ill'
THE LONG ARM OF LEE
VOLUME II
THE
LONG ARM OF LEE
OR
THE HISTORY OF THE ARTILLERY OF THE
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
With a Brief Account of the Confederate Bureau
of Ordnance
BY
JENNINGS CROPPER WISE
ILLUSTRATED
TWO VOLUMES
VOLUME El
1915
J. P. BELL COMPANY, Inc.
LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA
COPYRIGHT, 1915
J. P. BELL CO., INC.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME II
CHAPTER
PAGE
XXVI. CHANCELLORSVILLE — SUNDAY, MAY 3o 505
XXVII. CHANCELLORSVILLE,, CONTINUED -- FREDERICKS-
BURG AND SALEM CHURCH — MAY 3o 515
XXVIII. CHANCELLORSVILLE — MAY 4 . 530
XXIX. PREPARATION FOR THE SECOND MARYLAND IN
VASION — DEATH OF J A c K s o N — BRANDY
STATION 556
XXX. FROM FREDERICKSBURG TO GETTYSBURG 598
XXXI. GETTYSBURG — JULY 1 616
XXXII. GETTYSBURG — JULY 2 635
XXXIII. GETTYSBURG — JULY 3 660
XXXIV. GETTYSBURG — THE RETREAT 695
XXXV. REORGANIZATION AFTER GETTYSBUR G — THE
WINTER OF 1863-61 706
XXXVI. THE ARTILLERY COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY
COMPARED 742
XXXVII. THE WILDERNESS 760
XXXVIII. SPOTSYLVANIA 775
XXXIX. THE NORTH ANNA 799
XL. COLD HARBOR 812
XLI. COLD HARBOR TO PETERSBURG 834-
XLII. PETERSBURG — THE SIEGE COMMENCES 842
XLIII. THE TRENCHES IN JULY 847
XLIV. THE CRATER 859
XLV. THE SECOND CORPS IN THE VALLEY 876
XLVI. PETERSBURG — THE WINTER OF 1864 895
XLVII. THE BEGINNING OF THE END — 1865 919
XLVIII. "LE DEBACLE" 928
GENERAL INDEX 959
BATTERY INDEX 980
BATTALION INDEX__ _ 992
* A
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
VOLUME II
FACING
PAGE
SHEPPARD'S "VIRGINIA 1861" Frontispiece
MAJOR JOHN PELHAM, CHIEF HORSE ARTILLERY 512
COLONEL ROBERT FRANKLIN BECKHAM, CHIEF HORSE ARTIL
LERY 544
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBERT PRESTON CHEW, CHIEF HORSE
ARTILLERY 576
MAJOR JAMES BREATHED 608
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBERT ARCHELAUS HARDAWAY 640
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WlLLIAM THOMAS PoAGUE 672
MAJOR JAMES WALTON THOMSON 704
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DAVID GREGG MclNTOSH 736
MAJOR JOSEPH WHITE LATIMER 768
COLONEL WILFRED EMMET CUTSHAW 800
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN CHEVES HASKELL 864
MAJOR DAVID WATSON__ _ 928
CHAPTER XXVI
CHANCELLORSVILLE SUNDAY, MAY 3D
WHEN Stuart arrived and took command, he was
entirely ignorant of the situation except as to its
general features. Rodes' plan to wait for the morning
was approved by him and all activity was postponed
until dawn. Stuart then set about making a personal
and general reconnaissance and directed Col. Alexander,
in his capacity as Chief of Artillery, to examine the
ground for artillery positions.
A careful reconnaissance extending throughout the
night convinced Alexander that a frontal attack through
the dense woods against the enemy's works and artillery
position would prove most costly to the Confederates,
even if successful. The Federal infantry in the far
edge of the forest not only lay behind exceptionally
strong breastworks, with the approaches well protected
by abattis, but a powerful artillery was massed behind
individual epaulments on the crest of the hill behind and
within easy canister range of the woods, through which
an attack would have to be made. He soon found that
there were but two possible outlets by means of which
the Confederate artillery could be brought to the front.
The first was the direct route of the Plank Road de
bouching from the forest beyond the schoolhouse and
the junction of that road with the Bullock Road at a
point not over 400 yards from the position of the hostile
guns, part of which enfiladed the roadway for a long
distance towards the woods. In advance of their main
artillery position, the enemy had placed three pieces of
Dimick's Battery behind an earthwork across the road
and abreast of the infantry line. Even a casual ex
amination of this route was sufficient to convince Alex
ander of its impracticability for the advance of artillery,
which could only move up the narrow road in column of
pieces and would, therefore, be destroyed piecemeal be-
506 THE LONG ARM or LEE
fore it could be thrown into action. The utmost dash
and gallantry of the gunners would simply be sacrificed
in such circumstances.
The second outlet was a vista, some 200 yards long, a
lane cleared on both sides to a width of 25 yards, which
ran parallel to the Plank Road about 400 yards to the
south. This vista terminated at its eastern end in the
narrow dirt road leading from Hazel Grove to the
Plank Road and it was in this clearing that Col. Winn's
men had abandoned the two guns and three caissons,
which they had captured from the train of the 3d Corps
about 6 P. M., subsequently recovered by Sickles. It was
reached from the Plank Road not only by the dirt road
running to Hazel Grove 1,000 yards to the south, over
which route Pleasonton had dispatched the regiment of
cavalry to Howard's assistance, but by a second road
half a mile to the rear of the Confederate infantry
line. Pegram had from the first appreciated the value
of the opening, and, as we have seen, had posted Cham-
berlayne with a section in it the evening of the 2d in
support of McGowan's right, from which position
Chamberlayne had been able to deliver a more or less
random fire through the woods when Sickles' left col
lided with McGowan's right, about midnight.
At dawn, Alexander posted 17 guns as follows:
Capt. E. A. Marye, of Walker's Battalion, with two
Napoleons and two rifles in the clearing about the school-
house, at which point Pender's line crossed the Plank
Road, and a short distance in rear, and also on the road,
Capt. Brunson with his battery of four rifles, of the same
battalion. It was necessary for the latter to fire over
Marye's head, for in no other way could the guns be
placed. Capt. R. C. M. Page, of Carter's Battalion,
was placed with three Napoleons in the thin woods some
300 yards south of the Plank Road and on the dirt road
leading to Hazel Grove, to fire upon the enemy's infan
try lines until ordered elsewhere. Lieut. Chamberlayne
of Walker's Battalion, with two Napoleons, was masked
in the pines at the eastern end of the vista to assist the
THE LONG ARM OJB LEE 507
infantry in its advance and then accompany it, while
Maj. Pegram, with Davidson's and McGraw's batteries
of Walker's Battalion, took position at the western end
of the vista. Placing four Napoleons on a small cleared
knoll 400 yards to his rear to fire over the trees at the
enemy's smoke, he held his entire command well in hand
to advance down the vista and the dirt road towards
Hazel Grove, when circumstances should permit the oc
cupation of that position. Alexander's, Brown's,
Carter's, Jones', and Mclntosh's battalions were held
in the rear in column along the Plank Road.
Col. Alexander convinced Stuart that the Hazel
Grove position, which commanded Fairview Heights,
was the key to the Federal line, and Archer's Brigade
which had come up during the night and formed on
McGowan's right, thus occupying the extreme right of
the Confederate line, was ordered at daylight to seize
the hill, which Sickles had all but abandoned. Archer
at once advanced through the woods, driving the hand
ful of Federal skirmishers before him, and charged
about 400 yards across the open fields in front of the
Hazel Grove position. Pressing up the slope, his men
seized the hill and captured the four pieces of artillery.
Within 90 minutes after the attack commenced, Hazel
Grove was in possession of the Confederates, its wanton
desertion by Sickles having destroyed all chance of a
successful resistance by Hooker, in the lines then oc
cupied by his troops.
Stuart was now to reap the benefit of Alexander's
judicious disposition of the artillery, for at 5 A. M. the
latter ordered Maj. Pegram to move forward and oc
cupy Hazel Grove, and Col. Carter to move as many
of his pieces as possible up to the schoolhouse. Pegram,
all in readiness, responded, and before 6 A. M. had placed
Chamberlayne's Battery of his own battalion and
Page's of Carter's Battalion in position on the forward
crest of Hazel Grove. The sight that met his eyes was
one to fill the soul of an artilleryman with joy. Less
than 1,500 yards to the northeast the enemy's position
508 THE LONG ARM or LEE
lay before him, and his own guns almost completely en
filaded those of the enemy in the road and were able to
deliver an oblique fire upon the others on Fairview
ridge. Meantime, Col. Carter had moved up to Marye's
position at the schoolhouse, with six pieces of his own
battalion. Without hesitating a moment, Pegram
opened with his eight pieces upon the enemy, joined by
Carter's group of ten on the road, thus at the outset
subjecting the enemy's guns to a cross fire.
But until the Artillery opened fire, Stuart had not
recognized the vast importance of Archer's capture, and
while Pegram and Carter were getting into position, a
useless sacrifice of Lane's and Ramseur's men had been
made by furiously hurling them against Berry's and
Williams' intrenchments in the woods, from which the
Federals were, however, driven back upon their main
line just in front of Fairview. After an hour of
desperate fighting, Stuart's whole line was in turn
driven out of the works, and Archer himself was forced
to fall back to Hazel Grove, where he took up a position
in support of Pegram's guns. It was clear now that
extreme efforts would be required to drive the Federals
from their strong position, for Hooker had established
the 1st, 2d, and 5th corps on his line, threatening to turn
the Confederate left where a desperate conflict was
raging.
Meanwhile Stuart had seen the value of Pegram's
position, to which Alexander had, meantime, ordered
Moody's and Woolfolk's batteries and Parker's section
of his own battalion, with ten guns under Maj. Huger,
and Brooke's, Smith's, and Watson's batteries of
Brown's Battalion under Capt. Watson, Lusk's, and
Wooding's batteries of Mclntosh's Battalion under
Maj. Poague, and Tanner's and Carrington's batteries
of Jones' Battalion, all of which immediately went into
action. Mclntosh with a rifled section of Thompson's
Louisiana Battery of Jones' Battalion moved down the
road to Brunson's position, while Maj. Jones with
portions of W. P. Carter's, Reese's, and Fry's batteries
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 509
of Carter's Battalion, Tanner's Battery of his own, and
a section of Taylor's Battery of Alexander's Battalion,
twelve pieces in all, moved further to the front and to
the left of the schoolhouse group of ten pieces, now
under Maj. Braxton. Col. Carter about this time as
sumed control of his own, Huger's, and Poague's bat
teries at Hazel Grove and Col. Walker of Brown's,
Pegram's, and Jones' batteries at that same point.
Alexander states that perhaps 50 guns were engaged
at Hazel Grove, though not over 40 at any one time,
as the batteries had to be relieved from time to time to
replenish their ammunition. The fire which Pegram,
then Walker and Carter, conducted from this point was
perhaps for an hour the most continuous and rapid ever
delivered by the Confederate Artillery. Every caisson
had to be well filled during the night, yet many of them
were emptied within the hour, some of the better-served
pieces, those under Pegram, firing as rapidly as three
rounds a minute, which was an exceptionally rapid rate
for the time.
As an artillery position, Hazel Grove was ideal and
Alexander's battalion commanders made the best of
it. Somewhat greater in elevation than Fairview, its
bushy crest all but obscured the Confederate guns, well
drawn back from the view of the enemy, whose shells
bursting beyond the narrow ridge, or in the depression
in front, were quite harmless. Few reached their diffi
cult target, while the Federal position presented an ex
tensive and easy target to the Confederate guns. It is
remarkable how the Federal cannoneers managed to
maintain their fire against such odds, yet they did so and
although severely punished by Alexander's artillery,
their guns formed the rallying point for Hooker's
troops below them in the woods, and they inflicted
terrible losses upon Hill's attacking infantry. Had the
Confederates been provided with good ammunition for
their guns, it is doubtful if the Federal Artillery could
have made the stand it did. An extraordinarily large
percentage of the Confederate shells failed to burst, and
510 THE LONG AKM OF LEE
many were even more ineffective by reason of premature
explosions. With the very best ammunition the error
of the fuse, and consequently the area of dispersion, is
large, but the mean burst is easily ascertained and rang
ing becomes fairly simple and accurate. On the other
hand, ranging with the Confederate ammunition was
extremely difficult. The writer has heard this point dis
cussed by numerous Confederate artillery officers, who
declared that ranging with them was ordinarily mere
guess work, and that frequently a dozen bursts gave
them no knowledge whatever of the true range. In
deed it was most discouraging to the Confederate gun
ners to fire and fire upon a perfectly visible target under
the easiest conditions, and see not a sign of effect from
their shells, and this is a fact which must be considered
by the artillery student of the war.
Soon Anderson united with Stuart's right, the former
moving his left up to Mine Creek from the furnace,
while Hardaway followed with three rifles of Jordan's
Battery. Before moving off, Hardaway left Capt.
Dance with one rifle of Jordan's Battery, one Napoleon,
and one howitzer of Hupp's and two howitzers of
Hurt's, with instructions to follow Mahone's advance
along the Plank Road to the east. Dance at once oc
cupied a fine position on a knoll to the right of the road,
and about 900 yards from the enemy's breastworks.
Proceeding along the ravine, Hardaway encountered
Gen. Lee, who had selected a position on a wooded hill,
which the Major was directed to prepare for his three
guns, and from which he opened an active fire upon the
Fairview guns, after the axmen with great labor had
cut a roadway thereto.
By 9 A. M. the Federal artillery fire had appreciably
slackened, many of the guns having exhausted their am
munition since no provision was made to resupply them
in spite of the urgent requests of the officers. Besides,
the Federal Artillery had suffered severely from the
terrible cross fire, which Carter, Pegram, and Mclntosh,
now reenforced by Hardaway's guns, had been directing
for nearly two hours upon Fairview.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 511
It was at this juncture that the veteran commander
of the Richmond Letcher Battery, Capt. Greenlee
Davidson, received his mortal wound at the very mo
ment of victory. In the words of Maj. Pegram, he
was "one of the most gallant, meritorious, and efficient
officers in the service."
About this time Col. Walker assumed the active
direction of his battalion, of which Pegram had sent
Davidson's and Chamberlayne's, together with Page's
of Carter's Battalion, to the rear to replenish their am
munition. Col. Brown also assumed active control of
the artillery of the 2d Corps.
Concerning the Federal artillery position and the ef
fect of the Confederate fire, Capt. Clermont L. Best,
4th United States Artillery, Chief of Artillery, 12th
Corps, after explaining how his guns had been in
trenched during the night of May 3d, had the following
to say: "Our position would not have been forced had
the flanks of our line of guns been successfully main
tained. An important point, an open field about a mile
to our left and front, guarded by a brigade of our
troops (not of the 12th Corps) and a battery — was
seemingly taken by a small force of the enemy and the
battery captured and turned on us with fearful effect,
blowing up one of our caissons, killing Capt. Hampton,
and enfilading Gen. Geary's line. It was most un
fortunate. My line of guns, however, kept to its work
manfully until 9 A. M., when, finding our infantry in
front withdrawn, our right and left turned, and the
enemy's musketry so advanced as to pick off our men
and horses, I was compelled to withdraw my guns
to save them. We were also nearly exhausted of am
munition."
The remarks of Capt. Best are much more conclusive
of the service rendered by Alexander and his batteries
than anything the Confederate gunners themselves
might have said. The effect of Alexander's fire Gen.
Hunt also characterized as fearful.
512 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
The Federal line of battle was now along the heights
below and a short distance west of Fairview. Sickles'
Corps connecting with Slocum's on the left, occupied
this line to the Plank Road and across it. On his right
was a portion of the 2d Corps and beyond behind breast
works thrown up during the night along the Ely's Ford
Road, and separated by a small interval from Couch,
lay the 1st Corps under Reynolds. On Slocum's left
and facing towards Fredericksburg the 5th Corps op
posed McLaws, while the remnants of Howard's Corps
was massing beyond Meade. Thus Hooker still had 60,-
000 infantry in line while the combined strength of
Stuart, Anderson, and McLaws, after the losses of the
1st and 2d, was not over 40,000. But the elan of
Stuart's men had not waned in spite of the unsuccess
ful attempts of the morning to drive the enemy from
their strengthened line, and each minute the efforts of
the Confederate Artillery became more telling. There
was nothing for Stuart to do but to organize a fresh at
tack. The spirit of the brave leader as he rode the lines
encouraging his men was contagious. Entirely relieved
of anxiety for his right flank by the union with Ander
son's line in that quarter, he now massed his infantry on
the left to drive the enemy out of the position from
which they were threatening his flank, to the support of
which Ramseur's Brigade had been sent. Finally,
about 9 :30 A. M., a third assault was made and the Fed
eral line was broken by the sheer valour of Jackson's
infantry. The Artillery had meantime crushed the
Fairview batteries, the very keystone of the whole
structure of resistance.
As the Confederate infantry surged forward through
the woods, Carter, Jones, and Mclntosh dashed down
the road and up the slopes of Fairview to the crest,
while the batteries at Hazel Grove crossed the valley in
their front, and, joining with the others in action, poured
a whirlwind of fire upon the retiring Federals and their
batteries, the latter withdrawing to their ammunition
trains.
MAJOR JOHN TELIIAM
CHIEF HORSE ARTILLERY
Killed at Kellysville. 1S(>::
THE LONG ARM or LEE 513
The Federals now endeavored to make a stand near
the Chancellorsville house, but without success. En
filaded from the west by Carter's group, fired upon
from their right front by Pegram's batteries and from
their front by Jordan's guns, which Hardaway had
meantime brought upon the southern edge of the
plateau, and entirely without breastworks, their re
sistance was gallant but brief. At this juncture,
Hooker, while standing on the porch of the Chancellor
house, was put hors de combat by a fragment of brick
torn from a pillar by one of Jordan's shells, and did not
recover for several hours. For a time his defeated army
was without a leader.
About 1 A. M., Lee joined Stuart near the Chancellor
house and directed that both infantry and artillery re
plenish ammunition and renew the assault. The enemy
having stubbornly fallen back to a line of works pre
pared by Warren, running along the Ely's Ford and
United States Ford roads, with its apex at the White
House, thus covered their avenues of retreat.
When the Federals fell back to their works after be
ing shelled for about an hour, the Confederate batteries
at once advanced to the turnpike and threw up hasty
intrenchments from which a desultory fire was main
tained upon that portion of the line near the White
House. About 3 p. M. Colston's Division, which had
been temporarily withdrawn, reformed, and, resupplied
with ammunition, was ordered by Gen. Lee to move for
ward towards the United States Ford for the purpose of
developing the enemy's position. Page's Morris Bat
tery of Napoleons accompanied Colston. Hardly had
Colston's men been set in motion when the enemy
opened upon them with twelve pieces of artillery from a
barbette battery on an eminence, and although Page re
plied to this fire for half an hour or more, nothing
serious was attempted and Colston was directed to draw
off and intrench. Meanwhile Maj. Hardaway with thir
teen rifled pieces, including two of Fry's, two of
Marye's, and two of W. P. Carter's, Jordan's four rifles
514 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
and three of Hurt's, was ordered to accompany Gen.
Anderson to the river for the purpose of shelling the
enemy's wagon trains on the north bank near Scott's
Dam, about 1^ miles below the United States Ford.
The Confederates had before noon practically come
to a standstill on the Chancellor plateau, for disquieting
news had reached Gen. Lee from the rear. Sedgwick
had finally forced Early's flimsy line and compelled the
Confederates opposite Fredericksburg to fall back.
Operations about Chancellorsville were perforce sus
pended while Gen. Lee's attention was directed to the
new danger.
CHAPTER XXVII
CHANCELLORSVILLE, CONTINUED FREDERICKSBURG AND
SALEM CHURCH MAY 3D
WE left Early and Pendleton on the morning of the
2d disposing their men and guns to oppose as best they
could Sedgwick's advance, the Federals pretty much in
the same position and attitude they had assumed the
evening before. Before 10 A. M. Gen. Early, however,
directed Maj. Andrews to feel the enemy with his guns,
and accordingly Maj . Latimer opened with two rifles on
that portion of the hostile line near Deep Run, while
Graham's and Brown's Parrotts on Lee's Hill directed
their fire upon the infantry and batteries massed near
the Pratt house, driving them to cover. Latimer drew
no fire, but two batteries on the north bank and several
on the south side of the river responded with energy to
that of Graham's and Brown's guns. Soon after this
affair, Early rode to the left to confer with Pendleton,
who was directing the disposition of Walton's guns
along the Stansbury Hill, with a view to firing upon the
enemy's masses about Falmouth. While he was with
Pendleton, Col. Chilton, Gen. Lee's Ad jut ant- General,
arrived with verbal orders for him, directing that he
move at once to Chancellorsville with all his infantry
but one brigade, and that Gen. Pendleton should with
draw all the artillery along the Telegraph Road,
especially all the heavier pieces, to Chesterfield, ex
cept eight or ten guns which were to follow the rest when
forced by the enemy to do so. Early and Pendleton
both advanced many objections to the withdrawal of
their forces at such a time, which in their opinion would
only invite the advance of the enemy, but were informed
that the commanding general was convinced of the
wisdom of crushing Hooker's force and that, having
done so, he could then return to Fredericksburg and
drive Sedgwick off if necessary. To do this, all his
516 THE LONG ARM or LEE
infantry was needed, but more artillery about Chancel-
lorsville would be superfluous, and the small detaining
force was only expected to delay Sedgwick long enough
for the Artillery and trains to withdraw. Such was the
substance of Chilton's remarks. The orders as de
livered to Gen. Early left him no discretion and, much
against their will, he and Pendleton, about noon, set
about executing them. Hays' Brigade was directed to
relieve Barksdale's Regiment in the town and to remain
with Pendleton's artillery force. It was late in the
afternoon, however, before the infantry column moved
off from Early's line along the military road from
Hamilton's Crossing to the Telegraph Road, and then
along a cross road leading into the Plank Road, fol
lowed by Maj. Andrews with his own battalion and
Graham's Battery.
Pendleton had, before noon, ordered Nelson's Bat
talion to withdraw first since it was least exposed to the
view of the enemy. The three 20-pounder Parrotts of
Rhett's Battery were replaced by the lighter and less
valued pieces of Patterson's and Eraser's batteries.
Lieut. Tunis with the Whitworth moved over from
the extreme right and with Rhett's Battery and
Nelson's Battalion retired along the Telegraph Road
while Richardson's Battery which Walton had detached
to Early's line rejoined its battalion. Col. Cabell
also withdrew Carlton's Battery from Lee's Hill and
moved to the rear in command of the entire column
of 22 pieces. Pendleton, therefore, retained in position
after noon but 15 guns. Of these six guns of the Wash
ington Artillery and Parker's two 10-pounder Parrotts
were held in position on Marye's Hill and the ridge to
the left, Eraser's three and one of Patterson's guns on
Lee's Hill, and three of Patterson's on the ridge back of
the Howison house. During the withdrawal of his bat
teries, Pendleton resorted to every subterfuge to make
it appear to the enemy as if additional guns were being
brought into position. After remaining idle the greater
part of the afternoon, the Federals at last began to send
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 517
forward their skirmishers and to mass on the north bank
as if to cross. Pendleton now ordered Col. Cabell to re
turn with Carlton's Battery.
Upon arriving with the head of his column at the
Plank Road leading to Chancellorsville just before
dark, Early received a note from Gen. Lee saying that
he was not expected to withdraw his division from Fred-
ericksburg, if by remaining Sedgwick could be checked,
as by neutralizing the 30,000 Federals with his 10,000
men Early could render far greater service than he could
at Chancellorsville. Thus had Chilton misunderstood
the commanding general's directions, and led to an all
but disastrous movement in Lee's rear by denying
Early and Pendleton all discretion in the execution of
the orders he transmitted to them. The incident well
illustrates the danger of verbal orders and from orders
in any form emanating from one not actually conversant
with the conditions in remote quarters of the field of
operations. What Gen. Lee had intended for instruc
tions were transmitted as positive orders.
Early had hardly received the message from Gen. Lee
when he was informed by Gen. Barksdale through a
courier, at the rear of his column, that the enemy had ad
vanced in force against Hays' weak line, and that both
Hays and Pendleton had sent word that all the ar
tillery would be captured, unless they received immediate
relief. Meantime Barksdale, with rare good judgment,
and in the exercise of that initiative on the part of a sub
ordinate so valuable on such occasions, had retraced his
steps with his own regiments, followed by Gordon's Bri
gade. Early at once gave the order for his main column
to do the same.
Sedgwick, upon discovering the Confederate with
drawal, had crossed the remainder of his corps about
dark, and moved towards the River Road, or Bowling
Green Road, below the town, driving Col. Penn's Regi
ment of Hays' Brigade back to the line of the railroad,
and then formed line with his main body along the
river. Fortunately, he had not seriously attempted to
518 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
take the town. The heavy masses of the enemy seen at
Falmouth, earlier in the day, were the troops of the 1st
Corps under Reynolds moving to the left to reenforce
Hooker.
Between 10 and 11 p. M. Early's Division reoccupied
its old line and skirmishers were thrown out towards
the River Road, Barksdale again occupying the town
and Hays moving to Early's right. Before notice of
Early 's decision to return reached Pendleton he had,
after deliberate consultation with Hays, withdrawn the
Artillery, Walton's batteries moving off first, followed
by those on Lee's Hill. But Pendleton had scarcely
reached the Telegraph Road with the rear batteries,
when he met Barksdale returning to the field and was
told by him that the orders were to hold Fredericks-
burg at all hazards. Pendleton, as well as Hays, who
was at Marye's Hill supervising the final preparation
for the retirement of his brigade, was naturally much
puzzled by the incomprehensible conflict of orders they
had received during the day, but was finally assured
by Early himself that the confusion had resulted from
Chilton's mistake, and that since Barksdale and Gordon
had both returned of their own accord he had thought
best to reoccupy his lines so long as it was possible to do
so. Pendleton, in complete cooperation with Early,
though much perplexed, and weakened by having sent
so many of his guns to the rear, p - mptly directed
Walton and Cabell to reoccupy their positions, the
former being assigned to the command of die artillery
on Marye's Hill and the latter to that on Lee's and the
Howison Hill. It was 1 p. M. when the 19 guns, includ
ing those of Carlton's Battery, remaining for the de
fense of so important a position, were reestablished in
position.
At 11 P. M. Sedgwick received a much belated order
from Hooker to march upon Chancellorsville with all
haste. Leaving one division to cover his rear and skir
mish with the Confederates in its front, he moved his
other two divisions up the river towards Fredericks-
THE LONG ARM or LEE 519
burg. Had Hooker's orders been duly received, his ad
vance would have been all but unopposed. Even now
delays occurred, and although Gen. Warren arrived at
2 A. M. to hasten forward his movement, the head of
Sedgwick's column did not enter the town, but 3 miles
from the bridge at Franklin's Crossing, until daylight.
Having detected the movement of the enemy, and be
lieving that Sedgwick's main effort would be made on
the left, Pendleton at once advised Early, who dis
patched Hays' Brigade from his right, to reenforce
Barksdale near the town.
Meanwhile, Gibbon had thrown a bridge at the town
and crossed over with his division of the 2d Corps. With
the Federal advance were several batteries, to engage
which Pendleton directed Walton to send a section of
artillery to the most advanced works on the left. Mean
time Barksdale had directed Maj. Eshleman to move a
piece of Miller's Battery, which commanded the Plank
Road leading from the town, to the left front, thus un
known to Pendleton uncovering the most important ap
proach to Marye's Hill.
To meet the enemy, Early now had 7 companies of
Barksdale's Brigade between the Marye house and the
Plank Road, 3 companies on the Telegraph Road at the
foot of Marye's Hill, and 2 regiments on the ridges of
Lee's and Howison's hills, while one of Hays' regi
ments covered Barksdale's right and 2 occupied the
Stansbury ridge. The extreme right was held by Hoke's
and Smith's brigades with Andrews' Battalion of ar
tillery and Richardson's and Graham's batteries in their
old works.
Very shortly after daylight Sedgwick commenced
demonstrations at Deep Run as if to turn Hoke's line,
throwing forward his skirmishers up the ravine formed
by the stream. In spite of Latimer's fire, a large body
succeeded in reaching the railroad behind which it re
mained while several Federal batteries played upon
Latimer's guns. Andrews now brought Graham's and
Brown's batteries from the right to the support of Lati-
520 THE LONG ARM or LEE
mer's two Napoleons, and also Carpenter's rifled section,
which engaged in a duel with the enemy's artillery as
well as firing upon their infantry. Finally Hoke moved
out and drove the enemy from behind the railroad em
bankment, while Andrews' batteries played upon the
retiring troops.
As soon as the advance division (Newton's) of Sedg-
wick's Corps had entered the town, four regiments were
sent forward to attack the Confederate line in rear of
it, advancing over the ground made famous in Decem
ber by the desperate charges of Burnside's divisions.
Once more the brave Federal infantry pressed up to
within a few paces of the stone wall and rifle pits at the
base of the hills, while Pendleton's batteries poured
shell and canister into their ranks with dreadful effect,
and Barksdale's men, reserving their fire until the last
moment, hurled the attacking columns back in a blizzard
of musketry fire. Once more the enemy withdrew to
cover behind the accidents of the ground, while their bat
teries in the town poured their fire with unrelenting
vigor upon Marye's Hill. At all points Sedgwick's
men were repulsed, but it was apparent to the defenders
that the ever-increasing force in the town was only
temporarily balked. The glorious news of Jackson's
victory at Chancellorsville, which had just been received,
inspired the gray line to redouble its efforts.
Sedgwick now determined to turn the Confederate
position and directed Howe with his rear division, on the
left of Hazel Run, against the opposing line, while
Gibbon was ordered to move up the river from the town
and turn the Confederate left. But Howe found the
works in his front and those which extended beyond his
left occupied, while the stream on his right deterred him
from assaulting Marye's Hill in flank, and Gibbon's ad
vance was barred by the canal behind which on the
Stansbury Hill were the men of Hays' Brigade, and
the pickets of Wilcox's Brigade on Taylor House Hill.
Information of Gibbon's movement was at once sent
Wilcox, who, leaving one section of Lewis' Battery and
THE LONG ARM or LEE 521
50 men at Banks' Ford, had hastened down in person
with the other section of the battery under Lieut.
Nathan Penick, and threw his guns in action first on the
Taylor House Hill, then on the Stansbury ridge. Soon
he also brought up Moore's (Huger's) Battery, two
rifles of which on the Taylor House Hill engaged the
enemy's guns in Falmouth and on the plain below, for
about two hours, while the latter sought to prepare for
Sedgwick's final efforts.
When Gibbon and Howe, whose men unable to ad
vance also sought the cover of the ground, reported the
impracticability of turning the Confederate position, the
resolute Sedgwick determined to storm the opposing
works. For this purpose, Newton's Division in front
of the town was to be organized into two columns for the
assault of Marye's Hill, while Howe was to move up
Hazel Run and attack Lee's Hill. Newton's two col
umns, of two regiments each, with two regiments in sup
port, moved forward on the right of the Plank Road
while Col. Burnham with four regiments in line of bat
tle, to the left of the road, charged directly upon the
rifle pits at the base of Marye's Hill. The works against
which these troops charged were now held by but two
regiments supported by six guns on the hill above under
Walton, who directed a withering fire of canister upon
the enemy. As before, the Federals reeled and broke,
only to be rallied and led back with the same result. But
under a flag of truce for the purpose of allowing the
enemy to recover their dead, the fire in this quarter was
now suspended. This action by the Confederates was en
tirely unauthorized by proper authority and was due to
the strange good nature of a gallant officer, Col. Griffin
of the 18th Mississippi, who received the flag and hon
ored the request in spite of the fact that Howe was
actively engaged in attacking Hays' line only a few hun
dred yards to his right. Not only did Griffin suspend
the fire on his portion of the line, but he allowed his men
to show themselves, and when Newton was apprised by
his returning officers how weak the line was which had
522 THE LONG ARM or LEE
repulsed him, the three columns were ordered forward
again upon the termination of the local truce. It was
now that the full effect of Chilton's dreadful blunder, as
well as Barksdale's unwarranted interference with
Pendleton's dispositions, were to be felt. Instead of 37
guns in position to repel the enemy, there remained less
than half that number, and the direct approach up the
Plank Road instead of being completely dominated by
Miller's guns was exposed only to the fire of the six
pieces on the hill, above and behind the stone wall, the
few defenders of which finding themselves assailed from
every side by superior numbers were unable to check the
onset. The Federals dashed on up to and over the works,
completely overpowering the Mississippians, most of
whom were either killed, wounded or captured in the
desperate hand-to-hand conflict which ensued. Thus did
Griffin reap the whirlwind which he had sown. It was
now 11 A. M., and so rapid had been Newton's final as
sault that Hays and Wilcox, the latter having by this
time assembled a portion of his brigade on Taylor's Hill,
had not had time to come to Barksdale's aid. The
enemy, after securing the works at its base, swarmed up
Marye's Hill and seized five of Walton's guns and
Parker's two to their left, before they could be with
drawn, but the gunners kept to their work to the last.
Seeing Newton's success, Pendleton at once caused the
guns on Lee's Hill to be directed on the enemy
on Marye's Hill, and brought up two pieces of
Patterson's Battery from near the Howison house,
which opened fire from the brow near the Telegraph
Road. Just at this moment Richardson's Battery ar
rived at the Howison Hill from the right, from whence
it had been dispatched by Early, and was sent by
Pendleton to join Walton, who assumed direction of
the guns firing upon Marye's Hill, while Barksdale
formed a regiment in line to the left of the Telegraph
Road in their support.
The enemy now advanced his batteries on the plain
in support of Howe's column, which vigorously assailed
Lee's Hill. Upon these Carlton's and Eraser's bat-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 523
teries under direction of Col. Cabell poured a rapid fire
of canister, but they, too, were forced to withdraw as
the infantry supports in their front fell back along the
Telegraph Road, contesting every foot of ground. In
withdrawing, Richardson was compelled to abandon a
piece, the horses of which were all shot down. Fraser,
in the meantime, had been directing the fire of his left
piece upon Marye's Hill, while his other piece and Carl-
ton's Battery continued to hurl canister upon Howe's
men. Not until the enemy all but reached their guns
did Fraser and Carlton withdraw them, the former
saving both his guns by substituting a caisson limber for
a gun limber which had been blown up. While direct
ing this difficult task under a galling fire, Lieut. F. A.
Habersham, of Fraser's Battery, was struck in the head
and killed by a large fragment of shell, but his body
was borne from the field on the shoulders of his can
noneers. Cabell now led his two batteries to the rear
along the Telegraph Road and formed Carlton's for
action near the pump at the Leach house, while Early
hurried up with his troops from near Hamilton's Cross
ing and formed them on the line which the remnants of
Barksdale's Brigade was holding in front of the Cox
house, about two miles in rear of Lee's Hill. Walton
had been ordered to the rear along the Telegraph Road,
and directed to occupy the first favorable position with
his remaining guns. Soon the enemy brought a battery
into action near the brick house in rear of the Howison
house and engaged Carlton, who replied until his am
munition was expended, when Walton was ordered to
bring up his ten pieces and relieve Carlton and Fraser,
the former having lost one man killed and eight
wounded in the duel.
One incident in connection with Carlton's Battery
should here be mentioned, as it illustrates the coolness
and heroism of the Confederate gunner. An unex-
ploded shell fell among Carlton's guns with the fuse
still burning. Its explosion would have certainly
caused the death of several men. Without pausing an
524 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
instant in his work, Lieut. Thomas A. Murray, who was
busily engaged in sighting his piece, called private
Richard W. Saye's attention to the dangerous projectile
which lay at their feet and Saye, picking it up, hurled
it over the parapet of the work. The shell burst as it
fell to the ground in the ditch beyond.
Pendleton in his report mentions the mortification he
experienced in seeing Walton's and Patterson's guns
captured by the enemy. Fortunately the day has come
when it is considered an honor and not a disgrace for the
artillerymen to lose guns in such circumstances. In
this affair it does not appear that any criticism can be
made to the discredit of the gunners, for they remained
at their posts until the last, and by the nature of the
ground were cut off from saving their guns. The ar
tilleryman who feels that he must save his pieces, or be
disgraced before his comrades in arms, finds a strong
incentive to "pull out" before actually necessary, and
where such a spirit prevails the subaltern who cannot
view the whole field in its general aspect is too apt to
anticipate the crisis and retire his guns when by remain
ing in action a few minutes longer he might materially
influence the issue. Then, too, the guns give the bravest
infantry additional assurance. Nothing is more inspir
ing to a sorely pressed infantry than the nearby crash
of supporting guns and nothing more disheartening to
the foot soldiers than the sight of their artillery sup
ports drawing off from the post of danger. Upon such
facts the more modern and sounder rule has been based
that artillery when practicable must seek positions in
close proximity to the advanced infantry, and remain
with it until to do so longer becomes but a useless sacri
fice of men and guns. The mere personal knowledge
that their batteries are still in the fight is of great moral
support to the infantrymen who must after all bear the
ultimate shock of an assault driven home. If by losing
a single piece or many, the force of the enemy's blow can
be reduced by the artillery to within the limits of the
defending infantry's power of resistance, then by all
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 525
means the guns should be gladly lost and much honor
accorded the gunners who are resolute enough to lose
them, for it must be remembered that if the infantry is
overborne and swept from the field, the artillery as a
rule must fall with it. Let us all be thankful that the
old idea that under no circumstances must a gun be lost,
a rule which continued to be accepted from the time of
the War of Liberation to the Franco-German War, has
at last been abandoned, and that Bernadotte's proud
boast that in all his battles he had never lost a piece no
longer does him any credit in the eyes of the world.
This point is well covered by Hohenlohe, who dis
cusses at length the evils which flowed in 1866 from the
Prussian batteries withdrawing from the front line to
refit, or when their ammunition ran short. Of course,
there were exceptions even then, such as in the case of
Von der Goltz's Battery at Koniggratz. Ordinarily,
however, they were too prone to fall back when custom
and the regulations warranted it. But before 1870, the
German artillerymen had learned that to lose guns was
not dishonorable and at Chateaudun instead of a battery
withdrawing when its ammunition had been exhausted
and its material greatly injured, the battery commander
made his cannoneers mount the limbers and sing the
"Wacht am Rhine" until the commanding general
should see fit to order them to retire or until a fresh
supply of ammunition might arrive.
That Pendleton's batteries remained long enough at
their posts at Fredericksburg is amply attested by their
losses. In Walton's Battalion of Washington Artillery,
there were four men killed, and four wounded, including
Lieut. De Russy, besides the losses in material etc.,
which was two 3-inch rifles of Squire's, one 12-pounder
howitzer of Richardson's, one 12-pounder Napoleon of
Miller's, and a 12-pounder howitzer and a 12-pounder
Napoleon of Eshleman's Battery, four limbers, one cais
son, and 29 horses. In Lieut. Brown's section of
Parker's Battery, the loss including the section com
mander was 23 officers and men captured, two 10-
526 THE LONG ARM or LEE
pounder Parrotts, 2 limbers, 2 caissons, and 28 horses.
Patterson of Cutt's Battalion lost 3 men wounded, one
Napoleon, one 13-pounder howitzer, 2 limbers disabled,
and 4 horses killed, while Fraser lost one officer killed
and one caisson and limber by explosion. Carlton's loss
was one man killed, 10 wounded and 3 horses. Later
Patterson's two pieces were recaptured, so the total
loss of the artillery under Pendleton was 6 officers, 64
men, total 70; 8 guns and limbers, 4 caissons and 64
horses.
Sedgwick, as we have seen, did not press along the
Telegraph Road, but followed the direct route to Chan
cellors ville along the Plank Road. Wilcox, cut off by
the Federal advance from Early, instead of trying to
establish connection with him, determined to delay
Sedgwick's progress as much as possible. He, there
fore, and with a keen perception of the best part he was
able to play, drew up his brigade in line on a ridge
running from Stansbury Hill to a point on the Plank
Road some 500 yards in front of the Guest house, and
placing two rifled pieces of Moore's and Lieut. Barks-
dale's section of Penick's (Lewis') batteries in his
front, shelled the Federal troops on Marye's Hill and
the adjacent height at a range of about 800 yards. For
a time this checked the enemy, but soon their skirmishers
advanced to within 400 yards of the guns with dense
lines following. A force that was sent below the Plank
Road threatened to turn Wilcox's right, whereupon he
ordered Moore and Penick to retire and withdrew his
men along the River Road to a point half a mile in rear
of Dr. Taylor's house. In this affair, Lieut. Barksdale,
of Lewis' Battery, was severely wounded. So active
were Moore and Penick that Sedgwick mistook them
for a horse battery.
The slowness and caution with which the Federals
advanced encouraged Wilcox to move back to the Plank
Road and again seek to delay their progress to
wards Chancellorsville. Deploying a troop of cavalry
which he happened to have with him, in some pines in
rear of Downman's house, he moved his brigade and five
THE LONG ARM or LEE 527
batteries to Salem Church, about five miles from Fred-
ericksburg, where Cobb's rifled section of Penick's Bat
tery went into position near the toll gate, while Moore's
Battery sought a position 1,000 yards to the rear near
the church itself. In the meantime one of Early's aides
had informed Gen. Lee of the loss of the position in his
rear, whereupon, as we have seen, he postponed his as
sault on Hooker's new lines, and dispatched McLaws
with Mahone's, Wofford's, Semmes', and Kershaw's
brigades to the support of Wilcox.
Upon forming line in front of Salem Church, Wil
cox calmly awaited the arrival of the head of Sedgwick's
column, which soon came up pushing Maj. Collins'
small cavalry detachment down the road. Lieut. Cobb
now opened fire with his two pieces, but was almost im
mediately driven from his position by a battery with the
Federal advance guard, and fell back upon Moore's
position, soon followed by Wilcox's Brigade, which re
formed on the line already occupied by McLaws'
troops at Salem Church.
Leaving Wofford at the junction of the turnpike and
Plank Road, McLaws formed his line of battle perpen
dicular to the latter in front of the church, with Mahone
on the left, Semmes next, then Wilcox across the road,
and Kershaw on the right. Wofford took position on
Kershaw's right when ordered up, while the two bat
teries remained in the road. Wllcox placed a number of
his men in the church and also some in a schoolhouse
about 60 yards in advance of his line. These dis
positions had hardly been made when Brooks' Division
moving forward rapidly in line of battle, and athwart
the road, with Newton's Division in close support,
rushed into the open space between the toll gate and the
church, while Sedgwick's batteries drove Moore and
Penick from the road after the latter had fired a single
shot. Thus McLaws was left entirely without artillery
in the engagement which followed. The Confederate
line, however, lay well retired, in a thick growth of
woods which afforded much shelter from the hostile
guns.
528 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
After shelling the woods for about 20 minutes, the
Federals advanced, Bartlett's Brigade, which boasted it
had never been repulsed, on the left of the first line. On
came the charging troops, cheering as they entered the
woods, but when they had pressed to within 80 yards of
the Confederate line they were received by a tremendous
volley of musketry which momentarily checked the ad
vance. In spite of the Confederate fire, Bartlett's brave
men soon recovered their formation and swept on, tak
ing the schoolhouse and its small garrison as it passed.
But Wilcox, having held a regiment in reserve, now
hurled it upon Bartlett's disordered line, and after a
desperate encounter at close quarters, the Federals
were broken and pressed back past the schoolhouse.
Brooks' right had also been checked and broken. Sedg-
wick hurried forward his second line to save the day,
but all in vain, for Semmes and Wilcox advanced their
entire brigades and drove the enemy from the field clear
back to the toll gate in a dangerously prolonged pur
suit. At that point Sedgwick's massed reserves, to
gether with the closing in of night, forbade further
progress on the part of the Confederates. Meanwhile,
Col. Alexander with his battalion and Maj. Hamilton
with Manly's and McCarthy's batteries of Cabell's Bat
talion, had been ordered from the Chancellorsville
plateau down the Plank Road to the support of Mc-
Laws, but arrived too late to take part in the engage
ment. The necessity of withdrawing these guns from
so critical a point was due simply to the fact that Gen.
Lee was entirely without an artillery reserve. Every
piece, except those of Nelson's Battalion, which had
been ordered to the rear as a result of the disastrous
verbal order erroneously transmitted by Chilton, was
engaged. Salem Church was in effect a rear guard
action, and for use in such a contingency reserve ar
tillery was created. One cannot fail to see how crippled
the commander-in-chief had been by the loss of two of his
battalions. Had they been present, Pendleton's two bat
talions would no doubt have been available as a reserve,
THE LONG ARM or LEE 529
instead of being committed at the outset. As a reserve,
these battalions would have been held at Gen. Lee's
immediate disposal, and would have, therefore, been
among the first troops to arrive at Salem Church in sup
port of Wilcox. McLaws would then have had Nelson's
and Cutts' six fresh batteries, with which to repulse
Sedgwick instead of parts of two much-damaged ones,
without ammunition enough to remain in action at the
critical moment. Since Gen. Lee was able to withdraw
Alexander's four and Hamilton's two batteries from
Chancellorsville, it is apparent that he would have been
free to dispense with Pendleton's six batteries had they
been present, and without weakening his front by taking
so many guns from his advanced lines.
The sturdy Wilcox had, however, almost without ar
tillery fought a superb rear guard action. Few better
examples of the kind are to be found. In the nick of
time, he had interposed his small force between the
enemy and Lee's rear, after Early and Pendleton had
been forced from the path. But much credit is also due
Early and Pendleton, for they with 10,000 men and a
few guns had for the better part of two days neutralized
Sedgwick's whole corps of 30,000 men. Wilcox's Bri
gade had lost 500 officers and men, but Bartlett's Bri
gade alone of some 1,500 men had experienced casual
ties aggregating 580.
Sedgwick's line now extended from the river above
Banks' Ford to Fredericksburg, and during the night
a bridge was thrown at the ford.
CHAPTER XXVIII
CHANCELLORSVILLE MAY 4
AN hour before sunset on the 3d, Early was informed
that McLaws was moving down the Plank Road to
meet Sedgwick, and that he, Early, was expected, if
possible, to cooperate with McLaws in overwhelming
the enemy's column. Early was then three miles from
Salem Church and, satisfied that he could render no as
sistance to McLaws at so late an hour, advised him that
he would concentrate his force during the night, and en
deavor to drive the enemy from Lee's and Marye's hills
at dawn, throwing forward his left to connect with
Wofford on the right of Salem Church. Both Lee and
McLaws approved this plan.
It was late in the evening when Early succeeded ir»
concentrating his division, one battery only with a regi
ment of infantry in support being left on the right of
the Cox house ridge, so as to guard the flank beyond the
Telegraph Road against any movement of the enemy
up the Deep Creek Valley. Early 's plan was to ad
vance along the Telegraph Road with Gordon's Bri
gade in the front line, followed by Andrews' Battalion
of artillery and Graham's Battery, with Smith's and
Barksdale's brigades in rear forming a second line, and
to throw Hays' and Hoke's brigades across Hazel Run
opposite his position so as to move down the left bank
while he attacked the heights held by the enemy along
the road. Upon recovering Marye's and Lee's hills,
he proposed to occupy them with Pendleton's batteries
and Barksdale's men while Hays and Hoke, crossing
Hazel Hun at the ford on his left, connected with Mc
Laws, and Gordon and Smith moved along the Plank
Road up river.
At dawn, Gordon moved off along the Telegraph
Road and found Lee's Hill unoccupied, but a body of
hostile infantry moving westward along the Plank
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 531
Road halted and took position behind an embankment
of the road between Marye's Hill and the ridge above.
In the valley between Guest's and Downman's houses,
there was also a large body of the enemy's infantry and
a battery at the latter house. Andrews, who had accom
panied Gordon, now placed Graham's Battery in
position on the Telegraph Road along the western face
of Lee's Hill, and opened on the enemy's troops in the
valley, while Gordon's skirmishers descended the hill
and advanced upon them. At this juncture, two large
bodies of hostile infantry, probably brigades, crossed
the ridge just beyond the Alum Spring Mill and
threatened Gordon's left, as his line advanced, but
Graham shifted his fire upon them and drove them to
cover. Gordon then made a dash across the run and
after a sharp encounter drove off the enemy behind the
road embankment, captured some prisoners, several
commissary wagons, and a battery wagon and a forge
with their teams. This gave Early possession of
Marye's and Cemetery hills again, and while Smith
moved up to the support of Gordon, Barksdale reoc-
cupied the sunken road behind the wall at the base of
Marye's Hill, under a heavy fire from the batteries on
Stafford Heights, and was ordered to seize the town
itself, the bridge head, and a large wagon camp seen
there. But Barksdale was unable to occupy the town,
which was still held by Gibbon's Division of the 2d
Corps, and the wagon train decamped.
Having disposed of the enemy's infantry, Graham
turned his two 20-pounder Parrotts upon the battery at
Downman's which had been free to fire upon him, and
drove it off to the Guest house out of reach.
The enemy now held a line of shallow trenches ex
tending from Taylor's Hill to the brow of the hill be
yond Alum Spring Mill, while Gordon and Smith had
occupied the trenches along the crests from the Plank
Road towards Taylor's Hill, with their backs towards
Fredericksburg. Smith was now ordered to advance
towards Taylor's Hill, and in pressing forward up the
532 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
slope was opened upon by the Federal batteries at the
Taylor house with such effect that his movement was
checked. The enemy appeared in such strength and in
flicted such losses upon him that his brigade was with
drawn to its former position.
Hays' and Hoke's brigades had, meanwhile, moved
down the left bank of Hazel Run, and had taken up a
position from which they could connect with McLaws'
right, by moving across the ridge on which Downman's
house stood, and of this fact Early now notified Mc
Laws. McLaws did not attack, however, but informed
Early that Anderson was coming up to his support.
When these troops began to arrive at Salem Church,
Early drew Hays and Hoke further back to his right,
placing the former in line at the base of the Alum
Springs Hill, from which concealed position the brigade
might move up the wooded slope on to the plain above,
which was occupied by the enemy. Hoke was concealed
in the woods on the lower end of the Downman house
ridge. Gen. Lee now arrived and, personally examining
Early's dispositions, approved his plan of attack, which
was for Hays and Hoke to press forward to the Plank
Road, while Gordon supported by Smith endeavored to
sweep the crests in front of him, and to turn the Federal
left resting on the river.
Sedgwick's main line covered the Plank Road for
some distance on the south side, its center on the ridge
along which the road runs and both flanks retired and
resting on the river above and below. His main ar
tillery position was within his line and at the Guest
house, while other guns were on his left front facing
Early. Skirmishers were thrown out upon the ridges
in his front.
When dawn broke, no communication had yet been re
ceived from Hooker by Sedgwick, and he was still under
orders to move to Chancellors ville. At an early hour,
Early's movements in the latter's rear had caused him to
deploy Howe's Division facing to the rear and perpen
dicular to the Plank Road. His scouts had reported
THE LONG ARM or LEE 533
that a column of the enemy, 15,000 strong, had arrived
from Richmond and occupied the heights at Fredericks-
burg. At once abandoning all idea of taking the ag
gressive, Sedgwick was bent only upon crossing the
river, but this in spite of the bridge at Banks' Ford,
now within his line, he did not dare attempt by day
light. And so, with a line much attenuated and facing
in three directions, east, south, and west, he awaited
events. At last a welcome dispatch from Hooker, which
authorized him to cross at Banks' Ford, or fall back
upon Fredericksburg, and directing him not to attack,
was received; but a little later another message arrived
urging Sedgwick to hold a position on the south bank,
to which he replied that he was threatened on two
fronts, that his line was a poor one for defense, and that
his bridge was endangered, closing with a request for
assistance. Receiving no reply to this message he de
cided to remain in position until nightfall. Howe's Di
vision still extended from the river to a point a short
distance south of the Plank Road. Brooks' Division
was on the right of Howe, forming line at right angles
with him, and parallel to the road, while Newton's Divi
sion formed the west front occupying its position of the
evening before and extending to the river above the
bridge.
Anderson had arrived at Salem Church by midday,
and after some delay his three brigades were moved into
line on Early 's left. Between Anderson's left and Mc-
Laws' right, the latter confronting Newton's Division,
a large gap existed which was to be closed as the whole
line advanced upon the enemy. The Confederate line
from Lee's Hill to McLaws' left was six miles or more
in extent.
Pendleton after reestablishing Walton's guns on
Marye's Hill and Fraser's Battery with a number of
others on Lee's Hill, moved Carlton's Battery and
Ross's which had rejoined him from Port Royal during
the night, as far forward from the Telegraph Road to
wards the Guest house as possible, and also attempted
534 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
to find a good position for the Whitworth with which
Lieut. Tunis had returned. Andrews with his battalion
occupied positions along the Telegraph Road, while
Alexander had sent Taylor's (Eubank's), Woolf oik's,
and Moody's batteries of his own battalion under Maj.
Huger to cooperate with Anderson's brigades. Moody's
Battery moved far off to Anderson's right towards the
Telegraph Road. Manly's Battery remained with Wil-
cox near the church.
It was not until 6 p. M. that McLaws gave the signal
for attack, when Hoke moved at once across the plateau
between Downman's house and Hazel Run, under cover
of Ross's and Caiiton's fire, then down the slope, across
the valley, and up the steep ascent of the Plank Road
ridge, driving the enemy's skirmishers before him, while
the hostile guns at the Guest house played upon, but
failed to break, his line. Hays also swept the enemy's
advance line from his front. These two brigades with
unsurpassed ardor pressed on without halting for a
moment, and were lustily cheered by the gunners in their
rear whose fire was masked by the advance. From the
artillery positions along the Telegraph Road, the sight
was indeed an inspiring one, and filled the hearts of the
artillerymen with enthusiasm and admiration for the
gallant infantry which they were powerless to assist.
Gordon had advanced along the Plank Road ravine,
formed in line, and with the utmost elan swept on to
wards the Taylor house. Brushing the enemy's
skirmishers from the forward crests, he forced the ar
tillery on that flank to retire rapidly, only halting when
the Federals had been driven pellmell from Taylor's
Hill towards Banks' Ford. Even the guns at the Guest
house had been compelled to fly in order to escape
capture. Thus had the enemy been thrown into con
fusion on all sides when Hoke was wounded, and his
brigade, colliding with Hays' men in the woods, lost its
direction and was thrown into confusion beyond the
Plank Road. Hays' Brigade pressed on with such men
of Hoke's as had mingled with it, but having also be-
THE LONG ARM or LEE 535
come disordered in the woods, was checked by a retir
ing force of the enemy, which had been rallied to meet
the advance and which drove the Confederates back to
the Plank Road. Here Hays succeeded in rallying the
regiments of the two brigades to the support of which
Early brought up a part of Smith's Brigade. But be
fore the Confederates could be reformed, night had
fallen, and with Smith's two regiments in front, Hays'
and Hoke's brigades rested in position along the Plank
Road. Gordon had also come to a standstill by reason
of the approach of darkness, on the Taylor House Hill
confronting the enemy's left. McLaws' Division had
not advanced at all. Anderson's Division had pressed
forward on Hoke's left, driving the enemy's skirmishers,
which confronted his center, from the Downman house
and the upper part of the ridge, but it did not cross the
Plank Road until dark, and none of its batteries were
engaged. When the attack came to an end, Posey ex
tended Early 's left, with Wright further down the road,
towards Salem Church. Beyond Anderson was Mc
Laws with two of Alexander's batteries and Harda-
way's group on the river road on his left.
During the early morning Alexander had been
directed to post some of his guns so as to prevent Sedg-
wick from advancing along the River Road to unite with
Hooker at Chancellorsville, and for this purpose he had
placed Jordan's Battery on a bluff commanding the
road, where the guns were intrenched. These guns were
now able to fire upon Banks' Ford, as were those of
Andrews' Battalion, which had been moved up to
the Taylor House Hill when the battle ended. Manly's
Battery was also most effective in firing upon the re
treating enemy, while Hardaway with a number of bat
teries was nearby.
We have seen that after the seizure of the Chancellors
ville plateau on the 3d, Hardaway had been dispatched
to Scott's Dam with 13 rifled pieces. Some time
was required for the assembling of his force, the organi
zation of his column, and the refilling of his caissons.
536 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
The roads were also very heavy and difficult and it was
well after dark before Hardaway, moving northward
along the River Road, came up to the position of the
3d Virginia Cavalry near the Hayden house, with 10
of his guns. Gen. Anderson had meantime halted
Hurt's three pieces on the road some distance in rear, as
the weight of the carriages was such that it was doubtful
whether the teams could draw them through the mud.
Hooker's wagon trains, in park and with camp-fires
burning, were plainly visible at the base of a hill about
a mile from the bluffs on the south bank of the river,
when Hardaway in company with an engineer officer
reconnoitered the ground. About 3 A. M. he brought
up his 10 guns to the bluff in front of the Hayden house,
and after firing 15 rounds per gun, the pieces were
limbered up and started back through the mud to Chan-
cellorsville, while Hardaway remained to discover by
daylight the effect of his fire. The horses of the train
when fired upon had been picketed in a field on the slope
of the hill on the river side of the wagon park. Many
of them had been killed or injured, as well as some of
the teamsters, and a number of wagons had been
destroyed by shelling. But the results of such an enter
prise are never very serious, and have practically no ef
fect upon the main operations of the enemy. It is ex
ceedingly doubtful if in this case the injury inflicted by
Hardaway was worth the ammunition expended.
While the column was returning the enemy made a
demonstration on the south side of the river below
United States Ford as if to cut off Hardaway's com
mand, whereupon the batteries were hurried to the rear,
leaving Anderson's skirmishers to check the attack,
which proved not to be serious.
Anderson was now ordered to proceed to Salem
Church, and Hardaway's artillery detachment was
directed to follow. Upon approaching the church,
Alexander halted Hardaway's command, directing
Parker with his remaining section to join it. Send
ing Jordan's Battery to the position on the River
THE LONG ARM or LEE 537
Road before referred to he set out to determine what
position was best for Hardaway to occupy. In a short
while the latter was directed to move his guns from the
Plank Road to Smith's Hill to the north and drive off a
Federal battery on the north bank of the river, which
had enfiladed McLaws' line whenever it attempted to
advance towards Fredericksburg. It was now about
10 A. M., and meanwhile Anderson had commenced to
move forward, directing Hardaway to follow him to the
right of the church. Under this conflict of orders,
Hardaway galloped forward to consult Anderson, who
referred him to Gen. Lee. Since Alexander had sent
Maj. Huger with the 10 guns of his own battalion to the
right in support of Anderson, Hardaway was ordered
to comply with the orders of the Chief of Artillery,
which he proceeded to do.
Hardaway had been informed that he would find pits
for his guns at Smith's Hill, but upon arriving at the
designated position, found intrenchments for but four
pieces. Many of his men and horses had been without
rations for 24 hours, while they had been continually on
the move since leaving Chancellorsville the evening be
fore. So sultry and oppressive was the day that a num
ber of his gunners fainted while engaged in the work
of clearing away the timber and digging gun pits. But
at last the axe details from the gun detachments com
pleted their work, and most of the pieces were in position
and fairly well protected before the attack was ready to
be made.
To the left of Jordan's four pieces, which occupied a
position across a ravine, and some 900 yards down the
road, W. P. Carter's four guns were posted on the bluff,
with Fry's two guns to the left of him. Parker's section
and three pieces of Penick's (Lewis') Battery occupied
pits on a knob to the left rear and some 40 feet higher
than the bluff on which Carter and Fry were posted.
Hurt with a Whitworth occupied a pit at the bend of
the ridge 80 yards or more to the left of the knob, while
200 yards to the rear and 100 to the left McCarthy's
538 THE LONG ARM or LEE
two guns and Marye's two held the ridge. Lieut.
Ferrell's section of Hurt's Battery was kept in reserve.
The part played in the action of the day by Harda-
way's command, while a secondary, was quite an im
portant one. As soon as Early, Anderson, and Mc-
Laws became engaged, his guns opened upon the Fed
eral Battery of eight pieces in earthworks about a house
on the bluff of the north bank, and immediately op
posite Smith's Hill. Other Federal guns soon came into
action, two from a point 400 yards below, and two in a
thicket 200 yards above the main battery. The fire of
these 12 guns was principally directed at the four guns
of McCarthy's and Marye's batteries and the Whit-
worth, all of which stood in the open. At one time the
fire of Hardaway's right guns was all but silenced, which
enabled the enemy to concentrate more successfully on
those to the left. But going to the right of his position,
Hardaway in person encouraged his gunners to re
double their efforts.
Never in the war was a duel with the Federal ar
tillery conducted under more disadvantageous circum
stances. Although the shells were provided with the
fuse-igniter attachment, but one Confederate shell in
fifteen burst while the Federal ammunition was most ef
fective. Hardaway, an officer of much scientific knowl
edge, afterwards declared that the meal powder was
knocked off the fuses while they were being driven home
with the mallet, but in spite of the fact that he was in ef
fect using solid shot almost entirely, six of the enemy's
guns in the central work were disabled, and the other
two were driven from their position, while the remaining
four pieces were practically silenced, though they main
tained a desultory fire until after dark. Meantime, Mc
Carthy's section, which had expended its ammunition,
had been relieved by Ferrell's section of Hurt's Battery,
and sent to the rear. Hardaway's task had been well
executed, for by the continuous action of his guns, the
fire of the Federal artillery on McLaws' left, hitherto
so destructive to the infantry, had been completely
diverted.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 539
As night closed in a thick fog had settled over the
field which added greatly to the difficulties of the Con
federates, who were thus again balked of the fruits of
victory by darkness, and the delay in attacking. Under
cover of the fog, Brooks' and Newton's divisions re
formed about the ford, and upon them Howe's broken
division fell back and also reformed under cover of 34
guns on the north bank, protecting the bridge at Banks'
and the one at Scott's Ford, a short distance below.
Sedgwick had suffered too severely to think of an
other day's battle with his troops in their present
position. In two days he had lost over 5,000 of his men.
He, therefore, advised Hooker that his position was
commanded by the enemy's guns on the Taylor House
Hill, and asked if he should risk remaining on the south
bank. At 1 A. M. he received orders from Hooker's
Chief of Staff to "withdraw under cover," and by 5
A. M. the entire corps had crossed the river and taken up
its bridges. But the crossing had not been accomplished
without some loss, for Alexander had during the after
noon busied himself establishing points of direction for
night firing upon the position about the ford in antici
pation of Sedgwick' s retreat, and during the night
Jordan was able to fire upon the masses huddled about
the crossing, causing the enemy much annoyance.
This was perhaps the first instance of the employment
of indirect fire by the Confederate Artillery. Jordan's
position along the bluff to the left of the River Road,
facing towards Banks' Ford, was obscured from the
latter point by intervening ridges and thickets over
which by means of Alexander's deflection marks the
fire could be directed upon the enemy. About 1 A. M.
Hardaway had also withdrawn Carter's and Fraser's
four pieces on his right and shifting his line so as to face
the ford, opened fire down the ravine leading thereto, but
was soon directed by Alexander to cease firing as Mc-
Laws was sending two brigades in that direction. Rid
ing forward to the picket line of the infantry to secure
the exact direction of the pontoon bridges, and hearing
540 THE LONG ARM or LEE
the artillery of the enemy crossing, Hardaway re
turned and again shifted his guns so as to deliver an
indirect fire upon the approaches to the ford on the
north side of the river, and caused his guns to fire from
right to left, at the rate of about one shot a minute.
About 2 A. M. Hurt's Whitworth was directed upon a
deep hollow leading towards Falmouth, in which many
stragglers, wagons, etc., could be seen by the light of
the numerous fires along the line of retreat. Later it
was turned upon a large wagon train concentrated at
the junction of the Aquia Creek and United States
Ford roads. Although the range was about 3 miles,
the fire of the Whitworth was soon adjusted and
created consternation in the wagon park, causing the
train to disperse in the utmost disorder. The am
munition for the large rifle being very scarce and ex
pensive the fire soon ceased.
All day on the 4th, Brown's, Walker's, Mclntosh's,
and Jones' battalions had been held in position along
the Chancellorsville plateau, the cannoneers requiring
no encouragement to throw up hasty works for the guns.
With the exception of Walker's batteries, which had
been turned over the night before to Maj. Pegram, none
of the Artillery was seriously engaged, though most of
the batteries fired upon the enemy's works from time to
time. Early in the morning, 18 or 20 Federal guns
opened fire upon Pegram's position on the Plank Road,
and, after a somewhat protracted duel, ceased to fire.
In this affair, Pegram seems to have had the better of
it, for his guns all remained in position until the morn
ing of the 6th, when the enemy's withdrawal was dis
covered.
While Sedgwick's last brigade was crossing, he re
ceived an order from Hooker countermanding the
authority previously given for the withdrawal to which,
at 5 A. M. Sedgwick replied that it was too late, and that
the bridges were already being taken up while his men
were much exhausted.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 541
In spite of the fact that the enemy had escaped, it
was with great elation on the morning of the 5th that
Huger's and Andrews' guns fired the last shots across
the river at Sedgwick's retreating columns, and that
the Confederates at sunrise found themselves in com
plete possession of the southern bank of the river from
Fredericksburg to Hooker's contracted position above
Chancellorsville. The movement against Sedgwick had
been a complete success, and even Gibbon had been with
drawn across the river from the town during the night,
while Hooker had not ventured from his works to as
sist the inferior force which he had ordered up to his
own relief. The whole situation presents a tactical
anomaly. Hemming a vastly superior enemy up in his
works in front of United States Ford, Lee had with
drawn much of his artillery and the larger part of two
divisions of infantry from his front to hurl upon an
equal force, which had already pushed his rear guard
aside, and, uniting them with that broken rear guard,
had assailed an entire Federal corps of 30,000 men, rated
among the best of his adversaries, overthrowing it and
driving it across the river at Banks' Ford, in some dis
order at least, in the very face of the main army of the
enemy. But still the bold commander-in-chief was not
satisfied with what he had done. He knew that Sedg
wick's Corps had suffered so severely in men and morale
that it was not available for immediate service, even
had it been transferred to Chancellorsville, instead of
being headed for Falmouth. During the afternoon of
the 5th, therefore, leaving Early's Division, Barks-
dale's Brigade and Pendleton's artillery to guard the
river from Banks' Ford to the crossings below Fred
ericksburg, he ordered Anderson and McLaws to re
turn to Chancellorsville with a view to assailing
Hooker's position. What was known of that position
satisfied every man in the Confederate Army that the
worst was yet to come. Ninety thousand men behind
works covering a front of five miles, which they had had
48 hours to prepare, with all the advantages which un-
542 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
limited quantities of timber, broken ground, and diffi
cult approaches through a dense forest gave them for
defense, with three-fourths of their front covered by
streams on their southwest and northwest, and both
flanks resting on a wide river, — this was the propo
sition now before some 35,000 Confederates. Not only
would the attack have to be directed squarely on the
Federal front, but little assistance could be expected
from the Artillery. Impenetrable abattis covered the
entire line, and the crest of the works was everywhere
surmounted by head logs with loopholes, while in rear
separate structures were provided for officers and sup
ports from which the former could see and exercise con
trol over the defenders, and from which the latter could
be moved up to the advanced works under cover.
It is doubtful if in the whole military career of Gen.
Lee, a bolder resolve on his part can be discovered
than this one to hurl his troops upon Hooker's final
position at Chancellorsville. But again, it must be
conceded that in arriving at a decision, seemingly so
rash, if not desperate, he had considered the moral at
titude of his adversary. Again he did not count the
number of noses and muskets as the supreme factor of
his problem. The moral power of the enemy he re
garded inversely as the strength of his breastworks and
preparations for defense. It was the same unflinching
determination which led him to order Longstreet and
Jackson back to their lines at Sharpsburg the preceding
September, that now enabled the great commander to
approach the task before him in so resolute a manner.
He saw too well in both cases the results which would
flow from a more timid course, and he knew that
Hooker, like McClellan, would fall a victim to im
position. Lee has been harshly criticised for even con
templating an assault on Hooker's lines, but the question
may be asked his critics, what his position would have
been had he lain supine upon the fields he had won?
In a frank answer to this query is the vindication of his
action, if any justification is needed. It was certainly
THE LONG ARM or LEE 543
not for him to admit to the enemy by inactivity that his
last bolt was spent, and invite the Federals to move out
upon his army, weakened as it was by four days of tre
mendous effort and constant strain. Why, may we also
ask, should Lee at this juncture, after once having as
sumed the aggressive, and with unparalleled audacity
having divided his army in the face of a superior enemy,
now resort to the defensive? Was the resolve to attack
Hooker on the 5th more reckless than the actual at
tack which had been made on the 2d? Of the two de
cisions, the writer is inclined to consider Jackson's turn
ing movement by far the more daring. But, whether
so or not, Lee's willingness to take upon him the con
sequent risk of the maneuver, retaining under his im
mediate control but two small divisions, with a power
ful enemy both in his front and rear, displayed a higher
courage than was ever evinced by any other mortal man
upon the field of battle. The maneuver of Jackson, the
lieutenant, the lustre of which has all but obscured the
other incidents of the campaign, was indeed brilliant,
but the courage of Lee, the captain, who permitted it,
was far more superb, for victory alone was not the
stake — a nation hung in the balance.
No. On May 5, Lee did just what a general with
exceptional power to divine the enemy's thoughts, and
the boldness to act upon the latter's fears, should have
done. He drew his sword once more to strike, knowing
that the flash of the blade would itself strike terror to
a heart already taking counsel of a timorous mind. And
so, when his forces were again marshalled for attack,
the blow became unnecessary ; there was no adversary to
meet him. Critics deal too much in numbers. They
forget that moral force, in the words of Napoleon, is
everything in war. Who shall say that the violent
storm which caused Lee to postpone his attack on the
afternoon of the 5th was not as welcome to Lee as to
Hooker? We may surmise this with respect to the
former. We have evidence from his hasty withdrawal
across the river under its protection that it was wel
come to the latter.
544 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
During the afternoon and before Anderson's troops
had come up from Salem Church, the rain fell in tor
rents, converting the spongy soil into a vast quagmire.
In spite of the almost impassable condition of the roads,
Alexander who had reconnoitered the extreme Federal
left during the morning, and had directed the scattered
batteries to report to their respective corps, moved his
own battalion by the River Road and set his men to
work digging pits and preparing a position near the
Childs house, from which to open upon the enemy be
hind Mine Run. The rain continued to fall, but all
night the cannoneers kept at their work. Alexander's
position, partly around the bend of the river and near
the bank, was such as to enable his guns to deliver an
oblique fire upon a hostile group of artillery on the
enemy's extreme left.
As soon as Hooker learned from Sedgwick that the
6th Corps had abandoned the southern bank of the
river, he too determined to withdraw to the north bank,
but went through the idle form of calling his corps
commanders together to hear their views. As it hap
pened, the majority were of his own opinion, but judg
ing from the frame of mind of the commander-in-chief,
it is doubtful if he would have waived his own views had
they all been opposed to them. During the 5th
preparations were made for recrossing the Rappa-
hannock and an interior line of works, running from
Scott's Dam to the mouth of Hunting Run, was con
structed to cover the withdrawal. At nightfall the re
treat, greatly favored by the storm, began. First the
Artillery crossed over the bridges, the ends of which
were all but submerged by the rising current which
threatened their destruction. By daylight the great
mass of the Federal Army was on the north side, and by
8 A. M. the rear corps under Meade had crossed, leav
ing behind nothing but several field hospitals full of
wounded soldiers. Meanwhile, at early dawn on the
6th, the storm unabated, while Lieut. Taylor of Eu-
bank's Battery was placing his four Napoleons and
COLONEL ROBERT FRANKLIN BECKHAM
CHIEF HORSE ARTILLERY
Killed at Franklin, Tenn., 18C4
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 545
Lieut. J. D. Smith, of Jordan's battery, his section in
the six epaulments, which Alexander had constructed
near the river during the night, they were suddenly
fired upon by a group of guns across the river and
squarely on their own flank. A number of men and
horses were wounded and several dismounted limber
chests exploded before the detachments succeeded in
getting their pieces under cover. To this fire, Capt.
Jordan, in command of the guns, was quite unable to re
ply. During the night the enemy had constructed
works on the hill some 800 yards distant in which two
batteries had been placed to prevent the occupation of
Jordan's position, which commanded the lower bridge
at Scott's Dam, and it was only now that it was dis
covered by the Confederate pickets that Hooker had
abandoned his advanced lines, and that few Federal
troops remained on the south side of the river.
The batteries on the north bank continued to ham
mer at Jordan until 9 A. M. when Alexander brought
up Moody's Battery, a section of Parker's, and a 24-
pounder howitzer of Woolf oik's Battery, seven pieces in
all, which, aided by Jordan's guns, engaged the enemy.
During the duel which ensued two fresh hostile batteries
to the right of the others uncovered, and all being well
protected Alexander commanded his guns to cease fir
ing. Jordan's six pieces remained under cover in their
pits, while the enemy continued to fire upon him until
the other guns were withdrawn. This incident closed
the operations of the Confederate Artillery in the battle
of Chancellorsville, in which Alexander's Battalion
alone had lost Brown's entire section of Parker's Bat
tery by capture, 6 men killed, 25 wounded, 21 missing,
and 46 horses killed, disabled, or captured, or a total
loss in officers and men of 62, which was about twenty
per cent of those engaged. The losses of Walton's and
Cabell's battalions of the 1st Corps were 28 and 45,
respectively, while Garnett's loss was probably not less
than 25. In the 2d Corps, Brown, Walker, Carter,
Jones, Mclntosh, and Andrews together lost 150 men,
546 THE LONG AKM OF LEE
while the total loss in Cutts' and Nelson's reserve bat
talions and Beckham's horse batteries was about 30.
The aggregate Artillery loss in personnel at Chancel
lor sville was, therefore, not less than 275, or in the
neighborhood of seven per cent of the number actually
engaged. For field artillery at this period the loss was
enormous. But the loss inflicted upon the enemy's ar
tillery had been still greater. In a report of casualties,
which Gen. Hunt characterized as "imperfect," he states
his losses as 5 officers and 50 men killed, 13 officers and
268 men wounded, 53 captured or missing, or an ag
gregate loss in personnel of 389, not including the horse
batteries. In horses the loss was 389, and 14 pieces of
superior ordnance were taken by the Confederates who
themselves lost but 8. Although Hooker's entire loss
aggregated 16,844 of all arms, that of his artillery was
disproportionately large for the circumstances under
which it was engaged.
Nor had the Federal Artillery by any means meas
ured up to its former standard of efficiency. The reason
is not difficult to discover. The command of the Artillery
which had been committed to Hunt by both McClellan
and Burnside was withdrawn from him by Hooker, and
the splendid soldier whose services at Malvern Hill,
Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg had won great fame
for him as an artillerist, was relegated to a purely ad
ministrative duty. Not only was the superb organiza
tion which he had perfected much broken up by scatter
ing the Artillery here and there, and giving the various
corps and division commanders too high a degree of
control over it, but many of the batteries, unknown to
Hunt, were ordered to be left in camp on the north side
of the river when Hooker's main force moved to Chan-
cellorsville. The promotion and transfer of numbers
of the old regular artillery officers to other branches of
the service also deprived many of the divisional bat
talions of experienced commanders, and throughout the
arm a great deficiency in the quality and number of field
officers existed. For the command and administration
of an arm with 412 guns, 980 carriages, 9,543 officers
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 547
and men, and 8,544 horses, besides the immense ammu
nition trains requisite for such a force of artillery, there
were during the Chancellorsville campaign but five field
officers of artillery present with the Army, and they
were provided with miserably-inefficient staffs! Add
to this the fact that there was no active head to the Fed
eral Artillery until Col. Wainwright took command at
Fairview on the morning of the 3d, and that Gen. Hunt
was not given entire control until 10 p. M. that night,
and the wonder is that Hooker's scattered batteries
maintained themselves as well as they did. If Hooker
were open to criticism as a general in no other respect
the gross mismanagement of his artillery, the Federal
arm par excellence, already famous the world over for
the superiority of its organization and material and the
high efficiency of its officers and men, would appear to
be inexcusable.
Many writers speak of Hooker's movements up to the
time his three corps reached Chancellorsville on the 30th,
as exceptionally fine. If to dispatch one's entire
cavalry force, with the exception of a small brigade, to
another quarter of the universe on a wild-goose chase;
if to leave a great part of one's artillery at the base and
provide no chief for the rest, but commit it entirely to
the control of corps and division commanders ; if to pen
one's infantry up in the heart of a forest without having
even attempted a reconnaissance of the surrounding
country, and leave every approach, except a single line
of communication, open to be blocked by a nearby
enemy known to be exceptionally bold and active; if
such movements are correct, then Hooker's conduct of
the campaign was indeed fine. But it seems to the
writer that Hooker in disposing of his cavalry and de
molishing his artillery in the way he did, committed
acts which alone are enough to condemn any general
guilty of such acts as inefficient and lacking in the
fundamental conceptions of the tactics of the three arms
combined. And such a view, it is believed, will uni
versally obtain as time progresses and knowledge of
events at Chancellorsville becomes more general.
548 THE LONG ARM or LEE
But now as to the tactical employment and services
of the Confederate Artillery, the actual operations
of which have been so closely followed. From the
standpoint of the effectiveness of its fire, we have but to
consider the results it undoubtedly accomplished in the
conflict with an artillery superior in numbers and ma
terial. Again the Federal reports teem with references
to the severity and accuracy of the Confederate ar
tillery fire; not one but mentions the Confederate guns
in a way showing that the writer had in mind their fire as
bearing a direct influence upon the issue of events at
every point, and this in spite of the inferior grade of
ammunition with which Lee's gunners were provided.
We must at least concede, that with such a serious de
fect to overcome, an exceptional degree of energy and
efficiency was required on the part of the personnel to
accomplish even what might have been expected of
ordinary artillery.
The mobility which the Confederate batteries dis
played in this campaign is astounding when the de
ficiency in the number and quality of their draught
animals is considered. In no battle of the war was ar
tillery called upon for greater activity on the march
after contact with the enemy had been gained. Be
ginning with April 29th, when Lee directed his Chief of
Artillery to set the reserve battalions in motion, there
was not a day when a great part of his artillery was not
on the march. The transfer of the Artillery of the 2d
Corps from below Hamilton's Crossing to the vicinity
of Chancellorsville on the night of the 30th, was rapid
and conducted in such a successful manner over a single
road that there is an entire absence of complaint on the
part of division and brigade commanders about blocked
roads, etc., to which infantry commanders are so prone
to attribute the causes of their own delays. With little
rest, again the great column was set in motion and
whirled over 15 miles or more of despicable roads, both
narrow and difficult, and not only did it arrive at the
designated point of rendezvous in good order and in
THE LONG ARM or LEE 549
good time, but some of the battalions were forced im
patiently to remain in the clearings near the head of
Jackson's column, when the signal for the infantry at
tack was given. Indeed, the Artillery seems rather
to have been too forward, as in Crutchfield's case and
that of Carter on the night of the 2d, instead of being
tardy in its arrival. In spite of darkness and the for
bidding character of the terrain, when dawn of the 3d
broke every gun of both corps was in the best position
which those responsible for the posting of the Artillery
could select, a fact which enabled Alexander, who ac
companied Archer in his attack on Hazel Grove, to
secure the position with Pegram's batteries the instant
the Federals abandoned it, and instead of his lacking
guns at the critical point, there was actually a surplus
of them at hand in the foremost line. The cooperation
of Alexander, with Stuart, was extraordinary and
elicited from Stuart himself the statement that the
action of the Artillery was superb, attributing the rapid
movements of the batteries as he did to the improved
battalion organization. But, if Alexander's cooperation
with his corps commander was active and complete, no
less so was that of Brown, Walker, Jones, Mclntosh,
Poague, and Huger with their respective chiefs. Every
where we found them striving to be at the right point
at the right time. The activity displayed by Hardaway
was also noticeable. Stumbling through trackless
thickets, cutting his way with pick and axe to the front,
we find him moving a part of his guns, at least, forward
with the infantry as it advanced from the south to the
Chancellorsville plateau, soon to move to a distant
point of the theater of operations, only to push on over
bottomless roads to a more active conflict, after a dis
tressing night of toil and hunger. On the 4th we find
Alexander's Battalion whisked from Chancellorsville
after five days of constant marching or fighting, many
miles to the rear and then back again to the river, where
the morning of the 6th it was as active as when "boots
and saddles" was blown at Hanover Junction a week
550 THE LONG ARM or LEE
before. In this week a number of the batteries of this
battalion marched over 100 miles, in addition to being
actually engaged three days and three nights. We have
seen that the Horse Artillery under Beckham had lost
nothing of its old dash so well known to the enemy. Yet,
at least two of the light batteries, Moore's and Penick's,
maneuvered with such rapidity in action as they
dashed from hill to hill before Sedgwick's column on
the 4th, always in the front and retarding the enemy,
that they were mistaken by the Federal commander
himself for horse artillery.
Another fact to be discerned from the records is the
entire absence of friction in the Confederate Artillery,
and between it and the Army as a whole at Chancellors-
ville, while so much discord and lack of cohesion existed
in the same arm of the Federal Army in this campaign.
In Hooker's army, after the battle, there was a wide
spread feeling that the Federal Artillery had failed, a
sentiment so prevalent that Gen. Hunt himself saw fit
to offer explanations of the cause in his report. While
one is forced to absolve the Federal Artillery itself of
all blame, yet the fact remains that, though not of its
own doing, it was rendered collectively inefficient
throughout the campaign in spite of the individual
gallantry and prowess of Dilger, Weed, Best, Osborn
and others. Its very losses, which included about 20
officers, are sufficient evidence of the courage and fight
ing capacity of the Federal gunners, and it seems a pity
that so superb a fighting machine as that which under
Hunt was inherited by Hooker, should have been
wantonly sacrificed to the ignorance and stupidity of
one whom the world at large has seen fit to credit with
unusual skill as an organizer, palliating in a measure
thereby his miserable failure as an army commander.
It has already been remarked that the Confederate
Reserve Artillery was by necessity perverted from its
true function in the campaign. Unless battalions which
must be committed to the first line before a shot is fired
can be classed as an artillery reserve, Lee had none at
THE LONG ARM or LEE 551
Chancellorsville, and in this respect was sadly crippled.
In the narrative of events we have noted numerous oc
casions when such a force might have been, and had it
been available would have been, employed with controll
ing influence upon the issue. All that can be said of the
nominal reserve artillery is that in the sphere of duty
assigned it, the services it rendered fully measured up to
the expectations of the commander-in-chief , who in the
conclusion of his report paid high tribute to the Ar
tillery of his army in the following words :
"Cols. Crutchfield, Alexander, Walker, and Lieut. -Cols. Brown,
Carter, and Andrews, with the officers and men of their commands,
are mentioned as deserving especial commendation. The batteries
under Gen. Pendleton also acted with great gallantry." And later:
"The Horse Artillery accompanied the infantry, and participated
with credit to itself in the engagement."
In concluding this account of the great campaign of
May, 1863, the direct influence of the Confederate Ar
tillery upon the issue demands notice by reason of the
fact that history has almost completely ignored the
matter. Without calling further attention to the serv
ice rendered by Pendleton at Fredericksburg, which
was jointly rendered with that of Early's infantry, at
least two instances may be cited when the Artillery ex
ercised a direct and determining influence upon the ulti
mate result attained by Lee. Had Sickles not been
checked by Col. Brown at the furnace on May 2, he
would most certainly have developed the line of least
resistance in that direction, and thrown the main column
of his corps towards the southwest instead of, by a more
easterly movement, becoming involved with the left of
Anderson's Division. Had he, while engaging Ander
son with his own left, been free to follow up Jackson's
column with the force which Brown's prompt action
balked in its advance, the trend of that column would
have been more accurately determined, and at an early
hour in the day, that is before 1 p. M., Hooker would
most certainly have been advised of its true direction,
for already the head of the column had turned north-
552 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
ward at a point less than two miles from Brown's posi
tion, and nothing seems more probable than that this
fact would have been discovered through flanking par
ties of Sickles' Corps drifting up against it during the
advance of their main body. Already Berdan, with a di
vision close behind, had almost reached the unfinished
railroad ; had he reached and freely possessed himself of
it, this road would have formed the natural line of exten
sion for the troops behind in their effort to turn the flank
of any force which might seek to block their advance.
Possessed of this railroad Sickles' men would have had a
short route to the Brock Road, from which Jackson's
movement to the north would have been plainly visible,
and the very denseness of the country intervening be
tween the furnace and the Brock Road would have led
small parties of the Federals to search for points of
vantage from which to observe the movements of the
enemy. From the point where Berdan was actually
checked by Brown to the point along the railroad from
which a clear view of Jackson's column moving to the
north across Poplar Run and the railroad itself, and
ascending the Trigg House Hill might have been had,
the distance was not over 1% miles. The information
which Sickles would thus have secured would at once
have corrected the false impression under which he
labored, and which he created in Hooker's mind about
the enemy's movement to the south, and, added to the
reports coming in from Howard's front, would have
altered the whole estimate of the situation at head
quarters, giving Hooker and Howard some five hours
to prepare to meet the attack. In half that time, the
llth Corps alone, with such reserve artillery as was
available for use on the Federal right, could have been
so disposed behind Hunting Run as to present an im
pregnable front. With Barlow and every available re
serve hurrying to Howard's left, and Sickles already
wedged into the immense gap below the furnace, it
would not have required a tactician of the first order to
cut Lee's Army in twain. In fact, Brown's single bat-
THE LONG ARM or LEE 553
tery at one time stood between Hooker and the ac
complishment of this task. But let us pass from what
may appear too speculative, to that which is beyond the
realm of conjecture, and which savors of reality.
When Stuart arrived at the scene of action along the
Plank Road at midnight, May 2, he was totally ignorant
of the situation, and none of Jackson's staff except
Col. A. S. Pendleton reported to him. Fortunately,
however, he found Col. Alexander, who had the situation
in its broad aspects in hand. Rodes and Colston were
of course willing and anxious to give Stuart the bene
fit of all the information in their possession, but their
observations had been necessarily hasty and local in
character. It seems certain that no one at the moment
was so familiar with the situation as the Chief of Ar
tillery, whose very duties had led him to make a thor
ough reconnaissance of the paths and roads leading to
the front. That Stuart appreciated this fact, is evi
denced by his immediately associating Alexander with
him for the purpose of making a general examination
of the ground. It is now important to note from the
tenor of Stuart's report that Alexander, and not he,
discovered the Hazel Grove position and at once
grasped its importance. This fact is proved by the use
less and costly effort which Stuart made with Lane's
and Ramseur's brigades in the morning along the road,
while Alexander was massing his batteries in readiness
in the vista to seize Hazel Grove, at the first oppor
tunity. From the moment he had first laid eyes on
Hazel Grove, Alexander never lost its importance from
view, and in the light of what transpired, it seems
fortunate for the Confederates that its seizure was not
seriously attempted on the night of the 2d, before
Sickles and Pleasanton abandoned the position. Had
this been done, the attention of the Federals might have
been called to the point, and the head instead of the tail
of Sickles' column of attack would have been directed
towards the Confederates, thereby saving the key-point
554 THE LONG ARM or LEE
of Hooker's line of defense, and many men who met
their fate in the midnight fiasco.
Conceding then, that the occupation of Hazel Grove
was primarily due to the ready perception of Stuart's
Chief of Artillery, we must now go further and con
sider the controlling influence its occupation by the Ar
tillery exerted upon the issue. In the first place, there
is no reason to suppose that having twice failed on the
morning of the 3d to carry the Federal works in front
of Fairview, although aided by Pegram's artillery,
Stuart's infantry could have succeeded in a third at
tempt without artillery. In fact, the Federals them
selves unanimously ascribed the loss of their line of de
fense to the Confederate batteries at Hazel Grove, the
oblique fire of which Best's and Osborn's guns were
unable to withstand. The great mass of guns at Fair-
view Cemetery comprised the very bulwark of the Fed
eral defense, and it was those guns in large measure
which had swept back Stuart's gallant infantry from the
works they had taken, while the Confederate left was
subjected to an increasing pressure. To the threatened
point, Stuart's attention was more and more directed,
but meantime Alexander was moving the bulk of his
artillery to the extreme right, and when finally his ar
tillery preparations were well under way it must be
observed that it was not the Federal right, but that
portion of the line upon which the Confederate Artil
lery exerted its influence, that yielded, which of course
relieved the intense pressure on Stuart's left. It is thus
seen that the superiority of fire attained by Alexander
over the Federal Artillery, alone made possible the suc
cess of Stuart's third infantry assault, for it was the
withdrawal of their artillery that broke the backbone of
the enemy's resistance.
There are few better examples to be found than this
one of the power of artillery when once it has attained
a superiority of fire. Then it is that the crisis of the
battle has arrived, and whatever may be the timber of
the defending infantry, unless there are close at hand
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 555
fresh guns, as in the case of the Confederate short-range
batteries at Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg, to uncover
when the hostile artillery becomes masked, the day is
usually lost if the assaulting infantry is in earnest and
numerically adequate to its task. Stuart was fortunate
in possessing such an infantry, and it drove home with
all the ardor of its old recklessness favored by the fact
that almost until "cold steel" was the word, the support
ing batteries were able to maintain over its head a heavy
fire upon the somewhat elevated line of works held by
the enemy.
The loss of Fairview was but the precursor of
Hooker's withdrawal from the south side of the river,
for by its fall the Federal left was compelled to retire
before Anderson and McLaws. Even before it fell,
Hooker's heart had become set upon a general retro
grade movement. Otherwise, he would surely have al
lowed his batteries to be supplied with ammunition,
however hopeless their struggle might have appeared.
CHAPTER XXIX
PREPARATION FOR THE SECOND MARYLAND INVASION-
DEATH OF JACKSON BRANDY STATION
WHEN it became certain that Hooker had withdrawn
his immense army from the upper fords and had re
established his old camps about Fredericksburg and
Falmouth, Gen. Lee ordered his troops back to the
lines held by them during the winter.
Col. Walton immediately placed the bulk of the ar
tillery of the 1st Corps in camp at Stanard's farm, a
few miles below Massaponax Church, while Col. Brown
moved his batteries to the old artillery camping grounds
in rear of Hamilton's Crossing and about Guiney's
Station. Alexander, however, moved his battalion to
the immediate neighborhood of Bowling Green, a point
which was thought by both Gens. Lee and Pendleton
to be too far to the rear in case of emergency. Mean
while, the horses of the various artillery commands,
which were greatly worn down and depleted by the
strain of the recent campaign, were turned out to
pasture, although the orders were general that the Ar
tillery should be kept well in hand and prepared to
move at a moment's notice. Reports of the condition of
the batteries, detailing the number of serviceable guns,
horses, and the strength in personnel of each were
directed to be made, in order that all deficiencies might
be made up as far as possible.
The old idea that artillery battalions were an integral
part of infantry divisions had by this time almost dis
appeared, an advance in the right direction which had
taken long to accomplish. But still the old view con
tinued to crop out on occasions, as in the case of Col.
Cabell, who, instead of moving his battalion along the
Telegraph Road, as directed, to join Walton and rest
his horses, maintained his position on Lee's Hill in ac
cordance with Longstreet's views until he was peremp-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 557
torily ordered by Pendleton to repair to the rear. Cab-
ell, it seems, had preferred to consider his command as
permanently attached to one of Longstreet's divisions,
and had been most remiss in rendering his reports
through Col. Walton, Chief of Artillery 1st Corps.
Gen. Longstreet had arrived at Fredericksburg on
the 6th of May and soon after Pickett's and Hood's
divisions began to arrive with Dearing's and Henry's
battalions of artillery. On the day Longstreet arrived
A. P. Hill resumed command of the 2d Corps, Stuart
returning to his own division. Gen. Lee had also urged
the return of Ransom's Division, which the Secretary
of War, on the 6th, directed D. H. Hill in North Caro
lina to set in motion for Fredericksburg, if it could be
done with safety.
The great shock of the campaign now occurred, for
on May 10, Gen. Jackson succumbed. The story of his
last hours on this earth is one full of pathos, as well as
of the most inspiring lessons for the soldier. In the
hour of his death he was as great as when upon the
various battlefields of his career, with exalted mien and
superb composure, he led his men to victory. Concern
ing his wounding and death, Longstreet wrote: "The
shock was a very severe one to men and officers, but the
full extent of our loss was not felt until the remains
of the beloved general had been sent home. The dark
clouds of the future then began to lower above the
Confederates." Gen. Lee in a note to the wounded
general on the 3d, in the midst of battle had already de
clared that, could he have directed events, he should
have chosen, for the good of the country, to have been
disabled in Jackson's stead. In closing his message, he
congratulated Jackson upon the victory his "skill and
energy" had won, but the latter, expressing appreciation
of his superior's remarks, declared that Gen. Lee should
give the praise to God and not to him.
Soon after his wounding, he had been removed by
order of Gen. Lee to the Chandler house near Guiney's
Station, where Dr. McGuire did all in his power to save
558 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
him, but on Thursday the 7th he developed pneumonia
of the right lung, doubtless attributable to the fall from
the litter the night he was wounded. Fortunately for
the peace of his mind, Mrs. Jackson arrived this day
with their infant child, and took the place of his chaplain
who had remained almost constantly with him. By Satur
day, Drs. Hoge, Breckenridge, and Tucker had joined
McGuire in an effort to save him, and noting their pres
ence he said to Dr. McGuire : "I see from the number of
physicians that you think my condition dangerous, but
I thank God, if it is His will, that I am ready to go."
When informed by Mrs. Jackson at daylight the next
morning that he should prepare for the worst, he was
silent for a moment and then said, "It will be infinite
gain to be translated to heaven." And so we see that
although this wonderful man still clung to a hope of
recovery, his confidence in the future was as supreme as
his self-confidence had been on earth. Never once did
he express a doubt of his ability to rise paramount to
present difficulties or to meet the future. His sole re
quest was to be buried in Lexington, in the Valley of
Virginia, where as a simple and unassuming professor
of the Science of War he had kept the smothered fire of
his genius aglow while preparing himself and a host of
his pupils for the inevitable struggle which he had fore
seen. When told by his wife that before sundown he
would be in Heaven, he called for Dr. McGuire and
asked him if he must die. To the affirmative answer he
received, his reply was, "Very good, very good, it is all
right." His efforts then were to comfort his heart
broken wife, and when Col. Pendleton, whom he had
trained as a soldier and loved very dearly, entered his
room about 1 p. M., he asked who was preaching at head
quarters on this his last Sabbath. Being informed that
the whole Army was praying for him, he said, "Thank
God, they are very kind. It is the Lord's day ; my wish
is fulfilled. I have always desired to die on Sunday."
His mind now began to weaken while his lips fre
quently muttered commands as if he were on the field
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 559
of battle, then words of comfort for his wife. When
tendered a drink of brandy and water, he declined it,
saying, "It will only delay my departure and do no
good. I want to preserve my mind, if possible, to the
last." Again he was told that but few hours remained
for him, and again he replied, feebly but firmly, "Very
good, it is all right." In the delirium which preceded
his death he cried out, "Order A. P. Hill to prepare for
action, pass the infantry to the front rapidly, — tell Maj.
Hawks— " and then, pausing, a smile of ineffable sweet
ness spread over his pallid face and with an expression
as if of relief, he said, "No, no. Let us cross over the
river and rest under the shade of the trees."* Then
without sign of pain, or the least struggle, his spirit
passed onward and upward to God.
Such were the final moments of the great soldier.
With body all but cold in death, so long as his pulse
continued the dictates of his heart were pure. Almost
to the instant that heart ceased to beat, his mind gave
evidence of the quality of the man in the flash of the
willy though now subconscious, which possessed his
spirit. Still his mind dwelt upon rapid action and the
rush of infantry, which ever filled his soul with joy, but
then, even in the last flicker of his intellect, he realized
that the flag of truce had been raised by his enemies and
interposing the stay of his final words "No, no — ," he
died in the happiness of the earthly victory he had won.
Let us be thankful that he saw his men preparing to
rest upon their arms — not engaged in the heated
turmoil of the charge when he bade them farewell. Let
us be thankful that this dispensation was granted him
by the Maker who gently led him to the shade of the
river side where rested all those gallant associates who
had preceded him. No longer were they his pupils and
his subordinates in war, but his equals in the eternity of
peace. But yet an earthly rite remained to those whom
he had left behind, for far off from the scene of conflict,
that youthful band, bound together then as it is now,
"This remark was as given above, according to Capt. James Power Smith
of Jackson's staff, and not merely as usually quoted without the two first words.
560 THE LONG ARM or LEE
by the traditions of his fame, bore his body to the grave.
How fitting that a caisson of the cadet battery with
which he had for so many years drilled his pupils and
the Confederate Artillery should form his hearse, and
that his body should lie in state in the old tower class
room, wherein he had set so noble an example to
youth. It was in that very room that he had declared,
"If war must come, then I will welcome war," and that
the South in such event should "throw away the scab
bard."
In the shadow of the majestic Blue Ridge, with the
great North Mountain as his head stone, which like a
huge sentinel stands guard beside the parade ground of
his life, tenderly was his body laid to rest by the youth
ful soldiers he loved so well, but still, wielding the un
covered blade of immortality,
"His spirit wraps yon dusky mountain;
His memory sparkles o'er each fountain;
The meanest rill, the mightiest river,
Rolls,, mingling with his fame forever."
For one part of the Army, at least, it was Jackson,
the artilleryman, that had gone, for he in a higher de
gree than any of Lee's lieutenants had endeared him
self to the gunners to whose welfare he was ever at
tentive and of whose success he was ever proud. The
old love of the arm which he could not overcome in spite
of the more general command he had been clothed with,
coupled with the knowledge of the gunners that their
leader had once commanded a battery, created and main
tained a bond of sympathy between Jackson and his ar
tillery evidenced by innumerable little incidents in his
career as a general. One thing is certain, he was the
first of Lee's lieutenants to grasp the idea of artillery
as an entity and to employ it accordingly, and in this
he was ably assisted by Col. Crutchfield, between whom
and his chief the most thorough confidence existed. No
such relations as theirs existed between Longstreet and
Walton, neither of whom proceeded upon the principle
that the Chief of Artillery should be able to read the
THE LONG ARM or LEE 561
very soul of his commander, and by that constant and
close association which alone can breed the highest con
fidence between men, especially between soldiers, be able
to frame his every action in conformity with his superi
or's views. Mutual confidence between a commanding
general and his chief of artillery is certainly essential
to the success of the artillery, if not to the army as a
whole, for occasions will arise when the supreme com
mander must needs direct the movements of his bat
teries and there is always danger that the limitations and
necessities of the special arm may be lost sight of by one
who views the situation in its general aspect. Now, if
the chief of artillery has by his obedience, by his
readiness to act, and by his sympathy with the wider
problems of the general, won a personal place in ad
dition to his official position on the staff of his com
mander, he is prepared to suggest, without danger of
giving offense to his superior, a change here and there
which will at once inure to the benefit of his arm, and
enable it to accomplish the best results. If, however,
there is a want of sympathy between the two, or if the
subordinate holds himself aloof, or stands upon his
dignity and receives his orders in a perfunctory way,
rather suggesting by his conduct a superior specialized
knowledge, lack of harmony is sure to result with its
many evil consequences. W^e must concede, in view of
these facts, that Jackson was most fortunate in possess
ing Crutchfield, from whose relations with the com
manding general the artillery of his corps in turn
directly benefited.
The loss of Jackson was accepted by Lee in the same
spirit of Christian fortitude for which he was ever con
spicuous, and the day following his death the highest
tribute ever paid a soldier was published in the following
words :
"With deep grief, the commanding general announces to the
Army the death of Lieut. -Col. T. J. Jackson, who expired on the
10th inst., at 3:15 P. M. The daring, skill, and energy of this great
and good soldier, by the decree of an all-wise Providence, are now
lost to us. But while we mourn his death, we feel that his spirit
562 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
still lives and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable
courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and strength.
Let his name be a watchword to his corps, who have followed him
to victory on so many fields. Let his officers and soldiers emulate
his invincible determination to do everything in the defense of our
beloved country.
"R. E. LEE,
"General."
And to Stuart, the bereft Commander-in-Chief wrote,
"May his spirit pervade our whole army; our country
will then be secure."*
These words of Lee are referred to as the greatest
tribute ever paid a soldier, for never before or since has
so great a commander-in-chief as Lee appealed to the
love and memory of a lieutenant as the spirit which dif
fused should prove the motive power of his army.
On May llth, the Chief of Artillery, 2d Corps, re
ported that immediate steps had been undertaken to re
organize and refit his batteries. As it shows the con
dition of the Artillery in general, the substance of his
report is given.
Many guns were rendered unserviceable through lack
of horses. The available ones were as follows.
Walker's Battalion of 5 batteries, 14 guns in camp
and 4 on picket near Hamilton's Crossing.
Jones' Battalion of 4 batteries, 8 guns in camp and
4 on picket on the left.
Carter's Battalion of 4 batteries, 13 guns in camp
and 3 at the repair train in rear.
Andrews' Battalion of 4 batteries, 14 guns in camp.
Hardaway's (Brown's) Battalion of 6 batteries, 12
guns in camp, and 4 on picket in the center.
Mclntosh's Battalion of 4 batteries, 14 guns in camp.
Thus it is seen that but three batteries had been left
along the front while there were 87 guns available for
service in the 2d Corps.
Meantime, Col. Brown had sent out two officers from
each of his battalions amply provided with money to
•Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, pp. 792-3.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 563
buy fresh horses and authorized to sell the condemned
battery horses to farmers who might be willing to pur
chase them for future use.
The condition of Cabell's Battalion on the 15th is in
dicative of that of the others of the 1st Corps. Mc
Carthy's Battery with two 3-inch rifles, two 6-pounders,
one 4-horse battery wagon and two quartermaster
wagons, had 54 horses of which 12 were unserviceable.
Manly's Battery had one 3-inch rifle, two 20-pounder
howitzers, two 4-horse battery wagons, two quarter
master wagons, and 90 horses, of which 20 were unserv
iceable. With Carlton's Battery, there were two 10-
pounder Parrotts, one 12-pounder howitzer, three bat
tery wagons with 12 mules and 73 horses, seven mules
and twelve horses being unserviceable, while Eraser's
Battery had one 10-pounder Parrot, one 3-inch rifle, one
12-pounder howitzer, one forge, three wagons, and 62
horses, of which six were unserviceable. Including
mounts for the battalion sergeant-major, forge master,
wagon master, quartermaster-sergeant, and mounted
courier, 88 horses were required to complete the comple
ment of this battalion alone, while two Napoleons for
McCarthy, three for Manly, two for Carlton, and a 12-
pounder Blakely for Fraser were soon expected to
arrive from Richmond.
Gen. Pendleton made every effort to secure the horses
needed for the Artillery, but before the end of the
month was able to secure but 396. The condition with
respect to horses of the various battalions after the pre
ceding campaign is shown by the distribution of this
supply, which was as follows :
Hardaway's Battalion 112
Jones' Battalion 17
Walker's Battalion 56
Carter's Battalion 14
Macintosh's Battalion 34
Andrews' Battalion 40
Eshleman's Battalion 32
Garnett's Battalion 26
Cabell's Battalion 10
Alexander's Battalion _ 55
564 THE LONG ARM or LEE
This issue by no means supplied all the wants, which
fact gives a pretty good idea of the suffering and service
which the field artillery horses had undergone during
the short space of a single week, for it will be recalled
that the batteries were fairly well mounted when they
left their winter quarters the 29th of April.
Extraordinary efforts were now being made by the
Bureau of Ordnance to provide the necessary material,
and Col. Gorgas himself was present to examine into
the exact needs of all, and found that in general a
marked improvement in the ammunition was reported.
The shells for the 20-pounder Parrotts, due to defects in
the castings, were still unsatisfactory, for many of them
were reported to have burst near the muzzle. The new
projectile for the Whitworths, which had been fabri
cated in Richmond, however, proved a great success. In
the main, the field ordnance operations had been well
conducted during the campaign and satisfaction in that
respect was general. Capt. William Allan, Chief of
Ordnance, 2d Corps, had displayed unusual ability, and
his promotion was again urged by Col. Gorgas.
Nothing is so indicative of the growing appreciation
of the importance of the Artillery as the increased inter
est now displayed in the theoretical features of gunnery.
By a special order of June 8, a board to consist of not
less than three nor more than six artillery officers, to be
designated by the Chief of Artillery, was created and
directed to meet the first day of each month, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, to report such facts in regard
to material, ammunition, and any other matters con
cerning the Artillery, and to make recommendations
for its improvement. The board was also directed to
compile range tables for the various types of guns in
use. On the 15th, Gen. Pendleton appointed Col.
Alexander, Majs. Dearing and Henry, Capts. Reilly,
Blount, and Fraser to the board, and immediately they
set to work, extending their investigations over a wide
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 565
field and contributing in innumerable ways to the
betterment of the arm.*
It was at once found that a number of vacancies ex
isted among the superior officers of the Field Artillery,
which hampered the effective administration and leader
ship of the battalions. The number of guns with the
Army entitled the arm, under the law, to 3 brigadier-
generals, 7 colonels, 11 lieutenant-colonels, and 17
majors, whereas there were actually commissioned but
1 brigadier-general, 6 colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels,
there being, however, 19 majors, or two more than for
which authority of law existed. Already several pro
motions of importance had been made, among which was
that of Capt. Benj. T. Eshleman, of the Washington
Artillery Battalion, as its major with rank as of March
26, 1863. This battalion had not only furnished the
Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps, but three majors be
sides, namely, Garnett, Bearing, and Eshleman, while
one of its original captains, Thomas L. Rosser, had al
ready become a colonel of cavalry. Both he and Dear-
ing later became major-generals of cavalry. t
It was but a few days before the artillery board of
which Col. Alexander was president, and in the de
liberations of which he played a leading role, drafted a
plan for the reorganization of the Artillery and sub
mitted it to the commander-in-chief, with what result
we shall see.
By special order dated May 30, the Army of North
ern Virginia was reorganized into three corps with Long-
street, Ewell, and A. P. Hill as corps commanders.
The 1st Corps now consisted of McLaws', Hood's, and
Pickett's divisions, the 2d Corps of Early's, Edward
Johnson's, and Rodes' divisions, and the 3d Corps of
R. H. Anderson's, Heth's, and Pender's divisions.
Rodes' and Anderson's divisions each contained five,
•Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXVII, pp. 873, 895.
fRosser, Garnett, and Bearing were members of the graduating class at West
Point when they resigned in April, 1861. When the Washington Artillery
Battalion reported in Richmond in May they were assigned to duty with it,
the first as a captain and the others as lieutenants.
566 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Pickett's three, and all the others four brigades. The
Chief of Artillery was directed to designate the artillery
for the various corps and the General Reserve Artillery
was abolished.* This order marks a great crisis in the
development, not only of the Confederate, but of the ar
tillery organization of the world. For the first time
practical effect was to be given the growing recognition
of the fact that a general reserve artillery was no longer
necessary, and that the better tactical employment of
the arm required the distribution of all the guns among
the corps, if the danger of part of them being left in
active in the rear was to be overcome. The advantages
of corps artillery have been previously discussed
at length. Suffice it to repeat that together with the
change of name came also a change of position in the
order of march, and that every leader of troops and
every staff officer were at once compelled to recognize
that no part of the artillery was to remain in idleness,
but that all was to take a place in the line of battle since
improved material with its increased range enabled the
withdrawal of battalions for special missions, even after
they had once become engaged. It should here be noted
that Lee in the employment of his artillery had antici
pated the actual change in organization, which was,
therefore, in large measure, but the logical result of a
gradual process of development in his tactics. What
ever may be claimed as to the theoretical development
of artillery organization and tactics, the Confederates
certainly gave practical form to the conception of corps
artillery in its highest sense, and the innovation was
soon accepted and adopted by the armies of the
continent.
On June 2 and 4, Pendleton gave form to the new
artillery organization by first designating three divi
sional and two reserve battalions for each of the three
corps of the Army, and then assigning a chief of artillery
to each. The completed organization was as follows :
•Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, p. 850, Special Order No. 146.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 567
IST CORPS (Longstreet)
Col. James B. Walton, Chief of Artillery
DIVISIONAL BATTALIONS
CABELL'S BATTALION
Col. Henry Coalter Cabell
1. "A" Battery, 1st N. C. Reg., Capt. Basil C. Manly.
2. Pulaski (Ga.) Battery, Capt. John C. Fraser.
3. 1st Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Edward S. McCarthy.
4. Troup (Ga.) Battery, Capt. Henry H. Carlton.
DEARING'S BATTALION
Maj. James Dearing
1. Fauquier Battery, Capt. Robert M. Stribling.
2. Richmond Hampden Battery, Capt. William H. Caskie.
3. Richmond Fayette Battery, Capt. Miles C. Macon.
4. Lynchburg Battery, Capt. Jos. G. Blount.
HENRY'S BATTALION
Maj. M. W. Henry
1. Branch (N. C.) Battery, Capt. Alexander C. Latham.
2. Charleston German Battery, Capt. Wm. K. Bachman.
3. Palmetto (S. C.) Battery, Capt. Hugh R. Garden.
4. Rowan (N. C.) Battery, Capt. James Reilly.
ALEXANDER'S BATTALION
Col. E. Porter Alexander
1. Ashland Battery, Capt. Pichegru Woolfolk, Jr.
2. Bedford Battery, Capt. Tyler C. Jordan.
3. Brooks (S. C.) Battery, Lieut. S. C. Gilbert.
4. Madison (La.) Battery, Capt. Geo. V. Moody.
5. Richmond Battery, Capt. William W. Parker.
6. Bath Battery, Capt. Esmond B. Taylor.
ESHLEMAN'S BATTALION
Maj. Benj. F. Eshleman
1. 1st Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. C. W. Squires.
2. 2d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. J. B. Richardson.
3. 3d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. M. B. Miller.
4. 4th Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Joe Norcom.
568 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
2D CORPS (Ewell)
Col. John Thompson Brown, Chief of Artillery
DIVISIONAL BATTALIONS
CARTER'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Thos. H. Carter
1. Jeff Davis Alabama Battery., Capt. William J. Reese.
2. King William Battery, Capt. William P. Carter.
3. Louisa Morris Battery, Capt. R. C. M. Page.
4. Richmond Orange Battery, Capt. Chas. W. Fry.
JONES' BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Hilary P. Jones
1. Charlottesville Battery, Capt. Jas. McD. Carrington.
2. Richmond Courtney Battery, Capt. W. A. Tanner.
3. Louisiana Guard Battery, Capt. C. A. Green.
4. Staunton Battery, Capt. Asher W. Garber.
ANDREWS' BATTALION
Maj. James W. Latimer
1. 1st Maryland Battery, Capt. Wm. F. Dement.
2. Alleghany Battery, Capt. John C. Carpenter.
3. 4th Md. or Chesapeake Battery, Capt. William D. Brown.
4. Lee Battery, Capt. Charles J. Raine.
CORPS RESERVE BATTALION
FIRST VIRGINIA ARTILLERY
Capt. Willis J. Dance
1. 2d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. David Watson.
2. 3d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr.
3. Powhatan Battery, Lieut. John M. Cunnigham.
4. 1st Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Archibald Graham.
5. Salem Battery, Lieut. C. B. Griffin.
NELSON'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. William Nelson
1. Amherst Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick.
2. Fluvanna Battery, Capt. John L. Massie.
3. Georgia Regular Battery, Capt. John Milledge.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 569
3D CORPS (A. P. Hill)
Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery
MC!NTOSH'S BATTALION
Maj. David G. Mclntosh
1. Danville Battery, Capt. R. S. Price.
2. Alabama Battery, Capt. W. B. Hurt.
3. 2d Rockbridge Battery, Lieut. Samuel Wallace.
4. Richmond Battery, Capt. Marmaduke Johnson.
GARNETT'S BATTALION
Lieut. -Col. John J. Garnett
1. Donaldsonville (La.) Battery, Capt. Victor Maurin.
2. Norfolk Battery, Capt. Jos. D. Moore.
3. Pittsylvania Battery, Capt. John W. Lewis.
4. Norfolk Blues Battery, Capt. Chas. R. Grandy.
POAGUE'S BATTALION
Maj. William T. Poague
1. Albemarle Battery, Capt. James W. Wyatt.
2. Charlotte (N. C.) Battery, Capt. Joseph Graham.
3. Madison (Miss.) Battery, Capt. George Ward.
4. Warrenton Battery, Capt. J. V. Brooke.
CORPS RESERVE BATTALIONS
PEGRAM'S BATTALION
Maj. William J. Pegram
1. Richmond Battery, Capt. Wm. G. Crenshaw.
2. Fredericksburg Battery, Capt. Edward A. Marye.
3. Richmond Letcher Battery, Capt. Thomas A. Brander.
4. Pee Dee (S. C.) Battery, Lieut. Wm. E. Zimmerman.
5. Richmond Purcell Battery, Capt. Jos. McGraw.
CUTTS' BATTALION
1. "A" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Hugh M. Ross.
2. "B" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Geo. M. Patterson.
3. "C" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. John T. Wingfield.
From the foregoing we see that there were now with
the Army 15 battalions with a total of 62 light bat-
570 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
teries. Each battalion had a field-officer in addition to
its commander, and a complete commissioned staff. The
five battalions comprising the artillery of each corps con
stituted a division of artillery under the corps chief of
artillery, who reported to and received orders direct
from the corps commander, while the chief of ar
tillery of the Army reported to and represented the
commander-in-chief in his dealings with the corps ar
tillery. In the whole scheme of reorganization, one
cannot but see the features of the brilliant Alexander
cropping out, and the final success of his efforts to di
vorce the artillery from the tactical control of Gen.
Pendleton, except in so far as he represented the com
mander-in-chief in his capacity as administrative chief
of artillery.
By the time the reorganization was completed, Col.
Baldwin, the Chief of Ordnance, had received a fresh
consignment of 14 Napoleons from Gorgas, who was
energetically pushing forward the manufacture of the
improved gun in Richmond. These, in addition to the
14 captured pieces, were at once issued to the battalions
in the field in as equitable a manner as possible, only
two 3-inch rifles going to the Horse Artillery. The
distribution of guns was now as follows:
Cabell's Battalion, 8 rifles, 8 Napoleons.
Garnett's Battalion, 11 rifles, 4 Napoleons, 2 howitzers, and
one 6-inch Whitworth.
Bearing's Battalion, 5 rifles, 12 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one
6-inch Whitworth.
Henry's Battalion, 4> rifles, 12 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one
6-inch Whitworth.
Eshleman's Battalion, 10 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one 6-inch
Whitworth.
Alexander's Battalion, 11 rifles, 9 Napoleons, 3 howitzers.
Carter's Battalion, 8 rifles, 6 Napoleons, 2 howitzers.
Jones' Battalion, 4 rifles, 10 Napoleons.
Mclntosh's Battalion, 10 rifles, 6 Napoleons.
Andrews' Battalion, 10 rifles, 6 Napoleons.
Pegram's Battalion, 8 rifles, 9 Napoleons, 2 howitzers.
Dance's Battalion, 10 rifles, 8 Napoleons, 4 howitzers.
Cutts' Battalion, 10 rifles, 3 Napoleons, 5 howitzers.
