16O H85L
Kowell
a,nd. -KhetJoric
in
62-19555
160 H85L
Ho-well $7-50
Logic and. Rtieiiorlc in England.,
13OO-17OO
MAIN
Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700
Logic and Rhetoric
in England, 1500-1700
By Wilbur Samuel Howell
iiimimmiifiiiiiii i nmiiiimiiiHimiiii
IllllllllllllllllllllllI 10
NEW TORK
RUSSELL & RUSSELL INC
1961
Copyright 1956, by Princeton University Press
L,C. Card 56-6646
PUBLISHED 1961 BY RUSSELL & RUSSELL, INC.
BY ARRANGEMENT WITH PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Printed in the United States of America
Preface
THIS book is intended as a chapter in the history of ideas.
Its particular purpose is to describe the ideas that English-
men of the Renaissance held towards their method of pro-
ducing discourses for the needs of their civilization. Politi-
cal, cultural, intellectual, and literary historians have repeatedly
interested themselves in the writings of the Renaissance, and have of
course considered those writings to be the basic evidence upon which
our own knowledge of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ulti-
mately depends. My history is devoted, not to another account of
the contents of those writings, but to a new interpretation of the
theories that governed their production. Thus I seek here to trace
historically the methods recognized by the Renaissance Englishman
as the laws of authorship.
In its widest sense, authorship means the profession of making
anything. In a narrower sense, it means the profession of producing
any kind of literary work, poetical or non-poetical, oral or written.
As I have just used the term in reference to the subject of this book,
it means the profession of producing written or oral works of the
non-poetical kind. In other words, I am not here endeavoring to
give an account of the theories governing the production of Renais-
sance poetry, fiction, and drama j I am confining myself instead, for
reasons set forth in Chapter i of this book, to theories that govern
arguments, expositions, lectures, speeches, letters, and sermons. In
the Renaissance these latter discourses were produced in accordance
with the principles that made up the disciplines of logic and rhetoric.
The chief treatises on logic and rhetoric in England between 1500
and 1700 have therefore become the primary data of my present
history. I have tried to examine all of these data, I have sought to
classify them into families, to describe their general characteristics,
to identify their authors, to inquire into their origins, to indicate the
presuppositions upon which they rest, and to interpret them as part
of a social, political, intellectual, and religious context.
If the Renaissance may be considered the period which witnessed
at one and the same time the death of medievalism and the first be-
ginnings of modernism, then all ideas in that period become of
special interest, so far at least as they give us the opportunity to see
in them their ancient and their new aspects, ranged side by side as
for comparison and thus made capable of telling us more about the
7' SO 6^1U553 t v 1
PREFACE
nature of the old and the new than either one by itself had ever
been able to do before or would ever be able to do again. Certainly
the Renaissance ideas about logic and rhetoric exhibit the tendency
to illuminate the basic nature of ancient and modern thought. Thus
the history of these ideas may help us to see what classical rhetoric
and logic had come to mean at the time of the Renaissance ; what
the world which these two arts served had come to be; and why that
world had acquired new responsibilities which in turn demanded
changes in the orientation of these two arts. From this history we
can hope to derive a better understanding of the theories of com-
munication in our twentieth-century world, and perhaps a deeper
respect for the classical theories which governed western European
civilization from the age of Pericles to that of William and Mary.
This book contains traces of my previous attempts to tell the story
of English rhetoric. For example, a condensed account of the subject
dealt with below in Chapter 3 appeared under the title, "English
Backgrounds of Rhetoric,' 7 in History of Speech Education in Amer-
ica: Background Studies (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
1954), a volume published under the auspices of the Speech Asso-
ciation of America. I prepared the condensed account shortly before
I began to write Chapter 3. Thus it -was perhaps inevitable that both
versions would be similar in respect to many details of organization
and wording. At any rate, such similarities will be found to exist. I
should like to say, however, that Chapter 3 aims to cover the subject
of traditional rhetoric much more thoroughly than I was able to do
in the condensed account. I should also like to say, in acknowledging
some points of similarity between Chapter 4 and an essay of mine
entitled "Ramus and English Rhetoric: 1574-1 681" (The Quarterly
Journal of Speech, xxxvn, 299-310), that Chapter 4 is intended to
do thoroughly what I briefly outlined in that essay.
In the preparation of this book I have received many forms of
assistance, and I should like in gratitude to acknowledge them now.
The Trustees of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
granted me a Fellowship in the academic year 1948-1949 for re-
search in the field of English and American rhetorical and poetic
theory. As a result of that Fellowship, and of a sabbatical leave
simultaneously awarded me by the Trustees of Princeton Univer-
sity, I was able to complete my study of rhetoric and poetics in the
English Renaissance, and to make real progress in the study of Ren-
aissance logic. These studies were conducted chiefly at the Bodleian
PREFACE
Library, the British Museum, and the Huntington Library. Two
years thereafter, the Trustees of the Huntington Library awarded
me a Fellowship for a year of residence and study at that incom-
parable institution. At the same time, the University Research Com-
mittee of Princeton University granted me funds to help me defray
living expenses in California during my tenure as Fellow at the
Huntington Library. This latter arrangement, and the others pre-
viously mentioned, were greatly facilitated by the warm and effec-
tive support of the late Donald A. Stauffer, Chairman of the De-
partment of English at Princeton University. To him I shall always
owe a particular debt of gratitude. I also owe a particular debt of
gratitude to Godfrey Davies, Chairman of the Research Group of
the Huntington Library, who believed in the worth of this project
and helped to arrange the Huntington Fellowship that permitted me
to do much of the actual writing of this book. In addition, I wish to
offer thankful acknowledgment to the Princeton University Research
Fund for two subsidies guaranteeing the transcription and publica-
tion of my manuscript j to Mrs. Miriam T. Winterbottom for her
aid in typing the manuscript and reading proof j to Benjamin F.
Houston of Princeton University Press for his helpful assistance in
interpreting the manuscript to the printer and in working out effi-
cient editorial procedures 5 and to Lane Cooper, Harry Caplan,
Herbert A. Wichelns, Charles G. Osgood, and Whitney J. Gates
for various kinds of support and encouragement. Finally, I should
like to thank my wife for her affectionate help in all stages of this
endeavor.
WILBUR SAMUEL HOWELL
[ vii ]
Contents
PREFACE v
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
CHAPTER 2. SCHOLASTIC LOGIC 12
I. THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON 12
II. BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM 32
III. WITCRAFT 57
CHAPTER 3. TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE
PATTERNS 64
I. ORIGIN AND BOUNDARIES 64
II. THE FIVE GREAT ARTS 66
III. THE RHETORIC OF STYLE Il6
IV. MODELS FOR IMITATION 138
CHAPTER 4. THE ENGLISH RAMISTS 146
I. RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC 146
II. RAMUS ? S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND 173
III... RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND 247
CHAPTER 5. COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND
NEO-CICERONIANS 282
I. MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS 282
II. THE REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS 318
CHAPTER 6. NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC 342
I. DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS 342
II. BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL 364
INDEX 399
Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
ED, conceived today as the science of validity of thought, and
he term for the canons and criteria that explain trustworthy
inferences, was in the English Renaissance a theory not so
much of thought as of statement. For all practical purposes 3
the distinction between thoughts and statements is not a very real
distinction, since the latter are merely the reflection of the former,
and the former cannot be examined without recourse to the latter.
But what distinction there is consists in a differentiation between
mental phenomena and linguistic phenomena, the assumption being
that the thing to which either set of phenomena refers is reality
itself. Logicians of the twentieth century are primarily interested in
mental phenomena as an interpretation of the realities of man's en-
vironment, and in that part of mental phenomena which we call
valid or invalid inference. Logicians of the English Renaissance
were primarily interested in statements as a reflection of man's in-
ferences, and in the problem of the valid and invalid statement.
Thus Renaissance logic concerned itself chiefly with the statements
made by men in their efforts to achieve a valid verbalization of
reality. Since such statements were the work of scholars and scien-
tists, not of laymen, Renaissance logic founded itself upon scholarly
and scientific discourse and was in fact the theory of communication
in the world of learning. The data upon which this theory rested
were all learned tractates of that and earlier times. The theory itself
attempted on the one hand to explain the nature of these tractates,
as to language, sentence structure, and organization, and on the
other to offer assistance to the learner in his effort to master learned
communication, as part of his entrance fee to the scientific and philo-
sophical world.
Rhetoric, popularly taken today as a term for the sort of style
you happen personally to dislike, was less subjectively construed in
England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Rhetoric
was then regarded as the theory behind the statements intended for
the populace. Since the populace consisted of laymen, or of people
not learned in the subject being treated by a speaker or writer, and
since the speaker or writer by his very office was to some extent a
master of the real technicalities of his subject, rhetoric was regarded
[ 3 ]
INTRODUCTION
as the theory of communication between the learned and the lay
world or between expert and layman. Over and over again in logical
and rhetorical treatises of the English Renaissance, logic is com-
pared to the closed fist and rhetoric to the open hand, this metaphor
being borrowed from Zeno through Cicero and Quintilian to ex-
plain the preoccupation of logic with the tight discourses of the phi-
losopher, and the preoccupation of rhetoric with the more open dis-
courses of orator and popularizer. The fact that this metaphor gives
both arts the same flesh and blood, the same defensive and offensive
function, and the same skeletal structure, is merely an indication of
the conviction of Renaissance learning that logic and rhetoric are
the two great arts of communication, and that the complete theory
of communication is largely identified, not with one, not with the
other, but with both.
There was one important aspect of communication, however,
which logic and rhetoric did not seek fully to explain or to teach
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That aspect was con-
cerned with what we might call poetic, as opposed to scientific or
popular discourse. Englishmen of these two centuries did not waste
their time in the vain effort to deny to poetry a primarily communi-
cative function. Nor had the science of aesthetics yet been invented
to insulate poetry from any contact with logic and rhetoric. Instead,
poetry was considered to be the third great form of communication,
open and popular but not fully explained by rhetoric, concise and
lean but not fully explained by logic. So far as critics of that time
postulated a difference between poetry, on the one hand, and logical
and rhetorical discourse, on the other, their thinking might be de-
scribed by saying that the two latter kinds of discourse were respec-
tively considered to be closed and open, according to Zeno's analogy,
whereas the former was regarded as having both characteristics at
once. That is, poetry was thought to be a form of communication
which, because it habitually used the medium of story and character-
ization, spoke two simultaneous languages, one in terms of a, plot
simple enough to hold children from play, and the other in terms of
a humanistic meaning so subtle and complex that it held old men
from the chimney corner.
The difference between the figurative and the literal statement
might be said to be a partial clue to the distinction drawn by Renais-
sance critics between poetry and its two companion forms, but this
distinction meant, of course, that rhetorical and logical discourse in
[ 4 ]
INTRODUCTION
being declared literal was not therefore denied the resources of fig-
urative language. Figurative language was considered rather to be a
means of carrying out a literal as well as a figurative intention, and
thus the figures of speech were part of the machinery of scientific,
of popular, and of poetic discourse, and were assigned formally and
without equivocation to rhetoric during the Renaissance. Again, the
difference between the feigned history and the real history, between
fiction and fact, might be said to be a partial clue to the difference
between poetry and the other two branches of discourse, but again
this distinction meant history to be broadly representative of scien-
tific and popular discourse in its desire to be at once exact and popu-
lar, whereas feigned history or fiction, whether in prose or verse,
was broadly representative of poetic discourse in its desire to convey
meaning through indications of story and character. Still again, the
difference between the imitative and non-imitative discourse was in
part the distinction between poetry and its two companion forms,
but this distinction meant that the imitation of life as proposed by
poetry was in reality an attempt to create in language a posture of
imagined affairs to convey significance about an observer's awareness
of analogous postures in his own real affairs, whereas nonimitative
discourse dealt directly with real affairs without the intrusion of the
imagined postures.
Although poetry must be accepted as part of the communicative
structure of the Renaissance world, and although the theory of poetry
underwent changes between 1500 and 1700, it is not my present pur-
pose to deal with it. I propose instead to describe what happened in
those years to logic and rhetoric in England. The great change which
occurred in poetical theory in the Renaissance was that the value of
the new poetry was asserted more and more warmly and with in-
creasing effect. In other words, poetics more and more warmly sanc-
tioned as valid art those works which achieved their effect without
necessarily imitating in close fashion the subject matter, the themes,
and the metrical patterns of the ancient world of Homer and Virgil,
This change had its parallel in logic, where the interest in general
accumulated wisdom as the starting point for man's thinking about
his world was gradually lost, and an interest in direct observation of
reality as the starting point was gradually established. Meanwhile,
a similar change was taking place in rhetoric, as men lost faith in
ancient devices for finding arguments ready made in systems of com-
monplaces or accepted opinions and came more and more to accept
[ 5 ]
INTRODUCTION
the necessity for a direct and exhaustive study of the individual case
as the best means of finding arguments that would have a lasting
effect upon the hearer. But these parallel changes in poetical theory
and its companion disciplines, while indicative that a great cultural
revolution like the Renaissance will have similar effects in similar
fields of learning, do not provide a satisfactory historical pattern for
a close examination of Renaissance logic and rhetoric. The historical
pattern so far as logic and rhetoric are concerned is best described as
that in which there was at first an accepted tradition, then *. reform,
then a counterreform, and finally a resultant new tradition. Since
poetical theory in the Renaissance does not exhibit this pattern, ex-
cept in some degree, a treatment of it in connection with logic and
rhetoric might force it to assume an unwarrantable configuration
without gaining any compensating advantage save that of a more
direct appeal to literary scholars than may be possible in a work de-
voted exclusively to a chapter in the history of the theory of non-
poetical communication.
The accepted tradition in English logic during the first seventy
years of the sixteenth century is best described by saying that the
logical treatises of Aristotle, as construed by commentators of the
ancient pagan world and by their Christian and Mohammedan suc-
cessors, were the ruling authorities. Scholastic logic is the term given
to this tradition by historians of logic who lived in the period covered
by the present study, and I shall use this term as they used it. Scho-
lastic logic has a continuous history in England between the age of
Alcuin, first English logician, and the middle of the sixteenth cen-
tury, when this subj.ect was given a representative treatment in the
Latin language by John Seton and its first treatment in the English
language by Thomas Wilson and Ralph Lever. To this logic I shall
devote the second chapter of this book.
During the period in which scholastic logic was in the ascendancy
in England, rhetorical theory in that country is perhaps best termed
traditional. This traditional rhetoric is made up of three distinct pat-
terns, unified as to basic concepts and ultimate origin, but diverse
as to points of emphasis. These three patterns will be the subject of
my third chapter*
The first of these patterns I shall call the Ciceronian, Ciceronian
rhetoric exists wherever rhetoric is made to consist of all or most of
the five operations anciently assigned to it -by Cicero and Quintilian,
these five operations being designated as invention, arrangement,
INTRODUCTION
style, memory, and delivery. These five operations were first identi-
fied with English rhetorical learning by Alcuin, who wrote a Latin
version of Ciceronian rhetoric in the late eighth century. At the
middle of the sixteenth century, Ciceronian rhetoric, which had al-
ready been converted in part into the English language, received a
full-length treatment in that medium by Thomas Wilson, shortly
after he wrote the first English version of scholastic logic. Thus Wil-
son like Alcuin will play a dual role in my present story.
The second pattern of traditional rhetoric I shall call the stylistic.
Stylistic rhetoric is committed to all of the five operations just enu-
merated, but it chooses to select the third, style, for treatment. Sty-
listic rhetoric begins in English learning with the Venerable Bede,
whose Liber de Schematibus et Tropis, written at the beginning of
the eighth century, deals in Latin with an important part of the
Ciceronian theory of oratorical style. From that date until the i68o's,
this form of rhetorical learning had its adherents in England, the
later ones of whom converted the doctrine of the tropes and the
figures into English, as Wilson had done with scholastic logic and
Ciceronian rhetoric.
The third pattern of traditional rhetoric I shall call the formulary.
Formulary rhetoric was designed to foster the five operations which
Ciceronian rhetoric made essential parts of the training of speakers
and writers, but it carried out this purpose, not by the study of pre-
cepts, but by the study of examples. The first full-grown formulary
rhetoric to be written in English was produced in 1563 by Richard
Rainolde, and to this treatise we shall turn later when we deal with
formulary rhetoric in connection with the whole subject of tradi-
tional rhetoric in England before 1570.
A revolt against scholastic logic and traditional rhetoric occurred
in England between 1574 and 1600. This revolt was based upon the
educational reforms of the celebrated Frenchman, Pierre de la Ra-
mee, better known by his Latin name Petrus (or Peter) Ramus. An
earlier revolt against scholastic logic, that of Ramon Lull in the
thirteenth century, had considerable vogue on the European conti-
nent during the fifteen-hundreds, but it appears not to have influ-
enced Englishmen to any extent, whereas Ramus dominated English
logic in the late sixteenth century and held an English following of
some importance during most of the seventeenth century* Ramus's
revolt against scholasticism and tradition resulted in a logic and a
rhetoric that may be called Ramistic. Ramistic logic was the work of
[ 7 1
INTRODUCTION
Ramus himself, and thus it deserves to bear his name and no other.
His colleague, Omer Talon, or Audomarus Talaeus, was author of
the rhetorical system that carries out the Ramistic reform of that
branch of the liberal arts, and thus Ramistic rhetoric, as a body of
doctrine examined in the present study, has to be understood as hav-
ing a double authorship. Ramistic logic and rhetoric will be dis-
cussed together in the fourth chapter of the present study.
My fifth chapter will deal with the Systematics, This term occurs
in a brief history of logic written early in the seventeenth century
where it refers to that movement which sought to restore scholasti-
cism without ignoring the validity of some of Ramus's reforms. The
Systematics were influential during a large part of the seventeenth
century, even if they did not succeed in terminating the vogue of
Ramus in England. Their logic was written for the most part in
Latin, although there is one good example of it in English, It had
its minor branches, as one of its advocates took occasion to differ
with another, but by and large it sought to occupy middle ground
between scholastic and Ramistic logic.
While the Systematics were endeavoring to establish a reformed
scholasticism in logic, a corresponding movement in English rhetoric
can be observed. This movement will also be discussed in my fifth
chapter, and I shall call its authors the Neo-Ciceronians. Neo-Cice-
ronian rhetoric was the result of an attempt to restore the earlier tra-
ditional rhetoric without ignoring some of the reforms proposed by
Ramus. As the earlier traditional rhetoric had three distinct patterns,
so did Neo-Ciceronian rhetoric, and I shall deal with them severally
in Chapter 5.
Towards the end of the seventeenth century, a logic emerged
which was critical not only of the Systematics but also of the Ramists.
This logic found its first expression in English when the famous
Port-Royal Logic was published in an English version in 1685, al-
though three Latin editions of that work had already been published
by that time in England and had already made English learning
aware of what was to become a new tradition in logical theory. The
Port-Royal Logic was still being published in English versions and
used in English universities as late as the 1870*8, and thus it may
serve to illustrate accepted English thinking on this subject up to the
time of John Stuart Mill's System of Logic. At any rate, The Port-
Royal Logic is the most modern of logics produced in the seven-
[ 8 ]
INTRODUCTION
teenth century, and to it I shall devote a considerable part of my
sixth chapter.
That sixth chapter will also be concerned with those developments
in the seventeenth century which pointed towards a new rhetoric.
The first of these developments occurred early in the century with
the publication of Bacon's Advancement of Learning. This remark-
able work, which influenced English learning of the seventeenth
century as did no other contemporary work, contained some ideas on
rhetoric which were in opposition not only to Ramistic theory but
also to the traditional rhetoric of the early Renaissance. This oppo-
sition grew as the seventeenth century advanced. The Royal Society,
which carried out scientific investigations in the manner proposed by
Bacon, and which was to some extent the finest result of Bacon's
pioneering thought, had finally to develop a system of communica-
tion suited to the transfer of information from one scientist to an-
other, and from scientist to public, and the rhetorical theory which
underlies that system is a step towards the creation of a new rhetoric.
Other developments of the same sort occurred later in the century,
and they will be noticed as the sixth chapter unfolds.
As I have indicated already, the theory of communication as ex-
pressed in logic and rhetoric was throughout the Renaissance a re-
sponse to the communicative needs of English society of that time,
and thus it is not to be considered in a vacuum, but in complex rela-
tion to the culture surrounding it. Ramon Lull made his celebrated
attack on Aristotelian logic during the thirteenth century because he
wanted to convert Mohammedans to Christianity, not by the sword
but by the syllogism, and he conceived of Aristotelian logic as too
complex for that purpose. Ramus's attack on scholasticism and tradi-
tional rhetoric was motivated also by his desire to simplify overly
complex instruments. Both of these reformers were articulating mis-
givings which the society around them shared, and both were seek-
ing to bring learning into a closer relation with the practical needs
which it exists to satisfy. So it always is. A theory of communication
is an organic part of a culture. As the culture changes, so will the
theory change. The scholastic logic and the traditional rhetoric of
the early sixteenth century were an expression of late medieval times,
and were suited to those times. Had those times continued without
change, scholastic logic and traditional rhetoric would not have come
under attack by the Ramists, and would not have emerged from the
collision with Ramism as modified versions of their former selves.
[ 9 1
INTRODUCTION
Had the seventeenth century remained static to the end, The Port-
Royal Logic and the new rhetoric would not have emerged to rival
and at length to supplant Neo-Ciceronian rhetoric and the logic of
the Systematics.
The forces at work to change the theory of communication during
the English Renaissance may be indicated briefly. One force de-
veloped as men came to see that the old deductive sciences could not
offer a sufficient explanation of a world discovered through observa-
tion of nature, and thus it came about, not that logic changed from
an emphasis on deduction to an emphasis on induction, but that con-
crete descriptions of reality came to be admitted to the status of sci-
ences alongside the older generalizations of moralist and theologian.
Those concrete descriptions of reality did not have a ready-made
vocabulary in which to express themselves, and could not fully utilize
the ready-made vocabulary constructed from the ten categories of
scholastic logic. Thus scholastic logic began to fail as a guide to
learned communication, and the reformers began to move in.
Another force developed as the stable aristocracy of the late medi-
eval world began to lose its political power, and the middle class be-
gan to assert its authority. That aristocracy did not have to conciliate
the commoners whenever a crisis developed in political life. Instead,
the commoners had at all times to conciliate the aristocrats, and thus
stylistic rhetoric, which taught that the everyday pattern of speech
must be avoided at all costs in formal discourse, and the unusual pat-
tern adopted, was a perfect expression of the middle period of the
sixteenth century. But England of the seventeenth century beheaded
one king and deposed another, with the result that, by 1688, the
middle class had established itself as a powerful force 5 and the new
rhetoric had to abandon the unusual pattern of speech that would
delight the aristocrat, and to teach the everyday pattern that would
convince the commoner. Thus a new political structure made an old
theory of 1 popular appeal unworkable, and again the reformers
moved in.
A third force came from the Reformation. The Catholic world
of the Middle Ages was bound together by a system of agreements
that made it necessary for a speaker to proceed only so far as to link
a given proposal to those agreements. Thus the old rhetoric of the
commonplaces the old rhetoric which defined invention less as the
discovery of something new than as the recalling of the proper ele-
ment among the old was admirably suited to such a stable world.
[ 10 ]
INTRODUCTION
But the Reformation brought many of the old agreements under de-
bate, and created many doubts where only a few had existed before.
Ramus, himself a convert to Protestantism, simplified scholastic logic
and traditional rhetoric in order to sharpen the tools which an age of
controversy had to use. Then Protestantism itself began to lose its
solid structure and to disintegrate into an established church and the
sects. Preachers in the sects often had great fervor and no training.
Preachers in the established church often had great training and no
fervor. Congregations began to drift towards the sects. Thus the
rhetoric of the tropes and figures, the rhetoric which had sought to
say things in unusual ways in order to persuade, found itself failing
to convince the people that religious belief was a serious matter. Thus
preachers in the established church began to question the elaborate
rhetoric of style, as Fenelon questioned it in seventeenth-century
France and as Glanvill did in seventeenth-century England. And out
of their questioning emerged a new theory of communication as be-
tween preacher and layman, quite harmonious in its basic purpose
with the new political rhetoric and the new logic of the learned world.
CHAPTER 2
Scholastic Logic
I. Thomas Wilson's Rule of Reason
THE first logic that Englishmen could read in their own
native language was "Imprinted at London by Richard
Graf ton, printer to the Kynges Maiestie" in the year 1551,
and bore the title, The rule of Reason, conteinyng the Arte
of Logique, set forth in EngUshe. Its author, Thomas Wilson, was
well prepared for his pioneering task. He had taken his degree as
bachelor of arts at King's College, Cambridge, in 1 545~4-6, and had
studied Greek under Sir John Cheke of King's on his way to the
master's degree conferred upon him in 1549. Since the first edition of
the Rule of Reason appeared only three years after he took the latter
degree, the work was probably in the process of composition during
his maturer years at Cambridge. He implies as much, at any rate, in
the prefatory letter which dedicates the Rule of Reason to his sov-
ereign, the young king Edward VI. There he refers to his work as
"parte of suche fruictes as haue growne in a poore studentes gardin." 1
So far as the Rule of Reason is concerned, those fruits were the har-
vest of Wilson's logical studies at Cambridge and of his reading of
the six treatises that make up what has been called since the fifteenth
century the Organon of Aristotle. 2 Wilson's ability in Greek was
later shown in his translation of seven orations of Demosthenes,
which, as the earliest English version of that author, is deemed to
have attained "a high level of scholarship." 3 The Rule of Reason
1 Rule of Reason (London, 1551), sig. Azv.
2 These six treatises are usually given the following- Latin and English titles: i) Gate-
goriae^ that is The Categories (or The Predicaments) 3 2) De Interpretation or Peri-
hermeniae^ that is, On Interpretation-^ 3) Analytica Prior a^ that is, The Prior Analytics
(or Concerning Syllogism) ; 4) Analytica Posteriora, that is, The Posterior Analytics (or
Concerning Demonstration) ; 5) To^ica^ that is, The Topics \ and 6) De So$histicis
Elenchis, that is, The Sophistical ElenchL Excellent translations of these treatises are to
be found in The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford,
192$), i. See also Octavius Freire Owen, The Organon^ or Logical Treatises, of Aris-
totle. With the Introduction of Porphyry. Literally Translated, with Notes, Syllogistic
Exam-pies, Analysis^ and Introduction (Bonn's Classical Library, London, 1853).
3 Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Wilson, Thomas (i525?-i58i). This trans-
lation of Demosthenes bears the following- title and colophon: "The three Orations of
Demosthenes chiefe Orator among the Grecians, in fauour of the Olynthians, a people
in Thracia, now called Romania: with those his fovver Orations titled expressely & by
name against king Philip of Macedonie ... By Thomas Wylson Doctor of the ciuill
lavves. Imprinted at London by Henrie Denham . . . Anno Domini 1570."
f 12 ]
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
is not a translation of Aristotle's Organon. But it is an attempt to
render into English the main concepts and terms of the Organon, as
those concepts and terms had come to be understood in the Renais-
sance ; and it too is of good quality as a work of learning.
Richard Grafton, the printer of the Rule of Reason, was one of
those who sought to encourage Wilson in writing it. Grafton had
previously interested himself in such pioneering ventures as the dis-
tribution of Coverdale's English Bible and the publication of the first
Book of Common Prayer. 4 Wilson himself mentions in the dedica-
tory epistle of the Rule of Reason that Grafton had not only pro-
voked him to create an English logic, but had done him services
during his student days and at various later times.
That dedicatory epistle is full of the elation of the man who sees
himself as the founder of a tradition. My work, he tells the king,
represents an attempt "to ioyne an acquaintaunce betwiene Logique,
and my countrymen, from the whiche they haue bene hetherto
barred, by tongues unacquaynted." 5 He wants the king to respect
his labor in bringing so noble a mystery into so noble a country. He
stresses, however, that he does not regard himself as a cunning logi-
cian 5 "but because no Englishman untill now hath gone through
with this enterprise, I haue thought mete to declare that it maie be
done." He adds: "And yet herein I professe to be but as a spurre or
a whet stone, to sharpe the pennes of someother, that they may
polishe, and perfect, that I haue rudely and grossely entered."*
Earlier in the letter he speaks of the effect he hopes his treatise
will have, and he lays stress upon his patriotic motive:
This fruict being of a straunge kynde (such as no Englishe grounde
hath before this time, and in this sorte by any tyllage brought forth,)
maie perhaps at the first tasting, seme somewhat rough, and harshe
in the mouth, because of the straungenesse : but after a litle use, and
familiar accustomyng thereunto, I doubt not but thesame wil waxe
euery one daie more pleasaunt then other. But in simple and plaine
woordes to declare unto your Maiestie, wherein my witt and earnest
endeuour hath at this season trauailed: I haue assaied through my
diligence to make Logique as familiar to Thenglishe man, as by
diuerse mennes industries the most parte of the other the liberall
Sciences are. 7
4 Dictionary of National Biography > s.v. Grafton, Richard (d. 1572?).
6 Rule of Reason^ sig. A3v-A4.r. 6 Ibid., sig. A4.V.
7 Ibid., sig, Azv-Asr.
[ 13 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
The liberal sciences were, o course, the seven liberal arts, within
which early Renaissance learning was enclosed, so far as most of the
formal curriculum of school and university was concerned. Shortly
after Wilson begins to expound logic, he interrupts himself for a
moment to insert what he calls "A brief declaration in meter, of the
vii, liberal artes, wherin Logique is comprehended as one of theim,"
and these verses are of interest as showing the stress placed upon the
mastery of communication in the educational program of the six-
teenth century:
Grammer dothe teache to vtter vvordes.
To speake bothe apt and playne,
Logique by art settes forth the truth.
And doth tel vs what is vayne.
Rethorique at large paintes vvel the cause,
And makes that seme right gay,
Vvhiche Logique spake but at a worde,
And taught as by the way.
Musicke with tunes, delites the eare,
And makes vs thinke it heauen,
Arithmetique by number can make
Reconinges to be eauen.
Geometry thinges thicke and brode,
Measures by Line and Square,
Astronomy by sterres doth tel,
Of foule and else of fayre. 8
Perhaps Wilson has a figurative intention in assigning two lines
of these verses to each one of the liberal arts except rhetoric, which
in tribute to its largeness of wordage is given four. At any rate, when
he comes soon after to speak of the accepted difference between log-
ical and rhetorical discourse, he makes the two disagree only in re-
spect to economy of words. He observes:
Bothe these Artes are much like sauing that Logique is occupied
aboute all matters, and doeth playnly and nakedly setfurthe with apt
wordes the summe of thinges by the way of Argumentacion. Againe
of the other side Rethorique useth gay paincted Sentences, and setteth
forth those matters with fresh colours and goodly ornamentes, and
that at large. Insomuche, that Zeno beyng asked the difference be-
twene Logique and Rethorique, made answere by Demonstration of
8 Ibid.) sig. Bzr.
[ 14 ]
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
his Hande, declaring that when his hande was closed, it resembled
Logique, when it was open and stretched out, it was like Rethorique. 9
Scholastic logic as a system of precepts for the teaching of learned
communication had come during the sixteenth century to divide itself
into two procedures, one of which was called invention and the other,
judgment or disposition. Invention, or inventio as it was expressed in
Latin, consisted of the methods by which debatable propositions
could be analyzed to determine what could be said for or against
them. Judgment or disposition, termed iuMcium in Latin, consisted
in methods of arranging words into propositions, propositions into
syllogisms or inductions, and syllogisms or inductions into whole dis-
courses. Taken together, these two procedures constituted a ma-
chinery of analysis and synthesis on the level of language a ma-
chinery for assembling materials to prove the truth of an assertion
and for combining those materials into complex discourses. Actually
these two procedures are the organizing principle of Aristotle's
Topics, where seven books are devoted to the processes of analyzing
dialectical propositions, and the eighth book, to the process of cbm-
bining and using them. The same two procedures, with invention
again outranking disposition in the amount of space assigned to it,
were the structural members of Cicero's Topics, the treatise which
the Roman orator intended as a digest of Aristotle's similar work. 10
Boethius also recognized these procedures in his De Diferentiis
Topicis as the two parts of ancient Aristotelian logic. 11 Thereafter,
examples of this particular interpretation of Aristotle and Cicero are
a common feature of logical theory. Hugh of St. Victor and John of
Salisbury conceive of logic as having these two parts, 12 and their
opinions were in turn widely respected by later scholastics.
But so far as Thomas Wilson's generation is concerned, the chief
authority for this bipartite division of logic was Rudolph Agricola.
9 Ibid., sig. Bar-Bsv. The comparison of dialectic to the closed fist and rhetoric to
the open hand was attributed to Zeno of Citium, founder of Stoicism, by Cicero
(Orator, 32.113, and De Finibus, 2.6.17), and later by Quintilian (Institutio Oratoria t
2.20.7) and by Sextus Ernpiricus (Adversus Matkematicos y 1.7). For a discussion of
various appearances of this analogy in the Renaissance, see Wilbur S. Howell, "Nathaniel
Carpenter's Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric," Speech Mono-
gra$hs^ I (1934)* 30-41.
10 Cicero, Topics, 1-8.
11 For a convenient reprint of this work of Boethius, see J.-P. Migne, P&trologla
Latina (Paris, 1844-1905), LXiv, 1173. Boethius's words are: "Omnis ratio disserendi,
quam logicen Peripatetic! veteres appellavere, in duas distributor partes, unam in-
veniendi, alteram judicandi."
12 See Charles Sears Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (New York, 1928), pp.
154, 156 note 1 6, 164.
[ 15 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
Agricola, who lived between 1443 and 1485, was professor of phi-
losophy at Heidelberg in his later years. According to his biogra-
phers, he saw Erasmus when the latter was only ten years of age, and
he predicted the child's future greatness. 18 Agricola is considered a
major figure in the learned world of the early Renaissance. His most
influential work, written during the fourteen-seventies or eighties, is
called De Indentions Dialectics. It stresses invention and judgment
as the two parts of logic j 1 * it follows Aristotle and Cicero in pre-
ferring invention to judgment as the subject for detailed and sys-
tematic treatment j and it certainly was instrumental in inducing
logicians of the sixteenth century to adopt Aristotle's Topics rather
than other treatises of the Organon.'a.s guide to the main divisions of
logical theory. Wilson is merely reflecting the influence of Agricola
when he begins his Rule of Reason with the following definitions of
the two parts of logic:
The first parte standeth in framing of thinges aptlye together, in knit-
ting woordes, for the purpose accordingly, and in Latin is called
ludicium. The second parte consisteth in finding out matter, and
searching stuffe agreable to the cause, and in Latine is called Inuentio**
Cicero's Topics^ as an authoritative Latin interpretation of Aris-
totle's parallel treatise, was of course a work on dialectic rather than
logic. In Aristotle's Organon, dialectic is that branch of logic which
"reasons from opinions that are generally accepted" 16 in matters
where strict scientific demonstration is not applicable as an instru-
ment in the quest for truth. In other words, Aristotle made dialectic
a kind of logic of opinion, whereas rigid demonstration was the logic
of science. But of course the method used in determining what the
best opinion may be in a given case resembled the method used in
13 Biogra'phte Universelle, Ancienne et Moderne y s.v. Agricola, Rodolphe j Nowvelle
Biographie Generate^ s.v. Agricola, Rodophe.
14 See Rodol-phi A gricolae Phrisij^ de inuentiona dialectica libri tres^ cum scholijs
Icannis Mattkaei Phrissemij (Parisiis: Apud SImonem Colinaeum, 1538), pp. 7, 93, 149,
39 J -39 2 - This work was published many times at continental presses during the six-
teenth century. A copy of one of the earliest editions, Rodotyhi A gricole Phrisij Dialec-
tica (Louanii: In aedibus T. .Martini, 1515), is at the British Museum. Other editions
appeared at the following places: Cologne, 1518, 1520, 1523, 1527, 1528, 1535, 1538,
I 539> 154-2* iS43 *548 1552, i557> 1563? i570> *579i Strasbourg, 15215 Paris, 1529,
\533y *534> ^535> *53 8 3 *54 2 > *554> *558> Venice, 1559. An Italian version was pub-
lished at Venice in 1567.
15 Rule cf Reason^ sig. Bir.
16 Aristotle, Topica, ioo a 30. Translation by W. A. Packard-Cambridge in The
Works of Aristotle, ed. Ross, I. For an instructive account of Aristotle's distinction be-
tween logic and dialectic, see Owen, The Organon^ n, 357-359.
[ 16 ]
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
determining truth in science, and thus dialectic and logic were differ-
entiated by Aristotle rather in field of application than in basic in-
ternal structure. To scholastic logic, however, this Aristotelian dis-
tinction between dialectic and logic tended to vanish altogether, espe-
cially among those logicians who made logic consist of the procedures
of invention and judgment as anciently assigned to dialectic. Thus
it is not surprising that Wilson identifies dialectic with logic. He does
this, not as one who considered the identification a matter of con-
troversy in the learned world, but as one who considered the identi-
fication acceptable to everyone. In fact, he does it in an aside, when
he is discoursing upon the distinction between logic and sophistry:
Logique otherwise called Dialecte (for they are bothe one) is an Arte
to try the corne from the chaffe, the truthe from euery falshed, by
defining the nature of any thing, by diuiding the same, and also by
knitting together true Argumentes and untwining all knotty Sub-
tiltees that are bothe false, and wrongfully framed together. 17
The next major topic in Wilson's Rule of Reason, and a major
topic in the whole corpus of scholastic logic, is that of the predicables,
otherwise called "the fiue common words." 18 These five common
words are terms for the five predicates that propositions have, not in
a grammatical but in a scientific sense. That is to say, any statement
qualifies for admission into learning when it can be classified as a
statement of genus, of species, of difference, of property, or of acci-
dent. A statement that cannot be so classified may be true and helpful,
but it is not a proper scientific statement, and thus it cannot be given
status in the world of science.
These five terms are probably as unfamiliar to the modern mind as
they were in Wilson's day to Englishmen who knew no Latin. But
Latin scholars of the sixteenth century would have recognized these
five words as a development of four of the main terms in Aristotle's
Topics. All dialectical propositions, in Aristotle's view, are proposi-
tions of accident, of genus, of property, or of definition. Since defini-
tion involves mention of the differences between the thing being
defined and other species of the same genus, 19 we can see how Aris-
totle's four terms are in reality as comprehensive as the five predica-
bles of scholastic logic. Aristotle makes these four kinds of proposi-
tions the four heads of his treatment of dialectical invention, accident
17 Rule of Reason, sag. Bzv. 18 Ibid.^ sig 1 . B^r.
i9 Aristotle, Tofica, VI. x, 5-6.
[ 17 1
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
being the subject of Books II and III of the Topics, genus of Book
IV, property of Book V, and definition of Books VI and VIL The
scholastic logicians made their five parallel terms a part of the treat-
ment of dialectical judgment, not invention, although they also
recognized the importance of the predicables as a background for
the discovery of subject matter. 20
Wilson's enumeration of the seven places of invention inhering
in the substance or nature of things involves four of the concepts pre-
viously discussed by him as predicables, and thus he too suggests that
the predicables belong under invention as well as under judgment.
But primarily, he thinks, "they are good to iudge the knitting of
wordes, and to se what thing may truely be ioyned to other, for there
is no Proposition, nor yet ioining together of any sentence (accordyng
to the common order of nature) but they alwayes agre to these aboue
rehersed Predicables." 21 Moreover, they may be used to separate
permanently true from occasionally true propositions. If a proposi-
tion joins a species to its genus, and states how the species differs
from the genus, and what property the species has, and these steps
are correctly taken, the proposition is permanently true. Wilson's
own words are as follows:
Therfore when a proposition is made. from the kynde, to the general,
to his difference, or propertie: it is euermore an undoubted true propo-
sition, as this. Homo est animal ratione fraeditwn, loguendi facultatem
habens. A man is a liuing creature endewed with reason, hauing apt-
nesse by nature to speake. 22
Here a species (man) is properly associated with its genus (animal),
and is then properly differentiated from other members of that genus
by a differentia (the gift of reason), and is finally given a true prop-
erty (the aptness to speak). If, however, a proposition associates a
species with an accident, as in the statement, homo est albus (some
men are white), the proposition will not be true of all men, or it
may not be true of a white man at all times. "Therfore," concludes
Wilson, "it is good to be knowen, when you haue a Proposition,
whether it be undoubted true, for euermore, or els maye be false at
any tyme." 23
Another major topic in Wilson's Rule of Reason, as in scholastic
logic as a whole, is that of the categories or, as they were oftener
20 See below* pp. 16-27, 53- 21 #/* of Reason, sig. Cav.
sig. Cjr. 23 Ibid., sig. C 3 r-C 3 v.
[ 18 ]
called, the predicaments. These are the subject of Aristotle's Cate-
gories^ which is ordinarily made the first treatise in the Organon.
The question of the precise meaning of these categories, as Aristotle
discusses them, has occasioned much difference of opinion among his
many interpreters. 24 Wilson's view, however, is basically representa-
tive of that of his age. He calls the categories or predicaments "gen-
eral wordes," as opposed to the five predicables, or "common
wordes." The difference between the latter and the former, he says,
is "that the Predicables, set forth the largenesse of wordes," whereas
"the Predicamentes do name the verey nature of thynges, declar-
yng (and that substantially) what they are in very deede." 25 Thus
the predicables may be described as those words which define and
delimit the boundaries of scientific statements 5 the predicaments, as
those words which name the possible scientific conceptions men may
have as to the nature of reality. In other words, if a statement gains
admission into science only when its predicate declares the genus, the
species, the difference, the property, or the accident of its subject,
then a concept gains admission into science only when it is a concept
belonging under one of the basic aspects of things.
Substance and accident are the two great categories or predica-
ments, in Wilson's view. A concept of substance is a concept of a
thing as having about it something absolutely essential to its being or
nature something without which that thing could not be what it is.
A concept of accident, on the other hand, is a concept of a thing as
having about it something always or usually associated with it, but
not absolutely essential to its being or nature. Concepts of accident
are nine in number. These nine, added to the concept of substance,
make up the ten predicaments of scholastic logic, and these ten are
of course equivalent to the famous ten categories analyzed in the
first treatise of Aristotle's Organon. Wilson gives these ten cate-
gories their familiar Latin terms and his own experimental and
tentative English terms, as follows:
1. Substantia. The Substance.
2. Quantitas. The Quantite.
3. Qualitas. The Qualitee.
4. Relatiua The Relacion.
5. Actio. The maner of doing.
6. Passio. The Suffring.
24 For an instructive note on this problem, see Owen, The Organon t I, i.
26 Rule of Reason, sigf. C4V.
[ 19 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
7. Quando. When.
8. Vbi. Where.
9. Situs. The Settelling,
10. Habitus. The apparelling. 26
Although scholastic logic is content to treat the ten predicaments
as only in part definable, and thus as never susceptible of precise
verbal analysis, a few illustrative comments may help to reveal their
general function. We might say that the category of substance con-
tains a concept of the substance of each thing known or knowable
that it acts as a repository of man's knowledge about the substance
of all things. "As for an example," says Wilson, "if ye will knowe
what a man is, you must haue recourse to the place of substantia^ and
there ye shall learne by the same place that man is a liuyng creature
endued with reason." 27 Again, the category of quality contains the
concepts of the qualities of each thing known or knowable. The qual-
ity of virtue in men, for example, is "a constant habite of the mind,
makyng them praise worthye in whom it is." 28 Still again, the cate-
gory of relation contains the concepts of relations of things to things.
If you visit this category, it will tell you, among other items, that
"he*is a father, that hath a sonne, he is a maister, that hath a ser-
uaunt, and so forthe in the reaste." 29 The business of science is to
store these categories with concepts, as things are studied, and their
substance and their accidents are discovered and catalogued. The
business of a*particular science is to study things properly belonging
to it, and to ascertain about those particular things what concepts of
substance and of accident are truly applicable. The business of logic
is in part to decide the total number of categories to be used in classi-
fying all concepts, as a librarian might decide the total number of
terms to be used in classifying by subject all books under his juris-
diction. "Therfore," observes Wilson, with the young logician in
mind, "ye muste nedes haue these Predicamentes readye, that whan
so euer ye wyll define any worde, or geue a natural name unto it, ye
may come to this store house, and take stuffe at wyll." 30 To put the
matter in another way, there is a general vocabulary throughout the
world of learning, over and above the particular vocabulary of a
given science, and that general vocabulary must be mastered before
the world of learning can be known, as that vocabulary must be used
if a specialist in one field is to communicate with a specialist in an-
si ff . C 5 v. "Ibid., sig. D 7 r. **lbid. y siff. D 7 r.
sig. D 7 r. **Ibid., sig. D 7 r.
[ 20 ]
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
other. The ten categories were the key terms in that vocabulary.
Taken with the five common words, or predicables, they constituted
in scholastic logic a kind of basic English of the intellectual world
a vocabulary for scientific communication incorporated into the theory
of scientific communication.
Another major topic in scholastic logic and in Wilson's Rule of
Reason is that of definition and division. This requires little explana-
tion, since those processes, as understood then, are known by the
same terms today. Wilson's summary of the two processes is as good
as any. He says: "As a definition therfore dothe declare what a thyng
is, so the diuision sheweth howe many thynges are contayned in the
same." 31 The fundamental necessity of these two processes in dialec-
tic had been remarked by Plato. 32 Wilson mentions this Platonic re-
quirement as he prepares to make the statement just quoted.
Method was to become an important concept in Ramus's reform
of scholastic logic, as we shall see in Chapter 4. But of course that
concept, less fully developed than in Ramus, was a part of the tra-
dition that he labored to change. Like other expounders of the
tradition, Wilson devotes some space to method, apparently with
the first chapter of the second book of The Posterior Analytics in
mind, where Aristotle discusses the four forms of inquiry. To Wilson,
method is "the maner of handeling a single Question, and the
readie waie howe to teache and sette forth any thyng plainlie, and
in order, asit ; should be, in latine Methodus p ." 38 Aristotle's obscure
and condensed version of the four forms of inquiry becomes in Wil-
son a clear but possibly redundant discussion of eight forms, even as
Cicero's Topics, through a process of developing Aristotle's implica-
tions, yields five forms of general inquiry and three forms of finite
inquiry. 84 Wilson's program is indicated by saying that things are to
be examined by inquiring into their existence, their nature, their
parts, their causes, their effects, their concomitants, their opposites,
and their witnesses. 35 In covering the actual manner of setting forth
the results of an examination, Wilson briefly advises that exposition
should begin with the general and descend to the parts, as Cicero had
done in De Officiis and as Aristotle had done in the Ethics. Thus
81 ibid., sig. EIV.
82 In Phaedrus^ 265-266$ see Lane Cooper, Plato Phaedrus y Ion y Gorgias y and Sym-
$osium> with 'passages from the Republic and Laws Translated into English (London,
New York, Toronto, 1938), pp. 53-54.
88 Rule of Reason^ sig. E^v. 8 * Cicero, Topics, 79-91.
86 Rule of Reason, sig. E4v-E6r.
[ ax 1
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
Wilson discusses method by identifying it in part with dialectical
arrangement and in part with dialectical invention an emphasis that
Ramus modified by limiting method to arrangement alone.
Wilson's next topic is the proposition. His discussion of this ele-
ment of logic follows Aristotle's De Interpretations in substance and
the scholastic logicians in terminology and form of presentation. He
defines a proposition as "a perfite sentence spoken by the Indicatiue
mode, signifiyng either a trewe thyng, or a false, without al am-
biguitie, or doubtfulness. As thus, ewery man is a liar." 36 He next
proceeds to speak of the logical subject and predicate of a proposition.
Then he treats of the various kinds of propositions (general, particu-
lar, indefinite, singular) , then of opposition among propositions 5
then of categorical and hypothetical propositions, and of the kinds
of conversion or of reversal of subject and predicate.
The topic of argument brings to a close Wilson's discussion of
judgment as the initial procedure of logic. "An argument," he says,
"is a waie to proue how one thyng is gathered by another, and to
shewe that thyng, whiche is doubtfull, by that whiche is not doubt-
full." 37 Four kinds of argument are then distinguished by him, and
the Latin terms which he uses indicate that the English vocabulary
had not yet learned to speak of them with ease. The first kind Wilson
calls Syllogismus; the second, Enthymema-, the third, Indue tio or
Induction j and the fourth, Exemplum or Example. This part of
scholastic logic is based in Wilson and elsewhere upon the two books
of Aristotle's Prior Analytics. Wilson would have been less than
human if in this honored subject matter he had been more than tra-
ditional. He speaks of the parts and terms of the syllogism, and in
calling the middle term "the double repete," the major term "the
term at large," and the minor term "the several term," he reminds
us again that he is blazing a trail through a new land, without having
found in these instances at least the path that later generations of
Englishmen will follow. He calls the enthymcmc the half argument,
and thinks of it as a syllogism with one of its three propositions miss-
ing* His conception of induction is not so much improper as restricted.
He says:
An Induction, is a kynde of Argument when we gather sufficiently
a nombre of propre names, and there upon make the conclusion
uniuersall, as thus.
si e . E 7 r. JWA, sijj. F<5v.
[ 22 1
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
Rhenyshe wine heateth,
Maluesey heateth,
Frenchewine heateth, neither is there any wyne that doth the
contrary:
Ergo all wine heateth. 88
Similar to induction is example. "An example," he says, "is a maner
of Argumentation, where one thyng is proued by an other, for the
likenes, that is found to be in them both. . . ." 3fl And he illustrates
this form as follows:
If Marcus Attilius Regulus had rather lose his life, then not kepe
promise with, his enemie, then shoulde euery man beyng taken prisoner
kepe promise with his enemy.
Having finished with example, Wilson brings his discussion of
argument to a close with a mention of .the sorites and the dilemma
as special forms of the syllogism and with an exposition of five rules
for the knitting together of propositions.
His next topic is "the second part of Logique, called Inuentio, that
is to saie, the fyndyng out of an argument." 40 Invention, as one of
the two main procedures in the process of composing a learned dis-
course, involves a plan for the systematic discovery of sub j ect matter.
If it be suggested at this point that the discovery of subject matter
normally precedes its arrangement, and thus that invention as a
topic in logic ought normally to precede rather than follow disposi-
tion or judgment, the reply is that the same line of reasoning oc-
curred to Wilson and the other scholastic logicians, even though they
usually treated judgment first. Wilson justifies himself for placing
judgment before invention by saying that you have to know how to
order an argument before you seek for it, and that anyway "a reason
is easlier found then fashioned." 41 This attitude is a significant phe-
nomenon in intellectual history. It really is a way of saying that
subject matter presents fewer difficulties than organization, so far as
composition is concerned. A society which takes such an attitude must
be by implication a society that is satisfied with its traditional wisdom
and knows where to find it. It must be a society that does not .stress
the virtues of an exhaustive examination of nature so much as the
virtues of clarity in form. No guilt should be attached to either of
these tendencies. Each is of value, and each is with us at any moment
88 Ibid., Big. H5V. 80 Ibid., sig. H6v. * Ibid., Big. J 4 v.
41 Ibid., Big. Biv.
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
of time, guarding us against the excesses of the other. But the great
shift which occurred in men's thinking between 1500 and 1700 was
in part a shift from the preponderant emphasis upon traditional wis-
dom to the preponderant emphasis upon new discoveries, and this
shift is nowhere better illustrated than in the transition from Wil-
son's belief in the relative ease of discovery to the modern belief in
its relative difficulty.
Invention in scholastic logic was a process in which an author found
subject matter by connecting his mind with the traditional wisdom of
his race and by allowing that contact to induce a flow of ideas from
the general store into himself. This process involved his knowing
what were called "the places." Nowhere is scholastic logic more at-
tractive than in Wilson's definition of a place, and he deserves to be
quoted at some length on this point:
A Place is the restyng corner of an argument, or els a marke whiche
giueth warnyng to our memory what we maie speake probablie, either
in one parte, or the other, upon all causes that fall in question. Those
that be good hare finders will sone finde the hare by her fourme. For
when they se the grounde beaten flatte round aboute, and faire to the
sight: thei haue a narrow gesse by al likelihod that the hare was there
a litle before. Likewyse the hontesmaft in huntyng the foxe, wil sone
espie when he seeth a hole, whether it be a foxe borough, or not. So
he that will take profite in this parte of logique, must be like a hunter,
and learne by labour to knowe the borough es. For these places be
nothyng els but couertes or boroughes, wherein if any one searche
diligentlie, he maie fynde game at pleasure. And although perhappes
one place fayle him, yet shal he finde a dousen other places, to ac-
complishe his purpose. Therfore if any one will do good in this
kynde, he must go from place to place, and by serching euery borough,
he shall haue his purpose undoubtedlie in moste part of them if not
in all. 42
The great source for all speculation about the places, so far as
scholastic logic is concerned, is Aristotle's Topics, although Cicero's
similar work, which condenses and systematizes Aristotle, provides
a Latin terminology that had great influence upon Boethius and the
scholastics/ 3 Cicero classifies the places of logic as intrinsic and ex-
Ibid., sig. Jsv-J6r.
43 Boethius wrote extensively upon Aristotelian logic. He commented upon the entire
Organon; The Categories^ On Interpretation^ Prior Analytics^ Posterior Analytics^ Topics,
and Sophistical Elenchi. He also commented upon Porphyry's comment upon Aristotle,
and he wrote a commentary in six books on Cicero's Topics. The logical writing's of
Boethius are conveniently collected in Migne, Patrologia Latina, LXIV, 9-1216.
[ 24 ]
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
trinsic. Under the former head he evolves a final list of sixteen
distinct places, whereas under the latter he speaks only of argument
from authority, this entire head being devoted to what were called
non-artistic proofs, or proofs not invented by recourse to the places. 44
Wilson's procedure in respect to the classification of the places il-
lustrates both the sacrosanctity and the flexibility of this branch of
learning. Wilson follows Cicero in designating two great groups of
places, the inward and the outward. He follows Cicero in respect to
the terms used and the functions assigned to many of the actual places
described in these groups. But he does not follow Cicero's limiting
of the places to sixteen, or Cicero's allotting of them all to the first
of the two great headings. 45
We are fortunate in having from Wilson's first English logic a
concrete demonstration of the way in which the places were envisaged
as useful in the religious controversies of the time. Wilson poses the
question whether it be lawful for a priest to have a wife or no. He
undertakes to examine this question by taking the two key words
"priest" and "wife" to the places, and by seeing whether the con-
clusions obtained from the places in respect to one of these words
agree with the conclusions obtained in respect to the other. His as-
sumption is that where there is agreement between the conclusions
reached in the case of priest and the conclusions reached in the case
of wife, then to that extent the proposition that it is lawful for a
priest to have a wife is good. Where there is disagreement, of course,
the proposition is not good. Wilson's own description of this as-
sumption is as follows:
For where as the places agree (that is to saie, al thinges are referred
to y e one, that are referred to the other) there the proposition is good,
and the latter part of the proposition, is truly spoken of the first. But
where the places do not agree (that is to saie, some thynges are re-
ferred to the one worde, that are not referred to the other) there the
thynges themselues cannot agree. 46
Wilson's procedure is to examine priesthood within nineteen differ-
44 Cicero, Topics, 8-24.
45 In the final analysis, Wilson would seem to allow fifteen places, although his first
illustration of the use of the places as a system names exactly sixteen, and his second
illustration names nineteen. In reality some of these nineteen are species of genera named
among the original fifteen, and some of the original fifteen are dismissed as inapplicable
to the second illustration. The first illustration concerns the word king 5 the second, the
words priest and wife.
48 At this point, I quote from the 1552 edition of The rule of Reason, fol. 114*.
[ 25 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
ent places, such as that of definition, of genus, of species, of property,
of whole, of parts, etc. Then he examines wifehood under the same
aspects. Then he notes wherein there is agreement between the con-
clusions assembled for priesthood and for wifehood^ and shows how
these conclusions may yield arguments for and against the^ lawful-
ness of marriage among the clergy. Wilson's own conviction is that it
is lawful for a priest to marry, and his discussion does not conceal that
prejudice. Thus his machinery of analysis does not so much permit
him to discover what attitude is right as to defend adequately the
attitude that he had previously judged to be right,
A few samples of Wilson's analysis will show how he himself
conceived of the actual use of the procedure of invention. His defini-
tion of priest is as follows:
A Preacher is a clerke or shepeherd whiche wil geue his life for his
shepe, enstructed to sette forth the kynddome of God, and desierouse
to lyue vertuousely: a faithfull, and a wise steward whom the lord
doth set ouer his house, that he maie geue the householde seruauntes
meate, in due time.* 7
Wilson's definition of wife comes later, after the nineteen places have
been visited for ideas about priests. That definition reads :
A wife, is a woman that is lawfully receiued into the felouship of life,
for y* encrease or gettyng of chyldren, and to auoide fornication. 48
Wilson's use of these two definitions is indicated at the end of his
examination of wifehood under the nineteen aspects. He says:
Nowe that we haue drawen these wordes, the preacher, and the wife,
after this sort, throughout the places, so far as we could: we shuld
copare them together, and se wherein thei do agre, and wherein they
varie. Let vs compare the definitions together, and we shal finde sum-
what euen there, where these wordes be (desiryng to lyue vertuously)
whiche shall geue light for an argument, as thus,
Whosoeuer desireth to Hue vertuously,
must mary a wyf e.
Euery true preacher of Goddes word
desireth to Hue vertuously
Ergo euery true Preacher must mary a wife. 49
Wilson indicates that if his adversary denies the major premise of
this argument, the conclusion collapses unless some help can be found
* 7 lbid.> fol. ii4r-ii4V. 4B /**., fol. 1171-. * 9 /*#., fol. 1191-.
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
in the definition of wife. That help is forthcoming in the statement
that a wife is married for the increase of children, and for the avoid-
ance of fornication. Thus Wilson confronts his adversary with a new
argument:
Whosoeuer desireth to liue vertuously,
desireth to auoide fornication.
Whosoeuer desireth to auoyde fornication,
desireth mariage.
Ergo whosoeuer desireth to lyue vertuously,
desiereth mariage. 50
Thus does Wilson illustrate the use of the place of definition in
respect to the two words, priest and wife. He next illustrates the
place of genus or "generall worde":
Againe the generall worde of both these definitions geueth lyght for
an argument. Euery wyfe is a woman, euery Preacher is a man, and
nature hath ordeyned that man and woman may liue in mariage, (if
they be so disposed) of what degre, codition, or state, so euer they
be, nothyng in al the scriptures to the contrarye. Therfore I may
reason thus.
What soeuer is man, that same male marie a woman by gods
ordinaunce.
Euery preacher is a man
Ergo euery preacher maie marie a woman by gods ordinaunce. 51
Three of the other places which figure in this'' illustration of the
nature of logical invention are those of time, place, and "thynges
annexed." 52 If these appear to be reminiscent of three of the ten
predicaments discussed by Wilson as a major part of logical judg-
ment, and if therefore invention and judgment as the two parts of
scholastic logic begin to seem curiously redundant in subject matter,
I can only reply that this tautology was perfectly obvious to the
scholastic logicians themselves. Indeed, Wilson takes the trouble to
point it out. He says as he analyzes the places of time, place, and
things annexed:
And these thre are nothing els, than the thre predicamentes or tnoste
generall places, whiche I rehersed before.
fVbi. fWhere.
4 Quando. J When.
[Habitus. [The araying. 53
U*i fol. n 9 v. 51 7^., fol. n 9 v.
52 Ibid., foil. n6v, xx8r-xi9r, 53 Ibid., fol. 94 v.
[ 27 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
But the acknowledgment that one main part of logic duplicated the
other was not enough, as things turned out. The tautology had to be
removed. And it was Ramus who attempted, as we shall see, to re-
move such tautologies as this, and to make invention and judgment
nonoverlapping parts of logic. .
The final topic in Wilson's system of logic is that of fallacies. He
introduces it by summarizing what he had previously covered, and
by adding:
I wil fro hece furth, set out the maner of deceiptfull argumentes,
called in Latine, Refraehensiones, or fallaces condusiunculae, euen as
Aristotle hath set the furth. 84
These words are a reminder that this part of scholastic logic derives
its materials from The Sophistical Elenohi, which is the sixth and
final treatise in Aristotle's Organon. From that source Wilson selects
for main emphasis the lore of the six types of deceitful arguments
that depend on diction, and the seven that are independent of diction.
His illustrations reflect the religious controversies of his time, not of
Aristotle's. But he strikes a merry note at the end of his work by
setting forth "to delite the reader" a series of witty fallacies "called
trappyng argumetes." These he names as Crocodilites, Antistrephon,
Ceratinae, Asistaton, Cacosistaton, Vtis, and Pseudomenos. 35
The second of these, which means the turning of an argument back
upon an opponent, is illustrated by Wilson from Aulus Gellius. Ac-
cording to Wilson, Gellius relates that Pythagoras gave lessons in
eloquence to a young man named Euathlus. 56 The bargain between
them was that Euathlus must give Pythagoras a great sum of money,
half at the beginning of their association, and the other half when
Euathlus won his first case in court as a result of his training under
Pythagoras. It appears that Euathlus repeatedly postponed the day
of that first case, and after a while Pythagoras brought suit against
him for the other half of his fee. Pythagoras then went into court
and his words to his opponent are quoted thus by Wilson:
If thou art cast in the law, I haue wonne by vertue of the lawe: if
thou art not cast, but gettest the ouerhande by iudgement of these
id., fol. i2 3 v. **Ibid., fol. i 7 or.
56 See Aulus Gellius, Noctef Atticae^ 5.10. In Gellius, however, the figures in this
story are Protagoras and Euathlus. Diogenes Laertius, De Vita et Moribus PfailosopAorum
Libri AT, 9.56, also tells this story about Protagoras, but much more briefly than does
Gellius. The same story is told with Corax, the inventor of the art of rhetoric, in place
of Protagoras; see Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos^ 2,96-99.
[ 28 ]
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
men, yet muste I haue it neuerthelesse, because our bargain was so
made, when I first began to teach the. 57
This argument appeared to delight Euathlus. He pointed out to
Pythagoras that he could escape from its toils by hiring an advocate
to plead his case, whereupon he himself could not yet be charged
with having legally incurred the obligation to pay the rest of the fee,
if the verdict went in his favor. But he preferred, he said, to plead
his own case, and he would do so by turning the argument of
Pythagoras against him, and thus would escape from the debt al-
together. Wilson quotes him as follows:
For if you be cast in the law, I haue wonne by. vertue of the lawe, &
so I owe you nothyng. If you be not cast, but gette the ouerhand of
me, by the Judgement of these me: then according to my bargain, I
shal pay you nothyng because I haue not gotten the ouerhad in iudge-
ment. 58
Wilson observes that the young scholar in this instance gave his
master a bone to gnaw, and beat him with his own rod. For the
judges, fearing to decide one way or the other, postponed the case
to another time.
Now that the Rule of Reason has been discussed in full, our next
task is to comment upon its antecedents. These will constitute a kind
of history of scholastic logic in England from the time of its earliest
formulation by an Englishman to the time of Wilson's vernacular
treatise. As we leave the Rule of Reason, we might remark that it
enjoyed a considerable success for about thirty years after the date
of its first edition in 1551 as indication that Graf ton, the printer,
had correctly diagnosed public reaction when he initially urged Wil-
son to prepare it for publication. It was reprinted in 1552, 1553,
I 563, 1567, and 1580. Thereafter it apparently ceased to command
public interest, and it has never received further editions. Traces of
it can be found in Thomas Blundeville's The Arte of Logicke, pub-
lished in 1599, itself an attempt to teach logic to Englishmen who
knew no Latin. But Blundeville, as we shall see later, apparently
does not feel it an advantage to acknowledge his borrowings from
Wilson. 59 The chief reason why Wilson lost favor rapidly after 1567
is that Ramistic logic made its appearance in England in the fifteen-
seventies and ended the reign of scholastic logic as we see it in Wilson
57 Rule of Reason (1552), fol. 1721". 58 Ibid.) fol.
69 See below, p. 288.
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
and his predecessors. When the inevitable reaction set in against
Ramus, as we see it setting in with Blundeville, logicians did not
then go back to Wilson's generation for their inspiration, since even
anti-Ramists could not deny the validity o some of Ramus's criti-
cisms of scholastic logic. Thus the Rule of Reason did not long sur-
vive after Wilson's death, which occurred in 1581. But by virtue of
its position as the first logic to be written in English, it will always
have an honorable place in the intellectual history of the Anglo-
Saxons.
A last interesting fact about the Rule of Reason should be men-
tioned in closing this account of it. As it gained new material in the
editions that followed the first, it acquired something on one occasion
to give it a special interest to later historians of the English drama.
That occasion came as a result of the edition of *553- There, in con-
nection with his discussion of the fallacy of ambiguity, which is the
second of the six types of deceitful argument depending on diction,
Wilson adds to the three old illustrations in the earlier editions a
remarkable new one in the form of a 35-line quotation which he
identifies as from "an entrelude made by Nicolas Vdal." 60 This quo-
tation is an address to a "maistresse Custauce" by one "Roisterdoister,"
which, read according to one system of punctuation, has highly de-
rogatory implications for the lady in question, and, read according
to another system, highly complimentary implications. For almost
three hundred years after the date of that edition of the Rule of
Reason, it was commonly accepted that Wilson's 35-line quotation
from an interlude by Udall represented the only specimen of Udall's
dramatic works to have been preserved. 61 But in 1 8 1 8 a printed copy
of an anonymous old play was discovered and presented to Eton Col-
lege, the school where Thomas Wilson had prepared for Cambridge.
Also in 1 8 r 8 that old play was given a new edition under the title,
Royster D oyster It was not long until scholars became
60 Wilson^ 35-line quotation appears at foil. 67r-68r of the 1563 and the 1567 edi-
tions of the Rule of Reason. It appears in the 1553 edition at sig. 82 v, according to
Walter Wilson Greg in the Malone Society reprint of Roister Doister (Printed for the
Malone Society by John Johnson at the Oxford University Press, 1934 [1935]), p. v,
I have not seen the 1553 edition.
61 For a typical expression of this view, see Anthony a Wood, Athenae Oseonlenses,
ed. Philip Bliss (London, 1813-1820), i, 213-214.
62 For a convenient summary of the bibliographical history of this play, see Nicholas
Udall, Roister Doister, ed. Edward Arber (English Reprints, Vol, xvii, London, 1869),
p. 8. This summary by Arber accepts John Payne Collier as rightful claimant to the
honor of being the first to connect Wilson's quotation with the letter to Mistress Cus-
tance in Ral$h Royster Dayster. William Durrant Cooper, Ralfh Roister Doister, A
[ 30 ]
THOMAS WILSON'S RULE OF REASON
aware that the 35-line illustration of ambiguity in Wilson's Rule of
Reason was in fact a quotation from the anonymous old play, Ral^h
Royster Doyster, and that, since Wilson had attributed his quotation
to Nicholas Udall, the anonymous old play must be one o UdalPs
lost dramas. Thus did scholarship give real substance to what had
been the shadowy dramatic reputation of Udall $ thus was the now-
famous early comedy given an author in the person of a man solidly
distinguished in other fields. And the means to this happy end was
Thomas Wilson's English logic. Incidentally, the 35-line quotation
in Wilson is the letter which in the Udall play Royster Doyster had
had a scrivener write for him as part of his campaign to become the
husband of Mistress Custance. As interpreted by the scrivener, the
letter complimented Mistress Custance in terms at once fulsome and
persuasive j but as read by Mathew Merygreeke to the lady herself,
it was derogatory if not slanderous. 63 The words were the same in
each case. The meaning, as in poetry in general, changed with the
character and environment of the reader.
Comedy, By Nicholas Udall. And The Tragedie of Gorboduc (London, Printed for the
Shakespeare Society, 1847), p. vi, also supports Collier's claim. Later opinion is less
indulgent to Collier j see "Roister Doister," ed. Ewald Flugel, in Representative English
Comedies^ ed. Charles Mills Gayley (New York, 1903-1914), I, 97-98.
S3 The scrivener's letter appears in Ratyh Royster Doyster, Act III, Scenes 4 & 5. (In
the Malone Society reprint, lines 1074-1108 and 1239-1273.)
[ 31 1
II. Backgrounds of Scholasticism
SEVEN and a half centuries before the date of Thomas Wilson's
translation of scholastic logic into native English speech, another
Englishman, whose name was Alcuin, wrote a treatise on dialectic in
Latin, thus becoming the first English logician of record. That
treatise, formally entitled De Dialectic*, was composed in France,
probably about the year 794, as part of Alcuin's campaign to build an
educational system throughout the empire of his patron ^and friend
Charlemagne. 1 It was Charlemagne who had in the first instance in-
vited Alcuin to come to France in the capacity of a kind of minister
of. education. It was Charlemagne who took an active interest in
Alcuin's efforts to establish in France a learning that would suit the
needs of the Prankish pulpit, law court, and imperial administration.
It was Charlemagne who lent his own great prestige to the cause
of letters by allowing Alcuin on occasion to present treatises in which
learned doctrine was arranged in the form of a dialogue between the
emperor himself and the English scholar. One treatise so presented
by Alcuin is on rhetoric, and it will be discussed later as the earliest
full treatment of Ciceronian rhetoric by an Englishman. Alcuin's
De Dialectica is another treatise so presented, and it serves to begin
our present discussion of English logic.
When Alcuin took up his residence at the court of Charlemagne,
he was about forty-seven years of age, and already distinguished as
the most learned Englishman since Bede. Alcuin was born in 735,
the year of Bede's death, and was educated at York in a school
established by Egbert, one of Bede's pupils. That school enjoyed an
immense prestige during the eighth century. Professor Laistner has
said of it that, for nearly fifty years after its founding, it was "the
leading home of culture in western Europe." 2 The fact that it was
founded by one of Bede's pupils is enough to account for its early
fame 5 and Alcuin's connection with it as student, teacher, and li-
brarian is enough to explain its fame during the years of his own
1 The most convenient edition of Alcuin's De Dialectica is that in Migne, Patrologia
Latina> ci, 951-976, upon which my present discussion is based, and which I cite by
chapter and page (i.e., column) number. Since the opening- speech of De Dialectica
(1.951) identifies that work as an immediate continuation of Alcuin's De RhBtoricaty
and since the latter is known to have been written in the year 794, the former may be
given the same date. For a discussion of the date of De Rhetorica^ see Wilbur S. Howell,
The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne (Princeton, 1941), pp. 5-8,
2 M, L. W. Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Europe A*D. 500 to goo
(London, 1931), p. 150.
r 3* i
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
pre-eminence in European learning as master of the palace school at
Charlemagne's court. Before the time of Bede and Alcuin, the liter-
ary output of England had been meagre indeed, and English writings
on the theory of literature had been nonexistent, save for Aldhelm's
treatise on rhythm and metrics, De Septenario, usually called the
Letter to Acircius? But a new era began with Bede, during whose
lifetime the great English epic Beowulf, the earliest considerable
poetic achievement in any of the modern languages, is usually as-
sumed to have been composed. 4 Bede wrote three small works having
to do with literary theory: the Liber de Orthographies, the Liber de
Arte Metrica, and the Liber de Schematibus et Tropis. 5 The last of
these is a treatise on devices of rhetorical style, and it ranks as the
earliest fragment of Ciceronian rhetorical theory to have come from
the pen of an Englishman, although Alcuin must be regarded as the
first of his countrymen to teach the full Ciceronian doctrine. I shall
examine Bede's little work on style when I come later to speak of
stylistic rhetoric in England. At present it is sufficient to observe that
Bede and to some small extent Aldhelm created a fabric of literary
speculation for later English learning to complete, and that Alcuin,
in the generation which followed Bede, began to complete that fabric
in his De Rhetorica and De Dialectic^ both of which must be counted
as theories of communication, the one being devoted to the open and
the other to the closed discourse.
Early in De Dialectics, , Alcuin himself distinguishes between dia-
lectic and rhetoric in terms of Zeno's ancient metaphor of closed fist
and open hand, even as we have seen Wilson doing centuries later
in his vernacular logic. Alcuin's pupil Charlemagne asks : "What are
dialectic and rhetoric to each other?" Alcuin replies without acknowl-
edgments to Zeno:
Dialectic is to rhetoric as the closed fist is to the distended palm in a
man's hand. The former manner of arguing draws conclusions in brief
speech j the latter runs about through fields of fluency in copious
3 See Laistner, Thought and Letters, pp. 104-129, for an excellent brief account of
English learning- to the time of Bede's death. See also J. W. H. Atkins, English Literary
Criticism.: The Medieval Phase (New York and Cambridge, England, 1943), pp. 36-51,
cited below as The Medieval Phase j also Jack D. A. Ogilvy, "Anglo-Latin Scholarship,
597-780," The University of Colorado Studies, xxn (1934-1935)* PP- 3*7-34O.
4 See George K. Anderson, The Literature of the Anglo-Saxons (Princeton, 1949)3
pp. 8z-$3.
5 These works are printed in Migne, Patrologia Latina> xc, 12,3-186. The Liber de
Schematibus et Tro'pis is also in Carolus Halm, Rhetores Latini Minores (Leipzig, 1863),
pp. 607-618.
[ 33 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
speech. The former restrains its words 5 the latter is lavish with them
If indeed dialectic is the more enlarged in respect to the mvention of
subject matter, rhetoric is nevertheless the more fluent in respect to
the expressing of what has been invented. The former searches out
the few and the studious 5 the latter usually advances toward the
multitude. 6
Just before he makes this distinction between dialectic and rheto-
ric, Alcuin at Charlemagne's request divides philosophy into three
parts, that is, into physics, ethics, and logic. Each of these parts is
then divided into species, and logic, as the science concerned with the
theory of judging rightly, is given two species, dialectic and rheto-
ric/ Thus logic in the sense in which Alcuin uses the term is to be
defined by the definitions, divisions, and ultimate principles of dia-
lectical and rhetorical theory. Thus logic does not receive at his
hands a separate analysis as a science 5 how he regards it must be
gathered instead from the disciplines which he treats as its two
branches.
His De Dialectic*, conceived at the outset as the theory of learned
communication, is developed in such a way that at the end we can
understand why it was considered to be so far up to date as to be
given two editions in the sixteenth and three in the seventeenth cen-
turies. 8 Indeed, Alcuin's dialectical system would not have been an
anachronism in the Cambridge of Thomas Wilson's time, although
it is by no means as detailed as was scholastic logic of the Renaissance,
nor is it divided into invention and judgment, as was the custom
among the followers of Agricola. What Alcuin does is to distinguish
five principal points of emphasis in dialectical theory, and to build his
discussion upon them.
The first of these points he calls initially "isagogae," that is, "in-
troductions," thus associating this part of his work with Porphyry's
famous IsagogG) written during the third century A.P. to introduce
readers of Aristotle's Categories to a knowledge of the basic classes
*De Dialectic^ 1.953. Translation mine,
7 Ibid; 1-952. Alcuin's words are as follows:
C. Logica in quot species dividitur?
A. In duas, in dialecticam et rhetor icam.
8 The two sixteenth-century editions were by Menrad Molther at Haguenau and
Paris in 15*9 and by Matthieu Galen at Douai in 1563 and 1564. For further details,
see Howell, Rhetoric of Alcuin^ pp. 10-12. The three seventeenth-century editions were
by Heni-icus Canisius (in Antiquae Lectionis Tomus /-TV, Ing-olstadt, 1601-1604), by
Andre Duchesne (in B* Flacci Albini sive Alchvvini O$era> Paris, 1617), and by
thaeus Weiss (in Ad Logicam sive Organum Aristotelis Introductio^ Salzburg 1 ,
[ 34 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
of propositions discussed by Aristotle in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of the
first book of his Topics. In Alcuin, as in Porphyry, the term "intro-
duction" covers the same concepts which Thomas Wilson was to call
the predicables or the five common words. Thus Alcuin under his
first heading defines and illustrates genus, species, differentia, acci-
dent, and property. 9
His second point of emphasis is the "categoriae" or, in Thomas
Wilson's English, the predicaments. Alcuin anticipates Wilson by
classifying these as of substance or of accident, the latter group being
composed of nine categories which combine with the category of sub-
stance to make the ten in Aristotle's original list. 10 Alcuin's Latin
terms for these categories are parallel in six cases to those which
Wilson offers as the basis of his English terms. In the other four
cases, Alcuin uses close synonyms of the terms indicated by Wilson.
To these ten terms, Alcuin devotes eight chapters of his short treatise,
thus giving this aspect of dialectic more than a third of his total space.
His remaining points of emphasis are the argument or syllogism,
the place or topic, and the proposition. The last one of these, which
is Alcuin's concluding subject, embraces doctrine descended from the
second treatise in Aristotle's Organon, that is, the treatise On In-
terpretation-, and it is illogically placed in Alcuin's scheme, since a
discussion of propositions ought normally to precede the analysis of
the way in which propositions combine to form syllogisms and other
arguments. There are other criticisms to be made of the last three
points of Alcuin's De Dialectic^ and indeed of the treatise as a whole.
For one thing, it is decidedly skimpy, particularly in its treatment of
the syllogism. For another thing, it is often naive in the way it uses
examples. And again, it is superficial rather than profound in its
presentation of dialectical principles, as one of its editors has re-
marked. 11 But when these valid criticisms are registered, we should
still remain aware that this first logic by an Englishman contains
the basic concepts of Aristotelian logic, and transmits to its readers
a fair outline of the outline of Aristotle's Organon.
These basic concepts, to be sure, did not come to Alcuin from his
own direct study of Aristotle's logical system. They came to him in-
stead from various intermediate sources. Of the sixteen chapters into
which his treatise is divided in its edition by Migne, the first two and
9 De Dialectic^ 2.953-954- 10 Ibid., 3-954-955-
11 Matthaeus Weiss, whose criticism to this effect is cited in the headnote of the edition
I have been referring- to here.
[ 35 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
: remaining ten chapters belong in doctrine and direct phraseology
Jie same section of Isidore, to Boethius's Da Different Topicis,
the last four are partly or entirely made up of passages borrowed by
him from the section on dialectic in Isidore's Etymologiae^ whereas
the
to the
and pre-eminently to the Categoriae Decem, a work of uncertain
authorship supposed in Alcuin's time to be a translation by Saint
Augustine of Aristotle's Categorize^ Alcuin mentions Porphyry at
the end of his second chapter and occasionally brings in the name of
Aristotle, but the other sources just mentioned are sufficient to ac-
count for almost every word of his De Dialectics. Thus he is more
of a compiler than an independent theorist in this aspect of his total
achievement, as indeed were his successors in English logic for some
time to come.
Between the ninth and the mid-sixteenth centuries, a logic not
unlike Alcuin's prevailed in English learning as the universities of
Oxford and Cambridge developed from shadowy beginnings, and as
the seven liberal arts, one of which was of course dialectic or logic,
became the established form of higher education. These seven odd
centuries witnessed many minor shifts in emphasis in logical theory,
as western scholarship gradually uncovered forgotten details of
12 The following- table shows the sources of Alcuin's De Dialectica. The numbers at
the left refer to chapter numbers in the text in Migne. The Latin phrases are chapter
titles appearing- in the same text. At the right are references to Alcuin's sources, chapter
by chapter, with corresponding- references to the texts of those sources as printed in Migne.
I De Philosophia et Partibus Eius. Isidore, Etymologiae, a. 22, 23, 24$ Migne,
LXXXII, 140-142.
II De Isagogis. Ibid.) 2.255 Migne, LXXXII, 142-143.
III De Categoriis. Pseudo-Augustine, Categoriae Decem, chs. 8, 2, 3, 5, 95 Migne,
xxxn, 1421 et seq.
W De Quantitate. Ibid., ch. 105 Migne, xxxii, 1427-1430.
V De Ad Aliquid. Ibid., ch. ii; Migne, xxxii, 1430-1431.
VI De Qualitate. Ibid., ch. 12; Migne, XXXII, 1432-1435.
VII De Facere et Pati. Ibid.) ch. 135 Migne, xxxii, 1435-1436.
VIII De Jacere. Ibid., ch. 14 j Migne, XXXII, 1436.
IX De Ubi et Quando. Ibid., ch. 15 j Migne, xxxii, 1436.
X De Habere. Ibid., ch. 165 Mi'gne, xxxn, 1436-1437.
XI De Contrariis vel Oppositis. Isidore, Etymologiae, 2. 31 j Migne, LXXXII, 153-154.
Pseudo-Augustine, Categoriae Decem, chs. 18-205 Migne, XXXII, 1437-1439.
XII De Arguments. Boethius, De Differentiis Topicis, Bk. Ij Migne, LXIV, 1174-
1175. Isidore, Etymologize, 2. 28; Migne, LXXXII, 146.
XIII De Modis Diffinitionum. Isidore, Etymologiae, 2,. 29; Migne, LXXXII, 148.
XIV De Speciebus Diffinitionum. Ibid., 2. 295 Migne, LXXXII, 148-150.
XV De Topicis. Ibid., a. 30; Migne, LXXXII, 151-153.
XVI De Perihermeniis. Ibid., 2. 27 j Migne, LXXXII, 145-146.
For a slightly different analysis of the sources of Alcuin's De Dialectica, see Max
Manitius, Geschichte der Lateinischen Liter atur des Mittelalters (Munich, 1911-1931),
i, 283-284.
[ 36 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
Aristotelian logic, and as the great Arabic students of Aristotle's
Organon^ Al-Farabi in the tenth century, Avicenna in the eleventh,
and Averroes in the twelfth, transmitted their knowledge of Aris-
totelianism through the iron curtain between the Moslem and Chris-
tian world, and made the west freshly aware of the Greek basis of
its Latin culture. 13 But my present field is the Renaissance, and thus
I shall not Hwell so much upon the different shadings of medieval
scholastic logic, as upon the maj or figures and works in English logic
before the period of Thomas Wilson.
According to Anthony a Wood, famous historian of Oxford, the
first logician at that university was John, a monk of St. David's,
possibly to be identified with Johannes Scotus. 14 Wood bases his
statement upon the testimony of Brian Twyne, earliest Oxford his-
torian, who says that John was the first lecturer at Oxford under
an endowment established there by King Alfred around 879. Twyne
also says that John's lectures were based upon the logic of Aristotle
and Averroes. It is a temptation to regard this story with sentimental
indulgence, because Johannes Scotus, the great Irish scholar and
candidate for the honor of being the earliest scholastic philosopher,
had previously spent a large part of his life in France, where, like
Alcuin before him, he had been summoned by a French king to take
charge of the court school of that country, and where, like Alcuin, he
had lived to establish himself as the most learned Briton of his time.
But Twyne's story rests upon untrustworthy evidence, and cannot
now be accepted. 15 Nor is it possible any longer to accept on the basis
of the same evidence the belief that the first college, University, was
founded at Oxford in Alfred's reign. The first endowment of Uni-
versity College is now regarded as having been established in 1 2,49,
although educational activity of some sort began at Oxford early in
the previous century. Twyne's story, moreover, involves a strange
anachronism a lecturer on logic at Oxford in 879 would have been
unable to interpret Averroes, who was not born until 1 126.
In the latter half of the century in which Averroes was at work in
Moslem Spain on his commentaries on Aristotle, the seven liberal
13 For the history of logic in western Europe In these centuries, see Carl von Prantl,
Geschichte der Logik in Abendlande (Leipzig 1 , 1855-1870); also Barthelemy Haureau,
Histoire de la Philosophic Scolastique (Paris, 1872-1880); also Philotheus Boehner,
Medieval Logic An Outline of Its Development from 1250 to c. 1400 (Chicago, 1952).
14 Anthony a Wood, The History and Antiquities of the University of Oxford^ in two
Books^ ed. John Gutch (Oxford, 1792-1796), II, 820.
15 On this point, see Dictionary of National Biography ', s.v. Twyne, Brian (1579?-
[ 37 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
arts became the foundation of the growing educational activity at
both Cambridge and Oxford, with the result that logic began to
acquire a place of genuine importance in higher learning in Eng-
land. 16 That same half-century witnessed the composition of one of
the great medieval treatises on logic, John of Salisbury's Metalogicon.
John of Salisbury was mentioned earlier in these pages for his di-
vision of logic into invention and judgment. Baldwin calls his Meta-
logicon cc a unified and carefully coherent presentation of all teaching
that deals with words." 17 "So far as is known," remarks another critic
of the Metalogicon, "this is the first work of the Middle Ages in
northern Europe in which the complete Organon of Aristotle is
used. 3 ' 18 John was born in England but educated in France between
1136 and 1148 under the opposing influences of the nominalists and
realists. 19 His chief master in the camp of the former was Abelard;
later he studied under Abelard's opponents, especially the dis-
tinguished logician Gilbert de la Porree, author of the Liber de Sex
Princifiisj which long remained famous as a commentary on six of
Aristotle's ten categories. 20 Hugh of St. Victor is not usually men-
tioned among John's teachers in France, but it is worth remember-
ing that Hugh was professor of theology in the famous school of
St. Victor in Paris from 1 133 to his death in 1 140, and that John not
only mentions him in the NLetalogicon but follows him in considering
invention and judgment to be the parts of dialectic. 21 Apart from his
contribution to logic, John was distinguished as an ecclesiastical execu-
tive under successive archbishops of Canterbury, and he underwent
the ordeal of witnessing the assassination of one of them, his friend
Thomas a Becket, at the hands of determined opponents of the exer-
cise of political power by the church. John died in 1 180 at Chartres,
where he had spent his last four years as bishop of that cathedral.
16 James Bass Mullinger, The University of Cambridge (Cambridge, 1873-1911),
l> 342-343-
17 Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 156. For a detailed digest of the Metalogicon, see
this same source, pp. 158-172; see also Atkins, The Medieval Phase> pp. 59-90. The
Metalogicon was completed in 1159. The best edition is that of Clement C. J. Webb,
Joannis Saresberiensis E-piscO'pi CarnoUnsis Metalogicon^ Libri 1 1 II (Oxford, 1929). The
work is also in Migne, Patrologia Latina y cxcix, 82,3-946.
18 Thus S. Harrison Thomson in a review of Webb's edition of the Metalogicon in
S-peculwn, v (January 1930), 133.
19 For a good brief sketch of his life, see Dictionary of National Biografhy^ s.v. John
of Salisbury.
20 This work is printed in Migne, Patrologia Latina> CLXXXVm, 1257-1270. For a
brief account of the author, see Biogra*phie Universelle, s.v. Gilbert de la Porree.
21 For a brief indication of John's indebtedness to Hugh, see Baldwin, Medieval
Rhetoric and Poetic^ p. 156, note 16. For a sketch of Hugh's life, see Biografhie Uni-
ffy s.v. Hugues de Saint-Victor.
[ 38 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
The next century produced Alexander of Hales, an English phi-
losopher who was later considered to be important enough in the his-
tory of logic to be called the father of the scholastics. 22 His great
work, the Summa Theologiae^ completed after his death by his col-
leagues in the Franciscan order, shows his knowledge of the Arab
interpreters of Aristotle, but is not primarily a treatise in our present
field. His contemporary, Edmund Rich, who became archbishop of
Canterbury and later was canonized as St. Edmund, has a stronger
connection with English logic of the thirteenth century 5 in fact, he
is said to have been "the first to expound the Sophistici Elenchi at
Oxford." 28 Rich's pupil, Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, and
first chancellor of Oxford, also expounded parts of Aristotle's
Organon at that university, and left behind commentaries on The
Categories^ The Sophistical Elenchi, and The Posterior Analytics^
the last of which was published at Naples perhaps as early as 1473,
and at Venice on several occasions later in the same century. 2 *
But for the great thirteenth-century work on logic, we must turn,
not to an English author, but to a Frenchman, Vincent of Beauvais,
and to his vast encyclopaedia, the Speculum Majus, thought to have
been completed around 1250. One of the three divisions of the orig-
inal Speculum Majus is the Speculum Doctrinale^ and Book IV of
the latter is devoted to logic, rhetoric, and poetics, logic being given
98 chapters, rhetoric 10, and poetics 23. 25 Vincent's method is to
22 Alexander is given this title in the early seventeenth century by Robert Sanderson,
Logicae Artis C 'ompendivm (Oxford, 1618), p. 119.
23 See John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship^ 3rd edn. (Cambridge,
19*0, *j 574> 59 2 -
24 Ibtd^ pp. 575-576. Grosseteste's Latin text of The Posterior Analytics and his com-
mentary thereon, as published at Naples between 1473 and 1478 by Sixtus Riessinger,
was accompanied by the following treatises, all in Latin: i) Porphyry's Isagoge^ with
the commentary of Boethiusj 2) Aristotle's The Categories^ also with the commentary
of Boethiusj 3) Gilbert de la Porree's Liber de Sex Printi-piis^ with the commentary of
Albertus Magnus 5 and 4) Aristotle's On Interpretation* A copy of this work is in the
Huntington Library.
Grosseteste is identified in the table of contents at the beginning of this volume as
follows: "Posterior editio de Analecticis Anstotelis & interpretatio Linconiensis viri
summi." He is identified in much the same way at the head of his text of Aristotle and
in a Latin quatrain before the text begins; also in much the same way at the end of the
text. Anthony a Wood, History and Antiquities of Oxford, ed. Gutch, I, 199, attributes
this spelling of Grosseteste's name to the mistake that a foreigner would make with the
Latin form of Lincoln. Wood notes just before that most authors call Grosseteste "Lin-
colniensis" without any additional explanation.
26 My analysis of the Speculum Doctrinale is based upon two fifteenth-century edi-
tions, one believed to have been done at Strasbourg by the R-printer about 147*) and
the other known to have been done at Nuremberg by Anton Koberger in 1486. Copies
of both of these editions are in the Huntington Library, The two are alike in respect to
division of subject matter into books and chapters, and in respect to text. The edition
[ 39 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
quote excerpts from the writers considered by him to have pre-
eminent authority in these three fields, and to arrange the excerpts in
a continuous and comprehensive discussion, so that each field is
represented by its best subject matter and its ablest spokesmen. Now
and then Vincent departs from this routine by adding a chapter or
paragraph of his own composing. His treatment of poetics in the com-
pany of logic and rhetoric is his way of indicating that he is following
Al-Farabi, Arab commentator on Aristotle, in respect to the classifi-
cation of poetic theory as the last of the parts of logic. In fact, Vincent
quotes Al-Farabi's Liber de Divisione Scientiarum to this effect at
the beginning of his account of the poetical art. 26 Alcuin, as we have
seen, thought of dialectic and rhetoric as the two parts of logic, and
John of Salisbury extended this simple classification to include also
within logical theory the discipline of grammar, with poetics as one
of its aspects. 27 Thus Vincent merely adds the authority of Al-Farabi
to this established trend in logical theory. His discussion of poetics as
the last part of logic will not seem completely antique today if we
remember that poetics in his time and later was considered to be that
part of the theory of communication which dealt with veiled dis-
course, whereas rhetoric and logic completed the theory of communi-
cation by dealing respectively with the open and the closed discourse.
Vincents treatment of logic is in the full scholastic tradition. After
five chapters of preliminary comment on the purposes and parts of
this science, he selects as his headings such customary topics as the
predicables, the categories, propositions, syllogism, induction, places
of dialectic, demonstration, dialectical proof, problems, definition,
division, and fallacies. His primary authority is Aristotle. He quotes
Latinized passages from each one of the six works of the Organon:
The Categories, On Interpretation, The Prior Analytics, The Pos-
terior Analytics, The Topics, and The Sophistical Elenchi. He also
quotes now and -then from Aristotle's other works. He makes no
secret of the origin of these quotations, taking care at the beginning
or in the course of each chapter to indicate by Latin title the Aris-
totelian work upon which he depends at that point. Wherever the
published at Douai in 1624 puts the discussion of logic, rhetoric, and poetics into Book
ill instead of Book iv$ see Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic y pp. 174-175. For
a brief outline of the Douai text of the entire Speculum Majus^ see The Encyclopaedia
Britennica^ nth edn., s.v. Vincent of Beauvais.
^S-peculum Doctrinale [Strasbourg, 14?*], Bk. iv, Ch. 109. For a translation of a
large part of this chapter, see Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic^ pp. 175-176.
27 For John's classification of the disciplines in the Trivium, see the convenient table
in Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic^ p. 157.
[ 40 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
source is someone else, he indicates as much, and these indications
involve names which we have encountered before. For example, he
quotes passages from Isidore's Etymologize, Richard of St. Victor's
Excerftionum, Al-Farabi's Liber de Divisions Scientiarum^ Boethius's
De Differentiis Torpids and Liber de Divisions, Porphyry's Isagoge,
Gilbert de la Porree's Liber de Sex Principiis, and Themistius's
Paraphrases of Aristotle, with Isidore, Boethius, and Gilbert being
cited most often.
One theme to appear not only in Vincent's scholastic logic but also
in the logic which Ramus produced three hundred years later as a
protest against scholasticism is that of Aristotle's three laws. Vincent
devotes Chapter 53 of his treatise on logic to these three laws, which
he calls "that which concerns all," "that which is through itself,"
and "that which is universal." Vincent's Latin terms for these laws
appear as the title to that chapter: "De hoc qd' est de 01 & p se &
vniuersale." His previous chapter consists of passages located by him
"in li. posterio [rum]," that is, in Aristotle's The Posterior Analytics,
and the same source, although not specifically cited, provides him
with all the passages that make up Chapter 53. As the three laws
occur in The Posterior Analytics, they are indications of the nature
of propositions which befit the necessary demonstrations of science. 28
Aristotle's view is that truly scientific propositions can be recognized
by three characteristics, and must possess these characteristics. Vin-
cent takes the same view. But his explanation of them is a condensa-
tion of Aristotle, and Aristotle is so elliptical at this point that his
chapter on the three characteristics is one of the most difficult in the
entire Organon. Thus my present rationalization of these character-
istics, or laws, is to be accepted, not as a final statement of Aristotle's
meaning, but as an attempt to arrange his obscure clues into a pat-
tern that best seems to interpret them.
The first law, called "de omni" by Vincent and other Latin com-
mentators on Aristotle, appears to indicate that the predicate of the
strictly scientific proposition must be true of every case of the subject.
Aristotle's illustrations of this law are incomplete, and Vincent's still
more so. But the language of both suggests that a proposition violates
28 See Aristotle, The Posterior Analytics, Bk. i, Ch. 4. Owen's translation of this chap-
ter in his Organon, or Logical Treatises, of Aristotle, i, 253-156, has some helpful com-
mentary upon the meaning of Aristotle's three phrases, that is, of "TO /caret irwrbs" as
the equivalent of "de omni," "T Ka6' atiro" as the equivalent of "per se" and "TO
leatfoXou" as the equivalent of "universale." See also G. R. G. Mure's clear translation
of this difficult chapter in The Works of Aristotle, ed. Ross, I, 73 a -;4 a .
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
this first law when the subject and predicate belong together m some
instances but not in others. For example, if we say that any three-
sided figure having angles equal to two right angles is an ^isosceles
triangle, our proposition violates this first law, not by giving an
isosceles triangle three sides, or three angles equal to two right angles,
but by failing to place within the subject something which must al-
ways be there if that subject is to be true of every case of isosceles
triangle. The additional something is that two of its sides must be
equal. Thus the subject (three-sided figure having angles equal to
two right angles) and the predicate (isosceles triangle) belong to-
gether, but not in every case not, for example, in the case where
three sides are equal, or in the case where the three sides are unequal,
for in those cases, our triangle is not an isosceles.
The second law, called "per se" in Latin versions of Aristotle, as
in the version followed by Vincent, appears to mean that the predicate
of a strict logical proposition must be harmonious within itself no
less than harmonious with its subject. Aristotle discusses this law by
oblique indications. Thus Vincent's excerpts from him are not con-
ducive to an understanding of the original text. What appears to be
meant is that a proposition fails to conform to this second law when
its predicate postulates among its own parts a harmony that does not
really exist or a disharmony that is contrary to fact. For example,
if we say that any number is either odd or prime, our predicate deals
with two essential attributes of number, and thus is satisfactory to
that extent, but it deals with them unharmoniously, inasmuch as the
attribute of oddness and the attribute of primeness cannot be defined
in terms of each other. Odd can be defined in terms of even j prime
in terms of composite. Only when the attributes in a predicate stand
in such opposition to each other that one excludes the other, as odd
excludes even, can we postulate opposition between them in refer-
ence to the subject to which they belong.
The third law, called "universale" by Aristotle's Latin commen-
tators and by Vincent, appears to mean that the predicate of any
strictly logical proposition must belong to its subject in a proximate
as opposed to a remote relation. Thus if we say that any linear struc-
ture having angles equal to two right angles is. a geometrical figure,
our predicate applies to our subject, not in a proximate but in a re-
mote sense, as the more general term "figure' 7 includes the more
specific term "triangle" without regard to those things in the subject
which make the latter term more strictly applicable than the former.
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
Thus Aristotle's three laws, as a description of the nature of the
propositions we should encounter in strictly scientific literature, as
for example in mathematical writings, would seem to indicate that a
logical predicate of a proposition must belong to every instance of its
subject, must be harmonious within itself, and must represent the
proximate class of its subject. What Aristotle probably wanted these
laws to say is that our statements are important, inasmuch as they set
our minds at work to infer other statements j and that therefore, if
these latter are not to get completely out of hand, completely at
variance with reality, we must be very careful about our formulation
of them and of the original statements that prepared the way for
them. His three laws are in other words three ways of being careful
that statements yield no more than they should in the way of in-
ferences and suggestions.
Our basic statements, which should be the most sharply scrutinized
and carefully formulated of all our utterances, constitute in the ag-
gregate what Aristotle meant by science. Logic was to him the corpus
of doctrine relating to the process of getting those basic statements
properly conceived and expressed. In some fields, say geometry, for
instance, our basic statements could conform to the three laws just
discussed. But in other fields, like law, politics, and ethics, our state-
ments could not achieve an exactitude that extended to the utmost
limits of the three laws, and thus these latter statements had to be
classed as opinion, not science. To Aristotle, dialectic was the corpus
of doctrine relating to the process of getting such opinion conceived,
organized, and expressed. Beyond logic and dialectic were two other
aspects of argument, called by Aristotle eristic or contentious argu-
ment, on the one hand, and sophistries or deceitful arguments, on the
other. The latter of these aspects we would today probably identify
as the profitable misreasonings of politics or commerce, whereas the
former are misreasonings employed in seminar or theater or aca-
demic chair to test hypotheses or display wit or develop skill in the
processes of debate and controversy. 29
Vincent's own approach to these matters is as Aristotelian as he
could make it. Not only does he discuss the three laws by relevant
quotations from. The Posterior Analytics^ as we have observed; he
also places just before that discussion a series of quotations from
29 For Aristotle's enumeration of these four types of argument, see The Topics^ Bk. l>
Ch. i. The translation by W, A. Packard-Cambridge in Vol. I of The Works of Aristotle^
ed. Ross, is particularly good.
[ 43 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
Aristotle's Topics on the subject of logical demonstration, dialec-
tical reasoning, contentious argument, and false syllogisms, thereby
establishing an Aristotelian basis for the last forty-seven chapters of
his logic. 80 Moreover, immediately after his recognition of the four
types of argument, and immediately before his discussion of the three
laws, he quotes (Chapter 52) from The Posterior Analytics^ as I
noted earlier, and arranges these quotations to constitute an explana-
tion of logical demonstration and its materials, as contrasted with the
three other types of proof or argument.
The period in which Vincent produced his Speculum Majus is also
the period of Roger Bacon's Opus Majus. This latter work, says
Whewell in an oft-quoted passage, "may be considered as, at the
same time, the Encyclopedia and the Novum Organon of the thir-
teenth century." 31 These words do not exaggerate the importance of
the Opus Majus as a summary of learning and a vision of things to
come in the history of science. For many reasons, as Burke has ob-
served, "the O-pus Majus must ever remain one of the few truly
great works of human genius." 33 Judgments as complimentary as
these should not blind us to the fact, however, that the Opus Majus
does not rank with Vincent's Speculum Doctrinale as a contribution
to logical theory or as an influence upon the scholastic logicians of
the Renaissance. Indeed, Bacon^s brief account of logic, showing his
grasp of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and Categories, showing also
his insight into the commentary of Averroes upon Aristotle, and into
Al-Farabi's Liber de Divisione Scientiarum, is dedicated, not to the
exposition of logical theory, but to the argument that "the whole
excellence of logic depends on mathematics." 38 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the Opus Majus devotes to mathematics the space
ordinarily reserved in such treatises to logical theorizing. Moreover,
the Opus Majus was not given a printed edition until 1733, whereas
Vincent's Speculum Doctrinale appeared several times at the earliest
printing presses of Europe, and was known during the late fifteenth
30 See Speculum Doctrinale, Bk. IV, Ch. 51. This chapter, as Vincent indicates, de-
pends upon Aristotle, "in thopicis," that is, upon The. Topics, Bk. i, Ch. i.
81 William Whewell, History of The Inductive Sciences^ $rd edn. (London, 1857), I,
368. The sense of Whewell's statement is quoted by Sandys, History of Classical Schol-
arship i, 590, and by R. Adamson in the account of Roger Bacon in the Dictionary of
National Biography.
32 Robert Belle Burke, The O$us Majus of Roger Bacon A Translation (Philadelphia,
1928)^1, xii.
38 Ibid. y i, 120. Bacon's account of logic covers the two and a half pages that precede
this quotation in Burke's translation, whereas the account of mathematics covers three
hundred following pages.
[ 44 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
century wherever printed books were collected. By a strange mis-
carriage of justice, those earliest presses were meanwhile publishing
only those works of Roger Bacon that had about them the aura of
sorcery and black magic. Thus his popular reputation, as shown to-
wards the end of the sixteenth century in Robert Greene's successful
drama, Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay, is that of an alchemist rather
than that of a prophet or philosopher.
Robert Grosseteste's commentary on The Posterior Analytics of
Aristotle, which has already been mentioned as having appeared in
print at Naples perhaps as early as 1473, deserves to be called the
first treatise on logic by an Englishman in the history of printed
books. Vincent's Speculum IDoctrinale no doubt preceded it in print
by at least a year, but Vincent does not belong, of course, in the cata-
logue of English logicians, except as an influence from without. 84
Grosseteste's little work on logic, and Vincent's more considerable
one, had both appeared in first editions before the introduction of
printing into England by Caxton in 1476. The first Latin logic by
an Englishman to be printed at an English press is Roger Swines-
head's Tractatus Logici^ believed to have been produced by Theo-
doric Rood at the first printing press at Oxford in I483- 35 Swines-
head, a shadowy figure in English logic, whose last name is often
given as Swiset or Suiseth, and whose first name is sometimes made
Richard rather than Roger,.was a fellow of Merton College, Oxford,
and flourished in the second quarter of the fourteenth century, as an
associate of a group of Merton scholars particularly interested in
mathematics, astronomy, and logical disputation. 36 In the same year
in which Swineshead's Tractatus Logici was published, another Latin
treatise on the same subject, the Scri^ptum su^er Libros Veteros
Logice, by Antonius Andreae, of the Franciscan order, appeared at
34 The earliest edition of the S-peculum Doctrinale is acknowledged to be that at
Strasbourg around 1472. See above, p. 39, note 25.
85 I havle not seen a copy of this work. For bibliographical descriptions of it, see
Falconer Aladan, Oxford Books (Oxford, 1895-1931), i, 35 also E. Gordon Duff,
Fifteenth Century English Books ([Oxford], 1917), p. 78. The volume contains 19
treatises, each with the word "Tractatus" in the title, the whole being- "strung- together
to form a systematic work on Logic," says Madan. These facts would seem to suggest
that Tractatus Logici ought to be the proper bibliographical title of the work, rather
than the English Logic preferred by Madan and DufT. The seventeenth treatise is signed,
"Et sic fmiuntur insolubilia sxvynishede," but, says Madan, "he was probably only the
author of that part." The entire nineteen treatises in this volume, including one called
Topics, are however, ascribed to Swineshead by Anthony a Wood, History and An*
tiquities of Oxford^ ed. Gutch, I, 4.19.
38 See F. M. Powicke, The Medieval Books of Merton College (Oxford, 1931),
pp. 25, 26, 27. See also Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Swineshead, Richard.
r 45 i
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
St. Albans. 87 Andreae, known otherwise for the disarming and per-
suasive way in which he explained the doctrines of his master, Jo-
hannes Duns Scotus, was by birth a Spaniard and by date a member
of the generation between Grosseteste and Vincent, on the one side,
and Swineshead, on the other. 38 Thus the earliest Latin logic printed
anywhere from an English author, the earliest Latin logic printed in
England from a foreign author, and the earliest Latin logic printed
in England from an English author, all represented the thinking of
the period between the middle years of the thirteenth and the middle
years of the fourteenth centuries, and all were first published as the
fifteenth century was drawing to its remarkable end.
While these events were occurring one by one, a development of
high promise but of small intrinsic value took place in English
logical theory. This development constituted the first printed at-
tempts to transmit logical doctrine through the medium of native
English speech. Thomas Wilson, as has been said, is the author of the
first logic in English 5 but seventy years before he published the
Rule of Reason, logic delivered herself of two brief English
speeches, both of which were designed rather to awaken interest in
herself than to develop her doctrine in a systematic way. These
speeches are usually assigned to the year 1480 or 1481 as their date
of publication. One is in verse and the other in prose. Let us look
briefly at each.
No doubt the first in point of time is that contained in the rambling
allegorical poem, De Curia Sa$iencie y now better known as The
Court of Sapience, which was published at Caxton's famous press in
Westminster perhaps in 1480, perhaps in I48i. 39 The poem recounts
87 I have not seen the St, Albans edition of this work. But it is apparently a slight
abridgment of the edition published at Venice in 1477 and 14,80, the latter of which I
have seen in the copy at the Hunting-ton Library. The Venice edition of 1480 contains
the following treatises: Serif turn super Ubrutn Porphirii; Scriptum super librum pre-
dicamentoruui Aristotelis} Scriptum super librum sex principiorum ; Scriptum super Itbros
pyermeniaS} Scriptum super Ubrutn dwisionum Boecii. The St. Albans edition, as de-
scribed by Duff, Fifteenth Century English Books y p. 7, ends with the words, "Explicit
scriptu Antonii in sua logica veneciis correctum." Immediately before these final words
is a passage which falls, not on the last page of the Venice edition of 1480, but on the
last page but three. Thus the Venice edition of 1480 contains at this point some matter
not found in the St. Albans edition. This Venice edition also contains at the beginning
about two pages of text which the St. Albans edition omits. Later issues of this work
appeared at Venice in i4gz, 1496, 1508, 1509, and 1517.
38 Grosseteste died in 1*53, Vincent in 1264, Swineshead about a century later. Andreae
flourished in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries 5 see Nouvelle Biographic
Generate^ s.v. Andres, Antoine.
38 The poem is in English, although its first edition is customarily listed under the
Latin title, De Curia Sapiencie. It is attributed by Stephen Hawes to John Lydgate. ee
[ 46]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
the adventures of the poet in forsaking the world and entering upon
the contemplative life. The episode of chief concern to the present
discussion is that in which the poet visits the castle of sapience and
encounters the seven ladies, symbolizing the seven liberal arts. The
second of these ladies is "Dame Dialetica." Although we meet her
as a person, we are informed in a kind of stage direction as we ap-
proach her parlor that a "breuis tractatus de Dialetica" is about to
begin. This brief treatise occupies seven stanzas, each of seven lines,
and its chief interest for us is that it mentions the terms used by
Dame Dialetica in teaching her art to her own clerks and scholars. 40
We are informed that "latyne was hyr langage," and indeed her
parlor is decorated with such argumentative formulas as "differt,"
"scire," and "incipit," while her pupils often chorus "Tu es asinus."
But the poet describes her subject matter in English terms, and per-
haps his is the earliest attempt to give his countrymen a taste of the
printed English vocabulary of logic. Thus "quatkyn," "proposicion,"
"diuisioun," "subiect," "couple," "predicate," "subalterne," "con-
tradiccion," "Equipollens," "conuersioun," "Silogismes," "sophyms,"
"vniuersals," "predicamentes," "topykes," "principals," "Elynkes,"
are the important words he mentions, 41 and these, awkward or fa-
miliar as they may now seem to be in relation to our established
idiom, were in their time a novel experiment.
At about the time of the appearance of The Court of Science in
its earliest edition, the first encyclopaedia in English, the Mirrour of
the World or thymage of the same^ came also from Caxton's press.
This work represents Caxton's own translation of a French prose
work, Sensuit le livre de clergie nomme lymage du monde^ compiled
around 1245 by a Frenchman now identified as Gossouin. 42 Caxton's
his The Pastime of Pleasure, ed. William Edward Mead, Early English Text Society,
Original Series, No. 173 (London, 1928 [for 1927]), p. 56, line 1357. The second
edition, titled The Courts of Sapyence^ appeared at London in 1510. The only modern
edition, The Court of Sapience Spat-Mittelenglisches Allegorisch-Didaktisches Vision-
gedicht, ed. Dr. Robert Spindler, in Beitrage zur Englischen Philologie, vi (Leipzig,
*9*7)j is the basis of my present discussion and contains (pp. 97-114.) a survey of the
question of authorship of the poem.
40 See Spindler, pp. 196-198 [stanzas 264-270].
41 Judging by the variant reading given for line 1872 by Spindler, I suggest that
"principals" refers to Gilbert de la Porree's Liber de Sex Principiis. "Predicamentes,"
"topykes," and "Elynkes," refer of course to Aristotle's Categories, Topics^ and The
Sophistical Elenchi. The other terms are all to be located in these treatises or elsewhere
in the Organon. For additional information about the origin of these stanzas on logic,
see Curt Ferdinand Buhler, The Sources of the Court of Sapience, Beitrage zur Eng-
lischen Philologie, xxni (1932), pp. 71-74.
42 For details regarding publication date, source, composition date, and authorship of
[ 47 1
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
Mirrour gives an English account of the seven sciences, the entire
chapter on logic being as follows:
The secode science is logyke whyche is called dyaletyque. This science
proueth the .pro. and the .contra. That is to saye the verite or trouthe
and otherwyse. And it preueth wherby shal be knowen the trewe fro
the fals and the good fro the euyll. So veryly that for the good was
created heuen and maad And on the contrarye wyse for the euyll was
helle maad and establisshyd whiche is horrytle stynkyng and re-
doubtable. 43
This statement of the moral as well as scientific end of logic is not
accompanied by any analysis of logical means, any recommendation
as to logical procedures. The third edition of the Mirrour , published
by Laurence Andrewe at London in or around 1527, rectifies this
defect by enlarging the account of logic to 93 lines of text, as con-
trasted to 13 lines in the edition just quoted, and by offering tech-
nical definitions and illustrations of such logical instruments as the
proposition, the argument, definition, and description. 44 Beyond this
point, however, the English vocabulary of logic did not progress
until Wilson published his Rule of Reason.
Along with the interesting attempt in The Court of Sapience to
render logical terms into English speech and into the still more un-
accustomed medium of verse, we should here notice an early six-
teenth-century poem, Stephen Hawes's The Pastime of Pleasure.
Like The Court before it, The Pastime is a didactic allegory. As
this work, see Caxton's Mirrour of the World^ ed. Oliver H. Prior, Early English Text
Society, Extra Series, ex (London, 1913 [for 1912]), pp. v-x.
43 [William Caxton], Mirrour of the World or thytnage of the same ([Westminster,
1481]), sig-. C4v. From the Hunting-ton Library photostat of their own original copy.
44 The third edition is called The myrrour: & dyscrypcyon of the <worlde <with 'many
meruaylles. Its colophon reads: "Enprynted by me Laurence Andrewe dwellynge in
etestrete at the sygne of the golde crosse by flete brydge." It bears no date, but is
assigned tentatively to the year 1527 by the British Museum catalogue. The seven chap-
ters between Ch. 7 and Ch. 1 3 deal with the seven liberal arts, as had the same chapters
in the two earlier editions. But, as the following table shows, the edition of 1527 re-
arranges the order of the seven arts and adds new material to that contained in the
earlier texts:
Edition of 1481 Edition 0/1527?
Ch. 7 (On grammar) 21 lines Ch. 7 (On grammar) 72 lines
Ch. 8 (On logic) 13 lines Ch. 8 (On rhetoric) 84. lines
Ch. 9 (On rhetoric) 23 lines Ch. 9 (On logic) 93 lines
Ch. 10 (On arithmetic) 23 lines Ch. 10 (On geometry) 166 lines
Ch. ii (On geometry) 14 lines Ch. n (On arithmetic) 273 lines
Ch. iz (On music) 41 lines Ch. 12 (On music) 71 lines
Ch. 13 (On astronomy) 115 lines Ch. 13 (On astronomy) 138 lines
[ 48 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
critics have pointed out, it represents a course of training in the seven
liberal arts as the proper preparation for the life of an ideal knight
and as a necessary step in winning a fair lady of higher degree than
the suitor. 45 Although its account of rhetoric is of more interest his-
torically and otherwise than is its account of logic, the latter deserves
mention as a continuation of Caxton's emphasis upon the moral end
of this science upon its relevance to the quest for salvation. The
lady who dwells in the bright chamber of logic summarizes the vir-
tues of her science in these words:
So by logyke is good perceyueraunce
To deuyde the good and the euyll a sondre
It is alway at mannes pleasaunce
To take the good and cast the euyll vnder
Yf god made hell it is therof no wonder
For to punysshe man that hadde intellygence
To knowe good from yll by trewe experyence. 46
There are five other stanzas like this, each having seven lines, and
each being devoted in part or wholly to the praise of logic as the
science of discerning, by argumentation grounded on reason, who are
friends or foes, and what is false or true, right or wrong, in this
wretched world. These stanzas are part of the defective first edition
of The Pastime^ as published by Wynkyn de Worde at London in
1 509 j and of course they figure in the improved editions published
in 1517, I554j and I555- 47 Thus they were available for a half-
century as a reminder to readers that learning in logic is conducive to
the good life and to success in love.
That same half-century not only produced Wilson's Rule of Rea-
son as the first fully developed vernacular logic j it also produced
John Seton's Dialectic^ the first Latin textbook on logic to be pub-
lished in England, and the first response in English logical theory
to the enormously popular sixteenth-century continental work, Ru-
dolph Agricola's De Iwventione Dialectics. Agricola has been pre-
viously mentioned as a logician of the fifteenth century, and his De
Inventions Dialectica as a work which gave wide currency to ancient
45 See The Pastime of Pleasure ', ed. Mead, p. xliii. For a discussion of the relation of
The Court of Salience to The Pastime 'of Pleasure, see Whitney Wells, "Stephen Hawes
and The Court of Salience" The Review of English Studies^ VI (1930), 284-294.
46 The Pastime of Pleasure^ ed. Mead, p. 29 [lines 631-637].
47 A discussion of all editions of this poem will be found in Mead's reprint, pp. xxix-
xli. See his first note, p. xxx, for a precise indication of the missing lines in the 1509
edition.
[ 49 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
theory that the two parts of dialectic are invention and disposition/ 8
Speaking of Agricola's influence at Cambridge in the period before
1545, Mullinger says that "his treatise on logic became a text-book
in our own university," 49 As for the European attitude towards De
Inventione Dialectic^ Mullinger is quite right in remarking that the
treatise "appears to have been one of the most popular of the two
or three manuals that, up to the time of Seton, superseded for a
time the purely scholastic logic." 50
John Seton was educated at St. John's College, Cambridge, where
he earned the degree of bachelor of arts in 1528 and that of master
of arts in 1532, and where he served an appointment as fellow, dur-
ing which time he taught philosophy. Later he studied divinity, and
was awarded his doctorate in that subject at Cambridge in 1544. A
Roman Catholic, he held several ecclesiastical posts for the next
decade, but he eventually left England as a result of the religious
troubles of the period between the death of Henry VIII and the
early days of Elizabeth^ reign. He died at Rome in 1567. His
Dialectica was first published in 1545. According to his biographer,
Thompson Cooper, "this work was extensively circulated in manu-
script among students long before it appeared in print, and for nearly
a century it was recognized as the standard treatise on logic." 51 The
popularity of the Dialectics was due in large part, however, to Peter
Carter, also a graduate of St. John's, Cambridge, who brought out
In Johannis Setoni Dialecticam Annotationes at London in the fif-
teen-sixties, 52 and whose Dialectica loannis Setoni Cantabrigiensis>
aimotatlonibus Petri Carteri, as published at London in 1572 and
many times thereafter, kept Seton's logical doctrine alive for the next
seventy years. 53 My present discussion of Seton's Dialectica is based
upon the popular text as edited and annotated by Carter, 8 * since this
joint work is in point of influence superior to its predecessor.
48 See above, p. 1 6*
* 9 Mullinger, University of Cambridge^ I, 410.
Ibid., 1,4 1 3-
51 Dictionary of National Biograf&y, s.v. Seton, John.
52 In 1563, according to the Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Carter, Peter.
The work is entered in the Stationers 1 Registers during the year 1562-1563; see Edward
Arber, A Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers (London and Bir-
mingham, 1875-1894), I, 208. A copy dated London, 1568, is held at the library of
Trinity College, Dublin.
58 After the London edition of 1572, the Dialectica of Seton and Carter appeared in
*574 I577> 1584-1 I6n s 1617, 1631* 1639-
B * The title page of the edition I cite throughout my present discussion reads : "Dia-
lectica loannis Setoni Cantabrigiensis, annotationibus Petri Carteri, vt clarissimis ita
[ 50 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
The Dialectica is divided into four sections or books, the first three
of which deal with judgment or disposition as a main part of logic,
whereas the final section deals with invention as the other main part.
The reason for this disproportionate emphasis upon disposition, as
stated in words clearly attributed by Carter to Seton, is that Agricola
had treated invention with fulness and fluency, and that Seton him-
self would therefore undertake to speak of what remained. 55 Carter
elaborates this position by saying that Seton had largely confined
his work to disposition on the theory that dialectic chiefly treats that
subject 56 a theory, by the way, which Cicero had attributed to the
Stoics and had himself rejected. 57 To Carter, the practice of empha-
sizing disposition more than invention apparently seems justified,
because he makes no attempt to change Seton's original decision to
give only the last of his four main sections to the latter subject. But
Carter does recognize in his annotations that invention is prior to dis-
position in the order of nature, as matter is prior to form, and hie
credits this sentiment to Boethius. 68
As for the relation of dialectic to rhetoric and to logic, Carter ad-
heres to traditional scholastic views. Zeno's ancient metaphor is in
his mind if not in his exact words when he says : "Dialectic is the art
of disputing, Rhetoric the art of speaking, the latter being more
copious, the former, more 'compressed." 59 Thus both arts bear a rela-
tion to the parent discipline of logic, although Carter stresses only
the connection between logic and dialectic, and disposes them to-
wards each other as whole to part* 60 This opinion, which he attributes
breuissimis explicata. Hvic Accessit, ob Artium ingenuarum inter se cognationem, Gui-
lielmi Buclaei Arithmetica. Londini, Excudebant Gerardus Dewes & Henricus Marsh, ex
assignatione Thomae Marsh. Anno Salutis. 1584. Cvm Privilegio." In this edition,
which I consulted at the Huntington Library, Seton's text is distinguished from Carter's
notes by printed marginal indications, "Seton" designating the former, and "Car." the
latter.
55 The text reads at this point: "Dialectica est artificium, docens de quauis materia
probabiliter disserere, hanc in duas secant partes, nimirum, inueniendi & iudicandi de
priori diligenter & satis copiose scripsit Rhodulphus: de altero vero nos (volente Deo)
dicere aggrediemur." (sig. Air.) This section is designated in the margin as Seton's.
Carter's name does not appear until sig. A3r, where a heading announces for the first
time the presence of his annotations.
56 Says Carter, sig. AST: "Setonus inscripsit librum suum de iudicio, quia praecipue
earn Dialectices partexn tractat."
57 Topica, 6-7. See also above, p. 15.
58 Sig. A 3 r.
59 Sig. A3v. The text reads: "Ars disserendi Dialectica est, ars dicendi Rhetorica est:
haec enim latior est, ilia est strictior." Translation mine here and below.
eo Sig. ASV. The text: "Dialectica affecta est ad Logicam, tanquam pars ad totum.
Coelius secundus." "Coelius secundus" refers to Coelius Secundus Curio or Curion (5503-
[ 51 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
to Coelius Secundus Curio, might as handily have been attributed to
Alcuin, or to Isidore, among others. 61 It represents, of course, a view
unlike that of Wilson, who thought of dialectic and logic as identi-
cal. 63 But nevertheless it has deep roots in scholastic logic, and it was
not one of the opinions which seemed to matter much one way or the
other in the early sixteenth century.
As Seton and Carter proceed with their four books of doctrine,
they follow a scheme suggested by the conventional arrangement of
the various treatises in Aristotle's Organon. Thus Book I deals with
the simplest ingredients of learned discourse, that is, with terms, and
these require as the chief points of emphasis a discussion of the five
predicables and the ten categories. It will be recalled at this point
that the ten categories are the subject of the treatise ordinarily placed
first in the Organon^ and that Porphyry's Isagoge, as an introduction
to that first treatise, gave special currency to the concept of the five
predicables. Seton and Carter handle these big points of emphasis in
the style of scholastic logic. What they say of the general difference
between predicable and category is worth quoting, if only to remind
ourselves that scholastic logic, as the theory of learned discourse,
considered it important to deal not only with the basic methods of
reasoning and organization, but also with the -basic vocabulary in
which all learning was to be expressed. Here are their exact words:
Concerning the difference in theory between
arranging words into categories and predicables.
