troops may be, one advantage at least will arise —
that of the whole being made to act with decision upon one system, and under
the direction of one general. If, during the armistice, you can see the Prince
Royal, I shall be glad of it. He looks upon you as a real soldier, which with
him is a high degree of estimation." — GENERAL ALEXANDER HOPE, Envoy to
Sweden, to SIR CHARLES STEWART, Stralmnd, June 11, 1813, MS.
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 671
70,000 combatants, was to be advanced against Berlin, CHAP.
supported by Girard from Madgeburg, and Dayoust IX-
from Hamburg, forming a force in all of little less than isis.
100,000. Against this force Bernadotte could not op-
pose more than 70,000; so that he had much need to
conciliate the Allied sovereigns to avoid destruction.
Upon receipt of this intelligence, he entered warmly
into the views of the Allied sovereigns, and repaired
forthwith to Trachenberg in person to concert with
them the plan of operations. He was there received with
the utmost distinction by the Allied sovereigns, and a
stronger head than his might have been carried away by
the incense bestowed upon him. From hence, however,
arose a fresh set of difficulties ; for he openly aspired
to the command-in-chief of the Allied armies, or at least
of that portion of them which acted in Prussia and on
the Lower Elbe. It was no easy matter to reconcile
these pretensions with the preponderance of Russia in
the councils of the Coalition, and the just demands of
Prussia for the lead in defence of her own country ;
but at length the matter was adjusted, though not with-
out difficulty, by giving the Prince Royal the command
of the Army of the North, charged with the defence of
Berlin, with Prince William and Prince Henry of Prus-
sia serving under him to be a check upon his actions.*
But though Bernadotte was treated with such distinc-
* " Prince William and Prince Henry of Prussia are to serve in the army
•which is to be placed under the Prince Royal. This is the policy of Prussia,
lest the Prince Royal, once he has the army, should made himself too power-
ful. . . . My friend Hardenberg is strong in power and favour, although
he has collected in his person the management of every office in the state, and
although he is nearly seventy years of age, and very deaf. Still he brings the
affairs of the country forward; and, from what I hear, the interests of Great
Britain in the alliance could not be intrusted to better hands. The loss of
Scharnhorst has been a great misfortune ; his principles, as well as his abili-
ties, are so striking, that I wish all military arrangements were solely under his
control. Kiiiesebeck has considerable military ability, but he is supposed to
be favourable to peace, and hostile to Russia. The game evidently playing
now is to unite Prussia with Austria, and to separate her as much as possible
from Russia." — SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEREAGH, June 26,
1813, MS.
G72 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, tiou, and invested with so important a command, the
IX- plan of the campaign adopted was not his, but that of
1813. the Russian and Prussian generals, who, long opposed to
xvi. 186 ; Napoleon, had come to learn the proper mode of combat-
jxmd. 87- -ng kis SyStem Of warfare.1
44 A barbarous piece of treacherous cruelty practised by
Treacherous the French at this period powerfully contributed to inflame
the free the already ardent feelings of the Prussians at this time.
huTzow and It is thus narrated by Sir Charles Stewart : " A circum-
xurner.1 stance which has occurred to the free corps of Lutzow
June 16. j^g excited the greatest possible indignation here. This
corps was acting in the enemy's rear, when, hearing of the
armistice, they desired to have a free passage from the
neighbourhood of Hoff to the right bank of the Elbe. The
French general received them, and promised them a safe
conduct. He treacherously, however, on their march, fell
upon them with superior forces, and with difficulty two-
thirds of the corps escaped. The general gave as his ex-
cuse that he had received particular orders from Buona-
parte that the armistice excluded those who carried on war
like marauders in the rear of their opponents, and that the
free corps should be everywhere treated with the greatest
severity. This scandalous proceeding is a fair ground for
immediately breaking the armistice, but it is hard to say
how it will be viewed at the seat of judgment. The people
of Leipsic are so exasperated against the French that
. they have declared the city in a state of siege."2 So far
e- Sir Charles Stewart : but, unknown to him, the event was
destined to acquire enduring celebrity from what there
MS- befell a man of immortal fame. Among those wounded
on this occasion, was the poet Korner, whose patriotic
strains had rung like a trumpet to the heart of Germany,
and who had advanced to parley with the French general,
whom he assured of the armistice. But the perfidious
barbarian, exclaiming, " The armistice is for all the world
except you," cut him down before he had time even to
draw his sword. Korner fell back in his saddle on receiv-
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 673
ing the blow, which severely wounded him on the head, CHAP.
and was quickly followed by a second, by which he was IX-
wellnigh stunned. His horse, which was a very powerful isis.
courageous animal, however, carried him in an almost
senseless state into a neighbouring wood, where one of his
companions overtook him, and was proceeding to bind up
his wound, when a party of the enemy rode up. Without
losing his presence of mind, Korner immediately called
out in a loud voice, " Let the four squadrons advance."