Nelson's Battalion, 6 rifles, 8 Napoleons, 4 howitzers.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 571
Thus, it is seen that about equally distributed among
the three corps were one hundred and three 3-inch rifles,
one hundred and seven 12-pounder Napoleons, thirty
12-pounder howitzers, and four 6-inch Whitworths, or
a total of 244 guns of comparatively superior type to
those which had been in use within the past few months.
But, while the material was much improved by substi
tuting the captured rifles and the Napoleons of home
manufacture for the old 6-pounders, and while the bat
teries were equally equipped in the number of pieces,
that is four to a battery, a distressing lack of uniformity
in material existed. This was of course a glaring de
fect, greatly increasing the difficulty of ammunition
supply and impairing the general efficiency. Theo
retically it was capable of correction, but practically
there were many difficulties in the way. Some batteries
wanted rifles, others Napoleons, and few were willing
to be armed with howitzers alone. The gunners in the
various batteries had become familiar with their material
of whatever character, and the mere suggestion that uni
formity of battery armament should be enforced at once
raised a hue and cry on the part of all for the material
of their individual preference. For the sake of general
uniformity none were willing to waive those preferences.
After all, this attitude was natural, and it would have
required a bold chief indeed to ignore the human phase
of the situation. Believing that the good to be accom
plished by unifying the battery armaments was not com
mensurate with the general dissatisfaction such a step
would surely arouse, Gen. Pendleton declined to raise
the issue and so a great evil was allowed to exist to the
very end.
In the selection of a chief of artillery for the new
corps, the services of one who had been actively engaged
in every battle from Bull Run to date were recognized.
In the whole army, there was not one who deserved pro
motion more than Reuben Lindsay Walker, and his
elevation was welcomed by all and accepted in a spirit
of profound satisfaction by the Artillery. Less brilliant
572 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
than Alexander, he yet possessed the highest virtues
both as a man and as a soldier, and throughout his long
career gave many evidences of his peculiar ability as an
artillerist, especially as an organizer.
Here it should be remarked that in no arm of the
service was promotion so slow as in the Field Artillery.
In the list of battery commanders in May, 1863, we find
a number who had served in that capacity since the out
break of the war, and less than 30 of the original ar
tillery officers had attained the rank of field-officers
after two years of honorable and arduous service.
Many of these were among the most efficient officers in
the Army from every standpoint. Col. Long, Lee's
military secretary, said that the personnel of the Ar
tillery was unsurpassed by any troops in the Army,
and many officers in other arms have declared that the
Artillery was the most distinguished arm of the service.
It was the esprit de corps of the Artillery alone which
kept its officers true to their stripe, notwithstanding
the unfavorable opportunity for their advancement, and
few sought promotion by transferring to other arms,
Rosser, Dearing, and J. R. C. Lewis being among the
exceptions, while Col. Stephen D. Lee was promoted
out of the Artillery.
It has become the habit of historians to declare that
the Federal at all times excelled the Confederate ar
tillery in material and personnel. Even Col. Hender
son in his Aldershot lecture on the American Civil War
fell into the error of making so general and unqualified
an assertion.* Certainly, as far as the Army of North
ern Virginia is concerned, the quality of the personnel
of the Field Artillery was not surpassed if equalled by
any similar arm then in existence, a fact which seems to
be indisputable when the inferiority of its material, am
munition, equipment, stores, horses, training and all the
other disadvantages under which it labored are con
sidered.
*Science of War, G. F. R., Henderson, p. 245. But see Evolution of Modern
Strategy, by Lieut-Col. P. N. Maude, in which it is said that the three arms of the
Confederate Army were intrinsically superior at the beginning of the war.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 573
At the outbreak of the war the regular batteries
served as models to the Northern volunteers. One of
these was grouped with three manned by volunteers, and
the latter very naturally profited by the example set
them. Again, the supply of horses in the North and
West was practically inexhaustible, while in the South
there were few left at the close of the second year of the
war. Not only did the North possess the national school
of arms, which it was able to maintain in uninterrupted
activity for the technical education of its more scientific
officers, but it also conducted several schools of gunnery
while its armies operated in the field. In a measure,
West Point was offset by the Virginia Military Insti
tute, but had the South been free to conduct schools of
gunnery for its artillery officers, it would have been un
able to provide them with ammunition. After the war
commenced its only school of instruction was that of
actual experience, and a large majority of its junior ar
tillery officers fired a gun for the first time on the field of
battle. Surely the personnel must have possessed equal
if not superior qualities to those of their antagonists, to
accomplish the results they did. One need only follow
the rapid development which they brought about to be
satisfied that they were not ordinary or inefficient men.
We have seen what the stage of this development was
in May, 1863. Now let us examine conditions in the
Federal Artillery at the time.
If we accept the evidence of Gen. Henry T. Hunt,
Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, an officer of
great ability and unsurpassed special knowledge as an
artillerist when he wrote, the Federal Artillery in May,
1863, was in a most unsatisfactory condition.* In spite
of the splendid organization which McClellan had given
it and its initial services in the war under Hunt, a gen
eral decline in the efficiency of the arm had set in be
fore the end of 1862. Field-officers of artillery had be
come to be regarded as an unnecessary expense, and their
muster into the service was forbidden; so just at the time
*Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill, p. 259.
574 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
the Confederates were doing all in their power to im
prove the organization of their artillery by creating bat
talions with an adequate number of competent field and
staff officers, the Federals were destroying the tactical
cohesion of their artillery by denying it the necessary
officers, and instead of remaining in the artillery ir
respective of promotion, many of the best artillery of
ficers in the Army of the Potomac at once transferred
to other arms in which better opportunities for advance
ment were to be found. Thus, such experienced ar
tillerists as Hays, De Russy, Getty, Gibbon, Griffin,
and Ayres sought promotion in the cavalry and infan
try. While every effort was made to maintain the Con
federate batteries at full strength, however depleted the
units of the other arms, in the North no adequate meas
ures were taken to supply recruits for the artillery, and
the batteries were frequently dependent on the troops
to which they were attached for men enough to work
the guns in action. While Pendleton was maintaining
a remount depot for his command at Winchester under
Maj. Richardson, inadequate as it was, and scouring
the country, even as far as Georgia and Florida, for
draught animals, always being favored by the Quarter
master-General in the matter of horses, the Federal bat
teries were often forced to wait for remounts until the
cavalry, and even the medical and quartermaster trains
had been supplied, a fact which illustrated the general
feeling in the army towards the field artillery. While
the Confederate organization was being solidified and
molded along the lines dictated by experience, in the
North all experience was ignored and the Chief of Ar
tillery was in effect relieved by Hooker from all but
administrative work. In lieu of the perfect mechanism
of the arm under Hunt on the Peninsula, Hooker sub
stituted chaos. With the command of the Artillery at
his own headquarters to be exercised by his chief only
upon specific orders, there resulted such confusion
and disorder that the artillery had to be practically re
organized after a splendid organization had already
THE LONG ARM or LEE 575
been attained and sacrificed. Thus while the Confed
erates were building up, the Federals had been tearing
down. During the period in which the former were
organizing their artillery into corps divisions, all under
a strongly-centralized command, and appointing more
and more field officers, the Army of the Potomac had
no artillery commander- in-chief, and of the 14 artillery
brigades it possessed, nine were commanded by captains
and one by a lieutenant, in addition to their battery
duties, while but four were commanded by field
officers !
Such was the condition of the Federal Field Artillery,
when it entered upon the Gettysburg campaign, with
its 65 batteries and 370 splendid guns, It will, there
fore, as stated by Gen. Hunt himself, be perceived by
comparison that the organization of the Federal Ar
tillery was at this period in every way inferior to that
of the Confederates. Nothing but the same individual
courage and intelligence among the Northern artillery
men, as was to be found in the corresponding arm in
Lee's Army, saved the former from a complete break
down at Gettysburg. All the more honor is due them
for the account they there gave of themselves, but let us
hear nothing more of the superiority of the Federal Ar
tillery personnel, except in point of numbers. In that
respect the Confederates were greatly outclassed.
The return of May 20 gives the artillery personnel
of Lee's Army as 253 officers and 4,708 men present for
duty, and a paper aggregate of 7,279. These figures do
not include Dearing's Battalion and two batteries on
picket, nor two others with Ransom. The return of May
31, the last before the battle of Gettysburg, gives the
Artillery, less Alexander's and Garnett's battalions, a
total effective strength of 4,460. The 52 batteries re
ported therefore averaged 86 officers and men present,
and adding 860 for the 10 batteries not included in the
return, an effective aggregate of 5,320 is obtained. This
is not far from correct, since the aggregate present on
May 10 was 5,010. From these figures it is seen that
the average battery strength was about 3 officers and
576 THE LONG ARM or LEE
80 enlisted men, a fact which well illustrates the import
ance Lee attached to the efficiency of his artillery, and
the tremendous effort which had been made by the Chief
of Artillery and his subordinates to maintain the bat
teries at a serviceable strength. In the infantry and
cavalry there were battalions and squadrons at this time
with less than 100 men.
The aggregate strength of the Federal Artillery en
gaged in the Gettysburg campaign was 7,183, the num
ber of batteries 65, and the number of guns 370, or
about 110 officers and men and 6 pieces to the battery.
Having examined the organization of the Field Ar
tillery, let us look into that of the Confederate Horse
Artillery.
Immediately after the battle of Chancellorsville,
Stuart was directed to concentrate his division at Cul-
peper, meanwhile guarding his front and the Confed
erate left along the Rapidan, and before May 9, Jones'
Brigade with Chew's Battery was ordered from the
Valley to join him. By May 20, the strength of his
division, including the Horse Artillery, was 8,193
present and 11,905 present and absent.
Early in April the horse batteries had been organized
into a separate corps under Maj. R. F. Beckham, but
were temporarily left with the brigades with which they
had served, subject to the orders of the brigade com
manders.* The first step in the organization of the
Horse Artillery into a tactical unit had therefore been
taken when the Army was reorganized on May 30.
The growth of the battalion had been slow but sure.
Stuart from the first had proved an ardent advocate of
the increase in the number of horse batteries, placing
great reliance upon their services, and displaying un
usual interest in their proper development. Indeed,
though his historians do not include the horse batteries
in the organization of the cavalry, Stuart considered
them as much a part of his command as the cavalry regi
ments themselves. After Ashby raised Chew's Battery
*Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, p. 858.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBERT PRESTON CHEW
CHIEF HORSE ARTILLERY
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 577
and employed it so successfully, Stuart, it will be re
called, had organized the Stuart Horse Artillery. Its
original commander, as we have seen, was John Pelham,
who, just graduated from West Point, had been com
missioned by the Confederate Government at Mont
gomery as a lieutenant of artillery, and sent to Lynch-
burg in charge of the ordnance office there. From that
point he was ordered to Winchester, where he organized
and drilled Alburtis' Wise Battery, which he com
manded at Bull Run with conspicuous efficiency. When
assigned in the fall of 1861 to the duty of organizing
Stuart's Horse Battery, he gathered about him a most
remarkable and superior set of men, mostly from the
cavalry, some from Virginia, and some from Maryland,
under Dr. James Breathed. To these were added about
40 from Talladega County, Alabama, under Lieut.
William M. McGregor. It was not long before Hart's
light battery of Washington, South Carolina, was con
verted into a horse battery.
The experiences of the first Maryland invasion in
which the cavalry was so active and opposed to an enemy
well provided with horse batteries, convinced Stuart of
the urgent need of more artillery for his own command.
The day after the battle, Pelham's Battery, which had
received a large accession of recruits from Maryland,
was drawn upon for the men with which to create a new
horse battery, to the command of which Capt. M. W.
Henry was assigned, and on November 18 the light
battery of Capt. Marcellus N. Moorman, from Lynch-
burg, was converted. The men of Moorman's Battery
had been mustered into the service April 25, 1861, as a
company of infantry, under the name of the "Beaure-
gard Rifles," and sent to Norfolk, where for lack of
muskets it had been temporarily armed with Parrott
guns. When the Army was reorganized a year later
it was still serving as artillery at Sewell's Point and else
where about Hampton Roads, and was then definitely
mustered into the Confederate service as a battery of
artillery, and placed in a battalion with Grimes',
578 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Huger's, and Nichols' light batteries, under Maj.
John S. Saunders. Before its conversion it had, there
fore, served, and with great credit, throughout the
Peninsula, Second Manassas, and Maryland campaigns.
When Pelham was promoted major of horse ar
tillery, Breathed succeeded to the command of his bat
tery, while McGregor succeeded Henry upon the lat
ter 's promotion. During the winter of 1862, Brocken-
brough was promoted major, and his battery, the 2d
Baltimore Artillery, which had been detached for duty
in the Valley with Jones' and Steuart's brigades, was
also converted and placed under the command of Capt.
William H. Griffin. Another horse battery, McClan-
nahan's, had been formed by converting Imboden's
Staunton battery, but this battery was not regularly
brigaded with Stuart's Battalion until 1864, and
Griffin's battery did not join Beckham's Battalion until
Jenkins arrived at Gettysburg.
When Stuart finally concentrated his division at Cul-
peper towards the end of May, the Stuart Horse Ar
tillery Battalion was composed as follows :
Maj. R. F. Beckham
1. Ashby Battery, Capt. Robert Preston Chew.
2. 1st Stuart Horse Artillery,, Capt. James Breathed.
3. Washington (S. C.) Battery, Capt. James F. Hart.
4. 2d Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. William M. McGregor.
5. Lynchburg Battery, Capt. Marcellus N. Moorman.
6. 2d Baltimore Battery, Capt. William H. Griffin.
There was, therefore, a battery of horse artillery for
each of the six cavalry brigades under Hampton, Fitz
Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Jones, Robertson, and Jenkins,
respectively, as well as one for Imboden's independent
cavalry command.
At the end of May, the strength of the five batteries
of horse artillery present with Stuart at Culpeper was
18 officers and 519 men present for duty, with a paper
aggregate of 701, or an average effective battery
strength of about 107. These five batteries together pos-
THE LONG ARM or LEE 579
sessed 24 pieces of artillery, three being armed with
four and two with six pieces.
Stuart, who was making every effort to increase the
strength of the Horse Artillery in material, as well as
in personnel, sought to retain all the captured pieces in
his possession for his own batteries, and this led to an
altercation between him and the Chief of Ordnance,
who was unable to recover the guns for distribution. In
the correspondence which ensued, Stuart resented the
use of the expression that these guns had been "ap
propriated by the Stuart Horse Artillery," which he
erroneously, and no doubt because of a guilty conscience,
attributed to Col. Baldwin. The difficulty was finally
adjusted, however, by Gen. Lee assuming the burden
of the remark, which he denied was used by him in any
objectionable sense, and Stuart was allowed to retain
two 3-inch rifles and directed to turn in the three other
captured guns in his possession.
Beckham was endeavoring to provide all his batteries
with six pieces, a step which met with the disapproval of
the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chief of Artillery, for
the sole reason that the additional horses for this increase
in armament were not available. Even the dismounting
of some of the light batteries had become almost a neces
sity for lack of horses, but in some way Beckham soon
managed to supply the necessary number to complete
the quota of his battalion in spite of the fact that the
ambulance and ammunition trains were so poorly pro
vided with animals as to be almost unserviceable. Con
cerning Beckham's work in refitting his battalion and
establishing it upon a sounder basis, Stuart in his letter
to headquarters was most complimentary.
Meantime, Hampton, Fitz Lee, and W. H. F. Lee,
and the horse batteries of Breathed, McGregor, Hart
and Moorman, lay about Culpeper. The Artillery was
encamped on the farm of John Minor Botts, who was a
strong anti-secessionist and bitterly complained that
"Ten thousand men should burn his rails without
splitting any." Jenkins' Brigade with Griffin's Bat-
580 THE LONG ARM or LEE
tery had been assigned to duty in the Valley. On the
22d of May, Gen. Stuart reviewed that portion of his
division present, many distinguished personages ap
pearing, among them Gens. Hood and Randolph.
Great numbers of ladies also attended, which of course
pleased the gallant cavalry commander. Shortly after
wards, Robertson's Brigade arrived from North Caro
lina, and on June 4, Jones' Brigade with Chew's Bat
tery from the Valley, so that the following day another
review of the entire division was held, at which Gen.
Lee was expected to be present. In this Stuart was
much disappointed, but the "pageantry of war pro
ceeded." Eight thousand cavalry, with the battalion of
artillery in the lead, passed under the eye of the division
commander in column of squadrons.
So unique is this incident in the career of that grim
fighting machine, the Army of Northern Virginia, that
especial interest attaches to it. One is involuntarily
impelled to pause and reflect upon the exuberance of the
spirit of that youthful soldier, who, in spite of war's
dreadful tragedy all about him, and in which he himself
was a leading actor, could so indulge his fancy in the
very presence of the enemy. The following interesting
account of the review is taken from the war-time diary
of one of Stuart's gunners:
"Early this morning we started to the field, where the troops
were to be reviewed by passing by the eagle eye of their great
commander. The place where the review was held is a beautiful
and nearly level plain about four miles northeast of Culpeper
Courthouse, and little over a mile southwest of Brandy Station,
and on the west side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.*
"When we, Chew's Battery, arrived on the field some of the
Cavalry regiments were already forming in dress parade order
for the review procession. At about 10 o'clock the whole column,
which was about two miles long, was ready and in splendid trim
to pass in review before its illustrious and gallant chief, and his
brilliant staff.
"As soon as the whole line was formed, Gen. Stuart and his
staff dashed on the field. He was superbly mounted. The trap
pings on his proud, prancing horse all looked bright and new, and
*Now Chesapeake & Ohio R. R.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 581
his side arms gleamed in the morning sun like burnished silver. A
long black ostrich plume waved gracefully from a black slouch hat,
cocked upon one side, and was held with a golden clasp which also
stayed the plume. Before the procession started, Gen. Stuart and
staff rode along the front of the line from one end to the other. He
is the prettiest and most graceful rider I ever saw. When he
dashed past us, I could not help but notice with what natural
ease and comely elegance he sat his steed, as it bounded over the
field, and his every motion in the saddle was in such strict accord
ance with the movements of his horse that the rider and his horse
appeared to be but one and the same machine. Immediately after
Gen. Stuart and staff had passed along the front of the whole
line, he galloped to a little knoll in the southwest edge of the field
near the railroad, wheeled his horse to front face to the field, and
sat there like a gallant knight errant, under his waving plume,
presenting in veritable truth every characteristic of a chivalric
cavalier of the first order. He was then ready for the review,
and the whole cavalcade began to move and pass in review before
the steady, martial, and scrutinizing gaze of the greatest cavalry
chieftain of America.
"Three bands of music were playing nearly all the time while
the procession was moving, a flag was fluttering in the breeze from
every regiment, and the whole army was one grand, magnificent
pageant, inspiring enough to make even an old woman feel fightish.
"After the whole cavalcade passed the review station, at a quick
walk, the column divided up into divisions, brigades, and regiments,
which maneuvered all over the field. The last and most inspiring
and impressive act in the scene was a sham battle, the cavalry
charging several times with drawn sabers and the horse artillery
firing from four or five different positions on the field. I fired ten
rounds from my gun.
"Hundreds of ladies from Culpeper Courthouse and surrounding
country stood in bunches on the hills and knolls around the field
looking at the grand military display.
"A special train from Richmond stood on the track just in rear
of the review stand, crowded with people, and, judging from the
fluttering ribbons at the car windows, the most of the occupants
were ladies. Gen. Hood's Division of infantry was drawn up upon
the north side of the field, viewing the cavalry display, and also
for support in case the Yanks would have attempted to take a hand
in the show. There is a heavy force of Yankees camped on the
north bank of the Rappahannock, only about five miles from the
review stand.
"By about four o'clock this evening the whole affair was over,
and the troops withdrew from the field and repaired to their
respective camps."*
* Three Tears in the Confederate Horse Artillery., Neese, p. 168.
582 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
One would have thought that this affair was sufficient
to satisfy Stuart's love of the "pomp and circumstance"
of war. But no. When he found that Gens. Lee,
Longstreet, Ewell, and Pendleton would arrive at his
camp on the 8th, another pageant was ordered to be
held. But much less of that display for which Stuart
had so great a weakness was attempted on the occasion
of the third review, for Gen. Lee, always careful not to
tax his men unnecessarily, would not allow the cavalry
to take the gallop, nor the artillerymen to fire their guns.
On this occasion an incident occurred which, aside
from its amusing features, is of valuable interest to the
student because of its bearing on Stuart's character.
Capt. Chew had not come to Culpeper with any exalted
ideas as to the pomp of war. In fact, his battery was
reduced in point of appearance to the lowest plane to
which constant hardship and service could bring it. He
had only arrived from the Valley the night before and
with horses and men equally worn, found himself sud
denly on parade before the Commander-in-Chief . What
wonder then if, conscious of the ungainly appearance
of his half-starved horses, and in a spirit of pride, the
battery first sergeant should seek to improve the out
ward appearance of the battery by bestriding a fine,
sleek mule ! Just as the far-famed Ashby Battery, the
senior in rank in its battalion, and certainly the equal of
any other in point of service, approached the reviewing
stand in the very lead, Stuart's proud eye detected the
active ears of the mule at the head of the battery, and
with extreme impatience and disgust quickly dispatched
one of his aides to direct Capt. Chew to have both his
first sergeant and the mule leave the field! Says the
sergeant in his diary, "I cared very little about the
matter, but the mule looked a little bit surprised, and,
I think, felt ashamed of himself and his waving ears,
which cost him his prominent position in the grand
cavalcade.
"No doubt Gen. Stuart is proud of his splendid
cavalry, and well he may be, for it certainly is a fine
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 583
body of well mounted and tried horsemen. . . .
True a mule was not built for the purpose of ornament
ing a grand review or embellishing an imposing pageant,
but as mine so willingly bears the hardships and dangers
of the camp and field, I thought it not indiscreet to let
it play a little act in some of the holiday scenes of war."
One can picture the amusement this whole incident
afforded the youngsters of Stuart's staff, at their chief's
expense, not to mention Gens. Lee, Pendleton, and the
distinguished foreigners, who composed the reviewing
party. Perhaps no other general in the Confederate
Army would have paid the slightest attention to that
worthy mule. Of one thing we are certain, — there could
not have been many mules in use as mounts in Stuart's
Cavalry and Horse Artillery at this time, this one hav
ing slipped in, so to speak, over night !
But few other instances of such military frivolity on
the part of the Confederates are recorded. When in
March, 1864, Gen. Pendleton was sent to Dalton, Ga.,
to inspect the artillery of Johnston's Army, after re
viewing Hood's and Hardee's artillery and seeing it
drill on a number of occasions, he was tendered a grand
sham battle by Hood's entire corps, in which blank am
munition was used. The precedent for this display
was no doubt that which Hood and Pendleton had both
witnessed a year before at Culpeper.
Before Stuart's participation in his "horse play" at
Culpeper, the movement of Lee's army which resulted
in the Gettysburg campaign had commenced. Long-
street's and Swell's corps had already reached Cul
peper Courthouse, while Hill's Corps was left in
front of Hooker at Fredericksburg. After the review
the cavalry brigades were immediately assigned to posts
along the river, and Beckham proceeded towards
Beverly Ford that night, and placed four of his batteries
in camp near Saint James Church. Fitz Lee's Brigade
under Munford was assigned to the duty of picketing
the upper Rappahannock. Munford established his
camp across the Hazel River in the vicinity of Oak
584 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Shade. W. H. F. Lee established his brigade and
Breathed's Battery near Welford's house on the Wei-
ford Ford Road ; Jones' Brigade held the Beverly Ford
Road, and Robertson's remained at the Botts and B ar
bour farms picketing the lower fords. Saint James
Church stood about 200 yards to the west of the main
road to the ford and opposite it, and on the east of that
road in a large grove of trees stood an old brick house
known as the Thompson or Gee house, on an elevation
from which the fields on both sides of the road for a
distance of 500 yards to the north were commanded.
The grove was occupied by one regiment of Jones'
Brigade, the others bivouacking in the edge of the
woods, which skirted the fields to the north of the church.
Beckham, with Chew's, Moorman's, McGregor's, and
Hart's batteries, bivouacked in the edge of the woods
beyond, in sight of though in advance of the cavalry.
Beyond the camp of the battalion, unbroken woods ex
tended on both sides of the road for more than a mile,
and as far as the highland overlooking the river low-
grounds and Beverly Ford. From the latter point,
Beckham's and Jones' camps were about ll/£> to 2
miles.
Stuart, with his train in readiness for an early start,
had established his headquarters at a residence on
Fleetwood Hill, about a half mile east of Brandy Sta
tion, two miles down the road in rear of Saint James
Church. Fleetwood Hill complete^ commanded the
large open plain which surrounded it, with the ex
ception of the B arbour House Hill, of slightly greater
elevation. Such was the situation on the night of the
8th when Stuart, entirely ignorant of any concentration
of the enemy's cavalry on the north side of the river, is
sued his orders to march at an early hour.
Meantime, Pleasonton was approaching from the
north, with orders to make a reconnaissance in force as
far as Culpeper Courthouse if possible, to verify the re
ports that the Confederates were moving westward
from Fredericksburg. Pleasonton's force consisted of
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 585
two small brigades of infantry, some 3,000 men in all,
and about 8,000 cavalry, including Robertson's Brigade
of horse artillery of four batteries. Dividing this force
into two columns of equal strength, he ordered the first
under Gregg to cross at Kelly's Ford at dawn, and the
second under Buford, which included all of Ames' infan
try, to move by way of Beverly Ford, about 1% miles
above the railroad bridge, and 5% miles above Kelly's
Ford. Great care was exercised by the Federals during
the night to conceal their presence from Stuart's
pickets, and in this they succeeded.
At 4:30 A. M. on the 9th Buford's two leading regi
ments dashed across Beverly Ford and rapidly drove
the troops on picket there back towards the woods north
of Saint James Church. Upon learning that the
enemy was advancing from the ford, Beckham directed
Capt. Hart, whose battery was on the right of the bat
talion, to place a gun in the road by hand, while the bat
teries were ordered to hitch up and gallop back to the
Gee House Hill, some 600 yards in rear, and to go into
position there. Before the teams could be harnessed,
however, the enemy was almost upon the artillery camp,
and had begun to fire upon the horses at the picket lines.
But at this juncture Maj. Flournoy, with about 100
men of the regiment which had bivouacked in the grove,
dashed forward and temporarily checked the enemy,
which not only saved Beckham's guns, but gave time
for Jones to bring up the 7th Virginia Cavalry from the
main camp. Meantime, Hart had thrown two pieces into
action by the road, and Beckham in less than 20 minutes
after the first alarm was establishing his guns at the
grove. The 7th Regiment, upon coming up, immedi
ately charged, but was repulsed and driven back along
the road past Hart's two guns, leaving them entirely
isolated. Says Maj. McClellan, of Stuart's staff, "These
gallant cannoneers on two occasions during this mem
orable day proved that they were able to care for
themselves. Although now exposed to the enemy, they
covered their own retreat with canister, and safely re-
586 THE LONG ARM or LEE
tired to the line at Saint James Church, where they
found efficient support."*
During the charge of the 7th Regiment, the gunners,
standing in silent awe by their pieces perfectly aligned
along the wave-like swell north of the brick house,
watched the savage conflict between the horsemen in
their front, fascinated by the scene, and as Hart fell
back, alternately retiring his two guns from point to
point along the road, a wild cheer from Beckham's line
preceded the simultaneous flash of his 16 guns. Just as
the sun rose, the crash of the guns burst upon the ears
of the enemy's troopers, and soon the woods which they
had entered were rent with shrieking shells. Beckham's
steady fire forced the enemy to cover, while they sought
positions in which to place their artillery, none of which
had yet arrived from the ford. Thus did the Horse Ar
tillery hold Buford at bay, having lost nothing but the
field desk of the major, which jostled from the head-
quarter's wagon as it galloped off to safety.
The other regiment of Jones' Brigade now took
position on the left of the church, and Hampton with
four of his regiments occupied the rise between it and
Beckham's guns at the grove. About 8 A. MM W. H. F.
Lee moved down from Welf ord Ford towards the sound
of the firing and placed his dismounted troopers behind
a stone fence on the Cunningham farm, while Johnston's
section of Breathed's Battery moved down stream from
Freeman's Ford where the battery had been on picket,
crossed the Hazel River, and took up a position near
the Green House on a hill behind W. H. F. Lee's line,
from which it had a clear field of fire in every direction.
This position soon proved to be the key-point of the
Confederate line of defense. The other section of
Breathed's Battery moved back from Freeman's to
Starke's Ford.
A determined attack was made by the enemy's dis
mounted men, supported by a battery of four pieces,
*The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry, McClellan, p. 266. Also see article In
Philadelphia Weekly Times, June 26, 1880, by Maj. J. F. Hart.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 587
upon W. H. F. Lee's line, but it was repelled by the
Confederate sharpshooters, and Johnston's guns, but
not until several mounted charges made by the 10th Vir
ginia and 2d North Carolina Cavalry cleared the field,
driving the Federals back to the cover of the woods
along the Beverly Ford Road, and seriously threaten
ing their flank. Hampton had, meantime, extended his
right beyond the church, so as to partially envelop the
enemy's left, and together with Jones now advanced.
From this time until 10 A. M. the lines swayed back and
forth. During the early morning, the 6th Pennsyl
vania Cavalry, supported by the 6th United States
Regiment, made a superb mounted charge upon the
Confederate artillery position, over a plateau some 800
yards wide. The regulars, heedless of Beckham's shrap
nel, shell, and canister, actually reached his guns, and,
dashing between them, passed on only to be attacked
simultaneously on both flanks by the Confederate
troopers, who drove the survivors back. There are few
instances recorded of a simlar charge upon so strong
a line of artillery. Scarlett's charge at Balaclava was
no more daring than the one which Smith led at Saint
James Church, the latter possessing the additional fea
ture that it was premeditated and not the result of ac
cident.
Beckham's pieces now redoubled their fire, having
suffered none from the charge, and furiously shelled the
woods in their front, where the enemy was gathering in
increasing numbers. The artillery position was a com
manding one, and no doubt, had its flanks been guarded,
could have been held indefinitely. But the situation was
becoming serious in another quarter, for the head of
Gregg's column was approaching Stevensburg from
Kelly's Ford. Stuart had dispatched two regiments
under Wickham and Butler and one of Moorman's guns
to the support of Robertson's Brigade, which had moved
forward to Kelly's Ford early in the morning, and be
lieving the force of 1,500 men between Brandy Station
and the ford sufficient to guard the road to Culpeper
588 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Courthouse, proceeded to the church. His camp of the
night before had been broken and nothing remained at
Fleetwood Hill but a section of Chew's Battery under
Lieut. John W. Carter, which had been retired from
the fight after its ammunition was all but exhausted.
When Pleasonton found that Buford's column could
not overcome the resistance of the three Confederate bri
gades opposed to it in front of Beverly's Ford, he de
cided to wait until Gregg could move up to his assist
ance. The latter had readily effected a crossing at
Kelly's Ford about 6 A. M., Col. Duffie with four regi
ments of cavalry and a section of Pennington's Battery
in the lead. Duffie's orders were to move on Stevens-
burg, whilst Gregg with the rest of the column pro
ceeded towards Brandy Station in order to effect a
junction with Buford. Robertson had fallen back along
the direct road from Brandy Station to Kelly's Ford,
and the two regiments dispatched by Stuart to his sup
port were unable in spite of the most gallant efforts to
prevent Duffie's advance upon Stevensburg. But orders
now came for Duffie to join Gregg's main body and he
at once commenced to retrace his steps towards Mad-
den's, covering the movement with his guns while Wick-
ham's regiment retarded his progress in every way pos
sible. Meantime, unknown to Robertson, Gregg had
advanced directly upon Brandy Station, and actually
came within sight of Fleetwood Hill directly in the Con
federate rear before his approach, which had been con
cealed by numerous groves, was discovered by Stuart's
Ad jut ant- General, who had been left behind to main
tain communications. The leading regiment of Wynd-
ham's Brigade was already emerging into the open
about Brandy Station, within cannon shot of Carter's
guns. Without hesitating an instant, the young lieu
tenant brought one of his pieces from the road to the top
of the hill and boldly pushed it to the forward crest. A
few imperfect shell and some round shot was all the am
munition in the limbers, but with these a slow fire was at
once opened upon the enemy's moving column, while
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 589
first one and then another of the mounted cannoneers
was sent to inform Stuart of the peril.
The bold front which Carter put up led Gregg and
Wyndham to conclude that the hill was more formidable
than it was. At any rate, there was some hesitation on
their part and considerable delay while Clarke's section
of Pennington's Battery sought to prepare the road for
a charge. Every moment of this delay was precious to
the Confederates, for had Gregg succeeded in planting
his guns on Fleetwood Hill, Stuart's position would
have been most precarious. The first courier found
Stuart among Hart's guns near the church, and not un
til the second message arrived, and he heard the sound
of Carter's and Clarke's guns in his rear, did he counter
mand his order to Capt. Hart to ride back and verify
the report.
The 12th Virginia and the 35th Battalion were im
mediately withdrawn from Jones' line, 1^ miles from
Fleetwood Hill, and ordered by Stuart to gallop back
to Carter's assistance. Minutes seemed like hours to
Carter. Not a man but the cannoneers of his section
and Maj. McClellan of Stuart's staff occupied the hill.
The enemy had been imposed upon for a time, but at
last Wyndham's regiment in column of squadrons, with
standards and guidons fluttering, galloped forward and
commenced the ascent of the hill. Just as Carter was
retiring his guns, the enemy not 50 yards away, and the
last round having been fired, Col. Harman with the
leading files of the 12th Virginia galloped up to the
crest from behind, and without hesitating dashed at the
enemy. The rest of the regiment had strung out along
the road in great disorder due to the rapidity of his
movement, and as the men arrived in small groups, they
were no match for Wyndham's more collected force.
Stuart arived in a few moments, having ordered Hamp
ton and Jones to retire from the church and concentrate
at Fleetwood, while Robertson on the Kelly's Ford
Road was advised of the situation.
590 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Reforming his regiment Harman desperately en
gaged the enemy, while charge and counter-charge
swept across the face of the hill. Lieut. -Col. White, with
the 35th Battalion, had arrived shortly after Col. Har
man, and with two squadrons dashed around the west
side of the hill, and charged three guns of Martin's Bat
tery, which Gregg had already brought up, driving off
the cavalry support. But the gunners stood firm and a
hand-to-hand struggle ensued, in which neither side
asked quarter. This battery was the horse battery which
Pleasonton had with him at Hazel Grove on May 2,
when together with Huntington's batteries it repulsed
Winn's attack. In his report, Martin says: "Once
in the battery, it became a hand-to-hand fight with pistol
and sabre between the enemy and my cannoneers and
drivers, and never did men act with more coolness and
bravery, and show more of a stern purpose to do their
duty unflinchingly, and above all to save their guns;
and while the loss of them is a matter of great regret to
me, it is a consolation and a great satisfaction to know
that I can point with pride to the fact that, of that little
band who defended the battery, not one of them flinched
for a moment from his duty. Of the 36 men that I took
into the engagement, but 6 came out safely; and of
these 30, 21 are either killed, wounded, or missing, and
scarcely one of them is there but will carry the honor
able mark of the sabre or bullet to his grave."
White's men did not long retain possession of
Martin's guns, for the few troopers he had with him
were soon surrounded by superior numbers and were
compelled to cut their way out.
When the retirement of the Confederate line com
menced, one of Beckham's guns, as we have seen, was
with Butler's regiments, then engaged with Duffle; one
of Hart's and two of McGregor's pieces had become dis
abled from the shock of recoil, a section of Chew's Bat
tery had been sent to the right to join Robertson, arid
Carter's section of this battery was at Fleetwood Hill.
Thus there were but eight guns still in action at the
THE LONG ARM or LEE 591
church at the time. Leaving Moorman's remaining three
pieces with Jones' llth Virginia Regiment in position
at the church, Beckham with the rest of the artillery, in
cluding Hart's and McGregor's batteries, accompanied
Hampton's brigades to the rear, which came into action
just after Flournoy's Regiment of Jones' Brigade had
charged the 6th New York Battery, a section of which it
captured, but soon relinquished. Hampton's Brigade
advanced at a gallop in magnificent order, in column of
squadrons, with Hart's and McGregor's batteries
abreast of the leading line. As the column approached
the hill, its summit and the plateau east of the hill and
beyond the railroad was covered with Federal cavalry.
Diverging to his left, Hampton crossed the railroad
east of the hill, striking the enemy's flank with the head
of his column, while Hart galloped his battery to the
crest of the hill and opened fire on the enemy who had
been driven from the summit. But he only succeeded
in firing several shots with a single gun before the car
riage which had been partly repaired was permanently
disabled. McGregor now succeeded in placing two
pieces in position on the crest, and hardly had they gone
into action when the guns were charged by a party of the
enemy's cavalry, which from the extreme Federal left
came thundering down the narrow ridge, striking the
unsupported batteries in flank, and trying to ride down
the cannoneers. The charge was met by the gunners
alone, who, with pistols, sabers and rammer staffs drove
the hostile troopers from among the guns and caissons.
Lieuts. Ford and Hoxton with their pistols killed both
the brave leader of the charge, Lieut.-Col. Broderick,
and Maj. Shelmire, while private Sudley of McGregor's
Battery knocked one of the enemy from his saddle with
a sponge staff.
About the time the desperate attempt of the 1st New
Jersey Regiment to take the guns was repulsed by
Beckham, Jones' last Regiment with Moorman's three
guns arrived from the church, as did Capt. Chew with
the section which had been with Robertson. Beckham
592 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
quickly placed every available gun in position along the
crest and opened fire upon the enemy about Brandy
Station.
Hampton was more than holding his own on the
plain to the east, but the enemy was still contending for
Brandy Station, and a few were desperately defending
Martin's silent guns near the eastern base of the hill.
Lomax's llth Virginia spreading out on both sides of
the road to the station finally charged the latter, rode
completely over Martin's guns and pursued the de
fenders for some distance down the Stevensburg Road.
In the meantime, Hampton had, after a desperate hand-
to-hand fight with pistol and saber, overborne the enemy
in his front and followed upon their heels until com
pelled by the well-directed fire of Beckham's guns to
forego the pursuit. It was impossible even at close
quarters by reason of the dust and smoke to tell friend
from foe, and Beckham, rather than lose the effect of his
fire, continued to direct it upon the immense mass of
horsemen flying down the road in his front. The ar
tillery fire from Fleetwood Hill was most accurate and
effective and had, before the withdrawal of the enemy
commenced, several times broken the formations of his
cavalry.
Meantime W. H. F. Lee's Brigade with one regiment
of Jones' Brigade and Johnston's section of Breathed's
Battery had, by threatening Buford's rear, kept the
latter' s force from advancing to the aid of Gregg, in
spite of the fact that the direct route lay practically
open, and before dispositions could be made for the ad
vance Gregg had been repulsed. As soon as Gregg
withdrew, Stuart promptly formed a new line along
the eastern slope of the range of hills which, commenc
ing at Fleetwood, extended irregularly to the river at
Welford's Ford. Soon after Jones withdrew from the
church, exposing W. H. F. Lee's right flank, the latter
retired and occupied the hills overlooking the Thomp
son house, his line connecting with and prolonging that
which Stuart had established. Munford, with Fitz
THE LONG ARM or LEE 593
Lee's Brigade, was momentarily expected to arrive and
occupy the commanding ground about the Welford
house.
To the South, Duffie had arrived near Brandy Station
in time to cover Gregg's withdrawal by Rappahannock
Ford, and the activity of the Federals was now shifted
to Buford, who, extending further and further to his
right, until W. H. F. Lee's left was enveloped, launched
an attack from the high ground just south and west of
the Green House. The movement of the enemy had
forced Johnston to withdraw his guns about 2 p. M., and
in doing so he was joined by Breathed with the other
section of his battery, the whole retiring from point to
point and firing upon the advancing Federals. Buford
now sent forward a part of his infantry, and followed
up its advance with a mounted charge of two regiments,
which was quickly repelled. In the struggle W. H. F.
Lee was wounded about 4:30 p. M. Before the attack
had been repulsed Munford arrived on W. H. F. Lee's
left with three regiments of Fitz Lee's Brigade from
Oak Shade and at once threw forward a heavy line of
skirmishers with which Breathed' s Battery advanced.
But Buford was already falling back upon Beverly
Ford. Munford followed the Federals up closely while
Breathed doggedly hung upon their heels with three
guns and plied the retreating column from every avail
able position until the pursuers were checked by the
enemy's infantry and several batteries in position near
the ford.
Pleasonton afterwards attributed his retirement to
the fact that the purpose of his reconnaissance had been
accomplished since the presence of the Confederate
Infantry at Brandy Station was developed by his
column. But he must have kept his information from
Hooker, who on the 12th of June was, according to his
own words, entirely in the dark as to the Confederate
movements on his right, and Gen. Lee's intentions.*
Pleasonton's statement that the Confederate Infantry
*Oonduct of War, Vol. I, p. 158.
594 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
was seen disentraining at Brandy Station is wholly
false, for the first division of E well's Corps marched to
Stuart's assistance from Rixeyville, four miles north of
Culpeper Courthouse, by way of Botts' farm to Brandy
Station, and did not begin to arrive at the latter point
until Pleasonton had made his dispositions to withdraw.
So again it is seen how prone to error this "Knight of
Romance" was.
The battle of Brandy Station has been gone into in
some detail, because it was the first engagement in which
mounted troops were almost exclusively engaged on
both sides, and because it was one in which the Confeder
ate Horse Artillery displayed a most surprising degree
of mobility. Its successful employment was in marked
contrast to the comparatively ineffective use of the Fed
eral batteries. At every important point of the field, we
have found Beckham's guns playing a leading role, but
we search in vain for any material influence which the
guns of Pleasonton's column bore upon the issue. The
few which were brought into prominent action were
handled with great courage by the gunners, but they ap
parently had little or no effect, whereas the position
taken by Beckham at the church had proved the nucleus
about which the whole defense formed. Furthermore,
the fire of Beckham's massed batteries at that point had
practically brought Buford's column to a standstill, en
abling W. H. F. Lee to move upon the Federal flank
and check all hope of successful attack until the Federal
front could be partially changed to meet his threat, and
in the defense of Lee's line, almost at right angles to
that of Jones' and Hampton's, Johnston's two guns had
played an important part.
Again, when Gregg had all but occupied Fleetwood
Hill with his batteries, it was Carter's section of Chew's
Battery which snatched the opportunity from the enemy
and by the unaided efforts of a handful of bold gunners
saved Stuart, certainly from defeat, if not from a rout.
Beckham's rapid movement with Hampton to the rear
and the prompt massing of his batteries at Fleetwood
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 595
not only secured the position which Carter had pre
vented Gregg from taking, but contributed materially
to the breaking of the Federal column on the plain be
low with which Hampton was desperately engaged,
and the fire of the batteries was most effective upon the
retreating enemy. One of Moorman's guns had ren
dered splendid service with Butler's regiment in oppos
ing Duffie, while Chew with a section of his battery
in moving to the support of Robertson's Brigade on the
Kellysville Road, and then rapidly back to Fleetwood
at Beckham's summons, had traversed the field from
end to end in time to arrive at the decisive point at the
critical moment. The movements of the various bat
teries of Beckham's command exhibited not only re
markable mobility, and a rare ability on the battalion
commander's part to obtain concert of action between
his battery units, but also a most exceptional amount
of initiative on the part of his battery commanders who,
when assigned a special mission by direct order or by
chance, solved the problem which fell to them with skill
and determination.
In no battle of the war did the Artillery display a
higher degree of independence. This was as it should
have been, for if one objection to horse artillery exists,
it is as to its vulnerability on account of the large tar
get it presents while in motion due to the great number
of animals it requires. Then, too, it is sometimes
argued that much time is lost in the care and disposition
of the cannoneers' mounts. But such objections are
specious, and, even were they material, would be more
than counterbalanced by the celerity of movement and
the consequent diminishment in the time of exposure.
However this may be, Beckham's batteries certainly
proved the ability of the Confederate Horse Artillery
to take care of itself, for twice in one day the same
batteries were ridden over by the enemy's cavalry, and
yet the gunners managed to save themselves and their
material from harm by their own defensive power. Not
so much as a trace was cut, nor a team stampeded by
the enemy. It is true this immunity from serious injury
596 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
was due, in a measure, to the fact that the troopers
who got in among the guns on both occasions were
mounted, and therefore unable to secure the guns, etc.,
which they might have captured had the attacking force
been dismounted. But, then it must be remembered that
the speed of the mounted men alone enabled the enemy
to reach the guns which would have been quite impos
sible under the circumstances of each case for foot
troops. It was that same mobility which made it pos
sible for Hart and McGregor to move at the head of
Hampton's Brigade from the church to Fleetwood Hill,
that made it possible for Smith to dash across the open
in the face of the artillery, and for Broderick to rush
down upon the flank of the guns before they could
change front.
But even when cavalry possesses the requisite bold
ness and dash to accomplish such feats as those of
Smith's and Broderick's men, the gunners will always
possess a great advantage in the brief hand-to-hand
conflict which will ensue, for the majority of the mounted
men will as a rule pass on through the guns, unable to
draw rein. This was certainly the case in both instances
when Beckham's batteries were reached by the Federal
cavalry, and also when Flournoy charged Clarke's and
Martin's batteries. In the last instance, the Federal
gunners remanned their guns after Flournoy swept by,
and continued in action until finally overpowered by
Lomax, by whom the three guns were turned over to
Hart's Battery, the gunners of which opened fire with
two of the captured pieces.
In the battle of Brandy Station, the Confederate Ar
tillery loss was 1 killed, 10 wounded, and 1 missing, the
heaviest individual battery loss being in Moorman's
Battery, in which there were 1 man killed, 3 wounded,
and 1 captured.*
*Maj. McClellan, in his history of Stuart's campaigns, does not mention
Moorman's Battery in connection with this battle, and in the excellent account
of the battle by Lieut. G. W. Beale, 9th Va. Cavalry, which appeared in the
Richmond Times-Dispatch,, of August 11, 1912, no mention whatever of Moor
man's Battery is made. But see Beckham's report and the history of the
battery by Capt. J. J. Shoemaker, p. 39. The author also has a letter from
Capt. Shoemaker, who was 1st Lieutenant of the battery at the time, graphically
describing the part of the battery in the battle.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 597
Some idea of the ammunition expenditure of the
Horse Artillery may be gathered from the fact that a
single piece of Chew's Battery is reported by its gun
ner to have fired during the engagement 160 rounds.
But that such an enormous expenditure for a single
piece was by no means general is proved by the fact that
this gun burnt out at the breech before the day was over,
and was turned in as disabled.*
Of the part of the Artillery in the fight, Stuart in his
report has to say: "The conduct of the Horse Ar
tillery, under that daring and efficient officer, Maj. R. F.
Beckham, deserves the highest praise. Not one piece
was ever in the hands of the enemy, though at times the
cannoneers had to fight, pistol and sword in hand, in its
defense. The officers and men behaved with the great
est gallantry and the mangled bodies of the enemy
show the effectiveness of their fire."
We must now leave Stuart and the Horse Artillery
in order to follow the movements of the main army.
But, before doing so, it should be said that in all the
operations of the cavalry leading up to Gettysburg,
Beckham's guns took an active part. It should also
be said that in crossing the Potomac at Rowser's Ford
on the 27th of June, the practice of submerging the
guns and caissons and towing them across stream on
the river bottom while the ammunition was carried over
in feed bags, was resorted to by Beckham and was,
therefore, not one exclusively employed by Forrest in
the west, as some writers seem to think.
* Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery, Neese, p. 179.
CHAPTER XXX
FROM FREDERIC KSBURG TO GETTYSBURG
DURING the winter of 1862-63, Jackson had caused
his Topographical Engineer to prepare a detailed map
of the districts through which it would be necessary to
pass in going from the lower Valley through Maryland
to Pennsylvania.* This map was the most accurate and
remarkable one of its kind made during the war. It
showed every defensive position from Winchester to
Carlisle, and upon a study of this map Lee matured
his plans for the next campaign, which he desired to
make a decisive one. Longstreet proposed to send a
force into Tennessee to unite with Bragg and Johnston,
the latter then being at Vicksburg, which place it was im
possible for him to save. By concentrating such a large
force in Tennessee, Longstreet believed Rosecrans
could be crushed, Cincinnati threatened, and Grant
drawn off from Vicksburg. t But Lee preferred to in
vade the North, agreeing with Longstreet that in taking
this step the campaign should be offensive in strategy,
but defensive in tactics. Lee's idea was to force Hooker
to attack him in a strong position of his own selection
and he no doubt felt as Jackson did when he said "we
sometimes fail to drive the enemy out of his position,
but they always fail to drive us out of ours."
Gen. Lee's decision was reached near the close of
May and by the 1st of June he had completed his ar
rangements for the ensuing campaign. Before the
movement began, his plans were so fully matured and
made with such precision that the exact locality at which
a conflict with the enemy was expected to take place was
indicated on his map. This locality was the town of
Gettysburg.^ He was satisfied that if he could defeat
*Prepared by Capt. Jed Hotchkiss of his staff.
t Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania, Longstreet ; Battles and Leaders, p 245 ;
also see From Manassas to Appomattox, Longstreet, p. 336.
^Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, Long, pp. 267, 268.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 599
the Federal Army he could also drive it across the Sus-
quehanna and possess himself of Maryland, Western
Pennsylvania, probably West Virginia and Washing
ton, as well as relieve the pressure in the west and south
west. The plan being fully approved by Mr. Davis in
a personal interview, Lee commenced the movement on
June 2 by sending Swell's Corps to Culpeper Court
house, soon followed by Longstreet, while A. P. Hill
was left in observation of the enemy at Fredericksburg,
charged with the duty of screening the movement to
the west. By the 8th of June, the main body of the
Army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Cul
peper Courthouse, from which point Lee on the 9th
was able to send forward some of his infantry and
Carter's and Alexander's battalions of artillery to the
relief of Stuart at Brandy Station when, as we have
seen, he was assailed by Pleasonton.
On the 5th, when preparations were in progress for
the removal of army headquarters from Fredericks-
burg, two corps having already left, the enemy ap
peared in force on the opposite bank, and in the after
noon opened a heavy artillery fire near the mouth of
Deep Run, under cover of which they established a
pontoon bridge, over which a small body of infantry
was crossed. The evening and night was spent by
Pendleton in establishing the artillery defense with
the batteries of the 3d Corps, but the enemy's move
ment proved to be a feint, and soon after midday of the
6th, in company with the Commander-in-Chief, the
Chief of Artillery proceeded to Culpeper, arriving there
the morning of the 7th. The Artillery of the 1st and
2d Corps had accompanied their respective corps to the
point of concentration.
June 10, Swell's Corps left Culpeper for the Valley.
Milroy's Federal Division, about 9,000 strong, oc
cupied Winchester, while McReynolds' Brigade held
Berryville. Kelly's Division of about 10,000 men was
at Harper's Ferry with a detachment of 1,200 infantry
and a battery, under Col. Smith, at Martinsburg. Ewell
600 THE LONG ARM or LEE
reached Cedarville, via Chester Gap on the evening of
the 12th, whence he detached Jenkins' Cavalry Brigade
with Griffin's Battery, and Rodes' Division with Car
ter's Battalion to capture McReynolds who, discover
ing the approach of the Confederates, withdrew to
Winchester. Rodes then pushed on to Martinsburg,
and by the fire of Carter's Battalion, almost unaided,
drove the garrison out of its works and across the Po
tomac at Shepherdstown. Smith's Federal battery in
retreating by the Williamsport Road was pursued by
Jenkins, and lost five guns with all their caissons, teams,
and 400 rounds of ammunition. In the meantime,
Ewell with Early's and Johnson's divisions and the
corps artillery had arrived near Winchester on the
evening of the 12th. The next morning Early's Divi
sion, with Jones' and Dance's battalions of artillery,
was ordered to Newtown, where they were joined by a
battalion of Maryland infantry and Griffin's Battery.
Johnson moved along the direct road from Front Royal
to Winchester driving in the enemy's pickets, while
Early advanced along the pike to Kernstown and then
to the left so as to gain a position northwest of the
town, from which the defensive works could be attacked
with advantage. While Early was maneuvering for
a position, Johnson formed line of battle two miles from
the town preparatory to making an attack and was
opened upon by a battery of artillery near the Mill
wood Road. Col. Andrews at once brought up Carpen
ter's Battery in command of Lieut. W. T. Lambie,
which from a position to the left of the Front Royal
Road blew up one of the enemy's caissons and drove off
his guns. But almost immediately 12 or 15 long-range
pieces in and near the town uncovered and opened upon
Lambie's guns, forcing them to retire. Dement's Bat
tery in reserve also suffered some loss and was driven
from the field.
It was late in the day before Early was ready to at
tack. His progress had been opposed by a battery on
Pritchard's Hill, which compelled him to make a longer
THE LONG ARM or LEE 601
detour than he had anticipated. But finally Hays'
Brigade was moved around through the woods to the
Cedar Creek Pike, and along the road to a suitable
position, from which to assail Pritchard's Hill. This
hill was found by Hays to be occupied by a considerable
force of infantry, as well as by the battery, and Gordon
was sent by the same route pursued by Hays, to join the
latter in the attack. Together Hays and Gordon drove
the enemy across the Cedar Creek Pike, and Abraham's
Creek as far as Milltown Mills, and into their fortifica
tions on Bower's Hill, the latter being an exceptionally
strong position, well defended by artillery, and most
difficult of access by reason of the boggy creek bed in
its front. During the retirement of the enemy from
Bower's Hill, Maj. Latimer directed Carpenter from
the position to which he had retired to open with a section
of rifled pieces upon them, which was done with ex
cellent effect, but again the enemy's massed artillery
actively replied, whereupon about dark Latimer with
drew the battery and placed it in park with the rest of
Andrews' Battalion, which was not engaged again
that night or the following day. Early reformed his
division, three brigades in the front line and one in re
serve, while the enemy vigorously shelled his troops and
Lambie's guns further to the right. Night fell before
the attack could be organized and the men slept in
position on their arms, while a terrific storm raged and
torrents of rain fell upon them.
During the night, the Federal artillery was with
drawn from Bower's Hill and the south and west side
of the town, only a thin line of skirmishers being left
to confront Early and Johnson. Before 9 A. M. on the
14th, Early gained Bower's Hill, from which Ewell was
able to see the enemy's main work to the northwest of
the town. Early was accordingly directed to move to
the west of the town and seize a small open work near
the Pughtown Road, which commanded the main work,
while about 11 A. M. Johnson moved east of the town to
divert attention from Early and interfere as much as
602 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
possible with the work of fortification which the Fed
erals were busily engaged in. He accordingly advanced
to a point between the Millwood and Berry ville roads
and threw forward a regiment in skirmish order which
successfully engrossed the enemy's attention.
Leaving Gordon's Brigade and the Maryland Bat
talion with Griffin's and Hupp's batteries at Bower's
Hill, Early with the rest of his division, Jones' Bat
talion of artillery under Capt. Carrington, and Brown's
Battalion, less Hupp's Battery, under Capt. Dance,
moved by a long circuit of some ten miles under cover
of the intervening ridges and woods, and about 4 p. M.
gained a wooded hill (one of the ranges known as Little
North Mountain), opposite the enemy's position and
within easy artillery range of it. While Col. Jones was
engaged in placing the guns the men were allowed to
rest. At the north extremity of the ridge, just south
of the Pughtown Road, a cornfield, and at the south end
an orchard, afforded excellent positions for artillery to
fire upon the opposing works. The enemy had no
pickets thrown out towards the north and west, although
their main advanced work consisted of a bastion front
facing Early 's position. From this work a line of
parapets ran northward about 150 yards across the
Pughtown Road to a small redoubt, occupied by two
guns and an infantry support. So completely were the
Federals unaware of Early 's presence, that two miles to
the right of the position he had gained, the rear of their
line confronting Gordon at Bower's Hill could be seen.
Jones immediately upon arriving at the ridge care
fully reconnoitered the position with his battery com
manders and directed a battery of his own and two
batteries of Dance's Battalion, 12 guns in all, to be
brought up by Dance to the position on the right of the
ridge, which position was about three-fourths of a mile
to the left front of the bastion. Carrington with two
of Jones' batteries was then directed to occupy the
cornfield on the left of the ridge, a position somewhat
nearer the enemy's work, well to its right front, and
THE LONG ARM or LEE 603
from which it could be partially enfiladed. All of the
guns were held under cover on the rear crest im
mediately in rear of the positions assigned them, extra
ammunition brought up, and each battery commander
and gunner pointed out his special portion of the target.
The remaining batteries were held in reserve at the rear
base of the ridge, ready to relieve those in position.
Hays' Brigade, with Smith in support, was brought
up by Early and prepared to advance under cover of
Jones' fire. When the infantry had been refreshed
after a rest of about two hours, Jones gave the signal
for Dance and Carrington to open. Instantly the
twenty guns were pushed forward to the military crest
by hand and opened simultaneously, crossing their fire
on the opposing works. The Federal guns immediately
opposite Early's position were helpless from the first,
although an effort was made to keep them in action.
As soon as the Confederate fire commenced, the line
opposite Gordon began to fall back towards the main
work, and it was upon these troops that Latimer, east of
the Pike, caused Lambie to fire.
If the guns in the bastion and the small work on its
right replied to Carrington's group Dance was free to
fire upon them with the greatest deliberation, and if
they shifted to the Confederate right group, Carring
ton's nearer group had necessarily to be neglected by
them. Nor were they able under the most accurate
cross-fire of the two groups to concentrate with effect
upon Hays' line as it advanced leisurely across the in
tervening space. The works constructed for their
cover were well defined targets for the Confederate gun
ners, who had no doubt whatever as to their true ob
jective, and under such circumstances it was but a
question of a few minutes before a superiority of fire
was attained by the Confederate guns in their unex
pected and suddenly disclosed positions.
As soon as Early had seen that the Federal defense
was overwhelmed by the fire of his artillery, he had
sent Hays' Brigade forward, the men of which ad-
604 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
vanced without molestation across the open to within
200 yards of the enemy's works. Within thirty minutes
the hostile fire was completely subdued, and the de
fenders began to leave their intrenchments and fall back
upon the supports forming in the rear, whereupon the
signal for Jones to cease firing was given and the Con
federate assaulting column rushed up the slope, through
the brushwood abattis, and into the larger work,
bayoneting the cannoneers who remained at their
posts. Of the six rifled guns in this work, two were
immediately turned upon the fleeing enemy and the
troops forming to advance to the support of the
captured line. The Federals now abandoned the small
works to the north of the bastion, which were promptly
occupied by Smith's men, whereupon Dance shifted
his fire to the main Federal fort, holding his original
position in order that he might sweep the opposite ridge,
should it be recovered by the enemy.
The occupancy of the whole line of detached works
gave the Confederates complete command over the main
Federal position. Thus had the artillery, much as at
Harper's Ferry the year before, but with even smaller
loss, enabled the infantry to seize an exceptionally
strong defensive line. No wonder the latter was filled
with enthusiasm for the gunners.
In the operations leading up to so successful a re
sult Jones and his battery commanders displayed
marked ability and most excellent judgment. In the
first place, though always well up to the front in the
turning movement, they exhibited no undue haste, and
before rushing into position saved time and guarded
against mistakes by thoroughly reconnoitering the
position to be occupied by the guns. This having been
done, the batteries were brought up quietly, and without
the slightest confusion assigned their tasks. Nor were
the pieces exposed until the instant all were ready to
open fire. The method of bringing them into action on
this occasion is known as "creeping." Although a most
ordinary proceedure, and one which common sense
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 605
would always seem to dictate in circumstances like those
in which Jones found himself placed, a perfect storm of
discussion concerning "creeping" at one time broke out
among the artillerymen of the Continent, the pros and
cons appearing in numerous pamphlets.* It is such
artificial issues that overcome the patience of practical
soldiers to whom it seems that they have no place what
ever in serious treatises on the technique and tactics of
artillery.
As soon as Hays and Smith had secured the hill, Car-
rington moved his eight guns to its crest. In the mean
time, Hays had been reenf orced by Smith, and had with
the captured guns dispersed the column which en
deavored to recapture the position. An attack upon
Gordon's position at Bower's Hill had also been re
pulsed, so that the Federals contented themselves by
turning all the guns in the main fort and those in the
redoubt on the ridge to its north upon Early, to which
Jones replied as soon as he had brought up his bat
teries. From the captured position the Confederate
guns were able to fire into both of these works, as well
as upon the infantry masses near them, and continued
in action until nightfall. Although Hays' and Smith's
brigades had been formed along the rear crest of the
ridge for an attack upon the main work of the enemy,
the number of the latter, the difficulty of the interven
ing ground, and the growing darkness, all combined,
rendered a further advance unadvisable. But it was
apparent to all that the enemy had suffered severely
from Jones' fire and that his position was untenable.
Furthermore, Jones had early in the night brought all
of his guns up and placed them behind the abandoned
works.
Anticipating that Milroy would endeavor to escape
during the night, Ewell, just after dark, ordered John
son with a part of his division, and Lieut. -Col. Andrews
with Dement's Battery of Napoleons, and Raine's
*See Field Artillery With the Other Arms, May. p. 126 ; also see Von.
Schell, p. 43.
606 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
and Carpenter's rifled sections, eight guns in all, to move
to a point about 2^ miles north of Winchester on the
Martinsburg Pike to intercept the enemy's retreat, or
to attack from the north at daylight, in concert with
Early and Gordon, should he hold his ground. The
remainder of Andrews' Battalion was left with Lati-
mer in front of Winchester, somewhat to the southeast
of the town.
Finding the direct road to the designated point al
most impassable in the night, Johnson moved across
country until he struck the road leading from the Win
chester and Martinsburg Pike to Charles Town, and
marched via Jordan Springs towards Stephenson's De
pot, five miles from Winchester. By 3 A. M. he was
within four miles of the Martinsburg Pike, marching
rapidly towards it, Andrews' guns well closed up upon
the infantry. As the head of the column reached the
railroad some 200 yards from the pike, it was discovered
that the enemy, who had abandoned all his guns, was
moving north in full retreat, and almost instantly the fire
of musketry broke out between the heads of the two
columns. Johnson promptly formed his infantry in line
across the Winchester-Harper's Ferry Road, over
which he had approached the pike, a stone wall provid
ing excellent cover for the men. In the meantime, the
batteries had been halted about 200 yards from the rail
road, and the leading gun of Dement 's Battery ordered
forward to the depot, whence it was directed to be placed
in the road near the railroad bridge. Soon the other
piece of the same section of Dement's Battery was
ordered to occupy a position on the left of the road, and
well to the front. Neither of these pieces was able to
fire upon the pike at this time, however, on account of
the skirmishers in their front. But soon the skirmishers
fell back, followed by the enemy, and Dement's guns
opened with canister at a range of less than 150 yards,
and became desperately engaged in defending them
selves against the Federal infantry. Andrews now
posted Dement's second section and Raine's section
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 607
along the edge of the woods to the left of the road, and
somewhat further from the pike than Dement's two
guns, and Lambie's section of Carpenter's Battery at
a point about 200 yards to the right of the road to guard
the flank of Johnson's line. Hardly had these dis
positions been made when Milroy came on with his infan
try and cavalry, and attacked, making repeated and
desperate efforts to cut his way through to Martinsburg.
The 1,200 men which Johnson had in his first line were
now reenforced by Walker's belated brigade, and after
failing in several frontal attacks, and then in an effort
to turn the Confederate flanks, a part of the Federal
column, some 2,300 men, surrendered. The rest
scattered through the woods and fields, Milroy himself,
with about 250 cavalry escaping to Harper's Ferry, but
before morning, the Confederate cavalry had rounded
up many of the Federal stragglers.
In the fighting at Stephenson's Depot, Andrews
handled his guns with remarkable ability, all of them
being heavily engaged with the enemy's infantry at
close range for nearly two hours. The guns were shifted
from point to point with unusual celerity, and met each
attempt to turn Johnson's flanks with a well directed
and rapid fire of canister, following up the enemy's
dispersed groups after his column was broken. One of
Raine's guns, with an infantry support of but seven men,
compelled several hundred Federals retreating in dis
order along the Jordan Springs Road to surrender.
This instance illustrates the tremendous moral influence
of pursuing guns upon disorganized troops. Especially
effective was one of Dement's guns which during the
action occupied the railroad bridge and held it against
a large body of the enemy that endeavored to cut its
way over. In this section commanded by Lieut. Contee,
the loss was 1 killed and 13 wounded, the latter includ
ing the section commander. In the same section, 15
horses were killed or disabled.
In his account of the affair, Gen. Edward Johnson
says: "Before closing the report, I beg leave to state
608 THE LONG ARM or LEE
that I have never seen superior artillery practice to that
of Andrews' Battalion in this engagement, and
especially the section under Lieut. Contee (Dement's
Battery), one gun of which was placed on the bridge
above referred to, and the other a little to the left and
rear. Both pieces were very much exposed during the
whole action. Four successive attempts were made to
carry the bridge. Two sets of cannoneers (13 out of
16) were killed and disabled. Lieut. -Col. Andrews and
Lieut. Contee, whose gallantry calls for special mention,
fell wounded at this point. Lieut. John A. Morgan,
First North Carolina Regiment, and Lieut. Ran
dolph H. McKim, took the place of the disabled can
noneers, rendering valuable assistance, and deserving
special mention."*
Johnson's total loss in the operations of the 13th,
14th, and 15th was but 14 killed, and 74 wounded.
Some idea of the desperate work done by Andrews'
gunners at Stephenson's Depot may be got from the
fact that on that occasion he lost 2 men killed, 2 officers
and 12 men wounded, more than 10 per cent of those en
gaged, whereas the infantry loss was less than 2 per
cent of the force engaged. The total number of
captured Federals was about 4,000, including 108 of
ficers. The enemy abandoned 300 loaded wagons, 300
horses, a large quantity of commissary and quarter
master stores, and all their guns. Including those
captured by Early, 23 pieces of ordnance were secured.
Swell's total loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3
missing, aggregate 269.
Ewell at once informed Rodes at Martinsburg of
Milroy's flight, but as Jenkins was on the Potomac near
Williamsport on the morning of the 15th, there was no
cavalry with which Rodes could intercept the escaping
Federals. That evening, Rodes crossed the river at
Williamsport with three brigades, sending Jenkins for
ward to Chambersburg, and on the 19th moved his entire
*See account of this affair in Recollections of a Soldier, by the Rev.
Randolph H. McKim.
MA.TOIl .JAMES BREATHED
(.'11 IKK lloitsi: AKTI i.i.KUY
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 609
division to Hagerstown, where he encamped on the road
to Boonsborough, while Johnson crossed to Sharpsburg,
and Early moved to Shepherdstown to threaten
Harper's Ferry. In these positions, Ewell's divisions
rested until June 21, while Longstreet and Hill closed
up. The 2d Corps in a brief series of operations had not
only swept the route clear for the advance, with the ex
ception of 11,000 Federals at Harper's Ferry, but had
secured 28 pieces of superior ordnance with which to
complete the armament of its batteries besides turning
over the surplus guns and a large amount of supplies to
the Army.
On June 13, as Ewell's Corps approached Win
chester, Hooker put his army in motion from Falmouth
for Manassas. His plan to interpose between Lee's
flanks was opposed by Lincoln, Halleck and Stanton,
in spite of the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia
was spread over a distance of more than 100 miles, and
as Lincoln surmised, "was very slim somewhere." When
Hooker abandoned his position along Stafford Heights,
Hill started on the 14th for the Valley via Culpeper
Courthouse and Front Royal, Garnett's, Poague's, and
Cutts' battalions accompanying Heth's, Fender's, and
Anderson's divisions, respectively, with the battalions
of Mclntosh and Pegram organized as a corps reserve.
Longstreet's Corps, with Henry's, Cabell's, and
Dearing's battalions accompanying Hood's, McLaws',
and Pickett's divisions, respectively, and Alexander's
and Eshleman's battalions organized as the corps re
serve, left Culpeper on the 15th and moved along the
eastern slope of the Blue Ridge to cover the gaps. Hill
passed in rear of Longstreet, and when he was safely in
the Valley, the latter moved westward through Snicker's
and Ashby's gaps, the two corps uniting near Win
chester about the 20th. The march along the eastern
slope of the Blue Ridge had been an arduous one for
Walton's battalions, for not only were the roads fol
lowed extremely rough and difficult, and the heat op
pressive, but the artillery was frequently called upon to
610 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
make long digressions from the route to support the
cavalry and detachments of infantry in meeting the
threats of the enemy on the flank of the column. The
Cavalry with the Horse Artillery had, while endeavor
ing to screen the movement, been almost constantly en
gaged, encountering the enemy at Aldie, Middleburg,
and Upperville, and losing over 500 men in these
operations.
On the 16th the Chief of Artillery, after a week of
strenuous labor at Culpeper supervising the organiza
tion of the artillery trains, and assisting in arranging
for the reserve supply of ammunition, left for the
Valley and soon joined army headquarters which was
with the 1st Corps. Between the 23d and 25th, after
resting in camp near Millwood and Berryville for four
or five days, the 1st Corps crossed the Potomac at
Williamsport, and the 3d Corps at Shepherdstown.
Robertson's and Jones' brigades of cavalry with Moor
man's and Breathed's batteries remained at Ashby's
Gap, while Chew's, McGregor's, and Hart's batteries,
as we have seen, accompanied Stuart in his movement
around the enemy's rear with Hampton's, Fitz Lee's,
and W. H. F. Lee's brigades.
On the 21st, Gen. Lee ordered Ewell to move for
ward and take possession of Harrisburg, and the fol
lowing day Rodes and Johnson with Carter's and An
drews' battalions, the latter under Latimer, and Early
with Jones' Battalion, took up the march. Rodes and
Johnson proceeded via Chambersburg to Carlisle, and
Early's Division moved via Greenwood and Gettysburg
to York, with orders to join the main body at Carlisle
after destroying the Northern Central Roalroad, and
the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville.
Brown's and Nelson's battalions organized as the corps
reserve accompanied Johnson's Division.
On the 25th and 26th, Hooker also crossed his army
over the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, and moved to the
vicinity of Frederick. Here he threatened the Con
federate rear through the South Mountain passes,
should Lee move north, and also covered Washington,
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 611
but he soon found that his hands were tied by Stanton
and Halleck, who did everything possible to compel his
resignation, which was tendered and accepted on the
27th. At midnight, Meade was placed in command of
the Army of the Potomac. Meanwhile, Lee with the
1st and 3d corps had reached Chambersburg and
ordered Longstreet and Hill to join Ewell at Harris-
burg. Ewell with Johnson's and Rodes' divisions had
reached Carlisle. The following day, the 28th, Early
reached York and sent Gordon forward to destroy the
bridge, which was done, however, by a small party of
Federal militia, falling back before the Confederate ad
vance. Gen Lee did not learn until this day of Hooker's
crossing, for Stuart with the larger part of the cavalry
was entirely out of touch with the Army, and Robert
son with his own and Jones' Brigade had not moved
into Pennsylvania with the Army. Therefore, Lee was
in utter ignorance of the movements of the enemy (just
as Hooker had been at Chancellorsville), until one of
Longstreet's spies arrived about midnight on the 28th,
with accurate information as to the position of five of
Meade's corps, and Lee now learned that Meade was
at Frederick. That the absence of Stuart from the
immediate front and flank of the Army during its ad
vance into Pennsylvania was a grievous error on some
body's part seems certain, but the point cannot be gone
into at length here. It is by no means clear, however,
that the mistake is justly attributable to Stuart. Be
fore he separated from the Army with the larger part
of his division, he placed one brigade and part of another
in immediate touch with army headquarters, and this
force was at all times subject to the directions of
Stuart's superiors. The force was not used, but that was
not Stuart's fault. Stuart certainly had the sanction of
Gen. Lee for the movement he undertook, and if the
troops he left with the Army had been properly em
ployed, irrespective of what orders Stuart may have left
with Robertson, the absence of the cavalry would never
have been assigned as one of the causes of the Confeder-
612 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
ate reverses in Pennsylvania. There is much ground for
the belief that Lee counted on Stuart doing that which
he had authorized Stuart to leave for Robertson to do,
whereas Robertson, without direct orders from Lee
failed to do without any fault on his part what Stuart
would have done in similar circumstances. It would,
therefore, seem that Lee suffered more from the ab
sence of Stuart than from that of the cavalry, some of
which he had but did not use ; and again, it may be said,
that since Stuart was authorized to separate from the
Army of Lee, the latter as commander-in-chief must
bear the blame for all consequent mishaps.*
As soon as Lee learned of Hooker's move across the
Potomac and that the Federal army was marching to
wards South Mountain, he at once arrested the move
ments of his corps which had been hitherto ordered and
determined to concentrate his army at Cashtown. Hill's
Corps was accordingly ordered to move toward that
point on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next
day, leaving Pickett's Division at Chambersburg to
guard the rear until relieved by Imboden's command
from the Valley. Ewell was also recalled from Carlisle
to the point of concentration, and on the evening of the
30th his reserve artillery and trains with Johnson's
Division as an escort arrived near Chambersburg, and
Ewell himself with Early and Rodes reached Heidlers-
burg. Since Jenkins' Brigade with Griffin's Battery,
which had covered Swell's advance towards Harrisburg,
were the only mounted troops present, the advance of
the Federals upon Gettysburg was unknown. Heth's
Division of Hill's Corps had reached Cashtown on the
29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's Brigade
of that division, which had been sent forward to pro
cure a supply of shoes, found Gettysburg occupied by
the enemy, and returned nine miles to Cashtown, its
commander being unwilling to hazard an attack with his
*See Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign, Mosby ; also Col. Mosby's
and Col. Robertson's articles in Battles and Leaders; Campaigns of Stuart's
Cavalry, McClellan ; The Battle of Gettysburg, Henderson ; and numerous other
authorities pro and con.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 613
single brigade. Buford had early on the morning of
the 29th crossed into and moved up the Cumberland
Valley, via Boonesborough and Fairfield, with Gamble's
and Devens' cavalry brigades, after sending Merritt's
to Mechanicstown as a guard for his trains, and on
Tuesday afternoon, June 30, under instructions from
Pleasonton had entered Gettysburg.
Meade, who, like Lee, desired to fight a defensive
battle, very soon after taking command on the 28th
selected a strong position for his line along Parr's Ridge,
behind Pipe Creek. This ridge formed the divide be
tween the waters of the Potomac and Chesapeake Bay.
From Gettysburg, near the eastern base of the Green
Ridge and covering all the upper passes into Cumber
land Valley, good roads led to all important points be
tween the Susquehanna and the Potomac, as a result
of which the town was of great strategic importance.
On the west of the town, distant nearly half a mile, there
is a somewhat elevated ridge running north and south
with the Lutheran Seminary on the crest. This ridge,
known as Seminary Ridge, was covered throughout its
whole length with open woods. From the crest the
ground slopes gradually to the west, and again rising
forms another ridge about 500 yards from the first,
upon which, nearly opposite the Seminary, stood the
McPherson farm buildings. The western ridge, wider,
smoother, and lower than the first, intersects the latter
at Oak Hill, a commanding knoll at its northern ex
tremity, and about one and a half miles north of the
Seminary. From Oak Hill, the southern face of which
was bare, there is a clear view of the slopes of both ridges
and the valley between them. West of McPherson's
ridge, Willoughby Run flows south into Marsh Creek,
and south of the farm buildings and directly opposite
the Seminary, a wood bordered the run for about 300
yards, and stretched back to the crest behind. The
Seminary stands midway between two roads and about
300 yards from each, the first running from Gettysburg
southwesterly to Hagerstown, via Fairfield ; the second
614 THE LONG AKM OF LEE
northwesterly to Chambersburg, via Cashtown. Paral
lel to and 150 yards north of the Chambersburg Pike
is the bed of an unfinished railroad, with deep cuttings
through the two ridges. North of the town the country
is comparatively flat and open; on the east of it Rock
Creek flows south. South of the town, and overlooking
it, is a ridge of bold high ground, terminated on the west
by Cemetery Hill, and on the east by Gulp's Hill, which
bending around to the south extends half a mile or more
and terminates in low grounds near Spangler's Spring.
Gulp's Hill is steep and well wooded on its eastern face,
which slopes downward to Rock Creek. From Ceme
tery Hill, a ridge known as Cemetery Ridge extends
southward for a mile or more nearly parallel to
Seminary Ridge, 1,000 yards to the west. On a line in
prolongation of Cemetery Ridge rise two bold knolls,
known as Little Round Top and Big Round Top, re
spectively. The configuration of the ground compris
ing Cemetery Ridge is such that its crest forms a line
similar to the shank of a fish hook, with the crest line
of Gulp's Hill as the barb. The intervening ground
between Cemetery and Seminary ridges consisted of
rolling fields, intersected by numerous fences. Between
the two ridges runs the Emmittsburg Road, which
leaving the southern extremity of Seminary Ridge
crosses the depression in a northeasterly direction, and
passing over Cemetery Hill descends to the town. Such
are the general features of the battlefield of Gettysburg.
So impressed was Buford with the strength of the
various positions about Gettysburg, that no sooner had
Pettigrew withdrawn before his advance, than he de
cided to secure them to Meade. Expecting the early
appearance of the Confederates in force, he assigned
Devens' Brigade to the quarter of the field north, and
Gamble's to that west of the town, sent out scouting
parties along all the roads to collect imformation, and
informed Reynolds of the situation. His pickets ex
tended from below the Fairfield Road along the eastern
bank of Willoughby Run to the railroad cut, then
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 615
easterly some 1,500 yards north of the town to a wooded
hillock near Rock Creek. Meade arrived on the night
of the 30th, with his headquarters and the Reserve Ar
tillery under Hunt at Taneytown, about 12 miles south
of Gettysburg. The 1st Corps was at Marsh Run, the
llth at Emmittsburg, the 3d at Bridgeport, the 12th
at Littletown, the 2d at Uniontown, the 5th at Union
Mills, the 6th and Gregg's cavalry at Manchester, and
Kilpatrick's cavalry was at Hanover. Thus, while the
Confederates were concentrating near Gettysburg, the
Federal Army was widely scattered over the region to
the south and east of it. But Meade was soon convinced
that the movement of the enemy towards the Susque-
hanna had been abandoned, and while he issued care
fully drawn orders to prepare the Pipe Creek line for
defense, he also provided for an offensive movement in
case developments should justify it.
At this time the three Confederate corps were con
verging by easy marches on Cashtown, where Lee, now
more or less conversant with the positions of the Fed
eral corps, proposed to await an attack. Stuart was
still out of touch with the Army, and Robertson and
Imboden had not had time to come up. Pickett's Divi
sion had been left at Chambersburg to await Imboden's
arrival, and Law's Brigade had been detached from
Hood's Division and sent to New Guilford Courthouse,
a few miles south of Fayettesville, with orders to remain
there until Robertson's command arrived.
As soon as Hill on the 30th learned from Pettigrew
that the enemy was in Gettysburg, he informed Lee of
the fact and also Ewell that he intended to advance the
next morning and discover what was in his front. His
orders were specific not to bring on an action, but his
thirst for battle was unquenchable, and like the German
lieutenants in 1870 he rushed on, and, as we shall see,
took the control of the situation out of the hands of the
commander-in-chief. It was Hill, therefore, who
committed the second great mistake of the Confederate
campaign, the practical elimination of the cavalry being
the first.
CHAPTER XXXI
GETTYSBURG JULY 1
THE Confederate situation on the morning of July
1 was briefly as follows: Of the nine divisions, eight
with the exception of Law's Brigade were in motion to
wards Gettysburg, Ewell, in conformity with Hill's
plan, having at an early hour ordered Rodes and Early
to move on that point from the roads they were pursuing
toward Cashtown. Six of the divisions with the reserve
artillery of the three corps and the trains were concen
trated upon the turnpike from Fayettesville to Gettys
burg.
At 5 A. M., Hill with Heth's and Fender's divisions
and Pegram's and Macintosh's battalions of artillery
had left Cashtown, and at 8 A. M. Buford's scouts, about
three miles west of Gettysburg, on the Cashtown Road,
reported Heth's advance. Heth pressed on and found
Gamble's cavalry brigade in position on the McPher-
son Ridge from the Fairfield Road to the railroad cut,
supported by Calef's regular battery, one section of
which was stationed near the left of the line and the
other two across the Chambersburg or Cashtown Pike.*
Devens' squadrons prolonged Gamble's line to Oak
Hill.
As Heth advanced, he threw Archer's Brigade to the
right and Davis' to the left of the Cashtown Pike with
Pettigrew's and Brockenbrough's brigades in support.
Pegram's and Mclntosh's battalions, though well up,
were unable to gain positions from which to prepare
the attack before Heth launched his brigades, and the
batteries were left to act as best they could, without
any definite plan or objective. Hence, Heth's first at
tack was well resisted by Buford's dismounted troopers,
who would have been unable to hold their lines had they
been first subjected to a heavy artillery fire. Heth
*This battery was distinguished as Duncan's Battery in the Mexican War.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 617
would almost certainly have been able by a proper con
cert with Pegram and Mclntosh to seize Buford's po
sition before the latter was reinforced.
Upon receiving Buford's report, Reynolds started
for Gettysburg with Wadsworth's small division of two
brigades, and Hall's 2d Maine Battery, ordering
Doubleday and Howard to follow with their corps.
Hearing the sound of battle as he approached the town,
Reynolds directed his troops to cross the fields towards
the firing, and himself joined Buford at the Seminary.
It was now past 10 o'clock, and Heth had formed for
attack. Reynolds placed three of the regiments which
he had brought up north of the railroad cut, and two
south of the pike, substituting Hall's Battery for
Calef's, thus relieving the dismounted troopers, who
had alone opposed Hill for the past two hours. Cutler's
regiments were hardly in position when they were
furiously charged by Davis' Brigade and swept back
to Seminary Ridge under the fire of Pegram' s guns,
which also forced Hall to retire his battery by sections.
Reynolds had meantime sent to the rear to hurry
Doubleday forward and one of the latter's regiments,
together with the two which had been posted south of the
pike under Col. Fowler, charged Davis' Brigade and
drove it from the cut with terrible loss to both sides. The
Confederate brigade, losing all its field-officers but two,
and many of its men, was disabled for the rest of the
day. Just as Davis' Brigade overlapped Cutler's on
the right, so Meredith's, the other brigade which Rey
nolds had brought up, overlapped Archer's on the
latter's right. As Meredith's Brigade entered the wood
west of the Seminary, it was ordered forward by Rey
nolds in a furious charge upon Archer's Brigade, turn
ing the Confederate flank, capturing Archer and most
of his men, and pursuing the others beyond Willoughby
Run. Almost at the moment of victory, the superb
Reynolds, who with that magnanimity which character
ized his soul, had disregarded the affront of Meade's ap
pointment over him, and had only sought to aid his
618 THE LONG ARM or LEE
new commander and serve his country to the utmost
of his ability, was killed in the wood by a sharpshooter.
But with Wadsworth's Division he had, with rare
promptitude and gallantry, "determined the decisive
field of the war." In the words of Gen. Hunt, it may be
said that " to him may be applied in a wider sense than
in its original one Napier's happy eulogium on Ridge:
'No man died on that field with more glory than he,
yet many died, and there was much glory.' '
Soon after the repulse of Davis and Archer, Rowley's
and Robinson's divisions of two brigades each with the
four remaining batteries of the Corps arrived. Of Row
ley's Division, Stone's Brigade occupied the interval be
tween Meredith and Cutler, and Biddle's Brigade with
Cooper's Battery took position on the ridge between the
Fairfield Road and the wood. Reynolds' Battery re
placed Hall's, and Calef's rejoined Gamble's Brigade,
which with Devens' had been withdrawn from the field
about 11 A. M. and stationed as a reserve in rear of the
Federal left. Robinson's Division was also held as a re
serve near the base of Seminary Ridge. Gen. Howard
arrived about noon and, assuming command, directed
Gen. Schurz commanding the llth Corps to prolong
Doubleday's line towards Oak Hill with two of his divi
sions and three batteries, and to post his third division
and two batteries on Cemetery Hill as a rallying point.
Heth had, meantime, been preparing to renew the
attack, and, as soon as Fender arrived to support him,
was ordered to advance by Hill. The greater portion
of Heth's line now moved to the attack south of the
Cashtown Pike, with Fender's Division formed in a
second line. The nine batteries of Pegram's and Mcln-
tosh's battalions occupied positions west of Willoughby
Run, with Lane's, Poague's, Cutts', and Garnett's
battalions held in reserve along the pike some distance
to the rear. Pegram's entire battalion went into action
on a low crest just to the right of the turnpike, while
Rice's Battery and Hurt's section of Whitworths
joined it. Johnson's Battery and Hurt's other section
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 619
occupied a commanding hill further to the right near
the Fairfield Road, while the 2d Rockbridge Battery,
under Lieut. Wallace, was stationed just to the left of
the pike. The two battalions at once opened with a slow
fire which gradually grew in intensity as the Federal
guns uncovered. Hurt's Whitworths were energetically
employed in shelling the woods and soon Maurin's Bat
tery of Garnett's Battalion moved up to the relief of
one of Pegram's batteries, which had exhausted its am
munition.
At this juncture there were nine batteries engaged on
either side. But Hill was not to deliver the attack un
aided, for, approaching Gettysburg and guided by the
sound of battle, Rodes had directed his march along the
prolongation of Seminary Ridge, with three brigades on
the western and two on the eastern slope, while Ewell
ordered Carter to seize Oak Hill for his battalion of ar
tillery. By 1 o'clock the approach of Ewell had been
detected, and by 2 o'clock the column had begun to
arrive over the Middletown Road and Carter was es
tablishing his guns in position. Whereupon Howard
called on Sickles at Emmittsburg, and Slocum at Two
Taverns, for aid.
Col. Carter moved out ahead of Rodes' line, and plac
ing W. P. Carter's and Fry's batteries in position on
Oak Hill opened a destructive fire upon the enemy's
line running along the ridge west of the town to the
railroad cut. The effect of these two batteries,
though in a position much exposed to the ar
tillery and musketry fire of the enemy, was such as to
cause Schurz, who had prolonged Doubleday's line to
the right, to change front with his two divisions and oc
cupy a low ridge half a mile north of the town. This
change of front left a gap between his left and Double-
day's right covered only by the fire of Dilger's and
Wheeler's batteries posted behind it. To meet the
movement effected by Schurz, whose line was now at
right angles to that of Doubleday and confronting
Rodes, Carter moved Page's and Reese's batteries to the
620 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Confederate left. Page's Battery went into action at
the foot of the ridge occupied by O'Neal's Brigade, and
opened with canister upon the enemy's infantry, which
advanced to the attack. Disregarding at first the fire
of the Federal batteries, a number of which had taken
position in the valley north of the town and had con
centrated upon him, Page was finally driven back to a
more retired position. How persistently W. P. Carter
at Oak Hill and Page maintained their fire is shown by
the fact that within a short space of time the former
lost 4 men killed and 7 wounded, while the latter lost
4 men killed and 26 wounded, and 17 horses.
Mclntosh and Pegram had from the first crossed fire
with Carter, and from their positions had not only as
sisted in forcing Schurz to abandon his original line,
but had been able, by advancing two of Mclntosh' s bat
teries to the hollow east of Willoughby Run, to enfilade
a large mass of infantry in the railroad cut, completely
clearing it of the enemy.
The Federal attack on Rodes' left had become
serious. Not only was Page's Battery compelled to re
tire, but Iverson had lost three of his regiments, or
about 1,000 of his men, and the flank was being
gradually turned. Leaving Fry's Battery in its original
position on the ridge, Col. Carter rapidly moved
Carter's, Page's, and Reese's batteries to its eastern
base behind Doles' Brigade, which now held the extreme
Confederate left. These batteries, by a tremendous ef
fort, succeeded almost single-handed in checking the
Federal advance and driving back both the infantry and
artillery of the enemy from the threatened point.
Carter's Battery, though much depleted and damaged,
delivered a most effective fire with reckless daring.
At this juncture, about 3:30 p. M., Early's Division
began to arrive on Rodes' left, and Devens' dis
mounted troopers who had been holding a hillock on
Rock Creek were driven off by Doles' skirmishers.
Barlow, however, advanced his division supported by
Wilkerson's Battery, and recovered the position, but in
THE LONG ARM or LEE 621
order to connect with Barlow's left, it was necessary
for Schurz to push forward his center, and still further
attenuate his line.
As Early arrived, he took in the situation at a glance,
and directed Jones to throw his battalion into action
east of Rock Creek, and somewhat north of Barlow's
position. With twelve pieces Jones soon opened at easy
range upon the flank of Barlow's massed division, tak
ing part of it in reverse. No troops could withstand
such a fire long. No sooner had Jones opened than
Gordon's, Hays', and Avery's brigades in line, with
Smith's in support, moved out and attacked Barlow,
Gordon on the right connecting with Doles on Rodes'
left. The Confederate line was now, about 4 p. M.,
thoroughly reestablished, and from right to left con
sisted of Heth's, Rodes', and Early's divisions, sup
ported by four battalions of artillery, or seventeen bat
teries, all in action.
A bloody contest now ensued between Barlow and
Early in which the former was desperately wounded,
and Wilkerson's Battery severely punished after losing
its commander. The whole llth Corps or right wing
of the Federal line was soon driven back almost to the
town, where Schurz sought to establish a new line upon
a brigade and Heckman's Battery which he drew from
Cemetery Hill for the purpose. Jones had suffered
the loss of several men and one gun, which was struck
and bent by a solid shot. Three of his pieces had also
been rendered temporarily unserviceable by projectiles
wedging in the bore. But as soon as Early's advance
had masked his fire upon Barlow's retreating masses,
he sent Carrington's Battery across the creek in
order that it might secure a better position in front of
the town.
Doubleday had been vigorously attacked by Rodes
on his right, and both Heth and Fender of Hill's Divi
sion on his left. Early's success completely uncovered
his right, which was overlapped a quarter of a mile or
more by Rodes. But still retiring slowly to the base
622 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
of Seminary Ridge, where Col. Wainwright command
ing the artillery of the 1st Corps had massed 12 guns
south of the Cashtown pike, and Stewart's Battery
slightly north of it, the Federals offered a desperate re
sistance. Buford had thrown about half of Gamble's
dismounted troopers forward on the left, south of the
Fairfield Road. Heth's Division had suffered severely
and Fender had moved into the front line. On the Con
federate side, Gen. Pendleton was seeking to move
Johnson's Battery to a position well to Heth's right,
from which to enfilade Doubleday's left, and had
ordered Garnett's Battalion forward along the pike and
Poague's Battalion to move up under cover to the right
between Johnson and Pegram. The artillery cordon
was thus almost completed from the Fairfield Road to
Rock Creek, when about 4 p. M. the whole Confederate
line advanced to the final attack. Schurz, then Double-
day, gave the order to fall back upon Cemetery Hill, but
not until Davison's section of Stewart's Battery had
raked Scale's Brigade in column on the pike, and
Wain Wright's guns had inflicted great punishment upon
Perrin in spite of Pegram's and Mclntosh's fire. Wain
wright, mistaking the order, had clung to Seminary
Hill, until, seeing the infantry retreating to the town,
he moved his batteries down the Cashtown Pike, where
they were overlapped on both sides by the Confederate
skirmishers at close range. There, he was compelled to
abandon a gun all the horses of which were killed.
Schurz was also compelled to leave a gun on the field.
The Confederate batteries now advanced rapidly
from their several positions, and at once went into
action along Seminary Ridge, while the infantry pur
sued the retreating Federals through the town, which
was taken about 4:30 p. M. along with some 5,000
prisoners, principally men of the llth Corps, who had
lost their way in the streets on the way to the rear.
Doubleday's and Schurz's men rallied upon Stein-
wehr's Division of the llth Corps. Stein wehr's men
had been well posted behind the stone walls along the
THE LONG ARM or LEE 623
slopes of the hill, and in the houses thereon. As they
arrived, the troops of Doubleday's Corps were formed
on Steinwehr's left and Schurz's on his right. Buford
assembled his squadrons on the plain west of Cemetery
Hill, covering the Federal left flank and checking the
pursuit, while Wainwright and Osborn posted the ten
batteries of the two corps in strong positions on the hill
covering every approach to its summit. A regiment
comprising the train guard was promptly placed by
Wadsworth on Gulp's Hill. Hancock, much beloved
and admired by the Federal troops, now arrived and
assumed command, and soon under the energetic
direction of Hancock, Howard and Warren, strong en
trenchments of stone, earth and timber began to appear
all along the crests of Cemetery and Gulp's hills. The
sorely-tried Federals, much inspired by Hancock's
presence and the knowledge that his corps would soon
arrive, had no thought of abandoning their small Gibral
tar upon which the tide of defeat had washed them,
without the most desperate resistance.
While the Federals were busily occupied in prepar
ing their position for defense, Gen. Pendleton with his
staff was engaged in reconnoitering Seminary Ridge
as far south as the road leading eastward from the ridge,
through the Peach Orchard and Devil's Den. Gar-
nett's Battalion had already been ordered up along the
Fairfield Road to the ridge, where Pendleton had in
tended to mass a large number of guns, within easy
range of Cemetery Hill, but Gen. Ramseur, whose bri
gade had just occupied the town, met Pendleton while
selecting positions for his guns and urged him not to go
into action at the point decided upon, lest the enemy's
batteries should be provoked into firing upon his men,
who were much exposed. Leaving Capt. Maurin with
the batteries of Garnett's Battalion in park just behind
the crest opposite the town, Pendleton again set about
the exploration of the ridge, soon sending Col. Walker
an order to move up his battalions, and the Commander-
in-Chief detailed information about the road leading
past the enemy's left flank.
624 THE LONG ARM or LEE
From his station on Seminary Hill, Gens. Lee and
Longstreet had witnessed the enemy retreating to
Cemetery Hill. Lee's desire was to have Ewell secure
possession of the heights in his front. An order to do
this was sent Ewell by Lee, but with the caution not
to bring on a general engagement until the Army was
all up. The position was a formidable one, and its
strength was being rapidly increased. The 2d Corps
had been much cut up. Rodes had lost 3,000 men or
more, and besides a loss of about 500 of his men, Early
had sent two of his brigades well out to his left to watch
the York Road, over which the approach of part of the
12th Corps was reported. Hill's two divisions had been
very roughly handled and had lost heavily. They had
been withdrawn to Seminary Hill, as soon as Early 's
troops entered the town, leaving Ewell with only about
8,000 men to hold it and secure the prisoners. Ewell,
by acquiescing in the order he received, led Lee to be
lieve that the attempt to take the hill would be made and
offered no objection to its execution. But Johnson's
Division with Latimer's, Dance's, and Nelson's bat
talions of artillery under Col. Brown, were momentarily
expected by Ewell, and he delayed pending their ar
rival. These troops, however, did not arrive until near
sunset, and meantime the firing had all but died out.
During the fatal delay, portions of the Federal 12th
and 3d Corps arrived. Before Johnson's Division came
up, the enemy was reported to Ewell to be moving to
his left flank, and upon its arrival he ordered it to move
around to meet the threat and occupy Gulp's Hill, half
a mile to the east of Cemetery Hill, and Col. Brown at
once set about a search for a route by which to move his
artillery into position on Gulp's Hill, which he expected
would soon be in Johnson's possession. At this junc
ture, orders arrived from Gen. Lee for Ewell to draw
his corps to the right, but Ewell in person persuaded the
Commander-in-Chief to permit him to carry out his
original design. Unknown to Ewell, Gulp's Hill had
been occupied early in the evening by Wadsworth's Di-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 625
vision, and so when at midnight Johnson's Division was
moved around to its base, a reconnoitering party found
the enemy in possession, and no attempt was made to
seize it. Latimer had meantime moved his battalion to
the extreme left by a wide detour, and gone into
position on Benner's Hill, between the York and Balti
more roads in front of Gulp's Hill, where the batteries
were parked for the night.
General Hunt states that a Confederate attack on
Cemetery Hill was impracticable before 5 :30 P. M., and
that after that the position was perfectly secure. But
this statement is too general, and therefore not at all
satisfactory. That Ewell was guilty of unnecessarily
delaying seems quite clear. The truth seems to be that
he did not grasp the rare opportunity presented him
and that it slipped by while he intentionally awaited the
arrival of Johnson's Division and Brown's Artillery.
It is not contended that Ewell should have assaulted
after 5 :30 p. M. After that time, the Federal position
on Cemetery Hill was, as Gen. Hunt declares, no doubt
perfectly secure against the force Ewell could hurl
against it, and Johnson was undoubtedly too weak to
carry Gulp's Hill later in the night. The time at which
Ewell should have taken the position was when Schurz
fell back in more or less disorder before him. At that
time, Gulp's Hill was entirely unoccupied, and Stein-
wehr was alone in position on Cemetery Hill. It would
seem that Swell's troops could have followed Schurz
up the slopes practically protected against the fire of
Steinwehr's men by the enemy retreating in his front.
Gordon had practically routed Barlow's Division and
was actually among the latter's men when Ewell himself
ordered the pursuit to cease. Hear what Gordon has
to say: "The whole of that portion of the Union Army
in my front was in inextricable confusion and in flight.
They were necessarily in flight, for my troops were upon
the flank and rapidly sweeping down the lines. The fir
ing upon my men had almost ceased. Large bodies of
Union troops were throwing down their arms and sur-
626 THE LONG ARM or LEE
rendering because in disorganized and confused masses
they were wholly powerless either to check the move
ment or return the fire. As far down the lines as my
eye could reach, the Union troops were in retreat.*
Those at a distance were still resisting, but giving
ground, and it was only necessary for me to press for
ward in order to insure the same results which in
variably follow such flank movements. In less than half
an hour, my troops would have swept up and over those
hills, the possession of which was of such momentous
consequence. It is not surprising, with a full realization
of the consequences of a halt, that I should have refused
at first to obey the order. Not until the third or fourth
order of the most peremptory character reached me, did
I obey."t Now, here it is to be observed that if Double-
day was still resisting well out to Gordon's right, as he
certainly was at the time Gordon pressed forward to
the town, he could not have been securely intrenched
on Cemetery Hill. As a matter of fact, Steinwehr
alone, as we have seen, was there. Gen. Hunt himself
states that Doubleday reached the hill after Howard's
two divisions fell back on Steinwehr, and also that the 1st
Corps was reformed before the llth Corps. He also
states that the llth Corps was reformed with some diffi
culty and that not until Doubleday and Howard had
established their line did Wadsworth occupy Gulp's
Hill with the 500 men of the train guard. It appears
then, from his own words, that during the interim be
tween Gordon's enforced halt north of the hill and near
its base and the time Doubleday reformed, a period of
at least half an hour, there were no troops whatever on
Gulp's Hill and only Steinwehr and the two other divi
sions of the llth Corps, the latter in a state of disorgani
zation, on Cemetery Hill. Little should have been ex
pected by Ewell in the way of an artillery preparation
for his attack. In fact, the terrain offered few good
positions for his artillery, and even had it been capable
*No doubt Gordon could see the retrograde movement of Doubleday's line
before Rodes and Fender.
•^-Reminiscences of the Civil War, John B. Gordon.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 627
of rendering him valuable aid, that fact does not ex
tenuate the grievous error of his allowing the enemy to
intrench and reinforce himself. When he did move, it
was in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, though the latter's consent was finally
secured and Johnson's entire division, too weak to
carry Gulp's Hill, was placed in a position from which
communication with the rest of the Army was most
difficult. In fact, it was practically eliminated from the
field of utility for the remainder of the battle.
As to the point of Swell's ability to take Gulp's Hill
and Cemetery Hill on the evening of the 1st, there is,
however, the greatest diversity of authority. One of
his own staff officers declares as the result of a personal
reconnaissance that it was perfectly practicable.* At
any rate, Lee's original orders should have been obeyed
and the attempt made. In failing to do this, Ewell
committed the third great mistake of the campaign.
The fact that Lee's consent to the movement of John
son's Division around to the left had been secured does
not in any way signify that his original views were al
tered by Swell's representations. When that division
arrived, Lee had learned through the personal recon
naissance of Col. Long of his staff that it was no longer
practicable to assault Cemetery Hill. He knew that
Ewell had by his procrastination allowed the golden
opportunity to slip through his fingers, and that some
other move was necessary.
But now let us view the situation from another stand
point. Let us regard Ewell's action in the most favor
able light possible, assuming, contrary to the fact,
that he received no order from Lee to follow up Schurz.
Even then it would seem he was guilty of a most inex
cusable tactical blunder, for certain it is no general
should halt his troops in pursuit, with a hill immediately
in front obviously offering a rallying point for the
enemy. The mere fact that a routed or even a defeated
*Capt. James Power Smith. See his valuable paper, "General Lee at
Gettysburg," read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts,
April 4, 1905.
628 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
enemy makes for a particular point is sufficient to
prompt an energetic commander to seek in every way
possible to deny his adversary access thereto. Cemetery
and Gulp's hills by their very nature should have filled
Ewell with a consuming desire to reach their crests and
discover what lay beyond them. He should have longed
to secure their summits if for no other reason than to
keep the enemy from doing so. So long as a single regi
ment of his corps was capable of pushing on in fairly
good order, it should never have been allowed to halt un
til stopped by exhaustion or by the enemy. Troops, how
ever weary, do not rest on ordinary hillsides with the
great unknown on the rear crest, and had whatever force
Ewell may have sent forward in this case been checked
in its ascent by Steinwehr, the strength and exact loca
tion of the latter would have been discovered. The in
formation thus secured would have at once enabled
Ewell to seize Gulp's Hill, if not Cemetery Hill,
and with the former in his possession the latter would
have soon become untenable along with the whole posi
tion subsequently occupied by Meade's troops.
The Confederates had now become hopelessly com
mitted to the offensive, and just as Lee was compelled to
abandon the position near Cashtown as his line of de
fense, so Meade was being gradually drawn away by
circumstances from the defensive position he had se
lected behind Pipe Creek. Gettysburg, like a great
magnet, had drawn both armies forward from their
chosen fields of action, for neither Lee nor Meade was
able to overcome its attraction. Meade was compelled
to reinforce Buford, then Reynolds, then Howard, then
Hancock, to save them, while Lee was unable to re
linquish the contact which Hill, contrary to the general
plan of campaign and specific orders, had brought
about.
When Meade was thoroughly informed of the situa
tion at Cemetery Hill by Hancock and others, he im
mediately set his remaining troops in motion for
Gettysburg by forced marches, wisely recognizing Gen.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 629
Hunt as his tactical Chief of Artillery and directing
him to make all necessary dispositions concerning the
arm. Leaving Taneytown about 11 P. M. Meade and
Hunt reached the battlefield shortly after midnight and
soon reconnoitered the position. The general features
of the field have been explained. The Federal line,
though hurriedly established upon the natural ridges,
overlooked the open country to the north and the de
pression to the west. From Big Round Top on the
south to Gulp's Hill at the point of the fish hook on the
east, the distance was about three miles. The line pos
sessed a great advantage in that troops could be quickly
transferred from point to point of the crest line by mov
ing them across the interior area. Meade saw at once
that the position and his force would permit him to es
tablish about 25,000 infantry and 100 guns along each
mile of his front, and that his flanks were at once unas
sailable and unturnable if properly defended. Not only
did the natural flanks of the position rest upon precipi
tous and rocky slopes, but they were screened from ar
tillery fire by thick growths of trees. As he viewed the
favor which fortune had bestowed upon him, Meade's re
grets concerning the necessary abandonment of Pipe
Creek were dispelled.
Running roughly parallel to the shank of the Federal
hook, which was some two miles long from Little Round
Top to the bend at Cemetery Hill, nature with a bold
hand had marked out the main Confederate position
along Seminary Ridge. At the close of the 1st of July,
Ewell's Corps covered the front from Benner's Hill
around Gulp's and Cemetery Hill, to Seminary Hill
and the Fairfield Road, his line passing through the
town. Johnson was on the left, Early in the center, and
Rodes on the right. Hill's line occupied Seminary
Ridge, his left connecting with Ewell. Trimble, vice
Fender, was on the left, Anderson on the right, and
Pettigrew, vice Heth, in reserve on the rear slope of the
ridge. The Artillery of the 2d and 3d Corps bivouacked
that night along the line, generally in rear of the in fan-
630 THE LONG ARM or LEE
try. Latimer occupied Banner's Hill, while Brown held
Jones' and Dance's battalions for the night somewhat
in Johnson's rear in readiness to be moved to Gulp's
Hill should it be taken. Carter's batteries remained in
position along the ridge north of the town, together with
Nelson's Battalion. Col. Walker held Pegram's, Mc-
Intosh's, Lane's, Poague's, and that part of Garnett's
Battalion which had not been placed in position by
Pendleton, along the rear crest of Seminary Ridge,
ready to take up positions on the forward crest at dawn.
The exterior line of the Confederates is thus seen to
have been not less than 5 miles in extent with communi
cation from point to point rendered most roundabout
and difficult by reason of its concavity towards the
enemy. Furthermore, Lee's force enabled him to oc
cupy this line with not over 13,000 infantry, and 50 guns
per mile, or about half the number of guns and muskets
per mile of the enemy's position. The Federal forma
tion was deep and narrow, while that of the Confeder
ates was extensive in width and shallow. The relative
disposition of the two armies was, therefore, such that
the utmost cooperation between the various parts of the
exterior line, together with the concentration of its fire
effect, was essential to compensate, in an attack upon the
interior line, for the lack of the momentum of a superior
mass at any given point of assault. Without these two
elements, it now seems evident that any attack, how
ever gallantly delivered, was predestined to fail through
sheer lack of momentum. No problem could be pre
sented which involves to a higher degree than did
Gettysburg the absolute necessity of fire superiority to
the success of the offensive.
Such was the condition of affairs at the close of the
1st of July. While Lee's original desire to seize Ceme
tery Hill during the early part of the evening had been
thwarted, he still believed the important position could
be successfully assailed at daybreak in spite of Long-
street's advice to turn his attention to the enemy's
left in the vulnerable quarter to which Pendleton had
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 631
called attention. But while the views of Lee and Long-
street differed at this time, the fact remains that the
latter had already been urged to hasten forward his
troops in order to be ready to discharge and carry out
the part which circumstances might dictate. But Long-
street at heart never accepted the necessity for the
abandonment of the original plan to fight a de
fensive battle. While with Lee on Seminary Hill on the
afternoon of the 1st, he openly expressed his disap
proval of the former's intention to attack Cemetery
Hill in the morning, saying, "If the enemy is there in
the morning, it is because he wants to be attacked."
He left his commander-in-chief, according to his own
statement, with these parting words upon his lips, and
such an expression on his part gives a fair insight into
the spirit in which he set about the task of conforming
to the general plan. To say the least, he was not en
thusiastic, and lacking enthusiasm, that great lubricant
of the military machine, it is small wonder that his sub
sequent movements were characterized by delays.
When one's heart is not in his work, difficulties which
otherwise might be easily disregarded, and in a large
measure overcome, at once become all but insurmount
able. To understand Longstreet's movements from now
on, one must recognize the fact that he was at least an
unwilling actor of a most important role, a role in which
every particle of his old energy and enthusiasm was
necessary to bring about success.
Whatever orders were given Longstreet and the
other corps commanders, it seems certain that on the
night of July 1 every available man was expected to be
at the front early the following morning, and so when
late in the evening, after conferring with some of his
corps and division commanders, Lee finally accepted
their view and decided to attack as advised by Long-
street, he had every reason to expect that the 1st Corps
would be on hand and ready to undertake its mission.
After the engagement of the first day, Gen. Pendleton
had again examined the ground southwest of the town,
632 THE LONG ARM or LEE
and finding the ground in front of the southern part of
Cemetery Ridge much less difficult than that opposite
Hill's troops which were already in position opposite
Cemetery Hill, its practicable character was again re
ported to Gen. Lee. By that time, Col. Long had re-
connoitered the Federal right and reported adversely
against the chances of a successful attack in the morning
in that quarter, and the Commander-in-Chief had con
ferred with Ewell and his division commanders whose
views coincided with Pendleton's about the proper
quarter in which to make an assault. Gen. Pendleton
declared that Lee told him when he reported the result
of his second reconnaissance that he had already
ordered Longstreet to attack by way of the Peach
Orchard at sunrise the next morning, and requested
him to reexamine the ground in that direction at dawn.*
Whether Longstreet was directly ordered by Lee to
attack the Federal left at daybreak on the 2d or not, is
immaterial to this record. Suffice it to say, a great
blunder, the fourth of the campaign, was committed
either by Gen. Lee or by Gen. Longstreet. Much
authority both adverse to, and in support of, the latter
exists. If he was not ordered to attack at an early hour,
he should have been, and if he was directed to do so, he
failed to execute his orders. t
*Longstreet, in a vicious article in Battles and Leaders and later in his
book, endeavored to discredit the statements of Gen. Pendleton relative to this
reconnaissance. Not only has he been the only one to question the word of the
Rev. Wm. Nelson Pendleton, whose whole life was devoted to truth and the
service of God, but he has, also, been the only soldier of the Confederacy to
impugn the character of Gen. Lee. In expressing sentiments in his writings
entirely at variance with those of Longstreet, the general, Longstreet, the em
bittered politician, simply weakened the force of his arguments. Into this he
was undoubtedly provoked by the animosities and criticisms of post-bellum
politics. One is almost glad to believe, as claimed by many, that he never
really wrote From Manassas to Appomattox, but, after all, whether he did or
not, he is responsible for the sentiments expressed by his literary agent, and it
is doubtful if so much jealousy of Virginia and Virginians as that which is
evidenced in this book could have been engendered in his soul subsequent to the
war, unless the germ had lain there from the first. The writer, though but a
child of six years at the time, vividly recalls a conversation between his father
and Gen. William Mahone, while he was perched upon the latter's knee, in
which the General said. "It is too bad Longstreet has let them goad him into
mixing up his military record with politics," or words to that effect. Both
Mahone and the writer's father were victims of much the same political odium
attaching to Longstreet, at the time, but Mahone was wiser than Longstreet,
and though the superb little soldier was actually charged by his more un
scrupulous enemies with cowardice, he was never provoked into defending him
self against the absurd accusation. His remark made a lasting impression upon
the writer's mind, though its meaning was not fully comprehended for many
years.
tSee Military Memoirs of a Confederate, Alexander, and Advance and RetreatJ
Hood, both in support of Longstreet.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 633
Longstreet's supporters make entirely too much of
the technicality of whether or not a specific order was re
ceived by him to attack at an early hour. He was
culpable in not having his corps on the field ready to
attack, should the developments of the night require it.
He was with Lee the afternoon of the 1st, and has fre
quently declared that he was conscious of a state of
mental distress and uncertainty on the part of his com-
mander-in-chief. Since he did not know himself and
did not believe that Lee knew what to expect on the
morrow, all the more incumbent was it upon him to
have his troops present and prepared for any con
tingency. Longstreet knew that Ewell and Hill had
both been heavily engaged and that they had run up
against a snag. From this he must have known that the
exigency of the occasion required the immediate pres
ence of the 1st Corps. His troops had been set in
motion for Gettysburg. The question whether or not
he was to attack the next day was immaterial. His
duty, irrespective of an order for attack, or further
orders of any kind, was to bring his command up at the
first practicable hour. That a large part of the 1st
Corps could have arrived much earlier than it did is not
denied, for the main body of that corps went into bivouac
within four miles of the field at midnight. In not appear
ing as soon as possible, Longstreet was guilty of the
same lack of the spirit of cooperation which kept him
away from Chancellorsville. Had he done at Gettys
burg what the situation as known to him should have
disclosed to the commander of one-third of the entire
army to be necessary, he would have been present when
needed and no delay would ever have occurred, even
had no orders for attack been issued on the 1st. But
here it should be said that Longstreet's delay was not
the sole mistake made at Gettysburg, though many
people entirely lose sight of those which had preceded it.
Had Stuart been present, no battle would have been
fought on the 1st. Had Hill obeyed orders, no battle
would have been fought on the 1st. Had Ewell risen
634 THE LONG ARM or LEE
to the occasion on the 1st, Longstreet's attack on the 2d
would not have been necessary. How can it be justly
said that Longstreet lost the battle of Gettysburg?
Longstreet, Ewell, and Hill together and in an equal
degree contributed to the failure of the campaign. As
to the battle itself, it is inconceivable how one can dis
tinguish between the wanton sacrifice of opportunity
on the part of Ewell, and the delay of Longstreet,
in favor of the former.
CHAPTER XXXII
GETTYSBURG JULY 2D
THE Artillery of the 2d and 3d corps, as well as all
the divisions thereof, were upon the field and in position
on the morning of the 2d. The Reserve Artillery of
the 1st Corps had been held in camp near Greenwood
the preceding day, and Cabell's, Henry's, and Dear-
ing's battalions were attached to McLaws, Hoods, and
Pickett's divisions, respectively, as usual. Little in
formation had sifted back to the rear during the day of
the events transpiring at the front. Early in the even
ing, however, the news reached the various portions of
the 1st Corps that Hill and Ewell had been heavily en
gaged and were driving the enemy. At 4 P. M.^ Mc
Laws and Hood with Cabell's and Henry's battalions
left Greenwood, and marching 13 miles went into
bivouac at Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg.
Marching again at dawn they arrived near the field be
tween 6 and 8 A. M.
Late in the evening of the 1st, information was re
ceived in the rear that Hill and Ewell had come to a
standstill before the enemy in a strong defensive posi
tion, and soon orders arrived for the Reserve Artillery of
the 1st Corps consisting of Eshleman's Battalion, 9 guns,
and Alexander's, 26 guns, to move forward at 1 A. M.
Marching steadily over good roads with a bright moon,
the two battalions halted in a grassy, open grove about
a mile west of Seminary Ridge at 7 A. M., where the
animals were watered and fed. At this juncture, Col.
Alexander was sent for by Longstreet, and riding for
ward found him with Lee on Seminary Ridge. It was
explained to Alexander that the 1st Corps would as
sault the enemy's left flank and he was directed to take
command of the corps artillery and reconnoiter the
sector assigned him. He was particularly cautioned
to keep his batteries out of sight of the signal station on
636 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Big Round Top, in moving them into position. Plac
ing Maj. Huger in command of his own battalion, Alex
ander at once set about making his reconnaissance,
which was most thorough, extending over about three
hours. By noon Alexander had led his own, Cabell's,
and Henry's battalions by a meadow screened from the
Federal signal station to a point in the valley of
Willoughby Run, where they remained behind that por
tion of Seminary Ridge to be occupied by Longstreet's
infantry. After disposing his batteries he rode back
to learn the cause of the non-arrival of Hood and Mc-
Laws. Dearing's Battalion was with Pickett, and
Eshleman's was held in reserve by Alexander in rear of
the ridge, with the ordnance train.
Col. Walker had early in the morning posted the ar
tillery of the 3d Corps along Seminary Ridge with the
exception of Poague's and part of Garnett's battalions,
the latter under Maj. Richardson, both of which he held
in reserve on the rear crest. Thus Alexander's line of
guns was extended to the left by Walker's as far as the
Seminary. In the 2d Corps Col. Brown still held the
extreme left with Latimer's Battalion. About 4 A. M.
