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THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

VOLUME  II 


THE 

LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

OR 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  ARTILLERY  OF  THE 
ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA 

With  a  Brief  Account  of  the  Confederate  Bureau 
of  Ordnance 

BY 

JENNINGS  CROPPER  WISE 


ILLUSTRATED 


TWO    VOLUMES 
VOLUME     El 


1915 

J.  P.  BELL  COMPANY,  Inc. 
LYNCHBURG,  VIRGINIA 


COPYRIGHT,   1915 
J.  P.  BELL  CO.,  INC. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


VOLUME   II 


CHAPTER 


PAGE 


XXVI.     CHANCELLORSVILLE — SUNDAY,    MAY    3o 505 

XXVII.     CHANCELLORSVILLE,,    CONTINUED  --  FREDERICKS- 
BURG  AND  SALEM  CHURCH — MAY  3o 515 

XXVIII.     CHANCELLORSVILLE — MAY  4 . 530 

XXIX.     PREPARATION   FOR   THE   SECOND   MARYLAND    IN 
VASION — DEATH    OF     J  A  c  K  s  o  N — BRANDY 

STATION 556 

XXX.     FROM  FREDERICKSBURG  TO  GETTYSBURG 598 

XXXI.     GETTYSBURG — JULY    1 616 

XXXII.     GETTYSBURG — JULY  2 635 

XXXIII.     GETTYSBURG — JULY   3 660 

XXXIV.     GETTYSBURG — THE    RETREAT 695 

XXXV.     REORGANIZATION  AFTER  GETTYSBUR  G — THE 

WINTER   OF    1863-61 706 

XXXVI.     THE    ARTILLERY    COMMANDERS    OF    THE    ARMY 

COMPARED   742 

XXXVII.     THE  WILDERNESS 760 

XXXVIII.     SPOTSYLVANIA 775 

XXXIX.     THE   NORTH   ANNA 799 

XL.     COLD  HARBOR 812 

XLI.     COLD  HARBOR  TO  PETERSBURG 834- 

XLII.     PETERSBURG — THE   SIEGE   COMMENCES 842 

XLIII.     THE  TRENCHES  IN  JULY 847 

XLIV.     THE    CRATER 859 

XLV.     THE  SECOND  CORPS  IN  THE  VALLEY 876 

XLVI.     PETERSBURG — THE  WINTER  OF   1864 895 

XLVII.     THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  END — 1865 919 

XLVIII.     "LE    DEBACLE" 928 

GENERAL  INDEX 959 

BATTERY  INDEX 980 

BATTALION    INDEX__  _   992 


*  A 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

VOLUME    II 

FACING 
PAGE 

SHEPPARD'S  "VIRGINIA  1861" Frontispiece 

MAJOR  JOHN  PELHAM,  CHIEF  HORSE  ARTILLERY 512 

COLONEL  ROBERT  FRANKLIN  BECKHAM,  CHIEF  HORSE  ARTIL 
LERY    544 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  ROBERT  PRESTON  CHEW,  CHIEF  HORSE 

ARTILLERY    576 

MAJOR  JAMES  BREATHED 608 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL   ROBERT  ARCHELAUS   HARDAWAY 640 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WlLLIAM  THOMAS  PoAGUE 672 

MAJOR  JAMES  WALTON  THOMSON 704 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  DAVID  GREGG  MclNTOSH 736 

MAJOR  JOSEPH   WHITE    LATIMER 768 

COLONEL  WILFRED   EMMET   CUTSHAW 800 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  JOHN  CHEVES  HASKELL 864 

MAJOR  DAVID  WATSON__  _   928 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

CHANCELLORSVILLE SUNDAY,  MAY  3D 

WHEN  Stuart  arrived  and  took  command,  he  was 
entirely  ignorant  of  the  situation  except  as  to  its 
general  features.  Rodes'  plan  to  wait  for  the  morning 
was  approved  by  him  and  all  activity  was  postponed 
until  dawn.  Stuart  then  set  about  making  a  personal 
and  general  reconnaissance  and  directed  Col.  Alexander, 
in  his  capacity  as  Chief  of  Artillery,  to  examine  the 
ground  for  artillery  positions. 

A  careful  reconnaissance  extending  throughout  the 
night  convinced  Alexander  that  a  frontal  attack  through 
the  dense  woods  against  the  enemy's  works  and  artillery 
position  would  prove  most  costly  to  the  Confederates, 
even  if  successful.  The  Federal  infantry  in  the  far 
edge  of  the  forest  not  only  lay  behind  exceptionally 
strong  breastworks,  with  the  approaches  well  protected 
by  abattis,  but  a  powerful  artillery  was  massed  behind 
individual  epaulments  on  the  crest  of  the  hill  behind  and 
within  easy  canister  range  of  the  woods,  through  which 
an  attack  would  have  to  be  made.  He  soon  found  that 
there  were  but  two  possible  outlets  by  means  of  which 
the  Confederate  artillery  could  be  brought  to  the  front. 
The  first  was  the  direct  route  of  the  Plank  Road  de 
bouching  from  the  forest  beyond  the  schoolhouse  and 
the  junction  of  that  road  with  the  Bullock  Road  at  a 
point  not  over  400  yards  from  the  position  of  the  hostile 
guns,  part  of  which  enfiladed  the  roadway  for  a  long 
distance  towards  the  woods.  In  advance  of  their  main 
artillery  position,  the  enemy  had  placed  three  pieces  of 
Dimick's  Battery  behind  an  earthwork  across  the  road 
and  abreast  of  the  infantry  line.  Even  a  casual  ex 
amination  of  this  route  was  sufficient  to  convince  Alex 
ander  of  its  impracticability  for  the  advance  of  artillery, 
which  could  only  move  up  the  narrow  road  in  column  of 
pieces  and  would,  therefore,  be  destroyed  piecemeal  be- 


506  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

fore  it  could  be  thrown  into  action.  The  utmost  dash 
and  gallantry  of  the  gunners  would  simply  be  sacrificed 
in  such  circumstances. 

The  second  outlet  was  a  vista,  some  200  yards  long,  a 
lane  cleared  on  both  sides  to  a  width  of  25  yards,  which 
ran  parallel  to  the  Plank  Road  about  400  yards  to  the 
south.  This  vista  terminated  at  its  eastern  end  in  the 
narrow  dirt  road  leading  from  Hazel  Grove  to  the 
Plank  Road  and  it  was  in  this  clearing  that  Col.  Winn's 
men  had  abandoned  the  two  guns  and  three  caissons, 
which  they  had  captured  from  the  train  of  the  3d  Corps 
about  6  P.  M.,  subsequently  recovered  by  Sickles.  It  was 
reached  from  the  Plank  Road  not  only  by  the  dirt  road 
running  to  Hazel  Grove  1,000  yards  to  the  south,  over 
which  route  Pleasonton  had  dispatched  the  regiment  of 
cavalry  to  Howard's  assistance,  but  by  a  second  road 
half  a  mile  to  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  infantry 
line.  Pegram  had  from  the  first  appreciated  the  value 
of  the  opening,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  had  posted  Cham- 
berlayne  with  a  section  in  it  the  evening  of  the  2d  in 
support  of  McGowan's  right,  from  which  position 
Chamberlayne  had  been  able  to  deliver  a  more  or  less 
random  fire  through  the  woods  when  Sickles'  left  col 
lided  with  McGowan's  right,  about  midnight. 

At  dawn,  Alexander  posted  17  guns  as  follows: 
Capt.  E.  A.  Marye,  of  Walker's  Battalion,  with  two 
Napoleons  and  two  rifles  in  the  clearing  about  the  school- 
house,  at  which  point  Pender's  line  crossed  the  Plank 
Road,  and  a  short  distance  in  rear,  and  also  on  the  road, 
Capt.  Brunson  with  his  battery  of  four  rifles,  of  the  same 
battalion.  It  was  necessary  for  the  latter  to  fire  over 
Marye's  head,  for  in  no  other  way  could  the  guns  be 
placed.  Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page,  of  Carter's  Battalion, 
was  placed  with  three  Napoleons  in  the  thin  woods  some 
300  yards  south  of  the  Plank  Road  and  on  the  dirt  road 
leading  to  Hazel  Grove,  to  fire  upon  the  enemy's  infan 
try  lines  until  ordered  elsewhere.  Lieut.  Chamberlayne 
of  Walker's  Battalion,  with  two  Napoleons,  was  masked 
in  the  pines  at  the  eastern  end  of  the  vista  to  assist  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  OJB  LEE  507 

infantry  in  its  advance  and  then  accompany  it,  while 
Maj.  Pegram,  with  Davidson's  and  McGraw's  batteries 
of  Walker's  Battalion,  took  position  at  the  western  end 
of  the  vista.  Placing  four  Napoleons  on  a  small  cleared 
knoll  400  yards  to  his  rear  to  fire  over  the  trees  at  the 
enemy's  smoke,  he  held  his  entire  command  well  in  hand 
to  advance  down  the  vista  and  the  dirt  road  towards 
Hazel  Grove,  when  circumstances  should  permit  the  oc 
cupation  of  that  position.  Alexander's,  Brown's, 
Carter's,  Jones',  and  Mclntosh's  battalions  were  held 
in  the  rear  in  column  along  the  Plank  Road. 

Col.  Alexander  convinced  Stuart  that  the  Hazel 
Grove  position,  which  commanded  Fairview  Heights, 
was  the  key  to  the  Federal  line,  and  Archer's  Brigade 
which  had  come  up  during  the  night  and  formed  on 
McGowan's  right,  thus  occupying  the  extreme  right  of 
the  Confederate  line,  was  ordered  at  daylight  to  seize 
the  hill,  which  Sickles  had  all  but  abandoned.  Archer 
at  once  advanced  through  the  woods,  driving  the  hand 
ful  of  Federal  skirmishers  before  him,  and  charged 
about  400  yards  across  the  open  fields  in  front  of  the 
Hazel  Grove  position.  Pressing  up  the  slope,  his  men 
seized  the  hill  and  captured  the  four  pieces  of  artillery. 
Within  90  minutes  after  the  attack  commenced,  Hazel 
Grove  was  in  possession  of  the  Confederates,  its  wanton 
desertion  by  Sickles  having  destroyed  all  chance  of  a 
successful  resistance  by  Hooker,  in  the  lines  then  oc 
cupied  by  his  troops. 

Stuart  was  now  to  reap  the  benefit  of  Alexander's 
judicious  disposition  of  the  artillery,  for  at  5  A.  M.  the 
latter  ordered  Maj.  Pegram  to  move  forward  and  oc 
cupy  Hazel  Grove,  and  Col.  Carter  to  move  as  many 
of  his  pieces  as  possible  up  to  the  schoolhouse.  Pegram, 
all  in  readiness,  responded,  and  before  6  A.  M.  had  placed 
Chamberlayne's  Battery  of  his  own  battalion  and 
Page's  of  Carter's  Battalion  in  position  on  the  forward 
crest  of  Hazel  Grove.  The  sight  that  met  his  eyes  was 
one  to  fill  the  soul  of  an  artilleryman  with  joy.  Less 
than  1,500  yards  to  the  northeast  the  enemy's  position 


508  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

lay  before  him,  and  his  own  guns  almost  completely  en 
filaded  those  of  the  enemy  in  the  road  and  were  able  to 
deliver  an  oblique  fire  upon  the  others  on  Fairview 
ridge.  Meantime,  Col.  Carter  had  moved  up  to  Marye's 
position  at  the  schoolhouse,  with  six  pieces  of  his  own 
battalion.  Without  hesitating  a  moment,  Pegram 
opened  with  his  eight  pieces  upon  the  enemy,  joined  by 
Carter's  group  of  ten  on  the  road,  thus  at  the  outset 
subjecting  the  enemy's  guns  to  a  cross  fire. 

But  until  the  Artillery  opened  fire,  Stuart  had  not 
recognized  the  vast  importance  of  Archer's  capture,  and 
while  Pegram  and  Carter  were  getting  into  position,  a 
useless  sacrifice  of  Lane's  and  Ramseur's  men  had  been 
made  by  furiously  hurling  them  against  Berry's  and 
Williams'  intrenchments  in  the  woods,  from  which  the 
Federals  were,  however,  driven  back  upon  their  main 
line  just  in  front  of  Fairview.  After  an  hour  of 
desperate  fighting,  Stuart's  whole  line  was  in  turn 
driven  out  of  the  works,  and  Archer  himself  was  forced 
to  fall  back  to  Hazel  Grove,  where  he  took  up  a  position 
in  support  of  Pegram's  guns.  It  was  clear  now  that 
extreme  efforts  would  be  required  to  drive  the  Federals 
from  their  strong  position,  for  Hooker  had  established 
the  1st,  2d,  and  5th  corps  on  his  line,  threatening  to  turn 
the  Confederate  left  where  a  desperate  conflict  was 
raging. 

Meanwhile  Stuart  had  seen  the  value  of  Pegram's 
position,  to  which  Alexander  had,  meantime,  ordered 
Moody's  and  Woolfolk's  batteries  and  Parker's  section 
of  his  own  battalion,  with  ten  guns  under  Maj.  Huger, 
and  Brooke's,  Smith's,  and  Watson's  batteries  of 
Brown's  Battalion  under  Capt.  Watson,  Lusk's,  and 
Wooding's  batteries  of  Mclntosh's  Battalion  under 
Maj.  Poague,  and  Tanner's  and  Carrington's  batteries 
of  Jones'  Battalion,  all  of  which  immediately  went  into 
action.  Mclntosh  with  a  rifled  section  of  Thompson's 
Louisiana  Battery  of  Jones'  Battalion  moved  down  the 
road  to  Brunson's  position,  while  Maj.  Jones  with 
portions  of  W.  P.  Carter's,  Reese's,  and  Fry's  batteries 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  509 

of  Carter's  Battalion,  Tanner's  Battery  of  his  own,  and 
a  section  of  Taylor's  Battery  of  Alexander's  Battalion, 
twelve  pieces  in  all,  moved  further  to  the  front  and  to 
the  left  of  the  schoolhouse  group  of  ten  pieces,  now 
under  Maj.  Braxton.  Col.  Carter  about  this  time  as 
sumed  control  of  his  own,  Huger's,  and  Poague's  bat 
teries  at  Hazel  Grove  and  Col.  Walker  of  Brown's, 
Pegram's,  and  Jones'  batteries  at  that  same  point. 

Alexander  states  that  perhaps  50  guns  were  engaged 
at  Hazel  Grove,  though  not  over  40  at  any  one  time, 
as  the  batteries  had  to  be  relieved  from  time  to  time  to 
replenish  their  ammunition.  The  fire  which  Pegram, 
then  Walker  and  Carter,  conducted  from  this  point  was 
perhaps  for  an  hour  the  most  continuous  and  rapid  ever 
delivered  by  the  Confederate  Artillery.  Every  caisson 
had  to  be  well  filled  during  the  night,  yet  many  of  them 
were  emptied  within  the  hour,  some  of  the  better-served 
pieces,  those  under  Pegram,  firing  as  rapidly  as  three 
rounds  a  minute,  which  was  an  exceptionally  rapid  rate 
for  the  time. 

As  an  artillery  position,  Hazel  Grove  was  ideal  and 
Alexander's  battalion  commanders  made  the  best  of 
it.  Somewhat  greater  in  elevation  than  Fairview,  its 
bushy  crest  all  but  obscured  the  Confederate  guns,  well 
drawn  back  from  the  view  of  the  enemy,  whose  shells 
bursting  beyond  the  narrow  ridge,  or  in  the  depression 
in  front,  were  quite  harmless.  Few  reached  their  diffi 
cult  target,  while  the  Federal  position  presented  an  ex 
tensive  and  easy  target  to  the  Confederate  guns.  It  is 
remarkable  how  the  Federal  cannoneers  managed  to 
maintain  their  fire  against  such  odds,  yet  they  did  so  and 
although  severely  punished  by  Alexander's  artillery, 
their  guns  formed  the  rallying  point  for  Hooker's 
troops  below  them  in  the  woods,  and  they  inflicted 
terrible  losses  upon  Hill's  attacking  infantry.  Had  the 
Confederates  been  provided  with  good  ammunition  for 
their  guns,  it  is  doubtful  if  the  Federal  Artillery  could 
have  made  the  stand  it  did.  An  extraordinarily  large 
percentage  of  the  Confederate  shells  failed  to  burst,  and 


510  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

many  were  even  more  ineffective  by  reason  of  premature 
explosions.  With  the  very  best  ammunition  the  error 
of  the  fuse,  and  consequently  the  area  of  dispersion,  is 
large,  but  the  mean  burst  is  easily  ascertained  and  rang 
ing  becomes  fairly  simple  and  accurate.  On  the  other 
hand,  ranging  with  the  Confederate  ammunition  was 
extremely  difficult.  The  writer  has  heard  this  point  dis 
cussed  by  numerous  Confederate  artillery  officers,  who 
declared  that  ranging  with  them  was  ordinarily  mere 
guess  work,  and  that  frequently  a  dozen  bursts  gave 
them  no  knowledge  whatever  of  the  true  range.  In 
deed  it  was  most  discouraging  to  the  Confederate  gun 
ners  to  fire  and  fire  upon  a  perfectly  visible  target  under 
the  easiest  conditions,  and  see  not  a  sign  of  effect  from 
their  shells,  and  this  is  a  fact  which  must  be  considered 
by  the  artillery  student  of  the  war. 

