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W  Ut^  liiiai^^fj  /y^^ 


L  p  G  1  C  K: 

^    Or,  The  RIGHT  USE  of      M^^^^ 

REASON 


^^/iN 


THE 


Enquiry  after  TRUTH, 

WITH 

A  Variety  of  R ul  e s  to  guard  againft  Error , 

in  the  Affairs  of  Religion  and 

Human  Life,  as  well  as 

in  the  Sciences. 


By  /  SAA  C    IV A  T  T  S. 


The  Second  Edition,  Correfted. 


LONDON: 

Printed  for  J  out^  Clark  ^w^  Richard  Hett, 
at  the  Bible  and  Crown  in  the  Poultry  near 
Cheapfide,  Emanuel  Matthews,  at  the'RhXe. 
in  Pater-nofter-Row,  and  Richard  Ford,  at 
the  Angel  in  the  Poultry  near  Stocks-Market, 
MDCCXXVI. 


>-^'- 


T  O 


Sir  John  Hartopp,  Bart 


S  I  R, 

IT  is  fit  the  Publick  ihould  receive 
thro'  your  Hands  what  was  written 
originally  for  the  Afliftance  of  your 
younger  Studies,  and  was  then  prefent-* 
ed  to  you. 

It  was  by  the  repeated  Importunities 
of  our  Learned  Friend  Mr.  John  Eames, 
that  I  was  perfuaded  to  revife  thefe  Ru" 
diments  of  Logic -^  and  when  I  had  once 
fuifered  my  {elf  to  begin  the  Work,  I 
was  drawn  ftill  onward  far  beyond  my 
firft  Defign,  even  to  the  Neglect,  or 
too  long  Delay  of  other  preffing  and 
important  Demands  that  were  upon 
me. 

It  has  been  my  Endeavour  to  form 
every  Part  of  this  Treatife  bot-h  for  the 

A  2.  Inftruc- 


DEDICATION. 

Inftrudion  of  Students,  to  open  their 
Way  into  the  Sciences,  and  for  the 
more  extenfive  and  general  Service  of 
Mankind,  that  the  Gentleman  and  the 
Chrijiian  might  find  their  Accoimt  in 
the  Perufal  as  well  as  the  Scholar,  I 
have  therefore  colleded  and  propofed 
the  chief  Principles  and  Rules  of  right 
Judgment  in  Matters  of  common  and 
{acred  Importance,  and  pointed  out 
our  moft  frequent  Miftakes  and  Preju- 
dices in  the  Concerns  of  Life  and  Re- 
ligion, that  we  might  better  guard  a- 
gainft  the  Springs  of  Error,  Guilt  and 
Sorrow,  which  lurround  us  in  every 
Stage  of  Mortality. 

You  know,  5/V,  the  great  Defign  of 
this  noble  Science  is  to  refcue  our  rea- 
fbning  Powers  from  their  unhappy  Sla- 
very and  Darknefs  •  and  thus  with  all 
due  Submiffion  and  Deference  it  offers 
a  humble  Afliftance  to  divine  Revelati- 
on. Its  chief  Bufinefs  is  to  relieve  the 
natural  WeakneiTes  of  the  Mind  by  fome 
better  Efforts  of  Nature  j  it  is  to  dif- 
5  fuft 


DEDICATION. 

fufe  a  Light  over  the  Underftanding  iw 
our  Enquiries  after  Truth,  and  not  to 
furnilli  the  Tongue  with  Debate  and 
Controverfy.  True  Logic  is  not  that 
noify  Thing  that  deals  all  in  Difpute  and 
Wrangling,  to  which  former  Ages  had 
debafed  and  confined  it  5  yet  its  Difciples 
muft  acknowledge  alfo,  that  they  are 
taught  to  vindicate  and  defend  the 
Truth,  as  well  as  to  fearch  it  out.  True 
Logic  doth  not  require  a  long  Detail  of 
hard  Words  to  amufe  Mankind,  and  to 
puff  up  the  Mind  with  empty  Sounds, 
and  a  Pride  of  felfe  Learning;  yet  lome 
Dillindions  and  Terms  of  Art  are  ne- 
ceiTary  to  range  every  Idea  in  its  proper 
Cla(s,  and  to  keep  our  Thoughts  from 
Confufion.  The  World  is  now  grown 
fo  wife  as  not  to  (uffsr  this  valuable  Art 
to  be  engroft  by  the  Schools,  In  lo  po- 
lite and  knowing  an  Age,  every  Man  of 
Reafon  will  covet  (ome  Acquaintance 
with  Logicy  fince  it  tenders  its  daily  Ser- 
vice to  Wifdom  and  Virtue,  and  to  the 
Affairs  of  common  Life  as  well  as  to  the 
Sciences,  I  will 


DEDICATION. 

I  will  HOC  prefume^  Sir,  that  this  lit- 
tle Book  is  improved  fince  its  firft  Com- 
pofure,  in  Proportion  to  the  Improve- 
ments of  your  manly  Age.  But  when 
you  fhall  pleafe  to  review  it  in  your  re- 
tir'd  Hours,  perhaps  you  may  refrefh 
your  own  Memory  in  fome  of  the  ear- 
ly Parts  of  Learning  :  And  if  you  find 
all  the  additional  Remarks  and  Rules 
made  fo  familiar  to  you  already  by  your 
own  Obfervation,  that  there  is  nothing 
new  among  them,  it  will  be  no  un- 
pleafing  Reflection  that  you  have  fo  far 
anticipated  the  prefent  Zeal  and  Labour 
of, 

S      I      Ry 

Tour  mojl  faithful  and 
obedient  Ser'vanty 


1724. 


I.  WATTS. 


( I ) 


Is' Q  G  I  C 

OR, 

.  T]ie  rightMfe  of ,  R  ^,,l?;9  n. 


/;j-..'t .r-; :.i  ,    •; -.Y. 


ftbe  I N  T  R<)  DUG  t'i  0>f  and  general  S  c  h  e  m  e. 

LO  G I C  K  is  the  Art  of  tifing  Reafon  well 
in  our  Enquiries  after  '^Truth^  and  the  Com^ 
mimication  of  it  to  others. 
'■{^'      Reafon  is  the  Glory  of  human  Nature, 
and  dhfe  of  the  chief  Eminences  whereby  we  are 
raifed  above  our  fellow  Creatures  the  Brutes  in 
this  lower  World. 

Reafon^  as  to  the  Power  ^nd  Principle  of  it,  is 
"the  common  Gift  of  God  to  all  Men3  tho'  all 
are  not  favoured  with  it  by  Nature  in  an  equal 
Degree :  But  the  acquired  Improvements  of  it  in 
different  Men,  make  a  much  greater  Diftinftion 
between  them  than  Nature  had  made.  I  could 
even  venture  to  fay,  that  the  Impro'vement  of  Rea- 
fon hath  raifed  the  Learned  and  the  Prudent  in 
the  European  World,  almoft  as  much  above  the 
Hottentots  and  other  Savages  of  Africa.,  as  thofe 
Savages  arc  by  Nature  fuperior  to  the  Birds,  the 
Beafts,  and  the  Fifhes. 

Now  t\it  Deftgn  of  I^ogick  is  to  teach  us  the 
right  Ufe  of  our  Reafon.,- ox  IntelleUual  P'divers^ 
and  the  Improvement  ^  them  in  our  felves  and 
others i  this. is  not  only  necedary  in  order  to  at- 

B  tain 


2  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or; 

tain  aiiy  competent  Knowledge  in  the  Sciences^  or 
the  Affairs  of  Learning,  but  to  govern  both  the 
greater  and  the  meaner  J^ions  of  Life.  It  is  the 
Cultivation  of  our  Reafon  by  which  we  are  bet- 
ter enabled  to  diftinguifh  Good  from  E'vil^  as  well 
^s.lruth  from  Faljhood:  And  both  thefe  are  Mat- 
ters of  the  higheil  Importance,  whether  we  re- 
gard this  Life,  or  the  Life  to  come. 

The  Purfuit  and  Acquifition  of  'Truth  is  of  in- 
finite Concernment  to  Mankind.  Hereby  we  be- 
come acquainted  with  the  Nature  of  Things  both 
in  Heaven  and  Earth,  and  their  various  Relations 
to  each  other.  It  is  by  this  means  we  difcover 
our  Duty  to  God  and  our  fellow-Creatures :  By 
this  we  arrive  at  the  Knowledge  of  natural  Reli- 
gion^ and  learn  to  confirm  our  Faith  in  divine  Re- 
velation^ as  well  as  to  underftand  what  is  revealed. 
Our  Wifdom,  Prudence  and  Piety,  our  prefent 
Conduct  and  our  future  Hope,  are  all  influenced 
by  the  Ufe  of  our  reafoning  Powers  in  the  Search 
alter  Truth. 

There  are  feveral  Things  that  make  it  very  ne- 
ceHary  that  our  Reafon  mould  have  fome  Aflift- 
ance  in  the  Exercifc  or  Ufe  of  it. 

The  firil  is,  the  Depth  and  Difficulty  of  many 
Truths.^  and  the  TVeaknefs  of  our  Reafon  to  fee  far 
into  Things  at  once^  and  penetrate  to  the  Bottom  of 
them.  It  was  a  Saying  among  the  Antients,  Ve- 
ritas in  Puteo^  Truth  lyes  in  a  Well :  and  to  car^ 
ry  on  this  Metaphor  we  may  very  juftly  fay,  that 
Logick  does,  as  it  were,  fupply  us  with  Steps 
whereby  we  may  go  down  to  reach  the  Water  j 
or  it  frames  the  Links  of  a  Chain  whereby  we 
may  draw  the  Water  up  from  the  Bottom.  Thus, 
by  the  Means  of  many  Reafonings  well  conneft- 
cd  together,  Philofophers  in  our  Age  have  drawn 
a  thoufand  Truths  out  of  the  Depths  of  Dark- 

nefs. 


The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.^  5 

nefs,  which  our  Fathers  were  utterly  unacquaint- 
ed with. 

Another  Thing  that  makes  it  necefTary  for  our 
Reafon  to  have  fome  Afliftance  given  it,  is  the 
Difgtiife  and  falfe  Colours  in  'which  many  Things  ap- 
pear to  us  in  this  prefent  imperfe^  State :  There  are 
a  thoufand  Things  which  are  not  in  reaHty  what 
they  appear  to  be,  and  that  both  in  the  natural 
and  the  moral  World :  So  the  Sun  appears  to  be 
flat  as  a  Plate  of  Silver,  and  to  be  lefs  than  twelve 
Inches  in  Diameter  -y  the  Moon  appears  to  be  as 
big  as  the  Sun^  and  the  Rainbow  appears  to  be  a 
large  fubftantial  Arch  in  the  Sky  j  all  which  are 
in  reality  grofs  FallTioods.  So  Knavery  puts  on 
the  Face  of  Juftice^  Hypocrify  and  Superjfition  wear 
the  Vizard  of  Piety^  Deceit  and  Evil  are  often 
clothed  in  the  Shapes  and  Appearances  of  'Truth 
and  Goodnefs.  Now  Logick  helps  us  to  ftrip  ofF 
the  outward  Difguife  of  Things,  and  to  behold 
them  and  judge  of  them  in  their  own  Nature. 

Befides,  our  reafoning  Powers  need  fome  Aflift- 
ance, becaufe  they  are  fo  frail  and  fallible  in  the 
prefent  State  5  we  are  impofed  upon  at  home  as 
well  as  abroad 'y  we  are  deceived  by  our  Senfes^hy 
our  Imaginations^  by  our  Paffions  and  Appetites ; 
by  the  Authority  of  Men,  by  Education  and  Cuf- 
tom^  6cc.  and  we  are  led  into  freguent  Errors,  by 
judging  according  to  thefe  falie  and  flattering 
Principles,  rather  than  according  to  the  Nature 
of  Things.  Something  of  this  Frailty  is  owing 
to  our  very  Conftitution^  Man  being  compounded 
of  FleHi  and  Spirit :  Something  of  it  arifes  from 
our  infant  State^  and  our  growing  up  by  flow  De- 
grees to  Manhood,  fo  that  we  form  a  thoufand 
Judgments  before  our  Reafon  is  mature.  But 
there  is  ftill  more  of  it  owing  to  our  original  De- 
fe^ion  from  God,  and  the  fooUfh  and  evil  Difpo- 

B  z  litions 


4  LOGIC  K:  Or, 

fitions  that  are  found  in  fallen  Man :  So  that  one 
great  Part  of  the  Deftgn  of  Logick  is  to  guard  us 
againft  the  delufive  Influences  of  our  meaner  Pow- 
ers, to  cure  the  Miftakes  of  immature  Judgment, 
and  to  raife  us  in  fome  Meafure  from  the  Ruins 
of  our  Fall. 

It  is  evident  enough  from  all  thefe  Things,  that 
our  Reafon  needs  the  Aflillance  of  Art  in  our  En- 
quiries after  ^ruth  or  Duty,  and  without  fome 
Skill  and  Diligence  in  forming  our  Judgments 
aright,  wefhallbeled  into  frequent  Miftakes,  both 
in  Matters  of  Science^  and  in  Matters  of  Pra^icey 
and  fome  of  thefe  Miftakes  may  prove  fatal  too. 

The  j^rt  of  Logick^  even  as  it  affifts  us  to  gain 
the  Knowledge  of  the  Sciences,  leads  us  on  to- 
ward Virtue  and  Happinefs  j  for  all  o\xx  fpecula^ 
five  Acquaintayice  with  things  fhould  be  made  fub- 
fervient  to  our  better  CondvM  in  the  civil  and  the 
religious  Life.  This  is  infinitely  more  valuable 
than  all  Speculations,  and  a  wife  Man  will  ufe 
them  chiefly  for  this  better  Purpofe. 

iVll  the  good  Judgment  and  Prudence  that  any 
Man  exerts  in  his  common  Concerns  of  Life, 
without  the  Advantages  of  Learning,  is  called 
natural  Logick :  And  it  is  but  a  higher  Advance- 
ment, and  a  farther  Afliftance  of  our  rational 
Powers  that  is  deligned  by  and  expected  from  this 
artificial  Logick. 

In  order  to  attain  this,  we  muft  enquire  what 
are  the  principal  Operations  of  the  Mind^  which 
are  put  forth  in  the  Excrcife  of  our  Reafon  :  And 
we  (hall  find  them  to  be  thefe  four,  (-yiz.)  Fer-^ 
ceptien^  Judgment^  /Argumentation^  mid  L>ifpoJition. 

Now  the  Art  of  Logick  is  compos'd  of  thofe  Ob- 
fervations  and  Rules,  which  Men  have  made  about 
thefe  four  Operations  of  the  Mind,  Perception, 
"Judgment^  Reafoning^  and  -Difpojition^  in  order  to 
ailiil  and  improve  them.  I.  Peri 


The  right  Ufe  of  Reafonr  [$ 

I.  Perception^  Conception^  or  Apprehenfion^  is 
the  meer  fimple  Contemplation  of  Things  offer- 
ed to  our  Minds,  without  affirming  or  denying 
any  Thing  concerning  them.  So  we  conceive  or 
think  of  a  Horfe^  a  Tree^  High^  S-wift^  Slow,  A- 
nimalj  'Time,  Motion,  Matter,  Mind,  Life,  Death, 
&c.  The  Form  under  which  thefe  .Things  ap- 
pear to  the  Mind,  or  the  Refult  of  o\ir  Concep- 
tion or  A  pprehenfion,  is  call'd  an  Idea. 

II.  Judgment  is  that  Operation  of  the  Mind, 
whereby  we  join  two  or  more  Ideas  together  by 
one  Affirmation  or  Negation,  that  is,  we  either 
affirm  or  deny  this  to  be  that.  So  This  Tree  is 
high  5  That  Horfe  is  not  fivift  j  The  Mind  of  Man  is 
a  thinking  Being  j  Meer  Matter  has  no  Thought  be- 
longing to  it:,  God  is  jufi'y  Good  Men  are  often  mi- 
ferahle  in  this  World  j  A  righteous  Go'uernor  will 
make  a  Difference  betwixt  the  E'vil  and  the  Good, 
which  Sentences  are  the  Effe£t  of  Judgment,  and 
are  called  Propojitions. 

III.  Argumentation  or  Reafoning  is  that  Opera- 
tion of  the  Mind,  whereby  we  infer  one  Thing, 
i.  e.  one  Proportion,  from  two  or  more  Proporti- 
ons premifed.  Or  it  is  the  drawing  a  Conclufi- 
on,  which  before  was  cither  unknown,  or  dark, 
or  doubtful,  from  fome  Propofitions  which  are 
more  known  and  evident.  So  when  we  have 
judged  that  Matter  cannot  think,  and  that  the 
Mind  of  Man  doth  think,  we  then  infer  and  con- 
clude, that  therefore  the  Mind  of  Man  is  not  Matter. 

So  we  judge  that  A  juft  Governor  will  make  a 
Difference  betwixt  the  Evil  and  the  Good;  we  judge 
alfo,  that  God  is  a  juft  Governor ;  and  from  thence 
we  conclude,  .that  God  will  make  a  Difference  be- 
twixt the  Evil  and  the  Good. 

B  I  This 


6  LOGIC  Kt  Or, 

This  Argumentation  may  be  carried  on  further, 
thus,  God  will  one  time  or  another  make  a  Differ- 
ence  between  the  Good  and  the  Evil:  But  there  is 
little  or  no  Difference  made  in  this  PTorld;  'Therefore 
there  mufi  be  another  PVorld  wherein  this  Difference 
Jhall  be  made. 

Thefe  Inferences  or  Conclufions  are  the  Effects 
of  Reafoni'ng,  and  the  three  Proportions  taken 
altogether  are  called  a  Syllogifm^  or  Argument. 

IV.  Difpofition  is  that  Operation  of  the  Mind, 
whereby  we  put  the  Ideas,  Propofi'tions,  and  Ar-r 
guments,  which  we  have  formed  concerning  one 
Subject,  into  fuch  an  Order  as  is  fitteft  to  gain 
the  cleareft  Knowledge  of  it,  to  retain  it  longeft, 
and  to  explain  it  to  others  in  the  bell  manner: 
Or,  in  Ihort,  it>  is  the  Ranging  of  our  Thoughts 
in  fuch  Order,  as  is  beft  for  our  own  and  others 
Conception  and  Memory.  The  Effe6t  of  this 
Operation  is  called  Method.  This  very  Defcrip- 
tion  of  the  four  Operations  of  the  Mind  and  their 
Effe5ls  in  this  Order^  is  an  Inftance  or  Example 
of  Method. 

Now  as  the  Art  of  Logick  affifls  our  Concept i' 
on^  fo  it  gives  us  a  large  and  comprehenfive  View 
of  the  Subjc6bs  we  enquire  into,  as  well  as  a  clear 
and  difiinU  Knowledge  of  them.  As  it  regulates 
our  'Judgment  and  our  Reafoning^  fo  it  fecures  us 
from  Millakes,  and  gives  us  a  true  and  certain 
Knowledge  of  Things  5  and  as  it  furniihies  us 
with  Method^  fo  it  makes  our  Knowledge  of 
Things  both  eafy  and  regular^  and  guards  our 
Thoughts  from  Confufion. 

Logick  is  divided  into  four  Parts,  according  to 
thefc  four  Operations  of  the  Mmd,  which  it  di- 
reds,  and  therefore  we  fhall  treat  of  it  in  this 
Qrder. 

The: 


>N 


ne  right  life  ofKczCorL  % 

THE 

Firft  PART 

O  F 

L  O  G  1  C  K. 

Of  Perceptions  and  Ideas. 


TH  E  firft  Part  of  Logick  contains  Obfer- 
vations  and  Precepts  about  the  firft  O- 
peration  of  the  Mind,  Perception  or  Con^ 
ception:  And  fince  all  our  Knowledge, 
how  wide  and  large  foever  it  grow,  is  founded 
upon  our  Conceptions  and  Ideasy  here  we  fhall  con- 
lider, 

I .  'The  general  Nature  of  them. 
1.  The  OhjeUs  of  our  Conception^  or  the  Arche- 
types or  Patterns  of  thefe  Ideas. 

5.  The  fe'veral  Divijions  of  them. 

4.  The  Words  and  Terms  whereby  our  Ideas  aro 
exprefl. 

f.  General  Directions  about  our  Ideas. 

6.  Special  Rules  to  dire^  our  Conceptions^. 

B  4  CHAP; 


f  LOGIC  K:  0>,        PartL 

C  H  A  P.     I. 

Of  the  Nature  of  Ideas. 

FIRST,  the  Nature  of  Conception  or  Percep' 
tion  *  fhall  juO;  be  mention'd,  tho'  this 
may  feem  to  belong  to  another  Science  rather  than 
Logick. 

Perception  is  that  A5t  of  the  Mind  (or  as  fome 
Philofophers  call  it,  rather  a  Paffion  or  Impreffiori) 
whereby  the  Mind  Ijecomes  confcious  of  any  Thifi^j 
as  when  I  feel  Hunger^  'Thirfi^  or  Cold^  or  Heat  > 
when  I  fee  a  Horfe^  a  'free^  or  a  Man  j  when  I 
h<t2cc -x  human  Voice^  or  'Thunder^  1  am  confcious 
of  thefe  Things,  and  this  is  called  Perception.  If 
Iftudy^  meditate^  'ujifjp  or  fear^  I  am  confcious  of 
thefe  inward  A6i:s  alfo,  and  my  Mind  perceives 
its  own  Thoughts^  JVifloes^  Fears^  ^c. 

An  Idea  is  generally  defin'd  a  Rep-efentation  of 
a  Thing  in  the  Mind;  it  is  a  Reprefentation  of 
fomething  that  we  have  feen^  felt^  heard,  &c.  or 
been  confcious  of.  That  Notion  or  Form  of  a 
Horfe,  a  Tree,  or  a  Man  which  is  in  the  Mind, 
is  called  the  Idea,  of  a  Horfe,  a  Tree,  or  a  Man. 
That  Notion  of  Hunger,  Cold,  Sound,  Colour, 
Thought,  or  Wifli,  or  Fear,  which  is  in  the 
Mind,  is'call'd  the  Idea  of  Hunger,  Cold,  Sounds 

rvifij,  &c. 

It  is  not  the  outward  Object,  or  Thing  which 
is  perceiz^ed,  (viz.)  the  Horfe,  the  Man,  Qc.  nor 


Note,  The  Words  Cmcefthrt  and  Perception  are  often  ufed  promifcuoufly 
as  I  have  done  here,  becaufe  I  would  not  embarrafs  a  Learner  wirh.  too 
many  Difiinclions;  but  if  I  v/cre  to  diftinguifh  them,  I  would  fay,  Per- 
ception 15  the  Confcioufnef?  ot  an  Objeft  when  prefent:  Contention  is  the 
(oraiing  an  Idea  of  the  Objeft,  whether  prefent  or  abfent. 


IS 


G.I.        The  right  tlfe  of  Reafon."  9 

is  it  the  Y try  Perception  or  Senfe^'xndi  Feelings  (viz.) 
of  Hunger,  or  Cold,  t^c.  which  is  called  the  I- 
dea }  but  it  is  the  Thing  as  it  exifls  in  the  Mind 
by  Way  of  Conception  or  Reprefentation^  that  is  pro- 
perly called  the  Idea^  whether  the  Obje^  be  pre- 
fbnt  or  abfent. 

As  a  Horfe,  a  Man,  a  Tree,  are  the  outward 
Obje^s  of  our  Perception,  and  the  outward  Arclk- 
types  or  Patterns  of  our  Ideas  j  fo  our  own  Senfa- 
tions  of  Hunger,  Cold,  ^c.  are  alfo  inward  Arche^ 
types^  or  Patterns  of  our  Ideas :  But  the  Notions 
or  Pidiurcs  of  thefe  Things,  as  they  are  confider- 
ed,  or  conceived  in  the  Mind,  are  precifely  the 
Ideas  that  we  have  to  do  with  in  Logick.  To  fee 
a  Horfe^  or  to  feel  Cold,  is  one  Thing  5  to  think 
ofy  and  converfe  about  a  Man^  a.  Horjey  Hunger^ 
or  Cold^  is  another. 

Among  all  thefe  Ideas^  fuch  as  reprefent  BodieSy 
are  generally  call'd  Images^  cfpecially  if  the  Idea 
of  the  Shape  be  included,  Thofe  inward  Re- 
j^refentations  which  we  have  of  Spirit^  Thougbty 
Love^  Hatred^  Caufe^  Effect^  6cc.  are  more  pure 
and  mental  Ideas^  belonging  more  efpecially  to 
the  Mind,"and  carry  nothing  of  Shape  or  Senfe 
in  them.  But  I  fhall  have  occafion  to  fpeakmorc 
particularly  of  the  Original  and  the  DijlinBion  of 
Ideas  in  the  third  Chapter.  I  proceed  therefore 
now  to  confider  the  ObjeBs  of  our  Ideas. 


CHAR 


lo  L  0  G  I  C  K:  Or,  i     PartL 

C  H  A  P.    II. 
Of  the  ObjeEis  of  Terception, 

Sect.    I. 

Of  Being  in  general. 

TH  E  OhjeU  of  Perception  is  that  which  is  re- 
prefented  in  the  Idea,  that  which  is  the 
Archetype  or  Pattern,  according  to  which  the 
Idea  is  form'd  >  and  thus  Judgments^  PropoJitionSy 
Jleafonings^  and  long  Difcourfes^  may  all  become 
the  Objefts  of  Perception  j  but  in  this  Place  we 
fpeak  chiefly  o£  the  firft  and  more  fimple  Obje^s  of 
it,  before  they  are  join'd  and  form'd  into  Propo- 
sitions or  Difcourfes. 

Every  ObjeSi  of  our  Ideas  is  call'd  a  Themey 
whether  it  be  a  Being  or  Not  Being  j  for  Not  Be- 
ing may  be  proposed  to  our  Thoughts,  as  well  as 
that  which  has  a  real  Being.  But  let  us  firfl  treat 
of  Beings^  and  that  in  the  largeft  Extent  of  the 
Word. 

A  Being  is  confider'd  as  pojjibky  or  as  a&ual. 

When  it  is  confider'd  as  poffible-^  it  is  faid  to 
have  an  EJfence  or  Nature-,  fuch  were  all  flhings 
before  their  Creation :  When  it  is  confider'd  as  ac^ 
tual^  then  it  is  faid  to  have  Exiftence  alfo  5  fuch 
are  all  Things  which  are  created^  and  God  himfelf 
the  Creator. 

EJfence  therefore  is  but  the  very  Nature  of  any 
Beings  whether  it  be  actually  exifling  or  no.  A 
Rofe  in  Winter  has  an  ElTence,  in  Summer  it  has 
Exiftence  alfo. 

Note^ 


C.  II.  S.  2.    the  right  Ufe  i?/Reafon:         1 1 

Note^  There  is  but  one  Being  which  includes 
Exijlence  in  the  very  EJfence  of  it,  and  that  is 
God^  who  therefore  aftually  exills  by  natural  and 
eternal  Neceflity:  But  the  aSiual  Exijience  of  c- 
very  Creature  is  very  difliinct  from  its  EJfence^  for 
it  may  be^  or  may  not  he^  as  God  pleafe. 

yigain^  Every  Being  is  confider'd  either  as  fub- 
fifting  in  and  by  its  felf,  and  then  it  is  call'd  a 
Sub  fiance  j  or  it  fubfifts  in  and  by  another,  and  then  it 
is  call'd  a  Mode  or  Manner  of  Being.  Tho'  few  Wri-^ 
ters  allow  Mode  to  be  call'd  a  Being  in  the  fame 
perfect  Senfe  as  a  Subflance  is  j  and  fome  Modes 
have  evidently  more  of  xtA  Entity  ox  Being  than  o- 
thers,  as  will  appear  when  we  come  to  treat  of 
them.  Thefe  Things  will  furniih  us  with  Mat- 
ter for  larger  Difcourfe  in  the  following  Sedions. 

Sect.  II. 

Of  Sub  fiances  and  their  various  Kinds. 

ASubJiance  is  a  Being  which  can  fubfift  by 
itfelf,  without  Dependence  upon  any  other 
created  Being.  The  Notion  o^  fiibfifting  by  itfelf 
gives  occafion  to  Logicians  to  call  it  a  Subftancp. 
So  a  Horfc^  a  Houfe^  JVood^  Stone^  JFater^  Fire^ 
a  Spirit^  a  Body^  an  ^ngel  are  called  Sub  (lances  ^ 
becaufe  they  depend  on  nothing  but  God  for  their 
Exiftence, 

It  has  been  udial  alfo  in  the  Defcription  of  Siih' 
fiance  to  add,  it  is  that  which  is  the  Subjecb  of 
Modes  or  Accidents  3  a  Body  is  the  Sublbince  or 
Subjeft,  its  Shape  is  the  Mode. 

But  left  we  be  led  into  Miftakes,  let  us  here 
take  Notice  that  when  a  Subftance  is  fiid  to  fub- 
fift  without  Dependence  upon  another  created  Beings 
gU  that  \ve  mean  is,  that  it  cannot  be  annihilated, 

or 


12  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti 

or  utterly  'deftroyed  and  reduced  to  nothing,  by 
any  Power  inferior  to  that  of  our  Creator ;  tho* 
its  prcfent  particular  Form,  Nature  and  Proper- 
ties may  be  altered  and  deftroyed  by  many  inferi- 
or Caufes :  a  Horfe  may  dye  and  turn  to  Duft  j 
Ji'^ood  may  be  turned  into  Fire^  Smoke  and  j^Jhes  j 
a  Houfe  into  Ruhhijlj^  and  Water  into  Ice  or  Va- 
pour-,  but  the  Matter  of  which  they  are  made 
ftill  remains,  tho'  the  Forms  and  Shapes  of  it 
are  alter'd.  A  Body  may  ceafe  to  be  a  Houfe  or  a 
Horfe^  but  it  is  a  Body  iHll ;  and  in  this  Senfe  it 
depends  only  upon  God  for  its  Exiftence. 

Among  Suhfiances  fome  are  thinking  or  conici- 
ous  Beings,  or  have  a  Power  of  Thought,  fuch 
as  the  Mtnd  of  Man^  God^  Angels.  Some  are  ex- 
tended ^Xidifolid  or  impenetrable^  that  is,  they  have 
Dimenfions  of  Length,  Breadth,  and  Depth,  and 
have  a  Power  of  Refiftance,  or  exclude  every 
Thing  of  the  fame  kind  from  being  in  the  fame 
Place.  This  is  the  proper  Chara£ter  of  Matter 
or  Body. 

As  for  the  Idea  of  Space.^  whether  it  be  void 
ox  full ^  i.  e.  a  Vacuum  or  a  Plenum.^  whether  it  be 
interfpers'd  among  all  Bodies,  or  may  be  fuppos'd 
to  reach  beyond  the  Bounds  of  the  Creation,  it 
is  an  Argument  too  long  and  too  hard  to  be  dif- 
puted  in  this  Place  what  the  Nature  of  it  is  5 
"whether  it  be  a  real  Subftance,  or  a  meer  Con- 
ception of  the  Mind,  whether  it  be  the  Immen- 
iity  of  the  Divine  Nature,  or  the  meer  Order  of 
co-exiftent  Beings,  whether  it  be  the  manner  of 
'bur  Conception  of  the  Diftances  of  Bodies,  or  a 
meer  Nothing. 

Now  if  we  feclude  Space  out  of  our  Confi- 
deration,  there  will  remain  but  two  forts  of  Sub- 
iftances  in  the  World,  i.  e.  Matter  and  Mind^  or 
4s,  we  o^lierwife  call  them^  Body  and  Spirit;  at 


C.  II.  S.  2.     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon."         i  j 

leafl,  we  have  no  Ideas  of  any  other  Subftance 
but  thefe  *. 

Among  Sub  fiances,  fome  are  called  Simple^ 
fome  are  Compound^  whether  the  Words  be  taken 
in  a  philofophical  or  a  vulgar  Senfe. 

Simple  Suhjiances^  in  a  philofophical  Senfe,  are 
either  Spirits  which  have  no  manner  of  Compo- 
fition  in  them,  and  in  this  Senfe  God  is  called  a 
fimple  Being  y  or  they  are  the  firft  Principles  of 
Bodies,  which  are  ufually  called  Elements^  of 
which  all  other  Bodies  are  compounded :  Elements 
are  fuch  Sublhuices  as  cannot  be  refolved,  or  re- 
duced, into  two  or  more  Subllances  of  different 
Kinds. 

The 

*  Becaufe  Men  have  different  Ideas  or  Notions  of  Snhfiame-,  I  thought 
it  not  proper  entirely  to  omit  all  Aceouoc  of  them,  and  tharefore  have 
thrown  them  into  the  Margin. 

Some  Philofophers  fuppofe  that  our  Acquaintance  with  Matter  or  Ml  .d. 
reaches  no  farther  than  the  nieer  Properties  of  them,  and  that  there  is  a  (ore 
of  unknown  Being,  which  is  the  Snbftance  or  the  Subjeil  by  which  thefe 
Properties  of  filid  Extinficn,  and  of  Cogitcuion  are  fupported,  and  in  which 
thefe  Properties  inhere  or  exift.  But  perhaps  this  Notion  arifes  only  from' 
our  turning  the  meer  logical  Notion  of  SithfLvue  or  Self-fuhfifthi^r  into  the 
Notion  of  a  diftinft /"AjTTc/j/ or  natural  Being,  without  any  Necellity.  Soi'id 
Exte.ijion  feems  to  me  to  be  the  very  Subftance  of  Matter,  or  of  ail  "Bodies: 
and  a  Power  of  thinkinj^,  whkh  is  almays  iii  a£i,  feems  to  be  the  very  Sub- 
ftance of  all  Spirits;  fnr  God  himfclf  is  an  intelligent,  almighty  Power;  nor 
is  there  any  need  to  feek  for  any  other 'fecret  and  unknown  Being,  or  ^ji- 
({railed  Subfta>ice  entirely  diftindl  from  thefe,  in  order  to  fupport  the  feve~ 
ral  Modes  or  Properties  of  Matter  or  Mind,  for  thefe  two  Ideas  are  fufficienc 
for  that  Purpofe ;  therefore  thefe  are  Sttbftances. 

It  muft  be  confeft,  when  we  fay,  Spirit  is  a  thinking  Subfiavce,  and  Mat- 
ter is  an  extended  [odd  Suhflance,  we  are  Jbmetimes  ready  to  imagine  thac 
Extenfion  and  Solidity  are  but  meer  Modes  and  Pnfcrties  of  a  certain  un- 
known Subfiance  or  SubjeiSl  which  fupports  them,  and  which  we  call  2?o- 
^y;  and  that  Conjcioitfrefs, '  znd  a  Power  of  Thinking,  are  but  meer  Modes  and 
Properties  of  fome  unknown  Subfiance  or  Subje£l  which  fupporcs  them  alfb» 
and  which  we  call  Spirit:  But  I  rather  think  this  to  be  a  meer  M:!{ake» 
■which  we  are  led  into  by  ihe  grammatical  Form  and  Uie  of  Words;  and 
our  logical  Way  of  thinking  by  Subflances  and  Modes,  as  well  as  our^rjw- 
matical  Way  of  talking  by  Snhfianttves  and  ^djecli-jes,  delude  us  into  this 
Suppofition, 

However,  that  I  may  not  be  wanting  to  any  of  my  Readers,  I  would 
let  them  know  Mr.  Lett's  Opinion,  which  has  obtain'd  much  in  ths  pie- 
fen:  Age,  and  it  is  this:  "  That  our  Idea  of  zny  par  tint! nr  Sabftatice,  is 
«'  only  fuch  3  Combinacion  of  fimple  Id«ai  is  repiefer.ts  thac  thing  as  fub- 

['  fiftiiig 


14  LOGIC  K:  Or,        PartL 

The  various  Se6ts  of  Philofophers  have  attri- 
buted the  Honour  of  this  Name  to  vanous  Things. 
The  Peripateticks^  or  Followers  of  Ariflotle^  made 
Tire^  Air^  Earth  and  IVater  to  be  the  four  Ele- 
ments, of  which  all  earthly  Things  were  com- 
pounded 'y  and  they  fuppos'd  the  Heavens  to  be  a 
^intejfence^  or  fifth  fort  of  Body,  diftin6t  from 
all  thefe :  But,  fince  experimental  Philofophy  and 
Mathematicks  have  been  better  underftood,  this 
Doctrine  has  been  abundantly  refuted.  The  Chy" 
mifls  malce  Spirit^  Salt^  Sulphur^  Water  and  Earth 
to  be  their  five  Elements,  becaufe  they  can  re- 
duce all  terreftrial  Things  to  thefe  five  :  This 
feems  to  come  nearer  the  Truth  ;  tho*  they 
are  not  all  agreed  in  this  Enumeration  of  Ele- 
ments. In  fhort,  our  modern  Philofophers  gene- 
rally fuppofe  Matter  or  Body  to  be  one  fimple 
Principle,  ox  folid  Extenfion^  which  being  diverfi- 
fied  by  its  various  Shapes,  Quantities,   Motions 

"  Gfling  by  itfelf,  in  which  the  fuppos'd  or  confufed  Idea  of  Subfiance 
*'  (fuch  as  it  is)  is  always  ready  to  offer  icfelf.  It  it  a  Conjunftion  of  Ideas 
«  co-exifting  in  fuch  a  Caufe  of  their  Union)  as  makes  the  whole  Subjeft 
"  flibfift  by  itfelf,  though  the  Caufe  of  their  Union  be  unknown  ;  and  our 
"■general  Idea  of  Suhf!ance  atifes  from  the  Self-fubfiftence  of  this  CoUeflion 
«  of  Ideas. 

Now  if  this  Notion  of  Stihfiance  refl  here>  and  be  confider'd  meerly  as  an 
unknown  Caufe  of  the  Union  of  Properties,  it  is  much  more  eafy  to  be 
admitted :  But  if  we  proceed  to  fuppofe  a  fort  of  real,  fubftantial,  diftin«St 
Being,  different  from  [did  ^tantlty  or  Extaifion  in  Bodies,  and  different 
from  a  Power  of  thinking  in  Spirits,  in  my  Opinion  it  is  the  Introduflion 
of  a  needlefs  fcholaAical  Notion  into  the  real  Nature  of  Things,  and  then 
fancying  it  to  have  a  real  Exiftence. 

Mr.  Lock  in  his  EJJ'ay  of  Hum.  Und.  Book  II.  Ch.  2Z.  §.  2.  feems  to  ri- 
dicule this  common  Idea  ^i  Subfiance,  which  Men  have  generally  |fup- 
pofed  to  be  a  fort  of  Sttbjlrat7tm  diflinft  from  all  I'roperties  what- 
ibever,  and  to  be  the  Support  of  all  Properties.  Yet  in  Book  IV.  Ch.  5.  5.  6. 
he  feems  to  fuppofe  there  may  be  fbme  fuch  unknown  SubJiratHm,  which 
may  be  capable  of  receiving  the  Properties  both  of  Matttr  and  of  Mind 
(viz.)  Etttcnjio?!,  Solidity,  and  Cogitatim ;  for  he  fuppofes  it  poffible  for  God 
CO  add  Cogitation  to  that  Siihftance  which  is  corporeal,  and  thus  to  caufe 
■Matter  to  think.  If  this  be  true,  then  Spirits  (for  ought  we  know)  may  be 
corporeal  'Beings  or  thinking  "Bodies,  which  is  a  DoSrine  too  favourable  to  the 
Mortality  of  the  Saul.  But  I  leave  thefe  Debates  10  the  Philofophers  of  the 
Age. 


and 


C.  II.  S.  z.     the  right  life  of  Reafon.        i  $ 

and  Situations,  makes  all  the  Varieties  that  are 
found  in  the  Univerfe  j  and  therefore  they  make 
little  ufe  of  the  Word  Element. 

Compound  Subjiances  are  made  up  of  two  or 
more  fimple  Subftances :  So  every  Thing  in  this 
whole  material  Creation,  that  can  be  reduced  by 
the  Art  of  Man  into  two  or  more  different  Prin- 
ciples or  Subftances,  is  a  compound  Body  in  the 
philofophkal  Senfe. 

But  if  we  take  the  Words  Simple  and  Compound 
in  a  vulgar  Senfe,  then  all  thofe  are  fimple  Sub- 
fiances  which  are  generally  efteem'd  uniform  in 
their  Natures.  So  every  Herb  is  call'd  2.  fimple -y 
and  every  Metal  and  Mineral  >  tho'  the  Chy- 
mift  perhaps  may  find  all  his  feveral  Elements  in 
each  of  them.  So  a  Needle  is  ^fimple  Body,  be- 
ing made  only  of  Steel;  but  a  Sword  or  a  Knife 
is  a  compound^  becaufe  its  Haft  or  Handle  is  made 
of  Materials  different  from  the  Blade.  So  the 
Bark  of  Peru^  or  the  Juice  of  Sorrel  is  ^fiimple 
Medicine:  But  when  the  Apothecaries  Art  has 
mingled  feveral  Simples  together,  it  becomes  a 
Compound^  as  Diafcordium  or  Mithridate. 

The  Terms  of  pure  and  mixt^  when  applied  to 
Bodies,  are  much  akin  to  fimple  and  compound.  So 
a  Guinea  is  pure  Gold,  if  it  has  nothing  but  Gold 
in  it,  without  any  Alloy  or  bafer  Metal :  But  if 
any  other  Mineral  or  Metal  be  mingled  with  it, 
it  is  call'd  a  mixt  Subftance,  or  Body. 

Subftances  are  alfo  divided  into  animate,  and  in- 
animate. Anim.atcd  Subftances  are  either  anitnal  or 
vegetable  *. 

♦  Note,  Vegetables  as  veil  as  Arimah  have  gotten  the  Ntme  of  animar? J 
Subftances,  becaufe  fome  of  the  Ancients  fuppofed  UerU  and  VUntt,  'Beajsi 
and  S;Vrf;,  &c.  ro  have  a  fort  of  Sonli  diftintt  from  Maittr  ox  3e<^. 

2  Some 


16  LOGIC  K:  Or,         Part|. 

Some  of  the  animated  Subflances  have  various 
prganical  or  inflrumental  Parts,  fitted  for  a  Va- 
riety of  Motions  from  Place  to  Place,  and  a  Spring 
of  Life  within  themfelves,  as  Beafts^  Birds,  Fijhes^ 
and  Infedis ;  thefe  are  call'd  Animals.  Other  ani- 
mated Subjiances  are  call'd  Vegetables,  which  have 
within  themfelves  the  Principles  of  another  fort 
of  Life  and  Growth,  and  of  various  Produ61:i9ns^ 
fuch  as  we  fee  in  Plants,  Herbs,  and  Trees. 

And  there  are  other  Subjiances,  which  are  ci^U'd 
inanimate,  becaufe  they  have  no  fort  of  Life  ip 
them,  as  Earth,  Stone,   Air,  PFater,  &c.  '\ 

There  is  alfo  one  fort  of  Subftance,  or  Being, 
which  is  compunded  of  Body  and  Mind,  or  a  ra- 
tional Spirit  unjted  to  an  Animal  j  fuch  is  Man- 
kind. Angels,  <3r  any  other  Beings  of  the  fpiri- 
tual  and  invifible  World,  who  have  afTum'd  vifi- 
ble  Shapes  for  a  Seafon,  can  hardly  be  recjkon'd 
among  this  Order  of  compounded  Beings  5  be- 
caufe they  drop  their  Bodies,  and  divert:  them- 
felves of  thofe  vilible  Shapes,  when  their  parti- 
cular Meflage  is  perform'd,  and  thereby  fhcw  that 
thefe  Bodies  do  not  belong  to  their  Natures.      ^ 

Sect.     IIL  ^ 

Of  Modes  and  their  'various  Kinds,  and  firjl  of 
ejfential  and  accidental  Modes. 


T 


HE  next  fort  of  Objefts  which  are  repre- 
fented  in  our  Ideas,  arc  call'd  Modes.,    or 


Manners  of  Being  *. 


*  Note,  The  Term  Mode  is  by  fome  Authors  applied  chiefly  to  the  Rt' 
latkns  or  relative  Manners  of  Being,  But  in  logical  Treatifes  it  is  often 
ufed  in  a  larger  Senfe,  and  extends  to  all  jlttribates  whatfbever,  and  in- 
cludes the  moft  eflencial  and  inward  Properties,  as  well  as  outward  Refpe£ls 
and  Relations,  and  r^eaches  to  Aiikns  themfelves  as  well  as  Marmsn  of 
Aflion. 

A  Mode 


C.  II.  S.  3 .     t/je  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:         1 7 

A  Mode  is  that  which  cannot  fubfift  in  and  of 
itfelf,  but  is  always  efleem'd  as  belonging  to,  and 
fubfifting  by,  the  Help  of  fome  SubftanceiiV^\\\c\ 
for  that  Reafon,  is  call'd  its  Subje&.  A  Mode 
muft  depend  on  that  Siibflance  for  its  very  Exift- 
cnce  and  Being  >  and  that  not  as  a  Being  depends 
on  its  Caufe,  (for  fo  Su^ficinces  themfelvcs  depend 
on  God  their  Creatcirj)  but  the  very  Being  of  a 
Mode  depends  on  fome  Subftance  for  its  Suhje^i^ 
in  which  it  is,  or  to  which  it  belongs  j  fo  Moti' 
on^  Shape^  ^lantity^  JVeight^  are  Modes  of  Bo- 
dy y  Knowledge^  JVit^  Folly ^  Love^  Doubting^  J^-dg- 
ing^  are  Modes  of  the  Mind;  for  the  one  cannot 
lubfift  without  Body,  and  the  other  cannot  fublili 
without  Af/W. 

^'  Modes  have  their  feveral  Divifibns,  as  well  as 
Subftances. 

I.  Modes  are  either  ejfentia!^  or  accidental. 

An  ejfential  Mode^  or  Attribute^  is  that  which 
belongs  to  the  very  Nature  or  Eflence  of  the  Sub- 
je6t  wherein  it  isj  and  the  Subject  can  never  have 
the  fame  Nature  without  it  5  fuch  is  Roundnefs  m 
a  Bowl^  Hardnefs  in  a  Stone^  Softnefs  in  Watcr^ 
*vital  Motion  in  an  Animal^  Solidity  in  Matter^ 
Ithinking  in  a  Spirit  j  for  tho'  that  piece  of 
Wood  which  is  now  a  Boiiil  may  be  madey^^^rr j 
yet  if  Roundnefs  be  taken  away,  it  is  no  longer  a 
Bowl:  So  that  very  FieiTi  and  Bones,  which  is 
now  an  Animal^  may  be  without  Life  or  inward 
Motion  5  but  if  all  Motion  be  entirely  gone,  it  is 
no  longer  an  Animal,  bur  a  Carcafs :  So  if  a  Bo- 
dy, or  Matter,  be  divefted  of  Solidity^  it  is  a 
meer  void  Space  or  Nothing  j  and  if  Spirit  be  en- 
tirely without  Thinkings  I  have  no  Idea  of  any 
thing  that  is  left  in  it ,  therefore  fo  far  as  I  am  a- 
ble  to  judge,  Confcigufnefs  muft  be  its  ellential  At- 

'  C  tribute: 


i^  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

tribute  * :  Thus  all  the  PerfeEiions  of  God  ai'e  call'd 
his  Jttrihutes^  for  he  cannot  be  without  them. 
*"   An  e^ential  Mode  is  either /r/w^ry  ox  fecondary^ 
A  primary  ejfential  Mode  is  the  firft,  or  chief 
Thing,  that  conftitutcs  any  Being  in  its  particu- 
lar Ellcnce,  or  Nature,  and  makes  it  to  be  that 
which  it  is,  and  diflinguifhes  it  from  all  other  Be- 
ll^ :  This  is  call'd  the  Difference  in  the  Definition  of 
Tmngs,  of  which  hereafter :  So  Roundnefs  is  the 
primary  elTential  Mode,or  DiflTerence  of  a  Bowl;  the 
meeting  of  two  Lines  is  tht  primary  eflential  Mode, 
or  the  Difference  of  an  jingle -,  the  Perpendicula- 
rity of  thefe  Lines  to  each  other  is  the  Differ- 
ence of  a  right  Angle :  Solid  Extenjion  is  the  pri- 
inaiy  Attribute,  or  Difference  of  Matter :  Con- 
fcioufnefs^  or  at  leaft  a  Power  of  'Thinkings  is  the 
Difference,  or  primaryAttribute  of  a  Spirit* -y^ndi 
to^par  and  love  God  is  the  primary  Attribute  of  a 
pons  Man. 

A  [ccondary  effential  Mode  is  any  other  Attri- 
bute of  a  Thing,  which  is  not  of  primary  Con- 
lidcration :  This  is  call'd  a  Prc/perty :  Sometimes 
indeed  it  goes  toward  making  up  the  EfTence,  e- 
fpecially  of  a  complex  Beings  fo  far  as  we  are  ac- 
quainted with  it  J  fometimes  it  depends  upon, 
diid  follows  from  the  EfTence  of  it  j  lb  Volulility^ 
or  Jptnefs  to  roul^  is  the  Property  of  a  J5ow/,  and 
Is  derived  from  its  Roundnefs.  Mobility^  and  Fi- 
gure or  Shape.,  are  Properties  of  Matter  5  and  it 
is  the  Property  of  a  pious  Man  to  love  his  Neigh- 
bour. 

An  accidental  Mode,  or  an  Accident,  is  fuch  a 
Mode,  as  is  not  neceffary  to  the  Being  of  a  Thing, 

*  Note,  When  I  call  fdld  Exterijion  an  eflential  Mode  or  Atrrlbuteof  Mattery 
and  a  Fovcer  of  TUhbingzn  efiential  Mode  or  Artribute  of  a  Spirit,  I  do  ic  in 
compliance  with  common  Forms  of  Speech :  Fiit  perhaps  in  reality  thefe 
are  ihe  very  Eflences  or  Subftances  thcmfelves*  and  the  moH  fubftantial  Ideas 
ehac  we  can  frame  of  "Bodj  and  Spirit. 

I  for 


C.  n.  S.  3.     T^e  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.        19 

for  the  Subjefb  may  be  without  it,  and  yet  remain 
of  the  fame  Nature  that  it  was  before-,  or  it  is  that 
Mode  which  may  befepamted  orabohdit  from  its 
Subjeft;  fo  Smoothnefs  or  Roughnefs^  Blacknefs  or 
tVhitenefs^  Motion  or  Reft^  are  the  Accidents  of 
a  Bowl;  for  thefe  may  be  all  chang'd,  and  yet 
the  Body  remain  a  Boivl  ftill :  Learnings  Jufiice^ 
'  Folly ^  Sicknefs^  Healthy  are  the  Accidents  of  a 
Man :  Motion^  Squarenefs^  or  any  particular  Shape 
or  Size^  are  the  Accidents  of  Body  :  Yet  Shape 
and  Size  in  general  are  effcntial  Modes  of  itj  for 
a  Body  mull  have  fome  Size  and  Shape,  nor  can 
it  be  without  them  :  So  Hope,  Fear,  Wijhing^ 
jljfenting,  and  Doubting,  are  Accidents  oP  the 
Mind,  tho'  Thinking  in  general  ieems  to  be  effcn- 
tial to  it. 

Here  oblbrve,  that  the  Name  of  Accident  has 
been  oftentimes  given  by  the  old  peripatetick  Phi- 
lofophers  to  all  Modes,  whether  eflcntial  or  acci- 
dental j  but  the  Moderns  confine  this  Word  Ac- 
cident xo  the  Senfcin  which  I  have  defcribcd  it. 

Here  it  fhould  be  noted  alio,  that  tho'  the 
Word  Property  be  limited  fomctimcs  in  logical 
Treatifes  to  the  fecondary  e[fcntial  Mode,  yet  it  is 
"us'd  in  common  Language  to  iignify  thefe  four 
forts  of  Modes  j  of  v/hich  fome  arc  ejjential,  and 
fome  accidental. 

(i.)  Such  as  belong  to  every  Subject  of  that 
kind,  but  not  only  to  thofe  Subie6ts.  So  yellow 
Colour  and  Ductility  are  Properties  of  Gold-,  they 
belong  to  all  Gold,  but  not  only  to  Goldj  for 
Saffron  is  alfo  yellow,  and  Lead  is  duBile. 

(1.)  Such  as  belong  oyily  to  one  kind  of  Sub- 
je<5t,  but  not  to  e^very  Subject  of  that  kind.  So 
Learning,  Reading,  and  IVriting,  are  Properties 
of  human  Nature  3  they  belong  only  to  Man,  but 
Tiot  to  all  Men, 

C  2^  (|.)  Such 


20  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

(3.)  Such  as  belong  to  every  Subject  of  one 
kind,  and  only  to  them,  but  not  always.  So 
Speech  or  Language  is  a  Property  of  Man^  for  it 
belongs  to  all  Men,  and  to  Men  only  j  but  Men 
are  not  always  fpeaking. 

(4.)  Such  as  belong  to  every  Subje6b  of  one 
Kind,  and  to  them  only  and  always.  So  Shape 
and  Diviftbility  are  Properties  of  Body  5  fo  Omni" 
fcience  and  Omnipotence  are  Properties  of  the  di- 
vine Nature^  for  in  this  Senfe  Properties  and  jlt- 
tributes  are  the  fame,  and  except  in  logical  Trea- 
tifes  there  is  fcarce  any  Diflin6tion  made  between 
them.  Thefe  are  call'd  Prtpria  quarto  modo  ia 
the  Schools,  or  Properties  of  the  fourth  Sort. 

Note^  Where  there  is  any  one  Property  or  ef- 
fential  Attribute  fo  fuperior  to  the  reft,  that  it  ap- 
pears plainly  that  all  the  reft  are  deriv'd  from  it, 
and  fuch  as  is  fufficient  to  give  a  full  Diftindion 
of  that  Subjc£"t:  from  all  other  Subje6ts,  this  At- 
tribute, or  Property,  is  call'd  the  ejjential  Dif- 
ference^ as  is  before  declared  >  and  we  commonly 
iay,  the  EJjence  of  the  Thing  conflfts  in  it  5  fo 
the  EJfence  of  Matter  in  general  feems  to  confift 
in  Solidity^  or  folid  Extenjion.  But  for  the  moft 
part,  we  are  fo  much  at  a  Lofs  in  finding  out  the- 
intimate  Eflence  of  particular  natural  Bodies,  that 
we  are  forced  to  dilHnguiih  the  ejjential Diffcrencs 
of  moft  'i'hings  by  a  Combination  of  Properties, 
So  a  Sparrow  is  a  Bird,  which  has  fuch  colour'd 
Feathers,  and  fuch  a  particular  Size,  Shape,  and 
.Motion.  So  Wormwood  is  a  Herb,  which  has 
inch  a  Leaf  of  fuch  a  Colour,  and  Shape,  and 
Tafte,  and  fuch  a  Root  and  Stalk.  So  Beafts  and 
Fiflies,  Minerals,  Metals,  and  Works  of  Art 
fometimes,  as  well  as  of  Nature,  are  diftinguiihed 
by  fuch  a  CoUeRion  of  Properties.. 

Sect. 


C.  II.  S.  4.    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcaibn."       2 1 

Sect.     IV. 

^e  farther  Dliifions  of  Mode. 

II.  nr^\{^  fecond  Divifion  of  Modes  is  into  ahfo' 
\^  lute  and  relative.  An  abfolute  Mode  is 
that  which  belongs  to  its  Subjed,  without  Re- 
fpe6t  to  any  other  Beings  whatfoever :  But  a  re- 
lative  Mode  is  derived  from  the  Regard  that  one 
Being  has  to  others.  So  Roundnefs  and  Smooth- 
nefs  are  the  abfolute  Modes  ofa^^w/j  for  if  there 
were  nothing  elfe  exifling  in  the  whole  Creation, 
a  Bowl  might  be  round  and  fmooth :  But  Great- 
fiefs  and  Smallnefs  are  relative  Modes  5  for  the  ve- 
ry Ideas  of  them  are  derived  meerly  from  the 
Comparifon  of  one  Being  with  others :  a  Bowl 
of  four  Inches  Diameter  is  lery  great.,  compared 
with  one  of  an  Inch  and  half 5  but  it  is  'very  fmall 
in  Comparifon  of  another  Bowl,  whofe  Diamc^ 
ter  is  eighteen  or  twenty  Inches.  Motion  is  the 
abfolute  Mode  of  a  Bod)^,  but  Siinfmefs  or  Sloiv- 
nefs  are  relative  Ideas  j  for  the  Motion  of  a  Bowl 
on  a  Bowling-Green  is  /w///,  when  compared 
\yitha  Snail  j  and  it  is/ow,  when  compar'd  with 
a  Cannon-Bullet. 

Thefe  relative  Modes  are  largely  treated  of  by 
fomc  logical  and  metaphyfical  Writers  under  the 
iSTame  of  Relation  :  And  thefe  Relations  them- 
fclves  are  farther  fubdivided  into  fuch  as  arife  from 
the  Nature  of  Things.,  and  fuch  as  arife  meerly 
from  the  Operation  of  our  Minds ;  one  fort  are  cal- 
led real  Relations^  the  other  mental-,  fo  the  Like- 
ncfs  of  one  Egg  to  another  is  a  real  Relation^  be- 
caufe  it  arifes  from  the  real  Nature  of  Things ; 
for  whether  there  was  any  Man  or  Mind  to  con- 
ceive it  or  no,  one  Egg  would  be  like  another ; 

C  5  Bv(c 


2%  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

But  when  we  coiiiider  an  Egg  as  a  Noun  Subjian- 
ti've  in  Grammar,  or  as  lignified  by  the  Letters 
f,  ^,  ^,  thefe  are  mecr  mental  Relations^  and  de- 
rive their  very  Nature  from  the  Mind  of  Man. 
Thefe  fort  of  Relations  are  call'd  by  the  Schools 
Entia  Rationis^  or  fecond  Notions^  which  have  no- 
real  Being,  but  by  the  Operation  of  the  Mind. 

III.  The  third  Divifion  of  Modes  fhews  uSj 
they  are  either  intrinftcal  or  extr'mfical.  Intnnfi' 
cal  Modes  are  conceiv'd  to  be  in  the  Subject  or 
Sub  fiance,  as  when  we  fay  a  Globe  is  round ^  or 
fivift^  rollings  or  at  reft :  Or  v/hen  we  fay  a  Alatt 
is  tall^  or  learned^  thefe  are  intr'mjick.  Modes :  But 
cxtrinjick  Modes  are  fuch  as  arife  from  fomething 
that  is  not  in  the  Subject  or  Subfbance  it  felfj 
but  it  is  a  manner  of  Being,  which  fome  Sub- 
ilances  attain  by  Reafon  of  lomething  that  is  eX" 
ternal  or  foreign  to  the  Subject  j  as,  This  Globe 
lies  within  two  Tards  of  the  IVall;  or  this  Man  is. 
beloz-ed  or  hated.  Note,  Such  fort  of  Modes,  as 
this  laft  Example^  are  call'd  external  Denomi^ . 
nations. 

IV.  There  is  a  fourth  Divifion  much  akin  to- 
this,  whereby  Modes  are  faid  to  be  Inherent  or 
Adherent,  that  is.  Proper  or  Improper.  Adherent 
or  improper  Modes  arife  from  the  joining  of  fomc 
accidental  Subftance  to  the  chief  Subject,  which 
yet  may  be  Icparated  from  it  j  fo  when  a  Bowl  is 
wet,  or  a  Boy  is  clothed,  thefe  are  adherent  Modes ; 
for  the  Water  and  the  Cloaths  are  diftin6t  Sub- 
fiances  which  adhere  to  the  Bowl,  or  to  the  Boy : 
But  when  we  fay,  the  Bowl  is  fwift  or  round 'y.^ 
when  we  fay,  the  Boy  is  ftrong  or  witty,  thefe  are 
proper  or  inherent  Modes,  for  they  have  a  fort  of 
Jnbeing  in  the  Subftance  it  felf,   and   don't    a-, 

rife 


C.  IT.  S.  4^  rhe  right  Vfe  of  Reafon.        2  3 

rife  from  the  Addition  of  any  other  Subftance 
to  it. 

V.  ABion  and  PaJJion  are  Modes  or  Manners 
which  belong  to  Sub  fiances,  and  fliouM  not  en- 
tirely be  omitted  here.  When  a  Sm'ttl!^  with  a 
Hammer  ftrikes  a  piece  of  Iron^  the  Hammer  and 
the  Smith  are  both  Agents^  or  Subje«5ts  of  Acti- 
on 5  the  one  is  the  Prime  or  Supreme^  the  other 
the  Subordinate :  The  Iron  is  the  Patient^  or  the 
Subject  of  Paflion,  in  a  philofophical  Senfe,  be- 
caufe  it  receives  the  Operation  of  the  Agent:' 
Tho'  this  Senfe  of  the  Words  Pajfion  and  Pati- 
ent differs  much  from  the  vulgar  Meaning  of 
them  *. 

VI.  The  Jixth  Divifion  of  Modes  may  be  into 
.Phyjical;  i.  c.  Natural,  Civil,  Moral,  and  Super- 
natural. So  when  we  confider  the  Apoftle  Paul, 
who  was  a  little  Man,  a  Roman  by  the  Privilege 
of  his  Birth,  a  Man  of  Virtue  or  Honclly,  and 
an  infpir'd  Apofllej  his  low  Stature  is  a  phyjical 
Mode,  his  being  a  Roman  is  a  ci'vil  Privilege,  his 
Honefly  is  a  moral  Confideration,  and  his  being" 
infpired  is  fupernatural. 

VII.  Modes  belong  either  to  Body  or  to  Spi- 
rit, or  to  both.     Modes  of  Body  belong  only  to. 
Matter  or  to   corporeal  Beings  j  and  thefe  are 
Shape,  Size,  Situation  or  Place,  6cc.     Modes  of 
Spirit  belong  only  to  Minds  j  fuch  are  Kndwledgey, 
AJfent,  Dijfent,  Doubting^  Reafoning,  &c.     Modes 
which  belong  to  both  have  been  fometinies  call'd 

*  Note,  Av^ent  fignifies   the  Doer.   Patient  the   Sufferer,  j4flkn  is  Di'ngt 
Pajfion  is  Suffering,     jijient  and  Affion  have  recain'd  their  original,  and  phi-, 
lofophical  Senfe,  tho'  Patient  and    Paffmi  have  acquired  a  very   different 
meaning  in  common  Language. 

C  4  mixt 


24-  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Vmh 

fnixt  Modes^  and  thefe  are  only  found  in  human 
Nature,  which  is  compounded  both  of  Body  and 
Spirit  i  fuch  arc  Smfation^  Imagination^  Pajfion^ 
§cc.  in  all  which  thefe  is  a  Concurrence  of  the 
Operations  both  of  Mind  and  Body,  /.  e.  of  ani- 
inal  and  intelledual  Nature. 

But  the  Modes  of  Body  may  be  yet  farther  dif^ 
tinguilh'd.     Some  of  them  are  primary  Modes  or 
'^ualities^  for  they  belong  to  Bodies  confider'4  in 
themfelves,  whether  there  were  any  Man  to  take 
Notice  of  them  or  no  j  fuch  are  thofe  beforemen- 
tion'd  (yiz)  Shape ^  Size^  Situation^  &c.     Secon-^ 
dary  ^alities,  or  Modcs^  are  fuch  Ideas  as  we  a- 
fcribe  to  Bodic?  on  account  of  the  various  Itfi- 
prefTions  which  are  made  on  the  Senfes  of  Merx 
by  them  -,   and  thefe  are   call'd  fenfibk  ^alities^ 
y^hich  are  very  numerous  -,  fuch  are  all  Colours^  as 
Red^   Green^  Blue^  &c.   fuch  are   all   Sounds^   as 
Sharpy  Shrilly  Loiid^  Hoarfe  j  all  tafies^  as  Sweety 
Bitter^  Sour  ;  all  Smells^  whether  Pleafmt^   Of-^ 
fenfive^  or  Indifferent  -,  and  ail  I'aSlik  ^ualitieSj  or 
fuch  as  affedb  the  1'ouch  or  Feeling  (viz.)   Heaty 
Cold,  &:c.     Thefe  are   properly  call'd  fecondary 
^alities,  for  tho'  we  are  ready  to  conceive  them 
as  cxifting  in  the  veiy  Bodies  thcmfelves  which 
affeffc  our  Senfes,  yet  true  Philofophy  has  moft  un- 
deniably prov'd  that  all  thefe  are  really   various 
Ideas  or  Perceptions  excited  in  human  Nature, 
by  the  different  Impreilions  that  Bodies  make  up- 
on our  Senfes  by  their  primary  Modes,   i.  e.  by 
Means  of  the  different  Shape,  Size,  Motion  ?ind 
Pofition  of  thofe  little  invifible  Parts  that  com- 
pofe  them.     Thence  it  follows  that  ^fecondary 
Quality  confider'd  as  in  the  Bodies  themfelvcs,  is 
nothing  elfc  but  a  Power  or  Aptitude  to  produce 
fuch  Senfations  in  us.  See  Locke'' ^  Effay  of  the  Un- 
derftandine,  Book  2.  Ch.  8. 

I        -     ■  '  VIII.  1 


C.  II.  S.  5 .    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.       2  5 

VIII.  I  might  add  in  the  laft  Place,  that  as 
Modes  belong  to  Subftances^  fo  there  are  Ibme  alfo 
that  are  but  Modes  of  other  Modes :  For  tho'  they 
fubfift  in  and  by  the  Subjlance^  as  the  original 
Subject  of  them,  yet  they  are  properly  and  di- 
reftly  attributed  to  fome  Mode  of  that  Sub  fiance. 
Motion  is  the  Mode  of  a  Body  j  but  the  Swift' 
nefs^  or  Slownefs  of  it,  or  its  Dir^e^ion  to  the 
North  or  South^  are  but  Modes  of  Motion.  PFalk- 
ing  is  the  Mode  or  Manner  of  Man,  or  of  a 
Beaft  J  but  fFalking  gracefully  imphes  a  Manner 
or  Mode  fupcraddcd  to  that  iVftion.  All  compa- 
rative and  fuperlative  Degrees  of  any  Quality,  are 
the  Modes  of  a  Mode^  as  Swifter  implies  a  greater 
Meafure  of  Swiftnefs. 

It  would  be  too  tedious  here  to  mn  thro'  all 
the  ModeSy  jiccidents^  and  Relations  at  large  that 
belong  to  various  Beings,  and  are  copioufly  treat- 
ed of  in  general^  in  the  Science  call'd  Metaphy^. 
JickSy  or  more  properly,  Ontology :  They  are  alfo 
treated  of  in  particular  in  thofe  Sciences  which 
have  aflum'd  them  feverally  as  their  proper  Sub' 
je^s. 

Sect.     V. 

Of  the  ten  Categories.  Of  Subjlance  modify'' d,. 

WE  have  thus  given  an  Account  of  the  two. 
chief  Objects  of  our  Ideas  (viz.)  Suhjlan- 
cis  and  Modes^  and  their  various  Kinds :  And  in 
thefe  lall  Sedions  we  have  briefly  comprized  the 
grcateft  part  of  what  is  necpfiary  in  the  famous 
ten  Ranks  of  Being,  call'd  the  ten  Predicaments 
or  Categories  oi  jiriftotle^  on  which  there  areend- 
lefs  Volumes  of  Difcourfcs  formed  by  feveral  of 

his 


^6  LOG  I C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

his  Followers :  But  that  the  Reader  may  not  ut- 
terly be  ignorant  of  them,  let  him  know  the 
Names  are  thefe:  Subjiance^  §uantity^  ^ality^ 
Relation^  AHion^  PaJJion^  fVhere^  JVhen^  Situa- 
tion and  Cloathing,  It  would  be  meer  Lo(s  of 
Time  to  fhew  how  loofe,  how  injudicious,  and 
even  ridiculous,  is  this  ten- fold  Divifion  of  Things  ; 
And  whatfoevcr  farther  relates  to  them,  and 
which  may  tend  to  improve  ufeful  Knowledge, 
Ihould  be  fought  in  Ontology  and  in  other  Sci^ 
ences. 

Befides  Suhflance  and  Mode^  fome  of  the  Mo- 
derns would  have  us  confider  the  Subfiance  modi' 
fied^  as  a  diftinft  Object  of  our  Ideas  j,  but  I  think 
there  is  no  more  that  need  be  faid  on  this  Subject, 
than  this,  (yiz)  There  is  fome  Difference  be- 
tween a  Subllance  when  it  is  confider'd  with  all 
its  Modes  about  it,  and  cloath'd  in  all  its  Manners 
of  Exigence,  or  when  it  is  diftinguifh'd  from 
them,  and  conlider'd  naked  without  them. 

Sect.     VI. 

Of  Not-Being. 

AS  Being  is  divided  into  Subjlance  and  Mode^ 
fo  we  may  confider  Not -Being  with  Re- 
gard to  both  thefe. 

I.  Not-Being  is  confider'd  as  excluding  all  Sub- 
jlance^ and  then  all  Modes  are  alfo  ncceflarily  ex- 
cluded, and  this  we  call  pure  Nihility^  or  meer 
Nothing. 

This  Nothing  is  taken  either  in  a  "vulgar  or  a 
fhilofophical  Senfe  >  fo  we  (ay  there  is  nothing  in  the 
Cup^  in  a  vulgar  Senfe,  when  we  mean  there  is 
no  Liquor  in  it  j  but  we  cannot  fay  there  is  nothing 

in 


C.  II.  S.  6.    the  right  Ufe  <?/Reafonr         27 

in  the  Cup^  in  a  ftri6t  philofophical  Senfe,  while 
there  is  jiir  in  it,  and  perhaps  a  Million  of  Rays 

of  Light  are  there. 

II.  Not' Beings  as  it  has  relation  to  Modes  or 
Manners  of  Being,  may  be  confider'd  either  as  a 
meer  Negation^  or  as  a  Privatmi. 

A  Negation  is  the  Abfence  of  that  which  docs 
not  naturally  belong  to  the  Thing  we  are  fpeak- 
ing  of,  or  which  has  no  Right,  Obligation,  or 
Neceffity  to  be  prefent  with  it,  as  when  we  fay 
a  Stone  is  Inanimate^  or  Blind,  or  Deaf,  i.  e.  it 
has  no  Life,  nor  Sight,  or  Hearing  j  or  when  we 
fay, a  Carpenter  or  ^  Fifherman  is  unlearned-,  thefe 
arc  meer  Negations. 

But  a  Privation  is  the  Abfence  of  what  does 
naturally  belong  to  the  Thing  we  are  fpeaking  of^ 
or  which  ought  to  be  prefent  with  it,  as  when 
a  Man,  or  a  Horfe  is  deaf,  or  blind,  or  dead,  or 
if  a  Phyfician  or  a  Divine  be  unlearned,  tliefe  are 
call'd  Privations :  So  the  Sinfulnefs  of  any  human 
A^ion  is  faid  to  be  a  Privation,  for  5'/«  is  that 
want  of  Conformity  to  the  Law  of  God,  which 
ought  to  be  found  in  every  A6tion  of  Man. 

Note,  There  are  fome  Writers  who  make  all 
fort  of  relative  Modes  or  Relations,  as  well  as  all 
external  Denominations  to  be  mecr  Creatures  of  the 
Mind,  and  entia  Rationis,  and  then  they  rank 
them  alfo  under  the  general  Head  of  Not- Beings-, 
but  it  is  my  Opinion,  that  whatfoever  may  be  de- 
termin'd  concerning  meer  meyital  Relations  and 
external  Denominations,  which  fccm  to  havefome- 
thing  leis  of  Entity  or  Being  in  them-,  yet  there 
are  many  real  Relations,  which  ought:  not  to  be 
reduc'd  to  fo  low  a  Clafsj  fuch  are  the  Situation 
of  Bodies,  their  mutual  Dijiances.^  their  particu- 
lar Proportions  and  MeafureSy  the  Notions  of  Fa* 

therhoody 


It  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti, 

tberboody  Brotherhood^  Sonjljip^  6cc.  all  which  are 
relative  Ideas.  The  very  EfTenee  of  Virtue  ox 
Holinefs  conflfts  in  the  Conformity  of  our  A^ti^ 
ons  to  the  Rule  of  Right  Reafon,  or  the  Law 
of  God  J  The  Nature  and  EfTenee  of  Sincerity 
is  the  Conformity  of  our  Words  and  A6bions  to 
our  Thoughts,  all  which  are  but  meer  Relations 'y 
and  I  think  we  muft  not  reduce  fuch  pofitive  Be- 
ings as  Piety ^  and  Virtue^  and  Truth^  to  the  Rank 
ot  Non- Entities^  which,  have  nothing  real  in  them, 
tho'  Sin  (or  rather  the  Sinfulnefs  of  an  Aftion) 
may  be  properly  call'd  a  Not-being^  for  it  is  a  want 
of  Piety  and  Firtue.  This  is  the  moll  ufual  and  per- 
haps the  julleft  Way  of  reprefcnting  thefe  Matters. 


CHAP.     III. 

Of  the  federal  Sorts  of  Terceftions  or 

Ideas, 

IDEAS  may  be  divided  with  Regard  to  their 
Original^  their  Nature^  their  Obje^s  and  their 

Qualities. 

S  E  C  T.       I. 

Of  fenjtbk^  fpiritual^  and  abjlra^ed  Ideas. 

THERE  has  been  a  great  Controverfy  ^^ 
about  the  Origin  of  Ideas ^  (viz.)  whether 
any  of  our  Ideas  are  innate  or  no,  i.  e.  born 
with  us,  and  naturally  belonging  to  our  Minds. 
Mr.  Locke  utterly  denies  it ;  others  as  pofitive- 
ly  affirm  it.  Now,  though  this  Controverfy 
may  be  compromifed,  by  allowing  that  there  is  a 
Senfe,  wherein  our  firft  Ideas  of  fome  Things 
jnay  be  faid  to  be  inn.it e^  yet  it  does  not  belong 

toi 


C .  III.  S.  I .    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon:       2% 

to  this  Place  and  Bufinefs  to  have  that  Point  de- 
bated at  large,  nor  will  it  hinder  our  Purfuit  of 
the  prefent  W  ork  to  pafs  it  over  in  Silence. 
.  There  is  fufficient  Ground  to  fay,  that  all  cur 
Ideas,  with  Regard  to  their  Original^  may  be  di- 
vided into  fenjible^  fpiritual^  and  abftra^ed  I- 
deas. 

Senftble'ox  corporeal  Ideas  are  deriv'd  originally 
from  our  Senfes,  and  from  the  Communication 
which  the  Soul  has  with  the  animal  Body  in  this 
prefent  State  j  fuch  are  the  Notions  we  frame  of 
all  Colours^  Sounds^  Tafies^  Figures^  or  Shapes  and 
Motions ',  for  our  Senfes  being  converfant  about 
particular  fenfible  Obje6ts  become  the  Occafions 
of  feveral  diftin6fc  Perceptions  in  the  Mind  5  and 
thus  we  come  by  the  Ideas  of  Tellow,  fFhite, 
Heat^  Cold^  Sofly  Hard,  Bitter,  Sweet,  and  al^ 
thofe  which  we  call  fenfible  ^alities.  All  the 
Ideas  which  we  have  of  Body,  and  the  feveral 
Modes  and  Properties  that  belong  to  it,  feem  to 
be  deriv'd  from  Senfation. 

And  howfoever  thefe  may  be  treafured  up  in 
the  Memory,  and  by  the  Work  of  Fancy  may  be 
increased,  diminifh'd,  compounded,  divided,  and 
diverfified,  (which  we  are  ready  to  call  our  In- 
ventiori)  yet  they  all  derive  their  firll  Nature  and 
Being  from  fomething  that  has  been  let  into  our 
Minds  by  one  or  other  of  our  Senfes.  If  I  think 
of  a  golden  Mountain,  or  a  Sea  of  liquid  Fire,  yet 
the  lingle  Ideas  of  Sea,  Fire,  Mountain,  and  Gold 
came  into  my  Thoughts  at  firft  by  Senfation  j  the 
Mind  has  only  compounded  them. 

*  Spiritual  or  intellectual  Ideas  are  thofe  which 
we  gain  by  reflc6ling  on  the  Nature  and  A6lions 

*  Note^  Her*  the  Word  Spiritual  is  ufed  in  3  meet  natural,  and  aoc  in  * 
je)igiou$  Seofe. 

of 


S^  LO  G  I  C  K:  Ofy        PartL 

of  our  own  Souls^  and  turning  our  Thoughts 
within  our  felves,  and  obferving  what  is  tranf- 
afted  in  our  own  Minds.  Such  are  the  Ideas  wc 
have  of  Thought^  AJfent^  Dtjffent^  J^^gi^gt  R^^- 
fon^  Knowledge^  Underftanding^  IVill^  Love^  Fear^ 
Hope. 

By  Senfation  the  Soul  contemplates  Things  (as 
it  were)  out  of  it  fclf,  and  gains  corporeal  Repre- 
fentations  ox  fenftbk  Ideas:  By  Reflexion  the  Soul 
contemplates  it  fclf,  and  Things  within  it  felf,  and 
by  this  Means  it  gains  fpiritual  Ideas,  or  Repre- 
fentations  of  Things  intelle^iual. 

Here  it  may  be  noted,  that  tho*  the  firft  Ori* 
ginal  of  thefe  two  forts  of  Ideas,  {viz.)  Senfible 
and  Spiritual^  may  be  entirely  owing  to  thcfe 
two  Principles,  Senfation  and  RefleUion^  yet  the 
Recollection  and  frefh  Excitation  of  them  may  be 
owing  to  a  thoudmd  other  Occafions  and  Occur- 
rences of  Life.  We  could  never  inform  a  Man 
who  was  born  Blind  or  Deaf,  what  we  mean  by 
the  Words  J'elhw^  Blue^  Red^  or  by  the  Words 
Loud  or  Shrillj  nor  convey  any  jull  Ideas  of  thefe 
Things  to  his  Mind,  by  all  the  Powers  of  Lan- 
guage, unlefs  he  has  experienc'd  thofe  Senfations 
of  Sound  and  Colour  j  nor  could  we  ever  gain 
the  Ideas  of  Thou^ht^  Judgment.,  Reafon.,  Doubt' 
ing^  Hoping^  6cc.  by  all  the  Words  that  Man 
could  invent,  without  turning  our  Thoughts  in- 
ward upon  the  Actions  of  our  own  Souls.  Yet 
when  once  we  have  attain'd  t  hefe  Ideas  by  Senfa- 
tion and  Reflexion.,  they  may  be  excited  afrefh  by 
the  Ufe  of  Names,  \Vords,  Signs,  or  by  any- 
thing elfe  that  has  been  conne6led  with  them  ini 
QUr  Thoughts  -,  for  when  two  or  more  Ideas  have 
been  aiTociated  together,  whether  it  be  by  Cuf- 
tcrm,  or  Accident,  or  Deflgn,  the  one  prefently 
brings  the  other  to  Mind. 

Befidjc^ 


C.  m.  S.  I .    the  right  life  of  Rcafon:        5 1 

Befides  thefe  two  which  we  have  nam'd,  there 
is  a  third  fort  of  Ideas,  which  are  commonly  call'd 
abfira£led  Ideas^  becaufe  tho'  the  original  Ground 
or  Occafion  of  them  may  be  Senfation^  or  Re- 
fieUion^  or  hoth^  yet  thefe  Ideas  are  fram'd  by  an- 
other A6t  of  the  Mind  which  we  ufually  call  Ab- 
JiraSiion.  Now  the  ff^ord  Abftra^lon  lignifies  a 
withdrawing  fome  Parts  of  an  Idea  from  other 
Parts  of  it^  by  which  Means  fuch  abjira5fed  Ideas 
are  form'd,  as  neither  reprefent  any  Thing  corpo- 
real nor  fpiritualy  i.  e.  any  thing  peculiar  or  pro- 
per to  Mind  or  Body.  Now  thefe  are  of  two 
kinds. 

Some  of  thefe  abjira^ed  Ideas  are  the  mofl  ab- 
folute^  general  and  univerlal  Conceptions  of  Things 
confider'd  in  themfelves,  without  Refpe<51:  to  o- 
thers,  fuch  as  Entity  or  Beings  and  Not-being^  Ef- 
fence^  Exijience^  A5ij  Power ^  Subjiance^  Mode,  Ac- 
cident, &c. 

The  other  fort  of  abflraSied  Ideas  is  relatiz'e,  as 
when  we  compare  feveral  Things  together,  and 
conlider  meerly  the  Relations  of  one  Thing  to 
another,  entirely  dropping  the  Subjeds  of  thofe 
Relations,  whether  they  be  corporeal  or  fpiritual ; 
fuch  are  our  Ideas  of  Ca:^fe,  EJfec%  Likenefs,  Un- 
likenefs.  Subject,  Obje6l,  Identity,  or  Samenefs, 
and  Contrariety,  Order,  and  other  Things  which 
are  treated  of  in  Ontology. 

Molt  of  the  'TeriJis  of  Art  in  feveral  Sciences 
may  be  rank'd  under  this  Head  o'i  abJlraEled  Ideas, 
as  N'oim,  Pronoun,  Verb,  in  Grammar,  and  the 
feveral  Particles  of  Speech,  as  wherefore,  there- 
foret  when,  how,  altho\  howfoe'uer,  &:c.  So  Co7i- 
ne^ions,  Tranfitions,  Similitudes,  Tropes,  and  their 
various  Forms  in  Rhetorick. 

Thefe  abflraHed  Ideas,  whether  abfohite  or  re^ 
10've,  cannot  fo  properly  be  faid  to  derive  their 

immediate, 


32  LOGIC  K:  Or,        PartL 

immediate,  compleat  and  diftin6fc  Original,  either 
from  Sen/at  ion  or  RefleElion  :  (i.)  Becaufe  the 
Nature  and  the  Aftions  both  of  Body  or  Spirit 
give  us  Oecafion  to  frame  exa£bly  the  fame  Ideas 
of  Ejffence^  Mode^  Cau/e,  Effe5l^  Likenefs^  Con- 
trariety^ &c.  Therefore  thefe  cannot  be  call'd 
either  fenjible  or  fpiritual  Ideas,  for  they  are  not 
exad:  Reprefentations  either  of  the  peculiar  ^alities  Of 
j^^ims  of  Spirit  or  Body^  but  feem  to  be  a  diftin6t 
kind  of  Idea  fram'd  in  the  Mind,  to  reprefent 
our  mofl  general  Conceptions  of  Things  or  their 
Relations  to  one  another^  without  any  Regard  to 
their  Natures,  whether  they  be  corporeal  or  fpi- 
ritual.  And  (2.)  the  fame  general  Ideas  of  Cauje 
and  Effe^y  Likenefs^  ^c.  may  be  transferr'd  to  a 
thoufand  other  kinds  of  Being,  whether  bodily 
or  fpiritual,  beiides  thofe  from  whence  we  firil 
deriv'd  them :  Even  thofe  abJlraSied  Ideas^  which 
might  be  firfl  occafion'd  by  Bodies^  may  be  as 
properly  afterward  attributed  to  Spirits. 

Now,  tho'  Mr.  Locke  fuppofcs  Senfation  and 
RefleEiion  to  be  the  two  only  Springs  of  all  Ideas,- 
and  that  thefe  two  are  fufficient  to  furnifh  our 
Minds  with  all  that  rich  Variety  of  Ideas  which 
we  have;  yet  Abjira^ion  is  certainly  a  different 
A6t  of  the  Mind,  whence  thefe  abfira£led  Ideas 
have  their  Original;  tho'  perhaps  Senfation  or 
Reflection  may  furnifh  us  with  all  the  firll:  Ob-^ 
je6ts  and  Occallons  whence  thefe  abflra£ied  Ideas 
are  excited  and  deriv'd.  Nor  in  this  Senfe  and 
View  of  Things  can  I  think  Mr.  Locke  himfelf 
would  deny  my  Reprefentation  of  the  Original 
ol:  abjira^tcd  Idcas-^  nor  forbid  them  to  lh\nd  for  a 
diilind  Species, 


Sect. 


C. in.  S.  2.     the  right Ufe  vf  Reafon:       %i 

S  E  C  T.     II. 

OfJiTnpk  and  complex^  compound  and  colleSihe  Ideas. 

IDEAS  confider'd  in  their  Nature^  are  either 
fimplc  or  complex. 

Ajimple  Iclea^  is  one  uniform  Idea  which  can- 
not be  divided  or  dilHnguifh'd  by  the  Mind  of 
Man  into  two  or  more  Ideas  j  fuch  are  a  Multi- 
tude of  our  Senfations,  as  the  Idea  of  Sweety  Bit* 
ter^  Cold,  Heat,  White,  Red,  Blue,  Hard,  Soft, 
Motion,  JR^ej}-,  and  perhaps,  Extenfion  and  Duration : 
Such  are  alio  many  of  our  fpiritual  Ideas  3  fuch 
as  Thought,  IVill,  l-ViJJj,  Knowledge,  dec. 

A  complex  Idea  is  made  by  joining-two  or  more 
(imple  Ideas  together,  as  a  Square,  a  Triangle,  a 
Cube,  a  Pen,  a  Table,  Reading,  TVriting,  Truths 
Faljhood,  a  Body,  a  Man,  a  Horfc,  an  Angel,  a 
hea'-jy  Body,  a  fwift  Horfe,  &:c.  Every  Thing 
that  can  be  divided  by  the  Mmd  into  two  or  more 
Ideas  is  call'd  complex. 

(Complex  Ideas  are  often  confider'd  as  fmgle  and 
diftinEi  Beings,  tho'  they  may  be  made  up  of  fe- 
veral  fimple  Ideas  j  fo  a  Body,  a  Spirit,  a  Houfe, 
a  Tree,  a  Flower.  But  when  feveral  of  thefe  I- 
deas  of  a  different  Kind  are  join'd  together,  which 
are  wont  to  be  confider'd  as  diftin6t  fingle  Beings, 
this  is  call'd  a  compounded  Idea,  whether  thefe  u- 
nited  Ideas  be  fimple  or  complex.  So  a  Man  is 
compounded  of  Body  and  Spirit,  fo  Mithridate  is 
a  compound  Medicine,  becaufe  it  is  made  of  many 
different  Ingredients:  This  I  have  fhewn  under 
the  Do6trineof  Subftances.  And  Modes  alfo  may 
be  compounded  j  Harmony  is  a  compound  Idea, 
made  up  of  different  Sounds  united;  fo  feveral  dif- 
ferent  Firtues  muft  be  united    to  make  up  the 

D  compounded 


^  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or;        2ml^ 

compounded  Idea  or  Character,  either  of  a  Hero^ 
or  a  Saint. 

But  when  many  Ideas  of  the  fame  Kind  arc 
jojnM  together  and  united  in  one  Name,  or  un^ 
der  one  View,  it  is  call'd  a  colle^live  Idea  >  fo  an 
Armj^  or  a  Parliament^  is  a  Colle^ion  of  Men> 
a  Di^ionary  or  Nomenclatura  is  a  CoUe^ion  of 
Wordsj  a  Flock  is  a  Colkdion  of  Sheep,  a  Fo" 
refty  or  Grofve-i  a  CoUcdion  of  Trees ;  a  Heap  is 
a  CoJle6tion  of  Sand,  or  Corn,  or  Duft,  (^c,  a 
City  '}$  a  Colle£bion  of  Houfes  j  a  Nefegay  ijs  a 
Collection  of  Flowers  5  a  Months  or  a  l<?i?r,  13  a 
C0lk<iion  of  Days,  and  a  thoufand  is  a  Cojle&i- 
pj^  of  Units. 

"The  precile  Diflferenee  between  a  compound  and 
eelle^ive  Idea  is  this,  that  a  compound  Idea  unites 
Things  of  a  different  Kind,  but  a  colle^ive  Idea 
Things  of  the  {im>e  Kind :  tho*  this  Diftin^tion 
in  fomc  C^s  is  vm  accurately  obferv'd,  and  Cuftoi^ 
oftentimes  «fcs  the  Word  Compound  for  Coik^ive^ 

Sect.    Ill, 

Of  univerfal  and  particular  Ideas,  real  aj^ 

imaginary. 

IDEAS,  according  to  their  Ohje^$^  may  firft 
be  divided  into  particular  or  univerfal. 

A  particular  Idea  is  that  which  reprefents  one 
Thing  only. 

Sometimes  the  one  Thii^  is  reprefented  in  a 
loofe  and  indeterminate  manner,  as  when  w€  fay, 
fome  Man^  any  Man^  one  Man^  amther  Mm  i 
fome  Horfe^  any  H&rfe-y  one  City^ov  another^  which 
is  call'd  by  the  Schools  InSviduum  Fagum. 

Sometimes  the  particuiar  Idea  reprefests  one 
Thing  in  a  determinate  manner,  mi  then  it  is 
.  caird 


C.  III.  S.  3.    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.       $5 

eail'd  ^fmgular  Idea;  (lich  is  Bucephalus  or  y^kx* 
anikr'sHorCe,  C/Vf re  the  Orator,  Feter  the  Apo- 
ftlc,  the  Palace  of  Ferfailles,  this  Book,  that  Rir 
ver,  the  neiu  Foreft,  or  the  City  of  London :  That 
Idea  which  reprefents  one  particular  determinate 
Thing  to  me  is  call'd  a  fingular  Idea^  whether  it 
be  iimple,  or  complex,  or  compound. 

The  Obje^  of  any  particular  Idea,  as  well  as 
the  Idea  it  feif,  is  fometimes  call'd  an  Indvuidual : 
So  Peter  is  an  individual  Man,  London  is  an  indi- 
vidual City.  So  this  Book,  one  Horfe,  another  Horfe^ 
arc  all  Indimduals,  tho'  the  Word  Indiividual  isi 
more  uTually  limited  to  one  fingular,  certain,  and 
determined  Obje(5fc. 

An  univerfal  Idea  is  that  which  reprefents  a 
common  Nature  agreeing  to  feveral  particular 
Things  i  fo  a  Horfc,  a  Man,  or  a  Book,  are  call'd 
uniierfal  Ideas,  becaufe  they  agree  to  all  Hbrfes^ 
Men,  or  Books. 

And  I  think  it  is  not  amifs  to  intimate,  in  this 
Place,  that  thefe  unh'ocrfal  Ideas  arc  form'd  by 
that  Act  of  the  Mind  which  is  call'd  j^bjlratiiony 
i.  e.  a  withdrawing  foine  part  of  an  Idea  froni 
other  Parts  of  it :  For  when  fingular  Ideas  are 
iirll  let  into  the  Mind  by  Senlkion  or  Reflcft-ionj 
then,  in  order  to  make  them  unl^-erfal,  we  leave 
out,  or  drop,  all  thofe  peculiar  and  determinate 
Characters,  Qualities,  Modes,  or  Circumllances, 
which  belong  meerly  to  any  particulai'  individual 
Being,  and  by  which  it  differs  from  other  Beings  j 
■xndi  we  only  contemplate  thofe  Properties  of  itj" 
wherein  it  ^rees  with  other  Beings. 

Tho'  it  mult  be  contefs'd,  that  the  Name  of 
abjlractsd  Ideas  is  fonietimes  attributed  to  univer- 
fal  Ideas,  both  fcnfible  and  fpiritual,  yet  this  ^k- . 
ftratlion  is  not  lb  great,  as  when  we  drop  out  of 
our  Idea  every  fenfihk  or  fpiritual  Reprefentationj* 

D  2r  an<i 


^d        .       L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      .  Part  Ij 

and  retain  nothing  but  the  moll  general  and  ab- 
folute  Conceptions  of  Things,  or  their  meer  Re-* 
lations  to  one  another,  without  any  Regard  to 
their  particular  Natures^  whether  they  be  fenftbk 
oxfpiritual.  And  it  is  to  this  kind  of  Concepti- 
ons we  more  properly  give  the  Name  of  abfiraSi- 
ed  Ideas  as  in  the  firll  be6lion  of  this  Chapter. 

An  unherfal  Idea  is  either  general  or  fpecial. 

A  general  Idea  is  call'd  by  the  Schools  a  Genus  ^ 
and  it  is  one  common  Nature  agreeing  to  feveral 
other  common  Natures.  So  Animal  is  a  Genus^ 
becaufe  it  agrees  to  Horfe^  Lion^  Whale^  Butterfly^ 
which  are  alfo  common  Ideas  5  fo  Fiji)  is  a  Genus^ 
becaufe  it  agrees  to  ^roiit^  Herrings  Crab^  which 
are  common  Natures  alfo. 

A  fpecial  Idea  is  call'd  by  the  Schools,  a  SpC' 
cies  -y  it  is  one  common  Nature  that  agrees  to  fe- 
veral lingular  or  individual  Beings  y  fo  Horfe  is  a 
fpecial  Idea^  or  a  Species^  becaufe  it  agrees  to  Bu- 
cephalus^ Trott  and  Snoiv-ball.  City  is  ^fpecial  /- 
dea^  for  it  agrees  to  London^  Paris^  Brifiol. 

ISfote-y  1%  Some  of  thefc  Univerfals  are  Genus's, 
if  compar'd  with  lefs  common  Natures  >  and  they 
are  Species's^  if  compar'd  with  Natures  more  com- 
mon. So  Bird  is  a  Genus^  if  compar'd  with  Ea' 
gle,  Sparrow^  Raven^  which  are  alfo  common 
Natures:  But  it  is  a  Species^  if  compar'd  with 
the  more  general  Nature,  Animal.  The  fame  may 
be  faid  of  Fifi^  Beaft^  &c. 

This  fort  of  univerfal  Ideas,  which  may  cither 
be  confider'd  as  a  Genus,  or  a  Species,  is  call'd 
Subaltern :  But  the  higheft  Genus,  which  is  never 
ii  Species,  is  call'd  the  mojl  general,  and  the  low- 
ed: Species,  which  is  never  a  Genus,  is  call'd  the 
fmft  fpsciah 


C.  III.  S.  s'.  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:        37 

Note^  Il'^'y,  In  univerfiil  Ideas  it  is  proper  to 
conllder  their  Comprehenfion  and  their  Extent 
fion  *. 

The  Comprel^nfion  of  an  Idea  regards   all  the" 

eflential  Modes  and  Properties  of  it :  So  Body  in 

its  Comp'ehenfion  takes  in  Solidity^  Figure^  ^,an-' 

tity^  Mobility^  &c.     So  a  EovjI  in  its  Comprehen- 

fion  includes  Roundnejs^  Volubility^  &c.  , 

The  Eiitenfion  of  an  univerfal  Idea  regards  all 
the  particular  Kinds  and  lingle  Beings  that  are 
contain'd  under  it.  So  a  Body  in  its  Extenfion  in- 
cludes Sun^  Moon^  Star^  Wood^  Iron^  Plant^  A- 
nimalj  &c.  which  are  feveral  Species^  or  Indi- 
'viduah'i  under  the  general  Name  of  Body.  So 
a  B 012)1^  in  its  Extenfion^  includes  a  ivoode?i  Bowl, 
a  brafs  Bowl,  a  luhite  and  a  black  Bowl,  a  heaiy 
Bov/l,  i^c.  and  all  Kinds  of  Bowls,  together  with 
all  the  particular  individual  Bowls  in  the  World. 

Note^  The  Comprehenfion  of  an  Idea  is  fome- 
times  taken  in  fo  large  a  Senfe,  as  not  only  to  in- 
clude the  elTential  Attributes,  but  all  the|Troper- 
ties,  Modes  and  Relations  whatfoever,  that  belong 
to  any  Being,  as  will  appear  Chap.  VI. 

This  Account  of  Genus  and  i>pecies  is  part  of 
that  fimous  Doftrine  of  Unrjerfah^  which  is 
taught  in  the  Schools,  with  diverfe  other  For- 
malities belonging  to  it;  for  it  is  in  this  Place 
that  they  introduce  Difference^  which  is  the  pri- 
mary eltcntial  Mode,  and  Property  or  the  fecon- 
dary  eflential  Mode,  and  Accident  or  the  accidental 
Mode ;  and  thefe  they  call  the  fii;e  Predicables^  be- 
caufe  every  thing  that  is  affirm'd  concerning  any 
Being,  mull  be  either  the  Genus^  the  Species^  the  Dif- 
ference^ fome  Property.^  or  fome  Accident :  But^ what 

.     *  Note.,  The  Word  ExtenJ^on  here  is  taken  in  a  meer  logical  Senfe>  ar^J^ 
sec  in  a  {hjjical  and  mathematical  Senfe. 

.:.■   ^  D  3  farther 


|8  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Partt; 

fairther  is  necefTary  to  be  faid  concerning  thefe 
Things,  will  be  mentiofi'd  when  we  treat  of  De-» 
jinition. 

Having  jfiilifh'd  the  Do£trine  of  uni'verfal  and 
particular  Ideas^  I  fhould  take  Notice  of  another 
Division  of  them,  which  alfo  hath  Refpe6t  to 
their  OBjcBsy  and  that  is,  they  are  either  real  or 
imaginary. 

Real  Hem  are  ftich  as  have  a  juft  Foundation 
in  Mature,  and  havfe  feal  Objects,  or  Exemplars, 
Whifeh  efidj  or  do,  or  thay  actually  exift,  accord- 
ing to  thi^  prefent  State  and  Nature  of  Things  j 
fueh  arfe  i\\  our  Ideas  of  Long^  Broads  Swifty 
Siow^  JVood^  Iro'n^  Men,  Horfes^  Thoughts,  Spi- 
rits^ k  cruel  Mafter,  a  proud  Beggar,  a  Man  fe- 
ven  Foot  high. 

lifndgmary  Ideas,  which  aire  alfo-call'd/^w^^y?/- 
cal^  or  chimcHcal,  are  fuch  as  are  made  by  enlarge 
ihg,  diminiihirig,  uniting,  dividing  real  Ideas  in 
the  Mind,  ih  fuch  a  manner,  as  ho  Objefts,  or 
Exemplars,  did  or  will  fever  exift,  according  to 
the  prefent  courfe  of  Natiire,  tho'  the  feyeral 
Parts  of  thefe  Ideas  are  borrowed  from  real  Ob- 
jects} fiieh  are  the  Conceptions  we  hare  of  a 
'GeMauy,  -x  Satyr,  vl golden  Mount ain,2. flying  Horfcy 
it  ij)og  Without  a  Head;  a  Buli  iefs  than  a  Moufe, 
or  a  Moufe  as  big  ds  a  Bull,  and  a  Man  twenty 
Foot  high. 

Sbme  of  th&fe  fMtaflic  Ideas  are  Poffihle,  that 
}S,  they  are  not  iltterly  inconfiftent  ill  the  Na- 
ture of  Thirigs  5  and  therefore  it  is  within  the 
i^feaeh  of  Divinfe  Power  to  make  fuch  Objects  5 
iuch  ilre  mbit  of  the  Inftancfes  already  given: 
But  Mfofjihks  catry  an  utter  Inconfi Hence  in  thfe 
Ideas  which  are  join'd  >  fuch  arc  felf-a^ive  Mat- 
ier,  and  MfiTiife  bi:  eternal  Men,  a  pious  Man  with- 
Qut  Honefly,  or  Heaven  without  Holincfs. 

Sect. 


cms. 4.    The  right Ufe cf  ^x^(on:       fp 

Sect.    IV. 

The  Divifuin  of  Ideas^  luith  Regard  to  iheir 

^alities. 

I  Deis,  with  Regard  to  their  ^alities^  afford 
us  thefe  feveral  Divifions  of  them.  i.  They 
are  either  clear  and  dijiin^^  or  obfcure  and  cdnfujed. 
1.  They  are  vulgar  or  learned,  j.  They  ate  fer- 
feSl  or  imperfect.     4.  They  are  true  or  falfe. 

I.  Our  Ideas  are  either  clear  and  difimSt^  or  ob- 
fcure and  confufed. 

Several  Writers  have  diftinguiihed  the  dear 
Ideas  from  thofe  that  are  diftin£l;  and  the  confus'd 
Ideas  from  thofe  that  are  obfcure  -,  and  it  mull  be 
acknowledg'd  there  may  be  fome  Difference  be- 
tween them }  for  it  is  the  Ckarnefs  of  Ideas  fof 
the  moft  part  makes  them  difiinil^  and  the  Ob- 
fiur'tty  of  Ideas  is  one  thing  that  will  always  britjg 
%  fort  of  Confufton  into  them.  Yet  when  Ihde 
Writers  come  to  talk  largely  upon  this  Subje^, 
and  to  explain  and  adjuft  their  Meaning  with 
great  Nicety,  I  have  generally  found  that  they 
did  not  keep  up  the  Diftindion  they  firft  de* 
fign'd,  but  they  confound  the  one  with  the  o- 
ther.  I  {hall  therefore  treat  of  dear  or  difiinTl 
Ideaiy  as  one  and  the  fame  fort,  and  obfcure^  ox 
(onfufed  Ideas,  as  another. 

A  char  and  diftinU  Idea  is  that  wliich  represents 
the  Objed  to  the  Mind  with  full  Evidence  and 
Strength,  and  plainly  diftiiiguiihes  it  from  all  o- 
ther  Objefts  whatfbever. 

An  obfcure  and  confufed  Idea  reprefents  the  Ob- 
jed  either  fo  faintly,  fo  imperfeftly,  or  fo  ming- 
led with  other  Ideas,  that  the  Objeft  of  it  doth 
not  appear  plain  to  the  Mind,  nor  purely  in  its 

P  4  Qwa 


.  •  /':  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti: 

own  Nature,   nor  fufficiently  diftinguilli'd  from 
other  Things. 

When  we  fee  the  Sea  and  Sky  Clearer  at  Hand^ 
we  have  a  clear  and  difiinB  Idea  of  each  5  but 
when  we  look  far  towards  the  Horizon,  efpeci- 
ally   in  a  mifty  I^^y?  our  Ideas  of  both  are  but 
obfcure^nd  confufed',  for  we  know  not  which  is 
iSi?^  and  which  is  Sky.     So  when  we  look  at  the 
Colours  of  the  Rainbow  we  have  a   clear  Idea  of 
the  red^  the  blue^  the  green  in  the  middle  of  their 
ieveral  Arches,  and  a  difiintl  Idea  too,  while  the 
Eye  fixes  there  -,  but  when  we  confider  the  Bor- 
der of  thofe  Colours,  they  fo  run  into  one  ano- 
ther that  renders  their  Ideas  confufed  and  obfcitrc. 
So  the  Idea  which  we  have  of  our  Brother^  or 
our  Friend^  whom  we  fee  daily,  is  clear  and  di- 
flinty  but  when  the  Abfcncc  of  many  Years  has 
injured  the  Idea,  it  becomes  obfcure  and  confufed. 
.   'Note  here^  that  fome  of  our  Ideas  may  be  ve- 
ry clear  and  dijiinci  in  one  Refpccl,  and  very  ob' 
fcure  and  confiifed  in  another.     So  when  we  fpeak 
of  a  Chiliagonum^   or  a  Figure  of  a  thoufand  j^n- 
gles^  we  may  have  a  clear  and  diftintt  rational  Idea 
of  the  Number  one  thoufand  Angles^  for  we  can 
dcmonftrate  various  Properties  concerning  it  by 
Reafon:  But  the  Image^  or  fenftble  Idea^  which 
\vc  have  of  the  Figure,  is  but  confufed  and  obfcure^ 
for  we  cannot  precifcly  diitinguifli   it  by  Fancy 
from  the  Image  of  a  Figure  that  has  nine  hundred 
jingles  or  nine  hundred  and  ninety.     So  when  we 
fpcak  of  the  Infnite  Divifibility  of  Matter^    we 
always  keep. in  oarMmds  a  very  clear  and  dil]:in6t 
Idea  of  Divifton  and  Di'viftbility :  But  after  we 
have  made  a  little  Progrcfs  in  dividing,  and  come 
lo-  Parts  that  are  far  too  fmall  for  the  reach  of  our 
Senfes,  then  our  Ideas ^  or  fenftble  Images  of  thefe 
lutle  I^odies,  bgcpme  obfcure  and  indifiin^^    and 


C.  in.  S.  4^    the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:      41 

the  Idea  of  Infinite  is  very  ohfcure^  imperfeH  and 
confiifed. 

II.  Ideas  are  either  vulgar  or  learned.  A  'vul- 
gar Idea  reprefents  to  us  the  molt  obvious  and  fen- 
fible  Appearances  that  are  contain'd  in  the  Objecb 
of  them  :  But  a  learned  Idea  penetrates  farther 
into  the  Nature,  Properties,  Reafons,  Caufes  and 
EfFefe  of  things.  "  This  is  bell  illuftrated  by  fome 
Examples. 

It  is  a  'vulgar  Idea  that  we  have  of  a  RalnhWy 
when  we  conceive  a  large  Arch  in  the  Clouds 
made  up  of  various  Colours  parallel  to  each  o- 
ther:  But  it  is  a  learned  Idea  which  aPhilofopher 
has,  when  he  confiders  it  as  the  various  RefTle6bi- 
ons  and  Refractions  of  Sun-Beams,  in  Drops  of 
filling  Rain.  So  it  is  a  vulgar  Idea  which  wc 
have  of  the  Colours  of  folid  Bodies^  when  we  per- 
ceive them  to  be,  as  it  were,  a  red,  or  blue,  or 
green  Tin61:ure  of  the  Surface  of  thofc  Bodies: 
But  it  is  a  philofophical  Idea^  when  we  conlider 
the  various  Colours  to  be  nothing  elfe  but  differ- 
ent Senfations  excited  in  us  by  the  variouily  re- 
fraded  Rays  of  Light,  reflected  on  our  Eyes  in 
a  different  Manner,  according  to  the  different 
Shape,  or  Situation  of  the  Particles  of  which  the 
Surfices  of  thofc  Bodies  are  compos'd.  It  is  a 
'vulgar  Idea  which  we  have  of  a  IFatch  or  Clock^ 
when  we  conceive  of  it  as  a  pretty  Inftrumenr, 
made  to  fhew  us  the  Hour  of  the  Day :  But  it  is 
a  learned  Idea  which  the  IVatch-Maker  has  of  it, 
who  knows  all  the  feveral  Parts  of  it,  the  Spring, 
the  Balance,  the  Chain,  the  Wheels,  their  Axles, 
i^c.  together  with  the  various  Connections  and 
Adjullments  of  each  Parr,  whence  the  exaft  and 
uniform  Motion  of  the  Index  is  deriv'd,  which 
points  to  the  Minute  or  the  Hour.  So  when  a 
-,  ■  common 


Jt,2  LOG  I  C  K:  Or,       Parti. 

common  Underftanding  reads  FtrgiVs  jEneid,  he 
has  but  a  vulgar  Idea  oF  that  Poem,  yet  his  Mind 
is  naturally  entertain'd  with  the  Story,  and  his 
Ears  with  the  Verfe:  But  when  a  Critick^  or  a 
^an  who  has  Skill  in  Poefy,  reads  it,  he  has  a 
iearned  Idea  6f  its  peculiar  Beauties,  he  taftes  and 
relifhcs  a  fuperior  Pleafurcj  he  admires  the  Ho- 
ffian  Poet,  and  wifhes  |ie  had  known  the  Chrifii^ 
an  Theology^  which  would  have  fumifh'd  him  with 
nobler  Materials  and  Machines  than  all  the  ffea" 
then  Idols. 

It  is  with  a  'uulg^r  Idea  that  the  World  beholds 
the  Cartons  of  Raphael  at  Hamptoft-Courty  and 
^very  6nt  feels  his  Share  of  Pleafiire  and  Enter- 
tainment :  But  a  Painter  contemplates  the  Won- 
ders of  that  Italian  Pencil,  and  fees  a  thoufand 
Beauti^  in  titem,  Which  the  vulgar  Eya  neglect- 
ed :  His  learned  ideas  give  him  a  tranfcendcnt  De- 
light^ and  yet,  at  the  fame  time,  difcovcr  the 
Blcmiihes  Which  the  common  Gazer  never  ob- 

III.  Ideas  are  either  pevfeSl  or  imperfeSI: , 
which  are  otherwife  call'd  adequate  or  inade- 
quate. 

Thole  are  adequate  Ideas  which  per fe£tly  rcprc- 
fent  their  Archetypes  or  Objects.  Inadequate  /- 
fd^as  are  but  a  partial,  or  incompleat  Reprefenta- 
tion  of  thbfe  Archetypes  to  which  they  are  re- 
rerf'd. 

All  €>ur  fiinpU  Ideas  are  in  fome  Senfe  adequate 
br  perfe&^  hcciiuCe  Jimple  Ideas^  confider'd  ftieerly 
a«  our  firll  Perceptions,  have  no  Parts  in  them  : 
So  we  may  be  faid  to  haVe  a  perfe6t  Idea  of 
fVhife^  Blatk^  Swiet^  Smr^  Lengthy  Lights  Mo- 
tien^  ReH^  &c.  We  have  alfo  a  perfect  Idea  of 
Various  figures^  ^s  a  ^rian^k^  a  Square,  a  C>/m* 

der^ 


C.nLS.4:    the  right  Ufe  o/Kt^Conl        4j 

dei^y  a  Cube^  a  Sphere,  whieh  are  eompkx  Ideas : 
But  our  Idea  or  Image  &{  a  Figure  $f  a  thonfand 
Sides,  our  Idea  of  the  Git^  of  Lenderti  or  the  Pow* 
ers  of  a  Loadjiene,  are  very  impefteft,  as  well  as 
all  our  Ideas  of  infinite  Length  ax  Breadth,  infinite 
Pdwer^  ff^ifdoih  or  Duratim ;  for  the  Idea  of  w-* 
finite  is  endlefs  and  ever  growing,  and  ean  never 
be  compleated. 

