Full text of "Logick;"
This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project
to make the world's books discoverable online.
It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject
to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books
are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.
Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the
publisher to a library and finally to you.
Usage guidelines
Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to
prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.
We also ask that you:
+ Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for
personal, non-commercial purposes.
+ Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
+ Maintain attribution The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
+ Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other
countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.
About Google Book Search
Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers
discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web
at jhttp : //books . qooqle . com/
I
**>
0%&»ij r ?&r
/
(_>v —
4!
r*.., . ♦„
«»j^*
, "**-*A-skv»^
MfewVw
*V
>V
* .\
> $fb viaW
J
\^i. GEORGE R.
: . (~^ EORGE the Second, by the Grace of God, King of Great-
*' VJ &rit** i France and Ireland, Pefender of the Faith, Sec.
To all to whom thefc Prefents fliall come, Greeting. Whereas
James Buckland, Jama Waugb, Jehu Ward, Thomas Lorgmm,
and Edward Dil/y, Citizens and Bookfellers of our City of Lcndon,
Jiave by their Petition humbly reprefentcd unto Us, that they
have purchafed the Copy-Right of the Whole Works of the
late Doctor Is a ac Watts, and that they are now printing
and preparing for the Prefs, new Editions w'.th Improvements, of
ieveral of the feparate Pieces of the fa id Doctor Jfaac Watt*.
They have therefore moft humbly prayed Us, that We would
}>e gractoufly pleafed to grant them our Royal Licence and Pro-
tection for the fole printing, publishing, ar.d vending the faid
"Works, in as ample Manner and Form as has been done in Cafes
of the like Nature 5 We being willing to give all due Encou-
ragement to Works of this Nature, which may be of puhlick Ufe
and Benefit, are gratioufly pleafed to condefcend to their Requeft,
and do therefore by thefe Prefents, as far as may be agreeable tp
the Statute in that Behalf made and provided, grant unto them,
the (aid James Buckland, James Waugb ^ John V'ard r Thomas
J^ . 'Longman, and Edward Dilfy, their Executors, Administrators,
V". * . and Afiigns, our Royal Privilege and Licence', for the fole
..". " printing, publishing, and vending the faid Works for the Term
©f fourteen Years- to be computed from the Date hereof, (rridly
forbidding and prohibiting all our Subjects within our Kingdoms
and Dominions, to reprint, abridge, or tranflate the fame, either
in the like, or any other Volume or Volumes whatsoever, or fp
* import, buy, ven4* utter, or fiiftrlbute any Copies thereof re-
printed beyond the Seas, during the aforefatf Term of fourteen
Years, without the Confent and Approbation of the faid James
Buckland, James JVaug$ y John Ward, Thomas Longman % and ■
Edward Dilly, their Executors, Administrators and Affigns, by
Writing under their Hands and Seals firft had and obtained, as
fhey and every of them offending- herein, will anfwrr the contrary
at their Peril, whereof the Commifiioners and other Officers of
our Cuftomt, the Matter, Wardens, and Company of Stationers
©four .City of London, and all other our Officers and Minifters,
whom it may concern, are to take Notice, that due Obedience
pe rendered to our Pleasure herein fignified.
Given at our Court at St. James** the Twenty Firft pay of , . • : JS
MUrcb, 1758. in the Thirty Firft Year of Our Jteign. '" Jv&J
$y His Majefty's Command. *' r '' '*v3
W. PITT-
LOGICK:
OR, THE
Right Use of REASON
I N T H E
Enquiry after TRUTH,
WITH
A Variety of RULES to guard againft
Error, in the Affairs of Religion and
Human Life, as well as in the Sci-
ences.
By I SAAC H(A£j: S, D. D.
TheTwELFTH. EDiTiotfc'::^ '.
*«.» • ■
LONDON:
ed for J. Buckland, and T. Longman, in Pater-
^•JNofter-Row ; J. Waugh in Lombard-Street; E.
"'Diliy in the Poultry; and T. Field in Cheapfide.
M.DCC.LXIII.
THE -NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY
832994A
ASTOR. LENOX AND
T1JLDJEN FOUNDATIONS
ft 1936 L
„"*
TO
Sir John Hartopp, Baronet;
Sir,
jr$$l$ I is fit the Publick fhould receive through you*
$H X %H Hands what was written originally for the Af-
yfc y£ fiftance of your younger Studies, and was then
SOH)Hji prcfented to you..
It was by the repeated Importunities of our Learned
Friend Mr. John E antes y that I was perfiiaded to revife
thefe Rudiments of Loglek\ and when I had once fullered
tnyfelf to begin the Work, 1 was drawn ftiil onward far
beyond my firft Defign, even to the Neglefifc, or too long
Delay of. other preffing and important Demands that were
upon me. « " : * ? '*'.
It has been my Endeavour to form every Part of this
Treatife both for the: Inftru&ion of Students to open their
Way into the Sciences, and for the more extenfive and
general Service of Mankind, that the Gentleman and the *
Chrtftian might find their Account in the Perufal as well as
the Scholar. I have therefore collected and propofed the
chief Principles and Rules of right Judgment in Matters of
common and facred Importance, and pointed out our moft
frequent Miftakes and Prejudices in the Concerns of Life
and Religion, that we might better guard againft the
Springs of Error, Guilt and Sorrow, which furround.us in.
every State of Mortality.
You know, S/r, the great Defign of this noble Science
- is to refcue our reafoning Powers from their unhappy Sla-
V very and Darknefs ; and thus, with all dueSubmiffion and
5P- Deference, it offers a humble Afliftance to divine Revela-
tion. Its chief Bufinefs is to relieve the* natural Weak*
•** ' nefles of the Mind by fome better Efforts of Nature ; it is
>^ to diffufe a Light over the Underftanding in our Enquiries
10 after Truth, and not to furnifh the Tongue with Debate
GO A3 4g£
DEDICATION.
and Controverfy. True Logick is not that noify Thing thai
. fleals all id Dtfpute arid Wrangling, to which former Ages
had debafed add confined it ; yet its Difciples tnuft acknow-
. ledge al fo," that they are taught to vindicate and defend
the Truth, as well as to fearch it out. True Logick doth
not require a long Detail of hard Words to amufe Man-
kind, and to puff up the Mind with empty Sounds, and a
Pride of falfe Learning ; yet fome Diftin&ions and Terms
of Art are neceflary to range every Idea in its proper Clafs,
and to keep our Thoughts from Confufion. The World
is now grown fo wife as not to fufFer this valuable Art to
be engrSffed by the Schools. In fo polite and knowing an
Age every Man of Reafon will covet fome Acquaintance
*i with Logicky. fince it renders its daily Service to Wifdom
.'and Virtue^ and* to die Affairs of common Life, as well as
i to the Sciences.
I will not prefume, Sir, that this little Book is im-
; proved fince. its firft Corapofure in Proportion to the Im-
provements of your manly Age. But when you (hall
pleafe to review it in your retired Hours, perhaps you may
v refrelh your own Memory in fome of the early Parts of
; learning : And if you find all the additional Remarks and
■ Rules made fo familiar to you already by your own Ob-
servation, that there is nothing new among them, it will
L be no unpieafuicr Reflection that you have r fo far anticipa-
ted the prefent Zeal and Labour of>
Sir,
Tour mofi faithful and
Obedient Servant,
London, Aug. 24,
1724.
I. W A T T S.
INTRODUCTION
AND
GENfERAL SCHEME.
LOG tC ft h the Aft of Ufing Reafon * well in
oUr Enquiries after Truth, and the ComtnUnicfa
Hon of it to others. «
ReafoH * i$ thfe Glory of humafn Nature, and ofie
Of the chief Emirterfcies whereby we are raifed above
our Fellow-creatures the Brutes in this lowefr World*
Reafon, as. to the Power and Principle of it, i4
the common Gift of God to all Men ; though aH
are not favoured with it by Nature in an equal De-
gree : BOt the acquired Improvements of it in differ*
ent Men, make a much greater Diftindtiorn between ,
them than Nature had made. I could eveft ventures
to fay, that thfc Improvement of Reafon hath raifed
the Learned and the Prudent in the European Worlds
almoft as much above the Hottentots, arid other Sa-
vages of Jfrica y zs thofe Savages are by Nature ftl-
perior to the Birds, the Beafti, and the Fifhes.
i Now the Defign of Logick is to teach tfs th£
right tJfe of our Reafon, of Intellectual Power^
and the- Improvement of them in ourfelves and
others ; this is not dfnly fteceflary irt order to a:t-
A 4 tau*
■ * The Word Reafon in' this Place 16 not unfitted tb the mttt Faculty^
t reafoning, or inferring one Thing from another, but includct all the iflttUeWHJ
tfl Powers of Mao/.
2 INTRODUCTION.
tain any competent Knowledge in the Sciences > or
the Affairs of Learning, but to govern , both the
greater and the meaner Aftions of life, l f It is the •
Cultivation of our Reafon by which we are better
(enabled to diftinguifh Good from Evil, as well as
Truth from Falfhood: And both theft are Matters
of the higheft Importance, whether we regard this
Life, or the Life to come.
> The Purfuit and Acquijition of Truth is of infi-
nite Concernment to Mankind. Hereby we be-
come acquainted with the Nature of Things both
jd Heaven and Earth, and their various Relations
. to each other. It is by this Means we difcover
pur Duty to God and our Fellow-Creatures : By
this we arrive at the Knowledge of natural Reli-
gion^ and learn to confirm our Faith in divine Re-
velation, as well as to underftand what is revealed,
pur Wifdom^ Prudence and Piety, our prefent
Conduit, and our future Hope, are all influenced
by the Ufe of our rational Powers in the Search
tfter Truth. \
There are feveral Thfikgs that make it very ne-
ceffary that our Reafon (hould have fome Afiiftance
in the Exercife or Ufe of it.
I The firft is, the Depth and Difficulty of many
Truths, and the Weaknefs of our Reafon to fee far
into Things at once, and penetrate to the Bottom o£
them. It was a faying among the Ancients, Ve-
ritas in Puteo, Truth lies in a Well j and to carry,
on this Metaphor we may very juftly. fay, that
Xj&gick does, as it were, fupply us with Steps
whereby we may go down to reach the Water ;
or it frames the Links of a Chain, whereby we
may draw the Water up from the Bottom, f ,Thus,
by the Means of many Reafonings well connect-
ed together, Philofophers in our Age have drawn
a thoufand Truths out of the Depths of Dark-
■" *' - nefs,
INTRODUCTION. 3
nefs, which our Fathers were utterly unacquainted
with.
f Another Thing that makes it necefTary for our
Reafon to have fome Affiftance given it, is the
Di/guife and falfe Colours in which many Things op*
pear to us in this prefent imperfeft State :',There are
a thoufand Things which are not in reality what
they appear to be, and that both in the natural and
the moral World : So the SuH appears to be flat as
a Plate of Silver, and to be lefs than twelve Inches
in Diameter : The Moon appears to be as big as
the 5qp, and the Rainbow appears to be a large
fubftantial Arch in the Sky ; all which are in re*
ality grofs Falfhoods. So Knavery puts on the Face
of Juftice, Hypocrify and Superjtition wear the Vizard
of Piety % Deceit and Evil are often cloathed in the
Shapes and Appearances of Truth and Goodnefs*
Now Logick helps us to (trip off the outward Di£
guife of Things, and to behold them and judge of
them in their own Nature,
There is yet a farther Proof that our intelle&ual
or rational Powers need fome Affiftance, and that
is, becaufe they are fo frail and fallible in the pre-
fent State ; we are impofed upon at home as well^s
abroad ; we are deceived by our Senfes, by our iara-
ginations, by*our Paffions and Appetites ; by the Au-
thority of Men, by Education and Cuftom^ &V. and
we are led into frequent Errors, by judging accord-
ing to thefe falfe and flattering Principles, rather
than according to the Nature of Things. Some-
thing of this Frailty is owing to our very Conjli-
tution % Mao being compounded of Flefh and Spi-
rit : Something of it arifes from our Infant-State,
and our growing up by fmall Degrees to Manhood,
fo that we form a thoufand Judgments before our
Reafon is mature. But there is ftill more of it
owing to our original Defeftion from God, and
the
Tv* -
4 INT ROD VGf I6tf.
thefoolUh and evil Difpbfitions that are foond iff
fallen Man : So that one great Part of the Befign
tf Logick is to guard us againft the detofivc Influ-
ences of our meaner Powers, to cure the Miftakefc
of immature Judgment, and to raife us in fome
Meafure from the Ruins of our Fall.
It is evident enough from all thefe Things, that
our Reafon needs the Afliftance of Art in our En*
quiries after Truth or Duty \ and without fome Skill
and Diligence in forming our Judgments aright,
we (hall be led into .frequent Miftakes, both in
Matters of Science, and in Matters df Pr^i^ and
fome of thefe Miftakes may prove fatal too.
The Art of Logick, even as it aflifts us to gain the!
Knowledge of the Sciences, leads us on toward Vir-
tue and Happinefs j for all out Jpeculative Acquaint-
ance with Things fhould be made fubfervient to outf
better Conduit in the ttvil and the religious life. This
is infinitely more valuable than all Speculations*
and a wife Man will ufe them chiefly for this bettetf
Purpofe.
All the good Judgment and Prudence that any
Man exerts in his common Concerns of Life, with-
out the Advantage of Learning* is called natural
Logick : And it is but a higher Advancement, and
a farther Afliftance of our rational Powers, that is
defigned by and expe&ed from this artificial Logick.
In order to attain this, we muft enquire v^hat are
the principal Operations of the Mind, which are put"
forth in the.Exercife of our Reafon : And we (half
find them to be thefe four, (viz.) Perception, Judg-
ment, Argumentation and Bifpqfition.
Now the Art of Logick is compofed of thofe Ob-
fervations and Rules, which Men have made about
thefe four Operations of the Mind, Perception, Judg-
ment* Reafoning, and Bifpofition, in order to afiift
and improve them.
I. Perception*
INTRODUCTION. $
f I. Perception, Conception, Or Apprehenfion, is (he
mere firnple Contemplation of Things offered to
our Minds, without affirming or denying any Thing
concerning them.i So we conceive or think of a
Horfe, a Tree* Higb y Swift, Slow, Animal, Time*
Motion* Matter, Mini, Life, "Death, &c. The Form
under which thefe Things appear to the Mind, or
the Refult of our Conception or Apprehenfion, is
called an Idea, t -..- .
II. Judgment is that Operation of the.Mind t
wherdpy we join two or more Ideas together by
one Affirmation or Negation, , that is, we either
affirm or deny this to he that. So This Tree is high;
That Horfe is nptfwift ; The Mind of Man is a think-
ing Being ; Mere Matter has no Thought belonging So
it \ God isju/l ; Good Men are often miferable in this
World ; a righteous Governor will make a Difference
hitwixt the Evil and the Good% which Sentences are
the Effect of Judgrpent, and are called Propofitions.
III. Argumentation or Reafoning is that Operati-
on of the Mind, whereby we infer one Thing, i. e.
one Propofition, from two or more Propofitions
Ere mi fed. Or it is the drawing a Conclufion, which
efore was either unknown, or dark, or doubtful,
from fome Propofitions which are more known and
evident. * So when we have judged that Matter
cannot tbmk % and that the Mind of Man doth think*
we then infer and conclude, that therefore the Mind
of Man is not Matter.
So we judge that A juft Governor will make a
Difference between the Evil and the Good ; we judge
alfo that God is a juft Governor ; and from thence
we conclude, that God will make a Difference between
the Evil and the Good.
This
"^ ~ ■ a
6 7 NT R® DU€T 10 N.
1 This Argumentation may be carried on farther,
thus, God will one Time or another make a Difference
between the Good and the Ennl: But there is little or
<no Difference made in this World: Therefore there
muft be another World wherein this Difference fhajl be
made. *
Thefe Inferences or Conclufions are the Effe&s of
Reafoning, ^pd the throe Propofitions taken all to*
gether are called a Sylhgifm % or Argument.
IV. Difpofition is that Operation of the Mind,
whereby we*put the Ideas, Propofitions andr Argu-
ments, which we have formed concerning one Sub-
ject, into fuch an Order as is fitted to, gain the
cleared Knowledge of it, to retain it longed, and
to explain it to others in the bed Manner : Or, in
(hort, it is the ranging of our Thoughts in fuch
Order,, as is beft for bur own and others 1 Concepti-
on and Memory. 1 Th^Effeft of -this Operation is
cdltfr Method. This very Description of the four
- Operations of the Mind and their Effeffs in this Or-
, , der* is an Inftance or Example of Method.
Now as the Art of Lx>g\ck*3i(ry^o^r Concept ions*
£b it gives us a large and comprebenjive View of the
Subjects we enquire into, as well as * clear and di-
ftindi Knowledge^ them. As it regulates our
Judgment and our Reafoning* fo it fecures us from
Miftakes, and gives us a true and certain Know-
ledge of Things ; and as it furnifhes us with Method*
fo it. makes our Knowledge of Things both eafy and
regular* and guards our Thoughts from Confufion.
Logick is divided into fori r Parts, according to
thele four Operations of the Mind, which it diredis,
and therefore we {hall treat of it in this Order.
THE
^*$i
#tfr.j£*Jk* . c/L y <^y<
s»>
( 7 >
THE
FIRST PART
O *
%
LOG I C K.
Of Perceptions and Ideas.
TH E firft Part of Logick contains Obfer-
vations and Precepts about the firft Ope-
ration of the Mind, Perception or Concep-
tion : And fince all our Knowledge, how wide and
large foever it grow, is founded upon our Concep-
tion and Ideas > here we (ball confider,
i. The general Nature of them.
2 theObjeSlsofourConception f ox tht Archetypes
or Patterns of thefe Ideas.
3. The feveral Divifions of them.
4. The Words and Terms whereby our Ideas are
expreffed.
5. General Directions about our Ideas.
6. Special Rules to direfi our Conceptions.
CHAR
id' :
8 LOG IC K: Or, Part I.
C.H A P. I.
Of the Nature of Ideas.
FIRST, the Nature of Conception or Perception
t (halt juft be mentioned, though this may
feem to belong to another Science rather than Lo-
gick.
Perception is that AS of the Mind (or as fome
Philofophers call it, rather a Pajfwn ox^mpreffion)
whereby the Mind becomes confcious of, any Thing,
as when I feel Hunger, Tbirjt % or Cold, or Heat \
when I fee a Horfe, a Tree, or a Man ; when 1 hear
a £jf/ftz# J^i/Vi, or Thunder, I am confcious of thefe
Things, and this is called Perception. If I ftudy,
meditate, wijh, or fear, I am confcious of thefe in-
ward Adts alfo, and rpy JVLijid perceives its own
Thoughts, Wifhes, Fears, &c.
An Idea is generally defined a Reprefentatitm of
a Thing in the Mind -, it is a Reprefentation of fome-
thing that we have fern, felt, heard, &c. or been
confcious of \ That Notion or Form of a Horfe, a
Tree, or a Man, which is in- the Mind, is called
the Idea of a Horfe,* Tree, or a Man.
y That Notion of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Colour,
Thought, or Wifh, or Fear, which is in the ,
Mind, is called the Idea of Hunger,. Cold, &oun4,
Wifh, &c. a
It is not the outward Objed, or Thing which is
perceived, (viz.) the Horfe, the Man, &c. nor
is
•\ Note, The Words Conception and Perception are often ufed promifcuoufly,
as I have done here, bccaufe I would not embarrafs a Learner with too many
Diftineiions 5 but if I were to diftingui/h them, I would fay Perception is the
Confcioufnefs of an Object when prefent : Conception is the forming an Idea
of the ObjcQ whether prefent or abfent.
Chap. I. The right UJe of Rcalbn. 9
is it the very Perception or Senfe, and Feeling, viz.
of Hunger, or Cold, &V. which is called the
Idea 5 but it is the Thing as it exifts in the Mind hy
Way of Conception or Representation that is properly
called the Idea, whether the Objedt be prefent or
abfent.
As a Horfe, a Man, a Tree, are the outward
Obje&s of our Perception, and the outward Arche*
types, or Patterns of wr Ideas \ fo our own Senfa-
tions of Hunger, Cold, 6fr. are alfo inward Arche-
types* or Patterns of our Ideas: But the Notions
or PiSures^of tbefe "Things, as they are confidcred,
or conceived in the Mind, are precifely the Ideas
that we have to do with in iJogick. To fee a Horfe,
or to feel Cold, is one Thing ; to think of, and ton-
verfe about a Man, a Horfe, Hunger, or Cdla^is
another. \ '
Among all thefe Ideas, fuch as reprefent Bodies,
are generally called Images, efpecially if the Idea
of the Shape be included. Thofe inward Repre-
fentations which we have of Spirit, Thought, Love*
Hatred, Caufe, Effeff, &c. arc more pure and men* *
tal Ideas, belonging more efpecially to the Mind,
and carry nothing of Shape or Senfe in them. But
I (hall have Occafion fo fpeak more particularly of'
the Original and the Diftin&ion of Ideas in the third
Chapter. I proceed therefore now to confider the
Qbjefts of our Ideas,
CHAP.
'■*':'
%
to L & 1 C k: Or, Parti.
CHAP, ft
Of the Obje&s of Perception.
$ E C T. I.
Of Being in general.
TH E ObjeS of Perception is that which is re-
presented in the Idea, that which is the Ar-
chetype or PatterA, according to which the Idea
is formed y atid thus Judgments, Proportions, Rea-
finsi and long Diftourfes, may aH become the Ob-
jects of Perception ; but in this Place we fpeak
chiefly of the firft and more fimple Objefts of it, be-
fore they are joined and formed into Proportions
or Difcourfes.
Every Obje& of our Idea is called a Theme, whe-
ther it be a Being or Not~Being% for Not-Being
may be- propofed to our Thoughts, as well as
that which has a real Being. \But let us firft treat
of Beings, and that in the lirgeft Extent of the
Word.
A Being is confidered as poffible, or as aBual.
When it is confidered as poffible, ic is faid to
have an EJfence or Nature; fuch were all Things
before their Creation : VWhen it is confidered as ac-
tual, then it is faid to have Exiftence alfo ; fuch are
all Things which are created, and God himfelf the
Creatot.
EJfence therefore is but the very Nature of any
Being, whether it be actually exifting or no. A
Rofe in Winter has an Eflence, in Summer it has Ex*
iftence alfo. ,
- Note %
Ch. II. S. 2. The right Vfe ^Rcafonl ti
Note, There is but one Being which includes Ex-
ijience in the very Efiencc of it, and that is God, who
therefore ad u ally exifts by natural and eternal Ne-
ceffity j But the aSual Exillence of every Creature
is very diftinft from its EJfence, for it may be or
may not be^ as God pleafe.
/ Again, Every Being is confidered either as fub-
fifting in and by its felf, and then it is called a
Subftance •, or it lubfifts in and by another, and then
it is called a Mode or Manner of Being. Though few
Writers allow Mode to be called a Being in the fame
perfect Senfe as a Subftance is •, and fome Modes have
evidently .more of real Entity or Being than others*
as will appear when we come to treat of them.
Thefe Things will furnilh us with Matter /or larger
Difcourfe in the following SedUons.
, SECT; II.
Of Subftances and their various Kinds.
I A Subftance is a Being which can fubfift by it-
jf"\, felf, without Dependence upon any othfer
created Being. \The Notion of fubftfting by itfelf>
gives occafion to Logicians to call it a Subftance. So
a Horfe, a Houfe, Wood, Stone, Water, Fire, a Spirit^
a Body, an Angel, are called Subftances, becaufe they
depend on nothing but God for their Exigence.
It has been ufual alfo in the Defcription of Sub-
fiance to add, it is that which is the Subject of Modes
or Accidents ; a Body is the Subftance or Subje&»
its Shape is the Mode.
But left we be led into Miftakes, let us here take
Notice, that when a Subftance is faid to Jubfifk with-
out ^Dependence upon another created Being, all that
we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utter-
ly deftroyed, and reduced to nothing, by any Power
..toferior to that of our Creator-, though its prefent
< • ' B - particular
i* L G I C K: Or- Part I.
particular Form, Nature and Properties may be al-
tered and deftroyed by many inferior Caufes : A
Horfe may die and turn to Duji 3 Wood may be
turned into Fire, Smoke, and Afhes ; a Houfe into
Rubbijh, and Water into Ice or Vapour \ but the Sub-
ftance or Matter of which they are made ftill re-
mains, though the Forms and Shapes of it are al-
tered A Body may ceafe to be a Houfe or a Horfe,
but it is a Body ftill ; and in this Senfe it depends
only upon God for its Exiftence.
Among Subftances fome are thinking or confeious
Beings,, or have a Power of Thought, fuch as the
Mind <p Man, God, Angels. \ Some are extended
and folid, or impenetrable, th£t is, they have t)i-
menfions of Length, Breadth, and Depth, and
have alfo a Power of Refiftance, or exclude every
Thing of the fame Kind from being in the fame
Place. This is the proper Charadter of Matter or
Body.
. As for the Idea of Space, whether it be void or
full, i. e, a Vacuum or a Plenum, > whether it be in-
terfperfed among all Bodies, or, may be fuppofed
to reach beyond the Bounds of the Creation, it is
an Argument too long and too hard to be difputed
in this Place what the, Nature of it is : It ftas been
much debated whether it be a real Subftance, or a
mere Conception of the Mind, whether it be the
Immenfity of the divine Nature, or the mere Or-
der of co-exiftent Beings, whether it be the Man*
ner of our Conception of the Diftances of Bodies,
,oramere Nothing. Therefore I drop the Men-
tion of it here, and refer the Reader to the fir ft
Effay among the Pbilofopbical Effays by J. W. pub-
lifhed 1733.
Now if we feclude Space out of our Confidera-
tion, jhere will remain but two Softs of Subftance. 1 ?
in the World, t, Cr Matter and Mind, or as we
- ' ■■ ■ -i *• ■ - otherwise
dh. fl. S. 2. The right Vfe ^Heafon: S$
©therwife call them, Body and Spirit ; at leaft, wc
have rio Ideas of any other Subftance but thefe *.
* Among
* Becaufe Men have different Ideas and Notlens of Subftance, I thought it
toot proper entirely to omit ail Accounts of them, and therefore have thrown
them iDto the Margin.
Some Philofophers fuppofe that our Acquaintance with Matter or Mind
reaches no farther than the mere Properties of them, and tha'. there is a fort
of unknown Being, which is the Subftance or the SktjeB by which thefe Pro-
perties of folid Extenjion and of Cogitation are fupport ed, and in which thefe
Properties inhere or exift. But perhaps this Notion arifes only from our turn-
ing the mere abftra&ed or logical Notion of Subftance or Self-Jvbjtfting into the
Notion of a diftintl phyficalot natural Being, without tiny Neceffity. SoSd
Extenjion feems to me to be. the very Subftance of Matter, or of all JJodies 5
and a Power cf thinking, which is always in AR, feems to be the very Sub-
ftance of all Spirits ; for God himfelf is an intelligent, almighty Power • nor is
there any Need to feek for any other fecret and unknown Being, or abftraSed
Subftance entirely diftin& from thefe, in order to fupport the feveral Modes or
properties of Matter or Mind, for thefe two Ideas ate fuf&cieat for that Pur-
pofe j therefore I rather think thefe are Subftances,
It muft be confeffed, when we fey . pirit is a thinking Subftance, and Mat-
ter is an extended folid Subftance, we are fometimes ready to imagine that Ex~>
tenficn and Solidity are but mere Modes and Properties of a certain unknown Sub-
Jftancc or Subject which fupports them, and which we call Body ; and that a
Power of thinking is but a meer Mode and Property of fome unknown Subftance*
or Subject which fupports it, and -which we call Spirit: But I rather take
'this to be a mere Miftake, which we are led into by the grammatical Form
tad tJfe of "Words; and perhaps onr logical Way of thinking by Subftances and
Modes, as well as our grammatical Way of talking by Subftantrves and Adjtc- *
titfet, help to*' delude us into this Supposition.
However, that I may not be wanting to any of my Readers, I would let therm
know Mr. Locke* s Opinion, which has obtained much in the prefent Age, and
ft Is this : " That out Idea 'of any particular Subftance is only fuch a Combi-
" nation of fimple Ideas as rejprefents that Thing as fubfiliing by itfelf, in
" which the fuppofed or confufed Idea of Subftance (fuch as it is) is always
*« ready to offer ftfelf. It is a Conjunction of Ideas co-exifting in fuch a Caufe
" of their Union, and makes the whole Subject fubfift by itielf, though the
** Caufe of their Union be unknown; and outgeneral Idea of Subftance arifet
" from the Self-fubfiftence of this Colle&ion of Ideas.*'
Now if this Notion of Subftance reft here, and be considered merely as an
unknown Caufe of the Union or Properties, it is much more eafy to be ad-
mitted 1 But if we proceed to fupport a fort of real, fubftantial, diftinct Being,
different from folid Quantity or Extenjion in Bodies, and different from a
Power of thinking in Spirits, in my Opinion it is the Intrcduftion of a need-
lefs fcholaftical Notion into the real Nature of Things, and then fancying it to
have a real Exiftence.
Mr. Locke, in his EJfay of Human Under/landing, Book II. Chap. 22. §. 2.
feems to ridicule this common Idea of Subftance, which Men have generally
ruppefed to be a fort of Subftratum diftinct from all Properties whatfoever, and
to be the Support of all Properties. Yet in Book IV. Ch. 3. §. 6. he feems
to fuppofe there may be fome fuch unknown Subftratum, which may be capable
of receiving the Properties both ox" Matter and of Mini, (was.) Extenjion, -So-
•fitfry, and Cogitation 5 for he fuppofes it poflible for God to add Gcgitation to
thrt SiAftanu which is corporeal, and thus to caufe Matter t§ think. If this be
B a traa
*4 L O G I C K: Cr, ' fufh
I . Among Subftances, fome are called Simple* fotne
- are Compound, whether the Words t>e taken in a
pbilofopbiml or a vulgar Senfe. '-
Simple Subfiances in a pbilofcphical Senfe, are either
Spirits* which have no Manner of. Compofition in
them, and in this Senfe God is. called ajimple Being ;
or they are the firft Principles of Bodies, which
ire ufually .called Element^* of which all other
Bodies are compounded : [Elements are fuch Sub-
ftances as cannot be refolyed, or reduced, into two
' or more Spbftances of different Kinds.
The various Sefts of PhiJofophers have attri-
\ buted the Honour of this Name to various Things.
The Peripateticks* or Followers of Arifiotle* made
Fire* 4ir* £ar(b and Water* ta be the four Ele-
ments, of which all earthly Things were com-
pounded ; and they fuppofed the Heavens to be a
Quinteffence* or fifth fort of Body diftinft from
all thefe: But fince Experimental Philofophy and
Mathematicks have been better underftood, this
. Dodlfine has been abundantly refuted. The Cbe-
mifts make Spirit* Salt* Sulphur* Water \tu\ Earth,
to be their five Elements, becaufe they can re-
duce all terreftrial Things to thefe five: This
feems to come nearer the Truth ; though they arc
'not all agreed in this Enumeration of Elements*
In fhort, our modern Philofophers generally fup-
pofe Matter or Body to be but one fimple Principle,
f or folid Extenfton* which being diverfified by its va-
rious Shapes, Quantities, Motions, and Situations,
makes all the Varieties that are found in the Uni-
Arerfe ; and therefore they make little Ufe of the
Word Element.-
Compound
true, rhen Spirits v 'for ought we km.vr) may be cot portal Beings, or thinking
EoiHes, whii'h is a D< ftrine too fav< urable to the Mortality of the Soul.
But I 1-avc thefe Debates tfo the Philofophers of the Age, and will not be
too pofitivc in qiy Opinion of this abttrufe Subject,
. . . Sec moie of th*s Argument in Viih.r.pb'ud E(J'ay: y before cited, Eflay 2<3.
/*
Ch. II. S. 2. The right Ufe of Reafon. 15
Compound Subftances are made up of two or more -
fimple Subftances : So every Thing in this whole
material Creation, that can be reduced by the Art
of Man into two or more different Principles or
Subftances, is a compound Body in the pbilofophicdl
Senfe. \
But if we take the Words Simple and Compound
in a vulgar Senfe, then all thofe art fimple Subftances
which are generally deemed uniform in their Na-
tures. "So every Herb is called a Simple ; and every
Metal and Mineral \ though the Chemift perhaps
may find all his feveral Elements in each or them.
So a Needle is a fimple Body, Being only made of
Steel , but a Sword or a Knife is a Compound* be-
caufe its Haft or Handle is made of Materials dif-
ferent from the Blade. So the Bark of Peru, or the
Juice of Sorrel* is a /farp& Medicine': But when the
Apothecaries Art has mingled feveral Simples to-
gether, it becomes a Compound, as Diafcordium or
Mithridate.
The Terms of />#r<? and mixed, when applied to
Bodies, are much a-kin to fimple and compound. S&
a Guinea is p#re Gold, if it has nothing but Gold in
it, without any Alloy or bafer Metal : But if any
other Mineral or Metal be mingled with it, it is
called a mixed Subfanct or Body.
1 Subftances are alfo divided into animate and /»•
V animate. Animated Subftances are either animal or
vegetable*. ,
Some of the animated Subftances have various
\ brganical or initrumental Farts, fitted for a Varie-
ty of Motions from Place to Place, and a Spring
of Life within themfelves, as Beafts, Birds, Fifhf$ y
and Infefts ; thefe are called Animals. Other anii-
B 3 mated
• Note, Vtgttabkt as well at Ammak, hare gotten the Name of animated
Subftances, becaufe fume of the Ancients fuppofed Herbs and Plants, ifaj/frand
Birds, &c. to have a fort ofSouli diftinft from Matter or BgJy,
l6 LOGICK: Or, Parti.
mated Subfiancis are called Vegetables, which have
within themfelves the Principles of another fort of
Life and Growth, and of various Productions of
Leaves, Flowers and Fruit, fuch as we fee in Plants,
Herbs and Trees.
And there are other Subftances, which are called
inanimate, becaufe they have no fort of Life in them,
as Earth, Stone, Air, Water, &c. \
F There is alfo one fort of Subftance, or Beipg,
which is compounded of Body and Mind, or a ra-
tional Spirit united to an Animal •, fuch is Man-
kind. I Angels^ or any other, Beings of the fpiritual
and invifible World, who have affumed vifible
Shapes for a Seafbn, can hardly, be reckoned among
this Order of- compounded Beings ; becaufe they
drop their Bodies, and diveft themfelves of thofe
vifible Shapes, when their particular Meflage is
performed, and thereby (hew that thefe Bodies do
pot beldhg to their Natures,
SECT. III.
Bf Modes and their various Kinds, and firjl of effcn-
tial and accidental Modes.
■-' flpHE next fort of Obje&s which are repre-
jL fented in our Ideas, are called Modes, or
Manners of Being *.
\ A Mode is that which cannot fubfift in and of
itfelf, but is always efteemed as belonging to, and
fubfifting by, the Help of fome Subjtance, which
for that Reafon, is called its Subjeft. ■ A Mode
muft depend on that Subftance for its very Exift-
fpnce and Being ; and that not as a Being depends
on
• Note, The Term M$dt is by fome Author applied chiefly to the Relations
er relative Manners of Being. But in logical Treatifes it is often ufed in a lar-
ger Senfe, and extends to all Attributes whatsoever, and includes the rnoft effen-
fial and inward Properties, as well as outpard RefpecTts and Relations, and
reaches to ABiun themfelves as well as itiaunmoS A&ica,
Ch. II. S. 3. The right Ufe of Reafon. 17
on its Caufe,.(hr f° Subftances themfelves depend
on God their Creator ;) but the very Being of a Mode
depends on iome Subftance for its SubjeSt, in which
it is, or to which it belongs; fo Motion, Shape,
Quantity , Weight, are Modes of Body -, Knowledge^
Wit, Folly, Love, 'Doubting, Judging, are Modes of
the Mind ; for the one cannot fubfift without Body,
and the other cannot fubfift without Mind. ■
Modes have their feveral Divifions, as well as
Subftances;
I. Modes are either effential, or accidental. •
An ejfential Mode or Attribute, is that which
belongs to the very Nature or Eflence of the Sub-
ject wherein it is 5 and the Subjeft can never have
the fame Nature without it ; fuch is Roundnefs in
a Bowl, Hardnefs in a Stone, Softnefs in Water, vital
Motion in an Animal, Solidity in Matter, Thinking io
a Spirit ; for though that piece of Wood which v
is now a Bowl may be made fqiiare> yet if Round-
nefs be taken away, it is no longer a Bowl :\So that
very Flefh and Bones, which is now an 'Animal*
may be without Life or inward Motion ; but if
all Motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an Ani- .
mal, but a Carcafe : So if a Body or Matter be
divefted of Solidity, it is a meer void Space or No-
thing ; and if Spirit be entirely without Thinking, I
have no Idea of any Thing that is left in it ; there-
fore fo far as I am able to judge, Confcioufnefs muft
be its eflential Attribute *. Thus all the PerfeSions
of God are called his Attributes, for he cannot be
without them.
B 4 An
* Note, When I call folid Extenfion an eflential Mode or Attribute of
JMattcr, and a Power of Thinking an eflential Mode or Attribute of a Spirit,
2 do it ill Compliance with common Forms of Speech : But perhaps in reality
tbefeare the very Effences or Subftances themfelves, and thomoft fubftantiti
1 thai we can frame of Body and Spirit, and hate no need of any (wc know
a* *i\px\Subftratum or UAiateJligiblt Subfenct to fuppojt then ia their fix-
fAttttttBeipgt
l8 LOG I C K: Or, Parti.
An effential Mode is either primary or fecondary. !
A primary effential Mode is the firft or chief Thing, '
that conftirutes any Being in its particular Effence
or Nature, and makes^t to be that which it is, and
diftinguifhefc it from all other Beings :* This is call-
ed the Difference in the Definition of Things, of which
hereafter : \Sq Roundnefs is the primary effential
Mode, or 'Difference of a Bowl;, the meeting of two
Tines is th { e primary effential Mode, or the Difference
of an Angh ; the Perpendicularity of thefe Lines to %
efcch other is the Difference of a right Angle : Solid
£xhnfion is the primary Attribute, or Difference of
Matter : Confcioufnefs, or at leaft a Power of Think-
ing, is the Difference, or primary Attribute of a
Spirit* ; and to fear and love God is the primary
Attribute of a pious Man.
I A fecdndary effential Mode is any other Attribute
1 of a Thing, which is not of primary Corifiderati-
' on : This is called a Property : -Sometimes indeed
it goes towards making up the 'Eflence, efpecially
of a complex Being, fo far as we are acquainted ^with
it ; fometimes it depends upon, and follows from
the Eflence of it ; fo Volubility, or Aptnejs to roll,
is the Property of a Bowl, artd is derived from its
Roundnefs. Mobility and Figure or Shape are Pro-
perties of Matter \ and it is the Property of a pious
Man to love his Nfigbbour.
An accidental Mode, or an Accident, is fnch- a
Mode as is not neceffary to the Being of a Thing,
fqr the Subjeft may be without it, and yet re-
main of the fame Nature that • it was before •, or
it is that Mode which may be Separated or abo-
lifhed from its Subjeft ; fo Smoothnefs or Rougbnefs y
Blacknefs or IVbitenefs, Motion or Rift, are the Ac-
cidents of a Bowl i \for thefe may be all changed,
and yet the Body Remain a BoUfl ftill : Learnings
* 5« the Note la the foreitfog Psgt,
Ch. II. S. 3. The right life of Retfon. 19
Juftice, Folly, Sicknefs,' Health, are the Accident*
of a Man: Motion, Squareness, or an y far titular
Shape or Size, are the Accidents of Body : Yet
Shape and Size in general are eflential Modes of it ;
for a Body muft have fome Size and Shape, nor
can it be without them : So Hope, Fear, Wijhing,
JJfentingy and Doubting, are Accidents of the
Mind, though Thinking in general feems to be ef-
fcntial to it. •
Here obferve, that the Name of Accident has
been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetick Phi-
lofophers to all Modes, whether efiential or acci-
dental ; but the Moderns confine this Word Acci-
dent to the Senfe in which I have defcribed it.
Here it (hould be noted alfo, that though the
Word Property be limited fometimes in logical
Treatifes to the fecondary efjential Mode, yet it is
ufed in common Language to fignify thefe four
Sorts of Modes v of which fome are ejftntial, and
fome accidental.
( 1 .) Such^as belong to every Subject of that Kind,
but not only to thofe Subjects. So yellow Colour and
Du&ility are Properties of Gold ; they belong to all
Gold, but not only to Gold : For Saffron is alfo
yellow, and Lead is duStile. -
(2.) Such as belong only to one Kind of Subject
but not to every Subjedl of that Kind. So Learn-
ing, Reading, and Writing, are Properties of human
Nature; they belong only to Man, but not to all
Men.
(3.) Such as belong to every SubjeA of one Kind t
and only -to, them, but not always. So Speech or
Language is a Property of Man, for it belongs to
all Men, and. to Men only -, but Men are not always
ipeaking. '. "\ •
t (4.) Such as belong to every Subjeft of one
. Jund, and to them only and always. So Shape and
DivifibUity
20 LOGIC K: Or, Part L
Divisibility are Properties of Body ji fo Otmifcience
arid Omnipotence are Properties of the 'Divine Nature,
for in this Senfe Properties and Attributes are the
fame, and except in logical Treatifcs there is fcarce
any Diftiruftioiv made between them. Thefe are
called Propria quarto modo. in the Schools, or Pro-
perties of the fourth Sort*
Note, Where there fc any one Property or ejfen-
tial Attribute fo fuperbr to the reft, that it ap-
pears, plainly that all the reft are derived from it,
and fuch as is fufficient to give a full Diftindtion
of that Subjeft from, all other Subje&s, this At-
tribute or Property is called the ejfential Difference,
as is before declared ; and we commonly fay, the
Ejfence of the Thing conGfts in it ; fo the Ejfence
of Matter in general feema to confift in Solidity, or
folid Extenfwn. But for the mod Part, we are fo
much, at a Lofs in finding out the intimate Eflence
of particular natural Bodies, that we are forced
to diftinguifh the ejfential Difference of moft Things
by a Combination of Properties. So a Sparrow is
a Bird which has fuch coloured Feathers, and
fuch a particular Size, Shape, and Motion. So
Wormwood is an Herb which has fuch a Leaf of
fuch a Colour, and Shape, and Tafte, and fuch a
Root and Stalk. So Beafts and Fi flies, Minerals,
Metals and Works of Aft fometimes, as well as of
Nature, are diftinguifhed by fuch a ColleSion of
Properties.
SECT. IV.
The farther Divificns of Mode.
II. riT\HE fecond UiviRon of Modes is into ab-
I foluie and relative. An Abfolute Mode is
that which belongs to its Subjeft, without Re-
fpedt
Ch.ILS.4-* We right life of Reafon. 21
fpe£l to any other Beings whatfoever : But a rc-
'tative Mode is derived from the Regard, that one
Being has to others. '• So Routtdnejs and Smooth-
nefs are the abjolute Modes of a. Bowl j for if there
N -were nothing elfe exifting in the whole Creation*
a Bowl might be round and fmooth: But Greatnefs
and SmalJnefs, are relative Modes; for the verjp
Ideas of them are derived merely from the Com-
parifon of one Being with others : A Bowl of four
Inches Diameter is very great, compared with one
of an Inch and a half -, but it is very /mall in
Con, parifon of another Bowl, whofe Diameter is
eighteen or twenty Inches. Motion \s the abfolute
Mode of a Body, but Swiftntfs or Slownefs are
relative Ideas -, for the Motion of a Bowl on a
Bowling-Green is fwift, when compared with a
Snail ; and it is fiow, when compared with a Cai>
non-Bullet.
Thefe relatives Modes are largely treated of by
fome logical and metapbyfical Writers under the
Name of Relation: And thefe Relations themfelvep
are farther fubdivided into fuch as arife from the
Nature cf Things, and fuch as arije merely from
the Operation of our Minds ; one Sort are called real
Relations, the other mental j io the Likenefs of am
Egg to another is a real Relation, becaufe it arifes
from the real Nature of Things ; for whether there
was any Man or Mind to conceive it or no, one
Egg would be like another : But when we con fid er
an Egg 'as a Noun Subflantive in Grammar, or as
fignified by the Letters, *, g, g, thefe are mere
mental Relations, and derive their very Nature from
the Mind of Man. Thefe Sort of Relations are
called by the Schools Entia Rationis, or fecond No-
tions, which have no real Being, but depend en*
tirely on the .Operation of the Mind,
III. The
22 LOGIC K: Or, Parti.
III. The third Divifion of Modes (hews us,
they are either intrinfical or extrinficaU Intrinfical
Modes are conceived to be in the Subjeft or Sub-
fiance, as when we fay a Globe is round* or fwiftj
rollings or at reft : Or when we fay, a Man is tall,
br learned, thefe are intrinfick Modes : But extrinfick
Modfis are fuch as.arife from fomething that is not
in the Subjeft or Subftance itfelf ; but it is a Man-
lier of Being which forfte Subftances attain by Rea-
son of fomething that is external pr foreign to the
Subject ; as, This Globe lies within two Yards of the
Wall % ox* this Man is beloved or hated. \Wote, Such
Soft of Modes, as this lad Example, are called
external Denominations.
IV. There is a fourth Divifion much a-kin to
this, whereby Modes ire faid to be Inherent or
Adherent* that is, Proper or Improper. I Adherent
or improper Modes arife from the joining of fome
accidental Subftance to the chief Subjeft, which
yet may be feparated from it ; fo when a Bowl is
wet 9 or a Boy is clothed, thefe are adherent Modes •,
for the Water and the Clothes are diftinft Sub-
ftances which adhere t6 the Bowl, or to the Boy ;
But when we %£ the Bowl is fwift or round \
when we fay, the;, Boy is firong or witty, thefe are
proper or inheren&j&lodes, for they have a fort of
In-being in the jflnfflfttance itfelf, and do not ia-
rife from the Addition of any other Subftance
to it.
V. Anion and Pajfion are Modes or Mahnets
which belong to Subftances, dnd lhould not en-
tirely be omitted here. When a Smith with a
^Hammer ftrikes a Piece of Iron, the Hammer and
the Smith are both' Agents, or Subje&s of Ac-
'.■'■■;■■;. tion j
Ch, II. S. 4; c Tbe right UJe of Retton. z$
tion-, the one is the Prime or Supreme, the other
the Subordinate: The Iron is the Patient 9 . or th# ,
Subject o£;Paffion, ,in a philofopbical Senfe, be-
caufe it, receives, the Operation of the Agent:
Though this Senfe of the Words Paffion. and Pa-
tient differs much from the vulgar Meaning of
them *.;."_"
1 VI. The fixth Divifion of Modes may be into
Phyfical t u $. Natural* Civil, Moral, and Super-
natural. \ So when we confider the Apoftle Paul,
who was a little Man, a Roman by the Privilege
of his Birth, a Man of Virtue or Honefty, and an;
infpired Apoftle ; his low Stature is a pbyftcal Mode f
his being a Roman is a civil Privilege, his Honefty
is a moral Confideration, and his being infpired is
fuper natural, r
VII. Modes belong either to Body or to Spirit*
or to both. Modes of Body belong only to Matter*
or to corporeal Beings -, ^and thefe are Shape, Size*
Situation, or Place, &cJ Modes of Spirit belong
only to Minds *, fuch are Knowledge, Affent, Dijfint,
Doubting, Reafoning, &c. Modes which belong to
both, have been fometimes called mixed Modes, or
human Modes, for theie are only found in human
Nature, which is compounded both of Body and
Spirit ; fuch are Senfation, Imagination, Paffion, &fc.
in all which there is a Concurrence of the Opera-
tions both of Mind and Body, ;. e. of animal and
Jntelledlual Nature.
But the Modes of Body may be yet farther dif-
tuiguifhed. Some of them are primary Modes or
Qualities,
• Note, Agent Agnizes the Doer, Patient the Sufferer, Anion is Doing,
Paffion if Suffering : Agent and Anion have retained their original and philo-
sophical Senfe, though Patient and Paffion have acquired a very different
Meaning in common Language.
*4 L G IC K: Or, PartT;
Quatitre s, for they bdong to Bodies cemfidered in
tbemfelvfcs, whether there were any Man to take
Notice of them or no ; fuch are thofe before men-
tioned, {viz.) Shape, Size, Situation, &c. Secondary
Qualities, or Modes, are fuch Ideas as we afcribe to
Bodies on account of the various Impreflions which
are made on the Senfes of Men by them ; and
thefe are called fenfible Qualities, which are very
numerous ; fuch , are all Colours, as Red, Green,
Blue, &c. fuch are all Sounds, as Sharp, Shrill,
Loud, Hoarfe ; all Tajles, as Sweet, Bitter, Sour ; all
Smells, whether Plea/ant, Offenfive % or Indifferent ;
and all Tactile Qualities, or fuch as affeft the Touch
or Feeling, {viz.) Heat, Cold, fcfr. Thefe are prc>-
perly called fecondary Qualities* for though we arfe
ready to conceive them as exifting in the Very Bo-
dies themfelves which affeft our Senfes, yet truie
Philofophy has moft undeniably proved, that all
thefe are really various Ideas or Perceptions exci-
ted in human Nature, by the different ImpreffionH
that Bodies make upon our Senfes by their primary
Modes*, i. e. by Means of the different Shapes, Size,
Motion and Pofition of thofe little invifible Parte
that compofe them. Thence it follows, that a ft-
tondary Quality, confidered as in the Bodies them-
felves, is nothing elfe but a Power or Aptitude to
produce fuch Senfations^n .us : See Locke's Effay of
the Understanding, Book II. Ch. 8.
VIII. T might add, in the laft Place, that sfe
Modes belong to Subftances, fo there are fome alfb
that are but Modes of other Modes : For though they
fubfift in and by the Sub/lance, as the original
Subjeft .of them, yet they are properly and di-
re&ly attributed to fome Mode of that Subftance.
Motion is the Mode of a Body % but the Swift-
nefi 9
V
Ch. II. S. 5> rberigkV/e of Re^ton: 25
nefs* or Slownefs of it, or its Direfition to tie North
or South* are but Modes 6i Motion, Walking it
the Mode or Manner of Man, or of a Bead , but
Walking gracefully, implies a Manner or Modi; fu-
peradded to that Adtion. AH comparative and
Fuperlative Degrees of any Quality, are the Modes
of a Mode, as Swifter implies a, greater Meafure of
Swiftnefs.
It would be too tedious here to run through all
the Modes, Accidents, and Relations at large, that
belong to various Beings, and are copioufly treat-
ed of in general* in the Science called Metaphy-
ficks, or more properly Ontology : They are alfo
treated of in particular in thofe Sciences which
have affumed them feverally as their proper Sub-
jects.
SECT. V.
# Of the ten Categories. Of Subftance modified.
WE have thus given an Account of the two
* chief Objefls. of our Ideas* (viz.) Subftancei
and Modes, and their various Kinds : And in
thefe laft Sections we have briefly comprized the
greateft Part of what is neceffary in the famous
ten Ranks of Being, called the ten Predicaments
or Categories of Artftotle, on which there are end-
lefs Volumes of Difcourfes formed by feveral of
his Followers. But that the Reader may not
utterly be ignorant of them, let him know the
Names are thefe: Subftance, Quantity, Quality*
Relation, Aflion, Paffion, Where, When, Situa-
tion and Clothing. It would be mere Lofs of
Time to (hew how loofe, how injudicious, and
even ridiculous, is this ten-fold Divifion of Things :
And whatfoever farther relates to theni, and which
26 LO G IC K: Or, PartL
may tend to improve ufeful. Knowledge, fhould be
fought in Ontology, and in other -Sciences.
Befides Subftance and Mode, fame of the Moderns
would have us confider the Subftance modified, as a
diftinft Objedt of our Ideas •, but I think there is
nothing mo/e that need be faid on this Subjeft, than
this, (viz.) There is fome Difference between a
Subftance when it is confidered with all its Modes
about it, or clothed in all its Manners of Exiftence,
and when it is diftinguifhed from them, and confi- x
dered naked without them.
SECT, VI. .
, Of Not-Being.
AS Being is divided into Subftance and Mode, fo
we may confider Not-Being with Regard to
both thefe.'
I. Not-Being is confidefed as excluding all Sub-"
fiance, and then all Modes are alfo neceflarily ex-
' eluded, and this we call pure Nihility, or mere i\fo-
tbing.
\ This Nothing is taken either in a vulgar or zpbi-
hfopbical Senfe ; fo we fay there is nothing in the
Cup, in a vulgar Senfe, when we mean there is no
Liquor in it •, but we cannot fay there is nothing in
the Cup, in a ttrift philofophical Senfe, while there
is Air in it, and perhaps a Million of Rays of Light
are there, \
II. Not- Being, as it has relation to Modes or
Manners of Being, may be confidered either as a
••mere Negation, or as a Privation. '*
A Negation is the Abfence of that which does
not naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeak-
ing of, or which has no Right, Obligation, or
Neceflity to be prefent with it j as when we fay
a Stone
C. II. S. 5. Tie right Ufe of Reafcm 27
a Stone is Inanimate, or Blind, or Deaf, i. e. it has
no Life, nor Sight, nor Hearing \ nor when we fay
a Carpenter or a Fifhertnan is unlearned, thefe are
mere Neg&tions.
But a Privation is the Abfence of what does
naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeaking of,
or which*ought to be prefent with it, as when a
Man or a Horfe is deaf, or £//W, or dead, or if a
Phyjician or a Divine be unlearned, thefe are called
Privations : \ So the Sinfulnefs of any human ARiori
is faid to be a Privation -, for &* is that Want of
Conformity to the Law of God, which ought to
be found in every Adtion of Man.
Note, There are fome Writers who make all
fort of relative Modes or Relations, as well as all
external Denominations, to be mere Creatures of the
Mind, and Entia Rationis, and then they rank
them alfo under the general Head of Not-Beings ;
but; it is my Opinion, that whatfoever may be
determined concerning mere mental Relations and
external Denominations, *which feem to have fome-
thing lefs of Entity or. Being in them, yet there
are many real Relations, which ought not to be
reduced to fo low a Oafs ; fuch are the Situation
of Bodies, their mutual Diftances, their particu-
lar Proportions and Meafures, the Notions of Fa-
therhood, Brotherhood, Son/hip, &V. all which are
relative Ideas. The very Eflence of Virtue or
Holinefi confifts in the Conformity of our Ac-
tions to the Rule of Right Reafon, or the Law of
God : The Nature and Effence of Sincerity is the
Conformity of our Words and Aftions to cur
Thoughts, all which are but mere Relations ; and
I think we muft not reduce fuch pofitive Beings as
Piety, and Virtue, and Truth, {o the Rank of
Non-Entities, which have nothing real in them,
though Sin, (or rather the Sinfulnefs of an Aft ion)
C *• •"" may
,28 L G IC K: Or, partI v.
may be properly called a Not-Being, for it is ?•*■
Want of Pietj and Virtue. This is the moft ufual,
and perhaps the jufteft Way of reprefenting thefe
Matters.
CHAP. III.
Of the feveral Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas.
IDEAS may be divided with Regard to their
Original, their Nature, their Objefts, and their
Qualities.
SECT. I.
Of fenjible, spiritual, and abfiratted Ideas.
THERE has been a great Controverfy a-
bout the Origin of Ideas, (viz.) whether any
of our Ideas are innate or no, L e. born with us, and
naturally belonging to our Minds. Mr. Locke ut-
terly denies it ; others as pofitively affirm it. Now,
though this Controverfy may be compromifed, by
allowing that there is a Senfe, wherein our firft I-
deas of fome Things may be faid to be innate, (as
I have fhewn in fome Remarks on Mr. Locke's Ef-
fay, which have lain long by me) yet it does not
belong to this Place and-Bufinefs to have that
Point debated at large, nor will it hinder our Pur-
fuit of the prefent Work to pafs it over in Silence.
There is fufficient Ground to fay, that all our
Ideas, with Regard to their Original, may be di*
vided into three forts, (viz.) fenjible, fpiritual, and
akjlrafied Ideas,
I. Senfible or corporeal Ideas, are derived original-
ly from our Senfe?, and from the Communication
' which
,3
, ty III. S. !• Tie right life gfReafon. 29
which the Soul has with the animal Body in this
prefent State ; fuch are the Notions we frame of
all Colours, Sounds, Taftes, Figures, or Shapes and
Motions ; for our Senfes being converfant about
particular fenfible Objedts become the Occafions
of feveral diftinft Perceptions in the Mind ; and
thus we come by the Ideas of Yellow, White, Heat,
Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all thofe
which we call fenfible Qualities. All the Ideas which
we have of Body, and the fenfible Modes and Pro-
'perries that belong to it, feem to be derived from
Sulfation.
And howfoever thefe may be treafured up in
the Memory, and by the Work of Fancy may be
increafed, diminifhed, compounded, divided, and
diverfified, (which we are ready to call our In-
vention) yet they all derive their firft Nature and
Being from fbmething that has been let into our
Minds by one or other of our Senfes. If I think
of. a golden Mountain, or a Sea of liquid Fire, yet
the fingle Ideas of Sea, Fire, Mountain and Gold
came into my Thoughts at firft by Senfation ; the
Mind has only compounded them.
II. * Spiritual or Intellectual Ideas are thofe which
we gain by reflecting on the Nature and Adtions
of our own Souls, and turning our Thoughts with-
in our felves, and obferving what is tranfaded in
our own Minds. Such are the Ideas we have of
thought, Affent, Dijfent, Judging, Reafon, Knowledge;
Underftanding, Will, Love, Fear, Hope.
By Senfation the Soul contemplates Things (as it
Tarere) out of itfelf* and gains corporeal Reprefenta-
tioas or fenfible Ideas : By Reflexion the Soul
contemplates itfelf, and Things within itfelf and
* Here the Word Spiritual isufed in a mere natural, and not in a rcli-
y w» Scafc.
• : ' C 2 by
SE"
30 L G I C K: Or, Parti*
by this Means it gains fpiritual Ideas, orReprefen-
tations of Things intellectual.
Here it may be noted, though the firft Original
of thefe two Sorts of I^eas-, (viz) Senjible and Spiri-
tual^ may be entirely owing to thefe two Principles*
Senfation and Reflection^ yet the Recollection and
frefli Excitation of them may be owing to a thou*-
fand other Occafions and Occurrences of Life,
We could never inform a Man who was born
Blind or Deaf what we mean by the Words Yel-
loW) Blue, Red) or by the Words Loud or Shrill,
nor convey any juft Ideas of thefe Things to his
Mind, by all the Powers of Language, unlefs he
has experienced thofe Senfations of Sound and Co-
lour v nor could we ever gain the Ideas of Thought y
Judgment^ Reafon, Doubting^ Hoping, &V. by all
the Words that Man could invent, without turn-
ing our Thoughts inward upon the A&ions of our
own Souls. Yet when once w^ have attained thefe
Ideas by Senfation and Reflection) they may be ex-
cited afrefh by the Ufe of Names, Words, Signs,
or by any Thing elfe that has been connedled with
them in our Thoughts •, for when two or more I-
deas have been affociated together, whether it be
by Cuftom, or Accident, or Defign, the one pre-
fently brings the other to Mind.
III. .Befides thefe two which we have named*
there is a third Sort of Ideas, which $re commonly
called abftraCted Ideas, becaufe though the original
Ground or Occafion of them may be Senfation^ or
Reflection) or both> yet thefe Ideas are framed by
another A£t of the Mind, which we ufually call
jibflraCtion. Now .the Word AbftraCtion fignifies
a withdrawing fome Parts of an Idea from other
Parts of it, by which Means fuch abftraCted Ideas
are formed, as neither reprefent any Thing corpo-
real
-C.IIl- S. i. the right Ufe of Reafon. 3 1
real or fpiritual, i. e. any thing peculiar or proper
to Mind or Body. Now thefe are of two Kinds.
Some of thefe abftra5ied Ideas are the moft ab-
folute, general and univerfal Conceptions of Things
confidered in themfelves, without Refpeft to others,
fuch as Entity or Being, and Not-being, Effence,
Exijlence, A£l, Power, Subftance, Mode, Accident,
The other Sort of abftrafted Ideas is relative, as
when we compare feveral Things together, and
confider merely the Relations of one Thing to
another, entirely dropping the Subjedt of thofe
Relations, whether they be corporeal or fpiritual ;
fuch are our Ideas of Caufe, Effeft, Likenefs, Un-
likenefs, Subjeft, Objeft, Identity, or Samenefs, and
Contrariety, Order, and other Things which are
treated of in Ontology.
Moft of the Terms of Art in feveral Sciences
may be ranked under this Head of abjlrafled Ideas,
as Noun, Pronoun, Verb, in Grammar, and the
feveral Particles of Speech, as wherefore, therefore,
when, how, although, howfoever, &V. So Connexions,
Tranfitions, Similitudes, Tropes, and their various
Forms in Rhetorick.
Thefe abftrafled Ideas, whether abfolute or re-
lative, cannot fo properly be faid to derive their
immediate, complete and diftindl Original, either
from Senfation, or Reflection, (1.) Becaufe the Na-
ture and the Aftions both of Body and Spirit give
us Occafion to frame exactly the fame Ideas of Ef-
fence, Mode, Caufe, Effeft, :Likenefs, Contrariety,
'&c. Therefore thefe cannot be called either fenfi-
ble or fpiritual Ideas, for they are not exa& Re-
prefentations either of the peculiar Qualities or Affions
of Spirit or Body, but feem to be a diftindfc Kind
of Idea framed in the Mind, to reprefent our moft
general Conceptions of Things or their Relations to
. . C 3 one
32 L G I C K: Or, Parti,
one another ', without any Regard to their Natures*
whether they be corporeal or fpiritual. And, (2.)
the fame general Ideas, of Caufe and EffeSl, Like-
nefs, 65V . may be transferred to a Thoufand other
Kinds of Being, whether bodily or fpiritual, befides
thole from whence we firfl. derived them : Even
thofe abftraSed Ideas, which might be firft occa-.
Jioned by Bodies may be as properly afterward at^
tributed to Spirits.
Now, though Mr. Locke fuppofes Senfation and
Reflexion to be the only two Springs of all Ideas,
and that thefe two are fufficient to furniih our
Minds with all that rich Variety of Ideas which
we have ; yet AbftraStion is certainly a different
Aft of the Mind, whence thefe abftrafted Ideas
have their Original ; though perhaps Senfation ox
Refle&ion may furniih us with aH the firft Objedb
and Occafions whence thefe abftraSed Ideas are ex->
cited apd derived. Nor in this Senfe and View of
Things can I think Mr. Locke himfelf would deny
my Reprefentation of the Original of abftraSled I-.
fleas, nor forbid diem to ftand for a diftinft Species.
'Note, Though we have divided Ideas in this
Chapter into three Sorts, (viz.) fenfible, fpiritual,
^nd abfiraiied, yet it may not be amifs juft to take
notice here, that as Man may be called a compound
^ubfiance^ being made up of Body and Mind,
and the Modes yrhich arife from this Compofition
are called mixed Modes, fuch as Senfation, Paffion^
t)ifcourfe, &c. So the Ideas of this Subftance or
Being called Man x and of thefe mixed Modes may
t>e called mxt Ideas \ for they are not "properly and
ftri&ly fpiritual, fenfible or abftrafted. Scfc a much
Jarger Accpunt ot every P^rrof this Chapter in the
fbilofopbicfl EJfays, by L W. Eff. 3, 4, &c.
?ECT,
C III. 8.2. The right Ufe of Rcafon. 33
SECT. II.
Of fimple and complex, compound and collcBive Ideas.
IDEAS confidered in their Natnre, are either
fimpk or complex.
A fimpk Idea is one uniform Idea which cannot
be divided or diftinguifhed by the Mind of Man
into two or more Ideas •, fuch are a Multitude of
our Senfations, as the Idea of Sweet, Bitter, Cold,
Heat, White, Red, Blue, Hard, Soft, Motion, Reft,
and perhaps Extension and Duration : Such are alfo
many of our fpiritual Ideas ; fuch as Thought, Will,
Wijh, Knowledge, &c.
A complex Idea is made by joining two or more
fimple Ideas together ; as a Square, a Triangle, a ■
Cube, a Ren, a Table, Reading, Writing, Truth y '
Falfhood, a Body, a A4an, a Horfe, an Angel, a
heavy Body, a fwift Horfe, &c. Every Thing that
can be divided by the Mind into two or more Ideas
is called complex.
Complex Ideas are often confidered as fingle and
diftinft Beings, though they may be made up of fe-
veral fimple Ideas ; fo a Body, a Spirit, a Houfe, a
Tree, a Flower. But when feveral of thefe I-
deas of a different Kind art joined together, which
are wont to be confidered as diftinft fingle Beings,
this is called a compound Idea, whether thefe
united Ideas be fimple or complex. So a Man is
compounded of Body and Spirit, fo Mithridate \s
a compound Medicine, becaufe it is made of many
different Ingredients: This I have (hewn under
the Dqdfcrine of Subftances* . And Modes alfo may.
be compounded ; Harmony is a compound Idea
made up of different Sounds united-, fo feveral dif-
ferent Virtues muft be united to make up the comr
C 4 pounded
34 L O G I C K: Or, PartL
pounded Idea or Character, either of a Hero, or a
Saint.
But when many Ideas of the fame Kind are
joined together and united in one Name, or under
one View, it is called a collective Idea •, lb an Ar-
my, or a Parliament, is a Colle6tibn of Men \
a Dictionary, or Nomenclatura is a Collection of
Words •, a i<70r£ is a Collection of Sheep ; a Fo-
reft, or Grove, a Collection of Trees •, a Heap is a
Collection of Sand, or Corn, or Duft, &c . a Ci-
ty is a Collection of Houfes ; a Nofegay is a Col-
lection of Flowers ; a Month, or a Tasr, is a Col-
lection of Days ; and a Tboufand is a Collection of
Units.
The precife Difference between a compound and
tdtkRive Idea is this, that a compound Idea unites
Things of a different Kind, but a collective Idea
Things of the fame Kind : Though this DiftinCtion
• in fome Cafes is not accurately obferved, and Cut
torn oftentimes ufes the Word compound for cottec*
tive.
SECT. III.
Of univerfal and particular Ideas, real and ima-
ginary.
IDEAS, according to their Objefts, may firft
be divided into particular or univerfal.
A particular Idea is that which reprefents one
Thing only.
Sometimes the one Thing is reprefented in a
loofe and indeterminate Manner, as when we fay
fome Man, any Man, one Man, another Man % fome
Herfe, any Horfe y one City, or another, which is
called by the Schools Individuum Vagum.
Sometimes the particular Idea reprefents one
Thing in a determinate Manner, and then it is
called
C, IIL S. 3 . Tie right life of Reafon. 3$
called a fingular Idea ; fuch is Bucephalus, or Akx~
ander's Horfe, Cicero, the Orator, Peter the Apoftle,
the Palace of Ver failles, this Book, that River, the
New Foreft, or the City of London : That Idea
which reprefents one particular determinate Thing
to me is called a fingular Idea, whether it be fimple,
or complex, or compound.
The Objett of any particular Idea, as well as
the Idea itfelf, is fometimes called an Individual :
So Peter is an individual Man, London is an indi-
vidual City. So this Book, one Horfe, another Horfe^
are all Individuals •, though the Word Individual is
more ufually limited to one fingular, certain, and
determined Object.
An uniyerfal Idea is that which reprefents a com-
mon Nature agreeing to feveral particular Things ;
fo a Horfe, a Man, or a Book, are called univerfal
Ideas, becaufe they agree to all Horfes, Men, or
Books.
And I think it not amifc to intimate, in this
Place, that thefe univerfal Ideas are formed by
that Aft of the Mind which is called dbftraffion, i. e.
a withdrawing fome Part of an Idea from other
Parts of it : For when fingular Ideas are firft let
into the Mind by Senfation or Refledtion, then, in
order to make them univerfal, we leave out, or
drop all thofe peculiar and determinate Characters,
Qualities, Modes, or Circumftances, which belong
merely to any particular individual Being, and by
which it differs from other Beings ; and wq only
contemplate thofe Properties of it, wherein it agrees
with other Beings.
Though it mull be confefled, that the Name of
dbftraSied Ideas is fometimes attributed to univer-
fal Ideas, both fenfible or fpiritual, yet this Ab-
fir action is not fo great, as when we drop out of
- «ur..Idea every fenfible or fpiritual Reprefentationj
36 LOG IC K: Or, Parti.
and retain nothing but the moft general and abfolutc
Conceptions of Things, or their mere Relations to
one another, without any Regard to their particu-
lar Natures, whether they be fenfibk or fpiritual.
" And it is to this Kind of Conceptions we more pro-
perly give the Name of abftrafted Ideas, as in the
firft Se&ion of this Chapter.
An univerfal Idea is either general or fpecial
A general Idea is called by the Schools a Genus ;
and it is one common Nature agreeing to feveral
ether common Natures. So Animal is a Genus,
becaufe it agrees to Horfe, Lion, Whale, Butterfly,
which are alio Common Ideas •, fo Fijh is a Genus,
becaufe it agrees to "Trout, Herring, Crab, which
are common Natures alfo.
A fpecial Idea is called by the Schools a Species j
it is one common Nature that agrees to feveral fin*
gular individual Beings ; fo Horfe is & fpecial Idea,
or a Species, becaufe it agrees to Bucephalus, Trott,
and Snow-ball. City is a fpecial Idea, for it agrees
to London, Paris, BriftoL
Note, Ift. Some of thefe Univerfals are Genus* f,
if compared with lefs common Natures ; and they
are Species\ if compared with Natures more com-
mon. So Bird is a Genus, if compared with Ea-
gle, Sparrow, Raven, which are alfo common Na-
tures : But it is a Species, if compared with the more
general Nature, Animal. The lame may be faid of
Ftjh, Beaft, &c.
This fort of univerfal Ideas, which may either
be confidered as* a Genus, or a Species, is called
Subaltern: But the higheft Genus, which is never a
Species, is called the moft general-, and the loweft
Species, which is never a Genm, is called the moft
fpecial
It may be obferved here alfo* that that general
Nature or Property wherein one Thing agrees with
• moft .
/
C. HI. S. 3. The right Vfi of Reafon. 37
moft other Things is called its more remote Genus:
So Subftance is the remote Genus of Bird, or Beafi,
becauie it agrees not only to all Kinds of Animals,
but alfo to things inanimate, as Sun, Stars, Clouds,
Metals, Stones, Air, Water, &fc But Animal is
the proximate or nearefi Gfnus of Bird, Tsecaiife it
agrees to feweft other Things. Thofe general Na-
tures which ftand between the nearefi and moft re-
mote are called Intermediate.
Note, II dl y, In univerfal Ideas it is proper to
confider their Comprehenfion and their Extenfion *.
The Comprehenfion of an Idea regards all the ef-
fential Modes and Properties of it : So Body in its
Comprehenfion takes in Solidity, Figure, Quantity,
Mobility, &V. So a Bowl in its Comprehenfion in-
cludes, Roundnefs, Volubility, &V.
The Extenjion of an univerfal Idea regards all the
particular Kinds and* fingle Beings that are con-
tained under it. So a Body in its Extenfion includes
Sun, Moon, Star, Wood; Iron, Plant, Animal, &c.
which are feveral Species, or Individuals, under the
general Name of Body. So a Bowl, in its Exten-
fion, includes a wooden BoWl, a brafs Bowl, a white
and black Bowl, a heavy Bowl, &c. and all Kinds
of Bowls, together with all the particular indivi-
dual Bowls in the World.
Note, The Comprehenfion of an Idea is fometimes
taken in fo large a Senfe, as not only to include the
eflential Attributes, but all the Properties, Modes,
?md Relations whatsoever, that belong to any Being,
as will appear, Chap. VI. . * '
This Account of Genus and Species is part of
that famous Doftrine of Univerfals, which is taught
|n the Schools, wiA divers other Formalities be-
longing to it j for it is in this Place that they in-
* Not*, The Word Extenfion here if taken in a mere logic*! Senfe, an}
3 8 LOGICK.Or, Parti,
troducc Difference, which is the primary eflential
Mode, and Property, or the fecondary eflential
Mode, and Accident or the accidental Mode -, and
thefe , they call the five Predicates, becaufe every
Thing that is affirmed concerning any Being muft
be either the Genus, the Species, the Difference,
fome Property, fome Accident : But what farther is
necefiary to be faid concerning thefe Things will
be mentioned when we treat of Definition.
Having finifhed the Dodtrine of univerfal and
particular Ideas, I Ihould take notice of another
Divifion of them, which alfo hath Refpeft to their
Objetts -, and that is, they are either real or ima-
ginary.
Real Ideas are fuch as have a juft Foundation in
Nature, and have real Obje£ts,or Exemplars, which
did, or do, or may actually exift, according to the
prefent State and Nature of • Things ; fuch are all
our Ideas of Long, Broad, Swift, Slow, Wood, Iron,
Men, Horfes, Thoughts, Spirits, a cruel Majier, a
proud Beggar, a Man feven Feet high.
Imaginary Ideas, which are alfo called fantaftical^
or chimerical, are fuch as are made by enlarging,
diminifhing, uniting, dividing real Ideas in the
Mind, in fuch a Manner, as no Objedts, or Ex-
emplars, did or ever will exift, according to the
prefent Courfe of Nature, though the feveral Parts
of thefe Ideas are borrowed from real Objects -, fuch
are the Conceptions we have of a Centaur, & Satyr, a
golden Mountain, a flying Horfe, a Dog without a
Head, a Bull lefs than a Moufe, or a Moufe as big as
a Bull, and a Man twenty Feet high.
Some of thefe fantaftick Ideas are poffible, that
is, they are not utterly inconftftent in the Nature
of Things ; and therefore it is within the React
of Divine Power to make fuch Obje&s •, fuch are
moft of the Inftances already given : But Impofftblof
cany
.C.IILS. 4. ffle rtgkUfe of Rezfon. 39
•carry in utter Inconfiftertce in the Ideas which are
joined; fuch are felf-aRive Matter , and infinite or
.eternal Men, a pious Man without Honejly, or Heaven
without Holinefs.
SECT. IV.
The Drvifwn of Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities.
IDEAS, with Regard to their Qualities, affoai
us thefe feveral Divifions of them. 1 . Thcp
^are either clear and difiinft, or obfcure and confufed.
s. They are vulgar or learned. 3. They axeperfeff
or imperfett. 4. They are true or falfe.
I. Our Ideas are either clear and diflinff, or *£-
fcure and €onfufed.
Several Writers have diftinguilhed the clear
Ideas from thofe that af e diftinct ; and the confufed
Ideas from thofe that are obfcure ; and it mud be
acknowledged, there may be fome Difference be-
tween them; for it is the Clearnefs of Ideas for
the moft Part makes them dijlinft ; and the 03-
fcurity of Ideas is one Thing that will always bring
a Sort of Confufion into them. Yet when thefe
Writers come to talk largely upon thisSubjedt, and
to explain and adjuft their Meaning with great
Nicety, I have generaly found that they did not
keep up the Diftinftion they firft defigned, but
they confound the one with the other. I fhall
therefore treat of clear or diftinft Ideas, as one and
the fame Sort, and obfcure or confufed Ideas, as an-
other.
A clear and diftinSl Idea is that which reprefents
the Objed of the Mind with full Evidence and
Strength, and plainly diftinguifhes it from all other
Objefts whatfoever.
Kti
40 L 6 I C K: Or, Parti.
An obfcure and confufed Idea reprefents the. Ob-
ject either fo faintly, fo imperfe&ly, or fo mingled
with other Ideas, that the Object of it doth not
appear plain to the Mind, nor purely in its own
Nature, nor fufficiently diftinguifhed from other
Things.
When we fee the Sea and Sky nearer at Hand',
we have a clear and diftinR Idea of each ; But when
we look far toward the Horizon, especially in a
mifty Day, our Ideas of both are but obfcure and
confufed ; for we know not which is Sea and which
is Sky. So when we look at the Colours of the Rain-
bow, we have a clear Idea of the red, the blue, the
green in the middle of their feveral Arches, and a
diJlinSl Idea too, while the Eye fixes there ; but
when we confider the Border of thofe Colours, they
fo run into one another that it renders their Ideas
confufed and obfcure. So the Idea which we have
of our Brother-, or our Friend*, whom we fee daily, is
clear and diftinSl j but when the Abfence of many
Years has injured the Idea, it becomes obfcure and
confufed.
Note here, that fome of our Ideas may be very
clear and diftinft in one Refpeft, and very obfcure
and confufed in another. So when we fpeak of a
Chiliagonum, or a Figure of a tboufand Angles, we
may have a clear and diftinft rational Idea of the
Number one thoufand Angles •, for we can demon-
ftrate various Properties concerning it by Reafon :
But the Image, or fenfible Idea, which we have of
the Figure, is but confufed and obfcure ; for we
cannot precifely diftinguifh it by Fancy from the
Image of a Figure that has nine hundred Angles \ or
nine hundred and ninety. So when we fpeak of the
infinite Diviftbility of Matter, we always keep in
our Minds a very clear and diffinfl: Idea of Divi*
Jon. and Divifibility. But after we have made a
little
C. Ill, S. 4. The right TJfe of Reafon. 4 1
little Progrefs in dividing, and come to Parts
that are far too (mail for the Reach of our Senfes,
then our Ideas y or fenfible Images of thefe little
Bodies, become obfcure^ and indiftintt, and the
Idea qf Infinite is very obfcure, imperfeS^ and cm*
fufed. ■ .
II. Ideas are either vulgar or learned. A vul-
gar Idea reprefents to us the moft obvious and
fenfible Appearances that are contained in the Ob-
ject of them : But a learned Idea penetrates farther
into the Nature, Properties, Reafons, Caufes and
Effedts of Things. This is belt illuftrated by fome
Examples.
