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I 




LOGIC, 



OR THE 



!l!i0jt %\^t Of Mta^on, 



ZN TUB 



INQUIRY AFTER TRUTH. 



wiTrt 

VARIETY OF RULES TO GUARD AGAINST ERROa 
IN THE AFFAIRS OF RELIGION AND IIU- 
MAN LIFE. AS WELL AS IN THE 
SCIENCES. 



BY ISAAC WATFS, D. I). 



FOURTH AMERICAN EDITION. 



i • 



' WALFOLE I JV: Jl. 

I PRINTED BY GEORGE W. NICHOLS, 
FOR JOHN WEST & COMPANY, BOSTOX. 



1809. 

^ 1 »-* 



THc NEW Y'^'RK j- 

poBi.ic !,;"■.■-:'.■■ ■ 
793010 A : 




TO 



rOHN HARTOPP. Baronet. 



SiBf 



JLt is fit the public should receive throug^ 
your hands what was written orisinally for the assitt- 
mce of your younger stucUes, and was then presented 

lo JOU. 

It was by the repeated importunities of our learn* 
ed friend Mr. John Kame9^ that I was persuaded to re- 
vise these rudimenf tf iofficj and when I had once suf* 
Ifereck myself to begin the work, 1 was drawn still on-' 
ward far beyond my Brst design, even to the nef^lect^ 
or too long delay of other pressing; and important de- 
mands that were upon me. 

It has been my endeavour to form every part of 
is treatise both for the instruction of students, to open 
their way into the sciencesi and for the more extensive 
[md general service of mankind, that the gentleman and 
[4the Christian might find their account in the perusal as 
^cU as the scholar. I have therefore collected and pro- 
posed the chief principles an-i n?!-^ of rifjht jvvl^mwx 



'» 



f; 



IV di:dication. ; 

r 

in matters of common and sacred inir: rarer, :.nif' 
])0'niL'ci out our jr.iHi ftw-qucnt mlstiik-s anr. ■ :; k. ...i^ 
i.) Tic cnnc'.'rns ofiifj and rcIi«yion, ll^at we sni^ljl Vct-"^ 
t-r v;\\:\\\] a;r-u:ist the sprin.^s of error, guil' a-} sorr-.w,*- 
>v!»Ic]i surround us i.i our slat.' of mortaliiy. 

You know, Sir, the great d:sijn of this nobh 
science is to rescui our reasoning powers from their ui 
Irappy slavery and darkness ; and thus, with all di 
fcubmission and dcf-rencc, it o!Tv*rs an humble assistat)( 
todivi:ij re\'tlali:>n. I'fi chit; f business is lo relieve 
ii.V.ural vr'.".\l:ne5i5;.'s of the m\r..] by some belter efTorls 
n-iture ; it is to dlTiri: a li^jht over tlic understanding ii 
O'.jr iimiirljs af*.:-:' I.'::'?, r.: rl not to furnish the tonp-m 



I*.. 






^■. 



• I • 






7* •;■' . •• I: :yy. i':at 



I. /: ) i':\ ^,^ C.d', t'.ji'j c.'ii l.i c!li]:;r.c and wrangling, to 
>vhich former ag.*s hid d-'bas?d an I confined it ; yet \ 
its disciples must acknowledge also, that they are taught 
to vindicate and d-fjnd the truth, a^ well as to search ' 
it out. True l^^ic doth not require a long detail of 
liard words to amuse mankind, and to puflf up the mind 
with empty soimih, and a pride of fj^lss learning; yet 
some distinctions and terms of art arc necessary to range 
ev.ry idea in its proper class, and to |kecp our thoughtfi 




DEDICATION. v 

D confusion. The world is now grown so wise as 
to iiifier this valuable art to be engrossed by the 
(xds. In 80 polite and knowing an age, every man 
ratoit will covet some acquaintance with logic^ since 
eaders its daily service to vutdom a:id virtue^ and to 

affairs of common H/cy as well as to the •ciencct. 

I will not presume, Sir, that this little book is im- 
ved since its first composure in proportion to the 
iroTcments of your manly age. But when you shall 
ase to review it in your retired hours, perhaps you 
J refresh your own memory in some of the early 
is of Ifaming : And if you find all the additional re* 
irks and rules made so familiar to you already by 
ar own observation, that there is nothing new among 
»n, it will be no unpleasing reflection that you have 

far anticipated the present zeal and labour, of, 

SIRy 

Your moat Faithful^ and 

Obedient Servant^ 

I. WATTS. 
London, Aug. 34| 1724. 

A 2 



INTRODUCTION, 

AKD 

<fBmttAl ^tMttt. 



L 



lOGIC is the art cf using Reason* well i 
inquiriea after tru^h^ and the communication of it to oi 

Reason* is the glory of human nature, and one c 
chief eminencies whereby wc arc raised above our fe 
creatures, the brutes, in this lower world. 

Reason as to the fiower and principles of it, is the 
mongift of God to ail men ; though all are not favc 
with it by nature in an equal degree : But the acq 
imfircvement^ of it, in difTerent men, make a much gr 
distinction between them than nature had made. 1 < 
even venture to say, that the imfirorvement of reason 
raised the learned and the prudent, in the Euro 
\forld, almost as much above the Hottentots^ and < 
savages oi Africa, as those savages are by nature sup 
to the birds, the beasts, and the fishes. 

Kow, the design rf logic is to teach us the right ii 
our reason^ or inti'llt-cutai /lowers, and the improvcm* 
them in ourselves ar.d others ; this is not only neces 
in order to attain any cumpcteni knowledge in the sci^ 
or the affairs of leuniiiig, but to govern both the gr 
und the meaner ffr.'/y^z* of life. It is the cultivation < 
reason, by which we are better enabled to distin] 
good from evily as well as truth from falsehood : 
both these are matters of the highest importance, w 
er we regard this life, or the life to come. 

The fiursuit and acquisition of truth is of infinite 
cernment to mankind. Hereby we become acqua 

* The word aEAM>!v, in this place, it not confined to the 
faculty of reasoning, or inferring one thing from another| 1 
dudes all the intellectual poweis of maot 



INTRODUCTION. vii 

the nature of things, both in heaven and earth, and 

r various relations to each other. It is by this m'^an 

liscover our duty to God and our ft: How -creatures : 

.his we arrive at the knowled^ of natural relighriy 

learn to confirm our faith in divine rcvclationy as 

as to understand what is revealed. Our wisdom, 

ience, and piety, our present conduct, and our fu- 

hopc, are all influenced by the use of our rational 

Trs in the search after truth, 

here are several things that make it very necessary 
our reason should have some assistance in the exer- 
cr u*e of it. 

he first is the defith and dijficultij of many trutfmj 
the vjeakn€99 of our reason to %eefar into things at 
, and fienet rate to the bottom of them. It was a s.iying 
ngf the ancients, KctiVm ifly^w/^o, « Truth lies in a 
;" and, to carry on this metaphor, we may very 
ly say, tliat logic docs, as it were, supply us %vith 
s wliereby we may go down to reach the water ; or 
ames the links of a chain, whereby we may draw the 
?r up from the bottom. Thus, by the me.ms of 
ly reasonings well connected together, philosophers 
:^ur age have drawn a thousand truths out of the 
ihs of darkness, which our fathers wtre utteiiy unac- 
inted with. 

inother thing that makes it necessary for our reason 
ave some assistance given it, is the diBguiae andfaUe 
ura in vf/iich many things afiftrar to uh in thia /i resent 
crfcct state : There are a thousand things which are 
in reality what they appear to be, and that both in 
natural and the moral world : So the aun appears to 
lut as a plate of silver, and to be less than twelve 
les in diameter : The moon appears to be as big as 
auny and the rainbow appears to be a large substan- 
arch in the sky ; all which are in reality gross false- 
ds. So knavery puts on the face oi justice^ hyfiocriay 
au/ierstition wear the vicard of fiiety^ deceit and evil 
often clothed in the shapes and appearances of trufh 
goodneaa. Now, logic helps us to strip off the out- 
d disguise of things, and to behold them, and judge 
lem in their own nature. 

'here is yet a further proof that our intellectual or ra« 
al /lowers need some assistancei and that is because 



IV. Diafiontion is that operation of the tninAj whetAf 
vfe put the ideas, propositions, and arguments, which we 
have formed concerning one subject, into such an order 
as is fittest to gain the clearest knowledge of it, to retsitt 
it longest, and to explain it to others in the best manner i 
Ov, in short, it is the ranging of our thoughts in such 
order as is best for our own and others conception and 
memory. The effect of this operation is called method* 
This very descri/ition qftAc /our ofierationa of the mind 
and their tfftctSj in thia order^ is an instance or esamplc 
of method. 

Now, as the art of logic assists our conceptions, to U 
gives us a large and comfirehenme view of the subject^ 
wt inquire into, as well as a clear and distinct knowledge 
of them. As it regulates our judgment and ourreosoii' 
ing^ so it secures us from mistakes, and gives us a fmi 
and certain knowledge of things ; and, as it fiimishefl 
us with method^ so it makes our knowledge of things both 
eaay and regular ^ and guards our thoughts from conftt" 
sion. 

Logic is divided into four parts, according to theai 
four operations of the mind, which it directSy and there* 
lore we shall treat of k in this order. 



CKks 



■■■■■■• 



'*K5 



THE 

fit^t Part of Eo0tc« 



cr. 



OF PERCEPTIONS AND IDEAS. 

THE first part of Logic contains observations and 
|itcepta about the first operation of the mind, fierce/uion 
«r nncefition : And, since all our knowledge, how wide 
iDd large soever it grow, is founded upon our concep- 
tkn and ideas, here we shall consider^ 

1. The general Nmture of them. 

1t, The Objects of our Conception, or the Archetypes or Pat- 
terns of these I^ai. 

3. The several Divisions of them. 

4u The Words mnd Terms whereby oor Ideas are expressed. 

5. General Directions about our Ideas. 

i« Special Rules to Direct our Conceptions. 



CHAP. I. 

OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS. 



F 



IRST, the nature of conception or percep- 
tion shall just be mentioned,* though this may seem to 
belong to another science rather than Logic, 

Percffition is that act of the mind, (or, as some philoso- 
phers call it,) rather zpawon ot imfirc99ion^ wliereb]p the 
mind becomes conscious of any thing ; as, when I feel 
hungCFf thirati or cold, or heat ; when I see a horse, a 

* KoTS'—The words coveaVTioir and perceptioit are often 
tised promiscuously, as I hdive done here, because I would not em- 
barrass a learner with too many distinctions ; bui. if I were to dis- 
tinguish theno, I would say, fbeception is the consciousness of an 
c4ijecc when present : conciptiom is the forming an idea of the 
elgec^ whether present er absent. 




y^ 





HLCr 



1 6 LOG IC 2 OR, THE Paht. 1 

Among^ suhstanccfi, some are called nntfile^ some ar 
com/ioumi^ whether the words be taken in 2l fihiloso/ihia 
or a vulgar sense. 

Sim file substances^ in a fxhilf^sofihical sense are either s/dt 
its which Iiave no manner of composition in tbem^ and i 
this sense God is called a simftle being ; or they are th 
first principles ofbodies, which are usually called element 
of wliich all other bodies arc compounded: Klemetits^x 
such substances as cannot be resolved, or reduced int 
two or more substances of different kinds. 

The various sects of philosophers have attributed th 
honour of this name to various thin^^s. The Peripatctii 
or followers q{ .4ristotle^ made Fire^Mr^ i^^arrA, and Watt 
io be the four elements of which all earthly tbings wci 
rompounded ; and they, supposed the heavens to be %quin 
eascncc^ Qvjifih sort of body, distinct from all these :Bti 
^^ince experimental philosophy and mathematics bave bet 

«< mi^. fuse J idea of substance (such as it is) is always ready toofl 

- icHir. It is a conjunction of idea<; co-existing in such a cause 

*- li^eir union, and makes the whole subject subsist by. itself, thong 

" iltc cause of their union be unknown ; and our general idea of si 

" stance arises from the GclF-subsibtence of this collection of ideas.*' 

Now, if this notion ofsubstance rest here, and be considered me 

i.' as an unknown cause of the union of properties, it is much itk 

'>asy to he admitted ; but, if we proceed to suppose a sort of re 

'. -..hstantia), distinct being, difterent from solid quantity oreatensi 

'1 Wudics, and different from a power of thinking in spirits, in r 

pinion it is the introduction of needless scholastical notion into t 

1 ;.;-;! liature of thinc^s, and then fancying it to have a real existence. 

Mr- l.ccke. in his Essay of Human Understanding, Book 3. chs 

. C. §■ 2. seems to ridicule thfe common idea of substance, whi 

>.]( ') !ip.vc generally supposed to be a sort of substratum, distinct fr( 

'<>! properties whatsoever, and to be the support of all properti 

V>'", in Book 4. chap. 3 §. 6. he 8#^ms to suppose there may be st 

:.n unknown substraiuti!, which may be capable of receiving the pr 

rr; if; both of matter and of mind, namely, extension, solidity, s 

\ i'gi:?.tion ; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation 

-hat Mio.s'.ancc which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to thi 

It' t! Vis be true, then spirits (for oughr we know) may be corpoi 

I', in;:", or tliinking hoJie:;, which is a doctrine too favourable to 

I'.f^r n,irv of the stnil. But I leave these debates to the philosuph 

' I ' o :iv;c, and will not be too positive in xny opinion of this absir 

> ir more of ihli aigi'.ment in Pl;ijosophical Essavs, before ci 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. J 7 

letter understood, this doctrine lias been abundantly re- 
futed. -The Chemists make 5/.fr/V, Salt^ Sul/i/mr^ llater^ and 
Earth, lo be iheir^vff elements, because they can reduce 
all terrestrial things to these five :^ This seems to come 
nearer the truth ; though they are not all agreed in this 
enumeration of ekra^snts. In short, our modern philoso- 
phers generally suppose matter or body to be one simple 
principle) or Boiid extension, which being diversified by iu 
Tirious shapes, quantities, motions, and situations, makes 
111 the Tarieties that are found in the univei*se ; and there- 
fore they make little use of the word element, 
.' Cqm/iound substances are mude up of t'.vo or more lini/iit' 
ubstanccs : So every tl.inj; in this wliolc material crea- 
Uon, that can be reduced by the art of man into two or 
niore difierent principles or substances is a coinjiound boiiy 
bthe philosophical sense. 

But, if we take the words sim/tle and ccmfionnd in a \ul- 
garsense, then all those are simple substances which are 
generally esteemed uniform in their natui'e. So every 
herb is called a f/w/i/c, and every \ntVA\ a mineral ; thouj^Ii 
!^ the chemist -perhaps may find all his several elements in 
each of them. So a needle is a «<//}/ /^ body, bein^ only 
made of steel ; but a sword or a knife is a comficund^ be- 
came its haij^ or handle is made of materials difTcrent from 
the blade. So the Bark of Peru, or the Juice c/ iiorrel, is 
h simple medidne : But, when the apothecary's art har> 
mingled several simples together, it becomes u ccm/ioundi 
U Dia9Cordium^ or Mithridate, 

The terras oifiure and mixt, when, applitd to bodies, 
ire much akin to simt^U and com/iound, « So a gLinea is 
Pure gold, if it has nothinf; but gold in it, without any al- 
loy of baser metal : But, if any other mineral or metal by 
mingled \vith it, it is called a mixt substance or body. 

Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate. 
Animated substances are either animal or vegetabb .* 
^ Some of the animal substances have various or^anical ov 
'.hstrumental parts, fitted for a variety of motions from 

I* HOTB — Vegetaliles. «s well as animals, have gotten the name 
ef animated substances, t>ecau8e some of the ancients suppotod herbs 
and plants, beasts and birds, &c. to have a sort of soulj dhtinct from 
BatteTi or bod/. 

B 3 



U Iodic : OR, THE , 

place to place, und a spring of life within thems 
beasts, birds, fishes, and insects ; these are called 
Other animated sti^stancea are called vegetabh 
have within themselves the principles of anotht 
life and growth, and of various productions of lea 
ers, and fruit, such as we see in plants, herbs, i 

And there arc other substances, which are ca 
imate^ because they have no sort of life in them, 
stone, air, water, &c. 

There is also one sort of substance or being, 
comfiQuncled of body and mind^ or a rational spirit 
an animal ; such is mankind. Angdsy or any 
ings of the spiritual and invisible world, who ha 
med visible shapes for a season, can hardly be 
aviiong this order of compounded beings ; becai 
drop their bodies, and ciivest themselves of thoi 
shapes, when their particular message is perfori 
thereby shew that these bodies do not belong to 
lures. 



SECT. IIL 



dF woDiES, And their various kikds, and firj 

iSEXTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL MODES. 



X HE next sort of objects which are r< 
cd in our ideas, are called modes or manners of bi 
A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of i 
is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsistir 
Jielp oi %oxti^substance\ which for that reason is 
(^uhject. {lA mode must depend on that substanc 
very existence and being ; and that not as a being 
on its cause^ (for so «tt6»/a72ce« themselves depcn< 

• KoTE — The term mode is by fomc authors applied ch 
relations, or reladve manners of being. But in logical ire 
often used in a larger sense, and extends to all attributes w 
and includes the most essential and inward properties, as ^ 
ward respects andrelationf| and reaches to actions tbcmsel' 
%i manners of action . 



:!tAP. H. RIGHT USE OF REASON. I» 

their Creator ;) but the very being of a mode depends on 
some substance for its subject^ in which it is or to which it 
belongs ; so motion) shape, quantity) weig^ht, sat modes of 
the body ; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging;, 
are modes of the mind $ for the one cannot ' s>ubsist without 
body^ and the other cannot subsist without mind. 

Modes have their several divisions, as well as substances* 
I. Modes are either essential or accidental. 
An essential mode or attribute^ is that which belongs to 
the very nature or essence of the subject wherein it is ; and 
the subject can never have the same nature without it ; 
Buch is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in 
"Water, vital motion in an animal, solidity in matter, thinkings 
in a spirit ; for, though that piece of wood which is now a 
bowl may be made s^^warr, yet, [^roundness be taken away, 
it is no longer a bowl 2 so that very flesh and bones, whicli 
is now an animal^ may be without li/e or inward motion ; 
but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an ani« 
mal, but a carcass ; so, if a body or matter be divested of 
solidity ^ it is a mere void space, or nothing ; and, if sfiirit 
be entirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing 
that is left in it ; therefore, so far as I am able to judge, 
consciousness must be its essential attribute.* Thus all the 
perfections of God are called his attributes^ for he cannot 
be without them. 
An essential xiode is either /ir/mary or secondary, 
A firimary essential mode is the.first or chief thing that 
constitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and 
makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from 
all other beings : This is called the difference in the defi- 
nition of things ; of which hereafter : So roundness is the 
primary essential mode or difference of a bowl ; the meeting 
til two lines i? the primary essential mode, or the difference 
of an angle ; the fier/iendicularity of these lines to each other 

* Note — When I call solid extension an essential mode or attri- 
bute of matter, and a power of thinking an essential mode or attribute 
of a spirit, I do it in compliance with common forms of speech: But 
perhaps in reality these are very essences or substances themselves, 
and the most substantial ideas that we can form of body and spirit, 
and have no need of any (we know not what) substratum, or unin- 
teUigible substance, to support them in their escisteace or beln^. 



ao LOGIC: on, THE 

is tliC diffePtnce of a right angle : Solid exlcni 
primary attribute or difTerence oi matter : Conacl 
i3Li\ciai%t9i fiower of thinking^ is the difference o 
attribute of a afiirit i* and io/ear and iove God 
mary attribute of a fiiou9 man. 

A secondary essential mode is any other att 
thing which is not of pi imary consideration : T 
cd a firofierty. ' Sometimes indeed it goes towai 
up the essence, especially of a comfilrx being, s* 
are acquainted with it ; sometimes it depends 
follows from the essence of it ; so, volubility y or 
roll, is the property of a l)Owl, and is deriv< 
roundness. Alobility^ 9Xi^ figure, or shafie are 
of 7natter ; and it is the property of a pious man 
neighbour. 

An accidental mode^ or an accident, is such a 

not necessary to the being of a thing, for the s 

be without it, and yet remain ol' the same na 

was before, or it is that mode which may be si 

abolished from its stibject : So, smoothness or 

blackness or whiteness, motion or rest, are the i 

a bowl ; for these may be all changed, and y< 

remain a bowl still : learning, justice, folli, 

health, are the accidents of a man : Motion, sgi 

any particular shape or size, ore the accidents of 

shape, and size, in general, are essential modes 

body must have some size and shape ; nor can 

out them : So, hope, f ear ^ wishing, assenting, a 

are accidents of the m//i J, though thinking in ge 

to be essential to it. 

Here observe, that the name of accident has 
times given by the old Peripatetic phtlosc 
modes, whether essential or accidental ; but t 
confine this word accident to the sense in whic 
scribed it. 

Here it should be noted also, that, thoug 

/iroperty be limited sometimes, in logical treu 

secondary essential mode^ yet it is used in c 

guaga to signify these four sorts of moc/e« ; of 

are essential^ and some accidental. 

* See preceding Nete. 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 2 1 

' 1. Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but 7iot 
mly to those subjects. So, yellow colour^ and ductilityy are 
properties of gold ; they belong to all gold, but not only 
top:old ; for s^ifTron is also yellow^ and lead is ductile, 

3. Such OS belong only to one kind of subject, but not to 
rorry subject of that kind. So, learnings readings and 
vritin^f are properties o^ human nature ; they belong only 
to man, but not to all men. 

3. Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and only 
to lhcm« but not alivaya. So, a/iccch or language is a prop- 
erty of man^ for it belongs to all men, and to mtn only ; 
but men are not always speaking. 

4. Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and to 
them only and always* So, sha/ie and divisibility are prop- 
erues olbody ;\ so omnisrience and omni/ioience are proper- 
ties of divine Miture ; for in this sense properties and at- 
tributes are the same ; and, except in logical treatises) 
there is scarce any distinction made between them. These 
ire called />ro/^r/a quarts modo in the schools, or firofierties 
if the fourth sort, 

A'br£— Where there is any one Jiro/ierty or essential at' 
tribute so superior to the rest, that it appears plainly that 
ill the rest are derived from it, and such as is suHicient to 
give a full distinction of that subject from all other sub- 
jects, this attribute or property is called the essential dif" 
ftrencej as is before declared ; and we commonly say, the 
euence of the thinj consists in it ; so the essence of matter 
in general seems to consist in solidity^ or 6olid extension. 
But, fur the most part, we are so much at a loss in finding 
out the intimate essence of particular natural bodies, that 
ve are forced to distinguish the essential difference of most 
thinq;8 by a combination of properties. So a s/iarrow is a 
bird which has such coloured feathers, and such a pai*tic- 
ulur size, shape and motion. So wonnv>ood is an herb 
which has such a leaf of such a colour, and shape, and 
(aste, and such a root and stalk* So beasts and fishes, 
minerals, metals, and works of art sometimes, as well as 
©f nature, are distinguished by such a collection o/fira/iev* 
ti(s. 




THK TASTHBR DIVI 



'/ X HE recontl <livi«ion uf Mcxlea is into » 

and relative, 'Kn nbtoturf mode'uxiwx which bew „ 
iu subject, witlioui respect to anf ether bcinga nhftlM 
cr: But a rr/(t»'T'f nioi/cis difrivwl frDm the rvgat^ tj 
one being hat to others, J So roatrfnes* and ainooflir'~ ' 
theoAvo/u/e modes ofabowl ; Tor, if there « 
else exiiting in the whole creation, a bowl might ll 
H)4 tiMolA 1 But grealneta and tmattnean are I 
modest for Uie very ideas of them are derirt»] i 
irom the compajison of one being with olliers : A ' 
four inches Oiameler is very great compared with V 
inch nndahalf; butitis vrry «ntn//in compansonof anotl 
erbowl whosediameleris eighteen or t^vent}' inches. 
tion is the absolDtu mode of a body, but tiuiflneu or 
nru are relative idcis ; for the motion of a bowl on a boffi 
in(;gi'ecn is twift when compared with a snuil ; and U) 
tlQTo when compared with a cannon-bullet. 

These relative m^dea are lorgely treated of by s 
Ijiculand metaphyHJcn] writers, under the n.ime of >v9 
/toiM.: And theae relations themselves are farther tiitii| 
\iAiidintaJiufkaaari»eJnm the nature of fling*, And • 
erite mrrelt/Jrom the ofltraiton ofout mtnd» ; one lort ■ 
called real rcfationt, the other mental ; ao the Ukfiteai «f 
egg to another ia a real relation, because it ariacs I 
the real naUire of thin);rs ; for, whether there was any n 
or mind to conceive it or not, one egg would be like ano 
cr : But, when we consider on egg as a noun tuittantiva 
in grammar, or •■ signified by the letters egg, these wv 
TOere mental relations, and derive their very nature from 
the mind of man. These tort of relations are called by 
the school* entia rationi», or teronrt j.o/ioni, which have na 
real being, but depend entirely on the operation of the 
miad. 

HI. The l/iint divtaion of modcb shew us they are «• 
Act iiarijttical, or exirimicat. Intriiuicat tmdtt tre coa- 



Chap. II. JIIGIIT USE OF REASON. 



23 



■ f. 



A-;:-? 



a a 



* _ * 



ccivcd to be in the subject or substance, as when we say a 
globe is rounds or^iny/, rc///;/^, or ul re9t : Op when \vc 
say a man is /a//, or /roi 72«/, these are intrinnc modes : But, 
ejririnsic m'jdrs are such as arise from something^ that is 
not in the subject or substance itself; but it is a manner 
of being wliich some substances attain by reason of some- 
thing that is external or foreign to the subject ; as (hit 
ghbc lit'S vfithin two yards of the wall ; orf this man h bclov* 
idy lit hated, J^'ote, Such sort of modes as this last ex- 
tmple are called external denominations, 

IV. There is ^fourth division much akin to this, where- 
by modes are said to be inherent or adherent^ that is, 
proper or imfiro/ter. Adherent or improper mo</r« arise from 
the joining of some accidental substance to the chief sub- 
ject^ which yet may be stparated from it I so when a bowl 
is vety or a boy is clothed^ these are adherent modes ; for 
the water and the clothes are distinct substances, which 
adhere to the 6ow/, or to the boy : But, when we say the 
Aovtf i# swift or round J when we say the boy is strong or ivit- 
'if, these are proper or inherent modesy for they have a sort 
t^in-bcing in the substance itself, and do not arise from the 
Iddition of any other substance to it. 

V. Action and fiassion are modes or manners which be- 
ioog to substances, and should not entirely be omitted here. 
When A smith with a hammer strikes a piece oi irony the 
^mer and the smith are both agents or subjects of action ; 
the one is the prime or snpreme^ the other the subordinate : 
The iron is the /ra/iVnr, or the subject of passion, in aphi- 
knphical sense, because it receives the operation of the 
igent 9 though this sense of the words passion and patient 
iBffcrs much from the vulgar meaning of them.* 

VI. The sixth division of modes may i>e into /ihysicaly 
tlyt is, naturaly civile moraly and supernatural. So w iicn we 
consider the apostle Paul^ who was a little man, a Roman 
by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honcstyi 
and an inspired apostle : his low stature is ul physical mode^ 

*NoTC— Agent signifies the doer, patient the sofTerer, action is 
doing, fuission is siHTering! Ag^nt and action have retained their o- 
nginal philosophical heu&t. though pa i. - - md pasbion have acquired 
a very differ snt meaning in common la >^t • -"* 



2i LOGIC t OR, THE Paht 1 

]iis beings a Roman is a civil privilege) his horuaty is a mor 
ai consulerauon, and lus being ina/iired is sufiematurai, 

VIIJ Modes belong either to 6o(fy or to a/iirit, or it 
both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to corpo 
real beings ; and these are '«^a/re, size^ aituation ov fitaci 
&c. Modea of afiirit belong only to minds ; such are^wow^ 
cdgc^ aaaetit^ diaaent^ doubting^ reasonings &c. Modes wbici 
belong to both have been sometimes called mixed modet 
or human modea^ for these are only found in human nature 
V'hich is compounded both of body and spirit ; such ar 
acnsation, imagination^ fiasaion, &c. in all which there is ) 
concurrence of the operations both of mind and body, tha 
is of animal and intellectual nature. 

But the modea of body may be yet farther distinguished 
J Some of them are firimary modea or gualitiea^ for they be 
f long to bodies considered in themselves, whether ther 
were any man to take notice of them or not ; such ar 
those before mentioned, namely, ahafie^ aize^ aituation^ki 
Secondary qualitica^ or modea^ are such ideas as we ascrib 
to bodies on account of the various impressions which ar 
made on the senses of men by them ; and these are calle 
acjisible (/uaiiiiea^ which arc very numerous ; such arc a 
cclourSf as redy greeny blucy Sec. such are all aoi/hda^ f 
afiar/iy abriiiy loudy hoarae ; all iai^ea^ as awcety bitter y aour 
all tsmelUy whether fileaaanty offenatvcy or indifferent ; an 
all tactile gualitieay or such as afTcct the touch ovfeelini 
namely, heaty coldyhc. These arc properly called *ffCOi 
daru qualitiea ; for, though we are ready to conceive thei 
as existing in the very bodies themselves which affect 01 
senses, yet true philosophy has most undeniably prove 
that all these are really various ideas or perceptions e: 
< Ited in human nature by the different impressions th 
bodies make upon our senses by their firimary modeay th 
is, by means bf the different shape, size, motion, and p 
«>ition, of those little invisible parts that compose thei 
Thence it follows that a aecondary qualityy considered 
in the bodies themselves, is nothing else but a power 
aptitude to produce such sensations in us : See Loch 
Esaay on the Uunderstandingy Book II. Chap* 8. 
/ VIII. I might add, in the last place, that, as modea \ 
long to aubatunccay so there are soqie also that are but moi 




Chaf. IL right use OF RF.ASOX. 25 

father modes : For, though they subsist in and by the &m6- 
ttmee^ as the original subject of tlicm,- yet they are prop- / 
eriy and directly attributed \o some luodo of that substance.r 
yMotioii is the mode of a body ; but the s'lv'fineaa or aloumcss 
of it, or its direction to the north or fiouthj arc but modes of 
motion. Walking is the mode or manner of a man, or of 
a beast ; hxxiwalkijig gracefully implies a manner or mode 
superadded to that action. All comparative and superla- 
tive degrees, of any quality, are the ivcdea .of a mode^ as 
vvnfter implies a greater measure ofaivfineaa. 

It would be too tedious here to run through all the 
»TorfM, accidents^ sj\i\ relations^ at large, that belong to vari- 
QQS beings, and are copiously treated of in general^ in the 
scicnctt called Metaphysica^ or, more properly Ontology : 
Th^ are also treated of, in fiarticntar^ iii .those scii- nces 
vhich have assumed them severally as their proper sub- 
jecu. 



SECT. V. 

or THE T£ll CATEGORIES. OF SUDSTANCE MODIFIED. 



W, 



E have thus given an account of the tv;o 
chief objects of our ideas, namely, «tt6sm/*cM and woc/r.v, 
iiul their various kinds ; and in these lust sections we have 
briefly comprised the greatest part of what is necessary in 
tile famous ten ranks of being, called the inn /iredicamnus 
^categories q{ Aristotle^ on which there are endless vol- 
titoes of discourses formed by several of his followers. 
But that the reader may not utterly be ip;norant of them, 
let liim know the names are these ; Substance^ quaiitiuj^ 
quality ^ relation^ action^ fiassioiiy luherry ivhrn^ aifuafion, and 
chthing, lit would be mere loss of time to shew how 
loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous, this tenfold di- 
.vision of things is : And whatsoever farther relates tothenif 
Old which muy tend to improve useful knowledge, should 
besought in Ontology, and in other sciences. 

Besides substance and modet some of the moderns would 
have us consider the substance modified as a <lisv\\\cx oWyicX 
of our ideas \ but I thinj^ there U novbingmoi:^ \Av^\.tv^^^^^^ 

C 



26 LOGIC: ORr THE Part 

said on this subject, than this, namely, There is son 
difference between a substance, when it is considered mi 
\aUif8 modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of exis 
ence, and when it is distinguished from themj and coDsic 
cred naked noil /tout them. 



SECT. VL 

OF NOT-BEIKCr. 



A 



S being is divided into 9u6sfance and motley s 
we may consider not'being with regard to both these. 

I. Aot'bcing is considered as excluding all substance, an 
then all modes are also necessarily excluded } and th 
we cuii /iure tiihiUty^ or mere nothing, j 

This nothing \% taken either in n vulgar or 9l fihiioMo/ihii 
al sense ; so we say. There is nothing in the cu/i in a vu 
t^ar sense, when we mean there is no liquor in it ; but w 
cannot say, There is nothing in the eu/iy in a strict phili 
Kophical sense, where there is air in it, and perhaps a vol 
lion of ray^ of tight are there. 
/ II. A'ot'bii7ig^ as it has relation to modes or manners i 
bri7!g^ may be considered either as a mere negation^ ore 
a ftrivaiion, 

A nega ion is the absence of that which does not nati 
rally belong: to the thing we are speakinp^ of, or which ha 
no ri^ht, obligation, or necessity, to be present with it 
as, when we say, a stone is inanimate^ or blind ^ or deaf 
til at is, it has no life^ nor sights nor hearing ; nor wliei 
we say, a car/:cntery or njisherman is unlearned^ these ar 
mere 7ic gat ions. 
a But a/ijivafion is the absence of what docs naturally be 
' long to the thing we are s^Hraking of, or which ought to b 
present with it ;. as when a man or a horse is deaf or biinc 
or dead ; or if a physician or a divine be unlearned, ihes 
are called //riVa/ion* ; So the sinfulness of any humai 
action is said to be a firivatlon ; for sin is that want of con 
formity to the law of God which ought t* be found in eve 
r)- action of man. 



I 



Chip. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON, ^7 

.A'br*— .There are some writers wIm> make aU sorts of 
relative modes or relational as well as all external denom- 
inaiionsy to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia ra- 
//W«, and then they rank them also under the general head 
^Inot'beings ; but it is my opinion, that whatsoever may 
be determined concerninj^ mere mental relations and ex- 
lemal denominations, which seem to have somethinj^ less 
of entity or being in them, yet there arc many real reia' 
tionsf which ought not to be reduced to so low a class ; 
such are the Bifuaiion of bodies, their mutual diatancesj 
their particular firofiortiou^ and measurea^ the notions of 
fither/ioody brotherhood^ aonahi/iy Isfc. all which are relative 
ideas. The very essence oi virtues or hoiinesa consists in 
the conformity of our actions to the rule of riglit reason, 
or the law of (Jod : The nature and essence oT sincerity^ is 
the conformity of our words and actions to our thoughts, 
t!l which are but mere relations ; and I think we must not 
reduce such posuivc beings as /dettjy and virtur^ and /n/'//, 
tothc rank of non-w-ntities, which have notliing real in 
them, though ain^ (or rather the sinfulness of an action,) 
may be properly called a not-being; for it is a want of pi- 
ety and virtue. This is the most usual, and perhaps the 
justest way of representing these matters. 

■■ -1 mn ^1 nil "I ■• 
CHAP. III. 

OF THE SEVERAL SORTS OF PERCEPTIONS OR IDEAS. 

Wcas may be divided with regard lo their original^ their 
naturCiXXiW objectBj and their qualities. 

SECT. I. 

OF SENSIBLE, SFIKITUAL, AND ABSTRCTED IDEAS. 

X HERE has been a great controversy about 

ihc origin of idea?, namely, whether any of our ideas are 

innate or not, that is, bom with us and naturally belonging 

to our minds. Mr. Locke utterly denies \K \ o\Vv^\^ ^"h 



:8 LOGIC: OR, THE Part I. 

positively afTirm it. Now, ihough this conlroversy may ' 
be conipristd, by allo'Ainjj that there is a sense wherein 
our first ideas ol' some things may be said to be iunatei 
(us 1 hiiYc shewn in some remarkii on Mr. Locke's Essay, 
wliich Iiavc lain long by me,) yet it does not belong to this 
place and business to have that i>oint debated at lur{);e9 nor 
will it hinder our pursuit of the present work to pass over 
it in silence. 
/ There is sufficient pjround to say, that all our ideas with 
repcard to their original, niay be divided into ttiree sorts^ 
liamciy, seji^iblfytf/iiritiial^ and a64/rac/r(/ ideas. 
/ L iV«^i^/f or cor/iorca/ iVfa», are derived originally froia 
x>ur senses, and from the communication which the soul 
has with the animal body in this present state g such are 
the noiions we frame of all colours^ 9ound9^ ta$tc9yjigure*9 
or sba/ifH and notions ; for our senses being conversant 
about pariicular sensible ohjectS9 become the occauons cf 
several distinct perceptions in the mind ; and thus m 
come by the ideas of^rZ/ot^, white^ hettt^ .coid^ 9qfty hard^ 
bitter^ awecty and all those tvhich we call ^tnnblt qualitiMi 
All the ideas which we have of b^y^ and the senublp 
modes and propeiiies that belong to it| seena to be derive* 
ed from aenftation. 

And howsoever these tnay be treasured i|p in the meih* 
ory, and by the work of fancy may be increased, dimin* 
ished, compounded, divided, and diversified, (which we 
arc ready to call our invention^} yet they all derive theif 
lirst nature and being from something that has been let 
into our minds by one or other of our senses. If I think 
of a golden moutifniriy or a«ra qfUguidJircj yet the single 
ideas p^sca^JSrcy mountain^ and goldy came into my thoughts 
itt first by sensation ; the mind has only compounded them.- 

/^ IL S/tirituat* ov intellectual ideasy are those which we 
. . p;ain by reOectin^ on the nature and actions of our own 
!>ouls, and turning our thoughts within ourselves, and ob* 
serving what is transacted in our own minds. ) Such are. 
the ideas we have of thought^ aaaenlf diaeentyjudgingy rea^ ^ 
son. knoivlcdgey underalandingy vHlly IcfveyfeaVy hope, 

Dy senaaiion the soul contemplates things (as it werr* ^ 

* Here the word iplntval is ased In a mere nstpral, and not in m I 

li^ious sense. 




Chap. III. RIGHJ USE OF REASON. t^ 

out of itself) and gains corporeal representations or sen' ' 
able ideas : By reflection^ the soul contemplates itselfrand 
things ivithin itself, and by this mean it gains spiritual 
ideas, or representations of things intellectual. 

Here it may be noted, though the first original of these 
two sorts of ideas, nailiely, Benaibte and a/iiricual^ may be 
entirely owing to these two principles, scnsntion, and re- 
ilecilon, yet the recoUtction^ and frcsih excitation of them, 
may t>e owing to a thousand other occasions and occur- 
rences of life. We couJd never inform a man who was 
bom blind or deaf what we mean !)y tlie words yelhvjy 
^fVedj or by the words loud or shrilly nor convey any 
just ideas of these things to his min:l, by all the powers of 
language, unless he has experienced those sensations of 
sound and colour^ nor could we ever gain the ideas of 
thoikghty judgment y reason^ doubting^ ho/iingy Etc. by all the 
^rds that man couJd invent, without turning our thoughts 
inward upon the actions of our own souls. Yet, whei\ 
once we have attained these ideas, by -sensation and re- 
flection, they may be excited afresh by the use of names, 
words, signs, or by any thing else that has been connected 
with them in our thoughts ; for, when two or more ideas 
have been associated together, whether it be by custom, or 
accident, or design, the one presently brings the other to 
nund. 

y* III. Besides these two which we have named, there is 
■ 9i third sort of ideas, which are commonly called abstracted 
ttfraf, because, though the original ground or occasion of 
them may be sensation, or reflection, or both, -yet these 
ideas are framed by another act of the mind, which we 
Qlualiy call abstraction. Now, the word abstraction sig^ 
vnSkzt a vfithdraiuing some fiart of an idea from other fiarts 
ofity by which means such abstracted ideas are formed, as 
ndther represent any thing corporeal or spiritual, that is, 
any thing peculiar or proper to mind or body. Kow these 
are of two kinds. 

/ Some of these abstracted ideas are the most absolute^ 
general and universal conceptions of things, considered in 

; . Qiemseives, without respec( to others ; such as entity or 
Stingy and not 'beings essence^ existence^ act^fiovfer^ substance^ 

jmodff accident J &c« 

C2 



02 LOGIC : OH, THE Par 

being;8, this is Called a eom/iound idea^ whether these u 
ed ideas be simple or complex. So» a man is compou 
ed of dody and sfiirit ; so mithridate is a comfiound m^dic 
because it is made of many different ingredients : Thi 
hare shewn under the doctrine oi*ub9tancc9. And me 
also may be compounded. Harmony is a compound i 
made up of different sounds united : So, several dijfei 
virtues must be united to n|ake up the compounded ide; 
character, either of a herCj or a«a/ii/. 

But, when many ideas of the oame kind are joined 
gether, and united in one name, or under one view, i 
called a collective idea ; so, un army or % parliaments is a 
lection of men ; a dictionary or nomenclatura^ is a colk-c) 
of words ; 'a flock 'm acoilcciionofsheep ; tkforest^ov gn 
a collection of trees ; an heafi^ is a collection of sand 
corn, or dust, ^c. a city^ is a collection of houses ; a n 
gay^ is a collection of flowers ; a months or yrar, is a col 
tion of days ; and a thousands is a collection of units. 

The precise difference between a compound and collec 
idea is this, that a tomftound idea unites thin^^ of a diffei 
kind, but a coiiective idea thing^s of the same kind : Tho^ 
this distinction in some cases is not accurately obsen 
And custom oftentimes uses the word compound lor cok 
live. 

SECT. III. 

OF UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR IDSAS| REAL AND IM 

INART. 



I 



DEAS, according to their objects^ may first 
divided into fiar titular or universal, 

A fiartiailar idea is that which represents one thin;> or 
Sometimes the one thing is represented in a loose 
indeterminate manner, as, when we say, some many 
many one many another man ; some horsty any horse ; one c 
or anothsr ; which is called by the schools individuum 
gum, 
/ Sometimes the particular idea represents one thing i 
determinate manner, and thrsn it is called a singular id 
Biich is BucefiAaluSf or Alexander's horse, Cicero the ora 
Peter the apostle, the palace of Fcr9aiilc$^ this b^ok^ \ 



Chap. III. R|GHT USE OF REASON. 33 

rfrrr, the Acw Forest^ or the city o^ London : That idea 
which represents one particular determinate thing to me» 
is called a singular idcoy whether it be simple, or complex, 
or compound. 

The object of any particular idea, as well as the idea it- 
self, is sometimes called an individual :, So Pettr is an in- 
dividual man, LoTidon in an individual city. So, this book^ 
one horae^ anotAer /lorae^ are all individuals; though the 
word individual is more usually limited to one hingular^ 
certain and determined object. 

\n univerxai idcoy is that which represents a common 
nature ajjreeing to several particular things^ so a horsey a 
many ovabooA-y are called universal ideas ; bbcause they a- 
gre^ to all horscBj mcn^ or books. 

And I think it* not amiss to intimate, in this place, that 
}}it universal idea* are formed by that act of the mind 
If hie h is called abstraction^ that is, a withdrawing some 
part of an idea from other parts of it : For, when singular 
ideat are first let into the mind, by sensation or reflection, 
UieDy in order to make them univermlj we leave out, or 
drop all those peculiar and determinate characters, quali- 
ties, modes or circumstances, which belong merely to-any 
[Kirticular individual being, and by which it difters from 
other beings ; and we only contemplate those properties 
of it, wherein it agreea with otl^er beings. 

Though, it must be confessed, that the name of a^- 
ttracted ideas is sometimes attributed to universal ideaa^ 
both acnaible or s/nrituul, yet this abstraction -is not so 
Rreat, as when we drop out of our idea every sensible or 
ffiiritual representation, and retain nothing but the most 
general and absolute conceptions of things, or their mere 
1^ relations to one another, without any regard to their par- 
ticular natures, whether they bcaensiUe ov s/ii ritual. And 
!^I| 'tit to this kind of conceptions we more properly give 
P^h the name of abstracted ideasy as in the iirst section of this 
.,.[ chapter. 

An universal idea is either ^^ew^ra/ or eftiritual, 

A general idea is called by the schools a genus ; and il 

is one common nature agreeing to several other i:onl:non 

^ natures. I So animal is a genus ; because it agrees to horse% 

if lutHj vffiJiCy butterjltfy which are also commbn ideus ; so 

fish la a genus ; because it agrees to trout^ herrings crab^ 

which are common natures also. 






8 



; 



o4 LOGIC : OR, THE Paht. I 

A sfiecial idea is called by the schools a Bfiecies ; it is cm 
common nature that agrees to several sinc^ular inciividua 
beings ;^ so horse is a sfkecial idea^ or a sfiecies^ because i 
agrees to BucephaluB^ Trotty and SnowhaiL City is a 9fie 
ciul idea, for it agrees to Londotij Parisy Bristol, 

' J ^''otE 1st.— -Some of these univeraala are genuBe*^ i 
compared witli less common natures ; and they are species 
if compared with natures more common. So birdi%\ 
^enus, if compared- with eagie^ s/tarroxVi ravcn^ which an 
also common natures : Rut it is a s/ieciesy if compard 
with the more general natui*e, animal. The same may be 
said of^*^, beast i &c. ^ 

f This sort of universal ideas, which may either be coih 
sidered as a ^rnu«, or a .sfieciesj U called subaltern :'^hViX 
the highest ffenus^ which is never a s/iecies^ is culled the 
most general g and the lowest sfieeieSf which is never a 
genusy is called the most sfiecial. 

It may be observed here also, that that general nature 
or property, wherein one thing agrees with most other 
things, is called its more remote genus : So substance is the 
remote genus of bird^ or beasty because it agrees not only 
to all kinds of animals, but also to things inanimatey tl 
sun, stars, clouds, metals, stones, air, water, iifc. But an* 
imal is the proximate or nearest genus ofbird^ because ii 
agrees to fewer other things. Those general nature! 
which stand between the nearest and most remote^ are call 
cd intermediate, 

Abr£ 2t/.— In universal ideas it is proper to considei 
\\iQ\v comprehension and xhciv extension,^ 

^ The comprehension of an idi a regards all the essentia 
modes and properties of it :/So body^ in its comprehension 
takes in solidity ^Jiguresy quantity^ mobility^ £cc. So a bowi 
in its comprehension^ includes roundnessy volubilitVy &c. 

' TJie extension of an universal idea regards all the partic 
ular kinds and single beings that are contained under it 
So a tody in its sxtension includes suny moony stary woodyiron 
planty animaly See. which are several s/ieciesy or individualt 
under the general name of body. So a bovrly in its exten 
eioHy includes a vooden bowl, a brass bowl, a vfltile an< 

• Note — The word extension here is taken in a mere logics 
iciisc, and not in a phvsical and mathematical sensCt 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 35 

biackhow]^ 2L heavy howl^ 8cc. and all kinds of bowls, to- 
gether "with all the particular Individual bowls in the 
world. 

JS/oie. The comfirehennon of an idea is sometimes taken 
in so large a sense, as not only to include the essential at* 
tributes, but all xht properties, modes, and relations 
whatsoever, that belong to any being, as will appear^ 
Chafi. VI. 

This account of^^^nM^and sfieciea is part of that famous 
doctrine of universa/s^ which is taught in the schooLs, witli 
divers other formalities belonging to it ; for it is in this 
plgce that they introduce difference^ which is the primary 
essential mode, and firofierty^ or the secondary essential 
iDode, and accident^ or the accidental mode ; and these 
they call the Jive firedicablesy because every thing that is 
affirmed concerning any being must be cither the getiusy 
the sfieciea^ the difference^ some firofierty^ some accident : 
But what farther U necessary to be said concerning these 
things will be mentioned when we treat o^ definition. 

Having finished the doctrine o( universal and particular 
ideaoj I should take notice of another division of them^ 
which also hath respect to their objects ; and that is, they 

fre e i t h e r real or imaginary . 
Real ideas are such as have a just foundation in nature, 
tnd have real objects, or exemplars, which did, or do, or 
may actually exist, according to the present state and na- 
ture of things 5^uch are all our ideas oilong^ broad^swiftj 
^lowy woody irony men^ horsesy thoughtSy s/iiritSy a cruel maS" 
tery a proud beggary a man seven feet high. 

I Imaginary idtasy which are also called fantasticaly or 
chimericaly are such as are made by enlarging, diminishing, 
uniting, dividing real ideas in the mind, in such a man- 
ner, as no objects, or exemplars did or ever will exist, ac-v 

I cording to the present course of nature, though the sever- > 
al parts of these ideas are borrowed from real objects ; 
such are the conceptions we have of a centaury a satyry a 
golden mountaiuy dijlying horsey a dog without a heady a bull 

. less thafi a mousey or a mouse as big as a bully and a man 

\ twenty feet high. 

I &ome of these fantastic ideas are /lossible^ \\\^\. v^^ xHv^'^ 

■ ate not utterly inconsistent \\\ the n?iVuve <i^ vXCvcv^'Sk % ^xA 

ihenforQiiis mihia the reach of divine pov^ev Vo m^V^ ^^is.\\ 



r> 



6 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 



objects ; such are most of the instances already given : 
But im/i jsaidles to curry an utter inconsistence in the ideas 
"vvhich are joined ; such are self-active matter^ and ififiniie 
or e(cr7iul men^ a pious man withoui honesty^ or heaven Kvith* 

cut holiness. 



SECT. IV. 

TKE VIIVISION OF IDKAS, WITH REGARD TO THEIR 

QUALITIES. 



I 



"^ ■ DEAS, with regard to their gualities^ aflTorduf 
these several divisions of them. 1. They are cither clear 
and disurtcty or obscure and coi{fused, 2. They are vulgar 
or itarTicil. 3. They are fierject or im/ier/'ect. 4. They 
are true or /hise, 

I. Our ideas are either dear and distinct^ or obscure and 

COTlfutft'd. / 

Scvcml writers have dislinguibhed the clear ideas from 
those lluit are dtminct ; and ti>e c o n/iimd ideas fvom those 
thut ..re obaciirv ; and it nuisi be acknowledged there may) 
be some dilVercnce bei'vecn them ; Tor it is the cleamest 
of ideas lor the most p^rt makes them distinct ; and the 
obicuritif of ideas is one thing t:iat will always bring a sort 
of fC/^;/i^.7C7t ii.to them. Yet when thtse writers come to 
talk largely upot) il.is subject, and to explain and adjust 
their meaning wii'i grcjt nicety, I have generally found 
that they did not keep up the distinction they iirst design- 
ed, but they coiifound the one with the otlfer. I shall 
therefore treat cf cLar or distinct idcasy as one and the 
same sort, tincl L^scure or confuted idras^ as another. 
/ A clear and distinct idra^ is thut which represents the ob- 
ject of the mind with full evidence and strength, and plain- 
ly distinguishes it from rll other objects whatsoever. 

An cbicure and covfusvd idea represents the object ci- 
ther so faintly, so imperfectly, or so mingled with other 
ideas, that the object of it doth not appear plain to the 
mind, nor purely in its own nature, nor sufficiently distin- 
guished from other things. / 

VV hen we sec the sea and sky nearer at handi we haT« 
a clear s^d distinct id^a of each ; buty whea we took/or to« 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 37 

ward the horizon, especially in a n\\s\y day. uuv ideas of 
both are but obacurs and confuted ; for we know noi whicli 
\%sea^ and which i^skij. So when we look at the coloura 
9/the rainbow, we have a clear idea oHhcred^ the bhie^i the 
(^reen^ in the middle of their several arches, and a disdrict 
idea too, while the eye fixes there ; but, when we consider 
the border of those colours ; they so run into one another, 
that it renders their ideas co7{/ii«^^ and obscure; So the idea 
which we have oi our brother^ or ourj'rtend, whom we see 
daily, is clear and distinct ; but, when the absence of many 
years has injured the idea, it becomes obscure and con* 
fused. 

JS/o^E here — That some of our ideas may be very clear 
and distinct in one respect, and very obscure and confused 
in another. So when we speak of a C/tiliagonum^ or a^?^^- 
"iLre of a thousand angles^ we »T)ay have a cUar and distinct 
rational idea of the number one thousand angles ; for we can 
demonstrate various properties concerning it by reason : 
But the image ^ or sensible idca^ which we have of the figure, 
is but confused and obscure ; for we cannot precisely dis- 
tinguish it by fancy from the image o^ a figure that has 
nine hundred angles^ or nins hundred and ?iinety. So when 
^ve speak of the infinite divisibility of matter^ we always 
keep in our minds a very clear and distinct ideaof flfiv/o/u;^ 
and divisibility ; but, after we have made a little progress 
in dividing, and come to parts that are far too small for 
the reach of our senses, then our idtas or senUble images 
of these little bodies btcomQ obscure mnd indistinct^ and the 
idea of i?ifinite is very obscure^ imfurfcct^ and confused, 
f II. Ideas arc either vulgar or learned. A vulgar idea 
represents to us the most obvious and sensible appearances 
tliat«re contained in the obj.ct of them : But a learned 
idea penetrates farther Into the nature, properties, reason^,, 
causes, and effects of things. This is best illustruted by ' 
Borne examples.^ 

It is a vulgar idea that we have of a rainbow^ when \vc 
conceive a. large arch in the clouds, made up of Vdriou;i 
colours parallel to each other: 13ut \i\^ di learnt d lata 
With a philosopher has when he considers it us the vari- 
ous reflections and refractions of sun-beams, in diops of 
[ &]litip nJA, So it is a vulgar idva^ which w^ Iv^v* ^K vVvi 
foftniflft ^^1^ bodies^ when we perceive vVv^xtv \a'ot^ vx^\v 

D 



-» LOGIC : OR, THE Pab 

-were, a ml, or bir.c, or green tincture of the surfa 
inose bodies : But it is a iJiUosofihlcal ideoj when we 
sicler the various cc'. urs lo be nothing else but diffc 
sensations excited in us by the variously refracted 
of light, reflected on our eyes in a different manner, ace 
ing to the different size, or shape, or situation of the 
tides of which the surfaces of those bodies are comp( 
It is a vulgar idea wiilch we have of a 'ivatch or ciockf \ 
we conceive of it as a pretty instrument, made to she 
the hour of the day : But it is a learned idea whict 
\vatchmaker has of it, who knows all the several par 
it, the spring, the balance, the chain, the wheels, t 
axles, ^&c. together with the various connections ant 
justments of each part, whence the exact and uniform 
tion of the index is derived, which points to the mi: 
or the hour. So, when a common understanding rt 
Virt^ii's JEnrid ,he has but a vulgar idiaoi that poem, ye 
mind is naturally entertained with the story, and his 
with the verse : But, when a critic, or a man who 
skill in poesy, reads it, he has a Icartied idea of its peci 
beauties, he tastes and relishes a superior pleasure 
atlmirtrs the Roman Poet, and wishes he had knowt 
Cl.risit-iiln Theology, which would have furnished 
'wiili nobUr materials and machines than all the Heat 
idols. 

It is with a vulgar idea that the world beholds the 
toons of liafihael at Hampton Court, and every one 
]iis sl;arc of pleasure and entertainment : But a /.ai 
contemplates the wonders of that Itiiliun pencil, and 
a thousand bcuulies in them which the vulgar eye ncg 
cd : \V\^ learned zrfrc* give him a transcendant deli 
and yet, at the same time, discover the blemishes whicl 
common gazer nevtr observed. 
I HI. Idcaa arc L-nhcv /urftct or iftf/icr/ecty which arc 
er>Nisc called adtqiiafe or inadequate. 

I hose ire adequate ideas whici^ perfectly represent \ 
arcficiypes or objects. Inadiquatv ideas are but a pai 
or incomplete r^ presentation of lliosc archetypes to wl 
thty arc leferred. 

Ail our lim/.le ideas are in some sense adequate op. 

/rr, because simple ideas, considered merely as our 

perctpiions, have no parts in them : r So we i^ be 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 3J 

have a perfect i.lca of w/i//r, btack^ sweet, sour, icn^lli, tight, 
motiorvy rest, &c. We have also a perfect idea of various 
figures, as a triangle, a square, a cylinder, a cube, a sfihere, 
^hich are conapiiix ideas : B|it, our idea or imujjje of aX?- 
nrp of a thousand sides, our idea of the city of Loudon, or 
\\\^ flowers of a loadstone, are very impeffecl, as weli as our 
.ideas of i'}Jinitc length or breadth, infinite f lower, xvlsdofn, 
€ivduraUon i for the idea of i/ffnite'^ endless and ever 
grov.in^, andcaPi never be completed. 

Xora I — When >ve have a fierfct idea of any thing in 
all its parts, it is CAlled a comldeu idea ; when in all its 
properties} it is called comfirehensice. IJut, when we have 
but an inadequate and imjierftct idea, v/c are only said to 
Qji/irehend it ; therefore we use the term afi/irefiension when 
we speak of our knowledge of God, who can never be 
ttmfirehended by his creatures. 

J^otE 3.— Though there are a muUitude of id as which 
may be called /zf.yjc/, or adequate, in a vuljyar sense, yet 
there are scarce any ideas which are adequate, com/irehen* 
«vff and comjitete, in a philosophical sense : for there is 
scarce any thiny;in the world that we know, as to all the 
parts and powers and properties of it, in pei-fection. Even 
so plain an idea as that of a triangle, has, perlvaps, infinite 
properties be Ion giMg to it, of which we know but a few. 
Who can tell what are the shapes and positions of those 
particles, which cause all the variety of colours that ap- 
pear on the surface of things ? Who knows what are the 
f'gures of the little corpuscles that compose and distinguish 
tlifferent bodies ? The ideas of brass, iron, gold, wood, stone. 
h*o/i, and rosemary, have an infinite variety of hidden mys- 
teries contained in the shape, size, motion, and position of* 
the liule particles of which they are composed ; and per- 
haps, also infinite unknown properties and powers, that 
JWiy be derived from tlicm. And, if we arise to tlie 
animal world, or the world of sfiirits, our knowledge of 
them must be amazingly imperfect, when there is not the 
least grain of sand, or emfity s/iace, but has too many ques- 
tions and difficulties belonging to it for the wisest philoso- 
pher upon earth to answer and resolve. 
I IV. Our ideas are either true or false ; for an idea being 
the; representation of a thing in the mind, it nuistbecith^ir 
^ trtit or afalite re/iresentation of it. Iflhti k\^^Vi^Ci«^- 
krmahletc the objector archetype ot \l/\v\^ ai^^'ue \d«a i 



I 




40 LOGIC : OR, THE Pahi 

if rot, ii is ^fuli:e one. Sometimes ojir ideas are rcfcri 
ioiI;int;s really txisUrj:^ without us, as their archeiyi) 
11 I ^cc locUcs in tluir froftcr colours^ I have a true id, 
Ki:t, when a man iiiuler ihe ianndice sees a/i bodies nelk 
le h 'S iifaluc idee f)f ihem. S-^? if we see the sun or vn 
rifirifr or scii'ir,^^ cur idea represents Iheni b^i^f^er ih 
^' I c:i liii^y are on the meridian : And in this sense it i 
y.//A£- idea, because llmse heavenly bodies are all day and 
i.it;l.t of the same bijjjwi ss. Or, when I see a straight it 
ufi/unr crooked while ii is half undf^r the Wiittr, I say t 
w;.ter reives me a. ^/^f idea of it. Sometimes our id< 
refer to the ideas of otiier men, denoted by such a part 
uli'.r word, as their arclietypes: So, when I hear a F 
'!S.'n7:t use tlje words c.'.urch and s<icramer.tsj if I understJ 
hy lliesc words a c:ini^rc^a:io7i of faithful mcn^ Koho iiroj 
Cli<.'^:ianli\ty and the two Drdinanccsy baptism, and 
l.orrrs fii;*;p?r, i ha'.j a true idea of those words in 

^?v,;non M?r.«i'.* f/f Protestants : But, if the man who spe 
iri tLcin be a A//./.*..', he means the church cj Home and 
.-frz'c^i :i(i:rc::r.cu:.<y tind then I have a mistaken idea of th 
words, as .spoken hy him, for he has a different sense c 
7nca1ii:ij^: y\nd, i:i [genera], Whensoever I mistake 1 

.onscof any fpeaker oi; v. liter, I may be said Jto.!;^ 
'•^.Vc^ idea ot'it. 

Some tl.ink that .'rr^r// or^/^/*i^?q(/ properly belongs oi 
^-^ firo/iisicionSf wliicli shall be the subject of discourse 
I lie Second Part of Aoj^-.V ; for, if wc consider idea as m< 
impr: scions upon the mind, made by outward objects, Ihi 
Impressions will ever be conformable to the laws of nati 
:*) s' -ch a case : The 'ivater will make a stick appear cro 
t /, and the horizontal air will make the sun and moon ; 
];'jar l'ig,^cr. And, generally, where there is falsehood 
ideas, there seems to be some secret or latent firo/tositi 
v/hereby we judge falsely of things. This is more ol 
o'ls where we take up the words of a writer or speaker 
.. mistaken sense, for wc join his words to our own idc 
Mirich are different from his. But, after all, since id 
r:\: I'icturesof thinj^s, it can never be very improper 
■ rotiounce them to be true or falser according \o ihcir f 
?i:i:'j or ncnconfjrmi'y to their exemplars. 



r.'j:; 



■*» 



CiAp.IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON 4t 



CHAP. I V. 

OP WORDS, AND THEIR SEVERAL DIVISIONS, TO 
G£TU£R WITH THE ADVANTAGE AND 
DANGER OF THli^M. 



/-• 



SECT. I. 

Of WORD3 XK OEXEXIAL, AND TUKIU V9E. 

X HOUGH our ideas are first acquired by toe 
perception of objects, or by various stnaafiona and rcficc- 
^M», y«t ve convey ihcm to each otiier by the means of 
Certain sounds, or written marks, which we call wor^/^ ; 
Ud a great part of our knowledge is both obtained »nd com- 
Biunicated by these means, wbich are called Bfi^ech or /a/2- 

But, as we are led into the knowledge of things by lui^rih^ 
so we are oftentimes led into error or mistake by the use 
-■or abuse of w9r./« also. And, in order to guard against 
'Buch mistakes, as well as to promote our improvemenx in 
knowledge, it is necessary io acquaint ourselves a little 
vith vfordsvtiCnerma. We shall uegin with these obscr- 
vjtions. 

Obftcrvation 1. Words (whether they are spoken or wrii- 
^cn) have no natural connection with the ideas they arc 
designed to sigmfy, nor with the things which are rtj)rc- 
*cntcd in those ideas. There is no manner of affiiiiiy be- 
tween the sounds ^vhitc in English, or btauc in French, and 
**«/ colour which we call by that name ; nor have the let- 
tepi,.of which thes«5 words are composed, any niitural apt- 
'less to signify that colour rather than rtd or tureen. Words 
Wd names, therefore, are mere arbiruru sigjis^ invtnted by 
nien to communicate their thoughts or ideas toonu anoth- 
er. 

Obaerv, 3. If one simple word were appointed lo ex- 
press one simple idea, and nothing else, as ic^/i/rc, blacky 
iweety Hour^ ahar/i, bitter^ exCeusion^ duration^ therjj would 
be scarce any mistake al)0ut them. 

But al.is I it is a common unhappiness in languagC3 
that diflcrent aimjile ideas arc sometini'js expressed by tiij^ 

D 3 



4^ LOGIC: OR, THE Part I 

sa^tc word ; so the words sweet and ahar/i are applied both 
lo the objects of hearing and tasting, as we'shall see here- 
after ; and this, perhaps, may he one cause or foundation 
of obscurity and error arising from words. 

Observ, 3. In communicating our complex ideas to one 
."another, if we could jcnn as many peculiar and appropri- 
;iled words together in one sound, as we joinf^ simple ideal 
to make one complex one, we should beldom be in danger 
of mistaking : When I express the taste ot an afifiicy which 
we call the bitter sivect^ none can mistake what I mean. 

Yet tins sort of coiv.fio^JUon would make all language a 
most tedious and unwieldly thing, since most of our ideas 
arc complex and many of ihem have eight or ten simple 
ideas in them ; so tliut the remedy would be worse thao 
llie disease; for, wliai is now expressed in one short woni» 
p.s monthy or rjcary uould require two lines to express it. 
it is necessary tlfjcrcforp, that Mingle worda be invented to 
i^i^resh cow/lie J iiha^, in order to make language abort 
lUid useful. 

I5ut hcrqjs our great iiifcliciiy, that when single vtord9 
sjjj:nify com/ilex ideass cue word can never distinctly mani- , 
fcst all the fiarta of a complex idta ; and thereby it will 
often happen, that one man includes more or less in his idea 
than another does, while he aflixcs the 6ame word to it. 
jn this case, thei'c will hf ckinger of mistake between theni) 
ibi they do not mean the eame tbjccty though they use the 
name name. So, if one person or nation, by the word yeau 
jnean twelve months of thirty days each, that is, three 
J.undred and sixty days, another intend a solar year of three 
iiuiKlred sixty five djiys, and a third iTiean a lunar year, or ^ 
twelve /wnfl;' months^ that is, three hundred fifty four days, • 
there will be a great variuiion and error in their account 
lif things, unless they are well apprised of each other's 
meaning before hand. This is supposed to be the reason 
ivhy some ancient histories, and prophecies, and accounts 
cf chronology, are so hard to be adjusted. And this is 
the true reason of so furious and endless debates en many 
Voints of divinity ; the words churchy xvorMfi^ idolatry^ re* 
jenfanceyfaith^ clectionyinerit^grace^ and many others^ whick 
signify very coinfdejc ideas ^ are not applied to include just 
Ihe same simple ideas, and the same number of them, by 
the various contending parties j thence arise confusion and 
Contest* 



»aiit! f Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 



:e here- 1 
indauonl 

;s to one 
ppropri- 
)le ides 
i dange: 

ur idea 
» simpk 
I'se thtt 
rt word, 
press it 
tnttd :o 

' inani. 

js idea] 
^ fo it 

■ the 

>e 
or 

Si 



■*> 



^?- 



O^Afrt^. 4. Though a single name doe« not certainly it 
ifest to us ail the parts of a comfilex idea, yet it musi 
Kkiibwledged, that in many of our comfilex idtas^ the 
gle name may point out to us some chief firofierty wt 
belongs to the thing that the word signifies ; especi 
vhen the word or name is traced up to the original, thro 
se?eral languages from whence it is borrowed. So a 
/^ot//^ signifies one whoia sentjorth. 

But this tracing of a word to its original, (which is ( 
ed etymology J is sometimes a very precarious and un< 
tain thing ; and, after all, we have made but little progi 
towards the attainment of the full meaning^ of a com/ 
'V«i) by knowing some one chief property of it. We ki 
bot a small part of the notion of an afiosile, by kno\i 
Hrely thaf he is sent forth. 

Ohserv, 5. Many (if not most) of our words wliich 

applied to moral and intellectual ideaa^ when traced u; 

their onginal in the learned languages, will be founi 

signify sensible and ror/ior^a/ things. Thus, the words 

fireAensioftf understanding ^abstraction^ invention^ ideoy if{ 

enee^ firudence^ religion^ cfmrch^ adoration^ &c. have ii 

corporeal signification in their original. The name sf 

itself signifies breath or air^ in Latin, Greek, and Hebr 

Such is the poverty of all languages, they are force< 

use these names for incorporeal ideas, which thing h; 

tendency to error and confusion. 