Nete,  I .  When  we  have  a  perfect  Idea  oF  any 
thing  in  all  its  Parts,  it  is  call'd  zcompkat  Idea\ 
when  in  all  its  Properties,  it  is  call'd  eomprehenfive. 
But  when  we  have  but  an  inadequate  znd  imperfeS 
Ideaj  we  are  only  laid  to  n/^j&ewa?  it  j  therefotc 
we  ufe  the  Tefm  j^prehenfion,  whi;n  we  fpeak  of 
our  Knowledge  of  God,  who  can  ncvfcr  be  c^m- 
pr'ehended  by  his  Creatiircs. 

Note^  z.  Tho'  there  are  a  Multitude  of  Ideas 
which  may  be  call'd  perfeff,  or  adequate  in  a  vul- 
gar Senfi,  yet  therc  are  fcarce  any  Ideas  which 
are  adequate,  comprehen/i*ve  and  compkat  ih  ;i  phild^ 
fophicdl  Senfe  -,  for  there  iS  ftaite  any  thing  in  th6 
World  that  we  know,  as  to  all  the  Parts  and 
Poweisj  and  Properties  of  it  in  Pdrfetftiott.  Eveft 
fo  plain  an  Idea  as  that  of  n  Trianglt,  has,  per- 
haps, infinite  Propel-ties  belonging  to  ir,of  which 
we  know  but  a  few.  Who  can  tell  what  are  tlie 
Shades  and  Pcifitions  of  thofe  Particle,  which 
caui'e  all  the  Variety  of  Colours  that  appear  on 
the  Surface  bf  Things  ?  Who  knoWs  what  ai^ 
the  Figures  of  the  little  Corpufcles  that  compdie 
and  dilHnguirh  diflferent  Bodies  ?  The  Ideas  of 
Brafij^  Iron,  <j&Id,  fVood,  Stom,  fifjfb^  and  Rof^- 
mary  have  an  iiifinite  Variety  of  hidden  Mylli^^ 
ties  contain'd  in  the  Shape,  Motion  artd  Polttion 
of  the  little  Particles,  of  which  they  ai-e  cbm- 
pos'd  J  and,  pei-haps,  alfo  inifinitfeuhfehown  Pro^&r* 
ties  antl  PowTi-S)  that  may  b^  derivNd  frota  th&m> 

?  And 


44  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        PartL 

And  if  we  aiife  to  the  Animal  World,  or  the 
World  of  Spirits^  our  Knowledge  of  them  muft 
be  amazingly  imperfe6t,  when  there  is  not  the 
lc3.{\:  Grain  of  Sand,  or  empty  Space,  but  has  too 
many  Queftions  and  Difficulties  belonging  to  it 
for  the  wifeft  Philofopher  upon  Earth  to  anfwer 
and  refolve. 

IV.  Our  Ideas  are  either  true  m'/alfe-y  for  an 
Idea  being  the  Reprefentation  of  a  thing  in  the 
Mind,  it  muft  be  either  a  true  or  a  falfe  Repre^ 
fentation  of  it.  If  the  Idea  be  conformable  to  the 
Object  or  Archetype  of  it,  it  is  a  true  Ideaj  if 
not,  it  is  z  falfe  one.  So  when  a  Man  under  the 
Jaundice  fees  all  things  yellow,  he  has  a  falfe  Idea 
of  them.  So  if  we  fee  the  Sun  or  Moon,  r'lfing 
or  fetting,  our  Idea  reprefents  them'  bigger  than 
"when  they  are  on  the  Meridian :  And  in  this  Senfe 
it  is  a  falfe  Idea,  becaufe  thofe  heavenly  Bodies 
are  all  Day,  and  all  Night,  of  the  fame  Bignefs. 
Or  when  I  fee  zfirait  Staff  appear  crooked  while 
'  it  is  half  under  the  TVater  -,  I  fay,  the  Water 
gives  me  a  falfe  Idea  of  it.  So  when  I  hear  a 
Man  ufe  the  Words  Church  and  Sacraments,  if  I 
underftand  by  thefe  Words,  a  Congregation  of  faith' 
fill  Men,  who  profefs  Chrifiianity,  and  the  two  Or- 
dinances, Baptifm  and  the  Lord's  Supper,  I  have 
a  true  Idea  of  thofe  Words  in  the  common  Senfe 
of  Proteflants :  But  if  the  Man  who  fpeaks  of 
them  be  a  Papifi,  he  means  the  Church  of  Rome 
mid  the  [even  Sacraments^  and  then  I  have  a  mife- 
taken  Idea  of  thofe  Words,  as  fpoken  by  him,  for 
he  has  a  different  Senfe  and  Meaning. 

Some  think  that  'Truth,  or  Faljhood  properly 

belongs  only  to  Propofttions,  which  Aall  be  the 

Subjed:  of  Difcourfe  in  the  fecond  Part  of  Lo- 

gick  i  for  if  we  conlidcr  Ideas  as  meer  Impredl- 

,     .  :  %  "    ons 


C .  IV:  S.  I :    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:       45 

ons  upon  the  Mind,  made  by  outward  Objefls, 
thole  Impreflions  will  ever  be  conformable  to  the 
Laws  of  Nature  infuch  a  Cafe  :  The  IVater  will 
make  a  Stick  appear  crooked^  and  the  horizontal 
jUir  will  make  the  Sun  and  Moon  appear  higgen 
And  generally  where  there  is  FalJJoood  in  JdeaSj 
there  feems  to  be  {omcfecret  or  latent  Propoftion^ 
whereby  we  judge  falfly  of  Things :  This  is  more 
obvious'  where  we  take  up  the  Words  of  a  Wri- 
ter or  Speaker  in  a  miltaken  Senfe,  for  we  join 
his  Words  to  our  own  Ideas,  which  are  different 
from  his.  But  after  all,  fince  Ideas  arc  Pictures 
of  Things,  it  can  never  be  very  improper  to  pro- 
nounce them  to  be  true  or  fal/e^  according  to 
their  Conformity  or  Nonconformity  to  their  Exem- 
plars. 


CHAP.     IV. 

Of  Words  and  their  Jeveral  T>iv2fions,  to^- 
gether  'uuith  the  Advantage  and  T>anger 
of  them. 

S  E  c  T.     I. 

Of  Words  in  general^  and  their  Ufe, 

I'^HO*  our  Ideas  are  firft  acquir'd  by  the  Per- 
ception of  Objefts,  or  by  various  Senfatiom 
and  Rejle^ions^  yet  we  convey  them  to  each  o- 
ther  by  the  Means  of  ceitain  Sounds,  or  written 
Marks,  which  we  call  Words  j  and  a  great  Pare 
of  our  Knowledge  is  both  obtain'd  and  commu- 
nicated by  thefe  Means,  which  are  call'd  Speech  or 
Language. 

But 


45  hO  Q  IC  K:  Qr,        PattL 

But  as  we  ^fc  Ijcd  iqto  the  Knpwledge  of 
Things  by  Worisy  fp  we  ape  dftentimes  led  into 
Error,  or  Mif^akejlsy  th/s  Ufe  or  Abufe  o{  Words. 
alfo.  Ai>cJ  in  order  togyar^  againft  fuch  Miftakes, 
as  wdl  s^  to  f  rQn^ojte  pip-  Iroproveraent  in  Know- 
ledge, it  is  rigce(Ia.ry  to  acquaint  our  felves  a  little 
with  Words  mA  tsrmh  We  il^gll  begin  with 
theCe  Obiei-vati0i?§. 

dkferfv.  I .  Words  (whether  they  are  fpokcn 
or  written)  have  no  natural  Connexion  with  the 
Ideas  they  are  defign'4  to  fignifyj  aor  with  the 
Things  which  ate  reprefented  ia  thofe  Ideas.  There 
is  no  manner  of  Affinity  between  the  Sounds 
v;hite  in  EngUp^^  or  blaitc  in  Freneb^  and  tJiaf  Cc^ 
iQtjftr  whieh  we  call  by  that  Hame  5  nor  have  the 
Letters,  of  which  thefe  Words  are  composed, 
any  natural  Aptneis  to  fignify  that  Colour  rather 
than  red  or  green.  Word*  and  Naflses  therefore 
are  meer  arbitrary  Signs  invented  by  Men  to 
communicate  their  Thoughts,  or  Ideas,  to  one 
another. 

Qbferv.  i.  if  one  (inele  Word  were  appointed 
to  exprefs  but  one  (imple  Idea,  and  nothing  eife, 
as  IVhite^  Blacky  Sweety  Sour^  Sharp,  Bitter,  Ex" 
tenfion.  Duration,  there  would  be  fcarce  any  Mif- 
take  about  them. 

But  alas !  it  is  a  common  Unhappineft  in  Lan- 
guage, that  different  Jtmpie  Ideas  are  fometimes 
cxprefs'd  by  they^w^ //V<^j  fo  the  V7 ords  fiveet 
and  JJ)^jyp  ai"e  applied  both  to  the  Objects  of  hear- 
ing ancj  tailing,  as  we  iliall  fee  hereafter  5  and 
this,  perhaps,  pnay  be  oijs  Cmfs  or  Foundation  of 
Obfcurity  gnd  Error  arifiiig  fiom  Words. 

Obfer'v.  3.  In  communicating  oi^r  complex  It 
deas  to  one  anotjierj  if  we  could  join  as  many  pe.- 
culiar  and  appropriated  Words  together  in  one 
Sound,  as  we  join  fimple  Ideas  to  make  one  com- 
plex- 


C.  IV.  S.I.    the  right  Ufe  of  Kt^onl       47 

plex  one>  we  ihould  feldom  be  ia  Danger  of  mi(^ 
taking:  When  I  expre(s  the  Taile  ot  aq  Apple, 
which  we  call  the  Bitur-Sweefy  none  can  miftakc 
what  I  mean. 

Yet  this  fort  of  Comp9ft$ion  would  make  all 
Language  a  moft  tedious  and  unwieldy  thing, 
lance  moft  of  our  Idea?  are  complex,  and  many 
of  them  have  eight  or  ten  fimple  Idei»s  in  them  j 
io  that  the  Remedy  would  be  worfe  than  the 
Difeafe ;  for  what  is  now  expreIsM  in  one  ihort 
Word,  as  Month^  or  Tear^  would  require  two 
Lines  to  exprefs  it.  It  is  neeeflary,  therefore, 
t\x?it  Jingle  IVords  be  invented  to  exprefe  complex 
Jdeas^  in  order  to  make  Language  fhort  and  ufcful. 

But  here  is  our  great  Infelicity,  that  when 
fngle  Words  fignify  complex  Ideas^  one  Word  caa. 
never  diftinftly  manifelt  all  the  Parts  of  a  com- 
plex Idea,  and  thereby  it  will  often  happen,  that 
one  Man  includes  more  or  Ufs  in  his  Idea,  thaa 
another  does,  while  he  affixes  the  fame  Word  to 
it.  In  this  Cafe  there  will  be  Danger  of  MiC- 
take  between  them,  for  they  do  not  mean  the 
fame  Obje^^  tho'  they  ufe  the  fame  Name.  So  if 
one  Perfon,  or  Nation,  by  the  Word  Tear  mean 
twelve  Months  of  thirty  Days  each,  i.  e.  three 
hundred  and  (ixty  Days,  another  intend  a  Solar 
Tear  of  three  hundred  (Ixty  five  Days,  and  a 
third  mean  a  Lunar  Tear ^  ox  t\vt\v<^  Lunar  Months^ 
i.  e.  three  hundred  fifty  four  Days,  there  will  be 
a  great  Variation  and  Error  in  their  Account  of 
Things,  unlefs  they  are  well  appriz'd  of  each  o- 
ther's  meaning  beforehand.  This  is  fuppos'd  to 
be  the  Rcafon,  why  fome  ancient  HiftorieSy  and 
Propheftes^  and  Accounts  of  Chronohgy  are  fo 
hard  to  be  adjufted.  And  this  is  the  true  Reafon 
of  fo  furious  and  endlefs  Debates  on  many  Points 
xn  Divinity  i  the  Words  Churchy  fVorJhip^  Ido- 
latry^ 


If 8  L  O  G  I  C  Kt  Or,        Vihll 

latry^ '  Repentance^  Faith^  Ele^ion^  Merit^  Grace, 
and  many  others  which  lignify  very  complex  Ideas, 
are  not  apphed  to  include  jufl  the  fame  iimple  I- 
deas,  and  the  fame  Number  of  them,  by  the  va- 
rious contending  Parties  3  thence  arife  Confufion 
and  Contefl. 

Obferv.  4.  Tho'  a  Jtngk  Name  does  not  cer- 
tainly manifeft  to  us  all  the  Parts  of  a  complex  /- 
dea,  yet  it  mull  be  acknowledg'd,  that  in  many 
of  our  complex  Ideas^  the  lingle  Name  may  point 
out  to  us  fome  chief  Property  which  belongs  to 
the  thing  that  the  Word  lignifies  ;  efpecially 
when  the  Word,  or  Name,  is  trac'd  up  to  its 
Original  thro'  feveral  Languages  from  whence  it 
is  borrowed.  So  an  Apojlle  iignifies  one  'who  is 
fent  forth. 

But  this  tracing  of  a  Word  to  its  Original 
(which  is  call'd  Etymology)  is  fometimes  a  very 
precarious  and  uncertain  Thing:  And  after  all, 
"Vve  have  made  but  a  little  Progrcfs  towards  the 
Attainment  of  the  full  meaning  of  a  co?nplex  I- 
dea,  by  know^ing  fome  one  chief  Property  of  it. 
We  know  but  a  fmall  Part  of  the  Notion  of 
an  Apojlle,  by  knowing  barely  that  he  is  [ent 
forth. 

Ohferv.  f.  Many  (if  not  moft)  of  our  Words 
which  are  applied  to  moral  and  intelk^iial  Ideas, 
when  traced  up  to  their  Original  in  the  learned 
Languages,  wall  be  found  to  fignify  fenfihle  and 
corporeal  Things :  Thus  the  Words  Apprehenfion, 
Underflanding^  Abfira5lion^  Inve'ation^  Idea^  In- 
ference, Prudence,  Religion^  Churchy  Adoration, 
dec.  havQ  all  a  corporeal  Signification  in  their  O- 
riginal.  The  Name  Spirit  it  felf  fignifies  Breath 
or  Air,  in  Latin^  Greek,  and  Hebrezv :  Such  is 
the  Poverty  of  all  Languages,  they  are  forc'd  to 
.  ufe 


C.  IV.  S.  I .     the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'       49 

ufe  thefe  Names  for  incorporeal  Ideas,  which  has 
a  Tendency  to  Error  and  Confulion. 

Oh  few.  6.  The  lall  thing  I  ihall  mention  that 
leads  us  into  many  a  Miftake,  is,  the  Multitude 
of  Objects  that  one  Name  fometimes  fignifies : 
There  is  almoftan  infinite  Variety  of  Things  and 
Ideas  both  fimple  and  complex,  beyond  all  the 
Words  that  are  invented  in  any  Language ;  thence 
it  becomes  almoft  neceffary  that  one  Name 
fhould  fignify  feveral  Things.  Let  us  but  con- 
fider  the  two  Colours  of  l^/Iozu  and  Blue^  if  they 
are  mingled  together  in  any  confiderable  Propor- 
tion they  make  a  Green :  Now  there  may  be  in- 
finite Differences  of  the  Proportions  in  the  Mix^ 
ture  of  I'elloiv  and  Blue ;  and  yet  we  have  only 
thefe  three  Words,  TelloWj  Blue^  and  Grcen^  to 
fignify  all  of  them,  at  leall  bv  one  fingle  Term. 

When  I  ufe  the  Word  Shore^  I  may  intend 
thereby  a  Coaji  of  Land  near  the  Sea^  or  a  Drain 
to  carry  off  JVater^  or  a  Prop  to  fupport  a  Build- 
ing j  and  by  the  Sound  of  the  Word  Porter^  who 
can  tell  whether  I  mean  a  Man  'who  bears  Bur- 
dens^ or  a  Scr'vant  -ujIjo  waits  at  a  Nobleman's 
Gale  ?  The  World  is  fruitful  in  the  Invention  of 
Utenfils  of  Life,  and  new  Chara£fers  and  Offices 
of  Men,  yet  Names  entirely  new  are  feldom  in- 
vented >  therefore  old  Names  are  necefTarily  us'd 
to  fignify  new  Things,  which  may  occafion 
much  Confufion  and  Error  in  the  receiving  and 
Communicating  of  Knowledge. 

Give  me  leave  to  propofe  owt  fingle  Inflarice^ 
wherein  all  thefe  Notes  fliall  be  remarkably  ex- 
cmpUfied.  It  is  the  Word  Bifop^  which  in 
French  is  call'd  Eveque  ;  upon  which  I  would 
make  thefe  feveral  Obfervations.  (i.)  That  there 
is  no  natural  Conne6tion  between  the  facred  Of- 
fice hereby  fignified,  and  the  Letters  or  Sound 

E'  which' 


50  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

which  fignify  this  Office  5  for  both  thefe  Words,> 
E'veq^ue  and  Blfloop^  fignify  the  fame  Office,  the* 
there  is  not  one  Letter  alike  in  them  j  nor  h;ive 
the  Letters  which  compofe   the  Englijh  or  the 
French  Word  any  thing  facred  belonging  to  them, 
more  than  the  Letters  that  compofe  the  Words 
King  or  Soldier.     (2,.)  If  the  Meaning  of  a  Word 
could  be  learnt  by  its  Derivation  or  Etymology, 
yet  the  original  Derivation  of  Words  is  often- 
times very  dark  and  unfearchable  5  for  who  would 
imagine  that  each  of  thefe  Words  are  deriv'd 
from  the  Latin  Epifcopus^  or  the  Greek  'Ett /ctkott^^  ? 
yet  in  this  Inilance  we  happen  to  know  the  true 
Derivation ;   the  French  being  anciently  writ  E- 
'uefqucj  is  borrowed   from  the  firft  part   of   the 
Lafin  Word  j  and  the  old  Engliih  Bifeop  from  the 
middle  of  it.     (5.)  The  original  Greek  Word  fig- 
nifies  an  Overlooker^   or  one  who  ftands   higher 
than  his  Fellows  and  overlooks  them  :  It  is  a 
compound  Word,  that  primarily  fignifies  fenftble 
Jdeas^  tranflated  to  fignify  or  include  feveral  moral 
or  inteUeSiual  Jdeaf-,  therefore  all  will  grant,  that 
the  Nature  of  the  Office  can  never  be  known  by 
the  mecr  Sound  of  the  Word  Overlooker.     (4.)  I 
add  farther,  the  Word  BiJ/jop,  or  Epifcopus^  even 
when  it  is  thus  tranflated  from  a  fenfible  Idea,  to 
include  feveral  intellectual  Ideas,  may  yet  equally 
fignify  an  Overfeer  of  the  Poor  5  an  Infpe^or  of 
the  Cuftomsj   a  Surveyor  of  the  Highways  j    a 
Supervifor  of  the  Excife,  ^c.  but  by  the  Content 
of  Men,  and  the   Language  of  Scripture,  it  is 
appropriated  to  {igmiyx  facred  Office  in  the  Church. 
(f.)  This  very   Idea  and  Name,  thus  tranilated 
from  Things  fenfible,  to  fignify  a  fpiritual  and  ^a- 
ccd  I'hing,   contains   but   one  Property  of  it, 
(•y/z.)  one  that  has  an  O ver fight ^  or  Care  over  0- 
thers:  But  it  does  not  tell  us,  whether  it  includes 

a  Care 


C.IV.S.2:   The  right  Ufe  of  Kz^(ox\:      51 

Care  over  one  Churchy  or  many^  over  the  Laity ^ 
or  the  Ciergy.  (6.)  Thence  it  follows^  that  thofe 
who  in  the  complex  Idea  of  the  Word  Bi/ljop 
include  an  Overfight  over  the  Clergy,  or  over  a 
whole  Diocefe  of  People,  a  Superiority  to  Presby- 
ters, a  diftin6l  Power  of  Ordination,  (^c.  mud 
neceflarily  difagree  with  thofe  who  include  in  it 
only  the  Care  of  a  fingle  Congregation.  Thus 
according  to  the  various  Opinions  of  Men,  this 
Word  fignifies  a  Pope^  a  Gallkan  Bijhop,  a  Lu- 
theran Siiperintendant^  an  EngUJJj  Prelate^  a  Pafior 
of  afingle  JJfembly^  or  a  Presbyter  or  Elder.  Thus 
they  quarrel  with  each  other  perpetually  j  and  it 
is  well  if  any  of  them  all  have  hit  precifely  the 
Senfe  of  the  facred  Writers,  and  included  juft 
the  fame  Ideas  in  it,  and  no  others.  I  might 
make  all  the  fame  Remarks  on  the  Word  Churchy 
which  has  been  the  Occalion  of  as  many  and  as 
furious  Controverfies. 

Sect.     II. 

Of  negathe  and  pojitive  Terms. 

FROM  thefe  and  other  Confiderations  it  will 
follow,  that  if  we  woxild  avoid  Error  in  our 
Purfuit  of  Knowledge,  we  muft  take  good  heed 
to  the  Ufe  of  U^ords  and  Terms^  and  be  acquaint-^ 
cd  with  the  varioxts  Kinds  of  them. 

I.  Terms  are  e'lthcT poftive  or  negative. 

Negative  Terms  are  fach  as  have  a  little  Word 
or  Syllable  of  denying  joined  to  them,  according 
to  the  various  Idioms  of  every  Language,  as  C'«- 
pkafanty  Imprudent .,  Immortal^  Irregular^  Igno- 
rant^ Infinite,  Endlefs,  Lifelefs.,  Deatklefs,  Non- 
fenfe^  Abyfs^  Jnonymons  ,  where  the  Prepoijtions 

E  z  Uriy 


52  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti, 

t/«,  /w,  In^  Non^  Jj  An^  and  the  Termination  Ufs^ 
fignify  a  Negation,  either  in  Englijh^  Latin,  or 
Greek. 

Pofithe  Terms  are  thofe  which  have  no  fuch 
negative  Appendices  belonging  to  them,  as  Life, 
Death,  End,  Senfe,  Mortal. 

But  (o  unhappily  are  our  Words  and  Ideas 
link'd  together,  that  we  can  never  know  which 
are  pofttive  Ideas,  and  which  are  negative,  by  the 
Word  that  is  us'd  to  exprefs  them,  and  that  for 
thefe  Reafons. 

i^%  There  are  fome  pofttive  'Terms  which  are 
made  to  fignify  a  negative  Idea  j  as  Dead  is  pro- 
perly a  Tning  that  is  depriv'd  of  Life  -,  Blind 
implys  a  Negation  or  Privation  of  Sight-,  Deaf 
a  want  of  Hearing ;  and  Dumb  a  Denial  of  Speech. 

I'^^y,  There  are  alfo  fome  negative  'Terms,vihich. 
imply  pofttive  Ideas,  fuch  as  immortal  and  death" 
lefs^  which  fignify  Ever-living,  or  a  Continuance 
in  Life :  Infolent  fignifies  rude  and  haughty  :  7«- 
demnify  to  keep  fafe :  And  Infinite  perhaps  has  a 
pofttive  Idea  too,  for  it  is  an  Idea  ever  growing  j 
and  when  it  is  applied  to  God  it  fignifies  his  com- 
pleat  Perfe^ion. 

3 '^ly.  There  are  both  pofttive  ^nAnegativelitrms, 
invented  to  fignify  the  fame,  and  contrary  Ideas  > 
as  Unhappy  and  Miferable,  Sinlefs  and  Holy,  Pure 
and  Unde filed.  Impure  and  Filthy,  Unkind  ^xA  Cruel, 
Irreligious  and  Profane.^  Unforgiving  and  Revenge- 
ful, &c.  and  there  is  a  great  deal  of  Beauty  and 
Convenience  deriv'd  to  any  Language  from  this 
Variety  of  Expreflion  >  tho'  fometimes  it  a  little 
confounds  our  Conceptions  of  Being  and  Not-Be* 
ing,  our  pofttive  and  negative  Ideas. 

4^'^^',  I  may  add  alfo,  that  there  are  fome 
Words  which  are  negative  in  their  original  Lan- 
guage, but  feem  pofitive  to  an  Englifhman,  becaufe 

the 


C.  IV.  S.  2.  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:       $  3 

the  Negation  is  unknown  >  as  J^byfs^  a  Place 
without  a  Bottom  5  Anodyne^  an  eafing  Medicine  > 
Amnefly^  an  Unremembrance  or  general  Pardon ; 
Anarchy^  a  State  without  Government  j  Anony- 
mous^ i.e.  namelefs,  Inept^  i.e.  not  fitj  Iniquity^ 
i.  e.  Unrighteoufnefs  >  Infant.^  one  that  can't  fpeak 
(viz.)  a  Child  j  Injurious^  not  doing  Juftice  or 
Right. 

The  Way  therefore  to  know  whether  any  Idea 
be  negative  or  not,  is,  to  confider  whether  it  pri- 
marily  imply  the  Abfence  of  any  pofitive  Being, 
or  Mode  of  Being  j  if  it  doth,  then  it  is  a  Nega- 
tion or  negative  Idea  j  otherwise  it  is  a  pofitive  one, 
whether  the  Word  that  exprefles  it  be  pofitive  or 
negative.  Yet  after  all,  in  many  Cafes  this  is  ve- 
ry hard  to  determine  >  as  in  Amnejiy^  Infinite,  A- 
byfs,  which  are  originally  Negative  Terms,  but 
they  fignify  Pardon,  &c.  which  feem  to  be  Pofi- 
tives.  So  Darknefs,  Madnefs,  Clovjn,  arc  pofitive 
Terms  i  but  they  imply  the  want  o'^  Light,  the 
want  of  Reafon,  and  the  want  of  Manners  j  and 
perhaps  thefe  may  be  ranked  among  the  negative 
Ideas. 

Here  Note,  that  in  the  EngUJh  Tongue  tivo 
negative  Terms  are  equal  to  one  pofitive,  and  fig- 
nity  the  fame  Thing,  as,  not  unhappy  fignifies 
happy,  not  immortal  fignifies  mortal;  he  is  no  im- 
prudent Man,  i.  e.  he  is  a  Man  of  Prudence:  But 
the  Senfe  and  Force  of  the  Word  in  fuch  a  nega- 
tive way  of  Expreflion  feems  to  be  a  little  dimi- 
niih'd. 


E  3  Sect, 


54  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        PartL 

Sect.     III. 

Of  ftmple  and  compkx  Terms, 

II.  ^T^Erms  arc  divided  into  Jtmpk  or  complex.  A 
^  Jimple  Term  is  one  Word,  a  complex  Term 
is  when  more  Words  are  us'd  to  lignify  one 
Thing. 

Some  Terms  are  complex  in  TVords^  hit  not  in 
Senfij  fuch  is  the  fecond  Emperor  of  Romej  for  it 
excites  in  our  Mind  only  the  Idea  of  one  Man 
(viz.)  /lugufius. 

Some  Terms  are  complex  in  Senfe^  hut  not  in 
Words;  fo  when  1  fay  an  Army.^  a  Forefi^  I  mean 
a  Midtitude  of  Men^  or  Trees ;  and  ahnoft  all  our 
moral  Ideas,  as  well  as  many  of  our  natural  ones, 
are  exprefs'd  in  this  manner  j  Religion^  Piety ^  Loy- 
alty^ Knavery^  Thefts  include  a  Variety  of  Ide^s 
in  each  Term. 

There  arc  other  Terms  which  are  complex  hoth 
in  Words  and  Senfe  j  fo  when  I  fay,  z  fierce  Dogj 
or  a  pious  Man^  it  excites  an  Idea,  not  only  of 
thofe  two  Creatures,  but  of  their  peculiar  Cha- 
ra6lers  alfo. 

Among  the  Terms  that  are  complex  in  Senfe  hup 
not  in  Words^  we  may  reckon  thofe  firaple  Terms 
which  contain  a  primary  aijd  ^  fecondary  Idea  in 
them  i  as  when  I  hear  my  Neighbour  fpeak  that 
which  is  not  true,  and  I  fay  to  him  this  is  not 
true,  or  this  is  falfe,  I  only  convey  to  him  tl^e 
naked  Idea  of  his  Error  j  this  is  tht  primary  Idea: 
But  if  I  fay  //  is  a  Lye,  the  Word  Lye  carries  alfq 
ii  fecondary  Idea  in  it,  for  it  implies  both  the  F^ilf' 
hood  of  the  Speech,  and  my  Reproach  and  Cen-^ 
fure  of  the  Speaker.  On  the  other  hand,  if  I  fay  it 
is  a  Miflake,  this  carries  alfo  z  fecondary  Idea  with 

i^  • 


C.IV.S.  3.  The  right  Ufi  of  Ktz£on.        ss 

it ',  for  it  not  only  refers  to  the  Falfhood  of  his 
Speech,  but  it  includes  my  Tendernefs  and  Ci- 
vility to  him  at  the  fame  Time.  Another  Inlbnce 
may  be  this ;  when  I  ufe  the  Word  Incefi^  j^dul- 
tery^  and  Murder^  I  convey  to  another  not  only 
the  primary  Idea  of  thofe  A6tions,  but  I  include 
alfo  the  fecondary  Idea  of  their  Unlawfulnefs,  and 
my  Abhorrence  of  them. 

Note^  I  ^^,  Hence  it  comes  to  pafs,  that  among 
Words  which  fignify  the  fame  principal  Ideas, 
fome  are  clean  and  decent^  others  unclean  j  fome 
chafte,  others  ohfcene  j  fome  are  kind^  others  are 
affronting  and  reproachful^  becaufe  of  the  fecondary 
Idea  which  Cullom  has  affix'd  to  them.  And  it 
is  the  P^rt  of  a  wife  Man,  when  there  is  a  Ne- 
ceflity  of  exprefling  any  e'vil  jlSiions^  to  do  it  ei- 
ther by  a  Word  that  has  a  fecondary  Idea  of 
Kindnefs^  or  Softnefs-,  or  a  Word  that  carries  in 
it  an  Jdea  of  Rebuke  and  Severity^  according  as 
the  Cafe  requires :  So  when  there  is  a  Necc'llity 
of  cxprelTing  things  unclean  or  ohfcene^  a  wife 
Man  will  do  it  in  the  moil  decent  Language,  to 
excite  as  few  uncleanly  Ideas  as  poiliblc  m  the 
Minds  of  the  Hearers. 

Nute^  2^5  In  Length  of  Time,  and  by  the 
Power  of  Cuflom,  Words  fometimes  change  their 
primary  Ideas^  as  fhall  be  declared,  and  fomctimc.'; 
they  have  chang'd  their  fecondary  Ideas^  tho'  the 
primary  Ideas  may  remain :  So  Words  that  were 
once  chafe ^  by  frequent  Ufe  grow  ohfcene  and  un- 
cleanly j  and  Words  that  were  once  bonoirrable^ 
may  in  the  next  Generation  grow  mean  and  con- 
temptible. So  the  Word  Dame  originally  flgnifi- 
ed  a  Miftrefs  of  a  Family,  who  was  a  Lady.^  and 
it  is  ufed  ftill  in  the  Englip  Law  to  fignify  a 
Lady ;  but  in  common  Ufe  now-a-davs  it  rcprc- 
fents  a  Farmer's  JFife^  or  a  Mifirefs  of  a  Tainlly 

E  4  of 


56  LOGICK'.OTy       PartL 

of  the  lower  Rank  in  the  Country.  So  thofe  Words 
of  Rahjhakeh^  Ifa.  xxxvi.  12.  in  our  Tranflation, 
(Eat  their  oimi  Dung^  8cc.)  were  doubtlefs  de- 
cent and  clean  Language,  when  our  Tranflators 
wrote  them,  above  a  hundred  Years  ago.  The 
Word  Dung  has  maintain'd  its  old  fecondary  Idea 
and  inoffenfivc  Senfe  to  this  Day  j  but  the  other 
Word  in  that  Sentence  has  by  Cullom  acquired  a 
more  uncleanly  Idea,  and  fhould  now  rather  be 
chang'd  into  a  more  decent  Term,  and  fo  jt  fhould 
be  read  in  publick,  unlefs  it  fhould  be  thought 
more  proper  to  omit  the  Sentence  *. 

For  this  Reafon  it  is,  that  the  Jewijh  Rabbins 
have  fupplicd  other  chafte  Words  in  the  Margin 
pF  the  Hebrew  Bible,  where  the  Words  of  the 
Text,  thro'  Time  and  Cuflom,  are  degenerated, 
fo  as  to  carry  any  bafe  and  unclean  fecondary  Idea 
in  them  j  and  they  read  the  Word  which  is  in  the 
Margin,  which  they  call  Keri.^  and  not  that 
which  was  written  in  the  Text,  which  they  call 
Chetib. 

Sect.    IV. 

Of  Words  common  and  proper. 

III.  IT/^Ords  and  Names  are  either  common  ov  pro- 
''^  per.  Common  Names  are  fuch  as  fland  for 
univerfal  Ideas,  or  a  whole  Rank  of  Beings,  whe- 
ther general  or  fpecial.  Thefe  are  call'd  jippella- 
tives',  fo  Fifby  Bird^  Man,  City,  River,  are -com- 
mon Names  >  and  fo  are  Trout,  Eel,  Lobfier,  for 
they  all  agree  to  many  Individuals,  and  fome  of 
them  to  many  Species:  But  Cicero,  Virgil,  Buce- 

*  So  in  fome  Places  of  the  Jacred  H'lrtorians  where  ir  is  wntcen»  Eicry 
tne  that  pfjfcs  a^ainjl  the  iVall,  we  fliould  read  Every  Male. 

phalus. 


C.  rV.  S.  4^    the  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon:      $7 

pbalus^  London,  Rome,  jEtna,  the  ThameSy  are 
proper  Names,  for  each  of  them  agrees  only  to 
ont  fingle  Being. 

Note  here  firjl,  that  a  proper  Name  may  become 
in  fome  Senfe  common^  when  it  hath  been  given 
to  feveral  Beings  of  the  fame  Kind  5  fo  Cafar, 
which  was  the  proper  Name  of  the  firft  Empe- 
ror Julius,  became  alfo  a  common  Name  to  all 
the  following  Emperors.  And  T'ea,  which  was 
the  proper  Name  of  one  fort  of  Indian  Leaf,  is 
now-a-days  become  a  common  Name  for  many 
Inftifions  of  Herbs,  or  Plants,  in  Water  5  as  Sage- 
J'ea,  Alehoof-Tea,  Lemon-'tea,  &:c.  So  Peter, 
Thomas,  John,  William,  may  be  reckoned  com- 
mon Names  alfo,  becaufe  they  are  given  to  many 
Perfons,  unlefs  they  are  determined  to  lignify  a 
lingle  Perfon,  at  any  particular  Time,  or  Place. 

Note  in  the  fecond  Place,  that  a  common  Name 
may  become  proper  by  Cuftom,  or  by  the  Time, 
or  Place,  or  Perfons  that  ufe  it  j  as  in  Great  Bri- 
tain, when  we  fay  the  King,  we  mean  our  piefent 
rightful  Sovereign  King  George,  who  now  reigns  j 
when  we  fpeak  of  the  Prince,  we  intend  his 
Royal  Highnefs  George  Prince  of  Wales :  If  we 
mention  the  City  when  we  are  near  London,  we 
generally  mean  the  City  of  London ;  when  in  a 
Country  Town,  we  fay  the  Parfon  or  the  Efquire^ 
all  the  Parilh  knows  who  are  the  lingle  Perfons 
intended  by  it}  fo  when  we  are  fpeaking  of  the 
Hilloiy  of  the  New  Teftament,  and  ufe  the 
Words  Peter,  Paul,  John,  we  mean  thofe  three 
Apoflles. 

Note  in  the  third  Place,  that  any  common  Name 
whatfoever  is  made  proper,  by  Terms  of  Particu- 
larity added  to  it,  as  the  common  Words  Pope, 
King,  Horfe,  Garden^  Book,  Knife,  6cc.  are  de- 
(jgn'd  to  fignify  a  (ingular  Idea,  when  we  fay 
I  the 


js  LOG  I  C  K:  Or,       Parti. 

the  prefertt  Pope  -,  the  King  of  Great  Britain ;  the 

Horfe  that  won  the  lafi  Plate  at  New-Market  -, 
the  Royal  Garden  at  Kenfington-,  this  Book-,  that 
Knifey  &c. 

Sect.    V. 

Qf  concrete  and  abJiraSl  terms. 

JV.  T  J^T^J'^s  or  Terms  are  divided  into  ahjlra£t 
V  V    and  concrete. 

AhflraU  Terms  fignify  the  Mode  or  Quality 
of  a  Being,  without  any  Regard  to  the  Subje6b 
in  which  it  is;  2s,  Whitenefs^  Roundnefs-^  Lengthy 
Breadth^  Wifdom^  Mortality^  Life^  Death. 

Concrete  Terms,  while  they  exprefs  the  Quali- 
ty, do  alfo  either  exprefs,  or  imply,  or  refer  to 
feme  Subject  to  which  it  belongs  ;  as  white, 
rounds  long.,  hroad^  wife^  mortal^  li-ving^  dead. 
But  thefe  are  not  always  Noun  AdjeUi'ves  in  a 
grammatical  Senfe  5  for  a  Fvol^  a  Knave ^  a  Philo- 
fopher^  and  many  other  Concretes  arc  Subjlan- 
tives,  as  well  as  Knavery,  Folly,  and  Philofophy, 
which  are  the  abltrad  Terms  that  belong  to 
them. 

Sect.    VI. 

Of  unlvocal  and  equivocal  Words. 

V.  TJ^Ords  and  T'erms  are  either  univocal  or  equi- 
''  vocal.  Univocal  Words,  are  fuch  as  fig- 
nify but  one  Idea,  or  at  leail  but  one  fort  of 
Thing ;  equivocal  Words  are  fuch  as  fignify  two 
or  more  different  Ideas,  or  different  forts  ot  Ob- 
ie£ts.  The  Words  Book,  Bible,  FiJJj,  Houfe,  E- 
lephmt,  may  be  call'd  univocal  Words  3   for  I 

know 


t .  IV.  S.  6.    the  right  Ufe  ^/Reafon .       5  0 

know  not  that  they  fignify  any  thing  elfe  but 
thofe  Ideas  to  which  they  are  generally  affixtj 
but  Head  is  an  equivocal  Word,  for  it  Signifies 
the  Head  of  a  Nail  or  a  Pin^  as  well  as  of  an  J- 
nimal :  Nail  is  an  equivocal  Word,  it  is  us'd  for 
phe  Nail  of  the  Hand  or  Foot^  and  for  an  iron 
Nail  to  fallen  any  thing.  Pofi  is  equivocal,  it 
is  a  Piece  of  Timber ^  or  a  fwift  Me(Jenger.  A 
Church  is  a  religious  AJfemhly^  or  the  large  fair 
Building  where  they  meet  j  and  fometimes  the 
fame  Word  means  a  ^ynod  of  BifJjops^  or  of  Pref' 
byters-i  ^nd  in  fome  Places  it  is  the  Pope  and  a  ge- 
neral Council. 

Here  let  it  be  noted,  that  when  two  or  more 
Words  fignify  the  fame  Thing,  as  0^ave  and  Bil- 
low.  Mead  arjd  Meadow,  they  are  ufually  call'd 
fynoyiymous  Words  :  But  it  feems  very  ilrange, 
that  Words  which  are  dire6lly  contrary  to  each 
other,  ihould  fometimes  reprefent  almoft  the 
{ame  Ideas  j  yet  thus  it  is  in  fome  few  Inllanccs ; 
a  valuable,  or  an  invaluable  BleHing  j  ^flmmeful, 
or  a  fl)amelefs  Villain  j  a  thick  Skull,  or  a  thin 
skulled  Fellow,  a  meer  Paper  Skull;  a  Man  of  a 
large  Confcience,  little  Confcience,  or  no  Confcience ; 
?i  famous  Rafcal,  or  an  infamous  one :  So  uncer- 
tain a  Thing  is  human  Language,  whofe  Founda- 
tion and  Support  is  Cujlom. 

As  Words  fignifying  the  fimc  Thing  are  caird 
fynonymous  j  fo  equivocal  Words,  or  thofe  which 
fignify  feveral  Things,  are  call'd  homonymous,  or 
ambiguous ;  and  when  Pcrfons  \\(e.  fuch  ambiguous 
Words,  with  a  Defign  to  deceive,  it  is  call'd  £- 
quivocation. 

Owrfimple  Ideas, ^nd  cfpecially  the  fen/ible  Qua- 
lities, furnifii  us  with  ?i  great  Variety  of  equivor 
cal,  or  ambiguous  IFords-,  for  thefe  being  the  firfi-, 
and  jRoil  natural  Ideas  we  have,  we  borrow  fome 

of 


60  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

of  their  Names,  to  fignify  many  other  Ideas, 
both  flmple  and  complex.  The  Word  Sweet  ex- 
prefTes  the  pleafant  Perceptions  of  almoft  every 
Senfe  j  Sugar  is  fweet,  but  it  hath  not  the  fame 
Sweetnefs  as  Muftck  j  nor  hath  Mulick  the  Sweet- 
nefs  of  a  Rofe  >  and  a  fweet  Profpedt  differs  from 
them  all :  Nor  yet  have  any  of  thefe  the  fame  Sweet- 
nefs as  Difcourfe^  Counfel^  or  Meditation  hath> 
yet  the  royal  Pfalmifl  faith  of  a  Man,  We  took  fweet 
Counfel  together;  and  of  God,  My  Meditation  of 
him  fljall  he  fweet.  Bitter  is  alfo  fuch  an  equivo- 
cal Word  5  there  is  bitter  Wormwood^  there  are 
bitter,  JVords^  there  are  bitter  EnemieSy  and  a  bit- 
ter cold  Morning.  So  there  is  a  Sharpnefs  in  Fi' 
tiegary  and  there  is  a  Sharpnefs  in  Pain^  in  Sor^ 
rowy  and  in  Reproach  5  there  is  a  Iharp  Eye^  a 
fharp  Wity  and  a  iharp  Sword:  But  there  is  not 
one  of  thefe  feven  SharpneJJ'es^  the  fame  as  another 
of  them,  and  a  fharp  Eafi  Wind  is  different  from 
them  all. 

There  are  alfo  Ferbs^  or  Words  of  A£bion, 
which  arc  equivocal  as  well  as  Nouns^  or  Names. 
The  Words  to  bear^  to  take^  to  come^  to  get^  are 
fufhcient  Inftances  of  it  5  as  when  we  fay,  to  bear 
a  Burden^  to  bear  Sorrow  or  Reproach^  to  bear  a 
Namcy  to  bear  a  Grudge^  to  bear  Fruity  or  to  bear 
Children  5  the  Word  bear  is  us'd  in  very  different 
Senfes.  And  fo  is  the  Word  get^  when  we  fay, 
to  get  Money y  to  get  in^  to  get  off^  to  get  ready^ 
to  get  a  Stomachy  and  to  get  a  Coldy  6cc. 

There  is  alfo  a  great  deal  of  Ambiguity  in  ma- 
ny of  the  Englip  Particles^  as,  buty  before  y  be  fide  y 
'withy  withouty  thaty  theny  thercy  /or,  forthy  abovey 
cibouty  6cc.  of  which  Grammars  and  Di6biona- 
ries  will  fufKciently  inform  us. 

Sect. 


€.iy.S.7'    The  right  Ufe  of  Kc2i{on:      ^i 

Sect.    VII. 

Various  Kinds  of  equivocal  Wo^ds, 

IT  would  be  endlefs  to  run  through  all  the  Va- 
rieties of  Words,  and  Terms,  which  havedif- 
rent  Senfes  applied  to  them  j  I  {hall  only  menti- 
on, therefore,  a  few  of  the  moft  remarkable  and 
moll  ufeful  DiftinUions  among  them. 

1^%  The  firll  Divijion  of  equivocal  Words  lets 
us  know  that  fome  are  equivocal  only  in  their 
Sound  or  Pronunciation  >  others  are  equivocal  only 
in  fFriting;  and  others,  both  in  Writings  and  in 
Sound. 

Words  equivocal  in  Sound  only^  are  fuch  as 
thefe  i  the  Rein  of  a  Bridle,  which  hath  the  (lime 
Sound  with  the  Reign  of  a  King,  or  a  Shower  of 
Rain-f  but  all  three  have  different  Letters,  and 
dillind  Spelling.  So  Mighty  or  Strength,  is  equi- 
vocal in  Sound,  but  differs  in  Writing  from  Mite^ 
a  little  Animal,  or  a  fmall  Piece  of  Money.  And 
the  Verb  to  write^  has  the  fame  Sound  with 
Wright  a  Workman,  Right  or  Equity^  and  Rite 
or  Ceremony  5  but  it  is  fpelled  very  differently 
from  them  all. 

Words  equivocal  in  Writing  only^  are  fuch  as 
thefe }  to  tear  in  Pieces,  has  the  fame  Spelling 
with  a  7'ear:  To  lead^  or  guide,  has  the  fame 
Letters  as  Lead  the  Metal :  And  a  Bowl  for  Re- 
creation is  written  the  fame  Way  as  a  Bowl  for 
drinking,  but  the  Pronunciation  of  all  thefe  is 
different. 

But  thofc  Words  which  are  moft  commonly 
and  juftly  call'd  equivocal^  are  fuch  as  are  both 
written  and  pronounced  the  fame  Way,  and  yet 
have  different  Senfes  or  Ideas  belonging  to  them  ; 

fuch 


6i  L  0  G  IC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

fuch  are  all  the  Inftances  which  were  given  in 
the  preceding  Se6tion. 

Among  the  Words  which  are  equivocal  in 
Sound  only'i  and  not  in  JVriting^  there  is  a  large 
Field  for  Perfons  who  delight  in  Jefts  and  Puns^ 
in  Riddles  and  ^uibbles^  to  fport  themfelves=  This 
fort  of  Words  is  alfo  us'd  by  wanton  Perfons,  to 
convey  lewd  Ideas^  under  the  Covert  of  Expreffi- 
ens  capable  of  a  chafte  Meaning,  which  are  cal- 
led double  Entendres  j  or  when  Perfons  fpeak  Falf- 
hood  with  a  Dcfign  to  deceive,  under  the  Covert 
6f  1'ruth.  Tho'  it  muft  be  confeft,  that  all  forts 
of  equivocal  Words  yield  fufficient  Matter  for 
fuch  Purpofes. 

There  are  many  Cafes  alfo,  wherein  an  equivo- 
cal Word  is  us'd  for  the  fake  of  Decency  to  cover 
^foul  Idea :  For  the  moft  chafte,  and  modeft,  and 
well-bred  Perfons,  having  fometimes  a  Neceflity 
to  fpeak  of  the  Things  of  Nature,  convey  their 
Ideas  in  the  moft  inoffenfive  Language  by  this 
Means.  And  indeed,  the  mcer  Poverty  of  all 
Languages  makes  it  neceftary  to  ufe  equivocal 
ff'^ords  upon  many  Occaftonsj  as  the  common* 
Writings  of  Men,  ahd  even  the  holy  Book  of 
God  fufficiently  manifeft. 

i'l^y,  Equivocal  Words  are  uftially  diftinguilh*^ 
ed,'  according  to  their  Original^  into  fuch,  whofe 
various  Senfes  arife  from  meer  Chance  or  Accident^ 
and  fuch  as  are  made  equivocal  by  Dejign-,  as  the 
Word  Bear  lignifies  a  fiaggy  Beaft^  and  it  figni- 
fies  alfo  to  bear  or  carry  a  Burden  5  this  feems  to 
be  the  meer  efte6t  of  Chance :  But  if  I  call  my 
Dog,  Bear^  becaufe  he  is  ftiaggy,  or  call  one  of 
the  Northern  Confiellations  by  that  Name,  from  a 
fancied  Situation  of  the  Stars  in  the  Shape  of  that 
Animal,  then  it  is  by  Defign  that  the  Word  is 
.inade  yet  fiU'ther  equivocal. 


C.  IV.  S.  7.    the  right  Ufe  oj  Rcafon:       4f  i 

But  becaufe  I  think  this  common  Account  of 
the  Spring  or  Origin  of  equivocal  Words  is  too 
flight  and  imperfect,  I  fliall  referve  this  Subjedb 
to  be  treated  of  by  it  felf,  and  proceed  to  the  third 
Dim/ton. 

'■-  3^'y,  Ambiguous  or  equivocal  Words,  are  fuch, 
as  are  fometimes  taken  in  a  large  and  general  Senfe^ 
and  fometimes  in  a  Senfe  more  Jiri^  and  limited^ 
and  have  different  Ideas  affix'd  to  them  accord- 
ingly. Religion  or  Virtue^  taken  in  a  large  Senfe, 
includes  both  our  Duty  to  God  and  our  Neighbour -j 
but  in  a  more  ilTi6t,  limitedj  and  proper  Senfe, 
Virtue  fignifies  our  Duty  towards  Alen^  and  Reli- 
gion our  Duty  to  God.  Virtue  may  yet  be  taken 
in  the  llri£teft  Senfe,  and  then  it  fignifies  Power 
or  Courage^  which  is  the  Senfe  of  it  in  fome  Pla- 
ces of  the  New  Teflament.  So  Grace ^  taken  iri 
a  large  Senfe  means  the  Fa'vour  of  God^  and  all 
the  fpiritual  Bleffings  that  proceed  from  it,  (which 
is  a  frequent  Senfe  of  it  in  the  Bible)  but  in  a 
limited  Senfe  it  fignifies  the  Habit  of  HoUnefi 
wrought  in  us  by  Divine  Favour,  or  a  complex 
Idea  of  the  Chriftian  Virtues.  It  may  be  alfo  tak- 
en in  the  ftriftefl  Senfe  j  ana  thus  it  fignifies  any 
fm^e  Chrijiian  Virtue j'SiS  in  z  Cor.  viii.  6^  7.  where 
it  is  us'd  for  Liberality.  So  a  CZ/jv',  in  a  flri^l  and 
proper  Senfe,  means  the  Houfes  inclofed  within  the 
fValls  i  in  a  larger  Senfe  it  reaches  to  all  the 
Suburbs. 

This  larger  and  Jlri5ler  Senfe  of  a  Word  is  us'd 
in  almoft  all  the  Sciences,  as  well  as  in  Theolo- 
gy, and  in  common  Life.  The  Word  Geography^ 
taken  in  "xfirid:  Senfe.^  fignifies  the  Knowledge  of 
the  Circles  of  the  earthly  Globe,  and  the  Situati- 
on of  the  various  Parts  of  the  Earth  5  when  it  is 
taken  in  a  little  larger  Senfe^it  includes  the  Know- 
ledge of  the  Seas  alfo  3  and  in  the  largefi  Senfe  of 
I  all^ 


64  LO  G  IC  K:  Qr,        Vmh 

all,  it  extends  to  the  various  Cuftoms,  Habits, 
and  Governments  of  Nations.  When  an  Aftro- 
nomer  ufes  the  Word  Star  in  its  proper  and  ftri6t 
Senfe,  it  is  applied  only  to  thtfix'd  Stars^  but  in 
a  large  Senfe  it  includes  the  Planets  alfo. 

This  equivocal  Senfe  ofLWords  belongs  alfo  to 
many  proper  Names :  So  yljia  taken  in  the  larg- 
eft  Senfe  is  one  Quarter  of  the  World ;  in  a  more  li- 
mited Senfe  it  fignifies  Natolia^  or  the  leflery^<aj 
but  in  the  ftricteft  Senfe  it  means  no  more  than 
one  little  Province  of  Natolia^  where  flood  the 
Cities  of  Ephefus^  Smyrna^  SardiSy  6cc.  and  this 
is  the  molt  frequent  Senfe  of  it  in  the  New  Te- 
Itament.  Flanders  and  Holland^  in  a  ftri^t  Senfe, 
are  but  two  fingle  Provinces  among  the  feven- 
teen  j  but  in  a  large  Senfe  Holland  includes  feven 
of  them,  and  Flanders  ten. 

There  are  alfo  fome  very  common  and  little 
Words  in  all  Languages,  that  are  us'd  in  a  more 
extenji'ue  or  more  limited  Senfe  5  fuch  as  all^  e'very^ 
ivbofoe'very  6cc.  When  the  Apoftle  fays,  all  Men 
ha-ve  finncdy  and  all  Men  muft  die^  all  is  taken  in 
its  moft  univerfal  and  extenlive  Senfej  including 
all  Mankind^  Rom.  v.  12.  When  he  appoints 
Prayer  to  be  made  for  all  Men^  it  appears  by  the 
following  Verfes,  that  he  reftrains  the  Word  all 
to  fignify  chiefly  all  Ranks  and  Degrees  of  Men^ 
I  Tim.  ii.  i.  But  when  St.  Paul  fays^  I  fleafe 
all  Men  in  all  Things^  i  Cor.  x.  33.  the  Word  all 
is  exceedingly  limited,  for  it  reaches  no  farther 
than  that  he  pleas'd  all  thofe  Men  nsjhom  he  con- 
ixerfed  ivith^  in  <a!// Things  that  were  lawful. 

4^^'^y,  Equivocal  Words  are  in  the  fourth  Place 
diftinguifhed  by  their  literal  or  figurative  Senfe. 
Words  are  us'd  in  a  proper  or  literal  Senfe,  when 
they  are  defign'd  to  fignify  thofe  Ideas  for  which 
they  were  originally  made,  or  to  which  they  are 

primarily 


C.  IV;  S.  7.     the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:       6% 

primarily  and  generally  annexed  ;  but  they  are 
us'd  in  a  figurative  or  tropical  Senfe,  when  they 
are  made  to  fignify  fome  Things,  which  only 
bear  either  a  Reference  or  a  Refemblance  to  the  pri- 
mary Ideas  of  them.  So  when  two  Princes  con- 
tend by  their  Armies,  we  fay  they  are  at  Pt^ar  in 
a  proper  Senfe  >  but  when  we  fay  there  is  a  War 
betwixt  the  Winds  and  the  Waves  in  a  Storm, 
this  is.  call'd  Figurative^  and  the  peculiar  Figure 
is  a  Metaphor.  So  when  the  Scripture  fiys.  Riches 
make  themfelves  Wings^  and  fly  away  as  an  Eagle 
toward  Heaven^  the  Wings  and  the  Flight  of  the 
Eagle  are  proper  ExprefTions }  but  when  Flight 
and  Wings  are  applied  to  Riches^  it  is  only  by 
Way  of  Figure  and  Metaphor.  So  when  Man  is 
laid  to  repent^  or  laugh^  or  grieve.^  it  is  literally 
taken  j  but  when  God  is  faid  to  be  grieved.^  to  re-^ 
pent^  to  laugh^i  6cc.  thefe  are  all  figurative  Ex- 
preflions,,  borrowed  from  a  Refemblance  to  Man- 
kind, And  when  the  Words  Job  or  Efther  are 
us'd  to  fignify  thofe  very  Perfons,  it  is  the  literal 
3enfe  of  them  3  but  when  they  fignify  thofe  two 
IBooks  of  Scripture^  this  is  a  figurative  Senfe. 
The  Names  of  Horace^  Juvenal^  and  Milton^  are 
us'd  in  the  fame  manner,  either  for  Books  or 
Meri. 

When  a  Word,  which  originally  fignifies  any 
particular  Idea  or  Obje6t,  is  attributed  to  feveral 
other  Objedls,  not  fo  much  by  way  of  Refem- 
blance^ but  rather  on  the  Account  of  fome  evi^ 
dent  Reference  or  Relation  to  the  original  Idea, 
this  is  fpmetimes  peculiarly  call'd  an  analogical 
Word  3  fo  a  found  or  healthy  Pulfe  -,  a  found  Di- 
gefiion;  found  Sleeps  are  all  fo  call'd,  with  Refer- 
ence to  a  found  and .  healthy  Conftitution  3  but  if 
you  fpeak  o?  found  Do^rine,  or  found  Speech,  this 
is  by  way  of  Refemblance  to   Health,    and   the 

F  Words 


€6  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

Words  are  metaphorical:  Yet  many  Times  ylna^ 
logy  and  Metaphor  are  us'd  promifcuoully  in  the 
fame  Senfe,  and  not  diftinguilhed. 

Here  Note^  That  the  Defign   of  metaphorical 
Language  and  Figures  of  Speech  is  not  meerly  to 
reprefent  our   Ideas,  but  to  reprefent  them  with 
Vivacity,    Spirit,   AflFedion,   and   Power  j     and  . 
tho'  they  often  make  a  deeper  Impreflion  on  the 
Mind  of  the  Hearer,  yet  they  do  as  often  lead 
him  into  a  Miftake,  if  they  are  us'd  at  improper 
Times  and  Places.     Therefore,  where  the  Dengn 
of  the  Speaker  or  Writer  is  meerly  to  explain^  to 
inftru^l^  and  to  lead  into  the  Knowledge  of  naked 
Truth,  he  ought,  for  the  moft  part,  to  ufe  plain 
and  proper  Words,  if  the  Language  affords  them, 
and  not  to  deal  much  in  figurative  Speech.     But 
this  fort  of  Terms  is  us'd  very  profitably  by  Poets 
and  Orators.)  whofe  Bufinefs  is  to  move,  and  per- 
fuade,  and  work  on  the  Paffions,  as  well  as  on  the 
Underflanding.     Figures  are  alfo  happily  employ- 
ed in  proverbial  moral  Sayings  by  the  ivifeft  and 
the  befi  of  Men,  to  imprefs  them  deeper  on  the 
Memory  by  fenfible  Images  ;  and  they  are  often 
us'd  for   other  valuable  Purpofes  in   the  /acred 
Writings. 

f ''^b',  I  might  adjoin  another  fort  of  equivocal 
Words  'y  as,  there  are  fome  which  have  a  different 
Meaning  in  common  Language.^  from  what  they 
have  in  the  Sciences;  the  Word  PaJJion  fignifies 
the  receiving  any  yl£lion  in  a  large  philofophical 
Senfe ;  m  a  more  limited  philofophical  Senfe,  it 
fignifies  any  of  the  jiffe^ions  of  human  Nature^  as 
Love.)  Fear.,  Joy.,  Sorrow.,  6vc.  But  the  common 
People  confine  it  only  to  Anger.  So  the  Word 
Simple  philofophically  fignifies  Single.,  but  vulgar- 
ly it  is  us'd  for  Foolijh. 


3'  .  6'-^^t 


5 


C.  fV.  S.  8.    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.'      67 

6'^V,  Other  equivocal  Words  are  us'd  fome- 
times  in  an  abfolute  Senfe,  as  when  God  is  call'd 
perfeH:^  which  allows  of  no  Defe6l>  and  fome- 
times  in  a  comparatrue  Scnfe,  as  good  Men  are 
oftentimes  call'd  ferfeB  in  Scripture,  in  Compa- 
rifon  of  thofe  who  are  much  inferior  to  them  in 
Knowledge  or  Holinefs :  But  I  have  dwelt  rather 
too  long  upon  this  Subjed  already,  therefore  I 
add  no  more. 

Sect.    VIII. 

^e  Origin  or  Caufes  of  equivocal  IVords. 

NO  W,  that  we  may  become  more  skilful  in 
guarding  our  fclves  and  others  againft  the 
Dangers  of  Miftake  which  may  arife  from  equrjo- 
fdl  Words,  it  may  not  be  amifs  to  conclude  this 
Chapter  with  a  mort  Account  of  the  various 
'Ways  or  Means  whereby  a  Word  changes  its  Sig- 
nification, or  acquires  any  new  Senfe,  and  thus 
"becomes  equivocal^  efpccially  if  it  keep  its  old 
jSenfe  alfo. 

1 .  Meer  Chance  fometimes  gives  the  fame  Word 
different  Senfes  5  as  the  Word  Light  fignifies  a 
Body  that  is  not  heavy  j  and  it  alfo  fignifies  the 
'Effe^  of  Sun-Beams^  or  the  Medium  whereby  lue 
fee  Objects :  This  is  meerly  accidental,  for  there 
.fecms  to  be  no  Conne6tion  between  thefe  two 
jSenfes,  nor  any  Reafon  for  them. 

2.  Error  and  Miftake  is  another  Occafion  of 
giving  various  Senfes  to  the  fame  Word  j  as  when 
different  Perfons  read  the  Names  of  Briefly  Bi- 
fhop^  Churchy  Eafter^^c.'m  the  New  Teftament, 
they  affix  different  Ideas  to  them,  for  want  of 
Acquaintance  with  the  true  Meaning  of  the  fa- 
.cred  Writer  J  tho'  it  mult  be  confefs'd,  thefe  va- 

F  z  rious 


68  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        tml. 

rious  Senfes,  which  might  arife  at  firft  from  ho- 
ne ft  Miftake,  may  be  culpably  fupported  and  pro- 
pagated by  Intereft^  Ambition^  Prejudice^  and  a 
Party- Spirit  on  any  fide. 

^.'TimeandCuftom  alters  the  meaning  of  Words. 
Knave  heretofore  fignified  a  diligent  Servant 
{Gnavus  j)  and  a  Villain  was  a  meaner  'Tenant  to 
the  Lord  of  the  Manor  ( Fillicus  5 )  but  now  both 
thofe  Words  carry  an  Idea  of  Wickednefs  and 
Reproach  in  them.  A  Ballad  once  fignified  a 
folemn  and  facred  Song,  as  well  as  one  that  is  tri- 
vial, when  Solomon's  Song  was  call'd  the  Ballad  of 
Ballads;  but  now  it  is  applied  to  nothing  but 
trifling  Verfe,  or  comical  Subje6ts. 

4.  Words  change  tlieir  Senie  by  Figures  and 
Metaphors^  which  are  deriv'd  from  fome  real  J- 
nalogy  or  Refemblance  between  feveral  Things  j  as 
when  Wings  and  Flight  are  applied  to  Riches^  it 
fignifies  only,  that  the  Owner  may  as  eafily  lofe 
them,  as  he  would  lofe  a  Bird  who  flew  away 
with  Wings. 

And  I  think,  under  this  Head,  we  may  rank 
thofe  Words,  which  fignify  different  Ideas,  by  a 
fort  of  an  unaccountable  far-fetcht  Analogy^  or 
diflant  Refemblance^  that  Fancy  has  introduced 
between  one  thing  and  another  >  as  when  we  fay, 
the  Meat  is  green  when  it  is  half-roafled :  We 
fpeak  of  airing  Linen  by  the  Fire,  when  we  mean 
drying  or  warming  it :  We  call  for  round  Coals  for 
the  Chimney,  when  we  mean  large  fquare  ones : 
And  we  talk  of  the  IFing  of  a  Rabbity  when  we 
mean  the  Fore-Leg: The  true  Rcafon  of  thefe  Ap- 
pellations we  leave  to  the  Criticks. 

f.  Words  alfo  change  their  Scnfe  by  the  fpecial 
Occafiofi  of  ufing  them,   the  peculiar  manner  of 
Pronunciation,  the  Sound  of  the  Voice,  the  Motion   >\ 
of  the  Face,  or  Ccjliires  of  the  Body  j  fo  when  an 

angry 


C.  iV.  S.  2.  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'       69 

angry  Mafter  fays  to  his  Servant,  it  is  bravely 
done^  or  you  are  a  fine  Gentleman^  he  means  juft 
the  contrary  5  namely,  it  is  very  ill  done  j  you  are 
a  forry  fellow :  It  is  one  way  of  giving  a  fevere 
Reproach,  for  the  Words  are  fpoken  by  way  of 
Sarcafm  or  Irony. 

6.  Words  are  applied  to  various  Senies5by  new 
Ideas  appearing  or  ariling  fafter  than  new  Jd^ords 
are  framed.  So  whcnGun-Powder  was  found  out, 
the  Word  Powder^  which  before  lignified  only 
Dufl.^  was  made  then  to  fignify  that  Mixture  or 
Compofition  of  Nitre^  Charcoal^  6cc.and  the  Name 
Canon,  which  before  fignified  a  Lazv  or  a  Puky 
is  now  alfo  given  to  a  great  Gun,  which  gives 
Laws  to  Nations.  So  Footboys,  who  had  fre- 
quently the  common  Name  of  Jack  given  them, 
were  kept  to  turn  the  Spit,  or  to  pull  off  their 
Mailer's  Boots  J  but  when  Inftruments  were  in- 
vented for  both  thofe  Services,  they  were  both 
call'd  Jacks,  tho'  one  was  of  Iron,  the  other  of 
Wood,  and  very  different  in  their  Form. 

7.  Words  alter  their  Significations  according 
to  the  Ideas  of  the  various  Perfons,  Seels,  or  Par- 
ties who  ufe  them,  as  we  have  hinted  before  j  fo 
when  a  Papifl  ufes  the  Word  Hereticks,  he  gene- 
rally means  the  P rot efl ants  j  when  a  Protefiant  u- 
fes  the  Word,  he  means  any  Perfons  who  are 
wilfully    (and  perhaps   contentioufly)  objlinate  in 

fundamental  Errors.  When  a  Jew  fpeaks  of  the 
true  Religion,  he  means  the  Injiitutions  of  Mofes  j 
when  a  I'urk  mentions  it,  he  intends  the  Do^rine 
of  Mahomet ;  but  when  a  Chriftian  makes  ufe  of 
it,  he  defigns  to  fignify  Chrifiianity,  or  the  'Truths 
and  Precepts  of  the  Gofpel. 

8.  Words  have  different  Significations  accord- 
ing to  the  Book,  JFriting,  or  Difcourfe  in  which 
they  Itand.     So  in  a  Treatife  of  Anatomy,  a  Foot 

F  3  fignifics 


>o-  L  O  G  I  G  K:  Or,        Parti. 

Signifies  that  Member  in  the  Body  of  Man :  But  in 
a  Book  of  Geometry  or  Menfuration  it  fignifies 
tivehe  Inches. 

If  I  had  room  to  exemplify  moft  of  thefe  Par- 
ticulars in  one  lingle  Word,  I  know  not  where 
to  chufe  a  fitter  than  the  Word  Sound,  which 
feems  (as  it  were)  by  Chance,  to  fignify  three  dif- 
tin6t  Ideas,  (i;iz.)  Healthy,  (from  Sanus)  as  a 
found  Body;  Noife  (from  Sonus)  as  a yZ'nV/ Sound ; 
and  to  found  the  Sea  (perhaps  from  the  French 
Sonde  a  Probe,  or  an  Inib-ument  to  find  the  Depth 
of  Water.)  From  thefe  three,  which  I  may  call 
original  Senfes,  various  deri'vati've  Senfes  arife  j  as 
found  Sleepy  found  Lungs,  found  Wind  and  Limh,^ 
a  found  Heart,  a  found  Mind,  found  DoUrine,  a 
found  Divine,  found  Reafon,  a  found  Cask,  found 
timber,  a  found  Reproof,  to  beat  one  foundly,  to 
found  ones  Meaning  or  Inclination,  and  a  found  or 
narrow  Sea;  turn  all  thefe  into  Latin,  and  the 
Variety  will  appear  plain. 

I  confefs,  fome  few  of  thefe  which  I  have  men- 
tion d  ,  as  the  different  Springs  of  equivocal 
Words,  may  be  reduced  in  fome  Cafes  to  the 
lame  Original :  But  it  muft  alfo  be  granted,  that 
there  may  be  other  Ways  befide  thefe  whereby  a 
Word  comes  to  extend  its  Signification,  to  in-r 
elude  various  Ideas,  and  become  equi'vocaL  And 
tho'  it  is  the  Bufinefs  of  a  Grammarian  to  purfue 
thefe  Remarks  with  more  Variety  and  Particula- 
rity, yet  it  is  alfo  the  Work  of  a  Logician  to  give 
Notice  of  thefe  Things,  left  Darknefs,  Confufi- 
on,  and  Perplexity  be  brought  into  our  Concep- 
tions by  the  Means  of  Words,  and  thence  our 
Judgments  and  Reafonings  become  crrroneous. 


CHAP. 


C.  V.        the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.  7.1 

C  H  AP.     V. 
General  TiireBions  relating  to  our  Ideas. 

Dire6tion  I.  TpUrniJh  your  [elves  with  a  rich  Fari- 
■^  ety  of  Ideas  3  acquaint  your  felves 
with  Things  antient  and  modern  5  Things  natu- 
ral, civil  and  reHgious ;  Things  domelHck  and 
national  j  Things  of  your  native  Land,  and  of 
foreign  Countries  j  Things  prefent,  pall  and  fu- 
ture j  and  above  all,  be  well  acquainted  with  God 
and  your  (dv^s  -,  learn  animal  Nature,  and  the 
workings  of  your  own  Spirits. 

Such  a  general  Acquaintance  with  Things  will 
be  of  very  great  Advantage. 

Thtfirji  Benefit  of  it  is  thisj  it  will  aflift  the 
Ufe  of  Reafon  in  all  its  following  Operations}  it 
will  teach  you  to  judge  of  Things  aright ^  to  ar^ 
guejufily^  and  to  methodife  your  Thoughts  with 
Accuracy.  When  you  fhall  find  feveral  Things  a- 
kin  to  each  other,  and  feveral  different  from  each 
other,  agreeing  in  fome  Part  of  their  Idea,  and 
difagreeing  in  other  Parts,  you  will  range  your 
Ideas  in  better  Order,  you  will  be  more  eafily  led 
into  a  diftin6t  Knowledge  of  Things,  and  will  ob- 
tain a  rich  Store  of  proper  Thoughts  and  Argu- 
ments upon  all  Occailons. 

You  will  tell  me  perhaps  that  you  defign  the 
Study  of  the  Laiv  or  Divinity  j  and  what  Good 
can  natural  Philofophy  or  Mathematicks  do  you,  or 
any  other  Science,  not  directly  fubordinate  to  your 
chief  Defign  ?  But  let  it  be  confider'd,  that  all 
Sciences  have  a  fort  of  mutual  Conne6tion  >  and 
Knowledge  of  all  Kinds  fits  the  Mind  to  reafon 
and  judge  better  concerning  any  particular  Sub- 

F  4  jecb. 


72  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Parti. 

jeft.  I  have  known  a  Judge  upon  the  Bench  be- 
tray his  Ignorance,  and  appear  a  Uttle  confus'd  in 
his  Sentiments  about  a  Cafe  of  furpe6ted  Murder 
brought  before  him,  for  want  of  fome  Acquaint- 
ance with  animal  Nature  and  Philofophy. 

Another  Benefit  of  it  is  this  >  fuch  a  large  and 
general  Acquaintance  with  Things,  will  fecure 
you  from  perpetual  Admirations  and  Surprifes^  and 
guard  you  againlt  that  Weaknefs  of  ignorant  Per- 
Ibns,  who  have  never  fecn  any  thing  beyond  the 
Confines  of  their  own  Dwelling,  and  thercfore 
they  wonder  at  almoft  every  Thing  they  fee;  e- 
very  Thing  beyond  the  Smoke  of  their  own 
Chimney,  and  the  Reach  of  their  own  Windows, 
is  new  and  ftrange  to  them. 

A  third  Benefit  of  fuch  an  univeifal  Acquaint- 
ance with  Things,  is  thisj  it  will  keep  you  from 
being  too  pofitive  and  dogmatical^  from  an  Ex- 
cefs  of  Credulity  and  Unbeliefs  i.  e.  a  Readinefs  to 
believe,  or  to  deny  every  Tiling  at  firll  hearing  j 
when  you  fhall  have  often  feen,  that  ftrange  and 
uncommon  Things,  which  once  feem'd  incredible, 
are  found  to  be  true,  and  Things  very  commonly 
receiv'd  have  been  found  falfe. 

The  f'Fay  of  attaining  fuch  an  extenfi'ue  Treafure. 
of  Ideas^  is,  with  Diligence  to  apply  your  felf  to 
read  the  beft  Books ;  converfe  with  the  mofl 
knowing  and  the  wifeft  of  Men,  and  endeavour 
to  improve  by  every  Perfon  in  whofe  Company 
you  are ;  fuffer  no  Hour  to  pafs  away  in  a  lazy 
Idlenefs,  in  impertinent  Chattering  or  ufelels 
Trifles;  Viiit  other  Cities  and  Countries  when 
you  have  feen  your  own,  under  the  Care  of  one 
who  can  teach  you  to  profit  by  Traveling,  and 
to  make  wife  Obfervations  j  indulge  a  juft  Curi- 
ofity  in  feeing  the  Wonders  of  Art  and  Nature; 
fcarch  into  Things  your  felves,  as  well  as  learn 

then^ 


C.  V.        the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:         7  j 

them  from  others  j  be  acquainted  with  Men  as 
well  as  Books  >  learn  all  Things  as  much  as  you 
can  at  firft  Hand  j  and  let  as  many  of  your  Ideas 
as  poflible  be  the  Reprefentations  of  Thing'^,  and 
not  mcerly  the  Reprefentations  of  other  AJi-ns  I- 
deas :  Thus  your  Soul,  like  fome  noble  Building, 
fhall  be  richly  furnilli'd  with  original  Paintings, 
and  not  with  meer  Copies. 

Direct.  II.  Ufe  the  moft  proper  Methods  to  retain 
that  Treafure  of  Ideas  which  you  have  acquired, 
for  the  Mind  is  ready  to  let  many  of  them  flip, 
unlefs  fome  Fains  and  Labour  be  td^en  to  fix  them 
upon  the  Memory. 

■  And  more  efpecially  let  thofe  Ideas  be  laid  up 
and  preferv'd  with  the  greateft  Care,  which  arc 
moft  directly  fuited,  either  to  your  eternal  WeU 
fare  as  a  Chriflian^  or  to  your  part'iciMar  Station 
and  Profefion  in  this  Life  5  for  tho'  the  former 
Rule  recommends  an  univerial  Acquaintance  with 
Things,  yet  it  is  but  a  more  general  and  fuperfi- 
cial  Knowledge  that  is  requir'd  or  expelled  of 
any  Man,  in  Things  which  are  utterly  foreign  to 
his  own  Bufincfs  j  but  it  is  ncceilaiy  you  fhould 
have  a  more  particular  and  accurate  Acquaintance 
with  thofe  Things  that  refer  to  your  peculiar 
Province  and  Duty  in  this  Life,  or  your  Happi- 
nefs  in  another. 

There  are  fome  Perfons  who  never  arrive  at  any 
deep,  folid,  or  valuable  Knowledge  in  any  Sci- 
ence or  any  Bufincfs  of  Life,  becaufe  they  are 
perpetually  fluttering  over  the  Surface  of  Things 
in  a  curious  and  wandring  Search  of  infinite  Va- 
riety i  ever  hearing,  reading,  or  asking  after 
{bmething  new,  but  impatient  of  any  Labour  to 
lay  up  and  preferve  the  Ideas  they  have  gained : 
Their  Souls  may  be  compai"'d  to  a  Looking-Ghifs^ 

\  that 


74  LOGICK.'Or,       Parti. 

that  wherefbever  you  turn  it,  it  receives  the  Ima- 
ges of  all  Objects,  but  retains  none. 

In  order  to  preferve  your  Treafure  of  Ideas 
and  the  Knowledge  you  have  gain'd,  purfue  thefe 
Advices,  efpecially  in  youi'  younger  Years. 

1 .  Recoiled  every  Day  the  Things  you  have  feen^ 
or  heard^  or  read^  which  may  have  made  any  Additi- 
on to  your  Underftanding :  Read  the  Writings  of 
God  and  Men  with  Diligence  and  perpetual  Re- 
views :  Be  not  fond  of  haftning  to  a  new  Book, 
or  a  new  Chapter,  till  you  have  well  fix'd  and 
eftablifh'd  in  your  Minds  what  was  ufcful  in  the 
laft :  Make  ufe  of  your  Memory  in  this  manner, 
and  you  will  fenfibly  experience  a  gradual  Im- 
provement of  it,  while  you  take  Care  not  to  load 
it  to  excels. 

2.  I'alk  over  the  Tloings  which  you  have  feen^ 
heard^  or  learnt  with  fome  proper  Acquaintance  j 
this  will  make  a  frefh  Impreffion  upon  your  Me- 
mory }  and  if  you  have  no  fellow  Student  at  hand, 
none  of  equal  Rank  with  your  felves,  tell  it  over 
to  any  of  your  Acquaintance,  where  you  can  do 
it  with  Propriety  and  Decency  j  and  whether  they 
learn  any  thing  by  it  or  no,  your  own  Repetition 
of  it  will  be  an  Improvement  to  your  felf ;  And 
this  Practice  alfo  will  furnifh  you  with  a  Variety 
of  Words  and  copious  Language,  to  exprefs  your 
Thoughts  upon  all  Occafions. 

3.  Commit  to  writing  fome  of  the  moft  con- 
fiderable  Improvements  which  you  daily  make,  at 
leail  fuch  Hints  as  may  recall  them  again  to  your 
Mind,  when  perhaps  they  are  vaniih'd  and  loll. 
And  here  I  think  Mr.  Locke's  Method  of  Adver- 
faria.  or  common  Places^  which  he  defcribes  in  the 
end  of  the  firll  Volume  of  his  pofthumous  Worksy 
is  the  befl:  j  uling  no  learned  Method  at  all,  fet- 
ting  down  Things  as  they  occur,  leaving  a  dii- 

tin6t 


C.  V.         the  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon:  75 

tinct  Page  for  each  Subject,  and  making  an  In- 
dex to  the  Pages. 

At  the  end  of  every  Week,  or  Month,  or  Year, 
you  may  review  your  Remarks  for  thefe  two 
Reafons:  Firji^  to  judge  of  your  oimn  Improvementy 
when  you  fhall  find  that  many  of  your  younger 
Collections  are  either  weak  and  triflings  or  if  they 
are  juft  and  proper,  yet  they  are  grown  now  fo 
famihar  to  you,  that  you  will  thereby  fee  your 
own  Advancement  in  Knowledge.  And  in  the 
next  Place  what  Remarks  you  find  there  worthy 
of  your  riper  Obfervation,  you  may  ticte  them. 
^ith  a  marginal  iJ/^rjinfleadof  tranfcribing  them, 
as  being  worthy  of  your  fecond  Year's  Review, 
when  the  others  are  neglected. 

To  fhorten  fomething  of  this  Labour,  if  thcf 
Books  which  you  read  are  your  own,  mark  with 
a  Pen,  or  Pencil,  the  mofl  confidcrable  Things 
jn  them  which  you  defire  to  remember.  Thus 
you  may  read  that  Book  the  fecond  Time  over 
with  half  the  Trouble,  by  your  Eye  running  o- 
ver  the  Paragraphs  which  your  Pencil  has  noted. 
It 'is  but  a  very  weak  Objection  againlt  this  Prac- 
tice to  fiy,  I  jloall  fpoil  my  Book  j  for  I  pcrfuade 
my  felf  that  you  did  not  buy  it  as  a  BookfeUer  to 
fell  it  again  for  Gain,  but  as  a  Scholar  to  improve 
your  Mind  by  itj  and  if  the  Mind  be  improv'd, 
your  Advantage  is  abundant,  tho'  your  Book 
yield  lefs  Money  to  your  Executors. 

Notey  This  Advice  of  Wrltrnjr,  Marbing,  and  Rcviewirv!  your  >tarks,  re- 
fers chiefly  to  thofe  occa/ic.al  Nations  you  meet  with,  either  in  Reading  or 
in  Converfation  :  But  when  you  are  dlnaiy  and  /iro/f/zcif/ypurfuing  any  Sub- 
je£l  ef  Knowledge  in  a  good  Syftem  in  your  younger  Years,  rhe  Syfiern  it 
felf  is  your  Common-Place  "Book,  and  muft  be  entirely  reviewed.  The  faina 
may  be  faid  concerning  any  Treal.'fe  which  clofely,  lucciEctly  and  accurately 
haniJe*  any  particular  Theme, 

Direa; 


76  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Parti, 

Direct.  III.  j^s  you  ^proceed  hoth  in  Learning  and  in 
L'tfe^  make  a  ivife  Obfer-vation  what  are  the  ideas^ 
'what  the  Difcourfes  and  the  Parts  of  Knowledge 
that  have  been  more  or  lefs  ufeful  to  your  felf  or  o- 
thers.     In  our  younger  Years,  white  we  are  fur- 
nifhing  our  Minds  with  a  Treafure  of  Ideas,  our 
Experience  is  but  fmall,  and  our  Judgment  weak  > 
it  is  therefore  impoflible  at  that  Age  to  determine 
aright  concerning  the  real  Advantage  and  Ufeful' 
fiefs  of  many  Things  we  learn.     But  when  Age 
and  Experience  have  matured  your  Judgment,  then 
you  will  gradually  drop  the  more  ufelefs  Part  of 
your  younger  Furniture,  and  be  more  folicitous  to 
retain  that  which  is  moft  neceflliry  for  your  Wel- 
fare in  this  Life,  or  a  better.     Hereby  you  will 
come  to  make  the  fame  Complaint  that  almoft 
every  learned  Man  has  done,  after  long  Experi- 
ence in  Study,  and  in  the  AfKiirs  of  human  Life 
and  Religion  >  Mas  f  how  many  Hours^  and  Days^ 
and  Months.^  have  I  lofi  in  purfuing  fome  Parts  of 
Learnings  and  in  reading  fome  Authors^  which  have 
turned  to  no  other  Account^  but  to  inform  me^  that 
they  were  not  worth  my  Labour  and  Purfuit  I  Hap- 
py  the  Man  who  has  a  wife  Tutor  to  condudb 
him  thro'  all  the  Sciences  in  the  firft  Years  of  his 
Study  i  and  who  has  a  prudent  Friend  always  at 
Hand  to  point  out  to  him  from  Experience  how 
much  of  every  Science  is  worth  his  Purfuit !  and 
happy  the  Student  that  is  fo  wife  as  to  follow  fuch 
A-dvice ! 

Direct.  IV.  Learn  to  acquire  a  Government  over 
your  Ideas  and  your  L'houghts^  that  they  may  come, 
when  they  are  called^  and  depart  when  they  are  bid- 
den. There  are  fome  Thoughts  that  rife  and  in- 
trude upon  us  while  wc  fhun  them  3  there  are 

others^ 


C.  V.        The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:  yf 

others  that  fly  from  us,  when  we  would  hold  and 
fix  them. 

If  the  Ideas  which  you  would  willingly  make 
the  Matter  of  your  prefent  Meditation  are  ready 
to  fly  from  you^  you  mufl;  be  obftinate  in  the  Pur- 
fuit  of  them  by  an  Habit  of  fixed  Meditation  j 
you  muft  keep  your  Soul  to  the  Work,  when  it 
is  ready  to  ftart  afide  every  Moment,  unlefs  you 
will  abandon  your  felf  to  be  a  Slave  to  every 
wild  Imagination.  It  is  a  common,  but  it  is  an 
unhappy  and  a  fliameful  Thing,  that  every  Trifle 
that  comes  acrofs  the  Senfes  or  Fancy  fliould  divert 
us,  that  a  buzzing  Fly  fhould  teize  our  Spirits,  and 
fcatter  our  bed  Ideas ;  But  we  muft  learn  to  be 
deaf  and  regardlefs  of  other  Things,  befides  thac 
which  we  make  the  prefent  Subjed:  of  our  Me-  * 
ditation:  And  in  order  to  help  a  wandring  and 
fickle  Humour,  it  is  ufcful  to  have  a  Book  or  Pa- 
per in  our  Hands,  which  has  fome  proper  Hints 
of  the  Subjed  that  wc  defign  to  purfue.  We 
muft  be  refolute  and  laborious,  and  fometimes 
conflia  with  our  felves  if  we  would  be  wife  and 
learned. 

Yet  I  would  not  be  too  fevere  in  this  Rule :  It 
muft  be  confefs'd  there  ^xtSeafons  when  the  Mind, 
or  rather  the  Brain  is  overtired  or  jaded  with  Stu- 
dy or  thinking  ^  or  upon  fome  other  Accounts 
animal  Nature  may  be  languid  or  cloudy^  and  unfit 
to  affift  the  Spirit  in  Meditation  j  at  fuch  Seafons 
(provided  that  they  return  not  too  often)  it  is  bet- 
ter fometimes  to  yield  to  the  prefent  Indifpofid- 
on  5  for  if  Nature  intirely  refilt,  nothing  can  be 
done  to  the  Purpofe,  at  leaft  in  that  Subjed  or 
Science.  Then  you  may  think  it  proper  to  give 
your  fclf  up  to  fome  Hours  of  Leifure  and  Recre- 
ation^ or  ufiful  Idlenefs;  or  if  not,  then  turn  your 
Thoughts  to  fome  other  alluring  Subje^y  and  pore 

no 


7«  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

no  longer  upon  the  firfi^  till  fome  brighter  or 
more  Favourable  Moments  arife.  A  Student  {hall 
do  more  in  one  Hour,  when  all  Things  con- 
cur to  invite  him  to  any  fpecial  Study,  than  in 
four  Hours,  at  a  dull  and  improper  Seafon. 

I  would  alfo  give  the  fame  Advice,  if  fome 
vain^  or  ivortblefs^  or  fooJiJl}  Idea  will  croud  it 
felf  into  your  Thoughts ;  and  if  you  find  that  all 
your  Labour  and  Wrellling  cannot  defend  your 
felf  from  it,  then  divert  the  Importunity  of  that 
which  offends  you  by  turning  your  Thoughts  to 
fome  entertaining  Subjc6t,  that  may  amufe  a  little 
and  draw  you  off  from  the  troublefome  and  im- 
pofing  Gueft  j  and  many  a  Time  alfo  in  fuch  a 
Cafe,  when  the  impertinent  and  intruding  Ideas 
would  divert  from  prefent  Duty,  Devotion  and 
Prayer  have  been  very  fuccefsful  to  overcomfe 
fuch  obftinate  Troublers  of  the  Peace  and  Profit 
of  the  Soul. 

If  the  natural  Genius  and  Temper  be  too  vola- 
tile^ fickle  and  wandring^  fuch  Perfons  ought  in  a 
more  efpecial  manner  to  apply  themfelves  to  ma- 
thematical  Learnings  and  to  begin  their  Studies 
with  Arithmetick  and  Geometry  5  wherein  new 
Truths,  continually  arifing  to  the  Mind  out  of  the 
plaineft  and  eafied  Principles,  will  allure  the 
Thoughts  with  incredible  Pleafurein  thePurfuit: 
This  will  give  the  Student  fuch  a  delightful  Tafte 
of  p.eafoning,  as  will  fix  his  Attention  to  the 
fingle  Subjeft  which  he  purfues,  and  by  Degrees 
will  cure  the  habitual  Levity  of  his  Spirit :  But 
let  him  not  indulge  and  purlue  thefe  To  far,  as  to 
negleft  the  prime  Studies  of  his  defignM  Pro- 
fefiion. 


CHAP, 


C.  VI.       the  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.  79 


CHAP.     VI. 

Special  Rules  to  diteEi  our  Conception  of 

Things, 

A  Great  Part  of  what  has  been  already  writ- 
ten is  defign'd  to  lay  a  Foundation  for 
thofe  Rules^  which  may  guide  and  regulate  our 
Conceptions  of  Things  5  this  is  our  main  Bufi- 
nefs  and  Defign  in  the  firfi  Part  of  Logick.  Now 
if  we  can  but  dired  our  Thoughts  to  a  juft  and 
happy  Manner  in  forming  our  Ideas  of  Things, 
the  other  Operations  of  the  Mind  will  not-fo  ea- 
fily  be  perverted  j  becaufe  moft  of  our  Errors  in 
Judgment^  and  the  Weakncls,  Fallacy  and  Mif- 
take  of  our  Argumentation  proceed  from  the  Dark- 
nefs,  Confufion,  Defe6b,  or  fome  other  Irregula- 
rity in  our  Conceptions. 

The  Rules  to  affift  and  dire<5t  our  Conceptions 
are  thefe. 

1 .  Conceive  of  Things  clearly  and  dijlin5ljy  in 
their  oivn  Natures. 

2.  Conceive  of  Things  compkatly  in  all  their 
Parts. 

3.  Conceive  of  Things  comprehenfively  in  all 
their  Properties  and  Relations. 

4.  Conceive  of  Things  extenfively  in  all  their 
Kinds. 

r.  Conceive  of  Things  orderly^  ox  in  a  proper 
^  Method. 


Sect. 


L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        PartL 
Sect.    I. 


Of  gaining  clear  and  difiinSi  Ideas. 

TH  E  firft  Rule  is  this,  Seek  after  a  clear  and 
diflin^  Conception  of  Things  as  they  are  in 
their  own  Nature^ .  and  do  not  contmt  your  fehes 
inith  ohfcure  and  confufed  Ideas^  where  clearer  are 
to  be  attained. 

There  are  fome  Things  indeed  whereof  diftinft 
Ideas  are  fcarce  attainable,  they  feem  to  furpafs 
the  Capacity  of  the  Underftanding  in  our  pre- 
fent  State  j  fuch  are  the  Notions  of  Eter- 
nal^ Immenfe^  Infinite  <^  whether  this  Infinity 
be  applied  to  Numher^ .  as  an  infinite  Multi- 
tude j  to  ^lantity^  as  infinite  Length,  Breadth  j 
to  Powers  ^nd  Perfe5lions J  ^s  Strength,  Wifdorti,  or 
Goodnefs  infinite,  (^c.  Tho'  Mathematicians  in 
their  Way  demonftrate  feveral  Things  in  the 
Dodrine  of  Infinites^  yet  there  are  ftill  fome  in- 
folvable  Difficulties  that  attend  the  Ideas  of  Infi-, 
nityy  when  it  is  applied  to  Mind  or  Body  j  and 
while  it  is  in  Reality  but  an  Idea  ez^er  growing, 
we  cannot  have  fo  clear  and  diftindt  a  Concepti- 
on of  it  as  to  fecurc  us  from  Miftakes  in  fome  of 
our  Reafonings  about  it. 

There  are  many  other  Things  that  belong  to 
the  material  World,  wherein  the  fharpeft  Philo- 
fophers  have  never  yet  arriv'd  at  clear  and  diftin^t 
Ideas,  fuch  as  the  particular  Shape ^  Situation , 
Context wre.  Motion  of  the  fmall  Particles  of  Mine- 
rals, Metals,  Plants,  ^c.  whereby  their  very  Na- 
tures and  Eflences  are  diftinguifhed  from  each  o- 
ther.  Nor  have  we  either  Senfes  or  Inftruments 
fufficiently  nice  and  accurate  to  find  them  out. 
There  are  other  Things  in  the  World  of  Spirits, 

wherein 


C.  VL  S.  I ",     the  right  Ufi  of  Reafon.'       8 1 

wherein  our  Ideas  are  very  dark  and  confufed, 
fuch  as  their  Union  with  aniynal  Nature^  the  Way 
of  their  aBing  on  material  Beings^  and  their  Con- 
'verfe  with  each  other:  And  tho'  it  is  a  laudable 
Ambition  to  fearch  what  may  be  known  of  thefe 
Matters,  yet  it  is  a  vaft  Hindrance  to  the  Enrich- 
ment of  our  Underftandings,  if  we  fpend  too 
much  of  our  Time  and  Pains  among  Infinites  and 
Unfearchahles^  and  thofe  Things  for  the  Invefti- 
gation  whereof  we  are  not  furniih'd  with  proper 
Faculties  in  the  prefent  State.  It  is  therefore  of 
great  Service  to  the  true  Improvement  of  the 
Mind  to  diftinguifh  well  betv/cen  Knowabks  and 
Unknowables. 

As  far  as  Things  are  knowabk  by  us,  it  is  of 
excellent  Ufe  to  accullom  our  felves  to  clear  and 
difiin^  Jdeas.  Now  among  many  other  Occafi- 
ons  of  the  Darknefs  and  Miflakes  of  our  Mindsj 
there  are  thefe  two  Things  which  moft  remark* 
ably  bring  Confufion  into  our  Ideas. 

1.  That  from  our  Infancy  we  have  had  the  I- 
deas  of  Things  fo  far  conncdcd  with  the  Ideas  of 
Words^  that  we  often  millake  Words  for  Things, 
we  mingle  and  confound  one  with  the  other. 

2.  From  our  youngell  Years  we  have  been  ever 
ready  to  coniider  Things,  not  fo  much  in  their 
own  Natures,  as  in  their  various  Rcfpe5is  to  our 
felves^  and  chiefly  to  our  Senfes-y  and  we  have  al- 
fo  joined  and  mingled  the  Ideas  o^  fame  Things^ 
with  many  other  Ideas^  to  which  they  are  not  a* 
kin  in  their  own  Natures. 

In  order  therefore  to  a  clear  and  diftin^  Knov\''- 
ledge  of  Things,  we  mufl  uncloath  them  of  all 
thefe  Relations  and  Mixtures^  that  we  may  con- 
template them  naked,  and  in  their  own  Natures  j 
and  diftinguifh  the  Subje6b  that  we  have  in  View 
from  all  other  Subjects  whatfocver :  Now  to  per- 

G  form 


$z  LOG  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti 

• 

form  this  well,  we  muft  here  confider  the  Defi- 
nition of  IVords^  and  the  Definition  of  Things, 

Sect.   II. 

Of  the  Definition  of  Words  or  Names. 

IF  we  GGiild  conceive  of  Things  as  Angels  and 
unbodied  Spirits  do,  without  involving  them 
in  thofe   Clouds   which   Words  and   Language 
throw  upon  them,  we  fhould  feldom  be  in  Dan- 
ger of  fuch  Miftakes  as  are  perpetually  commit- 
ted by  us  in  the  prefent  State ;  and  indeed  it  would 
be  of  unknovv^n  Advantage  to  us  to  accuftom  our 
felves  to  form  Ideas  of  'Things  without  JVords^  that 
we  might  know  them  in  their  own  proper  Na-* 
tures.     But   fince  we  mull  ufe  Words^  both  to 
learn  and  to  communicate  moil  of  our  Notions, 
we  fhould  do  it  with  juil  Rules  of  Caution.     I 
have  already  declar'd  in  part,  how  often  and  by 
what  Means  our  Words  become  the  Occafions  of 
Errors  in  our  Conception  of  Things.     To  reme- 
dy fuch  Inconveniences,  we  muft  get  an  exa6t 
Definition  of  the  Words  we  make  ufe  of,  i.e.  we 
muft  determine  precifely  the  Senfe  of  our  Words, 
which  is  call'd  the  Definition  of  the  Name. 

Now  a  Definition  of  the  Name  being  only  a 
Declaration  in  what  Senfe  the  Word  is  ufed^  or 
what  Idea  or  Object  we  mean  by  it,  this  may  be 
cxprefs'd  by  any  one  or  more  of  the  Properties, 
Effects  or  Circumftances  of  that  Object  which 
do  fufficiently  diitinguilh  it  from  other  Obje<5ls  : 
As  if  I  were  to  tell  what  I  mean  by  the  Word 
Air^  I  might  fay  it  is  that  thin  Matter  which  we 
breathe  in  and  breathe  out  continually  j  or  it  is  that  fluid 
Body  in  which  the  Birds  fly  a  little  above  the  Earthy 
or  it  is  that .  inviftbk  Matter  which  fills  all  Places 

near 


C.  VI.  S.  2.    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     '  83 

near  the  Earthy  or  'ujhich  immediately  encompajfes 
the  Globe  of  Earth  and  M-^ater.  So  if  I  would  tell 
what  I  mean  by  Eighty  I  would  fliy,  it  is  that 
Medium  whereby  we  fee  the  Colours  and  Shapes  of 
T'hingSy  or  it  is  that  which  dijiinguifljes  the  Day 
from  the  Night.  If  I  were  ask'd  what  I  mean  by 
Religion^  I  would  anfwer,  it  is  a  ColkSlion  of  all 
our  Duties  to  God,  if  taken  in  a  ftridt  and  limited 
Senfei  but  if  taken  in  a  large  Senfe,  it  is  a  Col- 
le^ionof  all  our  Duties  both  to  God  and  Man.  Thefe 
are  call'd  the  Definitions  of  the  Name. 

Note^  In  defining  the  Name  there  is  no  Ne- 
ccflity  that  we  fhould  be  acquainted  with  the  in- 
timate EfTence  or  Nature  of  the  Thing  i  for  any 
manner  of  Defcription  that  will  but  fufficiently 
acquaint  another  Perfon  what  we  mean  by  fuch  a 
Word,  is2i(\JL^cicv)X.Definition  for  the  Name.  And 
on  this  Account,  a  fynonymous  Word,  or  a  mcer 
Negation  of  the  contrary^  a  I'ranjlation  of  the  Word 
into  another  Tongue,  or  a  grammatical  Explicati- 
on of  it,  is  fomctimcs  fufficicnt  for  this  Purpofe  j 
as  if  one  would  know  what  I  mean  by  a  Sphere^ 
I  tell  him  it  is  a  Globe ^  if  he  ask  what  is  a  7>/- 
dngle^  it  is  that  which  has  three  Angles  5  or  an  O- 
'ual  is  that  which  has  the  Shape  of  an  Egg.  Dark 
is  that  which  has  no  Eight;  Afihma  is  a  Difficulty 
of  Breathing;  a  Diaphorctick  Medicine^  or  a  Su- 
dorifick^  is  fomcthing  that  will  provoke  Sweating ; 
and  an  Infolvent  is  a  Man  that  cannot  pay  his 
Debts. 

Since  it  is  the  Defign  of  Zc?^/V^,  not  only  to  af- 
(Ift  us  in  Learning  but  in  Teaching  alfo,  it  is  ne- 
ceflliry  that  we  fhould  be  furni(hed  with  fome 
particular  Direftions  relating  to  the  Definition  of 
Names^  both  in  'Teaching  and  Learning. 

Q  %  Sect. 


84  LOGIC  K:  Or,        PautL 

Sect.     IIL 

Dire^ions  concerning  the  Definition  of  Names. 


Direft.I.  JJJF'E  a  Car  6  of  making  ufe  of  meer 
*^  fVords^  inftead  of  Ideas-,  i.e.  fuch 
Words  as  have  no  Meaning,  no  Definition  be- 
longing to  them  :  Do  not  always  imagine  that 
there  are  Ideas  wherejhver  there  are  Names;  for 
tho'  Mankind  hath  fo  many  MilUons  of  Ideas 
more  than  they  have  Names,  yet  fo  foolifh  and 
lavilh  are  we,  that  too  often  we  ufe  fome  Words 
in  meer  Walle,  and  have  no  Ideas  for  them  3  or 
at  leall,  our  Ideas  are  fo  exceedingly  fhatter'd 
and  confus'd,  broken  and  blended,  various  and 
unfettled,  that  they  can  fignify  nothing  toward 
the  Improvement  of  the  Underltanding.  You 
will  find  a  great  deal  of  Reafon  for  this  Remark,- 
if  you  read  the  Popip  School-men^  or  the  myfiick 
Divines. 

Never  reft  fatisfied  therefore  with  meer  fFords 
which  have  no  Ideas  belonging  to  them^  or  at  leaft 
no  fettled  and  determinate  Ideas.  Deal  not  in  fuch 
empty  Ware,  whether  you  are  a  Learner  or  a 
Teacher  5  for  hereby  fome  Peilons  have  made 
themfelves  rich  in  Words,  and  learned  in  their 
own  Efteem  ;  whereas  in  reality  their  Under- 
ftandings  have  been  poor,  and  they  knew  no- 
thing. 

Let  me  give  for  Inllance  fome  of  thofe  Writ- 
ers or  Talkers  who  deal  much  in  the  Words  Na- 
ture^ Fate.,  Luck^  Chance.,  Perfcclion.,  Power^Life^y 
Fortune.,  Inftintlj  6cc.  and  that  even  in  the  moft 
calm  and  inftruclive  Parts  of  their  Difcourfe  > 
tho'  neither  they  themfelves  nor  their  Hearers 
have  any  fettled  _  Meaning  under  thofe  Words  5 

and 


C.  VI.  S.  3.  The  Tight  Ufe  of  Reafon.        85 

?ind  thus  they  build  up  their  Reafonings,  and  in- 
fer what  they  pleafe,  with  an  Ambition  of  tJie 
Name  of  Learning,  or  of  fublime  Elevations  in 
Religion ;  whereas  in  truth,  they  do  but  amufe 
themfclves  and  tlieir  Admirers  -with  fwellmg  IFords 
of  Vanity^  under flanding  neither  what  they  fay^  yior 
whereof  they  affirm.  But  this  fort  of  Talk  was 
reproved  of  old  by  the  two  chief  Apoftles  St. 
Peter  and  St.  Paiil^  i  l^im.  i.  7.  and  2  Pet. 
ji.   18. 

When  Pretenders  to  Philofophy  or  good  Senfe 
grow  fond  of  this  fort  of  Learning,  they  dazlc 
and  confound  their  weaker  Hearers,  but  fall  un- 
der the  Negle6t  of  the  Wife.  The  Epicureans 
are  guilty  of  this  Fault,  when  they  afchbc  the 
Formation  of  this  World  to  Chance :  The  ^ri- 
fiotelians^  when  they  fay,  Nature  abhors  a  Vacu- 
um: The  Stoicks  when  they  talk  of  Fate^  wJiich 
is  fuperior  to  the  Gods ;  And  the  Gameflers  when 
they  curfe  their  Ill-Luck^  or  hope  for  the  Fa- 
vours of  Fortune.  Whereas,  if  they  would  tell 
us,  that  by  the  Word  Nature  rhcy  mean  the  Pro- 
perties of  any  Being.,  or  the  Order  of  things  ejla- 
blifhed  at  the  Creation  j  that  by  the  Word  Fate 
they  intend  the  Decrees  of  God^  or  the  nccejfary 
Connexion  and  Fafluence  of  fecond  Caufes  and  Ef- 
fects; if  by  the  Word  Luck  or  Chance  they  fig- 
nify  the  abfohite  Negation  of  any  determinate  Caufc, 
or  only  their  Ignorance  of  any  fuch  C^^///?,  weiliould 
know  how  to  coiwerfe  with  them,  and  to  aflcnt 
to,  or  diflent  from  their  Opinions.  But  while 
they  flutter  in  the  dark,  and  make  a  Noifc  with 
Words  which  have  no  fixt  Ideas,  they  talk  to 
the  Wind,  and  can  never  profit. 

I  would  make  this  Matter  a  little  plainer  rtill 
by  Inftances  borrowed  from  the  Peripatetick  Phi- 
lofophy,   which    was   taught   once    in   all   the 

G  3  Schools. 


86  L  0  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

Schools.     The  Profeflbr  fancies  he  has   afligh'4 
the  true  Reafon,  why  all  heavy  Bodies  tend  down- 
ward^ why  Amher  will  draw  Feathers  and  Straws^ 
and  the  Load- St  one  draw  Iron^  when  he  tells  you, 
that  this  is  done  by  certain  gravitating  and  attrac- 
tive  ^alities^  which  proceed  from  "^t  fuhftantial 
Forms    of  thofe  various   Bodies.      He   imagines 
that  he  has  explain'd  why  the  Loadjlone'^s  *  North 
Poky  JJjall  repel  the  North  End  of  a   magnetick 
Needle^  and  attraH  the  South^   when  he  affirms, 
that  this  is  done  by  its  Sympathy  with  one  End  of 
it,    and   its   Antipathy  againft    the    other   End. 
Whereas  in  truth,  all  thefe  Names  of  Sympathy^ 
Antipathy^  fubflantial  Forms  and  ^mlities^  when 
they  are  put  for  the  Caufes  of  thefe  Effects  in 
Bodies,  are  but  hard  Words,  which  only  exprels 
a  learned  and   pompous  Ignorance  of    the   true 
Caufe  of  natu'-al  Appearances ,  and  in  this  Seilfe 
they  are  mcer  TVords  without  ideas. 

This  will  evidently  appear,  if  one  ask  me,  why 
a  concave  Mirrour  or  convex  Glafs  will  burn  PVood 
in-  the  Sun-Beams,  or  why  a  IVedge  will  cleave 
it?  and  I  fhould  tell  him,  it  is  by  an  ufiorious 
Reality  in  the  Mirrour  or  Glafs,  and  by  a  cleaving 
Power  in  the  Wedge,  arifing  from  a  certain  un- 
known fubflantial  Form  in  them,  whence  they 
derive  thefe  Realities  ;  or  if  he  fliould  ask  me 
why  a  Clock  flrikcs^  and  points  to  the  IJour^  and  I 
fhould  fay,  it  is  by  an  indicating  Form  and  fonorific 
Quality;  whereas,  I  ought  to  tell  him  how  the 
Sun-Beams  are  collefbcd  and  united  by  a  burning 
Glafs ;  whence  the  mechanical  Force  of  a  IVedge 
is  dcriv'd  j  and  what  are  the  Wheels  and  Springs^ 
the  Pointer^  and  Hammer^  and  Belly   whereby  a 

^  Kl^^t■,  Shme  Writers  c3)l  rhat  the  Sottth-Pr.'a  of  a  t.oadflcne  which  at- 
trp.fts  the  South- End  of  the  Needle;  but  I  cluiie  u>  t'll.ow  thofe  who  call  ic 
rhe  N-.rth-Pole. 

Clock 


C.VI.S.3.   The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^^on.        87 

Clock  gives  Notice  of  the  Time,  both  to  the  Eye 
and  the  Ear.  But  thefe  uflorious  and  cleaving 
Powers^  fonorous  and  indicating  Forms  and  Quali- 
ties^ do  either  teach  the  Enquirer  nothing  at  all 
but  what  he  knew  before,  or  they  are  -meer  Words 
without  Ideas  *. 

And  there  is  many  a  Man  in  the  vulgar  and  in 
the  learned  World,  who  imagines  himfelf  deeply 
skilled  in  the  Contro-verfies  of  Divinity^  whereas, 
he  has  only  furnifhed  himfelf  with  a  Parcel  of 
fcholajlick  or  my  flick  Words,  under  fome  of  which 
the  Authors  themfelves  had  no  juft  Ideas,  and  the 
Learner  when  he  hears,  or  pronounces  them,  hath 
fcarce  any  Ideas  at  all.  Such  fort  of  Wonds 
fometimes  have  become  Matters  of  immortal  Con- 
tention, as  tho'  the  Gofpel  could  not  Hand  with- 
out them  J  and  yet  the  Zealot  perhaps  knows  lit- 
tle more  of  them  than  he  does  of  Shibboleth^  or 
Higgaion^  Selah^  Judg.  xii.  6.  Pfal.ix.   16. 

Yet  here  I  would  lay  down  this  Caution^  that 
there  are  feveral  Objects  of  which  we  have  not  a 
clear  and  diflin6t  Idea,  much  lefs  an  adequate  or 
comprehenfive  one,  and  yet  we  cannot  call  the 
Names  of  thefe  Things  Words  without  Ideas  5 
fuch  are  the  Infinity  and  Eternity  of  God  himfelf^ 


*  It  may  be  ohjeHed  here,  "  And  v/hat  does  the  modern  Thilofopher, 
"  with  all  his  Derail  of  mathematical  Numbers  and  Diagrams  do  more 
'=  than  this  toward  the  Solution  of  thefe  Difficultief  ?  Does  he  not  defcribc 
'«  Gravity  by  a  certain  utihmwn  Force,  xehereky  "Bodifs  terid  4oiv>iwj>rd  lo  ike 
"  Centre  ?  Hath  he  found  the  certain  and  mechanical  Reafons  of  yittraSHm, 
"  Miignetifm-,  &c.  ?  "  I  Atifwtr,  That  the  Moderns  have  found  a  thoufand 
Things,  by  applying  Mathemaricks  to  natural  Phllorophy,  which  the  Anti- 
ents  were  isjnorant  of;  and  when  they  ufe  any  Names  t)f  this  Kind,  vix.. 
Gravitation,  ^itr.i&io,:,  &c.  they  ufe  them  only  to  fignify, '  that  there  are 
fuch  Effefts  and  fuch  Caufes,  with  a  frequent  ConfeJlion  of  their  Ignorance 
of  the  true  Springs  of  them:  They  do  not  pretend  to  make  thefe  U'ords 
fland  for  the  real  Ciitfs  of  Things,  as  tho'  they  thereby  afligned  the  true 
philofophical  Solution  of  theTe  Difficulriesi  for  in  this  Senfe  they  will  fliU 
be  XVirdi  KithoHt  LUjs,  whether  in  the  Mouth  of  an  o/d  Philofopher  or  a 
ntm  one. 


G  4  the 


88  L  O  G  I  C  K :  Or,        Parti. 

the  Union  of  our  own  Soul  and  Body^  the  Union  of 
the  di'vine  and  human  Natures  in  Jefus  Chrift^  the 
Operation  of  the  holy  Spirit  on  the  Mind  of  Man^ 
6cc.  Thcfe  ought  not  to  be  call'd  Words  without 
Jdeasj  for  there  is  fufficient  Evidence  for  the  Re- 
ality and  Certainty  of  the  Exiftence  of  their  Ob- 
iefts,  tho'  there  is  fome  Confulion  in  our  cleareft 
Conceptions  of  them  •■,  and  our  Ideas  of  them, 
tho'  imperfe6t5  are  yet  fufficient  to  converfe  about 
them,  fo  tar  as  we  have  Need,  and  to  determine 
fo  much  as  is  neceflary  for  our  own  Faith  and 
Pradice. 