Soon  Anderson  united  with  Stuart's  right,  the  former 
moving  his  left  up  to  Mine  Creek  from  the  furnace, 
while  Hardaway  followed  with  three  rifles  of  Jordan's 
Battery.  Before  moving  off,  Hardaway  left  Capt. 
Dance  with  one  rifle  of  Jordan's  Battery,  one  Napoleon, 
and  one  howitzer  of  Hupp's  and  two  howitzers  of 
Hurt's,  with  instructions  to  follow  Mahone's  advance 
along  the  Plank  Road  to  the  east.  Dance  at  once  oc 
cupied  a  fine  position  on  a  knoll  to  the  right  of  the  road, 
and  about  900  yards  from  the  enemy's  breastworks. 

Proceeding  along  the  ravine,  Hardaway  encountered 
Gen.  Lee,  who  had  selected  a  position  on  a  wooded  hill, 
which  the  Major  was  directed  to  prepare  for  his  three 
guns,  and  from  which  he  opened  an  active  fire  upon  the 
Fairview  guns,  after  the  axmen  with  great  labor  had 
cut  a  roadway  thereto. 

By  9  A.  M.  the  Federal  artillery  fire  had  appreciably 
slackened,  many  of  the  guns  having  exhausted  their  am 
munition  since  no  provision  was  made  to  resupply  them 
in  spite  of  the  urgent  requests  of  the  officers.  Besides, 
the  Federal  Artillery  had  suffered  severely  from  the 
terrible  cross  fire,  which  Carter,  Pegram,  and  Mclntosh, 
now  reenforced  by  Hardaway's  guns,  had  been  directing 
for  nearly  two  hours  upon  Fairview. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  511 

It  was  at  this  juncture  that  the  veteran  commander 
of  the  Richmond  Letcher  Battery,  Capt.  Greenlee 
Davidson,  received  his  mortal  wound  at  the  very  mo 
ment  of  victory.  In  the  words  of  Maj.  Pegram,  he 
was  "one  of  the  most  gallant,  meritorious,  and  efficient 
officers  in  the  service." 

About  this  time  Col.  Walker  assumed  the  active 
direction  of  his  battalion,  of  which  Pegram  had  sent 
Davidson's  and  Chamberlayne's,  together  with  Page's 
of  Carter's  Battalion,  to  the  rear  to  replenish  their  am 
munition.  Col.  Brown  also  assumed  active  control  of 
the  artillery  of  the  2d  Corps. 

Concerning  the  Federal  artillery  position  and  the  ef 
fect  of  the  Confederate  fire,  Capt.  Clermont  L.  Best, 
4th  United  States  Artillery,  Chief  of  Artillery,  12th 
Corps,  after  explaining  how  his  guns  had  been  in 
trenched  during  the  night  of  May  3d,  had  the  following 
to  say:  "Our  position  would  not  have  been  forced  had 
the  flanks  of  our  line  of  guns  been  successfully  main 
tained.  An  important  point,  an  open  field  about  a  mile 
to  our  left  and  front,  guarded  by  a  brigade  of  our 
troops  (not  of  the  12th  Corps)  and  a  battery — was 
seemingly  taken  by  a  small  force  of  the  enemy  and  the 
battery  captured  and  turned  on  us  with  fearful  effect, 
blowing  up  one  of  our  caissons,  killing  Capt.  Hampton, 
and  enfilading  Gen.  Geary's  line.  It  was  most  un 
fortunate.  My  line  of  guns,  however,  kept  to  its  work 
manfully  until  9  A.  M.,  when,  finding  our  infantry  in 
front  withdrawn,  our  right  and  left  turned,  and  the 
enemy's  musketry  so  advanced  as  to  pick  off  our  men 
and  horses,  I  was  compelled  to  withdraw  my  guns 
to  save  them.  We  were  also  nearly  exhausted  of  am 
munition." 

The  remarks  of  Capt.  Best  are  much  more  conclusive 
of  the  service  rendered  by  Alexander  and  his  batteries 
than  anything  the  Confederate  gunners  themselves 
might  have  said.  The  effect  of  Alexander's  fire  Gen. 
Hunt  also  characterized  as  fearful. 


512  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

The  Federal  line  of  battle  was  now  along  the  heights 
below  and  a  short  distance  west  of  Fairview.  Sickles' 
Corps  connecting  with  Slocum's  on  the  left,  occupied 
this  line  to  the  Plank  Road  and  across  it.  On  his  right 
was  a  portion  of  the  2d  Corps  and  beyond  behind  breast 
works  thrown  up  during  the  night  along  the  Ely's  Ford 
Road,  and  separated  by  a  small  interval  from  Couch, 
lay  the  1st  Corps  under  Reynolds.  On  Slocum's  left 
and  facing  towards  Fredericksburg  the  5th  Corps  op 
posed  McLaws,  while  the  remnants  of  Howard's  Corps 
was  massing  beyond  Meade.  Thus  Hooker  still  had  60,- 
000  infantry  in  line  while  the  combined  strength  of 
Stuart,  Anderson,  and  McLaws,  after  the  losses  of  the 
1st  and  2d,  was  not  over  40,000.  But  the  elan  of 
Stuart's  men  had  not  waned  in  spite  of  the  unsuccess 
ful  attempts  of  the  morning  to  drive  the  enemy  from 
their  strengthened  line,  and  each  minute  the  efforts  of 
the  Confederate  Artillery  became  more  telling.  There 
was  nothing  for  Stuart  to  do  but  to  organize  a  fresh  at 
tack.  The  spirit  of  the  brave  leader  as  he  rode  the  lines 
encouraging  his  men  was  contagious.  Entirely  relieved 
of  anxiety  for  his  right  flank  by  the  union  with  Ander 
son's  line  in  that  quarter,  he  now  massed  his  infantry  on 
the  left  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  the  position  from 
which  they  were  threatening  his  flank,  to  the  support  of 
which  Ramseur's  Brigade  had  been  sent.  Finally, 
about  9 :30  A.  M.,  a  third  assault  was  made  and  the  Fed 
eral  line  was  broken  by  the  sheer  valour  of  Jackson's 
infantry.  The  Artillery  had  meantime  crushed  the 
Fairview  batteries,  the  very  keystone  of  the  whole 
structure  of  resistance. 

As  the  Confederate  infantry  surged  forward  through 
the  woods,  Carter,  Jones,  and  Mclntosh  dashed  down 
the  road  and  up  the  slopes  of  Fairview  to  the  crest, 
while  the  batteries  at  Hazel  Grove  crossed  the  valley  in 
their  front,  and,  joining  with  the  others  in  action,  poured 
a  whirlwind  of  fire  upon  the  retiring  Federals  and  their 
batteries,  the  latter  withdrawing  to  their  ammunition 
trains. 


MAJOR    JOHN    TELIIAM 

CHIEF  HORSE  ARTILLERY 

Killed  at   Kellysville.    1S(>:: 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  513 

The  Federals  now  endeavored  to  make  a  stand  near 
the  Chancellorsville  house,  but  without  success.  En 
filaded  from  the  west  by  Carter's  group,  fired  upon 
from  their  right  front  by  Pegram's  batteries  and  from 
their  front  by  Jordan's  guns,  which  Hardaway  had 
meantime  brought  upon  the  southern  edge  of  the 
plateau,  and  entirely  without  breastworks,  their  re 
sistance  was  gallant  but  brief.  At  this  juncture, 
Hooker,  while  standing  on  the  porch  of  the  Chancellor 
house,  was  put  hors  de  combat  by  a  fragment  of  brick 
torn  from  a  pillar  by  one  of  Jordan's  shells,  and  did  not 
recover  for  several  hours.  For  a  time  his  defeated  army 
was  without  a  leader. 

About  1  A.  M.,  Lee  joined  Stuart  near  the  Chancellor 
house  and  directed  that  both  infantry  and  artillery  re 
plenish  ammunition  and  renew  the  assault.  The  enemy 
having  stubbornly  fallen  back  to  a  line  of  works  pre 
pared  by  Warren,  running  along  the  Ely's  Ford  and 
United  States  Ford  roads,  with  its  apex  at  the  White 
House,  thus  covered  their  avenues  of  retreat. 

When  the  Federals  fell  back  to  their  works  after  be 
ing  shelled  for  about  an  hour,  the  Confederate  batteries 
at  once  advanced  to  the  turnpike  and  threw  up  hasty 
intrenchments  from  which  a  desultory  fire  was  main 
tained  upon  that  portion  of  the  line  near  the  White 
House.  About  3  p.  M.  Colston's  Division,  which  had 
been  temporarily  withdrawn,  reformed,  and,  resupplied 
with  ammunition,  was  ordered  by  Gen.  Lee  to  move  for 
ward  towards  the  United  States  Ford  for  the  purpose  of 
developing  the  enemy's  position.  Page's  Morris  Bat 
tery  of  Napoleons  accompanied  Colston.  Hardly  had 
Colston's  men  been  set  in  motion  when  the  enemy 
opened  upon  them  with  twelve  pieces  of  artillery  from  a 
barbette  battery  on  an  eminence,  and  although  Page  re 
plied  to  this  fire  for  half  an  hour  or  more,  nothing 
serious  was  attempted  and  Colston  was  directed  to  draw 
off  and  intrench.  Meanwhile  Maj.  Hardaway  with  thir 
teen  rifled  pieces,  including  two  of  Fry's,  two  of 
Marye's,  and  two  of  W.  P.  Carter's,  Jordan's  four  rifles 


514  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

and  three  of  Hurt's,  was  ordered  to  accompany  Gen. 
Anderson  to  the  river  for  the  purpose  of  shelling  the 
enemy's  wagon  trains  on  the  north  bank  near  Scott's 
Dam,  about  1^  miles  below  the  United  States  Ford. 

The  Confederates  had  before  noon  practically  come 
to  a  standstill  on  the  Chancellor  plateau,  for  disquieting 
news  had  reached  Gen.  Lee  from  the  rear.  Sedgwick 
had  finally  forced  Early's  flimsy  line  and  compelled  the 
Confederates  opposite  Fredericksburg  to  fall  back. 
Operations  about  Chancellorsville  were  perforce  sus 
pended  while  Gen.  Lee's  attention  was  directed  to  the 
new  danger. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

CHANCELLORSVILLE,    CONTINUED FREDERICKSBURG   AND 

SALEM  CHURCH MAY  3D 

WE  left  Early  and  Pendleton  on  the  morning  of  the 
2d  disposing  their  men  and  guns  to  oppose  as  best  they 
could  Sedgwick's  advance,  the  Federals  pretty  much  in 
the  same  position  and  attitude  they  had  assumed  the 
evening  before.  Before  10  A.  M.  Gen.  Early,  however, 
directed  Maj.  Andrews  to  feel  the  enemy  with  his  guns, 
and  accordingly  Maj .  Latimer  opened  with  two  rifles  on 
that  portion  of  the  hostile  line  near  Deep  Run,  while 
Graham's  and  Brown's  Parrotts  on  Lee's  Hill  directed 
their  fire  upon  the  infantry  and  batteries  massed  near 
the  Pratt  house,  driving  them  to  cover.  Latimer  drew 
no  fire,  but  two  batteries  on  the  north  bank  and  several 
on  the  south  side  of  the  river  responded  with  energy  to 
that  of  Graham's  and  Brown's  guns.  Soon  after  this 
affair,  Early  rode  to  the  left  to  confer  with  Pendleton, 
who  was  directing  the  disposition  of  Walton's  guns 
along  the  Stansbury  Hill,  with  a  view  to  firing  upon  the 
enemy's  masses  about  Falmouth.  While  he  was  with 
Pendleton,  Col.  Chilton,  Gen.  Lee's  Ad  jut  ant- General, 
arrived  with  verbal  orders  for  him,  directing  that  he 
move  at  once  to  Chancellorsville  with  all  his  infantry 
but  one  brigade,  and  that  Gen.  Pendleton  should  with 
draw  all  the  artillery  along  the  Telegraph  Road, 
especially  all  the  heavier  pieces,  to  Chesterfield,  ex 
cept  eight  or  ten  guns  which  were  to  follow  the  rest  when 
forced  by  the  enemy  to  do  so.  Early  and  Pendleton 
both  advanced  many  objections  to  the  withdrawal  of 
their  forces  at  such  a  time,  which  in  their  opinion  would 
only  invite  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  but  were  informed 
that  the  commanding  general  was  convinced  of  the 
wisdom  of  crushing  Hooker's  force  and  that,  having 
done  so,  he  could  then  return  to  Fredericksburg  and 
drive  Sedgwick  off  if  necessary.  To  do  this,  all  his 


516  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

infantry  was  needed,  but  more  artillery  about  Chancel- 
lorsville  would  be  superfluous,  and  the  small  detaining 
force  was  only  expected  to  delay  Sedgwick  long  enough 
for  the  Artillery  and  trains  to  withdraw.  Such  was  the 
substance  of  Chilton's  remarks.  The  orders  as  de 
livered  to  Gen.  Early  left  him  no  discretion  and,  much 
against  their  will,  he  and  Pendleton,  about  noon,  set 
about  executing  them.  Hays'  Brigade  was  directed  to 
relieve  Barksdale's  Regiment  in  the  town  and  to  remain 
with  Pendleton's  artillery  force.  It  was  late  in  the 
afternoon,  however,  before  the  infantry  column  moved 
off  from  Early's  line  along  the  military  road  from 
Hamilton's  Crossing  to  the  Telegraph  Road,  and  then 
along  a  cross  road  leading  into  the  Plank  Road,  fol 
lowed  by  Maj.  Andrews  with  his  own  battalion  and 
Graham's  Battery. 

Pendleton  had,  before  noon,  ordered  Nelson's  Bat 
talion  to  withdraw  first  since  it  was  least  exposed  to  the 
view  of  the  enemy.  The  three  20-pounder  Parrotts  of 
Rhett's  Battery  were  replaced  by  the  lighter  and  less 
valued  pieces  of  Patterson's  and  Eraser's  batteries. 
Lieut.  Tunis  with  the  Whitworth  moved  over  from 
the  extreme  right  and  with  Rhett's  Battery  and 
Nelson's  Battalion  retired  along  the  Telegraph  Road 
while  Richardson's  Battery  which  Walton  had  detached 
to  Early's  line  rejoined  its  battalion.  Col.  Cabell 
also  withdrew  Carlton's  Battery  from  Lee's  Hill  and 
moved  to  the  rear  in  command  of  the  entire  column 
of  22  pieces.  Pendleton,  therefore,  retained  in  position 
after  noon  but  15  guns.  Of  these  six  guns  of  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery  and  Parker's  two  10-pounder  Parrotts 
were  held  in  position  on  Marye's  Hill  and  the  ridge  to 
the  left,  Eraser's  three  and  one  of  Patterson's  guns  on 
Lee's  Hill,  and  three  of  Patterson's  on  the  ridge  back  of 
the  Howison  house.  During  the  withdrawal  of  his  bat 
teries,  Pendleton  resorted  to  every  subterfuge  to  make 
it  appear  to  the  enemy  as  if  additional  guns  were  being 
brought  into  position.  After  remaining  idle  the  greater 
part  of  the  afternoon,  the  Federals  at  last  began  to  send 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  517 

forward  their  skirmishers  and  to  mass  on  the  north  bank 
as  if  to  cross.  Pendleton  now  ordered  Col.  Cabell  to  re 
turn  with  Carlton's  Battery. 

Upon  arriving  with  the  head  of  his  column  at  the 
Plank  Road  leading  to  Chancellorsville  just  before 
dark,  Early  received  a  note  from  Gen.  Lee  saying  that 
he  was  not  expected  to  withdraw  his  division  from  Fred- 
ericksburg,  if  by  remaining  Sedgwick  could  be  checked, 
as  by  neutralizing  the  30,000  Federals  with  his  10,000 
men  Early  could  render  far  greater  service  than  he  could 
at  Chancellorsville.  Thus  had  Chilton  misunderstood 
the  commanding  general's  directions,  and  led  to  an  all 
but  disastrous  movement  in  Lee's  rear  by  denying 
Early  and  Pendleton  all  discretion  in  the  execution  of 
the  orders  he  transmitted  to  them.  The  incident  well 
illustrates  the  danger  of  verbal  orders  and  from  orders 
in  any  form  emanating  from  one  not  actually  conversant 
with  the  conditions  in  remote  quarters  of  the  field  of 
operations.  What  Gen.  Lee  had  intended  for  instruc 
tions  were  transmitted  as  positive  orders. 