The enemy were deceived by the stratagem and retired,
upon which Korner withdrew into the recesses of the wood
and escaped. He was from thence conveyed during the
night to the house of a peasant in the neighbourhood, by
whom he was kindly treated; and he was afterwards taken
secretly to the house of Dr Wingfield, in Leipsic, who,
with generous devotion, put in hazard his own life to save
that of his friend. He recovered so far as to be able to
resume his military duties, and take a part in the battle ^l^6' ''
of Dresden, where he was shot through the heart. A few Deutsche
Pandora von
days before his death, he composed his immortal ode to Y™d- Kpiie,
* ' L 4j3 . Biog.
his Lyre and Sword — the noblest of all the noble lyrical Univ. SUP.
pieces which his genius at that crisis created to aid in the ner.
liberation of the Fatherland.1
There can be no doubt that Sir Charles Stewart was
45
right in saying that this treacherous act afforded a good sir Charles
ground for breaking the armistice, but that it was v&ey&omaj"
doubtful how it would be taken at headquarters. In^tsof
truth, at this period it was more than doubtful whether a tions-
general pacification was not at hand ; or, at least, whether
Austria would not immediately come to pacific terms with
Napoleon. The anxiety which prevailed at the Allied
headquarters at this time on this subject was extreme.
They knew that a secret negotiation was going on between
the Cabinet of Vienna and the French Emperor, and that
Metternich had come to Dresden to conduct it in person
with him ; and they were ignorant of what had passed at
the private interview between them, which rendered all
VOL. T. 2 u
674 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, prospect of a good understanding hopeless. Sir Charles
rc- Stewart, accordingly, at this period wrote from the Allied
1813- headquarters to Lord Castlereagh that a mystery hung
over the negotiations which he could not penetrate ; that
a secret understanding existed between France and Aus-
tria ; and that the independence of Europe was about to
be sacrificed to " some miserable expedient for temporary
tranquillity.""* In truth, Sir Charles Stewart's penetra-
tion was by no means at fault on this occasion ; the dan-
ger which he divined and dreaded existed in its fullest
extent, and to a degree greater than he suspected. It
lay with Napoleon at this period by a word, and at a
trifling sacrifice, not only to disarm the hostility of Aus-
tria, but convert her into a firm ally. Nothing hindered
this from taking place but his indomitable pride and
firmness, which could not brook even the semblance of
defeat.
46 Though secretly determined, however, not to accept
Napoleon's the proposals of Austria, Napoleon had no pretext, after
sending Russia and Prussia had accepted the mediation of that
ti^e80toen power, for delaying to send plenipotentiaries to Prague,
Prague. ^ agree(j_on place of assembly. He nominated, accord-
ingly, M. de Narbonne and M. de Caulaincourt to repre-
sent France at the approaching congress. M. d'Anstett
* " I was much besieged by Chancellor Hardenberg to increase the issue of
£100,000, as you will see by the enclosed note. I have, however, more per-
emptorily resisted this, since I find there is still some mystery as to the nego-
tiations which I cannot entirely develop. I know not what Sweden may say
to these proceedings, but I understand she has accepted the Austrian me-
diation ; but she is kept very much in the dark. And when I review all I
have seen and heard, it is my firm belief some pacific arrangement will be
made, it is so evident that Austria, who has the chief power, is forming this.
It is clear that, though she approves of the principle of resistance to a certain
extent against France, she by no means goes along with England in her views
as to Buonaparte's power being more confined. It is incontrovertible that a
secret understanding exists between the French and Austrian Cabinets, and out
of all this I think one must be blind not to foretell that some miserable expe-
dient for temporary tranquillity will be resorted to. I have good reason since I
began this letter to believe what I have mentioned as to the Prince Royal's com-
munications is correct. We must judge him from the future, not the past." —
SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Berlin, June 26, 1813, MS.
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 675
represented Russia, and M. de Humboldt, Prussia, at the CHAP.
congress ; and from the high character of all these diplo- IX-
rnatists, it was confidently expected that the negotiations wis.
would make rapid progress, and possibly terminate in a
fortunate result. But this illusion was not of long dura-
tion. The Russian, Prussian, and Austrian plenipoten-
tiaries arrived at Prague on the 12th July, the time
appointed, and M. de Narbonne also made his appear-
ance. But M. de Caulaincourt, to their astonishment, did
not arrive, and his absence prevented anything being done.
After waiting in vain till the 1 8th, they were surprised,
instead of the absent plenipotentiary, at receiving a de-
spatch from Napoleon, dated Dresden, 17th July, in
which he complained that at Neumarkt General Bar-
clay de Tolly had declared that he considered the armi-
stice as lasting only till the 10th August instead of the
17th, the expiry of the period allowed for denouncing
the armistice, and that he must receive satisfaction on so
important a point before he sent M. de Caulaincourt to
jcommence the negotiations. He complained also that M.
d'Anstett and M. de Humboldt were not of the rank
which was required for those who were to meet M, de
Narbonne and the Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt). Both
objections were obviously unfounded. Barclay de Tolly
was merely a military commander, who had no authority
to say anything as to the duration of the armistice, which
it would be time enough to discuss when the period of its
expiry drew near. And as to the rank of the diploma-
tists— an objection which sounded strange from the child
of the Revolution — M. de Humboldt, of ancient family, and
brother of the illustrious naturalist, famed over the whole
world, was at least on a level with either Maret or Cau-
laincourt, neither of whom had any pretensions to aristo-
cratic descent. As it was, however, these objections gave
rise to an angry correspondence, which was riot terminated
till the 28th, when Caulaincourt, who had only been per-
mitted to quit Dresden on the 26th, having arrived, the
676 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, conferences were allowed to go on. This factious resist -
rc- ance upon trifling points strengthened greatly the argu-
isis. ments of those who contended that Napoleon was al-
together insincere in the conference, and that he was
* rain, 11.