Direct.  \\.  Do  not  fuppofe  that  the  Natures  or 
Effences  of  1'hings  always  differ  frotn  one  another^ 
as  much  as  their  Names  do.  There  are  various 
Purpofes  in  human  Life,  for  which  we  put  very 
different  Names  on  the  fame  Thing,  or  on  Things 
whofe  Natures  are  near  akin  j  and  thereby  often- 
times, by  making  a  new  nominal  Species^  we  are 
ready  to  deceive  our  fclves  with  the  Idea  of  an- 
other real  Species  of  Beings :  And  thofe  whofe  Un- 
derftandings  are  led  away  by  the  meer  Sound  of 
Words,  fmcy  the  Nature  of  thofe  'Things  x.oht 
very  different,  whofe  Names  are  fo,  and  judge  of 
them  accordingly. 

I  may  borrow  a  remarkable  Inflance  for  my 
Purpofe  almolf  out  of  every  Garden,  which  con- 
tains a  Variety  of  Plants  in  it.  Moll  or  all  Plants 
agree  in  this,  that  they  have  a  Root^  a  Stalky 
Leave s<y  Buds^  Blojfoms  and  Seeds :  But  the  Gar- 
diner ranges  them  under  very  different  Names,  as 
tho.^  they  were  really  different  Kinds  of  JBeings, 
meerly  becaufe  of  the  different  Ufe  and  Service  to 
which  they  are  applied  by  Men :  As  for  Inflance, 
thofe  Plants  whofe  Roots  are  eaten  fliall  appropri- 
ate 


C.  VI.  S.  3 .    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:     '8§ 

^te  the  Name  of  Roots  to  themfelves  j  fuch  arc 
Carrots^  Turnips^  Radijhes^  &e.  If  the  Leaves  arc 
of  chief  Ufe  to  us,  then  we  call  them  Herbs-,  as 
Sage^  Mint^  Thyme :  If  the  Leaves  are  eaten  raw, 
they  are  termed  Sallad,  as  Lettuce y  Purjlain:  If 
boiled,  they  become  Pot-herbs ',  as  Spinage^  Cole- 
ivorts ;  and  fome  of  thofe  fame  Plants,  which  arc 
Pot-herbs  in  one  Family,  are  Sallad  in  another. 
If  the  Buds  are  made  our  Food,  they  are  call'd 
Heads^  or  T'ops  -,  fo  Cabbage  Heads,  Heads  of  j^f- 
paragus  and  Artkhoaks.  If  the  Blojfom  be  of  moft 
Importance,  we  call  it  a  Flower  ;  fuch  are  Dah 
ftesy  'Tulips  and  Carnations^  which  are  the  meer 
Bloflbms  of  thofe  Plants.  If  the  Husk  or  Seeds 
are  eaten,  they  are  call'd  the  Fruits  of  the  Ground^ 
as  Peafe^  Beans,  Strawberries,  6cc.  If  any  Part 
of  the  Plant  be  of  known  and  common  Ufe  to  us 
in  Medicine,  we  call  it  a  phyftcal  Flerb,  as  Cardnus^ 
Scurvy-grafs;  but  if  we  count  no  Part  ufeful,  we 
call  it  a  Weed,  and  throw  it  out  of  the  Garden  j 
and  yet  perhaps  our  next  Neighbour  knows  fome 
valuable  Property  and  Ufe  of  it ;  he  plants  it  in 
his  Garden,  and  gives  it  the  Title  of  an  Herb  or 
a  Flower.  You  fee  here  how  fmall  is  the  real  Di- 
ftin^tion  of  thefe  fevcral  Plants,  conlider'd  in 
their  general  Nature  as  the  lejj'er  Fegetables  j  vet 
what  very  different  Ideas  we  vulgarly  form  con- 
cerning them,  and  make  different  Species  of  them, 
chiefly  becaufe  of  the  different  Names  given 
them. 

Now  when  Things  are  (et  in  this  clear  Light, 
it  appears  how  ridiculous  it  would  be  for  two 
Pcrfons  to  contend,  whether  Dandelion  be  a  Herb 
i:>x  a  Pl'^eed  5  whether  it  be  a  Pot-herb  or  Sallad \ 
when  by  the  Cuftom  or  Fancy  of  different  Fami- 
lies, this  one  Plant  obtains  all  thefe  Naraes,  ac- 
cording 


90  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Parti. 

cording  to  the  feveral  Ufes  of  it,  and  the  Value 
that  is  put  upon  it. 

Note  here,  that  I  find  no  Manner  of  Fault  with 
the  Variety  of  Names  which  are  given  to  feveral 
Plants,  according  to  the  various  Ufes  we  make  of 
them.  But  I  would  not  have  our  Judgments  im- 
pos'd  upon  hereby,  to  think  that  thefe  meer  no- 
minal  Species,  viz.  Herhs^  Sallad  and  Weeds  be- 
come three  really  different  Species  of  Beings,  on 
this  Account,  that  they  have  different  Names  and 
\Jit%^.     But  I  proceed  to  other  Inftances. 

It  has  been  the  Cuftom  of  Mankind,  when 
they  have  been  angry  with  any  Thing,  to  add  a 
new  ill  Name  to  it,  that  they  may  convey  there- 
by a  hateful  Idea  of  it  s  tho'  the  Nature  of  the 
Thing  ftill  abides  the  fame.  So  the  Papifts  call 
the  Protejlants  Hereticks :  A  prophane  Perfon  calls 
a  Alan  of  Piety ^  a  Precijian :  And  in  the  Times 
of  the  Civil  War  in  the  laft  Century,  the  Royal- 
ifis  call'd  the  Parliamentarians^  Fanaticks^  Round- 
heads and  Sc^aries :  And  they  in  Requital  call'd 
the  Royalijls^  Malignants:  But  the  Partizans  on 
each  fide  were  really  neither  better  nor  worfe  for 
thcfe  Names. 

It  has  been  alfo  a  frequent  Praftice  on  the  o- 
rher  Hand,  to  put  new  favourable  Names  upon  /// 
Ideas.^  on  purpofe  to  take  off" the  Odium  of^them. 
But  notwithitanding  all  thcfe  flattering  Names 
and  Titles,  a  Man  of  profufe  Generofity  is  but  a 
Spendthrift ;  a  natural  Son  is  a  Baflard  ftill ;  a  Gal- 
lant is  an  Adulterer<y  and  a  Lady  of  Pleafure  is  a 
IVhore. 

Dire6t.  III.  Take  Heed  of  believing  the  Nature 
and  P^Jj'ence  of  two  or  more  'Things  to  he  certainly  the 
fame^  hecaufe  they  may  have  the  fame  Name  given 
the-^.     This  has  been  an  unhappy  and  fatal  Occa- 

fion 


C.  VI.  S.  3 .    the  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon:       9 1 

fion  of  a  thoufand  Miftakes  in  the  natural,  in  the 
civil,  and  in  the  religious  Affairs  of  Life,  both  a- 
mongft  the  Vulgar  and  the  Learned.  I  ihall  give 
two  or  three  Inilances,  chiefly  in  the  Matters  of 
Natural  PhilofopJoy^  having  hinted  feveral  Dangers 
of  this  Kind,  relating  to  "Theology  in  the  forego- 
ing Difcourfe  concerning  Equivocal  Words. 

Our  elder  Philofophers  have  generally  made  ufe 
of  the  Word  Soul  to  fignify  that  Principle  where- 
by a  Plant  grows,  and  they  call'd  it  the  'vege' 
tathe  Soul:  The  Principle  of  the  animal  Moti- 
on of  a  Brute  has  been  likewife  call'd  a  Soul^  and 
we  have  been  taught  to  name  it  the  fenji the  Soul: 
They  have  alfo  given  the  Name  Soul  to  that  fu- 
perior  Principle  in  Man,  whereby  he  thinks, 
judges,  reafons,  (^c.  and  tho'  they  diftinguilhed 
this  by  the  honourable  Title  of  the  rational  Souly 
yet  in  common  Difcourfe  and  Writing  we  leave 
out  the  Words  vcgetativey  fenjiti-ve  and  rational -^ 
and  make  the  Word  Soul  fcrve  for  all  thcfe  Prin- 
ciples :  Thence  we  are  led  early  into  this  Imagi- 
nation, that  there  is  a  fort  of  fpiritual  Being  in 
Plants  and  in  Brutes^  like  that  in  Men.  Where- 
as, if  we  did  but  abflra6t  and  fcparate  thefe  Things 
from  Words,  and  compare  the  Caufe  of  Grovitb 
in  a  Plant^  with  the  Caufe  of  Reafoning  in  Mart 
^^without  the  Word  Soul)  we  fliould  never  think 
that  thcfe  tv^o  Principles  were  at  all  like  one  an- 
other i  nor  fhould  we  perhaps  fo  eafily  and  pe- 
remptorily conclude,  that  Brutes  need  an  intelli- 
gent Mind  to  perform  their  animal  A6lions. 

Another  Initance  may  be  the  Word  Life^ 
which  being  attributed  to  Plants.,  to  Brutes.,  and 
to  Men^  and  in  each  of  them  afcrib'd  to  the  SomI.^ 
has  very  eafily  betray'd  us  from  our  Infancy  into 
this  Mi  flake,  that  the  Spirit^  or  Mindy  or  'think- 
ing Principle  in  Man^  is  the  Spring  of  vegetative 
;  and 


Pf.  L  O  Q  IC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

ntnd  ammal  Life  to  his  Body :  Whereas  it  is  evident, 
that  if  the  Spirit  or  thinking  Principle  of  Man 
gave  Life  to  his  animal  Nature,  the  Way  to  fave 
Men  from  dying  would  not  be  to  ufe  Medi-^ 
cines,  but  to  perluade  the  Spirit  to  abide  in  the 
Body. 

I  might  derive  a  third  Inftanee  from  the  Word 
Heat  5  which  is  us'd  to  fignify  the  Senfation  we 
have  when  we  are  near  the  Fire,  as  well  as  the 
Caufe  of  that  Senfation  which  is  in  the  Fire  it 
felf  J  and  thence  we  conclude  from  our  Infancy, 
that  there  is  a  fort  of  Heat  in  the  Fire  refemhling 
our  own  Senfation^  or  the  Heat  which  we  feel : 
Whereas  in  the  Fire  there  is  nothing  but  little 
3?aiticles  of  Matter,  'of  fuch  particular  Shapes, 
Sizes,  Situations  and  Motions,  as  are  fitted  to 
imprefs  fuch  Motions  on  our  Flefh  or  NeiTes  as 
excite  the  Senfe  of  Heat.  Now  if  this  Caufe  of 
our  Senfiition  in  the  Fire  had  been  always  call'd 
by  a  diil;in6t  Name,  perhaps  we  had  not  been  fo 
rooted  in  this  Miilakc,  that  the  Fire  is  hot  with 
the  fame  fort  of  Heat  that  we  feel.  This  will  ap-r 
pear  with  more  Evidence,  when  we  confider 
that  we  are  fecure  from  the  fame  Miftake  where 
there  have  been  two  different  Names  allotted  to 
our  Senfation^  and  to  the  Caufe  of  it  -,  as,  we  do  not 
fay.  Pain  is  in  the  Fire  that  burns  us,  or  in  th? 
Knife  that  cuts  and  wounds  us  j  for  we  call  it 
burning  in  the  Fire^  cutting  in  the  Knife^  and  Pain 
only,  when  it  is  in  our  fehes. 

Numerous  Inftances  of  this  Kind  might  be  de^ 
•  riv'd  from  the  \V ovds  fiveet^  four,  loud^  Jljrill^  and 
:.ilmolt  all  the  fenfibk  ^alities^  whofe  real  Na- 
tures we  miftake  fi*om  our  very  Infancy,  and  we 
are  ready  to  fuppofe  them  to  be  the  fame  in  us, 
and  in  the  Bodies  .that  caufe  them  3,  partly,  be- 
caufe  the  Words,  which  fignify  our  own  Senfati- 


ons, 


C.  VI.  S.  3 .     The  right  Ufi  of  Reafon.      '9 1 

ons,  are  applied  alfo  to  fignify  thofe  unknown 
Shapes  and  Motions  of  the  little  Corpufcles  which 
excite  and  caufe  thofe  Senfitions. 

Direct.  IV.  In  Converfation  or  Reading  be  dili' 
gent  to  -find  out  the  true  Senfe^  or  difiin^  Idea^ 
ivhich  the  Speaker  or  Writer  affixes  to  his  Words  > 
land  efpecially  to  thofe  Words  which  are  the  chief 
Suhjeh  of  his  Difcourfe.  As  far  as  poflible  take 
heed,  left  you  put  more  or  fewer  Ideas  into  one 
Word,  than  the  Perfon  did  when  he  wrote  or 
fpokej  and  endeavour  that  your  Ideas  of  eve- 
ry Word  may  be  the  fame  as  his  were  :  Then 
you  will  judge  better  of  what  he  fpeaks  or 
writes. 

It  is  for  want  of  this  that  Men  quarrel  in  the 
Dark  j  and  that  there  are  fo  many  Contentions  in 
the  feveral  Sciences,  and  d'pecially  in  Divinity. 
Multitudes  of  them  arifc  from  a  Miftake  of  the 
true  Senfe  or  compleat  Meaning,  in  which  Words 
are  us'd  by  the  Writer  or  Speaker  >  and  hereby 
Ibmetimes  they  feem  to  agree^  ivhen  they  really  dif- 
fer in  their  Sentiments  j  and  fometimes  they  feenz 
t-o  differ  ivhen  they  really  agree.  Let  me  give  an 
Inftance  of  both. 

When  one  Man  by  the  Word  Church  fhall  un- 
derftand  all  that  believe  in  Chriji  5  and  another  by 
the  Word  Church  means  only  the  Church  of  Rome  % 
they  may  both  alTent  to  this  Proportion,  There  is 
no  Salvation  out  of  the  Churchy  and  yet  their  in- 
ward Sentiments  may  be  widely  different. 

Again,  if  one  Writer  fhall  affirm  that  Virtue 
added  to  Faith  is  fufficient  to  make  a  Cbrijlian^  and 
another  fhall  as  zealouily  deny  this  Propofition,. 
thev  feem  to  differ  widely  in  Words,  and  yet 
perhaps  they  may  both  really  agree  in  Sentiment : 
If  by  the  V/ord  Virtue^  the  Afhrmcr  intends  our 

X  "wbolf 


94  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        PartL 

whole  Duty  to  God  and  Man  j  and  the  Denier  by 
the  Word  Virtue  means  only  Courage^  or  at  moft 
our  Duty  toward  our  Neighbour^  without  includ- 
ing in  the  Idea  of  it  the  Duty  which  we  owe  to 
God. 

Many  fuch  fort  of  Contentions  as  thefe  are,  if 
traced  to  their  Original,  will  be  found  to  be  meer 
Logomachys^  or  Strifes  and  Quarrels  about  Names 
and  Words,  and  vain  Janglings^  as  the  Apoftle 
calls  them  in  his  firft  Letter  of  Advice  to  ti- 
mothy. 

In  order  therefore  to  attain  clear  and  diftin^ 
Ideas  of  what  we  read  or  hear,  wc  muft  fearch 
the  Senfe  of  Words;  we  muft  confider  what  is 
their  Original  and  Derivation  in  our  own  or  fo- 
reign Languages  j  what  is  their  common  Senfe 
Amongft  Mankind,  or  in  other  Authors,  efpecial- 
iy  fuch  as  wrote  in  the  fame  Country,  in  the  lame 
Age,  about  the  fame  Time,  and  upon  the  fame 
Subjects:  We  muft  confider  in  what  Senfe  the 
iame  Author  ufes  any  particular  Word  or  Phrafe^ 
•and  that  when  he  is  difcourllno;  on  the  fame  Mat- 
ter,  and  efpecially  about  the  lame  Parts  or  Para- 
graphs of  his  Wanting:  We  muft  confider  whe- 
ther the  Word  be  ufed  in  a  ftri6l  and  limited,  or 
m  a  large  and  general  Senfe  >  whether  in  a  literal, 
in  a  figurative,  or  in  a  prophetick  Senfe ;  whe- 
ther it  has  any  fecondary  Idea  annext  to  it  befidcs 
the  primary  or  chief  Senfe.  We  muft  enquire 
fiirthcr,  what  is  the  Scope  and  Defign  of  the 
Writer  j  and  what  is  the  Connexion  of  that  Sen- 
tence withthofe  that  go  before  it,  and  thofe  which 
follow  it.  By  thcfc  and  other  Methods  we  are  to 
fearch  out  the  Definition  of  Names ^  i.e.  the  true 
Senfe  and  Meaning  in  which  any  Author  or  Speaker 
afcs  any  Word,  which  may  be  the  chief  Subje6t 

of 


C.  VI.  S.  3.   the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon;        95 

of  Difcourfe,  or  may  carry  any  confiderable  Im* 
portance  in  it. 

Dire6t.  V.  When  we  communicate  our  Notions  t9 
others^  meerly  with  a  Dejign  to  inform  and  imprcue 
their  Knowledge^  let  us  in  the  beginning  of  our  Dif- 
courfe take  Care  to  adjuft  the  Definition  of  Names 
wherefoever  there  is  need  of  it  -,  that  is,  to  determine  . 
plainly  what  we  mean  by  the  chief  Words  which 
are  the  Subje^  of  our  Difcourfe  j  and  be  fure  always 
to  keep  the  fame  Ideas^  whenfoever  we  ufe  the  fam& 
IVords^   unlefs  we  gi've  due  Notice  of  the  Change,  . 
This  will  have  a  very  large  and  happy  Influence, 
infecuringnot  only  others  but  our  felves  too  from 
Confufion  and  Miflake  j   for  even   Writers  and 
Speakers  themfelves,  for  want  of  due  Watchful- 
nefs,  are  ready  to  affix  different  Ideas  to  their  own 
JVords^  in  different  Parts  of  their  Difcourfes,  and 
hereby  bring  Perplexity  into  their  own  Reafon- 
ings,  and  confound  their  Hearers. 

It  is  by  an  Obfervation  of  this  Rule,  that  Ma* 
thematicians  have  fo  happily   fecured  themfelves, 
and  the  Sciences  which  they  have  profefl,   from 
Wrangling  and  Controverfy  j  becaufe  whenfoever 
in  the  Progrefs  of  their  Treatifes  they  have  Oc- 
cafion  to  ufe  a  new  and  unknown  Word,  they  al- 
ways define  it,  and  tell  in  what  Senfe  they  fhall 
take  it  J  and  in  many  of  their  Writings  you  find 
a  heap  of  Definitions  at  the  very  beginning.  Now 
if  the  Writers  of  natural  Philofophy  and  Morality 
had  us'd  the  fame  Accuracy  and  Care,  they  had 
effectually  fccluded  a  Multitude  of  noify  and  fruit- 
lefs  Debates  out  of  their  feveral  Provinces :  Nor 
had  that  ficred  Theme  of  Divinity  been  perplex- 
ed with  fo  many  intricate  Difputes,  nor  the  Church 
of  Chrlfi  been  torn  to  pieces  by  fo  many  Sed:s 
and  Fa&ions,  if  th?  Words  Grace^  Faith^  Rights' 

ou/he/s^ 


!^6  LOGICK:Qr,        Parti. 

eufaefs^  Repentance^  Jufiification^  JVorJJnp^  Churchy 
Bijhop^  Presbyter^  6cc.  had  been  well  defined,  and 
their  Significations  adjufted,  as  near  as  poflible,  by 
the  Ufe  of  thofe  Words  in  the  new  Teftamentj 
or  at  leaft,  if  every  Writer  had  told  us  at  firft  in 
what  Senfe  he  would  ufe  thofe  Words. 

Dire£t.  VL  In  your  own  Studies'^  as  well  as  in 
the  Communication  of  your  'Thoughts  to  others,  meer- 
ly  for  their  Information,  aijoid  ambiguous  and  equi- 
vocal Terms  as  much  as  pofjible.  Do  not  ufe  fuch 
Words  as  have  two  or  three  Definitions  of  the 
Name  belonging  to  them,  i.  e.  fuch  Words  as 
have  two  or  three  Senfes,  where  there  is  any 
Danger  of  Miftake.  Where  your  chief  Bufineis 
is  to  inform  the  Judgment,  and  to  explain  a  Mat- 
ter, rather  than  to  perfuade  or  affe6b,  be  not  fond 
of  exprefling  your  felves  in  fgurati'ue  Language, 
when  there  are  any  proper  Words  that  fignify  the 
fame  Idea  in  their  literal  Senfe.  It  is  the  Ambi-' 
guity  of  Names,  as  we  have  often  faid,  that  brings 
alnioll  infinite  Conftifion  into  our  Conceptions  of 
Things. 

But  where  there  is  a  Neccility  of  ufing  an  am- 
biguous Word,  there  let  double  Care  be  us'd  in  de^ 
fining  that  Word,  and  declaring  in  what  Senfo 
you  take  it.  And  be  furc  to  fuffer  no  ambiguous 
Word  ever  to  come  into  your  Definitions. 

Direft.  VII.  In  cornmimi eating  your  Notions,  ufe 
every  Word  as  near  as  pofjible  in  the  fame  Senfe  in 
which  Alankind  commonly  ufes  it  >  or  which  ff^riters 
that  have  gone  before  you  have  ufually  affixt  to  it, 
upon  Condition  that  it  is  free  from  Ambiguity.  Tho' 
Names  are  in  their  Original  mcerly  arbitrary,  yet 
we  Ihould  always  keep  to  the  eflablifh'd  Meaning 
of  them,  unlcfs  great  Nccelllty  require  the  Al- 
teration } 


C.  VI.  S.  3  .^    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:      97 

terationj  for  when  any  Word  has  been  us'd  to 
iignify  an  Idea,  that  old  Idea  will  recur  in  the 
Mind  when  the  Word  is  heard  or  read,  rather 
than  any  new  Idea  which  we  may  fallen  to  it. 
And  this  is  one  Reafon  why  the  received  Defini- 
tions of  Names  ihould  be  chang'd  as  little  as 
poffible. 

But  I  add  farther,  that  tho'  a  Word  entirely- 
new,  introduced  int®  a  Language,  may  be  affixed 
to  what  Idea  you  pleafe,  yet  an  old  Word  ought 
never  to  be  fixt  to  an  unaccuftomed  Idea,  with- 
out juft  and  evident  Neceffity,  or  without  pre- 
fent  or  previous  Notice,  left  we  introduce  there- 
by a  Licenfe  for  all  manner  of  pernicious  Equivo- 
cations and  FalJIjoods',  as  for  Inftance,  when  an 
idle  Boy  who  has  not  feen  his  Book  all  the  Morn- 
ing fliall  tell  his  Mailer  that  he  has  learnt  his  Lef- 
fott^  he  can  never  excufe  himielf  by  faying,  that 
by  the  Word  Lejfon  he  meant  his  Breakfafl^  and 
by  the  Word  learn  he  meant  eating  ;  furely  this 
would  be  conftrued  a  downright  Lye,  and  his 
fancied  Wit  would  hardly  procure  his  Pardon. 

In  uling  an  ambiguous  Vv''ord  which  has  been 
us'd  in  different  Senfes,  we  may  chufe  v/hat  we 
think  the  modi  proper  Scnfc,  as  I  have  done  p.  85. 
in  naming  the  Poles  of  the  Loadjhne^  North  or 
South. 

And  when  a  Word  has  been  us'd  in  two  or 
three  Senfes,  and  has  made  a  great  Inroad  for  Er- 
ror upon  that  account,  it  is  of  good  Service  to 
drop  one  or  two  of  thofe  Senfes,  and  leave  it  on- 
ly one  remaining,  and  affix  the  other  Senfes  or  I- 
deas  to  other  Words.  So  the  modern  Philofo- 
phers,  when  they  treat  of  the  human  Soul^  they 
call  it  the  Mind  or  Mens  Humana^  and  leave  the 
Word  Anirna  or  Soul  to  fignify  the  Principle  of 
Life  and  Motion  in  meer  animal  Beings. 

H  The 


98  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

The  Poet  Juvenal  hvas  long  ago  given  us  a  hint 
of  this  Accuracy  and  Diftindion  when  he  fays  of 
Brutes  and  Men-^ 

Indulfttmuncli  communis  CoMitor  illis 
^antiim  Anirnas  j  nohis  Animum  quoque. 

Sat.xvi.  V.  1^4. 

'     ..      T       --.:5i 

{  Exception.  There  is  one  Cafe  wherein  fome  of 
thfefc  lail  Rules  concerning  the  Definition  of  Words 
miy  be  in  fbme  Meafure  difpenfed  with  j  and  that 
is,  when  llrong  and   rooted  Prejudice  hath  cfta- 
bliflied  fome  iravourite  Word  or  Phrafe,  and  long 
us'd  it  to  exprefs  fome  millaken  Notion,  or  to  u- 
nitc  fome  inconfiftent  Ideas  i  for  then  it  is  fome- 
tnnes  much  eafier  to  lead  the  World  into  Truth 
by  indulging  their  Fondnefs  for  a  Phrafe,  and  by 
ailigning  and  applying  new  Ideas  and  Notions  to 
their  favourite  Word^  and  this  is  much  fafer  alfo 
than  to  awaken  all  their  Paffions  by  reje6ting  both 
their  old  Words,  and  Phrafes,  and  Notions,  and 
introducing  all  new  at  once :  Therefore  we  con- 
tinue to  fay,  There  is  Heat  in  the  Fire^  there  is 
Coldnefs  in  Ice^  rather  than  invent  new  Words  to 
exprefs  the  Powers  which  are  in  Fire  or  Ice^  to 
excite  the  Senfations  of  Heat  or  Cold  in  us.     For 
the  fime  Reafon  fome  Words  and  Phrafes  which 
are  lefs  proper  may  be  continued  in  Theology^  while 
People  are  led  into  clearer  Ideas  with  much  more 
Eafc  and  Succefs,  than  if  an  Attempt  were  made 
to  change  all  their  beloved  Forms  of  Speech. 

In  other  Cafes  thefe  logical  Directions  fliould 
generally  be  obferved,  and  different  Names  affixt 
to  different  Ideas. 

Here  I  cannot  but  take  Occafion  to  remark, 
that  it  is  a  confiderable  Advantage  to  any  Lan- 
guage to  have  a  Variety  of  iienn  TVords  introduced 

into- 


C.  VI.  S.  3 :   The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon;      99 

into  it,  that  when  in  Courfe  of  Time  tiew  OhjeSfs 
and  new  Ideas  arife,  there  may  be  ne-iv  JVords  and 
Names  aflign'd  to  them :  And  alfo  where  one  lin- 
gle  Name  has  fuftain'd  two  or  three  Ideas  in  Time 
paft,  thei'e  new  Words  may  remove  the  Ambi- 
guity by  being  affixt  to  fome  of  thofe  Ideas.  This 
Practice  would  by  Degrees  take  away  part  of  the 
Uncertainty  of  Language,  And  for  this  Reafon 
I  cannot  but  congratulate  our  Englip  Tongue^  that 
it  has  been  abundantly  inriched  with  the  Tranfla- 
tion  of  Words  from  all  our  neighbour  Nations, 
as  well  as  from  antient  Languages,  and  thefe 
Words  have  been  as  it  were  enfranchifed  amongft 
US}  for  French^  Latin^  Greek  and  German  Names 
will  fignify  EngliJJj  Ideas,  as  well  as  Words  that 
are  antiently  and  intirely  EngUJJj. 

It  may  not  be  amifs  to  mention  in  this  Place, 
that  as  the  Determination  of  the  particular  Senfe 
in  which  any  Word  is  us'd  is  call'd  the  Definition 
of  the  Name^  fo  the  Enumeration  of  the  various  Scn- 
fes  of  any  equivocal  Word  is  fometimes  call'd  the 
Di'vifion  or  Difiindlion  of  the  Name  ;  and  for 
this  Purpofe  good  Di6tionaries  are  of  excellent 
Ufe. 

This  DifiinSlion  of  the  Name  or  JVord  is  great- 
ly neceflary  in  Argumentation  or  Difpute }  when 
a  fallacious  Argument  is  us'd,  he  that  anfwers  it 
diftinguifhes  the  feveral  Senies  of  fome  Word  or 
Phrafe  in  it,  and  fhews  in  what  Senfe  it  is  true 
and  in  what  Senfe  it  is  as  evidently  falfe. 


H  %  Sect*^ 


100  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

Sect.     IV. 

Of  the  Definition  of  things. 

AS  there  is  much  Confufion  introduced  into 
our  Ideas,  by  the  Means  of  thofe  Words 
to  which  they  are  affix'd  j  To  the  mingling  our  I- 
deas  with  each  other  without  Caution,  is  a  far- 
ther Occafion  whereby  they  become  confus'd.  A 
Court- Lady ^  born  and  bred  up  amongft  Pomp  and 
Equipage^  and  the  vain  Notions  of  Birth  and  ^d' 
lity^  conllantly  joins  and  mixes  all  thefc  with  the 
Idea  of  her  felf,  and  fhe  imagines  thefe  to  be  ef~ 
fential  to  her  Nature^-cind  as  it  were  necej/ary  to  her 
Being ;  thence  fhe  is  tempted  to  look  upon  menial 
Servants^  and  the  lowelt  Rank  of  Mankind,  as 
another  Species  of  Beings  quite  diftinft  from  her 
felf.  A  Plough  Boy  that  has  never  travelled  be- 
yond his  own  Village,  and  has  feen  nothing  but 
thatclfd  Houfes  and  his  Parifh-Church^  is  natural- 
Iv  led  to  imagine  that  T'hatch  belongs  to  the  very 
Nature  of  a  Houfe^  and  that  that  mult  be  a  Church 
which  is  built  of  Stone^  and  efpccially  if  it  has  a 
Spire  upon  it.  A  Child  whofe  Uncle  has  been  ex- 
cefUve  fond,  and  his  Schoobnafier  very  fevere, 
cafily  believes  that  Fondnefs  always  belongs  to 
Uncles^  and  that  Severity  is  eflential  to  Mafters  or 
Inflrukors.  He  has  feen  alfo  Soldiers  with  red 
Coats  J  or  Minifters  with  long  black  Gowns^  and 
therefore  he  perfuades  himfelf  that  thefe  Garbs 
are  eflential  to  the  Chara6ters,  and  that  he  is  not 
a  Minifler  v/ho  has  not  a  long  black  Gown^  nor  can 
he  be  a  Soldier  who  is  not  drefs'd  in  red.  It 
would  be  well  if  all  fuch  Millakcs  ended  ^with 
Childhood. 

I 

It 


C.  VL  S.  4.  The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.      1 0 1 

It  might  be  alfo  fubjoiii'd,  that  our  complex 
Ideas  become  confus'd,  not  only  by  uniting  or 
blending  together  more  fmple  or  Jingle  Ideas  than  re- 
ally belong  to  them,  as  in  the  Inllances  jull  men- 
tioned y  but  Obfcurity  and  Confufion  fometimes 
come  upon  our  Ideas  alfo,  for  want  of  uniting  a 
fuficient  Number  of  Jingle  Ideas  to  make  the  com- 
plex one :  So  if  I  conceive  of  a  Leopard  only  as 
^Jpotted  Heaji^  this  does  not  diftinguilTi  it  from  a 
Tyger  or  a  Lynx^  nor  from  many  Dogs  or  IlorfeSy 
which  are  fpotted  tooj  and  therefore  a  Leopard 
mu:l  have  fome  more  Ideas  added  to  compleat  and 
dilHnguifh  it. 

I  grant  that  it  is  a  large  and  free  Acquaintance 
with  the  World,  a  watchful  ObfeiTation  and  di- 
ligent Search  into  the  Nature  of  Things  that 
mull  fully  corre6b  this  kind  of  Errors :  The  Rules 
of  Logick  are  not  fufficicnt  to  do  it :  But  yet  the 
Rules  of  Logick  may  inftruct  us  by  what  means  to 
dilHnguifh  one  Thing  from  another,  and  how  to 
fearch  and  mark  out  as  far  as  may  be  the  Contents 
and  Limits  of  the  Nature  of  diilinct  Beings,  and 
thus  may  give  us  great  Alii ilance  towards  the  Re- 
medy of  thefe  Miilakcs. 

As  the  Definition  of  Names  frees  us  from  that 
Confufion  which  Words  introduce,  fo  the  Dejini- 
tion  of  Things  will  in  fome  Meallirc  guard  us  a- 
giiinll  that  Confufion  which  mingled  Ideas  have 
introduced :  For  as  a  Definition  of  the  Name  ex- 
plains what  any  Word  means,  fo  a  Definition  of 
the  Thing  explains  what  is  the  Nature  of  that 
Thing. 

In  order  to  form  a  Definition  of  any  Thing 
we  mull  put  forth  thefe  three  Acts  of  the 
Mind. 

i^"^,  Compare  the  Thing  to  be  defin'd  with  c- 
ther  Things  that  arc  moll  like  to  it  felf,  and  fee 

H  3  wherein 


ihi  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        l^artl. 

wHerein  its  EiTence  or  Nature  agrees  with  them  > 
and  that  is  call'd  the  general  Nature  or  Genus  in  a 
Definition :  So  if  you  would  define  what  PFini 
is,  firft  Compare  it  with  other  Things  Hke  it  felf, 
as  Cyder^  Perry^  ^c.  and  you  will  find  it  agrees 
eflentially  with  them  in  this,  that  it  is  a  Jort  of 
Juice. 

2^'y,  Confider  the  moft  remarkable  and  prima- 
ry Attribute,  Property,  or  Idea  wherein  this 
.Thing  differs  from  thofe  other  Things  that  are 
moft  like  it ;  and  that  is  its  ejfential  or  fpecifick 
■Difference :  So  PFine  differs  from  Cyder  and  Perry^ 
and  all  other  Juices^  in  that  it  is  preffed  from  a 
Grape.  This  may  be  call'd  its y^^-^W  iVi^/^r^,  which 
diftinguifhes  it  from  other  Juices. 

3'^'y,  Join  the  general  and  fpecial  Nature  toge- 
ther, or  (which  is  all  one)  the  Genus  and  the  Difr 
ference.^  and  thefe  make  up  a  Definition.  So  the 
Juice  of  a  Grape .^  or  Juice  prefi  from  Grapes  is  the 
definition  of  JVine. 

So  if  I  would  define  what  Winter  is,  I  confi-^ 
dcr  firil  wherein  it  agrees  with  other  Things 
which  arc  moll  like  it,  (r/z.)  Summer.^  Springs 
Autumn^  and  I  find  they  are  all  Seafuns  of  the 
Tear;  therefore  a  Seafon  of  the  Tear  is  the  Genus. 
Then  I  obferve  wherein  it  differs  from  thefe,  and 
that  is  in  the  Shortnefs  of  the  Days;  for  it  is  this 
which  docs  primarily  diftinguifh  it  from  other 
S'eafons;  therefore  this  may  be  call'd  its  y/'^aWiV^- 
ture  or  its  Difference.  Then  by  joining  thefe  to- 
gether I  make  a  Definition.  Winter  is  that  Sea- 
fon of  the  Tear  wherein  the  Days  are  fhortefi.  I 
confefs  indeed  this  is  but  a  ruder  Definition  of  it, 
'for  to  define  it  as  an  accurate  Aftronomer  I  mult 
limit  the  Days,  Hours  and  Minutes. 

After  the  fame  manner  if  we  would  explain  or 
'define  what  the  Picture  of  a  Man  is,  we  confider 

firlt 


C.  VI.  S.4.    The  right  Ufe  of  Kz^^on.       103 

iirft  the  Genus  or  general  Nature  of  it,  which  is  a 
Reprefentation-y    and  herein  it   agrees  with  many 
other  Things,  as  a  Statue^  a  Shadoiv^  a  Print.,  a 
'verbal  Defcription  of  a  Man,  £5?<r.     Then  we  con- 
fider  wherein  it  differs  from  thefe,  and  we  find  it 
differs  from  a  verbal  Defcription  in  that  it  is  a  Re- 
prefentation  to  the  Eye  and  not  to  the  Ear :  It  dif- 
fers from  a  Statue  in  that  it  is  a  Reprefentation 
upon  a  flat  Surface,  and  not  in  a  foHd  Figure:  It 
differs  from  a  Shadow  in  that  it  is  an  abiding  Re- 
prefentation and  not  a  fleeting  one  ;  It  differs  from 
a  Print  or  Draughty  becauic  it  rcprefents  the  Co- 
lours by  Paint  as  well  as  the  Shape  of  the  Object 
by  Delineation.     Now  fo  many,  or  rather  fo  few 
of  thefe  Ideas  put  together,  as  are  jull  fufficient  to 
dillinguifh  a  Picture  from  all  other  Rcprefcntati- 
onsj  make  up  its  eifcntial  Difference  or  its  (pedal 
Nature;  and  all  thefe  are  included  in  its  beingpaint- 
ed  on  a  plain  Surface.     Then  join  this  to  the  Ge- 
nus^ which  is  a  Reprefentation;  and  thus  you  have 
the  complcat  Definition  of  the  Picture  of  a  Man, 
viz.  it  is  the  Reprefentation  of  a  Alan  in  Paint  up- 
on a  Surface  or  a  Plane. 

Here  it  muft  be  ohferved^  that  when  we  fpeak 
of  the  Genus  and  Difference  as  compofing  a  D.cil- 
nition^  it  mull  always  be  underllood  that  the 
ncarejl  Genus  and  the  fpecifick  Difference  are  re- 
quired. 

The  next  general  Nature  or  the  neareft  Genus 
mull;  be  us'd  in  a  Definition,  becaufe  it  includes 
all  the  reil  i  as  if  I  would  define  IFine^  I  mull 
fay  Wiyie  is  a  Juice^  which  is  the  nearefl  Genus  ; 
and  not  fav,  JVine  is  a  Liquid^  which  is  a  re- 
mote general  Nature  j  or  PFine  is  a  Subftance  ^ 
which  is  yet  more  remote  ;  for  Juice  includes 
both  Subftance  and  Liquid.  Befides,  neither  of 
thefe   two  remote  general  Natures  would  make 

H  4  any 


104  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

any  Diftin6l:ion  betwixt  Wine  and  a  thouflind  o- 
thcr  Subfiances^  or  other  Liquids  -,  a  remote  Genus  . 
leaves  the  Thing  too  much  undiftinguilh'd. 

The  fpecifick  Difference  is  that  primary  At- 
tribute which  diftinguifhes  each  Species  from 
one  another,  while  they  ftand  ranked  under  the 
fame  general  Nature  or  Genus.  Tho'  Wine  dif" 
fers  from  other  Liquids  in  that  it  is  the  Juice  of 
a  certain  Fruity  yet  this  is  but  a  general  or  generick 
Difference^  for  it  does  not  diflinguifh  Wine  from 
Cyder  or  Perry  ;  the  Specifick  Difference  of  Wine 
therefore  is  its  PreJJure  from  the  Grape^  as  Cyder 
is  prefs'd  from  Apples^  and  Perry  from  Pears. 

In  Definitions  alfo  we  muft  ufe  the  primary  At- 
tribute that  diftinguifhes  the  Species  or  fpecial  Na- 
ture, and  not  attempt  to  define  Wine  by  its  parti- 
cular Talles,  or  Effects,  or  other  Properties, 
which  are  but  fecondary  or  confequential^  when  its 
PreJJure  from  the  Grape  is  the  moft  obvious  and 
primary  Diftinftion  of  it  from  all  other  Juices. 
I  cnnfefs  in  fome  Cafes  it  is  not  fo  eafily  known 
which  is  the  primary  Idea  that  diftinguifhes  one 
Thing  from  another  ;  and  therefore  fome  would 
as  foon  define  Winter  by  the  Coldnefs  of  the  Sea- 
fon^  as  by  the  Shortncfs  of  the  Days-,  tho'  the 
Shortnefs  of  the  Days  is  doubtlefs  the  moft  juft, 
primary  and  philofophical  Difference  betwixt  that 
and  the  other  Seafons  of  the  Year,  fince  Winter 
Days  are  always  yl^or/fy?,  but  not  always  the  cold- 
efi:  I  add  alfo,  that  the  Shortnefs  of  the  Days  is 
one  Caufe  of  the  Coldnefs^hut  the  Cold  is  no  Caufe 
of  their  Shortnefs. 


Sect, 


C.  VI.  S.  5 .    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     105 

Sect.     V. 

Rules  of  Definition  of  the  'Thing. 


TH  E  fpecial  Rules  of  a  good  Definition  arc 
thefe  : 

Rule  I.  A  Definition  muft  he  univerfal,  or  as 
fome  call  it,  adequate  j  that  is,  it  muft  agree  to  all 
the  particular  Species  or  Individuals  that  are  in- 
cluded under  the  fame  Idea  5  fo  the  Juice  of  a 
Grape  agrees  to  all  proper  Wines^  whether  Red^ 
White  ^  French^  Spanifh^  Florence^  i^c. 

Rule  II.  //  mufi  he  proper  and  peculiar  io  the 
Thing  defined^  and  agree  to  that  alone  5  for  it  is  the 
very  Defign  of  a  Definition  eflfeftually  to  diftin- 
guiih  one  Thing  from  all  others :  So  the  Juice  of 
a  Grape  agrees  to  no  other  Subftance,  to  no  other 
Liquid,  to  no  other  Being  but  Wine. 

Thefe  two  Rules  being  obferv'd,  will  always 
render  a  Definition  reciprocal  with  the  Thing  de- 
fined-, which  is  afcholaftick  Way  of  fpeaking,  to 
fignify  that  the  Definition  may  be  us'd  in  any  Sen- 
tence in  the  Place  of  the  Thing  defined.^  or  they 
may  be  mutually  afiirmcd  concerning  each  other, 
or  fubftituted  in  the  room  of  each  other.  The 
Juice  of  the  Grape  is  Wine^  or  Wine  is  the  Juice 
of  the  Grape.  And  wherefoever  the  Word  M'^itw 
is  us'd,  you  may  put  the  Juice  of  the  Grape  inftead 
of  it,  except  when  you  confider  Wine  rather  as 
a  IVord  than  a  Things  or  when  it  is  mention'd  in 
iiich  logical  Rules. 

Rule 


106  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Parti. 

Rule  Ill.yf  Definition  ought  to  be  clear  and  plain  y 
for  the  Defigii  of  it  is  to  lead  us  into  the  Know- 
ledge of  the  Thing  defined. 

Hence  it  will  follow  that  the  Words  us'd  in  a 
Definition  ought  not  to  be  doubtful^  and  equi'vo^ 
cal,  and  obfcure^  but  as  plain  and  eafy  as  the  Lan- 
guage will  afford :  And  indeed  it  is  a  general  Rule 
concerning  the  Definition  both  of  Names  and 
'Things^  that  no  Word  fhould  be  us'd  in  either  of 
them  which  has  any  Darkneis  or  Difficulty  in  it, 
unlefs  it  has  been  before  explain'd  or  defin'd. 

Hence  it  will  follow  alfo,  that  there  are  many 
Things  cannot  well  be  defin'd  either  as  to  the 
Na7ne  or  the  things  unlefs  it  be  by  fynonymous 
Words,  or  by  a  Negation  of  the  contrary  Idea, 
fi^r.  for  learned  Men  know  not  how  to  make 
them  more  evident  or  more  intelligible  than  the 
Ideas  which  every  Man  has  gained  by  the  vulgar 
Methods  of  teaching.  Such  are  the  Ideas  of  Ex- 
ienfion^  Duration^  Thought^  Confcioufnefs^  and  moll 
of  our  fimple  Ideas,  and  particularly  fenfible  Qua- 
lities, as  PVhite^  Blue^  Red^  Cold,  Heat^  Shrilly 
Bitter^  Sour^  i^c. 

We  can  fay  of  Duration  that  it  is  a  Continuance 
in  Beings  or  a  not  ceafing  to  be;  we  can  fay  of 
Confcioufnefs^  that  it  is  as  it  ivere  a  feeling  ivithin 
ourfehes,  we  may  fay  Heat  is  that  which  is  not 
Cold;  or  Sour  is  that  which  is  like  Vinegar;  or 
we  may  point  to  the  clear  Sky,  and  fay  that  is 
Blue.  Thefe  are  the  vulgar  Methods  of  teaching 
the  Definitions  of  Names ^  or  Meaning  of  Words. 
But  there  are  fome  Philofophers  whofe  Attempt 
to  define  thefe  Things  learnedly  have  wrapt  up 
their  Ideas  in  greater  Darknefs,  and  expos'd  thcm- 
felves  to  Ridicule  and  Contempt ;  as  when  they 
define  Heat  they  fay,  it  is  §jialiias  congregans  bo- 

mogene^ 


C.VI.S.  5.  Tke  right  Ufe  of  Kc^Con:  107 
piogenea  ^  fegregam  heterogenea,  i.  e.  a  Quality  ga- 
thering together  Things  \Cf  the  fame  Kind,  and 
feparating  Things  of  a  different  Kind.  So  they 
define  lVhite<)  a  Colour  (irijing  from  the  Pre-vaknce 
of  Brightnefs  :  But  every  Child  knows  Hot  and 
iVhite  better  without  thele  Definitions. 

There  are  many  other  Definitions  given  by  the 
peripatetick  Philoibphers,  which  are  very  faulty 
by  Reafon  of  their  Obfcurity  >  as  Motion  is  defin- 
ed by  them  the  AH  of  a  Being  in  Power  fo  far 
forth  as  it  is  in  Power.  Time  is  the  Meafure  or 
Number  of  Motion  according  to  pcifi-,  prefent  and 
future.  The  Soul  is  the  A51  of  an  organical  natu- 
ral Body  ^having  Life  in  Power-,  and  feveral  others 
of  the  fame  Stamp. 

Rule  IV.  It  is  alfo  commonly  prefcribcd  a-» 
mongft  the  Rules  of  Definition,  that  it  JJjould  be 
Jhort^  fo  that  it  mufi  have  no  Tautology  in  i't^  nor 
any  Words  fuperfluous.  I  confefs  Definitions  ought 
to  be  exprefs'd  in  as  few  Words  as  is  confident 
with  a  clear  and  juft  Explication  of  the  Nature 
of  the  Thing  defin'd,  and  a  DiiHn6bion  of  it  from 
all  other  Things  bcfide :  But  it  is  of  much  more 
Importance,  and  far  better,  that  a  Definition 
fhould  expLun  clearly  the  Subject  we  treat  o^^ 
tho'  the  Words  be  many^  than  to  leave  Obfcuri- 
ties  in  the  Sentence,  by  confining  it  within  too 
narrow  Limits.  So  in  the  Definition  which  we 
have  given  of  Logick^  that  it  is  the  Jrt  of  ufiw^ 
Reafon  well  in  the  Search  after  Truth  and  the  Com" 
munication  of  it  to  cthejs^  it  has  indeed  many  Words 
in  it,  but  it  could  not  well  be  lliorter,  Art  is  the 
■Genus  wherein  it  agrees  with  Rhetorick.,  Poefy^ 
Arithmetickj  M'Wcftling^  Sailings  Buildings  ^c.  far 
ftll  thefe  are  Arts  alfo  :  But  the  Difference  or  fpe- 
(:ial  IMature  of  it  is  drawn  from  its  Objed,  Rea- 

fon-^ 


io8  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

fon ;  from  the  A6t  ujing  it  well^  and  from  its  two 
great  Ends  or  Defigns,  viz.  the  Search  of  Truth ^ 
and  the  Communication  of  it :  Nor  can  it  be  jullly 
defcribed  and  explained  in  fewer  Ideas. 

V.  If  we  add  a ///^  Rule,  it  muft  be  that  neither 
the  'Thing  defined,  nor  a  meer  fynonymous  Name 
jjjould  make  any  part  of  the  Definition,  for  this 
would  be  no  Explication  of  the  Nature  of  the 
Thing  y  and  a  fynonymous  Word  at  beil  could  on- 
ly be  a  Definition  of  the  Name. 


Sect.     VI. 

Obfervations  concerning  the  Definition  of  Things. 

Efore  I  part  with  this  Subjedt  I  muft  propofe 
feveral  Obfervations  which  relate  to  the  De- 
finition of  Things. 

i^'^  Ohferv.  There  is  no  need  that  in  Definitions 
we  iliould  be  confined  to  one  fingle  Attribute  or 
Property,  in  order  to  exprcfs  the  Difference  of  the 
Thing  defined,  for  fometimes  the  effential  Dif- 
ference confills  in  two  or  three  Ideas  or  Attributes. 
So  a  Grocer  is  a  Man  isjho  buys  and  fells  Sugar  and 
Plums  and  Spices  for  Gain.  A  Clock  is  an  Engine 
with  Weights  and  TFhcels,  that  Jhews  the  Plour  of 
the  Day  both  by  pointing  and firiking :  And  if  I  were 
to  define  a  Repeating  Clock  I  muft  add  another 
Property,  viz.  that  it  alio  repeats  the  Hour.  So 
that  the  true  and  primary  eflential  Difterence  of 
forae  complex  Ideas  confiiling  in  feveral  diftin6l 
Properties  cannot  be  well  expreis'd  without  con- 
junctive Particles  of  Speech. 

2.^  Ohferv.  There  is  no  need  that  Definitions  ftiould 
always  hQ.pofitive,^ox  fome  Thing?  differ  from  others 

meerly 


C.  VI.  S.  6.    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon:      109 

meerly  by  a  Defe6t  of  what  othei-s  have  j  as  if  a 
Chair  be  defined  a  Seat  for  afmgle  Per  [on  ivith  a. 
Back  belonging  to  it^  then  a  Stool  is  a  Seat  for  a 
Jingle  Perfon  without  a  Back  -,  and  a  Form  is  a  Seat 
for  feveral  Perfons  without  a  Back :  Thefe  are  nega- 
tive  Differences.  So  Sin  is  a  want  of  Conformity 
to  the  Law  of  God;  Blindnefs  is  a  want  of  Sight. 
A  f^agabond  is  a  Perfon  without  a  Home.  Some 
Ideas  are  negative,  and  their  Definitions  ought  to 
be  fo  too. 

3*^  Obferv.  Some  Things  may  have  two  or  more 
Definitions^  and  each  of  them  equally  juft  and 
good }  as  a  Mile  is  the  Length  of  eight  Furlongs., 
or  it  is  the  third  part  of  a  League.  Eternal  is  that 
which  ever  was  and  ever  fh  all  be;  or  il'is  that  which 
had  no  Beginning  and  f  jail  have  no  End.  *  Man  is 
ufually  defined  a  rational  Animal :  But  it  may  be 
much  better  to  define  him  a  Spirit  united  to  an  A- 
nimal  of  fuch  a  Shape .^  or  an  Animal  of  fiich  a  pe- 
culiar Shape  united  to  a  Spirit^  or  a  Being  compofed 
of  fuch  an  Animal  and  a  Mind. 

^^^'' Obferv.  Where  the  EJfences  of  Things  are 
evident,  and  clearly  dilHn^t  from  each  other,  there 
we  may  be  more  exa6t  and  accurate  in  the  Defi- 
nitions  of  them :  But  where  their  EJJences  approach 
nearer  to  each  other,  the  Definition  is  more  diffi- 
cult. A  Bird  may  be  defined  a  feathered  Animal 
with  Wings^  a  Ship  may  be  defined  a  large  hollow 
Building  fnade  to  pafs  over  the  Sea  with  Sails :  But 
if  you  ask  me  to  define  a  Batt.^  which  is  between 
a  Bird  and  a  Beafl.^  or  to  define  a  Barge  and  Hoy., 

*  The  common  Definition  of  Man>  vir.  a  rational  AnmaU  is  very  fault?, 
i.Becaufe  i\Kt  Animal  is  no:  rational;  the  Rationality  of  Man  ari(es  from  the 
Mind  to  which  the  Animal  is  united.  2.  Becaufe  if  a  Spirit  fliould  be  >\- 
n'lied  to  a  Horfe  and  make  i:  a  rational  Being,  furely  this  would  not  be  a 
Mj»:  It  it  evident  therefore  that  rhe  fecuHar  Shape  mull  enter  into  the 
Definition  of  a  Man  to  render  it  juft  and  perfe£l,  and  for  wan:  of  a  ftiii 
Defcrip:icn  thereof  ail  our  Pcfiniuor.s  are  defeilive, 

which 


no  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

which  are  between  a  Boat  and  a  5'/^//>,  it  is  much 
harder  to  define  them,  or  to  adjuft  the  Bounds 
of  their  EfTence.  This  is  very  evident  in  all  mon- 
firous  Births  and  irregular  Produ6lions  of  Nature^  as 
well  as  in  mz.ny  IVorks  of  Art^  which  partake  fo 
much  of  one  Species  and  fo  much  of  another^  that 
we  cannot  tell  under  which  Species  to  rank  them, 
or  how  to  determine  t\\ei\-  fpecifick  Difference. 

The  feveral  Species  of  Beings  are  feldom  pre- 
cifely  limited  in  the  Nature  of  Things  by  any 
certain  and  unalterable  Bounds :  The  EfTences  of 
many  Things  do  not  conlill  in  indinjifibili^  or  in 
one  evident  indiviiible  Point,  as  fome  have  ima- 
gined ;  but  by  various  Degrees  they  approach 
nearer  to,  or  differ  more  from  others  that  are  of  a 
Kindred  Nature.  So  (as  I  have  hinted  before)  in 
the  very  middle  of  each  of  the  Arches  of  a  Rain- 
bow the  Colours  of  green^  yellow  and  red  are  fuf- 
liciently  diftinguilhed  j  but  near  the  Borders  of 
the  feveral  Arches  they  run  into  one  another,  fo 
that  you  hardly  know  how  to  limit  the  Colours, 
nor  whether  to  call  it  red  or  yellow-)  green  or 
blue. 

f"^'^  Ohferv.  As  the  highejl  or  chief  Genus' s^viz. 
Being  and  Not-Being  can  never  be  defined,  becaufe 
there  is  no  Genus  fuperior  to  them  j  fo  neither  can 
fingular  Ideas  or  hidividuals  be  well  defined,  be^ 
caufe  either  they  have  no  ejfential  Differences  from 
other  Individuals,  or  their  Differences  are  not 
knov/n  j  and  therefore  Individuals  are  only  to  be 
defcrib'd  by  their  particular  Circumftances  :  So 
Kin.fT  George  is  dilHnguifli'd  from  all  other  Men 
and  other  Kings,  by  defcribing  him  as  the  fir fi 
King  of  Great  Britain  of  the  Houfe  of  Brmfwick  : 
and  lVe(iminfter-Hall  is  defcribed  by  its  Situatiork 
and  itts  Ufe,  i^c, 

TIm 


C.VI.  S.6.    The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^^on]     irr 

That  individual  Bodies  can  hardly  have  any  ef- 
fential  Difference,  at  lead  within  the  Reach  of 
our  Knowledge,  may  be  made  thus  to  appear  j 
Methufehh^  when  he  was  nine  hundred  and  fixty 
Years  old^  and  perhaps  worn  out  with  Age  and 
Weaknefs,  was  the  ^me  Perfon  as  when  he  was 
in  his  full  Vigour  of  Manhood^  or  when  he  was 
an  Infant  newly  born^  but  how  far  was  his  Body 
thefame?  who  can  tell  whether  there  was  any 
Fibre  of  his  Flefh  or  his  Bones  that  continued  the 
fame  throughout  his  whole  Life  ?  or  who  can  de- 
termine which  were  thofe  Fibres  ?  The  Ship  m 
which  Sir  Francis  Drake  failed  round  the  World 
might  be  new  built  and  refitted  fo  often,  that 
few  of  the  fame  Timbers  remained  j  and  who  can 
fay  whether  it  mull;  be  call'd  the  fame  Ship  or 
no  ?  and  what  is  its  effential  Difference  ?  How 
fhall  we  define  Sir  Francis  Drake's  Ship,  or  make 
a  Definition  for  Methufelah  ? 

To  this  Head  belongs  that  moft  difficult  Que- 
ftion,  What  is  the  Principle  of  Indi-jiduation  ?  or 
what  is  it  that  makes  any  one  Thing  the  fame  as 
it  was  fometime  before  ?  This  is  too  large  and 
laborious  an  Enquiry  to  dwell  upon  it  in  this  Place  : 
Yet  I  cannot  forbear  to  mention  this  Hint,  viz. 
Since  our  own  Bodies  mufl  rife  at  the  laft  Day 
for  us  to  receive  Rewards  or  Punifhments  in  them, 
there  may  be  perhaps  fome  original  Fibres  of  each 
human  Body,  fome  Stamina  Fita^  or  primeval 
Seeds  of  Life^  which  may  remain  unchanged  thro* 
all  the  Stages  of  Life,  Death  and  the  Grave  > 
thefe  may  become  the  Springs  and  Principles  of  a 
Refurreftion,  and  fufficjent  to  denominate  it  the 
fame  Body.  But  if  there  be  any  fuch  conltant  and 
vital  Atoms  which  dillinguifh  every  human  Body, 
they  are  known  to  God  only. 

6^^  Ohrerv: 


113  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        PartL 

6^^  Ohferv.  Where  we  cannot  find  cut  the  Ef- 
fence  or  e£ential  Difference  of  any  Speacs  or  Kind 
of  Beings  that  we  would  define,  we  jniift  con- 
tent our  felves  with  a  Collection  of  <uch  chief 
Parts  or  Properties  of  it  as  may  heft  explam  it  fo 
far  as  it  is  known,  and  bell  dillinguiih  it  :rom  o- 
ther  Things :  So  a  Marigold  is  a  Flower  wLub  hath 
fo  many  long  yellow  Leaves  round  a  little  Knot  of 
Seeds  in  the  midji  with  fuch  a  peculiar  Stalk j  dec. 
So  if  we  would  define  Slver^  we  fay  it  i-,  a  white 
and  hard  Metal,  next  in  Weight  to  Gold :  If  we 
would  define  an  Elder-Tree,  we  mignt  fay  it  is 
mie  among  the  lejfer  Trees,  whofe  younger  Branches 
are  foft  and  full  of  Pith,  whofe  Lea-ves  are  jagged 
or  indented,  and  of  Juch  a  particular  Shape,  and  it 
hears  large  Clujiers  of  fmall  black  Berries ;  So  we 
mull  define  Water,  Earth,  Stone,  a  Lion,  an  Ea- 
gle, a  Serpent,  and  the  greatell  Part  of  natural 
Beings,by  a  Collediion  of  thofe  Properties,  which 
according  to  our  Obfervation  diilinguifh  them 
fi'om  ail  other  Things.  This  is  what  Mr.  Locke 
calls  nominal  Ej[l'ences,^vid.  nominal  Definitions.  And 
indeed  fince  the  ejjential  Differences  of  the  various 
natural  Beings  or  Bodies  roundabout  us  iirifefrom 
a  peculiar  Shape,  Size,  JViotion  and  Situation  of 
the  fmall  Particles  of  which  they  are  compos'd, 
and  fince  we  have  no  iufficient  Method  to  inform 
us  what  thefe  are,  we  mufl  be  contented  with 
fuch  a  fort-  of  Defnition  of  the  Bodies  they  com- 
poie. 

Here  note  that  this  fort  of  Definition,  which 
is  made  up  of  a  meer  Collection  of  the  moll  re- 
markable Parts  or  Properties,  is  call'd  an  imperfe6i 
Definition,  or  a  Defcription  5  whereas  the  Defni- 
tion is  call'd  perfect  when  it  is  compos'd  of  the  ef- 
fential  Difference  added  to  the  general  Nature  or 
Genus. 

j^^  Ohferv, 


C.VI.S.5.    The  right  Ufe  of  Ktz(on.     113 

7th  Obferv.  The  perfeil  Definition  of  any  Being 
always  includes  the  Definition  of  the  Name  where- 
by it  is  called,  for  it  informs  us  of  the  Senfe  or 
Meaning  of  that  Word,  and  iliews  us  what  Idea 
that  Word  is  affixed  to :  But  the  Definition  of  the 
Name  does  by  no  means  include  a  perfect  Definiti- 
on  of  the  'Thing ;    for  as  we   have  faid  before,  a 
meer  fynonymous  Word,  a  Negation  of  the  con- 
trary, or  the  mention  of  any  one  or  two  diilin- 
guiihing  Properties  of  the  Thing  may  be  a  fuffi- 
cient  Definition  of  the  Name.     Yet  in  thofe  Cafes 
where   the  efTential  Difference  or  Eflence  of  a 
Thing  is  unknown,  there  a  Definition  of  the  Name 
by  the  chief  Properties,  and  a  Defcription  of  the 
'Thing  are  much  the  fame. 

And  here  I  think  it  nccedluy  to  take  Notice 
of  one  general  Sentiment  that  feems  to  run  thro' 
that  excellent  Performance,  Mr.  Locke's  E[jl-iy 
of  Human  Underfianding^  and  that  is,  "  That 
"  the  EfTences  of  Things  are  utterly  unknown 
"  to  us,  and  therefore  all  our  Pretences  to  dilHn- 
"  guifh  the  ElTences  of  Things  can  reach  no  fir- 
"  ther  than  meer  nominal  EJjences^  or  a  CoUccti- 
"  on  of  fuch  Properties  as  we  know  >  to  fome  of 
"  which  we  affix  particular  Names,  and  others 
"  we  bundle  up,  feveral  together,  under  one 
"  Name:  And  that  all  our  Attempts  to  rank  Be- 
"  ings  into  diffi^rent  Kinds  or  Species's  can  reach 
"  no  farther  than  to  make  w^^-^r  nominal  Specie  s^zwdi 
^'  therefore  our  Definitions  of  Things  are  but 
"  meer  nominal  Defcriptions  or  Definitions  of  the 
"  Name. 

Now  that  v/e  may  do*  Juftice  to  this  great  Au- 
thor^ we  ought  to  confider  that  he  confines  this 
Sort  of  Difcourfe  only  to  the  Effence  of  fimple  I- 
deas^  and  to  the  Effence  of  SubfianceSy  as  appears 
evident  in  the  fourth  and  fixth  Chapters  of  his 

I  Third 


114-  LOGIC  K:  Ory       Parti. 

Third  Book  :  for  he  allows  the  Names  of  mixed 
Modes  always  to  fignify  the  real  EJfences  of  their 
Species^  Chap.  V.  and  he  acknowledges  artificial 
'I'hings  to  ha've  diftin5l  Species ;  and  that  in  the  Dif- 
tin6tion  of  their  Effences  there  is  generally  lefs 
Confufion  and  Uncertainty  than  in  natural^  Ch.  VI. 
Se(5t.  40,41 .  tho'  it  mult  be  confefs'd  that  he  fcarce 
makes  any  Diilinftion  between  the  Definition  of 
the  Name  and  the  Definition  of  the  Things  as  Ch. 
IV.  And  fometimes  the  Current  of  his  Difcourfe 
decries  the  Knowledge  of  E£ences  in  fuch  gene- 
ral Terms  as  may  juftly  give  Occafion  to  mif- 
take. 

It  muft  be  granted,  that  the  Eflence  of  moft 
of  our  fimple  Ideas  and  the  greatell  part  of  parti- 
cular natural  Suh fiances  are  much  unknown  to  us> 
and  therefore  the  eilential  Differences  of  fenfibie 
Qiialities  and  of  the  various  Kinds  of  Bodies,  (as 
I  have  faid  before)  lye  beyond  the  Reach  of  our 
Underilandings :  We  know  not  what  makes  the 
primary  real  inward  Dillin6tion  between  Red^ 
Green^  Sweet,  Sour,  6cc.  between  PFood,  Iron, 
Oil,  Stone,  Fire,  Water,  Flefij,  Clay,  in  their  ge- 
neral Natures,  nor  do  we  know  what  are  the  in- 
ward and  prime  Dillin6lions  between  all  the  par- 
ticular Kinds  or  Species  in  the  Vegetable,  Animal, 
Mineral, Met allick,ox  Liquid  World  of  Things. 

But  llill  there  is  a  very  large  Field  for  the  Know- 
ledge of  the  ElTences  of  Things,  and  for  the  Ufe 
of  perfeU  Defitiitions  among (l  our  complex  Ideas, 
the  modal  Appearances  and  Changes  of  Nature,  the 
Works  of  Art,  the  Matters  of  Science,  and  all  the 
Affairs  of  the  ci'vil,  the  jnoral  and  the  religious 
Life:  And  indeed  it  is  of  much  more  Importance 
to  all  Mankind  to  have  abetter  Acquaintance  with 
the  Works  of  Art  for  their  own  Livelihood  and 
daily  Uie,  with  the  Affairs  of  Morality  for  their 

Behaviour 


C.  VI.  S.  6.    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     i  r  5 

Behaviour  in  this  World,  and  with  the  Matters 
of  Religion^  that  they  may  be  prepared  for  the 
World  to  come,  than  to  be  able  to  give  a  perfect 
Definition  of  the  Works  of  Nature. 

If  the  paiticular  Eflences  of  Natural  Bodies 
are  unknown  to  us,  we  may  yet  be  good  Philo- 
fophers,  good  Artills,  good  Neighbours,  good 
Subjects  and  good  Chriftians  without  that  Know- 
ledge, and  we  have  juft  Reafon  to  be  content. 

Now  that  the  EiTences  of  fome  of  the  modal 
Appearances  and  Changes  in  Nature^  as  well  as 
things  of  Art^  Science  and  Morality  are  fufficient- 
ly  known  to  us  to  make  perfeti  Definitions  of  them, 
will  appear  by  the  Specimen  of  a  few  Definiti- 
ons of  thcfe  Things. 

Motion  is  a  Change  of  Place.  Szviftnefs  is  the 
pafling  over  a  long  Space  in  a  fliortTime.  A  na- 
tural Day  is  the  Time  of  one  alternate  Revoluti- 
on of  Light  and  Darknefs,  or  it  is  the  Duration  of 
twenty  four  Hours.  An  Eclipfe  of  the  Sun  is  a  Defe6t 
in  the  Sun's  Tranfmiflion  of  Light  to  us  by  the 
Moon  interpofing.  *  Snow  is  congealed  Vapour. 
*  Hail  is  congealed  Rain.  Aw'^  JJland  is  a  Piece  of 
Land  rifing  above  the  furrounding  Water.  An  *  Hill 
is  an  elevated  Part  of  the  Earth,  and  a  *  Gro-z'e  is  a 
Piece  of  Ground  thick  fet  with  Trees.  An  Houfe 
is  a  Building  made  to  dwell  in.  A  Cottage  is  a 
mean  Houfe  in  the  Country.  A  Supper  is  that 
Meal  which  we  make  in  the  Evening.  A  'Tri- 
angle is  a  Figure  compofed  of  three  Sides.  A 
Gallon  is  a  Meafure  containing  eight  Pints.  A 
Porter  is  a  Man  who  carries  Burdens  for  Hire.   A 


*  Note,  Ijland,  Hill,  Grove,  are  not  defined  here  in  their  more  remote 
^nd  fubflantlal  Natures,  (if  I  may  fo  exprefs  it)  or  as  the  Matter  of  them 
is  Eiirth ;  for  in  this  Senfe  we  know  not  their  Eflence,  but  only  as  con- 
fider'd  in  their  modal  appearances,  whereby  one  part  of  Earth  is  diftinguifh: 
from  anoiher,    The  fame  may  be  faid  of  Srn/Wt  Hail,  &c. 

I  z.  King 


ii6  L  O  G  IC  K:  Ofy        Parti. 

King  is  the  chief  Ruler  in  a  Kingdom.  Veracity 
is  the  Conformity  of  our  Words  to  our  Thoughts. 
Cwetoufnefs  is  an  exceffive  Love  of  Money,  or 
other  Poflellions.  Killing  is  the  taking  away  the 
Life  of  an  Animal.  Murder  is  the  unlawful  kil- 
ling of  a  Man.  Rhetorick  is  the  Art  of  fpeaking 
in  a  manner  fit  to  perfuade.  Natural  i  Philofophy 
is  the  Knowledge  of  the  Properties  of  Bodies  and 
the  various  Effefts  of  them,  or  it  is  the  Know- 
ledge of  the  various  Appearances  in  Nature  and 
their  Caufes  >  and  Logick  is  the  Art  of  ufing  our 
Reafon  well,  (^c. 

Thus  you  fee  the  eflential  Differences  of  vari- 
ous Beings  may  be  known,  and  are  borrowed  from 
their  ^alities  and  Properties^  their  Caufes^  Effedls^ 
Obje5ls^  JdjunEls^Ends.^  6cc.  and  indeed  as  infinite- 
ly various  as  the  EJfences  of  Things  are,  their  Z)^- 
finitlons  muft  needs  have  very  various  Forms. 

After  all  it  mull:  be  confels'd,  that  many  Logi- 
cians and  Philofophers  in  the  former  Ages  have 
made  too  great  a  Buflle  about  the  Exa6tnefs  of 
their  Definitions  of  Things,  and  entered  into  long 
fruitlefs  Controverfies  and  very  ridiculous  Debates 
in  the  feveral  Sciences  about  adjufting  the  Logical 
Formalities  of  every  Definition  j  whereas  that  fort 
of  Wrangling  is  now  grown  very  juftly  contemp- 
tible, fince  it  is  agreed  that  true  Learning  and  the 
Knowledge  of  Things  depends  much  more  upon 
a  large  Acquaintance  with  their  various  Proper- 
ties, Caufes,  Effe6bs,  Subjects,  Objects,  Ends  and 
Defigns,  than  it  does  upon  the  formal  and  fcho- 
lallick  Niceties  of  Genus  and  Difference. 


Sect, 


C.  VI.  S.  7.  1'he  right  Ufe  of  Reafon^      1 17 

Sect.    VII. 

Of  a  compkat  Conception  of  Tilings . 

HAVING  dwelt  fo  long  upon  the  firfi 
Rule  to  dire6t  our  Conceptions,  and  given 
an  Account  of  the  Definition  both  of  Names  and 
things  in  order  to  gain  clear  and  diftindi  Ideas^  we 
make  hafte  now  to  the  fccond  Rule  to  guide  our 
Conceptions,  and  that  is.  Conceive  of  Things  corn- 
pleat  ly  in  all  their  Parts. 

All  Parts  have  a  Reference  to  fome  Whole: 
Now  there  is  an  old  DiIlin61:ion  which  logical 
Writers  make  of  a  Whole  and  its  Parts  into  four 
feveral  Kinds,  and  it  may  be  proper  jufl;  to  men- 
tion them  here. 

1.  There  is  a  metaphyfical  Whole^  when  the 
EfTence  of  a  Thing  is  faid  to  confift  of  two  PartSy 
the  Genus  and  the  Difference^  i.  e.  the  general  and 
the  fpecial  Nature,  which  being  joined  together 
make  up  a  Definition.  This  has  been  the  Subjed: 
of  the  foregoing  Sections. 

2.  There  is  a  mathematical  Wloole  which  is 
better  call'd  integral,  when  the  feveral  P^r/j  which 
go  to  make  up  the  Whole  are  really  diftind:  from 
one  another,  and  each  of  them  may  fubfiil  apart. 
So  the  Head,  the  Limbs,  and  the  I'runk  are  the 
integral  Parts  of  an  animal  Body  ;  fo  Unites  are 
the  integral  Parts  of  any  large  Number  ,  fo  thefe 
Difcourfes  which  I  have  written  concerning  Per- 
ception, Judgment,  Reafoniyig  and  Difpofitiou  are 
the  four  integral  Parts  of  Logick.  This  fort  of 
Parts  goes  to  make  up  the  Compleatnefs  of  any 
Subieft,and  this  is  the  chief  and  moft  dirc6l  Mat- 
ter of  our  Difcourfe  in  this  Se(5tion> 

I  5  5. There 


ii8  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

5 .  There  is  a  phyftcal  or  ejfential  Whoh^  which 
is  ufually  made  to  fignify  and  include  only  the 
t^o  ejjential  Parts  of  Man,  Body  and  Soul:  But 
I  think  the  Senfe  of  it  may  better  be  altered,  or 
at  leall  enlarged,  and  fo  include  all  the  eflential 
Modes,  Attributes  or  Properties  which  are  con- 
tain'd  in  the  Comprehenfion  of  any  Idea.  This 
fhall  be  the  Subjeffc  of  Difcourfe  under  the  third 
Jiule  to  dire^  our  Conceptions. 

4.  There  is  a  logical  Whole^  which  is  alfo  call'd 
an  univerfal;  and  the  Parts  of  it  are  all  the  parr 
ticular  Ideas  to  which  this  univerfal  Nature  ex- 
tends. So  a  Genus  is  a  Whole  in  refpeft  of  the  fe- 
veral  Species  which  are  its  Parts.  So  the  Species  is 
a  IVhole^  and  all  the  Individuals  are  the  Parts  of  it. 
This  fhall  be  treated  of  in  xht  fourth  Rule  to  guide 
cur  Conceptions. 

At  prefent  we  confider  an  Idea  as  an  integral 
JVholc^  and  our  fecond  Rule  direfts  us  to  contemr 
plate  it  in  all  its  Parts :  But  this  can  only  refer  to 
jcomplex  Ideas,  for  fimplc  Ideas  have  no  Parts. 


Sect.     VIII. 

Of  Divifion^  and  the  Rules  of  it. 

Since  our  Minds  are  narrow  in  their  Capacity, 
and  cannot  furvey  the  feveral  Parts  of  any 
complex  Being  with  one  fingle  View,  as  God 
fees  all  Things  at  once,  therefore  we  mufb  as  it 
were  take  it  to  Pieces,  and  confider  of  the  Parts 
feparately,  that  we  may  have  a  more  compleat 
Conception  of  the  Whole.  So  if  I  would  learn 
the  Nature  of  a  Watch.^  the  Workman  takes  it 
to  pieces  and  flicws  me  the  Springs  the  Wheelsy 
the  Ades.^  the  Pinions^  the  Balance^  the  Dial- 
Plate^ 


C.VI.S.8.    The  right  Ufe  of  Kc^Con.       119 

Plate^  the  Pointer,  the  Cafe,  Sec.  and  defcribes 
each  of  thefe  Things  to  me  apart,  together  with 
their  Figures  and  their  Ufes.  If  I  would  know 
what  an  Animal  is,  the  Anatomift  confiders  the 
Head,  the  Trunk,  the  Limbs,  the  Bowels  apart 
from  each  other,  and  gives  me  diftin6t  Le6bures 
upon  each  of  them.  So  a  Kingdom  is  divided  in- 
to its  feveral  Provinces^:  A  Book  into  its  feveral 
Chapters ;  and  any  Science  is  divided  according  to 
the  feveral  Subjects  of  which  it  treats. 

This  is  what  we  properly  call  the  Di-vifion  of 
an  Idea,  which  is  an  Explication  of  the  Whole  by 
its  feveral  Parts,  or  an  Enumeration  of  the  feveral 
Parts  that  go  to  compofe  any  ivhole  Idea,  and  to 
render  it  compleat.  And  I  think  when  Man  is  di- 
vided into  Body  and  Soul,  it  properly  comes  un- 
der this  Part  of  the  Doctrine  of  integral  Divifion^ 
as  well  as  when  the  meer  Body  is  divided  into 
Head,  'Trunk  and  Limbs:  This  Divifion  is  forae- 
times  call'd  Partition. 

When  any  of  the  Parts  of  any  Idea  are  y(2£ 
farther  divided  in  order  to  a  clear  Explication  of 
the  Whole,  this  is  call'd  a  Subdivifion  j  as  when  a 
Tear  is  divided  into  Months,  each  Month  into 
Days,  and  each  Day  into  Hours,  which  may  alfo 
be  hnhti'  fub divided  into  Minutes  and  Seconds. 

It  is  neceflaiy  in  order  to  the  full  Explication 
of  any  Being  to  confider  each  Part,  and  the  Pro- 
perties  of  it,  diftin6t  by  it  felf,  as  well  as  in  its 
Relation  to  the  Whole :  for  there  are  many  Pro- 
perties that  belong  to  the  Parts  of  a  Being  which 
cannot  properly  be  afcrib'd  to  the  Whole,  tho' 
thefe  Properties  may  fit  each  Part  for  its  proper 
Station,  and  as  it  ftands  in  that  Relation  to  the 
\yhole  complex  Being. 

I  4  The 


\ 


120  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Part  L 

I'he  fpecial  Rules  of  a  good  Dinjifton  are  thefe. 

I .  Rule.  Each  Part  fingly  taken  mufl  contain  lefs 
than  the  ivhole^  but  all  the  Parts  taken  collectively 
{or  together)  nmfi  contain  neither  more  nor  lefs  than 
the  whole.  Therefore  if  in  difcourfing  of  a  'Tree 
you  divide  it  into  the  Trunk  and  Leaves  it  is  an 
imperfe6t  Divifion,  becaufe  the  Root  and  the 
Branches  are  needful  to  make  up  the  Whole.  So 
Logick  would  be  ill  divided  into  Apprehenfion^ 
'Judgment  and  Reafoning^  for  Method  is  a  coniider- 
able  Part  of  the  Art  which  teaches  us  to  ufe  our 
Reafon  right,  and  fhould  by  no  Means  be  o- 
mitted. 

Upon  this  Account,  in  every  Divifion  wherein 
we  defign  a  pcrfe61:  Exactncfs,  it  is  necellary  to, 
examine  the  whole  Idea  with  Diligence,  left  we 
omit  any  Part  of  it  thro'  want  of  Care  5  tho' ' 
in  fome  Cafes  it  is  not  pofHblc,  and  in  others  it 
is  not  neceffary  that  we  fliould  defcend  to  the  mi- 
nuteft  Parts. 

2.  Rule.  In  all  Divifions  we pould  firft  confider 
the  larger  and  more  immediate  Parts  of  the  Subje^y 
and  not  divide  it  at  once  into  the  more  minute  and 
remote  Parts.  It  would  by  no  Means  be  proper 
to  divide  a  Kingdom  lirft  into  Streets^  and  Lanes^ 
and  Fields^  but  it  muft  be  firft  divided  into  Pro- 
vinces or  Counties^  then  thofc  Counties  may  be  di- 
vided into  the  Towns^  Villages^  Fields^^c.  and  the 
Towns  into  Streets  and  Lanes. 

3.  Rule.  The  fever al  Parts  of  a  Divifion  ought 
to  be  oppofite^  i,  e.  one  Part  ought  not  to  contain  an- 
other. It  would  be  a  ridiculous  Divifion  of  an 
minimal  into  Headj  Limbs^  Body  and  Brain^  for  the 
Brains  are  contain'd  in  the  Head, 

Ye^ 


C.  VI.  S.  8 .    The  right  life  of  Reafon;     12 1 

Yet  here  it  miift  be  noted,  that  fometimes  the 
Subjects  of  any  Treatifc,  or  the  Objects  of  a  par- 
ticular Science  may  be  properly  and  necefTiirily  fo 
divided,  that  the  fecond  may  include  the  firft,  and 
the  third  may  include  the  firft  and  fecond,  with- 
out offending  againft  this  Rule,  becaufe  in  the  fe- 
cond or  following  Parts  of  the  Science  or  Dif- 
courfe,  thefe  Objects  are  not  coniider'd  in  the 
fame  manner  as  in  the  lirft  -,  as  for  Inltance,  Ge- 
ometry divides  its  Objects  into  Lims^  Surfaces  aiid 
Solids :  Now  tho'  a  Line  be  contain'd  m  a  Su'-- 
face  or  a  Solid^  yet  it  is  not  confider'd  in  them  fc- 
parate  and  alone,  or  as  a  meer  Line,  as  it  is  in  the 
firft  Part  of  Geometry  which  treats  of  Lines.  So 
Logick  is  rightly  divided  into  Conception,  fudg- 
ment,  Reafoning  and  Method;  for  tho'  Jdeas  or 
Conceptions  are  contain'd  in  the  following  Parts  of 
Logick,  yet  they  arc  not  there  treated  of  as  fepa-' 
rate  Ideas,  which  are  the  proper  Subject  of  the 
firfl  Part. 

4.  Rule.  Let  not  Suhdiviftons  he  too  numerous 
^i^nthout  NeceJJity :  for  it  is  better  many  Times  to 
diitinguifli  more  Parts  at  once  if  the  Subject  will 
bear  it,  than  to  mince  the  Difcourfe  by  cxceflive 
dividing  and  fubdividing.  It  is  preferable  there- 
fore in  a  Trcatife  of  Geography  to  fay  that  in  a 
City  we  will  confider  its  U'^alls,  its  Gates,  its  Build- 
ings, its  Streets  and  Lanes,  than  to  divide  it  for- 
mally firft  into  the  encompajfmg  and  the  €nco?npaJJed 
Parts  5  the  encompaffing  Parts  are  the  PFalls  and 
Gates  ',  the  encompafled  Part  includes  the  IFays- 
and  the  Buildifigs ;  the  Ways  are  the  Streets  ancj 
the  Lanes ;  Buildings  confiil  of  the  Fou;Liations 
g.nd  the  Superjirii^urc,  6cc. 

Toq 


122  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       PartL 

Too  great  a  Number  of  Subdivifions  has  been 
afFefled  by  fome  Perfons  in  Sermons,  Treatifes, 
In{lru6tions,  ^c.  under  Pretence  of  greater  Ac- 
curacy :  But  this  fort  of  Subtilties  hath  often  giv-^ 
en  greater  Confufion  to  the  Under ftanding,  and 
fometimes  more  Difficulty  to  the  Memory.  In 
thefe  Cafes  it  is  only  a  good  Judgment  can  deter-^ 
jnine  what  Subdivifions  are  needful. 

f.  Rule.  Divide  every  SiihjeSi  according  to  the 
fpecial  Defign  you  have  in  View.  One  Idea  or 
Subje6t  may  be  divided  in  very  different  Manners 
according  to  the  different  Purpofes  we  have  in 
difcourfing  of  it.  So  if  a  Printer  were  to  con- 
iider  the  feveral  Parts  of  a  Book^  he  muft  divide 
it  into  Sheets^  the  Sheets  into  Pages  ^  the  Pages 
into  Linesy  and  the  Lines  into  Letters.  But  a 
Grammarian  divides  a  Book  into  Periods^  Sentences 
and  Words^  or  Parts  of  Speech,  as  Noun^  Pro-^ 
7wun^  Verh^  &c.  A  Logician  confiders  a  Book  as 
divided  into  Chapters^  SeEtions^  Arguments^  Pro- 
fofitions^  Ideas^  and  with  the  Help  oi  Ontology  he 
divides  the  Proportions  into  SubjeSt^  Obje5l^  PrO". 
perty^  Relation^  Adion^  Pajjion^  Caufe^  Effe^y 
&c.  But  it  would  be  very  ridiculous  for  a  Logi' 
cian  to  divide  a  Book  into  Sheets^  Pages  and  Lines  > 
or  for  a  Printer  to  divide  it  into  Nouns  and  Pro-- 
nounSj  or  into  Propofttions^  Ideas,  Properties  or 
Cau/eS' 

6.  Rule.  In  all  your  Divijions  obferve  with  great- 
eji  Exa^nefs  the  Nature  of  '^things.  And  here  I 
am  conllrain'd  to  make  a  Subdivifion  of  this  Rule 
into  two  very  neceffary  Particulars. 

( I .)  Let  the  Parts  of  your  Divifion  be  fuch  as 
are  properly  dijlittguijhed  in  Nature.  Do  not  di- 
vide afunder  thofe  Parts  of  the  Idea  which  are  in- 
timately 


C.  VI.  S.  8 .     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     i  i  j 

timately  united  in  Nature,  nor  unite  thofe  Things 
into  one  Part  which  Nature  has  evidently  dil- 
joined :  Thus  it  would  be  very  improper  in  treat- 
ing of  an  minimal  Body  to  divide  it  into  ihcfupe^ 
rior  and  inferior  Halves  5  for  it  would  be  hard  to 
fay  how  much  belongs  by  Nature  to  the  inferior 
Half,  and  how  much  to  the  fuperior.  Much  more 
improper  would  it  be  ftiil  to  divide  the  Animal 
into  the  right  Hand  Parts  and  left  Hand  Parts^ 
which  would  bring  greater  Confufion.  This 
would  be  as  unnatural  as  a  Man  who  fhould  cleave 
a  Hazel  Nut  in  Halves  thro'  the  Husk^  the  Shell 
and  the  Kernel  at  once,  and  fay  a  Nut  is  divided 
into  thefe  two  Parts ;  whereas  Nature  leads  plainlv 
to  the  threefold  Diftindion  of  Husk^  Shell  and 
Kernel. 

{z.)  Do  not  affeEt  Duplicities  nor  T'ripUcities^  or 
any  certain  Number  of  Parts  in  your  Divifion  of 
Things  y  for  we  know  of  nofuch  certain  Number  of 
Parts  which  God  the  Creator  hiis  obferved  in  form- 
ing all  the  Varieties  of  his  Creatures,  nor  is  there 
any  uniform  determined  Number  of  Parts  in  the 
various  Subjects  of  human  Art  or  Science  ;  yet 
fomePerfons  have  difturbed  the  Order  of  Nature 
and  abufed  their  Readers  by  an  Affectation  oi  Di- 
chotomies^ trichotomies^  Sevens^  Twelves^  ^c.  Let 
the  Nature  of  the  Subie61:,  confidered  together 
with  the  Defign  which  you  have  in  view,  always 
determine  the  Number  of  Parts  into  which  you 
divide  it. 

After  all,  it  muft  be  confefs'd  that  an  intimate 
Knowledge  of  Things  and  a  judicious  Obfervati- 
on  will  alliil  in  the  Bufmefs  of  Divifion^  as  well 
as  of  Definition^  better  than  too  nice  and  curious 
an  Attention  to  the  meer  Formalities  of  logi- 
cal Writers,  without  a  real  Acquaintance  with 
Things. 

Sect, 


124  LOGIC  K:  Or,        PartL 


S    E    C    T.      IX. 

Of  ^  compreh^nfive  Conception  of  'ThingSj  and  of 

yibjlra^tion. 

TH  E  third  Rule  to  dire6t  our  Conception  r€' 
quires  us  to  conceive  of  Things  comprehenjive- 
ly.  As  we  mufl  furvey  an  Object  in  all  its  Parts 
To  obtain  a  compkat  Idea  of  it,  fo  we  mufl:  coiofi-* 
der  it  i|i  all  its  Modes^  Attributes^  Properties  and 
Relations^  in  order  to  obtain  a  comprehenffue  Con-t 
ception  of  it, 

The  Comprehenjion  of  an  Idea,  as  it  was  ex-i 
plain'd  under  the  Do6brine  of  Univerfals,  includes 
only  the  ejjential  Modes  or  Attributes  of  that  Idea  y 
but  in  this  Place  the  Word  is  taken  in  a  larger 
Senfc,  and  implies  alfo  the  various  occafional  Pro- 
;perties^  accidental  Modes  and  Relations, 

The  NecefTity  of  this  Rule  is  founded  upon 
the  fame  Reafon  as  the  former,  viz.  That  our 
Minds  are  narrow  and  fcanty  in  their  Capacities, 
and  as  they  are  not  able  to  confider  all  the  Parts 
of  a  complex  Idea  at  once^  fo  neither  can  they  at 
once  contemplate  all  the  different  Attributes  and 
Circtimjiances  of  it :  We  mufl:  therefore  confider 
Things  fucceflvely  and  gradually  in  their  various 
Appearances  and  Circum fiances :  As  our  natural 
Eye  cannot  at  once  behold  ihtfix  Sides  of  a  Dye 
or  Ctibe^  nor  take  Cognizance  of  ail  the  Points 
that  are  mark'd  on  them,  and  therefore  we  turn 
up  the  Sides  fuccefiively,  and  thus  furvey  and  num- 
ber the  Points  that  are  mark'd  on  each  Side^  that 
we  may  know  the  whole. 

In 


C.VI.S.9.    The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^^oa.      us 

In  order  to  a  comprchenfive  View  of  any  Idea, 
we  mull  firft  confider  whether  the  Obje6l  of  it 
has  an  Exijience  as  well  as  an  Effence;  whether  it 
be  a  fimple  or  a  complex  Idea  5  whether  it  be  a 
Subftance  or  a  Mode  5  if  it  be  a  Suhftance^  then 
we  muft  enquire  what  are  the  effential  Modes  of 
it,  which  are  necelTary  to  its  Nature,  and  wJiat 
are  thofe  Properties  or  Accidents  of  it,  which  be- 
long to  it  occafionally,  or  as  it  is  placed  in  fome 
particular  Circumftances :  We  mull  view  it  in  its 
internal  and  ahfoliite  Modes,  and  obferve  it  in  thole 
various  external  Relations  in  which  it  Hands  to  o- 
ther  Beings :  We  mull  confider  it  in  its  Powers 
and  Capacities  either  to  do  or  fuffer :  Wc  mull 
trace  it  up  to  its  various  Caufes^  whether  fupream 
or  fubordinate.  We  mull  dcfcend  to  the  Variety 
of  its  Effe^s^  and  take  Notice  of  the  feveral  Ends 
and  Defigns  which  are  to  be  attained  by  it.  We 
mull  conceive  of  it  as  it  is  either  an  ObjeEl  or  a 
Subject  5  what  are  the  Things  that  are  akin  to  it, 
and  what  are  the  Oppofites  or  Contraries  of  it  j  for 
many  Things  are  to  be  known  both  by  their  con* 
trary  and  their  kindred  Ideas. 

If  the  thing  we  difcourfe  of  be  a  nieer  Mode^ 
we  mull  enquire  whether  it  belong  to  Spirits  or 
Bodies;  whether  it  be  1  phyJicaloM  moral  M.odc: 
If  moral^  then  we  muft  confider  its  Relation  to 
God^  to  owx  felves^  to  our  Neighbours -y  its  refer- 
ence to  tJjis  Life  or  the  Life  to  come.  If  it  be  a 
Virtue^  we  mull  feek  what  are  the  Principles  of 
it,  what  are  the  Rules  of  it,  what  are  the  I'en- 
dencics  of  it,  what  are  the  falfe  Virtues  that  coun- 
terfeit it,  and  what  are  the  real  Pices  that  oppofe 
it,  what  are  the  Evils  which  attend  the  Negle^ 
of  it,  Avhat  are  the  Rewards  of  the  Prague  of  it 
both  here  and  hereafter, 

'  If 


126  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

If  the  Subject  be  hiflorical  or  a  Matter  of  Fa^^ 
we  may  then  enquire  whether  the  x\6lion  was 
done  at  all,  whether  it  was  done  in  fuch  a  manner^ 
or  by  fuch  Perfons  as  is  reported  j  at  what  Time  it 
was  done  3  in  what  Place  -,  by  what  Motive^  and 
for  what  Deftgn  -,  what  is  the  E'vidence  of  the 
Fa6t  j  who  are  the  Witnejjes  j  what  is  their  Cha- 
racter and  Credibility  j  what  Signs  there  are  of 
fuch  a  Fa6t  j  what  concurrent  Circumftances  which 
may  either  iiipport  the  Truth  of  it,  or  render  it 
doubtful. 

In  order  to  make  due  Enquiries  into  all  thefe 
and  many  other  Particulars  which  go  towards  th« 
compleat  and  comprehenfive  Idea  of  any  Being,  the 
Science  of  Ontology  is  exceeding  neceflary.  This 
is  what  was  wont  to  be  call'd  the  firft  Part  of 
Metaphyftcks  in  the  Peripatetick  Schools.  It  treats 
of  Being  in  its  moji  general  Nature^  and  of  all  its 
Affed:ions  and  Relations.  I  confefs  the  old  popiflj 
Schoolmen  have  mingled  a  Number  of  ufelefs  Sub- 
tilties  with  this  Science  >  they  have  exhaufted 
their  own  Spirits,  and  the  Spirits  of  their  Read- 
ers in  many  laborious  and  intricate  Trifles^  and 
fome  of  their  Writings  have  been  fruitful  of  Names 
without  Ideas ^  which  hath  done  much  Injury  to 
the  facred  Study  of  Divinity.  Upon  this  Ac- 
count many  of  the  Moderns  have  mod  unjuftly 
abandoned  the  whole  Science  at  once,  and  thrown 
Abundance  of  Contempt  and  Raillery  upon  the 
very  Name  of  Metaphyftcks -,  but  this  Contempt 
and  Cenfure  is  very  unreafonable,  for  this  Science 
feparated  ^vom^omc  Jr if  oteli an  Fooleries  and  y?^o- 
lajlic  Subtikics  is  fo  neceflary  to  a  diftinct  Con- 
ception, folid  Judgment,  and  juil  Reafoning  on 
many  Subjects,  that  fometimes  it  is  introduced  as 
a  Part  of  Logick^  and  not  without  Reafon.  And 
thofe  wl>o  utterly  defpifc  and  ridicule  it,  either 
5  betray 


C.  VI.  S.  9.    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafoft.  •  127 

betray  their  own  Ignorance,  or  will  be  fuppos'd 
to  make  their  Wit  and  Banter  a  Refuge  and  Ex^ 
cufe  for  their  own  Lazinefs.  Yet  thus  much  I 
would  add,  that  the  later  Writers  of  Ontology  are 
generally  the  bell  on  this  Account,  becaufe  they 
have  left  out  much  of  the  antient  Jargon. 

Here  let  it  be  noted  that  it  is  neither  ufeful, 
neceflaiy,  or  poflible  to  run  thro'  all  the  Modes, 
Circumflances  and  Relations  of  every  Subje6t  we 
take  in  Hand>  but  in  Ontology  we  enumerate  a 
great  Variety  of  them,  that  fo  a  judicious  Mind 
may  choofe  what  are  thofe  Circumflances,  Relati' 
ons  and  Properties  of  any  Subje<5V,  which  are  moft 
neceflary  to  the  prefcnt  Defign  of  him  that  fpeaks 
or  writes,  either  to  explain,  to  illultrate,  or  to 
prove  the  Point. 

As  we  arrive  at  the  compleat  Knowledge  of  an 
Idea  in  all  its  Parts,  by  that  A6t  of  the  Mind 
which  is  c^di  Divifion,  fo  we  come  to  a  compre- 
henfi-ve  Conception  of  a  Thing  in  its  ieveral  Pro- 
perties and  Relations,  by  that  A6b  of  the  Mind 
which  is  CixWd  jib ftra^ion,  i.  e.  we  confider  each 
fingle  Relation  or  Property  of  the  Subjeft  alone, 
■and  thus  we  do  as  it  were  withdraw  and  fcparate 
it  in  our  Minds  both  from  the  Subject  it  felf,  as 
well  as  from  other  Properties  and  Relations  in 
order  to  make  a  fuller  Obfervation  of  it. 

This  A6fc  oi Abflraclion  is  faid  to  be  twofold, 
cither  Preciji've  or  Negati've. 
■  Precifl'ue  jibflraclion  is  when  we  confider  thofe 
Things  apart  which  cannot  really  exift  apart ;  as 
when  v/e  confider  a  Mode  without  confidering  its 
Suhflance  and  Subje^,  or  one  effential  Mode  with- 
out another.  Negati'ue  AbflraFiion  is  when  we  con- 
fider one  Thing  feparatc  from  another,  which 
may  alfo  exiil  without  itj  as  when  we  conceive 


128  L  O  G  1  C  K:  Or,        VmL 

of  a  SubjeSl  without  conceiving  of  its  accidental 
Modes  or  Relations  j  or  when  we  conceive  of  one 
Accident  without  thinl^ing  of  another-,  if  I  think 
of  reading  or  writing  \^ithout  the  exprefs  Idea  of 
fome  Man^  this  is  precijive  Abflra^ion  ;  or  if  I 
think  of  the  Attrahion  of  Iron^  without  the  ex- 
prefs Idea  of  fome  particular  magnetick  Body.  But 
when  I  think  of  a  Needle  without  an  Idea  of  its 
Sharpnefsj  this  is  negative  Abjira^iion  >  and  it  is  the 
fame  when  I  think  of  its  Sharpnefs  without  confi- 
dering  its  Length. 

Sect.  X. 

,    Of  the  extenjive  Conception  of  'Things^  and  of 

Diftrihution. 

AS  the  Compleatnefs  of  an  Idea  refers  to  the 
feveral  Parts  that  compofe  it,  and  the  Com- 
prehenfion  of  an  Idea  includes  its  various  Proper- 
ties^ fo  the  Extcnfion  of  an  Idea  denotes  the  vari- 
ous Sorts  or  Kinds  of  Beings  to  which  the  fame 
Idea  belongs;  And  if  we  would  be  fully  acquaint- 
ed with  a  Subje61:,  we  mud:  obferve 

This  fourth  Rule  to  direct  our  Conceptions, 
viz.  concei-ve  of  'Things  in  all  their  Extenfion^  i.  e, 
we  muft  fearch  out  the  various  Species  ox  fpecial 
Natures  which  are  contained  under  it  as  a  Genus 
or  general  Nature.  If  we  would  know  the  Na- 
ture of  an  Animal  perfectly,  we  rauft  take  Cog- 
nizance of  Beajls^  Birdsy  Pipes  and  Infers ^  .as 
well  as  Men^  all  which  are  contained  und-cr  the  ge- 
neral Nature  and  Nanicof  j<f;.7>»i?/. 


As 


C.  VI.  S.  I  o.  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     1 1 9 

As  an  integral  M-^joIe  is  diftinguifhcd  into  its  fc- 
veral  Parts  by  Divifion^  fo  the  Word  Diftributi- 
on  is  moft  properly  us'd  when  we  dillinguifh  an 
univerfal  Whole  into  its  ieveral  Kinds  or  Species : 
And  perhaps  it  had  been  better  if  this  Word  had 
been  always  confin'd  to  this  Signification,  tho'  it 
mull  be  confeii,  that  we  frequently  fpeak  of  the 
Dh-ifion  of  an  Idea  into  its  feveral  Kinds^  as  well 
as  into  its  feveral  Parts. 

The  Rules  of  a  good  Diflrihut'ion  are  much  the 
fame  with  thofe  which  we  have  before  applied 
to  Divifion^  which  may  be  juft  repeated  again  in 
the  briefeft  manner,  in  order  to  give  Examples  to 
them. 

I.  Rule.  Each  Part //^^^/y  taken  mufl  contain  lefs 
than  the  Whole,  but  all  the  Parts  taken  collec- 
ti--cely  or  together^  m.ull:  contain  neither  more  nor 
lefs  than  the  Wholej  or  as  Logicians  fometimes 
exprefs  it,  the  Parts  of  the  Divifion  ought  to  ex- 
hauft  the  "whole  Thing  which  is  divided.  So  A/e-rt';- 
««^  is  juftly  diftributcd  into  Prophyla^ick^  or  the 
Art  of  preferving  Health  j  and  Therapeutick^  or 
the  Art  of  reftoring  Health ,  for  there  is  no  other 
fort  of  Medicine  belide  thefe  two.  But  Men  are 
not  well  diftributed  into  tall  ox  Jliort^  for  there  are 
fome  of  a  middle  Stature. 

II.  Rule.  In  all  Dijlrihutions  we  Ihould  firil 
confider  the  larger  and  more  immediate  Kinds  or 
Species  or  Ranks  of  Being,  and  not  divide  a 
Thing  at  oiice  into  the  more  minute  and  remote. 
A  Genus  lliould  not  at  once  be  divided  into  Indi- 
'vicluals^  or  even  into  the  loivefi  Species^  if  there 
be  a  Species  fuperior.  Thus  it  would  be  very  im- 
proper to  divide  Animal  into  T'rout^  Lohjier^  Eel^ 
Dog^  Bear^  Eagle^  Dove^  Worm  and  Butterfly^  for 

K  thefe 


130  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or]       Parti. 

thefe  are  inferior  Kinds  >  whereas  Animal  ought 
firll  to  be  diilributed  into  Man^  Beafi^  Bird^  ^(/^^5 
Jnfe^:  And  then  Beaft  lliould  be  diitributed  into 
Dog^  Bear^  &c.  Bird  into  Eagle-^  Dove^  6cc.  Fijb 
into  Trouty  Eel^  Lohfler^  6cc. 

It  is  irregular  alfo  to  join  any  inferior  Species 
in  the  fame  Rank  or  Order  with  the  fuperior  j  as 
if  we  fhould  diftinguilh  Animals  into  Birds^  Bears 
and  Oyfters^  Sec.  it  would  be  a  ridiculous  Diftri- 
bution. 

III.  Rule,  The  feveral  Parts  of  a  Diftribution 
ought  to  be  oppofitej  that  is,  one  Species  or 
Clafs  of  Beings  in  the  fame  Rank  of  Divifion 
ought  not  to  contain  or  include  another  -,  fo  Men 
ought  not  to  be  divided  into  the  Rich^  the  Poor^ 
the  Learned  and  the  'itall;  for  poor  Men  may  be 
both  learned  and  tall.y  and  fo  may  the  rich. 

But  it  will  be  objected,  are  not  animated  Bodies 
rightly  diilributed  into  Vegetative  and  Animal^ox  (as 
they  are  ufually  called)  Senfttive  ?  Now  the  Sen- 
fitive  contains  the  Vegetative  Nature  in  it,  for  A- 
nimals  grow  as  well  as  Plants.  I  anfv/er  that  in 
this  and  all  fuch  Diftributions  the  Word  Vegeta- 
tive lignifies  7neerly  Vegetative  >  and  in  this  Senfe 
Vegetative  will  be  fufficiently  oppofite  to  Animal^ 
for  it  cannot  be  laid  of  an  Animal  that  it  contains 
meer  Vegetation  in  the  Idea  of  it. 

fV.  Rule.  Let  not  Subdivifions  be  too  numer- 
ous without  Neceflity  j  therefore  I  think  ^an- 
tity  is  better  diilinguifhed  at  once  into  a  Line^  a 
Surface  and  a  Solid^  than  to  lay  as  Ramus  does, 
that  Quantity  is  either  a  Line,^  or  a  Thing  lined -j 
and  a  Thing  lined  is  either  a  Surface  or  a  Solid. 

V.  Rule, 


C.  VI.  S.  10.  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.    1 3  r 

V.  RuJe.  DIftribute  every  Subjeft  according  to 
the  rpecial  Defign  you  have  in  \"ievv,  fo  far  as  is 
necelTary  or  ufcRil  to  your  prelent  Enquiry.  Thus 
a  Politician  diilributes  Mankind  according  to  their 
civil  Charafters,  into  the  Rulers  and  the  Ruled-, 
and  a  Phyfician  divides  them  into  the  Sick  or  the 
Healthy  j  but  a  Divine  dilhibutes  them  into  Turks^ 
Heathens^  Je'-jus^  or  Chriftians. 

Here  Note,  that  it  is  a  very  ufclcfs  Thing  to 
diftribute  any  Idea  into  fuch  Kinds  or  Members 
as  have  no  different  Properties  to  be  fpoken  of^ 
as  it  is  meer  trifling  to  divide  ryght  Angles  into 
fuch  ixihofe  Legs  are  equals  and  whofe  Legs  are  un- 
equal^ for  as  to  the  meer  right  Angle  they  have  no 
different  Properties. 

VI.  Rule.  In  all  your  Diilributions  obfcrve  the 
Nature  of  Things  with  great  Exa6tnefs  j  and 
don't  affect"  any  particular  Form  of  Diilribution, 
as  fome  Perfons  have  done,  by  dividing  every  Ge- 
nus into  two  Species^  or  into  three  Species -,  Vv^hcre- 
as  Nature  is  infinitely  various,  arid  human  Afflurs 
and  human  Sciences  have  as  great  a  Variety,  nor 
is  there  any  one  Form  of  Diilribution  that  will 
exa6lly  fuit  with  all  Subjects. 

Note^  It  is  to  this  Doctrine  of  Difirihution  of 
a  Genus  into  its  fever al  Species^  we  mull  alfo  refer 
the  Diftribution  of  a  Caufe  according  to  its  feve- 
ral  Effecis,  as  fome  Medicines  are  heatings  fome  ar& 
cooling,  or  an  Efe^  when  it  is  dillinguiihed  by 
its  Caufes^  as  Faith  is  either  built  upon  divine  Tef- 
timony  or  human.  It  is  to  this  Head  we  refer  par- 
ticular artificial  Bodies.^  when  they  arc  dillinguiih- 
ed according  to  the  Matter  they  arc  made  of,  as 
a  Statue  is  either  of  Brafs^  of  Marble^  or  PFood^ 
&c.  and  any  other  Beinis  when  they  are  diilin- 

K  2.  guiihed 


132  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

guiihed  according  to  their  End  and  Dejlgn^  as  the 
furniture  of  Body  or  Mind  is  either  for  Ornament 
or  Ufe.  To  this  Head  alfo  we  refer  SuhjeSls  when 
they  are  divided  according  to  their  Modes  or  jdc- 
eidentSj  as  Men  are  either  merry  ^  or  grave^  or  fad-, 
and  Modes  when  they  are  divided  by  their  Suhje6is^ 
as  Dijlempers  belong  to  the  Fluids^  or  to  the  [olid 
Parts  of  the  Animal. 

It  is  alfo  to  this  Place  wc  reduce  the  Propofals 
of  a  Difficulty  under  its  various  Cafes ^  whether  it 
be  in  Speculation  or  Practice  :  As  to  ihew  the 
Reafon  of  the  Sun-heams  burning  Wood^  whether 
it  he  done  by  a  convex  Glafs  or  a  concave ;  or  to 
ihew  the  Conjiru^ion  and  Menfuration  of  Trian- 
gksy  whether  you  have  two  Angles  and  a  Side 
given,  or  two  Sides  and  an  Angle,  or  only  three 
Sides.  Here  it  is  neceflary  to  diflribute  or  divide 
a  Difficulty  into  all  its  Cafes^  in  order  to  gain  a  per- 
fect Knowledge  of  the  Subject  you  contemplate. 

It  might  be  obferv'd  here,  that  Logicians  have 
fometimes  given  a  Mark  or  Sign  to  dillinguifh 
when  it  is  an  integral  Whole^  that  is  divided  into 
its  Parts  or  Members^  or  when  it  is  a  Genus^  an 
nniverfal  TVhole^  that  is  dillributed  into  its  Species 
and  Individuals.  The  Rule  they  give  is  this: 
Whenfocver  the  whole  Idea  can  be  dire6tly  and 
properly  affirmed  of  cacli  Part,  as  a  Bird  is  an  A- 
7nmal^  a  Fiji)  is  an  Animal^  Bucephalus  is  a  Horfe^ 
Peter  is  a  Man^  then  it  is  a  Diflribution  of  a  Ge" 
7ms  into  its  Species^  or  a  Species  into  its  Individu- 
als :  But  when  the  whole  cannot  be  thus  directly 
affirmed  concerning  every  Part,  then  it  is  a  Divi- 
iioii  of  an  integral  into  its  feveral  Pieces  or  Mem- 
bers 5  as  we  cannot  %  the  Head^  the  Breafi^  the 
Hand  or  the  Foot  is  an  Animal;  but  we  fliy  the 
Head  is  a  Part  of  the  Animal^  and  the  Foot  is  an- 
other Part. 

This 


C.  VI.  S.  1 1 .  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon."     133 

This  Rule  may  hold  true  generally  in  corporeal 
Beings,  or  perhaps  in  all  Subllances :  But  when 
we  fay  the  Fear  of  God  is  Wifdom^  and  fo  is  human 
Civility :  Criticifm  is  true  Learnings  and  fo  is  Pbi- 
Jofophy :  To  execute  a  Murderer  is  Jujiice^  and  to 
fave  and  defend  the  Innocent  is  Juflice  too :  In  thefe 
Cafes  it  is  not  fo  eallly  determined,  whether  an 
integral  Whole  be  divided  into  its  Parts,  or  anuni- 
verfal  into  its  Species :  For  the  Fear  of  God  may 
be  call'd  either  one  Part^  or  one  Kind  o^  /^Fifdo77i  : 
Criticifm  is  one  Part^  or  one  Kind  of  Learning . 
And  the  Execution  of  a  Murderer  may  be  call'd  a 
Species  of  Juftice^  as  well  as  a  Part  of  it.     Nor 
indeed  is  it  a  Matter  of  great  Importance  to  de-^ 
terminc  this  Controverfy. 

Sect.    XI. 

Of  an  orderly  Conception  of  'things. 

THE  lafl  Rule  to  dire6t  our  Conceptions,  is, 
that  we  JJwuld  rank  and  place  them  in  a  pro- 
per Method  and  juft  Order.  This  is  of  neceflary 
XJ^e.  to  prevent  Confulionj  for  as  I'Trader  who 
never  places  his  Goods  in  his  Shop  or  Warehoufe 
in  a  regular  Order,  nor  keeps  the  Accounts  of  his 
buying  and  felling,  paying  and  receiving  in  a  jult 
Method,  is  in  utmoil  Danger  of  plunging  all  his 
Affairs  into  Confufion  and  Ruin  j  fo  a  Student 
who  is  in  the  Search  of  Truth,  or  an  Author  or 
'Teacher  who  communicates  Knowledge  to  others, 
will  very  much  obftru6fc  his  Defign,  and  confound 
his  own  Mind  or  the  Mind  of  his  Hearers,  unlefs 
he  range  his  Ideas  in  jufb  Order. 

If  we  would  therefore  become  fuccefsful  Learn- 
ers or  Teachers,  we  muft  not  conceive  of  Things 
in  a  confufed  Heap^  but  difpofe  our  Ideas  in  fome 
certain  Method^  which  may  be  molt  eaiy  and  ufe- 

K  3    ,  .      ful 


134  LOG  I  C  K:  Or,        Parti. 

ful  both  for  the  Underilanding  and  Memory  j 
and  be  fure  as  much  as  may  be  to  follow  the  Na- 
ture of  'Things^  for  which  many  Rules  might  be 
given,  viz. 

I .  Conceive  as  much  as  you  can  of  the  EJfen- 
tials  of  any  Subjeft,  before  you  confider  its  Jcci- 
dentals. 

z.  Survey  firfl  the  general  Parts  and  Properties 
of  any  Subjecljbetoreyou  extend  your  Thoughts 
to  ditcourfe  of  the  particular  Kinds  or  Species 
of  it. 