Early  had  hardly  received  the  message  from  Gen.  Lee 
when  he  was  informed  by  Gen.  Barksdale  through  a 
courier,  at  the  rear  of  his  column,  that  the  enemy  had  ad 
vanced  in  force  against  Hays'  weak  line,  and  that  both 
Hays  and  Pendleton  had  sent  word  that  all  the  ar 
tillery  would  be  captured,  unless  they  received  immediate 
relief.  Meantime  Barksdale,  with  rare  good  judgment, 
and  in  the  exercise  of  that  initiative  on  the  part  of  a  sub 
ordinate  so  valuable  on  such  occasions,  had  retraced  his 
steps  with  his  own  regiments,  followed  by  Gordon's  Bri 
gade.  Early  at  once  gave  the  order  for  his  main  column 
to  do  the  same. 

Sedgwick,  upon  discovering  the  Confederate  with 
drawal,  had  crossed  the  remainder  of  his  corps  about 
dark,  and  moved  towards  the  River  Road,  or  Bowling 
Green  Road,  below  the  town,  driving  Col.  Penn's  Regi 
ment  of  Hays'  Brigade  back  to  the  line  of  the  railroad, 
and  then  formed  line  with  his  main  body  along  the 
river.  Fortunately,  he  had  not  seriously  attempted  to 


518  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

take  the  town.  The  heavy  masses  of  the  enemy  seen  at 
Falmouth,  earlier  in  the  day,  were  the  troops  of  the  1st 
Corps  under  Reynolds  moving  to  the  left  to  reenforce 
Hooker. 

Between  10  and  11  p.  M.  Early's  Division  reoccupied 
its  old  line  and  skirmishers  were  thrown  out  towards 
the  River  Road,  Barksdale  again  occupying  the  town 
and  Hays  moving  to  Early's  right.  Before  notice  of 
Early 's  decision  to  return  reached  Pendleton  he  had, 
after  deliberate  consultation  with  Hays,  withdrawn  the 
Artillery,  Walton's  batteries  moving  off  first,  followed 
by  those  on  Lee's  Hill.  But  Pendleton  had  scarcely 
reached  the  Telegraph  Road  with  the  rear  batteries, 
when  he  met  Barksdale  returning  to  the  field  and  was 
told  by  him  that  the  orders  were  to  hold  Fredericks- 
burg  at  all  hazards.  Pendleton,  as  well  as  Hays,  who 
was  at  Marye's  Hill  supervising  the  final  preparation 
for  the  retirement  of  his  brigade,  was  naturally  much 
puzzled  by  the  incomprehensible  conflict  of  orders  they 
had  received  during  the  day,  but  was  finally  assured 
by  Early  himself  that  the  confusion  had  resulted  from 
Chilton's  mistake,  and  that  since  Barksdale  and  Gordon 
had  both  returned  of  their  own  accord  he  had  thought 
best  to  reoccupy  his  lines  so  long  as  it  was  possible  to  do 
so.  Pendleton,  in  complete  cooperation  with  Early, 
though  much  perplexed,  and  weakened  by  having  sent 
so  many  of  his  guns  to  the  rear,  p  -  mptly  directed 
Walton  and  Cabell  to  reoccupy  their  positions,  the 
former  being  assigned  to  the  command  of  die  artillery 
on  Marye's  Hill  and  the  latter  to  that  on  Lee's  and  the 
Howison  Hill.  It  was  1  p.  M.  when  the  19  guns,  includ 
ing  those  of  Carlton's  Battery,  remaining  for  the  de 
fense  of  so  important  a  position,  were  reestablished  in 
position. 

At  11  P.  M.  Sedgwick  received  a  much  belated  order 
from  Hooker  to  march  upon  Chancellorsville  with  all 
haste.  Leaving  one  division  to  cover  his  rear  and  skir 
mish  with  the  Confederates  in  its  front,  he  moved  his 
other  two  divisions  up  the  river  towards  Fredericks- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  519 

burg.  Had  Hooker's  orders  been  duly  received,  his  ad 
vance  would  have  been  all  but  unopposed.  Even  now 
delays  occurred,  and  although  Gen.  Warren  arrived  at 
2  A.  M.  to  hasten  forward  his  movement,  the  head  of 
Sedgwick's  column  did  not  enter  the  town,  but  3  miles 
from  the  bridge  at  Franklin's  Crossing,  until  daylight. 
Having  detected  the  movement  of  the  enemy,  and  be 
lieving  that  Sedgwick's  main  effort  would  be  made  on 
the  left,  Pendleton  at  once  advised  Early,  who  dis 
patched  Hays'  Brigade  from  his  right,  to  reenforce 
Barksdale  near  the  town. 

Meanwhile,  Gibbon  had  thrown  a  bridge  at  the  town 
and  crossed  over  with  his  division  of  the  2d  Corps.  With 
the  Federal  advance  were  several  batteries,  to  engage 
which  Pendleton  directed  Walton  to  send  a  section  of 
artillery  to  the  most  advanced  works  on  the  left.  Mean 
time  Barksdale  had  directed  Maj.  Eshleman  to  move  a 
piece  of  Miller's  Battery,  which  commanded  the  Plank 
Road  leading  from  the  town,  to  the  left  front,  thus  un 
known  to  Pendleton  uncovering  the  most  important  ap 
proach  to  Marye's  Hill. 

To  meet  the  enemy,  Early  now  had  7  companies  of 
Barksdale's  Brigade  between  the  Marye  house  and  the 
Plank  Road,  3  companies  on  the  Telegraph  Road  at  the 
foot  of  Marye's  Hill,  and  2  regiments  on  the  ridges  of 
Lee's  and  Howison's  hills,  while  one  of  Hays'  regi 
ments  covered  Barksdale's  right  and  2  occupied  the 
Stansbury  ridge.  The  extreme  right  was  held  by  Hoke's 
and  Smith's  brigades  with  Andrews'  Battalion  of  ar 
tillery  and  Richardson's  and  Graham's  batteries  in  their 
old  works. 

Very  shortly  after  daylight  Sedgwick  commenced 
demonstrations  at  Deep  Run  as  if  to  turn  Hoke's  line, 
throwing  forward  his  skirmishers  up  the  ravine  formed 
by  the  stream.  In  spite  of  Latimer's  fire,  a  large  body 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  railroad  behind  which  it  re 
mained  while  several  Federal  batteries  played  upon 
Latimer's  guns.  Andrews  now  brought  Graham's  and 
Brown's  batteries  from  the  right  to  the  support  of  Lati- 


520  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

mer's  two  Napoleons,  and  also  Carpenter's  rifled  section, 
which  engaged  in  a  duel  with  the  enemy's  artillery  as 
well  as  firing  upon  their  infantry.  Finally  Hoke  moved 
out  and  drove  the  enemy  from  behind  the  railroad  em 
bankment,  while  Andrews'  batteries  played  upon  the 
retiring  troops. 

As  soon  as  the  advance  division  (Newton's)  of  Sedg- 
wick's  Corps  had  entered  the  town,  four  regiments  were 
sent  forward  to  attack  the  Confederate  line  in  rear  of 
it,  advancing  over  the  ground  made  famous  in  Decem 
ber  by  the  desperate  charges  of  Burnside's  divisions. 
Once  more  the  brave  Federal  infantry  pressed  up  to 
within  a  few  paces  of  the  stone  wall  and  rifle  pits  at  the 
base  of  the  hills,  while  Pendleton's  batteries  poured 
shell  and  canister  into  their  ranks  with  dreadful  effect, 
and  Barksdale's  men,  reserving  their  fire  until  the  last 
moment,  hurled  the  attacking  columns  back  in  a  blizzard 
of  musketry  fire.  Once  more  the  enemy  withdrew  to 
cover  behind  the  accidents  of  the  ground,  while  their  bat 
teries  in  the  town  poured  their  fire  with  unrelenting 
vigor  upon  Marye's  Hill.  At  all  points  Sedgwick's 
men  were  repulsed,  but  it  was  apparent  to  the  defenders 
that  the  ever-increasing  force  in  the  town  was  only 
temporarily  balked.  The  glorious  news  of  Jackson's 
victory  at  Chancellorsville,  which  had  just  been  received, 
inspired  the  gray  line  to  redouble  its  efforts. 

Sedgwick  now  determined  to  turn  the  Confederate 
position  and  directed  Howe  with  his  rear  division,  on  the 
left  of  Hazel  Run,  against  the  opposing  line,  while 
Gibbon  was  ordered  to  move  up  the  river  from  the  town 
and  turn  the  Confederate  left.  But  Howe  found  the 
works  in  his  front  and  those  which  extended  beyond  his 
left  occupied,  while  the  stream  on  his  right  deterred  him 
from  assaulting  Marye's  Hill  in  flank,  and  Gibbon's  ad 
vance  was  barred  by  the  canal  behind  which  on  the 
Stansbury  Hill  were  the  men  of  Hays'  Brigade,  and 
the  pickets  of  Wilcox's  Brigade  on  Taylor  House  Hill. 
Information  of  Gibbon's  movement  was  at  once  sent 
Wilcox,  who,  leaving  one  section  of  Lewis'  Battery  and 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  521 

50  men  at  Banks'  Ford,  had  hastened  down  in  person 
with  the  other  section  of  the  battery  under  Lieut. 
Nathan  Penick,  and  threw  his  guns  in  action  first  on  the 
Taylor  House  Hill,  then  on  the  Stansbury  ridge.  Soon 
he  also  brought  up  Moore's  (Huger's)  Battery,  two 
rifles  of  which  on  the  Taylor  House  Hill  engaged  the 
enemy's  guns  in  Falmouth  and  on  the  plain  below,  for 
about  two  hours,  while  the  latter  sought  to  prepare  for 
Sedgwick's  final  efforts. 

When  Gibbon  and  Howe,  whose  men  unable  to  ad 
vance  also  sought  the  cover  of  the  ground,  reported  the 
impracticability  of  turning  the  Confederate  position,  the 
resolute  Sedgwick  determined  to  storm  the  opposing 
works.  For  this  purpose,  Newton's  Division  in  front 
of  the  town  was  to  be  organized  into  two  columns  for  the 
assault  of  Marye's  Hill,  while  Howe  was  to  move  up 
Hazel  Run  and  attack  Lee's  Hill.  Newton's  two  col 
umns,  of  two  regiments  each,  with  two  regiments  in  sup 
port,  moved  forward  on  the  right  of  the  Plank  Road 
while  Col.  Burnham  with  four  regiments  in  line  of  bat 
tle,  to  the  left  of  the  road,  charged  directly  upon  the 
rifle  pits  at  the  base  of  Marye's  Hill.  The  works  against 
which  these  troops  charged  were  now  held  by  but  two 
regiments  supported  by  six  guns  on  the  hill  above  under 
Walton,  who  directed  a  withering  fire  of  canister  upon 
the  enemy.  As  before,  the  Federals  reeled  and  broke, 
only  to  be  rallied  and  led  back  with  the  same  result.  But 
under  a  flag  of  truce  for  the  purpose  of  allowing  the 
enemy  to  recover  their  dead,  the  fire  in  this  quarter  was 
now  suspended.  This  action  by  the  Confederates  was  en 
tirely  unauthorized  by  proper  authority  and  was  due  to 
the  strange  good  nature  of  a  gallant  officer,  Col.  Griffin 
of  the  18th  Mississippi,  who  received  the  flag  and  hon 
ored  the  request  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Howe  was 
actively  engaged  in  attacking  Hays'  line  only  a  few  hun 
dred  yards  to  his  right.  Not  only  did  Griffin  suspend 
the  fire  on  his  portion  of  the  line,  but  he  allowed  his  men 
to  show  themselves,  and  when  Newton  was  apprised  by 
his  returning  officers  how  weak  the  line  was  which  had 


522  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

repulsed  him,  the  three  columns  were  ordered  forward 
again  upon  the  termination  of  the  local  truce.  It  was 
now  that  the  full  effect  of  Chilton's  dreadful  blunder,  as 
well  as  Barksdale's  unwarranted  interference  with 
Pendleton's  dispositions,  were  to  be  felt.  Instead  of  37 
guns  in  position  to  repel  the  enemy,  there  remained  less 
than  half  that  number,  and  the  direct  approach  up  the 
Plank  Road  instead  of  being  completely  dominated  by 
Miller's  guns  was  exposed  only  to  the  fire  of  the  six 
pieces  on  the  hill,  above  and  behind  the  stone  wall,  the 
few  defenders  of  which  finding  themselves  assailed  from 
every  side  by  superior  numbers  were  unable  to  check  the 
onset.  The  Federals  dashed  on  up  to  and  over  the  works, 
completely  overpowering  the  Mississippians,  most  of 
whom  were  either  killed,  wounded  or  captured  in  the 
desperate  hand-to-hand  conflict  which  ensued.  Thus  did 
Griffin  reap  the  whirlwind  which  he  had  sown.  It  was 
now  11  A.  M.,  and  so  rapid  had  been  Newton's  final  as 
sault  that  Hays  and  Wilcox,  the  latter  having  by  this 
time  assembled  a  portion  of  his  brigade  on  Taylor's  Hill, 
had  not  had  time  to  come  to  Barksdale's  aid.  The 
enemy,  after  securing  the  works  at  its  base,  swarmed  up 
Marye's  Hill  and  seized  five  of  Walton's  guns  and 
Parker's  two  to  their  left,  before  they  could  be  with 
drawn,  but  the  gunners  kept  to  their  work  to  the  last. 
Seeing  Newton's  success,  Pendleton  at  once  caused  the 
guns  on  Lee's  Hill  to  be  directed  on  the  enemy 
on  Marye's  Hill,  and  brought  up  two  pieces  of 
Patterson's  Battery  from  near  the  Howison  house, 
which  opened  fire  from  the  brow  near  the  Telegraph 
Road.  Just  at  this  moment  Richardson's  Battery  ar 
rived  at  the  Howison  Hill  from  the  right,  from  whence 
it  had  been  dispatched  by  Early,  and  was  sent  by 
Pendleton  to  join  Walton,  who  assumed  direction  of 
the  guns  firing  upon  Marye's  Hill,  while  Barksdale 
formed  a  regiment  in  line  to  the  left  of  the  Telegraph 
Road  in  their  support. 

The  enemy  now  advanced  his  batteries  on  the  plain 
in  support  of  Howe's  column,  which  vigorously  assailed 
Lee's  Hill.  Upon  these  Carlton's  and  Eraser's  bat- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  523 

teries  under  direction  of  Col.  Cabell  poured  a  rapid  fire 
of  canister,  but  they,  too,  were  forced  to  withdraw  as 
the  infantry  supports  in  their  front  fell  back  along  the 
Telegraph  Road,  contesting  every  foot  of  ground.  In 
withdrawing,  Richardson  was  compelled  to  abandon  a 
piece,  the  horses  of  which  were  all  shot  down.  Fraser, 
in  the  meantime,  had  been  directing  the  fire  of  his  left 
piece  upon  Marye's  Hill,  while  his  other  piece  and  Carl- 
ton's  Battery  continued  to  hurl  canister  upon  Howe's 
men.  Not  until  the  enemy  all  but  reached  their  guns 
did  Fraser  and  Carlton  withdraw  them,  the  former 
saving  both  his  guns  by  substituting  a  caisson  limber  for 
a  gun  limber  which  had  been  blown  up.  While  direct 
ing  this  difficult  task  under  a  galling  fire,  Lieut.  F.  A. 
Habersham,  of  Fraser's  Battery,  was  struck  in  the  head 
and  killed  by  a  large  fragment  of  shell,  but  his  body 
was  borne  from  the  field  on  the  shoulders  of  his  can 
noneers.  Cabell  now  led  his  two  batteries  to  the  rear 
along  the  Telegraph  Road  and  formed  Carlton's  for 
action  near  the  pump  at  the  Leach  house,  while  Early 
hurried  up  with  his  troops  from  near  Hamilton's  Cross 
ing  and  formed  them  on  the  line  which  the  remnants  of 
Barksdale's  Brigade  was  holding  in  front  of  the  Cox 
house,  about  two  miles  in  rear  of  Lee's  Hill.  Walton 
had  been  ordered  to  the  rear  along  the  Telegraph  Road, 
and  directed  to  occupy  the  first  favorable  position  with 
his  remaining  guns.  Soon  the  enemy  brought  a  battery 
into  action  near  the  brick  house  in  rear  of  the  Howison 
house  and  engaged  Carlton,  who  replied  until  his  am 
munition  was  expended,  when  Walton  was  ordered  to 
bring  up  his  ten  pieces  and  relieve  Carlton  and  Fraser, 
the  former  having  lost  one  man  killed  and  eight 
wounded  in  the  duel. 

One  incident  in  connection  with  Carlton's  Battery 
should  here  be  mentioned,  as  it  illustrates  the  coolness 
and  heroism  of  the  Confederate  gunner.  An  unex- 
ploded  shell  fell  among  Carlton's  guns  with  the  fuse 
still  burning.  Its  explosion  would  have  certainly 
caused  the  death  of  several  men.  Without  pausing  an 


524  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

instant  in  his  work,  Lieut.  Thomas  A.  Murray,  who  was 
busily  engaged  in  sighting  his  piece,  called  private 
Richard  W.  Saye's  attention  to  the  dangerous  projectile 
which  lay  at  their  feet  and  Saye,  picking  it  up,  hurled 
it  over  the  parapet  of  the  work.  The  shell  burst  as  it 
fell  to  the  ground  in  the  ditch  beyond. 