Latimer had after a most careful reconnaissance se
lected the only eligible position which was on the face of
Benner's Hill, where he experienced much difficulty in
securing proper cover for his caissons and limbers. His
position was directly in front of Culp's Hill, and just
across Rock Creek therefrom. Brown's Battery oc
cupied the right of the line, Carpenter's the center, and
Dement's and one section of Raine's the left. The guns
were much crowded, and no room existed for the 20-
pounder Parrott section of Raine's Battery, which
under Lieut. Hardwicke, with Graham's Battery of
Dance's Battalion, was posted further to the rear and
right near the toll gate on the Hanover Road. Carter's
Battalion still occupied the ridge held by Rodes' Divi
sion northwest of the town. Dance's Battalion was
placed under Col. Carter's command early in the morn
ing, and, after sending Graham's Battery to the left,
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 637
Carter posted Watson's Battery on the ridge just to the
left of the railroad cut, Smith's on its right near the
Seminary, and Dance's own battery under Lieut. Cun
ningham on the right of Seminary Hill and to the left
of the Fairfield Road. Hupp's Salem Battery under
Lieut. Griffin was held in reserve. Jones' Battalion
was held well in rear of Swell's left to guard against
any attempt to turn that flank and was therefore elimi
nated from the action of the day. Just before sunset,
he sent the Parrott section of Green's Battery at the re
quest of Stuart to join Hampton at Hunter stown, three
miles distant, and at 3 P. M. Tanner's Battery, which
had exhausted its ammunition on the 1st, was ordered
to the rear with the trains. Nelson's Battalion was held
in reserve in rear of the ridge and about 500 yards to
the left of the Cashtown Pike until 11 A. M., when it was
moved into park immediately in rear of the Seminary,
where it remained until dark in readiness to occupy
a selected position in the front line. Thus it is seen
that Ewell and Brown had not more than 48 of their
80-odd guns actually in position, and bearing on the
Federal lines on the 2d of July, for Jones' and Nelson's
battalions and Hupp's Battery were not engaged during
the day. Yet, Gen. Lee had directed Ewell to create a
diversion in Longstreet's favor, as soon as the guns of
the 1st Corps were heard, converting it into a real at
tack if a favorable opportunity offered.
Early in the morning when nearly all the Confederate
Army had reached Gettysburg, or its immediate vicin
ity, a great number of Meade's troops were still on the
road. The 2d Corps and two divisions of the 5th under
Sykes arrived about 7 A. MV and Crawford's Division
joined about noon. Lockwood's Brigade arrived from
Baltimore at 8; De Trobriand's and Burling's bri
gades of the 3d Corps at 9, and the Artillery Reserve,
with an ammunition train close in its rear, containing
besides the usual supply, 20 additional rounds of am
munition for every gun in the Army, from Emmitts-
burgat 10:30 A. M.
638 THE LONG ARM or LEE
The lack of energy on the part of the Confederates
in completing their dispositions for attack was in
marked contrast to Meade's activity. At every point
of his line of defense, the Federal commander and his
staff officers were to be seen. As the Federal troops
came up, all but exhausted by their long forced
marches, which extended throughout the night and
morning in spite of the oppressive heat, they were not
allowed to rest until placed in position. The 12th
Corps (Slocum's under Williams) occupied Gulp's
Hill on Wadsworth's right, the 2d Corps Cemetery
Ridge from which the 3d Corps was drawn to prolong
the line to Round Top ; the 5th Corps was placed in re
serve along the Baltimore Road near Rock Creek; and
the Reserve Artillery, under the immediate command of
Gen. Tyler, in a central position on a cross road from
the Baltimore Pike to the Taneytown Road. A part of
Buford's cavalry occupied the left, while Kilpatrick's
and Gregg's cavalry divisions were posted well out on
the right flank. The 1st and llth Corps still held Ceme
tery Hill. The batteries of the various corps were
strongly posted in rear of the infantry lines, and the
more advanced guns on Cemetery and Gulp's hills were
protected by epaulments and gun pits.
Some slight demonstrating on the part of Ewell at
daybreak had led Meade to order Slocum to attack the
Confederate left with the 5th and 12th Corps, so soon
as the 6th Corps should arrive to support him, but as
the ground in his front was found unfavorable by
Slocum, and the 6th Corps did not arrive before Swell's
activity ceased, the offensive was not assumed in this
quarter by the Federals. Furthermore, Meade was ap
prehensive about his left, and was well satisfied to re
main passive as long as each hour enabled him to
strengthen his line in that quarter with the constantly
arriving troops. In the meantime, Gen. Hunt, by his
foresight in providing extra reserve ammunition, was
THE LONG ARM or LEE 639
able to replenish the caissons of the 1st and llth Corps,
which had been practically emptied the preceding day.*
At the first blush of dawn, Gen. Pendleton made his
reconnaissance as directed, examining the ground al
most up to the Federal position. Finding no difficulties
which appeared to him insuperable, but detecting the
movements of large masses of the enemy's infantry in
the rear of the hostile line, he communicated with both
Lee and Longstreet, urging upon them both that an im
mediate attack be made. Again and again he sent
messages to the Commander-in- Chief by his staff of
ficers, to impress him with the necessity of prompt
action, and was informed that they were invariably
transmitted to Longstreet by Gen. Lee, who was much
annoyed by the latter's procrastination. But Long-
street did not arrive with Lee to examine the ground
until noon. As they finally viewed the enemy's position
from Seminary Ridge, near the Warfield house, the
main features of the enemy's position appeared as fol
lows: near the base of Cemetery Hill was Zeigler's
Grove a mile and a half due north of the base of Little
Round Top. From Zeigler's Grove Cemetery Ridge,
with a well defined crest, ran 900 yards or more south
to a smaller but prominent clump of trees, where it
turned sharply back for 200 yards, then south again for
700 yards to Weikert's house. So far the ridge was
smooth and open, in full view of and from 1,400 to
1,600 yards distant from Seminary Ridge. At
Weikert's, it was lost in a large body of rocks, hills, and
woods, lying athwart the direct line to Big Round Top,
the Taneytown Road bending around to the east of the
broken ground. This rough space extended some 400
yards west of the line of the ridge prolonged toward
Plum Run. Along its southern edge, it was bounded
by low marshy ground, stretching back to the base of
Little Round Top, half a mile or more from Weikert's
house, and its western boundary was wooded from north
*Hunt had formed the special ammunition train previously referred to upon
his own responsibility and unknown to Hooker, who had never accorded his
Chief of Artillery much consideration in the way of assigning him to the
tactical direction of the arm.
10
640 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
to south. In front of these woods and Plum Run,
stretched an open space 300 yards wide, a continuation
of the rolling fields in front of Cemetery Ridge. Plum
Run flows in a southeasterly direction towards Little
Round Top, and then bends to the southwest at a point
where it receives a small branch from Seminary Ridge.
In the angles formed by these streams is a bold, rocky
height, 100 feet lower than and 500 yards due west of
Little Round Top. With a steep eastern face the hill
is prolonged as a ridge generally in a northwesterly
direction between Plum Run on the north and Plum
Run Branch on the south to Seminary Ridge from
which it springs towards the east as a spur. The sur
face of the northern face of Devil's Den Hill proper is
intersected by innumerable ledges and outcroppings
of rocks, among which are many holes and bowlders.
From these peculiar formations the hill takes its name.
The marshy bottom forming the valley of Plum Run,
and the slopes of the two conical hills known as the
Round Tops, are also strewn with massive bowlders. A
cross road running along the north of Devil's Den and
the Taneytown Road intersected the Emmittsburg Road
at a peach orchard on the Devil's Den Ridge, 1,100
yards west of Plum Run. For a distance of 400 yards
from the stream, the road was bounded on the north by
trees and on the south by a wheat field. From the Peach
Orchard, the Emmittsburg Road ran diagonally across
the rolling fields between the Seminary and Cemetery
ridges, a mile and a half to Zeigler's Grove. For half
a mile from the orchard the road ran along a ridge per
pendicular to the Devil's Den Ridge, and nearly parallel
to and 600 yards distant from Seminary Ridge. From
Devil's Den to the wooded crest of Seminary Ridge the
distance was therefore about 1,700 yards. The junction
of the two bold ridges at the orchard formed the salient
of the Federal lines, and it was upon this point that
Longstreet's Corps was to be hurled. If the enemy
could be driven from the orchard by Longstreet, Gen.
Lee believed the latter's artillery massed at that com-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 641
manding position would be able to assist the infantry in
reaching Cemetery Ridge. From the Peach Orchard
Longstreet's attack would be in oblique order, and if
driven home would roll up the Federal left. Had the
attack been rendered before 9 A. M., before the Federal
3d and 6th Corps and the Reserve Artillery were in
position, and before the enemy's lines were strengthened
by nearly a whole day of energetic labor on the defensive
works, the Confederates would undoubtedly have ac
complished their design. The first indication the Fed
erals had of Longstreet's presence was when Sickles at
Hunt's suggestion sent forward a party to reconnoiter
the woods 600 yards in his front. The presence of the
enemy, however, when detected gave Sickles little con
cern, for already news of Sedgwick's near approach with
the 6th Corps, the largest in the Federal Army, had
been received, and Hunt, who from Devil's Den Ridge
had been attracted by the superior command of Big
Round Top, had set off to examine the extreme left and
see that proper precautions were taken in that quarter
to save the conical height from falling into the hands of
the Confederates. When Hunt returned to the Peach
Orchard after visiting Round Top and reporting all
safe to Meade, Birney's Division was posted along the
Emmittsburg Road on the Devil's Den Ridge, Gra
ham's on Birney's right in two lines in front of the
Smith house, and Burling had been ordered up to re
inforce Birney at the salient. Hunt had already sent
to the Reserve Artillery for some of his batteries, and
as Turnbull's arrived, he replaced with it Seeley's Bat
tery of the 3d Corps, which Capt. Randolph had placed
on Graham's right, the latter shifting its position to
the left of the Smith house. Randolph had also posted
Smith's Battery on the rocky hill at Devil's Den, Wins-
low's in the wheatfield, Clark's on the left face of the
salient or southern slope of the ridge, and his own at the
angle looking west.
Sickles' Corps was obviously too weak to hold the
advanced line or salient formed by the junction of the
642 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
two ridges at the orchard, and Sykes' 5th Corps which
had been ordered to reinforce him was momentarily ex
pected. No sooner did the Confederate fire open than
Meade also sent for C aid well's Division on Cemetery
Ridge, a division of the 12th Corps on Gulp's Hill, and
soon after for part of the recently arrived 6th Corps.
McGilvery's Artillery Brigade also soon arrived from
the Reserve, and Bigelow's, Phillips', Hart's, Ames',
and Thompson's batteries were ordered into position
along the crests.
Pickett's Division had left Chambersburg at 2 A. M.,
but after a march of 22 miles went into camp, three
miles from the field at 4 p. M. Yet McLaws' entire divi
sion and Hood's, with the exception of Law's Brigade,
had arrived within striking distance of the field early in
the morning. Longstreet deliberately waited for the ar
rival of Law's Brigade before he made the slightest
effort to place his infantry in position. This alone
was not the only cause of delay, for leaving New Guil-
ford Courthouse with Bachman's Battery at 3 A. M.
Law had rejoined Hood before noon. At this time
Hood and McLaws were on the Chambersburg Road
about a mile west of the town. We have seen that
Alexander had easily avoided the exposed point with
his artillery column, and had ridden back to discover the
cause of Longstreet's delay. Yet, he has subsequently
sought to defend that delay when it is proved by his
own action that there was no reason for it. Longstreet
had caused his infantry to countermarch and take a
devious route via Black Horse Tavern, in order to avoid
detection from the Federal signal station. At length,
after many vexatious and useless halts, his column ar
rived, Hood in front, at the Emmittsburg Road along
Seminary Ridge opposite Little Round Top, and on
the right of Anderson's Division of the 3d Corps which
had been extended towards the south during the morn
ing. In spite of Longstreet's devious route to screen
his flank movement, it had been discovered by the Fed
eral signal party.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 643
Both Pendleton and Col. Long of Lee's staff had ex
amined the positions which Walker's batteries had
taken along Seminary Ridge from which to support the
advance of the 1st Corps, and all was at last ready.
Gen. Lee had been sorely tried throughout the day by
what appeared to him, at least, to be an inexplicable de
lay on Longstreet's part. EwelFs and Hill's artillery
had already opened upon Cemetery Hill by way of
diversion in favor of the 1st Corps.
Upon arriving Longstreet deployed his divisions each
in two lines with Hood on the right and extending east
of the road to a point about 1,000 yards south of the
orchard, his left prolonged by McLaws, whose line
crossed the road to the rear. Reilly's, Latham's,
Garden's, and Bachman's batteries of Henry's Bat
talion of 20 guns, were posted among the trees on the
ridge in rear of Hood. Although there was no sign of
any enemy on the right, as a precaution a regiment
was detached and stationed at Kern's house, half a mile
down the Emmittsburg Road. While forming his line,
Law had been greatly attracted by Big Round Top,
and learning from some prisoners, which the mounted
scouts he had sent to reconnoiter its southern base had
captured, that it was weakly held and that the Federal
medical and ordnance trains were unguarded in its rear,
and could be reached by a good farm road, he protested
to Hood against a frontal attack and begged to be al
lowed to make a detour around the Federal flank.
Hood's orders were positive, but he was induced by
Law's persistent representations to communicate the
information the latter had secured to Longstreet. Soon
Capt. Hamilton of his staff, by whom the message was
sent to the corps commander, returned and directed
Hood by Longstreet's order to begin the attack at once
as previously planned. If Hood's message reached
Longstreet, he, Longstreet, had no just ground for his
subsequent contention, that he had urged in vain to be
allowed to turn the Federal left, instead of making a
frontal attack. Whether Lee had previously insisted
644 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
upon such an attack or not, it seems certain that his
views would have been materially altered by such infor
mation as that in Law's possession. And, again, while
the ground in his front was such that Longstreet's at
tack necessarily became a frontal one, the movement of
his corps with respect to the whole army was designed to
be tactically a flank attack. Upon discovering that his
blow would fall short of the flank, a fact unknown ex
cept to him, it was Longstreet's duty to inform the Com-
mander-in-Chief. Yet, he subsequently had the ef
frontery to declare that "he would and could have saved
every man lost at Gettysburg, had he been permitted to
do so." No. Longstreet was stubborn. He had been
ordered to do that which he did not want to do, which
was to participate in an offensive engagement, and he
did not propose to contribute anything on his own initia
tive to the success of a battle, the fighting of which he
had all along opposed. The severest arraignment of
Longstreet ever penned is the account of the battle of
Gettysburg by Gen. Law, in which, in an attempt to
shoulder the blame on Lee for its loss, he unwittingly
fixes the responsibility for Longstreet's failure to turn
the left flank, beyond peradventure of a doubt, upon
Longstreet himself.*
The order of attack issued by Longstreet as soon as
his divisions were in line of battle was for the movement
to begin on the right, Law's Brigade leading, the others
taking it up successively toward the left. It was
near 5 p. M. when the infantry advanced. The
artillery on both sides had already been warmly en
gaged the better part of an hour. Alexander's Bat
talion with 18, Cabell's with 18, and Henry's with
10 guns had been in action since about 3:45 p. M.
Henry's Battalion had moved out with Hood, and
as the Federal Artillery was well posted and pre
pared for the attack, his batteries were soon after com
ing into view heavily engaged. Cabell's Battalion had
*See "The Struggle for Round Top," E. M. Law, Battles and Leaders, Vol.
Ill, p. 322.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 645
at once gone into action behind a stone fence near
Snyder's house, about 700 yards from the Federal bat
teries, to support Henry. His position afforded little
cover for the guns, and the well-directed fire of the op
posing artillery at once caused him serious loss in men
and horses. To help him, Alexander had Huger move
Moody's, Ficklin's, Parker's, and Taylor's batteries with
their 18 guns to the Warfield house and open at a range
of 500 yards from the orchard. Alexander now had 54
guns of the 1st Corps in action, which he and Longstreet
both believed would in a short while be able to crush in
Sickles' line and silence his batteries. But so accurate
was the practice of the Federal guns, that two of
Fickling's pieces were soon dismounted. The labor of
running the guns up after each recoil to the crest of the
rocky slope was so exhausting to his cannoneers that
Moody was compelled to call for volunteers from
Barksdale's Brigade nearby to handle his four 24-
pounder Parrotts and two 12-pounder Napoleons.
Eight infantrymen promptly responded, two of whom
were killed and three wounded before night.
When Hood finally launched his infantry, it ad
vanced rapidly across the valley in front of the left
leg of the salient angle held by the Federals, all the
time under a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, and
brushing his skirmishers out of the way, soon struck
Sickles' main line. The advance continued steadily,
driving the enemy to the confines of Devil's Den, where
the troops of both sides on this portion of the field
seemed to dissolve in the rugged area. In less than an
hour Hood's troops had carried Devil's Den opposite
his center and captured three pieces of Smith's Battery,
which from the rocky height had severely punished the
attacking infantry. In the meantime, Law, supported
by a part of Robertson's Brigade, had in spite of Hood's
orders, swept over the northern slope of Big Round
Top, cleared it of the enemy, and, turning somewhat to
the left, advanced upon Little Round Top in rear of
the hill which Hood's center had carried. Henry's Bat-
646 THE LONG ARM or LEE
talion had done all in its power to support Hood's
infantry, devoting much attention to Smith's Battery
on Devil's Den Road, which had enfiladed and inflicted
much loss upon the attacking troops. Cabell had also
turned two of his guns upon this battery with fine effect.
In the meantime, however, Hood's left brigade had
been subjected to great annoyance and loss by the fire
of the enemy along the ridge on its left and had been
frequently compelled in its advance to change front to
repel the movements against its flank. McLaws had
held his men well under cover during the artillery prep
aration. In spite of the superior number and metal of
the enemy's guns, Alexander's own batteries stood man
fully to their task, determined to shake the Federal line
at the angle, and save McLaws' infantry as much as
possible in their advance. The ammunition expenditure
was enormous, but fortunately the reserve supply was
close at hand behind the ridge. At such close range, the
Confederate fire was more accurate than usual, while
many of the Federal projectiles passed over the crest
behind the Confederate batteries, and were lost in the
valley beyond. The thick growth of trees on the ridge
also served to reduce the effect of the shells that burst
short of the crest. But the Federal batteries were still
holding their own when Alexander, about 6 p. M.,
ordered Maj. Dearing, who had arrived in advance of
his battalion, and reported to him, to move up Wool-
folk's and Jordan's batteries with their ten pieces, which
had been held in reserve behind the ridge, to the support
of the other four batteries of the battalion under Huger.
But before these batteries joined Huger, at the War-
field house, Cabell had ceased firing and given the signal
with three guns for McLaws' Division to charge.
Leaping the wall behind which they had lain, McLaws'
men rushed past the guns in Kershaw's front, crushed
in the angle of Sickles' line by seizing the Peach
Orchard, and drove the enemy back in confusion from
their salient position, thereby relieving the pressure on
Hood's left.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 647
The breaking in of the Peach Orchard angle exposed
the flanks of the batteries on the advanced crests, which
fell back firing in order to cover the retirement of the
infantry behind Plum Run. Many guns of different
batteries had to be abandoned by the Federals because
of the destruction of their teams and cannoneers. Some
were hauled off by hand, but the loss was heavy. Bige-
low's 9th Massachusetts Battery made a stand close by
the Trostle house in a corner of a field to which the guns
were hauled by prolonges, where it was ordered by
McGilvery to remain in action at all hazards until a line
of artillery could be formed in front of the wood beyond
Plum Run. This line was soon formed by collecting all
the serviceable batteries and fragments of batteries
which had been withdrawn, and, together with Dow's
Maine Battery fresh from the reserve, Bigelow suc
ceeded in checking the pursuit and enabling all but one
of the abandoned guns to be recovered.
As McLaws' Division rushed past the guns at the
Warfield house, masking their fire, Alexander ordered
all six of his batteries to limber to the front, and charged
with them in line across the plain, going into action
again at the orchard. Perhaps no more superb feat of
artillery drill on the battlefield was ever witnessed than
this rapid change of position of Alexander's Battalion.
For 500 yards the foaming horses dashed forward, under
whip and spur, the guns in perfect alignment, and the
carriages fairly bounding over the fields. Every officer
and non-commissioned officer rode at his post, and not
a team swerved from the line, except those which were
struck down by the blizzard of Federal shell. Fortu
nately most of the enemy's projectiles overshot their
mark, and as the great line of six batteries with over
400 horses reached the position abandoned by the enemy,
"action front" was executed as if by a single piece.
Hardly had the teams wheeled, and the trails of the
pieces cleared the pintle-hooks when again a sheet of
flame burst from the 24 guns of Alexander's magnificent
battalion. Few artillerymen have experienced the sen-
648 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
sation which must have come to Alexander at this mo
ment, for seldom has such a maneuver been executed on
the battlefield.
The ground over which the battalion had advanced
was generally good, but obstructed in one place by a rail
fence. Seeing a body of Federal prisoners being moved
to the rear, Dearing had shouted to them to remove the
rails in the path of the artillery. "Never was an order
executed with more alacrity. Every prisoner seemed to
seize a rail, and the fence disappeared as if by magic."
But the joy of the charge was not all. It was the ar
tillerist's heaven to follow the routed enemy after a
prolonged duel with his guns, and to hurl shell and
canister into his disorganized and fleeing masses. To
Alexander's ears, the reports of his guns sounded louder
and more powerful than ever before, and the shouts of
his gunners directing the fire in rapid succession thrilled
his own and the soul of every witness of the fight with
exultant pride.
There is no excitement on earth like that of gallop
ing at the head of a rapidly advancing line of artillery,
with the awe-inspiring rumble of the wheels, mingling
with the clatter of innumerable feet close behind. The
momentum of the great mass of men, animals, and car
riages almost seems to forbid the thought of attempting
to check the force which has been set in motion. With his
mount bounding along almost as if borne on the breeze
of the pursuing storm, the eye of the commander in
stinctively searches the terrain for his position, while
a hundred, perhaps five hundred, human beings, and as
many dumb warriors, joyfully laboring in the traces,
watch his every movement. At last the leader's right
arm shoots upward, then outward. No words are neces
sary, and if spoken would be superfluous. In that dull
roar of the onrushing mass no voice but that of Jove
could be heard. The swoop of the fleetest hawk is not
more graceful nor more sudden than that which follows.
Every man and horse knows his part and must perform
it, for mistakes at such a moment are fatal. But, first
THE LONG ARM or LEE 649
of all, out of the orderly chaos which ensues, the dark
warriors come to rest as if in the ominous silence gath
ering breath with which to shout their defiance, while the
attending men and beasts are springing to their posts.
The joy of the charge is forgotten. Though every hand
and limb is still trembling with the old thrill, a greater
joy is now in store for all, for flash! bang! scre-e-ch — bo
om — a shell has burst among the flying foe. Small
wonder then that Alexander cherished no regret over
having declined the command of a brigade of infantry.
Surely there was glory enough for any soldier to be
found at the head of such a command as he led across
the fields and into action in front of Little Round Top !
After the enemy fell back upon the ridge in their
rear, Longstreet's batteries fired upon every part of the
hostile line in range, especially devoting their attention
to McGilvery's group of 28 guns behind Plum Run.
Three of Anderson's brigades, Wilcox's, Perry's, and
Wright's, pressed forward against Humphreys' line
and forced it back to Cemetery Ridge, under cover of
two of Gibbon's regiments and Brown's Rhode Island
Battery. Later they succeeded in breaking the Federal
line and seized many guns, but were driven out and fell
back about dusk under a heavy artillery fire from Mc
Gilvery's massed batteries.
Further to the right one Confederate regiment alone
succeeded in crossing Plum Run and actually got in
among Bigelow's Battery fighting hand to hand with
the cannoneers. Although, of the 104 men and 88 horses
of this battery, 28 men and 65 horses were killed or
wounded, still it maintained itself without losing a gun,
and the gallant captain, who himself was wounded, faith
fully discharged the important trust committed to him.
In doing so, he gave evidence, as in the case of Beck-
ham's gunners at Brandy Station, of the great resisting
power of artillery, even when unsupported.
Hood's center, as we have seen, had seized and still
held Devil's Den, but Law, who had reached the slope of
Little Round Top, had been driven back to its base by
650 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Weed's and Vincent's brigades and Hazlett's Battery,
which Warren on his own initiative had stationed at the
summit, just as Longstreet's attack commenced. The
placing of Hazlett's six guns in this position was a
marvelous feat, and one which, in view of the precipitous
and rugged slope of the mountain would have seemed
impossible under ordinary circumstances. But, to
gether the infantry and the cannoneers dragged them to
the top just in time to repel Law's troops, who were
already clambering up the slopes. The fighting for the
possession of Little Round Top was desperate. Weed
and Hazlett were both killed and Vincent wounded.
The first had himself won great distinction in the Penin
sula campaign, as an artillerist, and again at Chancel-
lorsville, where he served as chief of his corps artillery.
Shortly before his death he had been promoted from a
captain of artillery to a brigadier-general of infantry.
Brave Hazlett, whom we have met on other fields, fell
while bending over his former chief to receive his last
message. Hood's men, however, clung to the base of
the mountain, Devil's Den and its woods, and captured
three of Smith's guns.
It was now after 7 p. M. and Longstreet's troops, who
had become disjointed in their attack, were engaged in
more or less isolated combats. His artillery took part
wherever it could. "The fuses of the flying shells
streaked the darkening sky like little meteors."
As the Federal reinforcements had arrived piece
meal, they had been beaten in detail until by successive
accretions they greatly outnumbered Hood and Mc-
Laws. The fighting had been confined largely to the
Peach Orchard, Little Round Top, and the rugged area
of Devil's Den, behind the ledges and bowlders of which
the sharpshooters of both sides had been thickly posted.
At the close of the day, the Confederates held the base
of both the Round Tops, Devil's Den, and the Emmitts-
burg Road, with skirmishers thrown out as far as the
Trostle house. The Federals held the summits of the
Round Tops, the Plum Run line, and Cemetery Ridge.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 651
Before 8 p. M. the fire on both sides began to slacken,
and by 9 the field was silent and Longstreet's men rested
on their arms conscious of the fact that their work had
only begun.
Now let us see what had been done on other parts of
the field to support Longstreet's attack. We have seen
that Anderson's three brigades assaulted Humphreys
on the left of the 1st Corps. In this movement Wilcox
was ably supported by Patterson's Battery of six pieces,
and one gun of Ross's Battery, all of Lane's Battalion.
That Anderson's troops were desperately engaged is
shown by the fact that at one time Wilcox took 8 and
Wright about 20 pieces of the enemy's artillery.
Of Hill's artillery, Poague's Battalion took position
along Anderson's line in two groups. The left group
consisting of five pieces of Graham's and Wyatt's bat
teries under Capt. Wyatt occupied the ridge behind
Anderson's left, while Capt. Ward with five guns of his
own and Brooke's Warrenton Battery moved out to the
crest some 500 yards in advance of the ridge, when An
derson's brigades advanced. On Poague's left, Pe-
gram's Battalion under Brunson occupied a position be
hind a stone wall on the ridge opposite Cemetery Ridge,
losing during the day 9 men and 25 horses. Further to
the left and behind the same wall, Mclntosh was posted.
Poague and Brunson both succeeded in partially en
filading the Federal batteries along the Emmittsburg
Road and greatly aided Alexander in subduing their
fire and driving them from their advanced positions.
In this Mclntosh also assisted, but was principally en
gaged in diverting the fire of the batteries on Cemetery
Ridge from Longstreet's and Anderson's troops. On
Mclntosh's left, Lane with the two 20-pounder Par-
rotts and three 3-inch navy rifles of Wingfield's Battery,
and the five remaining pieces of Ross's Battery, engaged
the Federal Artillery on Cemetery Hill. Beyond Lane,
and just to the right of the Fairfield Road, Maj.
Richardson with nine pieces of Garnett's Battalion also
fired actively upon the same guns, and was late in the
652 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
day able to divert the fire of some of them from E well's
troops. So much for the part of the 3d Corps. In the
main, Walker's batteries were active and effective, and
no complaint whatever is to be made of the support
rendered by the artillery of the 2d Corps, 55 guns of
which were engaged though mostly at extreme range.
Ewell like Hill had been ordered to support Long-
street's attack by active demonstrations. The success
ful performance of his role was essential to the success
of the main attack in order that Meade might not draw
troops from the point of the hook to support those at the
end of the shank. We have seen that but 48 pieces of his
artillery had been placed in position in the morning, a
fact which almost presaged a lack of energy on his
part. But 32 of these were actively engaged. About
4 P. M. Latimer was ordered to open from his position
at Benner's Hill. As soon as his guns were unmasked,
the enemy replied with a superior number of guns from
Cemetery Hill and Gulp's Hill, causing many casualties
in the battalion. Soon the Federals planted some guns
well out to Latimer 's left front, enfilading Carpen
ter's Battery and practically silencing it. By this time
one section of Dement's Battery had entirely exhausted
its ammunition, and one of Brown's pieces had been dis
abled. Brown himself was wounded and his men so cut
up that but two pieces could be maintained in action.
Latimer was now compelled to retire his battalion with
the exception of four pieces which he left under cover to
repel any advance which the enemy might attempt.
It was now sunset. Jones' Battalion was absent
from the field altogether, and neither Carter's nor Nel
son's had fired a shot. The three batteries of Dance's
battalion in position behind Swell's right had alone, of
all the artillery of the 2d Corps, supported Latimer by
firing upon Cemetery Hill and the batteries posted
there. Latimer's contest had been most unequal.
Ewell's demonstration which should of course have
been made soon after Latimer opened fire was delayed,
and the infantry only got fairly to work after he had
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 653
been terribly cut up and compelled to withdraw his
guns. Finally Johnson's Division advanced and Lati-
mer boldly opened with the four pieces which he had left
in position, drawing the overwhelming fire of the massed
batteries of the enemy upon him. Perceiving that the
Federals were shifting the position of many of their guns
so as to play upon Latimer and Johnson, Richardson on
Hill's left redoubled his efforts to divert their fire and
partially succeeded. It was at this juncture that the
overbold and youthful Latimer was struck down, while
heroically cheering on the few cannoneers that remained
at their posts. The wound which the "boy major," as
he was called, received in his arm, resulted in his death
from gangrene on August 1st. Col. John Thompson
Brown, the Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps, char
acterized Latimer as a gallant and accomplished officer,
and a noble young man. "No heavier loss," said he,
"could have befallen the Artillery of this corps." And
Ewell, who was not given to flattery as his reports will
show, wrote of him, "The gallant young officer served
with me from March, 1862, to the second battle of Ma-
nassas. I was particularly struck at Winchester, May
25, 1862, his first warm engagement, by his coolness,
self-possession, and bravery under a very heavy artillery
fire, showing when most needed the full possession of all
his faculties. Though not twenty-one when he fell, his
soldierly qualities had impressed me as deeply as those
of any officer in my command." And writing of the
battle Gen. Pendleton said, "Here the gallant Maj.
Latimer, so young and yet so exemplary, received the
wound which eventuated in his death." While Gen.
Lee did not mention Latimer in his report of the battle
his admiration of the youthful artillerist was unbounded
and frequently expressed.
Entering the Virginia Military Institute in 1859,
Latimer promptly volunteered when the Corps of Ca
dets was sent to Richmond in April, was at once assigned
to duty with the artillery being organized in the camp of
instruction, and was soon commissioned a lieutenant in
656 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
to the peculiar character of the Federal position, which
was so compact, as well as covered by the accidents of
the ground, that troops could easily be shifted from
point to point. Nevertheless, full advantage was taken
of this fortunate circumstance by Meade. Again Hunt
proved to be the Nemesis of the Confederates, and time
and again his artillery was found massed just at the
right point to deny them success, for it was McGilvery
at Plum Run, who checked Longstreet, and it was
Stevens on the right who hurled Early from the ridge
he had all but won. During Longstreet's attack, Hunt
had supported Sickles with 11 batteries with 60 guns of
his general reserve alone. In addition to these guns,
the 2d, 3d, and 5th Corps had 80 guns in action. Against
these 140 pieces, Longstreet had but 62 guns on the field,
and Anderson's Division but 5 in advance of Seminary
Ridge.
While the artillery on both sides suffered severely in
men and horses, the total loss of ordnance was three Fed
eral guns, two of which only could be removed by the
Confederates from the field.
The fire of the Confederate Artillery was most effect
ive, but it was hopelessly outmatched in numbers.
Longstreet's batteries were assigned an almost impos
sible task, for after driving battery after battery from
the field, fresh ones continued to appear. Hunt's report
says: "The batteries were exposed to heavy front and
enfilading fires and suffered terribly, but as rapidly as
any were disabled they were retired and replaced by
others." And so, after the most persistent and heroic
efforts on the part of Alexander's artillerymen to silence
the enemy's batteries, at the close of the day they were
rewarded by seeing not less than 75 Federal guns in
position with ever-increasing infantry supports near-by.
Yet there was no sign of discouragement in the Artil
lery.
When night fell, the Confederate Infantry, with the
exception of Hood's and McLaws' Division on the
right, and Johnson's on the extreme left, bivouacked ap
proximately in the positions it had occupied in the morn-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 657
ing. But while the Infantry rested, it was necessary for
the Artillery to be refitted for the morrow. A splendid
moon lit up the field and greatly assisted the work. The
sound horses were watered and fed, while those killed
and disabled were replaced by drafts from the wagon
trains in rear. Extra caissons were brought up, am
munition issued, the lines rectified and such cover
as was possible provided for the guns and their detach
ments.
The losses in Alexander's own battalion had been
very heavy, probably not less than 75 men and twice
that number of horses. Taylor's Battery alone lost 9
men. But the heaviest loss was in Fickling's (Rhett's
or Brook's) South Carolina Battery, which had two 12-
pounder howitzers dismounted and 40 cannoneers killed
or wounded.
An incident in connection with Taylor's or Eubank's
Battery is especially worthy of being preserved. While
it was dashing forward to the orchard corporal
Joseph T. V. Lantz, a veteran gunner, was struck down
by a shell, which broke both his legs above the knees,
and soon died. When some of his companions at
tempted to remove him from the field, he said, "You can
do me no good; I am killed; follow your piece."
Nearby lay the body of a young cadet, Hill Carter
Eubank, who only a few days before had left the Vir
ginia Military Institute to enlist in the battery originally
commanded by his father. The facts are stated simply
to show the character of the men who manned the Con
federate guns. No artillery ever possessed a more
superb personnel, and equally heroic incidents concern
ing them might be recounted indefinitely.
In Cabell's Battalion, the losses were unusually
severe. McCarthy's Battery lost 9 men and 13 horses.
Lieuts. R. M. Anderson and John Nimmo, with the
rifled section of this battery alone, expended 200 rounds
of ammunition in less than 2 hours, in a duel with
Smith's Battery on Devil's Den Hill. Manly's Battery
had moved forward to the orchard with Alexander's
658 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Battalion and suffered accordingly. Eraser's Battery
not only lost its veteran commander, but one of its lieu
tenants and 11 men. When Lieut. Furlong succeeded
to the command of the battery, he was able to man but
two pieces. Capt. Carlton was also wounded, Lieut.
Motes succeeding to the command of the Troup Battery.
During the night it was withdrawn to be refitted. In
Henry's Battalion, which had been actively engaged
from the first in support of Hood, the losses were also
severe. One of Reilly's 3-inch rifles had burst, but two
10-pounder Parrotts captured by Hood's men from
Smith's Battery were turned over to and secured by the
battalion. Although Dearing had reported in person
to Alexander before the capture of the Peach Orchard
and had taken part in the fight, his battalion did not ar
rive upon the field until after dark, when it went into
bivouac behind the ridge.
During the night it became known that the artillery
along the whole line would be called upon to open at an
early hour, and before morning Eshleman's and Dear-
ing's battalions were moved up to Alexander's left, with
Cabell and Henry on his right. Gen. Pendleton and
Col. Long visited every portion of the line before morn
ing, verified the positions of the guns, and gave specific
directions to the Artillery of all three corps as to its
part on the morrow. With the exception of the massing
of all the batteries of the 1st Corps along the ridge at
the Peach Orchard, the positions of the Artillery re
mained generally unchanged. Brown and Walker, like
Alexander, made every effort to prepare their batteries
for the renewal of the battle, and everywhere the fullest
confidence reigned in the Artillery. Apparently there
was no uneasiness over the small supply of reserve am
munition at hand, a matter with which the gunners, as
a whole, were unfamiliar, perhaps fortunately so. But
it seems certain that some account should have been
taken of the condition of the ammunition supply, as a
matter of extreme importance to the success of subse
quent operations. The expenditure of the past two days
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 659
had been enormous, and it was apparent to all that an
unusual amount would be required the day following.
It would be interesting indeed to be able to follow the
movements of the ammunition trains and their methods
of supply, but one searches in vain for a record of these
things. Fortunately, nowadays, the trains, especially
the ordnance trains, are both regarded and treated as
an integral part of an army.
CHAPTER XXXIII
GETTYSBURG JULY 3D
THE dawn of July 3d found the two armies approxi
mately in the positions occupied by them at the close of
the fighting the evening before. Though Cemetery
Ridge remained intact in the hands of the Federals,
yet the operations had resulted at every point in an ad
vantage to the Confederates in spite of the fact that
they had failed to accomplish all they had attempted to
do. Longstreet had seized and occupied the advanced
Federal position on the left, E well's left held the breast
works on Gulp's Hill on the extreme Federal right, and
tremendous loss had been inflicted on Meade's army.
The advantage gained by Ewell would, it was believed,
enable him to take the Federal line in reverse. Gen.
Lee, therefore, determined to renew the assault. Long-
street, in accordance with this decision, was reinforced by
Pickett's three brigades and Dearing's Battalion of ar
tillery, which arrived after dark, and ordered to assail
the heights in his front at dawn, while Ewell was di
rected to make a simultaneous assault on the enemy's
right. But Meade did not supinely await the develop
ment of the Confederate attack as planned. A great
group of guns was placed in position during the night,
to bear on Johnson's Division, which had been strongly
reinforced, and at 4 A. M. Geary and Ruger advanced
under cover of the artillery to wrest their intrench-
ments from the Confederates. By 8 A. M. Ewell, in spite
of the most desperate efforts on the part of Johnson's
men, was forced to relinquish the captured works. Long-
street's dispositions had again been delayed and the
fighting on the left had commenced long before the 1st
Corps was ready to cooperate. It rendered Ewell no
effectual support whatever. The sixth great mistake
had been committed in this failure on the part of the
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 661
2d and 3d Corps to attack simultaneously, and again
Meade had been free to reinforce one of his flanks at
the expense of the other.
The change in the condition of affairs compelled Gen.
Lee to alter his plan of attack. A reconnaissance dis
closed to him that the Federal position from Round Top
to Gulp's Hill was occupied at every point by infantry
and artillery. There was, however, one point upon which
an assault could be directed with a reasonable prospect
of success. The word reasonable is used because sub
sequent events showed that success would have been at
tained had Lee's orders been executed. This point was
where Cemetery Ridge sloped westward to form the
saddle over which the Emmittsburg Road passed. Lee
believed that by forcing the hostile line at that point
and directing his attack toward Cemetery Hill, he could
take the Federal right in flank. He also perceived that
once having gained the saddle in the ridge, the fire of
the enemy's left would be neutralized, since it would be
as destructive to friend as to foe. The task was accord
ingly assigned to Longstreet, while as before Hill and
Ewell were to support him, and about 150 guns were to
be massed to prepare for the assault. These conclu
sions were reached at a conference held during the morn
ing on the field in front and within cannon range of
Round Top, there being present Gens. Lee, Longstreet,
A. P. Hill, and various staff officers. The plan of at
tack was fully discussed and it was decided that Pickett,
whose men were fresh and thirsting for battle, should
lead the assaulting column supported by McLaws and
Hood. A. P. Hill was also to support the attack with
such force as he could spare. It was never in any way
contemplated that Pickett should alone make the as
sault. He was to be given the lead for the sole reason
that since his troops were un weakened by previous fight
ing it was naturally assumed they would be more effec
tive than Hood's and McLaws', which had been terribly
punished. Any one familiar with war knows that
soldiers are not like wolves which become more fierce at
662 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
the sight of blood. The best troops are the most human
men, and while the best troops are able temporarily to
set aside, they are never able entirely to dispel, their
fears of death. The more losses they sustain, the more
difficult it is for them to set aside those fears. Pickett's
men were not only fresh, but were inspired by a desire
to reap their share of the glory of the battle, which had
been denied them by their absence from the field the day
before. While it had remained in the rear, its veteran
soldiers, though individually glad to escape the horrors
of battle, were none the less collectively fearful less they
might arrive too late to satisfy the pride of their com
mand.
The sole objection offered by Longstreet to the plan
proposed at the conference was that the guns on Little
Round Top might be brought to bear on the right flank
of his column, but this point was disposed of apparently
to his entire satisfaction by Col. Long of Lee's staff,
who suggested that they could be neutralized, if not
silenced, by a group of Confederate guns massed for the
purpose. None of the awful forebodings which Long-
street has subsequently declared he entertained were ex
pressed by him. He made no attempt to point out the
inevitable failure of the attack, and gave no evidence
of a feeling that the post of honor assigned his corps
was virtually a forlorn hope, in which it was to be ruth
lessly sacrificed by the "blood-thirsty Lee."* Yet he
has declared that he used the following words to the
Commander-in-Chief at the conference: "That will
give me 15,000 men. I have been a soldier, I may say,
from the ranks up to the position I now hold. I have
been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those
of two or three soldiers up to those of an army corps, and
I think I can safely say there never was a body of 15,000
men who could make that attack successfully." These
remarks, which Longstreet in fact would hardly have
dared make, are important if they were actually made,
for they show that his heart was still not in his work, and
*See Longstreet's absurd article in Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill, p. 339, and
also his book.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 663
prove as previously stated that his spirit throughout the
battle was not one of cooperation, and also, that he
positively did not gather from the discussion at the con
ference that Pickett's Division was alone to assault. Yet
he also argues that Pickett was wantonly sacrificed by
Lee in spite of the fact that he, Longstreet, made not
the slightest effort to support the division which,
actually by his own words, accomplished all the entire
corps was expected to do. The narrative will show that
it was Longstreet himself who sacrificed Pickett's Divi
sion, and also that its much misunderstood charge, so
commonly and erroneously attributed as a grievous
error to Lee, was in fact a feat which vindicates the
Commander-in-Chief of any possible blame for having
attempted the impossible. To believe Longstreet is to
recognize that he had in a sense staked his professional
opinion against the possibility of the successful issue
of the battle. It was then with his moral force, the
greatest power of any general, set against the successful
performance of his part, that Longstreet undertook the
execution of his orders. He says, "With my knowledge
of the situation, I could see the desperate and hopeless
nature of the charge, and the cruel slaughter it would
cause. My heart was heavy when I left Pickett/'
Picture Longstreet, the "old war-horse," the "Sledge
Hammer" of the Army of Northern Virginia, beset
with anticipations of loss in battle! Can anything be
more absurd, for among all his other virtues as a general
that of ability to steel his heart against inevitable losses
and not count the cost when occasion demanded was by
far the finest. Well might his heart have been heavy
when he left Pickett, for he must have known that no
steps had been taken, and that he did not intend to take
any, to support him.
Upon the representation that he could not uncover
his right by withdrawing Hood and McLaws, Long-
street was assigned seven brigades of Hill's Corps.
These with Pickett's made ten brigades for the column
of attack.
664 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Alexander was early apprised of the alteration of the
plan, and in order to bring his guns to bear on Cemetery
Hill a good many changes in the positions of the 1st
Corps batteries were necessary. The batteries had been
posted before daylight on the rolling ground about the
Peach Orchard, and by reason of the open character of
the position were necessarily exposed. The enemy's
guns were generally in pits or behind epaulments along
the ridge opposite, and though they fired occasional
shots during the morning, Alexander reserved his fire
in order to save ammunition. The shifting of his bat
teries to meet the change of orders was conducted as
quietly as possible by Alexander, but with his usual
energy and skill, and although the enemy's artillery be
came somewhat more active, the new line was established
by 10 A. M. Alexander now had in position 75 guns, all
well advanced, in an irregular curved line about 1,300
yards long, beginning in the Peach Orchard and ending
near the northeast corner of the Spangler wood. Along
this line Cabell's, Dearing's, Eshleman's, Alexander's
under Huger, and Henry's battalions were posted in the
order named from left to right. Maj. Richardson, with
the nine 12-pounder howitzers of Garnett's Battalion,
also reported to Alexander by Pendleton's orders, and
his pieces which were of too short range to be effective
along Hill's front were directed to be held under cover
close in rear of the forming columns of infantry, with
which it was intended they should advance. Pickett's
Division had already arrived at the orchard and the men
were eating and resting, ignorant of the fate which
awaited them, but all conscious of serious work ahead.
A few hundred yards to the left and rear of Alex
ander's line began Walker's line of 60 guns, the batteries
of which were generally posted as on the previous day,
extending along the ridge as far as the Hagerstown
Road. Nearly a mile to the north of Walker's left, two
Whitworth rifles of Hurt's Battery were posted on the
same ridge. In the interval 10 guns of Carter's Bat
talion occupied positions on the right and left of the
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 665
railroad cut, and to their right connecting with Walker's
left, Watson's and Smith's batteries and a section of
Hupp's of Dance's Battalion, with 10 guns, took po
sition. Latimer's Battalion, now under Capt. Raine,
remained in rear of Johnson's left, as did Jones' Bat
talion, while Nelson's Battalion had also been ordered
to that point with directions to engage the enemy's guns
on Gulp's Hill, if practicable. Capt. Graham, with four
guns, occupied a hill about 2,500 yards northeast of
Cemetery Hill, and was alone of the three battalions on
Ewell's left engaged during the day. Thus in the 2d
Corps, Brown placed in position but 25 pieces on the
morning of the 3d, and these were restricted to the use
of solid shot because of the utter unreliability of the
fuses provided for their shell.
The sole activity on the part of the Confederate Ar
tillery during the morning had been that of Wyatt's five
guns, or the left group of Poague's Battalion, which
opened fire upon the enemy's position about 7 A. M. A
number of Federal batteries soon concentrated their fire
on Wyatt, and Poague promptly ordered him to desist
from a further waste of ammunition in so unequal a con
test, in which nothing was accomplished but the ex
plosion of a Federal caisson, and the loss of 8 Confed
erate horses. Col. Poague afterwards learned that
Wyatt had been ordered by A. P. Hill to engage the
enemy.
On the Federal side, Hunt had placed 166 guns in
position before the attack commenced, and during the
engagement 10 more batteries from the reserve were
brought in action, raising the number of his guns to 220,
as against 172 employed by the Confederates. If there
was ever an occasion when every available piece was
needed in the front line, it was that of the artillery
preparation preceding Longstreet's assault, yet there
remained unemployed in the 2d Corps 25 rifles and 16
Napoleons, and in the 3d Corps fifteen 12-pounder
howitzers. As the Chief of Artillery had since daybreak
on the 3d been busily engaged visiting every portion of
666 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
the Confederate position from left to right he must have
known of the absence of many of these guns from the
line. Specific orders were personally given by him to
the various group and even battery commanders. His
aim was to secure a concentrated and destructive fire,
under cover of which the infantry might advance. The
problem now seems to have been a simple one so far
as the posting of the batteries was concerned, for even
had it been impracticable to place them all actually in
position, they might have all been held in readiness under
cover. Most careful instructions were given by Pendle-
ton on this point, and while he did actually supervise the
convenient placing of the ordnance trains, he seems to
have failed for some reason to verify personally the post
ing of the batteries. Subordinate artillery commanders
are of course responsible for such neglects as the actual
failure to bring their own guns into action, and in this
respect, Col. Brown, of the 2d Corps, was undoubtedly
remiss, subject, however, to the limitations imposed
upon him by the orders of his corps commander, and
those orders, it would seem, were responsible for the
elimination of Nelson's, Jones', and Raine's battalions.
Walker's failure to engage his 15 howitzers was due
solely to the ineffectiveness of their range, so no fault
is to be found with the artillery dispositions of the 3d
Corps, and Alexander brought every piece of the 1st
Corps into action.
Viewing the disposition of the Confederate Artillery
before the attack, a grave error should have been de
tected, and for this error the Chief of Artillery, subject
also to the orders from the Commander-in-Chief, was
responsible. Since Lee assumed no direct control over
his artillery, only informing himself of its general situa
tion through Col. Long of his staff, Pendleton must
receive the blame. Not only did he permit 56 of his
guns to remain idle as pointed out before, but he al
lowed 80 of the 84 guns of the 2d and 3d Corps, which
were engaged, to be brought into action on a mathe
matically straight line, parallel to the position of the
THE LONG ARM or LEE 667
enemy and constantly increasing in range therefrom to
the left or north! It was indeed a phenomenal over
sight on his part, as declared by Col. Alexander, not to
place a part of the Artillery, at least, north of the town
and east of the prolongation of his line of guns at the
center to enfilade the shank of the fish-hook, and cross
fire with the guns on Seminary Ridge. Even had Nel
son's and Jones' battalions, or either of them, both of
which remained idle with the exception of Milledge's
Battery of the former, been massed in such a position,
far greater effect would have been obtained by the Ar
tillery, and the actual disposition of the rest of the bat
talions, which for some reason unknown to us might have
been necessary, need not have been altered. Concen
trated fire does not necessarily mean massed batteries.
And especially is this true when the artillery of the of
fense may be disposed about the arc of an enveloping
line. With batteries widely dispersed about such an
arc, the enemy at the more interior or more restricted
position is at a great disadvantage, for just as the
sheafs of the surrounding groups converge upon a com
paratively small area, so the artillery fire of the defense
becomes divergent and hence less concentrated. No
more beautiful illustration could exist of the possible
relative effectiveness of artillery fire under such circum
stances than the terrain of Gettysburg. There, artillery
disposed about the outer arc would necessarily inflict
overwhelming and simultaneous losses upon the
thickly-massed batteries and infantry supports on Ceme
tery Ridge and its adjoining spurs, whereas the fire of
the defending batteries would, by virtue of the depres
sion in their front, either be compelled to ignore the at
tacking infantry, or the opposing batteries beyond and
above it. And even if part of the artillery of the de
fense was assigned to each of these missions, concentra
tion would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, artillery
fire directed at Seminary Ridge was either effective to
the highest degree, or totally noneffective, for "overs"
and "shorts" were lost. There was no infantry between
666 THE LONG ARM or LEE
the Confederate position from left to right he must have
known of the absence of many of these guns from the
line. Specific orders were personally given by him to
the various group and even battery commanders. His
aim was to secure a concentrated and destructive fire,
under cover of which the infantry might advance. The
problem now seems to have been a simple one so far
as the posting of the batteries was concerned, for even
had it been impracticable to place them all actually in
position, they might have all been held in readiness under
cover. Most careful instructions were given by Pendle-
ton on this point, and while he did actually supervise the
convenient placing of the ordnance trains, he seems to
have failed for some reason to verify personally the post
ing of the batteries. Subordinate artillery commanders
are of course responsible for such neglects as the actual
failure to bring their own guns into action, and in this
respect, Col. Brown, of the 2d Corps, was undoubtedly
remiss, subject, however, to the limitations imposed
upon him by the orders of his corps commander, and
those orders, it would seem, were responsible for the
elimination of Nelson's, Jones', and Raine's battalions.
Walker's failure to engage his 15 howitzers was due
solely to the ineffectiveness of their range, so no fault
is to be found with the artillery dispositions of the 3d
Corps, and Alexander brought every piece of the 1st
Corps into action.
Viewing the disposition of the Confederate Artillery
before the attack, a grave error should have been de
tected, and for this error the Chief of Artillery, subject
also to the orders from the Commander-in-Chief, was
responsible. Since Lee assumed no direct control over
his artillery, only informing himself of its general situa
tion through Col. Long of his staff, Pendleton must
receive the blame. Not only did he permit 56 of his
guns to remain idle as pointed out before, but he al
lowed 80 of the 84 guns of the 2d and 3d Corps, which
were engaged, to be brought into action on a mathe
matically straight line, parallel to the position of the
THE LONG ARM or LEE 667
enemy and constantly increasing in range therefrom to
the left or north! It was indeed a phenomenal over
sight on his part, as declared by Col. Alexander, not to
place a part of the Artillery, at least, north of the town
and east of the prolongation of his line of guns at the
center to enfilade the shank of the fish-hook, and cross
fire with the guns on Seminary Ridge. Even had Nel
son's and Jones' battalions, or either of them, both of
which remained idle with the exception of Milledge's
Battery of the former, been massed in such a position,
far greater effect would have been obtained by the Ar
tillery, and the actual disposition of the rest of the bat
talions, which for some reason unknown to us might have
been necessary, need not have been altered. Concen
trated fire does not necessarily mean massed batteries.
And especially is this true when the artillery of the of
fense may be disposed about the arc of an enveloping
line. With batteries widely dispersed about such an
arc, the enemy at the more interior or more restricted
position is at a great disadvantage, for just as the
sheafs of the surrounding groups converge upon a com
paratively small area, so the artillery fire of the defense
becomes divergent and hence less concentrated. No
more beautiful illustration could exist of the possible
relative effectiveness of artillery fire under such circum
stances than the terrain of Gettysburg. There, artillery
disposed about the outer arc would necessarily inflict
overwhelming and simultaneous losses upon the
thickly-massed batteries and infantry supports on Ceme
tery Ridge and its adjoining spurs, whereas the fire of
the defending batteries would, by virtue of the depres
sion in their front, either be compelled to ignore the at
tacking infantry, or the opposing batteries beyond and
above it. And even if part of the artillery of the de
fense was assigned to each of these missions, concentra
tion would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, artillery
fire directed at Seminary Ridge was either effective to
the highest degree, or totally noneffective, for "overs"
and "shorts" were lost. There was no infantry between
668 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
and beyond to suffer from wild shots as there was on
the heights occupied by the Federals. Again, whatever
the target selected by the inner batteries, their fire would
have been frontal with respect to the guns on the outer
arc, whereas every group on the latter line would have
crossed its fire with that of some other group. Hunt
occupied a position similar to that at the hub of a
wheel; Pendleton could have and should have grouped
his batteries about a part of the rim. The lines of the
spokes clearly illustrate what the comparative result
of the fire of the two artilleries would have been, and it
is not unreasonable to assume that the superiority of the
Federal guns in number and weight of metal would
have been more than compensated for by the natural
advantages of the Confederate position in so far as the
artillery was concerned. Certainly Hunt would have
been put to it to shift his batteries from point to point.
In fact, it would have been impossible for him to do
so, for they were terribly cut up even by the frontal
fire which was actually encountered.
These conclusions are not speculative, but are fully
borne out by an incident of the battle, which shows
what the possibilities really were. Quite by accident,
during the cannonade preceding Pickett's charge,
Milledge's Battery of Nelson's Battalion fired 48
rounds upon Cemetery Hill — the most vulnerable point
to artillery fire, by reason of the practicability of en
filading it, along the whole Federal line. The effect of
Milledge's fire is described by Col. Osborn, Chief of
Artillery, llth Corps, as follows:
"The fire from our west front had progressed 15 to
20 minutes when several guns opened on us from the
ridge beyond and east of Cemetery Hill. The line of
fire from the last batteries, and the line of fire from the
batteries on our west front, were such as to leave the
town between the two lines of fire. These last guns
opened directly on the right flank of my line of batteries.
The gunners got our range at almost the first shot.
Passing low over Wainwright's guns, they caught us
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 669
square in flank and with the elevation perfect. It was
admirable shooting. They raked the whole line of bat
teries, killed and wounded the men and horses, and blew
up the caissons rapidly. I saw one shell go through 6
horses standing broadside.
"To meet this new fire I drew from the batteries fac
ing west the 20-pounder Parrott Battery of Capt. Taft,
and wheeling it half round to the right brought it to bear
on them. I also drew from the reserve one battery and
placed it in position on Taft's right.
"Fortunately for us, these batteries, placed in the
new line, at once secured the exact range of their im
mediate adversaries. In a few minutes the enemy's fire
almost ceased, and when it again opened, and while the
fire was progressing, it was irregular and wild. They
did not again get our range as they had it before we
replied."*
Col. Osborn had in position over 60 guns along the
line of the llth Corps. If less than 50 rounds of Con
federate ammunition caused so much damage to that
enormous group of artillery, what, may we ask, would
several thousand have done?
The formation of the column of attack consumed
more time than had been contemplated, and about 11
A. M. before it had been completed some of Hill's
skirmishers provoked the enemy into premature activity
by attempting to seize a barn between the lines.
Gradually the Federal Artillery opened up, which
tempted Walker's guns to reply, and before long Hill's
line was subjected to the cannonade of over 100 guns.
But soon the roar of artillery died out and the field was
again as silent as a churchyard.
On the Federal side, Hancock's Corps held Cemetery
Ridge with Robinson's Division of the 1st Corps on
Hays' right in support, and Doubleday's at the angle
between Gibbon and Caldwell. Newton, who had suc
ceeded to the command of the 1st Corps, vice Reynolds,
was in charge of the ridge held by Caldwell. Com-
*Philadelphia Weekly Times, May 31, 1877.
670 THE LONG ARM or LEE
pactly arrayed on its crest was McGilvery's artillery
consisting of his own batteries and a number from the
Artillery Reserve. This group consisted of 41 pieces.
Well to the right of McGilvery, Capt. Hazard had
massed the 26 guns of the 2d Corps in front of Hays
and Gibbon. Woodruff's Battery was posted in front
of Zeigler's Grove, and on his left in succession were
posted Arnold's Rhode Island, Cushing's United States,
Brown's Rhode Island, and Roity's New York batter
ies. The two last named batteries had been heavily
engaged the day before, and so much cut up that they
now brought into action but four guns each. Besides
these, Daniel's Horse Battery was posted at the angle,
and soon after the action commenced Cowan's First
New York Battery with 6 rifles was placed on Roity's
left. A number of the guns on Cemetery Hill, as well as
those of Rittenhouse on Little Round Top, could also be
brought to bear on the point selected for Longstreet's
assault. Leaving out the latter, which were partially
neutralized by hostile groups, there were, therefore, 77
guns in two groups along the front of the 2d Corps, oc
cupying the actual crest and plainly visible to the Con
federates, who had brought to bear upon them approxi
mately 150 pieces.
Aware of the great strength of their position, the Fed
erals, after the early cannonade died out, simply sat
still and waited for developments. On the Confederate
side, it had been arranged that when the infantry
column was ready, Longstreet should announce the fact
by the fire of two guns of the Washington Artillery. At
this signal all the Confederate guns were to open simul
taneously on the batteries on Cemetery Hill, and the
ridge extending towards Little Round Top. Alex
ander was to observe the fire and give Pickett the order
to charge. Accordingly he established his observing
station about noon at a favorable point near the left of
his line of guns. Soon after establishing his station,
Alexander received the following note from Longstreet :
"COLONEL — If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive
the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts
THE LONG ARM or LEE 671
pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Gen.
Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good
judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let
Gen. Pickett know when the moment offers."
This note naturally startled Longstreet's Chief of Ar
tillery, who did not wish to substitute his judgment for
that of the Commander-in-Chief who had ordered the
attack to be made. No matter what Alexander may
have thought at the time, he must have felt that too much
responsibility was being shifted upon his shoulders by
his corps commander. He therefore sent Longstreet the
following message :
"GENERAL — I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire
on the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed
to view and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer
from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be
carefully considered before opening fire, for it will take all the
artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and
if the result is unfavorable we will have none left for another effort.
And, even if this is entirely successful, it can only be so at a very
bloody cost."
Oh, the wisdom of that message, the able cunning,
may we say, of the subaltern who sent it ! Nothing that
has ever been written or said can half so well give us an
insight into Alexander's character. It shows us that
not only was this able artilleryman prepared to execute
his orders irrespective of personal views concerning the
advisability of the general plan, that not only did he
have a most thorough grasp of the situation in its
present, as well as it future aspects, but that he also had
an eye to the propriety of the shifting of authority upon
subordinates. He at least did not propose to subject
himself nor the Artillery to the possibility of becoming
a scape-goat in event of a disaster, and promptly put
the matter up to the subtle Longstreet in that light. "If3
as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this
attack, it should be carefully considered before opening
our fire, etc." Well did Alexander use these words, and
it may be said here that when the Chief of Artillery him-
12
672 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
self, whose duty it was to prepare the assault, inferred
from the tone of the orders of the Corps Commander
that there was an alternative plan, no other fact is neces
sary to prove that Longstreet entertained such an alter
native. Where, may we require, did he find authority
for it? Certainly his orders had been specific to make
the attack, and those orders have been repeatedly held
up to the world by him as not only faulty in the extreme,
but as allowing him no alternative. He has even de
clared that he did not "dispute them further, because he
saw that Lee's mind was made up," or words to that
effect.* It is such fallacies as those which Long-
street has recorded that makes the world cry out,
"Would that mine enemy would write a book!" And
when one's enemy writes several books, it is even more
delightful to read them.
To Alexander's astute dispatch, the following reply
soon came from Longstreet :
"COLONEL — The intention is to advance the infantry, if the
artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy off, or having
other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When the
moment arrives, advise Gen. Pickett, and of course advance such
artillery as you can use in aiding the attack."
Let us underscore the "if" in this message, and again
ask whence came the pernicious word. There was no
"if" in Lee's orders. It was clearly of Longstreet's
adoption. In other words he had set about his task pre
pared to complete it "if" he chose to do so, and this is not
the spirit of a lieutenant who is committed heart and
soul to the success of his superior. Jackson used no
"ifs" in his orders for the execution of Lee's plans. He
made his orders mandatory, and said to his subordinates,
"You will do so and so," nor did he ever seek to shift
responsibility upon his Chief of Artillery. He loved
responsibility and never parted with it. This is what
Lee subsequently meant when he said he would have
won the battle of Gettysburg, had Jackson been present.
Lee must have been keenly conscious of Longstreet's
*See Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill, p. 343.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 673
unsympathetic support from the very beginning of the
campaign, and cognizant of that dragging influence
imposed upon his operations by the latter from the
start, he would most certainly have assigned the 1st
Corps to the less active part assigned to Hill after the
first day, and placed the more enthusiastic Jackson on
his right, where energy and promptitude were most re
quired. Who can doubt that Jackson and not Alex
ander, Brown, or Walker, would have occupied the im
portant station actually turned over by Longstreet to
Alexander? Can we doubt that Jackson and not a sub
ordinate, however able, would have himself selected the
moment for the advance of his infantry? He did it at
Chancellorsville, and why would he not have done it at
Gettysburg?
Upon the receipt of Longstreet 's reply, which on the
whole, however, was couched in quite a different tone
from his first message, Alexander was still unable to de
termine the extent of his discretion, nor was Gen.
Wright, who happened to be present, able to help him
out. Wright did say, however, that the Federal position
was not as difficult to reach as it appeared to be, for he
had almost carried a part of it the day before. In
fluenced by Wright's minimizing the difficulties to be
encountered, and somewhat as he tells us "by a sort of
camp rumor which I had heard that morning that Gen.
Lee had said that he was going to send every man he
had upon that hill," Alexander was reassured that no
discretion as to the attack was intended and resolved
to carry out his part in the way he believed to be in con
formity with the decision of the Commander-in-Chief.
His position was not an enviable one, and it is not sur
prising if his confidence was somewhat shaken by that
intangible evidence of irresolution on the part of his im
mediate superior, which in some indefinable way makes
itself so quickly felt to all. In this spirit it was that he
rode back to see Pickett, whose division was but a short
distance in his rear. Alexander did not express his feel
ings to Pickett, nor did he question him as to his views.
674 THE LONG ARM or LEE
But by those means which human natures possess, he
adroitly discovered Pickett's sentiments. Pickett he
found to be unusually sanguine of success and highly
gratified that his luck had favored him by giving him
the chance to make the charge. This was the soldier
over whose fate Longstreet's heart was so heavy. What
a pity it seems that some of Pickett's spirit was not
transmitted to Longstreet, and that the "camp rumor"
concerning Lee's resolution, which in itself bespoke the
high moral of the troops, did not engender more confi
dence in his lieutenant. But, while his troops were burn
ing with ardor for the fight, their great, soft-hearted
leader was sorely oppressed — his heart was already
bleeding for them!
A few minutes with the fiery Pickett sufficed to dis
pel Alexander's uncertainty of mind, and he returned
to his post stimulated by the contagious spirit of the
gallant infantry leader. No delay could now be made,
and no indecision on his part should contribute to the
miscarriage of the attack, so he wrote Longstreet:
"General: When our artillery fire is at its best, I shall
order Pickett to charge." Note the word "shall" in this
message. That word spelt a resolution born of Pickett
which had supplanted the previous irresolution born of
Longstreet.
All these things are moral factors it is true, and are
no part of the tactics employed in the battle, but never
theless it is such things that induce victories and de
feats, and in them is often to be found the reasons for
what would otherwise remain inexplicable. Not only
the esprit of the officers and men at the moment of
attack and the physical condition of the troops, but the
general state of their military digestion, so to speak, is
important when one undertakes to reason from
effect to cause. It is not the mere tactical conception
as included in orders that wins battles, and yet with
absolutely no other knowledge we frequently arrive at
conclusions concerning the reasons for the military
failures and successes of the past. The most faultless
THE LONG ARM or LEE 675
tactics are frequently set at nought by adverse psycho
logical conditions, whereas the sheer elan of the troops
will often counteract the most egregious tactical
blunders. In the final analysis the whole theory of at
tack may be resolved into the truth that poor tactics,
executed with spirit and confidence in the leaders, will
more often guarantee success than those of the most ap
proved form when the driving force of enthusiasm is
lacking. This fact is more readily grasped if one but
realizes that the culmination of attack is close contact,
and that there will be no close contact gained by the of
fense unless the tactical plan, however perfect, is de
veloped with a certain amount of rapidity, in order that
changes may not be enforced by the enemy's movements.
Enthusiasm alone will produce rapidity of execution.
All this well illustrates the causes of Longstreet's lapses
at Gettysburg. He himself has admitted that he was
woefully lacking in enthusiasm for the part assigned
him. Lacking this fundamental element of success, his
movements were consequently not only tardy as a rule,
but, when finally undertaken were not characterized by
that vigorous push for which he was noted.
We have examined the situation on the Confederate
side. Now let us view it from Cemetery Ridge as it
appeared to Gen. Hunt about 11 A. M., using his own
graphic description: "Here a magnificent display
greeted my eyes. Our whole front for two miles was
covered by batteries already in line, or going into
position. They stretched — apparently in one unbroken
mass — from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard,
which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which
were planted thick with cannon. Never before had
such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely,
if ever, abroad.* What did it mean? It might possibly
be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid
Ewell, or to guard against a counter-stroke from us, but
it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be
preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our batteries
*K6niggratz and Sedan had not then been fought.
676 THE LONG AKM OF LEE
and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust
our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops
might pass in good condition over the half-mile of open
ground, which was beyond our effective musketry fire."
Here let it be interpolated that Hunt, with the skill of
the fine soldier that he was, accurately divined the in
tentions of the Confederates, expressing his conclusions
as follows: "With such an object, the cannonade would
be long, and followed immediately by the assault, their
whole army being held in readiness to follow up a suc
cess. From the great extent of ground occupied by the
enemy's batteries, it was evident that all the Artillery
on our west front, whether of the Army Corps or of the
reserve, must concur as a unit under the Chief of Ar
tillery in the defense. This is provided for in all well-
organized armies by special rules, which formerly were
contained in our own army regulations, but they had
been condensed in successive editions into a few short
lines, so obscure as to be virtually worthless, because
like the rudimentary toe of the dog's paw, they had be
come, from lack of use, mere survivals, — unintelligible
except to the specialist. It was of the first importance to
subject the enemy's infantry, from the first moment of
their advance, to such a cross fire of our artillery as
would break their formation, check their impulse, and
drive them back, or at least bring them to our lines in
such condition as to make them an easy prey. There
was neither time nor necessity for reporting this to Gen.
Meade, and beginning on the right, I instructed the
chiefs of artillery and battery commanders to withhold
their fire for 15 or 20 minutes after the cannonade com
menced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible
accuracy on those batteries which were most destructive
to us, — but slowly, so that when the enemy's ammunition
was exhausted, we should have sufficient left to meet the
assault."
Before the Confederate Artillery was ordered to open,
Alexander sent a courier to the rear with directions to
Maj . Richardson to move up with Garnett's nine howit-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 677
zers, which he had decided to lead forward nearly to
musket range at the head of Pickett's Infantry, where
they would be of more service than in its rear. But un
fortunately for Pickett, though fortunately perhaps for
Pickett's batteries, Gen. Pendleton had sent them to
cover behind Hill's line, where they were not found in
time to be used by Alexander. Inasmuch as the Chief
of Artillery had placed these batteries at Alexander's
disposal he was guilty of a grave mistake in detaching
them without advising his subordinate. True, he moved
them in order to shelter them more thoroughly, but the
act was one of unwarranted interference, in the circum
stances in which it was done.
Just before 1 p. M. a courier dashed up to the Wash
ington Artillery and handed its commander an order
written on the fly leaf of a memorandum book. Ad
dressed to Col. Walton, its contents were as follows:
"Headquarters, July 3, 1863. Colonel: Let the bat
teries open. Order great care and precision in firing. If
the batteries at the Peach Orchard cannot be used
against the point we intend attacking, let them open
on the enemy on the rocky hill. Most respectfully, J.
Longstreet, Lieutenant- General commanding." The
order to fire the signal guns was immediately communi
cated to Maj. Eshleman, and the report of the first gun
of Miller's Battery soon rang out upon the still summer
air. There was a moment's delay with the second gun,
a friction primer having failed to explode. The inter
val was but a short one, but during it the heart of two
great armies could almost be heard to throb. Instantly
a canopy of smoke spread over the Peach Orchard, and
exactly at 1 o'clock, the roar and flash of 138 Confeder
ate guns announced the opening of the conflict. In a
few seconds, the artillery of both armies rent the air
with the deep notes of the guns, and the crescendo of
bursting shell, while the earth trembled as if Jove had
placed his feet upon the pedals of a great organ. Truly
might Mars have applauded the tremendous throb and
looked down with delight from his Olympic seat upon
678 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
the fire-wreathed arena of Gettysburg, for never in this
world had such a warlike scene been set before. The
Federal position seemed to have broken out with flash
ing guns at every point, and from Little Round Top
to Cemetery Hill the ridge blazed like a volcano. Hunt
had just completed his dispositions at Little Round Top
when the Confederate signal guns were heard. De
scribing the field as he viewed it from that point, he
says : "The scene was indescribably grand. All the Con
federate batteries were soon covered with smoke, through
which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed
filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the
hurtling of their fragments, formed a running accom
paniment to the deep roar of the guns. Thence I rode
to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and am
munition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the can
nonade ceased; but both the reserve and the train had
gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been
left to receive and convey orders, which I sent by them ;
then I returned to the ridge. Turning into the Taney-
town Pike, I saw evidence of the necessity under which
the reserve had "decamped," in the remains of a dozen
exploded caissons, which had been placed under cover of
a hill, but which the shells had managed to search out.
In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge
than on its crest, which I soon reached at the position
occupied by Gen. Newton, behind McGilvery's batter
ies, from which we had a fine view, as our guns were
now in action." Describing the Artillery fire of both
sides, Hunt further says: "Most of the enemy's pro
jectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all
the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit
to the Confederates, — a mere waste of ammunition, for
everything there could seek shelter. ... I now
rode along the ridge to inspect the batteries. The
infantry were lying down on its reverse slope, near the
crest, in open ranks, waiting events. . . . Our fire
was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests, I found
that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to
THE LONG ARM or LEE 679
Gen. Meade to advise its immediate cessation, and prep
aration for the assault, which would certainly follow.
The headquarters building, immediately behind the
ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of
the staff lay dead. Being told that the General had gone
to the Cemetery, I proceeded thither. He was not
there, and on telling Gen. Howard my object, he con
curred in its propriety, and I rode back along the ridge,
ordering the fire to cease. This was followed by a ces
sation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impres
sion that he had silenced our guns, and almost im
mediately his infantry came out of the woods and
formed for the assault. On my way to the Taneytown
Road to meet the fresh batteries, which I had ordered
up, I met Maj. Bingham, of Hancock's staff, who in
formed me that Gen. Meade's aides were seeking me
with orders to 'cease firing.' So I had only anticipated
his wishes." So much for the Federal side.
Before the cannonade opened Alexander had made
up his mind to give Pickett the order to advance within
15 or 20 minutes after it began, but when he observed
the full development of the Federal batteries, knowing
that the enemy's infantry was suffering little behind the
accidents of the ground and the sheltering walls along
the ridge, he could not bring himself to give the word.
He afterwards said that it seemed madness to launch
the infantry into that fire with an open area about 1,300
yards wide to traverse. So he let 15 minutes pass into
25, hoping vainly that the effect of the Confederate ar
tillery fire might soon produce more serious effects. At
the end of this time he wrote Pickett: "If you are com
ing at all, you must come at once, or I cannot give you
proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened
at all; at least 18 guns are still firing from the cemetery
itself." Five minutes after the sending of the message,
Hunt ordered his batteries to cease firing, and those at
the Cemetery were seen to limber up and retire to the
rear. It had not been the custom in the Federal Ar
tillery to withdraw temporarily in anticipation of an
680 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
infantry assault, in order to save ammunition, though
such a practice had all along been followed by the Con
federates. So Alexander believed that if fresh batteries
were not shortly brought up by the enemy, the position
could be carried. Observing with his glass for five
minutes or more the crest which was still swept by the
fire of the Confederate guns, he was unable to detect a
sign of life on the deserted position. The dead and
wounded men and horses, together with numerous dis
abled carriages, alone occupied the ground. He then
wrote Pickett: "For God's sake, come quick. The 18
guns are gone ; come quick, or my ammunition won't let
me support you properly."
Pickett had taken Alexander's first note to Long-
street, who read it and said nothing. Pickett then said,
"General, shall I advance?" Longstreet, unwilling to
take upon himself the responsibility of ordering him not
to do so, but equally unwilling to give the word for the
charge in pursuance of Lee's orders, simply turned his
head away, with the result that Pickett, whose heart
was in the right place, saluted and said, "I am going to
move forward, sir," and then galloped off to his division,
and immediately put it in motion.
Longstreet claims that he nodded his head in answer
to Pickett's question. But even if he did, that was a
remarkable way for a corps commander to set his as
saulting column in motion. His whole attitude and
conduct was not well calculated to impart to the leader
of his column that fiery ardor which alone could win
success. Fortunately, Pickett's nerve was unimpaired
by Longstreet's conduct. Had a less bold spirit been in
the lead, the 1st Corps would never have made the at
tempt. The whole incident is chilling to the spirits of
one who follows it, though it had no such effect on
Pickett. In the light of after events, it seems almost
too bad he had the resolution to make the attempt, for
we are now able to see that with the exception of his
individual enthusiasm and that of his men, not one ele
ment of success was present.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 681
Most of the Confederate reports declare that at this
juncture the Federal batteries were silenced, in the sense
than they were subdued. Again we see how dangerous it
is to reach the conclusion that silent guns are harmless
guns, for in this instance their retirement was but the
calm before the storm which was to break out with re
newed fury. The moment was in fact far more ominous
of what was to follow, than propitious for the assault.
Leaving his staff, Longstreet rode to Alexander's
observing station. It was then about 1 :40 p. M. Alex
ander explained the artillery situation to him, feeling
then more hopeful of success, but expressing a fear less
his ammunition might be exhausted before the crisis of
the attack. "Stop Pickett immediately and replenish
your ammunition," said Longstreet. But Alexander de
murred on the ground that the effect of the artillery
preparation would be lost, and also because there was
but a little reserve ammunition left. Longstreet then
said to him: "I don't want to make this attack. I
would stop it now, but that Gen. Lee ordered it and ex
pects it to go on. I don't see how it can succeed."
Let us pause again and ask ourselves if this was not
a pitiful situation in which the superb 1st Corps found
itself. Think of it ! How could aught but disaster ensue
with such a one at its head? Its bold leader had utterly
succumbed and instead of being his old self, the man
of iron nerve and will, he was now at the crucial instant
of the war, suffering from all the frailties of a weak
mortal. We know that Longstreet possessed great per
sonal courage, but as a leader, on this occasion, he was
most certainly, as proved by his own words, the victim
of "cold feet." It was his duty to order that charge.
If, in his opinion, it was so grievous a mistake as he later
declared it to have been, his course was clear. He
should have, in the presence of Lee and his staff, made
his protest, in writing, if necessary, and upon being
overruled, he should have gone back to his command
with teeth set and sought to impress his division and bri
gade commanders not only with the necessity of success,
682 THE LONG ARM or LEE
but with the practicability of the assault. Had he done
this, the attack would probably have succeeded, but
even had it failed, Longstreet would have been scot-
free of all blame and Lee would have been the first to
publish his protest, in order that his lieutenant might be
promptly and absolutely absolved before the world. As
it was, the magnanimous Lee assumed all the blame in
order that his lieutenant might not be rendered less effi
cient as a leader, by the destruction of the confidence of
his men. Lee knew that his own character, record, and
motives alone could stand the strain which the blame for
the loss of Gettysburg would impose upon the one who
assumed it, and it was his willingness to shoulder the
responsibility of the many risks that he took during the
war, which made him the moral equal, if not superior of,
any captain of history. It is interesting to speculate
what the career of a soldier with such moral force might
have been had he possessed the means at the disposal of,
and the ambitious lust for power which inspired Alex
ander, Caesar, and Napoleon. Though not generally
classed with these as a great captain, history will in the
course of time liken him with respect to the higher virtues
of the soul to Hannibal, who from the dispassionate
record now appears to have been the strongest man that
ever bore arms. Eventual success in war is the most
potent irrigant of that fame which grows greener and
greener with time. Defeat is the blighting sun which
scorches and shrivels military reputations until nothing
remains but the gullies and waste places of failure, from
which no garlands are plucked. These are facts which
the names of Hannibal and Lee alone have set at naught.
But to return again to our narrative.
What Col. Alexander's feelings were upon hearing
Longstreet's words is difficult to imagine. We can
hardly assume that he was surprised, but we can be sure
of one thing, — he was not shaken in his resolve to do
his best. The heart of Pickett himself was no bolder
than that which beat in Alexander's breast. He listened,
but dared not offer a word. He realized that the battle
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 683
was lost if he ordered his guns to cease firing, for he
knew that the ammunition supply was too low to per
mit of another artillery preparation; the guns had
hardly cooled during the past three days. There was
still a chance of success, and it was not his part by word
or deed to sacrifice it, and though he failed to see it, the
recordation of these sentiments on his part remains one
of the greatest indictments of the superior whom he has
so ardently sought to defend.
While Longstreet was still speaking to his Chief of
Artillery, the die cast itself, for Pickett's immortal divi
sion swept out of the woods in rear of the guns and pre
sented its gray breast to the enemy. The line swept on
with bayonets flashing in the sun like the spray on the
crest of a great wave. At the head of his brigade rode
Gen. Dick Garnett, of the old 9th Infantry, just out
of the ambulance, but stimulated with hope of fresh
glory. As he passed Longstreet, he threw back the cape
of his frazzled blue overcoat and, raising himself erect in
the saddle, waved a grand salute to his corps com
mander.
After riding forward with Garnett a short distance,
Alexander returned to his line, with a view to select such
of his guns as had enough ammunition to follow Pickett.
While the great artillery duel had been in progress,
and before the infantry advanced, a serious danger
threatened Longstreet's right. This was the appear
ance of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, which moved
upon that flank and commenced massing in the body
of timber extending from the base of Big Round Top
westward to Kern's house on the Emmittsburg Road.
Reilly's and Bachman's batteries of Henry's Battalion
had been promptly ordered to change front to the right
and had opened fire upon the enemy's cavalry with such
effect as at once to drive it beyond the wood and out of
sight. In the meantime, part of Stuart's Cavalry was
arriving on the right and soon formed line at right-
angles to that of Hood's Division, while Hart's Horse
Battery was stationed on the Emmittsburg Road at the
684 THE LONG ARM or LEE
angle, and later succeeded in driving off Merritt's Fed
eral Cavalry Brigade which deployed for the attack.
The infantry column led by Pickett had been poorly
formed. Six brigades, or those of Brockenbrough,
Davis, McGowan, Archer, Garnett, and Kemper, with
about 10,000 men, were in the first line, with a second
line composed of Lane's, Scale's, and Armistead's bri
gades, very much shorter than the first on its left, fol
lowing 200 yards in rear. The remaining brigade, Wil-
cox's, was posted in rear of the right of the column, both
flanks of which rested in the air with no support in its
rear. As the infantry rushed through the line of guns
and debouched upon the plain in front of the ridge,
the Federal Artillery, which had become almost silent,
broke out again with all its batteries, the 18 guns at the
cemetery promptly reappearing in action. The Con
federate batteries, which had been compelled to reserve
their fire while the infantry was moving past them, re
opened over its head, as soon as the attacking troops ad
vanced about 200 yards. But the Federal guns which
had been so skillfully concealed for the time being and
shoved to the forward crest to repel the assault, utterly
ignored the Confederate batteries, and concentrated
with the utmost precision upon the infantry. Mean
time, Alexander had formed about 18 guns, including
five from Garden's and Flanner's batteries, of Henry's
Battalion, on the right under Maj. John C. Haskell,
and four from the Washington Artillery on the left,
three under Capt. Miller, and one of Norcom's or Eshle-
man's old battery under Lieut. Battles. In the center
only about one gun in every four could be ordered for
ward. The ammunition had all but run out along the
line, and the caissons which had been sent to the ordnance
train had not returned. The train had also been moved
by Pendleton to a more distant point than the one it first
occupied, to escape the fire, which had been directed at
the batteries on the right of Walker's line on the ridge.
Alexander soon advanced with Eshleman's, Haskell's,
Lieut. Motes' Troup Artillery (Capt. Carlton having
THE LONG ARM or LEE 685
been wounded), and several other guns, to a swell of
the ground just west of the Emmittsburg Road, where
he sought to protect Pickett's column by firing upon the
enemy's troops, advancing to attack its right flank. The
four guns which Haskell advanced from the Peach
Orchard and the four on his left under Capt. Miller and
Lieut. Battles of the Washington Artillery, were so far
to the front of Pickett's route that they were able to
enfilade the Federal Infantry massing to meet the
assault. The effect of their fire was for a time terrific,
but soon attracted that of not less than 20 guns which
practically silenced them after disabling a number of
pieces and many men and horses.
The troops of Heth's Division, decimated by the
storm of deadly hail which tore through the ranks, had
faltered and fallen back before the combined artillery
and musketry fire of the enemy. This had impelled
Pender's Division to fall back also while Wilcox's Bri
gade, perceiving that the rest of Hill's troops were un
able to reach the Federal position, had failed so far to
move forward to Pickett's support. The disintegration
of the infantry column had set in when the column had
traversed about half the intervening space. The Fed
eral line overlapped it on the left 800 yards or more,
and was crowded with guns. The fire upon the un
supported left, the advance of which was retarded by
numerous fences, could be endured but a short time.
Already the artillery support which had been expected
from the 3d Corps was failing, by reason of the batteries
having indulged in the earlier duel of the morning.
That useless waste of ammunition was now to be sorely
felt. Garnett and Armistead had been killed, Kemper
wounded, and over 2,000 of Pickett's men had fallen
within 30 minutes, before the end of which time the
shattered remnants were driven from the position they
had carried.
Just as the Confederate column began to advance, the
reserve batteries which Hunt had ordered up had ar
rived, and Fitzhugh's, Weir's, and Parsons' were put in
686 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
near the clump of trees, while Brown's and Arnold's
batteries, much crippled, were withdrawn, Cowan's be
ing substituted for the former. McGilvery's group had
promptly reappeared and opened a destructive oblique
fire upon the right of the assaulting column, greatly
aided by Rittenhouse's six rifles on Little Round Top,
which were served with remarkable accuracy in enfilad
ing the Confederate lines. The steady fire from Mc
Gilvery's and Rittenhouse's groups caused the column
of attack to drift to the left out of its true course, so
that the weight of the assault fell directly upon the
position occupied by Hazard's group of batteries.
Hunt had counted on the cross fire of his artillery groups
halting the Confederate column before it reached the
Federal position, but in this he was disappointed, for
Hazard, who had exhausted his shell, was compelled
to remain silent until the Confederate Infantry arrived
within the zone of canister effect. The orders of the
corps commander, which, contrary to Hunt's directions,
had resulted in Hazard's expenditure of all his shell in
the artillery duel preceding the assault, deprived the
defense of nearly one-third of its guns in the early stage
of the attack, and entirely of the effect of the cross fire
which had been planned. Hunt subsequently declared
that Pickett's troops could never have reached Hazard's
batteries had his orders not been superseded. But this is
neither here nor there. They did reach the ridge in
spite of the tornado of canister fire which Hazard
opened upon them when within about 200 yards of his
batteries.
As the Confederate brigades closed upon the Federal
position, the fire fight of the infantry commenced in
earnest. It lasted but a short time and soon Pickett's
men, who with the exception of the more-advanced ones
had never halted, surged on. As the rear line merged
with the first the troops swarmed over the fences and
disappeared in the smoke and dust which concealed the
enemy's guns. Already the Confederate guns, except
those with which Alexander was engaging the enemy on
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 687
the right, had been compelled to suspend their fire. The
stars and bars were now discerned fluttering among the
Federal guns, but the enemy was closing in upon
Pickett's men from all sides in spite of every effort
which Walker's and Alexander's batteries made to pre
vent it. Ewell's Infantry and Artillery were all silent,
leaving Meade free to draw troops from his right to as
sist in the repulse of Pickett.
From the Confederate position, the awesome tragedy
was grand and thrilling, and the onlookers watched it
as if life and death hung upon the issue. "If it should
be favorable to us," wrote one of the Confederate of
ficers, "the war was nearly over; if against us, we each
had the risks of many battles yet to go through. And
the event culminated with fearful rapidity. Listening
to the rolling crashes of musketry, it was hard to realize
that they were made up of single reports, and that each
musket shot represented nearly a minute of a man's
life in that storm of lead and iron. It seemed as if 100,-
000 men were engaged, and that human lives were being
poured out like water."
Just as Pickett's troops had reached the Federal po
sition, Col. Freemantle, of Her Majesty's Army, who
until then had occupied a post of vantage behind Hill's
Corps on the ridge, came upon the field, and in the be
lief that the attack had fully succeeded declared to
Longstreet that he would not have missed the scene for
anything in the world.
When Pickett, who was riding with his staff in rear
of his division, saw that Hill's brigades on his left were
breaking up, after sending two aides to rally them, a
third was sent to Longstreet to say that the position in
front would be taken, but that reinforcements would be
required to hold it. Longstreet, in reply, directed
Pickett to order up Wilcox, and Pickett sent three mes
sengers in succession to be sure that the order was
promptly acted upon. As the fugitives from Petti-
grew's Division came back, Wright's Brigade of Ander
son's Division was moved forward a few hundred yards
13-
688 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
to cover their retreat. Already a stream of fugitive and
wounded soldiers had begun to flow from the ridge to
the rear, pursued by the enemy's fire from the right and
left, and it was apparent to all that Pickett's men, unless
strongly reinforced — could not hold on. After about 20
minutes, when the fire had all but ceased, and during
which time ever-increasing masses of Federal infantry
were seen to be moving from all directions upon his
men, Wilcox's Brigade of about 1,200 men, with some
250 of Perry's Florida Brigade on its left, charged
past the more-advanced Confederate batteries. Not
another man was ordered forward, and nothing re
mained for them to support, for Pickett's Division had
by this time simply crumbled away under the terrific
infantry and artillery fire, which had been concentrated
from all sides upon it.
The victory which for a moment had seemed within
their grasp had eluded the Confederates, 4,000 of whom
had fallen or been captured in the assault. No troops
could have behaved more gallantly than those who par
ticipated in the attack, and none could have displayed
higher qualities of courage and discipline than those of
the whole army when it became apparent that Pickett
had been repulsed. While Wilcox's Brigade was mak
ing its charge, Gen. Lee, entirely alone, had joined Col.
Alexander. The Artillery of the 1st Corp had ceased
firing in order to save ammunition in case the enemy
should attempt a counter-stroke. Wilcox's charge was
as useless as it was tragic. The brigade advanced but a
short distance before it was overcome by the fire of the
enemy, and compelled to halt, whereupon Lee ordered
it to be withdrawn and placed in position behind the
batteries with Wright's Brigade to oppose the enemy,
should they advance. The Commander-in- Chief was no
doubt apprehensive of such action on Meade's part and
personally did everything he could to encourage his
troops, especially the disorganized stream of fugitives
moving to the rear. "Don't be discouraged," said he to
them, "It was my fault this time. Form your ranks
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 689
again when you get under cover. All good men must
hold together now." Only when they had all passed,
and it was seen that no attack by the enemy was in
tended, did Gen. Lee leave the threatened point. The
officers of every grade on that part of the field seconded
his efforts to preserve order and reform the broken
troops, and the men so promptly obeyed the call to rally
that their thinned ranks were soon restored and the line
reestablished. There was no sign, whatever, of panic or
even discouragement. The troops, though mortified
over their repulse, longed for the enemy to attack in
order that they might efface the blot of their first serious
defeat.
While the broken infantry was streaming to the rear
and being reformed, Alexander's guns alone and en
tirely unsupported opposed the enemy at the Peach
Orchard. His ammunition was now almost entirely ex
hausted, so no notice was taken of the desultory fire of
the hostile batteries. Occasionally Alexander's batter
ies were compelled to fire with canister upon the Federal
skirmishers, which were thrown forward, but the
enemy's guns refrained from molesting the Confederate
batteries. Already some of Alexander's batteries had
withdrawn entirely from the field to refit, and those in
the best condition now returned after having partially
refilled their chests with ammunition and boldly re
mained in advanced positions until late in the day with
out a single infantryman in their fronts along certain
portions of the line. But Meade's Army was so much
shattered and discouraged by the losses it had incurred
that he did not feel able to attempt to follow up his
success. He saw that Lee had merely been repulsed and
not routed, and that two whole divisions, those of Mc-
Laws and Hood, lay across his path. Swinton also de
clares that besides the heavy losses they had sustained in
repulsing the attack, the Federal troops were thrown in
much confusion by the intermingling of the various
commands. The aggregate Federal loss of the three
days had reached the enormous figure of 23,000 men,
690 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
including Reynolds, Gibbon, and many other of the
most valuable officers; Hancock was wounded. While
the Confederates had been defeated, it is very easy to
see why Meade was unable to reap the fruits of his
victory. The idea that there was a gap in the Confeder
ate right is absurd, and had Meade attacked Lee, it
seems certain he would have received as bloody a repulse
as had been inflicted upon Pickett. In this respect we
must agree with Longstreet, Hunt, and Swinton, in
preference to the views of Alexander. The largest bod
ies of organized Federal troops available at the close of
the attack were on Meade's left. An advance to the
Plum Run line of the troops behind it, as Hunt points
out, would have brought them directly in front of Alex
ander's batteries, which still crowned the ridges along
the Emmittsburg Road; a farther advance would have
brought them under a flank fire from McLaws and
Hood. It is true that Alexander possessed little am
munition for his guns, but most of what was left was
canister and the field of fire which the Federal Infantry
would have had to traverse would have presented the
opposing artillery with an opportunity not less favor
able than that at Second Manassas. Only a few rounds
per gun would have been necessary.
Finding that Meade was not going to follow up his
success, Longstreet prepared to withdraw his advanced
line to a better defensive position. Hood and McLaws
were ordered to fall back slowly before Meade's skir
mishers, and during the afternoon Alexander withdrew
his guns from the Peach Orchard one by one. By 10
P. M. the batteries of the 1st Corps had been retired to
the positions occupied by them along Seminary Ridge
on the 2d of July, and the infantry was firmly estab
lished with the Peach Orchard still in its possession.
Stuart had rejoined the Army on the night of the 2d,
and had promptly assumed the duty of protecting the
flanks, which he still guarded.
Merritt's attack on the Confederate right had been
followed up by a bold charge of the Federal Cavalry led
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 691
by the gallant Farnworth, who had lost his life in the
fight. On the Confederate left, four of Stuart's brigades
had successfully opposed three of Gregg's near Cress's
Ridge, %y2 miles east of Gettysburg. Stuart's position
offered excellent opportunities for the use of his horse
artillery, reinforced by a section of Green's Battery of
the 2d Corps, Griffin's Horse Battery of Jenkins'
Cavalry Brigade, and Jackson's new horse battery.
In this affair Breathed and McGregor had taken no part
at first by reason of lack of ammunition, but later in the
day had appeared on the field and rendered valiant serv
ice, holding Gregg in check until nightfall. In this
quarter, both Stuart and Gregg held approximately
their original positions, but the Federal Cavalry had
succeeded in foiling Stuart's design to fall upon Meade's
rear. Chew's and Moorman's batteries were not en
gaged at Gettysburg with the Cavalry, having been left
in the rear between Hagerstown and the river, and Im-
boden's independent Cavalry Brigade with McClan-
nahan's Horse Battery of six pieces only reached the
field late on the 3d. It had been engaged throughout the
campaign in raids on the left of the advancing army.
During the afternoon of the 3d, Lee abandoned his
plan to dislodge Meade and determined upon immediate
retreat to Virginia, and under cover of darkness with
drew Ewell's Corps to the ridge, and drew back Long-
street's right to Willoughby Run. Imboden, with his
2,100 men, was assigned the duty of organizing all the
transportation of the Army into one vast train 14 miles
long, and conducting it without a halt to Williamsport,
and from thence to Winchester. Eshleman's Battalion
with eight pieces, Tanner's 4-gun battery of the 2d
Corps, Lieut. Pegram of Hurt's Battery with a Whit-
worth, and Hampton's Cavalry Brigade with Hart's
Battery were ordered to report to him, so that the escort
included 23 guns in all.
The great battle was over with the close of the third
day. Nothing will so impress the student with its mag
nitude as the statistics of the Artillery arm.
692 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Allowing the Confederates a maximum of 55,000
infantry present on the field during the three days and
272 guns, we find that in the battle the proportion of ar
tillery to infantry was about five pieces per thousand
men. Meade had engaged about 78,000 infantry with
310 guns, exclusive of the Horse Artillery. The Federal
proportion of artillery to infantry was therefore smaller
than that of the Confederates, being about four guns per
thousand men. As a matter of fact, however, the pro
portion actually engaged was larger, for practically all
of Meade's artillery was utilized at one time or another,
while much of Ewell's artillery was idle. The supply
of ammunition carried into the field for the Federal ar
tillery consisted of 270 rounds per gun, whereas that for
the Confederate artillery was but 150 rounds per gun.
This fact still further increased the relative superiority
of the Federal artillery.
Gen. Hunt reported an expenditure in action for the
Federal artillery of 32,781 rounds, an average of 106
per gun. Ewell's Corps reported 5,851 rounds ex
pended, and Hill's Corps 7,112 rounds. Ewell, there
fore, averaged 90 rounds per gun, and Hill about 110
for the 65 guns which they each brought into action.
The greatest reported individual expenditure of a
Confederate battery was that of Manly's which ex
pended 1,146 rounds during the campaign, or an aver
age of about 287 rounds per gun. This battery was
principally engaged on July 3. McCarthy's rifled
section, however, expended 600 rounds, or 300 per gun,
and one piece of his battery under Lieut. Williams
alone expended 300 rounds of shell and canister on the
3d.
The intensity of the fire of the two artilleries was, as
may be seen from the foregoing figures, greatly in favor
of the Federals whose relative strength in artillery,
based upon the Confederate average expenditure per
gun, was as 318 to 213, instead of 310 to 272, for it is
not merely the number of guns present during the bat
tle that determines the volume of fire. No report was
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 693
made of the expenditure in the 1st Corps, but all 83 of
its guns were engaged and undoubtedly averaged as
many rounds as those of Hill's Corps, or 110 each.
Their expenditure was, therefore, fully 9,000 rounds,
which brings up the aggregate for the Army during the
battle to 90,000 rounds. Thus for the 213 guns en
gaged, excluding the Horse Artillery, the Confederate
expenditure averaged 103 rounds per gun as compared
to 106 for the Federal guns. Again, losses alone do not
determine density of fire. In the solution of this prob
lem we must also consider the relative positions of the
adversaries. It is apparent that a less intensive fire
upon the compact Federal position, upon which nearly
all the defenders were massed, would cause greater loss
per gun than a much heavier fire upon the more ex
tended outer line. This is proved by the fact that the
killed and wounded, exclusive of the missing, in the Fed
eral reserve, with 108 guns engaged, numbered 230 or
an average of 2.1 per gun, whereas in Longstreet's Ar
tillery with 83 guns, the total loss was 271 or an average
of 2.6 per gun. It must also be borne in mind that
normally the loss incurred by offensive artillery in the
open and within the zone of musketry effect is greater
than that inflicted upon the defensive artillery more or
less under cover. In Ewell's Corps, the total artillery
loss was 132, and in Hill's Corps 128, or an average for
each of 2 per gun.
The destruction of artillery horses on both sides was
very great. In the 3d Corps alone, with a total of 77
guns, 190 horses were killed in action, 80 captured, 187
abandoned on the road, and 200 subsequently con
demned as unserviceable, or a total of 627 lost in the
campaign! The average loss per battery must, there
fore, have been about 50 animals or two-thirds of the
original number.
The heaviest loss in personnel sustained by any bat
talion was of course that of Huger's, or Alexander's own
command. In that battalion with 6 batteries and 26 guns,
138 men and 116 horses, or over 5 men and 4 horses per
694 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
gun, were killed or wounded. As the personnel of the
battalion did not exceed at the outset a total of 480, its
loss in the battle itself, not counting the missing, was
not less than 28 per cent of the whole, principally due to
artillery fire. But if these figures, applicable to a special
case, seem astounding, what of those concerning the
whole Artillery Corps for the campaign? We have
seen that the Artillery personnel on May 31 did not
exceed 5,300 officers and men in number. Certainly not
over 4,500 of these came upon the battlefields of the
campaign. Of that number 94 were killed, 437 wounded,
and in marked contrast but 77 were reported missing!
The aggregate loss sustained by Lee's Artillery between
July 1 and his return to Virginia two weeks later, was,
therefore, 608, or a loss of 13.5 per cent of the entire ef
fective personnel ! When we consider that but a handful
of men were captured no further evidence is necessary as
to the character of the service rendered by his artillery
men. It is such figures that make one realize that Gettys
burg was more than a defeat. It was a disaster from
which no army, in fact no belligerent state, could soon re
cover. The destruction of artillery material, in spite of
the fact that but five guns were lost, was enormous. Two
of these guns were abandoned near the Potomac by rea
son of the failure of their teams, two disabled pieces were
left on the field, and a third disabled piece which had
been withdrawn was later captured by the enemy's
cavalry. The guns were more than replaced by the seven
captured pieces, but not the harness, fittings, equipment,
and horses, and hundreds of its staunchest veterans were
lost to the Artillery forever. Latimer, Fraser, and
Morris, were but three of the six artillery officers who
sealed their devotion to the cause with their life, but
among the 26 wounded were such valuable men as Majs.
Read and Andrews, and Capts. Brown, Woolfolk,
Page, Carlton, Thompson, and Norcom.
CHAPTER XXXIV
GETTYSBURG — THE RETREAT
JULY 4 found the Artillery generally posted along
Seminary Ridge, with some of Alexander's batteries on
the right drawn back towards Willoughby Run. An
anxious inventory of the ammunition on hand had been
taken late the day before, and much to the relief of all
it was found that enough remained for one day's fight.
Fortunately Meade was not in an aggressive mood and
nothing was attempted by him, so the Artillery was not
engaged during the day.
Shortly after noon, a rainstorm of almost unsurpassed
fury broke upon the field and soon bemired the roads,
causing great difficulty in assembling the train about
Cashtown, and much suffering to the teams. Wagons,
ambulances, and artillery carriages by hundreds were
mingled in the roads and adjacent fields in one great
and apparently inextricable mass, while the wounded
found no shelter from exposure to the storm. Every
vehicle was loaded with wounded men, whose sufferings
could not be alleviated. The situation was awful. But
about 4 P. M. the head of the train was put in motion
from Cashtown and the ascent of the mountain in the
direction of Chambersburg began. For the terrors of
the retreat, which ensued, one must consult Gen. Im-
boden's graphic account.* Suffice it here to say that by
daylight on the 5th the head of the column had reached
Greencastle, 15 miles from Williamsport, having tra
versed two-thirds of the distance to the Potomac.
About dark on the 4th, the withdrawal of the Army
began. Hill's Corps followed immediately after the
train, taking the Fairfield Road, while Longstreet fol
lowed Hill. But the storm and the consequent con
dition of the roads impeded the movement so that Ewell
was unable to leave his position until daylight on the
morning of the 5th.
*Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill, p. 420.
696 THE LONG ARM or LEE
The retreat was a terrible march for the Artillery,
crippled as it was by the loss of so many horses in
battle, and the exhaustion of others. So many, lacking
shoes, became totally lame on the stony roads, that
squads of cannoneers had to scour the country along
the route for horses which were requisitioned when the
farmers would not sell them.
Walker's battalions were withdrawn from Hill's old
line about dusk and ordered to follow the 3d Corps,
while Alexander's moved to Black Horse Tavern about
5 P. M. where they were held in a great meadow adjoin
ing the Fairfield Pike with orders to watch the passing
column, and take their place immediately behind
Walker's command. Here the horses, still in harness,
were allowed to graze during the night as Walker's
batteries did not pass by until 6 o'clock the following
morning. The refreshment thus gained for the worn
animals was most welcome and enabled them to march
for 19 hours to Monterey Springs with hardly a halt,
and after resting from 1 to 4 A. M. to resume the march
for 14 hours more, not going into bivouac until they
reached Hagerstown at 6 p. M. the 7th. It was on the
march of the 5th that Maj Henry was compelled to
abandon two howitzers for lack of teams. Upon reach
ing camp about one mile from Hagerstown, the Artil
lery of the 1st and 3d corps was given a rest of several
days.
Swell's Corps did not withdraw from before Gettys
burg until the morning of the 5th. Green's Battery,
which had served on the left with Hampton, had joined
its battalion the preceding night while Tanner's had ac
companied Imboden. Capt. Raine, who succeeded Lati-
mer in command of Andrews' Battalion, had fallen back
on the 4th to a position astride the Cashtown Road with
Nelson's Battalion on its left. Dance's and Carter's
battalions followed Johnson's and Rodes' divisions to
the rear during the night while Jones' Battalion re
mained in position with Early's Division as the rear
guard. Brown, therefore, held three of his battalions
THE LONG ARM or LEE 697
across the enemy's path until the last infantrymen
moved off. Practically all of his field transportation, to
gether with that of the other artillery commands, was
taken to convey the wounded to the rear. Carter, Jones,
and Dance, never saw their wagons again, as they were
captured or destroyed by the enemy's cavalry on the
retreat. Brown's entire command reached the artillery
rendezvous at Hagerstown on the morning of the 7th
after an arduous but undisturbed march with the rear
guard of the Army.
In spite of the awful disaster which had befallen it,
the magnitude of which was not at first realized by the
Army, the spirits of the men were buoyant and the
Army as a whole was by no means discouraged. They
simply viewed the unsuccessful issue of the campaign
as unfortunate because more fighting would be neces
sary, but never once did the idea of ultimate defeat take
hold of them. The storm of the 4th and 5th was far
more responsible for the gloominess of the situation than
the defeat of Gettysburg, and with the reappearance of
sunshine, the irrespressible spirits of the men quickly
rose. Thus it was that they plodded back to old Vir
ginia rollicking and making the best of the hardships of
the retreat. To their good humor and enjoyment the
queer German inhabitants of the region through which
they passed contributed much.
The practice of forcible requisition was one in which
the gunners especially had had long experience at home,
as well as abroad, and was known to the service as
"pressing for shorts." By this process alone were the
batteries able to save their guns and it was certainly, in
the circumstances, justifiable. An incident recounted
by Col. Alexander is so amusing and full of interest that
it is here given in his own words to illustrate the method
of securing draught animals on the retreat:
"Near Hagerstown I had an experience with an old Dunkard
which gave me a high and lasting respect for the people of that
faith. My scouts had had a horse transaction with this old gentle
man, and he came to see me about it. He made no complaint, but
698 THE LONG ARM or LEE
said it was his only horse, and as the scouts had told him we had
some hoof-sore horses we should have to leave behind, he came to
ask if I would trade him one for his horse, as without one his crop
would be lost.
"I recognized the old man at once as a born gentleman in his
delicate characterization of the transaction as a trade. I was
anxious to make the trade as square as circumstances would permit.
So I assented to his taking a foot-sore horse, and offered him
besides payment in Confederate money. This he respectfully but
firmly declined. Considering how the recent battle had gone, I
waived argument on the point of its value, but tried another sug
gestion. I told him that we were in Maryland as the guests of the
United States. That after our departure the government would
pay all bills we left behind, and that I would give him an order on
the United States for the value of his horse, and have it approved
by Gen. Longstreet. To my surprise he declined this also. I
supposed then he was simply ignorant of the bonanza in a claim
against the Government and I explained that; and telling him that
money was no object to us under the circumstances, I offered to
include the value of his whole farm. He again said he wanted
nothing but the foot-sore horse. Still anxious that the war should
not grind this poor old fellow in his poverty, I suggested that he
take two or three foot-sore horses, which we would have to leave
anyhow, when we marched. Then he said, 'Well, sir, I am a
Dunkard, and the rule of our church is an eye for an eye, and a
tooth for a tooth, and a horse for a horse, and I can't break the rule/
"I replied that the Lord, who made all horses, knew that a good
horse was worth a dozen old battery scrubs; and after some time
prevailed on him to take two, by calling one of them a gift. But
that night, about midnight, we were awakened by approaching
hoofs, and turned out expecting to receive some order. It was my
old Dunkard on one of his foot-sores. "Well, sir,' he said, 'you
made it look all right to me to-day when you were talking; but
after I went to bed to-night I got to thinking it all over, and I
don't think I can explain it to the Church, and I would rather not
try.' With that he tied old foot-sore to a fence, and rode off
abruptly. Even at this late day it is a relief to my conscience to
tender his sect this recognition of their integrity and honesty, in
lieu of the extra horse which I vainly endeavored to throw into the
trade. Their virtues should commend them to all financial institu
tions in search of incorruptible employees."
Upon reaching Greencastle on the 5th with his con
voy, Imboden's trouble began. Not only did the citi
zens assail his train, but the Federal Cavalry in small
foraging parties began to molest his progress. He was
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 699
almost captured himself, but succeeded in throwing a
section of McClannahan's Horse Battery in action with
canister, which drove off the largest band. After a
great deal of desultory fighting during the day, he suc
ceeded in reaching Williamsport that afternoon with the
head of his column, the rear arriving next day with
Hart's Battery, the cavalry meanwhile guarding the
route on the west. Thus did this energetic officer reach
the Potomac with all the wagons of the Army, not less
than 10,000 draught animals, and practically all the
wounded which were able to be removed from Gettys
burg — several thousand in number. Only a small num
ber of wagons had been lost and few horses, this in spite
of the fact that during that awful march of fifty-odd
miles, there were neither rations for the men, nor forage
for the animals. But Imboden soon set the inhabitants
to work cooking for the wounded Confederates and his
train guard, and at last for the first time since leaving
Gettysburg the horses were unharnessed and turned out
to graze. This welcome halt was an enforced one, for
the enemy's cavalry had destroyed the bridge across the
river, which was unfordable by reason of the freshet. At
Williamsport the train guard was fortunately strength
ened by the arrival of two regiments of Johnson's Divi
sion, returning from Staunton whither they had escorted
the prisoners taken at Winchester on the advance.
They brought a supply of ammunition both for the
infantry and artillery.
The morning of the 6th it was reported that 7,000
Federal cavalry with 18 guns were approaching Wil
liamsport. Imboden promptly placed his guns under
Capt. Hart in position on the hills which concealed the
town, and set about organizing and arming his team
sters as a support for his infantry and dismounted
troopers. By noon, about 700 of the wagoners, led by
convalescent officers, were available for the defense. A
heavy fight ensued in which Eshleman's Battalion,
Richardson's two batteries of Garnett's Battalion,
Hart's and McClannahan's batteries, all took part.
700 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
By making a bold display of his artillery and march
ing his wagoners hither and thither, causing them
to appear at widely separated points, Imboden greatly
imposed upon Buford, and Kilpatrick, and succeeded in
holding them in check until Fitz Lee arrived in their
rear, and caused them to withdraw along the Boons-
borough Road. In this affair, which was opened by the
artillery on both sides, Eshleman, by the bold advance of
his four batteries, secured an enfilade fire upon the
enemy, and aided by McClannahan's guns inflicted great
loss upon them while the infantry, a part of which was
led by Capt. Hart, together with the dismounted
troopers, charged the Federals and forced them back,
capturing 125 before they reached their horses. The
teamsters fought so well that this affair has been called
the "Wagoners' Fight." Very fortunately for the
Army, Imboden had been able to ferry two wagon loads
of shell across the river from the ordnance train during
the action in the nick of time, Moore's Battery having
already exhausted its ammunition when the fresh sup
ply arrived. It may here be added that this ordnance
train had been ordered by Gen. Lee to Gettysburg from
Winchester and would have reached the Army certainly
by the 8th had it not retreated.
By extraordinary energy and good management,
Gen. Imboden had been able to save the transportation
of the entire Army, which could not have been replaced.
The next morning the Army began to arrive at Wil-
liamsport and the work of constructing bridges com
menced. Over 4,000 Federal prisoners, who had been
escorted to the rear by the remnants of Pickett's Divi
sion, with Stribling's and Macon's batteries, were ferried
across the river before the 9th, and sent on to Richmond,
via Staunton, in the charge of Imboden, with a single
regiment. In the meantime, Maj. John A. Harman,
noted for his energy and ability, was tearing down
warehouses along the canal and building pontoons with
the timbers thus secured to repair the bridge at Falling
Waters, which, however, was not completed until the
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 701
night of the 13th. During the time which intervened
the Army was in a precarious position. A line of battle
had been selected and prepared by the engineers with
its right flank on the Potomac near Downsville, passing
by St. James' College and resting its left on the Cono-
cocheague. The 1st Corps held the right, the 3d the
center, and the 2d the left as at Gettysburg. The Ar
tillery marched from Hagerstown on the 9th and 10th
and occupied the line, and for the next three days was
engaged with the infantry in continuous labor fortify
ing the position. The Commander-in-Chief had called
upon the whole Army for a supreme effort and in fur
thering his plan of defense, Gen. Pendleton and his sub
ordinates were most energetic in their cooperation.
Alexander with his own and Dearing's and Henry's
battalions occupied a position on the extreme right near
Downsville. Three batteries of Cabell's Battalion were
posted astride the Williamsport and Sharpsburg Pike,
Lieut. Motes with Carlton's Battery being attached to
Wofford's Brigade near St. James' further to the left.
Walker's battalions occupied the center north of St.
James' between Hagerstown and the Potomac. Mc-
Intosh's and Brunson's battalions, or the Corps Re
serve, generally occupied those portions of the line held
by Anderson and Heth, respectively, while Lane,
Garnett, and Poague supported the divisions to which
they were usually assigned. Brown's battalions oc
cupied the left of the line, Nelson's batteries covering
the Williamsport and Funkstown roads. Carter's Bat
talion was posted in a strong position to the rear in
front of the bridge at Falling Waters.
From the 8th to the 12th of July, Stuart with Chew's,
Breathed's, McGregor's, Moorman's, and Griffin's
horse batteries covered the Confederate front. These
days were occupied by severe fighting between the Con
federate Cavalry and the divisions of Buford and Kil-
patrick at Boonsborough, Beaver Creek, Funkstown,
and on the Sharpsburg front. While both sides claimed
the advantage, Stuart succeeded in delaying the advance
702 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
of Meade's army until the Confederate Infantry and
Artillery were thoroughly intrenched, so that when he
uncovered the front the Federals found it too strong to
be assailed without carefully maturing their plans. The
6th Corps had alone followed Ewell on the 5th as far
as Fairfield, the rest of the Federal Army remaining
on the battlefield for two days burying the dead, caring
for the wounded, and bringing order out of the chaos into
which the troops had been thrown by their prolonged
defense. A third day was lost to the pursuit at Middle-
town to procure supplies and bring up the trains,
and had it not been for the storm of the 4th and
5th and further rains on the 7th and 8th the Con
federates would have safely crossed the Potomac
before they were overtaken. As it was, Meade might
have attacked on the 12th, but simply contented him
self with a reconnaissance resulting in his determination
to feel Lee's line on the 13th. A general attack was to
follow if a favorable opening was discovered. But, by
the 13th, the ford at Williamsport was passable,
the bridge lower down stream had been completed, and
Lee issued orders for the crossing of his army during
the night. Ewell was to cross at the ford, and Long-
street followed by Hill with the Artillery of the three
corps at the pontoon bridge. Caissons were ordered to
start from the lines at 5 p. M., and the infantry and guns
at dark. The withdrawal was effected with great skill
and celerity, in spite of almost insurmountable obstacles,
so that when the Federals, after making various demon
strations the day before, advanced to the attack on the
14th they found but a few hundred stragglers in their
path.
The night movement on the part of the Confederates
entailed the utmost hardship upon the Army, especially
upon the Artillery. A heavy rainstorm had set in before
dusk, and continued almost until morning. The routes
to the crossings generally lay over narrow farm roads,
rough and hilly, which were soon churned into all but
impassable mires by the leading artillery carriages. No
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 703
moon lit the way and the night was unusually dark, but
large bonfires along the shore illuminated the crossings.
From sunset to sunrise the artillery battalions, in spite
of the most tremendous exertions on the part of the men,
were able to cover but three or four miles, and many
horses perished from exhaustion. Nevertheless all the
Artillery was saved except two unserviceable howitzers
of Henry's Battalion, which became stalled and were
abandoned. After daylight, the weather cleared so that
by 1 P. M. Hill's rear guard crossed the river under
cover of Carter's guns at the bridge head. The Ar
tillery then retired before the enemy's skirmishers which
had been pressing the pursuit during the morning and
took up a strong position on the south bank, while six of
Garnett's, Lane's 20-pounder Parrotts, and Hart's two
Whitworths were posted on his right and left by Gen.
Pendleton, who personally conducted the defense of the
crossing. For ten hours the old officer remained at this
important post, unaided by a single member of his staff,
all of whom were without horses and some of whom them
selves were broken down by their exertions of the past
two weeks. For 28 hours the Chief of Artillery was
without a morsel of food, and for 40 was unable to gain
a moment's rest.