3 .  Contemplate  Things  firft  in  their  ownfmipk 
Natures^  and  afterward  view  them  in  Compofition 
with  other  Things  5  unlefs  it  be  your  prcfent  Pur- 
pofe  to  take  a  compound  Being  to  pieces,  in  order 
to  find  out  or  to  fhew  the  Nature  of  it  by  fcarch- 
ing  and  difcovering  of  what  Simples  it  is  com- 
pofed. 

4.  Confider  the  ahfolute  Modes  or  Afi^e6Lions 
of  any  Being  as  it  is  in  it  felf,  before  you  proceed 
to  confider  it  relatively^  or  to  furvcy  the  vari- 
ous Relations  in  which  it  ftands  to  other  Be- 
ings, ^c. 

Note^  Thefe  Rules  chiefly  belong  to  the  Me- 
thod of  Inflruftion  which  the  Learned  call  S;yn- 
thetic. 

But  in  the  Regulation  of  our  Ideas  there  is 
feldom  an  abfolute  Necefiity  that  we  fiiould  place 
them  in  this  or  the  other  particular  Method:  It 
is  poiliblc  in  fome  Cafes  that  many  Methods  may 
be  equally  good,  that  is,  may  equally  afiift  the 
Underftanding  and  the  Mcmoiy  :  To  frame  a 
Method  cxquifitely  accurate,  according  to  the 
Jtlri^l  Nature  of  Things,  and  to  maintain  this  Ac- 
curacy from  the  Beginning  to  the  End  of  a  Trea- 
tifc,  is  a  moll  rare  and  difficult  Thing,  if  not  im- 
pollible.     But  a  larger  Account  of  Method \vou\d 

be 


C.  VI.  S.I  2:  The  right  Ufe  of  Ktz^QVi,       135 

be  very  improper  in  this  Place,  left   we  antici- 
pate what  belongs  to  xh.^  fourth  Part  of  LogicL 

Sect.     XII. 

^hefe  five  Rules  of  Conception  exemplified. 

IT  may  be  ufeful  here  to  give  a  Specimen  of 
the  five  fpecial  Rules  to  diretl  our  Conceptions^ 
which  have  been  the  chief  Subject  of  this  long 
Chapter,  and  repreient  them  practically  in  one 
View. 

Suppofe  the  Theme  of  our  Difcourfe  were  the 
PaJJions  of  the  Mind. 

I  %  To  gain  a  clear  and  dlftlnSl  Idea  of  Pajfi- 
9n.^  we  muft  define  both  thtName  and  the  'Thing. 

To  begin  with  the  Definition  of  the  Name  -,  we 
are  not  here  to  underftand  the  Word  Pafiion  in 
its  vulgar  and  moft  limited  Senfe,  as  it  Irgnifies 
meerly  Anger  or  Fury  5  nor  do  we  take  it  in  its 
moft  extenfive  philofophical  Senfe,  for  the  fuf- 
taining  the  Action  of  an  Agents  but  in  the  more 
limited  philofophical  Senfe,  Paffions  fignify  the 
various  AffeUions  of  the  Mind.,  flich  as  Admiration^ 
Love^  or  Hatred  3  this  is  the  Definition  of  the 
Name. 

We  proceed  to  the  Definition  of  the  Thing. 
Pafilon  is  defined  a  Scnfation  of  fome  fpecial  Com- 
motion in  animal  Nature.,  occafioned  by  the  Mind's 
Perception  of  fome  Object.  Here  the  Genus  or  ge- 
neral Nature  of  Pafiion  is  a  Senfation  of  fome  fpe- 
cial Co'mmotibn  in  animal  Nature.,  and  herein  it  a- 
grees  with  Hunger,  Thirft,  Pain,  ^c.  The  efj}n- 
tial  Difference  of  it  is,  that  this  Commotion  arifes 
from  a  Thought  or  Perception  of  the  Mind.,  aiid 
hereby  it  is  diftinguiflied  from  Hunger,  Thirft,  or 
Pain. 

K   4  2.^^^\ 


136  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Parti. 

2ciiy^  We  mull  conceive  of  it  compleatly^  or 
furvey  the  feveral  Parts  that  compofe  it.  Thefe 
are  (i.)  'The  Mind's  Perception  of  fume  Obje^.  | 
(2.)  The  confeq^iient  Ruffle  or  fpecial  Commotion  of 
the  Ner'ves^  and  Bloody  and  afiimal  Spirits.  And 
(3.)  The  Senfation  of  this  inward  Commotion. 

^diy^  We  mull  confider  it  comprehenfively  in  its 
various  Properties.     The  moft  elTential  Attributes 
that  molce  up  its  Nature  ha  e  been  already  menti- 
oned under  the  foregoing  Heads.     Some  of  the 
moft  conliderable  Properties  that  remain  are  thefe, 
n)iz.  That  PaJJlon  belongs  to  all  Mankind.^  in  great- 
er or  lefTcr  Degrees :  //  is  not  conflantly  prefent  with 
HSj  but  tiponfome  certain  Qccafions  :  It  is  appointed 
by  our  Creator  for  various  ufeful  Ends  and  Purpofes.^ 
viz.  to  give  us  Vigour  in  the  Purfuit  of  what  is 
good  and  agreeable  to  us,  or  in  the  Avoidance  of 
what  is  hurtful:  It  is  very  proper  for  our  State  of 
"Trial  in  this  TVorld :  It  is  not  utterly  to  be  rooted 
out  of  our  Nature.^    but  to  be  moderated  and  go- 
verned according  to    Rules  of  Virtue   and  Religi- 
on^ Sec. 

^thiy^  We  muft  take  Cognizance  of  the  various 
Kinds  of  it,  which  is  call'd  an  extenfive  Conception 
of  it.  If  the  Obje6l  v/hich  the  Mind  perceives 
be  very  uncommon.^  it  excites  the  Paffion  of  Ad- 
miration. If  the  Object  appear  agreeable  it  raifes 
Love :  If  the  agreeable  Object  be  abfent^  it  is  De- 
fire :  \i  attainable .^  it  excites  Hope:  Yi  unattain- 
able.^  Defpair :  If  it  hz  prefent  ^\\A  poj/ef.^  it  is  the 
Paflion  of  Joy :  If  loft.^  it  excites  Sorrow.  If  the 
Objeft  be  difagreeable^  it  caufes  in  general  Hatred 
or  Averfion:  If  it  be  abfent  and  we  are  in  Danger 
of  it,  it  raifes  our  Fear :  If  it  be  prefent.^  it  is  Sor- 
row and  Sadnefs.^  &cc. 

f^'^^y,  All  thefe  Things  and  many  more  which 
go  to  compofe  a  TreatiTe  on  this  Subjed  mull  be 

placed 


C.  VI.  S.  1 3 .  The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.'     1 37 

placed  in  their  proper  O^'der :  A  flight  Specimen 
of  which  is  exhibited  in  this  fhort  Account  of 
PaJJion^  and  which  that  admirable  Author  Def- 
cartes  has  treated  of  at  large;  tho'  for  want  of 
fufficient  Experiments  and  Obfervations  in  natural 
Philofophy,  there  are  fome  few  Miftakes  in  his 
Account  of  animal  Nature. 

Sect.     XIII. 

uln  Ilhijlration  of  thcfe  Jive  Rules  by  Similitudes. 

r^^HUS  v/e  have  brought  the  firil:  Part  of  Lo- 
JL  gick  to  a  Conclufion :  And  it  may  not  be 
improper  here  to  reprefcnt  its  Excellencies  (fo  fl;r 
as  we  have  gone)  by  general  Hints  of  its  chief 
Defign  and  Ufe,  as  well  as  by  a  various  Coynpari- 
fon  of  it  to  thofe  Inllruments  which  Mankind 
have  invented  for  their  feveral  Convcniencics  and 
Improvements. 

The  Dejign  of  Logick  is  not  to  furniHi  us  with 
the  perceiving  Faculty,  but  only  to  dircti  and  af- 
fift  us  in  the  U'lc  of  it:  It  doth  not  give  us  the 
Objc£t:s  of  our  Ideas,  but  only  cafts  fuch  a  Light 
on  thofe  Obje61:s  which  Nature  furniiflies  us  with, 
that  they  may  be  the  more  clearly  and  dilHnftly 
knov/n :  It  doth  not  add  new  Parts  or  Properties 
to  Things,  but  it  difco'vers  the  various  Parts,  Pro- 
perties, Relations  and  Dependencies  of  one  Thing 
upon  another,  and  by  ranking  all  Things  under  ^c'- 
iieral  and  fpecial  Heads,  it  renders  the  Nature,  or 
any  of  the  Properties,  Powers  and  Ufes  of  a  thing 
more  eafy  to  be  found  out,  v.'hen  we  fcek  in  what 
Rank  of  Beings  it  Ives,  and  wherein  it  agrees  with, 
and  wherein  it  differs  from  others. 

If  any  Comparifons  would  illuftrate  this,  it  may 
be  thus  reprefcntcd. 

I.  When 


138  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Parti. 

I.  When  Logick  aflifts  us  to  attain  a  dear  and 
diflinB  Conception  of  the  Nature  of  Things  by 
Definition^  it  is  Uke  thofe  Glajfes  whereby  we  be- 
hold fuch  Objects  diftin£tly,  asbyReafon  of  their 
Smallnefs  or  their  great  Dillance  appear  in  Con- 
fudon  to  the  naked  Eye :  So  the  Telefcope  difco- 
vers  to  us  diftant  Wonders  in  the  Heavens,  and 
fhews  the  milky  Way^  and  the  bright  cloudy  Spots 
in  a  very  dark  Skie  to  be  a  Colle6tion  of  Httle 
Stars,  which  the  Eye  unaffifted  beholds  in  mingled 
Confufion.  So  when  Bodies  are  too  fmall  for  our 
Sight  to  furvey  them  diftin6tly,  then  the  Micro- 
fcope  is  at  Hand  for  our  AfHflance,  to  fhew  us  all 
the  Limbs  and  Features  of  the  moft  minute  A'riimah^ 
with  great  Clearnefs  and  Dillin6tion. 

II.  When  we  are  taught  by  Logick  to  view  a 
Thing  compleatly  in  all  its  Parts  by  the  Help  of 
Divifton^  it  has  the  Ufe  of  an  anatomical  Knife^ 
which  difleds  an  animal  Body,  and  feparates  the 
Feins^  Arteries^  Ner^ues^  Mufcles^  Membranes^  &c. 
and  iTiews  us  the  feveral  Parts  which  go  to  the 
Compoiition  of  a  compleat  Animal. 

III.  When  Logick  inftruds  us  to  fuiTey  an 
Objc6t  comprehenftvely  in  all  the  Modes^  Properties^ 
Relations,,  Faces.,  and  Appearances  of  it,  it  is  of 
the  fame  ufe  as  a  terrejirial  Glohe^  which  turning 
round  on  its  Axis,  reprefents  to  us  all  the  variety 
of  Lands  and  Seas,  Kingdoms  and  Nations  on  the 
Surface  of  the  Earth  in  a  very  fhort  Succeflion  of 
Time,  fhews  the  Situation  and  various  Relation 
of  them  to  each  other,  and  gives  us  a  comprehen- 
five  View  of  them  m  Miniature. 

IV.  When 


C.  VI.  S.  1 3 .  The  right  life  of  Rcafon:     1 3  9 

IV.  When  this  Art  teaches  us  to  difiribute  any 
extenfive  Idea  into  its  different  Kinds  or  Species^  it 
may  be  compared  to  the  prifmatick  Glafs^  that  re- 
ceives the  Sun-Beams  or  Rays  of  Light,  which 
feem  to  be  uniform  when  falling  upon  it,  but  it 
fcparates  and  diftributes  them  into  their  different 
Kinds  and  Colours,  and  ranks  them  m  their  pro- 
per Succeflion. 

Or  if  we  defcend  to  Stibdhiftons  and  fubordi- 
iiatc  Ranks  of  Being,  then  Dlfiribntion  may  alfo 
be  iliid  to  form  the  Refemblance  of  a  natural  Tree^ 
wherein  the  Genus  or  general  Idea  flands  for  the 
Root  or  Stocky  and  the  fevxral  Kinds  or  Species^  and 
Individuals^  are  diflributed  abroad,  and  repreient- 
ed  in  their  Dependence  and  Connexion,  like  the 
feveral  Boughs^  Branches^  and  leffer  Shoots.  For 
Inftance,  let  Animal  be  the  Root  of  a  logical  Tree, 
the  Refemblance  is  fecn  by  meer  Infpe6bion,  tho* 
the  Root  be  not  placed  at  the  bottom  of  the 
Page. 


Animal 


140 


L  O  G  IC  K:  Or,        Parti 


Philip 
Ti  It       \fames 


Thomas^  Sec- 


j  Horfe— 

I  Squirrel 

Beaft      Lion 
Dog- 


Animal  •< 


Bird 


Bear,  i^c. 

Eagle 
iLark 
I  Duck 
^Goofe,  ^c. 


r  Trout 
Fifh   -^  Whale 

COyfler,  ^c. 


Flying- 


Infea 


Creeping- 


jTrott. 

'X  Bayard^  6cc. 

MaftifF. 
iSpaniel. 
IGrey-hound. 
^Beagle,  ^c. 


r  Englijh. 
<  Mujfcovy. 
C  Hook-Bill,  ^^- 


.Bee,  ^c, 

rWorm. 
^Ant. 
CCaterpiller,  (^c. 


The  fame  Similitude  will  ferve  alfo  to  illuftrate 
the  Divifion  and  Subdivifton  of  an  integral  Whoky 
into  its  feveral  Parts. 

When  Logick  dire6ts  us  to  place  all  our  Ideas 
in  a  proper  Method^  moll  convenient  both  for  In- 
ftrudion  and  Memory,  it  doth  the  fame  Service 

4  Jis 


e.  VI.  S.  1 3.  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:      141 

as  the  Cafes  of  well  contrived  Shelves  in  a  large  Li- 
brary^ wherein  Folio's^  ^arto's^  O^avo's^  and 
lejfer  Volumes^  are  difpofed  in  fuch  exad:  Order 
under  the  particular  Heads  of  Divinity^  Hiftory^ 
Mathematicks^  antient  and  mifcellaneou^  Learning, 
^c.  that  the  Student  knows  where  to  find  every 
Book,  and  has  them  all  as  it  were  within  his 
Command  at  once,  becauie  of  the  exad:  Order 
wherein  they  are  placed. 

The  Man  who  has  fuch  Afliflanccs  as  thefe  at 
Hand,  in  order  to  manage  his  Conceptions  and  re- 
gulate his  Ideas^  is  well  prepared  to  improve  his 
Knowledge,  and  to  join  thefe  Ideas  together  in  a 
regular  manner  by  Judgment^  which  is  the  fecond 
Operation  of  the  Mind,  and  will  be  the  Subje6b 
of  the  fecond  Part  of  Logick. 


THE 


142  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Part  IT. 

II  -   -  .     — "I 

THE 

Second  PART 

O  F 

L  O  G  1  C  K. 

Of  Judgment  and  Propofttion. 

"HEN  the  Mind  has  got  Acquaintance 
with  Things  by  framing  Ideas  of  them, 
it  proceeds  to  the  next  Operation,  and 
that  is,  to  compare  thefe  Ideas  toge- 
ther, and  to  join  them  by  Affirmation^  or  disjoin 
them  by  Negation^  according  as  we  find  them  to 
agree  or  difagree.  This  A6t  of  the  Mind  is  cal- 
led Judgment  ;  as  when  we  have  by  Perception 
obtained  the  Ideas  of  Plato^  a  Philofopher^  Man^ 
Innocent^  we  form  thefe  Judgments ;  Plato  was  a 
Philofopher  -,  no  Man  is  innocent. 

Some  Writers  have  aflerted,  that  Judgment  con- 
fifts  in  a  meer  Perception  of  the  Agreement  or  Difa" 
greement  of  Ideas.  But  I  rather  think  there  is  an  A6b 
of  the  Will  (at  leaft  in  moft  Cafes)  neceflary  to  form 
a  Judgment  j  for  tho'  we  do  perceive,  or  think  we 
perceive  Ideas  to  agree  or  difagree,  yet  we  may  fomc- 
times  refrain  from  judging  or  alTenting  to  the  Per- 
ception 


ne  right  Ufe  ^/  Reafon  I"  145 

cepiion,  for  fear  left  the  Perception  fhould  noc 
be  fufficiently  clear,  and  we  fhould  be  miftaken: 
And  I  am  well  aflured  at  other  Times,  that  there 
are  Multitudes  of  Judgments  formed^  and  a  firm 
Aflent  given  to  Ideas  joined  or  disjoined,  before 
there  is  any  clear  Perception  whefher  they  agree 
ordifagreej  and  this  is  the  Reafon  of  fo  many 
falfe  Judgments  or  Miftakes  among  Men.  Both 
thefe  Pra6tices  are  a  Proof  that  Judgment  has  fome- 
thing  of  the  Will  in  it^  and  does  not  meerly  confift 
in  Perception^  fince  we  fometimes  judge  (tho'  un- 
happily) without  perceiving,  and  fometimes  we 
perceive  without  immediate  judging. 

As  an  Idea  is  the  Refult  of  our  Conception  or 
Apprehenfion^  fo  a  Propofition  is  the  EfFed  of  Judg- 
ment. The  foregoing  Sentences  which  are  Ex- 
amples of  the  A6t  of  Judgment  are  properly  cal- 
led Propo fit  ions.  Plato  is  a  Philofopher^  6cc. 
Here  let  us  confider, 

I .  The  general  Nature  of  a  Propofition,  and  the 
Parts  of  which  it  is  compofed. 

z.  The  various  Divifions  or  Kinds  of  Propofi- 
tions. 

3 .  The  Springs  of  falfe  Judgment^  or  the  Do^rine 
of  Prejudices.  , 

4.  General  Dire5fions  to  affifi  us  in  judging  aright. 
f.  Special  Rules  to  direct  us  in  judging  of  particu- 
lar Ohje^s. 


CHAP. 


144  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  IL 


CHAP.     I. 

Of  the  Nature  of  a  Tropofition,  and  its 
feveral  ^Parts, 

APropofition  is  a  Sentence  wherein  two  or 
more  Ideas  or  'Terms  are  join'd  or  disjoin'd 
by  one  Affirmation  or  Negation,  as  Plato  was  a- 
P hilofopher :  E'uery  Angle  is  formed  by  two  Lines 
meeting :  No  Man  living  on  Earth  can  he  compleat- 
ly  happy.  When  there  are  never  fo  many  Ideas  or 
Terms  in  the  Sentence,  yet  if  they  are  joined  or 
disjoined  meerly  by  one  lingle  Affirmation  or  Ne- 
gation, they  are  properly  call'd  but  one  Propofttl- 
on^  tho'  they  may  be  reiblved  into  feveral  Propo- 
iitions  which  are  impHed  therein,  as  will  appear 
hej^eafter. 

In  defcribing  a  Prcpofition^  I  ufe  the  Word 
Terms  as  well  as  Ideas ^  becaufe  when  meer  Ideas 
are  join'd  in  the  Mind  without  Words,  it  is  ra- 
ther caird  a  'Judgment ;  but  when  clothed  with 
Words,  it  is  call'd  a  Propofition^  even  tho'  it  be 
in  the  Mind  only,  as  well  as  when  it  is  exprell  by 
fpeaking  or  writing. 

There  are  three  Things  which  go  to  the  Na- 
ture and  Conllitution  of  a  Proportion  (I'/z.)  The 
Subjeclj  the  Predicate^  and  the  Copula. 

The  Subject  of  a  Propofition  is  that  concerning 
which  any  thing  is  afhrmed  or  denied :  So  PlatOj 
Angkj  Man  living  on  Earthy  are  the  Subjects  of 
the  foregoing  Propofitions. 

The  Predicate  is  that  which  is  affirmed  or  deni- 
ed of  the  Subjedtj  fo  Philofopher  is  the  Predicate 
of  the  firlf  Propofition ;  formed  by  two  Lines  meet- 
ing-t  is  the  Predicate  of  the  fecond  3  capable  of  be- 
in^ 


C.  I.  ^be  right  Ufe  of  Reafon .         145 

ing  cordpkatly  happy^is  the  proper  Predicate  of  the 
third. 

The  SuhjeU  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition  tak- 
en together  are  call'd  the  Matter  of  it  5  for  thefe 
are  the  Materials  of  which  it  is  made. 

The  Copula  is  the  Form  of  a  Propofition ;  it  re- 
prefents  the  Act  of  the  Mind  affirming  or  deny- 
ing, and  it  is  exprell  by  the  Words,  am^  art^  is^ 
are^  6cc.  or,  am  not^  art  not^  is  not^  are  not^  &c. 

It  is  not  a  Thing  of  Importance  enough  to 
create  a  Difpute,  whether  the  Words  no^  mne^ 
not^  never^  Sec.  which  disjoin  the  Ideas  or  Terms 
in  a  negative  Propofition,  fhall  be  call'd  a  Part  of 
the  Subjeci^  of  the  Copula^  or  of  the  Predicate  : 
Sometimes  perhaps  they  may  feem  moil:  naturally 
to  be  included  in  one,  and  fometimes  in  another 
of  thefe,  tho'  a  Propofition  is  ufually  denominat- 
ed affirmative  or  negati'ue  by  its  Copula^  as  here- 
after. 

Note  I .  Where  each  of  thefe  Parts  of  a  Pro- 
pofition is  not  exprell  diltinftly  info  many  Words, 
yet  they  are  all  underllood  and  iinpiicitly  contain- 
ed  therein i  as,  Socrates difputecl^is  a  complcat  Pro- 
pofition, for  it  fignifies,    Socrates  li^'as   di/patifig. 
So,  I  dye^  fignifies,  I  am  dying.     I  can  ijurite^  i.  c. 
/  am  able  to  write.     In  LaJin  and  Greek  one  fin- 
gle  Word  is  many  Times  a  compleat  Propofition. 
Note  z.  Thefe  Words,  a??/,  art^  is,  &c.  when 
they  are  ufed  alone  without  any  other  Predicate, 
fignify  both   the  JS  of  the  Mind  judging,  w^hich 
includes  the  Copula,  and  fignify  alfo  aciual  Exift- 
ence^   which  is  the  Predicate  of  that  Propofiti- 
on.    So  Rome  is,  fignifies  Rome  is  exifient :  TJoere 
are  fome  flrange  Monflers,   that  is,  fome  firange 
Monfiers  are  exiflent.     Carthage  is  no  more,   i.  e. 
Carthage  has  no  Being. 

Ni^te 


146  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or;     Part  II. 

Note  3.  The  Subje6t  and  Predicate  of  a  Pro- 
portion are  not  always  to  be  known  and  diftin- 
guifhed  by  the  placing  of  the  Words  in  the  Sen- 
tence, but  by  reflc6ling  duly  on  the  Scnfc  of  the 
Words,  and  on  the  Mind  and  Defign  of  the  Speak- 
er or  Writer :  As  if  I  fay,  in  Africa  there  are  many 
Lions^  I  mean,  many  Lions  are  exifleyit  in  Africa : 
Many  Lions  is  the  Subject:,  and  exijient  in  Africa 
is  the  Predicate.  It  is  proper  for  a  Pbilofopher  to 
under fland  Geometry ,  here  the  Word  Proper  is  the 
Predicate,  and  all  the  reft  is  the  Subjed,  except 
is  the  Copula. 

Note  4.  The  Subje6l  and  Predicate  of  a  Pro- 
polition  ought  always  to  be  two  different  Ideasy 
or  two  different  Terms;  for  where  both  thc'Terms 
and  Ideas  arc  the  fame,  it  is  call'd  an  identical  Pro- 
fofttion^  which  is  mere  trifling,  and  cannot  tend^ 
to  promote  ivnowiedge,  fuch  as,  a  Rule  is  a  Riile^ 
or  'Xgood  Man  is  a  good  Man. 

But  there  are  fome  Propofitions,  wherein  the 
'Terms  of  the  Subject  and  Predicate  feem  to  be  the 
fame,  yet  the  Ideas  are   not  the  fime  ;  nor  can 
thefe  be  call'd  purely  identical  or  trifling  Propofiti- 
ons j  fuch  as,  Home  is  Home ;  that  is.  Home  is  a 
cow-jenient  or  delightftil  Place :  Socrates  is  Socrates 
fiill;  that  is,  the  Man  Socrates  is  fiill  a  Philofo- 
pher :  The  Hero  was  not  a  Hero  j  that  is,  the  Hero 
did  not  fJjeiv  his  Courage :  JVhat  i  have  written^  I 
have  written :  that  is,  what  I  wrote  I  fiill  approve^ 
and  will  not  alter  it :  fVhat  is  done^  is  done ;  that 
is,  it  cannot  be  mi  done.     It  may  be  eaflly  obferved 
in  thefe  Propoiitions  the  Term  is  equivocal^  for  in 
the  Predicate  it  has  a  different  Idea  from  what  it 
has  in  the  Suhje^. 

There  arc  alfo  -fome  Propofitions  wherein  the 
Ter?ns  of  the  Subjecb  and  Predicate  differ,  but  the 
ideas  arc  the  lame  3  and  thefe  are  not  meerly  iden- 
tical 


G.  II.  S;.  r.     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.^     147 

tical  or  trifling  Proportions  :  as,  impudent  is  floame- 
lefs\  a  Billozv  is  a  Pf^ave',  or  FIucJus  (in  Latin}  is 
a,  IV^'Ve-,  a  Globe  is  a  round  Body.  In  thefc  Pro- 
pofitions  either  the  Words  are  explained  by  a  De- 
finition of  the  Name,  or  the  Ideas  by  a  Definiti- 
on of  the  Thing,  and  therefore  they  are  by  no 
Means  ufelcfs,  when  formed  for  this  Purpofe. 


CHAP.     II. 
Of  the  'Various  Kinds  of  Tro^oftions. 


PRopofitions  may  be  difiributed  into  various 
Kinds  according  to  their  Suhjecl^  their  Co- 
fula^  their  Predizate^  their  Nature  or  Compofition^ 
their  Senfe  and  their  Eiidence^  which  Dillributi- 
ens  will  be  explained  in  the  following  Sedions. 

Sect.     I. 

Of  univerfai^  particular^  i?ide finite^  and  Jtngular 

Propo fit  ions. 

PRopofitions  may  be  divided  according  to  their 
Subje^  into  uni-verfal  and  particular;  this  is 
ufually  caird  a  Divifion  arifing  from  the  Quantity. 

An  univerfal  Propofition  is  when  the  Subjeft  is 
taken  according  to  the  whole  of  its  Extcnfion^ 
fo  if  the  Subject  be  a  Genus  or  general  Nature, 
it  includes  all  its  Species  or  Kinds:  If  the  Subje6b 
be  a  Species^  it  includes  all  its  Individuals.  This 
Univerfality  is  ufually  fignified  by  thefe  Words, 
ally  every<y  no^  none^  or  the  like  3  as,  all  Men  mufi 

L  2.  dye: 


148  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Part  II. 

dye :  No  Alan  is  Almighty  :  E'very  Creature  had  a 
beginning. 

A  particular  Propfttion  is  when  the  Subje6t  is 
not  taken  according  to  its  whole  Extenfionj  that 
is,  when  the  Term  is  Umited  and  reftrained  to 
feme  one  or  more  of  thofe  Species  or  Individuals^ 
whofe  general  Nature  it  exprefles,  but  reaches 
not  to  all  J  and  this  is  ufually  denoted  by  the 
Words,  fome^  many^  a  few^  there  are  wbichy  6cc. 
as,  fome  Birds  canftng  well :  Feiv  Men  are  truly 
ivife :  'There  are  Parrots  which  will  talk  a  hundred 
'Things.  ,     . 

Under  the  general  Name  of  univerfal  Propoftti- 
ons^  we  may  julUy  include  thofe  that  are  fingu- 
lar^  and  for  the  moft  part  thofe  that  are  indefinite 
alfo. 

Afingular  Propofition  is  when  the  Subjeft  is  a 
fingiilar  or  individual  Term  or  Idea  5  as  Defcartes 
was  an  ingenious  Philofophcr :  Sir  Ifaac  Newton 
has  far  exceeded  all  his  Predecejfors :  The  Palace  at 
Hampton-Court  is  a  pie af ant  Dwelling:  This  Day 
is  'very  cold.  The  Subjc<51:  here  muft  be  taken  ac- 
cording to  the  whole  of  its  Extenfion,  becaufc 
being  an  indii-idual^  it  can  extend  only  to  one,  and 
it  muil  therefore  be  regulated  by  the  Laws  oiuni- 
I'crfal  Propofitions. 

An  indefinite  Propofiition.^  is,  when  no  Note,  ei- 
ther of  Univerfality  or  Particularity,  is  prefixed  to 
a  Subjcft,  which  is  in  its  own  Nature  general  j 
as,  a  Planet  is  ever  changing  its  Place :  Angels  are 
7wble  Creatures.  Now  this  fort  of  Propofition, 
efpccially  when  it  dcfcribesthe  Nature  of  Things, 
is  ufually  counted  unrjcrfal  alfo,  and  it  liippofes 
the  Subje6t  to  be  taken  in  its  whole  Extenfion  > 
for  if  there  were  any  Planet  which  did  not  change 
its  Place  ^  or  any  Jngel  that   were  not  a  nobis 

Creature^ 


C.  II.  S.  I.     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafoii.'    149 

Creature^  thefe  Propofitions  would  not  be  ftricll}' 
true. 

Yet  in  order  to  fecure  us  againil  Miitakes  in 
judging  of  uni'verfal J  particular  and  indefinite  Pro- 
pofitions, it  is  neceflary  to  make  thefe  follo\Ying 
Remarks. 

I.  Concerning  univerfal Propofitions. 

Note  I.  Univerfal  Terms  may  either  denote  a 
metaphyfical^  iphyfical^  or  a  ;«i?n'7/ Univcrf^Hty.  • 

h.  metaphyfical^  ox  mathematical  Unii'ejfality^  is 
-when  all  the  Particulars  contained  under  any  ge- 
neral Idea  have  the  fame  Predicate  belonging  to 
them  without  anyException  whatfoever  5  or  when 
the  Predicate  is  fo  eflential  to  the  univerfal  Sub- 
jed:,  that  it  deftroys  the  very  Nature  of  the  Sub- 
je^  to  be  without  it  $  as,  all  Circles  hai'c  a  Centre 
and  Circumference :  All  Spirits  in  their  own  Nature 
are  immortal. 

A  phyfical  or  natural  Univerfality^  is,  when  ac- 
cording to  the  Order  and  common  Courfe  of  Na- 
ture, a. Predicate  agrees  to  all  the  Subjects  of  that 
Kind,  tho'  there  may  be  fome  accidental  and  pre- 
ternatural Exceptions  j  as,  all  Men  ufe  JVords  to 
exprefs  their  Thoughts^  yet  dumb  Perfons  are  ex- 
cepted, for  they  cannot  fpeak.  All  Beafls  have 
four  Feet^  yet  there  may  be  fome  Alonfiers  with 
live i  or  maim'd^  who  have  but  three. 

A  moral  Univerfality^  is  when  the  Predicate  a- 

grees  to  the  greatell  part  of  the  Particulars  which 

are  contain'd  under  the  univerfal  Subje6fc  3  as,  all 

Negroes  are  ftupid  Creatures:  All  Men  are  governed 

■by  Affedion  rather  than  by  Reafon:  All  the  old  Ro- 

_  mans  loved  their  Country :  And  the  Scripture  ufes 

,  this  Language,  when  St.  P<i/// tells  us,  The  Cretes 

are  always  Liars, 

L  3  Now 


150  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Part  II. 

Now  it  is  evident,  that  a  fpccial  or  fingular 
Conclufion  cannot  be  infciT'd  from  a  moral  Uni- 
'  •z'crfality^  nor  always  and  intallibly  from  a  phyftcal 
one,  tho'  it  may  be  always  infcrr'd  from  a  Uni- 
verfality  which  is  metaphyftcal^  without  any  Dan- 
ger, or  Poffibility  of  Miftakc. 

Let  it  be  obferv'd  alfo,  that  iifually  we  make 
httle  or  no  Diftincbion  in  common  Language,  be- 
tween a  Subjeft  that  is  phyfically  or  mctaphyfically 
univerfal. 

Note  2.  An  univerfiil  Term  is  fometimes  taken 
coUe^rcely  for  all  its  particular  Ideas  united  toge- 
ther, and  fometimes  dijlributively^  meaning  each 
of  them  fingle  and  alone. 

Inftances  of  a  colMti've  Univerfal  are  fuch  as 
thefe:  Jll  thefe  Apples  ivill  fill  a  BuJJkI:  J II  the 
Hours  of  the  Night  are  fiijfcient  for  feep :  All  the 
Rules  of  Grammar  oz-erload  the  Memory.  In  thefe 
Propofitions  it  is  evident,  that  the  Predicate  be- 
longs not  to  the  Individuals  feparately^  but  to  the 
"dohole  colle^ive  Idea  >  for  we  cannot  affirm  the 
fiimc  Predicate,  if  we  change  the  Word  all  into 
one^  or  into  every;  we  cannot  fay  o'm  Apple  or 
every  Apple  will  fill  a  Bujhel^  &c.  Now  fuch  a 
collc5iive  Idea  when  it  becomes  the  Subjcft  of  a 
Propofition,  ought  to  be  elteem'd  as  one  fingle 
Thing,  and  this  renders  the  Propofition /i>^^^/<^r 
or  indefinite^  as  we  iTiall  fhew  immediately. 

A  diftrihutive  Univerfal  will  allow  the  Word 
all  to  be  changed  into  every ^  or  into  onc^  and  by 
this  Means  is  diftinguifhed  from  a  colletlive. 

Inltances  of  a  dtftrihute  Univerfal^  are  the  mofl: 
common  on  every  Occafion^  as,  all  Men  aranor- 
tal:  Every  Man  is  a  Sinner^  6cc.  But  in  this  fort 
of  Univerfal  there  is  a  DilHn6lion  to  be  made, 
which  follows  in  the  next  Remark. 

Note 


C.  II.  S.  I ."      The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     1 5 1 

Note  3.  When  an  univerfal  'Term  is  taken  ^//^ 
tributrjely^  fometimes  it  includes  all  the  Individu- 
als contained  in  its  inferior  Species :  as  when  I 
{■xy  ^  every  Sic  knefs  has  a  Tendency  to  Death;  I  mean 
every  individual  Sicknefs  as  well  as  eve^y  Kind. 
But  fometimes  it  includes  no  more  than  meerly 
each  Species  or  Kind;  as  when  the  Evangelift  fiys, 
Chrift  healed  every  Difeafe^  or  every  Difeafc  luas 
healed  by  Chriji  j  that  is,  every  kind  of  Difeafc. 
The  firjfl  of  thefe.  Logicians  call  the  Diilribution 
of  an  Univerfal  in  fmgula  generum ;  the  la/l  is  a 
Diilribution  in  genera  fingulorum.  But  either  of 
them  joined  to  the  Subje6t  render  a  Propolltion 
univerfal. 

Note  4.  The  Univerfality  of  a  Subje6l  is  often 
reftniined  by  a  part  of  the  Predicate  3  as  when 
we  fay,  all  Men  learn  Wifdom  by  Experience :  The 
univerfal  Subjecl:,  all  Men^  is  limited  to  fignify 
only,  all  thofe  Men  vjho  learn  Wifdom.  The  Scri- 
pture alio  ufes  this  fort  of  Language,  when  it 
Ipeaks  of  all  Men  being  jufiified  by  the  Righteouf- 
nefs  of  onc^  Rom.  v.  18.  that  is,  all  Men  vjho  are 
juftified  obtain  it  this  way. 

Obferve  here,  that  not  only  a  metaphyfical  or  na^ 
turaly  but  a  moral  Univerfality  alfo  is  oftentimes 
to  be  rellrained  by  a  part  of  the  Predicate  j  as 
when  we  fiv,  all  the  Dutch  are  good  Seamen :  ylll 
the  Italians  are  fubtle  Politicians;  that  is,  thofe  a- 
mong  the  Dutch^  who  are  Seamen^  are  good  Sea- 
men }  and  thofe  among  the  Italians^  who  are  Po^ 
liticiansj  are  fubtle  Politicians,  /.  e.  they  are  gene- 
rally fo. 

Note  f.  The  Univerfality  of  a  Term  is  many 
times  reilrained  by  the  particular  Time^  Place^  Cir- 
cumfiance^  6cc.  or  the  Defign  of  the  Speaker  j  as 
if  we  are  in  the  City  of  London^  and  lay,  all  the 
Weavers  went  to  prefent  their  Petition  ;  we  mean 

L  4  only 


152     .         L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,     Part II. 

only  all  the  Weavers  who  dwell  in  the  City.  So 
when  it  is  laid  in  the  Gofpel,  all  Men  did  marvel^ 
Mark  v.  20.  it  reaches  only  to  all  thofe  Men  who 
heard  of  the  Miracles  of  our  Saviour. 

Here  alfo  it  fhould  be  obferv'd,  that  a  moral 
Uni'verfality  is  reftrained  by  1'ime^  Place^  and  o- 
ther  Qi^cumfiances  as  well  as  a  natural -,  fo  that  by 
thefe  Means  the  Word  all  fometimes  does  not  ex- 
tend to  a  tenth  Part  of  thofe  who  at  firft  might 
feem  to  be  included  in  that  Word. 

One  Occafion  of  thefe  Difficulties  and  Ambi- 
guities, that  belong  to  univerfal  Propofttions^  is  the 
common  Humour  and  Temper  of  Mankind,  who 
generally  have  an  Inclination  to  magnify  their 
Ideas,  and  to  talk  roundly  and  univerfally  concern^ 
ing  any  thing  they  fpeak  of  5  which  has  intro- 
duced univerial  Terms  of  Speech  into  Cuftom  and 
Habit,  in  all  Nations  and  all  Languages,  more 
than  Nature  or  Reafon  would  di6tate  j  yet  when 
this  Cultom  is  introduced,  it  is  not  at  all  impro- 
per to  ufe  this  fort  of  Language  in  folemn  and 
iacred  Writings,  as  well  as  in  familiar  Difcourfe. 

II.  Rein  arks  concerning  indefinite  Propofttions. 

Note  1 .  Propolitions  carrying  in  them  univer- 
fal  Forms  of  Expreffion,  may  fometimes  drop  the 
Note  of  Univerjahty^  and  become  indefinite^  and 
yet  retain  the  fame  univerfal  Senfe,  whether  meta-i 
phyfical^  natural  or  moral^  whether  collective  ox 
/Ufiributive. 

We  may  give  Inflances  of  each  of  thefe. 

Metaphyseal  -,  as,  a  Circle  has  a  Centre  and  Cit' 
cumference.  Natural  3  as,  Beafis  have  four  Feet. 
Morali  as,  Negroes  are  flupid  Creatures.  Collec-? 
live  J  as,  the  Apples  will  fill  a  BuJJjel.  Dillribu- 
tive  j  asj  Men  are  mortal. 

Note  2. 


C.  II.  S.  I  ^    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.       15^ 

Note  1.  There  are  many  Cafes  wherein  a  col- 
le^ive  Idea  is  exprell  in  a  Propofition  by  an  mde- 
finite  yb*w,  and  that  where  it  defcribes  the  Na- 
ture or  Quality  of  the  Subject,  as  well  as  when  it 
declares  fome  pafi  Matters  of  Fa^i;  as,  Fir-trees 
Jit  in  good  Order  will  give  a  charming  Profp^^ 
this  muft  fignify  a  Colle£iion  of  Fir-trees,  for  one 
makes  no  Profpe^.  In  Matters  of  Fad  this  is 
more  evident  and  frequent  j  as  the  Romans  over- 
oame  the  Gauls :  "The  Robbers  furrounded  the  Coach  : 
"The  wild  Geefe  flew  over  the  Thames  in  the  Form 
of  a  Wedge.     All  thefe  are  colle6tive  Subjects. 

Note  3 .  In  indefinite  Propofitions  the  Subject  is 
often  reftrained  by  the  Predicate,  or  by  the  fpe- 
cial  Time,  Place  or  Circumftances,  as  well  as  in 
Proportions  which  are  exprefly  univerfal  j  as,  the 
Chinefes  are  ingenious  Silk- Weavers,  i.  e.  thofe 
Chine fes,  which  are  Silk- Weavers,  are  ingenious  at 
their  Work.  The  Stars  appear  to  us  when  the 
Twylight  is  gone.  This  can  fignify  no  more  than 
the  Stars  which  are  above  our  Horizon. 

Note  4.  All  thefe  Reflri6cions  tend  to  reduce 
fome  indefinite  Propofitions  almoft  into  particular^ 
as  will  appear  under  the  next  Remarks. 

III.  Remarks  concerning  particular  Propofitions. 

Note  I .  A  particular  Propofition  may  fometimes 
be  expreft  indefinitely,  without  any  Note  of  Par- 
ticularity prefixt  to  the  Subjc6t  3  as,  in  Times  of 
Confufion  Laws  are  not  executed  :  Alen  of  Virtue 
are  difgraced,  and  Murtherers  efcape,  i.  c.  fome 
Laws,  fome  Men  of  Virtue,  fome  Murtherers :  Un- 
lefs  we  Ihould  call  this  Language  a  moral  Univer- 
fdlity,  tho'  I  think  it  can  hardly  extend  fo  far. 

Note  z .  The  Words  fome,  a  few,  6cc.  tho'they  ge- 
nerally denote  a  proper  P^r^/V«/^y?>y,  yet  fometimes 
they  expreis  a  colletlive  Idea ;  as*  fome  of  the  Ene- 

I  mies 


t54  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        PartIL 

mie^  bejy  the  General  around.  ^4  few  Greeks  would 
beat  a  thoufand  Indians. 

I  conclude  this  Se^ion  with  a  few  general  Re' 
marks  on  this  Subject  (viz.) 

Gen.  Rem.  I.  Since  univerfal.,  indefinite  and  par- 
ticular Terms  in  the  plural  Number  may  either  be 
taken  in  a  colle6ii"je  or  a  diflribHtive  Senfe,  there  is 
one  fhort  and  eafy  Way  to  find  when  they  are  fo//£'<r- 
tive -^ndwhcn  dijlributive  (viz.)  If  the  Plural  Num- 
ber may  be  chang'd  into  the  fingular,  i.  e.  if  the 
Predicate  will  agree  to  one  fingle  Subject,  it  is  a 
difiributi've  Idea  3  if  not,  it  is  colletlive. 

Gen.  Rem.  II.  Univerfal  and  particular  Terms 
in  the  plural  Number,  fuch  as,  all^  fomej  few^ 
many^  Sec.  when  they  are  taken  in  their  difiribu- 
ti've Senfe,  xt^xt(Q.r\t  fever al  fingle  Ideas-,  and  when 
they  are  thus  affixed  to  the  Subje6t  of  a  Propofi- 
tion,  render  that  Proportion  univerfal  or  par- 
ticular. 

Gen.  Rem.  III.  Univerfal  and  particular  Terms 
in  the  plural  Number,  taken  in  their  colkciive 
Senfe,  reprefent  generally  one  colletlive  Idea. 

If  this  one  collective  Idea  be  thus  reprefented 
(whether  by  univerfal  or  particular  Terms)  as  the 
Subject  of  a  Proportion  which  defcribes  the  Na- 
ture of  a  Things  it  properly  makes  either  a  fingu- 
lar or  an  indefinite  Propofttwn ;  for  the  Words,  all^ 
fome^  afew^  &c  do  not  then  denote  the  ^lanti- 
ty  of  the  Proportion,  but  are  efleem'd  meerly  as 
Terms  which  connect  the  Individuals  together  in 
order  to  compofe  one  colleHive  Idea.  Obferve 
thefe  Inltances,  all  the  Sycamores  in  the  Garden 
would  make  a  large  Grove  ;  i.  e.  this  one  Col- 
le^i^cion  of  Sycamores,  which  is  a  fingular  Idea. 
z  Some 


C.II.S.  i:      The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^^on.      155 

Some  of  the  Sycamores  in  the  Garden  'vuould  make 
a  fine  Groi'e :  Sycamores  would  make  a  noble 
Grove.  In  thcfe  \\i\  the  Subjed:  is  rather  inde- 
finite  than  fingiilar.  But  it  is  very  evident,  than 
in  each  of  thele  Propolitions  the  Predicate  can 
only  belong  to  a  colleilive  Idea^  and  therefore  the 
Sub] eel  muit  be  elleem'd  a  collcctii'e. 

It  this  collccfiie  Idea  (whether  reprdcntcd  by 
univerlal  or  particular  Terms)  be  uied  in  defcrlh- 
ing  pajl  Matters  of  Facl,  then  it  is  generally  to  be 
eftecni'd  afngular  Idea,  and  renders  the  Propofi- 
tion  fingular  -,  as,  all  the  Soldiers  of  Alexander  made 
but  a  little  Army :  A  fe\v  Macedonians  vanquified 
the  large  Army  of  Darius :  So-me  Grenadiers  in  the 
Camp  plundered  all  the  neighbouring  Toivns. 

Now  we  have  fnewn  before,  that  if  a  Propo- 
rtion dcfcribing  the  Nature  of  Things  has  an  rnde- 
finite  Subject,  it  is  generally  to  be  elteem'd  uni-ver- 
fal  in  its  propolitional  Senfe :  And  if  it  has  a  fm- 
gular  Subject^  in  its  propofitional  Senfe  it  is  akvays 
rankt  with  Univer fills. 

After  all  wc  muft  be  forced  to  confefs,  that 
the  Language  of  Mankind,  and  the  Idioms  of 
Speech  are  fo  exceeding  various,  that  it  is  hard  to 
reduce  them  to  a  few  Rules  >  and  if  we  would 
gain  a  jull  and  precife  Idea  of  every  uni'verfal^ 
particular  and  indefinite  Expreilion,  wc  mull  noc 
only  confider  the  peculiar  Idiom  of  the  Lan- 
guage, but  the  Time,  the  Place,  the  Occalion, 
the  Circumilances  of  the  Matter  fpoken  of,  and 
thus  penetrate  as  far  as  poilible  into  the  Defign  of 
the  Speaker  or  Writer. 


Sect. 


156  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Partll. 

Sect.     II. 

0/  affirmative  and  negative  Propofttiom. 

WHEN  a  Propofition  is  coniider'd  with  Re- 
gard to  its  Copula^  it  may  be  divided  into 
affirmative  and  negative  j  for  it  is  the  Copula  joins 
ar  disjoins  the  two  Ideas.  Others  call  this  a  Di' 
vifion  of  Propofitions  according  to  their  ^ality. 

Kn  affirmative  Propofition  is  when  the  Idea  of 
ihe  Predicate  is  fuppos'd  to  agree  to  the  Idea  of 
^the  Subject,  and  is  joined  to  it  by  the  Word  /V, 
or  are^  which  is  the  Copula  j  as,  all  Men  are  Sin- 
ners. But  when  the  Predicate  is  not  fuppos'd  to 
agree  with  the  Subject,  and  is  disjoined  from  it 
by  the  Particles  is  mt^  are  not^  ^c.  the  Propofi- 
tion is  negative  j  as,  Man  is  not  innocent  >  or,  no 
Man  is  innocent.  In  an  affirmative  Propofition  we 
aflert  one  Thing  to  belong  to  another,  and,  as  it 
were,  unite  them  in  Thought  and  Word :  In  ne- 
gative Propofitions  we  feparate  one  Thing  from  an- 
other, and  deny  their  Agreement. 

It  may  feem  fomething  odd,  that  two  Ideas  or 
Terms  are  faid  to  be  disjoined  as  well  ^s  joined  by 
,a  Copula :  But  if  we  can  but  fuppofe  the  negative 
Particles  do  really  belong  to  the  Copula  of  nega- 
tive Propofitions,  it  takes  away  the  Harfiineis  of 
the  Expreflion :  and  to  make  it  yet  fofter,  we  may 
•  confider  that  the  Predicate  and  Subje6t  may  be 
.properly  faid  to  be  joined  in  a  Form  of  Words  as 
a  Propofition^  by  connexive  Particles  in  Grammar 
or  Logick^  tho'  they  are  disjoined  in  their  Senfe 
and  Signification.  Every  Youth,  who  has  learnt 
his  Grammar,  knows  there  are  fuch  Words  as  difi- 
jun^ive  Conjunttions. 

Several 


C.  II.  S.  2.    The  right  life  of  Reafon:      15 7 

Several  Things  are  worthy  our  Notice  on  this 
Subje6t. 

i"ft  Note.  As  there  are  fome  teims^  or  IVords^ 
and  Ideal  (as  I  have  fhcwn  before)  concerning 
which  it  is  hard  to  determine  whether  they  arc 
•negative  or  pofitive^  fo  there  are  fome  Propojitions 
concerning  which  it  may  be  difficult  to  fay,  whe- 
ther they  affirm  or  deny  5  as,  when  we  fay,  Plato 
was  no  Fool:  Cicero  was  no  unskilful  Orator :  G^- 
far  made  no  Expedition  to  Mufcovy :  Jin  Oyfier  has 
no  part  like  an  Eel:  It  is  not  necejfary  for  a  Phyfi- 
cian  to  fpeak  French,  and  for  a  Phyfician  to  fpeak 
French  is  needle fs.  The  Senfe  of  thefe  Propofi- 
tions  is  very  plain  and  eaiy,  tho'  Logicians  might 
fquabble  perhaps  a  whole  Day,  whether  they 
fhould  rank  them  under  the  Names  of  negative  or 
affirmative. 

2^  Note.  In  Latin  and  EnglifJ)  two  Negatives 
joined  in  one  Sentence  make  an  Affirmative  5  as 
when  we  declare  no  Man  is  not  mortal^  it  is  the 
fame  as  tho'  we  faid,  Man  is  mortal.  But  in  Greek 
and  oftentimes  in  French  two  Negatives  make  but 
a  ftronger  Denial. 

l^  Note.  If  the  meer  negative 'Z^;-;?/,  A^o/,  be  ad- 
ded to  the  Copula  of  an  univerfal  affirmative  Pro- 
pofition,  it  reduces  it  to  a  particular  Negative  5  as, 
all  Men  are  not  wife^  fignifies  the  fame  as,  fome 
Men  are  not  wife. 

^^  Note.  In  all  affirmative  Propofitions,  the 
Predicate  is  taken  in  its  whole  Comprehenlion  j 
that,  is,  every  effential  Part  and  Attribute  of  it  is 
affirmed  concerning  the  Subject  5  as  when  I  fay, 
a  true  Chriflian  is  an  honefi ,  Mayi^  eveiy  Thing 
that  belongs  to  Honefty  is  affirmed  concerning  a 
true  Chrifiian.       -  •    • 

y^'^  Note. 


I5S  LOGIC  K:  Or,       PartIL 

^^^  Note.  In  all  negathe  Propofitions  the  Predi- 
cate is  taken  in  its  whole  Extenfion  j  that  is,  e* 
very  Species  and  Individual  that  is  contained  in 
the  general  Idea  of  the  Predicate,  is  utterly  denied 
concerning  the  Subie6t :  So  in  this  Proportion,  a 
Spirit  is  not  an  Animal^  we  exclude  all  forts  and 
kinds,  and  particular  Animals  whatfoever  from  the 
Idea  of  a  Spirit. 

From  thefe  two  laft  Remarks  we  mav  derive 
this  Inference,  that  we  ought  to  attend  to  the  eyi- 
tire  Comprebenfton  of  our  Ideas,  and  to  the  uni- 
verfal  Extenfion  of  them,  as  far  as  we  have  proper 
Capacity  for  it,  before  we  grow  too  confident  in 
our  affirming  or  denying  any  Thing,  which  may 
have  the  leall  Darknefs,  Doubt  or  Difficulty  at- 
tending it :  It  is  the  want  of  this  Attention  that 
betrays  us  into  many  Milhikes. 

Sect.     III. 

Of  the  Oppofition  and  Converfion  of  Propofitions. 

ANY  two  Ideas  being  joined  or  disjoined  In 
various  Forms  will  afford  us  feveral  Propo- 
fitions :  All  thefe  may  be  diftinguifhed  according  to 
their  ^lantity  and  their  ^tmlity*  mxo  four,  which 
are  markt  or  denoted  by  the  Letters,  A,  E,  I,  O, 
thus : 

rUniverfal  Affirmative, 
denotes  a  jUniverfal  Negative. 

y  Particular  Affirmative. 
(^Particular  Negative, 
according  to  thefe  old  Latin  Rhymes 

*  The  Reader  fliould  remember  here,  that  a  Propofition  accxjrding  to  its 
^antlty  is  caUed  tihiverfal  or  paTticuldr,  and  according  to  i;s  ^aUtj,  it  is 
cither  affiTm.ttivs  or  nfgathc. 

JJferit 


C.II.S.  j:     The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^Con.     159 

jljfent  A,  Negat  E,  '-oerum  generaliter  Amh<:e. 
Jfferit  I,  Negat  O^fed  particulariter  Ambo. 

This  may  be  exemplified  by  thefe  two  Ideas,  a 
Vine  and  a  Tre^. 

A  Every  Vine  is  a  Tree. 
E  No  Vim  is  a  Tree. 
I    Some  Vine  is  a  Tree. 
O  Some  Vine  is  not  a  Tree. 
The  Logicians  of  the  Schools   have   written 
many  large  Trifles  concerning  the  Oppofition  and 
Converfton  of  Propofitions.     It  will  be  Sufficient 
here  to  give  a  few  brief  Hints  of  thefe  Things, 
that  the  Learner  may  not  be  utterly  ignorant  of 
them. 

Propofitions  which  are  made  of  the  fame  Sub- 
ject and  Predicate  are  faid  to  be  oppofite^  when  that 
which  is  denied  in  one  is  affirmed  in  the  other, 
either  in  whole  or  in  part,  without  any  Confide- 
ration  whether  the  Propofitions  be  true  or  no. 

If  they  diffi:^r  both  in  Quantity  and  Quahty 
they  are  call'd  Contraditlory^  as, 

A  Every  Vine  is  ar\r^-K    r  111 

cr'      "^  /Thele  can  never  be  both  true, 

r\   Q        rr     •      }>-  or  both  falfe  at   the  fame 

O  Some  Vine  IS  note  rr-.- 

^  \  Time. 

a  Tree.  I 

If  two  Univerfals  differ  in  Quality   they   are 

Contraries.^  as, 

A  Every  Vine  is  a^rj^t    (•  u    u  ^u 

^      -^  y  Thefe  can  never  be  both  true 

E  m  Fine  h   >     "^^^^^ll^  ''"'  *'^  ""'^  ^ 

Tree.  j 

'If  two  particular  Propofitions  differ  in  Quality 
they  ve  SuhcontrarisSy  as, 

I  Sot?ie 


^6o  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  m 

I  Some  Vim  is  a^rr^u^r    _      t.     l  .i.  ^ 
tL.  /Thele  may  be  both  true  to- 

r\  c  '  rr  •  *?-  gether,  but  they  can  never 
OS^mFme>sno>r    g^  both  ftlfe. 

a  Tree.  j 

■,  Both  particular  and  univerfalPropofitions  which 
agree  in  Qiiality  but  not  in  Quantity  are  call'd 
Subaltern^  tho'  thefe  are  not  properly  oppofite^  as, 

A  Every  Vine  is  a  'Tree. 

I    Some  Vine  is  a  Tree. 
Or  thus, 

E  No  Vine  is  a  Tree. 

O  Some  Vine  is  not  a  Trde. 
The  Canons  of  fuhalternate  Propofitions  are  u- 
fually  reckoned  thefe  three  (i;iz.)  (i.)  If  an  uni»- 
verfal  PropoHtion  be  true,  the  particular  will  be 
true  alfo,  but  not  on  the  contrary.  And  (l.)  If  a 
particular  Proportion  be  felfe,  the  univeifal  muft 
te  fallc  too,  but  not  on  the  contirary.  (5.)  Sub- 
^Itern  Propofitions^  whether  univeifal  or  particu- 
lar, may  fometimes  be  both  true,  and  fometimes 
both  faife. 

V  ;The  Converfion  of  Propofitions  is  when  the  Sub- 
je6t  and  Predicate  change  their  Places  with  Pre- 
fervation  of  the  Truth.  This  may  be  done  with 
tonftant  Certainty  in  all  unli)er[al  Negatives  and 
_particidar  ^affirmatives  ;  as,  no  Spirit  is  an  Ani' 
mal^  may  be  converted,  no  Animal  is  a  Spirit  ; 
■and  fome  Tree  is  a  Vine.,  may  be  converted,  feme 
Vine  is  a  Tree.  But  there  is  more  formal  Trifling 
in  this  fort  of  Difcourfe  than  there  is  of  folid  Im- 
provement, becaufe  this  fort  of  Converfion  arifes 
meerly  from  the  Form  of  M^ords^  as  conne6fced  in 
a  Propofition,  rather  than  from  the  Matter. 
■;  Yet  it  may  be  ufeful  to  obferve,  that  there, are 
fome  Propofitions,  which  by  Reafon  of  the  Ideas 
ox  Matter  of  which  they  are  compos'd  may  be 
converted  with  conflant  Truth :  Such  are  thofe 

Propofitions 


C.  II.  S.  4.  the  right  Ufe  ^j/Reafon.^         1 6\ 

Propofitions  whofe  Predicate  is  a  nominal  or  real 
Definition  of  the  Subjed,  or  the  Difference  of 
it,  or  a  Property  of  the  fourth  Kind,  or  a  fuper- 
lative  Degree  of  any  Property  or  Quality  what- 
foever,   or  in  fhort,   wherefoever   the  Predicate 
and  the  Subject  have  exactly  the  fame  Extenfion 
or  the  lame  Comprehenlion  j  as,  e'very  Vine  is  a 
Tree  bearing  Grapes;  and  e^jery  Tree  bearing  Grapes 
is  a  Vine :  Religion  is  the  true  ft  Wifdom  j  and  the 
trueft  Wifdom  is  Religion:  Julius   Csefar  ivas  the 
fir  ft  Emperor  .of  Romej   and  the  fir  ft  Emperor  of 
Rome  'was  Julius  Csefar.     Thefe  are  the  Propofi- 
tions which  are  properly  convertible,  and  they 
are  call'd  reciprocal  Propofitions. 

Sect.    IV. 

Of  pure  and  modal  Propofitions. 

ANother  Divifion  of  Propofitions  among  the 
fcholaftick  Writers  is  into  pure  and  modal. 
This  may  be  call'd  (for  Diftinftion  fake)  a  Divi- 
fion according  to  the  Predicate. 

When  a  Propofition  meerly  exprefles  that  the 
Predicate  is  conneded  with  the  Subject,  it  is 
call'd  a  pure  Propofition -,  as,  e'very  true  Chriftian 
is  an  honeft  Man.  But  when  it  includes  alfo  the 
JVay  and  Manner  wherein  the  Predicate  is  con- 
ne(Sted  with  the  Subject,  it  is  call'd  a  modal  Pro' 
pofition^  as,  when  I  fay,  it  is  neceftary  that  a  true 
Chriftian  ftoould  be  an  honeft  Man. 

Logical  Writers  generally  make  the  Modality 
of  this  Propofition  to  belong  to  the  Copula,  be- 
caufe  it  fhews  the  Manner  of  the  Connection  be- 
tween Subje6t  and  Predicate.  But  if  the  Form 
of  the  Sentence  as  a  logical  Propofition  be  duly 
confider'd,  the  Mode  itielf  is  the  very  Predicate 

M  oi 


t6z  L  0  G  J  C  K:  Or,      l>art  II 

«6f  the  Propofitiorv,  and  it  muft  mn  thus :  That  a 
Hrue  Chr'ipan  jhould  he  an  hone  ft  Man  is  a  necejffary 
Thingy  and  then  the  primary  Propofition  is  includ- 
ed in  the  Subje6t  of  the  modal  Propofition. 

There  arc  four  Modes  of  connecting  the  Predi-. 
'cate  with  the  Subjeft,  which  are  ufually  reckon- 
■ed  up  on  this  Occafion  (yiz^NeceJJity  and  Contin- 
gency which  are  two  Oppofites,  PoJJibility  and  Im- 
fojjihility  which  aHb  are  Oppofites  >   as,  it  is  ne- 
cejfary   that  a  Globe  floould  be  roUnd:  That  a  Globe 
be  made  of  Wood  or  Glafs  is  an  unne cejfary  or  con- 
'tlrigent  Thing:  It  is  impojfihle  that  a  Globe  Jhould 
he  fquare :  It  is  pdjjlble  that  a  Globe  may  be  made  of 
Water. 

With  Regard  to  thefe  modal  Propofttions  which 
the  Schools  have  introduced,  I  would  make  thefe 
two  Remarks. 

Remark  i.  Thefe  Propofitions  in  EngliJJj  are 
'formed  by  the  Refolution  of  the  Words,  nmft  be, 
might  not  be^can  be^  and  cannot  /'<?,  into  thofe  more 
explicite  Fdrrtis  of  a  logical  Copula  and  Predi- 
cate, is  neccfjdry^  is  contingent^  is  poffible^  is  impof- 
ftble:  For  it  is  necejfary  that  aGlobe  JJjould  be  rdund^ 
iignifies  no  more  than  that  a  Globe  muji  be  round. 

Renfark  z.  Let  it  be  noted,  thilt  this  cjuadru- 

'{)le  Modality  is  orily  an  'Enumemtidn  of  the  n'a- 

'Pur al  Modes  6x  Manners  wherein  the 'Predicate  is 

connected  with  the  'Subject:  We 'might  iilfo  de- 

fcribe  feveral  moral  and  ci'vil  Modes  bf  connecting 

two  Ideas  together  {^oiz)  Laivfulnefs  and  Unlaw- 

fulnefsy  Con'veniency  and  Inconveniencyy^c. whence 

we  may  fotm  fuch  modal  Propofitions  as '  th 6fe.     It 

is  unlawful  for  any  Perfonto  kill  an  innocent  Man: 

'ItislaivfulforChriftianstoeatFlep  i'n'hcnt:  To 

^4  'tell 


C  U.S.  5.     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:     1 6y 

tell  all  that  we  think  is  inexpedient :  For  a  Man  to 
be  affable  to  his  Neighbour  is  very  convenient^  &c. 

There  arc  feveral  other  Modes  of  fpeaking 
whereby  a  Predicate  is  conne^ed  with  a  Subject  i 
fuch  as,  it  is  certain^  it  is  doubtful^  it  is  probable^ 
it  is  improbable^  it  is  agreed^  it  is  grant ed^  it  is  faid 
by  the  Ancients.^  it  is  written^  6cc.  all  which  will 
form  other  kinds  of  modal  Propofttions. 

But  whether  the  Modality  be  natural^  moral^ 
&CC.  yet  in  all  thefe  Propofitions  it  is  the  Mode  is 
the  proper  Predicate^  and  all  the  reft  of  the  Pro- 
pofition,  except  the  Copula  (or  Word  is)  belongs 
to  the  Subje^ ;  and  thus  they  become  pure  Pro- 
pojitiom  of  a  complex  Nature,  of  which  we  fhall 
treat  in  the  next  Se^ion^  fo  that  there  is  no  great 
Need  of  malting  Modals  a  diftin6t  fort. 

Ther€  are  many  little  Subtilties  which  the 
Schools  acquaint  us  with  concerning  the  Convert- 
fion^  and  Qppofition^  and  Equipollence  of  thefe  mo- 
dal Propofitions,  fuited  to  the  Latin  or  Greek 
Tongues,  rather  than  the  Englip^  and  fit  to  pafs 
away  the  idle  Time  of  a  Student,  rather  than  to 
enrich  his  Underilanding. 

Sect.   V. 
'Of  ftngle  Propofitions^  'whether  fimple  or  complex. 

WHEN  we  confider  the  Nature  of  Propofi- 
tions^ together  with  the  Formation  of  them 
and  the  Materials  whereof  they  are  made,  wc  di- 
vide them  into  fingle  and  compound. 

A  fingle  Propofition  is  that  which  has  but  one 
Subject  and  one  Predicate  j  but  if  it  has  more 
.Subje6ts  or  more  Predicates,  it  is  call'd  a  compound 
Propofition.^  and  indeed  it  contains  tv/o  or  more 
Propofitions  in  it. 

M  z  ^fi^gis 


164  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Part  11; 

A  Jingle  Propofition  (which  is  alfo  call'd  cate- 
goricaf)  may  be  divided  again  into  fimple  and 
complex  *. 

A  purely  ftmple  Propofttion  is  that  whofe  Subje6fc 
and  Predicate  are  made  op  of  fingle  Terms  5  as. 
Virtue  is  defirable:  E'uery  Penitent  is  pardoned:  No 
Man  is  innocent. 

When  the  Subject,  or  Predicate,  or  both,  are 
made  up  of  complex  Terms,  it  is  call'd  a  complex 
Propofition ;  as,  e'very  Jlncere  Penitent  is  pardoned: 
Virtue  is  defirable  for  its  own  Sake :  No  Man  alive 
is  perfe6ily  innocent. 

If  the  Term  which  is  added  to  the  Subje6b  of 
a  complex  Propofition  be  either  eflential  or  any 
"Way  neceflary  to  it,  then  it  is  call'd  explicative^ 
for  it  only  explains  the  Subject ;  as,  every  mortal 
Man  is  a  Son  of  iVdam.  But  if  the  Term  added 
to  make  up  the  complex  Subject  does  not  nccef- 
farily  or  conllantly  belong  to  it,  then  it  is  deter- 
minative,  and  limits  the  Subje6t  to  a  particular 
part  of  its  Extenfionj  as,  every  pious  Man  pall 
be  happy.  In  the  firft  Propofition  the  Word  mor" 
tal  is  meerly  explicative :  in  the  iecond  Propofiti- 
on the  Word  pious  is  deter?mnativc. 

Here  note,  that  whatfoever  may  be  affirmed  or 
denied  concerning  any  Subject  with  an  explicative 
Addition,  may  be  alfo  affirmed  or  denied  of  that 
Subject  without  it  j  as  we  may  boldly  fay,  every 
Man  is  a  Son  of  i^dam,  as  w^ell  as,  every  mortal 
Man :  But  it  is  not  fo,  where  the  Addition  is  de- 
terminative^ for  we  cannot  fay,  every  Manjhall  b€ 
happy ^  tho'  every  pious  Man  fliall  be  fo. 

*  As  f.m^h  Ideas  are  oppofed  to  complex,  and  yTwj/l?  Ideas  to  cowpound,  fo 
Propofitions  are  diflin^uilhed  in  the  fame  manner  :  The  EHglijh  Tongue  in 
rhls  Refpe£l  having  Ibme  Advantage  above  the  learned  Languages,  which 
'have  no  ufual  Word  to  difiinguilh/wj/*  Uomfrnfe, 

In 


C.  II  S.  6,    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.     1 65 

In  a  complex  Propofition  the  Predicate  or  Sub- 
je6t  is  fometimes  made  complex  by  the  Pronouns, 
ivho^  whkh,  whofe^  to  ivhom,  6cc.  which  make 
another  Propofition  j  as,  every  Man^  who  is  pious, 
jhall  he  faved :  Julius^  whofe  Sirname  was  C^^r, 
cvercame  Pompey :  Bodies^  which  are  tranfparent, 
have  many  Pores.  Here  the  whole  Propofition  is 
call'd  the  primary  or  chiefs  and  the  additional  Pro- 
pofition is  call'd  an  incident  Propofition.  But  it  is 
IHU  to  be  efteem'd  in  this  Cafe  meerly  as  a  pare 
of  the  complex  Term  >  and  the  Truth  or  Falf- 
hood  of  the  whole  complex  Propofition  is  not  to  be 
judged  by  the  Truth  or  Falfhood  of  the  incident 
Propofition^  but  by  the  Connection  of  the  whole 
Subject  with  the  Predicate.  For  the  incident 
Propofition  may  be  falfe,  and  abfurd,  or  impofii- 
ble,  and  yet  the  whole  complex  Propofition  may 
be  true,  as,  a  Horfe^  which  has  Wings,  might  fly 
over  the  Thames. 

Befide  this  Complexion  which  belongs  to  the 
SubjeSi  or  Predicate^  logical  Writers  ufe  to  fay, 
there  is  a  Complexion  which  may  fall  upon  the  Co- 
pula alfo :  But  this  I  have  accounted  for  in  the 
Se6lion  concerning  modal  Propofitions  j  and  indeed 
it  is  not  of  much  Importance  whether  it  were 
placed  there  or  here. 

Sect.    VI. 

Of  compound  Propofitions. 

A  Compound  Propofition  is  made  up  of  two  or 
more  Subjcfts  or  Predicates,  or  both  j  and 
it  contains  in  it  two  or  more  Propofitions,  which 
-are  either  plainly  exprefl:^  or  concealed  and  implied. 

M  3  The 


1 66  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  II. 

The  firfi  fort  of  compound  Propofitions  are  thofe 
•wherein  the  Compofition  is  expreji  and  evident^ 
and  they  are  diftinguifhed  into  thefe  fix  Kinds,- 
{viz.)  Copulative  J  Disjun^ive^  Conditional^  Caufaly 
Relative  and  Difcretive.  ' 

I.  Copulative  Propofttions  are  thofe  which  have 
more  Subjefts  or  Predicates  connected  by  affirma* 
tive  or  negative  Conjun6lions  >  as.  Riches  and  Ho* 
nour  are  Temptations  to  Pride  :  Csefar  conquered  the 
Gauls  and  the  Britons :  Neither  Gold  nor  Jewels 
will  piirchafe  Immortality.  Thefe  Propofitioils  are 
evidently  compounded^  for  each  of  them  may  be 
refolv'd  into  two  Propofitions,  (viz.)  Riches  are 
temptations  to  Pride;  and  Honour  is  a  Temptation 
io  Pride;  and  fo  the  reft. 

The  Truth  of  copulative  Propofitions  depends 
upon  the  Truth  of  all  the  Parts  of  them  j  for  if 
Cafar  had  conquered  the  Gauls^  and  not  the  Bri- 
tons^ or  the  Britons  and  not  the  Gauls.,  the  fccond 
copulative  Propofition  had  not  been  true. 

Here  note,  thofe  Propofitions,  which  cannot  be 
refolved  into  two  or  more  funple  Propofitions, 
are  not  properly  copulative^  tho'  two  or  more  I- 
dcas  be  contiedied  and  coupled  by  fuch  Conjunc- 
tions, either  in  the  Subjedt  or  Predicate  j  as,  fwo 
and  three  make  five :  Majejly  and  Me  chiefs  don't 
often  meet :  The  Sxn^  Mooit^  and  Stars  are  not  all 
to  be  feen  at  once.  Such  Propofitions  are  to  be 
efteemed  meerly  compldx^  becaufc  the  Predicate 
cannot  be  affirmed  of  each  fngle  Sub)e6t,  but  on- 
ly of  all  of  them  together  as  a  colk^ive  Subjedt. 

II.  DisjuH&rve  Propofitions  are  when  the  Paits 
are  disjoined  or  oppofed  to  one  another  by  dif- 
jundive  Particles  >  as,  it  is  either  Day  or  Night : 

The 


C.  II.  S.  6,      The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     1 67 

The  Weather  is  either  JJjining  or  rainy :  ^iflntit.y  i^ 
either  Lengthy  Breadth^  or  Depth. 

The  Truth  oF  Disjun^i-ves  depends  on  the  nc- 
ceflary  and  immediate  Oppofition  of  the  Paits > 
therefore  only  the  laft  of  thele  Examples  is  true  y 
but  the  two  firlt  are  not  ftriclly  true,  becaufc 
I'wilight  is  a  Medium  between  Day  and  N/ght ; 
and  dry^  cloudy  Weather  is  a  Medium  betweeu 
JJnning  and  raining. 

III.  Conditional  or  hypothetical  Propojltions  are 
thofe  whofe  Parts  are  united  by  the  conditional 
particle  if;  as.  If  the  Sun  be  fixt^  the  Earth  ?nuft 
wove :  If  there  be  no  Fire^  there  will  be  no  S?noke. 

Note^  The  firft  part  of  thefe  Proportions,  or 
that  wherein  the  Condition  is  contained,  is  call'd 
the  antecedent.^  the  other  is  call'd  the  confequent. 

The  Truth  of  thefe  Proportions  depends  not 
at  all  on  the  Truth  and  Falfhood  of  their  two 
Parts,  but  on  the  Truth  of  the  Connection  of 
them  J  for  each  part  of  them  may  be  filfe,  and 
yet  the  whole  Propofition  truej  as,  if  there  be 
no.  ProvJdence<i  there  will  be  no  future  PunifJjment. 

IV.  Cmfal  P-ropoJitions  are  where  two  Propo- 
rtions are  joined  by  caufil  Particles  ;  as,  Houfes 
were  not  built  that  they  might  be  deftroyed :  Reho- 
boam  was  unhappy  becaufe  he  followed  evil  CounfeL 

The  Truth  of  a  caiifal  Propofition  arifes  not 
from  the  Ti"uth  of  the  Parts,  but  from  the  caufal 
Influence  that  the  one  Part  of  it  has  upon  the  o- 
therj  for  both  Parts  may  be  true,  yet  the  Propo- 
fition falfe,  if  one  Part  be  not  the  Caufe  of  the 
other. 

Some  Logicians  refer  reduplicative  Propojltions 
to  this  Place,  as,  Men^  confidered  as  Alen^  are  ra  - 
tional  Creatures^  i.  e.  becaufe  they  ar^  Men- 

M  4  V.  Re- 


168  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,     Partll. 

V.  Relative  Propoftiions  have  their  Parts  joined 
by  fuch  Particles,  as  exprefs  a  Relation  or  Com- 
parifon  of  one  Thing  to  another}  as,  when  you 
are  filent  I  will  /peak :  As  much  as  you  are  worthy 
fo  much  you  pall  be  efteemed:  As  is  the  Father^  fo 
is  the  Son :  fVhere  there  is  no  Tale-Bearer^  Conten- 
tion will  ceafe. 

Thefe  are  veiy  much  akin  to  conditional  Propo- 
rtions, and  the  Truth  of  them  depends  upon  the 
Juftnefs  of  their  Connection. 

VI.  Difcretive  Propofitions  are  fuch  wherein  va- 
rious and  feemingly  oppofite  Judgments  are  made, 
whofe  Variety  or  Diftinclion  is  noted  by  the  Par- 
ticles, but^  tho\  yet^  6cc.  as.  Travellers  may  change 
their  Climate  but  not  their  Temper :  Job  was  pati- 
int^  thd"  his  Grief  was  great. 

The  Truth  and  Goodnefs  of  a  difcretive  Pro- 
pofition  depends  on  the  Truth  of  both  Parts,  and 
their  Contradillin6lion  to  one  another }  for  tho* 
both  Pai'ts  fhould  be  tnie,  yet  if  there  be  no 
feeming  Oppofition  between  them,  it  is  an  ufe- 
lefs  All'ertion,  tho'  we  cannot  call  it  a  falfe  one  -, 
as,  Defcartes  was  a  Philcfopher.,  yet  he  was  a 
Frenchman:  The  Romans  were  valiant^  hut  they 
[poke  Latin  5,  both  which  Propofitions  are  ridicu- 
lous, for  want  of  a  feeming  Oppofition  between 
the  Parts. 

Since  we  have  declared  wherein  the  Truth  and 
Falpood  of  thefe  compound  Propofitions  confifts,  it 
is  proper  aifo  to  give  fome  Intimations  how  any 
of  thefe  Propofitions  when  they  are  falfe  may  be 
cppofcd  or  contradicted. 

All  compound  Propofitions,  except  Copulatives 

and  Difcretives.)  are  properly  denied  or  contradi6t- 

cd  when  the  Negation  afFe6l:s  their  conjund:ive 

Particles  3   as^  if  the  disjunctive  Propoiition  af- 

3  fcrts 

r 


C.  11.  S.  6.    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.       1 69 

feits,  it  is  either  Day  or  Nigljt :  The  Opponent 
lays,  Jt  is  not  either  Day  or  Nighty  or,  it  is  not  ne- 
cejfary  that  it  jloould  he  either  Day  or  Night ;  ib  the 
hypothetical  Propolition  is  denied  by  faying,  it  does 
notfoUoiv  that  the  Earth  mufl  move  if  the  Sun  be  fix'd. 

A  disjunctive  Propojition  may  be  contradi6]:ed 
alfo  by  denying  all  the  Parts,  as,  it  is  neither  Day 
nor  Night. 

And  a  catifal  Propofition  may  be  denied  or  op- 
pofed  indire^iy  and  improperly.^  when  either  part 
of  the  Propofition  is  denied  j  and  it  miift  be  falfe 
if  either  Part  be  falfe :  But  the  Defign  of  the 
Propofition  being  to  fhew  the  caiifal  Connexion  of 
the  two  Parts,  each  Part  is  fuppos'd  to  be  true^ 
and  it  is  not  properly  contradi6i:ed  as  a  caiifal  Pro- 
pofttion^  unlefs  one  Part  of  ic  be  denied  to  be  the 
Caufe  of  the  other. 

As  for  Copulatives  and  Difcretives.^  becaufe  their 
Truth  depends  more  on  the  Truth  of  their  Parts, 
therefore  thefe  may  be  oppos'd  or  denied  as  manv 
Ways,  as  the  Parts  of  which  they  are  compos'd 
may  be  denied  5  ib  this  copulative  Propofition, 
Riches  and  Honour  are  "temptations  to  Pride^  may- 
be denied  by  faying,  Riches  are  not  '7'emptations.f 
thd'  Honour  may  he  :  or.  Honour  is  not  a  'Tempt a- 
tion^  tho'  Riches  may  he  :■  or,  neither  Riches  nor  Ho- 
nour are  Tempt  at  i  on  s.^  ^c. 

So  this  difcretive  Propofition,  Job  was  patient^ 
tho'  his  Grief  was  great.,  is  denied  by  fixying,  Job 
Ijuas  not  paticntj  tho'  his  Grief  was  great :  or,  Job 
•was  patimt,  but  his  Grief  was  not  great :  or,  Job 
was  not  patient.,  nor  was  his  Grief  great. 

We  proceed  now  to  the  fecond  fort  of  com- 
pound Propofitions,  (viz)  fuch  whofe  Compofttion 
is  not  exprejffed^  hut  latent  or  conceal  d.,  yet  a  fmall 
Attention  will  find  two  Propofitions  included  in 
them.    Such  are  thefe  that  follow i 

I.  Exclufivcsj 


170  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Part  II, 

1 .  Exclufives  5  as.  The  pious  Man  alone  is  hap- 
py. It  is  only  Sir  Ifaac  Newton  could  find  out  true 
Philofophy. 

2.  Except! ves  ;  as,  None  of  the  Antients  hut 
Plato  tvell  defended  the  SouVs  Immortality .  Ihe 
Frotefiants  worfhip  none  but  God. 

3.  Comparatives ;  as.  Pain  is  the  grea^efi  Af- 
fliElion.  No  Turk  was  fiercer  than  the  Spaniards, 
at  Mexico. 

Here  note,  that  the  comparative  Degree  does 
not  always  imply  the  Pofitive ;  as  if  I  fay,  A  Fool 
is  better  than  a  Knave ;  this  does  not  affirm  that 
Folly  is  goody  but  that  it  is  a  lefs  FvH  than  Kna- 
'uery. 

4.  Inceptives  and  Defitives,  which  relate  to 
the  beginning  or  ending  of  any  thing  3  as,  the 
Latin  Tongue  is  not  yet  forgotten.  No  Man  before 
Orpheus  ivrote  Greek  Verfe  5  Peter  Czar  of  Muf- 
covy  begun  to  civilize  his  Nation. 

To  thefe  may  be  added  Continuatives  -,  as,  Rome 
remains  to  this  Day^  which  includes  at  lealt  two 
Propolitions,  {viz^  Rome  ivas^  and  Rome  is. 

Here  let  other  Authors  fpend  Time  and  Pains 
in  giving  the  precife  Definitions  of  all  thefe  forts 
of  Propolitions,  which  may  be  as  well  understood 
by  their  Names  and  Examples  :  Here  let  them 
tell  what  their  Truth  depends  upon,  and  how 
they  are  to  be  oppofed  or  contradicted  ;  but  a 
moderate  Share  of  common  Senfe,  with  a  Review 
of  what  is  fiid  on  the  former  Compounds,  will 
fufEce  for  all  thefe  Purpofes  without  the  Formali- 
ty of  Rules. 


SecT. 


C.n.S.7.      The  right  Ufe  of  Kcz^ow,      ijt 

Sect.    VII. 

Of  true  and  falfs  Propofitlons. 

"TjRopolitions  are  next  to  be  confider'd  accord- 
\^  ing  to  their  Senfe  or  Signification^  and  thus 
they  are '  diftributed  into  true  midt  falfe.  A  trta 
Propofitim  reprefents  Things  as  they  are  in  thcm- 
fclves  ;  but  if  Things  are  reprefented  otherwjle 
than  they  are  in  themfelves,  the  Proportion  is 
falfe. 

Or  we  may  defcribe  them  more  particularly 
thus  i  a  true  Pro^<7////o«  joins  thofe  Ideas  and  Terms 
together  whole  Objects  are  joined  and  agree,  or 
it  disjoins  thofe  Ideas  and  Terms,  whofe  Obieccs 
dilagree  or  are  disjoin'dj  as,  every  Bird  hasff^i.i^s^ 
a  Brute  is  not  immortal. 

A  falfi  Proportion  joins  thofe  Ideas  or  Terms 
whofe  Objeds  difagree,  or  it  disjoins  thofe  vhofe 
Obje(5ts  agree  3  as  Birds  have  no  IVings^  Brutes 
are  immortal. 

Note^  It  is  impoflible  that  the  fame  Propofition 
fhould  be  both  true  and  falfe  at  the  fime  Time, 
in  the  fame  Senfe,  and  in  the  fame  Refped  j  be- 
caufc  a  Propolition  is  but  the  Reprefentation  of 
the  Agreement  or  Difagreement  of  Things :  Now 
it  is  impojfible  that  the  fame  Thing  Jfjould  be  and  not 
be^  or  that  the  fame  things  fjould  agree  and  not  a- 
gree  at  the  fame  'Time  and  in  the  fame  Refpcci.  This 
is  a  firfl:  Principle  of  human  Knowledge. 

Yet  fome  Propolltions  may  feem  to  contradict 
one  another,  tho'  they  may  be  both  true,  but  in 
ditferent  Senfes  or  Refpects  or  Times :  as,  Man 
*ivas  immortal  in  Paradife.^  and  Man  ivas  mortal  in 
Paradifc.  But  thefe  two  Proportions  muft  be 
refcr'd  to  different  Times  ^  as,  Man  before  his  Fall 

was 


272  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Partll. 

was  immortal,  but  at  the  Fall  he  became  mortal. 
So  we  may  lay  now,  Man  is  mortal^  or  Man  is 
immortal^  if  we  take  thefe  Propofitions  in  diffe- 
rent Refpefbs  -,  as,  Man  is  an  immortal  Creature 
as  to  his  Soul^  but  mortal  as  to  his  Body.  A  great 
Variety  of  Difficulties  and  feeming  Contradiftiqns, 
both  in  holy  Scripture  and  other  Writings,  may 
be  folved  and  explain'd  in  this  manner. 

The  moll  important  Queftion  on  this  Subject 
is  this^lVhat  is  the  Criterion  or  dijiinguijhing Mark 
&f  Truth  ?  How  fhall  we  know  when  a  Propofi- 
tion  is  really  true  or  falfe  ?  There  are  fo  many  Dif-^ 
guifes  of  Truth  in  the  World,  lb  many  falfe  Ap- 
pearances of  Truth,  that  fome  Se6ts  have  declar- 
ed there  is  no  PofTibility  of  diftinguifhing  'Truth 
from  Faljljood;  and  therefore  they  have  abandon'd 
^11  Pretences  to  Knowledge,  and  maintained  lire? 
nuoufly  that  nothing  is  to  be  known. 

The  firlt  Men  of  this  Humour  made  themfelves 
famous  in  Greece^  by  the  Name  of  Scepticks ,  that 
is,  ^  Seekers  :  They  were  alfo  call'd  jicademicks^ 
borrowing  their  Name  from  Academia^  their 
School  or  Place  of  Study.  They  tausht  that  all 
things  are  uncertain.,  tho'  they  allow'd  that  fome 
are  more  probable  than  others.  After  thefe  arole 
the  Se6l  of  Pyrrhonicks^  named  from  Pyrrho  their 
Mailer,  who  would  not  allow  one  Propofition  to 
be  more  probable  than  another  j  but  profels'd  that 
all  Things  ivere  equally  uncertain.  Now  all  thefe 
:Mcn  (as  an  ingenious  Author  exprelTes  it)  werq 
rather  to  be  call'd  a  Se£i  of  Liars  than  Philofor 
fherSy  and  that  Cenfure  is  jufl  for  two  Reafons  j 
(i.)  Becaufe  they  determined  concerning  every 
Propofition  that  it  was  uncertain,  and  believea 
.that  as  a  certain  Truth,  while  they  profefTed  there 
was  nothing  certain,  and  that  nothing  could  be  de- 
termined concerning  Truth  or  Fallhood  -,  and 
<    .  thus 


C.  II.  S.  7."    the  right  Ufe  tf/ Rcafon:      1 7  f 

thus  their  very  Dodrine  gave  itfelf  the  Lie.  (2.) 
Becaufe  they  judged  and  a6led  as  other  Men  did 
in  the  common  Affairs  of  Life  j  they  would  nei- 
ther run  into  Fire  nor  Water,  tho'  they  profefs'd 
Ignorance  and  Uncertainty,  whether  the  one 
would  burn,  or  the  other  drown  them. 

There  have  been  fome  in  all  Ages  who  have 
too  much  affeded  this  Humour,  who  difpute  a- 
gainft  every  thing,  under  Pretence  that  Truth  has 
no  certain  Mark  to  dijiinguijh  it.  Let  us  therefore 
enquire,  what  is  the  general  Criterion  of  Truth? 
And  in  order  to  this,  it  is  proper  to  confider  what 
is  the  Reafon  why  we  affent  to  thofe  Propofiti- 
ons,  which  contain  the  moft  certain  and  indubi- 
table Truths,  fuch  as  thefe,  the  JVhole  is  greater 
than  a  Part  >  two  and  three  make  five. 

The  only  Reafon  why  we  believe  thefe  Propo- 
rtions to  be  true,  is  becaufe  the  Ideas  of  the  Sub- 
jeds  and  Predicates  appear  with  fo  much  Clcar- 
nefs  and  Strength  of  Evidence  to  agree  to  each 
other,  that  the  Mind  cannot  help  difcerning  the 
Agreement,  and  cannot  really  doubt  of  the  Truth 
of  them,  but  is  conftrain'd  to  judge  them  true. 
So  when  we  compare  the  Ideas  of  a  Circle  and  a 
Triangle.^  or  the  Ideas  of  an  Oyfter  and  a  Butterfly^ 
we  fee  fuch  an  evident  Dilagreement  between 
them,  that  we  are  fure  that  a  Butterfly  is  not  an 
Oyfter -y  nor  is  a  Triangle  a  Circle.  There  is  no- 
thing but  the  Evidence  of  the  Agreement  or  Dif- 
agreement  between  two  Ideas,  that  makes  us  af- 
firm or  deny  the  one  or  the  other. 

Now  it  will  follow  from  hence,  that  ^clear  and 
diftindl  Perception  or  full  Evidence  of  the  Agreement 
-And  Difagreement  of  our  Ideas  to  one  another^  or  to 
things.,  is  a  certain  Criterion  of  Truth :  For  fince  our 
Minds  are  of  fuch  a  Make,  that  where  the  Evi- 
dence is  exceeding  plain  and  llrong,  we  cannot 

withoid 


174  LOGIC  K:  Or,       PartlL 

withold  our  Afl^^nt  j  we  fhouM  then  be  neceflari-' 
ly  expos'd  to  believe  Falfhood,  if  compleat  Evi-^ 
donee  fhould  be  found  in  any  Propofitions  that 
are  not  true.  But  lureiy  the  God  oF  perfect  Wif- 
dom.  Truth  and  Goodnefs  would  never  oblige 
his  Creatures  to  be  thus  deceiv'd  5  and  therefore 
he  would  never  have  conllituted  us  of  fuch  a 
Frame,  as  would  render  it  naturally  impoffible  to 
guard  againft  Error. 

Another  Confequence  is  naturally  deriv'd  from 
the  former  ^  and  that  is,  that  the  only  Reafon 
why  we  fall  into  a  Miftake  is  becaufe  we  are  im- 
patient to  form  a  Judgment  of  Things  before  we 
have  a  clear  and  evident  Perception  of  their  A- 
greeracnt  or  Difigreement  j  and  if  we  will  make 
Hafte  to  judge  while  our  Ideas  arc  obfcure  and 
confus'd,  or  before  we  fee  whether  they  agree  or 
difagree,  we  fhall  plunge  our  felves  into  perpetual 
Errors. 

Noi-e^  What  is  here  aflcrted  concerning  the 
Neceflity  of  clear  and  diftinft  Ideas  refers  cliiefly 
to  Propofitions,  which  we  form  our  fehes  by  our 
own  Powers :  As  for  Propofitions  which  we  de* 
rive  from  tlie  Tejfimony  of  others^  they  will  be  ac- 
counted for  in  Cha^.  IV". 

Sect.    VIII. 

Of  certain  and  dubious  Propofitions^  of  Knowledge 

and  Opinion. 

Since  we  hav«  found  that  Evidence  is  the  great 
Criterion  and  the  fure  Klark  of  Truth  j  this 
leads  us  dire61:ly  to  confider  Propofitions  accord- 
ing to  their  Evidence-,  and  here  we  muft  take 
Notice  both  of  the  different  Degrees  of  Evidence, 
and  the  different  Kinds  of  it. 

Propofitions 


C.  II.  S.  8 .'     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'     175 

Propofitioils  according  to  their  different  Deg-rees 
^f  Evidence  are  diftinguilli'd  into  certain  and  du- 
bious *. 

Where  the  Evidence  of  the  Agi'eemerit  or  Dis- 
agreement of  the  Ideas  is  fo  fh-ong  and  plain,  that 
we  cannot  forbid  nor  delay  our  AfTent  >  the  Pro- 
pofition  is  caird  certain^  as,  every  Cifcle  hath  a  Cen- 
tre ;  the  IVmid  did  not  create  itfelf.  An  Jffent  to 
fuch  Proportions  is  honour'd  with  the  Name  of 
Knowledge. 

But  when  there  is  any  Obfcurity  upon  the  A- 
greement  or  Difagreement  of  the  Ideas,  fo  that 
the  Mind  does  not  clearly  perceive  it,  and  is  not 
Gompeird  to  affent  or  diflcnt,  then  the  Propor- 
tion, in  a  proper  and  philofophical  Scnfe,  is  calPd 
doubtful  or  uncertain;  as,  the  Planets  are  inhabited^ 
the  Souls  of  Brutes  are  mere  Matter;  the  Woi'ld 
ivill  not  ftand  a  thoufand  Tears  longer  j  Dido  built 
the  City  of  Carthage,  ^c.  Such  uncertain  Pi-opo- 
Utions  are  call'd  Opinions, 

When  wc  confldcr  our  felvcs  as  Philofophers  or 
Searchers  of  Yruth^  it  would  be  well  if  we  always 
fufpended  a  full  Judgment  or  Determination  about 
any  thing,  and  made  farther  Inquiries,  where  this 
plain  and  perfe61:  Evidence  is  wanting  ;  but  we 
are  fo  prone  of  our  felves  to  judge  without  full 
Evidence,  and  in  fome  Cafes  the  Neceility  of 
Aclrion  in  the  Affairs  of  Life  conftrains  us  to  judge 
and  determine  upon  a  tolerable  Degree  of  Evi- 
dence, that  we   vulgarly  call  thofe  Propofitions 

**It  fnay  be  objefled,  that  this  Certainly  and  Uncertainty  being  onry  in  the 
Mindj  the  Divifion  belongs  to  Propofitions  rather  according  to  rhe  Degrees 
of  our  jijfent,  than  the  Degrees  of  Eviderut.  But  it  may  well  be  anfwered, 
that  the  Evidence  here  intended  is  that  which  appears  fo  to  the  Mind,  and 
rot  the  mere  Evidence  in  the  Kature  of  Thingi :  Befides  (as  we  fnall  Ihew 
immediately)  Tie  Degree  of  jljj'ent  ought  to  be  exaftly  proportionabl'"  to  the 
Degree  of  Evidence  i  and  therefore  the  Difference  is  not  great,  whether  Pro- 
pofitions be  cali'd  ({rf<n>j  or  umertain,  according  to  the  Meafare  of  Evidence, 
or  ef  AJfmt. 

certain^ 


176  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  il. 

certain^  where  we  have  but  very  Httle  Room  or 
Reafon  to  doubt  of  them,  tho'  the  Evidence  be 
not  compleat  and  rclilllefs. 

Certainty  according  to  the  Schools  is  diftinguifh- 
ed  into  Obje^iive  and  Subjective.  Obje^ive  Certainty  is 
when  the  Propofition  is  certainly  true  in  it  felfj 
and  Subjective^  when  we  are  certain  of  the  Truth 
of  it.  The  one  is  in  'Things^  the  other  is  in  our 
Minds. 

But  let  it  be  obferved  here,  that  every  Propofi- 
tion  in  itfelf  is  certainly  true  or  certainly  falfe.  For 
tho'  Doubtfulnefs  or  Uncertainty  feems  to  be  a  Me- 
dium between  certain  Truth  and  certain  Fallhood 
in  our  Minds,  yet  there  is  no  fuch  Medium  in 
Things  themfelvcs  j  no,  not  even  in  future  E- 
vents :  for  now  at  this  time  it  is  certain  in  itfelfj 
that  Mi dfuramer-D ay  fev en  Tears  hence  willbeferene^ 
or  it  is  certain  it  will  be  cloudy^  tho'  we  are  uncer-^ 
tain  and  utterly  ignorant  what  fort  of  Day  it  will 
be :  This  Certainty  of  diflant  Futurities  is  known 
to  God  only. 

Uncertain  or  dubious  Propofitions^  i.  e.  Opinions^ 
are  dillinguifh'd  into  probable  or  improbable. 

When  the  Evidence  of  any  Propoiltion  is  great- 
er than  the  Evidence  of  the  contrary,  then  it  is  a 
probable  Opinion:  Where  the  Evidence  and  Argu- 
ments are  Wronger  on  the  contrary  Side,  we  call 
it  improbable.  But  while  the  i\rguments  on  ei- 
ther Side  feem  to  be  equally  llrong,  and  the  Evi- 
dence for  and  againji  any  Propoiltion  appears 
equal  to  the  Mind,  then  in  common  Language  we 
call  it  a  doubtful  Matter.  We  alfo  call  it  a  dubi- 
ous or  doubtful  Propofition  when  there  are  no  Ar- 
guments on  cither  Side,  as  ne.'it  Chrijimas-Day 
'Will  be  a  very  parp  Frofi.  And  in  general  all  thcie 
Propofmons  are  doubtful^  wherein  we  can  per- 
ceive 


C.  II.  S.  9.  The  right  life  tf/Reafon.'         i  jy 

cti\t  no  fufficient  Marks  or  Evidences  of  Truth 
or  Faljhood.  In  fuch  a  Cafe  the  Mind  which  is 
learching  for  Truth  ought  to  remain  in  a  State 
of  Doubt  and  Sufpcnce^  until  fuperior  Evidence  on 
one  Side  or  the  other  inchne  the  Balance  of  the 
Judgment,  and  determine  the  Probability  or  Cer- 
tainty to  one  Side. 

A  great  many  Propofitions  which  we  generally 
believe  or  disbelieve  in  human  Affairs  or  in  the 
Sciences  have  very  various  Degrees  of  Evidence, 
which  yet  arife  not  to  compleat  Certainty  either 
of  Truth  or  Falfhood.  Thus  it  comes  to  pals 
that  there  are  fuch  various  and  almoft  infinite  De- 
grees of  Probability  and  Improbability.  To  a  weak 
Probability  we  fhould  give  a  weak  Jljfent^  and  a 
Jironger  AJfent  is  due  where  the  Evidence  is  great- 
er^ and  the  Matter  more  probable.  If  we  propor- 
tion our  AJfent  in  all  Things  to  the  Degree  of  Evi- 
dence^ we  do  the  utmoll  that  human  Nature  is 
capable  of  in  a  rational  Way  to  fccurc  it  felf  from 
Error. 

Sect.    IX. 

Of  Senfe^  Confcioufnefs^  Intelligence^  Reafon^  Faith 
and  bifpiration. 

AFTER  we  have  conflder'd  the  Evidence  of 
Propofitions  in  the  various  Degrees  of  it, 
we  come  to  furvey  the  fever al  Kinds  of  Evidence^ 
or  the  different  Ways  whereby  Truth  is  let  into 
the  Mind,  and  which  produce  accordingly  feveral 
kinds  of  Knowledge.  We  fhall  diftributc  them 
into  thefe  fix  (^'iz.)  Senfe^  Confcioufnefs^  Intelli- 
gence^ Reafon^  Faith  and  Infpiration^  and  then  di- 
ftinguiih  the  Propofitions  which  are  derived  from 
them. 

N  I.  The 


178  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or]      Part  m 

I.  The  E'uidence  of  Senfe  is  when  we  frame  a 
Propofition  accordmg  to  the  Dictate  of  any  of 
our  Senfes  5  fo  we  judge  that  Grafs  is  green ;  that 
a  Trumpet  gives  a  pkafant  Sound;  the  Fire  burns 
Wood',  Water  is  foft^  and  Iron  is  hard;  for  we 
have  feen,  heard  or  felt  all  thefe.  It  is  upon  this 
Evidence  of  Senfe  that  we  know  and  beUeve  the 
daily  Occurrences  in  human  Life  3  and  almoft  all 
the  Hillories  of  Mankind  that  are  written  by 
Eye  or  Ear-Witncfles  are  built  upon  this  Prin- 
ciple. 

Under  the  Evidence  of  Senfe  we  don't  only  in- 
clude that  Knowledge  which  is  derived  to  us  by 
our  outward  Senfes  of  Hearings  Seeing^  Feelings 
Tafting  and  Smelling^  but  that  alfo  which  is  de- 
riv'd  from  the  inward  Senfations  and  Appetites 
of  Hunger^  Ttbirfi^  Eafe^  Pkaftwey  Pain^  Weari- 
nefi^  Reft^  6cc.  and  all  thofe  Things  which  belong 
to  the  Bodyj  as  Hunger  is  a  painful  Appetite^  Light 
is  pleafant :  Reft  is  fweet  to  the  weary  Limbs. 

Proportions  which  are  built  on  this  Evidence 
may  be  n^mcdfenfibk  Propofttions,  or  the  Dilates 
of  Senfe. 

II.  As  we  learn  what  belongs  to  the  Body  by 

the  Evidence  of  Senfe^  fo  we  learn  what  belongs 
to  the  Soul  by  an  inward  Confciaufnefs,  which 
may  be  call'd  a  fort  of  internal  Feeling,  or  fpiri- 
tual  Senliition  of  what  pafles  in  the  Mind ;  as,  / 
think  before  I  fpcak ;  1  defire  large  Knowledge  ;  I 
I  fiifpcit  my  own  PraUice;  Iftudied  hard  to  Day; 
my  Confcience  bears  IVitnefs  of  7ny  Sincerity  ;  my 
Soul  hates  vain  'Thoughts ;  Fear  is  an  uneafy  Paf- 
fion ;  long  Meditation  on  one  Thing  is  tirefome. 

I  Thus. 


C.  II.  S.  9.      The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.^     179 

Thus  it  appears  that  we  obtain  the  Knowledge 
of  a  Multitude  of  Propofitiom^  as  well  as  of  fingle 
Ideas  by  thofe  tAvo  Principles  oi  Senfation  and  Re- 
fleSlion :  One  of  them  is  a  fort  of  Confcioufnefs  of 
what  affefts  the  Body,  and  the  other  is  a  Confci- 
oufnefs of  what  paiTes  in  the  Mind. 

Propofitions  which  are  built  on  this  internal 
Confcioufnefs^  have  yet  no  particular  or  diftinguifh- 
ing  Name  aflign'd  to  them. 

III.  Intelligence  relates  chiefly  to  thofe  abflraft- 
ed  Propofitions  which  carry  their  own  Evidence 
with  them,  and  admit  no  Doubt  about  them. 
Our  Perception  of  this  Self-E\:idence  in  any  Pro- 
pofition  is  call'd  Intelligence.  It  is  our  Knowledge 
of  thofe  firil  Principles  of  Truth  which  are  (as  it 
were)  wrought  into  the  very  Nature  and  Make 
of  our  Minds  :  They  are  fo  evident  in  them- 
felves  to  every  Man  who  attends  to  them,  that 
they  need  no  Proof.  It  is  the  Prerogative  and 
peculiar  Excellence  of  thefe  Proportions,  that 
they  can  fcarce  ever  be  prov'd  or  denied ;  They 
cannot  eafily  be  prov'd,  bccaufc  there  is  no- 
thing fuppos'd  to  be  more  clear  or  certain,  from 
which  an  Argument  may  be  drawn  to  prove 
them.  They  cannot  well  be  denied,  becaufe 
their  own  Evidence  is  fo  bright  and  convincing, 
that  as  loon  as  the  Terms  are  underllood  the 
Mind  neceHarily  aflcnts :  Such  are  thefe.  What" 
foever  aileth  hath  a  Being ;  Nothing  has  no  Proper- 
ties ',  a  Part  is  lefs  than  the  Whole  5  Nothing  can 
be  the  Caufe  of  itfelf. 

Thefe  Propofitions  are  call'd  Axioms,  or  Max- 
jms,  or  firft  Principles ;  thefe  are  the  very  Founda- 
tions of  all  improv'd  Knowledge  and  Reafonings, 
and  on  this  Account  thefe  have  been  thought  to 
be  innate  Propofitions,  or  Truths  born  with  us. 

N  i  Some 


I80  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  II. 

Some  fuppofe  that  a  great  Part  of  the  Know- 
ledge of  Angels  and  human  Souls  in  the  feparate 
State  is  obtained  in  this  manner  (viz.)  by  fuch  an 
immediate  View  of  Things  in  their  own  Nature, 
which  is  call'd  Intuition. 

IV.  Reafoning  is  the  next  fort  of  Evidence,  and 
that  is  when  one  Truth  is  inferr'd  or  drawn  from 
others  by  natural  and  juft  Methods  of  Argument  j 
as,  if  there  be  much  Light  at  Midnight,  I  infer, 
it  proceeds  from  the  Moon^  becaufe  the  Sun  is  un- 
der the  Earth.  If  I  fee  a  Cottage  in  a  Foreft,  I 
conclude,  [ome  Man  has  been  there  and  built  it.  Or 
when  I  furvey  the  Heavens  and  Earth,  this  gives 
Evidence  to  my  Reafon,  that  there  is  a  God  who 
made  them. 

The  Propofitions  which  I  believe  upon  this 
kind  of  Evidence,  are  call'd  Condufions^  or  rati' 
onal  Truths^  and  the  Knowledge  that  we  gain  this 
Way  is  properly  call'd  Science. 

Yet  let  it  be  noted,  that  the  Word  Science  is 
ufually  applied  to  a  whole  Body  of  regular  or  me- 
thodical Obfervations  or  Propolitions  which  learn- 
ed Men  have  formed  concerning  any  Subie6t  of 
Speculation^  deriving  one  Truth  from  another  by 
a  Train  of  Arguments.  If  this  Knowledge  chief- 
ly dirc<5ts  our  Frallice^  it  is  ufually  call'd  an  ^rt : 
And  this  is  the  mod  remarkable  Diftinftion  ber 
tween  an  j^rt  and  a  Science^  (viz.)  the  one  refers 
chiefly  to  Pra^ice^  the  other  to  Speculation.  Na^ 
tural  Philofophy  or  Phyficks^  and  Ontology  are  Sci- 
ences^  Logic k  and  Rhetorick  are  call'd  Arts'^  but 
Mathematics  include  both  Art  and  Science  ;  for 
they  have  much  of  Speculation.^  and  much  of  Prac- 
tice in  them. 

Obferi'S 


C.  II.  S.  9.     I'he  right  life  of  Reafon.^     1 8  r 

Ohferve  here^  that  when  the  Evidence  of  a 
Propofition  deriv'd  from  Senfe^  Confcioiifnefs^  In- 
telUgence^  or  Reafon  is  firm  and  indubitable,  it  pro- 
duces fuch  an  AfTent  as  we  call  a  natural  Cer- 
tainty. 

V.  When  we  derive  the  Evidence  of  any  Pro- 
pofition from  the  'Teftimony  of  others,  it  is  call'd 
the  Evidence  of  Faith  5  and  this  is  a  large  Part  of 
our  Knowledge.  Ten  thouiand  Things  there  aie 
which  we  beUeve  merely  upon  the  Authority  or 
Credit  of  thofe  who  have  fpoken  or  written  of 
them.  It  is  by  this  Evidence  that  we  know  there 
is  fuch  a  Country  as  China,  and  there  ivas  fuch  a 
Man  as  Cicero  who  dwelt  in  Rome.  It  is  by  this 
that  moft  of  the  Tranfa6tions  in  human  Life  are 
managed:  We  know  our  Parents  and  our  Kin- 
dred by  this  Means,  we  know  the  Pcrfons  and 
Laws  of  our  prefent  Governors,  as  well  as  Things 
that  are  at  a  vafl:  Diftance  from  us  in  foreign  Na- 
tions, or  in  antient  Ages. 

According  as  the  Perfons  that  inform  us  of  any 
thing  are  many  or  few,  are  more  or  lefs  wife,  and 
faithful,  and  credible,  fo  our  Faith  is  more  or  lefs 
firm  or  wavering,  and  the  Propofition  believed  is 
either  certain  or  doubtful  j  but  in  Matters  of  Faith 
an  exceeding  great  Probability  is  call'd  a  moral 
Certainty. 

Faith  is  generally  diftinguiflied  into  Divine  and 
Human^  not  with  Regard  to  the  Propofitions  that 
are  believed,  but  with  Regard  to  the  Teftimony 
upon  which  we  beheve  them.  When  God  re- 
veals any  thing  to  us,  this  gives  us  the  Evidence 
of  Divine  Faith  5  but  what  Man  only  acquaints 
us  with  produces  a  human  Faith  in  us  j  the  one, 
being  built  upon  the  Word  of  Man,  arifcs  but  to 
moral  Certainty  >  but  the  other,  being  founded  on 

N  5  the 


1 82  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  II. 

the  Word  of  God,  arifes  to  an  abfolute  and  infal- 
lible A[jurame^  fo  far  as  we  underftand  the  Mean- 
ing of  his  Word.  This  is  c-aiiVdifHpernatural  Cef 
ta'mty. 

Proportions  which  we  beUeve  upon  the  Evi- 
dence of  human  Teftimony  are  call'd  Narratives^ 
Relations^  Reports^  Hijiorical  Ohfervations ^  6cc. 
but  fuch  as  are  built  on  Divine  Tefiimony  are  term- 
ed Matters  of  Revelation  -,  and  if  they  are  of  great 
Importance  in  Rehgion,  they  are  call'd  Articles  of 

Faith. 

There  are  fomePropofltions,  or  Parts  of  Know- 
ledge, which  are  faid  to  be  deriv'd  from  Ohferva- 
tion  and  Experience^  that  is.  Experience  in  our 
felves,  and  the  Obfervations  we  have  made  on  o- 
ther  Perfons  or  Things  5  but  thefe  are  made  up  of 
fome  of  the  former  Springs  of  Knowledge  join'd 
together  {viz)  Senfe^  Confcioufnefs^  Reafon^  Faith^ 
&c.  and  therefore  are  not  reckon'd  a  diflin<5t  kind 
of  Evidence. 

VL  Inspiration  is  a  fort  of  Evidence  diftincb 
from  all  the  former,  and  that  is,  when  fuch  an 
overpowering  Impreflion  of  any  Propolition  is 
made  upon  the  Mmd  by  God  himfelf,  that  gives 
a  convincing  and  indubitable  Evidence  of  the 
Truth  and  Divinity  of  it :  So  were  the  Prophets 
and  the  Jpojlles  infpir'd  *. 

Sometimes  God  may  have  been  pleafed  to  make 
ufe  of  the  outward  Senfes,  or  the  inward  Work- 
ings of  the  Imagmation,  of  Dreams,  Apparitions, 
Vifions  and  Voices,  of  Reaibning,  or  perhaps  hu- 
man Narration,  to  convey  divine  Truths  to  the 
Mind  of  the  Prophet  -,  but  none  of  thefe  would 
be  fufficient  to  dcferve  the  Name  of  Infpiration, 

*  Note  here,  1  fpeak  chiefly  of  the  hJghefl  Kind  of  Infpiration. 

without 


C.  11.  S.  9.      The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     1 8  s 

without  a  fuperior  divine  Light  and  Power  at- 
tending them. 

This  fort  of  Evidence  is  alfo  very  diftinft  from 
what  we  ufually  call  Divine  Faith  3  for  every  com- 
mon Chriftian  cxercifes  Divine  Faith  when  he  be- 
lieves any  Propolition  which  God  has  revealed  in 
the  Bible  upon  this  Account,  becaufe  God  has  [aid 
it^  tho'  it  was  by  a  Train  of  Reafonings  that  he 
was  led  to  believe  that  this  is  the  Word  of  God : 
Whereas  in  the  Cafe  of  Infpiration^  the  Prophet 
not  only  exercifes  Divine  Faith  in  believing  what 
God  reveals,  but  he  is  under  a  fuperior  heavenly 
Impreflion,  Light  and  Evidence,  whereby  he  is 
alTured  that  God  reveals  it.  This  is  the  mofl  e- 
minent  Icind  o^  fupernatural  Certainty. 