Pendleton  in  his  report  mentions  the  mortification  he 
experienced  in  seeing  Walton's  and  Patterson's  guns 
captured  by  the  enemy.  Fortunately  the  day  has  come 
when  it  is  considered  an  honor  and  not  a  disgrace  for  the 
artillerymen  to  lose  guns  in  such  circumstances.  In 
this  affair  it  does  not  appear  that  any  criticism  can  be 
made  to  the  discredit  of  the  gunners,  for  they  remained 
at  their  posts  until  the  last,  and  by  the  nature  of  the 
ground  were  cut  off  from  saving  their  guns.  The  ar 
tilleryman  who  feels  that  he  must  save  his  pieces,  or  be 
disgraced  before  his  comrades  in  arms,  finds  a  strong 
incentive  to  "pull  out"  before  actually  necessary,  and 
where  such  a  spirit  prevails  the  subaltern  who  cannot 
view  the  whole  field  in  its  general  aspect  is  too  apt  to 
anticipate  the  crisis  and  retire  his  guns  when  by  remain 
ing  in  action  a  few  minutes  longer  he  might  materially 
influence  the  issue.  Then,  too,  the  guns  give  the  bravest 
infantry  additional  assurance.  Nothing  is  more  inspir 
ing  to  a  sorely  pressed  infantry  than  the  nearby  crash 
of  supporting  guns  and  nothing  more  disheartening  to 
the  foot  soldiers  than  the  sight  of  their  artillery  sup 
ports  drawing  off  from  the  post  of  danger.  Upon  such 
facts  the  more  modern  and  sounder  rule  has  been  based 
that  artillery  when  practicable  must  seek  positions  in 
close  proximity  to  the  advanced  infantry,  and  remain 
with  it  until  to  do  so  longer  becomes  but  a  useless  sacri 
fice  of  men  and  guns.  The  mere  personal  knowledge 
that  their  batteries  are  still  in  the  fight  is  of  great  moral 
support  to  the  infantrymen  who  must  after  all  bear  the 
ultimate  shock  of  an  assault  driven  home.  If  by  losing 
a  single  piece  or  many,  the  force  of  the  enemy's  blow  can 
be  reduced  by  the  artillery  to  within  the  limits  of  the 
defending  infantry's  power  of  resistance,  then  by  all 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  525 

means  the  guns  should  be  gladly  lost  and  much  honor 
accorded  the  gunners  who  are  resolute  enough  to  lose 
them,  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  if  the  infantry  is 
overborne  and  swept  from  the  field,  the  artillery  as  a 
rule  must  fall  with  it.  Let  us  all  be  thankful  that  the 
old  idea  that  under  no  circumstances  must  a  gun  be  lost, 
a  rule  which  continued  to  be  accepted  from  the  time  of 
the  War  of  Liberation  to  the  Franco-German  War,  has 
at  last  been  abandoned,  and  that  Bernadotte's  proud 
boast  that  in  all  his  battles  he  had  never  lost  a  piece  no 
longer  does  him  any  credit  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 

This  point  is  well  covered  by  Hohenlohe,  who  dis 
cusses  at  length  the  evils  which  flowed  in  1866  from  the 
Prussian  batteries  withdrawing  from  the  front  line  to 
refit,  or  when  their  ammunition  ran  short.  Of  course, 
there  were  exceptions  even  then,  such  as  in  the  case  of 
Von  der  Goltz's  Battery  at  Koniggratz.  Ordinarily, 
however,  they  were  too  prone  to  fall  back  when  custom 
and  the  regulations  warranted  it.  But  before  1870,  the 
German  artillerymen  had  learned  that  to  lose  guns  was 
not  dishonorable  and  at  Chateaudun  instead  of  a  battery 
withdrawing  when  its  ammunition  had  been  exhausted 
and  its  material  greatly  injured,  the  battery  commander 
made  his  cannoneers  mount  the  limbers  and  sing  the 
"Wacht  am  Rhine"  until  the  commanding  general 
should  see  fit  to  order  them  to  retire  or  until  a  fresh 
supply  of  ammunition  might  arrive. 

That  Pendleton's  batteries  remained  long  enough  at 
their  posts  at  Fredericksburg  is  amply  attested  by  their 
losses.  In  Walton's  Battalion  of  Washington  Artillery, 
there  were  four  men  killed,  and  four  wounded,  including 
Lieut.  De  Russy,  besides  the  losses  in  material  etc., 
which  was  two  3-inch  rifles  of  Squire's,  one  12-pounder 
howitzer  of  Richardson's,  one  12-pounder  Napoleon  of 
Miller's,  and  a  12-pounder  howitzer  and  a  12-pounder 
Napoleon  of  Eshleman's  Battery,  four  limbers,  one  cais 
son,  and  29  horses.  In  Lieut.  Brown's  section  of 
Parker's  Battery,  the  loss  including  the  section  com 
mander  was  23  officers  and  men  captured,  two  10- 


526  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

pounder  Parrotts,  2  limbers,  2  caissons,  and  28  horses. 
Patterson  of  Cutt's  Battalion  lost  3  men  wounded,  one 
Napoleon,  one  13-pounder  howitzer,  2  limbers  disabled, 
and  4  horses  killed,  while  Fraser  lost  one  officer  killed 
and  one  caisson  and  limber  by  explosion.  Carlton's  loss 
was  one  man  killed,  10  wounded  and  3  horses.  Later 
Patterson's  two  pieces  were  recaptured,  so  the  total 
loss  of  the  artillery  under  Pendleton  was  6  officers,  64 
men,  total  70;  8  guns  and  limbers,  4  caissons  and  64 
horses. 

Sedgwick,  as  we  have  seen,  did  not  press  along  the 
Telegraph  Road,  but  followed  the  direct  route  to  Chan 
cellors  ville  along  the  Plank  Road.  Wilcox,  cut  off  by 
the  Federal  advance  from  Early,  instead  of  trying  to 
establish  connection  with  him,  determined  to  delay 
Sedgwick's  progress  as  much  as  possible.  He,  there 
fore,  and  with  a  keen  perception  of  the  best  part  he  was 
able  to  play,  drew  up  his  brigade  in  line  on  a  ridge 
running  from  Stansbury  Hill  to  a  point  on  the  Plank 
Road  some  500  yards  in  front  of  the  Guest  house,  and 
placing  two  rifled  pieces  of  Moore's  and  Lieut.  Barks- 
dale's  section  of  Penick's  (Lewis')  batteries  in  his 
front,  shelled  the  Federal  troops  on  Marye's  Hill  and 
the  adjacent  height  at  a  range  of  about  800  yards.  For 
a  time  this  checked  the  enemy,  but  soon  their  skirmishers 
advanced  to  within  400  yards  of  the  guns  with  dense 
lines  following.  A  force  that  was  sent  below  the  Plank 
Road  threatened  to  turn  Wilcox's  right,  whereupon  he 
ordered  Moore  and  Penick  to  retire  and  withdrew  his 
men  along  the  River  Road  to  a  point  half  a  mile  in  rear 
of  Dr.  Taylor's  house.  In  this  affair,  Lieut.  Barksdale, 
of  Lewis'  Battery,  was  severely  wounded.  So  active 
were  Moore  and  Penick  that  Sedgwick  mistook  them 
for  a  horse  battery. 

The  slowness  and  caution  with  which  the  Federals 
advanced  encouraged  Wilcox  to  move  back  to  the  Plank 
Road  and  again  seek  to  delay  their  progress  to 
wards  Chancellorsville.  Deploying  a  troop  of  cavalry 
which  he  happened  to  have  with  him,  in  some  pines  in 
rear  of  Downman's  house,  he  moved  his  brigade  and  five 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  527 

batteries  to  Salem  Church,  about  five  miles  from  Fred- 
ericksburg,  where  Cobb's  rifled  section  of  Penick's  Bat 
tery  went  into  position  near  the  toll  gate,  while  Moore's 
Battery  sought  a  position  1,000  yards  to  the  rear  near 
the  church  itself.  In  the  meantime  one  of  Early's  aides 
had  informed  Gen.  Lee  of  the  loss  of  the  position  in  his 
rear,  whereupon,  as  we  have  seen,  he  postponed  his  as 
sault  on  Hooker's  new  lines,  and  dispatched  McLaws 
with  Mahone's,  Wofford's,  Semmes',  and  Kershaw's 
brigades  to  the  support  of  Wilcox. 

Upon  forming  line  in  front  of  Salem  Church,  Wil 
cox  calmly  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  head  of  Sedgwick's 
column,  which  soon  came  up  pushing  Maj.  Collins' 
small  cavalry  detachment  down  the  road.  Lieut.  Cobb 
now  opened  fire  with  his  two  pieces,  but  was  almost  im 
mediately  driven  from  his  position  by  a  battery  with  the 
Federal  advance  guard,  and  fell  back  upon  Moore's 
position,  soon  followed  by  Wilcox's  Brigade,  which  re 
formed  on  the  line  already  occupied  by  McLaws' 
troops  at  Salem  Church. 

Leaving  Wofford  at  the  junction  of  the  turnpike  and 
Plank  Road,  McLaws  formed  his  line  of  battle  perpen 
dicular  to  the  latter  in  front  of  the  church,  with  Mahone 
on  the  left,  Semmes  next,  then  Wilcox  across  the  road, 
and  Kershaw  on  the  right.  Wofford  took  position  on 
Kershaw's  right  when  ordered  up,  while  the  two  bat 
teries  remained  in  the  road.  Wllcox  placed  a  number  of 
his  men  in  the  church  and  also  some  in  a  schoolhouse 
about  60  yards  in  advance  of  his  line.  These  dis 
positions  had  hardly  been  made  when  Brooks'  Division 
moving  forward  rapidly  in  line  of  battle,  and  athwart 
the  road,  with  Newton's  Division  in  close  support, 
rushed  into  the  open  space  between  the  toll  gate  and  the 
church,  while  Sedgwick's  batteries  drove  Moore  and 
Penick  from  the  road  after  the  latter  had  fired  a  single 
shot.  Thus  McLaws  was  left  entirely  without  artillery 
in  the  engagement  which  followed.  The  Confederate 
line,  however,  lay  well  retired,  in  a  thick  growth  of 
woods  which  afforded  much  shelter  from  the  hostile 
guns. 


528  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

After  shelling  the  woods  for  about  20  minutes,  the 
Federals  advanced,  Bartlett's  Brigade,  which  boasted  it 
had  never  been  repulsed,  on  the  left  of  the  first  line.  On 
came  the  charging  troops,  cheering  as  they  entered  the 
woods,  but  when  they  had  pressed  to  within  80  yards  of 
the  Confederate  line  they  were  received  by  a  tremendous 
volley  of  musketry  which  momentarily  checked  the  ad 
vance.  In  spite  of  the  Confederate  fire,  Bartlett's  brave 
men  soon  recovered  their  formation  and  swept  on,  tak 
ing  the  schoolhouse  and  its  small  garrison  as  it  passed. 
But  Wilcox,  having  held  a  regiment  in  reserve,  now 
hurled  it  upon  Bartlett's  disordered  line,  and  after  a 
desperate  encounter  at  close  quarters,  the  Federals 
were  broken  and  pressed  back  past  the  schoolhouse. 
Brooks'  right  had  also  been  checked  and  broken.  Sedg- 
wick  hurried  forward  his  second  line  to  save  the  day, 
but  all  in  vain,  for  Semmes  and  Wilcox  advanced  their 
entire  brigades  and  drove  the  enemy  from  the  field  clear 
back  to  the  toll  gate  in  a  dangerously  prolonged  pur 
suit.  At  that  point  Sedgwick's  massed  reserves,  to 
gether  with  the  closing  in  of  night,  forbade  further 
progress  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates.  Meanwhile, 
Col.  Alexander  with  his  battalion  and  Maj.  Hamilton 
with  Manly's  and  McCarthy's  batteries  of  Cabell's  Bat 
talion,  had  been  ordered  from  the  Chancellorsville 
plateau  down  the  Plank  Road  to  the  support  of  Mc- 
Laws,  but  arrived  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  engage 
ment.  The  necessity  of  withdrawing  these  guns  from 
so  critical  a  point  was  due  simply  to  the  fact  that  Gen. 
Lee  was  entirely  without  an  artillery  reserve.  Every 
piece,  except  those  of  Nelson's  Battalion,  which  had 
been  ordered  to  the  rear  as  a  result  of  the  disastrous 
verbal  order  erroneously  transmitted  by  Chilton,  was 
engaged.  Salem  Church  was  in  effect  a  rear  guard 
action,  and  for  use  in  such  a  contingency  reserve  ar 
tillery  was  created.  One  cannot  fail  to  see  how  crippled 
the  commander-in-chief  had  been  by  the  loss  of  two  of  his 
battalions.  Had  they  been  present,  Pendleton's  two  bat 
talions  would  no  doubt  have  been  available  as  a  reserve, 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  529 

instead  of  being  committed  at  the  outset.  As  a  reserve, 
these  battalions  would  have  been  held  at  Gen.  Lee's 
immediate  disposal,  and  would  have,  therefore,  been 
among  the  first  troops  to  arrive  at  Salem  Church  in  sup 
port  of  Wilcox.  McLaws  would  then  have  had  Nelson's 
and  Cutts'  six  fresh  batteries,  with  which  to  repulse 
Sedgwick  instead  of  parts  of  two  much-damaged  ones, 
without  ammunition  enough  to  remain  in  action  at  the 
critical  moment.  Since  Gen.  Lee  was  able  to  withdraw 
Alexander's  four  and  Hamilton's  two  batteries  from 
Chancellorsville,  it  is  apparent  that  he  would  have  been 
free  to  dispense  with  Pendleton's  six  batteries  had  they 
been  present,  and  without  weakening  his  front  by  taking 
so  many  guns  from  his  advanced  lines. 

The  sturdy  Wilcox  had,  however,  almost  without  ar 
tillery  fought  a  superb  rear  guard  action.  Few  better 
examples  of  the  kind  are  to  be  found.  In  the  nick  of 
time,  he  had  interposed  his  small  force  between  the 
enemy  and  Lee's  rear,  after  Early  and  Pendleton  had 
been  forced  from  the  path.  But  much  credit  is  also  due 
Early  and  Pendleton,  for  they  with  10,000  men  and  a 
few  guns  had  for  the  better  part  of  two  days  neutralized 
Sedgwick's  whole  corps  of  30,000  men.  Wilcox's  Bri 
gade  had  lost  500  officers  and  men,  but  Bartlett's  Bri 
gade  alone  of  some  1,500  men  had  experienced  casual 
ties  aggregating  580. 

Sedgwick's  line  now  extended  from  the  river  above 
Banks'  Ford  to  Fredericksburg,  and  during  the  night 
a  bridge  was  thrown  at  the  ford. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

CHANCELLORSVILLE MAY    4 

AN  hour  before  sunset  on  the  3d,  Early  was  informed 
that  McLaws  was  moving  down  the  Plank  Road  to 
meet  Sedgwick,  and  that  he,  Early,  was  expected,  if 
possible,  to  cooperate  with  McLaws  in  overwhelming 
the  enemy's  column.  Early  was  then  three  miles  from 
Salem  Church  and,  satisfied  that  he  could  render  no  as 
sistance  to  McLaws  at  so  late  an  hour,  advised  him  that 
he  would  concentrate  his  force  during  the  night,  and  en 
deavor  to  drive  the  enemy  from  Lee's  and  Marye's  hills 
at  dawn,  throwing  forward  his  left  to  connect  with 
Wofford  on  the  right  of  Salem  Church.  Both  Lee  and 
McLaws  approved  this  plan. 

It  was  late  in  the  evening  when  Early  succeeded  ir» 
concentrating  his  division,  one  battery  only  with  a  regi 
ment  of  infantry  in  support  being  left  on  the  right  of 
the  Cox  house  ridge,  so  as  to  guard  the  flank  beyond  the 
Telegraph  Road  against  any  movement  of  the  enemy 
up  the  Deep  Creek  Valley.  Early 's  plan  was  to  ad 
vance  along  the  Telegraph  Road  with  Gordon's  Bri 
gade  in  the  front  line,  followed  by  Andrews'  Battalion 
of  artillery  and  Graham's  Battery,  with  Smith's  and 
Barksdale's  brigades  in  rear  forming  a  second  line,  and 
to  throw  Hays'  and  Hoke's  brigades  across  Hazel  Run 
opposite  his  position  so  as  to  move  down  the  left  bank 
while  he  attacked  the  heights  held  by  the  enemy  along 
the  road.  Upon  recovering  Marye's  and  Lee's  hills, 
he  proposed  to  occupy  them  with  Pendleton's  batteries 
and  Barksdale's  men  while  Hays  and  Hoke,  crossing 
Hazel  Hun  at  the  ford  on  his  left,  connected  with  Mc 
Laws,  and  Gordon  and  Smith  moved  along  the  Plank 
Road  up  river. 