Words are arranged together in predicables whenever they are being
examined along with other words. As "virtue" in respect to "man"
is accident j in respect to "condition," species; in respect to "temper-
ance," genus. Words are arranged together in categories, whenever
they are being examined in and for themselves. As "virtue" examined
without any other regard is quality. 63
Book II in Seton and Carter's scheme deals with propositions, even
as De Interfretauone^ conventional second treatise in the
1569), professor of belles-lettres at Basel, whose Logices Elementorum Libri Quatuor
(Basel, 1567) is, I assume, the work from which Carter drew these words. But I have
not been able to check this source.
61 See above, pp. 34, 36. e2 See above, p. 17.
ds Si. B8v. The Latin text, headed "De Pr^dicamentis," reads:
De diuersa ratione collocandarum vocum in praedicamentis, & praedicabilibus.
Voces collocantur in praedicabilibus, quemadmodum cum aliis considerantur. Vt, virtus
respectu hominis, accidens est: Respectu habitus, species j respectu temperantiae, genus.
Voces collocantur in praedicamentis, quemadmodum per se considerantur: vt, virtus
sine alterius respectu est in qualitate.
[ 52 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
takes up the same subject. The transitional sentence with which Book
II opens is attributed to Seton himself by his collaborator, and it
shows that the order of progress through the subject of logic is here
envisaged as an order of increasing complexity, the proposition being
a unit composed of simpler elements called terms, and being there-
fore more difficult to manage than is any one of its components. 64
The subject matter of Book II is afforded by the analysis of the
parts of propositions (subject, predicate, copula), the types of propo-
sitions (categorical and hypothetical), the forms of opposition be-
tween propositions, the forms of equivalence among propositions, the
nature of definition and description, and the nature of division. Dis-
course and its problems are everywhere in the authors' minds. Even
poetry is given a passing glance in the passage on description. The
authors say:
Description is twofold, poetical and dialectical. In poetical description
the genus 1 is omitted for the most part, and the opposite is done in
dialectical description. Description sets out a thing appropriately
that is, it is convertible with the process of delineating. 65
But redundancies develop. Thus in discussing definition, Seton and
Carter run through the places to show how definition can be accom-
plished by recourse to the differentia, the property, the whole, the
part, the conjugate form, and so on 3 yet in Book IV, where invention
is discussed, the same places are again the heads of discussion, and
the same doctrine has to be covered again.
The subject matter of Book III is argumentation the process of
combining logical propositions so that a fully articulated act of
thought, a complete inference or demonstration, is created. This
aspect of logic is considered in Aristotle's Prior Analytics, it will be
remembered, and that treatise is usually the third element in the
Qrganon. To Seton and Carter, dialectic has a special interest in the
structures of reasoning. "The highest goal of this art," they say, "to
which everything else in it tends, is argumentation, and we have des-
tined the third book to the explanation of it." They add: "First,
therefore, it ought to be shown what argumentation is 5 next, how
64 See sig. F6v for the beginning of Book II and for the wording of this transitional
sentence.
65 Sig. Kir. The Latin text reads at this point:
Descriptio duplex. Poetica. Dialectica.
In poetica descriptione maxima ex parte omittitur genus, e contra sit in Dialectica
descriptione.
Descriptio rem apposite explicat, id est, couertitur cum descriptio.
[ 53 1
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
many basic forms it has 5 and lastly, what are its affiliated types." 66
Book III follows this tripartite plan. Argumentation is defined as
reasoning in which specific propositions are laid down and a specific
conclusion drawn from them. It is a verbal process, to be distin-
guished from argument, which is not fully verbalized. 67 The basic
forms of argumentation are enumerated as syllogism, induction, en-
thymeme, and example. 68 In the discussion of syllogism, a table is
put in to show what terms were assigned to the members of the syl-
logism by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Themistius, Boethius, and
Agricola, 69 Induction is defined as an act of argument from many
particulars to one universal, or an act of progression from parts to
whole. 70 The enthymeme stands as an imperfect syllogism, only one
of the two premises being given to justify the conclusion, as when it
is argued that no science is designed without use, and therefore dia-
lectic is not designed without use. 71 An argument from example is a
demonstration in which one particular is proved from another on ac-
count of some resemblance between them, as when we say that the
touching of moist gypsum or white clay easily induces it to take what-
ever form you like, and that therefore rude minds are capable of
every discipline. 72
As for the affiliated types of argumentation, these are discussed
here and there during the exposition of the four main types. Perhaps
chief among the affiliates is the rhetorical syllogism. This is conceived
as a movement in five distinct parts, first being the statement of the
major premise, then the citing of proof for it, then the statement of
the minor premise, then the citing of proof for it, and finally, the
statement of the conclusion. The explanation and illustration of these
steps are borrowed by Seton and Carter from Cicero's De Iwven-
ttone y 1. 33. 58-59. Rhetorical induction is also made an affiliated
type of argumentation, and it is differentiated from dialectical induc-
tion as a probable conclusion based upon cases differs from a necessary
conclusion based upon cases. 74 Still another affiliated type is the
dilemma, and with it Book III ends.
ee Sig. Liv. The Latin text reads: "Svmmus hums artis scopus, ad quern omnia diri-
guntur, est argumentatio. Cui explicande. tertium libru destinauimus. Primum ergo quid
argumentatio, deinde quotuplex sit, postremo quae ei affinia sunt demonstrandum est,"
87 Sig, L;jr. as Sig. I-3V. 69 Sig. 1-4 v.
70 Sig. N8v. The Latin definition is: "Inductio est argumentatio a pluribus singularibus
ad vniuersale: vel a partibus ad totum progression*
71 Sig. 3 r. 72 Sig. Ojr. Sig. N 5 v.
74 Sig. Oir.
[ 54 ]
BACKGROUNDS OF SCHOLASTICISM
Book IV, as indicated earlier, deals with invention, the second
main part of dialectic, and proceeds to classify, enumerate, and dis-
cuss all of the places in which argumentative materials could be
found. This section of dialectical theory depends ultimately, of
course, upon Aristotle's Topics, usually arranged as the fifth book of
the Organon. The places are indicated in tabular form by Seton and
Carter as being divided into two main classes, the internal and the
external, each of which is further divided and subdivided until
thirty-three places are ultimately specified. 75
Seton and Carter's Dialectica is virtually the last maj or document
in the history of scholastic logic in England, Even as it appeared in
1572, new influences were beginning to be felt among English logi-
cians, and the chief of these influences was to be Ramistic logic, al-
ready on the threshold of being given an English translation and a
Latin edition for the first time at an English press. This historical
fact sheds some interesting light upon the complimentary verses
which Thomas Drant wrote as a preface to Carter's annotations of
Seton. These verses are a catalogue of the names of famous logicians
of the past, and of the place of Thomas Wilson, John Seton, and
Peter Carter on that roll. Ramus is also there, although not in such
a way as to suggest that his dialectic might one day supplant on Eng-
lish soil the scholastic logic celebrated by Drant. The verses which
contain Drant's references to Seton and Carter, Wilson and Ramus,
run as follows:
Yet helpful is Ramus, as if he alone were the
fruit-bearer,
Thrusts he forth grape-clusters joyful, with
Phoebus smiling the while.
The force of examples adorns him, as do also
finiteness and use,
Art also adorns him, and maxims, and luminous
order.
Nothing sweet to have tasted in fruits of that
very rame.
Our Wilson has spoken in accents of our very
country,
The Britannic Muse praises him still for his
pioneering:
Sig-. Pir.
[ 55 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
Nor, Seton, is your labor done in an ignoble
fashion,
Nor Carter, is yours: grace lies in both of your
works. 76
76 Sig. A/J.V. The Latin text reads :
Vtilis ast Ramus, quasi solus fructifer esset,
Protrudit laetos (Phoebo ridente) racemos.
Hunc exemplorum virtus, hunc finis, & vsus,
Hunc ars & voces ornant & lucidus ordo,
Fructibus istius Kami, nil dulcidus esu.
Wilsonus nostras, nostrati voce locutus
Claret adhuc nouitate rei, Musaque Britanna:
Nee (Setone) tuum plane est ignobile factum,
Nee (Cartere) tuum: decus est vtroque labore.
The play on the word "ramus," which as a common noun means "branch," "bough,"
"twig-," etc., is not easily rendered into English. The rare English word "rame," mean-
ing "branch of a tree" is the only possibility I can find for Drant's playful and diffi-
cult Latin.
III. Witcraft
RALPH LEVER'S The Arte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcrajt^ pub-
lished at London in 1573, has the interesting distinction of being the
second full-fledged logic in English, the final English logic in the
tradition of pre-Ramistic scholasticism, and a work which, had things
turned out a bit differently, might have stood where Wilson's Rule
of Reason stands as the first complete logic in our language. 1 In view
of Lever's theory of the proper terminology for English logic, he
might have changed the whole vocabulary of this science in the Eng-
lish-speaking world, had his Witcraft preceded Wilson's more con-
servative work and gained for itself the authority that any original
effort usually commands. At any rate, my account of scholastic logic
in England would be incomplete without reference to Lever, and
would lack some elements of color that only his peculiar approach to
his subject can impart. Thus to him I now turn in bringing this chap-
ter to a close.
Lever's career was parallel to Wilson's in many ways. Both were
born in the middle years of the decade between 1 520 and 1 530. Both
were educated at Cambridge, where Wilson attended King's College,
and Lever, St. John's. Both were undergraduates at about the same
time, Wilson being awarded his bachelor's degree in arts in 1 545-46,
and Lever his two years later. The same time interval separated
them when they both took their master's degree at Cambridge three
years after their first degree. For a time both were in the service of
noble families, Wilson as tutor of the sons of the Duchess of Suffolk,
and Lever as tutor of Walter, first earl of Essex, to whom he later
dedicated his Witcraft. Both were in exile from England during the
bitter reign of Mary Tudor. Both had a connection with Durham,
Lever being appointed canon of that cathedral in 1567, and Wilson
lay dean in- 1580. Wilson's biographer comments that Ralph Lever
protested against Wilson's being given this appointment, apparently
on the ground that the post should have gone to a professional
churchman. 2 Both men held doctoral degrees, Wilson from Ferrera
1 The title page reads : "The Arte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft, teaching a
perfect way to argue and dispute. Made by Raphe Leuer. Scene and allowed, according
to the order appointed in the Queenes Maiesties Iniunctions. Imprinted at London, by
H. Bynneman, dwelling in Knightrider streate, at the signe o the Mermayde. Anno.
1573. These Bookes are to be solde at his Shop at the Northwest dore of Paules church."
My references below are to the Huntington Library photostat of their own copy of this
work. So far as I know, the 1573 edition is the only one ever made.
2 Dictionary of National Biogra$hy> s,v. Wilson, Thomas (i525?-i58i). Ralph
Lever's biography in the same work does not refer to this interesting fact,
[ 57 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
and Lever from Cambridge. As has been said, both wrote complete
English logics, and were the two first to do so. Finally, both died in
the first half of the decade between 1580 and 1590, Wilson being
then famous as privy councillor and secretary of state, whereas^Lever
was at least of solid standing as holder of successive ecclesiastical
posts and as master of Sherburn Hospital in Durham.
There is some reason to believe that Lever became ^ interested in
the project of writing a logic in English shortly after his undergrad-
uate days at Cambridge, even as Wilson had done. In the dedicatory
letter in Witcrafa as he bestows his work upon the earl of Essex,
Lever says that "Martine Bucer read ouer this arte, in his old^days,
and renewed in his age, the rules that he learned thereof in his
youth." 3 This remark appears to place the date of the completion of
Witcraft sometime in the period between 1549 and X 55i, even
though the work was not published until more than twenty years
thereafter. As evidence that Witcraft belongs to this two-year period,
there is the circumstance of Bucer's having been regius professor of
divinity at Cambridge between the autumn of 1 549 and the time of
his death on February 28, 1551, whereas his earlier career had been
spent on the continent as an advocate of Protestantism and an asso-
ciate of Luther. So far as Lever is concerned, the same two-year
period was that in which he held an appointment as fellow of St.
John's, Cambridge, and worked to complete the studies for his mas-
ter's degree. Thus this period is the only time when Bucer's path
could have crossed Lever's in such a way as to make it possible for
the former to "read ouer" the latter's art of reason.
As additional evidence that Witcraft belongs to this two-year
period, there is the circumstance of Lever's endeavoring in "The
Forespeache" of his work "To proue that the arte of Reasoning may
be taught in englishe."* Lever's whole discussion of this point appears
to fit historically into the period before 1551, but not into the period
that followed. For in 1551, as noted earlier, Wilson's Rule of Rea-
son was published, and it was popular enough to have had four later
editions before Lever's Witcraft appeared in print. 6 Now, Lever does
not refer to the Rule of Reason as an unsatisfactory first step in the
attempt to teach logic in English. What is more striking, he does
not mention Wilson's pioneering work anywhere in the preface or
text of Witcraft^ even though, as I said, Wilson had been an older
contemporary of his at Cambridge, and had conspicuously succeeded
3 Witcrafa sig, *$r. * Sig. *4r. B See above, p. 29.
[ 58 ]
WITCRAFT
long before Witcraft was published in accomplishing the very pur-
pose which Lever himself was attempting. These omissions make it
difficult to believe that the main body of Witcraft was written after
Wilson's Rule of Reason was published. Coupled with the reference
to Bucer's having read the work in his old age, Lever's complete
silence on the subject of Wilson offers strong proof that Witcraft
was already in something like final form at the very moment when
the Rule of Reason captured the honor of being the first logic in
English. Only an author who has been beaten to the press by a rival
can fully appreciate what Lever's frustration must have been when
the Rule of Reason appeared in 1551. But Lever gained second hon-
ors at least by putting out Witcraft when he did. All he probably
added to the manuscript Bucer had seen were the dedicatory letter
and the concluding section of "The Forespeache." This concluding
section, which ends with the words, "Farewell from Duresme, the
.24. of Nouember, 1572," contains a spirited denunciation of one
W. F., who had edited Lever's The Philosopher's Game in 1563
without Lever's authorization and without respecting Lever's manu-
script. 7 This denunciation and the dedicatory letter with its reference
to Lever's period of service as tutor of Essex could not have been
written before 1563, but everything else in Witcraft could have
been and undoubtedly was the product of the period between 1549
and 1551.
Lever's approach to the task of creating an English logic where
none as yet existed was ingenious and radical; Most scholars in his
position would have created an English vocabulary out of the forms
of the established Latin vocabulary. In fact, Wilson was then doing
this very thing in preparing his Rule of Reason for the press. Thus
he was referring to his subject as logic or dialectic, and to its cognate
subject as rhetoric, as if Latin words could become English almost
fi Sig. *V.
7 The Most Noble auncient^ and learned flaye, called the Philosophers game y by Rafe
Leuer and augmented by W. F. (London, [1563]), is devoted to the description of a
game called "the battell of numbers" as played on "a doble chesse bord" (sig. Air,
Aar). "W. F." is identified as William Fulke by Lever's biographer in the Dictionary
of National Biography \ but he should be identified as William Fullwood, according to
the better authority of the Huntington Library Catalogue. The Huntington Catalogue,
s.v. Fullwood, William, points out that the verses on the fifteenth page (which are en-
titled "The bookes verdicte" and fall on the page preceding the text) are an acrostic,
with the first letter in each line combining to read "W ILYAM FVLVO D."
This William Fullwood was the one who published at London in 1568 The Enimie of
Idleness^ discussed below (pp. 143-145) as one of the early formulary rhetorics in
England.
[ 59 1
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
without change. Thus too he was creating for logic an English vocab-
ulary made up of such terms as predicables, predicaments, definition,
proposition, subject, predicate, and so on, where his every term had
a form derived from its Latin equivalent. But Lever would have
none of this. In his preface he states a less expected theory regarding
the problem of an English logic:
Therefore consider the case as it is: An arte is to be taughte in that
toung, in whiche it was neuer written afore. Nowe the question lyeth,
whether it were better to borrowe termes of some other toung, in
whiche this sayde Arte hath bene written: and by a litle chaunge of
pronouncing, to seeke to make them Englishe wordes, whiche are
none in deede: or else of simple vsual wordes, to make compounded
termes, whose seuerall partes considered alone, are familiar and
knowne to all english men? 8
The second of these options is the one chosen by Lever. He believes
himself to be close to the genius of our language in making this
choice, as he himself observes:
As for deuising of newe termes, and compouding of wordes, our
tongue hath a speciall grace, wherein it excelleth many other, & is
comparable with the best. The cause is, for that the moste parte of
Englyshe woordes are shorte, and stande on one sillable a peece. So
that two or three of them are ofte times fitly ioyned in one. 9
Thus does Lever expound his theory of an English terminology
for logic. But even with this theory in mind, the reader is not fully
prepared for what he finds later in the actual text of Witcraft. He
finds nothing unexpected in the way of doctrine, to be sure. Lever
arranges his doctrine into four books, precisely as Seton had done,
the three first books being devoted to judgment or disposition, and
the last, to invention. Moreover, in progressing through these two
grand divisions of logic, Lever goes from simpler to more complex
units of discourse, speaking in Book I of words, in Book II of propo-
sitions, in Book III of inductive and deductive arguments, and in
Book IV of the places or topics. But the reader in assimilating this
conventional scholastic doctrine finds himself in contact with an
amazing terminology. Lever's preface contains several anticipations
of his vocabulary, and one of the best is the passage in which he gives
his reader a first taste of what is to come. After stating his preference
for a familiar English vocabulary, he says:
8 Wttcrafty sig. *5v-*6r. 9 Ibid., sig. *5r-*5v.
[ 60 ]
WITCRAFT
For trial hereof, I wish you to aske of an english man, who vnder-
standeth neither Greek nor Latin, what he conceiueth in his mind,
when he heareth this word a backset, and what he doth conceiue when
he heareth this terme a Predicate. And doubtlesse he must confesse,
if he consider y matter aright or haue any sharpnesse of wit at al,
that by a backset, he conceiueth a thing that muste be set after, and
by a predicate, that he doth vnderstande nothing at all. The like shall
fall foorth when comparison is made, betwixt any of our new termes
compounded of true english words, and the inkhorne termes deriued
of straunge and forain languages. 10
A preference for "backset" as opposed to "predicate" is a fair
sample of the prevailing direction of Lever's vocabulary. "Logic" or
"dialectic" as terms for the subject he is treating disappear in favor
of "witcraft." "Rhetoric" as a term for the other branch of the theory
of communication disappears in favor of "speechcrafte." "Astron-
omy," on the few occasions when it is mentioned, disappears in favor
of "starcraft." Thus Lever says at one point: "For if it be wel sayd,
learning is not gotten with ease: it is also well sayd: witcraft is not
gotten with ease, speechcrafte, starcraft, Physike, lawe, or any other
kind of learning." 11 In his table of special terms at the end of his
work, he defines his subject as follows:
Witcrafte. ... If those names be alwayes accompted the best, which
doe moste playnly teache the hearer the meanyng of the thyng, that
they are appoynted to expresse: doubtelesse neyther Logicke, nor
Dialect can be thought so fit an Englishe worde to expresse and set
foorth the Arte of reason by, as Witcraft is, seeing that Wit in oure
mother toung is oft taken for reason: and crafte is the aunciente
English woorde, whereby wee haue vsed to expresse an Arte: whiche
two wordes knit together in Witcrafte, doe signifie the Arte that
teacheth witte and reason. 12
This principle is everywhere in evidence. Thus, for "category"
Lever has "storehouse" 5 for "proposition," "saying"; for "declara-
tive proposition," "shewsay"; for "definition," "saywhat"; for "af-
firmation," "yeasay"; for "negation," "naysay"} for "induction,"
"reason by example" j for "deduction," "reason by rule"j for "prem-
ise," "foresaye"$ and for "conclusion," "endsay."
A final example will show how strange this language is today,
despite its origin in simple English words. Here is a rule covering
the relation of the elements in a logical proposition to each other:
10 Ibid.> sig. *6r. Ibid., p. 150. 12 Ibid., pp. 138-239.
[ 61 ]
SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
If the backset be sayd of the foreset, and be neyther his sayewhat,
propretie, nor difference: then it is an Inbeer. For that we count an
Inbeer, which being in a thing, is neyther his saywhat, propretie,
kinde, nor difference. 13
When there was no established vocabulary for English logic, this
rule would doubtless have sounded as unfamiliar in a Latinized Eng-
lish as in Lever's Saxon English. But today Lever's English is al-
most completely unintelligible, and would have to be turned into the
very inkhorn terms he despised in order to yield its meaning. What
he is saying is this:
If the predicate is said of the subject, and is neither the definition,
the property, nor the differentia, of the subject, then it is an accident.
For that we count as accident, which being in a thing, is neither that
thing's definition, property, genus, nor differentia.
Like the other logicians in the scholastic tradition, Lever follows
Aristotle as his ultimate authority. Unlike many of them, Lever is
explicit on this point. He says in his preface:
Now to let euerie writer haue his deserued praise, I confesse (to them
that desire to knowe whom I folow) that in my three firste bookes, I
onely folow Aristotle: both for matter, & also for order. 14
Aristotle, he adds, far surpasses all profane writers in the truth of
his substance and the plainness of his manner. Who these profane
writers are, Lever does not say. But he describes them in general
terms as follows:
As for Ciceronians & suger tongued fellowes, which labour more for
finenes of speach, then for knowledge of good matter, they oft speake
much to small purpose, and shaking foorth a number of choise words,
and picked sentences 3 they hinder good learning, wyth their fond
chatte."
As for Lever's authority in the final book of Witcraft, he con-
fesses himself to be independent of those who have written on inven-
tion, even though he pays tribute to the method of invention advo-
cated in Aristotle's To-pics. His words are:
But in my fourth booke, which intreateth of the places, & sheweth a
way how to prouide store of arguments: I haue thought good neither
fully to folow Aristotle: nor yet anye other that I haue seene. For
p. 75. "/&, sig. **ir-**iv. Ibid., si ff , **iv.
[ 62 ]
WITCRAFT
Aristotles inuention serueth best, for vniuersitie men, when a question
is broughte to some generall issue, as to proue that the backset is, or
is not, the saywhat, the kinde, the propertie, or the Inbeer of the
f oreset. Howbeit, men vse in disputing or writing, to argue to and fro,
neuer bringing the matter that lyeth in question, to anye of these foure
generall issues. 16
One of the last things Lever says in his preface is that he may one
day supplement Witcraft by a work on the faults of reasoning. 17 He
is obviously thinking at that point of Aristotle's Sophistical Elenchi
as the final treatise in the Organon, and of the desirability of cover-
ing the subject of fallacies himself, so that his own English logic
would extend at last over the entire territory assigned to it by Aris-
totle. It is interesting to think that if Lever had applied his theory
of logical terminology to fallacies, the English language would have
had in the sixteenth century as unusual a work on that subject as
Bentham finally wrote in the beginning of the nineteenth century,
although Lever's approach would certainly have been less profound
than Bentham's. But Lever apparently never completed the task of
putting the Organon into an English vocabulary. Still, except for the
section on fallacies, he covers Aristotle's logical writings in round
terms, and thus gives us an odd monument to stand at the end of the
scholastic period in English logic.
id. y sig-. **iv-**2r. ^Ibid., sig. ** 4 r-
[ 63 ]
CHAPTER 3
Traditional Rhetoric: The Three Patterns
I. Origin and Boundaries
BETWEEN the year 700 and the year 1573, rhetoric flourished
continuously in England as that branch of the theory of
communication in which directions were set down, and ob-
servations made, for the guidance of speakers or writers
whose audience was the populace and whose purpose was instruction
or persuasion by means not primarily connected with the use of
fictions. 1
As indicated earlier, the directions and observations which made
up rhetoric during this period of eight hundred odd years are per-
haps best termed traditional. It is a temptation to call them scholastic,
and thus to speak of scholastic rhetoric as the companion of scholastic
logic. But the term "scholastic" as connected with rhetoric would
imply, not only a sort of rhetoric that was the product of a profound
deference to authority, not only the sort that reduced the theory of
communication to a stiff and formal method, but also the sort wherein
deference to authority would mean deference to Aristotle. After all,
these three meanings are always in our minds when we speak of scho-
lasticism in logic. Although the first two meanings would describe
the rhetoric I am speaking of in this chapter, the last would not,
except in a remote sense. In other words, it is not accurate to say
that Aristotle is the authority behind English rhetoric in the period
before 1573.* As we have seen, he taught Englishmen logic in that
time, and it might be added that he was the great teacher of logic in
western Europe during the whole period between his own era and
1 For various parts of this period rhetoric has been discussed historically by the fol-
lowing" authors: E, E. Hale, Jr., "Ideas on Rhetoric in the Sixteenth Century," Publica-
tions of the Modern Language Association^ xvm (1903), 424-4.4.4} R. C. Jebb,
"Rhetoric," in The Encyclopaedia Britannica, nth edn.j Donald Lemen Clark,
Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance (New York, 1922) j Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric
and Poetic 5 William Phillips Sandford, English Theories of Public Address, 1530-1828
(The Ohio State University, 1919); William Garrett Crane, Wit and Rhetoric in the
Renaissance (New York, 1937) j Thomas Whitfield Baldwin, William Shaks$ere>s Small
Latine & Lesse Greeke (Urbana, 1944)* n, 1-2385 J. W. H, Atkins, English Literary
Criticism: The Renascence (London, 1947)9 pp. 66-iox, cited below as The Renascence^
Sister Miriam Joseph, Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language (New York, 1947) j
Wilbur S. Howell, "English Backgrounds of Rhetoric," History of Speech Education in
America (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), pp. 3-47.
2 For a thorough investigation of this question, see Lee Sisson Hultzen, "Aristotle's
Rhetoric in England to 1600" (Unpbl. diss., Cornell University, 1932).
ORIGIN AND BOUNDARIES
that of the Renaissance. But Cicero, who was a profound student of
Aristotelian logic and rhetoric, formulated from that and other
sources a rhetorical system to which all rhetorical instruction in west-
ern Europe during the period now under discussion must be referred.
Thus Cicero was the great teacher of rhetoric in western Christendom
while scholastic logic held sway, and I should not like to deprive him
of that title by calling his doctrines scholastic. The term "traditional
rhetoric," as a substitute, suggests, of course, a doctrine transmitted
orally from teacher to pupil and from generation to generation. It
suggests also, not so much a theory composed of generalizations con-
stantly revised by reference to practice, as a body of ritualistic con-
ventions that have forgotten their original contact with the real
world. Neither of these implications is intended in the present chap-
ter. Traditional rhetoric was constantly being reformulated in writing
during the eight hundred odd years now under analysis, and those
reformulations are the basic documents I shall discuss. Moreover,
traditional rhetoric did not become a body of rituals insulated from
the needs of successive generations of speakers and writers. Speaking
in the law court, in the pulpit, and in the council of state, as well as
writing to dignitaries or to friends or to congregations, are continuing
activities. Rhetorical theory was originally developed to teach them,
and always bears a relation to them. In the period here being con-
sidered, these activities prevented rhetoric from losing contact with
the world. What I should like the term "traditional rhetoric" to
mean is that system of precepts which, as delivered in writing from
teacher to student and from generation to generation in England
between 700 and 1573, owed its authority to the teachings and pres-
tige of Cicero, and needed in that entire period only a few minor
revisions to keep it abreast of the needs of the times.
Traditional rhetoric, as I mentioned above in Chapter I, has three
patterns, the Ciceronian, the stylistic, and the formulary. Each of
these will now receive attention. The Ciceronian pattern cannot be
connected with the works of Englishmen until almost a century after
the appearance on English soil of the stylistic pattern, but neverthe-
less the Ciceronian pattern, as the most comprehensive of the forms
in which the teachings of Cicero made themselves felt, will be dis-
cussed first. The formulary pattern, so far as the English record is
concerned, did not appear until late in the period under discussion
here, and even when it did appear, it never became very popular.
But it deserves some treatment, nevertheless, and I shall consider
it in the final section of the present chapter.
II. The Five Great Arts
CICERONIAN rhetoric in the form which it assumed in Cicero's own
works is best described as an art made up of five arts. These five arts
or five procedures constitute the complex act of producing a commu-
nication intended for the popular audience, and Cicero designates
these procedures as invention, arrangement, style, memory, and de-
livery. In De Inventions, the first work which Cicero wrote on the
subject of rhetoric, he defined these five procedures as he and his
later disciples generally conceived of them, and these definitions are
brief enough for quotation here:
Invention is the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments to
render one's cause plausible. Arrangement is the distribution of argu-
ments thus discovered in the proper order. Expression [that is, elo-
cutio, Cicero's term for style] is the fitting of the proper language to
the invented matter. Memory is the firm mental grasp of matter and
words. Delivery is the control of voice and body in a manner suitable
to the dignity of the subject matter and the style. 1
Cicero's De Inventione discusses only the first of these five pro-
cedures, although, had it been completed, it would have covered the
others as well. The earliest extant Latin treatment of the doctrine
involved in these five procedures is that found in Ad, C. Herewvwwn
Libri Quattuor De Arte Rhetorica^ usually called the Rhetorica ad
Herennium. During the Middle Ages the Rhetorica ad Herenniwm
was ascribed to Cicero, and was often called the Rhetorica Secwnda
or Rhetorica Nova to distinguish it from Cicero's De Inventione,
which was called the Rhetorica Prima or Rhetorica Vetus? Nowa-
days the Rhetorica ad Herenniwm, is not accepted as Cicero's work,
but nobody disputes the great similarity between it and Cicero's De
Inventione, so far as the latter goes. Nor is it unfair to assume that
the two works would have been closely alike throughout, if Cicero
had completed De Inventione.
In his other major writings on rhetoric, Cicero holds to these five
procedures as his basic terms, whether he deals with them all, as in
De Oratore and De Partitione Oratoria, or mainly with the third
1 Cicero, De lnventione> 1.7.9, trans. H. M. Hubbell (The Loeb Classical Library,
Cambridge, Mass, and London, 194.9), pp. 19-41.
2 Edmond Faral, Les Arts Poetiques du XII* et d,u XIII* Siecle (Paris, 19x4), p. 495
also Atkins, The Medieval Phase y p, 1165 also below, p. 77.
[ 66 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
one, style, as in Orator? The following words from his Brutus,
spoken by himself as he and Brutus and Atticus converse about rhet-
oric on his own lawn near a statue of Plato, show his enduring regard
for eloquence as the product of these five faculties:
Well then, ... to praise eloquence, to set forth its power and the
honours which it brings to those who have it, is not my present pur-
pose, nor is it necessary. However, this one thing I venture to affirm
without fear of contradiction, that whether it is a product of rules
and theory, or a technique dependent on practice, or on natural gifts,
it is one attainment amongst all others of unique difficulty. For of
the five elements of which, as we say, it is made up, each one is in
its own right a great art. One may guess therefore what power is
inherent in an art made up of five great arts, and what difficulty it
presents.*
An art made up of five great arts this is the Ciceronian thesis
about rhetoric. The most thorough commentary in ancient Roman
times upon these five arts, as treated by Cicero and many lesser writ-
ers, is Quintilian's Institutio Oratorio,, written towards the end of
the first century A.D. "The art of oratory, as taught by most authori-
ties, and those the best," says Quintilian, "consists of five parts:
invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery or action
(the two latter terms being used synonymously)." 5 Of the twelve
books of his learned and important Institutio Oratoria, Books 3, 4, 5,
and 6 deal with inventio and constitute a summary of all previous
thinking upon this first and most difficult of the tasks of the speaker
and writer ; Book 7 deals with disposition Books 8, 9, 10, and the
first chapter of n deal with elocutio, usually considered the pro-
cedure that demanded almost as much space in rhetorical 1 theory as
inventio -, and Book 1 1 in its other two chapters deals respectively
with memoria and $ronuntiatio. Thus Quintilian adheres to the
practice of the best authorities. The first two and the final books of
his work are concerned with the earliest phases of the training of
3 Cicero's constant reference to these five terms is a feature of all his writings on
rhetoric. For samples of his use of them, see De Orator e y 1.28.1285 1.31.142) 1.42.187;
2 - I 9-79J 2 8 5-35 5 see also D* Partitione Oratoria, 1.3, and Oratory 14.43-55.
4 Brutus , 6.25, trans. G. L. Hendrickson (The Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge,
Mass, and London, 1939), pp. 35^37-
5 Institutio Oratoria^ 3.3.1, trans. H. E. Butler (The Loeb Classical Library, London
and New York, 1933), i 383. Italics are Butler's. Quintilian's own words are: "Omnis
autem orandi ratio, ut plurimi maximique auctores tradiderunt, quinque partibus constat,
inventione, dispositione, elocutione, memoria, pronuntiatione sive actione, utroque enim
modo dicitur."
[ 67 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
speaker and writer, and with the later phases of the career of the
orator in society. Cicero is the authority whom Quintilian undoubted-
ly admires most 5 but there are many other rhetoricians mentioned
in his pages, some famous and others little known, whose opinions
are quoted and sometimes disputed as he proceeds with his discussion
of the five procedures constituting the Ciceronian theory of rhetoric.
Invention, as the process of discovering valid or seemingly valid
arguments to render one's case plausible, sounds at first like an in-
vitation to master the appearances rather than the realities of tight
and honest proof. Actually, however, it was an invitation to speaker
or writer to find the best of available materials, wherever they might
be. Some of these available materials would be documentary evi-
dence, eyewitness testimony, confessions, and the like. Perhaps on
occasion such proofs as these would be sufficient. The art of rhetoric,
according to the ancient idea, did not extend to the discovery or use
of such proofs as these, which were called non-artistic, in the sense
that they were there to start with, and had only to be used, not dis-
covered by a theoretical process. Rhetorical invention was concerned
rather with the theoretical process by which proofs not there to start
with could be discovered or uncovered. These proofs were called
artistic, not because they were considered more ingenious if less
convincing than the others,, but simply because they were regarded
as being subject to discovery by a theoretical means that was always
available for that use. Aristotle's Rhetoric makes something of the
difference between non-artistic and artistic proofs, the latter being in
fact considered to be the only proof that belonged properly to rhe-
torical theory, inasmuch as theory could be no guide to the discovery
of the former. Says Aristotle in a passage that was to have great in-
fluence:
Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric
and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied
by the speaker but are there at the outset witnesses, evidence given
tinder torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean
such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of
rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be
invented. 6
This distinction between non-artistic and artistic proofs was ac-
cepted by Cicero and Quintilian as an important dividing line, on one
*RketoriC) 1355^ 3^ff.> trans. W. Rhys Roberts in The Works of Aristotle, ed. Ross,
XI.
[ 68 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
side of which lay relatively unpredictable materials, varying greatly
in weight and number from case to case, while on the other side lay
the relatively predictable materials that tended to be of constant ap-
plication to all sorts of cases, and that could usually be brought to
light by systematic analysis. 7 Rhetorical invention meant the process
of systematic analysis which would produce these circumstantial ma-
terials, or proofs based upon constant factors in every case. If a
murderer could be convicted by impeccable eyewitness testimony,
supplemented by his confession, and by other tangible direct evidence,
then rhetorical theory could offer little help to the prosecutor, who
would be able to gain his point simply by using these overwhelming
direct means. But if there 'were no eyewitnesses, no confession, not
much tangible direct evidence, but nevertheless a victim and the
probability of a crime, rhetorical theory could offer some help by
pointing to those collateral facts which, in the common experience
of mankind, are usually or always a kind of proof of the main fact
at issue.
Our modern distinction between direct and indirect evidence is
parallel to the ancient distinction between non-artistic and artistic
proofs. Incidentally, one great difference between ancient and mod-
ern rhetorical theory is that ancient peoples, less experienced than
man has since become in the methods of investigating all aspects of
his physical environment, tended to decide doubtful issues upon col-
lateral or indirect evidence, and to believe in the validity of their de-
cisions, with the result that ancient rhetorical theory stressed the
system by which indirect evidence was to be assembled 5 whereas
modern peoples have less faith in collateral evidence, and more taste
for decisions based upon direct evidence, with the result that modern
rhetorical theory has abandoned the ancient system of invention, and
replaced it with techniques for the discovery of direct evidence in
every case at issue. At any rate, the ancient system of invention, as
planned by Aristotle and elaborated by later theorists, chiefly Cicero
and Quintilian, survived and answered men's needs until the time of
the Renaissance, when it began to lose favor and to be supplanted
by modes of assembling factual data in connection with the process of
deliberation and decision.
Cicero's De Inventione, in giving an authoritative account of the
ancient system of rhetorical invention, obliges the speaker to assemble
7 See De In t oentione > 2.14.4.7$ D* Oratory 2.27.116-117$ also Institutto
5.1-1.
[ 69 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
proof by making three large decisions about the case which becomes
his to argue. One of these decisions requires that the case be classified
as to the kinds of oratory in use in human affairs. There were three
kinds of oratory in use in ancient Greece and Rome: the demonstrative
or eulogistic, the deliberative or political, and the judicial or forensic.
Each of these types had its own set of customary moral issues. Thus
demonstrative oratory was addressed to questions of honor or dis-
honor, deliberative oratory, to questions of expediency or inexpedi-
ency j judicial oratory, to questions of justice or injustice. If we as-
sume that any man who thinks at all would have assembled a store
of ideas upon these questions, then we may suggest to him that that
store is one place for research whenever he has to make a speech, and
that his research should begin by determining which of the three
sections of that store his subject will most intimately concern. 8
Another of the decisions which the speaker has to make in as-
sembling proof for his case requires him to classify his subject as to
the types of positions involved in disputes. This decision is connected
with a system of elaborate technicalities, the key term in which is
constitutio in the earliest Latin rhetorics like De Inventione and the
Rhetorica ad Herennium^ and status in later works like Quintilian's
Institutio Qratoria? These two terms, and others sometimes preferred
in place of them, j represent the theory that disputes arise as the result
of a conflict between someone's allegation and someone else's reply,
and that, because allegations and replies tend to be limited to a few
types, disputants tend therefore to take one of a small number of
fixed positions in conducting arguments. The precise number of the
positions available to disputants varies from one ancient rhetorical
theorist to another. In De Inventione^ Cicero says that four positions
are available whenever speakers debate upon traditional meanings of
things said or done; and he also says that there are five quasi-posi-
tions available whenever debates arise upon the meanings of written
documents. 10 If, for example, an allegation is made that the speaker
8 For Cicero's discussion of these three types of oratory in connection with the task of
rhetorical invention, see De Inventions^ 1.5*75 2.4.12-135 2.23-395 2,51.155-178.
9 The best ancient discussion of the meaning- of constitutio and status in rhetorical
theory is that in Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria^ 3,6.
10 D e Inventione, i.S.ioj 1.12.17. The term "quasi-position" as a name for the
category of disputes arising- over the interpretation of texts is suggested by Cicero's own
language in the Toftcs, 95. For a discussion of this category and its companion, the
true position, see Howell, Rhetoric of Alcum^ pp. 36-37. For Cicero's analysis of the
four positions and the five quasi-positions, see De Inventions, i.8.io-i6j 1.12. 17-, 18;
2.4-39 j 2.40.116-154.
[ 70 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
committed a certain crime, and the speaker denies that he committed
it, he has taken a position called conjectural by Cicero, and positions
of this kind are defended (or attacked) in certain fixed ways. If the
allegation is that the speaker committed a certain act constituting rob-
bery, and the speaker denies that his act does constitute robbery, he
takes what Cicero calls the definitive position, and positions of this
kind are defended (or attacked) in certain fixed ways. The other two
of these four positions are called the general and the procedural, the
former being the locality in which the question concerns the justice
or injustice of an act, and the latter, the locality in which questions
arise as to whether a given court or tribunal has jurisdiction in the
case under debate.
As for the five quasi-positions, they are assumed at various times
in debates over things written. Suppose, for example, that there is
a discrepancy between what written words say and what their author
apparently meant. Or suppose that there is a discrepancy between one
and another written rule for cases of a given kind. Or suppose that
what has been written is subject to two or more interpretations. Or
suppose that what has been written does not quite fit the case to which
it is applied. Or suppose that what is written contains a key term that
is left undefined. All of these causes of dispute exist wherever there
also exists any document to limit or prescribe human action. For
each of these five types of dispute, as for each of the preceding four,
the attack and defense are subject to description in advance, and rhe-
torical theory undertakes to supply that description as a means of
enabling the speaker to make the second of the three large decisions
required of him by the system of inventing artistic proofs.
The third decision required of the speaker forces him to consider
the successive steps necessary for persuasive presentation of any sub-
ject. The common experience of mankind indicates that in the pres-
entation of any subject the interest of the hearer should first be
aroused. Then the subject should be made understandable in terms of
the events which have made its discussion necessary. Next, the argu-
ment about to be launched in connection with the subject should be
stated in round terms, so that an audience will appreciate what po-
sition the speaker takes, and to what propositions his proof will be
answerable. Next, the proof of those propositions should be advanced,
and any contrary propositions that the speaker's opponent could up-
hold should be destroyed or refuted, Finally, the sentiments and
emotions of the hearer should be aroused in connection with the hu-
t 71 i
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
man implications of the proof. These six steps permitted the ancient
rhetoricians to discuss, as one of the big topics in rhetorical invention,
the successive parts of the classical oration, usually enumerated as
introduction, narration, division, proof, refutation, and conclusion. 11
The tendency to treat the six parts of the oration under the head-
ing of invention was not without its limitations, so far as the ancient
rhetoricians were concerned. For if rhetoric was made to consist of
the five procedures that Cicero declared it to have, and if the first of
these procedures, that is, invention, received so wide a treatment as
to include the six parts of the oration, what was to be said when the
second procedure, arrangement, came up for discussion? Cicero's De
Indentions contains no answer to this question it treats the six parts
of an oration under the heading of invention, and breaks off at that
point, leaving arrangement, style, memory, and delivery untouched.
The earliest Latin treatise to attempt to answer the question is the
Rhetorics ad Herenmum. The Rhetorica ad Herennium analyzes the
six parts of the oration when it discusses invention j and then, when
it comes to arrangement, as the second main part of rhetoric, it says
in effect that arrangement in theory consists of placing in each part
of the oration what should be placed there, whereas arrangement in
actual practice consists in knowing under what circumstances to omit
one or more of the standard parts of the oration or when to rearrange
their standard order. 12 In other words, this authoritative treatise
handles arrangement by recognizing it as an independent part of
rhetoric and by explaining it later as a subordinate part of one of the
other independent parts.
As for style, memory, and delivery, they were given their due
share of attention in ancient rhetoric, after arrangement had been
treated thus ambiguously. Style, as the third part of Cicero's program,
was usually considered to be next to invention in importance, and was
thus treated more fully than arrangement, memory, or delivery. The
kind of treatment style received in such treatises as the Rhetorica ad
Herennium^ the Orator, and the Institutio Oratoria will be indicated
later when I speak of the stylistic pattern of English rhetoric. Mem-
ory and delivery will also be explained later, as these main topics
emerge in English versions of the full Ciceronian pattern. Inciden-
tally, memory has an unusual subject matter connected with it in
11 For Cicero's discussion of the six parts of the oration in connection with the task
of rhetorical invention, see De Inventions^ 1,14-56.
12 Rhetorica a& Htrennium.) 3.9-10.
[ 72 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
treatises on rhetoric in ancient times and in the Renaissance, but it
was not given as much space in rhetorical theory as invention and
style received 3 whereas delivery, which concerned the use of the voice
and body in pronouncing an oral message to an audience, was con-
sidered to be of overwhelming importance in the process of communi-
cation but was not thought to be particularly susceptible to theoretical
treatment.
Many English rhetorics in the period between 700 and 1573 deal
with the theory of popular communication by emphasizing some or
all of the five procedures just described. Whenever these procedures
or a majority of them are mentioned by Englishmen as the basic
concepts of rhetoric, and are then treated in such a way as to stress
the special importance of invention, the rhetoric thus created be-
comes Ciceronian in the present sense in which I am using the term.
Alcuin's De Rhetorica has already been mentioned as the first work
by an Englishman to deal with the five procedures of Ciceronian
rhetoric. In turning now to this work to examine what Ciceronian
rhetoric looked like in its earliest appearance in English learning, I
should like to emphasize again that Alcuin wrote it in the year 794
as a dialogue between himself and Charlemagne not only to improve
rhetorical instruction throughout the Carolingian empire but also to
provide his readers with the precepts of one of the grand divisions
of logic, the other division being covered by his De Dialectical I
might add that De Rhetorica is an attractive little work, quite apart
from the interest it holds as the first statement by an Englishman of
Cicero's theory of popular communication j and that, as a work of
scholarship, it captures more of the spirit of Cicero than the De
Dialectica captures of the spirit of Aristotle.
Alcuin's treatment of rhetorical invention is in reality an abridg-
ment of Cicero's entire De Inventione?* Whole passages from the
Ciceronian treatise are taken over and pieced together by Alcuin in
such fashion that he gives his readers a fair outline of all the material
in that source. Thus he indicates the three kinds of oratory and their
customary moral issues. Thus he speaks in some detail of the four
13 See above, pp. 32-36, especially note 7. The Latin text and an English transla-
tion of Alcuin's treatise on rhetoric, which is formally called Dis'putatio de Rhetorica
et de Virtutibus Safientissimi Regis Karli et Albini Magistri, may be found in Howell,
Rhetoric of Alcuin. For other editions of the Latin text, see Migne, Patrologia Latina,
CI, 919-950, and Halm, Rhetores Latini Minores, pp. 523-550.
14 For particulars regarding; this and other sources of De Rhetprica y see Howell,
Rhetoric of Alcuin^ pp. 22-33, 159-169.
[ 73 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
positions and the five quasi-positions. Thus he emphasizes the six
parts of the oration and the materials and objectives of each part.
His discussion of the six parts of the oration covers almost twice as
much space as he allots to the nine positions, and a little more than
four times as much space as he allots to the three kinds of oratory. 15
Moreover, these topics, as the principal part of his discussion of in-
vention, are given more care than he bestows in the aggregate upon
arrangement, style, memory, and delivery as the other parts of
rhetoric.
For his treatment of these other parts, Alcuin depends upon a
rhetorician of the fourth century A.D. named Julius Victor, whose
Ars Rhetorica had dealt with the subject of Ciceronian rhetoric, and
whose explanation of arrangement, style, memory, and delivery was
made up of doctrine from Cicero's Orator and De Oratore, and from
Quintilian's Institutio Oratorio, Thus Alcuin's treatise remains
Ciceronian even when he comes to the end of De Inventions and has
no other work by Cicero available for use. To arrangement Alcuin
devotes little space, since he felt that he had already covered most
of that subject when he spoke of the six parts of an oration, and
would cover the rest when he spoke of the ordering of words in
sentences as a part of style. 17 Nor does he have anything to say of
memory, except to stress that Cicero had called it indispensable for a
speaker, and that practice and an abstemious life would improve it. 18
As for style, Alcuin speaks of it in such fashion as to indicate only a
fraction of that part of Ciceronian theory; but, even so, style ranks
next after invention in the amount of space he devotes to it. Delivery
he handles by quoting Cicero's opinion of its importance, and by bor-
rowing from Victor some observations that stem from the treatment
given this part of rhetoric in Cicero^ De Oratore and Quintilian's
Instfoutio Oratoria^
"With the death of Alcuin," remarks Atkins, "the tradition of
learning in England underwent a prolonged eclipse." 20 This observa-
tion applies with particular force to Ciceronian rhetoric, for it was a
long time after Alcuin^ era that interest in the five procedures began
16 Alcuin discusses the three kinds of oratory and related topics from line 88 to line
103 and from line 1199 to 1286 of his text as edited by Howell. The discussion of
the nine positions extends in the same text from line 123 to line 395, whereas the six
parts of the oration are discussed from line 470 to line 935.
16 See Howell, Rhetoric of Alcuin^ pp. 28-33, 167-168.
17 1 bid. > p. 130 [lines 975-985]- 18 Ibici^ pp. 136-138 [lines 1070-1083],
id.y pp. 138-140 [lines 1092-1134]. 20 The Medieval Phase> p. 59.
[ 74 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
to reassert itself in written works. Meanwhile, the educational system
in England undoubtedly made some attempt to train students in. the
art o communication, and thus undoubtedly provided some sort of
instruction in rhetoric and logic, as well as in grammar. But whether
instruction in rhetoric in English schools involved the five procedures
of Ciceronian rhetoric, as set forth by such an author as Alcuin, or the
stylistic theory of the ancients, as interpreted by Bede and others, is
a question not finally answered for the period between 800 and 1 200.
Nor is it easy to say confidently that a university in any real sense
existed at either Oxford or Cambridge during the greater part of
that period. There is a tradition, as I mentioned before, which dates
the founding of Oxford from the reign of King Alfred, and which
represents that monarch as having instituted and endowed lecture-
ships there in almost every faculty about the year 879, Asser of .St.
David's being recorded as first royal lecturer in grammar and rhet-
oric. 21 Asser might well have been a teacher of these subjects some-
where in Alfred's realm, but royal support for Oxford and Cam-
bridge as universities did not apparently begin until long after that
time, and thus Asser's connection with what could properly be called
a royal foundation or even a university in the formal sense is com-
pletely unsubstantiated. 22
Early in the thirteenth century, the procedures of Ciceronian rhet-
oric reappeared in English learning. This development, however, oc-
curred under the auspices of poetical as opposed to rhetorical theory,
and thus was somewhat outside of the Ciceronian tradition as inter-
preted by Alcuin. The writer who converted Ciceronian terminology
to the uses of the art of poetry was Geoffrey of Vinsauf, a shadowy
figure in the history of his times, who is believed to be of English
origin and to have received his education in part at St. Frideswide's
priory in Oxford, and in part in France and Italy, where he spent
rnost of his life. It was his Poetria Nova, composed sometime be-
tween 1208 and 1213, that discussed the tasks of the poet under the
headings of Ciceronian rhetoric, with the doctrine of style featured
more than that of invention and disposition. 28 The example which he
21 For the names of these ancient and royal lecturers, see Anthony a Wood, History
and Antiquities of Oxford^ ed. Gutch, n, 819-820. See also above, p. 37.
22 See Mulling-er, University of Cambridge^ I, 81, note i.
28 The text of the Poetria Nova is found in Faral, Les Arts Poetiques du XIl e et du
XIII* Siecle y pp. 197-2625 see the same work, pp. 194-197, for an analysis of the
Poetria Nova y and pp. 15-33 for a discussion of Geoffrey of Vinsauf } see pp. 28-33
for an analysis of the question of the date of the Poetria Nova, which Faral finally
places between 1208 and 1213.
[ 75 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
set was followed in the early sixteenth century by Stephen Hawes,
who has the distinction not only of converting the key terms of the
Rhetorics ad Herennwm and of De Inventione to the uses of poetry
more fully than Geoffrey had done, but also of being the first Eng-
lishman to render those terms and a part of their doctrine mto Eng-
lish. Some notion of Geoffrey's Poetria Nova can be gained from
Hawes, and thus I shall not pause here to discuss it, despite its im-
portance in the history of Ciceronian rhetoric in England,^ It should
be mentioned, however, that Geoffrey is not alone in his time in
thinking of the business of the writer as an offshoot of the business
of the orator and of Ciceronian rhetoric. Giraldus Cambrensis, a
Welsh contemporary of Geoffrey, indicates that the task of the
writer necessarily involves the processes of invention, arrangement,
and style, and thus he shows his awareness of Ciceronian theory even
though he mentions it more to endorse its applicability to writing
than to explain its doctrine. 24
So far as the thirteenth century is concerned, French learning pro-
vides a closer approach to the original Ciceronian pattern of rhetoric
than does English learning in the Poetria Nova of Geoffrey of Vin-
sauf . Vincent of Beauvais's Sfeculwm Doctrinale may be cited in sup-
port of this statement. I have already mentioned the Speculum
Doctrinale as one of the three parts of Vincent's colossal encyclo-
paedia, the Speculum Majus, and as a work which devotes all of
Book IV to a discussion of logic, rhetoric, and poetics, with logic re-
ceiving 98 chapters, rhetoric 10, and poetics 23." Book III, by the
way, is given over to grammar, and this subject is treated in 193
chapters, the last three of which deal respectively with the schemes,
the tropes, and certain other figures, among them allegory. Thus
Vincent follows Isidore in treating certain matters of rhetorical style
under the heading of grammar, and Bede does the same thing, as I
shall mention later in speaking of the origins of stylistic rhetoric in
England. 26 But whereas Isidore also treated the subject of poetry as
in large part the property of grammar, and whereas Geoffrey treated
poetry in terms of rhetoric, thus creating what Atkins calls "a treatise
on rhetoric as applied to poetry," 27 Vincent keeps largely to the an-
cient Ciceronian terms in speaking of rhetoric, and, as I indicated
above, he associates poetics with logic, giving the art of poetry ex-
24 Atkins, The Medieval Phase^ p. 93.
28 See above, pp. 39-44*
26 See below, pp. 116-119, 27 The Medieval Phase^ p. 97.
[ 76 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
tensive discussion through passages identified by him as in part
written by himself and in part borrowed from the Etymologiae of
Isidore and the Mythologiae of Fulgentius, with Cicero's De Oratore
being quoted briefly once. 28
In the chapters allotted to rhetoric, Vincent identifies his discus-
sion as a tissue of excerpts from the Etymologiae of Isidore, De
Diferentiis Topicis of Boethius, the Institutio Oratorio, of Quintilian,
and De Oratore, the Rhetorica Secunda, and the Rhetorics Prima
of Cicero. 29 Indeed,, there is scarcely a word in Vincent's entire dis-
cussion that is not part of a direct quotation from one of these author-
ities. Boethius and Isidore supply two-thirds of his material, or 2,36
lines of text; next to them in importance is the Rhetorica Prima of
Cicero, which supplies 68 lines of text 5 and least quoted of all are
the Institutio Oratoria, De Oratore, and the Rhetorica Secunda, the
contributions from which amount in sum to 43 lines of text divided
almost equally among the three works. 30 By means of his sources,
Vincent presents the following materials: i) a definition of rhetoric 5
2,) a distinction between rhetoric and dialectic - y 3) a brief explanation
of the five parts of rhetoric 5 4) a discussion of invention in terms of
the parts of an oration, the kinds of oratory, the kinds of positions,
the nature of the rhetorical syllogism, the kinds of rhetorical places 5
and 5) a brief discussion of style. An example of his method may be
seen in his first chapter, which he calls De Arte Rhetorical
Isidore as above.
Rhetoric is the science of speaking well on civil questions for the
purpose of persuading by a just and good copiousness in respect to the
interactions of events and persons. Indeed, rhetoric was the term in
Greece for copiousness of speaking. For among the Greeks speaking
is called rhesis, and the orator, rhetor.
Boethius in the Topes, Book IV.
28 Of the 23 chapters allotted by Vincent to the discussion of poetry, he acknowledges
Isidore to be his authority in chs. no, in, 112, 13, 127, 128, 129, 130, and 131. He
acknowledges Cicero to be his authority in the first part of ch. 127. Fulgentius he ac-
knowledges as authority in chs. 124, 125, and 126. He acknowledges himself as author
of chs. 109, 114., 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, and 123, although his
method of moralizing fables in these chapters is obviously based upon that exemplified in
the passages he quotes from Fulgentius.
29 The Rhetorica Secunda is the Rhetorica ad Herennium y which Vincent thought to
be Cicero's. The Rhetorica Prima is Cicero's De Inventiotoe. See above, p. 66.
80 Vincent's ten chapters on rhetoric in Speculum Doctrinale (Nuremberg, 1486),
Book iv, Chs. 99-108, amount to 352 full lines of text, 347 of which are identified
by him as quotations from his sources.
[ 77 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
Rhetoric differs from dialectic because dialectic mostly considers theses,
that is, questions without surroundings in time and place. And if at
any time dialectic takes up for dispute questions with surroundings in
time and place, it uses them not mainly but entirely in connection with
the thesis upon which it is discoursing. In truth, rhetoric treats of and
discourses upon hypotheses, that is, questions with a multitude of sur-
roundings in time and place, and if at any time it brings up a thesis,
it uses it in connection with its hypothesis. These are its surroundings:
Who? What? Where? By whose help? Why? In what manner? At
what time?
Moreover, dialectic is carried on by interrogations and responses,
whereas rhetoric flows along on an appropriate subject without inter-
ruption.
Again, dialectic makes use of the complete syllogism, whereas rhetoric
is content with the brevity of the enthymeme.
Once again, the orator has beyond his adversary a judge who decides
between the two disputants, whereas in truth the very one who sits
as adversary renders a quasi verdict against the dialectician by the
way he responds. Thus every difference between orator and dialec-
tician is constituted either in subject matter, or use, or end. I say
"end" because the orator attempts indeed to persuade the judge,
whereas the dialectician attempts to extort from his adversary what is
wanted. 81
Although Vincent's theory of rhetoric, like his theory of logic,
cannot be strictly classed as part of the history of these two subjects
in England, yet his treatment of both arts would have been familiar
and influential in England at most times between the age of Alcuin
and that of Thomas Wilson. Thus I have not hesitated to allow hirn-
to figure in my account of scholastic logic and of traditional rhetoric
in English learning, even as the English authors to whom I have
been referring are also the property of the intellectual history of
France or of other regions of western Europe, no less than of Eng-
land. Several generations after Vincent's time, he would still have
been accepted throughout Europe as an Authority on the rhetoric
then current* Indeed, the chapters on rhetoric in the Speculum Doc-
trinale are not unlike the first treatise on Ciceronian rhetoric to be
Doctrinal^ Bk, iv, Ch. 99. Translation mine. The texts here used were
printed at Strasbourg about 1472 and at Nuremberg- in 14.86. See above, p. 39, note 25.
The reference to Isidore is to the Etymologiae, 2.1.1 (in Migne, Patrologia Latina,
LXXXII, 123). The reference to Boethius is to De Differentiis Toficis, Book iv (in
Migne, Patrologia Latina, LXIV, 1205-1206).
[ 78 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
printed at an English press, despite the fact that the latter work was
written over two centuries after the former. Curiously enough, the
author of this first rhetoric in the history of English printing was an
Italian monk, not an Englishman, and the work itself was written
in Latin while he was teaching theology at Cambridge University*
The Nova Rhetorica, as this work is usually called, is more complete
than Vincent's chapters on rhetoric in respect to Cicero's five terms.
Both works, however, belong to each other's period as readily as to
their own.
The Nova Rhetorica, which appeared at Caxton's press in West-
minster around 1479, and at the press of "the Schoolmaster Printer"
in St. Albans in 1480, had for author a man who in English would be
called Brother Laurence William of Savona, of the Minor Order,
doctor of sacred theology j but his official name as recorded in refer-
ence books and library catalogues appears as Lorenzo Guglielmo
Traversagni. 82 Traversagni was born of aristocratic parents in Savona,
Italy, in the year 1422. At the age of twenty, already well schooled
in grammar, logic, rhetoric, and secular literature, he was received
into the Franciscan (or Minor) Order in his native town, where he
pursued his studies further during his early monastic life, his teacher
being Marco Vigirio, bishop of Noli, who soon conferred upon him
the title of doctor. Then he studied for the next few years at the
same place under Francesco dalla Rovere, who afterwards became
Pope Sixtus IV. His active career from his twenty-fifth to his seven-
tieth year was spent as a traveling scholar, teacher, and writer. He
studied logic, philosophy, theology, and canon law at Padua and
Bologna j he lectured on theology at Cambridge, Paris, and Tou-
louse 5 he wrote many books on such subjects as prayer, the contem-
plative and active life, matrimony, the triumph of Christ, the eternal
life, and chastity, in addition of course to his Nova Rhetorica, which
82 My present discussion of the Nova Rhetorica is based upon the Huntington Li-
brary's microfilm of an original specimen of the St. Albans edition of 1480 at the
Bodleian Library. This copy begins as follows: "Fratris laurencij guilelmi de saona
ordiuis [sic] mino[rum] sacre theologie doctoris prohemiu in nouam rethoricam."
Its colophon reads: "Inpressum fuit hoc presens opus Rethorice facultatis apud villa
sancti Albani. Anno domini. M. CCCC. LXXX." For additional information about
this edition and that made by Caxton somewhat earlier, see William Blades, The
Biography and Typography of William Caxton> England's First Printer (London and
Strasbourg, 1877), pp. 216-219$ also Duff, Fifteenth Century English Books, p. 1025
also Isak Collijn, Kataloge der Inkunabeln der Scfauedischen &ffentlichen Bibliotheken
II. Katalog der Inkunabeln der Kgl* Universitate-Bibliothek xu Uppsala (Uppsala,
I 97)> P* 2 3 2 J a l so British Museum General Catalogue of Printed Books, s.v. Tra-
versanus (Laurentius Gulielmus).
[ 79 J
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
was the only one of his treatises to be printed. He tells us at the con-
clusion of that work of his having finished it July 6, 1478, at Cam-
bridge. At that time he would have been fifty-six years of age. His
teaching career on foreign soil ended at Toulouse when he was sev-
enty. Thereafter he lived in the Franciscan monastery of his native
Savona, engaging himself in teaching, writing, collecting books, and
giving financial support from his own purse for various architectural
improvements in his cloister. He is reported to have been occupied
in enlarging one of his earlier works as late as the seventy-eighth
year of his life. One of the most complete of the biographical
sketches of him says that he died on the fifth day of the third month
of the year 1503, at the age of 81, and was buried in the church of
St. Francis of Savona, having bequeathed to his monastery the sum
of 300 crowns and what must have been a considerable library of
books he had assembled by himself. 33
Traversagni's Nova Rhetorica is thoroughly Ciceronian in the
sense in which that term is here being used. It is divided into an intro-
duction and three books, the whole work being composed of 362
pages. The introduction begins by recalling the present uses and the
past greatness of eloquence as an instrument in practical affairs and
a subject in learning 5 the final words of the third book refer to the
precepts of rhetoric as a treasure to be adapted to sacred speaking.
What lies between this beginning and end is a thorough discussion
of the five procedures of Ciceronian rhetoric. Early in Book I Traver-
sagni quotes a passage from Boethius in which the latter enumerates
these five procedures. s * Traversagni goes on to define each procedure
by borrowing his definitions from the Rhetorica ad Herennium,
which he had mentioned shortly before as Cicero's. 85 Invention occu-
pies the rest of Book I and most of Book II. What Traversagni does
is to discuss this important subject by considering how to devise ma-
terials f qr each of the six parts of the oration as these parts appear in
53 Giovanni Vincenzo Verzellino, Delle Memorie Particolari e Sfecialmente Degli
Uomini Illustri delta Citta di Savona, ed. Andrea Astengo (Savona, 1890-1891), I,
400-401. In the same volume, pp. 510-521, there is an account of Traversagni in Latin,
which supplements to some extent the account in Italian just cited. I have relied almost
completely upon these two accounts for the information I have given here. But I have
also consulted Lucas Waddingus, Scrtytores Ordinis Minorum> editio novissima (Rome,
1906-1921), i, 1583 in, 167; and Blades, Biogra-phy and Typography of Caxton, pp.
218-219.
^ Nova Rhetorica (St. Albans, 1480), sig. A8v. Traversagni's reference is to Boethius,
De Different Topicis, IV (in Migne, Patrologia Latina, LXIV, 1208).
85 Compare Nova Rhetoric** sig. A8v, and Rhetorica ad Herennium, 1.2.
[ 80 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
each of the three kinds of oratory. Thus Book I deals with the ex-
ordium, narration, division, proof, refutation, and conclusion, these
topics being related to the forensic oration, and being defined in the
language used in a similar connection in the Rhetorica ad Heren-
nium. Book II, so far as it treats invention, adds doctrine that ap-
plies to deliberative and demonstrative oratory. Arrangement is dis-
posed of briefly in the closing pages of that same book, and in Book
III, style receives great attention, with memory and delivery al-
lotted short but standard treatment. In the discussion of style, Tra-
versagni mentions such illustrious fathers as Jerome and Augustine,
but his examples of stylistic devices are drawn mainly from the Bible,
thus demonstrating how pagan rhetoric could be accommodated to
sacred utterances.
Six years after Traversagni's death, the terms of Ciceronian rhet-
oric were expressed for the first time in the English language, and
thus the way was prepared for the later vernacular rhetorics of Cox
and Wilson. Stephen Hawes's Pastime of Pleasure is the work in
which this development took place. I have already mentioned the
Pastime in connection with the early vernacular history of English
logic, and also in connection with the attempt of Geoffrey of Vinsauf
to write poetical theory in terms of rhetoric. 37 Now I should like to
show how Hawes converts Ciceronian rhetoric to the uses of the
theory of poetry, and what the particular combination amounts to
on this occasion.
In the course of his training in the seven liberal arts, and immedi-
ately after his indoctrination by the lady who taught logic, the hero
of the Pastime of Pleasure ascends one more flight of stairs in the
Tower of Doctrine and enters the chamber of Dame "Rethoryke."
The instruction which this lady gives the hero is not designed to
make him an orator. In fact, he kneels before her murmuring "O
gylted goddesse of the hygh renowne," 38 and asks that his tongue be
painted with her royal flowers, so that he may succeed in gladdening
his auditors and in having power "to moralyse thy lytterall censes
trewe." 39 These are the ends of poet and critic, not of lawyer, politi-
cian, or preacher. But why not? The hero of the Pastime is after all
a poet in quest of a beautiful lady, and he has the right to ask rhet-
36 Compare Nova Rhetorica^ sigs. A8v-Bir, and Rhetorica ad Herennium, 1.3.
37 See above, pp. 4.8-49, 76.
88 The Pastime of Pleasure, ed. Mead, p. 31 [line 668].
p. 31 [line 677],
[ 81 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
oric to teach her doctrine according to his particular needs. So she
responds to his needs by outlining in Ciceronian terms what she has
to teach:
Fyue partes hath rethoryke for to werke trewe
Without whiche fyue there can be no sentence
For these fyue do well euermore renue
The mater parfyte with good intellygence
Who that wyll se them with all his dylygence
Here folowenge I shall them specyfy
Accordynge well all vnto myne ordynary. 40
And, having used the insistence of repetition to stress the precise
number of the parts of her subject, she proceeds to specify them as
"inuencyon," "dysposycyon," "elocucyon," "pronuncyacyon," and
"memoratyf e." 41 All of these terms, so familiar in the training of an
orator, enter her explanation one after another in such fashion as to
make them serve the special problems of the poet.
First she speaks of "inuencyon." This she describes as the product
of five inward faculties of the mind: "comyn wytte," "ymagyna-
cyon," "fantasy," "good estymacyon," and "retentyfe memory." 42
Her discussion of these faculties as parts of invention presupposes
the instruction about them that the hero is later to receive in the
pavilion of Dame Astronomy, and thus my present analysis of the
five wits as applied to poetry rests upon both of these two sections of
the Pastime. Common wit is in ordinary life the faculty of experi-
encing perceptions, of discerning "all thynges in generall." 43 As ap-
40 /*<., p. 32 [lines 694-700].
41 Ibid.) pp. 33 [line 701]; 37 [line 8zi]j 4.0 [line 904] 5 50 [line 1189] 5 52
[line 1240].
Hawes's account of rhetoric extends from line 652 to line 1295, a total of 644 lines.
These are distributed as follows:
To preliminaries 652-700 that is 49
To invention 701-819 that is 119
To disposition 820-903 that is 84
To elocution 904-1183 that is 280
To pronunciation 1184-1239 that is 56
To memory 1240-1288 that is 49
To conclusion 1289-1295 that is 7
42 Ibid*) pp. 33-35. Mead regards these five faculties, not as parts of invention, but
as parts of rhetoric, although he also believes the five parts of rhetoric in Hawes's
scheme to be invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery} see pp. xxi, Ivi.
His latter view is correct. The former is not. He appears to have gone astray through
his failure to see the structural importance of line 703, and through his failure to
construe line 704 as a comment on line 703, not on line 701,
id ty p. no [line 2842],
[ 82 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
plied to the task of the poet, common wit chooses and joins poetic
perceptions. 4 * Imagination, as the faculty of bringing wholeness of
feeling to the things selected by perception, becomes in poetry the
power to cloak a truth in a dark fiction:
For often vnder a fayre fayned fable
A trouthe appereth gretely profytable.* 5
It was the power to imagine this sort of fable that made the famous
poets of antiquity so wise and inventive:
Theyr obscure reason fayre and sugratyfe
Pronounced trouthe vnder cloudy fygures
By the inuencyon of theyr fatall scryptures. 46
Fantasy, the third faculty that ministers to invention, is the mental
visualization of an object of perception and imagination, even as this
faculty for the general run of men acts "to brynge to fynysshement"
what the imagination produces. 47 Fourth in the poetic process is esti-
mation, or judgment, a logical gift, by which causation is determined,
quantity and quality ascertained, space, time, and other circumstances
calculated. 48 Lastly the poetic process involves retentive memory, the
faculty which enables the poet to retain inwardly the sum of his
poetical matter while his reason gives it approval and his written
language gives it outward form. 49
Nothing in Hawes's account of poetic invention trespasses upon
the doctrine of rhetorical invention in Cicero and his disciples 5 and
yet we would have to admit that there is a process of poetic as of
rhetorical invention, and that this process, while it has one configura-
tion in poetry and another in oratory, is in both cases a quest for the
materials of composition, and thus is justifiably called in both cases
by the same term.
When Hawes speaks, however, of disposition or arrangement as
it affects poetry, his account does trespass somewhat upon the theory
of arranging an oration. Thus Dame Rethoryke teaches this part of
her subject to the hero of the Pastime by recognizing it as a pre-
eminent characteristic of eloquence, and as a process of imparting
p. 33
p. 34
p. 34
p. 34
p. 34
p. 35
lines 706-707],
lines 713-714]} cf. p. no [lines 2843-2846].
Alines 719-721].
_ lines 722-735]} cf. p. no [lines 2847-2849
lines 736-749]; cf. p. no [lines 2850-2856]
'lines 750-763] } cf. p. in [lines 2857-2863
[ 83 1
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
meaning to matter, and often of deciding between the form of nar-
ration or that of argumentation. 50 These two latter terms are close
to the import of narration and proof as parts of the classical oration,
and Dame Rethoryke offers some cryptic observations on the oc-
casions when one or the other is to be preferred. The rest of her
disquisition upon this second part of rhetoric is more in the vein of
eulogy than of instruction. Her last observation laments the rudeness
of those who lack appreciation for order in discourse:
So dull they are that they can not fynde
This ryall arte for to perceyue in mynde.
We would ordinarily expect a treatment of style as the third
part of rhetoric to enumerate the kinds of style and to explain the
figures of speech and thought. Nor would we be surprised if much
of that treatment applied as well to poetry as to oratory, since all
the arts of discourse have points of style in common. Dame Rethoryke
begins her remarks upon style as if she were going to follow these
conventional lines. But as she continues, she soon limits herself to
the fable and the figure as keys to poetic symbolism, and thus her
treatment of style has more application to poetry than to oratory.
She discusses the possible interpretations of the fable of Atlas, the
Centaurs, Pluto, Hercules 5 B1 she speaks of the four rivers, that is, of
poetry as it creates understanding of ourselves, as it offers symbolic
solutions to human problems, as it profits us by its novelty, as it
sheds a glow of light upon our rudeness; 52 and she mentions Virgil,
Cicero, and Lydgate as examples of the styles of which she ap-
proves. 58
The treatment of "pronuncyacyon" by Dame Rethoryke is inter-
esting not only as the first English version of doctrine belonging to
this part of rhetoric, but also as an attempt to treat briefly the de-
livery of speeches and the oral interpretation of poetry. The stand-
ards of delivery both for speaker and reader are formulated by con-
sidering the audience. An audience of high estate, for example,
requires the speaker to be obedient and cultivated, if he would have
a sympathetic hearing. As for the custom of poets in telling their
tales, it consists in avoiding rudeness and in being gentle and seemly,
since the ends of speech are to refine manners and remove folly.
60 Ibid.) p. 37 [lines 810-903],
B1 Ibid., p. 43 [lines 988-1050].
62 Ibid.) p. 45 [lines 1051-1141].
53 Ibid.y p. 49 [lines 1161-11761.
[ 84 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
Thus does Dame Rethoryke condense into a few lines her advice
to poets who read their works aloud. She concludes as follows:
I can not wryte to moche for theyr sake
Them to laude for my tyme is shorte
And the mater longe whiche I must reporte. 64
Of all the parts of her subject mentioned by Dame Rethoryke for
the instruction of her disciple, memory is the one in which she comes
closest to the doctrine of Ciceronian rhetoric as it applies to the orator.
The doctrine of memory, as set forth in the Rhetorica ad Heren-
nium and as usually mentioned and discussed in other ancient works
on rhetoric, involved the notion of the natural memory, as a faculty
possessed by all men, and of the cultivated memory, as the faculty
that resulted when the natural memory was trained. The memory
system as developed by the ancient rhetoricians to train speakers to
rememb'er their speeches during delivery involved two key concepts,
called respectively the places and the images. 65 According to Cicero,
the distinguished poet Simonides of Ceos was the inventor of this
system, and Cicero thus states the theory behind it as developed by
Simonides out of a personal experience in which he had been able to
identify mutilated corpses by his ability to recall where they had
each been sitting at a banquet table before the roof fell in and crushed
them beyond recognition:
He inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty must select
localities and form mental images of the facts they wish to remember
and store those images in the localities, with the result that the ar-
rangement of the localities will preserve the order of the facts, and
the images of the facts will designate the facts themselves, and we
shall employ the localities and images respectively as a wax writing
tablet and the letters written on it. 58
The places chosen by a speaker as the basis of his own particular
memory system could be any set of physical arrangements the
rooms of a house, the floors of a public building, the stages of a long
54 Ibid*) p. 52, f lines 1237-1239].
55 See Rhetorica ad Herenmum^ 3.16-24, and Quintilian, Institutio Oratorio^ 11.2.1-26,
for representative accounts of the process by which the memory could be trained. The
two key concepts are thus stated in the former of these two works (3.16) : "Constat
igitur artificiosa memoria ex locis et imaginibus." For these same two terms in Quintilian,
see Institutio Oratoria^ 11.2.21-22.
56 De Oratore^ 2.86.354, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (The Loeb Classical
Library, Cambridge, Mass, and London, 1942), I, 467.
[ 85 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
journey, the components of a rampart, the sections of a picture, or
the signs of the zodiac. 57 The images to be stored in those places are
also the subject of individual choice, and should be selected so as to
be naturally associated with the ideas in a particular speech. For ex-
ample, images could be drawn from military weapons, if the speech
concerned military affairs. Now by storing the images within the
system of places, and by visualizing himself as visiting the places one
by one, the speaker would find each place holding its image, and each
image suggesting the ideas previously connected with it in his mind,
with the result that a constant flow of ideas would occur, and a fluent
speech would be produced.
Dame Rethoryke applies this ancient memory system to the needs
of the poet reciting his poems aloud to an audience. She suggests that
he envisage his leathern wallet as a convenient system of places, and
go through it mentally to remind himself of the images stored in its
various compartments and associated with their respective tales. Her
words are these:
Yf to the orature many a sundry tale
One after other treatably be tolde
Than sundry ymages in his closed male
Eache for a mater he doth than well holde
Lyke to the tale he doth than so beholde
And inwarde a recapytulacyon
Of eche ymage the moralyzacyon
Whiche be the tales he grounded pryuely
Vpon these ymages sygnyfycacyon
And whan tyme is for hym to specyfy
All his tales by demonstracyon
In due ordre maner and reason
Than eche ymage inwarde dyrectly
The oratoure doth take full properly
So is enprynted in his propre mynde
Euery tale with hole resemblaunce
By this ymage he dooth his mater fynde
Eche after other withouten varyaunce
Who to this arte wyll gyue attendaunce
As therof to knowe the perfytenes
In the poetes scole he must haue intres/ 8
07 These suggestions about the choice of places are from Quintilian, Institutio Orator*a y
11.2.18-22.
68 Pastime > p. 52 [lines 1247-1267],
[ 86 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
Thus does Dame Rethoryke complete her task of combining the
terms of Ciceronian rhetoric with the requirements of the poet's pro-
fession, as she had no doubt been taught to do by the Poetria Nova
of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, and as the Rhetorica ad Herennium had in
turn taught Geoffrey to do, when he decided to analyze the problem
of poetic communication in the accents of ancient rhetorical instruc-
tion. 59
In his pioneer essay on sixteenth-century English rhetorical theory
prefacing his edition of Leonard Cox's The Arte or Crajte of
Rh'ethoryke, Frederic Ives Carpenter implies that Caxton's transla-
tion of the Mirrour of the World is perhaps the first printed account
of Cicero's five terms to appear in English. 80 Actually, however, the
first two editions of the Mirrour, one of which is usually dated at
Caxton's press at Westminster around 1481, and the other at the
same press around 1490, contain no hint of Ciceronian terminology
in their very brief accounts of rhetoric as the third of the seven liberal
arts. In fact, those accounts do nothing but indicate that righteousness,
reason, and arranging of words are involved in rhetoric, and that
rhetoric is connected not only with the process of framing and apply-
ing laws and decrees, but also with the desire to earn salvation by
working in the cause of right. 61 Not until the third edition of the
Mirrour at the press of Laurence Andrewe in London around 1527
does that work discuss rhetoric in Cicero's five terms. Even then,
however, its treatment of invention, arrangement, and style is little
more in each case than a definition, although memory is discussed
59 The connection between the account of rhetoric in Hawes's Pastime and the ac-
count of poetry in Geoffrey's Poetria Nova has not to my knowledge been worked out.
But the kinship between the two works in respect to rhetorical theory can be established
not only by pointing: to their structural similarities but also by regarding 1 The Court of
Sapyence as a means of connecting Hawes to Geoffrey. Hawes believed the Court to be
the work of Lydgate, and his reverence for Lydgate is repeatedly expressed j see Pastime^
p. 56 [lines 1357, 1 373] 5 also Whitney Wells, "Stephen Hawes and The Court of
Salience ," The Review of English Studies^ vi (1930), 284-294. The Court in its brief
account of rhetoric advises the reader to go for further instruction "to Tria Sunt, And
to Galfryde, the poete lawreate"; (ed. Spindler, p. 199 [lines 1914-1915]). The "Tria
Sunt" appears to refer to the prose version of Geoffrey's Poetria. Nova, whereas the
mention of Geoffrey as poet laureate might be a covert reference to the poetic version
of the same workj see C. F. Buhler, The Sources of the Court of Sapience, Beitrage
zur Englischen Philologie, xxin (1932), p. 76. Thus some reason exists for believing that
Hawes on the authority of the Court would accept Geoffrey as the master of his own
master, and would thus have sentimental connections with the idea of converting Cicero-
nian rhetoric to the uses of poetry.
80 Leonard Cox, The Arte or Crafte of Rhethoryke> ed. Frederic Ives Carpenter
(Chicago, 1899), p. 25.
61 Caxton's Mirrour ^ ed. Prior, pp. 35-36.
[ 87 1
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
at some little length, and pronunciation receives definite emphasis.
Now by 1527 Hawes's Pastime^ with its fuller English account of
Cicero's five terms, had already gone through two editions, and thus
it deserves the honor in respect to those terms that Carpenter by
strong implication assigns to the Mirrour. The Mirrour is more ac-
curately numbered as the second of the appearances of Ciceronian
rhetoric in an English version.
The first two editions of Caxton's Mirrour are available to any
modern reader in Prior's reprint, to which I have already made
various references. But copies of the expanded third edition cannot
be consulted except at a few libraries, and thus some quotations from
its treatment of rhetoric may be helpful as a supplement to the pas-
sage quoted by Carpenter to show what he means when he refers to
the IVLirrour as containing "perhaps the first printed account of
rhetoric in English." 62 As I just indicated, the third edition of the
Mirrour treats invention, arrangement, and style, by giving little
more than brief definitions of them, and these definitions are included
in Carpenter's quotation from that work. But the subject of memory
receives really interesting treatment in that same edition. Here is the
way the entire subject is handled as a part of rhetoric:
ff Ars memoratiua / Or memory /
fl The fourth thynge is memory, as whan thou haste dysposed how
thou shalt elygantly vtter thy mater / Than thou must deuise a way
to kepe it in thy mynde for fere of oblyuion whan thou sholdest pro-
nowunce it / which mememory standeth in . 1 1 . thynges / that is to say
memory naturall / & memory artyficyall / memory naturall / is
that which god hath gyuen to euery man /
IT Memory Artyfycyall is that which men cal Ars memoratiua / The
crafte of memory / by which craft thou mayste wryte a thynge in thy
mynde / & set it in thy mynde as euydetly as thou mayst rede and
se the wordes whych thou wrytest with ynke vpon parchemet or
paper / Therfore in this arte of memory thou muste haue places
which shal be to the lyke as it were perchenent or paper to wryte
vpon / Also instede of thy lettres thou must ymagyn Images to set
in the same places / Therfore fyrst thou shalt chose thy places fyrste
As in some greate hous that thou knowest well / and begyn at a
certayn place of that hous / & marke som poste / corner / or wall /
beynge. there as they stande arow / and within .x. or .xii. fote and
32 o?. at., P . zs-
[ 88 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
not past .xx. fote asoder marke som other poste or wall // and so
alway procedyng f orthe one way tyll thou haue marked or notyd .C.
or ,CC. places / or as many as thou canste haue /
If Also in this crafte as I sayde before thou must haue euer ymags of
corporall thynges that thou muste se with thyn eye whiche thou muste
ymagyn in thy mynde that thou seest them sette in the places
IT And so of euery corporall thynge thou muste ymagyn that thou seest
the same comporall thyng in the place /
ff As whan thou wylte remembre a man / a horse / a byrde / a
fysshe / or suche other to Imagyn that thou seest the same man / hors /
byrde / or fisshe / in thy place and so of euery corporall thyng / But
yf thou canst not haue a corporall ymage of the same thynge / as yf
thou woldest remembre a thynge whyche is of it selfe no bodely nor
corporall thyng but incorporall / That thou muste yet take an ymage
therfore that is a corporall thynge / As yf thou woldest remeber thys
word / to rede / than thou maist ymagyn one lokynge on a boke / or
for this word, walk / to ymagin a payre of legges / or for this worde
wysedome an olde man wyth a whyt hed so that euery ymage must be
a bodely & a corporal thyng. 63
This same edition of the Mirrour also has an account of pronuncia-
tion which is brief enough for quotation here and which will serve
to indicate some of the doctrine connected with the Ciceronian discus-
sion of delivery as the last part of rhetoric:
fl The fyfte thynge is pronuciacyo which is but to modder and to ordre
thy voyce & thy body acordynge to the wordes & to the scyece /
IT The voyce must haue strength / sharpnes / & temperaunce.
IF Countenaunce is the orderynge of thy face / as whan thou spekyst
of a mery mater to shew a laughyng and mery countenaunce /
IF And whan thou spekyst of a pytefull mater to shew a lamentable
countenaunce & a heuy /
IF And whan thou spekest of a weyghty cause or mater to shewe a sad
and a solempne countenaunce
^Gesture is not only in excersisyng one parte of the body but I euery
outward meber of the body / as in hede / armes / & leggs / and
68 The myrrour: & dyscryfscyon of the worlds with many meruaylles ([London,
Z 5 2 7?])> sig"- Dar-Dsv. From the Huntingdon Library photostat of theij own original
copy. Spelling, abbreviating, and pointing are reproduced here to conform to that
original.
[ 89 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
other vtt 3 partes / Therfore to euery mater that thou shalt vtt 3 thou
must haue quemet gesture / as wha thou spekest of a solepne mat' to
stade vp ryghte with lytell meuynge of thy body / but poyntynge it
with thy fore fynger /
ffAnd whan thou spekyst of any cruell mater or yrefull cause to
bende thy fyst and shake thyn arme / And whan thou spekyst of
any heuenly or godly thynges to loke vp & polte towarde the skye
with thy finger /
Tf And wha thou spekest of any gentilnes /myldenes / or humylyte /
to ley thy handes vpon thy breste / & wha thou spekest of any holy
mater or deuocyon to holde vp thy handes./ 64
Thus did the third edition of Caxton's Mirrour deal with memory
and delivery as the last two parts of rhetoric. Its treatment of the
first three parts was less extended, as I have said, but no less faith-
ful to the main intent of Ciceronian teaching.
Next after it in the historical sequence of Ciceronian rhetorics in
English stands Leonard Cox's Rhethoryke^ which first appeared at
London around 1530, and which was given a second edition at the
same place in 1532. Cox's Rhethoryke marks the third appearance of
Ciceronian theory in the vernacular. But it has two other larger dis-
tinctions. First of all, it is the earliest English textbook on rhetoric
to be published anywhere, and so it deserves a special place in the
literary history of Anglo-Saxon civilization. Secondly, it is the first
systematic attempt to acquaint English readers with the original
rhetorical content of the Ciceronian doctrine of invention, and so it
is a milestone on the long road towards the vernacularization of
classical learning.
At the time when Cox wrote his Rhethoryke^ he was a school-
master at Reading. He indicates this fact in the epistle- dedicating his
work to "the reuerende father in god & his singuler good lorde the
lorde Hugh Faryngton Abbot of Redynge." 66 In the same letter he
says that he owes his position to the Abbot, whose ancestors had
es Leonard Cox, The Art ctr crafte of Rhetoryke (London, 1532), sig 1 . Azv. From
the Huntingdon Library photostat of their own copy of the 1532 edition. I have not
seen the first edition, which bears no date and has been assigned by Carpenter (o. dt. y
pp. 10, 12, 19) to the year 1530 or thereabouts. The British Museum General Catalogue
of Printed Books (London and Beccles, 1949) tentatively gives the first edition the
date of 1529, although in 1886 the Catalogue dated it 1524, as did the Short-Title
Catalogue in 1926. Carpenter's reprint is based upon both early editions, but the first
edition is his preferred authority.
[ 90 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
founded the very school in which he is now serving; and he goes on
to declare that he has long been considering ways in which he could
show his patron how much he appreciated what the latter had done
for him. Then he adds:
And whan I had thus long prepensed in my mynde what thynge I
myght best chose out: non offred it selfe more conuenyent to the
profyte of yonge studentes (which your good lordshyp hath alwayes
tenderly fauoured / and also meter to my [profession: than to make
som proper werke of the right pleasaunt and persuadible art of
Rhetorique whiche as it is very necessary to all suche as wyll either
be Aduocates and Proctours in the law: or els apte to be sent in theyr
Prynces Ambassades or to be techers of goddes worde in suche maner
as may be moost sensible & accepte to theyr audience and finally to all
them hauynge any thyng to purpose or to speke afore any companye
(what someuer they be). 66
This declaration of the uses of the art of rhetoric in law, statecraft,
and the ministry, as well as on numerous occasions of private life,
is typical of the whole rhetorical tradition in the Latin world from
Cicero to Traversagni, and is thus worthy to appear in the first rhe-
torical textbook to bear Cicero's teachings to English boys in their
own tongue. So is Cox's analysis of the social needs his work is
designed to meet:
So contraryly I se no science that is lesse taught & declared to Scolers
which ought chiefly after the knowlege of Gramer ones had to be
instructe in this facultie without the whiche oftentymes the rude
vtteraunce of the Aduocate greatly hindereth and apeyreth his clietes
cause. Likewise the vnapt disposicion of the precher (in orderyng his
mater) confoundeth the memory of his herers and briefly in declar-
ynge of maters: for lacke of inuencion and order with due elocucion:
great tediousnes is engendred to the multitude beyng present by oc-
casion wherof the speker is many tymes ere he haue ended his tale:
either left almost aloon to his no litle confusio : or els (which is a lyke
rebuke to hym) the audience falleth for werynes of his ineloquent
language fast on slepe. 87
The remedy for these shortcomings, Cox implies, is to be found
in proper instruction in rhetoric. It is to provide such instruction, he
declares, that "I haue partely translated out of a werke of Rhetorique
wry ten in the Latin tongue: and partely compyled of myn owne: and
ee Rhetoryke (153 a), sig. Azv. 6T Ibid., sig.
[ 91 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
so made a lytle treatyse in maner of an Introductyon into this afore-
sayd Science: and that in our Englysshe tongue." 68 Two Latin sources
openly referred to by Cox in his little treatise are Cicero's De Inven-
tione and Trapezuntius's Rhetoricorum Libri Quinque. But, as
Carpenter was the first to point out, the "werke of Rhetorique wryten
in the Latin tongue" from which Cox partly translated to form his
own work is Melanchthon's Institution** Rhetoricae.
Melanchthon's Institutiones Rhetoricae partitions rhetoric under
the headings of invention, judgment, arrangement, and style. 71 The
second of these terms seems to be out of place as a part of the
rhetoric of the Ciceronian tradition 5 but actually that term is not
so much out of place as unnecessary. As a concept in the classical
theory of communication, judgment refers to the second of the two
parts of dialectic, invention being the other part, as I have already
shown j 72 and judgment in dialectical theory, it will be remembered
from my earlier discussion, is equivalent in function to arrangement
or disposition in rhetoric. Thus it would seem that, if arrangement
is counted a part of rhetorical theory, nothing would be gained by
claiming judgment as an added part, since both of these concepts
involve the problem of literary structure, and to handle them both
in the same work is to invite the charge of redundancy. To be sure,
there were rhetorical theorists in antiquity who insisted that rhetoric
had six parts, and who found the sixth part by adding judgment to
the five parts approved by Cicero. Quintilian mentions these theo-
rists, and even discusses to some extent the meaning they assigned
to judgment as a part of rhetoric. 73 But his own opinion is that what
is said under judgment when it is treated separately overlaps what
has to be said anyway under invention, arrangement, style, and even
delivery, and therefore Cicero's five parts are to be preferred to the
suggested six. Nevertheless, Melanchthon chooses to count both
judgment and arrangement as parts of rhetoric, perhaps in imitation
of the theorists mentioned by Quintilian, or perhaps in an attempt to
indicate that rhetorical theory needed to be strengthened by additions
that belonged properly under a dialectical concept.
68 Ibid., sig. A 3 r.
69 Ibid., sigs. Eyv, F6r, F6v.
70 Carpenter, p. 29.
71 In Carpenter's edition of Cox's Rhetboryke, pp. 91-102, are printed extracts from
Melanchthon's Institutiones Rhetoricae 5 for the latter's partitioning of rhetoric under
these four heads, see p. 91.
72 See above, pp. 15-16.
78 Institutio Oratoria^ 3. 3. 5-7 > 6. $.1-4.
[ 9* ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
Cox defines rhetoric as having the four procedures that Melanch-
thon had assigned to it. 74 He limits himself, however, to invention,
commenting both at the beginning and end of his work that this pro-
cedure is hardest of the four to master. 75 He takes the trouble to
point out, moreover, that in thus limiting himself, he has "folowed
y e facion of Tulli who made a seuerall werke of inuencion." 76
As for his actual treatment of the first part of rhetoric, Cox agrees
somewhat more closely with the method followed in the Rhetorica
ad Herennium than with Cicero's method in De InventAone^ espe-
cially in connection with the doctrine of the positions of argument.
These positions are discussed by Cox under three main headings, after
the manner of the Rhetorica ad Herennium although the basic
terms which evolve from his classification are in close agreement
with those in De Inventione^ where the positions are classed some-
what differently, as I indicated earlier in this chapter. 78 Moreover,
even as the Rhetorica ad Herennium follows the general plan of dis-
cussing each of the kinds of oratory in relation to each of the several
parts of the oration, with the result that the terms for the parts of
the oration recur as each kind of oratory is described, so also does
Cox $ yet in the final analysis his doctrine amounts to that presented
a bit differently by Cicero's De Inventione* Incidentally, by treating
the parts of the oration under invention, Cox manages as the classical
theorists did to cover the most important aspect of the doctrine of
rhetorical arrangement without having to take it up directly.
There is, however, one slight peculiarity in Cox's theory of in-
vention, and it deserves notice in this history. It arises when Cox
speaks of the precise number of classes into which rhetorical dis-
courses fall. On this point he observes that there are "foure causes
or for the more playnnes foure kyndes of Oracions." 79 These he im-
mediately enumerates as "Logycall," "Demonstratiue," "Delibera-
tiue," and " Judiciall" j and he adds that "these thre last be properly
called spices or kyndes of oracions." 80 Now, in dealing with four
kinds of oratory rather than the conventional three as I discussed
them earlier, 81 Cox departs from the Rhetorica ad Herennium and
74 Rhetoryke ( 1 5 3 z ) , sig". A4r- A4.v.
75 /*<, sigs. A4V, F6r.
79 Ibid., sig. F6r.
77 Ibid., sig 1 . D7r; see also Rhetorica ad Herennmm y i.u.
78 See above, pp. 70-71.
79 Rhetoryke) sig. A5r.
80 Ibid.) sig. A5v. 81 See above, pp. 69-70.
[ 93 1
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
also from De Inventions Moreover, in what he says of the method
of invention to be followed in logical orations, he draws his material
from the theory of dialectical invention, taking the position that
logical questions appear both in dialectic and in rhetoric, and hence
need some attention in the latter science, even though what is said
of them there must be borrowed from the former. 83 In other words,
Cox extends the scope of Ciceronian rhetoric somewhat, and then
fortifies the theory of rhetorical invention by additions from the
parallel theory in dialectic. But he does not alter the traditional re-
lation of these two arts to each other, In fact, ^his distinction between
them, phrased as follows, is in the spirit of his time:
For this is the dyfference that is betwene these two sciences that the
Logician" in dysputynge obserueth certayne rules for the settynge of
his wordes being solicitous that there be spoke no more nor no lesse
than the thynge requyreth & that it be euin as plaily spoke as it is
thought. But the Rhethorician seketh about & boroweth where he can
asmoche as he may for to make the symple and playne Lpgicall argu-
mentes gaye & delectable to the eare. So than the sure iugement of
argumentes or reasons must be lerned of the logician but the crafte
to set the out with pleasaunt figures and to delate the mater belongeth
to the Rhetorician. 8 *
Twice in his. treatise on rhetoric Cox mentions his desire to do
something further with that subject. His dedicatory epistle draws to
a close with the avowal that he trusts "by the ayde of almyghty god
to endyte other werkes bothe in this faculty and other to the laude
of the hygh godhed." 85 At the very end of his work, in his con-
clusion as author, he speaks of his having treated invention, the chief
part of rhetoric, and of his being willing, if the present book suc-
ceeds, to "assay my selfe in y other partes & so make & accoplyssh y e
hole werke." BG Apparently his resolution to write another work on
rhetoric had not been abandoned by 1540, because in a letter dated
May 23 of that year he mentions his plan to write a work to be called
the Erotemata Rhetorical Possibly that would have been the more
complete treatise which he promised at the end of his earlier one 3
possibly also it would have been a further translation from Melanch-
82 Rhetorica aci Herenntum^ r.aj De Inventione, 1.5.7. See also Quintilian, Institutio
Oratoria^ 3.4.1-16, where the dispute over the number of kinds of oratory -is discussed.
83 Rhetorykt) sig. A6r, A8v.
**Ibid., sigs. A8v-Bir.
85 IbU.i sig. A 3 v. * 9 Ib*d., sig. F6r.
87 Rhethoryke^ ed. Carpenter, pp. 15-16, 21.
[ 94 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
thon, since Cox's projected title suggests his desire to identify his
new work with that famous author, who had called one of his own
works the Erotemata Dialectices. But Cox appears never to have fin-
ished or at any rate to have published a second work on rhetoric.
Among the circumstances which led Cox to take a special interest
in Melanchthon, there is at least one possibility to be emphasized.
Cox took his bachelor's degree at Cambridge University around
1528, and thus was an undergraduate when William Paget, who
must have been about Cox's age, is said to have delivered a course
of lectures in his own college at Cambridge on Melanchthon's rhe-
torical theory. 88 Since Paget appears to have left Cambridge before
taking his bachelor's degree, we may assume that his lectures on
Melanchthon were not part of the authorized curriculum. But they
are evidence of undergraduate interest in that particular author, and
Cox's own Rhethoryke reflects that same interest on a maturer and
more professional level.
Despite the fact that Cox does not go beyond the theory of
rhetorical invention, Ciceronian rhetoric was represented by him in
its most important aspect. Its other aspects were not long in finding
new English interpreters. About sixteen years after the date of the
second edition of Cox's Rhethoryke, and some five years before the
date of Thomas Wilson's great English version of the doctrine be-
longing to all five terms of the Ciceronian rhetorical formula, the
ancient theory of memory was made the subject of a separate work
for the first time in English, and thus did Ciceronian rhetoric re-
ceive its first important supplement since Cox's treatise on invention.
Robert Copland, a printer who had learned his trade under Caxton
and Wynkyn de Worde, was author of this supplement. He named
his work The Art of Memory, that otherwyse is called the "Phemx."
His title page describes it as "A boke very behouefull and profytable
to all professours of scyences. Grammaryens / Rethoryciens Dia-
lectyke / Legystes / Phylosophres & Theologiens." The colophon
indicates that the work was printed at London by William Middle-
ton, and that it was a translation "out of french in to englyshe by
Roberte Coplande." 89 "For asmuch as many (I th[is] tyme moderne
88 The date of Cox's Cambridge degree is not of record. He was incorporated B.A.
at Oxford on Feb. 19, 1529-30, as one who already held the same degree from Cam-
bridge. See Dictionary of National Biogra^hy^ s,v. Cox, Leonard. For mention of
Paget's lectures at Cambridge, see Mullinger, University of Cambridge^ i, 563; also
Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Paget, William (1505-1563).
89 No date is given on the title page or colophpn. The Short-Title Catalogue assigns
[ 95 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
y psetly reneth) be o a slow memory & late mynded," avows the
prologue, "this lytell boke was made & composed, for to gyue and
preset it to all people, albeit that at the begynnynge it was dyrected
to the Italyke nacion." The work thus identified by Copland as his
ultimate source is in reality a small Latin treatise by Petrus Ravennas,
also called Pietro Tommai, an Italian scholar, who died in 1 5o8_after
having served for a time as lecturer on canon law at the University of
Padua. Tommai's little book was first published at Venice in 1491 as
Foenix Dni Petri Rauenatis Memoriae Magistrif* under that same
title and others it was republished several times at European presses
during the sixteenth century.
The prologue of Copland's translation says that the original Italian
author had had no teacher of the art of memory, "but y it came to
hym by inuencion throughe the socour and help of god that lyghtned
and inspired his spyrite." What this means is that the original author
was merely inventor of ways in which the old memory system of
Ciceronian rhetoric could be worked out in practical terms. In other
words, Tommai accepted the basic concepts of places and images as
his starting point, and proceeded to suggest things to be used for
them, his method being to reduce his doctrine to a few main con-
clusions, each of which had its special rules. Here is a sample of his
formulations as Copland renders them into English :
The fyrste conclusyon. shalbe suche. This arte is, and consysteth of
places and magnytudes. The places be as cardes or scrolls or other
thynges for to wrytte in. The ymages be y symylytudes of the thynges
that we wyll retayne in mynde. Than I wyl fyrst [pre]pare my carde
wherin we may colloke & order y ymages in places. 91
The rules which follow this first conclusion indicate what type of
physical objects may serve as places, and how they are to be chosen:
the work tentatively to the year 1548. My present discussion of it is based upon the
Huntington Library photostat of the copy at Cambridge University Library.
90 The Huntington Library owns a copy of this edition under the title just given.
The text itself begins: "Artificiosa Memoria Clarissimi luris Vtrius[que] Doctoris &
militis domini Petri Rauenatis lura Canonica ordinarie de sero legentis in Celeberrimo
Gymnasio Patauino in hoc libello continetur." The colophon reads: "Bernardinus de
Choris de Cremona Impressor delectus Impressit Venetias Die. X. lanuarii. M. ccccxci."
This edition is cited below as Foenix.
S1 The Art of Memory^ sig. A2V-A3T. Tommai states the first conclusion as follows:
"Prima erit Conclusio: Ars ista constat ex locis & imaginibus: loca sunt tanq charta
seu alia materia in qua scribimus: Imagines sunt similitudines reru quas memoriae
uolumus comendare. Chartam ergo primu parabo in qua imagines collocare possimus."
sig. Bsr.
[ 96 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
And for the foundacion of this fyrst coclusyon I wyll put foure rules.
The fyrste is this. The places are the wyndowes set in walles, pyllers,
& anglets, with other lyke. The .11. rule is. The places ought nat to
be to nere togyther nor to fare a soder. . . . The .111. rule is suche.
But it is vayne as me semeth. For it is the opynyon of talkers that
the places ought nat to be made where as me do haunt, as in churche
and comyn places. For it suffyseth to haue sene church vacaunt wher
as people walke nat alway and in that hath ben taught y cotrary
experyence. whyche is the mayster of those thynges. The .1111. rule
is th[is]. That the places be nat to hye. For I wyl that the men set
for the ymages or in the steade of ymages may touch the places, y
whiche I haue iudged as behouefull. 92
In illustration of these rules, Tommai says that he selects a church
well known to himself, considers its parts, walks through it three or
four times, and then returns to his own house. There he endeavors
to remember the things he has seen. He recalls something on the
right side of the gate along the path that leads to the right aisle and
the high altar, and this he ordains as his first place. His second place
he fixes upon the wall next to the first, but five or six feet off. These
places are chosen either for some umisual feature they may possess,
say a pillar in a window, or for some unusual feature they may be
imagined to possess. Each place is fixed along the route through the
church and back to the entrance gate. Thus is a system of places
created for the later reception of images. Says Tommai of his own
system :
But bicause y I haue wylled to surmout all the men of Itally by
habundauce of thynges and holy scryptures, in Canone lawe and
Cyuyl, and in other authoritees of many thynges, whyle that I was
but yonge adolescent I haue prepared a C. M, places. And now I
haue added to them y other .x. M. places wherin I haue put the
thynges which are to say & vtter by my selfe, so y they be prompt-
emets whan I wyll experyment the vertues and strengthes of my
memory. 93
92 The Art of Memory ', sig. A3T-A3V. The Latin text reads at this point: "Et pro
fundamento huius primae conclusionis quatuor reg-ulas pono. Prima est haec: loca sunt
fenestrae in parietibus positae colunae anguli & quae his similia sunt. Secuda sit regular
loca non debent esse nimium uicina aut nimium distatia. Tertia sit reg-ula uana ut mihi
uidetur est opinio dicentium loca fieri non debere ubi sit hominum frequentia: ut in
ecclesiis aut in plateis; nam ecclesiam quado[que] uacua uidisse sufEcit non enirn semper
ibi hominum deambulatio uisa fuit & in hoc experientia quae est reru magistra cotrarium
docuit. Quarta sit regular loca no sint alta quia uolui [que] homines pro imaginibus
positi loca tang-ere possint quod utile semper iudicaui." Foenix, sig. Bjr.
93 The Art of Memory, sig. A4V.
[ 97 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
Having established his system of places, Tommai was apparently
quite successful in its use. He relates that when he was young, he
found himself in the company of certain noblemen, and it was pro-
posed that a list of names be read off, whereupon^ he ^ would recall
them. As each name was called, Tommai associated it with the image
of a friend of his having a similar name, and stored each image in
his system of places. Then, with the list complete, he mentally visited
his places, and from the images in them he recalled the names. 94
The rest of Tommai's work as Copland translates it is given over
to practical hints on systems of places and types of images. The alpha-
bet is suggested as one system of places, each letter being conceived
as a fair maiden, with whom something to be memorized can be
associated. Parts of the body, patterns of vocal sounds, arrangements
of colors, and systems of enumeration, are among the possibilities
considered, and the practical needs of preachers, lawyers, and pro-
fessors are kept in mind throughout.
However useful Copland wanted his Art of Memory to be in the
fraternity of talkers, he nevertheless does not present it as a sub-
division of rhetorical theory or as a conventional topic in the Cicer-
onian program for oratorical training. Thus to readers of its own
time, the Art would probably not have appeared to belong to the
family which also claimed Cox's Rhethoryke^ particularly since the
latter did not include memory among rhetorical interests. But Cop-
land does belong to that family, as we can see, and so it is entirely
appropriate to include his Art in the sequence of English versions of
the Ciceronian program, even though Thomas Wilson's The Arte
of Rhetorique is in a more obvious sense the next work after Cox in
this sequence, and is moreover the greatest Ciceronian rhetoric in
English, short of a direct translation of the works of the Latin master
himself.
Wilson published his Rhetorique in 1553, just two years after he
had made history by putting out the first English logic. 05 The opinion
persists among scholars that the first edition of the Rhetorique is in-
complete, and that the edition of 1560 is the true editio
94 Ibid., sig. ASV.
85 The title page of the first edition reads: "The Arte of Rhetorique, for the vse of
all suche as are studious of Eloquence, sette forth in English, by Thomas Wilson. Anno
Domini. M. D. LIII. Mense lanuarijV The Huntington Library has a copy of the first
edition; also of the second edition (London, 1560), the third (London, 1562), and the
seventh (London, 1584).
9e Thus Atkins, The Renascence, p. 74, refers to Wilson's Rhetorique as published in
15.53 and completed in 1560. Atkins borrowed this opinion from Wilson's Arte of Rhet-
[ 98 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
But in reality the latter contains only about four pages of material
not found in the former, as Russell Wagner has shown, and those
four pages are made up, not of additional doctrine, but of ex-
amples. 97 Thus 1553 may be accepted as the year in which the earliest
complete English account of the rhetorical doctrine connected with
all five parts of the Ciceronian theory of oratory appeared in print.
The Rhetorique was prepared by Wilson in accordance with a
promise that he had made a year earlier to John Dudley, known to
history as Duke of Northumberland, who was at that time the power
behind the young king Edward VI, and was later beheaded by Queen
Mary because of his attempt to secure the throne for Lady Jane Grey.
Wilson mentions his promise to the duke in the epistle which dedi-
cates the Rhetorique to him:
I therefore, commend to your Lordshippes tuition and patronage, this
treatise of Rhetorique, to the ende that ye may get some furtheraunce
by the same, & I also be discharged of my faithfull promise, this last
yere made vnto you.
Since the duke had been named chancellor of Cambridge early in
the year 1552, and since Wilson, as a quite recent graduate of that
university, was just then beginning to achieve some reputation from
his Rule of Reason, it may be that an interview between Wilson and
the nobleman had been initiated by the latter soon after he assumed
the chancellorship. The dedicatory epistle prefixed to the Rhetorique
suggests at any rate that Wilson's "faithfull promise" had been given
at a meeting between them:
For, whereas it pleased you among other talke of learning, earnestly
to wish, that ye might one day see the preceptes of Rhetorique, set
forth by me in English, as I had erst done the rules of Logicke:
hauing in my countrey this last Sommer, a quiet time of vacation,
with the right worshipfull Sir Edward Dimmoke Knight: I trauailed
so much, as my leasure might serue thereunto, not onely to declare
my good heart, to the satisfying of your request in that behalfe, but
also through that your motion, to helpe the towardnesse of some
other, not so well furnished as your Lordship is.
ortque 1560^ ed. George Herbert Mair ([Oxford], 1909)) p. xxxv. Incidentally, Mair's
edition of the Rhetorique is the only modern version easily available to students; for
convenience I shall refer my discussion to it.
97 Russell Halderman Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique An Abstract of
a Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, July, 1928," Cornell University Abstracts of
Theses, II.
[ 99 1
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
Invention is the subject to which Wilson devotes the lion's share
of attention, as did his Ciceronian predecessors. Like them he speaks
of the three kinds of oratory; 98 in analyzing the third kind, that is,
the forensic speech, he discusses the positions of argument j" he also
explains the parts of an oration, and considers the applicability of
each part to each kind of speech. 100 His treatment of the positions of
argument follows the classification adopted by Cox and sanctioned
by the Rhetorics ad Herenniwm^ and so he speaks of three main
positions or "States." But it turns out in the end that he covers nine
separate ones in all, more or less in the fashion of Cicero in De
Inventione. Wilson shows traces of confusion in this part of his
interpretation of classical doctrine, particularly when he first explains
what the legal state is. 101 His other main topics in the theory of in-
vention are handled more securely, however, and in general it may
be said that he gives the first adequate English account of that theory
to be found anywhere.
As a recognized writer in the field of logic, and thus as an authority
on dialectical invention, Wilson handles the problem of rhetorical
invention with a special awareness of the connections between philo-
sophical and popular expression. At the very beginning of his dis-
cussion of rhetorical invention, before he has proceeded beyond a
brief definition of the term, he says that the "places of Logique, giue
good occasion to finde out plentifull matter." 102 He adds at once:
"And therefore, they that will proue any cause, and seeke onely to
teach thereby the trueth, must search out the places of Logique, and
no doubt they shall finde much plentie." But this plain indication
that the machinery of dialectical invention is useful in the similar
procedure of rhetoric is not the only sign of Wilson's concern for the
integration of the disciplines of communication. After he proposes
four rhetorical places for proving that abstractions or inanimate
things are worthy of praise, he immediately sees the places of logic
as available for the same purpose, and thus he conceives of dialectical
98 Rhetoriquty pp. 11-99.
"7^., pp. 86-99.
100 Ibid., pp. 7, 99-156.
101 Ibid.) p. 89. At this point, Wilson regards the legal state as if it did not turn
upon the meaning of written language as if it applied, for example, to cases in which
a given offense is called manslaughter by the defendant and murder by the prosecutor.
Later (pp. 94-97) he regards the legal state as applying to cases which concern the
interpretation of a written law or text. Only the latter interpretation is justified by the
Rhetorica ad Herennium^ from which Wilson's classification of states is derived
p. 6.
[ 100 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
invention as a substitute form of rhetorical invention on a different
level of application. His exact words are:
Many learned will haue recourse to the places of Logicke, in steede
of these fower places, when they take in hand to commend any such
matter. The which places if they make them serue, rather to commende
the matter, then onely to teach men the trueth of it, it were wel done,
and Oratour like, for seing a man wholly bestoweth his witte to play
the Oratour, he should chiefly seeke to compasse that, which he en-
tendeth, and not doe that only which he neuer minded, for by plaine
teaching, the Logician shewes himself e, by large amplification, and
beautifying of his cause, the Rhetorician is alwaies knowne. 103
Wilson then lists six of the places of logic, and comments that they
are possibly more basic than the four rhetorical places he had just
enumerated. What he means by this can be gathered later when in
speaking of proof as a part of the oration he says: "Therfore I wish
that euery man should desire, & seeke to haue his Logique perfit,
before he looke to profite in Rhetorique, considering the ground and
confirmation of causes, is for the most part gathered out of
Logique"*
Thus does Wilson recognize two theories of invention, the one
dialectical and the other rhetorical, the one for proving and teach-
ing plainly, the other for commending, amplifying, and giving beauty
to a cause. But when he comes in the Rhetorique to the doctrine of
arrangement or disposition, which was of course not only the second
part of that subject in the Ciceronian scheme, but also the second
part of scholastic dialectic as Wilson himself among others had con-
ceived of it, he does not indicate differences or relations between dia-
lectical and rhetorical arrangement, any more than he had done at the
same point in his Rule of Reason. He speaks rather of two kinds of
rhetorical arrangement, one natural, the other discretionary. 105 Nat-
ural arrangement turns out to be the distributing of materials among
the parts of the oration. Since Wilson had spoken of that under in-
vention, he devotes little additional space to it now. Discretional
arrangement turns out to be that which results from a calculation of
what the time, the place, the audience, and the subject matter may
require. Calculations of this sort would not have special analogues in
dialectic, where the learned audience and learned subject are pre-
supposed j nor would the dialectician have recourse to the theory o
103 Ibid., p. 23. 104 7, p. 113. *Ibid., p. 158.
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
the parts of an oration, except as he might use the theory of oratorical
proof to guide him in constructing his argument. Hence Wilson was
not obliged to discuss rhetorical arrangement in the light of the
theory of dialectical arrangement. Nevertheless it would have" been
an imaginative extension of classical doctrine if he had elected to con-
sider those two kinds of organization with some thought of their
similarities and differences.
Elocution or style, as the third of the procedures of Ciceronian
rhetoric, receives far less of Wilson's total space than does invention,
but nevertheless he contrives it to rank next after invention in spatial
emphasis. In other words, he gives most of his first two books to in-
vention, and most of his third and last book to style, thus appearing
to say that these two procedures are much more important than the
others, and that style is much less important than invention. He pro-
tects himself, however, from an appearance of hostility to style by
paying high tribute to it in his own words and in those of Cicero, and
by averring it to be the one quality that distinguishes an orator from
other wise men:
For whereas Inuention helpeth to finde matter, and Disposition
serueth to place arguments: Elocution getteth words to set forth in-
uention, and with such beautie commendeth the matter, that reason
semeth to be clad in Purple, walking afore both bare and naked.
Therefore Tultie saieth well, to finde out reason and aptly to frame it,
is the part of a wiseman, but to commende it by wordes and with
gorgious talke to tell our conceipt, that is onely proper to an Oratour. 108
The true heads of Wilson's discussion of style are enumerated as
plainness, aptness, composition, and exornation, 107 The famous protest
against "straunge ynkehorne termes" or "outlandish English" is
pointed at those who affect French or Italian or Latin forms of speech
in preference to "their mothers language," and it occurs in connec-
tion with his sprightly treatment of the first of these topics. 108
Aptness and composition are handled briefly as terms respectively
concerning appropriateness of wording and pleasantness of sound in
putting words together. 109 Under exornation, the last major heading
of this section of his work, Wilson discusses the three kinds of style,
as well as the tropes, the schemes, and the colors. 110
108 Ibid., p. 1 60. Cf. Cicero, Orator^ 14.44; 19.61.
107 Ibid., p. i6z.
108 Ibid.) pp. 162-165.
10 */^., pp. 165-169. Ibid., pp. 169-208.
[ 102 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
Although Wilson's account of the classical theory of memory is
by no means the first in English, as I have already shown, it is supe-
rior to its predecessors in fidelity to its Latin sources and in exposi-
tory skill. Moreover, Wilson's account supplements the classical
theory by drawing upon current medical and psychological ideas to
locate the memory "in the hinder part" of the head, and to explain a
good memory as the product of a proper balance among qualities of
moisture, dryness, cold, and heat in the brain. Thus Wilson says,
"Children therefore being ouer moyst, and old men ouer drie, haue
neuer good memories." As for what the proper balance should be,
Wilson states himself as follows : "For such as be hot and moist, do
sone conceiue matters, but they keepe not long. Again, they that be
colde and drie, doe hardly conceiue, but they keepe it surely when
they once haue it." 111 Wilson's medical theory of memory, which he
openly attributes to the "Phisitions," 112 is reminiscent of the thinking
that produced in Hawes's account of poetic invention the description
of the five inward faculties of the mind. At any rate, Wilson speaks
of "the common sence," "iudgement," and "memorie," although he
does not mention the facilities of imagination and fantasy, both of
which figure prominently in Hawes's list.
When he turns from these considerations to the classical theory of
memory, Wilson proceeds to use the chief terms of the similar theory
in the Rhetorica ad Herennmm. Thus he divides memory into the
natural and the artificial 5 113 he retells the story of Simonides and his
identification of the mutilated victims after the collapse of the roof
at the house of Scopas; and he comes then to the concepts of the
place and the image, which he defines and illustrates. His theory is
contained in the following four propositions :
I The places of Memorie are resembled vnto Waxe and Paper.
II Images are compted like vnto Letters or a Seale*
III The placing of these Images, is like vnto wordes written.
IIII The vtterance and vsing of them, is like vnto reading* 11 *
In order that these propositions may be fully understood, Wilson
uses a somewhat preposterous example:
My friend (whom I tooke euer to bee an honest man) is accused of
theft, of adulterie, of ryot, of manslaughter, and of treason: if I
would keepe these wordes in my remembrance, and rehearse them in
111 Ibid., p. 210. 112 Ibid., p, 209.
1" Ibid.> p. 2 1 1 . ll * Ibid., p. 2 14-.
[ 103 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
order as they were spoken, I must appoint fiue places, the which I
had neede to haue so perfectly in my memorie, as could be possible.
As for example, I will make these in my Chamber. A doore, a win-
dow, a presse, a bedstead, and a chimney. Now in the doore, I wil set
Cacus the theefe, or some such notable verlet. In the windowe I will
place Venus. In the Presse I will put Afittes that famous Glutton. In
the Bedstead I will set Richard the third King of England, or some
notable murtherer. In the Chimney I will place the blacke Smith, or
some other notable Traitour. That if one repete these places, and these
Images twise or thrise together, no doubt though he haue but a meane
memorie, he shall carie away the wordes rehearsed with ease. And like
as he may doe with these fiue words, so may he doe with fiue score,
if he haue places fresh in his remembraunce, and doe but vse himself e
to this trade one fortnight together. 115
Wilson's final topic, pronunciation or delivery, is no longer than
his discussion of disposition, and thus is one of the two briefest parts
of his theory of oratory. He sees delivery as so important that
pleasantness in the sound of the speaker's voice and graciousness in
his bearing may well overcome defects in. his subject matter. He then
remarks that, "as the sounde of a good instrument stirreth the hear-
ers, and mooueth much delite, so a cleare sounding voyce, comf orteth
much our deintie eares, with much sweete melodic, and causeth vs to
allow the matter, rather for the reporters sake, then the reporter for
the matters sake." 116 He at once goes on to paraphrase the famous
saying of Demosthenes that the first quality in oratory is pronuncia-
tion, the second, pronunciation, and the third, pronunciation. 117 He
then divides pronunciation into two headings, voice and gesture, and
concludes this part of rhetoric, and indeed his treatise, with a discus-
sion of each. 118 His comments on faults in English pronunciation in
his own day are protests against shrillness, hoarseness, throatiness,
cackling, loudness, whining, frowning, and a multitude of other
habits of speech. What he says about training children to pronounce
distinctly has interest in the history of manners :
115 Ibid., p. * 1 5.
Ibid., p. a 1 8.
117 For this saying in Cicero, see Orator, 17.56, Brutus y 38.142, and De Oratory
3.56.213. Wilson undoubtedly quotes the story from De Oratore^ for he adds the inci-
dent about Aeschines as Cicero gives it at that same point, and the incident about Demos-
thenes's practicing- with pebbles under his tongue as Cicero gives it earlier in that same
work, that is, in T>e Oratore^ 1.61.260-261.
118 Rketorique> pp. 218-22,1. Cf. Rhetorica ad Herennium, 3.11.19.
[ 104 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
Musicians in England haue vsed to put gagges in childrens mouthes,
that they might pronounce distinctly, but now with the losse and lacke
of Musick, the loue also is gone of bringing vp children to speake
plainly. 119
In his Rhetorique as a whole, Wilson is bent not only upon giving
an English version of Ciceronian theory, but also upon naturalizing
that theory and making it at home in England. There are illustrations
of this latter tendency throughout the work. Thus in analyzing
Cicero's dictum that a universal proposition is always implied in a
particular, he says:
As for example. If I shall aske this question, whether it bee lawfull
for William Conquer our to inuade England, and win it by force of
Armour, I must also consider this, whether it bee lawfull for any
man to vsurpe power, or it bee not lawful. 120
Thus again in illustrating the ancient commonplaces from which a
eulogist would draw material for praising a noble personage, Wilson
shows how English speakers would use realm or shire as topics. He
says:
To bee an English man borne, is much more honor then to bee a
Scot, because that by these men, worthie Prowesses haue beene done,
and greater affaires by them attempted, then haue beene done by any
other.
The Shire or Towne helpeth somewhat, towardes the encrease of
honor: As it is much better to bee borne in Paris, then in Picardie: in
London then in Lincolne. For that both the ayre is better, the people
more ciuill, and the wealth much greater, and the men for the most
part more wise. 121
Thus again, in illustrating a eulogy to a noble personage, Wilson
writes a model speech of his own in praise of two young nobles,
Henry, second duke of Suffolk, and Charles, the third duke, whom
he had tutored, and whose death had occurred July 14, 1551, in an
epidemic of the sweating disease. 122 Again, Wilson's letter to the
grief -stricken mother of these young men is put in to illustrate the
deliberative address designed to give comfort. 123 Still again, Wilson
writes an example of a forensic speech in which a soldier, fresh from
the wars, is accused of murdering a worthy English farmer, and one
119 Ibid., p. 219. 120 lbid., p, 2.
121 Ibid., pp. 12-13. i2z lbid., pp. 14-17, 66, 68.
12S Ibid., pp. 66-85. For Wilson's other references to these two youths, see pp. 127, 184.
[ 105 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
line of proof developed against the soldier is that his reputation is
evil, he having been bred "among the men of Tinsdale & Riddesdale,
where pillage is good purchase, and murthering is coumpted man-
hood." 124 Again, to illustrate pretentious "inke pot termes" in style,
Wilson prints a letter devised by a Lincolnshire man, "Joannes
Octo," in applying for a vacant benefice through the intermediation
of a gentleman who might possibly have influence with the Lord
Chancellor. 125 And (to give one final example) Wilson suggests the
following as a specimen of synecdoche:
All Cambridge sorrowed for the death of Bucer> meaning the most
part. All England reioyceth that Pilgrimage is banished, and Idola-
trie for euer abolished: and yet all England is not glad but the most
part. 126
Wilson's Rhetorique should not be dismissed from consideration
without some recognition of its special concern for sermon-making.