Lee had intended to cross the Blue Ridge into Lou-
doun County, and there oppose Meade's advance, but
while waiting for the Shenandoah River to subside, the
Federals crossed below and seized the passes he had ex
pected to use. Pushing his army southward along the
eastern slope of the mountains, Meade threatened to
cut Lee off from Gordonsville and the railroad. The
danger was averted, however, by Longstreet's timely ar
rival at Culpeper on the 24th, followed by Hill, while
Ewell moved up the Valley and crossed the Blue Ridge
at Thornton Gap. By August 4, the entire Army was
united behind the Rapidan with Stuart in its front at
Culpeper, and the enemy behind the Rappahannock.
Thus did the second invasion of the North terminate.
14
704 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Livermore's estimate, which is believed to be more
accurate than the Confederate returns, places the ag
gregate Confederate loss in the battle of Gettysburg at
28,063, of which number 3,903 were killed, 18,735
wounded, and 5,425 missing, as opposed to a Federal
loss of 3,155 killed, 14,529 wounded and 5,365 missing,
aggregate 23,049. The losses of the Confederate Ar
tillery itemized by battalions were :
Killed Wounded Missing Total
Cabell's Battalion 8 29 0 37
Bearing's Battalion 8 17 0 25
Henry's Battalion 4 23 0 27
Alexander's Battalion 19 114 6 139
Eshleman's Artillery 3 26 16 45
Jones' Battalion 2 608
Andrews' Battalion 10 40 0 50
Carter's Battalion 6 35 24 65
Dance's Battalion 3 19 0 22
Nelson's Battalion 0 0 0 0
Lane's Battalion 3 21 6 30
Garnett's Battalion 0 5 17 22
Poague's Battalion 2 24 6 32
Mclntosh's Battalion 7 25 0 32
Pegram's Battalion 10 37 1 48
The aggregate loss of the Confederate Artillery was
therefore 582 as opposed to a loss of 736 in the Federal
Artillery, exclusive of the Horse Artillery on both sides.
In the battle we have had occasion to note the absence
of a number of prominent Confederate Artillery officers,
but, Pegram, Andrews, Cutts, Hardaway, and Garnett
joined their commands either near the end or soon after
the close of the campaign. In Maj. John C. Haskell, of
Henry's Battalion, a new character in the drama, and
one destined to play a leading role henceforth, has ap
peared. We heard little of Col. Walton at Gettysburg,
though he was present. As stated by Longstreet, he
was getting too old for active command and his health
had stood the rigours of the Virginia winters very
poorly. He had already expressed a desire to be trans
ferred to the southern department, but was retained as
Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps for some time.*
*Rebellion Records, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 699.
MAJOR .TAMES WALTON THOMSON
Killed at High Bridyv. 1st;:.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 705
From the magnitude of Gettysburg as an artillery
battle it may seem at first glance to require extended
criticism, but upon closer examination such is not the
case as far as the Confederate Artillery is concerned.
Other than the criticisms already offered, few others
need be made. The battle of the 3d of July was not lost
through lack of artillery support, as asserted by many
critics. True, the artillery fire was not maintained as
vigorously to the end as it might have been had there
been an abundance of ammunition. But it has been
clearly shown that the artillery preparation was as thor
ough in Longstreet's front as the position of the guns
would allow up to the very crisis of the attack which was
when Pickett's column engaged in the infantry fire fight.
Had Alexander and Walker possessed all the guns that
could have been brought into action, they could not have
maintained Pickett in his advanced position without the
timely cooperation of a large infantry support. In fact
the assaulting infantry itself masked the guns actually
in action. Men, not shell, were needed at the high
tide mark. Artillery can help infantry forward, but
it cannot prevent overwhelming numbers converg
ing under cover of the terrain upon it from many di
rections. That there were grave errors committed in
the disposition of the artillery is not disputed, but this
point is not usually made. The general criticism is
that the artillery preparation for Longstreet's attack
failed. That this is not true is proven by the very fact
that Longstreet's Infantry did reach the enemy's guns
and advanced much of the distance free from serious
opposition on the part of the hostile artillery. His
failure, then, was due to the lack of weight at the de
cisive point, both because he attacked with lack of con
cert among his troops, and because with whatever force
he assaulted, the enemy remained free to outnumber
him by transferring troops from other quarters of the
field. The lack of cooperation of the 2d Corps Artillery
was not due to Pendleton, nor to Brown, but to Ewell,
the corps commander.
CHAPTER XXXV
REORGANIZATION AFTER GETTYSBURG THE WINTER
or 1863-64
THE period of several weeks of inactivity following
upon the arrival of the Army behind the Rapidan was
one of welcome and necessary rest. During this time
so many convalescents and absentees returned to the
Army that soon it was raised to a strength of nearly
60,000 men. The organization of the Artillery remained
for a time unchanged with the exception of the tem
porary addition of Capt. Thomas E. Jackson's Char-
lottesville Battery to Beckham's Horse Artillery Bat
talion. McClannahan's Horse Battery, meantime, con
tinued under Imboden's detached command, so that with
Stuart's Division there were now seven horse batteries.
The distribution of the Artillery on July 31 was as
follows :
1st Corps, 5 battalions, 22 batteries, 83 guns, 96 of
ficers, and 1,724 enlisted men present for duty, aggre
gate present and absent 2,873.*
2d Corps, 5 battalions, 20 batteries, 84 guns, 95 of
ficers, and 1,448 enlisted men present for duty, aggre
gate present and absent 2,392.
3d Corps, 5 battalions, 20 batteries, 62 guns, 86 of
ficers, and 1,564 enlisted men present for duty, aggre
gate present and absent 2,7.27.
The effective strength of the Artillery with the Army
was therefore over 5,000, and the paper strength nearly
8,000, with 229 guns. Before August 10 the present for
duty increased to 5,747, and the aggregate paper
strength to 8,325. With the 1st Corps there were then
83, with the 2d Corps 81, and with the 3d Corps 77
pieces of artillery, or a total of 241 guns. Of this num-
*For guns of 1st Corps at this time see Rebellion Records, Vol. LI, Part II,
p. 740, Walton's letter.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 707
ber there were twelve 20-pounder Parrotts, thirty-nine
10-pounder Parrotts, sixty-four 3-inch rifles, two Whit-
worths, ninety-eight Napoleons, five 24-pounder howit
zers, and twenty-one 12-pounder howitzers. In the en
tire Corps there were but 8 battery wagons, and 32
forges, while there were 228 caissons or nearly one per
gun.*
In the Gettysburg campaign, Lee had engaged, ac
cording to Col. Taylor, 50,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry,
and 4,000 artillery, but this estimate of the Artillery is,
we believe, too small by 500 men. By August 10, how
ever, it is certain that there was one man in the Artillery
for every ten present in the Infantry. Thus it is seen
that Lee, like Frederick and Napoleon, compensated for
the decrease in his infantry by maintaining his artillery
in the face of all difficulties.
Besides the Field Artillery actually with the field
Army, there was a large force under Gen. Arnold
Elzey, in and about the defenses of Richmond. Lieut. -
Col. C. E. Lightfoot commanded a battalion consisting
of Smoot's Alexandria, Thornton's Caroline, Rives'
Nelson, and Hankins' Surry batteries. This battalion
occupied the works together with Col. T. S. Rhett's
four heavy artillery battalions. Serving with Ransom's
Division in the Department of Richmond were four bat
talions as follows :
MOSELEY'S BATTALION
Maj. E. F. Moseley
Richmond Battery, Capt. W. J. Dabney.
James City Battery, Capt. L. W. Richardson.
Goochland Battery, Capt. Jonathan Talley.
Yorktown Battery, Capt. E. R. Young.
BOQGS' BATTALION
Maj. F. J. Boggs
Richmond Battery, Capt. S. Taylor Martin.
Albemarle Battery, Capt. N. A. Sturdivant.
North Carolina Battery, Capt. L. H. Webb.
*See Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 636, for complete
summary of material, August 10, 1863.
708 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
BRANCH'S BATTALION
Maj. James R. Branch
Mississippi Battery, Capt. W. D. Bradford.
South Carolina Battery, Capt. J. C. Coit.
Petersburg Battery, Capt. R. G. Pegram.
Halifax Battery, " Capt. S. T. Wright.
UNATTACHED
Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg't, Capt. Alexander D. Moore.
Macon (Ga.) Battery, Capt. C. W. Staten.
STARK'S BATTALION
Maj. A. W. Stark*
Mathews' Battery, Capt. A. D. Armistead.
Giles Battery, Capt. D. A. French.
These 15 light batteries must have possessed a total
personnel of not less than 1,000 men and 60 guns.
There was, therefore, a large reserve force of artillery
in his immediate rear, which Lee could call upon in an
emergency, though of course the service of the officers
and men who had been held at the base had not been
such as to make them as efficient as those with the main
army.
Since the reorganization of the Artillery in May, it
had greatly increased in efficiency, but the Pennsyl
vania campaign had practically destroyed its field
transportation, and the batteries were themselves al
most dismounted. During the retreat it had, therefore,
been necessary to still further reduce the baggage al
lowances in order to supply the batteries and ordnance
trains with teams. At this time, the artillery trans
portation was fixed at two 4-horse wagons for the Chief
of Artillery and his entire staff, including the medical
officers, one 4-horse wagon for each corps chief and his
staff, one 4-horse wagon for each battalion headquarters,
one 4-horse wagon for all the battery officers of each
battalion, and two 4-horse wagons for the forage and
*Attached to Wise's Brigade.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 709
supplies of each battery. Surplus baggage was directed
to be turned over to the Chief Quartermaster at once.*
The following April a slight additional reduction
was made in the allowance of transportation, and but
one 4-horse wagon was authorized for the Chiefs of
Artillery and their entire staffs, while one 2 -horse wagon
for the medical supplies of each battalion and one 4-
horse wagon for the mess equipment of every 500 men
actually present were added. Thus it is seen that the
baggage train of the Artillery of the Army when com
plete consisted of not more than 160 wagons, requiring
only about 650 horses. It is doubtful if any other equal
force of artillery ever took the field with such a limited
train. But we must remember that but two wagons
were allowed army, corps, and division headquarters,
and but one for brigade headquarters, at this time. By
a rigid enforcement of the orders relative to the baggage
allowance, the field batteries were provided with an
average of about 50 horses before August 10, though
some of them were still sadly deficient in the number of
their animals.
While the Artillery of the 1st and 3d corps lay in
camp near Orange Courthouse and that of the 2d Corps
at Liberty Mills, the most strenuous efforts were made
by Gen. Pendleton to fully rehorse his command. His
investigations of the horse problem were wide and
thorough. Learning that horses temporarily disabled
were not adequately cared for by the agents of the
Quartermaster Department, and that numbers of them
which under a proper system might be restored to a
serviceable condition were allowed to perish from
neglect, he reported the condition of affairs to the Com-
mander-in- Chief, t He suggested that animals unfit for
service should be turned over to individual farmers who
should be encouraged to save them for their own needs,
and not allowed to be herded in great droves. Under
*G. O. No. 77, A. N. V., July 16, 1863.
^Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1262.
See his interesting letter, Rebellion Records, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 643
August 13, 1863.
710 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
the prevailing system, diseased animals merely spread
contagion and none could receive individual attention.
A farmer would ordinarily be only too glad to secure
one or two horses for light work, and he would in many
cases improve rather than impair their unfortunate con
dition, which was principally due to exposure and lack
of nourishment. Gen. Pendleton also declared that not
less than 300 good artillery horses could be secured in
Albemarle County alone, if the proper methods were
pursued. Quartermasters and their agents, unknown to
the people, could not secure these animals, he said, but
artillery officers, whose interest in the service was neces
sarily greater than that of mere purchasing agents,
would by tact and good judgment be able to purchase
them for about $600.00 apiece, or even perhaps trade
worn and feeble battery horses for the fresh ones. At
any rate, many could be secured by impressment as a
last resort. But very little seems to have been done at
this time, however, to remedy conditions, and again, on
September 3, the Chief of Artillery called the Com-
mander-in-Chief's attention to this very vital matter,
which threatened the efficiency of the whole artillery
arm. His recommendations to the Superintendent of
Transportation at Richmond were now as follows:
"First. The establishment of a sort of general horse district in
the counties of Halifax, Pittsylvania, Henry, Patrick, Franklin,
Campbell, and Bedford, with depots, stables, etc., under the care
of a responsible superintendent, who should select his own agents,
and have the care of all the horses of this army to be resuscitated,
etc.
"Second. The procurement from time to time, by this same
officer or others in connection with his charge, of a number of fresh
horses, to be taken to the depots in said district and kept with those
renovated, for transfer when needed to the field.
"Third. The establishment of suitable places of accommodation
for horses removed to and from this district and the army, so as to
insure their being suitably provided for in transit."*
As far as we know this plan, which in its general
aspect was adopted, was one of the first attempts to
•Rebellion Records, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 697. Ibid., p. 715.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 711
organize a remount depot in this country, certainly in
the Confederacy. It was to be established in a region
still fat with forage, where slave labor was cheap and
plentiful and one well removed from the theater of mili
tary operations.
So well received were Pendleton's suggestions that
Maj. Paxton, whom he recommended to be placed in
charge of the establishment, was soon appointed and
directed to organize the remount department, with
headquarters at Lynchburg. Before spring he had ac
complished much in seggregating diseased animals and
restoring them to health by means of infirmaries, as well
as in collecting animals for future use. Yet, disease was
so widespread, extending throughout the section and
as far as the North Carolina line, that of the 3,000 ani
mals in Paxton' s charge over 600 died before February.
The system adopted by the Department for parceling
out the animals in small herds, foraging, exercising, and
caring for them, was nevertheless such an apparent im
provement over old methods that the Chief of Artillery
recommended that the 1,500 animals which would be
required to rehorse his command be left in charge of
Maj . Paxton, until actually needed in the spring. More
apprehension was entertained at this time concerning
the lack of transport animals than remounts, and Gen.
Pendleton urged that his agents be allowed to draw upon
the supply of mules in Mississippi, Georgia, and Ala
bama, and this suggestion was approved by the Com-
mander-in-Chief.*
Early in September Longstreet's suggestion to trans
fer troops from Virginia to Tennessee for the purpose
of reinforcing Gen. Bragg was adopted. There re
mained several months of open weather and it was hoped
that some success could yet be won in the West. But
before the movement commenced the short route to
Chattanooga, via Bristol and Knoxville, was no longer
available, and Longstreet was compelled to take the
roundabout route from Petersburg via Weldon,
*Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 1182, 1188.
712 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Wilmington, and Augusta. Leaving Orange on the
9th, the infantry of the 1st Corps was moved to Peters
burg by rail, while Alexander's, Walton's, and Dear-
ing's battalions marched. Hood's and McLaws' divi
sions and Alexander's six batteries with 26 guns en
trained on the 17th and reached their destination after a
tedious journey, in which it took nearly eight days to
cover less than 850 miles. Meanwhile, Pickett's Division
with Dearing's Battalion of Artillery was assigned to
duty along the James River, relieving Jenkins' and
Wise's brigades, the former having accompanied Hood
and the latter going to Charleston, S. C. Walton's Bat
talion remained at Petersburg. On the 23d, Pickett
was assigned to the command of the Department of
North Carolina, with headquarters at Petersburg, Va.
Henry's and Cabell's battalions moved to Hanover
Junction with Pickett's Division, but on the 13th were
ordered by easy marches into camp in the neighborhood
of Gordonsville via Louisa Courthouse. On October 5,
Lamkin's Nelson Battery was attached to Henry's Bat
talion, to the permanent command of which Maj.
John C. Haskell had succeeded. But on the 9th this
battery, which was unarmed, was transferred to Cabell's
Battalion. Maj. Henry had been promoted and trans
ferred to the West.
An important promotion had meanwhile been made
in the Artillery Corps. It was apparent that Col.
Crutchfield would be hors de combat for many months,
and a permanent Chief of Artillery for the 2d Corps
was much needed. Accordingly one of the two existing
vacancies in the grade of brigadier-general of artillery
was filled by the promotion of Col. Armistead Lindsay
Long, formerly Military Secretary of the Commander-
in-Chief, and he was assigned to duty as Chief of Ar
tillery of the 2d Corps. The circumstances connected
with the selection of Long for this position will be dis
cussed later. Suffice it to say here that while he was in
every way competent to fulfill the position to which he
was appointed, yet his assignment to this high tactical
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 718
command was thought by some to overslaugh the claims
of Col. Brown to seniority in the Artillery of Swell's
Corps during the absence of Crutchfield. While there
was no open resentment of his appointment, neverthe
less it would seem that Col. Brown's claim to seniority
in the 2d Corps was disregarded nothwithstanding the
fact that he was a highly efficient officer and had exer
cised command in every campaign since April, 1861.
It will be recalled that he was the original battery com
mander of the 1st Company of Richmond Howitzers
when it left Richmond for Yorktown. From that time
to the day of his death he never missed an hour of duty.
Although an officer with no military training prior to
the war, he was a natural soldier and had no superiors
in point of courage. He was a man of too high a sense
of duty to allow any disappointment which he may
have felt to affect him. He never complained to his as
sociates, and showed no signs of bitterness to his superi
ors. His personal and family correspondence shows
that he himself accepted conditions in a most magnani
mous spirit, but his friends were less philosophical in
the matter. They felt that again the West Point in
fluence had overreached a gallant, meritorious officer
who, irrespective of the fact that he was a civilian before
the war, had proved himself to be eminently qualified to
command and, therefore, entitled to consideration upon
his military record in the service of the Confederacy,
without regard to circumstances before the war. This
belief was heightened by the fact that Col. Brown had
served as Acting Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps
since the day of Crutchfield's elimination, and that al
though he had not shown any particular brilliance at
Gettysburg, the minor part played by his command
there was known to have been due to Ewell's and not
his fault.
During the period of inactivity, in which the Con
federate Army was gradually recuperating its strength,
two corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac
and sent to reinforce Sherman's Army, and in spite of
714 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Longstreet's absence the two armies were numerically
more nearly equal than in the past campaign. This
condition induced Lee to attempt to force Meade to
an engagement while his army was reduced. Crossing
the Rapidan on the 9th of October, Lee moved to
Madison Courthouse and thence eastward, screening his
movements by the cavalry and the mountain spurs and
forests between himself and his enemy. But before Lee
arrived near Culpeper Courthouse on the llth, Meade
had learned through his cavalry of the danger to his
right, and withdrew along the railroad to the line of the
Rappahannock, Stuart driving Pleasonton from the old
field of Brandy Station back upon the Federal Army.
Cabell's Battalion had been left in front of Gordons-
ville, and HaskelFs had been moved forward to Liberty
Mills. The rest of the Artillery accompanied the Army
on its circuitous march and throughout the subsequent
campaign in which there was much skillful maneuver
ing on both sides and very little fighting. By the 18th,
Lee was back again on the Rappahannock. The main
Army lay in camp about Culpeper, while Stuart oc
cupied the country on the north side of the river. By
November 7, Meade reached the Rappahannock im
mediately behind which and in his front lay E well's
Corps, with Eaiiy's Division behind Brandy Station,
Rodes' covering Kelly's Ford on the right, and John
son's between them. Hill's Corps held the line of the
river on Swell's left. A pontoon bridge had been
thrown at the site of the old Rappahannock Bridge and
the tete de pont on the north bank was alternately
picketed by a single brigade of Early's and Johnson's
divisions and a battery of artillery. When the Federals
reached the river Hays' Brigade and Green's Louisiana
Guard Battery held the work on the north bank, while
Dance's and Graham's batteries occupied a redoubt on
the south side of the stream where they were placed
merely to prevent a crossing should the bridge-head be
taken, but they had no command whatever of the terrain
on the north shore.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 715
The Federal advance consisted of the 5th and 6th
Corps, which promptly occupied the hills in front of
Hays, and opened fire upon the work on the north bank
with a battery. To this, Lieut. Moore in command of
Green's Battery boldly replied, but was soon over
whelmed by two other batteries while Graham and
Dance vainly sought to assist him. At dusk a heavy
mass of the enemy's infantry rushed Hays and captured
most of his men, and the Louisiana Battery. Of the two
officers and 76 enlisted men of the battery, but 28 of the
latter escaped, with 9 of their 54 horses. The two 10-
pounder Parrotts and the two 3-inch Dahlgren rifled
pieces of the battery were taken by the enemy along with
all the carriages and about 400 rounds of ammunition.
In the meantime, Early had ordered up his infantry
and Jones' Battalion, while Massie's Fluvanna Bat
tery of Nelson's Battalion also arrived and engaged the
Federals. But at daybreak on the 8th, Lee withdrew
to his former position on the Rapidan. Although the
season was late, and Meade had first eluded Lee and
then recovered his original position, he was not willing
to go into winter quarters until he had himself under
taken offensive maneuvers in order, by some success,
to satisfy the expectations of the administration in
Washington.
Swell's Corps now occupied a line from the base of
Clark's Mountain to Mine Run, a small tributary of the
Rappahannock, and covered Mitchell's, Morton's, Rac
coon, and Summerville's fords; Hill's Corps that from
Orange Courthouse to Liberty Mills; while Stuart, as
usual, covered the front and flanks of the Army. Both
corps had been much reduced by winter furloughs, no
further operations before winter being expected. Al
ready the Confederates had begun to prepare for a long
rest, when at dawn, on November 26, Meade set his en
tire army in motion towards Germanna Ford, hoping to
cross the Rapidan at that point and surprise Lee. But
his movement, though shrouded with the utmost
secrecy, was instantly discovered by Stuart. Lee at
716 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
once ordered Hill to form a junction with Ewell at
Verdierville, and the latter to occupy a strong position
behind Mine Run. In spite of every precaution, many
delays impeded the Federal advance, and Meade's
troops did not cross the Rapidan until the morning of
the 27th. Meanwhile the Confederates had completed
their concentration and thrown up strong log and earth
breastworks. When Meade finally arrived in front of
Lee on the morning of the 28th, he found himself con
fronted by 30,000 infantry and 150 pieces of artillery
behind works even stronger than those his own men had
thrown up at Chancellor sville. This was a bitter dis
appointment to the Federal commander, but he dili
gently set to work to find an opening and next day
Warren reported favorable conditions for assault on the
Confederate right, while Sedgwick seemed to have dis
covered equally good ones on the other flank. Orders
for the simultaneous attack on both flanks were issued,
but when the Federal artillery of the center and right
opened not a sound came from Warren. His men had
sized up the strength of Lee's works more accurately
than their leader, for each had pinned a slip of paper
on his breast with his name on it in order that the wearer
might be identified. Reconnaissances both by Warren
and Meade satisfied them of the futility of an assault,
which if successful would be at the cost of not less than
30,000 men. Lee, too, was much disappointed by the
retreat of the Federals across Ely's Ford to Culpeper
Courthouse on the night of December 1, and so suddenly
and rapidly was it accomplished that he was unable to
overtake them on the 2d. Thus ended the Mine Run
campaign and the operations of 1863.
The Army was now promptly prepared to go into
winter quarters. The Infantry was generally held along
the Rapidan, while the Artillery with the exception of
two or three battalions was scattered along the line of
the Virginia Central Railroad for the greater con
venience of foraging the horses. Gen. Long's 2d Corps
Artillery with the exception of Nelson's Battalion,
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 717
which was kept on picket duty along the Rapidan, was
located in and about Frederick Hall, and four of Col.
Walker's 3d Corps battalions, after camping for a
month on the farm of Maj. Lee near Madison Run in
Madison County, erected their huts in the neighbor
hood of Cobham and Lindsay stations, about 10 miles
west of Gordonsville, with headquarters at Meeksville,
while Cutts' Battalion like Nelson's remained on picket
near Rapidan Station. It was at this time that Lieut.
Richard Walke, ordnance officer on Mahone's staff,
was promoted captain of artillery and assigned to duty
as Inspector-General of the 3d Corps Artillery, while
Maj. Herbert M. Nash was appointed Surgeon.
Captain William W. Chamberlaine had served on Col.
Walker's staff for some time as Corps Adjutant.
The Horse Artillery, which was continuously engaged
in the cavalry operations during the months of Sep
tember, October, November, and December, was
ordered into winter quarters at Charlottesville on
December 21st. Gen. Lee and Governor Letcher had
reviewed the infantry and Stuart's command at Cul-
peper Courthouse on November 5, when again Beck-
ham's Battalion passed before the great soldier at the
head of the cavalry, to the tune of Hampton's mounted
band.
Leaving the Rapidan country the horse batteries,
worn and depleted by months of continuous fighting
and marching, toiled over the bottomless roads to the
Rivanna, which they reached on the 22d. The camp
site selected for the battalion was located on the Early-
ville Road, about five miles from Charlottesville. For
the next two weeks, the men were busily engaged erect
ing log huts and stables. It was in this very locality
that Burgoyne's Hessians had been cantoned by Wash
ington after their capture at Saratoga during the Revo
lutionary War.
Officers of the Horse Artillery declare that the winter
of 1863-64, part of which they spent at Charlottesville,
was the severest ordeal through which they passed
718 THE LONG AKM OF LEE
while in the service. The cold winds which swept over the
mountainous district, and the heavy falls of snow
caused the greatest suffering to men and beasts. Alter
nately bemired and frozen, the roads were impassable
and the fields offered no opportunity for exercise. The
period of winter quarters was simply a struggle by
horses and men for existence, with scant provender for
the former, and an unusual deficiency in rations and
clothing for the latter. But these conditions were quite
general in the artillery camps.
Soon after placing his corps in winter quarters, Gen.
Pendleton, with headquarters at Louisa Courthouse, as
signed Majs. Page and Wolff e, and Lieuts. Peterkin
and Dandridge of his staff to the duty of examining the
forage conditions in the region between the railroad and
the James River, from a point slightly west of Char-
lottesville, to one just east of Beaver Dam Depot. These
officers were required to locate, and report by December
10 upon, the available supply of corn, oats, hay, straw,
and fodder, as well as the grist mills in the respective
districts designated for their inspection. Thus it is
seen that the rich farming lands of the James River
Valley, hitherto free from the presence of the armies,
was expected to support the Artillery during the winter.
The river counties with their Nile-like low grounds had
before the war comprised the finest agricultural section
of the state, and although the James River Nabobs were
no longer personally superintending the cultivation of
their estates, being off with the Army, their wives re
mained at home and managed to keep most of their
slaves at work, thus supporting their own as well as a
great number of refugee families from the more exposed
parts of Virginia. The Valley of Egypt was hardly
more fertile than the bottom lands between Lynchburg
and Richmond along the James, and those along the
Rivanna from Charlottesville to Columbia.
Many vacancies in the Artillery now existed, so that
numerous officers, who had previously been confined to
the lower grades, at last had before them prospects of
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 719
advancement. Early in November, Gen. Pendleton had
been called upon for his recommendations for promo
tion, and after conferring with Gen. Long, Col. Walker
and Gen. Stuart, submitted them on November 20.*
The authorized commissioned personnel at this time was
based, of course, upon the number of guns with the
Army. Including those of the 1st Corps with Long-
street in Tennessee, and those of the Horse Artillery,
the number actually in service was 244, while the full
legitimate armament entitled the Artillery to 276. Ar
rangements were already nearly completed to supply
the deficiency by substituting more Napoleons for the
howitzers that had been lost and become unserviceable
through ordinary wear and tear. The authorized
complement of officers included, therefore, 3 brigadier-
generals, 7 colonels, 11 lieutenant-colonels, and 17
majors, whereas there were actually commissioned but
2 brigadier-generals, 6 colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels,
and 17 majors. The existing general and field-officers
were as follows:
Brigadier-Generals — W. N. Pendleton and A. L. Long.
Colonels— S. Crutchfield, J. B. Walton, J. T. Brown, H. C.
Cabell, R. L. Walker, and E. P. Alexander.
Lieutenant-Colonels — A. S. Cutts, R. S. Andrews, T. H. Carter,
H. P. Jones, W. Nelson, and J. J. Garnett.
Majors— E. F. Eshleman, S. P. Hamilton, F. Huger, R. F.
Beckham, James Bearing, T. J. Page, W. J. Pegram, D. G.
Mclntosh, W. T. Poaajue, J. B. Brockenbrough, C. M. Braxton,
J. Lane, R. A. Hardaway, J. C. Haskell, J. P. W. Read, C. Rich
ardson, and Jas. Reilly.
Of these many were unfit for active service. Col.
Crutchfield, whom Jackson had earnestly sought to
have made a brigadier-general, and whose service had
been distinguished from the first, was practically dis
abled by the wound he had received at Chancellorsville.
For him, the Chief of Artillery recommended service
about the defenses of Richmond. Col. Walton was no
longer capable of performing active service, and his re-
*Rebcllion Records, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 839, and Memoirs of W N
Pendleton, p. 309.
15
720 THE LONG ARM or LEE
quest to be assigned to duty at Mobile was endorsed by
Pendleton, while Alexander was recommended to be
made permanent Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps.
Col. Cabell, an officer of great integrity and personal
courage, but lacking in energy and ability as a field
soldier, was recommended to be transferred to the com
mand of the battalion of field artillery at Richmond,
and Lieut.-Col. Lightfoot transferred to the field
army and placed in command of Cabell's Battalion.
Lieut.-Col. Andrews, an officer of tried ability, was still
an invalid from the wounds he had received at Cedar
Run, in 1861, and Stephenson's Depot, in June, 1863.
In justice to him, it was declared that he should be as
signed to a less active field, preferably to ordnance
duty, for which he was well qualified. Lieut.-Col.
Garnett, in the opinion of the Chief of Artillery, in
spite of his training and the high expectations of all,
had proved unsuited to the artillery service. It was be
lieved he could be more useful on conscript service than
in his present position, and such a change was recom
mended. Maj. Brockenbrough, though a most efficient
officer, was still disabled from the wound he had re
ceived at Fredericksburg, and was incapable of per
forming active duty. Accordingly Gen. Pendleton
recommended Col. Alexander to be brigadier-general;
Lieut.-Cols. Carter, Jones, and Cutts to be colonels;
Majs. Dearing, Eshleman, Huger, Braxton, Pegram,
Mclntosh, Poague, Beckham, Hardaway, and Richard
son, to be lieutenant-colonels; and Capts. Cutshaw,
Jordan, Miller, Stribling, Raine, R. C. M. Page, Wat
son, McGraw, M. Johnson, Ward, Maurin, Moorman,
Chew, and Breathed, to be majors with the following
general assignments:
Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery
IST CORPS
Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander, Chief of Artillery
TT » T> 4.4. v (Lieut.-Col. F. Huger. South Carolina.
Huger s Battalion. <,, . ™ 0 T , & ' . .
(Maj. T. S. Jordan, Virginia.
T, , , , T, . (Lieut.-Col. R. F. Beckham. Virginia.
Beckham s Battalion. 4,, . T ^ TTr „ , ~, .
(Maj. J. P. W. Read, Georgia.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 721
(Lieut. -Col. B. F. Eshleman. Louisiana.
Eshlemans Battalion, |Maj M B Mfflerj Louisiana.
RESERVE
Col. H. P. Jones, Virginia
(Lieut.-Col. C. E. Lightfoot, North Carolina.
Lightfoot s Battalion, |Maj g p Hamilto6n? Georgia
2D CORPS
Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long, Chief of Artillery
Col. T. H. Carter, Assistant Chief of Artillery
(Mai. R. C. M. Page, Virginia.
Page s Battalion, |M|£ M N Moorman^ Vi?ginia.
RESERVE
Col. J. T. Brown, Virginia
/-. i i > T> .. T (Mai. W. E. Cutshaw, Virginia.
Cutshaw s Battalion, -\, % ^ ,, o, ., ,. ' Tr.& . .
Maj. R. M. Striblmg, Virginia.
„ j , -o ,, v
Hardaway s Battalion,
Lieut.-Col. R. A. Hardaway, Alabama.
Virginia
3D CORPS
Col. R. L. Walker, Chief of Artillery
n , T, ,, T (Lieut.-Col. W. J. Pegram, Virginia.
Pegram s Battalion, J1l/r . T , ^r ^ * TT. . .&
Maj. Joseph McGraw, Virginia.
Lieut.-Col. D. G. Mclntosh, South Carolina.
Maj. Marmaduke Johnson, Virginia.
„ Lieut.-Col. W. T. Poague, Virginia.
Poague s Battalion, ,T . ^ TTr , , ?. . &.
(Maj. George Ward, Mississippi.
Mclntosh's Battalion,
RESERVE
Col. A. S. Cutts, Georgia
Richardson's Battalion.
Cutts' Battalion,
Lieut.-Col. Charles Richardson, Virginia.
Maj*. Victor Maurin, Louisiana.
Lieut.-Col. A. S. Cutts, Georgia.
Maj. John Lane, Georgia.
HORSE ARTILLERY
Lieut.-Col. James Bearing, Chief of Artillery
Chew's Battalion, Maj. R. P. Chew, Virginia.
Breathed's Battalion, Maj. James Breathed.
722 THE LONG ARM or LEE
The foregoing schedule includes 2 colonels less and
1 lieutenant-colonel and 3 majors more than the law
allowed, and provided for 7 promotions from the 1st,
8 from the 2d, and 9 from the 3d Corps, and 4 from the
Horse Artillery, which was about as fair a distribution
as could be made. It will also be observed that the two
reserve battalions of each corps were grouped under a
single field officer, which was done at the suggestion of
Gen. Long. It is also to be noticed that Maj. M. W.
Henry, to the command of whose battalion Haskell
succeeded, had dropped out by transfer to the Western
Army. It seems strange that Dearing should have been
recommended to succeed Beckham as senior officer in
the Horse Artillery. This must have been at the
instance of Stuart with whom Pendleton had conferred,
for no such transfer would have been proposed except
at his request. Dearing had a natural love for the
cavalry and later transferred to that arm as a brigadier-
general.
The foregoing recommendations of the Chief of Ar
tillery with the reasons upon which they were based,
give one a valuable insight into the affairs of the Ar
tillery at the time, but the welfare of the arm seems
not to have been the only consideration before the ap
pointing power. Influence, prejudice, politics, the
bane of armies, were not foreign to the Confederacy,
and it was many months before the needs of the service
overcame the obstacles thrown in the way of final action.
Garnett, meanwhile, retained his command, while Col.
Walton remained in Virginia until spring in command
of the Artillery with Pickett, consisting of Eshleman's
and Dearing's battalions. Cabell was also retained and
his battalion was held throughout the winter at the
front as an army reserve with Eraser's, Manly's, and
McCarthy's batteries at Somerville, Raccoon, and
Morton's Fords, and Carlton's Battery in support in
rear of the last two. Haskell's Battalion was tempora
rily attached to the 3d Corps, in the absence of Long-
street. Col. Cabell seems to have been well aware of
THE LONG ARM or LEE 723
the fact that he was not in favor, but was determined
that he should not be ousted and resolutely held on to
the last, giving up his guns only at Appomattox.
As time wore on and it became apparent to Pendleton
that the needs of the Artillery were simply being disre
garded, he again addressed Gen. Lee on the subject of
the necessary promotions as follows:
"Although I know you are anxious to secure the promotion of
our many meritorious officers, and regret, as I do, the obstacles that
have hitherto hindered favorable action upon the recommendations
in their behalf, I deem it my duty to submit for your consideration
some additional facts recently brought to my notice.
"First. Some of the best officers in the corps, finding how
extremely difficult it is to rise in it at all, in proportion to service
and merit, are making arrangements for more promising positions
in other arms; nor can this be wondered at or even objected to as
unpatriotic. Men the most devoted must be expected to value rank
alike, as an evidence that their services are appreciated, and as an
important condition toward more extended service. No man of
merit ever disregards the question of promotion, and much as
officers may be willing to sacrifice at times like these, they cannot
ignore so universal and powerful a sentiment as that associated
with martial honor.
"Even those officers who have no idea of seeking other service,
and whose simple sense of duty will keep them steadfast until the
end, in spite of disproportionate reward, are compelled to consider
themselves and their commands regarded with less than justice, and
after all that can be allowed for high principle, we must conclude
that it is not in human nature not to be more or less disturbed by
such a reflection, nor can such disturbance be without its injurious
effects upon the public service.
"In addition to these considerations, the fact is worthy of
particular attention that a number of the battalions have with
them only one field officer, so that in contingencies frequently
occurring, the senior captain, not always well qualified for the
charge, has to command a battalion, serious as are the responsi
bilities belonging to the position. It is certainly important that this
difficulty be corrected before the next active campaign.
"You will, I know, appreciate the case, and again ask for such
action on the part of the President and the Secretary as may be
practicable toward remedying the evil indicated."*
These were strong arguments, and were too true to
be further neglected. At this time, there were in the
*Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1193, letter dated February 22, 1864.
724 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
three corps and the Horse Artillery 214 artillery officers
present for duty, with an effective strength for their
arm of 4,893, and a paper strength of 7,137.* The
grand total of the Army of Northern Virginia, ex
clusive of Longstreet's command, was but 85,000 of
ficers and men on paper, yet there were 2,418 officers
of infantry and 331 of cavalry. These figures give
some idea of how little opportunity the artillery arm
afforded for promotion as compared to the others, not
withstanding the fact that the proportion of the ar
tillery personnel to that of the infantry and cavalry,
combined, was as 1 to 10. We must also consider that
casualties in the Infantry and Cavalry were by virtue
of the nature of those arms much greater among the
commissioned personnel than in the Artillery.
That the matter of promotions in the Artillery was
vigorously pressed by Gen. Lee is certain, for by S. O.
No. 77, A. N. V., March 19, 1864, the following as
signments were made:
Brig.-Gen. William Nelson Pendleton, Chief of Artillery
IST CORPS
Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Artillery
Col. Henry Coalter Cabell.
Maj. S. P. Hamilton.
John Cheves Haskell.
James Reilly.
Cabell's Battalion,
Haskell's Battalion,
TT (Lieut.-Col. Frank Huger.
Huger s Battalion, <.., . ™ -, ^ T j
(Maj. Tyler C. Jordan.
(Col. Hilary P. Jones.
Jones Battalion, <,, . T i. i» m -n j
(Maj. John P. W. Read.
,17 , . A ..,, (Col. Jas. Birge Walton.
Washington Artillery, |Maj Benj | Eshleman.
2o CORPS
Brig.-Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, Chief of Artillery
T, » T» . j. T (Lieut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton.
Braxton s Battalion. <,, . AT ,, XT ,,
(Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman.
, r> * (Col. John Thompson Brown.
Browns Battalion, <T . ^ i -n i. ' L A cs j
(Lieut. -Col. Robert A. Hardaway.
*Ibid., p. 1191.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 725
(Col. Thomas H. Carter.
Carter s Battalion, IM&. Richard c M page
(Mai. Wilfred E. Cutshaw.
Cutshaws Battalion, |Maj Robert M Stribling.
(Lieut.-Col. William Nelson.
Nelson s Battalion, |Maj Dayid Watson>
3D CORPS
Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery
(Lieut.-Col. Allan S. Cutts.
Cutts Battalion, |Maj John Lane
(Lieut.-Col. William Johnson Pegram.
Pegram s Battalion, Ma Joseh McGraw
(Lieut.-Col. David Gregg Mclntosh.
Melntosh s Battalion, Maj Marmaduke Johnson.
Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague.
Poague's Battalion,
Maj. George Ward.
Mai. Charles Richardson.
Richardson s Battalion, M^. M R
In this assignment, Jones was given Bearing's Bat
talion, Cutshaw succeeding to the command of Jones'
old battalion, while Richardson succeeded Garnett, and
Braxton succeeded Andrews.
Soon Gen. Long divided his artillery into two divi
sions, the first under Brown, consisting of Nelson's,
Hardaway's, and Braxton's battalions, and the second
under Carter, consisting of Cutshaw's and Page's bat
talions.* Hardaway and Page then commanded
Brown's and Carter's old battalions, respectively.
Early in March Beckham was promoted and trans
ferred to the western army, whereupon Dearing was
promoted and succeeded to the command of the Horse
Artillery, the organization of which was now as fol
io ws:f
HORSE ARTILLERY{
Lieut.-Col. James Dearing
Maj. Robert Preston Chew
Ashby Battery, Capt. James W. Thomson.
1st Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. James Breathed.
*Rel>elUon Records, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1267.
tFor Bearing's assignment to H. A., see Ibid., p. 1264.
JGriffin's Battery attached to Maryland line under Gen. Bradley T. Johnston.
Jackson's Battery with Jones in Department of Western Virginia.
726 THE LONG ARM or LEE
2d Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. Wm. M. McGregor.
Lynchburg Beauregards, Capt. J. J. Shoemaker.
Washington (S. C.) Battery, Capt. J. F. Hart.
Before the opening of the next campaign, Eshleman
was also promoted and given command of a newly-
organized battalion from among the batteries around
Richmond, and Capt. William Miller Owen, formerly
adjutant of the Washington Artillery, became its major
and battalion commander. Thus, with the exception of
the retention of Cabell in active command, we see that
the original recommendations of the Chief of Artillery
were finally very closely followed, and general satis
faction prevailed. It was about this time that Lieut.-
Gen. J. C. Pemberton, the unfortunate defender of
Vicksburg, tendered his resignation and requested to
be assigned to the Artillery with the rank of lieutenant-
colonel.* On May 12 he was assigned to Ransom's
Division in the Richmond defenses as Chief of Ar
tillery, t
Favorable weather in February tempted Meade to
undertake a renewal of operations, but the prompt ap
pearance of Lee induced the Federal commander to
forego his activity, not, however, until he had attacked
Swell's line. Nearly all the Confederate pickets were
taken. The preparedness of Brown's Artillery alone
saved the breaking of the Confederate line. The bat
teries of the 2d Corps, unaided, hurled the Federals
back and administered a bloody repulse to them with
slight loss to themselves. But for their prompt and
energetic action, instead of being a small affair, a dis
aster would have befallen the Army.
On the 29th of February, Gen. Custer with about
2,500 picked troopers and a section of horse artillery,
moving along the Earlyville Road, approached within
one mile of the Horse Artillery camp before he was dis
covered by the merest accident. It so happened that
Capt. Moorman with two of his men while going fishing
*Ibid.. p. 1296.
flbid., Vol. XXXVI, p. 994.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 727
saw the raiders approaching, and galloped back to camp
to give the alarm. The enemy appeared so suddenly
that the parked guns were all but captured. By the
time Maj. Chew was able to get his batteries hooked up,
the raiders were actually among the huts looting the
camp and shooting down the stray horses which it had
been impossible to drive in from the fields in which the
animals had been turned out. A few shots from Moor
man's guns while the teams were being brought up
served to check the enemy sufficiently to enable Chew
to place his batteries in position and open upon the
raiders, who were seemingly more intent upon the de
struction of the camp than the capture of the guns. The
artillery fire soon drove Custer off, and thus did Chew
entirely unsupported by infantry or cavalry save Char-
lottesville, with about 200 cannoneers, including the
sick and the dismounted men who were always called
in the Artillery Company "Q". In accomplishing this
result, an interesting stratagem was utilized. The 16
guns present were formed in line, and manned by the
dismounted cannoneers, while the rest of the men, bear
ing an old standard, were formed by Chew and Breathed
into a squadron behind the guns. There was not a
musket or carbine in the outfit, few pistols, and fewer
sabers. Most of the men, however, bore sticks and
clubs to represent arms. The few small arms were, of
course, ostentatiously employed, with such effect that
the enemy mistook the line of mounted cannoneers for
a cavalry support. In the meantime, the guns were
actively plied, while Custer held most of his men be
yond the river, uncertain as to the number of his enemy.
He had captured Capt. Moorman's two companions be
fore they reached camp. From them little information
could be secured. In fact they intentionally assumed
a most puzzling manner. Custer, himself, then ques
tioned a negro inhabitant of the neighborhood, who
stated with every appearance of candor that the ar
tillerymen had lied, and that Confederate troops were
728 THE LONG ARM or LEE
encamped all the way from the river to Charlottesville,
and had with them not less than 60 guns. This inter
view was on the south side of the river on a hill above
the bridge at Burnley's Mill, about a mile from the
Artillery camp, and while it was transpiring several
shells burst near the group. About the same time, Chew
moved his pseudo cavalry to the flank of the guns and
cried out in a loud voice, "Tell Col. Dulaney to bring
up the Seventh Regiment." The Federals heard the
command, and naturally assumed the superb cavalry
regiment had been moved from the Valley, where it was
actually in camp, to the defense of Charlottesville.
That night Custer retired towards the Rappahannock,
having accomplished nothing but the burning of the
Horse Artillery cantonments and Burnley's Mill,
while Chew moved his battalion four miles down the
Scottsville Road, unwilling to rely on Dulaney's sup
port. But the next day, when Custer was found to have
decamped, he returned to his old quarters, and rebuilt
his huts. The men had lost nearly everything they pos
sessed in the way of surplus clothing. The bountiful
supply must have greatly improved the outfit of the
Federal raiders. For the next few days rumors of
Custer's return were rife and a bold lookout was main
tained. On the 20th of March, the battalion was
ordered to Gordonsville for security, where it remained
until the opening of the next campaign, in camp on the
farm of Boiling Haxall. While there a large supply
of fresh horses was expected by the batteries, but the
total number received was 38.
Meanwhile the following resolutions were received by
the Horse Artillery Battalion from the Town Council
of Charlottesville, as a testimonial of the appreciation
of its people:
"Whereas, The recently attempted raid of the Yankees on this
place was undoubtedly checked and finally repulsed by unequaled
coolness and courage of the gallant officers and men of the artillery
battalion, encamped a few miles north of Charlottesville, wholly
unsupported as they were by either infantry or cavalry ; and,
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 729
"Whereas, Our town was thus unquestionably saved from pillage,,
and the public stores and the railroad bridges from destruction;
therefore, be it
"Resolved, That on behalf of the citizens of Charlottesville we,
the council of the town, do hereby return our thanks to the officers
and men of the said artillery battalion for their gallant and heroic
conduct on the occasion above mentioned, with the assurance of our
lasting and grateful appreciation of the service thus rendered us.
"Resolved, That the above preamble and resolutions be handed
to the commander of the battalion, in order that he may communi
cate the same to the officers and men of his command in the manner
he may deem most appropriate.
"By order of the Council, March 7, 1864.
"A. ROBERT McKEE, Clerk.
"To Maj. M. N. Moorman,
"Commanding Battalion,
"Stuart Horse Artillery."
It was after the arrival of the battalion at Gordons-
ville that Capt. Moorman was promoted major and
transferred to Braxton's Light Artillery Battalion, then
at Frederick's Hall, Lieut. J. J. Shoemaker succeeding
him as Captain of the Beauregard Rifles Battery of
Lynchburg, while Maj. Chew became the battalion
commander with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.
The next hostile move after Custer's raid was in
March when two columns of Federal cavalry under
Gen. Kilpatrick and Col. Dahlgren, respectively,
moved out from Culpeper Courthouse, the first towards
Richmond, and the second with orders to destroy the
artillery at Frederick Hall, and then proceed down
the James River, form a junction with Kilpatrick's
column, capture Richmond, destroy the city, and liber
ate the prisoners on Belle Isle. This was a big order
for Dahlgren. Nearly succeeding with respect to reach
ing Richmond, he would certainly have succeeded in
destroying the 2d Corps artillery, had it not been for
the foresight of Gen. Long. Anticipating a cavalry
raid upon his camp, he had early applied for two regi-
730 THE LONG ARM or LEE
ments of infantry as a guard. When refused this sup
port, he secured 125 muskets, which he distributed
among his cannoneers and organized them by battalions
into companies of riflemen.
Dahlgren captured the pickets at Germanna Ford,
crossed the Rapidan, and arrived within a few miles of
the Artillery camp before his approach was reported.
Gen. Long, immediately upon learning of the danger,
ordered Lieut.-Col. Braxton to place a battery in po
sition to command the road over which the enemy was
approaching, to deploy his company of sharpshooters as
skirmishers, and to withdraw his other batteries to a
position near the railway station. At the same time,
Col. Brown was directed to place his battalion in
position to guard the approaches below the depot, while
Cutshaw's and Carter's battalions were held in rear of
Brown's and Braxton's, and sharpshooters from the
supporting batteries were also sent forward and de
ployed. These dispositions were barely completed
when the Federal raiders came in view of Marye's
Battery on the road. Seeing the battle flag flying above
the guns, and catching a glimpse of the bayonets of the
sharpshooters, Dahlgren halted in some surprise, hav
ing been led to believe that the artillery at Frederick
Hall was without an infantry support. He now in
quired of a local contraband whether or not there was
infantry with the artillery, to which the negro replied,
"Yes, Massa, plenty of it." Being doubtful whether
the negro knew what was meant by infantry, Dahlgren
asked how he knew it. "Because," was the answer, "the
infantry had stickers on the ends of their guns." Con
vinced by the evidence of the negro that the artillery was
not unprotected, Dahlgren made a detour to the left,
keeping beyond the range of the guns. The only loss sus-
stained by the Artillery was that of the members of a
court-martial, which was in session in a house on the
enemy's line of march ; whereupon a wag remarked that
as the court, prisoners and witnesses were all present the
trial might go on and the proceedings be sent to Gen.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 731
Long, from Point Lookout, or Fort Delaware. The
prisoners escaped, however, with one exception, during
the following night. The two raiding columns failed
to cooperate, due to Dahlgren being led astray by a
faithful negro slave. Kilpatrick reached the inner line of
defenses of Richmond, and, attacking alone, was re
pulsed. Dahlgren moving down the James River Val
ley, some of the distance on the tow path of the canal,
burned many barns, seized all the horses for his men he
could lay his hands on, and almost captured Mr. Sedden,
the Confederate Secretary of War, and Gen. Wise, who
were visiting their families at "Sabot Hill" and "East
wood." But these worthies escaped on fleet horses, and
took the news of the Federal approach to Richmond,
where the Richmond School Cadets, and a nondescript
band of departmental clerks and Home Guards, the
latter consisting of old men and boys, were hastily
thrown across Dahlgren's path, while the Tredegar
Iron Works Battalion turned out to guard Belle Isle.
The raiders galloped into an ambush which had been
skillfully laid for them and were signally defeated. Dahl
gren himself, and many of his men, were killed, and only
a remnant of his band escaped.* Thus did the Federal
plans come to naught, and thus did Gen. Long by the
most admirable foresight save the Artillery of the 2d
Corps. On three separate occasions a negro had ma
terially befriended the Artillery.
Gen. Pendleton had spent the month of January on
leave of absence in Lexington with his family, but re
turned to Artillery Headquarters at Louisa Courthouse
on February 3. He was soon summoned to Richmond,
and ordered to Dalton, Ga. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston,
commanding the Army of Tennessee, had, upon taking
command, found the Artillery of that Army in a highly-
disorganized state^and at once applied to the War De
partment for Col. Alexander to be sent to straighten
things out. Writing on December 27 about the con-
*See Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, Long, p. 320, and Battles and Leaders, Vol.
p. 95. Also an interesting persoi '
April, 1894, by Mrs. Ellen Wise Mayo.
IV, p. ^95. Also an interesting personal narrative in the Century Magazine,
732 THE LONG ABM or LEE
ditions of his army, to Gen. Bragg, who was virtually
Mr. Davis' Chief of Staff, Gen. Johnston said:
"The artillery also wants organization, and especially a com
petent commander. I, therefore,, respectfully urge that such a one
be sent me. I have applied for Col. Alexander, but Gen. Lee
objects that he is too valuable in his present position to be taken
from it. His value to the country would be more than doubled, I
think, by the promotion and assignment I recommend."* To this
communication, Gen. Bragg replied in March, in part, as follows:
"Col. Alexander, applied for by you, as Chief of Artillery, is
deemed necessary by Gen. Lee in his present position. Brig.-Gen.
W. N. Pendleton, an experienced Officer of Artillery, has been
ordered to your headquarters to inspect that part of your command,
and report on its condition.
"Should his services be acceptable to you, I am authorized to
say you can retain him.
"I am exceedingly anxious to gratify you on that point, for I
know the deficiency existing.
"It is more than probable that such a junction may soon be made
as to place Col. Alexander under your command. "f
The foregoing correspondence gives one an idea of
the estimation in which Alexander was held throughout
the service. Since Gen. Pendleton exercised only an
administrative command of the Artillery, he was
naturally more available than Alexander for such duty
as required by Gen. Johnston. Leaving Louisa Court
house, March 4, he arrived at Dalton, via Atlanta, a
week later, with Lieuts. Peterkin and Hatcher, of his
staff, and immediately set to work. There is no reason
to believe that his assignment was not satisfactory to his
new commander, notwithstanding the fact that a
younger officer had been applied for. Gen. Johnston's
greeting was most cordial, and the artillery situation in
its general aspects was at once laid before Gen.
Pendleton.
The personnel of Johnston's Artillery at this time
numbered approximately 4,500, exclusive of Alex
ander's command. Energetic measures had already
been taken to supply the western batteries with a full
*Johnston's Narrative, p. 288.
•^Johnston's Narrative, p. 289.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 733
complement of horses. Maj. Beckham had recently
been promoted colonel, and transferred from Stuart's
Horse Artillery to Johnston's Army, having been suc
ceeded by Bearing, who had also been promoted. Maj.
Bondurant had also been promoted at the instance of
Gen. D. H. Hill, and transferred, as a lieutenant-
colonel, and Chief of Artillery of D. H. Hill's Division.
Pendleton at once took occasion to recommend for the
position of Chief of Artillery, Col. Thomas H. Carter,
of Virginia.
Some idea of the old general's energy and his pe
culiar fitness for work of the character to which he had
been assigned may be had from the fact that although
he only arrived in Johnston's camp at daybreak on the
llth, he commenced his inspection of the three reserve
battalions commanded by Lieut. -Col. Hollinguist at
noon the same day. This command constituted about
one-third of all the artillery with the Army. Accom
panied by Maj. Preston, Inspector- General of Ar
tillery, and one of his aides, and provided with one of
Gen. Johnston's own mounts, he made a minute in
spection of the battalions assembled on the usual drill
grounds, including the material, harness, field trans
portation, horses and stables. He was surprised to find
the animals in fair condition, the guns, carriages and
harness in very good order, and much evidence of in
telligent care and energy. Conditions were so much
better than he had expected to find them that at once
he recognized the fact that the trouble lay elsewhere.
A grand review of the Artillery of Hood's and
Hardee's corps was appointed for the 12th, to be fol
lowed by minute daily inspections of their various bat
talions. By the 16th, the actual work of inspection had
been completed, and written inquiries submitted to the
battalion commanders, in which various interrogations
relative to the service were propounded. On the 16th,
Gen. Hood conducted an imposing drill of his corps for
the benefit of Gen. Pendleton, followed by combat exer
cises in which about 20,000 men, including infantry, ar
tillery, and cavalry, engaged with blank ammunition.
734 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Much to the disappointment of the Chief of Artillery
notice was received the 19th that Brig.-Gen. Shoup had
been ordered from Mobile to join Johnston as his Chief
of Artillery. Shoup was a graduate of the United
States Military Academy, had served at Vicksburg with
great credit, and was reputed to be an able officer, but
his preferment over Carter appears to have been only
another evidence of the advantage held by West
Pointers. Certain it is that his service had not been as
illustrious as that of "Tom" Carter, of Pampatyke, a
distinguished graduate of the Virginia Military Insti
tute, a kinsman of Gen. Lee, a man of unblemished
personal character, and with a record as a soldier second
to none in the Confederacy.
Another great artillery drill and sham battle was
tendered Pendleton by Gen. Hardee. But the event,
while equally inspiring, was less eventful than the
former one, on which occasion one of Hood's major-
generals and part of his staff had been unceremoniously
unhorsed by their affrighted mounts. This incident no
doubt established the precedent for the grand review in
Paris in 1910, when the Commander-in-Chief of the
French Army was thrown at the feet of the President
of the Republic. Gen. Hardee's bride was evidently
more at home in the saddle than some of the western
knights, for she attended the review mounted, and ac
companied by a number of brilliant staff officers, with
out accident.
While in the West, Gen. Pendleton preached to the
troops on many occasions. His military views and sug
gestions were in the main approved by Gen. Johnston,
and reorganization had so far progressed during his
presence that the task remaining for Gen. Shoup was
much simplified. The main trouble had been found to
be with the senior officers. Returning to Richmond, on
March 29, via Charleston, where he and his staff officers
inspected the harbor defenses, Pendleton promptly laid
his report on the Artillery of the Army of Tennessee,
and his recommendations regarding it, before the Presi-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 735
dent. A conference with Mr. Davis, Mr. Sedden, and
Gens. Bragg and Cooper, resulted in his being ordered
back to Dalton to urge Gen. Johnston to make an ag
gressive move as speedily as possible, in order to dis
tract the Federals and prevent the massing of more
troops under Grant in Virginia. But before returning
to the West, he visited Gen. Lee at the front, who con
curred in the importance of his mission. Remaining
with Johnston but two days, during which time he
pressed upon him the desires of the administration,
Gen. Pendleton was back in Richmond again by April
21, and soon joined the Army.
We have seen that in personal appearance he much
resembled Gen. Lee. An amusing incident which oc
curred during his presence in Richmond should here be
recounted. One afternoon he was stopped by a tipsy
Irishman on Broad Street, who began haranguing and
gesticulating violently as he detailed some fancied
grievance. The ladies of the party wished to go on, but
the General insisted on listening patiently for a few
moments, then said, "My friend, you are talking to the
wrong person." "My," said Paddy, "ain't you Mass*
Bob?" "No," replied Gen. Pendleton. "Look and see
if you don't know me:" This answer seemed to steady
the excited soldier. He came a little closer, peered into
the General's face a moment, then giving himself a vio
lent slap on the leg, exclaimed, "I'll swear if it ain't old
Artillery." And with many apologies the embarrassed
soldier allowed the general to pass on.
When Gen. Pendleton returned to the Army he
found not only that Longstreet had returned to Vir
ginia, and that many changes had occurred, but that all
was not running smoothly in the administration of the
Artillery. Gen. Long, it seems, desired that all con
nection between the Artillery and the Infantry in so far
as the authority of division commanders was concerned,
should be officially severed by order, and that the corps
chiefs should be free to administer their commands as
integral units. While this view was clearly expressed
18
736 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
in Orders No. 69, June 4, 1863, reorganizing the Ar
tillery, and while the Commander-in-Chief deprecated
a clash of authority by reason of its misinterpretation,
yet he was unwilling to destroy the old associations be
tween the artillery battalions and the divisions with
which they had so long served. These associations he
regarded as a distinct asset. In this respect Gen. Long
was overruled, and soon a better understanding ensued.
A further effort was also now made to equalize the
armament of batteries and the strength of the battalions,
and as more horse batteries were needed, Alexander
and Long were each called upon to recommend a bat
tery for conversion, the first from Huger's, and the
second from Hardaway's Battalion. Alexander was
also called upon to use his influence to secure the as
signment of King's Battalion, to the 1st Corps of the
Army of Northern Virginia.* Longstreet had re
turned to Virginia with his two divisions and Alex
ander's own battalion some time before this and had gone
into camp near Mechanicsburg, about six miles south of
Gordonsville. The return of Longstreet's men, who
had served with marked distinction in the West, was
honored by their being reviewed by Gen. Lee, the first
ceremony of the kind he had conducted since October,
1862, when he reviewed his army in the Shenandoah
Valley. Describing the scene, Gen. Alexander wrote:
"It took place in a cleared valley with broad pastures,
in which our two divisions of infantry, with my old bat
talion of artillery, could be deployed. . . . It is
now over 40 years, but in imagination I can see to-day
the large square gate posts, without gate or fence, for
troops had been everywhere in that vicinity, marking
where a country road led out of a tall oak wood upon an
open knoll in front of the centre of our long double lines.
And as the well-remembered figure of Lee upon
Traveller, at the head of his staff, rides between the
posts and comes out upon the ground, the bugle sounds
^Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXVI, Part II, pp. 944, 945. This battalion had
been serving in Southwest Virginia in a different department.
COLONKL DAVID GIJKGG McINTOSN
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 737
a signal, the guns thunder out a salute, Lee reins up
Traveller and bares his good gray head and looks at us,
and we give the rebel yell and shout and cry and wave
our flags and look at him once more. For a wave of
sentiment — something like what came a year later at
Appomattox, when he rode back from his meeting with
Grant, — seemed to sweep over the field. All felt the
bond which held them together. There was no speaking,
but the effect was as of a military sacrament."
Many changes had occurred both in the artillery of
ficers and the batteries in the Army during the winter
and spring. Besides Griffin's 2d Maryland Horse Bat
tery, Dement 's and Brown's 1st and 4th Maryland
batteries, the latter now under Lieut. W. S. Chew, had
also been transferred to the Maryland line. Blount's,
Caskie's, Macon's, and the Fauquier Battery, the latter
now commanded by Marshall, had been transferred
under Maj. J. P. W. Read to Whiting's Division, and
Owen's Washington Artillery Battalion to Colquitt's
Division, both on duty in the Department of North
Carolina. Early in May, Col. H. P. Jones was assigned
to the command of these two battalions. The remnants
of the Louisiana Guard Battery had been sent to Rich
mond for reorganization.
On the 1st of May, the Artillery with the Army on
the Rapidan was organized as follows:
IST CORPS
Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Artillery
HUGER'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Frank Huger
Maj. Tyler C. Jordan
Brooks' (S. C.) Battery, Capt. William W. Fickling.
Madison (La.) Battery, Capt. Geo. V. Moody.
Richmond Battery, Capt. William W. Parker.
Bedford Battery, Capt. J. D. Smith.
Bath Battery, Capt. Esmond B. Taylor.
Ashland Battery, Capt. Pichegru Woolfolk, Jr.
738 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
HASKELL'S BATTALION
Maj. John C. Haskell
Maj. James Reilly
Rowan (N. C.) Battery, Capt. John A. Ramsey.
Palmetto (S. C.) Battery, Capt. Hugh R. Garden.
Nelson (Va.) Battery, Capt. James N. Lamkin.
Branch (N. C.) Battery, Capt. John R. Potts.
CABELI/S BATTALION
Col. Henry Coalter Cabell
Maj. S. P. Hamilton
Battery "A", 1st N. C. Reg't, Capt. Basil C. Manly
1st Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Edward S. McCarthy.
Pulaski (Ga.) Battery, Lieut. Morgan Callaway.
Troup (Ga.) Battery, Capt. Henry H. Carlton.
2D CORPS
Brig. -Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, Chief of Artillery
Col. John Thompson Brown, Chief of First Division
HARDAWAY'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Robert Archelaus Hardaway
Powhatan Battery, Capt. Willis J. Dance.
1st Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Archibald Graham.
Salem Battery, Capt. Charles B. Griffin.
2d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Lorraine F. Jones.
8d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr.
NELSON'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. William Nelson
Maj. David Watson
Amherst Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick.
Fluvanna Battery, Capt. John L. Massie.
Georgia Battery, Capt. John Milledge.
BRAXTON'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton
Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman
Alleghany Battery, Capt. John C. Carpenter.
Stafford Battery, Capt. Raleigh L. Cooper.
Lee Battery, Capt. William W. Hardwicke.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 739
Col. Thomas H. Carter, Chief of Second Division
CUTSHAW'S BATTALION
Maj. Wilfred E. Cutshaw
Maj. Robert M. Stribling
Charlottesville Battery, Capt. James McD. Carrington.
Staunton Battery, Capt. Asher W. Garber.
Richmond Courtney Battery, Capt. Wm. A. Tanner.
PAGE'S BATTALION
Maj. Richard Channing Moore Page
King William Battery, Capt. William P. Carter.
Jeff Davis Alabama Battery, Capt. William J. Reese.
Louisa Morris Battery, Lieut. .
Richmond Orange Battery, Capt. Charles W. Fry.
3D CORPS
Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery
POAGUE'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague
Maj. George Ward
Madison (Miss.) Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Richards.
Warrenton Battery, Capt. Addison W. Utterback.
"C" Battery, 1st N. C. Reg't, Capt. Joseph Graham.
Albemarle Battery, Capt. James W. Wyatt.
MC!NTOSH'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. David Gregg Mclntosh
Maj. Marmaduke Johnson
Richmond Battery (Johnson's), Capt. Valentine J. Chilton.
Danville Battery, Capt. Berryman Z. Price.
2d Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Wm. K. Donald.
Hardaway's Alabama Battery, Capt. Wm. B. Hurt.
PEGRAM'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Wm. Johnson Pegram
Maj. Jos. McGraw
Richmond Letcher Battery, Capt. Thomas A. Brander.
Richmond Purcell Battery, Capt. George M. Cayce.
Richmond Crenshaw Battery, Capt. Thomas Ellett.
740 THE LONG ABM OF LEE
Pee Dee (S. C.) Battery, Capt. Wm. E. Zimmerman.
Fredericksburg Battery, Capt. Edward A. Marye.
CUTTS* BATTALION
Col. Allen S. Cutts
Maj. John Lane
"B" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Geo. M. Patterson.
"A" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Hugh M. Ross.
"C" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. John T. Wingfield.
RICHARDSON'S BATTALION
Maj. Charles Richardson
Maj. M. B. Miller
Norfolk L. A. Blues, Capt. Chas. R. Grandy.
Donaldsonville (La.) Battery, Capt. R. Prosper Landry.
Norfolk Battery, Capt. Jos. D. Moore.
Pittsylvania Battery, Capt. Nathan Penick.
HORSE ARTILLERY
Maj. Robert Preston Chew, Chief of Artillery
BREATHED'S BATTALION
Maj. James Breathed
Washington (S. C.) Battery, Capt. James F. Hart.
1st Stuart H. A. Battery, Capt. Philip Preston Johnston.
2d Stuart H. A. Battery, Capt. Wm. M. McGregor.
Lynchburg Beauregards, Capt. J. J. Shoemaker.
Ashby Battery, Capt. James W. Thomson.
With Ransom's Division near Petersburg was Lieut.-
Col. C. E. Lightfoot's Battalion, consisting of
Hankins' Surry, Rives' Nelson, and Thornton's Caro
line batteries; with Hoke was Eshleman's Battalion
consisting of Martin's, Owen's, and Payne's batteries;
and at Chaffin's farm was Maj. A. W. Stark's Bat
talion, consisting of Armistead's Mathews, and French's
Giles batteries, Lieut.-Col. E. F. Moseley's Battalion
of Gumming' s and Miller's North Carolina, Staten's
Georgia, and Young's Yorktown batteries, and Maj.
J. C. Coit's Battalion of Bradford's Mississippi, Kelly's
South Carolina, Pegram's Petersburg, and Wright's
Halifax batteries. Including the eight batteries of
THE LONG ARM or LEE 741
Owen and Eshleman, with Colquitt and Whiting, and
Green's Louisiana and Sturdivant's Albemarle batteries,
unassigned, there were then not less than 26 field batter
ies in the neighborhood of Richmond and Petersburg,
while there were 52 light and 5 horse, or a total of 57
field batteries with the Army on the Rapidan. With
this army there were exactly 213 guns.* The artillery
personnel numbered May 1st about 4,800 effectives.
Deducting this number from the effective strength of
the Army, and we have 213 guns for 57,000 infantry
and cavalry, or a proportion of nearly 4 guns per thou
sand men of the other arms. The proportion of horse
guns to cavalry was exactly 2.5 per thousand, there be
ing 8,000 troopers and 5 horse batteries of 4 guns each.
At this time the effective strength of the Federal Army
under Grant was about 119,000, including an artillery
personnel of 10,210 and 318 guns, or a proportion of
about 3 guns per 1,000 of the other arms. One must
admire the ability of Lee to maintain so high a pro
portion of artillery in spite of the seemingly insur
mountable difficulties in his way. Yet his field army
was outnumbered in guns by the enemy by nearly a
third.
*Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 1036. Gens. Humphreys and
Alexander estimated that there were 224.
CHAPTER XXXVI
THE ARTILLERY COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY COMPARED
BEFORE taking up the narrative of the next cam
paign, it may be interesting to glance once more at the
four senior artillery officers of the Army at the time the
Artillery arm had attained its maximum efficiency in
personnel, material, and organization. At the close of its
third year, it was truly a formidable corps, though
somewhat reduced in the number of its guns. With the
purely military record of its commanders, we are al
ready quite familiar, but what was the contemporary
and what is a fair estimate of them at this time?
Gen. William Nelson Pendleton, by far the senior
in age as well as in rank among the officers of this arm,
like Bishop Polk of the Western Army, entered the
service of the Confederacy, as we have seen, from the
service of the church. Born at Lexington, Virginia,
December 23d, 1809, he was appointed a cadet at the
United States Military Academy in 1826, graduating
with his class. While at West Point he formed a lasting
friendship with Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis.
Assigned to the Artillery, he served one year in the
garrison of Augusta, Ga., with the rank of second lieu
tenant, and was then ordered back to the Academy as
assistant professor of mathematics. Subsequent to this
duty, he served with troops at Fort Hamilton, where he
resigned in 1833 to accept the chair of mathematics at
Bristol College, Pennsylvania, later becoming con
nected with the faculty of Delaware College. In 1837,
he became a clergyman in the Episcopal Church, in
fluenced to enter the ministry by the spirit of revival,
which reigned at West Point while he was a cadet, many
of his school-day companions doing the same. When
the war broke out, he was serving as rector of the Lex
ington parish. His entrance into the Confederate
THE LONG ARM or LEE 743
military service as the original commander of the Rock-
bridge Artillery has already been mentioned.
While Gen. Pendleton possessed many virtues as an
administrator, he lacked the dash requisite to popularity
as a soldier. The officers and men of the Army knew
little about his ceaseless activity in matters pertaining
to the equipment and arming of his command. His
constant attention to the care and preservation of the
material and horses was practically unknown to them,
nor are such things of a nature calculated to add to the
reputation of a soldier. They are regarded as matters
of course, and little interest is shown by the troops in
them. Boldness and dash in the presence of the enemy
appeal to the soldiery of an army. With such qualities
an officer, entirely lacking in administrative ability and
skill as an organizer, will acquire repute quite incom
mensurate with his true merit. The faithful perform
ance of the drudgery of the service adds little to the
lustre of a military name.
Pendleton was never conspicuous as a leader in battle,
though, as we have shown, he was by no means lacking
in courage. He was regarded from the first as slow and
lacking in aggressive spirit, and his natural caution due
to his age led to unfounded accusations. His name was
unjustly coupled with the midnight route at Shepherds-
town, after the battle of Sharpsburg, in an unpleasant
way. Notwithstanding a court of inquiry, appointed to
investigate the incident, clearly established the fact that
no blame attached to him for his conduct on that oc
casion, yet a military reputation is bound to suffer, even
when unjustly involved in such an incident. In this
case, the tongue of the scandal monger was simply set
to wagging all the more. Unfortunately, Pendleton
was again present and in command when the Artillery
was withdrawn from the heights of Fredericksburg be
fore Sedgwick's advance. Not only was he absolutely
free of blame on this occasion, but as has been shown
and testified to by Gen. Early, who was with him, the
guns were removed over the protest of the Chief of Ar-
744 THE LONG ARM or LEE
tillery. The withdrawal on this occasion was the result
of a serious mistake on the part of one of Gen. Lee's
own staff officers. Pendleton's critics entirely over
looked the fact that Early, who was really in command
at Fredericksburg, withdrew his troops at the same time,
yet no question ever arose over the conduct of Early.
The readiness with which Pendleton's action was taken
up and adversely discussed shows the sentiment in the
Army with respect to him. The feeling was not un
known to Pendleton. His staff officers got wind of the
calumnies that were being circulated and very promptly
informed him, in order that he might defend himself
against such gross injustice. Gen. Pendleton at once
addressed Gen. Lee upon the subject, with the result
that he received the following letter from the Com-
mander-in-Chief, which should for all time dispose of
any doubts as to the propriety of his conduct on this
occasion.
"ORANGE,, September 15, 1863.
"GENERAL — Your letter of 8th inst., inclosing one from Maj.
Page, reached me at a time when I was pressed by business that
had accumulated during my absence. I cannot now give the matter
much attention, and have only been able to read partially Maj.
Page's letter. I think the report of my dissatisfaction at your
conduct is given upon small grounds, the statement apparently of
your courier, upon whom I turned my back. I must acknowledge
I have no recollection of the circumstances, or of anything upon
which it could have been based. The guns were withdrawn from
the heights of Fredericksburg under general instructions given by
me. It is difficult now to say, with the after-knowledge of events,
whether these instructions could, at the time, have been better
executed, or whether if all the guns had remained in position, as
you state there was not enough infantry supports for those retained,
more might not have been captured.
"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"R. E. LEE,
"General."
It would seem that Pendleton's critics did not know
that some of the batteries, which were withdrawn in
obedience to the order which Chilton transmitted er-
THE LONG AKM or LEE 745
roneously, had proceeded too far towards the rear to re
turn in time to take part in the final action. They only
knew a part of the story — that is, that all the Artillery
was withdrawn, and that some of it did not return.*
What was known was sufficient, however, for those who
were willing enough to put the worst construction on
the affair. They took full account of Pendleton's haste
to withdraw his guns, in obedience to the peremptory
order he received, the tenor of which order they did not
know, but they overlooked the haste with which he re
turned to his position when the error in that order was
discovered.
The fact that Gen. Lee suggested the permanent
retention of his Chief of Artillery in the West by Gen.
Johnston while it certainly proves Pendleton was not
indispensable to the Army of Northern Virginia, does
not prove his services were not valued. The Artillery
had gradually attained a corps organization under three
most competent corps chiefs. These officers were not
only administrative, but tactical commanders, and under
their immediate control fell all the artillery of the
Army. Very naturally Pendleton, whose duties had
become in the process of evolution purely administra
tive, could be better spared than Alexander, who was
applied for by Johnston, or either of the other two
tactical commanders, Long and Walker. It must not
be thought, however, that Pendleton had become super
fluous because no tactical command remained to him.
One only need recall the splendid service he rendered the
Artillery by that general supervision, which led in one
instance to the creation of the remount department, and
in another to the establishment of forage districts in the
winter of 1863-64. The Artillery, in fact the Army,
owed much to his foresight in innumerable matters of
this character, which were quite beyond the province of
the corps commanders and their chiefs of artillery.
After everything is said in his favor that can be said,
the fact remains that Gen. Pendleton, though admired
*For foregoing incident see chapter on battle of Chancellorsville.
746 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
by those who knew him for the integrity of his character,
was not rated by the officers and men of the Army of
Northern Virginia as an efficient field soldier. We be
lieve, however, that it has been shown that he was far
more efficient than he was thought to be by his con
temporaries, who were generally ignorant of his true
worth and services. In the popular and contemporary
estimate of Pendleton, an element entered, the influence
of which we can now fully appreciate. The delicate
task of the various reorganizations of the Artillery from
the beginning to the end of the war fell solely upon his
shoulders. Promotion was necessarily very slow, and
much discontent existed among officers really entitled by
their services to reward, but for whom the number of
vacancies at no time afforded promotion. Under such
circumstances, dissatisfaction was as general as it was
inevitable, and to Pendleton, whose recommendations
were final, the malcontents of course attributed the fact
that their merits were not recognized. His position was
not an enviable one, and, lacking those qualities which
enable a commander to silence the voice of the malcon
tents under him by the brilliancy of his achievements,
it was not strange that Pendleton' s popularity as a
soldier suffered. The old officer fully appreciated the
unenviable character of the duty he was called upon
to perform, but never once did he complain. He set
about his task with the utmost resolution to perform it
as best he could, and relieve Gen. Lee of as much of the
burden of command as he could take upon himself. His
recommendations, as we have seen, were invariably the
result of the most careful consultation of the wishes of
the corps and division commanders of the Army, and
were never submitted until he had brought to bear upon
the claims of all the most mature deliberation, with the
result that the selections of the Chief of Artillery were
quite generally believed by unprejudiced parties to be
judicious and eminently fair in every respect. The
knowledge on the part of Gen. Lee that Pendleton
would allow no political or personal considerations to
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 747
influence him in making his recommendations, was
alone a sufficient reason for his retention as Chief of
Artillery, especially since there was no necessity for his
exercising a tactical command. It would indeed have
been difficult to find another as conscientious and as
free of all bias as was Pendleton.
Personally Gen. Pendleton, so much like Gen. Lee
in appearance, was a most lovable man. His influence
for good in the Army was great, and never once, despite
the asperities of war, did he lose sight of his mission as
a minister of the gospel, for he was a Christian of the
highest order, in fact as well as by profession. It is a
well-authenticated fact that on more than one occasion
his entrance into battle was preceded by an invocation
of a blessing upon the enemy. It is related that at
Haynesville, his first engagement, before giving the
word of command to open fire he raised his hand aloft
and in a loud voice, so that his men might hear, ex
claimed: "May God have mercy upon their souls."*
After the war, Gen. Pendleton, who had made a noble
sacrifice to the cause in the loss of his only son,
Col. A. S. Pendleton, returned to his pulpit in Lex
ington, where he spent a part of his remaining years in
close and constant companionship with his immortal
leader. Together Pendleton and Lee ceaselessly
labored, the one as rector, the other as a vestryman, in
building up the Episcopal Parish of their community.
Outliving Gen. Lee some years, Pendleton died Janu
ary 25, 1883, and, like his former commander and de
voted friend, is buried in Lexington, beside his son,
and within the shadow of Jackson's monument.
Brig.-Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, next in order
of seniority to Pendleton in the Artillery, was an of
ficer of exceptional merit and high accomplishments.
Born in Campbell County, Virginia, September 3,
1825, he was graduated from the United States Mili-
*When asked if this were true by a brother minister, the Rev. Mr. Royce,
now rector of New Windsor Parish on the Hudson, Gen. Pendleton admitted
that it was. Thus the incident seems to be without the vale of mere tradition.
The Rev. W. N. Pendleton was granted the degree of Doctor of Divinity in 1868.
748 THE LONG ARM or LEE
tary Academy in the Class of 1850. On duty as a
second lieutenant in the 2d Artillery at Fort Moultrie
for two years, he was then promoted first lieutenant,
serving for the next nine years on the frontier of New
Mexico, at Barrancas Barracks, Fort McHenry, Fort
Monroe, and taking part in the various Indian cam
paigns in Indian Territory, Kansas, and Nebraska.
When the crisis between the States arrived, he was on
duty at Augusta, Georgia, from which point he was
transferred to the National Capital, where he resigned
his commission June 10, 1861, after 11 years of service.
While in the Old Army, he had been placed under Capt.
Hunt, later Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac,
for special instruction, and under the tutelage of that
able artillerist he had acquired an exceptional knowledge
of the theory as well as the practice of gunnery. He
also served, in 1860, as aide on Gen. E. V. Sumner's
staff.
An interesting anecdote concerning Gen. Hunt
and Long may here be recounted. At Appomattox
Gen. Hunt sought out Gen. Long to render him such
services as he could. In the course of their conversa
tion, Hunt told his old friend that he was not satisfied
with the artillery preparation at Gettysburg, inasmuch
as he, Long, had not done justice to his instruction; that
the Confederate batteries, instead of concentrating their
fire on the point of attack, were scattered over the whole
field. Long was much amused at the criticism of his
former tutor and said: "I remembered my lessons at
the time, and when the fire became so scattered won
dered what you would think about it."
Repairing to Richmond immediately after resigning
from the Old Army, he accepted a commission as Maj.
of Artillery in the Confederate service, and soon ac
companied Gen. Loring in the capacity of Chief of Ar
tillery to West Virginia.* After this service in the
Trans-Alleghany Department, he was assigned in the
'Resigned June 1, 1861 ; reached Richmond July 18, on which day he was
appointed Major of Artillery.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 749
fall of 1861 to duty under Gen. Lee as chief -of -staff in
the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and
Florida. When Gen. Lee was given command of the
Army of Northern Virginia Long was appointed his
military secretary with the rank of colonel. In this
capacity he was recognized as the artillery expert of
Gen. Lee's staff, and rendered valuable service in con
nection with the Artillery at Fredericksburg, Chancel-
lorsville, and Gettysburg. In his professional ability
and special knowledge of artillery Gen. Lee reposed
great confidence, and it is readily seen that his assign
ment to tactical command was most acceptable to Army
Headquarters. His preferment over Col. Brown as
Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps was not viewed at
headquarters as a slight in any sense to that officer, and
as he ranked Alexander and Walker, and held his com
mission in the Artillery, his prior appointment to them
as brigadier-general was not a technical promotion over
their heads. Yet, in a sense, his preferment over Alex
ander, Walker, and Brown especially, was felt to be at
the time not wholly justifiable, in spite of his eminent
ability and long service. This was most natural, since
he had not been so thoroughly identified with the Ar
tillery as they and others had been. It was the old story
of the claims of line officers and staff officers. The
former always feel that active duty with troops entitles
them to more consideration than officers, even superior
in rank, whose service has been principally on the staff.
In the selection of Long for Chief of Artillery of the
2d Corps, the personal equation undoubtedly entered,
and such influences must never be lost sight of in the
consideration of army, as well as other appointments.
It must also be remembered that his service in the Old
Army had been longer than that of any other artillery
officer of the Confederate Army.
Thirty-nine years of age at the time of his appoint
ment as brigadier-general, he was six feet tall and of
handsome and commanding presence. His hair was
dark, and his complexion swarthy. A small military
750 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
mustache gave him a decided French appearance. In
manner Gen. Long was most affable, even gentle, but
beneath his pleasing exterior there lay a sternness of
character apparent to all. Of wide intellectual attain
ments and rare culture, he was perhaps one of the most
profound military scholars in the Army. He certainly
had no superior in the Confederacy in the theoretical
knowledge of his special arm, and beside was a tactician
of exceptional merit. As an organizer, he was superior
to Alexander, and probably the equal of Walker, but
he lacked the unusual dash of the former. We believe
it is a fair estimate of Gen. Long to say that taken all
in all he was one of the most accomplished officers in the
Army of Northern Virginia.
As to his personal character, no one who has read his
Memoirs of Gen. Lee, the best military historial work
of the kind yet written, can entertain a doubt. Bereft
of his eyesight after the war and at the time this
splendid work was written, he displayed in its prepara
tion the most remarkable patience and persistence, and
evidenced a lack of bias and prejudice equalled by few
writers on the war. It also testifies to the careful mental
training of the author, and his wide knowledge of the
military science in all its branches.* Gen. Lee enter
tained a high regard for him as evidenced by the fol
lowing testimonial written after the war: "Gen. A. L.
Long entered the Confederate service in 1861, and has
served continuously till the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, April 9, 1865. His conduct during
that time has been marked by zeal and gallantry. ..."
Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery 3d
Corps, was the last to attain the rank of brigadier-
*After the war closed, Gen. Long was appointed Chief Engineer of the
James River and Kanawha Canal Company. In 1869 he lost his eyesight from
injuries received from the explosion of a caisson in the service, and subsequent
exposure. He then removed to Charlottesville, where he resided until his death,
April 29, 1891. It was during the last twenty years of his life that he wrote
his Memoirs of General Lee, which were published in 1886. He also wrote
reminiscences of his own career, a comparative sketch of Stonewall and Andrew
Jackson, and a History of America in the Seventeenth Century. By reason of
his infirmity, he was compelled to use a slate prepared for the use of the blind,
and to depend upon the members of his familv and on his friends for much
assistance. Under all these disadvantages he labored on uncomplainingly, record
ing the history of his immortal leader of whom he was a most devoted admirer,
cheerful and courageous to the end.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 751
general in Lee's Artillery. He was born on his paternal
estate, Logan, Albemarle County, Virginia, May 29,
1827, and was therefore about the same age as his kins
man, Gen. Long. In his veins flowed the best blood of
the Old Dominion, being a son of Capt. Lewis Walker,
and a descendant of forebears who had been prominent
in the early settlement of the western part of the State.
By every influence of blood, environment, and tra
dition, he was trained to be a leader of his fellows, and
was perhaps the most picturesque figure in Lee's
Army. Of immense frame and exceptionally broad
shoulders, he was as handsome in figure as in counte
nance. Six feet four inches or more in height, his hair
was long and dark, and a sweeping mustache and im
perial beard added to his soldierly appearance. Above
all he was a superb horseman and seemed to have been
born to the saddle in spite of his immense stature. In
repose his face wore a grave expression, and a piercing
black eye, capable of great intensity, enhanced the indi
viduality of his features. His brow was massive and
his head sat gracefully upon his shoulders. Looking
into his handsome face, no man could doubt the deter
mination and the will-power which animated and char
acterized his being. In manner Walker was not par
ticularly alert, and while by no means dull, his mind was
not an active one. In physical hardihood, fixity of pur
pose, dogged determination, and dauntless courage, he
was unexcelled by any officer in the Army. But while
he was bold, he cannot be said to have possessed the dash
of Alexander, Pelham, Pegram, Chew, or Breathed, or
the intellectual brilliance of Long and Alexander. His
forte was organization, and it was generally conceded
that he had throughout the war the best organized ar
tillery in the Army, whether it were a battery, a bat
talion, or a corps division under his command. His
character was distinguished by great integrity, resolu
tion and devotion to duty. His admiration for and
confidence in Gen. Lee were unbounded, and few
soldiers were ever as much beloved by officers and men
17
752 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
under their command as was Reuben Lindsay Walker.
Upon being asked to give his estimate of Walker as a
soldier, his old adjutant, Capt. William W. Chamber-
laine, declared that in addition to Gen. Walker's ability
as an organizer, his most striking characteristics were
his intuitive knowledge of country, his appreciation of
terrain, and his ability to select and occupy the best
available positions for his guns and then to hold them
with great pertinacity. From this, one sees how his ex
perience as an engineer stood him in good stead as a
soldier.
The following incident well illustrates Walker's
character. As a cadet at the Virginia Military Insti
tute, where he was graduated with the Class of 1845, he
had for three years committed every offense, short of
one which would have resulted in his dismissal. Gen.
Smith, the Superintendent, narrates that he sought to
reduce him to good order and submission in many ways.
Threats, penalties, and punishments of the severest
nature only sufficed to confirm the imperious youth in
his course of utter disregard of all regulations. Ad
miring the young man for his lovable nature, his superb
physique, and his unflinching courage in adversity, the
Superintendent at last sought to appeal to his pride by
appointing him a lieutenant in his first class year. From
that time on, Cadet Walker was an example of all that
was conscientious, dutiful and soldierly. Never once
did he prove derelict in the discharge of the trust re
posed in him. And this may be said of his career as an
officer in the Army.
Walker followed the profession of Civil Engineer
ing until the outbreak of the war. Visiting Richmond
in February, 1861, he was promptly seized upon by Mr.
Purcell, a patriotic citizen, who had undertaken to re
cruit and equip a light battery at his own expense, and
placed in command of it. Not even was Capt. Walker
permitted to return to his home, then at New Kent
Courthouse, but he was hustled off with the famous Pur-
THE LONG ARM or LEE 753
cell Battery to Aquia Creek, without even bidding his
wife farewell. From the day of this unceremonious de
parture for the front, he had never had a day's leave of
absence from his command, and when next he met his
wife he was introduced to a child nearly a year old which
had been born to his wife in his absence. Such was the
fortitude of both men and women in those days. But
this particular mother had suffered separation enough
from her husband. From thenceforth she accompanied
her soldier husband in the field. Mrs. Walker's ambu
lance and mules, driven by a faithful white retainer, was
a familiar sight to the men of the Army of Northern
Virginia. From battlefield to battlefield she moved with
the ammunition trains, often bivouacking with her
children along the roadsides in her improvised house on
wheels, when the neighborhood afforded no shelter in the
homes of friends and relatives. In her determination
to remain close to her husband's side, not only did she
accept all the hardships of campaign, but she also added
a new member to her family. For a brief space only did
this Spartan mother desert her husband in the midst of
the perils of war. She followed him to the end, ready
to carry his stricken body from the field, or minister to
him in sickness and disease. On one occasion while her
driver was absent Mrs. Walker's team of horses was
impressed by a not-overscrupulous Confederate team
ster. Other horses could not be purchased, but so in
sistent was the good lady that means of transport be
secured for her ambulance, that soon her faithful re
tainer appeared with a fine pair of mules branded with
the familiar "U. S." It has never been explained
whence they came.
Strange to say that with all this loving care and con
stant attendance on the part of his wife, Walker was
never once wounded, in the sixty-three engagements in
which he participated during the war, nor was he in
valided at any time. In latter years he even grew
sensitive to the inquiry. "Why General, not wounded
in the war?" Invariably he would draw himself up to
754 THE LONG ARM or LEE
the full height of the giant that he was, and, squaring his
massive shoulders, reply, "No, sir, and it was not my
fault."*
And now we come to Alexander, who among the
senior officers was the artilleryman par excellence of
Lee's Army, though third in rank in his arm. A
graduate of West Point in the Class of 1857, his service
in the Engineer Corps, then as Commandant of the
Corps of Cadets and instructor of gunnery, his service
on the plains and in connection with the development
of the Myer signal system, we are already familiar with,
as well as with his early service in the Confederacy, first
as artillery instructor, then as signal officer on Beaure-
gard's staff, and then as Chief of Ordnance of the Army
of Northern Virginia. To repeat, entering the Con
federate service April 3, 1861, as a captain, at the age
of 24 years, he was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of
artillery in December, 1861, and colonel a year later.
After the most distinguished service in every battle from
Fredericksburg to date, he was commissioned brigadier-
general of artillery February 26, 1864.
Although Alexander had accompanied Longstreet to
Tennessee, and served in the capacity of his Chief of
Artillery in the Knoxville campaign, not having reached
Chickamauga with his battalion in time to participate
in the battle, he was in fact, up to the time of his pro
motion, the inferior in rank of Colonels Walton and
Cabell, though of the same grade with them. But while
their inferior, he had for some time practically directed
the tactical employment of the artillery of his corps.
* Surrendering with the army at Appomattox, Walker, who was promoted
Brigadier-General of Artillery in January, 1865, retired to private life as a
farmer, with a record of having participated in sixty-three engagements during
the four years of his military service. In 1872 he removed to Selma, Ala.,
where he was Superintendent of the Marine and Selma Railroad. In 1876 he
returned to Virginia in the employment of the Richmond and Danville Railroad,
and was later Superintendent of the Richmond Street Railway Company. Soon
he was engaged as constructing engineer of the Richmond and Alleghany Rail
road, or the present James River Division of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway.
In 1884 he became superintendent of construction of the Texas State Capitol, and
resided at Austin until 1888. Much scandal in connection with the previous
management of the work led the authorities to place it in his hands, by reason
of his known integrity. He was handsomely rewarded for the faithfulness and
efficiency with which he discharged the trust. He died at his home, "Point of
Forks," on the James River. June 7, 1890, where he spent the last two years of
his life as a farmer.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 755
At Fredericksburg, he was the directing genius of
Longstreet's defense. It was there, in referring to the
positions of his guns on Marye's Hill, that he remarked
to his corps commander: "We cover that ground so
well, that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A
chicken could not live on that field when we open on
it." And as has been seen, Alexander's forecast was
quite fulfilled. Again at Gettysburg where Col. Wal
ton, his senior, and the nominal Chief of Artillery, was
present, Alexander was in complete control of the Ar
tillery in the fight. On former occasions, his recognized
ability had merely enabled him to influence the disposi
tion of the artillery under Walton's immediate control,
but at Gettysburg we find him as a junior officer
actually in command, while his senior was present and
participating in the battle. This has always seemed a
remarkable anomaly, not so much as to the wisdom of
it, but that Walton would consent to it. A careful in
vestigation and study of the matter discloses that it
came about in the following way : Col. Walton was old,
and physically unequal to the exertions of the campaign.
Though a meritorious officer, of dauntless courage, and
with a fine military record, he now lacked the energy
to keep pace with events. Already one of his former
battery commanders, Eshleman, had supplanted him as
active leader of the celebrated Washington Artillery
Battalion. Longstreet knew Walton's capabilities full
well, and while he retained the gallant old officer as
Chief of Artillery of his corps, both for political and
personal reasons, he did not feel that he would be justi
fied in committing the tactical leadership of the ar
tillery to his hands, for those or any other considera
tions. In the movement upon Gettysburg, Walton's
Battalion was held back, whether intentionally or not
cannot be determined, but at any rate, Alexander ar
rived on the field some time in advance of Walton and
was placed in charge of the artillery already up. An
important mission was entrusted to him, and upon its
discharge the young officer had already entered when
756 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
his senior arrived. The situation was such that when
Walton did come up, no consideration of rank could
be allowed to jeopardize the success of the battle al
ready under way. Such arguments were unanswerable,
and however chagrined Col. Walton may have felt, he
was powerless to deny the force of the circumstances
which debarred him from the exercise of the tactical
command to which his rank entitled him. That he was
chagrined is quite well established by the verbal testi
mony of his contemporaries and his own letters, and it
was not long before he expressed the desire to be trans
ferred to service at Mobile. In justice to the old of
ficer, his wish should have been instantly complied with.
In fact, he should have been given the opportunity to
transfer, before being publicly overslaughed. But he
was retained on the roll of the 1st Corps, and after be
ing gradually sidetracked by being assigned to duty as
Inspector- General of Artillery at Large and placed on
detached duty, relinquished his commission in the 1st
Corps July 8, 1864.
From the time of his first appearance in the Artillery,
in fact in the Army, young Alexander was a marked
man and one destined to attain preeminence in his arm.
Rapidly he acquired a reputation which extended far
beyond the Army in which he was actually serving.
First Jackson sought to have him appointed a general
officer in the infantry, then Johnston urged his transfer
to the Western Army, with advanced rank. But he
was too well appreciated in the Army of Northern Vir
ginia to permit of his loss. Stephen D. Lee might be
spared to the far South, but not Alexander to the West.
The young Georgian was needed in Virginia.
In appearance, Alexander did not present so fine a
military figure as did Long and Walker. Of about
the average height, and of muscular build, yet he was
by no means a handsome man. In fact, his features
were rather irregular, and the scraggly, ill-shapen beard,
which his youth afforded, failed to hide a decidedly
ugly mouth. But his eye was bright and penetrating,
THE LONG ARM or LEE 757
and about the man, both in his general appearance and
carriage, was the unmistakable evidence of high breed
ing and exceptional intellect, and these appearances did
not belie the facts, for he was the scion of a noble stock,
and brilliant beyond his years. To the latter fact, his
whole career at West Point and in the Old Army testi
fies. No man becomes an engineer officer and the Com
mandant of the Corps of Cadets at the United States
Military Academy unless he possesses rare qualities of
mind and heart combined.
In manner, Alexander was active and alert, and his
whole character was vibrant with intenseness. Strong
in likes and prejudices, he was yet most amiable and
possessed the traits which make men socially popular.
As an officer, he was quick to estimate the situation be
fore him, prompt to direct, and inexorably firm in hold
ing his subordinates to their duty. He possessed won
derful personal magnetism, and transmitted much of his
own enthusiasm and spirit to his subordinates. Above all
things, he detested delay. Full of dash and the love of
responsibility, he perhaps expected too much of others,
in this respect forgetting that few men possessed that
elan which characterized himself. His was a nature which
loved prompt action; he liked rapidity of motion; any
thing that savoured of slowness, of lack of energy, of ex
cessive deliberation, provoked him sorely. His mind was
the kind that had figured out and matured the plans in
advance which most men pause to consider when the
time for action comes. He courted favor from no one,
and while immensely energetic and ambitious he was yet
able to forego an offered advancement in another arm
in the evident knowledge that he was needed in his own.
Endowed with such a nature and exuberant with
vigorous youth, it was natural that he should have
chafed at the shortcomings of others, for in his genuine
lack of vanity he was unable to appreciate the fact that
he himself was not like other men. He invariably meas
ured others by his own standard, and few came up to it.
This habit made him rather critical, and he never hesi-
758 THE LONG ARM or LEE
tated to express his views, hit whom they did, but he was
never disloyal to Gen. Lee, nor to the memory of Gen.
Longstreet. In fact, his devotion to the latter carried
him, in an attempt to defend his old corps commander,
beyond the limits of sound reasoning, as one who
studies his book, in other respects a masterpiece of
critical analysis, will discover.* Like Long, his writ
ings prove him to be a man of exceptional intellect, a
wide student of war and human nature, and to have
possessed a remarkable lack of bias. In his memoirs,
much after-acquired information was of course brought
to bear upon the solution of the military problems of
the war, however conscientiously he may have sought to
view things from a contemporary standpoint. The
author was a much wiser man when he wrote his book
than when he was actually confronted by the problems
which others were called upon to solve, but no one is
misled by his sagacity after the event, for it is not
difficult to distinguish between his contemporaneous
foresights, and the maturer reflections of the author, or
his hindsights.
Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, age 27 years,
was a soldier, who, had he served Napoleon, would have
been rewarded by a baton, for he possessed those
soldierly characteristics so dear to the Emperor. He was
far and away the superior of all others in his arm, whose
opportunity was equal to his own. Like Gen. Hunt of
the Federal Army, he was preeminent in the Artillery
of his army. His opportunities were never equal to
those of Senarmont and Drouot, for even Gettysburg
cannot properly be compared to Friedland and Wa-
gram; the tactical combinations were so different that
the number of guns engaged forms no basis for com
parison. Nevertheless, as written by Maj. May, R. H.
A., the names of Hunt and Alexander are as worthy of
remembrance as are those of the two great artillerists of
the Grand Army. Then, too, it must be remembered
*Military Memoirs of a Confederate, published by Charles Scribner's Sons
in 1908.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 759
that Alexander had no leader who held him always in
hand, prepared to throw his masses of guns into action,
as did Napoleon at the crisis of the combat, thus en
abling the Artillery to reap the fame of victory, when
the way to inevitable success had been carefully paved.
On the contrary he, like the other artillery commanders,
while given a free hand, was always expected to shoulder
a burden from the first, which precluded the more
brilliant maneuvers of the battlefields of the French.
Their services were none the less valuable; they simply
show in a different light. The issue largely depended
on the efforts of the Confederate artillerymen, but no
great reserve masses existed to be employed at the psy
chological instant, and win for their leaders the credit of
having capped the climax, so to speak.*
From now on, the historical narrative of events will
trace the military careers of Lee's senior artillerymen
subsequent to the period of which we write. The fore
going discussion of their characters should give a better
insight into the affairs of the Artillery in general.
*General Alexander, as we shall see, played a leading role in the Artillery
until the close of the War. After the Surrender at Appomattox, he became
Professor of Mathematics and of Civil and Military Engineering at the Univer
sity of South Carolina, in which position he served from January, 1866, to
October, 1869. He then became President of the Columbia Oil Company. In
May, 1871, he became Superintendent of the Charlotte and Augusta Railroad,
and in October, 1871, President of the Savannah and Memphis Railroad. In
1875 he became President and General Manager of the Western Railroad of
Alabama, and of the Georgian Railroad and Banking Company. He was Vice-
President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad from 1880 to 1882, Capital
Commissioner of the State of Georgia from 1883 to 1888, and from 1887 to
1893 President of the Central Railroad and Banking Company, and the Ocean
Steamship Company. He wrote a valuable treatise on Railroad Practice. His
death occurred in 1911.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE WILDERNESS
FOR six months the hostile armies had confronted each
other along the Rapidan, and every man in both knew
that the next campaign was to be the most serious one
yet conducted. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who had been
called from the West to take supreme command of the
Federal forces, arrived in Virginia in March, establish
ing his headquarters at Culpeper Courthouse on the
26th. He had been by far the most successful Federal
commander up to that time, and possessed an iron de
termination, which, coupled with the unlimited military
resources placed at his disposal, served to revive the
spirits of the North. Furthermore, his selection was a
guarantee to those who knew him that military opera
tions would be conducted from Army headquarters and
not by the President, his cabinet, the press, and the
politicians of the North.
Grant's strategy cannot be discussed here. Suffice it
to say that his general plan was well formulated and
it contemplated the thorough cooperation of the various
Federal armies under his control, with a definite end in
view. While that end was the subjugation of the South
in the shortest possible time, the objective of the Army
of the Potomac, under the immediate command of
Meade, was the Army of Northern Virginia, and in
directly Richmond, since the two were by circumstances
almost inseparably identified. Previous commanders
had failed to appreciate the fundamental strategic prin
ciple that an enemy's capital must fall with the army
which defends it, wherever that army may be. This fact
was not ignored by Grant.
When Grant took charge the situation in Virginia
was as follows: West Virginia was in the hands of the
North, and all that part of old Virginia north of the
Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge. On the sea-coast,
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 761
Butler with the Army of the James, numbering about
30,000 men, held Fort Monroe and Norfolk. In North
Carolina, the Federals held Plymouth, Washington,
and New Berne, from which points Richmond could
also be threatened. The 9th Corps under Burnside,
20,000 strong, was soon rendezvoused at Annapolis,
Maryland, from which point it could reinforce Meade or
operate independently along the coast.
Longstreet's Corps was at Gordonsville, Swell's
along the south bank of the Rapidan above Mine Run,
and Hill's on his left, and higher up the river. The Con
federate line was partially intrenched in position. Gen.
Lee's headquarters were two miles northeast of Orange
Courthouse. Meade's Army, consisting of Hancock's,
Warren's, and Sedgwick's, or the 2d, 5th and 6th
Corps, lay along the north bank of the Rapidan. The
Army of the Potomac had never been so thoroughly
equipped before, nor as powerful as a fighting machine.
It was lavishly supplied with all a rich country could
give it. The Army of Northern Virginia, on the other
hand, little more than half as large as its persistent
antagonist, was practically devoid of everything in the
way of clothing and supplies. Its arms and the temper
of the veterans which wielded them were, however, per
haps never better. Such was the situation on the 2d
of May, when Gen. Lee with the utmost confidence ex
amined with his glasses from Clark's Mountain on the
south side of the Rapidan the Federal lines on the op
posite bank.
Meade's activity in the direction of the upper fords
had not deceived Lee for an instant, and on the 3d of
May the Federals were discovered moving to his right,
just as he had predicted they would be. He at once
prepared to move upon Meade's flank with his whole
force as soon as the enemy crossed the Rapidan and
became entangled in the Spotsylvania Wilderness,
through which the route selected by Grant lay. Again
was Lee willing to forego the defense of a natural ob
stacle, which could in time be turned by superior num-
762 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
bers, in order to avail himself of the great advantage of
a most difficult terrain, which he knew to be a terra
incognita to his adversary. And again did the Fed
erals play into his hands by entangling themselves in
the gloomy wilderness, thus, in a measure, at least, neu
tralizing their numerical superiority.
The Army of the Potomac began to cross the Rapi-
dan at noon, May 3, its way having been prepared by
Sheridan's Cavalry. Bridges were laid in advance at
Germanna, Ely's, and at Culpeper Mine fords, cover
ing a front of about seven miles. Hancock, preceded by
Gregg's Cavalry, crossed at Ely's Ford, and moved to
Chancellorsville, which placed him on the left ; Warren,
with Wilson's Cavalry in front, followed by Sedgwick,
crossed at Germanna Ford and followed the Germanna
Plank Road, due southeast, to Wilderness Tavern.
Sedgwick encamped for the night three miles south of
the river. In these positions Meade's corps remained
until 2 p. M. of the 5th, while the 65 miles of trains were
crossing at Germanna and Culpeper Mine fords, the
movement of which was more difficult than anticipated,
and to which fact the unexpected delay in the advance
was attributed. The situation was now about as fol
lows: Near the Lacy house, where Grant, Meade, and
Warren had established their headquarters, there were
two roads, the Orange Turnpike on the right or south,
and the Orange Plank Road on the north or left, both
following the general direction of the river from
Orange Courthouse to Fredericksburg and nearly
parallel to each other. The route of the Federal Army
lay directly across the two roads along the western
border of the Spotsylvania Wilderness. When the
Confederates gained contact with the Federal advance,
Sedgwick's Corps in general occupied the Germanna,
and Hancock's the Brock Road, while Warren's oc
cupied the space within the obtuse angle made by the
two.
About noon on the 4th of May, Lee put Ewell's
Corps in motion along the Orange Turnpike, while
THE LONG ARM or LEE 763
A. P. Hill with two divisions moved along the Orange
Plank Road. The two divisions of Longstreet's Corps,
in camp near Gordonsville, were ordered to move
rapidly across the country and follow Hill's advance.
It was apparent from the first that the terrain se
lected by Lee for his initial operations would afford no
opportunity for the effective employment of the Ar
tillery, but instant steps were taken to bring it up and
assemble it from its widely dispersed camps.
In the 1st Corps, Huger's Battalion which was re
cruiting at Cobham Depot, Haskell's Battalion, also
in camp at that point, and Cabell's Battalion at Mor
ton's Ford, where it had been on picket duty during the
winter, were ordered on the 4th to rendezvous at
Richard's Shop, where they arrived late in the night on
the 5th, and at 3 A. M. on the 6th they marched for
Parker's Store on the Plank Road in rear of the Army.
Gen. Long's five battalions which had wintered at
Frederick Hall, and which later in the spring had
been moved to grazing camps near Liberty Mills in
Orange County, also received orders to march on the
4th, and were concentrated early on the 5th at Locust
Grove on the turnpike in rear of Ewell's Infantry.
Walker, with four battalions of the 3d Corps, left Cob-
ham and Lindsay depots on the 4th, and bivouacked
that night near Verdierville, joining Hill on the 5th and
accompanying Heth and Wilcox down the Plank Road.
Cutts' Battalion of this corps, which had been on picket
duty during the winter in the neighborhood of Rapidan
Station, was directed to remain with Anderson's Divi
sion, which constituted the rear guard of the Army.
The five batteries of the Horse Artillery which had
wintered at Charlottesville and then moved to Gordons
ville, were now operating with Stuart on Lee's right,
and were constantly engaged in harassing the enemy's
advance. The batteries had been ordered up from camp
on the 4th, and most of them were engaged the next day
with Rosser on the Catharpin Road.
764 THE LONG ARM or LEE
The rapid concentration of the Artillery at the front
was effected in a most creditable manner, and is suffi
cient evidence of the high state of efficiency of the arm
at this time. Nothing so tests the metal of field artillery
as long and rapid marching. In this instance it was
assembled without a hitch of any kind, every battalion
moving as if by clockwork. One need only measure
on the map the distances covered by the various bat
teries between the 4th and 5th of May to appreciate
the celerity of their movements. Suffice it to say that
many of the batteries covered 30 miles or more in less
than 24 hours, all finding their appointed positions with
out mishap of any kind.
Swell's Corps was the first to gain close contact with
the enemy. As it advanced along the turnpike on the
morning of the 5th, the Federal column was seen cross
ing the road from the direction of Germanna Ford.
Ewell had been instructed to regulate his advance by
the head of Hill's column, which Stuart was to lead to
the south of him, and not to bring on a general engage
ment until Longstreet arrived. Promptly forming
Johnson's Division across the road, he refrained from
provoking the enemy, and communicated with Lee, who
was still with Hill, but the position he occupied was on
the flank of the Federal line of march, and very
naturally such a collision soon led to active hostilities.
Warren, whose troops were passing when Ewell came
upon them, halted them and, turning to the right, made
a vigorous attack upon Johnson's Division, with which
Nelson's Battalion of artillery had been deployed.
Milledge's Battery in front of Jones' Brigade on the
right of the road was soon withdrawn when the infantry
support was forced to fall back about two miles to the
Flat Run Road, where it intersects the turnpike. Jones
was roughly handled, but Steuart's Brigade was pushed
forward and Rodes' Division was thrown in on its right,
south of the road. When the line was thus reestablished,
the Confederates pressed forward vigorously and, after
desperate fighting in the dense woods which hid friends
THE LONG ARM or LEE 765
and foe alike, drove back the enemy. Swell's entire
corps had now come up, Johnson's Division across the
turnpike, Rodes on his right, and Early in reserve.
Few practicable positions were available for ar
tillery, but Nelson had placed some of his guns on a
commanding ridge with a small field in their front on
the right and about a mile from the Lacy house. Two
of his guns were also placed on the road leading to the
Germanna Road to operate with the infantry of the
left wing. In these positions the Artillery rendered
such aid as it could in repelling the attacks of the Fed
erals during the afternoon.
Soon after Warren's repulse, Sedgwick moved up to
his right to oppose Early, who moved into the front line
and, supported by several of Nelson's guns, clung to his
position on the Federal flank, in spite of every effort to
dislodge him. The Federal efforts continued until
nightfall.
The collision with Ewell at first led Meade to believe
Lee had only left a division to oppose his progress, and
to impose upon him while the main army was being con
centrated across his path on the North Anna, but when
Hill's advance was also discovered on the Plank Road,
Meade abandoned his original view. It was but a short
time after Ewell became engaged when Hill struck the
Federal outposts near Parker's Store, just at the edge
of the Wilderness, and drove them in upon Sedgwick's
column which was moving along the Stevensburg and
Brock roads to Spotsylvania Courthouse. Heth's Di
vision, followed by the corps artillery with Poague's
Battalion in the lead, first encountered the enemy's
cavalry, whereupon Richards' Battery was thrown for
ward and assisted in driving in the outposts. The head
of Hill's column reached an opening on the left of the
Plank Road at midday, at a point about two miles from
its intersection with the Brock Road, and was halted.
From the ridge occupied by Heth, the enemy was seen
in force to the north and dispositions were at once made
for an encounter. The small clearing on the ridge af-
766 THE LONG ARM or LEE
forded the only practicable position for artillery. There,
near the Widow Tabb's house, Gen. Pendleton, after
consultation with the Commander-in- Chief, established
Poague's Battalion. Poague moved one of his pieces
down the road a few hundred yards and placed it in
line with Heth's Infantry. This, as will be seen later,
was most fortunate for the Confederates.
Immediately upon discovering Hill's presence, Meade
recalled Hancock's Corps, which was marching from
Chancellorsville to Spotsylvania Courthouse, and at
4 P. M. Hancock was ordered to drive Hill "out of the
Wilderness," which he had entered. Wilcox was
brought up to Heth's support and then ensued a
desperate encounter between the individuals of both
sides. Division, brigade, regimental, and even com
pany leading was out of the question. At no time were
more than a handful of men in sight from any one point,
and the troops simply fell upon each other and locked
in a death embrace, as chance directed their steps. As
darkness approached, the flashing muskets alone marked
the contending and intermingled lines. But never once
was the road occupied in force by the enemy, for
Poague's single piece, with the gallant battalion com
mander himself beside it, swept the approach and com
pletely dominated it from first to last. The battalion
from its position on the ridge was practically debarred
from participating in the struggle, as its fire would
have been as dangerous to friend as to foe in that seeth
ing cauldron which boiled beneath its muzzles. Mean
while the other battalions of the 3d Corps were held in
the immediate rear of Hill's Infantry.
When the battle closed at 8 o'clock, Swell's and Hill's
Corps had already formed a junction at a point about
halfway between Parker's Store and the Orange Turn
pike. Longstreet was now ordered to make a forced
march during the night and arrive upon the field before
dawn. Moving at 1 A. M. of the 6th, it was daylight
when he reached Parker's Store on the Plank Road,
three miles in rear of Heth and Wilcox.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 767
All night Hill's advanced troops, who had maintained
themselves so resolutely and successfully against Han
cock's six divisions, heard the Federals preparing to
renew the attack in the morning. Worn and much cut
up by the fighting of the previous afternoon and expect
ing relief during the night, the infantry failed to pre
pare to meet the inevitable attack. The lines were much
disordered, and commands were mixed. But not so with
Poague's Battalion on the ridge in the clearing.
At 5 A. M. Hancock's troops swept forward and soon
overlapped Wilcox's Division south of the road, rolling
it up and compelling Hill's whole line to retire in con
fusion past the single battalion of artillery, which stood
alone like a wall of flame across the enemy's path. Not
until the great masses of Hancock's troops came face
to face with the artillery did they cease to press for
ward, but no troops could pass through such a storm of
fire as that which Poague now opened upon them. The
gunners worked with almost superhuman energy, the
muzzles belched their withering blasts, the twelve pieces
blended their discharges in one continuous roar, and
there among them stood beneath the dense canopy of
smoke, which hovered above the four batteries, Lee him
self as if with a halo of war above his head. The great
commander knew then full well that between him and
disaster Poague's Battalion stood alone. What glory
for a soldier! This single incident brought more of
honor to the little colonel of artillery than most soldiers
attain in a life of service. It would be hard for some to
imagine in those soft, mild eyes, so familiar to the
writer, the light which must have radiated from them as
he stood among his guns on the 6th of May, 1864, the
bulwark of Lee's defense, and in the very presence of
his immortal commander. But one who has been thrown
with him, who has learned to know the quality of the
man, must feel that no heroism could transcend the limits
of his soul. And yet the incident is not referred to by
the historians of our time. We read that Poague's Bat
talion was present in the battle of the Wilderness. No
18
768 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
more. Even Morris S chaff, whose writings are inspired
with the noblest sentiments of appreciation, and whose
studious work on the battle of the Wilderness is by far
the best yet written, overlooks the heroic deeds of
Poague, though no more ready hand than his ever
brought the pen to bear with sweeter touch for friend
and foe alike. In the saving of such incidents to
posterity, of deeds unrecorded by contemporaries, al
most unknown even to the present generation, one must
feel thankful to the Goddess of Fame, nay, more, to the
Almighty that it may be done.
For awhile as Gen. Lee stood among Poague's unsup
ported guns, matters were indeed in a critical condition
for the Confederates. After sending a courier to hasten
the advance of the 1st Corps, and another to prepare the
trains to be moved to the rear, he at last discerned the
dust thrown up by the hurrying feet of Longstreet's
men. In perfect order, with ranks well closed and no
stragglers, the double column swung down the road at
a trot, and, regardless of the confusion which beset their
path, these splendid troops pressed on to the point of
danger. At their head rode Longstreet at his best,
ardent for the fray, as if but now he had slipped the
leash which held his tugging columns in check. Rapidly
deploying into line on the right of the road, Kershaw's
Division obliqued to the right under a withering fire to
meet the Federal left which had all but outflanked
Poague's batteries, and which was working havoc among
them. On the left of the road, Field's Division also de
ployed and swept past the guns, among which the men
detected Gen. Lee, whom they cheered lustily. When
they perceived that "Marse Robert" contemplated lead
ing them in the charge, they cried loudly for him to
forego his intention. "We won't go unless you go
back," shouted the Texans, while one of the gallant fel
lows seized his bridle rein and turned Traveller to the
rear. Gen. Gregg then urged Gen. Lee to do as the
men desired him to do, but it was with evident disap
pointment that Lee turned off and joined Gen. Long-
street.
MAJOR JAMES WHITE LATIMKK
Mortally wounded at Gettysburg. ISGo
THE LONG ARM or LEE 769
As Longstreet's men swept onward, Mclntosh's Bat
talion was thrown into position by Walker on Poague's
left, while three of the guns of Price's Battery advanced
along the Plank Road with the infantry. Pegram's
Battalion soon went into action on the ridge, half a mile
to the left of Mclntosh's, to oppose the efforts of the
enemy to penetrate between Ewell and Hill. Later on
Cutts moved up to the support of Pegram, while
Richardson's Battalion and Alexander's entire corps
artillery were held in reserve at Parker's Store.
Longstreet's charge was irresistible; the Federals
were first checked in their advance and then driven back
past their first line of log works. Back and forth for
two hours the lines of battle surged, settling down at
length almost where they had rested during the night
before.