It is a vulgar Idea that we have of a Rainbow^
when we conceive a large Arch in the Clouds,
made up of various Colours parallel to each other;
But it is a learned Idea which a Philofopher has
when he confiders it as the various Reflexions and
Refractions of Sun-beams, in Drops of falling
Rain. So it is a vulgar Idea which we have of
the Colours of [olid Bodies^ when we perceive them
to be, as it were, a red, or blue, or green Tinfture
of the Surface of thofe Bodies : But it is a philo-
fopbical Idea when we confider the various Colours
to be nothing elfe but different Senfations exci-
ted in us by the varioufly refrafted Rays' of
Light, reftedted on our Eyes in a different Man-
ner, according to the different Size, or Shape,
or Situation of the Particles of which the Sur-
faces of thofe Bodies are compofed. It is a vul-
gar Idea which we have of a Watch or Clock,
when we conceive of it as a pretty Inftrument,
made to fhew us the Hour of the Day ; But it is
a homed Idea which the Watchmaker has of it*
who knows all the feveral Parts of it, the Spring,
the. Balance, the Chain, the Wheels, their Axles,
£& together 4 with the various. Connexions and
« .v. K&jofc-
42' LOG IC K: Or, PartL
Adjuftments of each Part* whence the exaft and
uniform Motion of the Index is derived, which
points to the Minute or the Hour. So when a
common Underftanding reads Virgil's JEneid, he
has but a vulgar Idea of that Poem, yet his Mind
is naturally entertained with the Story, and his
Ears with the Verfe : But when a Critick, or a
Man who has Skill in Poefy, reads it, he has a
teamed Idea of its peculiar Beauties, he taftes and
relifhes a fuperior Pleafure •, he admires the Ro-
man Poet, and wifhes he had known the Chrifiian
Theology, which would have furnifhed him with
nobler Materials and Machines than all the Heathen
Idols.
It is with a vulgar Idea that the World beholds
the Cartoons of Raphael at Hampton-Court, and
every one feels his Share of Pleafure and Entertain-
ment : But a Painter contemplates the Wonders of
that Italian Pencil, and fees a thoufand Beauties in
them which the vulgar Eye negle&ed : His learned
Ideas give him a tranfcendent Delight, and yet, at
the fame time, difcover the Blemifhes which the
common Gazer never obferved.
III. Ideas are either perfeft or imperfect, which
are otherwife called adequate or inadequate.
Thofe are adequate Ideas which perfectly repre-
fent their Archetypes or Obje&s. Inadequate I-
deas are but a partial, or incomplete Reprefen-
tation of thofe Archetypes to which they are re*,
ferred.
All our Jimples Ideas are in fome Senfe adequate
or perfeSl, becaufe fimple Ideas, confidered merely
as our firlt Perceptions, have no Parts in them *
So we may be laid to have a perfeft Idea of
White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Length, Light,. Mo-
tion, Rjft, &c. We have alfo a perfect Idea of
various Figures, as a Triangle^ a Square^ a Cylin-
der 9
Ch. III. S. 4.* The right Ufe gfReafon. 4$
der, a Cube* a Sphere, which are complex Ideas :
But our Idea or Image of a Figure of a thoufand
Sides, our Idea of the City of London, or the Pow- .
ersofa Loadjtone, are very imperfeft, as well as all
our Ideas of infinite Length or Breadth, infinite.
Power, JVifdom or Duration ; for the Idea of /»-
finite is endlefs and ever growing, and can never be
compleated.
Note, 1. When we have a perfect Idea of any
thing in all its Parts, it is called a complete Idea ;
when in all its Properties, it is called comprthenfive.
But when we have but an inadequate and imperfeft •
Idea, we are only faid to apprehend it ; therefore
ufe the Term Apprehenfion, when we fpeak of our
Knowledge of God, ifrho can never be comprehended
by his Creatures.
Note, 2. Though there are a Multitude of Ideas
which may be called perfefl, or adequate in a vulgar
Senfe, yet there are fcarce any Ideas which are ade*
dequate, comprehenjive and complete, in a philofophical
Senfe ; for there is fcarce any thing in the World
that we know, as to all the Parts, and Powers, and
Properities of it, in Perfection. Even fo plain an
Idea as that of a triangle has, perhaps, infinite
Properties belonging to it, of which we know but
a few. Who can tell what are the Shapes and Po-
fitions of thofe Particles, which caufe all the Va-
riety of Colours that appear on the Surface of
Things ? Who knows what are the Figures of the
little Corpufcles that compofe and diftinguifh dif-
ferent Bodies? The Ideas of Brafs, Iron, Gold,
Wood, Stone, Hyffop, and Rofemary, have an infi-
nite Variety of hidden Myfteries contained in the
Shape, Size, Motion and Pofition of the little Par-
ticles, of which they are compofed •, and, perhaps,
alfo infinite . unknown Properties and Powers, that
' may be derived from them. And if we arife to
44 L G I C K: Or, Vittl.
the Animal World, or the World of Spirits, our
Knowledge of them muft be amazingly imperfeft,
, when there is not the leaft Grain of Sand, or empty
Space, but has too many Queftions and Difficulties
belonging to it for the wifeft Philofopher upon
Earth to anfwer and refolve.
IV, Our Ideas are either true or falfe ; for an Idea
being the Reprefentation of a Thing in the Mind,
it muft be either a true or a falfe Reprefentation of
it. If the Idea be conformable to the Objeft or
Archetype of it, it is a true Idea ; if not, it is a
:f*lf e onc - Sometimes our Ideas are referred to
"■ things really exifting without us as their Archetypes,
If I fee Bodies in their proper Colours I have a true
Idea : But when a Man tinder the Jaundice fees all
Bodies yellow, he has a falfe Idea of them. So if wc
fee the Sun or Moon rifing or fetting % our Idea repre-
fents them bigger than when they are on the Meridi-
an : And in this Senfe it is a falfe Idea, becaufe
thofe heavenly Bodies are all Day and all Night of
the fame Bignefs. Or when I fee a fir 'ait Staff appear
crooked while it is half under the Water, I fay, the
Water gives me a falfe Idea of it. Sometimes our
Ideas refer to the Ideas of other Men, denoted by
fuch a particular Word, as their Archetypes : So
when I hear a Proteflant ufe the Words Church and
Sacraments, if I underftand by thefe Words, a Con-
gregation of faithful Men who prof efs Chriftianity, and
the two Ordinances, Baptifm and the Lord's Supper,
I have a true Idea of thofe Words in the common
Senfe of Protejlants : But if the Man who fpeaks of
them be a Papift, he means the Church of Rome and
the f even Sacraments, and tfien I have a miftaken Idea
of thofe Words, as fpoken by him, for he has a
different Senfe and Meaning: And in general
whenfoever I miftake the Senfe of any Speaker or
Writer, I may be faid to have z falfe Idea of it.
* . ., Some
Ch. IV. S. i; The right Ufe ^Reafon; '4$
Some think that Truth or Faljhood properly be-
longs only only to Proportions, which fhall be the
Subjeft of Difcourfe in the fecond Part of Logick$
for if we confider Ideas as mere Imprcffions upon
the Mind, made by outward Obje&s, $hofe Impref-
Cons will ever be conformable to the Laws of Na-
ture in fuch a Cafe: The Water will make a Stick
-appear crooked, and the horizontal Air will make
the Sun and Moon appear bigger. And generally
where there is Faljhood in Ideas, there feems to be
fome fecret or latent Proportion, whereby we judge
falfly of Things : This is mojre obvious where we
take up the Words of a Writer or Speaker in a
miftaken Senfe, for we join his Words to our own
Ideas, which are different from his. But after all,
fmce Ideas are Pictures of Things, it can never be
very improper to pronounce them to be true or
falfe, according to their Conformity or Nonconformity
to their Exemplars.
C H A P. IV.
Of Words and their fever al Divijions, together
with the Advantage and Danger qf them.
S E C T. I. ; ''""'
Of Words in general, and their Ufe. ,
HOUGH our Ideas are firft acquired by
the Perception of Objedb, or by various Sen-
fations and Rebellions, yet we convey them to each
other by the Means of certain Sounds, or written
Marks, which we call Words ; and a great Part of
our Knowledge is both obtained and communica-
ted by thefe Means, which are called Speech or
Language.
2 ^»a.
T
. 'V.
r 46 I G IC K: Or, Parti;
But as we are led into the Knowledge of Things
by Words j fo we are oftentimes led into Error, or
Miftake, by the Ufe or Abufe of Words alfb. And
in order to guard againft fuch Miftakes as well as
to promote our Improvement in Knowledge, it is
neceflary to acquaint ourfelves a little with Words
and Terms. We (hall begin with thefe Obferva-
tions.
Obferv. i. Words (whether they are fpoken or
written) have no natural Connexion with the
Ideas they are defigned to fignify, nor with the
Things which are reprefented in thofe Ideas, There
is no Manner of Affinity between the Sounds
white in Englifh, or blanc in French \ and that Co-
lour which we call by that Name \ nor have the
. Letters, of which thefe Words are compofed,
any natural Aptnefs to fignify that Colour rather
than red or green. Words and Names therefore
are mere arbitrary Signs, invented by Men to
communicate their Thoughts or Ideas to one an-
other.
Obferv. 2. If one fingle Word were appointed to t
exprefs but one fimple Idea, and nothing elfe, as
White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Sharp, Bitter, Extenfton,
Duration, there would be fcarce any Miftake about
them.
But alas! It is a common Unhappinefs in Lan-
guage , that different fimple Ideas are fometimes ex-
preffed by the fame Word\ fo the Words fweet and
Jharp are applied both to the Objefts of hearing
and tafting, as we fhall fee hereafter ; and this, per-
haps, may be one Caufe or Foundation of Obfcurity
and Error arifing frorb Words.
Cbferv. 3. In communicating our "complex
Jdess to one another, if we could join as many
peculiar and appropriated Words together in one
Sound, as we join fimple Ideas to make one com-
plex
Ch. IV. S. i; The right Vfe 0/ Reafon; tf
plex one, we fhould feldom be in Danger of mif-
taking: When I exprefs the Tafte of an Apple,
which we call the Bitter Sweety none can miitake
what I mean.
Yet this fort of Compofition would make all Lan-
guage a mod tedious and unweildy Thing, fince
moft of our Ideas are complex, and many of them
have eight or ten fimple Ideas in them ; fo that
the Remedy would be worfe than the Difcafe; for
what is now exprefled in one fhort Word as Month*
or Tear j would require two Lines to exprefs \t*
It is neceffary, therefore, that fingls Words be in-
vented to exprefs complex Ideas, in order to make
Language fhort and ufeful.
But here is our great Infelicity, that when
Jingle Words fignify complex Ideas, one Word can
never diftinflly manifeft all the Parts of a com-
plex Idea; and thereby it will often happen, that
one Man includes, more or lefs in .his Idea, than
another does, while he affixes the fame Word to
it. In this Cafe there will be Danger of Mif-
take between them, for they do not mean the
fame ObjeSl, though they ufe the fame Name. So if
.one Perfon or Nation, by the Word Tear, mean
twelve Months of thirty Days each, i. e. three
hundred and fixty Days, another intend a Solar
Tear of three hundred fixty five Days, and a third
mean a Lunar Tear, or twelve Lunar Months^
i. e. three hundred fifty four Days, there will be
. a great Variation and Error in fheir Account of
Things, unlefs they are well apprized of each
other's Meaning beforehand. ' This is fuppofed to
be the Reafon, why fome ancient Hi/lories and
Prophecies, and Accounts of Chronology, are fo
hard to be adjufted. And this is the true Reafon
.. of fo furious and endlefs Debates on many Points
D 3 ia
48 LOGIC K.< Or; Part t
in Divinity ; the Words Church* Worfhip* Idolatry *
Repentance, Faith* EleSion* Merit* Grace* and
many others which fignify very complex Ideas* arc
not applied to include ju ft the fame fimple Ideas*
and the fame Number of them, by the various
contending Parties; thence arife Confufion and
Cornell.
Obferv. 4. Though a Jingle Name does not cer-
tainly manifeft to us all the Parts of a complex
Idea* yet it muft be acknowledged, that in many
of our complex Ideas* . the fingle Name may point
out to us fome chief Property which belongs to the
v Thing that the Word Signifies*, efpecially when
the Wgrd or Name is traced, up to its Original,
through feveral Languages from whence it is bor-
rowed. So an Apoftle fignifies one who is fent forth.
But this tracing of a Word to its Original,
(which is called Etymology) is fometimes a very
precarious and uncertain Thing: And after all,
we have made but little Progrefs towards the
Attainment of the full Meaning of a complex
Idea* by knowing fome one chief Property of it.
We know but a fmall Part of the Notion of
&n Apoftle, by knowing barely that he is fent
forth.
Obferv. 5. Many (if not mod) of our Words
which are applied to moral and intellectual Ideas,
when traced up to the Original in the learned
'Languages, will be found to fignify fenfible ami .
' eorporeal Things : Thus the Words Appreher$on*\
Under/landing* AbftraSion* Invention* Idea* Inference* '
Prudence* Religion* Church* Adoration* &c. have all
a corporeal Signification in their Original. The
Name Spirit itfelf fignifies Breath or Air*m Latin,
Greek* and Hebrew: Such is the Poverty of all
Languages, they are forced to ufe thtfe Names
for
Ch. IV. S.'i: The right Ufe *f Reafon; 49
for incorporeal Ideas, which Thing has a Tendency
. to Error and Confufion.
Obferv. 6. The laft Thing I fhall mention, that
leads us into many a Miftake is, the Multitude of
Obje&s that one Name fometimes fignifies : There
is almoft an infinite Variety of Things and Ideas,
both fimple and complex, beyond all the Words
that are invented in any Language ; thence it be-
comes almoft neceflary that one name fhould fig-
nify feveral Things. Let us but confider the two
Colours of Tellow arid' Blue, if they are mingled'
together in any confiderable Proportion, they make
a Green : Now there may bfc infinite Differences
of the Proportions in the Mixture of Tellow and
Blue ; and yet we have only thefe three Words*
Tellow, Blue, and Green, to fignify all of them, at
leaft by one fingle Term.
When I ufe the Word Shore, I may intend tkere-
by a Coaft of Land near the Sea, or a Drain to car-
ry off Water, or a Prop to fupport a Building ; and
by the Sound of the Word Porter, who can tell
whether I mean a Man who bears Burthens, or a
Servant who waits at a Noblematts Gate ? The
World is fruitful in the Invention of Utenjils of
Life, and new CharaSers and Offices of Men, yet
Names entirely new are feldom invented 5 therefore
old Names are almoft neceflarily ufed to fignify
new Things, whfch may occafion much Confufion
and Error in the receiving and communicating of
Knowledge. *
Give me leave to propofe one fingle Inftance,
wherein all thefe Notes (hall be remarkably ex-
emplified. It is the Word Bijhop, which in French
is called Eveque ; ifpon which I would make thefe .
feveral Obfervations. (1.) That there is no natu-
ral Connexion between tfcd facred Office hereby
fignified, and the Letters or Sound which fignify
D 4 ^ew\*
5 o LOG IC K: Or, Partt
this Office; for both thefe Words Eveque and Bi-
fhop* fignify the fame Office, though there is not
one Letter alike in them ; nor have the Letters
which compofe the Englifh or the French Word,
any thing facred belonging to them, more than the
Letters that compofe the Words King or Soldier.
(2.) If the Meaning of a Word could be learned
by its Derivation or Etymology, yet the original
Derivation of Words is oftentimes very dark and
unfearchable *, for who would imagine, that each
of thefe Words are derived from the Latin 'Epif-
copus* or the Greek 9 E*fatvr& ? Yet in this Inftance
we happen to know certainly the true Derivation 5
the French being anciently writ Evefque* is borrow-
ed from the firft Part of the Latin Word ; and thfe
* old Englifh Bifcop from the middle of it. (3.) The
original Greek Word fignifies an Overlooker* or one
who ftands higher than his Fellows, and overlooks
them : It is a compound Word, that primarily
fignifies fenjible Ideas* tranflated to fignify or iijr
elude feveral moral or intellectual Ideas \ therefore
all will grant that the Nature of the Office can ne-
ver be known by the mere Sound or Senfe of the
Word Overlooker. (4.) I add farther, the Word
Bijhop or Epifcopus* even when it is thus tranflated
from a fenfible Idea, to include feveral intelledtual
. Ideas, may yet equally fignify an Overfeer of the
Poor 5 an Infpeftor of the Cuftoms ; a Surveyor of
the Highways ; a Supervifor of the Excife, &c.
But by the Confent of Men, and the Language of
Scripture, it is appropriated to fignify a facred Of'
fee in the Church. (5.) This very Idea and Name,
thus tranflated from Things fenfible, to fignify a
fpiritual and facred Thing, contains but one Pro-
perty of it, (viz.) one that has an Over fight* or Care
ever others : But it docs not tell us whether it in-
clude§
Ch.IV. S.2: 7k rsgbtUfe of Retfon: "5*
eludes a Care over one Church,, or marry \ over the
Laity* or the Clergy. (6.) Thence it follows, that
thofe who in the complex Idea of the Word Bijhop*
include an Overfight over the Clergy, or over a
whole Diocefe of People, a Superiority to Prefby-
ters, a diftyidt Power of Ordination, &c muft no-
ceiTarily difagree with thofe who include in it only
the Care of a fingle Congregation. Thus accord-
ing to the various Opinions of Men, this Word
fignifies a Pope, a Galtican Bifhop, a Lutheran Super*
intendant, an Englifh Prelate* a Pafior of a Jingle Af-
fembly, or a Prejbyter or Elder. Thus they quarrel
with each other perpetually 5 and it is well if any
of them all have hit precifely the Senfe of the facred
Writers, and included juft the fame Ideas in it, and
no others.
I might make all the fame Remarks on the Word
Church or Kirk, which is derived from Kvf I* ©#x®/,
or the Houfe of the Lord, contradted into Kyrioik,
which fome fuppofe to Cgnify an Afjembly of Cbri-
fiians, fome take it for all the World that profeffes
Cbrijtianity, and fome make it to mean only the
Clergy, and on thefe Accounts it has been the Oc-
cafion of as many and as furious Controverfies, as
the Word Bifhop which was mentioned before.
SECT. II.
Of negative and pofitive Verms.
FROM thefe and other Confiderations it will
follow, that if we would avoia Error in our
Purfuit of Knowledge, we muft take good heed to
the Ufe of Words and Verms, and be acquainted
with the various Kinds of them.
,1. Terms are either pofitive or negative.
It L0G1CK: Or, Part t.
Negative Terms are fuch as have a little Word
or Syllable of denying joined to them, according
to the various Idioms of every Language, as 17*-
jkafant, Imprudent, Immortal, Irregular, Ignorant,
Infinite, Endlefs, Lifek/s, Deatblefs 9 Nonfenfe, Abyjs,
Anonymous, where the Propofitions Un, Im, In, Non,
A, An, and the Termination lefs, fignify a Negati-
on, either in Englijh, Latin 9 or Greek.
Pcfttive Terms are thofc which have no fuch ne»
gative Appendices belonging to them, as Life,
Death, End, Senfe, Mortal.
But fo unhappily are our Words and Ideas Jink*
cd together, that we can never know which are po-
fitive Ideas, and which are negative, by the Word
that is ufed to exprefs them, and that for thefe
Reafons.
i ft, There are fome pofitive Terms which are
made to fignify a negative Idea ; as Dead is proper-
ly a Thing that is deprived of Life ; Blind implies
a Negation or Privation of Sight •, Deaf a Want of
Hearing 5 Dumb a Denial of Speech.
adly, There are alfo (bme negative Terms which
imply pofitive Ideas; fuch as immortal and death-
lefs, which fignify ever-living, or a Continuance in
Life : Infolent fignifies rude and haughty : Indem-
nify to keep fafe ; and Infinite perhaps has a pofi-
tive Idea too, for it is an Idea ever growing ; and
when it is applied to God, it fignifies his complete
Perfetfion.
3dly f There art both pofitive and negative Terms,
invented to fignify the fame inftead of contrary Ideas;
as Unhappy and Miferable, Sinkfs and Holy, Pure
and Undefined, Impure and Filthy, Unkind and Cruel,
Irreligious and Profane, Unforgiving and Revenge-
ful, &c. and there is a great deal of Beauty and
Convenience derived to any Language from this
Variety of Expreffion -, though fometimes it a little
confounds
Ch.IV. S. K The right Up of RcsSon. /&
confounds our Conceptions of Being and Not-heing^
• our pqfitive and negative Ideas.
4thly, I may add alfo, that there are fome Words
which are negative in their original Language, but
feem pofitive to an Englifhman* becaufe the Nega-
tion is unknown ; as Abyfs* a Place without a Bou
torn ; Anodyne* an eafing Medicine ; Amnefty* an
Unremembrance, or general Pardon; Anarchy, a
State without Government ; ' Anonymous* i. e. name-
lefs-, Inept* u e. not fit ; Iniquity? #. e. Unrighteout
nefs ; Infant* one that cannot fpeak, (viz.) a Child ;
Injurious* not doing Juftice or Right.
The Way therefore to know whether any Idea
be negative or not is, to confidcr whether it pri-
marily imply the Abfence of any pofitive Being,
or Mode of Being ; if it doth, then it is a Negation
or negative Idea ; otherwife it is a pofitive one, whe-
ther the Word that exprefles it be pofitive or ne-
gative. Yet after all, in many Cafes this is very
hard to determine, as in Amnefiy* Infinite* Abyfs*
which are originally relative Terms, but they fig*
nify Pardon* &c. which feem to be Pofitivcs, So
Darknefs* Madnefs* Clown* are pofitive Terms, but
they imply the Want of Light* the Want of Rea-
fon* and the Want of Manners * and perhaps thefe
may be ranked among the negative Ideas.
Here note, that in the Englijh Tongue two ne-
gative Terms are equal to one pofitive* and fignify
die* fame Thing, as not unhappy* fignifies happy*
not immortal* fignifies mortah* he is no imprudent
Man* i.e. he is a Man of Prudence : But the Senfe
and Force of the Word in fuch a negative Way of
Expreffion, feems to be a little diminiffced.
SECT.
$4. L G I C K: Or, Part ti
SECT. III.
Of Jimple and complex Terms.
H. HfERMS are divided into fimpk or complex*
A //»#>/* Tim is one Word, a complex Term
is when more Words are ufed to fignify one
Thing.
Some Terms are complex in Words, but not in
Senfe, fuch is the fecond Emperor of Rome •, for it
excites in our Minds only the Idea of one Man,
{viz.) Auguftus.
Some Terms are complex in Senfe, but not in .
Words ; fo when I fay an Army, a For eft, I mean
a Multitude of Men, or Trees ; and almoft all our
moral Ideas, as well as many of our natural ones,
are exprefled in this Manner -, Religion, Piety, Loy-
alty, Knavery, Theft, include a Variety of Ideas in
each Term.
There are other Terms which are complex both
in Words and Senje ; fo when I fay a fierce Dog, or
a pious Man, it excites an Idea, not only of thofe
two Creatures, but of their peculiar Characters
alfo.
Among the Terms that are complex in Senfe, but
not in Words, we may reckon thofe fimple Terms «
which contain a primary .and a fecondary Idea in
them 5 as when I hear my Neighbour fpeak that
which is not true, and I fay to him this is not
true,' or this is falfe % I only convey to him the
naked Idea of his Error ; this is the primary Idea :
But if I fay it is a Lie, the Word Lie carries alfo
a fecondary Idea in it, for it implies both the Falf-
hood of the Speech, and my Reproach and Cen-
fure of the Speaker. On the other Hand, if I fay it
is a Mifiake, this carries alfo a fecondary Idea with
it;
Ch. IV. S. 3. Tie right Ufe of Rcafon. 5$
it; for it not only refers to the Falfliood of his
Speech, but includes my Tendernefs and Civility
to him at the fame Time. Another Inftance may .:
be this 5 when I ufe the Word, Inceft, Adultery*
and Murder ', I convey to another not only thepri-
mary Idea of thofe Aftions, but I include alfo the
Secondary Idea of their Unlawfulnefs, and my Ab-
horrence of them.
Note 1 ft, Hence it comes to pafs, that among
Words which fignify the fame principal Ideas, v>
lome are clean and decent, others unclean; fome v
cbajle, others obfcene; fome are kind, others are
affronting and reproachful, becaufe of the fecondary
Idea which Cuftom has affixed to them. And it
is the Part of a wife Man, when. there is a Ne-
ceflity of exprefling any evil Aftions, to do it ei-
ther by a Word that has a fecondary Idea of Kind'
nefs, or Softnefs ; or a Word that carries in it an
Idea of Rebuke and Severity, according as the Cafe
requires. So when there is a Neceffity of expreff-
ing Things unclean or obfcene, a wife Man will da
it in the m<jft decent Language, to excite as few
uncleanly Ideas as poffible in the Minds of the
Hearers. v
Note 2dly, In Length of Time, and by the
Power of Cuftom, Words fometimes change their
primary Ideas, as (hall be declared, and fometimes
they have changed their fecondary Ideas, though the
primary Ideas may remain : So Words that were
once chafte, by frequent Ufe grow obfcene and ##-
cleanly ; and Words that were once honourable,
may in the next Generation grow mean and con*
temptible. So the Word Dame originally fignifi-
ed a Miftrefs of a Family, who was a Lady, and
it istifed ftill in the Englifh Law to fignify a
Ladfyi but in common Ufe now-a-days it repre-
fents a Farmer's IVife, or a Mijlrtfasf & Family
•|f/A
*y
56 LOGIC K: Or, Part L
of the lower Rank in the Country. So thofc Words
of Rabjhakeb, Ifa. xxxvi. 12. in our Tranflation,
(Eat their own Dung, &c.) were doubtlefs decent
and clean Language, when our Tranflators wrote
them above a hundred Years ago. The Word
Dung has maintained its old fecondary Idea and in-
offenfive Senfe to this Day ; but the other Word ia
that Sentence has by Cuftom acquired a more un-
cleanly Idea, and fhould now rather be changed
into a more decent Term, and fo it fhould be read
in publick, unlefs it fhould be thought more pro*
per to omit the Sentence *.
For this Reafon it is, that the Jewijb Rabbins
have fupplied other chafte Words in the Margin
of the Hebrew Bible, where the Words of the
Text, through Time and Cuftom, are degenerated*
fb as to carry any bafe and unclean fecondary Idea
in them ; and they read the Word which is in the
Margin, which they call Keri, and not that
which was written in the Text, which they call
Cbetih
SECT. IV.
Of Words common and proper.
III. MfORDS and Names are either common
• or proper. Common Names are fuch as
ftand for univerfal Ideas, or a whole Ranjc of Be-
ings, whether general or fpecial. Thefe are called
Appellatives , fo Fifb, Bird, Man, City, River, are
common Names ; and fo are Trout 9i Eel, Lobfter y
for they all agree to many Individuals, and fome of
them to many Species: But Cicero^ Virgil, Buce-
pbalus,-
• So in fome Placts of the facred Hiftoriam, where it is written, Evty
m* that fijfa&gainfltbt Wall, we Aoold read, Every Malt*
Ch.IV. S. 4. The right Ufe of Reafon: $7
pbalus, London* Rome, jEtna, the Thames, are pro-
per Names, for each of them agrees only to one
/ingle Being.
Note herejir/?, that a proper Name may become
in fome Senfe common* when it hath been given to
feveral Beings of the fame Kind 5 fo Cafar, which
was the proper Name of the firft Emperor Julius*
became ajfo a common Name to all the following
Emperors. And Tea, which was the proper Name
of one Sort of Indian Leaf, is now-a-days become ^
'a common Name for many Infu'fions of Herbs, or ^
Plants, in Water •, as Sage-Tea, Ale-hoof Tea, Li-
mon-Tea, &c. So Peter, Thomas, John, William*
may be reckoned common Names alfo, becaufe
they are given to many Perfons, unlefs they are
determined to fignify a fingle Perfon at any parti-
cular Time or Place.
Note in the fecond Place, that a common Name
may become proper by Cuftom, or by the Time,
or Place, or Perfons that ufe Jit ; as in Great Bri-
tain, when we fay the King, we mean our prefent
rightful Sovereign King George, who now reigns ;
when we fpeak of the Prince, we intend his Royal
Highnefs George Prince of Wales : If we men-
tion the City when we are near London, we ge-
nerally mean the City of London*, when in a
Country Town, we fay the Parfon or the Efquire* \
all the Pariflh knows who are the fingle Perfons
intended by it ; fo wlien Ve are fpeaking of the
Hiftory of the New Teftaftlent, and ufe the
Words Peter, Paul, John, we mean thofe three
Apoftles.
Note in the third Place, that any common Name
whatfoever is made proper, by Terms of Particu- » ,
larity added to it, as the common Words Pope 9
King, Horfe, Garden, Book, Knife, 6fr . are defigned
to fignify a Angular Idea, when we fay the frejenl
Po$e \
$8 L O G IC K: Or, Part I.
Pope; the King of Great Britain-, the Horfe that won
the toft Plate at New-Market ; the Royal Garden at
Ke*fi*gton% this Book ; that Knife, &c.
SECT. V. , ,
Of concrete and abftraft Terms.
IV. \X7 ORDS or Terms are divided into
YY ^bftrdS an( l concrete.
Abfiraft Terms fignify the Mode or Quality of a
Being, without any Regard to the Subjed in which
it is ; as Whitenefs, Roundnefs, Length, Breadth,
Wifdom, Mortality, Life, Death.
Concrete Terms, while they exprefs the Quality,
do alfo either exprefs, or imply, or refer to fome
Subject to which it belongs ; as white, round, long,
iroad, wife, mortal, living, dead. But thefe are not
always Noun Adjeftives in a grammatical Senfe ;
For a Fool, a Knave, a Philofopher, and many other
Concretes are Subftantives, as well as Folly, Knavery.,
and Philofophy, which are the abftradt Terms thai
belong to them.
SECT. IV.
Of univocal and equivocal Words.
V. T/t70R'D$ and Terms are either univocal or
equivocal. Univocal Words are fuch as
fignify but one Idea, or at lead but one Sort of
Thing; equivocal Words are fuch as fignify two
or more different Ideas, or different Sorts of Ob-
jefts. The Words Book, Bible, Fi/h,^ Houfe, Ele-
fbant, may be called univocal Words ; for I
know
Ch. IV. S. 6. ?he right Vfe ^Reafon; .59
know not that they fignify any thing clfe but
thofe Ideas to which they are generally affixed ;
but Head is an .equivocal Word, for it fignifies
, the Head of a Nail, or of a Pin, as well as of an
Animal: Nailh an equivocal Word, it is ufed for
the Nail of the Hand or Foot, and for an iron
Nail to faften any thing. Poft is equivocal, it
is a Piece of Timber, or a fwift MeJJenger. A
Church is a religious Affembly, or the large fair
Building where they meet; and fometimes the
fame Word means a Synod of Bifhops or of Pref-
hyters, and in fome Places it is the Pope and a ge-
neral Council.
Here let it be noted, that when two or more
Words fignify the fame Thing, as Fffave and Bil-
low, Mead and Meadow, they are ufually called
Jynonymous Words : But it feems very ftrange,
that Words, which are dire&ly contrary to each
other, fhould fometimes reprefent almoft the fame
Ideas ; yet thus it is in fome few Inftances 5 a va-
luable, or an invaluable Bleffing ; a fhameful, or a
Jhamelefs Villain ; a thick Skull, or a thin Jkull'd
Fellow, a mere Paper Skull ; a Man of a large
Confcience, little Conscience, or no Confcience 5 a fa-
mous Rafcal, or an infamous one : So uncertain a
Thing is human Language, whofe Foundation and
Supporjt is Cujiom.
As Words fignifying the fame Thing are called
, fynonymous ; fo equivocal Words, or thofe which
fignify feveral Things, are called homonymous, or
ambiguous ; and when Perfons ufe.fuch ambiguous
Words, with a Defign to deceive, it is called Equi-
vocation.
Our Jimple Ideas, and efpecially the fenfible Quo-
ties, furnifh us with a great Variety of equivo-
cal or ambiguous Words ; for thefe being the firft,
and moft natural Ideas we have, we borrow fome
E o€
60 LOG 1 C K: Or, Parti.
of their Names, to fignify many other Ideas,
both fimple and complex. The Word Sweet ex-
preffes the pleafant Perceptions of almoft every
Senfej Sugar is fweet, but it hath not the fame
Sweetnefs as Muftck ; nor* hath Mufick the Sweet-
nefs of a Rofe ; and a fweet Projpeft differs from
jthem all : Nor yet have any of thefe the fame
Sweetnefe as Difcourfe 9 Counfel, or Meditation hath ;
yet the royal Pfalmift faith of a Man, We took
fweet Counfel together ; and of God, My Medita-
tion of him Jhall be fweet. Bitter is alfo fuch an
equivocal Word *, there is bitter Wormwood, there
are bitter Words* there are bitter Enemies, and a
bitter cold Morning. So there is a Sharpnefs , in
Vinegar, and there is a Sharpnefs in Vain, in Sor-
row, and in Reproach ; there is a fharp Eye, a
ftarp Wit, and a (harp Sword : But there is not
one of thefe feven Sbarpneffes, the fame as another
of them, and a fharp Eaft Wind is different .from
them all.
There are alfo Verbs, or Words of A&ion,
which are equivocal as well as Nouns or Names.
The Words to bear, to take, to come, to get, are
Jufficient Inftancesof it; as when we fay, to bear
a Burden, to bear Sorrow or Reproach, to bear a
Name, to bear a Grudge, to bear Fruit, or to bear
Children', the Word bear is ufed in very different
Scnfes: And fo is the Word get, when we fay, to
get Money, to get in, to get off, to get ready, to get
a Stomach, and to get a Cold, &c.
There is alfo a great deal of Ambiguity in many
of the Englijh Pamcles, as, but, before, befide, with,
without, that, thfn, there, for, forth, above, about,
&c. of which Grammars and Dictionaries will fuf-
ficiently'inform us*
SECT.
£h. IV. S.7. tie right Ufe of RezCon. 6i
SECT. VII.
Various Kinds of equivocal Words 1
IT would be endlefe to ran through all the Va-
rieties of Words and Terras, which have dif-
ferent Senles applied to them 5 1 (hall only mention
therefore a few of the moft remarkable and moft
ufeful Diftinftions among them.
- 1 ft, The firft Divi/ion of equivocal Words
lets us know that fome are equivocal only in their*
Sound or Pronunciation 5 others are equivocal onh
in Writing 5 and others, both in Writing and in
Sound.
Words equivocal in Sound only, are fuch as
thefe ; the Rein of a Bridle, which hath the fame
Sound with t.he Reign of a King, or a Shower of
Rain, but all three have different Letters, and
diftinft Spelling. So Might, or Strength, is equU
vocal in Sound, but differs in Writing from Mite %
a little Animal, or a fmall Piece of Money. And
the Verb t$ write, has the fame Sound with
Wright a Workman, Right or Equity, and Rite or
Ceremony, but it is fpelled very differently in
them all.
Words equivocal in Writing only, are fuch as
thefe \ to tear to Pieces has the fame Spelling
with a Tear: To lead, or guide, has the fame
Letters as Lead the Metal : And a Bowl for Re-
creation, is written the fame Way as a Bowl for
drinking * but the Pronunciation of all thefe is
different.
But thofe Words, which are moft commonly
and juftly called equivocal, are fuch as are both
written and pronounced the fame Way, and yet
have different Senfes or Ideas belonging to them %
E 2 fuck
y-
62 L O G I C K: Or, Parti;
fuch are all the Inftances which were given in the
preceding Se&ion.
Among the Words which are equivocal in
Sound only, and not in Writing, there is a large
Field for Perfons who delight in Jejls, and Puns 9
in Riddles and Quibbles, to lport themfelves. This
fort of Words is alfo ufed by wanton Perfons to
convey lewd Ideas, under the Covert of Exprejfions
capable of a chafte Meaning, which are called
double Entendres ; or when Perfons fpeak Faljhood
with a Defign to deceive, under the Covert of
Truth. Though it muft be confefled, that all forts
of equivocal Words yield fufficient Matter for fuch
Purpofes.
There are many Cafes alfo, wherein an equivo-
cal Word is ufed for the Sake of Decency to cover
f, foul Idea : For the mod chafte and modeft, and
veil-bred Perfons, having fometimes a Neceffity
to fpeak of the Things of Nature, convey their
Ideas in the mod inoffenfive Language by this
Means. And indeed, the mere Poverty of all
Languages makes it ncceflary to ufe equivocal Words
upon many Occafions, as the common. Writings of
Men, and even the Holy Book of God fufHciently
manjfeft.
2dly, Equivocal Words are ufually diftinguifh-
ed, according to their Original, ,into fuch, whofe
various Senfes arife from mere Chance or Accident*
and fuch as are made equivocal by Dejign ; as the
Word Bear fignifies zjhaggy Beajl, and it fignifies
alfo to bear or carry a Burden \ this feems to be the
mei;e tfFcft of Chance : But if I call my Dog, Bear,
becaufe he is fliaggy, or call one of the Northern
Conjlellations by that Name, from a fancied Situa-
tion of the Stars in the Shape of that Animal, then
it is by Defign that the Word is made yet farther
equivocal.
But
Cb. IV. S. 7. The right Ufe of Reafon. 63
But becaufe I think this common Account of
the Spring or Origin of equivocal Words is too
flight and imperfeft, I (hall rcferve this Subjeft to
be treated of by itfelf, aqd proceed to the third
Divifion.
3dly, Ambiguous, or equivocal Words, arc
fuch as are fometimes taken in a large and gene-
ral Senfe, and fometimes in a Senfe more JlriEt and
limited* and have different Ideas affixed to them
accordingly. Religion, or Virtue, taken in a large
Senfe, includes both our Duty to God and our
Neighbour ; but in a more drift, limited, and pro-
per Senfe, Virtue fignifies our Duty towards Men,
and Religion our Duty to God. Virtue may yet be
taken in the drifted Senfe, and then it fignifies
Power or Courage, which is the Senfe of it in fomc
Places of the New Tedament. So Grace, taken
in a large Senfe means the Favour of God* and all
the fpiritual Bleflings that proceed from it, (which
is a frequent Senfe of it in the Bible) but in a
limited Senfe it fignifies the Habit of Holinefs
wrought in us by Divine Favour, or a complex
Idea of the Chriflian Virtues. It may be alfo taken
in the ftrifted Senfe ; and thus it fignifies any
Jingle Chrijlian Virtue* as in 2 Cor. viii. 6, 7. where
it is ufed for Laterality. So a City, in a drift and
proper Senfe, means the Houfes inclofed within the
Walls, in a larger Senfe it reaches to all the
Suburbs.
This larger and Jlriffer Senfe of a Word is ufed
in almod all the Sciences, as well as in Theolo-
gy, and in common Life. The Word Geography \
taken in a Jlrift Senfe* fignifies the Knowledge of
the Circles of the earthly Globe* and the Situa-
tion of the various Parts of the Earth ; when it is
taken in a little larger Senfe, it includes the Know-
ledge of the Seas alfo ; and in the largefi Senfe of
E 3 ^
64 Z*t)<? IC Kt Or, Part L
all, it extends tatb&arious Cuftoms, Habits, and
Governments opNations. When an Aftronomer
ufes the Word Stdr in its proper and ftrift Senfe,
it is applied only to ft fixed Stars, but in a large
Senfe it includes the nwets alfo.
This equivocal Senfe of Words belongs alfo to
many proper Names : So Afta taken in the largeft
Senfe, is one Quarter of the World ; in a more
limited Senfe it fignifies NatoUa, or the leffer Afia \
but in the ftri&eft Senfe it means no more than
one little Province of Natolia, where flood the
Oties of Epbefus, $n*yrna, Sardis, &c. And this
is the moft frequent Senfe of it in the New Tefta*
inent. Flanders and Holland, in a ftrift Senfe, are
but two fingle Provinces among the fevenieen, but
in a large Senfe Holland includes feven of them,
and Flanders ten.
There are alfo feme very common and little
Words in all Languages, that are ufed in a more
extenfive or more limited Senfe ; fuch as all, every,
tvbatfoever, &c. When the' Apoftle fays, all Men
have finned, and- all Men wuft die, all is taken in its
moft univerfal and extenfive Senfe, including all .
Mankind, Rom. v. 12. When he appoints Prayer
to be made for all Mat, it appears by the following
Verfes, that he reftrains the Word all to fignify
chiefly all Ranks and Degrees of Men, 1 Tim. ii. J.
But when St. Paul fays, / plea/e all Men in all
things, 1 Cor. x. 33. the Word all is exceedingly
limited, for it reaches no farther than that he
pleafed i//thofe Men whom be conver/ed with, in all
Things that were lavsjul.
4thly, Equivocal Words are in the fourth Place
diftinguifhed by their literal or figurative Senfe.
Words are ufed in a proper or literal Senfe, when
they are defigneJ to fignify thofe Ideas for which
tbey were originally made, or to which they are
primarily
Ch. IV. S. 7. the right Ufe of Reafon. 6$
primarily and generally annexed 5 but they are*
ufed in a figurative or tropical Senfe, when they
are made to fignify fome Things, 'which only
bear either a Reference or Rtfembkmce to the pri-
mary Ideas of them. So When two Princes ^ con-
tend by their Armies* we fay they are at War in
a proper Senfe 5 but when we fay there is *War
betwixt the Winds and the Waves in a Storm,
this is called figurative, and the peculiar Figure
is a Metaphor. So when the Scriptures fay, Riches
make themfelves Wings, and fiy away as an Eagle
toward Heaven, the Wings and the Eight of the
Eagle are proper Expreffions ; .. but when Flight
and Wings are applied to Riches, it is only by
Way of Figure and Metaphor. So when a Man is
faid to repent % or laugh, or grieve, it is literally
taken ; but when God is faid to be grieved, to re*
pent, or laugh, &c. thefe are all figurative Ex-
preffions, borrowed from a Refemblance to Man* 5*
kind. And when the Words Job or Efther are
ufed to fignify thofe very Perfons, it is the literal
Senfe of them -, but when they fignify thofe two
Books of Scripture, this is a figurative Senfe.
The Names of Horace, Juvenal, and Milton, are
ufed in the fame Manner either for Books or
Men.
When a Word, which originally fignifies any
particular Idea or Objedt, is attributed to feveral
x other Objefts, not fo much by Way of Refem-
hlanCe, but rather on the Account of fome evi-
dent Reference or Relation to the original. Idea,
this is fometimes peculiarly called an analogical
Word ; fo a found or healthy Pulfe ; a found Di~
gejlion; found Sleep, are all fo called, with Reference
to a found and healthy Conftitution ; but if you
fpeak of found DoSrine, or found Speech, this
is by Way of Refemblance fo Health, and the
E 4 Words
.4
66 LOG IC K: Or, Part I.
Words are metaphorical: Yet many Times Ana*
logy and Metaphor are ufed promifcuoufly in the
fame Senfe, and not diftinguifhed.
Here note. That the Defign of metaphorical
Language and Figures of Speech is not merely to
reprefent our Ideas, but to reprefent them with
Vivacity, Spirit, Affection, and Power j and though,
they often make a deeper Impreflion on the Mind
of the Hearer, yet they do as often lead him
into a Miftake, if they are ufed at improper
Times and Places. Therefore, where the Defign
of the Speaker or Writer is merely to explain, to
inftruft, and to lead into the Knowledge of naked
Truth, he oughr, for the moft Part, to ufe plain
and proper Words, if the Language affords them,
and not to deal much in figurative Speech. But
this Sort of Terms is ufed very profitably by Poets
and Orators, whofe Bufinefs is to move, and per-
fuade, and work on the Pafiions, as well as on the
Underftanding. Figures are alfo happily employ-
ed in proverbial moral Sayings by the wifeft and
the beft of Men, to imprefs them deeper on the
Memory by fenfible Images ; and they are often
ufed for other valuable Purpofes in the facred
Writings.
5thly, I might adjoin another fort of equivocal
Words ; as there are fome which have a different
Meaning in common Language, from what they
have in the Sciences*, the Word Paffion fignifies
the receiving any Attion in a large philofophical
Senfe ; in a more limited philofophical Senfe, it
fignifies any of the Afeflions of human Nature, as
Love, Fear, Joy, Sorrow, &c. But the common
People confine it only to Anger. So the Word
Simple philofophically fignifies Single, but vulgarly it
is ufed for /fo//!?.
6.hly,
Ch. IV. S. 8. The right XJfe ^Reafon. 67
6thly, Other equivocal Words are ufcd fome-
times in an abfolute Senfe, as when God is called
perfe£l> which allows of no Defe& 5 and forne-
timcs in a comparative Senfe, as good Men are
oftentimes called perfeU in Scripture, in Compa-
rifon of thofe who are much inferior to them in
Knowledge or Holinefe : But I have dwelt rather
too long upon this Subject already, therefore I add
no more.
SECT. VIII.
The Origin or Caufes of equivocal Words.
NO W, that we may become more fkilful i*
guarding ourfelves and others againft the
Dangers of Miftake which may arife from equivo*
cat Words, it may not be amifs to conclude this
Chapter with a (hort Account of the various Ways
or Means whereby a Word changes its Signi-
fication, or acquires any new Senfe, and thus be-
comes equivocal, efpecially if it keeps its old Senfe
alfo.
1. Mere Chance fometimes gives the fame Word
different Senfes 5 as the Word Light fignifies a Body,
that is not heavy ; and it alfo" fignifies the Effett of
Sun-beams, or the Medium whereby we fee ObjeBs:
This is merely accidental, for there feems to be no
Connexion between thefc two Senfes, nor any Rea-
fon for them.
2. Error and Miftake is another Occafion of
giving various Senfes to the fame Word ; as when
different Perfons read the Names of Priejl, Zfr-
Jbcp, Churchy Eajler, &c. in the Ne^ Teftament,
they affix different Ideas to them, for want of
Acquaintance with the true Meaning of the facred
Writers though it muft be confeffed, thofe va-
twast
68 LOG l&K: Or, Parti.
rious Senfes, which might arife at firft from honcft
Miftakc may be culpably fupported and propagat-
ed by Intereft, Ambition, Prejudice, and a Party-
Spirit on any Side.
3. Time and Cujlom alters the Meaning of Words.
Knave heretofore fignified a diligent Servant (Gna-
ws;) and a Villain was a nearer Tenant to the Lard
of the Manor (Villicus ;) but now both thefe Words
carry an Idea of Wickednefs and Reproach to
them. A Ballad once fignified a folemn and fa-
cred Song, as well as'oge that is trivial, when So-
lomon's Song was called the Ballad of Ballads ; but
now it is applied to nothing but trifling Verfe, or
comical Subjects.
4. Words change their Senfe by Figures and
Metaphors, which are derived from fome real Ana-
logy or Refemblance between feveral Things ; as
when Wings and Flight are applied to Riches, it
fignifies only, that the Owner may as eafily lofc
them, as he would lofe a Bird who flew away with
Wings.
And I think, under this Head, we may rank
thofe Words, which fignify different Ideas, by a
Sort of an unaccountable far-fetcht Analogy^ or di»
ftant Refemblance that Fancy has introduced be-
tween one Thing and another ; as when we {ay,
the Meat is green, when it is halfroajled: We fpeak'
of airing Linnen by the Fire, when we mean drying
or warming it: We call for round Coals for the
Chimney, when we mean large fquare ones : And
we talk of the Wing of a Rabbit, when we mean
the Fore-leg: The true Reafon of thefe Appella-
tions we leave to the Criticks.
5. Words alfo change their Senfe by the fpecial
Occafion of ufing them, the peculiar Manner of
Pronunciation, the Sound of the Voice, the Motion
of the Face 9 or Gejtures of the Body 5 fo when an
angry
Ch. IV. S. 8. The right Ufe */Reafon. 69
angry Matter fays to his Servant, it is bravely done,
or you are a fine Gentleman, he means juft the
contrary ; namely, it is very HI done 5 you are a
firry Fellow : It* is ope Way of giving a fevere Re-
proach^ for the Words arefpoken by Way oF Sar-
cafm or Irony. v - t
6. Words are applied to various Senfe's, by new
Ideas appearing or arifing falter than new Words
are framed. So when Gun-powder was found out,
the Word Pcwdex, which before fignified only
Duft, was made then to fignify that AExture or
Compofttion of Nitre, Charcoal, &c. And the Name
Canon, which both fignified a Law or a Rule, is
now alfo given to .a great Gun* which gives Laws
to Nations. So Foot-boys, who had frequently
the common Name of Jack given them, were kept
to turn the Spit, or to pull off their Matter's
Boots *,. but when Inftruments were invented for
both thoft Services, they were both called Jacks,
though one was of Iron, the other of Wood, and
very different in their Form.
. 7. Words alter their Significations according to
the Ideas of the various Perfons, Sefis, or Parties
who ufe them, as we have hinted before ; fo when
'a Papifi ufes the Word Hereticks, he generally means
the Proteftants ; when a Proteftant ufes the Word,
he means any Perfons who were wilfully (and per-
haps contentioufly) objlinate in fundamental Errors;
When a Jew fpeaks of the true Religion, he means
the Inftitutions of Mofes ; when a Turk mentions
it, he intends the DoSlrine of Mahomet ; but when
a Chrijlian makes Ufe of it, he defigns to fignify
Chrifitanity, or the Truths and Precepts of the
Go/pel.
8. Words have different Significations accord-
ing to the Book, fVriting, or Difcourfe in which
they (land. So in a Treatife of Anatomy, a Foot
fignifies
70 LOG IC K: Or, Parti.
fignifies that Member in the Body of Man: But in a
Book of Geometry or Menfuration, it fignifics
twelve Inches.
If I had Room to exemplify moft of thefe Par-
ticulars in one (ingle Word, I know not where
to chufe a fitter than the Word Sound, which
feems (as it werej by Chance, to fignify three
diftinft Ideas, (viz) Healthy (from Sanus) as a
found Bod}; Notfe, (from Sonus) as a fhriU Sound j
and to Sound the Sea (perhaps from the French
Sonde, a Probe, or an Inftrument to find the Depth
of Water.) From thefe three, which I may call
original Senfes, various derivative Senfes arife ; as
found Sleep, found Lungs, found Wind and Limb,
a found Heart, a found Mind, found Doilrine, a
found Divine, found Reafon, a found Cofk, found
Timber, a found Reproof, to beat one foundly, to
found one's Meaning or Inclination, and a Sound or
narrow Sai ; turn thefe all into Latin, and the Va-
riety will appear plain.
I confefs, fome few of thefe which I have men-
tioned as the different Springs of equivocal Words,
may be reduced in fome Cafes to the fame Origi-
nal : But it muft alfo be granted, that there may
be ether Ways befides thefe whereby a Word comes
to extend its Signification, to include various Ideas,
and become equivocal And though it is the Bu-
finefs of a Grammarian to purfue thefe Remarks
with more Variety and Particularity, yet it is alfo
the Work of a Logician to give Notice of thefe
Things, left Darknefs, Confufion, and Perplexity
be brought into our Conceptions by the Means of
Words, and thence our Judgments and Reafonings be-
come erroneous.
CHAP;
Ch. V. The right Ufe of Reafon; 71
CHAP. V,
General Directions relating to our Ideas.
Direffionl.T^UmiJb your/elves with a rich Variety of
Jj Ideas 5 acquaint yourfelvcs with
Things ancient and modern; Things natural,
civil and religious ; Things domeftick anj} national \
Things of your native Land, and of foreign Coun-
tries : Things prefent, pad and future ; and above
all, be well acquainted with God and yourfelvcs ;
learn animal Nature, and the Workings of your
own Spirits.
Such a general Acquaintance with Things will
be of very great Advantage.
The firfi Benefit of it is this; it will aflift the
Ufe of Reafon in all its following Operations ; it
will teach you to judge of Things aright, to argyi
juftly y and to tnetbodife your Thoughts with Accu*
racy. When you (hall find feveral Things a-kin
to each other, and feveral different from each other,
agreeing in fome Part of their Idea, and difagree-
ing in other Parts, you will range your Ideas in
better Order, you will be more eafily led into a
diftinft Knowledge of Things, and will obtain a
rich Store of proper Thoughts and Arguments
upon all Occafions.
You will tell me perhaps, that you defign the
Study of the Law or Divinity ; and what Good
can natural Pbihfopby or Matbematicks do you, or
any other Science, not dirtftly fubordinate to
your chief Defign ? But let it be confidered, that
all Sciences have a fort of mutual Connexion; and
Knowledge of all Kinds fits the Mind to reafon
and judge better concerning any particular Sub-
ject.
j2 LOGIC K: Or, Parti
jeft: 1 have known n Judge upon the Bench betray
his Ignorance, and appear a little confufed in his
Sentiments about a Cafe of fufpefted Murder
brought before him, for want of fomc Acquaintance
with animal Nature and tybilofophy.
Another Benefit of it is this ; fuch a large and
general Acquaintance with Things wiU fecure yoii
from perpetual Admirations and Surprizes, and guard
you agaiiHt that Weaknefs of ignorant Perfons>
who have never feen any Thing beyond the Con-
fines of their own Dwelling, and therefore they
Wonder at almoft every Thing they fee ; every
Thing beyond the Smoke of their own Chimney,
and the Reach of their own Windows, is new and
flrange to them.
A third Benefit of fuch an univerfal Acquaintance
with Things, is thip ; it will keep you from being .
tod pofitive and dogmatical, from an Excefs of Cr+
dulity and Unbelief, u e. a Readinefs to believe, or
to deny every Thing at firft Hearing; when you
fhall have often feen, that ft range and uncommon
Things, which often feemed incredible, are found
to be true ; and Things very commonly received
have been found falfe.
The Way of attaining fuch an extcnfivi. Treafure
of Ideas, is, with Diligence to apply yourfelf to
read the belt Books, converfe with the moft
knowing and the wifeft of % Men, and endeavour
to improve by every Perfon in whofe Company
you are ; fuffer no Hour to pafs away in a lazy
Idlenefs, an impertinent Chattering or ufelcfi
Trifles : Vifit other Cities and Countries when
you have feen your own, under the Care of one
who can teach you to profit by Travelling, and
to make wife Obfervations ; indulge a juft Curio-*
fity in feeing the Wonders of Art and Nature 5
fearch into Things yourfclves, as well as learn
them .
Ch, V. Wright Ufe of Rcafonl 73
them from others ; be acquainted with Men as
well as Books ; learn all Things as much as you
can at firft Hand ; and let as many of your Ideas
as poflible be the Repre fen tat ions of Things, and
not merely the Reprefentations of other Mens I-
deas : Thus your Soul, like feme noble Buildihg,
(hall be richly furnifhed with original Paintings,
and not with mere Copies.
Direft IT. Ufe the mofi proper Methods to retain
that Treafure of Ideas which you have acquired; for
the Mind is ready to let many of them flip, unlefe
ibme Pains and Labour be taken to fix them upon
the Memory.
And more efpecially let thofe Ideas be laid uj*
and preferved with the greateft Care, which are
mod dire&ly fuited, cither to your eternal Wel-
fare as a Cbriftian, or to your particular Station
and Profejfion in thi$ Life ; for though the former
Rule recomrriends an univerfal Acquaintance with
Things, yet it is but a more general and fuperfi-
cial Knowledge that is required or expe&ed of
any Man, in Things which are utterly foreign to
his own Bufincfs •, but it is neceffary you Ihould
have a more particular and accurate Acquaintance
with thofe Things that refer to your peculiar Pro-
vince and Duty in this Life, or your Happinefs in
another. <
There are fome Perfons who never arrive at any
deep, folid, or valuable Knowledge in any Sci-
ence, or any Bufinefs of Life, becaufe they are
perpetually fluttering over the Surface of Things
in a curious and wandering Search of infinite Va-
riety ; " ever hearing, reading, or afking after
fomething new, but impatient of any Labour to
lay up arid preferve the Ideas they have gained :
Their Souls may be compared to a Looking-Glafs*
■WF
74 LOG IC K: Ofe Part.1.
that wherefoevcr you turn it, fc**ive8the Images
of all Objefts, but retains none.
In order to preferve your Treafure of Ideas and
the Knowledge you have gained, purfue thefe Ad-
vices, efpecially in your younger Years.
i. Recolleti every Bay the Things you have: fine,
cr beard, or ready which may have made any Ad-
dition to your Underftand in g: Read the Writing?
of God and Men with Diligence and perpetual
Reviews : Be not fond of haftening to a new Book,
or a new Chapter, till you have well fixed and
cftablifbed in your Minds what was ufeful in the
laft : Make ufeof your Memory in this Manner,
and you will fenfibly experience a gradual Im-
provement of it, while you take care not to load it
toExcefs.
2. Talk over the Things which you have feen,
beard or learned with fome proper Acquaintance , this
will make a frefh Impreflion upon your Memory;
. . . and if you have no Fellow Student at hand, none
r tiJ of equal Rank with yourfelves, tell it over to any,
of your Acquaintance, where you can do it with
Propriety and Decency ; and whether they learft
any Thing by it or no, your own Repetition of it
will be an Improvement to yourfelf: And this
Praftice alfo will furniftfyou with a Variety oflVords*
and copious Language, to exprefs your Thoughts
upon all Occafions.
3. Commit to Writing fome of the mod con-
fiderable Improvements which you daily make, at
leaft fuch Hints as may recall them again to your
Mind, when perhaps they are vanifhed and loft.
And here I think Mr. Lockfi Method of Adver*
faria or common Places, which he defcribes in the
End of the firft Volume of his poffibumous Works,
is the beft ; ufing no learned Method at all, fet-
ting down Things as they occur, leaving a dif-
MU .* tindl
Ch.V* <tbe right l Vfe of r Reafort. 75
tinft Page for each Subject, and making an Index
to the Pages,
Ac the End df every Week, of Month, of
Year, you may review your Remarks for thefe
Reafons; Firft, to judge of your otvH Improve-
ment, when you (hall find that many of your
youngerXollections are either weak and trifling }
. or if they are juft and proper, yet they are
grown now fo familiar to you| that you will
thereby fee your own Advancement in Know-
ledge. And in the next Place, what Remarks
you find there worthy of your riper Obfervation,
you may note them with a marginal S/*r, in (lead
of tranferibing them, as being worthy of your
fecond Year's Review, when the others are neg*
Icfted*
To -fhorten (bmething Of this Labour, if the
Books which you read are your own, mark with s
a Pen, or Pencil, the moft c&nfiderable Things
in them which you defire to remember. Thus
t you may read that Book the fxond Time ovef
with half the Trouble, by your Eye running
over the Paragraphs which your Pencil has
Doted. It is but a very weak Objection againft
this Practice to fay, / Jball fpoil my Book j for I
perfuade myfelf, that you did not buy it as a*\
BookfelUr> to fell it again for Gain, but as.;*Xt
Scholar, to improve your Mind by it ? and if the''
Mind be improved, your Advantage is abundant,.
though your Book yields lefs Money to your Exs^
tutors.
• Mft» Tliii Advice of failing^ Marking, and 1 Revitzvi-g your M^ffc?, re-
fas chiefly to thofe •ccafienal Notions you n.eet vith cither in Rcrsd.ng cr iri
Converfation : But when you are dire&ly and profejftdly purfuingany S.'lj ft
6/ Knowledge in a good Syftem in your younger Years, the Syfiem tfcitis
four Ccmrton-Plact Bui, and muft be entirely reviewed. The lame may b«
nid concerning any Treatijc which dofely, fuccinfUy^ and accurately h i d t*
lay particular Theme.
F Dir«fr
76 L G I C K: Or, Part I.
Direft. III. As you proceed both in Learning and
in Life \ make a wife Observation what are the Ideas*
what the Difcourfes and the Parts of Knowledge that
have been more or lefs ufeful to yourfelf or others.
In our younger Years, while we are farnifhing
our Minds with a Treafure of Ideas, our Experi- -
cnce is but fmal], and our Judgment weak 5 it is
therefore impoffible at that Age to determine arigljj
concerning the real Advantage and Ufefulnefs M^
many Things we learn. But when Age and Expe-
rience have matured your Judgment, then you will .
gradually drop the more ufelefs JPart of your
younger Furniture, and be more felicitous to re-
tain that which is molt neceflary for your Wel-
fare in this Life, or a better. . Hereby you will
come to make the fame Complaint that almoft
every learned Man has done after long Experi-
ence in Study, and in the Affairs of human Life .
and Religion : Alas ! how many Hours, and Days,
and Months, have I lojl in purfuing fome Parts of*
Learning, and in reading fome Authors, which have
turned to no other Account, but to inform me f that
they were not worth my Labour and Purfuit ! Hap-
py the Man who has a wife Tutor to conduit him
through all the Sciences in the firft Years of his
Study : and who has a prudent Friend always at
Hand to point out to him, from Experience, how
much of every Science is worth his Purfuit! And
happy the Student that is fo wife as to follow fuch
Advice!
Direft. IV. Learn to acquire a Government over
your Ideas and your Thoughts, that they may come
when they are called, and depart when they are bid-
den. There are fome Thoughts that rife and in*
trude upon us while we fhun them \ there are
others
Ch. V. toe right Ufe o/Reafon; f 77 '
others that fly from us, when we would hold and
fix them.
If the Ideas which you would willingly make
the Matter of your prefent Meditation are read}
to fly fromyou* you muft be obftinate in the Pur-
fuit of them by an Habit of fixed Meditation %
you muft keep your Soul to the Work, when it
is ready to ftart afide every Moment, unlefs you
will . abandon yourfelf to be a Slave to every
wild Imagination. It is a common, but it is an
unhappy and a fliameful Thing, that every Trifle
i that comes acrofs the Senfes or Fancy fhould divert
lis, that a buzzing Fly lhould teaze our Spirits,
and fcattcr our beft Ideas /But we muft leant to be
deaf and regardlefs of Other Things, befides that
which we make the prefent Subject of our Me*
ditation : And in orqer to help a wandering and
fickle Humour, it is Tifeful to have a Book or Pa-
per in our Hands, which has fome proper Hints
of the Subjeft that we defign t6 purfue. We
muft be refolute and laborious, and fometimea
conflict with ourfelves if we would be wife and
learned.
Yet I would not be too fevere in this Rule : It
muft be confefled there are Seafins when the Mind,
at* rather the Brain is overtired or jaded with Study
or Thinking 5 or upon fome other Accounts ani-
mal Nature may -be languid or cloudy, and unfit to
affift the Spirit in Meditation > at fuch Seafons
(provided that they return not too often) it is
better fometimes to yield to the prefent Indifpo-
fition 5 for if Nature entirely refift, nothing can be
done to the Purpofe, at leaft in that Subjeft or Sci-
ence. Then you may think it proper to give
yourfelf up to fome Hourt of Leifure and Recrea-
tion, or ttfeful Menefs \ or if not, then turn your
Thoughts to fome other alluring Subjeff, and pore
F 2 tna>
.78 LOGIC K: Or, Part L
no longer upon the frit, till fomc brighter or more
favourable Moments arife. A Student (hall do more
in one Hour, when all Things concur to invite him
to any fpecial Study, than in four Hours, at a dull
and improper Seafon.
1 would alfo give the fame Advice, if fome vain
of wdrtblefs, or foolifh Idea will crowd itfelf into
your Thoughts ; and if you find that all your La-
hour and Wreftling cannot defend yourfelf from
it, then divert the Importunity of that which of-
fends you by turning your Thoughts to forrte en-
tertaining Subjeft, that may amule a little and draw
you off from the troublefome and impofing Guefl: ;.
jand many a Time alfo in fuch a Cafe, when the im-
pertinent and intruding Ideas would divert from
ardent Duty, Devotion and Prayer have been very
iuccefeful to overcome luch obftinate Troublers of
the Peace and Profit of the Soul.
If the natural Genius and Temper be too vola-
tile, fickle and wandering, fuch Perfons ought in a
more efpecial Manner to apply themfclves to »ra-
' ihematical Learnings and to begin their Studies with
Aritbmetick and Geometry ; wherein new Truths, '
continually arifingto the Mind out of the plained
and eafieft Principles, will allure the Thoughts
tvith incredible Pleafure in the Purfuit : This will
give the Student fuch a delightful Tafte of Reafon-
ing, as will fix his Attention to the fingle Subjedfc
which he purfues, and by Degrees will cure the ha-
bitual Levity of his Spirit: But let him not indulge
and purfue thefe fo far, as to negled the prim*
Stifdies of his drfigned Profeffionr
C H A P.
Ch. VI. 7k right Ufe of Reafon. 79
CHAP. VI.
Special Rules to direSlour Conceptions of Things.
AGrc^t Part of what has been already written'
is defigned to lay a Foundation for thofe
Rules, which may guide and regulate our Con*
captions of Things ; this is our main Bufinefs
and DeGgn in the foft Part of Logick. Now if
we can but direft our Thoughts to a juft and hap-
py Manner informing our Ideas of Things, the o-
flier Operations of the Mind will not fo eaGly be
perverted; becauie moft of our Errors in Judg-
ment, and the Weaknefs, Fallacy and Miftake of
our Argumentation, proceed from r the Darknefi,
Confufion, Defeft, ojr fome other Irregularity in
our Conceptions* ' '„ . v ■''-'' •
The Rules to affift and direft our Concept ion«'
are thefe r
i. Conceive of things clearly and diftinSly in their
own Natures.
2. Conceive of things completely in all their
Parts.
3. Conceive of things comprehenfevely in all their
Properties and Relations.
4. Conceive of things extenfively in all their
Kinds.
5. Conceive of things orderly, or iri a proper
J\detbod 9
SECT.
So L G I d K: Or, ' Part I.
SECT. I.
Of gaining clear and diftinft Ideas.
TH E firft Rule is this, Seek after a clear and
difiinft Conception of Things as they are in their
own Nature, and do not content yourfelves with' ah*
/cure and confufed Ideas, where .clearer are to Se al*
joined.
There are fome Things indeed whereof -diftindt
Ideas are fcarce, attainable, they Teem to furpafs.
the Capacity of the Underftanding in our pre-
ieot State ; fuch are the Notions of Eternal, lm~
nenfe, Infinite, whether this Infinity be applied to
Number, as an infinite Multitude ; to Quantity, as
infinite Length, Breadth * to Powers and Perfect
ttons, as Strength, Wifdom, or Goodnefs infi- (
nite, i$c. Though Mathematicians in their Way
demoriftrate feveral Things in the Do&rine of.
Infinities, yet there are ftill fome infolvaBle DUB-"
culties that attend the Ideas of Infinity, when, it
is applied to Mind or Body ; and while it is 'in
reality but an Idea ever growing, we cannot have
fo clear and diftindt a Conception of it as to' Se-
cure us from Miftakes in fome of our Reafonings
about it.
There are many other Things that belong,to
the material World, wherein the fharpeft Philo-
fophers have never yet arrived at clear and diftindt
Ideas, fuch as the particular Shape, Situation, Con-
texture, Motion of the fmall Particles of Minerals %
Metals, Plants* &V. whereby their very Natures,
and Effences are diftinguifhed from each other«
Nor have we either Senfes or Inftruments fuf-
ficiently nice and accurate to find them our*
There are other Things in the World of Spirits
wherein
Ch. VI. S. i; tf>e right Ufe ^Reafon." 8 1
wherein our Ideas are very dark and confufed,
fuch as their Union with animal Nature, the Way
of their ailing on material Beings, and their Con-
verfe with each other. And though it is a laudable
Ambition to fearch what may be known of thefe
Matters, yet it is a vaft Hindrance to the Enrich-
ment of our Underftandings, if we fpend too
much of our Time and Pains among Infinites and
Unfearchables, and thofe Things for the Inveftiga-
tion whereof we are not furnifhed with proper Fa-
culties in the prefent State. It is therefore of great
Service to the true Improvement of the Mind *
to diftinguifh well between Knowables and Un-
knowables.
As far as Things are biowable by us, it is of ex-
cellent Ufe to accuftom ourfelves to clear and diftinft-*
Ideas. Now among many other Occafions of the
Darknefs and Miftakes of our Minds, there are
thefe two Things which moft remarkably bring
Confujion into our Ideas.
i. That from our Infancy we have had the Ideas
of Things To far conne&^d with the Ideas of Words
that we ofteii miftake Words for Things, we min-
gle and confound one with the other.
z. From our youngeft Years we have been ever
ready to confider Things not fo much in their own
Natures, as in their various RefpeSs to ourfelves 9
and chiefly to our Senfes \ and we have alfo joined
and mingled the Ideas of fome Things, with many
other Ideas, to which they were not a-kin in their
dwn Natures.
In order therefore to a clear and diftinSl Know-
ledge of Things*, we muft unclothe them of all
$hele Relations and Mixtures, that we may con-
template them naked, and in their own Natures :
and diftinguilh the Subjedt that we have in View
from all other Subjefts whatfoever : Now to per-
F 4 form
U L G IC K: Or, Parti.
form this well, we muft here confider the Definition.
of Words, and the Definition of "Things.
SECT. II.
Of the Definition of Words or Names.
IF we could conceive of Things as Angels and
unbodied Spirits do, without involving them
in thpfe Clouds which Words and Language throw
upon them, we fhould feldom be in Danger of
fuch Miftakes as are perpetually committed by us
in the prefent State ; and indeed it would be of,
unknown Advantage to us to accuftom our fe Ives
to form Ideas of things without Words, that we might
*fcnow them in their own proper Natures. Butfince
we muft ufe Words, both to learn. and to com-
municate mod of our Notionsj we fhould do ic
Vuhjuft Rules of Caution. I have already de-
clared in part, how often and by what Means our
Words become the Occafions of Errors in our
Conceptions of Things. To remedy fuch Incon-
veniencies, we muft get an exaft Definition of the
Words we make ufe of, i. e. we muft determine prc-
fifely the Senfe of our Words, which is called the
^Definition of the Name.
Now a Definition of the Name being only a
Decoration in what Senfe the Word is ufed, or
what -Idea or Qbjeft we mean by it, this may be
cxpreffed by any one or more of the Properties,
Effe&s or Circymftances of that Objeft which
do fufRciently diftinguilh it from other Obje&s ;
As if I were %o tell what I mean by the Word
dir> I may fay it is that thin Matter which we
breathe in and breathe out continually ; or it is that
fluid Body in which the Birds fly a little above the
Earth \ or it is that iirvifible Matter which fills all
Place*
Ch. VI. S. 2; The right Ufe qf Reafoiu gj
Places near the Earth, er which immediately encompaffes
the Globe of Earth and Water. So. if I would teli
what I mean by Light, I would fay, it is that Me-
dium whereby we fee the Colours and Shapes of Things ;
or it is that which dijlingui/hes the Day from the Night.
If I were afked what I mean by Religion, I would
anfwer, it is a Colleiiion of all our Duties to God,
if t^ken in a ftrift and limited Senfe* but if taken
in a large Senfe, it is &Colle8ion of all our Duties
both to God and Man. Thefe are called the Define
iiohs of the Name.
Note, In defining the Name there is no Neceffity
that we fhould be acquainted with the intimate El-
fence or Nature of the Thing ; for any Manner of
Defcription that will but fufficiently acquaint ano^
ther Perfon what we mean by fuch a Word, is a
fuffitient Definition for 'the Name. And on this Ac-
count*. a fynonymous Word, or a mere Negation of
tie contrary, a Tranjlation of the Word into another
Tongue, or a Grammatical Explication of it, is
fome times fufficient for this Purpofe 5 as if one
would know what I mean by a Sphere, I tell him
ti is a Globe*, if he afk what is a Triangle, it is that
y)bicb has three Angles ; or an Oval is that which
}ils the Shape of an Egg. Dark is that which has
no Light : Afihma is a Difficulty of Breathing \ a Dia-
-pboretick Medicine, or a Sudorifick, is fomethingthat
will provoke Sweating 5 and an Infohent is a Man that
tannot pay bis Debts. " -\
Since it is the Defign of Logick, not only to aflift"
-lift in Learning but in t caching alfo, it is necefiary
. that we fhotfld bt furiHfoeti *toith fome particular
-■ Direftions relating to the "Definitions of Name$ > both
inTtacbing indenting.
SECT.
84 L G I C KtOr, Partly
SECT. III. -
DireSions concerning the Definitions of Names.
Direft. I. TT AVE a Care of making Ufe of mere
JLX Wm 'ds ', in/lead of Ideas* i. e. fuch
Words as have no Meaning, no Definition be-
longing 16 them : Do not always imagine that there
are Ideas wherefoever there are Names : For though
Mankind hath fo many Millions of Ideas more
than they have Names, yet fo foolifii and lavifh
are we, that too. often. we uf£ fome Words in mete m
Wafte, and have nQ Ideas for tfcem 5 or at leaft, our
Ideas are fo exceedingly fluttered and confufed,
broken and blended, various, jaad.unfettled, that
they can fignify Nothing toward the Improvement
Qf the Underftandjng, You^ will find a great deit
of Reafon for this JRemark, if you read the Popijb
Schoolmen, ort\it myflick Divines*
Never reft fatisfied therefore' wit|i mere Jfords.
which have not. Ideas belonging, to them, or at leaft
m fettled and. determinate Ideas. Deal not in fuch
empty Ware, ; ^whether you are a Learner or A
Teacher ; for . hereby fome Perfons have madii
themJelves rich in Words, and learned in their
own Efteem ; whereas in reality their Under-
standings have! been 'poor, and they knew No-
thing.
Let me give, for Inftance, fome of thofe Wri-
ters or Talkers who deal much jh the Word Na-
ture, Fate, Luck 9 Chance, Perfection, Power, Life,
Fortune, Inftintt, &c. and that even in the moft
calm and inftrudlive Parts of their Difcourfe ;
though neither they themfelves nor their Hearers
have any fettled Meaning under thofe Words •,
and
Ch. VI. S. 3. The right Ufe e^Rcafon; 85
and thus they build up their Reafonings, and in-
fer what they pleafe, with an Ambition of the
Name of Learning, or of fublime Elevations in Re-
ligion ; whereas in Truth they dobutamufe them-
felves and their Admirers with fwelling Words of
Vanity *- under/landing neither what they fay ', nor where-
of they affirm. But ttys Sort of Talk was reproved
of «old by the two chief Apoftles St. Peter and St.
Paul* 1 Tim. i. 7. and 2 Pet. ii. 18.
When Pretenders to Philofophy or good Senfe
grow fond of this Sort of Learning, they dazle
and confound their weaker Hearers, but fail under
the Negleft of the Wife. The Epicureans are
guilty of this Fault, when they afcribe the For-
mation of this World to Chfike : The Ariftote-
lians, when they fay, Nature abhors a Vacuum :
The Stoics when they talk of Fate, which is fu-
perior to the Gods: And the Gamefters when
they <:urfe their Ill-Lucky or hopefor the Favours
of Fortunes Whereas, if they* would tell us, that
by the Word Nature they mean the Properties of
amy Being* or the Order of Things eftablifhed at the
Creation ; that by the Word Fate* they intend the
Becrm of God* or the. necejfary Connexion and In*
ftuence . of fecondCaufes and Ejfefts ; if by the Word
Luck or Chance they fignify the abfolute Negation
of any determinate Caufe* or only their Ignorance of
airy fuch Caufe* we fhould know how to converfe
with them, and to aflent to, or diflent from their
Opinions. But while they flutter in the dark,
and make a Noife with Words which have no
fixed Ideas, they talk to the Wind, and can never
profit.
1 would make this Matter a little plainer dill
by Inftances borrowed from the Peripatetick Phi-
Jpibphy, which was taught once in all the
Schools;
86 L O G I C K: or, Part t
Schools. The Profeflbr fancies he has afligned the
true Reafon, why all heavy Bodies tend downward*
why Amber will dram \ Feathers or Straws^ and the
Loadftone draw Iron* When he tells you, that this
is done by certain gravitating and attractive Qua.
Sties, which proceed from the fubflantial Forms of
cfrofe various Bodies. He imagines that he has
explained why the Load/tone's * North Pole* Jhall
repel the North End of a Magnetkk Needle, and at-
trail the South, when he affirms, that this is done
by its Sympathy* with one End of it, and its An-
tipathy againft the other End. Whereas in Truth*
all thefe Names of Sympathy* Antipathy* fubfiatp*
Hal Forms and Qualities* when they are put for the
Caufes of thefe Effe&s in Bodies, are but hard
Words which only exprefs a learned and pom*
pous Ignorance of the true Caufe of natural Ap-
pearances; artd in this Senfe they ire mere Words
without Ideas.
This wil! evidently appear if one afk me, why
a concave Mirror or convex Glafs will burn Wood
in the Sun-beams, or why a Wedge will cleave-
it! and I fhould tell him, it is by an uftorious
Quality in the Mirror or Glais, and by a cleaving
Power in the Wedge, arifing from a certain un-
known fubftantial Form in them, whence they
derive thefe Qualities ; or if he (hould afk me
why a Clock jlrikes* and points to the Hour ? and I
Ihouldfay, it is by an indicating Form and fonorifick
Quality ; whereas I ought to tell him ho* the
Sun-beams are -colle&ed and united by a burning
Glafs* whence the mechanical Force of a Wedge
is derived 5 and what are the Wheels and Springs, .
* Note, Some Writers call that the South- Pole of a Loadftone. which at,
traSs the South- End q{ ^he Needle; but 1 chafe to follow thofe who call 1%
the Nortb'Pefy. . ' •
the
Ch. VI. S. 3. Vbt right life of Reafon. 87
the Pointer and Ifammer, and Bell, whereby a
Clock gives Notice of the Time, both to the Eye
and the Ear. But' thefe ujlorious and cleaving
Powers, /onerous and indicating Formkand Qualities \
do either teach the Enquirer nothing at all but
\yhat hefcnew before, or are they mere Words
witbbut Ideas f.
And there is many a Man in the vulgar and
in the learned World, who imagines hiipfelf
deeply {killed in the Controverfies of Divinity,
whereas he has only furnifhed himfelf with a
Parcel of fcbolaftick or wnftick Words, under fotne
of which the Authors themfelves had nojuft Ideas;
and the Learner when he hears, or pronounces
them, hath fcarce any Ideas at all. Such fort of
Words fometimes have become Matters of im-
mortal Contention, as though the Gofpel could
not ftand without them ; and yet the Zealot per-
haps knows little more of them than he does of
$hibbohtb % or Higgaion, Selab, Judges xii. 6. Pfcd.
ix. 16.
Yet here I would lay down this Caution, that
there are feveral Objedts of which we have not a
clear and diftinQ Idea, much lefs an adequate or
comprehenfive one, and yet we cannot call the
Names of thefe Things Words without Ideas ;
+ It may be obje&ed here, €t And what does the modern Philofopher
** With all his detail of mathematical Numbers, and Diagrams, do more
" than this toward the Solution of thefe Difficulties ? Does he not defcrlbe
«' Gravity by a certain unknown Force, whereby Bodies tend downward /• the
** Center 5 Hath he found the certain and mechanical Reafons of Attraction,
*• Magneifm, See.** I attfwer, That the Moderns have found a thoufand
Things by applying Mathematicks to natural Philosophy, which the Anci-
ents were ignorant of 5 and when they ufe any Names of this Kind, «k.