As we have seen, Wilson discusses invention in part by emphasizing
the three ancient types of oratory, the demonstrative, the delibera-
tive, and the judicial. These forms of popular communication had
respectively developed from the public ceremony, the political as-
sembly, and the court of law. In Wilson's day these ancient forms of
discourse were all in use, and thus a training in rhetoric had to pro-
vide indoctrination in each of them while indicating what extensions
or modifications had been made in each since classical times. Delibera-
tive oratory had declined in importance during the period of the
Roman Empire, 127 and by the middle of the sixteenth century had not
yet regained its dominant position among the three forms. Wilson re-
flects this state of affairs by illustrating deliberative oratory as the
private counsel we might give a friend in an effort to induce him to
study the laws of England, or as the epistle we might write either
to persuade a young man to marriage or to comfort a mother on the
death of her sons. 128 Judicial oratory was flourishing in Wilson's day,
and he illustrates it without modifying or extending classical doc-
p- 93-
125 Ibid.) p. 163, In the 1553 edition of the Rhetorique this letter is not identified as
having been written by a Lincolnshire man signing- himself "loannes Octo." But it
has nevertheless an English setting.
Ibid.> p. 174.
127 p or an excellent discussion of this subject, see Harry Caplan, "The Decay of Elo-
quence at Rome in the First Century," Studies in Speech and Drama in Honor of Alex-
ander M. Drummond (Ithaca, 1944), pp. 295-325.
128 Rhetorique, pp. 31-39, 39-63, 66-85.
[ 106 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
trine. 129 Demonstrative or ceremonial oratory was also flourishing.
Wilson illustrates it by writing a commendation of the two young
nobles, to which I referred earlier. He also illustrates it by adding a
discourse in praise of King David for the killing of Goliath, and by
throwing in a discourse in praise of Justice. 180 These two latter are
close to sermons in substance and tone, although Wilson does not
offer them as pure examples of this type of demonstrative oratory.
What he does instead is to make frequent references to preaching
throughout his Rhetorique y thus indicating unmistakably the applica-
tion of rhetorical principles to pulpit oratory.
For example, in speaking of the oration as having the functions of
teaching, delighting, and persuading, he pauses to emphasize the
second of these uses by warning that "except men finde delite, they
will not long abide." 131 He adds:
And that is the reason, that men commonly tarie the ende of a merie
Play, and cannot abide the halfe hearing of a sower checking Serrtion.
Therefore euen these auncient Preachers, must now and then play the
fooles in the pulpit, to seme the tickle eares of their fleting audience,
or els they are like sometimes to preach to the bare walles, for though
their spirite bee apt, and our will prone, yet our flesh is so heauie,
and humours so ouerwhelme vs, that we cannot without refreshing,
long abide to heare any one thing. 132
For another example, when Wilson discusses the judicial speech
with its ancient doctrine of positions of argument, he defines the
Latin terms, constitwtio or status as "the chief e ground of a matter,
and the principall point whereunto both he that speaketh should re-
ferre his whole wit, and they that heare should chiefly marke"; 183
and unexpectedly he elaborates his definition by reference to pulpit,
not courtroom:
A Preacher taketh in hande to shewe what prayer is, and how needfull
for man to call vpon God: now he should euer remember this his
matter, applying his reasons whollie and fullie to this end, that the
hearers may both knowe the nature of prayer, and the needfulnesse
of prayer. The which when he hath done, his promise is fulfilled, his
time well bestowed, and the hearers well instructed.
Another application of rhetorical doctrine to pulpit oratory oc-
curs in Wilson's treatment of the introduction of speeches, where he
129 Ibid.) pp. 92-94. 13 Ibid.) pp. 14-17, 18-21, 23-29.
131 Ibid., p. 3. *Ibid.) pp. 3-4. * Ibid.) p. 88.
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
makes special mention o "Enteraunces apt for Preachers." 134 Still
another application occurs in connection with his discussion o narra-
tion as the second part of the speech. 135 Later, in his discussion of
style, he specifically disapproves of a rhymed sermon he recalls hav-
ing heard:
I heard a preacher deliting much in this kind of composition, who
vsed so often to ende his sentences with wordes like vnto that which
went before, that in my iudgement there was not a dozen sentences
in his whole sermon, but they ended all in Rime for the most parte.
Some not best disposed, wished the Preacher a Lute, that with his
rimed sermon he might vse some pleasant melody, and so the people
might take pleasure diuers waies, and dance if they list. 136
He reverts later to rhymed sermons when he discusses the figures
of simititer desmans and similiter cadens^ and at that point he speaks
of the liking of the people of St. Augustine's time for rhymed sen-
tences and orations made ballad wise, even as judges were reported
by Tacitus to have been driven to use the same sort of "Minstrels
elocution." 187
As for the sources of Wilson's Rhetorique, the best modern au-
thority is Russell Wagner. He has stated that the Rhetorica ad
Herennium^ doubtless considered by Wilson to be Cicero's, was one
of Wilson's chief authorities, and that Wilson also drew to some ex-
tent upon Cicero's De Inventione, De Oratore, De Partitione Ora~
toria, and Brutus, as well as upon Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria.
In addition to these basic treatises in the Ciceronian pattern, Wilson
was possibly obligated to Cox's Rhethoryke^ observes Wagner, and
obviously went to Erasmus "for leading ideals, for detailed matter,
and for examples and critical dicta." 188 Incidentally, the epistle de-
signed to persuade a young gentleman to marriage, already men-
tioned as an illustration of deliberative discourse, is one of Wilson's
borrowings from Erasmus, as he himself acknowledges. Many of
Wilson's readers had probably seen that epistle before, inasmuch as
Richard Taverner had also translated and published it in 1536 or
1537 as A right frutefull Epystle deuysed by the mosfie excellent
clerke Erasmus in laude and praise of matrimony
p. 105, * Ibid., p. 108. "/&, p. 168.
137 Ibid., pp. 2.02-203.
138 Russell Halderman Wagner, "Wilson and his Sources," The Quarterly Journal of
Speech, XV (1929)1 53-53*-
139 On this point see Charles Read Baskervill, "Taverner's Garden of Wisdom and the
of Erasmus," Studies in Philology, XXIX (April 1932), 149-150.
[ 108 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
By way of a necessary supplement to the sources identified by
Wagner, I should like to list Richard Sherry's A Treatise of Schemes
and Tropes* This work, first published in 1550, was, like Wilson's
Rhetorique^ the first complete treatise on its subject in English, and
it will be discussed in the next section of this chapter when I speak
of the stylistic pattern of traditional rhetoric. But it should be men-
tioned now as having supplied Wilson with English phraseology
and with illustrations for his treatment of the three kinds of style,
for his definitions of figure, of scheme, of gradatio^ and for his clari-
fication of such stylistic concepts as aptness, metaphor, abusion, me-
tonymy, transumption, periphrasis, epenthesis, syncope, proparalep-
sis, apocope, extenuatio^ and dissolution^*
Wilson's Rhetorique enjoyed great popularity for an entire gen-
eration after its first publication in 1553. ^ appeared in a second
edition at London in 1560, supplemented by "A Prologue to the
Reader," in which Wilson expresses his bitterness at the misfortunes
which his Rule of Reason and his Rhetorique had recently brought
upon him. Having fled from England after 1553 to escape perse-
cution by the Catholic regime of Queen Mary, Wilson had taken
refuge in Italy, only to have his two famous works pronounced
heretical by Rome, and himself imprisoned and tortured. His "Pro-
logue" speaks bitingly of the verdict of the Inquisition against him,
and he angrily refuses, now that he is back in England, to correct his
Rhetorique in its second edition, because, as he says, "If the Sonne
140 The following 1 table, which refers to Mair's edition of the Rhetorique^ and to the
first edition of Sherry's Treatise (London, 1550), indicates the topics wherein similarities
between the two works are to be found:
Tofic Wilson Sherry
"audience of sheepe" p. 166 sig. Car
"three maner of stiles" p. 169 sig.
"figure" p. 170 sig.
"metaphore" pp. 172-173 sig.
"abusion 1 * pp. 174-175 sig. C$i
"metonymia" p. 175 sig. C5V
"transumption" p. 175 sig. C5r-
"periphrasis" pp. 175-176 sig. C6v
"scheme" p. 176 sig. B5r
"epenthesis" p. 177 sig. B6r
"syncope" p. 177 sig. B6r
"proparalepsis" p. 177 sig. B6r
"apocope" p. 177 sig. B6r
"extenuatio" pp. 180-181 sig. D7r*
"gradatio" p. 204 sig. E>5v
"dissolutum" p. 205 sig, D6v
* Wilson illustrates "extenuatio" with the form used by Sherry to illustrate "diminutio."
[ 109 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
were the occasion of the Fathers imprisonment, would not the Father
bee offended with him thinke you?" He even uses the "Prologue"
as an opportunity to warn the public not to read such a subversive
treatise as his Rhetorique is, since "if the world should turne (as
God forbid) they were most like to weepe, that in all pointes would
followe it." But the world did not turn. England remained Protes-
tant $ Wilson lived to become prominent in Queen Elizabeth's gov-
ernment 5 and his Rhetorique did not bring persecution to its readers.
It was given a third edition in 1562, a fourth in 1563^ and a fifth in
1567. Then for more than a decade it seems to have lost public
favor, as Ramistic logic and rhetoric began to monopolize the spot-
light in England. But despite the steady growth of Rarnism in Eng-
land after 1574, Wilson's Rhetorique had another term of popularity
somewhat later, since it was given successive printings in 1580, 1584?
and 1585. But with the latest of these dates its bibliographical his-
tory ended until the time of Mair's reprint of I9O9- 141 Ciceronian
rhetoric was revived in England by Thomas Vicars just forty years
after Wilson's death in 1 58 1 , as we shall see in a later chapter, and that
revival was one of the early signs of English dissatisfaction with
Ramism, Still, the Ciceronianism that developed as a protest against
Ramus was not devoid of the marks of the latter's philosophy, and
thus it cannot be regarded as a mere continuation of Wilson's tradi-
tional scheme. Indeed, Wilson's Rhetorique is better accepted as a
great summary of late medieval Ciceronianism in England than as an
influence upon English Neo- Ciceronianism in the seventeenth century.
In bringing to a close this account of Ciceronian rhetoric in Eng-
land before the complete emergence of the English Ramists, I should
like to turn from lay to sacred rhetoric and mention a work that is
historically interesting as one of the earliest English treatises to be
devoted exclusively to the art of preaching. This treatise was written
originally in Latin by Andreas Gerardus Hyperius, and published in
^555 at Dortmund as De Formandis Concionibus Sacris^ seu De In-
terfere tatione Scripturarum Po$ulari Libri 77. Later it was translated
into English by John Ludham and published at London in 1577
under the title, The Practise of 'preaching. Otherwise Called The
Pathway to the Pulpet: Conteyning an excellent Method how to
frame Diuine Sermons. The author, Andreas Gerardus or Andre
Gerhard, whose surname Hyperius is the Latin word for his native
141 My list of editions of Wilson's Rhetorique is based upon entries in the Short-Title
Catalogue^ s,v. Wilson, Sir Thomas,
[ no ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
Ypres, was an influential Protestant theologian of the sixteenth cen-
tury. 142 He studied at the University of Paris between 1528 and
I 535? he lived in England from 1536 to 15405 he became professor
of theology at Marburg in 1 542, and held that post until his death in
1564. He wrote on dialectic, rhetoric, and other subjects, as well
as on preaching. The John Ludham who translated Gerhard's work
on preaching into English was graduated from St. John's College,
Cambridge, with the degree of bachelor of arts in 1563-64, and
served as vicar of Wethersfield in Essex from 1570 to 1613, when
he died 143
The Practise of preaching is divided into two books, each of which
describes itself as a treatise "Of framing of Diuine Sermons, or pop-
uler interpretation of the Scriptures." 14 * The word "popular" re-
ceives great emphasis throughout the work, for Hyperius believes
that there are two kinds of theological discourses, one addressed to
the expert and the other to the layman, and he intends his treatise
to be the theory of the latter kind. His first chapter begins with a
clear statement of this distinction:
No man doubteth but that there bee two maner of wayes of interpret-
ing the scriptures vsed of skilfull diuines, the one Scholastical^ pe-
culyer to y e scholes, y e other Popular pertayning to the people. That
one is apt for the assembles of learned men and young studients
somedeale profited in good letters: This other is altogether applied
to instructe the confused multitude, wherin are very many rude,
ignoraunt and vnlearned. The first is exercised within the narrowe
compasse of the Scholes: The seconde taketh place in the large and
spacious temples. The one strict and straight laced, sauoring Philo-
sofhicall solytarinesse and seueritie: The other stretched forth, franck
and at lybertie, yea and delightinge in the light and (as ye would
say) in the court of Orators. In y c are mani things exacted after the
rule of Logical breuitie and simplicitie: In this, Rhetoricall bountie
and furniture ministreth much grace and decencie. 145
As a theory to be followed by preachers who speak to the people,
the Practise of preaching bases itself upon the terms of the pagan
rhetoric of Cicero, but in such a way as to show that Hyperius has
142 Nowuette Biographic Generale y s.v. Hyperius, Andre Gerhard \ also Alexander
Chalmers, The General Biographical Dictionary, s.v. Hyperius, Gerard Andrew.
143 John Venn and J. A. Venn, Alumni Cantabrigienses (Cambridge, 1922-1951), Pt.
i, s.v. Ludham or Luddam, John. Cited below by title alone.
144 Andreas Gerhard Hyperius, The Practise of preaching Englished by lohn Ludham
(London, 1577), foil, ir, 5ov. My present discussion is based on the copy in the Hunt-
ington Library.
145 Ibid., fol. ir.
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
an independent mind and an awareness of the differences between
the orator and the pulpit speaker. The following passages beautifully
illustrate his traditionalism and his originality:
That many thinges are common to to [sic] the Preacher with the
Orator, Sairict Augustine in his fourth Booke of Christian doctrine,
doth copiously declare. Therfore, the partes of an Orator, whiche
are accounted of some to be. Indention, Disposition > "Elocution^ Mem-
ory, and Pronounciation^ may rightlye be called also the partes of a
Preacher. Yea and these three: to Teache, to Delight y to Turne\
Likewise againe the three kyndes of speakyng, Loftye, Base, Meane:
Moreouer, the whole craft of varienge the Oration by Schemes and
Tropes, pertaineth indifferently to the Preacher and Orator, as Sainct
Augustine in the same booke doth wittily confesse and learnedly
proue. To be short, whatsoeuer is necessarie to the Preacher in dis-
position, Elocution, and Memory e, the Rhetoritians haue exactly e
taught all that in their woorkhouses: wherfore (in my opinion) the
Preachers may most conuenientlye learne those partes out of them.
Certainly, he that hath beene somdeale exercised in the Scholes of
the Rhetoritians before he be receiued into the order of Preachers,
shall come much more apte and better furnished then many other,
and may be bolde to hope, that he shall accomplish somwhat in the
Church, worthy of prayse and commendation. 146
Having marked out arrangement, style, and memory as the three
parts of Ciceronian theory of special application to preaching, Hy-
perius now indicates why delivery and invention are less applicable:
But pronounciation, for as much as it is now far otherwyse vsed, then
it was in times past, and that all thinges ought with greater grauitie,
yea maiestie, to bee done in the Temple then in the courte (to the
whiche onely the Rhetoritians somtime informed theyr Disciples)
agayne, syth euery Prouince and euery language hath hys proper
decorum and comelynesse both in Pronounciation and gesture, which
in an other place woulde not so well bee lyked off: It shall be good
for the Preacher, not to searche the arte of Pronouncinge out of the
Scholes of auncient Orators, but to endeuour hymselfe rather to
imitate those Maisters, whom hee perceiueth, aboue the residue, to
bee commended for their excellent grace and dexteritie, in Pronoun-
ciation and behauiour, especially in theyr owne natiue Countrye and
region.
By all these thinges it may appeare, that the Preacher hath many
id. y fol. 9 r- 9 v.
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
poyntes, chiefely in Inuention, wherein he differeth from the Orator.
whiche thinge seeinge it is so, it shall be our part, in opening of In-
uention, to employ a specyall labour and dilygence. Albeit, in the
meane time, if wee shall perceiue any thing to happen by the way
as touching disposition, needful to be marked, we wyll in no wyse
dissemble it. 147
The whole subsequent work is a development of this attitude to-
wards the five parts of Ciceronian rhetoric. Hyperius takes very
seriously his remark that the preacher should go to the ancient rhet-
oricians for the theory of style and memory, for on these topics he
offers none of the traditional doctrine. As for delivery, he devotes
to it a part of the final chapter of his second book without special
regard for ancient doctrine. To arrangement he gives nine chapters
of Book I, although that much space does not seem to be promised
in the concluding words of the passage just quoted. These nine chap-
ters develop the thesis that in a sermon "The parts commonly re-
ceiued are in nuber seuen, y e is to say: reding of the sacred scripture y
Inuocatio, Exordiu, propositio or diuisio. Confirmation, Confutation,
coclusio?^* The discussion which this thesis receives from Hyperius
is very close indeed to the Ciceronian doctrine of the parts of an ora-
tion, after due allowances are made for what Hyperius regards as
necessary differences between the oration and the sermon. It even ap-
pears to be true that Hyperius, like Cicero, regards this part of rhe-
torical theory as a phase of the concept of invention, despite its ob-
vious bearing upon arrangement. But Hyperius, as he acknowledges,
does not follow Cicero closely in treating the other aspects of inven-
tion 5 he stays within the Ciceronian tradition, while creating new
doctrine to conform to the special needs of the preacher.
One of the innovations of Hyperius concerns the doctrine of the
kinds of sermons. He says, "I freely confesse that I can in no wise
fancy theyr Judgement, that endeuour to bringe, those three kindes
of cases, I meane Demonstrative, Delibratme, and ludiciall, oute of
the prophane market place, into the sacred and reuerend Churche,
and set them forth, vnto preachers to be immitated and folowed." 149
As a substitute for this aspect of Ciceronian theory, Hyperius pro-
poses that sermons are of five kinds: i) those of doctrine, in which
all true principles and opinions are confirmed; 2) those of redargu-
tion, in which false and erroneous opinions are refuted 5 3) those of
147 Ibid., foL 9 v. 148 /^V. > fol. air. *IH<i. y fol. i 7 v.
[ "3 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
institution or instruction, which teach how life and manners are made
godly 5 4) those of correction, which reprove corrupt manners} and
5) those of consolation, which offer comfort. 150 These five kinds of
sermons provide the main topics for Hyperius's second book, in
which the doctrinal sermon receives nine chapters of treatment, and
the other four kinds receive one chapter each, whereas other topics,
including delivery, receive only three chapters of the total.
Another of the innovations of Hyperius concerns that large sec-
tion of Ciceronian doctrine devoted to the positions of argument.
Hyperius says that the "State is a breefe sume of the whole matter,
wherof a man purposeth to speake, and euen the argument and f oun-
taine of the whole oration." 161 But having adopted the conventional
definition, he proceeds to apply it to pulpit oratory by enumerating
five states, one for each of his five kinds of sermons. For example, a
sermon on the proposition that the pains of hell are a reality refutes
an erroneous opinion, and thus contains a state "redargutiue." A ser-
mon which condemns the envious, the vainglorious, or the riotous,
contains a state "correctiue." And a sermon showing that a Christian
ought to live devoutly contains a state "instructiue."
The only other innovation of Hyperius that I shall discuss here
concerns the doctrine of places. Once again Hyperius alters the con-
ventional doctrine for the sake of having his theory more adequately
interpret the facts of preaching. All the places used in sermons, he
says, are divided into two forms or orders, one called theological
or divine places, the other, philosophical places." 2 The theological
places, which show the preacher how and after what sort he may
gather out of the scriptures the chief commonplaces touching all the
doctrine of piety and of faith, and all the duties of charity and hope,
turn out to be five in number, one for each of the five kinds of ser-
mons. 153 The philosophical places or the places of logical invention,
out of which are derived apt arguments to describe and set forth the
nature and force of the thing under discussion, turn out to be twenty-
eight in number, and to involve such concepts as definition, general
kind, species, difference, property, division, whole, parts, matter,
form, efficient, end, events, effects, subject, circumstances, compara-
tives, and opposites. 15 * These are rehearsed but not discussed by Hy-
perius j in fact, instead of treating them at length, he refers his
., foil. i8r-iSv, aor, 151 Ibid.* fol. air.
i" IbU. y fol. 54 v. 15a Ibid., foil. 54V-j8r.
foil. 54V, 58r-5 9 r.
[ "4 ]
THE FIVE GREAT ARTS
preacher to the logician for further help in this particular matter.
Hyperius's theory of preaching is enthusiastically hailed by Michel
Nicolas as the first complete work, and at the same time as one of
the best, on the art of the pulpit. 1 " The first half of this verdict is
ambiguous in the extreme, for there were many treatises on preach-
ing in the period before 1555, and one of the best of these, St. Au-
gustine's De Doctrina Christiana, is openly admired by Hyperius, as
is indicated in a passage quoted above. 156 Moreover, these earlier
treatises are not all incomplete, even when they select for major
emphasis a restricted aspect of their subject. But the other half of
Nicolas J s verdict is fully acceptable. The sacred rhetoric of Hyperius,
as Ludham's translation repeatedly demonstrates, is a fresh and stim-
ulating application of Ciceronian theory to the problems of sermon-
making, and while it preserves machinery that was to be discarded
by such later writers as Fenelon, it is unquestionably one of the best
works of its kind in the Ciceronian tradition. The English pulpit was
fortunate to have it available in popular form by 1577 as a full state-
ment of the position that was already under attack by the Ramists.
185 Nowoelle Biogra$hie Generate^ s.v. Hyperius.
156 For a discussion of theories of preaching in the period between noo and 1500,
and for a translation of one of those theories, see Harry Caplan, "A Late Medieval
Tractate on Preaching-," Studies in Rhetoric and Public Sneaking In honor of James
Albert Winans (New York, 19*5), pp. 61-91. For a list of theories of preaching- during
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, see the same author's Mediaeval "Artes
Praedicandi" A Hand-List and Mediaeval "Artes Praedlcandi" A Su^lementary Hand-
List, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, xxiv (Ithaca, 1934)5 xxv (Ithaca, 1936).
III. The Rhetoric of Style
STYLISTIC rhetoric, as a recognizable and distinctive pattern of tra-
ditional rhetorical theory in England, has two main characteristics.
First of all, it is openly committed to the doctrine of style as ^ the
most important aspect of training in communication. Secondly, it is
openly mindful that invention, arrangement, memory, and delivery,
or combinations of two or more of them, conceived in sum as Cicero
had anciently dictated, were also legitimate parts of the full rhetorical
discipline.
Readers of Cicero's Orator will recall that its major emphasis is
upon style, although it gives some degree of recognition to the other
parts of the Ciceronian formula. 1 Thus the Orator is important as a
source book in the history of traditional stylistic rhetoric, although
the fourth book of the Rh&torica ad Herennium^ the third book of
De Oratore^ and the eighth and ninth books of Quintilian's Institutio
Oratoria all contain a full treatment of style as the verbal aspect of
the speaker's total problem, and all are sources along with the Ora-
tor in the development of the stylistic pattern in England.
The first treatise by an Englishman in this field, as I mentioned
before, is the Venerable Bede's Liber de Schematibus et Tropis. 2
Bede is presumed to have written this work in 701 or 702.* As its
title suggests, it undertakes to deal with the Latin theory of elocutio,
not in its entirety, but in one of its main divisions, that of stylistic
devices. Thus Bede enumerates twenty-nine schemes and forty-one
tropes, but he succeeds in condensing these into seventeen of the
former and thirteen of the latter, whereupon he defines each and
illustrates it from the Bible, except in one case where his example is
from the Christian poet Sedulius. 4 It must be confessed that his
treatise is more of a dictionary of terms than a discourse upon the
problem of achieving effectiveness in sty 1^5 and yet, as the first
treatise of its kind by an Englishman, it represents an interesting and
persistent theory as to what it is that constitutes real distinction of
utterance.
14.45-445 I
2 See above, pp. 7, 33. For information about recent editions of Bede's little work,
see p. 33, note 5.
3 The evidence on this matter Is indicated in M. L, W. Laistner, A Hand-List of Btde
Manuscripts (Ithaca, 1943), pp. 131-132.
4 For the sources of Bede's illustrations, see the notes on the text of the Liber in Halm,
Rhetores Latini Minorts^ pp. 607-618. See also M. L. W, Laistner, "The Library of the
Venerable Bede/* in Bede His Life, Times^ and Writings, ed. A. Hamilton Thompson
(Oxford, i935)> P- *4i-
[ "6 ]
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
That theory consists in the assumption that good style is a delib-
erate and systematic repudiation of the speech of everyday life. In
other words, good style results only from word orders that stand
opposed to the patterns of common speech. The schemes and the
tropes are the two categories into which those orders fall, and thus
Bede's definitions of these basic concepts emphasize that each is an
attempt to get away from what is ordinary in usage. He says:
On many occasions in writings it is customary for the sake of elegance
that the order of words as they are formulated should be contrived
in some other way than that adhered to by the people in their speech.
These contrivances the Greek grammarians call schemes, whereas we
may rightly term them attire or form or figure, because through
them as a distinct method speech may be dressed up and adorned. On
other occasions, it is customary for a locution called the trope to be
devised. This is done by changing a word from its proper signification
to an unaccustomed but similar case on account of necessity or adorn-
ment. And indeed the Greeks pride themselves upon having been the
discoverers of such schemes and tropes. 5
It is suggestive to speculate upon the cultural implications of a
rhetorical theory which equates true elegance and hence true effec-
tiveness with a system of studied departures from the established
pattern of everyday speech. Such a theory appears to be the normal
concomitant of a social and political situation in which the holders of
power are hereditary aristocrats who must be conciliated by the com-
moners if the latter are to gain privileges for themselves. In a situa-
tion like that, persuasive forms of speech would emerge as agreeable
forms j and agreeable forms would be those which sound agreeable
to the aristocratic holders of power. What forms could sound more
agreeable to the aristocrat than those which originated in a repudia-
tion of the speech of the lower classes? Would not such forms re-
mind him of the superiority of his own origin and thus be a way of
softening his will by the subtle inducements of flattery? Would not
the patterns of ordinary speech, if used by a commoner in seeking
advantage from a great lord, be a way of showing contempt for the
august person addressed? And would not that implication of con-
tempt be enough to secure the prompt denial of the advantage sought?
Speaking of the use of rhymed sentences as one of the uncommon
patterns of speech, Thomas Wilson said in his Rhetorique, "Yea,
5 Bede, Liber y in Halm, p. 607. Translation mine.
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
great Lordes would thinke themselues contemned, if learned men
(when they speake before them) sought not to speake in this sort/ 39
These words imply that the schemes and the tropes are the functional
rhetoric of any aristocratic state or society, and that learned men as
commoners and rhetoricians in aristocratic states must formulate rhe-
torical theory upon that principle. And this implication is borne out
by the history of rhetoric in England. For the schemes and the tropes
were especially popular in the feudal and monarchial periods of Eng-
lish history, and became less important with the growth of parlia-
mentary government.
Bede's definitions of the schemes and the tropes, and also his sub-
sequent treatment of them, came to him from the thirty-sixth and
thirty-seventh chapters of Book I of Isidore's EtymologiaeS These
chapters, by the way, are part of Isidore's treatment of grammar,
and Book II of his same work deals with rhetoric and dialectic. 8 The
fact that Bede's treatise on the schemes and tropes comes from Isi-
dore's De Grammatica, rather than from a regular work on rhetoric
might lead to the supposition that it should be classed, not as a rhet-
oric, but as a grammar. Indeed, this very supposition apparently
troubled Halm when he reedited the minor Latin rhetorics that had
formed the basis of the famous Antiqui Rhe tores Latini as put out
earlier by Pithou and again by Capperonnier. At any rate, Halm ad-
mitted Bede's Liber to a place in his collection with open reluctance,
and he intimated that he would willingly have left it out if he had
not been more or less obligated to include in his work whatever his
two predecessors had allowed in theirs. 9 He might, however, have
spared himself this anxiety. In actual fact, the schemes and the tropes
are not more grammatical than rhetorical. Their history proves that
they are grammatical in Donatus and Charisius, rhetorical in the
Rhetorica ad Herennium y Orator, De Oratore^ and Institutio Ora-
toria^ both grammatical and rhetorical in English stylistic rhetorics
of the sixteenth century, and purely and emphatically rhetorical in
the reformed rhetoric of Ramus. Thus they should occasion no apol-
ogy to those who regard Bede's treatment of them as a work on
rhetoric.
Bede's failure to include in his Liber such other topics as those of
6 Mairs edition, p. 203.
7 See Laistner, "The Library of the Venerable Bede," in Thompson, p. 24.1.
8 For Isidore's "De Grammattca and J>e Rhetoric^ see Mig-ne, Patrologia Latina y
LXXXII, 73-124, 1 23-140 j for his De RJtetorica alone, see Halm, pp. 505-522.
* Halin, p. xv.
r
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
the virtues, vices, and kinds of style should not be construed to mean
that he was ignorant of the broad Latin doctrine o elocutio* Nor
should it be assumed that, because he does not specifically mention
style as one of the five parts of rhetoric, he therefore was unaware
of the full extent of the Ciceronian program. He knew both of these
matters beyond question. Although Cicero's rhetorical writings were
not a part of the considerable library to which he had access, 10 he did
of course know and use Isidore's Etymologize^ and that work lists
the five conventional parts of rhetoric, and treats style as the third
part, only a few pages beyond its disquisition on the schemes and
tropes as components of grammar.
Between the eighth and the fifteenth centuries, stylistic rhetoric
appears to have attracted more favor in England than did the full
Ciceronian formula, despite the fact that Alcuin's work in the latter
vein was of greater intrinsic value than was Bede's in the former. In
that long stretch of time a few names are of importance in the history
of stylistic theory. One of the earliest after Alcuin is John of Salis-
bury. His Metalogicon has already been mentioned as an early
scholastic logic by an English author, and as a work in which logic
is divided into invention and disposition, according to a tradition that
went back to Aristotle's Topics.^ It would be within reason for a man
who equated logic with these two procedures to regard rhetoric as
having no province except that of style and delivery. And that ap-
pears to have been John's position, although he does not treat rhetoric
specifically, except as his advice on what constitutes good writing
emphasizes matters of style above other considerations. 12
Soon after the time of John of Salisbury, the Ciceronian formula
for rhetoric, as we have seen, passed over into poetic theory and be-
came the framework of Geoffrey of Vinsauf's Poetria Nova-, and
when that formula was again restored to rhetorical theory in Stephen
Hawes's Pastime of Pleasure^ it carried back with it much of the
poetic content and poetic presuppositions that Geoffrey had given it. 13
In addition to his Poetria Nova, Geoffrey wrote a little treatise called
the Summa de Coloribus Rhetoricis , 14 which limits itself to the de-
10 For a catalogue of authors and works in BebVs library, see Laistner, "The Library
of the Venerable Bede," in Thompson, pp. 263-266.
11 See above, pp. 15, 38.
12 Atkins, The Medieval Phase > p. 75 5 also Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic^
pp. 156-172.
13 See above, pp. Si -8 7.
14 For an analysis of this work and typical extracts from it, see Faral, Les Arts
PoetiqueSy pp. 321-327.
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
vices of style, as did Bede's Liber y and thus by strong implication
holds rhetoric to the third part of Cicero's formula. If Geoffrey's
theory of a rhetorical poetic and a stylistic rhetoric was typical of the
early years of the thirteenth century, the same conditions must have
been still in existence some fifty years later. John of Garland, an
Englishman of that later date> composed a treatise entitled Poetria
and another called Exempla Honestae Vitae. The first of these is an
adaptation of the doctrine of rhetorical style to poetics, with some
faint recognition of such other rhetorical procedures as invention,
arrangement, memory, and delivery. 15 The second is described by
Atkins as "a text-book treating of the use of the rhetorical figures."
Atkins adds: "It supplies sixty- four illustrations of such devices, giv-
ing to each its appropriate name j but it represents nothing more than
the conventional treatment of such matters found in other collections
of a similar kind." 16
The teaching of stylistic rhetoric in an English classroom was
pictured around 1481 in The Court of Sa<pience^ the learned poetic
allegory which I mentioned earlier in connection with the first at-
tempts to express logical doctrine in English. 17 It will be remembered
that the hero of The Court visits the castle of sapience where dwell
the seven ladies, who represent the seven liberal arts. After he quits
the parlor of Dame "Dialetica," he goes next to "Dame Rethoryke,
Modyr of Eloquence," and in six seven-line stanzas, which amount,
as a Latin headnote in the text says, to a "breuis tractatus de Retho-
rica," he describes the effect of Dame Rhetoric upon the pupils before
her, the actual heads of the doctrine she is teaching them, the author-
ities upon whom she appears to him to rely, and the great prose
writers and poets to whom her instruction refers. 18
Delight rather than conviction best describes the mood of the pu-
pils of Dame Rhetoric, according to the report we are given. The
hero of The Court exclaims as he sees her at work:
And many a clerke had lust hyr for to here 5
Hyr speche to theym was parfyte sustynaunce,
Yche worde of hyr depuryd was so clere
And enlumynyd wyth so parfyte plesaunce,
That heuyn hit was to here her beau parlauncej
15 See Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic^ pp. 191-195.
lff The Medieval Phase, p. 97.
17 See above, pp. 46-47.
18 The Court of Sa^ience^ ed. Spindler, pp. 198-200.
[ 120 ]
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
Her termes gay of facound souerayne
Cacemphaton in noo poynt myght dysteyne.
If the last two of these lines seem negative in declaring that sov-
ereign eloquence is never discolored by what is ill-sounding or ob-
scene, the earlier lines are at least something of a positive program.
And their climactic reference to the musical sound of perfect speech
represents of course a main tenet of the program of a rhetoric limited
predominantly to style.
The actual heads of the doctrine which Dame Rhetoric teaches her
pupils are systematically reminiscent of ancient stylistic theory. Says
her poet-observer:
She taught theym all the craft of endytyng,
Whyche vyces bene that shuld auoyded be,
Whyche ben the coloures gay of that konnyng,
Theyre difference and eke theyre propurtej
Yche thyng endyted how hit shuld peyntyd be,
Dystinccion she gan clare and discus,
Whyche ys coma, colon, periodus.
First to be noticed in this list is the topic of the vices of style, and
these, as enumerated by Quintilian, not only involved cacemphaton
but such other things as meanness or extravagance, meagerness, same-
ness, superfluous elaboration, perverse affectation, and the like. 19
Second in the list are the colors, under which fall the schemes and
the tropes. Third is the topic of painting, which quite possibly refers
to the concept of illustration and word picture discussed with special
detail by Quintilian as 'e^apyeitx, that is, enargia or vivid descrip-
tion. 20 And last are the "coma," the "colon," and the "periodus,"
which must be construed as referring, not to marks of punctuation,
but to the whole question of rhythm in style. In Cicero, and again in
Quintilian, the comma or incisum is a thought expressed in something
less than a full sentence, possibly in a phrase 5 the colon or membrum
is a thought expressed likewise in something less than a complete
sentence, and in something more than a phrase, say in a clause 5 and
the feriodus or circuitus is a thought expressed in a complete sen-
tence, usually made up of four cola, this number being possibly rem-
iniscent of the ancient use of TrepioSos to designate the complete cir-
cuit of the four Grecian games, the most memorable of which were
the Olympics. 21
1 9 See Institute Oratorio, 8 . 3 .44-60 . 20 Ibid. , 8 . 3 . 6 1 - 8 1 .
21 See Orator^ 61.204-206, 62.211-2145 66.223-226. Also Institutio Oratoria y 9.4.22-45,
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
As for the authorities upon whom Dame Rhetoric relies in her
teaching of stylistic rhetoric, her poet-observer mentions "Galfryde"
and "Januense," that is, Geoffrey of Vinsauf and Balbus de Janua. 22
The former of these, as we know, wrote not only on Cicero's five
procedures in his Poetria Nova, but also on style alone in his Summa
de Coloribus Rhetoricis. The latter, Balbus, wrote on the schemes
and tropes in the fourth book of his Catholicon, which is a treatise on
Latin grammar and vocabulary. In addition to these two author! ties j
the poet-observer mentions Cicero as master of Dame Rhetoric; in
fact, Cicero is "The chosyn spowse vnto thys lady fre," and in him
"Thys gyltyd craft of glory ys content." The poet-observer then
mentions that works on law and science are sources of the knowledge
needed to express oneself beautifully, and here as elsewhere he fol-
lows the Ciceronian doctrine of elocutio. His description of the work
of Dame Rhetoric closes with the observation that she is concerned
with "prose and metyr of all kynde," and he then enumerates some
of the prose writers and poets to whom she refers her doctrine, the
most notable being Homer, Virgil, Ovid, and Horace. 25
The passage concerning Dame Rhetoric in The Court is notable
as the first printed English account of the doctrine of stylistic rhet-
oric and of the act of teaching it in a classroom. Dame Rhetoric uses
Latin textbooks and Latin examples; the clerks who are her pupils
would expect her actual instruction to be in Latin; indeed, around
1481, when The Court was first published, there were no English
textbooks on rhetoric, and English itself, as the medium of prelim-
inary instruction and the instrument for teaching Latin, had re-
placed French in the schools of England only about a century before.
But although Latin may have been the language overheard by the
poet-observer as he visited the parlor of Dame Rhetoric in the castle
of sapience, he transmits his own impressions in English, and thus he
becomes more interesting in a historical sense than he is usually con-
sidered to be as a poet.
The vogue of stylistic rhetoric in the schools of England during
122-130* C. F. Biihler regards these three terms as references to marks of punctuation,
and thinks the inclusion of them as a part of rhetoric is unusual. See his The Sources of
the Court of Sapience^ Beitrage zur Englischen Philologie, xxm (1932), p. 75. But actu-
ally these terms have a most prominent position in Cicero's and Quintilian's theory of
oratorical rhythm.
22 See Biihler, op. >., pp. 75-76.
23 Biihler, loc. cit. y notes that the list of exemplary writers in The Court corresponds
to the similar list in the Laborintus of vrard PAllemand.
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
the sixteenth century is indicated about seventy years after the first
edition of The Court by John Jewel's Oratio contra Rhetoricam**
This little work is one of the earliest of the extant literary efforts of
Jewel, who in Elizabeth's reign was to become the bishop of Salis-
bury and the greatest early apologist for the position of the English
church against Roman Catholicism. Between 1544 and 1552 Jewel
served as praelector in humanities and rhetoric at Corpus Christ!
College in Oxford. The Oratio contra Rhetoricam was delivered
around the year 1 548 before all the members of Corpus Christi, and
it is doubtless the most elaborate of the lectures pronounced by
Jewel during his praelectorship. It is not so much an attack on rhet-
oric, however, as an ingenious and ironical condemnation of what
rhetoric had come to mean in the schools and at Oxford. And what
rhetoric had come to mean was that speaking must be done in such a
way as to appear systematically opposed to the ordinary habits of
communication.
Early in his oration Jewel announces his own determination to
abandon the study of rhetoric and take up poetry. Perhaps he means
by this only that his subsequent lectures will concern the humanities
as his past ones have concerned rhetoric. Perhaps he is merely lend-
ing interest to a mundane transition by giving it an air of crisis and
renunciation. But at any rate he conducts his speech as if he had had
a genuine change of heart towards rhetoric, and really believed his
own statement that "the whole time which thus far we have devoted
to eloquence has been wasted and worse than "wasted."
As this thesis develops, Jewel makes it evident that there is a kind
of speaking which is worthy of study, and that this worthy kind has
lost the name of rhetoric, although it still possesses the greatest value
and dignity. "For if in speaking," says he, "we seek this (as we cer-
tainly do), that we may be understood by others with whom we deal,
who can discover a better mode of speech than, to speak intelligibly,
simply, and clearly? What need of art? What need of childish orna-
ments?" He adds:
Truth, indeed, is clear and simple j it has small need of the armament
of the tongue or of eloquence. If it is perspicuous and plain, it has
enough support in itself j it does not require flowers of artful speech.
24 My discussion of the Oratio contra Rhetoricam and all my quotations from it de-
pend upon Hoyt H. Hudson's translation and comment. See his "Jewel's Oration against
Rhetoric: A Translation," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, xiv (1928), 174-392.
[ 123 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
If it is obscure and unpropitious, it will not be brought to light in
vociferation and flow of words.
Jewel is not so naive as to want to imply that man is born with the
ready-made capacity to be fully understandable in speech. Nor does
he mean that truth is easily found and easily communicated, and that
intelligibility, simplicity, and clarity are possessions of everyone, if
only art keeps out of the way. What he does mean is that the business
of learning to be clear, simple, and understandable does not in his
time concern the rhetoricians, who are preoccupied instead with the
business of teaching the flowers of speech and the artifices of delivery.
These flowers and artifices as the exclusive concern of rhetoric are
what Jewel is renouncing. The picture he draws later of the rhetoric
of his time bears this out. Speaking of the insolence, trickery, and
slander of oratory, he says:
Such courses the orators undertake and profess: they have only so
much right on their side as they have tongue and impudence. For if
they trust to the truth and equity of their cause, why do they flee
simplicity and an ordinary mode of speech? Why pursue all these
verbal graces, these obscurities and pedantries? Why for free and un-
trammeled discourse contrive feet, rhythm, and like fetters? Why go
into battle with hints, conjectures, opinions, fables, and rumors? Why
devise so many snares for captivating our ears? What do they want
of these tropes, figures of speech, schemata, and what they call "colors"
(to me they seem rather shades) , epanorthoses, antimetaboles, sus-
pensions, catachreses, enigmas, extenuations, premunitions, exclama-
tions, aposiopeses, apologies, circumlocutions, diminutions, and hyper-
boles? Why fill the forum with cries, vociferations, and tears? Why
call down the gods from heaven? Why raise the shades from the
underworld? Why have buildings, temples, columns, tombs, and
stones cry out? What do they want of such faces? Why that thrashing
about of the body? Why that sudden contraction? that waving of
arms? that slapping of the thigh? that stamp of the foot? Why is it
they speak not with the mouth, not with the tongue, not with the
jaws, but with the hand, fingers, joints, arms, face, and the whole
body? For idle men have fashioned all these things for themselves,
and they become much more conversant with this arsenal than with
the subject itself and with truth. O gentle triflers, who will never in
your whole lives, I know, lack a subject of study!
It was only a short time after this outburst against ornamental
rhetoric, as the sixteenth century was reaching its midpoint, that the
[ 124 ]
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
first English textbook on the schemes and tropes, and on stylistic
rhetoric in general, was printed. This textbook is; Richard Sherry's
Treatise of Schemes and Tropes, published at London in 1550.*' A
graduate of Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1527, Sherry had been
appointed headmaster of Magdalen College School in 1534 after
taking his master's degree at Oxford in the meantime. His head-
mastership ended in 1 540. Ten years later, at the request of Thomas
Brooke, to whom he dedicated the work, he put into his mother
tongue the stylistic lore that he had formerly taught to his pupils
in Latin.
The realization that his English readers would find his vocabulary
unfamiliar, and might therefore reject his work without fair consid-
eration, led him in the opening words of his dedicatory epistle to try
to prevent such an outcome by associating it with rashness and fri-
volity, and by intimating that an opposite outcome would be a sign
of modernity. He says:
I doubt not but that the title of this treatise all straunge vnto our
Englyshe eares, wil cause some men at the fyrst syghte to maruayle
what the matter of it should meane: yea, and peraduenture if they be
rashe of Judgement, to cal it some newe fangle, and so casting it
hastily from the, wil not once vouch safe to reade it: and if they do,
yet perceiuynge nothing to be therin that pleaseth their phansy, wyl
count it but a tryfle, & a tale of Robynhoode. But of thys sorte as I
doubte not to fynde manye, so perhaps there wyll be other, whiche
moued with the noueltye thereof, wyll thynke it worthye to be
looked vpon, and se what is contained therin. These words, Scheme
and Trope, are not vsed in our Englishe tongue, neither bene they
Englyshe wordes. No more be manye whiche nowe in oure tyme be
made by continual vse, very familier to most men, and come so often
in speakyng, that aswel is knowen amongest vs the meanyng of them,
as if they had bene of oure owne natiue broode. 26
25 The title page reads : "A treatise of Schemes & Tropes very profytable for the
better vnderstanding- of good authors, gathered out of the best Grammarians & Oratours
by Rychard Sherry Londoner. Whervnto is added a declamacion, That chyldren euen
strayt fro their infancie should be well and gently broughte vp in learnynge. Written
fyrst in Latin by the most excellent and famous Clearke, Erasmus of Roterodame." The
dedicatory letter ends thus: "Geuen at London the .XIII. day of Decembre, Anno.
M, D. L. n There is no date on the title page. The colophon reads: "Imprynted at
London by John Day dwellinge ouer Aldersgate, beneth saint Martyns. And are to be
sold at his shop by the litle conduit in Chepesyde at the sygne of the Resurrection. Cum
priuilegio ad imprimendum solum. Per septennium."
20 A treatise of Schemes & Tropes (London, 1550), sig. Aiv-Aar.
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
The motives which led him to undertake his pioneering venture
are revealed later in the dedicatory epistle. Speaking in defense of
English not only as the language of such famous authors as Gower,
Chaucer, Lydgate, Elyot, and Wyatt, but also as a vocabulary capa-
ble of receiving all kinds of sciences and all manner of thoughts,
Sherry goes on to say that he is qualified to discuss the schemes and
tropes "bicause longe ago, I was well a quaynted wyth them, when I
red them to other in y Latin" 5 and he adds that, since "they holpe
me verye muche in the exposicion of good authoures, I was so muche
the more ready to make them speak English: partli, to renew the
pleasure of mine old studies, and partelye to satysfy your request." 27
He next recalls that the "famous clarke Rodulphus Agricola" had
urged all men to translate into their own tongue whatever they read
in another, that being the way to perceive the strength and weakness
of utterance. As for the attitude of the learned world towards the
subject of his present work, Sherry remarks:
No lerned nacion hath there bene but y learned in it haue written of
schemes & fygures, which thei wold not haue don, except thei had
perceyued the valewe. 28
Sherry emphasizes on three occasions that he is writing upon the
schemes and tropes as a topic of style, and that he is writing on style
as the third part of the whole Ciceronian program. The first occasion
arises in the dedicatory epistle as he speaks of the schemes and tropes
as aids in the interpretation of great writing:
For thys darre I saye, no eloquente wryter maye be perceiued as he
shulde be, wythoute the knowledge of them: for asmuche as al to-
gethers they belonge to Eloquucion, whyche is the thyrde and pryn-
cipall parte of rhetorique. 29
The second occasion arises at the beginning of the actual text of his
work, where Sherry prints the following headnote:
Schemes and Tropes.
A briefe note of eloqucio, the third
parte of Rhetoricke, wherunto
all Figures and Tropes be
- referred. 80
On the third occasion, Sherry is speaking of style and its relation to
the other parts of rhetoric. He says:
27 Ibid., si^. A 4 v* 2S Ibid,, sig-. A.$r. 2fl Ibid., sig. A6v. a Ibid., sig. Bir.
.[ 126 ]
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
Tullye and Quintilian thoughte that inuencion and disposicio were
the partes of a wytty and prudent man, but eloquence of an oratour.
For howe to finde out matter, and set it in order, may be comen to
all men, whyche eyther make abridgementes of the excellent workes
of aunciente wryters, and put histories in remebraunce, or that
speake of anye matter them seluesj but to vtter the mynde aptely,
distinctly, and ornately, is a gyft geuen to very fewe. si
It is important to notice these statements that the schemes and the
tropes are merely a part of style, and that style is third among the
five parts of rhetoric. They constitute proof that Sherry belongs
among writers on traditional stylistic rhetoric, not among disciples
of the reformed stylistic rhetoric of Ramus, whose influence in Eu-
rope began to mount after 1543. The Ramists, as we shall see in
greater detail later, considered rhetoric to have only two parts, style
and delivery, as opposed to five parts under the ancient program j
and style they considered to have only two parts, the schemes and
the tropes, as opposed to the larger content of the doctrine o elocutio
under Cicero, Thomas Wilson, and Sherry. It would have been un-
usual for Sherry to be influenced by the Ramists as early as 1550,
since their doctrine was young and untraveled at that date. But the
title of Sherry's work invites us to think that he conceives of rhet-
oric as the Ramists did, and to avoid such a misunderstanding we
must take into account his repeated declarations of faith in the older
arrangements of Cicero.
Sherry's treatise covers style by speaking of words used singly and
words used in combination. Under the first heading he speaks of
clearness and of the faults of barbarism and solecism. Under the sec-
ond heading he lumps everything else: the three kinds of style (the
great, the small, the mean, that is, the middle) $ the schemes, which
require a discussion of three things figures, faults, virtues 5 the
tropes, which are particularly useful as ornaments j the first order of
rhetorical figures, which include larger aspects of style like repeti-
tion, antithesis, and climax j the ornaments of sentences, which include
still larger aspects like partition, enumeration, rhetorical description
or enargia^ amplification, hyperbole, proofs, examples, parables, im-
ages, and so on.
The heart of Sherry's work is, however, the topic of the schemes
and the tropes, as his title indicates. To him, as to Bede, the schemes
*W., sig\ Biv-Bzr.
[ 127 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
and the tropes are verbal arrangements that differ from what is cus-
tomary and accepted, and thus they advertise the theory that true
effectiveness in speech proceeds, not from its accurate correspondence
to states of reality, but from its lack of resemblance to the^ idiom of
ordinary life. This theory is implied in Sherry's key definitions:
Scheme is a Greke worde, and signifyeth properlye the maner of
gesture that daunsers vse to make, whe they haue won the best game,
but by translation is taken for the fourme, fashion, and shape of anye
thynge expressed in wrytynge or payntinge: and is taken here now of
vs for the fashion of a word, sayynge, or sentence, otherwyse wrytten
or spoken then after the vulgar and comen vsage, and that thre sudry
waies: by figure, faute, vertue.
Figure.
Fygure, of Scheme y fyrst part, is a behaueoure, maner, or fashion
eyther of sentence, oracion, or wordes after some new wyse, other the
men do commenlye vse to wryte or speake: and is of two sortes.
Dianoias, that is of sentence, and Lexeos of worde. 82
Figure Lexeos, or of worde, is when in speakyng or wrytyng any
thynge touchynge the wordes is made newe or straunge, otherwyse
then after f comen custume: & is of n. kyndes, diccion, & construc-
tion, 88
Vertue, or as we saye, a grace & dygnitye in speakynge, the thyrde
fcynde of Scheme, is when the sentence is bewtyfied and lyfte vp aboue
the comen maner of speaking of the people. Of it be two kyndes:
Proprietie, and garnyshyng. 8 *
Tropes.
Emonge authors manye tymes vnder the name of figures, Tropes also
be comprehended: Neuerthelesse ther is a notable difference betwixt
the. In figure is no alteration in the wordes fro their proper signifi-
cations, but only is the oracion & setence made by the more plesaut,
sharpe & vehemet, after y affeccio of him that speketh or writeth : to
y which vse although tropes also do serue, yet properlye be they so
called, because in them for necessitye or garnyshynge, there is a
mouynge and chaungynge of a worde and sentence, from theyr owne
significacio into another, whych may agre wyth it by a similitude. 3 * 5
As individual schemes and tropes are enumerated and exemplified,
the thesis that each represents a departure from the ordinary pattern
of speech becomes more and more evident.
82 Ibid., Big. Bsr. 88 Ibid., sig. B 5 v. 84 Ibid., sig. C 3 r.
35 Ibid., &ig. C4.r-C4.v.
[ 128 ]
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
The first actual schemes listed by Sherry are the figures of diction.
He calls the second one of these by its Greek term A'pheresis^ and
by its Latin term Ablatio. This figure, he indicates, is produced when
we remove a syllable or letter from the beginning of any word with-
out changing the sense in which it is used, except apparently as our
action adds an element of surprise or interest to the ordinary meaning
of the term. Sherry's illustration of this figure does not represent
good reasoning about the derivation of the English word he dis-
cusses, but it does represent the nature of the figure he wants to ex-
plain. He takes the English word "pentis," which means a small
shed with sloping roof erected against another building, or by ex-
tension, any structure with a sloping roof, say a window awning*
Actually, this word, now surviving as "penthouse," came from the
Latin word "appendere" meaning "to belong to." But Sherry argues
that the word "pentis" was originally the Greek word "epenthesis,"
and that the Greek word not only had its first letter, "e," removed
by speakers seeking to alter its familiar pattern under the figure of
Apheresis, but also had its middle syllable, "hes," removed for the
same purpose under the figure of Syncope, with the result that "pen-
tis" came into being at the hands of seekers of novelty in style. The
whole of Sherry's explanation deserves quotation:
Apheresis 2 Ablatio, the takynge awaye of a letter or sillable from
the begynnynge of a worde, of a letter, when we say:
The pethesis of thys house is to low, for the epenthesis.
Wher note this y word pethesis is a greke worde, & yet is
vsed as an englishe, as many mo be, and is called a pentis
by these figures, Sincope and Apheresis, the whole word
beynge as is before, epenthesis, so called because it is be-
twyxt y lyght & vs, as in al occupiers shops comenlie it is. 88
The "occupiers shops" mentioned in the closing words of this quo-
tation are of course merchants' shops of any sort. The "pentis" or
"awning" in such shops would be between the occupants and the light
outside. The Greek word "*e7rei>0eo-ts" means "the insertion of a let-
ter" and by metaphor any insertion between something and some-
thing else. Still, the English word "pentis" does not happen to come
from "Wei>0<Ti9>" although the figure of Apheresis and of Syncope
would be admirably illustrated by it if Sherry's argument were ety-
mologically sound.
., sig-. B5v-B6r.
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
As we have already seen by Sherry's definition of the trope, there
is an element of necessity as well as of ornament about its use, and
thus it does not seem to represent a purely wilful departure from
the language of ordinary life as do the two schemes just discussed.
Nevertheless in Sherry's analysis of this aspect of style, the implica-
tion is plain not only that tropes involve the use of words in some
orbit outside of their usual ones, but also that, when these departures
from the ordinary are made, the motive is often ornament rather
than necessity. Metaphor, the first of the tropes listed by Sherry, is
defined as "Translatio, translacion, that is a worde translated from
the thynge that it properlye signifieth, vnto a nother whych may
agre with it by a similitude." 37 He adds: "And among all vertues of
speeche, this is the chyefe." Now when Sherry illustrates that form
of metaphor which represents the use of a physical term to designate
a mental happening, he has ornament rather than necessity in mind,
since in each of the cases he cites, the metaphor is strictly speaking
unnecessary, as he points out by showing what literal term would be
available if one did not want to decorate the ordinary expression.
He says:
Translacions be diuerse.
Some fro the body to the mynd, as: I haue but lately tasted the
Hebrue tonge, for newely begunne it. Also I smell where aboute
you go, for I perceyue.
Most of his other illustrations of tropes indicate that he is discussing
them, not on the primitive level where man has to use them, but on
the sophisticated level where man uses them to exhibit his wit and
learning. On this level, of course, they are conspicuous departures
from the speech of the people, inasmuch as tropes in popular speech
are more a matter of instinct than design.
One other example may be cited to show how pervasive in Sherry's
treatise is idea that figures are departures from ordinary patterns
of communication. In speaking of the first order of rhetorical figures,
Sherry comes at length to that called Homoeoteleuton or Similiter
desinens^ that is, like ending, or rhyme. Rhyme as an arrangement of
language is not part of ordinary speech. It is rather a contrivance for
making a thought seem out of the ordinary. Sherry's examples are
rather feeble, as indeed were the rhymed sermons condemned by
" Ibid., sig. C 4 v.
[ 130 ]
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
Thomas Wilson. 38 But their status as departures from common
speech is unmistakable. Says Sherry:
Homoteleto. Similiter desinens, endynge al alyke, when words or
senteces haue alyke endyng, as : Thou dareste do fylth-
ely, and studiest to speke baudely. Content thy selfe
w thy state, in thy herte do no man hate, be not the
cause of stryfe and bate. 39
As this review of Sherry's pioneering work draws to an end, I
should like to mention that he is quite explicit about the sources upon
which his treatise is based. He speaks in his dedicatory letter of hav-
ing prepared himself for his task by reading sundry treatises, some
written long ago, and some in his own day. 40 He declares, however,
of his definitions and examples:
I haue not translated them orderly out of anye one author, but run-
ninge as I sayde thorowe many, and vsyng myne owne iudgement,
haue broughte them into this body as you se, and set them in so playne
an order, that redelye maye be founde the figure, and the vse where-
vnto it serueth.* 1
From the authors and works explicitly mentioned by Sherry in his
dedicatory letter and in the Treatise itself, it would appear that he
places primary reliance upon such modern writings as Rudolph Agri-
cola's De Inventions Dialectica y Petrus Mosellanus's Tabulae de
Schematibus et Tropis, Thomas Linacre's Rudimentes GrammaticeSj
and Erasmus's De Du$lici Co*pia Verborum ac Rerum and The
Preacher $ whereas for the ancients he goes to Quintilian's Institutio
Oratoria^ to Cicero's Orator y De Oratore y and De Partitione Ora-
toria^ and to Aristotle's Topics and possibly his Rhetoric**
"But if God spare me lyfe," says Sherry after apologizing for the
inadequacies of his Treatise^ "I truste hereafter to make it an intro-
duccio, wherbi our youth not onlye shall saue that moste precious
Jewell, Time, whyle they wander by them selues, readynge at all
as See above, p. 108.
39 Treatise of Schemes and Tropes, sig. DSV.
40 Ibid., sig. A5r. 41 Ibid., sig. A6r.
42 In speaking- of the places of logic and rhetoric, Sherry says in part: "These be
commen to the Oratours with the Logicians, albeit Aristotle hathe seperatelye written
of them in hys Topickes, and in his Rethorickes hathe not touched the, and they profile
much both to iudgement, and to endightynge, but the varietie of authors hath made the
handlynge of them sumwhat darke, because amonge them selues they can not wel agre,
neyther of the names, neyther of the number, neyther of the order." Sig. F4V. This
passage, It seems, contains his only reference to Aristotle's Rhetoric,
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
aduentures sundry and varyous authors: but that also thei shalbe able
better to vnderstande and iudge of the goodlye gyftes and orna-
mentes in mooste famous and eloquente oratoures."* 8 The promise
indicated in these words was in some measure fulfilled by the publi-
cation at London in 1555 of Sherry's Treatise of the Figures of
Grammar and Rhetorike** This work is dedicated to William Paget,
Baron of Beaudesert, whom I mentioned earlier as an advocate of
Melanchthon's rhetorical theory when Paget and Leonard Cox were
at Cambridge together. 46 Sherry introduced four new features in his
revised edition: he made "figure" his key word, and proceeded to dis-
cuss figures of grammar, figures of rhetoric called tropes, and figures
of rhetoric called schemes $ he put the topic of the three kinds of
style at the end rather than near the beginning of his treatise 5 he pre-
sented his material in such fashion that a Latin discussion of a given
topic preceded an identical English discussion of it, the work as a
whole being thus an almost invariable alternation of Latin and Eng-
lish passages 5 and finally he abandoned as his one big illustration the
theme from Erasmus on the subject of the education of children, and
substituted for it an English version of Cicero's oration for Marcus
Marcellus. There are other differences between his first and his sec-
ond edition, but none that places the basic philosophy of the former
in a new light.
At one point in the first edition of his Treatise, Sherry remarks
that the man who goes'Tnto a goodly garden""g'arnished with herbs
and flowers, and only beholds them, without knowing what they are
called, does not have the pleasure of him who also knows the names
and properties of everything he sees. 48 This image may have sug-
gested something to Henry Peacham. At any rate, Peacham pub-
lished at London in 1577 The Garden of Eloquence Conteymng the
Figures of Grammer and Rhetorick-^ and this work, more extensive
48 Ibid,, sig. A7v-A8r.
44 The title page reads: "A Treatise of the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorike,
profitable for al that be studious of Eloquence, and in especial! for suche as in Grammer
scholes doe reade moste eloquente Poetes and Oratours: Whereunto is ioygned the oration
which Cicero made to Cesar, geuing thankes vnto him for pardonyng, and restoring
again of that noble ma Marcus Marcellus, sette foorth by Richarde Sherrye Londonar.
Londini in aedibus Ricardi Totteli. Cum priuilegio ad imprimendum solum." No date is
given on the title page. The colophon reads: "Imprinted at London in Fletestrete within
Temple barre, at the sygne of the hand and starre by Richarde Tottill. the .1111. daye
of Maye, the yeare of cure Lorde. M D L V. Cum priuilegio ad imprimendum solum."
45 See above, p. 95.
46 Sig. A8r-A8v.
47 The title page reads : "The Garden of Eloquence Conteyning the Figures of Gram-
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
than Sherry's two earlier efforts in the same field, brings to full
maturity the English stylistic theory of rhetoric.
"Figure" is the key term in Peacham's Garden, as it was in Sher-
ry's second edition. Peacham begins his work with the following
definitions:
The names of Figures.
Figures of the Grecians, are called Trofes and Schemates^ and of the
Latines, Fygures Exornations, Lightes, Colours, and Ornaments of
speech. Cicero who supposed them to be named of the Grecians Sche-
mates, as a iesture and countenaunce of speech, called them Concin-
nitie, that is propernesse, aptnesse, featnesse, also conformations,
formes, and fashions, comprising all ornamentes of speech vnder one
name.
A Figure what it is.
A Figure is a fashion of words, Oration, or sentence, made new by
Arte, tourning from the common manner and custome of wryting or
speaking. 48
With the definition of figure clearly set forth in these terms,
Peacham proceeds to divide his subject into its parts and elements.
A given figure, he says, is either a trope or a "schemate." A trope is
either of a word or of a sentence, there being nine of the former and
ten of the latter. A given "schemate," meanwhile, is either grammat-
ical or rhetorical. Grammatical "schemates" number fifty-six in all,
fourteen of them being orthographical, and forty-two, syntactical.
Rhetorical "schemates," the most numerous class, embrace twenty-
four that pertain to words, twenty-six that pertain to sentences, and.
sixty-six that pertain to amplification. 49 Thus his work as a whole
deals with one hundred and ninety-one terms, each of which is de-
fined, then divided where necessary into species, and finally illustrat-
\yy the Bible, by classical literature, and by homemade examples.
It may seem strange that human energy should be applied so dili-
gently to this interminable enumeration of stylistic devices, when
mer and Rhetorick, from whence maye bee gathered all manner of Flowers, Coulors,
Ornaments Exornations, Formes and Fashions of speech, very profitable for all those
that be studious of Eloquence, and that reade most Eloquent Poets and Orators, and also
helpeth much for the better vnderstanding 1 of the holy Scriptures. Set foorth in Englishe,
by Henry Pecham Minister. Anno. 1577. Imprinted at London, in Fleetestrete, beneath
the Conduite, at the Signe of Saint lohn Euaungelist, by H. lackson."
48 Garden of Eloquence y sig. Bir.
49 /*<., sig. Bir. Peacham's table indicates twenty-five rhetorical schemes of the
sentence, but actually he names twenty-six later. His table indicates sixty schemes of
amplification, but his later discussion includes sixty-six.
[ 133 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
the subject of communication offers more philosophic and more hu-
mane approaches, particularly in the regions where persuasion is con-
sidered, and the means of persuasion are studied as matters of logic,
emotion, and morality. But even though we admit that Peacham and
his school appear more concerned with the husks than with the ker-
nels of style, we should nevertheless credit them with some philo-
sophic conception of what they were doing a conception which im-
parts a measure of interest to their otherwise mechanical routine.
They conceived of wisdom and eloquence_as_the , twg_jorces_which
hgidTspqety tojgetKerjs^^ They conceived of
oratory as the union of these two forces and "as"the organ of leader-
ship. They conceived of wisdom as the force which man never elected
to do without, whereas eloquence was the force which he might under-
rate and disparage in moments of pride and confidence. Thus elo-
fluence Jiad_^ and the study of elo-
quence, became,, tfajLJSQidyjdLj^ wisdom having
already guaranteed that the substance of speech was present as raw
materialtVrhis philosophy was expressed by Peacham in the dedica-
tory letter of the revised edition of the Garden^ published at London
in J 593- Speaking there of the power of wisdom and the prudent art
of persuasion, he says that "so mighty is the power of this happie
vnion, (I meane of wisdom & eloquence) that by the one the Orator
forceth, and by the other he allureth, and by both so worketh, that
what he commendeth is beloued, what he dispraiseth is abhorred,
what he perswadeth is obeied, & what he disswadeth is auoided: so
that he is in a maner the emperour of mens minds & affections, and
next to the omnipotent God in the power of perswasion, by grace, &
diuine assistance." Peacham adds:
The principal instrumets of mans help in this wonderfull effect, are
those figures and formes of speech conteined in this booke, which are
the frutefull branches of eloquution, and the mightie streames of elo-
quence: whose vtilitie, power, and vertue, I cannot sufficiently com-
med, but speaking by similitude, I say they are as stars to giue light,
as cordials to comfort, as harmony to delight, as pitiful spectacles to
moue sorrowfull passions, and as orient colours to beautifie reason. 50
Implicit in _this philosophy is the assumption that the orator is an
er !LPjr^ r unc * er the rule of God, and that his subjects are^not^so much
the" common people as the^anstocrat" arici temporal king, whose au-
Garden of Eloquence (London, 1593), sig. ABsv-AB^r. This work has re-
cently been made available in a facsimile reproduction with an Introduction by William
G. Crane (Gainesville, Florida: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1954).
[ 134 ]
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
thority is unquestioned, and whose hearts are won only by the forms
of speech "differing from the vulgar maner and custome of writing
or speaking." 51
The reader of the first edition of the Garden of Eloquence is often
aware that Peacham's analysis of the figures of grammar and rhet-
oric depends upon the first edition of Sherry's Treatise. Sometimes
the dependence is so direct that a passage in Peacham is virtually a
copy of the similar passage in Sherry. For example, Peacham's long
illustration of the second kind of expolitio is closely similar to Sher-
ry's illustration of "expolicion," despite the fact that Sherry mentions
Erasmus as his source, whereas Peacham mentions Cornificius as his. 52
Incidentally, "expolitio" is the figure in which a speaker says the
same thing in many diverse ways, as though many things were being
said. In addition to this borrowing, there are in the early edition of
the Garden other passages which bear a close resemblance to cor-
respondingjpassagesjn SherrY^^xsl^dition, and must therefore have
been transferred deEBeraJeryfrom one to the other. 53
It is also apparent that Peacham's first edition borrows at least
once from the second edition of Sherry. The passage in which this
borrowing occurs is meant to illustrate the rhetorical device of $ar-
j2a_and I shall quote what Peacham and then Sherry have to say
on this point, not only to show the resemblance between them, but
also to indicate their thinking upon one of the largest and most im-
51 Ibid^ p. i. Notice that these words differ somewhat from those used by Peacham
in 1577 and quoted above, p. 133. The main difference is that "vulgar" has replaced
"common."
52 Compare the Treatise (1550), sig, F7r-F8v, with the Garden (1577), sig. Qir-Qar.
53 The following are examples:
Sherry: "Also I smell where aboute you go, for I perceyue. 11 (sig. C4v)
Peacham: (C . . . also, I smell whereabout you goe, for, perceaue whereabout you goe . . ."
(sig. B 3 v)
Sherry: "By that goeth before, the thynge that foloweth, as: He set hys spurres to hys
horse, for he rode a pace, or fled faste awaye." (sig. C6r)
Peacham: "Thinges following, by thinges going before, as to say, he put to his Spurres,
meaning hee roade apace. . ." (sig.
Sherry: "By that y foloweth, the thinge wente before, as: I got it wyth the swete of
my face, for w my labour." (sig. C6r)
Peacham: "Contrariwyse, thinges going before, by thinges following, as Genesis. 3. In
the sweate of thy face, shalte thou eate thy breadc, for, with labour shalt thou
eate thy bread, which goeth before sweate. . ." (sig. C3v)
Sherry: "Sarcasmus. Amara irrisio^ is a bitter sporting a mocke of our enemye, or a
maner of iestyng or scoffinge bytynglye, a nyppyng tawnte, as; The Jewes
sayde to Christ, he saued other, but he could not saue hym selfe," (sig. C7v)
Peacham: "Sarcasmus, is a bitter kinde of mocke, or dispytefull frumpe, vsed of an
enemy, such as the Jewes vsed to Christ haging on y Crosse, now sayd they,
let him come downe from the Crosse and saue himself e, that saued others:
Also, he saued others, himselfe he cannot saue." (sig.
[ 135 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
portant o the rhetorical figures those figures which, as Peacham
defines them, "doe take a way the wearinesse of our common and
dayly speach, and doe fashion a pleasant, sharpe, euident and gallant
kinde of speaking, giuing vnto matters great strength, perspecuitie
and grace. . . ." S4 Here then is Peacham on partitio-.
Partitio, when the whole is deuyded into partes, and then it is called
Partitien, as if you might say, he is well scene in all Sciences, this
generall saying you may declare by partes, thus. He perfitely know-
eth all the painefull rules of Grammer, the pleasaunt Flowers of
Rhetoricke, the subtilties of Logitians, the secretes of naturall Phi-
losophy, the difficultie of Wisedome supernaturall, the pleasaunt
Fables of Poets, the Mathematicall demonstrations, the motions of
Starres, the cunning reasons of numbers, the description of the worlde,
the measuring of the earth, the situations, names, distaunces of Coun-
tries, Cities, Mountaynes, Riuers, Fountaynes, and Wildernesses, the
properties of Soyles, the deepe misteries of Diuinitie, the difference
of harmonies, the consent of tunes, histories, olde and newe, antiqui-
ties, nouelties, Greeke, Latine and Hebrew. Finally, whatsoeuer good
learning hath bene founde and taught of good Authors, all that hath
this man perceyued, knowne and remembred. 55
In his first edition Sherry uses this same general thesis to illustrate
$artitiof* but it is from the wording of his second edition that
Peacham borrows, as we can see at once if we compare the quotation
just given with the following words from Sherry's revised treatise:
ition is 3 when that that might be spoken generally, is more largely
declared by parte, As if we would say: he is perfectly seen in al sci-
ences. Thys sentence thou mayest declare by partes in this wise. He
knoweth merueylously well the fables of Poetes, the flowers of Rhet-
orique, the painefull rules of Grammer, the subtilties of Logitians,
the secretes of natural philosophy, the hardnes of wisedom supernat-
ural, the misteries of diuinitie, the mathematicall demonstrations, the
mocions of starres, the reasons of nubers, the measuring of y earth,
the situations, names, and spaces of Cities, Mountaynes, Floudes, and
Pountaynes, the dyfference, and harmonies of Tunes, histories olde,
and newe: antiquities, nouelties, Greke and Latine: finally whatso-
euer good learnyng hath been founde and taught of good authours,
all that wholy hath this one man perfitlye perceyued, knowen, and
remembred. 57
54 Garden of Eloquence (1577), sig-. H^v.
55 Ibid., sig. RSV. 56 Treatise of Schemes fif Trofes, sig-.
57 Treatise of the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorike, fol. xli.
[ 136 ]
THE RHETORIC OF STYLE
In addition to Sherry, Peacham relies very heavily upon Susen-
brotus's Epitome Troporum ac Schematum^ and upon such other
authorities as Erasmus's Da Duplici Co$ia Verborum ac Rerum^
Quintilian's Institutio Oratorio,, and the anonymous Rhetorics ad
Herennmm^ which Peacham attributes to Cornificius. 58 Peacham
draws also from Cicero and probably from the other sources men-
tioned by Sherry, all of whom would be likely to influence any tra-
ditional stylistic rhetoric of the second half of the sixteenth century.
There is even some reason to believe that the second edition of
Peacham's Garden was influenced indirectly by the reformed rhetoric
of Ramus. As we shall see in the next chapter, Ramus taught that
all schemes and tropes were strictly the property of rhetoric, and
should never be counted as belonging in part to grammar. In fact,
the assigning of the tropes and schemes to rhetoric rather than to
grammar was a point of real emphasis in Ramus's concept of the
liberal arts. In his first edition of 1577, Peacham pays no attention
to this point of emphasis, his schemes being distributed between
grammar and rhetoric, as I indicated above. But by 1593, when
Peacham published his revised edition of the Garden^ England had
been so far converted to Ramistic rhetoric that even a traditionalist
like Peacham was to some extent affected. Thus it is not surprising
to find that this second edition abandons the distinction between
grammatical and rhetorical schemes, and omits from consideration
many of the schemes which the first edition had classed as gram-
matical.
_arden is the last English treatise_on the tropes ancjjthe fig-
q FP* aar in print before I $84, when^thg^ea^la^t- "F.ngTish version
ofJRamistir rh^Q^r waQ.pwfitfefipH TbT^n^y^nrvpy of English sty-
listic rhetoric as a separate pattern^of^i^^tiona^-tiie.ory ends with
Peacham. Stylistic rhetoric continuedjio be influential in England for
tKe f QllOT^gnpMBB^^^niSt in tReT exact form it had had in the
works we havebeenjon^delrmg. Wnat fornTit took after the days of
Sherry and Peacham has BSen suggested already, and will be discussed
more at length when Ramistic rhetoric has been analyzed. Mean-
while, a few words need to be said on the subject of formulary rhet-
oric, the third and last of the traditional patterns of rhetorical
theory in England.
88 For references by Peacham to these two latter works, see the Garden of Eloquence
(1577), sigs. A2V, Asr, Eiv, Qir, Qar. Peacham's debt to Susenbrotus, Sherry, Erasmus,
and other sources is discussed in full detail by William G. Crane in the Introduction to
his recent facsimile reprint of the Garden.
[ 137 ]
IV. Models for Imitation
FORMULARY rhetoric is made up of compositions drawn to illustrate
rhetorical principles and presented as models for students to imitate in
the process of developing themselves for the tasks of communication.
Rhetorical education has always rested upon the assumption that
practice in communication is necessary for the development of profi-
ciency, and that the best possible practice consists in performing exer-
cises like those required in the actual processes of civilized life. Some-
times these exercises are performed by students in conscious imitation
of models, and sometimes in conscious attempts to produce an original
piece of work according to previously studied rules. Traditional
English rhetoric of the Ciceronian and stylistic pattern is designed
to provide the necessary rules for the latter of these two methods,
whereas formulary rhetoric has the other of these methods in mind,
and aims to provide models for imitation.
There is, of course, an element of formulary rhetoric in each of
the two streams of theory already discussed. Thomas Wilson's Rhet-
orique, as I mentioned earlier, 1 contains model discourses to illustrate
a forensic speech, and the various kinds of eulogies, as well as the
letter of advice and of consolation. Sherry also presented model dis-
courses in company with each edition of his pioneering English ver-
sion of stylistic rhetoric, the first edition containing a theme by
Erasmus on the education of children, and the second, a speech by
Cicero to Caesar. 2 But full-blown illustrations like these are not by
any means the only models to occur in works of the Ciceronian and
the stylistic pattern. In particular, each scheme and trope offered an
opportunity for copious illustration from the Bible and classical lit-
erature, with the result that all treatises on figurative language con-
tain hundreds of model ornaments for imitation.
As an entity by itself rather than as an ingredient of rhetorical
theory, formulary rhetoric began its vernacular development in Eng-
land in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. Its origin would
appear to be in several popular collections of materials drawn from
the ancient classics. One of the earliest of these collections was Nich-
olas UdalPs Flovres for Latine S^ekynge Selected and gathered oute
of Terence, <md the same translated in to Englysshe, published at
London in 1533. UdalPs work not only included Latin passages from
1 See above, pp. 105-107.
2 See above, pp. 125, note 25, 133, note 44.
[ 138 1
MODELS FOR IMITATION
Terence and an English translation of them, but also notes on Ter-
ence's vocabulary and grammar. Richard Taverner's The garden of
wysdom and The secode booke of the Garden of wysedome, which
were separately published at London in 1539, are collections of
witty sayings of ancient Greek and Latin princes, philosophers, and
other renowned personages, and would of course serve admirably as
models for pithy and sententious discourse. 3 The same purpose would
also be served by Taverner's Proverbes or adagies with newe additions
gathered out of the Chiliades of Erasmus, likewise published at Lon-
don in 1539. This work is organized so as to give a Latin proverb, an
English translation of it, and a full explanation of it in English,
these latter two units being translations from Erasmus's Latin. An-
other work of the same general pattern and purpose is the Flores
aliquot sententiarum ex variis collecti scrip toribus, also called The
flowres of sencies gathered out of sundry wryters by Erasmus in
Latine and Englished by Ry chard Taverner, published at London
in 1540.* And of course Nicholas UdalPs translation of Erasmus's
Apophthegmes (London, 1542) should be mentioned not only as a
work drawn from the source that gave Taverner his Garden, but
also as one more indication of the popularity of Erasmus in England
in the fifteen-thirties and forties.
These collections cannot be claimed as true formulary rhetorics.
They are addressed primarily to young students, and are intended
not only to supply ideas and models for school exercises but also to
provide wise saws and ancient instances for developing youthful
character and intellect. They do not aim, however, to present models
to illustrate systematically the various types of discourse, and thus
they can hardly be said to introduce students to all or most of the
situations in which communications pass back and forth in the course
of human living. The true formulary rhetoric differs from these col-
lections in having its selections cover some or most of the occasions
for discourse, and in providing that these selections will teach good
rhetorical form no less than sound concepts.
s Charles Read Baskervill, "Taverner's Garden of Wisdom and the A$o<phthegmata
of Erasmus," Studies In Philology^ xxrx (April 193^)^ 153-1595 has shown that
most of the material in Taverner 5 s Garden^ and about two-thirds of the material in The
second booke of the Garden^ are translated from the A^ofhthegmata of Erasmus. Basker-
vill also clarifies the bibliographical history of these two works.
4 Baskervill, o$. "/., pp. i5i-i5z, indicates that this work was originally published
in 1540, and is a translation by Taverner of a small section of the Q^uscula aliquot of
Erasmus, not of the latter's A<po$hthegmata. I have seen only the 1550 edition in photo-
stat at the Huntington Library.
[ 139 ]
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
The first English work to conform fully to these specifications is
Richard Rainolde's A booke called the Foundation of Rhetorike^
published at London in 1563. This work, as Professor Johnson has
shown in the essay that accompanies his facsimile reprint of Rainolde's
original text, is mainly an English adaptation of Reinhard Lorich's
Latin version of Aphthonius's Progymnasmata? Aphthonius is one
of the three great names in the field of ancient formulary rhetoric,
the others being Theon and Hermogenes. Not much is known of
them, but each is remembered for his collection of model discourses
for use in rhetorical instruction, and each called his collection the
Progymnasmata, that is, Preparatory Exercises. Theon and Her-
mogenes lived in the second century of our era, and Aphthonius in
the late fourth century. 6 Their model discourses are grouped under
such terms as narration^ proof, refutation, and commonplace , and are
obviously meant to constitute preparation for the later study of the
full rhetorical discipline in its theoretical phases.
Rainolde's opening address "To the Reader" lends point to the
Rhetorike in four ways. First of all, it associates the work with the
famous man Aphthonius, who u wrote in Greke of soche declamacions,
to enstructe the studentes thereof, with all facilitie to grounde in
them, a moste plentious and riche vein of eloquence." Secondly, it
states Rainolde's belief in preparatory exercises "No man is able
to inuente a more profitable waie and order, to instructe any one in
the exquisite and absolute perfeccion, of wisedome and eloquence,
then Afhthonius , Quintilianus and Hermo genes." Thirdly, it recalls
that such exercises had helped the great Tully, "whose Eloquence
and vertue all tymes extolled, and the ofspryng of all ages worthilie
aduaunceth." Fourthly, it indicates that Rainolde is writing with an
eye to England's present needs "because as yet the verie grounde
of Rhetorike, is not heretofore intreated of, as concernyng these ex-
ercises, though in fewe yeres past, a learned woorke of Rhetorike is
compiled and made in the Englishe toungue, of one, who floweth in
all excellencie of arte, who in iudgement is profounde, in wisedome
and eloquence moste famous." This last statement, with its hand-
some tribute to the worth of Thomas Wilson's Rhetorique^ gives us
a flash of insight into the movement in Elizabethan England to cre-
5 The Foundation of Rhetorike by Richard Rainolde^ ed. Francis R. Johnson (New
York: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 194.5), pp. xiv-xvii.
8 For sketches of these three rhetoricians, see William Smith, A Dictionary of Greek
and Roman Biography and Mythology^ s.v. Aphthonius of Antioch, Hermogenes 6,
Theon, literary 5.
MODELS FOR IMITATION
ate a vernacular learning, and to adapt ancient rhetorical methods to
England's expanding civilization.
The text of Rainolde's Rhetorike opens with explanatory comment
on man's logical and rhetorical faculties, and on logic and rhetoric
as the sciences designed to instruct and adorn them. As groundwork
for his distinction between these two sciences, Rainolde depends upon
a familiar analogy:
Zeno the Philosopher comparing Rhetorike and Logike^ doeth as-
similate and liken them to the hand of man. Logike is like saith he
to the fiste, for euen as the fiste closeth and shutteth into one, the
iointes and partes of the hande, & with mightie force and strength,
wrappeth and closeth in thynges apprehended: So Logike for the
deepe and profounde knowlege, that is reposed and buried in it, in
soche sort of municion and strength fortified, in few wordes taketh
soche force and might by argumente, that excepte like equalitee in
like art and knowledge doe mate it, in vain the disputacion shalbe,
and the repulse of thaduersarie readie. Rhetorike is like to the hand
set at large, wherein euery part and ioint is manif este, and euery vaine
as braunches of trees sette at scope and libertee. So of like sorte, Rhet-
orike in moste ample and large maner, dilateth and setteth out small
thynges or woordes, in soche sorte, with soche aboundaunce and
plentuousnes, bothe of woordes and wittie inuencion, with soche good-
lie disposicion, in soche a infinite sorte, with soche pleasauntnes of
Oracion, that the moste stonie and hard hartes, can not but bee in-
censed, inflamed, and moued thereto. 7
Rainolde does not attempt to make the verbal power of rhetoric
appear more desirable than the lean wisdom of logic. It is rather the
union of both in some few men that makes for true benefit in the
commonwealth 5 and he enumerates the great orators of Greece and
Rome as examples of this union. Demosthenes in particular com-
mands his attention, and he mentions how Philip of Macedon had
sought to trap Athens into surrendering her orators to him in the
interest of tranquility, and how Demosthenes had defeated Philip's
design by delivering an oration based upon the fable of the shepherds
who surrendered their dogs to the wolves in a pact of peace, and of
the wolves who immediately afterwards devoured the flocks of the
shepherds. This fable recalls several others to Rainolde, some of
which have an English setting. His talk of fables leads him then to
say that orations are made not only upon them, but also upon such
T Fol. ir-iv.
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC! THE THREE PATTERNS
other exercises as the narration, the chria, the sentence, the confuta-
tion, the confirmation, the commonplace, the praising, the disprais-
ing, the comparison, the ethopeia, the description, the thesis, and
the advocacy or the opposing of a law. He adds:
Of euery one of these, a goodlie Oracio maie be made these exercises
are called of the Grekes Progimnasmata^ of the Latines, profitable
introduccions, or fore exercises, to attain greater arte and knowlege
in Rhetorike^ and bicause, for the easie capacitee and facilitee of the
learner, to attain greater knowledge in Rhetorike, thei are right
profitable and necessarie: Therefore I title this booke, to bee the
foundacio of Rhetorike^ the exercises being Progtmnasvnata?
The nineteen compositions which follow this statement are model
speeches upon each of the exercises previously enumerated by Rain-
olde. He gives two speeches to illustrate the fable 5 five to illus-
trate narration 5 and one to illustrate each of the other twelve ex-
ercises. Some of the model speeches run to nine or ten pages;
others, to six or eight; the shortest, to a half-page. Each model is
preceded by comments and suggestions on the composition of that
particular form. Also, most models are divided into clearly marked
sections or parts. For example, the speech to illustrate confutation,
which is on the subject, "It is not like to be true, that is said of the
battaill of Troie," is divided into six parts. The first censures all
poets as liars 3 the second states Homer's theory of the cause of the
Trojan war 5 the third reduces that theory to a matter of doubt; the
fourth, to an incredibility; the fifth, to an impossibility and an unlike-
lihood; and the sixth, to an unseemly and unprofitable notion. 9
Rainolde's Rhetorike appears not to have been published between
the date of its first edition and the date of Professor Johnson's fac-
simile reprint in 1945. There are two reasons for Rainolde's lack of a
public during the crucial early years of that interval of time. First,
the kind of rhetoric that he represented did not have much of a
chance to become popular in the schools of England at the time when
it was first introduced; for Ramism was then about to have its biggest
vogue, and was on the verge of crowding out traditional rhetoric,
which Rainolde accepted as his premise. Secondly, the exercises of
Aphthonius in the Latin version of Reinhard Lorich were often pub-
lished in England after 1572, and that Latin version probably satis-
fied what demand there was for formulary rhetoric on the elementary
8 Fol. 4r-4.v. 9 Foil, xxv r-xxviii v.
MODELS FOR IMITATION
levels of instruction, where Rainolde's English adaptation of Lorich
would probably not have been popular with schoolmasters. 10
The last formulary rhetoric to receive attention before we turn to
Ramus was written by William Fullwood, a member not of the pro-
fession of scholars and teachers, but of the company of merchant
tailors of London. Fullwood has figured before in this history. He
was the W. F. who brought out in 1563 an edition of Ralph Lever's
The Philosopher's Game^ thus incurring the displeasure of that
author, as Lever himself testified later in his Witcraft^ A year be-
fore his edition of The Philosophers Game, Fullwood published at
London The Castel of Memorie, his own translation of the medical
treatise De Memoria by Guglielmo Grataroli, which contains as its
seventh chapter a discussion of the memory system outlined in the
Rhetorica ad Herennium Fullwood's formulary rhetoric, first pub-
lished at London in 1568, is called The E.nimie of Idlenesse^ and is
dedicated "To the right worshipfull the Maister, Wardens, and
Company of the Marchant Tayllors of London. 3 ' 18 It contains a col-
lection of precepts on letter writing, and a collection of sample letters
on all sorts of topics and occasions, the whole being intended, not for
the educated class, but for the ambitious tradesman and merchant.
This intention, indeed, is expressed at one point in FullwoocPs dedi-
catory epistle, which is in verse:
For know you sure, I meane not I the cunning clerks to teach :
But rather to the vnlearned sort a few precepts to preach. 1 *
10 For an account of editions of Lorich in England, see Johnson's reprint of Rainolde,
pp. xiii-xiv. Donald Lemen Clark, "The Rise and Fall of Progymnasmata in Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Century Grammar Schools," Speech Mono graphs y xix (1952), 259-263,
should also be consulted about editions of Lorich in England and Europe.
11 See above, p. 59.
12 Fullwood's Castel of Memorie had a second edition in 1563, and a third in 1573.
A copy of the 1573 edition is in the Huntingdon Library. Its seventh chapter contains
7 leaves (14 pages) and extends from sig. F5V to sig, G4V. Its title reads: "The seuenth
Chapter treateth in fewe wordes of locall or artificiall Memorie." The previous chap-
ters deal with such topics as the location of the memory, what impairs and damages it,
what assists it, what medicines are available for curing or strengthening it, and what
philosophical principles govern it.
13 The title page reads: "The Emmie of Idlenesse: Teaching the maner and stile how
to endite, compose and write all sorts of Epistles and Letters: as well by answer, as
otherwise. Deuided iuto foure Bokes, no lesse plesaunt than profitable. Set forth in
English by William Fulwood Marchant, &c. The Contentes hereof appere in the Table
at the latter ende of the Booke.
An Enimie to Idlenesse,
A frend to Exercise:
By practise of the prudent pen,
Loe here before thine eyes.
Imprinted at London by Henry Bynneman, for Leonard Maylord. Anno 1568."
14 Emmie of Idlenesse (London, 1568), sig. A3V,
TRADITIONAL RHETORIC: THE THREE PATTERNS
Later, in verses purporting to express his book's verdict upon itself,
Fullwood indicates that its true utility will be declared by merchants,
lawyers, and people of all degrees, rich and poor, but chiefly and
above all by lovers.
The first of the four books into which the Enimie of Idlenesse is
divided sets forth certain principles of letter writing, and provides
many examples of those principles. Fullwood offers advice on the ad-
dressing of letters to one's superiors, one's equals, and one's inferiors -,
he divides letters into those "of Doctrine, of Myrth, or of Grauitie." 15
An illustration of the letter of mirth contains a traveler's report that
the Turks delight much in song, and provide themselves with an
ample supply of it by having singers go to cold climates where their
songs are frozen and sent back to be reproduced by being thawed out
at later celebrations. 18 In a curious analogy between letter writing and
logical doctrine, Fullwood indicates that a letter is properly divided
into three parts, the cause, the intent, and the consequence, even as
the logical argument "consisteth of the Maior, the Minor, and Con-
clusion. . ," 17 He thus explains the analogy:
The cause is in place of the Motor, which moueth or constrayneth vs
to write to an other, willing to signifie vnto him our mynde: The in-
tent is in steade of the Minor, whereby we gyue him to vnderstande
what our mynde is by Epistle or letter. The consequent or conclusion
is of it selfe sufficiently knowne. 18
Following this are examples of the way in which these three parts
are revealed in actual letters. Four parts are suggested for letters of
recommendation, and three parts again for "expositiue letters, certify-
ing the vvitnesse or notyce of a thing." 10 Book I closes with the dis-
cussion and illustration of a great many other types of letters, such as
those of congratulation, rejoicing, exhortation, invective, and the like.
Book II is a collection of letters by famous men to each other.
Politian is represented most often, sixteen of his letters being print-
ed 3 but Fullwood also includes letters by various other celebrities,
among them Pico della Mirandola, Ficino, and Pope Innocent VIII.
Book III is also composed entirely of specimen letters, but it con-
tains no historical correspondence, being devoted instead to letters
showing how to reply to a son, a father, a husband, a wife, a brother,
a sister, a daughter, a mother, a social equal, a business associate,
and friend.
15 Ibid., fol. 8r. 16 Ibid., fol. 9 r- 9 v. 17 Ibid., fol. lor.
18 Ibid., fol. lov. l /**., fol. 4 6v.
[ 144 ]
MODELS FOR IMITATION
In Book IV, the emphasis shifts to love letters "as well in Verse
as in Prose." 20 Here lovers request favors of their ladies, and the
ladies make answer. One lover ingeniously presses his suit under the
guise of telling the story of Pygmalion, his letter being headed as
follows:
A secrete Louer writes his will
By story of Pigmalions ill. 21
Following this are other love letters in verse, but this entire book,
despite the obvious appeal of its subject matter, contains only 28
pages, whereas Book III contains 53, Book II, 29, and Book I, 179.
In the three closing decades of the sixteenth century there were
other formulary rhetorics published in English at English presses
for the benefit of secretaries, lawyers, preachers, and private citizens.
These rhetorics, however, belong chronologically to the period that
followed the invasion of Ramistic doctrine into English learning, and
thus I shall not discuss them at this present time. They will receive
brief notice after my next chapter, where the Ramistic invasion is
chronicled.
, fol. 13 iv. 21 /<*., fol. 1 3 9V.
[ 145 ]
CHAPTER 4
The English Ramists
I. Ramus's Reform of Dialectic and Rhetoric
PIERRE DE LA RAMEE, also known as Peter Ramus, was born
in the Catholic faith in the year 1515 at the little village of
Cuth in Vermandois in the north of France j and he died at
Paris on August 26, 1572, as a Protestant victim of what
came to be called the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day. 1 His life
was as stormy as the times in which he lived. At the age of 2 1 , after
a struggle for an education at Paris against the discouragements of
poverty and lack of family assistance, he was awarded his degree of
master of arts as a result of his defense of the bold thesis that all
things affirmed on the authority of Aristotle are overelaborate, con-
trived, artificial. 2 Although this was more of an attack upon works
1 For the best biography of Ramus, see Charles Waddington, Ramus (Pierre de la
Ramee) sa vie, ses ecrits et ses opinions (Paris, 1855). This work grew out of Wad-
dington's earlier Latin biography, De Petri Rami Vita, Scrfytis, Philosofhia (Paris,
1848), published under the name of Waddington-Kastus. For a somewhat shorter
French account, see Charles Desmaze, P. Ramus Professeur au College de France sa vie,
ses ecrits, sa mart 1515-1572 (Paris, 1864). See also the brief life by Gustave Rigollot
in Nowuelle Biogra'phie Generale, s.v. Ramus, Pierre.
The best English life is by Frank Pierrepont Graves, Peter Ramus and the Educational
Reformation of the Sixteenth Century (New York, 191 ) For recent discussions of
Ramus's influence, see Hardin Craig, The Enchanted Glass (New York, 1936), pp. 142-
1595 Crane, Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance, pp. 51, 55-57; Perry Miller, The
New England Mind (New York, 1939), pp. 111-180, 512-330, 493-501; Baldwin,
William S&akspere's Small Latine 6f Lesse Greeke, n, 4-685 Harold 8. Wilson and
Clarence A. Forbes, Gabriel Harvey's "Ciceronianus" University of Nebraska Studies:
Studies in the Humanities No. 4 (Lincoln, 1945) > pp. 1-34, 107-1391 Rosemond Tuve,
Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago, 1947), pp. 33 1-3 53 Sister Miriam
Joseph, S hakes-pear e*s Use of the Arts of Language, pp. 3-401 Donald Lemen Clark,
John Milton at St. Paul's School (New York, 1948), pp. 76-77, 160-161, 179.
For special studies of Ramus, see the following: Leon Howard, " <The Invention' of
Milton*s 'Great Argument 1 : A Study of the Logic of 'God's Ways to Men/ " The Hunt-
ington Library Quarterly^ ix (February 1946), 149-1735 Norman E. Nelson, Peter
Ramus and the Confusion of Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetry, The University of Michigan
Contributions in Modern Philology, No. a (Ann Arbor, 3947), P. A, Duhamel, "The
Logic and Rhetoric of Peter Ramus," Modern Philology^ XLVi (February 1949)9 163-
1715 J. Milton French, "Milton, Ramus, and Edward Phillips," Modern Philology >
XLVir (November 1949)) 82-875 Wilbur S. Howell, "Ramus and English Rhetoric:
1574-1681," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, xxxvn (1951), 299-310; Walter J.
Ong, S.J., "Hobbes and Talon's Ramist Rhetoric in English,'* Transactions of the Cam-
bridge Bibliogra-phical Society, I (1949-1953), 2,60-269.
2 Waddington, Ramus, pp. 28-29. For a good discussion of the proper English trans-
lation of Ramus's thesis, see P. Albert Duhamel, "Milton's Alleged Ramism,"
ucvii (1952), 1036.
RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
professing to be Aristotelian than upon those actually written by
Aristotle, and although it tended to discredit Aristotle's late medieval
disciples more than the master himself, it was nevertheless a radical
doctrine, and it made Ramus seem impudent if not almost sacrile-
gious. The rest of his life was a struggle against the educational pro-
cedures of his time and against the hostility that the unorthodox
always bring upon themselves. He sought reform throughout the
field of the liberal arts, and he laid out a new program for grammar
and rhetoric as well as for logic 5 but his own efforts were mainly
bent upon the reform of the latter subject, and thus his work is per-
haps best understood as a great protest against the scholasticism that
I explained above in Chapter 2. His two earliest writings on logic
were angrily criticized and even suppressed by royal edict, a part of
the verdict against him being that he was to teach philosophy no
more. Somewhat later, the whole of the verdict against him was re-
versed, thanks to his powerful friend, the cardinal of Lorraine, but
this success made him more contentious than ever. Then came his
conversion to Protestantism, his exile from Paris, his return, a second
exile, a second return, and a series of troubles and misadventures that
finally ended when he was killed by the mob as the St. Bartholomew
massacre was in its third day.
As Ramus looked at the scholastic logic, the traditional rhetoric,
and the conventional grammar of his day, he was troubled by what
seemed to him to be redundancy and indecisiveness in the theories of
these basic liberal arts. It seemed to him to be necessary for instruc-
tion in communication that students be trained to discover subject
matter through a study of all the general wisdom behind a given
specific issue or case. But was it strictly required that both logic and
rhetoric offer this training, as they did when each of them sought to
teach the doctrine of invention? Again, it seemed to him necessary
that students be taught the principles of arrangement of subject mat-
ter through some sort of study of the degrees of generality of various
statements and perhaps even through some study of the psychological
habits of people who receive communications. But was it strictly re-
quired that both logic and rhetoric offer this training, as they did
when each made the doctrine of arrangement into a major topic?
And was it strictly required that rhetoric, having contracted to teach
organization of material, should place the theory of the six parts of
an oration under the heading of invention, with the result that the
very crux of the problem of arrangement was disposed of before the
t
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
topic of arrangement came up for discussion? Still again, it seemed
to him to be necessary that students master the schemes and the
tropes, since these departures from everyday speech were needed to
give discourse the persuasive aura of aristocracy in an aristocratic
society. But was it strictly required that the schemes and the tropes
be handled both as a part of grammar and as a part of rhetoric in the
existing curriculum?
Ramus's reform of the liberal arts was in fact a system of direct
answers to these questions. He ordained that logic should offer train-
ing in invention and arrangement, with no help whatever from rhet-
oric. He ordained that the topic of arrangement should take care of
all speculations regarding the method of discourse, with no help
whatever from invention. He ordained that rhetoric should offer
training in style and delivery, and that style should be limited to the
tropes and the schemes, with no help whatever from grammar, which
was to be assigned only subject matter derived from considerations
of etymology and syntax. The subject of memory, which we have
seen to be a recognized part of traditional rhetoric since the youth of
Cicero, was detached by Ramus from rhetoric, and was not made a
special topic elsewhere in his scheme for the liberal arts, except so
far as logic helped memory indirectly by providing the theoretical
basis for strict organization of discourse.
The closest associate of Ramus in his program of reform was Omer
Talon, also known as Audomarus Talaeus, whose special task it was
to write the reformed rhetoric, as Ramus was to write the logic. In
the preface to his first work on rhetoric, the Institutions Oratoriae,
published at Paris in 1544, Talaeus says that Ramus's purpose in
reforming the arts had already been proclaimed by his Dialecticae
Institutiones and his Aristotelicae Animadver stones, his two earliest
works on logic. And Talaeus adds that his own purpose is now pro-
claimed in this present work of his. 3 An even better and more spe-
cific declaration of the way in which Ramus and Talaeus had agreed
to collaborate in revising logic and rhetoric is found in . Talaeus's
preface to his revised and more polished rhetoric, where he speaks
as follows:
Peter Ramus cleaned up the theory of invention, arrangement, and
memory, and returned these subjects to logic, where they properly
3 Petri Rami Professoris Regii, & Audomari Talaei Collectaneae Praefationes^ E$is-
tolae^ Orationes (Marburg 1 , 1599), pp. 14-15. This preface is dated at Paris in the
year 1544.
[ 148 ]
RAMUS's REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
belong. Then, assisted indeed by his lectures and opinions, I recalled
rhetoric to style and delivery (since these are the only parts proper
to it) j and I explained it by genus and species, (which method was
previously allowed to me) , and I illustrated it with examples drawn
both from oratory and poetry. Thus these present precepts are almost
wholly in words drawn from those authors 5 but as this first and rude
outline has unfolded, the precepts have been tested by the judgment
of both of us, and disposed in order, and ornamented and treated
by kind. 4
The notion that dialectic should consist of the procedures of in-
vention and arrangement goes back to Aristotle's To-pics^ as I men-
tioned earlier, and was a recurrent feature of scholastic logic. 5 The
great fifteenth-century advocate of this notion, Rudolph Agricola,
was the one who led Ramus to base his own logic upon it. Agricola
died many years before Ramus was born, but Johannes Sturm, the
disciple of Agricola, lectured at the University of Paris when Ramus
was a student there, and those lectures, as Ramus himself testifies,
excited an incredible fervor for the study of logic, and gave Ramus
his first real awareness of its applications. 6
Ramus's reform of the liberal arts, however, involved more than
Agricola's theory that logic should consist of the topics of invention
and arrangement. After all, Thomas Wilson adhered to Agricola's
bipartite division of logic without feeling it therefore necessary to
exclude invention and arrangement from rhetoric and to limit rhet-
oric only to style and delivery. What Ramus did was to proceed be-
yond Agricola by fortifying himself with three general laws out of
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics^ and these laws explain his- reforms
better than anything else. Incidentally, the nature of these laws as
Aristotle and Vincent of Beauvais conceived of them has already
been indicated in my earlier chapter on scholastic logic. 7 Ramus was
particularly impressed by these laws as the basic criteria for determin-
ing the subject matter and the organization of all science. 8 The im-
portance he attached to them indicates that he was the sort of re-
*<., pp. 15-16. Translation mine. For Ramus's own statement of the way in which
he returned the topic of memory to logic, see P. Ra-mi Sckolarum Dialecticarum^ seu
Anvmadversionum in Organum Aristotelis, libri xx y Recens emendati per Joan Pisca-
torem Arg-entinensem (Frankfort, 1581), p. 593.
5 See above, pp. 15-16.
6 CMectaneae Praefationes, Efistolae, Orationes, p. 67. See also Waddington, Ramus,
pp. 384-385-
7 See above, pp. 41-4.4.
8 For a list of references by Ramus to these laws at various places in his writing's, see
Wilbur S, Howell, Fenelon's Dialogues on Eloquence (Princeton, 1951), p. 8, note 5.
[ 149 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
former who used one part of the old order to revise that order as a
whole, rather than the sort who abandoned the old order and
adopted a new.
Although his laws came ultimately to be known among English
Ramists as the law of truth, of justice, and of wisdom,^ and among
Latin Ramists as lex veritatis, lex justitiae, and lex sapientiae, they
were called "du tout," "par soy," and "vniuersel premierement" by
Ramus himself in the famous first French edition of his Dialectiqve,
after their original Latin forms "de omni," "per se," and "univer-
saliter primum." 9 "Et bref," says Ramus, "toute enonciation mar-
quee de ces trois marques, Du tout, Par soy, Vniuersel -premierement,
est vray principe d'art & science, & premiere cause de sa verite,
comme nous dirons plus amplement au neufiesme des Animaduer-
sions." "And in brief every statement marked by these three marks,
<of all/ c in itself,' 'universal in the first instance,' is a true principle
of art and science, and is the first cause of its truth, as we shall show
more fully in the ninth book of the Animadversions."
One of the most suggestive of the explanations of the meaning
assigned by the Ramists to these laws is found in the French version
of the Dialectiqve published in 1576, four years after Ramus's death.
This version is not to be confused with that just quoted, which
Ramus prepared and published by himself at Paris in 1555 and at
Avignon in 1556 as part of his program to make the learned arts
available in his own native language. 11 The French version published
after his death contains the following explanation of the three laws,
the terminology being more fully developed than that of the ver-
sion of 1555:
Next, an axiom is true or false: true, when it pronounces as the thing
itself isj false, when it pronounces to the contrary. The true axiom is
necessary or contingent: necessary, wfren it is always true and cannot
possibly be false. And this axiom is named and marked by Aristotle
in the first book of his Demonstration [that is, the Posterior Ana-
lytics], the mark being "of all" 5 the impossible, on the contrary, can
never be true. Axioms of the arts ought to be affirmed and true gen-
9 Dialectiqve de Pierre de la Ramee (Paris: Andre Wechel, 1555), pp. 84-85. For
these terms in Latin, see P. Rami Regn Professorts Dialecticae Libri Duo (Lvtetiae:
Apud Andream Wechelum, 1574)* PP- 5*-53-
10 Dialectiqve (1555), pp. 84-85. Translation mine here and below,
11 For a warning- against the confusing of the translation of 1576 with the earlier
translation, see Waddington-Kastus, De Pttri Rami Vita, Scrfytif, Philosophic p. 177.
See also Waddington, Ramus^ pp. 451-452.
[ 150 l
RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
erally and necessarily in this fashion, but beyond this they ought also
to be homogeneous and reciprocal. A homogeneous axiom is one in
which the parts are essential among themselves $ as the form is essen-
tial to that which is formed j and as the subject is essential to its
proper adjunct, and as the proper adjunct is essential to its subject in
itself, and not through any other cause; and as the genus has its spe-
cies to which it is essential. And this axiom is marked and termed "in
itself." A reciprocal axiom is when the predicate is affirmed and true
of its subject, not only "of all," and not only "in itself," but also
reciprocally: as Grammar is the art of speaking well; Rhetoric y the art
of communicating well; Dialectic, the art of disputing well; Arith-
metic, the art of computing well; Geometry, the art of measuring
well; also, man is a reasonable creature; grammar is composed, of two
farts, etymology and syntax; number is even or odd; the wolf is born
to howL And this axiom is called "universal in the first instance." 12
The first of these axioms, the lex veritatis, permitted Ramus to
sift out of the liberal arts any propositions that were true only at
times. Such propositions were in the field of opinion rather than of
science, and while they have to be reckoned with in our daily lives,
where contingent truths, probabilities, and uncertainties surround us,
they cannot claim to be demonstrable, and thus they cannot achieve
the validity of necessary truth. Ramus wanted the learned arts to con-
sist of universal and necessary affirmations of affirmations in which
the predicate was true of every case of the subject. For example, in
the proposition that dialectic is the art of disputing well, every case
of disputing according to artistic principle is a case of dialectic, and
thus, according to him, the proposition is truly general, truly neces-
sary, and to that extent is a candidate for admission into the dia-
lectical science.
The second of these axioms, the lex justitiae, permitted Ramus to
sift out of one liberal art any propositions that belonged to another.
Suppose, for example, that you examined traditional grammar and
traditional rhetoric, and found in the first the statement that schemes
were grammatical and rhetorical, whereas in the second you found
the statement that grammatical schemes were orthographical or syn-
tactical, while rhetorical schemes were of words, of sentences^ and of
amplification. Here would be a case where the same statements ap-
peared in about the same form in two different arts, and the subject
12 La Dialectiqve de M. Pierre de La Ramee Professevr d-u Roy, comprise en deux
liures selon la derniere edition (Paris: Guillaume Auuray, 1576), foil. 38v-4^r. Trans-
lation mine here and below.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
matter o the two arts seemed intermingled and confused. The law
of justice, invoked at this point, required a decision to be made as to
which of the two arts properly possessed the topic of schemes and
tropes, and what was therefore left to the art which lost the decision.
Rarnus decided that schemes and tropes belonged to communicat-
ing well, rather than to speaking well, and that grammar was left
with absolute dominion over etymology and syntax as the two ^essen-
tial properties of the art of serving oneself by means of articulate
speech. The same fundamental decisions had to be made in relation
to the ultimate ownership of statements having to do with invention
and disposition. These statements were claimed by traditional rhet-
oric and scholastic logic, as we have seen; but Ramus, accepting
Agricola (and Aristotle's Topics) as authority for the claim of logic
to these procedures, decided that rhetoric had proper subject matter
when it was left with style and delivery.
The third of these axioms, the lex sapientiae, permitted Ramus to
clarify the organization of the subject matter of the liberal arts. In
its original meaning, this law meant that the predicate of a scientific
proposition must represent the nearest rather than the more remote
class of things to which the subject could belong. Thus if we say that
grammar is an art, our statement is scientific, since it places our sub-
ject in its proximate rather than its remote class. But if we say that
grammar is a form, our statement places our subject in a class too
remote from its scientific character, and thus the statement, although
true, is not admissible into the grammatical science. Now Ramus
saw the possibility of extending this law so that, instead of using it
to place a given subject into its nearest class, we would use it to de-
termine whether a given proposition belonged in the class of most-
general statements, or in the class of merely general statements, or
in the class of concrete statements. And he also saw the possibility of
proceeding to present a science in accordance with this classifying of
propositions, the most general statements being placed first, the less
general ones next, and the least general ones last. Thus the lex sapi-
entiae appears to be the logical basis of Ramus's famous definition
of method:
Method is arrangement, by which among many things the first in
respect to conspicuousness is put in the first place, the second in the
second, the third in the third, and so on. This term refers to every
discipline and every dispute. Yet it commonly is taken in the sense of
a direction sign and of a shortening of the highway. And by this
OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
metaphor it was practised in school by the Greeks and the Latins, who,
speaking also of rhetoric, called method arrangement, from the term
for its genus. And under this term there is no doctrine, whether of
proposition, or of syllogism, that is taught in rhetoric, except only so
far as rhetoric makes mention of method. 13
The best short statement of Ramus's theory of logic, and thus of
his major contribution to learning, is found in the French version of
the Dialectiqve as published in 1555, although the Latin analogue of
that work, the Dialecticae Libri D-uo^ first published one year later,
is also a good summary of his logical teachings. Waddington calls
the latter treatise Ramus's final word on logic, whereas he calls the
former the first and most important philosophical work in French
up to Descartes's Discours de la Methode^ This verdict would have
pleased Ramus in a very special way. For in the last preface which
he wrote for his Dialecticae Libri Duo, he mentions Archimedes as
having wished that his discourse on the sphere and cylinder might
be engraved on his tomb 3 "and as for me," adds Ramus, "if you
wish to inform yourself about my vigils and my studies, I shall want
the column of my sepulchre to be taken up with the establishing of
the art of logic or dialectic." 15 To Ramus, logic was the center of the
program of liberal studies, and the chief instrument of man in the
quest for salvation. In fact, the strength of Ramus's passion for this
subject can be inferred from his own statement that God is the only
perfect logician, that man surpasses the beasts by virtue of his ca-
pacity to reason syllogistically, and that one man surpasses another
only so far as his address to the problem of method is superior. 18
The Dialectiqve of 1555 is inscribed to Cardinal Charles of Lor-
raine, whom Ramus designates on the title page and in the dedicatory
epistle as his Maecenas. The epistle thanks the cardinal for his pro-
tection of Ramus against the Aristotelians who sought to suppress
his teachings, and offers the present book as a return for that favor.
Dialectic, observes Ramus, deserves the great attention it has re-
ceived from philosophers 5 "for if the special arts have been reduced
to rule by the great labor of many men, grammar and rhetoric for
speaking well and for ornamenting speech, arithmetic and geometry
for computing and measuring well, what quantity of vigils and what
13 Dialectiyoe (*555)> P- i*9-
**Ramu$^ pp. 9, 106.
15 Dialecticae Libri Duo (Lvtetiae, 1574), p. a. La Dialectiqve de M. Pierre de La
Ramee (Paris, 1576), sig-. Air. Translation mine.
16 Dialecti^e (1555), pp. 118-119, iS5~ I 3^, 139-
[ 153 1
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
great number of men worked together to fashion dialectic, the gen-
eral art of inventing and judging all things?"" The epistle proceeds
to give a brief history of speculations upon dialectic or logic, Aris-
totle being credited with one hundred and thirty books on the sub-
ject, of which thirty-five deal with the true dialectic inasmuch as they
speak of arguments and of the disposition and judgment of argu-
ments. 18 The last great name in this brief history is Galen, after
whom, says Ramus, the true love of wisdom ceased, and the servile
love of Aristotle began. As for himself, Ramus believes it his mission
to cull from the works of the past, and particularly from the dia-
lectical works of Aristotle, such precepts and rules as are^strictly ger-
mane to dialectic, and then to arrange them in the^ fashion required
by his own regulations for method. Upon this mission, he says, I
have spent almost twenty years, and not merely the nine which
Horace had recommended as the proper interval between composi-
tion and publication.
Book I of the Dialectiqve opens with the definition that dialectic
is the art of disputing well, and that logic is to be used in the same
sense. Its rules are derived from the workings of the human reason.
Man ought to study dialectic in order to dispute well, "because it
proclaims to us the truth of all argument and as a"consequence the
falsehood, whether the truth be necessary, as in science, or, as in
opinion, contingent, that is to say, capable both of being and not
being*" 19 Ramus observes later:
But because of these two species, Aristotle wished to make two logics,
one for science, and the other for opinion 5 in which (saving the honor
of so great a master) he has very greatly erred. For although articles
of knowledge are on the one hand necessary and scientific, and on the
other contingent and matters of opinion, so it is nevertheless that as
sight is common in viewing all colors, whether permanent or change-
able, so the art of knowing, that is to say, dialectic or logic, is one and
the same doctrine in respect to perceiving all things, as will be seen
17 Ibid*) fol, 2V. This preface is also printed in Waddin#ton, Ramus, pp. 401-4.07.
18 By thirty-five books of Aristotle on "la vraye dialectique," Ramus means, as he
himself indicates, not thirty-five separate works* but some nine works divided into thirty-
five main sections. Thus he counts the six separate titles in the Organon as containing-
seventeen main sections or books j he counts the Metaphysics as containing- fourteen main
sections or books; and he counts the Rhetoric as containing 1 four sections or books, three
of which he would reckon as belonging 1 to the work now accepted as Aristotle's, and
the other, as belonging- to De Rketorica a Alexan&rumy now usually regarded as the
work of someone else.
18 Diahctiqve (1555), p. 2.
[ 154 ]
RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
by its very parts, and as the Aristotelian Animadversions explain more
fully. 20
Thus does Ramus indicate his belief in one system of logic for
both science and opinion, and in one theory of invention and arrange-
ment for both logician and rhetorician, whereas the scholastics, fol-
lowing Aristotle and Cicero, preferred two systems of logic, one for
science and the other for opinion, and two systems of invention and
disposition, one in the field of scientific and the other in the field of
popular discourse. Nowhere is the issue between scholastic and Ram-
ist indicated more sharply than it is in the words just quoted. No-
where is the essential point in Ramus's reform of scholastic logic and
traditional rhetoric stated more firmly than it is right here.
Ramus's next main point is that dialectic has two parts, invention
and judgment or arrangement. These are not severely insulated
from each other, he goes on, but rather are involved in each other,
the first being devoted to the separate parts of reasoning, and the
other, to the arranging of those parts into discourse. The separate
parts of reasoning offer a problem in terminology, and Ramus pro-
ceeds carefully to review the various terms for those parts in tradi-
tional Aristotelian logic. One traditional term, he says, is categoremj
another is category j still another is topics, that is, places and notes.
The doctrine of topics or places or localities, he goes on, indicates that
the parts of reasoning dwell in seats or habitats. But these parts
should more properly be called principles, elements, terms, means,
reasons, proofs, or arguments. These two last terms seem to Ramus
to be the most appropriate for his purposes. "We shall use the terms
of reasoning, that is, proof and argument, as being the most widely
received and the most customary in this art." 21
The basic distinction in Ramus's treatment of invention is that
between artistic and non-artistic arguments a distinction which he
expressly credits to Aristotle's Rhetoric^ and which has been dis-
cussed earlier in these pages. 22 Having established argument as the
term for the thing produced by invention, Ramus proceeds to define
the two great types of argument thus:
Argument then is artistic or non-artistic, as Aristotle partitions it in the
second of the Rhetoric: artistic, which creates belief by itself and by
its nature, is divided into the primary and the derivative primary.
20 Ibid*, pp. 3-4. See above, p. 16. 21 Dialectiqve y p. 5.
22 Ibid.) p. 5. See above> pp. 68-69.
[ 155 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Non-artistic argument is that which by itself and through _ its own
force does not create belief, as for example the five types which Aris-
totle describes in the first of his Rhetoric, laws, witnesses, contracts,
tortures, oaths. Thus it is always that these arguments are inter-
changeably called authorities and witnesses. 23
To artistic arguments, Ramus devotes fifty-five pages, and to the
non-artistic, five. Since one of the great differences between the an-
cient and the modern theory of proof is that the ancients stressed the
discovery of artistic proofs, and correspondingly neglected the non-
artistic, whereas the moderns have done almost exactly the reverse,
it can be seen that on this point Ramus is hardly a modern in his
emphasis.
Artistic arguments, as distributed between the category of primary
and the category of derivative primary, involve nine basic terms ^ The
six of these which are primary comprise causes, effects, subjects,
adjuncts, opposites, and comparatives j the three which are derivative
comprise reasoning from name, reasoning from division, and reason-
ing by definition. Since the class of non-artistic arguments is com-
posed, not of generals, but of particulars, it can be argued that Ramus
intended it as a class to rank with the nine basic terms just enumerated
to form a theory of invention of ten topics. In other words, it can be
argued that he wanted to preserve ten basic entities out of respect
for Aristotle's ten categories and thus give his reformed logic a tra-
ditional flavor. By splitting some of these ten topics into subdivisions
(for example, by speaking of cause as the final, the formal, the effi-
cient, and the material), he succeeded in preserving other traditional
terms while effecting a neat reorganization of the accepted subject
matter.
The ten basic entities in Ramus's theory of logical invention are
in reality the ten basic relations between predicate and subject in the
logical proposition, or the ten basic relations among the objects of
knowledge in the human environment. 24 This means in a way that if
you set yourself to making truthful declarations about an object,
those declarations will inevitably concern the object's causes, or its
effects, or its subjects, or its adjuncts, or its opposites, or its ana-
logues, or its name, or its divisions, or its definition, or its witnesses.
Thus a discourse on man might be made up of declarations on man as
23 Dialectiqve^ pp. 5-6, 61. For Aristotle's discussion of this distinction, and of the
five types of non-artistic arguments, see Rhetoric^ 1.2,15.
24 Dialectiqve, pp. 71-72.
[ 156 ]
RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
the product of causes, man as the producer of effects, man as the sub-
ject of many circumstances, man as the circumstance of certain sub-
jects (the earth, for example) ; of declarations on things opposite to
man, and things analogous to man ; and of declarations about words
that signify man, about wholes that include him, or parts that make
him up, or definitions that exactly characterize him, or witnesses who
testify to something he has or does not have. 25 When Thomas Wil-
son, Ramus's contemporary, wanted to show how the topics of logic
worked, he indicated that some nineteen different basic topics were
to be applied to a given concept, and he listed those topics as a mis-
cellany not only of some of the predicaments and all of the pre-
dicables, but also of additions created by splitting certain other old
terms asunder. 26 It was the indeterminate number of these topics in
the scholastic theory that Ramus objected to, as he also objected to
the fact that the scholastics mentioned the predicaments and pre-
dicables under invention as well as under arrangement, as if redun-
dancy could not or should not be avoided. He wanted to make logic
rigidly scientific by reducing the theory of logical invention to its
universal kinds, not to a mixture of universals and particulars j and by
treating these kinds in one of the two divisions of logic, not in both.
As he brings his account of invention to a close, he observes:
Consequently, then, although man may be ignorant of all things, this
is not in any sense to declare that he should not seek or that he cannot
invent, in view of the fact that he has naturally in himself the power
to understand all things; and when he shall have before his eyes the
art of invention by its universal kinds, as a sort of mirror reflecting
for him the universal images and the generals of all things, it will be
much easier for him by means of these images to recognize each single
species, and therefore to invent that which he is seeking 5 but it is
necessary by very many examples, by great practice, by long use, to
burnish and polish this mirror before it can shine and render up these
images. 27
John Seton, Thomas Wilson, and Ralph Lever treated arrange-
ment or judgment by making it the first rather than the second grand
division of logic, as if the problem of arranging thought were of
primary importance in the theory of learned discourse. 28 Ramus re-
25 In his "Peroration de Lr' Invention," Dialectiqve, pp. 65-70, Ramus sketches a dis-
course upon man derived from the basic terms of his theory of topics.
28 See above, pp. 15-28. 2T Dialectiqve, p. 69.
28 See above, pp. 16, 51, 60.
[ 157 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
verses this emphasis, although little significance should be attached
to his decision- What is really significant is that his treatment of Ar-
rangement does not include any mention of the categories or predica-
ments, any mention of the predicables, but is devoted instead to three
other aspects of scholastic logic, expounded in the ascending order of
complexity. After defining judgment as "the second part of logic,
which shows the ways and means of judging well by means of certain
rules of arrangement," and after indicating Aristotle's Prior Ana-
lytics and Posterior Analytics as the great source of these rules,
Ramus adds, "The arrangement of logic has three species, the propo-
sition, the syllogism, method." 29 This sentence gives an exhaustive
inventory of his second book, and that second book is the most influ-
ential of all his contributions to logic.
The proposition, or in Ramus's French the "Enonciation," "is
arrangement by means of which something is stated of something
else." 30 This is the simplest unit of arrangement, the most elementary
way of ordering what has been invented $ and its parts are the subject
(or antecedent) and the predicate (or consequent). It is at this point,
by the way, that Ramus designates his theory of invention as a theory
o the generic relations between antecedent and consequent, those
relations being that of cause to effect, of effect to cause, of subject to
adjunct, of adjunct to subject, and so on. But Ramus's main interest
now is to show what the proposition is as a unit of discourse. Thus he
discusses the simple proposition (which consists of one subject and
one predicate) and the compound proposition, where the predicate is
composite, or relative, or conditional, or disjunctive. The distinguish-
ing feature of this part of his work is that, in concluding his analysis
of the proposition, he mentions the three laws by which one can
judge whether or not a given proposition is scientific. Since these
three laws have already been explained as Vincent of Beauvais and
Ramus conceived of them, 81 I shall say nothing further about them
here, except to suggest that they stand in the structure of Ramistic
logic as the five predicables stood in scholasticism. That is, a state-
ment became properly scientific in the eyes of scholastic logic when
it could be classed as having a predicate of genus, of species, of dif-
ference, of property, or of accident. 82 In the eyes of Ramus, who
ignored the five predicables as a topic in logic, a statement became
29 Dialectiqvey p. 71. so Ibid., p. 71.
31 See above, pp. 41-4.40 *49~i53- 32 See above, pp. 17-18.
[ 158 ]
RAMTJS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
properly scientific only when it satisfied simultaneously each one of
the three laws.
"Syllogism," says Ramus in beginning his discussion of the second
aspect of judgment, "is arrangement by means of which a question
under examination is ordered along with the proof and brought to a
necessary conclusion." 33 Ramus^ attendant discussion is conventional.