209 ;Thiers, laying hold of every pretext to prolong the armistice, in
148. order to gain time for his military preparations being
completed.1
In the meanwhile, previous to M. de Caulaincourt's ar-
Fresh diffi- rival, Napoleon started another difficulty, which, though of
by iLrpo-e form only, was of such a kind as stopped altogether, in the
th°enfOTm°of mean time, the commencement of the negotiations. Met-
rence°nfe ternich proposed that, when the conferences were opened,
July 28. tne mode adopted in the negotiations of Tetschen in 1 779
should be followed — viz., by written notes, addressed not
by the belligerent parties to each other, but by both to
the mediating power, and by it transmitted to the pleni-
potentiary of the power for whom it was really intended.
To this proposition the Allied plenipotentiaries, anxious
to conciliate Austria, at once agreed ; but M. de Nar-
bonne contended for that pursued at the conferences of
Utrecht, where the plenipotentiaries sent their notes di-
rectly to each other, and the communications were carried
on partly verbally, partly in writing. It was obviously a
matter of little consequence which form was adopted, as
the notes to be exchanged were the same whether they
were to be addressed by the belligerents to each other or
to the mediating power ; but Napoleon was firm in insist-
ing for his side of the question ; and as the fatal term of
the 1 6th August was approaching, M. de Metternich, who
had become seriously alarmed that the negotiations would
come to nothing, requested and obtained a secret confer-
260; Thiers, ence with M. de Narbonne, the particulars of which, hap-
157. pily preserved in the archives of the Austrian statesman,
are of the highest interest and importance.2
" The difficulty now raised," said M. de Metternich, " is
not more serious than that which has been discussed. We
have announced to you officially that the convention is
and Nar-
boune.
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 677
ratified, in virtue of which the armistice is prolonged to CHAP.
the 16th August ; this, therefore, could never give you a
reason for withholding the nominating of jour plenipoten- 1813-
tiaries when ours arrived on the evening of the llth July, secret con-
Now the commissioners at Neumarkt, who know nothing jKniidi
of the matter, and have all the passions of military staffs,
pretend to interpret the clause differently, and you pre-
tend to be alarmed at it. I say ' pretend,' for you cannot
seriously believe what you advance. You rest on an in-
significant difficulty, which is entirely without foundation,
as not only the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries,
but the mediating power, are on your side of that ques-
tion. In these circumstances we can see nothing in such
conduct, when time is so precious, but a desire on the
part of the Emperor Napoleon to keep us here without
doing anything till the conclusion of the armistice. But
do not deceive yourselves ; you will not by so doing pro-
long the suspension of arms by one hour. By the diffi-
culties which you say you have encountered at Neumarkt,
you may judge of the difficulty which we have had in
getting the armistice prolonged even to the 10th August.
Rely upon it you will obtain no second suspension ; let
not the Emperor Napoleon deceive himself on so import-
ant a point. In such an event we shall not remain neu-
tral ; rest assured of that. After having from the very
first employed every possible means to bring him to
reasonable conditions — which he well knows we have com-
municated to him from the first moment, and on which
we have never for an instant varied, for they constitute
the only possible basis for the peace of Europe — we have
no alternative if he refuses but to become belligerents
ourselves. If we remain neutral, as he in reality desires,
the Allies, we know, will be beaten ; but we do not deceive
ourselves, our turn will come next, and we shall have well
merited the fate that awaits us. We shall not commit
that fault. At present, whatever you may be told to the
contrary, we are free. I give you my word of honour, as
678 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, well as that of my Sovereign, that we have no engage-
IX> ments with any one. But I give you my word at the
1813- same time, that at midnight on the 10th August we shall
be engaged with all the world except you, and that on
the morning of the 17th you will have three hundred
thousand Austrians the more on your hands. It is not
lightly, or without pain, for my Sovereign is a father,
and loves his daughter, that he has taken this resolution ;
but he owes it to his people, to himself, and to Europe,
to restore to all a stable state of things, since he has it in
his power to do so. He has no other alternative but to
fall a few days later under your blows into a state of de-
pendence more lamentable than that in which you have
put Prussia. Certainly we are not blind to the risks we
run in combating, even with large armies, the Emperor
Napoleon at the head of the French troops ; but after
having duly reflected on the matter, we prefer that chance
to dishonour and slavery. Do not come, then, after the
event and say we have deceived you ! Till midnight on
the 10th, everything is possible, even to the eleventh
hour ; but midnight past, not a day, not an instant of re-
spite ; instant war with all the world, even with us."
JJJ^isa*"' " What!" said Narbonne, "not an instant of respite, even
from Met- if a negotiation has commenced1?" "On one condition
ternich *••,, . , .
archives, only — that the entire basis of peace has been arranged,
and that nothing remains to settle but the details."1
M. de Narbonne readily perceived, from the earnest
M. de Nar- manner, solemn voice, and emphatic assurances of M. de
vahTtries to Mettemich, that he spoke with sincerity the resolution
Solemn of his Cabinet, and he was seized, in consequence, with
danger. ^ie mos^ mortal apprehensions as to the fate which
awaited his Imperial master. Under the influence of
these impressions, he wrote to Napoleon giving an ac-
count of what had passed, and urging the necessity of
immediately sending M. de Caulaincourt to Prague, with
full powers to begin the negotiation in good earnest ;
warning him, at the same time, that if everything was not
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 679
concluded by the 10th at midnight, renewed war with CHAP
Austria in. addition was inevitable. Napoleon, to whose ix.
secret thoughts Maret alone was privy, attached no credit isis.
to these representations, and if he had believed, he was
determined not to act upon them. Still he was not the
less desirous to gain as much time as he possibly could,
and with this view, he resolved on the following plan.