At  dawn,  Gordon  moved  off  along  the  Telegraph 
Road  and  found  Lee's  Hill  unoccupied,  but  a  body  of 
hostile  infantry  moving  westward  along  the  Plank 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  531 

Road  halted  and  took  position  behind  an  embankment 
of  the  road  between  Marye's  Hill  and  the  ridge  above. 
In  the  valley  between  Guest's  and  Downman's  houses, 
there  was  also  a  large  body  of  the  enemy's  infantry  and 
a  battery  at  the  latter  house.  Andrews,  who  had  accom 
panied  Gordon,  now  placed  Graham's  Battery  in 
position  on  the  Telegraph  Road  along  the  western  face 
of  Lee's  Hill,  and  opened  on  the  enemy's  troops  in  the 
valley,  while  Gordon's  skirmishers  descended  the  hill 
and  advanced  upon  them.  At  this  juncture,  two  large 
bodies  of  hostile  infantry,  probably  brigades,  crossed 
the  ridge  just  beyond  the  Alum  Spring  Mill  and 
threatened  Gordon's  left,  as  his  line  advanced,  but 
Graham  shifted  his  fire  upon  them  and  drove  them  to 
cover.  Gordon  then  made  a  dash  across  the  run  and 
after  a  sharp  encounter  drove  off  the  enemy  behind  the 
road  embankment,  captured  some  prisoners,  several 
commissary  wagons,  and  a  battery  wagon  and  a  forge 
with  their  teams.  This  gave  Early  possession  of 
Marye's  and  Cemetery  hills  again,  and  while  Smith 
moved  up  to  the  support  of  Gordon,  Barksdale  reoc- 
cupied  the  sunken  road  behind  the  wall  at  the  base  of 
Marye's  Hill,  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  batteries  on 
Stafford  Heights,  and  was  ordered  to  seize  the  town 
itself,  the  bridge  head,  and  a  large  wagon  camp  seen 
there.  But  Barksdale  was  unable  to  occupy  the  town, 
which  was  still  held  by  Gibbon's  Division  of  the  2d 
Corps,  and  the  wagon  train  decamped. 

Having  disposed  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  Graham 
turned  his  two  20-pounder  Parrotts  upon  the  battery  at 
Downman's  which  had  been  free  to  fire  upon  him,  and 
drove  it  off  to  the  Guest  house  out  of  reach. 

The  enemy  now  held  a  line  of  shallow  trenches  ex 
tending  from  Taylor's  Hill  to  the  brow  of  the  hill  be 
yond  Alum  Spring  Mill,  while  Gordon  and  Smith  had 
occupied  the  trenches  along  the  crests  from  the  Plank 
Road  towards  Taylor's  Hill,  with  their  backs  towards 
Fredericksburg.  Smith  was  now  ordered  to  advance 
towards  Taylor's  Hill,  and  in  pressing  forward  up  the 


532  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

slope  was  opened  upon  by  the  Federal  batteries  at  the 
Taylor  house  with  such  effect  that  his  movement  was 
checked.  The  enemy  appeared  in  such  strength  and  in 
flicted  such  losses  upon  him  that  his  brigade  was  with 
drawn  to  its  former  position. 

Hays'  and  Hoke's  brigades  had,  meanwhile,  moved 
down  the  left  bank  of  Hazel  Run,  and  had  taken  up  a 
position  from  which  they  could  connect  with  McLaws' 
right,  by  moving  across  the  ridge  on  which  Downman's 
house  stood,  and  of  this  fact  Early  now  notified  Mc 
Laws.  McLaws  did  not  attack,  however,  but  informed 
Early  that  Anderson  was  coming  up  to  his  support. 
When  these  troops  began  to  arrive  at  Salem  Church, 
Early  drew  Hays  and  Hoke  further  back  to  his  right, 
placing  the  former  in  line  at  the  base  of  the  Alum 
Springs  Hill,  from  which  concealed  position  the  brigade 
might  move  up  the  wooded  slope  on  to  the  plain  above, 
which  was  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Hoke  was  concealed 
in  the  woods  on  the  lower  end  of  the  Downman  house 
ridge.  Gen.  Lee  now  arrived  and,  personally  examining 
Early's  dispositions,  approved  his  plan  of  attack,  which 
was  for  Hays  and  Hoke  to  press  forward  to  the  Plank 
Road,  while  Gordon  supported  by  Smith  endeavored  to 
sweep  the  crests  in  front  of  him,  and  to  turn  the  Federal 
left  resting  on  the  river. 

Sedgwick's  main  line  covered  the  Plank  Road  for 
some  distance  on  the  south  side,  its  center  on  the  ridge 
along  which  the  road  runs  and  both  flanks  retired  and 
resting  on  the  river  above  and  below.  His  main  ar 
tillery  position  was  within  his  line  and  at  the  Guest 
house,  while  other  guns  were  on  his  left  front  facing 
Early.  Skirmishers  were  thrown  out  upon  the  ridges 
in  his  front. 

When  dawn  broke,  no  communication  had  yet  been  re 
ceived  from  Hooker  by  Sedgwick,  and  he  was  still  under 
orders  to  move  to  Chancellors ville.  At  an  early  hour, 
Early's  movements  in  the  latter's  rear  had  caused  him  to 
deploy  Howe's  Division  facing  to  the  rear  and  perpen 
dicular  to  the  Plank  Road.  His  scouts  had  reported 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  533 

that  a  column  of  the  enemy,  15,000  strong,  had  arrived 
from  Richmond  and  occupied  the  heights  at  Fredericks- 
burg.  At  once  abandoning  all  idea  of  taking  the  ag 
gressive,  Sedgwick  was  bent  only  upon  crossing  the 
river,  but  this  in  spite  of  the  bridge  at  Banks'  Ford, 
now  within  his  line,  he  did  not  dare  attempt  by  day 
light.  And  so,  with  a  line  much  attenuated  and  facing 
in  three  directions,  east,  south,  and  west,  he  awaited 
events.  At  last  a  welcome  dispatch  from  Hooker,  which 
authorized  him  to  cross  at  Banks'  Ford,  or  fall  back 
upon  Fredericksburg,  and  directing  him  not  to  attack, 
was  received;  but  a  little  later  another  message  arrived 
urging  Sedgwick  to  hold  a  position  on  the  south  bank, 
to  which  he  replied  that  he  was  threatened  on  two 
fronts,  that  his  line  was  a  poor  one  for  defense,  and  that 
his  bridge  was  endangered,  closing  with  a  request  for 
assistance.  Receiving  no  reply  to  this  message  he  de 
cided  to  remain  in  position  until  nightfall.  Howe's  Di 
vision  still  extended  from  the  river  to  a  point  a  short 
distance  south  of  the  Plank  Road.  Brooks'  Division 
was  on  the  right  of  Howe,  forming  line  at  right  angles 
with  him,  and  parallel  to  the  road,  while  Newton's  Divi 
sion  formed  the  west  front  occupying  its  position  of  the 
evening  before  and  extending  to  the  river  above  the 
bridge. 

Anderson  had  arrived  at  Salem  Church  by  midday, 
and  after  some  delay  his  three  brigades  were  moved  into 
line  on  Early 's  left.  Between  Anderson's  left  and  Mc- 
Laws'  right,  the  latter  confronting  Newton's  Division, 
a  large  gap  existed  which  was  to  be  closed  as  the  whole 
line  advanced  upon  the  enemy.  The  Confederate  line 
from  Lee's  Hill  to  McLaws'  left  was  six  miles  or  more 
in  extent. 

Pendleton  after  reestablishing  Walton's  guns  on 
Marye's  Hill  and  Fraser's  Battery  with  a  number  of 
others  on  Lee's  Hill,  moved  Carlton's  Battery  and 
Ross's  which  had  rejoined  him  from  Port  Royal  during 
the  night,  as  far  forward  from  the  Telegraph  Road  to 
wards  the  Guest  house  as  possible,  and  also  attempted 


534  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

to  find  a  good  position  for  the  Whitworth  with  which 
Lieut.  Tunis  had  returned.  Andrews  with  his  battalion 
occupied  positions  along  the  Telegraph  Road,  while 
Alexander  had  sent  Taylor's  (Eubank's),  Woolf oik's, 
and  Moody's  batteries  of  his  own  battalion  under  Maj. 
Huger  to  cooperate  with  Anderson's  brigades.  Moody's 
Battery  moved  far  off  to  Anderson's  right  towards  the 
Telegraph  Road.  Manly's  Battery  remained  with  Wil- 
cox  near  the  church. 

It  was  not  until  6  p.  M.  that  McLaws  gave  the  signal 
for  attack,  when  Hoke  moved  at  once  across  the  plateau 
between  Downman's  house  and  Hazel  Run,  under  cover 
of  Ross's  and  Caiiton's  fire,  then  down  the  slope,  across 
the  valley,  and  up  the  steep  ascent  of  the  Plank  Road 
ridge,  driving  the  enemy's  skirmishers  before  him,  while 
the  hostile  guns  at  the  Guest  house  played  upon,  but 
failed  to  break,  his  line.  Hays  also  swept  the  enemy's 
advance  line  from  his  front.  These  two  brigades  with 
unsurpassed  ardor  pressed  on  without  halting  for  a 
moment,  and  were  lustily  cheered  by  the  gunners  in  their 
rear  whose  fire  was  masked  by  the  advance.  From  the 
artillery  positions  along  the  Telegraph  Road,  the  sight 
was  indeed  an  inspiring  one,  and  filled  the  hearts  of  the 
artillerymen  with  enthusiasm  and  admiration  for  the 
gallant  infantry  which  they  were  powerless  to  assist. 

Gordon  had  advanced  along  the  Plank  Road  ravine, 
formed  in  line,  and  with  the  utmost  elan  swept  on  to 
wards  the  Taylor  house.  Brushing  the  enemy's 
skirmishers  from  the  forward  crests,  he  forced  the  ar 
tillery  on  that  flank  to  retire  rapidly,  only  halting  when 
the  Federals  had  been  driven  pellmell  from  Taylor's 
Hill  towards  Banks'  Ford.  Even  the  guns  at  the  Guest 
house  had  been  compelled  to  fly  in  order  to  escape 
capture.  Thus  had  the  enemy  been  thrown  into  con 
fusion  on  all  sides  when  Hoke  was  wounded,  and  his 
brigade,  colliding  with  Hays'  men  in  the  woods,  lost  its 
direction  and  was  thrown  into  confusion  beyond  the 
Plank  Road.  Hays'  Brigade  pressed  on  with  such  men 
of  Hoke's  as  had  mingled  with  it,  but  having  also  be- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  535 

come  disordered  in  the  woods,  was  checked  by  a  retir 
ing  force  of  the  enemy,  which  had  been  rallied  to  meet 
the  advance  and  which  drove  the  Confederates  back  to 
the  Plank  Road.  Here  Hays  succeeded  in  rallying  the 
regiments  of  the  two  brigades  to  the  support  of  which 
Early  brought  up  a  part  of  Smith's  Brigade.  But  be 
fore  the  Confederates  could  be  reformed,  night  had 
fallen,  and  with  Smith's  two  regiments  in  front,  Hays' 
and  Hoke's  brigades  rested  in  position  along  the  Plank 
Road.  Gordon  had  also  come  to  a  standstill  by  reason 
of  the  approach  of  darkness,  on  the  Taylor  House  Hill 
confronting  the  enemy's  left.  McLaws'  Division  had 
not  advanced  at  all.  Anderson's  Division  had  pressed 
forward  on  Hoke's  left,  driving  the  enemy's  skirmishers, 
which  confronted  his  center,  from  the  Downman  house 
and  the  upper  part  of  the  ridge,  but  it  did  not  cross  the 
Plank  Road  until  dark,  and  none  of  its  batteries  were 
engaged.  When  the  attack  came  to  an  end,  Posey  ex 
tended  Early 's  left,  with  Wright  further  down  the  road, 
towards  Salem  Church.  Beyond  Anderson  was  Mc 
Laws  with  two  of  Alexander's  batteries  and  Harda- 
way's  group  on  the  river  road  on  his  left. 

During  the  early  morning  Alexander  had  been 
directed  to  post  some  of  his  guns  so  as  to  prevent  Sedg- 
wick  from  advancing  along  the  River  Road  to  unite  with 
Hooker  at  Chancellorsville,  and  for  this  purpose  he  had 
placed  Jordan's  Battery  on  a  bluff  commanding  the 
road,  where  the  guns  were  intrenched.  These  guns  were 
now  able  to  fire  upon  Banks'  Ford,  as  were  those  of 
Andrews'  Battalion,  which  had  been  moved  up  to 
the  Taylor  House  Hill  when  the  battle  ended.  Manly's 
Battery  was  also  most  effective  in  firing  upon  the  re 
treating  enemy,  while  Hardaway  with  a  number  of  bat 
teries  was  nearby. 

We  have  seen  that  after  the  seizure  of  the  Chancellors 
ville  plateau  on  the  3d,  Hardaway  had  been  dispatched 
to  Scott's  Dam  with  13  rifled  pieces.  Some  time 
was  required  for  the  assembling  of  his  force,  the  organi 
zation  of  his  column,  and  the  refilling  of  his  caissons. 


536  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

The  roads  were  also  very  heavy  and  difficult  and  it  was 
well  after  dark  before  Hardaway,  moving  northward 
along  the  River  Road,  came  up  to  the  position  of  the 
3d  Virginia  Cavalry  near  the  Hayden  house,  with  10 
of  his  guns.  Gen.  Anderson  had  meantime  halted 
Hurt's  three  pieces  on  the  road  some  distance  in  rear,  as 
the  weight  of  the  carriages  was  such  that  it  was  doubtful 
whether  the  teams  could  draw  them  through  the  mud. 

Hooker's  wagon  trains,  in  park  and  with  camp-fires 
burning,  were  plainly  visible  at  the  base  of  a  hill  about 
a  mile  from  the  bluffs  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river, 
when  Hardaway  in  company  with  an  engineer  officer 
reconnoitered  the  ground.  About  3  A.  M.  he  brought 
up  his  10  guns  to  the  bluff  in  front  of  the  Hayden  house, 
and  after  firing  15  rounds  per  gun,  the  pieces  were 
limbered  up  and  started  back  through  the  mud  to  Chan- 
cellorsville,  while  Hardaway  remained  to  discover  by 
daylight  the  effect  of  his  fire.  The  horses  of  the  train 
when  fired  upon  had  been  picketed  in  a  field  on  the  slope 
of  the  hill  on  the  river  side  of  the  wagon  park.  Many 
of  them  had  been  killed  or  injured,  as  well  as  some  of 
the  teamsters,  and  a  number  of  wagons  had  been 
destroyed  by  shelling.  But  the  results  of  such  an  enter 
prise  are  never  very  serious,  and  have  practically  no  ef 
fect  upon  the  main  operations  of  the  enemy.  It  is  ex 
ceedingly  doubtful  if  in  this  case  the  injury  inflicted  by 
Hardaway  was  worth  the  ammunition  expended. 

While  the  column  was  returning  the  enemy  made  a 
demonstration  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  below 
United  States  Ford  as  if  to  cut  off  Hardaway's  com 
mand,  whereupon  the  batteries  were  hurried  to  the  rear, 
leaving  Anderson's  skirmishers  to  check  the  attack, 
which  proved  not  to  be  serious. 

Anderson  was  now  ordered  to  proceed  to  Salem 
Church,  and  Hardaway's  artillery  detachment  was 
directed  to  follow.  Upon  approaching  the  church, 
Alexander  halted  Hardaway's  command,  directing 
Parker  with  his  remaining  section  to  join  it.  Send 
ing  Jordan's  Battery  to  the  position  on  the  River 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  537 

Road  before  referred  to  he  set  out  to  determine  what 
position  was  best  for  Hardaway  to  occupy.  In  a  short 
while  the  latter  was  directed  to  move  his  guns  from  the 
Plank  Road  to  Smith's  Hill  to  the  north  and  drive  off  a 
Federal  battery  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  which 
had  enfiladed  McLaws'  line  whenever  it  attempted  to 
advance  towards  Fredericksburg.  It  was  now  about 
10  A.  M.,  and  meanwhile  Anderson  had  commenced  to 
move  forward,  directing  Hardaway  to  follow  him  to  the 
right  of  the  church.  Under  this  conflict  of  orders, 
Hardaway  galloped  forward  to  consult  Anderson,  who 
referred  him  to  Gen.  Lee.  Since  Alexander  had  sent 
Maj.  Huger  with  the  10  guns  of  his  own  battalion  to  the 
right  in  support  of  Anderson,  Hardaway  was  ordered 
to  comply  with  the  orders  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery, 
which  he  proceeded  to  do. 