Obsenf. 6. The last thing I shall mention, that lead: 
into msAy a mistake, is, the multitude cf objects that 
name sometimes signifies : There is almost anj infi 
"Variety of things and ideas, both simple and complex, 
yond all the words that are invented in any langua 
thence it becomes almost necessary that one name she 
•ignify several things. Let us but consider the two 
.CVLV% of yellovf taidblue; if they are miagled togethei 
a»y considerate proportion they make a green : Now, tl 
may be infinite differences of tlie proportions in the n 
ture of yellow and blue ; and yet we have only these tl 
wordS) yellow^ blue-, vsidgreenjXQ signify all o/'them, at 1 
hy one single term. 

When I use the word shore^ I may intend thereby a c 
'^iandnear Uie secy or a drain to carry off vtater^ ov a f 



44 LOGIC : OR, THE Part 1. 1 

to aujifiort a building ; and by the aouiid of the word/ior/rrs I 
who can tell whether I mean a- man wAo bcar% burden^^ or« j 
s€rvantj ivho wait a at a nobltman^ agate f The world is fruit- 
ful in the invention of utenuU of lifey and new characten 
and rfficea of men, yet names entirely new are seldom in* 
vented ; tlierefore old names are almost neeessaiily used 
to si^^nify new things, which may occasion much confusion 
and error in the receiving and communicating of knowl- 
edge^ 

Give me leave to propose one single instancei wherein 
all these notes shall be remarkably exemplified. It is the 
word bisho/iy which in France is called eveque ; upon which 
I would make these several observations. 1 . That tlierc 
is no natural connection between the sacred office hercbv 
signified, and the letters or sounds which signify this of* 
ike ; for both these words, eveque or biaAofiy signify the 
;»anie ofTice, though there is not one letter alike in them ; 
nor have the letters which compose the English or the 
IVench word any thing sacred belonging to them» more 
than the letters that compose the words king or soidier, 
2. If the meaning of a word could be learned by its deri* 
vation or etymology, yet the original derivation of words 
is oftentimes very dark and unsearchable ; for who would 
imagine that each of these words are derived from the 
Latin c/ii&co/ius^ or the Greek Episkopos. Yet, in this in« 
atance, we happen to know certainly tlie true derivation ; 
the French bting anciently writ eveaqucy is borrowed from 
the first part of the Latin word ; and the old English 6i>- 
co// from the middle of it. 3 The originul Greek word 
signiBes an overlooker^ or one wlio stands higher than his - j 
fellows' and overlooks them : It is a comt>ound word, that 
primai'ily signifies sensible idcas^ translated io signify or 
include several mortU or intellectual idcan ; therefore all 
M'ill grant that the nature of the office can never be known 
by the mere sound or sense of the word overlooker, 4. I add 
further, the word bishop, or efnscofius^ even when it is thus 
translated from a sensible idea, to include several intellect- 
ual ideas, may yet equally signify an overseer of the (poor i 
an ins/iector of the customs \ a surveyor olxXtt highways ; a 
su/iervisor of the excise, ^c. but by the consent of men, 
and the language of scripture, it is appropriated to signify 
a sacred office in the church, 5, This very idea and name, 



CixAP. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 



45 



thus translated from things sensible, to signify m spiritual 
and sjcred thing, contains but one property of it, namely, 
one (hat ha9 the oversight or care over ot/trra ; but docs not 
tell us whether it includes a care over one church or many ; 
over t lie /ui/i/, or the c/fr^-y. 6. Thence it follows, iluit 
those who, in the complex idea of the word 6hho/i, include 
an oversight over (he clergy ^ or over a w/toic diocese of ptro- 
i^U', a su/ieiiorUy to presbyters, a distinct /iOTtvr of ordina- 
tion, is^c. must necessarily disagree with those who include 
in it only the care of a single congregation. Thus accord- 
ihg to the various opinions of men, this word signifies a 
fio/;r, a Gallican dUho/i^ a Lutheran eu/ierititeTidant, an En- 
glish firelatey a fiastor oj a single assembly, or a firesbyter 
or elder. Thus they quarrel wiih each other perpetually : 
and it is well if any of them all have hit precisely the sense 
of the sacred writers, and included just the same ideas in 
it, snd no others. 

I might make all the same remarks on the word church 
or kirJti which isderived fromKuRiou oiros, or (he house 
of the Lordy contracted into Kyrioick^ which some suppose 
to ugnify an assembly of Christians^ some take it for all the 
world that firofeses Christianity ^ and some make it to mean 
only the clergy ; and on these accounts it has been the oc« 
casion of as many and as furious controversies as the worfl 
bishop, which was mentioned before. 



SECT. IL 



OF KEGATZVE AND POSITIVS TERMb. 



F 



ROM these, an;l other considerations, it will 

follow, that, if u'e could avoid error in our pursuit of know- 
ledge, we must take good heed to the use of wnds and 
terms, and be acquainted with U'le various kinds of then)' 

I. Terms are tiihtv ffsi live or negative, 

A'tt^ative terms are such as have a little word or sylla- 
ble of denying joined to them, according to the variou<> 
idioms of every language ; as unjtleasant^ imfirudcnt, immor- 
•^\ !rrrg:il:ir/iyrjcran(j injimtcy cndlfsa^ li/i'l^sf^ dfnr'tlf^xit, 



46 LOGIC : OR, THE Part 

nonsense^ abyasy anonymous^ ^vhere the propositions z/m,r! 
z/7, 72072, a, auy and the termiudtion icsa, signify a neg;auo 
cither in English, Latin, or Greek. 

Foaitive terms are those which have no stich ncgali^ 
appendices belonging to them, as ///*•, dvaihy rudy acme^ mw 
tai. 

But so unhappily are our words and ideas linked tc 
gcther, that we can never know which nrc fwiJiive idea 
and which arc negative^ by tl^e word that is used to cxpits 
them, and that for these reasons : 

!«/, There are noma fiosi five terma which are ma^b t 
Mgnify a negative idea ; as dead is properly a thing tlw 
is deprived oi life ; blind implies a negation orprivati* 
of eight : deaf a want of hearing ; dumb a denial ' 
Mjieech, 

2dlyy There arc also some negative terma which imp 
positive ideasy such as immortal and decthieso^ which u 
nify eiter living, or a continuance in life i Insolent^ sigi 
ftes rude and haughty ; indemnify^ to keep safe ; and i 
Jinitcy perhaps has a fioaiiive idea too, for it is an idea e*^ 
growing ; and when it is applied to Godf it signifies 1 
C37n/iiete perfection, 

3dly, There are both/io«/ivtf and negative terma^ inve 
cd to signify the aame^ instead of con/rary ideas : as unh 
fly and miserable, ainleaa and holy, pure and undrfUed, imp' 
2Lnc\flthy, unkind and cruel, irreligious ^nd prophanCi unj 
giving and fevengrful, &c. and there is a great dca! 
beauty and convenience derived to any language from t 
variety of expression ; tliongh sometimes it a little c 
founds our conceptions ofbeifsg and not-being, ourpoiii 
and negative ideas. 

4'A/y, 1 may add also, that there are some words wli 
arc i2r^a//vff in their or/g-/72tf/ Iwj'^uai^c, bin sacm poaii 
to an Englishman, because the nc^:ation is unknown ; 
abyss, a pf ace without a bottom ; anod'jr.e, an casin[^ n, 
icine ; amnesty, an unremembmncc, or general pard< 
anarchy, a state without government ; anofiymoujt, iha 
nameless ; inept, that is, not Ht ; iniquity, \\u\\. is, unri}. 
eousncss ; infant, one that cannot speak, namely* achi 
ivjuriouji, not doing justice or right. 

The way therefore to know whether any idea be nt 
th^c or n^t, is to consider whether it primarily imply 



HAP. IV. RIGHT USi: OV REASON. iY 

lisence of any poshive being, or mode of bting ; if it cloth, 
ticn it is a negation^ or 7icgath*c idea ; othcrwice it is a 
OBiiive onci whether the \vord that expresses it be positive 
T negative. Yet, after all, in many cases, this is very 
lard to determine, as inamneatyy infinite^ abyss^ which are 
Miginally relative terms, but they signify /^art/o;?, &c. 
fhich seem to be positive. So darkness^ madnc98^ cloion^ 
ire positive terms, but they imply the want oHighty the 
araiit of reason^ and the want of mannera ; and perhaps 
iicse may be ranktd among the negative ideas. 

Here note^ That in the English tongue /wo negative 
terms are equal to one /iositivey and signify the same thing, 
iinoc tnhafifiyy signifies hafifiy ; not immortal^ signifies 
wjTtal ; he is, no iw/irudent man^ that is he is a man offiru- 
iencc: But the sense and force of the word, in such a ne- 
gative way of e:(prcsision, seem to be a little diminished. 



SECT. in. 

OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX TBRM5S, 



11. Xi 



ERMS are divided into aim/ile or comfUexs 
^ 9imfde ter-^i is one word, a comfdex term is when more 
*ords arc used to signify one thing. 

Some terms are comfdex in worda^ but not in aenae ; suCh 
'the aecond limfieror of Home ; for it excites in our mind 
**^lythc idea of one man, namely, Auguatua, 

Some terms arc comfiiex in aenae^bnt not in worda ; so when 
*ay an army, 2iforeaty I mean a multitude of men or treva : 
^d almost all our moral ideaa^ as well as many of our nat- 
•^i ones are expressed in this manner ; Heligion^ fdety^ 
^yalfyy knavery^ tlieftj include a variety of ideas in each 
tnn. 

There are other terms whidh are comfiiex Both in worda 
^d aenae ; so when! say, z fierce dog, or Vifiioua man, it 
xcites an idea, not only of those two creatures, but of 
heir peculiar characters also. 

Among the terms that arc comfiiex in asnac^ but not in 
vcrd^j we may reckon tiiosc simple lerma >7V\\^c^tvt*\vw 




4B LOGIC : OR, THE 

a primary and a secondary idea in them ; as whe. 
my neighbour speak that which is not true, and 
him, This is not trucj or t/iis isfalse^ I only convey 
the naked idea of his error ; this is xht: primary idci 
if I say fV is a licy the word lie carries also a scconda 
in it, for it implies both the falsehood of the 8pee< 
my reproach and ctnsure of the speaker. On the 
hand, if I say it is a mistake^ this carries also a seco 
idea with it ; for it not only refers to the falsehood t 
;;pcech, but includes my tenderness and civility to hi 
the same time. Another instance may be this ; when 
Uic word incest^ adultery^ and murder^ I convey to ano 
■ot only the fmmary idta of those actions, but I incl 
also the secondary idea of their unlawfulness, and my 
horrcnce of them. 

Aorg 1st. — Hence it comes to pass, that amonj; woi 
which signify the s:imc firinci/iai ideasy some are ei<an a 
decent, oihcrs unclean ; some chaste, others obscene ; soi 
arc kind^ oihers arc affronting and refiroachful, because 
the sicondtiry idea which custom has aflixed to them. Ai 
it is the part uf a wise man, when there is a necessity 
expressing any evil actions, to do it either by a word th 
has a secondary idea ol kindness or softness, or a word th 
can ics witii it un idea of rebuke and severity, according 
chu case refpiircs : So when there is a necessity of exprcs 
ing things unclran or obscene, a wise man will do it in ll 
-nost decent language, to excite as few uncleanly ideas 
tobsible in the minds of the hearers. 
.Vote 2.i — In length of time, and by the power of cu 
m), words sometimes chaiig:c their />r/marf/ ideas, as ah; 
> declared, and sometimes they have changed their^'ccc 
ry ideas, tlioup:h the firimary ideas may remain : I 
>rilb lh;U were once chaste by frequent use grow obsct 
1 uncleanly ; und words th:^t were once honorable ma 
he next generation, grow mean and confeni/iiible. I 
word dame originally signified a mistress of a famil 
I was a fa'iy ; and it is used still in the English law 
ify a lady, but in common use now a-<bys it rtpi 
I ixjlirmer^s wj/r, or a mistress of a family of thr Ion 
in the country. So those words of Fabuhukrth, If 
i. r2, in our translation, (eat their own dung, tut 
doubtless dcc«tit and clean language, when o 



:hap. IV. RIGHl USE OF REASON. 49 

rtnslators wrote themy above a hundred years ago. The 
pord eat has maintained its old secondary idea and inof* 
cmive sense to this day ; but the ot/ier word in that sen- 
xnce has by custom acquired a more uncleanly idea, and 
ilKNikl now rather be changed into a more decent term) 
vd so it should be read in public, unless it should be 
thought more proper to omit the sentence.* 

For this reason it is that the Jewish Rabbins have sup- 
ffied other chaste words in the margin of the Hebrew Bi- 
ble^ where the words of the text, through time and cus« 
tMa, are degenerated, so as to carry any base and unclean 
^fKondanj idea in them ; and they read the word which is 
in the margin, which they call keri^ and not that which 
?u Avritteii in the text, which they callect c/teiid. 



SECT. IV. 

OF WORDS COMMON AND PHOPER. 



ML \^, 



ORDS and names are either common or /tro/i- 
tf» Common namea ai*e such as stand for universal ideas, 
wi whole rank of beings, whether general or spcciul. 
These are called a/ifieliativca ; sojish, birdy man^ czVy, r/v- 
^1 ire common names ; and so are trouty eely lobster^ for 
Ihey all agree to many individuaUy and some of them to 
'fetny s/teciea; But CicerOy Virgily Bucefihaluty London^ 
AfRf, JEinay the Thames^ are proper names^ for each of 
them agrees only to one single being. 

M6te hereyfiraty That a firofier name may become in 
Mne sense commony when it hath been given to several 
brings of the same kind ; so Cf«ar, which was the proper 
dme of the first emperor Juliusy became also a common 
lime to all the following emperors. And teay which was 
her proper name of one* sort of Indian leaf, is now-a-days 
fccome a common name for muny infusions of herbs, or 
lants, in water ; a aage tea, ale hoof teay limon tea, 8cc. So 

<* Note— So in some places of the sacred historians, where it is writ- 
er Kvcsy ouethatpisseih against the walii we shouU read, eveq iAdte« 

E 



oo LOGIC ; OU, nii: Part. 

Pcter^ T/iomaSf John^ l]lUiam^ may be reckoned comm 
names also, because they ai*e given to m^ny personsi u 
less they are determined to signify a single person at aj 
particular time or place. 

JSTote in the ^cond place^ That a common name may b 
come firofier by custom, or by the lime, or place, or pcrsa 
that use it ; as in Great- Britain, when we say the king^ v 
mean our present rightful sovereign King GzoftGE, vi 
now reigns ; when we speak of the firince^ we intend b 
royal highness Gborge Prince of lVaie9 : If we menlif 
the city^ when we are near London^ we generally mean tl 
city of London ; Whei)in a country town we say lhe>torw 
or the csguircy all the parisli knows who are the single pe 
sons intended by itj so when wc are speaking of the hi 
tory of the New Testameiit> and use the words Peter^ Pn 
John^ we mean those three -Apostles. ^ 

Note m the third place, That any common name whtts 
ever is made //ro/i^r b]r teri;iA$ of particularity added to 
as the common vrovds /lofityjcing^ horacy garden^ book^ knij 
Sec. are designed to si^uify a singular idea, when we si 
the /ircavnt fiofte ; the king rj Great Britain ; the horse l^ 
nvon the last filate at NcKvmarket ; the royal garden at Ki 
^i?igton ; thiM dookf that kn'/e^ 8cc, 

SECT. •.v. 

OF CONCRETE AXD ABSTRACT TERMS. 



IV. ^ 



ORDS or terma are divided into abatrt 
and concrete. 

Matract ternm signify the mode or quality of a beir 
without any regard to the subject in which it is ;..as Vfki 
vcssy roundficaaj length, breadth^ wiadumf mortality^ It 
death. 

Concrete terms, while they express the quality, do al 
( itlicr express or iniplyt or refer to some subject to wbi 
it l>eIongs ; as whitcj rounds long^ broad, wiaey mortal^ I 
ing, dtaih. But these are not always noun adjectives il 
grammatical sense ; for aybo/, a kncve^ a fihiloao/iher^t 
many other concretes, are aubatantivea, as well as^Arnatx 
folly, %in\ fihiloaafihyy which are the attract tein^ihat 1 



!oi>g to them. 



A 



Chap. VI. RIGHT X;SE OK KlvVSuN Ci 

S E C T. VI. 

OF UXIVOCAL AND KqUIVOCAL MORDS. 

VV ORDS and Urma arc either univocaL or f- 
pavocal, Urdvocal words arc such as signify hut One ideOf 
or at least ixit one sort of thing; \ equivocal words are such 
IS ■ig:nify two or moi'e different ideas, or different sorts of 
objects. The words book^ bihUyJiBh^ honae^ elefihant^ may 
be called univocal words ; for I know not that they signify 
my thing else but those ideas to which they are generally 
affixed ; but Ara^/isan equivocal word, for it signiiiL'S the 
bead of a ns/7, or of a f^in^ as well as of an animal ; jVufl is 
n equivocal word, it is used for the naii of the haml^ ovfjot^ 
ind for an iron nail to fasten any thing. Post is er>uivcjcal. 
It is u/iiece <if timber^ or a atvi/e messenger, A church is a 
Tdigiou9 assembly y qt the large fare building where they 
meet ; aQd sometimes the same wonl means a synod of 
tukofiSf or of fireabytersf and in some places it is the fio/ie 
md a general council. 

Here let it be notedy that when two or more words sig- 
nify the same thing, as wave and billow^ mead and meadow^ 
tbey are usually csdied synonymous words : But it seems 
▼cry strange, that words, which are directly contrary to 
eich other, should sometimes represent almost the same 
ideas ; yet thus it is in some few instances ; a valuable^ or 
U^invaluable blessing ; a shameful^ or a shameless villian ; a 
l^ckskullj or a thin skuWd fellow^ a mere pafier skull f a 
num of a large conscience^ little conscience^ or no conscience ; 
I famous rascaly or an infamous one. So uncertain a thing 
is human language, whose foundation and support is cus- 
tom ! 

As words signifying the same thing arc called synony* 
tnouSf so epuivocal words, or those which signify several 
tilings, are culled homonymous^ or ambiguous ; and when 
persons use such ambiguous words with a design to deceive> 
it is called equivocation, 

Ouv^m/iie ideasy and especially the sensible qualities^ fur- 
nish us with a great variety of equiyocal or ambiguous words ; 
for these being the first and most natural ideas we have, 
.we bor))pw some of their >iames,' to signify ipany other 



^'2 LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 

idens, botfi simple and complex. The word tweet express- 
es the pleasant perceptions of almost every sense ; sugar i% 
svw'ft, !'iit it hath not the sume sweetness as muttic : Nor 
"hath music the sweetness of a rose ; and a ^yrtri /irot/ieci 
diftVrs from them all : Nor yet have any of these the same 
swc.tness as discourse^ covncil, or meditation hath; yeC 
the royal Psalmist saith of a man, IVe took tweet council 
roiret/ier ; and of God, Aly meditation of him shalt be twctt, 
Bitter is also such an equivocal word ; there is bitter 
nvormivood^ there are bitter words^ there arc bitter enemies^ 
and a bitter cold morning. So there is a sharpness in xvn* 
(gar, and there is a sharpness in /lainy in sorrow, and in rr- 
firoach ! there is a sharp eye, a sharp wit^ and a sharp 
hvjord : But there is not one of these seven tharpnetMctt tte 
same as another of them ; and a sharp east windx% diflReiw 
cnt from them all. 

These are also verbs, or words of actionf which areequiipi 
ocal, as well as nouns or names. The words to bear^ to 
take, to come, to get, are sufficient instances of it ; at when 
we say, to bear a burden, to bear sorrow ov' reproach^ to 
bear a name, to bear a grudge^ to bear Jruit, or bear cAtU' 
ren ; the word bear is used in very different senses : And 
so is the word get, when we say, to get monsy, to gettn, to 
get off, to get ready, to get a stotnach, and to get a cM^ |CG» 

Inhere is also a great deal of ambiguity in many of tho 
English particles ; as buty before, beside, with, without^ that^ 
then, thereof or, forth, above, about, &c. of which grammes 
ar.d (lictionaries will sufficiently inform us. 



SECT. vir. 

\A1i:0VS KINDS OF KQUIVOCAL W0R»6. 



I 



_T would be endless to run through all the varie- 

it"*} of words and terms which have different senses appli- 

<.(< to them ; I shall only mention therefore a few of the 

'iwist remarkable and most useful distinctions among thera. 

t ./, The first division of equivocal words lets us know 

/iv some are equivocal only in their sound ov fironunciam 

: others are equivocal only in writing j others both iu 

r^ri-i'^gand in sound. 



\ 



CfiAt». VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 413 

Words equivocal in sound only are such as these ; the 
rein of a bridle, ivhich hath the same sound with the reign> 
of a king) or a shower of rain ; but all three have diffeient 
letterS) and distinct spelling. So, mighty or strength, 14 
equivocal in sound, but differs in writing from mitcy a little 
aoiltna], or small piece of money. And the verb to write 
has the same sound with iviight a workman, right or equi- 
ty, and rite or ceremony ; but it is spelled ^very differently 
in them all. 

AVords equivocal fn ivriting only are such as these. To 
ttur to pieces, has the same spelling with a tear : To iead^ 
or guide, has the same letters as iead^ the metal ; and a 
iow/ for recreation, is w^ritten the same way as a bovfl 
for drinking ;' but the pronunciation for all tlxese jis diC« 
ferent. 

But those words which are most commonly and justly 
-called equivocal^ are such as are both written and pronoun^- 
ced the same way, and yet have different senses or ideas 
belonging to them : such are all the instances which were 
given in the preceding section. ^ 

Among the words wl^ich are equivocal in ^ound only^ 
andno^ in writings there is a large field for persons who 
delight in jests and puns, in tiddles and quibbles, to sport 
themselves. This sort of words is also used by wanton 
pe;*sons to convey lewd ideaa^ under the covert of expres- 
sions capable of a chaste meaning, which are called double 
entendres ; or when persons ^i^^d\i falsehood with a design 
to deceive, under the covert of truth $ though, it must be 
confessed, that all sorts of equivocal wwds yield sufficient 
iHatter for such purposes. 

There are many cases also, whertin an equivocal word 
*s used, for the sake of decency, to cover a foul idea ■: For 
the most chaste and modest, and well bred peisons, 
having sometimes a necessity to speak of the things of 
nature, conv.ey their ideas in the most inoffensive lan- 
guage by this mean. And indeed, the mere poverty 
of all languages makes it nscessary to use e(/uivocal 
^orda upon many occasions, as tiie common wi^iiings of 
'nen, and even the holy book of *God, sufficiently ,manL- 

|fc8t. 

h '2dlyy Equivocal words are usually distinguished, ao- 
sCording to their original, into such; whose Ydripus jscnjatj^ 



54 LOGIC : OR, THE P^mx % 

arise from mere chance or accident^ and such as are made 
equivocal by £?<?«£c';7 ; as the word b^sar signifies a «Aaj^ 
beast^ and it signiBes also to bear or carry a burden ; thU 
seems to be the mere effect of chance: But if Ictjlnif 
dog bear^ because he is shaggy, or call one ofthe northem 
constellations by that name, froma fancied situation ofthe 
stars ill the ^hape of that animal, then it is by de^gn thst 
•the word is made yet further equivocal* 

But because I think this common account ofthe spnaf; 
•or origin of equivocal words is too slight and imperfect, I 
•shatt reserve this subject to be treated of by itself, and pnh 
cced to the third division. 

-'^fii/j Ambiguous or equivocal words are such as are 
sometimes taken in a iarge and general sense, and some- 
times in a sense more strict and limited^ and have different 
ideas affixed to them accordingly. Religion^ or viriueyUktn 
in a large sense, includes both our duty to -Gor/andoor 
jieighbour ; but in a more strict, limited, and proper aeaie* 
"tnrtue signifies our duty iavmrds men^ and religion our My 
. to God, Virtue may yet be taken in the strictest senUf 
and then it signifies fii>^er or courage^ vfhich is the seme 
of it in some places of the New Testament. .60 gractt 
taken in a large sense, means the J^ror o/G9dy and all the 
spiritual blessings that proceed from it, (which is a firequci* 
sense of it in the bible) but in a limited sense it aigmfiet 
tjie habit of holiness wrought in us by divine favour, or a 
complex idea ofthe Christian virtues. It may also be takea 
in. the strictest sense, and thus it signifies any single Chris^ 
tian virtue^ as in 2 Cor, viii. 6, 7, where it is used for /c^ 
rality. So a «/t/, in a strict and proper sense, means the 
jhouses enclosed Vfithin the walls ; in a large -.sense it reacfaea 
•to all the suburbs. 

This larger and stricter sense of a word is used in almost 
all the sciences, as well as in theology, and in commoi. 
life. The word geography^ taken in a strict scTtse, signifies 
the knowledge of the circles ofthe earthly globe, and the 
situation ofthe various parts of the earth <; when it is ta- 
ken in a little larger sense^ it includes the knowledge ofthe 
seas also ; and in the largest sense of all, it extends to the 
various customs, habits and governments of nationsv*^ 
When an astronomer uses the word star in its prcjpcr waA 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. »i 

strict sense, it is applied only to the jfijeed 9tara^ bul in a 
larg^ fiense it includes the fitaneU also. 

This equivocal sense of words belongs also to many 
proper names : Sovwf«a> taken in the ]argt«t sense is one 
quarter of the world ; in a more limited s .*nse it signifies 
katoliay or the Lesser Asia / but in the strictest sense it 
neans rm mare than sne little province in JVaiolia, where 
stood the cities of £fihesu9j Smyrna, Sardis, &c. And this 
is the most frequent sense of the New Testament, i^/an- 
ders and Hollandj in a strict sense, are hut two single pro« 
vinces among the seventeen, but in a large sense Holland 
Includes seven of them, and Flanders ita. 

There are also some very common and little words ia 
all languages, that are used in a more extenaive^ or more 
Iradt^ sense \ such as «//, every, whatsoever, &c. When 
the apostle says, all men have sinned and all men must <//>, 
dll is taken in its most universal and extensive sense, in- 
<\vi^\x\^ all mankind, Rom. v. 12. Wh«i he appoints 
payer to be made for all men^ it appears, by tlie following 
verses, that he restrains the word ail to signify chiefly all 
ranks and degrees of men, \ Tim. ii. 1. But when St. Paul 
-says, I/dease all men in all things, 1 Cor. x. 33, the word 
fl^ is exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than 
that he pleased aiil those men whom he converged with in all 
thinj!;s that were lawful, 

^fhly, Equivocal words are, in the fourth place, distin- 
guished by their literal or Jigurative sense. AVords are 
^8€d in Sifirofierov literal sense when they are designed to 
Mgnify those ideas for which they were originally madej 
or to which they are primari/jy and generally annexed / 
but they are used in 2^ figurative or trofdcal sense when they 
are made to signify some things, which only bear either a 
Tefirence or a resemblance tolhe primary ideas <)f them.— . 
"So when two princes contend by their armies, we say they 
are at war in a proper sense ; but when we say tliere is a 
var betwixt the winds and the waves in a storm, this is 
idWtdJigurative^ and the peculiar figure is a metafihor. So 
^heii the scripture says, Riches make themselves wings^ and 
Jiy awttif as an eagle tomards heaven, the wingSj and xXit flight 
of the eagle are /2ro/?(?r expressions; but when ./^/g'^r and 
ifiinjgs arc applied to riches, it is only by way oi figure and 



3fi LOGIC : OR, THE Part I. 

metaphor, S6 when a man is said to refientj or laughj or 
^nVvf, it is literally taken; but when God is said to A« 
grieved, to refient, or laugh, Scfc. these Are all figurative 
expressions borrowed from a resemblance to mankind.*—- ' 
And when the words Job or Esther are used to signify- 
those very persons, h is the /i/cra/ sense of them ; biit. 
when they sigp>ify those two books of scripture^ this it 
^^gurative sense. The names of Horace, Juvenal, and 
Milton, are ussd, in the same manner, either for book^ or 
mett' 

When a word, which originally agnifies any particular 
idea or object, is attributed to several other .objects^ not 
-so much by way oi resemblance, but rather on the aQcouni 
jo( some evident rejerence or relation to the ori}|;inai idea« 
this is sometimes peculiarly called an analogical word ; so 
a sound or healihy fiitlae, a sound digestion, sound sleepy are 
all so called with rejerence to a sound and healthy consti* 
tution ; but if you speak oi sound doctrine, or sotund 8/ieeck^ 
this is by way o[ resemblance to health ; and the worda are 
metaphorical : Yet many times analogy and metaphor are 
used promiscuously in the same sense, and notdistin* 
guished. 

litiYtnote, That -the design o[ metafthorical language, and 
^figures of speech, is not merely to represent our ideasi, but 
to represent them with vivacity, spirit, affection and pow-f 
er ; and though they often muke a deeper impression on 
'the mind of the hearer, yet they do as oiften lead him into 
a mistake, if they are -used at improper times and placea. 
Therefore, where the design of the speaker or writer is 
-merely Xo ex/dain, instruct, and to lead into the knowledge 
of naked truth, he ought for the most part to use plain and 
proper words if the language affords them, and not to deal 
much \{^ figurative speech. But this sort of terms is used 
very proBtably by poets and .orators, whose business is to 
move and persuade, and work on the passions, as well as 
<on the understanding. Figures are also happily employ- 
ed in proverbial moral sayings, by the wisest and the best of 
men, to impress them deeper on the memory by sensible 
images ; and they are often used for other valuable pur- 
poses in the sacred writings, 

Sthly, I might adjoin another sort of equivocal words ; an 
there are some which have a different meaning in commonk 
^r^uagc from wlwt they have in the sciences i the word^iMIr 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. ST 

don signifies the receiving any action in a large philosophical 
flense ; in a more limited philosophical sense, it signifies 
any of the affections of human nature^ as t^'ve^fear^joy^ sar- 
fov, Sec. But the common people confine it only to on- 
ger : So the word simfile philosophically signifies single^ 
but vulgarly it is used for Jboliah, 

Sthlyj Other equivocal words are used sometimes in an 

sbaoiute sense, as when God is called/t^r/e'c/ ; which allows 

' of no defect ; and sometimes in a comfiaraiive sense, as 

' good men are oftentimes called /^er/fc/ in scripture, in com- 

. parison of those who are much inferior to them in 

knowledge or holiness : But I have dwelt rather too long 

upon this subject already, therefore I add no more. 



SECT. VIII. 

TBEOMGIN OB CAySS&OF ««(UI.V0CAL WOEDS. 

X 'I' ^ Wj ^^^^' ^® "^y become more skilful in 
fttarding ourselves and others, against the danger of mis- 
takes which may arise from equivocal words, it may not be 
I MUSS to conclude thif. chapti^r with a short account of the 
Tirious wayfror means whereby a. word changes its signi* 
fication, or acquires any new sense, and thus becomes 
Kpiivocaif earpectally if it keeps its old sense also. 
i. Mere chance sometimes gives the same word different 
KDses ; as the word light signifies, a body that i« not heavy ; 
J ind it also signfies the effect of sun beams, or the medium 
I thereby vfe see objects : This is merly accidental, for there 
{tans to be no connection between these two senses, nor 
iQjr reason for them. 

2. Error and mistake is another occasion of giving vari- 
es senses to the same words ; as when different persons 
'cad the names. of /^rf>«r, biahofi^ churck, Easter, &c. in the 
Sew Testament, they affix different ideas to them, for 
^t of acquaintance with the true meaning of the sacred 
*riter ; though it must be confessed, these various senses, 
Mich might arise at ficst from honest mistake, may be 
CQipably supported and propagated by interest^ ambitloUf 
prejudiccy and a party-spirit on any side. 



/ 



Sd LOGIC : OR, THE Paat.I. 

3. 77mf and ct/arom alters the meaning of words. Kfune 
heretofore signified a diligent servant (GnavuaJ and aw^ 
lain was an under tenant to the lord of the manour fviUicui) 
but now both these words carry an idea of wickedness and 
reproach withthenr. A bafiad once signified a. solemn 
and sacred song, as well as one that is trivial, when Soh* 
mon*s Song was called the ballad of ballads ; but now it is ■ 
applied to nothing but trifling verse, or comical subjects. ' 

4. Words change their senses by ^^ttrc« 2ind metafihort^ 
which are derived from some real analogy or resemblattt 
between several things ; as when vfinga 9XidL flight areap^ 
plied to riches^ it signifies only, that the owner may ai eaii* 
ly lose them as he would lose a biid who flew away with 
wings. 

And I think, under thisliead, we may rank those irardi 
which signify different ideas, by a sort of an unaccbanti- 
ble far-fecht analogy^ or distant resemblance^ that fancy Ktt 
introduced between one thing and another ; ajp when wt 
-say, the meatisgreen^ when It is half 'roasted ^Yft i^Mlk 
of airing linen by thejire^ when we (mean drying or fwrw- 
^ng it : We call for round coals for the chimney) when wt 
mean large square ones : And we talk of the wing rfu m^ 
bity when we mean the/bre-leg : The true reason of thdo^ 
appellations we leave to the critics. - ' 

5. Words also change their sense by the ff/ier/Vi/ orcwi 
of using them, the peculiar manner of pronunciation^ tW 
sound of the voice, the motion qf theface^ or gestures fl/rf* 
body ; so when an angry master says to his servant, it ^ 
bravely done I or you are a fine gentleman ! he means jutf 
the contrary ; namely, it is very ill done ; you are b son% 
fellow: It is one way ofgiving a severe reproach, for the 

words are spoken by way of sarcasm, or irony, 

6. Words are applied to vaiious senses, by new ide^ 
appearing or arising faster than 9iew words are framed 
So when gunfio%vder was found out, the word fi9wder\ 
which before signified only dust^ was made then to signilj 
that mixture or composition of nitre, charcoal, Sec. And llw 
name cannon, which before signified a law or a rule, is no* 
also given to a great gtun, which gives laws to natiopi 
So footboys, who had frequently the common name c 
Jack given them,^were kept to turn the spit, or to pull o 
their master's boots ^ but when instruments were iovcntc 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 59 

far both those services, they were both cMed jackt^ though 
one was of iron, the other of wood^ and very different in 
their fcrm. 

7. Words alter their significations according to the 
ideoiofthe various f^eraona^ aecta^ or fiartica^ who use them, 
ii we have hinted before ; so when a Pafiiat uses the word 
hereiicay he generally means the Proteatanta ; when a PrO' 
iiiiant uses the word, he means anyfieraona tuho vtere wU 
fuUy (and perhaps conteniiously) obatinate in/undammtal 
enora. When a Jew speaks of the true rctigion^ he means 
the inatitution ofMoaca ; when a Turk mentions it, he in- 
tends the doctrine of Mahomet ; but when a Chriatian 
makes use of it, lie designs to signify Chriatianity^ or the 
trmha and the firecefita of the goaf leL 

8. Words have different significations according to the 
hwiky writings or diacourae in which they stand. So in a 
treatise of anatomy^ 'dfoot signifies ihtiimember in the body 
rfa man r But in a book of geometry or menauraliony it 
lignifies twelve inchea. 

If I had room to exemplify most of these particulars in 
one single word, I know not where to choose a litter than 
the word aoundy which it seems as it were by chance to sig- 
oify three distinct ideas, namely, heaithy, (from aanuaj as 
a lound body ; noiacy (from aonuaj as a ahriii sound ; and 
to aound the sea (perhaps from the French aonde^ a probe, 
or an instrument to find the depth of water.) From these 
three, vfhich I w^y cii\ original aenaeaj various derivative 
aenaea arise ; as sound alee/h sound lunga^ sound wind and 
limbj a sound hearty a sound mind, sound doctrine^ a sound 
divine f sound reaaon^ a sound caaky sound timber y a sound 
Teftroofy to beat one soundly, to sound one's meaning or /n- 
elinationy and a sound or narrow aea ; turn these all into 
Latin, and the variety will appear plain. 

I confess some few of these which I have mentioned, as 
the different springs o[ equivocal words, may be reduced in 
some cases to the same original : But it must also be grant- 
ed, that there may be other ways besides these whereby a 
word comes to extend is signification, to include various 
ideas, and become egutvocaJ, And though it is the busi- 
ness of a grammarian to pursue these remarks with more 
variety and particularity, yet it is also the work of a logi- 



i2 LOGIC; OR, THE PahtL 

And more especially let those ideas be laid up and prer 
served with the greatest care, which are most directly ' 
suited, either to your eternal welfare as a Christian^ or U) 
yourparticulur station and firo/easion in this life ; for though 
the former rule recommends an .universal acquaintance 
AvKh things, yet it is but a more general and superficial 
knowledge that is required or expected of any maOi in 
things which are utterly foreign to his own buuneu]! 
But it is necessary you should have a more particular aiil 
accurate acquaintance with those things that refer to yoof 
peculiar province and duty in this life, or your happioen 
in another. 

There are some persons who never arrive at any dccDi 
solid, or valuable knowledge in any science, or any busi- 
ness of life, because they are perpetually fluttering ortf 
the surface of things in a curious and wandering search ff 
infinite variety ; ever hearing, reading, or asking 
somt'thing new, but impatient of any labour to lay up 
preserve the idc as they have gained : Their souls may 
compared to a looking-glass, that wheresoever you tarn 8 
it receives the images of all objects, but retains none. 

In order to preserve your treasure of ideas, and 
knbwledge you have gained, pursue the folloyying advi( 
especially in your younger years. 

I. Recollect every day the things you have seen^ or> 
or ready which may have made an addition to your uoc 
standing: Read the writings of God and men with ^i 
gcnce and perpetual reviews : Be not fond of hastenirig* 
a new book, or a new chapter, till you have well fixed a| 
established in your minds what was useful in the last^ 
make use of your memory in this manner, and you 
sensibly experience a gradual improvement of it wl 
you take care not to load it to excess. 

2 . 2hlk ever the things which you have seen^ hcard^ or\ 
with some firo/icr acquaintance : This will make a fresh ii 
pression on your memory ; and if you have no fellot 
student at hand, none of equal rank with yourstlvesy tc 
it over to any of your acquaintance, where you can doil 
wilh propriety and decency ; and whether they learn an] 
thing by ii or not, your own repetition of it will be anu 
provenient to y ourscU '• AtvOl \\\\^ -^^v^cAi^^ ^v:i \iV\Ssi 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASbN. ^^ 

you with a variety of 'soorch^ and copious language, to ex> 
pi-ess your thoughts upon all occasions. 

3. ComTOit to writing: some of the most considerable. 
improvements which you daily make, at least such hints 
as may recal them again to your mind, when perhaps 
they arc vanished and lost. And here I think Mr. Locke's 
maihod of advci'saria J or common fiiaces, which he describes 
in the end of the first volume of Uis fioai/tumouswoi-ks is the 
best ; using no learned method at all, setting down things 
as ihey occur, leaving a distinct page for each subject, and 
making an index to the pages. 

At the end of every week, or month, or year, you may 
review your remarks, for these reasons ; J*'irst^ to judge of 
your own imfirovement ; when you shall find that many of 
your younger collections are either weak and trifling ; or 
if they are just and proper, yet they are grown now so 
fiEiiniliar to'you, that you will thereby see your own ad- 
vaBcement in knowledgi?. And, in the next place, wh^t 
remarks you find there worthy of your riper observation, 
youliiay note them tvith a marginal star^ instesd of tran- 
scribing them, as being worthy of your second year's ic- ' 
view, when others are neglected. 

To shorten something of this labour, if the books which 
you read are your own, mark with a pen, or pencil, the 
most considerable things in them which you desire to re- 
nember. Thus you may read that book the second time 
oVier with half the trouble, by your eye running over the 
"paragraphs which your pencil has noted. It is bu^ a very 
weak objection against this practice to say, I a hall sfioilmy 
hook ; for I persuade myself, that you did not !)uy it as a 
bookaeller, to sell it again for gain, but as a scholar^ to im- 
prove your mind by it ; and if the mind be improved, 
your advantage is abundant, though your book yields less 
money to your executors.* 

• Note — This advice of writing, marking, and reviewing your 
marks, refers chiefly to those occasional notions you meet with either 
ia reading or in conversation : But when you are directly and profes- 
fedly pursuing any subject of knowledge in a good system m your 
younger years, the system itself is your common-place-book, and 
must be entirely reviewed. The same may be said concerning an^ 
treatise which closely, succinctly, and accuraiteXy \wcw2S\e.'^ -wv^ \k^:c\v:Sx« 
)ir theme. 



64 €-0010 : OR, THE 

Direct. III. ^a you firocted both in learning an 
fnake a wise observation what are the iiieas, %uhat 
courses and the parts of knowledge that have been 
less useful to yourself or others. In our youngc 
v^nW we are furnishing our minds with a treasure 
our experience is but small, and our jndgment we< 
therefore impossible at that age to determine ari] 
ctrning the real advantage and usefulness of man; 
wc learn. But, when age and experience have 
your judgment, then you will gradually drop ti 
useless part of your younger/Mrw/Zttrr, and be moi 
tous to retain that which is most necessary for y< 
fare in this life, or a better. Hereby you will 
make the same complaint that almost every lean 
has done after long experience in study and in th 
of human life and religion : Mas! how many Aoi 
daysj and months^ have I lo^t in pursuing some 
learning, and in reading some authors^ which havt 
to no other account, but to inform me that they were n 
my labour andfiursuit ! Happy the man who hai 
tutor to conduct him through all the sciences in 
years of his study ; and who has a prudent frienc 
at hand to point out to him, from experience, hoi 
of every science is worth his pursuit! And ha 
student tliat is so wise as to follow such advice ! 

J)irect. IV. Learn to acquire a government O' 
ijcas and your thoughts^ that they may come when 
caUedy and de/iart when they are bidden. There ai 
thoughts that arise and intrude upon us while 
them ; there are others that fly from usj when m 
hold and fix them. 

W the ideas whicli you would willingly make tl 
ter of your present meditation are ready to fly from 
inu3t be obstinate in the pursuit of them by an 
^ fixed meditation ; you must keep your soul to tl 
"n^.en it is ready to siart aside every moment, un 
\\\\\ abandon yourself to be a slave to every wile 
ration. It is a common, but it is an unhapp 
siamcful thing, that every trifle that comes ac 
senses or fancy should divert us, that a buzzing fl; 
tcAze our spiritt) and Matter our best ideas : But ' 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF KEASON. 65 

learn to be deaf to, and regardless of other things, besides 
that which we make the present subject of our medita- 
tion : And in order to help a wandering and fickle hu« 
oour, it is proper to have a book or paper in our hands, 
vkich has some proper hints of the subject we design to 
pursue. We must be resolute and laborious, and some- 
times conflict with ourselvesi if wc would be wise and 
learned. 

i Yet I would not be too severe in this rule : It must be 
confessed there are aeatons when the mind, or rather the 
brain, is over tired or jaded with study and thinking ; or 
upon some other accounts, animal nature may be languid 
m cloudy^ and unfit to assist \he spirit in mecUtation ; at 
siich seasons (provided that they return not too often) it 
is better sometimes to yield to the present indisposition ; 
br if nature entirely resist, nothing can be done to the 
]Nirpose, at least in that subject or science. Then you 
nay think it proper to give yourself up to some hours of 
leitttre and recreation^ or useful idleness ; or if not, then 
(Qra your thoughts to some ot/ter alluring subject y and 
pore no longer upon the ^r«/, till some brighter or more 
fiiTorabie moments arise. A student shall- do mure in one 
hour, wlien all things concur to invite him to any special 
study, than in four hours, at a dull and improper season. 
I would also give the same advice, if some vain^ or 
9QrtMe89yorJboliah idcQy will croud itself intoyour thoughts ; 
and if you find that all your labor and wrestling cannot 
^fcnd yourself from it, then divert the importunity of 
that which offends you, by turning your thoughts to some 
entertaining subject, that may amuse you a little, and 
<1raw youoflffram the troublesome and impo«iing guest ; 
and many a time also, in such a case, wJieu the imperti- 
nent and intruding ideas would divert from present duty, 
devotion and firayer have been very successful to overcome 
SQch obstinate troubiers of the peace and profit of the 

If the natural genius and t<?mper be too volatile J^KtjfSi 
wanderings such persons ougiu in a more speciji oMiner 
to apply themselves to mu^hematical It'arningy and to be- 
^n their studies with arir/nnciic and geomtiry ; wherein 
itw truths continually arising to the mind; out of the 

r 3 



^8 LOGIC : OR, THE Pa 

present state. It is therefore of f^reat service to the 
improvement of the mind to distinguish well bet 
knowablcs and unknowabiea. 

As far as things are knowable by usy it is of exc< 
use to accustom ourselves to clear and distinct \ 
Now, among oiher occasions of the darkness and mis 
ofour minds, there are these two things which mo 
markably bi-ing confusion into qxxt ideas, 

1 . That from our infancy we have had the icU 
things so far connected with the ideas qfvfords^ that ^ 
ten mistake words for thingsj we mingle and con! 
one with the other. 

2. From our youngest years we have been ever i 
to consider things not so much in their own natures, 
their various resjiects to ourselves, rftid chiefly to our si 
and we have also joined and mingled the ideas of 
things, with many other ideas^ to wlilch they were not 
in their own natures. 

In order therefore to a clear and distinct knowled 
things, we must unclothe them of all these relation 
mixtures^ that we may contemplate them naked, s 
their oion natures^ and distinguish the subject that we 
in view from all other subjects whatsoever : Now, l< 
form this well, we must here consider the dcHnit 
words ^ and the definition of things. 



SECT. II. 

•F THE DEFINITION OF WORDS OR NAMftS. 



I 



F we could conceive of things as angels ar 
bodied spirits do, without involving them in those c 
which words and language throw .upon them, we s! 
seldom be in danger of such mistakes, as are perpct 
committed by us in the present state ; and indeed it ^ 
be of unknown advantage to us to accustom ourser 
form ideas of things without vfords^ that we might 
them in their own t^rofier natures. But, since we 
t|se words both to learn and communicate most of ou 



GtoAP. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 69 

lions we shoulddo it with just rules of caution. I haTC already 
declared in part, how often and by what means ou;* words 
become the occasion of errors in our conceptions of things. 
To lemedy such inconveniences, we must get an exact de* 
finition of the words we make use of, that is, we must deter- 
mine precisely the sense of our words, which is called the 
definition of the name, * 

Now a definition of the name being only a declaration in 

Mrhat sense the word is used, or what idea or object we. 

mean by it, this may be expressed by any one or iiiore of 

the properties, effects, or circumstances of that object 

"Which do sufficiently distinguish it from other objects : 

As, if I were to tell what I mean by the Word «zV, 1 may 

say, it is that thin inatter which we breathe in and breaths 

•lit continually ; or it is that fluid body in which the birda 

Jty a little above the earth ; or it is that invisible matter 

^ohichfUU all places near the earth, or which immediately en- 

tmfiassea the globe of earth and water. So if I would tell 

what I mean by lighty I would say it is that medium where* 

kfwesee the colours and shafies qf things ; or it is that which 

tliHinguiBhes the day from the nighi. If I Were asked what 

I mean by rr/r^'ora, I would answer, it is a collection (fall 

ottf duties to God, if taken in a strict and limited sense i 

but if taken in a large sense, it is a collection 'jf all our du» 

tUi both to God and man. These are called the definitions 

tffhe name. 

Mte-^ln defining the name there is no necessity that 
we should be acquainted with the intimate essence or nature 
of the things ; \ for any manner of description that will but 
sufficiently acquaint another person what we mean by 
such a word, is a sufficient definition for the name. And on' 
this account a synonymous word, or a mere negation of the 
contraryy a translation of the word into another tongue, or a 
^ammutical explication of it, is sometimes sufficient for this 
purpose ; as if one would know what I mean by a sphere, 
I tell him it is a globe / if he ask what is a triangle, it is 
that w/iich has threk angles ; or an oval is that which has 
the shape of an egg. Dark is that which has no light ; asth* 
«a is a difficulty of breathing ; a diaphoretic medicine, or a 
«Mfor/^c, is something that will/iroi;pA-tf sweating I ^XsAVK 
kiolvent, is a m^n Xhat cnnnot pay hi% debts. 



70 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet I . 

Since it is the (lesig;n of Logicj not only to assist us in 
learning' but in teaching also, it is necessary that we should 
be furnished with some particular directions relating to the 
dtfijiidon of name 9^ both in teaching and learning. 



SECT. III. 

DIHECTZONS CONCERMIKC THE DEFIKZTIOM OP KAMJ^. 
I3lREC I 1 1 

*Xa AVE a care of making UBe of mere words j in* 
stead ofidvaa^ that is, such words as have no meaning;^ no 
definition belonging; to them : Do not always imagine thai 
4hcre are ideas wheresoever there are names : For, though 
mankind hath so many millions of ideas more than thef 
have names, yet so foolish and lavish are we, that too of' 
ten we use some words in mere waste, and have no idea^ 
for them ; or, at least, our ideas are so exceedingly skat- 
tered and confused, broken and blended, various and un-*- 
settled, that they can sijjnify nothing toward the inaprove- ' 
ment of the understanding. You will find a great deal o^' 
reason for this remark, if you read the fiofiish schoohnew^ 
or the mystic divines. 

Never rest satisfied therefore with words which have f^^ 
ideas b-elongijig to them^ or at least no settled and determinr^ 
ideas. Deal not in such empty ware, whether you are * 
learner or a teacher ; for hereby some persons hax*"^ 
made themselves rich in words and learned in their owl* 
esteem ; whereas, in reality, their understandings haV<5 
been poor, and they knew nothing. 

Let me give, for instance, some of those writers or tallc- 
ers who deal much in the words nature^ fate^ lucky chance^ 
fierfection^ fiower^ life^ fortune^ instinct y &c. and that even 
in the most calm and instructive parts of their discourse ; 
though neither they themselves nor their hearers have any 
settled meaning under those words ;.r.and thus they build 
lip their reasonings, and infer what they please, with an 
ambition of the name of learning, or of sublime elevations 
in religion ; whereas in truth, they do but amuse them- 
selves and their admirers with swelling words of vanity t 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. Vl 

understanding neither what they say^ nor whereof they affirm. 
But this sort of talk was rtproved of old by the two chief 
apostles, St. Peter and St. Pauly 1 Tim. i. 7. and 2 Pet* 
u. 18. 

When pretenders to philosophy or i^od sense grow 
fend of this sort of learning, they dazzle and confoui>d 
their weaker hearers, but fall under the neglect of the 
vise. The Efiicureana are guilty of this fault when they 
ucribe the formation of the world to chance : The jiria* 
toteHana^ when they say, J^aturc abhors a vacuum : The 
StUcksy when they talk o[ fate^ which is superior to the 
gods: And the ^<7;/fe9/frff, when they curse their ilUlucky 
or hope for the favours o{ fortune. Whereas if they would 
tell us, that, by the word nature they mt*an the firofiertiea 
rfany beings or the order of things established at the crta^ 
tUn; that by the word fate intend the decreea of God^ 
or the necessary connection and injluence of second causes 
and effects ; if by the word tuck ov chance they signify the 
abtolute negation of any detereminate causcy or only their 
ignorance of any such causey we should know how to converse 
with them, and to assent to, or dissent from, their opinions. 
But, while they flutter in the durk, and make a noiae 
with words which have no fixed ideas, they talk to the 
wind, and never can profit. 

I would make this matter a little plainer still by instan- 
ces borrowed from the Pvri/iatetick philosophy, which was 
once taught in all the schools. The professor fancies he has 
issigned the true reason why u 11 heavy bodies tend dovmwardy 
Why amber will drawft-athers or straws^ and the loadstone 
draw iron when he tells you that this is done by certain 
gravitating 2Li\d attractive qualitiesy which proceed from the 
substantial forms of those various bodies. He imagines 
that he has exphined why the loadstone's north /loie* shall 
reftcl the north end of a magnetic needle^ and attract ihesouthy 
when be affirms, that this is done hv its sym/iafhy with one 
end of it, and its antthathy against the other end. Where- 
as in truth, all these names oisymfiathy. antipathy y subotan^ 
tialfonnsy and quaiiticsy when they arc put for the causes 

* Note— Some writers call that the south pole of a loadstone v-hich 
attracts the south end of the needle \ but I chooftc to foUow those wh9 
call it the nordi pole. « 



?3 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. 1. 

of these effects in bodies, are but hard wordi, which only 
express a learned and pompous ignorance of the true cause 
of natural appearances; and in this sense they are mere 
Vfords without ideas. 

This will evidently appear, if one ask ne, TVhy a ro»- 
cave mirror or convex giass tvill bum wood in the sun 
beamsi or why a wedge will cleave it P And I hsould telT 
hini) it is by an ustorious quality in the mirror or glass, and 
by a cleaving fiower in the wedge, arising from a certain 
unknown subatantialjorm in them, whence they derive these 
qualities ; or if he should ask me, Why a clock strikf^ and 
points to the hour ? and I should say, it is by an indicatht 
form and sonorijiic quality ; whereas I. ought to tell Um 
how the sun beams are collected and united by a burning' 
glass ; whence the mechanical force of a wedge is derived'; 
and what are the wheels and sfirings^ the fiointer^ and ham^ 
mer^ and belly whereby a clock gives notice of the time, 
both to the eye and the ear. But these uatorious and cleop' 
ing flowers, sonorious and indicative forms and qualities^ do 
either teach the enquirer nothing at all but what he 
i;new before, or they are mere words without ideas,* 

And there is many a man in the vulgar and in the 
learned world, who imagines himself deeply skilled in the ' 
controversies 0/ divinity, whereas he has only -furnished 
him^eli with a parcel of scholastic or mystic words, under 
some of which the authors themselves had no just ideas ; 
and the learner, when he hears, or pronounces them, hatb 

* It may be objected here, '< And what does the modern philoso- 
pher, with all his detail of TnathemaiictlnninberSi and diagrams, do 
more than this towards the solution of these diffculties ? Does he not 
describe gravity by a certain unknown force, whereby bodies tend 
downward to the centre ? Hath he found the certain and mechanical 
Ttasons of attraction, magnetism, &c, ?" I answer, that the modenii 
have found a thousand things by applying mathematics to natural 
philosophy, wl^ich the ancients were ignorant of ; and, when they use 
any names of this kind, viz gravitation, attraction, 8cc. they use them 
only to signify, that there are such efiectsand such causes, with a fre* 
quent confession of their ignorance of the true springs of them : Thef 
do not pretend to make these words stand for the real causes of things 
as though they thereby assigned the true philosophical solution of these 
difiicuhies ; for in this sense they w!ll still be words without ideas* 
wtctberin the mouth of an old pYi\\ow>]^\Mx ot ^xk««i «»a« 



Chap. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 



*f^ 



f 



icarce any ideas at all. Sucli sort of words sometimes 
hare become matters of immortial contention) as thou^Ii 
r the gospel could not stand without them ; and yet the zea- 
lot perhaps knows little more of them than he does oiS/nO' 
boletfi^ or Higgaionj Selah, Jud{;es xli. 6. Psal. ix. 16. 

Yet here I would lay down this cautiony tliat there are 

several objects of which we have not a clear and distinct 

idefty much less an adequate or comprehensive one, and 

yet we cannot call the names of tlicse thinf^s loords vfithout 

idea9 i such are the injitdty and cicrnity of God himstlfi the 

mnitm t^four own 9oul and body^ the ^tuion of the divine and 

MwHon natures in Jesus Christ ^ the o/icrafion ojthe Holy S/iir^ 

I it on ihc mind of man^ &c. These ought not to be called 

\wwrtU vnihout ideas ^ for thc**e is suflicicnt ev idtnce for the 

reality and certainty of the existence of there objects ; 

though there is some confusion in our clearest conceptions 

t of them; and our ideas ofthcnii thuugh imperfect, arc 

f. yet aufBcicnt to converse about them, so L\v as we have 

need) and to determine so much as is necessary for uur 

own £uth and practice . 

Direct. II. Do not sufifiose that the natures or essences of 

things aitoays differ from tne anothi r aa much as their names 

do. There are various purposes in human life, for which 

He put very different names on the same thin^, or on 

thinj^ whose natures are near akin ; and ti)creby oric-nilmes, 

by making a new nominal sfiecivSy we are reuciy to elective 

ourselves with the idea of another real s/iecics of ihin'^n : 

And those, whose understandings arc led awuy by the 

were sound of words, fancy the ?iuiure of those thinrp to 

lie Tcry different whose names are so, and judge of them 

iccordingly. 

I may borrow a remarkable instance for my purpose 
dmost out of every garden which contains a vai'uty of 
pUntsinit. Most or all pKtnis agree in this, that they 
l>2Te a roof^ a stalky leaves^ budsy blosn'^mfi^ and svedn : Uiic 
llic gardener ranges them under very diOV.rent names, us 
Ihough they were really different kinds of beings, mer.;ly 
iteCHUsc of the different use and serviee to which they arc 
ippiied by men : As, for instance, those plants whose roots 
are eaten, shall appropriate the names of roots to them- 
selves ; such are carrodsy tumi/isy radishes-, Sec. If the Uuviit 

c; 




74 LOGIC : OR, THE Par- 

are of chief use to us, then we call them hcrba ; as h 
niint^ thyme. If the leaves are eaten raw, ihey are terr 
sallad ; zs leCtucej/iurceiain. If boiled,^ they become j 
/icrba ; as sfdnnage^ colworCft ; and some of those same pla 
'which are /lotherdsy in one family, ar;: sallad in another 
t!ie buds arc made our food, they arc called heads or toi 
so cabbage heads, heads o^ a^/iaragus and artichoaka. If 
blossom be of most importance, we call it dijlawer ; v 
arc dameBy tulips^ and carnations^ which are the mere b 
soms of those plants. If the husk or seeds are eaten, t 
are called xXxn fruits of the grcundy zs/ieas^ beanSy stravH 
ries, S(c. If any part of the plant be of known and comn 
usii to us in medicine^ we call it a physical herb, as cardi 
acurvy 'grass ; but if we count no part useful, we call 
ivcedj and throw it out of the garden ; and yet perh 
our next nei^;hbour knows some valuable property ; 
use (.f it ; he plants it in his garden, and gives it the t 
uidu herb^OT ^ fiOivcr, You see here how small is 
real distinciion of these several /;/nnM, considered in ti 
gv;n;:ral nature as the lesser vegetables : Yet what very 
icreni ideas we vulgarly form concerning them* and m 
diill: en t ^/^rrrV* of them, chiefly because of the differ 
names given them. 

Now, when things arc set in this clear light, it appe 
how ridiculous it would be for two persons to contc 
whether c/a7ayr//cw be an ^crd or a Kveed ; whether itb 
potherb or sallad ; when, by the custom or fancy of dif 
ent families, this one plant obtains all these names 
cording to the several uses of it, and the value that is 
upon it. 

Xote here — That I find no manner of fault with the 
riety of names wliich arc given to several plants, accc 
in^ to the various use we make of them. But I wo 
not iiave our judgments imposed upon hereby, to th 
tirai llu-se mere tiowzi/za/ species, namely, hrrbs^ Mladj 
".vtcds. become three really different species of beings, 
tbis account, that they have different names and uses. 
I proceed to other instusres. 

It has been the custom of mankind, when they h 
been angry with any tSing, to add a nciv ill ra.-wr t< 
th:U thcv mav convev ther?bv a hateful idea of it, thd 

• • • • • 



^ 1 




lUGIir USE OF REASON. '/J 

(he nature of the lliing Mill Bbiilcs the s:>mc. Su ihc Pa- 
jtins cjll the ProicManis Ikrciics ; u profaTie person 
uiltKinan drjiietyn I^rcchian ; iind in Uie times of the 
citilnar, in the Ijst cer.uny, the Hcialists rallctl the 
?3t]ia-m':nVinant J-'analic, It'jiindficudn and Strlcritn. And 
ibej- in rciiuical callet! the Hoyalisls Afol'gnants : IluC 
ihepariizms on each side wctl' reall}' neither bcllcr nor 
n>rie fur these names. 

It has also been a frtqiiEiU pvaciice, r,n the other haml, 
to put tieio favorable na:iies upon il! idras, on purpose to 
like oS* the odiuiTi of ilium. But) nutw)lhslan(lin(r all 
these flattering namea and lilies, a m^n of profuse Btner- 
DUtf is but a s/te'tdihrift ; a n.ilnral son is a bai'aid sriJl ; 
a pliant is an adiil'rrcr ; a;iil a ViAy t.i pltMSiire is ii t.-Airr. 

Direct. 1 1 1. Tuk<- Jij,J (./ 6rll<T{:'(: il>,- nafur^- a-:.! , s- 
Kace ofltuo tr nn;rf thinga tn be ttrtahJy ilir Mm.-, h-re'ti 
Aty may have tlie tame nonir fimi th^-m. Ti'is h.is l.an 
tn unhappy anil f;ital nccBsicn nf a ltioii<i3ni1 m:sMkcs 1:1 
(he naturjl, in Ilie civil, am! religious ul]'.>irs of liH', boih 
unongst the vulgar and ihe karned. I shall give Uvo or 
three instances, cliicfly in the ni;iltera of natural fihih^o/:hij, 
having hinted several dangers of this kind rchitinp; to the- 
t/jfyin the forcRoing discourse conctTnin)Tfpujvocfl.'K'orrf«. 

0«p elder philosophers have pencraUy made use of (lie 
mrd Soul to signify ihatprinciple whereby a tlant grows, 
and ihey call it ibe -vt-gi-iaiive soul : The pvinctpk of liic 
■nimal motion of a brute has been likewise called a »oul, 
sad ire have been taught to n^inic it the wniiiihie foul t 
Ibey have also given liie name a-jut to thui superior prin- 
ciple in man, whereby he thinks, jiidg'k.'s, reasons, Gic. 
and though they distinguished ihis by the honorable lille 
of the rational tout, yet in common disroursu and writing, 
We leave out the words Tf^-c/a.'ion, irniiiivt aid raiicialt 
uid make the ivord as ti/ serve for nil lltese prini.iplus 1 
Thence we are led into this imagination, \\\ati/irrciiasori 
tft/iirilual bring in filaaii and in brut:-!, like that in men. 
Wherean, if we did but abstract Knd scpiraie these iliinjjs 
from words, and compare the cause ofjjTeTO.-A ina/./a;i.', 
with t^ cjusc of reaionini; in man, (withoni the word tcid) 
we should never think that these two principles were at all 
like one another ; nor should we peihaps so ensily and .per- 



76 LOGIC : OR, THE Pabt. 

omptorily conclude that brutes need an intelligent mitsi/ 
to pciTurm tlieir animal actions. 

Another instance may be the \7ord Life, which bcinjj 
attributed to filanta^ to hrittcB, and to men^ and in each of 
ttiem ascribed to the j?ow/, has very easily betrayed us 
from our infancy into this mistake, t/iat the spirit or mindf 
or thinking firindfUe in man is the sfiring of vegetative and 
animal life in his body : Whereas it is evifleni, that if the 
spirit or thinking principle of man gave /{fe to his animal 
nature, the way to save men from dyinpj would not be to 
use medicines, but to persuade the spirit to abide in the 
body. 

I might derive a third instance from the word HkaTi 
v/hich is used to sip^nify tl)e sensation we have when we are 
neai" the fire, as well as the cause of that ^fn^a^ion, which il 
in the fjre itself; and thence we conclude from our labo* 
cy, that there is a sort oj ht-at in the Ji re resembling our sen* 
mtioriy or the heat ivhich we feci % Wliereas, in the ftr»i 
there is nothing but little particles of matter, of such paff- 
licular shapes, sizes, situations and motions, as are fitted to 
impress such motion on our flesh or nerves as excite th^' 
sense o{ heat. Now if this cause of our sensation in thc^rt 
Itadbeen always calltd by a distinct name, perhaps we had 
not been so rooted in this mistake, that the fire is hot wtk 
the same sort of heat that we feel. This will appear with 
more evidence when we consider, that we are secure fro© 
the same mistake where there have been two different 
names allotted to our sensation, and to the cause of it ; aii 
we do not say jftain is in the f re that burns us, or in the 
knife that cuts and wounds us; for we call it burmngin 
rhefirey tutting in the knife, and /lain only when it is in 
ourselves. 

Numerous instances of this kind might be derived frotn 

the words sweet, aourj-md, shrilly and almost all the setm* 

die qualities, whose real natures we mistake from our very 

inf.incy, and we arc ready to suppose them to be the saiae 

in us, and in the bodies that cause them ; partly, because 

the words which signify our own sensations are applied 

also to signify those unknown shapes and motiondlof the 

Jilt It' corpuscles which cxdle at\d c^lm^^ lVvo«i^ sensations. 

Direct. IV. In conversation or reading^be diligent to Jlnd 

^uJ- rAe rnte ^enscy or diitinct i(ieo> which the %fteok€T or^n. 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 7/ 

ttr affixes to hU'SL^ordsy and eapecially to these rjord<t nvhich 
art the chief subject of his discourse. As far Sis possiljle 
uke'lieed lest you put more or fewer ideas into one word 
than the person did when he wrote or spoke ; and endeav- 
wr that your ideas of every word may be the same as his 
vere: Then you will judge better of what he speaks or 
writes. 

It is for want of this that men quarrel in the dark ; and 
ibat there are so many contentions in tiie several sciencesi 
and especially in divinity. Muiiiiudes of t'lem arise from 
I mistake of the true sense or complete meaning in which 
vords are used by the writer or speaker ; and hereby 
sometimes they seem to agree ivhen they really differ in their 
Kniimcnts ; and sometimes they aeem to differ when they 
rtally agree. Let me give an instance of both. 

When one man by the word church shall understand ell 
that believe in Christ ; and another by the word c/.«rf/i 
means only the church of Rome ; they may both assent to 
this proposition, There is no sali*afion cut of the churchy and 
yet their inward sentiments may be widely different. 

Againt if one writer shall affirm that virtue added to 
Joith is sufficient to make a Christian^ and another shall as 
zealously deny this proposition, they seem to differ widely 
in words, and yet perhaps they may both really agree in 
Sentiment ; if, b) the word virtue^ the affirmer intends our 
«Ao/r duty to God and man ; and the denier by the word 
"oirtue means only courage, or at most our duty tovfards 
^urneighhour, without including in the idea of it the duty 
vhich ve owe to God, 

Many such sort of contentions, as these are, tra^xd to 
ihcir original, wiil be found to be mere logomachies^ or 
strifes and quarrels about names and wordsy and vainjang' 
^i»gsy as the apostle calls them in his first letter of advice 
lO Timo'hy. 