Simultaneously with these events on the Confederate
right, the Federals had made an unsuccessful effort to
turn E well's left next the river, the brunt of the attack
falling upon Early's Division, behind the flank of which
Col. Carter had massed a number of his guns. The bat
teries there posted were heavily engaged and rendered
splendid service in repelling the attack upon Gordon's
Brigade. Cutshaw's Battalion was placed by Gen.
Long on the right of the turnpike, relieving Nelson's
batteries in their old position, while Hardaway's Bat
talion relieved those guns of Nelson's Battalion on the
Germanna Road. Braxton's Battalion occupied a posi
tion further to the right, about midway between the
turnpike and the Plank Road, from which point it was
able to cross fire to a certain extent with Pegram's
guns behind Hill's left. While seeking an advanced
and much exposed position for the three battalions of
his division early in the morning, the veteran artillery
officer, Col. John Thompson Brown, fell, instantly
killed by the bullet of a sharpshooter, adding another
illustrious name to the list of artillery officers lost in
battle. Little can be added concerning Col. Brown to
what his superiors in his own arm have written of him.
770 THE LONG ARM or LEE
In his report, Pendleton wrote of this much lamented
officer: "To the fine qualities of a Christian gentleman
of superior and cultivated intellect were added in Col.
Brown very high excellencies as a soldier. Judicious,
prompt, energetic and of dauntless gallantry, he had
rendered conspicuous service in every campaign of the
war. His example will not be forgotten in the arm to
which he was an ornament, nor his memory be un-
cherished by a grateful country." And, of him Gen.
Long, whose senior artillery division commander he
was, wrote: "His loss was deeply felt throughout the
whole army. He not only exhibited the highest social
qualities, but was endowed with the first order of mili
tary talents. On every field where he was called to act
he was distinguished for gallantry and skill. The Ar
tillery will ever remember him as one of its brightest
ornaments."*
By 8 A. M. Anderson's Division had rejoined Hill's
Corps. Meanwhile, it had been discovered by Gen.
Lee's engineer that the Federal left flank rested in the
air only a short distance south of the Plank Road, near
the unfinished railroad. When this was reported to
Longstreet about 10 A. M. he at once organized a column
of four brigades, G. B. Anderson's and Wofford's of
his own, and Mahone's and Davis' of Hill's Corps, for
the purpose of turning the Federal flank. Moving
rapidly to the right and then forward, the column was
deployed along the railroad at right angles to the hos
tile line. About 11 A. M. the four brigades, led by Col.
Sorrell in person, Longstreet's Adjutant-General, ad
vanced, striking the flank of the Federal line in reverse,
while a general attack was instituted along the Confed
erate front. The success of Longstreet's brilliant move
ment was complete. From a tactical point of view no
more beautiful movement was executed during the war,
and it only serves to show the remarkable ability of
Longstreet as a tactician when his was the plan that was
*For full and accurate account of the life and military career of this superb
officer, see The University Memorial, p. 560.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 771
being executed. Brigade after brigade of the enemy
was rolled up and routed. Hancock, totally unable, in
spite of the noted influence he exercised over his men,
to stay their flight, was compelled to content himself
with reforming them along the Brock Road, where
luckily he had thrown up hasty intrenchments the pre
ceding day. Panic had seized upon two whole Federal
corps, and a great Confederate victory seemed assured
when Longstreet, who rode forward south of the Plank
Road, at the head of five fresh brigades to press his ad
vantage, fell before a volley from one of Mahone's regi
ments advancing at right angles to his own course, and
which mistook Longstreet and the group of officers
about him for Federals. But Longstreet was not so
seriously wounded that he could not place Gen. Field in
command and direct him how to proceed. He explained
that one of his columns should continue the direct at
tack, while the other moved further around Hancock's
left by a route which Gen. Smith had reconnoitered and
was thoroughly familiar with. If this were done, the
already-broken enemy would be forced to surrender
or be destroyed. Before Field, however, got under
way, Gen. R. H. Anderson, his senior, then Gen.
Lee himself, arrived. Longstreet 's knowledge of the
situation was of course not possessed by either Lee or
Anderson. They only found the lines much disordered,
and before the realignment which the former directed to
be made could be effected, much delay had ensued. It
was 4:15 p. M. before Field's and Anderson's divisions
renewed the attack. Thus at the very crisis of the battle,
when the enemy was not only already defeated, but an
appalling disaster stared Meade in the face, Lee's second
great lieutenant was smitten and this almost within gun
shot of the field where Jackson fell just twelve months
before. In fact part of the enemy's forces occupied the
old Chancellorsville battlefield at the time.
It would almost seem that Providence was fighting
against the Confederates. Certain it is that Fate was
against them, for in the battle of the Wilderness even
772 THE LONG ARM or LEE
another ill-fortune had fallen upon Lee's Army. Be
fore 9 A. M. Gordon had discovered the exposed char
acter of the Federal right wing, and had later verified
the reports of his patrols by personal reconnaissance in
its rear. He at once reported the fact to Early, and
begged to be allowed to attack Sedgwick, with a view to
rolling up his line. But Early objected on the ground
that Burnside, whose troops were arriving on the field,
would be found behind Sedgwick. Gordon knew from
personal observation that Burnside was not there, and
in vain he appealed, first to his division commander,
then to Ewell, to be allowed to attack, urging them both
to verify his own information. Ewell was completely
dominated, however, by Early, and neither went himself
nor sent any one to investigate the situation for him.
About 5 :30 p. M. Gen. Lee, astounded by the inactivity
on the left, rode over from the right where Longstreet
and Hill had been so heavily engaged, to discover the
cause of Swell's silence. Gordon, in the presence of both
Ewell and Early, explained the situation to Gen. Lee as
he knew it to be, with the result that he was ordered
to attack at once. The attack took place just as the sun
went down, too late to reap the fruits of a surprise which
to Sedgwick was as great as Longstreet's flanking at
tack had been to Hancock. Moving around to their rear,
Gordon alone drove the Federals from a large portion
of their works and took 600 prisoners, and among them
two general officers. But darkness intervened to save
Sedgwick just as a bullet had saved Hancock and War
ren, and so Grant's army was saved from destruction
and enabled to fall back and establish a new line for the
defense of which Burnside's entire and almost wholly
fresh corps was now available.
Viewing Meade's precarious situation throughout the
6th, it seems certain that had Gordon been permitted to
attack when he desired to, his effort, which would have
been closely connected in time with Longstreet's success
on the right, would surely have brought complete
disaster to the Army of the Potomac. What he accom-
THE LONG ARM or LEE 773
plished at 6 P. M. could have been done at 11 A. M., and
with an enemy in his front and in rear of both flanks, it
is inconceivable that Meade could have successfully with
drawn his army, even had the terrain favored him instead
of practically eliminating all possibility of the move
ment of broken troops.
During the day, Stuart had persistently sought to
penetrate to the left rear of Meade's Army, but found
Sheridan confronting him at all points. The conflict
between the cavalry of the two armies was continuous,
and in the various more or less disjointed affairs between
Stuart's brigades and those of Sheridan, the Horse Ar
tillery was actively engaged. Johnston's Battery re
mained in position near Shady Grove, Thomson's and
Shoemaker's being heavily engaged near Rowe's farm,
and Hart's not far from Todd's Tavern. McGregor's
Battery remained at Orange Courthouse, with
W. H. F. Lee's Brigade. The nature of the cavalry
operations in the dense country was such, of course, as
to preclude the possibility of Chew's handling the bat
talion as a unit. On the 6th, when with Rosser, who was
engaging Wilson on the Catharpin Road, Chew per
sonally led Thomson's Battery in the charge of the
cavalry brigade, and, throwing the guns into action just
before the troopers struck the enemy, did fine execution
with them. The next day at Rose's farm, where Stuart
was in command, he again accompanied the cavalry in a
charge with his old battery, much to the delight of
Stuart, who now seems to have realized for the first time
that in Maj. Chew, Pelham had a worthy successor.*
Stuart's previous lack of appreciation of Chew was most
natural, for the two had scarcely ever been thrown to
gether before this time. It seems unfortunate that the
association of such bold and congenial spirits was so
brief. But the wide recognition of this artilleryman's
*"GEN. W. N. PENDLETON — Your note concerning Bearing is just received.
Maj. Chew, the officer now in charge of the Stuart Horse Artillery, is doing so
well that I am disinclined to put any one over him, although I have a high
appreciation of the officer you propose. I think Chew will answer as the
permanent commander, and, being identified with the Horse Artillery, is there
fore preferable to others.
"J. B. B. STUART, Major-General, April 6, 1864."
774 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
ability and the reputation as an unexcelled leader of
horse artillery which he had established for himself
were all the more to his credit since he owed nothing to
the great Stuart for them. Indeed, his service since
Ashby's death had been quite independent of illustrious
commanders, and he therefore reflected none of the lus
tre of others. He was a self-made soldier in the highest
sense of the word, and the fact that he could by his own
merit acquire precedence over such an officer as
Breathed, so long and so familiarly associated with
Stuart, may seem remarkable to those who have never
known the man. Slight personal contact with him is
sufficient, however, to brush away all surprise. Near
seventy years old at the time this is written, Col. Robert
Preston Chew retains the mental activity and much of
the physical hardihood of youth. Erect, of full muscular
development and above the average height, with a hand
some face upon which character has delineated its un
mistakable features, in appearance he is the ideal
soldier, and he is as much beloved by those with whom
he is now associated in his peaceful pursuits, as he was
by the splendid men of the Confederate Horse Artillery
during the war.*
*Col. Chew now resides in Charles Town, West Virginia. He tells the writer
that he is engaged in writing the history of the Horse Artillery. May God spare
him until he has completed the priceless record he alone is now capable of
preparing, and for many years to come.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
SPOTSYLVANIA
GRANT had utterly failed on the 5th and 6th of May
to carry out his plan of "swinging past" Lee's Army
and placing himself between it and Richmond, and while
Lee had delivered the Federal Army a stunning blow,
it still remained on its route, now secure behind strong
works, and with Hunt's tremendous force of artillery
established in position with the usual skill of its com
mander. It was impracticable for the Confederates,
who had established themselves upon the flank of
Grant's line of operations, to attack Meade's Army.
Whatever the conditions may have been in the Federal
Infantry, which had been so roughly handled, and which
had escaped complete disaster by the merest chance, Lee
knew that Hunt was undismayed and that no troops
could sweep over that superb line of guns in the Wilder
ness. So both armies lay behind their intrenchments on
the 7th, contenting themselves with skirmishing along
the front. Meanwhile, Lee kept a close lookout for a
movement of the enemy to his right and directed the
Chief of Artillery to open roads for the movement of
the artillery in that direction, should it be needed there.
The work was quickly accomplished by working parties
from the various batteries of the 3d Corps, under the
immediate direction of Col. Walker. At the same time,
Gen. Long made a reconnaissance under orders from
Gen. Ewell on the extreme left. Taking Jones' infan
try brigade and W. P. Carter's Battery, Long moved
around to Beale's house on the Germanna Road, where
he struck several regiments of Federal cavalry, which
were quickly dispersed by the battery. No other hostile
troops being found, it was evident that the enemy was
withdrawing from before the Confederate left, for the
dead and wounded still lay upon the field in that quarter.
Soon after Long made the report of his reconnaissance
776 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
to Lee, Stuart, about 3 p. M.^ discovered Meade's trains
moving to the Confederate right, and later the unmis
takable rumble of moving columns along the Brock
Road was heard.
With roads clear of the trains, Meade had been
ordered by Grant to move his troops at 8 :30 p. M., and
to establish one of his corps at the Courthouse, twelve
miles distant, one at the crossroads known as the Brock
House, and one at Todd's Tavern.
About dusk, Gen. Lee directed Pendleton to send
a staff officer to Anderson, who had succeeded Long-
street in command of the 1st Corps, to guide him over
the roads cut through the woods. Without a doubt in
his mind as to Grant's intention, Lee had taken up the
race for position at Spotsylvania. Going himself to
Anderson, Pendleton described the route and left with
him a competent staff officer to lead the column. Ander
son's orders were to start at 3 A. M.,, but he knew the
route he would have to follow to the Courthouse was
longer than that pursued by the Federals, so he set
his troops in motion at 11 p. M., four hours earlier than
ordered. We shall see later how fortunate was the ex
ercise of this initiative on his part. The Artillery of the
1st Corps, which had not been engaged the two preced
ing days, was ordered to follow the infantry column
from Parker's Store.
Anderson's two divisions, with Alexander's Artillery,
had about 15 miles to travel, but Fitz Lee and Hamp
ton kept the road open and held back the cavalry dur
ing the night in front of Spotsylvania and at Corbin's
Bridge, by blockading the narrow avenues of approach
through the forest with felled timber. Alexander moved
during the night by way of the Shady Grove Road and
Corbin's Bridge, rejoining the infantry about daylight
near the Po River, where the 1st Corps rested and pre
pared breakfast. Already the efforts of the Federals to
brush the cavalry from their front could be heard in the
heavy firing to the left. Grant and Meade, as was their
THE LONG ARM or LEE 777
entire army, were sure the race had been won by them,
and heavy attacks were being made by Wilson's
Cavalry, on Rosser at the Courthouse, and by War
ren's Corps on Fitz Lee at the Spindler farm on the
Brock Road. Reaching the Brock House at 7 A. M.,
Anderson sent Kennedy's and Humphreys' brigades,
with two batteries of Haskell's Battalion, to the assist
ance of Fitz Lee about a mile away, and Wofford's
and Bryan's brigades with the rest of the Artillery to
Rosser half a mile further to the front. Haskell's two
batteries at once became involved in a desperate con
flict, in which Capt. Potts was mortally wounded.
After two hours they exhausted their ammunition, but
not until they had rendered most effective service in re
pulsing a charge of three of Warren's brigades. Field's
Division now came up to the support of Kershaw's two
brigades, and extended his line to the left. Five batter
ies of Huger's Battalion were then posted by Alexander
on a ridge in the edge of the pine thicket on the Todd's
Tavern Road, where the cavalry had made its stand,
and Cabell's Battalion was held in reserve. Fitz Lee
when thus relieved joined Rosser at the Courthouse
and together they compelled Wilson to retire before
them. This enabled Wofford and Bryan to rejoin Ker-
shaw.
After Robinson's repulse, Griffin's Division rendered
two assaults, the first suffering a complete repulse, the
second enabling the Federals to establish themselves
under cover about 400 yards to the right front of the
Confederate line, where they began to intrench. Craw
ford's Division next came up and extended Griffin's
line to the left, and then Cutler's Division attacked the
Confederate left without success, and prolonged
Griffin's line of intrenchments to the right. During the
latter's attack, all five of Cabell's batteries under Maj.
Hamilton were brought into action. Meantime
Haskell's two batteries, which had suffered severely on
the Todd's Tavern Road under a reverse fire from a
horse battery near the Courthouse, were withdrawn.
778 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Anderson had won his race and Warren's whole
corps had been halted over a mile short of its goal by
two small Confederate divisions, and the bold use of
the artillery, which in places had been brought into
action within 400 yards of the enemy, and not over 100
yards from their skirmishers. Instead of being in posi
tion waiting for Lee at Spotsylvania Courthouse, the
advance of Meade's Army was completely cut off from
it and the direct routes thereto.
Both Lee and Meade now began to hurry forward
their troops. Ewell had left the Wilderness at dawn
and arrived in position on Anderson's right just in time
to assist in severely repulsing the combined attack
about 5:30 p. M., of Warren's and Sedgwick's corps
upon Anderson's line. In this affair nearly every gun
of Alexander's command was actually engaged, but only
a few of Long's that were in position in front of the
Courthouse took part, the bulk of the 2d Corps Ar
tillery arriving later and going into park near the Court
house for the night. The 3d Corps, under Early, which
had been left behind as a rear guard, did not leave its
old position until late on the 8th, bivouacking for the
night near Shady Grove. During the day a single
section of Mclntosh's Battalion was engaged with the
enemy's cavalry, which pressed upon the flanks of the
3d Corps as it advanced.
Upon arriving at Spotsylvania, early on the 9th, the
3d Corps, with the exception of Mahone's Division, ex
tended Swell's line of intrenchments to the right, while
Mahone moved to a commanding position on Ander
son's left, overlooking the Po. The Confederates had
now established a line covering Spotsylvania Court
house, with the 1st Corps on the left resting across the
Po River, the 2d Corps in the center north of the Court
house, and the 3d on the right crossing the Fredericks-
burg Road. While the brigades and divisions were fre
quently shifted, these positions were generally main
tained during the battles that ensued.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 779
During the 9th, while no attack was made by either
side, an incessant sharpshooting was kept up, resulting
in many losses to both sides, including the gallant Gen.
Sedgwick, who was killed on the Brock Road. The day
was largely devoted to the strengthening of old and the
construction of new breastworks. The Confederate bat
teries were extended along the entire front of the line,
and most of the guns placed in pits or behind slight
epaulments. Cabell's Battalion occupied an elevation
in rear of and slightly above Anderson's left, with four
guns under Maj. Gibbes on the extreme left of the
infantry line. On Cabell's right and in the second line
were posted Haskell's Battalion, and Woolfolk's Bat
tery. Huger's remaining five batteries were placed in
the infantry line. Beyond them and also with the
infantry, Page's and Braxton's battalions were in posi
tion with the 2d Corps. The field of fire for the guns
at this point, as at the Wilderness, was very limited and
the terrain afforded little opportunity for the effective
use of artillery. Further to the right and on the left
of the Courthouse clearing, Long posted Hardaway's
and Nelson's battalions, while Cutshaw's was held in re
serve on the road behind them. In the 3d Corps,
Walker, upon arriving, dispatched Mclntosh's Bat
talion to the extreme left, where it went into position
behind Mahone at a point where the Shady Grove Road
crosses the Po River. Poague's Battalion occupied the
infantry works on the left of the 3d Corps line, Pe-
gram's the line where it crossed the Fredericksburg
Road several hundred yards from the Courthouse,
and Cutts' a position on the extreme right in advance
of the road to Massaponax Church. Richardson's
Battalion was held in reserve behind the center. Thus
it is seen that nearly every gun in Lee's Army was in
position either in the advanced line, or in works close be
hind. The nature of the terrain absolutely forbade the
effective massing of guns for the more effective com
mand of a given field of fire. The situation demanded,
if artillery were to be employed at all, that it should
780 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
fight with the infantry, and simply endeavor to sweep
the field in its immediate front, and thus supplement
the musketry fire. Truly the Artillery was to fight as
infantry at Spotsylvania. There was to be no such
thing as artillery tactics there. It was simply a question
of how much it could increase the intensity of the fire of
the defense. No question of the time and the manner
in which that fire was to be delivered was open to dis
cussion, for tactics were ruled out in favor of the knock-
down-and-drag-out method, which the topography im
posed upon the Artillery. Never in all the war was the
Confederate Artillery called upon to serve in such a
manner as in the days of Spotsylvania.
The principal activity of the enemy on the 9th was
in front of the Confederate left and center, but the Ar
tillery fired only a few rounds and those principally at
the enemy's sharpshooters whenever they were seen to
gather in sufficient numbers to afford a reasonable tar
get.
Hancock crossed his three divisions over the Po on
the afternoon of the 9th and occupied the Shady Grove
Road, thus threatening the Confederate rear and en
dangering the trains which were parked on the road
leading by the old Courthouse to Louisa Courthouse.
Lee's main line was north of the Po, with its left,
Field's Division of the 1st Corps, resting on the stream
at a point just above the crossing of the Shady Grove
Road. Mahone, as we have seen, had been posted with
Mclntosh's Battalion on the other side of the stream
to protect the flank. Lee ordered Early on the morning
of the 10th to move around Mahone's left and strike
Hancock's right. Taking Heth's Division, Richard
son's Battalion and Ellett's Battery of Pegram's Bat
talion, Early moved to the rear and then followed the
Louisa Courthouse Road across the Po until he
reached a road coming in from Waite's Shop on the
Shady Grove Road. Moving about a mile along this
road, he met Hampton's Cavalry falling back before
Hancock, who had pushed out a column of infantry
THE LONG ARM or LEE 781
somewhat to the rear of the Confederate line. After
driving the Federal advance back to the Shady Grove
Road, Early reached Waite's Shop, from which point
Heth attacked in earnest, but he was twice repulsed in
his effort to gain the ridge upon which only two of Bar
low's brigades were posted with artillery, for Hancock
had already withdrawn his other divisions. In this at
tack, Richardson's Battalion came under a heavy artil
lery fire, and was suffering severely, when Pendleton
caused Cabell's Battalion, from its elevated position be
hind Anderson's left, to concentrate upon the enemy's
guns. The effect was instant and Richardson was re
lieved from a nasty situation. A fire now broke out in
the woods, and although Barlow had not been driven
from his ridge by Early, Meade ordered him to with
draw to the north side of the stream. Mahone's Divi
sion now crossed from the east bank, as the road was
clear, with several of Macintosh's batteries, and inflicted
some loss upon the retiring Federals, who were com
pelled to abandon a gun which had been wedged between
two trees by its affrighted team. Night was now ap
proaching, and as the enemy was found with artillery
well intrenched on the north bank, Early refrained
from further attempts and soon Heth returned to the
right, leaving Mahone in possession of the position on
the Shady Grove Road, from which Barlow had been
driven. To this point, all of Macintosh's guns were
brought up during the night and intrenched.
During the fighting on the extreme left, Meade had
made a tremendous effort to break Lee's line. First a
demonstration was made against the right immediately
in front of Spotsylvania Courthouse, but the attack
ing infantry was roughly handled and driven back to
their trenches by Cutts' and Pegram's battalions. The
main attack was directed against Field's Division on the
left, and meeting with a bloody repulse was renewed at
3 P. M. with the same result. In these affairs Cabell,
Huger, and Haskell were all heavily engaged. Alex
ander had posted their guns in such a way that they
782 THE LONG AKM or LEE
partially enfiladed the approaches to the infantry line,
and as Warren's troops advanced through the dense
thickets in Anderson's front, the woods were riddled
with canister, which effectually broke the enemy's forma
tion. As the Federals emerged in bad order, unable
to reform under the Confederate musketry fire, but
few of them were able to press home, and these were
cared for by the infantry, many of the men of which
were double armed with the muskets previously aban
doned in front of the works by the enemy earlier in the
day. The intensity of the Confederate musketry fire,
thus increased, was unusual. A lull of several hours
now ensued. About 7 P. M. Hancock made the third
assault on Anderson's line with Birney's and Gibbon's
divisions supported by the 5th Corps. Near sunset,
Anderson's skirmishers were suddenly swept back, and
almost without warning the successive lines of the
enemy were soon seen surging forward at the trot.
Rushing forward, the front line dissolved, but on came
the determined supports, driving the Confederates from
their works, but failing to break their resistance. The
line of the defenders was nearly bent back by the pres
sure and the fight continued in the rear of the breast
works until Anderson's Brigade, which had cleared its
front, was able to turn upon the flank of the assailants
and drive them over and beyond the works which they
had so gallantly taken.
As to the character of the work the Artillery per
formed in these attacks, a vivid description of the fore
going affair by the adjutant of Cabell's Battalion is
here inserted:*
"The troops supporting the two Napoleon guns of the Howitzers
(1st company) were, as I remember,, the Seventh (or Eighth)
Georgia and the First Texas. Toward the close of the day,
everything seemed to have quieted down, in a sort of implied truce.
There was absolutely no fire,, either of musketry or cannon. Our
weary, hungry infantry stacked arms and were cooking their mean
and meager little rations. Some one rose up and looking over the
works — it was shading down a little toward the dark — cried out:
*Four Years under Marse Robert, Stiles, p. 254.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 783
'Hello! what's this? Why, here come our men on the run, from —
no, by Heavens! it's the Yankees!' And before any one could
realize the situation or even start towards the stacked muskets, the
Federal column broke over the little works, between our troops and
their arms, bayoneted or shot two or three who were asleep, before
they could awake, and dashed upon the men who were at their
low fires, — with cooking utensils instead of weapons in their hands.
Of course they ran. What else could they do?
"The Howitzers — only the left, or Napoleon section was there —
sprang to their guns, swinging them around to bear inside our
lines, double shotted them with canister, and fairly spouted it into
the Federals, whose formation had been broken in the rush and
plunge over the works, and who seemed to be somewhat massed
and huddled and hesitating, but only a few rods away. Quicker
almost than I can tell it, our infantry supports, than whom there
were not two better regiments in the army, had rallied and gotten
to their arms, and then they opened out into a V shape and fairly
tore the head of the Federal columns to pieces. In an incredibly
short time those who were able to do so turned to fly and our
infantry were following them over the intrenchments ; but it is
doubtful whether this would have been the result had it not been
for the prompt and gallant action of the artillery.
"There was an old Capt. Hunter, — it seems difficult to determine
whether of the Texas or the Georgia Regiment, — who had the
handle of his frying-pan in his hand, holding the pan over the coals,
with his little slice of meat sizzling in it, when the enemy broke
over. He had his back to them, and the first thing he knew his
men were scampering past him like frightened sheep. He had not
been accustomed to that style of movement among them, and he
sprang up and tore after them, showering them with hot grease and
hotter profanity, but never letting go his pan. On the contrary,
he slapped right and left with his sooty, burning bottom, dis
tributing his favors impartially on Federal and Confederate alike —
several of his own men bearing the black and ugly brand on their
cheeks for a long time after, and occasionally having to bear also
the captain's curses for having made him lose his meat that evening.
He actually led the counter-charge, leaping the works, wielding and
waving his frying-pan, at once a sword and a banner."
Now exactly how accurate this interesting account
is, the writer cannot pretend to say, but it is valuable
as is the following incident from the same pen:
"There were two men in the First Howitzers older than most
of us, of exceptionally high character and courage, who, because
of the deafness of the one, and the lack of certain physical
flexibility and adaptation in the other, were not well fitted for
19
784 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
regular places in the detachment, or service about the gun. For a
time,, one or both of them took the position of driver, but this
scarcely seemed fitting, and one or both were finally classed as
'supernumeraries/ but with special duties under the surgeon of the
battalion, as bearers of our camping litters and our other simple
medical and surgical outfit. For this and other reasons the elder
of these two good and gritty soldiers was always called 'Doctor.'
"When the break occurred these two men, always at the front,
were overwhelmed with amazement, not so much at the irruption of
the enemy, as at what seemed to be the demoralized route of the
Georgians and Texans. They ran in among them asking explana
tion of their conduct, then appealing to them and exhorting them,
the Doctor in most courteous and lofty phrase: 'Gentlemen, what
does this mean? You certainly are not flying before the enemy!
Turn, for God's sake; turn, and drive them out!' Then with
indignant outburst: 'Halt, you infernal cowards!' and suiting the
action to the words, these choleric cannoneers tore the carrying
poles out of their litters, and sprang among and in front of the
fugitives, belaboring them right and left, till they turned, and
then turned with them, following up the retreating enemy with their
wooden spears.
"Some weeks later, after we had reached Petersburg in the
nick of time to keep Burnside out of the town, and had taken up
what promised to be a permanent position and were just dozing off
into our first nap in forty-eight hours, an infantry command passing
by, in the darkness, stumbled over the trail handspikes of our
guns, and broke out in the usual style: 'Oh, of course! Here's
that infernal artillery again ; always in the way, blocking the roads
by day and tripping us up at night. What battery is this anyway?'
Some fellow, not yet clean gone in slumber, grunted out: 'First
Company Richmond Howitzers.' What a change! Instantly there
was a perfect chorus of greetings from the warm-hearted Texans.
'Boys, here are the Howitzers! Where's your old deaf man?
Trot out your old Doctor. They're the jockeys for us. We are
going to stay right here. We won't get a chance to run if these
plucky Howitzer boys are with us.' "*
Clearly Meade could not break Anderson's line. But
he met with better success in the center, where he had
massed about 40,000 of his men against Ewell's line.
With the eye of an engineer, he had detected the weak
point, where a long salient jutted out in advance of the
*The Richmond Howitzers had a splendid reputation throughout the Army.
The personnel was unusual. Stiles and others tell us that it included many
professional and college men, and that one of the privates actually kept a
diary throughout the war in Greek. There was a law club in the battery, a
trained Glee Club, and orations were frequently delivered in Latin at the gather
ings of the men, as well as Greek odes.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 785
general line, and in front of which there was a most
limited field of fire. He saw that an overwhelming
force massed near the enemy's line could by sheer weight
break it at that point. In the hasty extension of the
Confederate line on the 8th, Ewell, to keep on high
ground, had occupied with his left and center an ele
vation running nearly a mile in advance of Anderson's
line, then bending back so abruptly that the gorge of
the immense salient was but three-fourths of a mile
wide. The forward angle of this salient was occupied
by Doles' Brigade, of Rodes' Division, and Smith's
Howitzer Battery of Hardaway's Battalion. It has
since the events of the 10th been known as the "Bloody
Angle."
From the first, Meade had been reconnoitering and
feeling Swell's weak point. The Confederates behind
the works had thrown up traverses on both sides of the
salient at close intervals to protect themselves against
the enfilade fire of the Federal skirmishers, and other
than this no effort had been made to correct the evils of
the position. On the morning of the 10th, Long had
relieved Braxton's and Page's battalions, substituting
Nelson's and Hardaway's battalions for them. Nelson
now occupied Johnson's and Hardaway Rodes' front.
At 5 p. M. Col. Emory Upton silently led twelve regi
ments with fixed bayonets and loaded muskets through
the thicket in Doles' front, after carefully explaining
the part each was to play. Upon reaching the works,
half the leading column of attack was to sweep to the
right and half to the left down the faces of the salient,
while a second line was to remain in position at the angle
and open fire to the front.
Upton's men succeeded in rushing the works at the
angle, and after a desperate hand-to-hand encounter,
swept the Confederates from behind their traverses;
many combatants on both sides were killed and
wounded. But as the Federals swept through the gap
thus made, Daniels' Brigade on one side, and Steuart's
on the other drew back from their lines and fell upon
786 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
the flanks of the enemy, while Battle's and Johnson's
brigades were hurried up from the left and thrown
across the gorge. Mott's Division was to have sup
ported Upton on the left, but upon forming for the
advance, found itself the target of Hardaway's and
Nelson's batteries on Swell's right, and were compelled
to abandon the task assigned it. In fact, Mott's bri
gades were broken by the Confederate Artillery, and
driven back in confusion to the cover of their works at
the base of the hill in Ewell's front. Assailed on three
sides at once and unsupported, Upton's men were first
forced back into the angle, in turn seeking cover behind
the traverses, and then over the works, retiring in dis
order to their own lines, after a loss of 1,000 men, or 20
per cent of the number engaged in the assault, while
Ewell lost 650 men, 350 of whom were captured.
In the melee following upon the irruption of the
Federals into Ewell's works, Smith's Richmond
Howitzer Battery at the angle was seized by the enemy,
but later recovered, the battery commander maintaining
his fire until he with a number of his cannoneers was
actually snatched from among the guns by the as
sailants. In the subsequent repulse of the Federals,
Hardaway's remaining batteries were alone engaged.
Thrown into position on the right of the salient, these
four batteries had relentlessly poured canister into
Upton's huddled troops and pursued them with their
fire until they left the works. Two of Cutshaw's bat
teries which had been held in reserve near the Court
house were rushed to the gorge, but were too late to
assist in the repulse. As the Federals withdrew, some
of the men of Garber's Battery of Cutshaw's Battalion,
under their captain, entered the works and turned two
of Smith's guns, for which no cannoneers remained,
upon the fleeing masses. Both Lieut-Col. Hardaway,
and his field-officer, Ma j . David Watson, were wounded,
the former slightly, the latter mortally, but in spite of
a painful wound, Hardaway with his clothes riddled
with bullets remained at his post and directed the fire of
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 787
his batteries. The loss of Maj. David Watson was a
serious one. In the words of the Chief of Artillery,
this veteran artilleryman who had served from the very
first of the war as a lieutenant at Yorktown with Ma-
gruder, then as captain of the 2d Company of Richmond
Howitzers until his recent promotion, was "an accom
plished gentleman, a faithful, patriot, and gallant
soldier."*
Grant attributed the failure of Upton's attempt of
the 10th to Mott's inability to advance, and on the llth
planned a much more powerful attack to be made by
the whole of the 2d and 9th Corps. The angle was
again selected for the focus of the assault.
A much exaggerated report of Federal activity on
the Confederate left led Lee to believe that Meade
would attempt to move in that direction during the
night, so the chiefs of artillery were ordered to with
draw all their guns from the front line, in order that
the Confederates might move under cover of darkness
without being heard. Mahone's Division on the ex
treme left was ordered to march during the night and
occupy Shady Grove before daylight. Gen. Long had
in the morning placed Cutshaw's and Page's battalions
in position along Johnson's front, the weakest part' of
Ewell's line, relieving some of Hardaway's batteries.
Late in the afternoon the orders came to him to have
"all of his batteries which were difficult of access" pre
pared to be removed before dark and was informed that
the projected movement required him to be ready to
take up the march at a minute's notice. He immediately
ordered all the artillery on Johnson's front, except two
of Cutshaw's batteries, to be withdrawn, as it had to pass
through a wood by a narrow and difficult road, and
the night bid fair to be very dark. Alexander showed
more foresight on this occasion than Long, for he
ventured to accomplish the intent of the order without
*For full and accurate account of his life and military career, see The
University Memorial, p. 570. He was the devoted friend and companion of Col.
Brown, who fell but four days before him. The sad coincidence of their deaths
and the similar features of their characters and careers lead us to paraphrase
what Tacitus wrote of Agricola, "Similes non mice tantum claritate, sed etiam
opportunitate mortis."
788 THE LONG ARM or LEE
literal compliance with it. Thus while Long withdrew
twenty-two guns of Page's and Cutshaw's battalions
from the salient, Alexander visited every one of his
batteries in person, had their ammunition chests placed
on the limbers (they were usually dismounted and
placed beside the guns in the pits), and the carriages
so placed and the roads leading from the works so
marked and prepared that they could easily withdraw
without making the slightest noise. All of Longstreet's
guns, therefore, remained in position.
About 3 A. M., Lee discovered that Meade was mass
ing for an assault upon Ewell instead of withdrawing
from his lines, and the orders to the Artillery were at
once countermanded. But already Swell's line, which
had been caused to conform to the terrain for the sole
purpose of affording the Artillery good positions, was
practically stripped of its guns and now remained a
dangerously weak projection, with a very poor field
for musketry fire. Naturally defective, yet with ar
tillery so posted as to sweep its faces, many of the ob
jections to the salient line had been overcome. Now
the line was totally lacking in defensive qualities, with
the exception that a hasty line of intrenchment had been
partially completed across the gorge.
All night Meade was engaged in massing Barlow's,
Birney's, Mott's, and Gibbon's divisions in front of
Johnson. The charge was ordered for 4 A. M., but owing
to a fog Hancock, who was to direct the attack, delayed
until 4 :35. The distance to the Confederate works was
about 1,200 yards. The Federal masses were very com
pactly arranged, too much so for freedom of action over
the ground to be traversed. Moving off quietly and
slowly, it was not until the Confederate pickets gave
the alarm that the Federals broke into a run and com
menced to cheer.
Johnson's men had heard the enemy's column form
ing, and repeated calls had been sent for the Artillery.
Long had already received orders to return the guns to
the works, and Cutshaw and Page were hastening back
by separate routes.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 789
The Federals came on, to use Gen. Johnson's words,
"in great disorder, with a narrow front, but extending
back as far as I could see." But there was hardly a gun
to fire upon the seething, confused mass of Federals.
Truly a great opportunity had been sacrificed, for it is
dreadful to contemplate what the effect of Long's
twenty-two guns would have been had they opened
a concentrated fire on the Federal column. It is not
difficult to picture the result, however, for that dense,
overcrowded column would never have reached the
Confederate works. What an opportunity was this
for the artillery! Never since Pope uncovered Porter's
flank at Second Manassas to Reilly's guns had the
breast of the Federal Infantry been so bared. "No
where else in the whole history of the war was such a
target presented to so large a force of artillery. Ranks
had already been lost in the crowd, and officers could
neither show example nor exercise authority. A few
discharges would have made of it a mob, which could
not have been rallied. There was a thick abattis of
felled trees in front, and 'chevaux de frise,' which, Bar
low says, 'would have been difficult to get through under
a cool fire.' For the mob, which his division would have
soon formed, there would have been no escape but
flight, with phenomenal loss for the time exposed to
fire.'*
"Had the Artillery been in position the result might
have been different, or had the weather been favorable,
the disaster might have been avoided; but the morning
was so dark and foggy that it was with difficulty that
we could distinguish friend from foe." These are the
comments and explanations of Gen. Long, himself, but
his guns were not there and he had lost his great chance.
And here it may be said that nothing so well illustrates
the difference between Alexander and Long as the man
ner in which they both complied with their orders on
this occasion. We sometimes hear that great soldiers
have often been the product of opportunity. But this
is not generally true. The casual observer fails to de-
*Military Memoirs of a, Confederate, Alexander, p. 520.
790 THE LONG AKM or LEE
tect the fact that it is preparedness to profit by oppor
tunity, and not merely the favor of fortune that enables
soldiers to win great reputations. Take for instance the
case just considered. Alexander sized up the situation
at a glance, and stood prepared to grasp what he foresaw
as a great opportunity, should it be presented to him.
Long failed utterly to realize what might be in store for
him, and neglecting to prearrange therefor, the great
est opportunity of his military career passed him by.
True he obeyed his orders and cannot be censured. The
point made is not one of blame, nor does opportunity
weigh orders.
The two leading guns of Page's Battalion only ar
rived in time to unlimber and fire three rounds between
them into the Federal masses before they were sur
rounded and seized. Twelve of Page's, and eight of Cut-
shaw's guns were then captured along with two-thirds
of Johnson's Division, including the division com
mander and Brig.-Gen. Steuart. Only the two rearmost
guns of Montgomery's Louisa Battery of Page's Bat
talion escaped.
The Confederate Infantry in the salient, deprived of
their artillery, had done all it could to check the onward
rush of the Federals. The whole thing happened so
quickly that neither Hancock nor Ewell at first realized
the extent of the disaster to the Confederates. After
their first success, the disordered Federals paused in the
advance to reform; as the fugitives from the salient
streamed to the rear, they met reinforcements from
the brigades of Johnston and Gordon on the right, and
from those of Daniel and Ramseur on the left, who
promptly checked the disorganized pursuers. The situa
tion was indeed a critical one for the Confederates, and
Gordon's (Early's) Division had only arrived in the
nick of time to establish the new line. Again Gen. Lee
had placed himself at the head of his troops to lead them
forward, and again the men had insisted on his retiring
before they charged the enemy and pressed them back
to the head of the salient.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 791
Upon learning that Hancock's advance was being
checked, Grant ordered eight brigades of the 6th Corps
to reinforce him, and about 8 A. M. these additional
troops increased the confusion and crowding in the
limited space within the salient. Burnside had also been
ordered to assault the Confederate lines and about 5
A. M. fell upon A. P. Hill on the right. On Hill's left
center, Burnside met with no success whatever, Nel
son's, Poague's, and Pegram's battalions simply tearing
the dense attacking columns to pieces as they appeared
in the open, but on the extreme right Potter's Division
swept Lane's Brigade from its trenches and seized two
guns of Cutts' Battalion. But Lane reformed his men
some distance to the rear and recovered both his works
and the guns, driving Potter off. Failing in his attack,
Burnside was then ordered to move to his right and con
nect with Hancock's line, which he did by 9:15 A. M.
Meanwhile both sides had moved up artillery to bear
on the salient space, across the gorge of which the Con
federates had formed behind the uncompleted breast
works. About this time a most gallant act occurred.
Unable to draw off two guns of the Staunton Battery,
which they had seized, the Federals had left them be
tween the lines. Cutshaw and Garber, the latter the
battery commander, now saw these guns standing idle
in the lead-swept space. Not a moment did they hesi
tate, but, followed by those men of the battery who had
escaped capture, rushed to the pieces, turned them upon
the enemy and maintained their fire until the Federal
line again swept forward. There between the strug
gling lines they plied the guns with many thousand eyes
upon them, and not a cannoneer faltered at his post.
But if this exploit was superb what of that of the gallant
Capt. Charles R. Montgomery, who had saved two of
his pieces when the other guns of Page's Battalion were
captured? Appreciating the seriousness of the situation
he had moved without a word of direction one of his
guns with great labor down a small ravine on the right
of the Harris house to a point within two hundred yards
792 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
of the enemy, and from that position maintained his fire
against all odds until three full caissons had been ex
hausted.
The conspicuous gallantry of Cutshaw, Garber, and
Montgomery on this occasion won the plaudits of two
armies, but alone they could not resist the increasing
pressure on their front. Braxton's, Nelson's, and a
part of Hardaway's Battalion had been promptly
posted by Col. Carter under the direction of Gen. Long
on a second line in rear of them at the gorge, and to the
left of the Courthouse. From this group, therefore,
Capt. Dance with Hardaway's batteries now moved
forward to the gorge, but by noon Long was compelled
to call for artillery reinforcements from the other
corps. Accordingly Col. Cabell with the 1st Com
pany of Richmond Howitzers was ordered to Ewell's
line from the left and went into action at the left base
of the salient just to the left of Dance's batteries while
Mclntosh, with two batteries, also arrived, going into
position at the Harris house, and posting two guns
above the McCool house.
A tremendous infantry combat had been raging
for some time before the artillery reinforcements ar
rived. Lee had brought up Perrin's, Harris' and Mc-
Gowan's brigades from his left, and Grant had as
sembled twenty-four brigades in and about the angle
of the salient. He had also posted field batteries to rake
its faces, while eight 24-pounder Coehorn mortars from
the reserve were placed so as to drop shells behind the
work at the gorge and behind the traverses along the
western face. Before 10 o'clock, Gen. Lee had brought
up every man and gun to the salient that could be spared
for the defense of his broken center. From then on, it
was but a question of endurance, for all day long the
struggle continued, neither side being able to make a
successful advance. During the day diversions were
made on both sides in favor of the center, the most
serious fighting being that between Warren and Ander
son west of the salient.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 793
At dawn, Warren had opened all his guns and sent
forward skirmishers to prevent Anderson from detach
ing troops to Swell's support. Alexander's guns, all
in position, replied slowly to those of Warren, their
presence seeming to deter him in his attack. Finally, at
9:15 A. M.^ Grant ordered him to attack at once, and
about 10 A. M. his men appeared in the open. By com
mon consent, Anderson's Infantry and the Artillery
in the trenches both held their fire until the Federal lines
were within 100 yards, then opened, while the guns
which Alexander held in his second line engaged the
enemy's batteries and diverted their fire from the works.
No sooner did the blizzard of Confederate fire burst
upon them than Warren's men turned and fled in such
utter consternation that it would seem two of his divi
sions lost their bearings in retiring, and engaged in a
fire fight with each other for some time, in which both
lost heavily, while the amazed Confederates merely
listened as at Chancellorsville during Sickles' attack.
The havoc worked with Warren's assaulting columns,
not half so dense as those of Hancock, gives some indi
cation of what would have happened to the latter had
Long's Artillery, like Alexander's, been in position.
Soon after Warren's failure, his corps, with the ex
ception of four brigades, was transferred to the angle,
adding eight more brigades to the twenty-four already
massed there for a fresh attack, but Grant abandoned
his determination when it was discovered that Lee had
greatly strengthened the gorge line and brought many
batteries to bear on the space in front, in addition to hav
ing reinforced his infantry. The Federals for the rest
of the day simply contented themselves by keeping up a
heavy infantry and artillery fire to which the Confeder
ate Infantry replied, while the Artillery maintained
only a desultory fire in order to save ammunition.
When night fell, Grant had lost in his great assault,
6,820 men; Lee 9,000, of which 4,000 were prisoners,
and twenty guns. Hancock's attack had failed by rea
son of the excessive number of men required to maneu-
794 THE LONG ARM or LEE
ver over so limited a space, and nothing of importance
had been accomplished but the compelling of Lee to
correct a faulty line, and a certain advance in the relent
less process of attrition, which comprised the major
part of the Federal strategy.
During the night, the remnant of Swell's Corps
abandoned the faces of the salient, the rear portions of
which it held throughout the day, and established itself
behind and improved the works at the gorge. Before
morning, Long's Artillery, with the batteries sent to its
assistance, was well intrenched in strong positions, com
pletely dominating the space within the abandoned faces
of the salient. The 13th, therefore, proved a day of rest
since Grant wisely gave up his efforts to break Lee's
new line. In fact, his troops themselves rendered the
verdict, for while as brave as any that ever lived, they
were after all human, and conscious of the futility of
further assaults.
On this day, Maj. Cutshaw was assigned to the com
mand of Hardaway's Battalion, Hardaway having at
last been compelled by his wounds to relinquish active
command. The remnants of Cutshaw's and Page's bat
talions were united under Maj. Page.
The losses in the 2d Corps Artillery had been un
usually heavy, but in the other corps little damage had
been received. First Lieut. Dent Burroughs, command
ing Moody's Battery, Huger's Battalion, had been
killed by a shot which penetrated the works. He was
said by Alexander to have been a superb young officer.
Several of the 1st Corps guns in the infantry trenches
had been struck and disabled in the repulse of Warren's
assault.
While the Light Artillery was engaged at Spotsyl-
vania, the Horse Artillery was winning laurels on
other fields. Pelham's and Breathed's old battery,
now under Capt. P. P. Johnston, had again dis
tinguished itself while operating with Fitz Lee on the
8th. On that occasion, the battery was near the Court
house, and well to the front of a portion of Anderson's
THE LONG ARM or LEE 795
Corps. A strong line of the enemy suddenly advanced
against Johnston's unsupported guns, which he held in
position, firing rapidly, while the led horses and dis
mounted men were retired. The Federals were so
numerous that four guns were unequal to the task of
holding them back, and on they pressed, bent on seizing
the battery. Maj. Breathed, who was present, finally
ordered Johnston to retire his left section, leaving the
other with him to cover the withdrawal, but the captain
declined to leave any of his guns while in action, and
undertook to withdraw them piece by piece. When the
enemy had begun to cry for their surrender, and while
he was preparing to move off the last piece, Johnston
was shot through the shoulder, and before the gun could
be limbered the drivers and horses of the lead and swing
teams were struck down, and the arm of the driver of the
wheel team was shattered. As if unconscious of the
presence of the enemy, Maj. Breathed sprang from his
horse, cut loose the disabled teams that were struggling
on the ground, mounted a wheel horse, and brought off
the gun almost as if by a miracle, while the surging
enemy mingled their cheers with those of Anderson's
men, who now crossed the crest in rear of the battery,
and stopped the pursuit. Breathed, Breathed, what a
name is thine! How justly are thy praises sung by com
rades and the erstwhile foe alike. It was you of whom
Wade Hampton wrote, "A braver and more gallant sol
dier never lived" ; whom Fitz Lee characterized as "one
of the bravest and best soldiers the Confederacy pro
duced" ; of whom Wickman said, "Capt. Breathed is the
best man for the management of a battery of horse ar
tillery that I have ever known" ; whom Rosser declared
to be "one of the most noted officers in the Confederacy
for fighting qualities," and whom Munford claimed to
be "as brave an officer and as hard a fighter as appeared
in the war." Of him Fitzhugh Lee, years after the war,
also wrote, "Should I, for any reason, go to the field
again, and get in the saddle once more, no one would I
rather have by my side, were he living, than the gallant
796 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Breathed." Stuart's opinion of Breathed is amply testi
fied to by the following letter from him to Lee concern
ing him: "I will never consent for Capt. Breathed to
quit the Horse Artillery, with which he has rendered
such distinguished service, except for certain promotion,
which he has well earned."
But, see what the Commander-in-Chief, himself*
is said to have written of this young officer — "With an
army of Breathed' s, I could have conquered the world."
During the 8th, Sheridan concentrated his cavalry
in rear of the Federal Army, and moved to the vicinity
of Fredericksburg. On the morning of the 9th, with
about 12,000 troops and a large body of horse artillery,
he struck the Telegraph Road, via Hamilton's Crossing,
and advanced upon Richmond. At Mitchell's Station,
he was resisted by Wickham, who was then reinforced by
Stuart with Fitz Lee's and Gordon's brigades, John
ston's, Griffin's, and a section of Hart's batteries. Again
the Confederate Cavalry sought to check Sheridan's
column at Beaver Dam, but failed. After resting his
exhausted men for a few hours, Stuart moved rapidly
to Yellow Tavern, which he reached at 10 A. M., on the
10th, in advance of Sheridan, and there posted Wick-
ham on his right and Lomax on the left. The latter's
line followed the Telegraph Road a short distance, then
crossed it to a hill on which Breathed had placed a single
piece of Hart's Battery, a section of which also oc
cupied the road, while Johnston's Battery was posted
on an elevation in rear of the line.
About 4 P. M., the enemy suddenly attacked, captur
ing most of the men and horses of Griffin's Battery on
the left, but no guns, and driving back Lomax's line.
Stuart assembled a handful of men on the road where
Hart with two guns remained undaunted, firing into
the flank of the enemy as they swept by. The Federals
were soon checked by a charge of the 1st Virginia
Cavalry and driven past the guns, which continued to
fire upon the surging masses. As the enemy's line re
tired, a dismounted trooper turned as he passed and dis-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 797
charged his pistol at Stuart. Thus was the fatal wound
inflicted upon the great cavalry leader while he stood
mounted among his guns, seeking by his example to
rally his cavalry. He died two days later in Richmond.
The Confederate Cavalry was now badly broken
up, and Hart almost alone remained between the fallen
chieftain and the enemy. On this occasion, Hart's con
duct was as heroic as Poague's had been at the Wilder
ness. The result of the battle is known. The Confed
erate Cavalry certainly met with defeat, but Sheridan
had been delayed and failed to enter Richmond. We
search in vain, however, for reference to the leading
part which the Horse Artillery took in this delaying
action, notwithstanding the fact that it bore the brunt
of the Federal attack, saved the Cavalry from a com
plete rout, and remained alone in action long enough
for the bulk of the Cavalry to rally and retire in order.
One cavalry regiment, the 1st Virginia, kept its organi
zation and supported the batteries after the enemy was
checked.
Meanwhile, Shoemaker's Battery remained with
W. H. F. Lee, near the Army, while Thomson's and
McGregor's under Chew were operating with Hampton
and Rosser on the left.
No account of the Artillery at Spotsylvania would be
complete without a brief mention, at least, of Maj.
Joseph McGraw of Pegram's Battalion.
This remarkable soldier had been discovered by Pe-
gram, who rapidly caused his advancement from a team
ster, through the lower grades. He was a man of
enormous stature and unusual ability, possessing those
rare qualities which distinguish the born commander.
His courage was proverbial; the character of the man
is well illustrated by the following anecdotes related to
the writer by Capt. W. Gordon McCabe, Adjutant of
Pegram's Battalion.
While sitting on his horse at Spotsylvania a solid shot
tore Maj. McGraw's left arm from his body, leaving
only a stump in the shoulder socket. For an instant
798 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
his officers and men hesitated in their work to proffer
aid to their much beloved field-officer. "Don't mind
me, men," he cried, "I'm all right — give it to 'em," and
with such words on his lips he fell forward from the
saddle without a cry of pain.
Upon regaining consciousness, McGraw refused
to receive the usual anaesthetic, and exercising the
prerogative of his authority as senior officer to the
surgeon in attendance, commanded the latter to remove
the shattered remains of his arm, which was done with
out eliciting a groan from the patient or a blink from his
marvelous blue eyes.
One of his officers undertook to commiserate with
the Major over his wound. "Pretty bad," replied Mc
Graw, "I reckon I'll be off duty thirty days."
Sometime after McGraw's wounding, Col. Pegram
and his adjutant, who like Damon and Pythias were in
separable, were sitting in their tents in the lines at
Petersburg. Orders had been given that no one should
approach the lines mounted, as the danger from Fed
eral sharpshooters was very great. The hoof falls of a
horse were heard approaching, and running to the tent
door to see who the reckless equestrian might be Col.
Pegram was confronted by McGraw, who calmly and
in the most soldierly manner saluted with his right hand
and reported, "Sir, Maj. Joseph McGraw returns to
duty."
Just before the withdrawal of the Army from the
Petersburg lines McGraw was promoted lieutenant-
colonel and placed in charge of 24 guns with their
horses. A few days later on the retreat he jocularly de
clared that he held an unparalleled military record in
that he had lost 23 guns in 24 days ! McGraw knew that
the man did not live who could justly criticize the recti
tude of his conduct in battle.
CHAPTER XXXIX
THE NORTH ANNA
IN the interval between the 12th and 18th of May,
Lee gradually moved his army eastward to meet cor
responding movements of the enemy. The first Corps
was shifted on the night of the 15th, from the extreme
left to the extreme right beyond the Fredericksburg
Road and extending to the Po. Huger's and Haskell's
battalions were placed in position along the new line,
while Cabell's was held in reserve. On the morning of
the 18th, Meade again attempted to break Lee's line
at the salient where Ewell remained in position with
thirty pieces of artillery well posted. Long withheld
his fire until the dense attacking column came within
short range, when Col. Carter in command of Page's re
organized battalion gave the word to fire. The murder
ous fire of canister and spherical case at once arrested
the advance, threw the enemy into confusion, and hurled
them back in disorder, and this before they entered the
zone of effective musketry fire. Indeed before emerging
from the woods, the attacking infantry was much
shaken; some of the enemy's brigades were almost at
once eliminated by the furious fire of the hostile artillery.
Only a few of the assailants reached the abattis, none
penetrated it, and the attack over the identical ground,
which had formed the battlefield of the 12th, was not re
newed. Few of the Confederate infantrymen discharged
their muskets, and practically no loss was sustained
either by the Confederate Artillery or Infantry. The
Federal medical returns state that "five hundred and
fifty-two wounded was the result, and the character of
the wounds were unusually severe, a large portion being
caused by shell and canister." Thus did the twenty-
nine guns actually engaged by Carter overthrow 12,000
picked infantry. One pauses to contemplate what might
have been the result on the 12th had Long been prepared
20
800 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
to meet Hancock's attack. When we consider the effect
of Alexander's Artillery on that same day, and of
Carter's guns on the 18th, the contention that Hancock's
crowded masses would never have reached the Bloody
Angle on the 12th, had the artillery been in position,
seems well supported.
During the afternoon, and after the failure of the
Federal assault, Ewell determined to make a flank
movement around Meade's right. Braxton, with six
guns of select caliber, was ordered to accompany the
column, but the roads proving impassable, due to the
heavy rains of the past week, he was soon compelled to
return to the lines. Simultaneously with his attack on
Ewell, Meade had assailed Hill's line in front of the
Courthouse. Placing a number of batteries in a posi
tion from which they could partially enfilade the works
of the 3d Corps, Meade attempted to advance a large
number of guns under cover of their fire, and with them
prepare the way for a large infantry assault in force.
Pegram's and Cutts' batteries bore the brunt of the
furious cannonade, which ensued during the next hour,
and succeeded in silencing the more advanced batteries
of the enemy, which caused the attack to be abandoned.
In the artillery duel Maj. Joseph McGraw, of Pe
gram's Battalion, was severely wounded, as were sev
eral other officers. Richardson's Battalion further to
the right and Alexander's Artillery beyond were not
engaged.
Unsupported by artillery, Ewell had lost 900 men,
but he learned on the 19th that the enemy had not only
moved from Anderson's front, leaving his dead and
wounded on the ground, but was also preparing to move
from his own front. Early on the 21st he discovered
that he was unopposed, so the 2d Corps, with all its ar
tillery, was moved to the right, passing by the other
corps to the Telegraph Road south of the Po, and then
by that road toward Hanover Junction. Later in the
day, the 1st Corps, with its artillery and some of
Walker's battalions, followed Ewell. That night the
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILFUKI* E. <TTSIIA\Y
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 801
3d Corps with its remaining artillery brought up the
rear after a collision with Warren's troops, in which
sharp skirmishing occurred. A. P. Hill then moved
upon Hanover Junction by a road slightly west of and
almost parallel to the Telegraph Road. About noon on
the 22d, after a march of thirty miles, the head of Lee's
column reached the North Anna, and before night the
whole army was in position on the south bank, having
moved over the chord of the arc which Grant had been
compelled to follow.
In the new position near Hanover Junction, the 1st
Corps occupied the center at the Telegraph Road
bridge, the 2d extending down and the 3d up the river
on the right and left, respectively. The small works at
the crossing, which had been prepared in advance, were
now greatly strengthened and every available gun was
placed in position, the Artillery with an extensive and
unrestricted field of fire completely commanding every
approach.
Breckinridge's Division from the Valley joined the
Army here with two battalions of artillery under Maj.
William McLaughlin ; these troops were held in reserve
at Hanover Junction.
The reinforcement which Breckinridge brought to
Lee did not number over 3,500 men, but they were sea
soned troops and the additional artillery more than made
up for the loss in guns at Spotsylvania. Breckinridge
had fought one of the most brilliant small engagements
of the war on the 15th at New Market in the Valley,
where with about 4,500 men of all arms, he had defeated
Sigel with not less than 6,000 men and 28 guns, thus
preventing him from seizing the upper Valley and mov
ing around Lee's flank. It was in this interesting bat
tle, of far more importance than the numbers engaged
would seem to indicate, that the Corps of Cadets of the
Virginia Military Institute with four companies under
its commandant and a section of artillery under Cadet
Capt. C. H. Minge, aggregating about 250, saved the
802 THE LONG ABM OF LEE
Confederates from defeat by a brilliant charge at the
crisis of the combat, losing 9 killed and 48 wounded, or
over twenty per cent of the Corps.* But the charge of
the cadets was not the only brilliant incident of the bat
tle, for Maj. William McLaughlin, formerly captain of
the 1st Rockbridge Battery, in command of Breckin-
ridge's Artillery, there won fresh laurels for his arm of
the service. His command consisted of Chapman's,
Jackson's, and McClannahan's batteries, with six, four,
and six guns, respectively, and a total personnel of about
250 men, to which was added in the battle, the cadet
section of two rifles and thirty men. This battalion of
artillery was one of those which Breckinridge now
brought to the Army. The most careful research fails to
disclose with certainty the composition of the other bat
talion at this time under McLaughlin's command. It
will be recalled, however, that Pendleton had urged
Alexander to endeavor to secure two batteries of Col. J.
Floyd King's Battalion for the 1st Corps, but before
January this battalion was transferred from the south,
where it had been operating, to Gen. Samuel Jones'
command in the Department of Western Virginia with
the following organization:
Capt. George L. Davidson
Davidson's Lynchburg Battery, Lieut. John T. Johnson.
Lowry's Wise Legion Battery, Lieut. J. H. Pence.
Richmond Otey Battery, Capt. David N. Walker.
Danville Ringgold Battery, Capt. Crispen Dickenson.
But on May 1, the return of Breckinridge 's Division
shows the following batteries :
Monroe Virginia Battery, Capt. George B. Chapman.
Lewisburg Battery, Capt. Thomas A. Bryan.
Roanoke Battery, Capt. Warren S. Lurty.
Botetourt Battery. Capt. Henry C. Douthat.
Rhett (Tenn.) Battery, Capt. William H. Burroughs.
Tennessee Battery, Capt. Hugh L. W. McClung.
Charlottes ville Battery, Capt. Thomas E. Jackson.
*For full account of this heroic incident, see The Military History of the
V. M. I., J. C. Wise, and The Battle of New Market, John S. Wise.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 803
The effective personnel of these seven batteries num
bered 30 officers and 597 men. Before Breckinridge
joined Lee, he himself was joined by Imboden with Mc-
Clannahan's Battery, which as we have seen with Chap
man's and Jackson's batteries comprised McLaughlin's
Battalion. On May 5th, Breckinridge was ordered to
send Col. King with two of his four batteries to the
Army of Northern Virginia for assignment to the 1st
Corps, and the other two were to remain with Breckin
ridge. According to statements in the history of the
Washington Artillery, by Maj. Wm. M. Owen, pp.
328, 347, the 13th Virginia Battalion which he had com
manded in East Tennessee was in the trenches with
Breckinridge at Cold Harbor on June 6, and was com
manded by Lieut.-Col. King, himself, and when
he was reassigned to its command July 31 it consisted
of Davidson's, Dickenson's and Walker's batteries.
Exclusive of these two battalions, Lee's Artillery per
sonnel now numbered :
1st Corps, 465; 2d Corps, 1,977; and 3d Corps, 2,632;
total 4,074, with an aggregate present and absent of
6,563.* The twenty pieces lost at Spotsylvania and the
casualties in personnel, were more than compensated for
by the reinforcement with Breckinridge, so that at the
North Anna, Lee had in the strongest position he had
yet occupied in this campaign, and by far the most
favorable one for artillery, not less than 225 guns
manned by the most numerous artillery personnel ever
brought by him into action.
At this time, the Federal Army, with the reinforce
ments it had received, numbered about 100,000 men with
an undiminished force of artillery, while the entire Con
federate force, including an additional reinforcement
which soon arrived under Pickett, did not exceed 40,000
men, or about 35,000 infantry and 5,000 artillery. Ac
cording to Col. Taylor's estimate, the reinforcement re
ceived by the Confederates from the Wilderness to Cold
*See Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1136.
Horse Artillery, 473 present for duty. Aggregate present and absent, 674.
804 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Harbor, was about 14,400 men, while during the same
time Grant brought up 50,000 fresh troops. Thus it is
seen that the proportion of artillery to infantry con
tinued to increase as the infantry failed in numbers, be
ing now nearly seven guns per thousand infantry, with
the artillery personnel comprising about one-seventh of
the field army. Truly were the precedents of Frederick
and Napoleon being followed.
The Confederates had hardly commenced intrenching
on the 23d, when the enemy appeared on the north bank
in the forenoon, and opened fire with artillery upon the
bridge-head works at the north ends of the railroad and
Telegraph Road bridges, which had been constructed the
year before. Eight guns of Huger's and a like number
of Haskell's Battalion were quickly placed in position
near the river by Alexander for the defense of these
works, while the Chief of Artillery reconnoitered the de
fensive line above and below them. The fords on the
right were soon protected by the Artillery of the 2d
Corps, Braxton's Battalion being posted well in advance
near the Doswell house. About 4:30 p. M. Warren's
Corps crossed the river without opposition at Jericho
Ford, four miles above the Chesterfield bridge on the
Telegraph Road, while Hancock advanced along the
Telegraph Road, and Burnside on his right moved to
wards Ox Ford Crossing. Burnside was unable to cross
and Hancock was held back in reserve. From the 3d
Corps, Heth's Division with Poague's Battalion, and
Wilcox's Division with Pegram's Battalion, were now
sent to oppose Warren, while Macintosh's Battalion was
placed in position to cover Anderson's Ford on Hill's
right, and below him near the center of the position Maj.
Lane with six rifles of Cutts' Battalion was posted on a
bluff back of the Montgomery house, which commanded
both the Chesterfield bridge and Anderson's Ford above.
Warren had formed line of battle in a very favorable
position with his front concealed within the edge of a
wood. His left rested on the river, which made a large
concave bend in his rear, and again drew near his right.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 805
The open ground in front of his right flank was com
manded by his artillery. But, while his position was a
strong one, his situation in relation to the rest of Meade's
Army was precarious, for a river lay between him and
his supports. As Hill's two divisions formed for attack,
Poague and Pegram advanced under cover of rising
ground behind the right of the line, until within good
supporting distance of the infantry, and as the Con
federates moved out to attack, their batteries, hitherto
unseen, galloped to the crest in their front and opened
with destructive effect upon the enemy's reserves at the
ford. Cutler's Division on the Federal right was broken
and pursued by Hill's troops, but the Federal artillery
on that .flank first checked the Confederates and then
engaged in a duel with Pegram and Poague, who had
meanwhile thrown the Federal reserves massed near the
left into great disorder. In the Federal center, Griffin's
Division in the woods maintained itself with great reso
lution, and Hill was compelled to forego the attack.
In the artillery duel which ensued, Maj. Ward, a most
valuable officer of Poague's Battalion, was killed by a
cannon shot. Meanwhile, Mclntosh had also become en
gaged with the enemy's artillery, losing Lieutenant
Pearce, in command of Clutter's Battery, and a limber
by explosion. In the center, Haskell and Huger had
held the bridges in their front, but the small infantry line
in the works on the north bank had either been captured
or forced to retire, leaving the works in the hands of the
enemy, who had aproached under cover of the ravines
leading to the river and which the Confederate batteries
were unable to search effectively. At nightfall, the south
end of the railroad bridge was burned, and soon the
Confederate center and right was moved back to a line
further from the river and on more advantageous
ground. This line, according to Gen. Alexander, was
too good, for its apparent strength defeated Lee's ob
ject, which was to induce the enemy, by withdrawing, to
attack him. Its center rested on the river half a mile
above the Ox Ford bridge, and thence, leaving the
806 THE LONG ARM or LEE
North Anna, it ran across the narrow peninsula formed
by the bend in the river, one and a half miles to Little
River, where its left rested. From the center on the
river the line ran southeast across another bend of the
river and rested three miles below near Morris' Bridge.
Along the center and right, the batteries of the 1st and
2d Corps were posted with their infantry while the 3d
Corps held the left.
On the morning of the 24th, the enemy's 5th and 6th
Corps formed in front of Lee's left wing, while the 2d
and part of the 9th crossed to the south bank and ap
peared in front of his right. Occasional skirmishing and
artillery firing broke out during the morning, but while
Meade's troops were massing nothing serious occurred.
Demonstrations on the Confederate left caused
Poague's Battalion to be sent to the extreme flank at
Little River, Pegram's, Mclntosh's, and Lane's bat
talions retaining their positions of the previous day,
while Richardson's with Mahone's Division occupied a
second line near the Anderson house. Gordon's Divi
sion, with Braxton's Battalion, soon joined Mahone, and
Breckinridge's Division with its two artillery battalions
was moved up to take Gordon's place on the right.
One need only look at the map to appreciate the pe
culiar situation of Meade's Army. To say the least, it
was a dangerous one, affording a tactical opportunity
to the Confederates, which eluded them by reason of the
illness of Gen. Lee. The point cannot here be discussed
further. The possibilities of the situation belong to the
realm of speculation, for the only activity was on the
part of the Federals. Burnside was first ordered to at
tack and carry Ox Ford, which, if done, would at
once unite the Federal wings and correct the evils of
Meade's position. If successful, the attack would also
divide Lee's wings. But Burnside pronounced the task
assigned to him impossible, and did not even attempt it.
Hancock, on his left and Warren, on his right, each ad
vanced skirmishers and felt Lee's lines, but both re
ported against a serious attack, for they had acquired
THE LONG AKM OF LEE 807
from their recent experiences the utmost respect for the
defensive abilities of the Confederates. Furthermore,
they now saw the Confederate Artillery well intrenched
and bearing upon every portion of the field over which
they would have to advance, and well knew the power of
its guns in such a position. The lesson of Fredericks-
burg had not been forgotten to say nothing of recent
events at Spotsylvania, where artillery alone had
hurled their splendid columns back on several occasions,
almost without the aid of infantry. They saw here
these same guns in the most favorable position they had
yet occupied, with a clear field of fire unbroken by cov
ered approaches of any kind, and they knew that to pass
through the zone of artillery fire was but the first stage
of the attack, for those guns could not be silenced and
would remain in the front line to add their canister
to the musketry effect of an infantry, never yet driven
from its works. Thus Lee, who, in spite of his
physical condition, was seeking to impress his army with
the necessity of striking the enemy a crushing blow when
the opportunity arrived, was deprived of his chance by
the forbidding aspect of his position. Nor was Lee
capable at the psychological moment of supplying his
army with the necessary energy to enable it to assume
the offensive. His subordinates assigned the same ob
jections to an attack on the Federals that the latter had
advanced against the plan to assault Lee's position.
The country occupied by the Federals on both flanks,
and especially on their left, was flat and open, allowing
the most effective use of their artillery and infantry be
hind well prepared intrenchments, and the Confederates
knew full well that Hunt was in command of Meade's
Artillery. Others might blunder, but they were satis
fied that Hunt would make the most of any natural or
artificial aid afforded by the terrain, and that as at
Malvern Hill, Sharpsburg, and Gettysburg, the Fed
eral Artillery would prove a bulk-head, which could not
be battered in, even after the infantry had been driven
to cover. If the Federals had learned to respect Lee's
808 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Artillery, none the less had the Confederates learned to
respect Hunt. They never entertained the least mis
giving as to their ability to drive the enemy's infantry,
nor were they especially mindful of the Federal guns
in other hands, but there was not a man in Lee's Army
who had not been impressed by the splendid abilities of
Hunt as an artillerist, and they never counted on his
making a mistake. A close study of the struggle be
tween the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of
the Potomac will satisfy the student that no officer in
the Federal Army, from first to last, commanded the
same respect from his enemy that Henry J. Hunt did.
Had Lee been entirely invalided and absent from his
army, as it lay in position on the North Anna, with the
Federals in a dilemma before it, it is possible something
might have been attempted by the Confederates. Some
strong will might have improved the opportunity which
Meade's position afforded. But, with Lee present,
neither the collective nor any individual will was capable
of asserting itself. It was impossible for the Army
to realize that he was really incapacitated, and the most
natural inertia of his subordinates under the circum
stances was heightened by a confidence in his genius,
almost sublime. Such is the effect of a master mind
upon mediocrity. It may be frequently noted in the
history of war. Who would have dared take the lead
in Italy with Hannibal present? And in the whole list
of Napoleon's marshals, however brilliant as fighting
lieutenants they may have been, we fail to detect a
single captain. The one man beside Lee in the Army
of Northern Virginia, who may be classed as a captain,
had fallen at Chancellorsville. Had he been present,
even Lee no doubt would have temporarily surrendered
the reins of control with a confidence born of experience,
impossible in the case of Ewell, A. P. Hill, or Ander
son, his corps commanders. This is an assertion which
must not be taken as a reflection upon any of the
three gallant lieutenants then leading the Confederate
Corps, for we are not discussing their potentialities as
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 809
captains, but conditions as they actually were. We
are projecting our view deep into the human side of
the situation, which is the only way a true understand
ing of many military problems may be had, and the
more the historian cultivates this habit, the more cor
rectly will history be written. When Napoleon declared
that history was essentially false, he did so in the full
knowledge that the historian commonly reasoned from
effect to cause, and not from cause to effect. Conscious
of the motives which guided his own career and the cir
cumstances which dictated his military maneuvers, his
faith in the history of his time based, as it was, upon the
imperfect perceptions of his critics, was entirely de
stroyed, and he realized that what was true in his own
case was true in the case of others. With what scorn
must he have viewed historians who insisted upon
logic for the satisfaction of their formulae! "Here is a
result," said the military critic; "give us that orderly
process of reasoning and events which led to it, and in
such a way that the science of war as propounded in
our manuals will be exemplified." And, so to meet
their demands and to discourage his opponents, who in
variably sought to observe every rule of war, failing
of course in the attempt, he caused Berthier to manu
facture what they required. Thus was the world mis
led, and yet it still continues in the attempt to formu
late the operations of one who was neither guided by,
nor observed, any rule. All this is true of every great
soldier, and never until this fact is grasped will the
world appreciate the loss it suffered when Lee died
without writing the history of his military career. In
that work, had it been written, the mist which en
shrouds the science of war, especially the leading of an
army, would have been dissipated, for free as he was
of all vanity, deceit, and personal interest, he would
have set forth no false formulae as the guiding princi
ples of Chancellorsville, and the Wilderness, and he
would have acknowledged many blunders which proved
both successful and unsuccessful, and for the commis-
810 THE LONG ARM or LEE
sion of which science has been called upon to supply
the reasons. An account of his military operations
would have set forth the human side of war as never be
fore or since disclosed, and the full truth of Moltke's
definition of war as "the practical adaptation of the
means at hand to the accomplishment of the end in
view" would have dawned upon every reader. The
usual manual of military field engineering prescribes
in detail the kind of intrenchments suited to a given
position, and even declares how many men are required,
and how long it will take them, to erect these works.
But suppose the first blow of the mattock uncovers
stone instead of sinking the tool in unresisting earth?
What then of position and time? Shall the troops lay
exposed on the rugged slope simply because the posi
tion is the correct one according to formulas and Krieg-
spiel? Will the enemy lie dormant, while dynamite is
brought forward to supply the place of pick and spade?
How better, than by these queries, can the real meaning
of the science of war be illustrated, or the tactics of
Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, and the Wilder
ness be explained? The leader of troops is but a mili
tary engineer by whom every expedient must be em
ployed. In the solution of the problem, if the human,
the psychological element, is ignored, the troops will
be exposed on the prescribed position.
The foregoing disgression may appear at first sight
to have little bearing upon the situation at Hanover
Junction. In truth it has all to do with it, for in the
problem the human element is the unknown factor to
the ordinary critic, which, when introduced into the
equation, solves it.
Before Lee recovered his motive power sufficiently to
take advantage of his opportunity at the North Anna,
Grant removed the temptation by withdrawing his
troops across the river and setting them in motion for the
Pamunkey. During the last two days of his presence
before the Confederates, Lee's Artillery had been little
engaged. But two incidents in connection with the use
THE LONG ARM or LEE 811
of the guns should be preserved. On the 24th, Lane's
Battalion had been actively employed in harassing the
enemy near the Telegraph Road bridge, and in doing
so had drawn upon itself a heavy fire from the hostile
batteries across the river, which caused some loss. Burst
ing in one of Lane's pits, where several detachments of
men were under cover, a shell ignited the tow in a
dismounted ammunition chest, which it shattered. The
explosion of the ammunition, which was momentarily
expected, would probably have killed every man in the
pit. Seeing the danger, Capt. John R. Wingfield and
private Hemington, without thought for their own
safety, sprang to the chest and extinguished the blaze
with their hands. The other incident also concerns
a battery of this (Cutts' or Lane's) battalion. Bat
tery "A," in command of Lieut. Lucius G. Rees, had
been left with McGowan's Brigade as the rear guard of
the 3d Corps in the movement from Spotsylvania to the
North Anna. It was, therefore, at the very rear of the
whole army. When Hill collided with the enemy, Rees
with his four guns was cut off by a large force of infan
try, and with unusual presence of mind dashed past
them to prevent the capture of his battery. This
brought him in the enemy's rear, but he unlimbered and,
firing a piece at a time, while the others withdrew, he
managed to elude his pursuers with the loss of but one
man mortally wounded. Moving by a long circuit to
the west and south, he then passed around the enemy's
right at Little River, and rejoined his battalion on the
24th, after two days of separation, most of which time
he was in the enemy's rear.
Pickett's Division of about 3,300 men rejoined from
Petersburg about this time.
CHAPTER XL
COLD HARBOR
AT noon on the 26th, Grant sent Sheridan, who had
rejoined the Army with the cavalry after a raid to the
James River, with the pontoon train to Hanover Town
on the Pamunkey River, under orders to prepare the
crossing, and after dark the infantry followed. Screened
by cavalry pickets, the withdrawal of the enemy was
not discovered by the Confederates until the morning
of the 27th, when Lee again took up the race. Moving
by the Telegraph and parallel roads, towards Ashland,
thence towards Atlee's Station, the Army bivouacked
for the night after an exhausting march of about fifteen
miles near Half Sink and Hughes' Shop. While the
Army was covering the remaining thirteen miles to the
Totopotomoy on the 28th, Hampton and Fitz Lee, with
all the Horse Artillery, were opposing Sheridan's ad
vance at Hawe's Shop on the road from Hanover Town
to Atlee's Station. This affair was one of the severest
cavalry engagements of the war, and was only broken
off by both armies arriving and taking up positions con
fronting each other. As the Confederates arrived,
Breckinridge's Division with McLaughlin's Battalion
of artillery occupied the southwest bank of Totopoto
moy Creek on the left of Lee's line, at the Hanover
Town Road. Next came the 1st Corps, Alexander
promptly placing every available gun in position on
Anderson's right, then the 2d Corps now under Early,
with Long's batteries well placed. The right of the
line near and beyond Pole Green Church was occupied
by the 3d Corps, while Walker's battalions were parked
in reserve behind Breckinridge's Division on the left.
Again had Lee won the race, in which at one time the
Federals were eight miles nearer Richmond than the
Confederates.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 813
The next morning, Walker posted Macintosh's Bat
talion on the left of the Hanover Town Road to sup
port Breckinridge, before whom the enemy had ap
peared in force, and the following day some of Lane's
batteries were placed in position between Mclntosh
and McLaughlin. Alexander had skillfully placed bat
teries from Cabell's and Huger's battalions on Breckin
ridge' s right, so as to secure for them an enfilade fire
down his front and a cross-fire with Walker's batteries,
and during the 30th and 31st all these guns were con
stantly and most effectively engaged against the
enemy's infantry and artillery. While the enemy
demonstrated throughout these two days against Lee's
left, active efforts were also directed upon the 2d Corps,
the Artillery of which now under Carter, Gen. Long
having been incapacitated by a severe illness, proved
most effective. Nelson's Battalion on the evening of
the 30th accompanied Rodes' Division on the Old
Church Road and took a prominent part in the attack
which drove the enemy's left from Johnson's farm to
Bethesda Church. In this affair, First Lieut. Ancell,
of the Fluvanna Battery, a meritorious officer, was
killed. Returning to the lines that night with the infan
try division, Nelson's Battalion resumed its old posi
tion, while Hardaway who had recovered from his
wound and rejoined his battalion on the 21st, posted his
guns on Nelson's left. Braxton, Cutshaw, and Page
held their battalions in reserve.
Though maintaining the greatest activity in Lee's
front along the Totopotomoy, Meade could not bring
himself to the point of a real assault on the Confeder
ate lines. Again he found Lee well intrenched; the
activity of the Confederate artillery alone sufficed to
give the warning, for here as before the Confederate bat
teries held the Federals at arm's length, while the infan
try for the most part rested in the trenches. With the
exception of Rodes' brilliant attack on the Federal left,
the infantry was not called upon to exert itself. On the
left where the threat was the most serious, the front was
814 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
so thoroughly dominated by Mclntosh, McLaughlin,
Lane, Cabell and Huger, with upwards of fifty guns,
that the Federal Infantry hardly disturbed the men in
the trenches. Verily was the Artillery doing its part
by its sister arm in this campaign. Shoulder to shoulder
it stood with the Infantry and watched and fought while
the latter conserved its strength.
On May 30, Hoke's Division with Dearing's old
battalion, now commanded by Maj. J. P. W. Read,
was ordered to march from Drewry's Bluff and join the
Army. The battalion still consisted of Blount's,
Caskie's, Macon's, and Marshall's (Stribling's) bat
teries, with a personnel of 17 officers and 355 men pre
sent for duty, and 16 guns.* But one battalion re
mained absent from the 1st Corps, and that, the Wash
ington Artillery now under Maj. Owen, was stationed
near Drewry's Bluff, having rendered distinguished
service in the operations against Butler, south of the
James.
Before resuming the narrative, it seems proper to
give a brief account of the operations of Read's or
Dearing's old battalion while detached from the Army
with Pickett, especially as no history of the Artillery of
the Army of Northern Virginia would be complete
without reference to the heroic service rendered by one
of the batteries in particular.
On the 1st of February, Pickett with Hoke's, Cling-
man's, and a part of Corse's Brigade, and Read's Bat
talion, had moved from Kinston, N. C., to threaten
Newberne, while Dearing in command of the cavalry
covered the front. Barton's three brigades and a naval
force on the Neuse were to cooperate with Pickett.
Dearings movement towards the north was success
ful in diverting the attention of the Federals from
Pickett's columns, and Col. R. Taylor Wood, with his
small flotilla, effected a complete surprise, capturing a
gunboat under the very walls of the fort at JSTewberne.
By 2 o'clock in the morning Pickett reached Bache-
*Now designated 38th Battalion Virginia Artillery.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 815
lor's Creek, seven miles distant, where he struck the
enemy's troops whose pickets were captured, but being
reinforced the Federal force checked the Confederate
advance, after the outer defenses had been lost. Pickett
now impatiently awaited the result of Barton's flank
movement, which was to open his way to Newberne, but
Barton failed to cooperate as planned and after remain
ing in position all the next day, Pickett was compelled
to retire to Kinston after inflicting some damage upon
the enemy, including the capture of a section of artillery
and a large number of horses, wagons, etc. In Pickett's
assault upon the enemy, in front of Newberne, Capt.
William H. Caskie in command of the Richmond
Hampden Battery, with his teams in a gallop actually
led the charge of the infantry. Almost instantly his
horse was wounded, but the gallant young officer seized
a musket and continued on foot at the head of his bat
tery. Seeing that he was dismounted, Gen. Pickett
sent him a fresh horse, upon which he continued in the
fight, not halting to unlimber his guns until within
a stone's throw of the enemy's infantry. For his
superb conduct on this occasion, he was soon promoted,
Capt. J. E. Sullivan succeeding to the command of his
battery.
The oldest of Read's batteries was the Richmond
Fayette, named as we have seen in honor of LaFayette,
who was visiting Richmond when it was formed, May
27, 1824. In acknowledgement of the compliment, the
distinguished Frenchman presented the battery with
two brass 6-pounders, which he had brought to this
country during the Revolution. Col. John Rutherford
was its first commander, Col. Henry Coalter Cabell
commanding it in April, 1861, when it volunteered for
duty, soon being assigned to Magruder at Yorktown,
from which time it had served in every great battle of
Lee's Army.
The Fauquier, or Stribling's original battery, had
also served with great distinction from the first, having
been specially mentioned in the Federal reports of the
21
816 THE LONG ARM or LEE
fighting at Turkey Island just after Malvern Hill,
where without support it repulsed a cavalry charge. It
was one of the few batteries to pursue the enemy on their
retreat from Second Manassas. Later it accompanied
Longstreet on the Suffolk campaign, in which it was
surrounded by an overwhelming force and lost its guns
and officers. After the latter were exchanged the bat
tery was reorganized and rearmed with six Napoleons
at Richmond, and took part in the Gettysburg campaign
as we have seen. Stribling was soon thereafter promoted
and succeeded by Lieut. William C. Marshall, who in
command of the battery escaped with it from Appo-
mattox, disbanded his men and destroyed his guns at
Lynchburg.
The remaining or the Latham-Dearing-Blount Bat
tery was organized in Lynchburg in April, 1861, and
served under its first commander at First Manassas. It
is said by some to have fired the first Confederate gun
on that day. Serving throughout the war with great
distinction, it also escaped the Surrender and disbanded
at Lynchburg, after destroying its guns. After
Latham transferred to the Branch, N. C., Battery,
Dearing established his brilliant reputation as an ar
tillerist with this Lynchburg battery.
Such was the record of this battalion, which more than
any other had served apart from the army to which it
belonged. The foregoing facts have been given lest its
detached service on other fields might be thought to have
injured its record.
On the 31st, Sheridan took possession of Cold Har
bor, to which point Meade at once sent the 6th
Corps. The sidling movement was again met by Lee,
who dispatched the 1st Corps, a part of the 3d, and
Breckinridge's and Hoke's divisions, the last having just
arrived from Petersburg, with Read's Battalion of ar
tillery, to his right with a view towards turning and at
tacking Meade's left. Cabell's, Huger's, Haskell's, and
Read's battalions were to cooperate with Kershaw's,
THE LONG ARM or LEE 817
Pickett's, Field's, and Hoke's divisions, respectively,
while McLaughlin operated with Breckinridge.
Grant had also ordered Gen. W. F. Smith with the
18th Corps, just landed at the White House with 10,-
000 men and 16 guns, to Cold Harbor. With but fifteen
miles to march, Smith lost his way and it was 4 p. M.
of the 1st when the 18th united with the 6th Corps,
which arrived about 10 A. M., after a distressing night
march.
Kershaw had arrived and attacked Sheridan about
6 A. M., but putting in only two brigades, they were re
pulsed by the Federal troopers with their magazine car
bines. Hoke, on KershawT's right, who had not been
placed under Anderson's command, failed to attack, and
the remainder of the long column with practically all
the Artillery remained halted in rear on the roads,
while the 6th Corps was arriving in support of Sheridan.
The whole movement was a distinct failure, and through
lack of leadership and clear orders a brilliant oppor
tunity to strike the 6th Corps en route, which was well
assembled by 1 P. M., was lost. Meantime, the Con
federate column had been ordered to intrench as it stood,
and the guns were ordered up and placed along the line.
The works were no more than kneeling intrenchments,
however, when Grant about 5 p. M. ordered the 6th and
18th corps to assault the Confederate line over an in
tervening space of about 1,400 yards. Between Ker-
shaw's and Hoke's divisions was an interval of about
50 yards occupied by a strip of marshy ground. The
Confederates had given up all ideas of an attack that
evening, when a sudden increase of fire along the picket
line 300 yards in front of the main line and the opening
of the enemy's guns interrupted their digging. It was
soon learned that the enemy had been successfully re
sisted by Hoke, Kershaw, and Pickett, upon whose
divisions the attack had fallen, except at the gap,
from which a thicket extended well forward, allow
ing the Federals as at Second Manassas and Fredericks-
burg to approach the line unobserved. A large Fed-
818 THE LONG ARM or LEE
eral force had worked through this interval to the rear
of the Confederate line, and soon compelled Kershaw
and Hoke to refuse their adjacent brigades and extend
across the gap in its rear. This action, which should have
been taken long before, checked the enemy after they
had taken several hundred prisoners. Hinton's and
Gregg's brigades of the 1st Corps were now hurried to
the spot and driving back the enemy reestablished the
line, while the Federals intrenched themselves about 300
yards in its front. Darkness put an end to the fight.
The Artillery had hardly fired a shot, for so dense were
the woods that no position was available for its use.
During the night a Napoleon gun of Cabell's Battalion,
under Lieut. Falligant, was posted in the rear of the
gap in a position much exposed to the enemy's sharp
shooters, and not more than 50 yards distant from them.
The other pieces of Cabell's Battalion were now posted
along Kershaw's, while Huger's and Haskell's batter
ies occupied Pickett's and Field's line extending to the
left.
Meade had also made a serious attempt against the
3d Corps on Anderson's left, but the assault fell upon
Heth's position, where Hardaway's Battalion had by
merest good fortune been posted near the Mander
house. Under cover of a skirt of woods, the Federals
advanced to within 50 yards of the Confederate in-
trenchments, but at that point were overwhelmed by
Hardaway's canister fire. Having very little protec
tion, Hardaway's batteries suffered severely and were
relieved during the night by Poague's Battalion.
By the morning of the 2d of June, the opposing lines
had settled down in their intrenchments closer to each
other than ever before, the hostile troops so close that
every exposed movement was plainly discernible. Three
Federal corps now confronted Lee's right at Cold Har
bor, while the other two lay opposite Early's or the 2d
Corps, at Bethesda Church. The fighting opened with a
renewed effort on the part of the Federals to force the
gap in Anderson's line, but Falligant's single piece was
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 819
kept constantly in action, and by the expenditure of an
enormous amount of canister passed along the line by
hand to it for several hundred yards, kept the swampy
space clear of the enemy while his gallant detachment
was relieved from time to time from the batteries
nearby.
In the afternoon, Gen. Early, perceiving a move
ment that indicated a withdrawal of the enemy from his
front, advanced against Burnside's right flank, making
a half wheel with the Johnson house position as his
pivot. Gen. Long, though still ill, had returned to duty
the day before. Cutshaw moved his battalion out of its
works and posted it in line with Garber's Battery on the
right just beyond the old Church Road.
This was a most fortunate disposition, and one which
enabled Garber with canister to check the pursuit of
one of Gordon's brigades, which pursuit was repulsed
and driven back by the guns. But Early's movement
was as a whole most successful. Striking Burnside's
Corps while in motion and sweeping down on Warren's
right, he not only took a number of prisoners with small
loss to himself, but prevented two entire corps from
taking part in the attack at Cold Harbor, which had
been planned by Grant. Long's Artillery had been
greatly assisted by Haskell's Battalion on Field's front,
which Alexander had moved out in front of the works
in order to get an enfilade fire. This battalion kept up
a constant fire upon Warren's line and prevented it
from changing front. All day the sharpshooting and
artillery practice were incessant. During this day a
number of Alexander's gun carriages in Pickett's and
Kershaw's front were actually disabled by bullets which
passed through the embrasures and cut the spokes of
the wheels. The terrain behind the intrenchments was
so flat that it was fully exposed to even the frontal fire
of the enemy, which prevented all movements of men
and horses.
During the day, Grant received a fresh reinforcement
of 5,000 troops, who were to take part with Wilson's
820 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Cavalry in a flank attack on Early in the morning,
while Burnside and Warren made a frontal assault.
Meanwhile, Lee had by marching Breckinridge's, Wil-
cox's, and Mahone's divisions across his rear, extended
Hoke's line to the Chickahominy, picketing the south
bank of the river with Fitz Lee's Cavalry and John
ston's and Shoemaker's batteries. During the night,
Cutshaw was relieved by Hardaway, and the position
of Kershaw's left at the gap was slightly changed and
greatly strengthened by placing there four guns of Ca-
bell's Battalion, behind good epaulments, to one of
which Falligant's gun was noiselessly withdrawn after
the old works were levelled to the ground. Law's Bri
gade was also moved up as a support and intrenched in
rear of the line at this point, for the massing of the
enemy's columns opposite had been plainly heard.
The Confederates in the best of spirits and utmost
confidence were waiting under arms for the attack, when
at the first blush of dawn the fire of the pickets in the
gap announced the appearance of the enemy. As the
Federals burst from the thickets, not over 100 yards
away, wildly cheering and with bands playing in their
rear, the Confederates, who for several hours had been
fearful less the attack would not come off, set their
teeth and took a firmer hold of their muskets. Pushing
forward to the point where the Confederate works stood
in the gap the night before, for a moment it seemed to
the Federals as if they had succeeded, but not so. Cab-
ell's four pieces under Lieut. Callaway, concealed in
their individual works, two on either flank of the infan
try trench, which traversed the gap somewhat in rear of
the old line, burst forth as if but one gun with doubled
charges of canister, partially enfilading the enemy and
crossing their fire at the deserted line. Of course, the
repulse of the enemy at this point was immediate and
bloody, and though Callaway 's men suffered from
musketry fire at the closest range, alone he would have
been able to clear his front. For his superb conduct on
this occasion, he was specially mentioned in orders.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 821
Read's guns along Hoke's and those of Cabell on
Kershaw's line were equally active, the approach of the
Federals generally being arrested about 50 yards from
the works. From Kershaw's right, Huger's Battalion
delivered a withering enfilade fire upon the space over
which the assault was rendered, while Pickett sent for
ward a line of skirmishers to fire upon the flank of the
attacking column. Haskell also opened to aid the troops
on his left.
On Early's front, Hardaway secured a most effective
oblique fire on the enemy and Cutshaw from his posi
tion in reserve moved rapidly to the front of the line and
to the left of Hardaway, when the attack developed and
from a most exposed point opened a terrific enfilade fire
upon the column which assaulted Rodes' works. Heth's
Division held the extreme left of Early's advanced line,
and to it Poague's Battalion had been assigned. The
division commander directed Col. Poague to post two
batteries, Wyatt's and Richards', on the left, but after
a rapid reconnaissance, Col. Poague reported in favor
of a better position, as the one indicated was plainly un
tenable. Heth, however, reiterated his orders, and
nothing was left the gallant Poague but to obey them.
As the batteries galloped forward, the heavy line of
skirmishers, with artillery in support, which Poague had
discovered not over 250 yards away, simply riddled the
teams and shot down many of the cannoneers. After
firing but a few rounds, the two batteries were so badly
crippled that they were no longer able to remain in
action. Poague was struck by a fragment of a shell,
narrowly escaping death. Capt. Wyatt and Lieut.
Rives were killed, many men and horses were killed or
disabled, and nothing but the most heroic efforts of the
survivors saved the guns from capture. Thus did an
infantry commander usurp the function of his artillery
leader, and by disregarding the advice and experience
of one of the most competent and daring artillerymen
in the Army, uselessly sacrifice two superb batteries,
which might have rendered valuable service under the di-
822 THE LONG ARM or LEE
rection of their proper leader. It was such ignorance
that had long since caused the Artillery to be given
a more independent organization, for the experiences
of the first year of the war had taught that division
and brigade commanders as a rule neither understood
nor were capable of handling artillery in camp, on
the march, or in action. The employment of the ar
tillery as a whole at Cold Harbor, and in the entire cam
paign, was marked by a degree of independence of the
infantry hitherto unknown. Frequently we have found
a battalion of one corps in the line of another corps. It
was a fatal mistake to turn Poague over to Heth's
mercies, but the error had its good effects, as it simply
emphasized the impracticability of the repetition of
such a practice, for Col. Walker's protest was prompt
and forceful.
On the right, Breckinridge's Division and the 3d
Corps, minus Heth's Division and Poague's Battalion,
had taken position about Games' farm, with the flank
of their line resting on the Chickahominy. Pegram's
Battalion, to which Dement's and Chew's Maryland
batteries from Richmond had now been added, occupied
a fine position on Turkey Ridge, with Macintosh's,
Richardson's, and Lane's battalions in order on its left.
In the rear of his batteries, Mclntosh posted a 24-
pounder howitzer, which he had adjusted for high angle
fire over the ridge, and which he successfully employed
with indirect fire against the enemy's working parties
in his front. On this part of the field the Federals were
generally held at arm's length by the Artillery which was
most actively employed. The action proper lasted but
about one hour, though at isolated points small attacks
reoccurred, and long-range artillery fire was kept
up by the enemy until noon. At one point only was the
Confederate parapet carried, and this on the right by
Barlow's Division, which approaching under cover to
within 75 yards of the works swept over them and seized
three pieces of artillery. But here Finnegan's Brigade
succeeded in driving out the enemy and recovering the
guns.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 823
By 7 A. M., Grant had authorized Meade to discon
tinue his efforts, and gradually the futility of further at
tack became apparent even to Meade, who had lost over
7,000 men during the morning, while the Confederate
casualties did not exceed 1,500, including several hun
dred captured.
The bulk of the Federal casualties was due to the Ar
tillery which had been superbly handled throughout the
day, as testified to by the complaints in the reports of
every Federal corps. At many points the enemy had
either been enfiladed, as by Cutshaw and Huger, or had
met with destructive oblique and cross fires, which, ac
cording to Gen. Humphreys, swept through the ranks
"from the right of Smith to the left of Hancock."
Again he states, "The assault on the 2d Corps could
not be renewed unless the enemy's enfilade artillery fire
could be silenced," and of the 6th Corps he writes:
"During all this time, besides the direct fire, there was
an enfilade artillery fire that swept though the ranks
from right to left." Here he undoubtedly refers to the
effect of Hardaway's, Cabell's, Haskell's, and Huger's
guns, which literally tore the assaulting column to
pieces. In writing of Smith's attack, he also says: "The
fire from the right came from a part of the enemy's
works against which no part of our attack was directed,
and Gen. Smith was unable to keep it down with his
artillery," which is but another reference to the 24 guns
which Huger pushed out in front of Pickett and Field.
After reading such statements, is it any wonder that
when Meade attempted to renew the assault his troops
laid down? The order for this fresh effort did not come
from Grant, who as we have seen had had enough early
in the morning. Meade's was the unconquerable will.
He desired to try conclusions again, and would have
done so had he been able, but "His immobile lines pro
nounced a verdict against further slaughter," declared
Swinton. Gen. Alexander denies this. He asserts that
no such mute protest on the part of Meade's men oc
curred, and that they lay down merely pending the
824 THE LONG ARM or LEE
organization of a fresh attack, in order to find cover
while the arrangements which necessarily consumed
much time were being made. This may be true, and as
it is more in consonance with the conduct of the Fed
eral Infantry on many other occasions, it probably is.
Swinton did not like Grant. He had been caught, it is
said, eavesdropping about Grant's headquarters, and re
proved by the stern soldier in no gentle terms. Besides
he was writing for home consumption, for already depu
tations were calling upon Lincoln for the removal of
"that butcher Grant." Just as he erred in imputing the
order for the renewal of the assault to Grant, so may
Swinton have been mistaken in other respects. A good
authority declares that Meade's troops, as if by general
agreement, after their bloody repulse in the early morn
ing, pinned white badges on their breasts bearing their
names and addresses, in order that they might be identi
fied by the enemy since they felt certain that they could
not successfully cross the Confederate fire zone. This
circumstance, if true, does not indicate that the troops
were unwilling and did not intend to renew their efforts,
for in no way can that badge be likened to a white fea
ther. On the contrary, it showed that the men who
wore it were resolved to do or die, and rather expected
to die. That many of his officers and men criticised
Grant for what they ignorantly styled the merciless
slaughter of his troops cannot be denied. They failed
to see that in no other way could he defeat Lee except
by fighting, and that to attack the Army of Northern
Virginia behind breastworks, under the most favorable
conditions, meant heavy losses. If their lack of faith in
Grant, coupled with the devotion of the Confederates
in Lee, enhanced the chances of Federal losses, that was
not Grant's fault, as a general. His was not the char
acter, however, which could make a veteran on the battle
field cry out: "God bless Marse Robert. I wish you
were Emperor of this country, and I were your carriage
driver."
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 825
After all criticism has been passed upon Grant and
Meade, the latter a soldier whose great ability was un
fortunately overshadowed by the presence of Grant, and
who grows in stature with the passing of time, Cold
Harbor was but the exemplification of Jackson's state
ment two years before: "We sometimes fail to drive
the Federals from their intrenchments, but they always
fail to drive the Confederates out." Let it be asked
then, who had succeeded before Grant failed?
To return to our narrative. On June 3 and 4, the
Chief of Artillery made a thorough reconnaissance of
the Chickahominy fords below Hill's right. On the 2d,
Ma j . Owen with the 2d, 3d, and 4th companies of Wash
ington Artillery, had been ordered to report to Gen.
Ransom at Bolton's Bridge, and to leave the 1st Com
pany at Drewry's Bluff where the battalion had been
engaged on the 21st of May with Butler's troops and the
Federal gunboats. At 10 A. M. on the 3d the batteries
reached Bolton's Bridge, during the fighting at Cold
Harbor, and were the next day posted at the fords as
far down as the York River railroad bridge by Pendle-
ton. Col. Eshleman now arrived and assumed com
mand. In the meantime, Lieut. -Col. Pemberton, of
Vicksburg fame, arrived with the Richmond Defense
Battalion, in command of Lieut.-Col. C. E. Lightfoot.
This battalion, with Fitz Lee's Division and Shoe
maker's and Johnston's batteries, were held in Bottom's
Ford to guard Lee's right flank. During the 4th, the
enemy appeared, and made strong demonstrations as if
to cross the river, but the fire of the Artillery prevented
their near approach to the ford.
After several days of inactivity, Lee assumed the of
fensive. On the 6th, he endeavored to turn Meade's
right flank by sending Early to the north of Matade-
quin Creek, and again on the 7th by a movement south
of that stream, but the swampy and impassable character
of the terrain prevented any success on both occasions.
When it was discovered on the 7th that the enemy had
withdrawn from Field's front, Haskell's Battalion was
826 THE LONG ARM or LEE
transferred to the south bank of the Chickahominy, and
posted at the Grape Vine and Federal bridges. Dur
ing the better part of the next week, skirmishing at
short range all along the lines from Pickett's front to
the river was incessant, and the Artillery was constantly
engaged, though in a desultory way. So close were the
lines that the guns had to be thoroughly covered, in spite
of which many casualties were incurred, especially in
Cabell's Battalion, which lost the veteran battery com
mander of the 1st Richmond howitzers. No officer in
the Artillery had seen more service than Capt. Ed
ward S. McCarthy, who was shot in the head and killed
on the 4th.
One matter of particular interest in connection with
this random fighting was the employment and develop
ment of Mclntosh's high angle fire with howitzers ad
justed as mortars, a practice which was the outgrowth
of the conditions. This indirect method of fire, ex
tensively employed here for the first time, offered many
advantages inasmuch as it could be delivered without
the exposure of the cannoneers to the vigilant sharp
shooters of the enemy. Exceptionally good effect seems
to have been obtained by Mclntosh with his first howit
zer, which led to the use of others, and this is the only
instance of indirect fire met with so far, except Alex
ander's cannonade of Bank's Ford the preceding year.
It was subsequently used quite extensively at Peters
burg, where it was also necessary to screen the guns and
detachments, but never fully appreciated, nor did it at
tract the attention it warranted. It was to be many
years before Gen. Langlois was to give to the world in
direct fire in its modern stage of perfection.
It was in connection with Mclntosh's experiments
with his howitzers that Pendleton sought the assistance
of the Chief of Ordnance in the preparation of "stink-
shells." In other words he desired to secure a pro
jectile from the bursting of which in the enemy's works
a suffocating effect would be obtained. "It seems at
least worth a trial," he wrote. He also urged that hand
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 827
grenades be provided the Confederate troops to be used
by them in assaulting the enemy's works.* The grenades
were reported to be available for issue, but no "stink-
shells" were made and nothing seems to have come of
the proposal.
On June 5th, Hunter, who had succeeded Milroy, de
feated Jones, who had succeeded Breckinridge, and on
the 12th Breckinridge was ordered to return to the
Valley with his division, and McLaughlin's Battalion of
artillery, to the command of which Lieut. -Col. King
was now assigned, while Maj. Gibbes was transferred
from Cabell's to the command of King's Battalion.
Three days later, when it was discovered that Meade had
again moved towards the Confederate right, Lee also
detached Early's Corps with Nelson's and Braxton's
battalions under Gen. Long, and dispatched the force
via Charlottesville to the Valley. Early's instructions
were to attack Hunter in the rear, and after uniting
with Breckinridge to move down the Valley, cross the
Potomac, and threaten Washington. These orders were
given in the hope that the movement might result in
Grant's recall for the defense of the Capital.
While the main army was engaged with Meade, the
Horse Artillery had been actively employed with the
cavalry divisions. McGregor's Battery, after being
sharply engaged at Stanard's Mill on the Po, from the
16th of May to the 19th, accompanied W. H. F. Lee's
Division as rear guard of the Army to Hanover Junc
tion, and from there to Hanover Courthouse, where on
the 31st it had again been heavily engaged. In this last
action, Lieut. Ford, conspicuous for his gallantry, was
killed. Hart's Battery participated in a small affair at
Ashland on the 1st, and on the same day Shoemaker's
and Johnston's batteries under Breathed were warmly
engaged at Bottom's Bridge, and Cold Harbor, where
three years before Pelham had won such undying
laurels. The story of the service of these batteries is one
in itself, and at the time of which we write perhaps no
*RebclUon Records, Series I, Vol. XXXVI. Part III, pp. 888-889.
828 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
organization in the Army commanded the admiration
and appealed to the pride of the Army as a whole as did
Chew's Battalion of Horse Artillery.* Its record in
marching and fighting is not excelled by that of any ar
tillery battalion that ever took the field.
During the fighting of the first few days of June,
Sheridan had drawn off around Meade's rear and at
tempted another raid on Lynchburg, via Gordonsville,
in cooperation with Hunter's movement up the Valley.
Accordingly on the 8th, Col. Chew and Maj. Breathed
with Hart's, Thomson's, Johnston's, McGregor's, and
Shoemaker's batteries, moved with Hampton's and Fitz
Lee's divisions to intercept the Federal Cavalry, which
they did at Trevillian Depot, on the Virginia Central
Railroad. In this affair, Hart's, Thomson's, and
Johnston's batteries only were engaged, and ably main
tained themselves against Pennington's four horse bat
teries. Next to Brandy Station, this was the largest
purely cavalry combat fought in Virginia, and Chew's
handling of the horse batteries on this occasion was es
pecially brilliant.
It may prove interesting to note the condition of the
Horse Artillery at this time. The report of Capt. John
Esten Cooke, Assistant Inspector General of Artillery
on Pendleton's staff, dated May 25, fully sets forth the
facts.
Johnston's Battery had lost 33 horses since the first
of the month, most of them in action, and many others
were badly broken down. Two guns had teams of but
five and two of but four horses. Shoemaker's Battery,
while it had lost fewer horses in action, was in a worse
plight than Johnston's as to the condition of its teams.
These batteries each required a minimum of 30 horses
to make them fully effective. The five batteries had
lost in all 99 animals and many of the cannoneers had
been relegated to Battery "Q," in order to supply
draught teams.
*Let us hope for the promised history of his battalion, by its commander,
before referred to.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 829
Requisition was immediately made by Pendleton on
the receipt of the report for 100 fresh horses, and he
endorsed Col. Chew's request that McClannahan's and
Jackson's horse batteries of McLaughlin's Battalion be
assigned to his command. Capt. Cooke reported that
every care was being taken of the animals, which were
being grazed whenever possible, in addition to receiving
eight pounds of corn daily.* On the 8th of June, Cooke
inspected Thomson's and Hart's batteries under the
immediate command of Chew, in camp with Hampton's
Division on the Brooke Turnpike above Meadow
Bridge. Their condition he reported as exceptionally
good under the circumstances, especially Thomson's,
as a result of that officer's efficiency and ceaseless care.
At this time, Thomson had 98 and Hart 112 men. The
limbers and caissons were full and the ordnance wagons
well supplied, except with Blakely ammunition, but
mules were needed by the train. The requisition for
horses for the battalion had been filled. So that in spite
of its service and an enormous loss of horses and
casualties aggregating about 100 men for the past
month, the Horse Artillery was in fine fettle, when it
encountered Sheridan at Trevillian's a few days later. t
Griffin's Horse Battery with Chew's and Dement's
4th and 1st Maryland batteries had been detached from
the cavalry in the field and attached to the Maryland
Line, stationed at Richmond under command of Gen.
Bradley T. Johnston.
Notwithstanding the demands upon him incident to
the field operations of the campaign, the Chief of Ar
tillery had not only hastened forward the refitting of
the Horse Artillery, but he had also found time to urge
legislation upon the President for the more complete
organization of the entire artillery arm. In conference
with Long, Alexander, and Walker, on the 3d of May,
he had accepted certain radical proposals drawn up by
Long and at once forwarded them to Gen. Lee. But
hearing nothing from them, he addressed the President
*RebelUon Records, Series I, Vol. XXXVI. Part III, pp 831-847
tlbid., pp. 883, 884, and Part I, p. 1053.
830 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
direct concerning them on June 8, urging that a more
just rule be adopted by Congress with respect to the
authorized quota of artillery officers. The abstract of
the proposed bill follows :
"A battery of field artillery to consist of 4 guns. For such a
battery 100 to 125 effective privates,, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 1
sergeant-major, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 2 buglers, 2 artificers,
1 guidon, 1 captain, 2 first lieutenants, and one second lieutenant.
Six gun batteries now existing may so remain till their number of
men is reduced to the above standard. The batteries shall be
organized into battalions of 3 or 4 batteries, and whenever it can
be done without detriment to the service, batteries from the same
state shall be thrown together. To each battalion of 4 batteries
there should be a lieutenant-colonel and major; 1 adjutant, with
the rank of first lieutenant ; assistant quartermaster, with the rank
of captain; a chaplain, surgeon, and assistant surgeon. Battalions
of 3 batteries may have officers of each grade, or fewer and of less
rank, as commanding generals may recommend. Two or three
battalions may constitute a regimental group, to be commanded by
a colonel, entitled to 1 adjutant, with the rank of captain, and
1 aide with the rank of first lieutenant. Two regimental groups to
form a brigade, to be commanded by a brigadier-general. Staff
of a brigade to be 1 adjutant-general, rank of captain; 1 aide-de
camp, rank of first lieutenant; 1 quartermaster, rank of major;
1 commissary, rank of major; and 1 chief surgeon. The artillery
of an army, provided it consists of two or more brigades, to con
stitute a corps of artillery, to be commanded by a general of
superior rank to a brigadier-general, with a staff as designated by
law for generals of like grade. All appointments above the rank
of captain to be made by selection."
These indeed were radical proposals, but certainly
very wise ones. The contemplated reorganization would
have provided for many promotions in the arm, and re
lieved a situation which was fraught with many diffi
culties. It would not only have greatly enhanced the
efficiency of the arm, but would have enabled many de
serving officers to be awarded well earned promotions.
Again, it would have ruled out politics to a large ex
tent, for Congress would have been restricted to the
appointment of junior officers only, all others depend
ing upon their military records for preferment.
Pendleton's communication was referred by Mr.
Davis to Gen. Bragg, his military adviser, who disap-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 831
proved the proposed method of determining the num
ber of officers in the arm, and declared the gun to be the
proper unit upon which to base the strength of the com
missioned personnel. But he very justly said that the
present proportion of officers to guns was inadequate,
and that he saw no valid reason for restricting the senior
artillery grade to that of brigadier-general. uThe Ar
tillery of an army of three corps like Gen. Lee's is
equivalent in importance to either corps of infantry,"
wrote Bragg. Gen. Lee also declared in favor of the
gun as the proper unit. Every battalion should have
two field officers, and his army was entitled to a major-
general of artillery, while each corps chief, whose com
mand was far more important than that of a brigade of
infantry, should bear the rank of brigadier-general, he
thought.
The matter was referred in September by the Presi
dent to the Secretary of War for conference with the
Committee of Military Affairs, as to the legislation
recommended in his annual message, and in the report
of the Secretary of War advocating an increase in the
commissioned personnel of the Artillery.
At the end of June, the artillery material of the three
corps proper consisted of ninety-four Napoleons, four
24-pounder and six 12-pounder howitzers, twelve 20-
pounder and forty-eight 10-pounder Parrotts, and
thirty- two 3-inch rifles, or a total of 196 pieces including
those of Gibbes', or King's old battalion, which had been
assigned to the 1st Corps in lieu of the Washington Ar
tillery, and not including those of Read's Battalion.
The 2d Corps also had then but four battalions, Cut-
shaw having been assigned to the command of the one
formed by the consolidation of the remnants of his own,
and Page's upon Hardaway's return to duty, Page be
ing relieved from command. If we take King's Bat
talion as counterbalancing the loss of Page's 20 guns, it-
will be seen that Lee had 16 more guns, not including
McLaughlin's, Eshleman's, Lightfoot's, and Owen's, at
Cold Harbor than he started with, and allowing four
22
832 THE LONG AKM OF LEE
pieces for each of the 15 batteries of those four battalions
he must have had, exclusive of the Horse Artillery, at
Cold Harbor, not less than 275 pieces of artillery, while
his infantry had diminished in numbers in spite of rein
forcements by at least 10,000 men. His proportion of
guns to infantry had therefore risen to nearly nine guns
per thousand infantry before he reached Petersburg. In
the meantime, Meade had lost near 60,000 men, killed,
wounded and missing, but had gained fully 40,000 by
reinforcement. His original proportion of artillery had
diminished, however, for nearly one hundred guns had
been returned to the base.
Little remains to be said concerning the Artillery in
the campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor,
which included a rapid series of tremendous combats.
The narrative has traced the movement of the various
commands in detail, and those movements fully expose
the tactics of the arm. It can only be added that nothing
is so accurate a test of efficiency as results, and even the
casual reader must have been impressed by the wonder
ful results obtained by Alexander, Long, and Walker.
It is inconceivable that Lee's Infantry, however superb
it was, could have withstood the shock of the blows which
Grant and Meade aimed at it, had there not been
mingled with its men in the foremost line, and shoulder
to shoulder with them, willing toilers at the muzzles and
the lanyards of the guns. As has been said before, little
opportunity was found to employ artillery in masses,
and it was understood by the gunners from the first that
their part lay in taking the brunt of the Federal at
tacks from the shoulders of the Infantry by ceaseless
vigilance and instant readiness to stem the tide of as
sault before it washed up against the Infantry lines.
They were called upon to do this over and over again,
always, except at North Anna, where no great effort
was made by the enemy, under the most adverse circum
stances, for they found neither commanding positions
nor extensive fields of fire. For the time being, one
might say, they simply took the place of the Infantry,
THE LONG ARM or LEE 833
and only once, at the Bloody Angle, did they allow the
enemy to cross bayonets with their sister arm. What a
record indeed is this !
To one more point must attention be called. From
the day of the rapid concentration of the Artillery along
the Rapidan on the 5th of May, there was never an hour
when every battery of Lee's Army was not either in
position, in immediate support, or on the march and
actually with the infantry divisions. Not one single
instance of delay in the movement of the Artillery, or
of a single battery, has been encountered, for the simple
reason that the wonderful organization it had been given
and the remarkable artillery leaders the war had de
veloped, always enabled the batteries to be in the first
line. One may search military history in vain for a
parallel. It will not be found in the Napoleonic cam
paigns, nor will it be found in the French War of 1859,
the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of
1866, or in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. Read
Hohenlohe, who never fails to present the record of the
Prussian Artillery in its best garb, and see how great
masses of artillery remained idle at the critical moment ;
how the unwieldy columns blocked the roads in the rear
of the armies, and then remember that the beautiful
countries of Bohemia and France, with their wide
chausses and rolling hills afforded ideal artillery terrain
as compared to the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, and the
almost pathless forests of Hanover, where scarce a clear
ing a mile wide or a commanding position is to be found.
Then pursue the investigation further and study the
operations of the Federal Artillery with Grant, and it
will be found that near 100 of his guns were returned
to Washington because no adequate use could be made
of them, nor were those which he retained wholly em
ployed at any one time. As a matter of fact, fewer
were engaged in any one battle than remained idle, and
this in spite of Hunt with all his skill and ability.
CHAPTER XLI
COLD HARBOR TO PETERSBURG
AFTER dispatching the 2d Corps to the Valley, Gen.
Lee moved the 1st and 3d Corps across White Oak
Swamp to the neighborhood of Riddles Shop, at which
point Wilcox's Division and Pegram's and Macintosh's
battalions relieved the Cavalry and pressed back the
enemy's advance. In this affair, Pegram with his old
battery, now commanded by Capt. Cayce, made a most
superb attack upon the enemy's leading troops, display
ing all the dash and strength of his character. During
the past campaign, he had, though constantly engaged,
found little opportunity to exhibit his rarest quality,
which was rapidity of action, but nevertheless his serv
ices had been distinguished and his reputation as a
fighter was unsurpassed by that of any artilleryman in
the Army. Very small, slight of figure, and only about
twenty-four years old, he had the heart of a lion and, as
the men said, "was always itching for a fight." Fortun
ate indeed is the officer who acquires such a reputation,
for it is such men that instill in those under their com
mand the elan which carries them on to victory. Illus
trative of the feeling of the soldiers who knew him to
wards this youthful and dashing artilleryman, the fol
lowing anecdote is recounted. On a certain occasion
when it was doubtful if there was to be a fight, Pegram
was seen galloping down the line of the infantry from
position to position occupied by his batteries, followed
by Capt. W. Gordon McCabe, his adjutant, who, like
Pegram, was a veritable game-cock. The troops were in
the humor for fighting, and as an old veteran spied the
pair of artillerymen approaching, he rose from the
trenches, waved his hat aloft and cried, "Come on, boys!
Here comes that d— — n little man with the glasses.
We're going to fight 'em now."