Tho'  Pcrfons  might  be  afllired  of  their  own 
Infpiration  by  fome  peculiar  and  inexprejjible  Con- 
fcioufnefs  of  this  divine  Impreflion  and  Evidence 
in  their  own  Spirits,  yet  it  is  hard  to  make  out 
this  Infpiration  to  others,  and  to  convince  them 
of  it,  except  by  fome  antecedent  or  confequent 
Prophecies  or  Miracles,  or  fome  publick  Appear- 
ances more  than  human. 

The  Propoiitions  which  are  attain'dby  this  fort 
of  Evidence  are  call'd  tnfpifd  'Truths.  This  is 
Divine  Revelation  at  firll  hand,  and  the  Di61:ates 
of  God  in  an  immediate  manner,  of  which  The- 
ological Writei's  difcoiTrfe  at  large;  but  fince  it 
belongs  only  to  a  few  Favourites  of  Heaven  to 
be  infpir'd,  and  not  the  Bulk  of  Mankind,  it  is 
not  neceflary  to  fpcak  more  of  it  in  a  Treatife  of 
Logick,  which  is  defign'd  for  the  general  Improve* 
ment  of  human  Reafon. 

The  various  kinds  of  Evidence,  upon  which  v/c 
Relieve  any  Propofition,  afford  us  thcfc  three  Ro- 
marks. 

N  4  I.  Remarks 


184  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,     Part II. 

I.  Remark.  The  fame  Propofition  may  be  known 
to  us  by  different  kinds  of  Evidence :  That  the 
whole  is  digger  than  a  fart  is  known  by  our  Senfes^ 
and  it  is  known  by  the  Self-Evidence  of  the  thing 
to  our  Mind.  ^7:7^3!/  God  created  the  Heavens  and 
the  Earth  is  known  to  us  by  Reafon^  and  is  known 
alfo  by  Divine  Tejlimony  or  Faith, 

IV"  Remark.  Among  thefe  various  Kinds  of 
Evidence,  fome  are  generally  ftronger  than  others 
in  their  own  Nature,  and  give  a  better  Ground 
for  Certainty.  Inward  Confcioufnefs  and  Intelli- 
gence^ as  well  as  Divine  Faith  and  Jnfpiration^  ufu- 
ally  carry  much  more  B'orce  with  them  than  Senfe 
or  human  Faith^  which  are  often  fallible  5  tho' 
there  aie  Inftances  wherein  human  Faith ^  Senfe 
and  Ri-afoning  lay  a  Foundation  alfo  for  compleat 
Aflurancc,  and  leave  no  room  for  Doubt. 

Reafon  hi  its  own  Nature  would  always  lead  us 
into  the  Truth  in  Matters  within  its  Compafs,  if 
it  were  us'd  aright,  or  it  would  require  us  to  fuf- 
pend  our  Judgment  where  there  is  want  of  Evi- 
dence. But  it  is  our  Sloth^  Precipitancy^  Senfe^ 
Pafjion^  and  many  other  Things  that  lead  our 
Reafon  aftray  in  this  degenerate  and  imperfe6t 
Eflate:  Hence  it  comes  to  pafs  that  we  are  guilty 
of  fo  many  Errors  in  Reafoning^  efpecially  about 
divine  Things,  becaufe  our  Reafon  either  is  buly 
to  enquire,  and  refolv'd  to  determine  about  Mat- 
ters that  are  above  our  prcfent  Reach  3  or  becaufe 
we  mingle  many  Prejudices  and  fecret  Influences 
of  Senfe ^  Fancy .^  Paffwn^  Inclination^  6cc.  with 
our  Exercifes  of  Reafon^  and  judge  and  determine 
according  to  thefe  irregular  Influences. 

Divine 


C.  II.  S.  9'.    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.       1 8  5 

Divine  Faith  would  never  admit  of  any  Con- 
troverfies  or  Doubtings,  if  we  were  but  aflur'd 
that  God  had  fpoken,  and  that  we  rightly  under- 
ilood  his  Meaning. 

III'^  Remark.  The  greateft  Evidence  and  Cer- 
tainty of  any  Propofition  does  not  depend  up- 
on the  Variety  of  the  Ways  or  Kinds  of  Evi- 
dence, whereby  it  is  known,  but  rather  upon 
the  Strength  and  Degree  of  Evidence,  and  the 
Clearnefs  of  that  Light  in  or  by  which  it  appears 
to  the  Mind.  For  a  Propofition  that  is  known 
only  one  Way  may  be  much  more  certain,  and 
have  ftronger  Evidence  than  another  that  is  fup- 
pos'd  to  be  known  many  Ways.  Therefore  thcfe 
Propofitions,  Nothing  has  no  Properties^  Nothing 
can  make  itfelf^  which  are  known  only  by  Intelli- 
gence, are  much  furer  and  truer  than  this  Propo- 
fition, iToe  Rainbow  has  real  and  inherent  Colours  in. 
it,  or  than  this,  the  Sun  rolls  round  the  Earth ;  tho' 
we  feem  to  know  both  thefe  laft  by  our  Senfes, 
and  by  the  common  'Tejiimony  of  our  Neighbours. 
So  any  Propofition  that  is  clearly  evident  to  our 
own  Confcioufnefs  or  Divine  Faith,  is  much  more 
certain  to  us  than  a  thoufmd  others  that  have  on- 
ly the  Evidence  of  feeble  and  obfcure  Senfations^ 
of  mere  probable  Reafonings  and  doubtful  Argu- 
ments,  or  the  Witncfs  of  fillible  Men^  or  even 
the'  all  thefe  lliould  join  together. 


CHAP. 


186  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       PartIL 


CHAP.     III. 

The  Springs  of  falfe  Judgment,  or  the  T^oc- 
trine  of  Prejudices, 

Introduction. 

IN  the  End  of  the  foregoing  Chapter  we 
have  furvey'd  the  feveral  Sorts  of  Evidence^ 
on  which  wc  build  our  Aflent  to  Propofiti- 
ons:  Thefe  are  indeed  the  general  Grounds  up- 
on which  we  form  our  Judgments  concerning 
Things.  What  remains  in  this  fecond  Part  of  Lo~ 
gick  is  to  point  out  the  feveral  Springs  and  Caufes 
of  our  Mifiakes  in  judging,  and  to  lay  down  fome 
Rules  by  which  we  fhould  conduct  our  felves  in 
paffing  a  Judgment  of  every  thing  that  is  propo- 
fcd  to  us. 

I  confefs  many  Things  which  will  be  mention- 
ed in  thefe  following  Chapters  might  be  as  well 
referr'd  to  the  third  Part  of  Logick^  where  we 
ihall  treat  of  Rcafoning  and  Argument  j  for  moll 
oi  oiu  falfe  J udg?nents(ztm  to  include  a  fecret  bad 
Reafoning  in  them ;  and  while  we  ihew  the  Springs 
of  Error  J  and  the  Rules  of  true  Judgmentj  we  do 
at  the  fame  time  difcover  which  Arguments  are 
fillacious,  which  Reafonings  are  weak,  and  which 
are  juft  and  ftrong.  Yet  fince  this  is  ufually  cal- 
led ^judging  ill  J  or  judging  well^  I  think  we  may 
without  any  Impropriety  treat  of  it  here  ;  and 
this  will  lay  a  furer  Foundation  for  all  forts  o£  Ra^ 
tiocination  and  Argument. 

Rafli  Judgments  are  call'd  Prejudices^  and  fo 
Are  the  Springs  of  them.  This  Word  in  com- 
mon Life  Cgnifics  an  ///  Opinion  which  we  have 

conceived 


cm.        The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^^orx.  1S7 

conceived  of  fomc  other  Perfon^  or  fome  Injury  done 
to  him.  Bur  when  we  life  the  Word  in  Matters 
of  Science,  it  fignifies  a  Judgment  that  is  formed 
concerning  any  Pcrfon  or  'Thing  before  fufficient  Exa- 
mination', and  generally  we  fuppofc  it  to  mean  a 
falfe  Judgment  or  Miftake :  At  lead,  it  is  an  Opi- 
nion taken  up  without  folid  Reafon  for  it,  or  an 
Aflent  given  to  a  Propolition  before  we  have  jull 
Evidence  of  the  Truth  of  it,  tho'  the  thing  itfelf 
may  happen  to  be  true. 

Sometimes  thefe  radi  Judgments  are  call'd  Pre- 
pojfejjions^  whereby  is  meant,  that  fome  particular 
Opinion  has  poflefTed  the  Mind,  and  engag'd  the 
AfTent  without  fufficient  Search  or  Evidence  of 
the  Ti-uth  of  it. 

There  is  a  vaft  Variety  of  thefe  Prejudices  and 
Prepoffeffions  which  attend  Mankind  in  every  Age 
and  Condition  of  Life  >  they  lay  the  Foundations 
of  many  an  Error,  and  many  an  unhappy  Pradice, 
both  in  the  Affairs  of  Religion,  and  in  our  civil 
Concernments,  as  well  as  in  Matters  of  Learning. 
It  is  neceflary  for  a  Man  who  purfues  Truth  to 
enquire  into  thefe  Springs  of  Error^  that  as  far  as 
pofTible  he  may  rid  himielf  of  old  Prejudices^  and 
watch  hourly  againil:  ne-iv  ones. 

The  Number  of  them  is  fo  great,  and  thcv  are 
fo  interwoven  with  each  other,  as  well  as  with 
the  Powers  of  human  Nature,  that  it  is  fometimes 
hard  to  difuinguifh  them  apart  j  yet  for  Method 
Sake  we  fhall  reduce  them  to  thefe  four  general 
Heads,  {liz.)  Prejudices  ariling  from  Things^  or 
from  Words ^  from  ourfehes^  or  from  other  Perfons ; 
and  after  the  Defcription  of  each  Prejudice^  we 
ihall  propofe  one  or  more  Ways  of  curing  it. 


Se 


cr. 


188  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Part II. 

Sect.     I. 

Prejudices  arijing  from  1'hings. 

THE  firji  fort  of  Prejudices  are  thofe  which  a- 
rife  from  the  things  themfelves  about  which 
ive  judge.  But  here  let  it  be  obferved  that  there 
is  nothing  in  the  Nature  of  things  that  will  necef- 
farily  lead  us  into  Error,  if  we  do  but  ufe  our 
Reafon  aright,  and  withhold  our  Judgment  till 
there  appear  fufficient  Evidence  of  Truth.  But 
fince  we  are  fo  unhappily  prone  to  take  Advan- 
tage of  every  doubtful  Appearance  and  Circum- 
ftance  of  Things  to  form  a  wrong  Judgment,  and 
plunge  our  felves  into  Miftake,  therefore  it  is  pro- 
per to  confider  what  there  is  in  the  1'hings  them" 
felves  that  may  occafion  our  Errors. 

I.  The  Ohfcurity  of  fome  Truths^  and  the  Diffi'-. 
cuJty  of fearching  them  out^  is  one  Occafion  of  rafh 
and  miilaken  Judgment. 

Some  Truths  are  difficult  becaufe  they  lye  re- 
mote from  the  firll  Principles  of  Knowledge,  and 
want  a  long  Chain  of  Argument  to  come  at  them: 
Such  are  many  of  the  deep  Things  of  Algebra  and 
Geometry^  and  fome  of  the  Theorems  and  Pro- 
blems of  moll  Parts  of  the  Mathematics.  Many 
Things  alfo  in  natural  Philofophy  are  dark  and  in- 
tricate upon  this  Account,  becaufe  we  cannot 
come  at  any  certain  Knowledge  of  them  without 
the  Labour  of  many  and  difficult,  as  well  as  charge- 
able Experiments. 

There  are  other  Truths  which  have  gre^it  Dark^ 

nefs  upon  them,  becaufe  wc  have  no  proper  Means 

or  Mediums  to  come  at  the  Knowledge  of  them. 

Tho'  in  our  AgQ  we  have  found  out  many  of  the 

3  ^eep 


cm.  S.I.  The  right  Ufe  of  Kt2i{:oi\:  189 
deep  Things  of  Nature  by  the  Aflillance  of  Glaf- 
fes  and  other  Inllruments  j  yet  we  are  not  hither- 
to arrived  at  any  fufficient  Methods  to  difcover 
the  Shape  of  thoie  little  Particles  of  Matter  which 
diftinguilh.  the  various  Sapours^  Odours  and  Colours 
of  Bodies  J  nor  to  find  what  fort  of  Atoms  com- 
pofe  Liquids  or  Solids^  and  dilHnguifh  Wood^  Mi' 
nerals^  Metals^  Glafs^  St  one  ^  6cc.  There  is  a 
Darknefs  alfo  lies  upon  the  A<5tions  of  the  intellec- 
tual or  angelicalVJ^oxld ;  their  Manners  of  Sublift- 
ence  and  Agency,  the  Power  of  Spirits  to  move 
Bodies,  and  the  Union  of  our  Souls  with  this  ani- 
mal Body  of  ours  are  much  unknown  to  us  on 
this  Account. 

Now  in  many  of  thefe  Cafes  a  great  part  of 
Mankind  is  not  content  to  be  entirely  ignorant ; 
but  they  rather  choofe  to  form  rafh  and  hafty 
Judgments,  to  guefs  at  Things  without  juil  Evi- 
dence, to  believe  fomething  concerning  them  be- 
fore they  can  know  them,  and  thereby  they  fall 
into  Error. 

This  fort  of  Prejudice^  as  well  as  moft  others, 
is  cured  by  Patience  and  Diligence^  in  Inquiry  and 
Reafoning^  and  a  Sufpenfion  of  "Judgment  till  wc 
have  attain'd  fome  proper  Mediums  of  Know- 
ledge, and  till  we  fee  fufficient  Evidence  of  the 
Truth. 

II.  The  appearance  of  'Things  in  a  Difguife  is 
another  Spring  of  Prejudice  or  rafh  Judgment. 
The  Outfide  of  Things  which  firll  Itrikes  us  is 
oftentimes  different  from  their  mward  Nature, 
and  we  are  tempted  to  judge  fuddenly  according 
to  outward  iVppearances.  If  a  Pi^ure  is  daub'd 
with  many  bright  and  glaring  Colours,  the  vul- 
gar Eye  admires  it  as  an  excellent  Piece  j  whereas 
the  fame  Perion  judges  veiy  contemptuoufly  of 

tbmc 


190  LOGIC  K:  Or,       PaftIL 

fome  admirable  Defign  sketch'd  out  only  with  a 
black  Pencil  on  a  coarfe  Paper,  tho'  by  the  Hand 
of  Raphael.  So  the  Scholar  fpies  the  Name  of  a 
new  Book  in  a  publick  News-Paper,  he  is  charm- 
ed with  the  Title,  he  purchafes,  he  reads  with 
huge  Expectations,  and  finds  it  all  Trafh  and  Im- 
pertinence: This  is  a  Prejudice  deriv'd  from  the 
Appearance  j  we  are  too  ready  to  judge  that  Vo- 
lume valuable  which  had  fo  good  a  Frontifpiece. 
The  large  Heap  o't  Encomiums  and  fwelling  Words 
of  AiTurance  that  are  bellowed  on  ^ack-Medi-' 
cines  in  publick  Advertifements  tempt  many  a 
Reader  to  judge  them  infallible,  and  to  ufe  the 
Pills  or  the  Plaifter  with  vaft  Hope  and  frequent 
Difappointment. 

We  are  tempted  to  form  our  Judgment  of  Per- 
fons  as  well  as  nings  by  thefe  outward  appearan- 
ces. Where  there  is  fVe ah h^  Equipage  and  SplendoVy 
we  are  ready  to  call  that  Man  happy.^  but  we  fee 
not  the  vexing  Difquietudes  of  his  Soul:  And 
when  we  fpy  a  Pcrfon  in  ragged  Garments^  we 
form  a  defpicable  Opinion  of  him  too  fuddenly, 
we  can  hardly  think  him  either  happy  or  wife,  our 
Judgment  is  fo  Itrangcly  biafs'd  by  outward  and 
fenliblc  Things.  It  v/as  thro'  the  Power  of  this 
Prejudice  that  the  Jezvs  rejcfted  our  bleflcd  Savi- 
our 3  they  could  not  fuffer  themfelves  to  believe 
that  the  Man  who  appear'd  as  the  Son  of  a  Car- 
penter was  alio  the  Son  of  God.  And  becaufe  St. 
Paul  was  of  a  little  Starure,  a  mean  Prefencc,  and 
Iiis  Voice  contemptible,  (ome  of  the  Corinthians 
vv^ere tempted  to  doubt  whether  he  were  infpired 
or  no.  This  Prejudice  is  cur'd  by  a  longer  Ac- 
quaintance  with  the  IVorld^  and  a  jufi  Obfervation 
that  Things  are  fometiynes  better  and  fometirnes  worfs 
than  they  appear  fo  be.  We  ought  therefore  to 
reltrain  our  exceHive  Forwardnefs  to  form  our  O- 

pinioii 


C.  III.  S.  I  ^    The  right  life  of  Reafonr     1 91 

pinion  of  Perfons  or  Things  before  we  have  Op- 
portunity to  fearch  into  them  more  perfeftly. 
Remember  that  a  grey  Beard  does  not  make  a  Phi' 
lofopher  5  all  is  not  Gold  that  glijiers ;  and  a  rough 
Diamond  may  be  worth  an  immenfe  Sum. 

III.  A  Mixture  of  different  Qualities  in  the  fame 
thing  is  another  Temptation  to  j  udge  amifs.  We 
are  ready  to  be  carried  away  by  that  QuaHty  which 
ftrikes  the  firft  or  the  Jlrongefi  Impreffions  upon  us, 
and  we  judge  of  the  whole  Obje61:  according  to 
that  QuaHty,  regardlefs  of  all  the  rell ;  or  fome- 
times  we  colour  over  all  the  other  Qiialities  with 
that  one  Tincture,  whether  it  be  bad  or  good. 

When  we  have  juft  Reafon  to  admire  a  Man 
for  his  Virtues^  we  are  fometimes  inclin'd  not  on- 
ly to  negle6t  his  WeakneJJ'es.^  but  even  to  put  a 
good  Colour  upon  them,  and  to  think  them  ami- 
able. When  we  read  a  Book  that  has  many  ex- 
cellent Truths  in  it  and  Divine  Sentiments,  we 
are  tempted  to  approve  not  only  that  whole  Book, 
but  even  all  the  Writings  of  that  Author.  When 
a  Poet^  an  Orator  or  a  Painter  has  perform 'd  ad- 
mirably in  feveral  illuftrious  Pieces,  we  fometimes 
alfo  admire  his  very  Errors,  we  miftake  his  Blun- 
ders for  Beauties,  and  are  fo  ignorantly  fond  as  to 
copy  after  them. 

It  is  this  Prejudice  that  has  rendered  fo  many 
great  Scholars  perfect  Bigots^  and  inclin'd  them 
to  defend  Homer  or  Horace^  Livy  or  Cicero.^  in  all 
their  Mi  (lakes,  and  vindicate  all  the  Follies  of 
their  favourite  Author.  It  is  this  that  tempts  fome 
great  Writers  to  fupport  the  Savings  of  almoft  all 
the  ancient  Fathers  of  the  Churchy^nd  admire  them 
even  in  their  very  Reveries, 

OO: 


192  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  11. 

On  the.  other  hand,  if  an  Author  has  profefs'd 
heretical  Sentiments  in  Religion,  wc  throw  our 
Scorn  upon  every  thing  he  writes,  we  defpife  e- 
ven  his  critical  or  mathematical  Learning,  and  will 
hardly  allow  him  common  Senfe.  If  a  Poem  has 
fome  Blemifhes  in  it,  there  is  a  Set  of  falfe  Cri- 
ticks  who  decry  it  univerfally,  and  will  allow  no 
Beauties  there. 

This  fort  of  Prejudice  is  relieved  by  learning  to 
diftinguiilr  Things  well,  and  not  to  judge  in  the 
Lump.  There  is  fcarce  any  Thing  in  the  World 
of  Nature  or  Art,  in  the  World  of  Morality  or 
Religion,  that  is  perfectly  uniform.  There  is  a 
Mixture  of  Wifdom  and  Folly,  Vice  and  Virtue, 
Good  and  Evil,  both  in  Men  and  Things.  We 
fhould  remember  that  fome  Perfons  have  great  IVit 
and  little  Judgment  -,  others  are  judicious,  but  not 
witty.  Some  are  good  humour'' d  ivithout  Compli^ 
went  j  others  have  all  the  Formalities  of  Complai- 
fance,but  no  good  Humour.  We  ought  to  know 
that  one  Man  may  be  vicious  and  learned^  while 
another  has  Virtue  without  Learning :  That  ma- 
ny a  Man  thinks  admirably  well  who  has  2.  poor 
Utterance  5  while  others  have  a  charming  manner 
of  Speech,  but  their  Thoughts  are  trifling  and 
impertinent.  Some  arc  good  Neighbours j2.nd  cour- 
teous and  charitable  toward  Men  who  have  no 
Piety  toivard  Gody  others  are  truly  religious,  but 
of  a  morofe  natural  Temper.  Some  excellent  Say- 
ings are  found  in  very  Jilly  Books^  and  fome  filly 
Thoughts  appear  in  Books  of  Value.  We  fhould 
neither  praife  nor  difpraife  by  Wholefale^  but  fepa- 
rate  the  Good  from  the  Evil,  and  judge  of  them 
apart :  The  Accuracy  of  a  good  Judgment  con- 
iills  much  in  making  fuch  Diltindions. 

Yet 


C.  III.  S.  I .  The  right  life  ^j/Rcafonr        193 

Yet  let  it  be  noted  too,  that  in  common  Dif- 
couife  we  ufuafly  denominate  Perfons  and  Things 
according  to  the  major  Part  of  their  Character. 
He  is  to  be  call'd  a  wife  Man  who  has  but  few 
Follies :  He  is  a  good PJoilofopher  who  knows  much 
of  Nature,  and  for  the  moll  Part  reafons  well  in 
Matters  of  human  Science :  And  that  Book  fhould 
be  elleem'd  ivell  ivrittcri^  which  has  much  more 
of  good  Senfe  in  it  than  it  has  of  Impertinence. 

IV.  Tho'  a  Thing  be  uniform  in  its  own  Na- 
ture, yet  the  different  Lights  in  which  it  fnay  be 
-placed^  and  the  different  Views  in  which  it  appears 
to  us^  will  be  ready  to  excite  in  us  millaken  Judg- 
ments concerning  it.     Let  an  zxz^Conc  be  placed 
in  a  horizontal  Plane,  at  a  great  DilVance  from 
the  Eye,  and  it  appears  a  plain  Triangle -,  but  we 
fhall  judge  that  very  Cone  to  be  nothing  but  -xflat 
Circle^  if  its  Bafe  be  obvertcd  towards  us.     Set  a 
common  round  Plate  a  little  obliquely   before   our 
Eye,  and  we  fhall  think  it  an  oz-al  Figure  j  but  if 
the  very  Edge  of  it  be  turned  toward  us,  we  fhall 
take  it  for  a  ftrait  Line :  So  when  we  view  the 
feveral  Folds  of  a  changeable  Silky  wc  pronounce 
this  Part  redj  and  that  yellow^  becaufe  of  its  dif- 
ferent Polition  to  the  Light,  tho'  the  Silk  laid 
fmoctfh   in  one  Light    appears  all   of  one   Co- 
lour. 

When  we  furvey  the  Miferies  of  Mankind,  and 
think  of  the  Sorrows  of  Millions,  both  on  Earth 
and  in  Hell,  the  Divine  Government  has  a  terrible 
Afpe^y  and  we  may  be  tempted  to  think  hardly- 
even  of  God  himfelf:  But  if  we  view  the  Profu- 
iion  of  his  Bounty  and  Grace  amongil  his  Crea- 
tures on  Earth,  or  the  happy  Spirits  in  Heaven, 
we  fhall  have  fo  exalted  an  idea  of  his  Goodnefs  as 
to  forget  his  Vengeance.     Some  Men  dwell  en- 

O  tirely 


194  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  IL 

tirely  upon  the  Promifes  of  his  Gofpel,  and  think 
him  all  i^i^r^j-j  Others,  under  a  melancholy  Frame, 
dwell  upon  his  Terrors  and  his  Threatnings,  and 
are  overwhelmed  with  the  Thought  of  his  Seve- 
rity and  Vengeance^  as  tho'  there  were  no  Mercy 
in  him. 

The  true  Method  of  delivering  ourfelves  from 
this  Prejudice  is  to  compare  all  the  various  Ap- 
pearances of  the  fame  thing  with  one  another,  and 
let  each  of  them  have  its  full  Weight  in  the  Ba- 
lance of  our  Judgment,  before  we  fully  determine 
our  Opinion.  It  was  by  this  Means  that  the  mo- 
dern A  ilronomers  came  to  find  out  that  the  Planet 
Saturn  hath  a  flat  broad  Circle  round  its  GlohCy 
which  is  call'd  its  Ring^  by  obferving  the  differ- 
ent Appearances,  as  a  narrow^  or  a  broader  OvaJ^ 
or  as  it  fometimes  feems  to  be  a  ftrait  Line^  in  the 
different  Parts  of  its  twenty  nine  Years  Revoluti- 
on thro'  the  Ecliptic.  And  if  we  take  the  fame 
jull  and  religious  Survey  of  the  great  and  blejfed 
God  in  all  the  Difcoveries  of  his  Vengeance  and 
his  Mercy,  we  fhall  at  laft  conclude  him  to  be 
both,  juft  and  good. 

V.  The  cafual  AJfociation  of  many  of  our  Ideas 
becomes  the  Spring  of  another  Prejudice  or  rafh 
Judgment,  to  which  we  are  fometimes  expos'd. 
If  in  our  younger  Years  we  have  taken  Medicines 
that  have  been  naufeous.,vjhcn  any  Medicine  what- 
foevcr  is  afterward  propos'd  to  us  under  Sickneis, 
we  immediately  judge  it  naufeous:  Our  Fancy  has 
fo  clofely  join'd  thefe  Ideas  together,  that  we 
know  not  how  to  feparate  them :  Then  the  Sto- 
mach feels  the  Difguft,  and  perhaps  refufes  the 
only  Drug  that  can  preferve  Life,  So  a  Child 
who  has  been  let  Blood  joins  the  Ideas  of  Pain 
and  the  Surgeon  together,  and  he  hates  the  Sight 

of 


C.  III.  S.  2."     The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.'     195 

of  the  Surgeon^  becaufe  he  thinks  of  his  Pain : 
Or  if  he  has  drunk  a  hitter  Potion^  he  conceives 
a  bitter  Idea  of  the  Cup  which  held  it,  and  will 
drink  nothing  out  of  that  Cup. 

It  is  for  the  fame  Reafon  that  the  Bulk  of  the 
common  People  are  fo  fuperlfitioufly  fond  of  the 
Pfalms  tranflated  by  Hopkins  and  SternhoJd^  and 
think  them  ficrcd  and  divine,  becaufe  they  have 
been  now  for  more  than  an  hundred  Years  bound 
up  in  the  fame  Covers  with  our  Bibles. 

The  bell  Relief  againll  this  Prejudice  of  jijjo- 
ciation  is  to  confider,  whether  there  be  any  natu- 
ral and  ncceiTIuy  Connection  between  thofe  Ideas 
which  Fancy .^  Ciiftom^  or  Chance  hath  thus  join'd 
together:  And  if  Nature  has  not  join'd  them,  let 
our  Judgment  correct  the  Folly  of  our  Iraagmati- 
on^  and  feparate  thefe  Ideas  again. 

Sect.     II. 

Prejudices  ariftngfrom  T-Vords. 

OUR  Ideas  and  Words  are  fo  linkt  together, 
that  while  we  judge  of  'things  according  to 
IVords^  we  are  led  into  feveral  Miltakes.  Thefe 
may  be  diftributed  under  two  general  Heads,  {viz.) 
Such  as  arife  from  fmgle  Words  or  Phrafes^  or  fuch 
as  arife  from  Words  join'd  in  Speech^  and  co/npoftng 
a  Difcourfe. 

I.  The  moft  eminent  and  remarkable  Errors  of 
the  firft  Kind,  are  thefe  three,  (i.)  When  pur 
Words  are  infignijicant^  and  have  no  Ideas  -,  as 
when  the  myllical  Divines  talk  of  the  Prayer  of 
.Silence^  the  fupernatural  and  paffive  Night  of  the 
Soul,  the  Facuity  of  Peivers,  the  Sufpenfon  of  ail 
^thoughts:  Or  (2.)  When  our  Words  are  eqiiivo- 

O  i  cal^ 


196  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part II. 

cal,  and  fignify  two  or  more  Ideas,  as  the  Words 
Law<y  Light  J  FleJJjy  Spirit^  Right  eoufmfs^  and  ma- 
ny other  Terms  in  Scripture:  Or  (3.)  When  two 
or  three  Words  are  fynonymous^  and  fignify  one 
Idea,  as  Regeneration  and  new  Creation  in  the  new 
Tcllament  •■,  both  which  mean  only  a  Change  of 
Heart  from  Sin  to  Holinefs  -,  or  as  the  Elector  of 
Cologne  and  the  BifJjop  of  Cologne  are  two  Titles 
of  the  iame  Man. 

Thefe  kinds  of  Phrafes  are  the  Occafions  of 
various  Tvliftakesj  but  none  fo  unhappy  as  thofe 
in  'Theology:  For  both  Words  without  Ideas^  as 
well  as  fynonymous  and  equivocal  Words^  have  been 
us'd  and  abus'd  bv  the  Humours,  Paflions,  Inte- 
vells,  or  by  the  real  Ignorance  and  Weaknefs  of 
Men  to  beget ,  terrible  Contefls  among  Chri- 
Itians. 

But  to  relieve  us  under  all  thofe  Dangers,  and 
to  remove  thefe  forts  of  Prejudices  which  arife 
from  fngle  Words  or  Phrafes^  1  mufl  remit  the 
Reader  to  Part  I.  Chap.  4.  where  I  have  treated 
about  Words,)  and  to  thofe  Dire^ions  which  I 
have  given  concerning  the  Definition  of  Names^ 
Part  I.  Chap.  6.  Se^.  3. 

11.  There  is  another  fort  of  falfe  Judgments  or 
Miihkes  which  we  arc  expos'd  to  by  Words;  and 
that  is,  when  tliey  are  join'd  in  Speech^  and  com- 
pofe  a  Dlfcourfc  3  and  here  we  are  in  Danger  two 
Ways. 

The  one  is,  when  a  Man  writes  good  Senfe,  or 
fpeaks  much  to  the  Purpofe,  but  he  has  not  a 
happy  and  engaging  manner  of  Expreflion.  Per- 
haps he  ufcs  coarfe  and  vulgar  Words,  or  old,  ob- 
folcte,  and  unfafliionable  Language,  or  Terms 
and  Plirafes  that  are  foreign,  latiniz'd,  fcholaftick, 
very  uncommon,  and  hard  to  be  underftood  ;  And 

this 


C.  in.  S.  2.   The  right  Ufe  ^Reafoii.     197 

this  is  ftill  worfe,  if  his  Sentences  are  long  and 
intricate,  or  the  Sound  of  them  harjfh  and  grat- 
ing to  the  Ear.  All  thefe  indeed  are  Defects  in 
Style^  and  lead  fome  nice  and  unthinking  Hearers 
or  Readers  into  an  ill  Opinion  of  all  that  fuch  a 
Perfon  fpeaks  or  writes.  Alany  an  excellent  Dif- 
courfe  of  our  Forefathers  has  had  Abundance  of 
Contempt  call  upon  it  by  our  modern  Pretenders 
to  Senfe,  for  want  of  their  diftinguiiliing  between 
the  Language  and  the  Ideas. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  a  Man  of  Eloquence 
fpeaks  or  writes  upon  any  Subject,  we  are  too 
ready  to  run  into  his  Sentiments,  being  fweetly 
and  infenfibly  drawn  by  the  Smoothnefs  of  his 
Harangue,  and  the  pathetic  Power  of  his  Lan- 
guage. B-hetorick  will  varnifh  every  Error  that  it 
inall  appear  in  the  Drefs  of  Truths  and  put  fuch 
Ornaments  upon  Vice  as  to  make  it  look  like  Vir- 
tue :  It  is  an  Art  of  wondrous  and  extcnfive  In- 
fluence jit  often  conceals,  obfcurcs  or  overwhelms 
the  Truth,  and  places  fometimes  a  grofs  FalHiood 
in  a  moil  alluring  Light.  The  Decency  of  Ac- 
tion, the  Mufick  of  the  Voice,  the  Harmony  of  the 
Periods,  the  Beauty  of  the  Stile,  and  all  the  en- 
gaging Airs  of  the  Speaker,  have  often  charm'd 
the  Hearers  into  Error,  and  perfuadcd  tliem  to 
approve  whatfoever  is  propos'd  in  fo  agreeable  a 
manner.  A  lai'ge  AfTembly  flands  expos'd  at  once 
to  the  Power  of  thefe  Prejudices,  and  imbibes 
them  all.  So  Cicero  and  Demoflhenes  made  the 
Romans  and  the  Athenians  believe  almoft  whatfo- 
ever they  pleafed. 

The  belt  Defence  againft  both  thefe  Dangers 
is  to  learn  the  Skill  (as  much  as  poflible)  oi  fcpa- 
rating  our  'thoughts  and  Ideas  from  J Vords  and  P  bra- 
fes,  to  judge  of  Things  in  their  own  Natures, 
and  in  their  natural  or  juft  Relation  to  one  an- 

O  3  other. 


19S  LOGIC  K:  Or,        Part  II. 

ther,  abi1:ra6ted  from  the  Ufe  of  Language,  and 
to  maintain  a  fleady  and  obftinate  Refolution  to 
hearken  to  nothing  but  Truth,  in  whatfoevcr 
Style  or  Drcfs  it  appears. 

Then  we  fhall  hear  a  Sermon  of  pious  and  jufl 
Sentiments  with  Efteem  and  Reverence,  tho'  the 
Preacher  has  but  an  unpohfh'd  Style,  and  many 
Defe6ts  in  the  manner  of  his  Deliveiy.  Then 
we  Ihall  negle6t  and  difregard  all  the  flattering  In- 
finuations  whereby  the  Orator  would  make  Way 
for  his  own  Sentiments  to  take  PofTeflion  of  our 
Souls,  if  he  has  not  folid  and  inftructive  Senfe  e- 
qual  to  his  Language.  Oratory  is  a  happy  Talent 
when  it  is  rightly  employed  to  excite  the  Paflions 
to  the  Practice  of  Virtue  and  Piety ;  but  to  fpeak 
properly,  this  Jrt  has  nothing  to  do  in  the  Search 
after  'truth. 

Sect.     III. 

Prejudices  arijing  from  ourfehes. 

N  Either  Words  nor  Things  would  fo  often  lead 
us  aftray  from  Truth,  if  we  had  not  with- 
in our  felves  fuch  Springs  of  Error  as  thefe  that 
follow. 

I.  Many  Errors  are  derived  from  our  Weaknefs 
of  Reafon^  and  Incapacity  to  judge  of  Things  in  our 
infant  State.  Thefe  are  call'd  the  Prejudices  of 
Infancy.  We  frame  early  Miflakes  about  the 
common  Objects  which  furround  us,  and  the  com- 
mon Affairs  of  Life :  We  fancy  the  Nurfe  is  our 
befl  Friend.^  becaufe  Children  receive  from  their 
Nurfes  their  Food  and  other  Conveniencies  of 
Life.  Wc;  judge  that  Books  are  "very  unpleafant 
Things'.y  becaufe  perhaps  we  have  been  driven  to 

them 


C .  III.  S.  3 :     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:     1 9  9 

them  by  the  Scourge.  We  judge  alfo  that  the 
Skie  touches  the  diftant  Hills^  becaufe  we  cannot 
inform  our  felves  better  in  Childhood.  We  be- 
lieve the  Stars  are  not  rifen  till  the  Sun  is  fet^  be- 
caufe  we  never  fee  them  by  Day.-  But  ibme  of 
thefe  Errors  may  feem  to  be  deriv'd  from  the  next 
Spring. 

The  Way  to  cure  the  Prejudices  of  Infancy  is 
to  diftinguiih,  as  far  as  we  can,  which  are  thofe 
Opinions  which  we  fram'd  in  perfe6t  Childhood, 
to  remember  that  at  that  Time  our  Reafon  was 
uncapable  of  forming  a  right  Judgment,  and  to 
bring  thcfe  Propofitions  again  to  be  examined  at 
the  Bar  of  maturer  Reafon. 

II.  Our  Senfcs  give  us  many  a  falfe  Informati- 
on of  Things,  and  tempt  us  to  judge  amifs.  This 
is  call'd  the  Prejudice  of  Senfe^  as  when  we  fup- 
pofe  the  Sun  and  Moon  to  be  Jlat  Bodies.^  and  to 
be  but  a  few  Inches  broad^  becaufe  they  appear  fo 
to  the  Eye.  Scnfe  incHnes  us  to  judge  that  Air 
has  no  Weighty  becaufe  we  don't  feel  it  prefs  hea- 
vy upon  us  5  and  we  judge  alfo  by  ourSenfes  that 
Cold  and  Heat^  Sweet  and  Sour^  Red  and  Blue^ 
Sec.  are  fuch  real  Properties  in  the  Objects  them- 
felvcs,  and  exactly  like  thofe  Senfations  which 
they  excite  in  us. 

Note  J  Thofe  Mi  flakes  of  this  fort  which  all 
Mankind  drop  and  lofe  in  their  advancing  Age  are 
call'd  meer  Prejudices  of  Infancy^  but  thofe  which 
abide  with  the  vulgar  Part  of  the  World,  and 
generally  with  all  Men,  till  Learning  and  Philo- 
fophy  cure  them,  more  properly  retain  the  Name 
of  Prejudices  of  Senfe. 

ThcCe  Prejudices ':iYe  to  be  remov'dfeveral  Ways, 
(i.)  By  the  Ailiftance  of  one  Scnfe  we  cure  the 
Miitakes  of  another,  as  when  a  Stick  thrufi  into 

O  4  tjje 


200  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,     Parti!, 

the  Pf^ater  feems  crooked^  we  are  prevented  from 
judging  it  to  be  really  lb  in  itCelf,  for  when  we 
take  it  out  of  the  fVater^  both  our  Sight  and  our 
Feeling  agree  and  determine  it  to  be  llrait.     (i.) 
The  Exercife  of  our  Reafon  and  an  Application 
to  mathematical  and   philofophical  Studies  cures 
many  other  Prejudices  of  Senje^  both  with  Rela- 
tion to  the /;<?^w;^/>' and  (?^r/Z?/}' Bodies.     (3.)  We 
ihould  remember  that  our  Senfes  have  often  de~ 
ceiv'd  us  in  various  Inltances,  that  they  give  but  ' 
a  confus'd  and  imperfcft  Reprefentation  of  things 
in  many  Cafes,   that   they  often  reprefent  falily 
thofe  very  Obje61:s  to  which  they  feem  to  be  fuit- 
ed,  fuch  as  the  Shape ^  Motion^  Size  and  Situation 
of  grofs  Bodies,  if  they  are  but  placed  at  a  Dif- 
tance  from  us ;  and  as  for  the  minute  Particles  of 
which  Bodies  are  compos'd,  our  Senfes   cannot 
diftinguilli  them.     (4.)  We  {hould  remember alfo 
that  one  prime  and  original  Defign  of  our  Senfes 
is  to  inform  us  what  various  Relations  the  Bodies 
that  are  round  about  us  bear  to  our  own  animal 
Body,  and  to  give  us  Notice  what  is  pleafant  and 
ufcful,  or  what  is  painful  and  injurious  to  us  >  but 
they  are  not  fuflicient  of  themfelves  to  lead  us  in- 
to a  philofophical  Acquaintance  with  the  inward 
Nature  of  Things.     It  mull  be  confefs'd  it  is  by 
the  AfCiH^dicc  of  the  Eye  and  the  Ear  efpecially 
(which  are  call'd  the  Senfes  of  DifcipUne)  that  our 
Minds  are  furnilh'd  with  various  Parts  of  Know- 
ledge, by  reading,  hearing,  and  obferving  Things 
divine  and  human  5  yet  Reafon  ought  always  to 
accompany  the  Exercife  of  our  Senfes  whenever 
we  would  form  a  juil  Judgment  of  Things  pro- 
pos'd  to  our  Enquiry. 

Here  it  is  proper  to  obferve  alfo,  that  as  the 
JVeaknefs  of  Reafon  in  our  infancy^  and  the  Die- 
fates  of  pur  Senfes  fomctimes  in  advancing  T'earsy 

lea(4 


C.  in.  S.  f.  The  right  Ufe  qJ  Reafon."      2QI 

lead  the  wifer  pan  of  Mankind  aftray  from  Truth  j 
fo  the  meaner  Pans  of  our  Species,  Perfons  whofe 
Genius  is  very  low,  whofe  Judgment  is  always 
weak,  who  arc  ever  indulging  the  Dictates  of 
Scnfe  and  Humour^  are  but  Children  of  a  larger 
Size }  they  Hand  expos'd  to  everlalling  MilLikes 
in  Life,  and  live  and  die  in  the  midft  of  Preju- 
dices. 

III.  Imagination  is  another   fruitful  Spring  of 
falfe  Judgments.     Our  Imagination  is  nothing  elie 
but  the  various  Appearances  of  our  fcnlible  Ideas 
in  the  Brain,  where  the  Soul  frequently  works  in 
uniting,  disjoining,  multiplying,  magnifying,  di- 
minifhing  and  altering  the  feveral  Shapes,  Colours, 
Spunds,  Motions,  Words  and  Things  that  have 
been  communicated  to  us  by  the  outward  Organs 
of  Senfe.     It  is  no  Wonder  therefore  if  Fancy 
lead  us  into  many  Miftakes,  for  it  is  but  Senfe  at 
fecond  Hand.     Whatever  is  llrongly  impreit  upon 
the  Imagination  fome  Perfons  believe  to  be  true. 
Some  will  choofe  a  particular  Number  in  a  Lot- 
teryy  or  lay  a  large  Wager  on  ^Jingle  Chance  of  a, 
Dye^  and  doubt   not    of  Succefs,    becaufe  their 
Fancy  feels  fo  powerful  an  Imprellion,  and  allures 
them  it  will  be  profperous.     A  thoufand  p-etended 
Propheftes  and  Infpirations^   and  all  the  Freaks  of 
Enthufiafm  have  been  derived  from  this  Spring. 
Dreams  are  nothing  elfe  but  the  Deceptions  of 
Fancy :  A  Delirium  is  but  a  fhort  Wildnefs  of  the 
Imagination  -,  and  a  fettled  Irregularity  of  Fancy 
is  DiflraHion  and  Madnefs. 

One  Way  to  gain  a  Victory  over  this  unruly 

Faculty,  is  to  fet  a  Watch  upon  it  perpetually, 

■  and  to  bridle  it  in  all  its  Extravagances  j  never  to 

believe  any  thing  merely  becaufe  Fancy  dictates  ir, 

any  more  than  1  would  believe  a  Midnight  Dream^ 

nor 


202  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Partli; 

nor  to  trufl  Fancy  any  farther  than  it  is  attended 
withy^':;^r^  Reafon.  It  is  a  very  ufeful  and  enter- 
taining Power  of  human  Nature  in  Matters  of 
Illuftration^  Perfuafion^  Oratory^  Poefy^  IVit^  Con- 
'verfation^  &c.but  in  the  calm  Enquiry  after  Truth 
and  final  Judgment  of  Things,  Fancy  fhould  re- 
tire, and  ftand  afide,  unlefs  it  be  call'd  in  to  ex- 
plain or  illuftrate  a  difficult  Point  by  a  Simi- 
litude. 

Another  Method  of  Deliverance  from  thefe 
Prejudices  of  Fancy^  is  to  compare  the  Ideas  that 
arife  in  our  Imaginations  with  the  real  Nature  of 
things,  as  often  as  we  have  Occafion  to  judge 
concerning  them  3  and  let  calm  and  fedate  Reajbn 
govern  and  determine  our  Opinions,  tho'  Fancy 
ihould  fhew  never  fo  great  a  Reluctance.  Fancy 
is  the  inferior  Faculty,  and  it  ought  to  obey. 

IV.  The  various  PaJJions  or  Affe^ions  of  the 
Mind  are  numerous  and  endlefs  Springs  of  Preju- 
dice. They  difguife  every  Obje6b  they  converfe 
with,  and  put  their  own  Colours  upon  it,  and 
thus  lead  the  Judgment  ailray  from  Truth.  It  is 
Love  that  makes  the  Mother  think  her  own  Child 
the  faireft,  and  will  fometimes  perfuade  us  that  a 
Blemiflj  is  a  Beauty.  Hope  and  Deftre  make  an 
Hour  of  Delay  feem  as  long  as  two  or  three 
Hours  5  Hope'mcMnzs  us  to  think  there  is  nothing 
too  difficult  to  be  attempted ;  Defpair  tells  us  that 
a  brave  Attempt  is  mere  Raflinefs,  and  that  every 
Difficulty  is  unfurmountable.  Fear  makes  us  i- 
magine  that  a  Bufh  fhaken  with  the  Wind  has 
Tome  favage  Beaft  in  it,  and  multiplies  the  Dan- 
gers that  attend  our  Path  :  But  IHU  there  is  a 
more  unhappy  Effe6l  of  Fear  when  it  keeps  Mil- 
lions of  Souls  in  Slavery  to  the  En-ors  of  an  efta- 
blifhed  Religion :  What  could  perfuade  the  wife 
4  Men 


C.  III.  S.  3 .    ^he  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.'      20  j 

Men  and  Philofophers  of  a  Popijh  Country  to  be- 
lieve the  grofs  Abfurdities  of  the  Roynan  Church, 
but  the  Fear  of  I'orture  or  Deaths  the  Galleys  or 
the  Inquifition  ?  Sorrow  and  Melancholy  tempt  us 
to  think  our  Circamftances  much  more  difmal 
than  they  are,  that  we  may  have  fome  Excufe  for 
Mourning :  and  Envy  reprcfents  the  Condition  of 
our  Neighbour  better  than  it  is,  that  there  might 
be  fome  Pretence  for  her  own  Vexation  and  Un- 
eafincfs.  dinger  and  JVrath  and  Revenge^  and  all 
thofe  hateful  PafHons  excite  in  us  far  worfe  Ideas 
of  Men  than  they  deferve,  and  perfuade  us  to  be- 
lieve all  that  is  ill  of  them.  A  Detail  of  the  evil  In- 
fluence of  the  Affections  of  the  Mind  upon  our 
Judgment  would  make  a  large  Volume. 

The  Cure  of  thefe  Prejudices  is  attain'd  by  a 
confbant  Jealoufy  of  our  fclves,  and  Watchfulncfs  o- 
ver  our  Pajjions^  that  they  may  never  interpofe  v/hcn 
we  are  call'd  to  pafs  a  Judgment  of  any  thing  : 
And  when  our  AffeUions  are  warmly  engag'd,  let 
lis  abftain  from  judging.  It  would  be  alfo  of 
great  Ufe  to  us  to  form  our  deliberate  Judgments  of 
Perfons  and  Things  in  the  calmeft  and  fercneft 
Hours  of  Life,  when  the  Paffions  of  Nature  arc 
all  iilenr,  and  the  Mind  enjoys  its  mod  perfe6i: 
Compofure  :  And  thefe  Judgments  fo  formed 
fhould  be  trcafur'd  up  in  the  Mind,  that  we  might 
have  Recourfe  to  them  in  Hours  of  Need. 

V.  The  Fondnefs  ive  have  for  Self,  and 
the  Relation  ivhich  other  Perfons  and  Things 
have  to  our  Selves^  furnifh  us  with  another  long 
Rank  oi Prejudices.  This  indeed  might  be  redu- 
ced to  the  Paffion  of  Self-Love^  but  it  is  (o  copi- 
ous an  Head  that  1  chofe  to  name  it  as  a  diftinct 
Spring  of  falfe  Judgments.  We  are  generally 
ready  to  fancy  every  thing  of  our  oivn  h;is  fome- 

thing 


204  LOGIC  K:  Or,       PartIL 

thing  peculiarly  valuable  in  it,  when  indeed  there 
is  no  other  Reafon,  but  becaufe  it  is  our  own. 
Were  we  born  amongfl  the  Gardens  of  Italy^  the 
Rocks  of  Switzerland^  or  the  Ice  and  Snows  of 
Rujfia  and  Sweden^  Hill  we  fhould  imagine  pecu- 
liar Excellencies  in  our  native  Land.  We  con- 
ceive a  good  Idea  of  the  'Town  and  Village  where 
we  firfl  breathed,  and  think  the  better  of  a  Man 
for  being  born  near  us.  We  entertain  the  beft 
Opinion  of  the  Pcrfons  of  our  own  Pariy^  and  ea- 
|ily  believe  evil  Reports  of  Perfons  of  a  different 
Sect  or  Fa^iion.  Our  own  Sexy  our  Kindred^  our 
Houfes^  and  our  very  Names  feern  to  have  fome-' 
thing  good  and  deiirable  in  them.  We  are  ready  ■ 
to  mingle  all  thefe  with  our  felves^  and  cannot  bear 
to  have  others  think  meanly  of  them. 

So  good  an  Opinion  have  we  of  our  own  Senti^ 
ments  and  Practices^  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  be-» 
lieve  what  a  Reprover  fays  of  our  Condu6t ,  and 
we  are  as  ready  to  aflent  to  all  the  Language  of 
Flattery.  We  fet  up  our  own  Opinions  m  Religi'^ 
on  and  Philofophy  as  the  Tefls  of  Orthodoxy  and 
Truth  s  and  we  are  prone  to  judge  every  Practice 
of  other  Men  either  a  Duty  ©r  a  Crime  which 
we  think  would  be  a  Crime  or  a  Duty  to  us,  tho' 
their  CircumAances  arc  vaftly  different  from  our 
own.  This  Humour  prevails  fometimes  to  fucli 
A  Degree,  that  we  would  make  our  own  Tajie  aricj 
Inclination  the  Standard  by  which  to  judge  of  e- 
very  Dilli  of  Meat  that  is  fet  upon  the  Table,  e- 
veryBook  in  a  Library,  every  Employment,  Stur 
dy  and  Buiincfs  of  Life,  as  well  as  every  Re- 
creation. 

It  is  from  this  evil  Principle  of  fetting  up  fel^f 
for  a  Model  what  other  Men  ought  to  he^  that  the 
uintichrijiian  Spirit  of  Impofition  and  Perfecution 
had  its  Original:  tho'  there  is  no  more  Reafon 

for 


-> 


cm.  S.  3.   the  right  Ufe  ^/Reafon:      205 

for  it  than  there  was  for  the  Praftice  of  that  Ty- 
rant, who  having  a  Bed  fit  for  his  own  Size,  was 
reported  to  ftretch  Men  of  low  Stature  upon  the 
Rack,  till  they  were  drawn  out  to  the  Length  of 
his  Bed  5  and  fome  add  alio  that  he  cut  off  the 
Legs  of  any  whom  he  found  too  long  for  it. 

It  is  alfo  from  a  Principle  near  als:in  to  this  thaC 
we  pervert  and  ftrain  the  Writings  of  any  vene- 
rable Authors,  and  efpecially  the  facred  Books  of 
Scripture  to  make  them  fpeak  our  own  Senfe, 
Thro'  the  Influence  which  our  own  Schemes  or 
Hypothefes  have  upon  the  Mind,  we  fometimes 
become  fo  fharp-fighted  as  to  find  thefe  Schemes 
in  thofe  Places  of  Scripture  where  the  holy  Wri- 
ters never  thought  of  them,  nor  the  holy  Spirit 
intended  them.  At  other  times  this  Prejudice 
brings  fuch  a  Dimnefs  upon  the  Sight,  that  we 
cannot  read  any  thing  that  oppofcs  our  own  Scheme, 
tho'  it  be  written  as  with  Sunbeams,  and  in  the 
plainefl:  Language  -,  and  perhaps  we  are  in  Dan- 
ger in  fuch  a  Cafe  of  winking  a  little  againfl;  the 
Light. 

We  ought  to  bring  our  Minds  free,  unbiafs'd 
and  teachable  to  learn  our  Religion  from  the 
Word  of  God  y  but  we  have  generally  form'd  all 
the  lefTer  as  well  as  the  greater  Points  of  our  Re- 
ligion beforehand,  and  then  we  read  the  Prophets 
and  Apoftles  only  to  perfuade  them  to  confirm 
our  own  Opinions.  Were  it  not  for  this  Influ- 
ence of  Self^  and  a  Bigotry  to  our  own  Tenets, 
we  could  hardly  imagine  that  fo  many  ftrange, 
abfurd,  inconfiilent,  wicked,  mifchievous,  and 
bloody  Principles  ihould  pretend  to  fupport  and 
defend  themfelves  by  the  Gofpel  of  Chrifi. 

Eveiy  learned  Critick  has  his  own  Hypothefis ; 
and  if  the  common  'Text  be  not  favourable  to  his 
Opinion,  a  various  Leffion  ihall  be  made  authen- 

tick. 


20(5  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       PartiL 

tick.  The  Text  muft  be  fuppos'd  to  be  defeSlive 
or  redundant^  and  the  Senfe  of  it  fhall  be  literal 
or  ynetaphorical^  according  as  it  beft  fupports  his 
own  Scheme.  Whole  Chapters  or  Books  fhall 
be  added  or  left  out  of  the  facred  Canon,  or  be 
turn'd  into  Parables  by  this  Influence.  Luther 
knew  not  well  how  to  reconcile  theEpiftle  of  St. 
'James  to  the  Do6trine  of  Juftification  by  Faith 
alone^  and  fo  he  could  not  allow  it  to  be  Divine. 
The  Papifts  bring  all  the  Apocrypha  into  their  Bi- 
ble, and  llamp  Divinity  upon  it,  for  they  can 
fancy  Purgatory  is  there  and  they  find  Prayers  for 
the  Dead.  But  they  leave  out  the  fecond  Com" 
mandment  becaufe  it  forbids  the  IVorfhip  of  Pmages. 
Others  fuppofe  the  Mofaick  Hijiory  of  the  Creation 
And  the  Fall  of  Man  to  be  oriental  Ornaments,  or 
a  mere  Allegory^  becaufe  the  literal  Senfe  of  thofe 
three  Chapters  of  Genefis  don't  agree  with  their 
Theories.  Even  an  honeft  plain-hearted  and  un- 
learned Chrijiian  is  ready  to  find  fomething  in  e- 
.very  Chapter  of  the  Bible,  to  countenance  his 
own  private  Sentiments  j  but  he  loves  thofe  Chap- 
ters beft  which  fpeak  his  own  Opinions  plaineft : 
This  is  a  Prejudice  that  fticks  very  clofe  to  our 
Natures  >  the  Scholar  is  infefted  with  it  daily,  and 
the  Mechanick  is  not  free. 

Self  has  yet  a  farther  and  pernicious  Influence 
upon  our  Underftandings,  and  is  an  unhappy 
Guide  in  the  Search  after  Truth.  When  our  own 
JnclinatioHj  or  our  Eafe^  our  Honour  or  otir  Profit 
tempts  us  to  the  Practice  of  any  thing  of  fufped:- 
cd  Lawfulnefs,  how  do  we  ftrain  our  Thoughts 
to  find  Arguments  for  it,  and  pcrfuade  our  felves 
5t  is  lawful :  We  colour  over  Iniquity  und  finful 
Compliance  with  the  Names  of  Virtue  and  Inno- 
cence^ or  at  leaft  of  Confiraint  aiid  NeceJJity.  All 
the  diffcrcnt  and  pppolite  Sentiments  and  Pradi- 

ces 


C,  III.  S.  3  ]    The  Tight  Ufe  of  Reafon?     20?^ 

ces  of  Mankind  are  too  much  influenced  by  this 
mean  Bribery,  and  give  too  juft  Occafion  for  fa- 
tyrical  Writers  to  fay  that  Self-Intereji  governs  all 
Mankind. 

When  the  Judge  had  awarded  due  Damages  to 
a  Perfon  into  whofe  Field  a  Neighbour's  Oxen 
had  broke,  it  is  reported  that  he  reverfed  his  own 
Sentence,  when  he  heard  that  the  Oxen  which 
had  done  this  Mifchief  were  his  own.  Whether 
this  be  a  Hiftory  or  a  Parable^  it  is  ftill  a  juft  Re- 
prefentation  of  the  wretched  Influence  of  Se/f  to 
corrupt  the  Judgment. 

One  Way  to  amend  this  Prejudice  is  to  thru  ft 
Self  fo  far  out  of  the  Qiieftion  that  it  may  have 
no  manner  of  Influence  whenfoever  we  arc  call'd 
to  judge  and  confider  the  naked  Nature,  Truth 
and  Juftice  of  Things.  In  Matters  of  Equity 
between  Man  and  Man,  our  Saviour  has  taught 
us  an  effectual  Means  of  guarding  againft  this  Pre- 
judice, and  that  is  to  put  my  Neighbour  in  the 
Place  of  my  Self]  and  ?ny  Self  in  the  Place  of  jny 
Neighbour^  rather  than  be  bribed  by  this  corrupt 
Principle  o^  Self-Love  to  do  Injury  to  our  Neigh- 
bours. Thence  arifes  that  Golden  Rule  of  dealing 
with  others  as  we  would  have  others  deal  with  us. 

In  the  Judgment  of  Truth  and  Falfloood^  Right 
and  Wrongs  Good  and  Evil^  we  ought  to  confider 
that  every  Man  has  a  Self  as  well  as  we  3  and 
that  the  Taftes,  Paflions,  IncUnations  and  Inte- 
refts  of  different  Men  are  very  different  and  often 
contrary,  and  that  they  di6bate  contrary  Things : 
Unlefs  therefore  all  manner  of  different  and  con- 
trary Propolitions  could  be  true  at  once,  Self  can 
never  be  a  juft  Teft  or  Standard  of  truth  and 
Faljhood^  Good  and  Evil. 

VI.  The 


20  S  LOGICK:Or,      Pait  IL 

VI.  The  Tempers  J  Humour  Sj  and  peculiar  Turns 
of  the  Mind^  whether  they  be  natural  or  acquir'd, 
have  a  great  Influence  upon  our  Judgment,  and 
become  the  Oecafion  of  many  Mijiakes.  Let  us 
furvey  a  few  of  them. 

(i.)  Some  Perfons  are  of  an  eafy  and  credulous 
Temper^  whilq.  others  are  perpetually  difcovering  a 
■  Spirit  of  CofTt^a^6iion. 

The  credulot^Man  is  ready  to  receive  every  thing 
for  Truth,  that  has  but  a  Shadow  of  Evidence ; 
every  new  Book  that„,he  reads,  and  every  ingeni- 
ous Man  with  whom^Btc  converfesj  has  Power  e- 
iiough  to  draw  him  junto  the  Sentiments  of  the 
Speaker  or  Writer. ,  ""He  has  fd  much  Complai- 
fance  in  him,  or  Weaknefs  of  Soul,  that  he  is 
ready  to  refign  his  own  Opinion  to  the  firft  Ob- 
jection which  he  hears,  and  to  receive  any  Senti- 
ments of  another  that,  are  aflerted  with  a  politive 
Air  and  much  Afliiraiicc.  Thus  he  is  under  a 
kind  of  Nccefllty,  thro'  the  Indulgence  of  this 
credulous  Humour,  either  to  be  often  changing 
-his  Opinions,  or  to  believe  Inconfiftencies. 

The  Man  of  Contradiction  is  of  a  contrary  Hu- 
mour, for  he  flands  reiiciy  to  oppofe  every  thing 
That  is  laid :  he  gives  a  flight  Attention  to  the 
Rcafons  of  other  Men,  from  an  inward  fcornful 
Prefumpiion  that  they  have  no  Strength  in  them. 
"When he  reads  or  hears  aDifcourfe  different  from 
his  own  Sentiments,  he  does  not  give  himfelf  leave 
to  confider  whether  that  Difcourfc  may  be  true  5 
but  cmplovs  all  his  Powers  immediately  to  con- 
fute it.  \'our  great  Difputcrs  and  your  Men  of 
Cjjntriiverfy  are  ni  continual  Danger  of  this  Ibrt  dt 
Prejudice:  they  contend  often  for  Victory,  and 
will  maintain  Vvhatfoe^'er  they  have  aflerted,  while 
I'ruth  is  loft  in  the  Noife  and  Tumult  of  reci- 
procal 


C.  III.  S.  3 .     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     209 

procal  Contradi6tions  j  and  it  frequently  happen^ 
that  a  Debate  about  Opinions  is  turned  into  a  mu- 
tual Reproach  of  Perfons. 

The  Prejudices  of  Credulity  may  in  fome  IVlea- 
fure  be  cur'd  by  learning  to  fet  a  high  Value  on 
Truth,  and  by  taking  more  Pains  to  attain  it  j  re- 
membring  that  Truth  oftentimes  lies  dark  and 
deep,  and  requires  us  to  dig  for  it  as  for  hid  Trea- 
fure  i  and  that  Fallhood  often  puts  on  a  fair  Dif- 
guife,  and  therefore  we  fhould  not  yield  up  our 
Judgment  to  every  plaufible  Appearance.  It  is 
no  part  of  Civility  or  good  Breeding,  to  part  with 
Truth ,  but  to  maintain  it  with  Decency  and 
Catidor. 

A  Spirit  of  Contradi^ion  is  fo  pedantick  and 
hateful  that  a  Man  ihould  take  much  Pains  with 
himfelf  to  watch  againft  every  Inftance  of  it :  He 
fhould  learn  fo  much  good  Humour  at  leaft  as  ne- 
vTr  to  oppofe  any  thing  without  juft  and  folid 
Reafon  for  it :  He  fhould  abate  fome  Degrees  of 
Pride  and  Morofenefs^  which  are  never  failing  In- 
gredients in  this  fort  of  Temper,  and  fhould  feek 
after  fo  much  Plonejly  and  Confcience  as  never  to 
contend  for  Conqueil  or  Triumph  ;  but  to  re- 
view his  own  Reafons  and  to  read  the  Arguments 
of  his  Opponents  (if  poflible)  with  an  equal  In- 
differency,  and  be  glad  to  fpy  Truth  and  to  fub- 
mit  to  it,  tho'  it  appear  on  the  oppofite  Side. 

(i.)  There  is  another  Pair  of  Prejudices  de- 
rived from  tivo  'Tempers  of  Mind,  near  akin  to 
thofe  I  have  juft  mention'd }  and  thefc  are  the 
dogmatical  and  the  fceptical  Humour^  i.  e.  always 
pojitive^  or  always  doubting. 

By  what  means  foever  the  Dogmatijl  came  by 
his  Opinions,  whether  by  his  Senfes,  or  by  his 
Fancy,  his  Education,  or  his  own  Reading,  yet 
he  believes  them  all  with  the  fame  AlTurance  that 

P  he 


sio  L  0  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  II. 

he  does  a  mathematical  'Truth  5  he  has  fcarcc  any 
mere  Probabilities  that  belong  to  him ;  every  thing 
with  him  is  certain  and  infallible;  every  PunftiUo 
in  Rehgion  is  an  Article  of  his  Faith,  and  he  an- 
swers all  manner  of  Objections  by  a  fovereign 
'  Contempt. 

Perfons  of  this  Temper  are  feldom  to  be  con- 
vinced of  any  Miftake:  A  full  Afflirance  of  their 
own  Notions  makes  all  the  Difficulties  of  their 
own  Side  vanifh  fo  entirely,  that  they  think  eve- 
ry Point  of  their  Belief  is  written  as  with  Sun- 
beams, and  wonder  any  one  fhould  find  a  Diffi- 
culty in  it.  They  are  amazed  that  learned  Men 
fhould  make  a  Controverfy  of  what  is  to  them 
fo  perfpicuous  and  indubitable.  The  lowed  Rank 
of  People  both  in  learned  and  in  vulgar  Life  is 
very  fubjed  to  this  Obftinacy. 

Scepticifm  is  a  contrary  Prejudice.  The  Dogma- 
tift  is  fure  of  every  thing,  and  the  Scepick  be- 
lieves nothing.  Perhaps  he  has  found  himfelf  of- 
ten miftaken  in  Matters  of  which  he  thought 
himfelf  well  affiar'd  in  his  younger  Days,  and 
therefore  he  is  afraid  to  give  AfTent  to  any 
thing  again.,  He  fees  fo  much  Shew  of  Reafon 
for  every  Opinion,  and  fo  many  Objeftions  alfo 
'  arifing  againll  every  Do6lrine,  that  he  is  ready 
to  throw  off  the  Belief  of  eveiy  thing :  He  re- 
nounces at  once  thePuvfuit  of  Truth,  and  contents 
himfelf  to  fay.  There  is  nothing  certain.  It  is  well 
if  thro'  the  Influence  of  fuch  a  Temper  he  does 
not  cait  away  his  Religion  as  well  as  his  Philofo- 
phy,  and  abandon  himfelf  to  a  profane  Courfe  of 
"  Life,  regardlefs  of  Hell  and  Heaven. 

Both  thefe  Prejudices  laft  mention'd,  tho'  they 

are  fo  oppofite  to  each  other,  yet  they  arife  from 

the  fame  Spring,  and  that  is.  Impatience  of  Study^ 

"  and  Pf^ant  of  diligent  Attention  in  the  Search  of 

Truth, 


C.  HI.  S.  3 .  The  right  Ufe  <?f  Reaibii.'        2 1 1 

Triith.  The  Dogmatifl  is  in  halle  to  believe  fome- 
thingi  he  can't  keep  himielf  long  enough  in  Sui- 
pence  till  fome  bright  and  convincing  Evidence 
appear  on  one  Sidej  but  throvcs  himieif  ciiiuaily 
into  the  Sentiments  of  one  Party  or  another,  and 
then  he  will  hear  no  Argument  to  the  contrary. 
The  Sceptick  willnot  take  Pains  to  learch  things 
to  the  Bottom,  but  when  he  fees  Difficulties  on 
both  Sides  refolves  to  believe  neither  of  them. 
Humility  of  Soul^  Patience  in  Study^  Diligence  in 
Enquiry^  with  an  honefi  Zeal  for  1'rnth^  would  go 
a  great  Way  towards  the  Cure  of  both  thcfe  Fol- 
lies. 

(3.)  Another  fort  of  'temper  that  is  very  injuri- 
ous to  a  right  Judgment  of  things  is  an  inconftant^ 
fickle^  changeable  Spirit^  and  a  'very  uneven  Temper 
of  Mind.     When  fuch  Perfons  are  in  one  Hu- 
mour, they  pafs  a  Judgment  of  Things  agreeable 
to  it  5  when  their  Humour  changes,  they  reverfc 
their  firft  Judgment,  and  imbrace  a  new  Opinion. 
They  have  no  Steadinefs  of  Soul -,  they  want  ivrw^- 
nefs  of  Mind  fufficient  to  eilabliili  thcmfelvcs  in 
any  Truth,  and  are  ready  to  change  it  for  the 
next  alluring  Falfhood  that  is  agreeable  to  their 
Change  of  Humour.     This  Ficklenefs  is  fometimes 
fo  mingled  with  their  very  Conftitution  by  Na- 
ture or  by  Diitemper  of  Body,  that  a  cloudy  Day 
and  a  lowring  Skie  {hall  ftrongly  incline  them  to 
form  an  Opinion,  both  of  themfelves  and  of  Per- 
fons and  Things  roujid  about  them,  quite  different 
from  what  they  believe  when  the  SunfJnnes  and 
the  Heai>ens  are  ferene. 

This  fort  of  People  ought  to  judge  of  Things 
and  Perfons  in  their  moft  fedate,  peaceful  and 
compofed  Hours  of  Life,  and  referve  thefe  Judg- 
ments for  their  Conduct  at  more  unhappy  Sea- 
fons. 

Pi  (4.) 


212  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Part  11. 

(4.)  Some  Perfons  have  ^violent  and  turgid  Man- 
ner both  of  T'alking  and  'thinking  •,  whatfoever  they 
judge  of,  it  is  always  with  a  Tinfture  of  this  Va-  , 
"nity.  They  are  always  in  Extremes,  and  pro- 
nounce concerning  every  thing  in  the  Superlative. 
If  they  think  a  Man  to  be  learned,  he  is  the  chief 
Scholar  of  the  Age  >  if  another  has  low  Parts,  he 
is  the  great  eft  Blockhead  [in  Nature  :  If  they  ap- 
prove any  Book  on  divine  Subje6ts,  //  is  the  heft 
Book  in  the  World  next  to  the  Bible ;  if  they  fpeak 
of  a  Storm  of  Rain  or  Hail,  it  is  the  moft  terrible 
Storm  that  fell  fince  the  Creation^  and  a  cold  Win- 
ter Day  is  the  coldeft  that  ever  was  known. 

But  the  Men  of  this  fweUing  Language  ought 
^o  remember  that  Nature  has  ten  thoufand  mode' 
rate  Things  in  it,  and  does  not  always  deal  in  Ex- 
tremes as  they  do. 

(f.)  I  think  it  may  be  call'd  another  fort  of 
Prejudices  derived  from  Humour^  when  fome  Men 
believe  a  DoUrine  meerly  becaufe  it  is  antient  and 
has  been  long  believ'd  j  others  are  fo  fond  of  No' 
'velty^  that  nothing  prevails  upon  their  Aflent  fb 
much  as  new  1'houghts  and  new  Notions.  Again, 
there  are  fome  who  fet  a  high  Efteem  upon  every 
thing  that  is  foreign^  and  far-fetched  j  therefore 
China  Figures  are  adnrir'd,  how  aukward  foever  : 
Others  value  Things  the  more  for  being  of  our 
own  native  Growth^  Invention^  or  Manufacture  j 
and  thcfe  as  much  defpife/<?r^;^«  Things. 

Some  Men  of  Letters  and  Theology  will  not  be- 
lieve a  Propolition  even  concerning  a  fublime  Sub- 
ject, till  every  thing  myfterious,  deep  and  diffi- 
cult is  cut  off  from  it,  tho'  the  Scripture  aflerts 
it  never  fo  plainly :  Others  are  fo  fond  of  a  My^ 
fiery  and  Things  incomprehenfible^  that  they  woukl 
fcarce  believe  the  Do£brine  of  the  trinity  if  it 
could  be  explaia'di  they  incline  to  that  foolifh 

■  '.  Rant 


C  111  S.  3  .^     ne  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     2  r  j 

Rant  of  one  of  the  Antients,  Credo  quia  impoffi- 
bile  eft;  I  believe  it  becaufe  it  is  impoffiblc. 

To  cui'e  thefe  Miftakes,  remefnber  that  neither 
antique  or  novels  foreign  or  native^  myftertous  or 
plain^  are  certain  Characters  either  of  Truth  or 
Falfhood. 

I  might  mention  various  other  Humours  of  Men 
that  excite  in  them  various  Prejudices^  and  lead 
them  into  rafli  and  miftaken  Judgments  >  but  thefe 
are  fufficient  for  a  Specimen. 

VII.  There  are  feveral  other  M'^eaknejfes  which 
belong  to  human  Nature,  whereby  we  are  led  in- 
to Miftakes^  and  indeed  are  render'd  almoft  unca- 
pable  of  pafUng  a  folid  Judgment  in  Matters  of 
great  Depth  and  Difficulty.  Some  have  a  nativ£ 
Obfcurity  of  Perception^  (or  fhall  I  call  it  a  want 
of  natural  Sagacity  ?)  whereby  they  are  hindcr'd 
from  attaining  clear  and  diilinCt  Ideas.  Their 
Thoughts  always  feem  to  have  fomething  con- 
fus'd  and  cloudy  in  them,  and  therefore  they  judge 
in  the  dark.  Some  have  a  Defeat  in  Memory^  and 
then  they  are  not  capable  of  comparing  their  prc- 
fent  Ideas  with  a  great  Variety  of  others,  in  or- 
der to  fecure  themfelves  from  Inconfi  (lency  in 
Judgment.  Others  may  have  a  Memory  large  e- 
nough,  yet  they  are  fubje6b  to  the  fame  Errors 
from  a  Narrownefs  of  Soul^  and  fuch  a  Fixation 
and  Confinement  of  'Thought  to  a  few  Object s^  that 
they  fcarce  ever  take  a  Survey  of  Things  wide  e- 
nough  to  judge  wifely  and  well,  and  to  fecure 
themfelves  from  all  Inconfiftencies. 

Tho'  thefe  are  natural  Defers  and  Weakneffes^ 
yet  they  may  in  fome  meafiire  be  reliev'd  by  La- 
bour, Diligence  and  a  due  Attention  to  proper 
Rules. 

P  3  But 


214  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  it 

But  among  all  the  Caufes  of  falfe  Judgment 
ivhicb  are  within  our  felves^  I  ought  by  no  means 
to  leave  out  that  univerfal  and  original  Spring  of 
Error ^  which  we  are  inform'd  of  by  the  Word 
of  God,  arid  that  is  the  Sin  and  Defection  of  our 
firft  Parents  J  v/hereby  all  our  bed  natural  Powers 
both  of  Mind  and  Body  are  impair'd,  and  ren- . 
der'd  very  much  inferior  to  what  they  were  in 
a  State   of  Innocence,      Our   Underflanding   is  . 
darken'd,   our   Memory  contrafted,  our  corrupt 
Humours  and  Paflions  are   grown   predominant, 
our  Reafon  infecbled,  and  various  Diforders  attend 
our  Conflitution  and  animal  Nature,  whereby  the 
Mind  is  rtrangely  impos'd  upon  in  its  Judgment 
of  Things.     Nor  is  there  any  perfe6b  Relief  to 
be  expe6ted  on  Eavth.     There  is  no  hope  of  ever 
recovering  from  thefe  Maladies,  but  by  ^/incere- 
Return  to  God  in  the  Ways  of  his  own  Appoint- 
ment, whereby  we  fhall  oe  kept  Hife  from  all  dan- 
gerous and   pernicious  Errors  in  the  Matters  of 
Religion  •,  and  tho'  Imperfections  and  A4ifiakes  will 
'  hang  about  us  in  the  prefent  Life  as  the  Effefts 
of  our  original  ylpofiacy  from  God,  yet  we  hope 
for  a  full  Deliverance  from  them  when  we  arrive 
at  Heaven. 

Sect,    IV. 

Prejudices  arifing  from  other  Perfons. 

WE R E  it  not  for  the  Springs  of  Prejudice^ 
that  are  lurking  in  ourfelves^  we  fliould  not 
be  fubjed  to  fo  many  Miftakes  from  the  Influence 
of  others:  But  fince  our  Nature  is  fo  fufceptive 
of  Errors  on  all  Sides,  it  is  fit  we  fhould  have 
Hints  and  Notices  given  us,  how  far  other  Per- 
fons may  have  Power  over  us,  and  become  the 
Z  Caufes 


C.  III.  S.  4.   The  right  Ufa  of  Reafon.^     ±1$ 

Caufes  of  our  falfe  Judgments.  This  might  nil 
be  call  into  one  Heap,  for  they  are  all  near  akin, 
and  mingle  with  each  other :  But  for  Diftinclion 
fake  let  them  be  call'd  the  Prejudices  of  Educati- 
on^ of  Cuftom^  of  Authority^  and  fuch  as  arife 
from  the  manner  of  Propofal. 

I.  Thofe  with  whom  our  Education  is  entruft- 
ed  may  lay  the  firfi  Foundation  of  many  Mijlakes 
in  our  younger  Years.  How  many  Fooleries  and 
Errors  are  inftill'd  into  us  by  our  Nurfes,  our 
Fellow-Children,  by  Servants  or  unskilful  Teach- 
ers, which  are  not  only  maintain'd  thro'  the  fol- 
lowing Parts  of  Life,  but  fometimes  have  a  veiy 
unhappy  Influence  upon  us !  We  are  taught  that 
'There  are  Goblins  and  Bugbears  in  the  Dark  j  our 
young  Minds  are  crouded  with  the  terrible  Ideas 
of  Ghofis  appearing  upon  every  Occafton^  or  with  the 
pleafanter  Talcs  of  Fairies  dancing  at  Midnight. 
We  learn  to  prophefy  betimes^  to  foretel  Futurities 
by  good  or  evil  Omens,  and  to  prefage  approaching 
Death  in  a  Family  by  Ravens  and  little  IVorms^ 
which  we  therefore  call  a  Death-lVatch.  We  are 
taught  to  know  beforehand,  for  a  Twelvemonth 
together,  nvhich  Days  of  the  Week  will  be  fair  or 
foul,  which  will  be  lucky  or  unlucky  j  nor  is  there 
any  Thing  lb  filly,  but  may  be  impos'd  upon  our 
Underftandings  m  that  early  part  of  Life  ;  and 
thefe  ridiculous  Stories  abide  with  us  too  long, 
and  too  far  influence  the  weaker  Part  of  Man- 
kind. 

We  chufe  our  particular  Se£l  and  Party  in  the 
civil,  the  religious  and  the  learned  Life,  by  the  In- 
fluence of  Education.  In  the  Colleges  of  Learn- 
ing, fome  are  for  the  Nominals,  and  fome  for  the 
Realifts  in  the  Science  of  Metaphyflcks,  becaufe 
their  Tutors  were  devoted  to  thefe  Parties.    The 

P  .^  old 


216  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  II. 

eld  Phllofophy  and  the  new  have  gained  thoufands 
of  Partizans  the  fame  Way :  And  every  Religion 
has  its  Infant  Votaries^  who  are  born,  Hve  and  die 
in  the  fame  Faith  without  Examination  of  any 
Article.     The  Turks  are  taught  early  to  believe  in  ^ 
Mahomet  j  the  Jezvs  in  Mofes  j  the  Heathens  wor- 
ship a  Multitude  of  Gods  under  the  Force  of  their 
Education.     And  it  would  be  well  if  there  were 
not  Millions  of  Chrijlians^  who  have  Uttle  more 
td  fay   for  their  Religion,  than   that  they  were 
born  and  bred  up  in  it.     The  greateft  Part  of  the 
Chrrftian  IForld  can  hardly  give  any  Reafon  why 
they  believe  the  Bible  to  be  the  Word  of  God^  but 
becaufe  they  have   always  bcliev'd   it,  and   they 
were  taught  fo  from  their  Infancy :  As  Jeivs  and 
T'urks^  and  American  Heathens  believe  the  moft^ 
monflrous  and   incredible  Stories,  becaufe   they 
have  been  train'd  up  amongft  them,  as  Articles  of 
Faith  j  fo  the  Papijis  believe  their  Tranfubfianti^ 
dtion^  and  make  no  Difficulty  of  aflenting  to  Im- 
polTibilities,   fince  it  is   the  current  Do6trine  of 
their  Catechifms.     By  the  liime  Means  the  feveral 
Sc6ts    and  Parties  in  Chriftianity  believe  all  the 
Jlrained  Interpretations  of  Scripture  by  which  they 
have  been  taught  to  fupport  their  own  Tenets  : 
They  find  nothing  difficult  in  all  the  abfurd  Glof- 
fes  znd  far-fetcht  Senks  that  arefometimes  put  up- 
on the  Words  of  the  Sacred  Writers,   becaufe 
their  Ears  have  been  always  accuftom'd  to  thefe 
Glofles ;  and  therefore  they  (it  fo  fmooth  and  eafy 
upon  their  Underftandings,   that  they  know  not 
how  to  admit  the  moft  natural  and  eafy  Interpre- 
tation in  Oppofition  to  them. 

In  the  fame  manner  we  are  nurfl:  up  in  many 
filly  and  grofs  Miftakes  about  domejiick  Affairs  as 
well  as  in  Matters  of  political  Concernment.  It 
is  upon  the  fame  Ground  that  Children  are  train'd 


C.  III.  S.  4.    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:     2 1 7 

up  to  be  Whigs  and  Tories  betimes  j  and  eveiy  one 
learns  the  diftinguifhing  Terms  of  his  own  Party, 
as  the  Pafijis  learn  to  fay  their  Prayers  in  Latin^ 
without  any  Meaning,  Reafon,  or  Devotion. 

This  fort  of  Prejudice  muft  be  cur'd  by  calh'ng 
all  the  Principles  of  our  younger  Years  to  the  Bar 
of  more  mature  Reafon,  that  we  may  judge  of 
the  Things  oi  Nature  ^.nd  political y^ff airs  by  juft- 
er  Rules  of  Philofophy  and  ObfeiTation  :  And  e- 
ven  the  Matters  of  Religion  mull  be  firft  enquir'd 
into  by  Reafon  and  Confcience^  and  when  thefe 
have  led  us  to  believe  Scripture  to  be  the  JVord  of 
God^  then  that  becomes  cur  Sovereign  Guide,  and 
Reafon  and  Confcience  mull  fubmit  to  receive  its 
Dictates. 

II.  The  next  Prejudice  which  I  fhall  mention 
is,  that  which  arifes  from  the  Cuftom  or  Fafhion  of 
thofe  amongfl  whom  we  live.  Suppofe  we  have 
freed  our  felves  from  the  younger  Prejudices  of  our 
Education^  yet  we  are  in  Danger  of  having  our 
Mind  turned  afide  from  Truth  by  the  Influence 
of  general  Cujiom. 

Our  Opinion  of  Meats  and  Drinks^  of  Gar- 
ments and  Forms  of  Salutation  are  influenced  much 
more  by  Cujiom  than  by  the  Eye,  the  Ear,  or  the 
Tafte.  Cuftom  prevails  even  over  Senfe  itfelf,  and 
therefore  no  Wonder  if  it  prevail  over  Reafon  too. 
What  is  it  but  Cujiom  that  renders  many  of  the 
Mixtures  of  Food  and  Sauces  elegant  in  Britain^ 
•which  would  be  aukward  and  naufeous  to  the  In- 
habitants of  China^  and  indeed  were  naufeous  to 
us  when  we  firft  tafted  them?  What  but  Cujiom 
could  make  thofe  Salutations  polite  in  Mufcovy^ 
which  are  ridiculous  in  France  or  England?  We 
call  our  felves  indeed  the  politer  Nations^  but  it  is 
we  who  judge  thus  of  our  felves  ^  and  that  fan- 
cied 


218  LOGIC  K:  Or,       PartlL 

cicd  PoUtenefs  is  oftentimes  more  owing  to  Cufiom 
than  Reafon.     Why  are  the  Forms  of  om  prefent 
Garments  counted  beautiful,  and  thofe  Fafhions  of 
our  Anccftors  the  Matter  of  Scoff  and  Contempt, 
which  in  their  Day  were  all  decent  and  genteel  ? 
It  is  Cufiom  that  forms  our  Opinion  of  Brefs,  and 
reconciles  us  by  Degrees  to  thofe  Habits  which 
at  firll  feem'd  very  odd  and  monftrous.     It  muft 
be  granted  there  are  forae  Garments  and  Habits 
which  have  a  natural  Congruity  or  Incongruity, 
Modefty  or  Immodefty,  Decency  or  Indecency, 
Gaudery  or  Gravity  j  tho'  for  the  moft  part  there 
is  but  little  of  Reafon  in  thefe  Affairs :  But  what 
little  there  is  of  Reafon  or  natural  Decency^  Cufiom  • 
triumphs  over  it  all.     It  is  almofl  impofUble  to 
perfuade  a  gay  Lady  that  any  Thing  can  be  de- 
cent which  is  out  of  Fafljion :  And  it  were  well  if 
Fafinon  ftretch'd  its  Powers  no  fiirther  than  the 
Bufinefs  of  Drapery  and  the  Fair-Sex. 

The  Methods  of  our  Education  are  govern'd 
by  Cufiom.  It  is  Cufiom  and  not  Reafon  that  fends 
every  Boy  to  learn  the  Roman  Poets,  and  begin  a 
little  Acquaintance  with  Gr^^^, before  he  is  bound 
an  Apprentice  to  a  Soapboiler  or  a  Leatherfeller. 
It  is  Cufiom  alone  that  teaches  us  Latin  by  the 
Rules  of  a  Latin  Grammar  j  a  tedious  'and  abfurd 
Method !  And  what  is  it  but  Cufiom  that  has  for 
part  Centuries  confin'd  the  brightefl  Genius's  e- 
ven  of  high  Rank  in  the  Female  World  to  the 
only  Bufinefs  of  the  Needle,  and  fecluded  them 
moil  unmercifully  from  the  Pleafures  of  Know- 
ledge, and  the  Divine  Improvements  of  Reafon  ? 
But  we  begin  to  break  all  thefe  Chains,  and  Rea- 
fon begins  to  didate  the  Education  of  Youth. 
May  the  growing  Age  be  learned  and  wife! 

It 


e.III.S.4i  The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^^oti]      219 

It  is  by  the  Prejudice  arifing  from  our  own  Cuf- 
tom^  that  we  judge  of  all  other  cinjil  and  religious 
Forms  and  Praciices.  The  Rites  and  Ceremonies 
of  IVar  and  Peace  in  other  Nations,  the  Forms 
of  M^eddings  and  Funerals^  the  feveral  Ranks  of 
Magifiracy^  the  Trades  and  Employments  of  both 
Sexes,  the  pub  lick  and  the  domeftick  affairs  of  Life  j 
and  almoft  every  thing  of  fore  ig^t  Cuftoms  is  judg'd 
irregular.  It  is  all  imagin'd  to  be  unreafonable  or 
unnatural^  by  thofe  who  have  no  other  Rule  to 
judge  of  Nature  and  Reafon^  but  the  Cuftoms  of 
their  own  Countiy,  or  the  httle  Town  where 
they  dwell.  Cufiom  is  call'd  ^fecond  Nature^  but 
we  often  miftake  it  for  Nature  it  felf. 

Befides  all  this,  there  is  a  Fafliion  in  Opinions.^ 
there  is  a  Faihion  in  Writing  and  Printings  in 
Style  and  Language.  In  our  Day  it  is  the  Vogue 
of  the  Nation,  that  Parliaments  may  fettle  the 
Succeffion  of  the  Crown^  and  that  a  People  can  make 
a  King;  in  the  laft  Age  this  was  a  Doclrine  akin 
to  Treafon.  Citations  from  the  Latin  Poets  were 
an  EmbcUifhment  of  Style  in  the  laft  Century, 
and  whole  Pages  in  that  Day  were  cover'd  with 
them  >  it  is  now  forbidden  by  Cuftom,  and  ex- 
pos'd  by  the  Name  of  Pedantry  -,  whereas  in 
Truth  both  thefe  are  Extremes.  Sometimes  our 
printed  Books  ftiall  abound  in  Capitals^  and  fome- 
times  rejecl  them  all.  Now  we  deal  much  in  Ef" 
■fays^  and  moft  unreafonably  defpife  fyjiematic  Learn- 
ing, whereas  our  Fathers  had  a  juftValue  for  Re- 
gularity and  Syftems  ;  then  Folio's  and  Quarto's 
were  the  faftiionable  Sizes,  as  Volumes  in  Ociavo 
are  now.  We  are  ever  ready  to  run  into  Ex- 
tremes, and  yet  Cuftom  ftill  perfuadcs  us  that  Rea- 
fin  and  Nature  are  on  cur  Side. 

This 


220  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       PartH, 

This  Bufinefs  of  the  Fajlmn  has  a  moft:  pow- 
erful Influence  on  our  Judgments  5  for  it  employs 
thofe  two  ftrong  Engines  of  Fear  and  Shame  to 
operate  upon  our  Underftandings  with  unhappy 
Succefs.  We  are  afham'd  to  believe  or  profefs  an 
unfafhionable  Opinion  in  Philofophy,  and  a  cow- 
ardly Soul  dares  not  fo  much  as  indulge  a  Thought 
contrary  to  the  eftablip'd  ox  fajhionable  Faith^  nor 
act  in  Oppofition  to  Cuflom^  tho'  it  be  according 
to  the  Didates  of  Reafon. 

I  confefs,  there  is  a  Refpe£t  due  to  Mankind 
which  fhould  incline  even  the  wifefl:  of  Men  to 
follow  the  innocent  Cuftoms  of  their  Country  in 
outward  Praftices  of  the  civil  Life,  and  in  lome 
Meafiire  to  fubmit  to  Fafhion  in  all  indifferent  Af- 
fairs^ where  Reafon  and  Scripture  make  no  Re- 
monftrances  againft  it.  But  the  Judgments  of  the 
Mind  ought  to  be  for  ever  free,  and  not  biafs'd 
by  the  Cuftoms  and  Faftjions  of  any  Age  or  Nati- 
on whatfoevcr. 

To  deliver  our  Underftandings  from  this  Dan- 
ger and  Slavery,  we  fliould  confider  thefe  three 
Things. 

1 .  That  the  greatcft  Part  of  the  Civil  Cuftoms 
of  .£^ny  particular  Nation  or  Agt  fpring  from 
Humour  rather  than  Reaftjn.  Sometimes  the  Hu- 
mour of  the  Prince  prevails,  and  fometimes  the 
Humour  of  the  People.  It  is  either  the  Great  or 
the  Many  who  didate  the  Fafhion,  and  thefe 
have  not  always  the  higheft  Reafon  on  their  Side. 

2.  Confider  alfo,  that  the  Cuftoms  of  the  fame 
Nation  in  different  Ages,  the  Cuftoms  of  different 
Nations  in  the  fame  Age,  and  the  Cuftoms  of  dif- 
ferent Towns  and  Villages  in  the  fame  Nation,  are 
very  various  and  contrary  to  each  other.  The  faft?i~ 
enable  Learning,  Language,  Sentiments  and  Rules 
of  Politenels  differ  greatly  in  different  Countries 

and 


cm.  5.4^    The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^i^on.      221 

and  Jges  of  Mankind  5  but  T'ruth  and  Reafon  are 
of  a  more  uniform  and  fteady  Nature,  and  don't 
change  with  the  Fafhion.  Upon  this  Account, 
to  cure  the  PrepoJfeJJions  which  arife  from  Cuftom^ 
it  is  of  excellent  Ufe  to  travel,  and  fee  the  Cuf- 
toms  of  various  Countries,  and  to  read  the  Tra- 
vels of  other  Men,  and  the  Hiftory  of  paft  Ages, 
that  every  Thing  may  not  feem  ftrange  and  un- 
couth which  is  not  pra6tis'd  within  the  Limits  of 
our  own  Parifh,  or  in  the  narrow  Space  of  our 
own  Life-time. 

3.  Conlider  yet  again,  how  often  we  our  felves 
have  chang'd  our  own  Opinions  concerning  the- 
Decency,  Propriety,  or  Congruity  of  feveral 
Modes  or  Pra^ices  in  the  World,  efpecially  if  we 
have  lived  to  the  Age  of  thirty  or  forty.  Cuflom 
or  Fajhion^  even  in  all  its  Changes,  has  been  rea- 
dy to  have  fome  Degree  of  Afcendency  over  our 
Underftanding,  and  what  at  one  time  feem'd  de^ 
cent,  appears  obfolete  and  difagreeabk  afterward, 
when  the  Falhion  changes.  Let  us  learn  there- 
fore to  abftra£t  as  much  as  poiUble  from  Cuflom 
and  Fafljion,  when  we  would  pafs  a  Judgment* 
concerning  the  real  Value  and  intrinfic  K^ature  of 
Things. 

III.  The  j^uthority  of  Men  is  the  Spring  of  an- 
other  Rank  of  Prejudices. 

Among  thel'e  the  Authority  of  our  Forefathers 
and  antient  Authors  is  moll  remarkable.  We  pay 
Deference  to  the  Opinions  of  others,  meerly  De- 
caufe  they  lived  a  thouland  Years  before  us  >  and 
even  the  Trifles  and  Impertinencies  that  have  a 
Mark  of  Antiquity  upon  them  are  reverenced  for 
this  Reafon,  becaufe  they  came  from  the  Anti- 
ents.  It  is  granted,  that  the  Antients  had  many 
wife  and  great  Men  among  them,  and  fome  of 
2.  their 


222  LOG  I  C  Kt  Or,      Part  II. 

their  Writings,  which  Time  hath  deliver'd  down 
to  us,  are  truly  valuable :  But  thofe  Writers  liv- 
ed rather  in  the  Infant-State  of  the  World  5  and 
the  Philofophers^  as  well  as  t\\c  polite  Juthors  of  our 
Age,  are  properly  the  Elders^  who  have  feen  the 
Miftakes  of  the  younger  Ages  of  Mankind,  and 
corre6ted  them  by  Obfervation  and  Experience. 

Some  borrow  all  their  Rehgion  from  the  Fa^ 
ihers  of  the  Chrijlian  Churchy  or  from  their  Sy- 
nods or  Councils-,  but  he  that  will  read  Monfieur 
jDaille  on  the  U/e  of  the  Fathers  will  find  many 
Reafons  why  they  are  by  no  means  fit  to  dictate 
our  Faith,  fince  we  have  the  Gofpel  of  Chrift^ 
and  the  Writings  of  the  Apollles  and  Prophets  in 
our  own  Hands. 

Some  Perfons  believe  every  thing  that  their 
Kindred^  their  Parents^  and  their  Tutors  believe. 
The  Veneration  and  the  Love  which  they  have 
for  their  Ameftors  inclines  them  to  fwallow  down 
all  their  Opinions  at  once,  without  examining 
what  Truth  or  FallTiood  there  is  in  them.  Men 
take  up  their  Principles  by  Inheritance,  and  de- 
fend them  as  they  would  their  Eftates,  becaufe 
they  are  born  Heirs  to  them.  I  freely  grant,  that 
Parents  are  appointed  by  God  and  Nature  to  teach 
us  all  the  Sentiments  and  Praftices  of  our  younger 
Years  5  and  happy  are  thofe  whofc  Parents  lead 
them  into  the  Paths  of  Wifdom  and  Truth !  I 
grant  farther,  that  when  Perfons  come  to  Years 
of  Difcretion,  and  judge  for  themfelves,  they 
ought  to  examine  the  Opinions  of  their  Parentt 
with  the  greatell  Modelly,  and  with  a  humble 
Deference  to  their  fuperior  Chara6ter  j  they  ought 
in  Matters  perfeftly  dubious  to  give  the  Prefer- 
ence to  their  Parents  Advice,  and  always  to  pay 
them  the  firft  Refpecl,  nor  ever  depart  from  their 
Opinions  and  Pradice,  till  Rcafon  a;id  Confcience 

make 


^^>. 


C. III.  S.  4.   The  right  Ufi  of  Reafon:      225 

make  it  neceflaiy.  But  after  all,  it  is  pofTiblethac 
'Parents  may  be  miftaken,  and  therefore  Rea/m 
and  Scripture  ought  to  be  our  final  Rules  of  De- 
termination in  Matters  that  relate  to  this  World, 
and  that  which  is  to  come. 

Sometimes  a  fa'vourite  Author^  or  a  Writer  of 
great  Name^  drags  a  thoufand  Followers  after  him 
into  his  own  Millakes,  meerly  by  the  Authority 
of  his  Name  and  Charafter.  The  Sentiments  of 
Ariflotle  were  imbib'd  and  maintain'd  by  all  the 
Schools  in  Europe  for  feveral  Centuries  -,  and  a 
Citation  from  his  Writings  was  thought  a  fuffici- 
ent  Proof  of  any  Propolition.  The  great  Def- 
cartes  had  alfo  too  many  impHcit  Believers  in  the 
lafl  Age,  tho'  he  himfelf,  in  his  Philofophy,  dif- 
claims  all  fuch  Influence  over  the  Minds  of  his 
Readers.  Calvin  and  Luther^  in  the  Days  of  Re- 
formation from  Popery^  were  learned  and  pious 
Men,  and  there  have  been  a  Succeflion  of  their 
Difciples  even  to  this  Day,  who  pay  too  much 
Reverence  to  the  Words  of  their  Mailers.  There 
are  others  who  renounce  their  Authority,  but 
give  themfelves  up  in  too  fervile  a  manner  to  the 
Opinion  and  Authority  of  other  Mafters,and  fol- 
low as  bad  or  worfe  Guides  in  Religion. 

If  only  learned^  and  ivife^  and  good  Men  had 
Influence  on  the  Sentiments  of  others,  it  would 
be  at  leafl:  a  more  excuGible  fort  of  Prejudice,  and 
there  would  be  fome  Colour  and  Shadow  of  Rea- 
fon for  it ;  But  that  Riches^  Honours^  and  outward 
Splendor  fliould  fet  up  Perfons  for  Didators  to  all 
the  reft  of  Mankind  5  this  is  a  moft  Ihameful  In- 
vafion  of  the  Right  of  our  Underftandings,  on 
.  the  one  hand,  and  as  fhamcful  a  Slavery  of  the 
Soul  on  the  other.  The  poor  Man  or  the  Labour- 
er believes  fuch  a  Principle  in  Politicks^  or  in  Mo- 
rality^ and  judges  concerning  the  Rights  of  the 

King 


224  LOGIC  K:  Or,        PartH. 

King  and  the  People^  juft  as  his  wealthy  Neighbour 
does.  Half  the  PariJJj  follows  the  Opinion  of 
the  Efquire^  and  the  'Tenants  of  a  Manor  fall  into 
the  Sentiments  of  their  Lord^  efpecially  if  he  lives 
amongft  them. 

As  for  Principles  of  Religion^  we  frequently 
find  how  they  are  taken  up  and  forfaken,  chang'd 
and  refum'd  by  the  Influence  of  Princes.  In  all 
Nations  the  Priefts  have  much  Power  alfo  in  dic- 
tating the  Religion  of  the  People^  but  the  Princes 
dictate  to  them :  And  where  there  is  great  Pomp 
and  Grandeur  attending  the  Priellhood  in  any 
Religion  whatfoever,  with  fo  much  the  more  Re- 
verence and  ftronger  Faith  do  the  People  believe 
whatever  they  teach  them :  Yet  it  is  too  often 
evident  that  Riches-^  and  Dominions^  and  high  7/- 
tks  in  Church  or  State  have  no  manner  of  Pre- 
tence to  Truth  and  Certainty,  Wifdom  and  Good- 
ncis^  above  the  reft  of  Mortals,  becaufe  thefe  Su- 
periorities in  this  World  are  not  always  confer'd 
according  to  Merit. 

I  confels,  where  a  Man  of  JVifdom  and  Tears^ 
of  Obfervation  and  Experience^  gives  us  his  Opi- 
nion and  Advice  in  Matters  of  the  civil  or  the 
'inoral  Life^  Reafon  tells  us  we  fhould  pay  great 
Attention  to  him,  it  is  probable  he  may  be  in  the 
Right.  Where  a  Man  of  long  Exercife  in  Piety 
fpeaks  o^  pra£iical  Religion^  there  is  a  due  Defer- 
ence to  be  paid  to  his  Sentiments :  And  the  fame 
we  may  fay  concerning  an  ingenious  Man  long  verf- 
ed  in  any  Art  or  Science^  he  may  juftly  expe£t  due 
Regard  when  he  fpeaks  of  his  own  Affairs  and 
proper  Bufinefs.  But  in  other  things  each  of  thefe 
may  be  ignorant  enough,  notwithftanding  all  their 
Piety,  and  Years,  and  particular  Skill ;  Nor  even 
in  their  own  proper  Province  are  they  to  be  believ'd 

iq 


C.  III.  S.  4.  The  right  Ufe of  KQ2i(on.        22> 

in  every  thing  without  Rcfervej  and  without  Ex- 
amination. 

To  free  our  felves  from  ihcfe  Prejudices^  it  is 
fufficient  to  remember  that  there  is  no  Rank  nor 
Chara6ler  among  Mankind,  which  has  any  jiill 
Pretence  to  fway  the  Judgments  of  other  Men 
by  their  Authority:  For  there  have  been  Perfons 
of  the  fame  Rank  andChara^er  who  have  main- 
tain'd  different  and  contrary  Sentiments  j  but  all 
thefe  can  never  be  true,  and  theiefore  the  mere 
Name  or  Reputation  that  any  of  them  poirefTes 
is  not  a  fufficient  Evidence  of  Truth. 

Shall  we  believe  the  Antknts  in  Philofophy  ?  But 
fome  of  the  Antients  were  Stoicks^  ibme  Peripa- 
teticks^  fome  Platonicks^  and  fome  Epicureans^  fome 
Cynics  and  fome  Sceptics.  Sliall  we  judge  of  Mat- 
.ters  of  the  Chriflian  Faith  by  the  Fathers  or  Pri- 
mitive Writers  for  three  or  four  hundred  Years 
after  Chriji?  But  they  often  contradidted  one  an- 
other, and  themfelves  too  -,  and  what  is  worfc, 
they  fometimes  contradicted  the  Scripture  itfelf. 
Now  among  all  thefe  different  and  contrary  Sen- 
timents in  Philofophy  and  Religion i,  which  of  the 
Antients  mufl  we  believe,  for  we  cannot  believe 
them  all  ? 

Again^  To  believe  in  all  Things  as  our  Prede- 
ce0brs  did,  is  the  ready  way  to  keep  Mankind  in 
an  everlafting  State  of  Infancy,  and  to  lay  an  e- 
ternal  Bar  againft  all  the  Improvements  of  dur 
Reafon  and  our  Happinefs.  Had  the  prefent  Age 
of!  Philofophers  fatisfied  themfelves  with  they^<^- 
jlantial  Forms^  and  occult  Qualities  of  Ariflotle^ 
with  the  [olid  Spheres^  Excentricks  and  Epicycles  of 
Ptolomy^  and  the  antient  Aftronomersj  then,  the 
great  Lord  Bacon^  Copernicus^  and  Defiartes^  with 
the  greater  Sir  Ifaac  Newton^  Mr,  Locke^  and  Mr. 
Boyle^  had  rifen  in  our  World  in  vain.     We  mud 

Q.  have 


226  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Fart  11. 

have  blunder'd  on  ftill  in  fucceflive  Generations 
amongft  Abfurdities  and  thick  Darknefs,  and  a 
hundred  ufeful  Inventions  for  the  Happinefs  of 
human  Life  had  never  been  known. 

Thus  it  is  in  Matters  of  Philofophy  and  Science, 
But^  you  will  (iiy,  Jhall  not  our  own  Anceflors  de- 
termine our  'Judgment  in  Matters  of  civil  or  religi- 
ous Concernment  ?  If  they  muft,  then  the  Child 
of  a  Heathen  mull;  believe  that  Heathenifm  is 
Truth  3  the  Son  of  a  Papifi  muft  aflcnt  to  all  the 
x^bfurdities  of  Popery ;  the  Pofterity  of  the  yews 
and  Socinians  muft  for  ever  heSocinians  and  Jeivs^ 
and  a  Man,whofe  Father  was  of  Republican  Prin- 
ciples, muft  make  a  Succellion  of  Republicans  in 
his  Family  to  the  end  of  the  World.  If  we 
ought  always  to  believe  whatfoever  our  Parents^ 
or  our  Priejis^  or  our  Princes  believe,  the  Inhabi-* 
tants  of  China  ought  to  worfhip  their  own  Idols, 
and  the  Savages  of  Africa  ought  to  believe  all  the 
IMonfenfe,  and  pra6tife  the  Idolatry  of  their  Ne* 
gro  Fathers  and  Kings.  The  Britifh  Nation,  when 
it  was  Heathen^  could  never  have  become  Chrifii^ 
an  i  and  when  it  was  a  Slave  to  Rome^  it  could 
iiever  have  been  reformed. 

Bcfides,  let  us  confider  that  the  great  God,  our 
common  Maker,  has  never  given  one  Man's  Un- 
derftanding  a  legal  and  rightful  Sovereignty  to  de- 
termine Truth  for  others,  at  Icaft  after  they  are  paft 
the  State  ofChildhood  or  Minority.  NofinglePer- 
fon,  how  learned  and  wife,  and  great  foever,  or 
whatfoever  natural^  or  ci'-oil^  or  ecckfiafical  Rela- 
tion he  may  have  to  us,  can  claim  this  Dominioa 
over  our  Faith.  St.  Paul  the  Apoftle  in  his  pri- 
vate Capacity  would  not  do  it  j  nor  hath  an  in- 
fpir'd  Man  any  fuch  Authority,  until  he  make  his 
divine  CommilTion  appear.  Our  Saviour  himfelf 
tells  the  y^wj-,  that  //  he  had  not  done  fuch  won- 
drous 


•C.  III.  S.  4.     The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.     227 

drous  TVorks  among  them^  they  had  not  Jjnned  in 
disbelieving  his  Do^brines,  and  refufing  him  for 
the  MeJJiah.  No  Bifhop  or  Presbyter,  no  Synod 
or  Council,  no  Church  or  iVflembly  of  Men, 
(fince  the  Days  of  Infpiration)  hath  Power  de- 
rived to  them  from  God  to  make  Creeds  or  Arti- 
cles of  Faith  for  us,  and  impofe  them  upon  our 
Underflandings.  We  muft  all  act  according  to 
the  beft  of  our  own  Light,  and  the  Judgment  of 
our  own  Confciences,  uling  the  bell  Advantages 
which  Providence  hath  given  us,  with  an  honell 
and  impartial  Diligence  to  enquire  and  fearch  out 
the  Truth :  For  every  one  of  us  ?nuft  give  an  Ac- 
count of  him f elf  to  God.  To  believe  as  the  Churchy 
or  the  Court  believes^  is  but  a  forry  and  a  danger- 
ous Faith:  This  Principle  would  make  Vi\oxQ,  Hea- 
thens than  Chriflians^  and  more  Papijls  than  Pro- 
tejlants ;  and  perhaps  lead  more  Souls  to  Hell  than 
to  Heaven  y  for  our  Saviour  himfelf  has  plainly 
told  us,  that  if  the  Blind  will  be  led  by  the  BUnd^ 
they  mu(i  both  fall  into  the  Ditch. 

Tho'  there  be  fo  much  Danger  of  Error  arifing 
from  the  three  Prejudices  lall  mentioned,  yet  be- 
fore I  difmifs  this  Head,  I  think  it  proper  to  take 
Notice,  that  as  Education^  Cuflom  and  Authority 
are  no  fure  Evidences  of  1'ruth.^  fo  neither  are  they 
certain  Marks  of  Falfiood;  for  Rcafon  and  Scri- 
pture may  join  to  di(5late  the  fame  Things  which 
our  Parents,  our  Nurfes,  our  Tutors,  our  Friends, 
and  our  Country  believe  and  profefs.  Yet  there 
appears  fometimes  in  our  Age  a  Pride  and  Petu^ 
lancy  in  Youth,  zealous  to  caft  off  the  Sentiments 
of  their  Fathers  and  'Teachers  on  Purpofe  to  fhew 
that  they  carry  none  of  the  Prejudices  of  Educa- 
tion and  Authority  about  them.  They  indulge  all 
manner  of  licentious  Opinions  and  Practices,  from 
a  vain  Pretence  of  aflcrting  their  Liberty.    But 

(i.2  aki' 


^28  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Part  II. 

alas!  this  is  but  changing  one  Prejudice  for  an- 
other ;  and  fometimes  it  happens  by  this  means, 
that  they  make  a  Sacrifice  both  of  Truth  and 
Virtue  to  the  vile  Prejudices  of  their  Pride  and 

Senfuality. 

IV.  There  is.  another  Tribe  oi  Prejudices  which 
are  near  akin  to  thofe  of  Authority^  and  that  is 
when  we  receive  a  Do^lrine  becaufe  of  the  Man- 
ner in  'which  it  is  proposed  to  us  hy  others.  I  have 
already  mentioned  the  powerful  Influence  that  O- 
ratory  and  fine  Words  have  to  infinuate  a  falfe  O- 
pinion  j  and  fometimes  Truth  is  refus'd,  and  fuf- 
ters  Contempt  in  the  Lips  of  a  wife  Man,  for 
want  of  the  Charms  of  Language :  But  there  are 
feveral  other  Manners  of  Propojal  whereby  mif- 
taken  Sentiments  are  powerfully  convey'd  into 
the  Mind. 

Some  Pcrfons  are  eafily  perfuaded  to  believe 
what  another  dictates  with  a  pofitive  Air  and  a 
great  Degree  of  AJfurance :  They  feel  the  over- 
bearing Force  of  a  confident  Dictator,  efpecially 
if  he  be  of  fuperior  Rank  or  Chara6ter  to  them- 
felvcs. 

Some  are  quickly  convinced  of  the  Truth  of 
any  Doctrine,  when  he  that  propofes  it  puts  on 
all  the  Airs  of  Piety ^  and  m-xkts  J'olemn  Appeals  to 
Heaven^  and  Proteftations  of  the  'Truth  of  it :  The 
pious  Mind  of  a  weaker  Chriftian  is  ready  to  re- 
ceive any  thing  that  is  pronounced  with  fuch  an 
awful  Solemnitv. 

It  is  a  Prejudice  »\ear  akin  to  this,  when  a  hum- 
ble  Soul  is  frighreJ  /?i:9  any  particular  Sentiments 
of  Religion,  becauie  a  A4an  of  great  Name  or 
Charadter  pronounces  Herefy  upon  the  contrary 
Sentiments,  calls  the  Disbeliever  out  of  the  Church, 
and  forbids  him  the  Gates  of  Heaven. 