In order therefore to attain clear and distinct ideas of 
vhat we read and hcar^ we must search the sense of wurdv ; 
^e must consider what is their original and deiivalion in 
mrowQ or foreign lunguap^es ; what is their common 
ense among mankind, or in other authors, especially such 
s wrote in the sjme cou'Ury, in the same a^^e, about the 
ame timc; and upon the same subjects : \Ye must con^ 

G2 



•^8 LOGIC: OR, THE Pah 

sicler in what sense the same author uses any panic 
'ivord or fihrascj and that when he is discoursing ot 
same matter, and especially about the same parts or ] 
g^raphs of his writing : We must consider whcthei 
word be used in a strict or limited, or in a large and 
cral sense ; whither in a literal, in a figurativci or 
prophetic sense ; whcth jr it has any secondary idem an 
ed to it, besides the primary or chief sense. We mu! 
quire farther, what is the scope and design of the wri 
and what is the connection of that sentence with those 
f^o before it, and those which follow it. By these and ( 
methods we are to search out the dfjinirion qf nameSi 
is the true sevisc and meaning in which any autht 
speaker uses any woiii, which may be the chief subjc 
discourse, or may carry any considerable importance 

Direct. V. it'/icT: ^i*^ communicate our notions to ot 
^-.icrcfj tinth a dei^i^n to it:JlrJ7i and imfirovc their kno^i 
hi US in the bc^^nniri^ vf cur diocoiirse take care toadjui 
drfir.ition cf names tv'iert' soever there is need cfit; th 
to determine plainly what we mean by the chief m 
Avliich arc thesubjtci of our discourse ; and be sui 
vays to keep the same ideas, wht-nsoercr we use the i 
words, unless we give due notice of ihc change. This 
hav« a very large and happy influence, in securing no 
1y others but ourselves too from confusion and mist 
for even writers and speakers themselves, for want o! 
watchfulness, are ready to affix different ideas to their 
itvordsj in different parts of their discourses, and he 
bring perplexity into their own reasonings, and conl 
their hearers. 

It is by an observation of this rule that mathemati 
have so happily secured themselves, and the sciences ^ 
they have professed, from wrangling and controve 
because whensojever, in the progress of their treatises, 
liave occasion to use a new and unkuown word, the; 
ways dfjine it, and tell in what sense they shall tak 
end in many of their writings you find a heap of (/<>>f/i/< 
'fit the very beginning. Now, if the writers of natura* 
losofihy and morality had used the same accuracy and 
ttiey had effectually secluded a multitude of noisy 
fruitless debates out of their own several provinces : 
,had that sacred theme of divinity been perplexed wii 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 7^ 



\m 



many intricate dist)uteS} nor the church of ChrUt been torn 

to pieces by so many sects and factions^ if the words ^rac^, 

'\ihjri^hteoiunc9«yre/ientancc, justification, vforshifly churchy 

, thk^^fireabytcr^ &c. had been welt defined, and their sig- 

; nifications adjusted, as near as possible, by the use of those 

\ vords in the New Testament ; or at least, if every writer 

:• had told tis at first in what sense he would use those words. 

^ Direct. VI. In your ov)n atudies^ as welt as in the commu* 

vctttion of your thoughts to others merely for their iiiforma' 

tim^ avoid ambiguous and equivocal terms as much asfiosaible. 

Do not use such words as have two or three definitions of 

the name belonging to thero^ that is, such words as have 

two or three senses, where there is any danger of mistake. 

U'here3'otir chief business is to inform the judgment, 

and to explain a matter rather than to persuade or affect^ 

be Dot fond of expresung yourselves \x\ figurative language, 

«^hcn there are any proper words that signify the same 

idea in the ///era/ sense. It is the ambiguity ofnames^ »$ 

y^e have often said, that brings almost infinite confusion 

into our concefitioni of things, 

Bist where there is necessity of using an ambiguous 
^ord, there let double care be used in defining that, word, 
and declaring in what sense you take it. And be sure to 
suffer no ambiguous word ever to come into your defiiii- 
linns. 

Direct. VII. In communicating yournotionsy use rvcy word 
^near as /iossibie in the same sense in which mankind com* 
^wnly use iij or which writers that have gone btfre you have 
^ntalty affixed toitj u/ion condition that it in free from am- 
^'guity. Though names are in their original merely arbi- 
trary, yet we should always keepto the established meaning 
ofthem, unless great necessity requires the alteration ; for, 
when any word has been used to signify an idea, that old 
idea will recur in the mind when the word is heard or read, 
rather than any new idea which we may fasten to it. And 
this is one reason why the received definition of names. 
should be changed as little as possible. 

But I a'ld further, that, though a word entirely new 
introduced into a language may be affixed to what i:!ca 
you please, yet an old word ought never to be fixed to an 
ynaccu&toined idea; without jnst und evident necessity, or 



80 LOGIC : OR, THE Part 

%vithout present or previous notice, lest we introdc^^ 
thereby a licence for all manner of pernicious equivocaiiw^ 
^ndfaisehoods j as for instance, when an idle boy, who has 
not seen his book all the rcorning, shall tell his master that 
he has learned his lesson^ ht. can never excuse himself by 
saying, that by the word lesson he meant his breakfast^ an^ 
by the word learnt he meant eating ; surely this would b^ 
construed a downright lie, and his fancied wit would hardlj^ 
procure him a pardon. 

In using an ambiguous word, which has been usedia 
di^crent senses, we may choose what we think the most 
proper sense, as I have done, fi. 73, in naming the fioles of 
the loadstone, north or south. 

And, when a word has been used in two or three senses, 
and has made a great inroad for error upon that account, 
it is of good service to drop one or two of those senses, 
and leave it only one remaining, and afiix the other senses < 
or ideas to other words. So the modern philosophers, 
when they treat of the human soul^ they call it the mindset 
mens huniana, and leave the word cnima^ or soulj to^^gniff 
the fir inci file of life and motion in mere animal beings. 

The poet ^/ui'^na/ has long ago given us a hint of this 
accuracy and disti\iction, when he says oi brutes and mrx, ' 

Ifidulsit mundi communis conditor illis 
Tcnitam animas ; nobis animum quogue. 

Sat. ix.v. 1S4. 
Excefitlon. There is one case, wherein some of thes6 
last rules concerning the definition of words may be in some 
measure dispensed with ; and that is, when strong and 
rooted prejudice hath established some favourite word or 
phrase, and long used it to express some mistaken notion, 
or to unite some inconsistent ideas ; for then it is some- 
times much easier to lead the world into truth, by indulg- 
ing their fondness for a phrase, and by assigning and ap- 
plying new ideas and notions tb^heir favorite word ; and 
this is much safer ako than to awaken all their passions 
by rejecting both their old words, and phrases, and no- 
tions, and introducing all new at once : Therefore we 
coutinuc to say, there is heat in thefir^^ there is coldness in 
:cef nxiliQY than invent new word^ lo t-^t^t^^^ \.\\^ yowcrs. 



CttA?: VI. RIGHT USE OF RE ASON. ti \ 

which are in ^re or ice^ to excite the sensations of heai or 
cold in lis. Kor the same reason, some words, and phrases, 
which are less proper, may be continued in t/ieoiogi/y while 
people are led into clearer ideas with much more ease 
and success, than if an attempt was made to change all 
their beloved forms of speech. 

In other cases, these logical directionft should generally 
be observed) and different names affixed to different Ideas. 

Here I cannot but take occasion to remark, that it i% a 
considerable advantage to any language to have a variety 
of new word ft introduced into it, that when, in Course of 
time, new ohjectn and nt*w ideaB arise, there may be new 
vtords and names assigned to them : And also, where one 
i^ngle name has sustiiined two or three ideas in time past, 
these new words may remove the ambiguity by being af- 
fixed to some of those ideas. This practice would, by de- 
grees, take away part of the uncertainty of language. 
And ^r thU reason I cannot but congratulate our English 
^gue, that it has been abundantly enriched whh the 
ttanslation of words from all our neighbour nations, as well 
&sfrom ancient languages, and these words have been a^i 
^t were infranchised amongst us ; for French, Latin, 
Greek, and German names, will signify English ideas, as 
^el| as words that are anciently and entirely English. 

It may not be amiss to mention in this place, that, as 
the determination of the particular sense in which any 
^ord is used jt called the definition of the namcy so the enu« 
memtion of the yarious senses of an equivocal word is 
sometimes called the division o€ distinction of the name ; 
<ttd for this purpose good doctrines are of excellent use. 

This distinction of the name or word is greatly necessary 
in argumentation or dispute ; when a fallacious argument 
is used, he that answers it distinguishes the several senses 
of some word or phrase in it, and shews in what sense it i^ 
'*^ff and iQ what sense it is evidentlyyo/^r. 




BX 





LOGIC ; OR, THE Pa?^ 



SECT. IV. 

OF THE DEFIKITIOM OF THIKCS. 

i ./jLS there is much confusion introduced into 
ideas, by the means of those worcf« to which they are aJ 
cd, so thje mingling our ideas "with each other without c 
tion, is a farther occasion whereby they become xonfui 
A court lady J bom and bred \ip amongst /kom/^ and equifu 
and the vain notioiiS of birth and gualify^ constantly j< 
and mixes all these with the idea of herself, and she i; 
gines these to be agential to her nature^ and as it were, 
ccssary to her being ; thence she is tempted to look u 
vi€7iial servani^y and the lowest rank of mankind, a« ano, 
species oj beings quite distinct from herself. A fiitno- 
that has never travelled beyond his own village, and 
.seen nothing but (hatched houses and his fiarish church 
naturally led to imagine that thatch belongs to the i 
nature ofa house^ and that that must be a church whic 
built of stone^ and especially if it has a s/dre upon it. 
child whose uncle has been excessive fond, and his scl 
master very severe, easily believes \hdXfondness always 
longs to unclesy and that severity is essential to master 
instructors. He has seen also soldiers with . red coats 
viinisters with long blaek gownsy and therefore he persu. 
himself that these garbs are essential to those cbaraci 
and that he is not a minister who has not a long black gi 
nor can he be a soldier who is not dressed in red. It w« 
be well if all such mistakes ended with childhood. 

It might be also subjoined, that our complex ideas 
come confused, not only by uniting or blending toge 
more simple or single ideas than really belong to ih^m, i 
the instances just mentioned ; but obscurity and confu 
sometimes come upon our ideas also, ./or want ofuniti 
Hufficient number of single ideas to make the complex c 
So if I conceive ol ^ leopard ou\y as a spotted beasty this > 
not distinguish it from a tyger or a lynxy nor from n 
siogs or horses^ which are spott'ff! t')o : nnd thervfc 



VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 83 

'wrd must have some more ideas added to complete and 
hg!iish it. 

grant that it is a large and free acquaintance with the 
.d, a watchful observation and diligent search into the 
4re of things, that must fully correct this kind of er- 
rors : The ruiea of logic are not sufficient to do it : But 
yet the ruUa of logic may instruct us by what means to dis- 
tinguish one thing from another, and how to search and 
mark out, as far as may be, the contents and limits of the 
nature of distinct beings, and thus may give us great as- 
sistance towards the remedy of these mistakes. 
/ As the dfjirdtion of names tree us from that confusion 
viWzYiHVorda introduce, so the definition of tfUnga yi\\\ in 
some measure guard us against that confusion which 
Tningied ideas have introduced : For, as a definition of the 
name explains what any word means, so a definition of 
the thing explains what is the nature of that thing. / 

In order to form a definition of any thing, we must put 
forth these three acts of the mind. 

/ First, compare the thing to be defined with other things 
that are most like to itself, and see wherein its essence or 
nature agrees with them ; and this is called the general 
fiatureov genus in a definition : So if you would define 
"What nvine is, first compare it with other things like itself, 
as cider^ fi^rry^ &c. and you will find it agrees essentially 
^ilh them in this, that it is a sort of juice. 

Secondly, Consider the most remarkable and primary 
attribute, property, o'c idea wherein this thing differs from 
those other things that are most like it ; and that is, its 
fisential or s/iecific difference : So wine differs from cider ^ 
and /ierry, and all oxh^v juices^ in that it i% pressed from 
agra/ie. This may be called its sfiecial nature^ which dis- 
tinguishes it from oxXitv juices. 

Thirdly, Join the general and special nature togethei^ 
or (which is all one) \h^ genus and the difference^ SLud these 
make up VL definition. So the juice of a gra/iCj or juice 
pressed from gra/ies, is the definition of wine, f 

So, if I would define what winter is, I consider first 
wherein it agrees with other things which are most like it, 
namely, summer^ sftring^ autumny and I find they are all 
ieaions of the year ; therefore a season of thc\jcar U tUe ^cxv- 




84 LOGIC : OR, THE f 

ii». Then I observe wherein it differs from the 
that is in the ahortnctM of the days $ for it is this 
does primarily distinguish it from other seaaonM ; 
fore this may be called its special nature or its dij^ 
Then, by joining these together, I make a definition 
ter is that season of the year therein the days are Si 
I confess indeed this is but a ruder definition of it, 
define it as an accuiate astronomer, 1 must limit tli 
hours, and minutes. 

After the same manner, if we would explain or 
v/hat the fiiclure of man is , we consider first the g 
general nature of it, which is a representation ; and 
it agrees with many other things, as a statue^ a shi 
prints a verbal description of a man, l^c. Then y 
sider wherein it differs from these, and we find it 
from a verbal description, in that it is a represent! 
the eye and not to the ear : It differs from a statue^ 
it is a representation upon a fiat surface, and not in 
figure : It differs from a shadow^ in that it is an 
representation, and not a fleeting one : It differs 
print or draughty because it represents the colours b 
as well as the shape of the object by delineation, 
so many, or rather so few of these ideas put toge 
are just sufficient to distinguish a picture from a 
representations, make up its essential difference, 
special nature ; and all these are included in its bein^ 
ed on a plain surface. Then join this to the genus^ 
is a representation ; and thus you have the complet< 
tion of a man, namely, it is the rtpreseniaiion of a 
paint upon a hurface (or a plane.) 

Hei*e it must be observed, that when we speak 
gcnu^ and dijfference as composing a definition^ it n 
ways be understood that the nearest genusy and the 
difference^ arc t*equired. 

• The next general nature^ or the nearest genus, n 
used in a definition, because it includes all the rest ; 
of its complex idea ; as if I would define wine^ I m 
wine is a /tiice^ which is the nearest genus ; and i 
wine is a li</uidj which is a remote general nulur 
wine isasubsfancejVihichhytt more remote i fc 
includes both, fu^tf/aitcc and liquid, Uesldes, no 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 85 

these two remote general natures would make any distinc- 
lioh between mncy and a thousand other subatancesy or oth« 
UP Hqtdds, a remote genus leaves the thing loo much un- 
distinguished. 

The 8/ieafic- difference is that primary attribute which 
distinguishes each species from one another, while they 
&tand ranked under the same general nature or genus. *Tho' 
ynne differs from other liquids in that it is the juice qf a 
certain fruity yet this is but a general or generic difference^ 
fop it does not distinguish ivine from cider or fierry ; the 
ifieqfic difference of wine therefore is its firessure frem the 
frafie; as cider is pressed from afi/iles, ^nd fierry from fiears. 

In definitions also, we must use the finmary attribute 
that distinguishes the sfiecies or special nature, and not at- 
tempt to define mne by its peculiar tastes, or effects, or 
3ther properties, which are but secondary or consequential^ 
»hen its firessure from the grafie is the most obvious and 
i)pimary distinction of it from all other juices. I confess 
A some cases it is not so easily known which is the pri- 
tnapy idea that distinguishes one thing from another ; and 
therefore some would as soon define winter by the cold- 
^m of the season^ as by the shortness of the days ; though 
the shortness of the days is doubtless the most just, prima^^ 
17 and philosophical difference betwixt that and the other 
Masons of the year, &ince winter days are always shortest^ 
but riot III ways the coldest'; I add also, that the shortness 
tfthe days is one cause of the coldness^ but the coid% no 
cause of their shortness, 

SECT. V 

mtJLES OF THE DEFINITION OF THE THING. 

THE sfiecial rules of a good definition are the follow- 

Rule I A definition must be universal^ or, as some call 

tiUdeguate ; that is, it must agree to all the particular 
pedes or individuals that are included under the same 
liea ; *v^xYkQ juice of a grafie agrees to all proper mv^ft.^^ 
[hethcr rcd^ white, French^ Sficm^sh^ J?lorence^ ^% 



86 LOGIC : OR, THE Paut 1 

Rule IT-...// must be firofier and/tecuUar to the thing drfifk 
€tU fi'iil agree to that alone ; for it is the very design of 
(lefiniiion effectually to distinguish one thing from all oth 
crs : So i\\c juice qfa grafie agrees to no other tubstancc 
to no other liquid* to no other being but 'nfine. 

These two rules being observed} wHl always render 
definition reci/irocal wth the t/tings defined ; which il 
scholastic way of speaking, to si^inify that the definitio 
may be used in any sentence in the place of the thing dt 
fined, or they may be mutually confirmed concerning eac- 
othcr, or substituted in the room of each other. Thejuic 
ofthi grafie ia wincy or 'ioine is the juice qf the grafie, A» 
wheresoever the word v)ine is used, you may put thejuic 
cf the gra/ic instead of it, except when you consider twii 
rather as a word than a thing, or when it is mentioned I 
such logical rules. 

Rule III ^4 drjinifion ought to be clear and filain ; fo 

the dcsi'^n of it is to lead us into the knowledge of the thin] 
(I c fined. 

Il'jncc it will follow, that the words used in a definiiioi 
out^ht not to be doubffuly or equivocal and obscure^ but a 
plain and easy as the language will afford : And indeed i 
is a g^fneral rule concerning the definition both of name 
and thingsj that no word should be used in either of then 
which lias any darkness or difBculty in it, unless it ba 
been before explained or defined. 

Hence it will follow also, that there are many thing 
which cannot well be defined, either as to the name ortli 
////?;,(/•, unless it be by synonymous words, or by a negatio! 
of the contrary idea, ^c, for learned men know not hoi 
to make tlicm more evident, or more intelligible, thanth 
ideas which every man has gained by the vulgar method 
of teaching. Such are the ideas c)f extemiony duHUi^ 
couscioufiurfiSy and most of our simple ideas, and particj 
larly sensible qualities, as whitcy blucy redy cUdy hcaty shri 
bittery sour, kc. 

\Vc can say of durationy that it ia a continuance in beifi 
or a 7iot ceasing to be ; we can say of consciousness y that 
is as it were a feeling ivirhin ourselves ; we may say, hi 
is th.it which is not cold; or sour is that which is like vinega 
or wc may point to the clear sky, and say, that is bit 



Chap. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 87 

These are vulgar melhods of teaching the dtjirjuontt rf 
aomeMj or meaning of words. But there arc some philo- 
I sophers, whose attempts to define these thing learnedly 
hare wrapt up their ideas in (rrcater darkness, and exposed 
(bemselres to ridicule and contempt ; as when they define 
heat^ they say, it is QuaUtai con^regatia homogcncay nnd 
Kj^egana /leterogeitra ; that is, a qu^iliiy gatiicring togi-thcv 
lhin;);sof the same kind, and separating things of a diflVr- 
enlkind. So they define vMte^ a colour arhing from the 
prevalence of brightnefia : But every child knows As/ and 
tnA(> better without these definitions. 

There are many other definiiions giren by the Peripa- 
tetick philosophers, which are very faulty, by reason of 
their obscurity ; as motion is defined by them the act of a 
being in fiowery ao farfjtth aa it ia in fiO'nfcr, Time ia the 
nnmreornumbtr cfwotion according to pa^t^ /irearntjond 
future. The aonl is the act of an organical natural body^ huv- 
ngl'fc in fiowcr ; and several others of the same star^p. 

Rule IV.-^It IS also commonly prescribed amongst the 
rules of definition, that it ahoulJ be ahort, so that it mi:fiS 
Itauc no tautology in it^ nor any ^orda sufierfuoua. I confess 
definiiions ought to be expressed in as few words as is 
consistent with a clear and just explication of the nature 
ofthe thing defined, and a rfistinction of it from all other 
Ihinj^s besides : But it is of much more importHncc, and 
&r better, that a definition should explain clearly the sub* 
ject we treat of, though the words be many^ than to leave 
obscurities in the sentence by confining it within too nar- 
ro:y limits. So in the dcfiniiion which we have given of 
^icy that is the«r^ cf using reason rjcll in the search after 
truths and the commur,icatioti of it to others^ it has indeed 
many words in it, but it could not be wt 11 shorter, jirt is 
\\i^ genua wherein it agrees with rhetoric^/iotay^ arithmetic^ 
vrestlingy failing, buildings &c. for all these are arts also : 
Bm the difference or special n9ture of it is drawn from 
US object, reason ; from the act using it welly and from its 
two great ends or designs, namely, the aearch after truths 
and the communication ofit; nor can it be justly described 
and cxpUined in fewer ideas. 

v.. ..If we add v^ffh rule, it must be, that neither the thing 
d^Jined, y.or a wrrr ^'mow/mous name, ahould make a part of 



88 LOGIC : OR, THE Pabt I. 

the drfiniiiony foP this would be no explication of the nature 
of thv th'nig ; and a s}nonymoiis woixl al best could only 
be 'ddi'/initio7i of the natnr. 



SECT. VI. 

OBSFRVATIONS CONCERNING TH)$ DEFINITION OF TUIKGS. 



B 



EFORE I part with this subject, I must pro- 
pose several observations which reUte to the definition of 

tilings. 

litt Observ. There is no need that, in drfinitMWU^ we 
siiould ' e confined to one single attribute ^r firofierty^ i& 
KiwU? to express the ditTerence of the thing definedf be 
sunaiinu-s tne csstjuiai difference consists in two ovthffC 
lilc'.is or altrloutss. So a ^rcrrr is a man tvAo buys wnd 
sells suirjry aud /u'unibs and s/iicesjlr gain, A dock is afl 
engine nvith vjeights and Tvhce.'s, that shows the hour of the 
daij h*Ah by f muting and striking : And if I were to define 
a reficating ckck^ I must add another property, namclft 
that it also rrfieats the hour. So that the true and prima* 
ly essentiul difference of some complex ideas consisiinfc 
in several ciistinct properties, cannot be well expressed 
^vithout conjunctive panicles of speech. 

2(1. Ohacrv. There is no need that definitions should al- 
v.'ays be fiositivey for some things differ from others merely 
by a defect of what others have ; as, if a chair be defined 
a a fat J^r a single ft vr:- on nvilh a back beUnging toit^ than a 
'i'ool is :i Stat for a single ficrson vAthout a back ; and a 
./' /-.'.v is a Stat for stvcral fiersons ivithnut a back : These 
are r . vrvr/iT di. Terences. So */'// is ivant of conformity to 
f'lt ia:i' \f God ; blindness is a ivant of sight ; a vagabond 
is a fu rson iviih'jiit a home. Some ideas are negative^ and 
ilxir (kiinilion ought to be so too. 

5 / OcsrrxK Some things may have two or more drfini- 
i'jTiSy and each of them equally just and good ; as a m/Zf* 
i^> the Irngfhof eight fur longs j or it is the third fiar: of a 
i -ut^ue. Eternal is that which ever vfasy and ever shall be i 
or it is that luhich had no beginning and shall have no cnd% 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 89 

Man* is usually defined a rational animal : But it may be 
much better to define him a a/iirit united to an animal qf 
9uch a shafiCy or jin animal of such a fiecuiiar ahafie united 
to a afiirit, or a being comfioaed qfsuch an animal and a mind. 

4//i Obaerv, Where the eaaencea of things are evident, 
and clearly distinct from each other, there we may be 
more accurate and exact in the definitions of them : But, 
where their Mff^wre* approach near to each other, the deji^ 
nition is more difficult. A lurdmzy be defined 2i feathered 
niiimal with wings, a ski/i may be defined a large holloiv 
building made to fiaas over the %vater vfith sails : But if you 
ask me to define a bat^ which is between a bird and a beasts 
or to define a barge and hoyj which are between a boat and 
a 8hi/i, it is much harder to define them, s>r to adjust the 
bounds of their e«sence. This is very .evident in all mon- 
Urous births, and irregular firoductions of nature, as well as 
in many tborlcs of art, which partake so much of one s/ie^ 
' cies, and so much of another^ that we cannot tell under 
which sfiecies to rank them, .or how to determine their 
^lecific difference. 

The several sfiecies of bein;3;s are seidom precisely lim- 
ited in the nature of things by an uncertain and unaltera- 
ble bounds : The essences of many things do not consist 
in indivisibiU, or in one evident indivisible point, as some 
bave imagined ; but by various degrees they approach 
nearer to, or differ more from, others that are of a lundred 
Batttre. So (as I have hinted before) in the very mitldle 
of each of the arches of a rainbow, the colours o( green, 
V^liow and red, are sufficiently distinguished ; but near 
the borders of the several arches they run into one anoth- 
^h SO that you hardly know how to limit the .colours, nor 
whether to call it red or yellotir, green or blue. 

5th Obs^rv. As the highest .or chief ge^u^es, jiamely, 

* The connnon definition of man name)1y» a rational animal, is ve- 
O'ftiuhy. 1. Because the animal is not rational; the rationality of 
wan arises from the mind to which th« animal is united. 2 Be- 
cause if a spirit should be united to a horse, and make it a rational 
^ng, surely this would not be a man : It is evident therefore that 
^e peculiar shape must enter into the definition of a nlao to render it 
just and perfect ; and for want. of a full description thereof, all ou,r 
definitions ?ire defective. 



yo LOGIC : OR, THE PaktL 

being and 7i9t-being, can never be defined, because there ii 
no genus superior to them : so neither can singular ideai 
or individuals be well defined, because either they have no 
essential differences from other individuals, or their difier- 
cnces are not known ; and therefore individuals are onlf 
to be described by their particular circumstances : So 
King George is distinguished from all other men and other 
kings, by describing him as the first king of Great Britain 
0/ the house ef Brun8V)ick ; and Westminster Hall is des- 
cribed by its situation and its use, b'r. 

That individual bodies can hardly have any essential 
difference, at least within the reach of our knowledge, rosy 
be made thus to appear : Methuielah, when he was nine 
hundred and sixty years old^ and perhaps worn out with 
age and weakness, was the 9ame person as when he was in 
his full vigour of 7nanhood^or when he was an infant^ new« 
ly born ; but how far wus his body the same ? Who can 
tell whether there wus any fibre of his flesh or his bones 
that coniinued the same throughout his whole life ? Or 
"who can determine which are those fibres ? The shifi in 
"which Sir Francis Drake saiUd round the world might be 
new built, and refitted so often, that-few of the same tim" 
bers remained ; and who can say whether it must be cal* 
led the same ship or not ? And what is its essential di^ 
ference ? How shall we define Sir Francis Drake's shipi 
or make a definition for Methuselah ? 

To this head belongs that most difficult question, What 
is the firincifile of individuation ? Or what is it that makes 
any one thing the same as it was some time before ? This 
is too large and laborious an inquiry to dwell upon in this 
place : Yet I cannot forbear to mention this hint, namely. 
Since our own bodies must' rise at the last day for us to 
receive rewards or puliishments in them, there may be 
perhaps some original fibres of each human body, some 
stamina vita^ or primeval seed of life^ which may remain 
unchanged through all the stages of life, death, and the 
grave ; these may become the springs and principles of s 
resurrection, and sufficient to denominate it that same hod^ 
But, if there be any such constant and vital atoms whicl 
distinguish every human body^they are known to God oi^ly 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 91 

6(A Obaerv. Where we cannot find ouiihe essence ov 

asentiat difference of any species or X'/Wof beings that wc 

vouid define} we must content ourselves with a collection 

of such c/iie/ fiarts or properties of it as may best explain 

itfio far as it Is known, and best distinguish it from other 

things : So a marigold is a Jlower which hath many long 

mid yeUow leaves^ round a litle knot of seeds in the midst^ 

tnr/A such a peculiar stalky &c. So if we would define silver^ 

ve say it is a white and hard metal^ next in weight to gold : 

If we would define an elder tree^ we might say it is one 

among the lesser treesj whose younger branches are soft and 

JnUofpith^ whose leaves are jagged or indented^ and qfsuch 

a particular shape j and it dears large clusters of small black 

i hnries : So me must define earthy stoncj a lion an eagle ^ a 

I ttrjienty and the greatest part of natural beings, by a col- 

[ kaion of those properties, which according to our obser- 

I niion distinguish them from all other things. This is 

what Mr. Locke calls nominal essence j and nominal defni' 

ims. And indeed, since the essential differences of the 

vinous natural beings or bodies round about us arise from 

I peculiar shape, size, motion, and situation of the small 

particles of which they are composed, and since we have 

noiufRcient method to inform us what these are, we must 

be contented with such a sort q/* definition of the bodies 

they compose. 

Hereno/r, That this sort of definition, which is made 
qi of a mere collection of the most remarkaMe parts or 
I prope rties, is called an imperfect definition^ or a description ; 
I whereas the definition is called perfect when it is compos- 
I cdofthe essential dijference^ added to the general nature 
^ ^^enus, 

1th Observ. The perfect definition of any being always 
UKludes the definition of the name whereby it is called, for 
it iDforms us of the sense or meaning of i^i word, and 
>hew8 us what idea that word is affixed to : But the dffini^ 
tknrfths name does by no means include a ptfect dffini* 
A'on of the thing ; for, as we have said before, a mere sy- 
iKmymous word, a negation of the contrary, or the men- 
tion of any one or two distinguishing properties of the 
tbingf may be a sufficient definition cf the name. Yet in 
tbose cases where the essential diffcrencea or essence of a 



92 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. T. 

thing; is unknown, there a drfinition of the namtf by (he 
chief properties, and a dcscrifiiion tf the things are muck 
the same. 

And here I think it necessary to take notice of one gea* 
eral sentiment, that seems to run through that excellent 
peiTormance, Mr. Locke's Essay on human understandings \ 
and that is. That the essence qf things are utterly unknowa. 
to us, and therefore all our pretences to distinguish the 
essences of things can reach no farther than mere nominal 
essences ^ or a collection of such properties as we know t 
to some of which we afBx particular names, and others ve 
bundle up, several together, under one name : And that, 
all our attempts to rank beings into different kinds of spe- 
cies can reach no farther than to make mere nominaitjk' 
cies ; and therefore our definitions of things are butatfn 
nominal dcscri/ifions or definitions of the name.'* 

Now, that we may do justice to that great author, ire 
Gu^ht to consider that he confines this sort of discoune 
only to the essence ofsimfde ideas ^ and to the essence q/'ut^ 
stances^ as appears evident in the fourth and sixth chapten 
of his third book ; for he allows the names 0/ mixed modn 
always to signify the real essences of their s/tecieSy Chap. V* 
and he acknowledges artificial things to have real distinct ^ 
sjiccies ; and that, in the distinction of their essencesi there \ 
is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in natural^ '- 
Chap. VI. sect. 40, 41. though it must be confessed that ' 
he scarcely makes any distinction between the dtfinitifm tf 
jhcTiame and the definition of the things Chap. IV. and some* . 
limes the current of his discourse decries the knowledge </ 
essences in such general terms as may justly give occaaioO 
to mistake. 

It must be granted, that the essence of most of our «>' 
f^le idcasy and the greatest part of particular natural sub* 
stances are m)|ich unknown to us ; and therefore the esseii' 
tial difference of different qualities, and of the various kindi^ 
of bodies, (as I have said before) lie beyond the reach of ou^ 
understandings : We know not what makes the piimar/ 
real inward distinctions between red^ green, sweety soury &c- 
between wood^ iron, «?/, stone^fre^ vtater^fcshy clay, in their 
general natures ; nor do we know what are the inward 
9nd prime distinctions between all the particular kinds or 
epecies in the vegetable^ animal^ mineral^ metallic^ or Hfuid 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 93 

world of thuigs. Si^c PMosofthical Essaya^'Ess^y x\. stc. I. 
But sliil there is a very large field for the knowledge of 
the esseneea of things, and foivthe use ol perfect definitions 
amongst our complex ideasj the modal afifiearances and 
thangea of nature^ the ivorka of art ^ the mattera of acienccy 
and all the affairs of the civil the moral j and the religloua 
Hfe: And indeed it is of much more importance to all 
mankind, to have a better acquaintance with the luorka of 
on for their own livelihood and daily use, with the affairs 
©/■morality for their behavior in this world, and with the 
mttera of religion^ th^t they may be prepared for the world 
to come, than to be able to give a perfect definition of the 
works of nature. 

If the particular essences of natural bodies are unknown 
to us, we . may be yet good philosophers, good artists, 
good neighbors, good subjects, and good Christians, with- 
out that knowledge ; and we have just reason to be con- 
tent. 

Now that the essences of some of the modal afi/iearan^ 
CM and changea in nature^ as well as thinga ofart^ acienccj 
and morality^ are suiHciently known to us to make perfect 
dffitttdona of them> will appear by the specimen of a few 
definitions of these things. 
Motion is a change of a place. Swiftneaa is the passing 
i over along space in a short time. A natural day is the 
. time qe ■'ue alternate revplution of light and darkness, or it 
is the^S&Aation of twenty-four hours. An eclifiae of the aun 
^ is a defect in tiie sun*s transmission of light to us by the 
I moon interposing. *Snow is congealed vapour. *//a//is 
I congealed rain. An *ialand is a piece of land rising above 
the surrounding water. An *///// is an elevated part of the 
earth, and a *grove is a piece of ground thick set with 
trees. An /loiiae is a building made to dwell in. A cot' 
tage is a mean house in the country. A aufi/ier is that 
meal which we make in the evening. A triangle is a fig- 
ure composed of three sides. A gallon is a measure con- 



•Note — Island, hill, grove, are not defined here in their nnore re- 
mote and substantial natures, (if I may so express it) or as the mat. 
ler of them is earth ; for in this sense we know not their essence, but 
only as considered in their modal appearances whereby cue T^^xiCkV 
earth is distinguished from another. The a*me taw \ia ^v^ «^V ^'sw^s^ i, 



94 LOGIC : OR, T»E Part. I 

taining eiRht pints. A Porter is a man who carries bu^ 
dens for hire. A king\^ the chitif rnler in a kingdom. 
Veracity is the conformity of our words to our thou^'hts. 
Covetouincss is an excessive love of money, or other p(»- 
sessions. Killing is the taking away the life of an animftl 
Murdt:r is the unlawful killin;^ of a man. Rhetoric istbe 
art of speaking in a manner fit to persuade* A'aturatjild: 
hsofihii is the knowledge of the properties of bodies, and 
the various eflects of them, or it is the knowledge of th6 
various appearance in nature, and their causes ; and Lfi^ 
is the art of using our reason wc'l, 8cc. 

Thus you see the essential difference of various beiigs 
may be known, and are borrowed from thtir gualitinm 
firo/ierticif, ihtir causes^ rfftcttj object b^ adjunct end4%kc» 
and indeed, as infinitely various as the cMence9 of tbfaigi 
are, thcrir dejinitiona must needs have various formsi 

After all it must be confessed, that many logicians and 
philosophers in the former ages have made too great abuf- 
tie about the exactness of their definitions of things, and 
entered into long fiuitless controversies, and very ridicu- 
lous debates in the several sciences, about adjusting the 
f'jgical formati tics oity try definition ; whereas that sort of 
wrangling is now grown very justly contemptible, since it 
is agreed that true learning and the knowledge of things 
depend much more upon a large acquaintance wijh their 
various properties, causes, effects, sujcct, object, '., da and 
designs, than it docs upon the formal and schoiakt««'nice* 
ties of ffvnua and difference. 



SFXT. VII. 

OF A COMPJLRTE CONCEPTION' OF THINC.S. 



H 



AVIXG dwelt so long upon the first ruie^ 
u'lrect o\u' conceptions, and given an account of the drjifi 
'ion both of namca and thiti^H^ in order to gain clear af 
distinct ideasy we make haste now to the second rute, ' 
guide our conceptions, and that is, (\ncjx*c of t/iin^s e^r 
jdetebj in all (heir f'arfs. 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF UEASOX. 95 

All tfar(B have a rcftrcncc to some nvhole : Now tliere is 
an old clistincuon which logical writers make of a whole 
and h%fiart8 into four r>cvcral kindsi and it may be proper 
just to mention them here. 

1. There is a metafihyaic€tl whole, when the essence of 
• thing is said to consist of two /larta^ the ^enua and the 
'4ifffTencfy that is, the general and the special nature, which 
being joined together make up a d^Jiniiion, This has 
been the suhject of the foregoing sections. 

3. There is a mathematical whole^ which is better called 
integral^ when the several parts which go to make up the 
nhole are really distinct from one another, and each of 
tbcm nay subsist apart. So the head^t the Umba^ and the 
fn»fit,are the integral parts of any large number ; so these 
i&scourses which I have written concerning pcrcefition^ 
Judgment^ reaaoningy and dia/ioaition^ are the four integral 
parts of /o^/c. This sort of parts goes to make up the 
€om/iieteneaa of any subject ; and this is the chief and most 
^rect matter of our discourse in this section. 

3. There is a fihyaical or eaaential wholc^ which is usu- 
ally made to signify and ir.chule only the two eaaential parta 
of man, body and aoul : Rut I think the sense of it may 
better be altered, or at least enlarged, and so include all the 
cucntial modes, attributes, or properties, which are con- 
tained in t e com/irchenaian of any idea. This shall be the 
luhject of discourse under the third rule to direct our con- 
iejifiona. 

4. There is sl logical whole^ which is also called an um- 
veraal j and the fiarta of it are all the fiarticuiar ideaa to 
which this universal nature extends. So ^ genua ia a whole 
in respect to several afieciea which are its parts. So the 
species is a whole^ and all the individual are the /larta of it. 
This shall be treated of, in the fourth rule to guide our 
fonce/iiiona. 

At present we consider an idea as an integral whole j and 
ourteronrf rule directs us to contemplate it in all it a parta : 
Bot this can only refer to complex ideas, for simple ideaa 
bftvc no parts. 



96 LOGIC: OR, THE Part I 

SECT. VIII. 

OF DIVISION AND THE RULES OF IT. 



S 



INCE our minds at'., narir.w in their capacity} 
and cannot survey the several p.xiia of any complex bein|) 
'with one single view, as God sees ell things at once; 
therefore we must, as it were, take it to pieces, and con- 
sider of the purts sepai-ately, that we may have a more 
complete conception of the whole. So that, if I would 
learn the naiure of a watch^ the workman takes it to piecei 
and shews me the sfiHng^ the ivheela^ the axlea^ the/^infOfff, 
the balance^ the dial-filate^ the pointer^ the caacy 8cc. and 
describes each of these things to me apart, together with 
their fiq^ures and their uses. If I would know whataD 
animal isi the anatomist considers the head the trunks the 
limbsy the bowels^ apart from each other, and gives me dis- ■ 
tinct lectures upon each of them, So a kingdom is divided 
into its several firovinces ; a book into its several chafiteni 
and any science is divided according to the several eubjectt 
of which it treats. \ 

This is what we properly call the division of an ideOi ] 
which is an exfilication of the whole by its several parts^ iff 
an enumeration of the several parts that go to compose any. ' 
whole idea, and to render it complete. And I think when i 
man is divided into body and soul, it properly comes under j 
this part of the doctrine of integral division, as well U 
when the mere body is divided inVo head, trunk, and Urnbs •* 
This division is sometimes called partition. 

When any of the parts of any idea are yet farther diri* 
ded, in order to a clear explication of the whole, thi<s is cal- 
led a subdivision ; as when a near is divided into montkti 
each month into days, and each day into hours, which 
may also be farther subdivided into minutes and seconds. ^ 

It is necessary, in order to a full explication of ayiy be* 

ing, to consider each part, and the properties of it, distinct 

by itself, as well as in its relation to the whole : For there 

2re man/ properties that belong to the several parts of a 

being which cannot properly be ^'a^tv\>^^ v^ xX«i "mVi^ 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 97 

though these properties may fit each part for its prop 
tr station, and as it stands in that relation to tl\c 
vhole complex being : As in a house^ the doora are move- 
able, the rooms square, the ceilings white, the windows 
transparent, yet the /louse is uf ither mov,eable3 nor square, 
nor white, nor transparent. 

The special Rules of a good Diviiiofi are these, 

I Rule Each fiart singly taken must contain less than 

the whole^ but all the /tarts taken collectively^ (or together^) 
must contain neither more nor less than the nvhole. There- 
fore, if in discoursing of a tree you divide it into the trunk 
and Uarves^ it is an imperfect division, because the reot and 
th« branches are needful to make up the wliole. So logic 
would be ill divided into afifirehension^ judgment and req^ 
toning ; for method is'a considerable part of the art which 
teaches us to use our reason right, and should by no 
means be omitted. 

Upon this account, in every division wherein we design 
a perfect exactness, it is necessary to examine the whole 
idea with diligence, lest we omit any parts of, it through 
^ant of care ; though in >ome cases it is not possible, and 
io others it is not necessary, that we should dscend to the 
minutest parts. 

II Rule...... In all divisions we should first consider the 

hrger and more immediate fiarts of the subject^ and not di- 
vide it mt once into the more minute and remote fiarts. It 
vould by no means be proper to divide a kingdom first Into 
^treetSy and lanes^ 9X\d fields ; but it must be first divided 
hio firovinces or counties^ then those counties may be di- 
vided into towns J villages, fields, &c. and towns into streets 
tnd lanes^ 

III Rule The several fiarts of a division ought to be 

f^fiositey that is, one fiart ought not to contain another. It 
vrould be a rediculous division of an animal into heady iimby 
Myy and brain^ for the brains are contained in the head» 

Yet here it must be noted, that sometimes the subjects 
of any treatise, or the objecfl of any particular science^ 
may be properly and necessarily so divid^id> \\\^X. >Cci^ ^v*~ 
«nd mtky Include the first, and the Uutd xa^^ \tvc\>\^^ >icifc 
tnt mod Mccoad, without offending agaAXv^V \.\Cv^ x>^'»^>'^^' 

1 






98 LOG IC : OR, THE Part. L 

cause 111 the second or following^ parts of the science of 
discourse these objects are not considered in the same 
manner as in the first ; as for instance, geometry divides 
its objects into Unes^ aur/acea^ and aoiida : Now, thong^h a 
iine be contained in a aurfacc or a aolid^ yet it is not con- 
sidered in a aiirface^ separate and alone, or as a mere lintj 
as it is ill the first part of geometry^ which treats olUnen. 
So logic i^ rightly divided into conre^//ort,yttt/j§f>iie«^, rra«o«- 
ing^ and method. For, though ideaa or concefitiona are con- 
tained in the following parts otiogic, yet they are not there 
treated of as se/iaraie ideaay which are the proper sobjcct 
of the first part. 

IV Rule Let not aubdiviaiona be too numeroua without 

nscesaity : For it is better many times to distinguish more 
parts at once, if the subject will bear it, than to mince the 
discourse by excessive dividing and subdividing. It is 
preferable therefore, in a treatiseof j'fo^ay^^y, to&ay^that 
in a city we will consi^Ier its luaiiay its gatea^ its buildmgi^ 
its «/rf f/^j and /ane^, than to divide it formerly firstinio 
the encom/iaaaifig and the encomflaaaed parts ; the enconi- 
passing parts are the ipalla and gatea^ the encompassed 
parts include the Vfaya and buildinga ; the ways are the 
street a and the lanea ; buildings consist of the /oundationf 
and the auficratructure^ &c. 

Too great a number of siibdivisionshas been affected by 
some persons in sermons, treatises, instructions, &c. un- 
der pretence of great accuracy : But this sort of subtilities 
hath often caused great confusion to the undtrstandingf 
and sometimes more difficulty to the memory. In these 
cases it is only a good judgment can determine what aub^ 
tUviaiona are useful. 

V Rule Divide evciy auhjcct according ttk the afiecid 

deaign you have in viciu. One and' the same idea or sub- 
jett may be divided in very different manners, accot>dingtc 
the different purposes we have in discoursing of it. Sa 
if a/irinter were tjo consider the several parts of a book^ h( 
must divide it into a/ieeta, the aheeta into fiagea^ the fiago 
into linea^ and the linea into lettera. But a grammarian di 
vides a book mio fierioda^ aen(e7jcea^ and worda, or parts o 

speech, as nourit fironoun^yerb^ Ue. K logician cf^ivi^ 

a dooJt as divided into chapters^ sections, arguments, iix\ 

osirfopiif^ id€a9 i and, with tVve \ke\i? ^i ontolog\I^V«£ ^^ 




CUAP. VI. UIGHT USE Ol' RL ASOX. ^^ 

\\\t firofioniiiona into subject y obJ€Ct^ fnoficrty^ rflatioiu «' - 
tioTiy fiasaioftj causcj rfftrctj 8cc. But it would be very ri- 
diculous for a logician to divide a book into sheet s^ fiai^rn 
and line8 ; or for a firintcr to divide it into no^m9 and ftro 
t'iLniy or into /irt/ioaitions^ ideas^ fwofierticz^ or causes. 

VI Rule //I all your divitsione observe rAth the ifrra: 

rst exact ne89 the nature qfthinga And here I am con- 
strained to make a subdivision of this rule into two very 
accessary particulars. 

(I.) Z,et the/tarti of your dlvtstons be such as are //re/:' 
rrly diatinguhhed in nature. Do not divide asunder those 
parts of the idea vhich are intimately united in nature, nor 
unite those things into one part ^vhich nature has evident- 
ly disjoined « Thus it would be very improper, in treating^ 
of an aniinal boduy to divide it into the aufierior and inferior 
ktvea i for it would be hard to say how much belongs by 
nature to tli« inferior half and how much to the sufierior. 
Much more improper would it be still to divide the animal 
into the right hand fiarts and left hand fiarta^ which would 
bring greater confusion. This would be as unnatural as if 
a man should cleave a hascl nut in halves through the husl:y 
the 9beUf and the kernel^ at oncei and say^ a nut is divided 
into th^se tvfo fiarts ; whereas nature leads plainly to the 
tbreeibld distinction of htisky shelly and kernel. 

(2.) Do not affect dufiUcafes^ nor trifiUcateSj nor any 
certain number of parts in your divi^iion of things ; for we 
know of no such certain number of parts which God the 
Creator has observed in forming all the varieties of his 
creatures ; nor is there ^ny uniform determined number 
of parts in the various subjects of human art or science ; 
ret some persons have disturbed the oi'der of nature, and 
abused their readers, by ah affectation of dichotomies^ trich^ 
oiomieSf sevens^ t^elveSyk.z, Let the nature of the sub- 
ject! considered together with the design which you have 
in view, always determine the number of parts into which 
fou divide it. 

After all, it must be confessed, that an intimate knowl- 
edge of things, and a judicious observation, will assist in 
Ihe business of <//Vz«/o7i, as well as of f/r^m//o7f, better than 
loo nice and curious an attention to the mere formalities of 
logical writers, without a real acquaintance with things. 



793010 ^ 



100 LOGIC : OR, THE Paet I. 

SECT, ix! 

OF A CONPaSRENSITt CONCEPTIOIT OF TRISCt, ^W OT 

ABSTRACTIOX. 



T 



HE third rule to direct our conceptiont n- 
tiuircs us to conceive of things comfireheitBivefy, Atvf 
must survey an object in all its fiaru to obtain a am/deie, 
htea of it, so we must consider it in all its modeif aiiriiateh 
firo/ieriiea and relations^ in order to obtain a comfirehendtf 
conception of it. 

The comfireAenaion of an Idea, as it was explained Older 
the doctrine of unlversals* includes onlf the ene^M 
modes or attrihutcM of that idea ; but in this place the woni 
is taken in a larger aense^ and implies also the Yirloiis i»-i 
cas2L>nal firofiertiea^ accidental modcMj and relations. 

The necessity of this rule is founded upon the saw 
reason as the former, namely^ That our minds are vu» 
row and scanty in their capacities, and as they arenot ibte 
to consider all iht fiarta of a complex idea at onee^ so nc!tli* 
cr can they at once contemplate all the different attribnUn 
and circum%tance9 of it : We must therefore consiikr 
things succeaaivcly and gradually in their various appea^ 
finces and circumstances : As our natural eye caanot |l 
once behold the six sides of a die or cuhe^ nor lake OOgrii' 
znnce of all the fiointa that are marked on them, and there* 
fore we turn up the sides successively, and thus aiimy 
»nd number the points that are marked on each m4e^ thlt 
we may know the whole. 

In order to a com/irehopgive view of any idea, we milit 
:irst consider, whether the object of it has an exiateneiu 
veil as essence ; whether it be a simple or contfilex idea ; 
'viieiher it be a substance or a mode. If it be a substmnc€% 
.lien we must inquire what are the fttfn/ia/ modes ofil 
I) arc nccensury to its nature, and what are those 
,-^:les or accidents of it which belong to it occasionallv 
K US Ir is placed in some partiQular circumstances : Vit 
\\v\'.\ \ lew it in 'wsintrmal and absolute mo^fi\ and observe 
■'. i 1 "boqe various ex^rmai relations in which it stands tc 



■ • I ! J'. 



^. 



Chap. VI. WGHT USE OF REASON. t«l 

olhcp beings : We must consider it in its fioix^era and ca- 
fucitiea either to do or suffer : We must trace it up to its 
various causes^ whether, supreme or subordinate. We must 
descend to the variety of its effects^ and take notice of the 
several ends and denigns which are to be attained by it: 
We must conceive of it as it is either an object or a {subject^ 
what are the things that are akin to it, and what are the 
ofi/iosiics or contraries of it ; for many things are to be 
known both by their contrary and kindred ideas. 

If the thing we discourse of be a mere mode^ we must in- 
cisure whether it belongs to sfiiriio or bodies ; whether it be a 
physical or /wore/ mode ; If more/, then we roust consider 
its relation to God^ to our selves, to our neighbor ; its refer- 
ence to this life^ or the life to come* If it be a virtue, we 
roust seek what are the Jirinci files of it, what are thj? rules. q£ 
it, what are the tendencies -oi'ii, and what are ihcjalsexurr 
tues thvii counterfeit it, and what are the real vices that op- 
pose it, what are the evils wlvich attend the neglect of it, 
«nd wh^t are the rewards of ih^firactice of it, both here and 
hereafter. 

If the subject be historical, or a matter of /act, Ve may 
then inquire whether the action was done at all ; whether 
k was done in such a manner, or by such persons as is re- 
ported / at what time it was done ; in what filace ; by what 
ntotive, and for what design ; what is the evidence of the 
Jdcti who are the witnesses "; what is their fAarfirc/er and 
credibility ; what stgns there arc of such a fact ; what conm 
current circumstances which may either support the truth 
of it, or render it doubtful. 

In order .to make xlue inqirines into all these, and many 
other particulars which go towards the comfilete and com- 
firehensive idea of any being, the science odontology is ex- 
ceeding necessary. This is what was wont to be called 
Xht/irst qfinetafit^ysics Jn the Perijiatetick schools. It treats 
ai being in its most general nature, and of all its affections 
and relati<Ms. I confess •the old Popish 4tchoolmen hav^ 
mingled a number of useless svibti lilies with this science / 
they have exhausted their own spiritS) .and the spirits of 
their readers, in many laborious and intricate trifles 4 and 
^ome of their wt*itings have been fruitful, of name* without 
'^drasj ^hich have done much injury lo \\\t ^'^^^x^^^vo^^'^ til 



103 LOGIC : OR, THE PavltI 

^(Uvinity. Upon this account many of the moderns hare 
,wai9%i unjustly abandoned the whole science at once, and 
• throw abimdance of contempt and raillery upon the very 
■■ name of meiafihy^cs ; but this contempt and censure is 
very unreasonable/ ; for this science, separated from' some 
Aristotelian fooleries, and-scholctsticaubtilities, is so neces* 
sary to a distinct conception, solid judgment, and just rea* 
soning on many subjects, that sometimes it is introduced 
as a/ar/ o/logicy and not without reason. And those who 
utterly despise and ridicule it, either betray their own ig- 
norance, or will be supposed to make their wit and banter 
u refuge and excuse for their own laziness. Yet this much 
I would add, that the later writers of ontology are generally 
t}\e best on this account, because they have left out much 
of the ancient jargon. See the Brief Scheme of Ontology 
in the I^holosofihical Essay a^hy /. Watts, 

Here let it be noted, that it is neither useful, necessar}*, 
or possible, to run through cr// the modeoy circumstances and 
relations of every subject we take in hand .; but in ontclo* 
,q'y we enumerate a great variety of them, that so a judi- 
cious mind may chosse what arc those circumatanccsy relo" 
tions^ and firopcrtiea of any subject, which are most ne- 
<:es5ary to the present design of him that speakS'Or writes, 
»,ill)cr to explain, to illustrate, or to prove the point. 

A s we arrive at the comfdete knowledge of an idea in all 
ils/'^r;«, by that act of the mind which is called division^ 
so we come to a co7w/irfAf««i;ff conception of a thing in Its 
several iirofierties and relations, by that act of the mind 
wluch is called abstraction ; that is, we consider each sin- 
.«;]e relation or properly of the subject alone ; and thus 
Nve do as it were withdraw and separate it in our minds, 
i.oth from the subject itself, as Well as from other proper- 
:it:v £,nd relations, in order to mftke a fuller observation of if. 

This act of abstraction is «2od to be twcrfbld, either fire* 
u^it'C or negative. 

) Precisive abstraction is when we consider those thingrs 
^part which cannot really exist apart ; as when we con* 
Wilder a mode without considering its sitbstance and subject^ 
4)r one csaen(ial mode without another, JSPegative abstrdC' 
tjgn iis; ^'hen we .consider one thing separate frvm anolber, 



Chap. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 10? 

vsWich may also exist without it ; as when we conceive of 
a 9vbjcct without conceiving; of its accidental modea or rr* 
htiona ; or when we conceive of one accident without 
thinking ot anoiher. If I think of reading or vjriiing with- 
out the express idea of some man^ this is fireciaive abatrac- 
tim; or if 1 think of the attraction ofiron^ without the ex- 
IKess idea of some particular magnetic body. I^ut, when 
I think of a needle witliout an idea of its ehar/meas^ this is 
ir^ttve abatraction / and it is the same when I think of its 
ikar/ineaa without considering its length. 



SECT. X. 

or THE EXTENSIVE COXCEPTION OV TlltVCS., AKD OF 

DISTRIBUTION. 



A 



S the com/iletencaa of an idea refers to the sev- 
eral /;iir/« that compose it, and the comprehension of an idea 
includes its various firofiertira ; so the cxtcnnijn of an idea 
denotes the various aorts or kinds of beinga to which the 
simeidea belongs : And if wc would be fully ncquiunted 
vith a subjectf we must observe 

This^arM rule to direct our conceptions, namely, Con* 
cetre <if thinga in all tlieir extenaion ; that is, we must 
search out the various a/teciea or a/iecial naturea which are 
cootuned imder it| as ^ genua or general nature, Ifwc 
vould know the nature of an animal perfectly, we must 
tike cognizance of beaatj birda, Jiahea, and inacctay as well 
as Mffiy all which arc contained under the general nature 
and name oiunimaL 

As an integral vfhole is distinguished into its several 
parts by diviaion ; so the word diatribution is most prop- 
erly used when we distinguish an univeraai nvhole isto its 
several kinds or species : And perhaps it had been better, 
if this word had been always confined to its signification, 
tliough it must be confessed that we frequently speak of 
the diviaion of an idea into its several kinds, as well as into 
its several parts. 

The rulea of a good diatribution are much the same with 
those which wc have before applied to diviaion, whicli. 



104 LOGIC : 01^, THE Part I. 

must be just repeated a^^ain in Che briefest manner, In or- 
der to give examples of them. 

Rule I Each p&ri sin^iy taken must contain less than 

the whole, but all the parts taken coUectivelyy or togeihefy 
must contain neither more nor less than the whole ; or, 
as logicians sometimes express it, the /larts of the divis' 
ion ought to exhaust the whole thing which is divided. So 
medicine is justly distributed into ftro/ihylacticj or the art 
of preserving health ; and thera/ieutiCf or the art of resto- 
ring health ; for there is no other sort of medicine besides 
these two. But pien are not well distributed into tall or 
s/iortj for there are some of a middle stature. 

Rule II In all distributions we should first consider 

the larger and more immediate kinds of species, or ranks 
of being, and not divide a thing at once into the more min- 
ute and remote. A genus should not at once be divided 
into individuahy or even into the lowest s/ieeie9y if there be 
a s/iecies sufierior. Thus it would be very improper to dl» 
vide animal into trout^ lobster^ eely dog^ ^ar^ cagle^ dove^ 
wornij and bunerflyy for there are inferior kinds ;; whereas 
aniinal ought first to be distributed into many beastj btrd^ 
Jishy insect ; and then beast should be distributed into dogt 
beary &c. Bird into eagle^ doye^ &c. Fish into troufy eky 
hbstery &c. 

It is irregular also to join any species in the same rank 
or order with the superior ; as, if we should 'distinguish 
animals into birds^ bears^ and oysters^ Sec. it w.ould be a 
ridiculous distribution. 

Rule III.../rhe several parts of a distribution ought to 
be opposite ; that is, one species or class of livings in the 
same rank of divis^ion, ought not to contain or include 
anpther ; so men ought not to be divided into the rich^ the 
fioovy the learned^ and the tall ^ for fiopr men may be both 
learned and tally and so may the richi. 

But it will be objected, Are not animated bodies rightly 
distributed into vegetative and animaly or (as they are usu- 
ally called) fiensijtive ? Now the sensitive contains the veg' 
etative lidXMV^'iix it, ^or animals grow as well as plants. I 
f^nswer, that in this, and in s^ll such distributions, the word 
/vegetative si^-nifies merely vegetation ; and in this sense 
j45gfvy57//y^ will be sufficiently opposite to animal ; for Ix 



Cha*. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 4O5 

cannot be said of an Minimal that it contains mere vegetation 
in the idei^of it. 

Rute IV Let not subdivisions be too numerous with- 
out necessity ; therefore I think quantity is better distin- 
guished at once into a liney surface^ and a solid ; than to 
s»y, aft Ramus does, that quantity is either a line or a thing 
lined ; and a thing lined is either a line or a solid. 

Rule V Distribute every subject according to the spe- 
cial design you have in view, so far as is necessary or 
useful to your present inquiry. Thus Vi fiolitician distri- 
butes mankind according to their civil characters into the 
rulers ami the ruled ; and a fihysieian divides them into 
the sick or the healthy ; but a divine distributes them into 
Turksy Heathens, Jtiva^ or Christians, 

Here note^ That it is a very useless thing to distribute 
any idea into such kinds or members as have no different 
properties to be spoken of ; as it is mere trifling to divide 
right angles into such whose legs are equal and whose legii 
are unequal, for as to the mere right angles they have no 
different properties. 

Rule VI In all your distributions observe the nature 

of things>vith great exactness, and do not affect any par- 
ticular form of distribiuion, as some persons have done, by 
dividing every genus into two sfteciesy or into three sfiecies ; 
whereas nature is infinitely various, and human affairs and 
human sciences have as great a variety ; nor is there any 
one form of distribution that will exactly suit with all sub- 
jects. 

^/ote It is to this doctrine o^ distribution of genus into 

its several sfiecies we must also refer the distribution of a 
^ause accoi*ding to its several effects^ as some medicines arc 
heating, some are cooling ; or an effect, when it is distin- 
guished by its causes, as faith is either built ufion divine 
testimony or human. It is to this head we refer particular 
artificial bodies, when tl>ey are distinguished according to 
the matter they are made of, as a statue is either of brass^ 
^f marble, or oftuood, &c. and any o\\\^v beings, when tliey 
are distinguished according to their end and design, as the 
furniture of body or mi?id is either for ornament or use. To 
this head also we refer subjects when they are divided ac- 
cording to their modes or accidents ; as men are eithtr mcr- 
^^f or£^ravr, or sad i and modeSj when l\\^7 ^tt^Wv^^Wf 



106 .Logic * or, tiie 

thcirm^/^c/jl, W^ ditiemfiera bchngt^ the Jliddsj 
wotid/mrtM^theammai, 

. It U alio to thift place we reduce the /trcf^uaU o, 
fvity Wider it9 variauM caaea^ whether it be Ki spet 
or praetice : Ast to shew the reason of 9un»6eam i 
wodj whether it be done by a Comdex glaaa or a coi 
or to shew the construction and meneuration of tri 
whether ^ou have two ang^les and a side given, or twt 
and an angle, or only three sides. Here it is necess 
distribute or divide a difficulty in alt ita caaeSf in on 
gain a perfect knowledge of the subject you contem 

It might be observed here, that logician% have aomet 
given a mark or 9ign to distinguish when it is an inti 
ttfhole that is divided into its fiarf or memben^ or wb< 
is a genusj an nmvertai vfhoUj that is distributed imc 
afieciea and individualM* The rule they give is this : Wl 
soever the whole idea can be directly and properly affii 
ed of each part, as, a bird t> an animal^ dijtah i» an ants 
Buccfihalus to a horse^ Peter is a maii| then it is a distrU 
tion of a genus into its a/ieeies^ or a species into ita fndkV 
nala : But when the whole cannot be thus directly affiniB 
concerning every partf then it is a division of an inttg 
into its several parts or members ; as we cannot say I 
head^ the breast^ the hand^ or ihe/bot is an animal^ but ' 
say, the head is a part of the animal^ and the foat is acoi 
cr part. 

This rule tnay hold true generally in corporeal beini 
or perhaps in all substances : But, when we say the / 
of God 99 wisdom^ and so is human civility ; criticism is tt 
learnings and so in philosophy : To execute a murderef 
justice^ and to save and defend thf innocent is justice t 
In these cases it is not so easily determined, whether 
intergral whole be divided into its parts, or an oniver 
into its species : For they^r of God mny be called eiti 
one party or one kind o^ wisdom : Criticism is one/iorf] 
one kind of learning : And the execution of a nmrde 
may be called a species of justjccy as well as a part of 
Nor indeed is it a matter of great importance to determi 
this conirovcrsy. 



A 






I" 



p. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 107 

SECT. XI. 

OF AN ORDERLY CONCEPTION OF THINGS. 

X HE hiat rule to direct our conceptions is, that 
"Oi/W rank and fiiace them in firofier method andjuat or^ 
This is of necessary use to prevent confusion ; for, 
rader who never places His goods in his shop or ware- 
: in a regular order, nor keeps his accounts of hisbuy- 
nd selling, paying and receiving, in a just method^is 
: utmost danger of plunging all his affairs into con- 
1 and ruin ; so a student who is in the search of truth, 
author or teacher who communi ates knowledge to 
s, will very much obstruct his design, and confound 
nrn mind or the minds of his hearers, unless he fBUge 
eas in just order. 

we would therefore become successful learners or 
ers we must not conceive of things in a confused heafi^ 
ispose our ideas in some certain method^ which maybe 
easy and useful both for the understanding and mem- 
and be sure, as much as muy be, to/oiicw the nature 
ngSf for which many rules might be given ; namely. 
Conceive as much as you cun of the essentials of any 
ct, before you consider its accidentals. 
Survey first the general fiarts and firofierties of any 
ct, before you extend your thoughts to discourse of 
articular kinds or sfiecirs of it. 

Contemplate things first in their own simfile natures^ 
ifterwards view them in comfiosition with other things ; 
s it be your present purpose to take a comfiound being 
sees, in order to find out, or to shew the nature of it, 
arching and discovering of what simfiles it is com- 
\. 

Consider the absolute modes or affections of any being 
is in itself, before you proceed to consider it relatively i 
\ survey the various relations in which it stands to 
' beings. Sec. 

»/r— These rules chiefly belong to the method of in« 
tion which the learned call synthetic. 



Ipi LOGIC : OR, THE Pabt.!. 

Bat in the regulation of our ideas, then; it seldomm 
abtoiute nece&sity that we should place them in this brlhe 
other particular method : It is possible in somie cases tint 
many methods may be equally good, that is, may equillf 
assist the understanding and the memory : To frame 
method exquisitely accurate, according to the strict 
ture of things, and to maintain this accuracy from the be- 
ginning to the end of a treatise, is a most rare and 
thin^, if not impossible. But a larger account of metkli 
would be very improper in this place, lest we anticipitt|. 
what belongs to ihe Jottrih fiarf of logic. 



SECT. XII. 



TH£SE FIVE RULES OF CONCEFTION EXEMPLIFIED. ^ 



I 



T may be useful here to give a specimen of the. 
Jive Bfiecinl rules to direct our concefttiona^ which have.beea 
the chief subject of this long chapter, and represent tbeo^ 
practically in one view. ^ 

Suppose the theme of our discourse was iht fianistuY 
the mind* 

Uty To gain a clear and diBtinct idea oipaadon^ we mmt 
define both the name and the thing. 

To begin with the dijinition ^f the name. We are not 
here to understand the word fiassion in its vulgar and molt. 
limited sense, as it signifies merely anger orjury / nor d9» 
we take it in its most extensive philosophical sense, for tbt 
sustaining the action of an agent ; but in the more limited 
philosophical sense, fiasaiona signify the varioua affectioilif 
qfthe mindy such as admiration^ lovcy or hatred ; this is tha 
definition of the name. 

We proceed to the dejinition of the thing, Paaaon is d^i^ 

ed a sensation of some s/iecial commotion in animal nature^ a^ 

ca^wned bt; (he ntind*8 perception ^f wmc object «UiUctf<l 



HAP. VL RIGHT USE OF REASON- 109 



•xcite that commotion. Here* tlie gcnua^ or general naluvc 
"Apanuion^ is a sensation of some f^/u ciat commotion in anima: 
n^upc ; and herein it agrees wiih lumger, thirst, pain, &.c. 
The essential difference cf it is> that this commotion arificfi 
Toma thought or perception of the mindy and hereby it is 
iistinguished from hunger, thirst, or pain. 

2rf/r/, We must conceive of it comfiletelyy ov sui'vey the 
several parts that compose it. These are, (I.) The mind's 
Herce/ition of some object, (2.) The consequent ruffle^ or 
ifiecial commotion of the nerves^ and bloody and animal spirits . 
And, (3.) The sensation of this innvard commotion, 

odly^ We must consider \\. comprehensively^ in its various 
firofterties. The most essential attributes that make up its 
nature have been already mentioned under the foregoing 
heads. Some of the most considerable properties that re- 
main are these, namely, That passion belongs to all 7nankind 
in greater or lesser degrees : It is not constantly presetit with 
118^ but upon some certain occasions : It is appointed by our 
(Creator for various useful ends and purposes y namely, to give 
us vigour in the pursuit of what is good and agreeable to 
us, or in the avoidance of what is hurtful : It is verypropi- 
^for our state of trial in tins morld : It is not utterly i^ be 
noted out (four nature^ but to be moderated and governed 
according to the rules of virtue and religion, &c. 

ithly. We must take cognizance of the various A:/72r/« of 
it, which is called an extensive conception of it. If the object 
which the mind perceives be very uncominony it excites the 
passion of ae/wira/zon : If the object appears agreeable^ it 
raises love : If the agreeable object be absent and at atnablcy 
it causes desire : If likely to be obtained^ it excites hope : If 

• Since this was written, I have published a thort treatise of the 
Jmssions, wherein 1 have so far varied fnmi this definition, as to call 
them sensible commotions of our whole nauue, both soul and bbdy, 
occasioned by the mind*s ])erceptioni of some object, 8ic. I made 
this alteration in the descripiion of the passions in thai book chiefly to 
include in a more explici« n.anner, the passions ofdtsire and aversion, 
which are acts of volition rafher ihaii sieusationb Yet since some 
commotions of animal nature utt(.rd a^l the |)assionS| and since there 
it always a sensation of thtiie con.n.i.tiniis i shall not change the def- 
inition I have written here-, for this will agiee to ali the passions 
whether they incU^de any aci oi voliiion or ^\o\ \ wqx \w<\t'e,^\^v^^ 
maticTafaiJ/^ear/mporfanC'' ;sov. 17, 17 i^. 