He speaks of the three parts of the syllogism, the three figures of
the simple syllogism, with their various moods 5 the composite syllo-
gisms, conditional and disjunctive. He does not bother to speak of
induction as a possible alternative to the syllogism $ and thus he de-
parts from scholastic logic, which usually recognized induction as a
species of argument. 3 * If his procedure in this respect seems far from
progressive, it should be remembered, not only that the time was
not yet ripe for sciences based upon experiment, observation, and the
minute description of particulars, but also that a logic of induction in
advance of that time would have had no influence. Moreover,
Ramus's conception of science was that it began, not with the par-
ticulars that might one day yield universals, but with the universals
that could be tested by his three laws. For such a science, the syllo-
gism was the master instrument, while the judgment of particulars
was a preliminary matter. Thus he says in his concluding remarks
on the syllogistic judgment:
When the judgment of the major premise and of the minor premise
will then be well guaranteed, and the syllogistic collocation of these
elements well set out, the question under examination will also be
well judged to be true or false; for at the second judgment the first
is presupposed, and from the first is borrowed that double light to
clarify the conclusion. And in brief the art of the syllogism does not
inform us of any other thing than that of resolving a stated question
by the manifest truth of two well-arranged parts. 35
Ramus later allows the process of induction, which arrives at a
preliminary judgment by a survey of particulars, to be a common
possession among all forms of life, whereas the syllogism is the prop-
erty only of the highest form of life and the expression only of the
highest intelligence. He phrases this thought in the following words:
Finally let us remember that the syllogism is a law of reason, truer
and more just than all the laws which Lycurgus and Solon once
33 Dialectiqve, p, 87. 34 See above, pp. 22-23, 54> 6-
pp. 1 1 3-1 14..
[ 159 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
fashioned, through which the judgment of the doubtful proposition
is established by a necessary and immutable verdict I say, a law of
reason, proper to man, not being in any sense shared with the other
animals, as the preliminary judgment can be in some sense shared, but
solely in things pertaining to sense and belonging to the body and
the physical life. 3 *
Then he goes on to say that lower forms of life like spiders and ants,
despite their sensory adjustment to their environment, can conceive
of nothing by using a middle term, and can draw no conclusion by
properly comparing and disposing such a term in the figure of a syl-
logism. Certainly, he adds, " certainly this part in man is the image
of some sort of divinity." 87
The final section of Ramus's Dialectiqve is given over to the dis-
cussion of method, his definition of which has already been quoted
as an application of the lex sapientiae. What Ramus has to say on
method is the most important part of his contribution to the theory
of communication, and it exercised such influence that a century-long
debate on that subject ensued, one masterpiece of which was Des-
cartes's Discours de la Methode. The enthusiasm of Ramus's disciples
and the malice of his opponents conspired, however, to distort this
aspect of his own teaching, and to narrow his recommendations to the
one that struck everybody as most unusual. Thus it is necessary to
approach these recommendations through his own words rather than
through the words of his later critics and admirers.
"Method," says Ramus, "is natural or prudential." 38 This view
of method as twofold follows upon his definition of method as that
in which ideas in any learned treatise or dispute are to be arranged
in the order of their conspicuousness, the most conspicuous things
being given first place, and less conspicuous things being given sub-
ordinate places. While both the natural and the prudential methods,
as explained by Ramus, fall under his definition, and are governed
by it, the natural method attempts to arrange ideas according to their
degree of conspicuousness in an absolute sense, whereas the pru-
dential method attempts to arrange them according to their degree
of conspicuousness in the consciousness of the inexpert listener or
reader.
The natural method, or as Ramus later implies, the method of
arranging a scientific discourse, proceeds upon the assumption that
some statements are naturally more evident or more conspicuous
**Ibid., p. 1 1 8. * 7 Ibid., p. 119. **lbid. y p. 120.
[ 160 ]
RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
than others, as for example, a statement of the cause of a thing is
more evident than a statement of its effect, or a general and uni-
versal is more evident than a particular or singular. 39 However true
it is, argues Ramus, that any authentic discipline must consist of gen-
eral and universal rules, those rules nevertheless possess different
degrees of generality, and to the extent that they are more general,
they should outrank the less general in the order of presentation.
Thus propositions of utmost generality will be placed first; proposi-
tions of lesser generality will be placed next 5 subalterns will be
placed next 5 "and finally the examples, which are most particular,
will be placed last." 40 After tracing the origins of this method to the
works of Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Ramus observes:
And in a word this artistic method to me appears as a sort of long
chain of gold, such as Homer imagined, in which the links are these
degrees thus depending one from another, and all joined so justly
together, that nothing could be removed from it, without breaking
the order and continuity of the whole. 41
Although Ramus's own Dialectiqve exemplifies the natural method
as well as any work could, he is not content to rest the case there.
Instead, in his discussion of this phase of method, he fabricates an
illustration to show what it means, and the illustration is valuable
as a precise description of the procedures he himself followed in re~
forming the liberal arts. His illustration consists in asking us to as-
sume that all the definitions, divisions, and rules of grammar have
been discovered and tested 5 and that each one is then inscribed upon
its own paper and is mixed with the others in a jug, like tickets in a
lottery. Now, Ramus demands, what part of logic will be able to
teach one to arrange these papers in their rightful order as I draw
them forth? Not the first part, surely, for here is a case where all
materials have already been found, and where no need exists for the
use of the places of invention. Not the doctrine of proposition or of
syllogism, for here is a case where all the materials have been stated
in proper form and tested by the first and by the second operation
of judgment. No, of all the parts of logic, only method can help in
this case. Accordingly, the logician, by invoking the natural method,
will draw the papers from the jug, and when he comes upon the
paper saying, "Grammar is the doctrine of speaking well,'' he will
39 Ibid., pp. 120, 128. See below, pp. 164, 168-169.
40 Dialectiqve^ pp. 120-121,
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
recognize this as the most general statement he can possibly en-
counter about grammar, and he will put this paper first. When later
he comes upon another paper saying, "The parts of grammar are
two, etymology and syntax," he will recognize it as the next most
general statement he can possibly encounter, and he will rank it
second. He will rank third the statement that defines etymology. He
will then rank under etymology all statements belonging to it, keep-
ing the proper order from general to particular. Then he will repeat
the same operation for the second part of grammar, putting first the
definition of syntax, then less general statements about k, and finally
the examples. Between each topic in the entire treatise, as at last
assembled, he will then insert transitional elements to indicate what
the preceding topic has been, and what the following will be.^For,"
says Ramus, "by means of these notes of transition the spirit is re-
freshed and stimulated." 42
Ramus's habit of dividing a subject into two main parts, as illus-
trated by this discourse on grammar, and by his treatment of logic
and rhetoric, led to the assumption that for him the natural method
is essentially the method of dichotomies of proceeding always to
separate a logical class into two subclasses opposed to each other by
contradiction, and to separate the subclasses and the sub-subclasses
in the same way, until the entire structure of any science resembled
a severely geometrical pattern of bifurcations. Actually, however,
the natural method as used by Ramus himself is better defined as the
concept of arranging ideas in the descending order of generality than
as the concept of dividing invariably by twos. Not only does Ramus's
own definition of the natural method stress the former concept,
without reference to the latter j but his procedure tends also in the
same direction. For example, although he divides logic into inven-
tion and arrangement, and invention into artistic and non-artistic
proofs, he proceeds to discuss the latter under five headings, not two ;
and of course his treatment of arrangement falls, not into two parts,
but three. Again, he divides artistic proofs into primary and deriva-
tive primary, but he proceeds to discuss the former class under six
headings, and the latter, under three. Even his original distribution
of logic into invention and arrangement is not based upon the assump-
tion that the principle of contradiction is involved, for he expressly
notes the presence of invention in an act of arrangement, and the
p. 126.
RAMUS's REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
presence of arrangement in an act o invention/ 3 His followers
tended to construe the natural method and the law of justice to mean
the severest kind of dichotomizing, as if any given idea had only two
members, one completely insulated from the other. But it is worth
noticing that Ramus himself did not take the habit of dichotomies as
seriously as that.
Nor did he limit the use of the natural method to learned writing
or to the kind of discourse in which the expert talks to the expert. He
expressly says that it is used also in poetry and oratory, and his dis-
cussion of this point is worth quoting as an indication of the relation
of logic and criticism in Ramistic philosophy:
Now this method is not solely applicable to the material of the arts
and doctrines, but to all things which we intend to teach easily and
clearly. And consequently it is common to orators, poets, and all
writers. The orators in their introductions and narrations, their proofs
and perorations, like to follow this order, and they call it then the
order of art and of nature. And sometimes they practice it most assid-
uously, as Cicero did in the accusation, first stating, then distributing.
[This reference to Cicero's speech against Verres, 11.1.12.34, is
then explained by Ramus as an example of the natural method.]
Thus do the poets, if sometimes they treat matter of learning and
doctrine. As Virgil in the Georgics first divides his matter into four
parts, as I have said. And in the first book he treats the things com-
mon to all parts, as astrology and meteorology j and the threshing
of the wheat and its husbandry, which was the first part proper. He
writes in the second book of trees in general and then of vines in par-
ticular. In the third book he writes of cows, horses, sheep, goats, dogs.
And in the fourth, of bees. 44
As a result of Ramus's belief in the applicability of the natural
method to all types of discourse, popular as well as learned, it came
to be assumed in the course of time that his theory of communication
advocated nothing except the natural method. But this is hardly the
case. He devotes eight pages of the Dialectiqve to the prudential
method, which he defines as that "in which things are given prece-
dence, not altogether and absolutely in terms of their being the most
conspicuous, but in terms of their being still the most convenient for
him whom we must instruct, and of their being most amenable for
inducing and leading him whither we purpose." 45 He adds:
43 Ibid.y pp. 4-5. See also above, p. 155.
pp. 123-1*5. 4S Ibici^ p. 128.
[ 163 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
It is termed prudential disposition by the orators, because it lies
largely in man's prudence rather than in art and m the precepts of
doctrine, very much as if the natural method were arrangement for
science, and the prudential method were arrangement for opinion. 4 *
In his discussion of the prudential method, Ramus indicates that
it is taught and practiced by philosophers, poets, and orators. Aris-
totle, he says, had implied it in his references to the procedures^ of
hidden and deceitful insinuation, where the speaker or writer begins
in the middle, without declaring what he intends to do, or what the
parts of his subject are, as when he indulges in analogy or parable.
As for the use of this method by philosophers, Ramus mentions
Plato as the supreme example. Poets, who propose to teach the
people, have to accept their auditors as a beast of many heads, says
Ramus, and thus have to begin their stories in the middle, and ex-
plain later how things got to be as they are. The wisdom of this
method, Ramus goes on, has particularly appealed to orators in their
attempts to gain initial attention of their hearers. He then sums up
this phase of his discussion:
And in brief all the tropes and figures of style, all the graces of action,
which make up the whole of rhetoric, true and distinct from logic,
serve no other purpose than to lead this vexatious and mulish auditor,
who is postulated to us by this [i.e., the prudential] methodj and
have been studied on no other account than that of the failings and
perversities of this very one, as Aristotle truly teaches in the third of
the Rhetoric*" 1
These words, written as the Dialectiqve is close to its final page,
may be taken as Ramus's best statement of the reasons behind the
rhetorician's special interest in the prudential method. The trouble-
some and stubborn auditor, who is present in body but not in mind
as the orator speaks, will not follow ideas arranged exclusively in a
descending order of generality, and thus will not be captivated by
the natural method, as would the scientist and philosopher. What
the popular audience needs is the casualness and variety of the pru-
dential method, the flattery of the tropes and figures, the graces of
delivery. One might wonder at this point why Ramus, believing
these things, would not allow rhetoric to have something to say of
4:6 Ibid., p. 128. I have corrected the misprint in the last clause, which reads: "comme
si la methode de nature estoit iugement de science, la methode de science [that is, de pru-
dence] estoit iugement d'opinion."
p. 134-
[ 164 ]
RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
arrangement as well as of style and delivery why he would not
concede rhetoric three parts or possibly even four, instead of two, on
the assumption that invention, like arrangement, style, and delivery,
is one process in scientific discourse and quite another in discourse
addressed to the people. Had he gone that far, he would have been
closer to the Aristotelian and Ciceronian opinion than he turned out
to be. In fact, his real break with Aristotle and Cicero was in ordain-
ing that rhetoric must cease to speculate upon invention and arrange-
ment as well as style and delivery, as if the two former processes had
little relevance except in scientific discourse. To Aristotle and Cicero,
dialectic was the theory of learned communication, rhetoric of popu-
lar communication, and thus both arts needed the two former proc-
esses, while rhetoric needed the two latter in particular. To Ramus,
dialectic was the theory of subject matter and form in communica-
tion, rhetoric the theory of stylistic and oral presentation. By his
standards, invention and arrangement were the true property of
logic, and must be treated only in logic, even if arrangement had to
have two aspects, one for the learned auditor and the other for the
people. By his standards, style and delivery were the true property
of rhetoric, and must therefore be treated only in rhetoric, even if the
popular audience which demanded them had to have also a special
theory of method that rhetoric was not allowed to mention.
The dictate that style and delivery are the whole of rhetoric was
given concrete formulation by Ramus's good friend and colleague
Audomarus Talaeus, as mentioned before. 48 Talaeus is said to have
been born around 1510 in Vermandois, the region of Ramus's birth
five years later 5 and he died at Paris in 1562, ten years before the
massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day. 49 There seems to be no evidence
that Talaeus shared Ramus's views towards ecclesiastical reform, but
the whole body of his work is witness that in the field of educational
reform he and Ramus were the closest and most friendly of collab-
orators. His Institutiones Oratoriae^ published at Paris in 1544, is
declared in its preface to do for the field of rhetoric what Ramus's
Dtalecticae Institutiones of the preceding year had done for the field
of logic. An even fuller explanation of the nature of his collaboration
with Ramus has already been quoted above, 60 and that explanation
accompanied his Rhetorica, which had reached its fifth edition by
48 See above, pp. 148-149.
49 See Biographic Universally s.v. Talon, Omer; also N cuvette Biografhie Generate*
s.v. Talon, Omer.
60 pp. 148-149.
[ 165 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
1552, and which was intended to reduce Ramistic rhetoric to its
briefest Latin expression, as Ramistic logic was reduced to its briefest
Latin expression by Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo of 1556.
A very good indication of Talaeus's adherence to the reforms of
Ramus is found in a now-forgotten work, La Rhetoriqve Francoise^
published at Paris in 1555. This work is a French translation of Ta-
laeus?s Rhetoric^ done in the very year of Ramus's own French
translation of his Dialecticae Libri Duo, and plainly intended to rep-
resent Ramistic rhetoric in vernacular learning, as the Dialectiqve
represents Ramistic logic. The translator of Talaeus's Rhetorica into
French was Antoine Foclin, who also called himself Foquelin or
Fouquelin. Like Ramus and Talaeus, Foclin was a native of Ver-
mandois. His edition of the satires of Persius, published at Paris iji
1555? ' 1S dedicated to Ramus, under whom he had studied for the
preceding nine years. 31 Thus he had ties of discipleship and place to
bind him to Ramism and to dispose him to forward Ramus's reforms
according to his own special talents.
La Rhetoriqve Francoise d y Antoine Foclin de Chauny en Ver-
mandois is dedicated to Mary Queen of Scots, then twelve years of
age and the darling of the French court, wherein she was being edu-
cated as the future bride of the dauphin and the future queen of
France. 52 Foclin's dedicatory letter runs to six pages. It is full of
enthusiasm for his generation's crusade to translate all the liberal
arts into French and thus to save youth from having to master alien
languages as a first step in education. It is also full of compliments
for the young Scottish queen who would one day have the oppor-
tunity not only to assist native French writers to work in their own
tongue, but also to support all learning and science. One passage indi-
cates the nature of the education the young queen is receiving at the
French court. Foclin mentions that Mary had recently pronounced
a Latin oration in the presence of the king and queen and most of the
princesses and nobles of the royal circle, and had then translated it
into French. The oration had defended the unorthodox thesis, re-
marks Foclin, that it was becoming to women to know letters and
the liberal arts; and it aroused admiration on all sides, and would
51 See BiografAie Vnifoerselle^ s/v. Foquelin, Antoine.
52 The title page of Foclin's work reads : "La Rhetoriqve Francoise d j Antoine Foclin
de Chauny en Vermandois, A Tresillvstre Princesse Madame Marie Royne d'Ecosse. A
Paris, De Pimprimerie d' Andre Wechel. 1555- Avec Privilege."
The Huntington Library holds this work in microfilm, and upon that copy my present
discussion is based, all translations from it being mine.
[ 166 ]
RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
have served him in the present work on rhetoric as a storehouse o
examples of all the tropes and figures, had the French translation
fallen sooner into his hands. Incidentally, the education of the young
queen, as seen in this passage, is more conventional than that which
Foclin is aiming for in his effort to make the learning of Latin un-
necessary. In still another passage, Foclin apologizes to the queen
because the French tongue is still too young and too poor to have a
vocabulary of its own for the terms of the liberal arts, and must
therefore borrow from the Greek or Latin, not only a basic term like
rhetoric, but also the terms for all the tropes and figures.
So far as Ramism is concerned, the most important part of Foc-
lin's dedicatory letter is that in which he identifies his work as a trans-
lation of the Latin rhetoric of Talaeus, and credits Talaeus with
authorizing and even assisting in that translation. With reference to
the enterprise of rendering the learned arts into French, Foclin says:
In order to advance and patronize which in my own way, I have trans-
lated the precepts of rhetoric, as faithfully assembled from the books
of the ancient Greek and Latin rhetoricians and arranged in unique
order of disposition by Omer Talon, a man no less excellent in this art
than perfect in all other disciplines. With the authorization and ad-
vice of whom, I have adapted the precepts of this art to our tongue,
omitting at all times that to which her natural usage seemed repug-
nant j adding also that which she has of the proper and particular in
herself, beyond Greek and Latin 5 and setting forth each precept by
examples and evidences from the most approved authors of our lan-
guage which, I saw, had been done most methodically and ingen-
iously by that same author in Latin. In which (Madame) all that I
can claim as mine (if I can claim anything mine in a work assembled
by the labors of so many good men), all that, say I, which I can claim
as mine, you have been the first to whom I have esteemed that it must
needs be avowed and dedicated. 53
Immediately after the dedicatory letter, which is dated at Paris,
May 12, 1555, the text of Foclin's French version of Talaeus begins.
It runs to 139 numbered pages, whereas Ramus's French Dialectigve
of that same year had run to 140 pages. 54 Such parallelism as this,
by the way, is not hostile to the spirit of Ramism, which gave equal
emphasis to the two arts, and made the arrangement of one cor-
63 La Rhetoriqve Francoise, sig. A;jr-A3v.
54 Foclin's Rhetoriqve appears to contain 138 pages, but actually it contains one page
more than that, because of the mistake of having two pages numbered 112.
[ 167 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
respond almost mathematically to that o the other. But in one sense
the mathematical proportions of Ramus's Dialectiqve and of Foclin's
Rhetoriqve do not coincide. The former allocates seventy pages to
invention and seventy to arrangement, thus maintaining an absolute
equality of emphasis between the two parts of logic. The latter allo-
cates one hundred and thirteen pages to style and only twenty-six to
delivery, as if the second part of rhetoric, however important it is in
practice, did not have the theoretical interest that the first part has.
The opening words of Foclin's Rhetoriqve are a perfect illustra-
tion of the natural method described by Ramus. Says Foclin:
Definition of rhetoric.
Rhetoric is an art of speaking well and elegantly.
The parts of rhetoric.
Rhetoric has two parts, style and delivery.
Style and its species.
Style is not anything but the ornamenting and the enriching of speech
and discourse; the which has two species, the one being called trope,
the other, figure.
Trope.
Trope is a style by means of which the proper and natural meaning of
the word is changed to another, as is indicated by the word trope,
which in French means interchange.
The species of trope.
There are four sorts of trope: metonymy, irony, metaphor, and synec-
doche. 55
Having descended through these progressively less general state-
ments to a cluster of four basic terms, as Ramus commanded, Foclin
proceeds to discuss each term in the order of his enumeration. This
part of his discussion turns out also to have a Ramistic bearing. One
of the dictates of Ramus's natural method was that causes should be
placed before effects. 56 Ramus himself observed this dictate by ar-
ranging his discussion of the first part of logic so that the topic o
cause not only preceded the topic of effect but also came first among
the ten basic topics of logical invention. Foclin's arrangement of
tropes follows this very pattern, cause being first, effect second, sub-
ject third, adjunct fourth, and so on down Ramus*s basic list. Thus
metonymy, the first trope in Foclin's cluster, has four distinct kinds.
pp, i -a. S6 See above, p. 161.
[ 168 ]
RAMUS'S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
The first kind consists in stating a cause as a means of implying an
effect. The second kind consists in stating an effect in order to imply
a cause. The third kind consists in stating a subject in order to imply
an accident or adjunct. The fourth kind consists in stating an accident
in order to imply a subject. Irony, the second trope in Foclin's list,
is defined as implying a contrary by its contrary, and this reminds us
that Ramus's fifth concept in invention is that of opposites. Foclin's
third trope, metaphor, is defined as implying a like by a like again
a reminder that Ramus's sixth concept is that of comparatives or
similitudes. Synecdoche, the fourth trope in Foclin's cluster, is de-
fined as implying the whole by naming the member, or as implying
the genus by naming the species, or as doing the reverse of either of
these two operations. Here again it is easy to see that Foclin has
Ramus's eighth and ninth topic of invention in mind, that of divi-
sion, which concerns wholes and parts, and that of definition, which
concerns genus and species.
Foclin devotes thirty-four pages to these four tropes, managing
under metaphor to discuss catachresis, allegory, enigma, and hyper-
bole. Much of his space is given over to illustrations of these stylistic
devices from the works of French authors of the time. Thus he
quotes from Tahureau, Baif, and Clement Marot, the latter being
cited from his translation of Virgil's first Eclogue. But his chief illus-
trations are drawn from Ronsard, Joachim du Bellay, and Jacques
Amyot. In 1547 Amyot had published a French translation of the
A ethic-pica of Heliodorus under the title, L'Histoire aethio-pique de
Heliodorus y contenant dix livres-, and it was this Greek romance
from the early centuries of the Christian era which provided Foclin
with almost as many illustrations as did Ronsard and Bellay, al-
though in his dedicatory letter he expresses the belief that there is
much of the contrived and the artificial about the tropes and figures
of Heliodorus, whereas those in the Scottish queen's French version
of her own Latin oration are by contrast true and natural. 57
Figure, the second part of style in Ramistic rhetoric, is given sev-
enty-nine pages of analysis and illustration by Foclin. His definition
and division of this topic make no reference to grammatical figures,
as did the older stylistic rhetoricians:
Figure is then a species of style, by means of which the language is
changed from the simple and popular manner of speaking. For just
eT La Rhetorigve Francoise y sig. A^r.
[ 169 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
as in reference to words, some are literal, and others metaphorical, so
in reference to language and manner of speaking, one kind is simple
and popular, the other, figured that it to say, a little changed from
the popular and customary manner of speaking, as happens primarily
when we wish to plan and discourse upon anything. Not that the vul-
gar do not sometimes use these ornaments of rhetoric, but that these
lights do not shine as often in the language and speech of the un-
learned.
Division of figure.
There are two sorts of figure: the one is in the word, the other in the
sentence. 58
Under these two headings, Foclin arranges his entire discussion of
the uncustomary forms of speech. His analysis of figures of the word
involves the topic of number, which leads him to speak of the meas-
ure and quantity of syllables in French poetry, and of resonance and
rhythm in poetry and prose. Figures of the sentence involve such
devices as prosopopoeia, apostrophe, and exclamation, each .device be-
ing illustrated from the authors already named. Like a good Ramist,
Foclin remembers that transitional elements in literary structure
refresh and stimulate the spirit, 59 and thus he concludes his discus-
sion of style with a model transition:
The precepts of style, the first part of rhetoric, have been set forth in
the tropes and figures. Let us go on to delivery, the second part of
the doctrine and art proposed.
Delivery, as Foclin defines it from Talaeus's Latin, becomes the
external manifestation of style, the projection of style to the hearer.
His text reads at this point:
Delivery.
Delivery is a part of rhetoric which teaches how to express convenient-
ly and how to put forth the style and the speech as conceived in the
mind. So that it differs from style in nothing except that in the latter
one thinks and conceives of what figure and elegant manner of speak-
ing one will use, whereas in the former one takes pains that the utter-
ance may be such as the conception and the thought of the mind
have bera*
Parts of delivery.
Delivery has two parts, the voice, which is called the pronouncing, and
the gesture, which is called the action. Of which parts, the first relates
pp. 34-35- &9 See above, p.
* La Rhetorique Fr^ncoise^ p. nz> i,e 113.
[ 170 ]
RAMUS 7 S REFORM OF DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC
to the hearing, the second to the sight. For by these two senses, all
knowledge comes into the mind. 61
Foclin recommends that correct speech be learned in infancy and
childhood as a part of grammar, but that rhetoric, as a later study,
will show what voice and inflection should be used in all sentences,
figures, and moods of speaking. He observes:
For each thing that is said has some proper sound, some sound differ-
ent from other things, and the voice sounds like the string of a lute,
according as it has been touched as by the movement of things which
must need be pronounced. 62
Having made these general observations, Foclin quotes a long
passage from L'Histoire aethiopique, and intersperses directions as
to its pronunciation. After other quotations to the same effect, he
turns to gesture, which he discusses in relation to the head, the face,
the arms, and the hands. He mentions that gesture has great efficacy
as a language that can be understood where spoken words are unin-
telligible. He recalls that Demosthenes strengthened his own deliv-
ery by diligent practice, even speaking against the roar of the sea to
develop his voice. And, like most writers on this aspect of rhetoric,
he cannot refrain from retelling the familiar story of how Demos-
thenes, when asked what he deemed the first requisite of eloquence,
replied, "Delivery," only to repeat that same answer when he was
then asked what was the second and what the third requisite. 68
Thus did Foclin's Rhetoriqve Francoise bring into native French
speech the Latin rhetoric of Talaeus in the very year of the first
French version of Ramus's Dialectiqve. It would be idle to pretend
that Foclin's translation is absolutely faithful to Talaeus's original,
especially as Foclin himself acknowledges omissions, additions, and
changes. 64 It would also be idle to pretend that Talaeus's Rhetorica
was absolutely faithful to itself from one of its many versions to an-
other in and out of France during the last half of the sixteenth cen-
tury. Still again, it would be idle to pretend that Ramus's own Dia-
lecttq've corresponds exactly to its later Latin and French versions,
before and. after Ramus's death. The truth is, Ramism as a system
of logic and rhetoric in Latin, French, and English, is not a single
pp. 112-113,1.6., 113-114. 62 Ibid., p. 114, i.e., 115.
p. i37i i-- 13*.
64 See above, p. 167. For a discussion of differences between Foclin's translation and
Talaeus's original, see Walter J. Ong, S.J., "Fouquelin's French Rhetoric and the
Ramist Vernacular Tradition," Studies in Philology^ Li (1954), 127-142.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
unvarying doctrine but a pattern of uniformities as to general frame-
work and a pattern of variations as to many of its details. Perhaps
the best statement of the pattern of uniformities in Ramism is to be
found by the comparative study of Ramus's Dialectiqve of 1555 and
Foclin's Rhetoriqve Francoise of the same year. At any rate these are
authentic versions done by Ramus himself and by his leading collab-
orators for their own nation at the same moment of time and in the
same stage of the development of their doctrine as a whole. With
these versions in mind, we are now prepared to see what happened
when Ramism crossed the English Channel and invaded the domain
o John Seton, Richard Sherry, Thomas Wilson, and Ralph Lever.
II. Ramus's Dialectic in England
ON April 4, 1550, Roger Ascham, public orator of the University of
Cambridge, wrote a letter to his friend Johannes Sturm, master of
the grammar school at Strasbourg. The letter was in Latin, as be-
fitted correspondence of that era between learned men of different
countries of the European community. One notable thing about that
particular letter is that it contains an enthusiastic account of the lit-
erary accomplishments of a young lady named Elizabeth, whom
Ascham had been tutoring for the preceding two years, and who was
one day to be the most famous queen in English history. "The
praise which Aristotle gives," remarks Ascham to Sturm, "wholly
centres in her beauty, stature, prudence, and industry." He adds:
"She has just passed her sixteenth birthday, and shows such dignity
and gentleness as are wonderful at her age and rank." 1 Her conver-
sational ability in French, Italian, English, Latin, and Greek, her
delight and skill in music, her restrained elegance of dress, and her
gift for perceiving what makes literary style good or bad, are all
described in glowing phrases by Ascham.
Another notable thing about that letter is that it refers to Joachim
Perion, a learned French Benedictine, and to one Cephas Chlono-
nius. What Ascham says of the former indicates his awareness that
Perion has recently been translating Aristotle into Latin and recently
speaking in defensd of Aristotle and Cicero, while industriously col-
lecting meanwhile a vast number of theological topics for use in con-
troversy. Perion's defense of Aristotle and Cicero, by the way, had
been directed against Peter Ramus, and had been published at Paris
in the form of three orations, two of which bear the date of 1543,
and the third, 1547. Ascham does not designate these particular pub-
lications nor does his letter anywhere refer to Ramus by name. But
the Cephas Chlononius whom he mentions in his reference to Perion,
and whom he allusively describes as an overbold critic of the leading
philosopher of Greece and the leading teacher of Rome, is unques-
tionably to be identified as Ramus* 2
Ascham's veiled censure of Ramus in this letter of 1550 has been
tentatively established as the earliest reference by an Englishman
1 These quotations are from the translation of part of this letter in The Whole Works
of Roger Ascham^ ed. John Allen Giles (London, 1864-65), vol. I, pt. I, pp. Ixii-lxiv.
For the complete Latin text of the letter, see the same place, pp. 181-193.
2 See M. Gugg-enheim, "Beitrage zur Biographic des Petrus Ramus, n Zeitschrift fur
Philoso$h%e und Philosophische Kritik> cxxi (1903), 141-142, where there is a con-
vincing- demonstration that Cephas Chlononius means Ramus in Ascham's letter.
[ 173 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
to Ramus's philosophy. 3 Another very early reference, much more
detailed, much more sympathetic, and not at all difficult to identify,
is also the work of Ascham, and can be found in the letter which he
wrote to Sturm on January 29, 1552, from Halle, when he was in
the midst of a period of travel on the continent. 4 On this occasion,
Ascham asks with some urgency that Sturm write him at once on a
piece of news he has just heard. Some English friends of mine, says
Ascham, inform me that Peter Ramus has written something critical
against you and me as a result of your publication at Strasbourg of
our correspondence. 5 You know what I think of Ramus from my
previous letters to you, Ascham goes on; how much I approve of the
spirit of his teaching, and of his general plan, which I take to be that
of tearing to pieces some inept and insipid Aristotelians rather than
that of refuting Aristotle himself. Unless you have forgotten my
words or have torn up my letter, he continues, you will remember
how much I prefer Ramus to Perion, the Cicero nianisms of whom I
laughed at with Martin Bucer, as Philipp Melanchthon and I have
laughed at his inept planning and bad arranging. Ramus appears to
me, he says in an illuminating passage, to feel rightly concerning the
doctrine of Christ, and to conceal his true opinions as the times may
dictate, showing his zeal meanwhile by writing against those whom
he perceives as deliberate adversaries of the true religion. And this
judgment of mine concerning Ramus, he adds, has been confirmed by
our Jerome Wolf, who has been in Paris and afterwards in Augsburg.
Ascham turns next to a more detailed exposition of his view of
Ramism. I hope, he writes, that my former letters, and this present
one, contain nothing in the way of license of expression - y and yet my
praise of the talent and the teaching of Ramus has been expressed
both openly and silently, and my approval of his general position
has been set forth in the following words:
The excellent doctrine of Aristotle seems too devoid of adornment,
too obscure, for delight in reading it to be able to arouse the zeal of
the many, or for the usefulness of it to be able to compensate for the
labors Involved, because almost everywhere it is taught without the
accurate use of examples.
8 OB this point see Wilson and Forbes, Gabriel Harvty*s "Ciceronianus? p, 19.
* For the complete Latin text of this letter, see Giles, Works of Ascham, vol. r, pt. ll>
Pp. 318-32* 3 for a translation of two brief excerpts, see vol. I, pt. r, pp. Ixxvi-Ixxvii.
5 The referent as to Rogeri Aschami et Joannis Sturmii Epistolae Duae de Habilitate
Anglican* (Argentorat! : RidxeKus exeudebat, 1551). There is a copy of this work in the
Blbliotheque Nationale.
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
This declaration, by the way, is the copy of a sentence which Ascham
had already used in his letter to Sturm of April 4, 1 550, in connection
with his reference to Cephas Chlononius. 6 The fact that it is linked
to Chlononius in the earlier letter, and to Ramus in the present one,
permits us to be sure that Chlononius and Ramus are one and the
same. Moreover, it permits us to see that Ascham and Ramus are
together in insisting upon example or practice as the final confirma-
tion of theory. Lest we miss his dedication to this tenet of Ramism,
Ascham not only underlines now what he had said earlier, but he
adds that he himself had always required theory to be accompanied
by practice, lest studies appear uselessly involved in obscurity or
rashly guided into error*
At this point in the letter of 1552, Ascham feels justified in re-
asserting his friendly disposition towards Ramus and in mentioning
his regret at the latter's recent attack upon the Sturm-Ascham cor-
respondence. I suspect, says Ascham, that certain Englishmen from
Cambridge, who disagree somewhat with us in religion, have turned
Ramus against us out of religious hostility, although they themselves
have left England and now live in Paris for religious reasons.
Ascham goes on to remark that Ramus's intelligence is shown no-
where to better advantage than in his having selected as his adver-
saries the three greatest of men, Aristotle, Cicero, and Sturm. As for
his present attack upon me, says Ascham, "I am not astonished nor
greatly distressed, if I displease Ramus, whom the Aristotles, the
Ciceros, and the Sturms are not able to please." 7 Then he makes a
remark which is not only calculated to drive a wedge between Sturm
and Ramus, but also is destined to be the earliest reaction by an
Englishman to Ramus's reform of dialectic and rhetoric. Says he
to Sturm:
Ramus, I believe, will press you and rush at you with the greater
violence, since he knows that you refer invention in the first instance
to the art of speaking, whereas he removes it from his own course in
rhetoric 5 and since he also knows that delivery, which these very
Ramists make much of, is rightly regarded by you, by Aristotle, and
by the learned generally, as belonging more in the realm of practice
than of theory.
e This declaration and my subsequent quotations from the letter o 155 a are in my
translation. For the two versions of the declaration as given by Ascham, see Giles,
Works of Ascham) vol. i, pt. I, p. i85, and vol. i> pt. II, p. 319.
7 Giles, vol. I, pt. II, p. 320.
[ 175 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
He now asks Sturm to assess the attack that Ramus has made upon
their letters, and to refute it at some apt place in his next work, un-
less silence seems the better course. Apparently Ascham thinks him-
self unworthy of the task of defending his famous friend Sturm
against an opponent as notable as Ramus j at any rate, he expresses
his willingness to hide behind Sturm's shield, since, as he says, I
myself have never written anything in the spirit of publicly refut-
ing Ramus.
There is much else in this particular letter, but nothing that adds
substantially to Ascham's opinion of Ramus. The letter is proof that
Ascham wanted in 1552 to explain his earlier ambiguous estimate of
Cephas Chlononius, and to make it very clear that he approved much
more highly of Chlononius or Ramus than he ever had of Joachim
Perion. The letter is also proof that Ascham had heard but the
vaguest rumors about Ramus's attack upon the Sturm-Ascham cor-
respondence "some friends of mine write me from England"
(these are his exact words), "that Peter Ramus has written I know
not what against my letters and yours, published by you at Stras-
bourg." 8 Perhaps Ascham's English friends were only passing on to
him the merest recent gossip. At any rate, the work in which Ramus
attacks these letters has thus far remained unidentified beyond
Ascham's excited little reference, 9
As for the subsequent disposition of the two men towards each
other, there is proof that it was friendly in the letter which Ramus
wrote to Ascham from Paris on February 25, 1564, when Ascham
was serving as Queen Elizabeth's secretary. 10 From what that letter
says, it appears that one day, in the palace of the French king, Ramus
chanced to meet a certain English nobleman, who thereupon gave
him greetings in the name of Ascham. Ramus asked at once to know
who was so interested in him in England that he would thus send
a sign of his friendship across the sea to Paris. The nobleman replied
with an account of Ascham's virtues and learning, and Ramus was
so impressed that he began to consider ways of returning the compli-
ment implied in Ascham's message of greeting. Now ? Ramus goes
on, a way has presented itself a young man named Matthew
8 Ibid.} p. 318.
* See Charles Schmidt, La Vie et les Travaux de Jean Sturm (Strasbourg 1 , 1855), p*
191, Among biographers of Ramus, the belief has persisted that Sturm and Ascham on
their side were not unfriendly to Ramismj see Waddington ? Ramus, pp. 393, 3965 and
Graves, Peter Hamus? pp. 93, 212, 214.
10 For the text of this letter, see Giles* II, 96-97.
[ 176 ]
RAMUS 3 S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
Scyne, of the staff of the English ambassador at Paris, Thomas
Smith, is returning to England and has consented to bear my greet-
ings to you. He has also consented, adds Ramus, to ask you about a
certain book of Archimedes, Trepl *LoroprpG)V) which I have heard
to be in the possession of a learned physician of your court. 11 If that
physician could supply me with a copy, Ramus continues, I would
be glad to supply him in turn with a certain rarer thing of Pappus
and Apollonius and Serenus in that same field. Ramus concludes with
the promise that if the mathematical studies to which he is now giv-
ing himself are benefited by the manuscript in question, he will feel
himself perfected by the great fruit of Ascham's mind.
Despite these blandishments, or perhaps because of their faintly
patronizing air, Ascham had not become a convert to Ramism at the
time of his death in 1568. In his famous Scholemaster^ first pub-
lished in 1570, he takes the side of Aristotle in logic and Cicero in
rhetoric against anyone who criticizes them, and he specifically men-
tions Ramus and Talaeus as their critics, although Quintilian is
singled out as the chief culprit in that vein. Says Ascham:
Quintilian also preferred! translation before all other exercises: yet
having a lust to dissent from Tullie (as he doth in very many places,
if a man read his Rhetoricke over advisedlie, and that rather of an
envious minde, than of any just cause) doth greatlie commend Para-
<phrasis, crossing spitefullie Tullies judgement in refusing the same:
and so do Ramus and Talaeus even at this day in France to. 12
Such singularity in dissenting from the best men's judgment,
Ascham goes on, is not popular with discreet and wise learning. He
adds:
For he, that can neither like Aristotle in Logicke and Philosophic,
nor Tullie in Rhetoricke and Eloquence, will from these steppes like-
lie enough presume by like pride to mount hier, to the misliking of
greater matters: that is either in Religion, to have a dissentious head,
or in the common wealth, to have a factious hart. 13
11 Ramus is apparently asking here for a copy of Heron's Mensurae, the^ final section
the Mensurae does not appear. Possibly Ramus wants to satisfy himself about this item
by looking at other manuscripts, particularly that belonging to the English physician.
For a discussion of these two Paris manuscripts of Archimedes, see The Works of Archi-
medes> ed, T. L. Heath (Cambridge, 189?), pp. xxiv-xxv.
12 Roger Ascham, The ScholemasUr^ ed. John E. B. Mayor (London, 1863), p. 101.
pp. IOI-I02.
[ 177 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
At this point Ascham recalls the case of a Cambridge student who
had begun by dissenting from Aristotle and had ended by adopting
the Arian heresy. Then comes Ascham' s parting shot at Ramus:
But to leave these hye pointes of divinitie, surelie, in this quiet and
harmeles controversie, for the liking or misliking of Pawphrasis for
a yong scholer, even as far as TulUe goeth beyond QuintiUan y Ramus
and Talaeus in perfite Eloquence, even so moch by myne opinion cum
they behinde Tultie for trew judgement in teaching the same, 1 *
In 1569, the year before these words were first published, a Cam-
bridge student named Gabriel Harvey chanced to buy a copy of
Ramus's Ciceronianus. That copy, now in Worcester College Library
at Oxford, contains a note by Harvey himself which says: "I redd
ouer this Ciceronianus twise in twoo dayes, being then Sophister in
Christes College." 15 By the year 1573, having meanwhile become
master of arts at Cambridge, Harvey was appointed Greek reader in
Pembroke Hall, and soon was referring publicly to Ramus as "not
indeed that branch, but, if I may so speak, a most flourishing tree,
not merely of both the grammars, but of every last one of the arts." 16
This mention of Ramus as a branch is, by the way, Harvey's little
pun, since "ramus" is the common Latin term for the branch of a
treej and the witticism calls to mind Thomas Drant's similar word-
play in his verse preface to Carter's edition of Seton's Dialectica in
I572. 17 But Harvey's completely serious recognition of Ramus as an
authority on the liberal arts, and his earlier undergraduate absorp-
tion in Ramus^s Ciceronianus^ are indications that Ascham and his
generation were beginning in the first years of the fifteen-seventies
to lose the struggle to keep Aristotle and Cicero supreme in logic
and rhetoric.
Indeed, so far as instruction in rhetoric at Ascham's own Cam-
bridge is concerned, the supremacy of Cicero was challenged as early
as April 23, 1574. That was the date when Harvey was appointed
praelector in rhetoric at his alma mater and began the preparation
of the lectures which, as delivered in the spring of 1575 and 1576,
and as published in 1577, are the first heavy commitment by an Eng-
p, i ox.
18 See Wilson and Forbes* Gabriel Harvey* $ "Cictrenutmis" p. iS.
** /Krf., p. zo. Harrey*s words as quoted by Wilson and Forbes are: "Ramus, non ille
quidem Ramtis, sed axbor, vt ita dicam, cunctarum Artium, non mo do vtriusque Gram-
maticae, fWentissima," Translation mine.
XT See above, pp. 55-56* and aote 76,
I 178 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
lishman to the rhetorical thinking of Ramus and Talaeus. 18 Those
lectures will be discussed later when I speak of Ramistic rhetoric in
England.
As for Ramistic logic, it was established as a part of English learn-
ing before the date of Harvey's lectures. Its earliest expounder at
Cambridge was Laurence Chaderton (or Chatterton), older than
Harvey by several years, but like him a member of Christ's College.
Chaderton was fellow of Christ's between 1568 and 1577, and thus
was in a position to influence Harvey at the very time when the
latter became enamored of Ramus's Ciceronianus. During Chader-
ton's period of service as fellow of Christ's, he held the office of
reader in logic in the public schools of the university, and, "lecturing
on the Ars logica of Peter Ramus, roused a great interest in that
study," as his biographer puts it. 19 But Chaderton's lectures were
never published. The earliest published advocacy of Ramistic logic
in England was not from a Cambridge man, but from a Scot named
Roland Macllmaine of the University of St. Andrews.
Macllmaine's life seems to have escaped the prying eyes of biog-
raphers. So far as I know, only three main facts can confidently be
asserted of him. The first is that he took his master's degree from
St. Mary's College of the University of St. Andrews in 1570, after
having enrolled in that college in 1565 and graduated as bachelor of
arts on March 7, I569. 20 The second is that he published at London
in 1574 the earliest Latin text of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo to
be printed on English soil, the publisher being Thomas Vautrollier,
who was given a patent on June 19 of that year to bring out Mac-
llmaine's edition for a ten-year period, 21 Thirdly, Macllmaine pub-
18 The best authorities for the dates of these lectures are Wilson and Forbes, Gabriel
Harvey's "Ciceronianus," pp. 5-10.
19 E. S. Shuckburgh, Laurence Chaderton, D. D. {First Master of Emmanuel) Trans-
lated from a Latin Memoir of Dr. Dillingfiam (Cambridge, 1884), p. 5. Harvey him-
self has been called "the earliest English advocate of Ramus" by Harold S. Wilson,
"Gabriel Harvey's Orations on Rhetoric*" English Literary History, xn (September
194.5), i So. But it seems more accurate to think of him only as the first English Ramist
in rhetoric. Chaderton was probably earlier than Harvey in advocating- Ramus publicly,
and Macllmaine certainly was.
20 See James Maitland Anderson, Early Records of the University of St. Andrews
(Edinburgh, 1926), pp. 164., 165, 273.
21 See Arber, Transcript of the Registers, n, 746, 886.
The title page of this edition reads: "P. Rami Regli Professoris Dialecticae Libri Dvo.
Exemplis omnium artium & scientiarum illustrati, no solum Diuinis, sed etiam mystisis,
Mathematicis, Phisicis, Medicis, luridicis, Poeticis & Oratoriis. Per Rolandum Makil-
menaeum Scotum. Londini, Excudebat Thomas Vautrollerius. 1574- Cum Priuilegio
Regiae Maiestatis." A second edition of this work came from the same press in 1576.
Waddington, Ramus, p. 454, lists two later editions at Frankfurt, one in 1579 and the
other in 1580.
[ 179 1
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
lished in 1574 at the same press the earliest English translation of
Ramus's chief work, calling it The Logike of the moste Excellent
Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, Newly translated, and m dmers
-places corrected, ajter the mynde of the Author
Macllmaine's translation, which I should like now to consider in
some detail, is introduced by an epistle to the reader, wherein he
comments with obvious enthusiasm upon several aspects of Ramus's
reform of logic. If the translation is to be regarded as the first Eng-
lish exposition of Ramistic logic in words derived from Ramus^the
introduction becomes not only the first parallel effort in an English-
man's own words, but also the official opening salvo in the battle to
convert Englishmen to that logic and to Ramism as a whole. ^
Macllmaine begins his campaign of exposition and persuasion by
stressing the classical origins of Ramistic logic. He says that this
logic comes from Aristotle's Organon, Physics, and Metaphysics, as
well as from Cicero's rhetorical works and from Quintilian's Insti-
tutio Oratoria* What Ramus had done, Macllmaine implies, was to
take these basic writings and distill from them their fundamental
logical precepts. Here are Macllmaine's own words about the sources
of Ramus's work:
As fore the matter whiche it containethe, thou shalt vnderstand that
there is nothing appartayning to dialectike eyther in Aristptles xvij-
booke of logike, iii his eight bookes of Phisike, or in his xiiij. bookes
of Philosophic, in Cicero his bookes of Oratorie, or in Quintilian (in
the which there is almost nothing that dothe not eyther appartayne to
the inuention of arguments a [sic] disposition of the same), but thou
shalt fynde it shortlie and after a perfecte methode in this booke
declared. 23
By way of elaboration, he remarks that no argument in practical
life can be found which is not classifiable either under Ramus's nine
types of artistic argument or under his tenth type, the non-artistic
argument. He emphasizes next that there exists "no sort of disposi-
tion whiche dothe not appartayne eyther to the iudgement of the
proposition, sylogisme or methode." In these two statements he indi-
cates his belief in Ramus's ten topics of invention as an exhaustive
22 The rest of the title page reads: "Per M. Roll. Makylmenaeum Scotum, rogatu
viri honestissimi, M. Aegidij Hamlini. Imprinted at London by Thomas Vautroullier
dwelling in the Blaekefrieres, Anno. M. P. LXXIIIT. Cvm Privilegio." A second edi-
tion of this work was produced at the same press in 1581. My references are to the first
edition.
[ 180 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
account of the problem of analysis in learned or popular composition,
and his belief that the problem of synthesis consists only in framing
ideas into the three structural units, that is, into propositions, syllo-
gisms, and treatises.
The next large point of emphasis in Macllmaine's advocacy of
Ramism is that the character of Ramistic logic or of any discipline
built upon it is determined by the famous three laws. If you marvel,
he says, that my short volume contains everything I have indicated,
the best explanation is that "in this booke there is thre documents or
rules kept, whiche in deede ought to be obserued in all artes and
sciences." These three documents are then explained each in turn.
The law of justice, which ordinarily is ranked second by the Ra-
mists, is given the primary place in Macllmaine's discussion, possibly
because it would seem to Englishmen to have produced the most
spectacular of the results which Ramus had achieved. Macllmaine
explains it thus:
The first is, that in setting forthe of an arte we gather only togeather
that which dothe appartayne to the Arte whiche we intreate of, leauing
to all other Artes that which is proper to them, this rule (which maye
be called the rule of Justice) thou shalt see here well obserued. 24
In my book, adds Macllmaine, are all the things which pertain to
logic, and not one of the things which pertain to grammar, rhetoric,
physics, or any other discipline. Many years ago, he continues, a
shoemaker criticized the clothing that Apelles had drawn on a figure
in one of his pictures 5 and Apelles replied that the shoemaker should
keep to his own art and criticize only the figure's shoes. Thus did
Apelles teach the law of justice. Any writer on any art breaks this
law when he digresses from his purpose. Concluding this part of his
explanation of Ramism, Macllmaine observes:
Is he not worthie to be mocked of all men, that purposethe to wryte
of Grammer, and in euery other chapiter mynglethe somthing of
Logicke, and some thing of Rethoricke: and contrarie when he pur-
posethe to write of Logicke dothe speake of Grammer and of Reth-
oricke? 25
The law of truth, as another great principle in the Ramistic criti-
cism of knowledge, is given its first English formulation in the fol-
lowing words of Macllmaine:
24 P. s. 25 P , 9 .
[ 181 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
The seconde document (which diligently is obserued in this booke) is
that all the rides and preceptes of thine arte be of necessitie tru, whiche
Aristotle requirethe in the seconde booke of his Analitikes and in
diuerse chapiters in his former booke. 28
Like RamuSj Macllmaine is interested in applications. Thus he
cautions that writers or teachers violate this second law whenever
their precepts are mingled with anything false, ambiguous, or un-
certain "as if in theaching me my logicke, which consistethe in rules
to inuente argumentes, and to dispone and iudge the same, thou
shouldest begyn to tell me some trickes of poysonable sophistrie." 27
And he adds, with special reference to the world of use, that the law
of truth should be planted in all hearts, particularly in the hearts of
ministers.
As for the law of wisdom, Macllmaine formulates it to apply in the
first instance to the problem of organizing discourse. Thus he says:
The third documente which thou shalt note herein obserued, is, that
thou intreate of thy rules which be generall generallye, and those
whiche be speciall speciallie, and at one tyme, without any vaine repe-
titions, which dothe nothing but fyll vp the paper. For it is not
sufficient that thou kepe the rule of veritie and iustice, without thou
obserue also this documente of wisedome, to dispute of euery thing
according to his nature. 28
Observing that one plays the sophist's part if he treats general
matters particularly, or particular matters generally, and that one
falls thereby into tautologies and redundancies, which of all things
are most hostile to the arts and sciences, Macllmaine proceeds to
illustrate what the violation of this third law means to him. If I ask
what logic is, he declares, and you reply that it teaches how to invent
arguments, your answer is in accord with the law of truth but not
the law of wisdom, for you have treated a general thing particu-
larly. "I aske the/* he explains further, "for the definition of the
whole arte, and thow geuest me the definition of inuention, which
is bet parte of the arte." 29
^Tfaiis does Macllmaine advocate Ramism by stressing its classical
origins and its characteristics as determined by the three laws. His
next step is to lay emphasis upon its theory of method. The method
followed in my work, says he, is that of placing first what is most
dear, and next what is next most clear, and so on. "And therfore,"
*** * s 7 pp. 9-10. 2 p. 10. *p. fl .
1 182 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
he remarks, "it continually procedethe from the generall to the spe-
ciall and singuler." 30 His immediate elaboration of this principle of
structure is thoroughly Ramistic:
The definition as most generall is first placed, next folowethe the
diuision, first into the partes, and next into the formes and kyndes.
Euery parte and forme is defined in his owne place, and made mani-
fest by examples of auncient Authors, and last the members are limited
and Joined togeather with short transitions for the recreation of the
Reader. 31
This, remarks Macllmaine, is the perfect method. This is the
method observed by Plato, Aristotle, and all the ancient historians,
orators, and poets. This is the method which was lost to view for
many years and is now raised as it were from death by that most
learned man and martyr to God, Petrus Rarnus.
Macllmaine in his introduction and translation does not stress
method in Ramistic philosophy in the terms that Ramus had in-
sisted upon. We know that Ramus thought of method as either nat-
ural or prudential. 32 We also know that, while his special affection
was bestowed upon the natural method, which he considered to be
applicable to scientific discourse and also to poetry and oratory, he
gave at least a respectable amount of space to the prudential method,
and made it the strategy of presenting material to the unread popu-
lace. In his introduction Macllmaine says nothing to suggest his
awareness of the prudential method as Ramus conceived of it. The
final chapter of his translation, which is brief, hurried, and even con-
temptuous, has something that might pass for an account of the pru-
dential method, although his comments at that point would limit it
to the uses of deceit and to the procedures of irrelevance, digression,
and inversion. In thus allowing the prudential method to become
almost completely inactive as an element in Ramism, Macllmaine is
lending support to the notion that Ramus advocated only the natural
method, and this notion gradually became influential in England.
The final point of emphasis in Macllmaine's advocacy of Ramism
is that the new logic is intended to serve the preacher, the scientist,
the lawyer, the orator, the mathematician, and indeed all writers,
teachers, and learners. In other words, it is the theory of communica-
tion, so far as any communication must have subject matter and form,
and thus it reaches into the practical world at the points where com-
30 p. i2. S1 p. 13. 82 See above, pp, 160-165.
[ 183 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
munications are necessary parts of the pattern of culture. We are
fortunate in having from Macllmaine an account of the uses of
Ramistic logic, if only to give our expectations on this score a precise
Elizabethan formulation.
If you are a divine, says Macllmaine, you will have to accom-
modate the principles of Ramistic logic to your own special needs.
Thus, instead of beginning your sermon with a definition, as the
strict method of logic would dictate, you begin instead with a state-
ment of the sum of the text you have taken in hand to interpret. Next
you divide the text into a few heads, so that the hearer may better
remember your discourse. Next you treat each head in terms of the
ten places of invention, showing causes, effects, adjuncts, comparisons,
and so on. Lastly, you make your matter plain and manifest with
familiar examples and authorities from the word of God.
Macllmaine next supposes his reader to be a doctor of medicine
about to deliver a lecture upon the subject of a fever. I shall quote
this passage in full for its interest to students of the theory of com-
munication and to students of Elizabethan science:
Yf thou be a Phisition and willing to teache (as for example) of a
feuer, this methode willethe thee to shewe first the definition, that is,
what a feuer is, Next the deuision, declaring what sorte of feuer it is,
whether the quartane, quotidian, hecticke, or what other: thirdly to
come to the places of inuention, and shewe fyrst the causes of the
feuer euery one in order, the efficient, as maye be hotte meates, the
matter as melancolie, choler, or some rotten humor, and soforthe with
the formale causes and finall. The seconde place is theffecte, shewe
then what the feuer is able to bring forthe, whether deathe or no. The
third place wishethe thee to tell the subiecte of the feuer, whether it
be in the vaines, artiers, or els where. The fowrthe to shewe the signes
and tokens which appeare to pretende lyfe or deathe: and to be shorte,
thou shalt passe thoroughe the rest of the artificiall places, and do that
which is requyred in euery of them: And last come to the confirmyng
of thy sayinges by examples, authorities, and (as Hippocrates and
Galen haue done) by histories and long experience. After this Methode
Heraclitus the Philosopher examyned the phisitions whiche came to
heale hym, and because they were ignorant and could not aunswere
to his interrogations he sent them away, and woulde receyue none
of their ^Medicens: for (sayd he) yf ye can not shewe me the causes
of my skknes, much lesse areye able to take the cause awaye. 33
After this extended reference to the scientist in his relation to the
M pp. 13-14,
[ 184 ]
RAMUS 7 S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
inventional scheme of Ramistic logic, Macllmaine turns next to the
lawyer, the orator, and the mathematician, all of whom are expected
to find their own problems of communication better solved in the
new logic than in the old. "So the lawyer," says Macllmaine, "shall
pleade his cause, in prouyng or disprouyng after as his matter shall
requier, with these ten places of Inuention, and dispone euery thing
orderlie into his propositions, syllogismes, and methode." 34 "So shall
the Orator declayme," he remarks. So shall the mathematicians set
forth their demonstrations. And, to be brief, he says, "bothe in wryt-
yng, teaching, and in learnyng, thou mayest alwayes kepe these thre
golden documentes in intreatyng thy matter, and this most ingenious
and artificial methode for the exacte forme and disposition of the
same."
The final steps in Macllmaine's advocacy of Ramism consist in
his statement that it brings more profit to the reader in two months
than would a four-year study of Plato and Aristotle as they were
then available to the public 5 and in his further statement that, in
being offered in English, Ramistic logic is a rebuke to those who
"woulde haue all thinges kept close eyther in the Hebrewe, Greke,
or Latyn tongues." Like a true son of the Reformation he says of the
hostility to translations that "I knowe what greate hurte hathe come
to the Churche of God by the defence of this mischeuous opinion." 36
He reminds his readers that Aristotle and Plato wrote in their native
tongue, not in Hebrew or Latin, and that Cicero wrote in his native
tongue, not in Greek. "Shall we," he demands, "then thinke the
Scottyshe or Englishe tongue, it not fitt to wrote any arte into?" And
he answers his question with a resounding "No in dede."
In the pages that follow his introductory epistle, Macllmaine pro-
ceeds to set forth the ten places of invention and the three aspects of
disposition, thus bringing into English the basic concepts of his source.
But he does more than that. His translation manages to keep Eng-
lishmen reminded of the zeal with which the Ramists viewed their
own accomplishments. This zeal is figured forth in his way of pre-
senting the account of the logician using Ramus's theory of method
to classify the various precepts of grammar as they are drawn on
individual slips of paper from a disordered mass of slips containing
in sum the whole body of grammatical knowledge. 36 This zeal is also
displayed in his fondness for illustrating logic by repeated refer-
34 P. 14- 35 p- 15-
36 pp. 95-96. For Ramus's use of this example, see above, pp. 161-162.
[ 185 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
ences to the liberal disciplines as reformed by Ramus. Thus he illus-
trates perfect definition by calling grammar "an Arte which teach-
ethe to speake well and congruouslye," rhetoric, to speak "eloquent-
lye," dialectic, "to dispute well/' and geometry, "to Measure well." 37
Thus he illustrates distribution by describing one of its forms as
follows:
So Grammer is parted into Etimologie and Syntaxe. Rethoricke, into
Elocution and Action: Dialecticke, into Inuention and Judgemente. 38
One additional illustration of this zeal is found in his translation of
Ramus's three laws, where his words seem to contain a note of tri-
umph and finality. He says:
And here we haue three generall documentes to be obserued in all
artes and sciences. The first is that all the preceptes and rules shoulde
be generall and of necessitie true: and this is called a documente of
veritie* The seconde that euery arte be contained within his owne
boundes, and withholde nothing appartaining to other artes, and is
named a documente of iustice. The third, that euery thing be taught
according to his nature, that is: generall thinges, generally: and par-
ticuler, particulerly : and this is called a documente of wysdome. 39
It has already been pointed out that Macllmaine does not trans-
late with adequacy what Ramus said about the prudential method.
In fact, he converts Ramism into English with this part almost com-
pletely missing. On the other hand, he occasionally adds material to
that found in Ramus's own writings, his apparent purpose being to
reclassify certain subheads of doctrine under still stricter dichotomies.
For example, Ramus himself divides artistic arguments into primary
aad derivative primary 3 and under the one heading he handles six,
and under the other, three, of his ten basic places of invention. Mac-
llmaine adds some complications to this procedure by subdividing
primary arguments into two classes, and by subdividing those two
classes so that the first yields five of the ten places of invention, and
the other, one, whereas the remaining four places are left where
Ramus had originally put them. In other words, Macllmaine intro-
duces some organizational flourishes into a doctrine already organ-
ized within an inch of its life. The new ingredients act, of course, to
make Ramus's natural method seem more heavily addicted to di-
chotomies than it had been in his own works.
** p. 6*. See also pp, *8, 96. For tliese definitions and partitions in Ramus, see above
p. 151.
**P- 55- **p. 74-
[ 186 ]
RAM US *S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
In one other respect, Macllmaine's translation changes the orig-
inal direction of Ramism. While discussing effect as the second of
the ten places of invention, Ramus's Dialectiqve of 1555 uses illus-
trations from Virgil and Horace, whereas Macllmaine's translation
deletes the Virgilian lines and substitutes for them a quotation made
up from the first six verses of the eleventh chapter of Matthew. 40
Again, in discussing subject as the third of the places of invention,
the Dialectiqve uses illustrations from Virgil, Cicero, and Propertius,
whereas Macllmaine confines himself to a single illustration from
the thirteenth chapter of Numbers. 41 Still again, in discussing simili-
tudes as one of the aspects of the sixth place of invention, the Dia-
lectiqve draws examples from Cicero, Ovid, and Virgil, whereas
Macllmaine drops Ovid and adds passages from Matthew and Gene-
sis. 42 These are not isolated instances of Macllmaine's tendency to
mix sacred with secular illustrations at points where Ramus remains
coolly secular. 43 The shift towards a concern for scriptural illustration
indicates that logic is being specifically emphasized by Macllmaine
as a tool of the preacher and the theological controversialist, although
of course it always had had its obvious application to religious advo-
cacy. Scriptural illustrations were to become still more prominent in
the second English translation of Ramistic logic ten years later.
It is needless at this moment to give an analysis of the Latin text
of the Dialecticae Libri Dvo as edited by Macllmaine and published
at London in 1574 and 1576. But that text should never be forgotten
in any historical evaluation of the English Ramists. Macllmaine in-
tended his Latin version for the learned world, even as he intended
his translation for the general public. Thus he established two dis-
tinct trends in English scholarship, and each was to have conse-
quences in the period between 1574 and 1700, as the following dis-
cussion will indicate in detail. Either trend by itself makes Ramus
into an important influence on English logic and rhetoric during the
late sixteenth and the entire seventeenth centuries. Both trends con-
sidered together amount almost to a complete monopoly for Ramus J s
logical and rhetorical theory in England in the early part of that
epoch and to a position of considerable weight throughout.
The beginnings of Macllmaine's interest in Ramism cannot be
40 Compare Dialdctigve, pp. 20-22, with Logike^ pp. 29-30,
41 Compare Dialecttqve, pp. 22-231 with Logike> pp. 30-32.
42 Compare Dialectiqve^ pp. 4^-44, with Logike^ pp. 46-48.
43 Compare Dialectique y pp. 34-3 7, 44~4 6 46-48* 55"5 6 > 61-62, with Logike, pp. 43-
44r 49> 5 *-54, So, 67-69.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
exactly accounted for. Two probabilities may be cited, however, to
link the reforms of the French logician with Scotland and the Scots
at the time of Macllmaine's residence at St. Andrews. Chief of these
probabilities is that the dedication of Foclin's Rhetortqve to Mary
Queen of Scots would be likely to give Ramism some special pres-
tige in Scottish universities in the period between 1555 and 1567.
The other probability is that James Stewart, Earl of Mar and of
Moray, who became regent of Scotland in 1567? after the abdication
of Queen Mary and the succession of her one-year-old son to the
throne, had once studied under Ramus when the latter was prin-
cipal of the College of Presle,* 4 and would be likely, as an alumnus
of St. Andrews and a person of real authority in its affairs, to impart
some prestige to Ramism at his alma mater, particularly during his
regency, which covered the last three years of Macllmaine's stu-
dent life.
An attempt has been made to link George Buchanan with the
Scottish interest in Ramus, 45 and on the surface this distinguished
poet and humanist seems well suited to the task of transporting
Ramism from France to Scotland. After all, Buchanan had more
contacts with European scholars than did any of his Scottish con-
temporaries, and he served as principal of one of the colleges at St.
Andrews in the period when Ramistic influences of some kind were
effectively at work upon the very generation to which Macllmaine
himself belonged. But against the acceptance of Buchanan as a Ramist
is the fact that his plan for the reform of St. Andrews, as composed
in the middle fifteen-sixties, advocates Cicero for rhetoric and Aris-
totle for logic. 46 And against it also is the fact that, during his two
lengthy periods of residence on the continent between 1526 and
1561, Buchanan was a close associate of the family of Gouvea, the
most celebrated of whom was the legal scholar Antonio, Ramus's
implacable foe. 47
** See David Irving, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of George Buchanan (Edin-
burgh, 1817)5 p. iooj also Waddington, Ramus, p. 396. Ramus was principal of the
College of Presle in Paris between 154.5 and 1551. See Waddington, Ramus, pp. 62-79.
James Stewart was In France in 1548 and again in 1550. See Dictionary of National
Biogra$hy\ s.v. Stewart, Lord James. One of those years is no doubt the date of his
studies under Ramus.
43 See for example Waddington, Ramus> p. 396; Mullinger, University of Cambridge,
n, 410 j Graves, Peter Ramus^ p. 213.
* 6 See **Mr George Buchanan's Opinion anent the Reformation of the Universitie of
St Andres," in Vernacular Writings of George EucJianan^ ed. Peter Hume Brown (Edin-
burgh and London, 1892), pp. 9, 12.
47 For an account of the controversy between Ramus and Gouvea, see Waddington,
[ 188 ]
RAMTJS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
Andrew Melville, another distinguished Scottish educator of the
second half of the sixteenth century, has also been linked with his
country's interest in Ramism. 48 But he could hardly have influenced
Macllmaine in any real sense, since he left St. Andrews before Mac-
Ilmaine entered, and lived on the continent between 1564 and 1573,
his advocacy of Ramism in Scotland being a matter of importance
only after he became principal of the University of Glasgow in the
very year when Macllmaine published the works which have just
been discussed.
Although St. Andrews appears to have been the first center of
Ramism in the British Isles, Cambridge was not far behind, as men-
tioned earlier. But what of Oxford? The view has been widely stated
that that university remained loyal to Aristotle and gave Ramus no
real reception. 49 Was that its actual attitude between 1574 and 1618?
There is evidence to support a mild negative answer.
The first piece of evidence is provided by the story of John Bare-
bone as told by Anthony a Wood. Barebone, a member of Magdalen
College at Oxford, bachelor of arts in 1570, and a fellow of Mag-
dalen for seven years after 1571, had a reputation as a noted and
zealous Ramist when he applied for his master's degree in April,
1574. In his disputations and daily colloquies he had given great
offense by his manner of rejecting Aristotle, of practicing the logical
method of Ramus, and of indulging on every possible occasion in
bitter controversy. Accordingly, he was told that his application for
a master's degree would be denied unless he agreed to undergo cer-
tain exercises in addition to those prescribed under the new statutes.
These special exercises were to consist in his defending against all
opposition the three Aristotelian theses that would be propounded
to him publicly at the proper time, and in his confessing publicly in
his introductory remarks that he had given his teachers offense by
disputing against them with too much acrimony. 50
Ramus, pp. 39-4.2. For a brief sketch o Buchanan's relations with the family of Gouvea,
see Irving', op. cit., pp. 67-71, 7 9-8 3 , 188.
48 Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Melville or Melvill, Andrew (1545-1622),
says that Melville went to France in 1564, where he "came under the direct influence
of Peter Ramus, whose new methods of teaching- he subsequently transplanted to Scotland."
49 See Waddington, Ramus, p. 3965 Mulling-er, University of Cambridge, n, 410-4115
Graves, Peter Ramus, p. 2125 Charles Edward Mallet, A History of the University of
Oxford (New York, 1924-1928), II, 147-148; Wilson and Forbes, op. cit., p. 19.
50 For Wood's two versions of this story, see his Historia et Antiquitates Universitatis
Oxoniensis (Oxford, 1674), Lib. I, p. 292, and his The History and Antiquities of the
University of Oxford, ed, Gutch, II, 176.
[ 189 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
This episode does not reflect hostility to Ramus on the part of
Barebone's examiners. It reflects instead their lack of enthusiasm for
a contentious young colleague who had already spent three years
among them as fellow. It also reflects their conviction that no master
of arts should be allowed to be wholly ignorant of Aristotle. Bare-
bone apparently met the special requirements imposed upon him,
for he is recorded as having received his master^ degree on July 9,
1574. He later served as vice-president of Magdalen, was awarded
his bachelor's degree in divinity, and became chaplain at Merton. 51
Another piece of evidence bearing upon the interest in Ramus at
Oxford is provided by John Case's Specvlvm Moralivm Qvaes-
tionvm, published at Oxford in 1585, and accepted as the earliest
book at the new Oxford press. 52 In his record of the doings of the year
^ Jh n Strype speaks of this book as follows:
In the other university of Oxford was a new printing press erected
about this year, (whether any before, I know not,) given as a suitable
present to that university by the earl of Leicester, their high chancel-
lor. And the first book printed there was a book of Ethics, made by
one Case, a learned man there, entitled, Speculum Quaestionum Mor-
alium. Which book the author dedicated to the said earl of Leicester,
and to the lord Burghley, chancellor of the other university. 53
Strype describes part of the contents of Case's dedicatory letter to
the two chancellors in these words :
And whereas at this time and somewhat before, another great contest
arose in both universities, concerning the two philosophers, Aristotle
and Ramus, then chiefly read, and which of them was rather to be
studied^ he gave them both their commendations and characters in
his said epistle . . . 54
Strype's immediate quotation from Case to illustrate what the latter
says of Ramus and Aristotle is somewhat truncated and does not
exactly represent its source. Case himself speaks thus:
Still I cannot but acknowledge that the youthful ardor of mind in
both universities has of late been fighting it out to determine whether
in the mastering of the arts the great acuteness of Aristotle is of more
worth than the flowing genius of Ramus. But, as I expect, the young
51 See Joseph Foster, Alumni Oxanienses (Oxford, 1891)* I, 68.
52 See Madan, Oxford Boaks^ I, 14-15.
** John Strype, Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion (Oxford,
1824), vol. in, pt, i, p. 499.
p. 500.
[ 190 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
exalt such apostasy from the true experience of age and from the wise
old custom of philosophizing, because beardless youth often does what
white hair denies to have been rightly done .... I do not blame
Ramus in this, for he was learned, I rather exalt Aristotle, for he
stands out above all. But perhaps the young men will hold my work
the poorer because I name in it the old interpreters of Aristotle. 55
This is testimony from a former fellow of St. John's College in
Oxford that the interest in Ramus in the years before 1585 was high
at his university as well as at Cambridge, and that Oxford under-
graduates were more inclined to the new logic than to the old. It is
also an indication from a Catholic (for Case owed allegiance to
Rome) that Ramism was respected outside of Protestant circles, and
was not subject to a purely denominational preference. Case even
allows an apologetic note to appear in his mention of his own present
book and its alignment on the side of Aristotle there is regret
rather than scorn in his fear that the undergraduates will prefer
Ramus to himself. And he knew the undergraduate temper, too.
When this book appeared, he was privately teaching logic and phi-
losophy to Roman Catholic undergraduates in his own home in Ox-
ford, having left his fellowship at St. John's sometime before.
It must be recorded that on another occasion Case was again not
so much an open opponent of Ramism as a neutral with some lean-
ings towards Aristotle. He published in 1584 at London a com-
panion-piece to the work just quoted. It too was in Latin, and its
title page as it would read in English describes it as The Sum of the
Ancient Interpreters of the Entire Aristotelian Dialectic, showing
what Ramus attacks truly or falsely in Aristotle y by the author John
Case, formerly fellow of the college of St. John the Baptist of Ox-
ford, Useful and Necessary to everyone attached to the Socratic and
the Peripatetic Philosophy. Case's willingness to admit truth as
well as error in Ramism is not the usual sign of the confirmed anti-
Ramist of the fifteen-eighties. Indeed, a spirit of moderation in men-
55 John Case, S-pecvlvm Moralivm Ovaestionvm (Oxford, 1585), fol. 5. Quoted by
Mullinger, University of Cambridge^ n, 411, note i. Translation mine.
56 This quotation is my translation of a substantial portion of the title page of the
second edition of this work as published at Oxford in 1592. The Latin title page in the
part covered by my quotation reads as follows: "Svmrna vctervm Interpretvm in vni-
versam Dialecticam Aristotelisj qvam vere falsoue Ramus in Aristotelem inuehatur,
ostendens. Auctore. loanne Case Oxoniensi, olim Collegii IX loannis Praecursoris socio.
Omnibus Socraticae Peripateticaeque philosophiae studiosis in primis vtilis ac necessaria."
See Madan, Oxford Books., i, 32-33.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
tioning Ramus at that time is almost equivalent to a qualified en-
dorsement of his position.
The great Richard Hooker, who received his bachelor's and mas-
ter's degrees from Corpus Christi College at Oxford some seven
years after Case*s similar degrees from St. John's, saw faults rather
than virtues in Ramism; but his criticism of Ramus is at least a sign
that his alma mater did not neglect to consider that philosopher. In
his treatise Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, published in a
first installment of four books about 1593, Hooker speaks of Aris-
totle as having come closer by true art and learning to the parts of
natural knowledge than any man since, and has this to add on a sub-
ject which he identifies as "Ramystry":
In the pouertie of that other new deuised ayde two things there are
notwithstanding singular. Of marueilous quicke dispatch it is, and
doth shewe them that haue it as much almost in three dayes, as if it
dwell threescore yeares with them. Againe because the curiositie of
mans wit, doth many times with perill wade farther in the search of
things, then were conuenient: the same is thereby restrayned vnto such
generalities as euery where offering themselues, are apparent vnto
men of the weakest conceipt that neede be. So as following the rules
& precepts thereof, we may define it to be, an Art which teacheth the
way of speedie discourse, and restrayneth the minde of man that it
may not waxe ouer wise. 57
Still another piece of evidence concerning the interest in Ramus
at Oxford belongs to a period some twenty-five years after the first
appearance of the treatise just quoted. On May 9, 1618, a young
man named Richard Mather entered Brasenose College, Oxford,
and was set the task of reading the works of Peter Ramus by his
tutor, Dr. Thomas Worrall. Samuel Clark, who had personally
known Mather, records the episode thus:
Soon after his coming to Oxford^ by a good providence, he came into
acquaintance with learned Doctor Woral y who was very helpful to
him by directing him in the course of his private Studies ; and among
other things, he advised him to read over the Works of the Learned
ST Richard Hooker, Of the Lawves of Ecclesiasticall Politie (London, [1593?] 1597),
pp. 58-59, This edition, a copy of which is in the Humington Library, advertises itself
as containing "Eyght Bookes," but in reality it contains only five, the fifth having its
own title page, the date i597> and separate pagination. The title page of the first four
books bears no date, but the work was entered in the Stationers' Registers January 29,
1592 [i.e., 1593], and thus it was probably first published that year. See Arber, Tran-
script of the Register^ II, 625.
RAMUS's DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
Peter Ramus $ which Counsel he followed, and saw no cause to repent
of his so doing. 58
Mather spent only a few months at Oxford, however, and then
left to become minister at Toxteth Park near Liverpool. During the
next few years he identified himself with the puritans, was twice
suspended from his ministry for nonconformity, and at length emi-
grated to New England, where he was preacher at Dorchester in
Massachusetts from 1636 till his death in 1669. One of his sons,
Samuel, was a member of the second graduating class at Harvard j
another, Increase, was father of Cotton. Thus Richard Mather is a
link not only between. Ramism and the Oxford undergraduate of
the second decade of the seventeenth century but also between Ra-
mism and the religious leadership of early New England. 59
This account of the influence of Ramus in Oxford has omitted his
most influential follower at that institution, Charles Butler, of Mag-
dalen College, who received his master's degree in 1587, and who
may have been one of the young men that John Case had in mind
in his reference to the debate over Aristotle and Ramus among stu-
dents of both universities around 1585. It was to become Butler's
function to prepare the books that carried Ramism into the public
schools of England throughout the seventeenth century. Like Ga-
briel Harvey, however, he is mainly associated with Ramistic rhetoric
and thus can be considered to good advantage later rather than now.
While Butler and his Oxford associates were at work in these
various ways, successive generations of Cambridge men devoted
themselves to the cause of Ramism and produced an astonishingly
large number of treatises in the process. In fact, the influence of
Ramus at Cambridge was more fruitful and more persistent even
though no more actual than at Oxford. This will become incidentally
apparent in the following account of the later stages of Ramism in
England.
Debates in the learned world often had Ramism as an ingredient
at the turn of the sixteenth century, and when they did so, they
acted of course to perpetuate the interest which Macllmaine had
58 Samuel Clark, The Lives Of sundry Eminent Persons in this "Later A ge (London,
1683), pt. I, p. 128. For an account of Mather's tutor, and for Mather's dates at Oxford,
see Foster, Alumni Oxonienses, s.v. Worrall, Thomas (Wirrall, Wyrell), of Cheshire,
and Mather, Richard.
59 For an authoritative discussion of the influence of Ramus in New England during 1
the seventeenth century, see Perry Miller, The New England Mind> pp. 111-180, 313-
330? 493-501-
[ 193 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
introduced. Sometimes these debates concerned a cardinal tenet of
Ramistic logic, sometimes the name of Ramus was bandied back and
forth by the contending parties in the course of disputes upon themes
outside of logical theory. History affords some good illustrations of
each of these aspects of English Ramism.
Strype is the best authority for the opening stages of a controversy
which involved Ramus's theory of method as its major issue. In his
survey of literary events of the year 1580, he says:
Let me add here the mention of a book writ against Everard Digby;
the same with him, I suppose, that was fellow of St. John's college
in Cambridge: against whom Dr. Whitaker, the master, took occasion
by some branches of statute, to expel him the college: especially sus-
pecting him to be a papist. Of which matter see the Life of Archbishop
Whitgift.* This Digby had writ somewhat dialoguewise against
Ramus's Umca Methodtts: which in those times prevailed much 5 and
perhaps brought into that college to be read; the rather, Ramus being
a protestant, as well as a learned man. Whereupon one Francis Milda-
pet, a Navarrois, writ against Digby, in vindication of Ramus, a small
book, entitled, Admonitio ad Everardum Digby y Anglum, de Umca
P. Rami Methodo, rejectis caeteris, retinenda?*
Strype's reference to the dialogue against Ramus points at a Latin
work by Digby, the title of which if translated would read thus : Two
Books on the Bipartite Method^ in Refutation of the Unipartite
Method of Peter Ramus y elucidating from the Best Authors a Plain ,
Easy, and Exact Way towards the Understanding of the Sciences.
This work was published at London by Henry Bynneman in 1580,
having been entered in the Stationers 3 Registers under the date of
May 3 of that year. 62 As Francis Bacon was to do some twenty-five
years later in his Advancement of Learning > Digby advocated two
methods, not one alone, for the organization of scientific discourses. 63
Immediately after his work appeared, it evoked a reply from the
* This is a reference to John Strype's The Life and Acts of the Most Reverend, Father
in God* John W/t&gift y D+ D. (London, 1718), pp. 371-273, where an account is given
of Digby*s expulsion by Whitaker and his subsequent reinstatement as a result of the
intervention of Archbishop Whitgift. The latter's investigation indicated that Whitaker
had suspected JMgby of being 1 a papist, but had removed him from his fellowship, not on
that issue, but an a minor charge.
61 Strype, di&talsy vol. u, pt- z, p. 405.
e * Arber, Transcript of the Registers, n, 370. Itfgby's title reads: "De duplici methodo
Khri duo, unicam P. Kami methodum refutantess in quibus via plana, expedita et exacta,
second um optimos autores, ad scientiamni cognitionem elucidatur."
** Far this aspect of Bacon y s theory of method, see below, pp. 369-370.
[ 194 3
ENGLAND
author mentioned by Strype. This author, Francis Mildapet, signed
himself from Navarre in order to recall Ramus's student days at the
College of Navarre in Paris, while his reply, as its title indicates, is
intended as An Admonition to Everard Digby, the Englishman,
seeking the Preservation of the Unipartite Method of Peter Ramus,
and the Rejection of Other Methods.
Mildapet's Admonition is dedicated to Philip, Earl of Arundel. Its
general position toward Digby's Two Books is indicated at the very
outset in a Latin passage quoted and thus paraphrased by Strype:
That is, that this dialogue was thought by some to be more boldly
sent abroad than learnedly composed: and this writer esteemed it
framed with no great judgment j and more wit than reason appeared
throughout in it. So that Digby seemed to oppose Ramus's philosophy
chiefly out -of a prejudice against him upon the account of religion.
But that which Digby's adversary did, was, as he said, that he thought
it not amiss to unravel the artifice of that bookj and to admonish
Digby freely, and yet modestly, of retaining that only method?*
Strype has nothing further to say about the controvery between
Digby and Mildapet. But it did not end at this point. By Novem-
ber 3, 1580, exactly six months after the entry of his Two Books for
publication, Digby had contrived a reply to Mildapet, and had
licensed it in the Stationers' Registers. 65 Its title, as it would be con-
strued in English, is A Response to the Admonition of F* M.ilda^pet
of Navarre concerning the Preservation of the Unif>artite Method
of P. Ramus. This in turn provoked a reply from Mildapet early in
1581. In that reply we learn for the first time that Digby's opponent
now and before was William Temple, a Cantabrigian of King's Col-
lege. Temple was younger than Digby by some six or seven years,
and the occupant of a fellowship in his college, though barely yet a
master of arts. His rejoinder to Digby advertises itself as A Disser-
tation of William Temple of Kings College^ Cambridge, on behalf
of a Defense of Milda-pet concerning the Unipartite Method, direct-
ed against the Lover of the Double Way; to which is added an Ex-
planation of Some Questions in Physics and Ethics, along with a
Letter concerning the Dialectic of Ramus y addressed to Johannes
Piscator of Strasbourg Not simply the opening dissertation against
64 Annals^ n, 2, 406.
65 Arber, Transcript of the Registers^ II, 381.
66 The Latin title page reads: "Pro Mildapetti de vnica methodo defensione contra
diplodophilum, commentatio gvlielrni tempelii, e regio collegio cantabrigiensis. Hue
[ 195 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Digby but the entire work is concerned with Ramism, the Questions
in Physics and Ethics being directed at Georgius Lieblerus, a Euro-
pean defender of Aristotle against Ramus, whereas the Letter con-
cerning the Dialectic is addressed to that Johannes Piscator who ap-
pears to have been at once a critic of Ramus's dialectic and a zealous
editor of that philosopher's more discursive works. 67 Thus ended
Temple's controversy with Digby. The whole affair gave the latter
some reputation as a conservative philosopher j but it made Tem-
ple a leading exponent of Ramism in England and on the conti-
nent as well. 88
Another controversy in which Ramus figured was that between
Gabriel Harvey and Thomas Nash. During the last decade of the
sixteenth century, these two Cantabrigians took offense at each other
and exchanged insults in a series of printed works that reflect little
credit upon either man. Robert Greene, also a Cantabrigian, was
an ally of Nash in the early stages of this campaign of vilification,
but he died before the pens of the main contestants had been half
accessit nonnvllarum e physicis & ethicis quaestionum explicatio, una cum Epistola de
Rarni dialectica ad Joannem Piscatorem Argentinensem. Londini, Pro Thoma Man.
Anno 1581."
67 On December 12, 1580, the following- work was entered in the -Stationers* Registers:
In. P. Rami. Dialecticam. animaduersiones Joanis Piscatoris Argentinensis. exem$lis sac-
rarvtn Litterarum passim illustrates. See Arber 5 Transcript of the Registers^ u, 384. This
work was published by Henry Bynneman at London under the date of 1581, and by
Henry Middleton in a second edition at the same place under the date of 1583. An
earlier edition at Frankfurt bears the date of 1580 and probably was the direct occasion
for Temple*s Letter concerning the Dialectic. Piscator's Animaduersiones along with
Temple's letter and Piscator's reply were republished later at Frankfurt, whereas the
two letters without the A nimaduer stones appeared also at London in 1582. See the
Short-Title Catalogue, s.v. Piscator, John; also Dictionary of National Biography, s.v.
Temple, Sir William (1555-1627) \ also Catalogue Generate des Liures lm<primes de la
Bibtiotheque Nationally s.v. Piscator, Johannes, Argentinensis. Piscator, also called Jean
le Pecheur, -was a Calvinist theologian at Strasbourg. See Waddington, Ratnus, p. 393.
Bibliographers have attempted to distinguish between a Piscator of Herborn, a Piscator
of Wittenberg, and a Piscator of Strasbourg. But these three are in reality one and the
same man. See Walter J. Qng, S.J., "Johannes Piscator: One Man or a Ramist Dichot-
omy?" Harvard Library Bulletin, vm (1954), 151-162.
68 Temple wrote a preface for De prima simplicium et concretorum corporum gen-
eratione Mspttatio (Cambridge, 1584), a pro-Ramist work by James Martin (or
Jacobus Martinus) of Dunkeld s Scotland, Martin had been professor of philosophy at
Paris and Turin. To Martin's work and Temple's Preface, Andreas Libavius responded
with his Ouaestionum $&ysicaru<m controversarum inter Perifateticos et Rameos tractates
(Frankfurt, 1591). Libavius, a German chemist, identified himself later with the at-
tempt to combine Ramus's dialectic with that of Philipp Melanchthon; see his De Dia-
lectica aristotelica a PbiUpfo Melanchthone et P, Ramo pers-picue selecta et ex-posita,
(Frankfurt, 1600); also his Dialectica $Mli$$o-ramaea (Frankfurt, i6o8)j and also
Waddington, Ramus> p. 394. The men who sponsored this combination became known
as tbe "Philippo-Ramists*" See below, pp. 2
[ 196 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
emptied of poison. This is not the place for an account of the charges
and countercharges that these masters of invective hurled at each
other. It should be noted, however, that they attacked wherever
they felt they could gain advantage, and that Ramus, as one of Har-
vey's idols, was not wholly spared.
In 1589, a year before this controversy had gotten under way,
Nash contributed a preface to a printed version of M.ena'phon^ the
pastoral tale which his friend Greene had composed. His preface,
addressed to "the Gentlemen Students of both Vniuersities," con-
tains an approving reference to Gabriel Harvey as one of the four or
five living authors of creditable Latin verse. 69 But elsewhere in the
same work, after praising his own St. John's College at Cambridge
"as an Vniuersitie within it self e," Nash laments that the precepts of
her learned men have not prospered, and that instead, especially in
the training of preachers, "those yeares which shoulde bee employed
in Aristotle are expired in Epitomes." 70 The Ramists, of course, were
responsible not only for the popularity of epitomes of the liberal
disciplines but also for the wide use of what Nash in the same passage
calls "Compendiaries" and "abbreuiations of Artes." That Nash has
Ramus specifically in mind as he wrote this preface is fully shown
when he speaks of the superiority of Greene's "extemporall vaine"
over "our greatest Art-masters deliberate thoughts." Invention like
that of Greene is quicker than the eye, he declares, and its results
are more admirable than those obtained by the proverbial seven
years of labor. A perfection that requires the work of years owes
more to time than to talent, more to industry than to inspiration. At
least, Nash implies as much in the following words:
What is he amongst Students so simple that cannot bring forth
{tandem aUquando) some or other thing singular, sleeping betwixt
euerie sentence? Was it not Maros xij. years toyle that so famed his
xij. Aeneidosl Or Peter Ramus xvj. yeares paines that so praised his
pettie Logique? Howe is it, then, our drowping wits should so wonder
at an exquisite line that was his masters day labour? 71
An even sharper slur upon Ramus occurs in Nash's Anatomle of
Absurditie, also published before the Harvey-Nash controversy was
69 See the text of Nash's preface as printed in G. Gregory Smith, Elizabethan Critical
Essays (Oxford, 1904), I, 316.
70 Ibid., I, 313-314.
71 Ibid.) I, 309. For Ramus's own estimate of the time he spent in composing- his
e^ see above, p. 154.
[ 197 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
fairly launched. Here Nash speaks of artificers who discredit art by
their ignorance, who bring shame upon their office by their own im-
pudence and presumption. Within this context he fits the following
remarks:
But as hee that censureth the dignitie of Poetry by Cherillus paultry
paines, the maiestie of Rethorick by the rudenesse of a stutting
Hortensiusj the subtiltie of Logique by the rayling of Ramus, might
iudge the one a foole in writing he knewe not what, the other tipsie
by his stammering, the thirde the sonne of Zantippe by his scolding:
so he that estimats Artes by the insolence of Idiots, who professe that
wherein they are Infants, may deeme the Vniuersitie nought but the
nurse of follie, and the knowledge of Artes nought but the imitation
of the Stage. 72
Shortly after these words were published, Richard Harvey, brother
of Gabriel, made some slighting references to Greene and to his
friend, Nash. Greene replied in A Quip for an Upstart Courtier by
sneering at the humble parentage of the Harveys. To this Gabriel
replied in Fovre Letters and certaine Sonnets (London, 1592). In
the fourth of these letters, he takes pains to set Ramus in a better
light than Nash had done:
The vayne Peacocke with his gay coullours, and the prattling Parrat
with his ignorant discourses (I am not to offend any but the Peacocke
and the Parrat) haue garishly disguised the worthiest Artes, and
deepely discredited the profoundest Artistes, to the pitifull defacement
of the one and the shamefull prejudice of the other. Rodol-pk Agricola,
PAiKp Melancthon, Ludouike Vines, Peter Ramus, and diuers ex-
cellent schollers haue earnestly complaned of Artes corrupted, and
notably reformed many absurdities^ but still corruption ingendreth
one vermine or other, and still that pretious Tra'inement is miserably
abused which should be the fountaine of skill, the roote of vertue, the
seminary of gouernment, the foundation of all priuate and publike
good. 73
Greene died a few months before the publication of Gabriel's
Fovre Letters^ and Nash was left to carry on the controversy alone.
He answered Gabriel in a pamphlet called Strange Newes (London,
1592). Gabriel delivered an immediate reply in Piercers Supereroga-
tion, which contains a passage mischievously hailing Nash as the
72 The AvuziomM of Absurdhie Is given by extract In Smith's Elizabethan Critical
Sy i, 321-337, the above quotation being- on p* 334,
In Smith, 11, 236.
[ 198 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
greatest confuter in an era of strenuous debates, particularly that
between Peripatetics and Ramists.
There was a time [writes Gabriel] when I floted in a sea of en-
countring waues, and deuoured many famous confutations with an
eager and insatiable appetite j especially Aristotle against Plato and the
old Philosophers, diuers excellent Platonistes, indued with rare &
diuine wittes (of whome elsewhere at large) j lustinus Martyr,
Philoponus, Valla, Viues, Ramus, against Aristotle - y oh, but the great
maister of the schooles and high Chauncellour of Vniuersities could
not want pregnant defence, Perionius, Gallandius, Carpentarius,
Sceggius, Lieblerus, against Ramus $ what? hath the royall Professour
of Eloquence and Philosophy no fauourites? Talaeus, Ossatus, Freigius,
Minos, Rodingus, Scribonius, for Ramus against them, and so foorth,
in that hott contradictory course of Logique and Philosophy. 7 *
Gabriel now turns the weapon of sarcasm against Nash as he con-
tinues:
But alas, silly men, simple Aristotle, more simple Ramus, most simple
the rest, either ye neuer knew what a sharpe-edged & cutting Confuta-
tion meant, or the date of your stale oppositions is expired, and a
new-found land of confuting commodities discouered by this braue
Columbus of tearmes and this onely marchant venturer of quarrels,
that detecteth new Indies of Inuention & hath the winds of Aeolus at
commaundement. Happy you flourishinge youthes that follow his in-
comparable learned steps, and vnhappy we old Dunses that wanted
such a worthy President of all nimble and liuely dexterities. 75
Sterile as these invectives between Nash and Harvey are, they
serve to indicate that Ramus is a familiar presence in the conscious-
ness of the Elizabethans, and that the learned world of the fifteen-
nineties, like the world of Temple and Digby ten years earlier, was
still divided concerning him. In fact, his enemies and his friends con-
tinue to identify themselves before and after 1600 in other heated
controversies. The case of William Gouge at Cambridge in the late
fifteen-nineties, as related by Samuel Clark, gives us a view of a
college debate over Ramus and of partisan feeling that ended in
blows and a near riot. Says Clark:
From the School at Eaton he was chosen to Kings Colledge in Cam-
bridge, whither he went Anno Christi 15955 and at the first entrance
74 Ibid.y n, 245-24.6. For Smith's notes on the cast of characters in this debate, see
II, 431-432.
75 Ibid., n, 246.
[ 199 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
of his studies, he applied himself to Peter Ramus his Logick, and
grew so expert therein, that in the publick Schools he maintained and
defended him, insomuch as when on a time divers So-phisters set them-
selves to vilifie Ramus, for which end the Respondent had given this
question, Nunquam erit magnus, cui Ramus est Magnus [Never will
he be great to whom Ramus is great], which some of the Sof>histers
hearing, and knowing the said William Gouge to be an acute disputant,
and a stiff defender of Ramus, they went to the Divinity Schools,
where he was then hearing an Act^ and told him how in the other
Schools they were abusing Ramus, he thereupon went into the
Sofhisters Schooles, and upon the Moderators calling for another
Opponent, he stepped up, and brought such an argument as stumbled
the Respondent, whereupon the Moderator took upon him to answer
it, but could not satisfie the doubt: This occasioned a Sofhister that
stood by to say with a loud voice, Do you come to vilifie Ramus, and
cannot answer the Argument of a Ramist? Whereupon the Moderator
rose up, and gave him a box on the ear, then the School was all on
an uproar j but the said William Gouge was safely conveyed out from
amongst them. 78
Gouge survived to take four degrees from Cambridge, to serve
as fellow of his college for six years, to lecture there on logic and
philosophy, and to hold a post as puritan divine during much of the
period between 1607 an ^ J 653- In addition to the anti-Ramists
whom he successfully "stumbled" in the debate described by Clark,
it is quite certain that he knew Richard Montagu during his life at
Cambridge. At any rate, Montagu's years at King's College over-
lapped those of Gouge. Montagu became one of the antagonists of
John Selden in a controversy during the early years of the seven-
teenth century on the question whether tithes are due by divine or
by ecclesiastical law. Selden, an eminent legal scholar, whose col-
legiate education was begun at Hart Hall, Oxford, and continued at
Clifford's Inn, argued against the justifying of tithes under divine
law, his famous work on this subject being The History oj Tithes,
published in London in 1618. Montagu, a staunch defender of the
Church of England against puritanism on one side and Catholicism
on the other, replied to Selden by asserting that tithes are an obliga-
tion under divine law. During his reply, Montagu took occasion to
censure Ramus and thereby to attack argumentative positions oc-
cupied by Selden.
76 Samuel Clark, Lives of Thirty-teao Divines (London, 1677), p. 135, as quoted in
Mayor's edition of Ascham's The SckaUmaster^ p. 231.
[ 200 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
Selden, for example, had said that he followed Scaliger in con-
demning Paulus Diaconus for his ignorant abridging of Sextus Pom-
peius Festus. Montagu retorted that few would defend Paulus for
that act any more than one would defend Festus in turn for his
abridging of the great lost encyclopedia of Verrius Flaccus. Yet
Paulus had made his abridgment, not to supersede Festus, nor to
take credit for another man^s work, but for his private use and for
the use of students. "He was, if not the last, yet one of the last,"
says Montagu, "that vndertooke in this gelding kind." 77 Festus
would have perished utterly, Montagu observes a bit later, if Paulus
had not made an epitome of him. As for the modern habit of epito-
mizing masterpieces, however, Montagu attributes it to Lipsius and
Ramus, and speaks thus of them and their work:
The Abridgements that haue beene made long since, and of late, are
held to be one of the chiefe plagues of Learning, and learned men.
It maketh men idle, and yet opiniatiue, and well conceited of them-
selues. He that can carry an Epitome in his pocket, * . . imagineth
mightily, that he knoweth much, and yet indeed is but an ignaro.
In a day he is taught, but to little purpose, as much as others can
learne in a whole yeere. Lately the World went a madding this way,
for Systemaesy Syntagms, Synofseis^ and I know not what, both for
the Handmaids and Mistresses of Arts. Lipsms and Ramus swayed
all: but soone they, perceiuing their owne folly, left them, turbidos
rivulos, & joeculentos [sic], and retyred, with some losse of time and
trauell, vnto the Fountaines. 78
Selden had also condemned those who spoke of three or of four
sorts of tithes in disregard of the rigorous exactness of the modern
theory of division. His own position was that "Tithes are best di-
uided into the first, and second Tithe." This statement provokes
Montagu to retort:
And why best? Belike, because it is a Dichotomie^ which being the
darling of the Father of Nouellists in Grammar, Philoso^hie^ and
vnlesse hee had died opportunely, in Theologie^ must needs be the
dotage of all such as he. But as great an Artist^ (no dispraise to
Ramus} that great Dictator of Learning, Alexanders Master, ap-
proueth not this best diuision in euery subiect, much lesse that vniuer-
sall title, Best. Doubtlesse it is the best, which includeth all of that
77 Richard Montagu, Diatribae wpon the first 'part of the late History of Tithes (Lon-
don, 1621), p. 4.17.
pp. 415-416.
[ 201 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
kinder where the membra dimdentia be so full, that nothing is exorbi-
tant, or without the verge of that diuision: else there is, sure there
may be, a better diuision than that. . . . 79
Montagu's strictures against abridgments of knowledge and di-
chotomous divisions are reminiscent of Francis Bacon's remark that,
while Ramus deserved well of learning for reviving the three laws,
he was not equally happy in introducing the "canker of Epitomes"
and the "uniform method and dichotomies." 80 Indeed, Bacon's whole
response to Ramus is relevant in a very immediate sense to the his-
tory of Ramism in England during the first quarter of the seven-
teenth century. But Bacon also belongs to the party that sought a
more forward-looking reform of scholasticism than that advanced
by the Ramists, and thus his opinion of Ramus will be reserved for
the chapter presently to be devoted in part to his position in the his-
tory of English logic and rhetoric.
The Montagu-Selden controversy, like that between Harvey and
Nash and the still earlier one between Digby and Temple, provided
effective publicity for Ramism in England from 1580 to 1621. In
the same period, and for a half -century thereafter, various scholars
of English or continental origin contributed even more directly to
England^ awareness of Ramus's logic. The efforts of these scholars
were devoted to propagating the reforms of Ramus through suc-
cessive editions of his Dialecticae Libri Duo, through learned com-
mentaries upon its text, and through learned adaptations of its pre-
cepts to the problems of orators and preachers. These scholarly works
are mainly in Latin, and they amount, of course, to a direct continua-
tion of Macllmaine's pioneering effort to make the Latin text of the
Dialecticae Libri Duo available to English learning.
Friedrich Beurhaus, a German Ramist, deserves mention among
English scholars of that same persuasion. Beurhaus was vice-rector
of the school of Dortmund at the time when three of his textbooks
on Ramus were published at London. The first of these consists of
the Latin text of the Dialecticae Libri Duo with questions and an-
swers in Latin at the end of each chapter to guide students to Ramus's
full meaning. The title in English would read like this: Inquiries of
an Expository Sort u<pon the Two Books of Dialectic of Peter Ramus,
most famous Royal Professor, as brought forth at Paris without
.^ pp. 341-34*-
80 See The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Speeding-, Robert Leslie Ellis, and
Booglas J>enon Heath (Boston^ 1860-1864), vi, 294.; ix, 128.
[ 2O2 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
Commentaries in the Recent Year 72; These being Part One of the
Logic Scholar for the Teaching and Learning of Dialectic (London,
I58i). si A year later another learned work by Beurhaus appeared
at the same press, advertising itself under a Latin title as Scholastic
Disputations wpon the Main Heads of Peter Ramus*s Dialectic) as
well as Comparisons, between It and Various Logics, These being
Part Two of the Logic Scholar, in which Truth of Art is investi-
gated?' 2 ' One of the most interesting features of this volume is a his-
tory of logic from ancient times to Beurhaus's day, with special at-
tention to the sixteenth century. Three chapters of the Introduction
are devoted to this subject. 83 The third and last contribution of Beur-
haus to English Ramism was published at London by G. Bishop in
1589 as a text and defense of the Dialecticae Libri Duo, the defense
being described as a tissue of scholastic disputations. 84 This and the
two previous works gave Beurhaus a larger representation in English
publishing houses than any continental Ramist enjoyed during the
sixteenth or Seventeenth century.
Wilhelm Adolf Scribonius, a doctor of medicine from Marburg
in Prussia, gains a place among English Ramists by virtue of a work
which was published in two editions at London by Vautrollier in
1583. Its title translated into English reads: The Triumph of
Ramistic Logic, Wherein a Very Great Many Censures and Obser-
vations are set forth, first in the Self -same Augmented Precepts of
Ramus y and then in all his Interpreters and Observers** Gabriel
81 The title page in Latin reads : "In P. Rami, Regii Prof essoris Clariss. Dialecticae
Libros Dvos Lvtetiae Anno LXXII. Postremo sine Praelectionibvs Aeditos, Explica-
tionvm Quaestiones: quae Paedagogiae Logicae De Docenda Discendaqve Dialectica.
Pars Prima. Auctore Frederico Bevrhvsio Menertzhagensi Scholae Temonianae Prorec-
tore. Londini Ex Officina Typographica Henrici Bynneman. CIO. IO. LXXXI. Cum
serenissimae Regiae Maiestatis Priuilegio."
82 The title page reads in part: "De P. Rami Dialecticae Praecipvis Capitibvs Dis-
pvtationes Scholasticae, & cum ijsdem variorum Logicorum comparationes: quae Paeda-
g-ogiae Logicae Pars Secvnda, qua artis veritas exquiritur .... Londini, Ex OfEcina
Typographica Henrici Bynneman. CID. ID. LXXXII."
83 Chapters iv, v, and vi. Chapter vi is especially detailed on the logic of the Renais-
sance.
84 I have not seen a copy of this work. The Cambridge University Library lists its
copy as follows: "P, Rami . . . Dialecticae libri duo. Defensio eivsdem per Scholasticas
. . . disquisitiones: avthore Frederico Bevrhvsio . . . 1589, Londini, Impensis G. Bishop."
See Early English Printed Books in the University Library Cambridge (Cambridge,
i 900- i 907) > I, 347. This work was entered in the Stationers* Registers December 9,
1588. See Arber, Transcript of the Registers^ II, 510.
85 The title page of the second edition, as listed in the British Museum General Cata-
logue of Printed Books y s.v. Scribonius, Gulielmus Adolphus, is as follows; "Triumphus
Logicae Rameae, ubi turn in ipsa praecepta P. Rami addita, turn in universes ejus inter-
pretes & animadversores animadversiones observation esq[ue] plurimae proponuntur . .
[ 203 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Harvey had this work in mind, no doubt, when he listed Scribonius
among the defenders o Ramus in "that hott contradictory course of
Logique and Philosophy." 86
Next to Macllmaine, the greatest Ramistic logician among six-
teenth-century Englishmen is William Temple, whose debate with
Digby on the subject of Ramus's theory of method has already been
discussed. Soon after that debate, Temple published at Cambridge
a Latin text of the Dialecticae Libri Duo, together with his commen-
tary 5 and in the same volume he placed not only a disputation of his
own upon Porphyry's Isagoge y but also a rebuttal under twenty-nine
heads to the letter which Johannes Piscator had addressed to him
after he had addressed a letter to Piscator on the subject of the lat-
ter's criticism of Ramus's dialectic. 87 Piscator's criticism of Ramus
had already been published at English presses, as had Temple's re-
sponse to it and Piscator's response to Temple. 88 Thus it is certain
that, when Temple's edition of the Dialecticae Libri Duo was pub-
lished in 1584, no Englishman was known as a better Ramist than
he, thanks to that published correspondence with Piscator, and to the
earlier controversy with Digby.
Temple inscribed his edition of 1584 to Sir Philip Sidney, ad-
dressing him in the dedicatory epistle in part as follows:
So that you may begin to love this discipline which was saved as from
ruin by the genius of P. Ramus and quite splendidly elucidated by
him, it is something which has now spread itself throughout Europe,
and however inelegantly taken up at first, has nevertheless begun to
be put to use by a very great many in the best universities. 89
With his characteristic warmth and generosity, Sidney wrote at
once to Temple to thank him for the book and the inscription. His
letter is brief and in every other respect qualified for quotation at
this time:
Editio secanda. Londini, 1583." The first edition is listed in the Short-Title Catalogue^
s.v. Scribonius s see also Arber, Transcript of the Registers^ n, 429.
86 See above, p. 199.
87 The volume containing these three works by Temple bears the following- title:
"P. Kami Dialecticae Libri Dvo, Scholiis G. Tempelli Cantabrigiensis illustrati. Qvibus
accessit, Eodem authore, Be Porphyrianis Praedicabilibus Disputatio. Item: Epistolae
de P. Rami Dialectica contra lohannis Piscatoris responsionem defensio, in capita viginti
novem redacta. Cantabrigiae, Ex officina Thomae Thomasij. 1584." This work was also
published at Frankfurt in 15915 see Waddington, Ramus, p. 454.
^See above, p. 196, note 67.
89 This section of Temple's dedicatory epistle is quoted by Mullinger, University of
ir, 409, note 5. Translation mine.
[ 204 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
Good M r Temple. I have receaved both yowr book and letter, and
think my self greatly beholding unto yow for them. I greatly desyre
to know yow better, I mean by sight, for els yowr wrytings make yow
as well known as my knowledg ever reach unto, and this assure
yourself M r Temple that whyle I live yow shall have me reddy to
make known by my best power that I bear yow good will, and greatly
esteem those thinges I conceav in yow. When yow com to London
or Court I prai yow lett me see yow, mean whyle use me boldli: for
I am beholding. God keep yow well. At Court this 23** of Mai 1584.
Your loving frend
Philip Sidnei
To my assured good frend
Mr William Temple 90
It must have been pleasant for Temple to be thus assured that his
works were already well known in London and at Court, and that
men like Sidney were reaching into them for a knowledge of the
new logic. It must also have been pleasant for him to have received
this invitation to meet Sidney in person. Not long after the invita-
tion was issued, such a meeting took place. Its result was that when
Sidney went abroad in 1585 at the head of an expedition to aid the
Netherlands in her war against the persistent aggression of Spain,
Temple accompanied him as private secretary. When Sidney died
on October 17, .1586, at Arnheim, from a poisoned battle wound, a
codicil in his will bequeathed "to Mr. Temple the yearly Annuity
of thirty Pounds by Year" 91 a clear proof that his esteem for Tem-
ple never waned. Nor did Temple's for Sidney. According to one
report, he held Sidney in his arms as his distinguished patron lay
dying. 92 Moreover, he paid tribute to Sidney's poetical theory by
writing a Latin comment on the Defence of Poesie^ and to Sidney's
genius by composing a Latin elegy in his honor for one of the sev-
eral volumes lamenting his death. 93
It is quite possible that Temple's interest in Ramism had begun
during his earliest years at Cambridge, when he could have attended
90 Sir Philip Sidney The Defence of Poesie Political Discourses Correspondence Trans-
lations^ ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge, 1923), p. 145.
91 Ibid.^ p. 376. For mention of Sidney's companions on his expedition to the Nether-
lands, see Mona Wilson, Sir Philip Sidney (London, 1950), p. 237.
92 See Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Temple, Sir William (1555-1627).
93 Temple's analysis of the Defence is preserved in manuscript at Penshurst. I am
indebted to Professor William Ringler of Washington University in St. Louis for
letting- me see his photostat of it. For a brief description of it, and for the titles of
the three foremost volumes in Sidney's honor, see Wilson, Sir Philip Sidney , pp. 307, 319.
[ 205 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Gabriel Harvey's lectures on the rhetoric of Talaeus or Laurence
Chaderton's lectures on Ramus's logic. At any rate. Temple became
bachelor of arts from King's College in 1578, whereas Harvey had
lectured on rhetoric in the spring of 1575 and 1576, and Chaderton
had been engaged in arousing interest in Ramus's logic during the
years between 1571 and 1577.* This same Chaderton is also certain
to have had a part in the development of our next Ramist scholar,
William Perkins, who took his degree of bachelor of arts from
Christ's College, Cambridge, in 1581, and his master's degree in
1584, the very year of Temple's edition of Ramus's DMecticae
Libri Duo**
Perkins's contribution to the cause of Ramism in England oc-
curred during the period of his appointment as fellow of Christ's
College between 1584 and 1595. This contribution consisted of a
treatise on preaching, which was published originally in Latin in
1592 and translated into English after Perkins's death. 06 The Eng-
lish translation, as done by Thomas Tuke in 1606, is called The
Arte of Prophecy ing, or y A Treatise concerning the sacred and onely
trve manner and methode of Preaching. Perkins divides his subject
into two parts, preaching and praying. He then divides preaching
into preparation for the sermon and promulgation or uttering of the
sermon, whereas praying is later made to consist of considering,
ordering, and uttering. He divides preparation for the sermon into
interpretation and right division or cutting j he divides right division
into resolution or partition and application 5 and so on. This prevail-
ingly dichotomous structure is of course Ramistic, and so far as I
know, Perkins is the first Englishman to write of preaching in terms
o that kind of structure.
There are two other evidences of Ramus's influence upon Perkins.
One presents itself when Perkins, in speaking of resolution or parti-
tion as the process of making a biblical text unloose its true doctrine,
mentions two means to this end, the second of which, he says, "is
done by the helpe of the nine arguments, that is, of the causes, effects,
subjects, adiuncts, dissentanies, comparatiues, names, distribution,
w See above, p. 179; st-e below, p. 2.4.8.
&5 See Dictionary of National Biography^ s.v. Perkins, William (1558-1602).
&G The first edition of the Latin text is titled Prophetica, sive de sacra et vnica ratione
conaonandi y ([Cantabrigiae] : ex officina Johanms Legate, 1592). A second edition bear-
ing- the same date as the first is listed in the catalogue of the Bibliotheque Xationale at
Paris* The English translation is entered in the Stationers' Registers under the date of
December 10, 1606. See Arber, Transcript of the Registers, in, 334, 338.
[ 206 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
and definition." 97 These "nine arguments" are of course the nine
places for the invention of artistic arguments according to Ramus's
dialectic, and Perkins was thinking of that very work when he penned
this passage. He was also thinking of that same work when, in his
brief chapter on memorized sermons, after rejecting "artificiall
memorie, which standeth vpon places and images," he says: "It is
not therefore an vnprofitable aduice, if he that is to preach doe dili-
gently imprint in his minde by the helpe of disposition either axio-
maticall, or syllogisticall, or methodicall, the seuerall proofes and
applications of the doctrines, the illustrations of the applications, and
the order of them all." 98 These words in part recall the second divi-
sion of Ramus's dialectic, which he named disposition, it will be re-
membered, and which he divided into three parts, propositions, syl-
logisms, and method.
Although Perkins has to be counted among the English Ramists
on account of the organization of his theory of preaching, and on
account of his two references to what we must identify as Ramus's
dialectic, he is not a thoroughgoing disciple of that master. He does
not mention Ramus as one of his authorities. Instead, at the end of
his treatise, he mentions the "Writers which lent their helpe to the
framing of this Art of Prophecying," and the only ones he enumer-
ates are Augustine, Hemingius, Hyperius, Erasmus, Illyricus, Wi-
gandus, Jacobus Matthias, Theodorus Beza, and Franciscus Junius."
As would be expected from this list, Perkins derives his doctrine
from sources closer to Ciceronian rhetoric and scholastic logic than
to the logic and rhetoric of Ramus. In fact, Ramus under his law of
justice did not allow preaching to be a separate art but assigned its
precepts to logic or to rhetoric a position which Perkins refuses to
defend. He remarks instead in his preface that preaching "would
remaine naked and poore, if all other arts should call for those things,
which are their owne." 100 His own effort is to restore to preaching
those grammatical, rhetorical, and logical rules that belong to it, and
to ignore Ramus's opposition to such an amalgam. Thus he must be
regarded as a traditionalist in respect to most of his subject matter,
and as a Ramist only in respect to method of presentation and to a
few points of doctrine.
87 Tuke's translation in The VVorkes of That Famous and Worthy Minister of
Christ^ in the Vniversitie of Cambridge M. William Perkins (London, 1613-1616)^
n> 663,
Ibid., p. 670. *Ibid. y p. 673. 100 /^., p. 645-
[ 207 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
As Chaderton is to be reckoned an influence upon Perkins and
Temple, so did Temple and Perkins undoubtedly influence George
Downham, the next scholarly Ramist after Perkins. Downham,
whose father was bishop of Chester, graduated bachelor of arts at
Cambridge in 1585, one year after Perkins was appointed fellow of
Christ's College, and one year after Temple first published his text
and elucidation of the Dialecticae Libri Duo, Thomas Fuller speaks
thus of Downham:
He was bred in Chris ts-colledge in Cambridge, elected Fellow there-
of 1585. and chosen Logick-professor in the University. No man was
then and there better skilPd in Aristotle, or a greater Follower of
Ramus, so that he may be termed the Top-twig of that Branch*
This pun on the Latin meaning of the word "ramus" permits Fuller
to share with Harvey and Drant whatever honors one may allow to
wordplay. 102 Perhaps Fuller deserves a special award for implying
further that Downham's name, downward looking as it is, offers
an amusing contrast to his upward position on the tree of English
Ramism.
The activity of Downham as professor of logic at Cambridge can
be equated with a treatise which he published some years later when
he was soon to begin his term as bishop of Derry in Ireland. That
treatise appeared in Latin at Frankfurt in 1605 and again at the
same place in i6io. 103 The title of the second of these editions would
read thus in English: Commentaries on the Dialectic of P. Ramus,
in which both generally and severally the Perfection of the Ramistic
Doctrine is demonstrated from the Better Authors, the Sense ex-
flained) the Use exhibited. In this work Downham proves himself a
master of the tightfisted style of the logician and of the openhanded
style of the orator. So Fuller believed, at any rate, when he bor-
rowed Zeno's ancient metaphor to speak as follows about Downham's
logical treatise:
It is seldome seen, that the Clunch-fist of Logick (good to knock a
man down at a blow) can so open it self as to smooth and stroak one
101 Thomas Fuller, The History of the Worthies of England (London, 1662), p. 189.
102 See above, pp. 55, 178.
103 There is a copy of the 1605 edition in the Columbia University Library 5 see
Frank Allen Patterson, The Works of John Milton (New York, 1931-1938), xi, 521,
523. The 16 10 edition has the following- title: Commentarii in P. Kami dialecticam^
qulbus ex classicis quibusque auctoribus <praece$torum Rameorum ferfectio demonstrate >
sensus expticatur* usus exfomtur (Francofurti, 1610).
[ 208 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
with the Palme thereof. Our Dounham could doe both, witness the
Oration made by him at Cambridge, (preposed to his book of Log-
ick) full of Flowers of the choicest eloquence.*
Commentaries in Latin and English on Ramus's Dialecticae Libri
Duo, and Latin editions of that same work, continued to be pro-
duced in England for more than sixty years after the date of Down-
ham's "book of Logick:." Alexander Richardson, who was a member
of Queen's College, Cambridge, when Downham resided at Christ's,
delivered a course of lectures on various subjects at his alma mater
after he became master of arts in 1587, and evidently was so well
regarded by his hearers that many of them took down what he said
and passed his teachings on to others in the form of notes. These
notes were published twice at London during the seventeenth cen-
tury under the title of The Logicians School-Master^ Samuel
Thomson, a London bookseller, who brought out the second of these
editions with many items that had not been included in the first, de-
votes a preface to Richardson, acknowledging his insight into all the
branches of learning, and his dedication to the arts. These arts Rich-
ardson would have greatly improved, observes Thomson, had his
health been better, and had he claimed for himself what was really
his. As a tribute to his lectures at Cambridge on many subjects,
Thomson remarks upon the happiness of the student "who could
make himself Master of Richardson's Notes." He adds:
But among many other Notes of his those of his Commentary on
Ramus Logick were most generally prized and made use of by young
Students: whereof (though long since printed) there are many Copies
in Manuscript still in being 5 and indeed it was his Logick whereby,
as by a Key, he opened the secrets of all other Arts and Sciences, to
the admiration of all that heard him. 106
104 Fuller, Worthies^ p. 189.
105 The title page of the first edition reads thus: "The logicians School-Master: or,
a comment vpon Ramvs Logicke. By Mr. Alexander Richardson sometime of Queenes
Colledge in Cambridge. London, Printed for lohn Bellamie, at the three golden Lyons
in Cornhill. 1629." There is a copy of this edition in the Cambridge University Li-
brary. The title of the second edition indicates the items that had not been printed in
the first: "The Logicians School-Master: or, A Comment upon Ramus Logick. By Mr.
Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are
added. His Prelections on Ramus his Grammer$ Taleiis his Rhetorick\ Also his Notes
on Physicks, Etkicks, Astronomy^ Medicine? and O-pticks. Never before Published. Lon-
don: Printed by Gartrude Daivson, and are to ... by Sam. Thomson at the White-Hor
. . . PauPs Church-yard. 1657." (The title page of the copy which I used at the Harvard
Library is torn off at the corner and thus my transcript of it is incomplete as indicated
by the dots.)
ice j*^ Logicians School-Master (1657), sig. A3
[ 209 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Richardson's sense of the value of Ramistic logic in relation to the
other arts upon which he lectured is shown by the fact that in the
second edition of his notes some 351 pages are devoted to a com-
mentary upon Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo^ whereas the comments
on grammar, rhetoric, physics, ethics, astronomy, medicine, and
optics cover a total of 159 pages, more than 50 of which are given
to rhetoric. Richardson's method in respect to logic is to quote a few
lines of Ramus's doctrine in Latin and to explain them in Latin-
studded English. Quite often his explanations proceed by stating
and answering objections which other scholars, such as Keckermann,
for example, had urged against Ramus. 107 If Thomson is correct in
implying that many manuscript copies of Richardson's notes on
Ramus were still circulating when the second edition of The Logi-
cians School-Master appeared, then 1657 must be accepted as a date
well before the end of Ramus's influence in England.
There is also evidence of an active scholarly interest in Ramus in
the decade before that in which the second edition of Richardson's
notes was published. A good indication of this interest is provided
by a vest-pocket edition of the Dialecticae Libri Duo made at Cam-
bridge in 1640. Its editor is not identified, but it contains Ramus's
Latin text and his preface to the reader, "recently brought out in this
more distinctive and more correct form for use in schools." 108 Six
years later, as posthumous publications of William Ames, who had
learned Ramism from William Perkins and George Downham at
Christ's College in the middle fifteen-nineties, there appeared two
little works from the Cambridge press entitled Demonstratio Logicae
Verae and Theses Logicae* The first of these is made up of six-
107 Ibid.^ pp. 4z, 57, 61, etc.
1Q8 The title page of the copy at the Folger Shakespeare Library reads thus: "P.
Kami Veromandui, Regii Professoris, Dialecticae Libri duo; Recens in usum Scholarum
hac forma distinctius & emendatius excusi. Cantabrigiae, Ex ofEcina Rogeri Danielis,
almae Academiae Typography CIDBCXL. Et veneunt per Petrum Scarlet."
1 **The Yale University Library has a volume in which these two works are bound
with four other treatises by Ames. The first two treatises in this volume are paged
together, and are called Technometria and Alia Technometriae. The third treatise is
the Demonslratio Logicae Verae. It has its own pagination, and a title page which reads :
"Gulielmi Amesii Demonstratio Logicae Verae. Cantabrigiae, Ex officina Rogeri Danielis>
almae Academiae Typography 1646." Next after it is the Disputatio Theologian adversus
MetapMcamt with its own title page and date (1646), but with pagination continued
from the preceding treatise. The fifth treatise is the Disputatio Theologica y De Per-
fect'tone SS. Scriptzera^ with its own title page, dated at Cambridge in 1646, and its
own pagination. Last is the Qmlielm Ametii Theses Logicae^ with no title page or
date of its own* and with its pagination continued from the preceding treatise. The
Demonstratio Logicae Verae was first published at Leiden in 1632, but I have not seen
that edition. A copy of it is listed in Gewmtkatalog der Preussischen Bibttotheken> s.v.
[ 210 }
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
teen introductory and 129 later propositions, along with a conclu-
sion, the whole being an explanation of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri
Duo. The Theses Logicae is devoted to the same end, and it pro-
ceeds by setting forth a sequence of more than 350 short logical defi-
nitions, principles, and laws.
Ameses Demonstrate Logicae Verae and the vest-pocket text of
the Dialecticae Libri Duo reappear once more in the history of Ra-
mism in England. The latter work was combined with George Down-
ham's Latin commentary upon Ramus's Latin logic and published
at the press of John Redmayne at London in i669. 110 Some idea of
the relation between Ramus and his scholarly commentators is indi-
cated by the fact that in this volume the Dialecticae Libri Duo oc-
cupies only 54 pages, whereas the Downham commentary runs to
481 pages of text and several pages of introduction and supplement.
Included in the introductory matter is the address which Downham
delivered at Cambridge in 1590 as professor of logic, and which
Fuller thought to be a splendid example of discourse at once tight and
open. 111 As for Ames's Demonstrate Logicae Verae y it was repub-
lished at Cambridge in 1 672 in combination with the text of Ramus's
Dialecticae Libri Duo, the Amesian propositions being on this occa-
sion distributed at appropriate intervals throughout the parent
work. 112
Much of our story of the Ramist scholars in England has thus far
involved Christ's College at Cambridge. The line of Ramists who
studied and in almost every case taught at Christ's extends backward
in time from Ames, Downham, and Perkins to Gabriel Harvey and
Laurence Chaderton. After Ames, the line runs to William Chap-
pell and thence to his illustrious pupil, John Milton, who may be
Ames, William, Puritaner, Apparently the Thews Logicae was first published in the
edition at Cambridge in 1646.