He sent powers to M. de Narbonne to commence the
negotiation without M. de Caulaincourt, and enjoined
him to propose as the basis of the negotiation, which
he offered to conduct by means of written proposals, the
principle of uti possidetis. As the French Emperor was
in possession at this time of more than the half of Ger-
many and the whole of Italy, there was little chance of
its being admitted by the Allied Powers ; and this was
rendered still more unlikely by what he at the same time
insisted on, in regard to the blockaded fortresses. He
required that French officers should be sent to all of
them to superintend the supply of provisions, and that
a return should be furnished for 50,000 men and 6000
horses, in the fortresses on the Oder — numbers consider-
ably superior to the garrisons, and to what had hitherto
been provided under the stipulations of the armistice.
The Emperor of Russia said he would not agree to this,
and Napoleon stated in reply, that if it was refused he
would instantly recommence hostilities. The matter was
at length adjusted by mutual concessions, but in the
mean time, some days were consumed in these preliminary
points, and July expired without the negotiations having
advanced a single step. The designs of Napoleon were
quite fixed ; he proposed to amuse the Allied Powers by
simulate proposals for peace to the very last moment,
and when this could no longer avail, to open a separate
and secret negotiation with Austria, which might delay
for a few days longer the commencement of hostilities
with that power, during which he hoped to succeed in
crushing Russia and Prussia in a pitched battle. The
G80 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, instructions to Caulaincourt, who was not to quit Dresden
IX- till the 26th, accordingly pointed to a separate treaty
1813. -with Austria, but by no means to a general peace. The
Powers previously sent to Narbonne had been so re-
stricted that Maret, in despatching them, wrote on the
envelope : " I send you more powers than power ; your
28, 1813, hands are bound, but your feet and mouth are free, and
you may walk about and dine/' l
Instead of remaining at Dresden to conduct the nego-
50
Napoleon tiation in person, or giving full powers to either M. de
fnce to meet Narbonne or M. de Caulaincourt to conduct it for him,
Napoleon, on the night of the 24th July, set out for
Mayence, whither the Empress had come to meet him,
for the double purpose of seeing her before the campaign
commenced, and of inspecting the troops which were con-
tinually passing through that fortress on their way to
Dresden. What passed on this occasion is now known
by the best of all evidence, that of the Empress herself :
" Associated," said she to the Senate, " in that short
interview with the most secret thoughts of the Emperor,
I then perceived with what sentiments he would be in-
spired if seated on a dishonoured throne, and under a
crown without glory." In these words is revealed the
inmost soul of Napoleon. " He was much urged by the
Empress," says Sir Charles Stewart, " to make peace on
2 Lend. IDS. any terms, but he answered, TOUT ou RiEN."2 The Em-
peror spent six days at Mayeuce, busied in inspecting
the fortifications and reviewing the troops which were
incessantly urged on to swell the roll of the corps on the
3 Fain, ii. Elbe, and on the 4th August he returned in person to
Sei7! ;-228- Dresden. During his stay at Mayence, he received
23i ^g*- several letters from Caulaincourt complaining bitterly of
204; Thiers, the illusory nature of the powers with which he was in-
163. vested and the instruction which he had received, but
without the slightest effect.3
Upon Napoleon's return to Dresden, he ascertained
from Maret and Caulaincourt that the pretexts for delay
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 681
would no longer avail, and that it was necessary to come CHAP.
to a categorical answer to the final proposals of Austria IX>
pro.
as the mediating power. He despatched, accordingly, 1813-
confidential instructions to M. de Caulaincourt, directing
him (without acquainting M. de Narbonne) to open a
secret negotiation with Metternich, and ascertain from Au8ust 6-
him on what terms his Government really would treat.
The Austrian diplomatist immediately (6th August) re-
paired to Brandeiss, where the Emperor Francis was, to
lay the matter before him. This was exactly what the
Cabinet of Vienna desired, and they directed Metternich,
in consequence, to communicate their views to Napoleon.
A secret meeting for this purpose was arranged between
Caulaincourt and Metternich, on the 8th August, at which
the proposals of Austria, which were substantially the same
she had always urged, were again brought forward by the
latter. They were, that " the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
was to be dissolved and divided between Russia, Austria,
and Prussia, Dantzic being ceded to the latter power ;
that Hamburg and the Hanse towns should be re-estab-
lished in their independence ; the Protectorate of the
Confederation of the Rhine renounced; Prussia reinstated
in her ancient possessions, with a frontier on the Elbe ;
and the Illyrian provinces, including Trieste, be ceded to
Austria." M. de Metternich accompanied this catego-
rical demand with an intimation that the Emperor
" awaited an answer, yes or no, till midnight on the
1 Oth, which shall be done also by Russia and Prussia ;
but that if such an answer was not received by that
time, on the morning of the llth the congress would be
dissolved by a public declaration, and the whole forces
of Austria joined to those of the Coalition, to conquer , See in
a peace compatible with the interests of all the powers ; ^ructions in
and that, in that event, their proposals should be held as 217, 218 ; '
withdrawn, and everything left to the decision of the M ; jfenT '
sword." l The instructions to this effect, signed by the asw.