K 




j» LOCK : OR. THE Pak 

Btt m :^ ngabcicB cf o-.ir idea?, then » aeldw 
i&aaiaBc secaKT :bft: ve sbouM place tliem in thii o 
z t^ a wtr-J:r:Zi^ rBecbtK : It is posubk in some cases 
-CMTT =ie3oc9 aay be eq-.iUr gtXNi, that is, tnaj v(| 
A«=c< -.:< iai>.:M* n£icg a^d 'Jic memory : To In 
?te'_r«i cn«t&i»T acc\:n:e, according to the stric 
..~ :i uof«- ^ » icai::iain -.his accuracy from tli 
{--^jTj n :31c :ad afa 'jra-die, ia a most rare and dif 
nKi{. Jboe ks^oasisk. But a lar^r accuunt ofm 

»^i_<: X my iapc^cr in this place, lest \ie ;iii'.ii 

v;j; aenwT^ » ibe.'iwt^ ^•jrt t/tigie. 



lit! nvE ft;:.x£cr coscei 



JL r =*T be niefut here logivc a specimen o 
." -*^ i-.^j :i sirret tiiT tentefiiit,ni. which liave 
^.■.:' *_b,-sc: 31 this ioag chapter, and represent 1 
..i^.i i: .-ce »iew. 
f ^»: ::: '^sc of our discoune was the /'bm» 

. 1"; C:-- i «'->i" and dutintt idea oifiatrien, \n 

■ .::• ;-< r^-:? iTid the MKg. 

■ ^K-oK *i'-: :^e :/^jir.::;in 5/" /A* nam^. We ap 
:.- _--=™:4r.o lae wcniAitfisn id its vulgar and 
:-. 9;~»^> ;> i: >i^ic=» merely on^rr or/ury ,- ID 
■i.; :; :" ::« 17.0s: cx:ensitc philosophical sense, fo 
-:.■/ i^ .-.-.::■: of injjtr.j; Ijui in the more lin 
»i;T-.i;-l ierse. .'MJi::'!4 signify the -variout uffrt 

-;tj, »u;k as ■iJ-r.irt:ia«, h\t, oi' haired j tliis i; 

•„,-r ,■: t.";enjn!e. 

. -7-,-^iiit3t*n:^;.*.':(ri3.it/"Mf fA-n^, P«twiiisd 
--— ■•.-^ :/K'u*,->tr:ait3Krnwiiniita'iimaliititirf 
I.; >i ■■. -r^d"* ^rrcff.:isn t/ nms ebjni ttd. 




. VI. RIGHT USE OF REASON. Wj 

that commotion. Here* il'.c grnusj or general nature 
Biorij is a sensation of some f-/:-. ciat commotion in animni 
r i and lierein it agrees >viih iiiinger, thirst, pain. Sec 
'sscTitial diffci'fnce of il is, lliiil this comworio7f ari^rn 

thought or fierce fnion of thr nvnd^ and hereby it is 
^uished from hunger, thirst, or pain. 
y, We must conceive of it comfilctcly^ or sui'vey the 
\\ parts that compose it. Tlicse are, (I.) The mind's 
\tion of some object, (2.) The consequent ruffle^ or 
I comniotion of the nerves^ and bloody and animal spirits. 
(3) The sensation of this inrjard commotion, 
y, We must consider it cowj/irrAcTiwvr/?^, in its various 
rtics. The most essential attributes that make up its 
t ha^e been already mentioned under the foregoing^ 
. Some of the most considerable properties that re- 
arc these, namely, That passion belongs to all mankind 
alcr or lt**ser deujrees : // is not constantly present with 
t iifvjn fiome certain occasions : It is appointed by our 
7r for various us'fulends and pnrfioses^ namely, to give 
^our in the piir&uit of what isgood and agreeable to 
• in the avoidance of what is hurtful : It is very prop- 

our state of trial in this world : It is not utterly to be 
f out of our nafurr^ but to be moderated and ^cruirncd 
lin^ to the rules of virtue and reliffiouj &c. 
/y. We must take coji^nizancc of the various Kinds of 
ich is called an extensive conception of it. If the object 
I the mind perceives be very uncommon^ it excites the 
>n oi admiration : If the object appears af^reeablv^ it 
. love : If the agreeable object be abnent and at ainable^ 
ses desire : If likely to be obtained y it excites hope ; If 

ncc this was written, I have publisbed a thort treatise of the 
IS, wherein 1 have so far varied (rni iii:!> defir.iticn, as to call 
«nsible commotions of our whi^lc na'iue. both soul aiid bbdy, 
med by the mind's ].crc(i>tinn'> vt triiic object. &.c. I made 
teration in the debcripiioii of the passions in tha' book chicHy to 
e in a more cxplici' ii.anitcr, the passions of desire and aversion^ 
are acts of volition la'her ihuii scnsarionb Yet since some 
otions of anlir.al rptnre uM».rd a-l :h«; paNsions, and shice there 
ays a sensa'icn ol ihi.v** con.n.i ti'-w" 1 *.ball not change the dcf. 
I I have wriittn hfrt . for ihis will ngiec to all the passions 
er they inclrdc any uz\ c: voliiioti or not ; nor indeed i» «*• 
r of any great impOTtar.c- Sov. 17, 17*8. 



110 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. I. 

unatfainahle^ dcafiair. If it be firesent and /io9»e»8€df it is the 
passion of yoy : If /o«.^ it excites sorrow: If the object be' 
dUat^reeabtci it causes, in general, hatred or aversion » Kit 
be ahaenty and yet we are in danger of ity it raises oVLvfear: 
If it be firescfUy it is sorrow^ and sadness j See. i 

Sf/ihjy All these things and many more) which ff^^ 
compose a treatise on this subject, must be placed in thdd 
/iro/icr ordtr : A slight specimen of wliich is exhibited ID | 
this short account of /^osAio/i, and which that admirable aa-j 
thor Descartes has treated of at large ; though for wantofl 
suETicient experiments and observations in natural philoso", 
phy, there ar;: some few mistakes in hia account of animal 
nature. 

SECT. Xlil. 

AN ILLUSTRATION OF THESE FIVE RULES BY SIMlLITCDEf- 



T. 



IIUS we have brought the first part of iogic 
to a conclusion : And it may not be improper here to rep- 
resent its excellencies (so far as we have gone) by general 
hints of its Mr/ design and z/.9c, as well as by a various fo«- 
fiarison of it to those instruments which mankind have in- 
vented fur their several conveniences and impix>Aemeot8. 

The design of logic is not to furnish us with the pcrcciT- 
ing faculty, but only dirtct and assist us in the use of it : It 
doth not give us the objects of our ideas, but only casts such 
a light on those olijects which nature furnishes us witbt 
that they may be tlie more clearly and distinctly known s 
It doth not add new parts or properties to things, but it 
(Uncovers the various pails, properties, relations, and de* 
pendencies of one thing upon another, and \>y ranking stt 
t/iing.i \im\Mr general i\m\ s/tecial hcadsy it renders the DaturCi 
or any of ilie properties, powers, and uses of a thing, more 
easy to be fount! out, when we seek in what rank of beings 
it lijs, and wliereiu it agrees with, and wherein it differ* 
from others. 

If any comparisons would illustrate this, it tnaf be tbu^ 
represented. 

I. When logic assists us to attain a c/nrr and ^^ViV 



CttAP. Vr. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1 1 1 

conception of the nature of things by drfimtiofiy it is like 
those ^/o««^» whereby we behold such objects diatinctlyy as, 
by reason of their smallness, or their great distance, ap- 
pear in confusion to the naked eye : So the telescope dis- 
covers to us distant wonders in the heavens, and shews the 
mlky way^ and the bright cloudy sfiota in a very dark sky, 
to be a collection of little stars, which the eye unassisted 
beboUis in a mingled confusion. So when bodies are too 
*maU for our sight to survey them distinctly, then the micro- 
^co/ie is at hand for our assistance, to shew us all the iimbs 
2iT\A/eature8 of the mo^i minute animals^ with great clear* 
ness and distinction. 

II. When we are taught by logic to view a thing cqot- 
Jiietsly in all its fiart9, by the he]p of division^ it has the use 
of an anatomical knifoy which dissects an animal body, and 
separates the veins j arteries^ nerves^ muscles, membranes, &c. 
and shews us the several parts which go to the composi- 
tion of a complete animal. 

III. When logic instructs us to survey an object com^ 
firehensively in all the modes, firo/ierties, relations, faces, and 
afifiearanees of it, it is of the same use as a terrestrial globe, 
which turning round on its axis represents to us all the 
variety of lands and seas, kingdoms and nations, on the sur- 
face of the earth, in a very short succession of time shews 
the situations and various relations of them to each other^ 
and gives a comprehensive view of them in miniature. 

IV. When thi» art teaches us to distribute any extensive 
idea into its different kinds or sfiecies, it may be compared 
to the firiamatic glass, that receives the sun-beams or rays 
flight., which seem to be uniform when falling upon it, 
but it separates and distributes them into their different 
kinds and colours, and ranks them in theii proper succession. 

Or, if we descend to subdivision^ and subordinate ranks 
of being, then distribution may also be said to form the re- 
semblance of a natural tree, wherein the genus or general 
idea stands for the reot or stocky and the several kinds or 
sfiecies, and individuals, are distributed abroad, and repre- 
sented in their dependence and connection, like the several 
hugha, branches, and lesser shoots. For instance let animal 
be the root of a logical tree, the reserc\VA\iX\c^ \^ 'a^^^wXi^ 
foere inspection, though the root be uoV \A^ct^ ^V >Jc\.^\»\.'- 
to/n ofihe pa^e. 




113 



LOGIC : OR, THE 



Man 



{Philip, 
James, 
Pcler, 
Thomas, Sec. 






Horse- 



$Trot, 
1 Bayard. 



Bird 



'Maslifr, 
Spaniel, 
Greyliound, 
.Beagle, S(c. 



r English, " 
< Muscovy, 
I Hook-Bill, 



I Squirrel 
Beast ^ 

Doj; 

• LBcar, &c. 
AnifDal -^ fliagle, 

J Lark, 

^ Duck 

* LGoose, 8cc. 
f Trout, 
Fish ^ Whale, 

(^Oyster, 8tc. 

C Wasp, 

fFlying i Bee, &c. 

r Worm, 
Insect <v Creeping — < Ant, 

t l^Caticrpillar, 

The same similitude will serve also to illustr 
ilivishn and aubdivhion of an intrgrul whole into its 
parts. 

When logic directs us to place all our ideas in a 
method^ most convenient both for instruction and m< 
it doth the same service as the casen ofvfeli contrived 
in a iarg • libraryy wherein/oZ/o^, quartos^ octavos^ am 
i^olumes^ are disposed in such exact order, under tl 
ticular heads o^ divimtyyhiatoryy mathematics^ ancie 
. ihcetlaneoua learning, \s^c. that the student knows 
TO tind every book, and has them all as it were witl 
MMnrnand at once, because of the exact order where: 
»i\v placed. 

1 !:r: man who has such assistance as these at hs 
■iV'.v'v to manage his conce/itions^ and regulate histd 
V' II pr-puved to improve his knowledge, and loyoi 
M i,t^e:her in a rtgular manner by judgment^ w 



i'«. t 



liic second operation of the mind, and will be the a 
r! tiu* fiecond patl ofl'^j^ic 



THE 



J^ttonn j^att of So0tc. 



OF JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION. 






w, 



m /m # 

HEN the mind has got acquaintance >viih 
things by framing ideas of them, it proceeds to the next 
operation, and that is, to compare these ideas together, 
and to join them by affirmation^ or disjoin tlicni by urga" 
rwTi, according as we find ihtm to agree or disagree. This 
act of the mind is called judgment ; as when we have by 
perception obtained the ideas o{ Ptato 2ifihi!osf.jiher^ ircn ir." 
wfM-, we form these judgments ; Fluto was a /i/iiioso/i/ii'r : 
•Vo man is innocent. 

y Some writers have asserted, ihvX judgment consists in a 
^ere fiercefnion of the agreement or disagreement ofideav. 
But 1 rather think there is an act of the will (at least in most 
Cases) necessary to form a judgment ; for, though we do 
perceive, or think we perceive, ideas to agree or disagree^ 
yet we may sometimes refrain from judging or assenting to 
the perception, for fear lest the perception should not be 
sufficiently clear, and we should be mi<»taken ; And i r.m 
*eU assured at other times, that there ar^ multitudes of 
i^gwenta formed yVJ\A a firm assent given to ideas /o/wrr/ or 
rf»»/oi«r£/, before there is any clear perception whether iluy 
agree or disagree ; and this is the reason of so TiM\x\y fulfte 
judgments ov mistakes among men. Both these prrsctices 
*re a proof that judgment has somethiiig of tl.e r/jU in it, 
Uiddoes not merely consist \u fiereefuiQn ; since we some* 
Unes judge (though unhappily) without perceivmg, ai)4 

Mnetimes we perceive without immediate iudging. 

K3 



I U LOGIC : OR, THE Pabt II. 

As an idea is the result of ovtv concefttion or afifirehefuhn, 
so a firo/ioaition is the effect of judgment. The foregoing 
sentences, which are examples of the act of judgment, are 
properly called firopositions, Plato ia a fthiloso/ihcrj &c. 

Here let us consider, 

1. Tnc general nature of a proposition, and the parti of which it i 

coinposed. 
'2. The various divisions or kinds of propositions. 
.>. The springs of false jtKilgmcnt, or the doctrine of prejudices. 
4. General directions to assist U5 in judging right. 
:'}. Special rules to direct us in juilgin|; particular objects. 



CHAP. I. 

OF THE NATURE OF A PUOPOSITION. AND ITS SE 

VERAL PARTS. 

13L PROPOSITION is a sentence therein two oi 
jiiorc ideas or terms are joined or disjoined by one affiroW' 
lion or negation, as P!aro vihis a fihilosofther z Every af^i 
i^ formed by two lines meeting : JVo man living on earth W 
f>f comfdetely hajifiy. When there are ever so many idcat 
or terms in the sentence, yet if they are joined or disjoin 
cd merely by one single affirmation or negation, they an 
proptrly called but one /iro/iosition, though they mayb< 
resolved into several propositions which are implied there 
in, as will hereafter appear. 

In describing a proposition, I use the words terms B 
well as iJeas^ because, when mere ideas are joined in th 
mind without words, it is rather called a judgment ; bti 
when clothed with words it is called a firo/ioaition^ etc 
though it be in the mind only, as well as when it is CJ 
pressed by speaking or wriiing. 

There are three things which go to the nature and coi 
siiuuion of a proposition^ namely, the subject ^iht/trcdicai. 
apd the cofiukt. 




I. RIG HT USE OF REASON. I \i 

tuhjeci of a propo«ilion ts that concern^g which y 
1% is affirmed or denied : So Plato, angjf^man liv- m-t 
arifi, are the subjects of the foregoing propositions. 
(irtdicale is that which k affirmed or denied of the 
; so^AiV^fQ^Atris the predicate of the first propo- 
formed by two Hnet meeting, is the predicate of the 
; caftable of being comfilttely I'afifiy, the proper pre- 
if the third. 

tubject end flretHeate of a flroftotition taken togeth- 
salled the matter of it i for these are the materials 
h it is made. 

ccfiula is the/omi ofa proposition ; it represents 
of the mind afiinning or denying, and it is ex- 
by the words, aoi, art, it, tire, ice. or am not, art not, 
■re not, he. 

nut a thiii^of importance enough to create disputCT 
r ihe word no, none, not, never, kc. which disjoin 
I or terms in a r.fgaiive proposition, ahull b^ c:il- 
irt of the aubjecl of the ca/iula, or of the /:ret/ica{e. 
mes perhaps thejr mny seem most naturally lo lic 
d in one, and sometimes in the other of ihcsi'. 
a proposition is usually denominated affirmative ni 
c from its co/iula, as iiercafter. 

1 Where each of these parts ofa prnpositior. is 

rested distinctly in so many woi-ds. yei they are all 
cod, and implicitly contained therein ; as Soerai'-i 
i, is a complete proposition, for it signirii-H HccraUrt 
Ruling. So I die, signifies laM dying. I eati wrilr, 
I am able lo write. In Latin and (irciik one single 
many times a tiomplcte composition. 
S ....These words, am, art, r>, 8tc. when thry are 
one wiihoni any other predicate, signify both the 
ie mind judging, which includes the eo/iuta, aHil'sig- 
o actual existence, which is the predicate of that 
lion. So Rome it, signifies Rome it tiitrcnt : 
rrr »onie strange inontters : that is, S:,me itrange 
■t are exhtent : Cartilage it no more, tlul is, Car. 

3. ...The subject and predicate of a proposition arc 
ays to be known and distinguished by the placing 
rords in tlie sentence] but by reflecting duly on the 




lio LOGIC: OR, THE PartII. 

^ense of il)e \Tord8, and on the mind and dedgn oftht 
speuker4|[,writer : As if I say, In Africa there are fMin\ 
iiontty I mean many lions are existent in Africa : Many II 
6tns is the subject, and existent in Africa is the predicite 
It is firofier for a t^hHosvfiher to understand geometry ; hen 
tlie word firofier is the predicate, and all the rest is thf 
subject, except Is the copula. 

JVote 4.. .The subject and predicate of a proportion oughl 
always to be two different idecs^ or two different termt \ 
for, where both the :erms and ideas are the same, it is cal< 
I'jd an identical /iro/ioffition, v/hic\\ is mere trifling, andcaiv 
not tend to promote know ledge ; such as, A rule is a rule 
or A good man is a good man. But there are some propo- 
sitions, wherein the terms of the subject and predicate 
seem to be the same ; yet the ideas are not the same , 
nor can the ie be called /iwr^/y identical or trifling proposi' 
lions ; such as I/ome is home ; that is. Home is a conven* 
lent or delightful filace ; Socrates is Socrates still ; that isi 
The man Socrates is still a /ihiloso/iher : The hero was not a 
h^ro^ that is% The hero did not shew his courage ; What Ihavt 
I'jritten^ I have ivritten ; that is, IVhat I wrote I still a/i' 
Jircve^ and will not alter it : IVhat is done is done ; that isi 
it cannot be undone. It may be easily observed in these 
propositions tiie term is equivocalj for in the firedicate'W 
has a different idea from what it has in the subject. 

There are also some propositions wherein the terms tA 
the subject and predicate differ, but the ideas are the same; 
and these are not merely identical or trifling propositions ; as 
im/iudcnt is fihamelcss ; ^billovj isa wavci or J?ur/u« (in Laiin] 
is a wave ; ^ globe is a round bndy. In these propositionsi 
cither the words are explained by a definiiion of the name^ 
or the ideas by a definition of the thing, and therefore 
thty are by no means useless when formed for thil 
purpose, 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 117 

CHAR II. 

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS. 



p 



ROPOSITIONS may be distributed into va- 
rious kinds, according to iheiv subject^ ihtiv cojmldj ihtiv 
JiredicatCy their nature or comfiosition^ tljelr ae7iacs and their 
evidence^ which distributions will be exptain«d in the foU 
lowing lections. 



SECT. I. 

OF VNIVERSAJLi PARTICULAR, INDEFINITE^ AND SINOULAR 

PROPOSITIONS. 



P 



ROPOSITIONS may be divided, according ^ 
• toiheirsubjecty into universal dind par iicuiar ; this is usually 
called a division arising from the quantity, ■ 

An universal firo/ioaition is when the subject is taken 
according to the whole of its extension ; so, if the subject 
be 2Lgenu8y or a general nature, it includes all its sfiecies or 
kinds : If the subject be a sfieciea^ it includes all individu- 
als. This universality is usually signified by these words, 
o//, every ^ no^ none, or the like ; as, Jill men must die : Aa 
fnan is almighty : Every creature had a beginning. 

K particular prof losition, is when the subject is not ta- 
\tn according to its whole extension ; that is, when the 
term is limited and restrained to some one or more of 
those species or individuals whose general nature it ex- 
presses, but reaches not to all ; knd this is usually denoted 
by the words, some, many, ^^w, there, are, which, &c. as 
^ome birds can sing well ; Few men are truly wise : IViere 
ore parrots which will talk an hundred things, 

A singular proposition is when the subject is a singular 
or individual term or idea : as, Descartes was an ingcn- 
ioua philosopher : Sir Isaac JSTewton has far exceeded all his 
t^redeceaaors : The palace at Hamjxton Court w a l\Ua*aat 
^ffem/^-: Thiaday ia very cold. TVve ^\x\>\^cX.\\«^ xos^sxNjfe 



130 LOGIC 2 OR, THE PaetIL I 

Xote 4.. .The universality of a subject is often restrained 
by a part of the predicate ; as when we say, All men leam 
wisdom by experience : the universal subject, a// men^ is 
limited to signify only all those men who learn wiedom. The 
-scripture also uses this sort of language, when it speaksof 
" all men being justified by the righteousness of one,' Ro.t. , 
10. that is, all men who are justified obtain it in this way. i 
Ohserz'e here. That not only a metaphysical or natural, but 
a ^/lora/ universality also is oftentimes to be restrained by a 
part of the predicate ; as when we say, All the Dutch are 
good seamen : All the Italians are subtil politicians/ that 
is, those among the Dutch that are seamen are good scb- 
men ; and those among the Italians who are poliltcians 
arc subtil politicians, that is, they are generally so. 

JS/bfe 5..., Tht universality of a term is many times re- 
strained by thQ particluar time, place, circumstance, fcc. 
or the design of the speaker ; as, if we were in the city of 
London, and say, All the weavers went to present their pe* 
tition ; we mean only, All the weavers who dwelt in the 
city. So when it is said in the gospel. All men did ula^ \ 
ve], Mark v. 20. it reaches only to AH those men who J 
heard of the miracles of our Saviour. ; 

Here also it should be observed, that a moral univerwiB' '" 
ty is restrained by time^ filace^ and other circumstances,' as 
well as a natural ; so that by these means the word afl 
sometimes does not extend to a tenth part of those who at 
first might seem to be included in that word. 

One occasion of these difficulties and arabiguit^s, tliat 
belong to universal firo/iositiona, is the common humor and 
temper of mankind, who generally have an inclination to 
magnify their ideas, and to talk roundly and universally 
concerning any thing they speak of; which has introduc- 
ed uaiversal terms of speech into custom and habit, in all 
nations and all languages, more than nature or reason 
would dictate ; yet, when this custom is introduced, jt is 
not at all improper to use> this sort of language in solemn 
and sacred writings, as well as in familiar discourse. 

II. Remarks concerning indefinite firofiositions.. 

M'ote 1.... Propositions carrying in them universal forms 
of expression may sometimes drop the note of universality 
and become indefinite^ and jet retaitv the same universal 



ChAi^. VI. RIGHT USE OP ftE ASON. 12 1 

sense, whether metafihysicaly natural^ or moraly whcthci- 
collective or cUstributvve, 
We rtiay give instances df each of these. 
Metaphysical ; as, A circle has a centre a7icl circUmfer* 
ence. Natural ; as. Beasts have four feet. Moral ; as, 
Mgroes are stupid creatures. Collective ; as, The ajijilch- 
xoillJUl a bushel. Distributive ; as, Men are mortal, 

^Tote 2.... There are many cases wlierein a collective idea 
is expressed in a proposition by an indefinite tertnj and 
that where it describes the nature or quality of the sub- 
ject, as well as when it declares some fiast matters of fact: 
as, Fir trees set in g^ood order will give a charming firosm 
iiect ; this must signify a collection^ for one makes no 
prospect. In matters of fact this is more evident and 
irequent ; as, The Romans overcame t/te Gauls : The rob- 
bers surrounded the coach : The wild geese fiew over the 
Thames in the form of a 'ioedge. All these are collective 
subjects. 
t Sroteli.,„lnidefnitefirofiositionstV' "bject is often rc- 
|8trained by the predicate, or by the sp al time, place, or 
|(ircumktances, as well as in propositions which are ex- 
Ppressly universal ; as, The Chinese are ingenious silk lOca^ 
vers; that is, those Chinese \y hie h are silk-weavers are 
ingenious at their work. The stars afifiear to us when the 
tvfilfght is gone ; this can signify no more than the stars 
which are above our horizon. 
J^ote 4... .All these restrictions .tend to reduce some in* 
\ ^fime propositions almost Inio particular^ as will appear 
I "Under the next remarks. 
i III. Remarks concerning particular propositions, 

i Note 1 As particular proposition may sometimes be 

['expressed indefinitely^ without any note of particularity 
prefixed to the subject ; as, In times of confusion laws arc 
■ «of executed : Men of virtue are disgraced^ and murderers 
' ticape i that is, some lawsj some men of virtue^ some mur^ 
r defers : Unless we should call this Lmguige a moral uni* 
versality^ though I think it can hardly extend so far. 

^Tote^ The words some, afew^ &c. though they gen- 
erally denote a proper particularity^ yt:t somctim'.s they 
express a collective ideaj as, Some of the enemies beset the 
^enctalarbuhdf^ j'/ew Greeks4v6uUibcat a thousand Ind^oa^. 

L 



122 LOGIC « OR, THE Pabt IL 



I conclude this section wilh a few general remarks <m 
this subject, namely, ] 

Gen, Rem. J. Since Universaly indefinite znd fiarticultr 
tei*ms, in the phiral number, may either be taken in a 
collective or distributive sense, there is one short and easf 
way to find when they are collective^ and when dietribu^ '. 
five ; namely, If the plural number may be changed ifito : 
the singular, that is, if the predicate will agree to one sin- ■ 
gle subject, it is a distributive idea ; if not, it is collective, ] 

Gen, Rem, II. Universal and particular terms, in the 
plural number ; such as, all^ ^ome^ fewj many, &c. when j 
they are taken in their distributive sense, represent sever' 
al single ideas ; and when they are thus affixed to tke sub- 
ject of a proposition, render that proposition universal or 
particular^ according to the universality or particularity of 
the terms affixed. 

Gen, Rem, III. Universal and fiarticular terms, in tbe 
plural number, taken in their collective sense, represent 
generally one collective idea. 

If this one collective idea be thus represented, (whether j 
by universal or particular terms) as the subject of a prop- 
osition, which describes the nature o/a things it properlf 
iTtakes either a singular or an indefinite firofiosition ; for 
the words ally somcy a fvnvy Sec. do not then denote the 
(juantity of the proposition, but are esteemed merely as 
terras which connect the individuals together, in order to 
compose one collective idea. Observe these instances ; 
Ml the sycamores in the garden would make a large grove ; 
that is, this one collection of sycamore, which is a singa^ 
lar idea. Some of the sycamores in the garden ivould mute 
a fine grove : sycamores ivould make a noble grove : In 
these last the subject is rather indefinite than nngutar* 
But it is very evident, that in each of these propositions the 
predicate can only belong to a collective ideoy a»d there- 
fore the subject must be esteemed a collective. 

If this collective idea (whether represented by universal 
or particular terms) be used in describing past matters oj 
facty then it is generally to be esteemed a singular idea: 
and renders the proposition singular ; as, All the soldier^ 
of Alexander made but a little army : A few Macedonian* 
vanguinhed the large army of Darius : Some gren0 
diersffl t/ie camp plundered aU the ncigHbQTi>^ t^'wn%v 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 123 

Now we have shewn before, that if a proposition descri« 
bing the nature of things has an indefinite subject, it is 
generally to be esteemed universal in its prepositional 
sense ; And, if it has a singular subject^ in its proposition- 
al sense it is alwavs ranked with universals. 

After all, we must be forced to confess, that the lan- 
guage of mankind, and the idioms of speech, are so ex» 
ceeding various, that it is hard to reduce them to a few 
rules ; and, if we would gain a just and precise idea of 
every universal particular and indejinite expression, we 
must not only consider the peculiar idioms of the lan- 
guage, but the time, the place, the occasion, the circum« 
stances of the matter spoken of, and thus penetrate, as f^r 
as possible^ into the design of the speaker qr writer. 



^ 



SECT. II. 

OF AFFIRMATIVE AND MEOATIVE POPOSITIOXS. 



Wi 



HEN a proposition is considered with re- 
gard to its cofiuloj it may be divided into affirmative and 
negative ; for it is the cofiula joins or disjoins the two ideas* 
Others call 4his a divisic^n of propositions according i6 
their quality. 
r An affirmative firofioaition is when the idea of the pre- 
dicate is supposed to agree to the idea of the subject, and 
is joined to it by the word is, or are, which is the cofiula ; 
as. All men are sinners, , But, when the predicate is not 
supposed to agree with the^ubject, and is disjoined froni 
it by the particles, is not, are not, &c. the proposition is 
negative ; zSyMan is not innocent ; or,A'b man is innocent. 
In an affirmative proposition, we assert one thing to belong 
to another, and, as it were, unite them in thought and 
word : In negative propositions, we separate one thing 
from another, and deny their agreement-, 



124 -LOGIC; OR, THE Tnt^ 

II may seem something odd, tlmt two ideas or terms aiv ' 
said lo be rlisjeiiied by a copula : But, if we c»ii bul tup- ' 
pose the negative particles do really belong lo ihc co[nili ^ 
ofncguiivc propositions, it takes airsy the liarshncuot j 
Ihe expi'cssion ; and, to make it yet eofter, vc may coo- 
siikr that tlie predicate ond subject may fce pi'uperly Mi 
to be joined ;n a form of 'oierd* aa a ftro/iotUion, hy coimw^ 
live panic ka In gratnmar or logic, though tiiey arc ^f* 
joiite'd in their aense and signification. Every youtb who 
Das learned his grammar, knows there arc such v/aiia U 
difjunctivettrofiesitiom. i 

Several things are worthy otjr notice on this subject. 

A'oit U/.., As there ure some ierini,or v/ordt, and trf/«r,(a('j 
I have shewn before) concerning which it is hard to dehl ~ 
mine whether they are negaiivc or fiosilvoe, so there ar 
aomc firo/msitioni co:icei'Ding which it may be difficaltwV 
Hfly wJiaiher they affirm or dfiuj : Aa, when we say, PI*' I 
to tvae no fool ; Ciccri) ii-o» tio tinaki'f,ii gratof ; C'W I 
made no cxfiedition la Muscavj : .in oysler AotNOjt^rfl 
lite an eet : It i» nol rtKetJiar-' far a ^Ji"i;^ian 79 »h«^ I 
£t-""- i auajvr a fihynaan to gfirak Prench i» nte^M*- T 

The Bfisf of these propositionfl is very plain and euri ] 
though logicians inighi squabble perhaps a whole (bft 
vhether ihey should r^nk ihcm un Jcr the names ofnt'^ 
tive or affirmative. 
•■ Molt 3rf....ln Latin and English, iwo negatives joined I 
in one sentence make an atRrmativu ; as when we declare ' 
A'o man it not mortal ; it is the same aa though we said' 
Jifan is mortal. But, in Greek, and oftentimes in Frencbi 
two negatives make but a stronger denial. 

Au(r 3d. ...If the mere negative term not he added to tH"' 
CO\n\\n ol an univerialaffirtnalive firoflosilion, ii reduces *^ 
to a /lariicular negative ; as, ^11 men are not wiae, aigoifiC* 
tiie same as. Some mm are not viiie. 

A'oit 41/1 In ViW affirmative proporitions, the prcd*' 

caic is taken in its whole comprehenUon ; that is, ever^ 
essential part and attribute of it is aflirmed concerning th^ 
swbject ; aa when I say, A true chriaimn is an honett nioft^ 
every thing that belongs to hanetiy is affirmed concemiq^ 
a (nil- chrialian. 

A'oteSth In all negative prepositions the predicate is 

tikcn in its whole extension ; that isj every species Mid ■ 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1^5 

individual that is contained ijp the general idea of the predi- 
cate, is utterly denied concerning the subject : So in this 
proposition, >d sfiirjt is net an^nimaij vre exclude all sorts 
and kinds and particular animals \?hatsoever from the 
idea of a 9/iirit. 

From these two last remarks ^e may derive this in- 
ference, that we ought to attend to the entire comfirehension 
of our ideas, and to the universal extension of them, as far 
as we have proper capacity for it, before we grow too con* 
fident of our affirming or denying any thing which may 
have the least darkness, doubt or difficulty attending it : 
It is the want of this attention that betrays us into many 
mistakes. 

SECT. III. 

OF THE OPPOSITION AND COKVEBSIOV OF PBOPOSITIOVS. 



A 




NY two ideas being joined or disjoined in 
various forms, will afford us several propositions. All these 
may be distinguished according to their quantity and their 
quality* into four, which are marked or denoted by the let«> 
ters, A, E, I, O, thus : 

C Universal affirmative, 
denot s a < ^'^^versal negative. 
y Particular affirmative. 
I Particular negative. 
• according to the old Latin rhymes — 

j^sserit A, negat E, verum generaliter amba^ 
Assent I, negat O, sed fianiculariier ambo. 
This may be exemplified by the^e two ideas, fi vine on4 
a tree, 

A Every vine is a tree, 
E Ab vine is a tree, 
I Seme vine is a tree. 
O Some vine is not a tree, 

* The reader should remember her^, that a proposition aceordhfi^ 
to its quantity is called universal or particular ^ and ^cco^din|^ to ^^ 
^jalit^i it is either jiffirmative or negative. 




in tOCIC : OR, THE Pi 

The logicitnji of the schools have writeea man] 
trifles ccmceTBiDg the opfioutwn and eonvenion^ of/ 
tiont. It will be luffident here to give a &v brie 
of these (hiog»| that the learner majr not be utterly i% 
of them. 

fropositions which are made of the same aubji 

predicatei are sidd to be ofifiotite^ when that which i 

ed in one is affirmed in the otlier, either in whd 

part) without any consideration whether the propo 

jbe true or not. 

>If they differ both in quantity and quality} th 
,C9lleA contradictory J asy 

A Mvery vine <> a ) 

tree* f These can never be both true i 

,0 Some vine is4iot t false at the same time. 

a trqe. J 

If twouniversals differ in quality, they are contrari 

A Every vine w a "l 

tree, t These con never be both true t 

E .Vo vine is a L er, but tbcy may be both fala 

tree, 3 

If tvfofiardcular propositions differ in quality, tl 
subcontraricB $ as, 

1 Some vine is a ^ 

tree, f These may be both true togethi 

O Some vineiMnot i they can never be both false. 
a tree. J 

^Both fiarticxdar and umvtrsal propositions, whicl 
in quality, but not in quantity, are called aubultem^ 1 
these are not properly ofifiosite; as, 

A Mvery vine is a tree. 
I Some vine is a tree. 
Or thus :...EA^0 vine is a tree. 

O Some vine is not a tree. 

The canons. of «u6a//mt ftrofiositions are usually r 
ed these three; namely, (1.) If an universal prop 

t|etroe> the particular will be true also, but not 



►• IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. \2t 

ary. And) (3.) If a fharticular propositum be blsei 
BhrffTJo/ must be laUetoo, but not od the contrary. 
hidaltern flrcfiOMiiotu^ .whether universal or particular} 
Bometimes be both true} and sometimes both £i]ae. 
itconvcTMion cffirofioaitiona^ In when the subject and 
Gate change their places with preservation of the trulfa. 
may be done with constant certainty In all universal 
ive9 9Xi^ particular affirmalivea / aSj A^ afiiritis an ani- 
nay be convert<;d. Ab animal is a afiirit : and> Some 
» a vincj may be converted} Some vine is a tree, ■ But 

is more of formal trifling in this sort of discourse 
there is of solid improvement} because tliis sort of 
rsion arises merely from theybrm o/wordsj as connect- 
a proposition} rather than from tlie matter. 
t it may be useful to observe} that there are some 
>silionS} which} by reason of the ideas or matter of 
1 they are composed} may be converted with con« 
truth : Such are those propositions whose predicate 
ominal or real definition of the subject, or the diflfer- 
of it} or a property of the fourth kind} or a superla* 
legree of any property or quality whatsoever ; or} in 

wheresoever the predicate and the subject have ex- 
the same extension} or the same comprehnsion ; as, 
y vine is a tree bearing" grafies ; and} Every tree bear* 
ra/ies is a vine : Religion is the truest wisdom i and} 
'ruest wisdom is religion : Julius Casar was thejhrst 
ror of Rome ; anU} The first emfieror rfRome was Julius 
r. These are the propositions which are properly coa« 
We, and they are called rccifiro^al flrofiosithons. 



SECT- IV. 

OP «U&£ AUD SCOBAL PROPOSlTfOKS. 

jLIlNOTHER division of propositions among 
cholasiic writers is into fiure and modal. This may 
lied (for distinction sake) a division according to the 
icate. 



\2B LOGIC: OR, THE PaetII 

When a proposition merely expresses that the predicate, 
is connected with the subject, it is called 2ifiurefirofiomtimi 
as, Jivery true Christian is an himest man. But, ivhenit 
also includes the way and manner wherein the predicate il 
connected with the subject, it is called a modal firofiomtims 
as when I say, It is necessary fhat a true Christain shmJi 
be an honest man. 

Logical writers generally make the modality of this pn- 
position to belong to the co/iuiaj because it shews the imn* 
ner of the connection between the subject and prtdicatfe. 
But, if the/orm of the sentence as a logical proposition be. 
duly considered, the mode itself is the very predicate oftbt 
proposition, and it must run thus ; That a true Christm 
should be an honest man is a necessary things and thea tha 
whole primary proposition is included in the subject oftbt 
liicdal proposition. 

There art: four modes of connecting the predicate wiA 
the subject, which are usually reckoned upon this occft* 
fcion, namely, nccesdty aud contingency^ which are twooppo- 
bites ; fiossibility and im/iossibility^ which are also opposites; 
as, It is fiecessary that a globe should be round : That a globe 
hi: madeofrjood orglassj is a necessary or contingent thing: 
It is imftosiible that a globe should te square : It is fiossibU 
that a globe may be made of water. 

With regard to the modal firofiositions which the schools 
have introduced, I would make these two remarks. 

Hemark I. These propositions in English are formed bf 
the resolution of the words, must bcy might not Lcj can be* 
and cannot bcy into those more explicate forms of a logical 
copula and predicate^ is necessary ^ is contingent^ isfiossibh 
is im/i03fiible : For it is necessary that a globe should bt 
roundy signifies no more than that a globe must be round. 

Remark 2. Let it be noted, that (his quadruple modaHtt^ 
is only an enumeration of the natural modes or manners 
wherein the predicate is connected with the subject : W< 
might also describe several moral and civil modes of con- 
necting two ideas together, namely, lawfulness and unla'O' 
fulnessy convenier.cy and inconvenicncy^ &c. whence we ma) 
form such modal firofiositions as these ; It is unlawful for fl«! 
fi^rs^n to Kill an nnocent man. It is unl<^iiful/or Christian 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. IW 

f* eatJlfBh in Lent : To tell all that we think ia inexfieditnt : 
for a man to be affable to hU neighbour ia very convenieniy &o. 

There are several other modea of speaking whereby a 
predicate is connected with a subject : Such as, it ia cer- 
tahiy It is doubtful J itia firobable^ it ia imfirobabley it iaagrcerij 
It ia granted^ it ia aaid by the ancientSy it ia wtittcn^ See. all 
irbich will form other kinds o^ modal firo/ioaitiona. 

But| whether the modality be natural^ rnoralj £cc. yet in 
lU these propositions it is the 7Hode is the firofier firedicatct 
lOd all the rest of the propositions, except the co/iula^ (or 
■ord My) belongs to the aubject ; and thus they become 
^e /irofioaitiona o[ VL comfilex nature) of which we shall 
treat in the next section ; so that there is no great need of 
Buking modala of a distinct sort. 

There are many little subtilitics which the schools ac- 
gount UB with concerning the conversion and o/ifioaition and 
tqvifiQllenee of these, modal propositions, suited to the Lat- 
a or Greek tonguesL rather than the Englij^h, and fit to 
ma away the idle tii^e of a student, rather than to enrlrh 
bU understandinp:. ' 

SECT. V.^ 

OrsiVOLB PROPOSITIONS, WHXTnm SIMPLE OR OOMPLEX. 



w. 



HEN we consider the nature tftirofieaitionsj 
together with iht/ormation of them, and divide the nuite* 
"8^ whereof they are made, we divide them into f2»^^ 
aod eomfiound, 

A ainglefirofioaitionj is that which has but one subject and 
^predicate ; but If it has more subjects or more predi- 
cates, it is called a compound firofioaition^ and indeed it con- 
tains two or more propositions in it. 

Kaingle proposition (which is also called fc^r^or/ra/) 
Hay be divided again 'wio aimjile and comfilex.* / 

• Ai limple kleai arc opposed to complex, and single ideas to com- 
pooad, 10 propositions are distinguished in the same manner i The 
English tongue, in this respect, having some advantage ab«vc iiim 
'^i^raed languages, which .have no usual vrord to distinguish single 
^'oin ftitnplc. 



130 LOGIC c OR, THE PamII. 

Afiurely simjile/irofiosition is that whose subject and pre- 
dicate are made up of single terms ; as Virtue h desirabU ; 
£x*rry penitent is /lardoned : No man js innocent. 

When the subject or predicate, or both, are made up of 
complex terms, it is called a comfilcx firofioaition ;. as, Ever^ 
sincere penitent is pardoned : Virtue ia disirable for its Qtm 
sake : No man alive is perfectly innocent. 

If the term which is added to the subject of a complex 
proposition be either essential or any way necessary to itf 
then it is called explicative^ for it only explains the subject t 
as, Every mortal man ia a son of Jdam, But, if the term 
added to make up the complex subject does not necessarilf 
or constantly belong to it, then it is determinative^ and 
limits the subject to a particular part of its extension ; as, 
Every pioua man shall be happy. In the first propoutioD 
the word mortal is merely explicative : la tlie second pro- 
position the word pioua is determinative. 

Here note, that whatsoever may be affipmed or denied 
concerning any subjecti with an explicative addition, mtf 
be also affirmed or denied of that subject without it ; diive 
may boldly say, Every man is a son of Adam, as well as 
every mortal man : But it is not so, where the addition is i 
determinative, for we cannot say, Every man shall be hap* * 
py, though every pious man shall be so. ^ 

In a complex proposition, the predicate or subject is 
sometimes made complex by the pronouns who, which, i 
whose, to whom, &c. which make another proposition *, as 
Every man who is pious shall be saved: Julius, whose sir 
name was Cssar, overcame Potnpey : Bodies, which are 
transparent, have many pores. Here the whole propor- 
tion is called the primary or chief, and the additional pro- 
position is called an incident proposition. But it is still to 
be esteemed in this case merely as a part of the compleic 
term ; and the truth or falsehood of the whole complex 
proposition is not to be judged by the truth or falsehood of 
the incident proposition, but by the connection of the 
whole subject with the predicate. For the incident pro- 
position may be false, and absurd, or impossible, and yet 
the whole complex proposition may be true ; as, A horac 
which hsis wings might fly over the Thames. 



Chap. H. RIGHT USE OF REASON. fsi 

Beiide this complexion which belongs to the subject or 
predicfttCy logical writers use to say, there is a complexion 
vhich may fall upon the copula also : But this I have ac- 
counted for in the section concerning modal propositions ; 
and indeed it is not of much importance whether it were 
placed there or here. 

SECT. VI. 

OF COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS. 



A 



COMPOtJND proposition is made up of two 

or more subjects or predicates* or both ; and it coatains in 

i it two or more propositions, which are either plainly ex- 

i pressed, or concealed and implied. 

. The first sort of compound propositions are those 

"Wherein the composition is expressed and evident, and they 

>«re distinguished into these six kinds, namely, copulative, 

ffisjunctive, conditional, causal, relative and discretive. 

1. Copulative propositions, are those which have more 
iQbjects or predicates connected by affirmative or nega- 
' UTe conjunctions ; ' as, Kic/iea and honor are tew/itationa to 
pride : Ca&ar conquered the GauU and Britons : JSl'either 
gdd or jevfei^ vnii fiurchate immortality. These proposi- 
lions are eviclently compounded, for each of them may be 
resolved into twopropositions,name]y,/^/r/ie«are/(rm^/ar<on9 
to pride i and Honoris a temptation tofiride ; and so the rest. 
The truth of copulative propositions depends upon the 
truth of all the parts of them ; for, if Cscsar had conquered 
tKe ffauls, and not the Britons, or the Britons, and not the 
Gapls,the second copulative proposition had not been true. 
Here note, Those propo iitions, which cannot be resolved 
hto two or more simple propositions, are not properly cop- 
aladve^ though two or more ideas be connected and coup- 
led by such conjunctions, either in the subject or predicate ; 
tt Tvt^and three make Jive : Majesty and meekness do not 
9ften meet : The sun^ moon, and stars, are not ail to be 
^enat once. Such propositions are to be esteemed mere- 
ly complex, because the predicate cannot be affirmed of 
each single subject, but only of all •f them together as t 
ciHcctive subject. 



laa LOGIC-; OR, Tim PaetH, 

IT. Difjunctive firofiosidona^ are when the paits ire 
disjoined or opposed to one another by disjunctive plAi* 
cles ; as, It ia either day or night : The weather ia either 
shining or rainy : Quantity is either lengthy breadth or dep^ 

The truth of disjunctives depends on the necessary and 
immediate oppositions of the parts ; therefore only the 
last of these examples is true ; but the two first are not 
strictly true, because tivilight is a medium between da^ 
and night ; and dry cloudy Vfeather is a medium between 
s/iinifig and raining, 

III. Conditional or hyfiothetical firofiositions^ are thoie 
whose parts are united by the conditional particle if; as. 
If the sun be^xed the earth must move : If there bcnojrty 
:here will be no smoke. 

Aore....The first part of these propositions, or that ^ 
wherein the conditional is contained, is called the antcct*" 
denty the* other is called the consequent. 

The truth of these propositions depends not tft all on the 
iruth or falsehood of their two parts, but on the truth of 
i.\\ii connection of them; for each pari of them may W 
false, and yet the whole proposition true ; as, Ifthtre bt - 
no /trovidcncc^ there will be no future fiunishment, ' 

IV. Causal fir ofiositionsy are where two proposiUbns j 
are joined by causal particles ; asi Houses were not bidlt '' 
that they might be destroyed : Rehoboam was unhappy be- \ 
cause he followed evil counsel, . j 

The truth of a causal proposition arises not from th6 \ 
truth of the parts, but from the causal influence that the ; 
one part has upon the other ; for both parts may betmei '■ 
yet the proposition false, if one part be not the cause of th^ 
other. 

Some logicians refer reduplicate propositions to thia 
place,as Men^ considered as me?iy avc rational creatureif 
that is, because they are 7nen, 

V. Relative profiositions have their parts joined by 
such particles as express a relation or comparison of one 
thing to another ; as, IVhen you are silent I will speak : At 
much as you are worth so much shall you be esteemed : At 
is the father^ so is the son : Where thtre r/ no tale-bearer^ 
contention will cease. 



ikf. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 135 

These are very much akin to conditional propositions, 
Mthe trulh of them depends upon the justness of their 
tmnection, 

» VL Disert.' je firofiositi^nw arc sUch wherein various 
nod seei^ingly opposite jud{^mcnts are made, whose vari- 
Uij or distinction is noted by the particles, buty though^ yet^ 
!Vr. as Trax^eilera may change their climate but not their 
'teafier ; Job Vfos fiatient^ though his grief «w» great. 
I The truth and goodness of a diac retire firofioaition de- 
pends on the truth of both parts, and their contradistinc- 
tion to one another ; for, though both pans should be trucy 
7et if there be no seeming opposition between them, it is 
n useless assertion, though we cannot call it a false one ; 
'II, Descartes vklb a fihilosofiherj yet he vfas a Frenchnan : 
iThe Roman* 'were valiant^ but they sfioke Latin ; both whicli 
'Iffopositiona are ridiculous, for want of a seeming oppd- 
.adon between the parts. 

Since we have declared wherein the truth SLX\d/alsehooci 
'*ef these cofnfiound firo/ionti^a consist, it is proper also to 
five some intimations how any of these propositions, when 
tbey are false, may be o/i/tosed or contradicted. 

All compolind propositions, except copulatives and dia- 
tntrvesy are properly denied or contradicted when the ne- 
l(Bdon affects their conjunctive particles ; as, if the dis- 
junctlTe proposition asserts, // is either day or night ; the 
isppqnent says, It is not either day or w'ght ; or, It ia not 
^ncewsary that it should be either day or night : so the hy^ 
Mthetieai proposition is denied, by saying, // does not foU 
Um that the earth must mon^e if the sun be Jixt, 

A disjunctive firo/iositionj may be contriidicted also by 
denying all the parts ; as, It ia neither day nor night. 

And a causal firofioaition may be denieil or opposed /Ticf/- 
Tectly and imfirofierlyy when cither part of tlie proposition 
' Udenied ; and it must be false if either pnrt be false : But 
the design of the pmposilion being to shew the causal con- 
Section of the two parts, each part is supposed to be tnie,und 
it is not properly contradicted as a cauaal firofionitiotiy un« 
kss one p^irt of it be deiued to be the cause of the other. 
As for co/iulatives and discrrtives^ becaus * thtir truth 
depends more on the truth of their pnrts, therefore these 
Qiiy be opposed or denied, as many ways as the parts of 

M 
I 




134 LOGIC : OR, THE Part U 

ivhich tlicy are composed may be denied ; so this copuli 
live proposition, Riches and honor arc tcmfitationa to firid 
may be denied by saying, Riches arc not temfitations^ thoug 
honor jnay be : or, Honor is not a temfitatia*, though rici 
ea may be i or, J\/either riches nor honor arc temf nation 

So ibis discrctivc proposition, Job was fiaficnf^ though h 
i(ricfivas great ^ is denied by saying, Jci6 rjas not ftatien 
though hiit grit'/ was great: ov^ Job wjs patient^ but h 
r^ricf was not great : or Job was not fiatient^ nor was / 
grief great. 

\Vc proceed now to the second sort of com/iound prop! 
Millions, namely, sucb whose c^mfiosiiion is not ex/irestt 
hut latent or concealed ; yet a small attention will find t« 
proposliions included in tbcm. Such are these tb; 
lollow. 

1. Excliisives ; ^^^ The fiions man alone is hajifiy, . 
.s 07ily ^ir laaac J^'envton could Jind out true philosofihy, 

2. Exceptives ; as, Abw<" of the ancien's but Flatoxot 
ilrfcjided the souths immortality. The Protestants worJu 
r,07ie bur God. 

3. Comparatives ; as, Pain ifs the greatest affliction 
.\'(j Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards at Mexico. 

Here notcy 'riiat tlie com/iarative decree does not alwav 
\m\>\y ihc positive ; as, if I say, A fool is better than 
^«aT'c, tills does not affirm ihixt fJly is goody but that it is 
:(ss evil tlwn knavery. 

4. Inceptives and desitivcsy which relate to the begif 
i.iiig or ending of any thinp:; as, The Latin tongue is n\ 
: set forgotten. Ko man before Orpheus wrote Greek vert 
Peter Czar of I^Iuscovy began to civilize his nation. 

To these may b ; added continuatives ; as, Rome remain 
'0 this day, which includes at least two propositions, nam 
ly , Rome wasy and Rome is. 

Here let other authors spend time and paios in givii 
the precise definitions in all these sorts of propositio 
T\hich may be as well understood by their names and c 
wmples : Here Itt them tell what their truth depends u 
on, and how they arc to be opposed or contradicted ; I 
a moderate share of common sense,, with a review of wt 
is said on the former com/icundsy will suffice for all the 
purposes, without the formality of rules. 



Cnkf. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 135 

SECT- VI L 

OF TRUE AND FALSE PUOFOSITIONS. 



P 



ROPOSITIONS are next to be considered 
according to their at^ise or signification^ and thus they arc 
distributed into true and faUe. A true firofio^iition repre- 
sents things as they are in themselves ; but, if things are 
Tt:presented otherwise than they are in themselves, the 
proposition is /aiae. 
|[ Or we may describe them more particularly thus : a 
true flrofioaition ]oins those ideas and terms together whose 
objects are joined and agree ; or it disjoins those ideas 
ind terms whose objects disagree, or are disjoined ; a:i» 
Every bird has winga : jl Brute ia not immortal. 

Kfahe firofioaition joins those ideas or terms whose ob- 
jects disagree, or it disjoins those whose objects agree ; 
as, Birda have no vringa : Brutea are immortal, 

J^ote It is impossible that the same proposition should 

be both true and false at the same titne, in the same sense, 
and in the same respect ; because a proposition is but the 
fepiesentation of the agreement or disagreement of things: 
Now it ia imfioahible that the acme thing ah^uld be ami nc: 
^or, that the aame thing should ogrre, end net agree ^ a: 
the aame time^ and in the aame res/iect. This is a first 
principle of human knowledge. 

Yet some propositions may seem to contradict one a- 
nother, though they may be both true, but in difterent 
senses, or respects, or times ; as, Man n*aft imnwrtiJ in 
taradiae^ and Man was mortal in fiaradise. But these two 
propositions must be referred to different Unnes : as, Man 
bfjbre hiafall was immortal, but at the fall he became 
loortal. So we may say now, ^fan ia mortal^ or man i^ 
'«ni9r/a/,if we take these propositions in different respects: 
•8, Man ia an immortal creature as ro his soul^ but mortal 
oatohiabody, A great variety of difficulties and seem- 
ing contradictions, both in Holy Scripture, and other wri- 
^ng«, may be solved and explained in this manner. 




J36 LOGIC : OR, THE Part 

The most impoitant question on this subject is tli 
Whatia the criterion or diatin fishing mark of truth ? H 
shall we know when a proposition is really true or fals 
There are so many disguises of truth in the worli1« so n 
iiy false appearances of truth, that some sects have c 
dared there is no possibility of disiinguishing truth fn 
Jalaehood ; and therefore they have abandoned all preti 
<:es to knowledge, and maintain strenuously that nothi 
ia to be knopn. 

The first men ofthis humour make themselves fame 
in Greece by the name o[ ace/itica^ that is, aeckera. Th 
were also called acadtmica^ borrowing their name fn 
academia, their school or place of study. They taug 
that ail things are uncertain^ though they allowed tl 
some are more probable than others. After these arc 
the sects of Fyrrhonica so named from Pyrrho their mi 
tcr, who would not allow one proposition to be more pre 
able than another ; but professed that all things were equt 
iy uncertain. Now all these men (as an ingenious auth 
expresses it) were rather to be called a sect ofliara th 
fihiloaofiheray and that censure is just for two reaaoni 
(I.) Because they determined concerning every propo! 
tion that // xvaa uncertain^ and believed that as a certa 
truth, whilf they professed there was nothing certain, ai 
tl.at nothing could be determined concerning truth 
falsehood ; and thus their very doctrine gave itself the li 
^^.) Because they judged and acted as other men did 
The common affairs of life ; they would neither run ir 
ii^c nor water, though they professed ignorance and i 
certainty, whether the one would burn, or the otb 
(.Ir-j'.vn them. 

There have been some in all ages who have too mu 
nnVctcd this humour, who dispute against every thii 
under pretence that truth haa no certain mark to diat 
guish it. Let us lljcrtibre inquire zvhat :a the general i 
urion of truth ? And, in order to this, it is proper to a 
sider what is the reason why we assent to those propo 
tions which contain the most certain and indubita! 
truths, such as these. The whole ta greater than a fiat 
7'zuo and three make Jive. • 

The only reason wliy we believe these propositions 
be true) is because the ideas of the subjects and predica 



CaAF. 11. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 137 

appear with so much clearness and strength of evidence 
to agree to each other, that the mind cannot help discern- 
ing tile agreement, and cannot douht of the truth of them> 
iti& constrained to judge them true. So, when we com- 
])are the ideas of a circle and a triangle^ or the ideas of an 
iyster and butterfly^ we see such an evident disagreement 
between them, that we are sure that a butterfly ia not an 
oy«/er, nor is a triangle a circle. There is nothing but the 
evidence of the agreement or disagreement between two 
ideas that makes us affirm or deny the one or the other. 

Now it will follow from hence, that a clear and distinct 
fierce/itio7t or full evidence of the agreement and disagreement 
of our ideas to one anothery or to things, is a certain criterion 
of truth ; For, since our minds are of such a make, than 
where the evidence is exceeding plain and strong, we can- 
not withhold our assent ; we should then be necessarily ex- 
posed to believe falsehood, if complete evidence should be 
found in any propositions that are not true. But surely 
the God of perfect wisdom, truth and goodness, would 
ftcver oblige his creatures to be thus deceived ; and there- 
fore he would never have constituted us of such a frame 
as would render it naturally impossible to guard against 
error. 

Another consequence is naturally derived from the for- 
mer, and that is, that the only reason why we fall into 
mistake, is because \vc are impatient to form a judgment 
of things before we have a clear and evident perception 
of their agreement or disagreement ; and, if we will make 
haste to judge while our ideas arc obscure and confused^ 
or before we see whether they agree or disagree, we shall 
plunge ourselves into perpetual errors. See more on this 
subject in an Essay on the Freedom of will in God and Man^ 
published in 1732, section 1. page 13. 

Abre.-Whatis here asserted concerning the necessity of 
clear and distinct ideas, refers chiefly to propositions which 
We form ourselvsa by our own powers ; As for proposiliofin 
which we derive from the testimony of others, they wiH.bo 
accpunted for in Chap. IV. 

M 3 



ISA LOGIC : OR, THE 



' SECT. VIII. 

OF CERTAIN AND DUBIOUS PROiH>8lTIOKS OF K 

A2iD OPIKION, 



S 



INCE we haiEt found that e^dence i 
criterioDy and the sure mark of truth, this leads 
to consider propositions according to their evid 
here we must take notice both of the different 
evidence, and the different kinds of it. 

Propositions, according to tlieir different det; 
idence are distinguished into certain and dubiou 

Where the evidence of the agreement or dis 
of the ideas is so strong and plain, that we ca 
nor delay our assent, the proposition is called c 
Mrvery circle hath a centre ; The world did not c 
An ussent to such propositions is honoured wit! 
o{ knowledge » 

But when there is any obscurity upon the 
or disagreement of the ideas, so that the min 
clearly perceive it, and is not compelled to as 
sent, then the proposition, in a proper and pi 
"senscf is called doubtful or wuertoin ; as, The 
inhabited ; The aotda oj brutes are mere matter i 
will not stand a thousand years longer ; Dido bui 
Carthage^ &c. Such uncertain propositions 
vfiinions. 

When we consider ourselves as philosophers 
ers aftsr truths it would be well if we always s 
full judgment or determination about any 

* It may be objected, that this certainty and uncertain 
in the mind, the division belongs to propositions rather, 
the degrees of our assent, than the degrees of evidence, 
be well answered, that the evidence here intended is th 
pears so to the mind, and not the mere evidence in 
things- Besides (as we shall shew immediately,) the de; 
ought to be exactly proportionable to the degree of ev 
therefore the difference is not great, whether propositi 
certain or UDCcmini ;(CCording to \\m measure of cy 
ik«seDr. 




Ch*^ n. RIGHT USE OF REASON\ 139 

made farther inquiries, where this plain aad firrfecs tvi- 
dentc 19 wanting : but we are so prone ol' ourselves to 
jud^ ^thout Tull evidence, and in &ome cases the neces- 
«ty of action in the affairs of life conntrBins us to judge 
ud determine upon a tolerable degree of evidence, that 
«e vulgarly call those propositions certain, where we hars 
but »ery little room or reason to doubt of theni) though 
Ac evidence be not complete and resistless. 
t Crrtainty, according to the schools is distinguished into 
A/eclive and tubjective. Ohjeciive crnainly, is when the 
proposition is certainly true in itself ; and tubjeeiivt^ 
when we are certain of the truth of it. The one is in 
tluTigt, the other is in our ntlnds. 

But let it be observed here, that cverjr proposition in it- 
Klf is certainly true or certainly fulse, Kor, though 
doubtfulness oi* uncertainty seems to be a medium between 
certain truth and certain falsehood in our minds, yet there 
ii DO such medium in things themselves, no, not even in 
future events : Far now at this time it is certain in itself, 
that midsummer-day seven years hence will be sei-ene, or 
it it certain it mill be cloudy, tho' we are uncenain and ut- 
terly ignorant what sort of day it will be : Thb ceHaimy 
ofdistaot futurities is known to God only. 
, Uncertain or dubious propositions, that iSi opinions, are 
fitinguished into probuble, ur improbable. 

When the evidence of any proposition is greater than 
ike evidence of the contrary, then it is a probable opinion : 
Where the evidence and arguinents are stronger on the 
contrary side, we call it improbable. But, while the ar- 
guments on either side seem to be equally strong, and the 
evidence for, ^nd against any proposition appears equal to 
the mind, then in common language nc cail it a doubtful 
matter. We also call it a dubious or doubtful proposi- 
tion, when there are no arguments on either side, as Next 
Christmas-day will be a very sharp frost. Andin general) 
til those propositions aredoubtful, wherein wecsn perceive 
M sufficient marlis or evidences of truth or falsehood. 
In such a case, the mind which is searching for truth 
ought to remain in a state of doubt or suspense, until su- 
perior evidence on one ude or the other incline the bal- 
ance of the judgment, and dctemine the probabilitr or 
GcrtuDiy to w on« wde. 



140 



LOGIC : OR, THE 



PaktII 



A great many propositions which we generally belientj 
or misbelieve in human affairs, or in the scienceSf hat 
very various degrees of evidence, which yet arise not 
complete r£T/a272/y, either of truth or falsehood. Thusil 
comes to pass that there are such various and almost li 
finite decrees of probability and improbability. To 
weak probability we should give a weak assent; tnd^ 
EU'ongcr assent is due where the evidence is greateri 
the matter more probable. If we proportion our 
in all things to the degrees of evidence, we do the uti 
that human nature is capable of, in a rational way toi 
cure itself from error. 



SECT. IX. 



OF SSNSB) CONSCIOUSNESS, INTILLIGENCE) REA»OX| rAinf| 

AND INfiPlHATlON. 



A 



FTER we have considered the evidence of a 

proposiiions in the various degrees of it, we come to sur- ^ 
vcy the several kinds of evidence, or the different ways ^ 
whereby truth is let into the mind, and which produce \ 
accord in i^ly several kinds of knowledge. We shall dis- : 
tribute them into these six ; namely, Sense, Conscious* 
ness. Intelligence, Reason, Faith, and Inspiration ; and then ■■ 
distinguish the propositions, which are derived from thein> . 

I. The evidence of sense is, when we frame a propo* 
sition according to the dictates of any of our senses ; so 
wc judge that grass is green; that a trumpet gives a 
pleas.int sound ; that Hre burns wood ; water is soft, and 
iron is hard ; for we have seen, heard or felt all these. It 
is upon this evidence of sense, that we know and believe 
the daily occurrences in human life ; and almost all the 
histories of mankind, that are written by eye or car wit- 
nesses, are built upon this principle. 

Under the evidence of sense we do not only include that 
knowledge which is derived to us by our outward senses 
of hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting, and snjelling ; 



AP. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 141 

ihat also which is derived from the inward sensations 
[appetites of hunger, thirsty ease, pleasure, pain, weari- 
es, rest, &c. And all those tl)ing;s which bcion); to the 
;y ; as Hunger is a fiainful afifictite ; Light is fiUasant j 
ti is sweei to the 'iveary limbs. 

Propositions wliich are built on this evidence, may be 
ned sensible propositions, or the dictates of sense. 
if. as we learn what belongs to the body by the evidence 
«nse, so we learn what belongs to the soul by an inward 
isciousiies8« which may be called a sort of int^nal 
lin}^, or spiritual sensation of what passes in the mind ; 
I think before I speak ; I desire lar^e knowled^^e ; I 
pect my own practice ; I studied hard to-day ; My con- 
ence bears witness of my sincerity ; My soul hates vain 
U};hts ; Fear is an easy passion ; Long meditation on 
! thing is tiresome. 

Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a 
iltitude of proi>ositions, as well as of single ideas, by 
«e two principles which Mr. Locke calls sensation and 
lection : One of them is a sort of consciousness of what 
ects the body, and the other is a consciousness of what 
ises in the mind. 

Propositions which are built on this internal concious* 
iSf have yet no particular or distinguisliing name assign- 
to them. 

[II. Intelligence relate chiefly to those abstracted pro- 
litiona which carry their own evidence with them, and 
mit no doubt about them. Our perception of this self- 
idence in any proposition is called intelligence. It is 
r knowledge of those first principles of truth which are, 
it were, wrought into the very nature and make of 
r minds : They are so evident in themselves to every 
in who attends to them, that they need no proof. It 
the prerogative and peculiar excellence of those propo* 
ions that they can scarce either be proved, or denied : 
i^cy cannot easily be proved, because there is nothing 
pposed to be more clear or certain, from which an argu- 
ent may be drawn to prove them. They cannot well 
denied, because their own evidence is so bright and con- 
icing, that «is soon us the terms are understood the mind 
cessarii/- assents \ such are these, Whatsoever actcth hath 



.*i 



LOCIC : OR, THE 



Part. U 



t ' z N - >:: c *r-5 "3 pnc-prriies ; A pari is less thfli 
V . , . N :.:-c v-r. :r thr cause of ilsclf. 
•.s 7 -: :.:^ Lr.* i-c ci L«J axioms, or maxims* or fii 

•:. r» ;* : c*: i-^ ".'""s vtry fu.-.ni'.aiions of all imprw 
¥ i c> :" -xx*:'>j<. ar. J en that account these hi 

• -o.;;:: :< i-'-ni-tc prcpcsiiionsi or truths 






v-^i z'iZ i. cTiii p^r. of the ktiowlt-clge of 
.51 r >r„'* i:: :: * s^pir^ic state is obtained 
'. * T'^ • ' c'. -- — i'T. bv *;:>. ir. inr.mcdiate view of ihi 

3s, ->.-. - re -* lilt Trx: s-rr: of evldencey and that I 

. - • .-.-^ . •« * .* i.:^::^^^- cr .".nvij from others by na 

< -"*i x-^i'j c:' jrcj"i=r.: ; as, if there be m 

• - - - c*:. I ;~*c*. r. r-ccecus !"rom ihc m 

. . . >, . ^ - • > ,- ,'ir :-£ ri:;"...* If I sec a cottage 

. -. -■ . .J. . -.r. s^.-.-; :r.-'* his been there andboi 

".: 1 », -vtv :■; r.e«^c:s ir.ti eaith, this gifc^ 

.... - * ■*: *?:~ .*' .::''• t rt .« i G c- J w ho made iht'in^ 

. ■ , t --W .r< 0- : ■ I '-i- .»vc vpon t!u5 kindofevi*' 

,. . \ .s .:.,■•*:.- -5. c*r. tljnal truths; andtho; 

;:. . V , ^i ? ; f ■-. V s< ^rcpcrly called science.! 

^ . ,.:... : i: : : -..cr-w. •ciir.ce is usually •[» 

. ^ *...,*.•■: r:r:':r ::r.J ::;tthocical ob5e^T^! 

^ . v > --. v.- :: . li.-— tJ :"vn have formrtl' 

C ^. • ^-' - r'-^iC.:!.:;.-*'. utrivlni^ one truth 

. i - . » i : :■.:.'•.:• "'".- '*s- li t^is kriowledge 

■-,.>.', — ..-.:;.:!* „^- . !y : a. led an art. Arf; 

- * , • -^ v* N- i . .>.lr:-!:i •. icl^vecii anarlilKl 

'*.*.: ,.-*c ..:V;f cr-i^y :o pratlice, tbe 

- .. , ■ \..-. -.Jp i.\>. ;v'r, LT physicS) &D^ 

. - , .i>. I;^:»: ,i,-^»; :^.t!or;c ire called arts i 

' • ^ . ■ ■? ^o:h ir: an.j svience: for the} 

■ - ^ ".* - *- •:..^ much tf practice intheifl 



N 



«% »• < 



•••.. ,'.•;, ....4 mi r..;-;.j ;.-..> .. :,z.\,ct oi.l/ to 



Cbaf. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. i4,S 

I sequent prophecies or miracles, or some public appearan- 
iccs more than human. 