Gravitation, Attraction, ice. they ufe them only to fignlfy, that there are
fuch Effects and fuch Caufes, with a frequent Confcfljon of their Ignorance
cf the true Springs of them : They do not pretend to make tbefe Words
ftand for the real Caufts of Things, as though they thereby affigned the true
philofophical Solution of thefe Difficulties; for in this Sehie they will ftill
be Words without Ideat, whether ia the Mout& of an old Philofopher or a
tmv one,
fuch
8$ LO G 1 C K: Or, Part I.
fuch ar6 the Infinity and Eternity of God himfelf,
the Union of our own Soul and Body* the Union of
the divine and human Natures in Jefus Cbrift, the
Operation of the Holy Spirit on the Mind of Mat,
t$c. Thefe ought not to be called Words with-
out Ideas, for there is fufficient Evidence for the
Reality and Certainty of the Exiftence of their
Objefts ; though there is fome Confufion in our
cleared Conceptions of them ; and our Ideas of
them, though imperfeft, are yet fufficient to con-
verfe about them, fo far as we have Need, and to
determine fo much as is necefiary for our own
Faith and Practice.
Direft.II. Do not fuppofe that the Natures or
EJfences of Things always differ from one another p
as much as their Names do. There are various
Purpofes in human Life, for which we put very
different Names on the fame Thing, or on Things
whofe Natures are near a-kin ; and thereby often-
times, by making, a new nominal Species,, we ar6
ready to deceive ourfelves with the Idea of another
real Species of Beings: And thofe, whofe Under-
ftandings are led away by the mere Sound of
Words, fancy the Nature of thofe Things to be very
different whofe Names are fo, and judge of them ac-
cordingly.
I may borrow a remarkable Inftance for my
Purpofe alrtioft out of every Garden, which con-
tains a Variety of Plants in it. Moft or all Plants
agree in this, that they have a Root, a Stalk,
Leaves, Buds, Bloffoms and Seeds : But the Gar-
dener ranges them under very different Names, as
though they were really different Kinds of Beings,
merely becaufe of the different Ufe and Service to
which they are applied by Men : As for Inftance,
thofe
Cb.Yl. S. 3. the right Ufe */Reafon. 89
thofe Plants Whbft Roots are eaten (ball appro-
priate the. Name of Roots to themfelves ; fuch are
Carrots, Turnips, Radifhes, fcfr. If the Z>*w are
of dhief Ufe to us, then we call them Herbs ; as
Sage, Mint, Tbfthe: If the Leaves are eaten raw,
they are termed Sallad ; as Lettuce, Pur/Iain : If
boiled, they become Pot-herbs; as Spinage, Cole-
worts 1 and fomeofthofe lame Plants, which are
Pot-herbs in one. Family, are Sallad m another.
If the Buds arp rfude our Food, they are called
Heads, or Tops ; So ". Cabbage-Heads, Heads of Af-
paragus and Artichoah. If the Bloffom be of moft
Importance, we call it a Flower ; fuch are Dai-
fies, Tulips^ and Carnations, which are the mere
Bloflbms of thofe Plants. If the Hujk or Seeds
arc eaten, they are called the Fruits of the Ground,
as Peafe, Beans, Strawberries, fcfc. If any Pare
of the Plant be of known and common Ufe to us,
in Medicine, we call it a phyjical Herb, as Carduus,
Scuny-grafs 5 but if "we count no Part ufeful, we
call it a Weed, and throw it out of the Garden ;
and yet perhaps our next Neighbour knows fome
valuable Property drid Ufe of it ; he plants it in
his Garden, and gives it the Title,of -an Herb, or
a filotver. You fee here how friiall is the real Di-
ftinftion of thefe feveral Plants, confidered in
their general Nature as the lejfer .Vegetables : Yet
What very different Ideas we vulgarly fdrm con-
cerning them, and make different Species of them,
chiefly becaufc of the different Names given
them.
Now when Things are fet in this clear Light, 4
.it appears how ridiculousi it. would be for two
Perfons to contend, whether Dandelion be an Herb,
or a Weed-, whether it be a Pot-herb or Sallad;
when by the Cuftom or Fancy of different Fami-
lies, this one Plant obtains all thefe Names ac-
cording
go LOGIC K: Or, Part I.
cording to the feveral Ufes of if, .and the Value
that is put upon it*
Note here, that I find no Manner of Fault with
the Variety of Names which are given to feveral
Plants, according to the various Ufes we make of
them. But I would not have. our Judgments itn-
pofed upon hereby, to think that thefe mere no* '
viinal Species, viz. Herbs, Sallad, and Weeds, be-
come three realty different Species of Beings, os
this Account, that they have different Names and
Ufes. But I proceed to other In fiances. ^
It has been the Cuftom of Mankind, when
they have been angry with any thing, to add a
new ill Name to it, that they may convey there-
by a hateful Idea of it, though the Nature qf the
thing drill abides the fame. So the Papijls call the
Protejlants Heretkks : A profane Perfon calls a
Man of Piety a Preciftan : And in the Times of
the Civil War in the lad Century, the RayaUfts
called the Parliamentarians, Fanaticks, Rtundbeads*
and Sectaries. And they in Requital called the
Royalifts, Malignant* : But the Partizans on each
Side were really neither better nor worfe for thefc
Names.
It has alfo been a frequent Praftice on the
other Hand, to put new favourable Names upon iU
Ideas, on purpofe to take off the Odium of them.
But notwithstanding all thefe flattering Name*
and Titles, a Man of profufe GeneroGty is but a
Spendthrift ; a natural Son is a Bajlard drill \ $
Gallant is an Adulterer, and a Lady of Pleafure is a
Wbore.
Dire£h III. Take heed of believing the Naturi
and Effence of two or more Things to be certainly the
fame, becaufe they may have the fame Name given
them. This has been an unhappy and fatal Occa*
fidfl
Ch. VI. S. 3. The right Ufe of Rcafon. Qi
(ion of a thoufand Miftakes in the natural, in the
civil, and in the religious Affairs of Life both a-
mongft the Vulgar and the Learned. I (hall give
two or three Inftances, chiefly in the Matters of
Natural Philofopby, having hinted feveral Dangers
of this Kind relating to ^theology in the foregoing
Difcourfe concerning Equivocal Words.
Our elder Philofophers have generally made ufe
of the Word Soul to fignify that Principle where-
by a Plant grows, and they called it the vegetative
Soul: The Principle of the Animal Motion of a
Brute has been likewife called a Soul* and we have
been taught to name it the fenfttive Soul: They
have alfo given the Name Soul to that fuperior
Principle in Man, whereby he thinks, judges, rea-
fons, &c. and though they diftinguiftied this by the
honourable Title* of the rational Soul, yet in com-
mon Difcourfe and Writing we leave out the Words
vegetative, fenfative, and rational \ and make the
Word Soul ferve for all thefe Principles 2 Thence
we are led early into this Imagination, that there is
a Sort of fpiritual Being in Plants and in Brutes, like
that in Men. Whereas if we did but abftraft and
feparate thefe Things from Words, and compare
the Caufe of Growth in a Plant, with the Caufe of
Reafoning in Man, (without the Word, Soul) we
fhall never think that thefe two Principles were at
all like one another; nor fhould we perhaps fo ea-
fily and peremptorily conclude, that Brutes need an-
intelligent Mind to perform their animal Actions.
Another Inftance may be the Word Life,
which being attributed to Plants, to Brutes, and
to Men, and in each of them afGribed to the Soul %
has very eafily betrayed us from our Infancy into
this Miftake, that the Sprit or Mind, or think-
ing Principle, in Man, is the Spring of vegetative
G and
£2 LOGIC K: Or, Part I.
and animal Life to bis Body: Whereas it is evident,
that if the Spirit or thinking Principle of Man
gave Life to his animal Nature, the Way to fave
Men from dying would not be to ufe Medicines*,
but t6 perfuade the Spirit to abide in the Body, lytf
I might derive a third Inftance from the Wofif
Heat ; which is ufed to fignify the Senfatitn
we have when we are near the Fire; as well as the
Caufe of that Senfation whidh is in the Fire itfelf;
and thence we conclude from our Infancy, that
there is a Sort of Heat in tH Fire refmbling our rim
Senfation, or the Heat which Hoe feet: Whereas in
the Fire there is nothing but little Patticle* of
Matter of fuch particular Shapes, SizA, Situa-
tions and Motions as are fitted to imprcfs fuch
Motions on our Flefli or Nerves as excite the
Senfe of Heat. Now if this Caufe of our Senfa*
tion in the Fire had been always called by a di-
ftindt Name, perhaps we had not been fo rooted
in this Miftake, that the Fire is hot with the fame
Sort of Heat that we feel. This will appear with
more Evidence, when we confider that we are re-
cure from the fame Miftake where there have, been
two different Names allotted to our Senfation 9
and to the Caufe of it ; as, we do not fay, Pain is
in the Fire that burns us, or in the Knife that cuts
and wounds us ; for we call it burning in the Fire*
tutting in the Knife, and Pain only when it is in
our f elves.
, Numerous Inftances of this Kind might be de-
rived from the Words fweet 9 four % loud, Jhrill 9 and
almoft all the fenfible Qualities, whofe real Natures
we miftake from our very Infancy, and we arc
ready to fuppofe them to be the fame in us, aod in
the Bodies that caufe them ; partly becaufe- tbe
Words which fignify our own Senfations are ap-
plied
. Ch. VI. S. 3. 77/e right Ufi gf Reafon. 93
plied alfo to fignify thofc unknown Shapes and
Motions of the little Corpufcles, which excite and
"caufe thofc Sulfations.
Dirc& IV. /* Comxrfatm * R**d?ng,he diligent
to find out tbt true Senfe 9 or diftinft Idea, which the
Speaker or Writer affixes to his Words \ and efpecialfy
to tbofe Words which are the chief Subjefl of bis Dtf-
cowrfe. As far as poffible take heed, left you put
more or fewer Ideas into one Word, than the Per-
fon did whto he wrote or fpoke ; and endeavour
that your Idq»s of every Word may be the fame
as hii were : Then you will judge better of what
lie fpcgfcs or writes.
It 1^ for want of this that JVIcn quarrel in the
Dark ; and that there are fo many Contentions ip
the feveral Sciences, and efpeciaily in Divinity.!
Multitudes of them arife from a Miftake of the
true Senfe or complete Meaning, in which Words
•are ufed by the Writer or Speaker ; and hereby
Ibmetimes they feem to agree, when they really differ
in their Sentiments ; and fometimes they feem to dif-
fer when they really agree. Let me give an Inftance
of both.
When one Man by the Word Church (hall
underftand all that believe in Cbriji ; and another
by the Word Church means only the Church t of
Rome ; they may both affent to this Prbpofition,
*Tbere is no Salvation out of the Church, and yet their
inward Sentiments may be widely different.
Again, if one Writer (hall affirm, that Virtue
added to Faith is fufficient to make a Cbriftian^ and
another (hall as zealoufly deny this Propofitjon,
they feem to differ widely in Words, and yec
fferhaps they may both really agree in Sentiment :
G 1 If
94 LOGIC K: Or, Part I.
If by the Word Virtue, the Affirmcr intends our
whole Duty to God and Man ; and the Denier by
the Word Virtue means only Courage, or at mott
our Duty towards our Neighbour, without includ-
ing in the Idea of it the Duty which we owe to
God.
Many fuch Sort of Contentions as thefe are, if
traced to their Original, will be found to be mere
Logomachies, or Strifes and Quarrels about Names
and Words, and vain JangHngs, as the Apoftle caHs
them in his firft Letter of Advice to Timothy.
In order therefore to attain clear and difiinR
Ideas of what we read and hear, we muft fearch
the Senfe of Words \ we muft confider what is
their Original and Derivation in our own or fo-
reign Languages; what is their common Senfe
amongft Mankind, or in other Authors, efpectaK
ly fuch as wrote in the fame Country, in the fame
Age, about the fame Time, and upon the fame
Subje&s : We muft confider in what Senfe the
fame Author ufes any particular Word or- Pbrafe,
and that whofl he is difcourfing on the fame Mat-
ter, and efpecially about the fame Parts or Para-
graphs of his Writing : We niuft confider whe-
ther the Word be ufed in a drift and limited, or
in a large and general Senfe ; whether in a literal,
in a figurative, or in a prophetick Senfe; whe-
ther it has any fecondary Idea annexed to it befides
the primary or chief Senfe. We muft enquire
farther, what is the Scope and Defign of the
Writer ; and what is the Connexion of that Sen*
tence with thofe that go before it, and thofe which
follow it. By thefe and other Methods we are to
fearch out the Definition of Names, i. e. the trye
Senfe and Meaning in which any Author or Speaker
vfes any Word which may be the chief* Subjeft
of
Ch. VI. S. 3. The right Ufe gf Reafon. -9$
of Difcourfe, or may carry any confidcrablc Im-
portance in it.
Direft. V* When we communicate our Notions to
ethers, merely with a Defign to inform and improve
their Knowledge* let us in the Beginning of our Dif-
courfe take cart to adjufi the Definitions of Names
ivberefoever hhere is need of it ; that is, to determine
plainly what we mean by the chief Words which art
the Subjea of our Difcourfe ; and be fare always to
keep the fame Ideas , wbenfoever we ufe the fame Words %
unlefs we give due Notice of the Change. This will
have a very large and happy Influence, in fecuring
not only others but ourfelves too from Confufion
and Miftake; for even Writers and Speakers
themfelves, for want of due Watchfulnefs, are rea*
dy to affix different Ideas to their own Words* in dif-
ferent Parts of their Difcourfes, and hereby bring
Perplexity into their own Reafonings, and con*
found their Hearers.
It is by an Obfervation of this Rule that Ma-
thematicians have.fo happily fecured themfelves,
and the Sciences which they have profefled, from
Wrangling and Controverfy; becaufe whenfoever
in the Progrcfs of their Treatifes they have Oc-
cafion to ufe a new and unknown Word, they al-
ways define it, and tell in what Senfe they (hall
take it ; and in many of their Writings you find .
a heap of Definitions at the very Beginning. Now ■
if the Writers of Natural Pbilofopby and Morality
had ufed the fame Accuracy and Gare, they had
tffe&ually fecluded a Multitude of noify and fruit-
lefs Debates out of their feveral Provinces : Nor
had that facred Theme of Divinity been perplex-
ed with fo many intricate Difputes, nor the Churchy
of Chrijl been torn to Pieces by fo many ScStZ*.
end .Factions, if the Words Grace* Faith, Rigb-
G 3 tcou^w
96 LOGICK: Or, Part I.
teoufnefs, Repentance, purification, Worfhip, Churcb r
Bijhop, Prejbyter, &c. had been well defined, and
their Significations adjufted, as near as poffible, by
the Ufe of thofe Words in the New Teftament ; or
at lead:, if every Writer had told us at firft in what
Senfe he would qfe thofe Words.
Direfl:. VI. In your own Studies, as well as m
the Communication of your Thoughts to others, mire*
ly for their Information* avoid ambiguous and eqm*
vocal Terms as much as poffible. Do not ufe fuch
Words 9s have two or three Definitions of the Name
belonging to them, i. t. fuch Words as have two
or three Senfes, where there is any Danger of* Mi*
flake. "Where your chief Bufineu is to inform the
Judgment, and to explain a Matter, rather than to
perfuade or affed, b%*iot fond of exprefling your*
felves in figurative Language, when there are any
proper Words that fignify . the fame Idea in their
literal Senk.^ his the Amb$guity>*f Names, as we
have often faid, that brings alnioft infinite Confu-
fion into our Conceptions of Ihings. .
But where there is aNeceffity of ufmg an ambi-
guous ff^ordf there Jet double Care be ufed in defining
that Word, and .declaring in what Senfe you take
it. And be fure to fuffer no ambiguous Word ever'
to come into your Definitions.
Direft. VII. In .communicating your Notions, ufe
every. Word, as near .-as poffible in. the fame Senfe. in
which Mankind commonly* ufes it;: or which Writers '.
that have gomkfore.yov-favetffualfy affixed to H s
uptin Condition that this fm>fror»Amhig&ity. Though
Name9 are m their. €>rigroal nmely. arbitrary, ..yet N
we (hould always- keep to the; eftaldiftjed Meaning
oY them, unlefs great Neceffity x^quire the A*--
i .' teration^
Ch. VI. S, 3. "The right Vfi ^Rcafon. 97
alteration ; for when any Word has been ufed to
fignify an Idea, that old Idea will recur in the
Mind, when the Word is heard or read* rather
than any new Idea which we may fatten to it*
And this is one Reafon why the received Definition,
of Names fhould be changed as little as poflibie.
. But I add farther, that though a Word entirely
new, introduced into a Language, may be affixed
to what Idea you pleafe, yet an old Word ought
never to be fixed to an unnccuftomcd Idea, without
juft and evident Neceflity, or without prefent or
previous Notice, left we introduce thereby a Li*
ccnfe for all Manner of pernicious Equivocations
and Falftmds\ as for Inftance, when an idle Boy
who has not ieen his Book all the Morning fbail tell
his Matter that be bos learned bis Lejfon, he can ne-
ver excufe himfelf&y faying, that by the Word
heffon he meant his Break/aft, and by the Word
learn he meant eating ; furely this would be con-
ftrued a downright Lie, and his fancied Wit would
hardly procure his Pardon.
In ufing an ambiguous Word, which has been
ufed in different Senfes, we may choofe what we
think the mod proper Senfe, as I have done, p. 86;
in naming the Piles of the Load/lone* North or
South.
And when a Word has been ufed in two or three
Senfes, and has made a great Inroad for Error up-
on that Account, it is of good Service to drop one
or two of tthofeSenfeSy and leave it only one re-
maining, and affix the other Senfes or Ideas to o-
ther Wprds. So the modern Phiiofophers* when
they treat of the bumnnSoul> they call it the Mind-
or Mens bumana, and leave the Word Anima or
Sont to %nify the 1 Principle of Life; and Motion iw
mere ammal Beings. k>C)> : '> ; • \> ■'.*•■'-
....;,:;■<: ' G 4 The*
98 LOGICK: Or, PartL
The Poet Juvenal has long ago given us a Hint
of this Accuracy and Diftinttion, when he fays of
Brutes and Men 9
Induljit mundi communis Conditor Mis
Tantum Animas * nobis Animum quoque.
Sat. ix. v. 134.
Exception. There is one Cafe, wherein fome of
thefc lad Rules concerning the Definition of JVards^
may be in fome Meafure difpenfed with ; and that
is, when firong and rooted Prejudice hath eftfr
blifhed fome favourite Word or Phrafe, and long
ufed it to exprefs fome Miftaken Notion, or. to
unite fome inconfiftent Ideas ; for then it is fome-
times much eafier to lead the World into Truth by
indulging their Fondnefs for a Phrafe, and by al-
igning and applying new Ideas and Notions 'to
their Favourite Word ; and this is much fafer alfo
than to awaken all their Paffions by reje&ing both
their old Words, and Phrafes, and Notions, and
introducing all new at once r Therefore we conti-
nue to fay, There is Heat in the Fin* there is Coldnefs
in Jee 9 rather than invent new Words to exprefs the
Powers which are in Ftre or Ice, to excite the Sen-
fations of Heat or Cold in us. For the fame Reafon
fome Words and Phrafes which are lefs proper,
may be continued in Theology, while People are led
into clearer Ideas with much more Eafe and Sue-
cefs, than if an Attempt were made to change all
their beloved Forms of Speech.
In other Cafes, thefe logical DireHicns fliould ge-
nerally be obferved, and different Names affixed to
different Ideas.
. Here I cannot But take Occafion to remark,
that it is a confiderable Advantage to any Lan-
guage to have a Variety of new Words introduced
into
Ch. VI. S. 3; Vie right Uje ^Rcafon: 99
into it, that when in Courfe of Time new Objefts
and new Ideas arife, there may be new Words and
Names affigned to them : And alfo where one fingle
Name has fuftained two or three Ideas in Time paft,
thefenew Words may remove the Ambiguity by
being affixed to fome of thofe Ideas. This Prac-
tice would by Degrees take sway Part of the Un-
certainty of Language. And for this Realbn I
cannot but congratulate our Englijh Tongue, that it
has been abundantly enriched with the Tratiflation
of Words from all our Neighbour Nations, as well
as from ancient Languages, and thefe Words hav$
been as it were enfranchifed amongft us s for French,
Latin, Greek •and German Names will figrtJfy Englijh
Ideas, as well as Words that are anciently and in-
tirely Englijh.
It m^y not be amifs to mention in this Place,
that as the Determination of the particular Senile
in which any Word is uftd, is called the Definition
if the Name* fo the Enumeration of the various
Senfes of an equivocal Word, is fometlmes called
the Divifion or DiJiinltion of the Name-, and for
this Purpofe good Diftionafies are of excellent
Ufe.
■* This BiJHnSlion of the Name or Word is greatly
neceffary in Argumentation or Difpute; when a
fallacious Argument is ufed, he that ahfwers it di-
IKnguiflies the federal Senfes of fome Word or
Phrafe in it, and (hctars in what Senfe it is true, and
in what Senfe iris as evidently/*^. 1 .
-■1 1, .«■•*■ ■. , « v
it, j
■ - '
> >.
SECT.
ico X QIC K:\Or, PartL
SEC T; IV.
Of tbt > Definition ef Things.
AS there id mu^h Confufion introduced into
our Ideas by the Means of thofe Words
to which they arc; affixed, fct the . mingling our
Ideas with each other without Caution is a farther
Occafion whereby they become contufed. A Court
Lady, born and bred, up amongft Pomp and Equi-
page* and the vain Notions of Birth and Quality,
conftantly joins and mixes all thefe with the Idea
of herfelr, and fhe imagines: thefe to be effential
to her Nature* and as it were necejfary to her Being *
thsnee (he is tempted to look upon menial Servants,
and the loweft Rank of Mankind, as another
Species of Beings, quite, diftinft from herfelf. A
Plough-boy* that has never travelled beyond his
own Village, and has feen nothing but. thatched
Hmtfes and his Parijb-Cburcb* is naturally led to
imagine that Thatch belongs to the very Nature
of a Houfe, and that that muft be- a Church which
is built of Stone* and efpecially if it has a Spire up-
on it. A Child whofe Uncle has been exceflive
fond, and his Scbool-mafter very fevere, eafily be*
lieves, that Fondntfs always belongs to Uncles* and
that Severity is eflential to Mafters or InJtruSors. f
He has feen alio Soldiers with red Coats, or Affi- :
nijlers with long black Gowns* and therefore he per-
fuades himfelf that thefe Garbs are eflential to the
Charaflers, and that he is not a Minijler who has-.
not a long black Gown* nor can he be a Soldier who
is not drefled in red. It would be well if all fuch
Miftakes ended with Childhood.
It
Ch. VI. S. 4, The right Vfe ^Rcafon. 101
It might be alio fubjoined, that our complex
Ideas become confufed* not only by uniting or blend-
ing together more fimple or Jingle Ideas* than really
belong to them, as in the Inftances juft mentioned;
but Obfcurity and Confufion fometimetf come upon
our Ideas alfo, for want of uniting a fujficient Num*
her of Jingle Ideas to make the complex one : So
if I conceive of a Leopard only as a fpotted Beajf 9
this does not diftinguifli it from a Tyger or a Lynx,
nor from many Dogs or Horfes 9 which are fpotted
too ; and therefore a Leopard muft have fome more
Ideas added to complete and diftinguifli it.
I grant that it is a large and free Acquaintance
with the World, a watchful Obfervatibn and dili-
gent Search into the Nature of Things that muft
fully correct this kind Of Errors : The Rules of Lo-
pck are not fufficient to do it : But yet the Rules of
Logick may inftruct us'by what means to diftinguifli
one thing from another, and how to fearch and
mark out as far as may be, the Contents and Limits
of the Nature of diftinft Beings, and thus may give
us great Affiftance towards the Remedy of thefc
Miftakes*
As the Definition of Names frees us from that
ConfuTion which Words introduce, fo the Defini-: .
Hon of Things will in fome Meafure guard us. *##:;
gainft that Confufion which mingled Ideas haw !
introduced : For as a Definition of the Name ex-
plains what any Word means, fe a Definition of
the Thing explains what is the Nature of that
Thing.
In order to form a Definition of any Thing
we muft put forth thefe three A£ts of the
Mind.
Firft, Compare the Thing to be defined with,
other Things that are moft like to itfclf, and fee
■ wherein
I
102 L O G I C K: Or, Part L
wherein its Efience or Nature agrees with them ;
and this is called the general Nature or Genus in a
Definition : So if you would define what Wine is,
firft compare it with. other Things like itfelf, as
Cyders Perry* &c and you will find it agrees
effentially with them in this, that it is a Sort of
Juice.
Secondly, Confider the mod remarkable and
primary Attribute, Property* or Idea, wherein this
Thing differs from thole other Things that are
xtioft like it * and that is its efential or Jpecifick Dif-
ference : So Wine differs from Cyder and Perry, and
all other Juices* in it that it is preffed from a Grape.
This may be called its fpecial Nature* which diftin*
guifhcs it from other Juices..
Thirdly, Join the general and fpecial Nature
together, or (which is all one) the Genus and the
Difference* and thefe make up a Definition. So the
Juice of a Grape* or Juice preffed from Grapes* is the
Definition of Win*.
So if I would define what Winter is, J confider
firft wherein it agrees with other Things which are
moil like it, (viz,) Summer* Spring* Autumn, and
I find they are all Seafons of the Tear * therefore a
Seafbn vf the Tear is the Genus. Then I obferve
wherein it differs from thefe, and that is in the
Shortnefs of the Days * for it is this which does pri-
marily diftinguifh it from other Seafons* therefore
this may be called its fpecial Nature or its Difference.
Then by joining thefe together I make a Definition.
Winter is that Seafon of the Tear wherein the Days
,*vre Jborteft. I confefs indeed this is but a ruder
Definition of it; for to define it as an accurate
Aftronomer I muft limit the Days, Hours, and
Minutes.
After the fame Manner if we would explain or
define what the Pifture of a Man is, we confider
firft
Ch. VI. S. 4. The right Ufe $f ReafonJ 103
lirft the Genus or general Nature of it, which is a
Representations and herein it agrees with many
other Things, as a Statue, a Shadow, a Pra/, a wr-
bal Defcription of a Man, ©V. Then we confider
wherein it differs from thefe, and we find it differs
from a verbal Defcription in that it is a Rtprefenta-
tion to the Eye and not to the Ear : It differs from
a Statue in that it is a Reprefentation upon a flat Sur-
face, and not in a folid Figure : It differs from a
Shadow in that it is an abiding Reprefentation and
not a fleeting one : It differs from a Print or Draught*
becaufe it reprefents the Colours by Paint as well
as the Shape of the Object by Delineation. Now
fo many or rather fo few of thefe Ideas put toge-
ther, as are juft fufficient to diftinguifh a Piliure
from all other Reprefentations, make up its cflential
Difference or its fpecial Nature ; and all thefe are
included in its being painted on a plain Surface. Then
join this to the Gems, which is a Reprefentation ;
and thus you have the complete 'Definition of the
PiUure of a Man. {viz.) it is the Reprefentation of
4 Man in Paint upon a Surface (or a p ]?Jane.)
Here it muft be obferved, that when we fpeak
of the Genus and Difference as competing a De-
finition, it muft always be underftood that the
neareft Genus and the fpecifick Difference are re-
quired. v
The next general Nature or the neareft Genus muft
be ufed in a Definition, becaufe it includes all the reft
as Parts of its complex Idea; as if I would define
Wine, I muft fay Wine is a Juice, which is the neareft
Genus ; and not fay, Win* is a Liquid, which is a
remote general Nature; or Wine is a Subjlance, which
is yet more remote, for Juice includes both Subjlance
and Liquid. Befides, neither of thefe two remote
general Nature* would make any Diftin&ion be-
tween
104 L G I C K: Or, Part I.
fween Wine and a thoufand other Subftances, or
Other Liquids j a. remote Genus leaves the Thing coo
much undiftinguifhed.
The fpecifick Difference is that primary Attribute
which diftinguifhes each Species from one another,
while they ftand ranked under the -fame general
Nature or Genus. Though Wine differs from other
Liquids, in that it is the Juice of a certain Fruit, yet
this is but a general or generick Difference, for it does
not diftingwfh Wine from Cyder or Perry r the Spe-
cifick Difference of Wine therefore is its Preffure from
the Grape ; as Cy der is preffed from Apples, and
Perry from Pears.
In Definitions alfo we muft ufe the primary Ah
tribute that diftinguifhes the Species or fpecial Na-
ture, and not attempt to define Wine by its parti-
cular Taftes, or Effefts, or other Properties, which
are but fecondary or consequential, when its Preffure
from the Grape is the mod obvious and primary
Diftin&ion of it from all other Juices. 1 confefs
in fbtpe Cafes it is not fo eafily known which is
the primary Idea that diftinguifhes one Thing from
another * and therefore fome would as foon define
Winter by the Coldnefs of the Seafon, as by the Short*
nefs of the Days-, though the Shortnefs of the Days
is doubtlefs the mbft juft, primary and philofophi-
cal Difference between that and the other Seaibns
of the Year, fince Winter Days are always (horteft,
but not always the coldefi ; I add alfo, that the
Sbortntfs . of the Days is one Caufe of the Coldnefs,
but the Cold is no Caufe of tjieir Shortnefs.
SECT.
Ch. VI. S. 5. The right Ufi gfReafon. *o$
SECT, V.
Rules of the Definition cf the Thing.
TH E /pedal Rules of a good Definition, ars
thefe:
Rule I. A Definition muji be univerfal, or as forte
call it, adequate ; that is, it rtuft agree to all the
particular Species or Individuals that are included
under the fame Idea \ fo the Juice of a Grape agrees
to all proper Wines, whether Red, White, French,
Spanijh, Florence, &c.
Rule II. // mufi be proper and peculiar to the Thing
defined, and agree to that alone \ for it is the very
Defign of a Definition effectually to diftinguifh one
Thing from all others : So the Juice efa Grape
agrees to no other Subftance, to no other Liquid,
to no other Being but Wine.
Thefe two Rules befng obferred, will always ren-
der a Definition reciprocal with the Thing defined ;
which is a fcholaftick Way of fpeaking, to fignify
that the Definition may be ufed in any Sentence in
the Place of the Thing defined, or they may be mu-
tually affirmed concerning each other, or fubftitu-
ted in the room of each other. The Juice of the
Grape is Wine, or Wine is the Juice of the Grape.
And wherefoever the Word Wine is ufed, you may
put the Juice of the Grape inflead of it, except when
you confider Wine rather as a Word than a Thing,
or when it is mentioned in fuch logical Rules.
io6 10 G IC K: Or, Parti:
Rule III. A Definition ought to be clear and plain \
for the Defign of it is to lead us into the Knowledge
of the Thing defined.
Hence it will follow, that the Words ufed in a
Definition ought not to be doubtful, and equivocal, -
and obfeure, but as plain and eafy as the Language
will afford: And indeed it is a general Rule con-
cerning the Definition both of Names and Things*
that no Word fhould be ufed in either of them,
which has any Darknefs or Difficulty in it, unlefs
it has been before explained or defined.
Hence it will follow alfo, that there are many
Things which cannot well be defined either as to
the Name or the Thing, unlefs it be by fynonymous 1
Words, or by a Negation of the contrary Idea, &V.
for learned Men know not how to make them
more evident or rnore intelligible than the Ideas
which every Man has gained by the vulgar Me-
thods of teaching. Such are the Ideas of Extenfion,
Duration, Thought, Confcioufnefs, and moft of our
fimple Ideas, and particularly fenfible Qualities,
ad White, Blue, Red, Cold, Heat, Shrill, Bitter; Sour*
&c. '
We can fay of Duration, that it is a Continuance
in Being, or a not ceafing to be ; we can fay of ■
Confcioufnefs, that it is as it were a feeling within
ourfehes ; we may fay, Heat is that which is not-
Cold', or Sour is that which is like Vinegar-, or.
we may point to the clear Sky, and fay that it is
Blue. Thefe are the vulgar Methods of teaching
the Definitions of Names, or Meaning of Words.
But there are fome Philofophers, whofe Attempts
to. define thefe Things learnedly, have wrapped up
their Ideas in greater Darknefs, apd expofed them-
selves to Ridicule and Contempt; as when they
defipe Heat^they fay, it is QuaUtas congregans bo-
mogenea
Ch.tfLS. 5. rteriibtUfe of 'Rfcafori. iof
btogenea 6? fegregans heterogenea, i. e. a Quality ga-
thering together Things of the fame Kind, and
fepafating Things of a different Kind; So the^
define White> a Colour arifing from the Prevalence of
Brigbtnefs i JBut evety Child knows Hot and White
better without thefe Definitions.
There are many other Definitions given by the
Peripatetick Philofophers, which are very faulty
by Reafan of their Obfcnrity ; as Motion is defined
by them the Afi of a Being in Power, fi far forth
as it is in Power. Time is the Meafure or Number
of Motion according to paft, prefent and future. The
Soul is the A3 of an orgamcal natural Body, having
Life in Power 5 and feveral others of the famd
Stamp.
Rule IV. It is ilfo fcbmmonly prefcribed among
the Rules of Definition, that it jhould be Jhort, fo
that it muft have no Tautology in it i nor any Wordi
fuperfluous. I confefs Definitions ought to be ex-
jpreffed in as few Wdf ds as is confifterit with a cleaf
and juft Explication of the Naturei of thfc Thing'
defined, and a Diftin&ion of it from all othcir
Things befide : But it is of much more Importance^
and far better, that a Definition fhould explain!
clearly the Subjedt we treat of, though the Words
be many, than to leave Obfcurities in the Sdritencfci
•by confinifig it within too narrow Limits* So irt
the Definition which wfc haVe given of Lbglck, thafc
it is the Art of ufing Reafonwell in the Seatch after
Truth and the Communicati^p df it to othets, it has in-
deed many Words in it* but it could not well btf
fliorter. Art is the Genus whefein it agrees with Rbt-
torick, Poejy, Arithmetiek, Wreftling, Sailing, 'Build,
ing, &c. for all thefe are ArU affo : But the Difr
ference or fpecial Nature of it is drawn frottf iis
Objeft, Reajon ; from the Adfc u/mg it wetf , vA
log L O G IC K: Or, Rrrr I
from its two great Ends or Dcfigns, viz. the Search
of Truth, and the Communications of it, nor can it
be juftly defcribed and explained in fewer Ideas.
V. If toe add a fifth Rule, k muft be, that nei-
ther the Thing defined, nor a mere fynonynums Name* .
Jhould make any Part of the Definition, for this would
be no Explication of the Nature of the Thing ; and
a fynonymoos Word at belt could only be a D&
nit ion of the Name,
SECT. VI.
Offervations concerning the Definition of Things*
E FORE I part with this Subjeft, I muft
propofe feveral Obfervations which relate to>
the Definition of Things.
i. Obferv. There is no Need that in Definition*
we fhould be confined to one Jingle Attribute or
Property, in order to exprefs the Difference of the
Thing defined, for fometimes the effential Diffe-
rence confifts in two or three Ideas or Attributes,
So a Grocer is a Man who buys and fells Sugar and
Plumbs and Spices for Gain. A Clock is an Engine
with Weights and Wheels, thatjbews the Hour of tb&~
Day both by pointing and fir iking : And if I were to**"
define a Repeating Clock, 1 muft add another Pr©-^
perty, viz. that it alfo repeats the Hour. So that^
the true and primary gflential Difference of fornc^
complex Ideas confifting in feveral diftindt Proper-^
lies, cannot be well exprefled without conjunctive^
Particles of Speech.
.2d Obferv. There is no need that Definition^
.ftiQttki always be pojitive, for fome Things differ*
. i . ' from
Ch. VI. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon, 109
from others merely by a Defeft of what others
have ; as if a Chair be defined a Seat for a Jingle
Perfon with a Back belonging to if, then a Stool is a
Seat for a Jingle Perfon without a Back 5 and a Form
is a Seat for fever al Perfons without a Back : Thefe are
negative Differences. So Sin is a want of Conformity
id the Law of God\ Blindnefs is a want of Sight ; a
Vagabond is a Perfon without a Home. Some Ideas
are negative, and their Definitions ought to be fo
ibo.
3d Obferv. Some Things may have two or more
Definitions^ and each of them equally juft and good ;
as a Mile is the Length qf eight Furlongs, or it is
the third Part of a League, Eternal is that which
ever was and ever Jhallbe ; or it is that which had
no Beginning and fkall heme no End. * Man is ufu-
ally defined a rational Animal: But it may be much
better to define him a Spirit united to an Animal of
fuch a Shape ', or an Animal of fuch a peculiar Shape
united to a Spirit l , or ■"a Being cbmpofed of fuch an
Animal and a Mind.
- 4th Obferv. Where the Effences of Things are
evident, arid clearly diftindt from each other, there
we may be more exaft and accurate in the Defi*
mtions of them : But where their Effences approach
near to each other, the Definition is more diffi-
cult. A Bird may be defined a feathered Animal
with Wings, a Ship may be defined a large hollow •
Building made to pafs over the Sea with Sails ; But
if you afk me to define a Batt> which is between
a Bird and a Beq/l, or to define a Barge and Hoy %
H 2 which
• 'fhe common Definition of Man, */«. a rational Animal i* very faulty,
*r . Becaufe the Animal is not rational \ the Rationality of Man arifes from the
Mind to which the Animal is united. 2. Becaufe if a Spirit fliould be waited
to a Horfe and make it a rational Being, furely this would not be a &tffj r H
is evident therefore that the peculiar Shape muft enter into the DefinkidSBH a
Man to render it juft and'perfett j and for want of a full Defciiption thereof
all our Definitions are defective.
Y
lid L G 1 C K: Of, fart t
which afe between a Boat and a Ship, it is much
harder to define them, or to adjuft the Bounds of
their Eflence. This is very evident in all tnonjlfous
Births arid irregular Produtlions of Nature, as well
as in many Works of Art, which partake lb much
of one Species arid fo muciti of another, that we can-
not tell under which Species to rank them, or how
to determine theif fpecifick Difference.
The feveral Species of Beings are feldom pre-
cifely limited in the Nature of Things by any
certain and unalterable Bounds : The Eflences of
many Things do not CQnfift in indivijibilii, or in
one evident indivifiCI^bint, as fome have ima-
gined ; but by various x)egrees they approach
nearer to, or differ more frt>m others that are of a
Kindred Nature. So (as I have hinted before) in
the very Middle of each of the Arches of a Rain-
bow the Colours of green, yellow, and red are fuf-
ficiently diftinguifhed •, but near the Borders of
the feveral Arches they run into one another* fo
that you hardly know how to limit the Colours,
nor whether to call it red ox yellow, green or blue.
5th Obferv. As the higbejl or chief Genus 9 s, viz.
Being and Not-Being can never be defined, becaufc
there is no Genus fuperior to them ; fo neither can
Jingular Ideas or Individuals be well defined, be-
caufe either they have no effential Differences from
other Individuals, or their Differences are not
known 5 and therefore Individuals are only to be
defcribed by their particular Circumftances : So
King George is diftinguilhed from all other Men
and other Kings, by defcribing him as the firjt
King of Great Britain of the Houfe of Brunfwick ;
and Weflminjler Hall is defcribed by its Situation
and its Ufe, &c.
That
Ch*VI. S. 6; rberightVfeofVjt&tovi. in
That individual Bodies can hardly have any
cffential Difference, at leaft within the Reach of
our Knowledge, may be made thus to appear;
Metbufclab, when he was nine hundred and fixty
Years old, and perhaps worn out with Age and
* Weaknefs, was the fame Perfon as when he was
in his full Vigour of Manhood, or when he was
an Infant , newly born j but how far was his Body
the fame? Who can tell whether there was any
Fibre of his Flefli or his Bones that continued the
fame throughout his whole Life ? Or who can de-
termine which were thofc .Fibres ? The Ship in
which Sir Francis Drake (ailed round the World
might be new built and refitted fo often, that few
of the fame Timbers remained ; and who can fay
whether it mud be callfcd the fame Ship or no ?
and what is its eflential Difference ? How (hall we
define Sir Francis Drake's Ship, or make a Defini-
tion for Meibufelabf
To this Head belongs that mofl: difficult Ques-
tion, What is the Principle of Individuation ? Or
what is it that makes any one Thing the fame as it
was fometime before ? This is too large and labo-
rious an Enquiry to dwell upon it in this Place :
Yet I cannot forbear to mention thi$ Hint, viz.
Since our own Bodies rauft rife at the laft Day for
us to receive Rewards or Punifliments in them,
there may be perhaps fome original Fibres of «ach
fcuman Body, fome Stamina Vita* or primeval
. Seed of Life, which may remain unchanged through
all the Stages of Life, Death and the Grave •, thefe
may become the Springs and Principles of a Re*
furredtion, and fufficient to denominate it the fame
Body. But if there.be any fuch conftant and vital
Atoms which diftinguifh every human Body, they
are known to God only.
H 3 6tt\Q6£ru*
j« L G 1 C K: Or, Part I;
6th Obferv. Where we cannot find out the Ef-
fence or ejfential Difference of any Species or Kind
of Beings that are would define, we muft content
ourfelves with a Colledtion of fuch chief Parts
or Properties of it, as may beft explain it fo far
as it is known, and beft difiinguifh it from other
Things : So a Marigold is a Flower which hath
many long yellow Leaves ', round a little Knot of Seeds
in the tnidft, with fuch a peculiar Stalk* &c. So if
we would define Silver, we fay it is a white and
bard Metal , next in Weight to Gold: If we would
define an Elder-Tree, we might fay it is one amonjr
the lejfer Trees, whofe younger Branches are foft and
full of Pith, whofe Leaves are jagged or indented, and
of fuch a particular Shape, and it bears darge Cluflers
effmall black Berries: So we muft define Wattf,
Earth * Stone, a Lion, ah Eagle, a Serpent* and the
greateft Part of natural Beings, by a Colledtion of
thofe Properties, which according to our Obferva-
tion diftinguHh them from all other Things. This
is what Mr. Locke calls nominal Effences, and nomi-
nal Definitions. And indeed fince the ejfential Dif-
ferences of the various natural Beings or Bodies
round about us arife from a peculiar Shape, Size,.
Motion and Situation of the fmall Particles oF
which they are compofed, and fince we have no
fufEcient Method to inform us what thefe are, we
muft be contented with fuch a fort of Definition of
the Bodies they compofe.
Here note, that this Sort of Definition, which
is made up of a mere Collection of the moft re-
markable Parts or Properties, is called an imperfetf
Definition or a Defcription •, whereas the Defini-
tion is called perfeS, when it is compofed of the ef-
fential Difference* added to the general Nature or
Genus.
7th Obfera.
Ch. VI. S. 6. The right life of Rcafon. 1 1 3
7th Obferv. The perfeU Definition of any Being
always includes the Definition of the Name where-
by it is called, for it informs us of the Senfe or
Meaning of that Word, and (hews us what Idea
that Word is affixed to : But the Definition of the
Names does by no Means include a perfeB Defini-
tion of the Thing ; for as we have faid before, a
mere fynonymous Word, a Negation of the con r
-trary, or the Mention of any one or two diftin-
guifhing Properties of the Thing may be a fufft-
cient Definition vf the Name. Yet in thofe Cafes
where the effential Difference or Effenceof a Thing
is unknown, there a Definition of the Name by the
chief Properties, and a Defcription of .the Thing arc
much the fame.
And here I think it necefiary to take Notice of
one general Sentiment, that fcems to run through
that excellent Performance, Mr. Locke's Efjay of
Human Underflanding, and that is, " That the
c< Eflences of Things are utterly unknown to us,
" and therefore all our Pretences to diftinguifh the
* c Eflences of Thing* can reach no farther than
« c mere nominal Effences \ or a Colle&ion of fuch
<c Properties as we know ; to fome of which %e
<c affix particular Names, and others we bundle
4< up, feveral together, under one Name : And
*« that all our Attempts to rank Beings into differ-
* c ent Kinds of Species, can reach no farther than
* c to make mere nominal Species: And therefore our
4C Definitions of Things are but mere nominal De«
V fcriptions or Definitions of the Name."
Now that we may do Juftice to this great Author ',
we ought to confider that he c^|pes this Sort
•of Difcourfe only to the Effence vf fimple Ideas,
and to the Efjence of Sub/lances, as appears evi-
dent in the fourth and fixth Chapters of »s Third
H 4 Book 5
114 LOGIC K: Or, Part I;
JJook ; For he allows the Names of mixed Modes
always to fignify the real Ejfences of their Species^
Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial Things to
have real dijlinft Species ; and that in the Diftindtion
of their Eflences, there is generally lefs Confufion- and
Uncertainty than in natural, Chap. VI. Sed. 40, 41.
though it mud be confefied that he fcarce makes
any Diftin&ion between the Definition of the Name*
and the Definition of the Thing, as Chap. IV. and
fometimes the Current of his Difcourfe decries the
Knowledge of Ejfences in fuch general Terms as may
juftly give Occafion to Miftake.
. It muft be granted, that the Eflence of molt of
our fimple Ideas, and the greateft Part of particular
natural Subftances are much unknown to us ; and
therefore the eflential Difference of fenfible Quali-
ties, and of the various Kinds of Bodies, (as 1 have,
faid before) lie beyond the Reach of our Undep-
ftandings : We know not what makes the primary
real inward Diftindlions between Red* Green, Sweety
Sour, &c. between Wood, Iron, Oil, Stone, Fire,
Water, Flefh, Clay, in their, general Natures, nor
(Jo we know what are the inward and prime Di£
. tkiftions between all the^particular Kinds or Spe-
cies in the Vegetable, Animal, Mineral, Metallick,
«>r Liquid World of Things. See Philofoph. Effays,
^ffayxi. Se#. 1.
But dill there is a very large Field for the Know-
ledge of the Eflences of Things, and for the Ufe
pf perfeB Definitions amongft our complex Ideas,
the modal Appearances and Changes of Nature, the
Works of Art, the Matters of Science, and all the
Affairs of x^&ivil, the moral, and the religious
fjfe : And indeed it fe of much more Importance
fO all Mankind to have a better Acquaintance with
|)be Wfth of Art fpr their p.wp Livelihood aji.d
Ch.VI. S.6> The right UfetfK&hn: 11$
daily Ufe, with the- Affairs of Morality tot their
Behaviour in this World, and with the Matters of
Religion^ that they may be prepared for the World
to come, than to be able to give a perfect Defini-
tion of the Works of Nature.
If the particular Eficnces of Natural Bbdies are
• unknown to us, we may yet be good Philofophers,
good Artifts, good Neighbours, good Subjeds, and
good Christians, without that Knowledge, and we
have juft Reafon to be content. -
Now that the Effences of fome of the modal Ap-
pearances and Changes in Nature, as well as Things
ef Art* Science and Morality are fufficiently known
to us to make perfeft Definitions of them, will ap-
pear by the Specimen of a few Definitions of thefe
Things.
Motion is a Change of Place. Swiftnefs is the
paffing* over a long Space in a lhort Timel A
natural Day is the Time of one alternate Revoluti-
on of Light and Darknefs, or it is the Duration of
twenty-four Hours. An Eclipfe of the Sun is a De-
feat in the Sun's Tranfmiffion of Light to us by the
Moon interpofing. *Snow is congealed Vapour.
* Hail is congealed Rain. An * Ifland is a Piece of
Land rifing above the furrounding Water. An *
fiill is an elevated Part of the Earth, and a * Grove
is a Piece of Ground thick fet with Trees. An Houfe
x js a Building made to dwell in. A Cottage is a
mean Houfe in the Country. A. Supper, is that
Meal which we make in the Evening. A 7W-
#ngle is a Figure compofed of three Sides. A
Gallon is a Meafure containing eight Pints. A
Portfr is a Man who carries Burde#fcr Hire. A
King
• Note, ljlandy Hill, Grove, are not designed here in their more remote
avd fuhjlantial Natures (ifM may fo exprefs it) or as the Matter of them is
Earth y for in this Senfe we know not their Efience, but only as confictered
in their modal Appearances , whereby one part of^^rtb is diftuiguUhtd from.
another. The fame may be laid of Snow t Ha^^mt %
rt e/^Eartt
1*6 t O G 1 € K: Or> Part I.
King is the chief Ruler in a Kingdom. Veracity is
the Conformity of our Words to our Thoughts.
Covetoufnefs \i an exceflive Love of Money, or
other Pofleffions. Kilting is the taking away the
Life of an Anifnal. Murder is the unlawful killing
of a M*n. Rbetorick is the Art of fpeaking in a
Manner fit to perfuade. Natural Philojopby is the
Knowledge of the Properties of Bodies and the va-
rious Effects of them, or it is the Knowledge of the
various Appearances in Nature, and their Caufes ;
and Logick is the Art of ufing our Reafon Avell,
&c.
Thus you fee the efiential Differences of various
Beings may be known, and are borrowed from their
Qualities and Properties, their Caufes* Effefls, Ok>
Jeffs, Adjunct, Ends, fcfc. and indeed as infinitely
various as the EJJences of Things are, their Defini-
tions tnuft needs have very various Forms.
After all it muft be confefied, that many Logi-
cians and Philofophers in the former Ages, have
made too great a Buftle about the Exa&nefs of
their Definitions of Things, and entered into long
fruitless Controverfies ana very ridiculous Debates,
in the feveral Sciences about adjufting the Logical
Formalities of every Definition •, whereas that fort
of Wraftglmg is now grown very juftly contempti-
ble, fince it is agreed that true Learning and the
Knowledge of Things depends much more upon a
large Acquaintance with their various Properties,
Caufes, Effe&s, Subject, Object, Ends and Defigns,
than it does upon the formal and fcholaftkk .Nice-
ties of Genus uid Difference.
SECT.
CH. VI. S. 7. fbe right TJji of Rfcafon. i ij
SECT. VII.
Of £ complete Qnkeption of things.
HAVING dwelt fo long upbh the frrft Ktite
to direct our Conceptions, ind given an Ac*
count of the Definition both of IfdA^s dhd fbinp
jn order to gain clear and diftinS Ideas, we make
hafte now to the fecond Rule to guide our Concept
tions, and that is, Cohceive of Tbtigs completely in
all their Parts.
All Parts have a Reference to fdtfte Whole :
Now there is an old Diftin&ion Which logical
Writers^ make of a fPbole arid its Parts into four
feveral Kinds, and it may be proper j'uft to men-
tion them here.
1. There is a metaphyseal Whole, when the EC-
fence of a Thing is faid to confift of two > Parts, the
Genus and the Difference, i. e. the general and the
fpecial Nature, which being joined together make
up a Definition. This has been the Subject of the
foregoing Settidris.
2. There is a mathematical Whole which is better
called integral, when the fiHrefal P&rts which go
to make up, the Whole are really diftindt from one
another, and each of them may fubfift apart. So
the Head, the Limbs, and the trunk, ate the integral
Parts of an animal Body ; fo Units zve the integral
Parts of any large Number ; fo thefe Difcdurfes
which I have written concerning Perception, Judg-
ment, Reafoning and Difpo/ition, are tjjp four integral
Parts of Logick. This Sort of Parts goes to make
up the Campletenefs of any Subject, and "this is the
chief and moft dirett Matter of our Difcourfe in
this Sedtion.
^ 3; There
V
n8 L G IC K: Or, Partt
3. There is zphyfical or effential Whole* which is
ufually made to fignify and include only the two *
effential Parts of Man, Body and Soul: But I think
the Senfe of it may better be altered, or at leaft
enlarged, and to include all the effential Modes,
Attributes or Properties which are contained in the
Comprebenfion of any Idea. This (hall be the Sub-
ject of Difcourfe under the third Rule to dire 51 our
Conceptions.
4. There is a logical Whole* which is alfo called
an Univerfal* and the Parts of it are all the parti*
cular Ideas to which this univerfal Nature extends.
So a Genus is a Whole in refpedt of the feveral Spe-
cies which are its Parts. So the Species is a Whole,
and all the Individuals are the Parts of it. This
fliall be treated of in the fourth Rule to guide our
Conceptions.
At prefent we confider an Idea *as an integral
Whole* and our fecondjiule direfts us to contem-
plate it in all Parts: But this can only refer to
complex Ideas, for fimple Ideas have no Parts.
S E C T. VIII.
Of Bivifion % %and the Rules of it.
SINCE our Minds are narrow in their Capacity -
and cannot furvey the feverai Parts of any
complex Being with one fingle View, as God fees
all Things at once 5 therefore we muft as it were
take it to Pieces, and confider of the Parts fepa*
rately that we may have a more complete Concep-
tion of the Whole. So if I would learn the Na-
ture of a Watch, the Workman takes it to pieces,
and fhews me the Spring, the Wheels^ the Axles*
the Pinions* the Balance* the Dial-Plate* the Poin-
ttr 9 the Cafe* &c< and defcribes each of thefe Things
Ch. VI S. 8. The right Vfe ^Reafon. I if
6 me apart, together with their Figures and {heir
fes. If I would know what an Animal is, the
Anatomift confiders the Head* the trunk* the
Limbs, the Bowels apart from each other, and •
gives me diftin£t Ledtures upon each of them.
So a Kingdom is divided into its feveral Provinces ;
a Book into its feveral Chapters ; and any Science
is divided according to the feveral Subjefts of which
it treats.
* This is what we properly call the Bivifion of an
Idea, which is an Explication of the Whole by its
Jeyeral Parts, or an Enumeration of the feveral Parts,
that go to compofe any Whole Idea, and to render
it complete. And I think when Man is divided in-
to Body and Soul, it properly conies under this part
of the Doftrine of integral Divifion, as well as when
the mere Body is divided into Head, Trunk and Limbs:
This Divifion is fometimes called Partition.
When any of the Parts of any Idea are yet far-
ther divided in order to a clear Explication of
the Whole, this is called a Subdivifion ; as when a
Tear is divided into Months, each Month into Days,
and each Day into Hours, which may alfo be far-
ther fubdivided into Minutes and Seconds.
It is necefiary in order to the full Explication
of any Being, to confider each Part, and the Pro-
perties of it, diftinft by itfelf, as well as in its Re-
lation to the Whole : For there are many Properties
that belong to the feveral Parts of a Being which
Cannot properly be afcribed to the Whole, though
thefe Properties may fit each Part for its proper
.Station, and as it (lands in that Relation to the
whole complex Being : As in a Houfe, the Doors
are moveable, the Rooms fquare, the Cielings white,
the Windows fjranfparent, yet the Houfe is neither
moveable, nor fquare, nor white, nor tranfparent.
The
&20 L O G JC K: Or, Part I.
ffbe facial -Rules of a good Divifion are thefc.
i Rule. Each Part fingly taken mujl contain left
ifian the Whole, but all the Parts taken collefiivrlf
(or together) mujl contain neither more nor lefs than
the Whole. Therefore if in difcourfing of a Tree*
you divide it into the Trunk and Leaves it is an
Imperfect Divifion, betaufe the Root and the
Branches : are needful to make up the Whole. So
Logick would, be ill divided into Apprebenfibfi
*fudgpent and Reafoning ; for Method is a con fid cr-
adle Part of the Art which teaches us to life our
Rfeafon right, and fhould by no Means be ocnit-
ted-
" Upon this Account, in every Divifion wherefa
we defign a per fed Exadtnefs, it is neceflary to
examine the whole Idea with Diligence, left tf£
ohfrit any Part of it through want of Care ; though
in fome Cafes it is not poflible, and in others it is
not neceflary that we fhould defcend to the minuteft
Parts.
2. Rule. In all Divifion^ we Jhould fir ft confider
the larger and more immediate Parts of the SuhjeS,
and not divide it at once into the more minute an£ re""
mote Parts. It would by no means be proper to
divide a Kingdom firft into Streets, and Lanes, and
Fields, but it muft be firft divided into Provinces
or Counties, then thofe Counties may be divided intQ
Towns, Villages, Fields, &c. and Towns into Streets
and Lanes.
3, Rule. The feveral Parts of a Divifion ought
to be oppofite, i. e. one Part ought not to contain am*
tber. It would be a ridiculous Divifion of an Am*
mal into Head, Limbs, Body and Brain, for the
Brains are contained in the Head.
Yet
Ch. VI. S. 8. The right Ufe of Reafon. 121
Yet here it muft he noted, that fometimc* the
Subje&s of any Treatife, or the Obje&s of any par-
ticular Science may be properly and neceflarily fa
divided,, that the fecond may include the firft, and
the third may include the firft and fecond, with-
out offending againft this Rule, becaufe in the fe-
cond or following Parts of the Science or Dif-
courfe, thefe Objedts are not confidered in the fame
Manner as in the firft ; as for Inftance, Geometry
divides its Objedts into Lines, Surfaces and Solids ;
Now though a Line be contained in a Surface, or
a Solid> yet it is not confidered in a Surface fepa-
rate and alone, or as a mere Line, as it is in the
firft Part of Geometry, which treats of JUnes. So
JLogici is rightly divided into Conception, Judg-
ment ', Reafoning,zn& Method. For though Ideas or
Conceptions are contained in the following Parts of
fjgick, yet they are not there treated of as fepa-
rate Ideas, which are the proper Subject of the firft
[ 4. Rule. Let » not Subdivifions be too numerous
without Neceffity : For it is better many Times to
idiftinguifli more Parts at once if the Subject will
bear it, than to mince the Difcourfe by excefiive
dividing and fubdividing. It is preferable therefore
in a Treatife of Geography to fay, that in a City we
will confider its Walls, its Gates, its Buildings, its
Streets, and Lanes, than to divide it formally firft
into the encompafftng and the encompajfed Parts ; the
encompaffing Parts are the Walls and Gates ; the
encompaffed Part includes the Ways and the Build-
ings; the Ways, are the Streets and the Lanes;
Buildings confift of the Foundations and the Super-
JtruSure, &c. ;
Too
ttt LOGIC R: Or, Part f/
T8b great a Number of Subdivifions has been
afie&ed by fome Perfons in Sermons, Treatifes, In-
ftruftions, 6?^. under Pretence of greater Accuracy I
But this Sort of Subtleties hath often given great
Confufion to the Understandings and fometimetf
more Difficulty to the Memory. In thefe Cafes it
is only a good Judgment can determine what Sub*
diviftons are needful.
5. Rule. Divide every Subjeft according to the
Jpecial Dejignyou have in View. One and the famd
Idea or Subject may be divided in very different
Manners according to the different Purpofes we
have in difcourfing of it: So if a Printer were to
confider the feveral Parts of a Book, he rtiuft divide
Jt into Sheets, the Sheets into Pages, the Pages intd
Lines, and the Lines into Letters. But a Gramma-
rian divides a Book into Periods, Sentences, and
Words, or Parts of Speech, as Noun, Pronoun, Verb*
&c. A Logician confiders a Book as divided. int6
Chapters, Seflions, Arguments, Propqfttions, Ideas ;
and with the Help of 1 Ontology, he divides the Pro-
pofitions into Subjeft, Objeft, Property, Relation, Ai±
tion, Pajjton, Caufe, EffeSf, &c. But it would be
very ridiculous for a Logician to divide a Book intd
Sheets, Pages, and Lines \ or for a Printer to dividi
it into Abu*; and Pronouns, or into Proportions, 1-
deas, Prope[ties or Gng/itf.
6 Rule. -ZS* all your Divtfons obferve with gteatejt
fetiaftnefs the Nature of Things. And here I atri .
conftrained to make a Subdivifiort of this Rule in*
to two very necefifery Particulars.
(1.) Let the Parts of your Divi/ion be fetch ds
are properly diftingui/hed in Nature. Do not di*
vide afunder thofe Parts of the Idea which are in-
timately
Ch* VL S. 8. The right XJfe ^Reafom 1 23
timately united in Nature, nor unite thofe Tfeiflgs
into one Part which Nature has evidently disjoin-
ed : Thus it would be very improper in treating of
an animal Body to divide it into the fuperior and
inferior Halves i for it would be hard to fay hoitf
much belongs byJNature to the inferior Half and
how much to the fuperior. Much more improper
would it be ftill to divide the Animal into the
Right-hand Parts and Left-hand Parts, which would "
bring greater Confufion. This would be as unna-
tural as a Man who fliould Cleave a Hafel Nut id
Halves through the Hufk % the Shell and the Kernel*
at once, and fay a Nut is divided into tbefe two Parish
whereas Nature leads plainly to the threefold Di-
ftin&ion of Hufk, Shell* and Kernel. ■
(2.) Bo not affett Duplicates nor Triplicititt, nor
any certain number of Parts in your Divijton of
Things ; for we r know of no fuch Certain Numbef
of Parts which God the Creator has bbfcrVed irt
forming all the Varieties of his Creatines, nor is
there any uniform determined Number of Parts
ift the various Subjects of human Art fir Science %
yet forne Perfons haVe'dlfturbed the Order of Na-
ture, and abufed their Readers by an Affe&atibrt
of Dichotomies, Trichotomies, Stuens, Twelves, 6?r.
Let the Nature of the Subjeft, Cortfidered together
with the Defign which you have in view, always
determine the Number of Parts into Which you
"divide it. •
After all, it muft be Cdflftrfled that an iritirtiate
Knowledge of Things and a judicious Obferva- '\
tlon will affift in the Bufinefs of DivifioH t as Well
as of Definition, better than too. nice and curious
an Attention to the mere Formalities of logical
Writers, without & real Acquaintance with Things*
I ' SECT.
124 LOGIC K: Or t Part 1*
SECT. IX/
Of a eomprebenfve Conception of Things, and of
Abftraftion.
TH E third Rule to dire£fc our Conception re-
quires us to conceive o£ Things comprebenjhetf*
As we muft furvey an Objeft in all its Parts \x>
obtain a complete Idea of it, fo we muft confider
it in all its Modes, Attributes* Properties* and Re-
lations, in ordfcr to obtain a comprebenfioe Con-
ception of it.
The Comprebenfion of an Idea, as it was ear-
plained under the' Doftrine of UniverfaB, includes
only the effential Modes or Attributes of that Idea 5.
but in this ' Place the Word is taken rn a larger
Senfe, and implies alfo the various occafional Pro-
perties, accidental Modes and Relations.
The Neceflity of this Rule is founded upon the
fame Reafon as the former, viz. That our. Minds
are narrow and fcanty in their Capacities,, and as
they are not able to confider all the Parts of a
complex . Idea at once, fo neither can they at once
contemplate all the different Attributes and Cir- -
cumjlances of it : We muft therefore confider Things
fucceffively and gradually in their various Appear-
ances and Circum (lances; As our natural Eye
cannot at once behold the fix Sides of a "Dye or
, Cube, nor take Cognizance of all the Points that
are marked on them, and therefore we turn up the
Sides fucceffively, and thus furvey and ntimber the
Points that are marked on each Side, that we may-
know the whole,
* .. In
Ch. VL S. 9. The tight Xlfe $f Reafdn. 12$
In order to a comprebenfive View of any Idea
we muft firft confider, whether the Objeft of ic
has an Exiftence as well as an Ejfence\ whether ic
be zfimpk or complex Idea \ whether it be a Sub*
fiance or a Mode ; if it be a Subjlance, then we
muft enquire what are the ejjential Modes of ir f
which are neceflary to its Nature, and what arc
thofe Properties or Accidents of ij, which belong
to it occafionaily, or as it is placed in fome par*
ticular Circumftances : We muft view it in its
internal and abfolute Modes, and obferve it in thofc
various external Relations in which it ftands to other
Beings : We muft confider it in its Powers and
Capacities either to do or fuffer: We muft trace it
up to its various Caufes, whether fupreme or fub-
ordinate. We muft defcend to the Variety of its
EffeffSj and take notice of its feveral Ends and De+
figns which are to be attained by it. We muft con-
ceive of it as it is either an Object or a Subjelt \ what
are the Things that are a-kin to it, and what arc
the Oppofites or Contraries of it ; for many Things
are to be known both by their contrary and their
kindred Ideas.
If the Thing we difcourfe of be a mere Mode $
we muft enquire whether it belongs to Spirits or
Bodies % whether it .be a phyfical or moral Modes
If moral, then we muft confider its Relation to
God 9 to our felves 9 to our Neighbours 3 its Reference
to this Life, or the Life to come. If it be a Virtue *
we muft feek what are the Principles of it, what
are the Rules of it, what are the Tendencies of ir s
and what are the falfe Virtues that counterfeit it^
and what are the real Vices that oppofe it, what
are the Evils which attend the Negkff of it, whac
are the Rewards of the Practice of it bot& hire and
hereafter. '
126 LO G IC K: Or, Parti,
If the Subjeft be bijlorical or a Matter of Fa8 9
we may then enquire whether the Aftion was
done at ail ; whether it was done infucb a Manner 9
or by fucb Perfons as is reported ; at what Time
it was done •, in what Place \ by what Motive, and
for what Defign ; what is the Evidence of the
FaSt \ who are the Witnejjes ; what is their Cbch »
raSler and Credibility, what Signs there are of
fuch a Fa£t ; what concurrent Circtmftances which
may either fupport the Truth ot it, or render it
doubtful.
In order to make due Enquiries into all thefc
and many other Particulars which go towards the
complete and comprebenftve Idea of any Being, the
Science of Ontology is exceeding neceffary. This
is what was wont to be called the faft Part of Me*
tapbyficks in the Peripatetick Schools. It treats of
Being in its nwft general Nature, and all of its
Affeftions and Relations. I confefs the old Popijh
Schoolmen have mingled a Number of ufelefs Sub-
tleties with this Science.; they have exhaufted their
own Spirits, and the Spirits of their Readers in
many laborious and intricate Trifles, add fome
of their Writings have been fruitful of Names
without Ideas , which hath done much Injury to
the facred Study of Divinty. Upon this Account
many of the Moderns have moft unjuftty aban-
doned the whole Science at once, and thrown
Abundance of Contempt and Raillery upon the
very Name of Metapbyficks \ but this Contempt
and Cenfure is very unreafonable, for this Science
feparated from fome Arifiotelian Fooleries and Jcbo*
lajiick Subtleties, is fo neceffary to a diftinft Con-
ception, fclid Judgment, and juft Reafoning on
many Subjefls, that fometimes it is introduced as
a Part of Logick, and not without Reafon. And
thole, who utterly defpife and ridicule it, either
betray
Ch. V l S. 9. The right Ufe ^Reafonl 1 27
betray their own Ignorance, or" will be fuppofed
to make their Wit and Banter a Refuge and Ex*
cufe for their own Lazinefs. Yet thus much I
would add, that the late Writers of Ontology are
generally the beft on this Account, becaufe they
have left out much of the ancient Jargon. See the
Brief Scheme of Ontology in the Pbikfopbical EJfajs
by /. W.
Here let it be noted that it is neither ufeful,
neceffary, or poflible to run through all the Modes,
Ckcumftmces, and Relations of every Subjedt we
take in hand ; but in Ontology we enumerate a great
Variety of them, that fo a judicious Mind may
chooft what are thofe Circumflances, Relations and
Properties of any Subjeft, which are moft necef-
fary to the prefent Defign of him that fpcaks or
writes, either to explain, to illuftrate, or to prove
the Point.
As we arrive at the complete Knowledge of an
Idea in all its Parts, by that Aft of the Mind
which is called Divifion, fo we come to a compre-
benfive Conception of a Thing in its feveral Pro*
perties and Relations, by that Ad of the Mind which
is called Abjlraftion, i. e. we conOder each fingle
Relation or Property of theSubjedt alone, and thus
we do as it were withdraw and feparate it in our
Minds both from the Subjeft itfelf, as well as from
other Properties and Relations in order to make a
fuller Observation of it.
This Aft of Abjlrafticn is faid to be twofold, either
Precifive or Negative.
Precijhe Abftraftion is when we confider thofe
Things apart which cannot really exift apart ; as
. when we confider a Mode, without confidering its
Subftance and Subjeft, or one ejfential Mode with-
out another. Negative Abftraftion is when we con-
fider one Thing feparate from another, which
1 3 ' may
128 LOG 1 C K: Or, Part L
may alfo exift without it * as when we conceive
of a SubjeB without conceiving of its accidental-
Modes . or Relations ; or when we conceive of on*
Accident without thinking of another. If I think
of reading or writing without the exprefs Idea of
fome Man, this is precifive AbftraBion % or if I
think of the Attraftion of Iron, without the exprefs
Idea of fome particular magnetick Body. . But when
I think of a Needle, without an Idea of its Sharp*
vefs, this is negative Abjtrattion ; and it is the fame
when I think of its Sbarpnefs without considering.
its Length.
S E C T. X.
Of the extenjhe Conception of Things, and of .
Dijiribution.
AS the Completenefs of an Idea refers to the fe-
veral Parts that compofe it, and the Com-
prebenfion of an Idea includes its various" Proper-
ties, fo the Extenfion of an Idea denotes the various
Sorts or Kinds of Beings to which the fame Idea be-
longs: And if we would be fully acquainted with a
Subjedt we muft obferve,
This fourth Rule to direft our Conceptions, w; ,
Conceive of Things in all their Extenfion, i. e.. we
muft fearch out the various Species or Special Na~
tures which are contained under it as a Genus or 1
general Nature. If we would know the Nature of
an Animal perfe&ly, we muft take Cognizance of •
Beajls, Birds, Fifhes and Infefts, as. well as Men, all <
which are contained under the general Nature and
Name of 4mmU
As
€& TI. io.' Tbl right XJfe of Reafon. 129
As an integral Whole is diftinguifhed into its fe-
veral Parts by Divijion, lb the Word Dijlributiou
is moft properly ufed when we diftinguifh an uni-
werfal Whole into its feveral. Kinds or Species : And
perhaps' k had been better if this Word had been
always confined to this Signification, though it muft
fce confeffed, that we frequently fpeak ot the Di-
Tjifion of an Idea into its feveral Kinds, as well as
into feveral Parts. *
The Rules of a good Diftributim are much the
fame with thofe which we have before applied
to Divijion^ which may be juft repeated again in
the briefeft Manner, in order to give Examples to
them. .
I. Rule. Each Part, fingly taken muft contain
lefs than the Whole, but all the Parts taken tol-
ieftively or together, muft contain neither more nor
lefs than the Whole ; or as Logicians fometimes ex-
prefs it, the Parts of the Divijion ought to exbauft
the whole Thing which is divided. So Medicine is
juftly diftributed into ProphykSick, or the Art of
preferring Health ; and Tberapeutick, or the Art of
reftoring Health ; for there is no other fort of Medi-
cine befides thefe two. But Men are not well dis-
tributed into tall or Jhort, for there are fbme of a
middle Stature.
II. Rule. In all Dijtributions we fliould firft
confider the larger and more immediate Kinds or
Species, or Ranks of Being, and not divide a
Thing at once into the more minute and remote.
A Genus fhould not at once be divided into Indi-
viduals, or even into the loweji Species, if there
be a Species fuperior. Thus it would be very im-
proper to divide Animal into Trout, Lobfler, Eel,
Dog, Bear, [Eagle, Dove, Worm and Butterfly, for
I 4 theft
I30 LOGIC K: Or; Part!
thefe are inferior Kinds ; whereas Animal ought firft
to be diftributed intaMw, Beaft, Bird, Fifb, Injcft ;
and then Beaft (bould be diftributed into Dog, Bear,
l$c. Bird into Eagle, Dove, &c. Fijh into Trout* Eel, ■
Lobfter, &?f .
It is irregular alfo to join any inferior Species in
the fame Rank or Order with- the fuperior ; as
if we would diftinguifti Animals into Birds, Bears %
and Olfiers, &c. It would be a ridiculous Diftri-
bution.
III. Rule. The feveral Parts of a Diftribution
ought to be oppofite > that is, one Species or Clafs
of Beings in the fame Rank of Divifion ought not
to contain or include another ; fo Men ought not to
be divided into the Rich, the Poor, the Learned,
and the Tall; for poor Men may be both learned and
tail, and fo may the rich.
But it will be objected, are not animated Bodies
rightly diftributed into Vegetative and Animal,' or
(as they are ufually called) Senfative ? Now the fen»
Jfative contains the vegetative Nature in it, for Ani~
tnals grow as well as Plants. I anfwer, that in this
and all fuch Diftributions, the Word Vegetative.
lignifies merely vegetative ; and in this Senfe Vegeta-
tive will be fufficiently oppofite to Animal, tor it
cannot be faid of an Animal that it contains mera
Vegetation in the Idea Qf it.
IV. Rule. Let not Subdivisions be too nume-
rous without Neceffity \ therefore 1 think Quantity
is better diftinguiflied at once into a Line, a Surface,
and a Solid, than to fay as Ramus does, that ^uanm
tiiy is either a Line, or a 7bing lined ; and a Thing
lined is atber a Surface or a Solid.
V. Jbfc
Cb,VI. S. Yo. tot right Vfe ef Reafori. 13!
V. #*/*. Diftribute every Subjeft according to
the fpecial Defign you have in View, fo far as is ne«f
ceflary or ufeful to your prefent Enquiry. Thus a
Politician diftributes Mankind according to their civil
Chara&ers into the Aiders and the Ruled ; and a -
Pbyfician divides them into the Sick or the Healthy \
^but a Divine diftributes them into Turks, Heathens^
yews, or Cbriftians.
Here note* That it is a very ufelefs Thing to dif-
tribute any Idea into fuch Kinds or Members as have
no different Properties to be fpoken of* as it is
mere trifling to divide right Angles into fuch whofe
Legs are equal, and wbofe Legs are unequal, for as to
the mere right Angle they have no different Pro-
perties,
VI. Rule. In all your Diftributions obferve the
Nature of Things with great Exadtncfs ; and do
not affedl any particular Form of Diftribution, as
fome Perfons have done, by dividing every Genus
into two Species, or into three Species ; whereas Na-
ture is infinitely various, and human Affairs and
human Sciences have as great a Variety, nor is
there any one Form of Diftribution that will exactly
fuit with all Subje&s.
Note, It is to this Doftrine of Diftribution of
a Genus into its feveral Species, we muft alfo refer
the Diftribution of a Caufe according to its feve-
ral Effefls, as fome Medicines are heating, fome art ,
cooling; or an EffeB^ when it is diftinguiflied by
its CaufeS, as Faith is either built upon divine Tefii~
mony or human. It is to this Head we refer par-
ticular artificial Bodies, when they are diftinguifli-
ed according to the Matter they are made of, as V; ^
a Statue is either of Brafs, cf Marble, or Wood* ' : '^ LM
CsV. and any other Befogs, when they are diftin-
guilbed
rj* LOGIC K: Or; Part. I;
guilhed according to their End and Deftgn, as the
Furniture of Body or Mind is either for Ornament or
Ufe. To this Head alfo we refer SubjeBs when
they are divided according to their Modes or Acci-
dents ; as Men are either merry or grave, or fad ; and
Modes, when they are divided by their SubjeBs, as
JXftempers belong to the Fluids, or to tbefolid <Parts of
the Animal.
It is alio to this Place we reduce the Propojalsofs
Difficulty under its various Cafes, whether It be in Spe-
culation or Praftice : As to (hew the Reafon of
Sun-beams burning Wood, whether it be done by a convex
Glafs or a concave ; or to (hew the ConfiruSion and
Menfuration of Triangles, whether you have two
Angles and a Side given, or two Sides and an An-
gle, or only three Sides. Here it is neceffary to
diftribute or divide a Difficulty into all its Cafes^ in or-
der to gain a perfed: Knowledge of the Subject you
contemplate.
It might be obferved here, that Logicians have
fometimes given a Mark or Sign to diftinguffh
when it is an integral Whole, that is divided into
its Parts or Members, or when it is a Genus, an
univerfal Whole, that is diftributed into its Species
and Individuals. The Rule they give is this:
Whenfoever the whole Idea can be dire&Iy and
properly affirmed of each Part, as a Bird is an
Animal', a Ftjh is an Animal, Bucephalus is a Horfe 9
Peter is a Man, then it is a Diftribution of a Ge-
nus into its Species, or a Species in to 'its Individuals ;
But when the whole cannot be thus direftly af-
firmed concerning every Part, then it is a Divi-
lion of an Integral into its t feveral Parts or Mem*
hers ; as we cannot fay the Head, the Breaft, the
Hand, or the Foot is an Animal, but we fay, the
Head is a Part of the Animal, and the Foot is another
Part.
This
Ch. VI. S. 1 1. The right TJfe of Rcafon. 133
This Rule may hold true generally in corporeal
Beings, or perhaps in all Subftances : But when'
we fay the Ftar of God is Wifdom, and fa is human
Civility : Criticifm is true Learning, and fo is Phi-
lofopby: To execute a Murderer is Juftice, andtofave
and defend the Innocent is Juftice too : In thefe Cafes'
it is not fo eafily determined, whether an integral .
"Whole be divided into its Parts, or an uni-
verfal into its Species : For the Fear of God may'
be railed either one Tart* or one Kind of Wifdomz
Criticifm is one Part* or one Kind of Learning:
And the Execution of a Murderer may be called a
"Species of Juftice as well as a Part of it. Nor in-
deed is it a Matter of great Importance to deter-
mine this Controverfy.
SECT. XL
Of an orderly Conception of Things J
TH E loft Rule to direft our Conception is,'
that we Jbould rank and place them in a pro-
per Method and juft Order. This is of neceffary
TJfe to prevent Confufion ; for as a Trader who
never places his Goods in his Shop or Warehoufe
in a regular Order, nor keeps the Accounts of his
buying and felling, paying and receiving in a juft
Method, is in utmoft Danger of plunging all his
Affairs into Confufion and Ruin 5 fo a Student who
is in the Searchf of Truth, or an Author ox .Teacher
who communicates Knowledge to others, will very'
much obftrudt hisDefign, and confound his own
Mind or the Mind of his Hearers, unlets he range . :MI
his Ideas in juft Order.
If we would therefore become fuccefsful Learn-
ers or Teachers, we muft not conceive of Things
in. a confujed Heap, but difpofe our Ideas in fome
certain Method, which may be moft eafy and ufe-
>34 L O G I C R: Or, Part L*
ful both for the Underftanding and Memory;
and be Aire as much as may be To follow the Nature
of Thing s, for which many Rules might be given,
viz.
i. Conceive as much as you can of the EJJkn-
tials of any Subjed, before you confider its Acci*
dentals.
2. Survey firfl: the general Patts and Properties
of any Subject, before you extend your Thoughts
to difcourfe of the particular Kind or Species
of it.
3. Contemplate Things firfl: in their ovmjimplt
Natures* and afterwards view them in Compofition
^vith other Things; unlefs it be your prefentPur-
pofe to take a compound Being to pieces, in order
to find out or to (hew the Nature of it by fearching
and difcovering of what Simples it is compofed.
4. Confider the abfolute Modes or Affe&ions of
any Being as it is in itfelf, before you proceed
to confider it relatively, or to furvey the vari*
ous Relations in which it (lands to other Beings,
&c.