Emperor of Austria, were shown by M. de Metternich to
682 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP. M. de Caulaincourt, to leave no doubt in the rnind of the
IX- latter of the gravity of the crisis which had arrived.
1813. Cajilaincourt acted a noble part on this occasion. He
Nobfe2'con- immediately, and the same evening, communicated the
deCwwi- ultimatum to the Emperor, accompanied by a letter
court. jn which he earnestly besought him to accept it. At
best, no stranger to the warlike resolutions of his mas-
ter, and well aware that he was imperilling his own
favour and fortune by tendering advice contrary to
them, he had moral courage enough for the sake of his
country to run the hazard. But it was all in vain.
Nothing could persuade Napoleon that Austria would
really join the Allies if her terms were not acceded to,
or that there was any necessity for returning an answer
to the Austrian ultimatum before midnight on the 10th,
which was the appointed time for the termination of the
armistice. He spent, accordingly, the whole of the 9th
in deliberating, and on the forenoon of the 10th sent off
an answer which was to the following effect : The French
Emperor agreed to the dissolution of the Grand Duchy
of Warsaw, as a matter " on which the decree of Provi-
dence had been pronounced." He agreed, if Austria and
Russia gave their consent, to cede the greater part, or
even the whole of the Grand Duchy to Prussia ; but
he insisted that her frontiers should be thrown back
behind the Oder; and that Brandenberg, Berlin, Potsdam,
arid the whole country between the Elbe and that river,
should be given in compensation for the loss of the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw to Saxony. Prussia thus reconstructed
was to have for a capital either Warsaw or Konigsberg ;
Dantzic, however, was to form no part of its dominions,
but to be a free city. As to Hamburg, Bremen, and
Lubeck, which had been incorporated with France by the
title of the " 32d Military Division," their cession was
not to be thought of; they formed an irrevocable part
of the territories of the Great Nation. He could not
consent to divest himself of the title of Protector of the
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 683
Confederation of the Rhine; to demand it was a gra- CHAP.
tuitous insult to him, without adding anything to the IX-
security of the Allied Powers. He consented to the isis.
restoration of lllyria to Austria, but reserving Trieste
to France, along with Villach Goritz, and some other
military positions beyond the Julian Alps, which secured
an easy entrance into that territory.* On these condi-
tions he agreed to sign a peace, and withdraw with his
forces behind the Rhine ; but if they were rejected, in
TliGirs xvi
preference to agreeing to any others, " he would for 222, 223.
years together combat Europe in arms." l
Meanwhile, the most intense anxiety prevailed at the
Austrian headquarters. Metternich in particular, who Termination
was well aware how little Austria was prepared for a war L-ess! and"
on a great scale, and what tremendous risks she would Of ?lar
run if it were entered upon by her and prove unsuccessful,
was in the utmost state of solicitude. He counted the france-
August 11.
hours as they struck during the whole of the 10th, and
sent times innumerable to the hotel of M. de Narbonne,
to inquire whether he had received any advices from his
master. When night came on, and still the answer was
the same, that no communication had been received, his
anxiety became unbearable, and such as all his diplo-
matic power of dissimulation could not conceal. At
length midnight struck, and the hour of decision had
arrived : the terms of Austria having been rejected, or
rather not acceded to, by the French Emperor, she was
bound under her existing engagements with the Allied
Powers to join her forces to theirs and declare war
against France. He proved faithful to his word. Early
on the morning of the llth, he signed a convention bind-a n.
J Bign. xii.
ing Austria to unite her forces to those of the Coalition,233-249?
111 T-i 9 A Thiers, xvi.
and declare war against France. At the same time, 225, 225.
messengers were despatched to Napoleon at Dresden
* Caulaincourt was authorised in the last extremity to consent to Prussia's
retaining what she already possessed, between the Elbe and the Oder, in addi-
tion to her gains on the side of Poland; but this was the only concession
authorised to him.
C84 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, announcing the dissolution of the congress, and the acces-
IX- sion of Austria to the confederacy ; and on the day fol-
1813. lowing Austria declared war.
Napoleon was taken by surprise by this decisive step ;
Napoleon he was far from having anticipated so bold a determina-
te engage*'11 ^on on tne Part °f tne Cabinet of Vienna. Still he was
farther* m a n°t without hopes of yet bringing matters to an adjust-
secret nego- mQui in conformity with his wishes. There still remained
tiation. <f
August 11. the chance of the secret negotiation begun through M.
de Caulaincourt with the Cabinet of Vienna ; and he
hoped by means of it to postpone hostilities for a few
days, or weeks, with Austria, during which he had 110
doubt of gaining such successes over the Allies as would
render that Government disposed to accede to his terms.
The courier with the last views and ultimatum of Na-
poleon, communicated in secret to M. de Bubna, arrived
at midday of the llth, after the accession of Austria
to the Coalition had been signed. M. de Caulaincourt,
however, did not despair of getting Austria to continue
the secret and separate negotiations, and, immediately
on receipt of the Emperor's answer, hastened to M. de
Metternich, and endeavoured to persuade him to keep
open the secret conferences, and delay the declaration
of war till it was seen whether an accommodation could
not be made on the footing of the last French proposals.