The propositions which arc attained by this sort of ev- 
Mence are called inspired truths. This is divine revela- 
mi at fii'st hand, and the dictates of God in an immediate 
hunner, of which theological writers itiscourse at large : 
pot since it belongs only to a few favourii ::s of heaven to be 
mipircdy and not the bulk of mankind, it is not necessary 
|b speak more ofitin a treatise of lo^ic, which is design- 
bfor the general improvement of human reason. 
\\ The various kinds of evidence upon which we believe 
[ttf proposition, afford us these three remarks : 
I Rfmark I. The same proposition may be ^nown to us 
m the different kinds of evidence : That the wnole is big* 
yjer than a part, is known by our senses, and it is known 
1^ the self-evidence of the thing to our mind. That God 
|mted the heavens and the earth is known to us by rea- 

iiBnd is known also by divine testimony or iuith. 

kxtf ARK II. Among these various kinds of evidence 
are generally stronger than others in their own na- 
ptnv, and give a better ground for certainty. Inward con- 
ticioainefts and intelligence, as well as divine faith and in- 
f ^irtUony usually carry much more force with them than 
■Me or human faith, which are often fallible ; though 
r Acre are instances wherein human faith, sense and reason - 
>' i% lay a foundation also for complete assurance, and 
' kivr no room for doubt. 

I .Reason in its own nature would always lead us into the 
, ttath in matters within its compass, if it were used aright, 
' urit would require us to suspend our judgment where 
there is a want of evidence. But it is our sloth, precipi- 
tecyi sense, passsion, and many other things, that lead 
•or reason astray in this degenerate and imperfect state * 
Hence it comes to pass that we are guilty of so many er- 
rors in reasoning, especi.dly about di\ine things, because 
wr reason either is busy to inquire, and rrsolved to deter- 
nline about mutters that are above our pres-nt reach ; or 
kcause we mingle many prejudices anrl secret influences 
ofsense, fancy, passion, incliiniion, &c. with our exer- 
cises of reason, -and judge and determbic according to their 
irregiilar instances. 

N 



146 LOGIC : OR| THE Paet 

Divine faith would never admit of any controversies 
doublings, if we were but assured that God had spok 
and that we rightly understood his meaning. 

Remark III. The greatest evidence and certainty 
any proposition does not depend on the variety of 
ways or kinds of evidence whereby it is known, but rati 
upon the strength and degree of evidence, and the clc 
ness of that light in or by which it appears to the mi 
For a proposition that is known only one way may 
much more certain, and have stronger evidence, tl 
another that is supposed to be known many ways. The 
fore these propositions, Nothing has no properties ; I 
thing can make itself ; which are known only by intc 
gence, are laach surer than this proposition. The rainb 
has real and inherent colours in it ; or than this, The i 
rolls round the eai*th ; though we seem to know b 
these last by our senses, and by the cpmmon testimony 
our neighbors. So any proposition that is clearly evid 
to our own consciousness or divine Joith^ is much more c 
tain to us than a thousand others that have only the e 
(]ence of feeble and obscure sensations of mere p;*oba1 
reasonings and doubtful arguments, or the Kinincss of 1 
Ilble Tnen^ or even though all these should join togetb 



CHAP. III. 

i HE SPRINGS OF FALSE JUDGMENT, ORTHEDC 

THINE OF PREJUDICES. 



iNriioDvcTio:^. 



I 



N the end of the foregoing chapter, we h 
surveyed the several sorts of evidence on which we bi 
our assent to propositions. These are indeed the gene 
grounds upon which we form our judgment concern' 
things. What remains in this Second Part of Lo( 
is to point out the sevei*al springs and causes of our n 
takes in judging, and to lay down some rules by wh 
we should conduct ourselves in passing a judgment u| 
every thing that is proposed to us. 



p. in. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 147 

confess many things which will be mentioned in these 
winfi^ chapters might be as well referred to the Third 
T ov Logic, where we shall treat of Reasoning and 
iment ; for moat of our false judgments seem to include 
:Fet bad reasoning in them ; and while we shew the 
igs of error, and the rules of true judgment, we do at 
lame time discover which arguments are fallacious, 
:h reasonings are weak, and which ai*e just and strong, 
since this is usually cidled a judging ill, or judging 
» I think we may without any impropriety treat of it 
; and this will lay a sure foundation for all sorts of 
•cination and argument. 

ash judgments are called prejudices, and so are the 
igs of them. This word in common life signifies an 
pinion which we have conceived of some other person, 
>me injury done to him. But when we use the word 
tatters of science, it signifies a judgment that is form- 
onceming any person or thing before sufficient exam- 
ati / and generally we suppose it to mean a false judg- 
t or mistake : At least, it is an opinion taken up with- 
solid reason for it, or an assent given to a proposition 
re we have a just evidence of the truth of it, thougli 
thing itself may happen to be true, 
ometimes these rash judgments are called preposses- 
8 ; whereby is meant, that some particular opinion has 
messed the mind, and engaged the assent, without suffi- 
it search or evidence of the truth of it. 
'here is a vast variety of these prejudices and prepos- 
>ions which attend mankind in every age and condition 
fe ; they lay the foundations of many an error, ami 
iy an unhappy practice, both in the affdii's of religion, 
in other civil concernments ; as well as in matters of 
ning. It is necessary for a man who pursues truth to 
jire into these springs of error, that as far as possible 
nay rid himself of old prejudices, and watch hourly 
inst new ones. 

The number of them is so great, and they are so intcr- 
'en with each other, as well as with the powers of hu- 
ll nature, that it is sometimes hird to distinguish them 
rt ; yet for method's sake we shall reduce them to these 
r general heads, namely, prejudices arising from 



U3 LOGIC : OR, THE PartIL : 

a 

tjin.:?s, or from vrortls, from ourselves, or from other pc^^ 
sor< ; and, afirr the description of each prejudice, we shall 
pn.'pcsc one or more ways of curing it. 



SECT. L 

PREJUDICES ARISING FROM THINC&. 



X HE first sort of prejudices are those which a-! 
rise from the thin$;s themselves about which we judge. 
Bu I here let it be observed, that there is nothing in Ae 
jKiuire of ihiiigs that will necessarily lead us into error, if 
we do but use our reason ari)i;ht, and withhold our jiid|', 
mcnt till there appears sufFicicnt c\ulence of truth. Bw 
since we are so unhappily prone to take advantage of ev- 
ery doubt'ul appearance and circumstance of things to 
forma wronp; judgment, and phmge ourselves into mis- 
take therefore it ib proper to consider what there is in the 
things themselves that may occasion our errors. 

1. The obscurity of some truths, and the difficulty of 
*:c:ircliing them out, is one occasion of rash and mistaken 
lii'ii^incnt. 

Some truths are difficult because they lie remote from 
tlie first principles of knowledge, and want a long chain 
of argument to come at them : Such are many of the deep 
liiliii^s of algcbia and geometry, and some of the thcortxw 
:iiul problems of most parts of the mathematics. Many 
li:il.^■> al.:o in natural philosophy are dark and intricate 
vii oii this account, because we cannot come at any certain 
ki.(\\Icdi;e of iliem without the labour of many anddiffi' 
viil*, as well as chargeable experiments. 

'I here are oilier truths which have great darkness up<>K 

!'.;n>, because we have no proper means or mediums t< 

.::!v at the knovilcdgc of them. Though in our age ^*'' 

.\ J f)ur.d out many of the deep things of nature, by tb 

- .-:-nce of glasses and other Histrumcnts ; yet we arc n^ 

. . ;!":o arrived at any sufficient methods to discover th 

' > »^f those little particles of mutter which distinguis 

. -.\-*:':il sapoura, odours, and colours qf bodies ; nor t 



Cha#. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 149 

find what sort of atoms compose liquids or solids, and dis- 
tinguish wood, minerals, metals, glass, stone, Sec. There 
IS a darkness also lies upon the actions of the intellectual or 
angelical world ; their manners of subsistence and agency, 
the power of spirits to move bodies, and the union of our 
souls with this animal body of ours, are much unknown to 
us on this account. 

Now in many of these cases, a great part of mankind is 
not content to be entirely ignorant ; but they rather choose 
to form rash and hasty judgments, to guess at things with- 
out just evidence, to believe something concerning them 
before they can know them ; and thereby fall into errar. 

vThis sort of prejudice, as well as most others, is cured 
by patience and diligence in inquiry and reasoning, and a 
suspension of judgment, till we have attained some proper 
mediums of knowledge, and till we see sufficient evidence 
ofthetmth. 

IL The appearance of things in a disguise is another 
spring of prejudice, or rash judgment. The outside of 
things, which first strikes us. Is oftentimes different from 
their inward nature ; and we are tempted to judge sud- 
denly according to outward appearances. If a picture 
is daubed with many bright and glaring colours, the vul- 
gar eye admires it is an Excellent piece ; whereas the 
same person judges very contemptuously of some admi- 
nible design, sketched out only with a black pencil on a 
coarse paper, though by the band of a Raphael. So the 
scholar spies the name of a new book in a public news-pa- 
per ; he is charmed with the title, he purchases, he reads 
with huge expectations, and finds It is all trash and im- 
pertinence : This is a prejudice, derived from the appear- 
ance ; we are too ready to judge that volume valuable 
Which had so good a frontispiece. The large heap of en- 
comiums and swelling words of assurance^ that are bes- 
towed on quack medicines ip public advertisements, temp^ 
i^any a reader to judge them infallible, and to use the pills 
^^ the plaister, with vast hope and frec^uent disappoint? 
ment. 

We are tempted to form our judgment of persons ais^ 
Well as things by these outward appearances* Where 
fterc is wealth, equipage, and spl^ndlgv^ N^^^x^x^'^^^n*^^ 



150 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II. 

4:all that man Iiappy ; but we see not the vexing disquiet- 
udes of his soul : and when we spy a person in ragged 
garments, we form a despicable opinion of him too suddcQ- 
ly ; we can hardly think him either happy or wise, our 
judgment is so strangely biassed by outwalk and sensible 
things. It was through the power of this prejudice, that 
the Jews rejected our blessed Saviour y they could not suf- 
fer themselves to believe that the man who appeared u 
;he son of a carpenter was also the son of God. And be- 
cause St. Paul was of little stature, a mean presence, and 
his voice contemptible, some of the Corinthians were tempt* 
cd to doubt whether he was inspired or not. 

This prejudice is cured by a long acquaintance with the 
world, and a just observation that things are sometimes 
belter and sometimes worse than they appear to be. We 
ought therefore to restrain our excessive forwardness tc 
form our opinion of persons or things before we have op- 
portunity to search into them more perfectly. Remem* 
ber that a grey beard does not make a philosopher ; all is 
not gold that glistens ; and a rough diamond may be wortt 
an immense sum. 

III. A mixture of difTerent qualities in the same thiagl 
is another temptation to judge amiss. We are ready t( 
be carried away by that quality which striks the first 01 
the strongest impressions upon us, and we judge of tb( 
whole object according to that quality, regardless of al 
the rest ; or sometimes we colour over all the other quali' 
lies with that one tincture, whether it be bad or good. 

When we have just reason to admire a man for his vir 
lues, we are sometimes inclined ngt only to neglect his weak; 
nesses, but even to put a good colour upon them, andt( 
think them amiable. When we read a book that has ma 
ny excellent truths in it, and divine sentiments, we an 
templed to approve not only that whole book, but even al 
the writings of that author. When a poet, an orator, or 1 
painter, has performed admirably in several illustrioui 
pieces, we sometimes also admire his very errors, w< 
mistake his blunders for beauties, and are so ignorantl] 
fond as to copy after them. 

It is this prejudice that has rendered so many grea 
scholars perfectly bigots, andinclined them to defend Hom 
er or Horace^ hiyy or CvcexO|mX\it\tm^\a^s^^'&^^\x^ 



:aAP. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 151 

iicate all the follies of their favorite author. It is tliat 
uempts some great writers to support the sayings of al- 
nost all the ancient fathers of the church, and admire 
tbem even in their very reveries. 

On the other hand, if an author has professed heretical 
teniiments in religion, we throw our scorn upon every 
thing he writes, we despise even his critical or mathe- 
matical learning, and will hardly allow him common sense. 
If a poem has some blemishes in it, there is a set of false 
critics who dec: y it universally, and will allow no beauties 
there. 

This sort of prejudice is relievt:d by learning to distin- 
guish things well, and not to judge in the lump. There 
iiBcarce^any thing in the world of nature or art, in the 
world of morality or religion, that is perfectly uniform. 

E'^*~~7e is a mixture of wisdom and folly, vice and virtue, 
and evil, both in men and things. We should re- 
wv..iber that some persons have great wit and little judg- 
ment ; others are judicious, but not witty. Some are 
Sood humoured without compliment ; others have all the 
brmalities of complaisance, but no good humour. We 
ought to know that one man may be vicious and learned, 
vhlle another has virtue without learning. That many a 
man thinks admirably well^ who has a poor utterance ; 
While others have a charming manner of speech, but their 
tlioughts are trifling and impertinent. Some are good 
neighbours, and courteous, and chs^ritable towards men, 
who have no piety towards Cod ; others are truly reli- 
gious, but of iporose natural tempers. Some excellent 
layings are found in very silly books, and some silly 
thoughts appear in books of value. We should neither 
praise nor dispraise by wholesale, but separate the good 
from the evil, and judge of them apart : The accuracy of a 
|Qod judgment c.nsists much in making such distinctions. 
Yet let it be noted too, tliut in common discourse wc 
Usually denominate persons and things according to the 
major part of their character. He is to be called a wise 
lAaD who has but few follies : He is a good philosopher 
who knows much of nature, and for the most part reasons 
Well in matters of human science ; and that book should 
!^ esjteemed well written^ which has more of good sense 
ioit Uianit has^of impertinence. 



153 LOGIC : OR, TflE Pam. U. 

IV. Thou^^h a thing be uniform in its own naturci yet 
the clifTerent lights in which it may be placed, and the dif- 
ferent views in which it appears to us, will be ready to 
excite in us mistaken judgments concerning it. Let an 
erect cone be placed on a horizontal plane, at a great dis- 
tance from the eye, and it appears a plain triangle , but 
we shall judge that very cone to be nothing but a flat dr- 
cle if its base be obverted towards us. Set a commoB 
round plate a little obliquely before our eyes afar off, and wc 
shall think it an oval figure : But if the very edge of it be 
turned towards us, we shall take it for a straight line. So 
when we view the several folds of a changeable silk, vc 
pronounce chis part red, and that yellow, because of its 
different pojsiiion to the light, though the silk laid smoott 
in one light appears all of one colour. 

When we survey the miseries of mankind, and think ci 
the sorrows of millions, both on earth and in hell, the di* 
vine government has a terrible aspect, and we may be 
tempted to think hardly even of God himself: But if wc 
view the profusion of his bounty and grace amoBg his cret* 
tures on earth, or the happy spirits in heaven, we ahill 
have so exalted an idea of his goodness as to forget hit 
vengeance. Some men dwell entirely upon the pronusef 
of his gospel, and think him all mercy : Others, under i 
melancholy frame, dwell upon his tcrroi*s and his threat 
enings, and are overwhelmed with the thoughts of his se* 
verity and vengeance, as though there were no mercy in 
him. 

The true method of delivering ourselves from this pre- 
judice, is to view a thing on all sides, to compare all the 
various appearances of the same thing with one another 
and let each of them have its full weight in the balance ol 
Qur judgment, before we fully determine our opinion. I 
was by this mean that the modern astronomers came tc 
iind out that the planet Saturn hath a fl<tt broad circl< 
I'ound its globe, which is called its ring, by observing th< 
different appearances as a narrow or a broader oval, or, af 
it sometimes seems to be a straight line, in the dififeren 
parts of its twenty-nine years revolution through the eclip 
tic. And if we take the same just and religious survey ^ 
Ihajfreat ^nd blessed God in s^U tl^^ discoye^es ef b} 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 153 

vengeance and his mercy, we shall at last conclude him 
to be both just and good. 

V. The casual association of many of our ideas be- 
comes the spring of another prejudice or rash judgm;:nt, 
to which we are sometimes exposed. If in our younger 
years we have taken medicines that, have been nauseous, 
vhcn any medicine whatsoever is afterward proposed to 
Ql under sickness, we immtdiutcly judge it nauseous : 
Our fancy has so closely joined these ideas together, that 
We know not how to separate them : Then the stomach 
ieels the disgust, and perhaps refuses the only drug that 
an preserve life. So a child who has been let blood joins 
the ideas of pain and the surgeon together, and he hates 
the sight of the surgeon because he thinks of his pain : 
Or if he has drank a bitter portion, he conceives a bitter 
[idea of the cup which held it, and will drhik nothing out 
of that cup. 

It is ifor the same reason that the bulk of the common 
people are so superstiiiously fond of the-psalms translated 
by Hopkins and Stcrnhold, and think them sacred and di- 
vine, because they have been now for more than an hun- 
dred years bound up in the same covers with our bibles. 

The best relief against this prejudice ofassociation is to 
consider, whether there be any natural and necessary con- 
nection between these ideas, wiiich fancy, cits^om, or 
chance, hath thus joined together ; and if nature has not 
joined them, let our judgment correct the folly of our im- 
agination, and separate these ideas again. 



SECT. II. 

PREJUDICES ARISING FROM WORDS. 



O 



UR ideas and words are so linked toj^elhcr, 
tl»at while we judge of things according to words, wc are 
kd into several mistakes. These may be distributed un- 
der tWo general heads, namdy, such as arise fro d sin/je 
^ords or phrases, or such as arise from words joined in 
%ech, and composing a discourse. 




dH LOGIC : OR, THE P 

I. The mont eminent and remarkible errors 
first kind are these three. (1) When our words 
significant} and have no ideas ; as when the myst: 
vines talk of the prayer of silence, the supematu 
passive niffht of the soul, the vicinity of powers, tl 
pension of all thoughts : Or (3) When our woi 
law, equivccal, and signify two or more ideas ; as xh 
law, light, flesh, spirit, righteousness,and many othc 
in scripture : Or (3) When two or three words are 
xnous, and signify one idea, as regeneration and n 
ation in the New Testament ; both which mear 
change of the heart from sin to holiness ; or, as tli 
tor of Cologn and the Bishop of Cologn are two 
the same man. 

These kinds of phrases are the occasion of vario 
takes ; but none so unhappy as those in theolog; 
words without ideas, as well as synonymous and e( 
words, have been used and abused by the humov 
sions, interests, or by the real ignorance and weal 
men,tf beget terrible contests among Christians. 

But tprelieve us under all those dangers, and to 
these sorf of prejudices which arise from single \ 
phr&ses, I must remit the reader to Part I. cl 
where 1 have treated about words, and to those di 
which i have (;iven concerning the definiiion of 
Part I. chap. VI. sect. 3. 

II. There is another sort of false judgments, ore 
which we are exposed to by words ; and that is wl 
are joined in speech, and compose a discourse •; a 
we arc in danger two ways. 

The one is, when a man wntes good sense, oi 
much to the purpose, but he has not a happy ar 
ging manner of expression. Perhaps he uses co: 
vulgar words, or old, o!)so1ete, and uufashionablc la 
or: terms, and phrases that are foreigU) latinized, scl 
very uncommon, and hard to be understood ; An< 
still worse, il his sentences arc long and intricate 
sound of them harsh and grating to the car All t 
.deed are defects in stile, and lead some nice 
thinking. hearers or readers into an ill opinioi 



II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1^5 

fi a person speaks or \7rites. Many an excellent 
e of our forefathers has had abundance of con- 
sist upon it by our modem pretenders to sense, for 
:htir distingisbing between the language and the 

e other hand, when a man of eloquence speaks or 
pon any subject, we are too ready to run into his 
ntsy being sweetly and insensibly drawn by the 
less of his harangue, and the pathetic power of 
uage. Rhetoric will vanish every error, so that 
ippear in the dres^ of truth, and put such oma- 
pon vice, as to make it look like virtue : It is an 
Dndrousand extensive influence ; it often conceals^ 
\ or overwhelms the truth, and places sometimes 
falsehood in a tnore alluring light. The decency of 
he music of the voice, the harmony of the pcriodsy 
ty of the stile, and all the engaging airs of the 
have often charmed the hearers into error, and 
?d them to approve whatsoever is proposed in so 
le a manner. A large assembly stands exposed 
:o the power of these prejudices, and imbibes them 
Cicero and Demosthenes made the Romans and 
snians believe almost whatsoever they pleased, 
lest defence against both these dangers, is to learn 
(as much as possible) of separating our thoughts 
s from words and phrases, to judge of the thmgs 
3wn natures, and in their natural or just relaUon to 
her, abstracted from the use of language, and to 
I a steady and obstinate resolution, to hearken to 
but truth, in whatsoever stile or dress it appears, 
we shall hear a sermon of pious and just sent!- 
dth esteem and reverence, though the preacher 
an unpolished stile, and many defects in the iT\an- 
is delivery. Then we shall neglect and disregard 
iattering insinuations, whereby the orator would 
ay for his own sentiments to take possession of our 
' he has not solid and instructive sense equal to bis 
e. Oratory is a happy talent, when it is rightly 
rd, to excite the passions to the practice of virtue 
y : but, to speak properly, this art has nothing t» 
5 search after truth. 



i56 LOGIC: OR, THE PaetH. 



SECT- III. 

rRBJUDICES ARISING FROM 0UR8SLVSS. 



N 



EITHER words nor things would so often 
lead us astray from truth, if we had not within ourselvei' 
such springs of error as these that follow. 

I. Many errors are derived from our weakness of reih 
son, and incapacity to jud^e of thinp;s in our in^tstite* 
These a re called the firtjurlics s 'fivfancy. We frame cirif 
mistakfs about the common objects which surround n% 
and the common affairs of life : We fancy the nurse is oat 
best friend, because children receive from their nurses 
thfir food and other conveniences of life. We judge tbiC' 
books are very unpleasant tilings, because perhaps wehan' 
been driven to them by the scourge. We judge also that \ 
the sky touches the distant hills, because we cannot infon^ \ 
ourselves better in childhood. We believe the stars s!t'^ 
not risen till the sun is set, because we never see them by \^ 
day But some of these errors may seem to be derived' ; 
from the next spring. 

The way to cure the prejudices of infancy, is to distin^ . 
guish, as far as we can, which are those opinions whicb WS . 
framed in perfect childhood ; to remember that at thit 
time our reason was incapable of forming a right judg» 
ment, dnd to bring these propositions again to b^ exi&mil^/ 
ed at the bar of mature reason. , 

II. Our senses gives us many a false information of 
things, and tempt us to judge amiss. This is called ^re;- 
udice of sense : as, when we suppose the sun and moon'trf- 
be fiat bodies, and to be but a few inches broad, becauM 
they appear so to the eye. Sense inclines us to judge that' 
air has no weight, because we do not feel it press heavy 
upon us ; and we judge also by our senses that cold and 
heat, sweet and sour, red and blue, &c. are such real pro*, 
peities in the objects themselves, and exactly like thosiB' 
sensations which they excite in us. 

Note.-^Those mistakes of this sort, which all mankind 
drop am] Jose in their advanc\t\^ ^9;e.^ «ive" called mere 
prejudices of infancy \ but tVvo^i^ YjVacXx ^\^^ m^ ^^ 




Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF RKASON. 137 

Vulgar part of ilie world, onil gener;i!lj- uiih Ml men, lill 
Icarninij and philosopliy cuic ihein, niofc properly uttaik 
the name ot firrjudire* of taite. 

These picjudicus are to be rcmoveti soeral ways. (1.) 
By the as&istnncc of one sense we cure tiit mistake of ano« 
ibcr : as, when a stick thrust into ll;c wuitr seems crooked, 
Heart: prevented from juit[;ing; it lo be really so in itself j 
for, when we tuke it out of the water, both oiir sight and 
feeling agree anil dLtermine it to be straight. (3.) The 
txercise of our reason) and an application (o maihemati« 
caland philosophical sttidlts, cures many other fir rjudiett 
tftentfy both with relation (o the heavenly and eanhly bo 
dies. (3.) We shoiilJ lemcmbcr t'al tiur sencts have of- 
ten deceived us in various instances ; ihut (hey give but > 
confused and imperfect representation of things in m4kii7 
uses ; that they often represent falsely ihose very objects 
to which they seem to be suited, such as the thafie, moiieaif 
iixe,and iiVbof ion of gross bodies, if iliey are but placed at 
• dutancefromus; and as for the minute particles of which 
bodies are composed, our senses cannot distinguish ihem. 
(4.) We should remember also, that one prime and orig- 
ioal design of our senses, is to inform us what various re- 
lation* the bodies that are round about us bear lo our own 
animal body, and to give us notice what is pleasant and 
saeful and what is painful or injurious to us ; but they arc 
Hat auSicient of themselves to lead us into a philosophical 
acquaintance with the inward nature of things. It must 
fac confeised, it is by the assistance of the ei/e and the ear 
eapecially (which are called the tentrt t^f tliicifitinrj that 
our minds are furnished with various pans of knowledgci 
bj reading, hearing, and observing lhinf;s divine and hu* 
man ; yet reason ought always to accomp-jny the exercise 
ofourKnses, whenever we would form a just judgment of 
things proposed to our inquiry. 

Mere it is proper to oUsei-re also, that as the weakness 
of reason in our infancy, and the dictates of our senses^ 
aomclimea in adnncing years, lead the wiser part of man- 
kind astray from truth ; bo the meaner parln of our spe- 
^esi pei'sons whose genius it very low, whose judgment it 
always weak, who are evt-r indulging the dictates of si:nftn 
and humour, ire but children of a UTCtntVu^t^cNWasv&^nr 
O 



15^ LOGIC : OR, THE Pi 

posed to everlasting mistakes in life, and live and die 
midst of prejudices. 

III. Imagination is another friiitful spring of fulsc 
inents. Our imagination is nothing else but the i 
appearances of our sensible ideas in the brain, whi 
soul frequently works in uniting, disjoining, mult!; 
magnifying, diminishing, and altering the several i 
colours, sounds, motions, words and things, that ha^ 
communicated to us by the outwaixl organs of sen 
is no wonder therefore if fancy leads us into man 
takes, for it is but sense at second hand* What 
strongly impressed upon the ihiagination, some f 
believe to be true. Some will choose a pariicular n 
in a lottery, or lay a large wager on a single char 
dye, and doubt not of success, because their fancy 1 
powerful an impression, as assures them it will I 
perous. A thousand pretended prophecies and i 
tions, and all the freaks of enthusiasm have been < 
from this spring. Dreams are nothing else but 
ceptions of fancy ; A delirium is but a short wild 
the imagination ; and a settled irregularity of fa 
distraction and madness. 

One way to gain a victory over this unruly facul) 
set a watch upon it perpetually, and to bridle it ii 
extravagancies ; never to believe any thing mei 
cause fancy dictates it, any more than I would bt 
midnight-dream, nor to trust funcy any farther th 
attended with severe reason. It is a very useful ; 
tertaining power of human nature, in matters of i 
tion, persuasion, oratory, poetry, wit, conversati 
but in the calm inquiry after truth, and the final }U( 
of things^ fancy should retire and stand aside, tm|e 
called in to explain and illustrate a difficult point ' 
inilitude. 

Another method of deliverance from these pre 
of fancy, is to compare the idru8 that arise in our 
nations with the real nature of things, as often as ^ 
occasion to judp;e concerning them ; and let calm 
date reason govern and determine our opinions, 
fancy should shew never so great a reluctance. F 
t^ie inferior faculty, and it ought tp obey. 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 15y 

IV. The various passions or alTeclions of the mind, 
are numerous and endless springs of prejudice. They 
disguise every, object they converse with, and put their 
own colours upon it, and thus lead the judgment astray 
from truth. It is love that makes the mother think her 
own child the fairest, and will sometimes persuade us that 
a blemish is a beauty. Hope and desire make an hour of 
delay seem as long as two or three hours : Hope inclines 
us to think there is nothing too dilHcult to be attempted : 
Despair tells us that a brave attempt is mere rashnesS) and 
that every difficulty is insurmountable. Fear makes us 
imagine that a bush shaken with the wind has some sav- 
age beast in it, and multiplies the dangers that attend our 
path : But still there is a more unhappy effect of fear, when 
It keeps millions of souls in slavery to the errors of estab- 
lished religion : What could persuade the wise men and 
philosophers of a popish country to believe the gross ab- 
sardities of the Romish church, but the fear of torture, or 
death, the galley, or the inquisition ? Sorrow and mel* 
ancholy tempt us to think our circumstances much more 
dismal than they are, that we may have some excuse for 
mourning : And envy represents the condition of our 
neighbor better than it is, that there might be some pre- 
tence for her own vexation and uneasiness. Anger, wrath, 
and revenge, and all those hateful passions, excite in us 
far worse ideas of men than they deserve, and persuade us 
to believe all that is ill of them. A detail of the evil in- 
fluence of the affections of the mind upon our own judg- 
ment would make a large volume. 

The cure of these prejudices is attained by a constant 
jealousy of ourselves, and watchfulness over our passions, 
that they may never interpose when we are called to pass 
a judgment of any thing i And when our affections are 
warmly engaged, let us alDStain from judging. It would 
be also of great use to us to form our deliberate judg- 
ments of persons and things in the calmest and serenest 
hours of life, when the passions of nature are all silent, and 
the mind enjoys its most perfect composure : and these 
judgments so formed should be treasured up in the mind, 
that we might have recourse to them in hours of need. 



1 ftO LOGIC : OR, THE Paet U. 

See many sentiments and directions relating^ to this sub- 
ject, in my Doctrine of the Passions, a n«w edition enlar- 
ged. 

V. The • fondness \vc have for 9e(fj and the relation 
"which other persons and things have to ourselves, furnish 
lis with another long list of prejudices. This indeed might 
be reduced to the passion of self-love ; but it is so copious 
an head that I choose to name it a distinct spring of false 
judgments. We are R:enerally ready to fancy every thinj 
of our own has something peculiarly valuable in it, whcb 
indeed there is no other reason, but because it is our own. 
Were we born among the gardens of Italy, the rocks of 
Switzerland, or the ice and snows of Russia and Sweden, 
still we would imagine peculiar excellencies in our natii^ 
iand. Wc conceive a good idea of tlie town and village 
where we first breathed, and think the better of a man fos 
being born near us. Wci^entertain the best opinion of the 
persons of our own party, and easily believe evB reports 
of persons of a different sect or faction. Our own sex, 
our kindred, our houses, and our very names, seem to 
have something good and desirable in them. We arc res* 
ily to mingle all these with ourselves, and canuQt bear to 
have others think meanly of them. 

So good an opinion have we of our sentiments and practi- 
4:cs, that it Is very dif!icult to believe what a reprover says 
of our conduct ; and we are as ready to assent to all the 
ianguage of flattery. We set up our own opinions in re- 
ligion and philosophy as the tests of orthodoxy and truth; 
and we are prone to judg^e every practice of other men 
xrithcr a duty or a crinie, .which we think would be a crime 
or a duty in us, though their circumstances are vastly 
difltrent from our own. Tliis humour prevails some- 
lijnes to such a degree, that we would make our own taste 
and inclination the standard by which to judge of every 
dish of meat that is set upon the table, every book in a li; 
brary, every employment, study, and business of life, ai 
well as every recreation. 

It is from this evil prisciple, of setting up self for 8 

model of what other men ought to be, that the anti-christiai 

spirit of imposition and persecution had its original; 

Though thtre is no more rea^oufov \\.\.\v^ti tl\«ire was foi 

ifjc practice of that tyrant, >yho Yvv^vtv^ ^>a^^ ^\. Iw>k 



CiiAP. III. lUGHT USE OF REASON. 16l 

own sire, "was reported to stretch men of low stature upon 
the rack} till they were drawn out of the lenfi:th of his bed ; 
and some add also, that he ciitoffthc legs of any whom he 
found too long for it. 

It is also from a principle near akin to this, that we per- 
vert and strain the writings of many venerable authors, and 
especially the sacred books of scripture, to make them 
speak our own sense. Through the influence which our 
own schemes or kypotheses have upon the mind, we some- 
times become so sharp*sighted as to find thtse schemes in 
those places of scripture where the holy writers never 
thought of them, nor the holy spirit intended them. At 
other times this prejudice brings such a dimness upon the 
sightf that we cannot read any thing that opposes our own 
scheme, though it be writtien as with sun-beams, and in 
the plainest language ; and perhaps we are in danger in 
such a case of winking a little against the light. 

We ought to bring our minds free, unbiassed, and 
teachable, to learn our religion from the word of God ; but 
we have generally formed all tiie lesser as well as the 
greater points of our religion before-hand, and then wc 
read the prophets and apostles only to perverc them to con- 
firm our own opinions. Were it not for this influence of 
♦f(^ and a bigotry to our own tenets, we could hardly im- 
agine that so many strange, absurd, inconsistent, wicked* 
mischievous, and bloody principles, should pretend to sup- 
iwrt and defend themselves by the gospe! of Christ. 

Every learned critic has his own hypothesis ; and if the 
common text be not fa\-ourablc to his opinion, a various 
lection shall be made authentic. The text must be sup- 
posed to be defe^ tive or redundant ; and the sense of it 
ilisll be literal or metaphorical, accordin;r as it best sup- 
ports his own scheme. Whole chapters or books shall be 
Added or left out of the sacred canon, or be turned into par- 
ables by this influence. Luther knew noj well how to re- 
concile the epistle of St. James to the doctrine of justifica- 
tion by faith alone, and so he could not allow it to be di- 
yinc. The Papists biing all the apocrypha into their bi- 
l*le, and stamp divinity upon it ; for they can. fancy pur- 
gatory is there, and they find prayers for the dead. 13ut 
they leave out the second commandment^ because it ^9!*- 

O 2 



(62 LOGIC: OR, T*HE Part II 

bids the worship of images. Others suppose the Moiaic 
history of the creation, and the fall of man, to be oriental 
ornaments, or a mere allegory, because the literal sense of 
those three chapters of Genesis do not agree with their 
theories. Even an honest plain-Jiearted and unlearned 
Christian is ready to find something in every chapter qt 
the bible to countenance his own private sentimema ; but 
he loves those chapters best which speak his own opinioo 
pjainest : This is a prejudice that sticky very close to oor 
natures ; the scholar is infested with it daily* and the me- 
chanic is not free. 

SeifhdiS yet a farther and more pernicious influence up- 
on our undersitandings, and is an unhappy guide, in the 
search after truth. When our own inclination, or oor 
ease, and honor, or our profit, tempt us to the pracdce of 
any thing of suspected lawfulness, how do we strain <mr 
thoughts to find arguments for it and persuade ourselvei 
it is lawful ? We colour over iniquity and sinful com- 
pliance with the names of virtue and innocence, or at Icait 
of constraint and necessity. All the different and oppo- 
site sentiments and practices of mankind are too much ili- 
iluenced by this mean briber3% and give too just O'JcasioD 
for satyrical writers to &ay, that self interest governs all 
mankind. 

When the judge had a^varded 4ue damages to a person 
$nto whose field a neighbor's oxen had broke, it is report- 
ed that he reversed Iris own sentence, when he heard that 
the oxen which had done this mischief were his own. 
Whether this be a history or a parable, it is still a juit 
representation of the wretched influence of aeif to oorrupt 
the judgment. 

One way to amend this prejudice, is to thrust bcI/soUa 
out of the question, that it may have no manner of infltt* 
ence whensoever wc are called to jud^e and consider tb< 
naked nature, truth, and justice of things. In matters oD 
equity between man and man, our Saviour has taught of 
an effectual means of guarding against this prejudice, aw 
that is, to put my neighbor in the place of myself, aik 
myself in the place of my neighbour, rather than be brib 
ed by this corrugt principle of self-love to do injury u 



G^AP. lU. RIGHT USE OF REASON. l^ 

oor neighbours. Thence arises that golden rule of ^eal- 
iDg with others as we would have others deal with us. 

In the judgment of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, 
good and evil, we ought to consider that every man has a 
SKLF as well as we ; and that the tastes, passions, inclina* 
(ions, and interests ol' different men are very diHercnt, 
and often contrary, and that they dictate contrary things : 
Unless therefore all manner of different and contrary prop- 
ositions can be true at once, aelfczn never be a just test or 
standard of truth and falsehood, good and evil. 

VI. Tempers, humours, and peculiar turns of the 
mind, whether they be natural or acquired, have a great 
iafluehce upon our judgment, and become the occasion of 
many mistakes. Let us survey a few of them. 

(1) Some persons are of an easy and credulous temper, 
while others are perpetually discovering a spirit of con- 
tradiction. 

The credulous man is ready to receive every thing for 
yuth that has but a shadow of evidence ; every new 
book that he reads, and every ingenious man with whom 
be converses, has power enough to draw him inio the sen- 
timents of the speaker or writer. He lias so much com- 
plaisance in himf or weakness of soul, that he is ready to 
resign his 9wn opinion to the first objection which he 
hears, and to receive any sentiments of another that are 
inserted with a positive air and much assurance. Thus 
iie is under a kind of necessity, through the indulgence of 
tins credulous humour, either to be often changing his 
opinions, or to believe inconsistencies. 

The ipan of contradiction is of axontrary humour, for 
he stancfs ready to oppose every thing that is said : He 
gives but a slight attention to the reasons of other men» 
from an inward and scornful presumption that they have 
no strength in them. When he reads or hears a discourse 
different from his own sentiments, he does not give him- 
self leave to consider whether that discourse may be true / 
but employs all his powers Immediately to confute it. 
Vour great disputers, and your men of controversy, are in 
continual danger of this sort of prejudice ; they contend 
often for victory, and will maintain whatsoever they have 
Userted; while truth is lost in th^ noise and tumult of rev 



•r64 LOGIC : OR, THfe PartJI. 

ciprocal contradictions ; and it frequently happens that a 
debate about opinions is turned into a mutual reproach of 
persons. 

The prejudice of credulity may in some measure be 
cured, by learning to set a high value on truth, and by ta- 
king more pains to attain it ; remembering that truth of- 
tcnti mes lies dark and deep, nad requires us to dig for it 
as hid treasure ; and that falsehood often puts on a iair 
disguise, and therefore we should not yield up our jude* 
ment to every plausible appearance. It is no part of civil< 
ity or good breeding to part with truth, but to maintain it 
^vith decency and candour. 

A spirit of contradiction is so pedantic and hateful, that 
a man should take much pains with himself to watch a- 
gainst every instance of it : He should learn so nuch 
^ood humour, at least, as never to oppose any thing with- 
out just and solid reason for it : He should abate some d^ 
grecs of pride and moroseness, which are never-failing in* 
gredients in this sort ot temper, and should seek after so 
much honesty and conscience as never to contend for coi^ 
quest or triumph ; but to review his own reasoni, and to 
read the arguments of his opponents (if possible} with lO 
equal indiffercncy, and be glad to spy truth, and to submit 
to it, though it appear on the opposite side. 

(3.) There is another pair of prejudices, derived from 
two tempers of mind, near akin to those I itave just now 
mentioned ; and these arc the dogmatical and the scepti^b 
•cal humour, that is, always positive, or always doubting. 
By what means soever the dogmatist came by his opin- 
ions, whether by his senses or by his fancy, his education 
-or his own reading, yet he believed them all with the samft 
assurances that he does a mathematical truth ; he hai 
•scarce any mere probabilities that belong to him ; everf 
thing with him is certain and infallible ; every punctilio in 
religion is an article of his faith ; and he answers all mao^ 
«er of objections by a sovereign contempt. 

Pei*sons of this temper are seldom to be convinced of 

<any mistake i A full assurance of their own notions makes 

all the difiiculties on their own side vanish so entirely, that 

^hey think every point of their belief is written as withsunr 

pca^s^ and wonder any ow ^UoiiUi find a difficiiJty io it^; 




Iir. RIGHT USE OF REASON. IB 

ire amazed that learned men should Inake a contro- 
nr what is to them to perspicuous nnd indubitubla. 
west rank of people, both in learfied and in vulgar 
very subject to this obstinacf . 

Micism is a contrary prejudice. The dogmatist is 
■ Every thing, and the sceptic believes nothing. Per- 
le has found himself often mistaken in matters of 
he thought himself well assured in his younger days, 
:i'erore he is afraid to give his assent toany thiiig 
lie sees so much shew of reason for every opinion, 
many ohjec lions also arising against every doctrine, 
: is ready to thi-ow ofT the belief of every thing : He 
ices at once the pursuit of truth, and contents him- 
say, There is nothing certain. It is well, if through 
luence of such a temper he does not cast away his 
n as well as his philosophy, and abandon himself to 
ne course of life, regardless of hell or heaven. 
I these prejudices last mentioned, though they are 
osite to eacli other, yet they atise from the sama 
, and that is, impatience of study, end want of dili- 
ttention in the search of truth. The dogmatist is 
e to believe something ; he cannot keep himself long 
1 in suspence, till some bright and convincing cvi- 
appear on one side, but throws himself cesuatly intg 
iliments of one party or another, and then he will 
a argument to the contrary. The sceptic will not 
■ins to search things to the bottom, but when he sees 
lies on both sides, resolves to believe neither of 
Humility of soul, patience in study, diligence in 
f, with an honest zeal for truth, would go a great 
wards the cure of both these follies. 
Another sort of temper that is very injurious to a 
udgment of things, is an inconstant, fickle, cfmnge- 
lirit, and a very uneven temper of mind. When ■ 
ersons are in one humour, they pass a judgment of 
agreeable to it ; when th/r humour chanqes, they 
t their first jiidi^ment, and embrace a new opinion, 
have no steadiness of soul ; they want firmness of 
ufficient to estabtisli themselves in any truth, and 
idy to change it for the next ulluriug fjIsehotKl that 
cable to their change of humour. This fickleness 



166 LOGIC : OR, THE Pahi 

is sometimes so mingled with their very constitiuion b 
Cure, or by distemper of body, that a cloudy day t 
lowering sky shall strongly incline them to form an 
ion both of themselves and of persons and things r 
about them, quite different from what they believe 
the sun shines, and the heavens are serene. 

This sort of people ought to judge of things and pe 
in their most sedate, peaceful, and composed hours o 
and reserve these judgments for their conduct at mor 
happy seasons. 

(4.) Some persons have a violent and turgid mi 
both of talking and thinking ; whatsoever they judge 
b always with a tincture of this vanity. They are a] 
in extremes, and pronounce concerning every thing i 
superlative. If they think a man to be learned, he 
thief Mcholar 0/ the age; If anoth^ has low parts, he 
^eatcBt blockhead in nature : If they approve any bo< 
divine subjects, it ia the beat book in the world next 
bible : If they speak of a storm of rain or hail, it is thi 
terrible Mtorm that fell mnce the creation : And a 
winter day the coldeet that ever was known. 

But the men of this swelling language ought to rei 
ber, that nature has ten thousand moderate things 
and does not always deal in extremes as they do. 

(5.) 1 think it may be called another sort ofprej 
derived from humour, when some men believe a do< 
merely because it is ancient, and has been long belli 
others are so fond of novelty, that nothing prevails 
their assent so much as new thoughts and new mo 
Again, there are some who set a high esteem upon 
thing that is foreign and far fetched ; therefore Chin 
tures are admired, how awkward soever : Others 
thinc;s the more for being of our own native growt 
vention or manufacture, and these as much despise fo 
things. 

Some men of letters aiid theology will not believe s 
position even concerning a sublime subject, till every 
inysterious, deep, and difficult, is cut off from it, iV 
ihe. scripture asserts it never so plainly ; others are s( 
of a mystery and things incomprehensible, that they ^ 
Hcarce believe the doctrine of the Trinity, if it could 1 



f 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. Ut 

r- 

I ^ ; 

. plained ; they incline to that foolish rant of one of the an* 
^ cientS) Credo quia im/iossibilc est ; I believe it because it is 
i impossible. 

t To cure these mistakes, remember that neither antique 
nor novel, foreign nor native, mysteriouii nor plain, are 
certain characters either of truth or of falsehood. 

I might mention various other humours bfmen that ex- 
cite in them various prejudices, and leads them into rash 
and mistaken judgments ; but these are sufficient for a 
specimen. 

VII. There are several other weaknesses which belong 
to human nature, whereby we are led into mistakes, and 
indeed are rendered almost incapable of passing a solid 
judgment in matters of great depth and difBcuIty. Some 
have a native obscurity of perception, (or shall I call it a 
"Want of natural sagacity ?) whereby they are hindered 
from attaining clear and distinct ideas. Their thoughts 
always seem to have something confused and cloudy in 
them, ahd therefore they judge in the dark. Some have 
a defect of memory, and then they are not capable of com- 
paring their present ideas with a great variety of others, 
Id order to secure themselves from inconsistency in judg- 
ment. Others may have a memory large enough, yet 
they are subject to the same errors, from a narrowness of 
soul, and such a fixation and confinement of thought to a 
few objects, that they scarce ever take a survey of things 
"wide enough to judge wisely and well, and to secure them- 
flelvea from all inconsistencies. 

Though these are wa/wra/ defects Sijid weaknesses^ yet 
they may in some measures be relieved by labour, diligence^ 
and a due attention to proper ruUs. 
But among all the causes of false judgment which are 
* vithin ourselves, I ought by no means to leave out that 
QDiversal and original spring of error, of which we are in- 
formed by the word of God y and that is, the sin and 
defection of our first parents ; whereby all our best natu- 
ral powers, both of mind J and body, are impaired and 
rendered very much inferior to what they were in a state 
of innocence. Our understanding is darkened, our me- 
mory contracted, our corrupt humours and passions are 
grown prcdominsintf our rea&on et\S^tVA^^> «jbA.%^\w5^ 



i 



168 LOGIC : OR, THE Vart ^* ] 

1 

disorders attend our constitution and animal nature, vhere* 
by the mind it strangely imposed upon in xu judgrotenicf 
things. Nor is there any perfect relief to be expected oft 
earth* The^e is no hope of ever recovering from llicai 
maiadiesy but bgt a sincere return to God in the waja oC llii 
own appointnatiilt whereby we ahall be kept safe firoa aft 
dangerous andcpemidous errors in tb^ matters of rsHg^jr^s 
and though imperfections and mistakes wiU bang iah^qii 
in the present life as the effects of our origiMl npsotjcy 
from God, yet we hope for a full deliverance fiom^lkc^k 
when we arrive^at keavcn. 

« ' S ECT. IV. • ;.«- 



: ^V 



W 



y&Ejuoicss ARisma fbom other MfttomL' :^ ^ . 

■ -i/ifV 
ERE it not foMhe Iqnringt of 

that are luiking in ourselvvs, we ahoiUd not be sofafrifiii^ 

so many nustaktrs from the iiiRueoce of others i Biil^«j^|. 

our nanure is so susceptive of errors on all ddes* kioiipt 

should have hints and notices given us, howfer ether por». 

sous may have power over us, and become the camea of 

all our lulse judgments. This might also be cast into oM 

heap* for they are all near akin, and mingle with eacb 

er ; but for disdnction sake let them be called die 

judices of education, of custom, of authority, and such 

arise Irom the manner of proposal. 

I. Those with whom our education is intrusted 

lay the first foundation of many mbtakes in our yoongeff 

years. How many fooleries and errors are inlisted iM> 

us by our nurses, our fellow-children ; by servants or ia-! 

skilled teachera ; whkh are not only maintained thnrngh 

the following parts of life, but sometimes have a very oft* 

happy influence upon us ! We are tanght that there aro 

bugbears and goblins in the dark ; our young minda ars 

croudcd with the terrible Ideas ofi|^hoats appearing. opoQ 

every occasion, or with the pleasanter tales of fidrieadane* 

iHg at midnight. We Jearo to prophecy betimes, to ferc- 

tei- fiiiurities by good or tcM omeii% and.to presage vf* 



JChap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 169 

preaching death in a family by ravens aiul little worms, 
which wc therefore call a death watch. \Vc (xva taiij^ht 
to know beforehand, for a twelvemonth together, which 
days of the week will be fair or foul, which will be lucky 
or unlucky ; nor is there any thinjj so silly, but may be im- 
posed upon our understandings in that early part of life ; 
and these ridiculous storits abide with us too long, and 
too far influence the weaker part of mankind. 

Wc choose our particular set and party in the civil, the 
religious, and the learned life, by the influence of educa- 
tion. In the colleges of learning, some are for the nomi- 
nals, and some for the realists, in the science of metaphy- 
sics, because their tutors were devoted to these parties. 
The old philosophy and the new have gained thousands 
of partisans the same way : And every religion has its in- 
fant votaries, who are born, jive and die in the same fivith, 
wuhout examination of any article. The Turks arc tauglt 
early to believe in Mahomet ; the Jews in Moses ; the 
heathens worship a multitude of gods, under the force of 
their education. And it would be well if tiiere were not: 
millions of Christians, who have little more to say for their 
religion, than that they were born and bred up in it. The 
greatest parX of the Christian world can hardly give any 
! rsason why they believe the Bible to be the word of God, 
^ but because they have always believed it, and they wsrc 
taught so from their infancy. As Jews and Turks, and 
American Heathens, believe the most monstrous an. I in- 
credible stories, because they have betn trained up amongst: 
them, as articles of faith ; so the Papists believe their 
transubstantiation, and make no difllculty ofasseniing Uj 
impossibilities, since it is the current doctrine of their cat- 
echisms. By the same means, the several sects and par- 
lies in Christianity believe all the strained interpretations 
of scripture by which they have been taught to support 
Iheir own tenets : They find nothing diflicult in all the ab- 
surd glosses and far-fetched sensts, that are somt-'timeii 
put upon the words of the sacred writers, becaus»r their 
cars have been always accustomed to these glosses ; and 
therefore they sit so smooth and easy upon tiicir ur.d: r- 
sandings, that they know not how to admU lW\i Tw:i^:X^'^V 
uval and easy iflCerpretalion in op\)uviiU'n\ x.*^ \\\t^xv% 

P 



170 LOGIC : OR, THE Part 11. 

In the 9ame manner, we arc nursed up in many silly and 
gross mistakes about domestic aflair8,as well as in maltcrt 
oi* poliiicul concernment, ll is upon the same ground chat 
children are trained up to be Whigs and Tories betimes ; 
and every one learns the distinguishing terms of his own 
party, as the Papists learn to say their prayers in LatiDy 
without any meaninp:, reason, or devotion. 

This sort of prejudice must be cured by calliog all the 
principles of our young years to the bar of more xnalnre 
reason, that we may judge of the things of nature and po- 
liiical affairs by justcr rules of philosophy and observation s 
And even ti)e matters of religion must be fii*st enquired in* 
to by reason and conscience, and when these have led us 
to bvlieve scripture to be the word of God, then that be* 
comes our soveixign guide, and reason and conacicDoe 
must submit to receive its dictates. 

II. The next prejudice which I shall mentioni is that 
whlcli arises from the custom or fashion of those amongst 
w hom we live. Suppose we have freed ourselves from the 
youniifer prcjii'liccs of our education, yet we are in danger 
of huviiii^ our mind turned aside from truth by the infill- 
ci.cc of . dcrul custom. 

Our opliuon of meals and drinks, of garments and 
f >rtn6 of salutation, are iuHuenced much more by custonirj 
tiled) by the eye, the ear, or the tuste. Custom prevails 
even over sense itscif, and therefore no wonder it it pre- 
vidl over reason too. What is it but cuatom that render* 
many of the maxims of food and sauces elegant in Britaini 
Willi h would be awkward and nauseous to the inhabitants 
of China, and indeed were nauseous to us when we first 
tasted them ? Whut hut custom could make those saluU- 
lio!)s polite in Muscovy, which are ridiculous in France 
or Kiii^iutid ? We call ourselves indeed the politer natiooii 
but it i"* we who jud;^e thus of ourselves ; and that fen- 
civ: i politeness is oftentimes more owing to custom th»n = 
rc«son. Why arc tl)e forms of our present garment* ' 
cuuiucvl bciiuufu!! and those fas'liions of our ancestors lb« 
mar.er of scolf and contempt, which in their day were all 
decent and getueel ? Ills custom that forms ouropmioO 
of dress, and reconciles by degrees to tliose habits whicli 
at til" it seemed very odd and monstrous. It must be grant- 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 171 

c<l, there are some garments and habits which have a 
natural congniiiy, or incongruity, modesty, or immodesty, 
decency or indecency, gaudery or gravity ; though for 
the most part thei'e is but little of reason in these affairs : 
But what little there is of reason or natural decency, cus- 
tom inumphs over all. It is almost impossible to per- 
suade a gay lady that any thing can be decent which is 
out of the fashion ; And it were well if fashion stretched 
its powers no farther than the business of drapery and the 
fair sex. 

The methods of our education are governed by custom. 
It is custom, and not reason, that sends every boy to learn 
the Roman poets, and begin a little scquaintance with 
Greek, before he is bound an apprentice to a soapboiler or 
leather seller. It is custom alone that teaches us Latin 
by the rules of a Latin grammar ; a tedious and absurd 
method I And what is it but custom that has for past 
centuries confined the brightest geniuses, even of the high- 
est rank in the female world, to the business of the needle 
only^ and secluded them most unmercifully from the 
pleasure of knowledge, and the divine improvement of 
reason ? But we begin to break all these chains, and rea- 
son begins to dictate the education of youth. May the 
L .growing age be learned and wise ! 

' It Is by the prejudice arising from our own customs, 
^ that we judge of all other civil and religious forms and 
practices. The rites and ceremonies of war and peace in 
other nations, the forms of weddings and funerals, the 
several ranks of magistracy, the trades and employments 
^ pf both sexes, the public and the domestic a{^irs of life, 
ind almost every thing of foreign customt is judged ir- 
regular. It is all imagined to be unreasonable or unnat- 
ttpalj by those who have no other rule to judge of nature, 
ind reason, but the customs of their own country, or the 
'little town where they dwell. Custom is called a secona 
nature, but we often mistake it for nature itstlf. 

Besides all this, there is a fashion in opinions, therein 
a fdshion in writing and printing, in style and language. 
In our day it is the vogue of the nation that parliaments 
may settle the succession of the crown, and that a people 
can make a king j in the last age this wvx^i ^ ^q^vyv^^ ^5^^ 



172 LOGIC: OR, THE Part It 

to treason. Citations from the Latin poets were an em- 
bellishment of style ill the last century, and whole paji^csin 
that day were covered wi:h them ; it is forbidden by cus- 
tom, and exposed by the name of pedantry ; whereas in 
truth both these are extremes. Sometimes our printed 
books shall abound in c .pituls, and sometimes reject them 
all. Now we dealmu':h in essays, and most unreasonably 
despise systematic learninp^, whereas our fathers had a 
just value for regularity and systems ; then folios and 
quartos were the fashionalile sizes, :is volumes in octavo 
lire now. We are ever ready to run into extremes, and 
yet custom still persuades us that reason and nature are ' 
on our side. 

This business of the fashion has a most powerful influ- 
ence on our judgments ; for it employs those two strong; 
engines of fear and shame to operate upon oiir understand- 
ings with unhappy success. We are asliamcd to believe 
or profess an unfashionable opinion in philosophy ; and a 
cowardly soul dares not so much as indulge a thought 
contrary to the established or fasliionable faith, nor ict 
in, opposition to custom, though it be according to the 
dictates of reason. 

I confess there is a respect due to mankind, which 
should incline even the wisest of men to follow the inno- 
cent customs of their country in the outward practices of 
civil life, and in some measure to submit to fashion in all 
iridlfferent affairsj where reason and scripture make no i 
remonstrances against it. But the judgments of ihe mind j 
()u.2^ht lo be fof ever free, and not biassed by the custom' 
i\nd fashionsof any age or nation whatsoever. 

To deliver our understandings from this danger and 
f.lavery, wc should consider three things. 

' . 'i'hat the greatest part of the civil customs of any 
particular nation or age spring from humour rather than 
t eason. Sometimes the humour of the prince prevails, 
i.j.d soiv.etlmcs the humour of the people. It is either 
.iie jM'cat or the many who dictate the fashion, and these 
i^avc lot always the l.ighest reason on their side. 

2. Consider also, thai i!ie customs of the same nations 

; ) riiiTtrerit acres, the cuf.toms of different nations in the 

.v:::vr r.^c^ ar.d {\\q cuslom^oWA^^v^T\XVo^w'i^v\d villages 




CiiAf. in. RIGHT USE Ol' REASON. IT3 

in the same nalion, are very vmioiis and contrarj lo each 
other. The faahioniible lexriiing, languai^e, sentimcntSf 
wmI rules of palileness, differ greaily in (lifTcrcnt caumriea 
mH ages of mankind j hut truth and reason are of a more 
uniform and muady n^tute, end do not cliange nitli the 
fuhion. Upon this occoiint, lo cure the prepossessions 
irhich arise iVom custom, it is of excellent use to travel 
and see the customs of various countries, and to read the 
travels orother men, and the Iiislory of past ages, that ev- 
ery thing may not seem strange and uncouth which is r.ot 
practised within the limits of our p3iish, or in tbenarroiv 
space of our own life-time. 

3. Consider ytt again, how ofien we ourselves have 
changed our opinions concerning the decincy, propriety, 
or congniity of several modes or practices in the world, 
especially if we liave lived to the ape of thirty or forty. 
Custom or fashionj eveti in all its changes, has been ready 
10 bsvc some Atf^-ee of ascendency over our understand- 
ings, and what at one time seemed decent, appears olisc- 
lete and disagreeable afterward, whrn the fdshion chan- 
ges. Let us learn therefore lo absirjct as much as possi- 
Ue fTom custom and fashion, when we would pass a judg< 
ment concerning the real value (t intiinsic iiatureof things. 

III. The authority of men is the spring of anoihev 
rank of prejudices. 

. Among these, the authority of our forcfdlhers and an- 
cient ftuthors is most remarkable. We pay deference to 
Uk opinion of others merely because they lived a thoui- 
nd years befoi'« us ; and even the rriOci and tmperlinen- 
cicE lliat hive a mark of antiquity upon them are reveren- 
ced for this reason, because they came fiom the ancients. 

-It is granted that the a.icients h.iO many wise and great 
ncn among them, and some of Iheir writings, which time 
liub delivered down to us, are truly valuable t But ihostt 
vriters lived rather in the infunt stale of ihe world ; and 
the pliilosophcrs, as well as the polite aulhori of our ng9, 
fgt properly the elders who have seen the mistakes of the 
yonnger ages of mankind, and corrected them by obscr,- 
Tstion and experience. 

Some borrow all their religion from the fathers of the 
i^niljan church, or from their synoJs or councils: bttt 
F 2 



I- 
lU LOGIC: OU, THL Part II. 

].e tlial ^'\i\ read Monsieur Daille on the use of the fath* 
crs, will find many reasons why they are by no means fit 
to dictate our faith, since we have the gospel of Christ, and 
|he writings of the apostles and prophets in cur hands. 

Some persons believe every thing that their kindred, 
Ihcir parents, and their tutors believe. The veneration 
•nd the love which they have for their ancestors incline 
hem to swallow cJown all their opinions at once, without 
Kamining what truth or falsehood there is in thsm. 
.len make up their piirciples by inhcritarce, rir.d dtfcnd 
item as they would their estates, because they are born 
cirE to them. I freely grant, that parents are appointed 
y God and nature to teach us all the sentimtnls and 
jjractice of our younger y^^ars ; and happy are those whose 
parents lead them inio the paths of wisdom and truth I I 
grant farther, that when persons come to yearfe of discre- 
tion, and judge fcr themselves, they ought to examine tht 
opinions of their parents with the [greatest modesty, and 
V. iih an humble def^frcnce to their superior character ; 
they ought in matters perfectly dubious lO give the pre- 
ference to their parents advice, and always t« pay Ihcra 
the first respect, nor ever depart fiom their opinions and 
practice, till reason and conscience make it necessary. Butj 
iifier all, it is possible that pAFcnts maybe mi&tiken, and 
ilicrcforc rea«on and sciipiure ouglit to be our final rules 
of determination in matters ih ;t relate to this world and 
t atwliichistocom:. 

Sometimes a favorite author, or a writer of great namtj 
drags a thousand followers after him into hisown mistaktSi 
merely by the authority of his name and character. The 
sentiments of Aristotle w, re imbibed and maintained bj 
jvll the schools in Europe for several centuries ; and aci- 
tatio:i from his writings was thought a sufficient proof ol 
any proposition. The great Descartes had also too manj 
implicit believers in the last age, though he himself, ir 
liis philosophy, disclaims all such influence over the mind! 
of his readers. Calvin and Luther, in the days of re 
formation from Popery, were learned and pious mcti 
and there have been a succession of their disciples 
^ven to this day, who pay too much reverence to th< 
yards of (h/eir masters. TVi^xe w^ ^\.V\^\:s who re 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 175 

liounce their authority, hut give themselves up in too ser- 
vile a manner to the opinion and authority of other mas- 
ters, and follow as bad or worse guides in religion. 

If only learned, and wise, and good men had influence 
ill the sentiments of others, it would he at least a more ex- 
f usable sort of prejudice, and there Would be some colour 
6f shadow and reason for it: But that riches, honours, 
ind outward splendor, should set up persons for dictators 
'0 all the rest of mankind ; this is a most shameful invasion 
•f the right of our understanding on the one hand, and as 
'.hameful a .slavery of the soul on the other. The poor 
man, or the labourer, too often believes such a principle 
la politics, or in morality, and judges concerning the 
rights of the king and the people just as his wealthy neigh- 
'^QUT does. Half the parish follows the opinion of the 
esquire ; and the tenants of a manor fall into the senii- 
ments of their lord, especially if he lives among them. 
llow imreasonable, and yet how common is this I 

As for the principles of relip;ion, we freqently find 
liow they are tiken up and forsaken, changed and resum- 
ed by the influence of princes. In all nations, the priests 
have much power also in dictating the religion of the peo- 
ple, but the princes dictate to them .* And, where there is 
a great pomp and grandeur attending the priesthood in 
any reli^^jion whatsoever, with so much the more rever- 
enc and stronger faith do the people believe whatever 
they teach them : Yet it is too evident, that riches and 
dominions, and high titles, in church or state, have no 
manner of pretence to truth and certainty, wisdom and 
j»;oodness, above the rest of mortals, because the superi- 
orities in this world are not always conferred according to 
merit. 

I confess, where a man of wisdom and years, of obser^ 
Vation and experience, gives us his opinion and advice in 
fnatters of the civil or the moral life ; reason tells us we 
should pay a great attention to him, and it is probable he 
may be in the right. Where a man of long exercise in 

|>iety speaks of practical religion, there is due deference to 
)e paid to his sentiments : And the same we may say con^ 
berning an ingenious man, long versed in any art or sci- 
jpnce, he maj justly expect due rcgwd v(l\^\^ ^^^ vj^^V^s <^ 



\76 LOGIC: OR, THE Pa&tH.' 

his own affairs and proper business. ■ Batt in other thingsi 
each of these manjr be ignorant enough^ notwithstanding 
all their piety and years, and particular skill : Nor crea in 
their own proper protince are they to be believed in every 
thin^, without reserve and without examination. 

To free ourselves from these prejudices, it is sulBdcnt 
to remember, that there is no rank or character amonp 
mankind, which has any such pretence to sway the jtidg'* 
mentsofother menby their authority s For there have 
been persons of the same rank and character who have 
maintained different and contrary sentimenu ; buv all 
these can never be true, and therefore the mere name or 
reputation that any of thtm possess is not a sufficient cvi* 
dfence of truth. 

Shall we believe the ancients in philosophy ? But «Miie 
of the ancients were Stoics, some Peripatetics, some l^la- 
tonics, and some Epicureans, some Cynics, and some Seep* 
tics. Shall we judge of matters of the Christian faith by 
the fathers, or primitive writers for three or four hundred 
years after Christ ? But they often contradicted one ano- 
ther, and themselves too ; and, what is worse, they some* 
times contradicted the scripture itself. Now, among all 
these different and contrary sentiments in philosophy and 
religion, which of the ancients must we believe, for we 
cannot believe them all ? 

Again, To believe in all things as our predecessors did« 
is the ready way to keep mankind in an everiasting state 
of infancy, and to lay an eternal bar against all the Jm* 
provements of our reason and our happiness. Had the 
present age of philosophers, satisfied themselves with the 
substantial forms and occult qualities of Aristotle, with 
the solid spheres, eccentrics, and epicycles of Ptolemy, 
and the ancient astronomers ; then the great Lord Bacon, 
Copernicus, and Descartes, with the gt eater Sir laai^ 
Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle, had risen in our 
world in vain. We must have blundered on still, in aoc* 
ccssive generations among absurdities and thick darkness, 
and a hundred useful inventions for the happiness of hu- 
man life had never been known. 

Thus it is in the matters of philosophy and science* 
But, you will ssy, shall not our owo ancestprs deterpiioo 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 177 

our judgmciU in matters of civil or religious concernment ? 
If they must, then the child of a Heathen must believe that 
Heathenism is truth ; the bon of a Papast must assent to 
all the aliMirdiiies of Popery ; the posterity of the Jews 
and Socinians must forever be Socinians and Jews ; and a 
man whose father was of Republican principles, must 
make a succession of Republicans in his fdmily to the end 
nf the world. Hwc ought always to believe whatsoever 
our parents, our priests or our princes believe, the inhab- 
itants of China ought to worship their own idols, and the 
sivages of Africa ought io believe all the nonsense, and 
practise the idolatry of their Negro fathers and kings. 
The British nation, when it was Heathen, could never 
have become Christian / and, when it was a slave to 
Rome, it could never have been reformed. 

Besides, let us consider, that the great God, our com- 
mon Maker, has never given one man's understanding a 
legal and rightful sovereignty to determine truths for oth- 
ers, at least after they are past the state of childhood or 
ninority. No single person, how learned and wise, and 
great soever, o'* whatsoever natural, or civil, or ccci jeias- 
tical relations he may have to us, can claim this c^ominioq 
over our fdith. St. Paul the apostle, in his private capa« 
city, would not doit ; nor hath an inspired man any such 
authority, until he makes divine commission appear. 
Our Saviour himself tells the Jews, that if he had not done 
such monstrous works among them, they had not sinned in 
disbelieving his doctrines, and refusing him for the Mes- 
siah. No bishop or presbyter, nor synod or council, no 
church or assembly of men, since the days of inspiration, 
hath power derived to them from God to make creeds or 
anicles of faiih for us, and impose them upon our under- 
standings. We must all act according to the best of our 
light, and the judgment of our own consciences, using the 
best advantages which providence hath given us, with an 
Jionest and impartial diligence to inquire and search out 
the truth ; For every one of us must give an account of 
liimself to God. To believe as the church, or the court 
believes, is but a sorry and a dangerous faith : This prin- 
ciple would make more Heathens than Christians, and 
more Papists than Protestants ; and perhaps lead more 



■.V 



ire L6GIC ; OR, THE Part U 

souls to bell than to bcaven ; for our Saviour Ttim&e 
hath plainly told us^ that if the blind will be led by xl 
blind, they must both fall into the ditch. 