110 The title pag-e reads : "P. Kami Veromandui Regii Professoris Dialecticae Libri
Duo: Recent in usum Scholarum hac forma distinctius & emendatius excvsi* Cum Coxn-
mentariis Georgii Dounami Annexis. Londini, Ex Officina Johannh Redmayne, & veneunt
per Robertum Nicholson ^ Henricum Dickinson Cantabrigiae Bibliopolas. MDCLXIX, W
This work is mistakenly listed by Donald Wing, Short-Title Catalogue of Books Printed
in England^ Scotland* Ireland, Wales, and British America and of English Books Printed
in other Countries 1641-1700 (New York, 1945-1951), s.v. La Ramee, Pierre de. Wing-
places its publication at Cambridge.
111 See above, pp. 208-209.
112 'pjjg t j t j e p a g- reads: "P. Kami Veromandui Regii Professoris, Dialecticae Libri
duo: Quibus loco Commentarii perpetui post certa capita subjicitur, Guilielmi Amesii
Demonstratio Logicae Verae, Simul Cum Synopsi ejusdem, qua uno intuitu exhibetur
Tota Ars bene Disserendi. Cantabrigiae* Ex Officina Joann. Hayes* Celeberrimae Aca-
demiae Typography 1672. Impensis G. Morden^ Bibliopolae, J>
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
counted not only the most celebrated but also the last of England's
Ramist scholars.
Chappell was a student at Christ's when Ames was serving there
as tutor and fellow. Thus these two men were thrown together in
the first few years of the seventeenth century. Ames was forced to
resign his fellowship in 1610, his withdrawal being occasioned by the
intemperance of his advocacy of puritanism. 113 Not long before that
date, Chappell was appointed to a fellowship at Christ's, and he held
that position for twenty-seven years, after which he became bishop
of Cork, In 1648, just one year before his death 3 he published at
London an anonymous Latin treatise on preaching, the Methodus
Concionandi. This was published in an English version under Chap-
pelPs name in 1656 as The Preacher^ The person who made the
English translation cannot be certainly identified, but he may well
have been the original author himself. Indeed, the "Phil. Christian-
us" who signed the preface to the translation implies that Chappell
alone was responsible for its authorship.
ChappelPs procedure in The Preacher is not unlike that already
described above in the discussion of Perkins's Arte of Pro^phecying.
That is to say, Chappell arranges his materials by definition and by
dichotomies, and on one occasion makes direct use of the places of
Ramus's theory of dialectical invention $ but he does not otherwise
incur obligations to Ramistic logic and rhetoric. Thus he defines the
"Method of Preaching" as "a discourse upon a Text of Scripture,
disposing its parts according to the order of nature, whereby, the
accord of them, one with the other may be judged of, and contained
in memory,'* 115 He divides this method into two parts, that of doc-
trine and that of use. 116 He divides doctrine into preparation and
handling. 117 He divides preparation into entering the place where the
doctrine is and placing the doctrine itself. 118 After he has sufficiently
113 Mullinger, University of Cambridge^ II, 510-511.
114 The title page reads: "The Preacher, or the Art and Method of Preaching-: shew-
ing- The most ample Directions and Rules for Invention, Method, Expression, and
Books whereby a Minister may be furnished with such helps as may make him a Useful
Laborer in the Lords Vineyard. By William Chappell Bishop of Cork^ sometime
Fellow of Christs College in Cambridge. . . . London, Printed for Ed.w. Farnham, and
are to be sold at his shop in Popes-head Palace neer Corn-hill, 1656." There is a
copy of this work in the McAlpin collection in the Union Theological Seminary.
No translator is mentioned in connection with the entry of this work in the Stationers'
Registers. See [George E. B. Eyre and Charles R. Rivington], A Transcript of the
Registers of the WorMpful Company of Stationers; from 1640-1708 A. D. (London,
1913-1914), n, 93. The entry is dated October 23, 1656.
115 The Preacher (1656), p. i. " Ibid., p. 3 .
p. 4- 118 /^.,p. 4.
[ 212 ]
RAMTJS^S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
considered doctrine as his first main topic, he turns to the topic of
use, and this he discusses both in general and in particular, the latter
head being broken down into the concerns of the mind and the con-
cerns of the heart. Of those uses "which have respect to the heart, or
will, and affections," 119 he mentions what bears upon the present
state of feelings and what bears upon their future state. He speaks of
reproving and of comforting as procedures to be followed in respect
to present distempers of feeling; and as a method for reproving
someone, he recommends the standard places of Ramus's program
for dialectical invention. True, he covers eight of these standard
places, 120 where Ramus had covered ten. But it takes no great in-
genuity to see that Ramus's ten places are covered by ChappelPs
eight. Both men agree upon causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, op-
posites, and comparatives as the first six of what Ramus calls argu-
ments and what Chappell calls "heads of the aggravations of sin." 121
After that point Chappell begins to take liberties with Ramistic doc-
trine, as most Ramists were certain sooner or later to do. Thus he
combines under his seventh heading the topics of name, division, and
definition, whereas these three in Ramus had been discussed as the
seventh, the eighth, and the ninth places. But agreement prevails
between Chappell and Ramus at the end of the list, nevertheless, for
both give last place to testimony.
One of ChappelPs chief claims to fame among literary historians
is that he is reputed to have whipped his pupil John Milton towards
the end of the latter's freshman year at Christ's College. 122 The actu-
ality of this incident has been questioned by the friends and defended
by the detractors of Milton, but there seems to be no doubt that
Chappell was Milton's tutor from April 1625 to March 1626 and
that some trouble between them terminated their relationship and
caused Milton to be transferred to the supervision of another tutor,
Nathaniel Tovey. 123
Milton's interest in Ramistic logic probably began during his asso-
ciation with Chappell. After all, the latter can be proved to be a
moderate Ramist, and logic is one of the subjects which Milton
would have had to study during his first years at the university.
Moreover, it is highly likely that Tovey was also a Ramist and
119 Ibid., p. 153. 120 /i<, pp. 166-179. 121 /*<., p. 166.
122 For a discussion of this episode, see David Masson, The Life of John Milton
(Cambridge and London, 1859-1880), I, 135-145.
I, 141.
[ 213 3
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
would not have changed the direction of Milton's logical studies
when the latter became his pupil. Tovey is known to have been
lecturer in logic at Christ's in 1621, the first year o his tenure as
fellow of that college. 124 Thus he would certainly have been ac-
quainted with the contemporary movements in logical theory, and
would certainly have been impelled to regard favorably the en-
thusiasm of his own college and university for Ramus. Unfortunately,
however, Tovey left no publications to establish his Ramism as fact.
Anyway, it is certain that Milton knew of Ramus's logic as early as
1627, when he was completing his sixth college term. On March 2,6
of that year, as scholars now fix the date, Milton wrote a letter to
his childhood preceptor, Thomas Young, remarking that "to express
sufficiently how much I owe you were a work far greater than my
strength, even if I should ransack all those hoards of arguments
which Aristotle or which that Dialectician of Paris has amassed, or
even if I should exhaust all the fountains of oratory." 128 The refer-
ence to "that Dialectician of Paris," as Masson originally sug-
gested, 126 is of course a reference to Ramus, and it not only estab-
lishes Milton's knowledge of that author but it also suggests his
contemporaneous familiarity with the practical applications of Aris-
totelian and Ramistic inventional theory in the problem of compos-
ing a discourse.
Forty-five years were to elapse before Milton published a Latin
text and his own Latin exposition of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo.
That work, as it appeared at a London press in 1 672, is called Joan-
nis M.iltoni Angli^ Artis Logicae Plenior Institutio^ Ad Petri Rami
Methodwm condnnata* On the only occasion when it was trans-
lated into English, its title was rendered as A fuller institution of the
Art of Logic > arranged after the method of Peter Ramus , by John
Milton, an Englishman? 2 * As for its date of composition, it doubt-
I, 1 06, See also Alumni CanUtbrigienses^ Pt. I, s.v. Tovy, Nathaniel.
^ i2 Patterson, The Works of John Milton, xii, 5. The date of this letter is usually
given as March 26, 1625, bat opinion now supports a date exactly two years later. See
William R. Parker, "Milton and Thomas Young, 1620-1628," Modern Language Notes,
Lin (1938), 399-407.
***L*fe of Milton^ I, 123.
127 The title page continues: "Adjecta est Praxis Annalytica & Petri Rami vita. Libris
duobus. Londini, Impensis Sfencer Hickman^ Societatis Regalis Typography ad insigne
Rosae in Caemeterio, Z>. Fault. 1672." There is a copy of this work in the Princeton
University Library.
128 The translator is Allan H. Gilbert in Patterson> The Works of John Milton,
XI. All of my English quotations from Milton's Artis Logicae Plenior Institutio are in
Gilberts translation, which I cite as Gilbert and use with the kind permission of the
Columbia University Press.
IN ENGLAND
less belongs among Milton's early works. Masson is almost certainly
right in his guess that it was "sketched out in Milton's university days
at Cambridge, between his taking his B.A. degree and his passing as
M.A." 129 Two anti-Trinitarian statements in the work have been
cited to suggest that it was written after 1641, since at about that
time Milton is believed to have lost faith in the doctrine of theTrin-
ity. 130 But of course those statements could have been inserted dur-
ing the sixteen-forties into a work mostly finished at an earlier date.
Masson J s conjecture, which would place the composition of the work
between the years 1629 and 1632, is supported by the reflection that
a treatise like The Art of Logic belongs to a university environment,
as the whole history of' Ramistic scholarship in England demon-
strates time and again j and that, with Milton as author, the treatise
would thus be the direct product of his recent undergraduate train-
ing in Ramus and of a tradition at Christ's in his day to carry on
Ramistic studies as part of one's advanced scholarship. In fact, Down-
ham's Commentaries represented to Milton's generation at Christ's
the best previous scholarship on Ramus by an alumnus of that col-
lege, and Downham's Commentaries are Milton's only domestic
source for his Art of Logic - 131
But Milton wished to improve Downham, not to copy him. The
latter, as we have seen, initially published his Commentaries without
giving his readers the benefit that would have come if he had also
included the text of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo. Milton de-
termined to avoid that sort of thing. At the same time, he determined
to avoid publishing a mere text of Ramus's logic, since that was too
brief to be clear. He begins the preface to his Art of Logic by saying
that he together with Sidney believed Peter Ramus to be the best
writer on this art. He observes, with a hidden reference to Ramus*s
law of justice, that "other logicians, in a sort of unbridled license,
commonly confound physics, ethics, and theology with logic/' 132 He
goes on to say that Ramus, as the many commentaries on him will
testify, sought too earnestly for brevity and thus fell short "not
exactly of clarity but yet of copiousness of clarity, for in the pres-
entation of an art it should not be scrimped but full and abun-
of Milton^ vi, 685.
130 This view is adopted and explained by Franklin Irwin> "Ramistic Logic in MiU
ton's Prose Works" (unpubl. diss Princeton, 194.1), pp. 29-33. See also G, C. Moore
Smith, W A Note on Milton's Art of Logicf* The Review of English Studies^ XIII (1937),
335-340*
131 Gilbert, pp. 520-521. 132 Ibid*, p. 3.
E
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
dant." 133 Then he explains how his present work is designed to give
the precepts of Ramus along with such aids to their understanding
as can be found in Ramus's Scholae Dialecticae and in the Ramistic
commentaries. In this connection he says:
So I have decided that it is better to transfer to the body of the
treatise and weave into it, except when I disagree, those aids to a
more complete understanding of the precepts of the art which must
of necessity be sought in the Scholae Dialecticae of Ramus himself
and in the commentaries o others. For why should we insist on brev-
ity if clarity is to be sought elsewhere? It is better by producing one
work to put together in one place a rather long exposition of a subject
with clarity than with less clarity to explain in a separate commentary
a work that is too brief, although this last has up to the present been
done with no less trouble and much less convenience than if, as now,
the treatise itself was so detailed as to furnish its own explanation. 134
A recent interpreter of Milton's attitude towards Ramism, P. Al-
bert Duhamel, argues that Milton "was never a Ramist except super-
ficially/' and uses as proof, among other considerations, the opening
words of the quotation just given, where Milton promises to explain
Ramism "except when I disagree." 135 It is true that Milton like
every other English Ramist disagrees in some particulars with
Ramus's own logical doctrine, and Duhamel gives a good brief list
of those disagreements as they apply in Milton's case. 136 But it must
always be remembered that Ramus had encouraged disagreement
between himself and his disciples by launching a movement of dis-
agreement between himself and the scholastics. Moreover, it must be
insisted that, while Milton availed himself of opportunities to dis-
agree with Ramusj he did not therefore become either a superficial
Ramist or a covert Peripatetic. Had he wanted to write an Aris-
totelian logic, he would have modeled his work upon such neo-
scholastic logics of his day as Blundeville's The Arte of Logicke,
Smith's Aditvs ad Logicam y or Sanderson's Logicae Artis Compen-
dium. These works show how the scholastics reconstructed Aristo-
telian logic In the light of the reforms of Ramus. 137 If Milton, as
Duhamel contends, is closer to the Peripatetics than to Ramus, he
would obviously have followed these neo-scholastics of the early
p. 3 . *jrf., pp. 3-5.
133 See P. Albert Duhamel, "Milton's Alleged Ramism," PMLA y LXVn (1952), 104.3.
"***!&., p. 104.5.
137 For a discussion of this point, see below, pp. 285-308.
E 216 ]
seventeenth century rather than the Dialecticae Libri Duo and
Downham's Commentaries.
A hidden reference to Ramus's law of justice has already been
pointed out in Milton's preface to his Art of Logic. There is also a
hidden reference in the same place to Ramus's law of wisdom and
law of truth.
The law of wisdom, as we know, applied in part to the method
of organizing a discourse j and it required in this context that subject
matter be arranged in a descending order of generality. Milton pro-
tests that certain expounders of Ramus had forgotten this law, but
that he will not. His actual words are as follows:
Since many of these expositors, perhaps drawn on by too much zeal
for commenting, reveal a neglect of all proper method astonishing in
them by mixing everything together, the last with the first, and are
accustomed to heap up the axioms, syllogisms, and their rules in the
early chapters that deal with simple arguments, thus necessarily cov-
ering students with darkness rather than furnishing them light, I have
decided first of all to take care that I treated nothing prematurely,
that I mentioned nothing before its proper time as though it were
already explained and understood, and that I dealt with nothing ex-
cept in its place, without fear that any one might judge me too narrow
in my explanation of the precepts of Ramus, while I was trying to set
them forth by lingering over rather than rushing through them. 138
Milton's reference to the law of truth is quite fugitive, so far as
his preface is concerned. This law, we remember, required all pre-
cepts of a science or body of knowledge to be universally true as
opposed to partly true. Milton promises to exclude from his work
all precepts that are not universal or certain. He says:
Yet I should not easily agree with those who object to the paucity of
rules in Ramus, since a great number even of those collected from
Aristotle by others as well as those which they have themselves added
to the heap, being uncertain or futile, impede the learner and burden
rather than aid him, and if they have any usefulness or show any wit,
it is of such a sort as any one might more easily understand by his
native ability than learn by means of so many memorized canons. 139
A recurrent theme of the Ramists is that they were seeking to re-
form Aristotelianism, not to destroy it. 140 Thus they protested that
133 Gilbert, p. 5. 139 Ibid., p. 5.
140 See for example Macllmaine's view as quoted above, p. 180.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
their views were not really novel, that in fact they used Aristotle as
their authority* Milton is no exception to this general practice. He
says in his preface:
Our common addition of the authority of Aristotle and other old
writers to the separate rules of logic would be wholly superfluous in
the teaching of the art, except that the suspicion of novelty which
until now has been strongly attached to Peter Ramus ought to be re-
moved by bringing up these testimonies from ancient authors. 141
After his preface, Milton sets forth Ramus's logical precepts, book
by book, and topic by topic, adding his own comments, registering his
own disagreements, and citing a few of his own examples from such
sources as Francis Bacon, Christian history, and the Bible. 142 Of par-
ticular interest in the work as a whole is his direct explanation of
Ramus's three laws and of Ramistic method. 143 At the end of the
treatise he adds "An Analytic Praxis of Logic from Downham" and
a brief "Life of Peter Ramus" from John Thomas Freigius. 14 * The
latter item tells of Ramus's ancestry, his audacious criticism of Aris-
totle, his academic troubles, the suppression of his two earliest works,
the intervention of the cardinal of Lorraine on his behalf, his tem-
porary triumph, and the agitations of his final years; but his con-
version to Protestantism is treated by Freigius only in guarded ref-
erences, as if it were completely disconnected from the development
and formulation of Ramus's dialectic.
The influence of Ramus upon Milton's habits as controversialist
and poet has been in part explored. Franklin Irwin's unpublished
Princeton dissertation, "Ramistic Logic in Milton's Prose Works,"
identifies Ramistic characteristics in Milton's tractates and pamphlets
and in his De Doctrina Christiana above all. Leon Howard has shown
the parallelism between Milton's Art of Logic and the theme and
purpose of Paradise Lost.* Then, too, as I mentioned before, there
is at least one modern critic who speaks of Milton's alleged Ramism
and who considers it important to detach Milton from Ramistic in-
fluences almost entirely, as if his prose were deliberately Aristotelian
and his Art of Logic a redaction of the work of scholastic logicians
rather than of Ramus's reformed scholasticism. 146 Whatever may be
pp. 7-9- "/*., pp. 25, 37, 43-
s ****** PP ' 37-33 471-4*5- 1 **/W^., pp. 487-495 497-515.
145 Leon Howard, " 'The Invention' of Milton's <Great Argument' : A Study of the
Logic of < God's Ways to Men,' " The Hunttngton Library Quarterly, ix (February
194.6), 149-173.
l4 This critic is P, Albert Duhamel in the article cited above, p. 216, note 135.
[ 218 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
the ultimate view, however, of the connection between Milton's
great eloquence and the canons of Ramistic dialectic, it is safe to say
that his Art of Logic shows a scholar's basic support of Ramus's
canons, and a scholar's awareness of the dependence of those canons
upon the final authority of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Thus
Milton belongs among the learned Englishmen who kept Ramism
alive in their native intellectual circles between 1574 an ^ 1672.
It remains for us to look at the frequent attempts in that same
period to keep Ramism alive for the Englishmen who read no Latin
or who preferred their learning in the vernacular. On their behalf
seven free versions of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo appeared dur-
ing the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and these must be added
to the learned works just described if the full extent of Ramism in
England is to be understood. These seven, of course, include Mac-
Ilmaine's Logike^ and that has already been sufficiently discussed.
But the others have also their points of interest and eccentricity.
In the year 1584, just three years after the second edition of Mac-
Ilmaine's translation had been published, Dudley Fenner brought
out at a continental press an anonymous work called The Artes of
Logike and Rethorike?*' The logical doctrine in this treatise is an
unacknowledged translation of the main heads of Ramus's Dialec-
ticae Libri Duo, although these heads are illustrated, not from the
classical authors whom Ramus used, but from the Bible. As for Fen-
ner's rhetorical doctrine, it will be explained in the next section of
this chapter as the first English translation of the main heads of
Talaeus's Rhetorica. On this latter account alone, Fenner's work
possesses special interest in the history of Ramism in England. But
it also possesses special interest as the first attempt to join together
in one English volume the reformed logic and the reformed rhet-
oric of the Ramists. Here between two covers the unlearned Eng-
lishman could read for the first time the entire Ramistic theory of
communication, even as Thomas Wilson had made it possible for the
147 The title page reads thus: "The Artes of Log-ike and Rethorike, plainlie set
foorth in the English toungej easie to be learned and practised: together with examples
for the practise of the same for Methode, in the gouernement of the familie, prescribed
in the word of God: And for the whole in the resolution or opening- of certayne partes
of Scripture, according- to the same. 1584." This work was published at Middelburg by
Richard Schilders about the time when Fenner began serving as chaplain to the English
merchants of that city. A second edition, probably published in 1588, bears the imprint
of Schilders and identifies the author as "M. Dvdley Fenner, late Preacher of the
worde of God In Middlebrugh."
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
unlearned of the previous generation to read within two volumes the
whole of scholastic logic and Ciceronian rhetoric.
Since Fenner had entered Peterhouse College at Cambridge in
1575, he may be numbered among the Cambridge Ramists, although
he did not complete his college course, thanks to his expulsion for
puritan tendencies. 148 No man of his time had a greater desire than
he to unlock the learned arts from the iron enclosure of Greek and
Latin. In the preface to the first edition of The Artes of Logike and
Rethorike he defends himself against the criticism of those who deem
it inexpedient to popularize matters "which are wonte to sit in the
Doctors Chayre." 149 Let not learned men strive, he warns, to keep
learning rare and excessively dear, "least the people curse them?^
Since it is true, he adds, that "the common vse and practise of all
men in generall, both in reasoning to the purpose, and in speaking
with some grace and elegancie, hath sowen the seede of these artes,
why should not all reape where all haue sowen?"
Fenner next defends himself in this preface against the charge
that his treatises will seem "newer then the newest" and will invite
objection because he has made changes in the accepted body of doc-
trine. He does not openly name Ramus as his authority at this point
or elsewhere in his work. But he did not need to, so far as his own
contemporaries were concerned. They would have seen, as modern
scholars have not always done, that Fenner was working within the
accepted body of Ramistic doctrine, and that the changes which his
preface refers to and discusses are not unlike the minor changes made
by most other good Ramists when they were seeking to promulgate
their master's teachings.
One change which Fenner justifies in his preface and incorporates
in his first treatise concerns the definition of logic. "Logike," he
says, "is an arte of reasoning." 151 This definition, he earlier remarks,
satisfies the requirements by having "an arte" as its true general, and
"of reasoning" as its true full difference. 152 It does not need the addi-
tion of "well" to make it more perfect, he argues, inasmuch as the
end of anything is not a necessary part of its definition. Another
change which he argues for in the preface and inserts later in his
Logike consists in the arrangement of arguments into two 1 categories,
"firste and arising of the firste," the latter category being then di-
148 Thomas Alfred Walker, A Biographical Register of Peterhouse Men (Cambridge,
1927-1930), II, 6-7. See also Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Fenner, Dudley.
149 Sig. Azr. 15 Si. Azv. 151 Sig. Bir. 132 Sig. Azv.
[ 22O ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
vided into "more artificiall and lesse artificiall." 153 Ramus, it will be
remembered, had been content merely to divide arguments into arti-
ficial and inartificial, or more accurately into artistic and non-artis-
tic. 154 Still another change which Fenner records in his preface and
in his ILogike concerns the argument of cause. Ramus. had listed four
types of this argument, that of final cause, of formal cause, of effi-
cient cause, and of material cause. 155 Fenner lists two types, one of
which contains Ramus's first and third collapsed into a single head-
ing, and the other, Ramus's second and fourth. 156 Fenner says that
this difference between himself and the accepted tradition is a distinct
gain in logical theory, and he certainly believes that the same thing
is true of his other changes. But now all his changes seem less like
improvements than like capricious variations in a pattern that re-
fuses to lose its dominant familiar contours.
What Fenner does with the subject of method is a good example
of his adherence to the familiar outlines of Ramism. He recognizes,
as Macllmaine had scarcely managed to do, 1ST that the Ramistic
theory of method involves an analysis of "the best and perf ectest" as
well as "the worst & troublesomest" ways of handling matter. Ac-
cording to the perfect way, which would be that followed in learned
writing, "the definition of that whiche is to bee handled, must be
firste set downe, and then the diuision of the same into the members,
and the generall properties of the same, and then the diuerse sortes
of it, if there be aniej so proceeding vntill by fitte and apte passages
or transitions, the whole be so farre handled, that it can be no more
deuided." 158 This kind of arrangement, called by Ramus the natural
method, is said by Fenner to be "so agreeable to reason, and easie to
be practised" that it "is for the most parte followed of all writers or
speakers." Yet writers or speakers may change, alter, or hide it ac-
cording to their subject, the time, the place, and such circumstances.
When they do change it, they adopt what Ramus called the pru-
dential method, and what Fenner calls "the hyding or concealing,
or crypsis of Methode." Those who follow this latter way, adds Fen-
ner, "leaue out the former orderly placing of Definitions, Diuisions,
and Transitions, and do take in diuers repetitions, declarations, mak-
ings lightsome, enlargings, or amplifications, prouings of the thing,
preuenting of obiections, outgoing from the matter, called digres-
sions, as it shall make most fitte for their purpose."
158 Sigs. Azv-A^r, Bir. 154 See above, p. 155. 155 Dialectiqve (1555), pp. 6-zo.
156 Sig. Biv-Bzr. 157 See above, pp. 182-183. 15S Sig. Dir.
THE ENGLISH RAMJSTS
While Fenner was an undergraduate at Cambridge, or shortly
thereafter, a young man named Abraham Fraunce entered St. John's
College of the same university. Fraunce took the degree of bachelor
of arts in 1579-80, and was at once appointed fellow of his college.
During the next three years, as he worked towards his master's de-
gree, he began to write what was ultimately to become the third Eng-
lish version of the main doctrine of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo.
Fraunce's earliest steps in this direction consisted in a little trea-
tise in praise of logic, and another which compared Ramus's logical
theory with that of Aristotle. These two works were followed almost
at once by a third^ which Fraunce called The Sheapheardes Logike.
Fraunce never published these early works, but the British Museum
has them all in a manuscript dating from the early fifteen-eighties. 159
The manuscript reveals that the comparison between Ramus and
Aristotle is dedicated by Fraunce to "his verye good Master and
Patron M r . P. Sydney." It reveals also that The Shea*pheardes
Logike contains three things: "the praecepts of that art put downe
by Ramus; examples fet owt of the Sheapheards Kalender 5 notes and
expositions collected owt of Beurhusius, Piscator, Mr. Chatterton
and diuers others." The fact that The Sheapheardes Logike derives
many quotations and even its title from Edmund Spenser's The
Sh&pheardes Calender ^ at that moment a very recent new book, gives
the Fraunce manuscript a special literary interest. But it also has
special interest for the historian of Ramism in England. The Chat-
terton mentioned in connection with its notes and expositions is none
other than Laurence Chaderton, one of the earliest expounders of
Ramus at Cambridge. As indicated above, 180 Chaderton never pub-
lished anything on Ramistic logic under his own name 5 but he was
still lecturing on that subject to the students of Fraunce's undergrad-
uate generation, and doubtless to Fraunce himself. Thus it is highly
probable that the only surviving fragments of his widely popular
lectures are now to be found in Fraunce's logical writings, particu-
larly The Sheafheardes Logike.
Fraunce's interest veered from literature to law after he took his
master's degree In 1583, and so he changed his abode from St. John's
College to Gray's Inn. For the next few years he worked upon the
w* For a description of this manuscript, see Catalogue of Additions to the Manu-
scripts in the BrtesA Museum m the years MDCCCLXXXVIII-MDCCCXCIII (Lon-
don* 1894-), pp. 32*-3.
lfl See above, p. 179.
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
English common law. In 1588, some five years after he left Cam-
bridge, and almost seven years after his first attempts to write on
logical theory, he published his version of the precepts of Ramus,
adding many legal illustrations to his previous quotations from Spen-
ser, and calling his work The Lawiers Logike^ This book is the first
systematic attempt in English to adapt logical theory to legal learn-
ing and to interpret Ramism to lawyers.
The union of law and logic is proclaimed in Fraunce's title, but
this is merely the beginning of his efforts to keep his readers aware
of his novel combination of disciplines. A twelve-line stanza on the
page that precedes his preface celebrates the same union. This stanza
dedicates the work to Henry, Earl of Pembroke, and speaks in part
as follows of its author's basic design:
I say no more then what I saw, I saw that which I sought,
I sought for Logike in our Law, and found it as I thought.
The preface that immediately follows these verses is addressed to
"the Learned Lawyers of England, especially the Gentlemen of
Grays Inne," and it supports in full what has just been said of the
history of Fraunce's concern for logic. But it adds several circum-
stances of interest. For example, it says that the two short treatises
which came before The Sheapheardes Logike were begun "when I
first came in presence of that right noble and most renowmed knight
sir Philip Sydney." 182 "These small and trifling beginnings," adds
Fraunce, "drewe both him to a greater liking of, and my selfe to a
further trauayling in, the easie explication of Ramus his Logike."
In addition to this fact about Sidney, the preface also tells us that
the present work has been redone six times in the past seven years,
thrice while Fraunce was still at St. John's, and thrice during his
residence at Gray's Inn. The preface also tells us something of the
concern of a university man about to embark upon a legal career
something of his doubt that his eight years at Cambridge would turn
to profit at an inn of court, something of his anxiety as to "wheather
Law were without Logike or Logike not able to helpe a Lawyer." 1 **
"Which when I prooued," he remarks, "I then perceaued, the prac-
181 His title page reads: "The Lawiers Logike, exemplifying- the praecepts of Log-ike
by the practise of the common Lawe, by Abraham Fraunce. At London, Imprinted by
William How, for Thomas Gubbin, and T. Newman. 1588." For a brief comparison
between the manuscript version and the printed version of this work, see the catalogue
cited above in note 159.
182 The Lawiers Logike y sig. fr. 16a Ibid. y sig. TV.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
tise of Law to bee the vse of Logike, and the methode of Logike to
lighten the Lawe." Thus the preface reconciles Fraunce's two edu-
cations. But with an instinct for the appeasement of readers who
would not want to encumber their minds with law as the price for
mastering Ramus's logic, Fraunce reassures them by saying, "I haue
reteyned those ould examples of the new Shepheards Kalender,
which I first gathered, and therevnto added thease also out of our
Law bookes, which I lately collected." 164
This observation prompts Fraunce to defend himself now quite
openly for abandoning philosophy at St. John's in favor of law at
Gray's Inn. It is plain from what he says that philosophy is deemed
the more glamorous and aristocratic pursuit, law the more bourgeois.
In an effort to correct the errors within this attitude, he emphasizes
that philosophy, especially in its logical branch, is illustrated re-
peatedly in the law, as Cicero had amply demonstrated in the Topics j
and he urges that philosophy, ordinarily counted a delicate, con-
ceited, and elegant learning by people who did not distinguish "be-
tweene the brauery of a Midsommers Comencement, and the seauen
yeares paynes of a Maister of arts," was in sober fact a taxing and
difficult study, capable of producing a "perpetuall vexation of Spirite,
and continuall consumption of body, incident to euery scholler." 165
Turning next to the other side of his case, Fraunce defends the law
against the charge that it is hard, unsavory, rude, and barbarous. He
believes it to be only in need of good teachers, good discipline, and
good students recruited from the universities.
The concluding section of Fraunce's preface is devoted to a de-
fense of Ramistic logic against what he characterizes as "the impor-
tunate exclamations of a raging and fireyfaced Aristotelean." This
Aristotelian, seeing Ramus's logic to be highly esteemed, cries out
against it in arguments that are in one sense the ageless outcry of old
men against the innovations of the young, and in another sense a
lament for the decline of Aristotle, for the spread of education to the
masses, and for the profanation of the temple of learning by the
lower middle class. Fraunce reports this Aristotelian thus:
Good God, what a world is this? What an age doe wee now lyue in?
A Sopister in tymes past was a tytle of credite, and a woord of com-
mendation 5 nowe what more odious? Aristotle then the father of
Philosophy^ now who lesse fauoured? Ramus rules abroade, Ramus
le4 Ibid.* sig, f v. 165 Ibid., sig. f av-T 3 r.
[ 224 ]
at home, and who but Ramus? Antiquity is nothing but Dunsicality,
& our forefathers inuentions vnprofitable trumpery. Newfangled,
youngheaded, harebrayne boyes will needes bee Maysters that neuer
were Schollersj prate of methode, who neuer knew order; rayle
against Aristotle assoone as they are crept out of the shell. Hereby it
comes to passe that euery Cobler can cogge a Syllogisme, euery Carter
crake of Propositions. Hereby is Logike prophaned, and lyeth prosti-
tute, remooued out of her Sanctuary, robbed of her honour, left of her
louers, rauyshed of straungers, and made common to all, which before
was proper to Schoolemen, and only consecrated to Philosophers. 168
Under Fraunce's satirical distortions this argument may seem less
persuasive than amusing at first 3 but still it cannot be disposed of
simply by ridicule, or deprecated as unable to rally conservative
learning to new resistance against the radicals. Thus Fraunce does
rightly to answer it with partial seriousness:
Coblers bee men, why therefore not Logicians? and Carters haue
reason, why therefore not Logike? Bonum y quo cQmmunius y eo melms^
you say so your selues, and yet the best thing in Logike you make to
be the woorst, in thinking it lesse commendable, because it is more
common. A spytefull speach, and a meaning no lesse malitious, to
locke vp Logike in secreate corners, who, as of her selfe shee is gen-
erally good to all, so will shee particularly bee bound to none. Touch-
ing the gryefe you conceaue for the contempt of Aristotle, it is need-
les and vnnecessary: for, where Aristotle deserueth prayse, who more
commendeth him then Ramus? Where he hath too much, Ramus
cutteth off, where too little, addeth, where any thing is inuerted, hee
bringeth it to his owne proper place, and that according to the direc-
tion of Aristotle his rules. Then, whereas there can bee no Art both
inuented and perfected by the same man, if Aristotle did inuent Log-
ike, as hee perswadeth you, hee did not perfect it, if hee did not
finish it, there is some imperfection, if there bee any want, why then
allow you all? 167
After these words Fraunce immediately closes his preface with
the hope that his readers will derive as much profit from practising
as he has had pleasure in going through "this last explication of
Ramus his Logike." In such a mood he turns from promise to per-
formance and begins the first legal logic in the English language.
His explication of Ramus follows the general pattern of the lat-
ter ? s Dialectiqve and its Latin counterpart, the Dialectics Libri Duo.
160 Ibid., sig. ftzv. 167 Ibid., sig-. ITsr.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Indeed, Fraunce openly stresses that he had these two works before
him as he notes that the second is somewhat differently arranged
from the first. Speaking of the topic of final cause, he thus refers to
both these classics:
Ramus in his French Logike placeth the end first, sith, according to
Aristotle in the second of his Physikes, the ende is first in conceipt
and consideration, though last in execution. But in the last edition of
his Latine Logike hee setteth it in the last place, respecting rather
finem rei^ then efficientis scofum & intentionem^ which last resolu-
tion of his I follow at this present, yet not so resolutely, but that I
can bee content to heare their aduise, who bid vs take heede that we
confound not the finall cause with the thing caused. 168
"I haue in my text kept my selfe," says Fraunce in his second
chapter, "onely to such maximaes both in Inuention and Disposition,
as are put downe orderly by Ramus^ and are essentially belonging to
this art: yet for the satisfiyng of the expectation of some yoong
Logicians, somewhat vnacquainted with this newfound Logike, as it
pleaseth some to tearme it, I will heereafter, as occasion shall serue,
put downe in the annotations, some of the other stampe." 169 These
words are accurate as the statement of a part of Fraunce's procedure
in The Lawiers Logike. His most extensive chapters consist of as
many as five sections. A first section contains Ramist doctrine stated
in English, and this is a continuing element throughout the entire
work. Another section consists of illustrations of Ramus's doctrine,
both from Spenser's English poetry and from the Latin and "Hotch-
pot French" 170 of England's early legal literature* Still another sec-
tion consists of annotations. These are in English or in Latin. Some-
times an annotation will appear to be Fraunce's commentary on
Ramus when in reality it is merely Fraunce's translation of Ramus's
French text. 171 At other times the annotations will be clearly credited
foL ajr. For later references by Fraunce to Ramus's "French Logike," see
foil. 1 1 or and 1 1 jr
16 /, foil. 7 v-8r.
170 This is Fraunce's own phrase, ibid. y sig. T3 r -
1T * A good illustration of this occurs at fol, Z4r, where Fraunce appears to be an-
notating Ramtts*s doctrine concerning the formal and final cause. Says Fraunce: "So euery
naturall thing hath his peculiar forme, as a lyon, a horse, a tree, &c. the hea'uen, the
earth, the sea, &c. So euery artificiall thing also, as a house, a shippe, &c. So things
Incorporall, as vertue, vice, &c. So in a woord, whatsoeuer is, by the formall cause it
is that which it is, and is different from all other things that it is not."
Here is the passage in Ramus's DmUcfiqve (Paris, 1555), P- , from which Fraunce
translates this annotation: "Ainsi toute choses naturelles ont leur forme, comme le Lyon,
le Cheual, PArbre, le Ciel, la Terre: Ainsi les choses artificielles, comme vne maison,
[ 226 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
to their sources, as when open reference is made to such Ramists as
Piscator, Beurhaus, Scribonius, and Talaeus, or to such scholastics as
Sturm, Hotman, Agricola, and Melanchthon. Hotman is cited as
often as any of these, perhaps because his known interest in logic and
his European reputation in the field of legal scholarship provided
Fraunce with a contemporary model for his pioneering attempt to
bring logic and law together in England. 172 It is obvious that Fraunce
intended his annotations to be as important a contribution to Ramism
as were his illustrations. In addition to these two sections, and of
course the actual statement of Ramist doctrine, his chapters contain
nothing that needs to be mentioned, except perhaps for an occasional
section headed canons or rules, and another headed elenchs or re-
buttals. These two sections, however, usually occupy little space in
comparison to the other three.
Like many other Ramists, Fraunce does not reproduce his master's
doctrine without additions and changes. Thus at the end of his fourth
chapter in Book I, he inserts a discussion of logical abuses, which, as
he says, deceive the simple "with a glorious shew of counterfeit rea-
vne nauire: Ainsi semblablement les choses in corporal les, comme la couleur, la chaleur,
la vertu & le vice a sa forme: Ainsi generallement toute chose est ce qu'elle est par sa
forme, & par icelles est separee des autres."
There are many other passages in Fraunce which seem to be his own commentary
on Ramus's doctrine but are in reality translations from Ramus's Dialectiqve. The fol-
lowing table indicates where many of them fall:
The Lafwiers Logike Dialcctiqve
fol. fr Reference to Aristotle's Elenchs p. 2
fol. 5r Reference to Plato's Ttmaeus p. 3
fol. $T Quotation from Parmenides ' p. 3
fol. 5v Aristotle made two logics pp. 34
fol. i6r Aristotle on the Efficient Cause p. 9
fol. i6r Ancient philosophers on Efficient Cause p. 17
fol. i6v Virgil quoted on advantage of knowing causation p. 20
fol. i6v Importance of efficient cause in daily affairs p. 17
fol, iyr 1 7V Aristotle on Fortune & Chance j and also Ovid,
and Cicero, and Epicurus, and Cicero again,
and a pagan poet pp. 1517
fol. 24r Aristotle on the two properties of form p. 7
fol. 24V Aristotle on Pythagorean idea that number is
the cause, Plato on idea as cause pp. & 9
fol. 3ir Parmenio, Philotas, Lentulus, etc. p. 21
fol. 39V Propertius & Ronsard p. 25
foil. 66v &7T Plato's complaint against the use of authority pp. 6465
fol. Sir 8iv Socrates and Aristotle on Menon*s dilemma* pp. 6669
fol. 98 v The syllogism as an arithmetical deduction p. 89
*This borrowing is placed by Fraunce under "Elenchs," not "Annotations."
172 For Hotman's logical theory, see his Dialecticae Institutionis Libri IV (1573), a
copy of which is in the Bibliotheque Nationale of Paris. For a brief discussion of it, see
Rodolphe Dareste, Essai sur Francois Hotman (Paris, 1850), p. 33.
[ 227 3
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
sons, commonly called Fallacians." 173 Fraunce found this doctrine,
not in Ramus's French Dialectiqve^ but in the older scholastic logics.
Again, after his chapter on logical effects, when he would normally
take up next the concept of subject, Fraunce defines and discusses
instead the doctrine of the whole, the part, the genus, and the
species. 174 Readers of Ramus know that he places the doctrine of
these four terms under the category of derivative primary argu-
ments, and deals with them when he speaks of dividing wholes into
parts. 175 Fraunce thus opposes himself to Ramus by placing the four
terms under primary arguments. In his discussion of them, Fraunce
recognizes that it is expedient for him to give some reason "why I
seuer the generall, speciall, whole and parte from the tractate of
diuision, where Ramus placed them." 176 The reason, as he there
states it, is that Talaeus had suggested the primary, as opposed to
the derivative primary, character of the doctrine belonging to these
four terms. This suggestion Fraunce himself elects to follow, even
though Talaeus had ended by not following it. Still again Fraunce
departs from Ramus by discussing the topic of comparatives in a
kind of appendix to the doctrine of invention, not as the last element
in the category of primary arguments. This departure has the effect
of placing such matters as quality, quantity, like, unlike, equal,
greater, and less between the twentieth and twenty-fourth chapters
of Fraunce's first book rather than between the twelfth and the six-
teenth chapters, as a strict adherence to Ramus would have required.
No one should attach particular importance to this or other discrep-
ancies between these two logicians. Fraunce did not make changes
with the idea of becoming a renegade Ramist, nor would any of his
contemporaries have thought him one. Discrepancies between one
Ramist and another are always in evidence, as I have often sug-
gested, and they are to be accepted only as a reminder that they can
exist and flourish without thereby creating any serious divisions
within Ramism as a movement.
Fraunce's attempt to interpret Ramus for lawyers would normally
be expected to suggest the desirability of performing the same task
for preachers. To some extent, of course, Dudley Fenner had had
preachers in mind when he published his translation of Ramus's
Dialectic&e Libri Duo in 1584, although he did not particularly em-
phasize sacred logic beyond providing biblical illustrations for the
173 The Lowers Logike^ fol. z6v. 174 Ibid., foil. 3IV-37V.
175 See above, p. 156. 1Te The Lawitrs Logike^ fol. 351-.
[ 228 ]
RAMUS's DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
doctrines in his source. In the decade following Fenner's work and
Fraunce's The Lawiers Logikej William Perkins, as we have seen, 177
took up the challenge of writing about pulpit oratory in terms rem-
iniscent of Ramus j but while he made preaching his central subject,
as Fenner had not done, he failed to emphasize Ramus's doctrine in
such a way as to make his learned Latin treatise a full commitment
in that direction. The first author to compose in English a full
Ramistic logic for preachers, and to appear to be trying to do for
divines what Fraunce had done for lawyers, published his work in
1620, when Perkins had been dead for eighteen years, and Fraunce
was sixty years old or more. That author was Thomas Granger, him-
self a preacher, who had studied at Peterhouse College, Cambridge,
between 1598 and 1605, an d had received in that time both his
bachelor's and master's degrees.
Granger's Ramistic treatise on preaching is called the Syntagma
Logicvm, that is, The Logic Book, or (to quote the author's own
explanatory subtitle) The Divine Logike? 7 * A Latin preface of seven
pages dedicates the work to Francis Bacon, "a most honorable, most
sagacious, and most learned man." In the main, however, Granger
keeps to his own native language and loses no time in identifying the
text of his work with Ramistic logic. On his title page he sets forth
in Latin an aphoristic definition of each member of the trivium, and
immediately adds in connection with the third definition a pithy com-
parison between the logic of Aristotle and that of Ramus. This com-
parison would read thus in English:
From ancient minerals did pagan Aristotle polish the golden organon.
First to the uses of theology did Christian Ramus with rare judge-
ment accommodate it.
The same comparison, carried somewhat further, is the theme of
an English laudatory stanza that precedes Granger's actual text.
177 See above, pp. 206-207.
178 Its title page reads as f ollows : "Syntagma Logicvm. or, The Divine Log-ike.
Seruing 1 especially for the vse of Diuines in the practise of preaching, and for the
further hetye of judicious Hearers^ and generally for all. By Thomas Granger Preacher
of Gods Word.
Grata quidem ratio est concordi <uoce relata^ Gram.
Gratior est ratio veniens ratione venusta^ Rhet.
Grata ter est ratio veniens ratione $olita. Logic.
E veterum tnlneralibus organon aureum expoliuit Aristoteles e//nicus.
Ad vsum iivprimis Theologicum summo cum iudicio accommodauit Ramus Christianas.
London, Printed by William I ones, and are to be sold by Arthur lohnson^ dwelling 1 in
Pauls Church-yard at the signe of the white Horse. 1620."
[ 229 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
This stanza is one of six appearing at the head of Book I, and it is
first of two English stanzas, the previous four having been in Greek
or Latin. This English stanza reads as follows:
This book's a Garden where doth grow a Tree,
CaPd Logike, fruitfull for Theologie.
The Roote, whose sappe doth vegetate the rest,
Is Aristotle height, because the best.
The Boughes & Branches growing thence, are Ramus,
Douname, Beurhusius, Temple, and Polanus,
And here and there, some other fruits doe grow,
Of pleasant taste, and of delightfull show.
Each reader may this Garden make his owne,
(And many will no doubt, when it is knowne.)
Then giue the price, (but small) to them that sell,
And thanke the Gardner dressing it so well. 179
It is impossible to say that this description of The Divine Logike
reflects Granger's own exact view of the connection between his work
and that of the Ramists. After all, the stanza just quoted is unsigned,
and the one just before and just after it bear the name of John Jones
of Cambridge. 1 * But Granger's similar view is available, neverthe-
less, in his own signed English preface to his work, where he ad-
dresses his readers on the subject of his relation to contemporary
logic. He speaks there of the ancient change that had occurred in
logical theory when logicians, ceasing to be occupied exclusively with
philosophical disputation and its rewards of applause, began to con-
cern themselves with fashioning logic in such a way "that it might
be as apt an instrument for Oratours in pleading, and Rhetoricians
in declaming, as for Philosophers in disputing." 181 Just as the ancient
logicians had adapted logic to philosophers and orators, Granger
goes on, "so the moderne y and newest (according to the necessitie,
condition, and exigence of times) to the practise of Diuines also, both
for the composing of common places, and other tractates, and also for
the interpretation, explication, amplification, and illustration of the
176 The Divine Lagike, sig. a^v. The Polanus referred to here is Amandus Polanus
von Polansdorf, a Prussian, who served as professor of theology at Basel, and whose
work, the Syntagma Theologian Christiana* (Geneva, 1612), probably suggested
Granger's title.
lst> Ths Jones, a member of Caius College, and a bachelor of arts in 1 61^-19, was
son of Granger's printer, William Jones. See Alumni Cantabrigienses, Pt. i, s.v, Joanes,
Joktt-
Divine LogtJee, sig, azr.
[ 230 ]
RAMUS^S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
Diuine text, or any other worke for the benefite of Gods Church." 182
Having thus identified the trend in the logic of his day towards the
needs of the preacher. Granger states his own ambition:
To this end also haue I perused the chiefest and best in this facultie,
and out of their Texts, and Commentaries (as the learned may easily
see) as also from myne owne practise, and experience haue I
composed this worke, therein directly ayming at the benefite, and
helpe of Preachers, and hearers, which haue some vnderstanding al-
readie in the rules of this Art, or that are desirous to attaine to some
knowledge, and practise thereof. 183
The "chiefest and best" logicians to whom Granger here refers do
not remain entirely anonymous throughout his preface. In fact, he
mentions at once the one who to his mind apparently qualifies for
recognition above all other contemporaries Ramus. Speaking of
Ramus as too epitomized to be understood by the unlearned without
a lengthy commentary, and characterizing lengthy commentaries as
too verbose to be useful to the learned who have already mastered
them in epitome, Granger thus defines his special aim:
Therefore I haue heere walked in the middle path, that neither the
skilfull might iustly taxe me with prolixitie, nor the vnskilfull with
breuitie. For this worke is in very deede an Epitome of the best Ex-
positions, and Logicall tractates both old, and new j and againe, Ramus
is an Epitome of this: which being well perused thou shalt finde him
(that seemes so obscure to all) as plaine, and easie, as the a b c. So
that this worke may serue insteed of all commenters, and Ramus him-
selfe for an Epitome. 18 *
The Divine Logike adheres to this statement of purpose. It
emerges as an English epitome of the standard commentaries on
Ramistic logic, to which it adds dashes of scholastic doctrine for good
measure j and it also emerges as an English commentary on the
logical system epitomized in Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo. Of the
two parts of logic it says that the "former is of the purpose, or mat-
ter propounded, whether it bee in minde, word, or writing: the sec-
ond is of iudgement." 185 Argument, an aspect of matter, is considered
as to invention and disposition. 186 Under invention are given the
familiar Ramistic classifications: arguments are "artificiall" or "in-
artificialP'j artificial arguments are "prime" or "primortiue"j prime
182 Ibid., sig. air-azv. 18S Ibid.* sig. aav. 1S * Ibid^ sig.
185 Ibid., p. a. ***lbid^ p. n.
E 231 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
arguments lead ultimately to the consideration of "Cause," "Effect,"
"Subiect," "Adiunct," opposites, comparatives ; primortive argu-
ments lead ultimately to the consideration of reasoning from name,
from divisions, and by definitions - 7 and at last inartificial arguments
lead to the consideration of divine testimonies, human testimonies,
and the like. 187 Books II, III, and IV discuss disposition under the
Ramistic headings of axioms, syllogisms, and method, as Book I had
discussed invention.
Like Fraunce and the other English Ramists, Granger does not
hesitate to take liberties with his basic source. The best illustration
of this, and the only one I shall mention, is to be found in Book V
of The Divine Logike. Here Granger turns to the subject of judg-
ment and fallacies. Ramus did not treat fallacies as a part of logic
when he wrote his Dialectiqve, and judgment was in his view not
only the second grand division of logic but also an exact synonym
of disposition. Granger follows Ramus in making judgment the sec-
ond part of logic, while he departs from Ramus by considering dis-
position as a kind of subdivision of the first part, that is, the part
belonging to the content or matter of discourse. Thus the act of judg-
ing becomes for Granger the act of evaluating a discourse already
devised and arranged. Here is what he says at the very beginning of
Book V on the relations between judgment and disposition:
Ivdgementy is the second part of Logicke, whereby euery proposite,
or oration, is iudged, and censured, whether it be according to Truth,
and sound Reason, or otherwise. It is the Consequent, Effect, and
End of Disposition.
This concept permits Granger to discuss in a subsequent chapter
Ramus's famous three laws, which of course are a standard part of
the second grand division of Ramistic logic. And it permits Granger
also to Introduce the subject of fallacies and refutations for the clos-
ing pages of his work, with the result that he like Fraunce is able to
give his readers the most attractive feature of scholastic logic as an
entity within the system of Ramus.
Six years after the publication of Granger's Divine Logike there
appeared at London a translation of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo
under the name of Antony Wotton. This work is unusual in being
the first English translation of Ramus's logic since Macllmaine's to
"advertise itself on its title page for what it is. It is also unusual in
pp. 11-233.
[ 232 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
having its title page state that Ramus's logical system is basically a
reorganization of scholastic logic. Here are the words used by Wot-
ton to convey these and other points:
The Art of Logick. Gathered out of Aristotle, and set in due forme,
according to his instructions, by Peter Ramus, Professor of Philoso-
phy and Rhetorick in Paris, and there Martyred for the Gospell of
the Lord lesus. With a short Exposition of the Praecepts, by which
any one of indifferent ca^acitie, may with a little paines, attaine to
some competent knowledge and vse of that noble and necessary Sci-
ence. Published for the Instruction of the vnlearned, by Antony
Wotton. 188
It turns out in his preface that Antony Wotton had studied
Ramus's logic more than forty years before, and had found it con-
tinuously useful since. Hence he had appointed his son in Cambridge
to do a translation of it and had given the latter a set of Latin notes
on Ramus^s text as a general guide to the whole undertaking. Those
notes appear in the present book, says Wotton, as the basis of the
exposition of Ramus's doctrine, whereas the present translation of
that doctrine, and the scriptural illustrations, are the work of the son.
The preface does not add that the son's name is Samuel, and that
Samuel was even then a fellow of King's College, having taken his
bachelor's degree in 1625*** Nor does the preface expressly acknowl-
edge that Antony had been student and fellow at King's in the days
of William Temple's appointment at the same college, 190 and prob-
ably had acquired from that distinguished scholar not only his initial
interest in Ramus but also the material for the Latin notes which
Samuel had been given as a way of preparing him to do his transla-
tion. No blame should be attached to Antony, however, for his fail-
ure to mention these facts. After all, what he does say in his preface
makes it sufficiently possible to determine them. Moreover, his own
attainment in years, the nearness of his death, and the quality of his
learning in logic are reasons why the son no doubt preferred to have
the father's name by itself upon the title page of their joint work
on Ramus. 191
Another English translation of the main ideas of Ramus's logic
188 The imprint reads: "London Printed by I. D. for Nicholas Bourne^ and are to be
sold at his shop at the Exchange. 1626."
1S * See Alumni Cantabrigienses, Pt. I, s.v. Wotton, Samuel.
100 See Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Wotton, Anthony (1561? -1626).
1S1 Antony Wotton died December n> 1626. The preface to his Logick is dated May a
of that year.
[ 233 ].
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
appeared at London two years after the one just discussed, and was
unusual in being accompanied by a commentary that attempted to
reconcile Aristotle and Ramus, then to correct the shortcomings of
Ramus wherever he did not agree with Aristotle, and finally to ex-
pound both authors from the writings of the Scholastics. The author
of this ambitious undertaking was Thomas Spencer, and his own title
page is in fact a statement of these three very purposes:
The Art of Logick, Delivered in the Precepts of Aristotle and Ramvs.
Whwerein i. The agreement of both Authors is declared. 2. The de-
fects in Ramus, are supplyed, and his superfluities pared off, by the
Precepts of Aristotle. 3. The precepts of both, are expounded and
applyed to vse, by the assistance of the best Schoolemen. By Tho :
Spencer. 192
In the work lying under this title, Spencer has followed the
method of placing within each chapter, usually at the beginning but
sometimes elsewhere as well, an English translation of doctrine con-
spicuously identified in the adjacent margin as from Ramus 5 and of
proceeding then to confirm and explain that doctrine by reference to
ancient and recent logicians. Aristotle's Organon is his chief ancient
source, although he also refers many times to Porphyry's Isagoge^
As for the "best Schoolemen" promised by his title, they turn out to
be important figures in medieval and Renaissance philosophy. Two
o them are Peter Fonseca and Sebastian Couto, Portuguese com-
mentators on Aristotle, and authors of the widely known Commen-
tarn Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu in vniuersam Dialec-
ticam AristoteliS) which Spencer cites on several occasions as the logic
of "the lesuites." 19 * Another schoolman is Pierre d'Ailly, French
ecclesiastic and philosopher of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth
centuries, 1 * 5 Still another is the medieval English logician, William
Ockham. 19e Still another is Saint Thomas Aquinas, whom Spencer
192 The imprint reads: "London Printed by lohn Daw son for Nicholas Bourne^ at the
South entrance of the Royall Exchange* 1628,"
183 See Art of Logick? pp. 59, 60, 63, 69, 70, 71, 129, 130, 131, for a sample o
Spencer's references to Porphyry. His references to Aristotle are so numerous as to make
it inexpedient to list them here.
194 Ibid., pp. 3-8. For an account of this Jesuit commentary, see The Catholic En-
cyclopedia, s.v. Conimbricenses.
Art of Logick, pp. 78, 97, 100, 167, 173, 175, iS 53 262. Spencer refers to him
by his Latin name Aliaco.
196 JW^., pp. 8, 27, 33, 50, 53, 107, 109, 1 1 8, 119, 130. For an analysis of Ock-
ham's contribution to logical theory, see Boehner, Medieval Logic An Outline of Its
'Development from, 1250 to c. 1400, pp. 36-44.
[ 234 ]
cites more often than any of the other schoolmen/ 97 In the ideas
and words of these and lesser authorities, Spencer sets forth the
topics and subtopics of the theory of invention and disposition, fea-
turing only the name of Ramus in the marginal notations, adhering
in general to the order prescribed by Ramus, and emphasizing every-
where Ramus's main points, including the famous three laws. 298
One of the defects in Ramus to be corrected by Spencer from the
precepts of Aristotle concerns the doctrine of the ten categories. The
ten categories were part of the machinery of invention in scholastic
logic. Ramus, in redesigning that machinery, had kept to the notion
of ten basic seats of argument, but had not named those seats as
Aristotle named his categories. It thus turned out that, whereas under
invention the scholastic logicians talked of substance, quantity, qual-
ity, relation, place, time, posture, apparel, doing, or suffering, the
Ramists made invention consist of cause, effect, subject, adjunct, and
six other places of predication. Spencer combines these two systems.
He gives one chapter to Aristotle's categories, and pays special atten-
tion to the category of primary substance, under which he discusses
what Ramus calls effect and subject. 189 Then he devotes twenty- five
chapters to Ramus's other places of invention, finding Aristotelian
authority for them, of course. As to his inclusion of effect and subject
under primary substance, he has this to say:
This Doctrine is peculiar to Aristotle: Ramus doth not acknowledge
it 5 for, he hath not a word of it: It may bee, he conceived, that, i. To
set downe all the seats of arguments in one place together, would
breed a needles repetition. 2. These single termes did not appertaine
to Logick. 3. The first substance, or thing subiected, in every sentence,
hath not the nature of an argument. It is very likely, that, he thought
thus: because, this doctrine of Aristotle hath beene anciently receiuedj
therefore, hee would not depart from it vnles hee had some reason
for it: and I conceiue, he had no reason, but these 3. 200
Although Spencer proceeds to reject each of these three reasons, he
does so without a trace of disrespect for Ramus's Aristotelian learn-
ing. He seems, indeed, to argue his case more to justify his restoring
187 Art of Logick, pp. 2, 16-18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 33, 39, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50* 53,
54, 56, 60, 77, 81, 83, 85, 86, 93, 97, 112, 130, 134, 168, 185, 195, 201, 202, 203.
Spencer's references are for the most part to the Summa TAeologica*
198 Art of Logick, pp. 11-147 (for invention), 149-311 (for disposition) and 179-
18 1 (for the three laws).
199 Ibid.) pp. 14-23.
p. 19.
[235 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
of the ten categories to logical theory than to explain what logicians
should do with them once they were restored.
The chief superfluity which Spencer sees in Ramus, and hence
abandons on the authority of Aristotle, is the doctrine of method.
This doctrine occupied the third and last position in Ramus's treat-
ment of disposition or judgment. As Spencer finishes his analysis of
propositions and syllogisms, the two other parts of Ramistic disposi-
tion," he suddenly says without preamble:
Now we are come to an end of all the precepts of Logicke: so as,
there is no more required, to make a Logician, then what hath beene
sayd alreadie. But that seemes not enough to Ramus^ for he brings
another member of this art, and calls it Methode: but I omit the same
of purpose 5 for divers reasons. 201
Only the last of Spencer's four reasons appears to be the one
which could have moved him to omit from his Ramistic treatise what
is in effect the very hallmark of Ramism. He gave that reason as the
concluding statement of his work:
He [Ramus] alledges Aristotles authoritie for method j but alto-
gether without cause 5 for he alledgeth no place, nor words, and I am
sure he cannot. Aristotle calls all the precepts of Logicke a Method,
whereby wee come to know, h'ow to discusse. Top. lib. I. cap. 2. lib.
8. cap. 12. prior, lib. I. cap. 31. therfore he did neuer meane to make
Method^ one member of his Art, distinct from the rest: seeing
therefore we haue nothing to say touching Method^ I must here put
an end to the whole Worke. 202
Now, this reasoning ignores the fact that Ramus had conceived
of his logic as in one sense the ancient science of dialectical invention
and judgment, and in another sense the ancient science of rhetorical
invention and disposition. Thus he had drawn into logic a distillation
of such theories of argument as Aristotle's Topics and Cicero's
Topics y as well as a distillation of what Aristotle's Rhetoric and
Cicero's voluminous rhetorical writings had to say on invention and
disposition in oratory. At the same time, Ramus had restricted
rhetorical theory to the subjects of style and delivery, on the assump-
tion that the other subjects of ancient rhetoric were adequately cov-
ered in logic. So when Spencer says that Ramus has no authority in
Aristotle for making method a division of the theory of discussion,
201 Ibid., pp. 309-310. *lbid.> p. 3 n.
E 236 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
he is thinking only of Aristotle's Organon, not of Aristotle's Rhet-
oric, for in the latter work method as the theory of arrangement of
persuasive discourse is explicitly treated. 203 It is true that Ramus's
theory of the natural method as the strict arranging of propositions
in a descending order of generality has no authority in Aristotle's
Rhetoric or Organon. But Ramus's theory of the prudential method
can claim some authority in Aristotle's Rhetoric, and his theory of
method as a part of logic is not an unwarranted deduction from the
ancient dialecticians. 204 What Spencer's reasoning does is to bring out
unwittingly that Ramus, bound as he was to Plato, Aristotle, and
Cicero, managed nevertheless to give the ancient theory of arrange-
ment a novel twist and to emerge as the first thinker of the modern
era to insist upon adding to the ancient doctrine of persuasive ar-
rangement the concept of expository or learned discourse as having
its separate theory of form.
The last English translation of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo
ever to be printed appeared in 1632 and several times thereafter
during the course of the seventeenth century. It was the work of
Robert Fage, and its title page is an exact description of its Contents:
Peter Ramus of Vermandois, The Kings Professor, his Dialectica in
two bookes. Not onely translated into English, but also digested into
questions and answers for the more facility of understanding. By R.
F. Gent. London. Printed by W. J. 1632.
The dedicatory letter identifies the "R. F." of the title page as "Ro.
Fage," and assigns the book to the author's uncle, Bestney Parker,
indicating also that the translation had been first done for the latter
in the form of a continuous discourse, and then altered to become a
dialogue. Since there was a Robert Fage who studied at St. Cath-
arine's College, Cambridge, between 1621 and 1627, and received
in that period both his bachelor's and master's degrees, it is almost
a certainty that he is the "Ro. Fage" of the Ramus translation. If so,
the last Englishman to translate Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo be-
came vicar of Fulbourn in Cambridgeshire in 1632, the year when
his translation appeared, and was later made vicar of Wilburton,
where he died in 1 669- 205
As for the later editions of Fage's translation, there would seem
20S See the closing words of Book n of the Rhetoric^ as well as the opening- chapter
and the seven closing- chapters of Book in.
204 See for example Plato's Phaedrus y 2.65-266.
205 See Alumni Cantabrigienses, Pt. i, s.v. Fage or Fagge, Robert.
[ 237 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
to have been six in alL Walter J. Ong, S.J., calls attention to an ap-
parently unique copy of an edition bearing the date of 1635, and to
another apparently unique copy of an edition of i636. 200 He has also
identified Fage's translation as the first unit in a work published at
London in 1 651 under the title, A Compendium of the Art of Logick
and Rhetorick in the English Tongue, Containing All that Peter
Ramus, Aristotle, and Others Have Writ Thereon: with Plaine Di-
rections for the More Easie Understanding and Practice of the
Same This particular edition of Page's translation does not bear
its author's name, and thus cannot easily be recognized for what it is.
The same observation applies to the next three editions. John Mil-
ton's nephew and pupil, Edward Phillips, published a miscellany at
London in 1658 and 1685 under the title, The Mysteries of Love
&? Eloquence, and at London in 1699 under the title, The Beau's
Academy. There is a treatise on logic in this miscellany, and it was
J. Milton French who first identified it as the work of Ramus and
Fage. 208 Thus at the very end of its career in translation in England,
as at the very end of its career there in scholarly Latin text and
commentary, Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo manages to get itself
associated with the name of Milton, though Phillips, who probably
became interested in Ramism when Milton was tutoring him in the
early sixteen-forties, hardly qualifies as an English Ramist in any
but a passive sense.
The concluding topic in this history of Ramistic logic in England
brings Ramus into the English theater and makes him a figure in
English drama. Two playwrights of the late sixteenth century de-
serve special mention in this connection. One of them has not been
identified, although the play of his in which Ramus is mentioned
survives. The other is Christopher Marlowe, whose undergraduate
days at Corpus Christi College in Cambridge occurred at the time
when William Temple of nearby King's was rising to fame as the
leading Cambridge Ramist and was engaging Everard Digby in con-
troversy on the question of Ramus's theory of method.
Marlowe's The Massacre at Paris, probably composed in the very
early fifteen-nineties, and performed a number of times before Lon-
2<>a See his Hobi>es and Talon's Ramist Rhetoric in English," Transactions of the
Cambridge Bibliographical Society^ I (194-9-1953), 261, note i.
M7 /^V. J pp. 260-261. For a discussion of the other items in this compendium, see
below, pp. 276, 279, 384.
208 J. Milton French, "Milton, Ramus, and Edward Phillips," Modem Philology
ATII (November 1949), 82-87.
[ 238 ]
RAMUS^S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
don audiences in the following decade, 209 makes use of the massacre
of St. Bartholomew for its titular materials, although the play as a
whole dramatizes French history between 1572 and 1589, with
leading emphasis upon the murderous struggles among Henry of
Anjou, Henry of Navarre, and Henry of Guise for the throne of
France. This war of the three Henries came to a climax in the assas-
sination of Henry of Guise at the command of Anjou, who was
reigning as Henry III. Thereafter, Henry III was assassinated by
a fanatic monk of the Catholic faction which Guise had headed, and
Henry of Navarre, a Protestant and the son of Antoine de Bourbon
and Jeanne d'Albret, ascended the French throne as Henry IV to
place the Bourbon dynasty in its long tenure of power.
At the beginning of Marlowe's play, the marriage of Henry of
Navarre and Margaret, Anjou's sister, is being celebrated, and
Henry of Guise is beginning to lay plans to kill Navarre's mother,
and Navarre himself, as well as Admiral Coligny, the greatest
Protestant leader in France. Guise's agents proceed at once to murder
Navarre's mother by giving her a pair of poisoned gloves, and to
attempt Coligny's life by shooting him with a musket ball. In actual
historical fact the death of Navarre's mother under circumstances
suggesting that she was poisoned occurred some two months before
the marriage of Navarre and Margaret* 210 Thus at this point Mar-
lowe is guilty of an anachronism, but his error is dramatically effec-
tive, nevertheless, and it lays no undeserved amount of extra guilt
upon Guise. After the attempted assassination of Coligny, Guise is
driven into an alliance with the queen-mother of France, Catherine
de' Medici, and with Anjou, the result of which is the massacre of
St. Bartholomew. Marlowe traces this tragic occurrence from the
fatal stabbing of Coligny to Guise's preoccupation with Protestant
victims of the humblest sort. From that point the scene of the play
widens to permit the development of the dynastic themes that the
blood and violence of the massacre have endowed with tragic values.
One of the episodes in Marlowe's dramatic version of the massacre
is that in which Ramus meets his death in the presence of Anjou and
Guise. Of all the victims of the actual massacre as depicted by Mar-
lowe, Ramus is the most important historical personage, Navarre's
mother and Coligny having fallen before the signal for the beginning
2 * 9 On these points, see The Works of Christopher Marlo*we y ed. C, F. Tucker Brooke
(Oxford [i925])> p. 440. This edition is cited below as Works of Marlowe.
210 For the sequence of these events, see La Grande Encyclopedic, s.v. Saint-Bartfaelemy.
[ 239 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
of wholesale slaughter was given, and the other victims being ob-
scure Protestants. As if to underline the importance of Ramus, he is
the only victim to be killed by Anjou. Perhaps Marlowe thought it
an ironic comment upon royalty that the king's professor of logic
should be murdered without provocation by one who was soon to
become King Henry III.
The actual scene of the murder is swift and intense. As Ramus is
sitting in his study, against the background of frightened cries from
the oncoming horror, his friend and collaborator Talaeus enters and
begs him to fly for his life if he would escape the Guisians. Then
Talaeus leaps out of the window and disappears through the ranks
of the assassins, as they recognize him for a Catholic and suffer him
to go. Perhaps he does not hear Ramus's plea, "Sweet Taleus
stay." 211 Or perhaps he does and chooses not to heed. In either event,
the historical Talaeus should not be blamed at all, for he was dead
when Ramus met his violent end, and had been dead ten years. Here
is a case where Marlowe's anachronism, if allowed to stand for fact,
as it has stood in some editions of The Massacre at Paris, 2iz would
identify Talaeus with the crime of having deserted his best friend
at a moment of crisis. At least Talaeus^ sins cannot be expanded to
include that of abandoning Ramus in the latter's final hour.
The indictment which Guise in Marlowe's play directs at Ramus
before Anjou strikes Ramus down is surely reminiscent of attacks
upon Ramism at Cambridge during Marlowe's student days. And
what does that indictment consist in? It consists in the charge that
Ramus is superficial as a thinker, irreverent as a student of Aristotle,
injudicious as an advocate of dichotomies and epitomes, and rash as
a disputant against the axioms of the doctors. Says Guise when Ramus
asks wherein he had offended:
Marry sir, in hauing a smack in all,
And yet didst neuer sound anything to the depth.
Was it not thou that scoftes the Organon,
And said it was a heape of vanities?
He that will be a flat dicotamest,
And seen in nothing but Epitomies:
Is in your iudgment thought a learned man.
211 Works of Marlowe^ p. 456.
212 See The Jew of Malta and The Massacre at Paris, ed. Henry Stanley Bennett
(London, [1931]}, p. 203, where Talaeus is said to have survived the massacre and to
have died in 1610.
[ 240 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
And he forsooth must goe and preach in Germany:
Excepting against Doctors axioms,
And i-pse dixi with this quidditie,
Ar guynentum testimonn est inartificiale.
To contradict which, I say Ramus shall dye:
How answere you that? your nego argumentum
Cannot serue, sirra: kill him. 213
At Ramus's plea for a hearing, Anjou bids him speak, and the
ensuing response may be considered to have been composed in Cam-
bridge rather than Paris. Ramus says that he wants a hearing, not to
prolong his life, but to cleanse himself of malicious misrepresenta-
tions like those of James Schegk. His defense of himself is that he
had sought to improve the arrangement of Aristotle's logical writ-
ings, and that the man who hates Aristotle or loves his own works
better than he loves God can never be a good logician or philosopher.
Marlowe's words sound thus as Ramus speaks them:
Not for my life doe I desire this pause,
But in my latter houre to purge my selfe,
In that I know the things that I haue wrote,
Which as I heare one Shekius takes it ill,
Because my places being but three, contains all his:
I knew the Organon to be confusde,
And I reduced it into better forme.
And this for Aristotle will I say,
That he that despiseth him can nere
Be good in Logick or Philosophic.
And thats because the blockish Sorbonests
Attribute as much vnto their workes
As to the seruice of the eternall God. 214
It is fitting that these last words should be a taunt at his enemies,
for Ramus had offended many people in his time, and it was too late
now for him to pretend diplomacy. Guise asks why Anjou should
suffer this peasant to declaim, and Anjou stabs Ramus, saying, "Nere
was there Colliars sonne so full of pride." Thus does Marlowe me-
morialize the murder of one of the chief influences behind the intel-
lectual life of that time.
sis Works of Marlowe, p. 457.
214 Ibid., p. 457. For further information about Shekius, that is, Schegt, see Wadding-
ton, Ratnus, pp. 198-199, 216, 366, 394. The reference to Ramus's three places means
that the ten fundamental terms of Rarnus's theory of invention are grouped under three
wider headings, that is, i) artistic primary arguments, ) artistic derivative primary
arguments, and 3) non-artistic arguments. See above, pp. 155-156.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Ramus enters in less spectacular fashion into another drama of the
late sixteenth century. The Pilgrimage to Parnassus? This was a
college play performed at St. John's College, Cambridge, in con-
nection with the Christmas festivities of I598. 216 Since no edition
of this play was printed until 1886, and no second performance is
known to have occurred, 217 the number of people to have been aware
of it in its own time is limited, and thus it cannot claim to have made
England conscious of Ramus to any appreciable extent. But it reflects
the success of the English Ramists in making their cause a matter of
familiar reference within their halls of learning, even if it did not
contribute to the spread of that cause or to its impact upon the gen-
eral public.
Under the image of a devout journey to the mountain of Apollo
and the Muses, the Pilgrimage represents the struggle of undergrad-
uates for their bachelor's degree. The play represents the students
as passing through four realms of knowledge and as having to sur-
mount four obstacles. The heroes are Philomusus and Studioso, that
is, Muse-Lover and Zeal, who are sent on their way by Consiliodorus,
that is, Hellenic Wisdom. Consiliodorus is father of Philomusus and
uncle of Studioso. His words of advice and warning to the two young
men occupy a large part of the first act, which is quite short, as are
the other four.
The two pilgrims journey first through the land of logic, where
they meet the student's first obstacle, Madido, the Moist One, or the
Sot. Madido has never completed his journey to the sacred moun-
tain, being addicted to wine, to Horace, and to the idea that the
tavern is a better source of inspiration for the aspiring poet than is
learning. Philomusus and Studioso are not greatly impressed with,
him, although perhaps Philomusus has a momentary desire to accept
his invitation to a pint of wine*
Next after logic comes the sweet land of rhetoric, through which
the pilgrims pass during Act III, and where they meet the student's
second obstacle, Stupido, or Stupidity. Stupido has been on the pil-
grimage for ten years, and has decided to go no further a change
of mind that appears essentially unprecipitate. Perhaps his being a
puritan has something to do with his renunciation of rhetoric, poetry,
* ls For the text of this play, see The Three Parnassus Plays (i50ff-jdoj), ed. J. B.
Leishman (London, 1949), pp. 95-132.
pp. 24-26.
pp. 8, 26.
[ 242 ]
RAMUS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
and philosophy as vain and useless arts. Or perhaps, as Philomusus
suggests, Stupido is one
Who, for he cannot reach vnto the artes,
Makes showe as though he would neglect the artes
And cared not for the springe of Hellicon. 218
In Act IV the pilgrims come to the land of poetry, where they
meet the student's most dangerous obstacle, Amoretto, Little Cupid,
or Love. His delight is in the verses of Ovid, his design is to remain
forever in his present state, and his advice to Philomusus and Stu-
dioso is that they spend not their wanton youth "In sadd dull plod-
ding on philosophers/'
Studioso Yea but our springe is shorte, and winter longer
Our youth by trauellinge to Hellicon
Must gett prouision for our latter years.
Amoretto Who thinks on winter before winter come
Maks winter come in sommers fairest shine.
There is no golden minte at Hellicon.
Cropp you the ioyes of youth while that you maye,
Sorowe and grife will come another daye. 218
This argument proves irresistible, and the pilgrims decide as if to
renounce their quest and to remain with Amoretto. But in Act V they
are on their way again, this time in the land of philosophy, where
they meet the student's last obstacle, Ingenioso, or Cleverness. In-
genioso is the crafty lad who knows more than the masters and the
masterpieces. He has learned that there is no gold on Parnassus, and
only the prospect of a vicarage or a schoolroom for those who reach
the land of the Muses. But our pilgrims are now safe from further
delay, and they come soon to the end of their four-year journey.
Ramus enters this play, not as a character, but as a reference. As
Philomusus and Studioso begin the first stage of their journey in the
land of logic, Studioso remarks that he has gotten hold of "lacke
Setons mapp" to guide them. 220 Thus it is plain that St. John's Col-
lege, which had previously produced such anti-Ramists as Everard
Digby, Robert Greene, and Thomas Nash, and such an ardent Ra-
mist as Abraham Fraunce, was again in the camp of the scholastics in
1598, and could find no better guide than Peter Carter's edition of
John Seton's Dialectical But it is Madido, the Sot, who mentions
218 Ibid., p. 117. ^Ibid., p. 119. 22 /**., p. 101.
221 See above, pp. 194., 197, aaa*
I 243 1
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
that, when he first came to the land of logic on his way to Parnassus,
he had begun "to reade Ramus his mapp, Dialectica e$t^ &c.," and
had thrown it away when "the slouenlie knaue presented mee with
such an vnsauorie worde that I dare not name it, vnless I had some
frankensence readie to perfume youre noses with after." 222 We may
be sure that Madido is here referring to some word which had a
prominent place in Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo as a scientific term
and an equally prominent place in current undergraduate slang as a
scatological term. Perhaps that word is "ars," the third term in
Ramus's famous definition of dialectic, and the term which Madido
would have had to mention next if he had completed his Latin quo-
tation from the first chapter of the Dialecticae Libri Duo. At any
rate, "ars" as a Latin term would at that time be part of every under-
graduated learned vocabulary, while as an English term for the but-
tocks it would not be used in polite speech, and it would suggest not
only a certain untidiness in anyone who did use it but also certain
characteristics that make Madido's reference to frankincense inele-
gant though understandable.
Ramus figures once more in the intellectual background of the
Pilgrimage. When Philomusus and Studioso meet Stupido in the
land of rhetoric, they find him a disciple of Ramus as well as a puri-
tan and a scorner of "these vaine artes of Rhetorique, Poetrie, and
Philosophic." 228 Stupido's first words to the pilgrims are these:
Welcome my welbeloued brethren, trulie (I thanke god for it) I
haue spent this day to my great comfort 5 I haue (I pray god prosper
my labours) analised a peece of an homelie according to Ramus, and
surelie in my minde and simple opinion M r Peter maketh all things
verie plaine and easie. As for Setons Logique, trulie I neuer looke
on it but it makes my head ache. 22 *
Since Philomusus and Studioso have already passed through the
land of logic with the assistance of "lacke Setons mapp," and since
Stupido, who regards Seton as difficult, has by now spent ten years in
getting through that same land under the guidance of Ramus, we
have to conclude, of course, that the author of the Pilgrimage is
making Ramus seem helpful only to the stupid, and is representing
him as essentially beneath the notice of the wise and successful
scholar. We have also to conclude that this same author is implying
232 Leishman, Three Parnassus Plays^ p. 108.
p. 113. ***IbU^ p. 1 1 a.
E 244 ]
RAMTJS'S DIALECTIC IN ENGLAND
an adverse judgment against the puritans, with whom Stupido is re-
peatedly identified, and that he is expressing a favorable judgment
toward the established church, which had its historical roots in John
Seton's kind of Catholicism and scholasticism. But it is difficult to con-
clude, as Leishman does, that the Stupido of this play is a caricature
of William Gouge. 225 When the Pilgrimage was performed at St.
John's College in 1598, Gouge had been an undergraduate at nearby
King's for only three years, whereas Stupido is caricatured as a slow
undergraduate of ten years' standing. Moreover, Gouge was a good
student, who stayed on at Cambridge to take the bachelor's and the
master's degrees and to occupy a fellowship until 1 604, whereas Stu-
pido seems not to be headed in those directions. To be sure, Gouge
was known as an undergraduate for his ability to defend Ramus, and
his connection with puritanism is conspicuous. 226 But Ramists and
puritans at Cambridge in the fifteen-nineties include William Per-
kins, Antony Wotton, and William Ames, as well as Gouge, and
thus in a general way there are at least four possible candidates for
the honor of being Stupido's counterpart. It is certain, therefore, that
the audience which saw the Pilgrimage performed in 1598 would
have had more than Gouge in mind as they speculated upon the
identity of Stupido. It is also certain that they would have known
all about Ramus, and that they would have applauded the historical
accuracy of the Pilgrimage in representing the puritans in the person
of Stupido as exempting both Ramistic and scholastic logic, but not
rhetoric, poetry, and philosophy, from the catalogue of vain and
useless arts.
As we turn now to Talaeus's rhetoric, which deserves to be ranked
next to Ramus's logic among the important branches of Ramism in
England, it might be well to mention in passing that these two lib-
eral arts are not the only aspects of my present subject 5 for Ramus
was accepted by Englishmen as an authority on grammar, arithmetic,
and geometry as welL This fact is borne out by various publications
in England in the period under discussion in this chapter. As early as
1581, Ramus's Rudimenta Graeca was given a printing at London;
four years later The latine grammar oj P. Ramvs Translated into
English was published in an edition at London and in another at
Cambridge; and in 1594, a Cambridge graduate student named Paul
Greaves, of Christ's College, brought out at Cambridge his Gram-
225 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 228 See above, pp. 199-200.
[ 245 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
matica Anglicana^ which described itself in its subtitle as "ad vnicam
P. Rami methodum concinnata." Ramus's mathematical writings
were meanwhile receiving attention from Englishmen. Thomas
Hood, a graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, and the first lec-
turer in mathematics under a foundation established by Thomas
Smith for the instruction of citizens of London, published at London
in 1590 The Elementes of Geometrie, a translation of Ramus's Latin
treatise on this subject. 227 William Kempe, also a graduate of Trinity
College, Cambridge, and master at Plymouth grammar school, pub-
lished at London in 1592 The Art of Arithmeticke in whole num-
bers and fractions, this work being likewise translated from Ramus.
William Bedwell, distinguished Arabic scholar and mathematician,
as well as a graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, and a friend of
Thomas Hood, left behind when he died a work called Via Regia
ad Geometriam y which was later published at London in 1 63 6 under
the editorship of John Clerke, and was offered to the public as Bed-
well's translation and enlargement of Ramus. Bedwell, along with
Kernpe, Hood, and Greaves, offers further evidence of the influence
of Ramus upon the intellectual life of Cambridge in the last quarter
of the sixteenth century. In addition, these men illustrate how far
Ramus's influence spread in England beyond the boundaries of logic
and rhetoric.
227 See Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Hood, Thomas (#. 1582-1598).
III. Ramus's Rhetoric in England
To Gabriel Harvey belongs the credit of being the first Englishman
to interpret Ramistic rhetoric to his countrymen. Harvey was a stu-
dent at Christ's College, Cambridge, during the early years of Lau-
rence Chaderton's tenure as fellow at that very hall of learning,
when Chaderton was arousing great interest by what may be regarded
as the first lectures on Ramus's logic at an English university. Thus
Chaderton was in a position to influence Harvey, as pointed out
above, 1 and may even have done so. Years later, when Harvey was
attacking Thomas Nash, he mentioned Chaderton's sermons, and
described them as "methodicall" 2 a particularly appropriate term
if this is an instance of its being applied by a Ramist pupil to the
work of his former Ramist master. But when Harvey himself de-
scribed his original conversion to Ramism, he did not mention Chad-
erton among the influences that played upon him. He mentioned
instead how he once came upon the Ciceronianus of Johannes Sam-
bucus, an author connected by marriage with the prestige of Italian
learning 5 and how in that work he found a eulogistic reference to
Ramus's Ciceronianus, which he immediately proceeded to buy and
to devour, reading "all of it in one day" and all of it again the next
day. 8 This explanation may be more for the sake of impressiveness
than of exactitude, inasmuch as it occurs when Harvey is addressing
undergraduates and is working to give Ramus the glamor of a for-
eign as opposed to a local endorsement. But nevertheless it stands in
the way of the confident assertion that Harvey was converted to
Ramism by his older contemporary Chaderton.
The date of Harvey's reading of Ramus's Ciceronianus has been
fixed as I569/ Five years later, when Harvey was appointed prae-
lector in rhetoric at Cambridge, he was presented with the oppor-
tunity of doing for Ramistic rhetoric in the English academic world
what Chaderton had been doing already for Ramistic logic. Harvey's
appointment as praelector occurred on April 23, 1574, two months
before Macllmaine's Latin text of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo
was registered for publication at the company of stationers in Lon-
don. During the spring of 1575, while Englishmen were reading
1 See p. *79
2 See Harvey, Pierce** Supererogation (London, 1593), in Smith, Elizabethan Critical
Essays, II, z&i.
8 See Wilson and Forbes, Gabriel Harvey's "Ciceronianus," pp. 18, 69-71.
* Ibid.) pp. 18, 20.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Macllmaine's recent works on Ramistic logic, Harvey delivered his
first course of lectures under his praelectorship, the two inaugural
discourses being subsequently published at London in 1577 as the
Rhetor? He gave a second course of lectures in the spring of 1576,
and the work which we know under the title of his Ciceronianus^
also published at London in 1577, is the inaugural lecture of that
series. 6 The Rhetor and the Ciceronianus are in Latin, and were no
doubt in the first instance delivered as Latin lectures. Taken to-
gether they constitute an admirable statement of the basic philosophy
of Ramistic rhetoric.
The Rhetor discusses natural inclination, theory, and practice as
the three means to oratorical effectiveness. Natural inclination and
theory are the topics of the first of the two lectures in the work, and
practice is the topic of the second. Harvey often refers to the rhetor-
ical learning of his day, and mentions such traditionalists as Agric-
ola, Susenbrotus, Mosellanus, Sturm, and Erasmus j 7 but his favorite
authorities are Ramus and Talaeus, as we would expect, while such
Ramists as Foclin, Freigius, and Rodingus receive various degrees
of attention. 8 All of these authors contribute more or less to Har-
vey's development of the Ramist view that rhetoric consists exclu-
sively of style and delivery.
Early in his discussion of the topic of theory, Harvey sets forth
the standard Ramist conception of the way in which the five parts of
Ciceronian rhetoric should be detached from their traditional sur-
roundings and redistributed between rhetoric and dialectic. The fol-
lowing passage speaks to that effect :
For of that fivefold division, which has almost alone prevailed among
our ancestors, how many now do not see that invention, disposition,
and memory are not the property of speech but of thought, not of
tongue but of mind, not of eloquence but of wisdom, not of rhetoric
but of dialectic? Therefore two sole and as it were native parts re-
5 The title page reads: "Gabrielis Harveii Rhetor, Vel duorum dierum Oratio, De
Natura, Arte, & Exercitatione Rhetorica. Ad stios Auditores. Londini, Ex Officina Typo-
graphica Henrici Binneman. Anno. 1577."
6 For a careful discussion of the dates of these two courses of lectures, see Wilson and
Forbes, Gabriel Harvefs "Ciceronianus" pp. 5-10. The title page of Harvey's Cicero-
manus reads as follows: "Gabrielis Harveii Ciceronianvs, Vel Oratio post reditum,
habita Cantabrigiae ad suos Auditores. Quorum potissimum causa, diuulgata est. Lon-
dini, Ex Officina Typographica Henrici Binneman. Anno. CIO. ID. LXXVII." See
Wilson and Forbes, p. 35.
7 Rhetor^ sigs. hiv, hzr, hzv, hjv, k^r, ozv, 041.
8 Ibid^ sigs. eir, eiv> ezv, e4v, fir, fiv, fzr, hzv, h;jv, k^r, lir, hv, nir, o^r,
qir, qiv.
[ 248 ]
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
main as proper and germane to this art, like the two eyes in the body,
style and deli very j the former bright in the splendors of tropes and
the involutions of sch ernes j the latter agreeable in the modulation of
voice and the appropriateness of gesture 5 each exciting a singular love
for itself whether in public orations or in private communication, 9
Practice or exercise as the topic of the second lecture in the Rhetor
involves Harvey in a discussion of two terms that were to be promi-
nent in English Ramism, not so much in connection with logical or
rhetorical theory, as with the applications and uses of that theory.
These two terms are analysis and genesis. 10 Analysis is the process by
which the student takes the composition of somebody else and sub-
jects it to scrutiny in an effort to discover how far it incorporates
within itself the principles of logic and rhetoric. Genesis is the process
by which the student brings a composition of his own into being
through the application of the machinery of invention, of arrange-
ment, of style, and of delivery. Harvey devotes almost the whole of
his second lecture to these two terms j and since at the very end he
promises to take up next the subject of Cicero's Oration to the Peo-
ple wpon his Return, we may assume that the subsequent lectures in
his first series were themselves an example of the exercise which
Ramus called analysis.
A good vernacular expression of the meaning of analysis and
genesis is afforded by Fraunce's Lawiers Logike, the dialectical the-
ory of which has already been discussed. 11 Speaking of the value of
dialectic "in discoursing, thinking, meditating, and framing of thine
owne, as also in discussing, perusing, searching and examining what
others haue either deliuered by speach, or put downe in writing,"
Fraunce proceeds to identify these two procedures by saying that
"this is called Analysis, that Genesis, and in them both consisteth the
whole vse of Logike." 12 Later, Fraunce illustrates genesis by an ex-
ample which he borrows from Sturm. This example consists in tak-
ing the word nobilitas and drawing it through the places of cause,
effect, subject, adjunct, opposites, comparatives, and so on, to indi-
cate how rich a store of arguments may come to the writer or speaker
who applies inventional theory to the problem of devising subject
matter. Fraunce then illustrates analysis by taking the word amicitia
9 Ibid., sigs. e4v-f ir. Translation mine.
10 Ibid., sigs. k4V-q2r, Far Harvey's discussion of Ramus's doctrine of analysis and
genesis, see ibid. y sig. lir. For another account of this doctrine in Ramus, see Graves,
Peter Ramus, pp. 117, 140-141, 165.
11 See above, pp. 222-228. 12 LavuUrs Logike, fol. 3r-sv.
[ 249 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
in Cicero's Laelius and identifying the places of invention as they
appear to have been used in the framing of that composition. 13
Fraunce's examples of genesis and analysis relate only to inven-
tion, the first part of logic, and he carries them no further. But we
may easily see their application in other fields. A strictly rhetorical
exercise of genesis, for instance, would require the student to draw
his previously acquired subject matter through the tropes and the
schemes, in order to clothe thought in every appropriate stylistic gar-
ment. Rhetorical analysis, on the other hand, would require him to
identify the stylistic garments of trope and scheme in the work of
any author chosen for study.
Towards the end of his Ciceronianus, as he prepares to invite his
Cambridge auditors to his coming lectures on another of Cicero's
orations, this time the Oration in the Senate wpon his Return, Har-
vey indicates that his method will be to conduct an analysis of this
Ciceronian work by applying to it the principles of Ramistic logic
as well as Ramistic rhetoric. Thus once again he indicates what Ra-
mistic analysis means to him. Here are his words to the under-
graduates:
Let us return, then, dear Cantabrigians, to that interrupted but not
abandoned exercise of Ciceronian exegesis. Let us weigh on their ap-
propriate scales all his ornaments of speaking and his main points of
disputing. . . . And since amplitude of content supports his harmony
of diction, as the soul supports the body, let us also employ the double
analysis which we have hitherto been using and apply both rhetoric
and dialectic continually in all his writings and with special care in
every period. Let us make rhetoric the expositor of the oratorical em-
bellishments and the arts which belong to its school, and dialectic the
expositor of invention and arrangement. Both these methods of analy-
sis will be very pleasant for me to teach and, believe me, they will be
very useful for you to learn. 14
Harvey's Ciceromaiws is interesting not only as a plain indication
of the methods of rhetorical analysis in process of being demonstrated
to Cambridge undergraduates of the fifteen-seventies but also as an
expression of a Cambridge man's idea of the change that was oc-
curring in the intellectual climate of England. In one sense, this
f, foil. 8iv-8 5 v.
14 This passage is quoted from Clarence A. Forbes's excellent translation of Harvey's
Ciceramanus in Wilson and Forbes, Gabriel Harvey's "Ciceronianus," pp. 85-87. All
o my quotations from this work are used with the permission of the University of Ne-
braska Press.
[ 250 ]
RAMTJS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
change meant the renunciation o a counterfeit Ciceronianism and
the adoption of a true one. In another sense, it meant the end of a
literary school devoted only to style, and the beginning of a school
devoted to subject matter as well. In still another sense, it meant a
realignment of English learning towards France and Germany as
opposed to Italy. And finally it meant an endorsement of Cambridge
as the brightest future star in the firmament of European as well as
strictly English scholarship.
These various ideas are all involved in Harvey's account of his
own spiritual progress from a counterfeit to a true Ciceronianism. At
one time, he had thought himself a simon-pure devotee of Cicero,
and had carried his devotion so far that he "virtually preferred to be
elected to the company of the Ciceronians rather than to that of the
saints." 15 He thus describes what this devotion entailed:
This will give the sum of the matter: I valued words more than con-
tent, language more than thought, the one art of speaking more than
the thousand subjects of knowledge 5 I preferred the mere style of
Marcus Tully to all the postulates of the philosophers and mathema-
ticians; I believed that the bone and sinew of imitation lay in my
ability to choose as many brilliant and elegant words as possible, to
reduce them* into order, and to connect them together in a rhyth-
mical period. In my judgment or perhaps I should say opinion
rather than judgment that was what it meant to be a Ciceronian.
This sort of Ciceronian, as Harvey had earlier explained, was spon-
sored in Europe by Italian learning. In that connection he had said:
I had among my favorites the most elegant and refined Italians 5 and
especially Pontanus, Cortesius, and those whom I have just men-
tioned Bembus, Sadoletus, Longolius, Riccius, Nizolius too, and
Naugerius I ever cherished in my bosom and embrace. One who
named them seemed to be naming not men but heroes and heavenly
beings.
As for Erasmus and those who clove to his views, Budaeus, More,
Aegidius, Glareanus, Vives, and all the others who are not considered
Ciceronians, I not only scorned them as perfectly infantile, but even
pursued them with hate as utter enemies. To tell the truth, it seemed
to me a wicked offence to touch Erasmus. 1 *
As a sharp contrast to his former idea of the meaning of Cicero-
nianism, Harvey offers to his undergraduate hearers the idea he now
15 ibid. y p. 69, "/> p. 6 1.
[ 251 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
holds to be wise and true. This new idea had come to him as the
result o his reading of Johannes Sambucus and Ramus. Harvey ex-
plains this new idea in various ways, even using at one point the very
words Ramus had used in a similar connection. 17 But the following
direct appeal to his students is perhaps as good a place as any in which
to see what his present conception of sound literary learning is:
Do you wish, then, to be honored with the glorious and magnificent
appellation of "Ciceronians"? I shall open my thoughts to you more
than ever before. Read the artistically and carefully elaborated Cice-
ronianus of Ramus, that of Erasmus, and that of Freigius. Follow with
the utmost diligence the footprints of Marcus Tully, your supreme
commander. Complete the laborious but splendid course of eloquence
and philosophy, which Cicero completed with noble mind and lofty
intellect. . . . Consider not merely the flowering verdure of style, but
much rather the ripe fruitage of reason *nd thought. . . . Remember
that words are called by Homer Trrepoe^ra, that is, winged, since they
easily fly away, unless they are kept in equilibrium by the weightiness
of the subject matter. Unite dialectic and knowledge with rhetoric,
thought with language. 18
These instructions, adds Harvey, will make a Ciceronian, "if not
of the Roman sort, yet of the French, German, British, or Cisalpine
sort." He had earlier sounded a sharp note of scorn against the re-
fusal by Italians to admit any northern Europeans to the ranks of the
eloquent. "As for us," he had then declared, "let us admit one
Frenchman, and three Germans: Ramus, Erasmus, Sturmius, and
Freigius." 1 * These, then, are the true Ciceronians the men who fol-
low, not so much the superficial characteristics of Cicero's style, but
the profundities of his insight into knowledge as the principle of form.
The standing of any university, Harvey makes plain, is determined
only by its ability to produce these true Ciceronians. He promises his
students that, "if I navigate with you in this harbor as did my pre-
ceptors with their auditors and students in their respective univer-
sities Sturmius at Strassburg, Ramus at Paris, Freigius at Basel and
Freiburg, Erasmus in all these cities and very many others of Ger-
many, France, Italy, and England, especially here in our own Cam-
bridge , perhaps you will one day see me not among the hindmost,
and doubtless I shall very soon see you among the foremost Cicero-
nians." 20 Harvey predicts, indeed, that Cambridge will be the place
17 Ibid.* p. 73. **Ibid f , p. 83. Ibvl. y p. Si. 2t> Hid., pp. 79-81.
[ 252 ]
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
to produce such an expositor of Cicero as he has been describing in
his lecture. "Already this long time," he says, "the standing of a
learned university, the majesty of a mighty queen, the tranquil peace
of a flourishing realm, the splendor of a cultured age, and the expec-
tation of men beyond the seas have been summoning such a man." 21
He adds:
Were he to step forth in our midst, resolved to inspire the exalted
and heroic spirits of noble characters to cultivate the aforesaid studies,
I should not hesitate to rank the University of Cambridge above the
most illustrious schools of all of Europe. Others may contend about
their venerable age, but I would rather hear that Cambridge is pre-
eminent for the number and fame of her learned men. Then some
day, just as of yore Athens was called the School of Greece, so Cam-
bridge may rightfully be known as the School of Britain 5 and to be
a Cantabrigian may mean among us what it meant among the Greeks
to be an Athenian.
Harvey is aware, of course, that the new learning which he wishes
to make victorious at Cambridge had powerful opponents in Kng-
land as well as in Italy. One of these opponents was Ascham, who
had died some eight years before Harvey delivered the lecture now
under discussion. Harvey mentions Ascham and specifically disclaims
any intention of casting aspersions upon the latter's Scholemasterf*
although Ascham, as we have seen, had cast some aspersions of his
own upon Ramus. 23 Harvey proceeds to acknowledge Ascham's
learning and eloquence, as if only compliments were in his mind 5
but then he changes his tone, and criticizes the S choirmaster for being
defended as a treatise on grammar when in reality it discusses not
only metaphors, which are properly within the sphere of rhetoric, but
also contraries, which are properly within the sphere of dialectic. 24
In other words, Harvey finds that Ascham fails to observe Ramus's
law of justice, which requires the liberal arts to keep to fixed bound-
aries. Immediately after this criticism, Harvey avows his own dedi-
cation to Ramism in these words:
But let others decide about the Scholemaster of Ascham, who is emi-
nently refined, elegant, and even, if he be compared with the school-
masters of others, truly most excellent and polished. In my school-
master I not only require these same qualities in still richer measure,
21 Ibid.y p. 101. 22 Ibid.) pp. 91-93. 23 See above, pp. 173, 177-178.
2 * Wilson and Forbes, Gabriel Harvey's "CiceronianusJ* p. 93.
[ 253 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
but I desiderate many others not less fruitful. I even dare boast, all
arrogance aside, that in my schoolmaster I distinguish, separate, and
divide the three subjects rhetoric from grammar and dialectic from
bothj that I assign its due to each subject in geometrical proportion,
as they say; that, in short, I heed the well-known Aristotelian doc-
trine of the categories. Ascham has not done this 5 if he had, he could
not have got so far outside his circumscribed limits nor digressed so
frequently from his purpose.
Harvey's Ciceronianus and Rhetor were respectively published in
June and November of 1577, an d thus are almost certainly the earli-
est interpretations of Ramistic rhetoric to be printed in England. 25
Talaeus's Rhetorica and a volume called Rethorica Rami were
licensed for publication with the society of stationers in London on
November n, I577, 26 but even if these got into print before the
Rhetor^ they were clearly later than the Ciceronianus by some five
months, and they may even not have been published that year at all,
since no copy of an edition of a Rhetorica by Talaeus or Ramus under
an imprint dated at London in 1577 * s now extant. 27
Ramistic rhetoric in Harvey's interpretation may claim to be first
in England not only in time but also in quality. Harvey followed
Ramus exactly in restricting rhetoric to style and delivery, but he also
followed Ramus in denying vigorously that style and delivery are
the only two subjects that a speaker has to master or an oratorical
critic has to teach. The movement which he founded in England upon
Ramus's authority did not mean that the presentational aspects of
Ciceronian rhetoric, alone and by themselves, constituted the whole
of the speaker's art ? although certain modern writers, among them
Sandford, have interpreted that movement in these exact terms. 28
Neither Harvey nor Ramus ever believed that speechmaking could
be limited in such a way as that. They believed instead that speaking
is made up of logic^ so far as any discourse must have subj ect matter
and form, and is also made up of rhetoric, so far as any discourse must
be clothed in words and uttered as speech. Their biggest dispute with
scholastic logic and traditional rhetoric was that those subjects were
25 The month In which each of these works was published is indicated in its colophon.
See also Ronald B. McKerrow, The Works of Thomas Nashe (London, 1904 [-1910]),
v, 163-164,.
^Arber, Transcript of the Registers, 11, 319.
27 See Baldwin, William Shaks<pere*$ Small Latine 6? Lesse Greeke y I, 521.
28 William P. Sandford, "English Rhetoric Reverts to Classicism, 1600-1650," The
Quarterly Journal of S$eech> xv (192,9), 504.
[ 254 3
RAMUS's RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
gravely redundant in covering invention and disposition twice over.
Their basic program o reform was to have logic handle the processes
of invention, disposition, and in a minor sense memory, wherever
these arose as a problem in learned or popular discourse, whereas
rhetoric would handle the processes of style and delivery, with gram-
mar limited to considerations of etymology and syntax. This exact
program is behind everything that Harvey says throughout the
Rhetor and the Ciceronianus. And it is expressed elsewhere in his
writings. For example, it is pretty completely stated in one of the
marginal comments made by him in his own copy of Quintilian's
Institutio Oratoria, where he delineates the perfect orator in these
Ramistic words:
A most excellent Pleader and singular discourser in any Civil Court,
or otherwyse, not A bare Professor of any one certain faculty or A
simple Artist in any one kynde: howbeit his principall Instrumentes
ar Rhetorique, for Elocution and Pronunciation j and Logique, for
Invention, Disposition, arid Memory. 29
Harvey's program of reform had not long to wait before it found
a supporter in Dudley Fenner's The Artes of Logike and Rethorike.
As I mentioned before, Fenner's work is made up of an unacknowl-
edged translation of the main heads of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri
Duo, and an unacknowledged translation, the first in English, of
Talaeus's Rhetorical Fenner entered Peterhouse College, Cam-
bridge, in 1575, and thus was in a position to hear and heed Harvey's
lectures on rhetoric. 81 It is probably Harvey, indeed, who gave Fen-
ner the idea for a work in which logic and rhetoric would on the one
hand be severely separated into two arts, on the basis of Ramus's
law of justice, and on the other would be united between two covers
of the same volume, on the basis that both were requisite for perfec-
tion in the art of communication. At any rate, Harvey emphasized
this Ramistic paradox in his lectures at Cambridge, and Fenner
illustrated it in his Logike and Rethorike.
"Rhetorike," says Fenner at the beginning of the second of his two
works, "is an Arte of speaking finelie. It hath two partes, Garnishing
20 G. C. Moore Smith, Gabriel Har<vty*s Marginalia (Stratford-upon-Ayon, 1913),
p. xas.
so See above, p. 219.
81 Fenner entered Peterhouse for the Easter Term of 1575 and thus may have heard
the lectures making- up Harvey's Rhetor* For Fenner's dates at Cambridge, see Walker,
Register of Peterhouse Men^ II, 6-7$ for the date of Harvey*s first course of lectures on
rhetoric, see Wilson and Forbes, Gabriel Harvey's "CiceronianusJ* p. 6,
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
of speache, called Eloqution. Garnishing of the maner of vtterance,
called Pronunciation." 32 The second of these parts is later dismissed
altogether from consideration "bicause [says Fenner] it is not yet
perfecte (for the preceptes for the most parte pertaine to an Ora-
tour) which when it shalbe perfect, it shall eyther onely conteyne
common preceptes for the garnishing of vtterance in all, or also
proper preceptes for the same in Magistrates, Embassadours, Cap-
taynes, and Ministers, therefore vntill it be so perfitted, wee thinke
it vnnecessarie to be translated into Englishe." 83 But Fenner's treat-
ment of style as the first part of rhetoric is in the exact Ramistic
tradition.
After dividing style into the tropes and the figures, Fenner pro-
ceeds to define and discuss each of these forms of language. Tropes,
he says, are "a garnishing of speache, whereby one worde is drawen
from his firste proper signification to another. . ," 8 * His subsequent
discussion of these forms involves allegory, metonymy, irony, synec-
doche, and metaphor, each of which is illustrated from the Bible.
Next come the figures, which are defined as follows:
A Figure is a garnishing of speache, wherein the course of the same
is chaunged from the more simple and plaine maner of speaking, vnto
that whiche is more full of excellencie and grace. For as in the fine-
nesse of wordes or a trope, wordes are considered asunder by them
selues: so in the fine shape or frame of speach or a figure, the apte and
pleasant ioyning togither of many wordes is noted. 35
Fenner's analysis of the figures is more extensive than that of the
tropes, as we would naturally expect in any rhetoric. He defines such
unusual forms of language as rhyme, blank verse, anadiplosis, anaph-
ora, paronomasia, exclamation, apostrophe, and prosopopoeia, pre-
ferring always the biblical illustration to other possibilities.
The Logike and Rethorike was published in 1584 and again near
1588 at Middelburg in the Netherlands. 38 Midway between these
two dates, William Webbe brought out at London his Discourse of
English Poetrie^ in which he has something to say that indicates the
influence of Talaeus's Rhetorica upon poetical theory. Webbe, by the
way, had taken a bachelor's degree from Cambridge in 1573, his
college being St. John's^ and thus he would as an undergraduate
have heard something of the new rhetoric of Talaeus. In his Dis-
32 Artes of Logike and Rethorike (1584.), sig. Dry.
38 Ibid., sig-. Eiv. ** Ibid., sig. Div. 8S Ibid.> sig.
86 See above, p, 219, note 147.
[ 356 ]
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
course of English Poetrie he speaks o "the reformed kind of Eng-
lish verse," 37 that is, of verse built upon quantity rather than rhyme
an issue that Gabriel Harvey and Edmund Spenser had discussed
with each other and the public several years before in a famous series
of published letters. 38 In explaining the verse-forms of Greek and
Latin poetry, Webbe lists twelve measures or feet, each by its tech-
nical name, and then he adds: "Many more deuisions of feete are
vsed by some, but these doo more artificially comprehende all quan-
tities necessary to the skanning of any verse, according to Tallaeus in
hys Rethorique." 39 Webbe means this reference to indicate that he is
here borrowing and translating from Chapter 1 6 of Book I of Ta-
laeus's Rhetorica y where under the heading De Metro Talaeus lists
and discusses these same twelve feet. 40 Webbe could not have bor-
rowed these terms from Fenner's Rethorike, for Fenner does not in-
clude them in his short discussion of feet and measures, his excuse be-
ing that English literature contains no worthy examples of them, and
hence the handling of them would be more curious than necessary. 41
In the year 1588, as Fenner's translation of Talaeus was achieving
its second edition on the continent, Abraham Fraunce published his
Arcadian Rhetorike at London. 42 This work is also a translation of
Talaeus, the second in the English language, the first on English
soil. Fraunce obviously intended it and his Lawiers Logike to serve
together as the means of introducing his countrymen to Ramus's
complete theory of communication. But by publishing his two works
separately, and by giving no open indication that his Rhetorike had
its origins in Ramism, he inadvertently fostered the early twentieth-
century belief that the latter treatise was in one sense a continuation
of the stylistic pattern of traditional rhetorical theory and in another
sense, a seemingly capricious renunciation of invention and disposi-
tion as concerns of the man of eloquence. 43
37 I quote from the text of Webbe's Discourse as printed In Smith, Elizabethan Critical
Essays^ I, 278.
88 These letters between Harvey and Spenser are reprinted by Smith, I, 87-122.
39 Ibid.) i, 280. It should be remarked that Puttenham's famous Arte of English
Poesie (London, 1589), Bk. II, Ch. 14, also limits the number of metrical feet to
twelve, and with three exceptions names the twelve with the terms used by Webbe and
Talaeus. See below, pp. 327-329.
4a See Avdomari Talaei Rhetorica e P. Ratnt Praelectionibuf observata, ed* Claudius
Minos (Frankfurt, 1582), pp. 80-8 1.
41 Artes of Logike and Rethorike^ sig. Dsr.
42 For an excellent modern edition, see The Arcadian Rhetorike By A braham Fraunce^
ed. Ethel Seaton (Oxford: Published for the Luttrell Society by Basil Blackwell, 1950).
43 Smith, Elizabethan Critical Essays, I, 303-306, 422, quotes a chapter of The Ar-
[ 257 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Fraunce's Rhetorike differs in two main ways from Fenner 's. First
of al! 7 it deals in some detail with delivery as the second part of
Ramistic theory, whereas Fenner had thought it unnecessary to trans-
late this part into English. Here is Fraunce's approach to it:
Of Eloquution which was the first part of Rhetorike, wee haue spoken
alreadie: it now remaineth to talke of Vtterance or Pronunciation the
second part. Vtt&rance is a fit deliuering of the speach alreadie beauti-
fied. It hath two parts, Voyce and Gesture, the one pertaining to the
eare, the other belonging to the eye. 44
The second way in which Fraunce differs from Fenner is that Fenner
relies upon the Bible for his illustrations, whereas Fraunce in the
very spirit of Ramus borrows his from secular classics. Thus in his
discussion of voice and gesture he provides illustrative passages from
Homer in Greek, Virgil in Latin, Sidney in English, du Bartas in
French, Tasso in Italian, and Boscan Almogaver and Garcilasso in
Spanish. These authors, indeed, are the seven main sources of illus-
tration in the whole Arcadian Rhetorike^ as Fraunce's original title
page indicates. 45 Each illustration is designed, of course, to exhibit a
trope, a figure, a kind of voice, or a motion of head, eyes, lips, arms,
hands, and feet. Thus the work as a whole may be characterized as
a collection of Ramistic precepts for style and delivery, and as a col-
lection of model passages to show how the precepts actually work in
the writings of the great ancients and moderns. Ramus and Talaeus
had prided themselves upon deriving the principles of composition
from the practice of the masters, and Fraunce adheres to this same
procedure in the Arcadian Rhetorike as he had in the Lawiers Logike.
William Kempe, already mentioned as a Cambridge Ramist and
a translator of Ramus's Arithmetic** published at London in 1588,
at the very press where The Arcadian Rhetorike was produced, a
treatise called The Education of children in learning? 1 This work
cadian Rhetorike^ and supplies notes about Fraunce, without mentioning Ramus or
Talaeus in that connection. He suggests a family relation between Fraunce's Lawiers
Logike and Arcadian Rhetorike* on the one hand, and Thomas Wilson's Rule of Reason
and Rhetorique y on the other; also between Fraunce's Rhetorike and Sherry's Treatise of
Schemes and Tropes. Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance (1922), pp. 58-61,
discusses Sherry, Peacham, Fenner, Fraunce, Charles Butler, John Barton, and John
Smith as partners in a single movement towards limiting rhetoric to style and delivery,
4 * Arcadian Rhetorike^ ed. Seaton, p. 106.
45 Ibid.) pp. xx-li, Iviii. In these pages Miss Seaton has a full discussion of all the
authors used by Fraunce for illustrative purposes.
46 See above, p. 246.
47 The title page reads: "The Education of children in learning: Declared by the
[ 258 ]
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
deserves mention here as an account of the way in which Ramus's
logic and rhetoric were beginning to enter into English elementary
education during the late sixteenth century. Kempe was a master in
the Plymouth grammar school when he wrote the Education^ and
thus it is probably a reflection of his own practice. Avowedly seeking
to arouse public interest in his profession, he dedicated his work to
the mayor and the other officials of Plymouth, and in a preface to the
reader announced his intention of reaching, not the learned school-
masters, but "all other sort of people," and of setting forth "the
dignitie and vtilitie of the matter, with such holie and ancient His-
tories, with such plaine and sensible reasons, as may teach the vn-
learned with some delight, and not be tedious to those that are
learned." 48 "I suppose," he confessed of his work, "that it will seeme
altogether a strange and a new Booke." After his preface are printed
four Latin epigrams to the author from his friends, one of whom
signs himself "lo. Sw." and thus begins:
Sturmius and Ramus, Freigius, Manutius, Ascham,
Beheld each thing in this kind that they might explain it.
Kempe has what they had, well collected, for teaching the English,
His diligence being at one with his motive of duty. 49
Ramus ? s influence is seen after Kempe has talked of "The Dignitie
of Schooling," as established by its pedigree, and "The Vtilitie of
Schooling," as established in part from a long speech by Alfred the
Great. Appropriately enough, Ramus is the obvious source of what
Kempe has to say about the liberal arts under his third major topic,
"The Method of Schooling." Kempe's theory of method is stated as
follows :
Wherefore first the scholler shall learne the precepts: secondly, he
shall learne to note the examples of the precepts in vnfoulding other
mens workes: thirdly, to imitate the examples in some worke of his
owner fourthly and lastly, to make somewhat alone without an ex-
ample. Now, all these kindes of teaching are seene in euery speciall
sort of the things taught, be it Grammar, Logike, Rhetorike, Arith-
metike, Geometrie, or any other Arte. 50
Dignitie, Vtilftie, and Method thereof. Meete to be knowne, and practised aswell of
Parents and Schoolemaisters. . . . Imprinted at London by Thomas Orwin, for John
Porter and Thomas Gubbin. 1588."
48 The Education of children in learning, sig. Ajr.
48 Ibid., sig. A4r. Translation mine.
50 Ibid^ sig. Far.
[ 259 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
After this preview of the curriculum, Kempe traces the child's
progress year by year until at the age of twelve he has mastered ele-
mentary grammar and is ready for the study of logic and rhetoric.
As Kempe describes the teaching of these latter two subjects and of
advanced grammar, we find ourselves in the presence, not of scholas-
ticism and traditionalism, but of Ramus's own doctrine.
The Ramists assigned the tropes and figures to style, as traditional
rhetoric had done 5 but style, as we have noticed, is always the first
part of rhetoric to a thorough Ramist, whereas traditional rhetoric
counted it the third part, even in treatises where no other part was
discussed. Not only does Kempe adhere to Ramism in this particular,
but he also approves of Ramistic analysis and genesis as educational
procedures, and he exactly follows Ramus's prescription as to the
contents of the second part of rhetoric, the first and second part of
logic, and the two parts of grammar. The following quotation, long
as it is, displays these aspects of Kempe's Ramism, and gives us an
amazing picture of the fatiguing discipline of Elizabethan elementary
education:
First the sch oiler shal learne the precepts concerning the diuers sorts
o arguments in the first part of Logike, (for that without them
Rhetorike cannot be well vnderstood) then shall followe the tropes
and figures in the first part of Rhetorike, wherein he shall employ the
sixth part of his studie, and all the rest in learning and handling good
authors: as are Tullies Offices^ his Orations, Caesars Commentaries,
Virgils Aeneis, Quids Metamorphosis y and Horace. In whom for his
first exercise of vnfolding the Arte, he shall obserue the examples of
the hardest poynts in Grammar, of the arguments in Logike, of the
tropes and figures in Rhetorike, referring euery example to his proper
rule, as before. Then he shall learne the two latter parts also both of
Logike and Rhetorike. And as of his Grammar rules he rehearsed
some part euery day 5 so let him now do the like in Logike, after-
wards in Rhetorike, and then in Grammar agayne, that he forget not
the precepts of arte, before continual vse haue ripened his vnderstand-
ing in them. And by this time he must obserue in authors all the vse of
the Artes, as not only the words and phrases, not only the examples
of the arguments j but also the axiome, wherein euery argument is
disposed j the syllogisme, whereby it is concluded j the method of the
whole treatise, and the passages, wherby the parts are ioyned to-
gether. Agayne, he shall obserue not only euery trope, euery figure,
aswell of words as of sentences: but also the Rhetoricall pronunciation
and gesture fit for euery word, sentence, and affection.
[ 260 ]
RAMUS's RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
And so let him take in hand the exercise of all these three Artes at
once in making somewhat of his owne, first by imitation 5 as when he
hath considered the propertie of speach in the Grammaticall etymolo-
gie and syntaxis: the fineness of speach in the Rhetoricall ornaments,
as comely tropes, pleasant figures, fit pronounciation and gesture: the
reason and pith of the matter in the Logicall weight of arguments, in
the certeyntie of the axiomes, in the due fourme of syllogismes, and
in the easie and playne method: then let him haue a like theame to
prosecute with the same artificiall instruments, that he findeth in his
author. 51
This procedure of mastering the precepts, of analyzing master-
pieces, and finally of producing themes of the student's own was to
continue, says Kempe, for three years, that is, from the twelfth year
of the student's age to the fifteenth. Thereafter would follow a half-
year of arithmetic and geometry j and so "before the full age of six-
teene yeers," the student would "be made fit to wade without a
schoolemaister, through deeper mysteries of learning, to set forth
the glorie of God, and to benefite his Countrie." 52 Kempe, as he
said, was writing both to encourage parents to educate their children
and to describe educational methods for the inexpert schoolmasters
outside and inside the professional system. 53 But there can be no
doubt that the procedures recommended to his readers were followed
in his grammar school at Plymouth and elsewhere in schools of the
period. I his program for the last year or so of grammar school
seems to overlap the work of the first year of college, no one should
be surprised, for that sort of duplication has been in the school sys-
tem throughout history.
The exact identity of the earliest edition used to acquaint English
schoolboys with Talaeus's Latin Rhetorica has not been satisfactorily
determined. I have already mentioned that a work under such a title,
and another called Rethorica Rami^ were licensed for publication
with the company of stationers in London on November n, 1577,
but that a copy of neither of these works from that date survives. 6 *
Nor does a copy of Claudius Minos's edition of Talaeus's Rhetorica
survive in an imprint dated at London in 1582, although that work,
and a now-vanished edition of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo, were
licensed for publication on December 5 of that year. 55 Also not pre-
51 Ibid., sig. Giv-G 3 r. 82 Ibid., sig. Hxr. ^ * 3 Ibid., sig. A*r-A 3 v.
54 See above, p. 254.. See also Arber, Transcript of the Registers^ II, 319.
55 See Arber, n a 417.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
served is any 1586 imprint of a London edition of Talaeus's Retor-
ike or of Ramus's Latin Logike, although both of these works were
received by the stationers that year on August 22 for printing. 56 And
finally there is no surviving copy of a 1588 London edition of Ta-
laeus's Rhetorica accompanied by Ramus's commentary, despite the
fact that such a work was entered with the stationers as that year was
drawing to an end. 57
A less negative record exists for editions put out in the fifteen-
nineties. Charles Butler, one of the few Oxonians to become an ardent
Ramist, published for schoolboys a Latin text of Talaeus in 1597.
Since this work contains a dedicatory letter dated from Oxford on
May 5, 1593, it can be assumed that its first edition appeared in that
year, although no copy under such a date survives. The 1597 text is
something of a curiosity, not only on account of the date on the
letter, but also because the work bears the title, Rameae Rhetoricae
Libri Dvo.** The obvious similarity between this title and the one
already mentioned as having been licensed in the stationers' registers
on November n, 1577, would suggest at first glance that Butler's
work had originally appeared as many as twenty years before 1 597.
But against this is the fact that Butler would have been only sixteen
years of age in 1577, and not yet an undergraduate at Oxford. A
more likely explanation of the registration of Talaeus's Rhetorica
under Ramus's name in 1577 is that everyone accepted the latter as
the primary authority behind the new rhetoric and as the more
famous personality of the two, whereas Talaeus was considered as a
secondary figure, and his name was even regarded in some quarters
as a pseudonym under which Ramus had published certain of his
works, 50 Butler did not subscribe to the view that Talaeus was Ra-
mus's pseudonym. But he did publish Talaeus's Rhetorica under
Ramus's name in 1597, confining himself to style and delivery, as
did Talaeus, and allotting to the first topic the thirty-seven chapters
and sixty-three pages of his Book I, and to the second topic, the ten
chapters and seventeen pages of his Book II.
A somewhat expanded edition of Butler's work, titled the Rheto-
ricae Libri Dvo, appeared at Oxford in 1598, and it is this which
became the most famous textbook in the history of Ramistic rhetoric
56 Arber, n, 455.
57 Arber* II, 509. The exact date of this entry is December 6> 1588.
58 The title page reads: "Rameae Rhetoricae Libri Dvo. In vsvm Scholarvm. Oxoniae,
Excudebat Josephus Bamesius. 1597."
59 See Waddington, Ramus^ pp. 464, 475,
[ 262 ]
RAMUS^S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
in England. 60 It no longer bore Ramus's name on its title page, but
it made no secret of its origins. Its dedicatory letter proclaims its
sources in veiled terms by saying that "whatever the ancients or
moderns have written anywhere in this line, the whole is set forth
here, accommodated to a legitimate method, and made clear by dis-
tinguished examples from poets and orators." 61 Whenever the word
"method" appears in the writings of the late sixteenth century in
England, it amounts almost to a confession of the author's awareness
of Ramus. But Butler acknowledges his indebtedness to Ramus in
much more definite terms when he comes to address his readers in
the preface that follows his dedicatory epistle.
This preface opens with a eulogy of Ramus as the greatest of the
entire company of ancient and modern philosophers. Says Butler:
As to the place which Peter Ramus may rightly hold among the
philosophers whom distinguished wisdom, as allotted to later times,
has celebrated throughout the entire circle of the earth, let that be the
judgment of the pre-eminent in learning and equity who are best able
and willing to decide. Indeed, according to my opinion, if you would
have regard either for truth in precepts, or for brevity in method, or
for clarity in examples, or for use and utility in all things, he will
stand out second to none in that most celebrated and most honored
chorus. Surely (that I may freely speak what I mean)
so far towers his head above the heads of all others
As cypresses are wont to tower above the pliant viburnum. 62
Virgil had used this image of the cypress to express the superiority
of Rome to all other cities. 63 Butler uses it and the Virgilian glori-
fication of Rome to cap his tribute to Ramus. Then he continues:
I offer this little book to you (O candid reader) in the name of that
one [i.e., Ramus], If it should bring anything of fruit and profit, you
6(? Its title page reads: "Rhetoricae Libri Dvo. Qvorvm Prior de Tropis & Figuris,
Posterior de Voce & Gestu Praecipit. In vsvm scholarum accuratius editi. , . . Oxoniae,
Excudebat Josephvs Barnesivs. M. D. XCVIII." Editions of this work appeared at Ox-
ford in 1600 and 1618; at London in 1629, i64z> 1649, J ^55> anc ^ 16845 at Cam-
bridge in 164x5 and at Leiden in 164.2,
61 RhetQTicae Libri Dvo> sig. ^r. Translation mine here and below.
62 Ibid*) sig. fsv.
63 See Virgil, Ecloga 7, lines 25-26. Virgil's lines are:
Verum haec tantum alias inter caput extulit urbes,
Quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi.