On the 12th, Read's Battalion, accompanying Hoke's
Division, marched from Cold Harbor to Petersburg, ar-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 835
riving there on the 15th, and was immediately thrown
into position near the Hare house to repel the threatened
attaek. During the 14th, 15th, and 16th, the 1st and 3d
corps remained in observation of the enemy near Mal-
vern Hill, while part of Lee's Army opposed Butler
on the south side of the river. It was from their
present position that Lee expected the enemy to attempt
an advance against Richmond, but Grant had deter
mined to cross the James at Wilcox's Landing, ten
miles below City Point and entirely out of Lee obser
vation, and to move thence directly upon Petersburg
with his whole army. This movement had been sug
gested to him by Halleck some days before, and Grant
was also, no doubt, familiar with McClellan's intention
to do the same thing just three years before. His pro
posed line of operations would lead him in the rear of
Butler and enable him to fall on the extreme right of
the Confederate defensive line, which now rested at
Petersburg, for the defense of which only a part of the
troops of the Department of North Carolina and South
ern Virginia under Gen. Beauregard were immediately
available, in addition to Lee's Army, which he hoped to
elude and outmarch. This was all but accomplished,
for while Lee remained on the north bank of the James,
watching what he believed to be the entire Federal force,
Grant had performed a feat unheard of before, and with
secrecy and celerity transferred nearly his entire army
across the river. On the 15th, 16th, and 17th, part of
his troops were actually arriving at Petersburg and en
deavoring to take the city, and were only prevented
from doing it, on the 15th, by Wise's Brigade, not more
than 1,200 strong, two small regiments of cavalry under
Dearing, Moseley's Battalion and Sturdivant's and
Martin's batteries with 22 guns, and some old men and
boys called Local Reserves, or a total force of less than
3,000 of all arms and conditions. The resistance of these
troops was grandly heroic and they have never received
the credit their conduct deserved, for they stood between
Lee and disaster, against odds perhaps never before
836 THE LONG ARM or LEE
paralleled. It was only upon the most urgent repre
sentations that Lee was persuaded by Beauregard to
send reinforcements to Petersburg, for the great soldier
could not believe that the Federals had crossed the river.
He finally sent Hoke's Division and Read's Battalion
of artillery from Drewry's Bluff on the morning of the
18th. With 18 miles to go, the head of Hoke's column
reached Petersburg at sunset, having traveled partly by
rail; the bulk of the division by forced marching, at 9
p. M. All that day, while Wise and Dearing were re
sisting the ever-increasing pressure at Petersburg, Lee
remained near Malvern Hill, his attention occupied by
the Federal Cavalry, but when on the morrow he finally
concluded that a part of Grant's troops had crossed the
James, he set the 1st Corps in motion for the south side
of the river.
Early in the morning, Pickett's and Field's divisions
with Huger's, Haskell's, and Gibbes' battalions, crossed
the pontoon bridge near Drewry's Bluff and advanced
towards the Bermuda Hundred lines, from which Beau-
regard had been compelled to withdraw Bushrod John
son's Division on the night of the 15th for the support
of Wise at Petersburg.
Kershaw's Division was halted near Drewry's Bluff.
The next day Pickett and Field, after a skirmish with
Butler's troops near Port Walthall, in which Alexan
der's two battalions were engaged, recovered Beaure-
gard's abandoned lines. On that same day, Kershaw's
Division, with Cabell's Battalion, and the 3d Corps with
its artillery, which had encamped the previous day near
Chaffin's Bluff, also crossed the river upon the bridge
near Drewry's Bluff, and was ordered to Bermuda Hun
dred. On the 18th, Pickett's Division, with Huger's
Battalion, established itself on a line fronting Bermuda
Hundred from Howie tt's on the James River, to the
confluence of Swift Creek with the Appomattox.
During the 15th, 16th, and 17th, Beauregard had
made a grand fight against the head of Grant's Army,
THE LONG ARM or LEE 837
but at last was compelled to request reinforcements or
instructions for his retreat. The fighting at Petersburg
had lasted until midnight on the 17th, and he knew that
his small force, now consisting of Wise's, Elliott's, and
Johnson's brigades of Bushrod Johnson's Division, and
Hoke's Division, a total of about 14,000 infantry, could
no longer maintain the lines. Already he had been
forced to relinquish the outer works of the eastern de
fenses and fall back upon a new line hastily laid off from
the river and running from the Hare house and Bland-
ford Cemetery to the Rives house.
After the receipt of Beauregard's dispatch on the
night of the 17th, Kershaw was ordered to march to
Petersburg, though Lee was not yet convinced that
Beauregard was correctly informed about the enemy.
It was not until a third staff officer arrived from Beau-
regard at 3 A. M. on the 18th, that Lee was convinced
that Grant's entire army was massing in front of Peters
burg. He now sent orders to Anderson to march with
Field's and Pickett's divisions for Petersburg, where
Kershaw arrived about 7 :30 A. M.
Upon his new line, Beauregard had skillfully posted
his artillery under Col. Hilary P. Jones. It consisted
of Read's, Moseley's, Coit's, and Boggs' battalions.
This large artillery force of sixteen batteries and 53
guns had proved of inestimable value to him in his
defense of Petersburg. Without it he could never have
maintained the front he did from the 15th to the 17th.
As it was now merged into Lee's Army, let us examine
its organization. With the organization of Read's Bat
talion, we are already familiar. That of the other bat
talions was as follows:
MOSELEY'S BATTALION
Maj. Edgar F. Moseley
Yorktown Battery, Capt. Edward R, Young.
Macon (Ga.) Battery, Capt. C. W. Staten.
Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg% Capt. John O. Miller.
Battery "C", 13th N. C. Batt., Capt. James D. Gumming.
838 THE LONG ARM or LEE
COIT'S BATTALION
Maj. James C. Coit
Halifax Battery, Capt. Samuel T. Wright.
Petersburg Battery, Capt. Richard G. Pegram.
S. C. "Chesterfield" Battery, Capt. James I. Kelly.
Miss. Confederate Guards Battery, Capt. William D. Bradford.
BOGGS' BATTALION
Maj. Francis J. Boggs
Albemarle Battery, Capt. N. C. Sturdivant.
Richmond Battery, Capt. S. Taylor Martin.
Read's Battalion after being engaged at Cold Har
bor on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of June, had reached Peters
burg on the afternoon of the 17th in time to materially
assist in the defense. Moseley's Battalion which had
been organized about the time of Butler's advance, had
been engaged in the fighting at Drewry's Bluff, and on
the Bermuda Hundred lines, when Beauregard bot
tled up the Army of the James so successfully. Its
commander had formerly served as a field officer in the
1st Virginia Regiment of Artillery, after its organiza
tion by Col. John Thompson Brown as part of Ma-
gruder's Army in 1861. Coit's Battalion had been
organized for service in North Carolina in the early
spring, later operating with Beauregard against But
ler. Both Moseley's and Coit's battalions had rendered
excellent service. Boggs' Battalion had only been
organized on the 17th as such. Hitherto its two batter
ies had operated independently in the vicinity of Peters
burg, and had been engaged against Butler. On June
5, Capt. Sturdivant and two of his guns had been
captured.
The batteries of these battalions averaged about four
guns and 90 men, and therefore comprised a valuable
addition to Pendleton's command, depleted by the de
taching of Long's two battalions, especially since Lee
was now called upon to defend so extensive a line.
On the morning of the 18th, before Lee's troops ar
rived, Bradford's three 20-pounder Parrotts and
THE LONG ARM or LEE 839
Wright's five Napoleons of Coit's Battalion were placed
in position on the north bank of the Appomattox to en
filade the approaches to Beauregard's left. The rest of
Jones' Artillery was either placed along or in rear of the
infantry trenches of the new line, and all of it was most
effectively employed during the day.
At 4 A. M., the 18th, Grant made a general advance
with the 2d, 5th, and 7th Corps, while the 6th and 18th
were held in reserve. He learned during the morning
with the utmost surprise that Beauregard's whole force
during the preceding days consisted of but two small
divisions, and very much chagrined he now urged his
corps commanders to press forward with energy and
carry the new line before it could be materially strength
ened. Meade himself fixed noon as the hour of attack.
By that time, Kershaw had relieved Johnson, and
Jones' guns had been skillfully disposed. Field's Divi
sion had also begun to arrive and occupy the trenches
on Kershaw's left, while Hoke and Wise remained in
position.
About midday the assault commenced, falling princi
pally on Wise and Hoke next to the river, but was re
pulsed with loss, Wright and Bradford simply tearing
the Federal ranks to shreds with their enfilade fire, while
the other batteries of Beauregard's command swept the
approaches with a most destructive frontal fire. So suc
cessfully did Jones' battalions perform their task that a
variance occurs in the reports of the fighting this day,
which can only be attributed to the effect of the "long
arm." Humphreys states that every Federal Corps as
saulted in force and that they were repulsed with loss,
while on the Confederate side the day was not considered
as one of general battle by the infantry, but as one of
artillery fighting alone.
"It was necessary to wait until night before Beauregard's
artillery could receive its plaudit of 'Well done,, good and faithful
servant/ and be relieved by fresh battalions of Longstreet's Corps.
Of all the moonlight nights I can remember, I recall that Saturday
night as perhaps the most brilliant and beautiful. The weather
was exceedingly dry., the air perfectly calm, with an exhilarating
840 THE LONG ARM or LEE
electrical quality in it. The dust rose with every movement and
hung in the air. The whole landscape was bathed and saturated
in silver,, and sounds were unusually distinct and seemed to be
alive and to travel everywhere. It was not a night for sleep in
the trenches. There was a great deal to be done at all points to
strengthen and improve them., and every man was personally inter
ested in working at his immediate location.
"In spite of all pains, the drawing out of old guns and approach
of new was attended with sounds which wandered far, and with
luminous clouds of dust gradually rising in the air. Then the
enemy would know we were moving, and there would come crashes
of musketry at random and volleys of artillery from their lines.
Then our infantry would imagine themselves attacked, and would
respond in like fashion, and the fire would run along the parapet
to right and left, and gradually subside for a while, to break out
presently somewhere else."
Such is Gen. Alexander's graphic description of the
night of the 18th of June, when with his accustomed
energy and bravery he was engaged with Lieut. -Col.
Branch of Beauregard's Artillery in replacing the lat-
ter's guns with his own. All through this work, his ex
posure was constant and to the verge of recklessness, but
there was work to be done, and in spite of the protests of
his men he galloped back and forth, ordering here, sug
gesting there, and utterly regardless of his own safety
until all was done that the exigencies of the situation re
quired. As the 1st Corps arrived, it had taken position
on Beauregard's right. After substituting Huger's
guns for Jones' along Hoke's and Wise's front, Alex
ander then placed two batteries of Haskell's and
Gibbes' Battalion in the trenches between the Baxter
Road and the Rives house. Haskell's remaining batter
ies were then posted on elevated positions in the second
line.
Beginning at the salient formed by the junction of
the new with the old works, known as the Rives salient,
where he posted Richardson's Battalion, Col. Walker, to
whose command the Washington Artillery had now been
assigned, occupied the line with the batteries of the 3d
Corps on Alexander's right, and extending around to
the south and west as far as the Weldon Railroad.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 841
The works comprising the line of defense at Peters
burg were by far the most pretentious which the Con
federates had yet occupied. With the exception of the
portion of the line recently established by Beauregard
when forced back on the 17th, they had been laid out by
engineer officers and constructed in advance by slave
labor. Every advantage of terrain had been taken and
a broad field of fire for artillery cleared in front of the
line. Of course there were defects, but to a large ex
tent these were corrected as they developed, and the
works throughout were rapidly extended and improved.
The trenches at Cold Harbor had barely afforded cover
for the infantry, and the epaulments for the guns
were there of the crudest kind, but now the artillery was
to fight behind real cover and placed to the best ad
vantage after careful reconnaissance of the approaches.
The morning after Pendleton's Artillery arrived, the
Chief of Artillery accompanied by Gen. Beauregard
visited the north bank of the river and, after a rapid in
spection of the terrain, ordered Lane's Battalion and
Penick's Battery of Richardson's to move over and
fortify the commanding eminence at the Archer House,
while Chew's and Clutter's batteries of Mclntosh's Bat
talion, under Maj. Marmaduke Johnson, were ordered
to be intrenched on a lower elevation half a mile higher
up the river. Poague's Battalion under Capt. Utter-
back joined Bradford's and Wright's batteries im
mediately opposite the point where the main line rested
on the south bank of the river. There were now, there
fore, about fifty guns placed to enfilade the approaches
to the Confederate left. But Grant did not renew his
assaults on the 19th, and his troops occupied themselves
intrenching where they had bivouacked during the night
in close proximity to the Confederate works. The op
posing lines thus established by accident in a measure
remained substantially unchanged until Lee's evacua
tion ten months later.*
*Por a detailed account of the Richmond Artillery defenses at this time,
see Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXXVI, Part III, pp. 809-11. There were
38 pieces of position on the lines, with a force of Heavy Artillery aggregating
2,893 present for duty, and the 1st, 2d, and 4th Maryland field batteries with
232 men and 10 guns. Ibid., p. 861.
CHAPTER XLII
PETERSBURG THE SIEGE COMMENCES
FROM the day the two armies confronted each other,
sharpshooting and artillery practice were incessant,
while both sides labored constantly, improving their
works. The great enfilading group of guns north of the
river to the command of which Col. Cutts had been as
signed, and to which several 30-pounder Parrotts and
12-pounder Whitworths were added and placed in po
sition at the Archer house, at once attracted the atten
tion of the Federal Artillery. When Cutts opened on
the enemy's line on the 20th, the effect of his fire, enfi
lade, and on some points of the opposing line reverse,
was so overwhelming as to cause great confusion among
the Federals, and lead to an almost immediate change
of position. A great effort was now made by Hunt to
silence the Confederate group. During the next few
days, Abbott's reserve artillery regiment of 1,700 men
with 60 mortars, ranging from 24-pounder Coehorns to
10-inch sea coast pieces, was brought up and undertook
to subdue Cutts' fire, but all in vain. His men toiled
all the harder at their fortifications and soon protected
themselves and their guns with bomb proofs and works
of the most substantial character. In the meantime,
however, they had suffered many casualties from Ab
bott's terrific mortar fire, including Lieut. Lucius G.
Rees, of Cutts' Battalion, who had so distinguished him
self on the North Anna, killed, and Lieut. James of the
same battery, wounded.
The effect of the Federal mortar fire was also felt at
other points of the line, and steps were now taken by
Gen. Alexander to counteract it. Fortunately, he had
ordered some 12-pounder mortars constructed in Rich
mond several weeks before, and these began to ar
rive on the 24th. They were light and convenient to
handle, and with characteristic energy and skill Alex-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 843
ander placed them at points where they could best as
sist in the defense of the weaker salients of the line, up
against which the enemy had pressed to short range.
The number of these mortars was gradually increased
until twenty-seven 12-pounder, 24-pounder, and 8-inch
mortars were in position along Beauregard's line, and
thirteen of like caliber beyond the Rives salient. Inte
rior lines were now constructed at the gorges of the
salients, a number of heavy pieces of position from Rich
mond placed therein to reply to six 100-pounder and
forty 30-pounder Parrotts, which Abbott had drawn
from his seige train and mounted in the permanent works
along Beauregard's abandoned line. These redoubts,
with the infantry trenches which connected them, formed
a veritable citadel, behind which a small force of de
fenders were secure against assault, and enabled Grant
to constantly extend his lines to the west, while a system
of redans and infantry trenches in their front and
pushed close up to the Confederate works made detach
ment of the Confederate troops from their front ex
tremely risky. But the weakest part of the Confederate
line was Elliott's salient, named from the brigade as
signed to its defense. Here the edge of the deep valley
of Poor Creek, which ran nearly parallel to the
Confederate line of works, was but 133 yards distant,
while the depression afforded ample space and perfect
cover for the massing of a large body of infantry. Along
the rear edge of this valley, the Federals threw up strong
rifle pits with elaborate head-logs and loop-holes from
which an incessant fire was kept up upon the Confed
erates. At this point, Col. Walker posted Cayce's Bat
tery of Pegram's Battalion, and under cover of night
the men managed to place obstructions in front of the
parapet.
On the 20th, Thomson's, Hart's, Shoemaker's and
Johnston's batteries were engaged the entire day at the
White House with Fitz Lee and Hampton, who had
returned from Trevillian's, and underwent the unusual
experience of horse artillery fighting both field artillery
844 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
and gunboats at the same time.* Two days later, Mc
Gregor's Battery was engaged with W. H. F. Lee in
an affair with Wilson's and Kautz's Cavalry at the
Davis house on the Weldon Railroad. The Federal
Cavalry was followed by W. H. F. Lee to the Staunton
River, where its progress was barred by local militia and
a force of artillery at the bridge. Attacked in rear by
the Confederate Cavalry, with an impassable stream in
their front, Wilson and Kautz decided after having done
much damage to the railroads to return to Petersburg,
and in doing so were assailed by Hampton's, Fitz Lee's,
and W. H. F. Lee's brigades, two brigades of infantry
under Mahone, Cayce's Battery under Pegram and the
entire Horse Battalion under Chew and Breathed at
Reams Station, where they were completely routed,
losing 1,500 men, two horse batteries complete with
twelve guns, and their wagon trains. In this affair, Pe
gram, Chew, and Breathed were in their glory, and in no
engagement of the war did the Horse Artillery display
greater dash, notwithstanding the preceding weeks of
constant marching and fighting.
Another affair in which the Artillery shone with par
ticular brilliance had, meantime, occurred at Petersburg,
in which Mclntosh was the bright star.
Advised on the 22d of a movement by the 2d and 6th
Federal Corps from their works opposite Hill, against
the railroads on his right, Lee sent Hill with Wilcox's
and Mahone's divisions, supported by Johnson's, to
meet it. Mclntosh with the 1st Maryland Battery
under Lieut. Gale was to move out with the infantry.
Hill's orders were to strike the enemy while stretched
out to the left, while Col. Walker's Artillery cooperated
with him from the lines. When all was ready, Mc
lntosh with Gale's section of Clutter's Battery galloped
forward to within a few hundred yards of the enemy's
intrenchments and opened upon their columns, instantly
causing confusion among them, while the infantry
*It will be recalled that the artillery had engaged gunboats on the Rappa-
hannock in 1862. Forrest also attacked gunboats on the Tennessee River with
Morton's horse batteries.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 845
rushed forward under cover of his fire and carried the
Federal line. Lieut. Wilkes' section of Capt. Valentine
J. Clutter's Richmond Battery, recently added to Mc-
Intosh's Battalion, now moved out and supported Gale.
While Wilcox obstructed the advance of the 6th Corps,
Mahone and Johnson passed through a gap between it
and the 2d Corps, and struck Barlow's Division, which
was moving around the 6th Corps, in the rear, capturing
1,700 prisoners and four guns, which were successfully
brought off during the night by Hill after also routing
Mott's Division. The conduct of Mclntosh, Gale, and
Wilkes on this occasion elicited the highest praise from
all arms, and gives us a rare instance of light batteries
actually maneuvering between intrenchments. One is
almost compelled to inquire if there were any limitation
upon what the artillerymen would attempt.
Lee now planned an attack on Meade's right to be
preceded by a great artillery preparation. It was hoped
that the infantry under cover of Cutts' enfilading and
Alexander's frontal fire might reach the Federal mortar
batteries and recover the outer line. Promptly on the
morning of the 24th, the Artillery opened the greatest
cannonade which the siege had yet seen, but for some
reason no infantry assault occurred. The cannonade was
not without its effect, however, for the enemy was im
pressed with the futility of making subsequent attempts
in that quarter, by the tremendous power which the Ar
tillery developed.
During the next few days, Gen. Alexander's atten
tion was especially attracted by the enemy's activity in
front of the Elliott salient. Having been an engineer
officer of some experience, he detected signs, which con
vinced him that underground work was going on. He
had confidently expected each morning to see a "Flying
Dutchman" in that quarter, or some other evidence of
the opening of approaches across the narrow space in
front of the salient, but instead he had noted an increase
of musketry fire from the Federal works there, and a
diminishment of alertness among the enemy's sharp-
846 THE LONG ARM or LEE
shooters on either side. Each day he visited the salient
and carefully watched what was going on. On his way
back to his headquarters on the 30th, he was slightly
wounded by a sharpshooter, and before leaving the
Army the next day, for six weeks, to visit his home in
Georgia, he called at Gen. Lee's headquarters in per
son and reported his views about the mine. Mr. Law-
ley, an English war correspondent of the London
Times,, was present and inquired how far it would be
necessary for the Federals to mine, and when told by
Alexander the distance was 500 feet, he replied that
the tunnel at the Siege of Delhi, the longest ever dug,
was but 400 feet, and that it was found impossible to
ventilate a longer gallery. Alexander replied that there
were many Pennsylvania miners in Meade's Army, and
that military precedents would not deter them from
making the attempt. It so happened that upon the
advice of Lieut.-Col. Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsyl
vania Regiment, a coal miner, against the advice of
every engineer in Meade's Army, the Federals had
opened a gallery on the 27th of June, just two days be
fore Alexander called Lee's attention to the danger.
Alexander did not return to the Army until August
18, Cabell commanding the Artillery of the 1st Corps
in his absence, but upon his advice Huger was assigned
to the command of the guns and mortars near the
salient. The day after his departure Gen. Lee directed
his engineers to open countermines. Shafts with listen
ing galleries were promptly sunk, unfortunately, on the
flanks of the salient, for the Federals were tunneling
straight for its apex and their operations were not
heard. Had Alexander been present, it is safe to say
the battle of the Crater would never have been fought,
for having devoted so much attention to the salient, he
would most certainly have been placed in charge of the
countermines and would have caused the first one to be
opened at the apex. From that point the enemy's mining
20 feet below the surface would readily have been de
tected and their gallery destroyed by the explosion of a
camoufletj or smothered mine.
CHAPTER XLIII
THE TRENCHES IN JULY
THE strength of the Artillery about Richmond and
Petersburg had been greatly enhanced during the past
month while the Infantry composed of Johnson's and
Hoke's divisions of Beauregard's Army, Pickett's,
Field's, and Kershaw's divisions of the 1st Corps, An
derson's, Heth's, and Wilcox's divisions of the 3d
Corps, showed a marked diminishment. In fact, re
cruiting for the Infantry had almost come to a standstill,
and on July 10, while the paper strength of the fore
going commands aggregated 103,178 men, there were
but 51,867 present for duty. In the Cavalry Corps com
posed of Hampton's, Fitz Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's
divisions, with 23,180 men on the rolls, there were but
10,493 effectives in the field. In marked contrast to
these figures are those of the Artillery which, not in
cluding Long's command in the Valley, numbered
6,472 present for duty, with an aggregate present and
absent of 9,435. In other words, while Lee was able
to muster but half his infantry and cavalry in the field,
but one-third of his artillery personnel was absent, a
fact which seems to testify to a comparatively high state
of discipline in the artillery arm.
To the work of maintaining his corps, Pendleton
constantly addressed himself. Furthermore, he now
sought to bring order in his arm out of the chaos into
which the recent campaign, with its heavy losses, had
necessarily thrown the Army.
It will be recalled that when Longstreet moved to
Petersburg en route to Tennessee, he had started from
the Rapidan with Alexander's, Walton's, and Dearing's
battalions, but that the first only through a change of
plans accompanied him to the West, the Washington
Artillery and Dearing's Battalion remaining through
out the winter in the Department of North Carolina
2?,
848 THE LONG ARM or LEE
and Southern Virginia with Pickett. Since that time,
these two battalions had considered themselves no
longer an integral part of the 1st Corps to which they
had been assigned by G. O. No. 19, June 4, 1863. True,
they had rejoined the Army at Cold Harbor in June,
but they had not fallen under Alexander's immediate
control. In fact, Dearing's old command under Read
had again been detached to Petersburg with Hoke's Di
vision, and the Washington Artillery, to the command
of which Lieut. -Col. Eshleman had been assigned, after
his provisional battalion had been broken up, later ac
companied the 3d Corps to Petersburg.
Since the battle of Gettysburg, where Walton was
so rudely displaced by his junior, the Washington
Artillery had not been well disposed towards Alex
ander. These troops were serving in a foreign land and
were naturally sensitive to anything in the nature of a
slight to their old commander, so they had welcomed
their separation from the 1st Corps Artillery to the com
mand of which Alexander had been assigned, March 1,
1864, with advanced rank from February 26. And so,
when on June 13, Lee commenced his movement from
Cold Harbor, the Washington Artillery applied direct
to the President to be allowed to attach itself to the 3d
Corps. * This was of course a violation of army regu
lations, but it must be remembered that state politics
entered into the affairs of the Army of Northern Vir
ginia, as in the case of all other armies that have ever
taken the field. Dissatisfaction on the part of these
troops with the persistent disregard of Walton's claims
was now open, and as his case was undoubtedly the
principal matter in the politics of the Artillery Corps,
the facts should be cited.
On coming into the field in May, 1861, Maj. Walton
was the senior artillery officer in the Army and com
manded the largest artillery organization. After First
Manassas, an act of Congress was passed at the instance
of Beauregard to authorize the promotion of artillery
*In Camp and Battle With the Washington Artillery Battalion, Owen, p. 329.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 849
officers, Walton's case being especially mentioned as a
deserving one. Under this provision, Walton was pro
moted Colonel and assigned to duty as Chief of Ar
tillery of the Army of the Potomac, retaining immediate
command of the Louisiana Battalion. Soon after this,
Pendleton, who had been advanced from the grade of
captain, subsequent to Walton's arrival in Virginia,
was promoted to the grade of colonel with temporary
rank, under the law authorizing the President to con
fer such rank. Though still Walton's junior, he was
again promoted and made brigadier-general and
chief of artillery, when the reorganization in the
winter occurred, and Col. Walton was assigned to duty
as chief of artillery of the 1st Corps. In the mean
time, Beauregard and Longstreet repeatedly recom
mended the promotion of Walton, who was by service
the senior artillery officer in the Confederate armies,
but it was announced that no more brigadier-generals
of artillery would be appointed. All this, and his dis
placement at Gettysburg was taken by Walton with
commendable grace, though naturally he was much
chagrined. Beauregard had, just after the reorganiza
tion, written him as follows : "I regret to hear that you
have not been promoted to the rank of brigadier-
general of artillery, which in the estimation of your
friends you have won by your efficient services on so
many glorious battlefields, commencing with Bull Run.
If my testimony to your efficiency, zeal and capacity,
whilst commanding the Battalion of Washington Ar
tillery in the Army of the Potomac and acting as chief
of artillery of the First Corps of that Army, can be
of any service to you I will willingly give it to you, not
as a favor, but as a right to which you are entitled."
And Longstreet, before the reorganization, wrote him:
"I have on three occasions and several times in conver
sation expressed my opinion and wishes in favor of hav
ing you promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. I
still think your services give you the best claim to the
promotion of any officer in the service, and I am quite
850 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
satisfied you are as well qualified to fill the office. I
still hope your promotion may soon come." But it will
be recalled that these letters were written early in the
war and before experience showed the necessity of
trained artillery leaders. Beauregard was from Louisi
ana himself, and Longstreet from Georgia, and it is a
fact that before the tremendous campaigns of 1862
welded the Army of Northern Virginia into a thor
oughly organized and disciplined fighting machine,
state prejudices were rife and entered into every ap
pointment. In fact, Longstreet, above all others, per
sisted to the end in harping on the favoritism he
imagined was shown Virginians. But it must be re
called that Pendleton owed his preferment over Walton
largely to Mr. Davis' influence, with whom he had been
a cadet at West Point, and besides the day was one
when graduates of the United States Military Academy
were in the ascendant.
Though a veteran of the Mexican War, Walton was
not a West Pointer. To soothe his disappointment, he
was now offered the command of a Louisiana Brigade
with advanced rank in the infantry, but this he refused,
as he could not see how assignment to the command of
an infantry brigade of 1,000 men, in lieu of that over
80 guns, was really a promotion. The next affronts to
Walton were the appointment of Long as brigadier-
general September 21, 1863, Shoup during the winter
in the Western Army, and Alexander, his second rank
ing battalion commander, March 1, 1864, with rank
from February 26. In the meantime, Col. Stephen D.
Lee, of the Artillery, had been promoted and assigned
to the command of an infantry brigade in the West,
November 6, 1862, soon to be again promoted August
3, 1863. Whatever Longstreet's early views about
Walton may have been, it would not seem that he had
long retained them, for he supplanted him, as we have
seen, at Gettysburg by Alexander and intentionally
left him behind when he made his expedition to Tennes
see. One thing seems certain. If Longstreet still, in
THE LONG ARM or LEE 851
1863, professed the advocacy of Walton's promotion,
he was not acting in good faith or was doing so to secure
his transfer from the 1st Corps.
In the meantime, Walton was not the only artillery
officer sidetracked. Col. Cabell had been persistently
overslaughed because of his age. His own adjutant has
recorded that this distinguished member of a proud and
historic family "lacked self-assertion and aggression;
to some extent, too, he lacked the manner and bearing
of a soldier, and he never maneuvered for position for
himself or his battalion."* "His essential characteristics
were a pure and unselfish nature, tender and affectionate
heart, gentle and unfailing courtesy, single-hearted and
devoted partiotism, quiet but indomitable courage."
"He was a man of intellect and culture, as well as char
acter." But all these virtures together did not spell
fitness for high command in the Artillery and their very
enumeration points to the fact that his military confi
dante knew he lacked the dash and ability requisite for
successful leadership and confirms the estimate of him
entertained at headquarters which has been previously
stated. A serious effort, it will be recalled, was made
to sidetrack Cabell by transferring him to the defenses
of Richmond, and there was even the suggestion that he
be given advanced rank in order that it might be accom
plished. Upon learning from his friends of this sug
gested promotion, the gallant old soldier was much
gratified, until by accident he discovered the motive,
when he flamed into an ungovernable rage and de
manded to know if he was taken for a "damned sneak
and coward and fool." He surrendered his old bat
talion, it is true, but not until Appomattox.
We have seen how Col. Brown was overslaughed in
the interest of Long, not by reason of lack of ability,
for he was an exceptionally fine officer, competent and
successful, but because Long's claims were more ac
ceptable at headquarters. Cabell and Brown, like Wal
ton, were not West Pointers. From the foregoing
*Four Years Under Marse Robert, Stiles, p. 155.
852 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
facts, it does not appear that Walton was the only one
who was overslaughed, whether justly or not, or that
state politics alone controlled in his case. Indeed, we
can go still further in tracing the effort to hand the
tactical reins of the Artillery over to young and trained
soldiers, for was not Pendleton himself, at first seized
upon with such avidity as the senior artilleryman,
gradually displaced from tactical command? The ef
fort to dispose of him on the battlefield has been clearly
perceptible in every reorganization of the arm. In fact,
except with regard to his actual rank, his case was not
dissimilar to that of Walton's, and an unprejudiced stu
dent of the Army of Northern Virginia will be com
pelled to admit that all these unfortunate maneuvers,
disappointing as they were to certain faithful soldiers
and their friends, were in the interest of artillery effi
ciency. Of course Walton and Cabell could not ap
preciate this. Soon after Alexander's promotion, Wal
ton had applied to be relived from duty with the Army
of Northern Virginia, and at his own suggestion was
assigned to duty as Inspector of Field Artillery at
Large. During his absence, a strong effort developed
in the Artillery arm to declare all positions not actually
filled in the mobile army vacant, in order that adequate
promotion might be given officers present in the field.
In pursuance of this hard plan, concerning which much
is to be said on both sides, Maj. S. F. Pierson, who had
not served with the Army in the field for several years,
but who still held his commission therein, was trans
ferred to the Virginia Reserves on July 21, and Lieut. -
Col. John S. Saunders was transferred to the Inspector
Generals Department.* But Walton had a friend at
court in Gen. Bragg, who had him ordered back to the
Army to prevent his elimination. Returning to the
Army after an arduous tour of duty in the South, Wal
ton now found it necessary to accept service under those
formerly his juniors, or resign. While he did not dis
parage the ability of Long and Alexander, yet he did
*Rel)enion Records, Series I, Vol. XL, Part III, pp. 790, 797.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 853
not feel that such a course was consistent with his
dignity. Furthermore, he was forced to the conclusion
upon a review of events than his services were no longer
valued. Accordingly on July 18, he tendered his
resignation and addressed a remarkable and pathetic
communication to his gallant command, in which much
of the foregoing matter is included. "It is with re
luctance," wrote he, "that I have been forced from the
service, with grief that I find myself separated from
you, with whom, I had hoped, should Providence per
mit, to return to the city of our home. Circumstances
have denied me this privilege ; but harsh as may be their
decree, they cannot rob me of the consolatory conviction
that while with you I tried to deserve your affection
and esteem, nor of the hope that while absent I may
retain them."
In the diary of the Washington Artillery as an entry
of July 20, the following is found: "The resignation
of our gallant old chief, Col. Walton, has been accepted.
We shall never cease to regret the circumstances that
have induced this action. All our hearts are so attached
to him, that no one, no matter how capable he may
prove himself, can command the Washington Artillery
as he has done, in peace as well as in war." Such were
the sentiments which animated the men of that splendid
command, whose services in Virginia were so heroic and
so unselfish from first to last. But it is not difficult to
see in the pages of the diary quoted from that the cir
cumstances which entailed the resignation of Walton
were appreciated in their proper light, as well as la
mented. The devotion of his officers and men to Wal
ton could not blind them to the fact that his age (54
years) and physical strength had rendered him un-
suited to further activity in the field.
On the day of Walton's resignation, the Washington
Artillery was ordered to rejoin the 1st Corps, and
regularly report through its chief. This order of Gen.
Pendleton's no doubt precipitated Walton's final action.
But special authority was obtained from the President
854 THE LONG ARM or LEE
overruling Pendleton's order, and the battalion was as
signed to Col. Walker's 3d Corps Artillery, although
desirous of being attached to Beauregard's command.
This transfer met with Pendleton's approval, provided
another battalion were assigned to the 1st Corps in its
place. On July 31, however, Maj. Owen was again as
signed to the command of the 13th Virginia Battalion,
which he bad previously commanded in Tennessee, re
lieving Maj. Gibbes and reporting to Lieut. -Col. Frank
Huger, Acting Chief of Artillery 1st Corps, in the ab
sence of Alexander. The 13th Virginia Battalion then
consisted of Davidson's, Walker's "Otey," and Dicken-
son's batteries, with 12 guns and 450 men.
Another matter affecting the artillery organization
now came up for final adjustment. During the month
of July, Maj. Edgar F. Moseley, who, though holding
his commission in the 1st Virginia Regiment of Ar
tillery, had for some time commanded a battalion under
Beauregard, was promoted lieutenant-colonel and reas
signed to the same battalion. From the first it had ap
peared an incongruity to allow officers of a single inde
pendent regiment to be promoted without reference to
other commands and to command battalions while hold
ing a commission in this regiment. Before Col. Brown's
death, he had sought to have Maj . Moseley promoted in
the 1st Regiment vice Lieut. -Col. Coleman, but met
with Pendleton's opposition on the ground that there
could be no such independent regimental promotion.
But at last Moseley was promoted without reference to
Pendleton's views, whereupon the Chief of Artillery
strenuously protested against the disregard of the
claims of other officers in the arm, senior in rank, and
with infinitely more service than Moseley had to his
credit. Furthermore, Pendleton now sought to have
the old regimental organization of the 1st Virginia Ar
tillery abolished as inconsistent with the general
scheme of artillery organization,
This regiment was organized under state authority in
1861, in the Army of the Peninsula under Magruder,
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 855
and turned over to the Confederacy as such by Vir
ginia. Magruder, it will be recalled, was an artilleryman
himself, and had with Alexander, from the first urged
the organization of artillery in large groups, and this
he proceeded to do in his own army. The original of
ficers elected in the regiment were Col. George W.
Randolph, afterwards Brigadier-General and Secre
tary of War, Lieut. -Col. Henry Coalter Cabell, and
Maj. John Thompson Brown. When Randolph was
promoted, Cabell became colonel and Brown lieutenant-
colonel, but the majority remained vacant for some time.
The companies associated to form the regiment were
the Richmond Fayette, originally commanded by
Randolph, then Cabell; the 2d Richmond Howitzers,
originally commanded by Brown; the 3d Richmond
Howitzers, orginally commanded by Robert Stanard;
Sands' or Ritter's Henrico; Southall's or Wyatt's
Albemarle; and Allen's Hampton; Cosnahan's Penin
sula; Coke's Williamsburg ; Young's Yorktown; and
Richardson's James City, batteries. Of these Allen's
was soon detached from the Army of Northern Vir
ginia, being brigaded with another to form Allen's Bat
talion, while Cosnahan's and Coke's were merged in
the spring of 1862 under Capt. John Coke. In October,
Coke's and Ritter's batteries were broken up and the
men and guns distributed among other batteries, so that
but six of its original batteries remained in the Army
after the reorganization, the Fayette being sooner or
later assigned to Dearing's, then Read's, the 2d and 3d
Howitzers to the 1st Virginia Regiment under Brown,
and Wyatt's to Poague's Battalion, while Young's and
Richardson's only remained with Moseley when elected
major of the regiment in the summer of 1862.
In July, 1864, Young's Battery alone remained in
Moseley's Battalion, Richardson's being on detached
duty at Chaffin's Bluff, so that the original regiment
was virtually defunct and was entitled to no field-
officers.
856 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Pendleton's recommendation for the official disband-
ment of the regiment was forwarded approved by Gen.
Lee and referred to Gen. Bragg by the Secretary of
War, who endorsed the views of the Chief of Artillery.
The upshot of the whole matter was the official dis-
bandment of the regiment on August 29, 1864, and its
recognition as a battalion of six companies to which no
extraordinary rule of promotion should apply.
Having taken steps to accomplish this end, though
failing in having the Washington Artillery reassigned
to the 1st Corps, Pendleton now called on Col. Jones
for the return of Read's Battalion to Pickett's Division,
from which it had been detached to operate with Hoke.
When Lee crossed the James on June 17 and 18, he
had left behind near Malvern Hill Cutshaw's and
Hardaway's battalions of the 2d Corps under Col.
Carter to patrol the river and resist the approach of
transports and gunboats. On the 13th of July, Col.
Carter, with Cutshaw's Battalion, had moved to
Walker's farm, while a small Confederate cavalry
force advanced towards Rowland's Mill and a regiment
to the vicinity of Charles City Court House. Carter's
scouts along the river reported that no vessels of any
kind had passed down the river since the llth, but about
4 P. M. he discerned two vessels, one a passenger and
the other a freight steamer, moving up stream. Throw
ing Cutshaw's guns into action on the bank, among
them a Whitworth rifle, Carter opened fire on these
vessels, injuring the freighter to some extent and strik
ing the transport, which caused it to turn back to Fort
Powhatan before reaching the channel nearest the guns.
That night the battalion withdrew to Phillip's Farm,
six miles back from the river, and went into camp. On
the 14th, Carter reappeared at Malvern Hill and with
the Whitworth drove off a picket gunboat opposite
Turkey Island House. Two days later the Whitworth
successfully drove back down the river three small gun
boats which had steamed up stream to clear the river of
the Confederate artillery, while Graham's Battery of
THE LONG ARM or LEE 857
Hardaway's Battalion, with four 20-pounder Parrotts
opened from Tilghman's Gate upon the pontoon bridge,
a gunboat, and the Federal camp at Deep Bottom.
The gunboat was struck several times and finally re
tired to the cover of the river bank and the camp was
thrown into such a commotion that an entire brigade left
the woods near Four-Mile Creek at a double-quick and
took shelter in the trenches. Carter also employed his
cannoneers in these expeditions as sharpshooters, hav
ing armed them with captured cavalry carbines, and pro
posed thereafter to operate with a single battery fully
mounted. Again it may be said, this was remarkable
service for field artillery, but it showed the ready
adaptability of that arm to meet the exigencies of any
situation.
Carter's activity along the James shelling the Federal
transports, gunboats, and landings, kept Butler in such
a constant state of alarm, that soon Grant's attention
was directed to this quarter. On the 26th, Hancock
with 20,000 infantry and 22 pieces of artillery, and
Sheridan with 6,000 cavalry, were started for Deep
Bottom to cooperate with Butler in surprising the Con
federates, and making a dash upon Richmond. Wilcox's
Division was already at Drewry's Bluff, for noting a
movement among the enemy towards the James, Lee
had sent it and Kershaw's Division on the 24th to re-
enforce Conner's Brigade and Carter's artillery force
on the north bank of the river. During the night of the
26th, Hancock and Sheridan crossed the river and at
dawn advanced. Kershaw's Infantry almost at once
fell back, leaving Graham's 1st Rockbridge Battery
without supports in an advanced position, where after
defending itself with superb coolness for some time its
four large Parrotts were captured. On hearing of Han
cock's crossing, Lee immediately sent over W. H. F.
Lee's Division of cavalry with McGregor's Battery,
and Heth's Division of the 2d Corps, while on the night
of the 28th, Poague's Battalion and Penick's Battery
were ordered from their positions north of the Appomat-
858 THE LONG AKM or LEE
tox to join Col. Carter. When Grant found that his
movement had been anticipated, he ordered Hancock to
recross the river on the night of the 29th. Col. Poague
was now directed to take position on the left of Pickett's
line, and guard that flank against the approach of the
enemy from Dutch Gap, where he remained through
out the winter shelling Butler's working parties along
the canal with guns and mortars.
On the north side of the river, the Confederate line
extended from New Market toward White Oak Swamp,
the right resting near the Chaffin farm. When Hancock
first appeared before this line, Gen. Ewell, who com
manded the Richmond defenses, had urged the turning
out of the Local Defense troops, but to this the Secre
tary of War had objected on account of the inconven
ience and interruption it caused the government depart
ments, from which the men were mostly drawn. The
dispatch of Anderson to the James by Gen. Lee, with
Wilcox's and Kershaw's divisions, had rendered the step
unnecessary, but Lieut.-Col. Pemberton, in charge of
the Artillery defenses of the city, had on the 27th
posted two batteries of Lightfoot's Battalion at the
intersection of the Mill and Varina Roads, behind Con
ner's right, and the other battery near the New Market
Road, all on the exterior line of works, while Maj.
Stark's Battalion, composed of the Mathews and
Giles batteries under Capts. Andrew D. Armistead
and David A. French, respectively, were posted near
the Barton house. Pemberton's two battalions num-
ered 700 men with 22 guns, or about 100 men per bat
tery. Soon the Louisiana Guard Battery, Capt.
Charles A. Green, Jr., which had been on duty in
Richmond since its misfortune on the Rapidan, joined
Stark's Battalion.
CHAPTER XLIV
THE CKATER
WE have seen that Gen. Alexander had detected
signs of the enemy's mining operations, and that on
July 1 the Confederate engineers had opened counter
mines. By July 10, the Confederates had done enough
work, had it been done at the salient, to have heard the
enemy, who would have been directly beneath them.
Besides those on the flanks of the salient, two other
shafts farther to the left near Colquitt's and Gracie's
salients were opened on the 10th and 19th, respectively,
and were being vigorously pushed. A perfect mania
for tunneling seemed to have broken out among the
Confederates. On the llth, Bushrod Johnson urged
that listening galleries be constructed along his lines,
all of which goes to show that no one but Alexander
had really perceived the enemy's objective. On the
12th, the enemy opened upon Wise's Brigade an un
usually heavy mortar fire, which not only necessitated
night work on the bomb-proofs, but caused Johnson to
order greater efforts on Maj. Moseley's part to sub
due this fire.
Before leaving the Army, Alexander had placed
about half a dozen Coehorn mortars in the ravines im
mediately in rear of Elliott's salient, and on June 20
he had posted the 16 guns of Haskell's Battalion in the
sunken Jerusalem Road, 600 yards in its rear, all under
Col. Haskell. Though somewhat exposed to the
enemy's fire, which overshot the works in their front,
Haskell's batteries were not permitted to break ground
or show any sign of their presence. This disposition of
these guns was a foresight for which the entire Army, as
we shall see, should have been grateful to Alexander.
On the 27th, Alexander, before being ordered to the
north of the James River, carefully inspected his lines
and was by no means satisfied with the protection Col.
860 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Huger had provided for the 1st Corps guns. The
works of Huger's and CabelFs battalions were in his
opinion entirely too slight to withstand the fire of the
heavy pieces, which he expected the enemy to bring to
bear on them. Accordingly Huger was directed to em
ploy his cannoneers in strengthening these works, as no
infantry or other labor was available.
The next day, Col. Walker, who still had Pegram's,
Mclntosh's, and Richardson's battalions less Penick's
Battery, in position on Huger's right, reported that the
enemy were strengthening their works in his front, and
increasing the number of their guns to such an extent
that he was working his cannoneers in reliefs of from 40
to 100 men day and night, while Mahone's Division of
the 3d Corps alone remained in the trenches in support
of his guns. On the night of the 28th, Colquitt's Bri
gade of Hoke's Division, and Wise's of Johnson's Di
vision were secretly transferred to the portion of the line
which had been held by Field's Division before it was
moved across the James River with Anderson to oppose
Hancock, while Gracie's Division was placed in the
works on Johnson's left. The utmost caution and silence
was enjoined upon the troops. Capt. Richard G. Pe
gram's Petersburg Battery, of Coit's Battalion, still oc
cupied Elliott's salient.
Having practically completed his mine, Grant had
sought, as we have seen, to draw off a large portion of
the Confederates to the north side of the river, before
springing it. A gallery 511 feet long, with two branch
galleries at the end, to the right and left, each 37 feet
long, had been successfully dug. Col. Pleasants' method
of ventilation was a simple one. "When the tunnel had
penetrated the hill far enough to need it, a close par
tition was built across it near the entrance with a close-
fitting door. Through the partition on the side of this
door was passed the open end of a large square box, or
closed trough, which was built along on the floor of the
tunnel, conveying the fresh outside air to the far end
of the tunnel, where the men extending it were at work.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 861
"To create a draught through the air box, a fireplace
was excavated in the side of the tunnel, within the par
tition, and a chimney was pierced through the hill above
it. A small fire in this chimney place, and the outside
air would pass through the air-box to the far end of the
tunnel, whence it would return and escape up the chim
ney, taking with it the foul air of the tunnel." This
gallery was finished July 17th, the flank galleries on the
23d, and on the 28th, the very day Lee was moving his
troops from his line to oppose Grant's feint to the north,
each gallery was charged with 4,000 pounds of gun
powder.
The Federals knew that Lee had detected their opera
tions, for they themselves could hear the Confederates
at work in the countermines. Nevertheless, they de
termined to delay the explosion until preparations for a
grand charge to succeed it could be completed. For the
assault a large force of infantry was to be employed,
which was to rush forward under cover of the concen
trated fire of many batteries. From their signal towers,
the Federal lookouts had located the position of nearly
every gun in the Confederate lines, and 81 heavy guns
and mortars, and about as many field pieces were
brought up and placed in position to bear on them. But
Haskell's Battalion was overlooked, thanks to Alex
ander.
Having failed in his effort against Swell's outer line,
Grant at Deep Bottom on the 28th gave orders for the
explosion of the mine on the morning of the 30th. "The
explosion might have been arranged for the afternoon
of the 29th, but the morning of the 30th was chosen, as
it permitted the placing of more heavy guns and mor
tars for the bombardment, which would follow the ex
plosion as well as preliminary arrangements, such as
massing the troops, removing parapets and abattis to
make passages for the assaulting columns, and posting
of pioneers to remove our abattis and open passages for
artillery through our lines. Depots of intrenching tools,
with sand bags, gabions, fascines, etc., were established,
862 THE LONG ARM or LEE
that lodgments might be more quickly made, though the
pioneers of all regiments were already supplied with
tools." Engineer officers were detailed to accompany
each corps, and the Chief Engineer was directed to park
his pontoon trains at a convenient point, ready to move
at a moment's warning, for Meade having assured him
self that the Confederates had no second line on Ceme
tery Hill, as he had formerly supposed, and as had been
positively reported to him, was now sanguine of success,
and made these preparations to meet the contingency of
the meagre Confederate force retiring beyond the Ap-
pomattox and burning the bridges. In such an event,
he proposed to push immediately across the river and
Swift Creek and open up communications with Butler
at Bermuda Hundred, before Lee could send any re
inforcements from his five divisions north of the
James.
On the afternoon of the 29th, when Meade issued
his orders for the attack, Lee had but three small divi
sions, Johnson's, Hoke's, and Mahone's behind his
works, and Alexander's, Jones', and three battalions of
Walker's Artillery. As soon as it was dark, Burnside
was to mass his troops in the valley opposite Elliott's
salient and remove the abattis in his front, so that the
columns of assault might debouch rapidly. He was
to spring the mine at about 3:30 A. M., and, moving
rapidly through the breach, seize the crest of Cemetery
Hill, a ridge four hundred yards in rear of the Con
federate lines.
Ord was to mass the 18th Corps in rear of the 9th,
and to follow and support Burnside's right.
Warren was to reduce the number of men holding his
front to the minimum, concentrate heavily on the right
of his corps, and support Burnside's left. Hancock
was to mass the 2d Corps in rear of Ord's trenches, and
be prepared to support the assault as developments
might dictate, while Hunt was to concentrate his ar
tillery on the hostile guns in, and commanding the
salient. Thus did Grant mass 60,000 men to fall upon
THE LONG ARM or LEE 863
a single point of Lee's ten miles of line, behind the
whole of which there was hardly one man for every six
in the assaulting column. Now let another describe
what occurred:*
"Long before dawn of the 30th the troops were in position, and
at half past three,, punctually to the minute, the mine was fired.
Then the news passed swiftly down the lines, and the dark columns,
standing in serried masses, waited in dread suspense the signal,
knowing that death awaited many of them on yonder crest, yet not
animated by the stern joy of coming fight, nor yet rosolved that
though death stalked forth with horrid mien from the dreadful
breach, it should be but to greet victory.
"Minute followed minute of anxious waiting, — a trial to even
the most determined veterans, — and now the east was streaked with
gray, yet the tender beauty of the dim tranquillity remained unvexed
of any sound of war, save one might hear a low hum amid the
darkling swarm as grew the wonder at delay. Nor was the cause
of hindrance easy to ascertain, for should it prove that the fuse
was still alight, burning but slowly, to enter the mine was certain
death. Thus time dragged slowly on, telegram upon telegram of
inquiry meanwhile pouring in from Meade, who, unmindful of the
dictum of Napoleon, that 'in assaults a general should be with his
troops,' had fixed his headquarters full a mile away. But these
were all unheeded, for Burnside knew not what to answer.
"Then it was that two brave men, whose names should be men
tioned with respect whenever courage is honored, Lieut. Jacob
Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees, both of the Forty-eighth Pennsyl
vania, volunteered for the peculiar service and entered the mine.
Crawling on their hands and knees, groping in utter darkness, they
found that the fuse had gone out about 50 feet from the mouth of
the main gallery, relighted it and retired.
" 'In eleven minutes now the mine will explode,' Pleasants re
ports to Burnside at thirty-three minutes past four, and a small
group of officers of the Forty-eighth, standing upon the slope of
the main parapet, anxiously await the result.
" 'It lacks a minute yet,' says Pleasants, looking at his watch.
' 'Not a second,' cried Douty, 'for there she goes.'
"A slight tremor of the earth for a second, then the rocking
as of an earthquake, and with a tremendous burst which rent the
sleeping hills beyond, a vast column of earth and smoke shoots
upward to a great height, its dark sides flashing out sparks of
"The following narrative of events from the pen of Capt. William Gordon
McCabe is the best account of the battle of the Crater ever written, and so
recognized both North, South, and abroad. It has stood the severest tests of
both time and criticism. Capt. McCabe was the gallant adjutant of Col.
William J. Pegram's Artillery Battalion, and reflected all the dash and courage
of his celebrated young commander.
24
864 THE LONG ARM or LEE
fire, hangs poised for a moment in mid-air, and then hurtling down
ward with a roaring sound, showers of stones, broken timbers, and
blackened human limbs, subsides — the gloomy pall of darkening
smoke flushing to an angry crimson as it floats away to meet the
morning sun. Pleasants has done his work with terrible complete
ness, for now the site of the Elliott Salient is marked by a horrid
chasm, 135 feet in length, 97 feet in breadth, and 30 feet deep, and
its brave garrison all asleep, save the guards, when thus surprised
by sudden death, lie buried beneath the jagged blocks of blackened
clay — in all, 256 officers and men of the 18th and 22d South
Carolina, — 2 officers and 20 men of Pegram's Petersburg Battery."
Two of Pegram's guns were hurled through the air
to a great distance. Of the two Confederate galleries
on the flanks of the mine, one, which was unoccupied,
was destroyed by the explosion, while the miners at
work in the other were badly shaken up but climbed out
and escaped as the gallery was not crushed in.
"The dread upheaval has rent in twain Elliott's Brigade, and
the men to the right and left of the large abyss recoil in terror
and dismay. Nor shall we censure them, for so terrible was the
explosion that even the assaulting column sunk back aghast, and
nearly ten minutes elapsed before it could be reformed.
"Now a storm of fire bursts in red fury from the Federal front,
and in an instant all the valley between the hostile lines lies
shrouded in bellowing smoke. Then Marshall, putting himself at
the head of the stormers, sword in hand, bids his men to follow.
"But there comes no response befitting the stern grandeur of the
scene — no trampling charge — no rolling drums of austerity — no
fierce shouts of warlike joy as burst from men of the 'Light
Division' when they mounted the breach of Badajos, or from
Frazier's Royals, as they crowned the crimson slopes of Saint
Sebastian.
"No, none of this there. But a straggling line of men of the
Second Brigade, First Division, uttering a mechanical cheer, slowly
mounts the crest, passes unmolested across the intervening space,
and true to the instinct, fostered by long service in the trenches,
plunges into the Crater, courting the friendly shelter of its
crumbling sides.
"Yonder lies Cemetery Hill in plain view, naked of men, and
hard beyond the brave old town, nestling whitely in its wealth of
green.
"Silence still reigned along the Confederate lines, yet Ledlie's
men did not advance, and now the supporting brigade of the same
division running forward over the same crest, and with an incredible
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN CHKVKS IIASKELL
THE LONG ARM or LEE 865
folly crowding in upon their comrades, already huddled together
in the shelving pit,, all regimental and company organization was
lost, and the men speedily passed from the control of their officers.
"If we except Elliott, who with the remnant of his brigade was
occupying the ravine to the left and rear of the Crater, no officer
of rank was present on the Confederate side to assume immediate
direction of affairs, and a considerable time elapsed before
Beauregard and Lee, — both beyond the Appomattox, — were in
formed by Col. Paul, of Beauregard's staff, of the nature and
locality of the disaster.
"But almost on the moment, John Haskell, of South Carolina, a
glorious young battalion commander, whose name will be forever
associated with the Artillery Corps of the Army of Northern
Virginia, galloped to the front, followed by two light batteries,
and having disposed these pieces along the Plank Road, and opened
Planner's light guns from the Gee house, passed to his left to
speak a word of cheery commendation to Lamkin of his battalion,
who was already annoying the swarming masses of the enemy with
his Virginia Battery of eight-inch mortars. Passing through the
covered way, Haskell sought Elliott, and, pointing out to him the
defenseless position of the guns on the Plank Road, urged him to
make such dispositions as would afford them protection. Essaying
this, Elliott sprang forward, followed by a mere handful of brave
fellows, but, almost on the instant, fell stricken by a grievous hurt
and was borne from his last field of battle.
"The fire of the enemy's artillery was now very severe, owing
to their superior weight of metal, and the guns of the Plank Road,
exposed in addition to the fire of the sharpshooters, were suffering
such loss that it was determined to retire all but six pieces, and, as
the situation seemed rather hopeless, to call for volunteers to man
these. To Haskell's proud delight every gun detachment
volunteered to remain.
"Nor did the artillery to the right and left fail to bear them
selves with the resolution of men conscious that, for the time, the
hope of the Army was centered in their steadiness, and that their
guns alone barred the road to Petersburg; for, let me repeat,
Cemetery Hill was naked of men."
With the superb Haskell encouraging them to every
effort, his cannoneers labored at their pieces like fiends.
He actually moved two detachments with their mor
tars forward to the trenches within fifty yards of the
Crater, into which they burst their shell at a surpris
ing rate. No less active was Maj. Hampton Gibbes,
whose battalion, on the right of the Crater, opened
as soon as the pieces could be brought to bear on the
866 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
enemy's massed troops. At first the left gun of David
son's Battery alone had an effective command of the
Crater, and it was left for a time unserved through the
misbehavior of the acting battery commander, Lieut.
James C. Otey, who, owing to a combination of cir
cumstances, was the only officer at the time present
with the battery. This unfortunate young officer, the
first and the last in the whole career of Lee's Artillery
Corps to abandon his guns in cowardice, seems to have
been entirely unmanned by the awfulness of the cata
clysm, in which he and his men had all but been en
gulfed. Let us not be too harsh in our judgment of
him. Let us imagine ourselves in his position and ask
if the mere thought of such an experience as that
through which he had passed does not shake our reso
lution. If poor Otey were at fault, then he has long
since atoned for his misdoing. To the writer he is more
to be pitied, and demands more of charity than any
other soldier in that grand artillery corps of Lee's
Army. Would that his name might not be mentioned,
but there it is in black and white in the record for all
time. The hand of mortal cannot obliterate it, the stain
is indelible. The incident is not recounted here to hold
Otey up to scorn, but to show that misconduct before
the enemy was so rare, so unheard of in Lee's Artillery,
that even on the part of a miserable, insignificant youth,
it attracted the attention of an army.
If Otey allowed his guns to remain inactive, it was
not to be for long, for Gibbes and Maj. Samuel Pres
ton, of Wise's Brigade, personally manned one of the
pieces and worked them with excellent effect, until they
both fell desperately wounded, thus making glorious
the spot of Otey's defection. Again the guns became
silent, and again a number of artillery officers, heedless
of all personal danger, rushed to the position to man the
pieces. This time it was Lieut.-Col. Huger, Acting
Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps, with Capts. Win-
throp, Mason, and Haskell, of Gen. Alexander's staff,
that reopened the fire, soon joined by Private L. T.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 867
Covington, of Pegram's destroyed battery. "Frank
Huger, who like Edward Freer of the Forty-third had
seen more combats than he could count years, was, as
always, to the fore, working as a simple cannoneer at
his heated Napoleons, cheering and encouraging his men
by joyful voice and valiant example." Thus did Gibbes,
Preston, Huger, and the other gallant artillerymen
maintain their fire at the critical moment in spite of the
concentration of the enemy's guns upon them until,
spurring hard from the hospital, with the fever still
upon him, came Lieut. John Hampden Chamberlayne,
of the 3d Corps Artillery, who with volunteers from
other batteries and Wise's infantrymen, so handled the
guns which had been abandoned by their men and until
then only manned by a few officers, that from that day
the battery bore his name, and he wore another bar
upon his collar.
The left gun of Davidson's Battery in the next salient
on the right of the Crater, which in the hands of those
we have mentioned did such fearful execution, was so
well protected that it could never be kept silent by
Hunt's concentrated fire. Whenever the Federals
showed themselves it reopened. Gibbes alone fired
forty or more rounds, at a range of less than 400 yards,
with it, before he was wounded. Five hundred yards to
the left was Wright's Halifax Battery of Coit's Bat
talion. These guns, which had a flanking fire on the
left of the destroyed salient and across all the ap
proaches thereto, were posted in the depression behind
the infantry line and thoroughly masked from the hostile
artillery fire not only by the ground in their front, but
by a heavy fringe of pines in advance of the Federal
line, which the enemy had carelessly neglected to level.
^Wight's fire was rapid, incessant, and accurate, caus
ing great loss. The Federal Artillery made vain efforts
to locate him with their mortar shells, which tore up the
ground all around, but could never hit him or silence his
four guns. Besides these, a half dozen or more of
HaskelTs 8-inch Coehorn mortars, from two or three ra-
868 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
vines in the rear, threw shell aimed at the Crater, and
Langhorne's 10-inch mortars along the Baxter Road
also took part in the work of destruction. It was now,
too, that Alexander's foresight was to yield such fine re
sults, for Haskell's sixteen guns which he had so long
kept concealed in the sunken Jerusalem Plank Road
were in position 600 yards directly in rear of the Crater.
The group simply swept the front from first to last.
As soon as the Federal attack developed, Cutts' great
group of guns north of the Appomattox opposite the
enemy's right, and Jones' batteries along Beauregard's
front near the river, opened upon the hostile artillery
and kept up a furious cannonade to prevent Hunt from
concentrating his fire upon the point to be assaulted, and
on the Confederate right Walker's batteries also sought
to divert the enemy's fire.*
"On the Federal side, Griffin of Potter's Division, not waiting
for Wilcox, pushed forward his brigade, and gained ground to the
north of the Crater, and Bliss's Brigade of the same division,
coming to his support, still further ground was gained in that
direction. But his leading regiments, deflected by the hostile fire,
bore to their left, and, mingling with Ledlie's men swarming along
the sides of the great pit, added to the confusion. Wilcox now
threw forward a portion of his division and succeeded in occupying
about one hundred and fifty yards of the works south of the Crater,
but stopped by the fire of Chamberlayne's guns, and, whenever
occasion offered, by the fire of the infantry, his men on the exposed
flank gave ground, and, pushing the right regiment into the Crater,
the confusion grew worse confounded. Some of the men, indeed,
from fear of suffocation, had already emerged from the pit and
spread themselves to the right and left, but this was a matter
of danger and difficulty, for the ground was scored with covered
ways and traverses, honeycombed with bomb-proofs, and swept by
the artillery. Others of them pressed forward and got into the
ditch of the unfinished gorge lines, while not a few creeping along
the glacis of the exterior line, made their way over the parapet into
the main trench. In all this there was much hand-to-hand fighting,
for many men belonging to the dismembered brigades still found
shelter behind the traverses and bomb-proofs and did not easily
yield.
*As regards the execution of Chamberlayne's guns, see especially statement
of Gen. Warren, Report of Conduct of the War (1865), Vol. I, p. 166; Gen.
Hunt, pp. 98, 184 ; Duane, p. 100.
For the efficiency of the Confederate artillery fire, see Meade's report, Ibid.,
p. 31 ; Col. Loring's statement, p. 95 ; Gen. Potter, pp. 87, 177.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 869
"Meanwhile, Gen. Meade, 'groping in the dark,' to use his own
phrase, sent telegram upon telegram to Burnside to know how
fared the day, but received answer to none. At fifteen minutes
to six, however, one hour after Ledlie's men had occupied the
breach, an orderly delivered him a note in pencil, written from the
Crater by Gen. Loring, Inspector General of the 9th Corps, and
addressed to Gen. Burnside. This was Meade's first information
from the front and was little cheer, for Loring stated briefly that
Ledlie's men were in confusion and would not go forward.
"Ord was now directed to push forward the 18th Corps, and the
following dispatch was sent to Richmond:
' 'HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
" 'July 30, 1864, 6 A. M.
' 'MAJ.-GEN. BURNSIDE — Prisoners taken say that there is no
line in their rear, and that their men were falling back when ours
advanced, that none of their troops have returned from the James.
Our chance is now. Push your men forward at all hazards, white
and black, and don't lose time in making formations, but rush for
the crest.
" 'GEORGE G. MEADE,
" 'Major-General, Commanding.'
"But Ord could not advance, for the narrow debouches were
still choked up by the men of the 9th Corps and by the wounded
borne from the front, and although Burnside promptly transmitted
the order to his subordinates, the troops in rear moved with
reluctant step, while no general of division was present with those
in front to urge them forward.
"Again did Meade telegraph to Burnside: 'Every moment is
most precious; the enemy are undoubtedly concentrating to meet
you on the crest.' But not until 20 minutes past seven did he
receive a reply to the effect that Burnside 'hoped to carry the crest,
but it was hard work.'
"Then Meade's patience seems fairly to have broken down.
'What do you mean by hard work to take the crest?' he asks. 'I
understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy's line, which
you occupied immediately after exploding the mine. Do you mean
to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance?
If not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire
an immediate answer.
" 'GEORGE G. MEADE, Major-General.'
"To which Burnside, in hot wrath, straightway replied:
" 'HEADQUARTERS, NINTH CORPS,
" '7:35 A. M.
" 'GEN. MEADE — Your dispatch by Capt. Jay received. The
main body of Gen. Potter's Division is beyond the Crater.
870 THE LONG ARM or LEE
' 'I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey
my orders to advance. I mean to say that it is very hard to
advance to the crest. I have never in any report said anything
different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not in
subordinate, I would say that the latter remark of your note was
unofficerlike and ungentlemanly.
" 'A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General.'
"Griffin, it is true, in obedience to orders to advance straight
for Cemetery Hill, had during this time attempted several charges
from his position north of the Crater, but his men displayed little
spirit, and, breaking speedily under the fire of the artillery, sought
their old shelter behind the traverses and covered ways. The rest
of Potter's Division moved out slowly and it was fully eight o'clock,
more than three hours after the explosion, when Ferrero's negro
division, the men beyond question inflamed with drink, burst from
the advance line, cheering vehemently, passed at a double quick
over the crest under a heavy fire, and, rushing with scarce a check
over the heads of the white troops in the Crater, spread to their
right, capturing more than two hundred prisoners, and one stand
of colors."
The negroes, however, could not traverse the space
which Haskell's guns dominated. No troops with their
formation could have done so. As the dense mass came
in sight, partly emerging from the Crater, the sixteen
guns concentrated upon it and drove the assailants to
cover without the aid of a hundred muskets. A single
negro private, with his musket at support arms, charged
home to the guns and was felled with a rammer staff, as
he sprung into the sunken road among the pieces.
At the same time that Ferrero made his effort,
Turner, of the 10th Corps, pushed forward a brigade
over the 9th Corps parapets, seized the Confederate
line further to the north, and quickly disposed the re
maining brigades of his division to confirm his success.
"Now was the crisis of the day, and fortunate was it for maiden
and matron of Petersburg, that even at this moment there was
filing into the ravine, between Cemetery Hill and the drunken
battalions of Ferrero, a stern array of silent men, clad in faded
gray, resolved with grim resolve to avert from the mother town a
fate as dreadful as that which marked the three days' sack of
Badajos.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 871
"Lee, informed of the disaster at 6:10 A. M., had bidden his aide,
Col. Charles Venable, to ride quickly to the right of the army and
bring up two brigades of Anderson's old division, commanded by
Mahone, for time was too precious to observe military etiquette, and
send the orders through Hill. Shortly after the General in Chief
reached the front in person, and all men took heart when they
descried the grave and gracious face, and 'Traveller' stepping
proudly, as if conscious that he bore upon his back the weight of a
nation. Beauregard was already at the Gee house, a commanding
position five hundred yards in rear of the Crater, and Hill had
galloped to the right to organize an attacking column, and had
ordered down Pegram, and even now the light batteries of Brander
and Ellett were rattling through the town at a sharp trot^ with
cannoneers mounted, the sweet, serene face of their boy-colonel lit
up with that glow which to his men meant hotly impending fight.
"Venable had sped upon his mission and found Mahone's men
already standing to their arms ; but the Federals from their lofty
lookouts were busily interchanging signals, and to uncover such
a length of front without exciting observation demanded the nicest
precaution. Yet was the difficulty overcome by a single device,
for the men being ordered to drop back one by one, as if going for
water, obeyed with such intelligence that Warren continued to
report to Meade that not a man had left his front.
"Then forming in the ravine in rear, the men of the Virginia and
Georgia brigades came pressing down the Valley with swift,
swinging stride, — not with the discontented bearing of soldiers
whose discipline alone carries them to what they feel to be a scene
of fruitless sacrifice, but with the glad alacrity and aggressive
ardor of men impatient for battle, and who, from long knowledge
of war, are conscious that Fortune has placed within their grasp
an opportunity which, by the magic touch of veteran steel, may be
transformed to 'swift-winged' victory.
"Halting for a moment in rear of the 'Ragland House,' Mahone
bade his men strip off blankets and knapsacks, and prepare for
battle.
"Then riding quickly to the front, while the troops marched in
single file along the covered way, he drew rein at Bushrod Johnson's
headquarters and reported in person to Beauregard. Informed
that Johnson would assist in the attack with the outlying troops
about the Crater, he rode still further to the front, dismounted,
and, pushing along the covered way from the Plank Road, came
out into the ravine in which he formed his men. Mounting the
embankment at the head of the covered way, he descried within
one hundred and sixty yards a forest of glittering bayonets, and
beyond, floating proudly from the captured works, eleven Union
flags. Estimating rapidly from the hostile colors the probable
force in his front, he at once despatched his courier to bring up the
872 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Alabama Brigade from the right, assuming thereby a grave
responsibility, yet was the wisdom of the decision vindicated by
the event. *
"Scarcely had the order been given when the head of the
Virginia Brigade began to debouch from the covered way. Direct
ing Col. Weisiger, its commanding officer,, to file to the right and
form line of battle, Mahone stood at the angle, speaking quietly
and cheerily to the men. Silently and quickly they moved out and
formed with that precision dear to every soldier's eyes — the sharp
shooters leading, followed by the 6th, 16th, 61st, 41st, and 12th
Virginia — the men of Second Manassas and Crampton Gap !
"But one caution was given, — to reserve their fire until they
reached the brink of the ditch; but one exhortation, that they
were counted on to do this work, and do it quickly.
"Now the leading regiment of the Georgia Brigade began to
move out, when suddenly a brave Federal officer, seizing the colors,
called on his men to charge. Descrying this hostile movement on
the instant, Weisiger, a veteran of stern countenance, which did not
belie the personal intrepidity of the man, uttered to the Virginians
the single word, 'Forward.'
"Then the sharpshooters and the men of the 6th on the right,
running swiftly forward, for theirs was the greater distance to
traverse, the whole line sprang along the crest and there burst
from more than eight hundred warlike voices that fierce yell, which
no man ever yet heard unmoved on field of battle. Storms of
case shot from the right mingled with the tempest of bullets which
smote upon them from the front, yet was there no answering volley,
for these were veterans, whose fiery enthusiasm had been wrought
to a finer temper by the stern code of discipline, and even in the
tumult the men did not forget their orders. Still pressing forward
with steady fury, while the enemy, appalled by the inexorable
advance, gave ground, they reached the ditch of the inner works —
then one volley crashed from the whole line, and the 6th and 16th,
with the sharpshooters clutching their empty guns and redoubling
their fierce cries, leaped over the retrenched cavalier, and all down
the line the dreadful work of the bayonet began.
"How long it lasted none may say with certainty, for in those
fierce moments no man heeded time, no man asked, no man gave
quarter; but in an incredibly brief space, as seemed to those who
looked on, the whole of the advanced line north of the Crater was
taken, the enemy in headlong fight, while the tattered battle flags
planted along the parapets from left to right told Lee, at the Gee
house, that from this nettle danger, valor had plucked the flower,
safety for an army.
*The young courier by whom this order was transmitted was Jimmy Blake-
more, an ex-cadet of the Virginia Military Institute, to whom Mahone constantly
entrusted the most important missions. Mahone, it will be recalled, was himself
an old cadet.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 873
"Redoubling the sharpshooters on his right, Mahone kept down
all fire from the Crater, the vast rim of which frowned down upon
the lower line occupied by his troops.
"And now the scene within the horrid pit was as might be
fitly portrayed only by the pencil of Dante, after he had trod
'nine-circle Hell.' From the great mortars to the right and left,
huge missiles, describing graceful curves, fell at regular intervals
with dreadful accuracy and burst among the helpless masses
huddled together, and every explosion was followed by piteous
cries, and oftentimes the very air seemed darkened by flying human
limbs. Haskell, too, had moved up his Eprouvette mortars among
the men of the 16th Virginia, so close, indeed, that his powder
charge was but one ounce and a half — and, without intermission,
the storm of fire beat upon the hapless mass imprisoned within.
"Mahone's men watched with great interest this easy method
of reaching troops behind cover, and then, with the initiative in
genuity of soldiers, gleefully gathered up the countless muskets
with bayonets fixed, which had been abandoned by the enemy, and
propelled them with such nice skill that they came down upon
Ledlie's men like the rain of the Norman arrows at Hastings.
"At half past ten the Georgia Brigade advanced and attempted
to dislodge Wilcox's men, who still held a portion of the line south
of the Crater, but so closely was every inch of the ground searched
by artillery, so biting was the fire of musketry, that obliquing to
their left, they sought cover behind the cavalier trench won by the
Virginia Brigade, — many officers and men testifying by their blood
how gallantly the venture had been essayed.
"Half an hour later the Alabamians under Saunders arrived, but
further attack was postponed until after 1 p. M., in order to
arrange for cooperation from Colquitt on the right. Sharply to
the minute agreed upon, the assaulting line moved forward, and
with such astonishing rapidity did these glorious soldiers rush
across the intervening space that ere their first wild cries subsided
their battle flags had crowned the works. The Confederate bat
teries were now ordered to cease firing, and forty volunteers were
called for to assault the Crater, but so many of the Alabamians
offered themselves for the service that the ordinary system of
detail was necessary. Happily, before the assaulting party could
be formed, a white handkerchief, made fast to a ramrod, was
projected above the edge of the Crater, and, after a brier pause,
a motley mass of prisoners poured over the side and ran for their
lives to the rear.
"In this grand assault on Lee's line for which Meade had massed
65,000 troops, the enemy suffered a loss of above 5,000 men,
including 1,101 prisoners, among whom were two brigade com
manders, while vast quantities of small arms and twenty-one
standards fell into the hands of the victors.
874 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
"Yet many brave men perished on the Confederate side.
Elliott's Brigade lost severely in killed and prisoners. The Virginia
Brigade, too, paid the price which glory ever exacts. The 6th
carried in 98 men and lost 88, one company 'the dandies/ of
course, — 'Old Company F' of Norfolk, losing every man killed or
wounded. Scarcely less was the loss in other regiments.
"Such was the battle of the Crater, which excited the liveliest
satisfaction throughout the Army and the country. Mahone was
created major-general from that date; Weisiger, who was wounded,
brigadier-general ; Capt. Girardey, of Mahone's staff, also brigadier,
the latter an extraordinary but just promotion, for he was a young
officer whose talents and decisive vigor qualified him to conduct
enterprises of the highest movement. Yet, fate willed that his
career should be brief, for within a fortnight he fell in battle north
of the James, his death dimming the joy of victory."
We search in vain for any such recognition of those
dauntless gunners, who alone stood between the enemy
and Petersburg after the explosion of the mine. "Ham"
Chamberlayne became a captain, but glory was the only
reward Gibbes and Haskell and Huger, and the others
received. Such was the lot of the artillerymen. In
deed no one seemed to think promotion, in an arm whose
officers distinguished themselves on every occasion, was
necessary. It would seem that the Army had come to
regard deeds of heroism and feats of extraordinary
valor as matters to be expected and not rewarded, in
the Artillery.
"On the Federal side, crimination and recrimination
followed what Gen. Grant styled 'this miserable fail
ure.' There was a Court of Inquiry, and a vast array of
dismal testimony, which disclosed the fact that of four
generals of division belonging to the assaulting Corps,
not one had followed his men into the Confederate
lines. Nay, that the very commander of the storming
division, finding, like honest Nym, 'the humor of the
breach too hot,' was at the crisis of the fight palpitating
in a bomb-proof, beguiling a Michigan surgeon into
giving him a drink of rum, on the plea that 'he had
malaria, and that he had been struck by a spent ball,'-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 875
legends of a hoary antiquity, whereof, let us humbly
confess, we ourselves have heard."
Although few promotions in the arm resulted from
the conduct of the Artillery in the Crater fight, the
Army, Petersburg, and the whole South knew that the
gunners had saved the day. They knew that the batter
ies had stood their ground without infantry supports,
and hurled back the enemy in their front. They knew
how Haskell, and Pegram, and Coit, from rear, from
right, and from left had formed a circle of fire about
the threatened point and, unaided, denied the enemy's
advance to the town, while Mahone was bringing his
men up from the right just in time to prevent Ayres'
Division of Warren's Corps from charging Chamber-
layne's "one-gun battery," as the enemy called the piece
which Gibbes and Huger and the other gallant officers
had heroically kept in action. The deeds of the ar
tillerymen were upon every tongue. Indeed, even in the
Federal accounts of the affair, a large part of every
report is devoted to the overwhelming and destructive
effect of the Confederate Artillery and never once did
the enemy thereafter forget the power of the guns which
occupied the works in their front.
CHAPTER XLV
THE SECOND CORPS IN THE VALLEY
WHILE the Federals were mining, and the Confed
erates countermining, many things of interest to the
Artillery were occurring besides the gathering of un-
exploded Federal shells from in front of the lines by
night, and the incessant artillery practice by day.
Between July 6 and 9, Grant had detached three divi
sions of the 6th Corps to Washington to oppose Early
and Breckinridge, who had reached Lynchburg ahead of
Hunter and without a fight sent him whirling back
through West Virginia, after he had devastated the
Valley and destroyed much private property usually
exempt from destruction, against both Lincoln's and
Grant's orders. Perhaps the greatest feat of Hunter's
ruthless campaign was the demolition of the Virginia
Military Institute. As a measure of military necessity,
this was of course justified, in so far as the burning of
its buildings and military equipment was concerned, but
the wanton burning of its valuable library, its scientific
apparatus, and the private houses and property of its
professors, over the protest of his officers, was an act
for which Hunter's government will yet have to pay.*
Nelson's and Braxton's battalions of artillery which
under Gen. Long were alone detached from the Army
with the 2d Corps, though marching continuously and
with great speed, failed to reach Lynchburg before
Hunter decamped. On June 22, however, these two
battalions were united with Breckinridge's Artillery
near Salem. Thence the Army of the Valley moved by
the direct route to Staunton. During the halt of two
days at that point, Gen. Long organized his entire force
*At the time this is written, a bill is pending in the United States Senate,
providing for an indemnity to the Institution for $214,000, which includes
no interest. This bill was drawn and introduced by Senator Henry A. Du Pont,
of Delaware, who like William McKinley was an officer in Hunter's army, and
both of whom protested against the destruction of the school. Senator Du Pont
was Hunter's Chief of Artillery and commanded the 5th United States Battery,
solid shot from the guns of which still remain in the walls of the barrack.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 877
of artillery. The least efficient batteries of Breckin-
ridge's Division were to be left in a reserve artillery
camp at Staunton, in command of Maj. Leyden, while
Nelson's, Braxton's, and McLaughlin's battalions were
fully horsed, armed, and equipped. The three bat
talions thus organized, with forty pieces, were placed
under the immediate command of Col. J. Floyd King,
while Jackson's, Lurty's, and McClannahan's horse bat
teries with ten guns were organized into another bat
talion to operate with McCausland's force of 1,500
cavalry. The 2d Corps and Breckinridge's Division to
gether numbered 8,000 infantry.
Hunter's retreat to the Ohio, or flight, it might be
more properly styled, left the Valley open to Early, who
promptly moved down it, and after encountering little
resistance crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown July
5 and 6. On the 9th, he advanced upon Fredericks-
town, whereupon Gen. Wallace withdrew his force of
about 5,000 men and placed them in line of battle along
the Monocacy a mile or two east of the town.
When Early determined to attack that portion of the
line opposite the railroad bridge, the ford, and across
the Georgetown Road, Gen. Long skillfully posted a
number of guns on the west bank which soon effectively
prepared the way for McCausland and Gordon to cross
the stream. These troops were soon assailed by the
enemy, whose line of battle was formed at right angles
to the river, presenting an opportunity to Long, of
which he immediately availed himself. Gordon hardly
became engaged before the supporting artillery raked
the Federal line from flank and in reverse, immediately
crushing it and driving the enemy in a route from the
ford and bridge. Never was victory more complete,
and seldom has one of equal magnitude been attained
with so little effort and cost to the assailants. The re
sult was due entirely to the skillful employment by
Long of his artillery in the operations of which the
most thorough cooperation between Nelson, Braxton,
and McLaughlin was obtained. On this occasion a
878 THE LONG AKM or LEE
few batteries only were used to clear the crossings, the
others being held in readiness under cover while the
infantry and cavalry tempted Wallace to assail them.
The plan worked to perfection, and no sooner had the
Federal line advanced and exposed its flank, than Long
and King threw every gun into action with decisive ef
fect, with the loss of but a score of men and two officers.
Lieut. Hobson, of the Amherst Battery, fell mortally,
and Lieut. Southall, Acting Assistant Adjutant-
General on Long's staff, severely wounded.
The conduct of the brave old Col. Nelson on this oc
casion and throughout the succeeding campaign, as well
as that of McLaughlin and Braxton, was highly com
mendable. William Nelson, closely connected by blood
with Lee, Pendleton, Page, Braxton, Carter, and many
other officers of the Artillery, was a picturesque char
acter. Among the first to raise a battery in the spring
of 1861, he had gradually risen to high rank. Like
Cabell, he was not noted for dash, nor was he by train
ing a soldier. But he possessed an unblemished char
acter, was sternly courageous, as dependable as any
officer in the Army, and was adored by his men who re
garded him as a father. The young farmer boys of
Hanover, and Louisa counties, flocked by hundreds to
his standard, and followed him from first to last with a
devotion which military prowess alone could not have
commanded. In appearance, the "Old Colonel," as his
men affectionately styled him, was truly a remarkable
figure. Gen. Bushrod Johnson commonly wore a linen
duster and straw hat, Gen. William Smith, ex-Governor
of Virginia and known as "Extra Billy," usually car
ried an umbrella on the march, Gen. Mahone a cow
in his headquarters train, but Col. Nelson alone adorned
himself with a high silk hat! On many occasions as he
rode past strange troops, the men with shouts of merri
ment cried after him, "Old man, come out of that hat!"
and similar humorous gibes. This eccentricity of dress,
however, was not abandoned by him in spite of the
derisive comments of the soldiery. His own men knew
THE LONG ARM or LEE 879
and loved him, for after all it was the head and heart
and not the helmet of their leader that mattered.
On the 10th, Early advanced rapidly against Wash
ington, which beside its garrison of near 20,000 troops
was now defended by the two divisions of the 6th Corps
detached from Petersburg, and 6,000 men of the 19th
just arrived from New Orleans. After creating great
alarm in the north, Early withdrew from before the
Capital on the night of the 12th, conscious of his inability
to carry the strong Federal works by storm, re-
crossed the Potomac at White's Ford on the 14th, en
camped for a few days at Leesburg, and then moved
through Snicker's Gap to Berryville, picketing the ad
jacent fords of the Shenandoah River with his artillery.
McLaughlin at Castleman's Ferry was soon heavily
engaged in repelling an attempt of the enemy's advance
guard to cross, but as the main column began to arrive
Early retired from Berryville via White Post to New-
town. Col. Nelson with two batteries then accompanied
Ramseur's Division to Winchester where they made an
unsuccessful attack upon the enemy, losing the guns of
Kirkpatrick's Amherst Battery. Nelson had advanced
his guns so close to the Federal line that when Ram-
seur's troops met with a severe reverse and fell back
in confusion, the battalion commander, whose conduct
was heroic on this occasion, was unable to save Kirk
patrick's guns. The battery was rearmed, however,
August 20.
After retiring to Strasburg and allowing the enemy
to occupy Winchester and push their advance to New-
town, Early turned upon them a few days later and
drove them in great haste through Winchester toward
Martinsburg. The Federal retreat was so rapid that al
though it was followed across the Potomac at Williams-
port, no punishment could be inflicted upon the enemy,
and Early resumed his position at Strasburg. During
these operations the Artillery, while little engaged, was
called upon for the most tremendous exertions in march
ing and countermarching.
880 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
At this juncture, Sheridan assumed command of a
large Federal force in the Valley, and Early fell back
before him to Fisher's Hill. Before the end of July,
Early's command had marched by road over 400 miles,
losing less than 3,000 men, and dispersing two armies of
an aggregate strength of double his own. During this
period, the Artillery was constantly with the infantry
column and with the exception of the physical break
down of Gen. Long, was in as good order as when it left
Cold Harbor. As a record of field artillery marching
this campaign is worthy of the most careful study, for
in that respect it excelled all others of the war and
shows to what a high degree of mobility field batteries
may be brought. Horses now are just as capable of
performing such work as they were in 1864, and yet
it is doubtful if a single battery in our army could march
400 miles on short provender, in less than 60 days, and
engage in a pitched battle with any degree of effect.*
Meanwhile Anderson with Kershaw's Division and
Cutshaw's Battalion of artillery had joined Early, and
on the 14th of August, Fitz Lee's Division of cavalry
with Johnston's and Shoemakers's horse batteries ar
rived at Front Royal. Early again drove the enemy
out of Winchester. On the 19th, Gen. Long was com
pelled to relinquish his command, placing Col. Nelson
in charge of the Artillery, while Capt. Kirkpatrick as
sumed command of Nelson's Battalion.
After much marching and skirmishing, in all of which
the Artillery was constantly engaged, the enemy re
tired to Harper's Ferry on the 21st. Early remained
in the neighborhood of Charles Town until the 25th,
moving thence to Shepherdstown, and then into camp
at Bunker Hill. On the 31st, Milledge's and Massie's
batteries accompanied Rodes' Division to Martinsburg,
where the latter battery was heavily engaged. Early
then concentrated his army near Stephenson's Depot.
Col. Carter had been relieved from his more or less
amphibious duties along the James on August 2, and
* Early made enforced requisition upon the Maryland farmers for horses, but
only a few were assigned to the artillery. See his Memoirs, p. 395.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 881
ordered to join Early as Chief of Artillery. He reported
for duty September 9. His selection to fill Gen. Long's
place was as wise as it was merited. In all that great
army, there was not a more gallant artilleryman than
Tom Carter, of Pampatyke, devoted friend and near
kinsman of Lee. Graduating from the Virginia Mili
tary Institute in the Class of 1849, he studied medi
cine at the University of Virginia. He soon forsook
his profession, however, and settled upon his fine estate
in King William County. There during the years im
mediately preceding the war, he reigned in lordly state
among his kinsmen and people, as his father had done
before him. Noted for the purity and strength of his
character, beloved and respected by all, dispensing
hospitality to his friends and charity to the poor and
needy of the country-side, he peacefully awaited the
call to arms, ready to repay with blood and valor his
State for the education it had given him. No sooner was
the summons issued than he called together his slaves,
admonished them to be faithful in his absence, and com
mitting them to the care of a young and beautiful wife,
saddled his thoroughbred charger and rode proudly to
the Court House where the guidon of his battery was
planted, and assumed command as if by inherited right.
A few days, nay hours, saw the King William Artillery
ready to receive its guns, for a hundred feminine hands
had toiled ceaselessly with needle and thread upon the
uniforms for his men. With a score of young kinsmen
of the country-side, consumed with martial ardor, there
was no lack of material for the officers and noncommis
sioned officers of the battery, mounted as they were
upon the best blooded animals which Virginia could
boast. There was no need to teach these men horse
manship, and the influence a century of association
among their projenitors and a lifetime spent with their
captain supplied the discipline of regular troops. A
cousin of Robert E. Lee, Tom Carter combined more
of the modesty, simplicity, and valor of his great kins
man than any other man in Virginia. It is recounted
882 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
that at Seven Pines, while he sat with one foot in his
stirrup and the other thrown across the pommel of his
saddle, coolly directing under a hail of fire the remaining
fragment of his battery, up rode D. H. Hill, of iron
nerve, and in the midst of the carnage about him, rose
in his stirrups and after saluting Carter declared that
he would rather be the captain of the King William
Artillery than President of the Confederate States.
From that day when Carter first fought under the
eye of Lee, his name was the very synonym of valor.
Promotion meant nothing to him. It came it is true,
and was well earned, but his sole desire was to serve
Lee and Virginia faithfully and well. On several oc
casions he was not rewarded by increased rank when it
should have been given him, but he was the kinsman of
Lee and knew that in spite of his merit his claims must
not be pressed. So it was that when Shoup was pro
moted in the Western Army, Carter preferred to remain
in Virginia, to the soil of which every tie of blood and
duty bound him. It was in Virginia that he belonged
and there he remained. As the great invading host
swept around Lee's Army, trampling Carter's crops,
driving off his horses and cattle, demolishing his barns
and fences, it was there on the very lawns of his ancestral
estate that he planted his guns while a devoted wife,
with the sublime courage of womanhood, ministered
tenderly to the victims of his fire. Soon the crash of the
guns ceased to disturb the peace of Pampatyke, but not
until it lay a rent and bleeding wreck in the path of the
great armies. But still at her post its mistress remained,
surrounded only by a score of faithful blacks, who
looked upon the tragic scenes of war, and bewildered
could not understands Hardly a week that the cavalry
patrols of one army or the other did not pass and repass,
or that the heroic wife of the absent artilleryman did not
like a sainted creature beckon some ambulance with
its woeful burden through the gates of Pampatyke.
Friend and foe alike there found relief, for while the
lips of Sue Roy bade her soldier husband struggle on to
THE LONG AKM or LEE 883
the last, her angelic hands and heart were animated
only by the spirit of Christ in the alleviation of the suf
fering about her. Her deeds were known to all — to both
armies, — and so when her gallant husband returned
from Appomattox, he was able to receive into his home,
wrecked but not wholly destroyed, the weary chieftain
whom he had followed on a hundred battlefields. Ah!
who can say what were the emotions of Robert E. Lee,
and Tom Carter, and Sue Roy during those bitter days
after Appomattox. Let us not profane the sanctity of
their haven of retreat. Let us avert our eyes after see
ing the great master of war dismount at the doorway,
and grasp in silence the outstretched hand of the kins
man whose blood had proved his devotion. More of the
sacred scene is not for us. Let us leave them, as an
ancient negro respectfully slips the martial trappings
from the back of old Traveller, and turns him out to
rest and graze beneath the patriarchal oaks of Pampa-
tyke, where no longer the manger is full, where no
longer the grain bins are laden with the golden freight
of yore, where no longer the fields are flooded by a sea
of tasseled wheat. But leaving them, how can it be
otherwise than with regret that ours is not the brush
to place on canvas this scene, so sweetly pathetic, and
yet so fraught with lessons of fortitude and courage that
no man might look thereon without seeing through his
tears a flash of the unconquerable spirit of Lee and Vir
ginia.
Such as we have described him, was Col. Thomas H.
Carter, the man who now succeeded Gen. Long in com
mand of Early's Artillery. He came to this important
post just as he did to the county courthouse in the spring
of 1861, received by all not only with respect, but with
affectionate regard. He did riot come to displace Nel
son. He merely received his long deferred due.*
At daylight on the 19th of September, the Confed
erate cavalry pickets at the crossing of the Opequon
and Berry ville Road, were driven in, and information
*After the war Col. Carter became Rector of the University of Virginia.
884 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
having been received by Early of the fact, he immedi
ately ordered all the troops at Stephenson's Depot to be
in readiness to move, while Gordon, who had arrived
from Bunker Hill, was directed to move at once. By
some mistake, Gordon failed to receive his orders. Ram-
seur was already in position across the Berryville Road
skirmishing with the enemy, when Early reached him
and learned that Gordon was not moving up. He at
once directed Breckinridge and Rodes to hasten for
ward as rapidly as possible. The position occupied by
Ramseur was about one mile and a half out from Win
chester on an elevated plateau between Abraham's
Creek and Red Bud Run, in the angle formed by the
Martinsburg and Front Royal roads. In his right
front the country was open, while to his left the ground
sloped off to Red Bud Run along which there were
some patches of woods which afforded cover for troops.
In his front and towards the Opequon ran the Berry
ville Road with hills and woods on both sides, which
also afforded admirable cover for the approach of the
enemy.
Nelson's Battalion was posted on Ramseur's line,
covering the approaches as far as practicable, and
Lomax with Jackson's Cavalry and part of Johnson's
was on the right, watching the valley of Abraham's
Creek and the Front Royal Road beyond, while Fitz
Lee was on the left, across the Red Bud, with his
cavalry and Johnston's Horse Battery.
Gordon's Division reached the field a little after 10
A. M. and was placed under cover in rear of a wood be
hind the interval between Ramseur and the Red Bud.
Knowing that it would not do to await the shock of the
heavy assaulting columns, which were being formed,
Early ordered Gordon to examine the ground on his
left with a view to making an attack himself, and placed
Rodes' three brigades as they came up on Gordon's
right, also in some woods. The enemy was now dis
covered moving in great force both against Ramseur's
front and left. Already Ramseur's men were falling
THE LONG ARM or LEE 885
back behind Nelson's batteries, which remained stead
fast, however, and single-handed checked the advance
while Early made his dispositions to hurl Gordon and
Rodes on the right of the Federal column. Meanwhile,
Nelson's batteries were being severely punished, but
gallantly continued to pour a most destructive fire into
the enemy's ranks, while Braxton's Battalion galloped
into position in front of Gordon and also opened fire
upon the Federal flank. Evans' Brigade of Gordon's
Division, passing beyond the guns, was soon overcome
and followed by the enemy, who rolled back the Con
federate left wing until it rested at right angles to Ram-
seur's line with seven of Braxton's guns at the salient.
The onrushing enemy actually approached to within
musket range of these pieces, which were totally unsup
ported, but could not drive the gunners from their posi
tion. Of the situation at this juncture Early wrote:
"This caused a pause in our advance and the position
was most critical, for it was apparent that unless this
force was driven back the day was lost. Braxton's guns,
in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood their
ground, and under the personal superintendence of
Lieut.-Col. Braxton, and Col. T. H. Carter, my then
Chief of Artillery, opened with canister on the enemy.
This fire was so rapid and well directed that the enemy,
staggered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving
a battle flag on the ground whose bearer was cut down
by a canister shot. Just then, Battle's Brigade of
Rodes' Division, which had arrived and had been formed
in line for the purpose of advancing to the support of
the rest of the division, moved forward and swept
through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while
Evans' Brigade was rallied and brought back to the
charge."
Ramseur's Division, which with Nelson's batteries al
ways in front bore the brunt of the attack, was at first
forced back a little, but rallying behind the guns soon
recovered itself. Lomax on the right had greatly as
sisted Ramseur by making a gallant charge against the
886 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
left flank of the attacking infantry, and Breathed's bat
teries with Fitz Lee managed to secure a destructive
flank fire across the Red Bud on the left, while in the
words of Early, "Nelson's and Braxton's battalions had
performed wonders."
Although the Confederates had before noon won a
splendid victory, it was not without paying a high price,
for the superb Rodes had been killed at the very mo
ment of success. Thus one by one were Jackson's
veterans falling, and who should take their places was
already becoming a problem.
The attack so far had been rendered by the Federal
6th and 19th Corps, but another remained. Early's
lines were now formed from Abraham's Creek across to
the Red Bud and were much attenuated.
About 2 o'clock, Breckinridge's and Wharton's divi
sions, and McLaughlin's Battalion reached the field
after a heavy engagement during the morning with the
enemy's cavalry on the Charles Town Road. Patton's
Brigade of Wharton's Division was then sent to re-
enforce Fitz Lee, while Col. King placed his batteries
on a hill in rear of Breckinridge's line, which now faced
to the left. Later in the afternoon two divisions of the
enemy's cavalry drove in the pickets north of the Rose
Bud and Crook's infantry corps, which had not been
engaged, forced back Patton and Fitz Lee. The Fed
eral Cavalry then swept around Early's left flank to op
pose which Wharton's other two brigades, King's Ar
tillery, and one of Braxton's guns were double-timed to
the rear. Breckinridge, after driving back the enemy,
formed his division in line in rear of Early's left and at
right angles to the Martinsburg Road, again repulsing
the enemy. But many of the men on Early's front line
hearing Breckinridge's fire in their rear, and thinking
they were flanked and about to be cut off, commenced
falling back, thus producing great confusion. At the
same time, Crook advanced against Gordon and struck
his line while in confusion. The whole front line now
gave way, but a large number of the men were rallied
THE LONG ARM or LEE 887
behind a line of breastworks, which had been thrown up
just outside of Winchester during the first year of the
war. At this point, the Artillery was gradually massed
and checked all pursuit. Of this movement of the Ar
tillery, Col. Carter wrote in his report: "Fortunately
the Artillery was under perfect control to the last, and
maneuvered and fought with untiring courage. The
guns retired from point to point, halting, unlimbering,
and firing, while efforts were made by general officers
to rally the infantry."
Wharton's Division maintained its organization on
the left, and Ramseur fell back in good order on the
right. But, again, the Federal Cavalry got around
Early's left and he was compelled to retire through the
town under cover of Wickham's Brigade of cavalry,
and Breathed's guns on Fort Hill. A new line was
formed east of the town, which was maintained until
nightfall, when Early retired without serious molesta
tion to Newtown.
Near the close of the day, Col. Carter received a pain
ful wound from a fragment of shell, which compelled
him to turn over the command of the Artillery to Nel
son, but he was not permanently disabled.
While many recriminations followed upon this af
fair, the whole army testified to the stout resistance
made by the Artillery in the long and exhausting
struggle which lasted from dawn to dark. The ulti
mate loss of the battle was due to the Federal superior
ity in cavalry, which was free to encircle the left flank,
gradually compelling Early's line to fall back before the
infantry in its front. Had Carter had sufficient ar
tillery to crown the heights northwest of the town, he
might have prevented the movement of the enemy's
cavalry in that direction. Unfortunately Cutshaw was
off with Kershaw's Division on an expedition east of
the Blue Ridge.
Three guns of King's Battalion were lost in this bat
tle, two of which were loaned the cavalry, and one of
which was abandoned on the retreat, after its teams were
shot down.
888 THE LONG ARM or LEE
After Early 's reverse at Winchester, he retreated
during the night with all his trains secure to Fisher's
Hill, and formed line of battle on the morning of the
20th, with McLaughlin's Battalion on the right, Brax-
ton's in the center, and Nelson's on the left. The after
noon of the 20th, Sheridan appeared on the banks of
Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher's Hill, and
for the greater part of the next two days was engaged
in reconnoitering Early 's line. After some sharp skir
mishing the enemy began to fortify in Early 's front,
but it was soon discovered that an attack was intended
on the Confederate left. Early now gave orders to re
tire, but just before sunset Crook's infantry drove back
Lomax's dismounted cavalry and involved Ramseur's
left before the withdrawal could be effected. Ramseur
made an attempt to meet this movement by throwing his
brigades successively into line to the left, and Wharton's
Division was sent for from the right, but it did not ar
rive. Pegram's brigades were also thrown into line in
the same manner as Ramseur's, but the movement re
sulted in confusion in both divisions and as soon as this
was noticed by the enemy, a general advance along the
whole Federal line was ordered. After very little re
sistance the Confederate Infantry made for the rear in
confusion, leaving the Artillery in the lurch, as it had
never done before. Of this incident Early wrote, "The
men and officers of the Artillery behaved with great cool
ness, fighting to the very last, and I had to ride to some
of the officers and order them to withdraw their guns,
before they would move. In some cases, they had held
out so long, and the roads leading from their positions
into the pike were so rugged, that eleven guns fell into
the hands of the enemy."*
Early is in error as to the number of guns. There
were fourteen lost, four of Nelson's, two of Lomax's
Horse Artillery, seven of Braxton's and one of King's
taken by the enemy on this occasion. Again Col. Nel
son's conduct was conspicuously gallant as he withdrew
*Gen. Jubal A. Early, etc., p. 430.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 889
his pieces in small groups, alternately unlimbering and
firing and entirely without infantry support.
From near Fisher's Hill, Early fell back on the 26th,
in line of battle beyond New Market, Nelson, Braxton,
and McLaughlin in the rear guard occupying every
practicable position from which to retard the pursuers.
In this retreat in which Nelson led the Artillery
with consummate skill, Capt. John L. Massie, of the
Fluvanna Battery, fell mortally, and Lieut. N. B.
Cooke, of Braxton's Battalion severely, wounded.
Early then moved toward Port Republic, arriving at
Brown's Gap on the 25th, where he was rejoined by
Kershaw's Division, and Cutshaw's Battalion. On the
same day, Col. Carter resumed command of the Ar
tillery, of which Carpenter's and Hardwicke's batteries
were engaged on the 26th and 27th.
On the 28th, Early again put his army in motion down
the Valley, marching via Waynesborough to Mount
Sidney, and thence by slow stages to Hupp's Hill be
low Strasburg, which position he reached October 13th.
Here an affair occurred in which Fry's Richmond
Orange Battery participated with great credit and in
which Lieut. S. S. French, adjutant on Carter's staff,
was severely wounded.
The Cavalry had meanwhile been moving by the back
road, and on the morning of the 8th had encountered
the enemy. In this affair the Cavalry broke badly, leav
ing Thomson's and Johnston's batteries entirely iso
lated, but the gunners managed to cut their way to
the rear, not, however, without the loss of six pieces.
The very next day Shoemaker's Battery and the re
maining section of Thomson's, which were serving with
Lomax's Cavalry as a guard to Early 's wagon trains
near Woodstock, were again deserted by the Cavalry,
which fled precipitately to the rear. With the ex
ception of one of Thomson's, all the guns were saved
by the extraordinary heroism of the horse artillery
men. On this occasion Capt. Carpenter of the Alle-
ghany Battery, a classmate and devoted friend of
890 THE LONG AKM OF LEE
Jimmie Thomson's at the Institute, particularly dis
tinguished himself. Observing the danger to which his
comrades were exposed, he quickly rallied a number of
the fugitive troopers and again and again formed them
across the Valley Pike to check the pursuers. In this
way he contributed materially towards saving the guns
and trains, losing an arm as a result of his reckless ex
posure. But what was an arm to Carpenter, if by los
ing it he could save the gallant Jimmie Thomson !
The following extract from the diary of a horse ar
tilleryman of Thomson's Battery throws some light
on the affair of October 9th: "The shameful way that
our Cavalry, especially that portion that tried to operate
on the North Mountain Road, fought, bled, and died,
a running rearward, was enough to make its old com
mander, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, weep in his grave. Ring
down the curtain on that scene, for the Cavalry played
a regular exeunt act."
This was the famous battle of Tom's Brook, some
times called by the Federals in a spirit of derision, "The
Woodstock Races." At any .rate, like the one the
preceding day, it was a disgraceful affair on the part
of the Confederate Cavalry. Soon after a Washington
paper contained a card signed by Gen. Custer to the
effect that he had captured all the guns of the Stuart
Horse Artillery but one, and offering a reward of
$1,000.00 for that. The reward was never claimed.
On October 19, at a very early hour, Early moved
forward to attack the enemy beyond Cedar Creek, and
by 10 A. M. not only had he routed two Federal Corps,
seized their camps with twenty-four pieces of artillery,
but Carter's battalions almost unaided by the Infantry
had dislodged the 6th Corps near Middletown. It was
here that a fatal halt by Early occurred in spite of Gor
don's and Carter's urgent requests to be allowed to fol
low up the success of the morning. Carter even went
so far as to declare that with his guns alone he could
crush out all resistance of the enemy and begged that
he be allowed to follow the Federals up, but Early de-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 891
layed to reform the disordered troops which he found in
the captured trains, and gave Sheridan time to stay the
route of his army and lead part of it back to the field
of battle. Early then formed his line across the pike
north of Middletown and at right angles thereto with
Wofford's Brigade on the right, then Wharton's Divi
sion, then Pegram's Division across the road, then Ram-
seur considerably in advance, with Kershaw and Gordon
in order to the left. Between Gordon and Rosser's
Cavalry, with Thomson's Battery on the extreme Con
federate left, was an interval of about a mile in which
about 3 P. M. Carter, of his own accord, placed six of
Cutshaw's and two of Jones' guns. Shortly after, about
3 :30 P. M., the enemy assailed Gordon in force and again
the Infantry gave way while the guns were retired only
upon Gordon's order. Nelson's, Braxton's and Mc-
Laughlin's battalions and the other batteries of Cut
shaw's, posted from right to left along the infantry line,
resolutely held their positions until the left began to
roll up, whereupon Carter withdrew them to a com
manding elevation several hundred yards in rear of the
infantry line. Soon the Infantry began to break and
move to the rear, but the Artillery maintained its fire,
holding the Federals for over an hour, and not until
its ammunition was exhausted was the order to retire
given. Meantime, Carter had placed a small group of
guns on the heights south of Cedar Creek to cover the
withdrawal of the Infantry and Artillery.
Again Early's Infantry had failed him after winning
a splendid victory, the Artillery as at Winchester alone
saving the retreat from becoming a rout. Night at
last came and under cover of darkness and the fire of
Carter's rearmost guns, the Army was falling back in
apparent safety. While the main body of the Artillery
was marching in column towards Hupp's Hill, a small
body of Federal cavalry burst into the fields on the right
of the turnpike and charged the column and trains in
rear. The bugle blasts, cheers, the rush of horses' feet,
and pistol shots in the darkness, at once created a panic
892 THE LONG ARM or LEE
in the infantry support, already much disorganized. The
artillery officers and men appealed in vain to the panic-
stricken infantrymen for muskets to defend the trains,
but could not secure them, and as the cannoneers were
totally unarmed they were compelled to abandon a
large number of guns and wagons. Not only did the
enemy recover all the guns captured from them in the
morning, but twenty-three others besides. "One hun
dred men in an organized state, with muskets, could
have saved the train," wrote Col. Carter.
This incident was as disgraceful to the Confederates
as it was pleasing to Sheridan. It was not, however, the
fault of the Artillery. The attack, in the nature of an
ambush, occurred at a very narrow passage south of
Strasburg, between the precipitous bank of the river on
the one side and bluffs for the most part on the other.
A bridge on the turnpike had failed and caused the road
to become congested with ordnance and medical trains,
and a long column of over 1,400 prisoners. There was
absolutely no chance, therefore, for escape, and the can
noneers could not be expected to engage with fence rails
or stones, even had they been available, in a night con
flict with armed troopers. That their conduct was in
every way commendable is attested by Col. Carter, who
declared that throughout the night, with confusion and
disorder all about them, the artillerymen remained cool
and thoroughly under control, and as a guarantee
against the repetition of such occurrences, he took oc
casion to recommend at once that a certain proportion of
artillerymen be armed with carbines.
After this misfortune, Early retreated to New
Market, in the neighborhood of which he remained until
the last of November, when the Army proceeded to
Harrisonburg, the Artillery going into winter quarters
near Staunton. Thus did Early's Valley Campaign of
1864 come to a close, brilliant in many respects yet,
in the main, ill-fated. With the exception of the Ar
tillery it hardly seemed possible that the troops which
broke so badly at Winchester, at Fisher's Hill, at Wood-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 893
stock, and on several other occasions were the men which
had fought under Longstreet, Jackson, Stuart, and Lee
himself. It has been attempted to explain the poor con
duct of Early's troops by saying that these men were
simply fought out, that they had reached the limit of
physical endurance, and that with a failure of physical
stamina came their demoralization as a natural conse
quence. This explanation is on a par with that which
makes of Jackson a religious fanatic at Games' Mill and
White Oak Swamp. Neither are satisfactory. Why, if
Early's Infantry was exhausted, was the Artillery still
capable of performing deeds of unsurpassed valor on the
field of battle, as well as the same marches which fell to
the Infantry? No. Some other explanation is necessary
and the correct one would seem to concern the discipline
of the several arms. Is it too much to suggest a com
parison of the field-officers and battery commanders of
the Artillery with the officers of equal rank in the
Infantry and Cavalry? Is it too much to say that in the
comparatively long service and training of the junior
officers of the Artillery, many of whom had served in
the lower grades of their arm since the beginning of the
war, lies the explanation? Is it too much to say that
in the artillery enlisted personnel, there may be found
a further cause for the superior conduct of the gunners
over that of the other troops, large numbers of whose
best men had fallen in battle, while an ever-increasing
number of conscripts, and inferior material filled their
places? Some such explanation seems reasonable, for
certain it is that there was a marked difference which
Early fully recognized. It is well known that he made
some harsh criticisms of his troops, and in this connec
tion an incident concerning the Artillery should be re
corded.
On a certain occasion it was reported that Early, in
his natural disappointment over the result of his cam
paign, had impugned the fighting qualities of his army.
Whereupon, Col. Carter, politely but firmly, demanded
a retraction in favor of the Artillery and got it. It is
894 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
not difficult in reading Early's memoirs to see that such
a discrimination was sincere on his part. Again and
again he bears tribute to the Artillery of his command,
when only veiled reproaches are found for the others.
The principal artillery lessons to be drawn from
Early's operations in the Valley are as to the endurance
of artillery, and what may be exacted of it in rear guard
actions, in the face of a superior force — superior not
only in point of numbers, but moral as well. Carter's
Artillery formed the very backbone of Early's Army
from Winchester to the end of the campaign. Without
it, on more than one occasion, withdrawals from before
the enemy would have been decisive defeats, and re
treats would have become disgraceful routs. It was
always at hand, as we have shown, in the forefront of
the advance, and on every hilltop on the retreat, either
to open the battle with encouragement to the Infantry,
or to deny Sheridan's superb and overwhelming force
of cavalry the full fruits of victory.
CHAPTER XL VI
PETERSBURG THE WINTER OF 1864
GRANT had learned a lesson, and for three weeks after
the Crater fight comparative quiet reigned at Peters
burg, though many brave men perished in the trenches.
Picket firing and artillery practice was continuous,
"while the fiery curves of mortar-shell by night, told
that the portentous game of war still went on."
About August 10th, Fitz Lee's Division of cavalry,
with Johnston's and Shoemaker's batteries under Capt.
Johnston, received orders to join Early in the Valley.
Maj. Breathed had been wounded in a skirmish on June
29. This force reached Front Royal on August 14, and
thenceforth participated in all of Early's operations in
the Valley.
Upon Alexander's return to the Army August 18, he
at once examined the Artillery defenses with the Chief
of Artillery, and steps were instantly taken by the
latter to have the works in rear of the Crater greatly
strengthened. A number of Blakelys, Columbiads,
and 30-pounder Parrotts were issued to the 3d Corps
and caused to be mounted and manned by the can
noneers of Penick's Battery, while more careful in
structions were drawn up for the Artillery in general,
in order to secure the most systematic routine of duty
possible and guard against all surprises. In connection
with this work, Gen. Pendleton was constantly in the
works and trenches.
About this time Lieut.-Col. Pemberton renewed
Carter's proposal to organize a special body of horse
artillery for the purpose of harassing the enemy along
the river, a duty which required great mobility, but
nothing was accomplished in that direction. Towards
the end of the month, Col. Hilary P. Jones was ordered
to Wilmington to organize the Artillery of the 3d Mili
tary District on the same basis as that of the Army in
26
896 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Virginia, leaving Lieut.-Col. Moseley in command of
Beauregard's Artillery.
Grant's next move after the Crater was an attempt
to seize the Weldon Railroad by gradually extending
his left. To meet this threat, Heth's Division and
Brander's Battery of Pegram's Battalion moved out on
the 18th and attacked the enemy at the Davis house on
the railroad, the affair resulting successfully for the
Confederates. The next day, Mahone's Division and
Pegram, with the rest of his battalion, joined Heth and
Brander and renewed the attack. In this engagement
in which the Federals lost nearly 3,000 prisoners, Pe-
gram greatly distinguished himself, and together with
a part of Heth's Division bore the brunt of the battle.
Again on the 21st, Pegram with twelve guns was heavily
engaged at Poplar Spring Church, where Mahone, at
tacking with six small brigades, failed to dislodge the
enemy. On this occasion instead of encountering a
small force as expected, he found an army corps well en
trenched with every approach to the hostile works swept
by a powerful array of artillery. On the 24th, Pegram
was directed, with Brander's and Cayce's batteries of his
own battalion, Ross's of Lane's, and sections of Hurt's
and Clutter's of Macintosh's, to accompany Heth's
column in its attack upon the enemy at Reams Station.
The following day Heth made a splendid effort captur
ing twelve stands of colors, nine pieces of artillery, ten
caissons, 2,150 prisoners, and 3,100 muskets, losing him
self but 720 men. In this brilliant affair Pegram, with
characteristic dash and skill, prepared the way to
victory. While the conduct of the North Carolina
troops was superb and won fresh laurels for the old
North State, Heth himself declared that he did not be
lieve any troops could have carried the works of the
enemy without such assistance as Pegram rendered the
North Carolinians, by first shaking the hostile line with
the fire of his guns.
By the end of August, however, Grant was firmly es
tablished across the Weldon Road and had thus taken
THE LONG ARM or LEE 897
another important line of communication from Lee. To
seize it had cost him in the four engagements of August
not less than 8,500 men, as opposed to a loss of one-
fourth that number to his adversary, but the advantage
was worth the cost. He knew that similar successes,
even at such disproportionate losses, would soon enable
him to accomplish his purpose.
In the severe fighting of August on the right, Hamp
ton had also won fresh laurels for the Cavalry, eliciting
high praise for his regiments and Hart's and Mc
Gregor's batteries from Lee himself. From September
14 to 30, these two batteries with Edward Graham's
Petersburg Battery of Beauregard's Artillery, now con
verted from light to horse artillery, rendered service
of the most brilliant character, in cooperation with the
Cavalry.
On the 29th of September, the enemy succeeded in
carrying by surprise, a commanding salient of the Con
federate works, known as Fort Harrison, near
Chaffin's Bluff. To meet this threat against Richmond,
Gen. Alexander, who had rejoined his command in
August, accompanied Field's Division that night with
Clutter's Battery of Macintosh's Battalion, and Marye's
Battery of Pegram's Battalion, both under Maj. Mar-
maduke Johnson. The next morning Haskell's Bat
talion joined Alexander north of the James, and Lieut.-
Col. Hardaway, who had been placed in command of the
Artillery on the James when Carter was ordered to join
Early, September 2, reported to Alexander with his
own and Stark's Battalion.
Immediately an effort was made to recover Fort
Harrison. Hardaway's and Stark's battalions co
operated as far as practicable with Johnson's and
Haskell's in the unsuccessful effort of the 30th to re
cover the fort from Butler, but the nature of the terrain
and the advantageous position of the enemy placed
Alexander at a great disadvantage. When the attack
was resumed October 1, Haskell's Battalion was united
with Hardaway's and Stark's on the right near the
898 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
river, and Lamkin's Battery, which had gained much
experience with high angle fire in the trenches at Peters
burg, was assigned the task of shelling the hostile works
with a number of mortars. But again the attempt to
drive Butler out of Fort Harrison proved unsuccessful,
and the Artillery was withdrawn to the defensive lines
with the exception of Lamkin's Battery, which remained
in the advanced position with the mortars.
While the Confederates were thus opposing Butler on
their extreme left, heavy fighting was also taking place
on the right, brought on by the continuous extension of
the enemy in that direction. In the affairs of Sep
tember 30 and October 1, known as the "Battles of the
Jones House," Pegram with Brander's and Ellett's
batteries on the first day operated with Heth in his at
tack on the Federal left, and on the second day with
Brander's and Cayce's batteries in the combined attack
of Heth and Wilcox. On the 2d, Pegram with Ellett's,
Cayce's under command of Lieut. Hollis, who greatly
distinguished himself the preceding day, and Gregg's
batteries, took a prominent part in repulsing the Fed
eral assault on Heth's position. In these affairs, the
Federals again lost heavily and again the reports teem
with references to the extraordinary effectiveness of the
Confederate Artillery.