Note y Thefe Rules chiefly belong to the Me-* .
thod of Inftruftion which the Learned call 5>a-
tbetick.
But in the Regulation of our Ideas there is
feldom an abfolute Neceffity that we (hould place
them in this or the other particular Method : It
is poflible in fome Cafes that many Methods may
be equally good, that is, may equally affifl: thei
Underftanding and the Memory: To frame a
Method exquifitely accurate* according to the
drift Nature of Things, and to maintain this Ac-
curacy from the Beginning to the End of a Trea-
tife, is a moft rare and difficult Thing, if not im-
poffible. But a larger Account of Method would
be
. Ch.VI.S. 12. fit <right life of 'Reafon. 135
be very improper in this Place, left we anticipate
what belongs to the fourth Part oflagick.
SECT. XIL
*Tbefe Jive Rules of Conception exemplified.
]T T may be ufeful here to give a Specimen of the
L five fptcial Rules to dirtti our Conceptions, which
ave been the chief Subjedt of this long Chapter*
and reprefent them pra&ically in one View.
Suppofe the Theme of our Difcourfe were the
Taffions of the NCtnd.
iff. To gain a clear and difiinEt Idea of Paffion,
we mud define both the Name afad the thing.
To begin with the Definition of the Name \ wc
ire not here to underftand the Word Pajfion in its
vulgar and moll limited Senfe, as it fignifies merely
Jbiger or Fury \ nor do we take it in its molt exten-
Uve philofophical Senfe, for the fuftaining the Aftion
Df an Agent \ but in the more limited philofophical
Senfe, Paffions fignify .the various Affeftions of the
Mind, fuch as Admiration, Love, or Hatred 5 this is
the Definition of the Name.
We proceed to the Definition of the Thing, Paf-
Jim is defined a Senfation of fomefpecial Commotion
in animal Nature, occasioned by the AfiwPs Perception
of fome Ohje ft futted to excite that Commotion. * Here
the Genus or general Nature of Paffion is a Sen-
fa/ion
• Since this was written I hare published a fliort Treat :fe of the Paf/ions,
therein I have Co far varied from this Definition as t > call them SvtfibU
Commotions of our whole Nature, bctb Soul and Body, oecafiomd by the Mtnft
Perception of fome Objeels, &c. I made this Alteration in the Uefcript'on of
the Paffions in that Book chiefly to include in a more explicit Maimer the
- Paifons cf Dejirt and Averfion wh ch are A£h of Vattion rather than Sea-
fa'iorts. Yet fines fome pommotioqs of animal Nature attend all the Paffions,
and fine there is always a Senfation of thefe Commotio**, I fhall not change
the Definition I have written here : For this will agree to all the Paffions
whether they include any Act of Volition or not*. Nor VttAetA \a C&* Vtoxxx*
•f any great importance. AW. 17, iji% %
•136 L G I C K: or, Part I.
fation of fome fpecial Commotion in animal Nature ; and
herein it agrees with Hunger, Thirft, Pain, 6fa
The ejfential Difference of it is, that this Commotion
arifes from a Thought or Perception of the Mind,
and hereby it is diftinguifhed from Hunger, Thirft, ,
or Pain.
2dly, We muft conceive of it completely, or fur-
veyithe feveral Parts that compofe it. Thefe arc '
(1.) The Mnd?s Perception of fome ObjeS. (2.) The
confequent Ruffle or fpecial Commotions of the Nerves,
and Blood, and animal Spirits. And f 3.) The Sen-
fation of this inward Commotion.
3dly, We muft confider it comprehenjively in its
various Properties. The moft effential Attributes
that make up its Nature has been already mention*
ed under the foregoing Heads. Some of the moft
confiderable Properties that remain are thefe, viz.
That Paffion belongs to all Mankind in greater or
leffer Degrees : // is not conjlantly prefent with us,
hut upon fome certain Occqfions : It is appointed by
cur Creator for various ufeful Ends and Purpofes, viz.
to give us Vigour in the Purfuic of what is good
and agreeable to us, or in the Avoidance of what is
hurtful : // is very proper for cur State of Trial in this
World: It is not utterly to be rooted out of our Nature,
but to be moderated and governed according to Rules of
Virtue and Religion, &c.
4thly, We muft take Cognizance of the various
Kiuds of it, which is called an extenfive Conception
„of it. If the Objeft which the Mind perceives
be very uncommon, it excites the Paffion of Ad-
miration: If the Object appear agreeable it raifes
Love: If the agreeable Objeft be abfent and at-
tainable it is Defire : If likely to be obtained, it
excite§ Hope: If unattainable, Defpair : If it be
prefent and poffeffed, it is the Paffion of Joy : If lofi
it excites Sorrow : If the Objedl be difagreeable,
it
Ch. VI. S. 13. The right Ufe of Rezfon. 13?
it caufes in general Hatred or Aver/Ion : If it be
abfent and yet we are in Danger of it, it raifca
our Fear : If it be prefent, it is Sorrow and Sa&«
nefs, &c.
5thly, AH thefe Things and many more which
go to compofe a Treatife on this Subjeft muft be
placed in their proper Order: A flight Specimen of
which is exhibited in this fhort Account of Paffioni
and which that admirable Author Defcartes has
treated of at large ; though, for want of fufficient
Experiments and Obfervations in natural Philofb-
phy, there are fome few Miftakes in his Account
of animal Nature.
SECT. XIII.
An llluftration of thefe five Rules by, Similitudes.
t
THUS we have brought the firft Part of Lo-
gic/: to a Conclufion : And it may not be im-
proper here to reprefent its Excellencies (fo far as
we have gone) by general Hints of its chief Dejign
and Ufe, as well as by a various Comparifon of it to
thofe Inftruments which Mankind have invented
for their feveral Conveniencies and Improvements.
The Defign of Logick is not to furnifli us with
the perceiving Faculty, but only to dire£i and af-
fift us in the Ufe of it : It doth not give .us the
Obje&s of our Ideas, but only cap fuch a Light
on thofe Obje&s which Nature furnilhes us with,
that they may be the more clearly and diftindtty
known : It doth not add new Parts or Properties
to Things, but it difcovers the various Parts, Pro-
perties, Relations and Dependencies of one Thing
upon another, and by ranking all Things under ge-
neral and fpecial Heads, it renders the Nature, or, .
any of the Properties, Powers, and Ufes of a Thingf .
;r
138 LOGIC K: Or, Part I
tnoreeafy to be found out, when we feek in whac
Rank of Being it lies, and wherein it agrees with,
and wherein it differs from others.
If any Comparifons would illuftrate this, it may be
thus rcprefentcd.
I. When Logick affifts us to attain a clear and x
diftinft Conception of the Nature of Things by
Definitions it is like thofe Glaffes whereby we be- .
hold fuch Obje&s diftin&ly, as by Reafon of their
Smallnefs or their great Diftance t *ppear in Con?
Fufion to the naked Eye : So the tdefcope difcover*
to us difUnt Wonders in the Heavens* and (hews
the milky Way, and the bright cloudy Spots in a very
dark Sky to be a Collection of little Stars, which
the Eye unaflifted beholds in mingled Confiifion.
So when Bodies are too fmall for our Sight to fur?* ■.
vey them diftindtly, then the Micro/cope is at Hand .
for our Affiftance, to (hew us all the Limbs and
Features of the moft minute Animals, with great r
Clearnefs and Diftin&ion.
II. Wen we are taught b? Logick to view t
Thing completely in all its Parts by the Help of Di-
vifion, it has theUfe of an anatomical Knife, which
diffe&s an animal Body, and feparates the Veins*
Arteries, Nerves, Mufcles, Membranes, 6?r. and (hews
us the feveral Parts which go to the Compofnion of
a complete Animal.
III. When Logick inftru&s us to furvey an
Ob}e6t comprebenfively in all the Modes, Properties,
Relations, Faces, and Appearances of it, it is of
the fame Ufe as a terrefitial Globe, which turning
round on its Axis represents to us all the Variety
of Lands and Seas, Kingdoms and Nations on the
Surface of the Earth in a very fhort Succeflion of
Time,
Ch. Vt. S. 13. Xfc right Xlfe */Reafbn. T39
Time (hews the Situation and various Relation of
, them to each other, and gives a ' comprehenfivc
View of them in Miniature.
IV. When this Art teaches us to diftrihutt any
rxtenfiue Idea into its different Kinds or Species, it
may. be compared to the frifmatick Glafs, that re-
ceives the Sun- beams or Rays of Light, which
feem to be uniform when falling upon it, but it fe-
derates and diftribures them into their different
Kinds and Gjloujfc and ranks them in their proper
SuccefTion.
Or if we defcend to Subdivifions and fubordinate
Ranks of Being, then Difirihttioh may alfo be
faid to form the Refemblance pf a natural Tree*
wherein the Genus or general Idea (lands for the
Root or Stocky and the fever*] Kinds or Species, and
Individuals* are distributed ahroad, and reprefented
in their Dependance and Connexion, like the fe-
veral Boughs, Branches, and lejfcf Shoots. ) For In*
ftance, lee Animal be the Root of a logical Tree,
the Refemblance is feen by mere Infpeftion, though
the Root be not placed at the Bottorfe of the
Page. \
K Animal
140
(•
10 G 1C K: Or,
•Philip
Parti
Jkaicaai
Beaft.
Thomas, &c.
Horfe— —
Squirrel.
Lion
Dog-
Bird
Bear, fc?c
Eagle
I Lark
I Duck-—
►Goofe, fcfc.
{Trout
Wbale
Oifter, {ft.
Iiifcot-
k Flying -*
f Creeping ■
iTrott.
' I Bayard, &c.
rMaftiflf.
) Spaniel. '
)Gr«yhound. ■ "
CBeagle,^.
.Mufcovy.
[Hook-Bill, &
I.Wafp. .
!Bee, &c.
' Worm
>Ant.
'Caterpillar, &e
Iftjefaoae Similitude will iferve alfo to illuftrai
the Dhtfo» and Subdvvijum of an integral Whol
Into its literal Parts.
When Logick directs us to place all our^Jej
in a proper Metbod i moft convenient both for h
ft|£&ipn and Memory, ic doth the lame SerVK
- ;eh. V?. S. 13; fbe rigfy t$ */Reafon. 141
as the Cafes of well contrived Sbehes in a large Li*
brary wherein Folio's, Quarto's, OSavo's and lejfer
Volumes, are difpofed in fuch exaft Order under
the particular Heads of Divinity, Hificry, Mathe-
rnaticks, ancient and titifcellanecus Learning, &c.
that the Student knows where to find every Book,
and has them all as it were within his Command at
once, becaufe of the exadt Order wherein they are
pUced.
The Man who has fuch Affiftances as tbefe at
Hand, in order to manage his Conceptions and re-
gulate his Ideas, is well prepared to improve his
Knowledge, and to Join tbofe Ideas together in a re-
gular Manner by Judgment, which is the fecond
Operation of the Mind, and will be the Subjeft of
the fecond Part qi Logick.
Ka ?H^
J 4 i LOG I C K : Or, Parffl.
THE
S ECOND PART
O F
LOG I G K.
■ 4 « - . . *
Of Judgment and Propofition.
WH E N the Mind has got Acquaintance
with Things by framing Ideas of them,
it proceeds to the next Operation, and
that is, to compare thefe Ideas together, and to join
them by Affirmation, or disjoin them by Negation,
according as we* find them to agree or difagree.
This Aft of the Mind is called Judgment % as when :
we have by Perception obtained the Ideas of Plato,
a Philofopher, Man, Innocent, we form thefe Judg-
ments i Plato was a Pbilofopber \ no Man is innocent.
Some Writers haveafierted, that Judgment con-
fifls in a mere Perception of the Agreement or Difa*
gteement of Ideas. But I rather think there is an Aft
of the Will (at leaft in moft Cafes) neceflary to form
a Judgment ; for though we do perceive or think we
perceive Ideas to agree or disagree, yet we may
fometimes refrain from judging or affenting to the
perception, for fear lelt the Perception Ihould
not
The right life ^Reafonr 143
not be fufficiently clear, and we (hould be miftaken :
And I am well afiured at other Times, that there
are multitudes of Judgments formed* and a firm ,
Aflent given to Ideas joined or disjoined, before
there is any clear Perception whether 'ttiey agree or
difagree; and this is the Reafon of fo many falje
Judgments or Miftakes among Men. Both thefe
Practices are a Proof that Judgment bus Jometbing of
the Will in it* and; does not merely confift in Per-
ception* fince we fbmetimes judge (though unhap-
pily) without perceiving, and fometimes we per-
ceive without immediate judging.
• As an Idea is the Refult of our Conception or Ap-
prebenfion* So a Proportion u the Effeft of Judg-
ment. The foregoing Sentences which are Ex-
amples of the A6t of Judgment are properly called
PropqfiHons. Plato is a Pbilofopber* Sec.
Here let us confidcr,
1. The general Nature of a Propofition, and the
Parts of wbub it is compofed.
2. Tig various Divtfsons or Kinds of Proportions.
3. The Springs of falje Judgment* or the Dodrine of
Prejudices,
4. General Directions to afjift us in judging a-
right..
5. Special Rules to direSt us in judging particular
Otjeas* -
K 3 CHAP.'
*44 ZOGI C JST : Or, Part II;
• CHAR ,1.
Of the Nature of a Propofition f and its
feveral Parts.
A Proportion is a Sentence wherein two or
f\^ more Ideas or Terms are joined or disjoined
by one Affirmation or Negation, as Plato wus s
PJbibfopber: Every Angle is formed by two Urns
meeting: No Man living on earth can be completely
happy. When there are ever fo many Ideaa or
Terms in the Sentence, yet if they are joined- of
disjoined merely by one (ingle Affirmation or Ne-
gation, they are properly called but one Propofition,
though they may be refolved into feveral Prop*.
litions which are implied therein, as will appear
hereafter.
In defcribing a Proportion I ufe the Word* Terms
as well as Ideas, becaufe when mere Ideals are join-
ed in the Mind without Words, it is rather called
a Judgment ; but when clothed with Words* it i»
called a PropefitiM*^ even though it be in die Mind
only, as well as when it is expreffed by ipeaking or
^Writing.
There are three Things which go to the Nature
and Conftitution of a Proportion, (viz.) the Sub/eff %
the Predicate, and the Copula.
The SuljeH of a Propofition is that concerning
which any thing is affirmed or denied : So Plate,
Angle, Man living on Earth, are the Subjeds of the
foregoing Propofitions.
The Predicate is that which is affirmed or deni-
cd of the Subjeft % fo Pbilofopber is the Predicare
of the firft Propofition ; formed by two Lines meet*
«£, is the Predicate of the feebnd •, capable of be-
i*g
Ch. L 5TZ?^ rigbt Ufe cfRt%(ac\. 145
og completely happy, is the proper Predicate of the
third. <
The SuijjeS and Predicate of a Proportion taken
together are called the Matter of it ; for thefe are
the Materials of which it is made.
The Copula is the Form of a Propofition \ it re-
prcfents the Aft of the Mind affirming or denying
and it is eirprefled by the Words, am, art, is, ate,
&c. or 9 am not, art not, is not* are not 9 (fc.
It is not a Thing of Importance enough to
create a Difpute, whether the Words no, none,
not, never, &c. which disjoin the Idea or Terms
in a negative PropoGtion, (hall be called a Part of
the Subject of the Copula, or of the Predicate.
Sometimes perhaps they may feem moil naturally
to be included in one, and fometimes in another
of thefe, though a Propofition is ufcally denomi-
nated affirmative or negative from its Copula, as here-
after.
- Note 1. Where each of theft Parts of a Prppo-
fition is notexprefied diftindly in fo many Words,
yet they are all undepftood, and implicitly contained
therein , as Socrates dijputed, is a complete Propos-
ition, for it fignifieq -5ffro/ii was deputing. So I die,
Jfignifiea/ am dying. I can write* i, e. / am able to
write. In Latin and Greek one fingle Word is many
Times a complete Proportion. ,,
v. Note t. Thefe Wor<l^ am, 0*4* is, &c. whe&
they are ufed alone without any other Predicate,
•tignify both the AS of the Mind judging, which
includes the Copula, and figoify alio aBual Exift-
ence, which is the Predicate of that Propofition.
So Rome is, fignifies Rome is exigent : There are
fimeftrange Mcnfters, that is, fame Jlrange Monffers
*re exiftm : Carthage is no, mm, ;r, f. Carthage has
no Being.
■ ; ■ 'J • ' * • '
K 4 Note
146 LOGIC K: Or, Part H,
'- Note 3. The Subjeft and Predicate of a Propo-
fition are not always to be known and diftinguilh-
cdbythe placing of the Words in the Sentence,
but by reflecting duly on the Senfe of the Words*
and on the Mind and Defign of the Speaker or
Writer: As if .1 fay, in Africa there are maty Lions*
I mean many Lions are exiftent in Africa : Many
•Horn i^ the Subjeft, and exiftent in Africa, is the
Predicate. It is proper for a Pbilofopber to under-
fiand Geometry \ here the Word proper is the Pre-
dicate, and all the reft is the Subjeft, except Is the
Copula.
Note 4. The SubjcQ: and Predicate of a Propofi-
tion ought always to be two different Ideas, or two
different Terms 5 for where both the Terms and
Ideas are the fame, it is called an identical Propajk
tiSn, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to prtH.
mote Knowledge; fuch as, a Rule is a Rule, or*-
good Man is a good Man.
But there are fpnfie PropoGtions, wherein the
Terms of the Subjett and Predicate feem to be the
fame; yet the 'Ideas are not the fame; nor can
thefe be called purely Identical or trifling PropoG-
tions * fuch as Home is Home\ that is, Home is a
convenient or delightful Placet Socrates -is Socrates
<&: ftill \ that is, the Man 'Stfcrates is ftill a Pbikfa-
pber : The Hero was not a Hero ; that is, the Hero did
nof Jbew his Xtouragel What I have written, I have*
written ; that is, what I wrote I ftill approve, and
will not alter it? What is done, is done ; that is, it
cannot be undone. It may be eafily obfcrved in
thefe PropoGtions the Term h equivocal, for in the .
Predicate it has a different Idea from what it has in
the Suhjefi.
There are alfafome Propofitiolns wherein the
Terms of the Subject and Predicate differ, , but the
Ideas are the fame* and thefe, are not merely iden- .
ticat
CKII.S. i. W right Ufe of ResXaci. 147-
tical or trifling Propofuions v as impudent isjbamelefs ;
a Billow is a /JF*itf ; or FluSus (in L*//») is a tVave \
a G&A* is a rawfrf /tody; In thefe Propofuions either
the Words are explained by a Definition of the
Name, or the Ideas by a Definition of the Things*
and therefore they arc by no Means ufelcfs wheb
formed for this purpofe. .
CHAP, VL
OftU various Kinds of Proportions.
PRopofitions may* be diftributed into various
, Kinds, according to their Suhjeft, their Copula,
their Predicate, rheir Nature or Compefitum, their
Senfe^wd their Evidence, which Distributions will
be explained in the following Se&ions,
SECT, I,
Of univerfat % particular, indefinite^ &J fmgular
Propofitiohs.
PRopofitions may be divided according to their
^SubjeSi into smher/altnd particular ; this is ufually
called a Divifion anGng from the Quantity.
, An univerfal Propofition is when the SubjeA is
taken according to the whole of its Extenfion;
fo if the Subject be a Genus, or general Nature,
it concludes ali its Species or Kinds: If the Subject
-be a Species, it concludes all its Individuals* This
U.iv.erfality is ufually fignified by thefe Words,
$* every, no, none } pr the like; as, all Men ntujf
die:
148 L&G 1C K: Or; Part IL
die : No Mm it Mmgbtj: Every Creature bad a
A particular Ptopofition is whin the Subjeft is
ftoc taken according to its whole Extenfion ; that
is, when the Term is limited and reftrained to
jbme one or more of thofe Species or Individuals*
whofe general Nature it exprefles, but reaches
not to all; and this is ufually denoted by the
Words, fome % many, a few, there are wbicb y &c.
as, Some Birds tan fing well: Few Men are trvij
wife : There are Parrots inbicb will talk a Hundred
Things.
Under the general Name of umverfal Propofi-
tionSy we may juftly include thofe that are Jt*gu<>
lar % and for the moft part thofe that are indefinite
alfo. ■•«■•. ^
& fingular Propdfition is when, the SubjeS: is*
lingular or individual Term or Idea ; as Defeases
was an ingenious Pbilofopber: Sir Ifaac Newton
bos far exceeded all bis Predecejfors : The Palace al
Hampton-Court is a pkafant Dwelling : This Day
is very cold. The Subjtft here ipuft be taken ac-
cording to the whole of its Extenfion, becaufe be-
ing an Individual it can extend only to one, and
it muft therefore be regulated by the Laws of uni-
verfal Proportions.
An indefinite Proportion is when no Note, ei-
ther of Univerfality or Particularity is prefixed ft
a Subject, which is id its own Nature general)
^ a Planet is ever thonging its Place : Angels are
noble Creature*. Now this Sort of Propofition,
cfpecially when it describes the Nature of Things,
is ufually counted umverfal alio, and it fuppofes
the Subjeft to be taken in its whole Extenfion:
for if there were any Planet which did not change
its Place 9 or any Angel that were not a noble
Creature*
Ch. II. S. i. Wt right Vfe of Rcafon. 149
Creature, thefe Propofitions would not be ftriftly
true.
Yet in order to fecure us agjfinft Miftakes in
judging of umverfd, particular and indefinite Pro-
pofitions, it is neceflary to make thefe following
Remarks.
I. Concerning umtitrfal Proportions.
Note i. Umverfal Terrtis may either denote a
mtapbyficali a phyftcaU or a flwra/Univerfality.
A metaphyseal or' mathematical Univerfality is
when all the Particulars contained under any ge-
neral Idea have the fame Predicate belonging to
them without any. Exception whatfoever; or when
the Predicate is fo el&ntiai to the univerfal Sub-
jeft, that it deftroys the Very Nattire of the Sub-
« je& to be without it ; as, all Circles have a Center
and Circumference : M Spirits in their own Nature are
immortal
A phyfical or natural Univerfality is ^rhen ac-
cording to the Order and common Courfe of Na-
ture a Predicate agrees to all the Subje6ls of that
Kind, though there may be fomc accidental and
preternatural Exceptions ; as, alt Men u/e Words
to exprefs their thoughts, yet dumb Perfons are ex-
cepted, for they cannot fpe'ak. AU Beafls have four
Feet ; yet there may be fome Monflers with five * or
maimed, who have but three*
A moral Unrotrfality is when the Predicate agrees
tb the greateft Part of the Particulars which are
contained under the uriivfcffal Sobjeft ; as, all Ne-
grots are ftupid Creatures : All Men are governed by,
Affeftion rather thanby Reafbn t All the old Romans
loved their Country : And the Scripture ufes this
Larrguage, when St. Paul telfe us, fbe Crctes are
always Liars, ♦ ■
150 LOG I C K : 0r % Part. II,
Now it is evident* that a fpecial or lingular Con-
clufion cannot be inferred from a moral Univerfality,
nor always and infallibly tromapby/kal one, though!
it may be always inferred from a Univerfality which
is metaphyseal, without any Danger or Poflibility of
a Miftake.
Let it be obferved alfo, that ufually we make
little or no Diftindtion in common Language, be*
tween a Subjeft that is phyficaUy or metaphyficaVy
univerfal.
Note 2. An univerfal Term is fometimcs taken
tolleShefy for all its particular Ideas united together*
and fometimes dijlributively, meaning each, of them
fingle and alone.
Inftances of a colkQive Univerfal are fuch as thefe :
r AU thefe Apples will a Bujhrt: All the Hours
of the Night are fufficient for Sleep : All the Rules of
Grammar overload the Memory. In thefe PropoC*
Cions it is evident, that the Predicate belongs not
to the Individuals feparately, but to the whole col-
leffive Idea ; for we cannot affirm the fame Pre-
dicate if we change the Word all into one or into
every \ we cannot fay one Apple or every Apple will Jill
a Bujbelj &c. Now fuch a eolleSlive Idea, when ic
becomes the fubjeft of a Propofiuon, ought to be
efteemed as one fingle Thing, and this renders the
Propofition fingular or indefinite, as we fhall (hew im-
mediately.
A difiributive Univerfal will allow the Word all to
be changed into every* or into one % and by this
Means is diftinguithed from a colleflive.
Inftances of a difiributive Univerfal are the mod
common on every Occafion ; as, all Men are mortal;
Every Man is a Sinner \ &c. But in this fort of U»*V
verfal there is a Diftinftion to be made, which fol-
lows in the next Remark.
Note 3.
Ch. II. S. i. The tight Ufe *f Reafon. l$f
Note 3. When an ttkiverfal Term is taken dif-
tributively, fometimes it includes all the Individ*-
als contained in its inferior Species : As when I
fay every Sicknefs bos a Tendency to Death ; I mean
every Individual Sicknefs, as well as every Kind.
But fometimes it includes no more than merely
each Species Or Kind; as when the Evangelift fays
Cbrifi healed every Difeafe, or every Dtfeafe was
healed by Cbrift % that is, every Kind of Difeafe.
The firjl of thefe, Logicians call the Diftrtbution
of an Univerfal in fthgula generum; the 1(0 is a
Diftribution in genera fingulorum. But either of
them joined to the Subjeft render a Proportion
univerfal.
Note 4. The Univerfality Of a Subjeft is often
reftrained by a Part of the Predicate 5 as when we
fay all Men learn Wifdm by Experience : The uni-
verfal Subjeft, all Men, is limited to fignify only,
all thofe Men who learn Wifdom. The Scripture
alfo ufes this fort of Language, when it fpeaks of
all Men being jufiified by the Rigbteoufnefs of one,
Rom. v. 18. that is, alt Men who are jufiified obtain
ic this way.
Obferve here, that hot only a metaphyseal or natural,
but a moral Univerfality alfo is oftentimes to be re-
ftrained by a Part of the Predicate ; as when we
fay, all the Dutch are good Seamen : All the Italians
are fubtle Politicians 5 that is, thofe among the
Dutch that are Seamen are good Seamen \ and thofe
among' the Italians who are Politicians are fubtle
Politicians, /'. e. they are generally fo.
Note 5. The Univerfality of a Term is many
times reftrained by the particular Time, Place, Cir-
cumjtance, &c. or the Defign of the Speaker; as
if we are in the City of London, and fay, all the
Weavers went to prefent their Petition; we mean
only
*5« L G 1 C K: *r f Part It
only all the Weavers who dwell in the City. So when
it is faid in the Gofpcl, cUMen did marvel, Mark v.
to. it reaches only to all tbofe Men who beard of the
Miracles cf our Saviour.
Here alfo ic Ihould be obferved, that a morel
Unroerfality is reftrained by Time* Place, and other
Grcumfiances, as well as a natural \ fo that by thefc
Means the Word otffbmetimes does not extend to
a tenth Part of thofc who at firft might feem to be
included in that Word.
One Occafion of thefc Difficulties and Ambigui-
ties, that belong to univerfal Proportions, is the
common Humour and Temper of Mankind > who
generally have an Inclination to magnify their I*
deas, and to talk roundly and Miverfally concern*
ing any thing they fpeak of; which has introduced
univerfal Terms of Speech into Cuftom and Ha*
bit, in all Nations and all Language*, more than
Nature or Reafon would di&ate* yet when this
Cuftom is introduced, it is not at all improper to
ufe this fort of Language in folemn and facred
Writings, as well as in familiar Difcourfe.
II. Remarks concerning indefinite Proportions*
Note i. Propofitions carrying in them univerfal
Forms of Expreffion may lometimes drop the
Note of Univerfality, and become indefinite, and
yet retain the lame Univerfal Senfe* whether met**
pbvfical, natural or moral, whether coltefttve or di*
ftributive. .
We may give Inftances of each of thefe.
Metaphyfical ; as* a Circle has a Center and Cir*
eumference. Natural, as, Beafts have four Feet*
Moral; as, Negroes are ftupid Creatures. Collec-
tive ; as, the Apples will fill a Bufbcl. Diftribu*
tive \ as, Men are mortal.
Note
Cb. II. S. i. He right Vfe of R«fon. 153
Notez. There *re many Cafes wherein a *?£
leftive Idea is exprefied in a Propoficion by an w-
A/&b7<? Tarw, and chat where it defqribes the Nature
or Quality of the Subjeft, as well as when it declares
fome paft Mutters of FaB\ as, Fir trees Jet in good
Order will give a farming ProfpeEt * this muft fig-
nify a CoUeStm of Fir-trees, for one snakes no Prof-
peft. In Matters of Fa& this is more evident and
frequent ; as the Remans overcame the Gauls : The
Robbers furro&ded the Coach : The wild Geefe flew over
the Thames in the Form of a Wedge. All thefe are
colledtfve Subjects.
Note 3. In indtfmte Propofitions the Subjefifc is
often reftrained by the Predicate, or by the fpecial
Time, Place; t or Circumftances, as ^ell as in Fro*
pofuions which ore exprefsly univerftl » as the
Chinefes are ingenious Silk-Weavers, i. e. thofe Cb&+
nefes, which are Silk-Weavers are ingenious at their
Work. The Stars appear to us when the Twilight is
gone. This can fignify no more than the Stars which
are above our Horizon.
Note 4. All thefe Reftri&ions tend to reduce
fome indefinite Propofitions almoft into particular, as
will appear under the next Remarks.
III. Remarks concerning particular Propofitions,
Note 1. A particular Propofiuon may fomctinoes
be expreffed indefinitely without any Note of Parti-
cularity prefixed to the Subject j as, in times of
Confufion Laws are not executed: Men of Virtue are
difgracedy and Murtbers efcape, j. c. fome Laws,
fame Men of Virtue* fome Atertbers : Unleis we (bould
call this Language a moral Unherfaiity, though I
think it can hardly extend fa far.
Ntfe a* The Words fome, a few, &c. though they
generally denote 21 proper Particularity, yet fome-
limes they exprefs a cglleSive Idea : as, fome of the
Enemies
i$4 L G 1 C k; Or, Part IL
Emmies hfet the General around. A few Greeks would
teat a tboufand Indians.
I conclude this SeSi$n with a few general Remarks
on thisSubjed, (viz.)
Gen. Rem. I. Since univerfal, indefinite, and par*
tuular Terms in the plural Number taay either bo
taken in a colleSive or diftributive Senfe, there is x>ne
lbort and eafy Way to find when they are collec-
tive and when diftributive, (viz.) If the Plural
Number may be changed into the fingular, i. e. if
the Predicate will agree to one (ingle Subjeft, it is a
diftributive Idea j if not, it is coUc&ive.
Gen. Rem. IL Univerfal and pirticular Terms in
the plural Number, fuch as, *JZ, /&»*, few, many*
Sec. when they are taken in their diftributhe Senfe,
reprcfcnt feveralftngle Ideas ; and when tbey are thus
affixed totheSubjedt of a Propofition, render that
Fropofition univerfal or particular^ according to the
univerfality or particularity of the Terms affixed.
M G*». Rem. III. Univerfal and particular Terms in
the plural Number, taken in thtW colleSive Senfe*
reprefent generally one colleSive Idea.
If this one colleSive Idea be thus reprefented
(whether by univerfal or particular Terms) as the
Subjeft of a Propofition which defcribes the Na+
sure of a Things it properly makes either \ fingu-
lar or an indefinite Propofition \ for the Words, all %
feme, a few, &c. do not their denote the ghian-.
thy of the Propofition, but areefteemed merely as
Terms which connefl: the Individuals together in
order to compofe one colleSive Idea. Obfervc
thefe Inftances, all the Sycamores in the Garden
would make a large Grove \ i. e. this one Col-
ledtipn of Sycamores, which is a fingular Idea.
Some
fek II. S. ii He right XJfe ^Reafott; 15 j
home of the Sycamores in the Garden would make afitt
Grope. Sycamores would make a noble Grove: la
thefe laft the Subjeft is rather indefinite than lingu-
lar. But it is very evident, that in each of thefe
Projections. the Predicate c&rt Only belong to zcoU
leftive Idea, a^d therefore the Subjedfc muft be e-
fteemecJ 4 colleftlve.
If thifc collepive Idea (whether repreferited by uni-
versal or particular Terms) be ufed in deferring pafl
jMatters of Fd8> theh It is generally to bfe efteetaeci
* Singular Idea, and render^ the Propofition Angu-
lar ; as all the Sol&irs 0/ Alexander niade but a little
Army: Afeti) Macedonians vanquifhed the large dr-
hy of Darius : Some Grenadiers in the Camp plundered
all the neighbouring %owns.
( Now we have (hewn befofe, that if a Pfopofitioh
defcribitig the ffoiurt bf Things, has an indefinite
Subjefl:, it is generally to be efteemed univerfal
in its pfopofitional Senfe : And if it has zjmgular
SubjeSt, iri its propOfitional Senfe it is always ranfc-
iid with tlniverfals.
After all we tiiuft be forced to cohfeft, . that the
LahgUagg of Mankind, and the Idioms of Speech*
are fo exceeding various, that it is hard to reduce
Iheitn to a few Rules ; and if We would gain a juft
and precife Idda of every imiverfal, particular*
and indefinite E&pteffidn, we rhiift hot only con-
fider the particular Idiom of the Language, but ths
Imle, the 0acei the Occafion, the Circumftah^
tfes of the Matter fpoken df, ind thus penetrate as
Fat as poffibic into the Defign of the Speaker of
Writer;
& SectV
156 LOGIC K: Or,' Partly
SECT. II.
Of affirmative and negative Propofitions.
WHENa Propofition is confidered'with Re-
gard to its Copula, it may be divided into
affirmative and negative \ for it is the Copula joins
or disjoins the two Ideas. Others call this a Divi-;
fion of Propofition according to their Quality.
An affirmative Propofition is when the Idea of
the Predicate is fuppofed to agree to the Idea of
the Subject, and is joined to it by the Word is, or
are, which is the Copula ; as, all Men are Sinners.
But when the Predicate is not fuppofed to agree
with the Subjeft, and is disjoined from it by the
Particles is not, are not, &c. the Propofition is
negative ; as, Man is not innocent ; or, no Man is
.innocent. In an affirmative Propofition we aflert one
Thing to belong to another, and, as it were, unite
them in Thought and Word : In negative Propor-
tions we feparate one Thing from another, and de-
ny their Agreement,
It may Teem fomething odd, that two Ideas or
Terms are faid to be disjoined as well as joined by a
Copula : But if we can but fuppofe the negative
Particles do really belong to the Copula of negative
Propofuions, it takes away the Harfhnefs of the
Expreflion ; and to make it yet fofter, we may
confider that the Predicate and Subject may be
properly faid to be joined in a Form of Words as a
Propofition, by connexive Particles in Grammar or
Logick, though they are disjoined in their Senfe and
Significations. Every Youth who has learned his
Grammar, knows there are fuch Words as disjunc-
tive Conjunctions*
Several*.
Ch. II. S. 2l Tie right XJfe *f Reafon. 157
Several Things are worthy our Notice on this
Subjedh
1 ft Note. As there are fome Terms, or Words,
and Ideas, (as I have fliewn before) concerning
j?hich it is hard to determine whether they are
negative or poptive, fo there are fome Proportions
concerning which it may be difficult to fay, whe-
ther they affirm or deny: As, when we fay, Plato
.was no Fool: Cicero was no unjkilful Orator : Cse-
far made no Expedition to Mufcovy : An Oifter has
no Patt like an Eel: It is not necejfary for a Pbjffi-
dan to fpeak French, and for a Phffician to fpeak
'French is needlefs. The Senfe of thefe Propofi-.
tions is very plain* and eafy, though Logicians
might fqqabble perhaps a whole Day, whether they
,fhould rank f hem under the. Names pf Negative or
Affirmative.
2d Note. In Latin and Englifb two Negatives
joined in one Sentence make an Affirmative ; as
when We declare, no Man is not mortal, it is the
fame as though we faid, Man is mortal. But in
Greek, and oftentimes in French, two Negatives
make. but a ftronger. Denial.
3d Note, If the mere negative Term, Not, b%
added to the Copula of an univerfal affirmative Pro-
pofition, it reduces it to a particular Negative -, as,
all Men are not wife, fignifies the fame as, fome Men
v are not wife. »
4th jjTote. In all affirmative Propofitions, the
Predicate is taken in its whole Comprehenfion ;
that is, every eflential Part and Attribute of it is
affirmed concerning the Subject ; as when 1 fay, a
true Cbriftian is an boneft Man, every Thing that
belongs to Honejty is affirmed concerning a true
JCbriflian.
m L % £th Note
I 5 & L O G I C K: Or, Part IL
5th Note. In all negative Propofirions the Predi-
cate is taken in its whole Extension ; that is, every '
Species and Individual that is contained in the ge-
neral Idea of the Predicate, is utterly denied con-
cerning the Subjedt : So in this Proportion, a Spi-
rit is not an Animal, we exclude all Sorts and Kinds,
and particular Animals whatfoever from the Idea of
a Spirit.
From thefe two laft Remarks we may derive this
Inference, that we ought to attend to the entire
Comprehetifion of our Ideas, and to the univerfal
Extenfion of them, as far as we have proper Capa-
city for it, before we grow too confident, in our
affirming or denying any Thing, which may have
the lead Darknefs, Doubt or Difficulty attending
it : It is the .want of this Attention that betrays
us into man/ Miftakes.
SECT. III.
Of the Oppofition and Converfion of Proportions.
AN Y two Ideas being joined or disjoined in
various Forms will afford us feveral Propo-
rtions : All thefe may be diftinguifhed according to
their Quantity and their Quality * into four, which
are marked or denoted by the Letters A, E, I, O,
thus :
C Univerfal Affirmativd^
denotes a < Univcrfal Ne 8 at ^«-
j Particular Affirmative*
C Particular Negative.
according to thefe old Latin Rhymes
Affcrit
• The Reader fliould remember here, {hat a Proportion according to its
QmKtity is called univerfal or particular, and according to its Quality, it I*
either ajfinnutive or negative.
£h. U.S. 3; <rk 1 right Vft oj Reafon. 159
jtfferit A, Neg at E, verm generaliter Ami* \
AJjerit I> tfegat Qyftdpartiadariter Ambo.
This may be exemplified by thefc two Ideas, i
Vine and a Tree.
A Every Vine is aTrte.
E No Vine is a Tree*
I Some Vine is a Tree.
O Some Vint is not a Tree*
The Logicians of the Schools have jriiiten
many large Trifles concerning the Oppojition and
Comer/ion of Propositions. It will be fufficient
here to give a few brief Hints of thefe Things,
that the Learner may not be utterly ignorant of
them.
Propofitions qJMph are made of the fame Subjefl:
and Predicate are laid to be oppefite* when that
which is denied in one is affirmed in the other, ei-
ther in whole or in part, without any Confideratkm
whetjl^the Proportions bfc true or no. * .
If they differ both in Quantity and Quality they ^
are called Contradictory \ as, fc ^ k 'A
A E ^ e p m U a l Thefe can never be both^fUe
© Some Vine is not\ %. both faIfe at thc famfi
. a Tree. i Tltne -
If two Univerfals differ in Quality, they- are
Contraries ; as,
E No Vine is a( "■«■*"; ** Aey.may be
Tree. 3 both falfe.
If two particular Propofitiooa differ in Quality,
$hey are Subcontraries ; as,
L 3 I &**
i66 t O G IC K: Or,' Part III
I Some Vine is <0 Thefe may ^ ^ true toge .
^ « »■• • y ther,- but they can never be .
°^ www '( both falfe. y
Both particular and univerfal Propofitions which
agree in Quality but not. in Quantity, are called
Subaltern, though thefe are not properly oppofite 9 as,
A Every Vine is a Tree.
I Some Vine is a Tree. m
Or thus,
E No Vine is a %ree.
O Some Vine is not a Tree.
The Canons oF fubalternate Propofitions are ufu-
.lily reckoned thefe three, (viz.) (il) If an univer-
fil Propofition be true, the particular will be true
alfo, but not on the contrary. And (2.) If a par-
ticular Ptopofitfon be falfe, the r univerfal muft be
Falfe too, but riot on the contrary • (3,) Subaltern
Proportions, whether univerfal or particular, may
fometimes be both true, and fometimes botfr falfe.
The Converfwn of Propofitions is when the Sub-
ject and Predicate change their Places with Pre-
servation of the Truth. This may be done with
ctnltant Certainty in all univerfal Negatives and
particular Affirmatives \ as, no Spirit is an Animal,
may be converted, no Animal }sd Spirit; and Jbme
Tree is a Vipe, may be converted, fome Vine is a
Tree. But there is more formal Trifliqg in this fort
of Difcourfe than there is of folid Improvement,
becaufe this fort of Cowoerfion arifes merelyrfrom
die Form of Words, as connected in a Propofition,
rather than from the Matter. ^
Yet it may be ufeful to obferve, thSt there are
fome Propofitions, which by Reafon of the Ideas
or Matter of which they are compofed may be
converted with conftant Truth : Such are thofe
Propo-
**
Ck II. S. 4: The rigbtUfe ^Rcafon. 161
Propofitions whofe Predicate is a nominal or real
Definition of the Subjeft, or the Difference of it,
. or a Property of the fourth Kind, or a fuperlative
Degree of any Property or Quality whatfoever, or
in fhort, wherefoever the Predicate and the Sub-
ject have exadUy the fame Extenfion or the fame
Comprehenfion ; as, every Vine is a Tree bearing
Grapes ; and every Tree bearing Grapes is a Vine :
Religion is the trueft Wifdm % and the trueft Wifdom
is Religion : Julius Csefar was the firft Emperor ef
Rome j and the firfi Emperor of Rome was Julius
Csefar. Thefe are the Propofitions which are pro-
perly convertible, and they are called reciprocal
Propofitions.
S E C T; IV.
Of pure and modal Propofitions.
ANOTHER Divifion of Propofitions among
■the fcholafticfc Writers is into pure and mo-
dal. This may be called (for Diftin&ion fake) a
* Divifion according to the Predicate.
When a Propofition merely exprefies that the
Predicate is conne&ed with the Subjeft, it is called
a pure Propofition 5 as, every true Chriftian is an
honefi Man. But when it includes alfo the Way and
Manner wherein the Predicate is connefted with the
Subjeft, it j$ called a modal Propofition ; as when I
fay, it ,is necejfary that a true Chriftian Jhould be an
boneJFMan.
Logical Writers generally make the Modality
of this Prtjpofition to belong to the Copula^ be-
caufe it (hews the Manner of the Connexion be-
tween Subjeft and Predicate. But if the Form
x>f the Sentence as a logical Propofition be duly
confidered, the Mode itfelf is the very Predicate
L 4 of
j6a LOGIC K: Or, Part H,
pf the Propofuion, and it muft run thus : That $
true Cbriftian Jbould be an honeji Man is a necejfary
Hiring* and then the whole primary Propofuion ift
included in the Subjeft of ths modal Propofuion.
There are four Modes oJTconne&ing the Predk
cate with the Sqbje&, which are ufually reckoned
up on this QccaGon, (viz-) Necejfiiy and Contingent
which are two Oppofites, Poffibility and ImpojftbtRty
which are alfo Oppofites ; as /'/ is nfcejfary that
a Globe Jbould be round: that a Globe be made of
Wood fr Glafs is an unnecejfary or contingent Things
Jt is impoffible that a Globe Jhpuid befqmre : It is pof-
fible that a Globe may be made of Water.
With Regard to the modal Proportions which the
Schools have introduced, I wpu]d make thefe twq
Remarks :
Remark i. Thefe Propofitions rn EngKJb are
formed by the Refolution of the Words, muft be^
piigkt not be* ean be, and cannot be, into thofe more
explicate Forrs of a logical Copula and Predi-
cate, is neceffary, is contingent* is poffibk^ is impoffc-
tie: For it is neceffary that a Globe Jbould be found,
fignifies no more than t^at a Globe muft I?e
round.,
Remark *• Let it be noted that thi$ quadru-
ple Modality is only an Enumeration of the na-
tural Modes or Manners wherein the* Predicate js
connected with the Subjcft: We might alio d?-
fcribe feveral moral and civil Modes of connedling
two Ideas together (viz) Lawfylnefs -and Unlaw*
fulwfsi Conveniency and Inconvcn^ency, &c. whence
we may form fuch modal Propofitions as thefe. It
is ttnlawful for aity Perfon to kill an innocent Man:
It is lawful for Cbriftians to eat Flefh in Lent : To
' ' ■-...■- fiu
Cb.IlS. 5. TberigkVfeoJKetfbri: 163
fell all that we think is inexpedient : For a Man to be
affable to bis Neighbour is very convenient &c.
There are feveral other Modes of fpeaking where-
by a Predicate is conne&ed with a Subjc&: Such
as, it is certain* it is doubtful* it is probable* it is
improbable* it is agreed* it is granted* it is /aid by
fbe Ancients* it is written* &c. all which will form
pther Kinds of modal Proportions.
But whether the Modality bt natural* moral* &c.
yet in all thefe Proportions it is the Mode is the
frbper Predicate* and all the reft of the Proportion,
except the Cgpula (or Word is) belongs to the Sub-
ject * and thus they become pure Propqfitions of a
complex Nature, of which we fliall treat in the next
Seflion* fo that there is no great Need of making
Modals a diftinft Sort.
There are many little Subtleties which the Schools
acquaint us with concerning the Converfton and Op-
fofition and Efuipollence of. thefe modal Propofitions,
fuited to the Latin or Greek Tongues, rather than
the Engltjb, and fit to pais away tjie idle Time of
a Student, rather than {q enrich his Under-
standing.
8E C T. V.
Of fingle Proportions* whether JImple or cmplex.
WH E N we confider the Nature of Propofiti-
ons* together with the Formation of them,
and the Materials whereof they are made, we di-
vide them into Jingle and compound.
A fingle Proportion is that which has but one
Subjett and one Predicate * but if it has more Suiv
jedls or more Predicates, it is called a compound
. Propofition* and indeed it contain* twp or more
Propofitiofia in it.
A
*64 LO G IC K: Or, Part H.
A fimple Propofition (which is alfo called cate-
gorical) may be divided again intofimpk and com-
flex*
A purely fimple Propofition is that whofe Subjeft
and Predicate are made up of (ingle Terms ; as
Virtue isdefirable: Every Penitent is pardoned: Nf
Man is innocent.
When the Subjeft or Predicate, or both, arc
- made up of complex Terms, it is called a complex
Propofition ; as, every fincere Penitent is pardoned \
Virtue is defirable for its own Sake j No Man alive is
ferfeUfy innocent.
If the Term which is added to the Subjedt of a
complex Propofition be either effential or any Way
neceflary to it, then it is called explicative, for it
only explains the Subjeft ; as every mortal Man is
m Son of Adam. But if the Term added to make
up the complex Subjeft does not necefiarily or
conftantly belong to it, then it is determinative,
and limits . the Subjeft to a particular Part of its
Extenfion ; as, every pious Man JhaU be happy. In
the firft Propofition the Word mortal is merely ex-
plicative : In the fecond Propofition the Wfird pious
is determinative.
Here note, that whatfoever may be affirmed or
denied concerning any Subjeft, with an explicative
Addition, may be alfo affirmed or denied of that
Subjeft without it ; as we may boldly fay, every
Man is a Son of Adam, as well as every mortal Man :
But it is not fo, where the Addition is dete^mina*
the, for we cannot fay, every Man Jhall be happy,
though every pious Man fhall be fo.
In
* As fimph Ideas are oppofed to emplex> and Jingle Ideas to compeuml,
fo Proportions are di&nguiihed in the fame Manner : The Englijb Tongue in
this Refpeft having fome Advantage above the learned Languages, which have*
no u&al Word to diftinguiih/*g/e from fimple.
In a complex Propofirion the Predicate or Sub*
je& is fometimes made complex by the Pronouns
who, .which, wbofe, to whom* &c. which make
another Propofition ; as every Man who isr pious,
Jhall be faved: Julius* whofe Sirnaine was Car/ar*
overcame Pompey: Bodies* which are tranfparent*
have many Pores. Here the whole Propofition is
called the primary or chief, and the additional Pro-
pofition is called an incident Propofition. But it ii
ftill to be eftcemed in this Cafe merely as a Part of
the complex Term ; and the Truth or Fallhood
of the whole complex Propofition is not to be judged
by the Truth or Fallhood of the incident Propor-
tion, but by the Connexion of the whole Subjeft
with the Predicate. For the* incident Propofition
may be falfe, and abfurd, or impoffiMe* and yet
the whole complex Propofition may be true^ as t
a Horfe,, which has Wings, might fly over tie
Thames*
Befide this Complexion which belongs to the Sufc
jell or Predicate, logical Writers ufe to fay, there
is a Complexion which may fall upon the Copula
alfo : But this I have accounted for in the SeSim
concerning modal Proportions ; and indeed it is not
of much Importance whethct it were placed there
or here,
SEC T. VI.
Of compound Propofititmsl
A Compound Propofition is made up of two er
more Subjedts or Predicates, or both ; and
it contains in it two or more Propofitions, which
are either plainly expriffedi or concealed and im-
plied.
The
166 L O G I C K: Or, Part II,
The firft fort of compound Propofitions are thofc
wherein the Compofition is exprefed and evident*
and they are diftinguifhed into thefe fix Kinds,
{viz.) Copulative, Disjunctive, Conditional, Caufal,
Relative and Difcrctive.
I. Copulative Propositions are thofe which have
more Subjects or Predicates connefted by Affirm*
live or negative Conjunctions ; as Riches and Ho-
nours are Temptations to Pride : Casfar conquered ike
Gauls and the Britons : Neither Gold nor Jewels
will pyrcbafe Immortality. Thefe Propositions are
evidently compounded, for each of them may be re-
folved into two Propofitions, (viz.) Riches art
temptations to Pride, and Honour is a Temptation to
.Pride ; and fo the reft.
The Truth of copulative Propofitions depend*
upon the Truth of all the Parts of them ; for if
Cdfar had conquered the Gauls 9 and not the 2W-,
tens, or the Britons and not the Gauls, the fecona
copulative Propofition had not been true.
Here note, thofe Propofitions, which cannot be
jefolyed into two or more fimple Propofitions, are
not properly copulative, though two or more Ideas
be connected and coupled by fuch Conjunctions,
either in the Subject or Predicate; as, two ad
three make five: Majefly and Meeknefs do not open
meet : The Sun, Moon, and Stars are not all to be fee*
at once. Such Propofitions are to be efteemed mere-
ly complex, becaufe the Predicate cannot be affirmed
of czch Jingle Subject, but only of all of them to-
gether as a colleSive Subject
II. Disjunfiive Propofitions are when the Parts
are disjoined or oppofed to one another by dif-
jun&ive Particles \ as, */ is either Day or Nfcht:
Ch. IL S. 6. Tie fight V/e ^Reifon; i 6f
The Weathet is either finning or rainy z Quantity is
either Leng tb, Bteadtb or Depth.
The Truth of DisjunSiDes depends on the ne*
teflary and immediate Opppfition of the Parts ;
therefore only the lad of thefe Examples is true %
but the two nrft are not ftrifily true, becaufe Twi-
light 15 a Medium between Day and Night ; and
dry, cloudy Weather, is a Medium between finning
and raining.
III. Conditional or hypothetical Proportions are!
, thofe whofe Parts are united by the conditional
Particle */* as, If the Sun be faced, the Earth mufi
move : If there be no Rre 9 there will be no Smoke.
Note* The firft Part of thefe Propofitions, or
I that wherein the Condition is contained, is called
[ the Antecedent^ the other is called the Confeqtmt.
I" The Truth of thefe Propofitions depenids not at
^ all on the Truth arid Falfhood of their two Parts,
but on the Truth of the Connexion of them ; for
each Part of them may be falfe, and yet the whole
Propofition true; as, if there be no Providence, there
mil be no future Punijbment.
IV. Caufat Propofitions are where two Propofiti-
ons are joined by caufal Particles ; as, Houfes were
not built that they might be deftroyed: Rehoboam
was unhappy becaufe be followed evil Counfel.
The Truth of a caufal Proportion arifes not from
the Truth of the Parts, but from thc-caufal Influ-
ence that the one Part of it has upon the other ; for
both Parts may be true, yet the Propofition falfe,
if one Part be not the Caufe of the other.
Some Logicians refer reduplicate Propofitions to
this Place, as Men, confidered as Men^ are rational
Creatures, i. e. btcaufe they are Men.
T. Re~
j68 LOGIC K: Or, Part tt
V. Relative Propofitions have their Parts joined
by fuch Particles, as exprefs a Relation or Compa-
nion of one Thing to another ; as when you are
ftlent I will fpeak: As much as you are worthy fo
much you Jball be efteemed : As is the Father ', foisthe
Son : Where, there is no Tale-Bearer, Contention will
ccafe.
Thefe are very much a-kin to conditional Propo-
rtions, and the Truth of them depends upon this
Juftnefs of their Connexion.
VI. Difcretive Propofitions are fuch wherein va-
rious and feemingly oppofite Judgments are made,
whofe Variety or Diftin&ion is noted by the Par-
ticles, buf y though, yet, &c. as Travellers may change
their Climate but not their Temper : Job was patient,
though bis Grief was great.
The Truth and Goodnefs of a difcretive Propth
fition depends on the Truth of both Parts, and
their Contradiftindtion to one another; for though
both Parts fhould be true, yet if there be no feem-
ing Oppofition between them, it is ah ufeleft
Afiertion, though we cannot call it a falfe one *
as Defcartes was a Philofopber, yet he was a French-
man : The Romans were valiant, but they fpoke La-
tin; both which Propofitions are ridiculous, fjpr
want of a feeming Oppofition between the Parts.
Since we have declared wherein the Truth aqd
. Faljhood of thefe compound Propofitions confift, it is
proper alfo to give fome Intimations how any of
thefe Propofitions when they are falfe may be op-
pofed or contradicted.
All compound Propofitions, except Copulatives
and Difcretives, are properly denied or contradift-.
ed when the Negation affeds their conjunctive-
Particles ; as, if the disjunctive Propofmon af-
ferts,
Ch. II. S. 6. The right life $f Reafon. a 69
ferts, it is either Day or Night. The Opponent fays,
// is not either Day or Night* or it is not necejfary that
it Jhould be either Day or Night \ fo the hypothetical
Propofition is denied by faying, it does not follow
that the Earth mujt move if the Sun be fixed.
A disjunSive Propofition may be contradicted alfo
by denying all the Parts ; as, // is neither Day nor
Night.
And a caufal Propofition may be denied or oppo-
sed indireftly and improperly* when either part or the
Propofition is denied ; and it muft be falfe if either
Eart be falfe : But the Defign of the Propofition
eing to (hew the caufal Connexion of the two Parts,
each Part is fuppofed to be true, and it is not pro*
perly contradicted as a caufal Propofition* unlefs one
i Part of it be denied to be the Caufe of the other*
As for Copulatives and Difcretives* becaufe their
Truth depends more on the Truth of their Parts
therefore thefe may be oppofed or denied as many
' Ways, as the Parts of which they are compofed
may be denied ; fo this copulative Propofition,
: Riches and Honour are Temptations to Pride* may be
denied by faying, Riches are not Temptations* though
Honour may be : Or, Honour is not a Temptation*
though Riches may be ; or, neither Riches nor /&-
nour are Temptations* &c.
So this difcretive Propofition, Job was patient,
though bis Grief was great* is denied by faying* Job
was not patient* though his Grief was great : Or, Job
was patient* but bis Grief was not great : Or, Job .
was not patient, nor was bis Grief great.
We proceed now to the fecond fort of compound
Propofitions, viz. fuch wbofe Compofition is not ex-
prejfed* but latent or concealed* yet a fmall Attention
will find two Propofitions included in them. Such
are thefe that follow.
1. Ex-
i;© LOG It k: Ct, Pat ih
i. Exclufives ; as, The pious Man alone is happy*
It is only Sir Ifaac Newton could find ont true Phife
fophy.
a. Exceptive* i as, None tf the Ancients but Pla-
to well defended the Soul's Immortality. The Profit-
ftants worjbip none but God.
g. Comparatives; as, Paints the, greatejt AJH4
tion. No Turk Was fiercer than /£* Spaniards ai
Mexico.
Here note* that the comparative Degree does not
always imply the pofitive % as if I fay, A Fool is
better than a Knave, this does not affirm that Folly
is good, but that it is a lefs Evil than Knavery.
4. Inceptives and Defitives, which relate to the
beginning or ending of any thing ; as, the Latid
Tongue is not yet forgotten. No Man before Orpheus
wrote Greek Verfe. Peter Czar of Mufcovy begad
to civilize bis Nation.
To thefe may be added Continuatives * as, kome
remains to this Day, which includes at lead two
Proportions, viz. Rome was, and Rome is.
Here let other Authors fpend Time and Pains
in giving the precife Definitions of all thefe forts
of Propofitions, which may as well be underftood
by their Names and Examples : Here let them teH
what their Truth depends upon, and how they are
to be oppofed or contradicted 5 but a moderate
Share of common Senfe, with a Review of what i*
laid on the former Compounds, will fuffice for all
thefe Purpofes without the Formality of Rules.
s e c t:
Ch. Hi S* ?> Tie right Ufe of Reafofl* tyi
S E C T. VII.
Of true and falfe Propofitions^
Pkopofitions ar next to be considered according
to their Senfe or Signification, and thus they
.are distributed into true or falfe. A true Prcpojt-
tion reprelents Things as they are in themfeives ;
but if Things are reprefented orhetwife than they
are in themtelves, the Propofition is falfe.
Or Kre may defcribe them more particularly
thus ; a true Proportion joiris choftffdeas and TermS
together whoft Objefts are joined and agree, or it
disjoins thofe Ideas and Terms, whole ObjeSts dif-
agree or are disjoined \ as, every Bird bos Wings, a
Brute is nbt immortal.
A falfe Propofition joins- thofe Ideas of Terms
Vrhofe Obje&s difagree, or it disjoins thofe whole
Objedis agree j as, Birds have no Wings, Brittes are
immortal.
Note, It is impotfible that the fame Propofition
fhould be both true and falfe at the fame Tin\e, iri
the fame Senfe and in the fame Refpefifc ; becaufe a
Propofition is but the Reprefentation of the Agree-
ment or Difagreement of Things : Now it is impefi*
Jible that the fame "thing Jhould be and not hi, or that
the fame Thing fhould agree and not agree at the famt
Time and in the fame Refpeft. iTiis is a firft Prin-
ciple of human Knowledge.
Yet fome Propofitions may fefcm to contfadiffc
one another, though they may be both true, but in
different Senfcs or Refpefts or Times : as, Man
\ was immortal in Paradife, and Man wds mortal in
.' Paradife. But'thefe two Proportions muft be re-*
. ferred to . different Times ; as, Man before bis Fall
' was liptnorul, but at the- Fall he became mortal*
M **
lyt LOGIC Ki Or* Part ft
So we may fay now, Man is mortal, or Man H
immortal, if we take thefe Propofitions in different
Refpefts j as Man is an immortal Creature as tobk
Soul, but mortal as to bis Bo&y. A great Variety
of Difficulties and teeming Contradictions, bqtb m
}idjy Scripture and other Writings, may be ftflved
and explained in this Manner. ^ i72
The moft impdrtant Queftibh on this Subjeft h
this, What is the Criterion, or diftiftguifliing Mark
efTrtitb? How fhall we know when a Propofltioti
is really true or falfe ? There are fo many yifguifcs
of Truth in the World, fo many falfe Appearances
jof Truth, that fome Sefts have declared there is no
Poffibility of diftinguifliing Trutb from RsgBffi
and therefore they have abandoned all Pretrrtj^b
"Knowledge, and maintained ftrenuoufly "that *p-.
thing is to be known. ?rzx\'
The firft Men of this Humour made themfefriii
- famous in Greece by the Name of Scepticks 9 tfllt
% Seekers: They were aifo called AcdderMx&>
borrowing their Name from Academia 9 iflftffr
School or Place of Study. They taught that'll
.Tbtfgs are uncertain^ though they allowed thait fofl^e
are more probable than others. After thefts arcife
'thcSefl: ox Pyrrbonicks, named from I^rrbb'thA
. Mafter, who would Hot altow one Propolitiofi ib
* be more probable than another ; but profcflfed that
all fbfngs type equally uncertain. Now aH'tl^e
Men (Ss iffihgemoos Author exprefles it) wfcre
i cathpr to t>e. called a Se£t of Liars than PbiUfi-
pkerSf and that Cenfure is juft for two {leafons :
li$) BeCaufe they determined concerning "-;" ty&f
^Propoftt ion that it &di uncertain* arid belief
.that as a certain Truth, while they pftrfeffaT/iw
[was mrtbinf terrain; and that/nothing could be
^ctcrminqd Vbncebing Truth br^ Palfbodd i &H
Jim Wti tffty Do&tltejjpve it&f the life.' ' (*)
(
dh.lLS. f. fbi tight V]e of Reftfcto. ijrj"
j&ecaufe they judged and afted as other Men did in
<the common Affairs of Life-, they would neither
tun into Fire dor Water, though they profefied Ig-
norance and Uncertainty, whether the one would
burn, or the other drbwn them.
There have been htae in all Ages wB6 have tod
much iffefted this Humour, who difpute againft
every Thing, under Pretence that Tt&tbbasno cer-
tain Mark to difiingtdfh it. Let us therefore en*
quire what is the general Criterion if frith t And
in order to this, it is pfoper to confider what is the
keaforftvhy we aflent to thofe Proportions, which
contain the moll certain and indubitable Truths,
fiieh as thefe, the H^bok is greater than a Parti twi
. mid three make five.
The only Reafpn why vtre beKevc thefe Ptopofi-
tioni to be true, is becaufe the Ideas of the Sub-
jects and Predicates appear with fo much Clearneft
and Strength of Evidence to agree to each other,
that the Mind cannot help difcernihg the Agree-
tpejutj and cannot doubt of the Truth of themj
but is conftrained to judge them true. So when
we compare the Ideas of a Grcli and a friafigle, of
.the Ideas of an Oifter and a Butterfly, we fee fuch
an etident Difagreemerit between them, that We are
,iure that a Butterfly is Hot an Qiftef ; no* 2s a Tfc
nqjle a Citcle. There is nothing but the Evidence
of the Agreement or Difagreement between twd
,tdeas 9 that makes us affirm of deny the one or the
Othejf.
Now it will follow from hence that a clear aid
JliftinB Perception dr full l&id*net if tbe.Ajpeemeni
and. Difagreement tf our tfeas to pni^another t or id
V^to^i»^is-.a.certitttCiY/«rM of Truth: For fince
our Min& are of fqch a NUke,, $i& Whefe the
JBtvidenqp is exceeding plain and ftrowg, we canpoe
*khhold oat Affcnt j we foquhk rfwp Ip aecefla-
^
■ ■*■■
i74 LO G 1 C K: Or, PartJL
rily expofed to believe Falfhood, if complete £vl»
dence (hould be found in any Propofitions that are
not true. But furely the God of perfed Wifdooi,
Truth and Goodnefs woultfVnever oblige h*4 Cttft-
tures to be thus deceived v^fli^t here fore he tirouM
never have conltituted us o&^fch a Frame as4vouid
render it naturally impoffible to guard againft Efrei.
Another Confequencc is naturally derived from
the former ; and that is, that the only Reafon iti&j
we fall into a Miftake is becaufe we are impatient
to form a Judgment of Things before we have te
clear and evident Perception of their Agr«rf>ent-dr
Difagreement ; and if we will make Hafte to judge
while our Ideas are obfeure and confufed, or before
We fee whether they agree or difagree, w«> fball
• plunge ourfelves into perpetual Errors. See more
'.on this Subjedt in an Effay on the Freedom ofWftii*
•God and Man \ Pubttfhed 1732. Seft. 1. p. 13.
• Sold by J. Roberts in Warwick-Lane* and R. HtU,
in the Poultry.
Note, What is here aflerted concerning the-Ne-
ceflity of clear and diftindt Ideas refers chiefly to
Propofitions, which we form ourfelves by our own
Powers : As for Propofitions which we derive fa}rn
" tl\e Teftimony of others, they will be accounted for
mCbap. IV.
SECT. VIII.
Of cert din' and dubious Propofitions , of Knowledge
and Opinion.
SINCE we have found that Evidence M the
great Criterion and the fure Mark of Truth*
this leads us direflly to confider Propofitions ac-
■ cording to their Evidence ; and here we muft take
Notice both of the different Degrees of Evidehte,
Md<kviiifferent Kinds of ic* < ■ -
* : Pro-
Ch. II. S. 8. The right XJfe gf Reafon. 175
• Propofitions according to their different Degrees
of Evidence art diftinguifhed into certain and du-
bious *•
. Where the Evidence of the Agreement or Dis-
agreement: of the Ideals fo ftrong arid plain, that
nc cannot forbi^OT^clay our Affent ; the Pro-
portion is called Imfini «as, every Circle bath a
Centre \tbe % World atd not create itfelf An Jffent
*0 yki^Propofitions is honoured with the Name of
Knowledge.
^But when there i$_any Obfcurity upon the
Agreement or Difagreement of the Ideas, fo that
the Mind does <not clearly perceive it* and is not
compelled to aflent or diflent, then the Propofition
in a proper and philofophical Senfe, is called doubt-
ful or uncertain ; as, the Planets are inhabited ; the
Sfiuls of Brutes are mere Matters the World will not
ftand a tboufand Tear 1 longer % Dido built the City iff
^Carthage, &V. Such uncertain Propofitions are
; called Opinions*
When we confider ourfelves as Philofopbers or
Searchers of Trutb, it would be well if we always
fufpended a full Judgment or Determination about
any, Thing, and made farther Inquiries, where this
plain and perfect Evidence is wanting; but we
. are fo prone of ourfelves to judge without, full
Evidence, and in fome Cafes the Neceffity of
Aftion in the Affairs of Life, conftrains us to judge
and determine upon a tolerable Degree of Evi-
dence, that we vulgarly call thofe Propofitions
M 3 certain,
•It may be obje&ed,. that this Certaivty and Uncertainty being onlyHj the
Mind, the Divifion belongs to Propofitions rather according to the .Decrees
of our AJfent, than the Degrees of Evidence. But it may be well aofwtred,
that the Evidence here' intended is tfeat which appears- fo to the Mind, and
not the mere Evidence in the Nature of Things : Befides (as we fhall iktw
• immediately) the Degree ef Affcnt ought to be exactly proportionable to f l^
Ve^r^e of Evidence; And therefore thf Difference is, not ^reat, whtth r
•Proportions be caHea 1 certain or uncertain, acceding to the Meafure of Evi-
dence, or of dffent*
jf6 ZOGICKt Or, PartlSt
certain, where we have but very little Rioorn *&
Reafon to dojjbt of them, though the Evidcnc* tit
pot complete or fefiftlefs.
Certainty* according to the Schools, \% dilfini
guifhed ipco ObjeQive and SubjeBive. Objjefttoe Cai
jainty is when the Proportion is certainly true in
hfelt; and SubjeSive, when l ^itr are certain' of thi
Truth of it; ' The one ii in fbings, the cither i* i4
pyr Mnds.
But let it be obferved here, that ever/ Prb£o&
tfon in itfelf is certainty true or certainty fatfe. £«
though Doukfulnejs or Uncertainty fetftis to be J
Medium between certain Truth and certain FtlC
hood in our Miqds, yet %littt is nb fqch Medfittfli
|n Things themfelves, no, not even in future ''fit
vents : For now at this Time it is certain in"itf«tf»
that Mtffutnrner-Vfyfiven Ztars hence mil be fite1$%
pr it is certain it will be cloudy, though weait uflCt^
tain an£ utterly ignorant what Sort of Day ir wifl
\>t : This Certainty of diftant Futurities is known
fo God only.
Uncertain or dubious Proportions, i. e. Opinions are
diftinguilbed into probable* or improbable.
When the Evidence of any Propofitjon is greater
than the Evidence of the contrary, then it is $
probable Opinion : Where the Evidence and Argu-
ments are ftrpnger on the contrary Side, Mire caJMt
improbable. But while the Arguments on either
Side feem to be equally ftrong, and the Evidence
for and again/} any Propofition appears equal fax
the Mind, then in common Language we call ii'%
doubtful Matter. We alfo call it a dubious pt
doubtful Propofition x when there is no AtefrmenTi
pn either Side, as next CbrifimaszDay wul t b'e'^4
'Very Jbarp, Froft. And in general alt thtfe Pro-
portions are doubtful* wherein we can perceive iftj
Jufficien^ Marks or Evidence* of Trutfr o$ Falfhood?
I*
GMfc S. 9. , 9ti tight Ufe t/Roifon. m
In fuch a Cafe, the Mind which is Searching tor
Truth ought to recpvn in a State of Doubt or
Sufpence, until fuperior Evidence on one Side or
the other incline the Balance of the Judgment, and
determine the Probability or Certainty to the 6n6
side. :
. A great many propofitions which we generally
believe or difbelieve in human Affairs, or in the
Sciences, have very various Degrees of Evidence,
which yet arife not to complete Certainty, either of
Truth or Falfhood. Thus it comes to pafs that
there are fuch various and almoft infinite Degrees
of Probability and Improbability. To a weak Pro-
bability we fhould give a weak Afleot \ and zfirong*
er Aflent is due where, the Evidence is greater, and
the Matter more probable. If we proportion o$r
'Aflent in all Things to the Degrees of Evidence, we do
fchp utmoft that human Nature is capable of in a
rational Way to feciire itfelf from Error.
SECT. IX.
Of Senfi, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, Faith,
and Inspiration.
A FTER we have confidered the Evidence of
j£"V, Propofitions in the various Degrees of it,
we come to furvey the feveral Kinds of Evidence,
or the different Ways. whereby Truth is let into
the Mind, and which produce accordingly feveral
Kinds of Knowledge. We (hall diftribute them
into thefe fix, (viz.) Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelli-
gence, Reafon, faith, and Infpir<iti6h, and then dU
ilinguilh the Propofitjpns which are derived from
them. , .'. s
, : ; ..,' ;P4,4 ■ ;;\^ .. I. Th«
178 L G I C K: Or, FartH.
.« - . ■ •
I. The .Evidence of Senfe is when we frame a
Propofition according to the Diftate of any of
our Senfes ; fo we judge that Grafs is green ; that
a Trumpet gives a plcafant Sound ; the Fire burns
Wood ; Water \ is foft 9 and Iron is bard ; for we
have feen, heard or felt all thefe. It is upon this
Evidence of Senfe that we know and believe the
cfeily Occurrences in human Life; and almoft all
the t Hiftories of Mankind that are writteir by
)Eye or Ear-Witnefies are" built gport thfs Prh*
Ciple.
Under the Evidence of Senfe we do not only in*
elude that Knowledge which is derived to us by 6uf
outward Senfes of Hearing* Seeing, Feeling, Tajting %
and Smelling, but that alfo which is derived frorr>*he
}nwar<l Senfations and Appetites of Hunger^ Thirjt %
Eafe, Pleafure % Pain, Wearing Reft % &c. and all
thofe Things which belong to the Body ; as, Hun-
ger is a painful Appetite ; Light is pleafant \ Reft is
fweet to the weary Limbs.
Propofitions which are built on this Evidence,
rnay be qamed fepfible Proportions^ or the Diftatft
1 of Senfe.
II. As we learn what belongs to the Body by
the Evidence of Senfe, fo we learn what belongs to
the Soul by an inward Confcioufnejs, which may be
called a fort of internal Feeling, or fpiritual Senfa-
tion of what pafles in rhe Mind ; as, 7 think before
J f peak ; idefire large Knowledge \ I fufpetl my own
PraRice\ I ftudicd bard To-day ; my Confcience bears
'' Witnefs of my. Sincerity , my Soul hates vain Thought s\
:< " Fear is an ' unedfy Pt>Jfion y long Meditation . on one
Sbitig is firefome. - « '••"■
Thus
Ch. II. S. 9. The right Ufe of R&fon: I79
Thus it appears that we obtain the Knowledge
of a Multitude of Propofitions* as well as of fingU
Ideas, by thofe two Principles which Mv. Locke calls
Senfation and Reflection ; One of them is a Sort of
Confcioufnefs of what aflfe£ts the Body, and the othef
is a Confcioufnefs of what pafles,in .the. Mind*
Propofiiions which are built on this internal Ccn-
fcioufnefst have yet no particular or diftinguifliing
. Name affigned to them.
III. Intelligence relates chiefly to thofe abftrafted
Propofitions which carry their own Evidence with
them , and admit no Doubt about them. Our
Perception of .this Self - Evidence in any Propofition
Is called Intelligence: It is our Knowledge of
thofe firft Principles of Truth which are (as it were)
wrought into the very Nature and Make of our
Mind ; ■• They are fo evident in themfelves to
every Man who attends to them, that they neeel
no Proof. It is the Prerogative and peculiar Ex*
cellence of thefe Propofitions, that they can fcarce
ever be proved or denied : They cannot eafily be
■proved j becaufe there is nothing fuppofed to be
' more clear or certain, from which an Argument
may be drawn to prove them. They cannot weH
-"be denied* becaufe their own Evidence is fo bright
and convincing, that as foon as the Terms are un-
derftood the Mind neceffarily aflents; tfuch are
thefe, Wbatfoever afietb bath a Being 5 nothing has
W Properties % a Part is lefs than the Whole \ nothing
can be the Caufe of itfelf. ,
. Thefe Propofitions arc called Axioms y or Maxims,
or fkft Principles \ thefe are the very Foundations of
all improved Knowledge and Reafonings, aqd on
that Account thefe have been thought to be innate
Propofitions, or Truths born with us*
:„ Some
*86 LQG1CK; Or* Port |I>
Some ipppofc that a great Part of the Know-
ledge of jjpigels and human Souk in the icp^ratc?
State. kpjrtwed in this Manner, {viz.) by fuch a«
immediate View of Things in their own Nature,
•rhich it called Intention.
. IV. jUafonhtg is the next Sort of Evidence, and
that is when on? Trpth is inferred or drawn from
others fry natural and juft Methods of Argument %
as* if there be much Light at Midnight, I infer,
it proceeds from the Moon, becaufe the Sun is under
the Earth *. If I fee a Cottage in a Foreft, I
conclude /me Aten hps been there and built it. Or
when t-furvey the Heavens and Earth, this gives
Evufcflft tp my Reafen, that there is a God who
Jh? Proportions which I believe upon this
kind pf Evidence, are called Cendufwns, or rational
Sfuths, and the Knowledge that we gain this Way
is properly called Science.
Yet let it be noted, that the Word Science is
ufually applied to 4 whole Body of regular or me-
thodic^ObJervations or PropoGtions which learn-
ed Men have formed concerning any Subject of -
Speculation* deriving one Truth from another by
a Train of Arguments. If this Knowledge chief-
ly dire&s our Brattice* it is ufually called an Art.
And this is the moft remarkable Diftinftion be-
tween an Art and a Science* (viz.) the one refers
chiefly to PraSice* the other to Speculation. Na-
tural Pbilofopby* or Pbxfick 9 and Ontology , are Sci-
ences', Legjck and Rbetorick are called Arts* but
Htfatbemoticks include both Art and Science * for
they have much of Speculation, and much of Prac-
tice in them. ,
Obfqrve
• Nttc, Since this Book was written, we have to many Appearances tf
- the jfunra BoreaJii as redacts this Ufercnct only so a Probability.
Cb. IL 5. g> TbersgbfU/i $f Realbn: rf t
Qhferve here, fliat when the Evidence df *
Fropofition derived from 8 enfe* Cenfefotfkejs, Jtarifc
fence, or Reafmn firm and indubitable, it produce*
ftch Afient as we call a natural Gertatniy.
V. When we derive the Evidence of any Pro*
pofirion from thzYe/Kmwy of others, it iacafled
the Evidence of Faith; and this is a large Part of
our Knowledge. Ten thoufand Things there art
which we believe merely upon the Authority or
Credit of thofe Wtro have fpokeh or written of thfcm.
It is by this Evidence that W* know there is flick d
Country as China, and ibtre was fiub a'Mdn Ms Ci-
cero who dwelt m Rome it is by this that AXMft
of the Tranfe&ofts in human Life aw managed 1
We know our Parents and our Kindred' by tiw
Means, we know the Perfons and I*Wfc of our
prefent Governors, as well as Things that are at a
vaft Diftance from us in foreign Nations, or m
ancient Ages.
According as the Perfons that inform us of any
Thing are many or few, or more or left Wife, and
faithful, and credible; fo our Faith is more or left
firm or wavering, and the Proportion btli&oei fe
either certain or doubtful ; but in Matters of Faith,
an exceeding great Probability is called a moral
Certainty.
Faith is generally diftinguMhed into Divine *nd
Human, not with Regard to the Proportions that
are believed, but with Regard to the teJHmny
upon which we believe them. When God reveals
any Thing to us, this gives us the Evidence of
divint Faith % but frhat Man only acquaints tte
with, produces a faw»<w ; Faith r in us* the one be-
ing built upon the Word of Man, arifes but to
floral Certainty, but the other being founded on
ife LOG IC K: Or,. Part II.
the Word of God, arifes to an abfolute and infallible
JjfurancCi lb far as we undcrftand the Meaning of
this Word. This is called fupernatural Certainty. >
Proportions which we believe upon the Evi-
dence of human Teftimony, are called Narratives*
Relations* Reports* Hijkrual Obfervations % &c. but
fuch as are built on Divine Testimony, are termed
Matters of Revelation; and if they are of great
Importance in Religion* they are called Articles of
Faith.
. There are fotne Propofitions or Parts of Know-
ledge which are faid to be derived from Obferva-
*fe*v*nd' Experience* that is, Experience in our*
&lv$s, ipd the Observations we have iriade on
other Perfons or Things; hut thefe are made up
of fome of the former Springs of Knowledge join-
ed. togetheiS (viz,) Senfe, Confcieufnefs* Reafon*
Faith* &{. *nd therefore are not reckoned a diftindt
Kind of Evidence. .
- VI. Infpiration is a fort of Evidence diftlnft
from all the former, and that is when fuch an o-
verpowering Impreffion of any Propofition is made
upon the Mind by God himfelf, that gives a con-
vincing and indubitable Evidence of the Truth and
Divinity of it; So were the Prophets and the
Apoft les infpired *.
Sometimes God may have been pleafed to make
ufe of the outward Senfcs, or the inward Work-
ings of the Imagination* of Dreams, Apparitions,
.Vifions and Yokes, or Rcafoning, or perhaps hu-
man Narration, to <ronvey divine Truths to the
Mind of the Prophet % but none of thefe would
be fufficient to deferve the Name of Infpiration,
without
• Note here, I fyak chiefly of the h'gheft Kind of Infpiration.