But the answer of M. de Metternich was decided. He
declared that the conditions, with the exception of a few
details, might have been accepted as the basis of a nego-
tiation on the preceding day, but that now it was too
late. Nothing could be received or considered by Aus-
tria but in conjunction with the Allied Powers. And
of their disposition, the clearest proof was afforded on
i sign. xii. *ne same day by the Russian and Prussian plenipoten-
™"ers9Lvi ^ar^es retiring from Prague, declaring the congress dis-
226-227. solved, and notifying the resumption of hostilities after
midnight on the 16th.1
Still Napoleon did not despair of getting Austria to
AEMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 685
postpone hostilities at least for a few days. When the CHAP.
Allied plenipotentiaries had withdrawn, there remained IX-
only M. de Caulaincourt and M. de Narbonne at Prague, isis.
who were in communication with the Austrian minister. Freshtffort
Both these statesmen, however, were most anxious to^j;^
bring about an accommodation, and warmly seconded thej-°?rtto,
c • bring about
efforts of M. de Metternich to effect it. The better to a peace.
compass this object, it was agreed that M. de Narbonne,
as the sole ostensible plenipotentiary on the part of
France at the congress, should alone withdraw from
Prague, and that M. de Caulaincourt should remain there.
It was given out that M. de Caulaincourt remained to
await the issue of a communication made by M. de
Metternich to the Emperor of Russia and King of
Prussia. But it was all in vain. The French Emperor
consented to M. de Caulaincourt remaining a few days
longer, not in Prague, but in its immediate neighbour-
hood ; and he sent him full powers in form to sign,
but none to treat. He made no modification in his
ultimatum towards Austria, which was the retention
of the Protectorate of the Rhine and the Hanse towns
by France, to which was added Trieste, which he had
formerly evinced a disposition to cede to Austria. When
these were the only terms on which he was authorised to gjjjjjf*
sign, it was evident that the further residence of M. de £»ul- >• ??7'>
... B'gn- X11-
Caulaincourt at Prague was a vam formality which could 247-249.
lead to no result.1
Still clinging, even in these circumstances all but
desperate, to the hope of an accommodation, M. de Can- Last Pro-
laincourt prolonged his stay for a few days longer at &°apoieon,
Koenigsal, near Prague, during which he exhibited the ^ject'ed'by
power to sign though not to treat, which he had at length the Alhes>
obtained from Napoleon, and again endeavoured to bring
about a separate treaty with Austria. Metternich, how-
ever, informed him, with deep regret, that it was too late
for any separate treaty : the terms must be submitted
to the Allied sovereigns. They were so accordingly ;
686 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, and the Emperor of Russia, in name of both, returned
IX- for answer, " that the Allied sovereigns, after consulting
IBIS, -with each other, being persuaded that all idea of a real
peace was inseparable from that of a general pacification,
which their Majesties had hoped to have effected by the
negotiations at Prague, regret to find that the articles
now proposed by his Majesty the Emperor of the French
cannot answer the ends in view, and therefore cannot be
deemed admissible." This answer was carried by M. de
Bender, the Austrian legate, to M. de Caulaincourt at the
chateau of Koenigsal.
Even after so many repulses, Caulaincourt made one
Last effort more effort to divert the Emperor from his warlike resolu-
tions. So late as the 13th August, within two days of
tne resumption of hostilities, he again addressed to
peace. Napoleon a most pressing letter, in which he adjured
him by every consideration for his country, his family,
and himself, to return to pacific counsels, and accept the
ultimatum of Austria. But nothing could bend the iron
will of the Emperor. Caulaincourt, defeated in all his
efforts, made no concealment to any one of his opinion
as to the obstinacy of his master, and that he should
have closed with the ultimatum of Austria. " In a long
conversation which ensued betwen them," says Sir Charles
* sir chas. Stewart, " General Caulaincourt told M. de Metternich
LOTdcLTie-^8'* if he were Buonaparte he would accept, without
i5agi8i3Ug' hesitation, the Austrian proposals, but that he was with-
MS- out full power, and did not think they would be accepted
by the Emperor/'1
In truth, matters had now gone so far, and the prepara-
tions of Napoleon on the one side, and the enthusiasm on
atthe AuTthe other, were on such a scale, that the resumption of
of hostilities had become in a manner unavoidable. " It is
IT 16 difficult to describe," says Sir Charles Stewart, " the en-
thusiasm generally created by the Austrian declaration of
war. The spirit of the army also was at the highest
point. When the three Allied sovereigns met at Prague
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 687
on the 16th August, it excited a proud sensation in the CHAP.
breast of such British subjects as witnessed the event ; IX-
for the persevering and energetic conduct of their own 1813-
country, under the wise administration of the Prince
Regent's Government, and, above all, the glorious exploits
of the British army in Spain, had ultimately, and I might
say exclusively, brought into action a complete and effi-
cient alliance against the ambition of France and the
tyranny of its chief, affording rational hopes of a glo-
rious termination of the contest. The recently dubious
conduct of Austria having thus terminated, she nobly
and magnanimously brought her great and command-
ing advantages in point of numerical forces to bear ;
and England, with her wonted generosity, was the first
l. I J • l • •». 1 T~ i, ! Lend. 97,
to acknowledge her sincerity, and restore to her her con- 98.