Hardaway  had  been  informed  that  he  would  find  pits 
for  his  guns  at  Smith's  Hill,  but  upon  arriving  at  the 
designated  position,  found  intrenchments  for  but  four 
pieces.  Many  of  his  men  and  horses  had  been  without 
rations  for  24  hours,  while  they  had  been  continually  on 
the  move  since  leaving  Chancellorsville  the  evening  be 
fore.  So  sultry  and  oppressive  was  the  day  that  a  num 
ber  of  his  gunners  fainted  while  engaged  in  the  work 
of  clearing  away  the  timber  and  digging  gun  pits.  But 
at  last  the  axe  details  from  the  gun  detachments  com 
pleted  their  work,  and  most  of  the  pieces  were  in  position 
and  fairly  well  protected  before  the  attack  was  ready  to 
be  made. 

To  the  left  of  Jordan's  four  pieces,  which  occupied  a 
position  across  a  ravine,  and  some  900  yards  down  the 
road,  W.  P.  Carter's  four  guns  were  posted  on  the  bluff, 
with  Fry's  two  guns  to  the  left  of  him.  Parker's  section 
and  three  pieces  of  Penick's  (Lewis')  Battery  occupied 
pits  on  a  knob  to  the  left  rear  and  some  40  feet  higher 
than  the  bluff  on  which  Carter  and  Fry  were  posted. 
Hurt  with  a  Whitworth  occupied  a  pit  at  the  bend  of 
the  ridge  80  yards  or  more  to  the  left  of  the  knob,  while 
200  yards  to  the  rear  and  100  to  the  left  McCarthy's 


538  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

two   guns   and   Marye's   two  held   the   ridge.      Lieut. 
Ferrell's  section  of  Hurt's  Battery  was  kept  in  reserve. 

The  part  played  in  the  action  of  the  day  by  Harda- 
way's  command,  while  a  secondary,  was  quite  an  im 
portant  one.  As  soon  as  Early,  Anderson,  and  Mc- 
Laws  became  engaged,  his  guns  opened  upon  the  Fed 
eral  Battery  of  eight  pieces  in  earthworks  about  a  house 
on  the  bluff  of  the  north  bank,  and  immediately  op 
posite  Smith's  Hill.  Other  Federal  guns  soon  came  into 
action,  two  from  a  point  400  yards  below,  and  two  in  a 
thicket  200  yards  above  the  main  battery.  The  fire  of 
these  12  guns  was  principally  directed  at  the  four  guns 
of  McCarthy's  and  Marye's  batteries  and  the  Whit- 
worth,  all  of  which  stood  in  the  open.  At  one  time  the 
fire  of  Hardaway's  right  guns  was  all  but  silenced,  which 
enabled  the  enemy  to  concentrate  more  successfully  on 
those  to  the  left.  But  going  to  the  right  of  his  position, 
Hardaway  in  person  encouraged  his  gunners  to  re 
double  their  efforts. 

Never  in  the  war  was  a  duel  with  the  Federal  ar 
tillery  conducted  under  more  disadvantageous  circum 
stances.  Although  the  shells  were  provided  with  the 
fuse-igniter  attachment,  but  one  Confederate  shell  in 
fifteen  burst  while  the  Federal  ammunition  was  most  ef 
fective.  Hardaway,  an  officer  of  much  scientific  knowl 
edge,  afterwards  declared  that  the  meal  powder  was 
knocked  off  the  fuses  while  they  were  being  driven  home 
with  the  mallet,  but  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  was  in  ef 
fect  using  solid  shot  almost  entirely,  six  of  the  enemy's 
guns  in  the  central  work  were  disabled,  and  the  other 
two  were  driven  from  their  position,  while  the  remaining 
four  pieces  were  practically  silenced,  though  they  main 
tained  a  desultory  fire  until  after  dark.  Meantime,  Mc 
Carthy's  section,  which  had  expended  its  ammunition, 
had  been  relieved  by  Ferrell's  section  of  Hurt's  Battery, 
and  sent  to  the  rear.  Hardaway's  task  had  been  well 
executed,  for  by  the  continuous  action  of  his  guns,  the 
fire  of  the  Federal  artillery  on  McLaws'  left,  hitherto 
so  destructive  to  the  infantry,  had  been  completely 
diverted. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  539 

As  night  closed  in  a  thick  fog  had  settled  over  the 
field  which  added  greatly  to  the  difficulties  of  the  Con 
federates,  who  were  thus  again  balked  of  the  fruits  of 
victory  by  darkness,  and  the  delay  in  attacking.  Under 
cover  of  the  fog,  Brooks'  and  Newton's  divisions  re 
formed  about  the  ford,  and  upon  them  Howe's  broken 
division  fell  back  and  also  reformed  under  cover  of  34 
guns  on  the  north  bank,  protecting  the  bridge  at  Banks' 
and  the  one  at  Scott's  Ford,  a  short  distance  below. 

Sedgwick  had  suffered  too  severely  to  think  of  an 
other  day's  battle  with  his  troops  in  their  present 
position.  In  two  days  he  had  lost  over  5,000  of  his  men. 
He,  therefore,  advised  Hooker  that  his  position  was 
commanded  by  the  enemy's  guns  on  the  Taylor  House 
Hill,  and  asked  if  he  should  risk  remaining  on  the  south 
bank.  At  1  A.  M.  he  received  orders  from  Hooker's 
Chief  of  Staff  to  "withdraw  under  cover,"  and  by  5 
A.  M.  the  entire  corps  had  crossed  the  river  and  taken  up 
its  bridges.  But  the  crossing  had  not  been  accomplished 
without  some  loss,  for  Alexander  had  during  the  after 
noon  busied  himself  establishing  points  of  direction  for 
night  firing  upon  the  position  about  the  ford  in  antici 
pation  of  Sedgwick' s  retreat,  and  during  the  night 
Jordan  was  able  to  fire  upon  the  masses  huddled  about 
the  crossing,  causing  the  enemy  much  annoyance. 

This  was  perhaps  the  first  instance  of  the  employment 
of  indirect  fire  by  the  Confederate  Artillery.  Jordan's 
position  along  the  bluff  to  the  left  of  the  River  Road, 
facing  towards  Banks'  Ford,  was  obscured  from  the 
latter  point  by  intervening  ridges  and  thickets  over 
which  by  means  of  Alexander's  deflection  marks  the 
fire  could  be  directed  upon  the  enemy.  About  1  A.  M. 
Hardaway  had  also  withdrawn  Carter's  and  Fraser's 
four  pieces  on  his  right  and  shifting  his  line  so  as  to  face 
the  ford,  opened  fire  down  the  ravine  leading  thereto,  but 
was  soon  directed  by  Alexander  to  cease  firing  as  Mc- 
Laws  was  sending  two  brigades  in  that  direction.  Rid 
ing  forward  to  the  picket  line  of  the  infantry  to  secure 
the  exact  direction  of  the  pontoon  bridges,  and  hearing 


540  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

the  artillery  of  the  enemy  crossing,  Hardaway  re 
turned  and  again  shifted  his  guns  so  as  to  deliver  an 
indirect  fire  upon  the  approaches  to  the  ford  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river,  and  caused  his  guns  to  fire  from 
right  to  left,  at  the  rate  of  about  one  shot  a  minute. 
About  2  A.  M.  Hurt's  Whitworth  was  directed  upon  a 
deep  hollow  leading  towards  Falmouth,  in  which  many 
stragglers,  wagons,  etc.,  could  be  seen  by  the  light  of 
the  numerous  fires  along  the  line  of  retreat.  Later  it 
was  turned  upon  a  large  wagon  train  concentrated  at 
the  junction  of  the  Aquia  Creek  and  United  States 
Ford  roads.  Although  the  range  was  about  3  miles, 
the  fire  of  the  Whitworth  was  soon  adjusted  and 
created  consternation  in  the  wagon  park,  causing  the 
train  to  disperse  in  the  utmost  disorder.  The  am 
munition  for  the  large  rifle  being  very  scarce  and  ex 
pensive  the  fire  soon  ceased. 

All  day  on  the  4th,  Brown's,  Walker's,  Mclntosh's, 
and  Jones'  battalions  had  been  held  in  position  along 
the  Chancellorsville  plateau,  the  cannoneers  requiring 
no  encouragement  to  throw  up  hasty  works  for  the  guns. 
With  the  exception  of  Walker's  batteries,  which  had 
been  turned  over  the  night  before  to  Maj.  Pegram,  none 
of  the  Artillery  was  seriously  engaged,  though  most  of 
the  batteries  fired  upon  the  enemy's  works  from  time  to 
time.  Early  in  the  morning,  18  or  20  Federal  guns 
opened  fire  upon  Pegram's  position  on  the  Plank  Road, 
and,  after  a  somewhat  protracted  duel,  ceased  to  fire. 
In  this  affair,  Pegram  seems  to  have  had  the  better  of 
it,  for  his  guns  all  remained  in  position  until  the  morn 
ing  of  the  6th,  when  the  enemy's  withdrawal  was  dis 
covered. 

While  Sedgwick's  last  brigade  was  crossing,  he  re 
ceived  an  order  from  Hooker  countermanding  the 
authority  previously  given  for  the  withdrawal  to  which, 
at  5  A.  M.  Sedgwick  replied  that  it  was  too  late,  and  that 
the  bridges  were  already  being  taken  up  while  his  men 
were  much  exhausted. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  541 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  escaped,  it 
was  with  great  elation  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  that 
Huger's  and  Andrews'  guns  fired  the  last  shots  across 
the  river  at  Sedgwick's  retreating  columns,  and  that 
the  Confederates  at  sunrise  found  themselves  in  com 
plete  possession  of  the  southern  bank  of  the  river  from 
Fredericksburg  to  Hooker's  contracted  position  above 
Chancellorsville.  The  movement  against  Sedgwick  had 
been  a  complete  success,  and  even  Gibbon  had  been  with 
drawn  across  the  river  from  the  town  during  the  night, 
while  Hooker  had  not  ventured  from  his  works  to  as 
sist  the  inferior  force  which  he  had  ordered  up  to  his 
own  relief.  The  whole  situation  presents  a  tactical 
anomaly.  Hemming  a  vastly  superior  enemy  up  in  his 
works  in  front  of  United  States  Ford,  Lee  had  with 
drawn  much  of  his  artillery  and  the  larger  part  of  two 
divisions  of  infantry  from  his  front  to  hurl  upon  an 
equal  force,  which  had  already  pushed  his  rear  guard 
aside,  and,  uniting  them  with  that  broken  rear  guard, 
had  assailed  an  entire  Federal  corps  of  30,000  men,  rated 
among  the  best  of  his  adversaries,  overthrowing  it  and 
driving  it  across  the  river  at  Banks'  Ford,  in  some  dis 
order  at  least,  in  the  very  face  of  the  main  army  of  the 
enemy.  But  still  the  bold  commander-in-chief  was  not 
satisfied  with  what  he  had  done.  He  knew  that  Sedg 
wick's  Corps  had  suffered  so  severely  in  men  and  morale 
that  it  was  not  available  for  immediate  service,  even 
had  it  been  transferred  to  Chancellorsville,  instead  of 
being  headed  for  Falmouth.  During  the  afternoon  of 
the  5th,  therefore,  leaving  Early's  Division,  Barks- 
dale's  Brigade  and  Pendleton's  artillery  to  guard  the 
river  from  Banks'  Ford  to  the  crossings  below  Fred 
ericksburg,  he  ordered  Anderson  and  McLaws  to  re 
turn  to  Chancellorsville  with  a  view  to  assailing 
Hooker's  position.  What  was  known  of  that  position 
satisfied  every  man  in  the  Confederate  Army  that  the 
worst  was  yet  to  come.  Ninety  thousand  men  behind 
works  covering  a  front  of  five  miles,  which  they  had  had 
48  hours  to  prepare,  with  all  the  advantages  which  un- 


542  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

limited  quantities  of  timber,  broken  ground,  and  diffi 
cult  approaches  through  a  dense  forest  gave  them  for 
defense,  with  three-fourths  of  their  front  covered  by 
streams  on  their  southwest  and  northwest,  and  both 
flanks  resting  on  a  wide  river, — this  was  the  propo 
sition  now  before  some  35,000  Confederates.  Not  only 
would  the  attack  have  to  be  directed  squarely  on  the 
Federal  front,  but  little  assistance  could  be  expected 
from  the  Artillery.  Impenetrable  abattis  covered  the 
entire  line,  and  the  crest  of  the  works  was  everywhere 
surmounted  by  head  logs  with  loopholes,  while  in  rear 
separate  structures  were  provided  for  officers  and  sup 
ports  from  which  the  former  could  see  and  exercise  con 
trol  over  the  defenders,  and  from  which  the  latter  could 
be  moved  up  to  the  advanced  works  under  cover. 

It  is  doubtful  if  in  the  whole  military  career  of  Gen. 
Lee,  a  bolder  resolve  on  his  part  can  be  discovered 
than  this  one  to  hurl  his  troops  upon  Hooker's  final 
position  at  Chancellorsville.  But  again,  it  must  be 
conceded  that  in  arriving  at  a  decision,  seemingly  so 
rash,  if  not  desperate,  he  had  considered  the  moral  at 
titude  of  his  adversary.  Again  he  did  not  count  the 
number  of  noses  and  muskets  as  the  supreme  factor  of 
his  problem.  The  moral  power  of  the  enemy  he  re 
garded  inversely  as  the  strength  of  his  breastworks  and 
preparations  for  defense.  It  was  the  same  unflinching 
determination  which  led  him  to  order  Longstreet  and 
Jackson  back  to  their  lines  at  Sharpsburg  the  preceding 
September,  that  now  enabled  the  great  commander  to 
approach  the  task  before  him  in  so  resolute  a  manner. 
He  saw  too  well  in  both  cases  the  results  which  would 
flow  from  a  more  timid  course,  and  he  knew  that 
Hooker,  like  McClellan,  would  fall  a  victim  to  im 
position.  Lee  has  been  harshly  criticised  for  even  con 
templating  an  assault  on  Hooker's  lines,  but  the  question 
may  be  asked  his  critics,  what  his  position  would  have 
been  had  he  lain  supine  upon  the  fields  he  had  won? 
In  a  frank  answer  to  this  query  is  the  vindication  of  his 
action,  if  any  justification  is  needed.  It  was  certainly 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  543 

not  for  him  to  admit  to  the  enemy  by  inactivity  that  his 
last  bolt  was  spent,  and  invite  the  Federals  to  move  out 
upon  his  army,  weakened  as  it  was  by  four  days  of  tre 
mendous  effort  and  constant  strain.  Why,  may  we  also 
ask,  should  Lee  at  this  juncture,  after  once  having  as 
sumed  the  aggressive,  and  with  unparalleled  audacity 
having  divided  his  army  in  the  face  of  a  superior  enemy, 
now  resort  to  the  defensive?  Was  the  resolve  to  attack 
Hooker  on  the  5th  more  reckless  than  the  actual  at 
tack  which  had  been  made  on  the  2d?  Of  the  two  de 
cisions,  the  writer  is  inclined  to  consider  Jackson's  turn 
ing  movement  by  far  the  more  daring.  But,  whether 
so  or  not,  Lee's  willingness  to  take  upon  him  the  con 
sequent  risk  of  the  maneuver,  retaining  under  his  im 
mediate  control  but  two  small  divisions,  with  a  power 
ful  enemy  both  in  his  front  and  rear,  displayed  a  higher 
courage  than  was  ever  evinced  by  any  other  mortal  man 
upon  the  field  of  battle.  The  maneuver  of  Jackson,  the 
lieutenant,  the  lustre  of  which  has  all  but  obscured  the 
other  incidents  of  the  campaign,  was  indeed  brilliant, 
but  the  courage  of  Lee,  the  captain,  who  permitted  it, 
was  far  more  superb,  for  victory  alone  was  not  the 
stake — a  nation  hung  in  the  balance. 

No.  On  May  5,  Lee  did  just  what  a  general  with 
exceptional  power  to  divine  the  enemy's  thoughts,  and 
the  boldness  to  act  upon  the  latter's  fears,  should  have 
done.  He  drew  his  sword  once  more  to  strike,  knowing 
that  the  flash  of  the  blade  would  itself  strike  terror  to 
a  heart  already  taking  counsel  of  a  timorous  mind.  And 
so,  when  his  forces  were  again  marshalled  for  attack, 
the  blow  became  unnecessary ;  there  was  no  adversary  to 
meet  him.  Critics  deal  too  much  in  numbers.  They 
forget  that  moral  force,  in  the  words  of  Napoleon,  is 
everything  in  war.  Who  shall  say  that  the  violent 
storm  which  caused  Lee  to  postpone  his  attack  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  5th  was  not  as  welcome  to  Lee  as  to 
Hooker?  We  may  surmise  this  with  respect  to  the 
former.  We  have  evidence  from  his  hasty  withdrawal 
across  the  river  under  its  protection  that  it  was  wel 
come  to  the  latter. 