£h. II S. g. the rigbWfe *f Reafon. 183,
without a fuperior or divine Light and Power at-
tending them;
This fort of Evidence is alfo very ' diftind from
what we ufiially call divine Faith \ for every com*
mon Chriftian exercifes divine Faith when he be-
lieves any Propofition which God has revealed in
the Bible upon this Account, becaufe God bos-find
ity though it was by a Train of Reafonings that he
was led to believe that this is the Word of God:
Whereas in the Cafe of Infpiration^ theTro]5het
not only exercifes divine Faiths in believing'whsffc
God reveals, but he is tinder a fuperior heavenly
Impreflion, Light and Evidence, whereby he is
allured that God reveals it. This is the rtbft emi*
nent kind of fupernatural Certainty. ' ?
Though Perfons might be afiured of their own
Infpiration by fome peculiar and intxpreffible Con-
fcioujnefs, of this divine Infpiration and Evidence
in their own Spirits, yet it is hard to make out this
Infpiration to others, and to convince them of it,
except by fome antecedent or confequent Prophe-
cies or Miracles* or fome public Appearances more
than human.
The Propofitions which are attained by this fort
of Evidence are called infpired Truths. This is
divine Revelation at firft Hand, and the Diftatea
of God in an immediate Manner, of which Theo-
logical Writers difcourfe at large, but fince it be*
longs only to a few Favourites of Heaven to be
infpired, and not the Bulk of Mankind, it is not
neceiTary to fpeak more of it in a Treatife of Lo-
gick, which is defigned for the general Improve*
ment of human Reafon. > ■
The various Kinds of Evidence, upon which we
believe any Propofition, affords us thefc three Re-
marks.
■I. Remark,
*84 JL.Q.9tJ2Xt Or, frrtjl,
I. Remark. The lame Ptopofition may be knowtf
CD us by different &nds of Evidence: That the
Whole is higger that* a Pott is ktiown by our SenfcSi
and it is known by the Self-Evidence of the Thing
to our Mind. That God created the Heave* ami tU
Earth ia.known to us by Jfcq/to».arKLis known alio
by Divine f<fhmo*j or Failb.
U. Remark* Among thefe Various Kinds of
£videpce^ foxne ace generally ftronger.than othe$
in their own N Attire, and give .a better Ground for
Certainty. Inward Qmfcioafiufs apd Intelligent as
veil ai Divine Faith and Inspiration, ulually carrjf
much more Force with, them thanSenfe or hummi
&aitb, itbteh *rcx>kcn fallible; though, there art
-laftances wjierein human Faith* Senfe and Reafma$
lay a Foundation alfo for complete Afiur^nee, and
leave no rooiii-for Doubt. "
&*/** in its own Nature would always lead us
Into the Truth in Matters within its Cbmpafc,. tf
Jt were ufed aright* or it would require us to fitfr
pend our Judgment where there is want of Evi-
dence! • But it is our Sloth, Precipitancy, Senfe,
Psffton, and many other Things that lead our
Rtafon aftray in this degenerate and imperfect
feftate : Hence it comes to pafs that w£ are guilty
ef fo many Errors inReafoning, efpecially about
Divine Things, becaufe our Rtafon either is bufy
to enquire, and refolved to determine about Mat-
ters that are above our prefent Reach \ or becaufe
we mingle many Prejudices and fecret Influences of
Senfe, Fancy, Pqffion, Inclination, &c. with our Ex-*
ercifcs of Reafon, and judge and determine accord-
ing so thefe irregular Influences.
tHvint
&; IIS. 9. tt rigk tye of Ration, tfcj
Divine Faith would never admit of any Contro*
verfics or Doubtings, if tfe wire but allured that
God had fpoken, and that we rightly underftood
iiis Meaning*
III. Remark. The greatcft Evidence and Cer-
tainty of any Propofition does not depend upon
the Variety of the Ways or Kinds of Evidence,
whereby it is known, but rather upon the Strength
fchd Degree of Evidence, and the Cleathds ofthac
^ight in or by which it appears to the Mind. For
\ Propofition that is known only one Way may be
: ttiuch more certain, and have ftrongor Evidence
than another that is fuppdfedto be Known many
"Ways. Therefore theie Propofition*, Nftbing hfs
"*o Properties, Nothing can Utah it/eft which ace
known only by Intelligence, are mi#h furer ami
truer than this Propofition, Tie Rainbow has real
and inherent Colours in it, or than this, the Sun rolls
round the Earth ; though we feem to know both
thefe laft by our Senfes, and by the dxpmbn Tefli*
toony of our Neighbours. So any Propofition that is
Clearly evident to our own Confcioufnefi or Divine
Faith, is much more certain to us than a thou&qd
others that have only the Evidence of feebte .and
oblfcure Senjations, of mire probable Reafonings and
doubtful Arguments* or the Witmjs of fallible Men,
or even though all theie ihould Join together.
c Ha r
i$6 • £ O O I C K: Or % Part II.
CHAP, E
Tie Springs ofjalfe Judgment \ or the Do&rint
qf Prejudices..
Introduction
IN the End of the foregoing Chapter we have
furveyed the feveral Sorts of Evidence, on which
we build our Afient to Propofitions. Thefe aft
indeed the general Grounds upon which we form
Our Judgments concerning Things. What remains
in this fecond Part of Logick is to point out the fe-
veral Springs and Caufes of our Mtftake> in judging*
and to lay down fom? Rules by which we fhould
conduit ourfelves in palling a Judgment of every
Thing that is propofed to us.
I confefs many Things which will be mentioned
in thefe follow* .^ Chapters might be as well re-
ferred to the third Tart of Logick, where we (hall
treat of Reafomng and Argument ; for molt of out
falfe Judgments feem to include a fecret bad R/afon-
ing in them % and while we (hew the Springs of Ef-
' rot % and the Rules of true Judgment, we do at the
fame time difcover which Arguments are fallacious*
which Reafonings are weak, and which are jud and
ftrong. Yet fince this is ufually called a judging
ill 9 or judging well, I think we may without any
Impropriety treat of it here ; and this will lay a
furer Foundation for all Sorts of Ratiocination and
Argument.
Rafti Judgments are called Prejudices, and fo
* are the Springs of them. This Word in com-
mon Life fignifies an ill Opinion which we have
conceived
~\
GL III. The right Vfe *f Reafon. iB?
conceived of fome ether Per/on, or fome Injury done to
bint. But when we ufe the Word in Matters of
Science, it fignifies a Judgment that is formed con-
cerning any Perfon or Thing before fufficient Examina-
tion ; and generally we fuppofe it to mean a falfi
Judgment or Miftake : -At leaft, it is an Opinion
taken up without folid Reafon for it, or an Affent
given to a Propofition before we have juft Evi-
dence of the Truth of it, though the Thing itfelf
xn^y happen, to, be true.
. Sometimes thele ra(h Judgments are called Pre*
3${]e£ion^ whereby is meant, that fome particular
Qpinion has poflefled the Mind, and engaged the
Afient without fufficient Search or Evidence of the
,l>iithpfit t . " "
■ There is 3 vaft Variety of thefe Prejudices and
PrepoffeJtbHs. which attend Mankind in every Age
and Condition of Life ; they lay the Foundations
of many an Error, and many an unhappy Pradtice*
both in the Affairs of Religion, and in bur civil
Concernments \ as well as in Matters of Learning*
It is neceflary for a Man who purfues Tfuth to en-
quire into thefe Springs, of Error* chat as far as pof-
fible he may rid himfelf of old Prejudices arid watch
hourly againft new ones.
The Number of them is fd gr£at* and they afa
fo interwoven with each other, as well as with the*
Powers of human Nature, that it is fbmetimes hard
to diftinguifh them apart ; yet for Method's Sakd
We (hall reduce them to thefe four general Heads*
[viz.) Prejudices arifing from Things, or fforii
Words* from ourfehes* of from otbdr Perfons 9 and
after the Defcription of each Prejudice, we fliall pto-
pofe ©ne or more Ways of. curing it*
' ' »■ ■ S£CT 4
x.88 LO G IC K: Or, PartUi
SECT, I
Prtjufau ar#ag from Thing. ■
T HE fofifirt if Prejudices are tbofe *hkh
arife from the Things tbemfe foes abmt wbty
*oe judge. But here let it be obfervcd chat thereis
nothing in the Nature rf Things that will ntteflarfljr
lead us into Error, if we do but ufe our Reafoo
aright, andwith-hold our Judgment till there ap-
pear fufficient Evidence of Truth. But fince we
are 16 unhappily prone to take Advantage of every
doubtful Appearance and Circumftance of Thtogs
to form a wrong Judgment, and phiage ouxftlvb
into Miftake, therefore it is proper to confkkt wKat
there is in the Things themfelves that may occaftfo
our Errors. - . -*
I. The Obfcurity effom Truths, end tbt D$U*fy
if fearching them out, is one Occafon of rafh and
roiftaken Judgment.
Some Truths are difficult becaufe they lye it*
mote from the firft Principles of Knowledge, arid
want a long Chain of Argument to come at theiri :
Such are many of the deep Things of Jllgebrm and
Geometry, and fbme of- the Theorems and Pro*
blems of mod Parts of the Matbematicks. Many
Things alfo in natural Phibfopby are dark and in-
tricate upon this Account, becaufe we cannot codBe
at any certain Knowledge of them without the La-
bour of many and difficult, as well as chargeable
Experiments.
There are other Truths which have great Dark-
nefs upon them, becaufe we have no proper Means
or Mediums to comp at the Knowledge of them.
Though in our Age we have found out many of
the
Ch. III.S.*. Ttbe rig It life efRcafon. 189
the deep Things of Nature by the Affiftance of
Glafies and other Inftruments ; yet we are not hi-
therto arrived at any fufficient Methods to difcover
the Shape of thofe little Particles of Matter which
diftinguifh the feveral Sapours, Odours, and Ccburs
of Bodies v nor to find what Sort bf Atoms com-
pofe Liquids or Solids* and diftinguifh Wood, Mine-
. tab, Metals, Ghfs, Stone, &c. There is a Dark-
nefs alfo lies upon the- Adtions of the intelleSual
or angelical World -; their Manners of SubGftence
aod Agency, the Power of Spirits to move Bo-
dies, and the Union of our Souls with this ani-
mal Body of ours, arc much unknown to us on this
Account. ;."■
Now in* many of jiiefe Cafes* a great part of
Mankind is not content to be entirehr ignorant 5
but they father chufe taform rafh and hafty Judg-
ments, to guefs at Things without juft Evidence,
to believe fomething concerning them before they
tan ktk>w them, and thereby they fall into Error.
This fort of Prqudice, as well as moft others,
is cured by Patience and Diligence in Enquiry and
Reafoning* and a Sujpenfitm of Judgment* till we
: have attained fome proper Mediums of Know*
ledge, and till we fee fufficient Evidence of the
Truth.
II. The Appearance of Things in a Dijguife, h
another Spring of Prejudice or rafh Judgment.
The Outfide of Things which firft ftrikes us, is
oftentimes different from their inward Nature,
and we are tempted to judge fuddenly according
to outward Appearances. If a PiSure is daubed
with many bright and glaring Colours, the vul-
gar Eye admires it: as an excellent Piece; whereas
the fame Ferfon judges very contemptuously of
N a Jfocne
190 Z & I C K: Or-, Part II*
•fome admirable Defign fketched out only with a
black Pencil' on a coarfe Paper, though by the
Hand of Raphael. So the Scholar fpies the Name
of a new Book in a publick News-Paper, he is
charmed with the Title, he purchafes, he reads
Vith huge Expectations, and finds it all Trafh and
Impertinence : This is a Prejudice derived from
the Appearances we are too ready to judge that Vo-
lume valuable which had fo good a Frontifpiece.
The large Heap of Encomiums and fwelling Words
of Affurance that are bellowed on Quack- Medicines
in publick Advertifements tempt many a Reader
to judge them infallible, and to ufe the Pills or the
Plaifter with vaft Hope and frequent Difappoint-
ment.
We are tempted to form our Judgment of Per*
'fons as fcell as Things by thefe outward Appearances.
Where there is Wealth \ Equipage and Splendor we
are ready to call that Man happy, but we fee not
the vexing Difquietudes of his Soul : And when we
fpy a Perfon in ragged Garments, we form a defpi-
cable Opinion of him too fuddenly ; we can hardly
think him either happy or wife, our Judgment is
fo ftrangely biafled by outward and fenfible Things.
It was through the Power of this Predjudicc that
the Jews reje&ed our bleffed Saviour ; they could
not fuffer themfelves to believe that the Man who
appeared as the So* of a Carpenter was alfo the Son
of God. And becaufe St. Paul was of a little Su-
ture, a mean Prefence, and his Voice contempti-
ble, fome of the Corinthians were tempted to doubt
whether he were infpired or no.
This Prejudice is cured by a longer Acquaint-
ance with the World, and a juft Obfervation that
Things are fometimes better and fometimes worfe than
they appear to be. We ought therefore to re-
ftrain our exceffive Forwardnefs to form our Opi-
nion
Ch. III. S. 1 1 *Tbt right Ufe of Reafon. 19 r
nipn of Perfons or Things before we have Oppor-v
tunity to fearch into them more perfe&ly. Remem-
ber that a grey heard does not make a Philofopber ;
all is not Gold that glifters •, and a rough Diamond
may be worth an immenfe Sum.
III. A Mixture of different Qualities in the famt t
Things is another Temptation to judge amifs. We
are ready to be carried away by that Quality which
ftrikes the firji or the ftrongefi ImpreJJions upon us,
and we judge of the whole Objedt according to that
Quality, regardlefs of all the reft ; or fometimes
we colour over all the other Qualities with that
one Tin&ure, whether it be bad or good.
When we have juft Reafon to admire a Man for
his Virtues^ we are fometimes inclined not-oiJjTfo
neglelt his Weakneffes, but even to put a goba
Colour upon them, and to think them amiable.
When we read a Book that has many exceljen^
Truths in it and . divine Sentiments, we are
tempted to approve not only that whole Book,!
but even all the Writings of that Author. When
a Poet , an Orator \ or a Painter % has performed 4 ad-
mirably in feveral illuftrious Places, we fometimes
alfo admire his very Errors, we miftake his Blun-
ders for Beauties, and are to ignorantly fond as tQ
copy after them. t [
It is this Prejudice that has rendered Jo many;
great Scholars perfeft Bigots, and inclined them to
defend Homer or Horace^ Livy or Cicero , in their.
Mi (lakes, and vindicate all the Follies of their
favourite Author. It is this that tempts fomfi
^reat Writers to fupport the Sayings of almofl: all
the ancient Fathers of the Churchy and* admire them
even in their very Reveries.
N 2 On
19* I O G I C K: Or, Piwt It
On the other Hand, if an Author has profcffed
heretical Sentiments in Religion, we throw our
Scorn upon every Thing he writes, wis def^ife even*
hi* critical or mathematical Learning, and Wilt hard- T
ly allow him Common Senfe. IF a Poem has ibmt
Blemifhes in it, there is a Set of falfe Criticks who
decry it uniyerfally, and will allow no Beauties
Acre.
This fort of Prejudice is relieved try learning to
diftinguifh Things well, and not to judft in the
%Mmp. There is fcarde any Thing in the World
of Nature of Art, in the World of Morality or
Religion, that is perfe&ly uniform. ThAt is; J
Mixture of Wifdom and Folly, Vice aricj Virtue;
Godd and Evil, both in Men and Things. "'Wtl
fcould remember that fome Perfons have great flp?^
and Bttie Judgment - 9 others are judicious, hut ri&
witty. Sbme are good humoured without Copffi
+e*t i others have all the Formalities of CompliK
fknce, but no good Humour. We ought to IctfdW'
Ait one Man may be vicious and learned f while an-,
Other has Virtue without Learning. That many
a Man thinks admirably well who has a poor UI-;
terana*, while others have a charming Manner of
Speech, but their Thoughts are trifling and irriper^
tinent. Some are good Neighbours* and courteous
ftnd charitable toward Men who have no Piety t(h
Hoard God ; others are truly religious, but of morofc
natural Tempers. Some excellent Sayings are found
in vtryjllly Booh* and fome filly Thoughts appear'
in Books of Value. We fhould neither prat/e nor
Jijpraife fy Wholesale > but feparate the Good from 1
the Evil, and judge of them apart : The Accuracy
of a good Judgment confifc much in making fuck
Diftinafons.
Yd
Ch. Ill, S. i. The right Vfe ?f Reafon. 193
Yet let it be opted too, that in common Dif-
courfc we ufually denominate Perfons and Things
according to the major Part of their Chata&er. He
is to be called z wife Man who has but few Follies •.
He is a good Pbilofopber who knows much of Na-
ture, and for the moft Part reafons well in Matters"
of human Science : And that Bookjhould be cfleem-'
cd well written, which has much more of good Scnfe
in it than it has of Impertinence.
IV. Though a Thing be uniform in its own Na-
ture, yet the different Lights in which it may be fta-
cedy and the different View in which it appears to us %
will be ready to excite in . us miftaken Judgments'
concerning it. Let an ereft Cone be placed . in a
horizontal Plane, at a great Diftance from the Eye,
and it appears a plain Triangle % but we (hall judge
that very Cam to be nothing but zjTat Circle, if jtg
Bafe be obverted towards us. Set a common roundi
Plate a little obliquely before our Eyes afar off, aoqf
we (hall think it an oval Figure : But if the very.
Edge of it be turned towards us, we (hall take i<
for a firait Line. So when we view the feveral
Folds of a changeable Silk, we pronounce this Part!
red, and thzt yellow, becaufe of its different Pofition
Co the Light, though the Silk laid fmooth in one
JLight appears all of one Colour.
When we furvey the Miferies of Mankind, aq<£
think of the Sorrows of Millions, both on ES^fc
and in Hell, the Divine Government has a terrjtlo
AfjpcB, and we may be tempted to think hardly
even of God himfelf : But ff we vjew the PrQfn^
(ion of his Bounty and Grace amongft his Crea-
tures on Earth, or the. happy .Spirit? in Heaven,
we (hall have (6 exalted ah lied of Sis Qo$inefj.i&
to forget his Vengeance. Some Men dwelt en-
N 4 tirely
194 L G I C K: Or, Part II,
tirely upon the Promifcs of his Gofpel, and think
him all Mercy: Others under a melancholy Frame,'
dwell upon his Terrors and his Threatnings^ and
are overwhelmed with the Thought of his Severity
and Vengeance j as though there were no Mercy in
him.
The true Method of delivering. ourfelVes from
this Prejudice is to view a Thing on all Sides,, to
compare all the various Appearances of the fame
Thing with one another, and let each of them have
its' full Weight in the Balance of our Judgment^
before we fully determine our, Opinion. It was by
this Means that the modern Aftjonomers came to
find out that the Planet Saturn hatha flat broad
Circle round its Globe, which is called its Ring, by
pbferving the different Appearances as a narrow
or a broader Oval, or as it fometimes Teems to be *
flrait line, in the different Parts of its twenty-nine
Years Revolution through the Ecliptic And if we
take the fame juft and religious Survey of the great
end bUffed God in all the pifcoveries of his Venge-r
^nce and his Mercy, we (hall at laft conclude him
to be both jufi and good*
V. The cajital /fjfociattQn of many of our Idea*
becomes the Spring of another Prejudice or rafh
Judgment, to which we are fometimes expofed.*
If. in our younger Years we have taken Medicine*
(hat have been naufeous, when any Medicine what-
foever is afterward propofed to us under Sicknefs,
wc immediately judge it naufeous : Our Fancy has
fp clofely joined thefe Ideas together that vve
know not how to feparate them : Then the Sto-
mach feels the Difguft, and perhaps refufes the
only Drug that can preferye Life. So a Chilct
vhb has been let Blood joins the Ideas of Pain
and the Surgeon together, and he hates the Sight
Ch. III. S. 2. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 95
of the Surg eon, becfcufe he thinks of his Pain: Or
if he has drank a bitter Potion, he conceives a bitter
Idea of the Cup which held it, and will drink no*
thing out of that Cup.
It is for the fame Reafon that the Bulk of the
common People are fo fuperftitioufly fond of the
Pfalms tranflatcd by Hopkins and Sternbold, and
think thetrt fatred and divine, becaufe they have
been now for more than an hundred Years bound
up in the fame Covers with our Bibles.
, The beft Relief againft this Prejudice df Jfo-
elation is to confider, whether there be any natu-
ral and neceflary Connexion between thofe Ideas
"which Fancy, Cujtbm, or Chance frath thus joined to-
gether : And if Nature has not joined them, let'our
Judgment correft the Folly of our Imagination, axid
leparate thefe Iicfeas again.
S E C T. II.
Prejudices arijingfrom Words,
OU R Ideas and Words are fo linked together,
that -while we judge of Things according to
Words, we are led into feveral Miftakes. Thefe
may be diftributed under two general Heads, (viz.}
Such as arife from Jingle Words or Pbrafes, or fuch
as arife from Words joined in Speech, and compojing a
Difcourfe*
I. The moft eminent and remarkable Errors of
the firtt Kind, are thefe three. (1.) When our
Words are infignijicant, ,and^ have no Ideas \ as
when the myfliail Divines talk of the Prayer of
Silence, the fuyernatural and pajfw Night of the.
Soul, the Vacuity of Powers, the Sujpenfion* of all
Thoughts: Or (2.) When our Words are qurw-
i 9 6 10 GIC K: Or, Rrt IL
&& and Cgnify two or more Ideas, as the Word*
Law, light, Fltjby Spirit, Rigbtmfntfs, and many
other Terms in Scripture: Or (3.) When two <*
three Words are fynoKymous, and fignify one Idea»
^s Regeneration and npao Creation in the New Te(ta-.
ment * both which mean only a Charge of the Hear{
from Sin to Holinefs i or as the EkOor of Coicgf
and the Bjjhop of Cologn ate two Title* of the Umfi
Man. *
Thefe Kinds of Phrafes are the OcctGops of vp- .
rious Mifiakes } but none fo unhappy as thofa in
Vbeotyy: For jwth Words without #tfr,..as WfU M;
fytunymm and equivocal Words, have been ufp4*u4
abufed by the Humours* Paffions, Interefts, orfefr
the real Ignorance and Wcakncft of Men, to t*g&
terrible Cornells among Christians,
But to relieve us under all thofc Dangers, and (o -
remove thefe forts of Prejudices which arUe from]
fingU Words or Phrafes, I muft remit the Reader,
to Part L Chap. 4. where I have treated about
Words, and to thofe Dire&wns which I have givqi
concerning the Definition of Names, Part I. Chap. § r
Seff.$.
II. There is another fort of falfe Judgments or
Mtftakes which we are expofed to by . Words ; , and. ;
that is, when they are joined in Speech, and /*»- <
pofe a Difcourfe 1 and here we are in Danger twfc,
4 Ways.
The one is, when a Man writes good Senle v .pr^
fpeaks much to the Purpofc, but he has, pptjL
happy and engaging manner of ExprcflSpn. Per*
haps he ufes coarfe and vulgar Words, or o\4%
oblblete, aud unfalhionable l^ngppge* or, Tecp^^
and Phrafes that are foreign, latinized, fchotaftickj ,
very uncommon, and hard to be underftood* And M
this
Gb. IILS. 2. Th* right Ufe of Kstfon. jqj
this is (till worfe, if his Sentences are long and in*
tricate, or the Sound of them harfh and grating to
the Eai 4 . All thefe indeed are DefeBs Uf Stfe* and
lead fome nice and unthinking Hearers or Rcadert
into an ill Opinion of all that fuch a Peiibn fpeaks
or writes. Many an excellent Difcourfe of our
Forefathers has had abundance of Contempt caft
upon it by our modern Pretenders to Senile, for
Want of their diftinguilhing between the lAiguage
and the Ideas.
Oh the other Hand, when a Mat of Etopmet
fpeaks or writes upon any Subject, we are too ready
t6 run into his Sentiments, being fweetjy and in*
fenfibly drawn by the Sqioothnefe of his Harangue,
and the pathetick Power of his Language. Rbe*
iorick will varniih every Error to that it (hall ap-
pear in the Drefs of Truth, and put fuch Ornaments
upon Vice, as to make it look like Virtue : It is an
Art of wondrous and cxtenfive Influence ; it often
conceals, obfcures, or overwhelms the Truth, and
places fometimes a grofs Falfhood in a moft allur*
rog Light. The Pecency of Aftion, the Mufick
of the Voice, the Harmony of the Periods, thp
Beauty of {he Style, and all the engaging Airs of
the Speaker, have often charmed the Hearer*
into Error, and perfuaded them to approve what*
foever is propofed in ib agreeable a Manner. A
large Affembly (lands expofed at once to the Pow«
cr of thefe Prejudices, and imbibes them all. So
Cicero and Demofibenes made the Romans and the
Athenians believe almoft whatfoever they pleated.
The beft Defence againft both thefe Dangers,
is to learn the Skill (as much as poffible) of fepa*
rating our Thoughts and Ideas from Words and Pbra+
fes 9 to judge of the Things in their own Natures*
and in their natural^ or juft Relation to one ano-
ther,
i 9 8 LO G IC K: Or, Part II.
ther, abftra&ed from the Ufe of Language, and to
maintain a fteady and obftinate Refolution, to
hearken to nothing but Truth, in whatfoever Stylft
or Drefs k appears.
Then we mall 1 hear a Sermon of pious and juft
Sentiments with Efteem and Reverence, though the
Preacher has but an unpoliflied Style, and many
Defefts iri the Manner of his Delivery, Then we
ihall negleft and difregard all the flattering Infinua-
tions whereby the Orator would make Way for his
own Sentiments to take Pofleffion of our Souls,' i(
he has not folid and Inftrufltive Senfe equal to hii
Language. Oratory is a happy Talent when ,xt is
rightly employed to excite the Paffioris to the Prac-
. lice of Virtue arid Piety ; but to fpeafc property,
this Art has nothing To do in the Search after truth.
sect, m. ■ ■ .
f • »
Prejudices arifing from ourfthes K .
NEI T H E R Words nor things would fo <£
ten lead us aftray from Truth, if we had not
within ourfelves fu'ch Springs of Error as.thefe
that follow.
I. Many Errors are derived from our Weaknefs
efReafon, and Incapacity to judge of things in wk
Infant State. Thefe are called the Prejudices of
Infancy. We frame early Miftakcs about the
common Obje&s which furround us, and the com-
mon Affairs of Life : We fancy the Nurfe is out
hefi Friend, becaufe Children receive from their
Nurfes their Food and other Conveniencies of
Life. We judge that Books ( are very^unpleafani.
things, becaufe perhaps we have been driven to
them
Ch, III. S. 3; "The right Vfe gf Reafon. 199
them by the Scourge. We judge alfo that the
Sky touches the diftant Hills, bccauie we cannot in-
form ourfelves better in Childhood. We believe
the Stars are notjifen till the Sun is fet, becaufc we
never fee them by Day. But fome of thefe Errors
may feem to be derived from the next Spring,
The Way to cure the Prejudices of Infancy is to
diftinguifti, as far as we can, which are chofe Opi-
nions which we framed in perfeft Childhood, to
remember that at that Time our Reafon was inca-
pable of forming a right Judgment, and to bring
thefe Propofitions again to be examined at the Bar
of mature Reafon.
II. Our Senfes give us many a falfe Informa-
tion of Things, and tempt us to judge amifs.
This is called the Prejudice of Senfe, as when we
fuppofe the Sun and Moon to be flat Bodies, and
to be but a few Inches broad, becaule they appear
fo to the Eye. Senfe inclines us to judge that Air
has no Weighty becaufe we do not feel it prefs heavy
upon us$ and we judge alfo by our Senfes that
Cold and Heat, Sweet and Sour, Red and Blue, &c.
are fuch real Properties in, the Objects themfelves,
and exactly like thofe Senfations which they excite
in us.
. Note, Thofe Miftakes of this Sort which all
Mankind drop and lofe in their advancing Age are
called mere Prejudices of Infancy, but thofe which
abide with the vulgar Part of the World, and ge-
nerally with all Men, till Learning and Philofophy
cure them, more properly attain the Name of Pre-
judices of Senfe.
Thefe Prejudices aire to be removed feveral Ways.
.(1.) By the Affiftance pf one Senfe we cure the
Miftakes of another, as when a Stick tbruft into
the
ftoo L0GICK:Or, PtrtIL
tbi Hotter fims crooked* we are prevented from
judging ic to be really fo in itfelf, far when we
cake it out of die Water, both our Sight aftd owr
Feeling agree and determine it to be (trait, (i.)
Hie Exercife of our Reafob, arid an AppJkatta
to mathematical and philofophical Studies, curti
Diatty other Prejudices of Senfe, both with relation
to the heavenly and earthly Bodies. (3.) We
ffiould remember that our Senfes have often do»
edited us in various Inftances, that they give butt
confuted arid imperfeft Repreftntatioa of Thin*
in many Cafes, that they often reprefent falfly thdp
very Objeds to which they fecm to be fitted* feck
as the SbaptL Matum y Size and Situation of 0106
Bodies, if they ate but placed at a Diftance ton
m } arid as for the minute Particles of which Bo-
dies are cotfnpofed, our Senfes cannot diQkgntfli
them. (4.) We fcould remember alfo, that one
tarime and original Defign of our Senfes, is to in-
form us what various Relations the Bodies that are
found about us bear to our own animal Body, and
to give us Notice what is pleafant and ufeful, or
what is painful and injurious to us * but they art
hot fufficient of themfelves to lead us into a philo-
fophical Acquaintance with the inward Nature of
Things. It mud be confcfled it is by the Aflift-
mnce of the Eye and the Ear efpecially (which are
called the Strifes of Difcipline) that our Minds are
furniflied with various Parts of Knowledge, by
reading, hearing, and otyerving Things divine and
human ; yet Reafon ought always to accompany
the Exercife of our Senfes whenever we would form
a juft Judgment of Things propofed to our En*
<juiry.
Here it is proper to obferve alfo, that as the
Weakncfs of Reafon in our Infancy, and the Die*
tctes of our Senfes^ ibmetimes in advancing Years*
lead
Ch. HI. S.3. The right Ufe of Reafon. 201
lead the wffer Part of Mankind aftray from Truth ;
ib the mealier Parts of our Species, Perfons whofe
-Genius is very low, whofe Judgment is always
Weak* who are ever indulging the Dilates of Senfe
and Humour * are but Children of a larger Size, they
ftand expofod to everlafting Miftakcs in Life, and
live and die in the midft of Prejudices.
' III. Imagination is another fruitful Spring of faJfe
Judgments. Our Imagination is nothing elfe but the
-various Appearances of our fenfible Ideas in the
Brain, where the Soul frequently works in uniting,
disjoining, multiplying, magnifying, diminiflung,
ind altering the fcveral Shapes, Colours, Sounds,
Motions, Words and Things that have been com-
fiiunicated to 'us by the outward Organs of Senfe.
ft is rto wonder therefore if Fancy leads us into mj-
m Miftakcs, for it is but Senfe at Second band.
whatever is ftrongly impreffed upon the Imagina-
tion fome Perfons believe to be true. Some will
choofe a particular Number in a Lottery^ or lay a
large Wager on zfatgk Chance of a Dye, and doubt
not of Succefs, becaufe their Fancy feels fo powerful
an Impreffion, and affures them it will be profper-
ous. A thoufand pretended Prophecies and Infpira-
tiokSy and all the Freaks of Enthufiafm have been
derived from this Spring. Breams are nothing
dfe but the Deceptions of Fancy : A Delirium is
but a fhort Wildnefs of the ImaginatiQn; and
a fettled Irregularity of Fancy is Diftra3icn and
Madncfs.
One Way to gain a Viftory over this unruly
Faculty, is to fee a Watch upon It perpetually,
and to bridle it in all its Extravagances -, never to
believe any thing merely becaufe Fancy di&ates it,
any more than I would believe a JtiGdmgbi-Dream,
nor to truft Fancy any farther than it is attended
aoa LOGIC K: Or, Part IL
with fevere Reafon. It is a very ufeful and enter*
taining Power of human Nature in Matters .of U*
lufiration, Perfuafion, Oratory, Po$, Wit, Covutrfth.
tion, &c> but in the calm Enquiry after Truth awl
final Judgment of Things, Fancy ihould reunj*
and ftand afide, unlefs it be called in to explain. Of
illuftrate a difficult. Point by a Similitude. . :.
Another Method of Deliverance from thefe Pre*
judices of Fancy, is to compare the Ideas that arifc
in our Imaginations with the real Nature of fflwgh
.as often as we have Occafioji to judge concerning
them ; and let calm and fedate Rea/on govern px&
determine our Opinions, though Fancy. Ihould ihcJjt
never fo great a Reludtance. Fancy is the inferior
Faculty, and it ought to obey:
IV. The various Pajfions or Affe&ions of thft
Mind are numerous and endlefs Springs of Pre-
judice. They difguife every Objedt they convede
with, and put their own Colours upon it, and thus
lead the Judgment aftray from Truth. It it
Love that makes the Mother think her own Child
the fairefl;, and will fometimes perfuade us that a
Blemifb is a Beauty. Hope and De/ire make an
Hour of £)elay feem as long as two or three
Hours ; Hope inclines us to think there is nothing
too difficult to be attempted ; Defpair tells us, that
a brave Attempt is mere Raflbnefs, and that every
Difficulty is unfurmountable. Fear makes us
imagine that a Bu(h fhaken with the Wind has
fome favage Bead in it, and multiplies the Dan-
gers that attend our Path : But ft ill there is a
more unhappy EfFcA of Fear when it keeps Mil-
lions of Souls in Slavery to the Errors of an efta-
blilhed Religion : What could perfuade the wile
Men and Philofophers of a Poptjb Country to be*
Uevj?
fch; Hf. S. 3, *Tbe tight XJfe ^Reafori. ioj
lieve the grofs Abfurditics of the Roman Church,
but the Fear of Torture or Death, the Galleys or
the Inqidfition? Sorrow and Melancholy tempt us to
think our Circumftancis much more difmal than
they are, that we may have fome Excufe for
Mourning* And Etrvy reprefcnts the Condition df
bur Neighbour better than it is* that there might bd
lome Pretence fof her own Vexation and Unea-
finefs. Anger and Wrath and Revengt, and all thofe
hateful Paffions excite in us far worfe Ideas of Men
than they defervc, and perfuade us to believe all that
is ill of them. A Detail of the evil Influence of the
jfffttftons of the Mind upon our Judgment would
ttoake a large Volume.
The Cure of thefe Prejudices is attained by a
conftant Jealoufy of ouHelves, and Watehfulnefs
Over our Paffions, that they may never interpofe
when we are called to pais a Judgment of any
Thing t And when our Affe6Horts are warmly en-
gaged, let Us abftain from judging. It would be
alfo of great Ufe to us to form our deliberate Judg-
ments of Perfons and Things in the calmed and
fercneft Hours of Life, when the Paffions of Na-
ture are all filent, and the Mind enjoys its moft
perfeft Compofure : And thefe Judgments fo form*
ed fhould be treafured up in the Mind, that we
might have Recourfe to them in Hours of Need.
See ftiany more Sentiments and Diredtions relating
to this Subjeft in my DoSrine if the Paffions* 2d
Edition enlarged.
•o w
V. The Pondnefs we have for Self, and the
Relations which other Perfons ant Things have to
wrfelves, furnifh us with anotier long Rank
:>f Prejudices. This indeed might be reduced
:o the Paffhn of Self Love, but it is fo copious
in Head that I chofe to name it as a diftin&
- • " * O Spring
2<*4 L O G I C K: 6r 9 flatf, If.
Spring of felfe Judgments. We art generally
read? to fancy every Thing of our own has fojjop-
thing peculiarly valuable in ic 9 when indeed thtfe
h no other Reaibn, but becaufe ic is wcw.
Were we born among the Gardens of Itgfyt^t
Rocks of Switzerland* or the Ice and SoMftjpf
Ruffia and Sweden* (till we (hould imagine f)«a-
liar Excellencies in our native Land. We con-
ceive a good Idea of the %own and fftfcgt wherfjpe
firft breathed, and think the better of a M^Ojfor
being born near us. We cntcruin the bell QpqfyfQ
ui the Perfons of our ow* Party* and eaGly Jpftye
evil Reports of Perfons of a Afferent SeB or I*8jm-
Our own Sex* our Kindred* our Houfes % and mrjjm
Names* fcem to have foraething good andcj^tji^te
in them. We are ready to mingle all theft; { jpVh
our/elves* and cannot bear to have otheilbc^ffik
meanly of them. . , jjfl
So gobd an Opinion have we of ouroufr&fa
orients and Proftices* that it is very difficulty be-
lieve what a Reprover fay 9 of our Condu&&A{Kf
we are as ready to aflent to all the Language of
Flattery. We fet up our own Opinions in Rehgion
and Philofopby as the Tefts of Orthafay&ndTruiJf*
and we are prone to judge every Pra&ice of other
Men, either a Duty or a Crime* which we think
would be a Crime or a Duty in us, though their
Cireunxftances are vaftly different from our, ojro.
This Humour prevails fometimes to fuch a Degree,
chat we would make our own Tqfte and Inclination the
Standard by which to judge of every Difh of Meat
that is fet upon the Table, every Book in a Library,
every Employment, Study and Bufoeft of life* at
well as every Recreation.
It is from this evil Principle of fetting.np §t\\
for a Model what other Men ought to be* that the
AfitUbrifiim JSpirit of Imppftam and Pcrfe&tm
had
\
Ch. fll. S. 3; The right Ufe ^Rcafon, 205
. had its Original : though there is no more Reafon
for it chart thertPwBs for the Practice of that Tyrant,
who having a Bed fit for his own Size was reported
to ftretch Men bf low Stature upon the Rack till
J they wer4rdt»*wn out to the Length of his Bed ;
- andibmeadd alfo, that he cut off the Legs, of any
whom he found too long for it.
" ) It b alfo from a Principle near a-kin. to this that
^^enrert and drain the Writings of any venerable
* Atithors* and efpecially the facred Books of Scrip-
ture to make tnemfpeakw ownSenfe. Through
- the Influence which our own Schemes or Hypothecs
r have upon the Mind, we fomctimes become fo
rftarp-fighted as to find thefe Schemes in thofe
*> ? Places of Scripture where the holy Writers never
a thought of them, nor the Holy Spirit intended them.
~ v At other Times this Prejudice brings fuch a Dim*
nefs upon the Sight that we cannot read, any
-■ Tfiirtg thatoppofes our own Scheme, though it be
written as with Sun*beams, and in the plained: Lan-
* guage s and perhaps we are in Danger in fuch a
• : Cafe Of winking a little a gain ft the Light.
- We ought to bring our Minds free, unbiased
*nd teachable to learn our Religion from the Word
of God ; but we have generally formed all the
lefleraswell as the greater Points of our Religion
before-hand, and then we read the Prophets and
Apoftles only to pervert them to confirm our own
Opinions. .Were it not for this Influence of Self,
arid a Bigotry to our own Tenets, we could hardly
■ imagine that fo many ftrange, abfurd, inconfiftent,
wicked, mifchievous, and bloody Principles fhould
pretend to fupport and defend themfelves by the
Go/pel of Cbrift.
Every learned Critick has bis own Hpothefis;
and if the common Text be not favourable to his
Opinion, a various Letiion fhali be made authen-
:*:. O 2 tick.
2d6 LOGIC K: Or, Part 'It
tick. The Text muft be fuppofed to be defeBroe
or redundant, and the Senfe of it (hall be Htcrd,
or metaphorical, according as it bed fupports his
own Scheme. Whole Chapters or Books flrall
be added or left out of the facred Canon, or be
turned into Parables by this Influence. JLutber
knew not well how to reconcile the Epiftle pf St.
James to the Do&rinc of Juftificatiori by Faith a*
lone % and fo he could not allow it to be Divine.
JThe Papifts bring all the Apocrypha into their
Bible?, and ftamp Divinity upon it; for they can
fancy Purgatory is there, and they find Prayers lor
the Dead. But they leave out the Jecmi Cm-
mandment- becaufe it forbids the Warftnp *of linages.
*% Others fuppofethe Mofaick Hijiory of the Creation
and the Fall of Man to be oriental Ornaments, or
a mere Allegory* becaufe the literal Senfe of thefe
three Chapters of Genefis do not agree with' then:
Theories. Even an honeft plain-hearted and tiii-
karned Chriftian 9 is ready to find fomething m
every Chapter of the Bible to countenance his own
private Sentiments ; but he loves thofe Chapters bfcft
which fpeak his own Opinions plaineft : This is a
Prejudice that (licks very clofe to our Natures \ the
Scholar is infefted with it daily, and the Mechanick
. is not free. ■• " *
Self has yet a farther and a pernicious Influence
upon our Underftandings, and is an unhappy
Guide in the Search after Truth. When our own
Inclination or our Eafe, our Honour or cur Profit
tempts us to the Practice of any Thing of fufpect-
cd Lawfulnefs, how do we ftrain our Thoughts
to find Arguments for ir, and pcrfuade ourftlves
it is lawful ? We colour over Iniquity and finfirf ,
Compliance with the Names of Virtue and Inno-
cence, or at lead of Omftraint and NeceJJity. AH.
the different and oppofcc Sentiments and Prac-
tices
Ch.HL S. 3.. The right Ufe of Reafon. 207
ticcs of Mankind are too much influenced by this
niean Bribery,, and give too juft Occafion for faty-
rlcal Writers to fay that Selflnterejt governs all
Mankind.
When the Judge had awarded due Damages to
a Perfon into whofe Field a Neighbour's Oxen had
broke, it is reported that he reverfed his own Sen-
tence, when he heard that the Oxen which had
dohe this Mifchief were his own. Whether this be
a Hi/lory or a Parable, it is ftill a juft Reprefenta-
tion of the wretched Influence of Self to corrupt the
judgment.
One Way to amend this Prejudice is to thrufl:
Self fo far out of the Queftion that it may have
no Manner of Influence whe-nfoever we-are called
to judge and confider of the naked Nature,. Truth
and Juftice of Things. In Matters of Fquity be-
tween Man and Man, our Saviour has taught us
an effectual Means of guarding againft this Preju-
dice, and that is to put tny Neighbour in the Place
of wyfelf > and myfelf in the Place of my Neighbour*
rather than be bribed by this corrupt Principle of
Self-Love to do Injury to our Neighbours. Thence
arifes that Golden Rule of dealing with others as we
would have others deal with us.
In the Judgment of Truib and Fal/bood, t Righ$
and Wrong, Good and Evil, we ought to confidef-
that every Man has a Self as well as we ; and
that the Taftes, Paifions, Inclinations and Interefts
of .different Men are very different, and often con-
trary, and that they diflate contrary Things : Un-
lefe therefore all Manner of different and contrary
Proportions could be true at once, Self can never
t>e a juft Teft or Standard of Truth and FdlJhoocl %
Cood and Evil,
O 3 VI. The
so8 LOGIC K: Or, Parti!'
■ i
VI. The tempers* Humours* and peculiar Termif
the Mini* whether they be natural or acquired, fuhfe
a great Influence upon our Judgment, and beeomp
the OccaGon of many Mtfiaka. Let us fdtveyj
few of them. "*
(i.) Some Perfons are of an tafy and creduMs
Temper* while others are perpetually difcovering*
Spirit of Contradtfiion. x
The credulous Mm is ready to receive evett
Thing for Truth, that has but a Shadow of Evi-
dence ; every new Book that he reads, and evctj
ingenious Man with whom he converfes/has Power
enough to draw him into the Sentiments of HM
Speaker or Writer. He has fb much Comphifance
in him, or Wcaknefe of Soul, that he is rcady^
refign his own Opinion to the firft Otjefltoii'WIS^
he hears, and to receive any Sentiments of atiotHSi
that are aflerted with a pofitive Air and much Af-
furance. Thus he 19 under a kind of NecctBft
through the Indulgence of his credulous Humour,
cither to be often changing his Opinions, oK*
believe Incontiftenctes.
The Man of Contradiction is of a contrary-HS-
mour, for he ftands ready to oppofe every Thing
that is fald : he gives a flight Attention to the
Reafons of other Men, for an inward fcornfuj
Preemption that they have no Strength in the*.
When he reads or hears a Difcourfe different from
big own Sentiments, he does not give himfelf Leave
to confider whether that Difcourfe may be trtier'*
but employs all his Powers immediately to corf*
fute it. Your great Difputefs and your Men if
Contriver]} are in continual Danger of this fort of
Prejudice; they contend often for Viftory, and
will maintain whatfoever they have aflerted, while
Truth is loft in the Noife and Tumult of reci-
procal
CI1.JB.&3*- The rigHUfe of Kt^on. 209
procal Contradi&ions ; and it frequently happens,
thzLz Debate about Opinions is turned into a mutual
Reproach of Pcrfons.
The Prejudice of Credulity may in fome Mea-
sure be cured, by learning to fet a high Value on
Truth, and by taking more Pains to attain it; re*
numbering that Truth oftentimes lies dark and
deep, and requires us to dig for it as bid Trea-
fure; and that Fallhood often puts on a fair Di£
fuife, and therefore we fhould not yield up our
udgment to every plaufible Appearance. It is
_ no Part, of Civility or good Breeding to part with
Truth, but to maintain it with Decency and
Candour.
A Spirit of Contradiction is fo pedantick and
hateful, that a Man (hould take much Pains with
himfelf to watch againft every Inftance of it : He
fiiould learn fo much good Humour* at leaft, as
never to oppofc any Thing without juft and folid
Reafon for it : He (hould abate fome Degrees of
Pride and Morojeuefs, which are never-failing In-
gredients in this fort of Temper, and fhould feek
after fo much Honefty and Confcience as never to con-
tend for Conqueft or Triumph j but to review his
own Reafon, and to read the Arguments of his Op*
ponents (if poffible) with an equal Indifierency, and
i)e glad to fpy Truth and to fubmit to it, though
it appear on the oppolite Side.
(2.) There is. another Pair of Prejudices derived
from two Tempers of Mind, near a-kin to thofe I
Jiave juft mentioned ; and thefc - arc the dogmatical
znd the fceptical Humour % i. e. always pofitivc % or
always doubting.
By what Means foever the Dqgmatijt came
his Opinion^ whether by his Senies* or by
Fancy, his Education, or his own Reading, yce
he believes them all with the feme A$aran<# that
■>-■#* O4 be
*io LOGIC K: Or, Part H,
he does a mathematical Trutk ; he has fcarce an/
mere Probabilities chat belong to him ; every thing
with him is certain and infallible ; every Pun&iljp
in Religion is an Article of his Faith, and he an*
fwers all Manner of Objections by a Sovereign Con*
tempt.
Perfons of this Temper are feldom to be con-
vinced of any Miftake : A full Affurance of their
own Notions makes all the Difficulties of their
own Side vanifti fo entirely, that they think every
Point of their Belief is written as with Sun-beaptf,
and wonder any one fhould find a Difficulty in it.
They are amazed that learned Men fhould make a
Controverfy of what is to them fo perfpicuous sm4
indubitable. The loweft Rank of People both in
learned and in vulgar. Life, is very fubjeft to this
Obftinacy.
Scepticifm is a contrary Prejudice. The Dogma-
till isfure of every Thing, and the Sceptick believe*
Nothing. Perhaps he has found himfclf often mis-
taken* in Matters of which he thought himfelf we"!
afiured in his younger Days, and therefore he is-
afraid to give Aflent to any Thing again. He fee*
fo much Shew of Reafon for every Opinion, and
fo many Objections alfo arifing againft eveiy
Doctrine, that he is ready to throw off the Belief
of every Thing: He renounces at once the Purfuit
of Truth, and contents himfelf to fay, There is n$*
thing certain. It is well, if through the Influence*
of fuch a Temper, he does not caft aw^y his Reli* .
gion as well as his Philofophy, and abandon him-
felf to a profane Courfe of Life, regardlefe of HeU
^ndHeaven.
Both thefe Prejudices laft mentioned, though they
are fp oppofite to each other, yet they ariie from
(he fame Spripg, and that.jjjfc Impatience of Study,
f_*d Want of diligent Attention in the Search of
Truth.
Gh. IIL S. 3. *Tbe right Ufe gfReafon; i\%
Truth. The Dogmatiji is in haftc to believe fome-
tfaing ; he cannot keep himfelf long enough in Sut
pence, till feme bright and convincing Evidence
appear on one Side, but throws himfelf cafually
into the Sentiments of one Party or another, and
then he will hear no Argument tQ the contrary.
The Sceptick will not take Pains to fearch Things
to the Bottom, but when he fees Difficulties on
both Sides, refolves to believe neither of them.
Humility of Soul; Patience in Study, Drligme in
Enquiry* with an honefi Zeal for Truth* would go
a great Way towards the Cure of both thefe Fol-
(3.) Another fort of Temper that is very injuri-
ous to a right Judgment of Things, is an inconftant y
JUkle* changeable Spirit* and a very uneven Temper
of Mind. When fuch Perfons are in one Hu-
mour, they pafs a Judgment of Things agreeable
to it ; when their Humour changes, they reverfc
their firft Judgment, and embrace a new Opinion.
They have no Sttadinefs of Soul 5 they want Firm-
nefs of Mind, fufficient to eftablilh themfelves in
any Truth, and are ready to change it for the
next alluring Falfhood that is agreeable to their
Change of Humour. This FicUenefs is fometimes
fo mingled with their very Conftitution by Na-
ture, or by Diftemper of Body, that a cloudy Day
and a lowring Shy fhall ftrongly incline them to
form an Opinion both of themfelves, and of Per-
sons and Things round about them, quite different
from what they believe when the Sunfhines* and
the Heavens areferene.
This fort of People ought to judge of Things
and Perfons in their moft fedate; peaceful, and
compofed Hours of Life, and referve thefe Jtfdg-
inents for their Conduit at more unhappy Seafons.
(4.) Some
411 tOG 1C K: Or, Part IF,
( 4. ) Some Perfons have a violent and turgid
Manner of Talking and Thinking ; whatfoevcr : they
judge of, it is always with a Tin&ure of this Vani-
ty. They are always in Extremes, and prpnounc?
concerning every thing in the fuperlative. If du$
think a Man to be learned, be is the chief Schmfi
cf the Agt: If another has low Parts, he is the
greattf Blockhead in Nature : If they approve Wf
Book on divine Subjects, it is the heft Book m $t
World next to the Bible : If tbey fpeak of a Storm
of Rain or Hail, it is the tnqfl terrible Storm that feu
fine* the Creation : And a cold Winter Day hthe
aldefi that ever was known.
But the Men of this fwelling Language ougl* $
remember, that Nature has ten thouiand modniiu^
Things in it, and does not always deal in ExtrcmQ
as they do. ■ ,. -fi
(5.) I think it may be called another ftrj( :$
Prejudices derived from Humour, when fome Men
believe a DoSrine merely becauje it is ancient, and hfi
been long believed ; others are fo fond of Novefa,
that nothing prevails upon their Aflent fo much ^s
new Thoughts and new Notions. Again, there are
fome who fet a high Efteem upon every Thing
that is foreign and far-fetched ; therefore China Pit*
tures are admired, how auk ward foeyer: Others
value Things the more for being of our own native
Growth, Invention, or Manufacture, and thefe ^
much dtfpifc foreign Things. . ./ i
Some Men of Letters and Theology will not tip*
lieve a Propofmon even concerning a fublime Sufc
je&, till every thing myfterious, deep and di|fi*
cult is cut off from it, though the Scripture aflfcrts
it never fo plainly 1 others are ta fond of a JIA*
jfay and Thing? incomprebenftble, that they wqu1$
fcarce believe the Etoftrinc of the Trinity j if hj
could be explained ; they incline to that foolifb
Rapt ;
Ch. III. S. 3: The right Ufe of Reafon. 213
Rant of one of the Ancients, Credo ama impofjibik
eft y I believe it becaufc it is impoflible.
To cure tbefe Miftakes remember that neither
antique nor novel, foreign nor native, myfterious nor
plain, are certain Characters either of Truth or
Falfhood.
I might mention various other Humour j of Mm
that expite in them various Prejudices^ 'and lead
them into rafh and miftaken Judgments 5 but thefe
arse TufEcient. for a Specimen.
W VIL There are feveral other Weakness which
belong to human Nature, whereby we are led into
M$dke$, and indeed are rendered almoft unca-
pable of paffing a folid Judgment in Matters of
great Depth and Difficulty. Some have a native
Obfcurity of Perception, (or fhall I call it a want of
natural Sagacity ?) whereby they are hindered from
attaining clear and diftinft Ideas. Their Thoughts
always feem to have fomething confufed and
cloudy in them, and therefore they judge ia
the Dark. Some have a DefeS in Memory, and
then they are not capable of comparing their pre?
fent Ideas with a great Variety of others, in order
to fecure themfelves from Inconfiftency in Judg-
ment. Others may have a Memory large enough,
yetkhey are fubjedt to the fame Errors from *
Narrownefs of Soul, and fuch a Fixation and Cm*
jmement of Thought to a few ObjeEU, that they fcarce
ever take a Survey of Things wide enough to judge
wifely and well, and to fecure themfelves from all
Inconfiftencies.
Though thefe are natural DefeSs tod fVeatmeffe$l
yet they may in fome Meafure be relieved by La-
bour, Diligence, and a due Attention to propel
Rules.
«4 L G IC K: Or, Part It
But among all the Caufes offalfe Judgment which
are within our/elves, I ought by no Means to
leave out that unrverfd and original Spring of Er*
ror 9 which we arc informed of by the Word of
God, and that is, the Sin and DefeShn of ourfirjt
Parents* whereby all our beft natural Powers both
of Mind and Body are impaired, and rendered
very much inferior to what they were in a State
of Innocence. Our Underftanding is darkened,
our Memory contra&ed, our corrupt Humours
and Paffions are grown predominant, * our Rea-
fon enfeebled, and various Diforders attend our
Conftitution and animal Nature, whereby the Mind
is ftrangely impofed upon in its Judgment <^
Things. Nor is there any perfeft Relief to be
cxpedted on Earth. There is no hope of ever «£
covering from thefe Maladies, but by a fmcere
Return to God in the Ways of his own Appoint*
ment, whereby we (hall be kept fafe from all dan-
gerous and pernicious Errors in the Matters of
Religion; and though ImperfeSions and Mifiahs
will hang about us in this prefent Life as the Eflfeds
of our original Apoftah from God, yet we hope for
» full Deliverance trom them when we arrive at
Heaven.
S E C T. IV.
t
Prejudices arifingfrom other Perfons.
WE R E it hot for the Springs of Prejudice
that are lurking in ourfehes> we (hould not
be fubjeft to fo many Miftakes from the Influence
of others: But fince our Nature is fo fufceptivc
of Errors on all Sides, it is fit we (hould have
Hints and Notices given us, how far other Per*
fons may have Power over us, and become the
Caufes
Ch. Ill S. 4. • 5& right Ufe */Reafon. i 1$
Caufe* of our falfe Judgments. This might a!i
becaft into one Heap, for they are all near a-kin,
and mingle with each other ; but for Diftin&ion
fake let Ihem be called the Prejudices of Education,
ofCuftom, of Authority^ and fuch as arife from the
Mower of Propofal.
I. Thofe with whom our Education is cntruft-
ed may lay the firft Foundation of many Mtjiakes
in our younger Years. How many Fooleries atid
Errors are inftilled into us by our Nurfes, our.
Fellow-Children, by Servants or unfkilful Teach-
ers, which are not only maintained through the
following Parts of Life, but fometimes have a very
unhappy Influence upon us ! Wd gre taught that
iTbere are Gobtings and Bugbears in the Dark; our
young Minds are crowded with the terrible Ideas
of Ghofis appearing upon every Occafion, or with the
pleafariter Tales of Fairies dancing at Midnight.
We learn to prophecy betimes, to foretel Futurities
by good or evil Omens, and to prefage approaching
Death in a Family by Ravens and little Worms y
which we therefore call a Death-Watch. We are
taught to know before-hand, for a Twelve-month
together, which Days of the Week will be fair or
foul, which will be lucky or unlucky ; nor is thertf
any thing fo filly, but may be impofed upon ouf.
Underftandings in that early Part of Life y arii|
thefe ridiculous Stories abide with us too long]
and too far influence the weaker Part of Man*
kind. J
* We choofe our .particular Seff and Party in ih}
civil, the religious and the learned Life, by the- In-
fluence of Education. In the Colleges of Learn-
ing, fome are for the Nominals, and fome for the
Realifts in the Science of Metaphyficks, becaufe
their Tutors were devoted to thefe Parties. The
old
216 LO G I€ Kr Or % fcartIL
old Philofophy and the new have gained thoufands
of Partizaos the fame way : And every Retigim
has its Infant Votaries* Mho are born, live and die
in the lame Faith without Examination of ;*ny
Article. The fnrh are taught eafrly tor beliefrc b
Mahomet \ the Jews in MoJes\ the Heathen* wtfr
fliip a Multitude of Gods under the Force of tl*3r
Education. And k would be well if fhwfe iHsfe
not Millions of Cbriftians* who have little more to
lay for their Religion, than that they were born
and bred up in it. The greateft Part of the
Cbrifiian World can hardly give any Reafon why
they believe the BMe to be the PPerdqfGod, bat
bec»ufe they have always believed ir, and they
were taught Jo from their Infancy. As Jews and
Turks, and American Heathens believe the moft
xnonftrous and incredible Stories, becaufc they
have been trained up amongft them, as Articles of
Faith \ fo the Papifts believe their franfalfiantUh
tion, and make no Difficulty of affenting to Im-
poffibilitics, fince it is the current Do&rine of their
Catechifms. By the fame Means the feveral Sefts
and Parties in Cbriftianity believe all the ftraimd
Interpretations of Scripture by which they have been
taught to fupport their own Tenets: They find
nothing difficult in all the abfurd Gloffes and far-
fetched Senfes that are fometimes put upon the
Words of their facred Writers, becaufe their Eats
feve,been always accuftomed to thefc Gloffes y and
therefore they fet fo fmooth and eafy upon their
fjnderftandings, that they know not how to admit
the moid natural and eafy Interpretation in Oppo*
ittion to fchem..
v loathe fame Manner we are - nurfed up in many
filly and gfofs Miftakes about domeftick Affairs as
well as in Matters of political Concernment. It
is upon the fame Ground that Children are trained
up
Ch.lII. S*4< The right TJfi of Raton. 217
up to be filings and Tories betimes 1 and every one
learns the diftingutihing Terms of his own Party, as
the PapiJkMaru iofaj their Prayers in Latin t without
.«ny Megjpfigi Reafqn, or Devotion.
T&is fiyc of Prejudice muft be cured by calling
all the Principles of our young Years to the Bar
of more mature Reafon, that we may judge of
the Things of Nature and political Affairs by jufter
Rule* of Philofophy and Obfervation: And even
i the Matters of Religion muft be firft inquired in-
to by Rtafon and Confcience, and when thefe have
led us to believe Scripture to be the Word of God,
then that becomes our fovereign Guide, and Rea-
fi>n and Conference muft fubmit to receive its Die*
,tates.
II. The next Prejudice which I (hall mention
is, that which arifes from the Gufim or Fajhion, of
-tbofe amongft whom we live. Suppofe we have freed
ourfelves from the younger Prejudices of our Edu*
cation* yet we are in Danger of having our Mind
turned afide from Truth by the Influence of general
Gjlom.
Our Opinion of Meats and Drinks, of Gar-
ments and Forms of Salutation are influenced much
mort by Cuflom, than by the Eye, the Ear, ortBe
Tafte. Cuftom prevails even over Senfe itrfelf, arid
therefore no Wonder if it prevail over Reafon tdo.
What is it but Ctfotn that renders many of tfte
Mixtures of Food and Sauces elegant in Britajk,
which would be aukward and naufcous to the In-
habitants of China, and indeed were aaufeous to
us when we firft tafted them ? What but Gufim
could make thofe Salutations polite in Mufcaw,
which are ridiculous in France or England f We
call ourfelvcs indeed the politer Nations, but it is
we who judge thus of ourfelves 2 and that fan*
cied
ai8 LOG 1 C k: Or, PartIL
cied Politenefs is oftentimes more owing to Cuftom
than Reafon. Why a^e the Forms of our pre/ait
Garments counted beautiful, and thofe Fafhions of
our Anceftors the Matter of Scoff and Contempt,
which in their Day were all decent And genteel ?
It is Cuftom that forms our Opinion of Drefs, and
reconciles us by Degree* to thofe Habits which
at firft feemed very odd and monflxous. It muft
be granted there are fome Garments and Habit*
which have a natural Congruity or Incongruity, .
Modefty or Immodefty, Decency or Indecency,
Gaudery or Gravity ; though for the mod part
there is but little of Reafon in thefe Affairs : But
what little thefe is of Reafon or natural Decency,
Cuftom triumphs over it all. It is almoft impdffibfe
to perfuade a gay. Lady that any thing can be de-
tint which is out of Fajhion: And it were well if
Fajbion ftretched its Powers no farther than the.Brf-
finefs of Drapery and the fair Serf.
The Methods of our Education are governed
by Cuftom. It is Cuftom and not Reafon that fend*
every Boy to learn the Roman Poets, and begin at
little Acquaintance with Greek, before he is bound '
an Apprentice to a Soap-boiler or Leather- feller.
It is Cuftom alone that teaches us Latin by the
Rules of a Latin Grammar \ a tedious and abfard
Method ! And what is it but Cuftom that has for
paft Centuries confined the brighteft Genus's evert
of the high Rank in the Female World to the only
Bufinefiof the Needle, and fecluded them moft un-
mercifully from the Pleafures of Knowledge, and
the divine Improvements of Reafon ? But we begia
to break all thefe Chains, and Reafon begins to
diltate the Education of Youth. May the growing
Age be learned and wife 1
It
Oh. III. S. 4; Tie right Ufe gfReafbn. *i£
It is by the Prejudice arifing from our own Cuf
' toms, that we judge, of all other civil and religious
forms arid Prahices. The Rites and Ceremonies
bi W'ar and Peace in other Nations, the Forms of
PPeddings and Funerals, the Teveral Rahks of Aft-
gijlraty, the Trades and Employments of both Sexes,
the pubtick and the dome/tick Affairs of £ife 9 and al-
taoft every thing of foreign Cujloms, is judged irre-
gular. It Is all" imagined to be unreafonabk or uh*
haturttl, by thofe who have no other Rule to judge
of Nature and Reafon, but the Cuftoms of their
bwn Country, ttr the little Town where they dw.eU.
Cuftom is called a fecond Nature, but we often mis-
take it for Nature it/elf.
Bcfidesall this,~*here is-a: ;F^(hion in Opinion's^
there is a Fafhion in Writing and Printing, in Style
r and Language. In our Day it is the Vogue of th<j
Nation, that Parliaments mdy ftttle the Succtflicn of
the Crown, ahd that a People can thah a King ; in
the laft AgC: iJthisi , was a E)o6trine a-kin to Treafori.
Citations from the Latin Poets were an Embelliffi-
ittent of Style in the laft Century, and whole Pages '
in that Day were covered with them j it is noflr
forbidden by Cuftom, and expofed by the Name of
Pedantry, Whereas id Truth both thefe are Ex-
tremes. Sometimes our printed Books (hall abound
In Capitals, and fometimes rejeft them all. Nov(r
toe deal much in EffdySi and moft unreafonably
defpife fyUemdtic Learning, whereas our Fathers
had a juft Value fof Regularity ahd Syflems ;
then Folio's and <$uatto*s were the fafhionable Sizes,
as Volumes in OSlavo are how. We are ever
teady to run into Extrerties^ and yet Cuftom ftili
geffuadcs us that RtafoH and Nature are on out
Side;
P this
220 LOGIC K: Or, Ptrtll.
This Bufinefs of the Fafhion has a moft power-
ful Influence on our Judgment: for it employs
thofe two ftrong Engines of Fear and Shame to
operate upon our Underftandings with unhappy
Succcfs. We are afhamed to believe or profefs an
unfafhionable Opinion in Philofophy, and a cow-
ardly Soul dares not fo much as indulge a Thought
contrary to the ejlablifbed or fajhionabk Faith* nor
aft in Oppofition to Cuftom % though it be according to
the Dictates of Reafon.
I confefs, there is a Refpeft due to Mankind
which fhould incline even the wifeft of Men to.
follow the innocent Cuftoms of their Country ia
outward Practices of the Civil Life, and in fome
Meafure to fubmit to Fafhion in all different 4F p
fairs, where Reafon and Scripture make no Remon%
ftrances againft it. But the Judgments of the
Mind ought to be for ever free, and not biafied by
the Cuftoms and Fafhions of any Age or Nation
whatfoever.
To deliver our Underftandings from this Dan-
ger and Slavery we fhould confider thefe three
Things.
i. That the greateft Part of the civil Cuftoms
of any particular Nation or Age fpring from Hi.
mour rather than Reafon. Sometimes the Humour
of the Prince prevails, and fometimes the Humour
of the People. It is cither the Great or the Mop
who di&ate the Fafhion, and thefe have not always
the higheft Reafon on their Side.
2. Confider alfi^ that the Cuftoms of the fame
Nation in different Ages, the Cuftoms of different
Nations in the fame Age, and the Cuftoms of dif-
ferent Towns and Villages in the fame Nation, are
very various and contrary to each other. The
fafhicnable Learning, Language, Sentiments, and
Rules of Politenefa differ greatly in different Cou*±
trit
Ch. III. S. 4. *fbe right Ufe of Reafon. 2»i
tries and Ages of Mankind ; but Truth and Reafon
are of a more uniform and Heady Nature, and
do not change with the Fafhion. Upon this Ac*
count, to cure the PrepojfeJJions which arife from
Cuftom, it is of excellent Ufe to travel, and fee the
Guftoms of various Countries, and to read the
Travels of other Men, and the Hiftory of paft
Ages, that every thing may not feem ftrange and
uncouth, which is not praftifed within the Limits of
our own Pariih, or in the narrow Space of our own
Life-time.
3. Confider yet again, how often we ourfelves
have changed our own Opinions concerning the
Decency, Propriety, or Congruity of *eyerai
Modes or Practices in the World, efpecially if we
^ave lived to the Age of thirty or forty. Cuftom
or Fafhion, even in all its Changes, has been ready
to have fome Degree of Afcendency over bur
*Underftandings, and what at one time feemcd de*
tent appears, obfokte and difagreeable afterward,
when the Fafhion changes. Let us learn there-
fore to abftradt as much as poffible from Cuftom
and Fajhion, when we would pafs a Judgment
concerning the real Value and iutrinfic Nature of
Things.
III. The Authority of Men is the Spring of another ■
Rank of Prejudices.
Among thefe the Authority of our Forefathers
and ancient Authors is moft remarkable. We pay
Deference to the Opinions of others, merely be-
caufe they lived a thoufand Years before us •, and
even the Trifles and Impertinencies that have a
Mark of Antiquity upon them are reverenced for
this Reafon, becaufe they came from the Anci-
ents. It is granted, that the Ancients had many
. wife and great Men among them, and fome of
P a " their
222 LOGIC K: or, Part II.
their Writings, which Time hath delivered down
to us, are truly valuable : but thofe Writers lived
rather in the Infant-State of the World ; and the
Philofopbers, as well as the polite Authors of our Age,
are properly the Elders, who have feen the Miftakes
of the younger Ages of Mankind, and corrected them
by Obfervation and Experience.
Some borrow all their Religion from the Fathers
of the Cbriftian Church, or from their Synods or
Councils ; but he that will read Monfieur Dmlk
on the Ufe of the Fathers, will find many Reafoni
why they are by no means fit to did ate our Faith,
fince we have the Gofpel of Cbrift, and the Writ*
ings of the Apoftles and Prophets in our owa
Hands.
Some Perfons believe every Thing that their
Kindred, their Parents, and their tutors believe.'
The Veneration and the Love which they have
for their Ancejlors incline them to fwallow down
all their Opinions at once, without examining
what Truth or Falfhood there is in them. Men
take up their Principles by Inheritance, and de-
fend them as they would their Eftates, becaufe
they are born Heirs to them. I freely grant, that
Parents are appointed by God and Nature to teach
us all the Sentiments and Praftices of our younger
Years ; and happy are thofe whofe Parents lead
them into the Paths of Wtfdom and Truth ! I
grant farther, that when Perfons come to Years
of Difcretion, and judge for themfelves, they
ought to examine the Opinions of their Parents
with the greateft Modefty, and with an humble
Deference to their fuperior Character 5 they ought
in Matters perfeftly dubious to give the Prefer-
ence to their Parents Advice, and always to pay
them the firft Refpeft, nor ever depart from their
Opinions and Practice, till Reafon and Confcience
make
CK.1II.S.4- The right Ufe of RezCon. *2$
make it neceflary. But after all, it is poflible that
. Parents may be miftaken, and therefore Reafon and
Scripture ought to be our final Rites of Determina-
tion in Matters that relate to this World, and that
which is to come.
Sometimes a favourite Author y or a Writer of
great Name, drags a thoufand Followers after him
into his own Miftakes, merely by the Authority of
his Name and Character. The Sentiments of A-
riftotle were imbibed and maintained by all the
Schools in Europe forfeveral Centuries; and a Cita-
tion from his Writings was thought a fufficiept
Proof of any Propofition. The great De/cartes
had alfo too many itpplicit Believers in the laft
Age, though he himfelf, in his Philofophy, dis-
claims all fuch Influence over the Minds of his
Readers; Calvin and Luther, in the Days of Re-
formation from Popery, were learned and pious
Men, and there hate been a Succeffion of their
Difciples even to this Day, who pay too much
Reverence to the Words of their Matters. There
are others who renounce their Authority, but give
themfelves up in too fervile a Mantier to the Opi-
nion and Authority of other Matters, and follow as
bad or worfe Guides in Religion.
If only learned, and wife, and good Men had
Influence on the Sentiments of others, it would
be at leaft a more ?xcufable fort of Prejudice, ahd
there would be fome Colour and Shadow of Rea-
fon for it : But that Riches, Honours, and outward
Splendour fhould fet up Perfons for Dictators to all
the reft of Mankind ; this is a moft fhameful In r
vafion of the Right of our Underftandings on the
one Hand, and as (hameful a Slavery of the Soul
on the other. The poor Man, or the Labourer, too
often believes fuch a Principle in Politics, or in
Morality, and judges concerning the Rights of the
P 3 King
22* 10 G IC K Or, Part IL
King and the People, juft as his wealthy Neighbour does.
Half the Parifh fallows the Opinion of the Efqmre f
and the Tenants of a Manor fall into the Send-
ments of their Lord, efpemlly if he lives amongft
them. How unreafonable and yet how common
is this !
As for Principles of Religion, we frequently
find how they are taken up and forfaken, chahged
and refumed by the Influence of Princes. In ail
Nations the Priefts have much Power alio in dic-
tating the Religion of the People, but the Prima
dittate to them : And where there is a great Pomp
and Grandeur attending the Priefthood in* any
Religion whatfoever, with fo much the more Re*
verence and ftronger Faith 'do the People believe
whatever they teach them : Yet it is too often avi-
dent that Riches, and Dominions, and high Titles
in Church or State have no Manner of Pretence to
Truth and Certainty, Wifdom and Goodnefs, above
the reft of Mortals, becaufc their Superiorities in
this World are not always conferred according to
Merit.
I confefs, Where a Man of Wif&otn and Tears
of Obfervation and Experience, gives us his Opi-
nion and Advice in Matters of the civil or the
moral Life, Reafon tells us we fhould pay a great
Attention to him, and it is probable he may be in
the Right. Where a Man of long Exerci/e in Piety
fpeaks of praBical Religion, there is a due Defe-
rence to be paid to his Sentiments : And the fame
we may fay concerning an ingenious Man long <vtrf*
id in any Art or Science, hemayjuftly expedt due
Regard when he fpeaks of his own Affairs and
f roper Bufinefs. But in other Things each of thefe
may be ignorant enough, notwithftanding all their
Piety and Years, and particular Skill : Nor even
in their own proper Province are they to be believed
in
Ch. III. S. 4. The rigbt Vfe of Rcafon. 225
in every thing without Referve, and without Exa-
mination.
To free ourfelves from thefe Prejudices, it is fuf-
ficient to remember, that there is no Rank nor Cha-
racter among Mankind, which has any juft Pre-
tence to fway the Judgments of other Men by their
Authority : For there have been Perfons of the
fame Rank and Character who have maintained dif-
ferent and contrary Sentiments ; but all thefe can
never be true, and therefore the mere Name or Re*
putation that any of them pofiefies, is not fufficient
Evidence for Truth.
Shall we believe the Ancients in Pbilofopby ? But
fome of the Ancients were Stoics, fome Peripate-
tics, fome Platonics, and fome Epicureans, fome Cy-
nics, and fome Sceptics. Shall we judge of Mat*
ters of the Cbriftian Fai{b by the Fathers or Pri-
mitive Writers for three or four hundred* Years
after Cbrift ? But they often contradicted one an-
other, and themfelves too; and, what is worfe,
they fome times contradi&ed the Scripture itfelf.
Now among all thefe different and contrary Sen* * .
, timents in Pbilofopby and Religion, which of the /.^
Ancients muft we believe, for we cannot believe ^
them all ?
* Again, To believe in all Things as our Prede#
ceflbrs did, is the ready Way to keep Mankind in
an everlafting State of Infancy, and to lay an
eternal Bar againft all the Improvements of our
Reafon and our Happinefs. Had the prefent Age
of Philofophers fatisfied themfelves with the fab-
ftantial Forms and occult Qualities of Arijlotle*
with the Jolii Spheres, Eccentrics, and Epicycles of
Ptolomy, and the ancient Aftronomers ; then the
great Lord Bacon, Copernicus, and JDe/cartes, with
the great Sir Ifaac Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr.
Boyle, had rifen in our World in vain. We muft
P 4 have
*26 ■ LOG I C K: Or, Part IL
have blundered on dill in fucceffive Generations
amongft Abfurdities and thick Darknefs, and a
hundred ufeful Invention* for the Happinefs of hut
man Life bad never been known.
Thus it is in Matters of Philofopby and Science %
Buiy you will fay, Shall not our cwn Anceftors de-
termine our Judgments in Matters of civil or religi-
ous Concernment ? If they mult, then the Child of
a Heathen muft believe that Heatbenifm is Truth ; the
Son of a Papi/l muft affent to believe all the Abfurdi-
ties of Popery \ the Pofterity of the Jewf and Soa*
nians muft for ever be Socinians and Jews 5 and a
Man whofe Father was of Republican Principles^
muft make a Succeffion of Republicans in his Family
to the End of the World, If we otfght always
to believe whatfoever our Parents, or our Priefts^
or our Princes believe, the Inhabitants of China
ought to worlhip their own Idols, and the Sa-
vages of Africa ought to believe all the Nonfenfe,
?md pra&ife the Idolatry of their Negro Fathers
and Kings. The Britijh Nation, when it was/fc#-
then, could never have become Cbriftran ; and when
it was a Slave to Rome, it could never have beep
reformed.
Befides, let us confider that the great God, ou*
common Maker, has never given one Man's Un-
derftanding a legal and rightful Sovereignty to de-
termine Truths for others, at leaft after they are pad
the State of Childhood or Minority. No fingle
Perfon, how learned and wife, and great foever, or
whatfoever natural, or civil, or ecclejiaflical Rela-
tion he may have to us, can claim this Dominion
over our Faith. St. Paul the Apoftle, in his pri-
vate Capacity, would not do it ; nor hath an in-
spired Maa any fuch Authority, until he makes his
divine Commfflion appear. Our Saviour himfetf
tells the Jews, that if be bad not done fucb won-
" djrouj
Ch. III. S. 4. Vbe right Ufe of&ttiori. 227
drous Works among them, they bad not famed in
difbelieving his Doftrines, and refilling him for
the Meffiab. No Bifhop or Prefbytcr, no Synod
or Council," ho Church or Affembly of Men, (fince
the Days of Infpiration) hath Power derived to
them frogn God to make Creeds or Articles of
Faith for us, and impofe them upon our Under-
standings. We muft all aft according to the bed
of our own Light* and the Judgment of our owq
Confciences, ufing the bed Advantages which
Providence hath given us, with an honeft and im-
partial Diligence to enquire and fearch out the
Truth : For every one of us mujt give an Account of
himfelf to God. To believe as the Church, or the
Court believes, is but a fbrry and a. dangerous
Faith : This Principle would make mqre Heathens
- than Chrijlians, and more Papifts' than Proteftants 5
and perhaps lead more Souls to Hell than to Hea-
ven 1 for our Saviour hfmfelf has plainly told us, that
if the Blind will be led by the Blind, they muft both fall
into the Ditch.
Though there be fo much Danjger of Error arif-
ing from thq three Prejudices laft mentioned, yet
before I difmifs this Head, I think it proper to take.
Notice, that as Education, Cuftom and Authority *
are no fure Evidences of Truth, fo neither are they v
certain Marks of Pal/hood -, for Reafon and Script
tore may join to 'dictate the feme Things which
our Parents, our Nurfes, our Tutors, our Friends*
and our Country believe arid profefs* Yet there
appears fometimes in our Age a Pride and Petu-
lancy in Ymith, zealous to caft off the Sentiments
of cheir Fathers and Teachers, on Purpofe to (hew
, that they carry none of the Prejudices of Educa-
tion and Authority about thefri. They indulge all
Manner of licentious Opinibrts and Pra&ices, from
3 yaig Pretence of aflcrtrng their Liberty. But
alasl
228 LOGICKiOr, Part II.
alas! This is bat changing one Prejudice for ano-
ther; and fomerimes it happens by this Means,
that they make a Sacrifice both of Truth and Vir-
tue to the vile Prejudices of their Pride and So*
fuality.
IV. There is another Tribe of Prejudices which
are near a-kin to thofe of Authority, and that is,
when we receive, a De£rine becaufe of the Maimer
in which it is prppofed to us by others. I have already
mentioned the powerful Influence that Oratory and
fine Words have to infinuate a falfe Opinion, and
fomctimes Truth is refufed, and fuffers Contempt
in the Lops of a wife Man, for Want of the Charms
of Language : But there are feveral other Manners
of Propofals whereby miftaken Sentiments are
powerfully conveyed into the Mind.
Some Perfons are eafily perfuaded to believe
what another dictates with a pofuive Air* and a
great Degree of Affurance : They feel the over-
bearing Force of a confident Didtator, efpecially
if he be of a fuperior Rank or Character to them-
fclves.