Though there be so much danger of error arising froi 
the three prejudices last mentioned, j'et, before I dlsmis 
this head» i think it proper to take notice^ that, as educi 
tion, custom, and authority, are no sure evidences of trut 
so neither are they certain marks of falsehood : for re. 
son and scripture may join to dictate the same thin( 
which our parents* our nurses, our tutors, our friends, ar 
our country believe and profess. If there appears som 
times in our age a pride and petulancy in youth, zealoi 
to cast off the sentiments of their fatliers, and teachers, < 
purpose to shew that they carry none of the prejudices i 
educ itlon and authority about them ; they Indulge all mai 
ner of iicentioua o|nnions and practices, from a vain pr 
tence of asserting their liberty, fiut alas ! This ia bi 
changing one prejudice for another ; and sometimes 
happens by this means, that they make a sacrifice both 
truth and virtue to the vile prejudices of their pride ai 
sensuality. 

IV. There is another tribe of prejudices which a* 
near akin to those of authority, and that is, when we r 
ceive a doctrine l>ecause of the manner in which it is pr 
]}osed to us by others. I have already mentioned the poi 
crful influence that oratory and fine words have to insin 
ate a false opinion ; and sometimes truth is refused, ai 
suffers contempt in the lips of a wise man, for want of tl 
charms of language : But there are several other ma 
ners of proposal, whereby mistaken sentiments are po we 
fully conveyed into the mind. 

Some persons are easily persuaded to believe wh 
another dictates with a positive air, and a great degree 
assurance: They feel the overbearing force of a con 
dent dictator, especially if he be of a superior rank * 
character to themselves. 

Some are quickly convinced of the truth of any do 
trine, when he that proposes it puts on all the airs of piet 
and makes solemn appeals to heaven, aud protest 
lions of the truth of it : The pious mind of a weak^ 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. ir9 

Christian is ready to receive any thing that is pronounced 
with such »4Vft\riTrt scrkmnity. 

It is a prejudice near akin to this, when an humble soul 
19 frij^htened inio any particular sentiments of religion, be- 
cause a man of grtnt name or character pronounces heresy 
upon tiie contrary sentiments, casts the disbeliever out of 
the church, and forbids him the gates of heaven. 

Others are allured into particular opmions by gentler 
practices on the understanding : Not only the soft tempers 
of mankind, but even hardy and rug(;ed souls, are some- 
times led captives to error by the soft air of address, and 
the sweet and engaging m;.thods of persuasion and kind- 
ness. 

I grant, where natural or revealed religion plainly dic- 
tate to us the infinite and everlasting importance of any 
sacred doctrine, it cannot be improper to use any of these 
methods, to persuade men to receive and obey the truth, 
after we have givtn suiHcient reason and argument to con- 
vince their understandings. Yet all these methods, con- 
sidered in themselves, have been often used to convey false- 
hocKl into the soul as well as truth ; and if we build our 
faith merely upon these foundations, without regard to 
the evidence of truth, and the strength of argument, our 
belief is but the effect of prejudice : For neither the posi- 
tivei the awful or solemn, the terrible or the gentle meth- 
ods of address carry any certain evidence with them that 
truth lies on that side. 

There is another manner of proposing our own opinion, 
or rather opposing the opinions of others, which demands 
a mention here, and that is when persons make a jest serve 
instead of an argument ; when they refute what they call 
error, by a turn of wit, and answer every objection against 
their own 8>.ntiments by casting a sneer upon the objector. 
These scoffers practise with success upon weak and cow- 
anUy spirits : Such as have not been well establishtd 
in religion or morality, have bctn laughed out of the 
best principles by a confident buffoon : they have yielded 
up their own opinions to a witty banterer, and sold their 
Ciith and religion for a jest. 

There is no way to cure these evils in such a degenerate 
Tvorkl as wc live iUf but by learning to distinguish v«:WVi^* 



ISO LOGIC : OB, THE Pakt 

tween the substance of anf doctrine, and the manner 
address, either in proposingt attacking, or defending i 
and then by setting a just and severe guard of rtason a 
conscience over all the exercises of our judgment, reso 
ing to yield to nothing but the convincing evidence of tru 
religiously obeying the light of reason, in matters of pi 
reason, and the dictates of revelation in things that rel 
to our fuith. 

Thus we have taken a brief survey of some of the ir 
nite varieties of prejudice that attend mankind on eve 
side of the prese:it state, and the dangers of error, or 
rash judgment, we are perpetually exposed to in this lifl 
This chapter shall conclude with one remurk, and o 
piece of advice. 

The remark is this, The same opinion, whether faJ 
or true, may be dictated by many prejudices at the sai 
time ; for, as I hinted before, prejudice may happtn 
dictate truth somt times as well as error. But, when ti 
or more prejudices oppose one another, as it often ha 
pens, the stronger pievails and gains the assent : Ytt hi 
stidom docs reason interpose with sufficient power to g 
the ascendant of tliem ull, us it ought to do ! 

The advice follows, namely, Since we find such a swar 
of prcju(!icts attending us both within and without ; un 
we feel the weakness of our reason, the fraiity of our t 
tures, and our insufficiency to guard ourselves from err 
iipun this account, it is not at all unbecoming the chara 
ter of a logician or a philosopher, together with the advl 
already given, to direct every person in his search aft 
truth to make his daily addresses to heaven, and implo 
the Cod of ttuth to lead him into all truth, and to ask wi 
dom of him who gi^ftth liberally to them that ask it, m 
iipbr.txdeth us not with our follies. 

Such a devout practice will be an excellent preparatti 
for the best improvement of all the directions and rul< 
proposed in the two following chaptci*s. 



:kap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. J8i 



CHAP. IV. 

:;eneraldiuections to assist us in judging 

ARIGHT- 



T 



HE chief des][|;n of the art of logic is to assist 
us in forming a true judgment of things ; a few proper ob- 
servations for this end have been dropt occasionally in 
some of the foregoing chapters : Yet it is necessary to 
nention them again in this placey that we may have a 
more complete and simultaneous view of the general di- 
rections) which are necessary in order to judge aright. 
VmuUitude of advices may be framed for this purpose ; 
the <:hief of them may, for order sake, be reduced to the 
Ulowing heads. 

Direction I. << When we consider ourselves as phi- 
losophers, or searchers after tinith, we should examine all 
Mir old opinions afresh, and inquire what wa» the ground 
if them, and whether our assent was built on just evidence ; 
ind then we should cast off all those judgments which 
irere formed heretofore without due examination/* A 
man in pursuit of knowledge should throw off all those 
prejudices which he had imbibed in limes past, and guard 
igainst all the springs of error mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, with the utmost watchfulness, for time to come. 

Observe here. That this rule of casting away all our 
brmer prejudicate opinions and sentiments is not propos- 
cdto any of us to be practised at once, considerejd as men 
of business or religion, as friends or neighl>ors, as fathers 
Dr sons, as magistrates, subjects, or christians ; but mere- 
ly as philosophers and searchers after truth : And though 
It may be well presumed that many of our judgments, both 
true and false, together with the practices built thereon in 
the natural, the civil, and the religious life, were foimed 
ivithout suflicient evidence ; yet an universal rejection of 
»11 these might destroy at once our present sense and prac* 
^ of duty with regard to God, ourselves, and our fellovr 
creatures. Mankind would be bcrebv thrown into such a 



Q 



IS2 LOGIC : OR, THE Part 

state of doubting and imliffei^encey that it would be too lo 
ere they recovered any principlea of virtue or religion 
a train of reasonings. 

Besides, the common alfatrs of human life often dema 
a much speedier determination, and we must many tki 
act upon present probabiliiies : The bulk of mankind hi 
not time and leisure, and advantage sufficient to begia 
their knowledge anew, and to build up every single op 
ion and practice afresh, upon the justest grounds 9t e 
dence. 

Yet let it be observed also, that so far as any person 
capable of forming and correcting his notions, and 
rules of conduct in the natural, civil, and religious 11 
by the strict rules of logic ; and so far as he bath tii 
s\nd capacity to review his old opinions, to re-examine 
those which are any ways doubtful, and to determine i 
thint^ without just evidence, he is likely to become 
much the wiser and the happier man ; and, if divine gn 
assist him, so much the better Christian. And thou 
this cannot be done all at once, yet it may be done by p 
(lent steps and degrees, till our whole set of opinions i 
principles i)e in time corrected and reformed, or at le 
established upon justcr foundations. 

Direction II. <' Endeavour that all your ideas of th< 
objects, concerning which you pass any judgment, 
clear and distinct, complete, comprehensive, extensi 
nnd orderly, as far as you have occasion to judge conce 
ing them." This is the substance of the last chapter 
ilie first part of logic. The rules which direct our C( 
ceptions must be reviewed, if we would form our juc 
ments aright. Dut if we will make haste to judg^ at 
adventures, while our ideas are dark and confused, and ' 
ry impcrfect^fkve shall be in danger of running into ma 
mistakes. This is like a person who would pretend 
^ive the sum total of a lar^e accountin arithmetic, wi 
out surveying nil the particulars ; or as a painter^ w 
prnfcsses to draw a fair and distinct landscape iathe V 
li|^I)t, when he can hardly distinguish a house from a t 

Observe here, That this direction does not requirt 
to gain clear, distinct, complete ideas of things in all i 
pn:':<i. nowcrs, and qualilicsi in an absolute sense ; fo* 



Chap*. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 18^ 

belongs to God alone, and is impossible for us to attain : 
But it is expressed in a relalive or limittd sense ; that is, 
oui' ideas should be clear, distinct, and comprehensive, 
&c. at least so far as we have occasion at that time to 
judy^e concerning them. We may form many true and 
certain judgments concerning God, angels, men, heaven, 
hell, &c. by those partial and very imperfect conceptions 
of them to which we have attained, if we judge no farther 
concerning them than our conceptions reach. 

We may have a clear and distinct idea of the existence 
of many things in nature, and affirm that they do exist, 
though our ideas of their intimate essences and causes, 
their relations and manners of action, are very confused 
and obscure. We may judge well concerning several 
properties of any being, though other properties are un- 
known ; for perhaps we kiiow not all the properties of 
ally being whatsoever. 

Sometimes we have clear ideas of the absolute proper- 
ties of an object; and we may judge of them with cer- 
tainty, while the relative properties are very obscure and 
unknown to us. So we may have a clear and just idea of 
the area of a parallelogram, without knowing what rela- 
tion it bears to the area of a triangle, or a polygon : I may 
know the length of the diameter of a circle, without know- 
ing what proportion it has to the circumference. 
'There are other things, whose external relative proper- 
ties, with respect to each other, or whose relation to us 
We know better than their own inward and absolute prop- 
erties, or their essential distinguishing attributes. We 
perceive ckarly, that fire will warm or burn us, and will 
evaporate water ; and that water will allay our thirst, or 
Quench the fire, though we know net the inward distin*- 
guishing particles, or prime essential properfj^s of fire or 
Water. We may know the King, cr^d Lord Chancellor, 
and affirm many things of them in tlieir legal characters, 
though we con have but a confused idea of their persons 
or natural features, if we have never seen tlieir faces. So 
the scripture has revealed God himscir to us, as our Crea- 
tor, Preserver, Redeemer, and Sanctiiler, and as the ob- 
ject of our worship, in clearer ideas than it has revealed 
miD7 other absiruBt questions \v\\\d\ xvve^^ \i«i ^"J^N-vy^ 



IM LOGIC : OR, THE PaetU. 

about hi6 divine essvnce or substance, his immensity or 
omnipresence. 

This therefore is the general observatioi in order to 
guide our judgments, ^< That we should not allow our* 
selves to form a judgment concerning things fatther than 
our clear and distinct ideas reach, and then we are not in 
danger of error." 

But there is one considerable objection against this rule} 
and which is necessary to be answered ; and there is one jott 
and reasonable exception^which is fts needful to be mentioned. 

The objection is this : May we not judge safely con- 
cerning some total or complete ideas, when we have i 
clear perception only of some parts or properties of them? 
May we not affirm, that ail that is in Cod is eternal, or 
that all his unknown attributes are infinite, though we 
have so very imperfect an idea of God, eternity, anid inSn* 
ity ? Again, May we not safely judge of particular ob* 
jects, whose idea is obscure, by a clear idea of the geDe^ 
al ? May I not affirm, That every unknown species of 
animals has inward springs of motion, because I have a 
clear idea that these inward springs belong to an animal 
in general ? 

Answer. All those supposed unknown parts, proper* 
ties, or species, are clearly and dislinctly perceived to be 
connected with, or contained in the known parts, proper^ 
ties, or general ideas, which we suppose to be clear and 
disiincl, as far as we judge of them : And as we have no 
particular idea of those unknown divine attributes, or UD* 
known species of animals ; so there is nothing particular 
ailirmed concenung them beyond what belongs to tbe 
genera] idea of divine attributes, or animals, with which I 
clearly and distinctly j>erceive them to be connected. 

It may be illustrated in this manner. Suppose a long 
chain lies before me, whose nearest links I see are iron 
rings, and I see them fastened to a post near mtj but ttie 
most distant links lie beyond the reach of my sight, so 
thut I know not whether they are oval or round, brass or 
iron : Now I may boldly affirm, the whole length of this 
chain is fastened to the post, for I have a clear idea that 
the nearest links are thus fastened, and a clear idea that 
the clisdnct links are coimected mv\vX\v^Tv^^^^\.^\^lca» 
draw the whole chain by one YuiVl, 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 185 

Or thus : If two known ideas, A and B are evidently 
joined, or agree, and if C unknown be included in A, and 
also D unknowiY'be included in B, then I may aflirm that 
C and D are joined and agree : For I have a clear percep- 
tion of the union ..of the two known ideas A and B ; and 
also a clear perception of the connection of the unknown 
ideas with the known. So that clear and distinct ideas 
must still abide as a general necessary qualification, in or* 
der to form a right judgment ; And indeed it is upon this 
foot that all ratiocination ii? built, and the conclusions are 
thus formed, which reduce things unknown from things 
knpwn. 

Ytt it seems to me, that there is one just limitation or 
exception to this general rule of judgment, as built on clear 
aud distinct ideus, and it is this. * 

Exception. " In matter of mere testimony, whether hu- 
man or divine, there is not always a necessity of clear and 
^stinct ideas of the things which are believed. Though 
the evidence of propositions, which are entirely formed by 
ourselves, depends on the clearness and distinctness of those 
ideas of which they arc composed, and en our own clear 
perception of their agreenlent or disagreement, yet we 
may justly assent to propositions formed by others, when 
We have neither a very clear conception in ourselves of 
the true ideas contained in the words, nor how they agree 
or disagree ; provided always, that we have a clear and 
sufficient evidence of the credibility of the persons who in- 
form us. 

Thus when we read in scripture the great doctrines of 
the deity of Christ, of the union of tKe divine and human 
natures in him, of the divine agency of the blessed Spiriti 
that the Son is the brightness of the Father's glory, that 
all things were created by him and for him, that the Son 
shall give up the kingdom to the Father, and that God 
shall be all in all ; we may safely believe them : For, 
though the ideas of these subjects themselves are not suffi- 
ciently clear, distinct, and perfect, for our own minds to 
form these judgments or propositions concerning them, 
yet we have a clear and distinct perception of God's re? 
vealing them, or that they are contained in scripture | a.i)^ 
tbjis is sufhcient evidencs to delevmiu^ ouv ^^^^\^V 



186 LOGIC : OR, THE Part II 

The same thing; holds true in some measure^ whei*e ere* 
dlble human testimony assures us of some propositions) 
while we have no sufficient ideas of the subject and predi- 
cate of them to detern.me our assent. So when an honeit 
and learned mathemuiiqian assures t ploughman that tbe 
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right anglei) 
or that the square of the h>^potheAuse of a right-angled tri- 
angle is equal to the sum of the Squares of the two sides ; 
the ploughman, who has but confused ideas of these 
things, may firmly and easily believe these propositions} 
upon the same ground because he has evidence of the skill 
and faithfulness of his inibrmeh* 



* Perhaps some may object against this representation of thingfy 
and 83/ , that '* W« cannot ])roperly be said to believe a propoahioii 
any further than we ourselves have ideas under the terms: TherefoiVi 
if we have no ideas under the terms, we believe nothing but the con* 
nection of words or sounds ; and, if we have but obscure and iiuuk- 
quate ideas under the terms, then we partly believe a connection of 
things, and partly a connection of sounds. But that we cannot pio- 
])€rly be said to believe the proi>osition, for our faith can never go be* 
yond our ideas.*' 

Now, to set this matter in a clear light, I suppose that every pnpo- 
sition which is proposed to my assent, is a sentence made up of termf 
which have some ideas under them known or unknown tome. I 
confess, if I believe there are no ideas at all under the termSp and 
there is nothing meant by them, then indeed, with regard to noe, It 
is the mere joining of sounds : But if, for instance^' a ploughman biS 
credible information from an honest and skilful fhathemadciani ttat 
an elipsis is made by the section of a cone, he believes the proposi^ 
tion, or he believes the sentence is true, as it. is made up of terms 
which his informant understands, though the ideas be unknown to 
him ; that is, he believes there are some ideas' which his infonnaAt 
has under these words which are really connected. And, I thinki 
this may be called believing the proposition, for it is a belief of somfr 
thing more than the mere joining of sounds ; it is a belief of the rod 
connection of some unknown ideas belonging to those sounds; and 
in this sense a man may be said to believe the truth of a propositioB, 
-which he doth not understand at all. 

With more reason still may we be said to believe a proposidoo 
upon credible testimony, if we have some sort of ideas oiider the 
terms, though they are but partial or inadequate and obscure ; suck 
as Divine answers were given by Urim and Thummlm i For, since 
it is purely upon testimony we believe the known parts of the kleas 
sjgniied by those words to be connected, upon the same teathnony 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 187 

Direction III. « When you have obtained as clear and 
€omi>rehen8ive ideas as needful, both of the subject and 
predicate of a proposition, then compare those ideas of 
the subject and predicate together with the utmost atten* 
tion, and observe how far they agree, and wherein they 
differ." Whether the proposition may be affirmed abso- 
lutely or relatively, whether in whole or in part, whether 
universally or particularly, and then under what partic- 
ular limitations. Turn these ideas about in your mind, 
«nd take a view of them on all sides, just as a mason 
would do to see whether two hewn stones exactly suit each 

those words to be connected, namely, because our infornnant is know- 
ing and faithful. And in this sense \ye .may justly be said to be- 
lieve a proposition of scripture entirely, which we understand but 
yeiy inoperfectly, because God who reveals jt is knowing and faithful 
'a perfection. 

And indeed, unless this representation of the matter be allowed, 
there are but very few propositions in the world, even in human 
things, to which we can give an entire assent, or which we may be 
said either to know, or believe, because there is scarce any thing on 
nrth of which we have an adequate, and most perfect idea. And it 
is evident, that in divine things there is scarce any thing which we 
couki either know or believe, without this allowance: For, though 
tcason and revelation join to inform me, that God is holy, how ex- 
ceeding inadequate are my ideas of God, and of his holiness ? Yet I 
iBay boldly and entirely assent to this whole proposition, since I am 
sore that every known and unknown idea signified by the term God 
Us connected with the ideas of the term holiness, because reason part- 
Y informs me, but especially because the divine testimony vtrhich has 
GiQnected them is certainly credible. 

X might argue firom this head perhaps more forcibly from the doc- 
trine of God* s incomprehensibleness. If we could believe nothing 
but wTiat we have ideas of, it would be impossible for us to believe 
that God is incomprehensible : For this implies in it a belief that 
there are some unknown ideas belonging to the nature of God. 
Therefore we both believe and profess that something concerning 
unknown ideas, when we believe and profess that God is incompre^* 
hensible. 

I persuade myself that most of those very persons who object a^ 
gainst my representation of things, will yet readily confess, they be* 
lieve all the propositions in scripture, rather than to declare they do not 
believe several of them { though they must acknowledge that several 
of them are far above their understanding, or that they have scarce 
any ideas of the true sense of them. And therefore, where proposi^ 
tions derived from 9redi1il6 te»timon^ are xsoAii ^'^ ^ ^%^ '-^^sx^. 



188 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. IL 

other in every part, and are fit to be joined in erecting a 
carved or fluted pillar. 

Con^pare tJie whole subject wiUi the vrhole predicate in 
their several parts ; Take heed in this matter that you 
neither add to, nor diminish the ideas contained in the sub- 
ject or in the predicate : for such an inadvertence or mis* 
lake will expose yow to great error in judgment. 

Direction IV. " Search for evidence of truth with dili« 
gtnce and honesty, and be heartily ready to receive evi« 
dence« whether for the agi*eement or disagreement of 
ideas." ^ 

Search with diligence; spare no labour in searching for 
the truth, in due proportion to the importance of the pro* 
position. Read the best authors who have writ on that 
subject ; consult your wise and learned friends in conver- 
sation ; and be not unwilling to borrow hints toward 

equate ideas, I think it is much more proper to say we believe tlienUi 
than that we do not believe them, lest we cut off a multitude of the 
|)ro|)ositions of the bible from our assent of faith. 

Yet let it be observed here, that when we believe a prqMsidon on 
mere testimony, of which we have no ideas at all, we can only be 
said to give a general implicit assent to the truth of that proposition, 
without any particular knowledge of, or explicit assent to tjfie special 
truth contained in that proposition ; A nd thus our implicit assent is of 
very little use, unless it be to tesdfy our l>elief of the knowledge and 
veracity of him that informs us. 

As our irUas of a proposition are more or less clear and adeqmtei 
as well as just and proper, so we do explicitly assent more or less to 
the particular truth contained in that proposition. And our assent 
hereby becomes more or less useful for the increase of our knowledge, 
or the direction of our practice. 

When divine testimony plainly proposes to our faith such a propo- 
sition whereof we have but obscure, doubtful, and inadequate id^s, 
we are bound implicitly to believe the truth of it, as expressed in those 
terms, in order to shew our submission to God who revealed it, as a 
God of perfect knowledge and veracity : But it is our^duty to use all 
proper methods to obtain a farther and explicit knowledge of the par- 
ticular truth contained in the proposition, if we would improve by it 
either in knowledge or virtue. A U necessary rules of grammar and criti- 
cism should be employed to find out the very ideas that belong to 
those words, and which were designed by the divine speaker or writer. 
Though we may believe the truth of a proposition which we do not 
linderstand, yet we should endeavour to understand every prc^ositiQO 
fyMicb we k^l'm^ to \n true 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 189 

your improvement from the meanest person, nor to re- 
ceive any glimpse of light from the most unlearned. Dil- 
igence and humility is the way to thrive in the riches of 
the understanding, as well as in gold or silver. Search 
carefully for the evidence of truth, and dig for wisdom as 
for hid treasure. 

Search with a steady honesty of soul, and a sincere im- 
Xmrtiality, to find the truth. Watch against every temp- 
tation that might bribe your judgment, or warp it aside 
from truth. Do not indulge yourself to wish any unex- 
amined proposition wei*e true or false. A wish often per- 
verts the judgment, and tempts the mind strangely to be- 
lieve upon slight evidence whatsoever we wish to be true 
or fuise* 

Direction V. " Since the evidence of the agreement 
or disagreement of two ideas is the ground of our assent 
to any proposition, or the great criterion of truth ; there- 
fore we siiould suspend our judgment, and neither affirm 
or deny till this evidence appear." 

This direction is different from the second ; for, though 
the evidence of the agreement or disagreement of two 
ideas most times depends on the clearness and distinct- 
ness of the ideas themselves, yet it does not always arise 
hence. Testimony may be sufficient evidence of the 
agreement or disagreement of two obscure ideas, as we 
imve seen just before in the exception under the second di- 
rection. Therefore, though we are not universally and in 
all cases bound to suspend our judgment till our ideas of the 
objects themselves are clear and distinct, yet we must al- 
ways suspend our judp:ment, and withhold our assent to, 
or denial of any proposition, till some just evidence appear 
of its truth or falsehood. It is an impatience of doubt and 
siispence, a rashness aivl precipitance of judgment, and 
hastiness to believe something on one side or the other, 
that plunges us into many errors. 

This direction to delay and to suspend our assent is 
more particularly necessary to be observed, when such 
propositions offi;r themselves to us as are supported by 
education, authority, custom, inclination, interest, or other 
powerful prejudices : for our judgment is led away in- 
fcnsibly to believe all that Ihey dkXaX^ 5 ^\A> \^\wvt^\'^^- 



190 LOGIC : OR, THE PartU. 

juclices and dangers of error are muluplit:d, we should stt 
the strictest guard upon our assent. 

Yet remember the caution or limitation here which I 
gave under the first objection, namely, that this is not to 
be too strictly applied to, in matters of daily practice, d* 
ther in human life or religion ; but, when we consider 
ourselves as philosophers, or searchers after truth, ve 
should always withhold our assent where there is not just 
evidence : And, as far and as fast as we can, in a due con* 
sistence with our daily necessary duties, we should also 
reform and adjust all our principles and practiceSi bolhifl 
reli);;ion and the civil life, by these rules. 

Direction VI. " We must judi^e of every proposition 
by those proper and peculiar mediums or means, whtrcby 
the evidence of it is to be obtained, whether it be senso^ 
consciousness, intelligence, reason or testimony. All our 
faculties and powers are to be employed in judging of 
their proper objects." 

If we judge of sounds, colours, odotirs, sapors^ the 
smoothness, roughness, softness, or hardness of bodies, it 
must be done by the use of oiir senses : But then we must 
take heed that our senses are well disposed, as shall be 
shewn afterward. 

And since our senses in their various exercises are in 
some cases liable to be deceived, and more especially when 
by our eyes or our cars we judge of the figure, quaniiiy) 
distance, and position of objects that are afar off, we ought 
to call our reason in lo the assistance of our senses, and 
correct the errors of one sense by the help of another. 

It is by the powers of sense and reason joined together, 
that we must judge philosophically of the inward nature, 
the secret properties and powers, the causes and effects, 
the relations and proportions, of a thousand corporeal ob- 
jects which surround us on earth, or are placed at a div 
tance in the heavens. If a man, on the one hand, con- 
lines himself only to sensible experiments, and does not 
exercise reason upon them, he may surprise himself and 
others with strange appearances, and learn to entertain the 
world with sights and shews, but never become a philos- 
opher : And, oij the other hand, if a man imprisoned 



Chap. IV. 



RIGHT USE OF REASON. 



19\ 



sciirc idea, for we know not what Tvas the peculiar agen- 
biinselfin his closet, and employ the most eKcjiiisite pow- 
ers of reason to find out the nature of things in the copo- 
real world, without the use of his senses, and the prac- 
licc of cxperimentSi he will frame to himself a scheme of 
chimeras, instead of true philosophy. Hence came the 
invention of substantial forms and qualities, of »ia/<?r/o/?r/- 
nui and/rr/ra/zo;?, with all the insignificant names used by 
the Peripatetic writers ; and it was for want of more ex- 
periments that the great Descartes failed in several parts 
of his philosophical writings. 

In the abstracted and speculative parts of the mathe- 
matics, which treat of quantity and number, the faculty of 
reason must be chiefly employed to perceive the relation 
cf various quantities, and draw certain and useful conclu- 
sions ; l)ut it wants the assistance of sense also to be ac- 
qaainied with lines, angles, and figures. And in practi- 
c»l mathematics our senses have still greater employment. 

If we would judge of the pure properties and actions 
of the mind, of the nature of spirits, their various percep- 
tions and powers, we must not inquire of our eyes and our 
ears, nor the images or shapes laid up in the brain, but 
we roust have recourse to our own consciousness of Avhat 
passes within our own mind. 

If we are to pass a judgment upon any thing that re- 
lates to spirits in a state of union with animal nature, and 
the mixt properties of sensation, fancy, appetite, passion, 
pleasure and pain, which ariM: thence, we must consult 
our own sensations, and the other powers which we find in 
ourselves considered as men or creatures made up of a 
mind and an animal, and by just reasonings deduce proper 
consequences, and improve our knowledge in these sub- 
jects. 

If we have occasion to judge concerning matters done 
in past ages, or in distant countries, and where we our- 
selves cannot be present, the powers of sense and reason, 
for the most part, are not sufficient to inform us, and we 
inust therefore have recourse to the testimony of oth- 
ers : And this is either divine or human. 

In matters of mere human prudence, we ' t 

greatest advaninge by making wise obserm 



193 -LOGIC : 0K» THE >knr 11. 

onvn conduct, and the conduct of otbers, aiid a survey of 
the events attending such conduct. Ejcperience in this 
case is equal to a natural sagacity, or rather superior. A 
treasure of observations and experiences, collected by 
xvise men, is of admirable service here. And perhaps 
there is nothing in the world of this kind equal to the aa- 
cred book of Proverbs, even if we look on it as a mere bn* 
man writing. 

In questions of natural religion, we must exercise the 
faculty of reason which God hath given us ; and, ^ce he 
has been pleased to afford us his word, we should confirm 
and improve, or correct our reasonings on this subject by 
the divine assistance of the Bible. 

In matters of revealed religion, that is, Christianityt Jo* 
daism, Sec. which we could never have known by the Bglit 
of nature, the word of God is our only foundation and 
chief light ; though here our reason must be used both to 
find out the true meaning of God in his word, and to de> 
rive just inferences from what God has written, as well to 
judge of the credentials whereby divine testimony is £a* 
tinguished from mere human testimony or fi-om impos- 
ture. 

As divine revelation can never contradict light reason, 
for they are two great lights given us by our Creator Cae 
our conduct, so reason ought by no means to assume to 
itself a power to contt*adict divine revelation. 

Though revelation be not contrary to reason, yet tliere 
are four classes wherein matters of revelation may beaud 
to rise above, or go beyond our reason. 

1 . When revelation asserts two things of which vre 
have clear ideas, to be joined, whose connection or agrec*^ . 
ment is not discoverable by reason ; as when scripture 
informs us, that The dead thall Wt^, that The earth €baU 
be burnt ufi^ and the Man Christ JesuM shall return fifm 
heaven ; none of these things could ever be found out or 
proved by reason. 

2 . When revelation affirms any proposition, while rea« 
son has no clear and distinct ideas of the subject or of the 
predicate ; as, God created all things by Jesus Christ : Bf 
the Urim and Thummim God gave forth divine oracte* 
The predicate of each of these propositions is to usan eb* 




Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 193 

cy of Jesus Christ when God the Father crcaiecf the world 
by him ; nor have we uny clear nnct cerluin conception 
what the Urim and Thummim wei'^j nor how God gave 
answers to his people by them. 

3. When revelation, in plain and express lanjjiiage, de- 
clares some doctrine which our reason at present knows 
with evidence and certainty, how or in what sense to re- 
roncile to some of its own principles ; as, that the child 
Jesus is the mighty God, Isa. ix. G, which proposition 
carries a seeming opposition to the unity and spirituality 
of the Godhead, which are principles of reason. 

4. When two propositions or doctrines are plainly as- 
seited by divine revelation, which our reason at present 
knows not how or in what sensei with evidence and cer- 
tainty, to reconcile with one another ; as, The Father ia 
the only true God, John xvii. 3. and yet Christ is over all, 
God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5. 

Now divine revelation huvin}< declared all these propo- 
sitions, reason is bound to receive them, because it cannot 
prove them to be utterly inconsistent or impossible, 
though the ideas of them may be obscure, though we our- 
selves see not the rational connaction of them, and though 
we know not certainly how to reconcile them. In these 
caseS) reason must submit to faith ; that is, we are bound 
to believe what God asserts, and wait till he shall clear up 
that which seems dark and difRcuIt, and till the mysteries 
of faith shall be farther explained to us either in this world 
or in the world to come,* and reason itself dictates thi^ 
submission. 

Direction VII. It is very useful to have some genera! 
principles of truth settled in the mind, whose evidence is 
great and obvious, that they may be always at hand to as- 
list us in judging of the great variety of things which 
occur. These may be called first notions, or fun<Iamcn- 
tal principles ; for, though many of them are deduced 
from each other, yet most or all of them may be culled 
principles when compared with a thousand other judg- 
ments which we form under the regulation and inSucnco 
^ I' of these primary propositions." 

* c *See lomething more on this subject^ Dii-ection II. prc:cdin(f 
^ I and chap- v. sec 6. 



\--' 



186 LOGIC : OR| TtiK Part II 

The same tbing holds true id boiii^ inetsin«» where crc 
dible human testimonf aaeurea us of some propoutioni 
while we hacve no sufficient ideae of the subject uid predi 
cate of them to detemune our assqlit. So when an bona 
and learned mathema4sian assures a ploughman thai III 
three angles of $L tiiangle are ciqual to two right aoglm 
or that the square of the hjqjMitheAuw of a right-angkd tii 
angle is equal to the sum of the Quarts of the two siiks 
the plooghmaui who has buH confused ideas of -lhe« 
things, may firmly and easily Itelieve these propoaitioM 
upon the same ground because he has evidence of the Ail 
and fditbfttlness of his informed* 



* Perhaps some may object aniftst this lefjiMeuta dott of Muji 
and ta/, that** Wccaouoc properly be said to beliifcapropeMi 
any further than we ourselves have ideas Jinder the terms i ThaffiNB 
if we have no ideas under the termsi we JMieve noUifaig bdl ilif coo 
nection of words or sounds • and, if we have but obscute end loads' 
quate ideas under the ternns, then we pardy beHeve a conaectioad 
things, and partly a connection of sounds. But that we canset pRH 
])erly be saud to believe the proiMsition, fyr o\ir faith can never |0 fe^ 
yond our ideas. 



»• 



Now, to set this matter in a clear light» I suppose that evciypMfC^ 
sition which is proposed to my assent, is a senienoe made op of tcnsi 
which have some ideas under them known or unknown tome. I 
confess, if I believe there are no ideas at all under the tenn^ uA 
there is nothing meant by them, then indeed, with regard tOflMB^'k 
is the mere joining of sounds : But if, for instance^ a plooighmaa liil 
credible information from an honest and skilful jnatheinatici|U^ ^ 
an elipsis is made by the section of a cone, he believes the pr^pH^ 
tion, or he believes the sentence is true, ai it> made up of tciiP* 
which his informant understands, though th^ kleas be uoJODOWSlt 
him ; that is, he befieves there are some ideas' which his In f a n B SH 
has under these words which are really connected. And, I thiski 
this may be called believing the proposition, for it is a belief of toons' 
thing more than the mere joining of sounds ; it is a belief of the nal 
connection of kome unknown idoLS belonging to those aouodsi 1^ 
in this sense a man may be said to believe the truth of a ptopo^dosi 
-w hich he doth not understand at all. 

With more reason still may we be s»d to believe a proposiddi 
iipon credible testimony, if we have some sort of ideas anderdH 
terms, though they are but partial or inadequate and obscnre'i sad 
as Divine answers were given by Urim and Thummim t For, aiae 
It is purely upon tesdmony we believe the known paru of the idea 
signified by ^ose wtids to be connected, upon the sine t e ail moa; 
wem»/alsobd^9aUthcttBlno«np«u of the adcwtf^aKedhj 



LiiAP. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 195 

Llicse old or beloved sentimentsj do not wink your eyes fast 
against the light, but part with any tiling for the sake of 
truth : Remember when you overcome an error you gain 
truth, the victory is on your side, and the advantage is all 
four own." 

. I confess those grand principles or btlief and practice 
which universally influence our conduct, both with regard 
to this life and the life to come, should be supposed to be 
well settled in the first years of our studies ; such as, the 
existence and providence of God, the truth of Christiani- 
ty, the authority of scripture, the great rules of morality, 
kc. We should avoid a light fluttering genius, ever ready 
to change our foundations, and to be carried about with 
every wind of doctrine. To guard against which incon- 
venience, wc should labour with earnest diligence and fer- 
vent prayer, that our most fundamental and important 
pMUts of belief and practice may be established upon just 
grounds of reason and scripiure, when we come to years 
oMitcretion, and fit to judge for ourselves in such impor- 
tant points. Yet, since it is possible that the folly or pre- 
judices of younger years may hare established persons in 
some mistaken sentiments, even in very impoitant matters, 
We should always hold ourselves ready to receive any new 
advantage toward the correction or improvement even of 
our established principles, as well as opinions of lesser mo- 
ment. 

CHAP. V^ 

SPECIAL RULES TO DIRECT US IN JUDGING OF PAR- 

TICULAH OBJECTS. 



I 



T would be endless to run through all those par- 
ticular objects concerning which we have occasion to pass 
a judgment at one time or another. Things of the most 
frequent occurrence, of the widest extent, and of the 
greatest importance, are the objects and exercises of sense, 
of reason, and speculation ; the matters of morality, reli- 



186 LOGIC ; OR, THE Part 

The same thing; holds true in somt measure, where • 
dible huinun testimony assures us of some propositi 
while we have no sufficient ideas of the subject and pr 
cate of them to detenr.lne our assent. So when an hoi 
and learned mathemau<;ian assures a ploughman thai 
three angles of a tiiangle are equal to two right ang 
or that the square of the h^i^potheAuse of a right-angled 
angle is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sid 
the ploughmaui who has but confused ideas of tl 
things, may firmly and easily believe these propositi* 
upon the same ground because he has evidence of the • 
and fdithfulness of his informed* 



* Perhaps some may object against this representation of thi 
and sa/, that '* \V€ cannot properly be said to believe a propoti 
any further than we ourselves have ideas under the terms: Yhcrc! 
if we have no ideas under the terms, we believe nothing but the 
nec(ion of words or sounds ; and, if we have but obscure and in 
quate ideas under the terms, then we partly bet>eve a connectio 
things, and partly a connection of sounds. But that we cannot 
])crly be said to believe the pro{>osiiion, for our faith can never go 
yond our ideas." 

Now, to set this matter in a clear light, I suppose that every pr 
sttion which is proposed to my assent, is a senience made up of te 
which have some ideas under them known or unknown to me 
confess, if I believe there are no ideas at all under the terms, 
there is nothing meant by them, then indeed, with regard to mi 
is the mere joining of sounds : But if, for instance^ a ploughman 
credible information from an honest and skilful mathematician, 
an elipsis is made by the section of a cone, he believes the prq 
tion, or he believes the sentence is true, ai it.is made up of ic 
which his informant understands, though the ideas be unkoow 
him ; that is, he believes there are son>e ideas' which his infem 
has under these words which are really connected. And, I tb 
this may be called believing the proposition, for it is a belief of sc 
thing more than the mere joining of sounds ; it is a belief of the 
connection of &ome unknown ideas belonging to those soutids; 
in this sense a man may be said to believe the ttuth of a proposi' 
-which he doth not understand at all. 

With more reason still may we be said to believe a proposi 
upon credible testimony, if we have some sort of ideas uiidei 
terms, though they are but partial or inadequate and obscure ; i 
as Divine answers were given by Urim and Thummim i For, i 
It is purely upon testimony we believe the known parts of tbe i 
signified by those wdds to be connected, upon the same testtn 

wema/aUobctisYfiaUthe ankoownparu of Uic ideas si^lfie 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 187 

Direction III. " When you have obtained as clear and 
€oinurehensive ideas as nesdful} both of the subject and 
predicate of a proposition, then compare those ideas of 
the subject and predicate toother with the utmost atten* 
tion, and observe how far they agree, and wherein they 
differ." Whether the proposition may be affirmed abso- 
lutely or relatively, whether in whole or in part, whether 
universally or particularly, and then under what partic- 
ular limitations. Turn these ideas about in your mind, 
md take a view of them on all sides, just as a ma&on 
would do to see whether two hewn stones exactly suit each 

those words to be connected, namely, because our informant is know- 
ing and faithful. And in this sense we .may justly l>e said to be- 
lieve a proposition of scripture entirely, which we understand but 
very imperfectly, because God who reveals Jt is knowing and faithful 
a perfection. 

And indeed, unless this representation of the matter be allowed, 
tbere are but very few profrasitions in the world, even in human 
' things, to which we can give an entire assent, or which we may be 
t said cither to know, or believe, because there is scarce any thing on 
ctrth of which we have an adequate, and most perfect idea. And it 
is evident, that in divine things there is scarce any thing which we 
could either know or believe, without this allowance: For, though 
teason and revelation join to inform me, that God is holy, bow ex- 
ceeding inadequate are my ideas of God, and of his holiness I Yet I 
L nay boldly and entirely assent to this whole proposition, since I am 
I sme that every known and unknown idea signified by the term God 
^a connected with the ideas of the term holiness, because reason part- 
^ informs me, but especially because the divine testimony which has 
o^onccted them is certainly credible. 

t^ might argue from this head perhaps more forcibly from the doc- 
trine of God*s incomprehensibleness. If we could believe nothing 
but wliat we have ideas of, it would be impossible for us to believe 
that God is incomprehensible : For this implies in it a belief that 
there are some unknown ideas belonging to the nature of God. 
Therefore we both believe and profess thiat something concerning 
lakaown ideas, when we believe and profess that God is incompre- 
hensible. 

I persuade myself that most of those very persons who object a^ 
gainst my representation of things, will yet readily confess, they be* 
lieve all the propositions in scripture, rather than to declare they do not 
believe several of them t though they most acknowledge that several 
of them are far above their understanding, or that they have scarce 
any ideas of the true sense of them. And therefore, where proposi-* 
tfona derived from credible testimony are made up of dark Qr w^^ 



186 LOGIC : OR, THE Pah 

The same thing holds true in some measure, where 
dlble huqian testimony assures us of some proposit 
while we h^ve no sufficient ideas of the subject and p 
cate of them to detenv.lne our assent. So when an hi 
and learned mathematician assures a ploughman ths 
three angles of a tiiangle are ecjual to two right an 
or that the square of the hji^potheAuse of a right-angle 
angle is equal to the sum of the squares of the two si 
the ploughman, who has but confused ideas of 1 
things, may firmly and easily believe these proposit 
upon the same ground because he has evidence of the 
and fdithfulness of his informei'.* 



* Perhaps some may object against this representation of t1 
and sa/, chat '* W« canuot properly be said to believe a propc 
any further than we ourselves have ideas under the terms: Thei 
if we have no ideas under the terinsi we believe nothing but th 
nection of words or sounds ; and, if we have but obscure and i 
quate ideas under the terms, then we partly believe a connect 
things, and partly a connection of sounds. But that we canno 
])crly bo said to believe the pro{>osition, for our faith can never { 
yond our ideas" 

Now, to set this matter in a clear lightj I suppose that every { 
sition which is proposed lo my assent, is a sentence made up of 
which have some ideas under them known or unknown ton 
confess, if I believe there are no ideas at all under the terms 
there is nothing meant by them, then indeed, with regard to r 
is the mere joining of sounds : But if, for instance^ a ploughma 
credible information from an honest and skilful mathematician 
an elipsis is made by the section of a cone, he believes the pr< 
tion, or he believes the sentence is true, ai it is made up of 
which his informant understands, though the kieas be unkoo 
him ; that is, he believes there are some ideas' which his infoi 
has under these words which are really connected. And, I i 
this may be called believing the proposition, for it is a belief of i 
thing more than the mere joining of sounds; it is a belief of th 
connection of some unknow n ideas belonging to those sounds; 
in this sense a man may be said to believe the tiuth of a propoi 
-which he doth not understand at all. 

With more reason still may we be said to believe a propo 
upon credible testimony, if we have some sort of ideas uiid 
terms, though they are but partial or inadequate and obKure ; 
as Divine answers were given by Urim and Thummim i For, 
it is purely upon testimony we believe the known pans of tlie 
signified by those words to be connected, upon the same testr 
wem»yaUo|i^fiaUtheaakQownp;ai8 of Uie kkassi^ifi 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 187 

Dirscdon III. " When you have obtained as clear and 
comurehensive ideas as nettdful} both of the subject and 
predicate of a proposition, then compare those ideas of 
the subject and predicate together with the utmost atten- 
tion, and observe how far they agree, and wherein they 
differ." Whether the proposition may be affirmed abso- 
lutely or relatively, whether in whole or in part, whether 
universally or particularly, and then under what partic- 
ular limitations. Turn these ideas about in your mind, 
and take a view of them on all sides, just as a mason 
would do to see whether two hewn stones exactly suit each 

those words to be connected, namely, because our informant is know- 
ing and faithful. And in this sense we .ma/ justly be said to be- 
lieve a proi>osition of scripture entirely, which we understand but 
foy iiniierfectly, because God who reveals ,it is knowing and faithful 
ia perfection. 

And indeed, unless this representation of the matter be allowed^ 
(here are but very few pro|)ositions in the world, even in human 
things, to which we can give an entire assent, or which we may be 
laid either to know, or believe, because there is scarce any thing on 
euth of which we have an adequate, and most perfect idea. And it 
is evident, that in divine things there is scarce any thing which we 
oouki either know or believe, without this allowance: For, though 
leason and revelation join to inform me, that God is holy, how ex- 
ceeding inadequate are my kieas of God, and of his holiness I Yet I 
lUy boldly and entirely assent to this whole proposition, since I am 
L Mnt that every known and unknown kiea signified by the term God 
^connected with the kleas of the term holiness, because reason part- 
winforms me, but especially because the divine testimony which has 
onnccted them is certainly credible. 

Jji^ might argue firom this head perhaps more forcibly from the doc- 
trine of God*s incomprehensibleness. If we could believe nothing 
but wliat we have ideas of, it would be impossible for us to believe 
to God is incomprehensible : For this implies in it a belief that 
there are some unknown ideas belonging to the nature of God. 
Therefore we both believe and profess that something concerning 
nknown ideas, when we believe and profess that God is incompre* 
bensibte. 

I persuade myself that most of those very persons who object a^ 
Sainst my representation of things, will yet readily confess, they be* 
lieve all the propositions in scripture, rather than to declare they do noc 
believe several of them i though they must acknowledge that several 
of them are far above their understanding, or that they have scarce 
any ideas of the true sense of them. And therefore, where proposi^* 
tfoiu derived from credible testimony are made up of dark 9t iuwl« 



200 LOGIC ; OR, THE Part II. 1 

C. Yet, after our utmost inquiries, we can never be as- 
sured by reason, that we know all the powers and prop* < 
crtics of any finite bein^. 

7. If finite beings are not adequately known by usyinuch '■ 
less the things infinite : For it is oi the nature of a finite ; 
mind not to be able to comprehend what is infinite. ' 

8. We may judge and argue very justly and certaioly 
concerning in&uities, in some parts of them, or so far as } 
our ideas reach, though tke infinity of them hath some- • 
thing incomprehensible in it. And this is built on ihe f 
general rule fol lowing, namely, | 

9. Whatsoever is sufficiently clear and evident, oupht | 
not to be denied, thoujrh there are other things Ijelongiag • 
to the same subject which cannot be compreheiuled. I *. 
may affirm many things with certainty concetning human 1 
souls, their union with bodies, concerning the divisibilil/ ] 
of matter, and the attributes cf Cod, though many other - 
thinp^s relating to them arc all darkness to us. < 

10. If any opinion proposed has either no arguments,* 
or equal arguments for and against it, we must remain in 
perfect suspcnce about it, till convincing evidence appear 
on one side. 

11. Where present necessity of action docs not con- 
strain us to determine, we should not immediately yield 
up our assent to mere probable arguments, without due 
reserve, if we have any rcisonable hope of obtaining 
greater light and evidence on one side or the other .* for, 
when the balance of the judgment once resigns its equili* 
brium or neutrality to a mere probable argument, it is 
too ready to settle itself on that side, so that the mind will 
not easily change that judgment, though bright and strong 
evidence appear afterwards on the other side. 

13. Of two opinions, if one has unanswerable dfflicultiet 
attending it, we must not reject it immediately, till we 
examine whether the the contrary opinion has not difficul* 
ties as unanswerable. 

13. If each cp'.nion has objections against it, which we 
cannot answer, or reconcile, we should rather embrace 
that which has the least difTiculiies in it, and which has 
the best arguments to support it : And let our assent 
bear proponioa to the superior evidence. 




:uAP. V. RIGHT USE OF REAV^N l" 

14. If any cloctiint hs:h Ttry rjrjrjs iti* s;:rr^::. 
[ghi and evidence to cc.T«:i.'-:;i o-.t i«:K.r.^ vt *ii:i^»r i« • 
eject it because there is i:^ k.-.^z-.^v '-•• :i^i ■•--..ii-.j. :• 
/hich we are net able to a:.«wtT : iw : :o: .i.n ivr i 
ommon Chrssuan wcjld :*£ btBe. "y.: iv r-**- ' it'^'ii v 
;ib failUj and m'jst re:. our.ce f.tr. \'.t r 'r:sjz\. •»' h?» -^t- 
pon and his senses ; arid :r:t ir.-t.*- ,'rt •-:.*-. -fi ji > -;;: :• 
louid hold bat very few tf ll.m it*-" : i "•^' i.-Tii-. int- : 
ions whicii attend ihc sicrti. - Jir-t-t '.sf -ut ♦r.t— :». • *.::■. 
he omnipresence of G«>J- •'••: f-e v'—ivb,: 'tr-t vj--".'nf. . 
jflii^ht, atoms, spucfc, ir.ouori- s-:.. L.'t ;:!.•:.: »•►-«•■. a 

;his day. 

15. Where two extreTT.ts i:t •r^'X^::. ^ir.Jrtr :: mi.** 
ttrs of speculation or prictict. i:.- T.^-.^r? 'A '.'.^^\ :..-. 
Certain and convincing cuctnce. -! .: i;t!.r*«.: « v. Tr^- .». 
take the middle way. MoiItr«.i-r. ii '3*',''» \.k « .v •--'-n-- 
Dear the truth than doyVJi-: t£"-Tm«tri. • i..i -. i:i T.- 
ccUeni rule to judge of ::.t '-:.xrfr-/:*r*^ i-":r^ "i-wt v' #• 
greatest part of persons ar.ra t; .:.g« , 'v? •.-i».«'» •avrivn 

deals ill superlatives, h is a g'x/i r*, * *V. .7 »;.i'-i v 
form our judj^ment in mir.v spti -li'J»t v>rr'v»r"-*iV- « 
reconciling medium iu sis'-ii c«.st» Cvri v:vt-- '-r.b. vv%. • 
truth as well as peac*:. 

16. W hen t '.vo oi ff-: rt ni pro;x^ «.1m vr. i -.i * ► Vi •. - > • • •y 
tlrong^and cogent e\i<*.enct, ^•/: 'o /v j,.*'v ♦ »»•-** - 
consistent, we may btjiev* bo*..; of v.**:, -iv. if- 
not at present see ihe w.y :»> : t'. vv-lj*: — • - >.- v j- • 
well as our own conscioutntss: L*v-r^ .* * v - v v 
man is free and that mukitu!'^'. of t •:;.{•. <• '/••» »••- 
; that rcsptct CGI •' in gent ; and yet rt*v*!i i,-.': •/<• y • * 
xire us, that (Jod foreknows thtro all ; %v * ..i v > 
certain fatality. Now, thougfi lf;an*':'j it.KU ;.4'«. '.v 
tldsday hit on any so clear and h9ip{>y rn; -.'s '. « 
tdlo reconcile these proposi'.io;;v y-.r »..?;•,•: -..•: 'v 
a plain inconsistency in them, wt ju^*.ly v, *«;■■•: • ^ • •* ■ . 
because their evidence is great. 

17. Let us not therefore too s'i'1d-::i!v ':- v ff ••- • • 
difliicull matters, that two things ar*. u*";*'./ 1 .'.'-• .»■ • ? 
Forihcreare many propositions which imy ;»i>;'''" ' •"'• 
Mtent at first, and yet afterwards wc find ih* ii ' •»•. : 
^Tiand the way ofrLconci'i'.i'i; them inj«y !'• iri i!- ji • 
Mid easy s As also, there are other \»vi);i'i^v\ o* 



•t ■' 



' » • < • 



.* _• ?.« 



a03 LOGIC : OR, THE 

ma^ appear consistem at first, but after due ex 
we find their inconsistency. 

18. For the same reason, we sliould not c;ill 
ficulties utterly insolvablen or those objections i 
able which we are not presently able to answer : 
diligence may give farther light. 

19. In short) if we will secure ourselves fr 
we should not be too frequent or hasty in ass 
ceitain consistency or inconsistency, the absolu 
sality, necessity, or impossibility of things, whei 
not the brighest evidence. He is but a younj 
philosophefi who, when he sees two particulAi 
dently agree, immediately asserts them to agr 
aally, to agree necessarily, aud that it is im 
should be otherwise. Or when he sees evident! 
particular ideas happen to disagree, he preseii 
their constant and natural inconsistency, their 
possibility of agreement, and calls every thinj^ c 
his opinion absurdity and nonsense. A true p 
will affirm or deny with much caution and mock- 
he has thoroughly examined and found the evidi 
cry part of his assertion exceeding plain. 

20. Jjet us have a care of building our ai 
any important i>oint of doctrine upon one singlt 
if there are more to be obtained. We sliould 
and reject all other arguments which support 
doctrine, lest if our favorite argument sliould 
and fail us, wc should be tempted to abandon tl 
tant principle of truth. I tl.ink this was a ver 
practice in Descartes, and some of his follov 
when he had found out the argument for the t 
God, derived from the idea of a most perfect a 
istent being, he seemed to despise and abandc 
arguments against Atheism. 

21. If \ve happen to have our chief argumei 
opinion refuted, we should not immediutcly { 
opinion itself; for perhaps it may be a truth si 
may find it to be justly supported by other i 
which we mij;ht once think weaker, or perlu 
arguments which we knew not before. 

^ 22. We ought to esteem thut to be suflTicici 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 203 

of a propositfon, where both the kind and the force of 
the arguments or proofs are as great as the nature of the 
thing admits, and as the necessity or exigence of the case 
acquires. So, if we have a credible and certain testimony 
that Christ rose from the dead, it is enough ; we are not 
to expect mathematical or ocular demonstration for it ; 
at least in our day. 

23. Though we should seek what proofs may be at- 
tained of any proposition, and we should receive any num- 
ber of arguments which are just and evident for the con- 
firmation of the same truth, yet we must not Judge of the 
tnitb of any proposition by the number of arguments 

, which are brought to support it, but by the strength and 
ipcight of them : A building will stand firmer and longer 
on four large pillars of marble, than on ten of sand,^C^ 
earth or timber. 

24. Yet where certain evidence is not to be found op 
expected, a considerable number of probable arguments 
carry great weight with them even in matters of specula- 
tion. That is a probable hypothesis in philosophy or in 
theology, which goes farthest towaixl the solution of ma- 
ny difficult questions arising on any subject. 

SECT. III. 

?aiKCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF 

MORALITY AMD RELIGION. 



H 



.ERE it may be proper, in the first place, to 

mention a few definitions of words or terms. 

By matters of morality and religion, I mean those things 
which relate to our duty to God, ourselves, or our fellow 
creatures. 

Moral good, or virtue, or holiness, is an action or tem« 
per conformable to the rule of our duty. Moral evil, or 
vice, or sin, is an action or temper unconformable to the 
rule of our duty, or a neglect to fulfil it. 

Note The words vice or virtue, chiefly imply the re- 
lation of our actions to men and this world. Sin and ho- 



204 LOGIC : OR, THE Paut.!!. 

liness, rather imply their relation to Cod and the other 
world. 

Natural good is that which ^ivts us pleasure or satis* 
faction. Natural evil is that which ^Ives us pain or grief; 

Happiness consists in the attainment of the highest and 
most lasting natural good. Misery consists in sufferiag 
the highest and most lasting natural evil ; that b in shoitf 
heaven or hell. 

Though this be a just account of perfect happiness and 
perfect misery, yet wheresoever pain overbalances pleas- 
ure, there is a degree of misery ; and wheresoever pleas* 
urc overbalances pain, there is a degree of happiness. 

I proceed now to lay dovm some principles and rules of 
judgment in matters of morality and religion. 

1. The will of our Maker, whether discovered by rea- 
son or revelation, carries the highest authority with it^ 
and is therefore the highest rule of duty to intelligent 
creatures ; a conformity or nonconformity to it determine! 
their actions to be morally good or evil. 

2. Whatsoever is really an immediate duty toward 
ourselves, or toward our fellow-creatures, is more remote- 
ly a duty to God ; and therefore in the practice of it we 
should have an eye to the will of God as our rule^ and to 
his glory as our end. 

3. Our wise and gracious Creator has closely united 
our duty and our happiness together ; and has connected 
sin, or vice, and punishment ; that is, he has ordained 
that the highest natural good and evil, should have a close 
connection with moral good and evil, and that both in the 
nature of things, and by his own positive appointment. 

4. Conscience should seek all due information, in or- 
der to determine what is duty, and what is sin, because 
happiness and misery depend upon it. 

5. On this account our inclination to present temporal 
good, and our aversion to present temporal evil, must be 
wisely overbalanced by the consideration of future and 
eternal good or evil, that is, happiness or misery. And 
for this reason we should not omit a duty, or commit a siD> 
to gain any temporal good, or to avoid any temporal evil. 

6. Though our natural reason in a state of innocence 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 20« 

mig^bt be sufficient to find out those duties which were 
necessary for an innocent creature, in order to abide in 
the favour of his maker, yet in a fallen state, our natural 
reason is by no means sufficient to find out all that is ne* 
cessary to restore a sinful creature to the divine favour. 

7. Therefore God hath condescended in various ages 
of mankind, to reveal to sinful men what he requires of 
them in order to their restoration, and has appointed in 
his word some peculiar matters of fuitli and practice, in 
order to their salvation. This is calicd revealed religion, 
Mthe things knowable concerning God and our duty by 
the light of nature are called natural religion. 

8. There are also many parts of morality and natural* 
religion, or many natural duties relating to God, to our- 
selves, and to our neighbours, which would be exceeding 
difficult and tedious for the bulk of mankind to find out 
and determine by natural reason ; therefore it has pleased 
God, in his sacred book of divine reA'elation, to express the 
most necessiary duties of this kind in a very plain and easy 
manner, and make them intelligible to souls of the lowest 
capacity ; or they may be very easily derived thence by 
the use of reason. 

9. As there are some duties much more necessary, 
and more important than others are, so every duty re- 
quires our application to understand and practice it in 
proporti<Jn to its necessity and importance. 

10. Where tv/o duties seem to stand in opposition to 
each other, and we cannot practice both, the leSs must 
give way to the greater, and the omission of the less is 
not sinful. So ceremonial laws give way to moral : God 
^11 have mercy and not sacrifice, 

11. In duties of natural religion, we may judge of the 
different degrees of their necessity and iniportance by rea- 
^n, according to their greater or more apparent tendency 
to the honor of God, and the good of men : But in mat- 
ters of revealed religion, it is only divine revelation can 
certainly inform us what is most necessary and most im- 
portant ; yet we may be assisted also in that search by the 
exercises of reason. 

12. In actions wherein there tt\^7 b^ %^ti\^ v^xv^V^ 
^^wrf/jet/m/ oriawfulnessof iVvem.vi^ ^\vq\3\^ <Nnrw^ 

S " V. 



206 LOGIC : OR| THE Paet II 

always the safest Mdcy and abstain as far as we can froc 
the practice of things whose lawfnlness we suspect. 

13. Points of the greatest importance in human fiA 
or in religion, are generally the most evident) both in thi 
nature of ihingSy and in the word of God ; and, wbcr 
]K)int8 of &ith or practice are exceeding difficult to fin 
out, they cannot be exceeding important. Tbisproposi 
tion may be proved by the goodness and faithfulness c 
God, as well as by experience and observation. 

14. In some of the outward practices and forms of re 
ligion, as well as human aifairs, there b frequently a prca 
ent necessity of speedy action one way or another i Ii 
§uch a case, having surveyed arguments on both sides* a 
far as our time and circumstances admit» we must gtddi 
our practice by those reasons which appear most proba 
blc, and seem at that time to overbalance the rest ; jt 
always reserving room to admit farther light and evi 
flcnce^ when such occurrences return again. It ia a pre 
ponderation of circumstantial argument that must detei 
inine our actions in a thousand occurrences. 

15. We may also determine upon probable argument 
'Where the matter is of small consequence, and would nc 
answer the trouble of seeking after certainty. Life am 
time ai*e more precious than to have a large share of then 
laid out in scrupulous inquiries^ whether smoaking lobac 
CO, or wearing a periwig be lawful or not. 

1 6. In affairs of greater importance, and which ma; 
have a long, lasting, and extensive influence on our futun 
conduct or happiness, we shoujd not take up with proba 
bilities, if certainty may be attained. Where there is an) 
doubt on the mind in such cases, we should call in the as 
ai^tance of all manner of circumstances, reason?, motives 
consequences on all sides : We must wait longer, anc 
with earnest request seek human and divine advice be« 
lore we fully determine our judgment and our practice 
according to the old Roman sentence. Quod Hatuendum cm 
semely deliberandum est diu ; ^ We should be long in COB* 
sidering what we must determine once for all." 



Chap. V. 



RIGHT USE OF REASON. 
SEGT. IV. 



207 



PRIKCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMRNT IN MATTERS OF 

HUMAN PRUBENCE. 



T, 



HE great design of prudence, as distinct from 
morality and religion, is to determine and manage every 
affair with decency, and to the best advantage. 

That is decent wiiich is agreeable to our state, condi* 
tiooy or circumstancesi whether it be in behaviour, dis- 
oourac, or action. 

Tiiat is advantageous which attains the most and best 
purpoaesy and avoids the most and greatest inconveniencics. 

As there is infinite variety in the circumstances ofper- 
lons, things, actions, times and places, so we must be fur- 
nished with such general rules as are accommodable to all 
this variety by a wise judgment and discretion : For what 
is an act of consummate prudence in some times, places^ 
•od circumstances, would be consummate folly in others. 
Now these rules may be ranged in the following manner. 

1. Our regard to persons or things should be governed 
by the degrees of concernment we have with them, the 
relation we have to them, or the expectation we have 
From them. These should be the measures by which 
wc should proportion our diligence and application in any 
thing that relates to them. 

2. We should always consider whether the thing we 
pursue be attainable ; whether it be worthy our pursuit ; 
whether it be worthy of the degree of pursuit ; whether it 
be worthy of the means used in otxler to attain it. This 
rale is necessary both in matters of kno\VTedge, and mat- 
ters of practice. 

3. When the advantages and disadvantages, conveni- 
ences and inconvenienciesofanv action are balanced to- 

m 

gether, we must fmally determine on that side which has 
the superior weight ; and the sooner in things which are 
necessarily and speedily to be done or determined. 

4. If advantages and disadvantages in their own nature 
ate equal, then those which are most certain or likely as 
to the event should turn the scale of our judgment and 
determine our practice. 



\ 



308 LOGIC : OR, THE Part. «. 

5. Where the improbabilUies of succt-ss or advantage 
are greater than the probubilities, it is not prudent to actor 
venture, if the action may be attended with danger or loss 
equal to the proposed gain. It is proper to inquire whe- 
ther this be not the case in almost all lotteries ; for the/ 
that hold stakes will certainly secure'part to themselves; 
and only the remainder being; divided into prizes must 
render the improbabiliiy of gain to each adventurer grea- 
ter than the probability. 

6/ We should not despise nor neglect any real advan* 
tage, and abandon the pursuit of it, though we cannot at* 
tain all the advantages that we desire. This would be to 
act like children, who are fond of something which s!»ikes 1 
their fancy most, and s\illcn and regardless of^every thing 
els?, if they are not humoured in that fancy. 

7. Though a gen.-ral knowledge of things be useful in 
science and human life, yet we should content ourselves 
with a more superficial knowledge of those things which 
}iave the least rehition to our chief end and design. 

8. This rule holds ^ood also in matters of business and 
practice, as well as in matters of knowledge ; and there- 
fore we should not grasp at every thing, lest in the end 
we attain nothing. Persons that either by an inconstanqr 
of temper, or by a vain ambition, will pursue every sort 
of art and science, study and business, seldom grow ei' 
cellent in any one of them : And projectors who form . 
twenty schemes seldom use suflicient application to finish 
one of them, or make it turn to good account. 

9. Take heed of delaying and trifling amongst the 
means instead of reaching at the end. Take heed of wast- 
ing a life in mere -speculative studies, which is called to 
notion and employment : Dwell not too long in philoso- 
phical, m:ithematical, or grammatical parts of learning, 
when your chief design is law, physic, or divinity. Do not 
spend the day in gathering flowers by the way-side, lest 
night come upon you before you arrive at your journey's 
end, and then you will not reach it. 

10. Where the case and circumstances of wise and 
good men resemble our own case and circumstances, we 
way borrow a great deal of instruction toward our prudent 

conduct from their example \ 2k.^\N€\\ ^'SkVcv ^U cases WC 
may iearn much fromtheiv coiwti^^uwvw^^ «^\Vl.^v 






Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 30§ 

II. After all other rules remember thiS) that mere 
speculation in matters of human prudence can never be 
« perfect ilirector, without experience and observation. 
Wc may be content therefore in our younger years lo 
commit some unavoidable mistakes in point of prudence, 
and we shall see mistakes enough in the conduct of others, 
both which ought to be treasured up amongst our useful 
observations, in order to teach us better judgment in time 
CO come. Sometimes the mistakes, imprudencies, and 
follies, which ourselves or others have been guilty of, give 
m brighter and mor« elfectual lessons of prudence, than 
the wisest counsels and the fuirest examples could ever 
have done. 



SECT. V. 

VBINCIVLIS AND RULES OF JUDGMliyT IN MATTERS OP 

HUMAN TESTIMONY. 



T 



HE evidence of human testimony is not so 
proper to lead us into the knowledge of the essence and in^ 
vard nature of things, as to acquaint us with the existence 
of things, and to inform us of matters of fact both past and 
present. And though there be a great deal of fallibility 
in the testimony of men, yet there are some things we 
may be almost as certain of as that the sun shines, or that 
five twenties make an hundred. Who is there at London 
that knows any thing of the world, but believes there is 
such a city as Paris in France ; that the Pope dwells at 
Rome ; that Julius Cxsar was an emperor, or that Luther 
bad a great hand in the reformation ? 

If we observe the following rules, we may arrive at 
such a certainty in many things of human testimony, an 
that it is morally impossible we should be deceived, that 
is, we may obtain a moral certainty. 

L Let us consider whether the thing reported be in itself 
possible ; if not, it )^an never be credible, whosoever relates it. 

S. Consider fa/ther whether it be probable, whether 
(here are any concurring circumstances to prove it; bcsid*) 



. J 



310 LOGIC: OR, THE PaetIL 

the mere testimony of the person that relates it. I confest^ 
if these last conditions are wanting, the thing may be truci 
but then it ought to have the stronger testimony to sop* 
port it. 

3. Consider whether the person that relates it be capa- 
ble of knowing the truth : Whether he be a skilful judge 
in such matters, if it be a business of art, or a nice ap- 
pearance in nature, or some curious experiment in philo- 
sophy. But if it be a mere occurrence in life, a plain, sen- 
sible matter of fact, it is enough to enquire whether he 
vrho relates it were an eye or ear-witness, or whether he' 
himself had it only by hearsay, or can trace it up to the 
original. 

4. Consider whether the narrator be honest and faith* 
ful', as well as skilful : Whether he has no bias upon hh 
mind, no peculiar gahi or profit by believing or reporting 
it, no interest or principle which might warp his own be- 
lief aside from truth ; or which might tempt him to pre- 
varicate, to speak falsely, or to give a representation a little 
dliferent from the naked truth of things. In short, 
whether there be no occasion of suspicion concerning his ] 
report. 