544  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

During  the  afternoon  and  before  Anderson's  troops 
had  come  up  from  Salem  Church,  the  rain  fell  in  tor 
rents,  converting  the  spongy  soil  into  a  vast  quagmire. 
In  spite  of  the  almost  impassable  condition  of  the  roads, 
Alexander  who  had  reconnoitered  the  extreme  Federal 
left  during  the  morning,  and  had  directed  the  scattered 
batteries  to  report  to  their  respective  corps,  moved  his 
own  battalion  by  the  River  Road  and  set  his  men  to 
work  digging  pits  and  preparing  a  position  near  the 
Childs  house,  from  which  to  open  upon  the  enemy  be 
hind  Mine  Run.  The  rain  continued  to  fall,  but  all 
night  the  cannoneers  kept  at  their  work.  Alexander's 
position,  partly  around  the  bend  of  the  river  and  near 
the  bank,  was  such  as  to  enable  his  guns  to  deliver  an 
oblique  fire  upon  a  hostile  group  of  artillery  on  the 
enemy's  extreme  left. 

As  soon  as  Hooker  learned  from  Sedgwick  that  the 
6th  Corps  had  abandoned  the  southern  bank  of  the 
river,  he  too  determined  to  withdraw  to  the  north  bank, 
but  went  through  the  idle  form  of  calling  his  corps 
commanders  together  to  hear  their  views.  As  it  hap 
pened,  the  majority  were  of  his  own  opinion,  but  judg 
ing  from  the  frame  of  mind  of  the  commander-in-chief, 
it  is  doubtful  if  he  would  have  waived  his  own  views  had 
they  all  been  opposed  to  them.  During  the  5th 
preparations  were  made  for  recrossing  the  Rappa- 
hannock  and  an  interior  line  of  works,  running  from 
Scott's  Dam  to  the  mouth  of  Hunting  Run,  was  con 
structed  to  cover  the  withdrawal.  At  nightfall  the  re 
treat,  greatly  favored  by  the  storm,  began.  First  the 
Artillery  crossed  over  the  bridges,  the  ends  of  which 
were  all  but  submerged  by  the  rising  current  which 
threatened  their  destruction.  By  daylight  the  great 
mass  of  the  Federal  Army  was  on  the  north  side,  and  by 
8  A.  M.  the  rear  corps  under  Meade  had  crossed,  leav 
ing  behind  nothing  but  several  field  hospitals  full  of 
wounded  soldiers.  Meanwhile,  at  early  dawn  on  the 
6th,  the  storm  unabated,  while  Lieut.  Taylor  of  Eu- 
bank's  Battery  was  placing  his  four  Napoleons  and 


COLONEL  ROBERT  FRANKLIN   BECKHAM 

CHIEF   HORSE   ARTILLERY 
Killed  at  Franklin,   Tenn.,   18C4 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  545 

Lieut.  J.  D.  Smith,  of  Jordan's  battery,  his  section  in 
the  six  epaulments,  which  Alexander  had  constructed 
near  the  river  during  the  night,  they  were  suddenly 
fired  upon  by  a  group  of  guns  across  the  river  and 
squarely  on  their  own  flank.  A  number  of  men  and 
horses  were  wounded  and  several  dismounted  limber 
chests  exploded  before  the  detachments  succeeded  in 
getting  their  pieces  under  cover.  To  this  fire,  Capt. 
Jordan,  in  command  of  the  guns,  was  quite  unable  to  re 
ply.  During  the  night  the  enemy  had  constructed 
works  on  the  hill  some  800  yards  distant  in  which  two 
batteries  had  been  placed  to  prevent  the  occupation  of 
Jordan's  position,  which  commanded  the  lower  bridge 
at  Scott's  Dam,  and  it  was  only  now  that  it  was  dis 
covered  by  the  Confederate  pickets  that  Hooker  had 
abandoned  his  advanced  lines,  and  that  few  Federal 
troops  remained  on  the  south  side  of  the  river. 

The  batteries  on  the  north  bank  continued  to  ham 
mer  at  Jordan  until  9  A.  M.  when  Alexander  brought 
up  Moody's  Battery,  a  section  of  Parker's,  and  a  24- 
pounder  howitzer  of  Woolf oik's  Battery,  seven  pieces  in 
all,  which,  aided  by  Jordan's  guns,  engaged  the  enemy. 
During  the  duel  which  ensued  two  fresh  hostile  batteries 
to  the  right  of  the  others  uncovered,  and  all  being  well 
protected  Alexander  commanded  his  guns  to  cease  fir 
ing.  Jordan's  six  pieces  remained  under  cover  in  their 
pits,  while  the  enemy  continued  to  fire  upon  him  until 
the  other  guns  were  withdrawn.  This  incident  closed 
the  operations  of  the  Confederate  Artillery  in  the  battle 
of  Chancellorsville,  in  which  Alexander's  Battalion 
alone  had  lost  Brown's  entire  section  of  Parker's  Bat 
tery  by  capture,  6  men  killed,  25  wounded,  21  missing, 
and  46  horses  killed,  disabled,  or  captured,  or  a  total 
loss  in  officers  and  men  of  62,  which  was  about  twenty 
per  cent  of  those  engaged.  The  losses  of  Walton's  and 
Cabell's  battalions  of  the  1st  Corps  were  28  and  45, 
respectively,  while  Garnett's  loss  was  probably  not  less 
than  25.  In  the  2d  Corps,  Brown,  Walker,  Carter, 
Jones,  Mclntosh,  and  Andrews  together  lost  150  men, 


546  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

while  the  total  loss  in  Cutts'  and  Nelson's  reserve  bat 
talions  and  Beckham's  horse  batteries  was  about  30. 
The  aggregate  Artillery  loss  in  personnel  at  Chancel 
lor  sville  was,  therefore,  not  less  than  275,  or  in  the 
neighborhood  of  seven  per  cent  of  the  number  actually 
engaged.  For  field  artillery  at  this  period  the  loss  was 
enormous.  But  the  loss  inflicted  upon  the  enemy's  ar 
tillery  had  been  still  greater.  In  a  report  of  casualties, 
which  Gen.  Hunt  characterized  as  "imperfect,"  he  states 
his  losses  as  5  officers  and  50  men  killed,  13  officers  and 
268  men  wounded,  53  captured  or  missing,  or  an  ag 
gregate  loss  in  personnel  of  389,  not  including  the  horse 
batteries.  In  horses  the  loss  was  389,  and  14  pieces  of 
superior  ordnance  were  taken  by  the  Confederates  who 
themselves  lost  but  8.  Although  Hooker's  entire  loss 
aggregated  16,844  of  all  arms,  that  of  his  artillery  was 
disproportionately  large  for  the  circumstances  under 
which  it  was  engaged. 

Nor  had  the  Federal  Artillery  by  any  means  meas 
ured  up  to  its  former  standard  of  efficiency.  The  reason 
is  not  difficult  to  discover.  The  command  of  the  Artillery 
which  had  been  committed  to  Hunt  by  both  McClellan 
and  Burnside  was  withdrawn  from  him  by  Hooker,  and 
the  splendid  soldier  whose  services  at  Malvern  Hill, 
Sharpsburg,  and  Fredericksburg  had  won  great  fame 
for  him  as  an  artillerist,  was  relegated  to  a  purely  ad 
ministrative  duty.  Not  only  was  the  superb  organiza 
tion  which  he  had  perfected  much  broken  up  by  scatter 
ing  the  Artillery  here  and  there,  and  giving  the  various 
corps  and  division  commanders  too  high  a  degree  of 
control  over  it,  but  many  of  the  batteries,  unknown  to 
Hunt,  were  ordered  to  be  left  in  camp  on  the  north  side 
of  the  river  when  Hooker's  main  force  moved  to  Chan- 
cellorsville.  The  promotion  and  transfer  of  numbers 
of  the  old  regular  artillery  officers  to  other  branches  of 
the  service  also  deprived  many  of  the  divisional  bat 
talions  of  experienced  commanders,  and  throughout  the 
arm  a  great  deficiency  in  the  quality  and  number  of  field 
officers  existed.  For  the  command  and  administration 
of  an  arm  with  412  guns,  980  carriages,  9,543  officers 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  547 

and  men,  and  8,544  horses,  besides  the  immense  ammu 
nition  trains  requisite  for  such  a  force  of  artillery,  there 
were  during  the  Chancellorsville  campaign  but  five  field 
officers  of  artillery  present  with  the  Army,  and  they 
were  provided  with  miserably-inefficient  staffs!  Add 
to  this  the  fact  that  there  was  no  active  head  to  the  Fed 
eral  Artillery  until  Col.  Wainwright  took  command  at 
Fairview  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  and  that  Gen.  Hunt 
was  not  given  entire  control  until  10  p.  M.  that  night, 
and  the  wonder  is  that  Hooker's  scattered  batteries 
maintained  themselves  as  well  as  they  did.  If  Hooker 
were  open  to  criticism  as  a  general  in  no  other  respect 
the  gross  mismanagement  of  his  artillery,  the  Federal 
arm  par  excellence,  already  famous  the  world  over  for 
the  superiority  of  its  organization  and  material  and  the 
high  efficiency  of  its  officers  and  men,  would  appear  to 
be  inexcusable. 

Many  writers  speak  of  Hooker's  movements  up  to  the 
time  his  three  corps  reached  Chancellorsville  on  the  30th, 
as  exceptionally  fine.  If  to  dispatch  one's  entire 
cavalry  force,  with  the  exception  of  a  small  brigade,  to 
another  quarter  of  the  universe  on  a  wild-goose  chase; 
if  to  leave  a  great  part  of  one's  artillery  at  the  base  and 
provide  no  chief  for  the  rest,  but  commit  it  entirely  to 
the  control  of  corps  and  division  commanders ;  if  to  pen 
one's  infantry  up  in  the  heart  of  a  forest  without  having 
even  attempted  a  reconnaissance  of  the  surrounding 
country,  and  leave  every  approach,  except  a  single  line 
of  communication,  open  to  be  blocked  by  a  nearby 
enemy  known  to  be  exceptionally  bold  and  active;  if 
such  movements  are  correct,  then  Hooker's  conduct  of 
the  campaign  was  indeed  fine.  But  it  seems  to  the 
writer  that  Hooker  in  disposing  of  his  cavalry  and  de 
molishing  his  artillery  in  the  way  he  did,  committed 
acts  which  alone  are  enough  to  condemn  any  general 
guilty  of  such  acts  as  inefficient  and  lacking  in  the 
fundamental  conceptions  of  the  tactics  of  the  three  arms 
combined.  And  such  a  view,  it  is  believed,  will  uni 
versally  obtain  as  time  progresses  and  knowledge  of 
events  at  Chancellorsville  becomes  more  general. 


548  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

But  now  as  to  the  tactical  employment  and  services 
of  the  Confederate  Artillery,  the  actual  operations 
of  which  have  been  so  closely  followed.  From  the 
standpoint  of  the  effectiveness  of  its  fire,  we  have  but  to 
consider  the  results  it  undoubtedly  accomplished  in  the 
conflict  with  an  artillery  superior  in  numbers  and  ma 
terial.  Again  the  Federal  reports  teem  with  references 
to  the  severity  and  accuracy  of  the  Confederate  ar 
tillery  fire;  not  one  but  mentions  the  Confederate  guns 
in  a  way  showing  that  the  writer  had  in  mind  their  fire  as 
bearing  a  direct  influence  upon  the  issue  of  events  at 
every  point,  and  this  in  spite  of  the  inferior  grade  of 
ammunition  with  which  Lee's  gunners  were  provided. 
We  must  at  least  concede,  that  with  such  a  serious  de 
fect  to  overcome,  an  exceptional  degree  of  energy  and 
efficiency  was  required  on  the  part  of  the  personnel  to 
accomplish  even  what  might  have  been  expected  of 
ordinary  artillery. 

The  mobility  which  the  Confederate  batteries  dis 
played  in  this  campaign  is  astounding  when  the  de 
ficiency  in  the  number  and  quality  of  their  draught 
animals  is  considered.  In  no  battle  of  the  war  was  ar 
tillery  called  upon  for  greater  activity  on  the  march 
after  contact  with  the  enemy  had  been  gained.  Be 
ginning  with  April  29th,  when  Lee  directed  his  Chief  of 
Artillery  to  set  the  reserve  battalions  in  motion,  there 
was  not  a  day  when  a  great  part  of  his  artillery  was  not 
on  the  march.  The  transfer  of  the  Artillery  of  the  2d 
Corps  from  below  Hamilton's  Crossing  to  the  vicinity 
of  Chancellorsville  on  the  night  of  the  30th,  was  rapid 
and  conducted  in  such  a  successful  manner  over  a  single 
road  that  there  is  an  entire  absence  of  complaint  on  the 
part  of  division  and  brigade  commanders  about  blocked 
roads,  etc.,  to  which  infantry  commanders  are  so  prone 
to  attribute  the  causes  of  their  own  delays.  With  little 
rest,  again  the  great  column  was  set  in  motion  and 
whirled  over  15  miles  or  more  of  despicable  roads,  both 
narrow  and  difficult,  and  not  only  did  it  arrive  at  the 
designated  point  of  rendezvous  in  good  order  and  in 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  549 

good  time,  but  some  of  the  battalions  were  forced  im 
patiently  to  remain  in  the  clearings  near  the  head  of 
Jackson's  column,  when  the  signal  for  the  infantry  at 
tack  was  given.  Indeed,  the  Artillery  seems  rather 
to  have  been  too  forward,  as  in  Crutchfield's  case  and 
that  of  Carter  on  the  night  of  the  2d,  instead  of  being 
tardy  in  its  arrival.  In  spite  of  darkness  and  the  for 
bidding  character  of  the  terrain,  when  dawn  of  the  3d 
broke  every  gun  of  both  corps  was  in  the  best  position 
which  those  responsible  for  the  posting  of  the  Artillery 
could  select,  a  fact  which  enabled  Alexander,  who  ac 
companied  Archer  in  his  attack  on  Hazel  Grove,  to 
secure  the  position  with  Pegram's  batteries  the  instant 
the  Federals  abandoned  it,  and  instead  of  his  lacking 
guns  at  the  critical  point,  there  was  actually  a  surplus 
of  them  at  hand  in  the  foremost  line.  The  cooperation 
of  Alexander,  with  Stuart,  was  extraordinary  and 
elicited  from  Stuart  himself  the  statement  that  the 
action  of  the  Artillery  was  superb,  attributing  the  rapid 
movements  of  the  batteries  as  he  did  to  the  improved 
battalion  organization.  But,  if  Alexander's  cooperation 
with  his  corps  commander  was  active  and  complete,  no 
less  so  was  that  of  Brown,  Walker,  Jones,  Mclntosh, 
Poague,  and  Huger  with  their  respective  chiefs.  Every 
where  we  found  them  striving  to  be  at  the  right  point 
at  the  right  time.  The  activity  displayed  by  Hardaway 
was  also  noticeable.  Stumbling  through  trackless 
thickets,  cutting  his  way  with  pick  and  axe  to  the  front, 
we  find  him  moving  a  part  of  his  guns,  at  least,  forward 
with  the  infantry  as  it  advanced  from  the  south  to  the 
Chancellorsville  plateau,  soon  to  move  to  a  distant 
point  of  the  theater  of  operations,  only  to  push  on  over 
bottomless  roads  to  a  more  active  conflict,  after  a  dis 
tressing  night  of  toil  and  hunger.  On  the  4th  we  find 
Alexander's  Battalion  whisked  from  Chancellorsville 
after  five  days  of  constant  marching  or  fighting,  many 
miles  to  the  rear  and  then  back  again  to  the  river,  where 
the  morning  of  the  6th  it  was  as  active  as  when  "boots 
and  saddles"  was  blown  at  Hanover  Junction  a  week 


550  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

before.  In  this  week  a  number  of  the  batteries  of  this 
battalion  marched  over  100  miles,  in  addition  to  being 
actually  engaged  three  days  and  three  nights.  We  have 
seen  that  the  Horse  Artillery  under  Beckham  had  lost 
nothing  of  its  old  dash  so  well  known  to  the  enemy.  Yet, 
at  least  two  of  the  light  batteries,  Moore's  and  Penick's, 
maneuvered  with  such  rapidity  in  action  as  they 
dashed  from  hill  to  hill  before  Sedgwick's  column  on 
the  4th,  always  in  the  front  and  retarding  the  enemy, 
that  they  were  mistaken  by  the  Federal  commander 
himself  for  horse  artillery. 

Another  fact  to  be  discerned  from  the  records  is  the 
entire  absence  of  friction  in  the  Confederate  Artillery, 
and  between  it  and  the  Army  as  a  whole  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  while  so  much  discord  and  lack  of  cohesion  existed 
in  the  same  arm  of  the  Federal  Army  in  this  campaign. 
In  Hooker's  army,  after  the  battle,  there  was  a  wide 
spread  feeling  that  the  Federal  Artillery  had  failed,  a 
sentiment  so  prevalent  that  Gen.  Hunt  himself  saw  fit 
to  offer  explanations  of  the  cause  in  his  report.  While 
one  is  forced  to  absolve  the  Federal  Artillery  itself  of 
all  blame,  yet  the  fact  remains  that,  though  not  of  its 
own  doing,  it  was  rendered  collectively  inefficient 
throughout  the  campaign  in  spite  of  the  individual 
gallantry  and  prowess  of  Dilger,  Weed,  Best,  Osborn 
and  others.  Its  very  losses,  which  included  about  20 
officers,  are  sufficient  evidence  of  the  courage  and  fight 
ing  capacity  of  the  Federal  gunners,  and  it  seems  a  pity 
that  so  superb  a  fighting  machine  as  that  which  under 
Hunt  was  inherited  by  Hooker,  should  have  been 
wantonly  sacrificed  to  the  ignorance  and  stupidity  of 
one  whom  the  world  at  large  has  seen  fit  to  credit  with 
unusual  skill  as  an  organizer,  palliating  in  a  measure 
thereby  his  miserable  failure  as  an  army  commander. 