Some are quickly convinced of the Truth of
any Do&rine, when he that propofes it puts on all
the Airs of Piety, and makes folemn Appeals to
Heaven, and Protefiations of the Truth of it : The
pious Mind of a weaker Chriftian is ready to re-
ceive any thing that is pronounced with fuch an
awful Solemnity.
It is a Prejudice near a-kin to this, when a hum-
ble Soul is frighted into any particular Sentiments
of Religion, becaufe a Man of great Name or Cha-
racter pronounces Herejy upon the contrary Senti-
ments, calls the DUbeliever out of the Church, and
forbids him the Gates of Heaven.
Others
Ch. III. S. 4- The right Ufe of Rctfon. 329
Others are allured into particular Opinions by
gentler PraQkes on the Undcrftanding : Not only
the foft Tempers of Mankind, but even hardy and
rugged Souk are fometimes led away Captives to
Error by the foft Airs of Addrefs, and the fweet and
engaging Methods of Perfua/mandKindmfs.
I grant, where natural or revealed Religion
plainly di&ate to us the infinite and everlafting
Importance of any fecred Do&rine, it cannot be
improper to ufe any of thefe Methods to perfuade
Men to receive and obey the Truth, after we have
given fufficient Reafon and Argument to convince
their Underftandings. - Yet all thefe Methods, con-
fidcred in thcmfelves, have been often ufed to con*
vey FaKhood into the Soul as well as Truth; and
if we build our Faith merely upon theft Founda-
tions, without Regard to the Evidence of Truth
and the Strength of Argument, our Belief is but the
EffeS of Prejudice : For neither the pqftthe^ the
awful or folemn, the terrible or the gentle Methods
of Addrefs, carry any certain Evidence with them
that Truth lies on that Side.
There is another Marnier of propofmg our own
Opinion, or rather oppofing the Opinion of others,
which demands a Mention here, and that is when *
Perfons make a Jeft ferve inftead of an Argument i
when they refute what they call an Error by a Trnn
of Wit* and anfwer every Objedion againft their
own Sentiments, by calling a Sneer upon die Ob-
jettor. Thefe Scoffers pra&ife with Succefs upon
weak and cowardly Spirits: Such as have not been
well eftablifbed in Religion or Morality have been
laughed out of the bed Principles by a confident
Buffoon ; they have yielded up their Opinions to a
witty Banter, and fold their Faith and Religion for
%Jefi, ■•■ii
There
230 LOGIC K: Or, Rut 11/
" There is ho Way to cure thefe Evils in fuch *
degenerate World as we live in, but by learning
to diftinguifh well between the Subjtancc of dnj
Vollrine, and the Marnier of Addrefs either in pro?
pofing, attacking, or defending it ; and then by
fetting a juft and fevere Guard of Reafon and
Confcience over all the Exercifes of our Judg-
ment, refolving to yield to nothing but the con-
vincing Evidence of Truth, religioufly obeying the
Light of Reafon in Matters of pure Reafon, and
the Diftates of Revelation in Things that relate to
our Faith.
Thus we have taken a brief Survey of fome of
the infinite Varieties of Prejudice that attend Man-
kind on every Side in the prefent State, and the
Dangers of Error or of rafh Judgment, we are
perpetually expofed to in this Life : This Chapter
lhall conclude with one Remark, and one Piece of
Advice.
The Remark is this, This fame Opinion, whether
falfe or true, may be diftated by many Prejudices at
the fame Time ; for as I hinted before, Prejudice
may happen to didtate Truth fometimes as well as
Error. But where two or more Prejudices oppofe
one another, as it often happens, the ftronger pre-
vails and gains the Afifcnt : Yet how feldom does
Reafon interpofe with fufficient Power to get the Af-
cendant of them all as it ought to do!
The Advice follows, {viz.) Since we find fuch
a fwarm of Prejudices attending us both within and
without ; fince we feel the Weaknefs of our Rea-
fon, the Frailty of our Natures, and our Infuffi-
ciency to gjjard ourfelves from Error upon tha-
Account, it is' not at all unbecoming the Character
of a Logician or a Pbilofopher (together with the
Advice already given) to dircdt every Perfon m his
Search after Truth to make his daily Addrefles to
Heaven,
Ch. IV. fyc right U/e *f Reafon. 231
Heaven, and implore the God of Truth to lead hint
into all Truth, and to afkWifdom of bim who givetb
liberally to them that afk it, and upbraidetb us not
with our oWn Follies. .
Such a devout Pra&ice will be an excellent Pre-
parative for the beft Improvement of all the Dr-
reftums and Rules propofed in the two following
Chapters.
C H A P. IV.
s General Directions to qffift us in judging
aright*
TH E chief Defign of the Art of Logick is to
aflift us in forming a true Judgment of.
Things ; a few proper Ubfervations for this End
have been dropt occafionally in fome of the fore-
going Chapters. Yet it is neceflary to mention
them again in this Place, that we may have a
more complete and fimiiltaneous View of the gene*
«/ Directions* which are neceflary in order to
judge aright. A Multitude of Advices may be
framed for this Purpofe ; the chief of tKem may,
for Order fake, be reduced to the following
Heads.
.. - - x
I. DireSl. When we Confider ourfelves as Pbi-
lofopbers, or Searchers after Truth, we Ihould exa*
wine all our old Opinions afrejb, and enquire *what
was the Ground of them, and whether our Affent were
built on jujl Evidence ; and then we fhould cafl off
all tbofe Judgments which were formed hereto-
fore without due Examination. A Man in purfuit
of Knowledge Ihould throw off all thofe Preju-
dices
232 L G 1 C K: Or, Part Xfc
dices which he had imbibed in Times paft, and
guard againft all tht Springs of Error mentioned in
the preceding Chapter y with the utmoft Watchfulnefi
for Time to come. x
Obferve here, that this Rule of cajling away all
mar former prejudkate Opinions and Sentiments* a
not propofed to any of us to be pradtifedat once,
conudtrcd bs Men of Bi(finefs 9 or Religion^ as Friends
or Neighbours , as Fathers or Sons, as Magifirates %
Subjefts or Chrifiians ; but merely as Pbilofopbers
and Searchers afier.Trutb: And though it may be
well prefumed that many of our Judgments, both
true and falfe, together with the'Pra&ices built
thereon in the natural, the civil and the religious
Life, were formed Without fufficient Evidence ; ,
yet an umverfal Rejection of all thefe might deftroy
at once our pfefent Senfe and Pra&ice of Duty
with Regard to God, our/elves, and our FcHow*
Creatures. Mankind would be hereby thrown
into fuch a State of Doubting and Indifference,
that it would be too long e'er they recovered any
Principles of Virtue or Religion by a Train of
Reafonings.
BefideS) the common Affairs of human Life often
demand a much fpeedjer Determination, and we
muft many Times aft upon prefent Probabilities :
The Bulk of Mankind have not Time and Lei-
fure, and Advantages fufficient to begin all their
Knowledge anew, and to build up every (ingle O-
pinion and Praftice afrefh upon the jufteft Grounds
of Evidence.
Yet let it l)e obferved alfo, that fb far as any
Perfon is capable of forming and correcting his
Notions and his Rules of Conduit in the natural,
civil and religious Life, by the ftrift Rules of La* >
gick ; and fo far as he hath Time and Capacity to
review his old Opinions) to re-examine all thole
which
Ch. IV. Vbe right Vfe ^Rcafon; 233
which are any Way doubtful, and to determine no-
thing without juft Evidence, he is likely to become
fo much the wifef, and the happier Man, and (if
Divine Grace aflift him) fo much the better Chrf-
ftlan. And though this cannot be done all at once,
yet it may be done by prudent Steps and Degrees,
till our whole Sett of Opinions and Principles be in
time corrected and reformed, or at lead cftablifhed
upon jufter Foundations.
II. Direft. Endeavour that all your Ideas of thofe
Objcffs* concerning winch you pafs any Judgment, be
clear and diftinSf* complete* comprehenfive* ext en/he
and orderly* as far as you have Occafion to judge
concerning them. This is the Subftance of the loft
Chapter of the firfi Part of Logick. The Rules
which .direEl our Conceptions muft be reviewed, if
We would form our Judgments aright. , jBut if
we will make hafte to judge at all Adventures,
while our Ideas are dark and confufei* and very im-
ferfeEt* we fhall be in Danger of running into many
Miftakes. This is like a Perfon who would pr/+
tend to give the Sum total of a large Account in
Jrithmuick* without furveying all the Particulars $
or as a Fainter* who pcofeffes to draw a fair and
diftinft Landlkip in jthe Twilight, when he can
hardly diftinguifh a Houfe from a Tree.
Obferve here, that this Dirsftion does not re*
quire us to gain clear, diftinft, complect Icjeas of
Things in all their Parts, Powers, and Qualities
in znabfoluteSenfe* for this belongs to God alone,
and is impoffible for us to attain : But it is exprt fled
in a relative or limited Senfe: that is, our Ideas
Ihould be clear, diftinft,- and comjprehenfive, fcfr.
at lead f? far as we hfoe Occafion at that Time to
Judge concerning them. $Ve may forjn many true
and certain Judgment! concerning GW, Angels*
Animals x
£34- LOGIC K: Qr K Part It
Animals , Men, Heaven, Hell, Sec! by thofe partial
and Very imperfeft Conceptions of fheffif t6 wftfcb
We have attained, if we judge rto farther ^6nd£fniitt
them than our Conceptions reach. ~ r *■; ^r :, J
We may have a clear and diftinA idek *ff iffi
Exigence of many., Things- in" Nature, and affirtH
that (bey do exiji, though out !de& of their JrfESJWft
EJfences andCaufis, their Relations and MtrihdF of
Affion are very conftifed and obfeure. We ; Sliy
judge well concerning fevetdl Properties^ of -toy
Being, though other Properties are unknown, for Jltf*
haps we know not all the Properties of any BekJg
Whatfoever. * ''->'■ f '■» '■#
Sometimes we have clear "Ideas of T tiie#^ft#
Properties of an Objeft j and we may 'JQdjgtf df
them with Certainty, while the relative PftpfriMt
are very obfeure and unknown to u$. So WSay
have a clear and juft Idea of the Arealif *P2NP
lelogram, without knowing what Relation feWft)
to the Area of a Triangle or * Polygon. TtySf.
know the Length of the Diameter of a Circle; -*WW
out knowing what Proportion it has to the CfreM*
ference. ■ /■•> r H
There are other Things, whofe externd T feUtttSI
Properties, with refpeft to each other/ 0* wftfcfl?
Relation td us * we knotf better than tlttfa d&ft
inward and abfolute Properties, or ' theif efltfttnrf
diftinguilhing Attributes. We perceive cleatf$
that Fire Will warm or burn us, aftd will ivapotyte
Water-, and that Water will allay our *Cbirft\ of
quench the Fire % though we knoW not thfc ifftfaid
diftinguijhing Pontiles or prime effential Propiftift
of Fire or JF*#r. ' We may know the'#to|^*f$
Lord Chancellor, and affirm m*riy Things or theitf
in their legal Cbafaliers, though we Cafi have btittf
confuted Idea of their i*^/&«jr 'or \WtiiurdlFe4iu&Tp
if we have never feen their Faces* So the Scrip*
&. W. "the rigbt\Jfe o/RezCdn. 23/
tUre has revealed God himfelf to us, as our Crea*
tort ftiflrv&i Redeemer* add SanSifier, arid as thd
ObjeB of eur Worjbip in clearer Ideas than ft htal
fevered tntfdy other abftfufe Queftions which may
be raifeti about his own Divine EffcHce or Subftnute;
tmme1^ty<Pt Omttiprefence.
This therefore is the general Obfirvation in order*
to guide ddr Judgments, that we JhoUld not allow
kurfthxs to fertn a Judgment cdncernittg Things fartbet
tbanbtir tlettr and difiinSt Ideas reach; and then we
ire not in Danger of Error.
• But there is one conjldertibk ObjcBion agairift this'
Rule which is neceffary to be anfwered; and there
h oQjejdft and reafonatrfe Exception, which is as'
needful to be mentioned*
~ IfcQbjcttian is thiii May We not judge fafely
concerning ibme total eft- complete Ideas % when w«
have a clear Perception only of foroc Potts 9r Pro*
perties of them t May we hot affirm; that All that ii
in God is eternal^ or that*// bis unknown Attributes
etreinfiintei though we liava fo vef y imperfeft an
Idea oi God, Eternity and; Iftfinityt Agato, May
we not fafeiy judge of particular Objedts whofe Idea
is obfetnre by a clear Idea of the goner dl? May I
not affirm, that every* Unknown Species 6f Animals
has inward Springs of Motion, becaufc I have a' clea#,
Idea that thefc inward Springs belong to an Animal
in general: ■ . t ■'..-." ;■ ; , . -. r ^
Anfwer. All thofe fuppofed Unknown Pdrii
Properties Of Species* are cieafrty arid diftin&fy per-
ceived to be conne&ed Wfchf, or cOjfttafoed in tfrd
knoxxk Pares, Properties}- <X genered Idids; Which
we fuppofe to be clear and diftimft as far as w*
judge ofr them : And as ^e h^e no particular
Idea of thofe Unknown divine Attr$utes % <sr unknown
Species of Animals i fo there is nothing particular
affirmed concerning then* beyond what tetopgs t,6
the general Idea of Divine Attributes 9T dnitnalf*
with which I clearly and diftin&ly perceive them to
be conne&ed.
It may be illuftratcd in this Manner. Suppofe
a long Chain lies before me, whole neareft Links I
fee are Iron Rings, and I fee them fattened to a Poft
near roe, but the moft diftant Links lie. beyond
the Reach of my Sight, fo that I know not whe*
ther they are. oval or round, Brafe or Iron ; Now I
may boldly ajfirm the whole length of this Cham
is fafiened to the Pofi % for I have a ciear Idea, that
the neareft links are thus fattened, *nd a dear
Idea that the diftant Links are connefcd.with the
neareft, if I can draw the whole Chain by one
Link.
Or thus: If two known Ideas, A and B> are
evidently joined, or agree, and if C unknown, be
included in A, and alfo D unknown be included
in B, then I may affirm that C and D are joined
and agree : For I have * clear Perception of the
Union of the two known Ideas A and Bj and
alfo a clear Perception of the Connexion of the
unknown Ideas with the known. So th# clear
and diftinS Ideas mutt ftill abide as a general ne-
ceflary Qualification in. order to form right Judg-
ments : And indeed it is upon this Foot, that all
Ratiocination is built, and the Conclufions are thus
formed, which deduce Things unknown f com
Things known*
Yet it feems to me, that there is one juft Limi*
tation or Exception to this general Rule of Judg*
mftt t a$ built on clear and diftinft Ideas, and it »
■this: : . . ' .
Exception. In Matters of mere Tejlimony^ whether
human or <tivim»tberx unfit always a Neccjfrty of clear
andJifiinH Ideas of the Things which are believed.
Thou^Jic^¥i<^«cc .of. Pn>pofitions,- which aim
: . * \ enttirefy
Ch. IV. The right VJe of Reafori; 237
entirety farmed by ourfelves, depends on the Clear-
nefs and Diftin&nefs of thofe Ideas of which they
are cqmpofed, and on our own clear Perception
of their Agreement or Difagreement, yet we may
juftly aflent tto Propofitions formed by others, when
-■we have neither a very clear Conception in our-
felves of the two Ideas contained in the Words, nor
hbw they agree or difagree ; provided always that
we have a clear and fufficient Evidence of the Cre-
dibility of the Perfons who inform us.
*- * Thus when we read in Scripture the great Doc-
trines of the Deify of Chrift, of the Union of the
-divine and human Natures in him, of the divink
~ Agency of the blejfed Spirit, that the Son is the Bright-
fiefs of bis Father's Qlory, that all things were created
by him, and forhiin, that the Son Jhall give up bis
^Kingdom to the Father, and that God jhall he all in
h*#, we may fefely believe them : For though our
; "Ideas of thefe Objects themfefves are not fufficiently
dear, diftinft, and perfeft* for our own Minds to
^form .thefe Judgments or Propofitions concerning
"diem, yet we have a clear and diftinft Perception
*>f Gbd # s revealirtg them, or that they are contained
ill 1 Scripture; and this is fufficient Evidence to de-
termine our Aflent*
■■-"■ The fame Thing holds true i<* fome Meafure,
^trtiere credible human Tejlimony affures us of fome
'Frojpofitions, while we have no fufficient Ideas of
the Subjeft and Predicate of them to determine
Wt Aflent. So wheh an horifcft and learned Ma-
thematician affures a Ploughman that the three An-
^glis (fa Triangle are equal to two right Angles, or
that the Square of the Hypotenufe of a right-angled
^triangle if equal to the Sum bf tbt Squares of the
tm+$id£3\ the Ploughman, who has but confufed
/Ideas of thefe Things; may firmly and fafely be-
l»ve thefe Proportions 'upon the fame Ground,
Q^2 bt&K&.
« 3 8 LO G IC K: Or, Part If.
beeaufe he has Evidence of the Skill and Faithful*
hefs of hi* Informer *.
Ill; Direff>
* Perhapt feme rflay object tg*in4l this Keprefentatlon of Things," an!
fay, that " we cannot properly be {aid. *>Meve * Pnfofitiom amy firth*
*' than we ourfelves have Ideas tinder the Terms : Therefore if we have at
49 If&tft under the Terns, we befievefothing but the Connexion of Words
•< or Sounds i and if we have but«*\6*r# and inadeameue Ideas under the
** Terms, then we pertly believe f Connexion of Things, and partly a
V Connexion of Sounds ':' Bat that we cannot properly be f aid to beOevt -aft
" Propofition, for our Faith on never go beyond our Ideas.**
Now to fet this Matter in a clear light, I fuppofe that every Propofitioa
.which is pcopofcd to my Mast, ia a Sentence made up of Terms which have
Ibme Ideas under them known or unknown tpme. I confcis, if I belsne-
tjhere are no Ideas at all under the Terms, and* there is nothing meant by
fhem, then indeed (with Regard to nie) it is rJten^ 1st
if (for Inftance) a Ploughman has credible Information from an booeft an!
-tVilful Mathematician, that an Bffrpfis rs made by tbeSc&ion of a Come, he
believes the Proportion, or he believes the Sentence is true, as it is nude Up
of Terms which his Informant underftands, though the Ideas be unknown t»
*hisn t that is, he believes there are fome Ideas which his Informant baa ua>
der thefe Words which' are really connected. And, I think this may juft}
*oe called believing the Propofition, for it is a .Belief of Xbmething more than
-ihe mcrt joining of Seemds ; it is a Belief of the real Connexion of fome on*
known Ideas belonging to thofe Sounds, and in this'Sfenfe a Man may be fail
«o believe the Truth of a Propofition, which he doth not underftand at all.
With more Rcafon fllll may we be laid to believe a Propofition upon credi-
ble Teftimohy, if we have Jaw Sort of Ideas under the Terms, though they
are but partial or Inadequate, and obfeure 5' fuch as divine Anftvers inert given
if Vrm and Ibumm : Tor lince it is purelyjopon Temtnbny , we believe fat
known Parts of the Ideas figniaed by.thofe Woras to be connected, upon «c
fame Teftimony we may alfo believe all the unknown Parts of the Ideas sjgnl*
tied by thofe Words to be connected, (v».) beeaufe our Informant is fcaowiag
and faithful. And in this Senfe we may juftly be (aid to bejieve a faouoftipn
of Scripture entirely, which we underhand but very imperfe^ly, beeaufe Col
who reveals it is knowing and faithful In rVrfcction.
And indeed, unleis this Reprefehtation of the Matter be allowed, there an
Tout very few Propofitions in die World", even in bvntmn Things, to which
we can give an entire Aflent, or which we may. be {aid either to bmow, of
it ) believe, beeaufe there is fcayce any Thing on Earth of which we have an
adequate, and moft perfect' Idea. And it' is evident that in divine- tbanfs
there is fcarce any Thing which we could either know or believe withe**
this Allowance : Fof though Rleafon and' Revelation join to inform me* that
God is betyj how exceeding Inadequate ate mi Ideas of Cod, and of his Be*
hntfs f Yet I may boldly and entirely aflent {0 this whole Propofition, fince
lam fure that every known a^urtknbv/n Idea fighified by* the Term God
Is connected with the Idea of the Term ffelhkfs, beeaufe tteafba partly in*
' fyms me, but efpecjaUy ntcaufe the Pivine Teftiinony which hat connected
them, vs certainly credible. ' *
I might argue upon thai Headtperhsts more' forcibly from rht iWbiat of
60?/ Jncompretenfiblenefs. If we could believe nothing but what we have
lucas df # it wertfe? hjelmpbffiUe for tfs to believe that God is ivtoinfreBt*ph :
Pfaaftfc implies In it a Belief^ that there* are ibme unknown Ideal belonging
^■^WwsV^HkW. TEoefbre we do both believe and ospfefs that fome.
thing
Ch. V& S3r right XJfe gf Reafon. itf
III. Direction. When you have obtained as
clear and comprehenfive Ideas as is needful, both
of the Subjeft and Predicate of a Propofition,
th^n compare tbofe Ideas of the Subjeft and Predi-
cate together with the utmoft Attention, and obferye bow
far thy agree* and wherein they differ: Whether the
Proportion may be affirmed Jbfolutety or JR*la»
tivefyj whether in Whole or in Parti whether
Univerfally or Particularly, and then under what
particular Limitations. Turn thefc Ideas about in
ypuv Mind, and take a View of them on all Sides,
juft as a Ma/on would do to fee whether two hewn
Sjrones exa&ly fuit each other in every Part, and.
■ 0*3. ztt .
tiling concerning unknown Ideas, when we believe and profeft that God it in*
y'tnfrebtnfibk,
: _ I per&ade myiclf that moft of thofe very Perfons who. object agauft my
,fieprefentation of Things, will yet readily confeis, they beliovt all the Propo-
rtions in Scripture, rather than declare Tboy do not tt&tve fevernl of tbem.%
though they xnoft acknowledge that fevertl of them art for above their Un-
derftanding, or that they have fcarce any Ideas .af the true Senfe of them*
And therefore where Propositions derived from credible TerHmony are made
j»p of 4ark or inadequate Ideas, I think it it much more prefer to fry, W*
tijicvethem, than that Wt do not httievt them, left we cut off a Multitude of
*&eTro*ofitioht of the Bible from our After* of Faith.
fr Yet let it he obferved here, that when we believe a Proportion on mere
^cftirflony, of which we have no Ideas at all, we can only be {aid to give.*
^geojira? implicit Agent to At Truth of that Proportion, without any particular
^Knowledge of, or explicit Ajftnt to the Jpotisl Truth tontmntdin that Profofi*
Hon : And this our implicit. Agent is otvery little Vie, onlefi it be to tcfttfy
.•Ur Belief of the Knowledge and Veracity of him that informs us.
^ Am our Ideas of a Proportion are more or left clear and adequate, as well
* as juft and proper, fo we do explicitly aflent more or le& to the particular
'Truth contained in that Proporltio*. And our Aflent hereby heroines more
* or lefs ufeful for the Encreafc of oar Knowledge, or the Dire&ioo of lour
v lPra&ice.
, . When Divine TefHmony plainly prooofes to our Filth fuch a Propo&km
~ whereof we have but obfeure, doubtful and inadequate Ideas, Wflface &Qnn4
" implicitly to believe the Truth of it, . as exprefled in tbofe Terms, . u* onjes to
ihew out, Submiifipn to Cod who revealed it, as a God of perfect Knew*
; ledge add; Veracity ? But it is our Duty to ufc ell proper Method* to obtain
'' a Htther arid explicit Knowledge of iht partituUr Tntf£cQn&inedJft the Pro-
. politico^ if we would improve by it either in Knowledge or. Vogue* All ne»
cefthr/^rtufes of Grammar and Criticifm mould be employed £p. find out the
' very^Ideas that belong to thofe Words, and which were dragned by the pi-
vine Speiker or Writer. Though we may believe the Truth of a Propofition
which wtrfo not underftand, yet we mould endeavour fo uaderftand every Pro*
' portion which we believe to be (rue.
44<> L O G I CK: Or, Part IL
are fit to be joined in ereding a carved or fluted
Pillar.
Compare the whole SubjeB with the whole Predi-
cate in their, feveral Parts : Take heed in this Mat-
ter that you neither add to, nor diminifli the- Ideas
contained in the Subjed or, in the Predicate $ *fof
fuch an Inadvertence or Miftake will expofe you>t$
great Error in Judgment.
IV. Dire&V .Search for Evidence of Truth with
Diligence and Honefty ? and be heartily ready to receive
Evidence,, whether for the Agreement or Disagreement
of Ideas.
Search with Diligence ; fpare no Labour in iearch*
ing for the Truth in due Proportion to the Im-
portance of the Propofition. Read the beft Au-
thors who have writ on that Subject ; confult ywr
wife and learned Friends in Converfation \ and
be not unwilling to borrow Hints toward your
Improvement, tram the meaneft Perfon, nor to
receive any Glimpfe of Light from the moft
unlearned. Diligence and Humility 4s the Wiy
to thrive in the Riches of the Underftanding, a
well as in Gold or Silver. Search carefully for the
Evidence of Truth, ahd,</ijf for Wifdom as for hid,
Treafure.
Search with a Jleady Honefiy of Soul, and * fin*'
cere impartiality to find the Truth. Watch
againft every Temptation that might bribe your
Judgment, or warp it afide from Truth. Do not
indulge yourfelf to wi/h any' unexamined Prtrpqfition
were true or falfe. AWifh often perverts the
Judgment, and tempts the -Mind ftrangely to be*
Jieve upon flight Evidence fcbatfoever we wiflvto
be aue.or falic*
ViDireff.
Ch. IV. The right XJfeof Reafon. 241.
V. DsreS. Since the Evidence of the Agree-
ment or Difagreement of two Ideas is the Ground
of our Aflent to any Proposition, or the great Cri-
terion of Truth ; therefore we Jbould fufpend our
Judgment % and neither affirm nor deny SHI this Evi-
dence appear.
This Direction is different fcofli the feeond ; for
though the Evidence of the Agreement or Dijagree*
ment of two Ideas mod times depends on the Clear-
nefs and Diftin&nefs of :tbe Ideas tbemfelves* yet it
does not always arife thence. Tejlimony may be *
fufficient Evidence of the Agreement or Dilagree~
ment of - two obfeure ideas, as we have feen juft
before in the Exception under the feeond Dlr-e8ion+
Therefore, though we are npt universally and, in all
Cafe* bound to fufpend our Judgment Jill, our Ideas
cf tbeOtyeds'tbemfelves are clear and. difiina, yet?
we muft always fufpend our Judgment, and with-
hold -our Aflbnt to, or Denial of any Propofition,
till (ome juft Evidence appear of its Truth or Fal/bood*
It is an Impatience of Doubt and Sufpence, a Ra(h-
nefs and Precipitance of Judgment, and Haftinefc
to believe (bmething on one fide or the other, that
plunges us into many Errors.
This Direction to delay and fufpend our Afient
is more particularly neceflkry to be obferved when
fuch Propofitions offer themfelves to us as are
Supported by Education^ Authority % Guftom, Incli*
nation, Interejty or other powerful Prejudices ; for
our Judgment is led away infenfibly to, believe all
that they diftate ; and' when; Prejudices and Dan*
gers of Error are multiplied, we fhould fet the
ftrider Guard upon Afient*
Yet remember the -Caution or Limitation here
which I gave under the firfi Direction, (viz.) that
this is not to be too ftri&ly applied to Matters of
0^4 daily
failj Pra8ice % either in human Life or Religion^
but wtcn *c conBdcr ourfclyes *& Pbilafopberss or
Searchers jfi'al truth* wc flwuld .always tfitb-hokE
our Aflciit where thrf^. ia .nQt. juft JByidtaiceL
And as: far and as faft as w& gan , in arsiue Gorififlx
cocci %tch our dailyAnec^ry I>juj^
•Jfo reform and adjuft all our Principkfr*n*k Frac*
ttaes^Mth wReligioa apd.tte civil life, by thefc-
tfajk:p^(rij&;^
tkcj^i4€fct. of. it. is i to be akiwnedr Ahciherrdt 'be:
AJ1 our. JFaciikieB and J?<w^r$^are . to be: jcaaploytxfc
ihi judging of thcit proper Obje&s. .;V.
Of, we . judge q£; SaugidbJGplms* \ CMrtr* Safttu
the ^m^J^/h J^bnefs^ Softwtfs* qx Bardw^s afa
J?^dr f it t xnW;be>done Jby theUfe of ouruS^jfr*^
Eutthonjtfd fnuftf tak^theed .that our Senics aiftj
wUj^fpo^d^as.iballbe (hewn afterward. .:■
.And: fmce our S*a$j in their various Exercifei
are in fome Cafes liable, to be deceived* and. morei
cfpeci^lly; when by our- Eyes or Ears: we judge of
the Figure, $uantity % Dtftauti, and Pofilw ot Oh-
je&s that are afar ig^.we ought to call our Reafen
in, to the Affiftance of our Senfec, and correct the
Errors of *«* &«/£ by the Help of another.
It is by the Powers of Se»Je and J&i/fa joined:
together* that we muft judge philosophically of.
the imvard Nature, the.fc&et Properties apd Pow*
ets^ ibcGattfa and Efefls* the Rthfcns and /Vo-
^//c^j ,qf a thoufand corporeal Ohjedfcs whid*
furroiupdq? pn Earth, or arc placed at a Diftanc|
in the HwVenju . If a JMfeaon the, one Hand con- \
fii^f.hiqpfclC only jq fetftle J&fierimettfs, and does.
jN^lJKro^ upon them, i»e way furprifc
C*. IV. Tbe right Ufe gf Rcafbb; 243
lumfelf and others with ft range Appearances, and
learn . to entertain the World with Sight* and
Shewsiitmt will\never become a Philofopher : And
en the other Hand, if a Man imprifon himfelf in
hisiQofet, 9nd employ the moft exquifite Powers
o&JUafon to find out die Nature of Things in
the corporeal World, without the U(e; of his
$enfa> ^nd the Pra&ke^'Of Euperimenis* he wilt
frame to* himfelf a Scheme of Chimeras inftead of
true Philofophy. Hence came the Invention of
Jkbjianiial Forms and Qualities) of Materia prima
and Privation* with all ^the infigntficant Namer
iifed by^th&lPeripateiick Writers * and it was for;
Want of more Experiments -that y the 'creat &ef
nOTtoiailed in fevetal P Arts of his philofophicaT
Writings.' -'• j 'i ■■■■ '< ■
, In the abftraOei and fpectdattvt Parti of the Ma-
tiemaficisi -which tftat of ifyantity and Number \
the Faculty of ito/0* muft be chiefly employed to
perceive : the Relation of various, Quantities, and
draw certain and ufcful Conctufions ; but it wanes,
the Affiltancc of AigQr- 4Mb to be acquainted with
lines* dnglesMnd Figures. And in practical Matbt-
maticks our &*/*/ have fttli neater Employment.
Jf we would judge of the pure Prop&ties % and
JfJionsjf tbe Mmd, of the Nature of Spirits, their
various Perceptions and Powers, we muft riot en-,'
quire of Our Eyes and our Ears, nor the Iriagps or
Shapes: laid tip in the Brain, but we muft have Re-
courfe to our own Coufdeujrkfs of what gaffes with-
in our own Mind, "■"•*•'.;., ; v . V
If we we to^pafe a Judgmekf upott any thing that '
relates to Spirits i**9Wtoftykforifatb animtfNa-
/#r/ y ahd the Irihct Propetttetfof &a>/iftir f FaH& jh-
pe(in i Paffi9n,PUaf^emA^Pai^ Which arife tbcnfce,
W*nUift confute ^^ the other
fwe}W%hlch:wetead tobuHfelVef^tefidered a^Mr
'■- ■ ' or
244 LOOICK: 0/5 PtrtIL
or Creatures node up of a Mind and aw Animal y and
by juft Rcafonings deduce proper €oofoquenccS|
and improve Jour Knowledge in thefe Subjects.
If wehavejDccafion to judge concerning Matteri
dm iuipaft Ages* or in defiant Countries* and what
we ourfelves cannot he {mfent, the Powers of Stnjfi
and Reafon (for the moft part) are net Efficient to
inform. us»*nd we mud therefore hgve Recourfet*
the !Eefthhotiy of other*:*. And this is either dnm
or human. ■' ■■■■"■ -.
In Mattws "of men. bumag Prudence, vk (hrilfM
the gteateft Advantage by making wife Obfervgti*
ons on* our. own ConduftV-hnd the <frndu& trf
others, and i Survey of the Events attending focfc
C6odu& Euperitnee in this Cafe i* equal to a man
red Sagacity or rather fupcrior. A Treafure of Gfc
firvatimes **& .Experiences colleded by wife Men; is
of admirable Service here. And perhaps there Is neU
thing in the World of this kind equal to the facitd
Book of Proverbs, even if we look on it as a mere;
human Writing. , : ,
In Queftions of Natural Religion, we muft exec*
cife the Faculty of Reafin which God has given us » '
and fince he has been pleafed xo stfibrd us btiWerr&t
we fliould confirm and improve, or correct our
Reafonings on this Subjeft by the Divine Afliftaoce
of the Bible. > '
In. Matters of revealed Religion, that is, CM*
ftiamty, Judaifm, &c. which we could never have
known by the Light of Nature, the Weird of Gad is
our only Foundation and chief Light ; * though here
our Reafon mult be ufed both to find Out the true-
Meaning of God in his Word, and -to derive juft ■
Inferences from what God has written, as well as to
judge of the Credentials whereby divine Veftimony t*
diftingirilhed from mere human Teftimony r or from
pofiure* .- - -
As
Ch. IV. STbe rigbtUfe gfReafcn; *4£
As Divine Revelation can never contradift right
Reafon, (for they are two great Lights given us by
our Creator for our Conduct) fo Reafon ought by
no Means to affume to itielf a Power to cohtradi&
Divine Revelation.
Though Revelation be not contrary to Reafon, yet
there are fourClaffis wherein Matters of Revelation
may be faid to rife above, or go beyond our Rjafon:
i. When Revelation afferts two^bings of which
W have clear Ideas, to be joined* wbofe Connexion!
or Agreement is not difewerabk by Reafon; ai when
Scripture informs us that the Dead Jhall rife, that
the Earth Jhall be burnt up, and the MtoCbriJb
Jefus Jhall return from mavtn, - hone df thefe
Things could ever be found out or proved by
Reafon.*
-a; When Revelation affirms any Propofitimi
while Reafon has no clear and diftinS Ideas of
She Subjeft, or of the Predicate ; as God created
all Things by Jefus Chrift : By the Urim and Thum-
mipi God gave forth divine Oracles. The Predi-
cate of each of thefe Propofirions is to us an ob-
fcure Idea, for we know not what was the peculiar
Agency ci Jefus Cbrijl when <5od the Father created
the World by him; nor have we any clear &nd
certain Conception what the Urim and Tbumtmm
were, nor how God gave Anfwers to his People by
them. .,.-..
3. When Revelation, in plain and exprefs Lan*
ptage, declares fame DoSrine which our Reafon at
frefent knows not with Evidence and Certainty how. or
in what Senfe to reconcile to fome of its own Princi*
pies ; as, that the Child Jefus is the mighty God, Miu
ix. 6. which Propofition carries a ieeming Oppofr
tion to the Unity and Spirituality of the Godbead§
which are Principles of Reafon. -
4. When
246 LOG IC K: Or, Partlfc
4* When two Propqfitions or DoSriues are plainly
affertei by divine Revelation, which our. Reafon at
prefent knows not bow or in wbahSenfi with Evident*
mi Certainty to reconcile with one another i as, The,
Father is the only true God, John xvii. 3. and yet
Cbrifi is over all, God bleffedfir ever* Rom. uu 5*
Now divine Revelation having declared all theft
Proportions, Reafon is bound to receive them, be-
Cauie it cannot prove them to be utterly inconiiftent
or impoffible, though the Ideas of them may beob?
leure, though we ourfelves fee not the rational Con*
nexioo of them, . and though we know not Certainly
• how to reconcile them, - In thefe Cafes Reafom inuft
Submit to Faith: That is, we are bound to believe
what God efforts, and wait till he (ball dear up that
which feems dark and difficult, and till the Jlgfa
ties of Faith (hall be farther explained to uacitfcr
in this World or in the World to come •■» ao4
Reafon itfelf diftates this Submiffion.
■ V
VHth Dirett. It is very ufefiil to have fome ge-
neral Principles of Truth fettled in the Mind, whffe
Evidence is great and obvious , that they may be al-
ways ready at band to qfftft us in judging of the great
Variety of Things which occur. Thefe may be called
firft Notions* or fundamental Principles ; for though
many of tljem ar? deduced from each other, yet
mod or all of them may be called Principles when
compared with a thoufand other Judgments which
we form under the Regulation and Influence 4f
thefe primary Proportions. ,
Every Art and Science, as well as the Affairs of
civil Life and Religion, have peculiar Principles
of this Kind belonging to them* There are Mt-
tapisfical, Pby/kal, Mathematical, Political, Oee*
uotnical, Medicinal, Theological, Moral and Pru*
denial
• See fanethfag mote on this Suljc&, Dirtft, II, f rttut, and Cbaj>. V. S*Q. &
Ch. IV. toe right Vfe of Rcafon. 247
dential Principles of Judgment. It would be too
tedious to give a Specimen of them all in this
Place. Thole, which are of the moft univerfal Ufe
to us both as Men and as Chriftians p may be found
ih the following Chapter among the Rules of Judg-
ment about particular Objeffs.
* Vlllth Diretl. Let the Hegrets of jour Ajfent
fo every Proportion bear an exaft Proportion to tie
different Degrees of Evidence. Kemember this is
onte of the greateft Principles of Wifdom that Man
Cstt strive at in thfe World, and the beft human
Security againft dangerous Miftakes in Speculation
Or Practice.
•^ Ih the Nature of Things of which our Know-
ledge is made up there is infinite Variety in their
Degrees of Evidence. And as God hath given our
Minds a Power to fufpend their Aflent till the
Evidence be plain, fo we have a Power to receive
Things which are propofed to us with a ftronger or
weaker Belief in infinite Variety of Degrees pro-
jHHtibnable to their Evidence. I believe that the
Planets are inhabited* and I believe that the Earth
tolls among them yearly round the Sun ; but I do not
believe both thefe Propofitionswith an eoual Firm*
neft of Aflent, becaufe the Arguments tor the lat-
ter are drawn from mathematical Obfervations % but
the Arguments for the former are but probable Con-
jectures and moral Riaftmings.- Yet neither do I be-
lieve either of thefe Propofitions fo firmly, as I do
that the Earth is about twenty-four thou/and Mites
found* becaufe the mathematical Proof of this is
touch eafier, plainer and ftronger. And! yet farther,
^when I fay that the Earth was treated by the Power
if God, I have ftill a more Infallible Afforance of
this than of aH thereft, becaufe Rzafon and Scrip*
Mr* join to affure me of it.
\XxhDi*
* 4 8 LO G IC K: Or> Ptotff.
IXth DireEt. Keep your Mind always open to receive
Truth, and never fet limits to your own Improvements.
Be ready always to hear what may be obje&ed even
againft your favourite Opinions, and thole which
have had longed Poflcflion of your Afient. And
if there fhould be any new and uhcontroulable Evi-
dence brought againft thefe old or beloved Senti-
ments, do not wink your Eyes faft againft t£e
Light, but part with any Thing for the Sake of
Truth : Remember when you overcome an Error
you gain Truth ; the Vi&ory is on your Side, an4
the Advantage is all your own.
I confefs thofe grand Principles of Belief and Prac-
tice which univerfally influence our Conduit, both
yith Regard to this Life and the Life to comet
ihould be fuppofed to be well fettled in the fjrft
Years of our Studies, fuch as, the Exifiencc and Pr*
vidence of God, the Truth of Cbriftianity 9 the sfuthh
rity of Scripture* the great Rules of Morality, &c.
We fhould avoid a light fluttering Genius, ever
ready to change our Foundations, and to be carried
about with every Wind ofDoflrinc. To guard againft
which Inconvenience, we fhould labour with ear*
neft Diligence and fervent Prayer, that our mod:
fundamental and important Points of Belief and
Practice may be eftablilhed upon juft Grounds t>f
Reajbn and Scripture when we come to Years of
Difcretion, and fit to judge for ourielves in fuch
importanrPokits. Yet fince it is poffible that the
Folly or Prejudices of younger Yeajrs may have e-
ftablilhed Peifons in lame miftaken Sentiments,
even in very important Matters, we fhould always
hold ourfelves ready to receive any new Advantage
toward the Correction or Improvement even of ou*
eftablijhed Principles, as well as Opinions of lcflcr
Moment'.
CHAP-
£ih V. S. is t •'Tb* right TJfe of Reafon. 249
,'CH A p. V.
Special Rul(s to direft us in judging of pariica*
; lar Objects. , '
IT would be endlcfs to run through all thofc
particular Objedts concerning which we jiave
Occafion to pafs a Judgment at one Time or ano-
ther. Things of the moft frequent Occurrence,
of the wideft Extent, and of the greateft Im-
portance, are the Objeib and Exerciles pf Senfa
of Reafon, and Speculation? the Matters of Mora-
lity, Religion, and Prudence, of human and divine
lefiimony, together with the. Ejfqys tf Reafoning
upon Things paft and future. Special Rules relating
to all thefc will be the Subjeft of the following
Seftions.
S E CX I.
'Principles and Rules of Judgment concerning the
.-:'.. Obje&s of Senfe. .
THOUGH our Senftx are fometimes liable
to be deceived, yet when they are rightly
difpofed, and fitly exercifed about- their proper Ob-
Jeffs, with the juft Affiftance of Reafon* they give
us fufficient Evidence of Truth.
This may be proved by an Argument drawn
from the Wifdom, Goodnefs, and Faithfulnefs of
Cod our Creator. It was He gave us our Senfes,
and He would not make us of fuch a Conftitution
as to be liable to perpetual Deception and una-
voidable Error in ufing thefe Faculties of Senfe in
the beft Manner we are capable of, about thefe
■f
2S& L G tC K: dr $ Rtrt its
Tcry Things which arc the proper Obje&s of
them.
This may be proved alfo by the HI Confequences
that would follow from the Suppofition of the contrary,
If we could have no Certainty of the Di&ates of
our Senfes, we could never be fure of any o\ the
common Affairs and Occurrences of Life. Men
Could not tfanfa& toy of their cktilcrr moral CJort-
cerns with any Certainty or Juftice ; nor indeed
could we eat or drink, walk or move with Safety;
Our Senfes diredt us in all thefe.
Again, the Matters of Religion depend inf fbm6
Meafure upon the Certainty of the Didates of
Senfe \ for Faith comes by Hearing ; and it is to
bur Senfes that God appeals in working Mrratlet
to prove his own Revelation* Now if when our
Eyes and Ears, and other Organs of Senfe art
rightly difpofed and exercifed about their proper
Obje&s* they were always liable to be deceived;
there could be no Knowledge of the Gofpel, no
Proof of divine Revelation by Vifions, Voices, or
Miracles.
Our Senleft will diftovet Things hear u4 afid
round about us, which are neceffary for our pre*
fent State with fufEcient Exaftnefs, and Things
diftant alfo, fo far as they relate to our necefiarj
Ufe of them.
Nor is there Need of any more accurate Rules
for the Ufe of our Senfes in the Judgment of all.
the common Affairs of life* or even of miraculous
and divine Operations* than the vulgar Part of
Mankind are fufficiently acquainted with by Na«*
ture, and by their own daily Observations.
But if we would exprefs thefe Rules in a more
exaft Manner, bow to judge by the Diflates of 9m
Senfes 9 they fhould be represented thus :
IvW*
Qb; V. 5. u The right TJfe gf Rfeafon. 251
• 1. We hiuft take Care that the Organs of our
Senfe be rightly difpofed, and not under the Power
o£ : any Diftetnper or confiderable Decay; as for
Inftancc, that ojnr Eyes are not tindtured with the ■.
Jiimdi&i wtvw *e would judge of Colours* left .
we pronounce them * all yellwb: That our Hands
are^not burning -ip ■$ /*IwWi nor benumbed with
Fw/tjot- the P*^. when we would judge of the
float or Gtldnefi of- any Objedt : That our P*/*/*
be not vitiated by wy^ifeafe, or by fome other
improper Tofte* when we would judge of the true
S^/fcof any Solid or liquid. This Direction re-
alties : .tor all our Senfes % but the following Rules
chiefly refer to our Sight.
-. 2. We muft obferve whether the Qbje3 be at a
proper D$ance% for if it be too near or too far off*
our Eyes will not Efficiently diftinguifh many
Things which are properly the ObjedU of. Sight ;
and therefore (if poffibie) we muft make nearer
Approaches to the Object, or remove farther from
it, till we have obtained that due Diftance which
gives us the cleared Perception.
3. We muft-not. employ our Sight to take a
full Survey at once of ObjeSs that are too large for
U y but we muft,- view them by Parts, and then
judge of th<; Whole : Nor muft <xn\Senfes judge
of Objefts too finally for fome Things which appear
through Glaffes to be reaHy and diftin&ly exiftent
are either utterly iqvifible, or greatly confufed when
iwe would judge "of them, by the naked Eye.
4. We muft place ourjelves in fuch a Pofition
toward the'^Ob/eSj or place the ObjeB in fuch a '
Pofition toward^uzjJEyej as may give us the clear-
eft Reprefentation of it 3 for a different Pofition
greatly alters the Appearance of the Shape of Bo-
dies. And for this Reafon we fliould change the
R Pofition
252 * L G I C K: Or r Part U.
Pqfition both of the Eye and the ObjeSl in fomc
Cafes, that by viewing the ObjeSl in fevcral Appear-
ances we may pafs a more complete and certain
Judgment concerning it.
5. We muft confider what the Medium is by
which Objefts are reprefented to our Senfes ; whether
it be thinner or thicker ; whether it be Air, or Va-
pour, or Water, or Glafs, fcfe. whether it be duly
enlightened or dufky *, whether it refledfc or refraft,
or only tranfmit the Appearance of the Objqftj
and whether it be ttndured with any particular Co-
lour 5 whether it be moving or at Reft.
, 6. We muft fometimes ufe ether Helps to affift
our Senfes ; and if we make ufe of Glaffcs* we
muft make all juft Allowances for the Thicknefe
or Thinnefs of them, for the Clearnefs or Dulnefs,
for the Smoothftefs or Roughnefs, for the Plafa-
nefs, the Convexity or Concavity of them, and for
the Diftance at which thefe Glaffes are placed from
the Eye, or from the Objedt, (or from one ano-
ther, if there be two or more GlaiTes ufed) and all
this according to the Rules of Art. The fame fort
of Caution fhould be ufed alfo in Mediums which
affift the Hearing, fuch as Speaking^Trumpets^ewr-
tug-Trumpets, &c.
7. If the Obje6l may be propofed to more Senfes
than one, let us call in the AfiiftanCe of fome
other Senfes to examine it, and this will encreafe
the Evidence of what one Senfe diftates. Ex.gr.
Our Ear may affift our Eye in judging of the Di-
ftance of Bodies, which are both vifible and fo- ■
norous, as an exploded Cannon* or a Cloud -charged
with Thunder. Our Feeling may affift our Sight in
judging of the Kind, the Shape, Situation, or Di-
ftance of Bodies that are near at Hand, as whe-
ther a Garment be Silk or Stuffs &c. So if I both
Jee,
£h. V. S. 2. The right Vfi of Reafon. 353
fie. bear* and embrace my Friend* I am lure he is
prefent.
8. We fhoqld alfo make feveral trials* at fome
diftant Times, and in different Circumftances, com-
paring former Experiments with later, and our
own Obfervations with thofe of other Perfons.
It is by fuch Methods as thefe that modern Pbi-
hfopby has been fo greatly improved by the ufe
of fenfible Experiments.
SECT. II.
Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of
Reafon and Speculation.
IT is by Reafon we judge both in Matters of
Speculation *nd*Pra£!ice , there are peculiar
Rules which relate to Things practical* whether
they be Matters of Religion, Morality* or Prudence*
yet many Things in this Se&ion may be applied to
praBical Enquiries and Matters of Faith* though
it chiefly relates to Knowledge or Speculations of
Reafon.
i, Whatfoever clear Ideas we can join together
without Inconfiftency, are to be counted Poffibki
becaufe Almighty Power can make whatfoever we
can conceive.
,2. From the mere Poffibility of a Thing we can-
not infer its altual Exijience * nor from the Non-
Exiftence of it can we infer its Impoffibitity.
Note* The Idea of G^feems to claim an Ex-
emption from this general Rule •, for if he be pof-
fible, he certainly exifts, becaufe the very Idea
includes Eternity* and he cannot begin to be: If
he exift not, he is impoffible for the very fame
Reafon.
Ra" 3. What-
254 LOG I C K: Or, Part If,
3< Whatsoever is evidently contained in the Idea
of any Thing, may be affirmed of that Thing with
Certainty. Reafon is contained in the Idea of a
Man ; and Extftence is contained in the Idea of
God; and therefore we ihay affirm God exijis, and
Man is reafonable.
4 It is impoffible that the fame Thing fhould
be, and not be at the fame Time, and in the fame
Refpedl. Thence it follows, that two contractor)
Ideas cannot be joined in the fame Part of the fame
Subjeff, at the fame Time, and in the fame RefpeSs:
Or, that two contradictory Proportions can never be
both true.
5. The more we converfe with any Subject in
its various Properties* the better Knowledge of it we
are likely to attain \ and by frequent and repeated
Enquiries and Experiments, Reafoning? and Con-
ventions about it, we confirm our true Judgments
of that Thing, and corredt our former Miftakes.,
6. Yet after our utmoft Enquiries, we can never
be affured by Reafon, that we know all the Powers
and Properties of any finite Being*
7. If finite Beings are not adequately known by,
us, much lefs the Things infinite : For it is of the
Nature of a finite Mind not to be able to compre-
hend what is infinite.
8. We may judge and argue very juftly and
cerainly concerning Infinites* in fome Parts of them,
or fo far as our Ideas reach, though the Infinity
of them hath fomething incomprehenfible in it.
And this is built on the general Rule following,
viz.
9. Whatfoever is fuffieiently clear and evident
ought not to be denied, though there are other
Things belonging to the fame Subjeft, which cannot
be comprehended. I may affirm many Things with
Certainty
Ch. V. S. 2. *rherigbt life $f Reafon; 255
Certainty concerning human Souls, their Union with
Bodies, concerning the Divifibility of Matter, and
the Attributes of God, though many other Things
relating to them are all Darknefs to us.
10. Jf any Opinion propofed has either no Ali-
gnments, or equal Arguments for and againft it, we
muft remain in perfeft Sufpence about it, till con-
vincing Evidence appear on one fide.
ii. Where prefent Neceflity of A&ion does
not conftrain us to determine, we fhould not im-
mediately yield up our Aflent to mere probable
Arguments, without a due Referve, if we have any
reafonable Hope of obtaining greater Light and
Evidence on one. fide or the other : For when the
Balance of the Judgment once refigns its Equili-
brium or Neutrality to a mere probable Argument*
it is too ready to fettle itfelf on that fide, fo that
the Mind will not eafily change that Judgment,
though bright and ftrong Evidence appear after-
wards on the other fide.
12. Of two Opinions, if one has unanfwerablc
Difficulties attending it, we muft not rejeft it im-
mediately, till we examine- whether the contrary
Opinion has not Difficulties as unan/werable.
13. If each Opinion has ObjeSlions againft it
which we cannot anfwer, or reconcile, we fhould
rather embrace that which has the leaft Difficulties
in it, and which has the beft Arguments to fupport
it : And let our Aflent bear Proportion to the fu-
perior Evidence.
14. If any Do&rine hath very ftrong and fuf-
ficient Light and Evidence to command our Aflent,
we (hould not rejeft it becaufe there is an Objec-
tion or two againft it which we are not able to
anfwer: For upon this Foot a common Chriftian
would be baffled out of every Article of bif Faith,
*nd muft renounce even the Didtates of his Rea-
R 3 [on
*5$ LOGICK: Or, Part IL
fin and his Senfes \ and the mod learned Man per*
haps would hold but very few of them fad: i For
foirie Objeftions which attend the facred Dodrinc
of the Eternity and the Omnipresence of God, and the
philofophical Do&rihes of Light, Atoms, Space, Mo-
tion, &c. are hardly, folvabk to this Day.
15. Where two Extremes are propofed, either
in Matters of Speculation or Pra&ice, and neither
of them has certain and convincing Evidence, it is
generally fafeft to take the middle Way* Modera-
tion is more likely to come near the Truth than
doubtful Extremes. This is an excellent Rule to
judge of the Characters and Value of the greateft
Part of Perfons and Things ; for Nature feldoin
deals in Superlatives. It is a good Rule alfo by
which to form our Judgment in many fpeculatif*
Controversies % a reconciling Medium in fuch Cafes
does often beft fecure Truth as well as Peace.
16. When two different Propofitions have each
a very ftrong and cogent Evidence, and do not
plainly appear iriconfifteht, we may believe both of
them, though we cannot at prefent fee the Way to
reconcile them. Reafon, as well as our own C<m-
fcioufnefs, affures us, that the Will of Man is free*
and that Multitudes of human Anions are in that
RefpeSt contingent*, and yet Reafon and Scripture at
fure us, that God foreknows them all, and this im-.
plies a certain Fatality. Now though learned Men
have not to this Day hit on any fo clear and happy
Method as is defired to reconcile thefe Propofiti-
ons, yet fince we do not fee a plain Inconfiftency
in them, we juftly believe them both, becaufe their
Evidence is great.
17. Let us not therefore too fuddenly determine
in difficult Matters, that two Things are utterly ith
ewjiflent : For there are many Propofitions which
may
Cb. V. S. 2. 7fo right Vfe gf Reafon. 257
may appear inconfifient at firft, and yet afterward*
we find their ConJiJtency, and the Way of recon-
ciling them may be made plain and eafy : As alio
there are other Propositions which may appear
confident at firft, but after due Examination we find
their Inconfijtency.
18. For the fame Rcafon we fhould not call
thofe Difficulties utterly infolyable, or thofe Ob*
jedions wanfwerabki which we are not prefently
able to anfwer : Time and Diligence may give far-
ther Light.
19. In (hort, if we will fecure ourfelves from
Error, we fhould not be too frequent or hafty in
averting the certain Confiftency or Inconftftency, the
abfolute Univerfality, Necfffity, or Impojfibility of
Things, where there is not the brighteit Evidence,
JJe is but a young and raw Philofopher, who
when he fees two particular Ideas evidently agree,
immediately aflerts them to agree univerfally, to
agree necefarily, and that it is impojfible it Jhould be
otberwife : Or when he fees evidently that two par-
ticular Ideas happen to difagree, he prefently aflerts
their conftant and natural Inconfiftency^ their utter
Impojfibility of Agreement, and calls every thing
contrary to his Opinion Abfurdity and Nonjenfe. A
true Fhilofopher will affirm or deny with much
Caution or Modefty, unlefs he has thoroughly ex-
amined and found the Evidence of every Pact of
his Affertion exceeding plain.
20. Let us have a Care of building our Aflu-
ranee of any important Point of Dottrine upon one
Jingle Argument^ if there are more to be obtained.
We fhould not flight and rejedt all other Argu-
ments which fupport the fame Dodrine, left if
our Javourite Argument fhould be refuted,, and fail
us, we fhould be tempted to abandon that impor-
tant Principle of Truth. I think this was a very
R*4 culpable
i 5 8 LOGIC K: Or, Part II.
culpable Pradtice in Dcfcartes, and fome of his
Followers, who when he had found out the Ar-
gument for the Exiftence of God, derived from the
Idea of a moft forfeit arid felf-exijtent Being* he feem-
ed to defpife and abandon all other Arguments a?
gainft Atbcifm.
21. If we happen to have our chief Arguments
for any Opinion refuted, we fhould not immedi-
ately give up the Opinion itfelf ; for perhaps it may
be a Truth (till, and we may find it ' to be juftly
fupported by other Arguments, which we might
once think weaker, or perhaps by new Arguments
which we knew not before.
22. We ought to efteem that to btjufficient Evi-
dence of a Proportion, where both the Kind and the
Forced the Arguments or Proofs are as great as
the Nature of the Thing admits, and as the Necef-
fity or Extgence of the Cafe requires. So if we
. have a credible and certain Tejiimony that Cbrift refe
from the Bead* it is enough ; we are not to expeft
mathematical or ocular Demonftration for it, at leaft
in our Day.
23. Though we fhould feek what Proofs may be
attained of any Propofition, and we fhould receive
• any Number of Arguments which arfr juft and
evident for the Confirmation of the fame Truth,
yet we muft not judge of the Truth of any Propofi-
tion by the Number of Arguments which are brought
to fupport it, but by the Strength and Weight of them :
A Building will ftand firmer and longer on four
large Pillars of Marble than on ten of Sand, or
Earth, or Timber.
24. Yet where certain Evidence is not to be
found or expe&ed, a cpnfiderable Number of pro-
bable Arguments carry great Weight with them
even in Matters of Speculation, That is a proba-
te Hypothecs in Pbilofophy or in IbcoJogy, which
goes
Ch. V. S. 3." The right VfeofRetfon; 259
goes fartheft toward the Solution of many difficult
Queftions arifmg on any Subjeft.
SECT. III.
Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of
Morality and Religion.
HE R E it may be proper in the firft Place
to mention a few Definitions of Words or
Terms.
By Matters of Morality and Religion I mean
thofe Things which relate to our Duty to God, our
Selves, or our Fellow-Creatures. . . -
Moral Good, or Virtue, ox Holinefs, is an A&ion
or Temper conformable to the Rule of our Duty.
Moral Evil, or Vice, or Sin, is an Aftiott or Tem-
per unconformable to the Rule of our Duty, or a
Neglect to fulfil it.
Note, The Words Vice ox Virtue chiefly imply
the Relation of our Anions to Men and this World:
Sin and Holinefs rather imply their Relation to God
and the other World.
Natural Good is that which gives us Pleafure or
• Satisfa&ion. Natural Evil is that which gives us
Pain or Grief.
Happinefs conGfts in the Attainment of the higheft
and moft lading natural Good. Mifery confifts in
fuffering the higheft and moft lading natural Evil :
that is, in fhort, Heaven or Hell.
Though this be a juft Account of perfeS Happi-
nefs and perfect Mifery, yet wherefoeveir Pain over-
balances Pleafure^ there is a Degree of Mifery ; and
wherefoever Pleafure overbalances Pain, there is a
Degree of Happinefs.
I pro-
*6o LOGIC K: Or, Part Ifc
I proceed now to lay down fome Principles and
Rules cf Judgment, in Matters of Morality and Re*
Ugion.
i. The Will of our Maker, whether difcovered
by Reafon or Revelation, carries the higheft Au- ,
thority with it, and is therefore the higheft Rule of
Duty to intelligent Creatures; a Conformity or
Non-conformity to it determines their Adions to
be morally good or evil.
a. Whatsoever is really an immediate Duty to*
ward oujfelvcs, or toward our Fellow-Creatures,
is more remotely a Duty to God ; and therefore in
the Practice of it we fbould have an Eye to the
Will of God as our Rule, and to his Glory as our
End.
3. Our wife md gracious Creator has clofely
united our, Duty and our Happinefs together ; and
has connected Sin, or Vice, and Puntfhment ; that
is, he has ordained that the higheft natural Good
and Evil fhould have a clofe Connexion with mo-
ral Good and Evil, and that both in the Nature
of Things, and by his own pofitive Appoint-
ment.
4. Confcience fhoufd feek all due Information
in order to determine what is Duty, and what
is Sin, becaufe Happinefs and Mifery depend upon
it.
5. On this Account our Inclination to prefent
temporal Good* and our Averfion to prefent tempo*
ral Evil, muft be wifely overbalanced by the Con-
fideration of future and eternal Good or Evil, that is t
Happinefs or Mifery. And for this Reafon we
ihould not omit a Duty, or commit a Sin, to
gain any temporal Good, or to avoid any temporal
Evil.
6 Though
Cb. V. S. 3; The right VJk of Rcafon. t6t
- 6. Though our natural Reafsn in a State of Inno-
cence might be fufficient to find out thole Duties
which were, necefiary for an innocent Creature, in
order to abide in the Favour of his Maker, yet ift
a fallen State cur natural Reafon is by no means fiifr
ficient to find out all that is neceflary to rejiore ft
finful Creature to the Divine Favour.
7. Therefore God has condefcended in various
Ages of Mankind to reveal to finful Mm what he
requires of them in order to their Refi*rattin> and
has appointed in his Word fome peculiar Matters
of Faith and Fra&ice, in order to their Salvation.
This is called revealed Religion, as the Things
knowable concerning God, and our Duty by the
Light of Nature are called natural Religion*
There are alfo many Pans of Morality, And
natural ReHgwn 9 or mahy natural Duties- relating
to God, to ourfclvts, and to our Neighbours,
which would be exceeding difficult and tedious
for the Bulk of Mankind to find out and deter-
mine by natural Reafon 1 therefore it has pleafed
God in this facred Book of Divine Revelation to
exprefs the mbft neceflary Duties of this kind in
a very plain, and e&fy Manner, and made them in-
telligible to Souls of the lowed Capacity; or they
may be very eafily derived thence by the Ufe of
Reafon.
9. As there are fome Duties much more neotf-
fary and more important than others are, fo every
Duty requires our Application to underftand and
prafldfe it in Proportion to its Neceffity and Import
tance.
10. Where two Duties Teem to ftand in Of*-
pofition to each other, and we cannot praAffe
both, the lefs muft give Way to the greater^ and
the Omiflion of the lefs is not finful. So ceremo-
nial
*V^>K
%6i L G I C K: Or, Part IL
mal Laws give Way to moral : God will have Mer~
cy and not Sacrifice
ii. In Duties of natural Religion, we may judge
of the different Degrees of their Neceffity and Im-
portance by Reafon* according to their greater or
more apparent Tendency to the Honour of God
and the Good of Men : But in Matters of revealed
Religion, it is only divine Revelation can certainly
inform us what is mod: neceffary and mod impor-
tant ♦, yet we may be afiifted alfo in that Search by
the Exercifes of Reafon.
12. In Anions wherein there may be fome Scru-
ple about the Duty or Lawfulnefs of them, we
Ihould chufe always the fafeft Side, and abftain as
far as we can from the Pra&ice of Things whofe
Lawfulnefs we fufpedt. .
13. Points of the greateft Importance in human
Life, or in Religion, are generally the mod evU
dent, both in the Nature of Things, and in the
Word of God ; and where Points of Faith or
Pra&ice are exceeding difficult to find out, they
cannot be exceeding important. This Propofnion
may be proved by the Goodnefs and Faithfulnefc
of God, as well as by Experience and Obferva-
tion.
14. In fome of the outward Pra&ices and
Forms of Religion, as well as human Affairs,
there is frequently a prefent Neceffity of fpeedy Ac*
tion one Way or another : In fuch a Cafe, hav-
ing furveyed Arguments on both Sides, as far as
our Time and Circumftances admit, we mutt
guide our Practice by thofe Reafons which appear
moft probable, and feem at that Time to overbalance
the reft ; yet always referving room to admit far- 1
ther Light and Evidence, when fuch Occurrences
return again. It is a Preponderaiion of circumftantial
Argu-
Ch. V. S. 4. "The right Vfe ^Reafon. 263
Arguments that mud determine our Aftions in a
thotifand Occurrences.
15. We may alfo determine upon probable Ar-
guments where the Matter is of fmall Conjequence,
and would not anfwer the Trouble of feeking after
Certainty. Life and Time are more precious than
to have a large Share of them laid out in fcrupu-
lous Enquiries, whether fmoaking fTobacco, or wear-
ing a Periwig be lawful or no.
16. In Affairs of greater Importance, and which
may have a long, lafting, and extenfive Influence
on our future Conduft or Happinefs, we Ihould
not take up with Probabilities, if Certainty may be
attained. Where there is any Doubt on the Mind*
in fuch Cafes we fhould call in the Afliftance of all
Manner of Circumftances, Reafohs, Motives, Con-
sequences on all Sides : We muft wait longer and
with earneft Requeft feek human and divine Ad-
vice before we fully determine our Judgment and
our Praftice, according to the old Roman Sentence,
Quod ftatuendum eft femel, deliberandum eft diu. We
ihould be long in confidering what we muft deter-
mine once for all.
SECT; IV. " ,-
Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of
human Prudence.
TH E great Defign of Prudence, as diftin<5k
.from Morality and Religion, Us to determine
and manage every Affair \yith Decency, and to the
belt Advantage.
This is decent, which is agreeable to our State,
Condition, or Circumftances, whether it be in Be-
haviour, Difcourfe, or A&ion.
264 LOGIC K: Or, Part II,
That is advantageous which attains the mod and
beft Purpofes, and avoids the moft and greateft In-
conveniences.
As there is infinite Variety in the Ctrcumftance*
of Perfons, things* ABions, Times and Places* ft
we ipuft be furnilhed with fpch general Rules as
are accommodable to all this Variety by a wife
Judgment and Discretion : For what is an A€t of
conjummate Prudence in fome Times* Places aad
CircumfianctSy would be c^nfummate Polly in others.
Now thtk Rules ipay be ranged in the following
Manner.
i. Our Regard to Pcrfbns or Things (hould be
gpverned by the Degrees of Concernment we have
with them, the Relation we have to them, or the
ExpeSation we have from them. Thefe (hould be
the Mcafures by which we (hould proportion our
Diligence and Application in any thing that relates
to them.
2. We Jhould always confider whether the
Thing we purfue be attainable^ whether it be
worthy our Purfuit\ whether it be worthy the
Degree of Purfuit\ whether it be worthy of the
Means ufed in order to attain it. This Rule is ne-
ceffary both in Matters of Knowledge and Matters
c>f PraStice.
3. When the Advantages and Difadvantages, Con*
veniencies and Inconveniencies of any A&ion are ba-
lanced together, we muft finally determine on that
Side which has the fuperior Weight ; and the (bon-
er in Things which are neceffarily and fpeedily to
be done or determined.
4. If Advantages and Difadvantages in their own
Nature are equal, then thole which are moft certain
or likely as to the Evens fhould turn the Scale of our
Judgment, and determine our Practice.
5- Who*
Ch. V. S. 4. The right Ufe $f Reafon. 265
5. Where the Improbabilities of Succefs pr Ad- .
vantage are greater than the Probabilities, it is not
Prudence to aft or venture, if the Aftio'n may be
attended with Danger or Lofs equal to the propofed
Gain. It is proper to enquire whether this be not
the Cafe inalmoft all Lotteries ; for they that hold
Stakes will certainly fecure Part to themfelves ; and
only the Remainder being divided into Prizes* muft
render the Improbability of Gain to each Adventurer
greater than the Probability.
6. We (hould not defpife or negleft any real Ad-
, vantage^ and abandon the Purfuit of it, though we
cannot attain all the Advantages that we defire.
This would be to aft like Children, who are fond
of fomething which ftrikes thQir Fancy moft, and
fullen and regardlefs of every Thing elfe, if they
are not humoured in that Fancy.
7. Though a general Knowledge of Things be ufe-
ful in Science and in human Life, yet we (hould
content ourfelves with a more fuperficial Know-
ledge of thofe Things which have the leaft Relation
to our chief End and Defign. w
8. This Rule holds good alfo in Matters of Bu-
finefs and PraSice^ as well as in Matters of Know*
ledge ; and therefore we Jbould not grajp at every
Thing, left in the End we attain nothing. Perfons
, that either by an Inconftancy of Temper, or by a
vain Ambition, will purfue every Sort of Art and
< Science, Study and Bufinefs, feldom grow excellent
in any one of them : And Projectors who form
twenty Schemes feldom ufe fufficient Application
to finifti one of them, or make it turn to good
Account.
9. Take heed of delaying and trifling'amongft
the Means inftead of reaching at the End. Take
heed of wafting a Life in mere speculative Studies,
which is called to Action and Employment : Dwell
266 LOGIC K: Or, Part II.
not too long in pbilofopbical, mathematical, or
grammatical Parts of Learning, when your chief
Defign is Law, Phyfick, or Divinity. Do not fpend
the Day in gathering Flowers by the Way Side, left
Night come upon you before you arrive at your
Journey f s End, and then you will not reach it.
10. Where the Cafe arid Circumftances of wife and
good Men refemble our own Cafe and Circumftancesj
we may borrow a great deal of Inftrudtion toward
our prudent Conduit from their Example, as well
as in all Cafes we may learn much from their Con*
verfation and Advice.
n. After all other Rules remember this, that
mere Speculation in Matters of human Prudence can
never be a perfedt Direftor without Experience and
Obfervation. We may be content therefore ift
our younger Years to commit fome unavoidable
Miftakes in Point of Prudence, and we fhall fee
Miftakes enough in the Conduit of others, both
which ought to be treafured up among our ufe*
ful Obfervations, in order to teach us better Judg-
ment for Time to come, Sometimes the Miftakes^
Imprudences and Follies, which ourfelves or others
have been guilty of, give us brighter and more ef-^
fedtual Leflbns of Prudence, than the wifeft Councils,
and the faireft Examples could ever have done.
SECT. V.
Prineiples and Rules of Judgment in Matters of
human Teftimony.
TSHE Tlvidfcrice of human Tejtimony is not fo
proper to lead us into the Knowledge erf'
the Effence and inward Nature of Things, as to
acquaint us with the Exifience of Things, and to
inform
Ch. V. 3. 5. the right Ufe gf Reafon. 26?
inform us of Matters of Faff both paft and prefent.
And though there be a great deal of Fallibility in
the Teftimony of Men, yet there are fome Things
tve may be almoft as certain of, as that the Sun
Jkmesi or that five twenties make an Hundred. Who
is there at London that knows any Thing 'of the
World, but believes there is fuch a City as Paris
in France 5 that the Pope dwells at Rome 5 that Ju-
lius Caefar was an Emperor % or that Luther had d
great Hand in the Reformation ?
If we obferve the following Rules, we may ar-
rive at fuch a Certainty in many Things of human
Teftimony, as that it is morally impbffible we
ihould be deceived, u e. we may obtain a moral
Certainty.
1. Let lis eonfider whether the Thing reported
be in \tk\i poffible \ if not, it can never be credible^
ivhofoever relates it.
2. Cohfider farther Whether it. be probable* whe-
ther there are any concurring Circumfiances to prove
it, befide the mere Teftimony of the Perfon that
relates it. I corifefs if thefc laft Conditions ard
wanting the Thing may be true, but then ic
ought to have the ftronger Teftimony to fup-
port it.
3. Confider whether the Perfbri who relates it
. be capable of knowing the Truth; Whether he be a
^Jkilful Judge in fuch Matters, if it be a Bufinefs of
Art, or a nice Appearance in Nature, or fome
curious Experiment in Philofophy. But if it be a
mere Occurrence in Life, d plain, fenfible Matter
of Fad, it is enough to enquire whetheT he who
relates it were an Eye or Ear-Witnefs* or whether
he himfeif had it only by Hear-foy 9 Qt Can trace if
tip to the .Original*
' I 4. Con-
t
268 L G IC K: Or, PartH.
4. Confider whether the Narrator be bonejt and
faithful, as well as fkilful : Whether he hath 00
Biajs upon his Mind, no peculiar Gain or Profit by
believing or reporting it, no Intereft or Principle
which might warp his own Belief afide from Tnftfa,
or which might tenfpt him to prevaricate, to fpcak
falfly, or to give a Rcprefentation a little different
from the naked Truth of Things. In (hort, whe-
ther there be no Occajion of Sufpicion concerning
his Report.
5. Confider whether federal Perfons agree toge-
ther in the Report of this Matter ; and if fo, then
whether thefe Perfons who joined together in their
Teftimony might not be fuppofed to combine top-
tber in a Falfbood. Whether they are Perfons of
fttfficient Skill, Probity and Credit. It might be alfo
enquired, whether they are of different Nations,
Setts, Parties, Opinions, or Interefts. For the morj
divided they are in all thefe, the more likely is their
Report to be true, if they agree together in their
Account of the fame Thing ; and especially if rihey
perfift in it without wavering.
6. Confider farther, whether the Report were
capable of being eafily refuted atfirft if it had not been
true ; if fo, this confirms the Teftimony.
7 Enquire yet again, whether there has been a
conftanty uniform Tradition and Belief of this Matter
from the very firft Age or Time when the Thing
was tranfadted, without any reafonable Doubts or
Contradi&ions. Or,
8. If any Part of it hath been doubted by any
confiderable Perfons, whether it has been fearcbei
out and afterwards confirmed, by having all the
Scruples and Doubts removed. In either of :hefe
Cafes the Teftimony becomes more firm and cn>
dible.
9. Eaj
Ch. V. S. 5. The right TJfe $f Reafori. 26 g
9. Enquire on the other Hand, whether there
are any confiderable Objeftions remaining againft
£he Belief of that Propofition fo attefted. Whe-
ther there be any Thing very improbable in the
.Thing itfelf. Whether any concurrent Circumftances
feem to oppofe it. Whether any Perfon or Perfons
give a pofttive and plain Teflimony againft it. Whe-
ther they are equally Jkilful, and equally faithful as
thofe who aflert it. Whether there be as many or
more in Number, and whether they might have
any fecret Biafs or Influence on them to contradict
it.
10. Sometimes the entire Silence of a Thing may
Jiave fomething of Weight towards the Decifion of
a doubtful Point of Hiftory, or a Matter of hu-
man Faith, (viz.) where the Faft is pretended to
be publick, if the Perfons who are filent about
it were fkilful to obferve, and could not but know
fuch an Occurrence ; if they were engaged by
Principle or by Intereft to have declared it : If
they had fair Opportunity to fpeak of it : And
thefe Things may tend to make the Matter fufpi-
cious, if it be not very well attefted by pofitive
? Proof.
11. Remember that in fome Reports there are
snore Marks of Faljhood than of Truths and in
others there are more Marks of Truth than of Falf-
bood. By a Comparifon of all thefe Things toge-
ther, and putting every Argument on one Side
and the other into the Balance, we mud form as
good a Judgment as we can which Side prepon-
derates; and give a ftrong or feeble Affent or
Diflent, or withhold our Judgment entirely, ac-
cording to greater or leffer Evidence, according to
more plain or dubious Marks of Truth or Falfe-
bood.
S 2, . 12. Ob-
270 L0 G I C k: Or, Part II.
12, Obferve that in Matters of human Teftimo*
ny there is fometimes a great Mixture of ^ruth ad
Faljbood in the Report itfelf : Some Parts of the
Story may be perfedtly true, and fome utterly falfej
and fome may have fuch a blended Confufion of
Circumltances which are a little warped afide from
the Truth, and mifreprefented, that there is Need
of good Skill and Accuracy to form a Judgment
concerning them, and determine which Part is true,
and which is falfe. The whole Report is not to be
believed, becaufe fome Parts are indubitably true,
nor the whole to be rejected, becaufe fome Parts
are as evident Faljboods.
We may draw two remarkable Observations from
this SeRion.
Obferv, I. H6w certain is the Truth of the
Chriftian Religion, and particularly of the Refur*
refiion of Cbrijl> which is a Matter of Faft on
' which Cbrijlianity is built! We have almoit all
the concurrent Evidences that can be derived from
human Tejtimony joining to confirm this . glorious
Truth. The Fadl is not impoffible •, concurrent
Ciicumftances caft a favourable Afpeft on it sit
was foretold' by one, who wrought Miracles, and
therefore not unlikely, nor unexpe&ed : The A-
poftles and firft Difciples were Eye and Ear- Wit-
neffes, for they converfed with their rifen Lord ;
they were the moft plain, honeft Men in them-
felves ; the Temptations of worldly Interefts did
rather dilcourage their Belief and Report qf it:
They all agree in this Mattet, though they were
Men of different Chara&ers ; Pbarifees and Fijher*
men^ and Publicans* Men of Judaa and GaliUt %
and perhaps fome Heathens^ who were early con
verted : The Thing might eafily have been <tf
proved if it were falfe •, it hath been conveyed fc
conftan
J
Ch. V. S. 6. The right Ufe of Rcafon. 271
conftant Tradition and Writing down to our Times ;
thofe who at firft doubted were afterwards convinced
by certain Proofs ; nor have any pretended to give
any Proof of the contrary, but merely denied the
Fad with Impudence in Opposition to all thefe
Evidences.
Obferv. II. How weak is the Faith which is due
to a Multitude of Things in ancient human Hifto-
ry ! For though many of thefe Criteria, or Marks
of Credibility are found plainly in the more general
andpublick Faffs, yet as to a Multitude of particular
Faffs and Circumftances, how deficient are they in
fuch Evidence as (hould demand our A/lent ! Per-
haps there is nothing that ever was done in all pad
Ages, and which was not a publick Fad, fo well
attefted as the Refurredtion of Chrifi*
S ECT, 'VI.
Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of
divine Tejtimony.
AS human Tejlimony acquaints us with Matters
of Faff , both paji and prefent, which lie be-
. yond the Reach of our own perfonal Notice ; fo
divine Tejlimony is fuited to inform us both of the
Nature of Things, as well as Matters of Faff, and
of Things future, as well z& prefent or pafi.
Whatfoever is di&ated to us by God himfelf,
or by Men who are divinely infpired, muft be be-
lieved with full Aflurance. Reafon demands us to
believe whatfoever divine Revelation dictates : For
God is perfeftly wife, and cannot be deceived ; he
is faithful and good, and will not deceive his Crea-
■ tures : And when Reafon has found out the cer-
tain Marks or Credentials of divine Teflimony to
f S 3 belong
272 L O G I C K: Or, Part H.
belong to any Propofition, there remains then no
farther Enquiry to be made, but only to find out
the true Senfe and Meaning of that which God
has revealed, for Reafon itfelf demands the Belief
of it.
Now divine TefHmony or Revelation requires thefe
following Credentials.
i. That the Propofitions or Do&rmes revealed
be not inconjiftent with Reafon \ for intelligent Crea-
tures can never be bound to believe real Inconfift-
cncies. Therefore we are fure the Popifh Doflrine
of Tranfubftanti -tion is not a Matter of divine Re-
velation, becaufe it is contrary to all our Senfes ancl
our Reafon, even in their proper Exercifes.
God can di&ate nothing but: what is worthy of
himfelf, and agreeable to his own Nature and di-
vine Perfections. Now many of thefe Perfe&ions
are difcoverable by the Light of Reafon, and what-
foever is inconfiftent with thefe Perfections, cannot
be a divine Revelation.