5. Consider whether several persons agree together in 
the report of this matter; and if so, then whether those 
persons who joined together in their testimony might not 
be supposed to combine together in a falsehood. Whether 
they are persons of suilicient skill, probity and credit. It 
might be also inquired, whether they are of different na* 
tion 6, sects, parties, opinions, or interests. For t he more- 
divided they are in all these, the more likely is their re- 
port to be true, if they agree together in their account of 
the same thing ; and especially if they persist in it witfaoet 
wavering, 

6. Consider farther, whether the report were capable . 
of being easily refuted at first if it had not been true ; if lOj 
this confirms the testimony. 

7. Inquire yet again, whether there has been a constant, 
uniform tradition and belief of this matter, from the very 
first age or time when the thing was transacted) without 
my reasonable doubts or contnidictionn. Or^ 



lukF. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 31 1 

8. If any part of it hath been doubted by any consider- 
tble persons, whether it has been searched out and after- 
rards confirmed, by having all the scruples and doubts re* 
noved. In either of these cases the testimony becomes 
nore firm and credible. 

9. Inquire on the other hand, whether there are any 
:onsiderable objections remaining against thebelief of that 
>roposition so attested. Whether there be any thing very 
mprobable in the thing itself. Whether any concurrent 
ircumstances seem to oppose it. Whether any person or 
lersons give a positive and plain testimony against it. 
yVhcther they are equally skilful and equally faithful as 
hose who assert it. Whether there be us many or more 
in number, and whether they might have any secret bias 
)r influence on them to contradict it. 

lb. Sometimes the entire silence of a thing may have 
lomething of weight toward the decision of a doubtful 
[)oint of history, or a matter of human faith, namely^ 
irhere the fact is pretended to be public, if the persons who 
irere silent about it were skilful to observe, and could not 
3in know such an occurrence ; if they were engaged by 
principles or by interest to have declaimed it : And these 
things may tend to make a matter suspicious, if it be not 
rery well attested by positive proof. 

1 i . Remember that in some reports there are more 
narks of falsehood than of truth, and in others there are 
more marks of truth than of falsehood. By a comparison 
if all these things tof^ether, and putting every argument 
30 one side and the other into the balance, we must form 
IS good a judgment as we can which side preponderates; 
ind give a strong or feeble assent or dissent, or withhold 
mr judgment entirely, according to greater or lesser evi- 
lence, according to more plain or dubious marks of truth 
NT falsehood. 

13. Observe that in matters of htiman testimony there 
A oftentimes a great mixture of truth and falsehood in the 
report itself : Some parts of the story may be perfectly 
rue, and some utterly false ; and some may have such 
i blended confusion of circumstances which are a little 
varpt a^de from the truth, aad misrepresented, that there 

« need of goo4 skill and accuracy to form a judgment 



212 LOGIC : OR, THE PartD. 

concerning theni) and determine which part is true, and 
"which is false. The whole report is not to be believed} 
because some parts are indubitably true, nor is the whole 
to be rejected, because some parts areas erident falsehoods. 

We may draw two remarkable observations from this 
section. 

Observ. I. How certain is the truth of the christian 
religion, and particularly of the resurrection of Christ, 
which is a matter of fact on which Christianity is built! 
We have almost all the concurrent evidences that can be 
derived from human testimony joining to confirm this glo- 
rious truth. The fact is not impossible ; concurrent cir- 
cumstances cast a favorable aspect on it ; It was foretold' 
by one who wrought miracles, and therefore not unlikely, 
nor unexpected ; The apostles and first disciples were eye 
and ear-witnesses, for they conversed with their risen 
Lord ; they were the most plain, honest men in themselves; 
the temptations of worldly interest did rather discourage 
tbeir belief and re^iort of it : They all agree in this matter, 
though they were men of different characters : FAarUeet 
9Sif[ fishermen^ and fiublicanaj men of Judea and GaHlccj and 
perhaps some heathena^ who were early converted : The 
thing might easily have been disproved if it were false ; 
it hath been conveyed by constant tradition and torUing 
down to our times ; those who at first doubted, were af- 
terwards convinced by certain proofs ; nor have any pre- 
tended to give any proof of the contrary, but merely de- 
nied the fact with inipudence, in opposition to all these 
evidences* 

Observ. II. How weak is the faith, which is due to a 
multitude of things in ancient human history ! For, tho' 
many of these criteria^ or marks of credibility, are found 
plainly in the more general and fiubUcfactay yet as to amul' 
titude oi fiarticular facta and circumatanceay Yrnvr deficient 
are they in such evidence as should demand our assent! 
perhaps there is nothing that ever was done in all paeft 
lages, and which was not a public fact) so well uttfs^led af 
fne reamrrcction of ChrUt^ 



Chap. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 313 

S E C T. VI. 

PRINCIPLES AND RULES OP JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OP 

DIVINE TESTIMONY. 



A 



S human testimony acquaints us with matters 
of fact, buili past and present, which lie beyond the reach 
of our personal notice ; so divine testimony is suited to 
inform us both of the nature of things, as well as matters 
of fact, and of things future, as well as present or past. 

Whatsoever is dictated to us by God himself, or by men 
who are divinely inspired, must be believed with full as- 
surance. Reason demands us to believe whatsoever di- 
Tine revelation dictates : For God is perfectly wise, and 
cannot be deceived ; he is faithful and good, and will not 
deceive his creatures : And when reason has found out 
the certain marks or credentials of divine testimony to be- 
long to any proposition, there remains then no farther in- 
quiry to be made, but only to fnid out the true sense and 
meaning of that which God has revealed?, for reason itself 
demands the belief of it. 

Now divine testimony or revelation requires these fol- 
lowing credentials. 

1. That the propositions or doctrines reavealed be not 
inconsistent with reason ; for intelligent creati^res can 
never be bound to believe real inconsistencies. Therefore 
wtare sure the popish doctrine of transubstuntiation is not 
s matter of divine revelation, because it is contrary to all 
our senses and our reason, even in their proper exercises. 

God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of himself, 

^ and agreeable to his own nature and divine perfections. 

Now many of these perfections are discoverable by the 

light of reason, and whatsoever is inconsistent with these 

perfections cannot be a divine revelation. 

But let it be noted, that in matters of practice towards 
our fellow-creatures, God may command us to act in a 
manner contrary to what reason would direct antecedent 
to that command. So Abraham was commanded to oficr 
np his son a sacrifice : The Israelites were ordered to 
borrow of the Egyptians without paying them, and to 
plunder and slay the iuaabitants of Canaan : Because God 




314 LOGIC: OR, THE Part 11 

has a sovereign right to all things, and can >vith equ'u 
dispossess his creatures of life, and every thing which \ 
has given them, and especially such sinful creatures i 
inunkind ; and he can appoint whom he pleases to be i\ 
instruments of this just dispossessiion or deprivation. S 
that these divine commands srre not really inconMste; 
with right reason ; for whatsoever is so cannot be b 
lieved, where that inconsistency appears. 

3. Upon the same account, the whole doctrine of re 
elation must be consistent with itself ; every part of 
must be consistent with each ether : And though in poio 
of practice latter revelation may repeal or cancel form 
laws, yet in matters of belief no latter revelation can be i 
consistent with what has been heretofore revealed. 

3. Divine revelation must be confirmed by some d 
vine and supernatural appearances, some extraordina 
sl'^ns or tokens, visions, voices, or miracles wrought, 
prophecies fulfilled. There must be some demonsu 
tions of the presence and power of God, superior to all t 
powers of nature, or the settled connections which God 
Creator has established among his creatures in this vl; 
ble world. 

4. Ifthere arc any such extraordinary snd wonder! 
appearances and operations brought to contest with, or 
oppos:^, divine revelation, there must and always will 
such a superiority on the side of that revelation which 
truly divine, as to manifest that God is there. This u 
the case when the Egyptian sorcerer contended with M 
SL's. But the wonders which Moses wrought did so 1 
transcend the powers of the magicians, as made them co 
fcas it was the finger of God. 

5. These divine appearances or attestations to revel 
tion must be either known to ourselves, by our own p( 




foregoing section. 

Some of those, who lived in the nations and a?:es whc 
miracles were wrought, were eye and c:\r wiMtiS'S 
the truth n:a\ divinity of the revelation ; but v.l- v ; ,. ii 
in these distant ages, must have them dc:i\cO (!l. m to 



. V. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 215 

it and incontestible history and tradition. We alsOy 
In these times, may see the accomplishment of some 
It prtdictions, and thereby obtain that advanta(j;e to- 
the confirmation of our Lith in divine revelation, be- 
what those persons enjoyed wiio lived when the pre- 
ns were pronounced. 
TJiere is another very considerable confirmation of 
testimony ; and that is when the doctrines tbem« 
, either on the publication or the belief of them, pro- 
supernatural effects. Such were the miraculous 
•s which "were communicated to believers in the first 
of Christianity, the conversion of the Jews or Gen- 
the amazing success of the gospel of Christ, without 
n aid, and in opposition to a thousand impediments ; 
^er in changing the hearts and lives of ignorant and 
s heathens, and wicked and profane creatures in alt 
5, and filling them with a spirit of virtue, piety and 
ess. Wheresoever persons have found this effect in 
3wn hearts, wrought by a belief of the gospel of 
t, they have a witness in themselves of the truth of ity 
>undant reason to believe it divine, 
the difference between reason and revelation, and 
it sense the latter is superior^ see more in Chap. 11. 
. and Chap. IV. direct. 6. 



SECT. VII. 

IPLES AND aULESOF JVDOINO GO«CBmvill6 THIXCS 
T, PRESENT, AND TO COMBy BY THB MERC USE O9 

kSON. 



^^ 



X HOUGH we attain the pcatcit assurance 
past and future by divine faith, and leafa many m^^ 
rfact, both past and present Ujr hnwumtmk^ yet ,^^ 
50 may in a good degree as«st «» to ««d|^ ; f 
r fact both past, present, and to cone, tjr ffc^ 

inciplcs. ^ ^ 

There is a system of bctilj|» IMM afioir 
we ourselves are apart, which via cal\ \y 
this world Uiere is a coimc #f Sttrt, o? 




■-A 



%ia ' LOGIC : OR, THE Pimr. E 

order of cautes, effiectty antecedentSf concomilJUitSf com* 
quenceS) Sec. fromwhich the author of nature doth notvaiy 
but upon, very important occasionB. 

2. Where antecedents, concomitants, uid conaequciiift 
causes and effects, ug^ and things ugnified» subjects nd 
adjuncts, are necessarily connected with each othert iM 
may infer the causes fron(^the effects, and effects froa 
causes, the antecedents from the consequents, as well li 
consequents from antecedents, &c/~and thereby be pNt1| 
certain of many things both past, present and to come^ ll 
is by this principle that astronomers can teU what day oi^ 
hour the sun ttnd moon were eclipsed five hundred, ycapl 
ago, and predict all future eclipses as long as the woM 
shall stand. They can tell precisely at what minuteAl 
sun rises or sets at Pekin in China, or what altitude thi 
dop:*star had at midnight or nad*noon in Rome on the di|i 
when Julias Csesar was slain. Gardeners upon the sans 
principle can foretell the months when every plant willbs 
in !)Ioom, :\nd the ploughman knows the weeks of harvests 
We are siiiv, if there be a chicken, there was an egg : U 
there be a rainbow, we are certain it rains not far off: U 
we behold a tree growing on the earth, we know it has 
naturally a root under ground. 

3. Where there is a necessary connection between can* 
ses and cflects, antecedents and consequents, signs and 
things signified, we know also that like causes will have 
like effects, and proportionable causes will have propo^ 
tionable effects, conti*ary causes will have contrary effects; 
and observing men may form many judgments by the 
rules of similitude and proportion, where the causesi et 
fects, &c. are not entirely the same. 

4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain coo* 
nection between antecedents, concomitants and* consfr 
quents, we can give but a conjecture, or a probable deter 
mination. If the clouds gather, or the weather glass unks 
we suppose it will be rain. If a man spit blood frequenti] 
with coughing, we suppose his lungs are hurt : If Terj 
dangerous symptoms ai>pear, we expect his death. 

5. Where causes operate freely, with a liberty of in 
didcrence to this or the contr^iry, there we canuot certain 
]y know what the effects, will be : For it seems lo bs ooo 



iChap. V. IIIGHT USE OF REASON. JIT 

dngent, and the certain knowledge of it bcloiign only to 
God. This is the case in the greatest pai t of human actions. 
I 5. Yet wise men by a just observuiion of human nature, 
: vili give very probable conjectures in this mutter, also 
concerning things past, or things i'uturc, because human 
nature in all ages and nations has such a conformity to 
itsjf. By a knowledge of the tempers of men, and their 
present circumstances, wc may be able to give u happy 
guess what their conduct will be, and what will be the 
event} by an observation of the like cases in former times. 
This made the Emperor Marcus Amonius to say, <^fiy 
looking back into history, and considering the fate and rev- 
.«hitions of governments, you will be able to form a guesi> 
pud almost prophecy upon the future. For things past, 
preitfit, and to come, are strangely un'.form, and of a col- 
our; and are cpmmonly cast in the same mould. So that 
Upon the matter, forty years of human life may serve for 
a sample of ten thousands." Collier's Antonius, Book 
Vll. sec. 50. 

7. There arc also some other principles of judging con- 
cerning the past actions of men in former ages, besides 
bookii histories and traditions, which are the mediums of 
QOATeying human testimony ; as we muy infer the skill 
vid magnificence of the ancients by some fragments of 
their statuesi and ruins of their buildings. We know 
What Roman legions came into Great Britain by numbers 
nf bricks dug out of the earth in some parts of the island, 
%ith the marks of some particular legion upon them, which 
iQust have been employed there in brick-making. We rec* 
tify Bome mistakes in history by statues, coins, old altars, 
titenaits of war, &c. Weconfirm and disprove some pre- 
tended traditions and historical writings, by medals, ima- 
s, pictures, urns, &^. 

Thus I have gone through all those particular objects 
1^ our judgment which I first proposed, and h.ive luid 
dtfwn pnnciples and rules by which we muy s.;fcJy conduct 
rsftlves therein. There is a varietv ol other objects, 
concerning which we are occasio:!r>r.y called to pass a 
'jodgnient, namely, the chiiracters of persons^the \-Ar\^ and 
vmth of things, the sense and meaning of p<{! ticu^iii* v%Ti* 
Icrsy matters of wit> oratory, poesy^ tiiAtievs of c^^vx'vv^ v^ 

T 



.- ^r^-^^ 



9I« 





]X2GlCi,OR,Tl{C 



Pwtil 



judicial ccmrttf tniitt^rs of tnfikr and comnerce bcMip 
man and man which wcmld be endksaa to cnimieQale^q 
But if the g;eneral and apccial mlea of judgncnt whid 
have been mentioned m theae two laal cMptem arBttnUfi 
ured up in the mindf and wfovght iQta the Teij tciopcM 
our aoub in our younger ^eara, they wiH laf m fimndaiin 
for just and reguhir judgment concerning a tbouaand apa 
cial oGCurrencea in the religioiia> civil ancLJi^mBd life# 



■-■/■' 






.'51 



T H E 

€]^trtr Pan of ilo0tc. 



OF REASONING AND SYLLOGISM. 



A 



S the first work of the mind is perception, 
ivbereby our ideas are formed, nnd the second is judgment^ 
irhich joins or disjoins our ideas and forms a proposition, 
10 the third operation of the mind is reasoning, which joins 
BCTcral propositions together, and makes a syllogism, that 
is, an argument whereby we are wont to infer something that 
U less known, from truths which are more evident. 

In treating of this subject) let us consider more partic- 
\i1ar]y, 

1- The nature of a syllogism, and the parti •f which it it composed. 

9- The several kinds q£ syllogisms, wiih particular rules relating to 
them 

^. The doctrine of sophisms, or false reasoning, together \v iih the 
means of avoiding them, and the manner of solving or answer- 
ing them. 

*• Some generaUules to direct our reasoning. 



CHAP. I. 

: OPTHE.NATURE OF A SYLLOGISM. AND THE PARTS 
, OF WHICH IT IS COMPOSED. 

• T 

XF the mere percention and comparison of two 
Ideas would always shew uswhether they agree or disagree ; 
^henali rational propositions would be matters of intelli- 
(tncci or first priaciples, and there would be no use q£ 



■ ■ / ■ 



890 '^^XO&IC : OR, THE PjiaxT 

Teasoningy or dnnrtni^^'vti jr conMqjweficet . It b theip 
rownessofthe human miiid which introduces the ncccttif 
of rtasoninp^/ When wc are unable to judge of the tn|A 
or falsehood of a proposition in an immediate manncTi k 
the mere contemplation of its subject and predicatift^ « 
are then conatfained to .iise^.niedlum« and tp compai 
each of thelh with some thirtl itTea»that by seeing howl 
they agree or disagree with it, we may be able to fail^ 
]how far they a$;r€e «r disagree among themsclrca i M% 
there are twoHnes'/A nhd^D^^inli*! know not wheth 
they are equal or not, I take a third line C| or an incbf ai 
apply it. to e^ch of them ; Jf it agreje with them botb|tlN 
I infer that A and B are equal : but if it agree with ap 
and not with t)ie other, then I conclude A andJI u^ ■ 
equal: If it ogreie with neither of^theoii there can be I 
comparison. 

> So if the question be Vfhrther Godmuti ke w^rMj^fltii^i 
seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a Creator} and aafi 

Our Creator mutt he worMhifi/ied ; 

God is our Creator ; 

Therefore God nnixt be worMfified^ 

The comparison of this third idea with (he two diatiw 
parts of the question, usually requires two propodtioa 
\vhich arc called the premises:; The third proposiufl 
which is drawn from them is the conclusion, wherein ii 
question itself is answered, and the subject and predicat 
joined either in the negative or the affirmative. 

7'he foundation of all affirmative conclusions is laid I 
this general truth, that as far as two proposed ideas agit 
'() any third idea, they agree also among themselves^ Tl 
rharacter of Creator agrees to God, and worship agrees! 
a Creator^ therefore worship agrees to God. 

The foundation of nil negative conclusions is this, tbi 
v/Iierc one of the two proposed ideas agrees with the tbii 
idea, and the other disagrees with it, they snust needis <B 
pgree so far also with one another ; as, if no sinners art k^ 
fiv, and ilangeUare happy ^ then ungda are not sinners. 

Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion oi 
syllogism : It is a sentence or argument made up of thr 
])ropoBitiona ao disposed, as that the last is necessarily i 
f erred from those which go before^ as in the nst^QC 
^v'iich have been just mentioned.' 




RIGHT USE OF KEASON. 



he malter of which a ayllogisni is made up, is thi-ee . 
r prapDsitionB ; and i best; three propoBilions are made v.p 
of iliree ideas or terms vjriov.Bly joined. 
The (iircc (crins arc called the i-cmolc matter of a aylla- 
' giim ; and ths three propositions the proxime or itnme- 
date matter o( it. 

The three terms are named the m;ijor, the minor, and 
the middle. 

The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term, 
because it is generally of a Urger extension than the mi- 
r DOT term) or the subject. The mujor and minor terms 
I iKCAlled the extremes. 

The middle term is the third idea invented, and dispos- 
cd in two propositions, in such a manner as to shew ths 
connection between the major and minor term in the con- 
' elusion ; for which reason the middle term itself is some- 
times called the argument. 

That proposition which contains the predicate of the 

conclusion connected with the middle term, is usually cal- 

\hA\^t major firofioaiiiin, whereas the minor jirofloiilion 

connects the middle term with the suliject of tlic conclu- 

: Bon, and is sametimes called the astum/uion. 

f Note-.-.This cx.Kt distinction of thessveral parts of a 

I vllogiam, andof the major and minor terms connected 

with the middle term in the major and minor propdsilions, 

docs chiefly belong to simple or categorical syllo^ismt, of 

which we shall speak in the next chaptur, though all syl> 

kgiams whatever have something aniilo[;ical to it. 

Note fiirther, That the major proposiiion is generally 
placed Erst, and the minor second, and the conclusion in 
ue last pidce, where the syllogism is regularly composed 
tod represented. 

The form of a tyllo;;iim is the framing and disposing 

oTthe premises accorrling to art or just principles of rea- 

■oning, and the ruguLr inference of the conclusicn from 

Ihem. 

' The act of reasoning, or inferring one thing from arotli- 

' cr, is generally expressed and known by the pyniclo ifn-n- 

ArCfWben the argument is lorm^d according to the nilc« 

T 2 



^ , 



22% '■'.' LOGIC: OR, THE ^ PAmr 

of arl ; though, in commoD Asooune or wniiniCf 
eau9al particles as/or, dccawc^ manifeat the act of re 
ing aa well aa the illative parttclca ihen and iker^ 
And wheresoever anjr of theae words are used* ther 
perfect syllogism expressed or implied, though pei 
the three propositiona do not appear, or arc not plao 
regular form. 



CHAP. II. 

OF TffB TARIPUS KINDS OF SYLLOGISMS^ V 
9AHTIfjJLAIt RULES RELATING TO THEM 



s 



SYLLOGISMS are diiided into various k 
either according to the question which is proved by t 
accoixling to the nature and composition of thcm» oi 
cs^rding to the middle terni) which is used to prove 
question. 

SECT. L 

OP U.VJVElisAT. AND rARTICULAR 8TLL06ISMS| 2 
>*£CATIVE AND AFFIRMATIVE. 



A 



CCORDING to the question which is 
proved, so syllogisms are divided into universal affi 
tive, t^niversal neg;ative, particular affirmative, and pi 
ular negative. This is often called a division of syllog 
drawn from the conclusion ; for so many sorts of coi 
sions there may bei wliich arc marked with the let 
A, E, I, O. 

In an uniirersal affirmstive syllogism, one idea is pr 
universally to agree with another^ and may be univer 
stifirmed of it| ast JSvery ain dearrue* deaths every unta 
%tfM u 9in i therefore every unlawful vfUh de$erve9 d 

In an universal negative syllogisroi one idea is pr 
to disagree vitb another idea universally, aod maj 



Ohap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 933 

thus denied of it : as, J^o injustice can be pleasing to God ; 
tUfiersecutionJbr the sake of conscience is injustice ; there- 
ibre, no persecution for conscience sake can be pleasing to 
God. 

Particular affirmative, and particular negative syllo- 
gisms, may be easily understood by what is said of uni- 
Tersals, and there will be sufficient examples given of all 
these in the next section. 

The general principle upon which these universal and 
particular syllogisms are founded, is this, Whatsoever is 
affirmed or denied universally of any idea, may bt iiffirm* 
ed or denied of all the particular kinds of beings which are 
contained in the extension of that universal idea. So the 
desert of death is affirmed universally of sin, and an un- 
lawful wish is one particular kind of 8in9 therefore the de- 
sert of death may be affirmed concerning an unlawful 
tvish. And so of the rest. 

Note...«In the doctrine of syllogisms, a singular and an 
Indefinite proposition are ranked among universals, as was 
before observed ki the doctrine of propositions. 

SECT. II. 

OF PLAIK, SIMPLI SYLLOGISMS, A9D THEIR. BULBS. 

X HE next division of syllogisms is into single 
vid compound. ThiKs is drawn from the nature and com*? 
poshion of them. 

Single syllogisms are made up of three propositions : 
Poinpound syllogisms contain more than three proposi- 
^8, and may be formed into two or more syllogisms. 

Single syllogisms, for distinction's sake, may be divided 
^nto simple,* complex, and conjunctive. 

Those are properly called simple or categorical syllor 
S^ms, which are made up of three plain, single, or cate- 
^rical propositions, wherein the middle term is evidently 

■ 

*Ai ideas and propositions are divided into single and compound, 
^ single art subdivided into simple and complex ; so there arc tft9 
AUnf 4ivisi9Bi and subdivisions applied to syllogismi. 



934 






i' * 



and rcigdkrif joined iHCfa one part t)f the qneHhm^ 
inajor pnyovthm^ and "With tb« other iki the tt 
whetioe there feUoira a ptain aitif le coiufhiaiiMi'; Us 
ry human virtue i9 to be 9Wtght wttk diHgence f - --" - 
a human virtue / XhtrttofttfirudetUeU to he 
gently. 

Note....Thoiigh the termi Of propoiitkina majr be 
plex I yet where the composition of the whole ai 
u th«a> plain, aimplei and rtgnlari it is prbpeHf 
almpteajFllo^niY aifce the complexion does not 
the ayllojlfaiticibrni of k/ 

SimidteiiyllogiamB have several rules bolonpnff to 
which hetajHMitv^y will gen^lly secure ua mm 
lnferenc<j^.JfiitiH^^ rules bein^ founded oA four jp 
al axiomifl Hyfe t fts ary to mtntioiiRhese ffxtoau h^K*^i 
handt for the use of thosre who will enter into the specdb^ 
live reason of all these rules. 

Axiom I . Particular proposiuons are contuned in ani* 
versalsy and may be inferred from them ; but univemti 
are not contained in particulars, nor can be inferred firoB 
them. 

Axioms. In all universal propositions, the subject ii 
pariiculur. 

Axiom S. In all affirmative propositions, the pre&iW 
has no greater extension than the subject ; for its exiea- 
slon is restrained by the subject, ahd therefore it Is *!" 
ways to be esteemed as a particular idea. It ia by mere 
accident, if it ever be taken universally, and cannot hap* 
pen but in such universal or singular propositipns as ate 
reciprocal. 

Axiom 4. The predicate of a negative proposition i* 
always taken universally, for in its whole extenrion it ^ 
dented of the subject ; If we say, No stone is vegetable 
we deny all sorts of vegetation concerning stones. 

The rules of nmfile^ regular Syllogisms are these. 

Rule I. The middle term mu9t not be taken tvnceftMi 
iiailarlyy but onceat leant universally. For if the middle trrn 
betaken for two different parts or kinds of the same nnivet 
aal idea; then the subject of the conclusion is comparpi 



AP. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 335 

h one of these parts, and llie predicate with another part, 
, this will never shew whether that siilijcct and pr».»di- 
i agree or disagree : There will then be four distinct 
nsin the syllogism, and the two parts of the question 
I not be compared with the same third idea ; as if I 
, Some men are pious, and some men arc robbers, I 
never iwfcr that some robbers are ]>ious, for the middle 
n men being taken twice particularly, it is not the 
le men who are spoken of in the major and minor pi op- 
ions- ' 
^ulc II. The term in the concluaion must never be taken 
'e vmv0rsaUij than they are in the firemiset. The rea- 
ls derived from the first axiom, that generals can nev- 
>e inferred from particulafs. 

^ule III. Ji negative conclusion cannot be proved by 
^affirmative firemisea. For, when two terms of the con- 
sion are united or agree to the middle'term, it dots not 
ow by no means that they disagree with one another. 
Rule IV. If one of the premi%ea be negative^ the con* 
fion must be negative. For, if the middle term be deni- 
of either part of the conclusion, it may sliew that the 
msofthe conclusion disagree, but it can never shew 
t they agree. 

ilule V. If either of the firemises be negative^ the con* 
iion must be fiartictilar. This may be proved for the 
St part from the first axiom. 

These two last rt//^« are sometimes united in this single 
itence, The conclusion always follovjs the weaker part of 
firendses. Now negatives and particulars are counted 
srior to affirmative and universals. 
iiule VI. From two negative firemises nothing can be 
eluded. ' For they separate the middle term both from 
subject and .predicate of the conclusion ; and when two 
as disagree to a third, we cannot infer that they either 
'ee or disagree with each other. 

ITet where the negation is a part of the middle term, the 
> premises may look like negatives according to the 
rds, but one of them is affirmative in sense : as. JV/tat 
' no thought cannot reason ; !)Ut a worm has 7io thought ; 
refore a worm cannot reason. The minor proposition 
:s really afiirm the middle term concerning the subject. 



226 LOGIC: OR, THE Pai 

namely, « worm hat no thou^ht^ and thus it is prope 
this syllogisni an afHrmativc proposition. 

Rule VII. From t%90 fiarticular ftremhes^ nothh 
be concluded. This rule depends chiefly on the fii'st i 

A more laborious and accurate proof of these rule 
the derivation of every part of them in all possible 
from the foregoing axioms, require so much time, a 
of so little importance to assist the right use of t 
that it is needless to insist longer upon them here 
nil this done ingeniously in the Logic culled the 
Thinkings Part III. Chap. 111. \:fc. 



SECT. II L 

or THE MODES AND FIGUB|CS OF SIM?L£ 8YLL0C 



S 



IMPLE syllogisms arc adorned and sur 
ed in the common books of logic with a variety of 
tions about moods and figures, \« herein, by the ai 
contexture of the letters A, E, I, and O, men have c 
ored to transform logic, or the art of reasoning, into 
of mechanism, and to teach b^ys to syllogise, or fra 
gumcntsand refute thenr^ without any real inward 
edge of the question. Tljis is almost in the same r 
as school-boys ha\e been taught perhaps in their 
years to compose Latin verses, that is, by certain 
and squares, with a variety of letters in them, whe] 
counting every sixth, seventh, or eij^hth letter, 
I^atin words should be framed in the form of hexa 
or pentameters ; and this may Ije done by thos 
i^now nothing of Luiin or of verses. 

I confess some of these logical subtiltics have 
more use than those versifying tables, and there is 
ingenuity discovered in determining the precise r 
of syllogisms that may be formed in every figure, ai 
ing the reasons of tlicm ; yet the light of nature, 
judgment, and due consideration of things, tend n 
tr^ic reasonini;, than all the trappings of moods and { 




ijbp. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 22/ 

But lest this book be charged with too great defects and 
parfeclions, it may be profxer to give short hints of that 
ich some iogiciafia have spent so much time and paper 
>n. 

\11 the possible compositions of three of the lettersi Ay 
I, O, to make three propositions^ amount to sixty -four ; 
fifty-four of them are excluded from forming true syl- 
isms by the seven rules in the foregoing section : The 
naining ten are variously diversified by figures and 
ods into fourteen syllogisms. 

The figure of a syllogism is the proper disposition of 
middle term with the pans of the question. ^ 
\ mood is the regular determination of propositions ac- 
ding to their quantity and quality, that iSt their univer- 
or particular affirmation or negation ; which arc -sig- 
ed by certain artificial words whtrtin the consonants 
neglected} and these four vowels, A, E, I, O, arc only 
;arded. 

There are generally cotmted three figures, 
in the first of them the middle term is the subject of 
major proposition, and the predicate of the minor, 
is contains four moods, called Barbara^ Celarenty Dariij 
'''to. And it is the excellency of this figure, that all 
ts of questions or conclusions may be proved by it| 
ether A, E, I, or O, that i^ universal or parliculary 
rmative or negative ; asj 

Bicrr- Every wicked man is truly miserable •• 
ba^ All tyrants are wicked men / 
ra. Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable. 
Cr- He that is always in fear is not happy ; 
la" Covetous men are always in fear ; 
*cnt. Therefore covetous men are not happy. 
Dq" Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us : 
ri* Some afilictions further our salvation ; 
/• Thcrefore^some afllictions arc good for us. 
Fe- Nothing that must be repelited of is truly desira- 
ble ; 
n- Some pleasures must be repented of ; 
6. Therefore there are some pleasures which are ao^ 
truly desirable. 



238 LOGIC : OR, THE Pakt III. 

In the second figure the middle term is the predicate of 
both the premises ; this contains lour moods, namely, CV« 
Murcy Camestres^ Featinoy Baroco, and.it admits only of ne- 
gative conclusions ; as, 

CV- No liar is fit to be believed ; 

«a- Every good christian is fit to be believed ; 

rc' Therefore no good Christian is a liar. 

The reader may easily form examples of the rest. 

The 3d figure requires that the middle term be the sub- 
ject of both the premises. It has six moods, namely, Da- 
rapti, Felapton, Dlsamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison : And 
it admits only of particular conclusions ; as, 

Dtt' Whosoever loves God shall be saved ; 
ra/2- All the lovers of God have their impeifections : 
//. Therefore some who have imperfections shall be 
saved. 
1 leave the reuder to form examples of the rest. 

The moods of these three figures are comprised in four 
Latin verses. 

Barbara^ CelaretiCy Darii, Ferio^ quoque prima. 
Cesarcj Cameatrea^ Feaiino, Barocoy secundx. 
Tertia Darafiti sibi vindicat, atque Feia/Uon, 
Adjungens Diaamia^ Datiai^ Bocardrf^ Feriaon, 

The special rules of thtPlhree figures are these. 

In the first figure the major proposition must always be 
universal and the minor affirmative. 

In the second figure also the major must be universal ; 
dnd one of the. premises, together with the conclusioo, 
must be negative. 

In the thiid figure the minor must be affirmative, and 
the conclusion always pariioular. , 

There is also a fourth figure, wherein the middle term 
is predicated in the major proposition, and sul>jected in the 
minor : But this is a very indirect and oblique manner of 
concluding, and is neveAised in the sciences, nor in hu- 
man life, and therefore I call it useless.—^Some logicians 
will allow it to be nothin.o: else but a mere inversion of the 
first figure ; the moods of it, namely Barali/itotty or Bar' 
barij CalenCea^ Dibatia^ FeafiamOf Frcsiaom, are not worthy 
to be esplsSntid by one example* 



/ ■ 

1 



Chap. IL RIGHTIJSE OF REASON. 229 

SECT. IV. 

OF COMPLEX SYLLOGISMS. 



I 



T is not the mere use of complex terms in a 
syllogism that gives it t+jis name, though one of the terms 
. is us^ually complex ; but those are properly called comfilex 
iyllogUma, in which the middle term is not connected with 
the whole subject, or the whole predicate in two diltinct 
propositions, but isintermingled and compared with thcim 
by parts, or in a more coVifused manner, in different forms 
of speech ; as, 

77ie sun is a senseless being ; 

The Persians %vorsIiifified the sun j 

Therefore the Persians worshi/ified a senseless being. 

Here the predicate of the conclusion is ivorshi/i/ied « 
*emelcss beings part of which is joined with the middle 
term sun in tlie major proposition, and the other part in 
\ht minor. 

Though this sort of argument is confessed to be entan- 
gled or confused, and irregular, if examined by the rules 
tf simple syllogisms ; yet there are a great variety of 
arguments used in books of learning, and in common life^ 
M'hose consequence is strong and evident, and which muht 
be ranked under this head ; as, 

I. Exclusive propositions will form a complex argu- 
ment ; as, Pious men are the only favorites of heaven ; True 
Christians are favorites of heaven ; Therefore true Chris^ 
tians are pious men^ Or thus. Hypocrites are not pious men ; 
Therefore hypocrites are not favorites of heaven, 

II. Exceptive propositions will muke such complex 
syllogisms ; as, Mine but physicians came to the consulta-* 
tion ; The nurse is no physician ; Therefore the rn^rsc came 
not to the consultation, 

III. Or, comparative propositions; tls^ Knowledge 19 
better than riches ; virtue is better than knowledge ; there* 
fore virtue is better than riches. O r t Inis , ji dove will fly a mile 
inaminute ; A swallow flies swftcr than a dove .» Therefore a 
swallow will fly more than a mile in a minute, 

IV. Or inceptive »nd desitive proposiiiofis i as^ The 

U 



238 LOGIC: OR, THE ^AUTilf. 

4:onc]usion with one of the premises is expressed while 
the other is supposed and reserved in the mind^ 1 husj 
lliere is no :rue religlo2i. without good morals ; therefore a 
knave cannot be truly religious : Or thus, it ia our duty to 
love »ur neighbor as ourselves ; therefore there are butfevf 
vfho fierjbrm their duty. 

Note. ...This is the most common sort of argument 
amongst mankind both in writing and in speaking ; for 
it would take up too much time, and too much retard the 
discourse to draw out all our arguments in mood and fig» 
ure. Besides, mankind love to have so much complimeiit 
paid to their understandings, as to suppose that they know 
the major or minor, which is suppressed and implied) 
vrhen you pronounce the other premise and the coucla- 
sion. 

If there beany debate about this argument, the syllo- 
gism must be compleUd,iii order to try its force and good*- 
oess, by adding the absent propositions. 



<y 



SECT. VII. 

D? THE flrrODLS TEUMS, OF COlltfO^r PLACEil OH T0P»C8) 
AND INVENTION OF AR'GTJMEKTS. 

X HE next division of syllogisms is according to 
the middle term, which is made use of in the proof of the 
proposition. Now the middle term (as we have hinted 
before) is often called argument, because the force of tbe 
syllogism depends upon it. We must make a little delay 
here to treat briefly of the doctrine of topics, or places 
whence middle terms or arguments are drawn. 

All arts and sciences have some general subjects which 
belong to them, which are called topics, or common-pla- 
ces ; because middle terms are borrowed, and arguments 
derived from thera for the proof of the various proposi- 
tions which we have occasion to discourse of. The top- 
ics of grammar are etymology, noun, verb, construction, 
signification, &c. The topics of logic are genus, species 
difference^ property, definition, division, kz, Th( 



CflAP. ri. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 3^1 

. The truth of most of the&e complex syllogisms may also 
bt made to appear, if needful, by reducing them either to 
jregular, simple syllogisms, or to some of the conjunctive 
' syllogisms which are described in the next section. I will 
■five an instance only in the first, and leave the rest to ex- 
ercise the ingenuity of the reader. 

The first argument may be reduced to a syllogistp i;i 
•Barbara, thus ; 

JTte 9un 18 a senaeleaa being ; 

What the Persiana worahifi/ied ia the aun ; 

Therefore what the Fcraiana worahi/t/ied is a aenaeieaa 
beings 
Though the conclusive force of this argument is evidently 
without this reduction. 

SECT. V. 

OF CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. 



i 
I- 



X HOSE are called conjunctive syllogiama wherein 
^neof tlii {)remisc3> namely, the major, has distinct partsi 
x?hich are joined by a ConjunctiGa; or some such particle 
«f speech. Most times the major or minofj or b^jfej are 
explicitly compound propositions ; and generally the tGAr^ 
jor proposition is made up of two distinct parts or propo- 
sitions, in such a manner as that, by the assertion of one in 
the minor, the other is either asserted or denied in the 
conclusion : Or, by the denial of one in the minor, the 
other is either asserted or denied in the conclusion. It is 
hardly possible indeed to fit any short definition to include 
all the kinds of them ; but the chief amongst them are the 
conditional syllogism, the disjunctive, the relative, and 
the connective. 

I. The conditional, or hypothetical syllogism, is that 
whose major or minor, or both, are conditional proposi- 
tions ; as, If there be a GotL the world is governed by firov* 
idence ; but there ia a God ; therefore the world ia gov em" 
ed by firovidence. 

These syllogisms admit two sorts of true argumenta- 
tion, where the major is condluon^Y* 



5M . . LOGIC : DR, THE 

T. When the antecedeiit ^ asserted in the 
the consequent may be asserted in the conclu 
is the preceding eacample^ This is ^lled argw 
/tuition of the antecedent to ihe ftoution qfthe co 

S. When the. consequent is contradicted in 
proposidon« that the antecedent may be con 
the conclusion ; aiSf J^fjftktiitM are in ike Hg 
vnnid exi»to without a cause : but the noorld dc 
without a €au9e ; therefore jfiheiots are nor \ 
TIds is called arguing^m the removing ofthi 
to the remcming qfthe antecedent*. 

To remore the antecedent or consequent hei 
inerelj sighiff -the denial of it, but the contrad 
for the mere denial ofit by a contrary proposit 
make a true syllogism, as appears thus : If evi 
he reaMonabiCi every brute i> reaeonable ; but no i 
oonbhie ; therefore no creature is reasonable. 
you say in the minor, but every brute is not reait 
*it would follow truly in the conclusior>, tber 
creature is not reasonable. 

When the ftntcccdent or consequent are ne 
positions, they are removed by an a^ii>*rt; ve ; 
be no God J then the fOorli d'^rrriot discover creati 
but the Vforlil ^^^ discover creating vtisdom ; the 
it a bod. In this instance the consequent is i 
contradicted In the minor, that (he antecedent i 
traclicted in the conchision. So in this argu 
Paul, 1 Cor. XV. If the dead rise not, C/irisi di 
but Christ did not die in vain ; therefore the dea 

There are also two sorts of false arguing, n 
From the remorving of the antecedent to the remc 
consequent s (2.) or, From (he fiosition of the con 
thefiosftion of the antecedent. Examples of thcs 
framed ; as, 

( 1 .) If a minister were a firince he must be hon 
a minister is not a firince ; therefore he must not i 

(2.) If a minister were a firince he must be hon 
a minister must be honoured ; therefore he is a/. 

Who sees not the ridiculous falsehood of botl 
[ogi^ms ? 

Obs: rv, J IT the subject of the antecedent a 



Chap. 11. RIGHT USE OF KEASON. 333 

sequent be the same, then the hypothetical syllogism 
may be turned into a categorical one ; as, If Cxaar be a 
king he must be honoured ; But C^sar h a king : therefore 
(5*0. This may be changed thus, Every king must be hori' 
tred ; but Caaar i« a king ; therefore, t5^r. 

Obterv. II. If the major praposilion only be condi- 
tional, the conclusion is categorical ; But if the minor or 
both be conditional, the conclusion is also conditional ; asi 
The worthi/i/iers of images are idolaters ; If the Pafiista 
vnrthi/i a crucijix they are nvorshififiers of an image ; 
therefore, If thePafiists worsM/i a crucifix they are idoia* 
Urs, But this sort of syllogisms should be avoided as 
much as possible in disputation, because they greatly em- 
barrass u cause : The syllogisms, >vhose major only is 
hypothetical, are very frequent, and used with great ad- 
vantage. 

' II. A disjunctive syllogism, is when the major prop- 
osition is disjunctive ; as. The earth moves in a circle or cnt 
elli/tsis ; but it does not move in a circle ; therefore it moven 
in an elttfisift, 

A distinctive syllogism may have many members oi^ 
parts ; thus, // is cither sflriitgy summer^ autumn^ or tvinter ; 
but it is not sftringy nutumn or %vinter ; therefore it is 5U7;> 
ner. 

The true method of arguing here^ is/rom the asseriion 
tfone to the denial of the rest^ or from the denial of one or 
more to the assertion of what remains ; but the major should 
be so framed, that the several parts of it chnnot be true 
together, though one of them is evidently true. / 

III. A relative syllogism requires the major pi'oposi" 
lion to be relative ; as, JVhere Christ is, there shaU his ser* 
vants be ; but Christ is in heaven ; therefore his servants 
^ali be there also. Or, ^-Is is the ca/itain ^o are his sol- 
diers ; but the ca/itain is a coward ; therefore his soldiert 
are so too. 

Arguments that relate to tho doctrine of proporiion 
must be referred lo this head ; as, ^is txvo are tr/fr-rr so are 
three to six ; but txvo make the half qf four ,• thereioro 
ihree make the half of six. 

Besides these, there is another sort of sy'iogism w^ich 
J3 Tcry nutura) and common, and yet authors tal.o y^i y 



» 



:^34 LOGIC 1 OR, THE'?^ I^t^^ 

little notice of k, call it by an imtmper namcf and- del 
crib'c it very dtfectivelf $ and that i«« 

IV. A connective syilogifm. Thiay some have callei 
copulaUve ;- but it does by no means require the major li 
be a copulative nor a compound proposition (accordngt 
the definition given of it| Part II. chap. II. sec. 6|)^i 
requires that two or more ideas be so connected eitberit 
the complex subject or predicate of the major, that if on 
of them be affirmed or denied in the minor, commof 
sense will naturally shew us what will be the cpnstf 
quetkce. It would l^e very tedious and useless to fiaou 
particular rules abaut them, as will appear by .the folknr 
ing examples, which are very Yarious,and yet may.b^fil^ 
I her multiplied. 

(1.) AleckniMM €md humiiiiy uMmyM go together / Mbm 
tvM a man of meckne*9 ; therefore Mi^e9 fpoo aUo kumhhi 
Or we may form this minori P/taraoh wom no humble numi 
therefore he was not meek. 

(2.) Mt man can iorve God and mammon ; the cove* 
tons man serves manvnon ; therefore he cannot serve God. 
Or, the minor may run thus, The true Chistian serves God', 
therefore hi' does not serve mammon, 

(3 ) GenitLs must Join ^viih study to make a great man i 
I'lorino has genius but he cannot study ; therefore FloniA 
will never he a great man. Or thus, Quintiu studies hard^ 
i}Ut hasno genius ; therefore Quintiis willnever beagreat man 

(4.) Gulo cannot make a dinner nviihout JUsh and Jish i 
ilicre vfas no fish to be gotten tO'day ; therefore Gulo rA« 
day cannot make a dinner, 

(5.) London and Paris are in different latitudes ; tk 
latitude of London is S\\ degrees ; therefore thU cannot bt 
the latitude qf Paris ^ 

(6.) The father and the son are of equal stature ; th 
father is six Jeet high y therefore the son is six feet high a!s€ 

(7.) Jose/ih and Benjamin had one mat her ; Pachel im 
the mother of Joseph ; therefore ^he was Benjanun*e moth 
er Coo, 

(8.) Pride is inconsistent with innocence ; Angels hav 
innocence ; therefore they have no/iride. Or thus. Devil 
have firide ; therefore they have not innocmte. 

I might multiply other instances 4>f these connectivi 
iyUogijimS} by bringing in if I aorts of exceptivci ezalvdvi 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 23,^ 

comparative) and modal propositions, into the composi- 
tion of them ; for all these may be wrought into conjunc- 
tive, as well as into bimple syllogisms, and thereby wc 
m^y render them complex. Bat it would waste time and 
paper without equal profit. 

Concerning these various kinds of conjunctive syllo- 
gisms, take these two observations. 

Observ. I. Most of them may be transformed into cat- 
egorical* syllogisms by those wlio have a mind to prove 
the truth of them tliat way ; or they may be easily convert- 
ed into each other by changing the forms of speech. 

Observ. II. These conjunctive syllogisms are seldom 
deficient or faulty in the form of them; for suchadefi- 
cience would be discovered at fii^t glance generally by com- 
mon reason, without any artificial rules of logic : The chief 
eare therefore is to see that the major proposition be true, 
upon which the whole iorce of the argument usually de- 
pends. 

SECT. VI. 



w 



OF COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS. 



E properly call those compound syllogisms^ 
which are made of two or more simple syllogisms, and 
may be resolved into them. The chief kind? aiw^ these ; 
Epichirema, Dilemma, Prosyllogismus, and Soiites. 

I. Epichirema is a syllogism which contains the proof 
of the major or minor, or bo,th, before it draws the conclu- 
sion. This is often used in writing, in public speeches, 
and in common conversation ; that so each part of the disr 
course may be confirmed and put out of doubt, as it moves 
on toward the conclusion which wascniefly designed. 
Take this instance. 

Sicknena may be good for us^for it weans us from the 
/lieawres ofUfe^ and makes us think of dying ; 

But ive are uneasy under sickness^ which aji/iears by our 
impatience^ cowiilaints^ groanings^ &c. 

Therefore we are uneasy sometimes under that which is 
good for us. ' 

Another instance y-ou may see in Cicero's oration in de- 
fence of Milo, who had slain ClodvxRi. Hv^xw^Yi^c Y^^^^r 
fiitioD h^ ilis^t /( h latofulfor one man to kill anothtr j^H^ ^^^^ 



iM^ LOGIC : OR, THE I 

xnent or matter of speaking : And indeed it is oi 
of sense and judgment that can use common pla< 
pics wellif for amongst thb variety he only knQ>i 
fit to be left outy as well as what is fit to be ^pokc 
. Ay some logical writers this business of topic 
v<ilmi ts treated of in such a mannert with matl 
figuWts and diagramsy filled with the barbarous 
words» Napcas, NipdS) Ropcrosi Nosropi he. t 
an ignorant lad were to be led mechanically in C( 
tificial harnesses and trammels to find out argi 
prove or refute any proposition whatsoever wii 
rational knowledge oftbe ideas. Now there is n 
throw words of contempt on such » practice ; the 
acription oi it carries reproof, and ridicule in abuv 



SECT. VIII. 

or SEVERAL KINDS OF AllGUMENTS AND DEMOKST 



W 



£ proceed now to the division of s; 
according to the middle term ; and in this paH of 
tise the syllogisms themselves are properly cal 
ments, and are thus distributed. 

I. Arguments are called gr-ammatical, meta 
physicali moral) mechanical, theological, £cc. i 
to the art, science, or subject, whence the middl 
topic is borrowed. Thus, if we prove that no m; 
steal from his neighbour, because the scripture 
this is a theological argument : If we prove it 
laws of the land, it is political ; but if we pro^ 
the principles of reason and equity, the argument 

II. Arguments are either certain and evident, 
ful and merely probable. 

Probable arguments, are those whoie conclu 
proved by some probable mediums ; as, This hili 
d church-yardf or ajidd qf batticj because there are 
man hontM found here. This is not a certain argu 



lan bones n/ight have btcu conv«}.ccl there some ollu 
• 

^videni and cei lain argumcnis arc called dcmonsuiij 
5 ; for ilicy prove their conclusions Ijv clear medium' 
undoubt'.-d principles ; and ihvy arc gqiierally divided 
these t no t>orts. 

. Demonstrations a /n'or/, ^viiich prove the effect by 
lecessary cause ;■ as 1 prove t^e scripture ta infalUUy 
, because it is the loovd of Hod vjht canvol iir, 
. Demonstations a fiosteriorif which infer the cause 
(I its necessary c fleet ; as, 1 infer there hath been the 
i of some artificer hcre^ becaust; I find a curious eit^iney 
I infer there is a Goilyfrom the ^oc^rka of his rjlsdom i?i 
vibible world, 

'he last of these is called demofisiratio tou oti^ because 
"oves only the existence of a thinp; ;' the first is named 
onatatio tou diotiy beoause it shews also the cause of 
tence. 

ut wo/r, That though these two sorts of arguments are 
peculiarly called demonatrationa^ yet generally any 
g and convincing argument obtains that name ; audit 
' custom of mathematicians to call their arguments 
istrationsy from what medium soever they derive 

Arguments are divided into artificial mnd inani- 

irtificial argument is taken from the nature and 

stances of the things ; and if the argument be 

it produces a natural certainty ; as> Tht world wa^ 

•ated by Gody because nothing can create iiaelf 

rtificial argument, is the testimony of another, and 

\llcd original, when our information proceeds im- 

y from the pei*sons concerned, or from eye or ear 

\ of a fact : It is called tradition when it is deliv- 

he report of others. 

u'c taken notice before, that testimony is (hither 

iiuman. If the human testimony bu strong, ic 

I moral certainty ; but divine testimony produ- 

L'rnntural certainty, which is far superior. 

\iguments taken from human tesiimony, as 

ni laws and rules of equitv, are called m»c^V % 

W 



^i6 LOGIC ; OK, TllL PAai liXI 

sides in every member, which is but the same thing L i 
other words. Or, it'a Papist should pretend to prove thsa 
/i/* rtUgiGTi is the only cachclic rcii^on ; und /* dtrived/ro 9\ 
Chrut and his apoitlcSy because it agrees with the doctrine « 
«// the fathers of the churchy all the holy martyrs^ and all t^ 
Christian ivorld thro:if;hout all ages : Whereas this is i%rn 
grcut point in contest, whether their religion does agr^i 
with thut of £ill \})c ancient and the primiiivc Christians 
or not. 

111. That sort of fallacv which is called a circle, is ve« 
ry near akin to the /iciitio /irinci/ui ; as when one of tlie 
premises in a syl!o»];'sm is questioned and opposed, and 
we ii:tend to prove it by ihc conclusion : Or, when in a 
\ vAv\ of syllogisms \s e prove the last by recurring to what 
v;:;S tht: conclusion of tlie first : The Papists are famous 8t 
♦liis sort of fallacy, when they prove the scriptures to be 
ihc word of God by the auihoiity or infallible testimony 
of their cJiurch ; und wl.cn ihty arc called to shew ih-- 
JiifviUible authority of iluii* church, they pretend to prove 
it !>y the scriplurts. 

IV. Tlie next kind of sophism is called non causa pro^ 
cau-'^Uy or the uiisi^'7:atio?i rfa fals,c cause. This the Pt*"^' 
])i:ieiic philosophers w«:e guilty of continually ; whc-^ 
ilicy told us that certain beings, which they called «fl^*'fl'^' 
tirJ f'jrnis^ were the springs of colour, motion, vcgetalion> 
unci the various opcraiioas of natural beings in the ani- 
nuiteand inani male world ; when they informed us tha« 
Niilure was terribly ulViiid of a vacuum, and that this vis 
the ciiuse why the water would not fall out wf a longtuW 
if it was turned upside down : The moderns as well as the 
uLcients fall aflcn into this fjlhicy, when they positively 
nshiv^n the reasons of n^vtural appearances, without suflj- 
xient experiments to pre •': ihem. 

Asirclogers are overrun with this sort of fallacies, and 

:liey cheat the people grossly, by pretending to tell for* 

unes, and to deduce the cause of the various occurrence** 

i!i the lives of men from the varices positions of the stars 

und planets, which they call aspects. 

Wten comets and eclipses of the sun and moon are con- 
slru:'.! -o oijnify ».hc (:!*•? of princes, the rcvoIutioQ oi 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 247 

states, famine, wars and calamities of all kinds, it is a fal- 
lacy that belongs to this inink of sophims. 

There is scarce any thing more common in human life 
than this sort of human argument. If amy two accidental 
events happen to concur, one is perfectly made the cause 
of the other. I f Titius wronged his neighbour of a guinea, 
and in six months after he fell down and broke his leg, 
weak men will impute it to divine vengeance on Titius 
for his^ former injustice. This sophism was found also 
in the early days of the world : For, when holy Job was 
surroumled with uncommon miseries, his own friends in- 
ferred, that he was a most heinous criminal, and charged 
him with aggravated guilt as the cause of his calamities ; 
though God himself by a voice from heaven solved this 
uncharitable sophism, and cleared his servant Job of that 
charge. 

How frequent is it among men to impute crimes to 
wrong persons ? We too often charge that uppn the wick- 
ed contrivance aftd premeditated malice of a neighbour, 
which arose merely from ignorance, or from unguarded 
temper. And, on the oU^er hand, when we have a mind 
to excuse ourselves, we practise the same sophism,, and 
charge th^t upon our inadvertence or our ignorance, which 
perhaps was designed wickedness. What is really done 
by a. necessity of circun>stances, we sometimes, impute to^ 
choice. And again, we charge that upon necessity which 
was really desired and chosen* 

Sometimes a person acts out of judgment, in opposition 
to his inclination ; another person perhaps acts the same 
thing out of inclination, and against his judgment. It is 
hard for us to determine with assurance, what are the in- 
ward springs an4 secret causes of every man's conduct ; 
and therefore we should be cautious and slow in passing a 
judgment where the case is not exceeding evident ; and 
if we should mistake, let it rather be on the- charitable^ 
than on the censorious side. 

'it is the same sophism that changes mathematical 
learning with leading the minds of men to scepticism and 
^fidelity, and as unjustly accuses the* new philoaophy of 
paving the way to heresy and schism. Thus the reformar 
tion frotij Popery ha» been charged with the murdef ai>4 



£18 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IIL 

blood of millions, which in truth is to he imputed to the 
tyranny of the princes and the priests, who would not suf- 
fer tiie people to reform their sentiments and their prac- 
tices accoriiinij to the word of God. Thus Christianity in 
the primitive ages was char^i-d by the Heathens with all 
the calamiiies wliich belel the Roman empire, because the 
Christians renounced the heathen gods and idols. 

The way to relieve ourselves from those sophisms, ami 
to secure ourselves from the danger of falling into them, is 
an Jiontsi and diligtfnt inquiry into the real nature and 
causes of things, wilh a constant watchfulness against all 
ihose prejudices that miglit warp the judgment aside from 
truth in that inc]uiry. 

V. The next is coMcO. /aUae:a accidcntis^ or a sophism 
v/herein wc pronounce concerning the nature and essential 
properties of any subject according to something which is 
merely accidental to it. This is akin to the formor, and 
is also very frequent in human life. So if opium or the 
Peruvian bark has been used imprudently or unsuccessful- 
ly, whereby the patient has received injury, some weaker 
people absolutely pronounce against the use of the barker 
opium upon all occasions whatsoever, and are ready to call 
them poison. So wine has been the accidental occasion 
of drunkenness and quarrels ; learning and printing may 
have been the accidental cause of sedition in a atate ; the 
reading of the bible, by accident has been used to promote 
heresies or destructive errors ; and for these reasons they 
have been all pronounced evil things. Mahomet forbade 
his followers the use of wine ; the Turks discourage 
learning in their dominions ; and the Papists forbid the 
scriptures to be read by the laity. JJiit how very unreas- 
onable are thes:: inferences, and these prohibitions which 
pre built upon them. 

VI. The next sophism borders upon the former; and 
that is, when wc argue from that which is tinjc in particular 
circumstances, to prove the same thing true absolutely, 
simply and abstracjbd from all circumstances ; this is call- 
ed in the schools a eo/i/iism a dicio secundum quid ad dictum 
simfdkiter ; as, That which is bought in the shajnhlca ia eaten 

for dinner ; Ravi meat ia bought in the shambles ; therefore 
rmtf meat 19 eaten /br dinner* Or thus, Livy m^ritcs fables anfi 



Chap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 219 

imfirobabilities when he describes firodiffies and omens ; there- 
fore Livy'ii Roman history is never to be believed in any 
thing. Or thus, IViere may be some mistakes of transcribers 
in some /lart of 'the scri/itures ; therefore scri/iture alone is 
not a safe guide f^r our faith. 

This sort of sophism has its reverse also ; as when w« 
argue from that which is true simply and absolutely, to 
prove the same thing true in all particular circumstances 
whatsoever ;* as if a traitor should argue from the sixth 
commandment, IVtou shalt not kill a man^ to prove that he 
himself ought not to be hanged : Or if a madman should tell 
me, I ought not tovjiihhold his sivord from him^ because no 
nan ought to nvithhold the firoherty of another. 

These two last species of sophisms are easily solved, by 
shewing the difference betwixt things in their absolute na- 
ture, and the same things surrounded with peculiar cir- 
cumstances, and considered in regard to special times, 
places, persons and occasions ; or by shewing the differ- 
ence between a moral and a metaphysical universality, and 
that the proposition will hold good in one case, but not in 
the other. 

VII. The sophisms of composition and division come 
next to be mentioned. 

The sophism of composition, is when we infer any thing 
concerning ideas in a compound sense, which is only true 
in a divided sense. And when it is said in the gospel that 
Christ made the blind to see, and the deaf to hear, and the 
lame to walk, we ought not to infer hence that Christ 
perfomed contradictions ; byt those who were blind be- 
fore, were made to see, and those who were deaf before, 
were made to hear, &c. So when the scripture assures 
us, The worst of sinners may be saved ; it signifies only, 
that they who have been the worst of sinners may repent 
%nd be saved, not that they shall be saved in their sins. Or 
if any one should argue thus, Two and three are even and 
odd ; Five are two and three ; therefore ^v<? are even and 

* Tlijs is arguing from a moral universality, which adnnits of some 
exceptions, in the same manner as may be argued from metaphysical 
^ a natu>:il imivcrbality, which admits of no exception. 



250 LOGIC : OR, THE Part III. 

odd. I Icrc that is very falsely infen-ed conccrnini^ two and 
chree in union^ which is only true of ihem divided. 

The 90fihi8m o[ division, is when we infer the same lhin)> 
concerning ideas in a divided sense, which is only true in|v 
compound sense ; as, if we should pretend to prove that 
every soldier in the Grecian arn^y put an hundred thous- 
and Persians to flight, because the Grecian soldiers did s(h 
Or if a man should argue thus, /Vir is one n-n^iber ; Tvo 
and three arc Jive ; therefore trjo end three crt one numhvr. 

This soit of sojjhism 15 committed when the word JM 
iij taken in a collective and a dlslribii'Jve sense, withcin u 
due distinction ; as, if any one should reason thus; Aili'u''. 
7misicalinstrinut}it^''>ftfie Jerdfih tcrnj.'l" made a tv^hle ccnc^'ti ; 
The harji ivas a musical instrument of the Jcn'infh temfiU \ 
therefore //;c /;fi:r/i made a noble concerf. Here the \7o:'(! 
*/tV in ihc major is collective, whereas such a conclusion 
requires that the word M should be distribuiivc. 

It is the same fallacy when the nnivei'sal word ^^// or 
Ao refers to specie's in one proposiiion, and to individuals 
in another ; &s, Ml animals tverein .X^jaha .irk ; therefore 
J\''o animals fierhhed in the flood : Wb.ercasin \nz premise 
nli animals signifies every kind (f animal, wliich c'oc-s no*. 
exclude or deny the drowninp^ of a thousand individuals. 

V^III. The last sort of sophism arises from our abtise 
of the ambiguity of words, which is the Lir^pst r.nd inost 
extensive kind of fallacy ; and indeed several of the fiir- 
mer fallacies might be rcductrd to this h.cad. 

Wiu-n the words or phrases arc p!:ii:ily ecjuivocal. they 
arc called hofihisms oWgitivocai}j?i ; as* if wc should argiiv 
tinis : He that sends forth a book in'o th? li^h:, d. sires it to 
he read ; He that throiof* a book info Uie^fire, scnd-i it into !^t 
litfht ; therefore Jfc that thrcivs a iook into the fire desires 
it to be read. 

This sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of tbe 
like nature, arc solved by shewing the uiiTLivnt senses of 
:he words, terms or phrases. Here h\^h( in the major 
proposition Hi;rnifies the /lubHc viviv of the Kvorld \ in the 
minor it sigiafies the brlghtnas of fame and fire ; and 
lliercfore the syllogism has four tcrnis, or rather, it has no 
midJl'.! icrni, aivj pi'o: ';;s nothing. 

Bui \V'^"Y\: «iir.h .;,\\/ss vq\\\\c^C'aVvOT\s^w\?.rL\lu\;uities ap- 
pear ih i:ri'i: • •.. ^, \\\\.y*t \%\\\.\.\z v\^yv«^v;y Vil \w\\vvii\\\'>^ w^ 



Ghap. III. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 251 

on ourselves or others. The greatest danger, and which 
wc are perpetually exposed to in reasoning, is, where the 
two senses or significations of one term as near akin, and 
not plainly distiflgiiished, and yet they are really sufficient- 
ly different in their sense, to lead us into great niistiikes, 
it' we are not watchful. And indeed the greatest part of 
controversies in the sacred or civil life arise frorjfi the dif- 
ferent senses that are put npon words, and the different 
ideas which are included in them ; as have been shewn at 
large in the First Part of Logic, Chap. IV. which treats 
of words and terms. 

There is, after all these, another sort of sophisms, which 
is wont to be called on imperfect enumeraiion, or li false 
induction^ when from a few experiments or obseryations 
men infbr general theorems and universal propositions. 
But this is sufficiently noticed in the foi*egoing chapter^ 
where we treated of that sort of syllogism which is cdX- 
Itdinductioji, 



SECT. II. 

TWO GEKEKAT* TESTS OF TRUE SYLLOGISMS, AND METH- 
ODS OF SOLVING ALL SOPHISMS. 

I J ESI PES the special description of true sy]Io« 
gUms and sophisms already given, and the rules by which 
^he one are fiamed, and the other refuted, there are these 
two giiueral methods of reducing all syllogisms whatso- 
ever to a test of their truth or falsehood. 

I. The first is, that the premises must, at least impli- 
<iitly, contain the conclusion ; or thus, One cf the firem- 
*«f* tnust contain the conclusion^ and the other must shett- 
that the conclusion is contained in it. The reason of this 
rula is this ; when any proposition is offered to be proved 
it is necessary to find another proposKion which confirms 
it, which may be called the containing proposition ; but 
because the second must not contaia the first in an express 



J5J LOGIC : OR, THE Paut lil. 

• 
jnanner. and in the same words,* therefore it is necessary 

tliat a third or osten si veproposilion be found out,to shew that 
the second proposition contains the first,which wasto be pro- 
ved. Let us make an experimentof tfiis syllogism : Whonc^ 
cveriaa t/avetohia naturalinclinationismUtrable ; l^hexvickcd 
7?ia?i is a slave to his natural inclination ; therefore The 
nvicked Tnan ia miaeral/k. Plere it is evident that the ma- 
jor proposition contains the conclusion ; for, under the 
general character of a slave to natural inclinations, a wick- 
ed man is contained or induded ; and the minor proposi- 
tion declares it ; whence the conclusion is evidently dedu- 
ced, that the wicked man is miserable. 

In many affirmative syllogisms wc may suppose either 
the major or the minor to contain the conclusion, and the 
other to shew it ; for there is no great difference. But in 
negative syllogisms it is the negative proposition that con- 
tains the conclusion^and the affirmative proposition shews it; 
as Every vnae man masters his fiassions ; No angry man 
masters his passions ; therefore No angry man is wise. 
Here it is more natural to suppose the minor to be the 
contained proposition ; it is the minor implicitly denies 
wisdom concerning an angry man, because masterinji^ the 
passions is included in wisdom, and the major shews it. 

Note....This rule may be applied to complex and con- 
junctive, as well as simple syllogisms, and is adapted to 
shew the truth or falsehood of any of them. 

II. The second is this ; Jsthe terms in every syllogism ah 
usually repeated twice^ so they must bs taken precisely in the 
same sense in both places : For the greatest part of mis- 
takes that arise ift forming syllogisms, is derived <from 
some little difference in the sense of one of the terms in 
the two parts of tlie syllogism wiierein it is used. Let us 
consider the following sophisms. 

1 . It is a sin to kill a man ; A murderer ia a man ; 
therefore It is a sin to kill a murderer* Here the word 



* It is confessed that conditional and disjunctive majir propesi- 
tion^o expressly contain all that is in the conclusioa ; but then it is 
tiot in a certain and conclusive ncianner, but only in a dubioas form of 

speech, and mingled wUYi o^eTX«tnv^\ ^xv^ \3EAi«Care it is not the 

ffame express propoftltioQ. 



cbap. in. 



RIGHT USE OF REASON. 



253 



kill in the first proposition sit^ifics to kill unjustljr, nv 
without law ; in the conclusion it is taken absolutely fur 
putting a man to death in general, and therefore the in- 
ference Is not good. 

3. Whai I anif you are not ; but / am a man ; therefore 
You are not a man. This is a relative syllogism : But if 
it be reduced to a regular categorical form, it will appear 
there is ambiguity h) the terms, thus ; Uliat lam, U d man: 
You are not what I ami ; therefore you are not a man. Here 
vfhat lam in the major proposition is taken sfiecially ibr 
my nature ; but in the minor proposition the same w^rds 
are taken individually for my person ; therefore the infer-' 
tnce must be false, for the syllogism does not take the 
term Vfhat lam both times in the same sense. 

3. He that aaya you are an animal, says true $ but He 
Oku says you are a goose says you arc an animal ; therefore 
Ht that says you are a goosey says true. In the major prop* 
ration the word animal is the predicate of an accidental 
proposition ; which accidental proposition being aflirma- 
tiTe, renders the predicate of It particular, according to 
chap. II. sec. 2. axiom 3. and consequently the word afi" 
^»ff/ there signifies only human animality. In the minor 
proposition the word animal^ for the same reason, signi- 
fies the anfina/zVy of a goose ; whereby it becomes an am- 
figwma term, and unfit to build the conclusion upon. Or 
^f you say, the word animal in the minor is taken for hu* 
"■on ammality, then tlie minor is evidently false. 