Butler adapts these lines to his context by making some slight changes in wording. Thus
he says:
tantum alios inter caput extulit omnes,
Quantum lenta solent inter viburna cupressi.
[ 263 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
may credit it all as having been learned from him. In truth, he him-
self studiously sought out the material, traversing completely the
broad forests of the most tested authors 5 he cut the choice cuttings
with active hand as one cuts to a rule, and he hewed, and smoothed,
and shaped them all.
Now if this seems to imply that Butler was attributing direct
authorship of the present work to Ramus, as his title of the preced-
ing year had done, he immediately corrects that impression in the
following words:
Having thus prepared all of this, he himself, occupied with grander
buildings, commended to Audomarus Talaeus, certainly a skilled
master in all phases of this subject, the work of joining the pieces to-
gether into perfection. And the latter, indeed, the task having been
entrusted to him, brought it to completion, Minerva being not unwill-
ing, as they say.
The bare definitions in Butler's Rhetoricae Libri Dvo have the
familiar wording of all such elements in Ramistic rhetorical theory.
"Rhetoric is the art of speaking well," he begins. Comment follows
this general observation. Then comes the organizing remark for the
whole treatise: "The parts of rhetoric are two, style and delivery." 6 *
"Style," it turns out, "is that of trope or that of figure," whereas de-
livery as "the appropriate declaring of style" has two parts, voice
and gesture. 65 "Trope," we are 'told, "is style in which a word is
changed from its native meaning to some other," and "figure is style
in which the character of speaking is changed from its straight and
artless idiom." 66 The several figures and tropes are illustrated from
classical authors, the orations of Cicero and the poetry of Virgil be-
ing of course the sources most often cited by Butler and by Talaeus
as well.
Butler's one English illustration is worthy of notice, not only as a
departure from the text of Talaeus, but also as an indication of the
regard in which Edmund Spenser's poetry was held in the closing
years of the sixteenth century. Speaking of rhyme-scheme in poetry
as one of the forms of change from the straight and artless idiom of
ordinary talk, Butler remarks that rhymes have been used by all
nations and peoples, but that "today they mostly consist in a re-
currence connected with sound" $ and then he illustrates with the
following poem "of our Homer":
64 Rhetoricae Libri Dvo y sig. Air. e5 JW., sigs. Air,
68 Ibid.) sigs. Air, A3r.
[ 264 ]
RAMUS 3 S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
Deedes soone doe die how ever noblie donne,
And thoughts of men doe as thernselues decay j
But wise wordes taught in numbers for to rune,
Recorded by the Muses, liue for aye:
Ne may with storming showres be washt away:
Ne bitter breathing windes w boisterous blast,
Nor age, nor envie shall them ever wast.
For not to haue beene dipt in Lethe lake,
Could save the sonne of Thetis from to die:
But that blinde bard did him immortal make,
With verses dipt in dewe of Castalie:
Which made the easterne conquerour to crie,
O fortunate yongman whose vertue found
So brave a trumpe thy noble actes to sound. 67
Butler was serving as master of the free school of Basingstoke,
Hants, when his famous edition of the Rhetoricae Libri Dvo was
published. Two years later, that is, in 1600, he became vicar at Woot-
ton St. Laurence, and he remained in that post until his death in
i647. 68 Thus he did not belong to the company of educators during
the larger part of his long life. But he must have maintained enough
contact with his former profession to know that his Rhetoricae Libri
Dvo became one of the leading textbooks of the seventeenth century.
This work, indeed, was paid the signal honor in 1612 of being
recommended by the prominent educator, John Brinsley. ' Brinsley
published that year at London a treatise entitled Lvdvs Literarivs:
or, The Grammar Schoole, which on its title page declared itself to
be intended "for the helping of the younger sort of Teachers, and of
all Schollars, with all other desirous of learning." The Lvdvs is
made up of a lengthy dialogue between Spoudeus and Philoponus,
two schoolmasters, the former of whom prefers traditional methods
of teaching, and the latter, newer methods. In their discussion they
intimate that English and penmanship are to be taught as prerequi-
sites to the work of the Latin grammar school, and that Latin gram-
mar itself is next given full emphasis. As the student progresses, he
sig. C;jv-C4r. Butler quotes here from Spenser's "The Rvlnes of Time," lines
400-406, 428-434. This poem was published at London in 1591 in a volume entitled
Complaints. Butler's quotation differs in minor ways from Spenser's text. See The Works
of Edmund Spenser A Variorum Edition^ ed. Edwin Greenlaw, Charles Grosvenor Os-
good, Frederick Morgan Padelford, Ray Heffner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1932-1949), [vni], 48-49*
68 See Foster, Alumni Oxonienses^ s.v. Butler, Charles, of Bucks.
[ 265 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
must be taught to write themes in Latin, and it is Spoudeus, the tra-
ditionalist, who wants to accomplish this object by reading his stu-
dents the rules out of Aphthonius, and then by having them compose
themes not only in accordance with those rules but also in imitation
of Aphthonius's models, especially those of the fable and the chria.
Philoponus indicates that he teaches Latin composition in a less rigid
way. Thus it is not surprising, when the talk turns to rhetoric, that
Philoponus emphasizes the new doctrines of Talaeus, and proceeds
to pay a handsome compliment to Butler. The words of Philoponus
deserve quotation at some length :
For answering the questions of Rhetoricke, you may if you please,
make them perfect in Talaeus Rhetoricke, which I take to be most
vsed in the best Schoolesj onely to giue each definitioi} and distribu-
tion, and some one example or two at most in each Chapter: and
those of the shortest sentences out of the Poets: so that they can giue
the word or words, wherein the force of the rule is. ... Claudius
Minos Commentary may bee a good helpe to make Talaeus Rhetor-
icke most plaine, both for precepts and examples. . . .
Or in stead of Talaeus, you may vse Master Butlars Rhetoricke, of
Magdalens in Oxford, printed in Oxford 5 which I mentioned before:
being a notable abbridgement of Talaeus, making it most plaine, and
farre more easie to be learned of Schollars, and also supplying very
many things wanting in Talaeus. . * . It is a booke, which (as I take it)
is yet very little knowne in Schooles, though it haue beene forth
sundry yeares, set forth for the vse of Schooles j and the vse and
benefit mil be found to be farre above all that euer hath beene written
of the same. 70
The success of his Rhetorical Libri Dvo prompted Butler to make
another textbook in a related field when he had reached the age of
sixty-eight. This new work he called the Oratoriae Libri Dvo, and
it was first published at Oxford in 1629."- Here he defines oratorio-
as the faculty of putting a speech together on any question whatever,
and oratio as a structure of words and thoughts designed to per-
** Lvtkrs Literarivs (London, 1612), pp. 172 3. Far a brief discussion of Aphthonius,
see above, pp. 140-143.
T0 Lvdvs Litrarvos % pp. 203-204.
T1 Its complete title page reads: "Qratoriae Libri Dvo. Qvorvm Alter ejus Defini-
tionem, Alter Partitionem Explicate In vsvm Scholarvm recent editi. Authore Carolo
Bvtlero, Magd. Oxoniae Excudebat Qvilielmvs Tvrner, im-pensis Authoris. 1629." This
work did not achieve the popularity of Butler's Rhetoricae Libri Dvo, but it neverthe-
less was given four later editions in 1633, 1635, 1642, and 1645. See Lee S. Hultzen,
iC CharIes Butler on Memory/' Speech MonograpAs y vi (1939), 45.
[ 266 ]
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
suade. 72 Here he speaks of persuasion as the process of doing three
things gaining favor, moving, teaching. 73 Here he discusses the six
parts of the classical oration, the positions of argument, the kinds of
oratory. These matters he treats in Book I, whereas Book II deals
with the five ancient parts of rhetoric, that is, with invention, ar-
rangement,, style, memory, and delivery. 74
The fact that Butler's Rhetoricae Libri Dvo deals exclusively with
style and delivery, while his Qratoriae Libri Dvo covers not only
these two fields to some extent, but also the great fields of memory,
arrangement, and invention, may be a bit bewildering at first gla,nce.
It may be bewildering because Butler, living in an age when Ramists
and traditionalists held opposing views on rhetoric, would seem in his
earlier work to have been thoroughly Ramistic, and in his later work
to have been thoroughly traditional. Is he then to be explained as a
man who was a Ramist in his youth and a traditionalist in his old age?
Must we cross him off the roster of English Ramists in the period
between 1629 and the date of his death in 1647, and enroll him for
those eighteen years in the ranks of traditional rhetoricians? Must
we say that he renounced Ramus and embraced Cicero as an old man,
and that his conversion to Ciceronian rhetoric is merely part of a
general shift in the seventeenth century from the rhetoric of style
and delivery to the rhetoric of subject matter and arrangement?
These questions have to be answered in the negative. 75 They have
to be answered in the negative because Butler believes himself as
much of a Ramist in the Oratoriae Libri Dvo as he was in the
72 Oratorios Libri Dvo (1629), sig. Air, Azr. These definitions read: "Oratoria est
Facultas formandl Orationem de qualibet Qvaestione"; "Oratio est Dictionu & Senten-
tiaru structuraj ad persuadendu accomodata."
73 Ibid., sig. Biv. Butler's terms are conciliando^ concitando y docendo*
7 * Butler deals first with style in Bk. I, Ch. 2, of the Oratoriae Libri Dvo y -where he
speaks of the traditional three kinds of style, grand, medium, and plain. He also deals
with style in Bk. u, Ch. 4, and that entire chapter is brief enough for quotation:
Caput 4. De Elocutione & Pronunciatione.
De Blocutionis & Pronunciations ornametis,
vide Rhetoricam. Quae vt Poesin, Historiam,
Philosophiam, Epistolas, adeoque ipsum familiare
Colloquium, exornant; ita in Oratfone praecipue
locu habet, & cuilibtft Dicendi generi asserunt
turn gratiam, turn dignitatem, (sig, Pzv).
75 I am aware that my negative answer runs against previous opinion on this matter.
Sandford, in particular, explains Butler's Oratoriae Libri Dvo as a phase of the shift
from an aiiticlassical to a classical attitude. See William Phillips Sandford, "English
Rhetoric Reverts to Classicism, 1600-1650," The Quarterly Journal of Speech^ XV
(1929), 503-525. See also by the same author, English Theories of Public Address^
1530-1828* pp. 104-107.
[ 267 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
Rhetoricae Libri Dvo. For example, in treating invention in the Ora-
toriae Libri Dvo, Butler uses the same materials that Ramus had
used in treating invention as the first part of logic. That is to say,
Butler reduces arguments to artistic and non-artistic 5 artistic argu-
ments he classifies as primary and derivative primary $ the ultimate
distinctions drawn by him among artistic arguments are that they
concern cause, effect, subject, adjunct, opposites, comparatives, and
so on. These are terms out of Ramus's logic, as we know. And if
Butler seems at times to depart from that source, his terms are never-
theless from commentaries by the later Ramists.
That Butler is here following Ramus as a devoted and deliberate
disciple, there can be no doubt, for he says as much. Here are his
words as he turns from diagramming Ramus's inventional system,
and prepares to comment upon it:
These brief and methodical precepts concerning the places or kinds
of arguments are supplied from Peter Ramus, whose singular acute-
ness in rebuilding the arts I am never able to admire enough 5 and
they are not so much assembled in part as adopted in full. Except
some in Ramus are brought forth somewhat differently here, to the
end that they may be adapted to the use of oratory. But not of course
in any wrong sense. For whatever cannot be set forth in a better
fashion, why should it be made worse by change? 7 *
Now if Butler is a Ramist in both of his works in the field of ora-
tory, why is it that those works differ so radically? The answer is that
in the earlier work he was writing on rhetoric, which as a Ramist he
had to limit to style and delivery, while in his later work he was in
reality writing on logic, and as a Ramist he had to develop this
subject under the headings of invention and arrangement. Thus his
two works differ more as Ramistic rhetoric differs from Ramistic
logic than as Ramistic rhetoric differs from traditional rhetoric.
But that is not the whole story. For, having claimed Butler as a
Ramist both in his youth and old age, we must now admit that his
later Ramism is not all it should have been. That he wrote on logic
in 1629 and called his subject oratorm is a liberty that Ramus would
never have allowed himself, for Ramus believed that there could be
no faculty of forming an oration except so far as that faculty was
governed by logic or by rhetoric, and thus there could be no treatise
on that faculty unless it was called logic or rhetoric. Nor would
7e Oratoriae Libri Dvo (1629), sig. Lir. Translation mine.
[ 268 ]
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
Ramus have allowed himself to approve o Butler's final decision to
treat memory as a part of logic. To Ramus, memory was not a divi-
sion of logic or of rhetoric. It was a faculty developed from nature,
not from science, or rather, it was not proper material for a science,
although it was assisted by the science of dialectical method. Butler
knows of Ramus's opinion in this matter, but he does not heed it. 77 He
gives instead a competent analysis of the ancient theory of memory. 78
In one other instance he proves himself in 1629 to be an adulter-
ated Ramist. His master would never have used in a scientific work
what Butler uses in speaking of the parts of the oration, the positions
of argument, and the kinds of oratory. These materials were not ac-
ceptable to Ramus because, if they appeared in rhetoric, they made
rhetoric overlap logic in violation of the law of justice 5 and if they
appeared in logic, either they violated the law of truth or else they
duplicated materials already established in logic by prior claim. For
example, the theory of the six parts of an oration was to Ramus a
loose variant of the theory of method in logic. Thus it deserved only
a bare mention in that science, and no mention at all in rhetoric,
where anything of that sort was an intruder* For another example,
the theory of the positions of argument was a loose variant of the
theory of the ten places of Ramistic logic. Thus it duplicated what
logic already contained, and so it lost its place in logic, whereas it
too was an intruder in rhetoric. Now, these arguments constitute
almost the sum of what Butler admires as Ramus's "singular acute-
ness in rebuilding the arts", but still they did not seem to have the
acuteness in 1 629 to convince Butler of the necessity of perpetuating
Ramus's basic distinctions.
In the year 1648, when Butler had been dead for only a few
months, and his Rhetoricae Libri Dvo was a venerable work with
more than a half-century of popularity behind it, a schoolmaster
named William Dugard, of the Merchant Taylors' School in Lon-
don, published at his own commercial press in that city a little work
called Rhetorices Element^ which was in fact an elementary version
of the text of Butler's edition of Talaeus arranged in the form of
7T Ibid.) sigf. K;jv. Butler*s "words are: "Oratoriae partes numerantur quinque: In-
ventio & Dispositio, Elocutio & Pronunciatio, atque Memorla. E quibus primum par
Dialecticae, alterum Rhetoric?, acceptum refert: partem quintain non ab Arte, sed a
Natura traditam, vt sibi, prae caeteris artibus necessariam, & quasi peculiarem, assumitj
& praeceptis perficit."
78 For a translation of Butler's chapter on memory* see Lee S. Hultzen, "Charles
Butler on Memory/* Speech Monografhs^ VI (1939), 47-65.
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
questions and answers. Dugard, who was also to publish at his press
the famous reply of John Milton to Salmasius, gave his version of
Butler a second edition in i65i. 79 Its Latin title declares it to be so
formed that, if the questions are omitted or neglected altogether,
the answers alone would present the entire theory of rhetoric to be-
ginners. And in his preface to those beginners, Dugard speaks thus
of Butler:
Butler improved Talaeus in very many ways. Little questions of the
kind presented here (unless my prediction deceives me) render Butler
himself easier and more adaptable by far to the capacity of those of
tender years. . . . Therefore, these having been sampled, you are to
consult Butler himself if you shall have been at a loss in any way
concerning this matter. 80
The work which follows this declaration presents the rhetoric of
Talaeus in the form of a catechism, style being given twenty-six
pages of text, and pronunciation, five, while at the end the figures
of style are summarized in neat tabular form.
Dugard's Rhetorices Elementa reached a fifth edition by 1657.
Three years later, Charles Hoole, writing a treatise for the indoc-
trination of young schoolmasters, mentioned Dugard along with
Butler and Talaeus when he came to speak of the study of rhetoric
in grammar schools. Hoole*s treatise, called A New Discovery Of
the old Art of Teaching Schoole^ invites comparison with Kempe's
Education of Children and Brinsley's Lvdvs. Like them, it is a de-
scription of contemporary education, and like them it indicates the
popularity of Ramistic rhetoric in English education. Hoole ad-
dresses himself first to the curriculum of the petty school, where
children of the age of four or five were taught to read English j and
then he speaks of the grammar school itself, where in successive
years the emphasis is upon Latin, "forasmuch as speaking Latine is
the main end oj Grammar^ Pupils of the fourth form are expected
79 The title page of this second edition reads: "Rhetorices Elementa, Quaestionibus et
Responsionihus Explicata: Quae ita formantur, ut, Quaestionibus prorsus omissis, vel
neglectis, Responsiones solummodo integram Rhetorices Tnstitutionem Tironibus ex-
hibeant. Per Gull. Du-gard, In usum Scholae Mercatorum-Scissorvm. Editio Secunda. . . .
Londini, Typis Autoris, Anno Domini 1651. Veneunt apud Fr. Egles field in Caemeterio
PauHno." I have not seen a copy of the first edition. For a discussion of Dugard's con-
nection with the publication o Milton's reply to Salmasius, see F, F. Madan, "Milton,
Salmasius, and Dugard," The Library, iv (ipza), 119-145.
** Rhetorices Element* (1651), p. 6. Translation mine.
ai Charles Hoole, A New Discovery Of the old Art of Teaching Schoole, ed* E. T.
Canipagnac (Liverpool and London, 1913), "The Usher's Duty," p. 50. Italics are
Hoole's.
[ 270 ]
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
to reach perfection in grammar and to begin to study the elements
of rhetoric. In mastering the latter subject, they make their first con-
tact with Talaeus and Butler through Dugard. Says Hoole:
And to enter them in that Art of fine speaking, they may make use
of Elementa Rhetorices, lately printed by Mr. Dugard, and out of it
learn the Tropes and Figures, according to the definitions given by
Talaeus^ and afterwards more illustrated by Mr. Butler. Out of either
of which books, they may be helped with store of examples, to ex-
plain the Definitions, so as they may know any Trope or Figure that
they meet with in their own Authours. 82
Another honor was paid in 1671 to Butler's version of Talaeus
it was partly converted into English by John Newton. Newton was
a loyalist during the Protectorate, and a clergyman and educational
reformer after the Restoration. What he wanted above all in educa-
tion was to have young people taught "all the Sciences in their own
Tongue," and to have the Latin School reserved for those who, be-
ing already familiar with the liberal arts in the vernacular, were
intent upon entering a learned profession. 83 In furtherance of this
design, he published English versions of the seven liberal arts, one
version being entitled An Introduction to the Art of Rhetorick (Lon-
don, i6yi). 8 * Newton is an eclectic. His rhetorical theory recognizes
invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery as the five com-
mon heads of that science 5 but his sources are not as purely Cicero-
nian as these divisions suggest. He indicates instead that his borrow-
ings are from a Neo-Ciceronian rhetorician and from a Ramist "the
truth is," he says, "the form and Method of this our Rhetorick, in
respect of Elocution, some examples only excepted, is the same with
Butler, and as for invention and disposition, I have very much fol-
lowed the first part of that excellent piece of Oratory, which Michael
Radau hath published under the title of Orator
82 Ibid., p. 132.
83 These ideas are stated in the dedicatory epistle and preface of his Introduction to
the Art of Logick (London, 1678). This work was first published in 1671. For a dis-
cussion of it, see below, pp. 316-317.
8 * For Newton's complete writings on the trivium and quadrivium, see his The Eng-
lish Academy: or a brief introduction to the seven liberal arts (London s 1677). There
was a second edition of this work at London in 1693. The title page of his Art of
Rhetorick^ as published in 1671, reads as follows: "An Introduction to the Art of Rhet-
orick. Composed for the benefit of young Schollars and others, who have not opportunity
of being* instructed in the Latine tongue; and is very helpful to understand the figurative
expressions in the holy Scriptures. Published for a Publick Advantage, By John Ne*wtott y
D. D. London* Printed by E. 7% and R. H. for Thomas Passenger at the three Bibles on
London-Bridge-) and Ben. Hurlock over against St. Magnus Church. 1671.**
E 271 3
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
from whence I might have taken much more than I have, but that I
was afraid of being too prolixe and over burthening my young Eng-
lish Rhetorician. . . ," 85 As for memory and delivery, the other two
parts of Newton's present subject, "I purposely omit them," declares
he, "as being natural endowments, which may be better improved by
constant practice, than by any precepts which can be given." 86
In the chapter which concludes his analysis of invention, Newton
makes use of material from Radau to give us an insight into the cul-
tural conditions that produce and are produced by the Ramist con-
ception of rhetoric. At that point he is speaking of the sharpness of an
oration. 87 Now sharpness as he discusses it is a stylistic phenomenon,
even though invention is his present subject, and even though style
will be treated after he has talked of disposition or arrangement. His
own definition of sharpness is that it consists in an agreeing discord
or a disagreeing concord in an oration, as when a beautiful and chaste
maiden is said to be a fire that scorches and chills, or when the sun
is called a fountain of light. These concords and discords, he explains,
are produced in various ways. But what really gives them authority
with listeners is that the public has a strong appetite for them. Says
Newton :
Such is the Curiosity of this age in which we live, as that it is grown
weary of these plain and ordinary waies, and requireth or expecteth
in the very style something more than ordinary 5 insomuch that now
a daies he is not worthy the name of an Orator? that knowes not how
to brandish an Oration, by some sharp and witty flourishes. And
therefore, that we may comply with the present times, we will also
speak something of that sharpness or ingenuity, with which an oration
should be adorned. 88
The history of Ramistic rhetoric in Britain would not be complete
without mention of various Latin editions of Talaeus in addition to
those that I have already indicated as having possibly preceded But-
ler, and those that grew directly or indirectly out of Butler. Andrew
Hart, a famous Scottish printer and bookseller of the Elizabethan
and Jacobean period, published at Edinburgh in 1621 a little work
entitled Avdomari Talaei Rhetorica^ which is the earliest surviving
British reprint of that treatise to acknowledge Talaeus as its author
^Introduction to the Art of Rhetorick (London, 1671), sig. Aior-Aiov.
**Ibid. y p. 130. For a discussion of Michael Radau's Orator Extem-poraneus, see
below, p. 3z6.
^Introduction to the Art of Rhetorick, pp. 28-36. 8B Ibid., p. 28.
[ 272 ]
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
and Ramus as its source. 89 Ten years later the same work was pub-
lished in England at the Cambridge University press, and there were
also two printings of it at London, one of which belongs to the year
1636, and the other probably to the same year, though it is un-
dated. 90 Finally, in 1651 at the press of William Dugard in London
there appeared a little work entitled Rhetoricae Com^endium^
Latino-Anglic^ by Thomas Home, an Oxonian who had become
headmaster of Eton, 81 The Latin section of Home's compend runs
to twenty-two pages and is followed by seventeen pages of English,
the latter being a translation of the former, and having as title, "A
Short Epitome of Rhetorick." The work does not advertise its ori-
gin, but it consists in reality of a very short disquisition upon six of
the ten major terms in Ramus's theory of logical invention, and a
much longer disquisition upon the doctrine of style as set forth by
Talaeus. Delivery, the second phase of Talaeus's rhetoric, is men-
tioned but not discussed.
Home's version of Ramistic doctrine and Newton's adaptation of
Butler are not the only vernacular versions of the reformed rhetoric
to be published in England during the seventeenth century. As a
matter of fact, there are five other versions, two of which are respec-
tively a schoolboy digest and a scholarly English commentary, where-
as three are closely identified with Dudley Fenner's sixteenth-cen-
tury translation of Talaeus.
John Barton, master of the free school in Kinfare, Staffordshire,
brought out at London in 1 634 a work consisting of a short English
89 There is a copy of Hart's reprint at the Folger Shakespeare Library. Its title page
reads: "Avdomari Talaei Rhetorica. E P. Kami Regii Professoris Praelectionibvs ob-
servata. Edinburgi, Excudebat Andreas Hart. 1621." A work of similar title was entered
with the company of stationers on December 6 > 1588. See Arber, Transcript of the
Registers^ n, 509. No copy of it appears to have survived.
90 The title page of the Cambridge edition reads: "Avdomari Talaei rhetorica e P.
Kami, Regii professoris praelectionibus observata. Cui praefixa est epistola, quae lectorem
de omnibus utriusque viri scriptis, propediem edendis commonefacit. Cantabrigiae, Ex
Academiae celeberrimae Typographeo- 1631." There is a copy of this edition in the
Univers'ity Library, Cambridge. The dated London edition as held in the University
Library, Cambridge, has the same title as that just quoted, and its imprint reads, "Lon-
dini: Excusum impensis Societatis Stationariorum. 1636." The undated London edition,
a copy of which I have seen in the Huntington Library, has the same title but not quite
the same imprint as that in the dated London edition. Its imprint reads, "Londini: Ex-
cusum pro Societate Stationariorunu" The Huntington copy has perhaps been cropped
in such a way as to have had its date removed. At any rate, the card catalogue of that
library identifies it as "perhaps the 1636 ed, with date cut off."
91 The title page reads: "Rhetoricae Compendium, Latino-Anglice. Opera Thomae
Horn, A. M. Scholae Etonensis Archididascali. Londini, Typis Guil* D&~gardi. Veneunt
apud Franc, Eglesfield in Caemeterio Paulino. 1651."
[ 273 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
summary and a shorter following Latin summary of Ramistic rhet-
oric, these two parts being published as The Art of Rhetorick Con-
cisely and Comfleatly Handled, although the Latin section is sep-
arately titled "Rhetorices Enchiridion." 92 In the dedicatory letter
Barton refers to his double summary as "these two-languag'd twins,"
and his letter to the reader implies that these twins are descended
from such previous rhetoricians as Keckermann, Aristotle, Cicero,
Dietericus, Molinaeus, Butler, and Isidore. He even mentions that,
since grammar and logic are necessary to an orator, men who "for-
merly wrote Rhetoricks, put in the Topicks of Logick and Figures
of Grammar, as essential parts of Rhetorick." 93 But his own work is
not descended from those who gave rhetoric something beyond the
procedures of style and delivery. True, he objects to "elocution"
and "pronunciation" as terms for the two parts of the proper rhet-
oric, on the ground that they both mean about the same thing, and
that neither includes the concept of gesture* 9 * True, he proposes
"adornation" and "action" as substitutes for these two terms. At this
point, however, his originality ends. For the rest, he devotes himself
to the Ramistic convention, and varies from it only by giving the
topic of action almost no space at all. Here are his essential state-
ments on the subject of adornation, and the full text of his chapter
on action:
Rhetorick is the skill of using daintie words, and comely deliverie,
whereby to work upon mens affections. It hath two parts, Adornation
and Action. Adornation consisteth in the sweetnesse of the phrase, and
is seen in Tropes and Figures. A Tro-pe is an affecting kinde of speech,
altering the native signification of a word. . . , 95
A Figure is an affecting kinde of speech without consideration had of
any borrowed sense. . . . M
Thus much of Adornationj a word of Action. Action is a part of Rhet-
orick exercised in the gesture and utterance.
Gesture is the comely carriage of the bodiej whereof nothing is need-
full to be spoken.
82 The complete title is as follows: "The Art of Rhetorick Concisely and Compleatly
Handled, Exemplified out of holy Writ, and with a compendious and perspicuous Com-
ment, fitted to the capacities of such as have had a smatch of learning 1 , or are otherwise
ingenious. By J. B. Master of the free-school of Kinfare in Staffordshire. . . . [n.p J
Printed for Nicolas Also^ and are to be sold at the Angel in Po<bes-head-attey. 1634."
* 3 Art of Rhetorick* si ff . A 3 v. * Ibid., si*. A 3 v.
p. i. ** /***., p, 33,
RAMUS'S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
Utterance is the sweet framing of the voice j of which we will note
onely that which we call Em-phasisj which is the elevation of some
word or words in the sentence, wherein the chief force lies. Psal. 76.7.
Thouy thou^ art worthy to be praised. 9 r
Another vernacular version of Talaeus's Rhetorics appeared in
1657, when the second edition of Alexander Richardson's Logicians
School-Master was published. This work has already been described
in an earlier section of this chapter where English commentaries upon
Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo were under examination. 98 Richard-
son's notes on "Taleus his Rhetorick" run to some fifty-six pages,
and cover only the subject of the tropes and figures. The basic phi-
losophy behind his analysis of these components of style can be
grasped from what he has to say about grammar and rhetoric:
For whereas Grammer is the garment of Logick, and would cover
every thing as Logick layes it down, the Nominative case before the
Verb, and the Accusative after the Verb: Figura comes and sets this
speech otherwise, and so changeth the habit of it j so that I may com-
pare Grammer to a trubkin, and Rhetorick to a fine handsome fellow;
and in Rhetorick I may compare a Trope to one cut or jag, and a
Figure to all the jags, or the whole shape thereof."
The images suggested by these partly obsolete terms would ap-
pear to be that of a small squat woman to represent grammar, and a
fine handsome fellow to represent rhetoric, whereas a trope would
be one slash in a garment to show the color of a garment underneath,
and a figure would be the pattern that all such slashes make, or the
shape of the garment as a whole. These metaphors were valid parts of
the Ramistic concept of grammar and rhetoric. And by virtue of its
preoccupation with unusual patterns of language, Ramistic rhetoric
naturally assumed jurisdiction over much of what we would today
consider to be poetical theory. Says Richardson, speaking of metrical
language: "So that here comes in Poetry, so that 'tis not a distinct
art by it self, and therf ore not to be handled by it self, but is a branch
of Rhetorrck [sic], . . / no Nevertheless, as Richardson makes plain
a moment later, poetry has one characteristic of its very own it con-
97 Ibid.) p. 35. Following- these words there is a half page devoted to commentary.
The quotation from Psalms actually reads: "Thou, even thou, art to be feared." For
Barton's reasons for not discussing gesture^ see his preface, sig. A7r.
98 See above, pp. 209-110.
* 9 The Logicians School-Master (1657), "Rhetorical Notes, J> p. 66.
1( *> Ib*L, p. 70.
[ 275 1
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
veys its meaning through the medium of fiction. He places this re-
striction upon poetry thus: "For the most part," he says, " 'tis used in
fables, and fabula is the subject of Poetry. . . ," 101
The three remaining seventeenth-century English versions of Ta-
laeus's Rhetorica stem more or less directly from the second part of
Dudley Fenner's Artes of Logike and Rethorike. As we have already
observed, Fenner was the first Englishman to translate Ramistic
rhetoric into his native language. 102 No doubt because the first edition
of his work was published anonymously, it tended in time to become
an item that could easily be attributed to another author or that could
be freely appropriated as unowned material. The three rhetorics re-
maining to my present discussion belong to one or the other of these
two categories.
Fenner's Rethorike is one of the three anonymous units of a work
published in 1651 under the title, A Compendium of the Art of
Logick and Rhetorick in the English Tongue. I have already men-
tioned that the first unit of this Compendium^ as Walter J, Ong, S J.,
has demonstrated, is to be identified as Robert Fage's translation of
Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo.* Now it should be added that the
other two units, likewise Identified by Father Ong, are Thomas
Hobbes's English abstract of Aristotle's Rhetoric^ and the main heads
of Talaeus's Rhetorica in Fenner's translation, the latter treatise be-
ing said on its title page in the Compendium to be "By a concealed
author." 104
Fenner's Rethorike is also the unacknowledged source of part of
the rhetorical doctrine in John Smith's The Mysterie of Rhetorique
Unvail'd (London, i657). 105 Smith's Rhetorique is in general a com-
pilation wherein some 138 tropes and figures are listed, not only by
Greek, Latin, and English names, but also by English definitions,
and by Latin and English illustrations. The English illustrations,
says Smith, "are most of them streams from Sir Philip Sidneys foun-
tain." 108 As for his Latin illustrations, he is also explicit about their
intermediate source, for he credits them repeatedly to Thomas Far-
101 Ibid.^ p. 71- 102 See above, p. 219. 103 See above, p. 238.
104 See Walter J. Ong-, S.J., "Hobbes and Talon's Ramist Rhetoric in English,"
Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society, i (194.9-1953), 260-262. For a
discussion of Hobbes's abstract of Aristotle's Rhetoric, see below, pp. 38 4--3S 5.
105 Smith signs his preface "From my Chamber in Mountague Close, Southwark March
27. 1656. John Smith." Wing, Short-Title Catalogue* lists this work under the name
of John Sergeant and Indicates editions in 1657, 1665, 1673, 1683, and 1688. The
Huntington Library has a copy of the ninth edition, dated at London in 1706.
106 Rhetorique (1657), sig. A$r.
[ 276 ]
RAMUS J S RHETORIC IN ENGLAND
naby. But he does not tell us that his quotations from Sidney, and
certain of his definitions as well, are borrowed from Thomas Blount's
Academic of Eloquence, and he probably did not know that Thomas
Blount in turn had as silently borrowed the same quotations and
definitions from John Hoskins's Directions -for Speech and Style^
then an unpublished manuscript. The relations between Smith,
Blount, and Hoskins were brilliantly identified by Hoyt H. Hud-
son. 107 According to Professor Lee S. Hultzen, Smith also borrows
definitions and a few illustrations from Henry Peacham's Garden
of Eloquence in its edition of I593. 10S Now, since Peacham, Hoskins,
Blount, and Farnaby are all committed for the most part to the old
Ciceronian tradition rather than to Ramism, it is a surprise to find
that Smith is enough of an eclectic to borrow as cheerfully from the
latter as from the former source. But so it is. As the beginning of his
Rhetorique are twelve pages of logical and rhetorical doctrine as an
introduction to the main work, and of these pages, three contain a
glossary of terms from Ramistic logic, whereas nine are closely
parallel to Fenner 's translation of Talaeus.
A few passages from Fenner and Smith will show how strikingly
the latter -follows the former in these nine pages of rhetorical doc-
trine. 109 After each author has defined rhetoric in somewhat the same
fashion, they both have this to say of its parts:
[Fenner] It hath two partes, Garnishing of speache, called Eloqution.
Garnishing of the maner of vtterance, called Pronunciation.
[Smith] It hath two parts, viz. i. Garnishing of speech, called Elo-
cution. 2. Garnishing of the manner of utterance, called Pronuncia-
tion (which in this Treatise is not principally aimed at.)
They both have also the same frame of language for the definition of
elocution and the mention of its parts :
[Fenner] Garnishing of speache is the firste parte of Rhetorike,
whereby the speache it selfe is beautified and made fine. It is eyther
107 John Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style> ed. Hoyt H. Hudson (Princeton,
1 9 3 5 ) ? PP xxx-xxxviii .
108 Ibid., p. xxxvii, note 38.
109 The passag-es quoted here can be found in Fenner's Rethorike (1584) and Smith's
Rhetorique (1657) as follows:
1) Naming- of the parts of rhetoric: Fenner, sig-. DIVJ Smith, p. i.
2) Definition and parts of elocution: Fenner, sig. DIVJ Smith, p. 2.
3) Definition of a trope: Fenner, sig-. DIVJ Smith, p. 2.
4.) Definition of a figure: Fenner, sig 1 . D3rj Smith, p. 4.
5)
Definition of figura sentential'. Fenner, sig-. D4r; Smith, pp. 7-8.
[ 277 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
the fine maner of wordes, called a Trope, The fine shape or frame
of speache, called a Figure.
[Smith] Elocution, or the garnishing of speech, is the first and prin-
cipal part of Rhetorique, whereby the speech it self is beautified
and made fine: And this is either
The fine manner of words called a Tro-pei or,
The fine shape or frame of speech, called a Figure.
Again they both use similar words to define the nature of the trope:
[Fenner] The fine maner of wordes is a garnishing of speache, where-
by one worde is drawen from his firste proper signification to
another, . . .
[Smith] A Trope, is when words are used for elegancy in a changed
signification 5 or when a word is drawn from its proper and genuine
signification to another.
Still again, they both use similar, at time identical, words to define
the nature of the figure:
[Fenner] A Figure is a garnishing of speache, wherein the course of
the same is chaunged from the more simple and plaine maner of
speaking, vnto that whiche is more full of excellencie and grace.
For as in the finenesse of wordes or a trope, wordes are considered
asunder by them selues: so in the fine shape or frame of speach or
a figure, the apte and pleasant ioyning togither of many wordes is
noted.
[Smith] A Figure is an ornament of elocution, which adornes our
speech, or a garnishing of speech when words are used for elegancy
in their native signification. And as in a Trope, or the finenesse
of words, words are considered asunder by themselves, so in a Fig-
ure, the apt and pleasant joyning together of many words is noted.
And once again, they both use the same language to define the figure
of sentence as the second type of figure:
[Fenner] Garnishing of the frame of speache in a sentence, is a gar-
nishinge of the shape of speache, or a figure, which for the f orceable
mouing of affections, doeth after a sorte beautifie the sence and
verie meaning of a sentence. Because it hath in it a certayne manlie
maiestie, which farre surpasseth the softe delicacie or dayntines of
the former figures.
[Smith] Secondly. Garnishing of the frame of speech in a sentence,
called Figura Sententiae, is a figure, which for the forcible moving
[ 278 ]
of affections, doth after a sort beautifie the sense and very meaning
of a sentence: because it carries with it a certain manly majesty,
which far surpasses the soft delicacy of the former Figures, they
being as it were effeminate and musical, these virile and majestical.
The final episode in the history of the anonymous first edition of
Farmer's Rethorike is that it was published under the name of
Thomas Hobbes in i68i. 110 Thus it was established among that dis-
tinguished philosopher's authentic writings, and received without
question as one of his works, until October 1951, when an article in
The Quarterly Journal of Speech announced its true identity. That
article, which I myself prepared as a preliminary digest of this pres-
ent chapter, had scarcely appeared in America when Walter J. Ong,
S.J., in an article published in England in the Transactions of the
Cambridge Bibliographical Society , also announced the true identity
of the work attributed to Hobbes. 111 In one important respect Father
Ong's article reached beyond mine. Whereas I had been unable to
explain why William Crook, Hobbes's literary executor, had been
willing, two years after the latter's death, to attribute to him a work
already printed in the previous century under its rightful author's
name, Father Ong offered what seems to be the true explanation of
this mystery. According to him, Hobbes's executor must have come
upon the work published at London in 1651 as the Compendium of
the Art of Logick and Rhetorick in the English Tongue, and notic-
ing that it contained an anonymous Art of Rhetorick as a kind of ap-
pendix to what he would of course recognize as Hobbes's condensed
version of the Rhetoric of Aristotle, the executor must have concluded
that Hobbes was the author of the appendix as well as the main
work. At any rate, he attributed Fenner's Rethorike to Hobbes in
1 68 1, and it was thereupon accepted in the Hobbes canon for almost
three hundred years, although at the same time it was accepted in its
own orbit as one Dudley Fenner's English rhetoric, and an Eng-
lish rhetoric, moreover, which oddly violated Cicero's laws by limit-
ing rhetoric to two parts, style and delivery.
page of the work in which Fenner's translation of Talaeus is published
under the name of Hobbes reads as follows: "The Art of Rhetoric, with a Discourse of
The Laws of England, By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. London, Printed for William
Crooke at the Green Dragon without Tern-ple-Bar^ 1681." For the work belonging- to
Fenner, see pp. 135-168. For other details concerning 1 it, see Wilbur S. Ho well, "Ramus
and English Rhetoric: 1574-1681," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, xxxvn (October
95i)> PP- 308-309.
111 Walter J. Ong, S.J., "Hobbes and Talon's Ramist Rhetoric in English," Transac-
tions of the Cambridge Biblio graphical Society^ I (194.9-1953)3 260-269.
[ 279 ]
THE ENGLISH RAMISTS
So ends the history of Talaeus's Rhetorica in seventeenth-century
England. Hobbes's involuntary association with it did not give it a
new lease on life after 1681, nor had Milton's association with Ra-
mus's Dialecticae Libri Duo prolonged its life after 1672. But these
dates are not to be taken as marking the complete end of Ramism in
England. They are instead the dates that mark the retirement of
Ramism from active competition with other logical and rhetorical
theories. Even after its retirement in 1672, as we have seen, Ramus's
Dialecticae Libri Duo, in Page's translation, made two public ap-
pearances in the closing years of the seventeenth century, thanks to
Edward Phillips, Milton's nephew. 112 And Talaeus's Rhetorica also
made some public appearances after the Fenner-Hobbes version of
1 68 1. There was, for example, a final edition of Butler's Rhetoricae
Libri Dvo at London in 1684, and John Smith's Mysterie of Rhet-
orique Unvail'd was reprinted in 1683 and 1688.
Even in the eighteenth century, evidence of the persistence of
Ramistic rhetoric can be found. Smith's Rhetorique had a ninth edi-
tion at London in 1706, and one "J. H., Teacher of Geography,"
published an abridgement of it in I739- 113 Also, a treatise which, by
its own acknowledgment, depended upon Smith's Rhetorique as well
as upon Farnaby's Latin Rhetoric^ appeared anonymously at London
in 1706 under the title, The Art of Rhetorick y As to Elocution; Ex-
*plain y d^ and it, too, was based ultimately upon Talaeus. 114 For ex-
ample, it divides rhetoric into two parts, "Elocution and Pronuncia-
tion ," adding "We shall treat only of the Former here." 115 It de-
fines elocution as "the adorning of Speech either with fine Words or
Expressions."^* It goes on to treat of the tropes and the figures, as a
Ramistic rhetoric would. As for the value of that rhetoric, it has this
to say in some complimentary verses by "M. N." to the author just
before the first page of the text:
. 112 See above, p. 238.
113 See above, p. 276, note 105. See also Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style,
ed. Hudson, p. xxxvii.
1J * The title page reads: "The Art of Rhetorick, As to Elocution j Explain'd: And
Familiarly Adapted to the Capacityes of School-Soys^ by way of Question and Answer 5
in English. . . . London. Printed, for . Sturton at the Corner of Gutter-Lane in Chea$-
side y 1706."
The anonymous author thus acknowledges his sources towards the end of his preface
to the reader: "I do not deny but I have been hugely Oblig'd to the Learned Farnaby's
Rhetorick in Latin, and the Ingenious Mr. Smith's Mystery of Rhetorick UnveiVd in
English, for the substance of This Treatise."
115 Art of Rhetoric^ As to Elocution- Ex-plain^ p. i.
p. 2.
[ 280 ]
Our Infant Poets taught by Rules like these,
Shall Learn with Dreyden's strength, and Otway's Ease,
The Happy Secret to instruct, and please.
Thus Rhefrick by thy Artful Pen restored,
Such Just Renown shall to thy Name afford,
That Greece and Rome shall be no more Ador'd.
But these words are more of an epitaph than a prophecy. For the
rules that represented this rhetoric were fast losing authority, and
another sort of rhetoric was emerging, even as a new era in logic was
at hand. What constituted that new logic and rhetoric will be the
subject of a later chapter.
CHAPTER 5
Counterreform: Systematics and
Neo-Ciceronians
I. Middle Ground between Contradictions
Ktfus's reform of scholastic logic encountered two sorts of
opposition during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries. The first sort may be described as the opposition
of denial j the second, as the opposition of compromise.
During his own lifetime, and particularly in the period between
1 543 and 1560, he was opposed by the supporters of the logic he had
attacked, and those adversaries confined themselves largely to deny-
ing the validity of his revision of the traditional system. Prominent
in that group of anti-Ramists were Perion, Gouvea, Galland, Char-
pentier, and Turnebus, each of whom spoke out sharply against his
reform, although by 1561 all of them except Charpentier were on
friendly terms with him. 1 After Ramus's death in 1572, his teach-
ings spread rapidly throughout northern Europe, their popularity
in England being related to their popularity in provincial France,
Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, and Germany. Now in
these countries his logical system came into collision not only with
the entrenched scholastic logic but also with the logic of Melanch-
thon. An older contemporary of Ramus, Melanchthon too had tried
his hand at improving the liberal arts, and his writings on logic and
rhetoric were particularly esteemed among his own religious sect,
the Lutherans. 2 As a result of the competition between his system
and that of Ramus, a disposition to work out a compromise acceptable
to these two schools and to the older scholasticism came into exist-
ence, and a logic compounded of elements from all three schools was
born. The English aspects of that compromise will be the subject of
the present chapter, first as regards logic, and next as regards rhetoric.
In the field of logic, three terms were applied during the period
between 1590 and 1640 to the logicians who helped to promote the
compromise. Some of them were called Philippo-Ramists, a word
1 For an account of this early criticism of Ramism, see Wadding-ton, Ramus, pp. 39-58,
70-80, 102-106, i2i-iij see also Graves, Peter Ramus^ pp. 30-47, 63-70.
2 For brief reference to Melanchthon's writings on rhetoric and logic, see above,
pp. 9 z, 94-95-
[ 282 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
suggested in part by Melanchthon's given name and by the popular
designation of his religious sect as Philippists. Others of the com-
promisers were called Mixts, after a term in the old chemistry mean-
ing "compounds." Still others were called Systematics, the reference
being to the Latin word "systema" as used in the titles of their works
on the liberal arts, and particularly as used in the works of Bartholo-
mew Keckermann, a learned German of Danzig.
Keckermann contributed several works to the critical revision of
Ramism. His System of Logic, published in Latin at Hanau in 1600,
and his Three Tractates of Logical Precognitions, published at the
same place four years later, are especially important to my present
subject, because of their influence upon the chief English Systematic,
Robert Sanderson. 3 Other works of Keckermann to be counted as in-
fluential in England are his Two Books of Ecclesiastical Rhetoric
and his later System of Rhetoric. To them, indeed, even the devoted
English Ramists occasionally refer, as we have seen. 4
The other chief continental Systematics were Heizo Buscherus,
Andreas Libavius, John Henry Alsted, and Clemens Timplerus.
Buscherus, rector of the school at Hannover, Germany, published in
1595 at Lemgo a Latin work in two books called The Philippo-
Ramistic Logical Harmony , and this is one of the earliest works to use
the term "Philippo-Ramistic." 5 Somewhat earlier Buscherus had
composed Two Books concerning the Theory of Solving Fallacies,
soundly and clearly deduced and explained from the logic of P.
Ramus, thus showing his interest in giving Ramistic logic an explicit
claim to a topic less emphasized by Ramus than by the scholastics.
The next Systematic, Andreas Libavius, wrote chiefly upon medicine
and chemistry. Indeed, he is credited with being perhaps the first
doctor to suggest the possibility of blood transfusions. 6 As early as
1591 he brought out at Frankfurt A Treatise of Disputed Physical
Questions between Peripatetics and Ramists , and one interesting
thing about this work is that it has a preface by the English Ramist,
William Temple. 7 Libavius also wrote a treatise upon various vexing
3 See below, p. 303. The Latin titles of these two works are respectively as follows:
Sy sterna Logicae (Hanoviae> 1600) and Praeco gnitorum Logicor-um Tractatus Tres
(Hanoviae, 1604).
4 See above, p. 274.
B Its Latin title is as follows: Hartnoma Logica Philty-po-Ramea (Lemgoviae, 1595).
There is a copy of it at the Bodleian.
6 Biogra'phie Uni^oerselle^ s.v. Libavius, Andre.
7 Its title reads: Quaestionum Physicarum C ontroversarum inter Perapeteticos et
Rameos tractatus: cum Praefatione Gtd.
[ 283 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
controversies of his own day among physicians of the Peripatetic,
Ramistic, Hippocratic, and Paracelsic school. 8 But somehow he found
time to write considerably on logic. At Frankfurt in 1600 he pub-
lished a Latin work called First and Second Dialogue of Andreas Li-
bavins concerning Aristotelian Dialectic > clearly selected and ex-
plained -from Philip Melanchthon and P. Ramus* this treatise be-
ing third in time among his strictly logical writings. He also pub-
lished at Frankfurt in 1 608 what he called The Philipfo-Ramistic
Dialectic. This characterized itself as based upon the descriptions and
commentaries of Melanchthon, Ramus, and other logicians j and as
an added feature it contained Talaeus's Rhetorical As for John
Henry Alsted, he wrote on the philosophy of Aristotelians, Lullians,
and Ramists before publishing at Herborn in 1614 his Harmonious
System of Logic, in which the Universal Mode of Disputing Well is
handed down from Peripatetic and Ramistic Authors?* At about the
same time Clemens Timplerus of Steinfurt in Luxembourg was also
contributing to the cause of the Systematics by writing his Methodical
System of Logic and The Methodical System of Rhetoric^
The influence of the Systematics can be seen in England among
the devoted Ramists whose work has just been described. Whenever
the strict limits of logic as Ramus conceived of it are relaxed by his
followers to permit scholastic elements to return to their traditional
home, the counterref orm is at work, even if it may not reach very far.
For example, the Syntagma Logicum of Thomas Granger, although
it belongs among England's Ramistic treatises, as I have indicated,
has certain traits that come to it from the Systematics, its division
into five books rather than two being a scholastic influence, as is its
inclusion of the ancient rhetorical idea that there are three kinds of
subject matter, demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial. 13 For an-
other example, Thomas Spencer's Art of Logick, already discussed
8 The Latin title, as quoted in the Nouvelle Biographie Generate^ s.v. Libavius, Andre,
reads thus: Variorum, Controversiarum inter nostri saeculi medicos peripateticos, Raineos^
Hipfocraticos, Paracelsicos^ A gitatarum^ Libri Duo (Frankfurt, 1600).
9 That is, De Dialectica Aristotelian a Philip. Melanchthone et P. Ramo fersficue
selecta et ex^osita^ Andrea Libawii* . . . Dialogus Primus \_-Secundui\*
10 The title reads thus: Dialectica Philip po-Ra^naea^ ex Descriptionibus et Commen-
tariis P. Melancthonis et P. Rami, alioruinque Logicorum. . . . Addita est Rhetorica
Dfscriptionis A . Thcdaei*
11 The title reads thus: Logicae Systema Harmonicum, in quo universus bene dis-
serendi modus ex authoribus Peripateticis juxta et Ramets traditur.
12 Their respective Latin titles are: Logicae Sy sterna Methodicum (Hanau, 1612)
and Rhetoricae Sy sterna Methodicum, (Hanau, 1613).
13 See above, pp. 2.29-131 j see also Thomas Granger, Syntagma Logicum (1620), p. 3.
[ 284 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
as a Ramistic treatise, seeks to combine the precepts of Aristotle with
those of Ramus and to explain both by the assistance of the best
scholastics an ambition that almost makes Spencer a Systematic. 1 *
There are many other indications of the same general ambition among
English Ramists, particularly the later ones, and each indication may
be counted as a softening of the Ramistic reform by the counter-
reformers.
But the true work of the English counterreformers is most clearly
seen in the logics that were written in England to restore scholasti-
cism while preserving some of Ramus's innovations. These logics
belong bibliographically to the period between 1599 and 1673, al-
though the most influential ones had all been published before 1620.
The three that may be said to have been so important as to have
taught logic to all England during the seventeenth century are the
product of Oxford men, even as Cambridge men had claimed the
same distinction during the sixteenth century, both before and after
the birth of the English Ramists. Latin is the language in which al-
most all of the work of the English counterreformers was published.
Nevertheless, their story begins with a vernacular work of limited
popularity and of non-academic appeal. This work is Thomas Blunde-
ville's Art of Logike ?*
Blundeville published his Logike at London in 1599, but there is
some reason to suppose that he wrote it around 1575. The evidence
for a considerable interval between its date of composition and of
publication comes from Blundeville himself. In his edition of 1619
he tells us that the Logike was written "many yeeres past" and with-
held from publication a long time, until, as he says, "I was fully
perswaded by diuers of my learned friends, to put it in print, who
hauing diligently perused the same, and liking my plaine order of
teaching vsed therein, thought it a most necessary Booke for such
Ministers as had not beene brought vp in any Vniuersitie." 16 If this
statement is open to the interpretation that his Logike could have
been written more than two decades before he published it first, an-
14 See above, pp. 234-237.
15 The lengthy title page reads in part: "The Art of Logike. Plainely taught in the
English tongue, by M. Blundeuile of Newton Flotman in Norfolke, aswell according to
the doctrine of Aristotle, as of all other moderne and best accounted Authors thereof. . . .
London Imprinted by lohn Winde^ and are to be sold at Paules Wharfe, at the signe of
the Crosse Keyes. 1599." Th e second edition, which I have not seen, was published in
1617. The third edition, as published at London by William Stansby in 1619, is en-
titled, The Arte of Logicke> etc. It contains a preface with a postscript attached, neither
of which is found in the edition of 1599.
16 Logike (1619), sig. 13V.
[ 285 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
other statement In the edition of 1619 would seem to place its date
of composition in the middle fifteen-seventies. That other statement
is one in which he says that his treatment of logic in English accepts
Latin terms after a due explanation of their meaning, -and that it is
much better to proceed thus "then to faine new words vnproper for
the purpose, as some of late haue done." 17 Now this remark seems
to be able to refer only to Ralph Lever's Witcraft, published in
15735 for that work is the sole English logic of the sixteenth century
to make an issue of preferring to construct an English logical vocab-
ulary out of native rather than Latin elements. 18 Thus Blundeville
appears to suggest that he could not 1 have written his Logike before
Witcrajt was published, and that he could well have written it when
Witcrajt was still a recent book. At that time, say in 1575, he would
not have been likely to foresee that Ramistic logic as advocated by
Macllmaine and others was destined to drive traditional logic from
the presses and book markets of England for an entire generation,
and that his own Logike would thus not be in demand for many years.
At any rate, the great popularity of Ramism in England between
1575 and 1600 may well explain why he did not publish his work
for a long time after its date of composition. That he was active as
a writer as early as the fifteen-sixties is well known. 19 Moreover, one
of his most attractive publications, The true order and Methode of
wry ting and reading Hy stories, not only is dated in 1574, but also is
derived in large part from a treatise by Jacobus Acontius, an Italian
philosopher, while another treatise by Acontius, the De Methodo,
first published in 1558, is an important influence behind the very
Logike now under discussion. 20 Blundeville would have been more
likely in 1575 to use Acontius as an anti-Ramist authority on method
than he would after 1580, when he could have found that sort of
authority nearer home. 21
One obvious mark of the influence of scholastic logic upon Blunde-
ville can be seen in the way his treatise is organized. Like many of
sg. ZV. ,
18 See above, pp. 59-60.
19 See Dictionary of National Biogra$y 9 s.v. Blundeville, Thomas.
20 The title page of Blundeville's work on reading- histories is worded as follows :
"The true order and Methode of wryting and reading Hystories, according- to the pre-
cepts of Francisco Patricio, and Accontio Tridentino, two Italian writers, no lesse
plainly than briefly, set forth in our vulgar speach, to the great profite and com-
moditye of all those that delight in Hystories. By Thomas Blundeuill of Nevvton Flot-
man in Norfolke. Anno, 1574. Imprinted at London by Willyam Seres,"
21 For a controversy in England in 1580-1581 on the subject of Ramistic method, see
above, pp. 194-196*
[ 286 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
the scholastic logicians, and indeed like Ramus, for that matter,
Blundeville divides logic into two parts, and he calls those parts in-
vention and judgment. His definitions of them are standard:
Inuention findeth out meete matter to proue the thing that yee in-
tend, and Judgement examineth the matter, whether it be good or
not: and then frameth, disposeth, and reduceth the same into due
forme of argument. 22
Now at this point it was the practice of the Ramists to limit them-
selves to invention and judgment, and to include under these two
topics all that could be said on the subject of logic. But Blundeville
does not do this. He goes back instead to the more elaborate practice
of the scholastics, and he proceeds to organize his treatise by speaking
respectively (i) of words, (2) of definition, division, and method,
(3) f propositions, (4) of places, (5) of arguments, and (6) of
fallacies. These parts of logic are roughly parallel to the six treatises
making up Aristotle's Organon^ and thus Blundeville and the scho-
lastics seem so far as organization is concerned to be purer Aristo-
telians than do the Ramists, inasmuch as the latter tended to or-
ganize the materials of the Organon around the two main headings
of Aristotle's Topics.
Another obvious mark of the influence of scholastic logic upon
Blundeville is evident in his treatment of the predicables, the pre-
dicaments, and the places. Ramus had felt the redundancy involved
in discussing these three matters in the traditional scholastic way;
and his reform of logic had in an important sense consisted of the
absorption of the predicaments by the doctrine of the places, and of
the predicables both by the doctrine of the places and by the doctrine
of the three laws. Hence the predicables and the predicaments are
not explicit terms in Ramus's logic, whereas the places are explicit
to the point of being conspicuous. What Blundeville does is to make
all of these three terms important once again in logic. He devotes
one chapter to the predicables, thirteen to the predicaments, six to
additional scholastic refinements like forepredicaments and postpre-
dicaments, and three to the places. 23 Thus does he show his prefer-
ence for scholasticism upon a very crucial issue indeed.
Still another indication that Blundeville is a scholastic can be seen
22 Logike (i599),P- x-
28 Ibid. y Bk. I, Chs. 4-2 3, Bk. iv, Chs. 1-3. The chapters devoted to the places (in
Bk. iv) are scheduled as six chapters in the table of contents of Blundeville's Logike^
but are printed as three.
[ 287 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
in his insistence upon restoring to logic the doctrine of confutation
and fallacies. These topics were included in Aristotle's Organon and
in such scholastic logics as that of Thomas Wilson. 2 * Ramus had felt
it unnecessary to discuss them explicitly, since to his view they were
already amply covered in everything logic had to say about valid
proof and sound arguments, and so would lead to redundancy if
treated as a new and distinct heading. Blundeville is apparently more
eager to have confutation and fallacies represented in logic than he
is to avoid redundancy. At any rate, he devotes Book VI of his
treatise to the theory of rebuttal and to the discussion of logical
errors. His coverage of these errors, by the way, is so reminiscent of
what Thomas Wilson had formerly said on the same point in The
rule of Reason that there can be little doubt of his having borrowed
his organization and some of his materials from his predecessor 5 in-
deed, there is even better evidence to the same effect in other parts
of his treatise. 25 But while he does not mention Wilson either in his
discussion of fallacies or in previous matters, he makes it clear at
least once that he relies upon Melanchthon's logic. Speaking of the
"Fallacia Accidentis," Blundeville mentions its three forms, the last
of which he describes as follows:
Thirdly, as (Melancthon saith) when an accidentall cause is made a
principall cause, as thus: Elias was an holy prophete, but Elias was
cladde with Camelles haire, ergo I being cladde with Camelles haire
am an holy prophet. 28
24 See above, pp. 28-29.
25 Wilson discusses thirteen "deceiptf ull argumentes," six of which are "Subtilties in
the worde," and seven, "Subtilties without the word." See his The rule of Reason (Lon-
don, 1552), foil. i28r-i62V. Blundeville adopts the same division for his treatment of
"Fallaxes," and his thirteen items are close to those of Wilson. See his Logtke (London,
1619), pp. 190-197. For other close parallels between Wilson and Blundeville, consult
the following passages in each, using- the third edition of 'the latter's Logike, and the
first or second edition of the former's Rule of Reason as indicated:
1) The four principal kinds of argument: Wilson (1552), fol. 465 Blundeville
(1619), p. 133.
2) The example of Induction all wines are hot: Wilson (1551), sig. l^vj Blunde-
ville, p. 173.
3) The common jest to illustrate Sorites: Wilson (1552), fol. $9V> Blundeville,
p. 177.
4) The dilemma of the man who marries: Wilson (1552), fol. yor-v; Blundeville,
p. 178.
5) The inversion Pythagoras (?) & Euathlus: Wilson (1552), fol. 17^5 Blunde-
ville, p. 178.
6) Crocodilites, Ceratinae, Asistata, Pseudomenos: Wilson (1551), foil.
Blundeville, p. 179.
z *Logike (1599)* P- 167-
[ 288 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
In referring to the compromise between Ramistic and Melanch-
thonian logic. Graves says that, like most compromises, it "was un-
satisfactory and led rather to the preservation of Aristotle than of
Ramus." 27 This opinion seems conclusively demonstrated by what I
have been saying about Blundeville. Nevertheless, there is at least
one aspect of his Logike that can hardly be explained as an over-
shadowing of Ramism by scholasticism. That aspect has to do with
Blundeville's discussion of method. Method is a topic in scholastic
logic, and indeed Blundeville treats it just after the topic of defini-
tion and division, as Thomas Wilson had done. 28 But Blundeville's
analysis of method goes far beyond Wilson's. What he does is to
take for granted not only that method is now a more important topic
than it was in the old logic, but also that it cannot be discussed with-
out some reference to Ramus, who of course was responsible for the
new interest in it. Thus Blundeville's chapter on method draws its
materials from Galen, from Acontius, and from the scholastics, with
an acknowledgment that the three kinds of method endorsed by
these sources are in effect what Ramus had insisted upon reducing
to one kind.
Blundeville begins his chapter on method by defining his terms
and dividing his subject into parts. "Methode," he remarks, "is a
compendious way of learning or teaching any thing: and it is three-
fold, that is to say, Compositiue, Resolutiue, and Diuisiue or defini-
tiue." 29 To each of these divisions of the subject he devotes explicit
and concrete attention.
The compositive method as he conceives of it is the procedure
followed when a learner or teacher begins with the smallest division
of a given thing and proceeds to understand or explain it by going
on to the next larger division, and so on, until the whole thing has
been accounted for. This kind of method, says Blundeville, is illus-
trated by my present treatise; "for first we treate of words or tearmes,
then of a proposition, and last of al of a Syllogisme." 30 The neatness
of this example cannot be questioned ; but when Blundeville attempts
to show how the compositive method may be expressed in spatial
terms, the image he chooses is less fortunate. He says:
... so likewise he that will teach the nighest way from Norwich to
27 Peter Ramus, p. 217.
28 See Wilson, The rule of Reason (London, 1551), sig. E4v-E6r. See also above,
pp. 21-22.
Logike (1599), P- 55- 80 /, p. 55-
[ 289 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
London by order compositiue will bidde him first goe to Windham,
from Windham to Atleborough, from Atleborough to Thetford, from
Thetford to Newmarket, from Newmarket to Barkway, fro barkway
to Ware, fro Ware to Londo. 31
The resolutive method involves the same procedure in reverse.
In other words, it consists of understanding or explaining a thing by
beginning with the thing as a whole and by resolving it progressively
into smaller and smaller divisions. Thus we might go from whole to
part, or from effect to cause. Blundeville illustrates this method by
suggesting a logic organized in terms of the syllogism, the proposi-
tion, and at last the subject and predicate. Nor does he decline to
reverse his geographical example for our benefit:
If ye will teach the way from Norwich to London by Methode reso-
lutiue, ye must say that there is a town called Ware twenty myles
from London: next to that is a Towne called Barkway, and so till yee
come to that which was first in methode compositiue. 82
Blundeville credits Galen with being the one to add to the two
methods just discussed a third and final one the divisive or defini-
tive method. This consists of an orderly definition and division of
general, less general, and particular elements, as when a given thing
is understood or explained by successive descriptions of its generic,
its special, and its individual characteristics. If, for example, we have
to speak of quality, says Blundeville, we define it, then we divide it
into its four kinds, and next we divide these kinds into their parts and
members, until we can go no further. It is at this point that Blunde-
ville elects to incorporate into his Logike a two-page summary of
De Methodo of Acontius, this being his way of fully explaining the
divisive or definitive method, despite his having credited its identifi-
cation to Galen. Blundeville's summary of Acontius defines method
as the right way of searching out or teaching knowledge of a thing,
and defines that right way as an inquiry into what the thing is, what
its final end is, and what are the causes of that end. 33 "And these,"
says Blundeville as he finishes the summary, "are all the chiefest
poynts contayned in the Latine treatise which my freend Acontius
wrote de Methodo*. and though that Petrus Ramus maketh but one
kynd of Methode, that is to say, to proceede from the first prin-
ciples or elements: yet I am sure he will not deny but that to goe
forwarde and backward be two diuers things, though not contrary,
p. 55- B8 /*^., pp. 56-57.
[ 290 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
as doth well appeare by the Compositiue and Resolutiue Methode
before defined." 34
The rest of Blundeville's discussion of method is borrowed from
the scholastics, and is in large part a statement of the matters which
Thomas Wilson had suggested as embracing the whole of this aspect
of logic. 35 In other words, Blundeville proceeds to treat such subjects
as the nine questions that should be asked in methodically handling
a simple logical inquiry. Had he confined himself to these questions,
his theory of method would have wholly belonged to the stable world
of scholastic logic. The fact that he did not confine himself to them,
but went beyond to espouse a more comprehensive theory, may be
said to be the measure of the influence of Ramus upon scholasticism,
even though Blundeville does not accept Ramus's exact methodology.
No more than three editions of Blundeville's Logike appear to
have been published, and those fell within the twenty years between
1599 and 1619. It is odd that the work did not have a larger number
of editions in that period. In the first place, it had the vernacular
market to itself from the date of its first appearance until 1620,
when Thomas Granger's Syntagma Logicum began to offer competi-
tion by presenting a new English adaptation of Ramus to readers
interested in logic. In the second place, it was intended to fill a pro-
fessional need, being designed, as the title page of its first edition
declares, "specially for such zealous Ministers as haue not beene
brought vp in any Vniuersity, and yet are desirous to know how to
defend by sound argumentes the true Christian doctrine, against all
subtill Sophisters, and cauelling Schismatikes. . . ." Perhaps the class
of ministers not educated in any university was too small to sustain
more than three editions of Blundeville's work. Perhaps its sale in
other quarters was gradually choked off by the several popular Latin
logics that appeared at English presses in the first two decades of the
seventeenth century. At any rate, these Latin logics achieved about
a dozen separate printings between the dates of Blundeville's first
and third edition, and are the next topic in this chapter.
The least influential of these Latin logics is John Sanderson's In-
stitvtionvm Dialecticarvm Libri Qvatvor, which was given three
editions at Oxford between 1602 and 1609 after an earlier one at
Antwerp in I589. 86 Twenty-seven years before the date of that Ant-
P . 58-
85 Compare Rule of Reason (London, 1551), sig. E4V-E6r, with Blundeville, pp. 58-59.
3ft The title page of the first edition reads thus: "Institution vm Dialecticarvm Libri
Qvatvor, A loanne Sandersono, Lancastrensi, Anglo, Liberalium artium Magistro, &
[ 291 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
werp edition, Sanderson had served as logic reader at Cambridge,
where he had previously earned a bachelor's and a master's degree.
Afterwards he had been expelled from his academic position because
of his adherence to the Catholic faith, and had ultimately settled in
France as teacher in the English college at Rheims and as canon of
the cathedral at Cambrai. 37 His Institvtionvm Dialecticarvm Libri
Qvatvor, virtually his only surviving work, is rooted in the scholastic
tradition and slightly marked with the reforms of Ramus. Like the
scholastics of the early sixteenth century, Sanderson divides logic into
invention and judgment, the latter topic being then subdivided into
terms, propositions, and arguments, and being treated part by part
in the first three books of his treatise, whereas Book IV is allotted to
invention. But like the Ramists, Sanderson emphasizes his transitions
as he goes from one part of his subject to the next 5 like them he
divides many of his chapters into a text and a following commentary j
and in his preliminary chapter on syllogism, induction, enthymeme,
and example, he speaks of the principles of demonstration, and dis-
cusses what he calls their three aspects, and what Ramus had heralded
as the three laws of propositions. 38
Samuel Smith's Aditvs ad Logicam^ that is, Affroach to Logic,
which declares itself in its Latin title to be "for the use of those who
first greet the university," turned out to be much more popular than
Sanderson's Libri Qvatvor. The Aditvs was originally published at
London in 1613, and went through three other editions at Oxford
by 1619, remaining thereafter a steady seller until i685. 39 Smith
attended Magdalen College in Oxford, where he became bachelor of
arts in 1609, master of arts in 1612, and bachelor of medicine in
sacrae Theologiae Doctore, Metropolitanae Ecclesiae Cameracensis Canonico, conscript!.
Antverpiae, Ex ofEcina Christopher! Plantini, Architypographi Regij. M. D. LXXXIX."
Two of the three Oxford editions are dated 16025 the third, 1609. See Short-Title Cata-
logue^ s<v. Sanderson, John. Despite three English editions, this work did not exert
great influence. It is not once mentioned in T. W. Baldwin's William Shaks$ere*s Small
Latine & Lesse Greeke^ which is one of most thorough of the published studies of English
education in the age of Shakespeare.
ST See Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Sanderson, John,
38 For Sanderson's emphasis on transitions, see Institutions fn Dialecticarvm Libri
Qvatvor (Antwerp, 1589), pp. 91, 155; for his treatment of the three laws, see p. 131.
39 My discussion of this work is based upon a copy of the "fourth" edition in the
Huntington Library. Its title page reads: "Aditvs ad Logicam. In vsum eorum qui primo
Academiam Salutant. Autore Samvele Smith Artium Magistro. Quarta editio, de nouo
correcta, & emendata. Londini Per Guilielmum Stansby. 1627." For an inventory of the
fourteen printings of this work during- the seventeenth century, see Madan, Oxford
Book$) in, 448. The original fourth edition appeared at Oxford in 1618. The London
reprint of 1627 also advertises itself as the fourth edition.
[ 292 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
1 620. After he took the last of these degrees, the university appoint-
ed him junior proctor. At that time, says Wood, he was "accounted
the most accurate disputant, and profound philosopher in the uni-
versity." 40 What seems to have been a career of unusual promise was
cut short abruptly when he died on June 17, 1620, about two months
following the start of his proctorship. He is said to have written sev-
eral works on logic, but his single published work in this field is the
Aditvs, and thus his contribution to the work of the Systematics can
be seen only in it.
Smith's general conception of logic is more like that of the scho-
lastics than of the Ramists. For example, his definition emphasizes
disputation and argumentation as the chief ends of logic, more or less
as Ramus was inclined to do, but he carefully indicates that logic
teaches us to argue probably and closely, while Ramus always pre-
ferred to insist that it teaches us to argue well. Says Smith:
Logic is the science of disputing in a probable and close way upon any
subject whatever. Or, as I would put it more plainly, logic is the
artistic and methodical understanding of precepts by which we know
how to use reasoning concisely for establishing trust in any probable
case whatever**
Another example of the way in which Smith's general conception of
logic parallels the scholastic conception is found in the relation he
sees between logic and rhetoric. Ramus had thought of logic as the
inventional and organizational aspect of discourse, whereas rhetoric
was the stylistic and the oral aspect. To Smith, the two arts differ as
the technical discourse differs from the popular, and he echoes Zeno's
ancient metaphor to suggest this kind of contrast:
[Logic] differs . . . from rhetoric because the latter teaches how to
prove by means of the expanded palm, that is, copiously and with
ornament, whereas the former teaches how to prove by means of the
closed fist, that is, strictly and narrowly. 42
When Smith comes to divide logic into its parts, he proves him-
self once again to be on the side of scholasticism rather than Ramism.
Thus he ignores the theory that logic is limited to invention and
arrangement, and accepts instead a tripartite logic, the first division
40 Anthony a Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, ed. Bliss, II, 283. For other details concern-
ing him, see under Smith, Samuel (1587-1620) in the Dictionary of National Biography.
41 Aditvs ad Logicam (1627), sig 1 . Aar. Translation mine here and below. The
italics parallel those in Smith's Latin text.
* 2 Ibid., sig. A*r.
[ ^93 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
being terms, the second, propositions, and the third, clusters of propo-
sitions or, in a word, discourses. His statements on this point are
worth quoting at some length:
Logic as a whole is divided into three parts 5 the first treats of simple
terms 5 the second of terms compounded, and the third, of discourse.
For as boys ought first to be taught to recognize letters and syllables
of the alphabet, then to combine characters, and at last to read the
combinations, so beginners in logic ought at first to be taught what is
a term, in what manner it should be formed, and what uses it has in
logic, then in what manner a proposition is made from simple terms,
and what are its structures, and finally, from what propositions is
erected the syllogism- All this we now begin (God willing) to show
in three books, and we follow the order pf building, and take the
position of beginning with the simple term, and of going on to the
proposition, and thence to the discourse. 43
The major topics covered by Smith in carrying out his program
are of course scholastic, not Ramistic. Thus he speaks of the term as
"the sign of a thing and of a concept, written or spoken in a certain
configuration of letters or syllables, according to an arrangement
divine or human." 44 Thus also he speaks of the predicable as "a gen-
eral term begotten to be properly applied to many things, as 'animal'
is applied to 'man' and to f beast' "$ and he proceeds at once to list
and discuss the predicables of genus, of species, of differentia, of
property, and of accident. 45 Thus again he defines the predicament
or category as "a certain fixed series of words expressing simple
states," this series being of course the ten famous terms in Aristotle's
Categories** And thus finally he speaks of the proposition and its
kinds 5 of the syllogism, the enthymeme, the induction, the example 5
of the places belonging to persons and to things 5 and of fallacies
within and outside of language. His treatment of these matters is
devotedly conventional and shows little concern for the reforms of
Ramus some seventy years earlier. But there is precision and brevity
in his style and comprehensiveness in his scope qualities which no
doubt contributed to the long popularity of the Aditvs.
In two distinct respects, however, the Aditvs shows the tendency
of the Systematics to incorporate silently into logic the doctrines of
Ramus. First of all, Smith devotes some space to those Aristotelian
principles which Ramus had made his own and had repeatedly em-
sig. Azv-Asr. 4 * Ibid. y sig.
sig. A4V-A 5 r. * Ibid., sig. Ai ir.
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
phasized as the three laws. Secondly, Smith follows Ramus in giving
the subject of method a larger emphasis and a more concentrated
treatment than it had had in scholastic logic.
Smith's treatment of the three laws does not once mention Ramus,
but it would be ingenuous to suppose that he would have discussed
them if Ramus had not popularized them throughout the learned
world by explaining them repeatedly and by making them the basis
of his reform of the liberal arts. To Ramus the three laws are de-
rived from Aristotle as three tests that any proposition has to meet
before it can be accepted as scientific. 47 To Smith the three laws are
also derived from Aristotle, but now they constitute the three marks
which an argument must have if it is to meet the first of the five re-
quirements laid down in the Organon for apodictic as opposed to
probable or to sophistical arguments.
Smith's general view is that any argument qualifies as science if it
is in the form of a syllogism and if its materials meet Aristotle's five
requirements. These requirements are that the constituent proposi-
tions of the argument must be true or necessary, primary and im-
mediate, more knowable than is the conclusion arrived at, earlier in
time than is that conclusion, and causal in the sense of having a middle
term as cause of the condition which the conclusion predicates of the
subject. 48 The first requirement obviously interests Smith most, for
he devotes more space to it than to the others 5 and as we read what
he says about it, we are in the presence of ideas that owe to Ramus
their position in seventeenth-century logic.
The first of the three marks of a genuinely necessary proposition,
says Smith, is that the proposition must be "Kara Tra^ros-," or "de
omni," or "suitable to everything at all times." In other words, the
predicate must be true at all times of all cases of the subject. Here
are Smith's own words:
Kara Travros, De Omni, is that which suits everything and at all times.
Therefore two conditions are required if the proposition is to be "de
omni"; universality of subject, in order that it may be predicated for
the subject on behalf of its entire contents, as, truly It is a fact that
every tree is greeny universality of time, in order that the predicate
may be attributed to the subject without any exception as to time or
place, as, every man is an animal. If the former condition is alone
47 See above, pp. 149-153) also pp. 41-44.
48 For Smith's definitions of these five conditions, see Aditvs ad Logicam (16*7), sig.
Eir, Ear, Eav, 4^ E4V.
[ 295 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
fulfilled, it is called antecedently universal j if the latter condition is
added, it is called posteriorly universal. This Kara iravros differs from
the dictum "de omni" in the rules of the syllogism, because this refers
to a single proposition, whereas the dictum "de omni" refers to the
entire syllogism. Moreover, the dictum "de omni" requires only uni-
versality in the subject, but Kara Travros adds perpetuity of time to
universality of subject. 49
The second mark of the genuinely necessary proposition is that
the proposition be "*a0 3 duro," or "per se," or self-consistent. Thus
when we say "man is rational," we have a proposition that is self-
consistent, inasmuch as the predicate is a part of the definition of the
subject. Smith distinguishes three other subject-predicate relations
that exhibit this mark of self-consistency. If, for example, the propo-
sition is "man is one who laughs," it has self-consistency, because its
predicate cannot be defined except in relation to its subject. If again
we say "Socrates is," we have predicated existence of substance, and
our proposition is self-consistent 5 or if we say, "having had his throat
cut, he died," we have predicated an effect of its own cause, and thus
have achieved self-consistency. 50
The third mark of the necessary proposition is that the predicate
and subject be in a primary, immediate, and reciprocal relation. As
Ramus had done before him, Smith uses the Greek terms "/cafloXou
TrpcSroz'," and the Latin terms "quatenus ipsum," to describe this
type of proposition. He says:
Ka^oXov Trp&rov, quatenus ipsum, is that in which an attribute is predi-
cated concerning a subject, not so much universally, not so much
through itself, as primarily, immediately, and reciprocally 5 as, all
living things take nourishment. Now this sort of necessity is met with
when the predicate belongs to the subject so far as the subject is thus,
or else it belongs to the extension of the subject. Thus "flying" and
"croaking" belong to the crow, but "flying" belongs to him so far as
he is a bird, "croaking" so far as he is a crow. Hence, the proposition,
the crow croaks, is "quatenus ipsum" ; but not so the proposition, the
crow flies**
The influence of Ramus upon Smith in the field of method is not
so well defined as in the field of the three laws, but it is nevertheless
unmistakable. Method was the last topic in Ramus's logic, and thus
it was in the position of greatest emphasis, so far as the strategy of
** Ibid^ sig. Eir-Eiv. 50 Ibid., sig-. Eiv-Ezr. 51 Ibid., sig-. Ear.
[ 296 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
presentation is concerned. Smith also gives the last place in his Aditvs
to this topic. Moreover, as if to emphasize its importance still more,
he makes his chapter on method occupy the entire third section of his
third book, whereas the preceding two sections of that book had each
contained several topics. It is the acceptance of method as a very
important part of logic that betrays the influence of Ramus in the sev-
enteenth century, and Smith's logic agrees with this rule, even if his
actual theory of method is closer to Blundeville than to Ramus.
Smith gives his chapter on method the title, "De Ordine," but
leaves no doubt that he intends this term to refer to what the Ramists
called "methodus." He says as much at the very outset:
As discourse in its inferential aspect teaches how to prove something
from something else, so in its organizational aspect it shows in what
manner definitions, divisions, and the other parts of any art or science
whatever should be correctly linked together among themselves so
that some may precede and others follow. This popularly is called
order or method 5 for we may seize hold of both terms indiscrim-
inately so long as according to them things are arranged that we may
know them the more easily. 52
As for the parts of the theory of method, Smith finds them by
distinguishing between the contemplative and the practical sciences.
The former examine things in and for themselves, without direct
consequences in action. The latter examine things in order that what
is discovered may be used as the basis of action. Smith's distinction
between these two types of intellectual endeavor is equivalent to our
distinction between theoretical and applied science, if by applied
science we mean all applications of knowledge to actual affairs,
whether in the field of technology or in law, medicine, politics, ethics,
or communication. In harmony with the idea of contemplative and
applied sciences, Smith defines two sorts of order to be followed in
arranging discourses, one of which he calls "synthetical, that is, uni-
tive," and the other, "analytical, that is, divisive." Here are his own
definitions of these terms, and his opinions about their connection
with the two orders of science:
The synthetical or compositive order is that which proceeds from,
elements towards what rests upon the elements, in order that a per-
fect examining of things may be made. This alone is solely perceived
in the sciences. . . ,
52 Ibid., sig. Giv.
[ 297 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
The analytical order is that which, from an ultimate proposed end or
action, or from an act by us, progresses towards investigating the
primary elements by which that end may be achieved. This is solely
perceived in the practical sciences. - . . 53
Incidentally, the method of proceeding from elements towards what
rests upon elements is illustrated by the AdU^s itself, as Smith ^ex-
plicitly recognizes in his account of the three divisions of logic. 54
Thus his work indicates what the synthetical or unitive order is, and
this kind of order approximates what Blundeville had called the
"methode compositiue." Also, of course. Smith's conception of ana-
lytical order is close in terminology and intent to Blundeville's
"methode resolutiue."
Scarcely less popular during the seventeenth century than Smith's
Aditvs was Edward Brerewood's Elementa Logicae, first published
at London in 1614, and often reprinted up to i684- 55 Brerewood
died the year before this work originally appeared, and at the time
of his death he was serving as first professor of astronomy at Gresh-
am College, London. His Elementa Logicae had probably been writ-
ten some twenty-five years before it was published, for it belongs
among the interests he would have had between 1581 and I59O>
when he was a student at Brasenose College, Oxford, and was taking
his bachelor's and master's degrees. 56 At any rate, he was interested in
natural philosophy by 1592, and was appointed to his professorship
at Gresham in 1596, so that a work on logic would not particularly
belong to his later years. No doubt one reason why he did not pub-
lish it soon after he wrote it was that Ramistic logic was dominant in
England in the fifteen-eighties and nineties, and there was little or
no market for the older doctrine. But by the time of his death in
1613, interest in the older doctrine was reviving, and his publishers
may on that ground have been impelled to bring out his Elementa
Logicae when it came to them later with a preface by William Baker
of Oxford.
sig. Gsr. Smith's Latin terms for these two kinds of order are respectively
"Ordo Syntheticus seu compositivus" and "Ordo Analyticus seu resolutivus."
54 See above, p. 294.
55 My discussion of this work is based upon its third edition, a copy of which is at
the Huntington Library. Its title pag-e reads: "Elementa Logficae, In gratiam Studiosae
inventutis in Academia Oxoniensi. Authore Edovardo Brerewood, olim Collegij
Emanasenser alumno dignissimo. Londini, Apud loannem Billivm, 1619." There were
10 separate printings during 1 the seventeenth century, as follows: London, 1614, 1615,
1619, 1621, 1628, 1638, 1649, 1684 j Oxford, 1657, 1668. All but three of these
printings are listed in Madan, Oxford Sooks^ m, 448.
56 See Dictionary of National Biography^ s.v. Brerewood or Bryerwood, Edward.
[ 298 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
In essence the TLlementa Logicae is a version of two topics of scho-
lastic logic and is arranged in such fashion that chapters of doctrine
are followed by chapters in which questions about the doctrine are
raised and answered. The first topic concerns propositions. It is given
twenty-four of the twenty-nine chapters making up the work as a
whole, Aristotle's De Inter-pretatione being cited several times as the
authority for this part of the discussion. 57 Brerewood defines a propo-
sition as "an indicative, suitable, and complete statement signifying
truth or falsity without ambiguity," 58 and in his analysis of it he
deals with the individual words that make it up and with its various
kinds as found in logic. His second topic, argumentation, covers in
five chapters the syllogism, the enthymeme, the induction, and the
example, his sources at this point being Aristotle's Prior Analytics,
Posterior Analytics, Topics, and occasionally the Categories. 59
Two other topics of scholastic logic, that is, the predicables and the
predicaments, are treated by Brerewood in his Tractatus quidam
logici de $raedicabilibus et fraedicamentis, which was edited by
Thomas Sixesmith and published at Oxford in 1628. This work did
not achieve any spectacular popularity, but it nevertheless went
through four editions by 1659, and it combined with the Elementa
Logicae to round out Brerewood's adaptation of the scholastic sys-
tem, and to- make him a familiar name in seventeenth-century
education.
Brerewood and Samuel Smith, as two of the foremost English
Systematics, held their influence among their learned countrymen
until the time when The Port-Royal "Logic in French, Latin, and
English versions became widely popular in England during the lat-
ter part of the seventeenth century. But the chief English Systematic,
Robert Sanderson, has the distinction of composing a logic that was
popular not only before the work of the Port-Royalists appeared,
but for more than a half-century thereafter. Called in everyday
speech Sanderson's Logic, this Latin treatise bears the actual title of
Logicae Artis Compendium.
57 See in particular Elementa Logicae (1619), Chs. 9, 10, n, 15.
"/, p. i. "/**., Chs. 25, 27.
60 First published at Oxford in 1615, this work was reissued eight times in the
seventeenth, three times in the eighteenth, and once in the nineteenth centuries. In addition,
there is an issue that bears no date. Madan, Oxford Books, in, 448, .lists all dated edi-
tions as follows: 1615, 1618, 1631, 1640, 1657, 1664., 1668?, 1672, 1680, 1705, 1707,
174.1, 1841. My discussion is based upon the Huntington Library copy of the second
edition. Its title page reads: "Logicae Artis Compendivm, Secvnda Hac Editione recog-
nitum, duplici A -p fen dice auctu-m^ & -pub lid iuris factum a Rob. Sanderson Collegij
[ 299 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
Robert Sanderson was educated at Lincoln College, Oxford, in
the first few years of the seventeenth century. 61 After taking his
bachelor's degree in 1606, he became fellow and later the lecturer
in logic at his college, this second post being awarded to him upon
his graduation in 1608 as master of arts. He was ordained deacon
and priest in 1611, held several ecclesiastical positions, including
that of chaplain to Charles I, and at length became regius professor
of divinity at Oxford. He was deprived of his professorship during
the civil war, but at the Restoration he regained it, and was then
made bishop of Lincoln. He died in 1663 at the age of 76, as his
Logic was about to receive its sixth edition, and not long after a young
Cambridge undergraduate named Isaac Newton had given it care-
ful study. 62
The second edition of Sanderson's Logic contains two appendixes
not found in the first edition, An unusual feature of the "Appendix
Posterior" or "Later Appendix" is a chapter devoted to the history
of logic, and it is here that we can form an estimate of the way in
which seventeenth-century logicians regarded themselves in relation
to their predecessors.
The first of the seven headings into which Sanderson divides the
history of logic would be translated as "Logicians before Aristotle." 63
These logicians, among whom Sanderson mentions Pythagoras, Par-
menides, Zeno, Socrates, Plato, and others, are accorded some praise
for their pioneering work, although Sanderson follows the usual
practice of naming Aristotle as the inventor of logic. So far as Sander-
son divides these logicians into schools, he speaks of them as Stoics
and Academics, and he has one interesting thing to say about each
school. The Stoics, he says, created a logic that was in one sense con-
fused and in another sense ostentatious 5 and as an example of this
latter characteristic, he cites their fondness for such outlandish argu-
ments as the ones they called "Antistrephon," "Crocodilites," "Utis,"
and so on. This remark may be interpreted as indirect criticism by
Sanderson of Thomas Wilson and Blundeville, both of whom had
Lincolniensis in alma Oxoniensi Socio. Oxoniae, Excudebant lohannes Lichfield &
lacobvs Short. 1618."
61 See Dictionary of National Biogra^hy^ s.v. Sanderson, Robert (1587-1653).
62 On this point see David Brewster, The Life of Sir Isaac Newton (New York,
C 1 *}*])* P- *7-
68 Logicae Artu Compendium (1618), pp. 117-118. The pagination of the two ap-
pendixes is independent of that of the main work.
[ 300 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
given some space to these terms. 64 As for the Academics, Sanderson
thinks their logic more serious than that of the Stoics, but he never-
theless criticizes them, and in particular their leader, Plato, for fail-
ing to teach logic methodically, and for failing to teach it esoterical-
ly. These two shortcomngs in Plato were rectified by Aristotle,
Sanderson adds, the latter being methodical and completely opposed
to anything heterogeneous and exoteric. Now, the belief that Plato
wrote for the general public and Aristotle for the initiated is not
self-evident, as Sanderson seems to think. Rather, it is self-evident
that the works of Plato, as transmitted to us, are more nearly pre-
pared for ultimate public consumption than are the works of Aris-
totle, which have come down to us as the cryptic notes upon which
Aristotle based academic lectures. But the really interesting thing
about Sanderson's comment is that logic to him is somehow better
as an esoteric science than it is when it is made exoteric. This attitude
becomes more prominent when he speaks later of Ramus.
The second heading in Sanderson's history of logic would be trans-
lated as "From Aristotle to the Scholastics." 65 He speaks here of two
schools, one of which sought to divert logic to the uses of the market
place, and to make it an instrument for moving the affections, whereas
the other school sought to keep it for its proper and native end of
contemplation, understanding, teaching, and ministering to the in-
tellect. Sanderson recognizes that orators were largely responsible
for the former school, and in describing it he mentions such men as
Cicero, Augustine, Jerome, and Chrysostom. The other school be-
longed to the philosophers, and here Sanderson enumerates several
names, chief of whom are Porphyry, Avicenna, and Averroes.
Sanderson devotes his next two sections to the scholastics. 68 These
logicians include Englishmen, of course, and Sanderson indeed names
an Englishman, Alexander of Hales, as father of this group. The
famous thirteenth-century textbook on logic, the Summulae Logi-
cales, is credited with having an unfortunate influence for a hundred
years, although its author, Petrus Hispanus, is given a place at the
end of Sanderson's list of the twelve leading scholastics, and is identi-
fied by his special name, "Magister Summularum," as each of the
other scholastics are identified by theirs.
64 See Wilson, Rule of Reason (1551), foil. I7OV-I75V, and Blundeville, Logike
(1619), pp. 178-179.
85 Logicae Artis Com$endvQin) pp. 1 1 8-1 \ 9.
68 Ibid^ pp. 119-121. Sanderson's Latin headings are "Scholastici" and "Quorunda
Scholasticomm Cognomenta."
[ 30i ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
Coming to the three centuries immediately preceding his own,
Sanderson speaks of the Lullians and the Ramists as the outstanding
logicians, and he devotes to each of these sects a section of his history. 67
The Lullians were followers of Ramon Lull, who died in the early
fourteenth century, and whose work, The Great, General, and Ulti-
mate Arty 68 is an attempt to simplify logic and indeed all learning.
Sanderson speaks of Lull with some contempt and lets it be known
that his attitude is derived from Keckermann's Three Tractates of
Logical Precognitions. But the Ramists receive from Sanderson, the
sort of respectful treatment that permits us to see at a glance what
Ramus's influence upon logic was conceived at that time to be.
Introducing Ramus as a more polished and cultivated scholar than
Lull, and citing Vives as the authority for this estimate, Sanderson
mentions Ramus's daring assaults upon Aristotle, his criticism of the
peripatetic philosophy, and his success in gaining for his Dialecticae
Libri Duo a following among those who worshipped eloquence and
whose status as Ciceronians led them to dislike the diction and style
of scholasticism. Nor were Ramus's followers unproductive. "Cer-
tainly," says Sanderson, "the industry of Ramus brought to the re-
public of logic the benefit of inducing good genius to improve more
diligently the theory of method." 69 Thus does a Systematic charac-
terize Ramus's major contribution to logical theory, and indicate
what there is in Ramism that is most deserving of lasting notice.
What criticisms do the Systematics make of Ramus's reforms? The
answer is supplied in some specific charges developed briefly by
Sanderson as he refers his readers to Keckermann for further indict-
ments. Here is what Sanderson says:
But nevertheless there are in Ramistic logic many things that justly
displease the learned: to wit, i) its alteration of the terms of the art
and of the expressions long current in the schools of logic 5 2) its
manifold mutilation of logic, which the Ramists have limited to ex-
cessively narrow boundaries and deprived of some, integral parts 5
3) its illustration of the uses of logic from the writings of poets and
orators, although these men have treated things not logically but exo-
terically; 4) its prescription of a single method everywhere, and its
er Ibid.y pp, 1 21-122.
68 As edited by C. Sutorius at Frankfurt in 1596, this work bears the title, M. Ray-
mundi Lullii, . . . Ars magna generates et ultima, quarumcumque artium et scientiarum
tpsnis Raymundi Lullii assecutrix et clavigera, et ad eas aditum facilem praebens > etc. See
Catalogue General des Litres Imfrimes de la Bibliotteque Nationale, s.v. Lulle, Ray-
mond. For a brief comment on Lull, see above, pp. 7, 9.
"Logic** Artis Camfendivm, p. 122. Translation mine here and below.
[ 302 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
prescription for using it a method excessively meagre and painful,
to which the Ramists wished all disciplines to be confined by the mere
process of definition and dichotomies. And there are justly a very great
many other vices or defects under most worthy censure against the
Ramists j which Keckermann has set forth accurately and weightily
in the entire fourth chapter of Tractate Two of his Logical Precog-
nitions.
Sanderson's emphasis upon these four defects in Ramism is a good
statement of the platform of the English Systematics. He turns next
to the Systematics., whom he calls "Systematic!," and speaks of them
in such fashion as to indicate some of the alterations he himself
proposes to make in their doctrine:
The newest century has produced several logicians who have rejoiced
in marching by a certain middle course between the Peripatetics and
the Ramists. These very ones publicly inveigh against the Ramists
while praising the Peripatetics; but nevertheless in their systems of
logic they are more Ramist than Peripatetic. For they transform the
boundaries accepted in the peripatetic schools, and they indulge too
much in method, while thus they cut everything to pieces in dividing
and subdividing piecemeal and in vain, so that meanwhile they lose the
sap and substance of things. These logicians can be called the Philippo-
Ramists, or the Systematics; of whom the pre-eminent one is Kecker-
mann, for Timplerus, Alsted, and several others have not kept equal
pace with him. He has his great use, indeed, his very great use, but
to those who are of mature judgment and excellently trained in the
peripatetic school. For whoever shall be able skilfully to unite the
writings of that man with the writings of the scholastics, after having
made a selection of boundaries and of method, will in my opinion do
the most skilful thinking of anyone in philosophy. Nevertheless, I
would wish that Keckermann be not rubbed often into the hands of
youth. Youth ought to be accustomed more to the peripatetic bound-
aries, and instructed in a simpler method, not being of such power of
judgment as to know how to separate the useless from the useful. 71
It is not too farfetched to conclude from this analysis of the Sys-
tematics that Sanderson conceives it to be his mission to unite their
doctrine with that of the older logic and thus to produce a better
amalgam of Ramism and scholasticism than had yet been made. That
mission is rather well accomplished in his Logic, which may be con-
sidered the best work of its kind to have been produced in England.
70 Ibid.y p. 122. 7 i Ibid.) pp. 122-123.
[ 303 ]
COUNTERREFORM: SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
One of the scholastic elements in Sanderson's amalgam appears in
his conception o the relation of logic and rhetoric. This conception
is stated in the second chapter of the "Later Appendix," where there
is a discussion of the circle of disciplines. The liberal disciplines, he
says > are either instrumental studies or master-studies; that is, some
of them are equivalent to servants, and the others, to sovereigns. 72
The servant-studies, or the instrumental, consist of grammar, logic,
and rhetoric, these being what scholasticism called the discursive or
the rational part of philosophy, since they are concerned either with
speech or with reason. After explaining why in barbarous times these
studies were called the trivium, Sanderson adds:
Of these, logic directs the reason, and is charged with perfecting the
mind 5 grammar directs speech, and is charged with forming discourse 5
rhetoric in its own way directs both one and the other, yet speech the
more, and is charged with moving the affections. 73
This conception of the relation between logic and rhetoric is clearly
scholastic rather than Ramistic, and indicates that, if Sanderson had
written on rhetoric, he would have done something with invention
and arrangement as well as style and delivery. But he would not
have made memory a topic of rhetoric or of logic, and in this respect
his procedure is close to the Ramists. His reason for rejecting the
theory of memory is that it belongs more to quackery than to science.
On this point he says, as he brings his discussion of the relation of
grammar, logic, and rhetoric to a close:
Some add mnemonics to these same arts. Of course it does not aid
memory in any way except as logic aids the mind. But I fear that
mnemonics may be more of an imposture than an art, if indeed it pro-
pounds anything distinct from the method which is taught in logic. 74
The chief scholastic elements in Sanderson's Logic are found in
his definition of his subject and in his division of it into parts and
terms. He rejects the Ramistic idea that logic or dialectic is the
theory of disputing, and says instead, "Logic, which by synecdoche
is dialectic, is an instrumental art directing our minds to the under-
standing of everything intelligible.' 575 His enumeration of the parts
of logic is accompanied by explicit references to the corresponding
works in Aristotle's Organon. His own words are:
Ibid. y p. 102. Ibtd. y p. 102.
pp. 102-103. T5 Ibid.) p. i.
[ 304 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
Its parts are three, by virtue of the number of mental operations di-
rected by it. Of these parts, the -first directs the first operation of the
mind, that is, simple conceiving^ and is about simple terms $ to which
pertain Porphyry's Introduction, and Aristotle's Book of Categories.
The second part directs the second operation of the mind, that is, con-
necting and dividing, and is about propositions-, to which pertains the
Book on Interpretation.
The third part directs the third and final operation of the mind, that
is, discoursing, and is about argumentation and method-, to which per-
tain the Two Books of Prior Analytics, the same number of books of
Posterior Analytics, the Eight Books of Topics, and lastly, the T<wo
Books of Sophistical Elenchi.
As we would expect from this description of the three parts of logic,
the major terms with which Sanderson deals in his treatise are the
five predicables, the ten predicaments, the various aspects of proposi-
tions, the four kinds of argument, the places of invention, and the
fallacies within and outside of language. Incidentally, he provides a
Latin distich to aid students in remembering the ten predicaments,
and the following words as arranged in relation to their correspond-
ing logical terms may help to suggest what the distich means :
[Substance] [Quantity] [Relation] [Quality] [Acting]
A tree six servants in violent cools off
heat
[Suffering] [Where] [When] [Situation] [Apparel]
scorched In the tomorrow I shall remain nor shall I
country be tunicked. 77
As for Ramistic elements in Sanderson's Logic , three chief things
may be said. First of all, Sanderson devotes two chapters of his
"Appendix Prima" or "First Appendix" to genesis and analysis as
aspects of the uses of logic j 78 and these terms, as I said earlier, desig-
nate important procedures in Ramus's discussion of the contribution
that practice as distinct from natural inclination or the study of theory
76 Ibid., pp. 2-3. Except for titles of works in the Organon, the italics are Sanderson's.
The Sophistical Elenchi is occasionally printed as two books rather than one. On this
point see Owen, The Organon, or Logical Treatises > of Aristotle^ 1 1, 540, 575.
77 Logicae Artis Com^endi^m^ p. 27. Sanderson's distich is arranged thus in Latin:
1234 5
Arbor Sex Servos Fervore Refrigerat
6789 10
Vstos Ruri Cras Stabo nee Tunicatus ero.
78 Ibid., pp. 67-88.
[ 305 ]
COUNTERREFORM: SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
may make in the development o logical ability. 78 In his discussion
of analysis Sanderson refers explicitly to the tenth book of John
Henry Alsted's Harmonious System of Logic, thus showing his close
awareness of the work of one of the very Systematics whom he had
mentioned in his account of the history of logic. 80 Secondly, Sander-
son devotes some attention to the discussion of the laws of scientific
demonstration, and at this point he is covering ground that Ramus
had heavily emphasized when he spoke of the famous three laws. 81
Thirdly, Sanderson discusses at some length the theory of method,
not as a Ramist, to be sure, but as one of the logicians who accepted
Ramus's thesis that method was more important than the scholastics
had allowed it to be.
Sanderson's two chapters on order and method he uses these
words interchangeably make an initial distinction between the
method of discovering knowledge and the method of presenting or
teaching it by discourse. 82 He calls the first of these the method of
invention, and the second, the method of doctrine. Here is his gen-
eral description of the two:
Each proceeds from that which is more known by us to that which
by us is less known j but one and the other in a different manner,
nevertheless. For we discover precepts by ascending, that is, by pro-
gressing from the concrete and the particular, which to us are more
directly known, towards the intelligible and universal, which are more
known by nature. But we transmit precepts by descending, that is, by
progressing from the universal and intelligible, which are more
known by nature, and more clearly known by us also, to that which is
less universal, and closer to the senses, and as it were less known.
Invention conceived as the discovery of new precepts may have
been suggested to Sanderson by Bacon's Advancement of Learning,
for Bacon in that work speaks influentially of such a concept. 83 At
any rate, the idea is an important development in the history of logic,
and it points to the thesis that Descartes was to enunciate in his Dis-
cours de la Methode. It might even be said that, while John Stuart
Mill's canons of induction were a long way ahead when Sanderson
wrote his Logic, Sanderson's work, nevertheless, is spiritually closer
78 See above, pp* 24.8-250.
80 Logicae Artis Compendium^ p. 79 j for my previous references to Alsted, see above,
pp. 283-284, 303.
81 Logicae Artis Co-mpendi*om y pp. 174-179.
82 Ibid.) p. 226.
83 See below, p. 367.
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
to Mill than to Ramus, so far as it conceives of a distinctive formula
for the discovery of knowledge. Here is what Sanderson says of this
formula :
The method of invention has four means, and as it were four stages
through which we ascend. First is the perception, by the help of which
we assemble some notion of individual things. Second is the observa-
tion or the seeing accurately, in the course of which we collect and
arrange what we have assimilated at different times by the percep-
tions. Third is the proof by trial, wherein we subject the multitude
of assembled observations to fixed tests. Fourth and last is induction,
in which we summon the multitude of collected and tested proofs so
as to make up a universal conclusion. 8 *
As for the method of doctrine, Sanderson divides it into two pro-
cedures, one of which he calls the "Compositiva," that is, the com-
positive, and the other, the "Resolutiva" or resolutive. 85 There can
be little doubt that these terms and the meanings assigned to them
by Sanderson are parallel to the similar terms and meanings in
Blundeville's Logike and Smith's Aditvs.** For example, Sanderson,
like Smith, applies the compositive method of presentation to the
theoretical sciences, whereas the resolutive method applies to the
practical arts 5 and Sanderson, like Smith and Blundeville, thinks of
the former method as a progress from smaller to larger units, while
the latter is a progress from large to small.
One feature of Sanderson's discussion of these two methods is that
he assigns five laws as common to each, two laws as peculiar to one,
and two law^as peculiar to the other. Thus he has a total of nine
laws to regulate the two methods of transmitting knowledge to
readers or listeners. These laws are given such names as "Lex brevi-
tatis," "Lex Harmoniae," "Lex vnitatis," and "Lex Generalitatis,"
thus recalling the procedure of Ramus in enumerating his famous
three principles of reform. Here are the nine laws as stated by
Sanderson:
[The Five Laws Common to Both Methods of Presentation]
I Lex brevitatis. Nothing should be lejt out or be superfluous in
a discipline. ...
II Lex Harmoniae. The farts of each individual doctrine should
agree among themselves. . . .
84 Logicae Artu Gom^endvom^ pp. 226-227. 85 Ibid.) p. 227.
86 See above, pp. 289-291, 296-298.
[ 307 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
III Lex vnitatis, sive Homogeniae. No doctrine should be taught
that is not homogeneous in subject or end. . . .
IV Lex Generalitatis, sive Antecessionis, & consecutionis. That
should fr&cede in teaching, voithout which something else
cannot be understood, -provided that it can be understood
itself without something else
V Lex Connexionis. The individual farts of doctrine ought to be
connected by aft transitions. . . .
[The Two Laws for the Compositive Method of Presentation]
I Lex vnitatis. The unity of a science defends upon unity of sub-
ject. Unity of subject is, to wit, unity of matter or at least of
form. . . .
II Lex Generalitatis. The more universal should precede the less
universal. . . .
[The Two Laws for the Resolutive Method of Presentation]
I Lex vnitatis. The unity of an instrumental discipline defends
ufon unity of end. . . .
II Lex Generalitatis. The more universal f recedes the less uni-
versal. . . . 87
Now that Sanderson has fully revealed his respect for the Ramists
and his devotion to the scholastics, we may pass on to the later
Systematics. These will not detain us long, for their work was not
as influential in England as that of the Systematics already con-
sidered. Still, they are of some interest, and their logics should not
be entirely omitted from the present discussion.
One of these logics, the Fasciculus Praeceftorum Logicorum, by
Christopher Airay, was published at Oxford in 1628 and reprinted
at the same place in 1633, 1637, and 1660. Airay was educated at
Queens College, Oxford, in the seven years immediately preceding
the publication of his Fasciculus^ in fact, he probably composed that
work just after his appointment as fellow of Queens in 1627. Like
the other Systematics, Airay displays a strong interest in scholastic
logic and a mild tendency to adopt some of the favorite ideas of the
Ramists. He is scholastic in dividing logic into the simple term, the
proposition, and the discourse, and in finding justification for this
87 Logicae Artis Comfendivm, pp. 227-231.
88 The present discussion of this work is based upon the Huntington Library copy
of the edition at Oxford fn 1633. Its title pag-e reads: "Fasciculus Praeceptorvm
Log-icorum : In Gratiam juventutis Academicae composite & typis donatus. Editio altera
liraatior opera secunda C. A. Oxoniae, Excudebat Gutlielmus Turner^ An. Dam. 1633."
[ 308 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
tripartite division in the mental operations of conceiving^ connecting
(or dividing), and discoursing. 89 He is also scholastic in arranging
his work into six books, and in progressing from the predicables to
the predicaments, and onward to propositions, arguments, places, and
fallacies. Needless to say, Aristotle's Organon is frequently cited as
the authority for these doctrines. 80 Incidentally, the distich Airay
proposes as a device for remembering the predicaments is different
from that of Sanderson, and would be translated more or less as
follows in relation to Aristotle's ten terms:
[Situation] [Quantity] [Acting] [Quality] [When]
On plain vast fought valiantly long ago
[Relation] [Substance] [Where] [Suffering] [Apparel]
The son of Arnesti standing & heated in armor 91
immovable
Despite all these marks of scholasticism, however, Airay's Fasciculus
shows in one place that it belongs in the period of the Ramists. That
place is where the laws of demonstration are discussed. Airay treats
the three laws called "de omni," "per se," and "quatenus ipsum,"
and he makes it plain that his discussion of them is based upon Aris-
totle's Posterior Analytics Nevertheless he must have been aware,
not only that Aristotle had explained them, but that Ramus had
given them a new and important emphasis in logic and had made
it almost a requirement that his immediate successors give them some
attention.
Another logic belonging to the school of Systematics is Franco
Burgersdijck's Institutionum Logicarum Libri Duo. Burgersdijck, a
Dutchman, was professor of logic at the University of Leiden, and his
Libri Duo was published in that city in 1626 and again in i634/ 3
Thus it belongs primarily to the history of continental logic, but it
89 Fasciculus (1633), p. 4. 90 Ibid^ pp. a, 19, 145, etc.
91 Ibid.) p. 38. Airay designates the categories by numbers above the words of the
distich, as follows:
82537
In Campo Magno Pugnabat Fortiter Olim
4 i 9 6 10
Filius Arnesti Stans & Calefactus in Armis
92 Ibid., pp. 145-152.
93 There is a copy of the edition of 162.6 at the Edinburgh University Library. The
British Museum has a copy of the edition of 1634. Burgersdijck was born in 1590 and
died in 1636. He was professor of logic and ethics at Leiden after 1620, and his treatise
on the former subject enjoyed great popularity in the schools of the Netherlands during
the seventeenth century. See Allgemeine "Deutsche Biogra^hie^ s.v. Burgersdyk, Franco B.
[ 309 1
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
has to be mentioned here because it was given an edition at Cambridge
in 1637 and some seven later editions at the same place by i68o. 94
One interesting thing about this work is that its preface "to the
reader contains an account of recent developments in logical theory
and indeed classifies all contemporary logicians as adherents of Aris-
totle, adherents of Ramus, or adherents of the compromise being
made between those two leaders. 95 The members of the first group,
says Burgersdijck, "follow Aristotle . . . and abridge his Organon^
and distribute by the same method the precepts drawn from that
place, and illustrate them with suitable examples." 96 "In this class,"
he adds at once, "can be Cumbered Hunnaeus, Crellius, Bertius,
Molinaeus, and very many others." 97 After a discussion of this group,
Burgersdijck turns to his second class, "in which," he says, "Peter
Ramus is leader of the family, a man elegantly learned indeed, but
audacious, indiscreet, and how very hurtful to antiquity.' 398 This
statement leads Burgersdijck to evaluate Ramism. As for his third
class, he mentions that he places within it "Keckermann and a great
many others, who have mixed the doctrine of Aristotle with that of
Ramus, and from the teachings of these two have arranged logical
materials from Aristotle while allowing Ramus to supply the method
and what they lacked in one, they supplied from the other." 99
Despite the slight disapproval implied in this judgment of the
Systematics, Burgersdijck is certainly a member of that class himself.
In his Libri Duo he deals with the logical materials of Aristotle's
Organon. Thus he speaks of the predicaments, the predicables, the
types of logical proposition, the four kinds of argument, the places,
94 These editions are dated as follows: 16375 1644; 16475 16515 16605 16665
16685 i6So.
95 My present discussion of this work is based upon the Princeton University Library
copy of the Cambridge edition of 1668. This copy has lost its title page, and the fol-
lowing title has been written on the flyleaf: "Fr. Burgersdicii Institutionum logicarum
libri duo Cantabrigiae Apud Joann. Field 1668." The dedicatory epistle in>this copy is
signed "Franco Burgersdicius" and is dated at Leiden September 15, 1626. The "Prae-
fatio ad Lectorem" is undated and unsigned.
86 Institutionum Logicarum Libri Duo (1668), sig. Azr. Translation mine here and
below.
97 Hunnaeus is also known as Augustin Huens (1522-1577). For a brief judgment
of his logical writings, see Eug. De, Seyn, Dictionnaire des Ecrivains Beiges, s.v. Huens,
Augustin. Crellius is Fortunatus Crellius, whose Isagoge Logica (Neustadt, 1592) is
referred to here. Bertius, .known as Petrus Bertius, published at Leiden in 1604 Petri
BertU Logicae Perifateticae Libri Sex. Molinaeus, that is Pierre Du Moulin, published
at Paris in 1603 his Elementa Logica, which went through several Latin editions, was
translated into French as Elements de Logique (Sedan, 1621), and appeared in an Eng-
lish version at London in 1624 as The Elements of Logick.
fr8 Institutionum Logicarum Libri Duo, sig.
9 Ibid., sig. A4V.
[ 310 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
and the fallacies. Although he does not arrange these materials ac-
cording to Ramus's theory of method, he does nevertheless show
some inclination to follow Ramus as well as Aristotle. For example,
he divides logic into two parts, that having to do with themes, and
that having to do with instruments j he follows the practice of pre-
senting his doctrine in terms of a text interspersed with commentary j
and he devotes the last section of his work to the theory of method.
In these respects, at least, he shows that Ramus has practices of which
he approves, even if in respect to such things as the theory of method
he is closer to the Systematics than to the Ramists.
Two other logics of the counterreform are by John Prideaux, a
scholar, churchman, and bishop. Prideaux was educated at Oxford in
the seven years between 1596 and 16035 he served as fellow and
later as rector of his college, Exeter 5 he became regius professor of
divinity at Oxford in 1615 and bishop of Worcester in i64i. 100
Among his writings are treatises on both rhetoric and logic, as we
might expect from a man who was successively a teacher, a preacher,
a propagandist, and an ecclesiastical executive. The term "propa-
gandist" is used advisedly in this case, by the way, for Prideaux be-
longed to that unique institution, the controversy college at Chelsea,
which was established in the reign of James I to offer argumentative
resistance to the cause of the Catholics. 101 Prideaux's writings on
rhetoric will be mentioned again in the next section of this chapter.
As for logic, he wrote a work which would be called in English The
Easiest Start towards the Constructing of Correct Syllogisms and the
Unraveling of Sophisms, and another work called He^tades Logicae,
that is, The Sevens of Logic. The first of these was originally pub-
lished at Oxford in 1629, and the second at the same place in 1639,
the two being in the same volume on the latter occasion. 102 Both were
combined to form the first treatise in Prideaux's later work, a Latin
100 For further details of his life, see Dictionary of National Biogmphyy s.v. Prideaux,
John (1578-1650).
101 A brief account of this institution can be found in Dictionary of National Biog-
raphy, s.v. Sutcliffe, Matthew (i55o?-i629).
102 tyjy discussion of The Easiest Start and the Sevens of Logic is based upon the
Huntington Library copy of the 1639 edition. That copy contains the following three
items by Prideaux, each with its own title page:
1) Tabvlae ad Grammatica Graeca Intro ductoriae. . . . Editio tertia. Oxoniae, 16^9.
34- PP.
2) Tyrocinvvm ad Syllogismvm Legitimum contexendum^ 6? c&ptiosum dissuendum^
exfeditissitnum* . . , Oxoniae, 1639. 18 pp.
3) Heftades Logicae. Sive Monita ad dm-pliores Tractatus Intro ductoria* Pugnus
quo com$re$sior eo ferit fortius* Oxoniae. 1639. 16 pp.
[ 3" 1
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
account of various sciences, the English title of which would be Notes
on Logic, Rhetoric, Physics, Metaphysics, Pneumatics, Ethics, Poli-
tics, and Economics*
Prideaux is fond of the figure seven as a way of indicating what is
important in a science. Thus in the Heptades Logicae and in the
Notes on Logic he presents all logical doctrine under seven heads.
The Heptades Logicae contain the Latin equivalents of seven terms
denoting respectively the processes of intellectualizing, objectifying,
stating, reasoning, methodizing, analyzing, and synthesizing* Cor-
responding terms in the Notes on Logic have the ring of the compro-
mise between scholasticism and Ramism, and are the Latin equiva-
lents, not of terms for seven mental operations, but of terms for the
seven results of those operations, so far as logic is concerned. Thus
intellectualizing is equated in the Notes on Logic with the predica-
bles, objectifying is equated with the predicaments, stating, with the
proposition, reasoning, with the syllogism, methodizing, with method,
analyzing, with analysis, and synthesizing, with synthesis. So in the
end the same seven scholastic-Ramistic concepts control Prideaux's
entire logical theory. 10 *
Another original feature of Prideaux's two treatises on logic is
that they contain questions and answers designed to induce students
to form preferences in respect to the competing logical theories of
the day. Here are examples, some of which offer additional proof
of Prideaux's fondness for sevens, and some of which provide direct
indications that English Systematics sometimes called themselves
Mixts:
Q. Is it true that the seven dialectical theories of method in use today,
to wit, i) the Aristotelian, 2) the Lullian, 3) the Ramistic, 4) the
Mixt, whether indeed in the manner of Keckermann or of Alsted,
ios This work is undated. Madan, Oxford Books, n, 487, argues that it was probably
published in 1650. Its title page reads: "Hypomnemata Logica, Rhetorica, Physica,
Metaphysica, Pneumatica, Ethica, Politica, Oeconomica. Per Jo: P: Coll: Exon: Oxoniae
Excudebat Impensis suis Leonar: Lichfield Academiae Typographus." There is a copy
at the Huntington Library,
10 * The following parallel lists indicate Prideaux's Latin terms :
eftades Logicae^ p. i Hypomnetnata^ p. 2.
1. Noematica i. Praedicabilibus
2. Thematica 2. Praedicamentis
3. Axiomatica 3. Propositionibus
4. Dianoetica 4. Syllogismis
5. Methodica 5 . Methodis
6* Analytica 6. Analysi
7. Genetica 7, Genesi -
[ 312 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
5) the Forensic of Hotman, 6) the Jesuitic, and 7) the Socinian,
differ mostly in respect to manner of treatment, not in respect to
purpose?
A. Yes. lOB
Q. Is it true that a Mixt ought to be preferred to a Peripatetic, a
Ramist, a Lullian, and the others?
A. Yes. 106
Q. Is it easier and more useful to teach through seven heads, or
through five, or through three, than through the more current
dichotomies of the moderns?
A. Yes. 107
Q. Is it true that the Ramistic dichotomies of the moderns overload
the memory rather than inform the intellect?
A. Yes. 108
Q. Is it true that the scholastic and Ramistic methods of breaking a
subject down insist too much at various times upon trifles?
A. Yes. 109
Q. Are the Aristotelian and the Ramistic methods one and the same?
A. Yes. 110
Q. Is it not true that the 359 places of Aristotle's Topics overload the
memory of the learner more than they instruct methodically?
A. Yes. 111
Q. Is it true that the ten places of Ramus ought to be esteemed good
throughout?
A. No. 112
Q. Is it not true that the places of the Tofics can be accommodated
equally to rhetorics and to logics for the purpose of treating simple
and complex themes?
A. Yes. 118
105 Hypotnnentata^ p. 94. For the same question in slightly different form, see
tades Lo gloat) p. 13. Translation mine here and below. Prideaux's reverent attitude
towards sevens appears to have led him to devise seven contemporary schools of logic,
when three would have been adequate. For brief reference to Lull, Hotman, and the
Jesuits, see above, pp. 7, 9, 227, 234, 302. Socinian logic is identified with the Socinians, a
continental religious sect of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Socinians were
anti-Trinitarians, their leaders being Laelius Socinus and his nephew Faustus.
106 Heptadts Logicae, p. 2. The passage reads: "An Mixta a Peripatetica, Ramea, &
Lulliana sit caeteris praeferenda. AfL"
107 Ibid., p. 2.
108 Hypomnemata) p. 32,
109 He$tades Logicae> p. 14.4 Hypomnemata^ p. 99.
110 Heftades Logicae> p. 13.
111 Hypomnemata, p. 76.
112 Ibid., p. 76.
118 Ibid., p. 76.
[ 313 1
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
Q. Is it true that the Ramistic method of disclosing fallacies is easier
than that of the Aristotelians?
A. No. 11 *
Prideaux's theory of method reveals once again his fondness for
dividing a subject by sevens, and it also shows his persistent eclecti-
cism. In this section of his treatise he speaks of those who place the
theory of method within the third grand division of logic, that is,
within the division which deals with discourses as distinguished from
propositions and terms. Then he mentions those who divide logic
into two parts, that is, into invention and judgment, and who pro-
ceed to regard the theory of method as an aspect of the latter
branch. 115 Although he does not attach names to either of these two
groups of logicians, it is obvious that he is here describing the re-
spective practices of the Systematics and the Ramists. As for him-
self, he does not at this point identify his doctrine with either of
these schools j but earlier he had shown how the first five of his seven
heads of logic could be construed either as belonging to the topics of
invention and judgment or to the three divisions of the Systematics. 116
Thus he wants his readers to feel at home with him, no matter what
school of logic they attend. But he mildly insists upon offering them
some things they would not get from the usual Systematic or Ra-
mist; for when he comes to explain what methods are available for
discovering knowledge or for presenting it, he falls back upon his
heptades and enumerates seven possible methods, referring here to
the authority of the Institutiones Logicae of Julius Pacius. 117 These
seven methods are the "Euretic" or Inventive, the Synthetic, the
Analytic, the Topical, the Dramatic, the Historical, and the Cryp-
tic. 118
The first three of these methods as Prideaux describes them can
be identified with conventional Systematic doctrine. That is to say,
the Inventive Method is useful in the discovery of new knowledge,
says Prideaux, and it proceeds through sense perception, observa-
tion, experiment, and induction the very steps which Sanderson
outlines for the method of invention, although Prideaux does not
* ibid., p. 8 9 . " B ibid., p. 9 o. " ibid., p. 2.
117 Ibid.) p. 91. The Institutions Logicae of Julius Pacius was published at Cam-
bridge in 1597. Pacius, also called Pace or Pacio, was an Italian jurisconsult and
scholar who taught at various continental universities in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries. He translated Aristotle, expounded the logic of Ramon Lull, and
was^well known as an authority on civil law, I have not examined his Institutiones
Lagicae.
118 For Prideaux's discussion of them, see Hy^omnemata^ pp. 91-93.
[ 314 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
mention him. 119 Prideaux's Synthetic Method and Analytic Method
are easily recognizable as the compositive and resolutive procedures
advocated by Blundeville, Smith, and Sanderson. In explaining the
Synthetic Method, by the way, Prideaux refers briefly to the three
laws that govern it, and these are exactly the three Aristotelian prin-
ciples borrowed by Ramus for his reform. Prideaux finds it unneces-
sary, however, to comment upon their origin, feeling no doubt that
his readers were aware of that matter.
The last four methods summarized by Prideaux may be called
rhetorical rather than logical, if by rhetorical we understand methods
useful in popular as distinguished from scientific discourse. At the be-
ginning of his Notes on Logic, Prideaux speaks of the logic of the fist
and the logic of the palm, and he explicitly recognizes that this dis-
tinction is suggested to him by Zeno's metaphorical summary of the
difference between logic and rhetoric. 120 The logic of the palm, as
Prideaux explains it, includes dialogues, panegyrics, forensic disserta-
tions, and other similar forms 5 and he likens it not only to the So-
cratic, Platonic, and Ciceronian mode of antiquity but also to the
forensic mode among the moderns. 121 This kind of logic is to be under-
stood as a background for Prideaux's later discussion of what he
calls the Topical, the Dramatic, the Historical, and the Cryptic
Method. The Topical Method, he says, is that in which material is
presented in terms of its mainheads or topics. The Dramatic Method
is that in which material is presented dialogue-wise, or by catechism,
as in the works of Plato. The Historical Method is that in which
material is presented in the order of chronology. The Cryptic Method
is that in which material is presented in some arbitrary order for the
sake of the pleasure of the listeners and the emotional effect upon
them. Prideaux refers this method to oratory and poetry. His descrip-
tion of it is worth quoting in full:
Lastly, the Cryptic Method is entirely arbitrary. On account of its
genius and natural capacity, poets and orators are the chief ones to
appropriate it rather freely in some noteworthy matter, so that they
may delight or variously move the auditors or readers concerned. Of
such is the art of Homer (praised by Horace) when he shows Ulysses
reflecting anew upon past happenings for Alcinous. Of such also is
the imitation of Virgil in the story told by Aeneas at the request of
Dido. More recent fragments of this method are seen in the Biblidos
119 See above, p. 307. 12 Hy^omnetnata^ pp. i-z.
121 This forensic mode Prideaux characterizes as one of the seven logics of his day.
See above, p. 313.