Othei's 


C.  III.  S.  4.   The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     229 

Others  are  allured  into  particular  Opinions  by 
gentler  P radices  on  the  Underftanding :  Not  on- 
ly the  fofter  Tempers  of  Mankind,  but  even  har- 
dy and  rugged  Souls  are  fometimes  led  away  Cap- 
tives to  Error  by  the  foft  y^irs  of  Addrefs^-xxK^  the 
fweet  and  engaging  Methods  of  Perfiiafion  and  Kind- 
nefs. 

I  grant,  where  natural  or  reveal'd  Religion 
plainly  dictate  to  us  the  infinite  and  cverlalling 
Importance  of  any  facred  Doctrine,  it  cannot  be 
improper  to  ufe  any  of  thefc  Methods  to  perfuade 
Men  to  receive  the  Truth,  after  we  have  given 
fufficient  Reafon  and  Argument  to  convince  their 
Underftandings.  Yet  all  thefe  Methods  confider- 
ed  in  themfelves,  have  been  often  us'd  to  convey 
Falfhood  into  the  Soul  as  well  as  Truth  5  and  if 
we  build  our  Faith  merely  upon  thefe  Foundati- 
ons, without  Regard  to  the  Evidence  of  Tmth 
and  the  Strength  of  Argument,  our  Belief  is  but 
the  Effect  of  Prejudice :  For  neither  the  pofttive^ 
the  awful  or  folemn^  the  terrible^  or  the  gentle  Me- 
thods of  Addrefs  carry  any  certain  Evidence  with 
them  that  Truth  lies  on  that  Side. 

There  is  another  Manner  of  propoftng  our  own 
Opinion,  or  rather  oppofmg  the  Opinions  of  others, 
which  demands  a  mention  here,  and  that  is  when 
Perfons  make  a  Jejl  ferve  inlfead  of  an  Argument  5 
when  they  refute  what  they  call  Error  by  a  'Turn 
of  Wit^  and  anfwer  eveiy  Objection  againll  their 
own  Sentiments,  by  cafting  a  Sneer  upon  the  Ob- 
jector. Thefe  Scoffers  pra6tifc  with  Succefs  up- 
on weak  and  cowardly  Spirits :  Such  as  have  not 
been  well  eftablifh'd  in  Religion  or  Morality, 
have  been  laught  out  of  the  belt  Principles  by  -x 
confident  Buffoon ;  they  have  yielded  up  their  O- 
pinions  to  a  witty  Banter^  and  fold  their  Faith  and 
Religion  for  a  Jefi, 

CL  3  There 


i30  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  II. 

There  is  no  Way  to  cure  tliefe  Evils  in  fuch  a 
degenerate  World  as  we  live  in,  but  by  learning 
to  diflinguiih  well  between  the  Suhjiatice  of  any 
Dodrine^  and  the  manner  of  Jddrefs  either  in  pro- 
poiing,  attacking,  or  defending  it  3  and  then  by   ^ 
fctting  a  juil  and  feverc  Guard  of  Reafon   and 
Confcience  over  all  the  Exercifes  of  our  Judg- 
ment, refolving  to  yield  to  nothing  but  the  con- 
vincing Evidence  of  Truth,    rcligioufly  obeying 
the  Light  of  Reafon  in  Matters  of  pure  Reafon^ 
ftnd  the  Dictates  of  Re'velation  in  Things  that  re- 
late to  oi|r  Faith. 

Thus  we  have  taken  a  brief  Survey  of  fome  of 
the  infinite  Farieties  of  Prejudice  that  attend  Man- 
kind on  every  lide  in  the  prefcnt  State,  and  the 
Dangers  of  Error  or  of  raflj  Judgment^  we  are 
perpetually  cxpos'd  to  in  this  Life :  This  Chapter 
fhall  conclude  with  one  Remark^  and  one  Piece  of 
Advice. 

The  Remark  is  this.  The  fame  Opinion,  whe? 
thcr  falfe  or  true^  may  be  dictated  by  many  Pre^ 
judices  at  the  iame  timej  for,  as  I  hinted  before. 
Prejudice  may  happen  to  dictate  Truth  fometimes 
as  well  as  Error.  But  where  two  or  more  Prejudices 
oppofe  one  another,  as  it  often  happens,  the  ftrong- 
er  prevails  and  gains  the  Aflent :  Yet  how  (eldom 
does  Reafon  interpofe  with  fufficient  Power  to 
get  the  Afcendant  of  them  all  as  it  ought  to  do ! 

The  Jd-vice  follows,  (viz)  Since  we  find  fuch 
a  fwarm  of  Prejudices  attending  us  both  within 
and  without  5  fince  we  feel  the  Weaknefs  of  our' 
Reafon,  the  Frailty  of  our  Natures,  and  our  In- 
fufficicncy  to  guard  our  felvcs  from  Error  upon 
this  Account,  it  is  not  at  all  unbecoming  the  Cha- 
racter of  a  Logician  or  a  Philofopher  (together  with" 
the  Advices  already  given)  to  dire6t  every  Perfoii 
\i\  his  S earth  after  Truth  to  make  his  daily  Ad- 

drelTcs 


C.  IV.         The  right  life  of  Reafon:        2  3 1 

drefTes  to  Heaven,  and  implore  the  God  of  Truth 
to  lead  him  into  all  Truth,  and  to  ask  Wifdom  of 
him  "who  giveth  liberally  to  them  that  ask  it,  and 
uphraidcth  us  not  with  om-  own  Follies. 

Such  a  devout  Pracbice  will  be  an  excellent  Pre- 
parative for  the  belt  Improvement  of  all  the  Di- 
reclions  and  Rules  propos'd  in  the  two  following 
Chapters. 


CHAP.     IV. 

General  'T>treEiions  to  affift  us  in  judging 

aright. 

THE  chief  Defign  of  the  Art  of  Logick  is  to 
ailifl  us  in  forming  a  true  Judgment  of 
Things  J  a  few  proper  Qbfer-vat'ions  for  this  End 
have  been  dropt  occafionally  in  fome  of  the  fore- 
going Chapters :  Yet  it  is  neceflary  to  mention 
them  again  in  this  Place,  that  we  may  have  a 
more  com  pleat  and  fimultaneous  View  of  the  ge^ 
neral  Directions^  which  are  necelliiry  in  order  to 
judge  aright.  A  i\Iultitude  of  Advices  may  be 
framed  for  this  Purpofc  j  the  chief  of  them  may, 
for  Order  fake,  be  reduced  \o  the  following 
Heads. 

I.  Direct.  When  we  confider  our  fclves  as  Phi- 
Jo  fophers^  or  Searchers  after  Truth ^  we  fhould  ex- 
amine all  our  old  Opinions  afreJJj^  and  enquire  ivbat 
was  the  Ground  of  thcm^  and  ivhether  our  jljfent 
were  built  onjuji  JEvidence-,  and  then  ive  Jhould  caji 
off  all  thofe  Judg/nents  which  were  formed  hereto' 
fore  without  due  Examination.  A  Man  in  purfuic 
of  Knowledge  Ihould  throw  off  all  thofe  Preju^ 

Q_4  dices 


252  LOGIC  K:  Or\      Partll. 

dices  which  he  had  imbib'd  in  Times  paft,  and 
guard  againil  all  the  Springs  of  Error  mention'd 
m  the  preceding  Chapter^  with  utmoil  Watchful- 
nefs  for  Time  to  come. 

Obfer've  here,  that  this  Rule  of  cajling  away  all 
our  former  prejudicate  Opinions  and  Sentiments.^  is 
not  propos'd  to  any  of  us  to  be  pra^lifed  at  once, 
conlider'd  as  Men  of  Bufmefs  or  Religion^  as  Friends 
or  Neighbours^  as  Fathers  or  Sons^  as  Magifirates^ 
Subjects  or  Chrijlians ;  but  meerly  as  Philofopbcrs 
and  Searchers  after  'Truth  :  And  tho'  it  may  be 
well  prefum'd  that  many  of  our  Judgments,  both 
true  and  falfc,  together  with  the  Pradices  built 
thereon  in  the  natural,  the  civil  and  the  religious 
Life  were  form'd  without  fufficient  Evidence  j 
vet  an  univerfal  Reje^ion  of  all  thefe  might  deftroy 
at  once  our  prefent  Senfe  and  Pra6tice  of  Duty 
with  Regard  to  God^  our  Selves.,  and  our  Felloiv- 
Crcatiires.  Mankind  would  be  hereby  thrown  in- 
to fuch  a  State  of  Doubting  and  Indifference^  that 
it  would  be  too  long  e're  they  recover'd  any 
Principles  of  Virtue  or  Religion  by  a  Train  of 
Reafonings. 

Be  fides  ^  the  common  Affairs  of  human  Life  of- 
ten demand  a  much  fpeedier  Determination,  and 
we  mult  many  times  a£t  upon  prefent  Probabili- 
ties :  The  Bulk  of  Mankind  have  not  Time  and 
Leifure,  and  iVdvantages  fufficient  to  begin  all 
their  Knowledge  anew,  and  to  build  up  every 
finglc  Opinion  and  Pra6bice  afrefh  upon  the  juft- 
eft  Grounds  of  Evidence. 

Yet  let  it  be  obferv'd  alfo,  that  fo  far  as  any 
Perfon  is  capable  of  forming  and  corre6ling  his 
Notions  and  his  Rules  of  Conduct  in  the  natural, 
civil  and  religious  Life  bv  the  llri6t  Rules  of  Lo- 
oirk^  and  [o  tar  as  he  hath  Time  and  Capacity  to 
I'eview  his  old  Opinions,  to  re-examine  all  thofe 
■■^■-  whicl^ 


C.  IV.         The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'        2  3  3 

which  are  any  way  doubtful,  and  to  determine 
nothing  without  juft  Evidence,  he  is  hkely  to  be- 
come fo  much  the  wifer,  and  the  happier  Man, 
and  (if  Divine  Grace  aflill  him)  fo  much  the  bet- 
ter Chriftian.  And  tho'  this  cannot  be  done  all 
at  once,  yet  it  may  be  done  by  prudent  Steps  and 
Degrees,  till  our  whole  Set  of  Opinions  and 
Principles  be  in  time  correfted  and  reform'd^  or 
at  leaft  eftablifht  upon  julfer  Foundations. 

II.  Dire5i.  Endeavour  that  all  your  Ideas  of  thofe 
Qbje^s  concerning  iiuhich  you  pafs  any  Judgment^  be 
clear  and  difi'tntl^  compleat^  comprchenji've^  extenfive 
and  orderly^  as  far  as  you  have  Occafion  to  judge 
concerning  them.  This  is  the  Subilance  of  the  lafi 
Chapter  of  the  firfl  Part  of  Logick.  The  Rules 
which  dire^  our  Conceptions^  mult  be  review 'd,  if 
we  would  form  our  Judgments  aright.  But  if 
we  will  make  hafte  to  judge  at  all  Adventures, 
while  our  Ideas  are  dark  and  confus'd^  and  very 
imperfeEl^  we  fhall  be  in  Danger  of  running  into 
many  Miftakes.  This  is  like  a  Perfon  who  would 
pretend  to  give  the  Sum  total  of  a  large  Account 
in  Arithmetick^  without  furveying  all  the  Particu- 
lars; or  as  a  Painter  who  profcfles  to  draw  a  fair 
and  dillin61:  Landskip  in  the  Twilight,  when  he 
can  hardly  diftinguifh  a  Houfe  from  a  Tree. 

Obferve  here,  that  this  Diredlion  does  not  re- 
quire us  to  gain  clear,  diilinft,  compleat  Ideas  of 
Things  in  all  their  Parts,  Powers  and  Qualities 
in  an  abfolute  Senfe^iox  this  belongs  to  God  alone, 
and  is  impoflible  for  us  to  attain :  But  it  is  cxpreit: 
in  a  7'elative  or  limited  Senfe-,  that  is,  our  Ideas 
fhould  be  clear,  di{lin6t  and  comprchenfive,  ^c. 
at  leail  fo  far  as  ive  have  Occafion  at  that  time  to 
judge  conccryiing  them.  We  may  form  many  true 
and  certain  Judgments  concerning  Qod^  Angels^  A- 
3  nimalsy 


234  LOGIC  K:  Or,       PartIL 

nimalsy  Men^  Heaven^  Hell^  Sec.  by  thofe  partial 
and  very  imperfe6b  Conceptions  of  them  to  which 
we  have  attained,  if  we  judge  no  farther  concern- 
ing them  than  our  Conceptions  reach. 

We  may  have  a  clear  and  diftin6t  Idea  of  the 
Exigence  of  many  Things  in  Nature,  and  affirm 
that  they  do  exift^  tho'  our  Ideas  of  their  intimate 
EJfences  and  Caufes,  their  Relations  and  Manners  of 
Aciion  are  very  confus'd  and  obfcure.  We  may 
^udgc  well  concerning  fever al  Properties  of  any 
Being,  tho'  other  Properties  are  unknown,  for  per- 
haps we  know  not  all  the  Properties  of  any  Being 
whatfoever. 

Sometimes  we  have  clear  Ideas  of  the  ah  folate 
Properties  of  an  Object  j  and  we  may  judge  of 
them  with  Certainty,  while  the  relatii-e  Proper- 
ties are  very  obfcure  and  unknown  to  us.  So  we 
may  have  a  clear  and  jull  Idea  of  the  Area  of  a 
Parallellogram  without  knowing  what  Relation  it 
bears  to  the  Area  of  a  l^riangle  or  a  Polygon.  I  may 
know  the  length  oixht Diameter  of  aCircle^wixh- 
out  knowing  what  Proportion  it  has  to  the  Cir- 
cumference. 

There  arc  other  Thinff§  whofe  external  relative 
Properties  with  refpect  to  each  other,  or  whofe 
Relations  to  us  we  know  better  than  their  own 
imvard  and  ahfolute  Properties^  or  their  eflential 
dillinguifhing  Attributes.  We  perceive  clearly, 
that  hire  ivill  Viarm  or  burn  us^  and  ivill  evaporate 
IFatcr  5  and  that  IVater  -will  allay  our  Thirji^  or 
quench  the  Fire^  tho'  we  know  not  the  inward  difr 
tinguilTiing  Particles  or  prime  effential  Properties 
of  Fire  or  PFater.  We  may  know  the  King^  and 
Lord  Chancellor^  and  affirm  many  Things  of  them 
in  their  legal  Charatlers^  tho'  we  can  have  but  a 
confus'd  Idea  of  their  Perfons  or  natural  Features^ 
if  we  have  never  fqcn  their  Faces.     So  the  Scri- 

-3     . 


C.  IV.       the  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon:        2  3  $ 

pture  has  reveal'd  God  himfelf  tp  us,  as  our  Cre- 
ator^ Preferver^  Redeemer^  and  Sanctifier^  and  as 
the  O^yV^  0/  our  fForJJnp^  in  clearer  Ideas  than  it 
has  reveal'd  many  other  abllrufe  Queftions  which 
may  be  rais'd  about  his  own  Divine  EJJence  or 
Suhflance^  his  Immenfity  or  Omniprefence. 

This  therefore  is  the  general  Ohfer-vation  in  or- 
der to  guide  our  Judgments,  that  we  Jljould  not  aU 
low  our  fehes  to  form  a  Judgment  concerning  things 
farther  than  our  clear  and  diJlinSl  Ideas  reach^  and 
then  we  are  not  in  danger  of  Error. 

But  there  is  one  confiderable  Objection  againft 
this  Rule  which  is  necefTary  to  be  anfwer'd  j  and 
there  is  ontjufi  and  reafonable  Exception^  which  is 
as  needful  to  be  mention'd. 

The  Objection  is  this :  May  we  not  judge  fafcly 
concerning  fome  total  or  compleat  Ideas ^  when  we 
have  a  clear  Perception  only  of  fome  Parts  or 
Properties  of  them?  May  we  not  affirm,  that  All 
that  is  in  God  is  Eternal^  or  that  all  his  uyikno-iv?i 
Attributes  are  infinite^  tho'  we  have  fo  veiy  imper- 
fect an  Idea  of  God^  Eternity  and  Infinity  ?  Again^ 
May  we  not  fafcly  juuge  of  particular  Objects 
whofe  Idea  is  obfcure  by  a  clear  Idea  of  the  Gf- 
neral?  May  I  not  affirm,  that  Every  unknown  Spe- 
cies of  Animals  has  inward  Springs  of  Motion^  be- 
caufe  I  have  a  clear  Idea  that  thefe  inward  Springs 
belong  to  an  Animal  in  general? 

Anfwer.  All  thofe  fuppos'd  unknown  Parts^  PrO" 
perties  or  Species  are  clearly  and  diltinctly  perceiv- 
ed to  be  connected  with,  or  contain'd  in  the 
known  Parts^  Properties  or  general  Ideas^  which 
we  fuppofe  to  be  clear  and  diftin6t  as  flir  as  we 
judge  of  them  :  And  as  we  have  no  particular  I- 
dea  of  thofe  unknown  divine  Attributes^  or  unknown 
Species  of  Animals  >  fo  there  is  nothing  particular 
iiffijrm'd  concerning  them  beyond  what  belongs  to 

the 


23(5  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Partll. 

the  general  Idecp  of  Divine  Attributes  or  Animals^ 
•with  which  I  clearly  and  diftin6bly  perceive  them 
to  be  conne6ted. 

It  may  be  illuftrated  in  this  manner.  Suppofe 
a  long  Chain  lies  before  me,  whofe  neareft  Links  I 
fee  are  Iron  Rings,  and  I  fee  them  fafhn'd  to  aPoft 
near  me,  but  the  moii  dijlant  Links  lie  beyond  the 
reach  of  my  Sight,  fo  that  I  know  not  whether 
they  are  Oval  or  Round,  Brafs  or  Iron :  Now  I 
may  boldly  affirm  the  whole  length  of  this  Chain  is 
fajieud  to  the  Pojh  ^o^  I  have  a  clear  Idea  that  the 
neareft  Links  are  thus  fliftened,  and  a  clear  Idea 
that  the  diftant  Links  are  connected  with  the 
fieareft,  if  I  can  dfaw  the  whole  Chain  by  one 
Link. 

Or  thus  i  If  two  known  Ideas,  A  and  B  are  e- 
videnrly  join'd,  or  agree,  and  if  C  unknown  be 
included  in  A,  and  alfo  D  unknown  be  included 
in  B,  then  I  may  affirm  that  C  and  D  are  join'd 
and  agree  i  for  I  have  a  clear  Perception  of  the 
Union  of  the  two  knov/n  Ideas  A  and  B ;  and 
alfo  a  clear  Perception  of  the  Connexion  of  the 
unknown  Ideas  with  the  known.  So  that  clear 
and  dijlin^  Ideas  muft  ftill  abide  as  a  general  ne- 
ceffiiry  Qualification  in  order  to  form  right  Judg- 
ments :  and  indeed,  it  is  upon  this  Foot  that  all 
Ratiocination  is  built,  and  the  Conclujiotis  are  thus 
formed,  which  deduce  Things  unknown  from 
Things  known. 

Yet  it  feems  to  me  that  there  is  one  juft  Limitati- 
on ox  Exception  to  this  general  Rule  of  Judgment^  as 
built  on  clear  and  diftin6t  Ideas,  and  it  is  this ; 

Exception.  In  Matters  of  meer  Teflimonyy  whether 
human  or  divine ^  there  is  not  always  a  NeceJJiiy  of  clear 
anddlftincl  Ideas  of  the  'Things  which  are  believ^cHTho* 
the  Evidence  of  Propofitions,  which  are  entirely 
forni'd  by  our  f elves ^  depends  on  the  Clearnefs  an,d 

Didindnefs 


C.  IV.        The  right  Wfe  of  Reafon:         2  3  7 

Diftinftncfs  of  thole  Ideas  of  which  they  are 
compos'd,  and  on  our  own  clear  Perception  of 
their  Agreement  or  Difagreement,  yet  we  may 
juftly  allent  to  Propofitions  fonfi'd  by  others^  when 
we  have  neither  a  clear  Conception  in  our  felves 
of  the  two  Ideas  contained  in  the  Words,  nor  how 
they  agree  or  difagree  j  provided  always  that  we 
have  a  clear  and  fufficicnt  Evidence  of  the  Credi- 
bility of  the  Perfons  who  inform  us. 

Thus  when  we  read  in  Scripture  the  great  Doc- 
trines of  the  Deity  of  Chrijly  of  the  Union  of  his 
divine  and  human  Natures^  of  the  divine  Agency  of 
the  blejjed  Spirit^  that  the  Son  is  the  Brightnefs  of 
his  Father'' s  Glory,  that  all  'Things  ivere  created  by 
him,  and  for  him,  that  the  Son  fhall  give  up  his 
Kingdom  to  the  Father,  and  that  God  jhall  be  all  in- 
all,  we  may  fafely  believe  them :  For  tho'  our  I- 
deas  of  thefe  Objects  themfelves  are  not  fufficient- 
ly  clear,  diftin6t  and  perfe6l,  for  our  own  Minds 
to  form  thefe  Judgments  or  Propofitions  concern- 
ing them,  yet  we  have  a  clear  and  diilinct  Per- 
ception of  God's  revealing  them,  or  that  they 
are  contain'd  in  Scripture  j  and  this  is  fufncient 
Evidence  to  determine  our  Afient. 

The  fime  Thing  holds  true  in  fome  Meafurc, 
w^here  credible  human  'Tejiimony  allures  us  of  feme 
Propofitions,  while  we  have  no  fufficient  Ideas  of 
the  Subject  and  Predicate  of  them  to  determine 
our  Afient.  So  when  an  honeft  and  learned  Ma- 
thematician afliires  a  Plowman  that  the  three  An- 
gles of  a  Triangle  are  equal  to  tivo  right  Angles,  or 
that  the  Square  of  the  Hypotenufe  of  a  right-angled 
Triangle  is  equal  to  the  Sum  of  the  Squares  of  the 
two  Sides  -y  the  Plowman,  who  hiis  but  confus'd 
Ideas  of  thefe  Things,  may  firmly  and  fifely  be- 
lieve thefe  Propofitions  upon  the  fame  Ground, 

.*   becauie 
■"A 


23 S  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       PartIL 

becaufe  he  has  Evidence  of  the  Skill  and  Faith- 
fulnefs  of  his  Informer  *. 

III.  DireWion.  When  you  have  obtain'd  as 
clear  and  comprehenfive  Ideas  as  is  needful,  both 
of  the  Subje6l  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofitioii, 
then  compare  thofe  Ideas  of  the  Subject  and  Predi- 

cats 

*  Perhaps  fome  may  objeft  againfl  this  Reprefentation  of  things,  and 
fay,  thar  "  We  cannot  properly  be  laid  to  believe  a  Propojitkn  any  farther 
*'  than  we  otiffelves  have  Ideas  under  the  Terms;  Therefore  if  we  have  no 
*'  Idtns  under  the  Terms,  we  believe  nothing  but  the  Connexion  of  Words 
"  or  Sounds  i  and  if  we  have  but  obfetire  and  wi^deqnate  Ideas  under  the 
*'  Terms,  then  we  partly  believe  a  Connc&ion  of  Things,  and  partly  a 
*'  Connexion  of  Sounds:  but  that  we  cannot  properly  be  faid  to  believe  the 
•'  Propofition,  for  our  Faith  can  never  go  beyond  our  Ideas. 

Now  to  fet  this  Matter  in  a  clear  Light,  I  fuppofe,that  every  Propofition 
which  is  propofed  to  my  AlTent,  is  a  Sentence  made  up  of  Terms  which 
have  fome  Ideiis  under  them,  known  or  unknown  to  me.  I  confefs,  if  I 
believe  there  are  no  Ideas  at  all  under  the  Terms,  and  there  is  nothing 
meant  by  them,  then  indeed  (with  regard  to  me)  it  is  the  meet  joining  of 
Sounds:  But  if  (for  Inflancc)  a  Plowman  has  credible  Information  from  an 
iioneft  and  skilful  Mathematician,  that  an  El/lpfJs  is  made  by  tl^e  SeSlon  tf 
^  Cone,  he  believes  the  Proportion,  or  he  believes  that  Sentence  is  true,  as  it 
is  made  up  of  Terms  which  his  Informant  underflands,  tho'  the  Ideas  be 
unknown  to  hinn;  that  is,  he  believes  there  are  (bme  Ideas  which  his  In- 
formant has  under  thefe  Words  which  are  really  connefted.  And,  I  think 
this  may  juftly  be  called,  believing  the  Propn/ition,  for  it  is  a  Beliet  of  fome- 
thing  more  than  the  meeT  joint >ig  of  Sounds ,  it  is  a  Belief  of  the  real  Con- 
neflion  of  fome  unknown  Ideas  belonging  to  thofe  Sounds;  and  in  this 
Senfe  a  Man  may  be  faid  to  believe  the  Truth  of  a  Propofition,  which  he 
doth  not  underfland  at  all. 

Wich  more  Reafon  flill  may  we  be  faid  to  believe  a  Propojilion  upon  cre- 
dible Tellimony,  if  we  hzve  fnne  fort  of  Ideas  under  the  Terms,  tho'  (hey 
arl  but  partial  or  inadequate,  and  obfcure,'  fuch  as.  Divine  j^nfmers  mere  giv- 
en by  Urim  and  Thummim  :  For  fince  it  is  purely  upon  Teitimony  we  believd 
the  hjoren  Parts  of  the  Ideas  fignified  by  thofe  Words  to  be  connefted,  upon 
the  fame  Teftimony  we  may  alfo  believe  all  the  ttnkmrvn  Parts  of  the  Ideas 
fi^nified  by  thofe  Words  to  be  connefled,  {viz..)  becaufe  our  Informant  is 
knowing  and  faithful.  And  in  this  Senfe  we  may, juftly  be  faid  to  believe 
a  Propofition  of  Scripture  entirely,  which  we  underfland  but  very  imperfcifly, 
becaufe  God  who  reveals  it  is  knowing  and  faithful  in  Perfection. 

And  indeed,  unlefs  this  Reprefentation  of  the  Martcr  be  allowed,  there  are 
but  very  fev/  PropoGtions  in  the  World,  even  in  hvman  Things,  to  which 
we  can  give  an  entire  Aflent,  or  which  we  may  be  (aid  either  to  know,  or 
to  believe,  becaufe  there  is  fcarce  any  thing  on  Earth  of  which  we  have  an 
adequate  and  moft  perfeft  Idea.  And  it  is  evident  that  in  Divine  Things 
theie  is  fcarce  any  thing  which  we  could  either  know  or  believe  without 
this  Allowance:  For  tho'  Reafon  and  Revelation  join  to  inform  me,  thac 
Cud  is  holy,  how  exceeding  inadequate  are  my  Ideas  of  Cud,  and  of  his  Ho' 
ilnifi'f  yet  I  may  boldly  and  entirely  aflent  to  this  whole  Propofition,  fince 
■I  4m  flire  that  ev<ry  knewn  and  unknown  Idea  fignlfied  by  the  Term  Cod, 


C .  IV.        The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'         2  3  9 

cate  together  with  utmofi  ^ttention^  and  ohfer"je  hoiv 
far  they  agree^  and  wherein  they  differ :  Whether 
the  Propofition  may  be  affirmed  Abfolutcly  or  Re- 
latively^ whether  in  Whole  or  in  Part^  whether 
Unroerfally  or  Particularly^  and  then  under  what 
■particular  Limitations.  Turn  thefe  Ideas  about  in 
your  Mind,  and  take  a  View  of  them  on  all  Sides, 
jufl  as  2^Mafon  would  do  to  fee  whether  two  hewn 
Stones  exadly  fuit  each  other  in  every  Part,  and  . 

is  connefled  with  the  Ideas  of  the  Term  Hclhiefs,  becaufe  Reafon  partly  in- 
forms me,  but  efpecially  becaufe  the  Divine  Teftimony  which  has  conneilcd 
them,  is  certainly  credible. 

I  might  argue  upon  this  Head  perhaps  more  forcibly  from  the  Doflrine 
of  God's  Jncomfrehenjiblcitefs.  It  we  could  believe  nothing  but  what  we  have 
Ideas  of,  it  would  be  impofCble  for  us  to  believe  that  God  is  huonwrehoip- 
ble:  For  this  implies  in  it  a  Belief,  that  there  are  fome  unknown  ideas  be- 
longing to  the  Nature  of  God.  Therefore  we  do  both  believe  and  profefs 
fomething  concerning  unknown  Ideas,  when  we  believe  and  profefs  that  Gtd 
is  imcmprehenfihle. 

I  perfuade  my  felf  that  mod  of  thofe  very  Perfons  who  obiecl  againft  my 
Reprefentation  of  Things,  will  yet  readily  cont'efs,  they  bdie-je  all  the  Propo- 
fitions  in  Scripture,  rather  than  declare,  They  do  not  believe  fevera!  of  than; 
tho'  they  muft  acknowledge  that  feveral  of  them  are  far  above  their  Under- 
flanding,  or  that  they  have  fcarce  any  Ideas  of  the  true  Senfeof  them.  And 
therefore  where  PropoHtions  deriv'd  from  credible  Tefiimony  are  made  up 
of  dark  or  inadequate  Ideas,  I  think  It  is  much  more  proper  to  fay.  We  be~ 
lieve  them,  :hzn  that  H'e  do  not  believe  them-,  left  we  cut  off  a  Multitude  of  che 
PropoCtions  of  the  Bible  from  our  Aflent  or  Faith. 

Yet  let  it  be  obferv'd  here-  that  when  we  believe  a  Propofition  on  meer 
Telfimony,  of  which  we  have  no  Ideas  a(  all,  ve  can  only  be  laid  to  give  a 
general  implicit  jiffciit  to  the  Truth  of  that  Pripujitiou,  without  any  particular 
Knowledge  of,  or  explit.it  j^jjeut  to  thi  fpcJul  Truth  '.cntr.ined  in  th.it  Propof:- 
tim  :  And  this  our  inipUJt  Jlffrnt  is  of  very  little  Ufe,  unkfs  it  be  to  ccllify 
our  Belief  of  the  Knowledge  and  Vera<:Jry  of  hini  that  informs  us. 

As  our  Ideas  of  a  Propofi'ion  are  more  or  lefs  clear  and  adequate,  as  well 
as  juft  and  proper,  lb  we  do  explicitly  aflent  more  or  lefs  to  the  purtiinlar 
Truth  contained  in  that  Propofition,  and  our  AlTent  hereby  becomes  more 
or  lefs  ufeful  for  the  Encreafe  of  our  Knowledge  or  the  Direction  ot  our 
Praftice. 

When  Divine  Teftimony  plainly  propofes  to  our  Faith  fuch  a  Propofici^-n 
whereof  we  have  but  obfcure,  doubtful  and  inadequate  Ideas,  we  are  bound 
implicitly  to  believe  the  Truth  of  it,  as  expreft  in  thofe  Terms,  in  order  to 
fhew  our  Submiflion  to  God  who  revealed  it,  as  a  God  of  perfe>5l  Know- 
ledge and  Veracity:  But  it  is  our  Duty  vj  ufe  all  proper  Methods  to  obtain 
a  farther  and  explicit  Knowledge  of  the  f articular  Truth  contain'd  in  the 
Propofition,  if -we  would  improve  by  it  either  in  Knowiedee  or  Virtue.  All 
neceflary  Rules  of  Grammar  and  Critic^fm  IViouId  be  employed  to  find  out 
the  very  Ideas  that  belong  to  thofe  Words,  and  which  were  defign'd  bv  the 
Divine  Speaker  or  Writer.  Tho'  we  may  believe  the  Truth  of  a  Propufiti- 
on  which  v.'e  do  not  underftand,  yet  we  Ihould  endeavour  to  underliand  e- 
very  Propofition  which  we  believe  :o  be  crue, 

are 


240  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  II. 

are  fit  to  be  join'd  in  ere6ting  a  cai*ved  or  fluted 
Pillar. 

Compare  the  whole  Subje^  with  the  whole  Pre^ 
dicate  in  their  feveral  Parts  :  Take  heed  in  this 
Matter  that  you  neither  add  to,  or  diminifh  the 
Ideas  contain'din  theSubje6t  or  in  the  Predicate ; 
for  fuch  an  Inadvertence  or  Millake  will  expofe 
you  to  great  Error  in  Judgment. 

IV.  DireB.  Search  for  Evidence  of  Truth  with 
Diligence  and  Honefiy^  and  he  heartily  ready  to  re- 
ceive Evidence^  whether  for  the  uigreement  or  Dif- 
agreement  of  Ideas. 

Search  with  Diligence  ;  fpare  no  Labour  in  fearch- 
ing  for  the  Truth  in  due  Proportion  to  the  Im- 
portance of  the  Propofition.  Read  the  beft  Au- 
thors who  have  writ  on  that  Subject  j  confult 
your  wife  and  learned  Friends  in  Converfition  -, 
and  be  not  unwilling  to  borrow  Hints  toward 
your  Improvement,  from  the  mcanell  Perfon,  nor 
to  receive  any  Glimpfe  of  Light  from  the  mod 
Unlearned.  Diligence  and  Humility  is  the  Way 
to  thrive  in  the  Riches  of  the  Underftanding,  as 
well  as  in  Gold  or  Silver.  Search  carefully  for 
the  Evidence  of  Truth,  and  dig  for  JFifdom  as 
for  hid  Treafure. 

Search  with  a  fleady  Honefty  of  Soul^  and  a  fin- 
cere  Impartiality  t-o  find  the  Truth.  Watch  a- 
gainft  every  Temptation  that  might  bribe  your 
Judgment,  or  warp  it  afide  from  Truth.  Do  not 
indulge  your  felf  to  wifi  any  unexa?nined  Propofi- 
tion were  true  or  falfe.  A  Wifh  often  perverts  the 
judgment,  and  tempts  the  Mind  flrangely  to  be- 
lieve upon  {light  Evidence  whatfoever  we  wiih  to 
be  true,  or  to  renounce  whatfoever  we  wifh  to 
be  falfe. 

V.  Dire&. 


C.  IV.       rh€  right  life  <?/Rearoh:  241 

V.  Dire5l.  Since  the  Evidence  of  the  Agree- 
ment or  Difagreement  of  two  Ideas  is  the  Ground 
of  our  AiTent  to  any  Propofition,  or  the  great  Cri- 
terion of  Truth  5  therefore  we  Jhould  fiifpend  our 
Judgment^  and  neither  affirm  or  deny  till  this  Evi- 
dence appear. 

This  Dire5iion  is  different  from  the  fecond;  for 
tho'  the  Evidence  of  the  Agreement  or  Difagreement 
of  two  Ideas  moft  times  depends  on  the  Clearnefs 
and  Dijiin^nefs  of  the  Ideas  themfelves^  yet  it  does 
not  alv/ays  arife  thence.     I'efiimony  may  be  a  fuf* 
ficient  Evidence  of  the  Agreement  or  Difagree- 
ment of  tv/o  obfcure  Ideas,  as  we  have  feen  jufl 
before  in  the  Exception  under  the  fecond  Dirpciion. 
Therefore,  tho'  Vv^e  are  not  univerfally,  and  in  all 
Cafes  bound  to  llifpend  our  Judgment  till  our  Ideas 
of  the  Obje6ls  themfelves  arc  clear  and  difiinci^  yet 
we  muft  always  fufpend  our  Judgment,  and  with* 
hold  our  AfTent  to,  or  Denial  of  any  Propofiti- 
on, //'//  fome  jufi  Evidence  appear  of  its  'Truth  or 
Falfloood.     It  is  an  Impatience  of  Doubt  and  Suf^ 
pence,  a  Rallmefs  and  Precipitance  of  Judgment, 
and  Hailinefsto  believe  fomething  on  one  Side  or 
the  other,  that  plunges  us  into  many  Errors. 

This  Diredlion  to  delay  and  fufpend  our  Allent, 
is  more  particularly  neceflary  to  be  obferv'd  when 
fiich  Propofitions  offer  themfelves  to  us  as  arc 
fupported  by  Education^  Authority^  Cuftom^  Incli^ 
nation^  Interefi^  or  other  powerful  Prejudices  >  for 
our  Judgment  is  led  away  infenfibly  to  believe  all 
that  they  di6tate}  and  where  Pi'cjud ices  and  Dan- 
gers of  Error  are  multiplied,  we  fhould  fet  the 
Itricter  Guard  upon  our  Affent. 
■  Yet  remember  the  Caution  or  Limitation  here 
which  I  gave  under  the  frft  Dire^ion  {viz)  that 
this  is  not  to  be  too  flri6tly  applied  to  Matters  of 
daily  Pra^ice^  either  in  human  Life  or  Religion  > 

R  but 


242  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  11, 

but  when  we  confider  our  felves  as  Philofophers  or 
Searchers  after  Truth ^  we  ihould  always  with-hold 
our  AlTent  where  there  is  not  juft  Evidence  : 
And  as  far  and  as  faft  as  we  can  in  a  due  Confift- 
ence  with  our  daily  neceflary  Duties,  we  Ihould 
alfo  reform  and  adjuft  all  our  Principles  and  Prac- 
tices both  in  Religion  and  the  civil  Life  by  thefe 
Rules. 

VI.  Dire^.  We  mu{\:  judge  of  every  Propofition 
hy  thofe  proper  and  peculiar  Mediums  or  Means 
whereby  the  Evidence  of  it  is  to  he  obtain' d<y  whe- 
ther it  be  Senfe^  Confcioufnefs^  Intelligence^  Rea- 
fon^  or  Teftimony.  All  our  Faculties  and  Powers 
are  to  be  employ'd  in  judging  of  their  proper  Ob- 
jects. 

If  we  judge  of  Sounds^  Colours,^  Odours^  Sapors^ 
the  Smoothnefs^  Roughnefs^  Softnefs  or  Hardnefs  of 
Bodies^  it  muft  be  done  by  the  ufe  of  our  Senfes  : 
But  then  we  muft  take  Heed  that  our  Senfes  are 
well  difpos'd,  as  fhall  be  fhewn  afterward. 

And  fince  our  Senfes  in  their  various  Exercifes 
are  in  forae  Cafes  liable  to  be  deceiv'd,  and  more 
efpecially  when  by  our  Eyes  or  Ears  we  judge  of 
the  Figure^  ^uantity^  Difiance^  and  Pojition  of 
Obje6ts  that  are  afar  off^  we  ought  to  call  our 
Reafon  in  to  the  Afliftance  of  our  Senfes,  and  cor- 
rect the  Errors  of  one  Senfe  by  the  help  of  another. 

It  is  by  the  Powers  of  Senfe  and  Reafon  join' d 
together  that  we  muft  judge  philofophically  of 
the  inward  Nature.^  the  fecret  Properties  and  Pow' 
ers^  the  Caufes  and  EffeSis^  the  Relations  and  Pro- 
portions of  a  thoufand  corporeal  Obje«5ts  which 
furround  us  on  Earth,  or  are  placed  at  a  Dilfance 
in  the  Heavens.  If  a  Man  on  the  one  Hand  con- 
fines himfelf  only  to  fenfibk  Experiments^  and  does 
not  exercife  Reafon  upon  them,  he  may  furprize 

himfelf 


C .  IV.         The  Tight  Ufe  of  Reafon.         243 

hiraCelf  and  others  with  flrange  Appearances,  and 
learn  to  entertain  the  World  with  Sights  and 
Shews,  but  will  never  become  a  Philofopher:  And 
on  the  other  Hand,  if  a  Man  impriibn  himfelf  in 
his  Clofet,  and  employ  the  moll;  exquifite  Powers 
of  Reafon  to  find  out  the  Nature  of  Things  in 
the  corporeal  World,  without  the  Ui'e  of  his 
Senfs^  and  the  Practice  of  Experiments^  he  will 
frame  to  himfelf  a  Scheme  of  Chmcras  inllead  of 
true  Philolbphy.  Hence  came  the  Invention  of 
fuhflantial  Forms  and  ^laUties^  of  Materia  Prima 
and  Privation^  with  all  the  iniignificant  Names 
us'd  by  the  Peripatetick  Writers  j  and  it  was  for 
want  of  more  Experiments  that  the  Great  Def 
cartes  fail'd  in  feveral  Parts  of  his  philofophical 
Writings. 

In  the  ahfiracied  and  fpeculatinje  Parts  of  the 
Mathematics^  which  treat  of  ^.antity  and  Num- 
ber^ the  Faculty  of  Reafon  mull  be  chiefly  em- 
ploy'd  to  perceive  the  Relation  of  'various  'Quan- 
tities^ and  draw  certain  and  ufcful  Concluficns;  but 
it  wants  the  Aliillance  o^ Senfe  alfo  to  be  acquaint- 
ed with  Lines^  Angles  and  Figures.  And  in  practical 
Mathematics  our  Senfes  have  ft  ill  greater  Emplov- 
ment. 

If  we  would  judge  of  the  pure  Properties  and 
Anions  of  the  Mind^  of  the  Nature  of  Spirits^ 
their  various  Perceptions  and  Pozvers,  we  mult  not 
enquire  of  our  Eyes  and  our  Ears,  nor  the  Images  or 
Shapes  laid  up  in  the  Brain,  but  we  rauft  have  re- 
courfe  to  our  own  Confcioufnefs  of  what  pailes  with- 
in our  own  Mind. 

If  we  are  topafs  a  Judgment  upon  any  thing  that 
relates  to  Spirits  in  a  State  of  Union  with  Animal  Na- 
ture^ and  the  mixt  Properties  oiSenfation^  Fancy ^  Ap- 
fetite^Pafjlon^  Pkafure  and  Pain^  which  arife  thencr, 
we  ijauft  confuk  our  own  Senfations  and  the  other 

R  2,  Powers 


244  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  II. 

Powers  which  we  find  in  our  felves  confider'd  zsMen 
or  Creatures  made  up  of  a  Mind  and  an  Animal  5  and 
by  juft  Reafon'mgs  deduce  proper  Confequences, 
and  improve  our  Knowledge  in  thefe  Subie6ts. 

If  we  have  Occalion  to  judge  concerning  Mat- 
ters done  in  pafi  Ages^  or  in  diftant  Countries^  and 
where  we  our  felves  cannot  be  prefent,  the  Pow- 
ers of  Senfe  and  Reafon  (for  the  moll:  part)  are  not 
fufiicient  to  inform  us,  and  we  muit  therefore  have 
recourfe  to  the  Teftimony  of  others  3  and  this  is 
either  divine  or  human. 

In  iVlatters  of  meer  human  Prudence^  we  Ihall 
find  the  greateft  Advantage  by  making  wife  Ob- 
fcrvations  on  our  own  Condutf^  and  the  Condu6b 
of  others,  and  a  Survey  of  the  Events  attending 
fuch  Condu61:.  Experience  in  this  Cafe  is  equal  to 
a  natural  Sagacity^  or  rather  fuperior.  A  Treafure 
of  Obfervations  and  Experiences  colle61:ed  by  wife 
Men,  is  of  admirable  Service  here.  And  perhaps 
there  is  nothing  in  the  World  of  this  kind  equal 
to  the  facred  Book  of  Proverbs^  even  if  we  look 
on  it  as  a  meer  human  Writing. 

In  Qiicftions  of  Natural  Religion  we  muft  ex- 
ercife  the  Faculty  o£  Reafon  which  God  has  given 
us  5  and  fince  he  has  been  pleas'd  to  afix)rd  us  his 
IVord^  we  fhould  confirm  and  improve  or  corre6t 
our  Reafonings  on  this  Subject  by  the  Divine  Af- 
fiilance  of  the  Bible. 

In  Matters  of  reveaVd  Religion^  that  is,  Chri- 
fiianity^  Judaifm^  &:c.  which  we  could  never  have 
.  known  by  the  Light  of  Nature,   the  JVord  of    i 
God  is  our  only  Foundation  and  chief  Light  >  tho' 
here  our  Reafon  muft  be  us'd  both  to  find  out  the 
true  Meaning  of  God  in  his  Word,  and  to  derive 
juft  Inferences  from  what  God  has   written,   as 
well  as  to  judge  of  the  Credentials  whereby  Di- 
vine Tefiimony  is  diftinguifh'd  from  meer  human 
.  ^efiimpnyy  or  from  Impofiure.  As 


C.  IV.        The  right  Ufe  of  Reaibn.        245 

As  Divine  Re'velation  can  never  contradI<5t  right 
Reafon^  (for  they  are  two  great  Lights  given  us 
by  our  Creator  for  our  Conduce)  fo  Reafon  ought 
by  no  Means  to  afllime  to  itfelf  a  Power  to  con- 
tradict Divine  Revelation. 

Tho'  Revelation  be  not  contrary  to  Reafon^  yet 
there  are  four  Cafes  wherein  Matters  of  RcvelAti- 
on  may  be  faid  to  rife  above  .y  or  go  beyond  our 
Reafon. 

1 .  When  Revelation  averts  two  Things  of  which 
ive  have  clear  Ideas  to  be  joined^  vjbofe  Connexion  or 
Agreeynent  is  not  difcoverable  by  Reafon  j  as  when 
Scripture  informs  us  that  The  Dead  flo all  rife^  that 
The  Earth  fjj all  be  burnt  up^  and  the  Alan  Chrifi 
fefiis  fhall  return  from  Heaven^  none  of  thcle 
Things  could  ever  be  found  out  or  prov'd  b/ 
Reafon. 

2.  When  Revelation  affirms  any  Propofition^ 
ivhile  Reafon  has  no  clear  and  dijlinfi  Ideas  of  the 
Subjett^  or  of  the  Predicate  j  as  God  created  all 
Things  by  ]t{us  Chrift:  By  the  Urim  ^«<^  Thum- 
mim  God  gave  forth  Divine  Oracles.  The  Predi- 
cate of  each  of  thefe  Propofitions  is  to  us  an  ob- 
fcure  Idea. 

^ .  When  Revelation,  in  plain  and  exprefs  Lan- 
guage^ declares  fome  DoBrine  irhich  our  Reafon  at 
prefent  knows  not  certainly  how  to  reconcile  to  fome 
of  its  own  Principles  j  as,  that  the  Child  Jefus  is 
the  mighty  God,  Efa.  ix.  6.  which  carries  a  feem- 
ing  Oppofition  to  the  Unify  and  Spirituality  of  the 
Godhead,  which  are  Principles  of  Reafon. 

4.  When  two  Propoftions  or  Dovlrines  are  affert- 
cd  by  divine  Revelation,  which  our  P^eafon  at  pre- 
fent knows  not  well  how  to  reconcile  with  one  aip- 
other;  as.  The  Father  is  the  only  true  God,  John 
xvii.  3.  and  yet  Chriji  is  over  all,  God  bleffed  for 
ever,  Rom.  ix.  f. 

R  3  Now 


246  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  11. 

Now  dh'ine  Rroclation  having   declared  thcfe 
Propofitions,  Reafon  is  bound  to   receive   them, 
bccaufc  it  cannot  prove  them  to  be  utterly  incon- 
iitlcnt  or  impoiTiblc,  tho'  the  Ideas  of  them  may 
be  obfcure,  tho'  we  ourielves  fee  not  the  rational 
Connetlion  of  them,  and  tho'  we  know  not  cer- 
tainly how  to  reconcile  them.     In   thefe  Cafes 
Reafon  muft  fubmit  to  Faith -,  that  h^ive  are  bound 
to  believe  ivhat  God  ajfcrts^   and  wait  till  he  fiiall 
clear  up  that  which  feems  dark  and  difficult,  and 
till  the  Myjlerics  of  Faith  fhall  be  farther  explain- 
ed to  us  either  in  this  World  or  in  the  World  to 
come  *,  and  Reafon  it  felf  dictates  this  Submif- 
iion. 

YVS^  Dire£iion.  It  is  veryufeful  to  have  form  ge-  ' 
neral  Pf-inciples  of  'Truth  fettled  in  the  Mind^  ivhofe- 
Evidence  is  great  and  obvious^  that  they  may  be  ai- 
rways ready  at  Hand  to  ajjifi  us  in  judging  of  the 
great  Variety  of  Things  ivhich  occur.     Thefe  may 
be  called  firfi  Notions^  or  fundamental  Principles ; 
for  tho'  many  of  them  are  deduced  from  each  o- 
ther,  yet  moft  or  all  of  them  may  be  call'd  Prin- 
ciples when  compared  with  a  thoufand  other  Judg- 
ments which  we  form  under  the  Regulation  ajid 
Influence  of  thefe  primary  Propofitions. 

Every  Art  and  Science,  as  well  as  the  Affairs  of 
civil  Life  and  Religion,  have  peculiar  Principles 
of  this  kind  belonging  to  them.  There  are  Me- 
taphyfical^  Phyftcal^  Mathematical^  Political^  Oe- 
commical^  Medicinal^  Theological^  Aloral  and  Pru- 
dential Principles  of  Judgment.  It  would  be  too 
tedious  to  give  a  Specimen  of  them  all  in  this 
Place.  Thofe  which  are  of  the  moil  univerfal 
Ufe  to  us  both  as  Men  and  as  Chrijlians^  may  be 

*  See  fomething  more  on  this  Subjeft,  DireO.  II.  frtied.  and  Chap.  V. 
Sea.  C 

2,  found 


C.  IV.         The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.^        247 

found  in  the  following  Chapter  among  the  Ruki 
of  Judgment  about  f  articular  Obje5is. 

VIIP^  Dire6iion.  Let  the  Degrees  of  your  Af- 
fent  to  every  Propo/ition  bear  an  exaSl  Proportion  to 
the  different  Degrees  of  Evidence.  Remember  this 
is  one  of  the  greateft  Principles  of  Wifdom  that 
Man  can  arrive  at  in  this  World,  and  the  beft 
human  Security  againll:  dangerous  Millakes  in  Spe- 
culation or  Practice. 

In  the  Nature  of  Things  of  which  our  Know- 
ledge is  made  up  there  is  infinite  Variety  in  their 
Degrees  of  Evidence.     And  as  God  hath  given 
our  Minds  a  Power  to  fufpend  their  Affent  till 
the  Evidence  be  plain,  fo  we  have  a  Power  to  re- 
ceive Things  which  are  propofcd  to  us  with  a 
flronger  or  weaker  Belief  in  infinite  Variety  of 
Degrees  proportionable  to  their  Evidence.     I  be- 
lieve that  the  Planets  are  inhabited^  and  I  believe 
that  the  Earth  rolls  amongfi  them  yearly  round  the 
Sun  J  but  I  don't  believe  both  thefe  Propofitions 
with  an  eq^ual  Firmnefs  of  AfTent,   becaufe  the 
Arguments  for  the  latter  are  drawn  from  mathe- 
matical Obfervations  j  but  the  Arguments  for  the 
former  are  but  probable  Conje^ures  and  moral  Rca- 
fonings.     Yet  neither  do  I  believe  either  of  theie 
Propoiitions  fo  firmly,  as  I  do  that  the  Earth  is 
about   twenty  four  thoufand  Miles  round^   becaufe 
the  mathematical  Proof  of  this   is  much   eafier^ 
plainer  and  flronger.     And  yet  farther,   when  I 
fay  that  the  Earth  was  created  by   the  Power  of 
Gody   I  have  ftill  a  more  infallible  Afiiirancc  of 
this  than  of  all  the  rell,  becaufe  Reafon  and  Scri' 
pure  join  to  aflure  me  of  it. 

YK}^  Dire5iion.     Keep  your  Alind  always  open  to 
receive  fruth^  and  never  fet  Limits  to  your  own  Im- 

R  4  provements 


248  L  0  G  I  C  K:  Or,      PaitlL 

■provements.  Be  ready  always  to  hear  what  may 
be  objefted  even  againil  your  favourite  Opinions, 
and  ihofe  which  iiave  had  longeil  Poflelfion  of 
your  Allent.  And  if  there  fhould  be  any  new  and 
uncontroulable  Evidence  brought  againil  thefe  old 
or  beloved  Sentiments,  don't  wink  your  Eyes  faft 
againft  the  Light,  but  part  with  any  Thing  for  . 
the  Sake  of  Truth :  Remember  when  you  over- 
come an  Error  you  gain  Truths  the  Victory  is 
on  your  Side,  and  the  Advantage  is  all  your 
own. 

I  confefs  thofe  grand  Principles  of  Belief  and 
PrcMlce  which  univerfally  influence  our  Condu6t 
both  with  Regard  to  this  Life  and  the  Life  to 
come,  {hould  be  fuppos'd  to  be  well  fettled  in  the 
firft  Years  of  our  Studies,  fuch  as,  the  Exijlence 
and  Providence  of  God,  the  Truth  of  Chrijiianityy 
the  Authority  of  Scripture,  the  great  Rules  of  Mo- 
rality, I3c.  We  fhould  avoid  a  light  fluttering 
Genius,  ever  ready  to  change  our  Foundations, 
and  to  be  carried  about  with  every  Wind  of  Doc- 
trine. To  guard  againil:  which  Inconvenience, 
we  fliould  labour  with  earneft  Diligence  and  fer- 
vent Prayer,  that  our  moll  fundamental  and  im- 
portant Points  of  Belief  and  Praj^tice  may  be  e- 
llablifn'd  upon  juft  Grounds  of  Reafon  and  Scri- 
pture when  we  come  to  Years  of  Difcretion,  and 
fit  to  judge  for  ourfelves  in  fuch  important  Points. 
Yet  fmce  it  is  poflible  that  the  Folly  or  Prejudices 
of  younger  Years  may  have  eftablilli'd  Perfons  in 
iome  miltaken  Sentiments,  even  in  very  important 
Matters,  we  fliould  always  hpld  ourfelves  ready 
to  receive  any  new  Advantage  toward  the  Cor- 
rcftion  or  Improvement  even  of  our  ejiablijhed 
Principles,  as  well  as  Opinions  of  Icfler  Moment. 

CHAP. 


C.  V.  S.  I .      'The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.      249 

C  H  A  P.     V. 

Special  Rules  to  direEi  us  in  judging  of  par- 
ticular  ObjeEis, 

IT  would  be  endlefs  to  run  thro'  all  thofe  par- 
ticular Objc6b  concerning  which  we  have  Oc- 
caflon  to  pafs  a  Judgment  at  one  Time  or  an- 
other. Things  of  the  moft  frequent  Occurrence, 
of  the  wideft  Extent,  and  of  the  greateft  Im- 
portance, are  the  Objefts  and  Exercifes  of  Senfe^ 
of  Reafon  and  Speculation^  the  Matters  of  Mora- 
lity^ Religion  and  Prudence^  of  human  and  divine 
"^eftimony^  together  with  the  EJfays  of  Reafoning 
upon  I'bings  pafi  and  future.  Special  Rules  relat- 
ing to  all  thefe  will  be  the  Subje6t  of  the  follow- 
ing Sections. 

Sect.     I. 

Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment  concerning  the 
Obje^s  of  Senfe. 

THO'  our  Senfes  are  fometimes  liable  to  be 
deceived,  yet  when  they  are  rightly  difpof" 
edj  and  fitly  exercifed  about  their  proper  ObjetlSj 
with  the  juft  Aflillance  of  Reafon^  they  give  us 
fufficient  Evidence  of  Truth. 

This  may  be  prov'd  by  an  Argument  drawn 
from  the  tVifdom^  Goodnefs^  and  Faithfulnefs  of 
God  our  Creator.  It  was  he  gave  us  our  Senfes^ 
and  he  would  not  make  us  of  liich  a  Conllitution 
as  to  be  liable  to  perpetual  Deception  and  una- 
VToidable  Error  in  ufing  thefe  Faculties  of  Senfe  in 
the  bell  manner  we  are  capable  of^  about  thefe 

Z,  very 


250  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part II. 

very    Things  which  are  the  proper  Objects   of 
them. 

This  may  be  proved  alfo  by  the  ill  Confequences 
that  would  follow  from  the  Suppofition  of  the  con- 
trary. If  wc  could  have  no  Certainty  of  the 
Dictates  of  our  Senfes,  we  could  never  be  fure  of 
any  of  the  common  Affairs  and  Occurrences  of 
Life.  Men  could  not  tranfa6t  any  of  their  civil 
or  moral  Concerns  with  any  Certainty  or  Juilicej 
nor  indeed  could  we  eat  or  drink,  walk  or  move 
with  Safety.     Our  Senfes  direct  us  in  all  thefe. 

Again,  the  Matters  of  Religion  depend  in  fome 
Meafur'i  upon  the  Certainty  of  the  Dilates  of 
Senfe  j  for  Faith  comes  by  Hearing  5  and  it  is  to 
our  Senfes  that  God  appeals  in  working  Miracles 
to  prove  his  own  Revelation.  Now  ir  when  our 
Eyes  and  Ears,  and  other  Organs  of  Senfe  are 
rightly  difpos'd  and  exercis'd  about  their  proper 
Objed:s,  they  were  always  liable  to  be  deceived, 
there  could  he  no  Knowledge  of  the  Gofpel,  no 
Proof  of  divine  Revelation  by  Vilions,  Voices, 
or  Miracles. 

Our  Senfes  will  difcover  Things  near  us  and 
round  about  us,  which  are  neceffary  for  our  pre- 
fent  State  with  fufficient  Exa61;nefs,  and  Things 
dillant  alfo,  fo  far  as  they  relate  to  our  neceffary 
\J(t  of  them. 

Nor  is  there  need  of  any  more  accurate  Rules 
for  the  Ufc  of  our  Senfes  in  the  Judgment  of  all 
the  common  affairs  of  Life^  or  even  of  miraculous 
and  divine  Operations^  than  the  vulgar  Part  of 
Mankind  are  fufficiently  acquainted  with  by  Na- 
ture, and  by  their  own  daily  Obfervations. 

But  if  we  would  exprefs  thefe  Rules  in  a  more 
cxa6t  .manner,  how  to  judge  by  the  Dictates  of  our 
Senfes^  they  ihould  be  reprefented  thusj 

I.  We 


C.  V.  S.  I .   '  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     251 

I .  We  muft  take  Care  that  tlie  Organs  of  our 
Senfe  be  rightly  difpos\l^  and  not  under  the  Power 
of  any  Diltemper  or  coniiderable  Decay  j  as  for 
Inflance,  that  our  Eyes  are  not  tinctured  with  the 
Jaundice^  when  we  would  judge  of  Colours^  left 
we  pronounce  them  all  yellozv :  That  our  Hands 
are  not  burning  in  a  Feirr,  nor  benumm'd  with 
Fro/^  or  the  Palfy,  when  we  would  judge  of  the 
Heat  or  Coldnefs  of  any  Object:  That  our  Palata 
be  not  vitiated  by  any  Difeafc^  or  by  fomc  other 
improper  "Tajie^  when  we  would  judge  of  the  true 
T'afie  of  any  Solid  or  Liquid.  This  Direction  re- 
lates to  all  our  Senfes^  but  the  following  Rules 
chiefly  refer  to  our  Sight. 

1.  We  muft  obferve  whether  the  Qbje^  be  at 
a  proper  Diftance^  for  if  it  be  too  near  or  too  far 
off,  our  Eyes  will  not  fufficiently  diftinguifh  ma- 
ny Things  which  are  properly  the  Objects  of 
Sight  j  and  therefore  (it  podible)  we  mull  make 
nearer  Approaches  to  the  Objc6l,  or  remove  far- 
ther from  it,  till  we  have  obtained  that  due  Dif- 
tance  which  gives  us  the  cleareft  Perception. 

3.  We  muft  not  employ  our  Sight  to  take  a 
full  Survey  at  once  of  Objeits  that  are  too  large  for 
it,  but  we  muft  view  them  by  Parts,  and  then 
judge  of  the  whole:  Nor  muft  our  Senfes  judge 
of  Objects  too  fmall,  for  fome  Things  which  ap- 
pear thro'  Glafles  to  be  really  and  djltinftly  exilt- 
ent,  are  either  utterly  invilibie,  or  greatly  con- 
fus'd  when  we  would  judge  of  them  by  the  naked 
Eye. 

4.  We  muft  place  ourfelves  in  fuch  a  Fofition 
toward  the  Objeb,  or  place  the  Object  in  fuch  a 
Fofition  toward  our  Eye,  as  may  give  us  the  clear- 
eft  Reprefentation  of  it}  for  a  different  Pofition 
greatly  alters  the  Appearance  of  the  Shape  of  Bo- 
dies.    And  for  this  Reafon  we  fhould  change  the 

Fofition 


252  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Partll. 

Pcfition  both  of  the  Eye  and  the  ObjeSt  in  feme 
Cafes,  that  by  viewing  the  Obje5l  in  fcveral  Ap- 
pearances we  may  pais  a  more  compleat  and  cer- 
tain Judgment  concerning  it. 

f.  We  muil;  confider  what  the  Medium  is  by 
ivhicb  Objects  are  repefented  to  our  Senfes j  whe- 
ther it  be  thinner  or  thicker 5  whether  it  be  Air, 
or  Vapour,  or  Water,  or  Glafs,  ^'c.  whether  it 
be  duly  enlightned  or  dusky  j  whether  it  reflect, 
or  refra6t,  or  only  tranfmit  the  Appearance  of  the 
Obje6lj  and  whether  it  be  tin6tur'd  with  any 
particular  Colour  5  whether  it  be  moving  or  at 
Reft. 

6.  We  muft  fometimes  ufe  other  Helps  to  aflift; 
our  Senfes  3  and  if  we  make  ufe  of  Glajfes^  we 
muft  make  all  juft  Allowances  for  the  Thicknefs 
or  Thinnefs  of  them,  for  the  Clearnefs  or  Dul- 
yiefs,  for  the  Smoothnefs  or  Roughnefs,  for  the 
Plainneis,  the  Convexity  or  Concavity  of  them, 
and  for  the  Diftance  at  which  thefe  Glaftes  are 
placed  from  the  Eye,  or  from  the  Object,  (or 
from  one  another,  if  there  be  two  or  more  Glaf- 
fes  ufed)  and  all  this  according  to  the  Rules  of 
Art.  The  fame  fort  of  Caution  fliould  be  ufed 
^Ifo  in  Mediums  which  ailift  the  Hearing,  fuch  as 
Speaking-l'rumpets.)  Hearing-Trumpets^  &c. 

7,  If  thf!  Object  may  be  propofed  to  more  Sen- 
fes than  otie^  let  us  call  in  the  Afliftance  of  fome 
other  Senlcs  to  examine  it,  and  this  will  increafc 
the  Evidence  of  v/hat  one  Scnfe  dictates.  Ex.  gr. 
Our  Ear  may  aftift  our  Eye  in  judging  of  the  Di- 
ftance of  Bodies,  which  are  both  viftble  and  fo- 
norous,  as  an  exploded  Canon^  or  a  Cloud  charged 
ivith  'Thunder.  Our  Feeling  may  aftift  our  Sight  in 
judging  of  the  Kind,  the  Shape,  Situation  or  Di- 
ftance of  Bodies  that  are  near  at  Hand,  as  whe- 
ther a  Garment  be  Silk  or  Stuffs  ^c.  So  if  I  both 


C.V.S.z:    The  right  Ufe  of  KQ2i(on:      2$^ 

fee^  hear^  and  embrace  my  Friendy  I  am  fure  he  is 
prefent. 

8.  We  fliould  alfo  m-skQ  fever al  Trials^  at  fome 
diftant  Times,  and  in  different  Circumftances, 
comparing  former  Experiments  with  later,  and 
our  own  Obfervations  with  thofe  of  other  Per- 
fons. 

It  is  by  fuch  Methods  as  thefe  that  modern  Phi' 
lofophy  has  been  fo  greatly  improved  by  the  life  of 
fenjible  Experiments. 

Sect.    II. 

Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment  in  Matters  of 
Reafon  and  Speculation. 

IT  is  by  Reafon  we  judge  both  in  Matters  of 
Speculation  and  Pra^ice;  there  are  peculiar 
Rules  which  relate  to  Things  pra^ical,  whether 
they  be  Matters  of  Religion^  Morality  or  Prudence^ 
yet  many  Things  in  this  Se6tion  may  be  applied 
to  practical  Enquiries,  and  Matters  of  F^/VZ?,  tho' 
it  chiefly  relates  to  Knowledge  or  Speculations  of 
Reafon. 

1 .  Whatfoever  clear  Ideas  we  can  join  toge- 
ther without  Inconfillency,  are  to  be  counted 
poffihle^  bccaufe  iVlmighty  Power  can  make  what- 
foever we  can  conceive. 

2.  From  the  mere  Pofibility  of  a  Thing  we 
cannot  infer  its  a^ual  Exijlence  j  nor  from  the 
Non-Exifience  of  it  can  we  infer  its  Impofibility . 

Note^  The  Idea  of  God  feems  to  claim  an  Ex- 
emption from  this  general  Rule,  for  if  he  be  pof- 
fible,  he  certainly  exifts,  becaufe  the  very  Idea 
includes  £/fm/>',  and  he  cannot  begin  to  be:  If 
he  exift  not,  he  is  impoffible,  for  the  very  fame 
.Reafon. 

5.  What- 


2  54  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        PartIL 

3.  Whatfoeveris  evidently  contained  in  the  Idea 
of  any  thing,  may  be  affirmed  of  that  thing  with 
Certainty.  Reafon  is  contained  in  the  Idea  of  a 
AUm-y  and  Exiftence  is  contained  in  the  Idea  of 
God  i  and  therefore  we  may  affirm  God  exijisy  and 
Alan  is  reafonable. 

4.  It  is  impoffible  that  the  lame  Thing  fhould 
be,  and  not  be  at  the  dime  Time,  and  in  the  fame 
Refpe6t.  Thence  it  follows,  that  two  contradic- 
tory Ideas  cannot  be  joined  in  the  fame  Part  of  the 
fame  Suhje^^  at  the  fame  'Time^  and  in  the  fame 

RefpeEls  :   Or,   that  t-ivo  contradictory  Propofitions 
can  ne-ver  he  both  true. 

f.  The  more  we  conveife  with  any  SubjeU  in 
its  'various  Properties^  the  better  Knowledge  of 
it  we  are  likely  to  attain  j  and  by  frequent  and  re- 
peated Enquiries  and  Experiments,  Rcafonings  and 
Converliitions  about  it,  we  confirm  our  true  Judg- 
ments of  that  Thing,  and  correct  our  former  Mif- 
takes. 

6.  Yet  after  our  utmoft  Enquiries,  we  can  ne- 
ver be  affijr'd  by  Reafon,  that  we  know  all  the 
Powers  and  Properties  of  any  finite  Being. 

7.  li  finite  Beings  are  not  adequately  known  by 
us,  much  lefs  are  Things  infinite :  For  it  is  of  the 
Nature  of  a  finite  Mind  not  to  be  able  to  compre- 
hend what  is  infinite. 

8.  We  may  judge  and  argue  very  juftly  and 
certainly  concerning  Infinites^  in  forae  Parts  of 
them,  or  fo  far  as  our  Ideas  reach,  tho'  the  Infi- 
nity of  them  hath  fomething  incomprehenilble  in 
•it.  And  this  is  built  on  the  general  Rule  folio w- 
-ing  {yiz.) 

9.  Whatfocver  is  fiifficiently  clear  and  evident, 
ought  not  to  be  denied,  tho'  there  are  other  things 
belonging  to  the  fame  Subject  which  cannot  be 
comprehended.     I  may  affirm  many  Things  with 

Certainty 


C.V.S.2;     The  right  Ufe  of'2.t^(on:      255 

Certainty  concerning  human  Soids^  their  Union  with 
Bodies^  concerning  the  Dimfihility  of  Matter^  and 
the  Attributes  of  God^  tho'  many  other  liiings 
relating  to  them  are  all  Darknefs  to  us. 

10.  If  an  Opinion  propos'd  has  either  no  Ar- 
guments^ or  equal  Arguments  for  and  againlt  it,  we 
mull  remain  in  perfe6t  Sufpenfe  about  it,  till  con- 
vincing Evidence  appear  on  one  Side. 

1 1 .  Where  prefent  Neceffity  of  Action  does 
not  conftrain  us  to  determine,  we  fhould  not  im- 
mediately yield  up  our  AfTent  to  meer  probable 
Arguments^  without  a  due  Refei-ve,  if  wc  have  any 
reafonable  Hope  of  attaining  greater  Light  ani 
Evidence  on  one  Side  or  the  other :  For  when  the 
Balance  of  the  Judgment  once  religns  its  Equili- 
brium or  Neutrality  to  a  meer  probable  xA-rgument, 
it  is  too  ready  to  fettle  itfelf  on  that  Side,  fo  that 
the  Mind  will  not  eafily  change  that  Judgment, 
tho'  bright  and  ftrong  Evidence  appear  afterwards 
on  the  other  Side. 

1 1.  Of  two  Opinions  if  one  has  unanfiverahk 
Difficulties  attending  it,  we  muft  not  reject  it  im- 
mediately, till  we  examine  whether  the  contrary 
Opinion  has  not  Difficulties  as  iinanpuoerable . 

1 3 .  If  each  Opinion  has  Objehions  againfl  it 
which  we  cannot  anfwer,  or  reconcile,  we  fhould 
rather  embrace  that  which  has  the  leaf  Difficul- 
ties in  it,  and  which  has  the  befl  Argurments  to  fupr 
port  it  ;  And  let  our  Allent  bear  Proportion  to 
the  fuperior  Evidence. 

14.  If  any  Doctrine  hath  very  ftrong  and  fuf- 
ficient  Light  and  Evideme  to  command  our  Aflent, 
we  fhould  not  reject  it  becaufe  there  is  an  Objec- 
tion or  two  againfl  it  which  we  are  not  able  to 
anfwer }  for  upon  this  Foot  a  common  Chriftian 
would  be  baffled  out  of  every  Article  of  1ms  Faith^ 
and  mufl  renounce  even  the  Diktat ei  of  his  Rea-, 

fori 


1S6  L  0  G  T  C  K:  Or,      Pan  II. 

/on  and  his  Senfes;  and  the  mofl:  learned  Man  per- 
haps would  hold  but  very  few  of  them  flifl  5  for 
fome  Objections  which  attend  the  facred  Doc- 
trines of  the  Eternity  and  the  Omniprjfence  of 
Gody  and  the  philofophical  Doctrines  of  Light^ 
Atoms^  Space^  Motion^  &c,  are  hardly  folvable  to 
this  Day. 

If.  Where  two  Extremes  are  propofed  either 
in  Matters  of  Speculation  or  Praftice,  and  neither 
of  them  has  certa'ni  and  convincing  Evidence^  it  is 
generally  fafell  to  take  the  m?ddle  M'^ay.  Modera- 
tion is  more  likely  to  come  near  the  Truth  than 
doubtful  Extremes.  This  is  an  excellent  Rule  to 
judge  of  the  Characters  and  lvalue  of  the  greatell 
Part  of  Perfons  and  'Things  5  for  Nature  feldoni 
deals  in  Superlatives.  It  is  a  good  Rule  alfo  by 
which  to  form  our  Judgment  in  many  fpeculative 
Controverfies  5  a  reconciling  Medium  in  fuch  Cafes 
does  often  beil  fecure  Truth  as  well  as  Peace. 

16.  When  two  different  Proportions  have  each 
a  very  firong  and  cogent  Evidence^  and  do  not  plain- 
ly appear  inconfillent,  we  may  believe  both  of 
them,  tho'  we  cannot  at  prefent  fee  the  Way  to 
reconcile  them.  Reafon^  as  well  as  our  own  Con^ 
fcioufnefsy  allures  us  that  the  f-Fill  of  Man  is  free^ 
and  that  Multitudes  of  human  Anions  are  in  that 
RefpeU  contingents  and  yet  Reafon  and  Scripture 
alllire  us  that  God  foreknows  them  all^  and  this  im- 
plies a  necejfary  Futurity.  Now  tho'  learned  Men 
have  not  to  this  Day  hit  on  any  clear  and  happy 
Method  to  reconcile  thefe  Propofitions,  yet  fince 
we  do  not  fee  a  plain  Inconfifiency  in  them,  we 
juftly  believe  them  both,  becaufe  their  Evidence 
is  great. 

17.  Let  us  not  therefore  too  fuddenly  determine 
in  difficult  Matters  that  two  Things  are  utterly  in- 
conftjient:  For  there  are  many  Propofitions  which 

may 


C.  V.  S.  2.    The  right  Ufe  ^Reafon."        257 

may  appear  inconfiflent  at  firfl:,  and  yet  afterwards 
we  find  their  Confiftency^  and  the  Way  of  recon- 
ciling them  may  be  made  plain  and  eafy :  As  alfo, 
there  are  other  Propofitions  which  may  appear 
confiflent  at  fir  ft,  but  after  due  Examination  we 
find  their  Inconfiftency. 

18.  For  the  fame  Reafort  we  fhould  not  call 
thofe  Difficulties  utterly  infohabJe^  or  rhofe  Ob- 
jections unanfwerahk^  which  we  are  not  prefently 
able  to  anfwer :  Timi.  and  Diligence  may  give  far- 
ther Light. 

I  p.  In  fhort,  if  we  will  fecure  ourfelves  from 
Error,  we  fhould  not  be  too  frequent  or  hafty  in 
aflerting  the  certain  Confijiency  or  Inconfijiency^ihe 
abfolute  UniverfaUty^  Necejfity^  or  Im'poJJibility  of 
Things,   where  there  is   not  the  brighteft   Evi- 
dence.    He  is  but  a  young  and  raw  l^hilofopher, 
who,  when  he  fees  two  particular  Ideas  evidently 
agree^  immediately  aflerts  them  to  agree  univer- 
frlly-i  to  agree  necejjarily^  and  that  it  is  impojfihle  it 
jhould  he  otherivife :  Or:  when  he  fees  evidently  two 
particular  Ideas  difagree^  he  prefently  afferts  their 
natural  Inconftjiency^  their  utter  Impoffihility  of  A- 
greement,  and  calls  every  thing  contrary  to  his 
Opinion  Ahfurdity  and  Nonfenfe.     A  true  Philo* 
fopher  will  affirm  or  deny  with  much  Caution 
and  Modefty,  unlefs  he  has  thoroughly  examined 
and  found  the  Evidence  of  every  Part  of  his  Af- 
fertion  exceeding  plain.  «^ 

20.  Let  us  have  a  Care  of  building  our  AfTur- 
ance  of  any  important  Point  of  Doftrine  upon  o?ie 
ftngle  Argument^  if  there  are  more  to  be  obtained. 
We  fhould  not  flight  and  reject  all  other  Argu- 
ments which  fupport  the  fame  DoCtrine,  left  if 
our  favourite  Argument  ftiould  be  refuted,  and  fail 
us,  we  fhould  be  tempted  to  abandon  that  import- 
ant Principle  of  Truth.    I  think  this  was  a  very 

S  culpable 


25S  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Part  Ii: 

culpable  Pra6tice  in  Defcartes^  and  fome  of  his 
Followers,  who  when  he  had  found  out  the  Ar- 
gument for  the  Exifience  of  God^  derived  from  the 
Idea  of  a  moft  perfe^  and  felf-exijient  Beings  he 
feemed  to  defpife,  cancel,  and  abandon  all  other 
Arguments  againft  Atheifin. 

21.  If  we  happen  to  have  our  chief  Arguments 
for  any  Opinion  refuted,  we  fhould  not  immedi- 
ately give  up  the  Opnion  itfelf  j  for  perhaps  it 
may  be  a  Truth  ftill,  and  we  may  find  it  to  be 
juftly  fupported  by  other  Arguments,  which  we 
might  once  think  weaker,  or  perhaps  by  new  Ar- 
guments which  we  knew  not  before. 

12.  We  ought  to  eftecm  that  to  be  fufficient 
Evidence  of  a  Propfttion^  where  both  the  Kind 
and  the  Force  of  the  Arguments  or  Proofs  are  as 
great  as  the  Nature  of  the  Thing  admits,  and  as 
the  Neceflity  or  Exigence  of  the  Cafe  requires. 
So  if  we  have  a  credible  and  certain  1'ejiimony  that 
Chrijl  rofe  from  the  Dead^  it  is  enough  >  we  are 
not  to  expert  mathematical  or  ocular  Demonfirati' 
on  for  it,  at  leaft  in  our  Day. 

2  3 .  Tho'  we  fhould  feek  what  Proofs  may  be 
attain'd  of  any  Propofition,  and  we  lliould  receive 
any  Number  of  Arguments  which  are  juft  and 
evident  for  the  Confirmation  of  the  fame  Truth, 
yet  we  muft  not  iudge  of  the  Truth  of  any  Pro- 
pofition by  the  Number  of  Arguments  which  are 
brought  to  fupport  it,  but  by  the  Strength  and 
JVeight  of  them :  A  Building  will  fland  firmer  and 
longer  on  four  large  Pillars  of  Marble,  than  on 
ten  of  Sand,  or  Earth,  or  Timber. 

24.  Yet  where  certain  Evidence  is  not  to  be 
found  or  expected,  a  confidcrable  Number,  of  -pro- 
hable  Arguments  cany  great  Weight  with  thera 
even  in  Matters  of  Speculation.  That  is  a  proba- 
ble Hypothefis  in  Philofophy  or  in  Theology^  whick 

goes 


C .  V.  S.  3 .     "J^he  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.      259 

goes  farthell:  toward  the  Solution  of  many  diffi- 
cult Queflions  ariiing  on  any  Subject.   . 

Sec  t.     III. 

Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment  in   Matters   of 
Morality  and  Religion. 

HERE  it  may  be  proper  in  the  firfl:  Place  to 
mention  a  few  Definitions   of  Words  or 
;  I  erms. 

f'  By  Matters  of  Morality  and  Religion^  I  mean 
thofe  things  which  relate  to  our  Duty  to  God, 
our  Selves,  or  our  Fellow-Creatures. 

Moral  Good,  or  Virtue,  or  Holinefs,  is  an  Ac- 
tion or  Temper  conformable  to  the  Rule  of  our 
Puty.  Moral  Evil,  or  Fice,  or  Sin,  is  an  A6tion 
or  Temper  unconformable  to  the  Rule  of  our 
Duty,  or  a  Negle6t  to  fulfil  it. 

Note,  The  Words  Fice  or  Firtue  chiefly  imply 
the  Relation  of  our  Actions  to  Men  and  this 
World :  Sin  and  Holinefs  rather  imply  their  Re- 
lation to  God  and  the  other  World. 

Natural  Good  is  that  which  gives  us  Plcafure  or 
Satisfa6tion.  Natural  Evil  is  that  which  gives  us 
Pain  or  Grief 

Happinefs  confifts  in    the  Attainment  of  the 

highell  and  molt  lafting  natural  Good.     Mifery 

confifts  in  fuffering   the  higheft  and  moffc  lall- 

•  ing  natural  Evil  j   that  is,  in   fhorr,    Heaven  or 

Hell. 

Tho'  this  be  a  juft  Account  of  perfeB  Happi^ 
nefs  and  perfeB  Mifery,  yet  wherefoever  Pain  o- 
verbalances  Pleafure,  there  is  a  Degree  of  Mifery  -, 
and  wherefoever  Pleafure  overbalances  Pain^  there 
is  a  Degree  of  Happinefs. 

S  z  I  proceed 


260  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  11. 

I  proceed  now  to  lay  down  fome  Principles  and 
Rules  of  Judgment  in  Matters  of  Morality  and  Re- 
ligion. 

1 .  The  Will  of  our  Maker,  whether  difcover- 
ed  by  Reafon  or  Revelation,  carries  the  highefl 
Authority  with  it,  and  is  therefore  the  highefi 
Rule  of  Duty  to  intelligent  Creatures  j  a  Confor- 
mity or  Non-Conformity  to  it  determines  their 
Actions  to  be  morally  good  or  ewl. 

2.  Whatfoever  is  really  an  immediate  Duty  to- 
ward our  felves,  or  toward  our  Fellow-Creatures, 
is  more  remotely  a  Duty  to  God ;  and  therefore  in 
the  Pra6bice  of  it  we  ihould  have  an  Eye  to  the 
iVill  of  God  as  our  Rtile^  and  to  his  Glory  as  our 
End. 

3.  Our  wife  and  gracious  Creator  has  clofely 
united  our  Duty  and  our  Happinefs  together  >  and 
has  connedted  Sin^  or  F'ice^  and  Punijhment  -,  that 
is,  he  has  ordained  that  the  highefi  natural  Good 
and  Evil  fhould  have  a  clofe  Connection  with  mo- 
ral Good  and  Evil^  and  that  both  in  the  Nature 
of  Things,  and  by  his  own  pofitive  Appoint- 
ment. 

4.  Confcience  fhould  feek  all  due  Information 
in  order  to  determine  what  is  Duty  .^  and  what 
is  Sin^  becaufe  Happinefs  and  Mifery  depend  up- 
on it. 

f .  On  this  Account  our  Inclination  to  prefent 
temporal  Good^  and  our  Averfion  to  prefent  tempo- 
ral Evil^  muft  be  wifely  overbalanced  by  the  Con- 
iideration  of  future  and  eternal  Good  or  Evil,  that 
is,  Happinefs  or  Mifery.  And  for  this  Reafon  we 
fhould  not  omit  a  Duty,  or  commit  a  Sin,  to 
gain  any  temporal  Good,  or  to  avoid  any  tempo- 
ral Evil. 

6.  Tho' 


C.  V.  S.  3.   The  right  Ufe  ^^/^Reafon.     261 

6.  Tho'  our  natural  Reafon  in  a  State  of  Inno- 
cence might  be  fufficient  to  find  out  thofe  Duties 
which  were  neceffary  for  an  innocent  Creature,  in 
order  to  abide  in  the  Favour  of  his  Maker,  yet  in 
a  fallen  State  our  natural  Reafon  is  by  no  means 
fufficient  to  find  out  all  that  is  necelTaiy  to  rejlore 
a  finful  Creature  to  the  divine  Favour. 

7.  Therefore  God  hath  condefcended  in  vari- 
ous Ages  of  Mankind  to  reveal  to  finful  Men  what 
he  requires  of  them  in  order  to  their  Ref  oration^ 
and  has  appointed  in  his  Word  fome  peculiar  Mat- 
ters of  Faith  and  Pra6tice,  in  order  to  their  Sal- 
vation. This  is  called  revealed  Religion^  as  the 
Things  knowable  concerning  God,  and  our  Du- 
ty by  the  Light  of  Nature  are  called  natural  Re- 
ligion. 

8.  There  are  alfo  many  Parts  of  Morality^  and 
natural  Religion^  or  many  natural  Duties  relating 
to  God,  to  our  felves,  and  to  our  Neighbours, 
which  would  be  exceeding  difficult  and  tedious 
for  the  Bulk  of  Mankind  to  find  out  and  deterr 
mine  by  natural  Reafon  5  therefore  it  has  pleafed 
God  in  this  facred  Book  of  Divine  Revelation  to 
exprefs  the  mofl  neceflary  Duties  of  this  kind  in 
a  very  plain  and  eafy  manner,  and  made  them  in- 
telligible to  Souls  of  the  lowed  Capacity}  or  they 
may  be  very  eafily  derived  thence  by  the  Ufe  of 
Reafon. 

9.  As  there  are  fome  Duties  much  more  necef- 
fary^ and  more  important  than  others  are,  fo  every 
Duty  requires  our  Application  to  underftand  and 
pradife  it  in  Proportion  to  its  Neceffty  and  Im- 
■portance. 

10.  Where  two  Duties  feem  to  ftand  in  Op- 
pofition  to  each  other,  and  we  cannot  pra6tife 
both,  the  lefs  muft  give  Way  to  the  greater^  and 
the  Omiffion  of  the  lefs  is  not  finful.     So  ceremo- 

S  5  nial 


262  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  II. 

nial  Lmvs  give  Way  to  moral:   God  will  have 
Mercy  and  not  Sacrifice. 

1 1 .  In  Duties  of  natural  Religion^  we  may 
judge  of  che  different  Degrees  of  their  Neceflity 
and  Importance  by  Reafon^  according  to  their  ' 
greater  or  more  apparent  Tendency  to  the  Ho- 
nour of  God  and  the  good  of  Men :  But  in  Mat- 
ters of  reveaPd  Religion,  it  is  only  divine  Revela^ 
tion  can  certainly  inform  us  what  is  moll  neceflli- 
ry  and  molt  important  5  yet  we  may  be  affifted 
alfo  in  that  Search  by  the  Exercifes  of  Reafon. 

1 1.  In  Actions  wherein  there  may  h&fome  Scrii' 
fie  about  the  Duty  or  Lawfulnefs  of  them,  we 
ihould  choofe  always  the  fi^fefi  Side,  and  abitain 
as  far  as  we  can  from  the  Practice  of  Things  whofe 
Lawfulnefs  we  fufpe6t. 

1 3 .  Points  of  the  greatefi  importance  in  human 
Life,  or  in  Religion,  are  generally  the  moji  evi- 
dent, both  in  the  Nature  of  Things,  and  in  the 
Word  of  God  5  and  where  Points  of  Faith  or 
Pra6tice  are  exceeding  difficult  to  find  out,  they 
cannot  be  exceeding  important.  This  Propofition 
may  be  proved  by  th6  Goodnefs  and  Faithfulnels 
of  God,  as  well  as  by  Experience  and  Obfer- 
vation. 

14.  In  fome  of  the  outward  Pradices  and 
Forms  of  Religion,  as  well  as  human  Affairs, 
there  is  frequently  ^prefcnt  Necejjity  of  fpeedy  Ac- 
tion  one  Way  or  another :  In  fuch  a  Cafe,  hav- 
ing furvcyed  Arguments  on  both  Sides,  as  fir  as 
our  Time  and  Circumftances  admit,  we  mud 
^uide  our  Practice  by  thofe  Reafons  which  appear 
moft  probable,  and  feem  at  that  Time  to  overbalance 
the  reft  3  yet  always  referving  room  to  admit  far- 
ther Light  and  Evidence,  when  fuch  Occurrences 
return  again.  It  is  a  Prepondcration  of  circumfiantial 

Arguments 


C.  V.  S.  4.      The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     26 ^ 

Argurrients  that  muft  determine  our  A6lions  in  ji 
thoufand  Occurrences. 

I  f.  We  may  alfo  determine  upon  probable  Ar- 
guments where  the  Matter  is  of  fmall  Confequence^ 
and  would  not  anfwer  the  Trouble  of  fecking  af- 
ter Certainty.  Life  and  Time  are  more  precious 
than  to  have  a  large  Share  of  them  laid  out  in 
fcrupulous  Enquiries,  whether  finoaking  Tobacco^ 
or  wearing  a  Periwig  be  lawful  or  no. 

16.  In  AfRiirs  oi greater  Importance^  and  which 
may  have  a  long  and  lafting,  and  extcnfive  Influ- 
ence on  our  future  Condu6t  or  Happinels,  we 
ihould  not  take  up  with  Probabilities^  if  Certain- 
ty may  be  attained.  Where  there  is  any  Doubt 
on  the  Mind,  in  fuch  Cafes  we  ihould  call  in  the 
Affiftance  of  all  manner  of  Circumllances,  Rca- 
fons,  Motives,  Confequences  on  all  Sides  :  We 
muft  wait  longer,  and  with  earneft  Rcqueft  feek 
human  and  divine  Advice  before  we  fully  deter- 
mine our  Judgment  and  our  Pra61:icc,  according 
to  the  old  Roman  Sentence,  ^uod  ftatuendum  efi 
femel^  deliberandum  efi  din.  We  fhould  be  long 
in  conlidering  what  we  muft  determine  once 
for  all. 

S  E  C  T.      IV. 

Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment  in  Matters  of  hu- 
man Prudence. 

TH  E  great  Defign  of  Prudence^  as  diftin(5t 
from  Morality  and  Religion.,  is  to  determine 
and  manage  every  Affair  with  Decency,  and  to 
the  beft  Advantage. 

That  is  decent^  which  is  agreeable  to  our  State, 
Condition,  or  Circumftances,  whether  it  be  in 
Behaviour,  Difcourfe,  or  Adion. 

S  4         ^  That 


264  L  0  G  I  C  K:  Ofy     Part  II. 

That  is  advantagious  which  attains  the  moft  and 
bell  Purpofes,  and  avoids  the  moft  and  greateft 
Inconveniencies. 

As  there  is  infinite  Variety  in  the  Circumfiances 
of  Perfons^  'Things^  ABions^  Times  and  Places^  fo 
we  mull  be  furnilhed  with  fuch  general  Rules  as 
are  accommodable  to  all  this  Variety  by  a  wife  , 
Judgment  and  Diicretion  :  For  what  is  an  A61  of 
confummate  Prudence  in  fome  1'mes^  Places  and 
Circumfiances^  would  be  confummate  Folly  in  o- 
thers.  Now  thefe  Rules  may  be  ranged  m  the 
following  manner. 

1 .  Our  Regard  to  Perfons  or  Things  fhould  be 
governed  by  the  Degree  of  Concernment  we  have 
with  them,  the  Relation  we  have  to  them,  or  the 
ExpeSiation  we  have  from  them.  Thefe  fhould 
be  the^  Meafures  by  which  we  fhould  proportion 
our  Diligence  and  Application  in  any  thing  that 
relates  to  them. 

2.  We  Ihould  always  confider  whether  the 
Thing  we  purfue  be  attainable;  whether  it  be 
ivorthy  our  Purfuit-,  whether  it  be  worthy  the^ 
Degree  of  Purfiiit  >  whether  it  be  worthy  of  the 
Means  ufed  in  order  to  attain  it.  This  Rule  is 
neceflary  both  in  Matters  of  Knowledge^  and  Mat- 
.tcrs  of  Practice, 

3.  When  the  Advantages  and  Difadvantages^ 
Ccaveniencies  and  Inconveniencies  of  any  Action  are 
balanced  together,  we  mull  finally  determine  on 
that  Side  which  has  the  fuperior  Weight  j  and 
the  fooner  in  things  which  are  neceflarily  and  fpee- 
dily  to  be  done  or  determined. 

4.  If  Advantages   and  Difadvantages  in    their 
.  own  Nature  are  equal,  then  thofe  which  ate  moffc 

certain  or  likely  as  to  the  Event  Hiould  turn  the 
ScaJie  of  our  Judgment,  and  determine  our  Prac- 
tice. 

f ,  Where 


C.  V.  S.  4.     I'he  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.      265 

f.  Where  the  Improbabilities  of  Succefs  or  Ad- 
vantage are  greater  than  the  Probabilities^  it  is 
not  Prudence  to  a6t  or  venture.  It  is  proper  to 
enquire  whether  this  be  not  the  Cafe  in  almoil  all 
Lotteries ;  for  they  that  hold  Stakes  will  certainly 
fecure  Part  to  themfelves  3  and  only  the  Remain- 
der being  divided  into  Prizes  muft  render  the  Im- 
probability of  Gain  to  each  Adventurer  greater  than 
the  Probability. 

6.  We  fhould  not  defpife  or  negleft  any  real 
Advantage^  and  abandon  the  Purfuit  of  it,  tho* 
we  cannot  attain  all  the  Advantages  that  we  dc- 
lire.  This  would  be  to  a6t  like  Children^  who 
are  fond  of  fomething  which  ftrikes  their  Fancy 
molt,  and  fullen  and  regardlefs  of  every  thing  elfe, 
if  they  are  not  humour'd  in  that  Fancy. 

7.  Tho'  a  general  Knowledge  of  Things  be  ufc- 
ful  in  Science  and  in  human  Life,  yet  we  fhould 
content  our  felves  with  a  more  fupcrficial  Know- 
ledge of  thofe  things  which  have  the  lead  Rela^ 
tion  to  our  chief  End  and  Defign. 

8. This  Rule  holds  good  alfo  in  Matters  of  Bn- 
finefs  and  Pra^ice^  as  well  as  in  Matters  of  Know- 
ledge i  and  therefore  we  fiould  not  grafp  at  every 
things  left  in  the  End  we  attain  nothing.  Perfons 
that  either  by  an  Inconftancy  of  Temper,  or  by 
a  vain  Ambition,  will  purfue  every  fort  of  Art 
and  Science,  Study  and  Bufinefs,  feldom  grow  ex- 
cellent in  any  one  of  them :  And  Projectors  who 
form  twenty  Schemes  feldom  ufe  fufficient  Ap- 
plication to  finifh  one  of  them,  or  make  it  turn 
to  good  Account. 

9.  Take  Heed  of  delaying  and  trifling  amongft 
the  Means  inftead  of  reaching  at  the  End.  Take 
heed  of  wafting  a  Life  in  meer  fpeculative  Studies, 
which  is  called  to  Adiion  and  Einployment :  Dwell 
RQt  too   long  in  philafophicaly    Tnathematical^    or 

grammatical 


2(56  LOGIC  K:  Or,       Partll. 

grammatical  Parts  of  Learning,  when  your  chief 
Defign  is  Law  ^  Phyfick^  or  Divinity,  Don't 
fpend  the  Day  in  gathering  Flowers  by  the  Way 
Side,  left  Night  come  upon  you  before  you  ar- 
rive at  your  Journey's  End,  and  then  you  will  not 
reach  it. 

10.  Where  the  Cafe  and  Circumftances  of  wife 
and  good  Men  referable  our  own  Cafe  and  Circum" 
fiances^  we  may  borrow  a  great  deal  of  Inftru6ti- 
on  toward  our  prudent  Condu6l:  from  their  Exam- 
ple<y  as  well  as  in  all  Cafes  we  may  learn  much 
from  their  Converfation  and  jidvice. 

1 1 .  After  all  other  Rules  remember  this,  that 
mere  Speculation  in  Matters  of  human  Prudence  can 
never  be  a  perfe6t  Dire<5bor  without  Experience  and 
Obfervation.  We  may  be  content  therefore  in 
our  younger  Years  to  commit  fome  unavoidable 
Miftakes  in  Point  of  Prudence,  and  we  fhall  fee 
Miftakes  enough  in  the  Conduct  of  others,  both 
which  ought  to  be  treafur'd  up  amongft  our  ufe- 
ful  Ohfervations^  in  order  to  teach  us  better  Judg- 
ment for  Time  to  come.  Sometimes  the  Mif 
takes^  Imprudences  and  Follies^  which  our  felves  or 
others  have  been  guilty  of,  give  us  brighter  and 
more  effectual  LefTons  of  Prudence^  than  the  wi- 
feft  Counfels^  and  the  faireft  Examples  could  ever 
have  done. 

Sect.  V. 

Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment  in  Matters  of 
human  Teflimony, 

THE  Evidence  of  human  I'eftimony  is  not  fo 
proper  to  lead  us  into  the  Knowledge  of 
the  Effence  and  inward  Nature  of  Things,  as  to 
acquaint  us  with  the  Exifteme  of  Things,  and  to 

inform 


C.  V.  S.  5.     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     267 

jnform  us  of  Matters  of  Fa^  both  paft  and  pre- 
fent.  And  tho'  there  be  a  great  deal  of  FaUibiUty 
in  the  Teftimony  of  Men,  yet  there  are  fome 
Things  we  may  be  almoft  as  certain  ofj  as  that 
the  Sunjloines^  or  that  Jive  Twenties  make  a  Hun- 
dred. Who  is  there  at  London  that  knows  any 
thing  of  the  World,  but  believes  there  is  fuch  a 
City  as  Paris  in  France  j  that  the  Pope  dwells  at 
Rome  5  that  Julius  C^efar  was  an  Emperor^  or  that 
Luther  had  a  great  Hand  in  the  Reformation  ? 

If  we  obferve  the  following  Rules,  we  may  ar- 
rive at  fuch  a  Certainty  in  many  Things  of  human 
Teftimony,  as  that  it  is  morally  impoilible  we 
fhould  be  deceived,  /.  e.  we  may  obtain  a  moral 
Certainty. 

1 .  Let  us  confider  whether  the  Thing  report- 
ed be  in  itkM  poffible;  if  not,  it  can  never  be 
credible^  whofoever  relates  it. 

2.  Confider  farther  whether  it  be  probable,  whe- 
ther there  arc  any  concurring  Circumfiances  to  prove 
it,  befide  the  mere  Tellimony  of  the  Pcrfon  that 
relates  it.  I  confefs  if  thefe  lad  Conditions  arc 
wanting,  the  thing  may  be  tme,  but  then  it 
ought  to  have  the  ftronger  Tellimony  to  fup- 
port  it. 

3 .  Confider  whether  the  Perfon  who  relates  it 
be  capable  of  knowing  the  'Truth :  Whether  he  be 
a  skilful  Judge  in  fuch  Matters,  if  it  be  a  Bufinefs 
of  Art,  or  a  nice  Appearance  in  Nature,  or  fomc 
curious  Experiment  in  Philofophy.  But  if  it  be 
a  mere  Occurrence  in  Life,  a  plain,  fenfible  Mat- 
ter of  Fa6V,  it  is  enough  to  enquire  whether  he 
who  relates  it  w^^re  an  Eye  or  Ear-JVitnefs,  or 
whether  he  himfelf  had  it  only  by  Hear  fay,  or  can 
t:race  it  up  to  the  Original. 

4,  Confider 


268  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  IT. 

4.  Confider  whether  the  Narrator  be  honefi  and 
faithful^  as  well  as  skilful :  Whether  he  hath  no 
Biafs  upon  his  Mind,  no  peculiar  Gain  or  Profit 
by  believing  or  reporting  it,  no  Interefl  or  Prin- 
ciple which  might  warp  his  own  Belief  afide  from 
Truth,  or  which  might  tempt  him  to  prevaricate, 
to  fpeak  falfly,  or  to  give  a  Reprefentation  a  lit- 
tle different  from  the  naked  Truth  of  Things.  In 
fhort,  whether  there  be  no  Occafion  of  Sufpicion 
concerning  his  Report. 

5*.  Conllder  whether  feveral  Per/ons  agree  toge- 
ther in  the  Report  of  this  Matter  j  and  if  fo,  then 
whether  thefePerfons  who  join'd  together  in  their 
Teftimony  might  not  be  ifuppos'd  to  combine  to- 
gether in  a  FalJJoood.  Whether  they  are  Perfons 
oi  fufficient  Skilly  Probity  and  Credit.  It  might 
be  alfo  enquired  whether  they  are  of  different  Na- 
tions, Se6is,  Parties,  Opinions,  or  Interefts.  For 
the  more  divided  they  are  in  all  thefe,  the  more 
likely  is  their  Report  to  be  true,  if  they  agree  to- 
gether in  their  Account  of  the  fame  Thing  j 
and  efpecially   if  they  perfift  in  it  without  wa- 


venng, 


6.  Confider  farther,  whether  the  Report  were 
capable  of  being  eafily  refuted  at  firft  if  it  had  not 
been  true ;  if  fo,  this  confirms  the  Teftimony. 

7.  Enquire  yet  again,  whether  there  hath  been 
ji  confiant^  uniform  tradition  and  Belief  of  this 
Matter  from  the  very  firft  Age  or  Time  when  the 
Thing  was  tranflifted,  without  any  reafonable 
Doubts  or  Contradi6bions.     Or, 

8.  If  any  Part  of  it  hath  been  doubted  by  any 
confiderable  Perfons,  whether  it  has  been  parch- 
ed out  and  afterwards  confirmed^  by  having  all  the 
Scruples  and  Doubts  removed.  In  either  of  thefe 
Cafes  the  Teftimony  becomes  more  firm  and  cre- 
dible. 

&  p.  En(^u.ii'' 


C.  V.S.  5.    The  right  Ufe  ^^/Rcafon.       26^ 

p.  Enquire  on  the  other  Hand,  whether  there 
are  any  confiderable  OhjeCfions  reinaining  againft  the 
BeHef  of  that  Propofition  fo  attefted.  Whether 
there  be  any  thing  very  improbable  in  the  thing  it 
(elf.  Whether  any  concurrent  Cir  cum  fiances  feem 
to  oppofe  it.  Whether  any  Perfon  or  Peribns  giv^e 
^  pofitrue  and  plain  Tefiimony  againfl  it.  Whether 
they  are  equally  skilful^  and  equally  faithful  as  thoie 
■  who  affert  it.  Whether  they  be  as  many  or  more 
in  Number,  and  whether  they  might  have  a- 
ny  fecret  Biafs  or  Influence  on  them  to  contra- 
did  it. 

10.  Sometimes  the  entin Silence  of  a  Thingm^y 
have  fomething  of  Weight  toward  the  Decilion 
of  a  doubtful  Point  of  Hiftory,  or  a  Mutter  of 
human  Faith,  (r/.r..)  where  the  Fait  is  pretended 
to  be  publick,  if  the  Perfons  who  are  filent  about 
it  were  skilful  to  obferve,  and  could  not  but  know 
fuch  an  Occurrence  -,  if  they  were  engaged  by 
Principle  or  by  Intereft  to  have  declared  it;  if 
they  had  fair  Opportunity  to  fpeak  of  it :  And 
thefe  Things  may  tend  to  make  a  Matter  fufpici- 
ous,  if  it  be  not  very  well  atteilcd  by  pofitive 
Proof 

1 1 .  Remember  that  in  fome  Reports  there  are 
more  Marks  of  Faljhood  than  of  Truth ^  and  in  o- 
thers  there  are  more  Marks  of  Truth  than  of  Falf- 
hood.  By  a  Comparifon  of  all  thefe  things  toge- 
ther, and  putting  every  Argument  on  one  Side 
and  the  other  into  the  Balance,  we  mull  form  as 
good  a  Judgment  as  we  can  which  Side  prepon- 
derates J  and  give  a  ftrong  or  a  feeble  Aflcnt  or 
Diflent,  or  with-hold  our  Judgment  entirely,  ac- 
cording to  greater  or  lejfer  Evidence^  according  to 
more  plain  or  dubious  Marks  of  Truth  or  Falf- 
hood. 

iZr,  Obferve 


2-70  LOGIC  K:  Or,       PartIL 

I  z.  Obfervc  that  in  Matters  of  human  Tefti- 
mony,  there  is  oftentimes  a  great  Mixture  of  Truth 
with  FaJJJjood  in  the  Report  itfelf :  Some  Parts  of 
the  Story  may  be  perfe6tly  true,  and  fome  utter- 
ly falfej  and  ibme  may  have  fuch  a  blended  Con- 
fufion  of  Circumftances  which  are  a  Httie  warpt 
afide  from  the  Truth,  and  mifreprefented,  that 
there  is  need  of  good  Skill  and  Accuracy  to  form 
a  Judgment  concerning  them,  and  determine 
■which  Part  is  true,  and  which  is  falfe.  The  whole 
Report  is  not  to  be  beheved,  becaufe  fome  Parts  arc 
indubitably  true^  nor  the  whole  to  be  rejecced,  be- 
caufe fome  Parts  are  as  evident  Faljhoods. 

We  may  draw  two  remarkable  Obfervations 
from  this  Section. 

Obferv.  I.  How  certain  is  the  Truth  of  the 
Chrifiian  Religion^  and  particularly  of  the  Refur- 
reHion  of  Chrifl^  which  is  a  Matter  of  Faft  on 
which  Chriftianity  is  built!  We  have  almoft  all 
the  concurrent  Evidences  that  can  be  derived  from 
human  Tejiimony  joining  to  confirm  this  glorious 
Truth.  The  Fa6t  is  not  impoiliblej  concurrent 
Circumftances  call  a  favourable  Afpe6b  on  it ;  it 
was  foretold  by  one  who  wrought  Miracles,  and 
therefore  not  unlikely,  nor  unexpe6led :  The  A- 
poftles  and  firft  Difciples  were  Eye  and  Ear- Wit- 
nefles,  for  they  converfed  with  their  rifen  Lord  j 
they  were  the  moft  plain,  honeft  Men  in  them- 
felves  5  the  Temptations  of  worldly  Interefts  did 
rather  difcourage  their  Belief  and  Report  of  it  : 
They  all  agree  in  this  Matter,  tho'  they  were 
Men  of  different  Chara6ters  -,  Pharifees  and  Fijhev 
■men^  and  Publicans^  Men  of  Judea  and  Galilee^ 
and  perhaps  fome  Heathens.^  who  were  early  con- 
verted :  The  Thing  might  eafily  have  been  dif- 
proved  if  it  were  falfe  3  it  hath  been  conveyed  by 

couftant 


CV.S.  6;     The  right  Ufe  of  ^t^^onl       271 

conftant  Tradition  and  Writing  down  to  our 
Times ;  thofe  who  at  iirft  doubted  were  after- 
wards convinced  by  certain  Proofs  j  nor  have  any- 
pretended  to  give  any  Proof  of  the  contrary,  but 
meerly  denied  the  Fa6t  with  Impudence  in  Oppo" 
fltion  to  all  thefe  Evidences. 

Obferv.  II.  How  weak  is  the  Faith  which  is 
due  to  a  Multitude  of  things  in  antient  human 
Hiilory  !  For  tho'  many  of  thefe  Criteria^  or 
Marks  of  Credibility  are  found  plainly  in  the  ^^- 
Tieral  and  puhlick  Facls^  yet  as  to  a  Multitude  of 
Particulars^  how  deficient  are  they  in  {uch  Evi- 
dence as  fhould  demand  our  AfTent  ?  Perhaps  there 
is  nodiing  that  ever  was  done  in  all  pait  Ages,  and 
which  was  not  a  publick  Facb,  fo  well  attefted  as 
xhe  Refurredion  of  Chrifl;. 

Sect.    VI. 

Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment  in  Matters  of  di- 

roine  T'eJii?nony. 

AS  human  T'eftimony  acquaints  us  with  Matters 
of  Fa^^  both  paji  and  prefcnt^  which  lye 
beyond  the  Reach  of  our  own  perfonal  Notice  > 
fo  divine  Tefiirnony  is  fuitcd  to  inform  us  both  of 
the  Nature  of  'Things^  as  well  as  Matters  of  Fa^,, 
and  of  Things  future^  as  well  as  prefcnt  or  paJi. 

Whatfoever  is  diftated  to  us  by  God  himfelf, 
or  by  Men  who  are  divinely  infpired,  mull  be  be- 
lieved with  full  AfTurance.  Reafon  demands  us  to 
believe  whatfoever  div'me  Rei)elation  dictates :  For  ' 
God  is  perfe6lly  ijoife^  and  cannot  be  deceived ;  he 
is  faithful  and  good^  and  will  not  deceive  his  Crea- 
tures :  And  when  Reafon  has  found  out  the  cer- 
tain Mariis  or  Credentials  of  divine  I'efitmony  to 
z  belong 


272  LOGICK.'Or,      Part  It. 

belong  to  any  Propofition^  there  remains  then  no 
farther  Enquiry  to  be  made,  but  only  to  find  out: 
the  true  Senfe  and  Meaning  of  that  which  God 
has  revealed,  for  Reafon  itfelf  demands  the  Belief 
of  it. 

Now dhine Teflimony  or  Re'Delationxto^ixts  thefe 
following  Credentials. 

I .  That  the  Propofitions  or  Do6trines  revealed 
be  not  inconftjient  with  Reafon;  for  intelligent 
Creatures  can  never  be  bound  to  believe  real  In- 
confiftencies.  Therefore  we  are  fure  the  Popifh 
Do6trine  of  'Tranfubjiantiation  is  not  a  Matter  of 
divine  Remelation^  becaufe  it  is  contrary  to  all  our 
Senfes^  and  our  Reafon^  even  in  their  proper  Ex* 
ercifes. 

God  can  di£tate  nothing  but  what  is  worthy  df 
himfelf,  and  agreeable  to  his  own  Nature  and  di- 
vine Perfe6tions.  Now  many  of  thefe  Pertedti- 
ons  are  difcoverable  by  the  Light  of  Reafon^  and 
whatfoever  is  inconfiftent  with  thefe  Perfe6tions, 
cannot  be  a  divine  Revelation. 

But  let  it  be  noted  that  in  Matters  of  Pra6iice 
toward  our  Fellow-Creatures^  God  may  command 
us  to  a£t  in  a  manner  contrary  to  what  Reafon 
would  direct  antecedent  to  that  Command.  So 
Abraham  was  commanded  to  offer  up  his  Son  a 
Sacrifice  :  The  Ifraelites  were  ordered  to  borrow 
of  the  Egyptians  without  paying  them,  and  to 
plunder  and  flay  the  Inhabitants  of  Canaan :  Be- 
caufe God  has  a  fovereign  Right  to  all  Things, 
and  can  with  Equity  dilpollefs  his  Creatures  of 
Life,  and  every  Thing  which  he  has  given  them, 
and  efpecially  fuch  finful  Creatures  as  Mankind  j 
and  he  can  appoint  whom  he  pleafes  to  be  the  In- 
llruments  of  this  juft  Difpoffeflion  or  Deprivati- 
on. So  that  thefe  divine  Commands  are  not  re- 
ally inconftjient  with  riglot  Reafon  ^  for  whatfoever 

is 


€.V,S.6.   ne  right  Ufe  of  Kc3ifon:        273 

is  Co  cannot  be  believed  where  that  Inconfijtency 
appears. 

2.  Upon  the  fame  Account  the  inhoU  Do^rine 
of  Revelation  muft  be  confiftent  with  itfelf'y  every 
Part  of  it  muft  be  confiftent  with  each  other: 
And  tho'  in  Points  of  Pra^ice  latter  Revelation 
may  repeal  or  cancel  former  divine  Laws,  yet  in 
Matters  of  Belief  no  latter  Revelation  can  be  in- 
confiftent  with  what  has  been  heretofore  re- 
vealed. 

3.  Divine  Revelation  muft  be  confirmed  by 
fbme  divine  and  fupernatiiral  Appearances^  fome 
extraordinary  Signs  or  'Tokens^  Fijions^  Voices^  or 
Miracles  wrought,  or  Prophejies  fulfilled.  There 
muft  be  fome  Demonftrations  of  the  Prefence  and 
Power  of  God,fuperior  to  all  the  Powers  of  Na- 
ture, or  the  fettled  Conne6tion  which  God  as 
Creator  has  eftablifhed  among  his  Creatures  in 
this  vifible  World. 