It is from this last general test of syllogisms that wo 
derive the custom of the respondent in answering the ar* 
K^tnents of the opponent, which is to distinguish upon the 
%ajor or minor proposition, and declare which terra is 
^ed in two senses, and in what sense the proposition 
^Vf be true, and in what sense it is false. 



354 LOGIC s OR, THE ^ P*»t IK - 

CHAP. IV, 

« a 

SOME GENERAL RULES TO DIRECT OUR RE^ASOIIIK^^ 



M. 



'OST of the general and special directiofsis 
given to form our judgment aright in the preceding part 
of logic might be rcl.earsed here ; for the judgment^ 
-which we pass upon things are generally built on tome 
secret reasoning or argument by which the proposiUoh i» 
siipposed to be proved. But there may be yet lome fiir- 
then assistance given to our reasoning powers in their 
search after truths and an observatioo of the foUowiog 
rules will be of great importance for that end. 

RuLB L << Accustom yourselves to clear and distinct 
kleas, to evident propositions, to strong and convincing a^ 
);^ui'ncnts." Converse much with those friends, and those 
books, and those parts of learning, where you meet vith 
the greatest clearness of thought, and force of reasoiuDg- 
The mathematical sciences, and particularly arithmetic, 
l^comotry, and mechanics, abound with these advantages: 
And if there were nothing valuable in them for the uses of 
human life, yet (he very s|>eculaJtive parts of this sort of 
learning are well worth our study ; for by perpetual cx» 
rumples they teach us to conceive with clearness, to ooo- 
iKct our ideas and propositions in a train of dependence, to 
reason with strength and demonstration, and to distinguiik , 
bc'tv^'ccn truth and falsehood. Something of these scien- 
ces should be studied by every man who pretends to learn* 
ing, and that, as Mr. Locke expresses it, not so much to 
make us malhem.utici«ns, as to make us reasooable cret' 
tui'es. 

We shouki gain such a famJliarity with evidentie of per* 
ception and foice of reasoning,- and get sisch a habit of 
flisccrning clear truths^ that the mind may be soon offen- 
ded with obscurity and confu&ion : Then we shall, as it 
were, naturally and with ease restrain our minds from 
rash judgment, before we attain just evidence of the prop* 
osition which is offere4 to us \ and we sh«ll with Sb# 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF RKASON. C35 

same ease, and, as it were naturally, seize and embrace ev- 
ery irulh Ihat is proposed with just tuclcnce. 

The habit of conceiving clearly, of judging justly, and 
of reasoning well, is not to be attained merely by the hap- 
piness of constittilion, the brightness of genius, the best 
natural parts, or the best collection of logical precepts : it 
is custom and practice that must form and estublibh this 
Iiabit. We must apply ourselves to it tiil we peiform all 
this readily, and without reflecting on rules. A coherent 
thinker and a strict reasoneris not to be made ut once by 
a set of rules, any more than a good painter or musician 
■may be formed extempore, by an excellent lecture on mu- 
sic or painting. It is of intinite importance therefore in 
our younger years to be taught both the value and th.e 
practice of conceiving clearly and rea&oninj> right : Foi", 
when we are grown up to the michile of life, or past it, it 1% 
ro wonder that we should not learn good reasoning, any 
more than that an i^;nori>nt clown should not be able to 
learn fine language, dancing, or a courtly behavior, when 
his ntstic airs have grown up with him tiil the age of fort/, 
i'or want of this care, some persons of rank and educa« 
lion dwell all their days among obscure ideas ; they 
conceive and judge always in confusion ; they take 
weak arguments for demonstt*ation ; they are led away 
with the dijguises and shadows of truth. Now, if sucii 
persons happen to have a bright imagination, a volubility 
of speech, and a copiousness of language, they not only 
impose many errors upon their own understandings, but 
tbey stamp the image of their own mistakes, upon their 
neighbors also, and spread their errors abroad. 

it is a matter of just lamentation and pity, to consider 
the weakness of the common multitude of mankind in thi;i 
respect, how they receive any thing into their assent upon 
the most tiifling grmnids. True reasoning hath very lit- 
tle share in forming their opinions. They resist the most 
convincing arguments by an obstinate adherence to thei*.' 
prejudices, and believe the most improbable things with 
the greatest assurance. Thuy talk of the abstrusest mys- 
teries, and determine upon them witii the utmost confi- 
dence, and without just evidence eilh«^r from reason or 



^56 LOGIC : ORi THE FAKTlIt. 

revelation. A confuses] heap of dark end inconustent ideast 
make up « goM part of their kjiowledge in matters of phU 
losophy as well as reli^4:ion, having never been taught the 
use and value of clear and Just reasoning. 

Yet It must be still coiiCessed that there are tame niys« 
teries in religion^ both natural and revealedy as well as 
<somc abstruse points in phik>sophy« wherein the wise as 
>veli as the unwise must be content with obscure ideas. 
There are several thingS) especially^ relating to the invisi* 
ble world, vhich are tinscarchable in our present staieittOfl 
•r here fore we mustbciie%*e what revelation plainly dictateSf 
though the ideas may be obscure. Reason itself demands 
th.is of us ; but we should seek for the brightest ^evidence 
hoiU of the ideas, and of (fie connexion qf tbems whereso- 
x'\iv it is attuinuble. 

Hi?LK IJ. «^ Enlarge your general acquaintance iHth 
O.iin^s daily, in oi*i{er to attain a ricN furniture oft<^icS}Or 
:iiid<ilc terms, whereby those propositions which occur 
luay be cither proved or disproved ; but especially mtdi- 
-late and inquire witii great diligence and exactness into 
ibe nature, pi^operties, circumstances, and relations of the 
])articular subject about which you judge or argue.** 
Vunsiiler Its cutises, effects, consequences^ adjuncts» cqipO' 
^iies, signs, &cc. so far as is needful to your present ptt^ 
po^. You should survey a question round about* and on 
oil sides, and extend your views as far as possible to every 
thing that has a connexion with it. This practice Ms 
;iiany advantaj^es in it ; as, ^ 

1 . It will be a means to suggest to your mind proper 
to\nc^ for argument about any proposition that relates to 
Mie same subject. 

3. It will enable you with greater readiness and justness of 
Thought to give an answer to any sudden question upon 
iliat subject, whether it arises in your own ndnd, oris pro* 
posed by others. 

3. This will instruct you to give a plainer and speedi* 
er solution of any difficulties that may attend the theme 
of your discourse, and to refute the objections of those who 
have espoused a contrary opinion. 

4. By such a large survey of the whole subject in all its 
properties and relationsi yon will be better secured from 



Chap. IV. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 257 

inconsistencies, that is, from assening or denying any thing 
in oiY^ place, which contradicts what you have asserted oi' 
denied in another : And to attain these ends, an exten* 
siveness of understandings and a large memory, are of un- 
speakable service. 

One would be ready to wonder sometimes how caiily 
great, wise, and jeamed men are led into assertions in 
some parts of the same treatise, which arc found to be 
scarce consistent with what they have asserted in other 
pluccs : But the true reason is, the narrowness of the mind 
of man, that it cannot take in all the innumerable proper*- 
tics and relations of one subject wiih a single view ; and 
therefore, whilst they are intent on one particular part of 
their theme, they bend all their force of thought to prove 
or disprove some proposition that relates to that part, 
without attention to the consequences which may ilow 
from it, and which may unhappily affect another part of 
the same subject ; and by this mean they are sonietime^i 
led to say things which afe inconsistent. In such a case, 
the great dealers in dispute and controversy take pleasure 
to oust nonsense and self-contradiction on thtir antagonist, 
with huge and hateful reproaches. For my p:Art, I rather 
choose to pity human nature, whose necessary narrowness 
of understanding exposes us ail to some degrees of thiy 
frailty. But the most extensive survey possible of our 
whole subject is the best remedy Agitinst i^. It is our 
ju^ingand arguing upon a partial view of thinp:^, that ex- 
poses us, to mistakes, and pushes us into absurdities, or at 
least to the very borders of them. 

RuLK III. •" In searching the knowledge of things, al- 
ways keep the precise point of the present question in 
four eye. Take heed that you add npthinnj to it while 
you arc arguing, nor omit any part of it." Watch care- 
fully lest any new idea? slide in to mingle themselves eith- 
er with the subject or the predicate. See that tlie ques- 
tion be not altered by the ambiguity of any word taken in 
different senses ; nor let any secrot. prejudices of your own, 
■or the sophistical arts of others, cheat your understanding-; 
by changing the question^ or shuflling in any thing el^.c 
iiii its room. 



2iQ ' LOGIC ; OR, THE Paet III. 

And fur this end it U useful to keep the precise matter 
of InqAiiry as sfmfitc as may be, and disengaged from a com* 
plicaiion of ideasy which do not necessarily belong to it. 
Hy admitting a complication of ideas, and taking too many 
tilings at once into one question, the mind is sometimes 
dazzled and bewildered ; and the truth is lost in such a va* 
ritfy and cofifusion of ideas ; whereas, by limiting and 
narrowing the question, you take a fuller survey of the 
whole of it. 

By keeping the whole point of inquiry in our constant 
view, we shall be secured from stidden, rash, and imper- 
tinent responses and determinations, which some have ob^ 
iruded instead of solutions and solid answers, before they 
perfectly knew the questions. 

Rule IV. " When you have exactly considered the 
precise point of inquiry, or what is unknown in the question, 
then consider what and how much you know already of 
this questioHi or of the ideas and terms of which it is com- 
posed/' It is by a comparison of the known and unknown 
parts of the question together that you find what reference 
the part kpown hath unto, or what connexion it hath with 
the thing that is sought : Those ideas, wliereby the 
known and unknown parts of the question are connected, 
•will furnish you with middle terms or arguments where- 
by the thing proposed may be proved or disproved. 

In this part of your work, namely, compaiing ideas to- 
gether, take due time, and be not too h^sty to come to ade- 
termit^ation, especially in points oi importance^ Some 
men, Vhen they see a littie agreement or disagreement 
between ideas, they presume a $^reat deal, and so jump in- 
to thq conclusion : This is a short way to fancy, opinion 
and conceit, but a most unsafe and uncertain way to true 
^knowledge and wisdom. 

Rule V. " In choosing your middle terms or argu- 
ments to prove any question, always take such topics as 
are surest, and least fallible, and which carry the greatest 
evidence and strength with them.'* Be not so solicitous 
;abottt the number, as the weight of your arguments, espe- 
cially in proving any proposition which admits of natural 
certainty, or of complete demonstration. Many times 
WP do injury to a cause by dwelling upon Irifiinj; 



. Chap. IV. RI GHT USE OF REASON. 25t 

ari^menta.^ Wc amuse our heareri with uncerlulniles, 
by multiplying the number of feeble reftsoningSt before we 
mentioa those which are more substantial, conclusive, and 
convincing. And too often we yield up our assent to mei-e 
probable arguments, where certain proofs may be obtained. 

Yet it must be confessed, there are many cases wherein 
the growing numbers of probable arguments increases the 
degree of probability, and gives a great and sufficient con- 
firmation to the truth which is sought ; as, 

(1.) When we are enquiring the true sense of any word 
or f hrase, we are more confirmed in the signification of it, 
by finding the same expression so used in several authors^ 
or in several places of the same author. 

(3.) When we are searching out the true meaning or 
opinion of any writer, or inquiring into any sacred doc- 
trine of scripture, we come to a surer determination of the 
truth by several distinct places wherein the same thing is 
expressed or plainly implied ; because it is not oo probable 
that an honest skilful reader should mistake the meaning 
of the writer in many places, as he may in one or two. 

(3.) When we would prove the importance of any scrip- 
^ral doctrine or duty, the multitude of texts wherein it is 
repeated and inculcated upon the reader, seems naturally 
to instruct us that it is a matter of greater importance than 
oUier things which are but slightly or singly mentioned in 
the Bible. 

^ (4.) In searching out matters offset in times past or in 
distant places, in which case moral evidence is sufficient, 
<nd moral certainty is the utmost which can be ottainedi 
here we denve a greater assurance of the truth of it by a 
number of persons, or a multitude of circumstances con* 
curring to bear witness to it. 

(5.)I^rom many experiments in natural philosophy we 
more safely infer a general theorem, than we can form one 
or two. 

(6.) In matters which require present practice, both 
tacred and civil, we must content ourselves oftentimes 
ivith a mere preponderatioo of probable reasons or argu- 
ments* Where there are several reasons on each side, hi 



260 LOGIC: OR, TliK PartIII. 

and against a thing that is to be done or omitted, a small 
argument added to the heap may justly turn the balance 
on one side, and determine the judgment> as I have noted 
in the Second Part of La>ic. 

To conclude : A growing acquaintance with matters of 
learning, and a daily improvement of our understandings 
in affairs human and divine^ will best teach us to judge 
and distinguish in what cases the number of arguments 
udds to their weight and force : It is only experience can 
fully inform us when we must be determined by probable 
topics, and when we must seek and expect demonstrations. 

Rule VI. " Prove your conclusion (as far as possible) 
by some propositions that are in themselves more plain, 
evident, and certain, than the conclusion ; or at least such 
as ate more known, and more intelligible to the person 
whom you would convince." J.f we shall neglect this 
rule, Ave «hall endeavour to enlighten that which is ob- 
scure by something equally or more obscure, and to con- 
firm that which is doubtful by something equally or more 
uncertain. Common -sense dictates to all men, that it is 
impossible to establish any truth, and to convince others 
of it, but by something that is better k^own \d them tbaR 
that truth is. 

Rule VII. " Labour in all your arguings to enlighten 
the understanding, as well as to conquer and captivate 
the judgment." Argue in such a manner as may give a 
natural, distinct, and s^lid knowledge of things to your 
hearers, as well as to force their ae sent by a mere proof of 
the question. Now, to attain this end, the chief topic or 
medium of your demonstration should be fetched, ^ 
much as possible, from the nature of the thing to be 
proved, or from those things which arc most natui*ally con- 
nected with it. 

Geometricians sometimes break this rule without ne- 
cessity, two ways, namely, 

I . When they prove one piH)position only by shewing 
ihat absurdities will follow if the contradictory proposition 
6e supposed or admitted .: Ti^isis called Reductio cii f^bf 



CttAT. IV. TIGHT USE OF REASOJf. 9«l 

mrduTfiy^ or Demonsiraliofier imfiossitile. As, for instance^ 
When they prove ail the radii of a circle to be equal, by 
supposing cnc radius to be long^er or shorter than another, 
and then shewing what consecjutnces will follow. Thisi 
I confess^ forces the assent, but it does not enlighten the 
luind, by shewing the true reason and cause why all radii 
are equal, which is derived from the very construction of 
a circle : For, since a circle is formed by fixing one eind of 
1 straight line in the ccntrey and moving the other end 
round, (or, which is all on«, by compasses kept open to a 
certain extent,} it follows evidently that every part of the 
circumference being thus described) must be equally dis- 
tant from the centre, and therefore the JRadii which are 
lines from the centre to the circumference, must be ail 
equal. 

3. Geometricians forget this rule when they heap up 
snany far-fetched lines, figures^ and propositions to prove 
aome plain, simple, and obvious proposition. This is cair- 
ed a Demonstration fier aiiena et remotOj or an argument 
from unnatural and remote mediums : As if, in order to 
prove the radii of a circle are all equal, I should make sev- 
eral triangles and squares about the circle, and then from 
some properties and propositions of squares and triangles 
Prove that the racZ/iof a circle are equal. 

Yet it must be confessed, that sometimes such questions 
liappen, that it is hardly possible to prove them by direct 
arguments drawn from the nature of things, &c. and then 
t may not only be lawful but necessary to use indirect 
)roofs, and arguments drawn from remote mediums, or 
:rom the absurdity of the contradictory suppositions. 

Such indirect and remote arguments may also be some** 
Imes used to confirm a proposition, which has been before 
iroved by arguments more direct and immediate. 

^ Note — This rale chl«fly refers to the estalilivfament of S9me truth. 
ather thap the refutation of error. It is 2 very common and useful 
^ay of arguing, to refute a false pro|iositton. by shewing what evi- 
lent falsehood or absurdity will follow from it : For what proposition 
oever is really absurd and false, doea effectually prove that principle 
9 be false, fron: which it is derived ; so that this way of icfi:tiii|; a*: 
rror is not so asually called Reductio ad Absurdnm* 



fourtftPart ofEoffic. 



OK DISPOSITION AND METHOD. 



A.T is not merely a clsar ancl distinct idea* a wdl 
fbiined proposition, or a just argument, that is siiRicieiit 
to search out ant] communicote tlie knowledge of a subjwl. 
There must bt a variety and series of ihctn diaposetlini 
^u= rnanner, in order (o attain this end : And therefon 
it la the design of the latit pirt of Logic to leach iu0)« 
art of method. It is that must secure our tiioughts fnm 
that confusion, darkness, and mistake, ^vhich unavoidiUf 
aUend the meditations and discourse even of tlie brigbietf 
genius who despises ihe rules of it. 

!. We shall here consider the nature of method, anl 
the several kinds of it. 

II. Lay down the general tules of method, with aftt 
particulars under them. 



CHAP. I. 

OF THE NATURE OF METHOD, AN^D THE SEVEKAt- 
KINDSOFIT, NAMELY, NATURAL AND AKBITBABT, 
SYNTHETIC AND ANALYTIC. 



Mk 



1.ETH0D, taken in the largett senae, iiD- 
pUcs the placing of several things, or performing sevenl 
operations in auch an order, as is moat convenient to attua 
some end proposed : And in this sense it is applied toaH 
ibe yt9fk» of ntture mid tut, to ftU U)« dirioc aSaun pC 



lAP. I. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 365 

ealion and providence ; and to the artifices, schemes, 

ntrivances and practices of mankind, whether in natural, 

wl,or sacred affairs. 

No*, this orderly, disposition t>f things inchide? the ideas 

prior, posterior, and simultaneous; of superior, inferior, 

d equal ; of beg^inning, end, and middle, kc. nl.ith are 

scribed more particularly among the general afl'jciinns 

being, in ontology. 

Dutin logic, method is usually taken in a more limited 

ise, andthe nature of it is thus described : Mcihodi^i ' 

r diF/i097(ion qfa variety of thoughts on arty ifubject in such 

icraw may beat atrve tojind out unkno'svn truths, to'cX" 

\in and confirm truths that are known, or to fix them to 

' memory. 

It is distributed into two general kinds, namely, natural 

i arbitrary. 

Natural method is that which observes the order of na- 

'e, and proceeds in such a manner us that the knowledge) 

the things which follow depends in a grest measure on ' 

: things which go before, and this is twofold, viz, ^Mf^'^ 

•tic and analylicJ* • 

' The word analysis' has three or four senses, which it may not bs 
[>roper to take notice of here. 

.. It signifies the |^neral and particular heads of a discourse, trith 
ir mutual connexions, both co-ordinate and subr^rdinate, drawn oilt 
uvay of abstract into one or more tables, whxh ure frequently pliu> 
like an index at the beginning or end of u book. 
'• It signitics the resolving of a disconr^te in*o its various subject!! 
1 arguments, as when any writing of the anc:t:^nt >^rpphet8 is re- 
red into the prophetical, historical, docrrinnl, a^i 1 ])ractical parts 
t ; it is aaid to be analysed in general When a sentence i« dis- 
fished into the nounp, the verb?, pronouns, adverbs, ai.d oriic: par- 
is of speech, which compose it, then it is oaid to be aualy &ed gruift' 
tically- When the same sentence is distir.guishcd into subject and . 
licate, proposition, argument, act, object, cjiuse. eflecc. adjunv* 
K>site, &c. then it is analysed lOgically and tnetnphj sically. This 
r is what is chiefly meant in the theological school, when the/ 
ik of analysing a text of scdpturc. 

Analysis signifies particularly the science of algebra, wherein 
lestion beinrMTOpoaed, i>ne or morcletter.H. ns, x, y, /, or vow- 
as, a, e, 4/ltc. are made use of to signify tl^ unlcnown number^ 
icli l^if l^ii'^^^tarminCled trith several known numbers ia the ^UA&* 



2f6§ LOGIC : Or^, Tiin P.IRT 

Synthetic mer/toH is that Tvhich bcgfins with the par 
amd leads onward to«the knuwledy^ of the \Yho1e ; it 
gins with the most simple pt inciples> and general tru 
and proceeds by degrees to that vvhicii is drawn from th 
or compounded ot* them : And therefore it is called 
method of composition. 

Analytic method takes the whole compound as it fi 

it whether it be a species or an inclivicUial, and leads lis 

^ to the knowledge of i't, by resolving it into its firat prir 

pies or parts, its generic nature, and its special properiii 

si.nd therefore ilis called the method of resolution. 

As synthetic method is generally used in teaching 
5cicnces after they are invented^ so^ analytic is most pr 
tised in finding out things unknown. Though it must 
confessed that both methods are sometimes employjecl 
find out truth and to commuuFcate it. 

If wc know the parts of any subject easier and bet 
titan the whole, we consider the parts distinctly, ami 
putting them together, wc come to the knowledge ofi 
"^vholc. So in grammar wc learn first to know letters, 
join tiicm to make syllables, out of syllables we coinp< 
wor Js, and out of words we make sentences and discours 
So the physician and iipothccary knows the nature J 
powers of lus simples, namely, his drugs, his herbs, 
miiitrals, 6cc. and putting them together, and considtri 
tlieir several virtues, he finds what will be the nature i 
powers of the bolus, or any compound medicine : Thi; 
the synthetic method. 

But if we are better acquainted with the whole tl 

tfon, is at last, ty the rnlf s of art, separated or rekasci from that 
tanglcmcnt, aaJ its particiJlur value is found out by shewing its c<i 
tion or equality to sonte knawn nuriiber. 

4- It siiiiiifies anaU iic.^1 mccihd, as here explained in logic- 
•Note. It is confessed that synJhciis often begin* wi:h the ge 
and proceeds to the sf>ecJCi and individuals. But the ;^enus or ge 
jc nature is then cvnsidered or.ly as a {ih> sical or esssmial pari of 
species, thju^h it l>c lomcimcs called an universal or logical wh 
Thus syntheiic mcihnd n>ainraini its own description stiU, for it 
jin? with the yarts, and proceeds to the vrhtJ-.- ; vrhich is comp' 
of thtm- 



.CuAP. I. RIGHT USE OP REASON. t$r 

wc are with particular parts, then we divide or resolve the 
vhole into its parts, and thereby gain a disiinct knowledge; 
of them. So in virfgar life we leaifi in the ti^ross whut 
plants or minerate are $ and then by chemistry we gain; 
the knowledge of «alt» sulphur* spirit, water, earth, which 
are the principles of them. So we are first acquuinieil 
. mi\i the whole hody of an animal, anti then by anatomy or 
dissection we come to learn all the inward and outward 
parts of it. This is the analytic method. 

According to this most general and obvious idea of syn- 
thetic and analytic method, they differ from each other 
as the way which leads up from a valley to a muiiiUaia 
differs from itself, considered as it leads down from the: 
mountain to tht; valley ; or, as St. Matthew arc! St. Luke 
prove Vhrut to be rhr €<m of Mraham ; Luke finds it out 
by analysis, rising frcrn Christ to his ancestors ; Matthey 
teaches it in the synthetic method, beginning from Abra- 
ham, and shewing that Christ is found among his poster- 
ity. Therefore it is a useful thing in the sciences, • wbeu 
We have by analysis found out a truth, we u^e the synthet- 
\t method to explain and deliver it, and prove it tt> be true. 
In this easy view of things, these two kinds of method 
may be preserved conspicuously, and entirely distinct : 
But the subjects of knowledge being infinite, and the 
xvays whereby we arrive at this khowledge being almost 
infinitely various, it is very difficult, and almost impossi- 
ble, always to maintain the precise distinction between 
these two methods. 

This will appear evidently in the following observa- 
tions. 

Observ. I. The analytic method being used chiefly to 
find out things unknown, it is not limited or confined 
merely to begin with some whole subject, and proceed to 
The knowledge of its parts, but it takes its rise sometimesi 
from any single part or properly, or from any thing what- 
soever that belongs to a subject which happens (o be first 
and most easily known, and thereby inquipes into the more 
abstruse and unknown parts, properties, causes, effects, 
and modes of it, whether absolute or relative :' As, for in- 
stance. 

(1.) Analysis finds out causes by their effects. So in 
the speculative part of natural philosophy, whtiu we ob- 



368 LOGIC: OR, THE Part 1^ 

serve iii;lit, coioiirs^ motion, hardness, sofmcss, and otli* 
propcriics and powers of bodies, or any of the common i 
uncommon appetrroiKes of thinjjs, either on eurih or 
heaven, we starch out ihe causes of them. So by the v 
rious creatm*es \f e find out the Creator, and learn his ui 
«iom, power and goodness. 

(3.) It finds out eiTecls by their causes. So the pract 
cul and mechanical part of natural philosophy conddci 
such powers of moilon, as the wind, the fire, and the wate 
Sec. and then contrives what uses they may be applied t 
and %vhat will he their efFeclt, in order to make mills ur 
engines of vui^ious kinds. 

(3.) It finds out the general and special nature of 
thin^, by conhideiLng; ^hc various attributes of the indivii 
uds, and oi^Lrrviii^ what is common and what is props 
what is acculenta*, and what is essential. So by surve) 
\i\{^ the CDli'iir, the shi'.pe, mDtion, rest, place, solidity, art 
extension ot bofliet:, we come to fi:u! thut the natuve ( 
body in general is solid extension ; because all other qua 
iiies of bodies are chan^nablc ', but this belongs torn'/ be 
(lies, and it endures tliimigli all changes; a]^d becaiis 
tnis is proper to body alone, and agrees not to any thin 
i'.sc : and it is the foundation qf all other properties. 

(t.) It finds out the remaining properties or parts of 
./ning, by having some parts or properties given. So ti 
*<Area of a triangle is found by knowing the height and tl 
oase. So by having two sides and an angle of a triung 
i^ivcn, we find the remaining side and angles. So wh< 
>ve know cogitation is the prime attribute of a -spirit, v 
iiifer its immateriality, and thence its immortality. 

(5) Analysis finds the means necessary to attain a pr 
j:o:'jd erd, by havirijr the end first assigned. So in mor 
}Mj-i:i';.Tj, ecop.ouiical aftairs, having proposed the govcr 
J' ;. : n: '^:a.\ u r mily, a society, or a nation, in order 

■.:ii' j','::t irtcrcLt, v.j consider and search out what a 
; ■- nrop'j;- Unvs, rules and means to effect it. .So in t 
i^:jiCi"i':(;s oi'ariiiicers, nnniifacturers of various kinds, t 
c ii'j belli i^ proposed, as making cloth, houses, ships, Ss 
'•'J find out ways oi' ■:oni posing thor^e things for the scvt 
:il 'r*"? of human life, lint the putting any of these mea 
i:^ '::. 'T'.iiv):: to ?.:::; Uj :!*■.• r::y^^ :? •ynthtftio meth?.'!. 



CuAF. I. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 269 

Many other particulars might be represented to shew 
the various forms of analytic method, whet«by truth is 
found out) and some of them come very near to«synlhetiC)- 
so hardly as to be distinguished. 

Observ. IL Not only the investigation of truth, but the 
communication of it also, is often practised in such a me- 
thod, as neither agrees precisely to synthetic or analytic. 
Some sciences, if you coiuiidtr the whole of them in gener- 
al, are treated in synthetic order ; so {Shysics, or natural 
philosophy, begina usually with an account of the general 
nature and properties of matter or bodies, and by degrees 
descend t^consider the particular species of bodies, ' with 
their pK>wers and propenies ; yet it is very evident^ that 
\rhcn philosophers come to particular plants and animals, 
then by chemistry and anatomy they analyse or resolve 
those bodies into their several consthuent parts^ On the 
other hand, logic as begun in analytic method ; the whole 
is divided into its integral parts, according to the four 
opjerations of the mind ; yet here and there synthetic meth- 
od is used in the particular branches of it, for it treats of 
ideas in genet al ^rst, and theu descends to the several spe- 
cies of them ; it teaches how propositions are made up of 
ideas, and syllogisms, of propositiuus, ivhkh is the order 
Ci' composition. 

The ancient scholastic writers have taken a great deal 
of pains, and ^'ngaged in useless disputes, about these two 
anethodsj aiKl after alt have not been able to give such an 
account of them as to keep them entirely distinct from 
each other, neither in the theory nor in the practice. Some 
jf the modems have avoided this confusion in some mea- 
sure by confining themselves to describe almost nothing 
dse.hut the synthetic, analytic methods of gtrometilclanf> 
and algebraists, whereby they have too much narrowed 
the nature and riiles of method, as thougb every tiling:; 
!Were to be treated in mathematical forms. 

Upon the whole, I conclude that neitlTcr of these two 

methods should be too scrupulously and supersiitioiibl v 

pursued, either in the invention or in the communicaiio;! 

of knowledge. It is enough, if the order of nature*l)e but 

iobserved in making the knowledge of things following d-j,- 

j)end on the knowl^^dge of the things which go bclyre. 

Y.2 . V ■ • 



Ai'i>it:'ury mctliod ! jJive", tV.c o;\'i?r ot iiitur 

'."iiirnoviutcs iir^clf to many pMi'pojci t suca ns, 

\i\} Ihii'gSj iind retain tlivni in ir.cuiovv ; to hai 

persuade mankind to any practice in tiic relig 

cnil life ; or to dclii»l!i, luiiuse, or entertain the 

As for the ossistanre -of the mcinorvi in mc 
iiutura! order iias an happy i ill! iience ; for rcasc 
tlucinr^ one thing from another, g;reatly assists tl 
by the natural connection and mutual dependent 
But there are various ot-her methods which ma 
made use of for this purpose, and indeed there 
subjeccs that can hardly be reduced eitlu:r to 
.s/nthtsis. 

in mciln^-or wrilinj; histery, -sottt'c follow tl 
t:.: (;(n''-rnr)rs of a naUon, and dispose every 
Mndcr thiir particular rdgns : So ihe sacrei 
KinuTi and Chronicles are written. Soine wri 
o:* ioiiriials, and majie a new cha|U£rjof every yt 
pi.r ull those transactions together wlach rel 
r.iil'ject ; that is, all the affairs of one war, one i 
(.on it (Tc racy, one<ouncil> &c. tho* it lastod 
and under many rulers. 

So in writing the lives of men, which is caUed 
some authors follow the tract of their yeai«, ani 



CnJiU 1. RIGHT USE OF REASON. m 



k 



Tiaia^ the periods all begin with C. : as. Creation, Cata- 
clysm, or delngei Chaldean, Empire, Cyrus, Christ, Con- 
»tantine, Sec. Some divide their accounts of time accor- 
ciio^ to the four great monarchies ; Assyrian, Persian, 
Grecian, and Roman. Others think it serves the memo- 
ry best to divide all their subjects into the remarkable 
number of sevens t so Prideaux has written an introduc- 
tion to history. And there is a book of divinity called 
Fasiculus Contriver sariunij by an author of the same name, 
written in the same method, wherein every controversy 
has seven -qtjestions belonging to it ; though the drder of 
nature seems to be too much neglected by a confinement 
to this septenary number. 

Those writers and speakers whose chief business is to 
amuse or delight, to allure, terrify, or persuade mankind, 
do not confine themselves to any natural order, but in a 
• cryptical or hidden method adapt every thing to tlieir de- 
-signed ends. Sometimes they omit those things which 
might injure their design, or grow tedious to Jheir hcar- 
<irs, though they seem to have a necessary relation to the 
Xx>int in hand : Sometimes they add those things which 
^lave no great references to the subject, but are suited to 
Allure or refresh the mind and the ear. They dilakr 
sometimes, and flourish long upon little incidents, and they 
skip over, axid but slightly loiich the drier parts of thei? 
theme. They place the first things last, and the last 
things fii^t, with wooderous art ; and yet so manage it 
as to conceal their artifice, and lead the senses and pas- 
sions of their hearers i^ito a pleasing and |powerffil captiv- 

It is chiefly poesy and oratory that require the practice 
of this kind of arbitrary method f They omit things essen? 
tial which are not beautiful, tlvey insert little needless cir- 
<cumstaQces4 and beautiful djigressionsji they invert times 
and actionsf in order to place every thing Sn the most af- 
fecting light; and for .this cnij> in their practice they neg- 
lect all logical forms ; yet a good acquaintance with the; 
forms of logic aQ«l natural nuethod is of admirable use to 
those who would attain these arts in perfection ; hereby 
they will be able to ran^e their own thoughts in such a mc«^ 
•ipA and ^ghcqiiq as to t»kc a ipore te^ge atvj tomprehcR_ 



*- ■■■■ 



in LOGIC : OS, THI&: Past IV. 

t»ive surrey of thrir subject and 'd^p6m iniA Ihe parii' of 
it / and by this meui th^ will better judge whtt tochooot 
aiul what to refiiaet and how to dress aod manage the 
wUolt scene before tbciB) so as to attain their ^wn ends 
whU greater giery and lugccss. 



CHAP. 11. 

TH£ RUUeS OF METHOD. GENERAL AMD PARTICO^ 

LAH. 



T, 



HE general rules of true mctliod in the po^ 
nilt or communication of knowied^c» may be all compri^ 
c(l under the foUowinjc heads. It must be (I.) Safe. (2.) 
I-'lain and cosy. (3.) Vttiinci. (4.) J'\Ul or without de/ed* 
(5.) Short or without au/ierJluUy. (6.) Frofier to the nA» 
Ject and the deiign, J7.) Connected, 

Rule. I. Among all tiie qualifications of a ||;oo4 
method} there is none more necessary and important tbtn 
ihat it should be safe, and secure from errar ; and to this 
end these four particular or special directions shonid he 
iobservcd. 

I . <^ Use great care and ciixumspection in laying the 
fouodation of your discourse) or your scheme of thoughts 
upon any subject." Those pi-opositions which are to stand 
(IS Rrst principles! and on which the whole argument de- 
pcnds» must be viewed on all sides with the utmost accum* 
cy, lest an error being admitted there, should diffuse itself 
through the whole subject. i>ee therefore that your gen- 
eral definiuons or descriptions are as accurate as the na* 
ture of the tiling will bear ; See that your general dtvis* 
tons ard distributions be just and exact, according to the 
rules p:iven in the first part of logic ^ See that yo\it,axioi:u 
be sufficiently evident, so as .to demand the assent of those 
fthat examine them with due attention : See that your 
^v§x and mpr.e immediate conscqucuces from {bes^ 



iA?. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 273 

nciplcs be 'Well drawn ; tind take the same care of all 
lei' propositions that have a powerful and spreading in- 
trnce through the several parts of your discourse. 
lor want of this care, soiireiimcs a larg^ treaties has 
n written by a ion]^ deduction of consequences from 
; or two doubtfu! principles, which principles have been 
actually refmed in a few lines, and thus the whole trca- 
: has been destroyed at once : So the iar^st-and feirest 
ilding sinks and tumbles tu the j^round, if the foundation 
1 corner-stones of 4t ai*c feeble and iusulBcicnt. 
2. ^< It is a very adviseable thing that your primary and 
idamcntal propositions be not only evident aiKi tnie, but 
y should be made a little familiar to the mind by dwell- 
; upoii them before you proceed farther/' By this 
an you will gain so full an acquaintance, with them» 
t you may draw consequences from them with much 
ire freedom) with greater variety, brighter evidence, and 
:h a tirmer certainty, than if >ou have bnt a slight and 
Iden view of them. 

3.' <* As you proceed in the connexion of your argu- 
tnts, see that your ground be made fii*m in evei7 step." 
c that every link of your chain of reasoning be strong 
i good : For if but one link be fcei^Ie afid duuUfui) the 
lole chain of arguments feels the weakness of it, and lies 
posed to every objectijr, and the original question re* 
lins undetermined. 

i. " Draw up all your propositions and arguments with 
much caution, and express your ideas with r.iich a jus^ 
litation, as may preclude or tmtidpatc any objections." 
t remember this io only to be done, as far as it is possi- 
> without too much entangling the question, orintro- 
cing compiicutcd ideas, and obscuring the sense. ' But 
iuch a cautious and limited dress of the question should 
ider the ideas too much complicated, or the sense ob« 
jre, then it is better to keep the argument more simple, 
rar, and easy to be understood, and afterwards mention 
I objections distinctly in their full strength, and give a 
»tinct answer to them. 

Rule II. Let your method be plain and easy, so that 
ur hearers or readers, as well as yourself, mray nm 



?7* LOGIC : OR, TftE 

thrOBgh it without ettbtrraitoient} and may ta 
«Bdooniprtliehaiire:vieir'Af tbj Whole scheme, 
end the foUdwing-^ohiciilar directions viU beu! 

1. <^ Begin always with those' Uiinc^* whic 
known and i&oat obvtoua, vrherebf the mind m: 
diflKculty or' fittigiiei and proceed by regular 
Meps to things that are more dxfficnlt/' * Anc 
fioasible let not the understanding^ or the prooi 
yoor positkmih ' depend oa the \iosilions th«t i 
always on'thos^whieh go bcGvre.- It is a matt 
der that in' ^ knowing an ag;e as this, there sh 
many peraons otfering tiolence dally to this iruiei 
ing Uie Liitin lan^age by a grammalr written 
which method sterna to ref|iiiriB'a per&ct know! 
finfcnowntoHgue» in orderto leam' the first 
of it, 

S. « Donot effectekoessfve haste in leaminf 
ing any scienceinor hurry at once into the inicfs* 
you be too soon involved in several new and str; 
and propositions which cannot be Well unders 
out a longer and closer attention to those which ^ 
Such sort of speed is but a waste of time, aiu 
strain you to take many steps backward aq^a 
would arrive at a regtilar and complete knowlc 
«ubject« 

3. *( Be not foncf of crowding too many thoi 
reasonings into one sentence or paragraph, bcyc 
prehension or capacity of your readers or hearer 
are some persons of a good genius and a capacii 
who write and speak very obscurely upon this 
they ailect a long train of dependencies, before \ 
to a period ; they imagine that they can nevet 
page with too much sense ; but they little think 
bury their own best ideas in the crowd, and rer 
in a manner invisible and useless to the great 
mankind. Such men may be great schij|lars] 
are but poor teacliers. 

4. ^< For the same reason, aroid too many sul 
Contrive your ^heme of thoughts in such a i 
Will finish your whole argument with us fc^ 
branches as reason will admit ; and let ihcm i 



C^AP, ir. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 57^ 

are obvious and open to the understandings that they may 
be within one single view of the mind." This will not 
only assist the understanding* to receive, but it will aid the 
memory also to retain truth: Whet eas a discourse cut 
out into a vast multitude of gradual subordinations, has 
many incouTcniences in it ; it gives p^in to the mind and 
memory, in surveying and retaining the schem* of dis- 
course, and exposes the uns);ilful hearer to mingle the su- 
perior and inferior particulars together ; it leads then> in- 
to a thick wood instead ol open day -light, and places them 
in a labyrinth instead of a plain path. 

5. ** Give all cUIigence in your younger years to obtain 
a clear and easy way of expressing your conceptions, that 
your words, as last as you titter themr may stamp your 
own ideas exactly on the mind of the hearer/' This is a 
most happy talent (or the conve3^nce of truth, and an ex- 
cellent security against mistakes and needless controver- 
sies. 

RvLB III. Let your method be distinct, and without the 
perplexing mixture of things that ought to be kept sepa- 
rate, and this will be easily practised by four directions. 

I . '* Do not bring unnecessary or heterogeneous* mattcT 
into your discourse on any subject ; that is, do not mingle 
an argument on one subject witli matters that relate en«» 
tirely to another, but just so fur as is necessary to give a 
clearer knowledge of the subject in hand." Examples in 
logic may be borrowed from any of the sciences to illus- 
trate the rules ; but long interpositions of natural philoso- 
phy, of the imagination and passions, of agency of spirits 
united tb bodies, Sec. break the thread of discourse, and 
perplex the subject. ^ 

• 2. « Let every complicated theme or idea be divided 
into its distinct single parts, as far as the nature of the 
abject and your present design require it." Though 
you must not abound in needless subdivisions, yet some- 
thing of this work is very necessary ; and it is a good 
judgment alone can dictate how far to proceed in it, and 
when to stop. 

* T^inj^&of one kind are called h^o^eneons) things of different 
^inds«re Mterogeneoos. 



276 LOGIC : OR, THE Part IV. 

Compound ideas must be reduce.d to a simple form in 
order to understand them well. You may easily tnaster 
that subject ir all the parts of it by a reguiar succession, 
yhich would confound the understanding to survey them 
at once. So we come at the knowledge of a very complet- 
ed diagram in geometry, or a complicated machine in me- 
chanics, by having it parcelled out to us in its several parts 
and principles^ according to this and the foregoing rules 
of method. 

3. *< Call every idea, proposition and argument to its 
own place. Put those things all together that belong to 
one part or property, one consideration or view of your 
subjoct.'' This will prevent needless repetitions, and 
Xeep you from intermixing things which are different. 
We must maintain this distinction of things and places if 
we would be safe from error. It is confusion that leads us 
into endless mistakes, which naturally arise from a variety 
of ideas ill-joined, ill-sorted, or ill-disposed. It is one 
great use of method, tfiat a multitude of thoughts and 
propositions may be so distinctly ranged in their propor 
situations, that the mind may not be overwhelmed with a 
a confused attention to them all at once, nor be di^^tracted 
with their variety, nor be tempted to unite things which 
ought to be separated, nor to disjoin things which should 
be united. 

4. '^ In the partiiion of your discourse into distinct 
Iteacls, take hetd that youf particulars do not interfere with 
the generals, nor %vith each other." Think it is not enough 
that you make use of distinct expressions in each partic* 
Vilar, but take care that the ideas be distinct also.' It is 
mere fuolery to multiply distinct pamculars in treating of 
thin^^ where the difference of your pai*ticulars lies only in 
names and words, « 

Rule IV. The method of treating a subject should 
be plenary or full, so that nothing may be wanting ; noth- 
ing which is necessary or proper should be omitted. 

When you are called to explain a subject, do not pSss bft 
nor skip over any thing in it which is vciy difficult or 
obscure. 



p. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. U77 

Then you eniimcrate the parts or the properties of any 
ect, do it in a complete and comprehensive manner, 
/hen yoii are asserting or proving any truth, see that 
7 doubtful or disputable part of the argument be well 
)orted and confirmed. 

' you are to illustrate or argue a point of difficulty, be 
.00 scanty of words, but rather become a little copious 
diffusive in your language : Set the truth before the 
er in several lights, turn the various sides of it to view, 
der to give a fullideaandfirmevidence of the proposition, 
n^en you are drawing up a narative of any matter of 
see that no important circumstances be omitted, 
/'hen you propose the solution of any difficulty, con- 
T all the various cases wiiercin it can happen, and 
f how they may be solved. 

I short, let your enumerations, your divisions, and dis^ 
itions of things, be so accurate, that no needful idea or 
may be left out. - 

his fulness of method does not require that eveiy 
^ should be said which can be said upon any subject ; 
his would make each single science endless ; But you 
lid say every thing which is necessary to the design 
:ew, and which has a proper and direct tendency to 
end ; always proportioning the amplitude of your 
:er, and the fulness of your discourse, to your great 
^n, to the length of your time, to the convenience, de- 
t, and profit of your hearers. 

ule V. As your method must be full without dcfl« 
cy, so it must be short, or without superfluity. The 
ess of a discourse enlarges our knowledge, and the 
concerted brevity saves our time. In order to ob- 
e this rule, it will be enough to point out the chief of 
e superfluitiea or redundancies, which some persons 
guilty ot in their discourses, with a due caution against 
a. 

^ Avoid all needless rtpetitions of the same thing 
(Terent pans of your discourse.'* It must be confessed 
e are several cases wheiiin a review of some forego- 
proposition is needful to explain or provt several of tbe 
wing positions ; but let your method be so contrived, 
r as possibic; that it may occatfon the fcweittt]bk<^*«a»i^*, 

Z — 




SSS LOCIC ; on, THi: PAnrll 



aTsoFilics.imc Uiiag ; for iiis not gratttul to l!ie hearer 
viihoui evident necesnily- 

3. " Have a care of tedious prolixity, or drawing <m 
any part of your discourse to an vnneceBsary and lircsotii 
length." It is much more honourable' for an insimcto 
an orator, a pleader, or a preacher, thet his hearers sliotil 
say, I nasafraii! lie m'otiIiI hnvedone, than that they shov! 
be tempted to ahew signs of uneasiness, anil long for tl 
coticlusion. 

Bcsi(!es, there is another inconvenience ii it ; whe 
you affect to amplify on the former branches of a discoom 
you will ol't^n lay a necessity upon yourself of contraetil 
the latter nnd most useful pviris of it, and perhaps pTen 
yourself in Ihe most imporluni pan of your design. T 
iiy a preacher has been guilty of this fault in formei" d ' 
nor is the present age without some instance 
iveakncss. 

:;. Do not miilliply csptieauons r/licrc tliere hM 
ilifliculty, or darkness, or (lunger of mistake." Benot ff^ 
iit'tracinj* every word of your theme, through a!I M 
i;vammatical, the logical wnd melaphysical charailrt! 
iinj rclaiions of its nor shew your critical learnin^ii 
»[ii'eading abroad lh« Tariotis senses of a word, and il" 
various origins of ihosc senses, the eiymoTogy of unni 
the synonymous and the paronymous or kindred nana 
Uf. where the chief point ol discourse does not at all tt 
qui re ij. You would bngli at a pedant, who profesungd 
<.Npl;iin the Athana-<ian cieed, should acquaint you tU 
Aihanasius is derived from a Creek word, which stgii 
fJcEiuimorialiiyi and that the same word Atbaiiasid sigrf 
fics also the \icr\i lancj. 

There are some persons ao fand of ihuir learned dislitf 
tions, that they will shew their suUiliy hy distingutsbid 
v-heie there is no diSerentc. And the same silly aSeta 
lion will inirod'.ice distinctions tijion cvury occurnM 
find bring three or four negatives upon every sukjectl 
discourse ; first to declare what it is irot, and then w*-" 
is : Whereas such negatives ought never Wbe lacnt 
where there is n;) tipparent danger of mistake. H 
iliculons would thm writer, who, if he wcri; Bp 
lhe^ ' ilddecljre negativdy,{l.) 



ijlid?! 




11. RIGHT USE OF ri:asox. 



279 



C'l ; nor, (0) A creed wriuen by ihem ; but, (3.) 
lYcly, a creed conipobCil by several Chrisiiaii Liahops 
o^-.lber in the cily oi' Nice ? The positive is juJi- 
lierj,an:l the l\vo »e^.aivts aie iinperuueiit. 

*» I^j not fond of proving those iliin^i vvliioh need 
ooi." Snch as self-evident pioposilions uDkI iruihs 
rsally conf>-ssed, or suc!i a*i are entirely airrced lo, 
ranted by our opponents. It ii this vain aii^.ctaiio;i 
o\ing every thiiij^ th*.t has ied ireometiicians lo TuMii 
ss and intricate (lenionstraiion:* lo support some lue- 
s, uliich arc suflkkntly cvidunl lo the tyc by in- 
io') ; or to the mind by the first uK-iuiiji) oftlKni ; aad 
hw same iiumoor that rvi^^n^ soineiiiiic.t i.i u]c puipi'* 
ip.r.d) !)ali' t!ie sermon in pio\i.ii; sulik ^c^ki 1 
wiiicik ii never dibpMle.l oi uou'it'.M, «.ii. i... r.'j; ivi.-H 
iclit'iry of m -le useful iiiieri..i:.inv.iit. 

As ihcre are son^e thii.^;s ao L\idi^n».ly U':ie. that 
vv».nt v.n iiruof, so tliere arc olliers so evidently Ul^e, 
hey want no refutation. It is mere tiiljiu^, anti a 

of uur precious moments, lo invert and raise sueli 
litiHs as no nun wouki ever m..ke in earuesl, and that 
!y for the s.tkc of answeri.i^ and solviiii; them : TIuh 
-> in notoiiuusly upon tiie due bievity of method. 
** Avoid in j^encral all learned forms, all trappings ol' 
iid c;;remonies of the schools, where there i-> no need 
m.'* It is reported concerniniij the lute Czar of 
:ovy, that when he first acquainted himself wiiU muih- 
icui learnin;:^, he practised all the rules of eircuin- 
ion and contravalL.tion, arid the siei;e of a town i;i 
ii.\ ; and by the length of those formaliliwS he lost the 
•tuniiy of takinij ihj town. 

'• Do not sufilr every occasional and incidental 
rht lo carry )ou away into a lont»; parenthesis, and 
to strcicli out your discourse) and divert you fronv 
loiiil in iK.nd." In the pursuit of your subject, if any 
I t^.oup;ht occur which btlonjjsto some other themv. 
it down forllie Sake of your niemory on some otlu*- 
r, and lay it l)y in reserve for its proper place *:i»!i 
;n : but let it not incorporalt ilstli' >\i,h your pre&ti 1 
10, iK-r di\iW cfi )^>ur mir.d frcn^ \our HK.in l.usines-, 
j'h iiol'.ctild le Lwv :.'j :i.vi;*'v:. A :/.»»• '• -..o w«Iks 



i 



380 LOGIC : OR, THE Pii 

(lirecl!)- but &[n\f]y lownnl hia journey's end, wilt I 
thitlier miicli soaniir tlinn tiis nEiglibour, who runs in 
cry crooked lurnin^ whicli ha metis, and wanders ai 
gaze at everf tiling tliat stiikea hia cj-csby the wa^ 
gather every gaudy llowcr that grows by ibt: side i 
road. 

To num Hp nil : " There ia a happy medium 
observed in our mettiod, bo that ttie brevity may nc 
(ler the sense obacurc, nor the argument feeble, nc 
knowled^ merely BU]x;rficial : And, on the otiter 
tha! (lie fulriesa and copiousness of our method mt 
watte the time, tire the learner, or fill the mind wE 
Ac* andimpcriinencies.*' 

Tbe cfipions andihe contracted way of writing haTi 
(heir peculiar ndrflntnges. There is a proper uM 
made of largB paraplnuaeB, and lull, punicular, &» 
fiisive explications and argitmcnts ; tlieae are fitte 
tliose who design to he acquainted tlioroti^hly with 
jisrt of ihe subjert. Tl.ere is also an nse of shorter 
ubstracts, and compendiums, to instruct those who 
only a slight and general knowli^ge, as well as to r 
the memory of those who have learned the scicni 
VL'ndy, and gone through a large scheme. But il 
l^roES abuse of tliese various methods of Instruction, 
:> i>erson hos read a mere compendium or epitome 
■-.('tcnce, and he vainly imagines, that he undcrstani 
whole science. So one boy may become a phikts 
1>y reading over the mere dry definitions and diviu 
i'.dieil'lrr't Comfiendiitn of Pfrifiateticiam : So anothe 
LiiHKtthat he nndcrsiuflda anatomi/ because he has i 
>kt!eion i and a ihiid profess himself a learned < 
vht:i) he can repeat tlie apostles creed. 
' lluLE IV. "Take care that your method be pro 
t)ie subject in hand, proper to your present design, ■ 
:iK |)roper to the age und fitacc wherein you dwell. 

1. Let your method be proper to the subject 
sciences must not be learned or taught in one td' 
Morality and theology, metaphysics and logic, will 
tasily and happily reduced to strict mathematical m 
Those who have tried, bare found much iuoQTei 
therein. 



CiiAv. 11. IIIGIIT USE OF REASOX. 2:)i 

Some thiny^s have mere need to be cxfdaincd than to he 
proved ; as uxiomS) or self-evident propobiiiuns ; und irt- 
deed a:l the first great priucipIeSf the chief and niostini' 
portiuit dccirijies both of nuuirai and revcultd relij;ion ; 
ior when the svnse of them is clearly explained, they ap- 
pear so e>ic!ent in the li^iit of nature or scripture, thut 
ihcy want no other proof. There are other tijin^^s that 
Ciland in need olproof, as well us c.n plication, as nuuiy math- 
exnaticl theorems, lind sevtrul c!ct p contio\e»bits in mo- 
r4iliiy and di\i:.ity. Iheru are yet cthtr sorts of suhjtct.-i 
whicli wunt rather to bw wurmly impressed upon the mind 
by fervent exiiortatlons, anJ ^.tand in more need of this than 
thtry do tith'wr of proof or cxplicalion ; such arc the mosc 
general, plain and obvious duties of picly towards God, and 
love towards men, with the governments of all our incli- 
nalions and passioiu. Now these several subjects oujhc 
to be treated in a cliirurent manner and method. 
^ A{^ain there are some subjects in the same treatise 
^ which are more useful and necessary than others, and some 
purts of a subject which arc eminently and chitlly design- 
ed by- a writer or speaker : True methoil willteach us to 
cv%'cll longer upon these themes, and to lay out more 
thought and labour upon them ; whereas the same art of 
method will teach us to cut short those things which arc 
t used only to introduce our main subject, and to stand as 
scaUolding merely to aid the structure of our di:>col:r^)e. 
It will teach us also to content ourselves with brief hiot.'; 
of those matters which are merely occasional an I ii.ci- 
dciuul. 

ii. Your method must be adjusted by your design ; for 

J. if you treat of the same subject with two diflertnt views 

and designs, you will find it necessary to use diflcivnt 

r iiiethods. Suppose the doctrine of the "sacred Trinity 

fwere your theme, and you were to read a lecture to youn^- 
siudents on the subject, or if you designed a treatise fo 
\ the conviction of learned men, you wouW pursue a ver; 
i- difl'erent method from that which would be proper to reg 
£ ulate a practical discourse or a sermon to instruct com 
> nion christians merely in tiie ]jious improvement of ihii» 
. doctrine, and awaken them to the dulies which ;»rc dtri- 
.. >\cd I hence. 

r 



k8i LOGIC': OR, THfi: Part IV, 

In short we must not first lay down certain and precise 
rules of method, and resolve to confine the matter we dis- 
course of to that particular form and order of topics ; but 
we must well consider, and study the subject of our dis* 
course thoroughly, and take a just survey of our present 
design, and these will give sufficient^ hints of the particu- 
lar form and order in which we should handle it, provi- 
ded that we are moderately skilled in the general laws of 
jnethod and order. 

Yet let it be noted here, that neither the subject, nor 
matter of a discourse, nor the particular design of it, can 
rso precisely determine the method, as to leave no room 
for liberty and variety. The very same theme may be 
handled, and that also with the same design, in several 
different methods, among which it is hard to say which 

tthe best. In writing a system of divinity, some begin 
ilhthe scriptures, and thence deduce all other doctrines . 
and duties. Some begin with the being of God and his 
xtttributes, so far as he is known by the light of nature ; 
:>nd then proceed to the doctrines of revelation. Some 
iVistingni«b the whole sui)jtct into the crcdenda and agen- 
da, that is, Things to be believed, and things to be done. 
Some think it best to explain the whole Christian religion 
by an Instorical detail of all the discoveries which God 
)ias made of himself to this lower world, beginning at the 
rrcation in the first chapter of Genesis, and so proceeding 
onward according to the narative of the Old and New 
Testament. And there are others that endeavour to in- 
c lude the whole of religion under these four heads, name- 
ly. The afiostleacreedy the Lord's firayer, the (en command' 
merits^ and the t^o sacraments ; though I cannot but think j 
this is the least accurate of any. The same vai'iety may 1 
be allowed in treating other subjects. This very treatise 
oflo^ic is an instance of it, whose method differs very con- 
siderably from any others which 1 have seen, as they dif- 
fer also greatly from one another, though several of them 
are confessed to be well written. 

3. Though a just view of our siibject and our design 
.may dictate proper rules of natural method, yet there 
must be some little difference at least paid to the custom w 
'liie.agc wherein we live, and to the hunjiour and geniflf 



Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 2S3 

of our readers or hearers ; which if we utterly reject and 
disdain, our performances will fail of the desired success^ 
even though we may have followed the just rules of mcfh- 
od. I will mention but this one instance ; In the form(&r 
century it was frequent with learned men to divide their 
theme or subject into a great multitude of co-ordinate 
members or parts, they abounded also in the forms of lo- 
gic and distinction, and indulged numerous ranks of sub- 
ordination. Now, though we ought not to abandon the 
rules of just method and division, in order to compare 
with the modish waters in our age who have renounced 
them, yet it is prudent to pay so much respect to the cus- 
tom of the age, as to use these forms of division with due 
moderation, and not affect to multiply them in such a 
manner, as to give an early and needless disgust to the 
generality of your present readers. The same may be 
■baid concerning various other methods of conduct in the 
affairs of learning, as well as the affairs of life, wherein 
we must indulge a little to custom : And yet we must by 
no means suffer ourselves so far to be imposed upon and 
governed by it as to neglect those rules of method which 
are necessary for the safe, easy, and complete inquiry into 
truth, or the ready and effectual communication of it to 
k others. 

I Rule VII. The last requisite of metliod is, that the 
f parts of a discourse should be well connected ; and these 
three short directions will suffice for this purpose. 

1. " Keep your main end and design ever in view, and 
let all the parts of your discourse have a tendency towards 
it, and as far as possible make that tendency visible all the 
way :" Otherwise the readers or hearers will have reason 
to wonder for what end that or this particular was intro- 
duced. 

2. <( Let the mutual relation and dependence of the 
-several branches of your cHscourse be so just and evidentf 
that every pait may naturally lead onward to the next, 
without any huge chasms or breaks which interrupt and 
deform the scheme." The connexion of truths should 
arise and appear in their successive rank and order, as the 

IS' several parts of a fine prospect ascend just behind each 
1^1 '9^^^Vy in their natural and regular elevations and distan- 



'■ .«.* '■ ■,...■ f^'.- n ■■» ■- ^ j^,'~' ..'1 

l" ■*.. . _ ■ ' ■ ' " " , « . 

":»* " :.'L(>(&IG: OR, THE - Part IV. 

.,/...> ~ ... - 

rr3, and invitft Ihe cfe to climb oninrard vtiih cohstaat plea- 
stirc till it reach the sky. Whatsoever horrid beauty a 
precipice or a cataract may add to the prospect of a couo< 
ttT) yet such sort of hideous and abrupt appearances in a 
scene of reasoning are real bleipishes and not beamijes* 
AVhen the reader is passing over such a treatisei hr of- 
ten finds an wide vacancy > and makes an uneasy stopi and 
'knows not hovto transport his. thoughts over to the next 
particular, for want of some, clue or connecting i4ra U» 
Jay hold of. '^ 

3. <( Acquaint yourself with all the proper and decent 
forms of transition from one part of a discourse to aDol^|cry 
and practise them as occasion offers." Wherjs thej/^as* 
propositions and arguments, are happily disposed* '^aud 
well connected^ the truth indeed is secure ; but it renden 
the discourse much more agreeable, when proper and 
Kraceful expression joins the parts of it together in bo eii* 
tertaininc^ a manner, that the reader knows not how to 
I'javc OiTlill lie hath arrived at the end. 

'I'h'jse are the jjeneral and most important rules of true 
MEiiion ; and though they belong chiefly to the commu* 
nicaiion of knowled^je, yet an early and thorough acquain- 
tance with them will be of considerable use towards ifae 
pursuit and attainment of it. 

Tliose persons who have never any occasion to commu- 
nicate knowledge by writing or by public discourses, majr 
also with great advantage peruse these rplcs of method^ 
that they may learn to judge with justice and accuracy 
concerning the performances of others. And besides, a 
good acquaintance with method, will greatly assist every 
one in ranging, disposing and managing all human nfiaira, 
'VUt /iarficular means or method for a farther improvment 
of the understanding; are very various, such as meditation^ 
rcadhig^co7ivcr&ing<idiH/iuting by speech or by ^vriting^queatlon 
and a::srjcr^ Sec. And in each of these practices some spc- 
x:ial forms may be observed, and special rules may be giv- 
en to facilitate and secure our inquiries after truth : Hut 
this would require a little volume by itself, and a treaiiiie 
of hgic has always been esteemed suflicicntly complete 
without it. 




A TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



THE Introduction or genenl Scheme, page 6 

Of Perception and Ideas. 

CMAP. I. Of thenfttoreofldeas. p, 1| 

CHAP. II Ofthe Objects of Perception. Sect 1. Of Being tn 
l^neral, p 13. Sect. 2. Of Substances and their various kindi, p. 
14. Sect 3- Of Modes and their varioui Icinds ; and first of es* 
sf ntial and accidental modes, p 18. Sect. 4. The farther division! 
of mode, p. 22. Sect. 5- Of the ten categories— Of Substance 
modiHed, p. 25. Sec^ 6 Of not-being, p. 26. 

CH.\P.!I1« Of the several sorts of Perception or Ideal* Sect. 1« 
Of sensible, spiritual, and abstracted ideas, p. 27. Sect. 2. Of 
simple and complex, compound and collective ideas, p. .31 • Sect. 
3. Of universal and panicular ideas, real and imaginary, p. 32* 
Sect. 4. The division of ideas with regard to their qualities, p* 36. 

CHAP. IV. Of words, and their several divisions, together with the 
advantage and danger of them. Sect. 1. Of words in general and 
their use, p 41. Sect. 2. Of negative and poshive terms, p. 45* 
Sect. 3. Of simple and complex terms, p. 47. Sect* 4. Of words 
common and proper, p. 49. Sect. 5. Of concrete and abstract 
terms, p. 50. Sect. 6. Of univocal and equivocal words, p. 51. 
Sect. 7. Various kinds of equivocal words, p, 53. Sect. 8. The 
origin or causes of equivocal words, p. 57' 

CHAP. V. General directions relating to our ideal, namely, !• Of 
acquiring a treasure of ideas— 2. Of retaining ideas in riiemor)'^— 
3. Of selecting useful kieas — 4. Ofthe government of our thoughts, 
p. 60. 

CHAP. VI. Special rules to direct ovr conceptions of things, p. 66. 
Sect. 1 . Of gaining clear and distinct ideas, p- 67* Sect. 2. Of 
the G jfinition of words or names, p. 68* Sect. 3. Directions con* 
ccrning the definition of name*, p. 70. Sect. 4. Ofthe definititm 
of things, p. 82. Sect. 5. Rules of definicion ofthe thing, p. 85. 
Sect, G. Obser\'ation8 concerning the definition of things, p. 88. 
Sect. 7. Of a complete conception of things, p. 94. Sect. 8. Of 
division and the rules of it, p. 96. Sect 9. Of a comprehensive 
. onccj tioii of tilings, and of abstt^ctJon, p. 100.. Sect. 10. Of the 



188 i. TAttLE OF CON^TENTS. J 

ntentive conccpiicn pf (b.ltis*i ^^ of disHihui'ioi, p. 103. Scct^ g 
II. Uf>n uRletl]rconcciiiion of things, II 107. Seer. 13 Thtu^M 
fiveni|»t of conception Exrmplitinl, p. 108. Srct. 13. Au Uluicrk-^ 
liim of tbete five rules by stmilimdes, ]> 110. - ^ 

Of Judgment and Propoaitiofi. ■ " 

- ii-, . "-^■'l- ""'^ 

CHAP. I' Ofthenatiireef *prtlpniiiion^(llt9Mvera1jJttN^S14. '* 
CHAP. II' Orihevarionikindtorpfopotiilcns. Srct'l'. Ofi»W, 

vinal, panJcular, uidefiiiiic, and imgDlar. [iraposirioni. f. WfXi\ 
Sect. S. Of affirnntin mm) aegtilve nrepMition*, p. t'33, Srcu 
3> OF the appMiiianandcnnvmion cf prnpotitiaTit,p. 1)5. . Siifet. 
4. Of pure ml modal propoiiiioni, p..lJ7. Sect. i. of tinglitpnf- 
pMhinni.tihetheT dmpleoi cannplei,p, |39, Sect. 6. otbam- 
poand prnpotitioni, p. 131. Sect. 7.oMrueindfJ>c)<n>,iotiiioiM, 
p> 135. Sect. 8 of cettsinanddoubiful pttqioi'iionsofkniivlrdf^e 
and opininn, p, 13B. Sect- 9. of .■««, con,ciousncjs, iiiie;ii£(iici', 
leawn. faiih, and impimioHi P- 140. 

CHAP. III. Thcfpringsof falst '[adgmcnt. or 'lie Ooc'rineof prcjn- 
dices, p. 116 Sect.!. Prejudices arising from ihin~j. p. 14S. 
Sect. 3. Prf judicei ari*ing from wnids, p. I3,J. Si-ci, 3. Pri^ li]- 
ces arisiT^g from ounelvei, p' 156. Sti.;. 4. l'«3jJive» aiiiing 
from other person*, page ICS, 

CHAP IV. Geiicraldirections[oMiistiiiinjiuls;.>Eiriglu,i.,lSI. 

C1J.\P-V. Spccia! Kule*tod'.rfCt us in jiuJEing particiiltr objac-s. 
[-Ego 1^5. Srciioii 1 rrlnciplei aiid rates ol jiHlgnnent caiiccTiiiiij; 
thr objects of BPn«, page 196. Section 2, PrincipJos and rulei ot 
jiidgnncnt in mai'm of teason and ipeculalion. page 17J. Section 
;l, l'rinci[Jes and rulci of judgment iii iruitcrs nf moratltj and rc- 
ligiin. pafe30j. Secnoii 4 Ptinciplea a-id rules <.f judgment in 
miiien of human prudence, pige 'W. Section J. I'linciplcs ami 
rulos of jiidgmont in ma'ters of human te»iimonv, pi^e 20a. Sec- 
lion d, Hrinciplei and rules of juOgiiicnt in ii>aiie» of divine tc^ti. 
mony, page 213. Section?. Principliiiml ruk'sof juJgmeu; oin- 
I'erning things pa'l, preient, and '.u t-inic, !jj ilic nien luc pf r.~,-.. 
ion, page 315. 

Of Reasoning and Si/l/off's:::. 

CHAP. I. Of the niicre ..f a syll'-g^m, and of iV ^ii-s t ; .- 'y.'t 
ii is compMcJ, pije -219. . 



A TABLE OF COXTENrS. 2dr 

CHAP. II. Of ih'j viuio'j. kinds of syllogiims, wlih particular rules 



relating to thcin. SLcion 1, cfutiiveryul and particular S) llogiims 
both negative and aiiiiiiia.ivc, ]). '222. Section 2. of plain, simple 
syllogisms, and their rules, p '<;2S. Section 3. of the moods and 




Si . . « -. 

die terms, of common ])laccs or topics, and invention of atguments, 
page*238. Sc'Ciion 8. of several kinds of arguments and demon- 
strations, page 240. 

C H A I*. HI. The i;octrme of sophisms. Section I. of several kinds 
of sopkisms, and their solution, page 244. Section 2. Two gene- 
ral testi of true S; Ilogisnis, and methods of suUingall sophinaSj 
page 25 1. 

CHAP. IV. Some general rules to direct our reasoning, page 254, 

€6e ifouttfi ^art, viz. 

Of Disposition and Method. 

CHAP. I. The nature and kinds of method, page 264. 
CHAP, 2. CeucivU and spatial rules of me:hod, pag* 272. 



'■} 



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MAY 1 S I93B 



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