Repeatedly during the siege was Pegram praised by
the generals of the divisions with which he served, as well
as by his corps commander. In the action of September
30, when Heth's and Wilcox 's divisions were assigned
the task of recovering the extension of the line of rifle-
pits to the right of Petersburg, he shone with especial
brilliance. On this occasion McGowan's Brigade after
a gallant resistance was borne back by sheer weight of
opposing numbers. Seeing that the South Carolinans
were giving ground, Pegram, who had gone forward
with them in their initial advance, rode through the line
of battle, snatched the colors from the ensign and rode
with them straight toward the enemy. "When forty or
fifty yards in advance of the whole line, placing the
THE LONG ARM or LEE 899
color-staff on his stirrup and turning halfway round in
his saddle, he dropped the reins on his horse's neck,
raised his hat and shouted out in tones sweet and clear
as a bugle, 'Follow me, men!' It was a scene never to
be forgotten — the glorious sunset, the lithe, boyish
form, now sharply cut against the crimson western sky,
then hid for a moment by the smoke of battle, the tat
tered colors, the cheering lines of men. With a rousing
yell, the sturdy brigade closed up, and never after gave
back a single inch. The color-bearer ran out to him, the
tears standing in his eyes, and cried out: 'Give me back
my colors, Colonel! I'll carry them wherever you say!'
'Oh! I'm sure of that,' he answered cheerily, 'it was
necessary to let the whole line see the colors; that's the
only reason I took them.' "*
On the 7th, Haskell's and Johnson's battalions shared
in the repulse of the enemy by Field's Division, along
the New Market and Darbytown roads north of the
James and were particularly effective, the gallant
Haskell being struck in the head by a bullet and Lieut.
McQueen of Garden's Battery also falling severely
wounded. Haskell's Battalion was again engaged on
the 13th under Capt. Garden, in an affair memorable
in the Artillery for the heroic conduct of Corporal
Fulcher, of Flanner's Battery. A Federal shell burst
ing among the ammunition, wounded six men and
ignited the fuses of a number of shell, which had been
improperly exposed. Though himself wounded, Fulcher
seized the shells and carrying them under fire to a
nearby pool extinguished the burning fuses.
The Presidential election in the North was now near
at hand, and before settling down into winter quarters,
Gen. Grant determined to make one more vigorous ef
fort to turn Lee's right, seize the southside road, and
compel the evacuation of Petersburg. For this pur
pose, he concentrated on his left the greater portion of
three army corps, at the same time directing pressure to
be exerted all along the line, and especially north of the
*See W. Gordon McCabe's sketch of Pegram in The University Memorial.
900 THE LONG ARM or LEE
James. On the 27th, a simultaneous attack was made
on the lines below Richmond, and on Lee's right flank,
resulting in the latter quarter in the battle of Hatcher's
Run.
The Federal advance below Richmond, though gen
eral and in considerable force, was easily repelled.
While the enemy delivered a frontal attack upon the
Confederates in position, with Hardaway's and Stark's
battalions between the Darbytown Road and Fort
Harrison, Haskell's and Johnson's battalions moved out
around the extreme left of Field's Division and secured
a most destructive flank fire upon the attacking columns,
literally sweeping the approaches along the Williams-
burg, and Nine Mile Roads, and even as far as the
Charles City Road. The entire shock of the assault was
in this way diverted from the Infantry and the attack
was abandoned before it developed serious proportions.
Lieut. Wilkes, commanding Clutter's Battery, a young
officer of distinction, fell mortally wounded.
In connection with this affair it is to be noted what
might have been accomplished with artillery in June,
1861, on the same ground had it been in the same hands.
But at that time, there were no Alexanders, Haskells,
and Hardaways, but only a great mass of disintegrated
artillery, without organization and operating solely as
individual batteries. It was the experience of four
years of constant fighting that now enabled the Artillery
to maneuver in large groups over country which had
formerly precluded the movement of a single battery.
The time had come when the modern belief that artillery
can go with the infantry was everywhere entertained,
and it seems surprising that so soon as Lee's Artillery
surrendered its guns, or buried them, that the world
should have ignored the lessons which it had been taught
by Alexander, Long, and Walker, only after nearly
half a century to be retaught by Langlois, the father of
modern field artillery.
On the extreme right, the Federal attack was no more
successful than below Richmond. Advancing through
THE LONG ARM or LEE 901
the most densely wooded region, confusion added to the
resolute resistance of the Confederates, brought failure
to the movement. At first the enemy advanced,
gradually forcing Hampton back to and across the
Boydton Plank Road. While rendering splendid serv
ice with the advanced line, Capt. Hart fell at the head
of his battery with a severe wound.
After the enemy had crossed Hatcher's Run and
pressed forward to Burgess's Mill, Lee hurled a part of
Hill's Corps upon Hancock's isolated column, de
termined to recover the Boydton Road which was now
of so much importance to him, since the Weldon Rail
road had been lost. Here Pegram, with Ellett's Bat
tery under Lieut. Hollis, and Gregg's Battery, again
fought his guns with the most desperate courage. In
action the mild appearing youth seemed to have become
a fiend incarnate, and innumerable tales of his reckless
daring and total disregard of danger to himself and
his men might be recounted. In the fighting around
Petersburg he had become one of the foremost figures
in the Artillery and such a reputation had he acquired
for valor that in all that splendid artillery corps, no
name was more prominently before the Army.
At the same time that Hill's troops and Pegram
hurled themselves upon the head of Hancock's column,
Hampton's cavalry division which with Hart's, Mc
Gregor's, and Graham's batteries had worked its way
around to the right, fell upon the Federal left and rear,
with the result that Hancock was compelled to with
draw in confusion after losing about 1,500 men.
After these signal reverses Grant refrained for some
time from further attempts on Lee's flanks, contenting
himself with a ceaseless cannonade and redoubling the
activity of the sharpshooters. And so the inexorable
process of attrition wore on, every loss of life in the
trenches placing the Federals that much nearer the in
evitable issue.
On the 12th of October, orders were received to arm
all cannoneers that could be spared from the guns with
902 THE LONG ARM or LEE
muskets for the defense of the trenches. In this way
only could the rapidly failing infantry lines be rein
forced. In the Washington Artillery Battalion alone
one-half of the drivers were thus armed and organized
as an infantry garrison for Fort Gregg. After six
months of service in the trenches, exposed day and night
to hostile fire, this battalion was at last relieved by that
of Lieut. -Col. Moseley, and ordered to the extreme right
to serve thereafter with the 3d Corps. It would seem
certain that Longstreet's recent return to the command
of his corps had something to do with the transfer. Not
only was Eshleman's Battalion transferred, but Gibbes'
old battalion, now commanded by Maj . Owen, formerly
of the Washington Artillery, was transferred Novem
ber 3, from the 1st to Beauregard's old command, or
Anderson's Corps. But on the 15th, Owen's Battalion
was again transferred, this time to the 3d Corps.
On November 4, an order was published permanently
assigning assistant adjutant-generals in the Artillery
Corps, as follows :
STAFF OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY
Capt. Dudley D. Pendleton
1st Corps, Capt. S. Winthrow, and Capt. J. C. Haskell.
2d Corps, Capt. W. A. Percy.
3d Corps, Capt. William W. Chamberlaine and Capt. Richard
Walke.
Pendleton now again sought to have the measure
proposed in May, in the form of a bill for the increase of
the commissioned personnel, adopted. With this end
in view he addressed the Secretary of War, November
8, but soon received a reply from Mr. Sedden, in which
it was apparent that with the exception of allowing in
creased rank to general officers in the Artillery Corps,
no help from the War Department need be expected.*
This was not what Pendleton wanted. His efforts were
not in the interest of himself but for the welfare of the
Corps, and he promptly pointed out to the Secretary the
injustice being done artillery officers by the Government
*Rcl)ellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part III, pp. 1205, 1211.
THE LONG AEM OF LEE 903
continuing the old system. In arguing the case of his
corps, Pendleton wrote on the 15th to the Secretary of
War as follows:
"DEAR SIR — Permit me, in acknowledging your kind favor of
the 12th instant, to submit additional considerations in reply to
your objections to our proposed bill.
"First. You regard such legislation as objectionable, because
in the main unnecessary, since the organization asked for virtually
exists in this army by regulation and can be similarly introduced
in any other.
"Second. It will prove, you apprehend, embarrassing in several
respects: First, a system fixed by law allows to the commanding
general less freedom in adapting his resources to emergencies;
second, a plan suitable for a large army may not be adapted to
smaller commands; third, officers attached under law cannot be as
freely transferred as the commanding general may desire.
"The considerations in reply to both of these objections seem
to me to be really decisive. First, as to the necessity of the case;
although we have artillery battalions formed under orders of the
commanding general, sanctioned by the Department, and although
this organization has proved one of the most efficient instru
mentalities in our great struggle, the result is attained at the cost
of very serious injustice to a large class of most deserving officers;
is attended by inconveniences which experience satisfied us ought
to be obviated, and is liable to depreciate in the future, if remedial
measures be not adopted. The injustice of which I speak results
partly from the fact that the status of artillery officers as now
determined by number of guns, 80 for a brigadier, 40 for a colonel,
24 for a lieutenant-colonel, and 16 for a major, is entirely dispro-
portioned to their merit and services. A single case may illustrate:
The Chief of Artillery of one of our Army Corps, although his
command in extent, importance, and responsibility greatly exceeds
that of any infantry brigadier, must remain a colonel, as our roll
already has 3 brigadiers of artillery, and we have not four times
80 guns.* In like manner, battalion commanders, whose commands,
admirably managed, in difficulty and importance far surpass
ordinary infantry regiments, must remain lieutenant-colonels, or
majors, because we have not a sufficient number of times 40 or 24
guns to allow of their being rewarded with another grade. In
truth, my dear sir, there ought to be more scope for promotion in
this arm. Officers painfully feel that they are not fairly estimated,
that in spite of noblest service they are often needlessly far behind
their brethren of other arms. This might, indeed, be remedied in
part by reducing the number of guns required for the several
*Pendleton here, of course, refers to Col. Walker of the 3d Corps.
904 THE LONG ARM or LEE
grades. But this is not the whole case, — our artillery field officers
feel that in the present plan they occupy rather a false position;
it seems to regard them somewhat as exceptional and almost
superfluous, instead of as an essential element of the structure and
efficiency of the army. Their arm they know to be of eminent
value. Their power they are equally satisfied is greatly enhanced
by combination, the significance of its extensive organization they
have seen fully proved, and to leave them nearly unrecognized by
legal sanction, appears to them something like a degradation of
their branch of the service. There are, besides, others on whom
the present plan operates hardly. Every regiment of infantry or
cavalry has its own non-commissioned staff provided by law; our
artillery battalion as now existing, though imperatively needing
such officers, are not allowed them except by temporary detail,
without recognized authority. The service cannot but suffer from
these things, and especially from the insufficient number of field
officers. It not unfrequently now occurs that instead of two field
officers to a battalion, we cannot under the casualties of service get
one; and if, as is sometimes the case, the eldest captain be not
efficient for larger command, hazard may ensue, which ought not
to be permitted.
"These, my dear sir, are not matters of speculation, or fancy;
they are realities seriously felt by some of the best men we have
in service, and they seem conclusively to show that some such
legislation as that proposed is really called for in justice to our
arm, and with a view to the best interests of the service. With
regard, in the second place, to embarrassments involved in apply
ing law to this organization, first that the general cannot arrange
detachments as readily as he may wish, the breaking of batteries
has rarely been found necessary during the past two years, nor
could there be difficulty in doing it if necessary, were batteries
fully legalized. The same great principle of military control
under which commanding generals can send infantry or cavalry
companies, regiments, brigades, etc., where he deems it necessary,
must, of course, apply to artillery organizations of whatever kind,
and, besides, as you observe, we expressly guard that point in our
bill. Gen. Lee would undoubtedly have commented unfavorably
on this feature of the plan had it constituted in his judgment a
real objection. Second, that which may suit a large army may
not be adapted to smaller commands. This the bill also provides
for; it is not mandatory, only permissive, each case can be arranged
according to its own conditions. Third, officers assigned under
the law become inconvenient fixtures. There is undoubtedly an evil
here, though we guard against it by a clause in the bill, and besides,
whatever be the evil, it pertains equally to the infantry and cavalry
regiments, brigades, etc., yet the advantages of a definite legal
THE LONG ARM or LEE 905
system for these have been found greatly to overbear the dis
advantages suggested; and so it would prove for similar reasons
in the artillery.
"These views,, my dear sir., I submit with kind candor, yet
with sincere deference. Impartial observers like yourself,, survey
ing processes from a position allowing wide range of view., can
often detect errors which escape the notice of those more occupied
with details ; but in a case of this nature, where all the chief
officers of an arm, under frequent appeals from those of highest
authority associated with them, concur in recommending a specific
as well tested by experience and approved in their judgment; and
when that recommendation is enforced by the deliberate approval
of so rigidly careful a judge as Gen. Lee, I feel that there can be
little danger of mistake in asking for the legislation in question, as
really needed and likely to promote the best interests of the
service."
The foregoing communication from the Chief of Ar
tillery is given in full, for to the careful reader, it is a
history of the conditions in the Artillery arm as they
existed at the time of its writing. Not only did Pendle-
ton decline to be brushed aside, but he made bold to put
the matter squarely up to the Department, in such a way
that to disapprove meant to accept full responsibility
for further neglect of the claims of artillery officers.
December 7, the enemy's cavalry set out in force upon
a raid toward Belfield and beyond, which movement
called forth Hampton's Division and his horse batteries.
At Hicksf ord, Hampton met the raiding column and re
pelled it. An infantry column accompanied by Pe-
gram's Battalion and the Washington Artillery was un
able to overtake the main body of the enemy, and after
seven arduous days of marching and some skirmishing
with the rear guards, returned to the lines worn out by
the incessant toil over frozen and all but impassable
roads.
Both armies now settled down for the winter, but with
ever-watchful eyes upon each other. The Confederate
Artillery had indeed borne its share of the struggle.
The weeks which followed witnessed privations un
dreamed of before. The awful monotony of life in the
trenches was occasionally broken, however, by the ex-
906 THE LONG ARM or LEE
citement of Hill's activities during January and Febru
ary on the right. On several occasions the Washington
Artillery was called upon to march and countermarch
in that quarter, finally going into cantonments near
Burgess's Mill.
Again did the spirit of revival sweep over the Army,
and serve in a great measure to hold the weary troops
steadfast. In the diary of the Washington Artillery
is found the following significant passage: "January
29 — The men have built a chapel just behind my tent,
and have prayer-meetings nightly. The whole army
has taken to praying, and if prayer accomplish any
thing, we should whip the fight yet. Peace commis
sioners started for Washington yesterday. No good is
expected from the mission. We will certainly have a
campaign in the spring of some sort or other." The
men who were now "praying nightly" were the gay
Louisianians, who but a short while before enlivened the
camps with their music and dancing. Thus had time,
adversity, and starvation wrought a change in the spirit
of the troops. But with the love and fear of God had
come an unconquerable resolve to die at their posts, a re
solve unknown in the earlier stages of the war. Then it
was the joy of victory which inspirited the troops to
deeds of valor. Now it was a sacred devotion to duty, to
a cause, to God, that animated the Confederate soldier
and enabled him to bear the travail of war and slow
death in the trenches, without even the hope of eventual
success. Before it was the innate bravery of the race;
in the winter of 1864-65, as at Fredericksburg, it was a
sterner God-given courage which held the men to their
colors.
To foster the spirit of sacrifice among the men of his
command Gen. Pendleton was constantly at work. His
love for them was great, and he watched over them with
the spirit of one personally responsible for their future
state. Of his command at this time he wrote: "In the
whole of the eventful campaign of 1864, the Artillery
of the Army of Northern Virginia bore a distinguished
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 907
part, and in every portion of the widely-extended field
of operation rendered signal service. It was every
where and at all times proved reliable, howsoever great
the emergency. In the wildest fury of battle and cease
less harassment and exposure from sharpshooters and
shelling on the lines, on the toilsome march, amid all the
hardships of the trenches, through summer, fall, and
winter, and when steadily breasting the tide of reverse
against friends unnerved or overpowered, and foe
flushed with triumph, the brave officers and men of this
branch of our army have almost without exception ex
emplified the very highest virtues of Christian soldiers
battling for their faith, their honor, and their homes."
At this time the staff of the Chief of Artillery was
as follows: Capt. Dudley D. Pendleton, Assistant
Ad jut ant- General; Lieut. George W. Peterkin, and
Acting Lieut. Charles Hatcher, aides-de-camp; Capt.
John Esten Cooke, and Lieut. E. P. Dandridge, As
sistant Inspector Generals; Maj. John C. Barn well,
Ordnance Officer; Dr. John Graham, Surgeon; Maj.
John Page, Quartermaster; and of them their chief re
ported, "It is but just that I should say they have uni
formly discharged their duties with faithful alacrity and
to my entire satisfaction."
Artillery headquarters were located during the winter
near the railroad cut on the extension of Halifax Street,
and about this center the most ceaseless activity reigned.
The labors of the Chief and his staff and of the artillery
corps commanders were incessant in the effort to secure
and care for the horses and maintain the material in
serviceable condition. Then, too, there were many
vacancies to fill and where so many were deserving of
reward the problem of promotion imposed no light task.
The difficulty of securing needed supplies at this
time can be illustrated in no better way than by giving
the following extract from the record of purchases, with
908 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Confederate money, by an artillery officer traveling
from Augusta, Ga., to Petersburg, in the early days of
1865.
1 curry comb $ 10.00
Mending pants 20.00
Hair cutting and shave 10.00
Meal on road 20.00
Cigars and bitters 60.00
Pair of eyeglasses 135.00
Candles 50.00
Coat, vest,, and pants 2,700.00
1 gallon whiskey 400.00
1 pair pants 700.00
6-yd. linen, 2% ft. wide 1,200.00
1 oz. sulphate quinine 1,700.00
2 weeks' board 700.00
1 doz. Catawba wine 900.00
Shad and sundries 75.00
Matches 25.00
Penknife 125.00
1 package brown Windsor soap 50.00
Army boots were selling in Richmond at this time
for from $500.00 to $600.00 a pair, and artillery of
ficers commonly paid $175.00 for the leather and $75.00
for the fabrication of the coarsest kind of military
boots. One may easily imagine the difficulty encoun
tered in replacing and repairing artillery harness, equip
ments, etc., the price of leather being $5.30 per pound.
The matter of securing draught animals was even more
serious. The schedule of prices established by the War
Department in August, 1864, which provided for the
impressment of animals, fixed the value of first-class
artillery horses and mules at $500.00.* The price was
bad enough. The main difficulty was to find the animals
and to feed those already on hand. The schedule prices
for feed at this time were as follows :
Corn, per bu. 56 Ibs $4.00
Unshelled corn 3.95
Cleaned oats, per bu. 32 Ibs 2.50
'Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part II, p. 1153.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 909
Wheat bran, per bu. 17 Ibs $ .50
Hay, unbaled, per 100 Ibs 3.00
Sheaf oats, baled 4.40
Sheaf oats, unbaled 3.50
Blade fodder, baled 3.90
Shucks, baled 2.60
Wheat straw, baled, per 100 Ibs 2.20
We have followed its trials and tribulations in some
detail, but nothing can so impress one with the severity
of the ordeal through which the Artillery had passed
since the first of May, as a summary of its losses, which
itemized by corps and battalions were as follows:
Huger's Battalion 37
Cabell's Battalion 47
Haskell's Battalion .. 68
Hardaway's Battalion 4
Stark's Battalion 2
Gibbes' Battalion 20
Johnson's Battalion.. 19
Total 1st Corps 197
Field and Staff 3
Page's Battalion 177
Cutshaw's Battalion 191
Hardaway's Battalion 74
Nelson's Battalion 116
Braxton's Battalion 128
McLaughlin's Battalion 103
Total 2d Corps 788
Pegram's Battalion 78
Poague's Battalion 82
Mclntosh's Battalion 84
Richardson's Battalion 51
Lane's Battalion 64
Owen's Battalion 33
Washington Artillery 18
Total 3d Corps 370
Stribling's Battalion 132
12th Virginia Battalion 41
910 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Moseley's Battalion 87
Coit's Battalion _ 58
Total Anderson's Corps (Beauregard) 318
Horse Artillery 79
RECAPITULATION
1st Army Corps 197
2d Army Corps 788
3d Army Corps 370
Anderson's Corps 318
Horse Artillery 79
Aggregate 1,752
Of this number, exactly 500 were reported as missing,
principally in the 2d Corps, due to captures at Spotsyl-
vania, where 7 officers and 137 men of Page's, and 4 of
ficers and 128 men of Cutshaw's Battalion were taken
by the enemy. Deducting 17 officers and 483 men miss
ing from the aggregate loss and the casualties in battle
are found to be 1?252, of which number 72 were officers.
In the 3d Corps alone 7 officers were killed and 25
wounded, Poague's Battalion losing 12 of the number,
Lane's 8, Mclntosh's 6, and Pegram's 4. In the 2d
Corps there were 9 officers killed, 18 wounded, and 16
missing.
If we take the aggregate loss at 1,752, we find the
loss of the Artillery Corps to have been over thirty per
cent of its original strength, with a total loss in killed
and wounded of over twenty-eight per cent ! It is small
wonder that Lee's Artillery was so highly regarded by
both friend and foe. The writer knows of no such
figures as these as applicable to any other artillery.*
In spite of the great drain on the personnel incident
to such a list of casualties, never was the Artillery Corps
allowed to become depleted to the point of ineffective
ness. The total artillery personnel of the 1st, 3d, and
Anderson's Corps, as stated in the returns of October
20, 31, November 10, and December 10, being 5,339,
•* Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 1052.
THE LONG ABM or LEE 911
6,167, 6,277, and 6,179, respectively. It was not until
after the opening of spring that disintegration began to
set in.
On December 28, 1864, the distribution and arma
ment of the Artillery was as follows:
IST CORPS
Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander
CABELL'S BATTALION
Col. Henry Coalter Cabell
1st Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Robert M. Anderson.
4 Napoleons.
Troup (Ga.) Battery, Capt. Henry H. Carlton.
4 10-pounder Parrotts.
Battery "A", 1st N. C. Reg't, Capt. Basil C. Manly.
2 Napoleons, 2 3-inch rifles.
Pulaski (Ga.) Battery, Lieut. Morgan Callaway.
4 Napoleons.
HUGER'S BATTALION
Lieut. -Col. Frank Huger
Maj. Tyler C. Jordan
Brooks' (S. C.) Battery, Capt. William W. Fickling.
14 12-pounder howitzers.
Madison (La.) Battery, Lieut. Jordan C. Parkinson.
2 12-pounder, 4 24-pounder howitzers.
Richmond Battery, Capt. William W. Parker.
4 3-inch rifles.
Bedford Battery, Capt. John D. Smith.
4 3-inch rifles.
Bath Battery, Capt. Esmond B. Taylor.
4 Napoleons.
Ashland Battery, Lieut. James Woolfolk.
2 Napoleons, 2 20-pounder Parrotts.
HASKELL'S BATTALION
Maj. John C. Haskell
Branch (N. C.) Battery, Capt. Henry G. Flanner.
4 Napoleons.
Palmetto (S. C.) Battery, Capt. Hugh R. Garden.
3 Napoleons, 1 10-pounder Parrott.
27
912 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Nelson Battery, Capt. James N. Lamkin.
26 mortars.
Rowan (N. C.) Battery, Capt. John A. Ramsey.
1 12-pounder Whitworth, 2 8-pounder Armstrongs.
HARDAWAY'S BATTALION
Lieut. -Col. Richard A. Hardaway
Powhatan Battery, Capt. Willis J. Dance.
4 3-inch rifles.
3d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr.
4 Napoleons.
1st Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Archibald Graham.
2 3-inch rifles, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.
Salem Battery, Capt. Charles B. Griffin.
4 Napoleons.
STARK'S BATTALION
Maj. Alexander W. Stark
Mathews Battery, Capt. Andrew D. Armistead.
4 Napoleons.
Louisiana Guard Battery, Capt. Charles A. Green.
4 Napoleons.
Giles Battery, Capt. David A. French.
4 Napoleons.
JOHNSON'S BATTALION (Improvised)
Maj. Marmaduke Johnson
Clutter's Richmond Battery, Lieut. Lucas Mclntosh.
2 Napoleons, 2 3-inch rifles.
Fredericksburg Battery, Lieut. John G. Pollock.
4 Napoleons.
2D CORPS
Col. Thomas Hill Carter
NELSON'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. William Nelson
Amherst Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick.
2 Napoleons, 1 3-inch rifle.
Georgia Regular Battery, Capt. John Milledge, Jr.
3 3-inch rifles.
Fluvanna Battery, Capt. Charles G. Snead.
2 12-pounder howitzers.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 913
BRAXTON'S BATTALION
Lieut. -Col. Carter M. Braxton
Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman
Alleghany Battery, Capt. John C. Carpenter.
2 Napoleons.
Stafford Battery, Capt. R. L. Cooper.
2 10-pounder Parrotts.
Lee Battery, Capt. William W. Hardwicke.
2 Napoleons.
CUTSHAW'S BATTALION
Maj. Wilfred Emmet Cutshaw
Richmond Orange Battery, Capt. Chas. W. Fry.
2 12-pounder howitzers.
Staunton Battery, Capt. Asher W. Garber.
2 3-inch rifles.
2d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Lorraine F. Jones.
2 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.
KING'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. J. Floyd King
Maj. William McLaughlin
Lewisburg (W. Va.) Battery, Capt. Thomas A. Bryan.
2 3-inch rifles.
Monroe Battery, Capt. George B. Chapman.
2 Napoleons.
Wise Legion Battery, Capt. William M. Lowry.
2 Napoleons.
3D CORPS
Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker
MC!NTOSH'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. David Gregg Mclntosh
Maj. Marmaduke Johnson
1st Maryland Battery, Capt. William F. Dement.
4 Napoleons.
4th Maryland Battery, Capt. Walter S. Chew.
1 10-pounder Parrott, 2 3-inch rifles.
2d Rockbridge Battery, Capt. William K. Donald.
3 24-pounder Parrotts.
Hardaway's Alabama Battery, Capt. William B. Hurt.
2 3-inch rifles, 1 12-pounder Whitworth.
Danville Battery, Capt. Berryman Z. Price.
4 Napoleons.
914 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
PEGRAM'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. William J. Pegram
Maj. Joseph McGraw
Richmond Letcher Battery,, Capt. Thomas A. Brander.
4 Napoleons.
Richmond Crenshaw Battery, Capt. Thomas Ellett.
4 3-inch rifles.
Richmond Purcell Battery, Capt. George M. Cayce.
4 Napoleons.
Fredericksburg Battery, Lieut. John G. Pollock.
4 Napoleons.
Battery "B", 1st N. C. Reg't, Capt. Thomas E. Gregg.
4 Napoleons.
POAGUE'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague
Albemarle Battery, Capt. Charles F. Johnston.
1 Napoleon, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.
Madison (Miss.) Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick.
4 Napoleons.
Pittsylvania Battery, Capt. Nathan Penick.
2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2 3-inch rifles.
Warrenton Battery, Capt. Addison W. Utterback.
4 Napoleons.
Graham's N. C. Battery, Capt. Arthur B. Williams.
2 Napoleons, 1 3-inch rifle.
RICHARDSON'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Charles Richardson
Maj. Victor Maurin
Norfolk Blues Battery, Capt. Charles R. Grandy.
2 Napoleons, 2 3-inch rifles.
Donaldsonville (La.) Battery, Capt. R. Prosper Landry.
2 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.
Norfolk Battery, Capt. Jos. D. Moore.
4 Napoleons.
CUTTS' BATTALION
Col. Allen S. Cutts
Maj. John Lane
Battery "A", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Hugh M. Ross.
4 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.
Battery "B", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. George M. Patterson.
6 Napoleons.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 915
Battery "C", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. John T. Wingfield.
4 Napoleons, 2 10-poimder Parrotts, 2 3-inch rifles.
ESHLEMAN'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Benj. F. Eshleman
Maj. M. B. Miller
1st Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Edward Owen.
1 10-pounder Parrott, 3 3-inch rifles.
2d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. J. B. Richardson.
4 Napoleons.
3d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Andrew Hero, Jr.
4 Napoleons.
4th Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Joe Norcom.
3 Napoleons, 1 10-pounder Parrott.
GIBBES' BATTALION
Maj. William W. Owen
Lynchburg Battery, Capt. John Hampden Chamberlayne.
4 Napoleons.
Ringgold Battery, Capt. Crispen Dickenson.
4 Napoleons.
Richmond Otey Battery, Capt. David N. Walker.
4 Napoleons.
ANDERSON'S CORPS
Col. Hilary P. Jones
MOSELEY'S BATTALION
Maj. William H. Caskie
Battery "C", 13th N. C. Battalion, Capt. James D. dimming.
2 Napoleons.
Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg't, Capt. John O. Miller.
4 10-pounder Parrotts.
Macon (Ga.) Battery, Capt. C. W. Staten.
4 Napoleons.
Yorktown Battery, Capt. Edward R. Young.
4 Napoleons.
BRANCH'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. James R. Branch
Maj. James C. Coit
Confederate Guards, Miss. Battery, Capt. William D. Bradford.
2 12-pounder, 3 20-pounder Parrotts.
Petersburg Battery, Capt. Richard G. Pegram.
4 Napoleons.
916 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Halifax Battery, Capt. Samuel T. Wright.
4 Napoleons.
S. C. "Chesterfield" Battery, Capt. James I. Kelly.
2 Napoleons.
STRIBLING'S BATTALION
Maj. Robert M. Stribling
Maj. Joseph G. Blount
Lynchburg Battery, Capt. James M. Dickerson.
4 Napoleons.
Fauquier Battery, Capt. William C. Marshall.
4 Napoleons.
Richmond Fayette Battery, Capt. Miles C. Macon.
2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2 3-inch rifles.
Richmond Hampden Battery, Capt. J. E. Sullivan.
4 Napoleons.
BOGGS' BATTALION
Maj. Francis J. Boggs
Martin's Richmond Battery, Lieut. Samuel H. Pulliam.
3 Napoleons, 1 12-pounder howitzer.
Albemarle Battery, Lieut. William H. Weisiger.
4 Napoleons.
HORSE ARTILLERY
Lieut.-Col. Robert Preston Chew
CHEW'S BATTALION
Lieut.-Col. Robert Preston Chew
Petersburg Battery, Capt. Edward Graham.
2 3-inch rifles, 2 12-pounder howitzers.
Washington (S. C.) Battery, Lieut. E. Lindsay Halsey.
4 3-inch rifles.
2d Stuart H. A. Battery, Capt. William M. McGregor.
4 3-inch rifles.
BREATHED'S BATTALION
Maj. James Breathed
1st Stuart H. A. Battery, Capt. Philipp P. Johnston.
Lynchburg Battery, Capt. John J. Shoemaker.
Ashby Battery, Capt. James W. Thomson.
Roanoke Battery, Capt. Warren S. Lurty.
HORSE ARTILLERY BATTALION OF LOMAX'S DIVISION
2d Maryland Battery, Capt. William H. Griffin.
Charlottesville Battery, Capt. Thomas E. Jackson.
Staunton Battery, Capt. John H. McClannahan.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 917
Chew's own battalion was serving with Hampton
near Petersburg and Breathed's with Rosser and Fitz
Lee in the Valley. The Horse Artillery had gradually
been increased to ten batteries.
At the beginning of the New Year, Haskell's, Harda-
way's, Johnson's and Stark's battalions under Gen.
Alexander were still north of the James and had been
recently joined by Poague's Battalion. Cutts' and
Richardson's battalions remained in position north of
the Appomattox, with the exception of Penick's Bat
tery, which had been attached to Poague's Battalion.
The 2d Corps Artillery was in the Valley, while Cab-
ell's and Huger's battalions of the 1st Corps, Jones'
battalions of Anderson's, and Pegram's, Macintosh's
and Gibbes' remained in the trenches, and Eshleman's
near Burgess's Mill.
In addition to the twenty-six mortars manned by
Lamkin's Battery, Poague manned four, Mclntosh two
8-inch howitzers and two 8-inch mortars, Pegram two
8-inch and two 24-pounder mortars, Cutts one 8-inch
columbiad and seven 24-pounder mortars. In Ander
son's Corps, Coit, Blount, arid Caskie manned four 30-
pounder Parrotts, one 8-inch Columbiad, four 8-inch,
twelve 24-pounder, nine 12-pounder mortars, and about
25 howitzers of various calibers. Exclusive of the heavy
guns and pieces of position, and the guns of the Horse
Artillery there were in the four corps of Lee's Army,
January 1, 1865, 282 field guns, including 192 Na
poleons and howitzers, and 90 rifled pieces.*
Of the field-officers, Col. Moseley had been killed
December 16, Gibbes had been wounded on July 30,
Caskie was absent on indefinite sick leave, Boggs was
on duty in Richmond, Maurin at High Bridge, and
Branch was absent on leave. Maj. Miller was therefore
assigned to duty with Richardson's Battalion in the
absence of Maurin, while Maj. Blount had succeeded to
the command of Dearing's, or Read's, and Maj. Owen
*For tabular report showing heavy artillery In position and manned by field
artillery at Richmond and Petersburg, see Rebellion Records. Series I, Vol
XLII, Part III, p. 1354.
918 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
to Gibbes' Battalion. Dement's Battery, leaving its
guns in the trenches at Petersburg, was on duty at
Drewry's Bluff.
Notwithstanding the strenuous service which it had
rendered and losses which almost seem to have been an
nihilating, the condition of the Artillery at the close of
the year 1864 was actually better than when it left
winter quarters the preceding spring. On this point,
Pendleton, in his report, wrote February 28, 1865: "In
conclusion I am able to report that our artillery remains
at the close of this arduous campaign in a condition of
most encouraging efficiency, and that with reasonable
effort toward supplying it with a few guns to replace
some lost in unfortunate affairs that have been described
(here he refers to loss in the Valley) , and with horses to
reestablish a number of teams disabled in action or
worn down by hard service, it will be in full strength
for the campaign of the ensuing spring. It may be con
fidently relied upon to accomplish, by the Divine bless
ing during the next season, as it has so well done through
the last, its entire share in the defense of our country."*
*For condition of Walker's Artillery of the 3d Corps, September 30, 1864,
see Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part II, p. 1309.
CHAPTER XL VII
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 1865
WHEN Longstreet rejoined the Army and was as
signed to the command of the troops north of the James,
he found the outer artillery defenses in a state not al
together satisfactory, and, it would seem, held Lieut. -
Col. J. C. Pemberton responsible for the condition of
affairs. But in this Longstreet was in error, for what
ever may have been Pemberton's shortcomings at Vicks-
burg, he had labored incessantly upon the works below
Richmond, and had with little encouragement greatly
improved them. Longstreet's criticisms, however, soon
led to dissatisfaction, and on January 7, Pemberton was
relieved from his former duties and assigned to duty as
Inspector General of Artillery and Ordnance with
Capt. L. S. Marye as his assistant. Alexander was
now placed in entire charge of the artillery defenses
north of the river, while Col. Stapleton Crutchfield,
still quite unfit to perform active field service, was as
signed to the command of the garrison at Chaffin's Bluff,
where Hardaway had for some time been stationed with
his battalion. On January 16, Alexander was again
compelled to rest from his duties for a brief space, leav
ing Col. Cabell in control as Acting Chief of Artillery
of the 1st Corps.
At the close of January, the entire effective strength
of Carter's four battalions of artillery in the Valley was
but 35 officers and 538 men present for duty, with an
aggregate present and absent of 2,082. Of the latter
number, 16 officers and 383 men were carried as
prisoners of war. The rolls showed 32 guns in service.
The condition of Early's command in camp near
Staunton was most unsatisfactory, particularly with
respect to the artillery horses, for which on account of
Sheridan's activities and long droughts during the
past summer sufficient forage could not be secured.
920 THE LONG ARM or LEE
After sending Fitz Lee's Cavalry Division to Peters
burg, Lomax's Brigade to the pasture lands in the Alle-
ghanies, and temporarily disbanding Rosser's Brigade,
the men of which were allowed to return to their homes
with their horses, the situation was still serious. Ac
cordingly the men and horses of King's or McLaugh-
lin's artillery battalion were sent to southwestern Vir
ginia to be wintered, while the officers and men of
Braxton's and Cutshaw's battalions under Col. Carter
were ordered to report to Gen. Lee to man the works
about Richmond. Col. Nelson with six pieces of his bat
talion remained with Early. About this time Gen.
Long again reported to Early for duty, and caused the
guns of the 2d Corps, from which the men and horses
had been taken, to be shipped by rail to Lynchburg.
This was a deplorable state of affairs, but it could not
be avoided, as the horses of the Cavalry and Artillery
would have perished had they been kept in the Valley.
Two very small brigades of Wharton's Division, and
Nelson's artillery command now comprised Early's
whole force, which was placed in camp near Fishersville
between Staunton and Waynesborough.
At the time Braxton and Cutshaw were ordered to
Richmond, there were Lieut.-Col. Atkinson's four bat
talions of heavy artillery under Majs. Hensley, Hardin,
Cary, and Robertson, respectively, and Lightfoot's
Local Defense Battalion and Leyden's 9th Georgia
Battalion of light artillery manning the lines, with a
total of 68 officers and 1,517 men present for duty.
Other forces of heavy artillery were assigned to the de
fenses of Petersburg, and the Richmond and Danville
Railroad under Lieut.-Col. Howard and Maj. Boggs,
respectively.*
Genls. Lee and Pendleton were now making every
effort to secure horses for the artillery in order that it
might be placed in condition before spring to take the
field. On the 1st of February, it was estimated that
*For detailed distribution of this force and that at Petersburg along the
Richmond and Danville Railroad, see Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI,
I'art II, PP. 1196-97-98 and 1185.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 921
6,000 horses and 4,000 mules were needed for the armies
of the Confederacy, and that the number which could
possibly be secured before spring was 5,000 ; 3,000 from
Mississippi and 2,000 in Virginia. The Inspector Gen
eral of Transportation estimated that with ample funds
15,000 animals might sooner or later be secured in
Mexico and Texas, at $70.00 gold per head, but these
animals were totally unsuited to artillery service. In
Mississippi the animals would have to be purchased
from within the enemy's lines at a vastly greater cost,
while in Virginia the available supply would only be
forthcoming for cash payments in gold.* Such was the
condition of affairs and well might Pendleton have
despaired of remounting his batteries.
A suggestion was now made by Col. Carter to drive
the unserviceable animals of the Artillery west to the
counties of Augusta and Rockbridge, where they could
be exchanged with the farmers for fresh ones, should
authority to that effect be granted. He reported that
a fairly large supply of horses could be had in this
section, calling attention to the fact that Sheridan had
but recently taken therefrom over 1,700 animals in spite
of the drain of the war. This plan was promptly pro
posed to the Inspector General of Transportation, and
again Pendleton protested against the practice of herd
ing the condemned artillery horses in great droves only
to perish from neglect, and consume forage, when they
might be distributed among the farmers for purposes
both of recuperation and aid to agriculture.
In a report dated February 14, Maj. Cole states that
2,482 horses and 1,370 mules were immediately required
by the Army at Petersburg, and a grand total of 3,270
horses and 2,409 mules for all the forces in Virginia.
Having been provided with $100,000 in gold and $3,-
000,000 in treasury notes, he was hopeful of securing
2,500 animals in Virginia and North Carolina, pro
vided he was allowed to impress and pay for them at
"Letter of Inspector General of Transportation, February ... 1865, Rebellion
Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, p. 1190.
922 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
local appraisements. In addition to this number, he
reported that 700 artillery horses would be returned
from the infirmaries before April 1.*
The horse depots which had been established at
Pendleton's suggestion had proved of great benefit to
the service, for by means of them large numbers of ex
hausted animals had been rendered serviceable and re
issued. But the losses in the field continued to be
greater than the supply, especially in the tidewater
section of Virginia. Many of the animals were bred
and raised in the mountainous regions of the west,
and were not acclimated to the lowlands about Peters
burg, nor could they be made to flourish, in spite of
every effort, when taken from their accustomed pastures
and placed on army forage. Glanders and farcy, the
most dreaded equine diseases, became prevalent in the
corrals at Petersburg, and Owen's 13th Virginia Bat
talion was almost dismounted before the close of the
winter from these maladies of the horses. t
So vehemently had Braxton and Cutshaw protested
against the unhorsing of their commands, that early in
March it was decided to issue horses and new guns to
the former, and it was ordered to relieve Poague's Bat
talion on duty under Alexander. But after issuing the
horses, and before the guns arrived from Richmond, the
issue of forage became so scarce that many of the ani
mals perished. About this time Cutshaw applied to
have his battalion converted into cavalry for more active
service than that which he was performing as heavy
artillery. Both the officers and men of his command,
he declared, were desirous of this change and were will
ing to repair to the Valley, where in small groups they
would secure their own mounts.
Conditions were indeed becoming desperate. Even
the Horse Artillery which Pendleton was endeavoring
to reorganize and place upon a more efficient footing for
the anticipated campaign, was in urgent need of guns
*Rcbellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, p. 1232.
flbid, p. 1305.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 923
and equipment, necessitating a call upon Alexander for
rifles for its armament. But to this Alexander ob
jected, urging that howitzers be issued the horse bat
teries, instead of his much-needed rifle pieces, of which
he already had too few. He was even now compelled to
strengthen the line he was defending by planting sensi
tive shell among the abattis in his front, illuminating
his field of fire by night with fire balls, etc., and to take
from him his best ordnance was an act of folly, which he
strenuously opposed.
As spring approached conditions in the Army in gen
eral grew worse and worse. From the trials of the late
winter, "history would fain avert her eyes." They were
such as can never be forgotten by those who watched
and waited; such as can never be credited by those who
read the story in peace and plenty. To guard the long
line of intrenchments from the Chickahominy to
Hatcher's Run, there was now left but a gaunt remnant
of that valiant host which had hurled back nearly thrice
its number at Cold Harbor, and wrought humiliation
to the Army of the Potomac on a score of fields in this
vigorous campaign.
"Living on one-sixth of a ration of cornmeal and
rancid pork, thinly clad, their bodies indeed shivered
under the freezing blasts of heaven, but their dauntless
spirits cowered not under the fiery blasts of war. But
there was to be added a pang deeper than the pang of
hunger; sharper than the rigor of the elements or hurt
of shot and steel. For now from the cotton lands of
Georgia and the rice fields of Carolina, came borne on
every blast the despairing cry, which wives with little
ones raised to wintry skies, lit by the glare of burning
homes, and the men of the 'Old North State' bethought
them of the happy homesteads which lay in the path of
the ruthless conqueror, who was waging war with an
audacious cruelty, capable of destroying a whole nation.
A subtle enemy, till then well-nigh unknown, attacked
in rear the Army which still haughtily held its front,
924 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
and men, with bated breath and cheeks flushing through
their bronze, whispered the dread word 'desertion/ '
On the 28th of February, Gen. Lee reported to the
Secretary of War a total of 1,094 desertions between the
15th and 25th of the month! Of this number, 586 were
in Hill's and 217 in Anderson's Corps. During the ten
days ending March 8, 779 men abandoned their colors,
450 from these same corps.
"The historian, far removed from the passions of the
time, may coldly measure out his censure ; but we, com
rades, bound to these men by countless proud traditions,
can only cry with the old Hebrew prophet, 'Alas! my
brother!' and remember that these were valiant souls,
too sorely tried."*
In response to a circular of March 7, calling for sug
gestions as to how to cure the dread malady which now
unabated threatened to destroy the Army of Northern
Virginia, Gen. Alexander promptly proposed the classi
fication of offenses with appropriate punishments and
an increase of the authority of regimental courts, to be
employed in lieu of the cumbersome system of Corps
Courts hitherto in use. The proceedings under the
proposed system were to be more summary and the
death penalty more frequent, t But it is exceedingly
doubtful if desertion could have been checked by more
drastic punishment, or in any way. The Army of
Northern Virginia was doomed — the Confederacy had
long since shown the hectic flush upon its check.
Gen. Lee had already disclosed his plans to Gen.
Pendleton and given him confidential instructions re
garding the proposed withdrawal of the Army. In ac
cordance with these plans Pendleton redoubled his ef
forts to place the Artillery on the most efficient footing
possible, and at last, with the support of Gen. Lee, he
succeeded in securing the many needed promotions in his
corps, for which he had so long struggled, and authority
*Address of W. Gordon McCabe on the Siege of Petersburg, Army of Northern
Virginia Memorial, p. 169.
tA careful study of Gen. Alexander's plan will repay the student, Rebellion
Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, pp. 1300, 1301.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 925
to reorganize his battalions. On March 1, the following
promotions were announced, with rank from February
18.
To be Brigadier-General — Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker.
To be Colonels— Lieut.-Col. William Nelson, D. G. Mclntosh,
Frank Huger, and W. J. Pegram.
To be Lieutenant-Colonels — Majs. John C. Haskell, W. M.
Owen,, John Lane, R. P. Chew, W. E. Cutshaw, Marmaduke
Johnson, and R. M. Stribling.
To be Majors— Capts. H. W. Ross, T. J. Kirkpatrick, W. J.
Dance, B. C. Manly, T. O. Brander, S. T. Wright, N. V. Sturdivant,
J. F. Hart, P. P. Johnston, J. A. Thomson, and W. G. McGregor.
Never in its history was the Artillery Corps so well
provided with field-officers as now. It seems too bad
that Pendleton's insistence could not have been re
warded before. He now set about the task of reorgani
zation with renewed energy, and everywhere found the
greatest encouragement reigning among his officers.
But there had as usual been some oversights. Harda-
way, who well deserved promotion, was left out and
Alexander, calling attention to his merits, suggested
the consolidation of Johnson's Battalion with Leyden's
in order that the necessary vacancy in the grade of
colonel might be created. He also recommended Gar
den, Parker, Lamkin, Woolfolk, and Moody to be pro
moted majors, and Leyden a lieutenant-colonel.
Pendleton himself was not promoted, but it is prob
able he would have been had time permitted. From a
confidential communication from Gen. Pendleton
written some years after the war the following extract
is taken.
"On the ground, probably, that this arm of the service, all
essential as it is, can never be independent, but always only
cooperative with others, Confederate law allowed in it no grade
above that of Brigadier-General. Only such, therefore, was I to
the last, though having under me three other Brigadier-Generals,
and, consequently serving in fact as a Major-General. But no
exaltation of name was, so far as I know myself, a ruling motive
with me, the incongruity never disturbed me. It was about to be
corrected on Gen. Lee's recommendation when irremediable reverse
befell our army and cause."
926 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Instead of consenting to the conversion of Cutshaw's
Battalion, Pendleton at once addressed himself to the
task of reorganizing the entire Artillery of the 2d Corps.
Sending Col. Carter to Gen. Long, he proposed through
him to fully remount Nelson's, Braxton's, and Cut
shaw's battalions, and place them on the most effective
basis. For this purpose, McLaughlin's Battalion was
to be ordered East, dismounted, placed in the stationary
batteries, and its horses, guns, and equipment used for
the other battalions. Gen. Long promptly assented to
the plan, and at once Cutshaw was withdrawn from
Fort Clifton, Braxton from Chamn's Bluff, Nelson
ordered to Lynchburg and the work undertaken. Cut
shaw's Battalion at this time consisted of Fry's, Mont
gomery's, Reese's, Carter's, Garber's, Carrington's,
Tanner's, and Jones' batteries, with 674 officers and men
present for duty and 1,047 on the rolls. It, therefore,
afforded a surplus which was to be used in completing
the personnel of Nelson's and Braxton's battalions. Ac
cordingly, on March 17, McLaughlin was ordered to re
port to Col. Carter at Lynchburg, turn over his horses
and material to Nelson, and proceed by the canal with
his men to Richmond.
Other changes in the Artillery were also now neces
sary. In the 3d Corps, Chew's 1st Maryland Battery, in
which there were but 36 men present for duty, was
recommended to be consolidated with Griffin's horse, or
the 2d Maryland Battery, of Breathed's Battalion.
Martin's and Dickenson's batteries of Sturdivant's
and Owen's battalions, respectively, were relieved of
their guns and formed into a battalion with Douthat's
Battery, which was brought from the southwest with
McLaughlin's Battalion. This new battalion under
command of King was assigned to duty in the stationary
batteries of Alexander's line. Walker's Battery of
Owen's Battalion was assigned to Sturdivant's Bat
talion, in place of Martin's, and Chamberlayne's to Mc-
Intosh's Battalion in place of Chew's, while Maj. Owen
was assigned to duty under Mclntosh. Thus was the
THE LONG ARM or LEE 927
13th Virginia Battalion disbanded and sufficient ma
terial from Martin's, Dickenson's, and Chew's batteries
secured in addition to that of McLaughlin's Battalion to
fully rearm and equip Nelson's, Cutshaw's, and Brax-
ton's veteran battalions.* These changes were officially
promulgated March 20, and on that same day the Horse
Artillery, with Chew as Chief, was reorganized, as fol
lows:
Maj. Hart's Battalion:
Hart's Battery and Graham's Battery,, to serve with Gen.
Butler's Division.
Maj. McGregor's Battalion:
McGregor's Battery and McClannahan's Battery, to serve with
Gen. W. H. C. Lee's Division.
Maj. Breathed' s Battalion:
Shoemaker's Battery and Griffin's Battery, to serve with Gen.
Fitz Lee's Division.
Maj. Johnston's Battalion:
Johnston's Battery and Jackson's Battery, to serve with Gen.
Lomax's Division.
Maj. Thomson's Battalion:
Thomson's Battery and Lurty's Battery, to serve with Gen.
Rosser's Division.
Col. Chew, like all the other artillery commanders, was
now admonished to be prepared for active operations,
however early or unexpectedly the call might come.
*Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part III, pp. 1316-17-19-21-22-23-
27-28 and 1333.
28
CHAPTER XLVIII
"LE DEBACLE"
WELL might Pendleton caution his subordinates that
their measures should be prompt, for already the evacu
ation had been too long deferred. How Lee was over
ruled and compelled to remain in the Petersburg lines
against his will cannot be discussed here. Nor how,
when the object of the peace conference failed, the
Army, although bitterly disappointed, set its teeth, once
more resolved to struggle on to the end, whatever
that might be. We must content ourselves solely with
tracing the events which concerned the Artillery.
Sheridan's cavalry divisions were circling about Lee's
Army like great vultures impatient for their prey. One
of his columns was marching upon Lynchburg, and to
meet the danger Pendleton was directed to send enough
of his men there to man the field guns which Early had
turned in during the winter. Accordingly, Garber's,
Jones', and Carrington's batteries were dispatched to
Col. Carter, who with his usual energy and skill pre
pared to meet the raiders.
On the morning of March 25, the Chief of Artillery
was summoned to meet the commanding general at the
headquarters of Gen. Gordon at 5 A. M. Gen. Lee
had decided to make a daring attempt to break Grant's
line near the center by an attack upon Fort Steadman,
which, it was believed, could be carried by surprise.
How Gordon's sudden blow was at first crowned with
success; how his guides ran away and left his storming
columns groping in ignorance; how his supports failed
to reach him, must be read elsewhere. Suffice it here to
say that what bid fair to be a brilliant success through
unwonted misfortune, dereliction, or what not, re
sulted in miserable failure.
This unsuccessful effort, in which, however, the Ar
tillery fully performed its allotted task, was quickly fol-
.MAJOR DAVID WA'LXJX
Killed at Second Cold Harbor, 1S(54
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 929
lowed by a vigorous advance on the part of Grant.
Early on the morning of the 29th, the corps of Warren
and Humphreys moved toward Lee's intrenchments
on the extreme right, while the inexorable Sheridan
swept around the flank and occupied Dinwiddie Court
house, six miles southwest of the infantry column. Lee,
quickly divining the intention of the enemy, moved out
along the White Oak Road with 15,000 infantry and
2,000 cavalry, leaving Longstreet north of the James
and Gordon alone in front of Petersburg. On the 31st,
he attacked the Federals in flank, but after pursuing
as far as the nature of the country permitted, was com
pelled to return to his works. On the same day, Sheri
dan advanced to Five Forks, driving Fitz Lee and part
of Pickett's command before him. The following morn
ing, Sheridan was reinforced by Warren and Hum
phreys, and in the evening defeated the 3d Corps. Per
ceiving that his forces were too weak to combat success
fully with the enemy, Lee ordered Longstreet on the
evening of the 1st to move rapidly across the river to
Petersburg.
In the battle of Five Forks, the Artillery suffered a
loss indeed irreparable, a loss directly due to Gen.
Pickett's orders. On this occasion Gen. Pickett as
sumed to designate the position for Pegram's guns — a
position with every defect known to artillerymen. But
Pegram with that spirit of blind obedience which con
stituted his sole fault did not question his orders and
died like a rat in the trap to which he was assigned.
No finer tribute to Pegram can be penned than that
which his gallant adjutant and comrade has already
given to the world, and so those eloquent lines are quoted
here: "Of him I almost fear to speak, lest I should do
hurt to that memory which I would honor. For to those
who knew him not, the simplest outline of a character so
finely tempered by stern and gentle virtues would seem
but an ideal picture touched with the tender exaggera
tion of retrospective grief ; while to so many of you who
knew him, as he was, the gentle comrade and the
930 THE LONG ARM or LEE
brilliant fighter, any portrait must prove, at best, but a
blurred semblance of the young soldier, whose simple,
heroic, godly life rejects, as it were, all human pane
gyric. Yet even the coldest must allow that it was a
life which afforded a notable example of how great a
career may be crowded within the compass of a few
years. In the spring of '61, a youth of modest de
meanor, he entered the military service as a private
soldier; in the spring of '65, still a mere lad, he fell in
action, Colonel of Artillery, mourned by an Army.
"More than once in desperate and critical events were
grave trusts confided to his prudence, skill and courage ;
more than once did he win emphatic praise from Hill,
from Jackson and from Lee. Thus it was his lot to be
tried in great events, and his fortune to be equal to the
trial, and having filled the measure of perfect knight
hood, 'chaste in his thoughts, modest in his words,
liberal and valiant in deeds,' there was at last awarded
him on field of battle the death counted 'sweet and
honorable.'
"Such was William Johnson Pegram, of the Third
Corps, who at the early age of twenty-two died, sword
in hand, at the head of his men, with all his 'honor owing
wounds' in front 'to make a soldier's passage for his
soul.' ' And may the author add, such was the soldier
who was sacrificed by the ignorance of his division com
mander — an infantry officer who undertook to direct
the placing of his artillery without discretion on the
part of his artillery commander.
Had Col. Pegram lived and the war continued he
would have attained to high command. Already Gen.
Lee had expressed his intention to give the young
soldier a brigade at the first opportunity which pre
sented, but it is doubtful if the gallant artilleryman
would have exchanged his sixteen guns for such a com
mand.
Early on the morning of the 2d, the Federals re
newed the attack, breaking the lines of the Confederates
and forcing them from their position covering the Boyd-
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 931
ton Plank Road, and Gibbon's Division of Ord's Corps
boldly essayed to break through into the town. The
morning of the 1st, Pendleton had ordered seven guns
of Poague's command, which had been held in reserve
near Hewlett's, to march for Petersburg, and that night
the whole battalion was directed to follow. When the
first two batteries arrived they were ordered to proceed
to the right and conceal themselves before dawn near
the Turnbull house.
After capturing all the works to the south and west,
Grant found a more difficult task before him at the town,
for Ord's way was barred by two open profiles, known
as Battery Gregg and Fort Whit worth, the latter from
the character of a gun mounted therein. These works
were about 200 yards apart and 1,000 in front of the
main line of intrenchments. The gorge of Battery
Gregg was closed by a palisade and its ditch was gener
ally impassable. On the right flank, however, a line to
connect with Whitworth had been started, and here the
unfinished ditch and parapet gave a narrow access to
the parapet of Gregg. It was by this route that the
enemy finally reached it. It was defended by two guns
of the Washington Artillery, under Lieut. McElroy,
and the 12th and 16th Mississippi, 214 men in all. Fort
Whitworth was open at the gorge and was held by
three guns of the Washington Artillery, under Lieut.
Battles, and two Mississippi regiments.
Thrice Gibbon's columns, above 5,000 strong, surged
against Gregg and each time were repulsed by the de
voted garrison, McElroy fighting his guns with great
valor while his drivers armed with muskets aided the
infantry. The day was an eventful one for the Wash
ington Artillery, for early in the morning when Battles
was ordered to withdraw from the outer line, before his
horses could be brought up the enemy rushed to the
works and seized his guns. But, McElroy in the fort,
seeing Battles surrounded and cut off led a charge of
his pseudo-infantry, and recovered the pieces.
932 THE LONG ARM or LEE
Shortly before noon, Gibbon, reinforced by two bri
gades of Turner's Division, while the third advanced
against Whitworth, again assailed Gregg, and this time
his men swarmed over the parapet and captured Mc-
Elroy's guns. Of the garrison 55 were killed, 129
were wounded, and only 30 were found uninjured, while
Gibbon lost 122 killed and 592 wounded in the four as
saults.
McElroy had again performed a splendid feat of
arms. Surely he felt no shame over the loss of those two
guns, which "taught prudence to the enemy for the rest
of the day." It was the unflinching character of Lee's
artillerymen as exemplified by McElroy that prompted
Meade in July to telegraph Grant, "I cannot advise
an assault. . . . It is not the number of the enemy,
which oppose our taking Petersburg ; it is their artillery
and their works, which can be held by reduced numbers
against direct assault."*
The seven guns of Poague's Battalion from near the
Turnbull house assisted Eshleman's other batteries on
the Boydton Road in checking the enemy's pursuit, and
while heavily engaged had been joined by Poague with
the remainder of his command. Maj. Brander had also
posted three guns on the north bank of the Appomattox,
from whence they were able to enfilade the Federal left
as it swung towards the river, while Chew threw four
pieces into action on the right of the Cox Road. But
by noon the Federals had seized Gregg and Whitworth,
and fully established their line from these works to the
river. Nevertheless, McElroy, Poague, Brander, and
Chew had checked the enemy and given Field's Divi
sion time to reach Petersburg before the outer line fell.
Kershaw now alone remained north of the James to
confront Weitzel. A. P. Hill, veteran of many fields,
a knight sans peur et sans reproche, had fallen. But all
was not yet lost.
During the day, the artillery fire on the east of the
city had been unusually severe. Beginning the previous
*Written July 26.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 933
night, the enemy's mortars and guns had been kept
incessantly at work.
Lee and Longstreet had watched the defense of Fort
Gregg, with the utmost admiration, fully expecting the
compact Federal masses to assail the inner works, be
hind which Field had been placed. Early in the morn
ing, Lee had advised the President that he must aban
don the lines that night, and having noted Grant's
pause, about 3 p. M., issued the formal orders for the
evacuation in time to begin the move by dark, and the
troops north of the James were directed to march
through Richmond and join the Army on the roads
leading westward. While Alexander stood at the north
end of the pontoon bridge, near Drewry's Bluff, watch
ing his batteries file by, Walker and Jones withdrew
their battalions from the Petersburg lines. Pendleton
had ordered all the guns to move out at 8 p. M. This
was accomplished with great success in spite of the
enemy's ceaseless cannonade. But ten pieces had to be
abandoned and these by Jones for lack of teams, all
being disabled. Even a number of mortars were saved,
and by 2 A. M. all the field artillery had crossed the
Appomattox and commenced the march westward along
the Hickory Road. Thus did Lee evacuate the forty
miles of intrenchments which for nine months had been
"clothed in thunder," and for the defense of which the
line of defenders had at last been overstretched.
Along the north bank of the Appomattox moved the
long lines of artillery and dark silent columns of infan
try through the gloom of the night towards Amelia
Courthouse, where rations had been ordered to be col
lected for the Army. "As the troops moved noiselessly
onward in the darkness that just precedes the dawn, a
bright light like a broad flash of lightning illumined the
heavens for an instant, then followed a tremendous ex
plosion. 'The magazine at Ft. Drewry is blown up,'
ran whispers through the ranks, and again silence
reigned." All knew now that Alexander and Ker-
shaw had spiked their heavy guns and were on the way
934 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
to join the main column. Passing through Manchester
at daybreak, Alexander's column marched 24 miles on
the 3d, going into camp that night near Tomahawk
Church, while the main column halted about nine miles
from Goode's Bridge after a distressing night and day
of toil, broken only by a brief halt at Chesterfield Court
house, about dawn that morning.
At 8:15 A. M. Richmond in flames had been sur
rendered to Weitzel, and the sun was hardly up before
Meade's troops entered the works about Petersburg.
Alexander's command had just gone into bivouac
when he was ordered to accompany some engineer of
ficers to prepare a wagon route for the Artillery and
trains to an overhead railroad bridge across the Ap-
pomattox River. Marching all night in the mud, the
entire column was safely gotten across during the 4th
and went into camp near sundown about three miles
from Amelia Courthouse. During the day, Pendle-
ton was busily engaged making arrangements for the
reduction of the Artillery to a basis proportionate to the
other troops, and to dispose of the surplus. Only the
best equipped battalions were to remain with the Army,
while all the rest were to be taken by Gen. Walker to
Lynchburg.
The morning of the 5th, Walker set out by a road to
the right and west of the main column after destroying
ninety-five caissons with a great quantity of ammu
nition, which had early in the winter been sent to Amelia
from Petersburg.
As soon as Grant learned of Lee's line of retreat, he
pushed forward his whole available force, numbering
near 80,000 men, in order to intercept him on the Rich
mond and Danville Railroad. The Federal pursuit was
as rapid as the progress of Lee's Army was slow. The
heavy rains, bottomless roads, and utter lack of forage
soon reduced the artillery teams and transport to a
most distressing state of exhaustion, and hundreds of
men were forced to leave the ranks from hunger.
The long wagon trains with their broken-down teams
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 935
encumbered the roads at every turn, the men cheered
on at first by the promise of food at Amelia Courthouse.
But, disappointment there awaited them, for Lee's
orders had miscarried and the rations and forage in
tended for the Army lay in the storehouses in Richmond.
Nothing remained but the wide dispersion of the
troops for foraging purposes, and dissolution under
these conditions was inevitable. The delay at Amelia
entailed by the necessity of collecting food was fatal, for
already Sheridan's troopers were harassing the flank
and even the head of the column, while Grant's whole
force well fed and carried forward by the stimulating
hope of early victory was marching on nearly parallel
roads.
In the words of one of Pendleton's staff officers, "It
was a period in which no note was taken of day or night ;
one long, confused, dreadful day. There seemed to be
no front, no rear, for firing might be heard ahead and be
hind, and on both sides at once. There were no head
quarters, except where the ambulance happened to be."
Small wonder that the brave men and their horses fell
by the roadside exhausted by want and weariness.
Such was the condition when it was learned that Sheri
dan was across Lee's path at Jetersville, whereupon the
Army was formed into line of battle to attack him. But
it was now reported that the 2d and 6th Corps were in
front of the Army, and in order to pass them the
column was countermarched a short distance, turned
off to the right through Amelia Springs, and after
marching all night reached Rice's Station six miles
west of Burkeville at daylight.
During the night a serious panic was started by a
large black stallion carrying a fence rail swinging to his
bridle, and running through the column. In the long
continued firing which broke out, many officers and men
were killed, among them Maj. Smith, who was in com
mand of the detachment of heavy artillerymen from
Drewry's Bluff.
936 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
At Rice's Station, Alexander was directed to select
a line of battle upon which Lee soon formed his army,
now reduced to about 10,000 men, while Pendleton
placed his battalions in positions commanding the
Burke ville Road and from which they could sweep the
approaches on the left.
All day the 2d Corps had closely pressed Lee's rear,
while the cavalry and the 6th Corps struck Swell's
column at Sailor's Creek. The latter force of about
8,000 men consisted of Kershaw's Division, a number
of departmental employees under Gen. Custis Lee, the
marines and sailors of the fleet under Admiral Tucker,
and the heavy artillery from Drewry's and Chaffin's
bluffs, under Col. Crutchfield and Maj. Stiles. After a
most desperate conflict in which Ewell's nondescript
force first repulsed, then charged the enemy, it was over
borne by numbers and captured. Gen. Lee had gone in
person to try to save Ewell's command, but now re
turned to the other troops, and told Gen. Pendleton on
coming up with him, "General, half of our army is
destroyed."
Toward noon, the enemy began to appear in Lee's
front at Rice's Station, but were easily held off by
Pendleton and Alexander with the Artillery. During
the day Dearing's and Rosser's cavalry had met and
captured a small mixed force of the enemy which had
been sent forward to destroy the High Bridge on the
Lynchburg Road. In this affair, both Gen. Dearing
and Maj. James W. Thomson were killed. Thus two
more officers, whose names will be remembered as long
as any others in Lee's Artillery, laid down their lives.
The combat was short and bloody, the Confederate
victory complete, and Dearing and the gallant Col.
Boston of the Cavalry both fell in the first flush of
victory. Opposite the Confederate center and left, the
enemy sent up the white flag. But on the extreme right,
Thomson, in ignorance of the surrender, pressed for
ward with his mounted cannoneers. As he did so, he
caught sight of the white flag away down the line and
THE LONG AKM or LEE 937
gave a shout of joy. At that very moment he was
struck with two balls, either of which would have proved
fatal. With a deep groan he reeled from his saddle and
fell dead. A moment later not a shot was to be heard.
About the stricken body of the youthful major, his
gunners grouped themselves in silence, among them his
devoted friend and comrade, Maj. James Breathed,
who, as he sighed and turned away, said, "With ten
thousand such men as Jimmie Thomson, I could whip
Grant's Army."
So died this martial youth, who from the day he
entered the Virginia Military Institute in September,
1860, until the hour of his death, personified all that was
valiant, all that was noble. No space here to tell of the
many fields upon which he had won fame. But a lad
of eighteen when as a lieutenant he helped Chew
organize Ashby's Horse Battery, but twenty when
captain of that battery, and but twenty-one when he be
came a battalion commander in the Horse Artillery,
yet he was a veteran when he died, and was able to
boast continuous service from the very beginning to the
very end of the war. With Ashby, Jackson, and
Stuart, he had fought upon every field made famous by
their names, and on many an unknown field he had
followed Chew who fought while others rested.
There beside Bearing and Boston he lay, all of them
covered by their rubber blankets, suggestive of the
curtain which had fallen upon these heroic lives. But an
other scene in the tragedy remained. An officer quickly
searches the field. It is Jimmie Thomson's roommate
at the Institute, the son of Admiral Smith Lee, who has
heard of his death and is looking for his body, and
more, — for the letter and the picture which he knows
will be found in the breast pocket of that stained gray
jacket. And on another portion of the field is found by
a Confederate officer, in the haversack of a Federal
soldier, a slip of paper containing a description of
Thomson's death, and on it is written the following
verse :
938 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
"His life burned not to ashes, white with doubt,
But flaring up in battles' breath went out,
His young blood pulsing years in a wild route,
Then halting at high tide.
"In the loud trumpet blast, in the grand rush of lifted banners met,
With his cheeks flushing and his saber wet,
His young eyes flashing and his young lips set ;
So his rich spirit passed.
"Just when the field was won,
When the clouds broke from off the hard-won fight,
And the pierced flag leaped out upon our sight,
In victory upspringing from the right,
His brave young soul went out."*
During the afternoon Lee received information of
an attack by the Federal Cavalry on his wagon train
two miles in rear, whereupon he requested Gen. Pendle-
ton to go back and see what could be done to save
further loss. Meeting the remnants of Harris' Bri
gade, Pendleton gathered together about twenty volun
teers and soon joined by a regiment of Cooke's Cavalry
moved back to the train on which the enemy had fired.
Pendleton and Cooke attacked the hostile cavalry, but
were soon compelled to fall back, unable to save the
wagons, and pursued for some distance by the enemy.
About sundown the Federals began massing in front
of the line at Rice's Station for an attack in force, and
Lee gave orders to resume the retreat. The Army, now
cut off from Danville, marched towards Lynchburg,
reaching Farmville at sunrise, after great hardships.
During the entire night but six miles were covered. At
Farmville, the weary column crossed to the north side
of the Appomattox, and received a small supply of
rations. As the Artillery began crossing the bridges at
Farmville, the enemy pressed closely upon the rear
guard, whereupon Pendleton placed several batteries in
position on the heights on the north bank to cover the
crossing.
*The finder of this paper was the Hon. W. L. Wilson, Member United States
Congress from West Virginia, and later President of Washington and Lee
University.
For a beautiful and most interesting account of Maj. Thomson's career, see
"A Modern Greek," by John S. Wise, Bob Taylor's Magazine, December, 1906.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 939
Gen. Lee now sent for Alexander, and with his map
explained to him that the enemy had taken a highway
bridge across the Appomattox near the High Bridge,
were crossing on it and would come in upon his road
about three miles ahead of him. Directing Alexander to
send artillery to cover this passage, he placed the two
bridges at Farmville under the latter's personal charge
with orders to destroy them after the troops had all
crossed. After pointing out on the map a shorter route
to Lynchburg than that which Lee was following, and
producing a resident of the section to confirm the map,
Gen. Alexander retired and immediately set fire to the
railroad bridge as the enemy was already in sight.
Poague's Battalion of artillery had been sent ahead
to the point indicated by Lee, and Mahone's Division
supported by Poague's guns took up a good position
and began to intrench. Persistently assailed by Miles'
Division throughout the day, Mahone held his own,
while Poague fought his guns with desperate determina
tion, losing then recovering one of his pieces. The serv
ice which the stern and indomitable Poague here ren
dered fully satisfied the confidence reposed in him by
Pendleton, who selected the gallant little hero of the
Wilderness in preference to all others for the delicate
task of opening the way for the Army.
At midnight, the main column moved on the road to
ward Buckingham Courthouse, with Mahone and
Poague forming the rear guard. During a truce, after
sundown on the 7th, which Mahone secured for the re
moval of his wounded, a letter from Grant was trans
mitted to Lee through him, in which Grant first sug
gested the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia,
to which Lee promptly replied, inquiring what terms
would be offered.
In spite of the roads, a long march was made during
the night, and the morning of the 8th found the head of
the Confederate column near Appomattox Courthouse.
During the march on the 8th, as Pendleton and Alex
ander rode together, the Chief of Artillery mentioned
940 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
the fact that a number of the senior officers of the Army
had conferred together and concluded it should be
represented to Lee that in their opinion further resist
ance was futile, in order that he might surrender with
out incurring the odium of first proposing the step.
According to Alexander, Pendleton' s contemporary
account was about as follows :
It being the concensus of opinion among certain of
ficers that Longstreet should approach the Com-
mander-in-Chief on the subject, he, Pendleton, had
suggested such action to Longstreet, but his proposal
had been indignantly rejected, with the emphatic re
mark that it was his duty to support and not hamper
his superior in the execution of his trust; that his, the
1st Corps, could still whip twice its number, and that as
long as that was so, he would never suggest surrender.
Failing to enlist Longstreet 's services for the purpose
proposed, he, Pendleton, had himself made bold to sug
gest a surrender to Gen. Lee, but was snubbed by the
Commander-in-Chief, who coldly declared that "There
are too many men here to talk of laying down their
arms without fighting."
Gen. Alexander further asserted that in recounting
these events, Pendleton was plainly embarrassed by the
reception he had been given by Gen. Lee, which he,
Alexander, at the time inferred to have been much in
the nature of a rebuke. Concerning this whole inci
dent, however, there are many recorded discrepancies.
In later years, Pendleton, always loth to discuss the
sad circumstances connected with the retreat and sur
render of the Army, gave the following account of his
discharge of the mission upon which he was deputed by
his fellow officers.
"Fighting was going on, but not very severely, so that con
versation was practicable. Gen. Gordon had an interview with me;
told me of discouraging intelligence from the South, and of a
conference which had been held between other responsible officers
and himself, and announced their joint wish that, if my views
agreed with theirs, I should convey to Gen. Longstreet, as second
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 941
in command, and then,, if he agreed, to Gen. Lee, our united judg
ment that the cause had become hopeless, so we thought it wrong
longer to have men killed on either side, and not right, moreover,
that our beloved commander should be left to bear the entire trial
of initiating the idea of terms with the enemy. My judgment not
conflicting with those expressed, it seemed to me to be my duty to
convey them to Gen. Lee. At first, Gen. Longstreet dissented, but
on second thought preferred that he himself should be represented
with the rest. Gen. Lee was lying alone, resting, at the base of a
large pine tree. I approached and sat by him. To a statement of
the case he quietly listened, and then, courteously expressing thanks
for the consideration of his subordinates in desiring to relieve him
in part of existing burdens, spoke in about these words: 'I trust
it has not come to that. We certainly have too many brave men to
think of laying down our arms. They still fight with great spirit,
whereas the enemy do not. And, besides, if I were to intimate to
Gen. Grant that I would listen to terms, he would at once regard
it as such an evidence of weakness that he would demand uncon
ditional surrender, and sooner than that I am resolved to die.
Indeed, we must all determine to die at our posts.' My reply could
only be that every man would no doubt cheerfully meet death with
him in the discharge of duty, and that we were perfectly willing
that he should decide the question."
This account differs widely from Alexander's. It
may be that as time wore on, Gen. Pendleton saw mat
ters in a softer light, and felt that what had at first ap
peared as a rebuke to him, was in fact the result of
overwrought nerves.
After Pendleton's conversation on the march with
Gen. Alexander, he pushed on to communicate in per
son with Gen. Walker, whose column he found about
two miles beyond the Courthouse on the road to Ap-
pomattox Station. While he was conversing with
Walker, whose batteries were parked and who himself
was engaged in the duty of shaving, a large force of
Federal cavalry burst upon the camp and began firing
upon the defenseless men and their horses. The situa
tion was desperate, but with great coolness, and the ut
most presence of mind, Gen. Walker remained master
of the situation. Almost instantly Walker's and Dicken-
son's batteries, which had been relieved of their guns
and armed as a guard with muskets, formed line in a
942 THE LONG ARM or LEE
fringe of pines, and held the enemy at bay until a num
ber of guns could be thrown into action, while the train
was withdrawn. Thus did Walker's Artillery, entirely
unsupported, maintain itself against the enemy. There
was no panic whatever among these brave gunners. The
following interesting account of this affair is taken
from the diary of the Washington Artillery, written by
Maj. W. M. Owen.
"After we went into bivouac this evening, the artillery firing
we had heard in front late in the afternoon seemed to be approach
ing nearer. It was not a great while before long trains of wagons
came tearing down the road from the front, the drivers whipping
up their mules and shouting lustily. I mounted my horse and
rode forward to see what was the matter. I had not gone far
before I came up to a force of infantry that were being aligned
across the road and preparing for defense.* Here I met some
officers and men of the Washington Artillery, from whom I learned
that Gen. Walker's column of artillery (about sixty pieces) had
been marching in front of the Army all day, and at about 4 p. M.
had halted in a grove just before reaching Appomattox station, on
the Lynchburg railroad. Everything had been so quiet that they
concluded to have a good rest, the officers and men taking ad
vantage of the time to wash up and refresh themselves. It was
not thought necessary to put out pickets, as the enemy was sup
posed to be pushing only our rear. While enjoying this supposed
security, all of a sudden a bugle call rang out upon the air, and a
squadron of Federal cavalry was seen preparing to charge. Men
rushed to their guns in a hurry, horses were hitched up, and as
the enemy advanced they were met by a raking fire of canister,
which repulsed them. But again and again the enemy, reinforced,
charged. They were Sheridan's cavalry, f The guns that could
be gotten off fired retiring, and fell back to Appomattox Court
house, where in the streets of the town they met infantry coming
to their support, who in turn drove the enemy's cavalry back with
loss. But the Washington Artillery, fighting to the last and
evading capture with difficulty, destroyed their gun carriages, buried
their guns in the woods, and nearly all the officers and men went
to the mountains. They fired their last shot to-day, after three
years and nine months of service in the field, since Bull Run,
July, 1861."
This account explains the fact that some of the Ar
tillery known to have been with Walker's column sur
rendered the following day with Pendleton's command.
""These were Walker's dismounted cannoneers. — Author's note.
fCuster's command. — Author's note.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 943
While with Walker, and after the repulse of the
enemy's cavalry, Pendleton received a summons from
Gen. Lee, and setting out to rejoin the main column
narrowly eluded a hostile force of cavalry, which was
sweeping through the village, by leaping his horse over a
fence and skirting the fields. When he reported to the
Commander-in-Chief about 1 A. M. of the 9th, he found
him "dressed in his neatest style, new uniform, snowy
linen, etc." To Gen. Pendleton's expression of sur
prise, Gen. Lee explained, "I have probably to be Gen.
Grant's prisoner, and thought I must make my best ap
pearance."
Here the question suggests itself, was Lee really pre
paring to meet his victorious adversary, or was he,
prompted by that spirit, the flash of which Pendleton
has described, resolved to die at the head of his army in
the event Grant failed to grant him honorable terms?
He had placed himself on several occasions at the head
of his troops, with the evident determination to die at
their head if need be. It would almost seem that he was
now clothing himself for the final sacrament in the cause
which he held to be holy.
Grant was now hurrying forward his troops and mass
ing a large force in Lee's front, having despatched a
column by the short route pointed out to Lee by Gen.
Alexander. Almost before Pendleton rejoined Lee, he
heard the firing of artillery beyond the Courthouse,
which could only mean the capture of Walker's Ar
tillery column. Against cavalry alone, the sturdy gun
ners could contend, but not against the infantry, which
was soon brought up by the defeated troopers.
Late in the afternoon of the 8th, Lee had received
Grant's reply to his note of the evening before, and
again he addressed the Federal commander, proposing
a meeting between them at 10 A. M. the next day, this
communication being delivered to Grant about mid
night. But as the terms of Lee's note rather suggested
a discussion of political character, Grant in a third note
declined the interview.
944 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
At daylight, it was discovered that the enemy was in
great force astride the Confederate line of retreat, and
that Walker's command had been captured. A col
lision was unavoidable. Indeed Gordon, now in com
mand of the 2d Corps, and leading the column, had been
directed to clear the road at dawn.
At three o'clock on the morning of the 9th of April,
the Confederates moved silently forward. Reaching the
heights a little beyond the Courthouse Gordon found
the enemy disposed to dispute his way, and at once de
ployed the 2,000 men of his corps, while Gen. Long
brought forward the thirty pieces of artillery which
were all that were left of Carter's, Poague's, Johnson's,
and Stark's battalions. A well directed fire from the
Artillery and an attack by Fitz Lee quickly dislodged
the force immediately in Gordon's front, but beyond he
could already discover the dark masses of the enemy's
infantry, and knew further effort unaided was useless.
In this affair Fitz Lee actually took a number of
prisoners, and two 12-pounder Napoleons, but it was
apparent to all that the sacrifice of life incident to fur
ther fighting would be as useless as it would be culpable.
Though Gordon, Long, and Fitz Lee fought with
great spirit, still at noon the main column had not ad
vanced beyond the Courthouse. When Lee early in
the morning inquired of Gordon how he was progress
ing, the answer was that nothing could be accomplished
without heavy reinforcements from Longstreet. Where
upon Lee took immediate steps to bring the fighting to
an end and reopened negotiations with Grant. This
was the only thing left, for Field's and Mahone's divi
sions and Alexander's Artillery were holding Meade
back in the rear and could not be spared for an attack in
the front.
Meanwhile, the march of the Army had been brought
to a halt by Gordon's inability to advance, and the rear
was closing up. Longstreet directed Alexander to form a
line of battle, on which Mahone's and Field's divisions
were to be rallied for a last stand, Alexander at once
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 945
placed all his artillery and all the organized infantry
in position behind the North Fork of the Appomattox.
While the enemy were extending their lines to the left
the battery commanders begged to be allowed to open
upon them, but this Alexander would not permit.
A flag of truce was now sent Grant, requesting a
suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for sur
render, and an order to Gordon's troops to suspend their
fire. This order, when received by Gen. Long, was
sent by him through Majs. Southall, Parker, and other
members of his staff to the different batteries, while he,
himself, proceeded to the Courthouse. On reaching
that point he discovered that the order had not carried
to Clutter's Battery under Lieut. Mclntosh, a brother
of the battalion commander. This battery occupied a
hill immediately above the village, and continued to fire
rapidly upon an advancing line of the enemy's infantry.
Gen. Long at once rode in person to the battery, and
ordered the captain to cease firing and to withdraw his
battery to a small valley east of the village, where the
Artillery was being parked.
According to Gen. Long, the shots which Lieut.
Wright's section of Clutter's Battery fired were the
last fired in battle by the Army of Northern Virginia.
Some time before the order to cease firing was given,
as Alexander came upon Lee and his staff by the road
side at the top of the hill, the General called him aside
and again laid the map before him saying that the Army
had come to the junction and inquired, "What have
we got to do to-day?"
After talking with Gen. Pendleton, Alexander had
formulated a plan in his own mind and now proceeded
to present it. His own words are here quoted :
"My command having been north of the James had had no share
in the fighting about Petersburg, and but little in the retreat. They
had now begun to hear of a surrender, and would hint their senti
ments in loud voices when I rode by.
' 'We don't want to surrender any ammunition. We've been
saving ammunition all this war. Hope we are not saving it for a
surrender.'
946 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
"I told the general of this, and said that if he saw fit to try to
cut our way out, my command would do as well as they had ever
done.
"He answered:
' 'I have left only two divisions, Field's and Mahone's, suffi
ciently organized to be relied upon. All the rest have been broken
and routed and can do little good. Those divisions are now scarcely
4,000 apiece, and that is far too little to meet the force now in
front of us.'
"This was just the opportunity I wished, and I hastened to lay
my plans before him. I said:
' 'Then we have only choice of two courses. Either to surrender,
or take to the woods and bush, with orders either to rally on
Johnston, or perhaps, better, on the Governors of the respective
States. If we surrender this army, it is the end of the Confederacy.
I think our best course would be to order each man to go to the
Governor of his own State with his arms.'
' 'What would you hope to accomplish by that?' said he.
' 'In the first place,' said I, 'to stand the chances. If we
surrender this army every other army will have to follow suit. All
will go like a row of bricks, and if the rumors of help from France
have any foundation the news of our surrender will put an end
to them.
' 'But the only thing which may be possible in our present
situation is to get some kind of terms. None of our armies are
likely to be able to get them, and that is why we should try with
the different States. Already it has been said that Vance can make
terms with North Carolina, and Jo Brown with Georgia. Let the
Governor of each State make some sort of a show of force and then
surrender on terms, which may save us from trial for treason and
confiscation/
"As I talked it all looked to me so reasonable that I hoped he
was convinced, for he listened in silence. So I went on more
confidently :
' 'But, General, apart from all that — if all fails and there is
no hope — the men who have fought under you for four years have
got the right this morning to ask one favor of you. We know that
you do not care for military glory. But we are proud of the
record of this army. We want to leave it untarnished to our
children. It is a clear record so far, and now is about to be closed.
A little blood more or less now makes no difference, and we have
the right to ask of you to spare us the mortification of having
you ask Grant for terms, and have him answer that he has no
terms to offer. That it is "U. S. — Unconditional Surrender." That
was his reply to Buckner at Fort Donelson, and to Pemberton at
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 947
Vicksburg, and that is what threatens us. General, spare us the
mortification of asking terms and getting that reply.'
"He heard it all so quietly and it was all so true, it seemed to
me, and so undeniable, that I felt sure that I had him convinced.
His first words were:
' 'If I should take your advice, how many men do you suppose
would get away?'
' 'Two-thirds of us,' I answered. 'We would be like rabbits
and partridges in the bushes, and they could not scatter to
follow us.'
"He said: 'I have only 15,000 muskets left. Two-thirds of them
divided among the States, even if all could be collected, would be
too small a force to accomplish anything. All could not be collected.
Their homes have been overrun, and many would go to look after
their families.
' 'Then, General, you and I as Christian men have no right to
consider only how this would affect us. We must consider the
effect on the country as a whole. Already it is demoralized by
four years of war. If I took your advice, the men would be without
rations and under no control of officers. They would be compelled
to rob and steal in order to live. They would become mere bands
of marauders, and the enemy's cavalry would pursue them and over
run many wide sections they may never have occasion to visit.
We would bring on a state of affairs it would take the country
years to recover from.
" 'And as for myself, you young fellows might go to bush
whacking, but the only dignified course for me would be to go to
Gen. Grant and surrender myself and take the consequences of
my acts.'
"He paused for only a moment and then went on.
' 'But I can tell you one thing for your comfort. Grant will
not demand an unconditional surrender. He will give us as good
terms as this army has a right to demand, and I am going to meet
him in the rear at 10 A. M. and surrender the army on condition of
not fighting again until exchanged.'
"I had not a single word to say in reply. He had answered
my suggestion from a plane so far above it that I was ashamed of
having made it. With several friends I had planned to make an
escape on seeing a flag of truce, but that idea was at once abandoned
by all of them on hearing my report."
Thus did the plan upon which the bold young Alex
ander had cogitated during the preceding days come to
naught, dissipated like thin smoke in the air of Lee's
nobility of soul. In maturer years, Gen. Alexander came
to see the folly of his proposals, and magnanimously ac-
948 THE LONG AKM or LEE
knowledged the error of his hot youth, accepting the
inevitable in the same spirit it was received by Lee.
Let us not censure him if in the enthusiasm of his youth
he failed to perceive that in defeat there was a greater
courage than prolonged resistance with the useless sacri
fice of brave lives. Such an end to a struggle for liberty
may have been suited to Cronge and de Wett, but it
was beneath a Lee, from whose view that higher duty to
God was not obscured by any false sense of obligation
to his army and his people.
About 8 :30 A. M., Gen. Lee, in his full new uniform,
begirt with sword and sash, rode to the rear to meet
Grant, and soon received the communication from the
latter before mentioned. He at once wrote the Federal
chieftain, again requesting an interview, but in terms
which suggested fuller compliance with the original pro
posal. While this last message was being prepared, a
messenger riding like the wind dashed around a curve
and, seeing Lee, brought his superb charger to a halt.
It was the gallant, one-armed John Haskell of artillery
fame at Petersburg, nay, more, of world fame. All
recognized the rider, who with his good arm only suc
ceeded in drawing up his lathered steed one hundred
yards or more beyond the group. Gen. Lee went to meet
him, exclaiming: "What is it? What is it?" and then
seeing the sad plight of Col. HaskelFs magnificent ani
mal so well known to the Army, without waiting for a
reply, sorrowfully said: "Oh, why did you do it? You
have killed your beautiful horse!"*
Col. Haskell explained that Fitz Lee had sent in a
report that he had found a road by which the Army
could escape, and that Longstreet had ordered him to
overtake Lee, before he could send a note to Grant, and
to kill his horse if necessary to do it.
Lee, however, did not credit the report, which later
proved to be a mistake.
*This animal was noted for its beauty and speed. It had been led all the
way from Richmond on the retreat, with a view to making an escape in case of
surrender. The horse recovered and was sold to a Federal officer for a handsome
sum in gold.
THE LONG ARM OF LEE 949
What need to describe the sad rites which now en
sued? Or to tell of the anguish which showed in the
eyes of those heroic men that had for four horror-laden
years toiled wearily on to Appomattox, whither the in
exorable sign posts of Fate had led them — to which we
now know the fickle dame, ofttimes disguising the
route with cajoling flatteries, had guided them from the
first? Was it another trick of Fate that the very roof
which shielded the proud Lee from the gaze of the
curious, as he conferred with Grant, was the haven in
which its owner had sought refuge from the stricken
field of First Manassas? Well may it be said that no
home in all that bleeding Southland was free from the
merciless intrusions of war?*
After the formal surrender of his army, Gen. Lee
appointed Gens. Longstreet, Gordon, and Pendleton
to conduct the transfer of property, and to supervise the
paroling of the officers and men. In accordance with
the stipulations of the agreement the guns and troops
were withdrawn from the lines, and the work was
promptly undertaken.
The return of the Chief of Ordnance for the morning
of April 9 showed 7,892 organized infantry, with 75
rounds of ammunition each, and 63 field guns with an
average of 93 rounds. But 61 guns and 13 caissons,
however, remained, for two pieces had been destroyed
during the morning.
The infantry were first massed near the Courthouse,
and after stacking arms were directed to retire, while
the Federal officers took charge. Alexander was di
rected to form all the guns and caissons in a single
column along the road, that the Federal ordnance of
ficers might conduct them into their lines. The animals
had been practically without forage of any kind for sev
eral days. Alexander writes : "With a heart full of sym
pathy for the poor brutes, I formed the column on
Tuesday, April 11, and left them standing in the road,
*The house in which the articles of surrender were signed was the residence
of Maj. McLean, to which he had removed after his home at Manassas was
destroyed in the battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861.
950 THE LONG ARM or LEE
which they filled for about a mile. The next morning
I bade good-bye to Appomattox, and as I rode off from
the scene I saw the mournful column of artillery still
standing in the road unattended, but with many of its
poor horses now down in the mud and unable to rise."
Let us avert our eyes from the sad picture and be
thankful that a large number of the artillery horses,
including all the mounts, had been claimed by the of
ficers and men.
Many batteries had escaped the surrender, both from
Walker's column on the 8th, and from the Army at Ap
pomattox the following day. Some made their way to
Lynchburg, where the guns were destroyed, and others
buried their guns by the roadside and disbanded. Of
all that great corps of near three hundred pieces, little
more than half a hundred were surrendered. Many of
the artillerymen joined Johnston, among them a large
detachment of horse artillery under Col. Chew, who
escaped with Rosser's Cavalry Division and reported at
Greensboro, N. C., April 30. They were not allowed
to engage in hostilities against Sherman, for the view
was taken that they were an integral part of Lee's
Army, and therefore embraced in the surrender. Later
they were paroled with Johnston's troops.
The total number of officers and men of the Army of
Northern Virginia paroled by Grant during the 10th
and llth of April was 28,231, for large numbers of
stragglers soon joined the organized force which stacked
arms on the 9th.
It is difficult to determine with certainty the exact
composition of the Artillery present at the Surrender.
The parole lists indicate that the remaining organiza
tions were as follows :*
f Giles Battery
Stark's Battalion. _ __J Louisiana Guard Battery
^Richmond Hampden Battery
*See Vol. XV, Southern Historical Papers. In this valuable volume the
names of the artillery officers who surrendered, as well as of the enlisted men,
are given.
THE LONG ARM or LEE
951
Cutshaw's Battalion.
Lightfoot's Battalion.
Hardaway's Battalion.
Johnson's Battalion.
Haskell's Battalion.
Huger's Battalion.
Macintosh's Battalion.
Richardson's Battalion.
Poague's Battalion
Braxton's Battalion.
2d Richmond Howitzers
Staunton Battery
King William Battery
Richmond Orange Battery
Reese's Alabama Battery
^Louisa Morris Battery
( Caroline Battery
{ Surry Battery
3d Richmond Howitzers
1st Richmond Howitzers
Norfolk Blues Battery
Salem Battery
1st Rockbridge Battery
^Powhatan Battery
f Fredericksburg Battery
I Clutter's Battery
I 1st Maryland Battery
I^Southside Battery
f Lamkin's Nelson Battery
1 Palmetto (S. C.) Battery
] Rowan (N. C.) Battery
t Branch's (N. C.) Battery
f Bedford Battery
Madison (La.) Battery
--• s Ashland Battery
Parker's Richmond Battery
I Bath Battery
4th Maryland Battery
Danville Battery (Price's)
Lynchburg Battery (Chamberlayne's)
2d Rockbridge Battery
Ringgold Danville Battery
Graham's Petersburg Battery
Jeff Davis (Ala.) Battery
Donaldsonville (La.) Battery
"Manly's N. C. Battery
Pittsylvania Battery
Warrenton Battery
Williams' N. C. Battery
Albemarle Everett Battery
.N. C. Battery (?)
Lynchburg Lee Battery
With the Army were fragments of other batteries, in
cluding men from the four companies of the Washing
ton Artillery Battalion who attached themselves, after
952
THE LONG ARM or LEE
escaping from Walker's column, to Alexander's and
Long's commands. Some of the batteries enumerated
as present with the Army at the Surrender numbered
but a mere handful of men. The strength of the various
battalions may be determined from the following
enumeration :
ARTILLERY PAROLE ROLLS, DATED APRIL 9, 1865
General Headquarters, Brig.-Gen. Pen-
dleton and Staff
Officers
12
Enlisted
Men
13
Total
25
First Army Corps, Brig.-Gen. E. P.
Alexander and Staff
11
36
47
Haskell's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. J. C.
Haskell
15
139
154
Huger's Battalion, Maj. Tyler C. Jordan....
Macintosh's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Wm. M.
Owen
21
14
307
268
328
282
Poague's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Wm. T.
Poague
17
279
296
13th Virginia Battalion, Capt. D. N.
Walker
2
10
12
Richardson's Battalion, Capt. R. Prosper
Landry
4
77
81
Total First Army Corps
84
1,116
1,200
Second Army Corps, Brig.-Gen. A. L.
Long and Staff
8
22
30
Carter's Command, Col. Thomas H. Car
ter
2
4
6
Braxton's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Carter M.
Braxton
7
19
26
Cutshaw's Battalion, Capt. C. W. Fry
Hardaway's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. R. A.
Hardawav
12
19
199
382
211
401
Johnson's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Marma-
duke Johnson
8
135
143
Lightfoot's Battalion, Asst. Surg. J. B.
Coakley
1
29
30
Stark's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Alex. W.
Stark
11
154
165
Total Second Army Corps
68
944
1,012
Anderson's Corps, Col. Hilary P. Jones....
Blount's Battalion
2
3
1
21
3
24
Coit's Battalion
37
37
Strihling's Battalion
2
8
10
Total Anderson's Corps .
7
67
74
Smith's Battalion, Capt. W. F. Dement....
13
252
265
Total Artillery ....
184
2,392
2,676
THE LONG ARM or LEE 953
The foregoing rolls partially disclose the organization
of the Artillery as effected by Pendleton at Amelia
Courthouse, when the reduction in the force with the
Army became necessary, and at which time parts of
Coit's, Eshleman's, Cabell's, King's, Nelson's, Pegram's,
and Sturdivant's battalions were placed under Gen.
Walker to be taken to Lynchburg. According to Custer,
there were over thirty pieces of artillery with Walker,
besides a large train, and twenty-four of these guns and
many prisoners were captured, but Sheridan places the
number of guns captured by Custer from Walker at
twenty-five. Custer claims that during the ten days
preceding the Surrender his command captured forty-
six guns.*
The exact composition of the various artillery com
mands after leaving Amelia is difficult to determine, but
the following order, the last issued by Gen. Walker,
and for which the author is indebted to Gen. Walker's
Assistant Ad jut ant- General, Capt. William W. Cham-
berlayne, throws some light on the subject.
"Ho. QRS. RESERVE ARTY, A. N. VIRGINIA
"April 7, 1865.
"CIRCULAR.
"This command will move at 1 o'clock A. M., in the following
order :
"Lightfoot's Battalion,
"Coit's Division,
"Eshleman's Division,
"Cabell's Division,
"Walker's Battalion.
"Leyden's Battalion,
"Col. Cabell will furnish a section of Napoleons to march with
the Rear Guard.
"The wagons in rear of their respective Battalions.
"By command of Gen. Walker.
"WM. W. CHAMBERLAYNE,
"A. A. -General."
[Receipted on the back.]
*It will be recalled that some of Walker's batteries had buried their guns,
others joined the main column, and others dispersed before Custer's final attack.
— j
[!on> \ Rear Guard.
Lion, 3
954 THE LONG ARM OF LEE
Hd. Qrs. Cabell's Batt.,
Received by WALTER B. CARR,
April 7, '65. Sergeant Major.
Hd. Qrs. Reserve Arty 3d Corps,
April 7, '65. B. F. ESHLEMAN,
Lt.-Col. Commanding.
Received by JAS. C. COIT,
Maj. Commanding Batt.
[Other receipts torn off.]
If we allow Walker a force of 500 men, and the
various batteries which escaped to Lynchburg and the
ten batteries of horse artillery 800, it will be seen that
the Artillery personnel numbered not less than 3,800
officers and men April 8, 1865. Thus, whatever may be
said of the state of disorganization of the Infantry and
Cavalry, there being not more than 2,000 of the latter
towards the end of the retreat, it is apparent that the Ar
tillery maintained its organization in a comparatively
high state of efficiency to the end, with its personnel
only slightly reduced since its departure from Peters
burg.* No higher tribute can be paid its commanders
than this fact, for the Artillery in the nature of things
should have been the first to show signs of dissolution.
Grant's terms were honorable. The arms, artillery,
such of it as was left, and all public property were to be
turned over to the victors, all officers retaining their side-
arms, private horses and baggage. In addition to this
and in the interest of the desolate Southern people,
every soldier in the Confederate Army who claimed to
own a horse or mule was to be permitted to retain it for
farming purposes. And so many of the artillery
teams, for the preservation and care of which Pendleton
had labored so incessantly, were now to exchange the
gun and the caisson for the plow and the harrow, the
implements in that struggle for existence, which for
*Shoemaker's Horse Battery contained 00 men when it surrendered. There
is no reason to suppose the other horse batteries were not as strong, so the fore
going estimate is extremely conservative. Three full batteries of Blount's
Battalion with certainly 50 men each escaped to Lynchburg.
THE LONG ARM or LEE 955
the next decade proved to be far more cruel and dis
tressing than the mere war for liberty, through which
the South had passed. Who can tell what were the
emotions of those gallant gunners when first they struck
the plowshare of peace into the poverty-stricken soil
of their native fields? Did not the war-stained harness,
which still hung from the backs of those weary, worn
animals, recall to mind the charger and the martial
trappings of a hundred battlefields ? Did not the dumb
patience of those faithful brutes, bearing like their
masters the wounds and scars of battle, hold for Lee's
men a lesson of fortitude and admonish them
that together the old war horse and the veteran must
labor on for the salvation of the land? Ah! it is sweet to
believe that these brave gunners, often as at dawn they
led their old artillery teams from the leaky shelters that
stabled them, recalled the reveille of other days, and per
haps with a manly tear in their eyes gently stroked the
muzzles of those faithful steeds. Or perhaps, as they
rested together, man and beast, in the heat of noon-tide,
'neath the generous shade of some ancient oak, the sigh
ing of the nearby pines recalled to their minds the rush
of the guns, the hastening feet, the roar of battle, of an
other day, and admonished them to be brave so that
when the final Appomattox came upon them they
might be released from the plow of life with the same
consciousness of duty, well performed, that filled their
souls on that April day in 1 865 — that day when nature
with her sweet scented fields and budding trees sought
to sweeten the bitterness of defeat, and soothe with her
beauties the fevered brow of a vanquished army.
It has been said that the shots fired by Lieut. Wright
were the last, but let us accept Page's beautiful story as
one of fact. Two weeks before the Surrender an old ar
tillery officer had been sent with a small column and
a battery to guard an important pass in the Blue
Ridge, through which a Federal column from South
west Virginia was expected to attempt to move upon
Lee's rear.
956 THE LONG ARM or LEE
The "Old Colonel" had seized and held the crossing.
The position for his guns had been carefully selected.
It was at the highest point of the pass just where the
road crawled over the shoulders of the mountain along
the limestone cliff, a hundred feet sheer above the deep
river, where its waters had cut their way in ages past,
and now lay deep and silent as if resting after their
arduous toil before they began to boil over the great
bowlders which filled the bed of the stream. The posi
tion was impregnable, and the "Old Colonel" had been
ordered to hold it until relieved.
Late on the 10th, the enemy assailed the battery,
but all in vain. Numbers counted for little in that wild
eyrie, where a single gun could hold out against a host.
On the llth, the Federals attempted under a flag of
truce to convince the "Old Colonel" that Lee had sur
rendered, but still he remained at his post, awaiting
some order to withdraw. No order came, but soon un
doubted news arrived of the sad event. At last, as the
sun set in all its glory, throwing the great western peaks
in dark relief against the golden sky, and the shades of
night spread through the silent vales, the pickets were
called in and the old battery formed as if for parade.
Once more the men were to be allowed to make the
mountains echo with the crash of their guns.
The embers of the sinking camp-fires threw a faint
light on the guns, standing so grim and silent in the em
brasures of the little work; nearby stood the caissons
with the harness hanging limply from the poles. Not a
word was spoken, except that of command. "At the
order each detachment went to its piece; the guns were
run back, and the men with their own hands ran them
upon the edge of the perpendicular bluff above the
river, where, sheer below, the waters washed its base. The
pieces stood ranged in the order in which they had so
often stood in battle, and the gray, thin fog rising
slowly and silently from the river deep down between
the cliffs, and wreathing the mountain side above,
might have been the smoke from some unearthly battle
THE LONG ARM or LEE 957
fought by ghostly guns, posted there in the darkness and
manned by phantom cannoneers. At the word the gun
ners drew their lanyards taut — as if a single piece
the six guns belched forth a sheet of flame, roared a last
challenge on the misty night, and sent their thunder
reverberating through the darkening mountain tops,
while startling alike the blue-coated warriors in their
camp below, the browsing deer and the prowling fox."
A deadly silence now fell upon the scene, broken only
by the sighing of the tree-tops above and the rushing
torrent. Then came another command — "Let them go,
and God be our helper. Amen !"
For a few moments there was utter silence ; then one
prolonged, deep, resounding splash, as the war-worn
guns plunged into the pool, spreading over its once-
placid surface a spray, as if some titan hand had lain a
floral tribute upon the abysmal tomb of Lee's Artillery.
Such was the final sacrament of those men, whose record
is enshrined in the names of Pendleton, Long, Alex
ander, Walker, Walton, Crutchfield, Brown, Pelham,
Pegram, Chew, Breathed, Latimer, Thomson, Landry,
Cutshaw, Mclntosh, Poague, Carter, Braxton, Haskell,
Huger, Hardaway, Cabell, Gibbes, Watson, McGregor,
McGraw, McCarthy, Nelson, Chamberlayne, Caskie,
and a host of their peers too numerous to mention, the
like of whom the world has never known before or since
their time. Such was the hallowed rite that marked the
"Burial of Lee's Guns" and the end of that strife in
which Sumter was the primer that discharged the ex
plosive compounded of political antagonism. An ap
parent motive only had been needed, both north and
south, for the pulling of the lanyard to expand an
energy stored up through years of cherished animosity.
But now, the end had come and once more the placid
waters settled over a cause, buried but not forgotten.
If in its record there is a single incident to inspire
other generations to emulate the devotion to duty, the
valor, the Christian fortitude, of the men who fought
its guns, then the "Long Arm of Lee" did not exist,
struggle, and perish in vain.
GENERAL INDEX
Battery and battalion organizations are not included in the General
Index, but in the "Battery Index" and the ''Battalion Index," which follow.
The records of the batteries and battalions are the records of their com
manders, who are referred to in the General Index in their individual
capacity only. Thus, if it be desired to trace the record of Captain, later
Colonel, Thomas H. Carter, the references to Carter's Battery and Carter's
Battalion should be consulted, as well as the item, "Carter, Col. T. H.," in
the General Index. Statistics, such as numbers engaged, organization,
personnel, material, captures, losses, ammunition expenditure, tactical
features and dispositions, topography, Confederate and Federal, are not
generally indexed, but will readily be found in the appropriate chrono
logical chapter of the text.
PAGE
Administrative Regulations for
Artillery 199
Alburtis, Capt 335
Aldie, action at 218
Alexander, E. P., appointed Col.
and Chief of Ordnance .... 72
his former record 73
mentioned,
115, 130, 136, 140, 141, 155
criticisms of 193, 194, 195
quoted 218, 226, 227, 239
his attack on Pendleton,
227,231, 232
referred to. .288, 292, 293, 319,
337, 343, 351, 363, 372, 376,
378, 387, 400, 413, 416, 424,
440, 445, 490, 494, 505, 507,
508, 509, 511, 534, 536, 537,
539, 545, 549, 551, 553, 554,
564, 565, 570, 572, 635, 642,
645, 646, 647, 658, 664, 667,
670, 671, 672, 674, 676, 680,
681, 682, 684, 686, 688, 689,
695, 696, 697, 704, 720, 731,
736, 754, 776, 781, 787, 789,
793, 823, 840, 842, 845, 850,
868, 895, 897, 900, 919, 923,
924, 933, 934, 936, 939, 940,
944, 945, 947, 949
Allan, Col. William, quoted. . . . 195
mentioned 564
Alphabetical designation for
battalions 415
Altercation over use of land
torpedoes 178
Ambuscade of artillery column,
891, 892
American tactics 160, 161
"American Artillerist's Com
panion" 149
PAGE
Ammunition, fixed, introduction
of 32
purchased in Europe, 1861 . . 37
seized with Baton Rouge
arsenal 38
laboratories 40
manufacture of 42
capacity of laboratories ... 45, 46
purchased up to 1863 55
amount made 56
furnished by West Point
Foundry 64
lack of in 1861 76, 139, 140
expenditure of at Coggin's
Point 234
supply of 243
expenditures compared . . 269, 274
expenditure 326
improved in 1862 340
report on 424
poor quality at Chancellors-
ville 509
influence of 548
Board for study of 564
expenditures 597
Federal reserve at Gettys
burg 637, 638
Anderson, Jos. R. & Co., pro
prietors of R i c h m o n d
Tredegar Works, the Con
federate "Krupps" 51
mentioned 341
Anderson, Lieut. R. M 657
Anderson, Capt. Robt., his
manual 154
Andrews, Lt.-Col. R. Snowden,
244, 414, 416, 515, 516, 551,
605, 704, 720
Anecdote, concerning cavalry
trooper 196
30
960
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
Antietam, Battle of 294
Antimony, sulplmret of 47
Appropriations for ordnance
work 36, 37
Archer, Dr. Junius L., manu
facturer of guns 68
Archer Projectiles, defects of.. 128
Armament of batteries on the
Peninsula 201
of army in 1862, tabulated.. 284
Armored car 216
Armistead, Capt. George 90
Arms, captured, regulations
concerning 39, 59
purchased abroad 55
destroyed at Harper's Ferry 68
Armstrong, Sir William, devel-
opes breech-loader 29
Armstrong Guns 243
Arsensals, seizure of Federal
by Confederates 24, 41
U. S., created 26
erected by C. S. A 35, 36
material seized with Federal 38
location of Confederate 40
Articles of War, C. S. A 109
Artificers, pay of 108
Artillery, American, reputation
of in 1861 31
amount of Confederate origi
nally proposed 42
officers detailed for ordnance
work 39, 52, 53
of Virginia, armament of.. 62, 67
early American 85
early instruction 85, 91
in Mexican War 93
merged with Engineer Corps 89
status of in 1808 88
in 1815 90
in 1837 91
in I860 94
officers in from West Point. . 95
Corps of, C. S. A... 108, 109, 117
law creating officers. 108, 109, 117
pay of officers in 108
Provisional, C. S. A., created 107
of Virginia 112, 115
strength of in 1861 140
French Schools 152
mass tactics 152, 153
proportion of to infantry 151, 153
Federal organization 156
administration of Confederate 199
nature of the arm 209
efficiency of 277, 278
reorganization of C. S. A. . . 279
PAGE
organization at Sharpsburg,
282, 283
reorganization of 1862 332
reduction of in 1862 337
strength of in Oct., 1862.339, 346
assignment of in 1862 345
strength of in Dec., 1862 411
organization of in April, 1863 . 419
organization of in May, 1863, 442
error of at Chancellorsville. . 490
mobility of at Chancellors
ville 491
fire effect of at Chancellors
ville 511
status of Federal in 1863,
546, 550
Confederate and Federal com
pared 547, 548, 573
number and grades of officers
in 1863 565
reorganization of 1863 565
organization of in 1863 .... 567
strength of in July, 1863... 575
of Western Army, inspected
by Pendleton 583
charged by cavalry,
585, 587, 591, 596
movement of to Gettysburg . . 599
reconnaissances,
623, 631, 639, 643, 658
resisting power of 649
faulty disposition of at
Gettysburg 666
efforts to secure promotion
for officers in 719, 723, 724
divisions created 722, 725
of Western Army reorganized 731
character of C. S. A. com
manders 742
proposed organization of in
1864 830
superior personnel of in 1864. 893
proposed increase of C. S. A.
Corps in 1864 902
Pendleton's tribute to his ... 906
headquarters of at Peters
burg 907
staff of in 1864 902, 907
losses of at Petersburg 909
heavy batteries about Rich
mond 920
promotions in, in 1865 925
Ashby, Gen. Turner 162, 163
Atkinson, Lt.-Col 920
Atlanta Arsenal 57
Augusta Arsenal 40
Ausrusta Powder Mills 40
GENERAL INDEX
961
PAGE
erected 43
site and capacity of 45
Superintendent of 57
Austerlitz, Battle of 153
Austrian, guns purchased. . . .37, 55
artillery 155
tactics 'in 1859 172
ammunition expenditure .... 274
Auxonne, Artillery School. . 152, 159
Badajos 864
Baggage allowance 428, 708, 709
Balaclava, charge of Light
Brigade at, compared to
Brandy Station 587
Balck, quoted 106
Baldwin, Col. J. B 116
Baldwin, Col. Briscoe G., Chief
of Ordnance 341, 351, 570
Balloons, Federal observation,
234, 366, 376
Barefooted gunners 355, 356
Barksdale, Lieut 526
Barnwell, Maj. J. C...198, 319,
380, 387, 388, 417, 423, 907
Barry, Lieut 216
Barry, Col. Wm. F., Chief of
Artillery 133, 157
Baton Rouge Arsenal 37, 40
powder seized with 38
Battalions, organization of pro
posed 141
created 155
use of 344
organization of 413, 415
no longer part of infantry
commands 556
proposed composition of in
1864 830
Battery, the organization of a,
109, 110
material of a 110
complement of horses Ill
authority to raise 144
strength of a Va. militia. . . 144
mobility of 165
Lee discourages raising of
additional 197
those disbanded in 1862 284
proposed organization of a,
in 1864 830
Battles, Lieut. ..684, 685, 931, 932
Bautzen, Battle of 153
Bayard, Gen. Geo. D., killed by
shell 350
Bayne, Maj. T. L., command
ing Blockade Service 56
Beauregard, Gen., at Petersburg 836
Beaver Dam, Battle of 207, 211
PAGE
Beckham, Col. R. F..128, 162,
597, 733, 720, 722, 725
(See Beckham's Battery and
Beckham's Battalion)
Beef, issued in 1862 374
cattle 427
Bellona Arsenal, created 26
mentioned 51
guns seized at 68
Bercier's Orleans French Bat
tery of La 93
Bermuda Agency 56
Bernadotte, his proud boast
that he had never lost a
gun 525
Bernard, Col. Simon 97
Besancon, Artillery School.... 152
Best, Capt 550, 554
Bethesda Church, Battle of .... 207
Beverly Ford 259
Big Bethel, Battle of, rifle guns
used in 64
described 118
Blackburn's Ford 127
Blacksmiths, pay of 108
Blakely guns, purchased 55
mentioned 243
in Horse Artillery 346
Blankets 115
Blockade Running Service 56
Blount, Maj. J. G 564, 917
(See Blount's Battery)
Bliicher, calls for more guns.. 153
Blumenau, Battle of 274
Board of War, 1776 25
Boggs, Maj. Francis J., 838, 917, 920
(See Boggs' Battalion)
Bombardment of Fredericksburg 362
Bomford, Col. George, Chief of
Ordnance 26, 91
Boonsboro, Battle of 292
Boots, price of in 1864 908
Borman fuses, defective 122
Boston, Col 936
Bourcet 160
Bowen & Co., of Pendleton,
S. C., powder contractors.. 43
saltpetre contractors 44
Bowling Green, Artillery Camp
at 410, 556
Bragg's Battery (Horse Artil
lery) 164
Bran, price of in 1864 909
Branch, Col. James R 840, 917
( See Branch's Petersburg
Battery and Branch's Bat
talion)
Brander, Maj 932
962
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
Brandy Station 434, 584
Braxton, Lt.-Col. Carter M.,
416, 421, 509, 720, 878, 885
(See Braxton's Battery and
Braxton's Battalion)
Breathed, Maj. James. . 162, 338,
346, 440, 577, 720, 795, 937
(See Breathed's Battery and
Breathed's Battalion)
Breech-loading gun, develop
ment of 29
origin of 31
varieties of 32
Brenizer, Capt. A. C., Supt.
Salisbury Foundry 57
Bridge, gallant defense of a, at
Stephenson's Depot 607
Bridles, number issued 56, 114
Brigade groups, proposed in
1864 830
Brockenbrough, Maj. J. P.,
380, 382, 383, 384, 408, 417,
421, 423, 720
( See Brockenbrough's Bat
tery and Brockenbrough's
Battalion)
Brooke, Capt. John Mercer,
invents gun 67
Brooke gun, invention of 51
Brown, Capt. J. S 335
Brown, Lieut. J. Thompson, Jr. 454
Brown, Col. John Thompson,
114, 118, 226, 338, 417, 469,
470, 494, 545, 549, 551, 552,
556, 562, 568, 624, 625, 636,
637, 658, 665, 666, 673, 696,
697, 701, 704, 713, 769, 851, 855
( See Brown's Battery, Brown's
Battalion, and Brown's
Division)
Broun, Lieut.-Col. W. LeRoy,
Supt. Richmond Arsenal. 52, 57
Buddecke's Battle Orders 229
Bull Run, Battle of 127, 130
reason for victory of 99
Bullet, the perfect expansion,
origin of 28
Billow, quoted 106
Bunker Hill, camp at 327
Bureau of Artillery and
Ordnance, proposed 38
Bureau of Foreign Supplies,
created 35
work of 55, 56
Bureau of Mining and Niter,
created 35, 44, 49
officers of . 53
PAGE
Bureau of Ordnance, C. S. A.,
organized 34, 38
officers of 39, 52, 53, 54
work of 40
laborers impressed 44
organization and operations,
52, 54, 55
expenditures of 54, 55
its fleet of blockade runners 56
credits allowed 56
gradual restriction of its
field of operations 59
"Burial of the Guns" 956
Burnside, his escape from
Fredericksburg 402
his "Mud March" 445
Burroughs, Lieut. Dent 794
Burton, Supt. J. H., Macon
armory 57
Burton Projectiles, defects of. . 128
Burwell, Lieut 460, 461
Cabell, Col. Henry Coalter,
280, 372, 386, 387, 391, 396,
415, 517, 523, 556, 720, 722,
846, 851, 852, 855, 919
( See Cabell's Richmond
"Fayette" Battery, and
Cabell's Battalion)
Cadets, of V. M. I., as in
structors 99, 115
Cadets, Richmond School 731
Caesar 431
Caisson, of Cadet Battery,
Jackson's hearse 560
Caissons, number made 56
Callaway, Lieut. Morgan.. 820, 911
(See Pulaski, Ga., Battery)
Camp Meetings, Religious 430
Camps, Artillery, in 1863,
556, 716, 717
Cantonments, Artillery, winter
of 1861-2 ." 145
Cape Fear River, fishery estab
lished on 48
Captured arms, regulations con
cerning 39, 59
Carbines, for cannoneers recom
mended 892
Carpenter, Capt. John C.,
337, 338, 440, 889, 890
( See Carpenter's Alleghany
Battery)
Carpenter, Capt. Joseph,
337, 338, 440
(See Carpenter's Alleghany
Battery)
GENERAL INDEX
963
PAGE
Carter, Capt. J. W.,
347, 588, 589, 594
(See Carter's "Ashby" Bat
tery)
Carter, Col. Thomas Hill,
326, 337, 379, 380, 399, 416,
440, 507, 508, 509, 551, 720,
733, 769, 799, 813, 856, 857,
880, 881, 882, 883, 885, 887,
889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 895,
897, 920, 921, 926, 928, 944
(See Carter's King William
Battery, Carter's Battalion,
and Carter's Division)
Carthaginian Army 431
Gary, Maj ". 920
Caskie, Maj. William H...440, 815
( See C a s k i e ' s Richmond
"Hampden" Battery )
Cavalli, designs breech-loader.. 29
Cavalry, ordered to help bat
teries 195
anecdote concerning 196
Cavalry charges vs. Artillery,
585, 587, 591, 596
Cavalry tactics, proper 404
Cayce, Capt 834
( See Richmond "Purcell"
Battery )
Cedar Mountain, Battle of.... 241
Chalons, school at 152
Chamberlaine, Capt. W. W., 717, 902
Chamberlayne, Capt. John
Hampden. . .493, 506, 867, 874
( See Chamberlayne's Battery )
Chancellorsville, Battle of 442
May 3 505, 515
May 4 530
Chaplains, inadequate number
of 430
Charcoal, how procured 42
Charges, made by horse bat
teries 166, 168
of Cavalry vs. Artillery.