4.  If  there  are  any  fuch  extraordinary  and  won- 
derful Appearances  and  Operations  brought  to 
conteft  with,  or  to  oppofe  divine  Revelation^  there 
muft  and  always  will  be  fuch  a  Superiority  on  the 
Side  of  that  Revelation  which  is  truly  divine^  as 
to  manifeft  that  God  is  there.  This  was  the 
Cafe  when  the  Egyptian  Sorcerers  contended  with 
Mofes:  But  the  Wonders  which  Mofes  wrought  did 
fo  far  tranfcend  the  Power  of  the  Magicians^  as 
made  them  confefs,  It  was  the  Finger  of  God. 

f .  Thefe  divine  Appearances  or  Atteftations  to 
Revelation  muft  be  either  known  to  ourfelves^  by 
our  own  perfonal  Obfervation  of  them,  or  they 
rnuft  be  Efficiently  attefted  by  others^  according  to 
the  Principles  and  Rules  by  which  Matters  of  hu' 
man  Faith  are  to  be  judged  in  the  foregoing  Sec- 
tion. 

T  Some 


274  L  O  G  IC  K:  Or,      V^ttlk, 

Some  oF  thofe  who  lived  in  the  Nations-  ant4 
^ges  where  Miracles  were  wrought,  were  Eye  and 
jlar-WitneiTes  of  the  Truth  and  Divinity  of  the 
Revelation  i  but  we  who  live  in  thefe  diftant  Ages, 
njuft-have  thenvderived  down  to  usby  juft  andun^ 
OQQteftable  Hiftory  and  Tmdition.  We  alfo  even 
in  thefe  diftant  I'imes  may  fee  the  Accomplifh- 
ments  of  feme  cmtknS  .PrediSitons.^  and  thereby  ob- 
tain that  Advantage  toward  the  Confirmation  of 
our  Faith  in  divine  Revelation  beyond  what  thofc 
Perfons  enjoyed  who  lived. when  the  Fredi6lions 
were-  pronounced. 

6.  There  is  another  veiy  confldcrable  Confirma- 
tion of  ^mw  'Teflimony-y  and  that  is,  when^  the 
Doctrines  themfelves  either  on  the  Publication  or 
the  Belief  of  them  produce  fuperr^tural  EfFe6ls, 
SuchW£re  the  miractibus Powers "^hichwcre  com- 
municated to  Believers  in  the  firfl  Ages  of  Chri- 
iHanity,  the  Converfton  of  Jews  and  Gentiles^  the 
amazing-  Smcefi  of  the  Gofpel  of  Chrift  without 
human  Aid^  and  in  Oppofition  to  a  thoufand  Im- 
pediments, its  Power  in  changing  the  Heaits  and' 
Lives  of  ignorant  and  vicious  Heathens^  aixi  wick- 
ed and  profane  Creatures  in  all  Nations,  and  fil- 
ling them  with  a  Spirit  of  Virtue,  Piety  and  Good- 
neis.  Wherefoever  Perfons  have  found  this  Ef- 
fect in  their  own  Hearts,  wrought  by  a  Belief  of 
the  Gofpel  of  Chrift^  they  have  a  Witnefs  m 
themfelves  of  the  Truth  of  it,  and  abundant  Rea- 
fon  to  believe  it  divine. 

Of  the  Difference  between  Reafin-  and  Revela^ 
tivn^  and  in  what  Senfe  the  latter  is  fuperior,  fee 
more  in  Chap^  II.  Se^.  g.'.md  Chap.lV.Direfi.6. 


Sect- 


fe.  ^.  S,  7.     T'fje right  Ufe  of  Rcafdo.'      275 

Sect.    VII. 

Principles  and  Rules  of  judging^  concerning  7%ings 
pafi^  prefent\y  and  to  co-me^  by  the  'Mere  Ufe  of 
Reafon. 

THO'  we  attain  the  greateft  Aflurancd  of 
Things  pafl  and  future  by  divine  Faith,  and 
le'arn  niany  Matters  of  Fa6t  both  paft  and  prefent 
hy  human  Faith,  yet  Reafon  alio  may  in  a  good 
Degree  aflift  lis  to  judge  of  Matters  of  Fact  both 
pajf,  prefent,  and  to  come,  by  the  following  Prin- 
ciples'. 

1.  There  is  a  Syjiem  of  Beings  round  about  us^ 
of  which  we  ourfehes  are  a  Part,  which  we  call 
tht  IVofld;  and  in  this  World  there  is  a  Couife  of 
Natuie^  or  a  fettled  Order  of  Caufcs,  Effects,  An- 
tecedents, Concomitants,  Confequents,  c-Cc.from  which 
the  Author  of  Nature  doth  not  vaiy  but  upon  very 
ifnpoitant  Occafions. 

2.  VVhere  Antecedents,  Concomitants  arid  Confe- 
qimits,  Caufes  and  EffcUs,  Signs  and  Things  fgni - 
fed,  Suhjetls  and  Adjun^s  are  neccflarily  conne6t- 
ed  With  each  other,  we  may  infer  the  Caufes  from 
the  EfFciSlSj  and  Effects  from  Caufes,  the  Antece- 
deiits  from  the  Confequents,  as  well  as  Confequents 
fi'om  Antecedents,  ^c.  and  thereby  be  pretty  cer- 
tain of  many  Things  both  pa  ft,  prefent^  and  to 
come.  It  is  by  this  Principle  that  Afronomers  caii 
tell  whctf  Day  and  Hour  the  Sun  and  Moon  were 
eclipftd  fi've  hmidred  Tears  ago,  and  predict  all  fu- 
ture Eclipfes  as  long  as  the  World  {hall  Hand.  They 
can^  tell  precifely  at  what  Minute  the  Sun  rifes  or 
fits  this  Day  at  Pequin  in  China,  or  what  AJti- 
tude  the  Dogr liar  had  at  Midnight  or  Midnoon  in 
RoinCj  on  the  Day  when  ]\i[msCx(:2ir  was  fain. 

T  t  Gardiners 


27<5  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,        Part  li. 

Gardiners  upon  the  flime  Principle  can  forctel'  tlie 
Months  when  every  Plant  will  be  in  Bloom^  and  the 
Plowman  knows  the  Weeks  of  Haweji  :  We  are 
lure  if  there  be  a  Chicken^  there  was^  an  Egg :  If 
there  be  a  Rainbow^  we  are  ceitain  //  raim  not  far 
off:  If  we  behold  a  ^ree  growing  on  the  Earthy  we 
know  it  has  naturally  a  Root  under  Ground. 

3 .  Where  there  is  fuch  a  necejfary  Conne6tiori 
between  Caufes  and  Effe^s^  Antecedents  and  Confe- 
qnentSy  Signs  and  'Things  fignified^  we  know  alfo- 
that  like  Caiifcs  will  have  like  Effects,  and  propor- 
tionableC-xu^t?>.^\^\\-Avc proportionable  Effects,  con-- 
trary  Caufes  will  have  contrary  Effects  5  and  obfeiT- 
ing  Men  may  form  many  Judgments  by  the  Rules 
of  Similitude  and  Proportion,  where  the  Caufes^ 
Effe5lSy  hcc.  are  not  entirely  the  fame. 

4.  Where  there  is  but  :i  probable  and  uncertain 
Connexion  between  Jntecedents^  Concomitants  and 
ConfequcntSy  we  can  give  but  a  Conje^lure,  or  a/>r<?- 
^^^/^  Determination.  If  the  Clouds  gather,  or  the 
Weather-Glafs  Jinks,  we  CuTppok  it  will  rain:  If  a 
Man  Jpit  Blood  frequently  with  coughing,  we  Tup- 
pofe  liis  Lungs  are  hurt :  If  veiy  dangerous  Symp- 
toms appear,  we  expe6t  his  Death.. 

f.  Where  Caufes  operate  freely  with  a  Ltber- 
ty  of  Indiff'ercnce  to  this  or  the  contrary,  there  we 
cannot  certainly  know  what  the  EfFe6t  will  be : 
For  it  feems  to  be  contingent,  and  the  certain  Know-^ 
ledge  of  it  belongs  only  to  God.  This  is  the  Cafe 
in  thegreateft  Part  of  human  Actions. 

6.  Yet  wife  Men  by  a  juft  ObfeiTation  of  hu- 
man Nature  will  give  very  probable  Conjeftures 
in  this  Matter  alio  concerning  Things  paji,  or 
Things  future,  bccaufe  human  Nature  in  all  Ages 
and  Nations  has  fuch  a  Conformity  to  itfelf.  By 
a  Knowledge  of  the  Tempers  of  Men  and  their 
prefent  Circumltanccs,  wx  may  be  able  to  give-  a 

happy 


C.  V.  S.  7.    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.      277 

happy  Guefs  what  their  Condu6t  will  be,  and  what 
will  be  the  Event  by  an  Obfervation  of  the  hke 
Cafes  in  former  Times.  Tliis  made  the  Emperor 
Marcus  Antoninus  to  fiy,  "  By  looking  hack  into 
*'  Hijiory^  and  conjidering  the  Fate  and  Re-joh'jions 
*'  of  Governments^  you  will  be  able  to  form  a  Guefs ^ 
*^  and  almofi  prophefy  upon  the  future.  For  Things 
*'  paft^  prefent^  and  to  come^  are  firdngely  uniform^ 
*'  and  of  -a  Colour  ;  and  are  commorily  ca(i^  in  t Joe 
*'  fame  Mould,  So  that  upon  the  Matter^' forty 
*'  Years  of  human  Life  may  fer^^e  for  a  Sample  of 
"  ten  thoufand. "  CoUier'i  Atitoninus,  Book  VI T. 
Se6t.  fo. 

7.  There  are  alfo  fome  other  Principles  of  judg- 
ing concerning  the  pall  Actions  of  Men  in  former 
Ages,  befide  Books^  Hijlories  and  Traditions^  which 
are  the  Mediums  of  conveying  hum^mTeiHrnony; 
as  we  may  infer  the  Skill  and  Magnificence  of  the 
Antients  by  fome  Fragments  of  their  Statues^  and 
Ruins  of  their  Buildings.  We  know  what  Ro- 
man Legions  came  into  Great  Britain  by  Numbers 
of  Bricks  dug  oat  of  the  Earth  in  fome  Paits  of 
the  I  (land,  with  the  Marks  of  {omc  particular  Lc- 
^  gion  upon  them,  which  mull  have  been  employed 
"  there  in  Brick-making.  We  rectify  fome  Millake> 
in  Hillory  by  Statues^  Coins^  old  Altars^  Utenfih 
ef  TVar^  6cc.  We  confirm  or  difprove  fome  pre- 
tended Traditions  and  hillorical  Writings,  by  Me- 
dals^ Lnages^  Pi£fures^  Urns^  &c. 

Thus  1  have  gone  thro'  all  thofe  particular  Ob- 
jecls  of  our  Judgment  which  I  firlt  propos'd,  and 
have  laid  down  Principles  and  Rules  by  which  we 
may  fafely  conduct  ourfelves  therein.  Theru*  is  a 
Variety  of  other  Objects  concerning  which  wc 
are  occafionally  called  to  pafs  a  Judgment,  (viz.) 
The  Charatlers  of  Perfons^  the  Value  and  M^'orth 

T  3  */ 


zj%  L  O  G  J  C  K:  &c.       Part  II. 

pf  'ThingS'i   tlie  Senfe  and  Me(imng   of  particular 
fVriters^  Matters  of  Wity  Oratory^  Poefy^  [Mat- 
ters of  Equity  injudicial  Courts^  Matters  of  traf", 
Jick  and  Commerce  heiwixt  Man  and  Man^  which 
would  be  endlefs  to  enumerate.     But  if  the  general 
aiid  fpecial  Rules  of  Jtidgmcnt  which  have  been 
mentioned  in  thefe  two  laft  Chapters  are  treiiTured 
up  in  the  Mind,  and  w;rought  into  the  veryTcra/^ 
per  of  our  Souls  in  our  younger  Years,  they  will 
lay  a  Foundation  for  juft  and  regular  Judgment 
concerning  a  thoufand  fpecial  Occvirrenccs  in  the 
religiousy  civil  and  learned  Life. 


THE 


279. 


THE 

Third  PART 

O  F 

L  O  G  I  C  K. 


Of  Reafoning  and  Syllogifm. 

AS  the  firft  Work  of  the  Mind  is  Percepti- 
on^ whereby  our  Ideas  are  framed,  and 
the  fecond  is  Judgment^  which  joins  or 
disjoins  our  Ideas,  and  forms  a  Propofitkn,  fo  the 
third  Operation  of  the  Mind  is  Reafoning^  which 
joins  feveral  Propofitions  together,  and  makes  a 
Syllogijm^  that  is,  an  Argument  whereby  ive  are 
'wont  to  infer  fomething  that  is  lefs  krionun.^  frofn 
Truths  which  are  more  evident. 

In  treating  of  this  Subjeft.,  let  us  confldermorc 
particulai'ly 

1 .  The  Nature  of  a  Syllogifm,  and  the  Parts  of 
which  it  is  compofed. 

2.  The  feveral  kinds  of  Syllogifms,  wiih  parti^ 
cular  Rules  relating  to  them. 

T4  I'T^e 


s8o  LOGIC  K:  Or,     Part  III. 

3.  'ithe  Do^rim  of  Sophifms,  or  falfe  Reafon^ 
ing^  together  with  the  Means  of  avoiding  them^  and 
the  manner  of  folvi?ig  or  anfwering  them. 

4.  Some  general  Rules  to  diredl  our  Reafoning.  -• 


C  H  A  P.     I. 

Of  the  Nature  of  a  Syllogifm,   and  the 
^arts  af  which  it  is  compofedy 

IF  the  mere  Perception  and  Comparifon  of  two 
Ideas  would  always  iliew  us  whether  tliey  a- 
gree  or  diiagree  5  then  all  rational  Propolitions 
would  be  Matters  of  Intelligence^  or  firfi  Princi" 
ples^  and  there  would  be  no  Ufe  of  Reafoning^  or 
drawing  any  Confequences.  It  is  the  Narrownefs 
of  the  human  Mind  which  introduces  the  Necef- 
Ijty  of  Reafoning.  When  we  are  unable  to  judge  of 
the  Truth  or  Falfhood  of  a  Propofition  in  an  im- 
mediate manner,  by  the  meer  Contemplation  of  its 
Subjeft  and  Predicate,  we  are  then  conftrained  to 
ufe  a  Medium^  and  to  compare  each  of  them  with 
fome  third  Idea^  that  by  feeing  how  far  they  agree 
or  difagree  with  it,  we  may  be  able  to  judge  how 
far  they  agree  or  difagree  among  themfelves :  x^s,  if 
there  are  two  Lines  A  and  B,  and  I  know  not 
whether  they  are  equal  or  no,  I  take  a  third  Line 
C,  or  an  Inch^  and  apply  it  to  each  of  them  j  if  it 
agree  with  them  both,  then  I  infer  that  ^  and  jS 
ure  equal -y  but  if  it  agree  with  one  and  nqt  with 
the  other,  then  I  conclude  A  and  B  are  unequal: 
Tf  it  agree  with  neither  of  them,  there  can  be  no 
Comparifon. 


C  I.  The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.  28 1 

So  if  the  Queftion  be  whether  God  mufi  be  wot- 
fnpped^  we  feek  a  third  Idea^  fuppofe  the  Idea  of 
a  Creator,  and  lay, 

Our  Creator  mufi  he  worfijipped. 

God  is  our  Creator. 

V^h  ere  fore  God  mufi  be  worfioipped. 

The  Comparifon  of  this  third  Jdea^  with  the 
two  diftin6t  Parts  of  the  Qiieftion,  ufually  requires 
two  Propofitions,  which  are  called  the  Premijfes  : 
The  third  Propofition  which  is  drawn  from  them 
is  the  Conclufio'n^  wherein  the  §iiefiion  itfelf  is  an-' 
fwered,  and  the  Subjed  and  Predicate  joined  ei- 
ther in  the  Negati've  or  the  Affirmative. 

The  Foundation  of  all  affirmati've  Conclufions  is 
laid  in  this  general  Tmth,  that  fo  far  as  two  pro- 
pos'd  Ideas  agree  to  any  third  Idea,  they  agree  al- 
io among  themfelves.  The  Charafter  of  Creator 
agrees  to  God^  and  Worfijip  agrees  to  a  CreatoTy 
therefore  Worfijip  agrees  to  God. 

The  Foundation  of  all  yiegative  Conclufions  is 
this,  that  where  one  of  the  two  propofed  Ideas 
agrees  with  the  third  Idea,  and  the  other  difagrees 
with  it,  they  muft  needs  diiagree  fo  fxx  alfo  with 
one  another  J  as,  if  no  Sinners  are  happy ^  and  if 
Angels  arc  happy ^  then  Angels  arc  not  Sinners. 

Thus  it  appears  what  is  the  ftri6i:  and  juft  No*" 
tion  of  a  Syllogifm :  It  is  a  Sentence  or  Argument 
made  up  of  three  Propofitions  fo  difpofed,  as  that 
the  laft  is  neceflarily  infer'd  from  thofe  which  go 
before,  as  in  the  Inftances  which  have  been  jull 
mentioned. 

In  the  Confiitution  of  a  Syllogifm  two  Thino-s 
may  be  confidered  {viz.)  the  Matter  and  the  Form 
of  it. 

The  Matter  of  which  a  Syllogifm  is  made  up, 
is  three  Propofitions  5  and  thefe  three  Propofitions 
are  made  up  of  three  Ideas  or  I'erms  varioufly  join- 
ed. 


ztz  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

ed.  T.hs  three  'Terms  are  called  the  remote  Matter 
of  a  Syllogifm,  and  the  three  Propofitions^  the 
Proxime  or  immediate  Matter  of  it. 

The  three  Terms  are  named  the  Alajor^  the 
Mimr^  and  the  Middle. 

The  Predicate  of  the  Conclufion  is  called  the 
major  Term^  becaufe  it  is  geneiully  of  larger  Ex- 
tenfioii  than  the  minor  Termy  or  the  Subje^.  The 
major  and  minor  Terms  are  called  the  Extremes. 

The  middle  Term  is  the  third  Idea  invented  and 
difpofed  in  two  Propofitions  in  fuch  a  manner  as 
to  fhew  the  Connexion  between  the  major  and  mi- 
nor Term  in  the  Conclufion  j  for  which  Reafon 
die  middle  Term  itfelf  is  fometimes  called  the  jfr- 
gument. 

That  Propofltion  which  contains  the  Predicate 
o/  the  Conclufion,  connected  with  the  middle 
Term,  is  iifually  called  the  major  Propojition^  where-. 
iis  the  minor  Propofttion  connefts  the  middle  Term 
with  the  Subje6t  of  the  Conclufion,  and  is  fome- 
times called  the  AJfumption. 

Note^  This  exact  DiiHn6lion  of  the  feveral  Paits 
of  a  Syllogifra,  and  of  the  major  and  minor  Terms 
connected  with  the  middle  Term,  in  the  major  and 
minor  Propofitions,  does  chiefly  belong  to  fimple 
or  categorical  SyllogifmSy  of  which  we  fiiall  fpeak 
in  the  next  Chapter,  tho'  all  Syllogifms  whatfo- 
ever  have  fomething  analogical  to  it. 

Note  farther,  that  the  major  Propofition  is  ge- 
nerally placed  firllj  and  the  minor  fecond,  and  the 
Conclufion  in  the  laft  Place,  where  the  Syllogifm 
is  regularly  compos'd  and  reprefented. 

The  Form  of  a  Syllogifm  is  the  framing  and  dif- 
pofing  of  the  Premifies  according  to  Art,  or  jull 
Principles  of  Reafoning, and  the  regular  Inference 
of  the  Conclufion  from  them. 

The 


JC.  il.  6. 1 .     The  tight  Ufe  pf  Rcafon:    z%  | 

The  4:^  of  Reajhning  ciir  inferring  ©iie  thing 
from  another,  is  generally  exprefl  and  known  by 
the  Pnrticle  Th^^fare^  when  the  Argument  i^ 
formed  according  to  the  Rules  of  Ait  >  the*  ia 
common  Difcourfe  or  Writing,  fuch  caufal  Pai' 
tides  as  For^  Becuufe^  manifelt  the  A6t  of  Rca- 
foning  as  well  as  the  illative  Particles  Then  and 
Ther/fore  :  And  \vhere(oe\'^er  any  of  thefe  Words 
.ape  lotted,  there  is  a  per re6t  Syllogifm  cxpi'dl:  cr 
imply'd,  tho'  perhaps  the  three  Proportions  do 
not  appear,  or  are  not  placed  in  regular  Form. 


CHAP.     il. 

Of  the  'various  Kinds  of  SyllogifmSj   with 
particular  Rules  relating  to  them, 

SYllogifms  are  divided  into  various  Kinds,  ei- 
ther according  to  the  ^ie/lim  which  is  prov- 
ed by  them,  acccwding  to  the  Nature  and  cfompo- 
fitton  of  them,  or  according  to  the  middle  Term^ 
which  is  us'4  to  prgve  the  Queftian. 

S  fe  C  T.       I. 

0/  nnlverfal  and  particular  Syllegifms^  both  nega- 
tive and  affirmative. 

ACcordmg  to  the  ^eftion  which  is  to  be 
proved,  fo  Syllogiims  are  divided  into  tint-' 
verfal  Affirmative^  univerfal  Negative^  particular 
Affirmative^  and  particular  Negative.  This  is  oft- 
en called  a  Divifion  of  Syllogifm s  drawn  from  tlic 
Concjujion  -,  for  fo  many  lorts  of  Conclufions  there 

may 


2H  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  III. 

may  be  which  are  marked  with  the  Letters  A, 

E,  r,  o. 

In  an  nniverfal  affirmative  Syllogifm^  one  Idea 
is  proved  univerfally  to  agree  with  another,  and 
may  be  univerfally  affirmed  of  it,  as  every  Sin  de- 
ferves  Deaths  every  unlawful  JViJh  is  a  Sin;  there' 
fore  every  unlawful  fViJh  de ferves  Death. 

In  an  univerfal  negative  Syllogifm^  one  Idea  is 
proved  to  difagree  with  another  Idea  univerfally, 
and  may  be  thus  denied  of  it  j  as,  no  Injufiice  can 
he  pkaftng  to  God  ;  all  Perfecution  for  the  Sake  of 
Confcience  is  Injufiice  5  therefore  no  Peffecution  for 
Confcience  Sake  can  be  pleaftng  to  God. 

Particular  affirmative^  and  particular  negative 
Syllogifms  may  be  eafily  underllood  by  what  is 
faid  of  Univerfalsy  and  there  will  be  fufficient  Ex- 
amples given  of  all  thefe  in  the  next  Seftion. 

The  general  Principle  upon  which  thefe  univer- 
fal and  particular  Syllogifms  are  founded  is  this ; 
whatfoever  is  affii'med  or  denied  univerfally  of  any 
Idea,  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  all  the  parti- 
cular Kinds  or  Beings,  which  are  contained  in  the 
Extenfion  of  that  univerfal  Idea.  So  the  Defer t 
of  Death  is  affirmed  univerfally  of  Sin^  and  an  un- 
lawful JVifh  is  one  particular  Kind  of  Sin.^  which 
is  contained  in  the  univerfal  Idea  of  Sin.^  therefore 
the  Defert  of  Death  may  be  affirmed  concerning 
an  unlawful  Wifh.     And  fo  of  the  reft. 

Note^  In  the  Doctrine  of  Syllogifms,  -^fingular 
and  an  indefinite  Propofition  are  ranked  among 
Univerfals^  as  was  before  obfeiTed  in  the  Do6h'inc 
of  Propofitions. 


Sect* 


C.II.S.  2:   The  right  Ufe  of  Kc^Con:      zt$ 

Sect.    II. 
Of  plain^  ftmpJe  SyllogifmSy  and  their  Rules, 

THE  next  Divifion  of  Syllogifms  is  into/«- 
gle  and  compound.  This  is  drawn  from  the 
Nature  and  Compofttion  of  them. 

Single  Syllogifms  are  made  up  of  three  Propofi- 
tions  ;  Compound  Syllogifms  contain  more  than 
three  Propofitions,  and  may  be  formed  into  two 
or  more  Syllogiims. 

Single  Syllogifms^  for  Dillin6lion  Sal<e,  may 
be  divided  into  *  Simple^  Complex  and  Conjunct 
five. 

Thofe  are  properly  called /;»^/(?  or  categorical 
Syllogifms^  which  arc  made  up  of  three  plain^  fin" 
gle^  or  categorical  Propofitions^  wherein  the  middle 
Term  is  evidently  and  regularly  joined  with  one 
Part  of  the  Quellion  in  the  major  Proportion, 
and  with  the  other  in  the  minor,  whence  there 
follows  a  plain,  fingle  Conclufion  j  as,  ez'ery  hu^ 
man  Virtue  is  to  he  fought  with  Diligence',  Prudence 
is  a  human  Virtue  j  therefore  Prudence  is  to  be  fought 
diligently. 

Note }  Tho'  the  Terms  of  Propofitions  may  be 
complex^  yet  where  the  Compofition  of  the  whole 
Argument  is  thus  plain.^  fimplc  and  regular^  it  is 
properly  called  a  fimple  Syllogifm^  fince  the  Com- 
pleclion  does  not  belong  to  the  fyllogiftic  Form 
of  it. 

•  As  Ideas  and  Propofitions  are  divided  into  /ingU  and  compeunJ,  anii 
J!>iS/t  are  fubdivided  inro/w?/*  and  comp/ex;  fo  rhere  are  the  farre  Divisions 
and  Subdivifions  apply'd  to  SyUogilms. 

Simple 


Ms^       Log  i  c  k:  bt,    ^art^tt 

Simple  Syllogifms  have  feveral  Rules  belonging 
to  them,  which  being  obfervcd,'  will  generally  fe- 
cure  us  from  falfe  Inferences :  But  thele  Rules  be- 
ing fbunded  on  four  genital  Axiam^  it  is  riecefla- 
ry  to  mention  thefe  uixioms  beforehand,  for  the 
ufe  of  thofe  who  will  enter  into  the  fpeculativ^ 
K^cafons  of  all  thefe  Rules. 

'  Axiom  I .  Particular  PrbpofitionS  are  contained 
in  Univerfals,  and  may  be  infer'd  froin  them-^  but 
Univerfals  are  not  contained  in  PaEtticukrS,  nor 
can  be  infer'd  from  them. 

Axiom  2.  In  all  imiverfal  Pro'pofitions,  the  Sub- 
ject is  univerfal :  In  all  particular  Propositions,  the 
Subject  is  particular. 

Akiom  3.  In  all  affirmative  Propofitionsj  the 
Predicate  has  no  greater'  Extenlion  than  the  Sub- 
jc^  J  for  its  Extenfion  is  telf rained'  by  the  Sub* 
jeft;  and  therefore  it'  is  always  to  be  efteemed  as  a 
particular  Idea.  It  is  by  raeer  Accident^  if  it  e- 
vcr  be  taken  unrverfally,  and  ca-iinot  happen  bufi- 
in  fuch  univerfal  or  flngplar  Proportions  as  are  re" 
cipocaV 

jlxiom  4.  The  Predicate  of  a  negative  Propo- 
iltion  is  always  'taken  univerfally, ,  for  in  its  whole: 
Extenfion  it  is  denied  of  the  Subje6t.  If  we  fay 
no  -Stone  is  veg^table^  ^  we  deny  all  •  ibrts  of  Fegeta- 
tim  concerning-  5'i«»^j. 

The  Rules  of  7?»>|e^<^,  regular  Syllogirms  ar^ 

thefe. 

Rule  I.  T'he  middle  Term  mufl  not  he  taken  tivice 
pWticaUrly^  but 'once  at  leafi  univerfdlly.     For  if- 
the  middle  Term  be  taken  for  two  different  Part^' 
or  Kinds  of  the  fame  univerfal  Idea,  then  the  Sub- 
ject of  the  Conclulion  is  compared  with  one  of 

thefe 


C.U.S.a:     Th£  right  Ufi  of  KQ^^orC.     7.%7 

thefe  Parts,  and  the  Predicate  with  another  Part, 
and  this  will  never  fhew  whether  that  Subjeft 
and  Predicate  agree  or  difagree :  There  will  then 
he  four  diftin5i  'Terms  in  the  Syllogifm,  and  the 
two  Parts  of  the  QuefHon  will  not  be  compared 
with  the  fame  third  Idea-,  as  if  I  fay,  fome^  Men 
are  piousy  and  fome  Men  are  Robbers^  I  can  never 
infer  xhazfome  Robbers  arv^  pious^  for  the  middle 
Term  Men  being  taken  twice  particularly,  it  is 
not  the  fame  Men  who  are  fpoken  of  in  the  ma- 
jor and  minor  Propoiitions. 

Rule  II.  72v  Terms  in  the  ContJufon- muft  never 
Betaken  more  univerfaUy  than  they  are  in  the  Pre' 
vujfss.  The  Reafon  is  derived  from  the^  firft  Ax- 
iom, that  Generals  can  never  be  inferred  from  Par*' 
tkuiars. 

Rule  III.  A  negative  Condufion  cannot  be  provedr 
by  two  affirmative  Premiffes.  For  when  the  two 
Terms  of  the  Conclufion  are  united  or  agree  to 
the  middle  Term,  it  does  not  follow  by  any  Means 
that  they  difagree  with  one  another. 

Rule  IV.  If  one  of  the  Premiffes  be  negative^  the 
Conclufion  mufi  be  negative.  For  if  the  middle 
Term  be  denied  of  either  Part  of  the  Conclufi- 
on, it  may  {hew  that  the  Terms  of  the  Conclu- 
fion difagree,  but  it  can  never  fhew  that  they 
agree. 

Rule  V.  If  either  of  the  Premiffes  be  particular'^ 
the  Conclufion  mufi  be  particular.  This  may  be 
proved  for  the  moft  partfrom  the  firfl  Axiom. 

Thefe  two  laft  Rules  are  fometimes  united  in 

this  fingle  Sentence,  The  Conclufion  always  follows 

the  weaker  Part  of  the  Premiffes.  Now  Negatives 

I  and 


%n  LOGIC  K:  Or,    Fart  III; 

and  Panieiilars  are  counted  inferior  to  Affirmatives 
and  Univerfals, 

Rule  VI.  From  two  negative  Premijfes  nothing 
can  he  concluded.  For  they  feparate  the  middle 
Term  both  from  the  Subje6t  and  Predicate  of  the 
Conclufion,  and  when  two  Ideas  difagree  to  a 
third,  we  cannot  infer  that  they  either  agree  or 
difagree  with  each  other. 

Yet  where  the  Negation  is  a  Part  of  the  middle 
yerm^  the  two  Premifles  may  look  like  Negatives 
according  to  the  Words,  but  one  of  them  is  af-' 
frmative  in  Senfe ;  as,  IVbat  has  no  'thought  can' 
mt  reafon  3  but  a  Worm  has  no  Thought ^  therefore  a 
IVorm  cannot  reafon.  The  minor  Propofition  does 
really  affirm  the  middle  Term  concerning  the  Sub- 
ject {viz^  a  Worm  is  what  has  no  Thought 'y  and 
thus  it  is  properly  in  this  Syllogifm  an  ciffirmative 
Propofition. 

Rule  VII.  From  two  particular  Premijfes^  nO" 
thing  can  he  concluded.  This  Rule  depends  chiefly^ 
on  the  firft  Axiom. 

A  more  laborious  and  accurate  Proof  of  thefe 
Rules,  and  the  Derivation  of  every  Part  of  them 
in  all  poffible  Cafes,  from  the  foregoing  Axioms, 
require  fo  much  Time,  and  are  of  fo  little  Im- 
portance to  affill  the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon,-  that  it 
is  needlefs  to  infift  longer  upon  them  here.  See 
all  this  done  ingenioufly  in  the  Logick  call'd,  the 
uirt  of  Thinkings  Part  iii.  Chap.  iii,6cc. 


Sect. 


C.  II.  S.  3 .     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.      289 

Sect.     III. 

0/  the  Moods  and  Figures  of  fimple  Syllogifnis, 

Simple  SyUogifms  are  adorned  and  fiirroundcd  in 
the  common  Books  of  Logick  with  a  Vari- 
ety of'inventions  ^honi  Moods  and  Figures.,  where- 
in by  the  artificial  Contexture  of  the  Letters  A, 
E,  I,  and  O,  Men  have  endeavoured  to  tranf*- 
form  Logick.,  or  the  jirt  of  Reafoning^  into  a  fort 
of  Mechanifm^  and  to  teach  Boys  to  fyllogize,  or 
frame  Arguments  and  refute  them,  without  any 
real  inward  Knowledge  of  the  Quefcion.  This  is 
almoft  in  the  fame  manner  as  School-boys  have 
been  taught  perhaps  in  their  trifling  Years  to  com- 
pole  Latin  Verfes  5  i.  e.  by  certain  Tables  and 
Squares,  with  a  Variety  of  Letters  in  them,  where- 
in by  counting  every  fixth,  feventh,  or  eighth 
Letter,  certain  Latin  Words  lliould  be  framed  in 
the  Form  of  Hexameters  or  Pentameters',  and  this 
may  be  done  by  thofe  who  know  nothing  of  La- 
tin or  of  Ferfes. 

I  confefs  fome  of  thefe  logical  Subtilties  have 
much  more  Ufe  than  thofe  verfifying  Tables,  and 
there  is  much  Ingenuity  difco\ered  in  determin- 
ing the  precife  Number  of  SyUogifms  that  may 
b  e  formed  in  every  Figure^  and  giving  the  Rea- 
fons  of  them  j  yet  the  Light  of  Nature,  a  good 
Judgment,  and  due  Confidcration  of  Things  tend 
more  to  true  Reafoning  than  all  the  Trappings  of 
Moods  and  Figures. 

But  left  this  Book  be  charged  with  too  great 
Defe6ts  and  Imperfections,  it  may  be  proper  to 
give  Ihort  Hints  of  that  which  fome  Logicians 
have  fpent  fo  much  Time  and  Paper  upon. 

U  All 


290  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

All  the  poflible  Combinations  of  three  of  the 
Letters  A,  E,  I,  O,  to  make  three  Proportions 
amount  to  fixty  four  5  but  fifty  four  of  them  are 
excluded  from  forming  true  Syllogifms  by  ihcfe- 
^en  Rules  in  the  foregoing  Section  :  The  remain- 
ing Ten  are  varioufly  diverfified  by  Figures  and 
Moods  into  fourteen  Syllogifms. 

The  Figure  of  a  Syllogifm  is  the  proper  Difpo- 
lition  of  the  middle  Term  with  the  Parts  of  the 
Queftion. 

A  Mood  is  the  regular  Determination  of  Propo- 
rtions according  to  their  Quantity  and  Quality, 
i.  e.  their  univerfal  or  particular  Affirmation  or 
Negation  j  which  are  fignified  by  certain  artifici- 
al Words  wherein  the  Confonants  are  negleded, 
and  thefe  four  Vowels,  A,  E,  I,  O,  are  only  re- 
garded. 

There  are  generally  counted  three  Figures. 
In  the  firfi  of  them  the  middle  Term  is  the 
Subje6b  of  the  major  Propofition,  and  the  Predi- 
cate of  the  minor.  This  contains  four  Moods 
(viz.)  Barbara^  Celarent^  Darii,  Ferio.  And  it 
is  the  Excellency  of  this  Figure  that  all  forts  of 
Queftions  or  Conclufions  may  be  proved  by  it, 
whether  A,  E,  I,  or  O,  i.  e.  univerfal  or  particu- 
lar, affirmative  or  negative,  as. 

Bar-  Every  wicked  Man  i^ truly  miferable; 
ba-   All  Tyrants  are  wicked  Men  -, 
ra.   Therefore  all  Tyrants  are  truly  miferable. 

Ce-  He  that's  always  in  Fear  is  not  happy ; 
la-   Covetous  Men  are  always  in  Fear  3 
rent.  Therefore  covetous  Men  ai*e  not  happy. 


Da- 


C.  11.  S .  5 .     '^he  right  life  ^Reafon .'        291 

Da-  Whatfocver  furthers  our  Salvation  is  good 
for  us ; 
ri'    Some  AfHi6tions  further  our  Salvation } 
/.    Therefore  fomc  Afflictions  are  good  for  us. 

Fe-  Nothing  that  muft  be  repented  of  is  truly 

defirable  5 
vi"    Some  Pleafures  muft  be  repented  of  5 
0,    Therefore  there  are  fome  Pleafures  which  are 

not  truly  defirable. 

In  thtfecond  Figure  the  middle  Term  is  the 
Predicate  of  both  the  PremilTes  -,  this  contains 
four  Moods  (viz.)  Cefare,  Cameflres^  Fejiino,  Ba* 
roco^  and  it  admits  only  of  negative  Concluii- 
onsj  as, 

Ce-  No  Liar  is  fit  to  be  believed  5 
fa-  Every  good  Chriftian  is  fit  to  be  believed  > 
re.  Therefore  no  good  Chriftian  is  a  Liar. 

The  Reader  may  eafily  form  Examples  of  the 
reft. 

The  third  Figure  requires  that  the  middle  Term 
be  the  Subje6t  of  both  the  Premifles.  It  has  fix 
Moods  (viz.)  Darapti,  Felapton^  Difamis^  Datiji^ 
Bocardo^  Ferifon :  And  it  admits  only  of  particu- 
lar Conclufions  3  as. 

Da'  Whofoever  loves  God  fhall  be  faved  5 
rap'   All  the  Lovers  of  God  have  their   Imper- 
fections J 
//..  Therefore  fome  who  have  Imperfections  fliall 
be  faved. 

I  leave  the  Reader  to  form  Examples  of  the 
reft. 

U  2  -    The 


292  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

The  Moods  of  thefe  three  Figures  are  compriz- 
ed in  fourX^^/'/^Verfes. 

Barbara^  Celarenf,  Darii^  /m<?  quoque  primac, 

Cefare^  Cameftres,  Feftino^  Baroco^  fecund^e. 
Tenia  Darapti  Ubi  vindicat,  atque  FelaptoUy 
Adjungens  Difamis^  Datifi^  Bocardo^  Ferifon. 

The  fpecial  Rules  of  the  three  Figures  are  thefe» 

In  the  Jirft  Figure  the  major  Propofition  muft 
always  be  univerfal,  and  the  minor  affirmative. 

In  the  fecond  Figure  alfo  the  major  muft  be  uni- 
verfal, and  one  of  the  Premifles,  together  with 
the  Conclufion,  muft  be  negative. 

In  the  third  Figure  the  minor  muft  be  affirma- 
tive, and  the  Conclufion  always  particular. 

There  is  alfo  z  fourth  Figure  wherein  the  middle 
Term  is  predicated  in  the  major  Propofition,  and 
fubjefted  in  the  minor :  But  this  is  a  very  indireft 
and  oblique  mannef  of  concluding,  and  is  never  ; 
ufed  in  the  Sciences,  nor  in   human  Life,  and 

therefore  I  call  it  ufelefs. Some  Logicians  will 

allow  it  to  be  nothing  elfe  but  a  meer  Inverfion 
of  the  firft  Figure  >  the  Moods  of  it,  (yiz)  Ba- 
ralipton,  or  Barbaric  Calentes^  Dibatis^  Fefpamo^ 
Frefifom^  are  not  worthy  to  be  explained  by  one 
Example. 

Sect.    IV. 

Of  Complex  Syllogifms. 

IT  is  not  the  meer  Ufe  of  complex  Terms  in  a 
Syllogifm  that  gives  it  this  Name,  tho'  one 
of  the  Terms  is  umally  complex ;  but  thofe  are 
properly  called  complex  Syllogifms^  in  which  the 
middle  Term  is  not  conneded  with  the  whole 

Subject, 


1 


C.  II.  S.4.'      The  right  life  of  V<t2i(on,     29  j 

Subje6t,  or  the  whole  Predicate  in  two  diftin6t 
Propofitions,  but  is  intermingled  and  compared 
with  them  by  Parts,  or  in  a  more  confufed  man- 
ner, in  different  Forms  of  Speech ;  as, 

The  Sun  is  afenfelefs  Being '^ 

The  Perfians  worjhipped  the  Sun  > 

Therefore  the  Perfians  worJJnpped  a  fenfelefs  Be- 
ing. 

Here  the  Predicate  of  the  Conclufion  is  wor^ 
fjipped  a  fenfelefs  Beings  part  of  which  is  joined 
with  the  middle  Term  Sun  in  the  major  Propofi- 
tion,  and  the  other  Part  in  the  minor. 

Tho'  this  fort  of  Argument  is  confefs'd  to  be 
entangled^  or  confufed^  and  irregular^  if  examined 
by  the  Rules  of  ftmple  Syllogifms  j    yet  there  is  a 

freat  Variety  of  Arguments  ufed  in  Books  of 
-earning,  and  in  common  Life,  whofe  Confe- 
quence  is  ftrong  and  evident,  and  which  muil  be 
ranked  under  this  Head  3  as, 

I.  Exclufive  Propofitions  will  form  a  complex 
Argument  j  as,  pious  Men  are  the  only  Favourites 
of  Heaven  j  true  Chrifiians  are  Favourites  of  Hea- 
venly therefore  true  Chrifiians  are  pious  Men.  Or 
thus.  Hypocrites  are  not  pious  Alen',  therefore  Hy- 
pocrites  are  no  Favourites  of  Heaven. 

II.  Exceptive  Propofitions  will  make  fuch  com- 
plex Syllogifms  j  as,  None  but  Phyficians  came  to 
the  Confultation  3  the  Nurfe  is  no  Phyfician  j  there- 
fore the  Nurfe  came  not  to  the  Confultation. 

III.  Or,  Comparative  Propofitions  j  as.  Know-' 
ledge  is  better  than  Riches  ;  Virtue  is  better  than 
Knowledge  5  therefore  Virtue  is  better  than  Riches,  . 
Or  thus,  a  Dove  will  fly  a  Mile  in  a  Minute ;  a 

U  I  SivalloiQ, 


294  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,     Part  III. 

Swallow  flies  fwifter  than  a  Dove  ;   therefore  a 
Swallow  will  fly  more  than  a  Mile  in  a  Minute. 

IV.  Or  Incepti've  and  -D^/zii;^  Propofitions  3  as. 
The  Fogs  vanijh  as  the  Sun  arifes  ;  but  the  Fogs 
have  not  yet  begun  to  vaniflo  j  therefore  the  Sun  is 

not  yet  rifen. 

V.  Or  Modal  Propofitions  j  as,  It  is  necejfary 
that  a  General  underftand  the  Art  of  War  ;  but 
Caius  does  not  under Jland  the  Art  of  War  -,  there- 
fore it  is  neceffary  Caius  fhould  not  be  a  General. 
Or  thus,  A  total  Eclipfe  of  the  Sun  would  caufe 
Darknefs  at  Noon  -,  it  is  poflible  that  the  Moon  at 
that  T'lme  may  totally  eclipfe  the  Sun  j  therefore  it 
is  po(fible  that  the  Moon  may  caufe  Darknefs  at 
Noon. 

Befidc  all  thefe,  there  is  a  great  Number  of 
coinplex  Syllogifms  which  can  hardly  be  reduced, 
under  any  particular  Titles,  becaufe  the  Forms 
of  human  Language  are  fo  exceeding  various  5  as, 

Chriflianity  requires  us  to  believe  what  the  Apof- 
tles  wrote ;  St.  Paul  is  an  Jpoflle ;  therefore  Chri^ 
fiianity  requires  us  to  believe  what  St.  Paul  wrote. 

No  human  Artift  can  make  an  Animal -y  a  Fly  or 
a  Worm  is  an  Animal  j  therefore  no  human  Artift 
can  make  a  Fly  or  a  Worm. 

1'he  Father  always  lived  in  London  j  the  Son 
always  lived  with  the  Father  ;  therefore  the  Son  al-. 
ways  lived  in  London. 

T'he  Blofjomfoon  follows  the  full  Bud',  this  Pear- 
■  Tree  hath  many  full  Buds  j  therefore  it  willfjortly 
have  many  BJoffoms. 

One  Hailftone  never  falls  alone  3  but  a  Hailftone. 
felljuft  now  -y  therefore  others  fell  with  it. 

Thun<kr 


C.  n.  S,  4.    Tb^  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     z  9  5 

I'hunder  feldom  comes  without  Lightning-,  but  it 
thundered  Teflerday  j  therefore  probably  it  lightned 
alfo. 

Mofes  wrote  before  the  Trojan  IFar-,  the  firfi 
Greek  Hijiorians  wrote  after  the  Trojan  fF'ar  5 
therefore  the  firfi  Greek  Hifloriam  wrote  after 
Mofes  *. 

Now  the  Force  of  all  thefe  Arguments  is  fo 
evident  and  conclufive,  that  tho'  the  Form  of  the 
Syllogifm  be  never  fo  irregular,  yet  we  are  fure 
the  Inferences  are  juft  and  true  -,  for  the  Premiffes^ 
according  to  the  Reafon  of  Things,  do  really  con- 
tain the  Conclufion  that  is  deduced  from  them^  which 
is  a  never  failing  Teft  of  true  Syllogifms,  as  fhall 
be  fhewn  hereafter. 

The  Truth  of  mofl  of  thefe  complex  Syllogifms 
may  alfo  be  made  to  appear  (if  needful)  by  reduc- 
ing them  either  to  regular^  ftmple  Syllogifms^  or  to 
fome  of  the  conjun^i've  Syllogifms^  which  are  de- 
fcribed  in  the  next  Section.  I  will  give  an  In- 
flance  only  in  the  firft,  and  leave  the  reft  to  ex- 
ercife  the  Ingenuity  of  the  Reader. 

The  firft  Argument  may  be  reduced  to  a  Syl- 
logifm in  Barbara  thus, 

'The  Sun  is  a  fenfelefs  Being  ; 

JVhat  the  Periians  worflnpped  is  the  Sun ; 

Therefore  what  the  Perfians  worfhipped  is  a 
fenfelefs  Being.  Tho'  the  conclufive  Force  of  this 
Argument  is  evident  without  this  Redu6tioa 

*  Perhaps  Tome  of  thefe  Syllogifms  may  be  reJuced  to  thofe  which  I 
call  Connexive  afterward,  but  ir  is  of  lictle  Moment  to  what  Species  they  be- 
long: for  it  is  not  any  formal  Sett  of  Rules  io  much  as  the  Evidence  and 
Force  of  Reafon  that  muft  determine  the  Truth  or  Fallhood  of  all  fuch  Syl- 
logifms. 


U  4  Sect. 


296  L  0  G  I  C  K:  &c:     Part  III. 

Sect.  V. 

Of  conjun6live  Syllogifrm. 

rnr^HOSE  are  called  conjunSlive  Syllogifms^  where- 
J^     in  one  of  the  PrcmifTes,  namely  the  major, 
has  dill:in6^t:  Parts,  which  are  joined  by  a  Conjunc- 
tion, or  fome   fuch   Particle  of  Speech.     'Moil  > 
Times  the  major  or  minor,  or  both,  are  explicit- 
ly compound  Propojltions :  And  generally  the  major 
Propofition  is  made  up  of  two  diftin6t  Parts  or 
Propofitions  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  that  by  the  Af-, 
feition  of  one  in  the  minor^  the  other  is  either  af- 
fcrted  or  denied  in  the  Conclufton :  Or  by  the  De- 
riial  of  one  in  the  minor^  the  other  is  either  afTert- 
ed  or  denied  in  the  Conclufton.     It  is  hardly  pofH- 
ble  indeed  to  fit  any  fhort  Definition  to  include 
all  the  Kinds  of  them  j   but  the  chief  amongft 
them  are  the  conditional  Syllogifm,  the  disjun^ive^ 
the  relative^  and  the  connexive. 

I.  The  coriditional  or  hypothetical  Syllogifm   is 
A^'hofe    major  or  minor,  or  both,  are  conditional 
Propofitions ;  as,  /f  there  he  a  God^  the  World  is^ 
governed  by  Providence-,  hut  there  is  a  God',  there- 
fore the  World  is  governed  by  Providence. 

Thcfe  Syllogifms  admit  two  forts  of  true  Argu? 
mentation,  where  the  major  is  conditional, 

<i .  When  the  Antecedent  is  afierted  in  the  mi- 

•    nor,  that  the  Confequent  may  be  afierted  in  the 

Conclufion  >  fuch  is  the  preceding  Example.  This 

is  called  arguing  from  the  Pofition  of  the  jintecedent 

to  the  Pofition  of  the  Confequent. 

z.  When  the  Confequent  is  contradi(5bed  in 
the  minor  Propofition,  that  the  Antecedent  may 
be  contradicted  in  the  Conclufion  j,  as.  If  Athcifi 

are 


C,  II.  S.  5.     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     297 

are  in  the  right^  then  the  World  ex'ifts  'without  a 
Caufe  5  but  the  World  does  not  exiji  without  a 
Caufe ',  therefore  Atheifls  are  not  in  the  right.  This 
is  called  arguing  from  the  removing  of  the  Confe- 
quent  to  the  remo'ving  of  the  Antecedent. 

To  remove  the  Antecedent  or  Confequcnt  here 
does  not  meerly  fignify  the  Denial  of  it,  but  the 
Contradi^ion  of  it ;  for  the  mcer  Dental  of  it  by 
a  contrary  Propofition  will  not  make  a  true  Syllo- 
gifm,  as  appears  thus ;  If  every  Creature  be  rea- 
fonable^  every  Brute  is  reafonahle ;  hut  no  Brute  is 
reafonable ;  therefore  no  Creature  is  reafonahle. 
Whereas  if  you  fay  in  the  minor,  but  every  Brute 
is  not  reafonahle^  then  it  will  follow  truly  in  the 
Conclufion,  therefore  every  Creature  is  not  rea- 
fonahle. 

When  the  Antecedent  or  Confequent  arc  nega^ 
ti'ue  Propofitions,  they  are  removed  by  an  Affir- 
mative j  as.  If  there  be  no  God-y  then  the  World 
does  not  difcover  creating  Wifdom  y  but  the  World 
does  difcover  creating  Wifdom  >  therefore  there  is  a 
God.  In  this  Inftance  the  Confequent  is  removed 
or  contradiftcd  in  the  minor,  that  the  Antecedent 
may  be  contradicted  in  the  Conclufion.  So  in 
this  Argument  of  St.  Paul^  i  Cor.  xv.  If  the 
Dead  rife  not^  Chrijl  died  in  vain-,  but  Chrill  did 
not  die  in  vain-,  therefore  the  Dead fhall rife. 

There  are  alfo  two  forts  of  falfe  arguing,  {yiz^j 
( I .)  From  the  removing  of  the  Antecedent  to  the  re- 
moving of  the  Confequent ;  or  (1.)  From  the  Pofiti- 
on  of  the  Confequent  to  the  Pojition  of  the  Ayitecc- 
dent.     Examples  of  thcfc  are  eafily  framed ;  as, 

( I .)  If  a  Minifler  were  a  Prince  he  mufi  be  ho- 
noured J  But  a  Minijier  is  not  a  Prince  j 

'Therefore  he  tpufi  not  be  honoured. 

(z.)  //■ 


298  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       Part  III. 

(2.)  If  a  Minijier  were  a  Prince,  he  muft  he  ho^ 
nourccly  But  a  Minijier  muft  he  honoured -^ 

I'herefore  he  is  a  Prince. 

Who  fees  not  the  ridiculous  Falfhood  of  both 
thefc  Syllogifms? 

Ohferv.l.  If  the  Subject  of  the  Antecedent  and 
the  Confcquent  be  the  fame,  then  the  hypothetical 
Syllogifm  may  be  turned  into  a  categorical  One  5 
a?.  If  Cdsfar  be  a  King,  he  muft  be  honoured  j  But 
Cacfar  is  a  King',  therefore,  {^c-  This  may  be 
changed  thus,  Every  King  muft  he  honoured  j  but 
Cselar  is  a  King  -,  therefore,  {^c. 

Ohferv.  II.  If  the  major  Propofition  only  be 
conditional,  the  Conclullon  is  categorical :  But  if 
the  fnmor  or  both  be  conditional,  the  Concluflon  is 
alfo  conditional ;  as.  The  IVorfhippers  of  Images  are 
Idolaters ;  If  the  Papifts  worftjip  a  Crucifix,  they 
are  Worftoippers  of  an  Image ;  therefore  if  the  Pa- 
pifts  worfhip  a  Crucifix,  they  are  Idolaters.  But 
this  fort  of  Syllogifms  Ihould  be  avoided  as  much 
as  poffible  in  Dilputation,  becaufe  they  greatly 
embarrafs  a  Caufe :  Tho'  Syllogifms,  whole  ma- 
jor only  is  hypothetical,  are  very  frequent,  and  us'd 
with  great  Advantage. 

II.  A  disjunctive  Syllogifm  is  when  the  major 
Propofition  is  disjunctive ;  as,  77?e  Earth  moves 
in  a  Circle  or  an  Ellipfis  j  but  it  does  not  move  in  a 
Circle  j  therefore  it  moves  in  an  Ellipfis. 

A  disjunClive  Syllogifm  may  have  many  Members 
or  Parts  thus;  //  is  either  Spring,  Summer,  Au- 
tumn, or  Winter  5  but  it  is  not  Spring,  Autumn,  or 
Winter  -,  therefore  /'/  is  Summer. 

The  true  Method  of  arguing  here  is  from  the 
Affertion  of  one,  to  the  Denial  of  the  reft,  or  from 

2,  ib.e- 


C.  II.  S.  5.     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'     299 

the  Denial  of  one  or  more^  to  the  AJfertion  of  'what 
remains:  but  the  major  lliould  be  fo  framed,  that 
the  feveral  Parts  of  it  can't  be  true  together,  the* 
one  of  them  is  evidently  true. 

III.  A  relative  Syllogifm  requires  the  major  Pro- 
pofition  to  be  relative  3  as,  Where  Chriji  is^  there 
Jhall  his  Ser'vants  be ;  but  Chriji  is  in  Heaven  j 
ihcTefoie his  Servants  JJjalllpe  there  alfo.  Or,  yfx 
is  the  Captain^  fo  are  his  Soldiers  j  but  the  Captain 
is  a  Coward  j  therefore  his  Soldiers  are  fo  too. 

Arguments  that  relate  to  the  Do6trine  of  Pro- 
portion muft  be  referred  to  this  Head  ;  as,  As 
two  are  to  four^  fo  are  three  to  fix ;  but  two  make 
the  half  of  four  j  therefore  three  make  the  half 
of  fix. 

Befides  thefe,  there  is  another  fort  of  Syllogifm. 
which  is  very  natural  and  common,  and  yet  Au- 
thors take  very  little  Notice  of  it,  call  it  by  an 
improper  Name,  and  defcribe  it  very  defc6livelv, 
and  that  is, 

IV.  A  connexive  Syllogifm.  This  fome  have 
called  copulative ;  but  it  does  by  no  Means  requin^ 
the  major  to  be  a  copulative  nor  a  compound  Pro 
pofition  (according  to  the  Definition  given  of  it 
Part  ll\  Chap.  ll\  SeU.  6.)  but  it  requires  that 
two  or  more  Ideas  be  io  connected  either  in  the 
complex  Subje6b  or  Predicate  of  the  major,  that 
if  one  of  them  be  affirmed  or  denied  in  the  minor, 
common  Senfe  will  naturally  Ihew  us  what  will 
be  the  Confequence.  It  would  be  very  tedious 
and  ufelefs  co  frame  particular  Rules  about  them, 
as  will  appear  by  the  following  Examples,  which, 
are  very  vai'ious,  and  may  yet  be  farther  multi- 
plied. 

(I.)  Meek" 


300  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

( I .)  Meeknefs  and  Humility  always  go  together  ; 
Mofes  was  a  Man  of  Meeknefs ;  therefore  Mofes 
was  alfo  humble.  Or  we  may  form  this  minor, 
Pharaoh  was  no  humble  Man  j  therefore  he  was  not 
meek. 

(i.)  No  Man  canferve  God  and  Mammon  j  the 
covetous  Man  ferves  Mammon  j  therefore  he  can- 
not  ferve  God.  Or  the  minor  may  run  thus,  the 
true  Chrijlian  ferves  God-,  therefore  he  does  not  ferve 
Mammon. 

(5.)  Genius  mujl  join  with  Study  to  make  a  great 
Man ;  Florino  has  Genius  but  he  cannot  ftudy  -,  there- 
fore Florino  will  never  be  a  great  Man.  Or  thus, 
Quintus  ftudies  hard  but  has  no  Genius  j  therefore 
Quintus  will  never ^  Sec. 

(4.)  Gulo  can't  make  a  Dinner  without  Flefh  and 
Fiflo ',  there  was  no  Fifh  to  be  gotten  to  Day  5  there- 
fore Gulo  this  Day  cannot  make  a  Dinner. 

(y.)  London  and  Paris  are  in  different  Latitudes  ^ 
the  Latitude  of  London  is  fif  X)^^.  therefore  this 
cannot  be  the  Latitude  of  Paris, 

(6.)  Jofeph  and  Benjamin  had  one  Mother  ; 
Rachel  was  the  Mother  of  Jofeph  j  therefore  fhe 
was  Benjamin' J  Mother  too. 

(7.)  The  Father  and  the  Son  are  of  equal  Stature^ 
The  Father  is  fix  Foot  high  j  therefore/^*:  Son  is  fix 
Foot  high  alfo. 

(8.)  Pride  is  inconftftent  with  Innocence-,  Angels 
have  Innocence;  therefore  they  have  no  Pride.  Or 
thus ;  Devils  have  Pride ;  therefore  they  have  not 
Innocence. 

I  might  multiply  other  Inftances  of  thefe  con- 
nexive  Syllogifms^  by  bringing  in  all  forts  of  ex' 
ceptive,  exclufive^  comparative^  and  ?nodal  Propo- 
fitions  into  the  Compofition  of  them  5  for  all 
thefe  may  be  wrought  into  conjunctive^  as  well  as 
into  fimple  Syllogifms,  and  thereby  we  may  render 

them 


C.  II.  S.  6.     The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.      3 o  i 

them  complesc.    But  it  would  wafte  Time  and  Pa- 
per without  equal  Profit. 

Concerning  thefe  various  Kinds  of  conjunSihe 
Syllogifms,  take  thefe  two  Obfervations. 

Ohferv.  I.  Moft  of  them  may  be  transformed 
into  categorical  Syllogifms  by  thofe  who  have  a 
Mind  to  prove  the  Truth  of  them  that  Way  j  or 
they  may  be  eafily  converted  into  each  other  by 
changing  the  Forms  of  Speech. 

Obfcrv.  II.  Thefe  conjunBhe  Syllogifms  are  fel- 
dom  deficient  or  faulty  in  the  Form  of  them  j  for 
fuch  a  Deficience  would  be  difcovered  at  firfl 
Glance  generally  by  common  Reafon,  without 
any  artificial  Rules  of  Logick  :  The  chief  Care 
therefore  is  to  fee  that  the  major  Propofition  be 
true,  upon  which  the  whole  Force  of  the  Argu- 
ment ufually  depends. 

Sect.    VI. 

Of  compound  Syllogifms. 

WE  properly  call  thofe  compound  Syllogifms 
which  are  made  up  of  two  or  more /ingle 
Syllogifms^  and  may  be  refolved  into  them.  The 
chief  kinds  are  thefe,  Epichirema^  Dilemma,  Pro- 
fyllogifmusy  and  Sorites. 

I.  Epichirema  is  a  Syllogifm  which  contains  the 
Proof  of  the  major  or  minor,  or  both,  before  it 
draws  the  Conclufion.  This  is  often  ufed  in  Writ- 
ing, in  publick  Speeches,  and  in  common  Con- 
verfation,  that  fo  each  Part  of  the  Difcourfc  may 
be  confirmed  and  put  out  of  Doubt,  as  it  moves 

on 


302  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,    Pan  III. 

on  toward  the  Conclufion,  which  was  chiefly  de- 
ligned.     Take  this  Inftancc, 

Sicknefs  may  be  good  for  us  j  for  it  weans  us  from 
the  Pleafures  of  Life^  and  makes  us  think  of  dy* 
ing'. 

But  we  are  uneafy  under  Sicknefs^  which  ap- 
pears by  our  Impatience^  Complaints^  Groanings^ 
6cc. 

Therefore  we  are  uneafy  fometimes  under  that 
*which  is  good  for  us. 

Another  Inftance  you  may  fee  in  Cicero's  Orati- 
on in  Defence  of  Milo^  who  had  flain  Clodius.  His 
major  Propofition  is,  that  it  is  lawful  for  one  Man 
to  kill  another^  who  lies  in  wait  to  kill  him  ;  which 
he  proves  from  the  Cujlom  of  Nations^  from  natu- 
ral Equity^  Examples^  6cc.  his  minor  is  that  Clo- 
dius laid  wait  for  Milo }  which  he  proves  by  his 
Arms^  Guards^  Sec.  and  then  infers  the  Conclufi- 
on,  that  it  was  lawful  for  Milo  to  kill  Clodius. 

II.  A  Dilemma  is  an  Argument  which  divides 
the  whole  into  all  its  Parts  or  Members  by  a  dif- 
jun^iive  Propofition,  and  then  infers  fomething 
concerning  each  Part  which  is  finally  inferr'd  con- 
cerning the  whole.  Inftances  of  this  are  fre- 
quent -y  as.  In  this  Life  we  muji  either  obey  our  vi- 
cious Inclinations  or  reftfi  them :  To  obey  them  will 
bring  Sin  and  Sorrow.^  to  reffi  them  is  laborious  and 
painful :  Therefore  we  cannot  be  perfe^ly  free  from 
Sorrow  or  Pain  in  this  Life. 

A  Dilemma  becomes  faulty  or  ineffeUual  three 
Ways :  Firfl^  when  the  Members  of  the  Divifion 
are  not  well  oppos'd,  or  not  fully  enumerated  j  for 
then  the  major  is  falfe.  Secondly^  When  what  is 
alTerted  concerning  each  part  is  not  juft  j  for  then 
the  minor  is  not  true.     'Thirdly^  When  it  may  be 

retorted 


C.Il.  S.  6.    The  right  life  ^/Reafon:       ^o? 

retorted  with  equal  Force  upon  him  who  ut- 
ters it. 

There  was  a  flimous  ancient  Inftance  of  this 
Cafe  wherein  a  Dilemma  was  retorted.  Etiathlus 
promifcd  Pro/,^^i?r<^j  a  Reward  when  he  had  tauj^ht 
him  the  Art  of  Pleadings  and  it  was  to  be  paid  the 
firft  Day  that  he  gain'd  any  Caufe  in  the  Couit. 
After  a  confiderable  time  Protagoras  goes  to  Law 
with  Euathlus  for  the  Reward,  and  ufes  this  Di- 
lemma >  Either  the  Caufe  ivill  go  on  my  Side  or  on 
yours :  If  the  Caufe  goes  on  my  Side^  you  mufi  pay 
me  according  to  the  Sentence  of  the  Judge :  If  the 
Caufe  goes  on  your  Sidcj  you  muji  pay  me  according 
to  your  Bargain :  Therefore  whether  the  Caufe  goes 
for  ?ne  or  againji  me  you  mufi  pay  me  the  Reward.  But 
Euathlus  retorted  this  Dilemma  thus  5  Either  I 
JJj  all  gain  the  Caufe  or  lofe  it:  If  I  gain  the  Caufe^ 
then  nothing  will  he  due  to  you  according  to  the  Sen- 
tence of  the  Judge :  But  if  I  lofe  the  Caufe,  nothing 
will  be  due  to  you  according  to  ?ny  Bargain :  There- 
fore whether  I  lofe  or  gain  the  Caufe  I  will  not  pay 
you,  for  nothing  will  he  due  to  you. 

Note  i^%  A  Dilemma  is  ufually  defcribed  as  tho' 
it  always  proved  the  Abfurdity,  Inconvenience,  or 
Unreafonablenefs  of  fome  Opinion  or  Pra6tice ; 
and  this  is  the  mofl  common  Defign  of  it  j  but  it 
is  plain,  that  it  may  alfo  be  ufed  to  prove  the  Truth 
or  Advantage  of  any  thing  propofed  j  as,  In  Hea- 
ven  we  f jail  either  hai'e  De  fires  or  not :  If  we  ha-z-e 
no  Defires,  then  we  have  full  Satisfi^ion  j  //  we 
have  Def  res,  they  JJj  all  be  fatisfed,  ai  fiji  as  they 
arife  5  therefore  in  Heaven  we  fhall  be  compleatly 
fatisfied. 

Note  1^,  This  fort  of  Argument  may  be  com- 
pofed  of  three  or  more  Members,  and  may  be  cal- 
led a  Tri  lemma. 

ni.  A 


304-  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  HI. 

III.  A  Profyllogifm  is  when  two  or  more  Syllo* 
gifms  are  fo  connected  together,  that  the  Conclu- 
iion  of  the  tbrmer  is  the  major  or  the  minor  of 
the  following  •,  as,  Blood  cari't  think  -,  but  the  Soul 
of  Man  thinks  j  therefore  the  Soul  of  Man  is  not 
Blood;  hwtthe  Soul  of  a  Brute  is  his  Blood  accord- 
ing to  the  Scripture 3  therefore  the  Soul  of  Man 
is  different  from  the  Soul  of  a  Bruie.  See  another 
Inllance  in  the  Introdu^ion  to  this  Treatife,  p.  y. 

IV.  A  Sorites  is  when  feveral  middle  Terms  are 
chofen  to  conneft  one  another  fuccenively  in  feve- 
ral Propofitions,  till  the  laft  Propolition  connc6ts 
its  Predicate  with  the  firll  Subject.  Thus,  ^11 
Men  of  Revenge  have  their  Souls  often  uneafy  j  un- 
eafy  Souls  are  a  Plague  to  themf elves  j  now  to  he 
ones  own  Plague  is  Folly  in  the  Extreme  •■,  therefoi'e 
all  Men  of  Revenge  are  extreme  Fools. 

The  Apoille,  ^6?;^.  viii.  19.  gives  us  an  Inftance 
of  this  fort  of  Argument  if  it  were  reduced  to  ex- 
a6t  Form :  Whom  he  foreknew  thofe  he  predejiinat^ 
ed ;  whom  he  pre  deft  inated  he  called -,  whom  he  called 
he  juftified;  whom  he  juftified  he  glorified  ^  there- 
fore whom  he  foreknew  he  glorified. 

To  thefe  Syllogifms  it  may  not  be  improper  to 
add  Indu5lion^  which  is,  when  from  feveral  parti- 
cular Propofitions  we  infer  one  general  5  as.  The 
J)o5lrine  of  the  Socinians  cannot  be  proved  from  the 
GofpelSy  it  cannot  be  proved  from  the  Aks  of  the 
ylpoftles^  it  cannot  be  proved  from  the  Epiftles^  nor 
the  Book  of  Revelations ;  therefore  //  cannot  beprov' 
ed  from  the  New  Teftament. 

Note,  This  fort  of  Argument  is  often  defe£tive, 
becaufe  there  is  not  due  Care  taken  to  enumerate  all 
the  Paiticulars  on  which  the  Goncluiion  ihould  de- 
pend. 

All 


G.  11.  S.  7.    T/je  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.      305 

All  thefe  four  Kinds  of  Syllogifms  in  thisSc6lion 
may  be  called  RedMndantj  becaufe  they  have  mo:t 
than  three  Proportions.  But  there  is  one  loit  of 
Syllogifm  which  is  dcfc^i-ve^  and  is  called  an  En- 
thymem^  becaufe  only  the  Conclufion  with  one  of 
the  Premill'es  is  exprefr,  while  the  other  is  fuppofcd 
and  referved  in  the  Mind  :  Thus,  There  is  no  trm 
Religion  without  good  Morals ;  therefore  a  Knwje 
cannot  be  truly  religious :  Or  thus,  It  is  oUr  Duty 
to  love  our  Neighhoiirs  as  our  fcl-ves  j  therefore  there 
are  but  feiv  who  pei'forrn  their  Duty. 

NofCj  This  is  the  moft  comnion  foit  of  Argi/- 
•ment  amongft  IMankind  both  in  Writing  and  in 
Speaking}  for  it  would  take  up  too  much  Time, 
and  too  much  retard  the  Difcourfe  to  draw  out  all 
cm-  Arguments  in  Mood  and  Figure.  Belides,  Man- 
j<ind  love  to  have  ib  much  Compliment  paid  to 
their  Underftandings  as  to  fuppofe  that  they  know 
the  Major  or  iWnor,  which  is  fupprefied  and  im- 
plied, when  you  pronounce  the  other  Premife  and 
the  Conclufion. 

If  there  be  any  Debate  about  this  Argument, 
the  Syllogifm  muil  be  compleated  in  order  to  try 
its  Force  and  Goodnefs  by  adding  the  abfent  Pro- 
pofition. 

Sect.     VII. 

Of  the  middle  Termsy  of  common  Places  or  Topics^ 
and  Invention  of  ^rgwrncnts. 

THE  next  Divifion  of  Syllogifms  is  according 
to  the  middle  Term^  which  is  made  ufe  of  in 
the  Proof  of  any  Proportion.  Now  the  middle 
Term  (as  we  have  hinted  before)  is  often  called  the 
Argument^  becaufe  the  Force  of  the  Syllogifm  de- 
pends upon  it ;  We  muft  make  a  little  Delay  here 

X  to 


306  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

to  treat  briefly  of  the  Do6trine  of  Topics^  or  Pla- 
ces whence  middle  Terms  or  Arguments  are  drawn. 

All  Arts  and  Sciences  have  fome  general  Sub- 
je6ts  which  belong  to  them,  which  are  called  To- 
pics^ or  common  Places  j  becaufe  middle  Terms  are 
borrowed,  and  Arguments  derived  from  them  for 
the  Proof  of  the  various  Proportions  which  we 
have  occafion  to  difcourfe  of     The  Topics  of 
■Grammar  are  Etymology^  Noun^  Ferb,  ConJiru6ti- 
on^  Signification^  Scc.     The  Topics  of  Logic  are 
Genus,    Species,  Difference,   Property,    Definition, 
Di'vifion,  6cc.     The  Topics  of  Ontology  or  Meta- 
phyftcs  are   Caufe,  Eff'e^,  A^ion,  Paffion,  Identi- 
ty, Oppofition,   Suhjeii,  AdjunEl,  Sign,  6cc.      The 
Topics  of  Morality  or  Ethics  are  Law,  Sin,  Du- 
ty, Authority,  Freedom  of  Will,  Command,  Threat- 
ning.  Reward,  Punifijment,  &c.     The  Topics   of 
Theology  are  God,    Chrifi,   Faith,  Hope,  JVorJhip, 
Salvation,  &c. 

To  thefe  feveral  Topics  there  belong  particular 
Obfervations,  Axioms,  Canons  or  Rules  -\,  which 
are  laid  down  in  their  propCT  Sciences ;  as, 

Grammar  hath  fuch  Canons  {viz.)  JVords  in  a 
different  Conflru^ion  obtain  a  different  Senfe.  JVords 
derived  from  the  fame  Primitive  may  probably  have 
fome  Affinity  in  their  original  Meaning,  &c. 

Canons  in  Logic  are  fuch  as  thefe.  Every  Part 
of  a  Divifion  fingly  taken  mufi  contain  lefs  than 
the  IV hole.  A  Definition  mufi  be  peculiar  and  pro- 
per to  the  Thing  defined.  Whatever  is  affirmed  or 
denied  of  the  Genus,  may  he  affirmed  or  denied  of  the 
■  Species,  8cc. 

Metaphyfical  Canons  are  fuch  as  thefe  5  ^«^/  Cau- 

fes  belong  only  to  intelligent  Agents.     If  a  natural 

'  and  neceffary  Caufe  operate,  the  EffeU  will  follow, 

■f  A  Canm  is  3  Propoficion  declaring  fome  Property  of  the  Subje&>  which 
is  not  expreft  in  the  Definitm  or  Divi/on  of  it, 

^C. 


G.  II.  S.  7.      The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.      3  07 

i^c.  and  there  are  large  Catalogues  of  many  more 
in  each  dill:in6l  Science. 

Now  it  has  been  the  Cuftom  Ox^  thofe  who 
teach  Logic  or  Rhetoric  to  direct  their  Diiciple^>, 
when  they  want  an  Argument,  to  confult  the  Ic- 
•veral  Topics  which  are  iliited  to  their  Subject  of 
Difcourie,  and  to  rummage  over  the  Definitions^ 
■Divifions  and  Canons  that  belong  to  each  I'opick. 
This  is  called  the  Ini-cntion  of  an  Argument ;  and 
■it  is  taught  with  much  Solemnity  in  fome  Schoo'5. 

I  grant  there  may  be  good  Ule  of  this  Practice 
for  Peifons  of  a  lower  Cjcnius,  when  they  are  to 
compofe  any  Difcourfe  for  the  Publick  >  or  for 
thofe  of  liiperior  Parts  to  refreHi  their  Memory, 
and  revive  their  /Acquaintance  with  a  Subject 
which  has  been  long  abfent  from  their  Thoughts  5 
or  when  their  natural  Spirits  labour  under  Indifpo- 
fition  and  Languor  :  But  when  a  Man  of  mode- 
rate Sagacity  has  made  himfelf  Mailer  of  his 
Theme  by  juft  Diligence  and  Enquir}^,  he  has 
feldom  need  to  run  knocking  at  the  Doors  of  all 
the  Topics  that  he  may  furnilh  himfelf  with  Ar- 
gument or  Matter  of  fpeaking:  And  indeed  it  is 
only  a  Man  of  Senfe  and  Judgment  that  can  ufe 
common  Places  or  Topics  well  j  for  among (f  this 
Variety  he  only  knows  what  is  fit  to  be  left  out, 
as  well  as  what  is  fit  to  be  ipokcn. 

By  fome  logical  Writers  this  Bufincfs  of  Topics 
and  fniention  is  treated  of  in  fuch  a  manner  with 
mathematical  figures  and  Diagrams,  fill'd  with 
the  barbarous  technical  Words,  Napcas^  Nipcis^ 
jRopcos,  Nojrop^  6cc.  as  tho'  an  ignorant  Lad  were 
to  be  led  mechanically  in  certain  artificial  Harncf- 
•fes  and  Trammels  to  find  out  Arguments  to  pro\  e 
or  refute  any  Propofirionwhatfoever,  without  any 
rational  Knowledge  of  the  Ideas.  Now  there  is 
no  Need  to  throw  Words  of  Contempt  on  fuch 

X "  i  a  Practice  j 


308  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Oty     Part  III. 

a  Pradice  >  the  very  Defcription  of  it  carries  Re- 
proof and  Ridicule  in  Abundance. 

Sect.    VIII. 

Of  fever al  Kinds  of  Arguments  and  D^monfirations. 

WE  proceed  now  to  the  Diviiion  of  Syllo- 
gifms  according  to  the  middle  Term ;  and 
in  this  Part  of  our  Treatife  the  Syllogifms  them- 
felves  arc  properly  called  Arguments^  and  are  thus 
diftributed. 

I.  Arguments  are  called  Grammatical^  Logical^ 
Metaphyfical^  Phyftcal^  Moral^  Mechanical^  Theo- 
logical^ 6cc.  according  to  the  Art,  Science,  or 
Subject  whence  the  middle  Term  or  Topic  is, 
borrowed.  Thus  if  we  prove  that  no  Man  fhould 
flealfrom  his  Neighbour  becaufe  the  Scripture  for' 
bids  it  J  this  is  a  theological  Argument :  If  we  prove 
it  from  the  Laws  of  the  Land^  it  is  political ;  but 
if  we  prove  it  from  the  Principles  of  Reafon  and 
Equity^  the  Argument  is  moral. 

II.  Arguments  are  either  certain  and  evident^  or 
doubtful  and  meerly  probable. 

Probable  Arguments  are  thofe  whofe  Conclufi- 
ons  are  proved  by  fome  probable  Medium  3  as, 
This  Hill  was  once  a  Church-Yard.^  or  a  Field  of 
Battle^  beaiufe  there  are  many  human  Bones  found 
here.  This  is  not  a  certain  Argument,  for  human 
Bones  might  have  been  conveyed  there  fome  otlier 
Way. 

Evident  and  certain  Arguments  are  called  De^ 
monjlrations  3  for  they  prove  their  Conclufions  by 
clear  Mediums  and  undoubted  Principles  j  and  they 
are  generally  divided  into  thefe  two  forts. 

I.  Demon- 


C.  II.  S.  8.     The  right  Ufe  ^Reafon.        309 

I .  Demonftrations  a  Priori^  which  prove  the 
Effc6t  by  its  neceflliry  Caufe  -,  as,  I  prove  the 
Scripture  is  infallibly  true^  becaufe  it  is  the  IVord 
of  God^  who  cannot  lye. 

z.  Demonftrations  a  Poferiori^  which  infer  the 
Caufe  from  its  ncceflary  Effect  j  as,  I  infer  thcrs 
hath  been  the  Hand  of  fome  Artificer  here^  becaufe 
I  find  a  curious  Engine.  Or,  I  infer  there  is  a  God^ 
from  the  Works  of  his  Wifdom  in  the  "cifible  TVorld. 

The  lail  of  thefe  is  called  Demonftratio  rS  on, 
becaufe  it  proves  only  the  Exiftence  of  a  Thing  -, 
the  firlt  is  named  Demonftratio  rS  d^loriy  becaufe 
it  fhews  alfo  the  Caufe  of  its  Exiftence. 

But  Note,  That  tho'  thefe  two  forts  of  Argu- 
ments are  moft  peculiarly  called  Demonfirations, 
yet  generally  any  ftrong  and  convincing  Aigument 
obtains  that  Name  5  and  it  is  the  Cuftom  of  Ma- 
thematicians to  call  all  their  Arguments  Demon- 
ftrationsy  from  what  Medium  foevcr  they  derive 
them, 

III.  Arguments  are  divided  into  artificial  and 
inartificial. 

An  artificial  Argument  is  taken  from  the  Na- 
ture and  Circumftances  of  the  Things  >  and  if  the 
Argument  be  ftrong  it  produces  a  natural  Certain^ 
ty,  US',  The  World  ijuasfirfi  created  by  God^  becaufe 
nothing  can  create  itfelf. 

An  inartificial  Argument  is  the  Teftimony  of 
another,  and  this  is  called  original,  when  our  In- 
formation proceeds  immediately  from  the  Perfons 
concerned,  or  from  Eye  or  Ear-Witneflcs  of  a 
Fa6t :  it  is  called  Tradition  when  it  is  delivered  by 
the  Report  of  others. 

We  have  taken  Notice  before,  that  Teftimo- 
ny is  either  divine  or  human.  If  the  human  Te- 
ftinaony  be  ftrong,  it  produces  a  moral  Certainty  5 

X  ^  but 


310  L  O  G  I  C  K:  ^c.     Part  III. 

but  divine  Teflimony  produces  z.fupcrnatural  Cer- 
tainty which  is  far  fuperior. 

Note  i  Arguments  taken  from  human  'feflimony^ 
as  well  as  from  Laws  and  Rules  of  Equity^  are  cal- 
led moral;  and  indeed  the  fiime  Name  is  alfo  ap- 
plied to  every  fort  of  Argument  which  is  drawn 
trom  the  free  JBions  of  God^  or  the  contingent  Ac- 
tions  of  Men,  wherein  we  cannot  arife  to  a  natural 
Certainty^  but  content  our  felves  with  an  high 
Degree  of  Probahility^  which  in  many  Cafes  is 
fcarce  inferior  to  natural  Certainty. 

IV.  Arguments  are  either  direEf  or  indireSl.  It 
is  a  direB  Argument  where  the  middle  Term  is 
fuch  as  proves  the  Queftion  itfelf,  and  infers  thac 
very  Propofition  which  was  the  Matter  of  En- 
quiry. An  indire^  or  oblique  Argument  proves  or 
refutes  fome  other  Propofition,  and  thereby  makes 
the  Thing  enquired  appear  to  be  true  by  plain 
Confequence. 

Several  Arguments  are  called  indireB',  as,  (i.) 
"When  fome  contradi6lory  Propofition  is  proved 
to  be  filfc,  improbable,  or  impofiible :  Or  when 
upon  Suppofition  of  the  Falfhood  or  Denial  of 
the  originiil  Propofition,  fome  Abfurdity  is  infer- 
red.    This  is  called  a  Proof  j^^r  impoffibile^   or  a 
Reduulio  ad  ahfurdum.      (i.)  When  ibme  other 
Propofition  is  proved  to  be  true  which  is  lefs  pro- 
bable, and  thence  it  follows  that  the  original  Pro- 
pofition is  true,  becaufe  it  is  more  probable.  This 
is  an  Argument  ex  magis  probabiU  ad  minus.     (3.) 
When  any  other  Propofition  is  proved  upon  which 
it  was  before  agreed  to  yield  the  original  Queftion. 
This  is  an  Argument  ex  Concejfo. 

V.  There  is  yet  another  Rank  of  Arguments 
which  have  Latin  Names  j  their  true  Diltinftion 

is 


I 


C.  II.  S.  S .      The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.     3 1 1 

is  derived  from  the  Topics  or  middle  Terms  which 
are  ufed  in  them,  tho'  they  are  called  an  iVddrefs 
to  our  Judgment.^  our  Faith^  our  Ignorance^  our 
ProfeJJion^  omx  Modejiy^  and  our  PaJJions. 

I .  If  an  Argument  be  taken  from  the  Nature 
or  Exiftence  of  Things,  and  addreft  to  the  Rea- 
fon of  Mankind^  it  is  called  Argumentum  ad  Judi- 
cium. 

z.  When  it  is  borrowed  from  fome  convincing 
Teftimony,it  is  Argumentum  ad  Fidem^  an  Addrel's 
to  our  Fatib. 

3 .  When  it  is  drawn  from  any  infufficient  Afe- 
dium  whatfoever,  and  yet  the  Oppofer  has  not 
Skill  to  refute  or  anfwer  it,  this  is  Argumentum, 
ad  Ignorantiam^  an  Addrefs  to  our  Ignorance. 

4.  When  it  is  built  upon  the  profeft  Principles 
or  Opinions  of  the  Peribn  with  whom  we  argue, 
whether  thefe  Opinions  be  true  or  falfe,  it  is  nam- 
ed Argumentum  ad  Hominem^  an  x^ddrels  to  our 
frofeft  Principles.  St.  Paul  often  ufes  this  Argu- 
ment when  he  reafons  with  the  Jen^js^  and  when 
he  fays,  Ifpeak  as  a  Man. 

f .  When  the  Argument  is  fetch'd  from  the 
Sentiments  of  fome  wife,  great,  or  good  Men, 
whofe  Authority  we  reverence,  and  hardly  dare 
oppofe,  it  is  called  Argumentum  ad  Verecundiam^ 
an  Addrefs  to  oMrModeJiy. 

6.  I  add  finally,  when  an  Argument  is  borrow- 
ed from  any  Topics  which  are  fuited  to  engage 
the  Inclinations  and  Pailions  of  the  Hearers  on 
the  Side  of  the  Speaker,  rather  than  to  convince 
the  Judgment,  this  is  Argumentum  ad  Pajfwnes^  an 
Addrefs  to  the  PaJJions  3  or  if  it  be  made  pub- 
lickly,  it  is  called  ad  Populum^  or  an  Appeal  to  th& 
People, 

X  4  Aftev 


312  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

After  all  thefe  Divifions  of  Syllogifm  or  j^rgu- 
went  arifing  from  the  middle  'Term^  there  is  one 
Dillinftion  proper  to  be  mentioned  which  arifes 
irom  the  Premijfes.  An  Argument  is  called  uni- 
form when  both  the  Premifibs  are  derived  from 
the  fime  Springs  of  Knowledge,  whether  it  be 
Senfe^  Reajon^  Confcioufnefs^  human  Faitb^  or  di- 
vine Faith :  But  when  the  two  PremifTes  are  de- 
rived from  different  Springs  of  Knowledge,  it  is 
called  a  mixt  Argument. 

Whether  the  Conclufion  muft  be  called  i7^/;;?^» 
or  Divine^  when  one  or  both  PremifTes  are  Di'vinc^ 
but  the  Conclufion  is  drawn  by  human  Reafoji^  I 
leave  to  be  difputcd  and  determined  in  the  Schools 
of  Theology. 

Thus  thefecond  GhapUr  is  finifhed,  and  a  par- 
t-iGular  Account  given  of  all  the  chief  Kinds  of 
Syllogifms  or  Arguments  which  ai'e  made  ufe  of 
among  Men,  or  treated  of  in  Logic^  together  with 
fpmal  Rules  for  the  Formation  of  them,  as .  far  as 
is  neceffary. 

If  a  Syllogifm  agree  with  the  Rules  which  are 
given  for  the  Conll:ru61:ion  and  Regulation  of  it, 
it  is  called  a  true  Jrgument :  If  it  difagree  with 
fehefe  Rules,  it  is  a  Paralogifm^  or  falfe  Ar.gument : 
But  when  a  falfe  Argument  puts  on  the  Face  and 
Appearance  of  a  true  one,  then  it  is  properly  caK 
kd  a  Sophifm  or  Fallacy^  which  fhall  be  the  Sub- 
j^  of  the  next  Chapter. 


CHAP. 


C.  III.  S.  I :    The  right  Ufe  ^/Reafon:     3 1 1 

CHAP.    III. 
The  ^o^rine  of  Sofhtfms, 

FROM  Truth  nothing  can  really  follow  but 
what  is  true  :  Wheiifoever  therefore  we  find 
a  falfe  Conclujion  drawn  from  Prcmifles  which 
feem  to  be  true,  there  mull  be  fome  Fault  in  the 
Dedu61:ion  or  Inference  -,  or  elfe  one  of  the  Pre- 
miffes  is  not  true  in  the  Senfe  in  which  it  is  ufed 
in  that  Argument. 

When  an  Argument  carries  the  Face  of  Truth 
with  it,  and  yet  leads  us  into  Miftake,  it  is  a  Sg- 
$hifm  5  and  there  is  fome  Need  of  a  particular 
Defcription.  of  thefe  fallacious  Arguments,  that 
we  may  with  moje  Eafe  and  Readineis  dcted  and 
folve  them. 

Sect.    I. 

Of  fever^il  Kinds  of  SophifmSy  and  their  Solution, 

AS  the  Rules  of  right  Judgment  and  of  good 
Ratiocination  often  coincide  with  each  o- 
ther,  fo  the  Do£lrine  of  Prejudices,  which  was 
treated  of  in  the  fecond  Part  of  Logic^  has  antici- 
pated a  great  deal  of  what  might  be  faid  on  the 
SubjeU  of  Sophifms ;  yet  I  Ihdl  mention  the  moft 
remarkable  Springs  o£  falfe  Argumentation^  which 
are  reduced  by  Logicians  to  fome  of  the  following 
Meads. 

I.  The 


JH  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      PartllL 

I.  The  fir  ft  fort  of  Sophifm  is  called  Ignoratio 
Elenchi^  or  a  Miflake  of  the  ^ueftion  5  that  is, 
when  ibmething  elfe  is  proved  which  has  neither 
any  neceftary  Connection  or  Inconfiftency  with 
the  Thing  enquired,  and  confequent4y  gives  no 
Determination  to  the  Enquiry,  tho'  it  may  feem 
at  firft  Sight  to  determine  the  Qpeftionj  as,  if 
any  fhould  conclude  that  St.  Paul  was  not  a  na- 
tive Jew^  by  proving  that  he  was  born  a  Roman ; 
or  if  they  fhould  pretend  to  determine  that  he 
'H'as  neither  Roman^  nor  Jew^  by  proving  that  he 
was  born  at  Tarfus  in  Cilicia :  Thefe  Sophifms  are 
refuted  by  fhewing  that  all  thefe  three  may  be 
true  J  for  he  was  born  of  JewiJJo  Parents  in  the 
City  of  Tarfus^  and  by  fome  peculiar  Privilege 
granted  to  his  Parents,  or  his  native  City,  he  was 
born  a  Denizon  of  Rome.  Thus  there  is  neither 
of  thefe  three  Characters  of  the  Apoftle  incon- 
fiftent  with  each  other,  and  therefore  the  prov- 
ing one  of  them  true  docs  not  refute  the  others. 

Or  if  the  Queftion  be  propofed,  Whether  Ex" 
cefs  of  IVine  can  be  hurtful  to  him  that  drinks  it^ 
and  the  Sophiller  fhould  prove  that  it  revives  his 
Spirits^  it  exhilarates  his  Soul^  it  gives  a  Man  Cou" 
rage^  and  makes  him  firong  and  aUive^  and  then  he 
takes  it  for  granted  that  he  has  proved  his  Point. 
But  the  Refpondent  may  eafily  fhew  that  tho' 
Wine  may  do  all  this^  yet  it  may  be  finally  hurt^ 
ful  both  to  the  Soul  and  Body  of  him  that  drinks  it 
to  Excefs. 

Difputers  when  they  grow  warm  are  ready  to 
fim  into  this  Fallacy :  They  drefs  up  the  Opinion 
of  their  Adverfary  as  they  pleafe,  and  afcribe  Sen- 
timents to  him  which  he  doth  not  acknowledge  > 
and  when  they  have  with  a  great  deal  of  Pomp 
attack'd  and  confounded  thefe  Images  of  Straw 


C.  III.  S.  I .    ne  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:     3 1 5 

of  their  own  making,  they  triumphs  over  their 
Adverfary  as  tho'  they  had  utterly  confuted  his 
Opinion. 

It  is  a  Fallacy  of  the  fime  kind  which  a  Difpu- 
tant  is  guilty  of  when  he  finds  that  his  Adverfary 
is  too  hard  for  him,  and  that  he  cannot  fiiirly 
prove  the  Queftion  firft  propos'd  5  he  then  with 
Slynefs  and  Subtilty  turns  the  Difcourfe  afide  to 
fome  other  kindred  Point  which  he  can  prove, 
and  exults  in  that  new  Argument  wherein  his  Op- 
ponent never  contradi61:ed  him. 

The  Way  to  prevent  this  Fallacy  is  by  keeping 
the  Eye  fixt  on  the  precife  Point  of  Difpute,  and 
neither  wandering  from  it  ourfelves,  nor  fuffering 
our  Antagonift  to  wander  from  it,  or  fubilitute 
anything  elfe  in  its  Room. 

II.  The  next  Sophifm  is  called  Petitio  Pnnci^ 
piiy  or  a  Suppofttion  of  what  is  not  granted ;  that 
is,  when  any  Propofition  is  proved  by  the  fame 
Propofition  in  other  Words,  or  by  fomcthing 
that  is  equally  uncertain  and  difputed :  As  if  any 
one  undertake  to  prove  that  the  human  Soul  is  ex- 
tended thro"  all  the  Parts  of  the  Body^  becaufe  it 
reftdes  in  every  Member.^,  which  is  but  the  lame- 
Thing  in  other  Words.  Or  if  a  Papiji  fhould 
pretend  to  prove  that  his  Religion  is  the  only  Ca- 
tholick  Religion^  and  is  derived  from  Chrifi  and  his 
Apofiles^  becaufe  it  agrees  ivith  the  Doctrine  of  aU 
the  Fathers  of  the  Churchy  all  the  holy  Martyrs^ 
and  all  the  Chriflian  World  throughout  all  Ages : 
Whereas  this  is  a  great  Point  in  Conteft,  whether 
their  Religion  does  agree  with  that  of  all  the 
Antients,  and  the  primitive  Chriftians  or  no. 

III.  That  foit  of  Fallacy  which  is  called  a  C/r- 
cle  is  very  near  akin  to  the  P&titio  Principii  -,  as, 

wheii 


ii6  LOGIC  K:  Or,    Part  IIIC 

when  oiie  of  the  PremifTes  in  a  Syllogifm  is  que- 
ilioned  and  oppofed,  and  we  pretend  to  prove  it 
by  the  Conclufion :  Or,  when  in  a  Train  of  Syl- 
logifms  we  prove  the  laft  by  recurring  to  what 
was  the  Conclulion  of  the  firft.  The  Papijis  are 
famous  at  this  fort  of  Fallacy,  when  they  prove 
the  Scripure  to  be  the  Word  of  God  by  the  Autho- 
rity or  infallible  'Tefiimony  of  their  Church  ;  and 
when  they  are  called  to  fhew  the  infallible  Autho- 
rity of  their  Churchy  they  pretend  to  prove  it  by 
the  Scripture. 

IV.  The  next  kind  of  Sophifm  is  called  non 
Caufa  pro  Caufd^ox  the  AJfignation  of  a  falfe  Caufe. 
This  the  peripatetic  Philofophers  were  guilty  of 
continually,  when  they  told  us  that  certain  Be- 
ings, which  they  called  fubfiantial  Forms^  were 
the  Springs  of  Colour,  Motion,  Vegetation,  and 
the  various  Operations  of  natural  Beings  in  the 
animate  and  inanimate  World  >  when  they  inform- 
ed us  that  Nature  was  terribly  afraid  of  a  Vacuum^ 
and  that  this  was  the  Caufe  why  the  Water 
would  not  fall  out  of  a  long  Tube  if  it  was  turn- 
ed upfide  down :  The  Moderns  as  well  as  the  An- 
tlents  fill  often  into  this  Fallacy  when  they  pofl- 
tively  aflign  the  Reafons  of  natural  Appearances, 
without  fufficient  Experiments  to  prove  them. 

Aftrologers  are  overrun  with  this  fort  of  Falla- 
cies, and  they  cheat  the  People  grolly  by  pretend- 
ing to  tell  Fortunes^  and  to  deduce  the  Caufe  of 
^the  various  Occurrences  in  the  Lives  of  Men, 
from  the  various  Pofttions  of  the  Stars  and  Fla- 
nets^  which  they  call  Afpe5is. 

When  Comets  and   Eclipfes  of  the  Sun  and 
Moon  are  conftrued  to  lignify  the  Fate  of  Princes, 
the  Revolution  of  States,  Famine,  Wars  and  Ca- 
lamities 


C.  III.  S.  I.     The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:      317 

kmities  of  all  kinds,  it  is  a  Fallacy  that  belongs 
to  this  Rank  of  Sophifms. 

There  is  fcarce  any  thing  more  common  in  hu- 
man Life  than  this  fort  of  deceitful  Argument. 
If  any  two  accidental  Events  happen  to  concur, 
one  is  prefently  made  the  Caufe  of  the  other.  ]f 
Titius  wronged  bis  Neighbour  of  a  Guinea,  and  in 
fix  Months  after  he  fell  down  and  broke  his  Leg^ 
weak  Men  will  impute  it  to  the  divine  Venge- 
ance on  Titius  for  his  former  Injuftice.  This  So- 
phifm  was  found  alfo  in  the  early  Days  of  the 
World :  For  when  holy  Job  was  furrounded  with 
uncommon  Miferies,  his  own  Friends  inferr'd,  that 
he  was  a  moji  heinous  Criminal,  and  charged  him 
with  aggravated  Guilt  as  the  Caufe  of  his  Calami- 
ties i  tho'  God  himfelf  by  a  Voice  from  Heaven 
folv'd  this  uncharitable  Sophifm,  and  cleared  his 
Servant  Job  of  that  Charge. 

How  frequent  is  it  among  Men  to  impute 
Crimes  to  wrong  Perfons  ?  We  too  often  charge 
that  upon  the  wicked  Contrivance  and  premedi- 
tated Malice  of  a  Neighbour,  which  arofe  mere- 
ly from  Ignorance,  or  from  unguarded  Temper. 
And  on  the  other  hand,  when  we  have  a  Mind  to 
excufe  ourfelves,  we  pradtife  the  fame  Sophifm, 
and  charge  that  upon  our  Inadvertence  or  our  Ig- 
norance ,  which  perhaps  was  defign'd  Wicked- 
nefs.  What  is  really  done  by  a  Neceflity  of  Cii'- 
cumftances,  we  fometimes  impute  to  Choice :  And 
again,  we  charge  that  upon  Neceflity,  which  was 
really  delired  and  chofen. 

Sometimes  a  Perfon  a6ts  out  of  Judgment  in 
Oppofition  to  his  Inclination"  j  another  Perfon 
perhaps  a6ls  the  fame  Thing  out  of  Inclination, 
4and  againft  his  Judgment.  'Tis  hard  for  us  to 
tietermine  with   Aifiirance  what  are   the  inward 

Springs 


518  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

Springs  and  fecret  Caufes  of  every  Man's  Con- 
du6b  5  and  therefore  we  fhould  be  cautious  and 
flow  in  palTing  a  Judgment,  where  the  Cafe  is 
not  exceeding  evident :  And  if  we  fhould  miftake, 
let  it  rather  be  on  the  charitable  than  on  the  cen- 
forious  Side. 

'Tis  the  {iime  Sophifm  that  charges  mathemati- 
cal Learning  with  leading  the  Minds  of  Men  to 
Scepticifm  and  Infidelity^  and  as  unjuftly  accufes 
the  new  Philofophy  of  paving  the  Way  to  Herefy 
and  Schifm.  Thus  the  Reformation  from  Popery 
has  been  charged  with  the  Murder  and  Blood  of 
Millions^  which  in  Truth  is  to  be  imputed  to  the 
'tyranny  of  the  Princes  and  the  Priefls^  who  would 
not  fuffer  the  People  to  reform  their  Sentiments 
and  their  Pradices  according  to  the  Word  of 
God.  Thus  Chrijiianity  in  the  primitive  Ages 
was  charged  by  the  Heathens  with  all  the  Cala- 
mities which  befel  the  Roman  Empire^  becaufe 
the  Chriftians  renounced  the  Heathen  Gods  and 
Idols. 

The  Way  to  relieve  ourfelves  from  thefe  So- 
phifms,  and  to  fecure  ourfelves  from  the  Danger 
of  falling  into  them,  is  an  honeft  and  diligent 
Enquiry  into  the  real  Nature  and  Caufes  of  Things, 
with  a  conftant  Watchfulnefs  againfl  all  thofe 
Prejudices  that  might  warp  the  Judgment  afide 
from  Truth  in  that  Enquiry. 

V.  The  next  is  called  fallacia  Accidentis^  or  a 
Sophifm  wherein  we  pronounce  concerning  the 
Nature  and  ej/ential  Properties  of  any  Subje6t,  ac- 
cording to  fomething  which  is  merely  accidental 
to  it.  This  is  akin  to  the  former,  and  is  alfo  vcf 
ry  frequent  in  human  Life.  So  if  Opium  or  the 
Peruvian  Bark  has  been  ufed  imprudently  or  un- 

fuccefsfuiiy. 


C.  III.  S.  I ."    The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'      3 1 9 

fuccefsfully,  whereby  the  Patient  has  received  In- 
jury, fome  weaker  People  abfolutely  pronounce 
againft  the  Ufe  of  the  Bark  or  Opium  upon  all 
Occafions  whatfoever,  and  are  ready  to  call  them 
Poifon.  So  l-Fine  has  been  the  accidental  Occa- 
fion  of  Drunkennefs  and  Quarrels  j  Learning  and 
Printing  may  have  been  the  accidental  Caufe  of 
Sedition  in  a  State  j  the  Reading  of  the  Bible  by 
Accident  hath  been  abufed  to  promote  Hcrejies  or 
deJiruSii've  Errors  j  and  for  thefe  Reafons  they  have 
been  all  pronounced  evil  'things.  Mahomet  forbad 
his  Followers  the  Ufe  of  JVine-,  the  tiirks  dif- 
courage  Learning  in  their  Dominions  j  and  the 
Papijis  forbid  the  Scripture  to  be  read  hy  the  Laity. 
But  how  very  unreafonable  are  thefe  Inferen- 
ces, and  thefe  Prohibitions  which  are  built  upon 
them ! 

VI .  The  next  Sophifm  borders  upon  the  for- 
mer j  and  that  is  when  we  argue  from  that  which 
is  true  in  particular  Circumjiances  to  prove  the 
liime  thing  true  abfolutely^  fimply^  and  ah(lraUed 
from  all  Circumfianccs;  this  is  called  in  the  Schools 
a  Sophifm  a  di^o  fecundum  quid  ad  d.iclum  funpH- 
citer }  as,  that  which  is  bought  in  the  Shambles  is 
eaten  for  Dinner  j  raw  Meat  is  bought  in  the  Sham- 
bles \  therefore  raw  Meat  is  eaten  for  Dinner:  Or 
thus,  Livy  writes  Fables  and  Improbabilities  when 
be  defcribes  Prodigies  and  Omens  j  therefore  Livy's 
Roman  Hiflory  is  never  to  be  believed  in  any  thing. 
Or  thus,  there  may  be  fome  Mifiake  of  tranfcrib- 
ers  in  fome  Part  of  Scripture  \  therefore  Scripture 
alone  is  not  afafe  Guide  for  our  Faith, 

This  fort  of  Sophifm  has  its  Reverfe  alfo ;  as, 
when  we  argue  from  that  which  is  ixmq  ftmplyxnd 
abfolutely  to  prove  the  fime  thing  true  in  all  parti- 
cular 


320  LOGIC  K:  Or,       PartllL 

cular  Circumfiances  whatfoever  *  5  as,  if  a  Trapor 
ihoiild  argue  from  the  fixth  Commandment,  Thou 
jbalt  not  kill  a  Ma,n^  to  prove  that  he  himfelf  cught 
not  to  be  hanged:  Or  if  a  mad  Man  fhould  tell  me, 
/  ought  not  to  withold  his  Sivord  from  him^  he* 
caufe  no  Man  ought  to  ivithold  the  Property  of  aw 
other. 

Thefc  two  laft  Species  of  Scphifms  are  eafily 
folved  by  lliewing  the  Difference  betwixt  Things 
in  their  abfolute  Nature,  and  the  fame  Things  fur- 
rounded  with  peculiar  Circumfiances^  and  confider- 
ed  in  Regard  to  fpecial  Times,  Places,  Perfons 
and  Occafions  j  or  by  Viewing  the  Difference  be- 
tween a  moral  and  a  ynetaphyfical  Univerfality^  and 
that  the  Propofition  will  hold  good  in  one  Cafe 
but  not  in  the  other. 

VII.  The  Sophifms  of  Compofition  and  Divifton 
come  next  to  be  mentioned. 

The  Sophifm  of  Compofition  is  when  we  infer 
any  thing  concerning  Ideas  in  a  compounded  Senfe^ 
which  is  only  true  in  a  di'vided  Senfe.  As  when  it 
is  faid  in  the  Gofpel  that  Chrifi  made  the  Blind  to 
fee^  and  the  Deaf  to  hear^  and  the  Lame  to  walk^ 
we  ought  not  to  infer  hence  that  Chrifi  performed 
Contradictions  j  but  thofe  who  ivere  biind  before 
•were  made  to  fee,  and  thofe  who  were  deaf  before 
were  made  to  hear,  &:c.  So  when  the  Scripture 
affures  us  the  worfi  of  Sinners  may  be  faved^  it  fig- 
nifies  only  that  they  who  have  been  the  worfi  of 
Sinners  may  repent  and  be  fwed,  not  that  they 
{hall  be  faved  in  their  Sins.  Or  if  any  one  fhould 
argue  thus,  Two  and  three  are  even  and  ocld-y  five 

*  Thi«  is  arguing  from  a  moral  Unherfality  which  admits  of  fome  Ex- 
ceptions, in  the  fame  manner  as  may  be  argued  from  metaphjijical  or  a  >iatM~ 
tM  Univtrfaiity,  which  admit*  of  no  Exceptions. 

are 


C.  III.  S.  I .    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon;    5  2 1 

are  two  and  three ;  therefore  five  are  even  and  odd. 
Here  that  is  very  falfly  inferred  concerning  fwd 
and  three  in  Union^  which  is  only  true  of  them 
divided. 

The  Sophifm  of  Divifion  is  when  wc  infer  the 
fame  Thing  concerning  Ideas  in  a  divided  Senfe^ 
which  is  only  true  in  a  compounded  Senfe ;  as,  if 
We  fliould  pretend  to  prove  that  every  Soldier  in 
the  Grecian  Army  put  an  hundred  thoufand  Perftans 
to  Flighty  becaufe  the  Grecian  Soldiers  did  fo.  Ot 
if  a  Man  fhould  argue  thus  j  five  is  one  Number  j 
fwo  and  three  are  five  3  therefore  two  and  three  are 
one  Number. 

This  fort  of  Sophifms  is  committed  when  th6 
Word  All  is  taken  in  a  coUe^iive  and  a  diflributive 
Senfe,  without  a  due  DilHndionj  as,  if  any  one 
ihould  reafon  thus  -,  All  the  mufical  Inflruments  of 
the  Jewifh  "Temple  made  a  noble  Confort :  The  Harp 
was  a  mufical  Inflrument  of  the  Jcwifh  temple  ; 
therefore  the  Harp  made  a  noble  Confort. 

It  is  the  fame  Fallacy  when  the  univerfal  Word 
All  or  No  refers  to  Species  in  one  Propofition,  and 
to  Individuals  in  another  j  as,  All  Animals  were 
in  NoahV  Ark  j  therefore  no  Animals  perifioed  in 
the  Flood  :  Whereas  in  the  Premife  all  Animals 
fignifics  every  kind  of  Animals^  which  does  not 
exclude  or  deny  the  drowning  of  a  thoufand  In- 
dividudls. 

VIII.  The  laft  fort  of  Sophifms  arifes  from  out 
Abufe  of  the  Ambiguity  of  IFords^  which  is  the 
largeft  and  moll  extenfive  kind  of  Fallacy  j  and 
indeed  fevcral  of  the  former  Fallacies  might  be 
reduced  to  this  Head. 

When  the  Words  or  Phrafes  are  plainly  equivo'^ 
cal,  they  are  called  Sophifms  of  Equivocation  >  as, 
if  we  {hould  argue  thus,  He  that  fends  forth  a 

Y  Book 


3  22,  L  O  G  IG  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

Book  into. the.  Light ^  de fires  it  to  he  read;  He  that 
tlrt'ows  a  Book  into  the  Bre^  fends  it  into  the  Light  -, 
therefore,  he.  that  throws  a  Book  into  the  Fire  de- 
fires  it  to  he  read. 

This  SophifiTi,  as  well  as  the  foregoing,  and  all 
of  the  like  Nature  are  folved  by  fhewing  the 
different  Senfes  of  the  Words,  Terms  or  Phrafes. 
Here  Light  in  the  major  Proportion  Hgnifies  the 
publick  Fieiv  of  the.  IVorld;  in  the  minor  it  figni- 
fies  the  Bri^htnefs  of  Flame  or  Flre^  and  therefore 
the  Syllogilm  has  four  Terms,  or  rather  it  has  nq 
middle  Terms^  and  proves  nothing. 

But  where  fuch  grofs  Equivocations  and  Amhi* 
guities  appear  in  Arguments,  there  is  little  Danger 
of  impoiing  upon  ourfelvcs  or  others.  The  great- 
eft  Danger,  and  which  we  are  perpetually  expofed 
to  in  Reafoning,  is,  where  the  two  Senfes  or  Sig- 
nifications of  one  Term  are  near  akinj  and  not 
plainly  diftinguifhed,  and  yet  they  are  really  fuf- 
ficiently  different  in  their  Senfe  to  lead  us  into 
great  Miftakes,  if  we  are  not  watchful.  And  in- 
deed the  greateft  Part  of  Controverfies  in  the  far 
cred  or  civil  Life  arife  from  the  different  Senfes 
that  are  put  upon  Words,  and  the  different  Ideas 
which  are  included  in  them  j  as  has  been  Ihewn 
at  large  iq  the  firft  Part  of  Logick,  Chap.  IV; 
which  treats  of  Words  and  'Terms. 

There  is  after  all  thefe,  another  fort  of  So- 
phifm  which  is  wont  to  be  called  an  imperfe6i 
Enumeration^  or  a  falfe  InduSlion^  when  from  a 
few  Experiments  or  Obfervations  Men  infer  ger 
ncral  Tneorems  ajtid  univerial  Propofitions.  But 
this  is  fufficiently  noticed  in  the  foregoing  Chap- 
ter, where  we  treated  of  that  fort  of  Syllogifm 
which,  is  called  Induct  ion  >, 

Sect* 


G.  Ill,  S.  2.    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.      j  2  j 


S  E  c  T.     11. 

V^ivo  general  Tefls  of  true  Syllogifens,  and  Methods  of 
fohing  all  Sophifms. 

B Elides  the  fpecial  Defcription  of  true  Syllo- 
gifms  and  Sophifms  already  given,  and  the 
Rules  by  which  the  one  are  framed,  and  the  other 
refuted,  there  are  thelc  two  general  Methods  of 
reducing  all  Syllogifms  whatfoever  to  a  'Teji  of  their 
Truth  or  Fallhood. 

I.  The  firft  is  that  the  Premijfes  mufl  (at  lead: 
implicitly)  contain  the  Conclnfion;  or  thus.  One 
of  the  Premijes  mufl  contain  the  Conclnfion^  and 
the  other  ?nufi  fheiv  that  the  Conclufton  is' contained 
in  it.  The  Rcafon  of  this  Rule  is  this>  When 
any  Propofition  is  offered  to  be  proved,  it  is  ne- 
celfary  to  find  another  Propofition  which  con- 
firms it,  which  may  be  called  the  containing  Pro- 
pofition ;  but  becaufc  the  fecond  muil  not  contain 
the  firft  in  an  exprefs  manner,  and  in  the  fmic 
Words  *,  therefore  it  is  neceflary  that  a  third  or 
oflenffve  Propofition  be  found  out  to  fliew  that 
the  fecond  Propofition  contains  the  firll  which 
was  to  be  proved.  Let  us  make  an  Experiment 
of  this  Syllogifm.  IVhofuccer  is  a  Skrje  to  his 
natural  Inclinations  is  mifcrable  -,  the  wicked  Man 
is  a  Sla-ve  to  his  natural  fncVmations  >  therefore  the 
'wicked  Man  is  miferahle.  Here  it  is  evident  that 
the  major  Propofition  contains  the   Conclufioni 

*  It  is  confefs'd  that  conditional  and  disjmt^ive  Propofitions  do  expreftyi 
contain  all  that  is  in  the  ConcluGon ;  but  then  it  is  not  in  a  ctrtain  ana  co„- 
clufive  Manntr,  but  only  in  a  dttbioMs  Form  of  Speech,  and  mingled  v.'ch" 
oiher  Termsj  and  therefore  ic  is  not  the  ftonc  tKfufs  Propofitiov. 