fidence."1
Sir Charles Stewart arrived in Prague on the 16th
August, and bore a part in the preparations for the sir Charles
reception of the Allied sovereigns, which took place two confidential
days after. Before this auspicious event occurred, he t°0Twith
had a long confidential conversation with Prince Metter-
nich, who, notwithstanding all his diplomatic reserve,
knew, on proper occasions, how to expand in the charm
of the most unreserved communication. The account of
the interview must be given in his own words. " He
began," says Sir Charles, " by detailing the course
he had pursued since he had been intrusted with the
reins of Government. He found the finances of the
Austrian monarchy exhausted by costly and unsuccessful
wars, in a state of insolvency, and the despondency of its
subjects at the lowest ebb. He arranged the marriage of
the Archduchess to give his country the first ascending
steps from the abyss of misfortune into which it had
fallen ; never intending, however, when existence and
power were again secured, that the marriage should
influence or direct the politics of the Cabinet of Vienna.
' I persevered in my course/ he added, ' and, deaf to the
G88 ARMISTICE OF PLESW1TZ.
CHAP, opinions and entreaties of a powerful party, I would not
IX stir. When the Eussians, in the pursuit of Napoleon's
IBIS, forces, were on the Merael, I told them they must come
to the Oder or the Elbe, before Austria would act. I
was universally suspected, and especially in England ; I
know it, and was not surprised at it ; but throughout I
had but one object in view — to raise my country, and,
through her ascendancy, give peace to the world. I know
the British Cabinet always suspected me, and I do not
wonder at it ; but I trust I shall now stand vindicated
in their eyes, and in that of posterity. I wish for nothing
so much as to establish the most cordial relations between
the two Courts, which I hope will be effected without
delay. The last letter from the Duke of Bassano (Maret)
began and ended in a most offensive tone, stating that
Austria had prostituted the character of a mediator, for
that to his certain knowledge she had been long in con-
cert with the Allies, but that, nevertheless, the extreme
desire of the Emperor for peace prompted him to make a
last effort to get some neutral point fixed on for negotia-
tions, even during the progress of hostilities. My deli-
isirChas. berate answer was, that the Allies would never refuse to
Stewart to
Lord Castle- listen to propositions for peace, provided England and
I7,ei8i3,ug' Sweden consented to them, and that they were founded
105'.' 'on the basis of the propositions of Austria of 16th
' "
May.'
The Austrian army was reviewed by the three Sove-
and're- reigns, now united at Schlan, six miles from Prague, on
Austrian e the 1 9th August. " It was," says Sir Charles Stewart,
August 19. " & sublime military spectacle. Ninty-one battalions of
infantry and fifty squadrons of cavalry defiled before
their Majesties. The battalions were on an average
about 800 strong, and the infantry amounted to some-
thing more than 70,000 men. The cavalry present did
not exceed 7000 ; the remainder of it and the light
troops, about 30,000 strong, were with the advanced-
guard, and were not inspected. The composition of this
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 689
army was magnificent, although I could easily perceive CHAP.
a great many recruits ; still the system that reigned IX-
throughout, and the military air that marked the sol- isia.
diers, especially the Hungarians, must ever fix it in my
mind as the finest army on the Continent. The Russians
may possess a more powerful soldiery, of greater physical
strength and hardihood, but they cannot equal the Aus-
trians in discipline or military air. The general officers
of the latter are a superior class, and the army has a fine
military tone in all its departments. To see one Aus-
trian or Hungarian regiment is to see their whole army,
for a complete equality and uniformity reign throughout ;
their movements were beautifully correct, and the troops
seemed in the most perfect order. Twenty-four squad-
rons of cuirassiers and sixteen of hussars were particularly
conspicuous. Among the former were the cuirassiers of
the Emperor, who were presented with new standards
on the occasion ; and the three Sovereigns, amidst loud
cheers from the troops, nailed in union their flags to the
poles in front of the army, in token of their firm
alliance. The enthusiasm of this moment exceeded all
power of description. The artillery seemed less well
appointed ; the waggons and horses for their guns and1Lond
trains were inferior to those of the Russians, whose artil- 107.
lery horses were perfect." * *
A great difficulty, however, existed in bringing even
part of this imposing force into the field, from the ex- Advance of
_ , • i .1 • money to
treme penury of the Austrian treasury, and the impossi- the AUS-
bility of its moving forward till from some extraneous LoTc^th-
source or another an immediate supply of money was o
tained. In this dilemma all eyes were, as a matter of
course, turned to England ; but there was no time to com-
* Although, however, the Austrians exhibited this imposing array at the
nemorable review, and the troops looked so well when marching past, yet
jreat part of them were raw recruits, little qualified to bear the fatigues or go
hrough the duties of a campaign ; and the Austrians really in the field during
he campaign which followed never exceeded 80,000 or 90,000 men, although
heir official reports gave out a much larger number.— Compare CATHCART,
95, with WILSON, ii. 86, 206.