[ 315 ]
COTJNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
of Calagius, in the Hebraidos of Frischlin, in Du Bartas's description
of the brazen shield received by Barak from Deborah, and among us
in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales and in Spenser in the records found
through Britomart in the library of memory $ and in others every-
where. 122
Next after Prideaux in the roster of English Systematics is John
Newton. Newton has already been mentioned as an educational re-
former who wanted all the sciences to be available in English and
who translated Butler's Ramistic rhetoric as part of that plan. 123 He
also prepared an English version of the logic of the Systematics. This
work, called An Introduction to the Art of Logick, was published at
London in 1671 and again in i678. 124 Addressing himself at the be-
ginning of this work to all teachers of vernacular learning, he pre-
sents logic as the seventh and last part of an English Academy, and
says that his present work was composed "from those well known,
and yet received Compendiums of this Art, which have been hereto-
fore published by the late Learned Prelate Bishop Saunderson, Mr.
Airy, Mr. Smith^ Burgersdicius^ and Others." 125 Had Newton in-
cluded Brerewood in this list of sources, he would have been able
to suggest that his vernacular logic had been influenced by every im-
portant work published in Latin by the English Systematics. In sober
fact, however, Newton appears to have relied more upon Burgers-
dijck's Institutionum Logicarum Libri Duo than upon Sanderson,
Airay, or Smith. For example, his division of logic into two parts, one
called the thematical, and the other, the instrumental, is directly bor-
rowed from Burgersdijck, as is his entire discussion of method. 126
But he doubtless relied to some extent upon all the authors whom
he named. At any rate, he follows the familiar plan of discussing
such other great topics of Systematic logic as the predicables, the
predicaments, the types of propositions, the kinds of argument, the
122 Hypomnemataty p.. 93.
123 See above, pp. 271-2,72.
124 ftf v p rsent discussion is based upon the Harvard University Library copy of the
second of these editions. Its title page reads: "An Introduction to the Art of Logick:
Composed for the Use of English Schools, and all such who having no Opportunity of
being Instructed in the Latine Tongue, do however Desire to be Instructed in this Liberal
Science. By John Ne*uton y D. D. The Second Edition Enlarged and Amended by the
Authour- London, Printed by A. P. and T. H. for T. Passinger, at the Three Bibles, on
the middle of London-Bridge^ 1678."
^Introduction to the Art of Logick (1678), sig. A6r. For a further reference to
Newton's English Academy^ see above, p. 2,71, note 84.
126 Compare Burgersdijck, Inftitutionum Logicarum Libri Duo (1668), pp. 4, 206-
aii, with Newton, Introduction to the Art of Logick (1678), pp. 3, 170-171.
[ 316 ]
MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN CONTRADICTIONS
places, and fallacies, nor does his treatment o these terms depart
from the essential doctrine of Smith, Sanderson, and Airay.
By way of bringing to a close this account of the English System-
atics, I should like to mention a treatise by Obadiah Walker en-
titled Of Education Especially of Young Gentlemen, published at
Oxford in 1673, an d reprinted on five later occasions in the seven-
teenth century. This work was designed to indicate how an educa-
tion could be acquired and how it could be used in the conduct of
life. Chapters xi, xii, and xiii of Part I introduce the faculties of
memory, style, invention, and judgment, since of course these facul-
ties must be trained by the educational process. For the improve-
ment of memory, Walker recommends the use of the memory system
devised by the ancient rhetoricians $ and he shows how that system
could be applied in his day to the streets of London as a network of
places into which images could be stored and thus remembered. For
the improvement of style, he recommends the figures of speech. As
for invention, he turns from rhetoric to logic, and discusses Aristotle's
ten predicaments and the other devices used in providing oneself with
a store of arguments. What he actually says about the predicaments
and the other devices is conventional and unimportant 5 but his in-
clusion of them in his treatise is a reminder that, despite the conven-
tionality of the doctrine associated with them, they stood for im-
portant objectives in seventeenth-century education, as this account
of the English Systematics has continuously demonstrated.
II. The Reappearance of the Three Patterns
THE work of the Systematics in effecting a compromise between
scholasticism and Ramism during the later sixteenth and earlier
seventeenth centuries had a close parallel at the same time in the field
of rhetorical theory. The Ramistic reform of rhetoric had consisted
in limiting that subject to style and delivery, while ordaining that
the ancient rhetorical procedures of invention and arrangement
should be purged of redundancies, combined with the similar pro-
cedures of ancient dialectic, improved in certain respects, and trans-
ferred with utter finality to logic. This reform, of course, had caused
some hostility among the traditional rhetoricians, Ascham's attitude
being a good case in point. 1 Yet later traditional rhetoricians saw that
Ramus's criticism of their doctrine had real justification, even if he
had been too emphatic or arbitrary in some of his views. Thus they
attempted to answer him not by hostility but by compromise. In
other words, they sought to restore Ciceronian concepts to rhetoric,
even as the Systematics were restoring Aristotelian concepts to logic j
but at the same time they sought to purge those concepts of redun-
dancy and to arrange them methodically, as the Ramists were effec-
tively advocating. The rhetoric which resulted from this compromise
as worked out by English rhetoricians in the period between 1586
and 1700 will be the subject of this final part of the present chapter.
The English rhetoricians who formulated this compromise were
not as historical-minded as their opposite numbers in logic, and thus
they did not identify themselves as a distinct school or give them-
selves a name to correspond with their effort at counterreform. It is
a good thing, of course, that they did not call themselves Philippo-
Ramists or Systematics or Mixts, for they would then have been
easily confused with the counterreform in logic, as if they too were
followers of Aristotle instead of Cicero. In the absence of a name in-
vented by themselves, it seems wise to call them Neo-Ciceronians.
Not only did they take the Ciceronian position that rhetoric had
the duty of providing a machinery for invention, arrangement, and
memory, as well as for style and delivery, even though logic might
also claim some jurisdiction over the first three of these processes;
but also they recognized that the late medieval interpretation of
Ciceronian rhetoric was often wordy, poorly arranged, and difficult
1 See above, pp. 173, 177-178.
[ 318 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
to teach. Thus they certainly deserve to be known as Ciceronians of
a new vintage.
My discussion of the English Ramists has already provided two
examples of strong Neo-Ciceronian tendencies in English rhetorical
theory of the seventeenth century. Those examples involve practicing
Ramists who did not seem to adhere with due strictness to Ramistic
rhetorical doctrine. The outstanding case of this sort is of course
Charles Butler. Butler published the most famous of England's
Latin versions of style and delivery as formulated by Ramus's col-
league Talaeus in the latter's Rhetorica; and some thirty years later,
Butler published a Latin treatise devoted mainly to invention, ar-
rangement, and memory, his purpose on this second occasion being to
give these concepts a better adaptation to oratory than they had in
the strict logical theory of Ramus. 2 In other words, Butler limited
rhetoric severely to style and delivery with the Ramistic right hand
of his youth, and with the less Ramistic left hand of his old age he
sought to broaden Ramus's logic by applying it to oratory and by
showing that there was for the orator an extra-logical theory of in-
vention, arrangement, and memory. Ramus would have denied that
invention and arrangement had an extra-logical as well as a logical
context 5 but Butler registered no such denial, although he fancied
himself a devoted Ramist in his later as in his earlier work. The
truth is, no doubt, that the thirty years between those two works had
convinced him of the necessity of modifying Ramism as a way of
preserving it against those who wanted to revive Cicero, and that
thus his thinking had meanwhile acquired a Neo-Ciceronian aspect.
Another seventeenth-century English rhetorician with the character-
istics of a Ramist and a Ciceronian is John Newton. Newton belongs
with the Ramists because he published in 1671 a rhetoric made up in
part of Charles Butler's chapter on style 5 but he identifies himself
with the Ciceronians by including in that same rhetoric Michael
Radau's discussion of invention and arrangement. 3 By Newton's
time, such a mixture may have seemed almost commonplace, so far
had Ramus's doctrine lost its original compulsiveness. Thus Newton
may possibly be a Ramist by .mistake or a counterref ormer by acci-
dent 5 but Butler has to be counted as primarily a Ramist and only
secondarily as a part of the counterreform.
Turning now to those English rhetoricians who belong more com-
pletely to the counterreform than do Butler or Newton, I should like
2 See above, pp. 262, 266. 3 See above, pp. 271-272.
[ 319 ]
COXJNTERREFORM: SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
to speak first of Thomas Vicars. Vicars was awarded the degree of
bachelor of arts at Oxford in 1611, and the master's degree four
years later. Thereafter he served for a time as fellow of his college,
Queens. 4 During this period he became interested in the German
Systematic, Bartholomew Keckermann, and published around 1620
a translation of one of Keckermann's works under the title, A Manu-
duction to Theologie. "Manuduction" means "a leading by the hand"
or "a hand guide," and this word was a favorite with Vicars, for
it appeared a year later in its Greek and Latin form in the title of
another of his works, the Xetpo/ycuyta Manuductio ad Artem Rhe-
toricam) that is, the MLanuduction to the Rhetorical Art. 5 This
treatise is a good example of rhetoric formulated in the Neo-Cicero-
nian style, as can be seen to best advantage in its third edition, pub-
lished at London in 1628.
The compromise proposed by Vicars between the Ciceronians and
Ramists is anticipated by the title page of that third edition. 6 Not
only does the Latin title contain the words "genesis" and "analysis"
as a reminder of the famous Ramistic operations of composing and
criticizing oratory; it also contains John Owens's Latin epigram in
which the time-honored Ciceronian (and Zenonian) analogy of palm
and fist is used to differentiate rhetoric and dialectic. Here is Vicars's
title as it would read in English:
A Hand Guide or Manuduction to the Rhetorical Art. In which are
taught Genesis and Analysis, that is, the theory of artistically com-
posing and of skilfully, clearly, and methodically analyzing orations.
Third edition augmented by a second part. For the use of schools. By
the author, Thomas Vicars, of Carlisle, lately Fellow of Queens Col-
lege in Oxford. John Owen:
Rhetoric is like unto the palm, Dialectic to the fist.
The latter wages war 5 but yet the former carries off the palm/
* See Dictionary of National Biography^ s.v. Vicars, Thomas (fl, 1607-1641).
5 (London, 1 62 1 ) . There is a copy of this work at the British Museum.
* The title page of the copy in the Folg-er Shakespeare Library reads : "Xetpa^wvtet
Manvdvctio ad Artem Rhetoricam. In qua Genesis & Analysis, h.e. ratio artificiose com-
ponendi & dextre resolvendi orationes perspicue & methodice docetur. Editio tertia altera
parte auctior. In usum Scholarum. Auctore Thoma Vicarsio, Carleolensi, nuper Collegii
Reginensis apud Oxonienses Socio. Joan. Audoen. Rhetorica est palmae similis, Dialectica
pugnoj Haec pugnat, palmam sed tamen ilia refert. Londini, Typis Joannis Haviland,
impensis Roberti Milbovrne. CIO. IDC. XXIIX."
7 This epigram is numbered 105 in Book I of Efigrammatum loannis Owen Oxonien-
sis, Cambro-Britanm y Libri Tres. Ad Henricvm Princtyem Cambriae Dvo (London,
1612). The text of this epigram in that source is as follows:
Ratio & Oratio.
Rhetorica est palmae similis, Dialectica pugno;
Haec pugnatj palman sed tamen ilia refert.
[ 320 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
As for the actual execution of this design, Vicars devotes Book I
to "genesis," and discusses the five main parts of Ciceronian rhetoric,
whereas Book II is devoted to "analysis," and contains an application
of Cicero's rhetorical terminology to three of that orator's speeches.
It has to be emphasized, however, that Vicars defines "analysis" at
the beginning of Book II by a direct and open quotation from Ra-
mus's Scholae Dialecticae* Thus does he reconstruct Ciceronian rhet-
oric upon a plan borrowed from Ramus. He could, of course, have
been more Ramistic than Ciceronian in his work, had he omitted the
discussion of memory, as the Ramists did, and had he treated inven-
tion and arrangement in terms of Ramus's logical doctrine, while
giving style and delivery an exposition from Talaeus. But in fact he
discusses these terms in the manner of Cicero, and he yields to Ramus
only as he feels the need to adopt a new organizing principle for
rhetorical doctrine.
Although Vicars appears to be the first English rhetorician since
Ludham to use Cicero's five great terms as the basic concepts for a
theory of rhetoric, his Manuduction to the Rhetorical Art did not
achieve the highest degree of influence in the Neo-Ciceronian move-
ment. It was given only one other edition after 1628.* A much more
successful Neo-Ciceronian rhetoric is Thomas Farnaby's Index Rhet-
oricus, first published at London in 1625, and given ten later edi-
tions in the seventeenth and several in the eighteenth centuries. 10 In
fact, even if Farnaby's work in its original Latin title calls itself "the
rhetorical indicator adapted to schools and to the instruction of the
tenderer ages" even if, in short, it is a schoolboy rhetoric there
is no work in the Neo-Ciceronian tradition to compare with it in the
8 See Manvdvctio ad Artem Rhetoricam (London, 1628), p. 101, for this reference
to Ramus.
8 See Wing, Short-Title Catalogue^ s.v. Vicars, Thomas.
10 The copy of the first edition at the Bodleian Library bears the following 1 title and
date: Index Rhetoricus > Scholis et Institution* tenerioris aetatis accommodatus (London,
1625). According to Pollard and Redgrave, Short-Title Catalogue^ and Wing, Short-
Title Catalogue, editions of this work occurred at the following dates: 1625, 1633,
1634?, 1640, 1646, 1654, 1659, 1672, 1682, 1689, 1696. Raymond E. Nadeau refers
to an edition of 17045 see Clyde W. Dow, "Abstracts of Theses in the Field of Speech
and Drama, vn," Speech Monographs, xix (1952), 12.8. The Huntington Library holds
a copy of an edition dated at London in 1713, and the Dictionary of National Biog-
raphy^ s.v. Farnaby, Thomas (15 75? -1647), identifies a fifteenth edition in 1767. My
present discussion is based upon the Huntington Library copy just mentioned. Its title
page reads: "Index Rhetoricus et Oratorius, Scholis, & Institutioni tenerioris Aetatis ac-
commodatus. Cui adjiciuntur Formulae Oratoriae, et Index Poeticus. Opera & Studio
Thomae Farnabii. Editio Novissima prioribus emendatior. . . . Londini, Typis excudun-
tur pro Mat. Wotton, ad Insigne Trium Pugionum^ in vico vulgo dicto Fleet street^ &
G. Conyers, ad Insigne Annuli Aurei y in vico vulgo dicto Little-Britain. 1713."
[ 3*1 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
durability of its appeal. As one of the most famous schoolmasters of
his time, Farnaby was ideally suited to write such a popular textbook
as the Index Rhetoricus turned out to be. And as a good classical
scholar he was well equipped to handle not only the several Roman
poets whose works he edited but also the Latin rhetoricians who
formulated the tradition behind his textbook in rhetoric. At the head
of that tradition, of course, were Cicero and Quintilian. Farnaby re-
fers often to these two, and to a great many of their descendants, in-
cluding Agricola, Sturm, Vossius, and Keckermann. 11
The Index Rhetoricus is a clear and compact discussion of most of
the chief terms in Ciceronian rhetoric. Farnaby defines rhetoric as the
faculty of speaking well and in a manner calculated to persuade, no
matter what the speaker's subject may be. He assigns to this faculty
the three specific duties of delighting, teaching, and moving. He in-
dicates that speakers deal with all matters under dispute, but that in
practice they limit themselves to demonstrative, deliberative, and
forensic questions. He acknowledges that ability in speaking comes
from nature and from the study of theory $ but it is the latter topic,
of course, which interests him most. In treating it, he indicates that
all rhetorical theory can be referred to the headings of invention,
arrangement, style, and delivery. Under the first of these terms he
discusses the discovery of materials for the three kinds of oratory
and for the various positions of argument, as well as for the three
duties of rhetoric. Under the second term, arrangement, he enumer-
ates the six parts of an oration, and discusses them as a pattern of
organization for the material previously invented. Style is then ex-
plained in terms of elegance, orderliness of verbal units, and dig-
nity, the last quality being finally broadened into an analysis of the
tropes and figures. Then follows a section on delivery,- and here
Farnaby talks of practice, imitation, reading, and precepts.
Ramistic influences in the Index Rhetoricus are not strongly visi-
ble, but they can nevertheless be detected. For example, Farnaby
omits the subject of memory when he seeks to restore the Ciceronian
rhetorical system, and this part of his procedure is a tribute to the
11 According to Raymond E. Nadeau's doctoral dissertation, "The Index Rhetoricus
of Thomas Farnaby** (University of Michigan, 1951), the primary sources of the Index
Rketoricus are the Commentariorum Rhetoricorum . . Libri vi (1605) and the Rhet-
orices Contractae (i6ai) of Vossius, the Systema Rhetorlcae (1606) of Keckermann,
and the Instit-utto Oratorio, of Quintilian. Nadeau Indicates some fifty-nine other sources,
Cicero being of course one of the most outstanding-. See Clyde W. Dow, "Abstracts of
Theses in the Field of Speech and Drama, vn," Speech Monogra-pfa^ XIX (1952), 128.
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
success of one of Ramus's reforms. For another example, Farnaby
discusses the six parts of an oration under the heading of arrange-
ment, although these materials were placed under invention by the
older Ciceronians. Here again his procedure shows a concern for the
observance of Ramus's law of justice, by which each division of
knowledge was awarded what lawfully belonged to it. Thus does
Farnaby respond to the influences created by the Ramists, as we
would expect a rhetorician to do who owed much to Keckermann,
the Systematic. In fact, Farnaby's Index Rhetoricus stands in rela-
tion to Neo-Ciceronian rhetoric in England as Sanderson's Logicae
Artis Com'pendivm) likewise a product of Keckermann's influence,
stands in relation to the logic of the English Systematics. That is to
say, both of these treatises were very popular, very long-lived, and
very cognizant of the determination to effect a compromise between
the ideas of Ramus and those of the medieval tradition.
Another work in the Neo-Ciceronian movement is William Pem-
ble's Enchiridion Oratorivm^ published at Oxford in i633. 12 Pemble
had prematurely died ten years earlier, after having taken two de-
grees at Oxford and after having served brilliantly at Magdalen
Hall in that university as lecturer in divinity. 13 His Enchiridion Ora-
torivm, which in English would be called the Oratorical Manual,
defines rhetoric as "the art of treating any matter whatever in an
ornamental and copious way for the people's knowledge and persua-
sion." 14 It proceeds to divide rhetoric into invention, arrangement,
style, and delivery, although it deals only with the first two of these
terms. Under invention, which Pemble defines as "the devising of
arguments true or apparently true for rendering a cause probable," 15
there is a discussion of the discovery of arguments in simple and com-
plex themes, in the three kinds of oratory, and in the four argu-
mentative positions of the legal case. Arrangement, defined as "the
distribution of invented materials in an order showing what ought to
be collected into what places," 16 is made to deal with the six parts of
the oration. In respect to this topic, the Enchiridion Oratorivm con-
forms to the same pattern as that of the Index Rhetoricus, although
12 The title page of the Harvard University Library copy reads as follows : "En-
chiridion Oratorivm. A Gvlielmo Pembelo Avlae Magdalenensis non ita pridem Alumno
facundissime pio concinnatum. . . Oxoniae Apud lohannem Lichfield Academiae Typo-
graphum pro Edvardo Forrest. A. D. 1633."
^Dictionary of National Biogra^hy^ s.v. Pemble, William (i 592?-! 613) .
^Enchiridion Oratori^m^ p. i. Translation mine here and below.
**Ibid., p. 2.
16 Ibid.) p. 2; see also p. 57.
[ 323 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
the latter work was published after Pemble's death and thus could
not have influenced him. Pemble likewise conforms to the pattern of
the Index Rhetoricus in omitting memory from the list of necessary
rhetorical subjects. As he does this, he says that memory is not any
more proper to rhetoric than to the other arts 17 an ancient idea, and
also, of course, an echo of Ramus's reform.
The Neo-Ciceronian movement was given additional support by
Obadiah Walker in 1659 ^th the publication at London of a work
called Some Instructions concerning the Art of Oratory?* Walker's
treatise Of Education has already been briefly noticed in the first part
of the present chapter, and at that time he was seen to be identified
to some extent with the English Systematics/ 9 Walker was a product
of Oxford, where he studied at University College and took the de-
grees of bachelor of arts in 1635 and of master of arts in 1638. He
stayed on at his college as tutor after he had received his second
degree, and thereafter his life was associated with academic pursuits.
In 1 676 he became master of University College. 20 Some Instructions
concerning the Art of Oratory may thus be said to have a sound
pedigree and to proceed from well-informed quarters. Moreover,
the work is to be regarded as an interesting interpretation of four of
the main terms of Ciceronian rhetoric.
Walker arrives at these four terms by dividing oratory into inven-
tion and style, and by subdividing each of these subjects so that the
first covers both invention and arrangement, whereas the second
covers both style and delivery. Here are his own statements to indi-
cate his major and subordinate divisions:
The Parts of Oratory are I. Invention, taking care for the Matter j
and 2. Elocution, for the Words, and Style . 21
In all your Compositions, especially those of any length, upon all your
Materials revised, a Division, and distribution of them under certain
Heads, such as best fits them, is alwayes to be cast, and contrived j
17 /rf. t p. 2.
16 The title page of the Huntingdon Library copy reads as follows : "Some Instrvctions
concerning- the Art of Oratory. Collected for the use of a Friend a Young Student.
London, Printed by F. G. for R. Royston y at the Angel in Ivy lane, 1659." This work
was given a second edition "very much Corrected and Augmented" at Oxford in i68z.
The second edition differs from the first by having 150 pages of text rather than 128,
but even so the two editions are virtually identical in content for the first 100 pages of
each. Thereafter the second edition shows some additional material.
19 See above, p. 317.
20 See Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Walker, Obadiah (1616-1699),
Instructions concerning the Art of Oratory (1682), p. i.
[ 324 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
though not necessary al waves to be mentioned; yet, in many also
not to be concealed. 22
Thus much of i. Invention, and Arguments $ and of the partition of
them 5 Now 2. of Elocution. . . . And in it i. concerning Words. 2.
Then of Periods ^ and of the various artificial flaring of the words in
them. 3. Next, of the several -figures and modes of livelier and more
passionate expression. 4. of Stiles. After which I shall adde something,
5. of Recitation. 6 of Pronunciation, and 7. of Action. 23
Walker draws the major part of his doctrine from Ciceronian
authors, and betrays the influence of Ramus only in the way in which
he distributes his emphasis upon the various headings of his subject.
His chief authority is Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria^ this work be-
ing cited over and over again. 24 He refers to Cicero's orations for
examples of rhetorical practices, and on one occasion he uses a pas-
sage from Cicero's De Inventione to illustrate etiology. 25 When he
is finishing his discussion of rhetorical topics as a source of arguments,
he mentions that Aristotle's Rhetoric may be consulted for additional
information on this point. 26 The only well-known modern rhetorician
to whom he refers is Farnaby, although he names such modern writ-
ers as Scaliger, Hooker, Bishop Andrews, and Francis Bacon. 27 De-
spite the Ciceronian tendency of his chief rhetorical authorities, how-
ever, there is one major respect in which Walker differs from them:
he devotes only one-tenth of his total space to the subject of inven-
tion, whereas the true Ciceronian who deals with invention at all
would regard it as worthy of a much heavier emphasis. Walker's
tendency to slight it may be regarded as an indirect result of Ramus's
insistence that rhetoric had no right to speculate upon that aspect of
the theory of communication. As a natural corollary, Walker's over-
emphasis on style is probably a reflection of the exclusive concern of
Ramistic rhetoric for the verbal and oral aspects of writing and
speaking.
Walker and Farnaby, along with Pemble and Vicars, are the chief
English rhetoricians of the Neo-Ciceronian school during the seven-
teenth century. Their effort to revive most or all of the major terms
of Ciceronian rhetoric, and also at the same time to accept some of
**Ibid.> p. 15. M /**., p. 24.
2 *Ibid., pp. 2, 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 4.1, 43, 75, 82, 95, 104, 105, 107, 130, 134, 135,
i36> i37 14*.
25 /*<*., pp. 22, 72, 80-8 1, 91, 93- 26 /&*'<, p. 7.
27 Ibid., pp. 2 (for Farnaby) 5 143 (for Scaliger) i 46-48 (for Hooker) j 77, 89 (for
Andrews); and 12, 60, 75, 106 (for Bacon).
[ 325 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
Ramus's reforms, was aided by a similar endeavor on the continent
and by an occasional edition of a continental rhetoric in England.
For example, Michael Radau's Orator Extemforaneus^ already
mentioned as the source of certain non-Ramistic features of John
Newton's otherwise Ramistic rhetoric, first entered the English
Neo-Ciceronian movement in 1657 when it was given an edition at
London. 28 It contains a bipartite summary of the oratorical art, one
section being devoted to a theoretical treatment of invention, ar-
rangement, style, and memory, while the other section presents exer-
cises for training students in the three kinds of oratory, particularly
the demonstrative. Radau, by the way, was professor of sacred theol-
ogy in the Jesuit college at Brunsberg, Prussia, and had had the
misfortune to see his Orator Extemporaneus published as if it were
largely the work of one George Beckher before it was finally pre-
sented to the public under its rightful auspices. 29
My account of the Neo-Ciceronian movement in England would
not be adequate without some recognition of the English rhetoricians
of the later sixteenth and the earlier seventeenth centuries who sought
to maintain a stylistic rhetoric looking back to the old Ciceronian tra-
dition rather than to Ramus. That is to say, there were a few English
rhetoricians in those years who confined rhetoric to style, as if they
were partly Ramists, but who nevertheless treated style in the man-
ner of such oild-fashioned Ciceronian^ as Richard Sherry and Henry
JPeacham. A characteristic of the work ot theserhetoricians is that
they heavily emphasized the tropes and the figures while omitting
various features of the Ramistic treatment of these devices of style.
A good case in point has already been covered in my discussion of
John Smith's Mysterie of Rhetorique Unvail'd (i657). 30 This com-
pilation of some 138 tropes and figures owes much to John Hoskins
and Henry Peacham, as well as to Thomas Farnaby, and thus it be-
longs in part to the Ciceronian school ^ but it also owes several pages
of doctrine to Dudley Fenner's first English version of Talaeus's
28 See above, pp. 271-272. This work was given a second edition in England in 1673,
two years after Newton published an English version of much of it. The Princeton
University Library has a copy of this second edition. Its title page reads as follows:
"Orator Extemporaneus seu Artis Oratoriae Breviarium bipartitum, Cujus Prior pars
praecepta continet generalia, Posterior praxin ostendit in triplici dicendi genere prae-
sertim Demonstrative. Nee non supellectilem Oratoria, Sententias, Historias, Apophtheg-
mata Hieroglyphica suppeditat. Auctore R. P. Michaele Radau Societatis Jesu. S. Theolo-
giae Doctore ejusdemque Professore. Londini, Typis lohannls Redtnayne, MDCLXXIII."
2fl For an account of Beckher's plagiarized edition of the Orator Extemporaneus^ see
the edition of this work at Amsterdam in 1673^ sig. *5r-*5v.
ao See above, pp. 276-279.
[ 326 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
Rhetorica^ and thus it partakes in part of Ramus's reforms. Its Ra-
mistic characteristics serve to identify it interestingly with the work
of the English Ramists. At any rate, I placed it in that school rather
than in the Neo-Ciceronian school, although it would not be out of
place in the latter.
George Puttenham's The Arte of English Poesie, published at
London in 1589, will begin my discussion of the stylistic rhetorics of
the counterreform. This famous work is, to be sure, a treatise on
poetry rather than on rhetoric, but it handles the doctrine of style as
a work on rhetoric would, and thus it belongs in part to the history
of rhetorical theory in England. Moreover, it treats style, not ac-
cording to the Ramistic formula that Abraham Fraunce used in the
Arcadian Rhetorike in 1588, but according to the older Ciceronian
formula. That is to say, Puttenham devotes some twenty-three chap-
ters of the third book of his treatise to style, and these chapters con-
sist of recognizable topics from traditional rhetoric. There is, for
example, an elaborate analysis of the figures of grammar and rhet-
oric; and there is also an examination of such other matters as the
grand, medium, and familiar style, the principal deformities of ex-
pression, and the nature of decorum as a stylistic virtue. 31 Only in
one place does Puttenham show an awareness of Ramistic rhetorical
theory, and that is in his second book, where he discusses the whole
subject of prosody, and includes a particular description of the twelve
kinds of ancient metrical feet. His enumeration of these feet is ob-
viously influenced either by the corresponding passage in Talaeus's
Rhetorica or by William Webbe's version of that passage in Talaeus's
Rhetorical In other respects, however, Puttenham appears to pay
no attention to the Ramists.
Puttenham's theory of style in respect to oratory and poetry may
be said to consist in the belief that, as oratory achieves persuasiveness
only by transcending the speech patterns of ordinary daily converse,
so does poetry achieve persuasiveness and delightfulness only by
transcending the speech patterns of oratory. In other words, Putten-
ham acknowledges ordinary conversation to be a step below the level
that oratory must achieve, whereas oratory is a step below the level
that poetry must achieve. And he takes the position that, if the lan-
guage used on any of these levels be well-bred, ordinary conversa-
81 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie^ ed. Edward Arber (London, 1*69),
pp. 149-282. For a recent edition of this work, see Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice
Walker, The Arte of English Poesie by George Puttenham (Cambridge, 1936).
32 The Arte of English Poesie, ed. Arber, pp. i33-*37 See also above, p. 257.
[ 327 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
tion is at the lowest point on the scale because it does not use figura-
tive language at all, while oratory and poetry are progressively
higher in value because of their progressive concern for the right use
of figures. This view amounts to a denial that the language of ordi-
nary life can be a medium for oratory or poetry. It also amounts to
an affirmation that the medium for oratory and poetry can be found
only by dressing up the language of ordinary life with such viola-
tions of our daily speech as the tropes and the figures represent.
The requirement that the language of effective literature must be
well-bred, as opposed to rustic, uncivil., or pedantic,, is the first part
of the theory just stated, and Puttenham openly commits himself to
it. His words are addressed to the poet, but he has the orator also in
mind. Here is what he says of the poet's use of language:
This part in our maker or Poet must be heedyly looked vnto, that it
be naturall, pure, and the most vsuall of all his countrey: and for the
same purpose rather that which is spoken in the kings Court, or in
the good townes and Cities within the land, then in the marches and
frontiers, or in port townes, where straungers haunt for traffike sake,
or yet in Vniuersities where Schollers vse much peeuish affectation of
words out of the primatiue languages, or finally, in any vplandish
village or corner of a Realme, where is no resort but of poore rusticall
or vnciuill people: neither shall he follow the speach of a craftes
man or carter, or other of the inferiour sort, though he be inhabitant
or bred in the best towne and Citie in this Realme, for such persons
doe abuse good speaches by strange accents or ill shapen soundes, and
false ortographie. 33
Given a well-bred pattern of language to start with, the would-be
orator and poet proceed then to take the position, according to Putten-
ham, that good utterance "resteth altogether in figuratiue speaches," 8 *
and that figurative speech is "a noueltie of language euidently (and
yet not absurdly) estranged from the ordinarie habite and manner
of our dayly talfce and writing." 35 In fact, like all his predecessors in
the study of figurative language, Puttenham acknowledges the figures
to be "but transgressions of our dayly speech." 36 When these trans-
gressions are absent altogether, then our writings or our public
speeches become "but as our ordinary talke, then which nothing can
be more vnsauourie and farre from all ciuilitie." 87 Puttenham illus-
trates such unfigured talk by citing the case of the Yorkshire knight
33 The Arte of English Poesie, ed. Arber, pp. 156-157. ** Ibid. y p. 152.
35 Ibid., p. I7 x. " Ibid., p. 269, 37 Ibid. 9 p. 151.
[ 328 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
in Queen Mary's reign who was chosen speaker of parliament and
whose speech to the queen was so marred by his lack of teeth and
his inability with unusual language that a gentleman contemptuously
called the effort an "alehouse tale" "because the good old Knight
made no difference betweene an Oration or publike speach to be de-
liuered to th'eare of a Princes Maiestie and state of a Realme, then
he would haue done of an ordinary tale to be told at his table in the
countrey, wherein all men know the oddes is very great.' 538 On the
other hand, when figures or transgressions of our daily speech are
not only present in our writings or orations, but are present in such
a way as to be enclosed within a metrical pattern, then our literary
effort becomes poetry or "speech by meeter," and this kind of utter-
ance is "more cleanly couched and more delicate to the eare than
prose is, because it is more currant and slipper vpon the tongue, and
withal tunable and melodious, as a kinde of Musicke, and therfore
may be tearmed a musicall speech or vtterance, which cannot but
please the hearer very well." 39 Puttenham immediately adds:
It is beside a maner of vtterance more eloquent and rethoricall then
the ordinarie prose, which we vse in our daily talke: because it is
decked and set out with all maner of fresh colours and figures, which
maketh that it sooner inuegleth the iudgement of man, and carieth
his opinion this way and that, whither soeuer the heart by impression
of the eare shalbe most affectionatly bent and directed.
The difference between figured metrical language and figured
prose is not the only difference that Puttenham sees between poetry
and oratory, as the whole first book of his treatise demonstrates. In
fact, if his entire theory on this matter were worked out, it would be
necessary to recognize that he occasionally uses terms like "imita-
tion" and "counterfeiter" in his discussion of poetry, but does not
imply their similar use in the analysis of oratory. Thus he does not
regard the poem as being a kind of metrical oration. He does regard
the two, however, as being alike persuasive, and he believes they owe
their persuasiveness, so far as style is concerned, to the presence
within them of figurative language.
Two other stylistic rhetorics of the Neo-Ciceronian school were
produced in England before the end of the sixteenth century, al-
though one of them was not published in its own right until the
present era. Angel Day's The English Secretorie was the earlier of
p. 151.
[ 329 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
the two. When this work appeared at London in 1592 in its third
edition, it contained directions to be heeded and models to be fol-
lowed in letter writing, as it had in its two earlier editions j but it
also contained a new element in the form of "A declaration of such
Tropes, Figures, and Schemes, as either vsually or for ornament sake
are therin required." 40 In other words, this third edition of Day's
work is both a formulary and a stylistic rhetoric. It is a formulary
rhetoric because it contains models of descriptive, laudatory, vitupera-
tive, deliberative, dehortatory, conciliatory, consolatory, amatory,
judicial, and familiar letters, as well as of many other kinds. It is a
stylistic rhetoric, of course, because of its section on the figures, which
Day classifies as tropes and schemes. His treatment of these con-
trivances of style is distinctly non-Ramistic. To begin with, he classi-
fies schemes as grammatical and rhetorical, 41 whereas a Ramist would
have insisted that schemes must belong wholly to rhetoric under
Ramus's law of justice. Secondly, he includes in his program a brief
mention of invention and arrangement, 42 whereas Ramus would have
regarded these matters as the property of logic and as unsuitable for
discussion elsewhere in the world of learning. For the rest, Day's
treatise on style is like the many others of its kind, and it need not
detain us longer.
The later of the two rhetorics mentioned at the beginning of the
preceding paragraph is John Hoskins's Directions for Speech and
Style. This work was not published under Hoskins's name until the
nineteen-thirties, when it received two editions, one by Hoyt H.
Hudson and the other by Louise Brown Osborn. 43 Nevertheless, it
had something o a history in print before it achieved these two edi-
tions. First of all, a few pages of it were silently embodied in Ben
Jonson's Timber and were published in that work in 1641, some four
years after Jonson's death. Thanks to Miss Osborn, these pages were
40 The English Secretorie was published at London as follows: 1586, 1590?, 159*,
*595j J 599 1^07, 1614, 1618, 1626, 1635. My present discussion is based upon the
Huntington Library copy of the 1599 edition. Its title page reads: "The English Secre-
tary, or Methode of writing- of Epistles and Letters: with A Declaration of such Tropes,
Figures, and Schemes, as either vsually or for ornament sake are therin required. Also
the parts and office of a Secretarie, Deuided into two bookes. Now newly reuised and in
many parts corrected and amended: By Angel Day. At London Printed by P. S. for C.
Burble and are to be sold at his shop, at the Royall Exchange. 1599."
41 The English Secretary (1599),?. 81.
* 2 Ibid., p. 9.
43 See Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style, ed. Hudson 5 Louise Brown Osborn,
The Life, Letters, and Writings of John Hoskyns 1566-1638 (New Haven, 1937), pp.
115-166.
[ 330 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
publicly identified in 1930 as the property of Hoskins. 4 * Secondly,
almost all of the Directions was borrowed without acknowledgment
and published by Thomas Blount as a principal part of his Academie
of Eloquence. Thirdly, many of Blount's borrowings were in turn
lifted from him without acknowledgment and published by John
Smith as part of his Mysterie of Rhetorique Unvail'd. The pillaging
of Hoskins by Blount and Smith was publicly exposed in 1935 by
Hoyt H. Hudson, as I indicated earlier. 46 Thus two of the most
famous stylistic rhetorics of the second half of the seventeenth cen-
tury must be regarded as in part the work of Hoskins.
The Directions for Speech and Style deserves the compliment that
these imitators paid it. It is a treatise on letter-writing, and it recog-
nizes invention, arrangement, and style as the main divisions of its
subject. Style is, however, the great point of interest for Hoskins.
Thus he devotes most of his treatise to the four qualities of the good
epistolary style, and to the figures that provide for variety, amplifi-
cation, and illustration. His definition of a metaphor provides an
excellent example of the ease and attractiveness of his treatise as a
whole:
A Metaphor, or Translation, is the friendly and neighborly borrowing
of one word to express a thing with more light and better note,
though not so directly and properly as the natural name of the thing
meant would signify. 46
Metaphor and the other tropes, as well as certain figures or schemes,
are lumped together by Hoskins and discussed as devices "For Vary-
ing" $ all the other figures considered by him are arranged to show
his readers how "To Amplify" or how "To Illustrate."* 7 Thus he
does not classify tropes and figures according to the bipartite scheme
of Ramus and Talaeus, even though Talaeus is mentioned by him as
one of his recent sources. 48 In fact, he owes little to Ramistic rhetoric,
and his reference to Talaeus may well have no purpose except to
arouse interest by associating his work with a strong popular trend
in the same general direction. His main sources are Cicero and Quin-
tilian among the ancients, and Lipsius and Pierre de la Primaudaye
**See Louise B. Osborn, "Ben Jonson and Hoskyns," The Times Literary Supple-
ment) May i, 1930, p. 370.
45 See Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style^ ed. Hudson, pp. xxvii-xxxviii. See
also above, pp. 276-277.
49 Directions for Speech and Style* ed. Hudson, p. 8.
pp. 8-17, 17-40, 41-50*
p. 3.
[ 331 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
among the moderns. 49 One indication, for example, of his reliance
upon the Ciceronian tradition is that he begins his rhetorical treatise
with a few words about invention and arrangement two subjects
which a Ramist would have deemed out of place in a work devoted
to the figures of style. But it should be emphasized that Hoskins does
not rely upon the Ciceronian tradition in any servile way. He inter-
prets rather than copies it, and thus his Directions for Speech and
Style is (in Miss Osborn's phrase) "essentially original." 50
The next author in the ranks of English stylistic rhetoricians of the
Neo-Ciceronian school is Thomas Blount, whose borrowings from
Hoskins have just been mentioned. Blount's Academie of Eloquence ,
first published at London in 1654, contains so much of Hoskins's
Directions that it hardly deserves special mention as an independent
stylistic rhetoric. 51 Of the four parts into which it is divided, the first
is described by Blount as "a more exact English Rhetorique, then has
been hitherto extant." 52 But Hudson calls this part "nothing but a
copy of the second, third, fourth, and fifth sections of Hoskins's Di-
rections^ with such omissions and changes as Blount's fancy, reason,
or inadvertence dictated." 53 Again, the fourth part of the Academie
of Eloquence contains, as Blount says, "A Collection of Letters and
addresses written to, for, and by severall persons, upon emergent
occasions 5 with some particular Instructions and Rules premised for
the better attaining to a Pen-perfection." 54 But once more, as Hud-
son points out, the instructions and rules premised by Blount are
nothing but passages from Hoskins. 55 True, the collection of letters
in this fourth part of Blount's work cannot be traced to the Direc-
tions^ nor can the formulae majores and formulae minores of the
second and third parts. But neither can these elements be classed as
the property of stylistic rhetoric. What they are, in actuality, is a
49 Ibid^ pp. xxii-xxvii.
50 The Life, Letters^ and, Writings of John Hoskyns, p. 109.
51 The Academie of Eloquence- was given other editions as follows: 1656, 1660, 1663,
1664, 1670, 1683, 1684. See Wing, Short-Title Catalogue, s.v. Blount, Thomas. See
also Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style, ed. Hudson, p. xxx, note 35. My present
discussion is based upon the Huntingdon Library copy of the second edition. Its title page
reads: "The Academy of Eloquence: Containing a Compleat English Rhetoriqve, Ex-
emplified j Common-Places^ and Formula's digested into an easie and Methodical way to
speak and write fluently, according to the Mode of the present Times: with Letters both
Amorovs and Morall, Upon emergent Occasions. By Tho. Blount Gent' The second
Edition with Additions .... London, Printed by T. N. for Humphrey Moseley, at the
Prince's Arms in S. Pauls Churchyard. 1656."
62 Academy of Eloquence (1656), sig. A4r.
58 Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style> ed, Hudson, p. xxxi.
54 Academy of Eloquence^ sig. A4r-A4V. 55 Hudson, p. xxxi.
[ 332 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
contribution to the formulary rhetoric o the seventeenth century.
They are interesting on that score 5 and the -formulae majores and
minores, which Blount respectively calls "Common-places" and
"lesser forms," are interesting because Blount attributes his belief in
the importance of such collections to Francis Bacon's similar belief
as expressed in the Advancement of Learning** Still, these formulas
need not be considered further. As for the rest of Blount's Academie,
nothing may be said of it that would not be better said in reference
to Hoskins.
I shall close this account of Neo-Ciceronian stylistic rhetoric with
a brief comment upon John Prideaux. Prideaux has been mentioned
already as one of the English Systematics. 57 Thus it is not strange to
find him also among the Neo-Ciceronians, although he never sought
to cope with Ciceronian rhetoric as a whole.
Prideaux's earliest work on stylistic rhetoric appeared in Latin as
the second treatise in his Hyfomnemata, which was published at Ox-
ford around 1650. This second treatise runs only to three short chap-
ters, one dealing with the tropes, one with the figures, and one with
the schemes. 58 Prideaux defines rhetoric as "the art of speaking orna-
mentally, or, as Aristotle holds (Rhetoric, Bk. i, Ch. 2), it is the
faculty of seeing whatever aims to be suitable to the creating of belief
in any thing." 59 In other words, Prideaux appears to identify the
tropes, figures, and schemes with what Aristotle meant by all the
modes of persuasion in any given case. This interpretation of Aris-
totle is of course subject to criticism, for Aristotle describes the modes
of persuasion as the whole operation of creating trust in our own
character as speakers, of putting our hearers in the right frame of
feeling, and of proving the truth or probability of our cause by resort
to argument. 60 But at any rate Prideaux is not completely wrong in
his reference to Aristotle, inasmuch as Aristotle in a later chapter of
the Rhetoric talks of language as one of the key factors in creating
trust in ourselves, arousing emotion in others, and making people
believe in the truth of what we say. 81 What Prideaux does is to con-
fine himself to the stylistic aspect of a problem that Aristotle had not
56 Academy of Eloquence, sig. A4.r.
57 See above, pp. 311-316,
88 Hypomnemata, pp. 103-1 x i.
** Ibid., p. 104. Translation mine. Prideaux's words are as follows: "Rhetorica est
Ars ornate dicendi. vel ut habet Arist. Facultas in qua[que~\ re videndi quid contingit
esse Idoneum ad faciendam fidem. Rhet. L. I. c. 2." (Prideaux's italics).
60 See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1356* 1-35.
61 Ibid., Bk. 3, Ch. 7.
[ 333 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
confined to style. Incidentally, as Prideaux discusses the tropes, fig-
ures, and schemes, he falls into the habit of dividing each of these
topics into seven parts, even as he had divided logic into heptades
when he first wrote upon It in 1639. Thus he speaks of seven varieties
of tropes, seven of figures, and seven of schemes.
Prideaux's Sacred Eloquence, published at London in 1659, * s
more important than the treatise just discussed, and it represents a
further development of his theory of stylistic rhetoric. 62 Prideaux
defines sacred eloquence as "a Logicall kind of Rhetorick, to be used
in Prayer, Preaching, or Conference 3 to the glory of God, and the
convincing, instructing, and strengthning our brethren." 63 He di-
vides his subject into heptades or sevens, and proceeds to speak of
Tropes, Figures, Schemes, Patheticks, Characters, Antitheses, and
Parallels. In discussing each of these topics, he divides his doctrine
under seven heads, indicating at one point that such organization
makes the points easier to remember, and that there is biblical au-
thority for sevenfold divisions of things. 64 His conception of the
rhetorical importance of the tropes, figures, and schemes is well illus-
trated by what he says as schemes come up for analysis : "To teach,
to delight, and throughly [sic] to perswade, are the scopes of Ora-
tory. After teaching Tropes therefore, and delighting Figures,
convincing and perswading Schemes may be well enquired after." 85
As for "Patheticks," Prideaux identifies them with the passions, and
he discusses the seven most prominent ones love, hatred, hope,
fear, joy, sorrow, zeal. 66 "Characters" turn out to be characterizations
of men or situations. For example, Prideaux enumerates the seven
steps in sin's genealogy, the seven qualities of a good bishop, the
seven traits of old age, the seven arms of a Christian soldier. 67 "An-
titheses" and "Parallels," as the terms suggest, are devices for build-
ing sermons upon a series of seven contrasts or of seven similitudes. 68
Throughout the treatise Prideaux cites such authorities on rhetoric as
Cicero, Quintilian, St. Augustine, and the author of the Rhetorica ad
Herennmm, thus preserving the content of the Ciceronian tradition 5
but there can be little doubt that his use of heptades as a structural
62 Its title pag-e reads: "Sacred Eloquence: Or, the Art of Rhetorick, As it is layd
down in Scripture. By the Right Reverend Father John Prideavx late Lord Bishop of
Worcester .... London, Printed by W. Wilson^ for George Satvbridge, and are to be
sold at his Shop at the signe of the Bible on Ludgute-Hill. 1659."
63 Sacred Eloquence, p. i. * Ibid^ pp. 106-117.
**lbU^ p. 5*. "Ibid., pp. 76-105.
* T Ibid., pp. 108, iio-nz, 114-115, 117.
88 Ibid.y pp. 118-12,3, 124-134.
[ 334 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
principle in presenting doctrine is partly a repudiation of Ramistic
dichotomies and partly an acceptance of Ramus's desire for a clearer
organization of the learned arts.
In the period under discussion in this chapter England produced
several formulary rhetorics designed to exemplify rhetorical theory
by presenting students with model compositions ' for imitation and
study. In fact, the preceding review of Nee-Ciceronian rhetoric has
involved some reference to these formularies. For example, the sec-
ond and all later editions of Thomas Farnaby's Index Rhetoricus
contains a section entitled "Formulae Oratoriae," and thus Farnaby
belongs in part to the formulary school. 69 So indeed do Angel Day
and Thomas Blount, as I mentioned earlier. 70 There are in this school
a few others, however, who deserve a brief moment of attention.
The chief English authors of formulary rhetorics in the closing
decades of the sixteenth century are Anthony Mundy and Lazarus
Piot, if we except Angel Day, who need not be discussed further.
Mundy published at London in 1593 a work called The Defence of
Contraries, which advertised itself in its subtitle as "Paradoxes against
common opinion, debated in forme of declamations in place of pub-
like censure: only to exercise yong wittes in difficult matters." 71 Al-
though it proclaims itself on its title page as "Translated out of
French," it is in fact a translation of a French version of Ortensio
Landi's Italian work, the Paradossi^ first published at Lyon in 1543.
Landi's Paradossi contains thirty declamations. 72 Mundy translates
twelve of these and promises at the end of his work to do fourteen
others, twenty-six paradoxes having been in the French version that
he used. 73 His paradoxes are argumentative compositions in defense
of such unpopular conditions as poverty, physical ugliness, ignorance,
69 See above, p. 321, note 10. 70 See above, pp. 330, 332.
71 The title page continues thus; "Wherein is no offence to Gods honour, the estate
of Princes, or priuate mens honest actions: but pleasant recreation to beguile the iniquity
of time. Translated out of French by A. M. one of the Messengers of her Maiesties
Chamber. Pater e aut obsfine. Imprinted at London by lohn Winder for Simon Water-
son. 1593." There was a second edition in 1616.
72 For a good bibliographical account of this work, see Jean George Theodore Graese,
Tresor de Ltvres Rares et Precieux (Dresden, 1859-1869), V, 130-131.
73 The French version published at Paris in 1561 contains twenty-six paradoxes. Its
title reads: "XXV paradoxes ou sentences debatues et . . . deduites contre le commune
opinion. . . . Plus adjouste de nouveau le paradoxe que le plaider est chose tres utile et
necessaire a la vie des hommes. Paris, 1561." This French version is credited to Charles
Estienne. My colleague, Dr. Henry K. Miller, Jr., informs me that, although the first
twenty-five of the paradoxes in this volume are from Landi's Paradosii^ the twenty-
sixth the one in defense of lawyers is apparently Estienne's own, or at any rate is
not in Landi.
[ 335 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
blindness, foolishness, loss of worldly honors, drunkenness, sterility,
and want. The paradoxes promised for his second volume are to in-
clude, he says, a defense of the wounded, the illegitimate, prisoners,
women, and lawyers. 7 * As for his intention in preparing the volume
for publication, he paraphrases what his French source had said to
justify itself. Thus he recalls in his address "To the friendly Reader"
that a knight is prepared for the field by exercises in arms 5 and
he adds:
In like manner, for him that woulde be a good Lawyer, after he hath
long listened at the barrej he must aduenture to defend such a cause,
as they that are most imployed, refuse to maintaine: therby to make
himselfe more apt and ready, against common pleaders in ordinarie
causes of processe. For this intent, I haue vndertaken (in this book)
to debate on certaine matters, which our Elders were wont to cal
Paradoxes ... to the end, that by such discourse as is helde in them,
opposed truth might appeare more cleere and apparant. Likewise, to
exercise thy witte in proofe of such occasions, as shall enforce thee to
seeke diligentlie and laboriously, for sound reasons, proofes, authori-
ties, histories, and very darke or hidden memories. 75
Lazarus Plot's The Orator is very similar in purpose to Mundy's
Defence of Contraries, but there is no truth in the old belief that
"Piot" is one of Mundy's pseudonyms and that The Orator is mere-
ly an expansion of Mundy's earlier collection of paradoxes. In fact,
Mundy and Piot are two quite different persons, and these two works
are quite unlike in content, as Celeste Turner was the first to empha-
size. 76
The Orator is made up of a hundred exercises, each of which con-
tains a speech made in accusation and a speech made in reply. 77 Dec-
lamation 8 1, for example, concerns a surgeon who murdered a man
7 * Defence of Contraries^ pp. [102-103],
T5 Ibid. y sig. A4r-A4V. The fact that Mundy's preface "To the Reader" is a para-
phrase of Estienne*s "An Lecteur Salut" was also called to my attention by Pr. Miller.
Tft See Celeste Turner, Anthony Mundy An Elizabethan Man of Letters (Berkeley,
X 9 2 8)> PP- 98-102, 196.
77 Its title page reads: "The Orator: Handling 1 a hundred seuerall Discourses, in
forme of Declamations: Some of the Arguments being- drawne from Titus Liuius and
other ancient Writers, the rest of the Authors owne inuention: Part of which are of
matters happened in our Age. Written in French by Alexander Siluayn, and Englished
by L, P. London Printed by Adam Islip. 1596." The French work upon which Piot
les demandes, accusations & deffences sur la matiere d'icelles." (Paris,
E 336 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
"to see the mouing of a quicke heart." 78 The surgeon was a resident
of Padua, enjoyed a reputation for great skill, and had the desire to
open a living man in order that he might observe how the human
heart beats. The government would not give him a condemned male-
factor for experimental purposes, however, and thus the surgeon
had to make his own arrangements. One night a poor soldier came
to his door. The surgeon took him in, kept him three days in secret,
and then had him taken to a cave, where, with the help of hirelings,
the surgeon bound him and opened him alive, and a saw that in him
which he so greatly desired." But one of the hirelings confessed his
part in the crime. The surgeon was brought to trial. Declamation 8 1
consists of his statement in defense of his act, and of the attorney
general's reply. The surgeon's statement in defense pled that he
killed this one man to save many, and that he had been forced to do
as he did because the Senate would provide him with no condemned
malefactor for his purpose. He also argued that the murdered man
was probably a bad lot, being a soldier. But he said nothing of what
he had seen when he observed a living heart at work. The reply of
the attorney general accused the surgeon of egotism, and argued that
he might have tried his experiment on an animal "whose entrals had
not beene much vnlike vnto a mans." The attorney general also said
that the surgeon was guilty of slandering as well as murdering the
victim, and that his crime would incite others to similar atrocities.
This is one of the most interesting of the cases in The Orator. Of
greater literary interest, perhaps, is Declamation 95, which concerns
a Jew who lent a Christian money, and was promised a pound of
flesh from the Christian's body if the debt was not paid on time."
The speeches in this case may have suggested something to Shake-
speare for his famous trial scene in The Merchant of Venice. If so,
the argument runs, Shakespeare's play could not have been written
before 1596, when The Orator was published. 80
Plot wants these declamations to be used to develop rhetorical
skill. In his address to the reader at the beginning of his work, he
speaks as follows:
In these thou maiest learne Rhethoricke to inforce a good cause, and
art to impugne an ill. In these thou maiest behold the fruits and
flowers of Eloquence, which as Tully saith in his Orator, Bene con>-
78 The Orator* pp. 316-332. 79 Ibid., pp. 400-406.
80 For a brief reference to this matter, see William Allan Nejl&on and Charles Jarvis
Hill, The Complete Plays and Poems of William Shakespeare (Boston, 194*), p. 116.
[ 337 ]
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
stitutae ciuitatis est quasi alumna: Vse them to thy profit good Reader,
and accept them with as good a mind as I present them with a vertuous
intent. If thou studie law, they may helpe thy pleadings, or if diuinitie
(the reformer of law) they may perfect they [sic] persuasions. In
reasoning of priuate debates, here maiest thou find apt metaphors, in
incouraging thy souldiours fit motiues . . * briefly euery priuate man
may in this be partaker of a generall profit. . . .
Two formulary rhetorics of the seventeenth century will close
my account of this branch of the counterreform. One of them was
the work of John Clarke, the other, of Thomas Home. Both were
intended to circulate within the world of the schoolboy rather than
in the world of the adult student as envisaged by Piot, Mundy, and
Angel Day. Thus it should occasion no surprise that Clarke and
Home make more of an attempt than did Piot, Mundy, and Day to
preserve important parts of the terminology of Ciceronian rhetoric
in connection with their publishing of models for study and imitation.
Clarke's earliest contribution to formulary rhetoric was published
at London in 1628 under the title, Transitionum rhetoricarum for-
mulae, in usum scholarum, but that work was supplanted the next
year by his Formvlae Oratoriae^ a third edition of which was entered
in the stationers' registers on June i, 1629, with John Clarke desig-
nated as author and Thomas Farnaby as editor. 81 Clarke was master
of the free school at Lincoln, and his Formulae Oratoriae makes use
of that circumstance by including a series of salutatory, valedictory,
and eristical orations as given by students at that school. 82 The work
also includes other types of speeches, as well as a series of formulas
for introducing orations, for winning good will, for conciliating, for
addressing one's adversary, for insinuating, moderating, explaining,
partitioning, proving, citing testimony, objecting, refuting, conclud-
ing, recapitulating, arousing feeling, and making transitions. 8 * In
addition to these models, there -is a preliminary section headed
81 The earliest edition that I have seen is the fourth. Its title page reads: "Formvlae
Oratoriae in usum scholaru concinnatae una cum orationibvs Declamation ib us &c De[que]
collocatione oratoria et artificio demum Poetico, praeceptiunculis. Quarta Editio. . . .
Impe Robert! Mylbourn in Caemi Paulino ad Insig 6 . Canis Leporary. 1632." For the
entry of the third edition with the Stationers, see Arber, Transcript of the Registers, iv,
212. Clarke's Transitionum Formulae was entered with the stationers on March 31,
1628. See Arber, Transcript of the Registers^ iv, 195.
82 See Formvlae Oratoriae (1632), pp. 190 ff.
83 For a comparison of Clarke's formulas with those of Lipsius, Alsted, and Farnaby,
and for a sketch of formulary rhetoric in the seventeenth century, see Ray Nadeau,
"Oratorical Formulas in Seventeenth-Century England," The Quarterly Journal of
xxxviu (1952), 149-154.
[ 338 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
"Methodvs" in which epistles, themes, and declamations are classified
and discussed. Epistles, for example, are classed as demonstrative,
deliberative, and judicial, whereas demonstrative epistles are classed
as narration-descriptions, laments, eulogies, and so on. Towards the
end of the work as a whole, there is a section on making verses. With
variety of this sort, we need not wonder that the Formulae Oratoriae
found a continuing place for itself in schoolboy life, and that by 1673
it was in its eleventh edition. 84
Thomas Home, whose Rhetoricae Compendium was mentioned
in connection with my account of the English Ramists, 85 also made a
contribution to formulary rhetoric in England by publishing at Lon-
don in 1641 a work called Xetpaycuyta sive Manuductio in Aedem
Palladis?* The IVLanuductio is divided into three parts, one dealing
with rhetorical preliminaries, another with precepts, and the third
with examples. 87 The examples concern such themes as "On the Birth-
day of Christ, Savior of Humankind," "Lamentations on Christ's Pas-
sion," "In Annual Remembrance of the Consecration of Charles,"
"Virtue shines in Adversity," "Elizabeth Queen of the English,"
"Envy as Nurse of Evil," "A Friend as Another Self," and so on.
But the section on precepts also contains examples of a briefer sort in
the shape of formulas for such rhetorical operations as introducing
speeches, expressing gratitude, rebuking an adversary, providing con-
nections and transitions, exhorting, dissuading, supplicating, citing
examples, referring to authorities, and stating conclusions. 88 In the
first section of his work Home maintains contact with the Ciceronian
tradition by talking about invention and about the parts of the classi-
cal oration. 89 For the rest, there is nothing about the work to require
attention, except for the interesting circumstance that Home's Latin
text is at one point interrupted so that for study and imitation he can
present a few English models of sententious remarks, letters, and
short speeches. 90
John Newton, whose work on logic and rhetoric has been men-
84 See Wing, Short-Title Catalogue^ s.v. Clark, John.
85 See above, p. 273.
86 Its title page reads: "Xeipo-ywyfa sive Manuductio in Aedem Palladis, Qua utilissima
methodus Authores bonos legendi indigitatur: Opera Th. Home Art. Mag. Scholae
Tunbridgiensis Archididascali .... Londini, Excudebat Rob. Young. 1641." My present
discussion is based upon the Princeton University Library copy of the edition of this work
at London in 1687.
87 Manuductio (1687), pp. 1-54.3 55-152, 153-208.
88 Ibid., pp. 71-92.
89 Ibid.y pp. 26-29, 30-335 also p. 99.
90 For these English examples, see pp. 102-110.
[ 339 1
COUNTERREFORM : SYSTEMATICS AND NEO-CICERONIANS
tioned above, 91 and who wanted to make the liberal arts available in
English, expressed in 1671 an interesting verdict upon the formulary
rhetorics of Clarke and Farnaby, and upon certain other aspects of
rhetorical education in the seventeenth century. In the preface of his
Introduction to the Art of Rhetorick y he castigates teachers who dis-
parage the teaching of English to children, and he mentions the
difficulty he himself had had as a schoolboy with rhetorical instruc-
tion as conducted in Latin. He observes: "I thought it hard my self,
that I should be commanded to make a Theam before I had any
other instructions for framing thereof than what Claris Formulae
or Farnabie's Rhetorick did afford me: As for the Oratorical part of
Sutler's Rhetorick it was to us like terra incognita, and it is well if
it be otherwise yet. . . ," 92 Newton then speaks disparagingly of the
things he had been forced to read in order to find subject matter for
his themes. As he recalls how thoroughly he had neglected the books
assigned to him, he remarks that he cannot but smile now at the
cheats perpetrated by the boys against their masters. The boys, it
would seem, went to Clarke's Formulae or Farnaby's Index Rhetori-
cu3 whenever they had to write a composition 5 and they proceeded
to copy out an exordium from this place, a narration and confirma-
tion from thatj concealing their source in each case by some changes
in phraseology. The remedy for such cribbing, Newton thought, was
to teach boys to write in their own tongue and to delay their use of
the formularies until they had some grounding in histories and
moral discourses.
In concluding this sketch of Ciceronian rhetoric as it was adapted
to the needs of Englishmen in the seventeenth century, I should
like to mention two additional treatises that belong to my subject,
not as formularies or as works upon Cicero's full program or upon
style, but as works upon gesture and memory. Gesture is the sole con-
cern of John Bulwer's Chirologia . . . Chironomia, published at Lon-
don in 1 644.'* "Chironomia" is a word out of Quintilian meaning
91 See pp. 271-272, 316-317. 92 Sig.
93 Its title pag-e reads: "Chirologia: or the Natvrall Langvage of the Hand. Composed
of the Speaking- Motions, and Discoursing- Gestures thereof. Whereunto is added Chirono-
mia: Or, the Art of Man vail Rhetoricke. Consisting of the Naturall Expressions, digested
by Art in the Hand, as the chief est Instrument of Eloquence, By Historicall Manifesto's,
Exemplified Out of the Authentique Registers of Common Life, and Civill Conversation.
With Types, or Chyrograms: A long wish'd for illustration of this Argument. By J. B.
Gent. Philochirosophus. Manus tnembrum hominis loquacissimum. London, Printed by
TAa* Har$er y and are to be sold by R. Whitaker, at his shop in Pauls Church-yard.
1644." The dedicatory epistle is signed "John Bulwer." The Chtrologia covers 191
[ 340 ]
REAPPEARANCE OF THE THREE PATTERNS
"the law of gesture," 94 and Bulwer characterizes this law as "The
Art of Manuall Rhetorique." Thus he sets forth, as he says, "the
Canons, Lawes, Rites, Ordinances, and Institutes of Rhetoricians,
both Ancient and Moderne, Touching the artificiall managing of the
Hand in Speaking." 95 As for the "Chirologia," Bulwer interprets
that as the natural language of the hand and body that is, the mean-
ings that writers have fixed upon such gestures as wringing the
hands, shaking hands, kissing the hands, and so on. One of the most
interesting things about Bulwer's work as a whole is that he attributes
to Francis Bacon's De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum the in-
spiration that produced it. 96 Another interesting thing about it is its
connection with contemporary theories of acting. 97 Still another inter-
esting thing about it is its illustrations, one of which precedes the
title page and pictures "Eloquentia" as an open hand, "Logica" as a
fist. An adaptation of this illustration appears on the title page of this
present book.
The other additional treatise is called The Art of Memory r , writ-
ten by Marius D'Assigny, and published at London in i697- 98 D'As-
signy, who was of French extraction, had a considerable interest in
rhetoric. In fact, his Rhetorica Anglcrum^ put out in 1699, was com-
posed of oratorical exercises in sacred and ordinary rhetoric and of
certain rules for the strengthening of weak memories. 99 His Art of
Memory ', dedicated "To the Young Students of both Universities,"
is a rather quaint treatise on man's faculty for remembering, and it
contains much medical and psychological lore of its own day 5 but its
final chapter, "Of Artificial or Fantastical Memory or Remem-
brance," is a restatement of the Ciceronian theory of places and
images as an aid to recollection. 100 Thus did Ciceronian rhetoric con-
tinue to exert its influence to the very end of the period of my
present study.
pages. The Chironomia has its own title page and separate pagination. It covers
14.7 pages.
94 See Institutio Oratoria, 1.11.17.
95 These words are from the separate title page of the Chironomia.
96 See Chirologia .... Chironomia y sig. A4V-A5V.
97 For a discussion of this matter, see B. L. Joseph, Elizabethan Acting (Oxford,
I 95 1 )- Joseph prints from Bulwer's Chirologia .... Chironomia several pages of
illustrations of gestures; see pp. 4, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48.
98 Its title page reads : "The Art of Memory. A Treatise useful for such as are to
speak in Publick. By Marius D'Assigny, B. I>. . . . London, Printed by 7. D. for Andr.
Bell at the Cross-Keys and Bible in Cornhil^ near Stocks-market, 1697."
99 See Dictionary of National Biogra-phy, s.v. D'Assigny, Marius (1643-1717), for
the complete Latin title of this work.
100 Art of Memory, pp. 82-91.
[ 341 1
CHAPTER 6
New Horizons in Logic and Rhetoric
I. Descartes and the Port-Royalists
Kius's campaign against the citadel of scholasticism was not
conducted in the modern spirit, even if it is tempting to
regard him as a direct forerunner of Bacon and Descartes.
He was on the side of the moderns, to be sure, in his fer-
vent belief that the scholastic theory of communication needed dras-
tic revision if it was to satisfy the needs of a new era in human affairs.
But when he came to formulate his conception of what those revi-
sions should be, he hardly assumes the role of prophet of things to
come. Indeed, his revisions seem now to be little more than a scho-
lasticism with certain redundancies eliminated, certain terms dis-
carded, certain procedures newly emphasized, and certain reorganiza-
tions effected. Thus he cut out of rhetoric all material that had
previously received a logical as well as a rhetorical coverage, and
he gave that material to logic alone. Thus also he cut out of gram-
mar all things previously included in both rhetoric and grammar,
and he gave those things entirely to rhetoric. Having made these
three liberal arts severely independent of each other, he reorganized
their precepts by using dichotomies as a presentational device and by
adopting a descending order of generality as the grand principle of
structure. In the field of logic, which was his own favorite subject,
he gave new emphasis to the separation of that art into invention
and arrangement 5 he discarded the predi cables and the predicaments
from logical theory 5 he reduced invention to a neat and convenient
system of ten places 5 and finally he gave prominence to his own
version of Aristotle's three laws of the proposition and to his own
rigorous revision of the scholastic theory of method. These reforms
are not unreasonable or unhelpful, nor did they prove unpopular.
But nevertheless they do not provide a clue to the direction that logic
was to take in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In short, they
are not the instruments of revolution.
The same observation holds true for the Systematics. They were
on the side of the moderns in their belief that something had been
wrong with the old scholasticism, and that Ramus had not entirely
corrected it. But in their vision of reform they saw only the alterna-
[ 34* ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
tive of proceeding to improve scholasticism in the direction taken
by Ramus or of proceeding to improve Ramism by a retreat towards
scholasticism. Thus they accepted Ramus's emphasis on the theory
of method and sought to improve and extend what he had done in
that field. Thus they rejected his rejection of the predicables and the
predicaments, with the result that these celebrated terms were re-
stored to logical theory. Thus also they rejected Ramus's division
of logic into invention and arrangement, preferring instead a scho-
lastic division into terms, propositions, arguments, and fallacies. So
far as the Systematics began to emphasize logical method as investi-
gative no less than presentational, they were showing their aware-
ness of the intellectual revolution that was taking place in the seven-
teenth century. But otherwise they were looking to the past, not
the future.
Apart from the English Ramists and Systematics, who between
themselves were responsible for most of the logical treatises pro-
duced in England during the seventeenth century, there was a move-
ment that now demands some attention. That movement stemmed
from one of the great works of the modern world, Rene Descartes's
Discours de la Methode -^ and it became influential in England when
one of the most popular textbooks of all time, The Port-Royal
Logic, began to appear at London presses in the closing decades of
the seventeenth century. The Discours de la Methode and The Port-
Royal Logic are not the only forces behind the development of
modern English logic, but they are the most important new forces
to reveal themselves in logical treatises printed in England before
1700; and the earlier of them is perhaps the most illuminating of
all the books that have to be read if we are to understand the nature
of the difference between the medieval and the modern world. Speak-
ing of Descartes's philosophy as a whole, and of the Discours de la
Methode in particular, Leon Roth well summarizes the importance
of that work as follows: "It marks an epoch. It is the dividing line
in the history of thought. Everything that came before it is old;
everything that came after it is new." 1 These words, by the way,
apply with special aptness to the Discour de la Methode as a protest
against the Ramists and the scholastics and as an anticipation of the
logic of Port-Royal.
The Discours de la Methode or Discourse on Method was pub-
1 Leon Roth, Descartes* Discourse on Method (Oxford, 1937), p. 3.
[ 34-3 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
lished in 1637,* when Descartes was forty-one years of age, and
thus we may say that the new logic had its official beginning at that
time. But Descartes tells us in that treatise that he was twenty-three
when he first evolved his famous method and decided to make it the
rule of his life. 8 Since Descartes became twenty-three on March 31,
1619, the new logic may be said to have been in existence for eight-
een years before it finally reached the public, and to have had some
kind of form before the publication of that great similar revolution-
ary document, Francis Bacon's Novttm Organum*
More of a spiritual autobiography than a formal exposition, the
Discourse recounts how Descartes had become dissatisfied with the
literary education he had received, and with the entire system of
opinions which he (and the surrounding European community) held.
That education had embraced the usual subjects: languages, fables,
histories, eloquence, poetry, mathematics, morals, theology, juris-
prudence, medicine, and philosophy. 5 As he describes these for us,
and expresses his continuing respect for them and for his Jesuit teach-
ers, we recognize an active note of distaste only in his account of
philosophy, by which he obviously meant logic. He says of it that it
"affords the means of discoursing with an appearance of truth on all
matters, and commands the admiration of the more simple." 6 As for
the respected beliefs which his education had given him, they seemed
to him to rest more upon example and custom than upon reasoned
conviction, and his faith in them began to wane. At this point (he
was sixteen at the time and the year was 1612) he made a decision
which might stand as the symbol of the decision made by mankind
in turning from the medieval to the modern world: he decided to
abandon old beliefs and to reconstitute his knowledge. Speaking of
this decision and of the events that led to it, he says:
For these reasons, as soon as my age permitted me to pass from under
the control of my instructors, I entirely abandoned the study of letters,
and resolved no longer to seek any other science than the knowledge
of myself, or of the great book of the world. I spent the remainder
of my youth in travelling, in visiting courts and armies, in holding
2 Ibid ty pp. 13-16.
3 Rene Descartes, Discours de la Methode^ ed. tienne Gilson (Paris, 1925), p. 22.
4 For a comparison of Bacon and Descartes on the subject of method, see Roth, of. cit^
pp. 52-71,
6 John Veitch, trans. The Method, Meditations,, and Selections jrom the Principles of
Descartes (Edinburgh and London, 1887), pp. 5-11.
p. 7.
[ 344 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
intercourse with men of different dispositions and ranks, in collecting
varied experience, in proving myself in the different situations into
which fortune threw me, and, above all, in making such reflection on
the matter of my experience as to secure my improvement. 7
Descartes's reflection upon the matter of his experience during
the next seven years produced at length his famous method. That
method was his personal prescription for the reconstituting of his
own knowledge, and it consisted of four maxims. He states them thus:
The -first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly
know to be suchj that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and
prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what
was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all
ground of doubt.
The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into
as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate
solution.
The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing
with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little
and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more
complex 5 assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects
which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence
and sequence.
And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and
reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted. 8
As a prudent reformer, who understood that man cannot live with-
out belief and that the abandonment of belief is not something to be
casually undertaken or irreverently executed, Descartes sought to
caution the public against the injudicious application of his method
to their own lives. "I have never contemplated anything higher," he
insists, "than the reformation of my own opinions, and basing them
on a foundation wholly my own." 9 "The single design to strip one's
self of all past beliefs," he adds, "is one that ought not to be taken
by every one." 10 He even acknowledges that he had to protect him-
self against the chaos of disbelief by evolving and using a provisory
code of morals for his own guidance during the interval between his
rejection of the old and his acceptance of the new. That provisory
code is his subject in Part III of his Discourse, and its first article is
that he did not permit himself to abandon his faith in God. 11
7 Ibid., p. 10. 8 Ibid.) p. 19. 9 lbid. 9 pp. 15-16.
10 Ibid., p. 16. ^Ibid., p. 23.
[ 345 ']
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
The remaining sections of the Discourse represent Descartes's at-
tempt to build a new world for himself. Part IV, it will be recalled,
contains his celebrated argument, "je pense, done je suis," which be-
comes the first principle of his new philosophy and also the basis for
his proof of the existence of God. 12 In Part V he presents a summary
of a treatise he had prepared in the course of applying his four max-
ims to the study of the world and man- and this summary is an
interesting indication of the structure and content of the new science
he is working to create. A memorable feature of this section of the
Discourse is his tribute to Harvey for the latter's discovery of the
circulation of the blood. 13 In Part VI, his concluding section, Des-
cartes explains at some length why his Discourse and the three
treatises accompanying it in its first edition are being offered to the
public in place of the treatise which he had presented in summary.
At moments during this explanation he seems particularly close to
the modern world, as for example when he mentions that the new
science will have the power to "render ourselves the lords and pos-
sessors of nature." 14 Most prophetic of all are his remarks about the
future of medicine.
It is true [he says] that the science of Medicine, as it now exists, con-
tains few things whose utility is very remarkable': but without any
wish to depreciate it, I am confident that there is no one, even among
those whose profession it is, who does not admit that all at present
known in it is almost nothing in comparison of what remains to be
discovered 5 and that we could free ourselves from an infinity of mala-
dies of body as well as of mind, and perhaps also even from the debility
of age, if we had sufficiently ample knowledge of their causes, and of
all the remedies provided for us by Nature. 15
Turning now to the consideration of the Discourse as a pivotal
event in the history of logic, I should like to point out that it breaks
with the past in at least three important ways. A discussion of each
of them at this point will introduce us to several of the unusual
aspects of The Port-Royal Logic and will indicate much of what the
new logic was to be.
In the first place, Descartes's Discourse calls for a logic that will
accept experiment rather than disputation as the chief instrument in
the quest for truth. The logic of the scholastics and the Ramists had
12 For Descartes's statement of his first principle, see Discours y ed. Gilson, p. 32.
13 Ibid. y pp. 50, 4.07-408. 14 Vetch, o<p. cit. y p. 61.
15 Ibid., p. 6 1.
['346 1
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
been a logic of learned disputation. That is to say, it had been a logic
for the conduct of disputes, and its great unwritten assumption was
that by conducting disputes man could detect error and establish
truth. Descartes's disagreement with this assumption is sharp and
uncompromising. In considering whether the scientist gains an ad-
vantage from publishing his discoveries and having them subjected
to controversy, Descartes indicates that in his own case his critics had
not been of assistance. Of disputation in general he then says this:
And further, I have never observed that any truth before unknown
has been brought to light by the disputations that are practised in the
Schools y for while each strives for the victory, each is much more
occupied in making the best of mere verisimilitude, than in weighing
the reasons on both sides of the question 3 and those who have been
long good advocates are not afterwards on that account the better
judges. 16
But the scientist does gain an advantage from publishing his discover-
ies and having them verified and extended by the experiments that
others will thereupon be induced to make. In fact, Descartes reveals
that this very consideration is a powerful factor in impelling him to
publish the Discourse and the three treatises that accompany it. 17
Private and personal as this decision may appear to be, it stands never-
theless in relation to the great intellectual change that took place in
the seventeenth century a change in which disputation lost its mo-
nopoly as an instrument for the pursuit of truth, and came rather to
be regarded as an adjunct to the experimental approach.
In the second place, Descartes's Discourse calls for a logic that
will be a theory of inquiry rather than a theory of communication.
The logic of the scholastics and the Ramists had been formulated as
an instrument for the transfer of knowledge from expert to expert.
Thus invention was construed, not as the process of discovering what
had been hitherto unknown, but as the process of establishing con-
tact with the known, so that the storehouse of ancient wisdom would
yield its treasures upon demand, and would bring the old truth to
bear upon the new situation. The ten places of Ramus, and the ten
categories of Aristotle as interpreted by the scholastics, were devices
for establishing contact between the new case and the old truth.
Once he had established systematic contact between these two sets
of realities, the learned man had the materials for communication,
p. 67. 1T Ibid., p. 73.
[ 347 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
and his next problem was to arrange those materials for presentation.
This problem was solved by the scholastic and the Ramistic theory of
method. Method to these logicians was not a method of inquiry but
a method of organization. Thus Ramus's natural method required
that the more general statement should have precedence over the less
general whenever ideas were arranged into formal treatises. But how
were those general statements found in the first place? Ramus found
them in custom and example, but Descartes could not find them there,
inasmuch as his original loss of belief occurred because all knowledge
found in custom and example seemed to him doubtful or erroneous.
Thus Descartes had to evolve a new sort of method a method of
inquiry. In evolving this method, he had turned first, he says, to the
logicians, only to find them inadequate. Of their science he has this
to say:
But, on examination, I found that, as for Logic, its syllogisms and
the majority of its other precepts are of avail rather in the communi-
cation of what we already know, or even as the Art of Lully, in
speaking without judgment of things of which we are ignorant, than
in the investigation of the unknown 5 and although this Science con-
tains indeed a number of correct and very excellent precepts, there
are, nevertheless, so many others, and these either injurious or super-
fluous, mingled with the former, that it is almost quite as difficult to
effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a Diana
or a Minerva from a rough block of marble. 18
This criticism provides the context for Descartes's announcement of
the four maxims that make up his method. These four maxims bear
upon the investigation of the unknown, but the third in particular
embodies Descartes's whole concept of investigative procedure, and
that maxim requires the investigator to proceed from the simplest
and easiest truths towards the more complex. Such a procedure stands
in sharp contrast to Ramistic method, which began with the most
general and proceeded towards the most particular. It should be
noticed, however, that Descartes's theory of method, although op-
posed to Ramus's theory, is not unlike that of Smith, Sanderson, and
certain other Systematics, who, as I have shown, thought of method
in its investigative aspects. 19 Nevertheless, Descartes differs from the
Systematics in refusing to allow presentational method a place in
logic. In this respect he was more modern than they and indeed
more modern than the Port-Royalists.
p. 18. 19 See above, pp. zgg, 297, 306.
[ 348 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
In the third place, Descartes's Discourse calls for a logic of prac-
tical as distinguished from speculative science. By practical he meant
actually usable in life. Speaking of his new notions in the field of
physics, and remarking upon the difference between them and the
principles employed up to his time, he gives the following account of
the meaning of his notions to science:
For by them I perceived it to be possible to arrive at knowledge highly
useful in life 5 and in room of the Speculative Philosophy usually
taught in the Schools, to discover a Practical, by means of which,
knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens,
and all the other bodies that surround us, as distinctly as we know
the various crafts of our artizans, we might also apply them in the
same way to all the uses to which they are adapted, and thus render
ourselves the lords and possessors of nature. 20
A further indication of Descartes's conception of the science that
would emerge from the use of his method is afforded when in the
Discourse he speaks of the new science of man, and indulges immedi-
ately in a minute description of the functioning of the heart and
arteries. 21 A practical science composed of minute descriptions of this
sort would postulate induction as the basic logical procedure, and in-
duction was to become the chief intellectual operation as discussed in
the new logic. The chief intellectual operation of the old logic was
syllogistic, even though induction was recognized as one of the forms
of reasoning. And of course the science envisaged by the old logic
was speculative rather than practical. For example, in Samuel Smith's
Aditvs ad Logicam^ which I examined as a specimen of the work of
the Systematics, method is divided into two branches, the compositive
and the resolutive, and the former of these, which is the method of
going from part to whole, and which is not unlike Descartes's pro-
cedure from simpler to more complex, is useful only in what Smith
calls the contemplative sciences, where things are examined for them-
selves, not for the sake of action. 22 Smith does not overlook the prac-
tical sciences, to be sure. In fact, he specifically applies the resolutive
method to them. The difference between him and Descartes is that he
sees speculative sciences emerging from the method of proceeding
from the particular to the general, whereas Descartes sees practical
sciences emerging from that same method.
20 Veitch, op. /., pp. 60-6 1,
21 Ibid^ pp. 46-54.
22 See Smith, Aditvs ad Logicam (1627), sig-. Ga
[ 349 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
It took many years for logic to change so as to incorporate within
itself the three requirements that Descartes wanted it to have. In-
deed, so far as English logic is concerned, these three requirements
are completely met for the first time only when John Stuart Mill
published his System of Logic at London in 1843. Mill's logic em-
phasizes experiment rather than disputation as the chief instrument in
the pursuit of truth, his famous description of the four experimental
methods of inquiry being an adequate illustration of that emphasis. 23
MilPs logic also stresses that this science is the instrument of inquiry
rather than communication. Such stress appears first when Mill de-
fines logic as "the science which treats of the operations of the human
understanding in the pursuit of truth." 24 But it appears even more
openly when he adds almost at once: "The sole object of Logic is
the guidance of one's own thoughts: the communication of those
thoughts to others falls under the consideration of Rhetoric, in the
large sense in which that art was conceived by the ancients j or of the
still more extensive art of Education." 25 As for an emphasis upon
practical science and the inductive procedure, MilPs logic, with its
celebrated denial that the syllogism is an adequate description of the
process of inference, and with its corollary assertion that "All in-
ference is from particulars to particulars," 26 is more completely in-
ductive, and more completely directed towards the practical and
empirical than any preceding logic had been. In this respect, and
indeed in the two others that I have just mentioned, Mill was in-
fluenced by many forces: by his opposition to Whately's Logic ; by
his acquaintance with the works of Newton, Whewell, and Herschel ;
by his discipleship in the utilitarian philosophy of his father and
Benthamj and by his intimate familiarity with the development of
English thought since Bacon. Thus his logical theory is not to be
explained as a direct descendant of Descartes's Discourse on Method.
But Descartes may be explained, nevertheless, as MilPs collateral
ancestor, and the Discourse, as a necessary step in the transition from
scholastic to modern logic.
Twenty-five years after the date of the first publication of the
Discourse, a work called La Logique, ou L*Art de Penser appeared
anonymously at Paris. This work came ultimately to be called the
28 For that description, see John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic? Ratio cinative and
Inductive, 4th edn. (London, 1856), I, 4.19-4.66.
2 Ibid., I, 4.
25 Ibid., I, 4-5.
26 Ibid.) i y 206-231. The quotation is from p. 218,
[ 350 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
Logique de Port-Royal in its own country and The Port-Royal Logic
in England. Mill mentions it respectfully under the last of these
titles, and credits it with having given logic a focus upon thinking,
as distinguished from the old scholastic focus upon argumentation. 27
It enjoyed an almost unparalleled success in France and on the con-
tinent from 1662 to 1878, receiving a great many editions at Paris,
and numerous others at Lyon, Amsterdam, Utrecht, Leiden, Halle,
Basel, and Madrid. "One can say of this Logic," remarks an en-
thusiastic eighteenth-century editor, "that it put into oblivion all
those produced up to its time, and that not one of those produced
afterwards has put The Art of Thinking into oblivion, although some
of them have been very good.'' 28 Its great popularity in Europe, and
its interesting connection with Descartes's Discourse, entitle it with-
out question to a place in the history of continental logic. What
makes it of interest in the history of English logic is that it had a
great success in Britain before the seventeenth century had ended,
and it was still being published at British presses two hundred years
later. Between 1664 and 1700 it received eight London editions, one
in its French text, four in Latin, and three in English. 29 Thereafter
it was frequently reprinted in English up to the closing years of
the nineteenth century.
The authors of this celebrated work were Antoine Arnauld and
Pierre Nicole, the former of whom composed the first draft for cir-
culation in manuscript, and the latter of whom helped to prepare the
first printed edition and to expand the text for subsequent editions. 30
These two men were close associates in a group of mystics and re-
formers congregated at Port-Royal near Paris. Theologically this
group subscribed to the principles of Jansenism, and thus they sought
to live by a high moral code and to spread such doctrines as that of
the complete depravity of man, the actuality of predestination, and
the impossibility of full atonement. The most famous of the Port-
Royalists was Pascal. By his Provincial Letters and his Thoughts on
Religion he made Jansenism an impressive force in France during
28 [G. Du Pac de Belleg-arde and J. Hautefage], CEuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld
(Paris, 1775-1781), XLI, iv. Translation mine. Cited below as QSvvres de Arnauld.
29 The French edition was published at London in 1664 as Logique^ ou VArt de Penser.
There is a copy of it in Dr. Williams^ Library, London. The Latin editions were pub-
lished at London in 1674, 1677, 168*5 and 1687, under the title, Logica^ sive ars cogi-
tandi. So far as the seventeenth century is concerned, the English editions appeared under
the title, Logic; Or, The Art of Thinking as follows: London, 1685, 1693, 1696.
80 CEuvres de Arnauld^ XLI, iv-v, 101-104.
C 351 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
the seventeenth century. In addition to their accomplishments in the-
ology, the Port-Royalists believed in the reform of education, and to
this end they arranged themselves against the methods used by the
Jesuits and by the universities. The schools which they established
came to be known as the little schools of Port-Royal, and two of the
textbooks written to demonstrate their reforms became celebrated. 81
One was the Grammaire Generals et Raisonnee, later known as the
Grammaire de Port-Royal, written by Antoine Arnauld and Claude
Lancelot. The other was the work under consideration here.
The first English translators of The Port-Royal Logic are con-
scious of a certain originality in the work which they are making
available to their countrymen. They emphasize this attitude in their
first edition in a preface headed "The Translators to the Reader." 32
Here they mention how obscure, tedious, and useless logic has be-
come j how the schoolmen have clogged and fettered reason with
vain misapplications 5 how ordinary works on logic are shelters for
the obstinate and vainglorious who refuse either to be beaten or con-
vinced by argument j and how the remedy is provided by the famous
author of the present treatise. He has recovered this art from night
and confusion, continue the translators, and has cleared away the rub-
bish, the underbrush, the superfluous boughs, "so that now Logic
may be said to appear like Truth it self, naked and delightful, as
being freed from the Pedantic Dust of the Schools." 33 These senti-
ments, which might at first be mistaken for the self-interested exag-
ai For a study of the educational methods and accomplishments of the Port-Royalists,
see H. C. Barnard, The Little Schools oj Port-Royal (Cambridge, 1913).
32 Who these translators were I do not know. The title page of their first edition in-
dicates that, "For the Excellency of the Matter," the Logic has been "Printed many
times in French and Latin** and is "now for Publick Good translated into English by
Several Hands." The best I can do is to suggest that one of the translators bears the
initials J. L and another, H. C. The initials J. L. appear in the stationers' registers
under the date of April 2, 1674, where The Art of Thinking is entered for publication
as "a new System, of Logick^ written originally in French by Monsieur le Bon and, done
into English by J. L." See Transcript of the Registers* ed. Eyre and Rivington, II,
479. Monsieur Le Bon was the person originally granted the privilege of publishing
the Logic in its French text in Paris. See Graesse, Tresor^ s.v. Logique. But J. L. re-
mains unidentified. As for the initials H. C., they appear as the signature on the dedi-
catory epistle of the translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric published at London in 16865
and they connect their owner with our Logic because the title page of that translation
of Aristotle says that the Rhetoric was "Made English by the translators of the Art of
Thinking." H. C., however, does not reveal anything about himself in his dedicatory-
epistle, which is addressed to Henry Sydney, once ambassador to Holland, and later a
prominent figure in the government of William and Mary. The second English trans-
lation of the Logic was done by John Ozell and was published at London in 1717. The
third translation, by Thomas Spencer Baynes, appeared at Edinburgh in 1850.
33 Logic-, Or, The Art of Thinking (London, 1685), sig.
[ 352 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
gerations of commerce, turned out to correspond with the detached
judgment of scholarship.
One dominant feature of The Port-Royal Logic is its lack of en-
thusiasm for the logical theory of the scholastics. It pays a tribute
to Aristotle by acknowledging his "very vast and comprehensive
mind," and by admitting the debt of all subsequent logicians to his
analysis of the syllogism and of demonstration. In this latter connec-
tion the Port-Royalists say: "And whatever confusion may be found
in his Analytics, it must be confessed, nevertheless, that almost all
that we know of the rules of logic is taken thence $ so that there is,
in fact, no author from whom we have borrowed more in this Logic
than from Aristotle." 34 But the borrowings of the Port-Royalists from
Aristotle are not always complimentary. Here and there they cite
Aristotle's definitions and reasonings as examples of things to avoid. 35
And while they deny that it is their intention to do him dishonor
by such means, 36 they refuse throughout their work to defer to his
authority upon any matter when reason counsels otherwise. Indeed,
they state as a kind of thesis that "there is no ground whatever in
human sciences, which profess to be founded only on reason, for be-
ing enslaved by authority contrary to reason." 37 And in accordance
with it they contend that the ten categories, those great concepts of
scholastic logic, "are in themselves of very little use, and not only
do not contribute much to form the judgment, which is the end of
true logic, but often are very injurious, for two reasons, which it is
important to remark." 38 Their two reasons are to the effect that the
categories are arbitrary man-made conventions rather than ultimate
truths, and that they lead men to be satisfied with verbal formula-
tions rather than with a distinct knowledge of things. Despite these
objections, however, the Port-Royalists admit the ten categories into
their logic as being "short, easy, and common" j 39 and they devote
a brief perfunctory chapter to them. 40 They also devote a brief per-
functory chapter to another great concept of scholastic logic, the five
predicables, saying as they dismiss them, "This is more than sufficient
84 Thomas Spencer Baynes, trans. The Port-Royal Logic, 8th edn. (Edinburgh and
London [188?]), p. 21. Here and below I have cited Baynes's translation rather than
that of 1685. Baynes took his duties as translator much more seriously than the original
translators did, and thus his text can be used with almost no amendments, whereas many
amendments and various time-consuming explanations would have to be made in con-
nection with any conscientious use of the earliest English version.
35 For examples, see Baynes, pp, 168-169, 252.
36 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 37 Ibid., p. 23. 8S Ibid., p. 40.
39 Ibid., p. 8. 40 Ibid., pp. 39-42.
[ 353 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
touching the five universals, which are treated at such length in the
schools." 41 As for the rules of the syllogism, the figures and modes
of the syllogism, and the grand principle for judging the correctness
of a syllogism, these topics are also included, but are admitted by
the Port-Royalists to be of little use, despite the traditional emphasis
upon them. 42 If to these examples of reluctance on the part of the
Port-Royalists to endorse scholastic logic we add their slighting
references to such favorite terms of the Systematics as "second in-
tentions" and the like, 43 we get the impression that in their view a
great part of traditional logical theory has lost its utility.
Another dominant feature of the logic of the Port-Royalists is their
firm but respectful rejection of several important features of the log-
ical theory of the Ramists. 44 In fact, the references of Arnauld and
Nicole to Ramus and his disciples are so numerous as to indicate that
Ramism had made a profound impression in logical circles in France,
and that its influence was still felt by Frenchmen in the second half of
the seventeenth century. Some of these references are concealed, but
many are open and direct, as if the Port-Royalists wanted their
criticisms of Ramism to be more than an attempt to slay the slain.
The concealed rejection of one feature of Ramism occurs when the
Port-Royalists justify the definition of logic implied in the original
title of their work. This original title, La Logique, ou L'Art de
Penser*) shocked certain persons when the work appeared at Paris in
1662, their objection being that they considered logic to be the art
of reasoning well rather than the art of thinking. In the second and
all later editions of the work appears a preliminary chapter headed
. 55-
42 CEuvres de Arnauld y XLI, 258. For some reason Baynes does not include in his
translation a reference to the note in the French text at the beginning- of Part in, Ch. 3,
saying, "This chapter and the following-, up to the twelfth, are among those which we
mentioned in the Discourse [that is, in the first of the two discourses prefixed to the text
of The Port-Royal Logic} as containing things which are subtle and necessary for
logical speculation but which are of little use." These nine chapters are devoted to the
rules, the figures, and the modes of the syllogism.
43 For these slighting references, see Baynes> pp. 10-11. "Words of the first Intention
are those, whereby any thing is signified or named by the purpose and meaning of the
first Author or Inuentor thereof, in any speech or language whatsoeuer it be: as the
beast whereon wee commonly ride, is called in English a Horse, in Latine Equus, in
Italian Cauallo, in French, CheuaL Words of the second Intention are termes of Art,
as a Noune, Pronoune, Verbe, or Participle, are termes of Grammar: likewise Genus,
Sfecies, Pro-prium, and such like, are termes of Logicke." Thus speaks Thomas Blunde-
ville, The Arte of Logicke (1619), pp. 3-4..
44 My present discussion of this matter parallels that in my Fenelon's Dialogues on
Eloquence (Princeton, 1951), pp. 25-35.
[ 354 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT- ROYALISTS
"Second Discours," in which the authors reply to their critics and
have this to say of the objection just stated:
We have found some persons who are dissatisfied with the title, The
art of thinking^ instead of which they would have us put, The art of
reasoning well. But we request these objectors to consider that, since
the end of logic is to give rules for all the operations of the mind,
and thus as well for simple ideas as for judgment and reasonings,
there was scarcely any other word which included all these operations:
and the word thought certainly comprehends them all 5 for simple
ideas are thoughts, judgments are thoughts, and reasonings are
thoughts. It is true that we might have said, The art of thinking well$
but this addition was not necessary, since it was already sufficiently
indicated by the word art^ which signifies, of itself, a method of doing
something well, as Aristotle himself remarks. Hence it is that it is
enough to say, the art of painting, the art of reckoning, because it is
supposed that there is no need of art in order to paint ill, or reckon
wrongly. 45
Reasoning or arguing had been a component of the scholastic and
the Ramistic conception of logic, and thus the insistence of the Port-
Royalists upon thinking is an answer to both of these schools 5 but
their insistence upon the exclusion of "well" suggests by its length
and seriousness that something had happened to give this adverb a
special place in the theory of logic, and that special measures are
necessary to dislodge it. What had happened, of course, was that
Ramus had made the word a part of all of his definitions of the lib-
eral arts. 46 Indeed, his emphasis upon it had taken such a hold that
the Port-Royalists used the heavy artillery of Aristotle's authority
against it, even though they did not always defer in their own minds
to that authority.
A second feature of Ramistic logic, and a very important feature
indeed, is rejected quite openly by the Port-Royalists. This feature
comprehends Ramus's interpretation of the doctrine of places. As we
know, Ramus had equated the doctrine of the places or seats of
argument with the doctrine of invention, and had made invention
first of the two parts of logic. The Port-Royalists say that these
places, like the ten categories of scholastic logic, are of little use. 47
* B Baynes, pp. 14-15. 46 See above, p. 151.
47 They make this remark about the categories and the places in the first of their two
preliminary discourses. Their words are: "II y avoit d'autres choses qu'on jugeoit assez
inutilesj comme les categories & les lieux. . . ." See CEuvres de Arnauld^ XLi, in.
Baynes's translation of this passage (o^>. cit.> p. 8) is inaccurate so far as the word
[ 355 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
Moreover, they reject Ramus's argument for treating the places as
the first part of logic. Their words are:
Ramus, on this subject, reproached Aristotle, and the philosophers of
the schools, because they treated of places after having given the rules
of argumentation, and he maintained against them that it was neces-
sary to explain the places, and what pertains to invention, be-fore treat-
ing of these rules.
The reason Ramus assigns for this is, that we must have the matter
found, before we can think of arranging it.
Now the exposition of places teaches us to find this matter, whereas
the rules of reasoning can only teach us arrangement.
But this reason is very feeble, for although it be necessary for the
matter to be found, in order to [arrange it], it is nevertheless not
necessary that we should learn how to find the matter before having
learnt how to dispose it. 48
The Port-Royalists then widen their attack on the places so as to
include Cicero, Quintilian, and Aristotle among those who advo-
cated that method of finding subject matter. Despite the celebrity of
such sponsors, say Arnauld and Nicole, general experience proves
the places to be of little real value. Here is the supporting argument:
We may adduce, as evidence of this, almost as many persons as have
passed through the ordinary course of study, and who have learned,
by this artificial method, to find out the proofs which are taught in
the colleges. For is there any one of them who could say truly, that
when he has been obliged to discuss any subject, he has reflected on
these places, and has sought there the reasons which were necessary
for his purpose? Consult all the advocates and preachers in the world,
all who speak and write, and who always have matter enough, and I
question if one could be found who had ever thought of making an
argument a causa, ab affectu, ab adjunctis, in order to prove that which
he wished to establish, 49
As if the doctrine of the places were so firmly entrenched in men's
minds as to require still more drastic assaults, the Port-Royalists
"lieux" is concerned. He renders the passage thus: "There are other things which we
deem sufficiently profitless j such as the categories and the laws. . . ."
48 Baynes, pp. 236-237. The amendment in brackets is dictated by the French text.
See OSuvres de Arnauld, XLI, 302. Baynes's "in order to its arrangement" seems less well
adapted to the original.
49 Baynes, p. 238,
[ 356 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
narrow the attack once more to the sector occupied by Ramus. They
quote the speech that Virgil in the Aeneid puts into the mouth of
Nisus as the latter's friend Euryalus stands surrounded by enemies
bent on vengeance. Then they observe sarcastically:
"This is an argument," says Ramus, "a causa efficiente." We may,
however, judge with certainty, that Virgil, when he wrote these verses,
never dreamt of the place of efficient cause. He would never have
made them had he stopped to search out that place j and it was neces-
sary for him, in order to produce such noble and spirited verses, not
only to forget these rules, if he knew them, but in some sort also to
forget himself, in order to realize the passion which he portrayed. 50
After this bombardment of Ramus and the scholastics, during which
we can plainly see that the doctrine of the places is doomed to ulti-
mate extinction, the Port-Royalists suddenly cease their firing, and
allow the places to come back into logic under a flag of truce. But
Arnauld and Nicole explain the doctrine with cold brevity, and they
specifically refuse to treat it according to the plan followed by Cicero,
by Quintilian, and by Ramus. They say that the plan of Cicero and
Quintilian is not methodical enough, whereas "that of Ramus is too
embarrassed with subdivisions." 51 Instead of these, they choose to
follow the very recent plan proposed by the German philosopher
Clauberg."
A third feature of Ramistic logic is rejected by the Port-Royalists
in connection with the method they follow in their own work and
recommend for others. Ramus had decreed that a subject should be
divided into distinct parts, and that material belonging more to one
part than another should not be allowed to appear except in that one
part. This rule is rejected by the Port-Royalists when they explain
in the first of their preliminary discourses what method they them-
selves have followed. They say:
It is right, also, to mention that we have not always followed the
rules of a method perfectly exact, having placed many things in the
Fourth Part which ought to have been referred to the Second and
Third 5 but we did this advisedly, because we judged that it would
be useful to consider in the same place all that was necessary in order
to render a science perfect; and this is the main business of method,
which is treated of in the Fourth Part. For this reason, also, we re-
60 Ibid., p. 239. 51 Ibid., p. 24.1.
62 For a note on the Port-Royalists and Clauberg, see Baynes, p. 416.
[ 357 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
served what was to be said of axioms and demonstrations for the same
place. 53
Later, when the Port-Royalists speak of the problem of dividing
wholes into parts, they accept Ramus's view as merely advisory
rather than compulsive. Here are their exact words:
Ramus and his followers have laboured very hard to show that no
divisions ought to have more than two member -s, [dichotomy]. When
this may be done conveniently, it is better -, but clearness and ease be-
ing that which ought first to be considered in the sciences, we ought
not to reject divisions into three members, and especially when they
are more natural, and when it would require forced subdivisions in
order to reduce them to two members. For thus, instead of relieving
the mind, which is the principal end of division, we should load it with
a great number of subdivisions, which it is much more difficult to re-
tain than if we had made at once more members in that which we
divide. For example, is it not more short, simple, and natural, to say,
All extension is either line y or superficies, or solid, than to say with
Ramus, Magnitude est Hnea, vel lineatum, lineatum est superficies,
vel
The theory that a subject may be divided into as many as four parts
rather than the two advocated by the Ramists is espoused by the Port-
Royalists themselves when they speak of logic as made up of con-
ceiving, judging, reasoning, and disposing. 55 And when they come to
discuss method, they divide it into analysis and synthesis, making the
former relate to the discovery of truth, the latter, to the presenta-
tion of truth to others. 56 Ramus, it will be recalled, spoke also of two
methods, but both of his related to the presentation of truth. 57 Thus
the Port-Royalists extend Ramus's theory by adding something to
it, and that something consists explicitly in their mentioning Des-
cartes and in their recommending as a foundation of all method the
four rules propounded in his Discourse In fact, Descartes is given
credit for much of the rest of what the Port-Royalists say on the
subject of method in inquiry. 59 It must be conceded that the Port-
Royalists are not so far committed to Descartes as flatly to reject the
idea of a logic that speculates upon the method of presenting truth to
others. Instead, they tend to retreat in this respect from the advanced
outpost of Cartesianism they tend, in other words, to go back to
58 Ibid., p. 12. 54 Ibid., pp. 165-166. The bracketed word is in Baynes.
ss lbid., p. 25. S6 Ibid. y pp. 308-323. 67 See above, pp. 160-165.
58 Baynes> pp. 3*5-3 l6 - 59 See CEuvres de Arnauld y XLI, 362, note (a).
[ 358 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
the Systematics when they allow logical theory to deal with the
method of presentation as well as with the method o inquiry. Thus
they show signs of conservatism and caution. They show signs of not
yet being willing to limit logical method to the discovery of new
truth, of not yet being willing to require rhetorical theory to take
charge once more of the theory of presentation 5 but while in each of
these respects they are not in line with the later views of Mill, they
are still in the forefront of the logical speculation of the seventeenth
century.
A fourth feature of Ramistic logic is rejected by the Port-Royal-
ists when they refuse to follow the dictates of Ramus's law of justice.
This law, as we know, required that each science should keep rigidly
to its own subject matter and should touch nothing belonging to other
sciences. 60 In applying this law, Ramus had refused to allow both
logic and rhetoric to speculate upon invention and arrangement, or
to allow both rhetoric and grammar to speculate upon the tropes
and the "figures. He had decreed instead that logic must be the sole
science of invention and arrangement, rhetoric the sole science of style
and delivery. And when he and Talaeus carried out this decree, they
were careful to exclude all logical content from the theory of rhetoric,
all rhetorical content from the theory of logic. The Port-Royalists
show their impatience with this rule in the first of the two pre-
liminary discourses which are attached to their work. Speaking there
of certain subjects not treated within their logical theory, they re-
mark that those subjects belong properly to metaphysics. As if this
statement implied a conformity to Ramus's law of justice, they go
on to explain that the subjects in question are omitted as being held
in low esteem by everyone. In the course of this explanation, they
affirm their own belief in mentioning in logic any subject whatever
that is useful in forming the judgment. And they say the following
with Ramus expressly in mind:
The arrangement of our different knowledges is free as that of the
letters in a printing office, each has the right of arranging them in
different classes according to his need, so that, in doing this, the most
natural manner be observed. If a matter be useful, we may avail our-
selves of it, and regard it, not as foreign, but as pertinent 'to the subject.
This explains how it is that a number of things will be found here
from physics and from morals, and almost as much of metaphysics
as it is necessary to know, though in this we do not profess to have
eo See above, pp. 151-151.
[ 359 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
borrowed anything from any one. All that is of service in logic belongs
to it 5 and it is quite ridiculous to see the trouble that some authors
have given themselves as Ramus and the Ramists though other-
wise very able men, who have taken as much pains to limit the juris-
diction of each science, and to prevent them from trespassing on each
other, as might be taken in marking out the boundaries of kingdoms,
and determining the jurisdiction of parliaments. 61
While the Port-Royalists were thus taking a stand against certain
important aspects of Ramism, and were at the same time showing
their reluctance to accept some of the most hallowed concepts of
scholasticism, they did not lose the opportunity to express' their pro-
found indebtedness to Descartes. As I said a moment ago, they made
open mention of his writings as they were propounding their theory
of the method of inquiry. But on other occasions they refer to him
almost as openly, even if our lack of familiarity, with his works makes
those references seem much less direct to us than to seventeenth-
century readers. At one point the Port-Royalists identify him under
a reference to "a celebrated philosopher of this age, 57 and at once
acknowledge his books as the source of much that was new in their
own logic. 62 At another point, they cite him as "an author of the
present time," quoting him there as having said "with great reason,
that the logical rules of Aristotle serve only to prove to another that
which we already know, but that the art of Lully only enables us
to talk, without judgment, of that which we do not know." 63 At still
another point, they refute the philosopher Gassendi by quoting
against one of his views the celebrated proposition, "je pense, done
je suis," although they do not openly identify these words with Des-
cartes. 64 This and the preceding references are sufficient evidences of
the Cartesianism of the authors of The Port-Royal Logic. But there
are many others. For example, the acceptance by the Port-Royalists
of reason rather than authority as the court of highest appeal in sci-
ence is not only the pervasive theme of their whole logical theory
but also that of Descartes's intellectual life after he had lost faith
in the sciences produced by authority. And, for another and final
example, the Port-Royalists's use of the words "idea," "thought,"
and "thinking," is thoroughly Cartesian, as Baynes has indicated. 65
What was the actual logic derived by the Port-Royalists from
their reluctance towards scholasticism, their respectful repudiation
61 Baynes, pp. 10-11. e2 Ibid. y pp. 7-8. 63 Ibid.^ p. 4!. Cf. Veitch, op. cit., p. 18.
64 OSuvres de Arnauld^ XLI, 1325 also Baynes, p. 33. fl5 Op. ctt., pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.
[ 360 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
of Ramus, and their warm admiration for Descartes and the new
philosophy? This question can be answered only by a complete read-
ing of The Port-Royal Logic itself. Anyone who undertakes that task
will find himself rewarded, for the Port-Royalists have not lost their
significance for us. In Part I of their work, they discuss the opera-
tion of the mind in conceiving, that is, in forming ideas and in at-
taching words to them. The student of what we call semantics will
find this section of The Port-Royal Logic refreshingly modern. Part
II deals with the mental operation of judging, that is, of putting
ideas together, of affirming or denying one thing of another, of ex-
pressing ourselves in propositions. Part III deals with the act of
reasoning. This operation involves the syllogism, which the Port-
Royalists doubt to be as useful as it is generally supposed to be. 68
However, in their analysis of fallacies, particularly those common in
civil life and ordinary discourse, they make perhaps their finest
contribution to logical theory, and are as modern as today's news-
paper. 67 Of the second of their two chapters on fallacies Baynes says:
It contains a fine analysis of the inward sophisms of interest, passion,
prejudice, and self-love, through which we are continually deceived,
and is characterized throughout by a tone of high moral thoughtful-
ness, and a truly humane, just, and noble spirit. It is a part, therefore,
which has naturally excited general attention, and called forth uni-
versal praise. 68
Immediately after this remarkable chapter on fallacies stands Part
IV, which describes the mental operation of disposing, that is, of
ordering ideas, judgments, and reasonings, so as to obtain knowledge
and to establish it for others. Here, too, there is much to command
the attention of the modern reader, although we no longer regard
logic as the science of the method of explaining all the other sci-
ences, and thus as a branch of the art of communication.
By way of concluding my analysis of The Port-Royal Logic, I
should like to say that it comes closer to the three requirements laid
down by Descartes for this science than does any other logic of its
time, whether French or English, and thus it deserves what its
authors say of it when they offer it to the public as "this new logic." 89
As for Descartes's strongly implied stipulation that logic must
speculate upon the experimental as distinguished from the disputa-
66 Baynes, p. 179. C7 See Part in, Ch. 20 j Baynes, pp. 266-297.
68 Baynes, p. xxxv. 69 /&*<., p. i.
[ 361 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
tious approach to truth, the Port-Royalists are on his side. They do
not mention disputation when they speak of the four operations that
logic reflects upon, and of the three services that logic performs. 70
But they do mention the spirit of debate as an injurious vice, al-
though they add that discussions cannot in general be censured and
that, "provided they be rightly used, there is nothing which con-
tributes more towards giving us different hints, both for finding the
truth, and for recommending it to others." 71 Moreover, their atti-
tude towards the value of the experimental approach to truth is well
illustrated in their discussion of their own opinion of Aristotle. "And
where is the philosopher," they ask at that point, "who is hardy
enough to affirm that the swiftness of heavy things increases in the
same ratio as their weight, since there is no one now who may not
disprove this doctrine of Aristotle by letting fall from a high place
very unequal weights, in the swiftness of which, nevertheless, there
will be remarked very little difference? " 72
Descartes's explicit stipulation that logic must speculate upon the
method of finding truth rather than upon the method of imparting
truth to others is accepted by the Port-Royalists only in part, as we
have seen. They devote some time to the method of imparting truth
to others, calling it the method of synthesis or composition or doc-
trine. 73 In this emphasis, at least, they are closer to the old outlook
than to the new. But they reverse the situation in their discussion of
the method of inquiry. There, instead of borrowing their precepts
from the Systematics, who also had recognized this method, they
borrow openly from Descartes, and quote his four famous rules .in
detail. Thus they give new impetus to the tendency that was to lead
to Mill's removal of the theory of communication from logic. In
other words, they emerge on this issue as more modern than the
Systematics, even if they are less modern than Mill.
Descartes's requirement of a logic for practical as distinguished
from speculative science is of real influence with the Port-Royalists,
although their own. prof essional interests are in theology and educa-
tion rather than in physics or medicine, and thus they do not have
the scientific learning necessary for a logic heavily illustrated from
the inductive sciences. They insist that traditional logic is soon for-
gotten by students who have had to learn it, and they attribute this
situation to the failure of logic to relate itself to common use. They
pp. 25-16. 7i lbid., p. z 7 6. lbid., p. z 3 .
73 Ibid^ pp. 309, 316-318.
[ 362 ]
DESCARTES AND THE PORT-ROYALISTS
observe at the same time that logic "exists for the very purpose of
being an instrument to other sciences." They state their own inten-
tion of illustrating logic from the solid knowledges, "to the end that
we might learn to judge of these sciences by logic, and to retain
logic by means of these sciences." 74 Later they describe common logic
as having the defect "that those who study it are accustomed to find
out the nature of propositions or reasonings, only as they follow the
order and arrangement according to which they are fashioned in the
schools, which is often very different from that according to which
they are fashioned in the world and in books whether of eloquence,
or of morals, or of other sciences." 75 They even express doubt in the
value traditionally attached to the rules of the syllogism, as we have
seen 5 and of induction they remark, "It is in this way that all our
knowledge begins, since individual things present themselves to us
before universals, although, afterwards, the universals help us to
know the individual." 76 But this and other statements by the Port-
Royalists do not make their logic an inductive practical logic as was
that of Mill. For example, the excellent observation just quoted does
not lead them to include induction under the analysis of reasoning.
They include it instead as a topic in their first chapter on fallacies.
Still, they are on the side of the future rather than the past in the
inductive aspect of their logic, as in the other aspects, and thus they
gave the seventeenth century a real intimation of things to come, and
its best intimation, so far as England's logical theory is concerned,
although they were conservative in the formulation of the new design.
74 Ibid., p. 1 6, for this and the previous quotations and paraphrases of this paragraph.
75 Ibid., p. 144. 76 Ibid., p, 265.
[ 363 ]
II. Bacon, Lamy, Hobbes, and Glanvill
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY England did not witness the publication of
a rhetorical theory that could engage in serious competition with the
two major theories described in the preceding chapters. In the period
between 1600 and 1621, the English Ramists had almost no rivals
among their own countrymen in the dissemination of rhetorical ideas ;
and from 1621 to 1700 the Neo-Ciceronians. became more and more
successful, at first as the competing, and later as the dominant, faction.
But at the end of the century these two theories were still in posses-
sion of the field, and no new rhetoric had emerged in any well-
formulated single treatise to declare itself the herald of a new era.
Thus the history of English rhetoric in the seventeenth century does
not openly present a development to match in modernity and fresh-
ness of approach the event that occurred in English logic when the
famous work of the Port-Royalists began to appear at London presses
and to assimilate itself into English learning. In fact, the last major
episode in a history limited to my present subject and period would
appear to have been already recorded, and the attempt to chronicle
the emergence of a new rhetoric would seem to lack a sound factual
basis.
Nevertheless, a new rhetoric that offers some parallel to the new
logic of the Port-Royalists was in the making in England during the
seventeenth century. It did not come into being as a single distinct
work under single authorship, but it did emerge in outline in various
English publications brought out between 1600 and 1700. Some of
these publications were devoted directly to rhetoric. They have been
reserved for this chapter of my history, not because they would have
been completely out of place under earlier classifications, but be-
cause they offer some interesting hints as to a new rhetorical attitude
and thus do not entirely belong to the old systems. Others of these
publications were devoted to subjects not specifically rhetorical,
among them being a famous appraisal of learning, a history of the
new movements in science, some works in the field of logic, and some
sharp criticisms of the contemporary English pulpit. All of these
works, and the new rhetorical attitude suggested in them, will be
my subject in the concluding pages of this book.
First of all, this new attitude consisted in the recognition that rhet-
oric must make herself the theory of learned as well as of popular
communication, and that therefore rhetoric must become a fuller, a
[ 364 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
more inclusive, discipline than it had been with the Ciceronians. In
Ciceronian terms, of course, rhetoric was limited to popular, and logic
to learned, converse. Thus both sciences undertook to survey inven-
tion and arrangement, while rhetoric was forced also to survey style
and delivery, her followers being required to face the public, and the
public being in need of such aids to ready understanding as spectacular
patterns of language and dramatic delivery. Zeno's comparison of
logic to the closed fist and rhetoric to the open hand was in itself a
way of saying that logic constituted the theory of discourse for the
world of learning as rhetoric did for the world of practice and use. But
there came a time when logic under the impetus of Descartes's teach-
ings began to renounce its obligation to the theory of communication,
and to affirm its obligation to the theory of inquiry. At that point
it became inevitable that rhetoric would take over the obligation re-
nounced by logic, for society always needs a complete theory of com-
munication, and rhetoric always possesses some special equipment for
the meeting of that need. Thus the new rhetoric of the seventeenth
century is a development towards the idea that learned exposition as
well as popular argument and exhortation is within its proper scope.
Francis Bacon, ordinarily considered as Descartes's only rival for
the honor of being the father of modern philosophy, published his
first great work, The Advancement of Learning, when Descartes was
nine years of age. This work is one of the most remarkable of the
modern era. It undertakes to defend learning against all those who
discredit it 5 and it undertakes also to survey all branches of learning
so that the strong disciplines may be identified, and the weaker ones
carefully marked for further study and improvement. Bacon refers
to this survey as "a general and faithful perambulation of learning,
with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not im-
proved and converted by the industry of man." 1 His inventory of the
learned disciplines, his comments upon their adequacies and inade-
quacies, became the greatest native influence in English learning dur-
ing the seventeenth century. So far as English logic of that period is
concerned, Bacon is a less immediate influence than Descartes, because
no English logic based directly upon his thinking appeared before
1700, whereas The Port-Royal Logic with its strong Cartesian out-
look repeatedly appeared in England after 1664. Nevertheless, The
Advancement of Learning contains suggestions which could have led
1 See The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, VI, 1 8 1 . Cited as
Works of Bacon hereafter.
[ 365 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
to the same kind of logic that the Port-Royalists produced from Des-
cartes's Discourse, had English logicians been inclined to move in that
direction. In other respects, Bacon's work had tremendous conse-
quences at home, particularly in its call for an experimental approach
to knowledge and in its frank request for the development of new
arts and sciences. Although it cannot be said to have proposed a com-
plete new rhetoric, as distinguished from the Ciceronian and Ramistic
systems then in existence, it did take a fresh look at the theory of
communication, and it did indicate that rhetoric had obligations to
learned as well as to popular discourse obligations more compre-
hensive and vital than it had in the older systems.
According to The Advancement of Learning^ all knowledge can be
divided into history, poesy, and philosophy, the last of these cate-
gories being the complement of the human reason and the general
head for all sciences, theological, natural, and humanistic. 2 When
Bacon comes to speak of the humanistic sciences, and those in particu-
lar which concern man's mind as distinguished from his body, he
dwells at some length upon four great intellectual arts, and these
arts he calls invention, judgment, memory, and elocution. 3 These
are four of the five great arts that Cicero had associated with rhetoric.
But to Bacon they are not so much the parts of a single discipline as
the disciplines underlying all the various knowledges. In other words,
as each scientist gains knowledge in his own field, and judges it, and
records it, and transmits it, he deals not only with the knowledge of
that field, but with the knowledges of gaining, judging, recording,
and transmitting 5 and sooner or later he builds up wisdoms connected
with these four processes as well as knowledge connected with his
field. These four processes and the wisdoms built up from the con-
templation of them are what Bacon discusses under the arts belonging
to the four terms which he borrows from Ciceronian rhetoric. It is
profoundly apparent that, while he is in one sense a traditionalist
bent upon preserving these terms in a spirit of respect, he is in an-
other sense an innovator bent upon enlarging their reference, re-
vitalizing their meanings, and making them relate, not to the mere
desire of a speaker fo command subject matter, organization, mem-
ory, and delivery, but to the larger desire of scholarship to contribute
to "the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate." 4 Thus
Bacon's discussion of the four arts has a wider context than did the
Ciceronian or scholastic discussion of them.
z Ibid. y vi, 182, 202, 207. * Ibid.y VI, 260-261. 4 Ibid.^ VI, 134.
[ 366 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
The wideness of this context is apparent when Bacon discusses
invention as the first of these intellectual arts. 5 He sees at once that
there must be two kinds of invention, one of which brings new arts
and sciences into being, and the other of which helps us to find
materials for speech and arguments. In other words, there must be
one technique of invention for the discovery of something not known
before, and another technique for the rediscovery of something pre-
viously known but temporarily forgotten. Bacon sees this second
technique as a means of getting through to the traditional beliefs of
the race, but not as a means of discovering new worlds. He says:
The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention:
for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or
resummon that which we already know 5 and the use of this invention
is no other but out of the knowledge whereoj our mind is already
possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be "pertinent
to the spurfose which we take. -into our consideration* So as, to speak
truly, it is no Invention, but a Remembrance or Suggestion, with an
application j which is the cause why the schools do place it after judg-
ment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do
account it a Chase as well of deer in an inclosed park as in a forest
at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called
invention : so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end
of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and
not addition or amplification thereof. 6
In his subsequent discussion of the invention of speech and argu-
ments, Bacon speaks respectfully of promptuaries and topics as aids
to the resummoning of the knowledge we already havej and al-
though he recognizes that logic as well as rhetoric has claimed the
former as well as the latter of these aids, he does not hesitate to
give the promptuaries or rhetorical places back to rhetoric. 7 In this
particular he is siding with Ciceronian rhetoric against the Ramists.
But in his vision of invention as the discovery of something hitherto
undiscovered, and in his promise to do a subsequent work on the in-
vention of sciences, 8 he is anticipating Descartes and the Port-Royal-
ists, and is taking the side of the new logic against Ramism and
scholasticism.
Bacon's discussion of judgment as the second of the four intel-
lectual arts is in fact a brief discussion of logic. He speaks here of
id^ VI, 261-272. *Ibid.) VI, 268-269. 7 I&id., VI, 269-270.
VI, 268.
[ 367 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
induction, syllogism, and fallacies. 9 The last of these subjects is so
handled by him as to constitute the beginnings of what came to be
famous as his doctrine of Idols. As for induction and syllogism, he
speaks of the former as being the process of judging immediately
from the evidence of the senses, whereas the latter is the process of
judging through a middle term.
Two observations may be made at this time about Bacon's dis-
cussion of memory, the third of the great intellectual arts. 10 First
of all, he thinks of memory in a wide sense as the whole process
of storing up what has been invented and judged, and thus he in-
cludes within it the art of making written records. Secondly, he thinks
of memory in the narrow sense as the process of storing up knowl-
edge in the human mind. As he discusses this latter aspect of the
custody or retaining of knowledge, he mentions with some contempt
the artificial memory system of ancient rhetoric, with its places and
images. His comment upon that system runs as follows: "It is cer-
tain the art (as it is) may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious:
but in use (as it is now managed) it is barren; not burdensome nor
dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren; that is,
not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and oc-
casions." 11
The final one of the four great intellectual arts is first mentioned
by Bacon as the art of elocution or tradition. 12 "Elocution" as he uses
the term has initial reference to elocutio^ that is, style, the third part
of Ciceronian rhetoric, where the speaker or writer seeks to cover
with words the thoughts that invention and arrangement have taught
him to find and to organize. But in line with his policy of widening
the context in which he uses the ancient terms, Bacon makes "elo-
cution" the synonym of "tradition" in his first reference to the fourth
intellectual art, and while it is not at once clear what he means by
this second term, the reader naturally expects that it will turn out
to mean more than style in rhetoric. In his later discussion of this art
of elocution or tradition, he specifies that it covers the entire
process of communication. The opening words of that discussion can
be construed in no other way: "There remaineth the fourth kind of
Rational Knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing
or transferring our knowledge to others; which I will term by the
general name of Tradition or Delivery." 18 Delivery, as the fifth part
9 Ib'td^ VI, 272-280. 10 Ibid.* VI, 280-282. 13 - Ibid., VI, 281.
12 Ibid., VI, 261. 1S Ibid., VI, 282.
[ 368 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
of Ciceronian rhetoric, means oral presentation or pronunciation. By
using that term here, after having used elocution before in a similar
connection, Bacon is saying that the fourth intellectual art takes over
the functions of two parts of Ciceronian rhetoric, but that those
functions are now conceived, less as style and delivery in the speech
intended to persuade, than as the whole enterprise of expressing or
transferring our knowledge to others in speech, in writing, in expo-
sition, or in controversy. Here, then, is a concrete and eloquent recog-
nition of an enlarged art of tradition or communication.