Y  z  for 


3  24  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,     PartllL 

for  under  the  general  Chara6ber  of  a  Slave  to  na- 
tural Inclinations  j  a  ivicked  Man  is  contained  or 
included  >  and  the  minor  Proportion  declares  itj 
whence  the  Conclufwn  is  evidently  deduced  that 
the  wicked  Man  is  miferable. 

In  many  affirmative  Syllogifms  we  may  fuppofe 
either  the  major  or  the  minor  to  contain  the 
Conclufion,  and  the  other  to  fhew  it ;  for  there . 
is  no  great  Difference  :  But  in  negative  Syllo- 
gifms it  is  the  negative  Propofition  that  contains 
the  Conclufion,  and  the  affirmative  Propofition 
fhews  it ',  as,  every  wife  Man  maflers  his  Pajficns  j 
no  angry  Man  majlers  his  PaJJions  j  therefore  no 
angry  Man  is  wife.  Here  it  is  more  natural  to 
fuppofe  the  minor  to  be  the  containing  Propoftti- 
on-y  it  is  the  minor  implicitly  denies  IVifclom 
concerning  an  angry  Man^  becaufe  mafiering  the 
PaJJions  is  included  ifi  IVifclom^  and  the  major 
fliews  it. 

Note^  This  Rule  may  be  applied  to  complex  and 
conjun^ive^  as  well  as  fimple  Syllogifms,  and  is 
adapted  to  fhew  the  Truth  or  Falfliood  of  any 
of  them. 

II.  The  fecond  is  thisj  As  the  Terms  in  ev?ry 
Syllogifm  are  ufually  repeated  twice,  fo  they  mufl  be 
taken  precifely  in  the  fame  Senfe  in  both  Places: 
For  the  greateft  Part  of  Miflakes,  that  arife  in 
forming  Syllogifms,  is  derived  from  fome  little 
Difference  in  the  Senfe  of  one  of  the  Terms  ia 
the  two  Parts  of  the  Syllogifm  wherein  it  is  ufed. 
Let  us  confider  the  following  Sophifms. 
■  i.  It  is  a  Sin  to  kill  a  Man -,  a  Murderer  is  a 
Man  y  therefore  it  is  a  Sin  to  kill  a  Murderer. 
Here  the  Word  Kill  in  the  firfl  Propofition  fig- 
nifies  to  kill  unjuflly,  or  without  a  Law,  in  the 
Conclufion  it  is  taken  abiblutely  for  putting  a 

•■■  I  Man 


G.  III.  S.  2.^    The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.'      3  2  5 

Man  to  Death  in  general^  and  therefore  the  Inference 
is  not  good. 

2.  IVhat  lam,  you  are  not-,  hux.  I a/n  a  Man; 
therefore  you  are  not  a  Alan.  This  is  a  relath-e 
Syllogifm :  But  if  it  be  reduced  to  a  regular  cate- 
gorical Form,  it  will  appear  there  is  Ambiguity  in 
the  Terms,  thusj  fVhat  I  am,  is  a  Man  ;  ym  are 
Kot  tvhat  lam  j  therefore  you  are  not  a  Man.  Here 
what  I  am,  in  the  major  Propofition,  is  taken  fpe- 
cifically  for  my  Nature  ;  but  in  the  minor  PropO' 
fition  the  fame  Words  are  taken  individually  for  ?ny 
Per  [on  -,  therefore  the  Inference  mult  be  falfe,  for 
the  Syllogifm  doth  not  take  the  Term  what  I  am 
both  Times  in  the  lame  Senfe. 

3 .  He  that  fays  you  are  an  Jnimal,fays  true  5  but 
be  that  fays  you  are  a  Goofe,  fays  you  are  an  Animal ; 
thtvQ.'ioYt  he  that  fays  you  are  a  Goofe,  fays  true.  In 
the  major  Propolition  the  Word  Ani'mal  is  the 
Predicate  of  an  incidental  Propofition  j  which  in- 
cidental Propolition  being  affirmative  renders  the 
Predicate  of  it  particular,  according  to  Chap.  \\^, 
Se6l.  2^,  Axiom  3.  and  confequently  the  Word  A- 
nimal  there  iignifies  only  human  Animality.  In 
the  minor  Propofition,  the  Word  Animal,  for  the 
fame  Reafon,  iignifies  the  Animality  of  a  Goofc  ; 
thereby  it  becomes  an  ambiguous  Term,  and  unfit 
to  build  the  Conclufion  upon.  Or  if  you  fiy,  the 
Word  Animal  in  the  Minor  is  taken  for  human 
Ani/nality,  then  the  Minor  is  evidently  falfe. 

It  is  from  this  X'xil  general  Tejl  of  Syllogifms  that 
vve  derive  the  Cuftom  of  the  Refpondent  in  an- 
fwering  the  Arguments  of  the  Opponent,  which  is 
to  diilinguifh  upon  the  major  or  minor  Propofiti- 
on, and  declare  which  Term  is  ul'ed  in  two  Senfes, 
and  in  what  Senfe  the  Propofition  may  be  true, 
;iod  in  what  Senfe  it  is  falfe. 

y  3  -   CHAP. 


326  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,     Part  UI.        j 

CHAP.    IV. 

Some  gejieral  Rules  to  direct  our  Reafonmg, 

MOST  of  the  general  and  fpecial  Directions 
given  to  form  our  J  udgments  aright  in  the 
preceding  Part  of  Logic  might  be  rehearicd  here  j 
tor  the  Judgments  which  we  pafs  upon  Things  arc 
generally  built  on  fome  fccret  Reafoning  or  ArgU" 
nicnt  by  which  the  Propoiition  is  fuppofed  to  be 
proved.  But  there  may  be  yet  Ibme  farther  Af- 
lillances  given  to  our  reafoning  Powers  in  their 
Search  after  Truth,  and  an  Oblervation  c£  the  fol- 
lowing Rules  will  be  of  great  Importance  for  that 
End. 


I.  Rule.  Accuftom yourfehes  to  clear  and  diJlinSi 
Jdcas^  to  evident  Proportions^  to  firong  and  convinc- 
ing Arguments.  Converfe  much  with  thofe  Friends 
and  thofe  Books  and  thofe  Parts  of  Learning 
Avhere  you  meet  with  the  greateft  Clearnefs  of 
Thought  and  Force  of  Reafoning.  The  rnathe- 
VtiaticaL  Sciences, .  and  particularly  Arithnietick^ 
Geometry^  and  Mechanicks  abound  with  thefe  Ad- 
vantages :  And  if  there  were  nothing  valuable  in 
them  for  the  Ufes  of  human  Life,  yet  the  very 
fpeculative  Parts  of  this  fort  of  Learning  are  well 
worth  our  Study  >  for  by  perpetual  Examples 
they  teach  us  to  conceive  with  Clearnefs,  to  con- 
nect our  Ideas  and  Propofitions  in  a  Train  of  De- 
pendence, to  reaibn  with  Strength  and  Demon- 
llration,  and  to  dillinguifli  between  Truth  and 
Falfliood.  Something  of  thefe  Sciences  ihould  be 
ifudied  by  every  Man  who  pretends  to  Learning, 
■xnd  that  (as  Mr.  Locke  exprefles  it)  not  fo  much  to 
3  make 


G.  IV.        The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon?         5  27 

^ake  us  Mathematicians^  as  to  make  us  reajhnabk 
Creatures. 

We  fhould  gain  fach  a  Familiarity  with  Evi- 
dence of  Perception  and  Force  of  Reafoning,  and 
getfuch  a  Habit  of  difceining  clear  Truths,  that 
the  Mind  may  be  foon  offended  with  Oblcurity 
and  Confufion  :  Then  we  fhall  (as  it  were)  natu- 
rally and  with  Eafe  reftniin  our  Minds  from  rafh 
Judgment,  before  we  attain  jult  Evidence  of  the 
Propofition  which  is  offered  to  us  j  and  we  fhall 
with  the  fame  Eafe,  and  (as  it  were)  naturally  feize 
and  embrace  every  Truth  that  is  propofed  with  jull 
Evidence. 

This   Habit   of  conceiving  clearly^   of  judging 
jujily^  and  of  reafoning  well^  is  not  to  be  attained 
merely   by   the  Happinefs  of  Conflitution,    the 
Brightnefs  of  Genius,  the  befl  natural  Parts,  or 
the  befl   Collection   of  logical  Precepts.      It  is 
Cujiom  and  Pra^ice  that  mufl  form  and  eltablifh 
this  Habit.     Wc  muft  apply  our  felves  to  it  till 
we  perform  all  this  readily,  and  without  reflect- 
ing on  Rules.      A  coherent  'Thinker^  and   ^Jiridi 
Reafoner  is  not  to  be  made  at  once  by  a  Set  of 
Rules,  any  more  than  a  good  Painter  or  Mufician 
may  be  form'd  extempore  by  an  excellent  Lecture 
on  Mufic  or  Painting.     It  is  of  infinite  Im.port- 
ance  therefore  in  our  younger  Years  to  be  taught 
both  the  Value  and   the  Practice  of  conceiving 
clearly  and  reafoning  right :    For  when   we  are 
grown  up  to  the  middle  of  Life,  or  pail  it,  it  is 
no  Wonder  that  we  fhould  not  learn  good  Rea- 
foning,   any  more  than  that   an  ignorant  Clown 
fhould  not  be  able  to  learn  iine  Language,  Danc- 
ing, or  a  courtly  Behaviour,  when  his  rultic  Airs 
have  grown  up  with  him  till  the  Age  of  Forty. 

Y  4  For 


328  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  III. 

For  want  oit\)\sC'x^tJome  Perfons  o?  Rank  and 
Education  dwell  all  their  Days  among  obfcure  Ide- 
as  >  they  conceive  and  judge  always  in  Confufion, 
they  take  weak  Arguments  for  Demonftration, 
they  are  led  away  with  the  Difguifcs  and  Shadows 
of  Truth.  Now  if  fuch  Pcrfons  happen  to  have 
a  bright  Imagination,  a  V^olubility  of  Speech,  and 
a  Copioufneis  of  Language,  they  not  only  impofe 
many  Errors  upon  their  own  Underllandings,  but 
they  flamp  the  Image  of  their  own  Miltakes  up- 
on their  Neighbours  alfo,  and  fpread  their  Errors 
abroad. 

It  is  a  Matter  of  juft  Lamentation  and  Pity  to 
confider  the  Weaknefs  of  the  common  Multitude 
cf  Mankind  in  this  Refpect,  how  they  receive  any 
thing  into  their  AfTent  upon  the  moll  trifling 
Grounds.  True  Reafoning  hath  very  little  Share 
in  forming  their  Opinions.  They  rcliil  the  moll: 
convincing  Arguments  by  an  oblHnate  Adherence 
to  their  Prejudices,  and  believe  the  moll  impro- 
bable Things  with  the  greatclt  Allurancc.  They 
talk  of  the  abilrufell  Mylleries,  and  determine  up^ 
on  them  with  the  utmoll  Confidence,  and  with- 
out juil  Evidence  either  from  Reafon  or  Revela- 
tion. A  confufed  Heap  of  dark  and  inconfillent 
Ideas  makes  up  a  good  Part  of  their  Knowledge 
in  Matters  of  Philofophy  as  well  as  Religion^  hav- 
ing never  been  taught  the  Ufc  and  Value  of  clear 
and  juft  Reafoning. 

Yet  it  muft  be  ftill  confcfl  that  there  are  fome 
Myfteries  in  Religion^  both  natural  and  revealed^  as 
well  as  fome  abjirufe  Points  in  Philofophy^  where- 
in the  Wife  as  well  as  the  Unwife  mull  be  con- 
tent with  obfcure  Ideas.  There  are  fcvcral  Things, 
efpecially  relating  to  the  invifible  World,  which 
are  unfearchable  in  our  prefent  State,  and  there-. 
fore  we  mull  believe  what  Revelation  plainly  dic- 

"tatesj 


C.  IV.       The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:         329: 

tates,  tho'  the  Ideas  may  be  obfcure.  Reafon  it 
felf  demands  this  of  us ;  but  we  fhould  feek  for 
the  brightell  Evidence  both  of  Ideas,  and  of  the 
Conneclion  of  them,  wherefoever  it  is  attain- 
able. 

IL^  Rule.  Enlarge  your  general  Acquaintance  with 
'Things  daily^  in  order  to  attain  a  rich  Furniture  of 
Topics^  or  middle  Terms^  whereby  thofe  Propoiitions 
which  occur  may  he  either  proved  or  difpro-ved-,  but 
efpecially  meditate  and  enquire  with  great  Diligence 
and  Exacinefs  into  the  Nature^  Properti^s^  Circum- 
fiances  and  Relations  of  the  -particular  Subjetl  about 
ivhich  you  judge  or  argue.  Condder  its  Caufes,  Ef- 
fects, Confequences,  Adjuncts,  Oppofites,  Signs, 
^c.  fo  far  as  is  needful  to  your  prefent  Purpofe. 
You  fhould  furvey  a  Queltion  round  about,  and 
on  all  Sides,  and  extend  your  Views  as  fir  as  pof- 
fible,  to  every  Thing  that  has  a  Connection  with 
it.     This  Practice  has  many  Advantages  in  it  j  as, 

1 .  It  will  be  a  Means  to  fuggelt  to  your  Minds 
proper  Topics  for  Argument  about  any  Propoliti- 
on  that  relates  to  the  fame  SubjecSt. 

2.  It  will  enable  you  with  greater  Readinefs  and 
Juifnefs  of  Thought  to  give  an  Anfwcr  to  any 
fuddcn  Qi^icition  upon  that  Subject,  whether  it 
ahfes  in  your  own  Mind,  or  to  be  propofed  by 
others. 

3.  This  will  inftruct  you  to  give  a  plainer  and 
fpeedier  Solution  of  any  Difficulties  that  may  at- 
tend the  Theme  of  your  Difcourlc,  and  to  refute 
the  Objections  of  thofe  who  have  cfpoufed  a  con- 
traiy  Opinion. 

4.  By  fuch  a  large  Survey  of  the  whole  Sub- 
je6t  in  all  its  Properties  and  Relations,  you  will  be 
better  fecured  from  Inconfiftencics,  /.  e.  from  af- 
ferting  or  denying  any  thing  in  one  Place,  which 
contradicts  what  you  have  aileitcd  or  denied  in  an- 
other ; 


330  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Paitlll. 

other :  And  to  attain  thefe  Ends,  an  Extenfivenefs 
of  Undcrilandingj  iuid  a  large  Memoiy  are  of  un- 
fpcakable  Service. 

One  would  be  ready  to  wonder  fometimes  how 
cafily  great  and  wife,  and  learned  Men  are  led  in- 
to Afiertions  in  fome  Paits  of  the  ^ime  Treatife, 
which  are  found  to  be  fcarce  confiilent  with  what 
they  have  aflerted  in  other  Places  :  But  the  tme 
Rcafon  is  the  Narroivnefs  of  the  Mhid  of  Man, 
that  it  cannot  take  in  all  the  innumerable  Proper- 
ties and  -Relations  of  one  Subje6t  with  a  fingle 
View  J  and  therefore  whilll  they  are  intent  on  one 
l^anicular  Pait  of  their  Theme,  they  bend  all  their 
Force  of  Thought  to  prove  or  dilprove  fome  Pro- 
pofitionthat  relates  to  that  Part,  without  a  fuffici- 
ent  Attention  to  the  Confequences  which  may 
flow  from  it,  and  which  may  unhappily  affect  an- 
other Part  of  the  liime  Subje6t,  and  by  this  Means 
they  are  fometimes  led  to  fay  things  which  are  in- 
coiiiiftcnt.  In  fuch  a  Cafe  the  great  Dealers  in  Dif- 
putc  and  Controverfy  take  Pleafure  to  cail  Non- 
jenfe  and  Self -Contradiction  on  their  Anragoniffc 
with  huge  and  hateful  Reproaches.  For  my  Part, 
I  ratlier  choofe  to  pity  human  Nature,  whofe  ne- 
cdlary  Narrownefs  of  Under  Handing  expofes  us 
all  to  fome  Degrees  of  this  Frailty.  But  the  moll 
cxtenfive  Survey  poflible  of  our  whole  Subject  is 
the  bell  Remedy  againft  it.  It  is  our  judging  and 
arguing  upon  a  partial  View  of  Things,  that  ex- 
poies  us  to  Millakcs,  and  pufhes  us  into  Abfurdi- 
tics,  or  at  leall  to  the  very  Borders  of  them. 

.  IIF  Rule.  In  fearching  the  Knowledge  of  Things, 
aVdjays  keep  the  frecife  Point  of  the  prefent  ^uejii- 
on  in  your  Eye.  Take  heed  that  you  add  nothing  to 
it  while  you  are  arguing,  nor  omit  any  Part  of  it. 

Watch 


C.  IV.       the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:         5  3 1 

Watch  carefully  left  any  new  Ideas  flidc  in  to 
mingle  themfelves  either  with  the  Sub)e<5l  or  the 
Predicate.  See  that  the  Queftion  be  not  altered 
by  the  Ambiguity  of  any  Word  taken  in  different 
Senfes  j  nor  let  any  fecret  Prejudices  of  your  own, 
or  the  fophiftical  Arts  of  others,  cheat  your  Un- 
derllanding  by  changing  the  Queftion,  or  ihuf- 
fling  in  any  thing  elfe  in  its  Room. 

And  for  this  End  it  is  ufeful  to  keep  the  preci{e 
Matter  of  Enquiry  ixsfimple  as  may  be,  and  difcn- 
gaged  fro'/n  a  Complication  of  Ideas ^  wliich  do  not 
necefiiirily  belong  to  it.  By  admitting  a  Complica- 
on  of  Ideas,  and  taking  too  many  I'hings  at  once 
into  one  Queftion,  the  Mind  is  Ibmctimcs  dazzled 
and  bewildered,  and  the  Truth  is  loft  in  fuch  a 
Variety  and  Confulion  of  Ideas  j  whereas  by  li- 
miting and  naiTowing  the  Qiieftion,  you  talce  a 
fuller  Survey  of  the  whole  of  it. 

By  keeping  the  fingle  Point  of  Enquiry  in  our 
conlhint  View,  we  fhall  be  fecured  from  fudden, 
rafti,  and  impertinent  Refponfes  and  DeteiTnina- 
tions,  which  fome  have  obtruded  inftead  of  Solu- 
tions and  folid  Anfwers,  before  they  perfectly  knew 
the  Queftion. 

IV*^*^  Rule.  When  you  have  exaSily  conjidered 
the  precife  Point  of  Enquiry^  or  what  is  unknown  in 
the  ^leftion^  then  confider  ivhat^  and  how  much  you. 
know  ah'cady  of  this  ^leflion^  or  of  the  Ideas  and 
I'erms  of  which  it  is  compofcd.  It  is  by  a  Compari- 
fon  of  the  known  and  unknown  Parts  of  the  Que- 
ilion  together,  that  you  find  what  Reference  the 
Part  known  hath  unto,  or  what  Connection  it  hath 
with  the  Thing  that  is  fought :  Thofe  Ideas  where- 
by the  known  and  unknown  Paits  of  the  Qiieflion 
are  conncded,  will  furnifh  you  with  middle  Terms 

or 


3J2  LOGIC  K:  Or,     Part  III. 

or  Arguments  whereby  the  Thing  propofed  may 
be  prov'd  or  difprov'd. 

In  this  Part  of  your  Work,  {viz.)  Comparing 
Ideas  together^  take  due  Time,  and  be  not  too  halty 
to  come  to  a  Determination,  efpecially  in  Points  of 
Importance.  Some  Men  when  they  fee  a  little 
Agreement  or  Difagreement  between  Ideas,  they 
prefume  a  great  deal,  and  fo  jump  into  the  Con- 
clufion :  This  is  a  fhort  Way  to  Fancy,  Opini- 
on and  Conceit,  but  a  moft  iiniafe  and  uncertain 
Way  to  true  Knowledge  and  Wifdom. 

V*^^  Rule.  In  choofing  your  middle  Terms  or  Ar^ 
guments  to  prove  any  ^ueflion^  ahvays  take  fuch  To- 
pics as  are  fureji^  and  leaji  fallible^  and  which  carry 
the  great  eft  Evidence  and  Strength  with  them.  Be 
not  fo  felicitous  about  the  Number,  as  the  Weight 
of  your  Arguments,  efpecially  in  proving  any  Pro- 
portion which  admits  of  natural  Certainty^  or  of 
co'mpleat  Demonftration.  Many  Times  we  do  In- 
jury to  a  Caufe  by  dwelling  upon  trifling  Argu- 
ments. We  amufe  our  Hearers  with  Uncertam- 
ties  by  multiplying  the  Number  of  feeble  Reafon- 
ings,  before  we  mention  thofe  which  are  more 
fubllantial,  conclufivc  and  convincing.  And  too 
often  wc  yield  up  our  own  Aflent  to  mere  proba- 
ble Arguments,  where  certain  Proofs  may  be  ob- 
tained. 

Yet  it  muft  be  confeft  there  arc  many  Cafes 
wherein  the  growing  Nwrnber  of  probable  Arguments 
increafes  the  Degree  of  Probability,  and  gives  a 
ereat  and  fufficient  Confirmation  to  the  Truth 
which  is  fought  i  as, 

(i.)  When  we  are  enquiring  the  true  Senfe  of 
^ny  Word  or  Phrafe,  we  are  more  confirmed  in 
the  Signification  of  it  by  finding  the  fime  Ex^ 

prclllon 


C.  IV.         The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:        5  3  5 

preflion  fo  ufed  in  feveral  Authors,  or  in  feveral 
Places  of  the  lame  Author. 

(1.)  When  we  are  fearching  out  the  true  Mean- 
ing or  Opinion  of  any  Writer,  or  enquiring  into 
any  facred  Doch'ine  of  Scripture,  we  come  to  a 
furer  Determination  of  the  Truth  by  feveral  dif- 
tindb  Places  wherein  the  fime  Thing  is  exprell:,  or 
plainly  implied  j  bccaufe  it  is  not  fo  probable  that 
an  honcil  skilful  Reader  fhould  miftake  the  Mean- 
ing of  the  Writer  in  many  Places,  as  he  may  'm 
one  or  two. 

(3.)  When  we  would  prove  the  Importance  of 
any  fcriptural  Do6lrine  or  Duty,  the  Multitude 
of  Texts  wherein  it  is  repeated  and  inculcated  up- 
on the  Reader,  feem  naturally  to  inll:ru6t  us  that 
it  is  a  Matter  of  greater  Importance,  than  other 
Things  which  are  but  flightly  or  fingly  mention- 
ed in  the  Bible. 

(4.)  In  fearching  out  Matters  of  Fact  in  Times 
pafl:  or  in  diftant  Places  (in  which  Cafe  7noral  Evi- 
dence is  fufficient,  and  moral  Certainty  is  the  ut- 
moll  which  can  be  attained)  here  we  derive  a 
greater  Afllirance  of  the  Truth  of  it  by  a  Num- 
ber of  Perfons,  or  a  Multitude  of  Circumflanccs 
concurring  to  bear  Witnefs  to  it. 

(f .)  From  many  Experiments  in  natural  Philo- 
fophy  we  more  fafely  infer  a  general  Theorem, 
than  we  can  from  one  or  two. 

(6.)  In  Matters  of  prefcnt  Practice,  both  ficred 
and  civil,  we  mufl  content  ourfelves  oftentimes 
with  a  mere  Prcponderation  of  probable  Rcafons 
or  Arguments.  Where  there  arc  feveral  Reafons 
on  each  Side,  for  and  againlt  a  Thing  that  is  to 
be  done  or  omitted,  a  imall  Argument  added  to 
the  Heap  may  jultly  turn  the  Balance  on  one  Side, 
and  determine  the  Judgment,  as  I  have  noted  in 
tlie  z^  Part  of  kogic. 

To 


3  5^  LO  G  I  C  K:  Or,       PartllL 

To  conclude  j  a  growing  Acquaintance  with 
Matters  of  Learning,  and  a  daily  Improvement  of 
our  Underftandings  in  Affairs  human  and  divine, 
will  bell  teach  us  to  judge  and  dillinguilh  in  what 
Caies  the  Number  of  Arguments  adds  to  their 
Weight  and  Force :  It  is  only  Experience  can  fully 
inforin  us  when  we  mull  be  detcrmin'd  hy  proha- 
hk  Topics^  and  when  we  muft  fcek  and  expe6t  De- 
monjlrations. 

VI''^  Rule.  Prove  your  Conchijicn  {as  far  as 
poffible)  by  fonie  Propojitions  that  are  in  themfelves 
more  plain^  evident^  and  certain  than  the  Conclufion  > 
or  at  leafl  fuch  as  are  more  kno-wn^  and  more  intelli" 
gible  to  the  Perfon  whom  you  would  convince.  If  we 
neglect  this  Rule^  we  fhall  endeavour  to  enlighten 
that  which  is  obfcure  by  fomething  equally  or 
more  obfcure,  and  to  confirm  that  which  is  doubt- 
ful by  fomething  equally  or  more  uncertain.  Com- 
mon Senfe  dictates  to  all  Men,  that  it  is  impoflible 
to  eflablifh  any  Truth,  and  to  convince  others  of 
it,  but  by  fomething  that  is  better  known  to  them 
than  that  Truth  is. 

VIP^^  Rule.  Labour  in  all  your  Arguings  to  en- 
lighten the  Under flanding^  as  well  as  to  conquer  and 
captivate  the  Judgment.  Argue  in  fuch  a  Manner 
as  may  give  a  natural,  diftind:,  and  folid  Know- 
ledge of  Things  to  your  Hearers,  as  well  as  to 
force  their  AfTent  by  a  mere  Proof  of  the  Que- 
ilion.  Now  to  attain  this  End,  the  chief  Topic 
or  Medium  of  your  Demonftration  fnould  be 
fetched,  as  much  as  pofliblc,  from  the  Nature  of 
the  Thing  to  be  proved,  or  from  thofe  Things 
which  are  mod  naturallv  connedcd  with  it. 

Geometricians 


C IV .        The  right  Ufe.  of  Rea  fon .        1 3  $ 

Geometricians  fometimes  break  this  Rule  with- 
out Neceflity,.  two  Ways,  (viz.) 

I.  "When  they  prove  one  Propofirion  only  by 
ihewing  what  Abfurdities  will  follow  if  the  con- 
tradidbory  Propofition  be  fuppofed  or  admittedi: 
This  is  caWcd  Meciu^io  ad  ahfurdum  "j",  or,  DentQn^ 
Jiratio  per  impojjibile;  as  for  Inftance,  When  they 
prove  all  the  Radii  of  a  Circle  to  be  equals  by  fup- 
pofing  one  Radius  to  be  longer  or  fhorter  than  an- 
other, and  then  Ihewing  what  abfurd  Confequen- 
ces  will  follow.  This,  I  confcfs,  forces  the  Ai- 
fent,  but  it  does  not  enlighten  the  Mind  by  ihew- 
ing the  true  Reafon  and  Caufe  why  all  R^diiare 
equal.y  which  is  derived  from  the  very  Conllruc- 
tion  of  a  Circle :  For  fince  a  Circle  is  formed  by 
fixing  one  End  of  a  Itrait  Line  in  the  Centre, 
and  moving  the  other  End  round  (or,  which  is  all 
one,  by  Compafles  kept  open  to  a  certain  Extent) 
it;  follows  evidently  that  every  Part  of  the  Cir- 
cumference being  thus  defcribed  mull:  be  equally 
dillant  from  the  Centre, .  ;md  therefore  the  Radiiy 
which  are  Lines  from  the  Centre  to  the  Circum*- 
ference,  miifi  all  be  equal. 

z...  Qeometricians  forget  this  Rule  when  they 
heap  up  many  far-fetch'd  Lines,  I''igurcs  and  Pro- 
portions to  prove  fome  plain,  fimple  and  obvi- 
ous Propolition.  Tliis  is  called  a  Demonflration 
-per  aliena  i^  remota^  or  an  Argument  from  unna- 
tural and  remote  Mediums :  As  if  in  order  to  prove 
the  Radii  of  a  Circle  are  all  equal^  I  fhould  maker 
feyeral  Triangles  and  Squares  about  the  Circle- 

+  M)<^i  This  ^R«4.  chiefly  refers  to  the  E/?.»W/,'?;»?c)»f  offbme  Truth,  ra- 
ther than  to  the  Rtfutation  of  Er/or.  It  is.  a  very  comrnqn-:  and  iifenil 
Way  of  arguing  ro  refute  a  falfe  Propofition  by  fhewing  what  evident  Talf- 
hood  or  Abfurdity  wilj  foUow  .from  it :  For  what  Propofitioi:  foever  is  re- 
ally abfurd  and  falfe,  does  effetftually  prove  .that^  Principle,  to  be  falfe  from 
which  it  is  derived ;  fo  that  this  Way  of  refucing,3n  Error  is  not  fo  ufually 

and 


536  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,       PattllL 

and  then  from  ibme  Properties  and  Proportions  of 
Squares  and  Triangles  prove  that  the  Radii  of  a 
Circle  are  equal. 

Yet  it  muft  be  confeft  that  fornetimes  fuch 
Quellions  happen,  that  it  is  hardly  poflible  to 
prove  them  by  direct  Arguments  drawn  from  the 
Nature  of  Things,  13 c-  and  then  it  may  not  only 
be  lawful,  but  neceffary  to  ufe  indirect  Proofs^  and 
Arguments  drawn  from  remote  Mediums.^  or  from 
the  Ahfurdity  of  the  contradi^ory  Suppojition. 

Such  indire^  and  remote  Arguments  may  alfo 
be  fometimes  ufed  to  confirm  a  Propofition  which 
has  been  before  proved  by  Arguments  more  dire^ 
and  immediate. 

Vllph  Rule.  Tho'  Arguments  fhould  give 
Light  to  the  Sub)e6t,  as  well  as  conftrain  the  Af- 
fent,  yet  you  muil  learn  to  diflinguiflj  well  between 
an  Explication  and  an  Argmnent  >  and  neither  iyn- 
pofe  upon  yourfelves^  nor  fujfer  your  [elves  to  be  im- 
fos'd  upon  by  others^  by  mijiaking  a  mere  Illuflration 
for  a  convincing  Reafon. 

Axioms  themfelves,  or  felf-evident  Propofitions 
may  want  an  Explication  or  Illuflration^  tho'  they 
are  not  to  be  proved  by  Reafoning. 

Similitudes  and  Alluftons  have  oftentimes  a  very 
happy  Influence  to  explain  fome  difficult  Truth, 
and  to  render  the  Idea  of  it  familiar  and  eafy. 
Where  the  Refemblance  is  juft  and  accurate,  the 
Influence  of  a  Simile  may  proceed  fo  far  as  to 
ihew  the  PofTibihty  of  the  Thing  in  Queftion: 
But  Similitudes  mull  not  be  taken  as  a  folid  Proof 
of  the  Truth  or  Exillence  of  thofe  Things  to 
which  they  have  a  Refemblance.  A  too  great 
Deference  paid  to  Similitudes^  or  an  utter  Rejec- 
tion of  them  feem  to  be  two  Extreams,  and  ought 
to  be  avoided.    The  late  ingenious  Mr.  Locke^  e- 

veu 


C.  IV.        The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.         337 

even  in  his  Enquiries  after  Truth,  makes  great  Ufe 
of  Similes  for  frequent  lUuftration,  and  is  very 
happy  in  the  Invention  of  them,  tho'  he  warns  us 
alfo  left  we  miftake  them  for  conclufive  Avgu^ 
ments. 

Yet  let  it  be  noted  here,  that  a  ParahJe  or  a  Si- 
miUtude  ufed  by  any  Author,  may  give  a  fufficicnt 
Proof  of  the  true  Senfe  and  Meaning  of  that  Au- 
thor, provided  that  we  draw  not  this  Similitude 
beyond  the  Scope  and  Delign  for  v/hich  it  was 
brought  >  as  when  our  Saviour  affirms,  ReiK  iii.  ^ . 
/  ivill  come  on  thee  as  a  'Thief ^  this  will  plainly 
prove  that  he  defcribcs  the  tlnexpe^e.inejs  of  his 
yippearance^xho'  it  will  by  no  Means  be  drav/n  to 
fignify  any  Injiiflice  in  his  Defign. 

\K^^  Rule.  In  your  'whole  Courfe  of  Reafoning 
keep  your  Mind  Jincerely  intent  on  the  Purfuit  of 
Truth  -y  and  follow  [olid  Argument  ivherefoe'ver  it 
leads  you.  Let  not  a  Party-Spirit^  or  any  Pajjion 
or  Prejudice  whatfoever,  flop  or  avert  the  Cur- 
rent of  your  Reafoning  in  the  Quell  of  true 
Knowledge. 

V/henyou  are  enquiring  therefore  into  any  Sub- 
ject, maintain  a  due  Regard  to  ihc  Arguments  and 
Obje6tions  on  both  Sides  of  a  Qiieftion :  Conii- 
der,  compare,  and  balance  them  well  before  you 
determine  for  one  Side.  It  is  a  frequent,  but  a 
very  faulty  Praftice  to  hunt  after  Arguments  only 
to  make  good  one  Side  of  a  QueiHon,  and  en- 
tirely to  negle6t  and  refufc  thofe  which  favour  the 
other  Side.  If  we  have  not  given  a  due  Weight 
to  Arguments  on  both  Sides,  we  do  but  wilfully 
mifguide  our  Judgment,  and  abufc  our  Reafon,  by 
forbidding  its  Search  after  Tmth.  When  we  e- 
fpoufe  Opinions  by  a  fecret  Biafs  on  the  Mind 
thro'  the  Influences  of  Fear.,  Hon^  Honour^  Cre- 

Z  ^  dit, 


338  LOGIC  K:  Or,     Part  III. 

.^i/j  Interejl-^  or  any  other  Prejudice^  and  then  feek 
Arguments  only  to  fupport  thole  Opinions,  we 
have  neither  done  oiir  Duty  to  God  or  to  our 
felves  i  and  it  is  a  Matter  of  meer  Chance  if  we 
ftumble  upon  Truth  in  our  Way  to  Eafe  and  Pre- 
ferment. The  P Giver  of  Reafoning  was  given  us 
by  our  Maker  for  this  very  End,  to  purfue  Truth  5 
and  we  abufe  one  of  his  richeft  Gifts,  if  we  bafe- 
ly  yield  it  up  to  be  led  alfray  by  any  of  the  mean- 
er Powers  of  Nature,  or  the  periihing  Interefls 
of  this  Life.  Reafon  itfelf,  if  honeftly  obeyed, 
will  lead  us  to  receive  the  divine  Revelation  of  the 
Gofpel,  where  it  is  duly  propofed,  and  this  will 
ihew  us  the  Path  of  Life  everlafting. 


Mgfc^MM^ii  aa-<r- 


THE 


339 


THE 

Fourth  PART 

O  F 

L  O  G  I  C  K. 


Of  T>ifp4^Jitiou  and  Method. 

IT  is  not  meerly  a  clear  and  dijlhul:  Idea,  a 
well-formed  Propofition,  or  a  jufi  Argument^ 
that  is  fufficient  to  fearch  out  and  communi- 
cate the  Knowledge  of  a  Subjeft.  There  mull 
be  a  Variety  and  Series  of  them  difpoied  in  a  due 
manner  in  order  to  attain  this  End ;  And  there- 
fore it  is  the  Defign  of  the  la]i  Part  of  Logic  to 
teach  us  the  Jrt  of  Method.  It  is  that  muft  fe- 
cure  our  Thoughts  from  that  Confulion,  Dark- 
nefs,  and  Miftalce  which  unavoidably  attend  the 
Meditations  and  Difcourfes  even  of  the  brightelt 
Genius  who  defpifes  the  Rules  of  it. 

1 .  We  fhall  here  confider  the  Nature  of  Me" 
thod^  and  the  fever al  Kinds  of  it. 

2.  Lay  down  x}[i'i  general  RuUs  of  Afethod,-wkh 
a  few  Particulars  under  them. 

Zz  CHAP, 


340  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,     Part IV. 


C  H  A  P.     I. 

Of  the  Nature  of  Method,  and  the  fever al 
Kinds  of  it,  (viz.)  Natural  and  Arbitra- 
ry, Synthetic  and  Analytic. 

IhfEtbodj  taken  in  the  largeft  Senfe,  implies  the 
*■  ^*'  ■placing  of  feveral  'Things^  or  performing  [eve- 
ral  Operations  in  fuch  an  Order  as  is  mofl  conveni- 
ent to  attain  fome  End  propofed :  And  in  this  Senfe 
it  is  appUed  to  all  the  Works  of  Nature  and  Ait, 
to  all  the  divine  Affairs  of  Creation  and  Provi-r 
dencc  -,  and  to  the  Artifices,  Schemes,  Contrivan- 
ces and  Pra6lices  of  Mankind,  whether  in  natu- 
ral, civil,  or  facred  Affiiirs. 

Now  this  orderly  Difpofition  of  Things  in- 
cludes the  Ideas  of  Prior^  Pofierior^  and  Simulta- 
neous >  of  Superior  J  Inferior^  and  Equal-,  of  Be- 
ginning., End^  and  Middle^  6cc.  which  are  defcrib- 
ed  more  particularly  among  the  general  AffeUions 
of  Being  in  Ontology. 

But  in  Logic  Method  is  ufually  taken  in  a  more 
limited  Senfe,  and  the  Nature  of  it  is  thus  de- 
fcribed :  Method  is  the  Difpofttion  of  a  Variety  of 
^thoughts  on  any^  Subje^  in  fuch  Order  as  may  hefi 
fevue  to  find  out  unknown  'Truths^  to  explain  and 
confirm  T^ruths  that  are  known.,  or  to  fix  them  in  the 
Memory. 

It  is  diftributed  into  two  general  Kinds  (viz.) 
Natural  and  Arbitrary. 

Natural  Method  is  that  which  obfcrves  the  Or- 
der of  Nature,  and  proceeds  in  fuch  a  manner  as 
that  the  Knov/ledge  of  the  Things  which  follow 
depends  in  a  great  Meafure  on  the  Things  which 
go  before,    and  this  is   twofold,  (:yiz.)  Synthetic 

and 


G.  I.  The  right  Ufe of  Reafon.'  341 

and  Analytic^    which  are  fometimcs  called  Syn^ 
thefts  and  Analyfis  *. 

Synthetic  Method  is  that  which  begins  with  the 
Parts  i",  and  leads  onward  to  the  Knowledge  of 
the  Whole  ;  it  begins  with  the  molt  iimple  Princi- 
ples, and  generalTruths,  and  proceeds  by  Degrees  to 
that  which  is  drawn  from  them,  or  co.npounded 
of  them  :  and  therefore  it  is  called  the  Method  of 
Compofition. 

Analytic  Method  takes  the  whole  Compound  as 
it  finds  it,  whether  it  be  a  Species  or  an  Individual^ 
and  leads  us  into  the  Knowledge  of  it  by  refolv- 
ing  it  into  its  firft  Principles  or  Parts,  its  generic 
Nature,  and  its  fpecial  Properties  j  and  therefore 
it  is  called  the  Method  of  Refolution. 

As  fynthetic  Method  is  generally  ufed  in  teach- 
ing  the    Sciences  after    they   are   invented,    fo 

*  The  Word  Analyfn  has  three  or  four  Senfesj  which  it  may  not  be  im- 
proper ro  cake  Notice  of  here. 

1.  It  (igniiies  the  general  and  particular  Heads  of  a  Difcourfe>  with  their 
mutual  Conne£lions,  both  coordinate  and  fubordmatej  drawn  out  by  way  of 
Abftraft  into  one  or  more  Tables,  which  are  frequently  placed  like  an  htdex 
at  the  Beginning  or  End  of  a  Book. 

2.  It  fignifies  the  refolving  of  a  Difcourfe  into  its  various  Subjefis  and  Ar- 
guments; as  when  any  Writing  of  the  antient  Prophets  is  refolved  into  the 
profhethal,  hifttrha!,  doSri,ial,  and  pr.id'uni  Parts  of  itj  it  is  faid  to  be  anaJyfcd 
in  general.  When  a  Sentence  i<!  difUngvilfht  into  ihe  N'ntun,  the  Ferbs,  Pro- 
nouns, yJdverbs,  and  other  Pjrudes  of  Speech  which  compofe  it,  then  it  is 
fiid  to  be  analys'd  urainrnati.al'.y.  When  the  fame  Sentence  is  diftinguifht 
into  SuhjeS  and  Prtdh/itf,  Prnpojit'on,  ylr^ament,  ,J3,  Objeil,  Canfe>  EffeH, 
Adjtmtl,  Ofpnflte,  &c.  then  it  is  anays'd  io^kally  and  wc'.iphyf.cal'y.  This  lalt 
js  what  is  chiefly  meant  in  the  thcoU<gkal  Schools,  when  they  fpeak  of  ana- 
Ijfing  a  TfXt  of  S.ripture. 

3.  Analypi  fignihes  particularly  the  Scie/ice  of  Algrhr^,  wherein  a  Que- 
ftion  being  propofed,  one  or  more  Letters,  as,  *,  y,  k,  or  Vowels,  as,  a,  e,  i, 
&c.  are  made  ufe  of  to  fignify  the  unknown  Number,  which  being  intermin- 
gled with  feveral  known  Numbers  in  the  Queltion,  is  at  iaft  by  the  Rules  of 
Art  feparatfd  or  releas'd  from  that  Entanglement,  and  its  particular  Value  is 
£Dund  out  by  (hewing  jts  Equation, .  or  Equality  to  fjme  known  Num- 
ber. 

4.  It  fignifies  analytical  Metfiod,  as  here  explain'd  in  Loghk. 

-f-  Note,  It  is  cgnteft  that  SyTitkejit  often  begins  with  the  Genus,  and  pro- 
ceeds to  the  Species  and  Individuals.  But  the  Ge?,ns  or  ;:eneric  Natnre  is  then 
confidered  only  as  iphiJicM  or  ejjeutial  P.irt  of  the  Speciesi  tho'  it  be  fomc- 
times  cilled  an  unherfal  or  logha!  fVhok.  Thus  fynthetic  Method  maintains 
its  own  Defcription  ftill,  for  it  begins  with  the  Parts,  and  proceeds  to  the 
Whale  which  is  cfjmpofed  of  rhem. 

Z  3  analytic 


343  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  IV. 

ib  analytic  is  moft  pra^tifed  in  finding  out  Things 
unknown.  Tho'  it  mull  be  confelt  that  both 
Methods  are  fometimes  employed  both  to  find  out; 
'JTiiith,  and  to  communicate  it. 

If  we  know  the  Parts  of  any  Subje^l:  eafier  anci 
better  than  the  Whole,  we  confider  the  Parts 
didincbly,  and  by  putting  them  together  we 
come  to  the  Knowledge  of  the  Whole.  So  in 
Qra?mnar  we  learn  firil  to  know  Letters,  we  join 
them  to  make  Syllables-^  out  of  Syllables  we  com- 
pofc  Words,  and  out  of  IVords  we  make  Sentences 
and  J)ifcot:rfcs.  So  the  Phy/ician  or  Apothecary 
knows  the  Nature  and  Powers  o{\\\^  Simples  {viz ^ 
his  Drugs,  his  Herbs,  his  Minerals,  6cc.  and  put- 
ting them  together,  and  confidering  their  feveral 
Virtues,  he  finds  what  will  be  the  Nature  and 
Powers  of  the  Bolus,  or  any  compound  Medicine : 
This  is  the  fynthetic  Method. 

But  if  v/e  are  better  acquainted  with  the  Whole 
than  v/c  are  with  particular  Parts,  then  we  divide 
or  rcfolve  the  Whole  into  its  Parts,  and  thereby 
gain  a  diilinct  Knowledge  of  them.  So  in  vulgar 
Life  we  learn  in  the  Grofs  what  Plants  or  Mine^ 
nils  arcj  and  tlicn  by  Chymiftry  we  gain  the 
Knowledge  of  Salt,  Sulphur,  Spirit,  Water y 
Earth,  which  are  the  Principles  of  them.  So 
\vt  Jlrc  fir  11  acquainted  with  the  whole  Body  of 
an  Junnal,  and  then  by  Anatomy  or  Dijfeilion^ 
we  Come  to  learn  all  the  inward  and  outward 
Parts  of  it.     This  is  analytic  Method. 

According  to  this  moft  general  and  obvious  I- 
dca  of  fynthetic  and  analytic  Method,  they  differ 
from  each  other  as  the  Way  which  leads  up  front 
a  Valley  to  a  Mcir/itain  differs  from  itfelf,  confi- 
dcred  as  it  leads  down  from  the  Mountain  to  the 
Valley  \  or  as  St.  Mfilthew  and  St.  Luke  prove 
CbriH  to  be  the  Son  of  Abraham  5  Luke  finds  it  out 

5  by 


C.  I.  The  right  Ufe  of  Rcafon.  3  4  j 

by  Analyfts,^  rifing  from  Chrift  to  his  Anceflors  j 
Matthew  teaches  it  in  fynthetic  Method,  begin- 
ning from  Abraham^  and  fhewing  that  Chriji  is 
found  among  his  Pojierity.  Therefore  it  is  a  u- 
fual  Thing  in  the  Sciences,  when  we  have  by  A- 
nalyfts  found  out  a  Truth,  we  ufe  fynthetic  Me- 
thod to  explain  and  deliver  it,  and  prove  it  to  be 
true. 

In  this  eafy  View  of  Things,  thefe  two  kinds 
of  Method  may  be  preferved  confpicuoufly,  and 
entirely  diftin£t :  But  the  Subjects  of  Knowledge 
being  infinite,  and  the  Ways  whereby  we  arrive 
at  this  Knowledge  being  almoft  infinitely  vari- 
ous, it  is  veiy  difficult,  and  almoft  impofliblc  al- 
ways to  maintain  the  precife  Diilinftion  between 
thefe  two  Methods. 

This  will  evidently  appear  in  the  following  Oh- 
fervations. 

Obf  I.  Analytic  Method  being  ufcd  chiefly  to 
find  out  Things  unknown,  it  is  not  limited  or 
confined  merely  to  begin  with  fome  'lubok  Sub- 
je6b,  and  proceed  to  the  Knowledge  of  its  Parts, 
but  it  takes  its  Rife  fomctimes  from  any  fingle 
Part  or  Property,  or  from  any  thing  whatfoever 
that  belongs  to  a  Subject  which  happens  to  be 
firft  and  moft  eafily  known,  and  thereby  enquires 
into  the  more  abftrufe  and  unknown  Parts,  Pro- 
perties, Caufes,  Effects,  and  Modes  of  it,  whe- 
ther abfolute  or  relative  j  as  for  Inftance, 

(i.)  Analyfts  finds  out  Caufes  by  their  EfFe6bs. 
So  in  the  fpeculative  Part  of  natural  Philofophy^ 
when  we  obferve  Light^  Colours^  Motions^  Hard- 
nefi,  Softnefs^  and  other  Properties  and  Powers  of 
Bodies,  or  any  of  the  common  or  uncommon 
Appearances  of  Things  either  on  Earth  or  in  Hea- 
ven, we  fearch  out  the  Caufes  of  them.     So  by 

Z  4  the. 


344  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  IV. 

the  various  Creatures  we  find  out  the  Creator^  and 
learn  bis  IFifdoni^  Power  and  Good  fiefs. 

{z.)  It  finds  out  EfFcds  by  their  Caufes.  So 
the  pradicaland  mechanical  Part  of  natural  Phi- 
iofopby  confiders  fuch  Powers  of  Motion,  as  the 
JVwd^  the  Fire^  and  the  TFater^  6cc.  and  then 
contrives  what  Ulcs  they  may  be  appHed  to,  and 
what  will  be  their  Effcds  in  order  to  make  Mills 
and  Engines  of  various  Kinds. 

(3.)  It  finds  out  the  general  and  fpecial Nature 
'of  a  Thing  by  confidering  the  various  Attributes 
.of  the  Individuals,   and  obferving   what  is  com- 
mon, and  what  is  proper,  what  is  accidentru  and 
what  is  eflential.     So  by  furveying  the  Colour,  the 
Shape,  Motion,  Reft,  Place,  SoliJay,  Extenfiono^ 
Bodies,  we  come  to  find  that  the  Nature  of  Body 
in  general  is  foUd  Extenfion ;  becaufe  all  other  Qua- 
hties  of  Bodies   are  changeable,  but  this  belongs 
to  all  Bodies,  and  it  endures  thro'  all  Changes} 
,  and  becaufe  this  is  proper  to  'iSo<\y  alone,  and  a- 
\  grees  not  to  any  thing  elfe  -,  and  it  is  the  Foun- 
dation of  all  other  Properties. 

(4.)  It  finds  out  the  remaining  Properties  or 
;  Parts  of  a  Thing,  by  having  fome  Parts  or  Pro- 
,perties  given.  So  \.hc  Area  of  a -Triangle  is  found 
by,  knowing  the  Height  and  the  Bafe.  So  by 
having  tivo  Sides,  and  an  Angle  of  a  Triangle  giv- 
en, we  find  the  remaining  Side  and  An^es.  So 
when  we  know  Cogitation  is  the  prime  Attribute 
of  a  Spirit,  Ave  infer  its  Immateriality,  and  thence 
its  Immortality. 

(f .)  Analyfn  finds  the  Means  neceflary  to  at- 
t;nn  a  propofed  End  by  having  the  End  firll  af- 
figned.  So 'mviorai,  political,  ooconomical  Affairs^ 
having  propofed  the  Government  of  Self,  a  Family, 
a  Society -^  or  a  Nation,  in  order  to  their  befl  Inte- 
reft,  we  copfider  and  ieaich  out  what  are  ihc  pro.- 

per 


C.I.         i  The  right  Ufe  <?/ReaTon.'        "^4^$ 

pj;r  La'-jos^  Ruks  and  Means  to  effeft  it.  So  in 
the  Pradices  of  jirtificcrs^  and  the  Manufactures 
of  various  Kinds,  the  End  being  propofed,  as 
making  Cloth ^  Houfes^  Ships^  13 c.  we  find  out 
Ways  of  compoling  thcfe  things  for  the  fcveral 
Ufes  of  human  Life.  But  the  putthig  any  of  thefc 
Means  in  Execution  to  attain  the  End,  is  fyntbetic 
Method, 

Many  other  Particulars  might  be  reprefented  to 
fhew  the  various  Forms  of  analytic  Method,^  where- 
by Truth  is  found  out,  and  fome  of  them  come 
very  near  to  fyntbetic^  lb  as  hardly  to  be  dillin- 
guiilied. 

Q^/  II.  Not  only  the  Inveftigation  of  Truth, 
but  the.  Communication  of  it  alfo  is  often  pra6lil- 
cd  in  fuch  a  Method,  as  neither  agrees  preciicly  to 
fynthetk  or  analytic.     Some  Sciences,  if  you  con- 
iider  the  whole  of  them  in  general^  are  treated  in 
fyntbetic  Order  j  fo  Phyficks  or  natural  Philofuphy 
begins  ufually  with  an  Account  of  the  general 
Nature  and   Properties  of  Matter  or  Bodies,  and 
by  Degrees  defccnds   to  confider   the   particular 
Species  of  Bodies,  with  their  Powers  and  Proper- 
ties j  yet  it  is  very  evident  that  when  Philofophers 
come  to  particular  Plants  and  Animals,  then  by 
Chymijiry  and  Anatomy  they  analyfe  or  refolve  thofe 
Bodies  into  their  fcveral  conllituent  Parts.      On 
the  other  Hand  Logic  is  begun  in  analytic  Method-^ 
the  wbGle  is  divided  into  its  integral  P^r/i,  accord- 
ing to  the  four  Operations  of  the  Mind  >  yet  here 
and  there  fyntbetic  Method  is  ufed  in  the  particu- 
lar Branches  of  it,  for  it  treats  of  Ideas  in  general 
firft,  and  then  defcends  to  the  feveral  Species  of 
them ;  it  teaches  us  how  Propofitions  are  made  up 
of  Ideas^  and  Syllogifms  of  Propofitions^  which  is 
the  Order  of  Compofttion. 

The 


34<?  LOGIC  K:  Or,      Part  IV. 

The  antient  fchoUflic  Writers  have  taken  a  great 
deal  of  Pains,  and  engaged  in  ufelefs  Dilputes  a- 
bout  thefe  two  Methods,  and  after  all  have  not 
been  able  to  give  fuch  an  Account  of  them  sis  to 
keep  them  entirely  diftin6k  from  each  other,  nei- 
ther in  the  Theory  or  in  the  Practice.  Some  of 
the  Moderns  have  avoided  this  Confufion  in  fome 
Meafurc  by  confining  themfelves  to  defcribe  almoft 
nothing  elfe  but  the  Jynthetic  and  analytic  Me- 
thods of  Geometricians  and  Algehraifis^  whereby 
they  have  too  much  narrowed  the  Nature  arrf 
Rules  of  Method,  as  tho'  every  thing  were  to  be 
treated  in  77iatbe}?2atical  Forms. 

Upon  the  whole  1  conclude,  that  neither  of 
thcle  two  Methods  fhould  be  too  fcrupuloufly 
•and  fupcrftiriouny  purfued,  either  in  the  Invasi- 
on or  in  the  Communication  of  Knowledge.  It 
is  enough  if  the  Order  of  Nature  be  but  obferved 
in  making  the  Knowledge  of  Things  following 
depend  on  the  Knowledge  of  the  Things  which 
go  befoi'e.  Oftentimes  a  mixed  Method  wiW  be 
found  moft  effectual  for  thefe  Purpofes ;  and  in- 
deed a  wife  and  judicious  ProfpeO:  of  our  main 
End  and  Defign  muft  regulate  all  Method  what- 
iocvcr. 

Here  the  Rules  of  natural  Method  ought  to  be 
propofed,  (whether  it  be  analytic^  or  fynthetic^  or 
mixt :)  but  it  is  proper  firft  to  give  fome  Account 
of  arbitrary  Method^  left  it  be  thruft  at  too  great 
a  Diftance  from  the  firft  mention  of  it. 

Arbitrary  Method  leaves  the  Order  of  Nature, 
and  accommodates  itfelf  to  many  Purpofes ;  fuch 
as,  to  treafure  up  Things,  ana  retain  them  in 
Memory ;  to  harangue  and  perfuade  Mankind  to 
any  Practice  in  the  religioiis  or  the  civil  Life  j  or 
to  delight,  amufe,  or  entertain  the  Mind. 

As 


C.I.  The  right Ufe of  Kt2i(on.        347 

As  for  the  AJJiflance  of  the  Memory^  in  mofl 
Things  a  natural  Order  has  an  happy  Influence  j 
for  Reafon  itl'df  deducing  one  Thing  from  an- 
other, greatly  allifts  the  Memoiy  by  the  natural 
Connection  and  mutual  Dependence  of  Things. 
But  there  are  various  other  Methods  which  Man- 
kind have  made  ufe  of  for  this  Purpofe,  and  in- 
deed there  are  fome  Subjefts  that  can  hardly  be 
reduced  to  Analyfn  or  Synthefts. 

In  reading  or  writing  Hijiory^  fome  follow  the 
Order  of  the  Governors  of  a  Nation,  and  difpofe 
every  Tranfa6bion  under  their  particular  Reigns : 
So  the  facred  Books  of  Kings  and  Chronicles  are 
written.  Some  write  in  Jnnals  and  Journals^  and 
make  a  new  Chapter  of  every  Year.  Some  put 
all  thofe  Tranfadions  together  which  relate  to 
one  SuhjeB  5  that  is,  all  the  Affliirs  of  one  TVai\ 
one  League^  one  Confederacy^  one  Council^  8cc.  tho* 
it  lafted  many  Years,  and  under  many  Rulers. 

So  in  writing  the  Lives  of  Men^  which  is  cal- 
led Biography^  fome  Authors  follow  the  Track  of 
their  Tears^  and  place  every  thing  in  the  precife 
Order  of  Time  when  it  occurr'd  :  Others  throw 
the  'Temper  and  CharaBer  of  the  Perfons,  their 
private  Life^  their  public  Stations^  their  perfonal 
Occurrences.)  their  domefiic  Conduff,  their  Speeches^ 
their  Books  or  IVritings^  their  Sicknefs  and  Death^ 
into  fo  many  diftin6t  Chapters. 

In  Chronology  fome  Writers  make  their  Epochas 
to  begin  all  with  one  Letter:  So  in  the  Book 
called  Du^or  Hiftoricus^  the  Periods  all  begin  with 
C}  as,  Creation^  Cataclyfm^  or  Deluge,  Chaldean 
Empire^  CyruSy  Chrifi^  Conftantine^  &c.  Some  di- 
vide their  Accounts  of  Time  according  to  the 
four  great  Monarchies ;  Affyrian^  Perfian,  Gre- 
cian and  Roman.  Others  think  it  fcrvcs  the  Me- 
inory  beft  to  divide  all  their  Subje6ls  into  the  re- 
markable 


.34S  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Oy,    Pan  IV. 

markablc  Number  of  Sevens ;  fo  Prideaux  has 
written  an  Introduction  to  Hijlory.  And  there  is  a 
Book  of  Divinity  called,  Fafcicitlus  Controverji- 
ariim^  by  an  Author  of  the  fame  Name,  writ- 
ten in  the  lame  Method,  wherein  every  Contro- 
verfy  has  fe'ven  ^efiions  belonging  to  it  >  tho'  the 
Order  of  Nature  feems  to  be  too  much  neglect- 
ed by  a  Confinement  to  this  feptenary  Number. 

Thofe  Writers  and  Speakers^  whofe  chief  Bu- 
fmefs  is  to  amufe  or  delight,  to  allure,  terrify,  or 
perfuade  Mankind,  do  not  confine  themfelves  to 
any  natural  Order^  but  in  a  critical  or  hidden  Me- 
thod adapt  every  thing  to  their  defigned  Ends. 
Sometimes  they  omit  thofe  Things  which  might 
injure  their  Defign,  or  grow  tedious  to  their 
Hearers,  tho'  they  feem  to  have  a  necefiiny  Re- 
lation to  the  Point  in  Hand :  Sometimes  they  add 
thofe  Things  which  have  no  great  Reference  to 
the  Subjed-,  but  are  fuitcd  to  allure  or  refrcfh  the 
JN4ind  and  the  Ear.  They  dilate  fometimes,  and 
flourilli  long  upon  little  Incidents,  and  they  skip 
over,  and  but  lightly  touch  the  dryer  Part  of  their 
Theme.  '^Vhcy  place  the  firjl  Things  lajl^  and  the 
lafl  Things  firft  with  wondrous  Art,  and  yet  fo 
manage  it  as  to  conceal  their  Artifice,  and  lead 
the  Scnfes  and  Paflions  of  their  Hearers  in  a  pleaf- 
ing  and  powerful  Captivity. 

It  is  chiefly  Poe/}'  and  Oratory  that  require  the 
Practice  of  this  kind  of  arbitrary  Method:  They 
omit  Things  eflential  which  are  not  beautiful, 
they  infcrt  little  needlefs  Circumftances,  and  beau- 
tiful Digreflions,  they  invert  Times  and  A6lions, 
in  order  to  place  every  Thmg  in  the  mofl:  affect- 
ing Light,  and  for  this  End  in  their  Practice  they 
neglect  all  logical  Forms  -,  yet  a  good  Acquaintance 
with  the  Forms  of  Logic  and  natural  Method  is 
of  admirable  \^{^  to  thofe  who  would  attain  thefe 
^  Arts 


C.  II.  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.        549 

Arts  in  Perfeftion.  Hereby  they  will  be  able  to 
range  their  own  Thoughts  in  fuch  a  Method  and 
Scheme,  as  to  take  a  more  large  and  comprehen- 
five  Survey  of  their  Subjed  and  Deiign  in  all  the 
Parts  of  it  j  and  by  this  Means  they  will  better 
ludge  what  to  chufe  and  what  to  refufe  j  and 
how  to  drefs  and  manage  the  whole  Scene  before 
them,  fo  as  to  attain  their  own  Ends  with  great- 
er Glory  and  Succels. 


CHAP.     II. 
The  Rides  of  Method,  general  and  fpecial. 

THE  Requifites  of  true  Method  in  the  Pur- 
fuit  or  Communication  of  Knowledge,  may 
be  all  comprized  under  the  following  Heads.  It 
muft  be  (1 0  Safe,  (z.)  Plain  and  Eafy.  ( 5 .)  Dif- 
tin^i.  (4.)  Full  or  without  Defeat,  ff  •)  Short  or 
without  Superfluity.  (6.)  Proper  to  the  Subject  and 
the  Deftgn.     (7.)  Cornered. 

I.  Rule.  Among  all  the  Qiialifications  of  a 
good  Method,  •  there  is  none  more  neceflary  and 
important  than  that  it  fhould  be  fafe  and  fecure 
from  Error;  and  to  this  End  ihdc  iowr  particular 
Directions  ^o\x\6.  be  obfer\'ed. 

I.  Ufe  great  Care  and  CircumfpeCtion  in  laying  the 
Foundations  of  your  Difcourfc^  or  your  Scheme  of 
Thoughts  upon  any  Subjeti.  Thefe  Proportions 
which  are  to  Hand  as  firfl  Principles,  and  on 
which  the  whole  Argument  depends,  muft  be 
viewed  on  all  Sides  with  utmoft  Accuracy,  left  an 

Error 


350  LOGIC  K:  Or,      PartlVl 

Error  being  admitted  there,  fhould  diffufe  itfclf 
thro'  the  whole  Subject.  See  therefore  that  your 
general  Definitions  or  Defer ipt ions  are  as  accurate 
as  the  Nature  of  the  Thing  will  bear :  See  that 
your  general  Di"jifions  and  Difirihutions  be  juft  and 
exa6c5  according  to  the  Rules  given  in  the  firft 
Part  of  Logic :  See  that  your  Axioms  be  fufEci- 
ently  evident,  fo  as  to  demand  the  AiTent  of  thofe 
that  examine  them  with  due  Attention.  See  that 
your  firji  and  ?nore  immediate  Confequences  from 
thefe  Principles  be  well  drawn  j  and  take  the  fame 
Care  of  all  other  Propofttions  that  have  a  power- 
ful and  fpreading  Influence  thro'  the  feveral  Parts 
of  your  Difcourfe. 

For  want  of  this  Care,  fometimes,  a  large  Trea^ 
tife  has  been  written  by  a  long  Dedudion  of  Con- 
fequcnces  from  one  or  two  doubtful  Principles, 
which  Principles  have  been  efFe6lually  refuted  in 
a  few  Lines,  and  thus  the  whole  Treatife  has  been 
dellroyed  at  once :  So  the  largeft  and  faireft  Build- 
ing links  and  tumbles  to  the  Ground,  if  the  Foun- 
dations and  Corner-Stones  of  it  are  feeble  and  in- 
fufficient. 

2.  It  is  a  very  advifible  Thing  that  your  prima- 
ry and  fundamental  Propofitions  be  not  'only  evident 
and  true^  but  they  fJjould  be  made  a  little  familiar 
to  the  Mind  by  dwell'mg  upon  them  before  you  pro- 
ceed  farther.  By  this  Means  you  will  gain  fo  full 
an  Acquaintance  with  them,  that  you  may  draw 
Confcquenccs  from  them  with  iTiiuch  more  Free- 
dom, with  greater  Variety^  brighta*  Evidence, 
and  with  a  firmer  Certainty,  than  if  you  have  but 
a  night  and  iuddeii  View  of  them. 

5 .  As  you  proceed  in  the  Conne^iion  of  your 
Arguments,  fee  that  your  Ground  he  made  firm  in 
every  Step.  See  that  every  Lin'k  of  your  Chain 
of  Rcafoning  be  ftrong  and  good :  For  if  but 

one 


C.  n.     .   The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'         3  5 1 

one  Link  be  feeble  and  doubtful,  the  whole  Chain 
of  Arguments  feels  the  Weaknefs  of  it,  and  lies 
cxpofed  to  every  Objector,  and  the  original  Qiic- 
Jftion  remains  undetermined. 

4.  Draw  up  all '^ our  P ropojit ions  and  ^rgmnents 
ivith  fo  much  Caution^  and  exprefs  your  Ideas  with 
fuch  ajufi  Limitation  as  may  preclude  or  araidpate 
any  Objections.  Yet  remember  this  is  only  to  be 
done  as  far  as  it  is  pofiible,  without  too  much  en- 
tangling the  Queftion,  or  introducing  complicat- 
ed Ideas,  and  obfcuring  the  Senfe.  But  ii  fuch  a 
cautious  and  limited  Drefs  of  the  Queflion  lliould 
render  the  Ideas  too  much  complicated,  or  tlie 
Senfe  obfcure,  then  it  is  better  to  keep  the  Argu- 
ment more  fimple,  clean  and  eafy  to  be  under- 
ilood,  and  afterwards  mention  the  Objections  di- 
ftindly  in  their  full  Strength,  and  give  a  diilind: 
Anftver  to  them. 

11'^  Rule.  Let  your  Method  be  plain  and  eafy^ 
fo  that  your  Hearers  or  Readers,  as  well  as  your 
felf,  may  run  thro'  it  without  Embaraffment,  and 
may  take  a  clear  and  comprchenfive  View  of  the 
,.whole  Scheme.  To  this  End  the  following  par- 
ticular Directions  will  be  ufeful. 

I .  Begin  always  with  thofe  Things  which  are  beji 
known^  and  moji  obvious^  whereby  the  Mind  may 
have  no  DiJ^icjilty  or  Fatigue^  and  proceed  by  regu- 
lar and  eafy  Steps  to  Things  that  are  -more  difficult. 
And  as  far  as  poflible,  let  not  the  Underflanding, 
or  the  Proof  of  any  of  your  Pofitions,  depend  on 
the  Politions  that  follow,  but  always  on  thofe 
which  go  before.  It  is  a  Matter  of  Wonder  chat 
an  fo  knowing  an  Age  as  this,  there  ihould  be  fo 
many  Perfons  ofi'ering  Violence  daily  to  this  Rule, 
i)y  teaching  the  Latin  Language  by  a  Grammar  writ- 
ten in  Latin,  which  Method  feems  to  require  a 

perfe<5h 


352  LOGIC  K:  Or,      PartlV- 

perfect  Knowledge  of  an  unknown  Tongue,   in 
order  to  learn  the  lirll  Rudiments  of  it . 

2.  Do  not  affe^  excejji-ve  Ha  fie  in  learning  or 
teaching  any  Science^  nor  hurry  at  once  in  the  midfi 
of  it^  left  you  be  too  foon  involved  in  fcveral  new 
and  ftrange  Ideas  and  Proportions,  which  cannot 
be  well  underftood  without  a  longer  and  clofcr 
Attention  to  thofe  which  go  before.  Such  fort 
of  Speed  is  but  a  wafte  of  Time,  and  will  con- 
ilrain  you  to  take  many  Steps  backward  again,  if 
you  would  arrive  at  a  regular  and  compleat  Know* 
ledge  of  the  Subjc6t. 

3.  Be  not  fond  ofcro'tvding  too  many  Thoughts  and 
Reafonings  into  one  Sentence  or  Paragraph^  beyond 
the  Jpprehenfion  or  Capacity  of  your  Readers  or 
Hearers.  There  are  fome  Perfons  of  a  good  Ge- 
nius, and  a  capacious  Mind,  who  write  and  fpeak 
very  obfcurely  upon  this  Account  j  they  affe6t  a 
long  Train  of  Dependences  before  they  come  to 
a  Period  j  they  imagine  that  they  can  never  fill 
their  Page  with  too  much  Senfe  j  but  they  little 
think  how  they  bury  their  own  bell  Ideas  in  the 
Croud,  and  render  them  in  a  manner  invifible  and 
ufelefs  to  the  greatell  Part  of  Mankind.  Such 
Men  may  be  great  Scholars,  yet  they  arc  but  poor 
Teachers. 

4.  For  the  llimc  Reafon  avoid  too  many  Sub- 
dlijifioyis.  Contrive  your  Scheme  of  Thoughts  in 
ilich  a  manner  as  may  finifh  your  whole  Argu- 
ment with  as  few  interior  Branchings  as  Reafon 
will  admit  j  and  let  them  be  fuch  as  are  obvious 
and  open  to  the  Underllauding,  that  they  may 
come  within  one  lingle  View  of  the  Mind.  This 
will  not  only  aHlll  the  Undcrftanding  to  receive, 
but  it  will  aid  the  Memory  aUb  to  retain  Truth : 
Whereas  a  Difcourfc  cut  out  into  a  vaft  Multitude 
of  gradual  SiibordinationSj  has  many  Inconveni- 
ences 


C.  IL  The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:       3  5  5 

ences  in  it  5  it  gives  Pain  to  the  Mind  and  Me- 
mory, in  Turveying  and  retaining  the  Scheme  of 
Difcourfc,  and  expofes  the  unskihlil  Hearers  to 
mingle  the  fuperior  and  inferior  Particulai'S  toge- 
ther, it  leads  them  into  a  thick  Wood  inilead  of 
open  Day-light,  and  places  them  in  a  Labyrinth 
inftead  of  a  plain  Path. 

f .  Give  all  Diligence  in  your  younger  Tears  to  ob- 
tain a  clear  and  eafy  Way  of  exprejjtng  your  Con- 
ceptions^ that  your  Words,  as  fall  as  you  utter  them, 
may  llamp  your  own  Ideas  exa611y  on  the  Mind 
of  the  Hearer.  This  is  a  moll  happy  Talent  for 
the  Conveyance  of  Truth,  and  an  excellent  Se- 
curity againll  Millakes  and  needlefs  Controver- 
fies. 

III'^  Rule.  Let  your  Method  he  difiinB^  and 
without  the  perplexing  Mixture  of  Things  that 
ought  to  be  kept  feparate,  and  this  will  be  ealily 
prattifed  by  four  Dire5lions. 

I .  Don''t  bring  unnecejfary  heterogeneous  "f  Mat- 
ter  into  your  Difcourfe  on  any  Subje^  j  that  is,  don't 
mingle  an  Argument  on  one  Subject  with  Mat- 
ten  that  relate  entirely  to  another,  but  juft  fo  far 
as  is  necellary  to  give  a  clearer  Knowledge  of  the 
Su'DJe^l  in  Hand.  Examples  in  Logic  may  be  bor- 
rowed from  any  of  the  Sciences  to  illullrate  the 
Rules :  But  long  Interpolitions  of  natural  Philo- 
fophy^  of  the  Imagination  and  PaJJions^  of  the  A- 
gency  of  Spirits  united  to  Bodies,  6cc.  break  the 
Thread  of  Difcourfe,  and  perplex  the  Subject. 

2.  Let  every  complicated  Theme  or  Idea  be  divided 
into  its  diflin^  fmgle  Parts,  as  far  as  the  Nature  of 
the  Subject  and  your  prefent  Dejtgn  requires    it. 

+  Things  of  one  Kind  are  called  btmtgtnteut.  Things  of  different  Kind* 
UthitroitHttuf, 

A  a  Tho'. 


« 


3  54  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or;     Part IV. 

Tho'  you  mull  not  abound  in  needlefs  Subdivifi- 
ons,  yet  fomething  of  this  Work  is  very  necef- 
fary  5  and  it  is  a  good  Judgment  alone  can  dic- 
tate how  far  to  proceed  in  it,  and  when  to  Hop. 

Compound  Ideas  muft  be  reduced  to  a  fimple 
Form  in  order  to  underftand  them  well.  You 
may  ealily  mafter  that  Subje6t  in  all  the  Paits  of 
it  by  a  regular  Succeflion,  which  would  confound 
the  Underllanding  to  furvey  them  at  once.  So 
we  come  to  the  Knowledge  of  a  very  perplexed 
Diagram  in  Geometry^  or  a  complicated  Machine  in 
Mechanics^  by  having  it  parcell'd  out  to  us  into 
its  feveral  Parts  and  Principles,  according  to  this, 
and  the  foregoing  Rule  of  Method. 

I .  Call  every  Idea^  Propofttion  and  Argument  to 
Its  proper  Clafs^  and  keep  each  Part  of  the  Subjedi 
in  its  own  Place.  Put  thofe  things  all  together 
that  belong  to  one  Part  or  Property,  one  Confi- 
deration  or  View  of  your  Subje£b.  This  will 
prevent  needlefs  Repetitions,  and  keep  you  from 
intermixing  Things  which  are  different.  We 
muft  maintain  this  Diilindion  of  Things  and  Pla- 
ces if  we  would  be  fafe  from  Error.  It  is  Confu- 
lion  that  leads  us  into  endlefs  Miltakes,  which  na- 
turally arife  from  a  Variety  of  Ideas  ill-joined,  ill- 
foited,  or  ill-difpofed.  It  is  one  great  Ufe  of  Me- 
thod, that  a  Multitude  of  Thoughts  and  Propo- 
fitions  may  be  fo  diftindly  ranged  in  their  pro- 
per Situations,  that  the  Mind  may  not  be  over- 
whelmed with  a  confufed  Attention  to  them  all  at 
once,  nor  be  dillra6ted  with  their  Variety,  nor 
be  tempted  to  unite  Things  which  ought  to  be 
feparated,  nor  to  disjoin  Things  which  ihould  be 
united. 

4.  In  the  Partition  of  your  Difcourfe  into  dijiinci 
Pleads^  take  heed  that  your  Particulars  do  not  inter- 
fere with  the  General^  nor  with  each  other^    Think 

it 


C.  IL         The  right  Ufe  of  Kt^^on.        355 

It  not  enough  that  you  make  u{e  of  diftin^  Ex- 
prelHons  in  each  Particular,  but  take  Care  that  the 
Ideas  be  diilinft  alfo.  It  is  mere  Foolery  to  mul- 
tiply diftinft  Particulars  in  treating  of  Things^ 
where  the  Difference  of  your  Particulars  lies  only 
in  Names  and  JVords. 

IV'"^  Rule.  The  Method  of  treating  a  Sub- 
je6t  fhould  be  plenary  or  /////,  fo  that  nothing  may 
be  wanting  y  nothing  which  is  necellliry  or  proper 
fhould  be  omitted. 

When  you  are  called  to  explain  a  Subjeft,  don*t 
pafs  by,  nor  skip  over  any  thing  in  it  which  is  ve- 
ry difficult  or  obfcure. 

When  you  enumerate  the  Parts  or  the  Properties 
of  any  Subject,  do  it  in  a  complete  and  compre- 
hend ve  manner. 

When  you  are  ajjerting  or  proving  any  Truth, 
fee  that  every  doubtful  or  difputablc  Part  of  the 
Argument  be  well  fupportcd  and  confirmed. 

If  you  are  to  illuflrate  or  argue  a  Point  of  Dif' 
jiculty^  be  not  too  fcanty  of  Words,  but  rather 
become  a  little  copious  and  diffufive  in  your  Lan- 
guage :  Set  the  Truth  before  the  Reader  in  feve- 
ral  Lights,  turn  the  various  Sides  of  it  to  view, 
in  order  to  give  a  full  Idea,  and  firm  Evidence  of 
the  Propofition. 

When  you  are  drawing  up  a  Narrative  of  any 
Matter  of  Fa<5t,  fee  that  no  important  Circum- 
ftance  be  omitted. 

When  you  propofe  the  Solution  of  any  Difficul- 
ty^ confidcr  all  the  various  Cafes  wherein  it  can 
happen,  and  ihew  how  they  may  be  folved. 

In  {hort,  let  your  Enumerations^  your  Divifions 
and  Difiributions  of  Things  be  fo  accurate,  that 
no  needful  Part  or  Idea  may  be  left  out. 

A  a  *  This 


35(S  LOGIC  K:  Or,     Part  IV. 

This  Fulnefs  of  Method  does  not  require  that 
every  thing  fhould  be  faid  which  can  be  faid  upon 
any  Subje6t  j  for  this  would  make  each  fingle 
Science  endlefs :  But  you  fhould  fay  every  thing 
"which  is  necellary  to  the  Defign  in  View,  and 
which  has  a  proper  and  direct  Tendency  to  this 
End  i  always  proportioning  the  Amplitude  of  your 
Matter,  and  the  Fulnefs  of  your  Difcourfe  to  your 
great  Defign,  to  the  Length  of  your  Time,  to 
the  Convenience,  Delight  and  Profit  of  your 
Hearers. 

V*'^  Rule.  As  your  Method  mufl  htfullwith^ 
out  Deficiency^  fo  it  mull  be  JJoort^  or  without  Su- 
perfluiiy.  The  Fulnefs  of  a  Difcourfe  enlarges  our 
Knowledge,  and  the  well- concerted  Brevity  faves 
our  Time.  In  order  to  obferve  this  Rule,  it  will 
be  enough  to  point  out  the  chief  of  thofe  Super- 
fluities or  Redundancies^  which  fome  Perfons  arc 
guilty  of  in  their  Difcourfes,  with  a  due  Caution 
againfl  them. 

I .  Avoid  all  needlefs  Repetitions  of  the  fame  Thing 
in  different  Parts  of  your  Difcourfe.  It  mufl  be 
confefl  there  are  feveral  Cafes  wherein  a  Review 
of  the  fame  foregoing  Propofition  is  needful  to 
explain  or  prove  feveral  of  the  following  Poflti- 
ons  J  but  let  your  Method  be  fo  contrived,  as  far 
as  pofTible,  that  it  may  occafion  the  feweft  Re- 
hearfals  of  the  fame  Thing ;  for  it  is  not  grateful 
to  the  Hearers  without  evident  Neceflity. 

2.  Have  a  Care  of  a  tedious  Prolixity^  or  draW" 
ing  out  any  Part  of  your  Difcourfe  to  an  unnecejfary 
and  tire  fome  Length.  It  is  much  more  honourable 
for  an  Inftruftor,  an  Orator,  a  Pleader,  or  a  Preach- 
er, that  his  Hearers  fhould  fay,  /  was  afraid  he 
m)ould  have  done^  than  that  they  ihould  be  tempt- 
ed  to  fhew  Signs  of  Uneaflnefi,  and  long  for  the 
^Qmlufton.  Befidc3 


C .  II.         The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:         3  5  7 

Befides,  there  is  another  Inconvenience  in  it  j 
When  you  affect  to  amplify  on  the  former  Branch- 
es of  a  Difcourfe,  you  will  often  lay  a  Neceflity 
upon  yourfelf  of  contrading  the  latter  and  moft 
uleful  Parts  of  it,  and  perhaps  prevent  yourfelf 
in  the  moft  important  Part  of  your  Defign.  Ma- 
ny a  Preacher  has  been  guilty  of  this  Fault  in  for- 
mer Days,  nor  is  the  prefent  Age  without  fome  In- 
ftances  of  this  Wealcnefs.j 

3 .  Do  not  multiply  Explications  where  there  is  no 
Difficulty  J  or  Darknefs,  or  Danger  of  Mijlake.  Be 
not  fond  of  tracing  every  Word  of  your  Theme 
thro'  all  the  grammatical^  the  logical  and  metaphy-' 
ftcal  Characters  and  Relations  of  it,  nor  fhew  vour 
critical  Learning  in  fpreading  abroad  the  various 
Senfes  of  a  Word,  and  the  various  Origin  of  thofe 
Senfes,  the  Etymology  of  Terms,  xht  fynonymous 
and  the  paronymous  or  kindred  Names,  ^c.  where 
the  chief  Point  of  Difcourfe  does  not  at  all  re- 
quire it.  You  would  laugh  at  a  Pedant^  who 
profefling  to  explain  the  Athanafian  Greedy  ihould 
acquaint  you,  xh.ix.  Athanaftus  is  derived  fromi  a 
Greek  Word,  which  fignifies  Immortality^  and 
that  the  fame  Word  'AGauao-Za  fignifies  alfo  the 
Herb  Tanfie. 

There  are  fome  Perfons  fo  fond  of  their  learn- 
ed Diftindtions,  that  they  will  ihew  their  Subtilty 
by  diftingttijhing  where  there  is  no  Difference :  And 
the  fame  filly  Affeftation  will  introduce  Difiin^i" 
ens  upon  every  Occurrence,  and  bring  three  or 
four  Negatives  upon  every  Subje6b  of  Difcourfe  j 
firft  to  declare  what  it  is  not,  and  then  what  it  is : 
Whereas  fuch  Negatives  ought  never  to  be  men- 
tioned where  there  is  no  apparent  Danger  of  Mif- 
take.  ^  How  ridiculous  would  that  iWriter  be, 
who,  if  he  were  fpeal^ing  of  the  Nicene  Greedy 
fliould  declare  negatively,     i.  That  he  did  not 

A  a  3  mean 


55  8  L   O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  IV. 

mean  the  Do5irine  which  the  Inhabitants  of  Nice 
hlievedy  nor,  (i.)  yi  Creed  written  by  them^  but 
(3.)  Politively,  a  Creed  compofed  by  federal  Chri- 
iHan  Bifiops^  met  together  in  the  City  of  Nice?  The 
Pofitive  is  fufficient  here,  and  the  two  Negatives 
are  impertinent. 

4.  Be  not  fond  of  proving  thofe  'things  which  need 
m  Proof  fuch  as  felf-evident  Proportions  and 
Truths  univerfally  confeft,  or  fuch  as  are  entirely 
agreed  to  and  granted  by  our  Opponents.  It  is 
this  vain  Affectation  of  proving  every  thing  that 
has  led  Geometricians  to  form  ufelefs  and  intricate 
Demonflrations  to  fuppoit  fome  Theorems,  which 
are  fufficiently  evident  to  the  Eye  by  Infpe6tion, 
or  to  the  Mind  by  the  firft  mention  of  them;  and 
it  is  the  lame  Plumour  that  reigns  fometimes  in 
the  Pulpit,  and  fpcnds  half  the  Sermon  in  proving 
fome  general  Truth  which  is  never  difputed  or 
doubted,  and  thereby  robs  the  Auditory  of  more 
ufeful  Entertainment, 

f .  As  there  are  fome  things  fo  evidently  true, 
that  they  v.'ant  no  Proof,  fo  there  are  others  fo  ^- 
vidently  falfe^  that  they  want  no  Refutation.  It  is 
mere  trifling,  and  a  walle  of  our  precious  Mo- 
ments, to  invent  and  raife  fuch  Objc6tions  as  no 
Man  would  ever  make  in  earneft,  and  that  merely 
for  the  fake  of  anfwering  and  folving  them :  This 
breaks  in  notorioufly  upon  the  due  Brevity  of  Me- 
thod. 

6.  Avoid  in  general  all  learned  Forms ^  all  Trap" 
pings  of  Art^  and  Ceremonies  of  the  Schools^  where 
there  is  no  need  of  them.  It  is  reported  concern- 
ing the  late  Czar  of  Mufcovy^  that  when  he 
firit  acquainted  himfelf  with  mathematical  Learn- 
ing, he  pra6tifed  all  the  Rules  of  Circumvallation 
and  Contravallation^  at  the  Siege  of  a  Town  in 

Livonia  % 


C.  II.         The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon .'  3  5 ^ 

Livonia ;  and  by  the  Length  of  thole  Formalities 
he  loft  the  Opportunity  of  taking  the  Town. 

7.  Don't  fuffer  every  occafional  and  incidental 
Thought  to  carry  you  away  into  a  long  Parenthejis^ 
and  thus  to  ftretch  out  your  Difcourfe^  and  divert 
you  from  the  Point  in  Hand.  In  the  Purfuit  of 
your  Subject,  if  any  ufeful  Thought  occur  which 
belongs  to  fome  other  Theme,  note  it  down  for 
the  fake  of  your  Memory  on  fome  other  Paper, 
and  lay  it  by  in  referve  for  its  proper  Place  and 
Seafon:  But  let  it  not  incorporate  it  felf  with 
your  prefent  Theme,  nor  draw  off  your  Mind 
from  your  main  Bufinefs,  tho'  it  fhould  be  never 
fo  inviting.  A  Man  who  walks  dire6tly  but  flow- 
ly  towards  his  Journey's  lEnd,  will  arrive  thither 
much  fooner  than  his  Neighbour,  who  runs  into 
every  crooked  Turning  which  he  meets,  and  wan- 
ders afide  to  gaze  at  every  thing  that  ftrikes  his 
Eyes  by  the  Way,  or  to  gather  every  gaudy  Flow- 
er that  grows  by  the  fide  of  the  Road. 

To  fum  up  all  j  There  is  an  happy  Medium  to  he 
vhferved  in  our  Method^  fo  that  the  Brevity  may  not 
render  the  Senfe  obfcure^  nor  the  Argument  feeble^ 
nor  our  Knowledge  merely  fuperficial :  And  on  the 
other  Hand^  that  the  Fulnefs  and  Copioufnefs  of  our 
Method  may  not  wafle  the  Timc^  tire  the  Learner^ 
or  fill  the  Mind  with  Trifles  and  Impertinences. 

The  copious  and  the  contracted  Way  of  writing 
have  each  their  peculiar  Advantages.  There  is  a 
proper  Ufe  to  be  made  of  large  Paraphrafes^  and 
/«//,  particular^  and  diffufive  Explications  and  Ar- 
guments  -,  thefe  are  fitteft  for  thofe  who  defign  tp 
be  acquainted  throughly  with  every  Part  of  the 
Subject.  There  is  alfo  a  Ufe  o?  fhorter  HintSy 
AhfiraEls  and  Compendiums  to  inftru61:  thofe  who 
feek  only  a  flight  and  general  Knowledge,  as  well 
as  to  refrefh  the  Memory  of  thofe  who  have  learnt 

A  a  4  the 


360  L  O  G  I  C  K:  Or,      Part  IV; 

the  Science  already,  and  gone  thro'  a  larger  Scheme. 
But  ic  is  a  grofs  Abufe  of  thefc  various  Methods 
of  Inftru6tion5  when  a  Perfon  has  read  a  mere  Com- 
pend  or  Epitome  of  any  Science,  and  he  vainly  ima- 
gines that  he  underftands  the  whole  Science.     So 
one  Boy  may  become  a  Philofopher  by  reading  o- 
ver  the  mere  dry  Definitions  and  Divifions   of 
^c'oeihlefs  Cofnpendtum  of  Peripateticifm:   So  an- 
other may  boait  that  he  underflands  Anatomy^  be- 
caufe  he  has  feen  a  Skeleton  ;  and  a  third  profe{s 
himfelf  a  learned  Divine^  when  he  can  repeat  the 
ApoflUs  Creed, 

W^  Rule.  Take  care  that  your  Method  be 
proper  to  the  Suhje^l  in  Hand^  proper  to  your  pre~ 
fent  Defign^  as  well  as  proper  to  the  Age  and  Place 
wherein  you  dwell, 

I .  Let  your  Method  he  proper  to  the  SuhjeEl.  All 
Sciences  muli:  not  be  learnt  or  taught  in  one  Me- 
thod. Morality  and  Theology^  Metaphyfics  and 
Logic ^  will  not  be  calily  and  happily  reduced  to  a 
flri6t  mathematical  Method :  Thole  who  have  tried 
have  found  much  Inconvenience  therein. 

Some  things  have  more  need  to  be  explained 

than  to  he  proved ;  as  Axioms  or  felf- evident  PrO' 

pofitions^  and  indeed  all  the  jirft  great  Principles^ 

the  chief  and  moil  important  Do6trines  both  of 

natural  and  re'vealed  Religion  >  for  when  the  Senlc 

of  them  is  clearly  explained,  they  appear  fo  evi-" 

dent  in  the  Light  of  Nature  or  Scripture^  that 

they  want  no  other  Proof.  There  are  other  Things 

that  ftand  in  need  of  Proofs  as  well  as  Explication^ 

as  many  mathematical  Theorems^  and  feveral  deep 

Controverftes  in  Morality  and  Divinity.    There  are 

yet  other  forts  of  Subje6ts  which  want  rather  to 

be  warmly  impreft  upon  the  Mind  hj  fervent  E}<' 

hortations^  and  iland  in  more  need  of  this  than 

they 


CAl,         The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon^       3  e  t 

they  do  either  of  Proof  or  Explication  j  fuch  are 
the  molt  general,  plain  and  obvious  Duties  of 
Piety  towards  God^  and  Love  toward  Men^  with  a 
Government  of  all  our  Inclinations  and  PaJJions. 
Now  thefe  feveral  Subje6ts  ought  to  be  treated  in 
a  different  Manner  and  Method. 

Again^  There  are  fome  Subjefls  in  the  fame 
Treatife  which  are  more  ufeful  and  necejfary  than 
others,  and  fome  Parts  of  a  Subje6t  which  are  e~ 
minently  and  chiefly  deftgned  by  a  Writer  or  Speak- 
er; True  Method  will  teach  us  to  dwell  longer 
upon  thefe  Themes,  and  to  lay  out  more  Thought 
and  Language  upon  them  j  whereas  the  fame  Art 
of  Method  will  teach  us  to  cut  fhort  thofe  things 
which  are  ufed  only  to  introduce  our  main  Subject, 
and  to  fland  as  a  Scaffolding  merely  to  aid  the 
Stru6ture  of  our  Difcourfe.  It  will  teach  us  alfo 
to  content  our  felves  with  brief  Hints  of  thofe 
Matters  which  are  merely  occafional  and  inci^ 
dental. 

2.  Your  Method  mufl  he  adjufiedhy  your  Defign  ; 
for  if  you  treat  of  the  fame  Subje61:  with  two  dif- 
ferent Views  and  Defigns,  yonwiWfind  it  necef- 
fary  to  ufe  different  Methods.  Suppofe  the  Doc- 
trine  of  the  facred  Trinity  were  your  Theme,  and 
you  were  to  read  a  Le6lure  to  young  Students  on 
that  Subje6t,  or  if  you  defigned  a  Treatife  for  the 
Convi6tion  of  learned  Men,  you  would  purfue  a 
very  different  Method  from  that  which  would  be 
proper  to  regulate  a  pra6tical  Difcourfe,  or  a  Ser- 
mon to  inftm6t  vulgar  Chriftians  merely  in  the  pi- 
ous Improvement  of  this  Do6lrine,  and  awaken 
them  to  their  Duties  which  are  derived  thence. 

In  fhort,  we  mufl  not  firfl  lay  down  certain 
and  precife  Rules  of  Method,  and  refolve  to  con- 
fine the  Matter  we  difcourfe  of  to  that  particular 
Form  and  Order  of  Topicks^  but  we  mufl  well 
^  coafider 


362  LOGIC  K:  Or;     Part IV. 

confider  and  fludy  the  Subject  of  our  Difcourfe 
throughly,  and  take  a  juft  Survey  of  our  prefent 
Defign^  and  thefe  will  give  fufficient  Hints  of  the 
f  articular  Form  and  Order  in  which  we  fhould 
handle  it,  provided  that  we  are  moderately  skill'd 
in  \\\Q,  gerieral  Laws  of  Method  and  Order. 

Yet  let  it  be  noted  here,  that  neither  the  Suh^ 
je£l  or  Matter  of  a  Difcourfe,  nor  the  particular 
JDefign  of  it,  can  fo  precifely  determine  the  Me- 
thod, as  to  leave  no  Room  for  Liberty  and  Va- 
riety. The  very  fame  Theme  may  be  handled,  and 
that  alfo  with  the  fame  Delign,  in  feveral  different 
Methods,  among  which  it  is  hard  to  fay  which  is 
the  bell.  In  writing  a  Syftem  of  Divinity^  fome 
begin  with  the  Scriptures^  and  thence  deduce  all 
other  Do61:nnes  and  Duties.  Some  begin  with 
the  Being  of  God  and  his  Attributes^  fo  far  as  he 
is  known  by  the  Light  of  Nature^  and  then  pro^ 
ceed  to  the  Do6trines  of  Revelation.  Some  di- 
IHnguifh  the  whole  Subject  into  the  Credenda  and 
Agenda^  that  is,  "things  ta  be  believed^  and  Thingi 
to  be  done.  Some  think  it  belt  to  explain  the 
whole  Chriftian  Religion  by  an  hifiorical  Detail 
ef  all  the  Difcoveries  which  God  has  made  of  him- 
felf  to  this  lower  f For  Id.,  beginning  at  the  Creation 
in  the  firll  Chapter  of  Genefis^  and  fo  proceeding 
onv^'ard  according  to  the  Narrative  of  the  old  and 
new  Teilament.  And  there  are  others  that  en* 
deavour  to  include  the  whole  of  Religion  under 
thefe  four  Heads  {viz})  The  Apo flies  Creed^  tha 
Lord's  Prayer^  the  ten  Commandments.,  and  the  two 
Sacraments 'y  tho'  I  cannot  but  think  this  is  the 
leaft  accurate  of  any.  The  fame  Variety  may  be 
allowed  in  treating  other  Subjects  j  this  very  trea^ 
life  of  Logic  is  an  Inftance  of  it,  whofe  Method 
differs  very  confiderably  from  any  others  which  I 
have  feen,  as  they  differ  alfo  greatly  from  one  an- 

5  other. 


C.  IL  the  right  Ufe  of  Reafon:        5  6% 

other,  tho'  feveral  of  them  are  confeft  to  be  well 
written. 

3.  The'  a  juft  View  of  our  Suhje6i  and  our  De- 
fign  may  dictate  proper  Rules  of  natural  Method, 
yet  there  miifi  be  forne  little  Deference  at  leafi  paid 
to  the  Cujiom  of  the  Age  'wherein  we  dwell^  and  to 
the  Humour  and  Genius  of  our  Readers  or  Hearers^ 
which  ii  we  utterly  reje6l  and  difdain,  our  Per- 
formances will  fiil  of  delired  Succefs,  even  tho' 
we  may  have  followed  the  juft  Rules  of  Method. 
I  will  mention  but  this  one  Inftance :  In  the  for- 
mer Century  it  was  frequent  with  learned  Men  to 
divide  their  Theme  or  Subject  into  a  great  Mul- 
titude of  coordinate  Members  or  Parts,  they  a- 
bounded  alfo  in  the  Forms  of  Logic  and  Difiin^i- 
on,  and  mduXgtdinMmtxovis  Ranks  of  Subordination. 
Now  tho'  we  ought  not  to  abandon  the  Rules  of 
juji  Method  and  Divifton,  in  order  to  comport  with 
the  modifli  Writers  in  our  Age  who  have  renounc- 
ed them,  yet  it  is  prudent  to  pay  fo  much  Refpe6t 
to  the  Cullom  of  the  Age,  as  to  ufe  thefe  Forms 
of  Divifion  with  due  Moderation,  and  not  affe6b 
to  multiply  them  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  give  an 
early  and  needlefs  Dilgull  to  the  Generality  of  our 
prelent  Readers.  The  fame  may  be  faid  concern- 
ing various  other  Methods  of  Condu(51:  in  the  Af- 
fairs of  Learning  as  well  as  the  Affairs  of  Life, 
wherein  we  muft  indulge  a  little  to  Cuftom :  And 
yet  we  muft  by  no  Means  fuffer  ourfelves  fo  far  to 
be  impofed  upon  and  governed  by  it,  as  to  negle6b 
thofe  Rules  of  Method  which  are  neceffary  for  the 
fafe,  eafy  and  compleat  Enquiry  into  Truth,  or 
the  ready  and  effectual  Communication  of  it  to  o- 
thers. 


VII'i^  Rule.  The  laft  Requiflte  of  Method  is, 
that  the  Parts  of  a  Difcourfe  JJjould  he  well  conneSi- 

ed'. 


%64  LOGIC  K:  Or]      Partiv: 

^d',  and  thefe  three  fhort  Dire^ions  will  fuffice  for 
this  Purpofe. 

« .  Keep  your  main  End  and  Deftgn  ever  in  view^ 
(tnd  let  all  the  Parts  of  your  Difcourfe  have  a  Teit^ 
demy  toward  it^  and^  as  far  as  fo^ible^  make  that 
tendency  v'fihle  all  the  Way :  Otherwife  the  Read- 
ers or  Hearers  will  have  Reafon  to  wonder  for 
what  End  this  or  that  Particular  was  introduced. 

2.  Let  the  mutual  Relation  and  Dependance  of 
■^he  fever  al  Branches  of  your  Difcourfe  befojufi  and 
evident^  that  every  Part  may  naturally  lead  onward 
to  the  next^  without  any  huge  Chafms  or  Breaks 
ivhich  interrupt  and  deform  the  Scheme.  The  Con- 
nexion of  Truths  fhould  rife  and  appear  in  their 
fuccefllve  Ranks  and  Order,  as  the  feveral  Parts 
of  a  fine  Profpe6t  afcend  juft  behind  each  other, 
in  their  natural  and  regular  Elevations  and  Di fian- 
ces, and  invite  the  Eye  to  climb  onward  with  con*- 
ilant  Pleafure  till  it  reach  the  Sky.  Whatfoever 
horrid  Beauty  a  Precipice  or  a  Catara<5t  may  add 
to  the  Profpe6l  of  a  Countr}'-,  yet  fuch  fort  of  hi- 
deous and  abrupt  Appearances  in  a  Scene  of  Rea- 
foning  are  real  Blemifhes  and  not  Beauties.  When 
the  Reader  is  pafhng  over  fuch  a  Treatife,  he  oft- 
en finds  a  wide  Vacancy,  and  makes  an  uneafy 
Stop,  and  knows  not  how  to  tranfport  his  Thoughts 
over  to  the  next  Particulai",  for  want  of  fome  Clue 
or  connecting  Idea  to  lay  hold  of. 

3 .  Acquaint  yourfelf  with  all  the  proper  and  decent 
Fm'MS  of  Tranjttion  from  one  Part  of  a  Difcourfe  to 
another^and pra^ife  them  asOccaJion  offers.  Where 
the  Ideas,  Propofitions  and  Arguments  are  happi- 
ly dilpofed,  and  well  connefted,  the  Truth  in- 
deed is  fecure  j  but  it  renders  the  Difcourfe  much 
more  agreeable,  when  proper  and  graceful  Expref- 
fion  joins  the  Paits  of  it  together  in  fo  entertain- 
ing 


C.  n.        The  right  Ufe  of  Reafon.'         ^6$ 

ing  a  manner,  that  the  Reader  knows  not  how  to 
leave  off  till  he  hath  arrived  at  the  End. 

Thefe  are  the  general  and  moll  important  Rules 
of  true  Method  y  and  tho'  they  belong  chiefly  to 
the  Communication  of  Knowledge,  yet  an  early 
and  thorough  Acquaintance  with  them  will  be  of 
confiderable  Ufe  toward  the  Purfuit  and  Attain'- 

ment  of  it. 

Thofe  Perfons  who  have  never  any  Occafion  to 
communicate  Knowledge  by  Writing  or  by  pub- 
lick  Difcourfes,   may  alfo  with  great  Advantage 
perufe  thefe  Rules  of  Method^  that  they  may  learn 
to  judge  with  Juftice  and  Accuracy  concerning 
the  Performance  of  others.     And  befidcs,  a  good 
Acquaintance  with  Method  wdll  greatly  afllft  eveiy 
one  in  ranging,  difpofing  and  managing  all  human 
Affairs.     The  particular  Means  or  Methods  for  a 
farther  Improvement   of  the  Underftanding  are 
very  various,  fuch  as,  Meditation,  Readings  Con^ 
verfing^  Difputing  by  Speech  or  by  Writings  ^le^ 
Jlion  and  Anfwer^  6cc.     And  in  each  of  thefe  Pi^ac- 
tices   fome   fpecial  FoiTns  may  be  obfervcd,  and 
fpecial  Rules  may  be  given  to  facilitate  and  fccui'e 
our  Enquiries  after  Truth :  But  this  would  require 
a  Uttle  Volume  by  itfelf,  and  a  Treatife  of  Logic 
has  always  been  efleem'd  fufficiently  compleat  with- 
out it. 


FINIS. 


THE 

TABLE 

O  F    T  H  E 

CO  N  T  E  N  T  S. 

^HE  Introdu^ion  or  general  Scheme      Page  i 


T 


The  Firji  Tart  {viz.)  Of  Perceptions  and 

Ideas. 

Chap.  I.  Of  the  Nature  of  IdeaSy  S 

Chap.  II.  Of  the  Ohje^s  of  Perception.  Se6b.  i. 
Of  Being  in  general^  p.  lo.  Se6t.  2.  Of  Sub^ 
fiances  and  their  various  Kinds,  p.  1 1.  Se6t.  3. 
Of  Modes  and  their  various  Kinds  ;  and  fir  ft  of 
ejfential  and  accidental  Modes<y  p.  16.  Se6t.  4. 
^he  farther  Divifions  of  Alode.^  p.  zi.  Se6t.  f. 
Of  the  ten  Categories.     Of  Sub  fiance  modify^  dy 

'    p.  2f .    Se6t.  6.  Of  Not-Beingy  p.  2.6, 

Chap.  III.  Of  the  fcveral  forts  of  Perceptions  or 
Ideas.  Se<5t.  i .  Of  fenfibUy  fpiritualy  and  ab^ 
fira^ied  IdeaSy  p.  28.  Se6b.  2.  Of  fimple  and 
complexy  compound  and  collective  Ideas,  p-  3?- 

Sed. 


CONTENTS. 

Se£t.  3 .  Of  unherfal  and  particular  Idcas^  real 
and  imaginary^  P-  34-  Se6t.  4.  The  Divijion  of 
Ideas-)  ivith  Regard  to  their  ^ialitieSy  P-  3P 

Chap.  IV.  Of  IVords  and  their  fe'veral  Di'vift- 
ons^  together  with  the  Ad-vantage  and  Danger  of 
them.  Se6t.  i .  Of  Words  in  general  and  their 
Ufe^  P-  4r-  Se(5t.  2.  Of  negative  and  pofttiie 
Terms^  P-  fi-  Se6t.  3.  Of  Jimple  and  complex 
Terms^  p.  5-4.  Se6t.  4.  Of  IVords  com:non  and 
proper^  p.  5*6.  Sect.  ^.  Of  concrete  and  abJiraSi 
I'erms^  p.  f8.  Se6t.  6.  Of  univocal  and  eqiii^co^ 
cal  Wordsj  ibid.  Se6t.  7.  Various  Kinds  of  e- 
quivocal  TVords^  p.  61.  Se6t.  8.  fT/:;^  Or/^/;?  or 
Caufes  of  equivocal  IVords^  p.  6j 

Chap.  V.  General  Dire6lions  relating  to  our  Ideas^ 
(viz.)  I.  Of  acquiring  a  1'reafure  of  Ideas.  z.Of 
retaining  Ideas  in  Memory.  3.  Of  fcle cling  ufe- 
ful  Ideas  ^  4.  Of  the  Government  of  our  Thoughts^ 

p.  71 

Chap.  VI.  Special  Rules  to  direSl  our  Conception 
of  things .,  P-79'  Secb.  i .  Of  gaining  clear  and 
difiinci  Ideas^  p.  ^o.  Sect.  2.  Of  the  Definiti- 
on of  Words  or  Names.,  p.  82.  Sect.  3..  Direc^ 
tions  concerning  the  Definition  of  Names^  p.  84. 
Se6t.  4.  Of  the  Definition  of  Things^  p.  100. 
Sect.  f.  Rules  of  Definition  of  the  Thing.,  p.  lof. 

,  Se£t.  6.  Obfervations  concerning  the  Definition  of 
Tloings.,  p.  108.  Se6t.  7.  Of  a  compleat  Concep- 
tion of  Things^  p.  117.  SecS:.  8.  Of  Divifion, 
and  the  Rules  of  it,  p.  118.  Se6t.  p.  Of  a  com- 
prehenfive  Conception  of  Things^  and  of  Abflrac- 
tion^  p.  124.  Se6t.  10.  Of  the  extenfive  Con- 
ception of  jthings^  and  of  Diflribution^  p.  128. 
Se£t.  u.  Of  an  orderly  Conception  of  Things^ 


CONTENTS. 

p.  135.  Se6t.  11.  The fe  five  Rules  of  Concept i^ 
on  exemplify'' d J  p.  I3f.  Sect.  13.  ^«  Illufirati- 
on  of  the fe  five  Rules  by  Similitudes^  P*  '  37 


The  Second  Tart   {viz.)   of  Judgment  and 

Propofition. 


c 


HAP.  I.  Of  the  Nature  of  a  Propofition^  and 
its  feveral  Part Sy  P-  ^44 


Chap.  II.  Of  the  various  Kinds  of  Propofitions. 
Se6t.  I .  Of  univerfaly  particular^  indefinite.,  and 
ftngular  Propofitions^  p.  147.  Se6l.  2.  Of  af- 
firmative and  negative  Propofitions ^  p.  if (5. 
Se6b.  3.  Of  the  Oppofition  and  Converfion  of  Pro' 
pofttions^  p.  ifS.  Se6t.  4.  Of  pure  and  modal 
Propofitions^  p.  161.  Se6t.  f.  Of  fingh  Propo- 
fitions^ whether  fimple  or  complex^  p.  163.  Sec.  6. 
Of  compound  Propofitions^  p.  16^.  Sec.  7.  Of 
true  and  falfe  Propofitions^  p.  171.  Sec.  8.  Of 
certain  a?id  doubtful  Propofitions^  of  Knowledge 
and  Opinion^  p.  174.  Sec.  p.  Of  Senfe^  Con- 
fcioufnefs^  Intelligence^  Reafon^  Faith  and  Infipi- 
ration^  ^-  iJ7 

Chap.  III.  The  Springs  of  falfe  Judgment^  or  the 
Dodirine  of  Prejudices^  p.  i85.  Sec.  i.  Preju- 
dices arifingfrom  Things^  p.  188.  Sec.  1.  Pre" 
judices  arifingfrom  fFords^  p.  ipf .  Sec.  3.  Pre- 
judices arifing  from  ourfelves^  p.  ip8.  Sec.  4, 
Prejudices  arifingfrom  othei'  Perfons^        p- 2^14 


Chap. 


CONTENTS. 

Chap.  IV.  General  Dm^ions  to  affift  us  in  judg- 
ing aright^  P-  ^3^ 

Chap.  V.  Special  Rules  to  dire^i  us  in  judging  of 
particular  Objects.  Sec.  i.  Principles  and  Rules 
of  Judgment  concerning  the  Objects  of  Senfe,  p. 
249.  Sec.  2.  Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment 
in  Matters  of  Reafon  and  Speculation^  p.  2f  3. 
Sec.  3.  Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment  in  Mat- 
ters of  Morality  and  Religion^  p.  25-9.  Sec.  4. 
Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment  in  Matters  of 
human  Prudence^  p.  263.  Sec.  f .  Principles  and 
Rules  of  Judgment  in  Matters  of  human  Tiefiimo- 

"^y-i  P-  "^^^^  ^^^'  ^'  P^''^^"P^^^  ^^^  Rules  of 
Judgment  in  Matters  of  divine  "tefiimony^  P-  ^-/i- 
Sec.  7.  Principles  and  Rules  of  Judging  concern- 
ing Things  pafi,  prefent^  and  to  come,  by  the  mere 
Ufe  of  Reafony  P-  ^7S 


The  Third  Tart  {viz.)  Of  Reafoning  and 

Syllogifm. 


c 


HAP.  I.  Of  the  Nature  of  a  Syllogifm^  and 
of  the  Parts  of  which  it  is  compofed^    p.  280 

Chap.  II.  Of  the  various  Kinds  of  Syllogifms^witb 
particular  Rules  relating  to  them.  Sec.  i .  Of  u- 
niverfal  and  particular  Syllogifms^  both  negative 
and  affirmative.^  p.  283.  Sec.  2.  Of  plain.Jimple 
Syllogifmsy  and  their  Rules^  p.28f.  Sec.  3.  Of 
the  Moods  and  Figures  offimple  Syllogifms^  p.  289. 
Sec.  4.  Of  complex  Syllogifms^  p.  292.  Sec.  f . 
Of  conjunSiive  Syllogifms^  p.  296.  Sqc.  6.  Of 
compound  Syllogifms^  p.  501.    Sec.  7.   Of  the 

B  b  middls 


CONTENTS. 

middle  Terms^  of  common  Places  or  Topics^  and 

.  Invention  of  Arguments^  p.  3  Of.     Sec.  8.  Of  fe- 

"veral  Kinds  of  ^rgumcfits  and  Demonftrations^ 

p.  308 

Chap.  III.  The  Do6lrine  of  Sophifms.     Sec.  i.Of 

feveral  Kinds   of  Sophifms^   and  their  Solution^ 

p.  313.     Sec.  2.  I'lvo  general  'Tefls  of  true  Syl- 

logifms^   and  Methods    of  folving  all  Sophifms^ 

Chap.  IV.  Some  general  Rules  to  diteU  our  Rea- 
foningy  p.  326 


c 


The  Fourth  Tart  (viz.)  Of  Method. 

1HAP.  I.  The  Nature  and  Kinds  of  Method^ 

p.  340 


Chap.  II.  General  and  fpecial  Rules  of  Method^ 

P-  H^