585, 587, 591, 596
Charleston Arsenal 40, 57
Charlotte Chemical Works.... 40
Charlottesville, Horse Artillery
saves 726
resolutions of thanks of town 728
Chateaudun, Prussian battery
at 525
Chatham Artillery of Savannah 88
Chemists, Ordnance, discov
eries of 43, 45, 47
Chesterfield Depot, Artillery
Headquarters, in 1863.... 450
PAGE
Chew, Lt.-Col. Robert Preston,
162, 326, 337, 349, 423, 440,
720, 727, 773.774, 927, 937, 950
(See Chew's "Ashby" Battery
and Chew's Battalion)
Chew, Capt. Walter E
(See 4th Md. Battery)
Chief of Artillery, proper rela
tions of a, with his com
mander 560
Childs, Maj. F. L., Supt.
Fayetteville Arsenal 57
Cliildsburg, Artillery Camp at. 410
Chinese multiple firing guns.. 31
Christ, in the camp 430
Cigars and tobacco, price of in
1864 908
Clarksville Harness Shops 57
Clausewltz, quoted 106, 183, 238
Cleveland, Tenn., manufactured
copper found at 47
Clothing, men without reported
sick 425
condition of in 1863 425
anecdote concerning 426
cost of in 1864-5 908
Clutter, Capt. Valentine C 378
( See Clutter's Richmond
Battery)
Cocke, Gen. Philip St. George 115
Cog-gin's Point, bombardment at 234
Coit, Maj. James C 838
(See Coit's Battery and
Coit's Battalion)
Cold Harbor, 1st Battle of .211, 212
Cold Harbor, 2d Battle of 812
Cold Harbor to Petersburg. . . . 834
Colemaii, Lt. Col. Lewis M..204 392
Colonial Artillery 85
Colston, Gen. R. E 105
Columbus Arsenal 57
Combat unit, the 344
the battalion as the 413
Commanders, artillery, char
acter of 742
Commissioner of Artillery, 1776 25
Company "Q" 727
Confederacy formed 107
Confederate Powder Mills 40
site and capacity of 45
Contee, Lieut ' 607, 608
Contractors for sulphur 42
Contribution from Washington
Artillery for people of
Fredericksburg 410
Cooke, John Esten, his tribute
to Pelham 434, 435
mentioned 828, 907
964
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
Cooke, Lieut. N. B 889
Copper, how obtained 47
Corn, ration of 428
price of in 1864 908
Cornmeal, component of ration 374
Corps artillery, use of,
160, 284, 285, 287, 568
Corps Reserve 284, 285, 287, 568
Corps Chief of Artillery, pro
posed 415
Corps Groups, proposed in 1864, 830
Court of Inquiry for Artillery 341
Courtney, Maj. A. R..244, 281, 654
(See Courtney's Battery and
Courtney's Battalion)
Covington, Private L. T 866, 867
Cowardice, case of 866
Crater at Petersburg,
846, 847, 859, 863
Creeping, practice in artillery. . 605
Cross Keys, Battle of 173
Crozet, Col. Claudius 96
Crutchfield, Col. Stapleton,
105, 170, 246, 258, 264, 267,
272, 276, 278, 281, 290, 291,
293, 298, 325, 326, 327, 328,
337, 358, 377, 378, 379, 381,
384, 385, 391, 392, 410, 413,
420, 423, 424, 428, 440, 450,
468, 489, 490, 491, 493, 494,
549, 551, 560, 561, 712, 713,
719, 919, 936
Culpeper, Artillery cantonments
near 145
Cummings, Col. A. C 133
Curry combs, number issued, 56, 114
price of in 1864 908
Custer, Gen., advertises for
Confederate guns 890
Cutshaw, Lt.-Col. Wilfred Em
met .337, 440, 720, 791
(See Cutshaw's Battery and
Cutshaw's Battalion)
Cutts, Col. Allan S.,
417, 427, 704, 720, 842
(See Cutts' Battery and
Cutts' Sumter, Ga., Bat
talion)
Cuyler, Lt.-Col. R. M., Supt.
Macon Arsenal 57
Dabney, Lieut., of King Wil
liam Battery 322
Dahlgren's Raid 729
Dance, Capt. Willis J.,
510, 568, 600, 792
(See Dance's Powhatan Bat
tery and Dance's Battalion)
PAGE
Dandridge, Capt. Edward P.,
198, 412, 424, 718, 907
Danville Depot 57
Daum, Lieut.-Col. Philip 169
Davidson, Capt. Geo. L 802
(See Lynchburg Battery)
Davidson, Capt. Greenlee,
380, 382, 383, 384, 393, 511
( See Richmond "Letcher"
Battery )
Davis, Gen., manufactures
powder 43
Davis, Jefferson, false accusa
tion against 24
Dearing, Col. James,
415, 564, 565, 572, 646, 647,
658, 720, 722, 725, 816, 936
(See Dearing's Lynchburg
Battery, Dearing's Light
Battalion, and Dearing's
Horse Artillery Battalion)
Deflection marks, used at
Banks' Ford 539
De Lisle, Maj. Roman 87
Depots, horse 710
De Russy, Lieut., killed 525
Desertion, becomes prevalent . . 923
proposals to stop 924
Deshler, Col. James 202, 205
(See Deshler's ' Battery and
Deshler's Battalion)
Dilger, Capt. Hubert, his ex
ploits 475, 480,
481, 482, 484, 550
(See Dilger's Federal Bat
tery )
Dimmock, Col. Charles, Chief
of Ordnance of Va 69
his efforts 70
Disbanded, organizations, in
1862 284
Diseases of horses, 332, 709, 710, 922
Divisions of artillery created,
570, 722, 725
Divisional reserves created .... 200
Downer, Supt. W. S., Rich
mond Armory and Clarks-
ville Harness Shops 57
Douay, Artillery School 152
Drivers, experience of 331
Drouot 159, 230
Drunken negro troops 870
Ducktown, Tenn., copper smelt
ing at 47
Duel, artillery, only one on
Peninsula 237
at Cedar Mountain 250
GENERAL INDEX
965
PAGE
Du Teil, original exponent of
masses 159
Early's Valley Campaign, 827, 876
Ellett, Capt. Thomas 378
(See Ellett's Richmond Bat
tery)
Elliott, Lieut., of Maurin's Bat
tery 311
Employees of Bureau of Ord
nance, number of 57
organized as armed guards. . 58
Engineer Corps, merged with
Artillery 89
Entente Cordiale, between Ar
tillery and Infantry 406
Epaulments, use of 545
Eshleman, Lt.-Col. Benj. F.,
129, 356, 519, 565, 720
(See Eshleman's Battery and
Eshleman's Battalion)
Eubank, Cadet Hill Carter.... 657
"Eugenia," blockade runner... 56
European agent of Bureau of
Ordnance appointed .... 35, 37
Evelington Heights, Pelham's
and Stuart's blunder at. . . 233
Exemptions of mechanics .... 48, 57
Explosion of Parrotts 388
Fair Oaks or Seven Pines,
Battle of 192
Fallagant, Lieut 820
Farcy, disease of 922
Farriers, pay of 108
Fayetteville Arsenal and
Armory 40, 57
Federal Artillery, organization
of * 156
sorry condition of in 1863. . . 573
its status in 1863 546, 550
Infantry, immobile at Cold
Harbor 823, 824
Ferrell, Lieut 538
Field Officers for battalions ... 570
Artillery, in 1863, list of... 719
assignment of 720
in 1865 925
Fishery, established for oil
supply 48
Fire balls used at Petersburg . . 923
"First American" Regiment, 89, 93
Fleet, of Bureau of Ordnance . . 56
Fleetwood, affair at 349
Floyd, Mr., Secretary of State,
accusation against 24
Fodder, price of in 1864 909
Forage, hauled by batteries . . . 425
where secured 425, 426
how collected . . 428
PAGE
•measures to procure in 1863, 718
price of in 1864-5 908
lack of in 1864-5 919, 920
Ford, Lieut 827
Forges, number made 56
Forno, Capt. Henry, of La .... 93
Fort Drewry, blown up 933
Fort Gregg, action of 902, 931
Fort Harrison, action of 897
Fort Pulaski, rifled guns used
in defense of 66
Fort Steadman, action of 928
Fort Whitworth, action of 931
Fortress Monroe 91
Foundries, created 40
Franco-German War, artillery
experience of 239
Fraser, Capt 564, 694
(See Pulaski, Ga., Battery)
Frazier's Farm, Battle of 215
Friedland, Battle of 153
Friction-tubes, purchased in
Europe in 18G1 37
manufactured 47
purchased abroad 55
number made 56
Frobel, Maj. B. W 257, 280
(See Frobel's Battalion)
Fry, Capt 334
Frederick the Great, his artil
lery 150, 153
mentioned 432, 707
Fredericksburg, Battle of 362
Freemantle, Col., witnesses
Gettysburg 687
French, Lieut. S. S 889
French, influence of the on
American system .... 87, 88, 89
French Artillery, organization of 150
in 1859 190
Artillery Schools 152
"French Detachment," of
Henry's Battery 352
French Gunners of Louisiana,
heroism of 389
Fuel, in 1862 373
Fuentes de Onoro, horse artil-
tery at 166
Fulcher, Corporal, his gallantry 899
Fulminate of mercury, sub
stitute for 47
Fuzes, time, new invented 47
purchased abroad 55
number made 56
Borman type defective 122
igniter attachment fails to
" work 538
Games' Mill, Battle of 210
966
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
Gainesville, Battle of 255
Gale, Lieut 844, 845
Garber, Capt. Asher W....383, 791
(See Garber's Staunton Bat
tery)
"Garde Royale," 'manual of... 154
Garden, Capt. Hugh R 899
(See Palmetto, S. C., Battery)
Garnett, Maj. John J., In
spector of Ordnance,
355, 415, 565, 704, 720, 722
(See Garnett's Battalion)
Garnett, Lieut. J. M 164
Gatling, Dr. R. J., his gun first
used 32, 33
General Chief of Artillery.... 415
Georgia, supplies and provi
sions in 427
German artillery experience in
1870 191
Getty, Capt. C. T., Supt. Lynch-
burg Depot " . . . . 57
Gettysburg, Battle of 221
movement of army upon .... 598
errors in campaign of 611
faulty artillery positions of 667
strategic situation of town. . 613
tactical features of battlefield 614
disposition of troops at.... 615
action of July 1 616
action of July 2 635
action of July 3 660
retreat from 695
Gibbes, Maj. J. Hampton,
779, 865, 866, 867, 874, 902
(See Gibbes' Battalion)
Gibbon's Artillerist's Manual,
1859 29
Gilham, Col. William 96, 98
his manual 99, 154
referred to 337
Girths 115
Gitschin 238
Glanders, disease of 922
Glendale, Battle of 216
Gneisenau 238
Golly, Maj., of Louisiana 93
Gorey, Lieut., his gallantry at
Sharpsburg 301
Gorgas, Brig.-Gen. Josiah, ap
pointed Chief of Ordnance 34
his character and work. . . .35, 36
statement of 39, 40
recommendations of 35, 54
referred to 564
Graham, Dr. John 907
Graham, Lieut 385
Grain, where secured 425, 426
PAGE
Grant, Gen. U. S., remarks of
on artillery 190
discussion of his character,
823, 824
Gravellotte, Battle of 274
Greased Heel, horse disease. . . . 348
Greble, Lieut. John T., killed.. 118
Greener, William, C. E., his
treatise on arms 28
inventions 28
Grenades, proposed use of 827
Grenoble, Artillery School 152
GribeauvaPs system 150
Gridley, Col. Richard 86
Grimes, Capt. Cary F 92
( See Grimes' Portsmouth Bat
tery)
Grooved guns, origin of 28, 29
experiments with 31
Groveton, Battle of 255
Gunboats, artillery encounters
with 844, 857
Gun carriages, manufacture of 48
number made 56
made in Va. in 1861 78, 79
Guns, manufacture of 51
Austrian purchased 37, 55
Blakely purchased 55
number made at Tredegar
Works 56
furnished by West Point
Foundry 64
brought by Washington Ar
tillery 71
captured at First Manassas 71
list of those made in 1861. . . 78
number of Federal and Con
federate in 1862 148, 286
number and proportion of at
Sharpsburg 286, 325
kinds favored by Gen. Lee. . . 340
mortification over loss of. ... 524
proper spirit over loss of .... 525
Prussian rule as to with
drawal from action 525
Gunners defend their pieces,
585, 587, 591, 597
Gunnery, theory of, provision
for study of in 1863 564
Board of, appointed in 1863 564
Guibert 160
Guidon, pay of 110
Gustavus, his artillery propor
tion 153
Gwynn, Maj.-Gen. Walter 113
Hai'nesville, Battle of 66, 125
Halters, number issued 56, 114
GENERAL INDEX
967
PAGE
37
149
777
Hamburg, ordnance material
shipped from
Hamilton, Gen. Alexander, his
drill regulations
Hamilton, Maj. S. P.,
280, 370, 386, 391, 396, 415,
419, 450, 451, 466, 468, 528,
(See Hamilton's Battalion)
Hardaway, Lieut. -Col. Robert
Arehelaus,
319, 380, 417, 421, 423, 468,
469, 510, 513, 535, 536, 537,
538, 540, 549, 704, 720, 786,
813, 897, 900, 919, 925
(See Hardaway's Ala. Bat
tery and Hardaway's Bat
talion)
Hardin, Maj. M. B 920
Hardwicke, Capt 636
(See Hardwicke's Lynchburg
"Lee" Battery)
Harness, purchased in Europe
1861 37
leather for manufacture of.. 47
made from oiled canvas 48
purchased abroad 55
number of sets made 56
Clarksville shops 57
condition of 424
price of in 1864 908
Harper, Maj. -Gen. Kenton, re
lieved '. 113
Harper's Ferry Arsenal, created 26
value of 68
destroyed by Federals 68
reconstructed 70, 71
Harper's Ferry, Battle of 288
Harrison, Col. Charles 87
Harrison's Landing 233
Hart, Maj. James F 332, 901
(See Hart's Battery and
Hart's Battalion")
Harvie, Col. E. J., Inspector-
General 355
Haskell, Col. J. C.,
440, 684, 685, 704, 865, 866,
873, 874, 899, 900, 902, 948
(See HaskelPs Battalion)
Haskell, Capt. J. C 907
Hatcher, Lieut. Charles,
198, 732, 907
Hatcher's Run, Battle of 900
Havana Agency 56
Hawes, Lieut. *S. H 334
Hay, where and how secured,
425, 426
price of in 1864 909
PAGE
Hazard, Capt 670
( See Hazard's Federal Bat
tery )
Heavy Artillery, in defenses of
Richmond * 920
Hemini>ton. Private, his gal
lantry 811
Henderson, Col. G. F. R.,
quoted 106, 219
his error 378
Henry, Capt. M. W...346, 564, 712
(See Henry's Battery and
Henry's Battalion)
Hensley, Maj 920
(See Hensley's Battery)
High angle fire at Cold Harbor,
822, 826
High Bridge, action at 936
Hill, A. P., erroneous use of
artillery by 208, 211, 213
his fatal error at Gettysburg 615
Hill. Gen. D. II '. 122
Hindman, Col., Saltpetre con
tractor 44
Hobson, Lieut 878
Hohenlohe, Prince Kraft 160
quoted 238
Hollinguist, Lieut.-Col 733
Hollis, Lieut 901
Holman, Maj. Christian 87
Hooker, Gen., his movements
discussed 455, 472
destroys artillery organiza
tion 547, 550, 574
Horse Artillery, origin of.. 150, 151
C. S. A. created 162
charges made by 166, 168
operations of in 1862 347
operations of in 1863 446, 448
at Chancellorsville, 460, 467, 471
at Brandy Station 585
organization and status of in
1863 576
reviews of in 1863 580, 581
organization, 1863 706, 725
camp of in 1863 717
fight of at Charlottesville . . . 726
receives thanks of town 728
criticism of 773, 774
condition of in 1864 828
proposed increase of 895
reorganization of in 1864,
922, 923, 927
Horses, complement of a battery 111
efforts to secure 114
taken from cavalry for guns 178
extra for batteries 214
scarcity of in 1862 327, 328
968
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
number per battery 328, 333
regulations concerning ...... 330
experience of artillerymen
with 331
character of animals 331, 332
purchased in Texas 332
diseases of 332, 348
shelters for . 356
for artillery secured in
Georgia 418
care of demanded of officers 423
reported condition of 424
number required in 1863 427
sickness among 427, 428
deficiency of 412
condition of in May, 1863,
556, 562, 563
sale of condemned to farmers 563
number distributed in 1863.. 563
mentioned 574
requisitioned 697
"pressing for shorts" 698
provisions for care of 709
diseases of 710
price of in 1863 710
where obtained 711
condition of in 1864 829
price of in 1864 908, 921
great effort to procure. . .921, 922
care of in depots 922
fate of the artillery horses,
949, 954, 955
Horseshoes, manufacture of. ... 48
supply of -49, 115
Horse brushes, number issued 56
Horse equipment, deficiency of
in 1862 412
Horsemen, artillerymen as 331
Hotchkiss Guns 243
Howard, Lieut. James 277
Huckstep, Capt 334
(See Huckstep's 1st Flu-
vanna Battery)
Huger, Benj., Col. U. S. Ord
nance Corps 26
appointed Inspector General
Artillery and Ordnance, C.
S. A 53
Huger, Lieut. -Col. Frank,
338, 420, 508, 534, 537, 541,
549, 636, 645, 646, 664, 720,
846, 866, 867, 874
( See Huger's Norfolk Battery
and Huger's Battalion)
Huger, Capt. Francis K 90
Humphreys, Maj. F. C., Supt.
Columbus Arsenal 57
PAGE
Hunt, Gen. Henry J.,
222, 230, 233, 243, 276, 298,
546, 629, 638, 641, 675, 678,
748, 775
Huse, Caleb, Foreign Purchas
ing Agent 37
purchases Austrian batteries 37
inspects Armstrong and
Blakely plants 37
his purchases abroad 55
Hutter, Capt. E. S., Supt. Dan
ville Depot 57
Illuminators, at Petersburg. . . . 923
Incendiary shells, prepared by
Pendleton 398
Indirect fire, first instance of. . 539
employed at Cold Harbor by
Mclntosh 822, 826
Infantry supports for artillery 177
Initiative, opportunity for 482
Inspection, of batteries. .. .354, 355
of artillery, Jan., 1863 412
results of" 413
of Johnston's Artillery by
Pendleton in 1864 732
Inspector General Artillery and
Ordnance 53
Inspector of Ordnance and Ar
tillery 355
Instruction, Artillery, Early,
85, 86, 89, 91
in the South 98, 101, 149
Intrenchments, constructed at
Fredericksburg. . .369, 372,429
constructed by gunners 537
Iron Clads, armor for, made. . . 51
Iron Mines and Ores 50
Iron Pyrites, of Louisiana and
Alabama used in produc
tion of sulphur 42
Izard, Capt. George 90
Jackson, Gen. T. J., referred to 30
tests Parrott gun 64
favors rifled guns 65
element of his success 103
anecdote concerning 106
appointed Colonel 113
mentioned 114, 123, 126
at Bull Run 134
his failure on Peninsula 218
himself again 246
congratulates Beckham on
field 481
death of described 557
his wife arrives at his death
bed 558
Cadet caisson his hearse.... 560
affection for in artillery. . . . 560
GENERAL INDEX
969
PAGE
James, Lieut 842
James rifles, captured at
Manassas 72
Jealousy, caste; in service 405
Johnson, Capt. John R 339
(See Johnson Bedford Bat
tery)
Johnson, Maj. Marmaduke,
720, 897, 898
(See Johnson's Richmond
Battery and Johnson's Bat
talion)
Johnston, Jos. E., his inability
to advance on Washington,
24, 76, 139
knew little of rifling 64
preferred smooth bores .... 65, 75
lacked ammunition in 1861.. 76
appointed Major-General .... 113
Jomini, quoted 106
Jones. Col. Hilary P.,
416, 423, 508, 549, 720, 725,
737, 837, 895, 933
(See Jones' Battalion)
Jones' House, Battles of the ... 898
Jordan, Maj. Tyler C 720
(See Bedford Battery)
Kelly's Ford, Battle of 432, 714
Kellysville 432
Kemper, Maj. Del 415
( See Kemper's Alexandria
Battery)
Kernstown, Battle of 169
King, Col. J. Floyd... 802, 803, 877
(See King's Battalion)
Kirkpatrick, Capt. T. J 880
( See Amherst Battery and
"Madison," Mis s., Bat
tery)
Knox, Col. Henry, recommends
artillery schools, etc 86, 89
Koniggratz, Battle of, 221, 238, 274
Kosciusko, Gen., his manual for
artillery 149
Kostenetski, at Austerlitz 168
Kuropatkin's Cavalry tactics . . 404
Labor, skilled and unskilled. .48, 57
training of 58
Ladies, visit Cavalry Camp .... 580
"Lady Davis" blockade runner 56
La Fere, Artillery School 152
Lahitte system of rifling 30
Laidley, Maj., revises Ordnance
Manual 26
Lallemand's treatise 149
Lambie, Lieut, W. T 600, 607
PAGE
Lamkin, Capt 925
(See Amherst-Nelson Bat
tery)
Lancaster grooved gun 29
Landry, Capt., heroism of 389
(See Donaldsonville, La., Bat
tery )
Lane, Maj. John* 417, 422
(See Lane's Ga. Battery and
Lane's Battalion)
Lantz, Corporal Joseph T. V. . . 657
his gallantry 423
Latham, Capt. A. C 816
(See Latham's Battery)
Latimer, Maj. Joseph White,
337, 379, 380, 384, 393, 399,
416, 421, 440, 453, 568, 601,
610, 636, 651, 653, 694
( See Richmond "Courtney"
Battery and Latimer's Bat
talion)
Latrobe, Capt. 0., his gallantry 389
Lead, supply and price of 49
purchased abroad 55
Leather, supply and curing of . . 47
contracts for 48
purchased abroad 55
price of in 1864 908
"R, E. Lee," blockade runner.. 56
Lee, Gen. Charles 87
Lee, Lieut. H. H 164
Lee, Gen. Robert E., assists in
ordnance work of Va 70
appointed Maj. -Gen 113, 116
his policy respecting promo
tion 413, 418
his boldness at Chancellors-
ville 542
his dispatch on Jackson's
death 562
his Gettysburg plans 598
his conduct after Pickett's
charge 688
his lost opportunity at the
North Anna 799
Lee, Robert E., Jr., Private, in
cident concerning 310
Lee, Col. Stephen Dill,
201, 278, 299, 312, 313, 323,
326, 337, 338, 351
(See Lee's Battalion)
Leipzig, Battle of 153, 274
Leonard and Riddle, Saltpetre
contractors 43
Letcher. Gov. John, of Va 63
Lewis, Maj. J. R. C 416, 572
Lewisburg, Va., powder manu
factured in . . 43
970
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
Leyden, Maj 877
( See Leyden's Battalion )
Liaoyang, Battle of 274
Lichtenstein 230
Light batteries mistaken for
horse 550
Lishtfoot, Lieut.-Col. C. E.,
277, 720
(See Lightfoot's Battalion)
Linseed oil, used in manufac
ture of harness 48
Little Rock Arsenal 40
Local Reserves 835
Lombardy Campaign of 1859.. 190
Long, Brig.-Gen. Armistead
Lindsay 95, 712, 716,
719, 729, 731, 736, 747, 770,
775, 785, 787, 788, 789, 792,
793, 813, 819, 827, 852, 876,
877, 880, 881, 900, 920, 926, 945
Longstreet, Gen., detaches valu
able artillery force 443
difference between him and
Jackson 444
Alexander's defense of 445
at Gettysburg 630, et seq.
his orders to artillery 635
his Tennessee Campaign 711
his 1ST. C. Campaign 814
"Long Toms," or 30-pounder
Parrotts 370
Losses, no test of artillery ef
ficiency 267
of artillery at Petersburg. . . 909
Louisiana batteries in Mexican
War 93
Liitzen, Battle of 153
Lynchburg Depot 57
Machine Guns, first use of ... 32, 33
Machinery, imported for powder
mills 46
made at Richmond Tredegar
Works 46
loss and destruction of 58
saved at Harper's Ferry 69
Macon Armory 57
Macon Arsenal 57
Macon Ammunition Labora
tories, nature and capacity
of 45, 57
erected 46
Maddox, Lieut 319
Magruder, Gen. J. B., 114, 118, 337
Magruder, Lieut 336
Mahone, Gen. William, at the
Crater 871
Mallet, Col. Jno. W., Supt. of
Laboratories 45
his work and character .... 45, 46
PAGE
Malvern Hill, instance of cited 191
battle of 221
Manassas, First, Battle of 127
Manassas, Second, Battle of... 266
great artillery victory 267
Manuals for artillery 149
Marceau, Pelham likened to ... 440
March, remarkable, by artillery 261
Markham's, affair at 352
Marching, ability of batteries. . 165
"Marseillaise Hymn," gunners
sing \ 353
Martinsburg, 1863 600
Marye, Capt. E. A 311, 378
(See'Fredericksburg Battery)
Marye, Capt. L. S 919
( See Richmond "Hampden"
Battery)
Marye's Hill, remarkable artil
lery position 397
Maryland Invasion, First 277
Maryland, preparation for sec
ond invasion of 556
Masked Batteries, caution as to 138
Mason, Capt 866
Masses, use of artillery 141
used by Napoleon. ...... 152, 153
originated 159
effect of 160
employed by Porter 208, 212
why not employed at first. . . 237
employed at Second Manassas 275
Hunt's, at Sharpsburg 324
Massie, Capt. J. L 125, 334, 889
(See Massie's Fluvanna Bat
tery)
Material, of a battery 110, 111
captured at Manassas. .. .71, 136
defects of at Big Bethel 123
Confederate at Manassas. . . . 136
number of guns comprising
in 1861 115
at Sharpsburg 284
on Peninsula 201
in Oct., 1862 340
condition of in 1863,
556, 562, 583, 564
distribution of by battalions 570
of horse artillery in 1863 . . . 579
character of in 1863.... 706, 707
in June, 1864 831
siege issued at Petersburg. . . 895
number of guns in 1864 917
(See also Ordnance Material)
Maurin, Maj. Victor 720, 917
( See Maurin's Donaldsonville,
La., Battery)
GENERAL INDEX
971
PAGE
May, Maj., quoted 221
McCabe, ' Capt. W. Gordon,
quoted 250
referred to 344, 440
quoted 797, 708,
834, 863, 864, 865, 866, 899, 929
McCarthy, Capt. Edward S 826
(See 1st Co. Richmond How
itzers)
McClellan, reorganizes artillery 156
McCorkle, Lieut 392
McDowell, Battle of 170
McElroy, Lieut 931, 932
McGilvery Artillery Brigade, at
Gettysburg,
642, 647, 670, 678, 686
McGraw, Maj. Joseph,
440, 720, 797, 798, 800
(See Richmond "Purcell"
Battery )
McGregor, Capt. Wm. M 577
( See McGregor's Battery and
McGregor's Battalion)
Mclntosh, Col. David Gregg,
423, 440, 508, 549, 720, 822, 912
( See Mclntosh's Battery and
Mclntosh's Battalion)
McKim, Lieut. Randolph TL,
his gallantry 608
McLaughlin, Maj. William,
801, 802, 878
( See McLaughlin's Battery
and McLaughlin's Battal
ion)
McQueen, Lieut 899
Meade, Gen., his plan at Get
tysburg 613
Meade, Capt. William 198
Meade, Lieut. R. H 164
Mechanics, exemptions of those
employed 48
number of employed 57
Mechanicsville, Battle of 206
Medical supplies 709
Medicine, price of in 1864 908
Memphis Depot 41
Mercury, imported 47
Metals, how obtained 49
Metz, Artillery School 152, 154
Mexican War, Southern artil
lery in . 93
Mexico, purchases of material
and powder in 38, 43
mercury imported from 47
leather supply from cut off . . 48
lead purchased in 49
horses from 921
Middleburg, affair at 353, 610
PAGE
Middletown, Battle of, 1864... 890
Militia, of Virginia, provisions
for . 61
armament of 62, 67
artillery, early 89
organization of in 1792 91
Miller, Maj. M. B 720, 917
(See 3d Co. Washington Ar
tillery)
Mine Run Campaign 715
Mining Bureau, created.. 35, 44, 49
remarkable work of 49, 50
officers of 53
Mining at Petersburg, 845, 846, 860
Mobility, of artillery, instances,
165, 261, 548, 549, 832, 833,
894, 900
Monocacy, Battle of 877
Montgomery Depot 40
Montgomery, Capt. Chas. R. . . . 791
( See Louisa "Morris" Bat
tery)
Moody, Capt 925
(See Moody's "Madison,"
La., Battery)
Moore, David, gunner 125
Moorman, Maj. Marcellus N.,
308, 346, 720, 726, 729
( See Moorman's Battery and
Moorman's Battalion)
Morel, Corporal, heroism of ... 389
Mordecai, Capt. Alfred, Ord
nance Corps 26, 91
Morgan, S. D., of Nashville,
Tenn., powder contractor . . 43
Mortars, at Petersburg and
Crater 868, 873
Moseley, Lieut.-Col. E. F.,
120, 121, 838, 854, 896, 902
(See Moseley's Battery and
Moseley's Battalion )
Motes, Lieut.' 658, 684
Motienling, Battle of 482
Mount Vernon Arsenal 40
Mountain rifles 27
Mountain howitzers, at Port
Republic 174
Mt. Carmel Church, Artillery
Camp in '63 450
Mukden, Battle of 221
Mules, conduct of in battery at
Port Republic 175
supply of for trains 332
amusing incident concerning
in Stuart's Cavalry review 582
Munchengratz 238
Munford, Gen. T. T 105
Murat, Pelham likened to 440
972
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
Murray, Lieut. Thomas A., his
coolness 524
Musicians, pay of 108
Muskets for gunners, recom
mended 892
Nachod 238
Napoleon, remarks on artillery,
152, 153
his principles 159
cited 238, 310, 362, 365, 707
his rules of war 809
Napoleons, 12-pounder, demand
for 340
substituted for howitzers. ... 719
Nash, Maj. Herbert N 717
Nashville Arsenal 41
Nassau Agency 56
"Native American" Artillery of
Louisiana 93
Negro, misleads Dahlgren. . 730, 731
Negro Troops at the Crater ... 870
Nelson, Capt. G. W.,
335, 380, 387, 388, 412
(See Hanover Battery)
Nelson. Col. William '.417,
878, 880, 883, 885, 888, 889, 920
(See Hanover Battery and
Nelson's Battalion)
New Berne Campaign 814
New Cold Harbor, battle near 211
New Market, Battle of.... 801, 802
New Orleans Depot 41
New York, 71st Reg. Battery,
132, 136
Night Attack, by artillery 234
Nimmo, Lieut. John 657
Niter, secured in Alabama and
Tennessee 42, 44
purification of 43
supply of in 1864 44
Niter Bureau created 35. 44, 49
officers of 44, 53
Nitric acid, made 47
Non-commissioned staff, pro
posed in 1864 830
Norfolk Navy Yard, destruc
tion of . ." 69
North Anna, Battle of 799
Artillery Camp on the 410
Norton, Capt., inventor of ex
plosive lead shell 28
Oats, price of in 1864,
803, 908, 909, 942
Observers, Federal aerial 234
Officers, furnished Confederacy
by West Point 95
to artillery by West Point
and V. M. I.. . 101
PAGE
artillery, rank and pay of ... 108
proportion of based on guns,
145^ 423
efficiency of 337
proportion of from Virginia,
413, 418
Jackson on appointment of . . 423
authorized number 423
Lee's estimate of artillery. . . 424
inefficient culled out 430
individuality of artillery. . . . 440
number and distribution of
artillery in 1863 565
promotion of in 1863 565
slowness in promotion of .... 572
few transfers among 572
supply drawn from 573
authorized number of and
grades 719, 722
list of artillery field officers in
1863 " 719
assignments of 720, 724
increase of proposed in 1864,
830, 902
conditions concerning 903
Old Point Comfort Arsenal,
created 26
Orders, error in transmitting at
Fredericksburg. . .516, 517,522
Ordnance Department, U. S. A.,
created, 25
developed 26
Ordnance Material, character of
in 1861 27, 28
purchase of foreign 27
rifled employed by French in
Italy 30
employed by Prussians in
1864 30
multiple firing guns 31, 32
material (C. S. A.) on hand
1861 37
purchased in Europe in 1861 37
seized with Federal arsenals,
37, 41
first made at 41, 42
most important plant for
manufacture of 51
amount procured up to 1863 55
statement of amount made.. 56
obtained by capture 59
of Virginia in 1861 67
issued in Virginia in 1861. . . 70
in possession of Washington
artillery 71
captured at 1st Manassas... 71
list of that secured in Vir
ginia in 1861 78, 79
GENERAL INDEX
973
PAGE
character of in 1862 284
captured at Harper's Ferry. . 291
demand for in 1802 . . 340
types made in 1862 340, 341
heavy demanded by Gen. Lee 411
new "issued ." 426, 427
Ordnance Manuals, U. S. A. . . . 26
C. S. A 26
Ordnance Officers, proposals
concerning 38
regulations concerning 39
improved processes developed
by 46
discoveries of 47
authorized and rank of .... 52, 53
educational requisites and
promotion 52, 53
recommendations concerning
rank of 54
mentioned 109, 110
efforts of 288
Ordnance Operations, field, suc
cessful in 1863 564
Ordnance Regulations, U. S. A.,
26, 27
C. S. A. adopted. ..38, 52, 53, 54
Ordnance Rifles, 3-inch, demand
for 340
Ordnance Storekeepers, pay and
rank of 57
Ordnance Train, Reserve. . .243, 292
Organization, of Artillery
Corps 108
of field batteries 109
of Virginia troops 116
of artillery in Dec., '61 142
of artillery in 1864, 903, 905, 927
at surrender 950, 951, 952
Orleans Artillery, in Mexican
War 93
Osborn, Maj 550, 554, 623, 668
Ostendorff & Co., J. M., of Wal-
halla, S. C., powder con
tractors 43
Otey, Lieut. James C 866
Owen, Maj. W 917
(See 1st Co. Washington Ar
tillery and Owen's Bat
talion )
Page, Maj. John, 198, 427, 718, 907
Page, Maj. R. C. M...506, 718, 720
(See Louisa "Morris" Bat
tery and Page's Battalion)
Page, Maj. T. J., Jr.,
336, 380, 415, 422, 718
( See Page's Yorktown "Ma-
gruder" Battery)
Page, Dr. Isham Randolph.... 198
PAGE
Paris, affair at 348
Parker, Capt. W. W 925
(See Richmond Battery)
Parkinson, Lieut. Jordan C.... 911
Parole lists 952
Parrott, Capt. R. P., his rifled
gun 30, 63
Parrott Rifles, tested at V. M. I.,
63, 64, 80
captured at Manassas 71
number furnished during war 64
first used at Big Bethel 64
mentioned 119, 197
demand for 340
20-pounders 344
explosion of 30-pounders. . . . 388
Patchenko's Russian Battery.. 274
Paxton, Maj., Horse Agent. ... 711
Pay of Artillery Officers 108
Pearce, Lieutenant 805
Peas, black-eye, component of
ration 374
Pegram, Col. William Johnson,
249, 250, 278, 366, 416, 420,
440, 461, 489, 494, 506, 507,
508, 511, 540, 549, 554, 704,
720, 798, 834, 896, 898, 899,
901, 929, 930
(See Pegram's Richmond
"Purcell" Battery and
Pegram's Battalion)
Pegram, Capt. R. G 691
(See Pegram's Petersburg
Battery)
Peet, Lieut. W. T 459
Pelham, Col. John,
162, 178, 233, 298, 299, 326,
337, 346, 349, 350, 352, 354,
382, 383, 384, 385, 392, 403,
404, 433, 434, 435, 439, 577, 773
(See Pelham's Battery and
Pelham's Battalion)
Pemberton, Lieut.-Col. J. C.,
726, 895, 919
Pendleton, Gen. Wm. N., favors
rifled guns 64, 65
sent to Richmond to procure
ordnance 75
his splendid work 76, 77, 78
mentioned 95, 124,
125, 127, 134, 137, 140, 143,
146, 147, 155, 182, 192, 193,
194, 195, 198, 200, 225, 234,
239, 243, 255, 257, 277, 278,
318, 319, 333, 338, 341, 343,
346, 372, 373, 410, 413, 425,
430, 450, 451, 454, 515, 516-
24, 530, 551, 557, 563-74,
974
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
583, 610, 622, 623, 630, 631,
632, 639, 643, 653, 658, 664,
666, 668, 677, 701, 703, 704,
709, 718, 719, 722, 731, 734,
735, 742, 766, 770, 776, 826,
829, 847, 849, 850, 853, 854,
895, 902, 903, 906, 918, 920,
922, 925, 928, 934, 938, 939,
940, 942, 945, 949
Pendleton, Maj. A. S., his letter 429
Pendleton, Capt. Dudley D.,
198, 334, 902, 907
Peninsula Campaign 176
summary of 239
Penick, Capt. Nathan 521
(See Pittsylvania Battery)
Percussion Caps, manufactured 47
Percy, Capt. W. A 902
Personnel, character of artil
lery 165
of Confederate Artillery su
perior 572
Henderson's error as to
character of 572
Peterkin, Lieut. George W.,
198, 718, 732, 907
Petersburg, Grant's movement
upon 835
siege of 842
winter of 1864 at 895
Petersburg Smelting Works
created 40
erection of 49
Peyton, Capt. T. J 334
( See Richmond "Orange"
Battery )
Phelps, Lieut 448
Pickens' Heavy Artillery 135
Picket ropes 114
Pickett, his interference with
the artillery 821
his charge 683
Pierson, Maj. S. F 852
(See Pierson's Battalion)
Pigott, Dr., lead-smelting proc
ess of 49
Pinckney, Gen., his drill regu
lations 149
Plater, Lieut 384
Pleasants, Lieut. -Col., designs
mine at Petersburg,
846, 860, 863
Pleasants, Lieut 385
Pleasonton, Gen., his misstate-
ments 486, 487, 496, 593
Plevna, Battle of. . 221
PAGE
Poague, Col. William Thomas,
326, 344, 417, 421, 440, 508,
549, 720, 767, 768, 939
( See Poague's Battery and
Poague's Battalion)
Pollock, Lieut. John G 912
Poplar Spring Church, action of 896
Pork Packeries 51
Port fires, number made 56
Port Republic, Battle of 173
Position, artillery, at Second
Manassas 264
Potash, chloral 47
Potts, Capt 378, 777
(See N. C. Battery)
Powder, purchase of in Europe,
1861 37
amount ordered in 1861 37
Confederate mills 40
amount on hand in 1861 .... 41
amount required in 1861. ... 42
manufacture of, and mills,
42, 43, 45, 46
contracts for 43
Powder Mills, created 40
necessity for 42
location of private 42, 43
Preparation, lack of artillery,
208, 213
at White Oak Swamp 219
plan for at Malvern Hill 224
utter lack of at Malvern Hill,
225, 226, 230, 237
by artillery 324
lack of at Fredericksburg. . . 397
splendid artillery at Win
chester, 1863 602, 603
Preston, Col. John T. L 96, 97
Preston, Maj. Samuel 866, 867
Prices, for articles in 1864 908
Pringle, Lieut., of Garden's
Battery 322
Projectiles, defects of 128
for Whitworth guns 564
Promotion, in continental artil
lery 88
discussed 413, 418
slowness of in C. S. Artillery 572
proposed regulation of in
1864 830
for artillery officers urged. . . 902
granted March 1, 1865 925
Proportion of field officers to
guns 423
Provisional Army C. S. A.
created 107
Prussian Artillery 155
tactics 160, 161
GENERAL INDEX
975
PAGE
in 1866 171
lack of masses in 1866 238
ammunition expenditure of . . 274
experiences of 1866 and 1870 287
Prussian Horse Artillery .. 166, 168
Railroad battery 197, 216
Raine, Maj. Chas. J 720
(See Lynchburg "Lee" Bat
tery)
Rains, Gen. G. W., Bureau of
Ordnance 43
invents new powder process. . 47
Ramsey, Capt 309
(See' Rowan, N. C., Battery)
Ramsey's Horse Battery (Brit
ish) 166
Randolph, Geo. W.,
114, 118, 123, 141
Randolph, Capt 641
Randolph, Lieut. Thos. N 198
Ranging, difficulty of with poor
shell 510
Rapidity of fire, at Cold Har
bor 212
Rappahannock Bridge, Battle of 714
Rations in 1862 374
Read, Maj. J. P. W 415, 420
(See Read's Ga. Battery and
Read's Battalion)
Reconnaissance, lack of,
208, 213, 219, 224, 225, 226
at Sharpsburg by Col. Lee,
312. 316
mentioned 505
Reduction, of Artillery Corps.. 337
Reed, Dr., invents shell for
rifled guns 32, 66
manufacture of his shell .... 47
Rees, Lieut. Lucius G 811, 842
Regimental Groups, proposed in
1864 830
Regimental promotion 88
Regulations, for Federal Artil
lery 157
for artillery administration.. 199
for Artillery Corps 330
Reilly, Maj. James 564
(See Reilly's Rowan, N. C.,
Battery)
Religious, interest, in artillery 430
spirit, at Petersburg 906
Remedies, proposed to overcome
evils of the artillery 414
Remount depots 574, 710
Reorganization, of artillery,
278, 279
in 1862. . . 327
PAGE
in 1863 413
proposed in 1863 565
in Aug., 1863 906
in Dec., 1864 911
Reserve Artillery, winter quar
ters of 146
use of as tactical unit dis
cussed 160
movements of on Peninsula,
178, 192, 193, 237
divisional, created 200
composition of 242, 255
referred to 277, 278, 287, 292
use of as tactical unit 287
involved in investigation. . . . 341
composition of in 1862-3 345
camp of in 1862 354
strength of in 1862 361
mentioned 370, 371
lack of at Chancellorsville
keenly felt by Lee,
455, 467, 528, 550
corps, in 1863 568
at Gettysburg 616
captured in April, 1865.. 942, 944
Reserve Ordnance Train,
292, 293, 327
Respect, mutual, between artil
lery and infantry 406
Retreat, The 933
Reviews, of Stuart's Cavalry
and Horse Artillery in 1863 580
of army at Culpeper in 1863 717
of artillery of Western Army,
733, 734
of Longstreet's Corps 736
Revival Meetings, in Camp .... 430
Reynolds, Gen., nobility of.... 617
Rhett, Col. T. S 52, 277, 707
Rhode Island, Colonial battery 86
Rice's Station, action at... 936, 938
Richardson, Gen. W. H., of Va. 97
Richardson, Lieut. -Col. Charles,
327, 415, 419, 574, 636, 651,
664, 676, 699, 720
(See Richardson's Battalion)
Richmond, Armory and Arsenal,
40, 62
issues of during war 56
superintendents of 57
Richmond Artillery defenses. . . 841
Richmond Tredegar Works. . . . 341
Rifling, knowledge of in 1861 . . 28
Napoleon's experiments with 29
Lahitte System 30
experiments with rifling 31
of ordnance recommended ... 63
976
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
slight knowledge of in Amer
ica 64, 65, 66
sudden developments of 80
Ringold, Maj., his manual 154
Rives, Lieut 821
Roads, condition of on Penin
sula 177, 190, 191
Roberts, Lieut. -Col. Owen 87
Robertson, Maj 920
Robertson, Lieut 334
Rockets, number issued 56
Rodes, Gen. R. E 105
Rodman guns, reputation of... 31
Rogers, Maj. A. L 417
(See Loudoun Battery)
Rolling mills created 40
Rome, Ga., guns cast at 42
Romney, loss of guns at 164
Ross, Richard, Saltpetre con
tractor 44
Rosser, Gen. Thos. L 565
Rouse, Lieut. Milton 162, 338
Rubber, India, lack of 48
Ruggles, Gen 115
Russian ammunition expendi
ture 274
Sacrament, the final 956
Saddles, number issued 56
how made 114
Sailor's Creek, Battle of 936
Saint Privat, Battle of . . . .274, 287
Saint Sebastian 864
Salisbury Foundry 57
Saltpetre, contracts for 43
supplies of 44
yield of Tennessee beds 44
price of 44
location of beds 44
purchased abroad 55
San Antonio Arsenal 40
Saunders, Maj. J. S 280, 852
(See Saunders' Battalion)
Savage's Station, Battle of. ... 215
Savannah Depot 40
Saye, Private Richard W., his
gallantry 524
Scarlett's charge at Balaclava 587
Scharnhorst 238
School of Fire, Fortress Monroe 91
School, training for officers of
C. S. A 99
Schools, French Artillery 152
Schoolfield's Battery uses ma
chine gun 32
Scoffern, his treatise on warfare
and arms 29
Scott, Gen. Winfield. . . .89, 90, 149
Second Manassas, Battle of. ... 266
PAGE
Sedan, instance of cited... 191, 221
Prussian Artillery at 287
compared with Harper's
Ferry 291
compared with Fredericks-
burg 402
Sedden, Mr., Secretary of War 731
Selma Arsenal 57
Senarmont 153, 159, 230
Sensitive shell, used at Peters
burg 923
Seven Days' fighting 197, 235
Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, Bat
tle of 192
Sha-ho, Battle of 274
Sham battles 580, 583
Sharpsburg, Battle of 294
Shell, with copper band, in
vented 32, 47
polygonal cavity invented... 47
purchased abroad 55
number issued 56
fail to explode 509, 538
burst at muzzle 564
Shelters, for horses 356
for men 373
Sherman's Artillery 191
Shepherdstown, affair at 341
Shields, Capt. J. C 114
(See 1st Co. Richmond How
itzer Battalion)
Ships, owned and operated by
Bureau of Ordnance 56
Shoemaker, Capt. J. J 449, 729
(See Shoemaker's Lynchburg
Battery)
Shoes, men without reported
sick 425
lack of 355
Shoup, Brig.-Gen 734
Shrapnel, purchased abroad. ... 55
Shumaker, Maj. L. M 257, 258
(See Shumaker's Danville
Battery and Shumaker's
Battalion )
Sickness, in the artillery. ..... 425
Sloan, Capt. Benj., Ordnance
Corps 53
Smith, Lieut. J. D 545
Smith, Capt. B. H., Jr., his
gallantry 347
(See 3d Co. Richmond Howit
zer Battalion)
Smith, Gen. Francis H 98
Smith, Maj. F. W 935
Smith, Col. Persifer F 93
Soft Hoof, horse disease 332
Sor. Battle of.. . 238
GENERAL INDEX
977
PAGE
Sore Tongue, disease of horses 332
South Carolina, early artillery
of 87
South Mountain, Battle of 292
Southern Artillery, early 85, 92
in Mexican War 93
Spotsylvania, Battle of 775
Spurs, number pairs issued. ... 56
Squires, Capt 129
Staff, of Chief of Artillery. ... 198
proposed for artillery 830
of Artillery Corps in 1864,
902, 907
"Stag," blockade runner 56
Stanard's Farm, Artillery Camp
at in 1863 556
Stansbury, Maj. S., Ordnance
Corps 53
Steaming, improved process ... 46
invented by Gen. Rains 47
Stephenson's Depot, 1863 606
Stevens, Capt., his book of tac
tics 149
Stink-shells, proposed 826
Stiles, Maj. Robert, quoted, 782, 783
mentioned 936
Stockton, Capt. Isaac F., of La. 93
Strasburg, Artillery School 152
Strategy, of Lee at Fredericks-
burg 364
Straw, price of in 1864 909
Stribling, Maj 720
Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., his trib
ute to Pelham 233
his reviews and sham battles 580
amusing incident concerning 582
effect of his absence from
Gettysburg 611
Subterfuges, artillery, in use.. 516
Suffocating Projectile, proposed 826
Sulphur, secured in Louisiana 42
contracts for supply of 42
Superintendents of armories,
rank and pay of 57
Supplies, lack of at Petersburg 907
Surrender, proposed 939
the 948
"Swamp Angel," rifled gun used
at Sumter 66
Tactics, for use of horses of
battery Ill
of light artillery 141
early American 149
of Federal Artillery 156
originated by Chew 166, 168
for divisional reserves 200
erroneous 208, 213
improvement of execution of 275
PAGE
peculiar at Sharpsburg 324
at Fredericksburg ..372, 402, 404
at Chancellorsville, discussed,
542, 548
in 1864 832, 833, 900
Talcott, Col., Chief of Ordnance,
U. S. A 26
Talcott, Capt 91
Tashichiao, Battle of 274
Taylor, Capt. E. B 458, 544
(See Eubank's Bath Battery)
Taylor, Capt. J. S....281, 300, 322
Teamsters, character of 331
Tennessee Campaign of Long-
street 711
Tentage, allowance of 429
Terry, Lieut. Nathaniel 247
Texas, horses for artillery. .332, 921
Texas Arsenal 40
Thomas, Lieut., "A", 4th U. S.
F. A 305
Thomson, Maj. James Walton,
162, 338, 440, 890, 891, 936,
937, 938
( See Thomson's "Ashby" Bat
tery and Thomson's Bat
talion )
Thurmond, Lieut 334
Tin, how obtained 49
purchased abroad 55
Tobacco, price of in 1864-5. . . . 908
Tom's Brook, Battle of . . . .889, 890
Torpedoes, first manufactured 51
explosive for land use 178
altercation over 179
invented by Gen. Rains 180
Torres Vedras 429
Torstenson 153
Toulouse, Artillery School 152
Tousard, Col. Louis de, his
manual 149
Tracy, Gen. E. L., of Louisiana 93
Trains, Reserve Ordnance 243
regulations for wagon 429
Transfers, few among Artillery
Officers 572
Transportation, Field Artillery,
428, 708
Trautenau, Battle of 238
Tredegar Works, Richmond,
makes machine gun 32
referred to 36, 41, 46
sketch of ; its work 50
immense importance of 51
work of during war 56
military organization of em
ployees 58
troops of called out 731
978
GENERAL INDEX
PAGE
Trevillian Depot, Battle of 828
Trezevant, Maj. T. J., Supt.
Charleston Arsenal 57
Truehart, Maj. Daniel 164, 337
Tunis, Lieut 452, 453, 516, 534
Tyler, Lieut., sent to Metz 154
Tyler, Col. Robert 0 223
Ullmann, Dr., sulphur con
tractor 42
Upperville, Battle at 348
action at 610
Utterback, Capt 841
Utz, Lieut 385
Valley Campaign of 1864.. 827, 876
Valley Campaign, Artillery in
Jackson's 162
Vessels, operated by Bureau of
Ordnance 56
Vionville, Battle of 274
Virginia, Commission for the
Public Defense 63
appropriations of for defense,
62, 69
officers in Colonial Artillery,
87, 88
early artillery of 87, 88
volunteer artillery of . ... 112, 113
strength of batteries 145
proportion of Artillery Of
ficers 413, 418
Virginia Military Institute,
rifled gun sent to for test 64
ordnance material at 67
mentioned 80
as a school of arms 95
its influence 100, 155, 170
Jackson at the 246
mentioned 337, 351
graduates of at Chancellors-
ville 477
burial of Jackson at 560
mentioned 573
demolished by Hunter 876
Von Caemmerer, quoted 159
Von der Goltz, quoted 106
his battery at Koniggratz. . . 525
Von Hindersin, Inspector Gen
eral of Artillery 30
compared with Jackson 30
referred to 161
Von Kiesling's Battle Orders . . 229
Von Moltke, quoted 106, 365
"Wacht am Rhine," Prussian
gunners sing when out of
ammunition 525
Wagner, Col., quoted 230
Wagons, transport, manufac
ture of . . 48
PAGE
shortage of in 1862 327
regulations concerning 330
number of per battery 425
allowance of 428, 429
field 708, 709
Wagram, Battle of 153
Wahrendorff gun 29
Wainwright, Col., commands
Federal Artillery,
547, 622, 623, 668
Walke, Capt. Richard 717, 902
Walker, Brig.-Gen. Reuben
Lindsay 95, 113, 246,
248, 251, 252, 253, 278, 281,
289, 290, 291, 293, 311, 321,
326, 337, 378, 379, 380, 383,
384, 391, 416, 440, 511, 549,
551, 569, 571, 623, 630, 636,
643, 658, 664, 669, 673, 684,
686, 696, 704, 719, 750, 775,
900, 918, 925, 933, 934, 941,
942, 953
(See Walker's "Purcell" Bat
tery and Walker's Bat
talion )
Wallace, Lieut 619
Walton, Col. James Birge,
93, 94, 117, 127, 130, 135,
143, 146, 155, 258, 281, 326,
338, 377, 379, 410, 523, 556,
560, 677, 704, 719, 722, 755,
848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853
( See Walton's Battalion and
Washington Artillery of
La.)
Ward, Maj. Geo 720, 805
(See Mississippi Battery)
Washington Regiment, of Louisi
ana 93, 94
Waterloo Bridge (Va.),
259, 260, 261
Watson, Maj. David,
508, 720, 786; 787
( See 2d Co. Richmond Howit
zer Battalion)
Weed, Capt 550
West Point Foundry 63
guns furnished by during war 64
"West Point of the Confeder
acy" 96
West Pointers, number of in
Confederate Artillery .. .95, 101
influence of upon promotion,
713, 734, 851
Western Army, artillery of in
spected by Pendleton 583
Westover 234
Wheat, price of in 1864 909
GENERAL INDEX
979
PAGE
White, Lieut.-Col. J. L., Supt.
Selma Arsenal 57
White Oak Swamp, Battle of,
215, 216
Whiskey, price of in 1864 708
Whitworth Guns,
243, 344, 389, 452, 453, 454,
516, 534, 538, 540, 564
Wilderness, Battle of the 760
Wilkes, Lieut 845, 900
Wilkinson, Gen. James, his
drill regulations 149
Williams, Lieut 692
Williams, Capt. R. S., his in
vention antedates that of
Gatling 32
his gun used at Seven Pines 32
specifications of his gun 32
Willis, Lieut. Ed 164
Willisen, quoted 106
Winchester, First Battle of . . . 171
Battle of, 1863 600
Wingfield, Capt. John R 811
(See Georgia Battery)
Winter quarters for 1863 410
Winthrop, Capt. S 866, 902
PAGE
Wise, Gen. H. A., his defense of
Petersburg 731, 835
Withdrawal of guns, Prussian
practice 525
Wolffe, Maj. B. L 198, 718
Wooding, Capt 384
(See Danville Battery)
"Woodstock Races" 890
Woolfolk, Capt. Pichegru 925
(See Ashland Battery)
Woolfolk, Lieut. James, his gal
lantry 458
Woolwich, Artillery School 86
Worley, William, Saltpetre
contractor 44
Wright, Col. M. H., Supt. At
lanta Arsenal 57
Wright, Capt. S. T....277, 945, 955
(See Halifax Battery)
Wyatt, Capt. J. W 821
( See Albemarle "Everett"
Battery )
Yale, C. D., of Virginia, powder
contractor 43
Yellow Tavern, Battle of 796
BATTERY INDEX
The battery organizations of the Army of Northern Virginia always
bore two, and sometimes three names, a fact which leads to much con
fusion in the study of the Artillery records. The following index is
arranged under two heads: "A", according to the locality in which the
batteries were recruited; "B", according to the names of the battery
commanders. Text references will be found under heading "A" only.
Thus the references to Pegram's Richmond "Purcell" Battery will be
found under "A", opposite Richmond, while Chew's "Ashby" Battery, and
Brown's "Wise" Battery, which were not local organizations, will be found
under "A", opposite "Ashby" and "Wise", respectively. In order to trace
the complete record of a particular battery it is essential to know to what
battalion it belonged at various periods, as the Artillery was frequently
referred to in the records by battalions, especially during the latter years
of the War when the battalion was the tactical unit. The record of a
battalion embraces the record of the constituent batteries.
Federal batteries are indexed under index "B" only.
BATTERY INDEX "A"
PAGE
Alabama Battery ( Hardaway,
Hurt) 202, 203, 282, 285,
297, 350, 352, 358, 380, 410,
421, 510, 514, 538, 540, 569,
618, 619, 664, 691, 739, 896, 913
Alabama Battery ( Bondurant,
Reese, "Jeff Davis"),
142, 184, 189, 202, 203, 211,
212, 282, 285, 298, 336, 358,
421, 508, 568, 619, 620, 739, 926
Albemarle Battery ( Southall,
Wyatt, "Everett"),
241, 242, 334, 569, 665, 739,
821, 855
Albemarle Battery (Sturdivant,
W. H. Weisiger, C. F. John
ston) 707, 741, 835,
838, 914, 916
Alexandria Battery ( Kemper,
Smoot) 130, 131, 132,
134, 142, 184, 189, 201, 203,
215, 707
Alleghany Battery (Jos. Car
penter, J. C. Carpenter),
143, 164, 169, 170, 171, 172,
173, 174, 203, 230, 244, 245,
248, 258, 262, 266, 270, 282,
. 284, 285, 290, 327, 329, 358,
378, 408, 410, 421, 520, 568,
600, 601, 606, 607, 636, 651,
738, 889, 913
Amherst Battery (T. J. Kirk-
patrick) 143, 205, 242,
PAGE
283, 285, 293, 319, 335, 360,
380, 422, 454, 568, 738, 878,
879, 912
Amherst-Nelson Battery (W. G.
Latham, Lamkin ) ,
712, 738, 865, 898, 912, 917
Andrews' Battery, Co. "A",
Stark's Batt. Heavy Artillery 205
Ashland Battery (Woolfolk),
143, 202, 205, 242, 281, 284,
299, 300, 303, 322, 335, 336,
358, 371, 396, 397, 420, 452,
508, 534, 545, 567, 646, 737,
779, 911
"Ashby" Horse Battery (Chew,
Thomson, J. W. Carter),
143, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167,
170, 173, 205, 259, 283, 296,
346, 347, 422, 446, 576, 578,
580, 584, 588, 594, 595, 597,
610, 691, 701, 725, 740, 773,
796, 828, 829, 845, 889, 890,
891, 916, 927, 937
Baltimore, 2d Battery (See
Maryland Horse Battery)
Bath Battery (Eubank, Taylor) ,
256, 257, 271, 281, 285, 296,
303, 309, 310, 358, 371, 420,
452, 458, 509, 534, 544, 567,
645, 657, 737, 911
"Beauregard Rifles" Battery
( See Lynchburg Battery )
BATTERY INDEX
981
PAGE
Bedford Battery (Jordan, Hens-
ley, Claytor, J. D. Smith),
201, 256, 257, 271, 281, 285,
296, 300, 303, 308, 321, 338,
358, 371, 396, 397, 420, 450,
452, 458, 459, 466, 469, 510,
513, 535, 536, 537, 539, 545,
567, 646, 737, 911
Bedford Battery (Bowyer, J. R.
Johnson). Disbanded Oct.,
1862 and merged with Dear-
ing's and Stribling's batteries,
142, 204, 211, 244, 245, 247,
259, 270, 281, 284, 335
Botetourt Battery ( Douthat,
Anderson ) . Converted into
heavy artillery in 1865.. 802, 926
Cadet Battery (See Va. Mil.
Inst. Battery)
Campbell Battery (Clarke,
Wimbish, "Long Island").
Mustered out Oct., 1862,
202, 203, 205, 242, 282, 284, 334
Cape Fear Battery (See North
Carolina)
Caroline Battery ( Thornton ) ,
707, 740
Charleston Battery (See South
Carolina Battery)
Charlotte Battery ( Bruce,
"Staunton Hill Artillery")
Charlotte Battery (See North
Carolina Battery)
Charlottesville Battery ( Car-
rington) 173, 174, 203,
211, 242, 244, 281, 285, 358,
421, 508, 568, 602, 603, 621
Charlottesville Horse Battery
(Jackson) 691, 699, 706,
802, 803, 829, 877, 916, 927
"Chesapeake" Battery (See 4th
Maryland Battery)
Chesterfield Battery ( E p e s,
"Johnston" )
Chesterfield Battery (See South
Carolina)
"Cockade Artillery" ( See Peters
burg Battery)
"Confederate Guards" Battery
(See Mississippi Battery)
"Courtney" Battery (See^Rich-
mond Battery)
Danville Battery ( Stamps,
Dickenson, "Ringgold") . Con
verted into heavy artillery
in 1865... 282, 284, 285, 327,
329, 358, 378, 384, 421, 508,
802, 803, 854, 915, 926, 941
PAGE
Danville Battery ( Shumaker,
Wooding, B. Z* Price),
170, 173, 174, 203, 218, 258,
262, 270, 569, 618, 739, 769, 913
"Dixie Artillery" (See Monroe
Battery)
Donaldsonville Battery ( See
Louisiana Battery)
"Eighth Star" Battery (See
Page-Shenandoah Battery)
"Everett Artillery" (See Albe-
marle Battery)
Fairfax Battery (Young). Be
came Co. "G", 14th Va. Infty.
in Oct., 1862, but later served
as a light battery.
Fauquier Battery ( Stribling,
Marshall) 142, 184, 188,
202, 204, 258, 273, 280, 285,
336, 358, 370, 410, 420, 445,
567, 700, 737, 814, 815, 916
"Fayette Artillery" (See Rich
mond Battery)
Fluvanna, 1st Battery (Cocke,
Huckstep). Merged with 2d
Fluvanna to form Massie's
Fluvanna Battery, Oct. 4,
1862 143, 205, 242, 283,
294, 319, 320, 322, 336
Fluvanna, 2d Battery (Hoi-
man, Ancell ) . Merged with
1st Fluvanna Battery to form
Massie's Fluvanna Battery,
Oct. 4, 1862.. . .143, 205. 242,
283, 294, 319, 320, 322, 334, 336
Fluvanna Battery ( Massie,
Snead) . . . .285, 360, 380, 422,
454, 568, 715, 738, 813. 880, 912
Fredericksburg Battery ( Brax-
ton, E. A. Marye),
142, 164, 185, 188, 204, 211,
245, 258, 267, 281, 285, 289,
311, 312, 319, 358, 378, 420,
506, 508, 513, 538, 569, 730,
740, 897, 912, 914
Georgia Battery, "A", Sumter
Battalion (Cutts, Ross),
143, 205, 242, 282, 285, 298,
334, 360, 373, 380, 422, 454,
533, 569, 651, 740, 896, 914
Georgia Battery, "B", Sumter
Battalion (Price, Patterson),
205, 242, 282, 285, 298, 334,
360, 380, 422, 454, 516, 522,
524, 525, 569. 740, 915
Georgia Battery, "C", Sumter
Battalion (Crawford, Wing-
field) 241, 242, 282,
982
BATTERY INDEX
PAGE
285, 298, 360, 422, 569, 651,
740, 811, 914, 915
Georgia Battery, "D", Sumter
Battalion (Blackshear) .
Mustered out Oct., 1862,
205, 242, 282, 284, 298, 334
Georgia Battery, "E", Sumter
Battalion (Lane),
143, 201, 205, 242, 334, 363,
369, 380, 388, 410, 450, 454
Georgia Battery ( Carlton,
"Troup") 201, 203, 280,
284, 289, 321, 357, 369, 419,
450, 451, 454, 516, 517, 518,
522, 523, 525, 533, 563, 567,
657, 684, 701, 722, 738, 911
Georgia Battery, Regular (Mil-
ledge) 125, 205, 234,
242, 283, 285, 293, 319, 320,
322, 360, 366, 422, 454, 568,
668, 738, 764, 850, 912
Georgia Battery, Regular
(Hamilton) 143, 205
Georgia Battery (Read, Eraser,
"Pulaski") .. ..184, 189, 201,
203, 280, 284, 289, 304, 321,
357, 369, 410, 419, 450, 451,
454, 516, 522, 523, 525, 533,
539, 563, 567, 657, 722, 738,
820, 911
Georgia Battery (Blodget) 142
Georgia Battery (Ells, Staten,
Macon) 360, 370, 380,
708, 740, 837, 915
"German Artillery" (See South
Carolina Battery)
Giles Battery (McComas, D. A.
French) 202, 205, 280,
708, 740, 858, 912, 950
Gloucester Battery ( Montague,
Yeatman ) . Heavy artillery
company but served as light
battery. Became Co. "A",
34th Va. Infty., in 1864.
Goochland Battery ( Roemer,
Turner, Leake ) . Mustered
out Oct., 1862, and merged
with King William Battery,
202, 204, 242, 258, 280, 282,
284, 333, 334, 336
Goochland Battery (Guy, Tal-
ley) 707
Halifax Battery (Wright),
708, 740, 838, 839, 867, 916
"H a m p d e n Artillery" ( See
Richmond Battery)
Hampton Battery (Allen) 855
PAGE
Hanover Battery (W. Nelson,
G. W. Nelson). Mustered
out Oct., 1862, and merged
with Amherst and Ashland
batteries 202, 203, 335, 360
"Harbor Guards" (See Norfolk
Battery)
Henrico Battery (Sands, Rit-
ter) . Mustered out Oct., 1862,
184, 189, 202, 242, 334, 855
Irwin Battery (See Georgia
Battery. Wingfield)
James City Battery (Hankins,
Richardson),
202, 203, 242, 707, 853
"Jeff Davis Artillery" (See
Alabama Battery)
"Johnston Artillery" ( See Ches
terfield Battery)
King and Queen Battery
(Groves, "Newtown") . . . 128, 134
King William Battery (T. H.
Carter, W. P. Carter),
111, 142, 184, 189, 202, 203,
282, 285, 298, 309, 310, 312,
322, 323, 336, 358, 421, 425,
489, 507, 508, 513, 537, 539,
568, 619, 620, 739, 775, 881,
882, 926
"Lee Artillery" (See Lynchburg
Battery)
"Letcher" Battery (See Rich
mond Battery)
Lewisburg (W. Va.) Battery
(Bryan) 802, 913
"Long Island" Battery (See
Campbell Battery)
Loudoun Battery ( Rogers ) .
Mustered out Oct., 1862, and
merged with the Fauquier
Battery 130, 131, 135,
142, 187, 188, 202, 203, 258,
280, 284, 336
Louisa Battery (Coleman, R.
C. M. Page, Montgomery,
"Morris") 143, 184, 189,
205, 242, 282, 285, 358, 421,
506, 511, 513, 568, 619, 620,
739, 790, 791, 926
Louisiana Battery, 1st Co.
Washington Artillery Bat
talion (Squires, Owen),
143, 204, 258, 273, 280, 285,
297, 303, 308, 310, 319, 358,
371, 420, 425, 567, 915
Louisiana Battery, 2d Co.
Washington Artillery Bat-
BATTERY INDEX
983
PAGE
talion (Rosser, J. B. Richard
son) 143, 204, 257, 273,
281, 285, 296, 309, 310, 319,
358, 371, 420, 454, 519, 522,
525, 567, 915
Louisiana Battery, 3d Co.
Washington Artillery Bat
talion (M. B. Miller, Hero),
143, 204, 258, 273, 280, 285,
307, 310, 319, 358, 371, 396,
420, 519, 522, 525, 567, 677,
684, 915
Louisiana Battery, 4th Co.
Washington Artillery Bat
talion (Eshleman, Norcom),
143, 257, 280, 204, 285, 309,
310, 319, 358, 371, 420, 525,
567, 684, 915
Louisiana Battery ( Girardey,
D'Aquin, Thompson, Green,
"Louisiana Guard" ) ,
241, 245, 248, 258, 259, 270,
281, 285, 358, 385, 414, 421,
443, 508, 568, 637, 696, 714,
715, 737, 741, 858, 912, 950
Louisiana Battery ( Maurin,
Landry, "Donaldsonville" ) ,
204, 258, 273, 280, 284, 312,
319, 320, 322, 357, 370, 371,
377, 379, 386, 387, 388, 397,
419, 447, 914
Louisiana Battery (Moody,
"Madison") 185, 188, 202,
281, 285, 300, 303, 308, 321,
327, 358, 371, 386, 387, 396,
397, 400, 420, 452, 458, 508,
534, 545, 567, 645, 737, 794, 911
Lynchburg Battery (G. S. Da
vidson, Chamberlayne),
802, 854, 866, 867, 926
Lynchburg Horse Battery
(Shoemaker, Moorman,
"Beauregard Rifles"),
204, 230, 258, 280, 284, 285,
322, 335, 336, 346, 370, 422,
446, 448, 449, 460, 467, 471,
480, 481, 577, 578, 584, 587,
591, 596, 610, 691, 701, 726,
729, 740, 773, 796, 823, 828,
845, 880, 889, 895, 916, 927
Lynchburg Battery ( Deshler,
Raine, Hardwicke, "Lee" ) ,
170, 173, 174, 258, 282, 285,
299, 300, 328, 378, 384, 421,
568, 605, 636, 665, 738, 889, 913
Lynchburg Battery (H. G.
Latham, Dearing, Blount,
PAGE
Dickerson) 114, 130, 142,
184, 188, 189, 202, 204, 420,
445, 567, 737, 803, 814, 815,
915, 916, 926, 941
"Macbeth Artillery" ( See South
Carolina Battery)
Macon Battery ( See Georgia
Battery)
"Madison" Battery (See Louisi
ana Battery)
"Madison" Battery (See Missis
sippi Battery)
"Magruder Artillery" (See
Yorktown Battery)
Manchester Battery (Weisiger) 244
Maryland Battery ( Brocken-
brough, W. H. Griffin, 2d
Baltimore L. A. ) . Converted
into horse artillery in 1863,
142, 170, 173, 174, 203, 211,
244, 258, 262, 266, 270, 282,
285, 327, 446, 578, 600, 602,
612, 691, 701, 737, 796, 829,
841, 916, 926, 927
Maryland, 1st Battery (R. S.
Andrews, Dement ) ,
185, 188, 204, 205, 211, 245,
248, 259, 262, 266, 281, 285,
289, 293, 298, 414, 421, 568,
600, 605, 606, 607, 608, 636,
651, 737, 822, 829, 841, 913,
918, 926
Maryland, 4th Battery (W. D.
Brown, W. F. Chew, "Chesa
peake" ) . Converted into
heavy artillery in 1865,
204, 211, 244, 245, 248, 259,
281, 284, 285, 290, 293, 298,
309, 310, 358, 384, 410, 421,
515, 519, 568, 636, 651, 737,
822, 829, 841, 913
Masters' Battery (Masters).
Heavy siege battery employed
as field artillery iii Peninsula
Campaign 204
Mathews Battery (Armistead),
185, 708, 740, 858, 912
"McComas Artillery" ( See Giles
Battery)
Mercer (W. Va.) Battery (N.
B. French)
Mississippi Battery (Richards,
Ward, T. J. Kirkpatrick,
"Madison"),
569, 651, 739, 765, 821, 914
Mississippi Battery (Bradford,
"Confederate Guards" ) ,
708, 740, 838, 915
984
BATTERY INDEX
PAGE
Middlesex Battery ( Fleet,
Hardy). Mustered out Oct.,
1862, and distributed among
Ashland, 2d Fluvanna, and
Johnson's Richmond batteries,
241, 246, 248, 258, 281, 284, 336
Monroe Battery (Booton, Chap
man, "Dixie"),
202, 204, 257, 273, 283, 284,
319, 335, 802, 913
"Morris Artillery" (See Louisa
Battery)
Nelson Battery (Rives),
205, 284, 707, 740
Nelson-Amherst Battery ( See
Amherst-Nelson Battery)
"Newtown" Battery (See King
and Queen Battery)
Norfolk Battery (J. J. Young,
"Harbor Guards"),
183, 202, 242, 334
Norfolk Battery ( Vickery,
G r a n d y, "Light Artillery
Blues") 92, 112, 113, 202,
257, 284, 369, 419, 447, 452,
459, 569, 740, 914
Norfolk Battery (Huger, J. D.
Moore) 113, 202, 204,
258, 280, 284, 335, 357, 370,
371, 419, 447, 521, 526, 527,
569, 578, 700, 740, 914
North Carolina Battery, "C",
13th N. C. Batt. (Gumming),
740, 837, 915
North Carolina Battery, "F",
13th N. C. Batt. (Branch,
H. G. Latham, Potts, Flan-
ner) 202, 205, 245,
258, 267, 280, 281, 285, 358,
414, 420, 425, 445, 567, 643,
684, 738, 899, 911
North Carolina Battery, "A",
1st N. C. Reg. (Manly),
184, 189, 202, 203, 280, 284,
335, 357, 369, 419, 450, 451,
452, 466, 528, 534, 535, 563,
567, 657, 722, 738, 911
North Carolina Battery, "B",
1st N. C. Reg. (Gregg) . .901, 914
North Carolina Battery, "C",
1st N. C. Reg. (Brem, J.
Graham, Williams, Char
lotte),
202, 205, 241, 569, 739, 914
North Carolina Battery, "D",
1st N. C. Reg. (Reilly, Ram
sey, Rowan ) ,
142, 185, 203, 237, 269, 272,
PAGE
280, 285, 296, 300, 309, 310,
335, 355, 358, 370, 410, 420,
445, 567, 643, 658, 683, 737,
789, 912
North Carolina Battery, "E",
1st N. C. Reg. (Moore, J. 0.
Miller, Wilmington, "Cape
Fear") 708, 740, 837, 915
North Carolina Battery
(Lloyd). Mustered out Oct.,
1862, and merged with Man-
ly's and Reilly's N. C. bat
teries,
202, 282, 284, 298, 321, 335
North Carolina Battery (Webb) 707
"Orange" Battery (See Rich
mond Battery)
"Otey" Battery ( See Richmond
Battery )
Page-Shenandoah Battery ( Rice,
8th Star). Merged with
Wooding's Danville Battery,
Sept. 26, 1862,
170, 173, 244, 258, 270, 283,
284, 327, 329
"Palmetto Artillery" (See
South Carolina Battery)
"Pee Dee Artillery" (See South
Carolina Battery)
"Peninsula" Battery ( Cosna-
han, W. B. Jones). Merged
with Williamsburg Battery
in April, 1862,
184, 189, 201, 282, 322, 855
Petersburg Battery ( Rambout,
Stoope, "Cockade Artillery")
Petersburg Battery (J. R.
Branch, R. G. Pegram ) . Con
verted into horse artillery in
1864 202, 205, 280,
285, 296, 303, 358, 369, 370,
377, 708, 740, 838, 860, 864,
875, 901, 915
Petersburg Battery (Nichols,
E. Graham). Converted into
horse battery in 1864,
202, 205, 378, 569, 897, 901,
916, 927
Pittsylvania Battery (Lewis,
Penick) 284, 357, 362,
369, 377, 379, 410, 419, 447,
452, 461, 520, 526, 527, 537,
550, 569, 740, 841, 857, 895,
914, 917
Portsmouth Battery ( Grimes,
Thompson, "Light Artillery") .
Mustered out Oct., 1862, and
merged with Moorman's
BATTERY INDEX
985
PAGE
Lynchburg and Huger's Nor
folk batteries,
92, 112, 202, 204, 230, 256,
257, 280, 284, 335, 377
Powhatan Battery (Dance),
143, 241, 242, 282, 285, 360,
385, 392, 421, 510, 568, 637,
665, 714, 715, 738, 912
"Pulaski" Battery (See Georgia
Battery )
"Purcell" Battery (See Rich
mond Battery)
Richmond Battery, 1st Co.
Howitzers (J. C. Shields,
Palmer, McCarthy, R. M.
Anderson) 114, 130, 142,
184, 189, 203, 280, 284, 304,
357, 370, 419, 450, 451, 452,
466, 528, 537, 538, 563, 567,
657, 692, 713, 722, 738, 782,
783, 784, 792, 826, 911
Richmond Battery, 2d Co.
Howitzers (J. T. Brown,
Hudnall, Watson, L. F.
Jones) 118, 202, 205,
242, 282, 285, 293, 360, 385,
421, 508, 568, 637, 665, 738,
785, 787, 855, 913
Richmond Battery, 3d Co.
Howitzers (R. Stanard, Mose-
ley, B. H. Smith, Jr.),
114, 134, 141, 187, 188, 202,
204, 242, 282, 285, 347, 360,
385, 421, 508, 568, 637, 665,
738, 785, 786, 855, 912, 926, 928
Richmond "Purcell" Battery
(R. L. Walker, W. J.
Pegram, McGraw, Cayce ) ,
113, 131, 132, 133, 134, 142,
204, 211, 230, 236, 245, 248,
249, 250, 258, 266, 281, 285,
289, 290, 291, 311, 312, 335,
358, 378, 395, 420, 425, 466,
507, 511, 569, 739, 834, 843,
844, 896, 898, 914
Richmond "Hampden" Battery
(Caskie, L. S. Marye, Sulli
van) 170, 173, 203,
244, 245, 248, 258, 282, 285,
327, 336, 358, 378, 420, 445,
567, 569, 730, 737, 814, 815,
916, 950
Richmond "Letcher" Battery
(G. Davidson, Brander),
204, 230, 236, 258, 281, 285,
289, 293, 378, 420, 466, 507,
511, 569, 739, 780, 871, 891,
896, 898, 914
PAGE
Richmond "Thomas" Battery
(P. Stanard, E. J. Ander
son). Merged with "Hamp
den" Battery in 1862,
128, 142, 202, 203, 204, 230,
257, 258, 267, 281, 283, 284,
333, 336
Richmond "Otey" Battery
(Otey, D. N. Walker),
802, 854, 915, 941
Richmond "Orange" Battery
(Peyton, Fry),
202, 203, 205, 242, 282, 285,
334, 358, 421, 508, 513, 537,
568, 619, 620, 739, 889, 913, 926
Richmond "Fayette" Battery
(Cabell, Macon, Fleming),
114, 184, 188, 202, 205, 242,
280, 285, 357, 370, 420, 445,
567, 700, 737, 814, 815, 855, 916
Richmond "Courtney" Battery
( Courtney, Latimer, Tanner ) ,
142, 170, 173, 174, 203, 211,
244, 245, 247, 259, 262, 270,
281, 285, 289, 293, 298, 358,
421, 508, 509, 568, 637, 691, 926
Richmond Battery (Parker, J.
T. Brown, Jr.),
241, 256, 257, 271, 281, 285,
296, 299, 300, 303, 308, 321,
358, 371, 378, 387, 396, 420,
452, 454, 458, 508, 516, 522,
525, 536, 537, 545, 567, 645,
737, 911
Richmond Battery (Crenshaw,
Ellett) 204, 211, 258,
267, 281, 285, 289, 290, 311,
312, 358, 420, 466, 569, 739,
871, 901, 914
Richmond Battery (M. John
son, Clutter, Chilton),
283, 285, 294, 319, 320, 322,
336, 358, 377, 421, 569, 618,
622, 739, 805, 840, 845, 912, 945
Richmond Battery (Martin).
Converted into heavy artil
lery in 1865,
707, 740, 838, 844, 916, 926
Richmond Battery (Dabney).. 707
"Ringgold Artillery" ( See Dan
ville Battery)
Roanoke Battery (Lurty). Con
verted into horse artillery in
1864 802, 877, 916, 927
Rockbridge, 1st Battery (Pen-
dleton, McLaughlin, ^Poague,
A. Graham),
116, 124, 126, 127, 141, 143,
986
BATTERY INDEX
PAGE
164, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
174, 175, 202, 203, 205, 230,
244, 245, 246, 248, 258, 263,
266, 270, 279, 282, 285, 297,
298, 300, 301, 310, 323, 327,
360, 366, 385, 391, 401, 408,
410, 421, 453, 515, 516, 519,
530, 531, 568, 636, 665, 714,
715, 738, 856, 912
Rockbridge, 2d Battery (Miller,
Lusk, Donald),
170, 173, 174, 244, 285, 358,
421, 508, 569, 618, 739, 913
Rowan Battery (See North
Carolina Battery)
Salem Battery (Hupp, C. B.
Griffin, "Flying Artillery"),
241, 242, 282, 285, 360, 395,
421, 510, 536, 568, 637, 664,
738, 912
Shenandoah-Page Battery ( See
Page-Shenandoah Battery)
South Carolina Battery (Bach-
man, "Charleston German
Artillery") . . . .204, 257, 269,
272, 280, 285, 296, 297, 300,
303, 308, 309, 310, 322, 355,
358, 370, 420, 445, 567, 642,
643, 683
South Carolina Battery (Boyce,
"Macbeth"),
258, 280, 284, 307, 308, 310
South Carolina Battery ( Coit ) ,
241, 708
South Carolina Battery ( Rives ) 142
South Carolina Battery (Rhett,
Brooks, Ficklin),
203, 205, 236, 242, 256, 257,
271, 281, 285, 296, 299, 300,
303, 308, 321, 358, 371, 378,
380, 387, 410, 420, 454, 458,
516, 567, 645, 737, 911
South Carolina Battery (Gar
den, "Palmetto"),
257, 269, 280, 355, 358, 370,
420, 445, 567, 643, 684, 738,
899, 911
South Carolina Horse Battery
( Hart, "Washington" ) ,
203, 215, 283, 346, 422, 446,
449, 577, 578, 584, 585, 586,
589, 590, 591, 596, 610, 683,
691, 699, 700, 703, 726, 740,
773, 796, 797, 827, 828, 829,
897, 901, 916, 927
PAGE
South Carolina Battery (Mcln-
tosh, Brunson, Zimmer
man, "Pee Dee"),
204, 211, 258, 281, 285, 289,
311, 358, 378, 395, 420, 466,
506, 569, 740
South Carolina Battery (Kelly,
"Chesterfield") 740, 838, 916
Stafford Battery (Cooke, T. B.
French, Cooper),
142, 202, 205, 280, 285, 296,
303, 358, 360, 370, 377, 410,
738, 913
Staunton Battery (Balthis,
Garber) 128, 132, 175,
185, 188, 203, 230, 244, 259,
262, 266, 281, 285, 288, 289,
293, 298, 358, 385, 421, 568,
913, 926
Staunton Battery ( Imboden,
McClannahan ) . Light, 1861,
Mountain, 1862, Horse, 1863-
5 128, 132, 142,
175, 185, 188, 578, 691, 699,
700, 706, 803, 829, 877, 916, 927
"Staunton Hill Artillery" (See
Charlotte Battery)
"Stonewall Artillery" (See Al-
leghany and 1st Rockbridge
batteries)
Stuart Horse Artillery, 1st Bat
tery (Pelham, Breathed, Mc
Gregor, P. P. Johnston),
178, 185, 186, 187, 189, 205,
211, 233, 256, 259, 262, 283,
296, 346, 348, 422, 424, 448,
460, 467, 471, 477, 478, 480,
483, 577, 578, 586, 610, 691,
701, 725, 740, 773, 794, 796,
825, 827, 843, 880, 884, 889,
895, 916, 927
Stuart Horse Artillery, 2d Bat
tery (Henry, McGregor),
346, 348, 352, 353, 422, 448,
460, 471, 483, 577, 578, 584,
590, 591, 596, 610, 691, 701,
726, 740, 773, 796, 827, 828,
843, 857, 897, 901, 916, 927
Sumter Battery (See Georgia
Battery)
Surry Battery (Ruffin),
241, 707, 746
Tennessee Battery (Rhett, Bur
roughs) 802
Tennessee Battery (McClung) . . 802
"Thomas" Battery (See Rich
mond Battery)
BATTERY INDEX
987
PAGE
"Troup Artillery" (See Georgia
Battery )
Va. Mil. Inst. Battery (Minge),
114, 124, 320, 801
Warrenton Battery (Utterback,
Brooke) 285,
360, 421, 508, 569, 651, 739, 914
"Washington" Battery ( See
South Carolina Battery)
"Washington Artillery" ( See
Louisiana batteries)
"West Augusta" Battery
(Waters) 164, 169
Williamsburg Battery (Garrett,
Coke). Mustered out Oct.,
1862 183, 188,
202, 205, 242, 282, 284, 334, 855
Wilmington Battery ( See North
Carolina)
PAGE
Winchester Battery ( Cutshaw ) .
Mustered out and merged
with Carpenter's Alleghany
Battery Sept. 26, 1862,
164, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
258, 283, 284, 327, 329, 380
"Wise Artillery" (Alburtis, J.
S. Brown). Mustered out
and merged with Lynchburg
"Lee" Battery Oct., 1862,
128, 141, 142, 201, 203, 280,
284, 285, 335, 377, 577
"W i s e Legion" Battery
(Lowry) 802, 913
Yorktown Battery (E. R.
Young) . . .707, 740, 837, 853, 915
Yorktown Battery (T J. Page,
"Magruder Artillery" ) . Mus
tered out and distributed
among Lee's Battalion Oct.,
1862. .202, 203, 283, 284, 336, 787
BATTERY INDEX "B"
CONFEDERATE
Aiken's Battery ( Henrico "Varina" )
Alburtis' Battery ("Wise Artil
lery" )
Allen's Battery (Hampton)
Ancell's Battery (2d Fluvanna)
Anderson's Battery ( 1st Richmond
Howitzers)
Anderson's Battery (Botetourt)
Anderson's Battery ( Richmond
"Thomas")
Andrews' Battery (1st Maryland)
Andrews' Battery (Co. "A", Stark's
Battalion Heavy Artillery, 1861.
This battery was detached from
the defenses at Drewry's Bluff and
served with the Light Artillery in
the Peninsula Campaign)
Armistead's Battery (Mathews)
Bachman's Battery (Charleston,
"German," S. C.)
Balthis' Battery (Staunton)
Beckham's Battery (Groves' King
and Queen. Improvised)
Blackshear's Battery ("D" Sumter,
Ga. Disbanded Oct., 1862)
Blodget's Battery (Georgia)
Blount's Battery (Lynchburu)
Bondurant's Battery ("Jeff Davis,"
Ala, )
Booton's Battery (Dixie or Monroe)
Bowyer's Battery (Bedford)
Boyce's Battery '( "Macbeth," S. C.)
Bradford's Battery ( Confederate
Guards, Miss.)
Branch's Battery (Petersburg)
Branch's Battery (H. C. Latham's,
N. C.)
Brander's Battery (Richmond
Letcher )
Braxton's Battery (Fredericksburg)
Breathed's Battery ( 1st Stuart
Horse Artillery)
Brem's Battery (North Carolina)
Brockenbrough's Battery ( Balti
more Light Artillery or 2d Balti
more)
Brooks' Battery (Rhett's, S. C.)
Brooke's Battery ( Warrenton )
Brown's Battery (Wise Artillery)
Brown's Battery (Parker's Rich
mond)
Brown's Battery (4th Md. or "Ches
apeake" )
Brown's Battery (2d Richmond
Howitzers )
Bruce's Battery (Charlotte or
"Staunton Hill")
Bryan's Battery (Lewisburg, W.
Va.)
Burroughs' Battery (Tennessee)
Cabell's Battery (Richmond "Fay-
ette" )
Carlton's Battery ("Troup," Ga.)
Carter's Battery (King William)
988
BATTERY INDEX
Carter's Battery ("Ashby" Horse
Artillery)
Carpenter's Battery (Alleghany)
Carrington's Battery ( Charlottes-
ville)
Caskie's Battery (Richmond,
"Hampden" )
Cayce's Battery (Richmond "Pur-
cell")
Chamberlayne's Battery (Lynch-
burg)
Chapman's Battery ("Dixie" or
Monroe)
Chew's Battery ("Ashby" Horse
Artillery)
Chew's Battery (4th Md. or "Chesa
peake" )
Chilton's Battery (Richmond)
Clarke's Battery ("Long Island,"
Campbell)
Claytor's Battery (Bedford)
Clutter's Battery ( Richmond )
Cocke's Battery (1st Fluvanna)
Coit's Battery (South Carolina)
Coke's Battery ( Williamsburg)
Coleman's Battery (Louisa, "Mor
ris")
Cooke's Battery (Stafford)
Cooper's Battery (Stafford)
Cosnahan's Battery (Peninsula)
Courtney's Battery (Richmond)
Crawford's Battery ("C", Sumter,
Ga.)
Crenshaw's Battery (Richmond)
Cumming's Battery ("C", 13th N.
C. Battalion)
Cutshaw's Battery (Winchester.
Merged with Carpenter's Alle
ghany Battery in 1862)
Cutts' Battery (Sumter, Ga.)
Dabney's Battery (Richmond)
Dance's Battery (Powhatan)
D'Aquin's Battery ( "Louisiana
Guard" )
Davidson's Battery (Richmond
"Letcher")
Davidson's Battery (Lynchburg)
Dearing's Battery (Lynchburg)
Dement's Battery (1st Maryland)
Deshler's Battery ( Lynchburg
"Lee" )
Dickenson's Battery (Danville
"Ringgold")
Dickerson's Battery (Lynchburg)
Donald's Battery (2d Rockbridge)
Douthat's Battery (Botetourt)
Drewry's Battery ("South Side")
Ellett's Battery (Richmond "Cren-
shaw" )
Ellett's Battery ("Pamunkey")
Ells' Battery (Macon, Ga.)
Epes' Battery (Chesterfield)
Eshleman's Battery (4th Co. Wash
ington Artillery, La.)
Eubank's Battery (Bath)
Ficklin's Battery (Brooks', S. C.)
Planner's Battery ("F", 13th N. C.
Battalion)
Fleet's Battery (Middlesex)
Fleming's Battery (Richmond "Fay-
ette")
Eraser's Battery (Pulaski, Ga.)
French's Battery (Stafford)
French's Battery (Mercer, W. Va.)
French's Battery (Giles)
Fry's Battery ( Richmond "Orange" )
Garber's Battery (Staunton)
Garden's Battery (Palmetto, S. C.)
Garrett's Battery (Williamsburg)
Girardey's Battery ( "Louisiana
Guard" )
Graham's Battery (North Carolina)
Graham's Battery (1st Rockbridge)
Graham's Battery (Petersburg)
Grandy's Battery (Norfolk L. A.
Blues)
Green's Battery ("Louisiana
Guard")
Griffin's Battery (Salem "Flying")
Griffin's Battery (2d Baltimore
Light Artillery)
Gregg's Battery ("B", 1st N. C.
Reg.)
Grimes' Battery (Portsmouth Light
Artillery)
Groves' Battery ("Newtown," King
and Queen)
Guy's Battery (Goochland)
Hamilton's Battery (Georgia Regu
lar)
Hankins' Battery (James City)
Hardaway's Battery (Alabama)
Hardwicke's Battery ( Lynchburg
"Lee")
Hart's Battery ("Washington," S.
C.)
Henry's Battery (2d Stuart Horse
Artillery)
Hensley's Battery (Bedford)
Hero's "Battery (3d Co. Washington
Artillery, La.)
Holman's Battery (2d Fluvanna)
Huckstep's Battery (1st Fluvanna)
HudnalPs Battery (2d Richmond
Howitzers)
Huger's Battery (Norfolk. Formed
from Norfolk L. A. Blues 1861 )
Hupp's Battery (Salem)
BATTERY INDEX
989
Hurt's Battery (Alabama)
Imboden's Battery (Staunton)
Jackson's Battery (Charlottesville)
Jolmson's Battery (Bedford)
Johnson's Battery (Richmond)
Johnston's Battery (1st Stuart
Horse Artillery)
Johnston's Battery (Albemarle)
Jones' Battery ("Peninsula")
Jones' Battery ("Pamunkey")
Jones' Battery (2d Richmond How
itzers)
Jordan's Battery (Bedford)
Kelly's Battery (South Carolina)
Kemper's Battery (Alexandria)
Kirkpatrick's Battery (Amherst)
Lamkin's Battery (Amherst-Nelson)
Landry's Battery (Donaldsonville,
La.)
Lane's Battery ("E", Sumter, Ga.)
Latham's Battery (Nelson-Amherst)
Latham's Battery (Lynchburg)
Latham's Battery (Branch's, N. C.)
Latimer's Battery (Richmond)
Leake's Battery (Goochland)
Lewis' Battery ( Pittsylvania )
Lloyd's Battery (N. C.)
Lowry's Battery ("Wise Legion")
Lusk's Battery (2d Rockbridge)
Lurty's Battery (Roanoke)
Macon's Battery (Richmond "Fay-
ette" )
Manly's Battery ("A", 1st N. C.
Reg.)
Marshall's Battery (Fauquier)
Martin's Battery (Richmond)
Marye's Battery (Fredericksburg)
Marye's Battery (Richmond "Hamp-
den" )
Massie's Battery ( Fluvanna Con
solidated)
Masters' Battery (Erroneously re
ferred to in Rebellion Records as
a Virginian Light Battery. It
was composed of 4 siege guns and
was commanded by Captain L.
Masters, Assistant Inspector, Gen
eral A. P. Hill's Staff, Captain
Artillery, Provisional Army, C. S.
A.)
Maurin's Battery (Donaldsonville,
La.)
McCarthy's Battery ( 1st Richmond
Howitzers )
McClannahan's Battery (Staunton)
McClung's Battery (Tennessee)
McComas' Battery (Giles)
McGregor's Battery (2d Stuart
Horse Artillery)
Mclntosh's Battery ("Pee Dee," S.
C.)
McLaughlin's Battery (1st Rock-
bridge)
Milledge's Battery (Georgia Regu
lar)
Miller's Battery (2d Rockbridge)
Miller's Battery (3d Co. Washing
ton Artillery)
Miller's Battery ("E", 1st N. C.
Reg.)
Minge's Battery (V. M. I. Cadet)
Montague's Battery (Gloucester.
Transformed into Co. "A", 34th
Va, Infantry, in 1864)
Montgomery's Battery (Louisa
"Morris")
Moody's Battery ("Madison," La.)
Moore's Battery ("E", 1st N. C.
Reg.)
Moore's Battery. (Norfolk)
Moorman's Battery (Lynchburg)
Moseley's Battery (3d Richmond
Howitzers )
Nelson's Battery (Hanover)
Nichols' Battery (Petersburg)
Norcom's Battery (4th Co. Wash
ington Artillery)
Otey's Battery (Richmond)
Owen's Battery ( 1st Co. Washing
ton Artillery, La.)
Page's Battery (Yorktown "Ma-
gruder")
Page's Battery (Louisa "Morris")
Palmer's Battery (1st Richmond
Howitzers)
Parker's Battery (Richmond)
Patterson's Battery ("B", Sumter,
Ga., Batt.)
Pegram's Battery (Richmond "Pur-
cell")
Pegram's Battery (Petersburg)
Pelham's Battery ( 1st Stuart Horse
Artillery)
Pendleton's Battery (1st Rock-
bridge)
Penick's Battery (Pittsylvania)
Peyton's Battery (Richmond "Or
ange" )
Poague's Battery (1st Rockbridge)
Potts' Battery (North Carolina)
Price's Battery (Danville)
Price's Battery ("B", Sumter, Ga.)
Raine's Battery (Lynchburg "Lee")
Rambout's Battery ( Petersburg
"Cockade")
Ramsey's Battery (Rowan or "D",
1st N. C. Reg.)
Read's Battery (Pulaski, Ga.)
990
BATTERY INDEX
Reese's Battery ("Jeff Davis," Ala.)
Reilly's Battery (Rowan, N. C.)
Rhett's Battery (South Carolina)
Rhett's Battery (Tennessee)
Rice's Battery "( "8th Star" or Shen-
andoah-Page. Merged with Wood-
ing's Danville Battery in 1862)
Richards' Battery ( "Madison,"
Miss.)
Richardson's Battery (2d Co. Wash
ington Artillery, La.)
Richardson's Battery (James City)
Ritter's Battery (Henrico)
Rives' Battery ( South Carolina )
Rives' Battery (Nelson)
Robertson's Battery ( "Appomattox
Invincibles" )
Roemer's Battery (Goochland)
Rogers' Battery (Loudoun. Dis
banded Oct., 1862)
Ross's Battery ("A", Sumter, Ga.)
Rosser's Battery (2d Co. Washing
ton Artillery, La. )
Ruffin's Battery (Surry)
Sands' Battery (Henrico)
Shields' Battery (1st Richmond
Howitzers )
Shoemaker's Battery (Lynchburg)
Shumaker's Battery (Danville)
Smith's Battery (Bedford)
Smith's Battery (3d Richmond
Howitzers )
Smoot's Battery ( Alexandria )
Snead's Battery (Fluvanna)
Southall's Battery ( Albemarle
"Everett")
Squires' Battery (1st Co. Washing
ton Artillery, La.)
Stamps' Battery (Danville "Ring-
gold")
Stanard's Battery ( Richmond
"Thomas")
Stanard's Battery (3d Richmond
Howitzers)
Staten's Battery (Macon, Ga.)
Stoope's Battery (Petersburg "Cock
ade")
Stribling's Battery (Fauquier)
Sturdivant's Battery (Albemarle)
Sullivan's Battery (Richmond
"Hampden")
Talley's Battery (Goochland)
Tanner's Battery (Richmond)
Taylor's Battery (Bath)
Thompson's Battery ( "Louisiana
Guard" )
Thompson's Battery ( Portsmouth.
Mustered out Oct., 1862)
Thomson's Battery ("Ashby" Horse
Artillery)
Thornton's Battery (Caroline)
Turner's Battery (Goochland)
Utterback's Battery (Warrenton)
Vickery's Battery (Norfolk L. A.
Blues)
Walker's Battery (Richmond "Pur-
cell")
Walker's Battery (Richmond
"Otey")
Ward's Battery ("Madison," Miss.)
Waters' Battery (West Augusta)
Watson's Battery (2d Richmond
Howitzers )
Webb's Battery (North Carolina)
Weisiger's Battery (Manchester)
Weisiger's Battery (Albemarle)
Williams' Battery ("C", 1st N. C.
Reg., Charlotte)
Wimbish's Battery ("Long Island,"
Campbell. Disbanded Oct., 1862)
Winfield's Battery ("C", Sumter
Batt., Irwin, Ga.)
Wood ing's Battery (Danville)
Woolf oik's Battery (Ashland)
Wright's Battery (Halifax)
Wyatt's Battery (Albemarle, "Ever
ett")
Yeatman's Battery (Gloucester)
Young's Battery (Norfolk "Harbor
Guards")
Young's Battery ( Yorktown )
Young's Battery (Fairfax. Became
Co. "G", 14th Va. Infty., in Oct.,
1862, but later transformed into
a light battery)
Zimmerman's Battery ("Pee Dee,"
S. C.)
FEDERAL
PAGE
PAGE
Arnold's Battery,
132, 136, 388, 670, 683
Ayres' Battery 136
Brady's Battery 194
Brown's Battery 647, 670, 685
Calef's Battery 617, 618
Bigelow's Battery 642, 647 Campbell's Battery 299
~D«-,-:^-»V,:^>'^ T>n-t-4-^ one 01 r» r^nvKol.^'^ ~Dr> 4-4- m-*T ~\1fi
Benjamin's Battery 298, 310
Best's Battery 171
Carlisle's Battery 136
Cothran's Battery 171, 305
BATTERY INDEX
991
Clark's Battery .. 169, 310,
Cook's Battery ...........
Cooper's Battery .........
Cowan's Battery ..........
Cushing's Battery ........
Daniel's Battery ..........
Dickenson's Battery ......
Dieckmann's Battery .....
Dilger's Battery ...... 475,
Dimick's Battery .........
Dow's Maine Battery .....
Durrell's Battery .........
Edwards' Battery ........
Fitzhugh's Battery .......
Frank's Battery ..........
Gibson's Battery .........
Graham's Battery ........
Greene's Battery .........
Griffin's Battery .. 132, 133,
Hall's 2d Maine Battery . . .
Hampton's Battery .......
Hart's Battery ...........
Hazlett's Bakery .........
Hazzard's Battery,
215, 391,
Heckman's Battery .......
Hill's Battery ............
Hunt's Battery ...........
Kirby's Battery ..........
Knapp's Battery
Martin's Battery
Muhlenberg's Battery
McMullen's Battery
PAGE
468, 641
310
. . . . 618
305, 686
. . . . 670
. . . . 670
. . . . 387
. . . . 479
479, 619
. . . . 505
. . . . 647
. . . . 310
136
685
. . . . 305
. . . . 319
. . . . 308
136
136, 223
617, 618
. . .. 171
. . . . 642
. 650
171,
395, 686
621
393, 480
. . . . 136
. . . . 194
249, 305
. . . . 596
. . . . 310
. 310
PAGE
Osborn's Battery 215
Parson's Battery 685
Pendleton's Battery 348
Pennington's Battery 589
Pettit's Battery 215, 363
Phillips' Battery 642
Randall's Battery 395
Randolph's Battery 216
Reynolds' Battery 618
Rhode Island Battery 132, 136
Rickett's Battery, 132, 133, 136, 655
Robertson's Battery,
210, 308, 309, 319, 585
Roity's Battery 670
Seeley's Battery 641
Simmon's Battery 310
Smith's Battery. .641, 645, 646, 657
Stevens' Battery 655
Stewart's Battery 622
Taft's Battery 310, 669
Thompson's Battery 393, 642
Tidball's Battery,
136, 210, 309, 319, 350
Von Kleiser's Battery 310
Weeden's Battery 223
Weed's Battery 310, 459
Weidrick's Battery 479, 480
Weir's Battery 685
Wheeler's Battery. .. .479, 480, 619
Wilkerson's Battery 620, 621
Winslow's Battery 641
Woodruff's Battery 670
BATTALION INDEX
The battalion organizations of the Army of Northern Virginia always
bore two, and sometimes three names, a fact which leads to much confusion
in the study of the Artillery records. The records of the battalions, which
were referred to as such in the latter part of the War, embrace the records
of the constituent batteries. It is, therefore, essential for the student to
know to what battalion a particular battery belonged in order to trace
the complete record of the latter. The battalion organizations are fre
quently included in the text in order to simplify a study of the various
batteries.
Alexander's Battalion (Lee's
old battalion),
358, 361, 371, 374, 377. 388,
396, 416, 420, 442. 450, 452,
467, 507, 509, 528, 535, 549,
563, 567, 575, 599, 635, 636,
644, 647, 656, 657, 664, 689,
693, 696, 701, 704, 712
Andrews' Battalion,
244, 245, 248, 345, 358, 379,
393, 399, 408, 421, 442, 451,
453, 454, 458, 515, 516, 519,
520, 530, 534, 535, 541, 545,
562, 563, 568, 600, 601, 606,
608, 610, 624, 625, 630, 636,
651, 665, 666, 696, 704
Beckham's Battalion (Pelham's
old battalion. See Horse Ar
tillery Battalion)
Boggs' Battalion .. 707, 837, 909, 916
Branch's Battalion 708, 915
Braxton's Battalion (Andrews'
old battalion),
724, 730, 738, 769, 779, 785,
792, 800, 804, 806, 813, 827,
876, 885, 886, 888, 889, 891,
909, 913, 917, 920, 922, 926, 944
Breathed's Battalion (Horse
Artillery) 916, 917, 927
Brockenbrough's Battalion, 345, 358
Brown's Division (Nelson's and
Hardaway's battalions),
725, 726, 730, 738
Brown's Battalion (See First
Virginia Regiment)
Brunson's Battalion ( See
Pegram's Battalion)
Cabell's Battalion (See also
Hamilton's Battalion),
189, 199, 304, 305, 321, 328,
357, 369, 370, 371, 377, 379,
380, 391, 396, 408, 409, 419,
442, 450, 451, 452, 518, 545,
PAGE
563, 567, 609, 635, 636, 643,
646, 657, 658, 664, 701, 704,
712, 714, 722, 738, 763, 777,
779, 781, 782, 792, 799, 813,
816, 818, 820, 821, 823. 825,
836, 860, 865, 909, 911, 917
Carter's Division ( Cutshaw's
and Page's battalions ) ,
725, 726, 730, 739
Carter's Battalion,
421, 442, 489, 490, 493, 494,
506, 507, 509, 510, 512, 513,
545, 562, 563, 568, 599, 600,
610, 619, 620, 630, 636, 651,
664, 696, 697, 701, 703, 709
Chew's Battalion (Pelham's old
battalion. See Horse Artil
lery)
Coit's Battalion,
740, 837, 860, 867, 875, 909
Courtney's Battalion,
244, 245, 258, 259, 281, 328,
329, 358
Cutshaw's Battalion (Original
battalion) 725, 730, 739,
769, 779, 786, 787, 788, 790,
792, 813, 819, 820, 821, 823,
831, 856, 889, 909, 913, 917,
920, 922, 926, 944
Cutshaw's Battalion ( Page's
and Cutshaw's consolidated )
Cutts' Battalion (See Sumter
Battalion)
Dance's Battalion (See First
Virginia Regiment)
Dearing's Battalion (See also
Jones' Battalion and Read's
Battalion) 358, 411, 420,
442, 445, 455, 567, 575, 577,
609, 635, 636, 646, 647, 658,
664, 701, 704, 712, 722, 723,
814, 847, 855
BATTALION INDEX
993
PAGE
Bearing's Battalion ( Pelham's
old battalion. See Horse Ar
tillery) 725
De Lagnel's Battalion 204
Deshler's Battalion. . .205, 831, 909
Eslileman's Battalion (See
Washington Artillery)
Eslileman's Battalion ( Impro
vised) ,
722, 726, 740, 848, 902, 909
First Virginia Regiment
( Brown's, Dance's, Harda-
way's) 205, 234, 236,
242, 280, 282, 287, 292, 293,
325, 333, 339, 345, 346, 360,
374, 379, 385, 395, 408, 421,
442, 466, 469, 507, 540, 545,
562, 563, 568, 600, 602, 610,
624, 630, 636, 696, 697, 704,
854, 909
Frobel's Battalion,
257, 269, 272, 280, 297, 300,
309, 322, 328, 333, 370, 377
Garnett's Battalion (See Rich
ardson's Battalion),
419, 442, 450, 452, 467, 545,
569, 575, 609, 618, 622, 623,
630, 636, 651, 664, 677, 699,
701, 703, 704
Gibbes' Battalion (King's old
battalion) 827, 831, 836,
840, 854, 865, 902, 909, 915, 917
Hamilton's Battalion (See also
Cabell's Battalion), 280, 289, 380
Hart's Battalion (Horse Artil
lery) 927
Hardaway's Battalion (Brown's
old battalion),
725, 736, 738, 769, 779, 785,
786, 787, 813, 818, 820, 821,
823, 831, 856, 897, 909, 912,
917, 919
HaskelPs Battalion ( Henry's
old battalion),
712, 714, 722, 725, 738, 763,
777, 779, 781, 799, 804, 805,
816, 818, 819, 821, 823, 825,
836, 840, 859, 861, 868, 875,
897, 900, 909, 911, 917
Henry's Battalion (See also
Haskell's Battalion),
411, 420, 442, 445, 453, 557,
567, 609, 635, 636, 642, 643,
645, 658, 664, 696, 701, 703,
704, 712
PAGE
Horse Artillery Battalion (Pel-
ham, B e c k h a m, Dearing,
Chew) 298, 299, 300,
301, 302, 303, 305, 310, 312,
317, 323, 346, 347, 349, 350,
352, 354, 366, 373, 379, 380,
408, 422, 434, 442, 460, 461,
468, 480, 494, 550, 576, 578,
583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 590,
591, 592, 594, 595, 706, 717,
747, 763, 773, 794, 828, 829,
904, 909, 916, 917, 932
Huger's Battalion (Alexander's
old battalion),
724, 736, 737, 763, 777, 787,
794, 799, 804, 805, 813, 816,
818, 821, 823, 836, 840, 859,
860, 909, 911, 917
Johnson's Battalion ( Impro
vised) 897,
898, 900, 909, 912, 917, 925, 944
Johnston's Battalion (Horse
Artillery) 927
Jones' Division (Read's and
Owen's battalions) 737
Jones' Battalion (See also Cut-
shaw's Battalion ) ,
203, 205, 236, 242, 279, 282,
297, 306, 307, 328, 334, 339,
345, 358, 391, 421, 442, 467,
494, 507, 512, 545, 562, 563,
568, 600, 602, 603, 604, 605,
610, 621, 630, 637, 651, 665,
666, 697, 704, 715, 891, 909
King's Battalion (13th Va.
Batt.) 736, 801, 802,
806, 826, 827, 831, 854, 887, 909
King's Battalion ( McLaughlin's
old battalion),
887, 909, 913, 917, 920
King's Battalion ( Improvised.
Dismounted) . . .913, 917, 920, 926
Lane's Battalion ( See Sumter
Battalion)
Latimer's Battalion (See An
drews' Battalion)
Lee's Battalion (See also Alex
ander's Battalion),
204, 257, 269, 270, 271, 272,
275, 276, 281, 287, 292, 297,
300, 303, 306, 307, 328, 335,
336, 339
Leyden's Battalion (9th Georgia
Battalion ) 920, 925
994
BATTALION INDEX
PAGE
Lightfoot's Battalion (Rich
mond Defense Battalion),
825, 707, 740, 825, 831, 858,
909, 920
McGregor's Battalion (Horse
Artillery) 927
Mclntosh's Battalion,
421, 442, 467, 494, 507, 510,
512, 540, 545, 562, 563, 569,
609, 616, 618, 620, 621, 630,
651, 701, 704, 739, 769, 778,
779, 780, 781, 792, 804, 805,
806, 813, 822, 826, 834, 844,
845, 860, 896, 897, 899, 909,
910, 913, 917, 926
McLaughlin's Battalion ( See
also King's Battalion),
801, 802, 877, 879, 886, 888,
891, 909, 926, 927
Moore's Battalion (3d North
Carolina Battalion) 335, 361
Moseley's Battalion,
707, 740, 805, 837, 838, 859, 915
Nelson's Battalion,
199, 205, 234 237, 242, 283,
292, 293, 318, 325, 335, 339,
345, 346, 360, 380, 397, 422,
442, 450, 454, 516, 528, 546,
568, 610, 624, 630, 637, 651,
666, 696, 701, 704, 715, 716,
717, 738, 764, 765, 769, 779,
785, 792, 813, 827, 876, 879,
880, 885, 886, 888, 891, 909,
912, 917, 920, 926
Owen's Battalion (King's old
battalion, 13th Va. Batt.),
722, 737, 814, 825, 831, 854,
902, 909, 922, 926
Owen's Battalion (See Wash
ington Artillery)
Page's Battalion (Carter's old
battalion) 779, 785, 787,
788, 790, 791, 799, 813, 831, 909
Page's Battalion (Page's and
Cutshaw's consolidated)
Pegram's Battalion ( Walker's
old battalion),
564, 609, 616, 618, 619, 620,
622, 630, 651, 701, 704, 739,
769, 779, 780, 781, 791, 797,
800, 804, 805, 806, 822, 834,
841, 871, 875, 896, 905, 906,
909, 910, 914, 917, 929
Pelham's Battalion (See Horse
Artillery Battalion)
PAGE
Pendleton's Battalion (Reserve
Battalion) 143, 185, 189, 205
Pierson's Battalion 203,
279, 282, 297, 303, 307, 322, 327
Poague's Battalion,
569, 609, 618, 622, 630, 636,
651, 665, 701, 704, 739, 767,
768, 769, 791, 804, 805, 818,
821, 822, 857, 858, 909, 910,
914, 917, 931, 932, 939, 944
Read's Battalion (Dearing's old
battalion ) ,
737, 814, 816, 821, 831, 834,
837, 838, 848, 855, 856, 909
Richardson's Battalion ( Origi
nal) 199, 205, 237, 242
Richardson's Battalion ( Gar-
nett's old battalion ) ,
740, 769, 779, 780, 781, 800,
806, 840, 860, 909, 914, 917
Richmond Howitzer Battalion
(See also Richmond Bat
teries ) ,
114, 115, 118, 130, 141, 142,
184, 188, 189, 202, 204, 242, 280
Saunders' Battalion. . .280, 289, 380
Shumaker's Battalion,
257, 258, 266, 282, 327
Stark's Battalion,
708, 740, 858, 897, 912, 917, 944
Stribling's Battalion 909, 916
Sturdivant's Battalion 926
Sumter Battalion (llth Georgia
Artillery Battalion, Cutts',
Lane's. See also Georgia
Batteries) 143, 184, 199,
201, 205, 234, 237, 241, 242,
282, 283, 292, 297, 303, 306,
307, 328, 334, 335, 339, 345,
346, 360, 380, 422, 442, 450,
454, 528, 546, 569, 609, 618,
622, 630, 651, 701, 703, 704,
717, 740, 763, 781, 791, 800,
804, 806, 842, 845, 909, 910,
914, 917
Thomson's Battalion (Horse
Artillery) 927
Walker's Battalion (See also
Pegram's Battalion),
204, 245, 254, 258, 281, 311,
323, 328, 335, 345, 358, 379,
399, 408, 420, 442, 461, 466,
467, 489, 494, 506, 507, 510,
513, 540, 545, 562, 563
BATTALION INDEX
995
PAGE
Walton's Division (Eshleman's
and Dealing's battalions) . . . 722
Walton's Battalion ( See Wash
ington Artillery)
Washington Artillery Battalion
of Louisiana (Walton's, Esh
leman's, Owen's. See also
Louisiana Batteries),
38, 71, 94, 116, 128, 130, 135,
141, 143, 185, 189, 199, 204,
205, 258, 273, 281, 285, 287,
296, 297, 300, 303, 306, 307,
PAGE
309, 310, 319, 321, 322, 328,
333, 336, 339, 355, 356, 357,
358, 361, 370, 374, 377, 386,
387, 388, 390, 396, 397, 409,
410, 414, 415, 420, 442, 450,
451, 454, 515, 516, 518, 522,
524, 525, 532, 545, 563, 567,
609, 635, 636, 664, 670, 677,
684, 685, 691, 699, 700, 704,
712, 722, 726, 737, 814, 825,
831, 840, 847, 848, 853, 902,
905, 909, 915, 931
ERRATA
Graham's N. C. Battery, p. 205, should be Graham's Petersburg
Battery.
Andrews' Henry Battery, p. 205, should be Andrews' heavy
battery, improvised light.
Fairfax Battery, Capt. E. R. Young, p. 242, should be Yorktown
Battery, Capt. E. R. Young.
Ellis' Battery, pp. 360, 370, 380, should be Ells' Macon, Ga.,
Battery.
Major James White Latimer, facing p. 768, should be Major
Joseph White Latimer.
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