VOL. I. 2 X
690 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, municate with London before hostilities commenced, and
IX- although Great Britain was bound bj a secret article of
the treaty of Reichenbach, already mentioned, to pay
Austria a subsidy of £1,000,000 sterling in the event of
her commencing hostilities, yet there was no fund instantly
available to make good that obligation. Lord Cathcart
and Sir Charles Stewart now did the most essential
service to the common cause by anticipating the decision
of the home Government. They instantly arranged with
Count Stadion for the immediate advance of half of the
stipulated subsidy upon Austria becoming a belligerent,
being £250,000, which they provided for by bills drawn
on the British treasury by them, which were discounted
at Berlin, and rendered instantly available. The effect
of this advance, much more considerable in those coun-
tries tnan tn^s' was mucn enhanced by the circum-
cLue S^ance °f kills appearing in circulation, drawn by the
, Aug. British ambassador on the treasury of their Government,
MS.; cath- and indorsed by the Austrian authorities — a practical
206.' indication of the union between the two Governments,
which went far to restore the Austrian credit.1
When Sir Charles Stewart arrived at Prague, he found
Difficulties the great difficulty was the appointment of a commander-
r- in-chief for the Allied army. That unity in design and
direction was indispensable, was evident to all ; but it
was not equally apparent in whom the supreme power
was to be vested. " The Emperor Alexander," says Sir
Charles, " nobly aspired to the supreme command ; his
personal intrepidity, perseverance, and firmness, entitle
him to great consideration in this respect ; and my im-
pression is, that had Austria consented to put the whole
Allied force under his command, there would have been
a unity of design productive of beneficial results. The
King of Prussia was not disinclined to this opinion ; and
the Emperor of Russia, with some assistance in the
council, and General Moreau to consult with, might have
been advantageously invested with the supreme command.
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 691
But Austria naturally wished, from the prominent part CHAP.
she had taken, and the important position she occupied, IX-
to be the arbiter of universal peace, and have the glory isis.
of her own work, and she was therefore desirous that an
Austrian should have the military command. A certain
degree of jealousy of Russia on political points operated
against her yielding to the Emperor's wishes, and, above
all, the arrival of Moreau at the Allied headquarters
created discontent among the Austrians, and was one of
the principal reasons why the command-in-chief was not
offered to the Emperor of Russia." Impressed with the
responsibility of his situation, and actuated by a noble
feeling of public duty, the Emperor Alexander consented
to forego the greatest object of his ambition, and the
command was bestowed on the Austrian Prince Sch war-1 Lend. 101.
tzenberg.1
Napoleon, on his side, before hostilities were renewed,
had a grand review of his troops around headquarters. French re-
It was originally designed for his fete-day, the 15th August, V1
on which, according to the custom of Catholic countries,
his birthday was held. But as it grew near the time, it
became evident to all that, at that time, they would be on
the verge of hostilities, and accordingly it took place on
the 10th August. Great pains were taken to give the
pageant even more than the splendour usual on such
occasions; and the number and appearance of the troops
certainly seemed to justify the confidence which the Em-
peror still had in his good fortune. The King of Saxony,
with his brother and nephew, assisted at the ceremony;
and Napoleon, surrounded by his marshals, and followed
by a brilliant staff, passed the line at the gallop, which
\vas drawn up in the plain of Ostra Gehege, near Dres-
ien. By his side was seen the white plume of Murat,
vhom the soldiers had so often followed to victory, and
vho at the Emperor's desire had come up from Naples Jf f'ftj^
o share in the triumphs which were approaching.2 The *vi'. 230.
foung and Old Guard, 48,000 strong, of whom 5000
692 ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ.
CHAP, were magnificent cavaliers, struck every one by the bril-
^ liancy of their uniforms and the precision of their move-
1813. ments.
When both parties were thus rapidly drifting into a
Reflections decisive contest, and their secret views are now so fully
conferences, known from their private correspondence, it is almost super-
fluous to refer to the state papers which were published
on either side to vindicate their conduct, which too often
justify the well-known words of Talleyrand, that the prin-
1 See Hist, cipal object of language is " to conceal the thought." ]
xiLE62K* In tne concluding manifestoes of this great debate, there
were, as is usual on such occasions, some truths brought
forward on both sides, and much suppressed. The Aus-
trians were right when they asserted that the French
Emperor had betrayed his determination to prosecute the
war by the critical and unfounded objections in point of
form which he had brought forward to postpone, till it was
too late, the opening of the negotiations ; and he was
equally right when he answered, that they had been since
February in secret communication with the Allied Powers,
and that the Cabinet of Vienna was determined on war
unless the terms of accommodation which they proposed
were acceded to by the French Emperor. This was all
true; but this was a part only of the case, and did not
touch its real merits. The manifestoes kept out of view
entirely the terms of peace which had been contended
for on either side, and the disagreement concerning which
had caused the conferences to be broken off. They did
not disclose that Austria had demanded only the restora-
tion of Prussia, the abandonment of the Grand Duchy of
Warsaw, the reconstruction of Prussia, the renunciation
of the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine,
and the cession of the Illyrian provinces ; and that the
negotiation broke off because Napoleon refused to give up
the Hanse towns or renounce that Protectorate. They
did not reveal that the terms offered by Austria, after
France had undergone a reverse unexampled in history,
ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. 693
left to Napoleon Belgium, Holland, and Italy, besides CHAP.
old France; that is, an empire more powerful than it
had entered into the imagination of Louis XIV. to con- 1813-
ceive. This was the real point at issue between the
parties. The war was renewed because Napoleon could
not bring himself to abandon the Hanse towns and the
title of Protector of the Rhenish Confederacy. Three
words, which he himself used, as expressing his determi-.
nation, revealed his whole policy from first to last —
" TOUT ou RIEN."
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH.
APR1 1962
DA Alison, (Sir) Archibald,
522 bart.
L8A6 Lives of Lord Castlereag
v.l and Sir Charles Stewart
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