"Tradition," says Bacon, "hath three parts 5 the first concerning
the organ of tradition; the second concerning the method of tradi-
tion j and the third concerning the illustration of tradition." 14 This
partition requires him to speak of the organ of tradition as language,
and he broadens language to mean spoken words, written words,
hieroglyphics, gestures, and cyphers. The main discipline connected
-with this aspect of communication is grammar, to which Bacon de-
votes some attention. He then goes on to speak of the method and
the illustration of tradition, and these two parts of communication
as he explains them deserve a moment of attention in any history of
English logic and rhetoric.
"For the Method of Tradition," remarks Bacon as he comes to
this subject, "I see it hath moved a controversy in our time." 15 The
controversy to which these words refer was undoubtedly that be-
tween Everard Digby and William Temple in the early fifteen-
eighties over the question of Ramus's theory of method. 16 That con-
troversy, of course, was merely one episode in the great European
debate on the same question during the second half of the sixteenth
century, and thus Bacon's words have a double reference. To Bacon,
that debate had been unproductive. Remarking that "where there is
much controversy there is many times little inquiry," 17 he proceeds
at once to announce that "this part of knowledge of method seemeth
to me so weakly enquired as I shall report it deficient."
In remedying the deficiency which he finds in the theory of method
as set forth in the controversy over Ramism, Bacon allows method
to stand as a part of judgment in logical theory, and even gives the
reasons for his stand, thus obviously implying his agreement with
Ramus on this point. But Ramus had thought of method exclusively
in terms of the delivery of knowledge from one expert to another or
14 Ibid., VI, 282-283. 15 Ibid., VI, 288. l6 See above, pp. 194-196.
" Works of Bacon, vi, 288.
[ 369 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
from expert to public, and had therefore committed himself to two
divisions of method, the natural and the prudential. It is in respect
to these cardinal tenets of Ramism that Bacon expresses disagree-
ment, and his disagreement is made manifest, not by an open refuta-
tion of Ramus, but by the expression of a theory that urges method
to consider how it may contribute to the advancement as well as to
the mere delivery of learning. He says :
Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to
the use of knowledge, but likewise to the 'progression of knowledge:
for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of
knowledge, the wisdom of the Tradition is that which inspireth the
felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real
diversity of method is of method referred to Use, and method re-
ferred to Progression j whereof the one may be termed Magistral, and
the other of Probation. 18
Thus does Bacon recommend two methods of presentation, one
for the delivery of knowledge on the more elementary levels of in-
struction, and one for the delivery of knowledge between the sci-
entist and the more adult section of the community. The words that
immediately follow this recommendation have something to say of
each method.
For as knowledges are now delivered [Bacon adds], there is a kind of
contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver: for he that
delivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be
best believed, and not as may be best examined $ and he that receiveth
knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction than expectant inquiry ;
and so rather not to doubt than not to err: glory making the author
not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to
know his strength.
Although Bacon's main- theory of method is set forth in terms of
his distinction between a magistral and a probationary presentation,
he enumerates several other choices open to the deliverer of knowl-
edge. 19 One of these choices is between the enigmatical and the exo-
teric method 5 another, between the aphoristic and the conventional
method j another, between the method of assertion and proof and
that of question and answer. In the course of his explanation of these
18 Ibid.y VI, 2 89. For Bacon's earlier comment upon these two methods of delivery of
knowledge, see vi, 133.
.y VI, 290-296.
[ 370 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
and other aspects of method, he pauses momentarily to praise and
criticize Ramus in words to which I referred above 5 20 and he takes
pains to condemn as an imposture the method taught by Ramon
Lull. 21 This entire section of The Advancement of Learning is im-
portant for rhetoric, because as rhetoric took over learned as well as
popular communication, it needed a theory of expository organiza-
tion to supplement its ancient theory of the six parts of the per-
suasive discourse, and Bacon's theory of the method of delivery tends
to be an original contribution to the theory of exposition, as Ramus's
had been in its day. It must be remembered, however, that Bacon
did not consider method to be within the scope of rhetoric. He ac-
cepted instead the Ramistic belief that the method of presentation
belonged to logic. Thus his contributions to expository method were
not intended by him to contribute to the future of rhetoric, and in
this respect he did not see beyond his time.
But he did see beyond his time when he discussed what was left to
rhetoric after grammar had supplied the organ of communication
and logic had supplied the method. Bacon saw rhetoric as the instru-
ment which contributed to the delivery of knowledge by illuminat-
ing what was to be transmitted. He refers to this aspect of the fourth
great intellectual art as "the Illustration of Tradition, compre-
hended in that science which we call Rhetoric, or Art of Eloquence;
a science excellent, and excellently well laboured." 22 When Bacon
calls rhetoric the illustration of tradition, the image behind his words
is that of shedding light so as to make anything visible to the eyes.
In other words, illustration within the context of the theory of com-
munication would mean the shedding of light so as to make knowl-
edge visible and hence deliverable to an audience. "It is a figure
called Illustration," remarks John Marbecke in 1581, "by which the
forme of things is so set foorth in words, that it seemeth rather to
be seene with the eies, then heard with the eares," 23 This is what illus-
tration meant to Bacon, and his theory of communication assigned to
rhetoric the task of presenting the form of things so that they could
be seen as if in a great light.
Thus it is that, as Bacon says, "The duty and office of Rhetoric
is to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the
/V., vr, 294-295. See above, p. 202.
21 Works of Bacon, VI, 296.
22 Ibid., vr, 296.
23 John Marbecke, A Booke of Notes and Common 'places (London, 1581), p. 491.
My quotation is from A New English Dictionary, s.v. Illustration.
[ 371 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
will." 24 Of great interest is the theory o persuasion involved in these
words and almost at once explained by Bacon. It is an adaptation of
the famous theory set forth in Plato's Phaedrus. As Bacon expounds
it, the human will is conceived as a kingdom subject to domination
by a coalition between two of three powerful rival kingdoms. One of
these rivals is reason, which has certain natural advantages in her
struggle to possess the will, and so would ordinarily be victorious
against any single rival. Another of the rivals is passion or affection,
a vast, unruly force, capable almost of possessing the will unaided.
The third rival is imagination. Bacon believes that _a coalition between
imagination and passion would give these two powers control over
the will, despite the natural superiority of reason to either one alone.
So also would a coalition between imagination and reason, or between
passion and reason, although this last coalition would rarely be likely
to take place, the two parties being suspicious of each other. Within
this atmosphere of warfare, sedition, and conspiracy, Bacon places
rhetoric as a kind of diplomacy exerted to contract an alliance be-
tween reason and imagination so that man may live the rational life.
Here is the crucial passage of his exposition:
Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to
reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and
insinuations to the will, more than of naked propositions and proof 85
but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,
. . . reason would become captive and servile, if Eloquence of Per-
suasions did not practise and win the Imagination from the Affection's
part, and contract a confederacy between the Reason and Imagination
against the Affections. For the affections themselves carry ever an ap-
petite to good, as reason doth 5 the difference is, that the affection
beholdeth merely the 'present; reason beholdeth the juture and sum
of time, and therefore the present filling the imagination more,
reason is commonly vanquished 5 but after that force of eloquence and
persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present,
then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth. 25
One outstanding fact about this conception of rhetoric is that it
does not limit its own application merely to discourse addressed to
the people. In the passage just quoted, Bacon intimates that, if the
passions were obedient to the reason, the only persuasions that would
be necessary are naked propositions and proofs, or in a word, cold
logic. But he does not assume cold logic to be more of a force between
24 Works of 3acon t VI, 297. 25 Ibid.) vi, 299.
[ 372 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
the learned man and the learned audience than it is between the
speaker and the populace. On either level he suggests that passions
are unruly, the imagination errant, the reason in danger of defeat.
Thus rhetoric cannot be restricted to the popular sermon, the popular
appeal, the popular exposition. She must be present in learned dis-
course as well. Bacon indicates the need in the learned community for
the appeals of rhetoric when he speaks of the derision heaped upon
Chrysippus and many of the Stoics for believing that subtle argu-
ments addressed to reason were sufficient to control human behavior,
and that learning could "thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputa-
tions and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of
man." 26 And much earlier in The Advancement of Learning he
analyzes the weaknesses of learned men, showing there that they as
a class are not exempt from tendencies towards unreason, emotion,
and prejudice. 27 The best proof, however, that Bacon does not limit
rhetoric to popular discourse comes from The Advancement of Learn-
ing as a whole. For this work is a learned work, written by a learned
man, for a learned community j but yet it does not disdain to be
rhetorical in Bacon's own sense of that term it addresses itself to
the imagination and reason, and it seeks to transmit its message by
shedding a great light upon it, by making it visible to the eyes. Many
of its passages illustrate this quality, and none better than that in
which Bacon summarizes the value of learning.
We see then [he says] how far the monuments of wit and learning
are more durable than the monuments of power or of the hands. For
have not the verses of Homer continued twenty-five hundred years or
more, without the loss of a syllable or letter j during which time in-
finite palaces, temples, castles, cities, have been decayed and demol-
ished? It is not possible to have the true pictures or statuaes of Cyrus,
Alexander, Caesar, no nor of the kings or great personages of much
later years 5 for the originals cannot last, and the copies cannot but
leese of the life and truth. But the images of men's wits and knowl-
edges remain in books, exempted from the wrong of time and capable
of perpetual renovation. Neither are they fitly to be called images,
because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the minds of others,
provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages.
So that if the invention of the ship was thought so noble, which carrieth
riches and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most
remote regions in participation of their fruits, how much more are
26 Ibid., VI, 298-299. 27 Ibid.y VI, 129-135.
[ 373 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
letters to be magnified, which as ships pass through the vast seas of
time, and make ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, illumina-
tions, and inventions, the one of the other? 28
The theory that the illuminations of rhetoric are pervasive in all
discourse, learned as well as popular, leads Bacon to attach an im-
portant modification to the image that the Ciceronians had borrowed
from Zeno to express the difference between rhetoric and logic. Bacon
indicates that these two arts differ, not so much as the open hand
differs from the closed fist, but more as the handling of ideas without
reference to an audience differs from the handling of ideas with
reference to an audience. His exact words in this connection are as
follows :
It appeareth also that Logic differeth from Rhetoric, not only as the
fist from the palm, the one close the other at large 5 but much more in
this, that Logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and Rhetoric
handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And
therefore Aristotle doth wisely place Rhetoric as between Logic on
the one side and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating
of both: for the proofs and demonstrations of Logic are toward all
men indifferent and the same 5 but the proofs and persuasions of
Rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors . . . which applica-
tion, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should
speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them
all respectively and several ways . . . and therefore it shall not be
amiss to recommend this to better inquiry. . . . 21>
In a way, this distinction, as Bacon conceives of it, amends Ramism
and scholasticism, for those logics had assumed responsibilities to-
wards audiences, especially the learned audience, whereas Bacon
wants logic to remain indifferent to that consideration. At the same
time, this distinction anticipates Descartes, who had wanted logic to
ignore communication and focus upon inquiry. But it would not be
accurate to press these interpretations of Bacon too far. After all, as
we have already seen, he visualized logic as the sole custodian of
method in communication, and thus he is not consistently committed
to a logic that renounces all interest in audiences. His basic position
seems rather to be that, as logic remains the custodian of method in
the transmitting of knowledge, and as grammar remains the custo-
dian of the verbal means of transmission, so rhetoric should keep to
vr, 168-169. 2g Ibid.) VI, 300.
[ 374 1
her task of shedding light upon the subject of any learned or popular
communication, and, in discharging that task, should realize that the
greatest of light is shed upon a subject when it is connected with
popular opinions and manners, and with the nature of the individual
auditor. Thus Bacon stands as a composite of scholasticism, of Ra-
mism, and of something that looks to the future. His call for an in-
vestigation of the problem of adapting subjects to audiences is par-
ticularly modern, although Plato in Phaedrus had also wanted
rhetoric to investigate that problem, and Aristotle in his Rhetoric had
actually begun the investigation.
Bacon has many other things to say about rhetoric in the course of
his numerous writings, and whatever he says is stimulating. But I
shall not dwell further upon him here. As I see it, his chief contribu-
tion to modern rhetoric consists in his theory of tradition, and in his
emphasis upon rhetoric as the supreme illustrator of knowledge for
any audience, learned or popular. That important segment of his
total rhetorical theory seems more significant than any other as a
prophecy of things to come. Anyone who wishes to see the whole of
his rhetorical theory, and to judge what other values it holds for the
modern world, should read Professor Karl Wallace's book on that
theory. 80 Wallace's book is an excellent guide to materials that would
otherwise be difficult to assemble and to examine.
Turning now to other writers of the seventeenth century, and to
other works which involved rhetoric, I should like to say that their
second large contribution to the new rhetorical theory consisted in
a growing recognition of the inadequacy of artistic proof as a means
of persuasion, and in the development of a belief in non-artistic proof
as a better way to that goal. The nature of the distinction between
these two kinds of proof has already been discussed in these pages. 81
In general, artistic proofs were so called because they were developed
by systematic means from all of the truths already known and ac-
cepted about all of the patterns of behavior involved in any case
handled by rhetoric, whereas non-artistic proofs were not subject to
production by any systematic means, but had merely to be used if
they existed or ignored if they did not exist. Thus when a series of
reliable eyewitnesses testified that a given thing had happened, their
testimony was considered non-artistic, or not subject to production
by any predetermined plan or method. When on the other hand a
30 Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication 6f Rhetoric (Chapel Hill, 1943)-
81 See above, pp. 68-69.
[ 375 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
series of reasonings from the normal and predictable circumstances
of a case tended to show that a given thing had happened, those
reasonings were considered artistic, or subject to development by
method. It is instructive to recall that Ramus advocated an inven-
tional method made up of ten places or seats of argument, and that
nine of his places produced artistic proofs, whereas the tenth ex-
isted to take care of any non-artistic proofs that might be there for
use. 32 In an age which lacked the facilities to assemble and dissemi-
nate such non-artistic proofs as documents, confessions, eyewitness
reports, contracts, laboratory analyses, statistics, and the like, it was
inevitable that artistic proofs would receive special emphasis. It was
also inevitable that interest in artistic proofs would decline with the
development of science, with the expansion of facilities for the study
and dissemination of facts, and with the growth of respect for direct
observation and controlled experiment. When Descartes decided that
he could no longer accept things as true merely because they were
accepted generally as true, and when he determined to hold beliefs
only if his reason clearly attested their validity, he was in effect
deciding not only that the old science was forever gone and a new
experimental science was on the way, but also that the old rhetoric
with its formula for artistic proofs would soon disappear, and a new
rhetoric based upon invention from observation and facts must one
day develop. Descartes's attitude, as we have seen, was subsequently
reflected in logical theory by the Port-Royalists' denunciation of the
doctrine of places in logic. Throughout the seventeenth century a
parallel attitude is shown in a disposition on the part of some writers
to turn away from a rhetoric of invention by commonplace and to
adopt a rhetoric of invention by research.
One early evidence of this attitude in England is provided in a
little Latin essay by Nathaniel Carpenter on the subject of logic and
rhetoric. Carpenter studied at St. Edmund Hall and Exeter College
in Oxford in the early years of the seventeenth century, being
awarded his bachelor's degree in 1610, his master's degree in 1613,
and his bachelor's degree in divinity in 1620. During his residence
at Oxford, he achieved some reputation as a preacher 3 and like John
Prideaux, the future logician and bishop, he was designated a mem-
ber of the controversy college at Chelsea, thus becoming a part of
that unsuccessful effort to establish a propaganda center against the
32 See above, pp. 155-156.
[ 376 ]
threat of Catholicism in England. 83 Carpenter's most famous work,
the Philosophic* Libera, published at Frankfurt in 1621, and repub-
lished three times at Oxford in the course of the seventeenth century,
contains an essay refuting Zeno's claim that logic is to be understood
as the closed fist, rhetoric as the open hand} and it is in the course of
this essay that he suggests a theory of invention not dependent upon
the places of logic or rhetoric. 84
The complete argument of Carpenter's essay is addressed to the
thesis that logical discourse is not necessarily compact, nor is rhetor-
ical discourse necessarily diffuse, as Zeno's metaphor implies. Car-
penter reasons syllogistically that diffuse discourse is the product of
the procedure known as amplification, but that amplification is the
work of logic. As evidence for the latter of these two premises (the
former being accepted as indisputable), Carpenter turns first to the
books on logic, and shows that they recognize three classes of argu-
ment, one class being designated as the argument for proof, another,
as the argument for exposition or instruction, and still another, as the
argument for amplification. Carpenter next turns to the theory in-
volving the assignment of invention, arrangement, and style to the
various academic disciplines, and he argues here as follows:
Moreover, since three things are required for the fulness of a speech,
namely, invention of subject matter, arrangement of arguments, and
adornment, it is obvious that the first is supplied from the various
fields of knowledge conformably to the speaker's end and purpose, the
second from logic, and the third from rhetoric. Accordingly, it follows
that the various fields of knowledge contribute substance or content,
logic the tying together and arranging of arguments, and rhetoric
merely the flower and spice of the speech. But no sane person denies
that the faculty of amplifying is based upon the faculty of arranging
arguments.
The final movement of Carpenter's argument is devoted to showing
that even the tropes and figures depend basically upon logic as the
science of arrangement, and thus that amplification cannot be made
33 For previous mention of this institution, see above, p. 311. For other details about
Carpenter, see Dictionary of National Biography , s.v. Carpenter, Nathanael (1589-
1628?).
34 For the Latin text of this essay, which is entitled "Logica pug-no, Rhetorica palrnae,
non recte a Zenone comparatur," see Nathaniel Carpenter, Philosophia Libera (Oxford,
1622), pp. 158-161. For an English translation, see Wilbur S. Howell, "Nathaniel
Carpenter's Place in the Controversy between Dialectic and Rhetoric," S-peech Mono-
hs^ I (1934)? 20-4.1.
[ 377 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
the property of rhetoric simply by classifying it among the tropes and
figures. Anyway, says Carpenter, tropes and figures actually con-
tract discourse on some occasions, and amplify it on others, and so
cannot be said to be in essence an amplificatory device.
In the perspectives of history, Carpenter's argument is modern
only in his emphasis that invention belongs to the various fields of
knowledge, and that the speaker or writer does not find substance
or content except in those fields. This theory amounts to a rejection
of the places of Ramistic logic as aids to the discovery of subject
matter 5 and to a rejection, as well, of the places of scholastic logic
and Ciceronian rhetoric. In other respects. Carpenter draws his ma-
terials from traditional sources. Thus he accepts logic as the authority
on the classification and the arrangement of arguments, and rhetoric
as the authority on ornament, thereby identifying himself as some-
thing of a Ramist, although he goes on to reject the basic claim of
Ramus that the tropes and figures are the absolute property of
rhetoric. His belief in the falsity of Zeno's metaphor is of course
antischolastic and anti-Ciceronian 3 but he does not advance there-
from to a modern position in any respect except that just specified.
A much later and more decisive evidence that rhetoric was turning
away from invention by commonplace and was endorsing invention
by external means is provided in a work called The Art of Speaking,
published at London in 1 676, and reprinted there in 1 696 .and 1 708.
This work is an English translation of a French treatise first pub-
lished anonymously at Paris in 1675 under the title, De I* Art de
Parler. Because the French treatise did not identify its author, and
because it bore unmistakable resemblances to the thinking of the al-
ready famous Port-Royalist logicians, its English publishers indi-
cated on its title page in 1676 that it was "Written in French by
Messieurs du Port Royal: In pursuance of a former Treatise, In-
tituled, The Art of Thinking." Thus started a legend of a Port-
Royalist rhetoric as a parallel of the Port-Royalist logic, and this
legend was not impaired when the latter work achieved its first
English translation nine years after the original appearance of the
Art of Speaking. In its second printing at London in 1696, and in 'ts
third there in 1708, the Art of Speaking continued to advertise itself
as the work of the "Messieurs du Port Royal." By then, of course,
the Logic, Or The Art of Thinking of Arnauld and Nicole was so
well known in England that a treatise definitely associated with those
two authors would sell much better than it could have expected to
[ 378 1
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
otherwise. Thus there was an undoubted commercial advantage in
continuing in 1696 and 1708 to sell the Art of Speaking as a Port-
Royalist work. But by 1688 the work had appeared at Paris in its
third edition, and that third edition had changed its title to La
Rhetorique^ ou PArt de Parler, and had announced its author as
Bernard Lamy. Bernard Lamy was not a Port-Royalist. He be-
longed instead to the Congregation o the Oratory, a religious order
which like the Port-Royalists had interested itself in educational re-
form. 85 His Art of Speaking hardly deserves the title of a Port-
Royalist rhetoric, for it is in many ways a compromise between
Ramus and the Port-Royalists, not an important disavowal of the
Ramists and the Neo-Ciceronians. 36 Nevertheless, it had a new spirit
about it, and one aspect of that spirit had to do with its acceptance
of the Port-Royalist opposition to artistic proof and the doctrine of
the places of rhetoric as aids to invention.
The Art of Speaking is divided into four regular parts and a fifth
part in the form of an appendix entitled "A Discourse, in which is
given an Idea of the Art of Perswasion." 37 The first part deals with
matters of speech, grammar, and usage 5 the second part, with tropes
and figures j the third part, with speaking, pronouncing, articulating,
breathing, reciting 5 and the fourth part, with style, considered not
only in relation to its different kinds (the sublime, the plain, and
the middle), but also in relation to its adaptability to oratory, his-
tory, philosophy, and poetry, and in relation to its power to make
discourse beautiful. Thus far, the work is Ramistic in its restriction
of rhetoric to style and delivery 5 and at the same time it is Cice-
ronian in its tendency to allow matters of grammar to creep into
rhetoric, and in its treatment of style as something more than the
35 For a comparison of the Oratorians and the Port-Royalists in this respect, see
Barnard, The Little Schools of Port-Royal^ pp. 205-207.
86 The Art of Speaking is discussed as a compromise between Ramus and the Port-
Royalists in Wilbur S. Howell, Fenelon's Dialogues on Eloquence, pp. 33-36. For an-
other recent study of Lamy's work, see Douglas Ehninger, "Bernard Lami's L'Arl de
Parler: A Critical Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, xxxn (1946), 429-434.
87 My discussion is based upon the first edition of the English translation, I- am in-
debted to my colleague, Professor Alan Downer, for lending me his copy for my present
purpose. The title page reads; "The Art of Speaking: Written in French by Messieurs
du Port Royal: In pursuance of a former Treatise, Intituled, The Art of Thinking.
Rendred into English. London, Printed by W. Godbid, and are to be Sold by M. Pitt,
at the Angel against the little North Door of St. Paul's Church. 1676." Parts I, II, and
in of this edition are paged together from p. i to p. 212, but the numbering of the
pages is incorrect at several points. Parts IV and V are paged together from p. i to p.
164, and the numbering of this sequence is correct- Part v begins on p. 88 of the second
sequence of pages.
[ 379 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
tropes and the figures. In its fifth part, it becomes frankly Ciceronian,
mentioning the five ancient divisions of rhetoric, the three ways of
persuading, the places of proof, the means of insinuation, the appeals
to passions, and the classical pattern of oratorical arrangement. The
work ends by acknowledging that in its final part it had dealt with
invention and arrangement, that in its first four parts it had dealt
with style, and that in not treating memory or oratorical delivery,
it had recognized these faculties to be more in the realm of practice
than of precept.
The only section of this work that definitely belongs neither to the
Ramists nor to the Neo-Ciceronians is that in which the places of
invention are denounced as worthless after they have been briefly
explained in two short chapters. This denunciation of the means of
inventing artistic proofs is a mark of the influence upon Lamy of
The Port-Royal Logic and its severe denunciation of the logical
theory of places. "Thus in few words," says Lamy as he begins his
similar attack, "have I shown the Art to find Arguments upon all
Subjects of which the Rhetoricians are accustomed to Treat, which
makes the greatest part of their Rhetorick." 38 He proposes at once
"to judg of the usefulness of this method." He acknowledges that
his respect for the authors who have commended it has obliged him
to set it forth. He also acknowledges that the places have "some kind
of use," and he specifies that use as follows:
They make us take notice of several things from whence Arguments
may be drawn; they teach us how a Subject may be vary'd and dis-
covered on all sides. So as those who are skilPd in the Art of To-picks,
may find matter enough to amplifie their discourse 3 nothing is barren
to them; they speak of every thing that occurs, as largely and as oft
as they please. 39
Having stated the traditional defense of places, Lamy turns to those
who attack this means of inventing proof, and he quotes them with
approval :
Those who reject these Topicks, do not deny their Fecundity; they
grant that they supply us with infinite numbers of things; but they
alledg that that Fecundity is inconvenient; That the things are trivial,
and by consequent the Art of Topcks furnishes nothing that is fit for
us to say. If an Orator (say they) understands the subject of which he
treats; if he be full of incontestable Maxims that may inable him to
88 The Art of Sneaking, Pt. v, p. 103. 39 Ibid., Pt. v, p. 104..
[ 380 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVJLL
resolve all Difficulties arising upon that subject 5 If it be a question
in Divinity, and he be well read in the Fathers, Councils, Scriptures,
&c. He will quickly perceive whether the question proposed be Ortho-
dox, or otherwise. It is not necessary that he runs to his Topicks, or
passes from one common place to another, which are unable to supply
him with necessary knowledg for decision of his Question. If on the
other side an Orator be ignorant, and understands not the bottom of
what he Treats, he can speak but superficially, he cannot come to the
point j and after he has talk'd and argued a long time, his Adversary
will have reason to admonish him to leave his tedious talk that sig-
nifies nothing; to interrupt him in this manner, Speak to the purpose j
oppose Reason against my Reason, and coming to the Point, do what
you can to subvert the Foundations upon which I sustain my self. 40
Frank talk like this is a refreshing change in rhetorical theory, as
the talk of the Port-Royalists against the places of logic was a re-
freshing change in that field. Lamy goes on to say that a "witty
man speaking of the method of which Raimondus Lullius treated
after a particular manner, calls it An Art of Discoursing without
judgment of things we do not understand."" This "witty man" is
of course Descartes, and these words from his Discourse on Method
were also quoted by the Port-Royalists. 42 Before Lamy thus covertly
indicates the source of his condemnation of Lull, he takes up the argu-
ment that the places of rhetoric are of value in providing the speaker
with proofs beyond those gleaned from the study of his own particu-
lar subject. He dismisses this argument thus:
To this it is answered, and I am of the same Opinion, That to per-
swade, we need but one Argument, if it be solid and strong, and that
Eloquence consists in clearing of that, and making it perspicuous. All
those feeble Arguments (proper, as well to the accused, as the accuser,
and as useful to refel as affirm) derived from Commonplaces, are like
ill Weeds that choke the Corn. 43
So did Lamy introduce into French and then into English rhet-
oric a devastating attack upon the concept of artistic proofs and the
places of invention. If modern rhetoric no longer believes in artistic
proofs, and no longer teaches an elaborate system of places, the Port-
Royalist logicians and their disciple Lamy are in large part respon-
40 Ibid.* Pt. V, pp. 104-105. **Ibid.) Pt. v, p. 106.
42 See Descartes, Discours de la MethocLe^ ed. Gilson, p. 17, lines 19-20; also The
Port-Royal Logic, trans. Baynes, p. 41$ also above, pp. 348, 360.
4& The. Art of Speaking, Pt. v, p. 106.
[ 381 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
sible. They are responsible, that is, because their correct diagnosis of
the weakness o the system of places, and their correct recommenda-
tion of an invention based upon an exhaustive study of the factual
states in any case, happened to fall in the earlier part of the modern
period, and happened to be expressed in works that were reprinted
again and again during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in
the most influential centers of European learning. But if the Port-
Royalists and Lamy had not happened to speak as they did, the
events set in motion by Bacon and Descartes would sooner or later
have forced rhetoric to re-examine the whole question of persuasive
methods in an age of science, and would have caused her to make
the sort of changes that were actually recommended in The Port-
Royal Logic and the Art of 8-peaking.
A third large contribution which seventeenth-century writers made
towards the development of a new attitude in rhetoric consisted in
the advocacy of a simpler theory of organization than the older rhet-
oric and logic had taught. Ramistic rhetoric, of course, had involved
no theory of organization whatever, since that subject was reserved
by Ramus for logic and in particular for the doctrine of method. In
Ramistic logic, as we know, the procedure recommended for all
learned discourse was called the natural method, and it consisted of
a severe arrangement of propositions in a descending order of gen-
erality. As for discourse addressed to the people, Ramus allowed a
less rigid procedure, called the prudential method, but his disciples
tended not to advocate it. Ciceronian rhetoric, in the period before
and after Ramus, taught arrangement in terms of the divisions rec-
ommended by Cicero for the oration. And scholastic logic, particu-
larly under the direction of the Systematics, taught various kinds of
method, a few of which concerned inquiry, and the others, presenta-
tion. Valuable as these theories were and their importance has un-
fortunately been forgotten they still had to be modified somewhat
in the modern era to foster rhetoric's continuing interest in discourse
organized to persuade, and to meet her developing interest in dis-
course organized to explain and teach.
The best contribution made in the seventeenth century towards a
theory of expository method lies in Bacon's distinction between the
magistral and the probationary types of transmission of knowledges,
and his recommendation of the latter type for further use and de-
velopment- As I have said, Bacon assigns to logic his entire discussion
of method, and thus he does not consider his recommendations upon
[ 382 1
this subject to be part of a new rhetoric. But nevertheless they turned
out to be that, as logic ceased to concern herself with the method of
communication, and as rhetoric began to assimilate the methods
taught by the Ramists and the Systematics, and to adapt those
methods to her own necessities. The magistral and the probationary
procedures have already been explained in my discussion of Bacon's
theory of tradition as a whole. To those comments I should now
like to add a passage in which Bacon describes in imaginative terms
what he conceives his probationary method to be:
But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to
be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method
wherein it was invented, ^ and so is it possible of knowledge induced.
But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man know-
eth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet
nevertheless, secundwrn majus et minus^ a man may revisit and descend
unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent j and so transplant
it into another as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it
is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots j
but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest
upon roots than slips. 44
As for the theory of method in persuasive discourse, there were
tendencies at work in seventeenth-century English learning to re-
quire fewer parts for the deliberative, the forensic, and the demon-
strative oration. These tendencies in learning were a reflection of
tendencies in the surrounding society. England in that period was
witnessing the decline in the power of the aristocracy, the growth
of the political and social influence of the middle class, the lessening
of the expectation for ceremony and formula in religion, and the de-
velopment of a genuine need for the effects of religious persuasions,
as distinguished from the former preference for verbal appeals con-
fined largely to rituals. These social and political pressures had their
consequences in the world of English learning, and one of those
consequences was that rhetorical theory tended to become simpler
and less ritualistic in all respects, the doctrine of arrangement being
no exception.
But the tendency toward simplicity in the theory of rhetorical ar-
rangement also received powerful support in seventeenth-century
England from the authority of Aristotle's Rhetoric. In the year
44 Works of Bacon y VI, 289-290.
[ 383 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
1619, Theodore Goulston published at London his edition of that
famous work, so arranged that the pages consist of three parallel
columns, one of which contains the Greek text, the next, a Latin
translation, and the third, a series of Latin notes and comment. 45 In
or about the year 1637, Thomas Hobbes published at London an
abridged English version of Aristotle's rhetorical theory under the
title,. A Brief e of the Art of Rhetoriqve** Hobbes's version was re-
printed at London in 1651 and 16815 and Goulston's Greek-Latin
edition was republished at the same place in i6$6* 7 Meanwhile, in
1686, a complete English translation of the Rhetoric appeared at
London, announcing that it was "Made English by the translators
of the Art of thinking." 48 Thus from first to last the seventeenth cen-
tury in England saw much of this major work, and English learning
had every opportunity to absorb Aristotle's theory of the arrange-
ment of persuasive discourse.
Perhaps the best way to see how English learning conceived of
that theory is to quote it in the words of Thomas Hobbes. In the
45 The title page reads in part: 1 "A/BtcrroreXovs Tex v7 l s ptjropiKris Bi/9\la rp/o. Aristotelis
de Rhetorica seu arte Dicendi Libri tres, Graecolat. . . . Londini Typis Eduardi Griffini,
do. loc. xix." No editor's name appears on the title page. The Latin dedicatory epistle
is addressed to Prince Charles of Great Britain, and is signed- "Theodor us Govlston."
46 There is a copy of this work in the Folger Shakespeare Library. Its title page
reads: "A Briefe of the Art of Rhetoriqve. Containing in substance all that Aristotle
hath written in his Three Bookes of that subject, Except onely what is not applicable to
the English Tongue. London Printed by Tho. Cotes, for Andrew Crook, and are to be
sold at the black Bare in Pauls Church-yard."
An entry in the stationers' registers for Feb. i, 1636, i.e., 1637, attributes the work
to "T. H., l} i.e., Thomas Hobbes, and permits its first edition to be dated in or near that
year. See Arber, Transcript of the Registers, iv, 372.
47 Hobbes's Briefe appeared at London in 1 6$ i in A Compendium of the Art of
Logick and Rhetorick in the English Tongue. For an indication of other items in the
Compendium, see above, pp. 238, 276. See also Walter J. Ong, S.J., "Hobbes and
Talon's Ramist Rhetoric in English," Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical
Society, i (1949-1953), 260-261.
The Briefe was reprinted in 1681 as "The Whole Art of Rhetorick" in Thomas Hob-
bes's The Art of Rhetoric, with a Discourse of The Laws of England. This volume also
contains a little treatise called "The Art of Rhetorick Plainly set forth," as if it were the
work of Hobbes. In reality, it is merely a reprint of the section on rhetoric in Dudley Fen-
ner's The Artes of Logike and Rethorike* See above, p. 279.
The 1696 edition of Goulston's Greek-Latin version of Aristotle's Rhetoric bears the
same title as the first edition of 1619. Its imprint reads: "Londini, Typis Ben. GrifEni,
Impensis Edvard. Hall Bibliop. Cantabr'. M DC XCVI."
48 Its title page reads as follows: "Aristotle's Rhetoric j or, The true grounds and
principles of oratory 5 shewing the right art of pleading and speaking in full assemblies
and courts of judicature. Made English by the translators of the Art of thinking. . .
London, Printed by T. B. for R. Taylor, 1686." This work contains the three books
of Aristotle's Rhetoric and as Book IV the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, formerly attributed
to Aristotle. The identity of these translators has not been determined. See above, p.
352, note 32.
[ 384 1
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
twelfth chapter of Book III of his Brief e, Hobbes drastically abridges
the thirteenth chapter of Book III of Aristotle's Rhetoric, but he
manages, nevertheless, to convey the essentials of Aristotle's doctrine.
His entire chapter is brief enough for quotation here:
The necessary parts of an oration are but two; 'propositions and proof $
which are, as it were, the problem and demonstration.
The proposition is the explication or opening of the matter to be
proved* And -proof is the demonstration of the matter propounded,
To these necessary farts are sometimes added two other, the proem
and the epilogue j neither of which is any proof.
So that in some there be four parts of an oration; the proem ^ the
proposition, or as others call it, the narration , the proofs, which con-
tain confirmation 3 confutation amplification, and diminution; and the
epilogue**
Aristotle's Rhetoric was destined, of course, to exert upon modern
English rhetorical theory an influence not confined to the doctrine
of arrangement. What Aristotle says of style undoubtedly affected
what English rhetoricians of the seventeenth century came to ad-
vocate in that field, as I shall mention later. And there are many
other ways in which Aristotle's penetrating eyes have helped modern
rhetoric to understand her problems, as can be seen in the pages of
Richard Whately's famous Elements of Rhetoric, first published at
London in 1828. Nevertheless, modern theory has been particularly
benefited by Aristotle's conception of the basic organization of per-
suasive discourse, and that benefit began to operate widely in English
learning as the seventeenth century produced her Greek, Latin, and
English versions of the Rhetoric.
The final contribution of seventeenth-century writers to a new
attitude towards rhetoric came in their denunciation of the doctrine
of the tropes and figures and in their advocacy of the principle that
ordinary patterns of speech are acceptable in oratory and literature
as in conversation and life. This change was accelerated in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries by the rise of the democratic state,
and by the consequent need on the part of the ruling class to develop
new techniques for communication with the common man. But the
change began in the Renaissance, and it received in the seventeenth
century the support of the new science and the new spirit in religion.
49 The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London,
1839-1845), vi, 500. Cited below as Works of Hobbes.
[ 385 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
Scientific discourse, or the communication between one scientist and
another in the scientific community, did not prove to be a natural
medium for the tropes and figures of Ciceronian or Ramistic rhetoric.
Nor could the preaching done in the churches of the later Reforma-
tion allow itself to be as indifferent to persuasion as it had been dur-
ing the Middle Ages, when Catholicism had seemingly completed
her task of conversion in the European community and appeared to
need only to rely upon ceremonial forms to keep faith alive. Once
preaching set out to convert commoners, style ceased to remain an
exploitation of the ways in which verbal formulations can be made
to depart from the patterns of ordinary speech, and at that moment
the tropes and the figures tended to become obsolete in the pulpit,
except as they contributed to the effectiveness of a simpler and plainer
way of speaking.
The change from the tropes and the figures to a less unusual style
began in the learned discourse of the seventeenth century with the
publication of Bacon's Advancement of Learning in 1605. The in-
fluence of that remarkable work upon the theory of style in com-
munication in the world of science, as upon the entire theory of the
transmission of knowledges from man to man and from age to age,
cannot be overemphasized. In his opening pages Bacon speaks of
three vices or diseases that beset scholarship, and one of those vices
turns out to be "delicate learning," that is, the concern for "vain
imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations," 60 or the exces-
sive devotion to mannerism as distinguished from matter in the pres-
entation of discourse. In a passage memorable for its acuteness in
diagnosing the cultural distempers of the sixteenth century, Bacon
remarks that the early Reformation had produced a need for ancient
testimony as a support in the struggle against Rome, and that the
need for ancient testimony had led to a revival of interest in ancient
authors. A delightful appreciation of ancient language and style, he
goes on, was produced as the result of that revival of interest, and
was cherished, partly on aesthetic grounds, and partly as a means to
a more effective presentation than that afforded by an imitation. of
the thorny style of Roman scholasticism. The delight of the scholars
in the ancient style, Bacon continues, led them to a theory of preach-
ing based upon the notibn that the people could be won over to the
Protestant cause by "elogtiencq and varietjrof discourse, as the fittest
and forciblest access into the capacity of the vulgar sort." 51 Here,
.M Works of Bacon, vi> 117. * l lbii y vi, 119.
1 386 i
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
then, is a brilliant explanation of the reasons behind the rise of sty-
listic rhetoric. Bacon caps his historical analysis with a famous passage
in which he gives us some insight into the excesses created by the
Ciceronian and Ramistic emphasis upon a study of the tropes and
figures. He observes:
So that these four causes concurring, the admiration of ancient authors,
the hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of languages, and the
efficacy of preaching, did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence
and copie of speech, which then began to flourish. This grew speedily
to an excess 5 for men began to hunt more after words than matter 5
and more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the round and clean
composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and
the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures,
than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argu-
ment, life of invention, or depth of judgment. 52
Bacon's implied distinction between a healthy and a pathological
addiction to style is worth considering as a reminder that an early
Ramist like Gabriel Harvey had associated the pathological addic-
tion to style with a counterfeit Ciceronianism, and had tried to re-
store health to that branch of learning by endorsing Ramus's entire
theory of communication. 53 Thus the early Ramists are on the side
of the proper balance between content and style. Nevertheless, there
is always danger that style, when abstracted from the other aspects
of composition, will teach the unwary to value it above thought or to
divorce it from thought, and it is that danger which the later Ramists
tended to foster, simply because they could not keep their rhetoric
close to their logic in an educational program which taught rhetoric
at one stage of a pupil's development, and logic at another stage.
The way to prevent the divorce of content from style is to teach
style in company with invention and arrangement, as even the Cicero-
nians did not always doj and Bacon's attack upon stylistic rhetoric
as a distemper of learning is therefore to be construed as a plea for
the better integration of the mental and verbal aspects of communi-
cation, if the new science is to be properly transmitted.
The authority of Aristotle's Rhetoric is also on the side of a proper
integration between content and style in the theory of communica-
tion, and thus the publication of that work in England during the
seventeenth century tended to give Englishmen confidence in plain
52 Ibid*> VI, 119* B3 See above, p. 452.
[ 387 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
ways of speaking or writing. For example, Hobbes's English abridg-
ment of the Rhetoric^ as published around 1637 and at two later
dates in the century, contains the sort of stylistic doctrine that the
times demanded. 64 Here are two passages to show how far Aristotle
opposes a fine or an unnatural style for oratory:
The virtues of a word are twoj the first, that it be perspicuous; the
second, that it be decent, that is, neither above nor below the thing
signified, or neither too humble nor too fine. 55
To make a poem graceful, many things helpj but few an oration. For
to a poet it sufficeth, with what words he can, to set out his poem. But
an orator must not only do that, but also seem not to do it: for else he
will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks j and there-
by be the less believed j whereas belief is the scope of his oration. 56
Thus Bacon, Aristotle, and Hobbes lent influence to the theory
that the tropes and the figures, as a great system of violations of
normal ways of speaking, were not an acceptable imperative for
learned discourse. The Royal Society, as the center of the new sci-
entific activity, went further its members renounced the rhetoric
of tropes and figures as a guide to scientific writing, and adopted a
theory of style that belongs to the new attitude towards rhetoric.
We see the attitude of the Royal Society to best advantage in
Thomas Sprat's fine work, The History of the Royal-Society of
London, For the Improving of Natural Knowledge, published at
London in 1667. This history deals with three subjects: the state of
knowledge in the ancient and modern world 5 the actual procedures
of the Royal Society in fostering the growth of experimental knowl-
edge 5 and the values to be attached to experimental knowledge in
general. In discussing the second of these subjects, Sprat describes
what happens in the Royal Society as they meet to direct, judge,
analyze, improve, and discuss experiments. 57 Each of these five ac-
tivities is important in the history of seventeenth-century science.
But for our present purpose, the happenings in the Royal Society as
they discussed experiments are of crucial importance, for in these
happenings we can see a new rhetoric of exposition emerging to re-
place the rhetoric of persuasion by tropes and figures.
The discussion of experiments, or transmission of descriptive and
54 See above, p. 384. B5 Works of Hobbes, VI, 488.
5 Ibid., vi, 488-489.
57 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London (London, 1667),
pp. 95-115.
[ 388 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
argumentative materials from member to member, led the Royal
Society, says Sprat, to become most solicitous about "the manner of
their Discourse." Unless they had taken pains about this, he adds,
and had sought to keep it in due temper, "the whole spirit and
vigour of their Design, had been soon eaten out, by the luxury and
redundance of speech." What the Royal Society is objecting to when
they express fear of luxury and redundance of speech is ornamental
language in short, the tropes and the figures. Maybe in the begin-
ning, says Sprat, these ornaments were highly justified as being
necessary "to represent Truth^ cloth'd with Bodies j and to bring
Knowledg back again to our very senses, from whence it was at first
deriv'd to our understandings." 59 But now the ornaments of speaking
are put to worse uses. Here is how Sprat elaborates his attitude to-
wards the tropes and figures:
They make the Fancy disgust the best things, if they come sound and
unadorn'd: they are in open defiance against Reason $ professing, not
to hold much correspondence with that ; but with its Slaves, the Pas-
sions: they give the mind a motion too changeable, and bewitching, to
consist with right practice. Who can behold, without indignation, how
many mists and uncertainties, these specious Tropes and Figures have
brought on our Knowledg? How many rewards, which are due to
more profitable, and difficult Arts, have been still snatch J d away by
the easie vanity of fine speaking! For now I am warm'd with this just
Anger, I cannot with-hold my self, from betraying the shallowness of
all these seeming Mysteries $ upon which, we Writer s^ and Speaker s,
look so bigg. And, in few words, I dare say $ that of all the Studies of
men, nothing may be sooner obtained, than this vicious abundance of
Phrase, this trick of Metaphors, this volubility of Tongue^ which
makes so great a noise in the World. 60
Had the Royal Society left matters here, history would have had
a lively denunciation of the tropes and the figures, but no program
of reform. As Sprat sees it, reform is difficult, because people labor
so long to acquire an ornamental speech in the years of their educa-
tion that "we cannot but ever after think kinder of it, than it de-
serves." Nevertheless, English science attempted to cope positively
with the unfortunate effects of the ornamental style in science. "It
will suffice my present purpose," Sprat observes, "to point out, what
has been done by the Royal Society ', towards the correcting of its
excesses in Natural Philosophy^ to which it is, of all others, a most
**Ibid. y p. in. 59 Ibid., p. 112. eo Ibid. y p. 112.
[ 389 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
profest enemy." And here is the outline o the new rhetoric, as Sprat
describes it from the endeavors of the scientists:
They have therefore been most rigorous in putting in execution, the
only Remedy, that can be found for this extravagance; and that has
been, a constant Resolution, to reject all the amplifications, digressions,
and swellings of style: to return back to the primitive purity, and
shortness, when men deliver'd so many things^ almost in an equal
number of words. They have exacted from all their members, a close,
naked, natural way of speaking ; positive expressions 5 clear senses j a
native easiness: bringing all things as near the Mathematical plain-
ness, as they can: and preferring the language of Artizans, Country-
men, and Merchants, before that, of Wits, or Scholars. 61
These words, compared with those uttered by George Puttenham
in 1589, enable us to measure the change that had occurred in Eng-
land in the seventy-eight years that immediately preceded Sprat's
History. Puttenham had warned writers against following "the
speach of a craftes man or carter, or other of the inferiour sort,
though he be inhabitant or bred in the best towne and Citie in this
Realme. . . ." 8a Puttenham had advised the writer in all the intrica-
cies of the tropes and figures of ornamental artistocratic speech. And
now, less than a century later, the historian of the Royal Society is
showing that English scientists were renouncing the tropes and fig-
ures and were preferring "the language of Artizans, Countrymen,
and Merchants, before that, of Wits or Scholars." True, Puttenham
was writing a rhetoric for the poet, whereas Sprat was recording a
rhetoric for the scientist. But even so the change is striking, and it
would still be noticeable, even if we confined ourselves to a strict
comparison between poet and poet or scientist and scientist of the
two eras. What lies between 1589 and 1667 is to be described, so
far as rhetorical history is concerned, as the change from the medieval
to the modern orientation. Nothing shows better how far that
change had progressed than does the comparison between Putten-
ham and Sprat.
In the same period, a change was occurring in the theory of style
in sermons, despite the tendency of formal homiletics to remain tied
during the seventeenth century to Ramistic or Neo-Ciceronian doc-
trine. The change began in criticisms of ornamental style in pulpit
oratory. At the very beginning of the sixteen-hundreds, William
p. 113. e2 See a bove, p, 3*8.
[ 390 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
Vaughan's The Golden-grotte, which deals with the arts of governing
one's self, one's household, and one's country, contained under the
last of these three heads a chapter on rhetoric, as well as chapters on
grammar, logic, poetry, philosophy, and so on. In Vaughan's chapter
on rhetoric there is a caustic reference to "our common lawyers, who
with their glozing speeches do as it were lay an ambush for iustice,
and with their hired tongues think it not vnhonest to defend the
guilty , and to patronize vnlawfull pleas." 63 And just before this
reference Vaughan condemns the unprofitable doctrine that rhetoric
holds for preachers. "For although Rhetorical speeches do delight
their auditory," he says, "yet notwithstanding, they make not much
for the soules health." 64 Quoting then from the Prometheus of Aes-
chylus that "Simple and material speeches are best among friends,"
Vaughan adds this cautionary advice for the pulpit: "Preachers ther-
fore must labour to speak and to vtter that, which the hearers vnder-
stand, and not go about the bush with their filing phrases." 68 He
adds a bit later that "Caluine that zealous Preacher had, as many
men know, an impediment in his speach, and in his sermons neuer
vsed any painted rhetoricall termes." 66
The use of painted rhetorical terms is decried later in the seven-
teenth century in William Pemble's Vindiciae Gratiae. Pemble has
already figured in these pages as author of the Enchiridion Ora-
torivm^ a Neo-Ciceronian manual published at Oxford in i633. 67
Pemble lectured at Oxford on divinity until his premature death in
1623, and the Vindiciae Gratiae, first published some four years after
his death, represents one series of those lectures. Although that
series was devoted to the nature and properties of grace and faith,
Pemble devotes much of his Preface to comments on preaching, and
these indicate his desire for a double plainness in sermons, one being
plainness of style and speech, and the other, plainness of matter.
Plainness of style, he suggests, is his own ambition in the Preface he
is now writing. He says in this connection:
Vnto my apprehension, such Prologues, how euer sleeked ouer, doe
yet feele rough and vneuen, and smell ranke of Lying or Flattery,
when they are most seasoned with artificiall and trimme conueyance:
68 William Vaughan, The G olden- groue, moralized, In three books: A itiorke very
necessary for all such y as would know how to gouerne themselues y their houses^ or thetr
countrey (London, 1600), sig. X8r. The italics are Vaughan's, and his note indicates
that the quotation is from Martial.
**Ibid., sig. Xyv. es Ibid., sig. X;v. 66 Ibid. y sig, X8r.
87 See above, pp. 323-324.
[ 391 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
but of all, most vnhandsomely doth this Rhetoricke suite with such
as pleade Gods cause before mortall men, who, if they will acknowl-
edge this alleageance, must yeeld attention vpon a Sic dicit Dominus y
without further entreaty. 68
As for what he means by plainness of style, that comes out in the
following passage from a later stage of his Preface:
How many excellent discourses are tortured, wrested, and pinched in,
and obscured through curiositie of penning, hidden alluions, forced
phrases, vncouth Epithites, with other deformities of plaine speaking;
your owne eares and eyes may be sufficient iudges, A great slauerie, to
make the. minde a seruant to the .tongue, & so to tye her vp in fetters,
that shee may not walke but by number and measure. Good speech,
make the most on't is but the garment of truth: and shee is so glorious
within, shee needes no outward decking j yet if shee doe appeare in a
raiment of needle worke, its but for a more maiesticke comelinesse, not
gawdy gaynesse. Truth is like our first Parents, most beautiful when
naked, twas sinne couered them, tis ignorance hides this. Let perspi-
cuitie and method bee euer the graces of speech ; and distinctnesse of
deliuery the daughter of a cleere apprehension: for my selfe, I must
alwayes thinke they know not what they say, who so speake, as others
know not what they meane. 69
Perhaps the greatest of the seventeenth-century pleas for plain-
ness of style in sermon-making came from the pen of Joseph Glan-
vill in 1678. Glanvill took his bachelor's degree at Oxford in 1655,
and his master's degree three years later. Thereafter his life was
spent in the church. But he was interested in the new movements in
the science of his day 5 he enjoyed the friendship of the founders of
the Royal Society 5 and on December 14, 1664, he himself was
elected fellow of that distinguished organization. 70 Thus his theory
of preaching grew out of his own professional concern for the needs
of the pulpit and out of his acquaintance with the new rhetorical doc-
trine being evolved in the meetings of the Royal Society. It is no
exaggeration to say that he brought the doctrine of plainness from
the new theory of scientific exposition and planted it in the ancient
theory of religious persuasion. He was not the first to advocate plain-
ness in sermon-making -, but his position in the seventeenth century
68 William Pemble, Vindiciae Gratiae* A Plea for Grace (London, 1629), p. i.
69 Ibid.y pp. 12-23.
70 Dictionary of National Bio gra^hy^ s.v. Glanvill, Joseph (1636-1680)5 also Foster,
Alumni Oxonienses^ ~s.v. Glanvill, Joseph.
[ 392 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
as writer on homiletics and as member of the group advocating a new
rhetoric for science gives his homiletical theory a double significance.
GlanvilPs A Seasonable Defence of Preaching, published at Lon-
don in 1678, is not primarily a work in the field of sacred rhetoric,
but it must be mentioned as an indication of its author's interest in
the problems of pulpit speakers, and it provides an excellent intro-
duction to his more purely rhetorical doctrine. 71 The Defence is a
dialogue on preaching by five laymen, identified as A, B, C, D, and E.
The main speaker is A. He talks first with B on the question whether
there is an excess of preaching in the modern church, his position
being that there is not. 72 He next talks with C on the institution of
preaching as distinguished from prayer. 73 C believes that preaching
is outmoded in the modern era, inasmuch as there are no longer any
heathens to convert j and thus he advocates more prayer and less
preaching. A answers this argument by asserting that sermon-making
is still essential, and that its success can be explained. In the course
of this part of the dialogue, A mentions that the success achieved by
the puritan preachers before the civil war depended not so much on
the excellence of their sermons as on other factors. At this point D
enters the argument. He turns out later to be a nonconformist, and
his general contention is that preaching in the established church has
not been effective of late, whereas preaching in the sects has shown
both greater plainness and greater power. 74 In the course of A's ob-
jections to each of these theses, he pauses to exchange ideas with C
on the relative merits of preaching, prayer, catechisms, and homi-
lies. 75 The dialogue comes to an end in a conversation between A and
E on the disadvantages of having a hired clergy and on the careless-
ness and looseness that might develop in sermons from the wrong
kind of attempts to make them plain. 70
It is GlanvilPs An Essay concerning Preaching: Written for the
Direction of A Young Divine, also published at London in 1678, that
contains his chief contribution to rhetorical theory. 77 This work ana-
71 The title page reads: "A Seasonable Defence of Preaching: and the Plain Way of
it. London: Printed by M. Clark, for H. Brome, at the Gun in St. Paul's Church-yard.
MDCLXXVIII."
72 A Seasonable Defence of Preaching (1678), pp. 1-8.
73 Ibid., pp. 8-39. 7 *Ibid., pp. 39-50, 74-99-
75 Ibid., pp. 50-74. Ibid. y pp. 99-112,
77 Its title page reads: "An Essay concerning Preaching: Written for the Direction of
A Young Divinej and Useful also for the People, in order to Profitable Hearing. Lon-
don: Printed by A. C. for H. Brome, at the Gun in St. Paul's Church-yard. M. DC.
LXXVIII."
[ 393 1
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
lyzes first the different standards used by listeners to measure the
effectiveness of sermons, some listeners being only in the mood for
entertainment, others for instruction, still others for a pedantic show
of learning, still others for plentiful biblical texts, still others for
passion and vehemence, and still others for coldness and monotony.
Glanvill then sets forth what he considers to be the true standard:
"The End of preaching must be acknowledged to be the Instruction
of the hearers in Faith and Good Life, in order to the Glory of God,
and their present, and future happiness 5 and this ought to be the
Rule and Measure of Preaching, and the exercise judged by this." 78
Having established this function as the true aim of the preacher,
Glanvill proceeds to organize his theory of sermon-making into four
main subjects. Let us let him describe them for us: "I shall handle
the Rules of Preaching under these four Heads. It ought to be plain,
practical, methodical, affectionate." 7 *
Plainness to Glanvill is a broad characteristic, and he proceeds to
explain it mainly in terms of its opposites. These are enumerated as
"hard words," "deep and mysterious notions," "affected Rhetorica-
tions," and "Phantastical Phrases." Hard words are outlandish
words used where ordinary English would serve. Deep and mysteri-
ous notions are hypotheses and speculative questions in theology and
philosophy. Affected rhetorications are nothing less than the tropes
and the figures of Ciceronian and Ramistic rhetoric. Of stylistic
rhetoric in general Glanvill says: "There is a bastard kind of elo-
quence that is crept into the Pulpit, which consists in affectations of
wit and finery, flourishes, metaphors, and cadencies." 80 GlanvilPs
objection to this sort of style is that it degrades the ministry. "If we
would acquit our selves as such," he declares, "we must not debase
our great, and important message by those vanities of conceited
speech 5 plainness is for ever the best eloquence 5 and 'tis the most
forcible." 81 As for fantastical phrases, they differ from the rhetorica-
tions in being not so much violations of accepted patterns of speech
as exploitations of smart current colloquialisms. Thus, says Glanvill,
if you teach men to believe Christ's doctrine, to obey his laws, and
to conform to his example, you are counted dull and unedifyingj
"but if you tell the people, that they must roll upon Christ, close
with Christ, get into Christ, get a saving interest in the Lord Christ:
O, this is savoury, this precious, this is spiritual teaching indeed;
An Essay concerning Preaching (1678), p. 10.
76 Ibid., p. ii. 80 /, p. 23. **/, pp. 34-25.
[ 394 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
whereas if any thing more be meant by those phrases than what the
other plain expressions intend, it is either falshood or nonsense." 82
When Glanvill requires that, as a second consideration, sermons
may be judged excellent only when they are practical, he means that
sermons must actually improve the conduct of the listeners. "The
main business of Religion," he avers, "is a good and holy life." 83 And
the main design of the preacher, he adds, "should be to promote
that." Thus sermons must contain pious doctrine, practicable direc-
tions, and forcible motives. Pious doctrine is of course made up of
the basic tenets of the preacher's religion. Practicable directions con-
cern the advice the preacher may give as to the way in which that
doctrine transforms itself into duties and actions. Forcible motives
are those hopes, those fears, and those preferences, "convincing mens
understanding that their interest is in their duty." 84
GlanvilPs discussion of the requirement that preaching should be
methodical is just as close to the spirit of the new rhetoric as is his
discussion of plainness of style. Here is what he says at the outset of
this part of his treatise: "Method is necessary both for the under-
standings, and memories of the hearers j when a discourse hath an
order, and connexion, one part gives light to another 3 whereas the
mind is lost in confusions." 85 These words remind us of the efforts
of Ramus to give method a new significance in the theory of presenta-
tion. These words remind us, too, that Ramus believed order in dis-
course to be a great contributing factor in making it easy for the
speaker and the hearer to remember what was being said. But Glan-
vilPs general rules for method remind us, not of Ramus and the
Ciceronians, but of the new rhetoric. The first of these rules is that
method should "be natural" "not strain'd and forced, but such as
the matter, and the capacities, and wants of the auditors, require,
and lead you to." 89 The second of Glanvill's rules for method is
that "It should be obvious, and plainly laid down." 87 Those who ad-
vocate a cryptic method to surprise the hearers are vain and weak;
"our business is not to surprise, but to instruct." 88 GlanvilPs third
rule is that the method should not be too intricate "the main things
to be said may be reduced to a small number of heads, which being
thorowly spoken to, will signifie more than a multitude slightly
touch'd." 89 Following these general rules, Glanvill talks of method
in terms of the parts of the sermon, and proceeds to discuss the choice
8 * Ibid., p. 26. **Ibid., p. 28. M /<*., p. 37 * 5 Ibid. t p, 38.
p. 39. ** Ibid., p. 39- "/<*., p. 39- "Ibid., p. 40.
[ 395 ]
NEW HORIZONS IN LOGIC AND RHETORIC
of the text, the introduction, the body, and the application. Through-
out this concluding portion of his discussion of organization, he keeps
to the theme of plainness, common sense, and moderation. He also
writes everywhere with an eye to the effect of a given procedure
upon those who listen.
The fourth one of GlanvilPs requirements is that a sermon should
be affectionate. By this he means that it should express and arouse
zeal. Affections, he says, "are the springs of the Soul, that move the
Will, and put our powers into Action." 90 It is best, of course, he goes
on, for our affections to be aroused by our understanding, by our
knowledge of duty. But not everyone is capable of that kind of moti-
vation. The common people, for example, "have not Souls for much
knowledge, nor usually are they moved by this method." 91 For them,
and for all others who lack the intellectual power to know what duty
is, the tropes, figures, and schemes of style, and the inducements of
vehemence in delivery, are necessary. Nor are these appeals illegiti-
mate. God condescends to use them for us 5 "he speaks in our Lan-
guage," says Glanvill, "and in such schemes of speech as are apt to
excite the affections of the most vulgar, and illiterate." 92
After concluding these four topics, Glanvill discusses faults in
sermons, and then turns to a discussion "of the main circumstances
of Preaching, which concern the Voice and the Action"** Thus does
he manage to add delivery to his previous discussion of style, matter,
and arrangement, as if he were thinking of the old Ciceronian divi-
sions of rhetoric, and were trying to cover the four most often em-
phasized by the Neo-Ciceronians. His final step is to discuss the edu-
cation of a preacher, and here too he reminds us of Cicero laying
down a program of philosophical preparation for the duties of a
pagan orator in a layman's world. He admits towards the end of the
Essay that his doctrines may be out of step with his time. Some go to
church, he remarks, to be entertained by fine language and witty
sentences. "They come to Sermons with the same appetites and in-
clinations, as they go to see, and hear Plays." 94 Others go to church
with a genuine zeal for religion but with a head full of false images
and false expectations as to the language the preacher should use.
The plainness and simplicity that I recommend, observes Glanvill,
will not edify them$ in fact, they will pretend they do not under-
stand. They and the other group just mentioned, Glanvill declares,
make up the greater part of those who judge sermons in this age. It
90 Ibid., p. 54-. 91 /, p. 55. "/<*., p. 56.
p. 78, 9 * /<*., p. 87.
[ 396 ]
BACON, LAMY, HOBBES, AND GLANVILL
is not often "that the true plain Preaching is popular." 95 To the
young divine for whom he is writing the Essay Glanvill then says
that one must be ready to hear affected triflers and ignorant canters
extolled as rare men, while the truly excellent preachers are mis-
liked. And upon this note he brings his theory of rhetoric to an end.
GlanvilPs Essay concludes my discussion of the new rhetoric of
the seventeenth century, and my analysis of the main currents in
logical and rhetorical theory in England during the Renaissance.
Glanvill is an excellent prophet of things to come in the theory of
communication. His Essay summarizes most of the trends I have been
discussing in this chapter. It stands as a refreshing change for the
reader who proceeds chronologically to examine works on rhetoric
in the period between 1500 and 1700. It points specifically towards
the emergence in English rhetorical theory of that fine modern rhet-
oric, Fenelon's Dialogues on Eloquence^ which was published in
French in 1717 and 1718, and in English in I722. 96 Fenelon's Dia-
logues, by the way, are supposed to have been composed in 1679, or
thereabouts, and thus they are the product of the same era that pro-
duced GlanvilPs Essay in England. They are a more complete rhet-
oric than Glanvill's, because Fenelon devotes as much space to the
oration of the layman as to the sermon of the preacher, and he even
gives his rhetorical theory a significance for the student of poetical
communication. 97 Indeed, he goes farther than any rhetorician of his
time towards creating a new rhetoric, even as the Port-Royalists
went farther than contemporary logicians in creating a new logic.
Although Fenelon was not a Port-Royalist, his Dialogues are a better
Port-Royal rhetoric than that achieved by Lamy, who was given
credit by seventeenth-century Englishmen for having completed in
rhetoric the reform started by Arnauld and Nicole in logic. Thus
Fenelon ought to be in my present chapter. But he cannot be claimed
for English rhetorical theory until the eighteenth century was well
under way, and that era lies outside my present limits. GlanvilPs
Essay , however, is almost as good an example of the new rhetoric
as the Dialogues are, and it is an example which belongs naturally to
England and to the seventeenth century. I am content to close these
pages with GlanvilPs name in the last sentence of my description of
the new rhetoric.
95 ibid., P . 9 i.
96 On these points, see my Fenelon's Dialogues on Eloquence^ pp. 36-37, 46, 49.
97 See my "Oratory and Poetry in Fenelon's Literary Theory," The Quarterly Journal
of Speech, XXXVII (1951), i-io.
[ 397 ]
Index
Abelard, 38
ablatio, 129
abusion, 109
Academics, 300-301
Acontius, Jacobus, De Methodo, 286, 289,
290
Adamson, R., 44
Advancement of Learning, see Bacon,
Francis
Aegidius, 251
Aeneas, 315
Aeolus, 199
Aeschines, 104
Aeschylus, Prometheus^ 391
Agricola, Rudolph, 15-16, 34, 54., 126,
14.9, 198, 227, 248, 322 i De Inventione
Dialectica Libri Tres, 16, 49-50, 51, 131,
152
Airay, Christopher, 308, 3171 Fasciculus
Praeceptorum Logicorum, 308-309, 316
Albertus Magnus, 39
Alcinous, 315
Alcuin, 6, 7, 37, 40, 75, 785 De Dialectica,
32-3^) 735 De Rhetorica, 32, 33, 70, 73-
74, 119
Aldhelm, Letter to Acircius, 33
Alexander, 373
Alexander o Hales, 39, 301; Summa
Theologica^ 39
Al-Farabi, 375 Liber de Divisione Scienti-
arum, 40, 41, 44
allegory, 169, 256
Alsted, John Henry, 283, 284, 303, 312,
3381 Harmonius System of Logic, 284,
306
Ames, William, 210, 212, 2455 Demon-
stratio Logicae Verae, 210-211$ Theses
Logicae, 2IO-2H
Amoretto, 243
amplification, 127, 377
Amyot, Jacques, 1695 L > Histoire aetht-
opique, a translation of Heliodorus's
Aethiopica, 169, 171
anadiplosis, 256
analysis and genesis, 249-250, 260, 305-
306, 312, 320-321
Analytica Posteriora, see Aristotle, Pos-
terior Analytics
Analytica Priora, see Aristotle, Prior Ana-
lytics
anaphora, 256
Anderson, George K., 33
Anderson, James Maitland, 179
Andreae, Antonius, Scriptum . super Libros
Veteros Logics 45-46
Andrews, Bishop, 325
antimetabole, 124
antitheses, 334
Apelles, 181
apheresis, 129
Aphthonius, Progymnasmata, 140, 142,
266
Apiciusj Marcus Gabius, 104
apocope, 109
Apollo, 242
Apollonius, 177
apology, 124
aposiopesis, 124
apostrophe, 170, 256
Arber, Edward, 30, 50, 179, 192, 194,
195, 196, 203, 204, 206, 254) arfi, 262,
*73> 3*7-3*9, 338 3^4
Archimedes, 153, 1775 Quadratura Para-
bolae^ 177
argument, 22, 305, 309, 310, 316, 343*
dilemma, 23, 54, 2885 enthymeme, 22,
54, 288, 292, 294, 299, 305, 3105
example, 22, 23, 54, 288, 292, 294, 299,
305, 3105 induction, 22-23, 54, 159-
160, 288, 292, 294, 299, 305, 310, 363,
3685 rhetorical induction, 545 rhetor-
ical syllogism, 54, 77 5 sorites, 23, 288 j
syllogism, 22, 35, 54, 159-^0) **S,
292, 294, 299, 305, 310, 312, 354, 361,
363, 368
Aristotle, 6, 39, 54, 62, 63, 64, 69, 147,
155) *$*) 164, 165, 173, 174, 175, 177,
178, 180, 183, 185, 188, 189, 190,
191, 192, 193, 196, 197, 199, 208, 214,
217, 2l8, 219, 222, 224-225, 227, 229,
274, 285, 289, 300, 301, 302, 310, 311,
318, 347, 353, 355, 356, 360, 362, 374*
384, 385 f Categories, 12, 19, 34, 35,
36, 39, 40, 44, 46, 47, 52, 156, 294,
a 99) 35> Ethics, 215 Metaphysics^ 154,
i8oj On Interpretation^ 12, 22, 35, 39,
40, 46, 52, 299, 3055 Organon, 12, 13,
16, 19, 24, 28, 35, 37, 38) 39i 4) 4i>
47) 52, 53, 55> *3i *54> io> *34> ^37,
240, 241, 287, 288, 295> 304, 305, 309,
3105 Physics, 1 80, 2265 Posterior Ana-
lytics, 12, 21, 39, 40, 4-i-44> I49> I 5>
158, 182, 299, 305, 309 j Prior Ana-
lytics, 12, 22, 40, 53, 158, 182, 236,
299, 305, 3535 Rhetoric, 64, 6S, 131,
i54> *55> *56> ^4, 236, 237, 276, 279,
3*5> 333, 35*> 373, 383-3*5, 387-3885
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, 154, 38 4 j
Sophistical Elenchi, 12, 28, 39, 40, 47,
[ 399 ]
INDEX
63) 227, 3053 Topics, 12, 15, 16-18,
4) 35) 40, 44> 47> 55) 62, ^9) I 3^>
149, 152, 236) 287, 299, 305, 313
Aristotle's three laws, 41-43, 232, 235,
287, 292, 307; in Vincent of Beauvais,
41-43; in Ramus, i49-*53) 158-15?)
3425 in Macllmaine, 181-182, 186; in
Milton, 217-218 j in Smith, 295-296;
in Sanderson, 3065 in Airay, 309; in
Prideaux, 315$ lex justitiae, 150, 151-
152, 181, 186, 215, 253, 255, 269, 323,
33) 359-36oi lex sapientiae, 150, 152-
*53> *6o, 182, 186, 2175 lex veritatis,
150, 151, 181-1823 186, 217, 2695 de
omni, 150, 295, 3095 per se, 150, 296,
3093 universaliter primum (jquatenus
ipsum), 150, 296, 309; du tout, 150;
par soy, 150; universel premier ement,
150
arithmetic, 14, 51, 151, 15 3, 258, 259
Arnauld, Antoine, and Claude Lancelot,
Grammaire Generate et Raisonnee, 352
Arnauld, Antoine, and Pierre Nicole, Port-
Royal Logic, 8-9, 10, 299, 343, 346,
350-363, 364, 365^ 378 382, 384, 397
arrangement: logical, 15, 16-23, 34, 147-
148, 152, 154, 155, 157-165, 180-181,
226, 231-232, 235, 255, 287, 292, 314,
3*7) 3*8, 321, 342, 343, 348, 359, 365,
370-371, 377 j philosophical, 366, 367-
368 j poetic, 75, 82, 83-84; rhetorical,
6, 66, 67, 72, 74, 81, 92^ 93, 101-102,
112, 113, 147-148, 152, 153, 155, 164-
165, 267, 269, 271, 318, 319, 322, 323,
324-325, 326, 330, 331, 332, 365, 380,
382-385, 395-396
artistic proofs, 68-69, 155-156, 162, 180,
221, 231, 268, 375-382
Art of Rhetorick, A>s to Elocution ; Ex-
plain* d> 280-281
Ascham, Roger, 173)253,259, 318; Letter
to Sturm (1550), 173-174, 1755 Letter
to Sturm (1552), 174-1765 Schole-
master, 177-178, 253-254
Asser of St. David's, 75
Astengo, Andrea, 80
astronomy, 14, 61, 82
Atkins, J. W. H., 33, 38, 64, 66, 74, 76,
98, 119, 120
Atlas, 84
Atticus, 67
Augustine, Saint, 81, 108, 112, 207, 301,
334 j De Doctrina Christiana, 112, 115
Averroes, 37, 301
Avicenna, 37, 301
Bacon, Francis, 9, 218, 229, 325, 342,
350, 364, 382, 388; Advancement of
Learning, 9, 194, 202, 306, 333, 365-
375. 382-383, 386-3875 De Dignitate
et Augmentis Scientiarum, 341; Novum
Organum, 344; Works, ed. James Sped-
ding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denon
Heath, 202, 365-374) 382-383, 386-387
Bacon, Roger, Opus Majus, 44-45
Balf, 169
Baker, William, 298
Balbus de Janua, Catholicon, 122
Baldwin, Charles Sears, 15, 38., 40, 64,
119, 120
Baldwin, Thomas Whitfield, 64, 146, 254,
292
Barak, 316
Barebone, John, 189-190
Barnard, H. C., 352, 379
Bartas, du, 258, 316
Barton, John, 258, 2735 Art of Rhetorick
Concisely and Compleatly Handled, 274-
275
Baskervill, Charles Read, 139
Baynes, Thomas Spencer, trans. Port-Royal
Logic, 352-363
Beckher, George, 326
Bede, 7, 32, 33, 75, 76, 127; Liber de
Arte Metrica, 33; Liber de Ortho-
graphia, 33; Liber de Schematibus et
Tropis, 7, 33, 116-119
Bedwell, William, 246
Bellay, Joachim du, 169
Bembus, 251
Bennett, Henry Stanley, 240
Bentham, Jeremy, 63, 350
Beowulf, 33
Bertius, Petrus, 310
Beurhaus, Friedrich, 202, 203, 222, 227,
230; Dialecticae Libri Duo, an edition
of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo, 203;
Inquiries, 202-203; Scholastic Disputa-
tions, 203
Beza, Theodorus, 207
Bible, 81, 116, 138, 218, 219, 258;
Genesis, 187; Matthew, 187; Numbers,
1875 Psalms, 275
Blades, William, 79, So
blank verse, 256
Bliss, Philip, 30, 293
Blount, Thomas, Academie of Eloquence,
277) 33i. 332-333) 335
Blundeville, Thomas, 29, 30, 297, 298,
300-301, 315; Arte of Logicke, 29, 216,
285-291, 307, 354; True order and
< Methode of wyting and reading Hys-
tories, 286
Boehner, Philotheus, 37, 234
Boethiusi 15, 24, 39, 51, 54; commentaries
upon Aristotle's Organon, 245 De Dif-
[ 400 ]
INDEX
ferentiis Topicis, 15, 36, 41, 77-78, 805
Liber de Divisione, 41, 46
Book of Common Prayer, 13
Boscan Almogaver, 258
Bourbon, Antoine de, 239
Brerewood, Edward, 298, 3165 Elementa
Logicae, 298-2995 Tractatus quidam
logici, 299
Brewster, David, 300
Brinsley, John, Ludus Literarius, 265-266,
270
Britomart, 316
Brooke, C. F. Tucker, 239
Brooke, Thomas, 125
Brown, Peter Hume, see Buchanan, George
Brutus, see Cicero
Brutus, 67
Bucer, Martin, 58-59, 106, 174
Buchanan, George, 188, 189$ "Opinion
anent the Reformation of the Univer-
sitie of St Andros," ed. Peter Hume
Brown, 188
Buckley, William, Arithmetica, 51
Budaeus, 251
Biihler, Curt Ferdinand, 47, 87, 122
Bulwer, John, Chirologia . . . Chvronomia,
340-341
Burgersdijck, Franco, Institution-urn Logi-
carutn Libri Duo, 309-311, 316
Burke, Robert Belle, 44
Busche, Alexandre van den (Le Sylvain),
336
Buscherus, Heizo, 283
Butler, Charles, 193, 258, 274, 319;
Oratoriae Libri Duo, 266-269, 3195
Ra?neae Rhetoricae Libri Duo, 262 ;
Rhetoricae Libri Duo, 262-266, 267,
268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 280, 319, 340
Butler, H. E., 67
cacemphaton, 121
Cacus the thief, 104
Caesar, 132, 138, 3735 Commentaries, 260
Calagius, Biblidos, 315-316
Calvin, 391
Campagnac, E. T., 270
Canisius, Henricus, 34
Caplan, Harry, vii, 106, 115
Capperonnier, 1 1 8
Carpentarius, 199, 282
Carpenter, Frederic Ives, see Cox, Leonard
Carpenter, Nathaniel, 15, 3765 Philoso-
phia Libera, 377-378
Carter, Peter, ed. Seton's Dialectica, 50-56,
178
Case, John, 190-191, 193; Speculum Mo-
ralium Ouaestionum, 190-191} Summa
veterum Inter pretum, 191-192
catachresis, 124, 169
Categoriae, see Aristotle, Categories
Catherine de* Medici, 239
Caxton, William, Mirrour of the World^
47-48, 49, 87-90
Centaurs, 84
Cephas Chlononius, 173, 175, 176
Chaderton, Laurence, 179, 206, 208, 211,
222, 247
Chalmers, Alexander, in
Chappell, William, 211, 213; Methodus
Concionandi, 212-213; The Preacher,
212-213
Charisius, 118
Charlemagne, 32, 33, 34, 73
Charles I, 300, 339
Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine, 147, 153,
218
Charles, third duke of Suffolk, 105
Chaucer, 126; Canterbury Tales, 316
Cheke, Sir John, 12
Cherillus ( Choerilus ) , 198
Christ, 135, 174, 339
Christianus, Phil., 212
Chrysippus, 373
Chrysostom, 301
Cicero, 4, 6, 54, 65, 68, 83, 84, 91, 92,
in, 122, 127, 137, 148, 155, 165, 173,
*75> *77, 178* l8 j l8 5j 187? 188, 219,
227, 236, 237, 251, 252, 253, 260, 264,
267, 274, ^79) 30i, 3*8> 319, 321, 322,
3*5, 33i> 334, 35*, 357> 382, 39^5
Brutus, 67, 104, io8j De Finibus, 15;
De Inventione, 54, 66, 69, 70-71, 72,
73> 74-> 76, 77, 92, 93> 94, io> *i
325} De Officiis, 21, 2605 De Oratore,
66, 67, 69, 74, 77, 85, 104, 108, 116,
118, 131, iSoj De Partitione Oratoria,
66, 67, 108, 1315 Laelius, 250$ Oration
against Verres, 163} Oration for Marcus
Marcellus, 132, 1385 Oration in the
Senate upon his Return, 2505 Oration
to the People upon his Return, 2495
Orator, 15, 67, 72, 74, 102, 104, 116,
118, 121, 131, 337-3385 Topics, 15, 16,
21, 24-25, 57, 70, 224
Ciceronian rhetoric, see rhetoric
Ciceronians, 62, 251, 252, 302, 319, 320,
3&5y 374
circuitus, 121
circumlocution, 124
Clark, Donald Lemen> 64, 143, 146, 258
Clark, Samuel, 192-193, 199-200
Clarke, John, 338, 3405 Formulae Ora-
toriae, 338-339, 3405 Transitionum
rhetoricarum formulae, 338
Clauberg, 357
Clerke, John, 246
[ 401 ]
INDEX
Clifford's Inn, aoo
Coligriy, Admiral, 239
Collier, John Payne, 30
Collijn, Isak, 79
colon, 121
Columbia University Press, 214
Columbus, 199
commonplaces, see invention, logical, rhe-
torical
Company of Merchant Taylors, 143
Compendium of the An of Logick and
Rhetorick in the English Tongue, 238,
176) 279, 384
Concerning Demonstration, see Aristotle,
Posterior Analytics
Concerning Syllogism, see Aristotle, Prior
A nalytics
conclusion, see parts of the classical oration
Congregation of the Oratory, 379
Consiliodorus, 242
constitutio^ 70-71, 107, 114
controversy college at Chelsea, 311, 376-
377
Cooper, Lane, vii, 21
Cooper, Thompson, 50
Cooper, William Durrant, 30
Copland, Robert, Art of Memory , a trans-
lation of Tommai's Foenix, 95-98
Corax, 2 8
Cornificius, 135
Cortesius, 251
Couto, Sebastian, 234
Coverdale's English Bible, 13
Cox, Leonard, 81, 132$ Erotetnata Rhe-
torica, 945 The Arte or Crafte of Rhe-
thoryke, 90-95, 98, io8j The Arte or
Crafte of Rhethoryke, ed. Frederic Ives
Carpenter, 87-88, 90, 92, 94
Craig, Hardin, 146
Crane, William Garrett, 64, 134, 137, 146
Crellius, Fortunatus, 310
Crook, William, 279
Curio, Coelius Secundus, 51-52
Cyrus, 373
d > Ailly, Pierre, 234
Dareste, Rodolphe > 227
D > Assigny, Marius, Art of Memory, 3415
Rhetorica Anglorum, 341
David and Goliath, 107
Davies, Godfrey, vii
Day, Angel, 329, 3385 English Secretorie,
329-^30, 335
Deborah, 316
De FinibuSy see Cicero
De Interpretatione > see Aristotle, On Inter-
pretation
De Inventione, see Cicero
deliberative oratory, 70, 93, 106
delivery, 7, 66, 67, 72-73, 74, 75, 81, 82,
84-85, 89, 104, 112, 113, 148, 164,
170-172, 249, 255, 258, 260-261, 262,
264, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 277,
280, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 324-325*
359 3<55) 3^6, 368-374, 379, 3805
gesture, 73, 89-90, 104-105, 170-171,
249, 258, 260-261, 264, 274, 275, 340-
34i 3^9> 39*5 voice, 73, 89, IO4-XO5,
170-171, 249, 258, 264, 275, 379, 396
demonstrative oratory, 70, 93, 106-107
Demosthenes, 12, 104, 141, 1715 Three
Orations, 12
De Officiis, Se Cicero
de omni, 150, 295, 309
De Oratore, see Cicero
De Partitione Oratoria, see Cicero
Descartes, Rene, 153, 342, 360, 361, 362,
3*5> 3 6 7> 374> 3?6> 3823 Discours de
la Methode, 153, 160, 306, 343-350*
35i) 358, 366, 381
De Septenario, see Aldhelm, Letter to Acir-
cius
Desmaze, Charles, 146
De Sophisticis Elenchis f see Aristotle, So-
phistical Elenchi^
dialectic, see logic"
dialectic and logic differentiated, 16, 43,
51, 154-155
dialectic and logic identified, 17, 52, 154,
304
Diana, 348
Dido, 315
Dietericus, 274
Digby, Everard, 194-196, 199, 202, 204,
238, 243, 369$ Two Books on the Bi-
partite Method, 1945 Response to the
Admonition of F. Mildapet, 195
dilemma, see argument
Dillingham, Dr., 179
diminution, 124
Dimmock, Sir Edward, 99
Diogenes Laertius, De Vita et Moribus
Philosophorwm, 28
disposition, see arrangement
dissolutum, 109
division, see parts of the classical oration
Donatus, 1 1 8
Dow, Clyde W., 321, 322
Downer, Alan, 379
Downham, George, 208, 210, 218, 2305
Commentaries on the Dialectic of P.
Ramus, 208-209, 211, 215, 217
Drant, Thomas, 55-56, 178, 208
Dry den, 281
Duchesne, Andre, 34
[ 402
INDEX
Duchess of Suffolk, 57
Dudley, John, 99
Duff, E. Gordon, 45, 46, 79
Dugard, William, Rhetorices Elementa,
269-270
Duhamel, P. Albert, 14.6, 216, 218
Duke of Northumberland, 99
Du Moulin, Pierre, 274, 310
Duns Scotus, Johannes, 46
Du Pac de Bellegarde, G., and J. Haute-
rage, 351, 354, 355, 356, 358, 360
Du tout, 150
Earl of Essex, 57, 58, 59
Earl of Leicester, 190
Edward VI, 12, 13, 99
Egbert, 32
Ehninger, Douglas, 379
Elias, 288
Elizabeth, see Queen Elizabeth
Ellis, Robert Leslie, see Bacon, Francis
Elyot, 126
enargia, 121, 127
enigma, 124, 169
enthymeme, see argument
enumeration, 127
epanorthosls, 124
epenthesis, 109, 129
Epicurus, 227
Erasmus, 16, 108, 135, 207, 248, 251 j
A$o<phthegmata<> 108, 139$ Chiliades,
1395 Ciceronianus, 2521 Declamation
on Educating Children, 125, 132, 1385
De Du'plici Co'pia Verborum ac Rerum y
I 3 I > I 37i Epistle in praise of matri-
mony, 1085 Opuscula aliquot^ 1391
Preacher, 131
Estienne, Charles, 335
Ethics, see Aristotle
etiology, 325
Euathlus, 28, 288
Euryalns, 357
6vrard 1'Allemand, Laborintus, 122
example, 1275 see also argument
exclamation, 124, 170, 256
expolitio, 135
exposition in medical science, 184
extenuation 109
extenuation, 124
Eyre, George E. B., and Charles R. Riving-
ton, 212, 352
Page, Robert, Peter Ramus . . . Ms Dia-
lectica, a translation of Ramus's Dia-
lecticae Libri Duo, 237-238, 276, 280
fallacies, 28, 228, 232, 287, 288, 294, 305,
309* 3i> 3i7 343) 3*ij 368 i ambigu-
ity, 305 antistrephon, 28, 300; asistaton,
28, 288; cacosistaton, 285 ceratinae, 28,
288 j crocodilites, 28, 288, 3005 fallacia
accidentiS) 2885 pseudomenos, 28, 2885
utis, 28, 300
Faral, Edmund, 66, 75, 119
Faringdon, Hughj 90
Farnaby, Thomas, 276-277, 325, 326,
338, 3405 Formulae Oratoriae, 321;
Index PoeticuS) 3215 Index Rhetoricus,
^280, 321-323, 324, 335, 340
Fenelon, 11, 115, 1494 Dialogues on
Eloquence, 397
Fenner, Dudley, 2193 220, 229, 326-3275
Artes of Logike and Rethortke, 219-222,
*55- 2 56, 257 258, 273, 276-279, 280,
384
Festus, Sextus Pompeius, 201
Feuillerat, Albert, 205
Ficino, 144
figures, 109, 124, 132-137, 164, 167, 169-
170, 256, 260, 261, 264, 270, 271, 274,
275, 276, 277, 278-279, 280, 317, 322,
325 326, 3^7-335) 359) 37S> 379> S^o,
385-397
Fliigel, Ewald, 3 i
Foclin, Antoine, 166, 2485 La Rhetorique
Francoise, a translation of Talaeus's
Rhetorica, 166-172, 1885 ed. Satires of
Persius, 166
Fonseca, Peter, 234
Foquelin, see Foclin
Forbes, Clarence A., and Harold S. Wilson,
see Harvey, Gabriel, Ciceronianus
forensic oratory, see judicial oratory
formulary rhetoric, see rhetoric
Foster, Joseph, 190, 193, 265, 392
Fouquelin, see Foclin
Francesco dalla Rovere, 79
Fraunce, Abraham, 2225 Arcadian Rhe-
torike^ ed. Ethel Seaton, 257-258, 3275
La<wters Logi&e, 223-228, 329, 249-2 5 o>
257, 25 8 j Shea'pheardes Logike^ 222,
223
Freigius, John Thomas, 199, 248, 2595
Ciceronianusy 2525 Life of Peter Ramus ^
218
French, J. Milton, 146, 238
Frischlin, tJebraidos^ 316
Fulgentius, Mythologiae^ 77
Fulke, William* 59
Fuller, Thomas, 208, 209^ an
Fullwood, William, 59$ Cartel of Mem-
orie, 1435 Enimie of Idlenesse, 59, 143-
1455 ed. Lever's Philosopher's Game, 59,
14-3
Galen, 154, 184, 289, 290
[ 403 ]
INDEX
Galen, Matthieu, 34.
Gallandius, 199) 282
Garcilasso, 258
Gassendi, 360
Gayley, Charles Mills > 31
Gellius, Aulus, Noctes Atticae, 28
Genesis, see. Bible
genesis, see analysis and genesis
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, 75-76,
8 i, 87, 119, 122} Summa de Coloribus
Rhetoricis, 119-120, 122
geometry, 14, 151, 153, 259
gesture, see delivery
Gilbert, Allan H., A fuller institution of
the Art of Logic, a translation of Mil-
ton's Artis Logicae Plenior Institutio,
214-219
Gilbert de la Porree, Liber de Sex Princi-
piis, 38, 39, 41, 46, 47
Giles, John Allen, 173, 174, 175, 176
Gilson, Ittienne, 344, 346
Giraldus Cambrensis, 76
Glanvill, Joseph, n, 364, 392; Essay
concerning Preaching, 393-397; Season-
able Defence of Preaching, 393
Glareanus, 251
Gossouin, Sensuit le livre de clergie, 47
Gouge, William, 199-200, 245
Goulston, Theodore, 384
Gouvea, Antonio, 188, 189, 282
Gower, 126
gradatio, 109
Graese, Jean George Theodore, 335, 352
Grafton, Richard, 12, 13, 29
grammar, 14, 118, 147, 148, 151, 152,
153, 161-162, 171, 181, 185-186, 229,
^54-j *59 *6o, ^74-, ^75) 304, 3^7,
342, 359, 369* 37i> 374o 379
Granger, Thomas, Syntagma Logicum,
229-232, 284, 291
Grataroli, Guglielmo, De Memoria, 143
Graves, Frank Pierrepont, 146, 176, 188,
189, 249, 282, 289
Gray's Inn, 222, 223, 224
Greaves, Paul, 245
Greene, Robert, 45, 196, 243; Friar Bacon
and Friar Bungay, 455 Menaphon, 1975
Quip for an Upstart Courtier, 198
Greenlaw, Edwin, 265
Greg, Walter Wilson, 30
Grey, Lady Jane, 99
Grosseteste, Robert, 39, 45, 46
Guggenheim, M., 173
Gutch, John, 37, 45, 75, 189
Hale, E. E. Jr., 64
Halm, Carolus, 33, 73, 116, 117, 118
Harvey, Gabriel, 146, 178, 179, 193, 196,
197, 199, 202, 203-204, 206, 208, 211,
247, 255, 257, 3875 Ciceronianus, trans.
Harold S. Wilson and Clarence A.
Forbes, 146, i74> 1785 i79> l8 9> *47>
248, 250-254, 2555 Four Letters, 198;
Piercers Supererogation, 198-1995 Rhe-
tor, 248-250, 254, 255
Harvey, Richard, 198
Harvey, William, 346
Haureau, Barthelemy, 37
Hautefage, J., see Du Pac de Bellegarde,
G., and J. Hautefage
Hawes, Stephen, 46, 76, 103} Pastime of
Pleasure, 47, 48-49, 81-88, 119
Heath, Douglas Denon, see Bacon, Francis
Heath, T. L., 177
Heffner, Ray, 265
Heliodorus, Aethiopica, 169, 171
Hemingius, 207
Hendrickson, G. L., 67
Henry VIII, 50
Henry, Earl of Pembroke, 223
Henry of Anjou, 239, 240, 241
Henry of Guise, 239, 240, 241
Henry of Navarre, 239
Henry, second duke of Suffolk, 105
Heraclitus, 1 84
Hercules, 84
Hermogenes, Progymnasmata, 140
Heron, Mensurae, 177
Herschel, John, 350
Hill, Charles Jarvis, 337
Hippocrates, 161, 184
Hobbes, Thomas, 146, 238, 279, 280, 3645
Art of Rhetorick, 279, 384; Art of
Rhetorick Plainly set forth,' 279, 384;
Brief e of the Art of Rhetorique, 276,
279, 384-385, 388} Discourse of the
Laws of England, 279, 384$ Whole Art
of Rhetorick, 384; Works, 385, 388
Homer, 5, 122, 142, 161, 252, 258, 315,
373
homiletics, 106-108, 110-115, 184, 187,
206-207, 212-213, 229-232, 334-335>
386-387, 39-397
homoeoteleuton, 130-131
Hood, Thomas, 246
Hooker, Richard, 192, 3255 Lawes of
Ecclesiasticall Politie, 192
Hoole, Charles, A New Discovery Of the
old Art of Teaching Schoole, 270-271
Horace, 122, 154, 187, 260, 315
Home, Thomas, 273, 3385 Manuductio in
Aedem Palladis, 339; Rhetoricae Com-
pendium, 273
Hortensius, 198
[ 404- ]
INDEX
Hoskins, John, 277, 326$ Directions for
Speech and Style, 277, 280, 330, 331-
33*, 333
Hotman, Francois, 227, 313
Houston, Benjamin F., vii
Howard, Leon, 146, 218
Howell, Wilbur S., 32, 34, 64, 70, 73, 74,
146, 149, 279, 354, 377, 379, 397
Hubbell, H. M., 66
Hudson, Hoyt H., ed. Hoskins's Directions
for Speech and Style, 277, 280, 330,
33*, 3325 trans. Jewel's Oratio contra
Rhetorical, 123-124
Huens, Augustin, 310
Hugh of St. Victor, 15, 38
Hultzen, Lee Sisson, 64, 266, 269, 277
hyperbole, 124, 127, 169
Hyperius, Andreas Gerardus, 110-115,
20 7 j see also Ludham, John
Illyricus, 207
image, 127
images, see memory
indsum, 121
induction, see argument
Ingenioso, 243
inkhorn terms, 102
inkpot terms, 106
Institutio Oratoria, see Quintilian
introduction, see parts of the classical ora-
tion
invention: logical, 15, 23-29, 34, 100-101,
147-148, 152, 154, 155-157, 162, *8o-
181, 184-185, 226, 231, 235, 255, 287,
*9* 305) 314) 317) 3*8, 3**, 34*, 343)
347 355-357* 359> 3^55 philosophical,
306-307, 314-315) 345. 347-348, 350,
357-360, 361, 3^6-367, 377i poetic,
75, 82-83; rhetorical, 5, 6, 10, 66, 67,
68-72, 73-74, 77, 80-81, 90, 92-94,
100-101, H2, 114-115, 147, 152, 155,
164-165, 249, 267, 269, 271, 318, 319,
3**, 323, 3*4-3*5, 3*6, 330, 331, 332,
339, 365, 367, 380, 396
irony, 168-169, 256
Irving, David, 188
Irwin, Franklin, 215, 218
Isidore, 36, 52, 76, 274$ De Grammatica,
ii 8 ; De Rhetorica, 118-, Etymologiae,
36, 41, 77-78, 118, 119
indicium, see arrangement
James I, 311
Jansenism, 351
Jeanne d'Albret, 239
Jebb, R. C., 64.
Jerome, 81, 301
Jewel, John, Oratio contra Rhetoricam,
see Hudson, Hoyt H.
John of Garland, Exempla Honestae Vitae,
120} Poetria, 120
John of St. David's, 37
John of Salisbury, 15, 40, 119; Meta-
logicon, 38, 119
Johnson, Francis R., see Rainolde, Richard
Jones, John, 230
Jonson, Ben, Timber, 330-331
Joseph, B. L., 341
judgment, see arrangement
judicial oratory, 70, 93, 106-107
Julius Victor, Ars Rhetorica, 74
Junius, Franciscus, 207
Justin Martyr, 199
Keckermann, Bartholomew, 210, 274, 303,
310, 312, 320, 323 j System of Logic,
2835 System, of Rhetoric, 283, 3225
Three Tractates, 283, 302-3033 Two
Books of Ecclesiastical Rhetoric, 283
Kempe, William, 246$ Education of
children in learning, 258-261, 270
kinds of sermons, 113-114
King Alfred, 75, 259
Laelius, see Cicero
Laistner, M. L. W., 32, 33, 116, 118, 119
Lamy, Bernard, 3645 Art of S -peaking,
378-382, 397
Lancelot, Claude, see Arnauld, Antoine,
and Claude Lancelot
Landi, Ortensio, see Mundy, Anthony
la Primaudaye, Pierre de, 331
La Ramee, Pierre de, see Ramus, Peter
Le Bon, Monsieur, 352
Leishman, J. B., 242, 244, 245
Lentulus, 227
Le Sylvain, see Busche, Alexandra van den
letter writing, i43-*45> 33O, 331-33*,
339
Lever, Ralph, 6, 57-58, 157, 1725 The
Philosopher's Game, ed. William Full-
wood, 59, 143 j Witcraft, 57-63, 143,
286
lex justitiae, 150, 151-152, 181, 186, 215,
*53, *55> *69, 3*3, 33O, 359"36o
lex safientiae, 150, i5*-i53, 160, 182, 186,
217
lex veritatis, 150, 151, 181-182, 186, 217,
269
Libavius, Andreas, 196, 283-284
Lieblerus, Georgius, 196, 199
Linacre, Thomas, Rudimentes Grammati-
ces, 131
Lipsius, 201, 331, 338
Livy, Titus, 336
[ 405 ]
INDEX
logic: new, 3, 8-9, 346-350, 361-363,
3755 Port-Royal, 8-9, 343, 350-363*
Ramistic, 7-8, 9, 29, 146-165, 1 73-245,
342, 343, 346-347, 354-36o, 367, 374.,
375) 3?8i scholastic, 6, 7, 9, 12-63, 64,
301, 342, 343, 34-6-34-7) 35*5 353~354,
357> 36o, 367, 374, 375, 378, 382;
Systematic, 8, 282-317, 318, 322, 342-
343, 354, 38*
logic and dialectic differentiated, see dia-
lectic and logic differentiated
logic and dialectic identified, see dialectic
and logic identified
logic and rhetoric compared, 4, 78, 94,
101, in, 147-I49> i5i) i53-i54i 164,
186, 250, 254-255, 293, 304, 374, 377 j
as closed fist to open hand, 4, 15, 33, 51,
141, 208-209, 293, 315, 320, 341, 365,
374, 377
logic as the closed fist, see logic and rhetoric
compared
Longolius, 251
Lord Burghley, 190
Lorich, Reinhard, 140, 142; trans, Aph-
thonius's Progymnasmata, 140
Ludham, John, no, 321$ Practise of
preaching, a translation of Hyperius's
De Formandis Concionibus Sacris, 110-
Lull, Ramon, 7, 9, 313* 3*4, 37*,
The Great, General, and Ultimate Art,
302, 348, 360
Luther, Martin, 58
Lydgate, John, 46, 84, 87, 126
Macllmaine, Roland, 179, 187-189, 202,
204, 217, 221, 232, 247, 286} Dia-
lecticae Libri Duo, an edition of Ramus's
Dialecticae Libri Duo, 179, 187, 247,
248 j Logike, a translation of Ramus's
Dialecticae Libri Duo, 180-187, 219,
248
Madan, Falconer, 45, 190, 270, 292, 298,
299, 312
Madido, 242, 243, 244
Maecenas, 153
Mair, George Herbert, see Wilson, Thomas
Mallet, Charles Edward, 189
Manitius, Max, 36
Manutius, 259
Marbecke, John, Booke of Notes and Com-
mon 'places^ 371
Marcus Marcellus, 132
Margaret of Anjou, 239
Marlowe, Christopher, Massacre at Paris,
238-241
Marot, Clement, 169
Martial, 391
Martin, James, 196
Mary Queen of Scots, 166-167, 188
Masson, David, 213, 214, 215
Mather, Cotton, 193
Mather, Increase, 193
Mather, Richard, 192-193
Mather, Samuel, 193
Matthew, see Bible
Matthias, Jacobus, 207
Mayor, John E. B., 177-178
McKerrow, Ronald B., 254
Mead, William Edward, 47, 49, 81-82
Melanchthon, Philipp, 92, 93, 132, 174,
196, 198, 227, 282, 284, 2885 Erotemata
Dialectices, 94-95 j Institutions Rhe-
tor icae, 92
Melville, Andrew, 189
Wiembrum, 121
memory, 7, 66, 67, 7*~73, 74, 75, 81, 82,
112, 113, 148, 149, *55> *66, 267, 269,
271, 272, 304, 321, 322, 324, 326, 340,
366, 368, 3805 cultivated, 85, 88, 103,
i43i *7, 3i7> 3i8, 319, 341, 368}
natural, 85, 88, 103, 143, 2075 places
and images, 85-87, 88-89, 96-98, 103-
104, 143, 207, 317, 341, 368
Menon, 227
Merchant Taylors' School, 269, 270
Merygreeke, Mathew, 31
metaphor, 109, 130, 168-169, 256, 331,
389^ 394
Metaphysics, see Aristotle
method; scholastic, 21-22, 311, 382$ Ra-
mistic, 152-153, 160-165, 182-186, 217,
221, 236, 287, 30^-303, 3", 34*, 348,
357-36o, 369, 3825 Systematic, 289-
291, 295, 296-298, 306-308, 311, 312,
314-316, 339, 343, 348, 349, 359, 362,
382 j Port-Royal, 357-360, 361, 3625
Cartesian, 345, 348, 358-359, 362;
Baconian, 369-371, 374, 382-383
metonymy, 109, 168-169, 256
Migne, J-P., 15, 24, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38,
73, 78, 118
Mildapet, Francis, see Temple, William
Mill, John Stuart, 8, 307, 359, 362, 3635
System of Logic, 8, 306, 350, 351
Miller, Dr. Henry K, Jr., 335, 336
Miller, Perry, 146, 193
Milton, John, 346, 208, 211-212, 213,
238, 270, 2805 Artis Logicae Plenior
Institutio, trans, Allan H. Gilbert, 214-
219
Minerva, 348
Minos, Claudius, 1995 ed, Talaeus's Rhe-
torica, 257, 261, 266
Miriam Joseph, Sister, 64, 146
Mistress Custance, 30, 31
E 406 ]
INDEX
Mixts, 283, 312-313, 318
Molesworth, Sir William, 385
Molther, Menrad, 34
Montagu, Richard, 200; Diatribae, 201-
202
More, Sir Thomas, 251
Mosellanus, Petrus, 131, 248; Tabulae de
Schematibus et Tropis, 131
Mullinger, James Bass, 38, 50, 75, 95,
188, 189, 191, 204, 212
Mundy, Anthony, 335, 338} Defence of
Contraries, a translation of Ortensio
Landi's Paradossi, 335-336
Mure, G. R. G., 41
Muses, 242, 265
music, 14, 105
Nadeau, Raymond E., 321, 322, 338
narration, see parts of the classical oration
Nash, Thomas, 196, 199, 202, 243, 247,
254; A natomie of A bsurditie, 197-198;
Preface to Greene's Menaphon, 197;
Strange Nevues, 198
Naugerius, 251
Neilson, William Allan, 337
Nelson, Norman E., 146
Neo-Ciceronian rhetoric, see rhetoric
Newton, Isaac, 300, 350
Newton, John, 271, 339; Introduction to
the Art of Logick, 271, 3 16-31 7 ; In-
troduction to the Art of Rhetorick, 271-
*7*i 3i9i 3*6, 340
Nicolas, Michel, 115
Nicole, Pierre, see Arnauld, Antoine, and
Pierre Nicole
Nisus, 357
Nizolius, 251
non-artistic proofs, 25, 68-69, I 55- I 5 6 >
162, 180, 221, 231, 241, 268, 375-38a
Numbers, see Bible
Gates, Whitney J., vii
Ockham, William, 234
Octo, loannes, 106
Ogilvy, J. D. A., 33
Ong, Walter J., S. J., 146, 1713 *9*> 2 3*>
276, 279, 384
On Interpretation, see Aristotle
Oration against Verres, see Cicero
Oration for Marcus Marcellus, see Cicero
Oration in the Senate upon his Return, see
Cicero
Oration to the People- upon his Return, see
Cicero
Orator, see Cicero
Oratorians, 379
Organon, see Aristotle
Osborn, Louise Brown, 330, 331, 3325
Life, Letters, and Writings of John
Hoskyns, 330, 332
Osgood, Charles G vii, 265
Ossatus, 199
Otway, 281
Ovid, 122, 187, 227, 2433 Metamorphoses,
260
Owen, Octavius Freire, 12, 1 6, 19, 41, 305
Owens, John, 320
Ozell, John, trans. Port-Royal Logic, 352
Pacius, Julius, Institutiones Logicae, 314
Padelford, Frederick M., 265
Paget, William, 95, 132
Pappus, 177
parable, 127
parallels, 334
Parker, Bestney, 237
Parker, William R., 214
Parmenides, 227, 300
Parmenio, 227
paronomasia, 256
par soy, 150
partition, 127, 135-136
parts of the classical oration, 72, 99, 267,
269, 322, 323, 339, 380$ introduction,
72, 107-108-, 340, 385; narration, 72,
108, 340, 385; division, 72; proof, 72,
340, 3855 refutation, 72; conclusion, 72,
385
Pascal, 351-352
Patricio, Francisco, 286
Patterson, Frank Allen, 208, 214
Paulus Diaconus, 201
Peacham, Henry, 132, 3263 Garden of
Eloquence, 132-137, 277
Pemble, William, 323, 325; Enchiridion
Oratorium, 3*3-324, 3915 Vindiciae
Gratiae, 391-392
Pericles, vi
Perihermeniae, see Aristotle, On Interpre-
tation
periodus, 121
Perion, Joachim, 173, 174, 176, 199, 282
periphrasis, 109
Perkins, William, 206, 208, 210, 211, 229,
2455 Arte of Prophecying, 206-207,
212; Prophetica, 206
per se, 150, 296, 309
Petrus Hispanus, Summulae Logicales, 301
Philip, Earl of Arundel, 195
Philip of Macedon, 12, 141
Philippo-Ramists, 196, 282-283, 284, 303,
318
Phillips, Edward, 146, 2805 Beau's Acad-
emy, 23 8 j Mysteries of Love Sf Elo-
quence, 238
Philomusus, 242-245
[ 407 ]
INDEX
Philoponus, 199, 265-266
Philotas, 227
Physics, see Aristotle
Packard-Cambridge, W. A., 16, 43
Pico della Mirandola, 144
Piot, Lazarus, 335; The Orator ', 336-338
Piscator, Johannes, 149, 195, 196, 204,
222, 2275 Animadversiones, 196
Pithou, 1 1 8
places, see invention, logical, rhetorical
places and images, see memory
Plato, 21, 67, 161, 164, 183, 185, 199,
237, 300, 301, 315; Phaedrus, 21, 372,
375; Timaeus, 227
Pluto, 84
poetry, 4-6, 40, 75, 123, 275-276, 327-
3*9, 3^6, 379
Polanus, 230
Pollard, Alfred William, G. R. Redgrave,
et al., Short-Title Catalogue, 95-96,
1 10, 196, 204, 321
Pontanus, 251
Pope Innocent VIII, 144
Pope Sixtus IV, 79
Porphyry, 24, 36, 301; Isagoge, 34, 35,
39, 41, 46, 52, 204, 234, 305
Port-Royalists, 348, 35 I -3^3 ) 3^4, 3 66 >
3*7, 376, 37i 379, 38i, 382, 397
Posterior Analytics, see Aristotle
Powicke, F. M., 45
Prantl, Carl von, 37
predicables, 17-18, 157, 158, 287, 294j
*99 305i 309, 3*o, 3", 316, 342, 343,
353-354
predicaments, 19-21, 27, 35, 156, 157,
235, 287, 294, 299, 305, 309, 3io, 312,
3i6, 317, 342, 343, 353, 355
Predicaments, see Aristotle, Categories
premunition, 124
Prideaux, John, 311, 3765 Notes on Logic,
Rhetoric, etc., 312-316, 333-334-5 Sacred
Eloquence, 334-3355 Sevens of Logic,
311-3135 The Easiest Start, 311
Princeton University Research Fund, vii
Prior Analytics, see Aristotle
Prior, Oliver H., 48, 87, 88
pronunciation, see delivery
proof, see parts of the classical oration;
see also argument, artistic proofs, non-
artistic proofs
proparalepsis, 109
Propertius, 187, 227
prosopopoeia, 170, 256
Protagoras, 28
Psalms, see Bible
Pseudo-Augustine, Categoriae D.ecem, 36
Puttenham, George, Arte of English Poesie,
Pygmalion, 145
Pythagoras, 28-29, 288, 3
Quarterly Journal of Speech, vi, 279
Queen Elizabeth, 50, no, 123, 173, 176,
339
Queen Mary, 57, 99, 109, 329
Quintilian, 4, 6, ,54, 69, 140, 178, 219,
322, 331, 356, 357; Institutio Oratoria,
15, 67-68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 77, 85, 86,
92, 94, 108, 116, 118, 121, 122, 127,
131* J 37> *77i 180, 255, 322, 325, 334,
340-341
Rackham, H., and E. W. Sutton, 85
Radau, Michael, Orator Extern^ or aneus,
271-272, 319, 326
Rainolde, Richard, 7$ Foundacion of Rhe-
torike, ed. Francis R. Johnson, 140-143
Ramistic logic, see logic
Ramistic rhetoric, see rhetoric
Ramus, Peter, vi, 7, 8, 9, n, 21, 22, 28,
30, 4', 55, 5* no, 118, 127, 137, 146-
281, 282, 283, 284, 287, 288, 289, 290,
292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 302-303,
307, 309, 3io, 311, 313, 315, 318, 319,
321, 325, 3 2 *, 3*7, 330, 33*> 335)
342, 343, 347, 348, 354, 355, 356, 357,
358, 359-360, 361, 369, 370 371, 376,
S7 379> 382, 387* 3955 Aristotelicae
Animadversiones, 148, 149, 150, 155;
Ciceronianus, 178, 179, 247, 252; Dia-
lecticae Institutiones, 148; Dialecticae
Libri Duo, 150, 153, 166, 202, 209,
210, 211, 215, 217, 219, 222, 225, 226,
228, 231, 232, 237, 238, 244, 255, 261,
262, 275, 276, 280, 302; Dialectique,
150, 151, 153-165, 167, 171, 172, 187,
225, 226-227; Letter to Ascham, 176;
Praefationes, Epistolae, Orationes, 148;
* Rhetorica Rami, 254, 261; Scholae Dia-
lecticae, 149, 216, 321
Ravennas, Petrus, see Tommai, Pietro
Redgrave, G. R., see Pollard, Alfred Wil-
liam, G. R. Redgrave, et al.
refutation, see parts of the classical oration
Regulus, Marcus Atilius, 23
Research Group of the Huntingdon Library,
vii
rhetoric, 3-4, 64-65 j Ciceronian, 6-7, 65-
i*5 378, 38*1 386, 387, 394; formu-
lary, 7, 138-145, 330, 333, 335-340;
Neo-Ciceronian, 8, 318-341, 364, 366,
37> 379> 38o, 390, 391, 396; new, 3-4,
9, 69, 3^4-3975 Ramistic, 7-8, 165-172,
247-281, 318, 364, 366, 367, 379,
380, 382, 386, 387, 390, 394; stylistic,
[ 408 ]
INDEX
7, ii, 116-137, 326-335, 394; tradi-
tional 6, 7, 9, 14, 65-145, 318
Rhetoric, see Aristotle
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, 154, 384
Rhetorica ad Herennium, 66, 70, 72, 76,
77, 80, 81, 85, 87, 93, 94, 100, 103,
104, 108, 116, 118, 137, 143, 334
rhetorical induction, see argument
rhetorical syllogism, see argument
rhetoric and logic compared, see logic and
rhetoric compared
rhetoric as the open hand, see logic and
rhetoric compared
rhyme, 256
rhymed sermons, 108
Riccius, 251
Rich, Edmund, 39
Richard III, 104
Richard of St. Victor, Excerptionum, 41
Richardson, Alexander, Logicians School-
Master ^ 209-210, 275
Rigollot, Gustave, 146
Ringler, William, 205
Rivington, Charles R., see Eyre, George
E. B., and Charles R. Rivington
Roberts, W. Rhys, 68
Rodingus, 199, 248
Ronsard, 169, 227
Ross, W. D., 12, 1 6, 41, 43, 68
Roth, Leon, 343, 344
Royal Society, 9, 388-390, 392
Royster Doyster, 30, 31
Sadoletus, 251
St. Bartholomew's Day, 146, i47> J 65,
239-241
Salmasius, 270
Sambucus, Johannes, Ciceronianus, 247,
Sanderson, John, Institutionum
carum Libri Quatuor, 291-292
Sanderson, Robert, 39, 315, 317, 34 8 J
Logicae Artis Compendium, 39, 216,
299-308, 316, 323
Sandford, William Phillips, 64, 254, 267
Sandys, John Edwin, 39, 44
sarcasmus y 135
Scaliger, 201, 325
Schegk, James, 199, 241
schemes, 109, 112, 116-119, 121, 122,
124, 125-131, 132-137, 148, 151-152,
*49> 33> 33i) 333, 334
Schmidt, Charles, 176
scholastic logic, see logic
Scopas, 103
Scotus, Johannes, 37
Scribonius, Wilhelm Adolf, 199, 22 7 j
Triumph of Ramistic Logic, 203-204
Scyne, Matthew, 176-177
Seaton, Ethel, ed. Fraunce's Arcadian Rhe-
torike, 257-258
Sedulius, 116
Selden, John, 2005 History of Tithes , 200-
201
semantics, 361
Serenus, 177
Sergeant, John, 276
sermons, see homileticsj see also kinds of
sermons
Seton, John, 6, 49, 60, 157, 172, 245;
Dialectica, ed. Peter Carter, 50-56,
178) *43> *44
seven liberal arts, 14, 36, 271
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos,
15, 28
Shakespeare, 64, 1465 The Merchant of
Venice, 337
Sherry, Richard, 109, 172, 3265 Treatise
of Schemes and Tropes, 109, 125-131,
^33 i35> 137, 2585 Treatise of the
Figures of Grammer and Rhetorike, 132,
i33> 135-136, 137
Short-Title Catalogue, see Pollard, Alfred
William, G. R. Redgrave, et al. j see
also Wing, Donald
Shuckburgh, E. S., 179
Sidney, Sir Philip, 205, 215, 222, 223,
258, 276, 2775 Letter to William
Temple, 205
similiter cad ens, 108
similiter desinens, 108, 130-131
Simonides, 103
Sixesmith, Thomas, 299
Smith, G. C. Moore, 215, 255
Smith, G. Gregory, 197, 198, 199, 257-
258
Smith, John, 258} Mysterie of Rhetorique
Unvail'd, 276-279, 280, 326-327, 331
Smith, Samuel, 216, 317, 348; Aditus ad
Logicam, 216, 292-298, 307, 315, 316,
349
Smith, Sir Thomas, 177
Smith, Thomas, 246
Smith, William, 140
Socinians, 313
Socinus, Faustus, 313
Socinus, Laelius, 313
Socrates, 227, 296, 300
sorites, see argument
Spedding, James, see Bacon, Francis
Speech Association of America, vi
Spencer, Thomas, Art of Logick, a trans-
[ 409 1
INDEX
lation of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo 9
233-237) 284-285
Spenser, Edmund, 222, 226, 257, 264,
3165 Ruines of Time, 2655 S hep hear des
Calender ', 222, 224.
Spindler, Robert, 47, 87, 120
Spoudeus, 265-266
Sprat, Thomas, The History of the Royal-
Society of London, 388-390
status, 70-71, 107, 114
Stauffer, Donald A., vii
Stewart, James, Earl of Mar and Moray,
188
Stoics, 300-301, 373
Strype, John, 190, 194-* 95
Studioso, 242-245
Stupido, 242-245
Sturm, Johannes, 149, 173-176, 227, 248,
249, 252, 259, 322
style: poetic, 75, 82, 84, 327-329 j rhe-
torical, 7, 66, 67, 72, 74, 77, 81, 92,
102-103, 112, 113, 116-137,. 148, 164,
168-170, 249) 255, 260, 2*2, * 6 4> 267,
269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 277, 280, 317,
318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 324-325) 3^6,
327-335> 359> 3^5> 368-3*9) 377> 379>
380, 385-397
stylistic rhetoric, see rhetoric
Susenbrotus, 137, 248; Epitome Troporum
ac Schematum, 137
suspension, 124
Sutcliffe, Matthew, 311
Sutton, E. W., and H. Rackham, 85
Swineshead, Roger, 45, 46 j Tractatus
Logic*, 45
Sydney, Henry, 352
syllogism, see argument
syncope, 109, 129
synecdoche, 106, 168-169, 256
Systematici, 303
Systematic logic, see logic
System of Logic, see Mill, John Stuart
Tacitus, 108
Tahureau, 169
Talaeus, Audomarus, 8, 146, 148, 165,
i79> *99 227, "8, 238, 248-281, 321,
33 *> 35 9 > Institutions* Oratoriae, 148,
165; Praefationes, Epistolae, Orationes,
1 48-149 j Rhetorica, 165-172, 209, 219,
*54> 255 25^, 257, 261, 262, 266, 272,
273) 275, 276, 280, 284, 319, 326-327i
see also Foclin, Antoine
Talon, Omer, see Talaeus, Audomarus
Tasso, 258
Taverner, Richard, Epistle in praise of
matrimony, 1085 Flo<wres of sencies,
1395 Garden of wysdom, 108, 1395
Proverbes or adagies, 139; Second booke
of the Garden of vaysedome, 139
Temple, William, 194-196, 199, 202, 206,
208, 230, 233, 238, 240, 283, 3695
Admonition to E'verard Digby, 194-195 ;
Dialecticae Libri Duo, an edition of
Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo, 204-
2055 Dissertation, 1955 Letter concerning
the Dialectic of Ramus, 195-196} Ques-
tions in Physics and Ethics, 195-1965
Tributes to Sidney, 205
Terence, 139
The Court of Salience, 46-47, 48, 87, 120,
1 2 3 j "Breuis tractatus de Rethorica,"
12O- 1 22
Themistius, 41, 545 Paraphrases of Aris-
totle, 41
Theon, Progymnasmata, 140
The Pilgrimage to Parnassus, 242-245
Thetis, 265
Thomas a Becket, 38
Thomas Aquinas, Saint, 234-235
Thompson, A. Hamilton, 116, 118, 119
Thomson, Samuel, 209, 210
Thomson, S. Harrison, 38
three kinds of oratory, 70, 77, 93, 100,
106, 267, 269, 284, 322, 323, 326, 339,
383 .
three kinds of style, 109, 112, 127, 132,
327i 379
Timplerus, 283, 284, 303
Tommai, Pietro, Foenix, see Copland,
Robert
Topica, see Aristotle, Topics; see also
Cicero, Topics
Topics, see Aristotle 5 see also Cicero
Tovey, Nathaniel, 213-214
Transactions of the Cambridge Biblio-
graphical Society, 279
transumption, 109
Trapezuntius, Rhetoricorum Libri Quin-
que, 92
Traversagni, Lorenzo Guglielmo, 79, 915
Nova Rhetorica, 79-81
tropes, 112, 116-119, 121, 122, 124, 125-
131, 132, 133, 148, 152, 164, 167, 168-
169, 249, 256, 260, 261, 264, 271, 274,
2 75> 276, 277, 278, 280, 322, 326, 327-
335> 359> 378, 379> 380, 385-397
Trustees of Princeton University, vi
Trustees of the Huntington Library, vii
Trustees of the John Simon Guggenheim
Memorial Foundation, vi
Tuke, Thomas, Arte of Prophecying, a
translation of Perkins's Prophetica, 206-
207
[ 410 ]
INDEX
Turnebus, 281
Turner, Celeste, 336
Tuve, Rosemond, 14.6
Twyne, Brian, 37
Udall, Nicholas, 30, 31 j Flovres for Latine
Spekynge, 138-1395 Ralph Royster
Doyster, 305 trans. Erasmus's A'pO'ph-
thegmes, 139
Ulysses, 315
universaliter 'primum (quatenus ipsum),
1501 96, 309
un'vuersel premier ement, 150
University of Nebraska Press, 250
University Research Committee of Prince-
ton University, vii
Valla, 199
Vaughan, William, The Golden-grove,
390-391
Veitch, John, trans. Descartes's Discours
de la Methods, 344-349, 360
Venn, J. A., in
Venn, John, in
Verrius Flaccus, 201
Verzellino, Giovanni Vincenzo, 80
Vicars, Thomas, no, 3255 Manuduction to
the Rhetorical Art, 320-321
VigiriOj Marco, 79
Vincent of Beauvais, 39, 46, 149, 158;
Speculum Doctrinale, 39-44, 45, 76-78;
Speculum Majus, 39, 76
Virgil, 5, 84) 122, 187, 227, 258, 264}
Aeneid, 197, 260, 315, 3575 Eclogues,
263 5 Georgics, 163
Vives, Ludovicus, 198, 199, 251, 302
voice, see delivery
Vossius, 322
Waddington, Charles, 146, 149, 150, 153,
154, 176, 179* l88 > l8 9> *96, 2 4) 2 4ij
262, 282
Waddington-Kastus, 146, 150
Waddingus, Lucas, 80
Wagner, Russell Halderman, 99, 108
Walker, Alice, 327
Walker, Obadiah, Of Education, 317, 3245
Some Instructions concerning the ArtTbf
Oratory, 324-325
Walker, Thomas Alfred, 220, 255
Wallace, Karl R.> 375
Webb, Clement C. J., 38
Webbe, William, Discourse of English
Poetrie, 256-257, 327
Weiss, Matthaeus, 34, 35
Wells, Whitney, 49, 87
Whately, Richard, Elements of Logic, 3505
Elements of Rhetoric, 385
Whewell, William, 44, 350
Whitaker, Dr., 194
Whitgift, Archbishop, 194
Wichelns, Herbert A., vii
Wigandus, 207
Willcock, Gladys Doidge, 327
William and Mary, vi, 352
William the Conqueror, 105
Wilson, Harold S., 179
Wilson, Harold S., and Clarence A.
Forbes, see Harvey, Gabriel, Ciceroni-
anus
Wilson, Mona, 205
Wilson, Thomas, 6, 7, 12, 34, 35, 37, 55,
56, 57-58, 783 i49> *57 i?^, 219, 289,
300-3015 Rhetorique^ 81, 95, 138, 140,
258$ Rhetorique, ed. G. H. Mair, 98-
110, 117-118, 127, 1315 Rule of Rea-
son, 12-31, 32, 46, 48, 49> 5*> 57> 58,
59, 99, 109, 258, 288, 2915 Three
Orations of Demosthenes, 12
Wing, Donald, Short-Title Catalogue,
211, 276, 321, 332, 339
Winterbottom, Mrs. Miriam T., vii
Wolf, Jerome, 174
Wood, Anthony a, 30, 37, 39, 45, 75, 189,
293
Worrall, Dr. Thomas, 192
Wotton, Antony, 232, 2455 Art of Logick,
a translation of Ramus's Dialecticae
Libri Duo, 232-233
Wotton, Samuel, 233
Wyatt, 126
Xanthippe, 198
Young, Thomas, 214
Zeno of Citium, 4, i4-*5> 33> 5*> I 4 1
208, 300, 315, 365, 374, 377> 378
1 24 635
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11