* But let it be noted, that in Matters of Prailice
towards our Fellow-Creatures ', God may command
us to aft in a Manner contrary to what Reafon
would dired antecedent to that Command. So
Abraham was commanded to offer up bis Son a
Sacrifice: The Jfraclites were ordered to borrow
of the Egyptians without paying themt and. to
plunder and flay the Inhabitants of Canaan : Be-
caufe God has a fovereign Right to all Things,
and can with Equity difpoflefs his Creatures of
Life, and every Thing which he has given them',
and efpecially fuch iinful Creatures as Mankind •
and he can appoint whom he pleafes to be the In-
ftruments of this juft Difpofleffion or Depriva-
tion. So that thefe divine Commands are not
really inconfiftent with right Reafon -> for wbatfoerer
a
Ch. V. S. 6. The right life of Reafon. 273
is fo cannot be believed where that Inconfiftency ap-
pears.
2. Upon the fame Account the "vbol? Doftrine of
Revelation mutt be conjijlent uiik- n-elf\ every Part
of it mult be confident wi h e. ch o f hrr : And
though in Points oi Practice latter Revelation may
repeal or cancel former divine Laws, yet in Matters
of Btlief no latter Revehtion can be inconfiftcnt
with what has been knetofoEQ revealed.
3. Divine Revelation rriuft be confirmed by
fome divine and fupernatural Appearances, fome
extraordinary Signs or Tokens* Vijions, Voices, or
Miracles wrought, or Prophecies fulfilled. There
mud be fome Demonftrations of the Prefence and
Power of God, fuperor to all the Powers of Nature,
or the fettled Connexion which God as Creator
has eftabliftied among his Creatures in this vifible
World.
4. If there are any fuch extraordinary and won-
derful Appearances and Operations brought to con-
teft with, or to oppofe divine Revelation, there mud
and always will be fuch a Superiority on the Side of
that Revelation which is truly divine, as to manifeft
that God is there. This was the Cafe when the
Egyptian Sorcerers contended with Mofes. But the
"Wonders which Mofes wrought did fo far tranfeend
the Power of the Magicians^ as made them confefs
// was the Finger of God.
5. Thefe divine Appearances or Atteftations to
Revelation muft be either known to ourfelves, by
our own perfonal Obfervation of them, or they
muft be jufficiently attejled by others, according to
the Principles and Rules b* which Mutters of
human Faith are to be judged in the foregoing
Se&ion.
S 4 Some
j 7 4 LOGIC K: Or, Part II, -
Some of thofe, who lived in the Nations and
Ages where Miracles were wrought, were Eye and
Ear-Witneffes of the Truth and Divinity of the
Revelation . but we, who live in theft diftant Agps
muft have them derived down to us by juft and in-
conteftable Hiftory and Tradition. We alfo even
iji thefe diftant Times may fee the Accomplifh-
ments of fome ancient PrediSions, and thereby ob*
tain that Advantage toward the Confirmation of
our Faith in divine Revelation beyond what thofc
Perfons enjoyed who lived when the Predictions
were pronounced*
6.. There is another very confiderable Confir-
mation of divine Tejtimony 5 and that is, when the
Doflrines themfelves either on the Publication or
{he Belief of them produce fupernatural EffedU.
Such were the miraculous Powers which were com*
ipupicated to Believers in the firft Ages of Chri-
ftianity, the Converfwn of Jews or Gentiles, the
;amazing Succefs of the Gofpel of Cfirift without
human Aid, and in Opposition to a thoufand Im-
pediments, its Power in changing the Hearts and
Lives of ignorant and vicipu^ Heathens, and wicked
and profanfe Creatures in all Nations, and filling
them with a Spirit of Virtue, Piety and Goodnefs.
Wherefoever Perfons have found this Effedt in theijr
own Hearts, wrought by a Belief of the Gofpel pf
Cbrijl* they have a Witnefs in themfelves of the
Truth of it, and abundant Reafon to believe it
divine.
Of the Difference between Reafon and Revelation,
and in what Senfe the latter is fuperior, fee mo(£
in Cbaf. IJ. Sell. 9. and Cbtp. IV. Direff. 6.
3 E C T,
Cb, V. S. 7. The right U/e of Reafon. 475
SECT. VII.
Principles and Rules of judging, concerning Thing*
paft, prefcnt, and to come* by the mere U/e of
Reafon.
THOUGH we attain the greateft Affurance
of Things paft and future by divine Faith*
and learn many Matters of Faft, both paft and
frefent, by human Faith \ yet Reafon alfo may in a
good Degree aflift us to judge of Matters of Fa6t
oth paft, prefent, and to come, by the fallowing .
Principles.
1. There is a Syftem of Beings round about us,
of which we ourfelves are a Part, which we call
the World , and in this World there is a Courfe of
Nature, or a fettled Order of Caufes, EffeSts* Ante-
cedents* Concomitants* Conferences* &c. from which
the Author of Nature doth not vary but upon very
important Occafions.
2. Where Antecedents, Concomitants* and Confe-
quents* Caufes and Effefts* Signs and Things Jigiti-
^Jied* SubjeSls and AdjunSs* are neceflfarily connected
with each other, we may infer the Caufes from
the Effe&s, and Effe&s from Caufes, the Antece* -
dents from the Confequents, as well as Confequents
irom Antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty cer-
tain of many Things both paft* prefent, and to
come. It is by this Principle that Aftronomen&sqk
tell what Bay and Hour the Sun and Moon «fe
fdipfedfive hundred Tears ago* and predift d\\futur$
Eclipfes as long as the World (hall ftand. They
■can tell precifely at what Minute the Sun rifes or
Jets this Day at Pequin in China, or what Alti-
tude the Dog-ftar bad at -Midnight or Midnoon in
Jlome, on the Day when Julius Cxfar was flain.
Gacdecic^
&76 LO G IC K: Or v Part IE
Gardeners upon the fame Principle can Foretel the
Months when every Plant will be in Bloom, and the
Ploughman knows the Weeks of Harvefi : We are
fure, if. there be a Chicken* there was an Egg : If
there be a Rainbow, we are certain it rains not far
off: If we behold a free growing on the Earth* we
know it has naturally a Root under Ground.
3. Where there is a necejfary Connexion between
Caufes and EffeBs* Antecedents and Consequents, Signs
and 7%r£tf ftgnified* we know alfo that ££* Caufes
will have //£<? EfFe&s, and proportionable Caufes
will have proportionable Effedts; contrary Caufes
will have contrary Effefts; and obferving Men
may form many Judgments by the Rules of Simi-
litude $nd Proportion, where the Caufes* EffiUs^
&c. are not entirely the fame.
4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain
Connexion between Antecedents, Concomitants anfl .
Confequents* we can give but a Conje&ure, or a />r0- '
table Determination. If the Clouds gather, or the
Weather-glafs finks, we fuppofe it will rain : If a
Man fpit Blood frequently with Coughing , we fuppofe
his Lungs are hurt : If very dangerous Symptoms
appear, we expedt his Death.
5. Where Caufes operate freely, with a Liberty
of indifference to this or the contrary* there we cannot
certainly know what the Effeft will be: For it
feems to be contingent, and the certain Knowledge
of it belongs only to God. This is the Cafe in the
greateft Part of human Adtions.
6. Yet wife Men by a juft Obfervation of hu-
man Nature, will give very probable Conjeftures
in this Matter, alfo concerning Things paft^ or
Things future^ becaufe human Nature in all Ages
and Nations has fuch a Conformity to itfelf. By
a Knowledge of the Tempers of Men and their
prefcnt Circumftances, we may be able to give a
. happy
Ch. V. S. 7. fbert&hftJfe gfRcafon: iff
happy Guefs what their Coriduflt wift be* and \#iat
Will be theEvcnt, 1 by ah {fofervatton M r the like?
Cafes in former Tfmes. This fifradethe Eijnpiibt
Marcus Antoninus to fa^; cl B$ lofting Mm ffld
« Hifiory, and confiM-ty He Me MSMtuiitok
** of Governments, ydti will be able to forth •tjf'C '"
€c and almoft prophefy itpbn ibk future^ FcP l 9
<« paft, prefeht, And to Me, hrejfdnfttt itfiLfa.
*' dnddfaCofouti itid&e cdrifflfofy
«« Mould. So tM itpbn the MHier,for^ T^s^
c< human Life may fervefor a Sample of ten tboufmii^
Collier's Antoninus, Book VII. Se&. 50,
7. There are alfo fome other Principles of judg*
ing concerning the pad A&ions of Men in former
Ages, befides Books % Hiftories and Traditions, which
are the Mediums of conveying human Teftimony \
as we may infer the Skill and Magnificence of the
jtneients, by fome Fragments of their Statues, and
Ruins of their Buildings. We know what Roman
Legions came into Great Britain by Numbers of
Bricks dug out of t he Earth in f ome Parts of *the
Iflarid, with the Rlarks or tome 'p^cularTjegiotf
upon them, which muft have been employed there
in Brick-iyiaking. We redtify fome Miftakes in
Hiftory by Statues, Coins, old Altars, Utenfils of
War, &c. We confirm or difprove fome pretended
Traditions and hiftorical Writings, by Medals,
Images, Pi&ures, Urns, fcSV.
Thus I have gone through all thofe particular
Objefls of our Judgment which I firffrpropofed, and
have laid down Principles and Rules by which we
may fafely conduft ourfelves therein* There is a
Variety of other Objefts concerning which we
are occafionally called to pafs a Judgment, {viz.)
. The Cbarafters of Perfons, the Value and Worth of
IhingS) the Senfe and Meaning of particular Writers^
Matters
27S L0GICK:6cc: Partll.
Matters of Wit, Oratory, Poefy, Matters of Equity
in judicial Courts, Matters of Traffick and Commerce
between Man and Man, which would be endlefs to
enumerate. But if the general and fpecial Rules of
judgment which have been mentioned in thefe two
laft Chapters are treafured up in the Mind, and
wrought into the very Temper of our Souls in
our younger Years, they will lay a Foundation for
juft and regular Judgment concerning a thoufand
ibecial Occurrences in the religious civil and learned
THE
t *79 1
THE
THIRD PART
O F
L O G I C K.
Of Reafon and Syttogifm.
AS the firft Work of the Mind is Perception*
whereby our Ideas are framed, and the fe-
cond is Judgment , which joins or disjoins
our Ideas, and forms a % Propofition* fo the third
Operation of the Mind is Reafoning, which joins
feveral Proportions together, and makes a SyUogifm*
that* is, an Argument whereby we are wont to infer
fometbing that is lefs known, from Truths which are
more evident.
In treating of this Subjeft, let us confider more
particularly.
i. The Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts of
which it is compofed.
2. The feveral Kinds of Syllogiims, with particu-
lar Rules relating to them.
' 3- ***
280 L O IC K: Or, Part I1L
3. fbe DoHrine of Sophifms, or falfe Reafoning,
together with the Means of avoiding them* and the
fanner of folving or anfwering them.
'■ £, Syne general Rules to fyreft our Reafqning.
C H A P. I.
Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Pafts of
which it is cpmpofed.
IF the inerc Perception and fiomparifon of two
Ideas ^yould always (hew us whether they agree
or difagree ; then all' rational Propofitions would
be Matters of Intelligence* or firft Principles f and
there would be no Ufe of Reafoning* or drawing
any Confequcnces. It is the Narrownefs *>f the
human Mind which introduces the Neceffity of
Reafoning. When we arcunable to judge of the
Truth or Falfhood of a Propofition in an imme-
diate Manner, by the mere Contemplation of its
Subjeft and Predicate, we are then conftrained to
ufe a Medium* and to compare each of them with
fome third Idea* that by feeing how far they agree
or difagree with it, we may be able to judge how
far they agree or difagree among themfelves : As
if there are two Lines A and B 9 and I know not
whether they are equal or no, I take a third Line
C, or an Inch* and apply it to each of them 5 if it
agree with them both, then I infer that A and B
are squal j but if it agree wrth one and not with
the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal:
If it agree with neither of them, there can be no
Companion.
So
£Sh. I. tte right Up of Raton. 281
So if the Queftion be whether God muft bewor-
Jhipped, we feek a third Idea, fuppofc the Idea of a
Creator, and fay,
Our Creator muft be worflripped.
God is our Creator.
Therefore God muft be, worjhipped.
The Comparifon of this third Idea, with the two
diftinft Parts of the Queftion, ufually requires two
Propofitions which are called the Premifes: The
third Propofition which is drawn from them is the
Conclufion, wherein the Queftion itfelf is anfwered,
and the Subject and Predicate joined either in the
Negative or the Affirmative.
The Foundation of all Affirmative Conclufions is
laid in this general Truth, that , fo far as two pro-
pofed Ideas agree to any third Idea, they agree alfo
among themfelves. The Chawdter of Creator
agrees to G&tl, and Wbr/bip agrees to a Creator*
therefore Worfhip agrees to God.
The Foundations of all Negative Conclufions is this,
that where one of the two propofed Ideas agrees
with the third Idea, and the other difagrees with
it, they muft needs difagree fo far alfo with one
another 5 as, if nd Sinners are happy, and if Angels
are happy, then Angels are not Sinners.
Thus it appears what is the ftri£t and juft No-
tion of a Syllogifm: It is a Sentence or Argument
made up of three Propofitions fo difpofed, as that
the laft is neceflarily inferred from thofe which go
before, as in the Inftances which have been juft
mentioned.
In the Conftitution of a Syllogifm two Things may
be confidered, {viz.) the Matter and the Form of it.
The Matter of which a Syllogifm is made up, is
three Propofitions ; and thefe three Propofitions are
made up of three Ideas or Terms varioufly joined.
The
a8» LOGIC K: Of, Pitt lit
The three Terms are called the remote Matter of a
Syllogifm * and the three Propofitions the froxime or
immediate Matter of it.
The three Terms are named the Major + the Af*»
nor, and the Middle.
The Predicate of the Conclufion is called thd
major Term becanfe it is generally of a larger Ex-
tenfion than the minor Term, or the Subject. The
major and minor Terms are called the Extremes.
The middle Term is the third Idea invented and
difpofed in two Propofitions in fuch a Manner as
to (hew the Connexion between the major and
minor Term in the Conclufion ; for which Reaibn
the middle Term itfelf is fometimes called the Ar-
gument.
That Proportion which contains the Predicate
of the Conclufion, connected with the middle Term,
is ufually called the major Propofitton, whereas the
minor Proportion connects the middle Term with
the Subjeft of the Conclufion, and is fometimes
called the AJfumption.
Note, this exadt Diftin&ion of the feveral Parts
of a Syllogifm, and of the major and minor Terms-
connedted with the middle Term, in the major and
minor Propofitions, does chiefly belong to Jimplt
or categorical Syllogifms* of which we (hall fpeak in
the next Chapter, though all Syllogifms whatfoevef
have fomething analogical to it.
Note farther, that the major Proportion is gene-
rally placed firft, and the minor fecond, and the
Conclufion in the laft Place, where the Syllogifm is
regularly compofed and reprefented.
The Form of a Syllogifm is the framing and drf-
pofing of the Premifes according to Art, or juft
Principles of Reafoning, and the regular Inference
of the Conclufion from item.
The
Cb. 11% S. x. The right Vfe gf Reafoti. a8j
The A3 of Reafomng* or inferring one Thing
ff-om another, is generally exprefled and known by
the Particle Therefore, when the Argument is form*
cd according to the Rules of Art; though in com*
mon Difcourfe or Writing, fuch caufal Particles as
For* Becaufe* manifeft the A£t of Reafoning as well
a* the illative Particles Then and Therefore : And
wherefoever any of thefe Words are ufed, there is
a perfect Syllogifm exprefled or implied, though
perhaps the three Propofitions do not appear, or
are not placed in regular Form*
CHAP* IL
Of the Various Kinds of Syllogifms, with pari
ticular Rules relating to them.
SYLLOGISMS are divided into Various
Kinds, either according to the Sfaeflion which
. id proved by them, according td thfe Nature arid
^Compofition of them, Or according to the middle Tertrit
which Is ufed to pfove the Queitiorl.
sficf, i.
0/ umverfal and particular Syllogifms, iott tiegatMi
and affirmative i
ACCORDING to the fyeftion which is to
be proved, fo Syllogifms are divided inw>
univerfd Affirmative, univerfal Negative, particular*
Affirmative, and particular Negative. This is ofterf
called a Divifioa of Syllogifms drawn from the'
T Qondufioni
2S4 LOGIC K: Or, P*t Itt
Conclujion ; for fo many Sorts of Conclafions there
may be which are marked with the Letter A y £,
In an univerfal affirmative Syllogifm, one Idea il
proved univerfally to agree with another, and may
be univerfally affirmed of it, as every Sin deferva
Death, every unlawful Wtfh is a Sin ; therefor* every
unlawful fVifh deferves Death.
In an univerfal negative Syllogifm, one Idea il
proved to difagree with another Idea univerfally,
and' may be thus denied of it, as no Injujiici can k
pleafing to God \ all Perfecution for the fake of Confid-
ence is Injujiice ; therefore no Perfecution for Confitemt
Sake can be pleajing to God.
Particular affirmative, and particular negative 5y/-
logifms may be eafily underftood by what is faid of
Univerfah, and there will be fufficient Examples
given of all thefe in the next Seftion.
The general Principle upon which thefe univerfid
and particular Syllogifms are founded is this,
Whatfoever is affirmed or denied univerfally of any
Idea, may be affirmed or denied of all the particu-
lar Kinds or Beings, which are contained in the
Extenfion of that univerfal Idea. So the Defert of
Death is affirmed univerfally of Sin, and an unlaw-
ful Wifh is one patticular Kind of Sin, which is
contained in the univerfal Idea of Sin, therefore the
Defert of Death may be affirmed concerning an Wh
lawful IVijh. And fo of the reft.
Note, In the Doctrine of Syllogifms, a Jingulm
and an indefinite Propofition are ranked among
Univerfah, as was before obferved in the Po&rine
*of Propofitions,
S E Ct
Ch. II. 6. 2. The right Vfe ^B^cafon. 285
SECT. II.
Of plain, Jimpk Syllagifms 9 and their Rules.
THE next Divifion of Syllogifms is \ntofingU
and compound. This is drawn from the Nature
and Compofition of them.
Single Syllogifms are made up of three Propofitir
ens : Compound Syllogifms contain more than three
Propofitions, and may be formed into two ck
inore Syllogifms.
Single Syllogifms, for Diftin&ion's Sake, may bp
divided into * Simple, Complex, and Conjunctive.
Thofe are properly called Jimple or categorical
Syllogifms, which are made up of three plain Jin-
jfe, or categorical Proportions, wherein the middle
Term is evidently and regularly joined with one
Part of the Queftion in the major Propofition,
and with the other in the minor, whence there
follows a plain fingle Conclufion ; as, every hu-
man Virtue is to be fought with Diligence : Prudence
is a human Virtue \ therefore Prudence is to be fought
diligently.
Note, Though the Terms of Propofitions may
be complex 5 yet where the Compofition of the
whole Argument is thus plain, Jimple, and regular,
it is properly called a Jimple Sylhgifm, fince the
Complexion does not belong to the fyllogiftic Form
of it.
Simple Syllogifms have feveral Rules belonging to
thcji), which being bbferved, will generally fecure
us from falfe Inferences : But ttiefe Rules being
T 2 founded
* As Ideas and Propofitions are divided into fi*$e and compound, and Jt*g&
.jwe fubdfrided into fimplt and complex j & there are the feme Divifions apd
Subdivifioni applied to Syllogifai*.
*86 L 6 G 1 C K? Or, / fratt f&
founded on four general Axioms, it is neceffary to
mention thefe Axioms beforehand, for the Ute of
thofe who will enter into the fpeculative Reafon of
all thefe Rules.
Axiom i. Particular Propofitions are contained
hi Univerfals, and may be inferred from them)
but Univerfals are not contained in Particulars, nor
can be inferred from them.
Axiom 2. In all univerfal Propofitions, the Sub-
ject is univerfal : In all particular Prdpofitions, the
$utye& is particular.
Axiom 3. In all affirmative Propofitions, the
Predicate has no greater Extenfion than the Sub-
ject 5 for its Extenfion is restrained by the Subjeft,
and therefore it is always to be efteemed 4s a
.particular Idea. It is by mere Accident, if k
ever be taken univerfally, and cannot happen but
in fuch univerfal or fingular Propofitions as are
reciprocal.
Axiom 4. The Predicate of a negative Propofi-
tion is always taken univerfally, for in its whole
Extenfion it is denied of the Subjeft. If w,e fay m
Stone is vegetable, we deny all Sorts of Vegetation
concerning Stones.
The Rules of Jimple, regular Syllogifms are
thefe.
Rule I. tfbe middle Term mujl not be taken twice
particularly, but once at leaft univerfally. . For if
the middle Term be taken for two different Parts
or Kinds of th« fame univerfal Idea, then the Sub-
jeft of the Conclufion is compared with one of
thefe Parts, and the Predicate with another Part,
and this will never fhew whether that Subjeft and
'Predicate agree or difagree: There will then be
Ch; IO. 2. ,' VberSgB tye ^ReSbn. 4fy
four difiinlt terms in the Syllogifm, and the two:
Parts of the Queftion will not be compared with
tht fmne third Idea ; as if I fay, fome Aden are pious f
and fome Men are Robbers, I can never infer that
feme Robbers are pious* for the middle Term Men
being taken twice particularly, it is not the fame
Men who are fpoken of in the major and minor
Propofition.
Rule II. The Terms in the Conclufion muft never be
token more umverfalhf than they are in the Premfe^
The Reafon is derived from the firft Axiom, that
Generals, eon never be inferred frm Particulars.
Rule III, A negative Conclufion cannot be proved by
two affirmative Premifes. For when the two Terms
4>f the Conclufion are united or agree tQ the middle
Term, it does not follow by any Means that they
difagree with one another.
•■■ Rule IV. If one of . tie Premifes be negative* the
Conclufion muft be negative. For if the middle Term
be denied of either Part of the Conclufion, it may
Aew that the Terms of the Conclufion difagree,
but it can never (hew that they agree.
Rule V. If either of the Premifes be particular* the
Conclufion muft be particular. This may be proved
for the moft part from the firft Axiom.
Thefc two laft Rules are fometimes united in
this fingle Sentence, The Conclufion always follows
the weaker Part of the Premifes. Now Negatives
and Particulars are counted inferior to Affirmatives
*nd Univcrfals.
Rule VI. From two negative Premifes nothing can
H concluded. For they feparate the middle Term
T 3 Vwk
m LOG ICK: Or; frit lift
both from the Subjed and Predicate of the Con*
clufion, and when two Ideas difagree to a third*
we cannot infer that thiy either agree or di&grft
*ith each cither.
Yet where the Negation is a Part of the middk
Tirm, the two Premifes may look like Negatives^
according to the Words, but x>ne of them is sf-
frmative in Senfe ; as, What has no thought cat*
not reafon > but a Worm has no Thought \ therefore
a Worm cannot reafon The minor Propofition does
really affirm the middle Term concerning the Sab*
$e&, {viz.) a Worm is what has no Thought, tod
thus it is properly in this Syllogifm an afflniurtiitt
Propofition.
Rule VII. From two particular Premifes nothing
tan be concluded. This Rule depends chiefly o& the
firft Axiom.
A more laborious and accurate Proof of theft
Rules, and the Derivation ot every Part of them in
fell poflible Cafes, from the foregoing Axioms, re-
quire fo much Time, ahd are of fo little Importance
to affift the right Ufe of Reafon, that it is ncedlcfc
to infift longer upon them here. See; all this done
ingenioufly in the Logick called, the Art of Xbink-
ing, Part III. Chap. III. &c.
S E C T.
S E C T. IIL
Of tbt Moods and Figures of fmple Sylhgifms*
CIMPLE Syllogifms are adorned and furrounded
in the common Books of Logick with a Variety
<?f Inventions about Moods and Figures, wherein
by the artificial Contexture of the Letters A> £, /,
and 0, Men have endeavoured to transform Lo-
gicky or the Art of Reafoning % into a fort of Me-
fbanifm, and to teach Boys to fyllogize, or frame
•Arguments and refute them, without any reafl
inward Knowledge of &e Queftion. This is at-
nioft in the fame Manner as School-boys have
been taught perhaps in their trifling Years to corn!-
pofe Latin Verfes ; i. e. by certain Tables and
Squares, with a Variety of Letters in ;hem, where-
in by couhting every fixth, ; feventh, or eighth
JLetter, certain Latin Words (hould be framed in
the Form of Hexameters or Pentameters; and this
.may be done by thofe who know nothing of Latin
ovm Verfes.
I confefs fome of thefe logical Subtibies have
much more Ufe than thofe verbifying Tables, and
there is much Ingenuity difcovered in determining
the precife Number of Syllogifms that may be
formed in every Figure^ and giving the Reafons of
them ; yet the Light of Nature, a good Judg-
ment, and due Confideration of Things, tend more
to true Reafoning than all the Trappings "of Moods
and Figures.
But left this Book be charged with too great
Defe&s and Imperfe&ions, it may be proper to
give (hort Hints of that which fome Logicians have
fpent fo much Time and Paper upon.
T 4 All
'9 9 * LOGIC K: Or, Part IU
All the pofTible Compoficions of three of the
Letters, A y £, /, 0, to make three Propofitiont
amoupt to facty four \ but fifty four q{ *hepv are
excluded from forming true Syllogifms by the Jtven
Rules in the foregoing Sett ion : The remaining
Ten are variouQy diverfified by Figures and Moodf
into fourteen Syllogifms.
The Figure pf a Syllogifm is the proper Difpo-
fition pf the middle Term with the P*m of the
Queftion. •
A Mood is the regular Peterminatlon of Pro*
pofitions according to their Quantity and Quality,
t. e. their univerfal or particular Affirmation or
Negation ; which are fignified by certain artifi-
cial Words wherein the Confonants arc neglefted,
and thefe four VqwcIs A, J£, J, O* arc pnly re-
garded.
iThere are generally counted three Figures.
In the firjt of them the middle Term is the
Subjeft of the major Propofition, and the Predicate
pf the minor. This contains fpur Moods, (viz.)
Barbara, CeJarent, Darii y Ferio. And it is the
Excellency of tjiis Figure that all Sorts of Ques-
tions or Conclufions may be proved by it, whether
A> Ey 7, or O, i. e. unjver$l or particular, affir-
mative or negative, fs,
Bar- Every wicked Man is truly miferable.
ba- All Tyrants are wicked Men ;
ra. Therefore ?11 Tyrants are truly miferable*
Ce- He that's always in Fear is not happy j
la- Covetous Men are always in Fear ;
ffnf. Therefpre Cqyetous Men'arc not happy.
Ch. II. S. 3; Tbe right XJfe gf Reafon. igi
: Da • Whatfocvcr furthers our Salvation is- good
for us ;
ri- Some Affli&ions further our Salvation ;
i. Therefore fome Affii&ions are good for us.
Fe- Nothing that mud be repented of is truly
defirable;
: ri- Some Pleafures muft be repented of;
- 0. Therefore there are fome Pleafures which
are not truly defirable.
In the fecond Figure the middle Term is the
Predicate of both the Premifes ; this contains four
Moods, (to.) Cefare, Gameftres 9 Feftino^ Baroco y and
it admits only of negative Conclusions ; as,
Ce- No Liar is fit to be believed;
fa- Every good Chriftian is fit to be believed ;
re. Therefore no good Chriftian is a Liar.
The Reader may eafily form. Examples of the
reft.
The third Figure requires that the middle Term
be the Subjeft of both the Premifes. It has fix
Moods, (viz.) Daraptu Felapton^ Difamis, Datifi 9
Boeardo* Ferifon : And it admits only of particular
Conclusions; as.
Da- Whofoever loves God (hall be faved ;
rap- All the Lovers of God have their Imper-
feftions :
//. Therefore fome who have Imperfe&ions
(hall be faved.
I leave the Reader to form Examples of the
reft.
"'-' ■ • The
2 9 2 LOGIC K: Or, Pant Iff;
. The Moods of thefe three Figures are comprized
in four Latin Verfes.
Barbara* Celartut, Darii, Ferip quoque prifiae^
Cefare, Camefires 9 Feftino, Baroco, fecundse.
Tertia Darapti fibi vindicate atque Ftlaplon,
Adjungens Difamis, Datifi 9 Bocardo, Ferifon.
Thtfpecid Rules of the three Figures are thefe.
In the fir Jl Figure the major Proposition mud al-
ways be univerfal, and the minor affirmative.
- In the fecond Figure alfo the qiapr muft be uni-
verfal, and one of the Premifes, together with eke
Conclufion, muft be negative.
In the third Figure the minor muft be affirma-
tive, and the Conclufion always particular.
There is alfo a fourth Figure^ wherein the rahjdle
Term is predicated in the major Proportion* and
fubje&ed in the minor: But this is a very indirect
and oblique Manner of concluding, and is never
ufed in the Sciences, nor in human Life, and
therefore I call it ufelefs. Some Logicians wiU
allow it to be nothing elfe but a mere Invcrfion of
the firft Figure ; the Moods of it, (viz.) Baralip-
ton, or Barbari, Calentes^ Dibatis, Fefpamo* FreJifom>
are not worthy to be explained by one Example.
SECT. IV.
Of Complex Syllogifnu.
IT is not the mere Ufe of complex Terms in a
Syllogifm that gives it this Name, though one
of the Terms is ufually complex ; but thofe are
properly called complex Syllogifms, in which the
middle Term is not connected with the whole
Subjedt,
$ubje&, Of the whole Predicate in two diftin6t
Proportions, but is intermingled and compared
with them by Parts, or in a more confufed Man-
ner, in different Forms of Speech j as>
&he Sun is a fenfdefs Being*
' The PerGans worfbipped the Sun ;
Therefore the Perfians worfhifped afenfekfs Being.
Here the Predicate of the Conclusion is, wor-
{hipped a fenfelefs Being* part of which is joined with
the middle Term Sun in the major Propofkion, and
the other part in the minor.
Though this fort of Argument is confeffed to be
Mangled, or tonfufei* and irregular, if examined bj
the Rules of Jimplc SylUgiJms\ yet there is a great
Variety of Arguments ufed in Books of Learning*
and in common Life, whofe Confequeticeis ftroiig
and evident, and which muft be ranked under thk
jjead ; as,
I. Euclufive Propofitions will form a complex
Argument ; as, pious Men are the onfy Favourites if
Heaven ; true Cbrijiians are Favourites Jof Heaven ;
'therefore true Cbrijiians are\pious Mm. Or thus,
'Hypocrites are not pious Afar* therefore Hypocritts
are no Favourites of Heaven.
II. Exceptive Propofitions will make fuch com*
plex Syllogifms t 2^^ None but Pbyficians came to the
Confutation ; the Nurfe is no Pbyficum y therefore
the Nurfe came not to the Confutation*
III. Or, Comparative Propofitions; as, Know-
ledge is better than Riches •, Virtue is better than
Knowledge \ therefore Virtue is better than Riches.
Or thus, a Dove mU fy a Mile in a Minute $ a
Swallow
* 9 4 LO G 1 C K: Or, Part III:
Swallow flies Jwifter than a Dove: Therefore a
Swallow wiUfy more than a Mile in a Minute.
IV. Or Inceptive and Defitive Propofitions ; as;
the Fogs vamfb as the Sun rifes \ but the Fogs have
not jet begun to vamfb * therefore the Sun is not yet
rifen.
V. Or Modal Propofitions j as, // is neceffary
that a General underfiand the Art of War ; but
Caius does not underfiand the Art of War \ there*
fore it is neceffary Caius Jbould not be a General*
Or thus, A total Eclipfe of the Sun would caufi
Darknejs at Noon * it is poffible that the Mow at
that Time may totally eclipfe the Sun\ therefore it
is poffible that the Moon may caufe Darknefs at
Noo*
Befidc all thefe, there is a great Number of com*
plex Syllogifms which can hardly be reduced under
any particular Titles, becaufc the Forms of human
Language are fo exceeding various ; as,
Cbriftianity requires us to believe what the Apoftles
wrote ; St. Paul is an Apofile ; therefore Cbriftianity
requires us to believe what St. Paul wrote.
No human Artijl can make an Animal ; a Fly or a
Worm is an Animal ; therefore no human Artifi can
make a Fly or a Worm.
The Father always lived in London ; the Son al-
ways lived with the Fatbe&i therefore *& Son always
lived in London.
The Blofjom foon follows the full Bud ; this Pear-
Tree bath many full Buds ; therefore it willjbortfy
have many Blojjoms.
One Hailftone never falls alone \ but a Hailftone
felljuft now j therefore others fell with it.
Thunder
Oh II. I. 4. The right XJfi gf Reafon. *$$
Thunder feldom corns without Lightning ; but it
thundered Tefierday ; therefore probably it lightened
alfo.
Mofes wrote before the Trojan War\ the firft
Greek Hifiorians wrote after the Trojan War ;
therefore the firft Greek Hifiorians wrote after
Mofes •.
• Now the Force of all thefe Arguments is fo
evident and conclufive, that though the Form of
the Syllogifm be never fo irregular, yet we are fure
the Inferences are juft and true ; for the Pretnifes t
according to the Reafon of Things, do really contain
the Conclufion that is deduced from them, which is a
never failing Teft of true Syllogifm, as (hall be
lhewn hereafter.
The Truth of moft of thefe complex Syllogifms
may alfo be made to appear (if needful) by redu-
cing them either to regular, fimpte Syllogifms* or to
fome of the conjunSive Syllogifms 9 which are defcrib*
ed in the next Section. I will give an Inftance
only in the firft, and leave the reft to exercife the
Ingenuity of the Reader.
The firft Argument may be reduced to a Syllo-
gifm in Barbara, thus,
The Sun is afenfelefs Being ;
What the Perfians wor/bipped is the Sun ;
Therefore what the Perfians wor/bipped is a Senfe-
lefs Being. Though the conclufive Force of this
Argument is evident without this Reduction.
• Perhaps Tome ©f thefe Syllogifms may be reduced to thofe which I call
Conntxive afterward $ hut it is of little Moment to what Sfecia thejrbefonf 5
for it is not any formal Set of "Rule* fo much as the Evidence and MBr of
Reafon that muft determine the Truth or FaJmood of all fuch SyUogUBty -
SECT.
»
29* LOG IC K:Or 9 P*t Ufe
S EC T. V.
. Of Coy (waive Sylkgifms.
THOSE arc calW conpmSm Syllogifm
wherein one of the Prcmifcs, namely the mar
jor, has diftin& Parts, which are joined by a Con*
jun&ion, or Come fuch Panicle of Speech. Mod
Times the major or minor, or both, are txplicitdj
compound Proportions: And generally the wqor
Proportion is made up of two diftinft Parts or
Fropofitions, in fuch a Manner, as that by the
Affertion of one in the minor, the other is either
aflerted or denied in the Conclusion : Or by the De?
nial of one in the minor \ the other is either aflerted
or denied in the Conclufton. It is hardly poffiblt
indeed to fit any fhort Definition to include all tbt
Kinds of them ; but the chief amongft them ait
the conditional Syllogifm, the disjunftive y t\\trelativi%
and the connexive.
I. The conditional or hypothetical Syllogifm is
whofe major or minor, or both, are conditional
Propofitions ; as. If there be a God y the World is
governed by Providence \ but there is a God \ there-
fore the World is governed by Providence.
Thefe Syllogifms admit two Sorts of true Argu-
mentation, where the major is conditional.
1. When the Antecedent is afierced in the minor
that the Confequent may be aflerted in the Conclu-
fittte fuch is the preceding Example; . This i*
calwa arguing from the Pofttion of the Antecedent So
the Pofttion of the Confequent.
2. When the confequent is contradi£ed in
the minor Propofition, that the Antecedent may
be contradicted in the Conclufion ; as, If Atbeifts
art
Cb. II. S. 5. The right XJfe of Realbn: 297
are in the right > then the World exifts without a Caufe%
but the World dots not exijl without a Caufe ; there-
fore Atheijls are not in the right. This is called
arguing from the removing of the Confequent to the
femoving of the Antecedent.
To remove the Antecedent or Confequent here,
floes not merely fignify the Denial of it, but the
CmtradiHion of it j for the mere Denial of it by
* contrary Propofition will not make a true Syllo-
gjfrn, as appears thus : If every Creature be rea-
fonable, every Brute is reajonable : But no Brute is
Veafonable ; therefore no Creature is reafonable.
Whereas if you fay in the minor, but every Brute
is not reafonable* then it would follow truly in the
Conclufion, therefore every Creature is not rea-
fonable.
When the Antecedent or Confequent are nega-
tive Propofitions, they are removed by an Affir-
mative ; as, If there be no God 9 then the World does
not difcover creating Wifdom ; but the World does
difcover creating Wifdom ; therefore there is » God.
In this Inftance the Confequent is removed or con-
tradicted in the minor, that the Antecedent may
be contradi&ed in the Conclufion. So in this Ar-
gument of St. Paul 9 1 Cor. xv. If the Dead rife not 3
Chrijl died in vain ; but Chrift did not die in vain \
therefore the Deadfhall rife.
There are al(d two Sorts of falfe Arguing, (viz.)
(1 .) From the removing of the Antecedent to the remov-
ing of the Confequent ; or (2.) From the Pofition of the
Confequent to the Pofition of the Antecedent. Exam-
ples of thefe are eafily framed ; as, Sk
(1.) If a Minifler were a Prince he mufi b^kn*
-cured ; but a Minifier is not a Prince 5
Therefore he muft not be honoured. ,
298 LOGICK.Or, Part lit?
(2.) If a Mmfier were a Prince* be ntufi be ho-
noured \ ha a Mnijier muft be honoured ;
Therefore bets a Prince.
Who fees not the ridiculous Falfhood of both
thefe Syllogifms ?
Obferv. L If the Subjedt of the Antecedent and
the Confequent be the fame, then the hypothetical
Syllogifm may be turned into a categorical one ; a**
If Gefar be a King be muji be honoured r ; but Caefar
is a King ; therefore, &c This may be changed
thus, Every King, muji be honoured * but Caefar is *
King \ therefore, &c.
Obferv. II. If the major PropoGtion only be
conditional* the Conclufion is categorical: But if the
minor or both be conditional, the Condition is alio
conditional \ as, The Worfhippers of Images are Ido-
laters \ If the Papifts worfhip a Crucifix, they are
Worfhippers of an Image •, therefore, If the Papifis
worfhip a Crucifix, they are Idolaters. But this fort
of Syllogifms fhould be avoided as much as poffi-
ble in Deputation, becaufe they greatly em bar raft
a Caufe : The Syllogifms, whole Major only fe
hypothetical, are very frequent, and ufed with great
Advantage.
II. A disjunfiive Syllogifm is when the major Pro-
pofition is disjun&ive ; as, The Earth moves in a
Circle or an Ellipfis ; but it does not move in a Circle 1
therefore it moves in an Ellipfis.
» disjunctive Syllogifm may have many Members
arts thus ; it is either Spring, Summer, Autumn,
or Winter ; but it is not Spring, Autumn, or Win-
ter ; therefore it is Summer.
The true Method of arguing here is from the
Jjfertion of one 9 to the Denial of the refi t or from
ik
'I'!
Ch. It S. $* Hi right XJfe ^Reafori. 299
the Denial of one or more, to the Affertion of what re*
mains ; but the Major fhould be fo framed, that
the feveral Parts of it cannot be true together
though one of them is evidently true.
III. A relative Syllogifm requires the major Pro*
pofition to be relative ; as* Where Chrift is, there
jhatt his Servants be : But Chrift is in Heaven ; there-
fore his Servants Jhall be there alfo, Or, As is thi
Captain^ fo are his Soldiers ; but the Captain is d
Coward \ therefore bis Soldiers arefo too.
Arguments that relate to the Doftrine of Pro*
portion, muft be referred to this Head; as, At
two are to four, fo are three to fist ; but two maki x
the half of four \ therefore three make the half of
Jix.
Befides thefe, there is another Sorfc of $yllogifrtt
which is very natural and common, and yet Au-
thors take very little Notice of it, call it by an im-
proper Name, and defcribe it very defectively, and
that is,
IV. A connexhe Syllogifm. This fome have*
called, copulative •, but it does by do Means require
the major to^ be a copulative nor a cprApourid Pro-
portion, (according to the Definition given of it*
Part II. Chap. II. Se£l. 6.) but it feauires that
two or more Ideas be fo conneded either in the!
complex Subjeft or Predicate of the major, that
if one of them be affirmed or denied in the minor,
common Senfe will naturally Ihew us whatj^L
be the Confequence; It would be very tedj^B
and ufelefs to frarfie particular Rules abdiit th^^
as will appear by the following Examples, which
are very various, and yet may be farther multH
pUcd ' v . -^.to a*
300 LOGIC K: 0r % Part III.
(i.) Metknefs and Humility always go together;
Mofes was a Man of Meckncfs* therefore Mofes was
alfo bumble. Or we may form this Minor, Pharaoh
was no bumble Mari\ therefore he was not meek.
(2.) No Man can ferve God and Mammon ; the
xovetous Man ferves Mammon; therefore be can-
not ferve God. Or the Minor may run thus, the
true Chriftian ferves God; therefore he does not
ferve Mammon.
(3.) Genius mujt join with Study to make a greet
Man\ Florino bos Genius but be cannot fiudy\ there-
fore Florino will never be a great Man. Or thus,
Quintus ftudies bard but bos no Genius \ therefore
Quintus will never be a great Man.
(4.) Gulo cannot make a Dinner without Flejb and
Ftfh\ there was no Ftp) to be gotten Zo-dqyt therefore
Gulo this Day cannot make a Dinner.
(5.) London and Paris are in different Latitudes \
the Latitude 0/ London is 51 i Degrees - 9 therefore
this cannot be the Latitude of Paris.
(6.) Jofeph and Benjamin had one Mother ; Ra-
chael was the Mother of Jofeph ; therefore fhe was
BenjaminV Mother too.
(7.) The Father and the Son are of equal Stature:
The Father is fix Feet high \ therefore the Son is fix
Feet high alfo.
(8.) Pride is inconftftent with Innocence ; Angels
have Innocence ; therefore they have no Pride. Or
thus ; Devils have Pride ; therefore they have net
Innocence.
J^[ might multiply other Inftances of thefe con-
^ffive Syllogifms, by bringing in all forts of ex-
eeptive, exctufive, comparative^ and modal Propo-
rtions into the Compofition of them 5 for all
'thefe may be wrought into conjunctive^ as well as
into Jimple Syllogifms, and thereby we may rcndir
them
:v«^ ^
'. i- '
Ch. II. S. 6. Tfc rijjfc l#? gf Rcafon: 30I
them complex. But it would wade Time and Paper
without equal Profit.
Concerning thefe various Kinds of conjunctive
Syllogifms, take thefe two Obfervations.
Obferv. I. Moft of them may be transformed into
categorical Syllogifms by thofe who have a mind to
prove the Truth of them that Way \ or they may
be eafily converted into each other by changing the
Forms of Speech.
Obferv. II. Thefe conjunctive Syllogifms are fel-
dom deficient or faulty in the Form of them ; for
fuch a Deficience would be difcovered at firft
Glance generally by common Reafon, without
3ny artificial Rule$ of Logick: T.he chief Care
therefore is to fee chat the major Propofition be true,
upon which the whole Force of the Argument
ufually depend.
SECT. VI.
Of Compound Syllogifms^
WE properly call thofe compound Syllogifms
which are made of two or more Jingle Syfc
logifmsj and may be refolved into them. The chief
Kinds are thefe, Epicbirema, Dilemma, Projyllogif*
tnus, and Sorites.
I. Epicbirema is a Syllogifm which contains^ttk
Proof of the major or minor, or both, b^iflHP
draws the Conclufion. This is often ufed in w^
* ing, in publick Speeches, and in common Con-
versation, that fo each Part of the Difcourfe may
be confirmed and put out of Doubt, as it moves
U 2 on
$6* LO G 1 C K: Or, Part Iff.
on tbwafd the ConcluGon, which was chiefly dcr*
figned. Take this Inftance ;
Sicknefs may be good for us ; for it weans us from
the Pleafures of Life, and makes us think of dy-
ing*
But we are uneafy under Sicknefs ', which ap-
pears by our Impatience, Complaints, Groaning*,
&c.
Therefore we are uneafy fometimes under that
which is good for us. -
Another Inftance you may fee in Cicero's Oration
in Defence of Milo who had flain Clodius. His
' major Propofition is, that it is lawful for one Man
to kill another who lies in wait to kill him \ which he
proves from the Cuftom of Nations, from natural
Equity, Examples, &c. his minor is, that Clodius
laid wait for Milo; which he proves by his Arms,
Guards, &c. and then infers the Condufion, that it
was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius.
II. A Dilemma is an Argument which divide*
the whole into all its Farts or Members by a dis-
junSlive Propdfition, and then infers fomething
concerning each Part which is finally inferred con-
cerning the "whole. Inftances of this are frequent ;
as, In this Life we muft either obey our vicious In*
clinations or refifi them : To obey them will bring Sin
and Sorrow i to refifi them is laborious and painfull
therefore we cannot be perfectly free from Sorrow or
Pain in this Life.
Mt^ Dilemma becomes faulty or ineffeSJual three
^Hpys : Firft, When the Members of the Divifion
are not well oppofed, or not fully enumerated ; for
then the major is falfe. Secondly, When what is
afferted concerning each Part is not juft ; for then
the minor is not true, thirdly, When it may fe*
• * retorted
\
Cb. II. S. 6. The right Up of Reafon. 303
retorted with equal Force upon him who utters
it.
There was a famous- ancient Inftance of this
Cafe wherein, a Dilemma was retorted. Euathlus
promifed Protagoras a Reward when he had taught
him the Art of Pleadings and it was to be paid the
firft Day that he gained any Caufe in the Court.
After a confiderable Time, Protagoras goes to Law
with Euathlus for the Reward, and uies this Di-
lemma ; Either the Caufe will go on yty Side or on
yours j // the Caufe goes on my Side, you muft pay me
according to the Sentence of the Judge : If the Caufe
goes on your Sidej you muft fay me according to your
Bargain: Therefore whether the Caufe goes for me or
againji me you muft pay me, the Reward. But Euathlus
retorted this Dilemma thus: Either I Jhallgain the
Caufe or lofeit: If I gain the Caufe ', then nothing
will be due to you according to the Sentence of the
Judge : But // Ilofe the Caufe, nothing will be due to
you according to my Bargain : Therefore whether I
lofe or gain the Caufe I will not pay you> for nothing
will be due to you.
Note 1. A Dilemma is ufually defcribed as though
it always proved the Abfurdity, Inconvenience!, or
Unreafonablenefs of fome Opinion or Practice;
and this is the moft common Defign of it •, but it
is plain, that it may alfo be ufed to prove the Truth
or Advantage of any thing propofed ; as, In Hea*
*uen we Jhall either have Dejires or not : If we have
no DefireSj then we have full SatisfaSion \ if we
have Dejires, they Jhall be fatisfied as fafi as they
arife ; therefore in Heaven we Jhall be' comedy
fatisfied. ^^
Note 2. This Sort of Argument may be com-
, pofed of three or eiore Members, and may be
called a Trilemma.
U 3 III. A
304 LOGIC K: Or, Part. IIL
HI. A ProfyUogifm is when two or more Syllo-
gifms are fo connected together, that the Conclufi-
on of the former is the major or the minor of the
following; as, Blood cannot think, but the Soul of
Man thinks ; therefore the Soul of Man is not Blood 1
but the Soul of a Brute is bis Blood* according to the
Scripture; therefore the Soul of Man is different from
the Soul of a Brute. See another Inftance in the In-
troduction to this Treatife, p. 5.
IV. A Sorites is when feveral middle Terms are
chofen to conned): one another fucceflively in feve-
ral Propofitions, till the laft Propofition conneds
its Predicate with the firft Subjeft. Thus, All Mm
cf Revenge have their Souls often uneafy ; uneajy Souk .
erre a Plague to themfelves ; now to be one's own Plague
is Folly in the Extreme ; therefore all Men of Revenge
tre extreme Fools.
The Apoftle, Rom. viii. 29. gives us an Inftance
of this fort of Argument if it were reduced to ex-
adt Form : Whom he foreknew thofe be predefiinated \
whom he predeftinated he called *, whom he called be
juftified \ whom he jujlified be glorified^ therefore
whom he foreknew he glorified.
To thefe Syllogifms it may not be improper to
add Indu3ion 9 which is, when from feveral parti-
cular Propofitions we infer one general ; as, The
Doilrine of the Sr.cinians cannot be proved from the
Cofpels % it cannot be proved from the Afts of the
Apoftles 9 it cannot be proved from the Epftles, nor
the Book of Revelations ; therefore // cannot be proved
frtvbe New Teftament.
TnotOi This Sort of Argument is often defedive,
becaufe there is not due Care taken to enumerate
all the Particulars on which the Concluiion fhould
depend.
AH
Cb. II. 6. 7. Tie right Ufetf RcaCon. 305 .
All thefe four Kinds of Syllogiftns in this Sc&ion
may be called redundant, becaufe they have more
than three Proportions. But there is one Sort of
Syllogifm which is defective, and is called an En-
thymem, becaufe only the Conclufion with one of
the Premifes is exprefled, while the other is fuppofed
and referved in the Mind : Thus, There is no true
Religion without good Morals \ therefore a Knave
cannot be truly religious : Or thus, // is our Duty to
love our Neighbours as our/elves •, therefore there are
hut few who perform their Duty.
Note, This is the mod common Sort of Argu-
ment amongft Mankind both in Writing and in
Speaking ; for it would take up too much Time
and too much retard the Difcourfe to draw out all
our Arguments in Mood and Figure. Befides*
Mankind love to have fo much Compliment paia
to their Underftandings as to fuppofe that they
know the Major or Minor* which is fupprefied and
implied, when you pronounce the other Premife
and the Conclufion.
If there be any Debate about this Argument,
the Syllogifm muft be completed in order to try
its Force and Goodnefs, by adding thq abfent Pro-
pofitions'.
SECT. VII.
Of the middle terms, of common Places or Topics, and
Invention of Arguments.
THE ncxtDivifion of Syllogifms is according
to the middle Term, which is made ufe of in
the Proof of any Propofition. Now the middle
Term (as we have hinted before) is often called
Argument, becaufe the Force of the Syllogifm de-
pends upon it: We muft make a little Delay here
U 4 \<*
cy
506 L G IC K: Or, Part III,
to treat briefly of the Do&rine of Topics* or Placet
whence middle Terms or Arguments are drpwn.
All Arts and Sciences h^ve fome general Sub*
jefts which belong to them, which are called T(h
pes or common Places , becaufe middle Terms are
borrowed, ancl Arguments derived from them for
the Proof of their various Propofitions which we
have ^Occafipn to difcourfe of. The Topics of
Grammar, are Etymology, Noun, Verb, Conftru8ion x
Signification * &c. ' The Topics of Logic are Genus,
Species* Difference, Property, Definition, Diyijion, &c.
The Topics pf Ontology or Metaphyfick, are Cdufe,
EffeSl, Aflion, Pafiion, Identity, Oppofttion, Subjeff,
JldjunSl x Sign, &c. The Topic of Morality, or
Etbicks, are Law, Sin, Duty, Authority, Freedom
of Will, Commands Threading, Reward, Puni/hment,
frc. The Topics of Theology, are Gqd 9 Cbrifi,
Faiths Hope* Worfhip, Salvation, &c.
To theffc feveral Topics there belong particular
Obfervations, Axioms, Canons, or Rules, * which
are laid down in their proper Sciences ; as,
Grammar h^th fuch Canons, {viz.) Words in a dif-
ferent Conflruftion obtain a different Senfe. Words de-.
'rived from the fame Primitive may probably have feme
Affinity in their original Meaning, &c.
Canons in Logic, are fuch as thefe, Every Part
of a Divifion fingly taken mujl contain lefs than
$he Whole. A Definition mull be peculiar and pro-
fer to the Thing defined. Whatever is affirmed or de-
nied of the Geniis, may be affirmed or denied of the Spe-
cies, &c.
Metaphyseal Canqqs are fuch as thefe 5 find
Caufes belong only to intelligent Agents. If a natural
fnd neceffary Caufe operate $ the Effeti will follow, &c y
and
f A Qanm ts a Propefitio© declaring fome Property pf the Subje&j whkk
%jpt esprefled in the Dtfnitk* or Dtojfy* of it. '"" r ~-~ a
Ch. II. S. 7. The right life of Reafon, 367
and there are large Catalogues of ihany more b
each diftinft Science.
Now it has been the Cuftom of thofe who teach
Jjtgick or Rbetorick, to diredt their Difciples, when
they want an Argument, to cpnfult the feveral To-
pics which are fuite^ to their Subject of Difcourfe,
and to rummage over the Definitions, Divifions and
Canons that belong to each Topic, This is called
the Invention of an ,Argument ; and it is taught with
imitch Solemnity in forre Schools. " : ■
I grant there may be good Ufe of this Pradtice
for Perfons of a lower Genius, when they are to
* compofe any Difcourfe for*the Publick ; or for
thofe of fuperior Parts to refrefh their Memory,
and revive their Acquaintance with a Subjefl: which
has been long abfent from their Thoughts, or
when their natural Spirits labour under Indifpofi-
tion and Languor ; but when a Man of modeYate
Sagacity has made himfelf Matter of his Theme
by juft Diligence and Enquiry, he has feldom need
to run knocking at the Doors of all the Topics that
he may furnifli himfelf with Argument or Matter
of Speaking : And indeed it is only a Man of Sehfe
and Judgment that can ufe common Places or To»
pics well •, for amongft this Variety he only knows
what is fit to be left out, as well as what is fit to
he fpoken.
By fome logical Writers this Bufinefs of Topics
and Invention^ is treated of in fuch a Manner with
Mathematical Figures and Diagrams, filled with
the barbarous technical Words, Napcas> Nipcis %
Ropcos, Nofrop, &c. as though an ignorant Lad were
to be led mechanically in certain artificial Harnef-
fes and Trammels to find out Arguments to prove
or refute any Propofition whatfoever, without any
rational Knowledge of the Ideas. Now there is
no Need to throw Words of Contempt on fuch *
JPrai3ic^v
308 LO G 1C K: Or, Part III.
Pra&ice •, the very Dcfcription of it carries Reproof
and Ridicule in Abundance.
SECT; VIII.
Of fever al Kinds of Arguments and Demonftrationu •
WE proceed now to the Divifion of Syllo-
gifms according to the middle Term ; and
in this Part of our TreatUe the Syllogifms them-
felves are properly called Arguments, and are thus
diftributed.
I. Arguments are, called Grammatical, Logical,
Metaphyseal, Pbyfical, Marat, Mechanical, Theologi-
cal, &c. according to the Art, Science, or Subjeft,
whence the middle Term or Topic is borrowed.
Thus if we prove that no Man fhould fteal from ins
Neighbour ', becaufe the Scripture forbids it, this is
a theological Argument : If we prove it from the
Laws of the Land, it is political ; but if we prove
it from the Principles of Reafon and Equity, the
Argument is moral.
II. Arguments are either certain and evident, or
doubtful and merely probable.
Probable Arguments are thofe whofe Conclufi-
ons are proved by fome probable Medium ; as,
This Hill was once a Church-Yard* or a Field of
Battle, becaufe there are many human Bones found
here. This is not a certain Argument, for human
Bones might have been conveyed there fome other
Way.
Evident and certain Arguments are called Demon*
firations ; for they prove their Conclufions by clear
Mediums and undoubted Principles ; and they are
generally divided into thefe two Sorts.
i. De-
Ch. IL 8. 8. The right Ufi of Rnfon. 309
1. Dcmonftrations & Priori, which prove the
Effeft by its neceflary Caufe ; as, I prove the Scrip*
ture is infallibly true, becaufe it is the IVord of God,
who cannot lie.
2. Demonft rations a Pofteriori, which infer the
Caufe from 4ts neceflary Efieft; as, I infer there
hath been the Hand of fome Artificer here, becaufe I
find a curious Engine. Or, I infer, there is a God*
from the Works of bis Wifdom in the vifibl JVorld.
The laft of thefe is called Demonjlratio r* on,
becaufe it proves only the Exiftence of a Thing ;
the firft is named Bemonftratio v* <Mot/, becaufe it
fhews alfo the Caufe of its Exiftence.
But Note, That though thefe two Sorts of Ar-
guments are mod peculiarly called Demonjlrations,
yet generally any ftrong and convincing Argument
obtains that Name ; and it . is the Cuftom of Ma-
thematicians to call all their Arguments Demon-
ftrations, from what Medium foever they derive
them.
III. Arguments are divided into artificial and in-
artificial.
An artificial Argument is taken from the Na-
ture and Circum (lances of the Things ; and if the
Argument be ftrong, it produces a natural Certain*
ty\ as The Wgrld was firft* created by God T becaufe ;;:r?^
nothing can create itfelf.
An inartificial Argument is the Teftimony of
another, and this is called original, when our Infor-
mation proceeds immediately from the Perfons cod-
cerned, or from Eye or Ear-Witnefies of a Fa& :
it is called Tradition when it is delivered by the Re-
port of others.
We have taken Notice before, that Teftimony
is either divine or human. If the human Tefti-
mony be ftrong* it produces a moral Certainty*
S io LOGIC K: Or^ JPart III.
but divine Teftimony produces a fupematural Cer-
tainty* which is far fuperior.
Note, Arguments taken from human Teftimony,
as well as from Laws and Rules of Equity , are called
moral* and indeed the fame Name is alfo applied
to every Sort of Argument which is drawn from
the free Aftions of God, or the contingent Aftions of
Men % wherein we cannot arife to a natural Certain*
iy % but content ourfelves with an high Degre of Pro*
lability % which in many Cafes is fcarce inferior to
natural Certainty.
IV. Arguments are either direS or indireS* It
is a direSt Argument where the middle Term is
fuch as proves the Queftion itfelf, and infers that
very Propofition which was the Matter of En-
quiry. An indirect or oblique Argument proves or
refutes fome other Propofition, and thereby makes
the Thing enquired appear to be true by plain,
Confequence.
Several Arguments are called indirect ; as, (i.)
When fome contradictory Propofition is proved to
be falfe, improbable or impofiible : Or when upon
Suppofition of the Falfhood, or Denial of the ori-
ginal Propofition, fome Abfurdity is inferred.
This is called a Proof per impoffibile, or a ReduSio
ad abfurdum. (2.) When fome other Propofition
is proved to be true which is lefs probable, and
thence it follows that the original Propofition is
true, becaufe it is more probable. This is an Ar-
gument ex minus probabili ad magis. (3,) When
any other Propofition is proved upon which it was
before agreed to yield the original Queftion. This
is an Argument ex Conceffo.
V. There is yet another Rank of Arguments
which hwc Latin Names 5 their true Diftinftio*
to
Ch. II. $.8. *Tbe rigtt tffe o/ReaTon. 3 1 1
is derived from the Topics or middle Terms which
are ufed in them, though they are called an Addrefs
to our Judgment, our Faith, our Ignorance, our Pro-
feffion, our Modefty, and our Paffions.
1. If an Argument be taken from the Nature
or Exiftence of Things, and addrefled to the Rea*
fon of Mankind, it is called Argumentum ad Judi*
cium.
2. When it is borrowed from fome convincing
Teftimony, it is Argumentum ad Fidem, ail Addrels
to our Faith.
3. When it is drawn from any inefficient Me*
ilium whatfoever, and yet the Oppofer has not Skill
to refute or anfwer it, this is Argumentum ad Igruh
rantiam, an Addrefs to our Ignorance.
4. When it is built upon the profefled Principles
. or Opinions of the Perfon with whom we argue,
whether the Opinions be true or falfe, it is named
Argumentum ad hominem, an Addrefs to our pro-
, fejfed Principles. St. Paul often ufes this Argument
when he reafons with the Jews, and when he fays,
I /peak as a Man.
5. When the Argument is fetched from the Sen-
timents of fome wife, great, or good Men, whofe
Authority we reverence and hardly dare oppofe, it
is called Argumentum ad Verecundium, an Addrefs to
our Modejly.
6 I add finally, when an Argument is borrow-
ed from any Topics which are fuited to engage
the Inclinations and Paffions of the Hearers on
the Side of the Speaker, rather than to convince
the Judgment, this is Argumentum ad Pajftones,
an Addrefs to the Paffions ; or if it be made pub-
lickly, it is called ad Populum 9 or an Appeal to the
People.
Afier
3i* LOGIC K: Or, Part IIL
After all thefe Divifions of Syllogifm or Argument
arifing from the middle Term, there ia one Diftino
tioft proper to be mentioned which arifes from the
Premi/es. An Argument is called uniform when
both the Premifes are derived from the fame Springs
of Knowledge, whether it be Senfe, Reafon, Confcu
cufnefs, human Faith, or divine Faith: But when
the two Premifes are derived from different Spring*
of Knowledge, it is called a tnixt Argument.
Whether the Conclusion mud; be called Human
or Divine, when one or both Premifes are Matters
of Divine Faith, but die Conclufkm is drawn by
human Reafon, I leave to be difputed and deter*
mined in the Schools of Theology.
Thus the fecond Chapter is finiflied, and a parti-
cular Account given of all the chief Kinds of Syl-
logifm or Arguments which are made ufe of among
Men, or treated of in Logick, together with fpecid
Rules for the Formation of them, as far as is ne-
ceflary.
If a Syllogifm agree with the Rules which are
given* for the Conftrudtion and Regulation of it, it
is called a true Argument : If it difagree with thefe
Rules, it is a Paralogifm, or falfe Argument : But
when a falfe Argument puts on the Face and Ap-
pearance of a true one, then it is properly called
a Sopbifm or Fallacy, which (hall be the Subject of
the next Chapter.
CHAP.
Ch. HI. S. i. The right TJfi of Rtafon. 3 1 %
CHAP. III.
The DoSlrine of Sophifmi.
FROM Truth nothing can really follow but
what is true : Whcnfocvcr therefore we find
zfalfe Conclujion drawn from Premifes which feem
to be true, there muft be fome Fault in the De-
duction or Inference ; or elfe one of the Premifes
is not true in the Senfe in which it is ufed in that
Argument.
When an Argument carries the Face of Truth
with it, and yet leads us into Miftake, it is 41
Sopbifm ; and there is fome Need of a particular
Defcription of thefe fallacious Arguments, that we
may with more Eafe and Readinefs detett and folve
them.
SECT. L
Of feveral Kinds ofSopbifms, and their Solution.
1
AS the Rules of right Judgment and of good
Ratiocination often coincide with each o-
ther, fo the Doftrine of Prejudices, which was
treated of in the Second Part of Logick, has anti-
cipated a great deal of what might be faid on the
Subjeft of Sopbifms ; yet I fhall mention the molt
remarkable Springs of falfe Argumentation, which
are reduced by Logicians to fome of the following
Heads.
I. The
314 LOGIC K: Or, Part 11$
I. The firft fort of Sophifm is called Ignorati*
Elencbij or a Miftafce of the gtueftion ; that is*
when fomething elfe is proved which has neithef
any neceflary Connexion nor Inconfiftency with
the Thing enquired, and confequentfy gives no
Determination to the Enquiry, though it may feetn
at firft Sight to determine the Queftion ; as, If aiiy
Ihould conclude that St. Paul was not a native
Jew, by proving that he wis born a Roman ; or if
they (hould pretend to determine that he was nei-
ther Romdn nor Jew, by proving that he was born
at Tarfus in Cilicia : Thefe Sophifms are refuted
by (hewing that all thefe three may be true ; for.
he was born of Jewifh Parents in the City of Tar*
fus % and by fome peculiar Privilege granted to his
Parents, or his native City, he was botfn a Denizen
of Rome. Thus there is neither of thefe three Cha-
rafters of the Apoftle inconfiftent with each other,
and therefore the proving one of them true does
not refute the others.
Or if the Queftion -be propofed, Whether Exceft
of Wine can be hurtful 'to him that drinks it, and the
Sophifter (hould prove that.it revives his Spirit* > it
exhilerates his Soul* it gives a Man Courage , and
makes him ftrong and aflive, and then he takes it
for granted that he has proved his Point.
But the Refpondent may eafily (hew, that though
Wine may do all this, yet it may be finally hurtful
both to the Soul and Body of him that drinks it to Ex-
cefs.
Difputers when they grow warm, are ready to-
run into this Fallacy : They drefs up the Opinion
of their Adverfary as they pleafe, and afcribe Sen-
timents to him which he doth not acknowledge y
and when they have with a great deal of Pomp
attacked and confounded thefe Images of Straw
of
Ch. III. & tf <&* rigbtVje ^R&fon. 31$
of their own making, they triumph over their Ad*
verfary as though they had utterly confuted his
Opinion.
It is a Fallacy of the fame Kind which & Difpu-
tant is guilty of, when he finds that his Adverfary
is too hard for him* and that he cannot fairly prove
the Queftion firft propofed ; he then with Slynefs
and Subtlety turns the Difcourfe afide to fome othet
kindred Point which he can prove, and exults ih
that new Argument wherein his Opponent ncvetf
contradicted him.
The Way tp prevent this Fallacy is by keeping
the Eye fixed on the preeife Point of Difputc, and
neither wandering from it ourfelves, nor fuffering
our Antagonift to wander from it, or fubftitute any
Thing elfe in its Room*
• II. The next Sophifm is called Petitio Principih
or a Suppojition of what is not granted ; that is, when
any Propdfition is proved by the fame Propofition
in other Words, or by fomething that is equally
uncertain and difputed : As if any one Undertake
to prove that the human Soul is extended through all
the Parts of the Body, becaufe it re/ides in every
Member, which is but the fame Thing in other
Words. Or, if a Papift ftiould pretend to prove
that his Religion is the only Catholick Religion, and
is derived from Cbrift and bis Apofiles, becaufe it
agrees with the Doffrine of all the Fathers of the
Church, all the holy Martyrs, and all the Cbriftian
World throughout all Ages : Whereas this is a great
Point in Conteft, whether their Religion does agree
with that of all the Ancients, and the primitive
Chriftians, or no.
III. That Sort of Fallacy which is called a
Circle, is very near a-kin to the Petitio Principii ; as
X when
3 i6 LO G I C K: Or, Part III.
when one of the Premifes in a Syllogifm is quef-
tioned and oppofed, and we intend to prove it
by the Conclufion : Or, when in a Train of Syl-
logifms we prove the laft by recurring to what
vas the Conclufion of the firft. The Papifts are
famous at this Sort of Fallacy, when they prove
the Scripture to be the Word of God by the Authority
or infallible Teftimony of their Church* and when
*they are called to fhew the infallible Authority of
their Church, they pretend to prove it by the
Scripture.
IV. The next kind of Sophifm is called m
Caufa pro Caufd* or the AJfighation of a falfe Caufe.
This the Peripatetic Philosophers were guilty of
continually, when they told us that certain Beings,
which they call fubftantial Forms* were the Springs
of Colour, Motion, Vegetation, and the various
Operations of natural Beings in the animate and
inanimate World ; when they informed us that
Nature was terribly afraid of Vacuum* and that this
was the Caufe why the Water would not fall out
of a long Tube if it was turned upfide down : The
Moderns as well as the Ancients fall often into this
Fallacy when they pofirively affign the Regions of
natural Appearances, without fufficient Experi-
ments to prove them.
Aftrologers are over-run with this Sort of Falla-
cies, and they cheat the People grofly by pretend-
ing to tell Fortunes^ and to deduce the Caufe of the
various Occurrences in the Lives of Men from the
various Pofitions of the Stars and Planets* which they
call Afpefis.
When Comets and Eclipfes of the Sun and Moon
are conftrued to fignify the Fate of Princes, the
Revolution of States, Famine, Wars and Calami-
ties
Cb. lit. S. t: Thi right tlfe effteafoft. $ if
ties of all Kinds, it is a Fallacy that belongs to this
Rank of Sopbifms.
There is fcarce any Thing more commdn in
human Life than this Sort of deceitful Argument*
If any two accidental Events happen to concur,
one is prefently made the Caufe of the other. If
Titius wronged bis Neighbour of a Guinea^ and iti
Jix Months after be fell down and broke his Leg+
weak Men will impute it to the divine Vengeancd
on Titius for his former Injuftice. This Sophifm
was found alfo in the early Days of the World i
For when holy Job was furrounded with uncommon
Miferies, his own Friends inferred* that be Was &
mfi heinous Criminal, and charged him with aggira*
•Dated Guilt as the Caufe of his Calamities •, though'
God himfelf by a Voice from Heaven folvcd this
Uncharitable Sophifm, and cleared his Servant Job
of that Charge.
How frequent is it among Men to irilpUte
Crimes to wrong Perfbns ? We too often charge
that upon the wicked Contrivance and premedi-
tated Malice of a Neighbour* which arofe merely
, from Ignorance, or - from unguarded Temper*
And on the other Hand, when we have a Mind to
excufe ourfelyes, we pra&ife the fame Sophifm,
and charge that upon our Inadvertence or our Ig-
norance, which perhaps was defigned Wickedriefs.
What is really done by a Neceflity of Circufflftan-
ces* we fometimes impute to Choice. And again*
we charge that upon Neceflity, which was really
defired and chofen.
Sometimes a Perfon a£ts out of Judgriifent in
Oppofition to his Inclination ; another Perfonl
perhaps ads the fame Thing out of Inclination,
and againft his Judgment. It is hard for us tof .
determine with Affurance what are the inward
X 2 Springs
3i8 LOG I C K: Or, Part III.
Springs and fecret Caufes of every Man's Con-
duit; and therefore we fhould be cautious and
flow in palTing a Judgment, where the Cafe is not
exceeding evident : Apd if we (hould miftake, let
it rather be on the charitable than on the cenfori-
ous Side.
It is the fame Sopbifm that charges mathemati-
cal Learning with leading the Minds of Men to
Scepticism and Infidelity, and as unjuftly accufes
the new Philofopby of paving the Way to Herefy
and Scbifm. Thus the Reformation from Popery
has been charged with the Murder and Blood of
Millions, which in Truth is to be imputed to the
Tyranny of the. Princes and the Priefts, who would
not fuffer the People to reform their Sentiments
and their Practices according to the Word of
God. Thus Cbrifiianity in the primitive Ages
was charged by the Heathens with all the Cala-
mities which befel the Roman Empire, becaufe
the Chriftians renounced the Heathen Gods and
Idols.
The Way to relieve ourfelves from thofe So-
phifms, and to fecure ourfelves from the Danger
of falling into them, is an honed and diligent En-
quiry into the real Nature and Caufes of Things,
with a conftant Watchfulnefs againft all thofe Pre-
judices that might warp the Judgment afide from
Truth in that Enquiry.
V. The next is called Fallacia Accidentis, or a
Sophifm wherein we pronounce concerning the
Nature and effential Properties of any Subject ac-
cording to fomething which is merely accidental
to it. This is a-kin to the former, and is alfo ve-
ry frequent in human Life. So if Opium or the
Peruvian Bark has been ufed imprudently or un-
fuccefsfully.
Cb. Hi; S. i . The right XJfe of"R&Son. 3 r 9
fuccefsfully, whereby the Patient has received In-
jury, fome weaker People abfolutely pronounce
againft the Ufe of the Bark or Opium upon all Oc-.
cafions whatfoever, and ire ready to call them
Paifon. So Wine has been the accidental Occa-
lion of Drunkennefs and Quarrels ; Learning and
Printing may have been the accidental Caufe of
Sedition in a State ; the Reading of the Bible by
Accident has been abufed to promote Herefies or
deftruftive Errors •, and for thefe Reafons they have
been .all pronounced evil Things. Mahomet forbad
his Followers the Ufe of Wine 5 the Turks dif-
courage Learning in their Dominions ; and the
Papifts forbid the Scripture to be read by the Laity.
But how very unreafonable are thefe Inferen*
ces, and thefe Prohibitions which are built upon
them !
* VI. The next Sophifm borders upon the former ;
and that is, when we argue from that which is tru6
in particular Circumftances to prove the fame thiiig
true absolutely) ftmply* and abftrafled from all Cir-
cumftances * 9 this is called in the Schools a Sophifm.
a.dillofecundum quid ad diSlum JimpUciter 5 as, That
which is bought in the SBambles is eaten for Dinner %
raw Meat is bought in the Shambles 5 therefore raw
Meat is eaten for Dinner. Or thus, Livy writes
Fables and Improbabilities when he describes Prodigiefi
and Omens 5 therefore Livy's Roman Hiftory^ is ne-
ver to be believed in any thing. Or thus, There may;
he fome Mi/lake of Tranfcribers in fome Part of Scrip-
ture - 9 therefore Scripture alone is not afafe Guide for
our Faith.
This Sort of Sophifm has its Reverfe alfo ; as
when we argue from that which is true /imply and
abfolutefyto prove the fame Thing true in 41 parti*
X 3 cular
jio LO G I C K: Or, Part HI.
atlar Circumftances wbatfoever* ; as if a Trayfor
ihould argue from the fixth Commandment, Thou
jhalt not kill a Man* to prove that be bimfelf ought
not to be banged,: Or if a Madman (hould tell me,
I ought not to witb-bold tbe Sword fromhim % becaufi
no Man ought to witb-bold tbe Property of another.
Thefe two laft Species of Sophtfms are eafily foltr*
ed by (hewing the Difference betwixt Things in
their abfolute Nature^ and the fame Things fun-
rounded with peculiar Grcumftances* and confidered
|n Regard to fpecial Times, Places, Perfons and
Occafions ; or by (hewing the Difference between
a moral and a metaphyseal UnherfkUty 9 and that the
Propofition will hold good in one Cafe, but not in
the other.
VII. The Sophifms of Compofition and Divifion
come next to be mentioned.
The Sopbifm of Compofition is when we infer
tny thing concerning Ideas in a compounded Senfe,
which is only true in a divided Senfe. And when it
is faid in the Gofpel that Cbrifi Made tbe Blind to
fee* and the Deaf to bear, and the Lame to walk,
we ought not to infer hence that Cbrifi performed
Contradiffions ; but thofe * who were blind before
were made to fee, and thofe who were deaf before
were made to hear, fcfr. So when the Scripture
affurcs us tbe worft of Sinners may be faved % it fig-
nifies only • that they who have been the worft of
Sinners may repent and be faved, not that. they
dial} be faved in their Sins. Or if any one (hould.
argue thus, fm *nd tbret «re even and *dd * jfa*
an
' • This it arguing from t w**el Umwfifip, which admits of fame Excepti-
ons, in the lame Manner as may be argued from mtifpfofoaJ or a natural Um&
vtrjgliq, wWcfradnujfc of j*o Exceptions, ■■'-*<;
Ch. IIL 5. i. The right life gf Rcafon. 321
are two and three ; therefore five are even and odd.
Here that is very falfely inferred concerning two
and three in Unions which is only true of them di-
vided.
The Sophifm of Divi/ion is when we infer the
fame Thing concerning Ideas in a divided Senfe,
which is only true in a compounded Senfe ; as, if we
Ihould pretend to prove that every Soldier in the
Grecian firry put an hundred thousand Perfians tp
Flight ', becaufe the Grecian Soldiers did fo. Or if a
Man fhould argue thus ; five is one Number ; two
and three are five j therefore two and three are one
Number*
This fort of Sophifms is committed when the
Word All is taken in a colleSive and a dijlributive
Senfe, without a due Diftin&ion *, as, if any ode
fliould rcafon thus.; All the mufical Injlruments of the
Jewifh Temple made a noble Concert* the Harp was a
mufical Injlrument of the Je wifti Temple ; therefore the
Harp made a noble Concert. Here the Word All in
the Major is colle&ive, whereas fucjh a Conclufion
requires that the Word All fhould be diftributivei.
It is the fame Fallacy when the univerfal Wod
All or No refers to Species in one Prppofitionj an4
to Individuals t in another ; as, All Animals were in
Noah'j Ark\ therefore no Animals perijhed in the
Flood: Whereas in the Premife all Animals fignifies
every kind of Animals, which does not exclude or
deny the drowning of a thoufand Individuals.
VIII. The l'aft fort of Sophifms arifes from our
Abufe of the Ambiguity, of Words, which is the largeft
and moft v extenfive kind of Fallacy; and indeed
feveral of the former Fallacies might be reduced to
this Hfcacl.
When the Words or Phrafes are plainly equivocal,
they are called Sophifms of Equivocation * as, if we
X 4 ihould
3«i LOGIC K: Or % Part III.
ihould argue thus, He that fends forth a Book into the
light , defires it to be read ; He that throws a Book
into the Fire* fends it into the light 9 therefore he
that throws a Book into the Fire defires it to be redd.
This Sophifm, as well as the foregoing, and a]l
of the like Nature are folved by (hewing the diffe- .
rent Senfes of the Words, Terms or Phrafes. Here
light in the major Propofition fignifies the puhlick
View of the Word\ in the minor it fignifies the
Brigbtnefs' of Flame and Fire* and therefore the Syl-
logifm has four Terms, or rather it has no middle
Term, and proves nothing.
But where fuch grofs Equivocations and Ambigut-
ties appear in Arguments, there is little Danger of
impofing upon ourfelves or others. The greateft
Danger* and which we are perpetually expofed to
in Reafoning, is, where the two Senfes or Signifi-
cations of one Term are near a-kin, and not plain-
ly diftinguifhed, and yet they are really fufficiently
different in their Senfe to lead us into great Mis-
takes, if we are not watchful. And indeed the
treated Part of Contrpverfies in the facred or civil
ife, arife from the different Senfes that are put
upon Words, and the different Ideas which are
included in them ; as have been fhewn at large in
the firft Part of Logick, Chap. IV. which treats of
Words and ferms.
There is after all theft, another fort of Sophifm
which is wont to be called an imperfeS Enumeration*
or a falfe Induction* whert from a few Experiments
or Obfervations Men infer general Theorems and
univerfal Propofitions. But this is fufficiently taken
notice of in the foregoing Chapter, where we treated
of that fort of Syllogifm which is called InduHion.
SECT.
Ch. III. S.2. The right Vfe t/Reafon. 323
SECT. II.
Zwo general Tefts of true Syllogifms, and Methods of
fohing all Sopbifms.
BESIDES the fpecial Defcription of trw
Syllogifms and Sopbifms already given, and the
Rules by which the one are framed, -and the other
refuted, there are thefe two general Methods of re-
ducing all Syllogifms whatfoever to a Tefi of their
Truth or Falfhood.
I. The firft is, that the Premifes mufi (at leaft
implicitly) contain the Conclufion \ or thus, One
of the Premifes mufi contain the Conclufion* and the
other mufi Jhew that the Conclufion is contained in
it. The Reafon of this Rule is this : When any
Propofition is offered to be proved, it is necet-
fary to find another Propofition which confirms
it, which may be called the containing Propofition \
but becaufe the fecond mufi; not contain the firft in
an exprefs Manner, arid in the fame Words*,
therefore it is neceflkry that a third or ofienfive Pro-
pofition t)e found out to (hew that the fecond Pro-
pofition contains the firft which was to be proved.
Let us make an Experiment of this Syllogifm.
Wbofoever, is a Slave to bis natural Inclinations is mi-
ferable \ the wicked Man is a Slave to his natural In-
clinations; therefore the wicked Man is miferable.
Here it is evident that the major Propofition
contains the Conclufion •, for under the general
Character of a Slave to natural Inclinations, a wicked
Man
* It is confetTed that conditional and Ssjuntlivi major Propositions do et-
prefsly contain all that is in the Conclufion $ but then it is not in a certain
aryl conclufive Manner, but only in a dubious Form of Speech, and mingled
With other Terms, and therefore it is not tilt fame exfreft Propofition,
324 L O G J C Kr Or, Part IH*
Man is contained or included •, and the minor Pro-
pofition declares it •, whence the Conclujion is evi-
dently deduced that the wicked Man is miferahle.
In many affirmative Syllogifms we may fuppofe
other the major or the minor to contain the Con-
clufion, and the other to (hew it ; for there is no
great Difference. But in negative Syllogifms it is
the negative Proposition that contains 'the Conclu-
fion, and the affirmative Propofition (hews it ; as,
tvery wife Man mafitrs bis Paffions % no angry Man
mqfiers bis Pajfwns \ therefore no angry Man is wife*
Here it is more natural to fuppofe the minor to be
the containing Propofitipn \ it is the minor implicitly
denies Wifdom concerning an angry Man, becaulc
majlering the Paffions is included in Wijiom, and the
major mews it.
Note, This Rule may be applied to complex and
conjunctive^ as well as ftmple Syllogifms, and is
adapted to (hew the Truth or FaHhood of any of
them,
II. The fecond is this : As the Terms in every
Syllegifm are ufually repeated twice, fo tbey mujl bt
taken precijely in the fame Senfe in both Places : For
the greateft Part of Miftakes, that arife in form-
ing Syllogifms, is derived from fome little Differ-
ence in the Senfe of one of the Terms in the two
Parts of the Syllogifm wherein it is ufed. Let us
confider the following Sophifms.
i. It is a Sin to kill a Man ; a Murderer is a
Man 5 therefore it is a Sin to kill a Murderer. Here
the Word Kill in the firft Propofition flgnifies to
kill unjujlly, or without a Law ; in the Conclufion
it is taken abfolutely for putting a Man to Death in
general, and therefore the Inference is not good.
2. What I am, you are not\ but I am a Man\
therefore you ate not * Man. This is a relative SyU
Iogi/m:
Ch. III. S. 2. *Tbe right Vfe gfReafon, 325
£//5» : But if it be reduced to a regular categorical
Form, it will appear there is Ambiguity in the
Terms, thus; What I am, is a Man ; you are not
what J* amy therefore you are not a Man. Here
what 1 am in the major Propofition, is taken fpecU
ally for my Nature ; but in the minor Propofition
the fame Words are taken individually for my Per-
fon ; therefore the Inference muft be falfe, for the
Syllogifm does not, take the Term what lam both
times in the fame Senfe.
3. He that fays you are an Animal* fayi true ; but .
be that Jays you are a Goofe, fays y du are an Animal \
therefore be that fays you are a Goofe % fays true. In
the major Propofition the Word Animal is the Pre-
dicate of an incidental Propofition 5 which incidental
Propofition being affirmative, renders the Predicate
of it particular, according to Chap. II. Se8. 2. Axiom,
3. and confequently the Word Animal there fignifles
only human Animality. In the . minor Propofition,
the Word Animal for the. fame Reafon, fignifies
the Animality of a Goof e\ whereby it becomes. 40
ambiguous Term, and unfit to build the Conclude
on upon. Or if you. fay, the Word Animal in the
minor, is taken for human Animality, then the minor
is evidently falfe;
It is from this laft general Ttjl of Syllogifms that
we derive the Cuftom of the Respondent in an-
fwering the Arguments of the Opponent* which is
to diftinguilh upon the major or minor Propofition*
and declare which Term is ufed in two S$nfes, and
in what Senfe the Propofition may be true, and in
what Senfe it is falfe. •
CHAP.
3*6 LOGIC K: Qr % Part ffl;
C H A P. IV.
Some general Rules to direB our Reafontng.
MO S T of the general and fpecial Dire&ions
given to form our Judgments aright in the
preceding Part of Logick might be rehearfed here;
for the Judgments which we pafs upon Things are
generally built on fome fecret Reafontng or Argu-
ment by which the Propofition is fuppofed to be
proved. But there may be yet fome farther Af-
fiftances given to our reafontng Powers in their
Search after Truth, and an Observation of the fol-
lowing Rules will be of great Importance for that
End.
I. Rule. Accujtom yourfelves to clear and diftinS
Ideas* to evident Proportions y tojlrong and convincing
Arguments. Converfe much with thofe Friends,
and thofe Books, and thofe Parts of Learning
where you meet with the greateft Clearnefs of
Thought and Force of Reafoning. The mathe-
matical Sciences, and particularly Arithmetic^
Geometry* and Mechanics* abound with thefe Ad-
vantages : Arid if there were nothing valuable in
them for the Ufes of human Life, yet the very
Speculative Parts of this fort of Learning are well
itforth our Study; for by perpetual Examples
they teach "us to conceive with Clearnefs, to con-
heft our Ideas and Propofitions in a Train of De-
pendance, to reafon with Strength and Demon-
ftration, and to diftinguilh between Truth and
Falftiood. Something of thefe Sciences fliould be
ftudied by every Man who pretends to Learning,
and that (as Mr. Locke exprefies it) not fo much to
make
Ch. IV. We right life of RadaE 327
make us Mathematicians* as to make us reafonable
Creatures.
We fhould gain fuch a Familiarity with Evi-
dence of Perception and Force of Reafoning, and
get fuch a Habit of difcerning clear Truths, that
the Mind may be foon offended with Obfcurity
and Confufion : Then we Ihall (as it were) natu-
rally and with Eafe reftrain our Minds from rafh
Judgment, before we attain juft Evidence of the
Proportion which is offered to us ; and we fhall
with the fame Eafe, and (as it were) naturally feize
and embrace every Truth that is propofed with juft
Evidence.
This Habit of conceiving clearly, of judging
juftly* and of reafoning well, is not to be attained
merely by the Happinefs of Conftitution, the
Brightnefs of Genius, the bed natural Parts, or
the belt Colle&ion of logical Precepts. It is Cuf-
tom and Praftice that muft form and cftablifh this
Habit. • We muft apply ourfelves to it till we per*
form all this readily, and without reflecting on
Rules. A coherent Tinker* and a flrift Reafoncr*
is not to be made at once by a Set of Rules, any
more than igood Painter or Mufician may be form*
ed extempore by an excellent Left u re on Mufick or
Painting. It is of infinite Importance therefore in
our younger Years to be taught both the Value
and the PraSice of conceiving clearly and reafon-
ing right : For when we are grown up to the mid-
die of Life, or pad it, it is no Wonder that we
fhould not learn good Reafoning, any more than
that an ignorant Clown fhould not be able to learn
fine Language, Dancing, or a courtly Behaviour*
when his ruftic Airs have grown up with him till
the Age of Forty.
For
$28 LOGIC K: Or] Part III.
For want of this Care fome Perfons of Rank and
Education dwell all their Days among obfeure
Ideas; they conceive and judge always in Confufi-
on, they take weak Arguments for Demonftration,
they are led away with the Difguifes and Shadows
of Truth, Now if fuch Perfons happen to have
a bright Imagination, a Volubility of Speech, and
a Copioufnefs of Language, they not only impofe
many Errors upon their own Underftandings, but
they (lamp the Image of their own Miftakes upon
their Neigbours alfo, and fpread their Errors
abroad.
It is a Matter of juft Lamentation and Pity to
confider the Weaknefs of the common Multitude
of Mankind in this Refpeft, how they receive any
thing into their Affent upon the moft trifling
Grounds. True Reafoning hath very little Share
in forming their Opinions. They refift the moft
convincing Arguments by an obftinate Adherence
to their Prejudices, and believe the moft impro-
bable Things with the greateft Aflurance. They
talk of the abftrufeft Myfteries, and determine
upon them with the utmoft Confidence, and with*
out juft Evidence either from Reafon or Revela*
tion. A confufed Heap of dark and inconfiftent
Ideas make up a good Part of their Knowledge in
Matters of Pbilofophy as well as Religion* having
never been taught the Ufe and Value of clear and
juft Reafoning.
Yet it muft be ftill confefled that there are fome
Myfteries in Religion, both natural and 'revealed, as
well as fome abftrufe Points in Pbilofophy* where-
in the Wife as well as the Unwife muft be con-
tent with obfeure Ideas. There are feveral Things*
efpecially relating to the invifible World, which
are unfearchable in our prefent State, and there-
fore we muft believe what Revelation plainly dic-
tates
Ch. IV. <the right Uft gf Reafon. 329
tates, though the Ideas may be obfcure. Reafon
itfelf demands this of us ; but we fhould feek for
the brighteflr Evidence both of Ideas, and of the
Connexion of them, wherefoever ic is attainable.
II. Rule. Enlarge your general Acquaintance with
Things daily* in order to attain a rich Furniture of
Topics ', or middle Terms* whereby thofe Propofitions
which occur may be either proved or difproved* but
efpecially meditate and enquire with great Diligence
and Exaflmfs into the Nature* Properties* Circum-
ftances and Relations of the particular Subjelt about
which you judge or argue. Gonfider its Caufes, Ef-
fects, Confequences, Adjunfts, Oppofites, Signs,
&c. fo far as is needful to your prefent Purpose,
You Ihould furvey a Queftidn round about, and on
all Sides, and extend your Views as far as poffibte
to every Thing that has a Connexion with it. This
Practice has many Advantages in it * as,
1. It will be a Means to fugged to your Mind,
proper Topics for Argument about any Propor-
tion that relates to the fame Subject.
2. It will enable you with greater Readinefs and
Juftnefs of Thought to give an Anfwer to any fud-
den Queftion upon that Subjeft, whether it arifes
in your own Mind, or be propofed by others.
3. This will inftruft you to give a plainer and
fpeedier Solution of any Difficulties that may at-
tend the Theme of your Difcourfe, and to refute
the Objections of thofe who have efpoufed'a con-
trary Opinion.
4. By fuch a large Survey of the whole Sub-
ject in all its Properties and Relations, you will be
better fecured from Inconfiftencies, u e. from af-
ferting or denying any thing in one Place, which
contradicts what you have afferted or denied in an-
other :
330 LOGIC R: Or, Part IIL
other : And to attain thefc Ends, an Extenfivenefs
of Understanding, and a large Memory, are of un»
fpeakable Service.
One would be ready to wonder lbmetimes how
eafily great and wife and learned Men are led into
Afiertions in fome Pares of the fame Treatifc,
which are found to be fcarce confident with what
they have afierted in other Places : But the true
Reafon is the Narrownefs of the Mind of Man, that
it cannot take in all the innumerable Properties
add Relations of one Subjedfc with a (ingle View ;
and therefore whilft they are intent on one particu-
lar Part of their Theme, they bend all their Force
of Thought to prove or difprove fome Proportion
that relates to that. Part, without a fufficient Atten-
tion to the Confequences which may flow from it,
and which may unhappily affefl: another Part of
the fame Subje&, and by this Means they are
fometimes led to fay things which are inconfiftent.
In fuch a Cafe the great Dealers in Difpute and
Controverfy take Pleafure to call Nonfenfe and Self
Contradiction on their Antagonift with huge and
hateful Reproaches. For my Part I rather chufe
to pity human Nature, whofe neceffary Narrownefs
of Underftanding expofes us all to fome Degrees of
this Frailty. But the mod extenfive Survey pofli-
ble of our whole Subjedl is the beft Remedy againft
it. It is our judging and arguing upon a partial
View of Things, that expofes us to Miftakes, and
puihes us into Abfurdities, or at lead to the very
Borders of them.
III. Rule. In fearching the Knowledge of Things f
always keep the precife Point of the prefent §uef
tion in your Eye. Tahe heed that you add nothing to
it while you are arguing* nor omit any part of it.
Watch
Gh. IV. The right Ufe of R^fon. 331
* Watch carefully left any new Ideas Aide in to mingle
themfelves either with the Subje6t or the Predicate.
See that the Queftion be not altered by the Ambi-
guity of any Word taken in different Senfes ; nof
let any fecret Prejudices of your own, or the. fo-
phiftical Arts of others, cheat your Underftanding
by changing the Queftion, or fhuffling in any thing
elfe in its room.
And for this End it is ufeful to keep the precife'
Matter of Enquiry as Jimple as may be, and difen*
gaged from a Complication of Ideas, which do not .
neceflarily belong to it. By admitting a Compli-
cation of Ideas, and taking too many Things at
once into one Queftion, the Mind is fometimes
dazzled and bewildered % and the Truth is loflf in
fuch a Variety and Confufion of Ideas ; whereas by
limiting and narrowing the Queftion, you take a
fuller Survey of the whole of it.
By keeping the fingle Point of Enquiry in our
conftant View, we (hall be fecured from fudden,
rafih, and impertinent Refponfes and Determinate
ons, which fome have obtruded inftead of Solutions
and folid Anfwers, before they perfe&ly know the
Queftions.
IV. Rule. When you ha<oe exaftly confidered
the precife Point of Enquiry', or what is unknown in
the Quejiion, tfyn conjider what, and bow much you
know already .vf this §>t(eftion 9 or of the Ideas and
Terms of which it is compcrfed. It is by a Compari-
fon of the known and unknown Parts of the Quef-
tion together, that you find what Reference the
Part known hath unto, or what Connexion it hath
with the Thinglhat is fought : Thofe Ideas, where-
by the known and unknown Parts of the Queftion
are connected, will furnifh you with middle Terms
Y or
33* LOGIC K: Or, Part HI.
or Arguments whereby the Thing propofcd may be
proved or difproved.
. In this Pare of your Work* (viz.) Comparing Ideas
together, take due Time, and be not too hafty to
come to a Determination, efpecially in Points of
importance. Some Men when they fee a Kttle
Agreement or Difagrecment between Ideas, they
prefume a great deal, and fo jump into the Conclu-
sion : This is a (hort Way to Fancy, Opinion, and
Conceit, but a mod unfafe and uncertain Way to
. true Knowledge and Wifdom.
V. Rule. In chuftngyour middle Terms or Argu-
ments to prove any Quejlion> always takefucb Topics as
are fur eft, and leaji fallible, and which carry the groateft
Evidence and Strength with them. Be not fo felicitous
about the Niimber, as the Weight of your Argu-
ments, efpecially in proving any Propofition which
admits of natural Certainty, or of complete Demon-
ftration. Many Times we do Injury to a Caufe by
dwelling upon trifling Arguments. We amufe our
Hearers with Uncertainties, by multiplying the
; Number of feeble Reafonings, before we mention
thofe. which. are more fubftantial, conclufive and
convincing. And too often we yield up our own
Afient to mere probable Arguments, where certain
Proofs may be obtained.
Yet it muft be confefled there a|e. many Cafes,
wherein the growing Number of probable Arguments
increafes the Degree of Probability, and gives a
great and fufficient Confirmation to the Truth which
is fought ; as,
( i.y When we are enquiring the true Senfe of
any Word or Phrafe, we are mote confirmed in
the Signification of it, by findinguhe fame Ex-
preffion
Ch. IV. The right Vfi gf Reafpttl %%%
predion fo ufed in federal Authors, or in feveral
Places of the fame Author.
(2.) When We are fearching out the true Mean*
ing or Opinion of any Writer, or enquiring into
any facred Doftrine of Scripture, we come to a
furer Determination of the Truth by feveral di-
ftindt Places wherein the fame Thing is expreffed
or plainly implied \ becaufe it is not fo probable
that an honeft fkilful Reader fhould miftake the
Meaning of the Writer in many Places, as he may
in one or two.
(3.) When we would prove the Importance of
any fcriptural Do£trin6 or Duty, the Multitude of
Texts, wherein it is repeated and incalculated upon
the Reader, feems naturally to inftrudt that it is a
Matter of greater Importance, than other Thing9
which are but (lightly or fingly mentioned in the
Bible.
(4.) In fearching out Matters of Fail in Times
paft or in diftant Places (in which Cafe moral Evi-
dence is fuffkient, and moral Certainty is the utmoft
which can be attained) here we derive a greater
Affurance of the Truth of it by a Number of
PerfonSj or a Multitude of Circumftarices concur-*
ring to bear Witnefs to it.
(5.)- From many Experiments in natural Philo-
fophy we more fafely infer a general Theorem*
than we can from one or two.
(6.) In Matter? which require prefent Pra&ice,
both facred and civil, we muft content ouffelves
oftentimes with a mere Pfeponderation of probable:
Reafons or Arguments. Where there are feveral
Heafons on each Side, for and agalnft a Thing
that is to be done; or omitted, a fmall Argument
added to the Heap may juftly turn the Balance on
one Side, and determine the Judgment* as I bavd
noted in the Second Part of Logtik.
Y a X%
334 LOGIC K: Or* Pkrt Itf;
Tb conclude ; a growing Acquaintance with
Matters of Learning, and a daily Improvement of
our Underftandings in Affairs human and divine,
will bed teach us to judge and diftinguiflb in what
Cafes the Number of Arguments adds to their
Weight and Force : It is only Experience can fully
inform us when we muft be determined by probable
Topics* and when we muft feek and expert Demon-
ft rations.
VI. Rule. Prove your Conclufion (as far as
pojfible) by fome Proportions that are injbemfekes
more plain, 'evident, and certain than the Conclufion;
or at leaft fucb as are more known, and more intelli-
gible to the Per/on whom you would convince. If we
negleft this Rule, we (hall endeavour to enlighten
that Jwhich is obfeure by fomething equally or
more obfeure, and to confirm that which is doubt-
ful by fomething equally or more uncertain. Com-
mon Senfe di&ates to all Men, that it is impoffible
to eftablifh any Truth, and to convince others of
it, but by fomething that is better known to them
than that Truth is.
VII. Rule. Labour in all your Arguings to en-
lighten the Under/landing, as well as to conquer and
captivate the Judgment. Argue in fuch a Manner,
as may give a natural, diftinft, and folid Know-
ledge or Things to your Hearers, as well as to force
their Aflent by a mere Proof of the Queftion.
Now to attain this End, the chief Topic or Me-
dium of your Demonftration (hould be fetched as
much as goflible, from the Nature of the Thing to
be proved, or from thofe Things which ate* moft
• Naturally connected with it.
Geom*
Cb. IV. ftfoe right Ufe of Reafon/ 335
Geometricians fonietimes break this Rule without
Necefllty, two Ways, {viz.)
1. When they prove one Propofition only by
fhewing what Absurdities will follow if the con-
tradictory Propofition be fuppofed or admitted :
This is called Reduflio ad abfurdum*, or Demon-
Jiratio per impcffibile ; as for Inftancej When they
prove all the Radii of a Circle to be equals by fup-
pofing one Radius to be longer or fliorter than
another, and then fhewing what abfurd Confe-
quences will follow. This I confefs, forces the
Aflent, but it does not enlighten the Mind by
(hewing the true Reafon and Gaufe why all Radii
are equal 9 which is derived from the very Conftruc-
tion of a Circle : For fince a Circle is formed by
fixing one End of a ftrait Line in the Centre, and
moving the otlwfr End round (or, which is all one,
by Compafles kept open to a certain Extent) it
follows evidently that every Part of the Circum-
ference being thus defcribed mult be equally diftant
from the Centre, and therefore the Radii, which
are Lines from the Centre to the Circumference,
muft be all equal.
2. Geometricians forget this Rule when they
heap up many far-fetched Lines, Figures and Pro-
portions to prove fome plain, fimpte, and obvious
Propofition. This is called a Demonftration per
aliena et remota, or an Argument from unnatural
and remote Mediums : As if in order to prove the
Radii of a Circle are all equal, I . (hould make fe-
veral Triangles and Squares about the Circle, and
Y 3 then
Note, This Rule chiefly refers to the Eftablijbment of fome Truth, rather
than to the Refutation of Error. .It is a very common arid ufeful Way of ar-
guing to refute a falfe Propofition, by mewing what evident Falihood or Ab-
surdity will follow from it : For what Propofition foever is really abfurd and
falfe does effectually prove that Principle to be falfe from which it is derived j
fo that this Way of refuting an Error is not fo ufually called Rtdufth ad db-
Jurdum*
53 6 LOGIC K: Or, Fart III,
then from fome Properties and Propoficions of
Squares and Triangles prove that the Radii of a
Circle are equal.
Yet it muft be confeffed, that fometimes fuch
Queftions happen, that it is hardly pofiible to prove
them by direfit Arguments drawn from the Nature
of Things, &c. and then it may not only be lawful,
but neceflary to ufe indireS Proofs* and Arguments
drawn from remote Mediums, or from the Abjttrdiiy
of the contradictory Suppofttions.
Such indirect and remote Arguments may alfo be
fometimes ufed to confirm a Propofnion which has
been before proved by Arguments more direB and
immediate.
VIII. Ruj,e. Though Arguments fhould give
JJght to the Subjeft, as well as conftrain the Af-
fenr, yet you mutt learn to difiingutjh well between
an Explication and an Argument \ and neither impofi
Upon yourfelves, nor fuffer y our f elves to be impofed upon
$y others, by mjftaking a mere lllujlration for a convin-
cing Reafon.
Axioms themfelves, or Self-evident Propoficions
fiiay want an Explication or llkflration> though they
are not to be'proved by Rcafoning.
Similitudes and AUuJions have oftentimes a very
happy Influence to explain fome difficult Truth,
and to render the Idea of it familiar and eafy.
Where the Reiemblance isjuft and accurate, the
Influence of a Simile may proceed fo far as to
(hew the Poflibiiity of the Thing in Queftionr
But Similitudes muft not be taken as a folid Proof
of the Truth or Exiftence of thofe Things to
which they have a Refemblance. A too grea?
Deference paid to Similitudes^ or an utter Rejec-
tion of them feem to be two Extremes, and ought
|o bp avoided. J^c late ingenious Mr, Locke %
Ch. IV, The right Ufe of RMfoq. 337
even in his Enquiries after Truth, jnakes gre^t
Ufe of Similes for frequent Illuftratiop, and is very
happy in the Invention of them, though he w^rns
us alfo left we miftake them for conclufive Argu-
ments.
Yet let it be npted here, th# a Parable or a #-
militude ufed by any Author, may give a fufficient
Proof of the true Senfe and Meaning of that Au-
thor, provided that we draw not this Similitude
beyond the Scope and Defign for which it was
brought; as when our Saviour affirms, Rev. iii, 3.
/ wiU come on thte as a Thief \ this will plainly prove
that he defcribes the UnexpeScdnefs of bis Appearance*
though it will by no Means be drawn to fignify
any lnjujiice in bis Defign.
1 IX. RuLfe. In your whole Courfe of Reafoning
keep your Mind fincerely intent in tbe Purfuit of
Truth ; and follow folid Argument wherefoever it leads
you. Let not a Party Spirit* nor any Pajfion or Pre-
judice whatfoever, ftop or avert the Current of your
Reafoning in Quell of true Knowledge.
When you are enquiring therefore into any Sub-
je£t, maintain a due Regard to the Arguments and
Objections on both Sides of a Queftion : Confi-
der, corppare, and balance them well before you
determine for one Side. It is a frequent, but a
very faulty Pra&ice to hunt after Arguments only
to make good one Side of a Queftion, and en.
tirely to negleft and refute thofe which favour the
other Side. If we have not given a due Weight
to Arguments on both Sides, we do but wilfully
mifguide our Judgment* and abufe our Reafon, .
by forbidding its Search after Truth. When we
e/poufe Opinions by afecret Biafs on the Mind,
through the Influences of Fear* Hope, Honour, Credit*
' Y4 Jnterejl*
338 L O G I C K: &c. Part III.
Inter eft, or any other Prejudice^ and then feek Ar-
guments only to fupport thofe Opinions, we have
neither done our Duty to- God nor to ourfelves ;
and it is a Matter of mere Chance if we ftumble
upon Truth in our Way to Eafe and Preferment.
The Power of Reafoning was given us by our
Maker for this very End, to purfue Truth ; and we
abufe one of his richeft Gifts, if we bafely yield
it up to be led aftray by any of the meaner Powers
of Nature, or the perilhing Inrerefts of this Life.
Reafon itfelf, if honeftly obeyed, will lead us to
receive the divine Revelation of the Gofpel, where
it is duly propofed, and this will (hew us the Path
of Life everlafting.
THE
[ 339 1
eW&"
THE
FOURTH PART
OF
LO G I G K.
Of Difpofition and Method.
IT is 'not merely a clear and diftinS Idea* a well'
formed Proportion* or a juft Argument* that is
fufficient to fearch out and communicate the
Knowledge of a Subjedh There muft be a Variety
and Series of them difpoled in a due manner in or-
der to attain this End : And therefore it is the De-
fign of the lafi Part of Logick to teach us the Art of\
Method: It is that muft fecure our Thoughts from
that Confufion, Darknefs, and Miftake which un-
avoidably attend the Meditations and Difcourfes
even of the brighteft Genius who defpifes the Rules
of it.
i. We (hall here confider the Nature of Method^
and the Jeveral Kinds of it.
2. Lay down the general Rules of Method, with
a few Particulars under them,
CHAP.
340 LOGIC K: 0r % Part IV.
CHAP. I.
Of the Nature of Method, and the feveral
Kinds of if, (viz.} Natural and Arbitrary,
Synthetic and Analytic*
JifETHOD, taken in the largeft Senfe, implies
* the placing of feveral Things, or performing feve*
ral Operations ihfucb an Order as is moft convenient to
attain fome End propofed: And in this Senfe it is
applied to all the Wcirks of Nature and Art, to ail
the divine Affairs of Creation and Providence;
and to the Artifices, Schemes, Contrivances and
Practices of Mankind, whether in natural, civil,
or facred Affairs.
Now this order Jy Difpofition of Things includes
the Ideas of Prior, Pofterior, and Simultaneous -, of
Superior, Inferior, and Equal ; of Beginning, End>
and Middle, &c. which are defcribed more par-
ticularly among the general AffeSions of Being in
Ontology.
But in Logick Method is ufually taken in a more
limited Senfe, and the Nature of it is thus de-
fcribed : Method is the Difpofition of a Variety of
Thought on any Subjeft in fucb Order as may h$
ferve to find out unknown Truths, to explain and con-
firm Truths that are known, or to fix them in the
Memory.
It is diftributed into two general Kinds, (3*2.)
Natural and Arbitrary.
Natural Method is that which obferves the Or*
der of Nature, and proceeds in fuch a Manner as
that the Knowledge of the Things which follow
depends in a. great Mcafure on the Things which
go before, and this is twofold ? {viz.) Synthetic
and
Ch. I. The right life gf Reafon, 341
and Analytic, which are fometimcs called Syntbefis
and Analyfis *•
Syntbetick Method is that which begins with the
Parts -f, and leads onward to the Knowledge of
the whole; it begins with the mod fimple Princi-
ples, and general Truths, and proceeds by Degrees
to that which is drawn from them or compounded
of them : And therefore it is called the Method of
Compofition.
Analytic Method takqs the whole Compound as it
finds it, whether it be a Species or an Individual, and
leads into the Knowledge of it by rcfolving it into
its firft Principles or Parts, its generic Nature, and
its fpecial Properties •, and therefore it is called the
Method of Refohttion.
As Synthetic Method is generally ufed in teach-
ing the Sciences after they are invented, fo
analytic
• The Word Analyfis has three or four Senfes, which it may not be im-
proper to take Notice of here.
1 . It fignifies the general and particular Heads of a Difcourfe with their mu-
tual Connections, both co-ordinate and fubordinate, drawn out by way of Ab-
ftraft into one or more Tables, which are frequently placed like an Index at the
Beginning or End of a Book.
2. It fignifies the revolving of a Difcourfe into its various Subjects and Argu-
ments, as when any Writing of the ancient Prophets is refolved into the prophe-
tical, bifiorical, doBrinal, and pra tlica I Parts of it ; itisfaidto be analysed in
general. When a Sentence is diftinguiflied into the Nouns, the Verbs, Pronouns,
Adverbs, and other Particles of Speech which compofe it, then it is faidto.be
analy fed grammatically. When the fame Sentence is diftinguiflied into Subject
and Predicate, Prcpofition, Argument , A8, Ob} eft, Caufe, Effetl, AaJuncJ,
Oppofite, &c. then it is analy fed logically vaAwetapbyficaUy. This la ft is what
is chiefly meant in the theological Schools, when they fpeak of analyfing a Text
rf Scripture.
3. Analyfis fignifies particularly the Science of Algebra, wherein a Queftion
being propoled, one or more Letters, as, x,y, », «r Vowels, as, a, e y t, &c*
are made ufe of to fignify trie unknown Number, which being intermingled
withfeveral known Numbers in the Queftion, is at laft by the Rules of Art
feparated or rcleafed from that Entanglement, and its particular Value is found
out by mewing its Equation, or Equality to fom'e known Number*
4. It fignifies analytical Method, as here explained in Logick.
f Note, It isconfetied that Syntbefis often begins with the Genus, and pro-
(Deeds to the Species and Individuals. But the Genus or generic Nature is then
iconfidered only as a pbyfical or ejjential Part of the Species, though it be fome-
times called zn unruerfal ox logical Whole, Thus jyntbetic Method maintains
its own Defcription ftili, for it begins with the Parts, and proceeds to the
phoU which is compofed of them.
34a LOGIC K: Or, Part IV.
analytic is mod pra&ifed in finding out Things
unknowm. Though it muft be confeffed that
both Methods are fometimes employed to find
out Truth, arid to communicate it.
If we know the Parts of any Subject eafier and
better than, the Whole, we confider the Parts
diftin&ly, and by putting them together we come
to the Knowledge of the Whole. So in Grammar
we learn firft to know Letters, we join them to
make Syllables, out of Syllables we compofe Wtrds,
and out of Words we make Sentences and Difcourfes.
So the Pbyfician or Apothecary knows the Nature
and Powers of his Simples, (viz.) his Drugs, his
Herts, his Minerals, &c. and putting them toge-
ther, and confidering their feveral Virtues, he finds
what will be the Nature and Powers of the Bolus*
' or any compound Medicine : This is the fyntbetic
Mefiod.
But if we are better acquainted with the Whole
than we are with particular Parts, then we divide
or refolve the Whole into its Parts, and thereby
gain a diftindl Knowledge of them. So in vulgar
Life we learn in the Grofs what Plants or Minerals
are •, and then by Chemiftry we gain the Know-
ledge of Salt, Sulphur, Spirit, Water, Earth, which
are the Principles of them. So we are firft acquaint-
ed with the whole Body of an Animal, and then by
Anatomy or Diffeflion, we come to learn all the in-
ward and outward Parts of it. This is analytic Me-
thod.
According to this moft general and obvious
Idea of fynthetic and analytic Method they differ
from each other as the Way which leads up from
a Valley to a Mountain differs from itfelf, confi-
dered as it leads down from the Mountain to the
'Valley ; or as St. Matthew and St. Luke prove
Chrift to be the Son of Abraham -, Luke finds it out
by
Ch. I. The tight XJfe of Reafon; §43
by Analyfts, rifing from Chrijl to his Anceftors ;
Matthew teaches it in fynthetic Method, beginning
from Abraham, and ftiewing that Chrijl is found
among his Pofterity. Therefore it is "a ufual Thing
in the Sciences, when we have by Analyfis found
out a Truth, we ufe fynthetic Method to explain
and deliver it, and prove it to be true.
In this eafy View of Things, thefe two Kinds of
Method may be preferved confpicuoufly, and en-
tirely diftindt: But the Subjects of Knowledge'
being infinite, and the Ways. whereby we arrive at
this Knowledge being almoft infinitely various, it
is very difficult, and almoft impoffible, always to
maintain the precife DiftindHon between thefe two
Methods.
This will evidently appear in the following Ob-
fervations.
Obf I. Analytic Method being ufed chiefly to find
out Things unknown, it is not limited or confined
' merely to begin with fome whole Subjeft, and.
proceed to the Knowledge of its Parts, but it takes
its Rife fometimes from any fingle Part or Proper-
ty, or from any Thing whatfoever that belongs to '
, a Subject which happens to be firft and mOft eafily
known, and thereby enquires into the more abftrufe
and unknown Parts, Properties, Caufes, Effe&s,
and Modes of it, whether abfolute or relative : As
for Inftance,
(1.) Analy/is+finds out Caufes by their Effects.
So in the Speculative Part of natural Philofopby %
when we obferve Light, Colours, Motions , Hard-
nefs, Softnefs, and other Properties and Powers of
Bodies, or any of the common or uncommon
Appearances of Things either on Earth, or in Hea-
ven, we fearch put the Caufes of them. So by
the
34$ LOGIC K: Or, Part IV.
the various Creatures we find out the Creator, and
learn his Wifdm, Power and Goodnefs.
(2.) It finds out EfFefts by their Caufes. So the
practical and mechanical Part of natural Philofopby f
cpnfiders fuch Powers of Motion, as the Wind, the
Fire, and the Water, &c. and then contrives what
Ufes they may be applied to, and what will be their
EfFeds in order to make Mills and Engines of vari-
ous Kinds.
(3.) It finds out the genera] and fpecial Nature
of a Thing by confidering the various Attributes
of the Individuals, and obferving what is common,
and what is proper, what is accidental, and what is
efiential. So by Purveying the Colour, the Shape,
Motion, Reft, Place, Solidity, Extenfion of Bodies,
we come to find that the Nature of Body in general
is folid Extenfion ; becaufe all other Qualities of Bo-
dies are changeable, but this belongs to all Bodies,
and it endures through all Changes ; and becaufe
this is proper to Body alone, and agrees not to any
thing elfe ; and it is the Foundation of all other
Properties.
(4.) It finds out the remaining Properties or
Parts of a Thing, by having fome Parts or Pro-
perties given. So the Area of a Triangle is found
by knowing the Height and the Baje. So by having
two Sides, and an Angle of a Triangle given, we find
the remaining Side and Angles. So when we know
Cogitation is the prime Attribute of a Spirit, we in-
fer its Immateriality^ and thence its Immortality.
(5.) Analyfis finds the Means necefiary to at-
tain a propofed End by having the End firft af-
figned. So in moral, political, aconomical Affairs,
having propofed the Government of Self, a Family,
a Society, or a Nation, in order to their beft Inte-
rest, we confider and fearch out what are the pro-
per
Ch.I. The right Ufe of Reaton; $44
per Laws, Rules and Means to effect it. So in the
Pra&ices of Artificers* and the Manufactures of vari-
ous Kinds, the End being propofed, as, making
Cloth* Houfes* Ships* fcfr. we find out Ways of com-,
pofing thefe things for the feveral Ufes of human
Life. By the putting any of thefe Means in Exe-
cution to attain the End, isjyntbetic Method.
Many other Particulars might be reprefented to
fliew the various Forms of analytic Method* where-
by Truth is found out, and fome of them come
very near to Jyntbetic* fo as hardly to be diftin-
guifhed.
Obf. II. Not only the Inveftigation of Truth,
but the Communication of it alfo is often pra&ifcd
in fuch a Method, as neither agrees precifely to
fyntbetit or analytic. Some Sciences, if you con-
sider the whole of them m general* are treated in
fyntbetic Order ; fo Pbyfics or natural Phihjopby be-
gins ufually with an Account of the general Nature
and Properties of Matter or Bodies, and by De-
grees defcends to confider the particular Species of
Bodies, with their Powers and Properties * yet it ia
very evident that when' Philofophers come to parti-
cular Plants and Animals, then by Chemiflry and
Anatomy they analyfe or refolve thofe Bodies into
their feveral conftituent Parts. On the other hand,
Logick is begun in analytic Method * the whole is di-
vided into its integral Parts* according to the four
Operations of the Mind ; yet here and there jyn*
thetic Method is ufed in the particular Branches of
it, for it treats of Ideas in general firft, and then
defcends to the feveral Species of them * it teaches
us how Proportions are made up of Ideas* and SyU
logifms of Propofitions* which is the Order of Com-
pofition.
The
346 L G I C K Or, Part IV,
The ancient Scbolaftic Writers have takeii a great
deal of Pains, and engaged in ufelefs Difputes
about thefe two Methods, and after all have noc
been able to give fuch an Account of them as to
keep them entirely diftindt from each other, neither
in the Theory nor in the Practice, Some of the
Moderns have avoided this Confufion in fome Mea-
sure by confining themfelves to defcribe almoft no-
thing elfe but the fyntbetic and analytic Methods of
Geometricians and Jjgebraijis, whereby they have too
much narrowed the Nature and Rules of Method,
as though every thing were to be treated in mathe-
matical Forms.
Upon the whole I conclude, that neither of
thefe two Methods fhould be too fcrupuloufly
and fuperftitioudy purfued, either in the Inven-
tion or in the Communication of Knowledge. It
is enough if the Order of Nature be but obferved
in making the Knowledge of Things following
depend on the Knowledge of the Things which
go before. Oftentimes a mixed Method will be
found moft effedtual for thefe Purpofes ; and in-
deed a wife and judicious Profpeft of our main
End and Defign mud regulate all Method whatfo-
ever.
Here the Rules of natural Method ought to be
propofed, (whether it be analytic^ or fyntbetic^ or
mixed:) but it is proper firft to give fome Account
of arbitrary Method, left it be thruft at too great a
Diftance from the firft Mention of it.
Arbitrary Method leaves the Order of Nature,
and accommodates itfelf to many Purpofes * fuch
as, to treafure up Things, and retain them in
Memory ; to harangue and periuade Mankind to
any Pra&ice in the religious or the civil Life j or
to delight, amufe, or entertain the Mind.
As
Ch. I. The right U/e gf Rcafod. '347
As for the Affiance of the Memory, in moft Things
a natural Order has an happy Influence ; for Reafon
itfelf deducing one Thing from another, greatly
affifts the Memory by the natural Connexion and
mutual Dependence of Things. But there are va-
xious other Methods which Mankind have made
Ufe of for this Purpofe, and indeed there are fome
Subjedts that can hardly be reduced to Analyfis or
Syntbefts.
In reading or writing Hiftory, fome follow the
Order of the Governors of a Nation, and difpofe
every Tranfa&ion under their particular Reigns t
So the facrcd Books of Kings and Chronicles are writ-
ten. Some write in Annals or Journals* and make
a new Chapter of every Year. Some put all thofe
Tranfadtions together which relate to one SubjeB ;
that is, all the Affairs of one War, one League, one
Confederacy, one Council, &c, though it lafted many
Years, and under many Rulers.
So in writing the Lives of Men, which is called
Biography, fome Authors follow the Trafl: of their
Tears, and place every Thing in the precife Order
of Time when it occurred : Others through the
Temper and CbaraSer of the Perfons, their private
Life, their publick Stations, their perfonal Occurrences*
their domeftick Conduit, their Speeches, their Books or
Writings, their Sicknefs and Death, into fo many
diflinft Chapters.
. In Chronology fome Writers make their Epochas
to begin all with one Letter : So in the Book called
Duftor Hiftoricus, the Periods all begin with C ; as
Creation* Cataclifm, or Deluge, Chaldean Empire,
Cyrus, thrift, Conftantine, &c. Some divide their
Accounts of Time according to the four greac
Monarchies ; Ajfyrian, Perfian, Grecian, and Roman.
Others think it fervci the Memory beft to divide
Z all
348 LOGIC K: O, Part IV.
all their Subjects into the remarkable Number of
Sevens ; fo Prideaux has written an IntroduSion to
h$ory. And there is a Book of Divinity called
Fafciculm Contriver fiarum y by an Author of the lame
Name, written in the fame Method, wherein every
Controverfy has /even Queftions belonging to it;
though the Order of Nature feems to he too much
negleftcd by a Confinement to this feptenary Number.
Thofe Writers and Speakers* whofe chief Bufinefi
is to amufe or delight, to allure, terrify, or perfuade
Mankind, do not confine themfelves to any natural
Order, but in a cryptical or bidden Method adapt
every Thing to their defigned End. Sometimes
they omit thofe Things which might injure their
Defign, or grow tedious to their Hearers* though
they feem to have a neceflary Relation to the Point
in Hand : Sometimes they add thofe Things which
have no great Reference to the Subjedt, but are
fuited to allure or refrefli the Mind and the Ear.
They dilate fometimes, and flburifti long upon little
Incidents, and they fkip over, and but lightly touch
the drier Part of their Theme. They place tbefrjt
Things tafty and the lafi Things j&)0, with wondrous
Art, and yet fo manage it as to conceal their Arti*
fice, and lead the Senfes and PafiGons of their Hear-
ers into a pleafing and powerful Captivity.
It is chiefly Poefy and Oratory that require the
PradHce of this Kind of arbitrary Method: They
omit Things effential which are not beautiful, they
infert little needlefs Circumftances, and beautiful
Digrefiions, they invert Times and AdHons, in
order to place every Thing in the moft affecting
Light, and for this End in their Praflice they
neglefl: all logical Fhrms ; yet a good Acquaintance
with the Forms of Logick and natural Method is of
admirable Ufe to thofe who would attain thefe
Arts
Ch.-IE fib right Ufl qfRmfon. 349
Arts in Perfe&fon. Hereby they will be able to
range their own Thoughts in luch a Method and
Scheme, as to make a more large and comprehen-
five Survey of their Subjeft and Dcfign in all the
Parts of it ; and by this Means they will better
judge what to choofe and what to refufe ; and how
to drefi and manage the whole Scene before them,
fo as to attain their own Ends with greater Glory
and Succefi.
CHAP. II.
The Rules of Method, general and particular.
TH E general Requifites of true Method in
the purfuit or Communication of Know-
ledge, may be all comprifed under the following
Heads. It mull be (1.) Safe. (2.) Plain and Eajy.
(30 Diflinff. (4.) Full, or without Defeat. (5.) Short,
or without Superfluity. {6 r ) Proper to the SubjeSl and
the Dejgn. (7.) Connected.
I. Rule. Among all the Qualifications of a
good Method, there is none more neceflary and
important than that it 'fhould befafe and fecure from
Error ; and to this Endthefe four particular % ox fa-
cial Directions fhould be obfervecL
1. Vfe great Care and CircuthfpeStion in laying the
Foundations of your Difcourfe, or your Scheme of
Thoughts upon any Subject. Thofe Propofitions
which are to ftand as firft Principles* and on
which the whole Argument depends, muft be view-
ed on all Sides with the utmoft Accuracy, left an
Z 2 Error
35<> LOG IC K: Or; Part IV.
Error being admitted there, fiutald diffufe icfelf
through the whole Subjeft. See therefore that your
general Definitions or Defiriptms are as accurate as
the Nature of the Thing will bear : See that your
general Divifions and Dijtributions be juft and exaft,
according to the Rules given in the firft Part of
Logick : See that your Axioms be fufficiently evi-
dent, fo as to demand the Affent of thofe that ex-
mine them with due Attention. See that yourfirfi
and more immediate Conferences from thefi Principles
be well drawn ; and take the fame Care of all o-
ther Propofitions that have a powerful and fpreading
Influence through the feveral Parts of your Dif-
courfe.
For want of this Care fo me times a large Trea-
tife has been written by a long Dedudtion of Con-
sequences from one or two doubtful Principles,
which Principles have been effectually refuted in a
Few Lines, and thus the whole Treatife has been
deftroyed at once: So the largeft and faireft Build-
ings finks and tumbles to the Ground, if the Foun-
dations and Corner-Stones of it are feeble and in-
sufficient.
2. It is a very advifeable Thing that your prU
tnary and fundamental Propofitions be not only evident
and true j but theyfbould be made a little familiar to the
Mind by dwelling upon them before you proceed fartbtr.
By this Means you will gain fo full an Acquaint-
ance with them, that you may draw Confequences
from them with much more Freedom, with great-
er Variety, brighter Evidence, and with a firmer
Certainty, than if you have but a flight and fudden
View of them.
3. As you proceed in the Connexion of your
Arguments, fee that your Ground be made firm in
every Step. See thac every Link of your Chain
of Reafoning be ftrong and good: For if but
one
Ch. IL The right life ^Reafon. 351
one Link be feeble apd doubtful, the whole Chain
of Arguments feels the Weaknefs of it, and lies ex-
pofed to every Objeflor, and the original Queftion
remains undetermined,
4. Draw up all your Proportions and Arguments with
fo much Caution, and exprefsyour Ideas with fucb ajufi
- Limitation as may preclude or anticipate any Objections.
Yet remember this is only to be done as far as it is
pofiible, without too much entangling the Quefti-
on, or introducing complicated Ideas, and objur-
ing the Senfe. But if fuch a cautious and limited
Drefs of the Queftion fhould render the Ideas too
much complicated, or the Senfe obfeure, then it
is better to keep the Argument more fimple, clear
and eafy to be underftood, and afterwards mention
the Objections diftindly in their full Strength, and
give a diftinlt Anfwer to them.
II. Rule. Let your Method be plain and eafy,
fo that your Hearers or Readers, as well as your*
felf, may run through it without Embarraffment,
and may take a clear and comprehenfive View of
the whole Scheme, To this End the following
particular Directions will be ufeful.
1. Begin always with tbofe Things which we bejl
known, and mojt obvious, whereby the Mind may have
no Difficulty or Fatigue, and proceed by regular and eafy
Steps to Things that are more difficult. And as far as
poffible let not the Underftanding or the Proof of
any of our Portions depend on the Pofitions that
follow, but always on thofe which go before.
It is a Matter of Wonder that in fo knowing an
Age as this, there fhould be fo many Perfons t)&
fering Violence daily to this Rule, by teaching the
Latin Language by a Grammar written in Latin, which
Method feemsto require a perfe# Knowledge of
Z 3 an
35* LOGIC K: Or, Part IV.
an unknown Tongue, in order to learn the firft
Rudiments of it. . .
2. Do not affeft exctfhe Hofit in learning or teach-
ing any Science, nor hurry at once into the midft of ifi,
left you be too foon involved in feveral new and
ftrange Ideas and Propositions* which cannot be
well understood without a longer and clofer Atten-.
tion to thofe which go before. Such fort of Speed
is bbt a wafte of Time, and will conftrain yod to
take many Steps backward again, if you would
Arrive at a regular and complete Knowledge 6f the
Subjeft.
3. Be not fond of crowding too many Thongbti and
Reafinings into one Sentence or Paragraph, beyond the
sApprehenfion or Capacity of your Readers or Hearers.
There are fome Perfons of a good Genius, and a
capacious Mind, who write and f{te&k very obfcure*
ly upon this Account ; they affeft a long Train of
Dependences, before they come to a Period ; they
imagine that they can never fill their Page with too
much Senfe ; but they little think «how they bury
their own beft Ideas in the Crowd, and render them
in a Manner invifible and ufelefs to the greateft
Part of Mankind. Such Men may be great Scho-
lars, yet they are but poor Teachers.
4. For the fame Reafon, avoid too many Sttbdi*
viftons. Contrive your Scheme of Thoughts in
fuch a Manner as may finifh your whole Argu-
ment with as few inferior Branchings as Reafon
will admit; and let them be fuch as are obvious
and open to the Underftanding, that they may
come within one fingle View of the Mind. This
will not only aflift the Underftanding to receive,
but it will aid the Memory alfo to retain Truth \
Whereas a Difcourfe cut out into a vaft Multitude
of gradual Subordination* has many Inconveni-
encies
Or. IL * the right Vfe o/Resfon; 3 jj
enciesin it* it gives Pain to the Mind and Mo.
mory, in furveying and retaining the Scheme of
Difcourfe, and cxpofcs the unftilful Hearers to
mingle the fuperior and inferior Particulars toge-i
ther, it leads them into a thick Wood inftead of
open Day- light, and places them in>a Labyrinth
inftead of a plain Path.
5. Give all Diligence in your younger Tears to obtain
a clear and eajy Way of exp effing your Conceptions, that
your Words as faft as you utter them, may ftamp
your own Ideas exadJy on the Mind of the Hearer v
This is a mod happy Talent for the Conveyance
of Truth, and an excellent Security againft Mi*
(takes and needlefs Controverfies. : \
III. Rule, Let your Method be diJlinS, and
without the perplexing Mixture of Things that
ought to be kept feparate, and this will be cafily
pra&ifed by four Directions.
1. Do not bring mnecejjary heterogeneous * Mat-
ter in your Difcourfe on any SubjeB ; that is, do not
mingle an Argument on one Subjeft with Matters
that relate entirely to another, but juft fo far as is
neceffary to give a clearer Knowledge of the Sub-
ject in hand. Examples in Logick may be borrow-
ed from any of the Sciences to illuftrate the Rules :
But long Interpofitions of natural Pbihfopby, of the
Imagination and Paffiens* of Agency of Spirits united
to Bodies, &c. break the Thread of Difcourfe, and
perplex the Subjedt.
2. Let every complicated ibeme or Idea he divided
into its difiinB fi^k Parts, as far as the Nature of
the Subjeft and your prefent Defign requires it. Though
Z 4 you
* Things of one Kind are called btmogmms, Thiogs of different K
.are called heterogeneous.
354 LOG IC K: Or, Part IV.
you muft not abound in necdlcfs Subdivifions, yet
fomcthing of this Work is very neceflary ; and ic
is a good Judgment alone can <H£tate how far to
proceed in it, and when to flop.
Compound Ideas muft be reduced to a fimple
Form in order to underftand them well. You may
eafily matter that Subjedt in all the Parts of it by
a regular Succeffion, which would confound the
Underftanding to furvey them at once. So we
come to the Knowledge of a very perplexed Dia-
gram in Geometry, or a complicated Machine in Me-
chanics, by having it parcelled out to us into its
feveral Parts and Principles, according to this, and
the foregoing Rule of Method.
3. Call every Idea, Propofition and Argument to its
proper Clafs, and keep each Part of the SubjeB in Us
own Place. Put thofe Things all together that be-
long to one Part or Property, one Confideration or
View of your Subjedl. This will prevent needlef$
Repetitions, and keep you from intermixing Things
which are different. We muft maintain thU Di-
ftindion of Things and Places if we would be fafc
-from Error, It is Confufion that leads us into end-
lefs Miftakes, which naturally arife from a Variety
of Ideas ill-joined, forted, or ill-difpofed. It is
one great Ufe of Method, that a Multitude of
Thoughts and Propofltions may be fo diftin&ly
ranged in their proper Situations, that the Mind
may not be overwhelmed with a confufed Attenti-
on to them all at once, nor be diftradtcd with their
Variety, nor be tempted to unite Things which
ought to be feparated, nor to disjoin Things wh/'ch
fbould be united.
4. In the Partition of your Difcourfe into dijlinft
heads, take heed that your Particulars do not inter*
fere with the General^ nor with each other. Think
ft
Ch. IL : The fight Vfe cf Reafon; 355
it is not cnoogh that you make ufe of diftinA E*-
prefifons in each Particular, but take Care that the
Ideas be diftinft alfo. It is mere Foolery to mul-
tiply diftirift Particulars in treating of Things^
wKere the Difference of your Particulars lies only
in Names and Words.
IV. Rule. The Method of treating a Subjeft
fhould be plenary or full, fa that nothing may be
wanting ; nothing which is neceffary or proper
fhould be omitted.
* When you are called to explain a Subjefiy do not
pafs by, nor fkip over any Thing in it which is
very difficult or obfcure.
When you enumerate the Parts or the Properties
of any Subjeft, do it in a complete and compre-
hend re Manner.
•When you are averting or proving any Truth,
fee that every doubtful or difputable Part of- the
Argument be well fupported and confirmed. '
If you are to ilhfirate or argue a Point of Diffi-
eulty, be not too fcanty of Words, but rather be-
come a little copious and diffufive in your Lan-
guage : Set the Truth before the Reader in feverai
Lights, turn the various Sides of it to view, in
order to give a full Idea and firm Evidence of the
Proportion.
When you are drawing up a Narrative of any
Matter of Faft, fee that no important Circumftance
be omitted.
When you propofe the Solution of any Difficulty^
confider all the various Cafes wherein it can hap-
pen, and fhew how they may be folved.
In fhort, let your Enumerations^ your Divi/ions,
and Difiributions of Things be fo accurate, that no
jieedful Part or Ide* be left out.
This
356 LOGIC K: Ofi Part IV.
This Fulnefs of Method dots not require, that eve-
ry thing (hould be faid which can be faid upon any
Subjeft ; for this would make each (ingle Science
endlefs : But you (hould fay every thing which is
neceflary to the Defign in View, and which has *
proper and direft Tendency to this End * always
proportioning the Amplitude of your Matter, and
the Fulnefs of your Difcourfe to your great Defign
to the Length of your Time, to the Convenience,
Delight and Profit of your Hearers.
V. Rule. As your Method muft be full without
Deficiency y fo it muft btjbort* or without Superfluity*
The Fulnefs of a Difcourfe enlarges our Knowledge,
and the well-concerted Brevity faves our Time. In
order to obferve this Rule, it will be enough to
point out the chief of thofe Superfluities or Redmn*
daruies, which fome Perfons are guilty of in their
Difcourfes, with a due Caution againft them.
i. Avoid all needlefs Repetitions of the fame Thing
in different Parts of your Difcourfe. It muft be
confefied there are feveral Cafes wherein a Review
of the fame foregoing Propofition is needful to ex*
plain or prove feveral of the following Pofitions •,
but let your Method be fo contrived, as far as pot
fible, that it may occafion the feweft Rehearfals of
the fame Thing; for it is not grateful to the Hear-
ers without evident Neceffity.
2. Have a care of tedious Prolixity, or draw-
ing out arty Part of your Difcourfe to an unneufjary
and tirefome Length. It is much more honourable
for an Inftru&or, an Orator, a Pleader, or 9 Preach-,
er, that his Hearers (hould fay, I was afraid hi,
x vjould have done, than that they (hould be tempted
to (haw Signs of Uneafinefs, and long for the C00—
clufion.
Befides,
^
Ch. II. 7B* right Ufe of Reafan; 357
Befide6, thtire is another Inconvenience in it;
when you affeft to amplify on the former Branches
of a Difcourfe, you will often lay a Neceffity upon
yourfelf of contracting the latter and mod ufeful
Parts of it, and perhaps prevent yourfelf in the
moft important Part of your Defign. . Many a
Preacher has been guilty of ! this Fault in former
Days, nor is the prefent Age without fome Inftances
©f this Weaknds,
3. Do not multiply Explications where there is m
Difficulty* or Darknefs* or Danger of Mijiake. Be
not fond of tracing every Word of your Theme
through all the grammatical, the logical* and tneta-
pbyfical Chara&ers and Relations of it, nor fliew
your critical Learning in fpreading abroad the va-
rious Senfes of a Word, and the various Origin of
thofe Senfes, the Etymology of Terms, the fynony-
mous and the paronymotts or kindred Names, &V»
where the chief Point of Difcourfe does not at all
require it. You would laugh at a Pedant* who
profefling to explain the Athanafmn Creed* fhould
acquaint you, that Athanafius is derived from a
Greek Word which fignifies Immortality* and that
the fame Word 'Afawi* fignifies alfo the Herb
Vanfie.
There are fome Perfons fo fond of their learned
Diftin&ions, that they will fliew their Subtlety
by dijlinguijhing where there is no Difference : And
the fame filly Affe&ation will introduce DifiinSu
ons upon every Occurrence, and brirtg three or
four Negatives upon every Subject of Difcourfe y
firft to declare what it is not, and then what it is : *•
Whereas fuch Negatives ought never to be men-
tioned where there is no apparent Danger of Mif- v
take. How ridiculous would that Writer be,
who, if he were fpeaking of the Nicene Creed*
ihould declare negatively, 1* That he did not
mean
35« LOG IC K: 6r, Part. IV.
mean the DoSrine which the Inhabitants of Nice
believed^ nor (2.) A Creed written by them, but
(3.) Pofitively a Creed compofed byfeveral Chriftian
Bijbops met together in the City of Nice ? The Pqfi-
tive is fufficient here, and the two Negatives are
impertinent.
4. Be not fond of proving tbofe Things which need
no Proof fuch as felf-evident Propofitions and
Truths univcrfally confefled, or fuch as are entirely
agreed to and granted by our Opponents. It is this
vain AfFe&ation of proving every Thing that has led
Geometricians to form ufelefs and intricate Demon-
firations to fupport fome Theorems, which are Ef-
ficiently evident to the Eye by Infpedtion, or to
the Mind by the firft Mention of them ; and it is
the fame Humour that reigns fometimes in the Pul-
pit, and fpends half the Sermon in proving fome
general Truth which is never difputed or doubted,
and thereby robs the Auditory of more ufeful En-
tertainment.
5. As there are fome Things fo evidently true
that they want no Proof, fo there are others fo
evidently falfe that they want no Refutation. It is
mere trifling, and a Wafte of our precious Mo-
ments, to invent and raife fuch Obje&ions as no
Man would ever make in earned, and that merely
for the Sake of anfwering and folving them : This
breaks in notorioufly upon the due Brevity of Me-
thod.
6. Avoid in general all learned Forms 9 all Trap-
pings of Art j and Ceremonies of the Schools^ where
there is no need of them, it is reported concern*
ing the fate Czar tf Mufcovy, that when he firft
acquainted himfelf with mathematical Learning, he
pra&ifed all the Rules of Circumvallation and Con-
travallation, at the Siege of a Town in Livonia \
and
Ch. II. The right Ufe gf Reafon; 359
and by the Length of thofe Formalities he loft the
Opportunity of taking the Town.
7. Do not fuffer every occafional and incidental
^Thought to catty you away into a long Parent hefts* and
thus to firetch out your Difcourfe* and divert you from
the Point in Hand. In the Purfuit of your Subjedt,
if any ufeful Thought occur which belongs to fome
other Theme, note it down for the fake of your
Memory on fome other Paper, and lay it by in
Referve for its proper Place and Seafon : But let it
not incorporate itfelf with your prefent Theme,
nor draw off your Mind from your main BuGnefs,
though it (hould be ever fo inviting. A Man,
who walks direftly but (lowly towards his Journey's
End, will arrive thither much fooner than his
Neighbour, who runs into every crooked Turning,
which he meets, and wanders afide to gaze at eve-
ry Thing that ftrikes his Eyes by the Way, or to
gather every gaudy Flower -that grows by the Side
of the Road.
To fum up all ; There is an happy Medium to be
ebferved in our Method, fo that the Brevity may not
render the Senfe obfcure* nor the Argument feeble*
nor our Knowledge merely fuperficial: And on the
other Hand, that the Fulnefs and Copioufnefs of our
Method may not wajte the Time* tire the Learner* or
fill the Mind with Trifles and Impertinencies.
The copious and the contracted Way of writing,
have each their peculiar Advantages. There is a
proper. Ufe to be made of large Paraphrafes, and
full* particular* and diffufive Explications and Argu-
ments; thefe are fitteft for thole who deflgn to
be acquainted thoroughly with every Part of the
Subject. ■ There is alfo a Ufe of fhorter Hints*
AbftraSs and Compendiums to inftrudt thofe who
feek only a flight and general Knowledge, as well
as to refrelh the Memory of thofe who have learned
* the
360 L O G 1C K: Or, Part IV.
the Science already, and gone through a larger
Scheme. But it is a grofs Abufe of thefe various
Methods of Inftru&ion, when a Perfon has read a
mere Compend or Epitome of any Science, and he
vainly imagines that he underftands the whole Sci-
ence. So one Boy may become a Pbilofopber by
reading over the mere dry Definitions and Divtfions
of Scbeiblcr*s Compendium of Peripateticifm : So an-
other may boaft that he underftands Anatomy, be-
caufe he has fcen a Skeleton ; and a third profefs
himfelf a learned Divine, when he can repeat the
Apo files Creed.
VI. Rule. Take Care that your Method be-fro-
per to tbe Subjeft in Hand, proper to jour prtfent De»
fign, as well as proper to tbe Age and Place wherein
you dwell.
i. Let your Method be proper to tbe SubjeSl. All
Sciences muft not be learned or taught in one Me-
thod. Morality and Theology, Metapbyftcks and Jjo*
gick will not be eafily and happily reduced to a
ftrift mathematical Method : Thofe who have tried
have found much Inconvenience therern.
Some things have more need to be explained
than to be proved \ as Axioms or felf evident Propo*
fitions; and indeed all the firft great Principles,
the chief and moft important Dodtrincs both of
natural and revealed Religion \ for when the Senfe
of them is clearly explained, they appear fo evi-
dent in the Light of Nature or Scripture, that
they want no other Proof. There are other Thing*
that ftand in Need of Proof, as well as Explication*
as many mathematical Theorems, and feveral deep
Controverjies in Morality and Divinity. There are
yet other Sorts of Subje&s which want rather to be
warmly impreffed upon the Mind by fervent Ex-
hortations, and ftand in more Need of this thaa
they,
Ch. II. The right Ufeef Ration; 361
they do either of Proof or Explication ; fuch arc
the moft general, plain and obvious Duties of Piety
towards God, and Love towards Men, with a Govern-
ment of all our Inclinations and Paffions. Now thefc
feveral Subjects ought to be treated in a different
Manner and Method.
,. Again, There are fome Subjedts in the fame
Treatife which are more ufeful and neceffary than
others, and forne Parts of a Subjcdt which are
eminently and chiefly defigned by a Writer or Speaker :
True Method will teach us to dwell longer upon
thefe Themes, and to lay out more Thought and
Language upon them ; whereas the fame Art of
Method will teach us to cut fhort thofe Things
which are ufed only to introduce our main Subject,
and to ftand as a Scaffolding merely to aid the
* Structure of our Difcourfe. It will teach us alfo to
content ourfelves with brief Hints of thofe Matters
which are merely occafional and incidental.
2. Tour Method rnuji be adjufted by your Dcfigni
for if you treat of the fame Subjeft with two dif-
ferent Views and Defigns, you ttill find it nceef-
fary to ufe different Methods. Suppofe the Doc-
trine of the facred Trinity were your Theme, and
you were to read a Lefture to young Students on
that Subjeft, or if you defigned a Treatife for the
Convidion of learned Men, you would purfue a
very different Method from- 7 that which would be
proper to regulate a practical Difcourfe, or a Ser-
mon to inftruft vulgar Chriftians merely in the pi-
ous Improvement of this Do&rine, and awaken
them to their Duties which are derived thence.
In fhort, we muft not firft lay down certain
and precife Rules of Method, and refolve to con-
fine the Matter we difcourfe of to that particular
Form and Order of Topics $ but we muft well
conftder
362 LOGIC K: Of, Part IV.
confider and ftudy the Subjefl of our Difcourfe
thoroughly, and take a juft Survey of our prefent
Dejign, and thefe will give fufficient Hints of the
particular- Form and Order in which we fliould handle
k, provided that we are moderately (killed in the
general Laws of Method and Order.
Yet let it be noted here, that neither the Subjcft,
nor Matter of a Difcourfe, nor the particular De-
fignofit, can fo precifely determine the Method,
as to leave no Room for Liberty and Variety. The
very fame Theme may be handled, and that alfo
with the fame DeBgn, in feveral different Methods,
among which it is hard to fay which is the beft. In
writing a Syftem of Divinity, fome begin with the
Scriptures, and thence deduce all other Do&rines
and Duties. Some begin with the Being of, God and
his Attributes* fo far as he is known by the Light
of Nature, and then proceed to the Do&rines of
Revelation. Some diftinguilh the whole Subject into
the Credenda and Agenda, that is, Things to be be-
lieved, and Things to be done. Some think it beft
to explain the whole Chriftian Religion by an hijio-
rical Detail of all the Difcoveries which God has made
ofhimfelfto this lower World, beginning at the Cre-
ation in the firft Chapter of Genefis, and fo proceed-
ing onward according to the Narrative of the Old
and New Teftament. And there are others that
endeavour to include the whole of Religion under
thefe four Heads, (viz.) The Apofiks Creed, the
Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the two
Sacraments-, though I cannot but think this is the
leaft accurate of any. The fame Variety may be
allowed in treating other Sqbjedts ; this very Trea-
tife of Logick, is an Inftance of it, whofe Method
differs very confiderably from any others which I
have feen, as they differ alfo greatly from one an-
other
Ch. IT. Tbi right Ufe 0/* Reafon. 363
other, though feveral of them are confefifed to be
well written.
3. Though a juft View bf our Subjeft and our
Dejign may diftate proper Rules of natural Me-
thod, yet there muft be Jome little Deference at leaft
paid to the Cujlom of the Age wherein we dwell> and
to the Humour and Genius of our Readers or Hearer S*
which if we utterly rejeft and difdain, our Per-
formances will fail of defired Succefs, even though
we may have followed the juft Rules of Method*
I will mention but this one Inftance : In the for-
mer Century it was frequent with learned Men to
divide their Theme or Subjeft into a great Multn
tude of co-ordinate Members or Parts, they abound-
ed alfo in the Forms of Logick and DiftinBion, and
indulged numerous Ranks of Subordination. Now
though we ought not to abandon the Rules of juft
Method and Divifion % in order to comport with the
modifh Writers in our Age who have renounced
them, yet it is prudent to pay fo much Refpedt to
the Cuftom of the Age, as to ufe thefe Forms of
Divi/ion with due Moderation, and not affe£fc to mul-
tiply them in fuch a Mariner as to give an early add
needlefs Difguft to the Generality of our prefent
Readers. The fame may be faid concerning vari-
ous other Methods of Conduit in the Affairs of
Learning as well as the Affairs of Life, wherein
we muft indulge a little to Cuftom : And yet we
muft by no Means fuffer ourfelves fo far to be im-
pofed upon and governed by it, as to negleft thoie
Rules of Method which are neceflary for the fafe+
eafy^ and complete Enquiry into Truth, or the ready
and effectual Communication of it to others. '
VII. Rule. The laft Requifite of Method 11,
that the Parts of a tfifcourje Jhoutd be well connected ;
A a and
364 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV.
and thcfc three fliort Dire&ions will fuffice for this
Purpofe.
1 . Keep your main End and Defign ever in View* and
let all the Parts of your Difcourfe have a Tendency to*
ward it, and as far as poffble make that Tendency vi-
fible all the IVay : Otherwife the Readers or Hearers
will hav^ Reafon to wonder for what End this or
that Particular was introduced.
2. Let the mutual Relation and Dependence of the
fever al Branches of your Difcourfe be fo jufi and evi-
dent > that every Part may naturally lead. onward to
the next, without any huge Chafms or Breaks which
interrupt and deform the Scheme. The Connexion of
Truths fhould arife and appear in their fucceflive
Ranks and Order, as the feveral Parts of a fine Prof-
ped afcend juft behind each other, in their natural
and regular Elevations and Diftances, ami invite
the Eye to climb onward with conftant Pleafure till
it reach the Sky. Whatfoever horrid Beauty a Pre-
cipice or a Cataraft may add to the Profped of a
Country, yet fuch fort of hideous and abrupt Ap-
pearances in a Scene of Reafoning are real Blemiffo-
es and not Beauties. When the Reader is paffing
over fuch a Treatife, he often finds a wide Vacan-
cy, and makes an uneafy Stop, and knows not
how to tranfport his Thoughts over to the next
Particular, for want of fome Clue or conneding
Idea to lay hold of.
3. Acquaint yourfelf with all the proper and decent
Forms of Transition from one Part of a Difcourfe to
another, and praSife them as Occafion offers. Where
the Ideas, Propofitions and Arguments, are hap-
pily difpofed, and well conneded, the Truth in-
deed is fecure •, but it renders the Difcourfe much
more agreeable, when proper and graceful Expref-
fion joins the Parts of it together in fo entertaining
_ a
Ch. II. The right XJfe of Reafon. 365
a Manner, that the Reader knows not how to leave
off till he hath arrived at the End,
Thefe are the general and moft important Rules
of true Method ; and though they belong chiefly to
the Communication of Knowledge, yet an early and
thorough Acquaintance with them will be of confi-
derable Ufe toward xhtPwfidt and Attainment of it.
Thofe Perfons who have never any Occafion to
communicate Knowledge by Writing or by publick
Difcourfes, may alfo with great Advantage perufe
thefe Rules of Method* that they may learn to judge
with Juftice and Accuracy concerning the Perform-
ance of others. And befides, a good Acquaintance
with Method* will greatly aflift every one in rang*
ing, difpofing and managing all human Affairs.
The particular Means or Methods for a farther
Improvement of the Underftanding are very vari-
ous, fuch as, Meditation* Reading* Converfing* Dif-
fering by Speech cr by Writing* Queftion and Anfwer %
&c. And in each of thefe Practices fome fpecial
Forms may be obferved, and fpecial Rules may be
given to facilitate and fecure our Enquiries after
Truth : . But this would require a little Volume by
itfelf, and a, Treatife of Logick has always been
efteemed fufficiently complete without it.
THE END.
The TABLE of the
CONTENTS.
rfH E Inttoduftion or general Scheme, Page i.
The Firjl Part, (viz.) Of Perception an^BLdeas.
Ch a p. I. Of the Nature tf Ideas* p. 8. .
Ch a p • 1 1. Of the ObjeSts of Perception. Scft. i . Of
Being in general, p. 10. Se&. 2. Of Subftances and
their various Kinds , p. 1 1. Se£h 3. Of Modes and
their various Kinds ; andfaft of ejfential and acciden-
tal Modes, p. 1 6. Se<5t. 4. The farther Divifions
of Mode* p. 20. Sedh 5. 0/ /£* ten Categories.
Of Subftance modified, p. 25, Sedt. 6. Of iNfo/*
Being 9 p. 26.
Chap. III. Q/" the fever al Sorts of Perception or Ideas:
Scft. 1. Of fenfible, fpiritual, and abfirafted Ideas,
p. 28, Se&. 2. Of ftmple and complex, compound
and collective Ideas, p. 33. Sett. 3. Of univerfal
and particular Ideas, real and imaginary, p. 34.
Seft. 4. 72tf Divifton of Ideas, with regard to their
Qualities, p. 39.
Chap. IV. Of Words and their feveral Divifions, to*
get her with the Advantage and Danger of them.
Seft. 1. Of Words in general and their Ufe, p. 45.
Se£t. 2. Of negative andpofttive Terms * p. 51.
Se£h 3. Of fimple and complex Terms, p. 54.
Seft. 4. Of Words common and proper, p. 56.
Se&. 5. Of concrete and abflrali Terms^ p. 58.
Sea.
CONTENTS.
Se£h 6. Of univocal and equivocal Words, p. 58,
Se&. 7. Various Kinds of equivocal Words, p. 61.
Seft. 8* Tto Origin or Caufes of equivocal Words,
p. 6 7 .
Chap. V. General DireSlions relating to our Ideas \
(viz,) 1. Of acquiring a Treafure of Ideas. 2. Of
retaining Ideas in Memory. (3.) Of fele£ling ufeful
Ideas. 4. Of the Government of our thoughts, p. 71.
Chap. VI. Special Rides to dire H our Conception of
Wings, p. 79. Sedt 1. Of gaining ckar*and diftinS
Ideas, p. 80. Sedfc. 2. 0/ /to Definition of Wqrds
or Narhes, p. 82. Sedt. 3. DireSiions concerning the
Definition of Names, p. 84. Se<ft. 4. 0/ /to D^-
nition of Things^ p. 100. Seft. 5. Rules of Defini-
tion of the Thing, p. 105. Se£h 6. Observations
concerning the Definition of Things, p. 108. Seft. 7.
Q/d complete Conception of Things, p. 117. Seft. 8.
Of Divifion, and the Rules of it, p. 118/ Seft. 9.
0/ £ comprehenfive Conception of Things, and of Ab-
ftrattion, p. 124. Seft. 10. Of the extenfve Con-
ception of Things, and of Diftribution, p. 128. Se£h
ii. Of an orderly Conception of Things, p. 133.
Seft. 12. Thefe five Rules of Conception exemplified,
p. 135. Se<5t. 13. An Illuftration of the five Rules
by Similitudes, p. 137.
The Second Part, (viz.) Of Judgment and
I Proportion.
CHAP. I. Of the Nature of a Proportion, and its
fever al Parts, p. 144.
Ch a*. II. Of the various Kinds of Propofitions. Se£t.
1. Of univerfal, particular, indefinite, and fmgular
Propofitions, p. 147. Sedl. 2. Of affirmative and ne-
gative
CONTENTS.
gative Proportions, p. 156. Seft. 3. Of the Oppofh
tion and Converfion of Proportions, p. 158. Sedh 4.
Of pure and modal Proportions, p. 161. Seft. 5. Of
,Jtn?rilar Proportions , whether fimple or complex ', p.
163. Seft. 6. Of compound Propofitions, p. 165.
Se&. 7. Of true and falfe Proportions, p. 171.
Sett. 8'. Of certain and doubtful Propofitions of Know-
ledge and Opinion, p. 174. -Soft. 9. Of Senfes,
Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafcn, Faith and Inspi-
ration, p. 177.
Chap. III. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or +he Doc~
trine of Prejudices, p. 186. Scdt. 1. Prejudices ari-
fingfrom Things \ p, 188. Se£h 2. Prejudices arifing
fromlVords, p. 195. Seft. 3. Prejudices arifing
from ourfelves, p. 198. Sedh 4. Prejudices arifing
from other Perfons, p, 214.
Chap. IV; General BireElions to qffift us in judging
aright, p. 231.
Ch a p. V. Special Rules to dirett us in judging of parti-
cular Objetts. Sedh 1. Principles and Rules of Judg-
ment concerning the Objefls of Settfe, p. 249. Sed. 2.
Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of Rea-
fon and Speculation, p. 253. Se£h 3. Principles and
Rules of Judgment in Matters of Morality and Reli-
gion, p. 259. Seft. 4. Principles and Rules of Judg-
ment in Matters of human Prudence, p. 263. Se£h 5.
Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of human
Teftimony, p. 266. Se6l. 6. Principles and Rules of M
Judgment in Matters of divine Tejlimony, p. 271.
Se£t. 7. Principles and Rules of judging concerning
Things paft, prefent, and to come, by the mere Uje of
Reafon, ' p. 275.
*' The
CONTENTS.
The Third Part, (viz.) Of Reafoning and
Syllogifm.
CHAP. I. Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and of
the Parts of which it is compofed, p. 280.
Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms, with
particular Rules relating to them. Se£t. 1. Ofuni-
verfal and particular Syllogifms, both negative and
affirmative, p. 283. Seft. 2. Of plain, finiple Syl-
logifms, and their Rules, p, 285. Se&. 3. Of the
Moods and Figures of funple Syllogifms, p. 289.
Seft. 4. Of complex Syllogifms, p. 292. §eft. 5.
Of conjunSive Syllogifms, p. 296. Se6t. 6. Of
compound Syllogifms, p. 301. Sedt. 7. Of the middle
forms, of common Places or Topics, and Invention of
Arguments, p. 305. SeA. 8. Of feveral Kinds of
Arguments and Demonjlrations, p. 308.
Chap. III. The Bollrine of Sopbifms. Seel, 1. Of
feveral Kinds of Sopbifms, and their Solution, p. 3 1 3.
Seft. 2. Two general Tefts of true Syllogifms, and
Methods offolving all Sopbifms, p. 323.
Chap. IV. Some general Rules to x dire£l our Reafoning,
* p. 326.
c
The Fourth Part; (viz.) Of Method.
HAP. L The Nature and Kinds of Method,
p. 340.
Chap. II. General, and /fecial Rules of Method,
p. 349*
BOOKS Printed for T. Longman, and J. Buck-
land, in Pater-nofter-row • J. Waugh in
Lombard-ftreet ; E. Dilly in thePoulcry ; and
T. Field in Cheapfide.
I. * I * H E Works of the late Reverend and Learned l/aac
± Watts, D. D. Publifhed by himfelf, and now colle&-
ed into Six Volumes 4to. In which are alfo inferted, the Second
Part of the Improvement of the Mind, an Eflay on Education,
and fome Additions to his Mifcellaneous Thoughts in Profe and
Verfe; now firft publifhed from his Manufcripts, and, by Di-
rection of his Will, revifed and corrected by D. Jtnnings t D. D,
and the late P. Doddridge, D. D. Price bound 4/. 4/.
II. The Improvement of the Mind : Or a Supplement to the
Arc of Logick, containing a Variety of Remarks and Rules for
the Attainment and Communication of ufeful Knowledge in Re-
ligion, the Sciences, and in common Life.
Ill- The Second Part of the Improvement of the Mind, with
various Rules and Remarks about the Communication of ufeful
Knowledge. To which is added, a Difcourfe on the Education
of Children. 8vo. Price 4s.
IV. A (hort View of the Scripture Hiflory : With a Continu-
ation v-of the Jewifh Affairs from the Old Teftament till the Time
cf Chrift ; and an Account of the chief Prophecies that relate to
him : Reprefented in a Way of Queition and Aniwer. The fixth
Edition. 1 2mo. Price bound 3s.
V. rfhe World to come : Or Difcourfes on the Joys or Sorrows
of departed Souls at Death ; and the Glory or Terror of the
Refui rection : Whereto is prefixed a Proof of the Separate Statt.
8vo. z vols. Price bound 8s.
VI. Hot <e Lyric* : Poems chiefly of the Lyrick Kind. In
three Books. Sacred. 1. To Devotion and Piety. 2. To Vir-
tue, Honour and Friendfhip. 3. To the Memory of the Dead.
The Seventh Edition, corred^ed, with the Author's Effigy, izmo.
Price bound 2s. 6d.
VII. *fhi Knowledge of the Heavens and the Earth made Eajy*
Or, *fhe fir ft Principles of Aftronomy and Geography explained by
the Ufe of Globes and Maps. Written for the Ufe of Learners.
The fixth Edition. 8vo. Price 4s.
V I II . <fbe Do&rine of the Paffions explained and imprtnfd : Or
a brief and comprehenfive Scheme of the natural Affections of
Mankind : And an Account of their .Narnes, Nature, Appear-
ances, Effects, and different Ufes in human Life. To which are
fubjoin'd Moral and Divine Rules fof the Regulation or Govern*
mciit of them. The Third Edition J i2mo. Price is. 6d.
'/&A
, >r .
o USJ7***"
v.
' 1
!
1
¥
-*'
».: %
\z-
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11