It  has  already  been  remarked  that  the  Confederate 
Reserve  Artillery  was  by  necessity  perverted  from  its 
true  function  in  the  campaign.  Unless  battalions  which 
must  be  committed  to  the  first  line  before  a  shot  is  fired 
can  be  classed  as  an  artillery  reserve,  Lee  had  none  at 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  551 

Chancellorsville,  and  in  this  respect  was  sadly  crippled. 
In  the  narrative  of  events  we  have  noted  numerous  oc 
casions  when  such  a  force  might  have  been,  and  had  it 
been  available  would  have  been,  employed  with  controll 
ing  influence  upon  the  issue.  All  that  can  be  said  of  the 
nominal  reserve  artillery  is  that  in  the  sphere  of  duty 
assigned  it,  the  services  it  rendered  fully  measured  up  to 
the  expectations  of  the  commander-in-chief ,  who  in  the 
conclusion  of  his  report  paid  high  tribute  to  the  Ar 
tillery  of  his  army  in  the  following  words : 

"Cols.  Crutchfield,  Alexander,  Walker,  and  Lieut. -Cols.  Brown, 
Carter,  and  Andrews,  with  the  officers  and  men  of  their  commands, 
are  mentioned  as  deserving  especial  commendation.  The  batteries 
under  Gen.  Pendleton  also  acted  with  great  gallantry."  And  later: 
"The  Horse  Artillery  accompanied  the  infantry,  and  participated 
with  credit  to  itself  in  the  engagement." 

In  concluding  this  account  of  the  great  campaign  of 
May,  1863,  the  direct  influence  of  the  Confederate  Ar 
tillery  upon  the  issue  demands  notice  by  reason  of  the 
fact  that  history  has  almost  completely  ignored  the 
matter.  Without  calling  further  attention  to  the  serv 
ice  rendered  by  Pendleton  at  Fredericksburg,  which 
was  jointly  rendered  with  that  of  Early's  infantry,  at 
least  two  instances  may  be  cited  when  the  Artillery  ex 
ercised  a  direct  and  determining  influence  upon  the  ulti 
mate  result  attained  by  Lee.  Had  Sickles  not  been 
checked  by  Col.  Brown  at  the  furnace  on  May  2,  he 
would  most  certainly  have  developed  the  line  of  least 
resistance  in  that  direction,  and  thrown  the  main  column 
of  his  corps  towards  the  southwest  instead  of,  by  a  more 
easterly  movement,  becoming  involved  with  the  left  of 
Anderson's  Division.  Had  he,  while  engaging  Ander 
son  with  his  own  left,  been  free  to  follow  up  Jackson's 
column  with  the  force  which  Brown's  prompt  action 
balked  in  its  advance,  the  trend  of  that  column  would 
have  been  more  accurately  determined,  and  at  an  early 
hour  in  the  day,  that  is  before  1  p.  M.,  Hooker  would 
most  certainly  have  been  advised  of  its  true  direction, 
for  already  the  head  of  the  column  had  turned  north- 


552  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

ward  at  a  point  less  than  two  miles  from  Brown's  posi 
tion,  and  nothing  seems  more  probable  than  that  this 
fact  would  have  been  discovered  through  flanking  par 
ties  of  Sickles'  Corps  drifting  up  against  it  during  the 
advance  of  their  main  body.  Already  Berdan,  with  a  di 
vision  close  behind,  had  almost  reached  the  unfinished 
railroad ;  had  he  reached  and  freely  possessed  himself  of 
it,  this  road  would  have  formed  the  natural  line  of  exten 
sion  for  the  troops  behind  in  their  effort  to  turn  the  flank 
of  any  force  which  might  seek  to  block  their  advance. 
Possessed  of  this  railroad  Sickles'  men  would  have  had  a 
short  route  to  the  Brock  Road,  from  which  Jackson's 
movement  to  the  north  would  have  been  plainly  visible, 
and  the  very  denseness  of  the  country  intervening  be 
tween  the  furnace  and  the  Brock  Road  would  have  led 
small  parties  of  the  Federals  to  search  for  points  of 
vantage  from  which  to  observe  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  From  the  point  where  Berdan  was  actually 
checked  by  Brown  to  the  point  along  the  railroad  from 
which  a  clear  view  of  Jackson's  column  moving  to  the 
north  across  Poplar  Run  and  the  railroad  itself,  and 
ascending  the  Trigg  House  Hill  might  have  been  had, 
the  distance  was  not  over  1%  miles.  The  information 
which  Sickles  would  thus  have  secured  would  at  once 
have  corrected  the  false  impression  under  which  he 
labored,  and  which  he  created  in  Hooker's  mind  about 
the  enemy's  movement  to  the  south,  and,  added  to  the 
reports  coming  in  from  Howard's  front,  would  have 
altered  the  whole  estimate  of  the  situation  at  head 
quarters,  giving  Hooker  and  Howard  some  five  hours 
to  prepare  to  meet  the  attack.  In  half  that  time,  the 
llth  Corps  alone,  with  such  reserve  artillery  as  was 
available  for  use  on  the  Federal  right,  could  have  been 
so  disposed  behind  Hunting  Run  as  to  present  an  im 
pregnable  front.  With  Barlow  and  every  available  re 
serve  hurrying  to  Howard's  left,  and  Sickles  already 
wedged  into  the  immense  gap  below  the  furnace,  it 
would  not  have  required  a  tactician  of  the  first  order  to 
cut  Lee's  Army  in  twain.  In  fact,  Brown's  single  bat- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  553 

tery  at  one  time  stood  between  Hooker  and  the  ac 
complishment  of  this  task.  But  let  us  pass  from  what 
may  appear  too  speculative,  to  that  which  is  beyond  the 
realm  of  conjecture,  and  which  savors  of  reality. 

When  Stuart  arrived  at  the  scene  of  action  along  the 
Plank  Road  at  midnight,  May  2,  he  was  totally  ignorant 
of  the  situation,  and  none  of  Jackson's  staff  except 
Col.  A.  S.  Pendleton  reported  to  him.  Fortunately, 
however,  he  found  Col.  Alexander,  who  had  the  situation 
in  its  broad  aspects  in  hand.  Rodes  and  Colston  were 
of  course  willing  and  anxious  to  give  Stuart  the  bene 
fit  of  all  the  information  in  their  possession,  but  their 
observations  had  been  necessarily  hasty  and  local  in 
character.  It  seems  certain  that  no  one  at  the  moment 
was  so  familiar  with  the  situation  as  the  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery,  whose  very  duties  had  led  him  to  make  a  thor 
ough  reconnaissance  of  the  paths  and  roads  leading  to 
the  front.  That  Stuart  appreciated  this  fact,  is  evi 
denced  by  his  immediately  associating  Alexander  with 
him  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  general  examination 
of  the  ground.  It  is  now  important  to  note  from  the 
tenor  of  Stuart's  report  that  Alexander,  and  not  he, 
discovered  the  Hazel  Grove  position  and  at  once 
grasped  its  importance.  This  fact  is  proved  by  the  use 
less  and  costly  effort  which  Stuart  made  with  Lane's 
and  Ramseur's  brigades  in  the  morning  along  the  road, 
while  Alexander  was  massing  his  batteries  in  readiness 
in  the  vista  to  seize  Hazel  Grove,  at  the  first  oppor 
tunity.  From  the  moment  he  had  first  laid  eyes  on 
Hazel  Grove,  Alexander  never  lost  its  importance  from 
view,  and  in  the  light  of  what  transpired,  it  seems 
fortunate  for  the  Confederates  that  its  seizure  was  not 
seriously  attempted  on  the  night  of  the  2d,  before 
Sickles  and  Pleasanton  abandoned  the  position.  Had 
this  been  done,  the  attention  of  the  Federals  might  have 
been  called  to  the  point,  and  the  head  instead  of  the  tail 
of  Sickles'  column  of  attack  would  have  been  directed 
towards  the  Confederates,  thereby  saving  the  key-point 


554  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

of  Hooker's  line  of  defense,  and  many  men  who  met 
their  fate  in  the  midnight  fiasco. 

Conceding  then,  that  the  occupation  of  Hazel  Grove 
was  primarily  due  to  the  ready  perception  of  Stuart's 
Chief  of  Artillery,  we  must  now  go  further  and  con 
sider  the  controlling  influence  its  occupation  by  the  Ar 
tillery  exerted  upon  the  issue.  In  the  first  place,  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  having  twice  failed  on  the 
morning  of  the  3d  to  carry  the  Federal  works  in  front 
of  Fairview,  although  aided  by  Pegram's  artillery, 
Stuart's  infantry  could  have  succeeded  in  a  third  at 
tempt  without  artillery.  In  fact,  the  Federals  them 
selves  unanimously  ascribed  the  loss  of  their  line  of  de 
fense  to  the  Confederate  batteries  at  Hazel  Grove,  the 
oblique  fire  of  which  Best's  and  Osborn's  guns  were 
unable  to  withstand.  The  great  mass  of  guns  at  Fair- 
view  Cemetery  comprised  the  very  bulwark  of  the  Fed 
eral  defense,  and  it  was  those  guns  in  large  measure 
which  had  swept  back  Stuart's  gallant  infantry  from  the 
works  they  had  taken,  while  the  Confederate  left  was 
subjected  to  an  increasing  pressure.  To  the  threatened 
point,  Stuart's  attention  was  more  and  more  directed, 
but  meantime  Alexander  was  moving  the  bulk  of  his 
artillery  to  the  extreme  right,  and  when  finally  his  ar 
tillery  preparations  were  well  under  way  it  must  be 
observed  that  it  was  not  the  Federal  right,  but  that 
portion  of  the  line  upon  which  the  Confederate  Artil 
lery  exerted  its  influence,  that  yielded,  which  of  course 
relieved  the  intense  pressure  on  Stuart's  left.  It  is  thus 
seen  that  the  superiority  of  fire  attained  by  Alexander 
over  the  Federal  Artillery,  alone  made  possible  the  suc 
cess  of  Stuart's  third  infantry  assault,  for  it  was  the 
withdrawal  of  their  artillery  that  broke  the  backbone  of 
the  enemy's  resistance. 

There  are  few  better  examples  to  be  found  than  this 
one  of  the  power  of  artillery  when  once  it  has  attained 
a  superiority  of  fire.  Then  it  is  that  the  crisis  of  the 
battle  has  arrived,  and  whatever  may  be  the  timber  of 
the  defending  infantry,  unless  there  are  close  at  hand 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  555 

fresh  guns,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Confederate  short-range 
batteries  at  Sharpsburg  and  Fredericksburg,  to  uncover 
when  the  hostile  artillery  becomes  masked,  the  day  is 
usually  lost  if  the  assaulting  infantry  is  in  earnest  and 
numerically  adequate  to  its  task.  Stuart  was  fortunate 
in  possessing  such  an  infantry,  and  it  drove  home  with 
all  the  ardor  of  its  old  recklessness  favored  by  the  fact 
that  almost  until  "cold  steel"  was  the  word,  the  support 
ing  batteries  were  able  to  maintain  over  its  head  a  heavy 
fire  upon  the  somewhat  elevated  line  of  works  held  by 
the  enemy. 

The  loss  of  Fairview  was  but  the  precursor  of 
Hooker's  withdrawal  from  the  south  side  of  the  river, 
for  by  its  fall  the  Federal  left  was  compelled  to  retire 
before  Anderson  and  McLaws.  Even  before  it  fell, 
Hooker's  heart  had  become  set  upon  a  general  retro 
grade  movement.  Otherwise,  he  would  surely  have  al 
lowed  his  batteries  to  be  supplied  with  ammunition, 
however  hopeless  their  struggle  might  have  appeared. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

PREPARATION    FOR    THE    SECOND    MARYLAND    INVASION- 
DEATH  OF  JACKSON BRANDY  STATION 

WHEN  it  became  certain  that  Hooker  had  withdrawn 
his  immense  army  from  the  upper  fords  and  had  re 
established  his  old  camps  about  Fredericksburg  and 
Falmouth,  Gen.  Lee  ordered  his  troops  back  to  the 
lines  held  by  them  during  the  winter. 

Col.  Walton  immediately  placed  the  bulk  of  the  ar 
tillery  of  the  1st  Corps  in  camp  at  Stanard's  farm,  a 
few  miles  below  Massaponax  Church,  while  Col.  Brown 
moved  his  batteries  to  the  old  artillery  camping  grounds 
in  rear  of  Hamilton's  Crossing  and  about  Guiney's 
Station.  Alexander,  however,  moved  his  battalion  to 
the  immediate  neighborhood  of  Bowling  Green,  a  point 
which  was  thought  by  both  Gens.  Lee  and  Pendleton 
to  be  too  far  to  the  rear  in  case  of  emergency.  Mean 
while,  the  horses  of  the  various  artillery  commands, 
which  were  greatly  worn  down  and  depleted  by  the 
strain  of  the  recent  campaign,  were  turned  out  to 
pasture,  although  the  orders  were  general  that  the  Ar 
tillery  should  be  kept  well  in  hand  and  prepared  to 
move  at  a  moment's  notice.  Reports  of  the  condition  of 
the  batteries,  detailing  the  number  of  serviceable  guns, 
horses,  and  the  strength  in  personnel  of  each  were 
directed  to  be  made,  in  order  that  all  deficiencies  might 
be  made  up  as  far  as  possible. 

The  old  idea  that  artillery  battalions  were  an  integral 
part  of  infantry  divisions  had  by  this  time  almost  dis 
appeared,  an  advance  in  the  right  direction  which  had 
taken  long  to  accomplish.  But  still  the  old  view  con 
tinued  to  crop  out  on  occasions,  as  in  the  case  of  Col. 
Cabell,  who,  instead  of  moving  his  battalion  along  the 
Telegraph  Road,  as  directed,  to  join  Walton  and  rest 
his  horses,  maintained  his  position  on  Lee's  Hill  in  ac 
cordance  with  Longstreet's  views  until  he  was  peremp- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  557 

torily  ordered  by  Pendleton  to  repair  to  the  rear.  Cab- 
ell,  it  seems,  had  preferred  to  consider  his  command  as 
permanently  attached  to  one  of  Longstreet's  divisions, 
and  had  been  most  remiss  in  rendering  his  reports 
through  Col.  Walton,  Chief  of  Artillery  1st  Corps. 

Gen.  Longstreet  had  arrived  at  Fredericksburg  on 
the  6th  of  May  and  soon  after  Pickett's  and  Hood's 
divisions  began  to  arrive  with  Dearing's  and  Henry's 
battalions  of  artillery.  On  the  day  Longstreet  arrived 
A.  P.  Hill  resumed  command  of  the  2d  Corps,  Stuart 
returning  to  his  own  division.  Gen.  Lee  had  also  urged 
the  return  of  Ransom's  Division,  which  the  Secretary 
of  War,  on  the  6th,  directed  D.  H.  Hill  in  North  Caro 
lina  to  set  in  motion  for  Fredericksburg,  if  it  could  be 
done  with  safety. 

The  great  shock  of  the  campaign  now  occurred,  for 
on  May  10,  Gen.  Jackson  succumbed.  The  story  of  his 
last  hours  on  this  earth  is  one  full  of  pathos,  as  well  as 
of  the  most  inspiring  lessons  for  the  soldier.  In  the 
hour  of  his  death  he  was  as  great  as  when  upon  the 
various  battlefields  of  his  career,  with  exalted  mien  and 
superb  composure,  he  led  his  men  to  victory.  Concern 
ing  his  wounding  and  death,  Longstreet  wrote:  "The 
shock  was  a  very  severe  one  to  men  and  officers,  but  the 
full  extent  of  our  loss  was  not  felt  until  the  remains 
of  the  beloved  general  had  been  sent  home.  The  dark 
clouds  of  the  future  then  began  to  lower  above  the 
Confederates."  Gen.  Lee  in  a  note  to  the  wounded 
general  on  the  3d,  in  the  midst  of  battle  had  already  de 
clared  that,  could  he  have  directed  events,  he  should 
have  chosen,  for  the  good  of  the  country,  to  have  been 
disabled  in  Jackson's  stead.  In  closing  his  message,  he 
congratulated  Jackson  upon  the  victory  his  "skill  and 
energy"  had  won,  but  the  latter,  expressing  appreciation 
of  his  superior's  remarks,  declared  that  Gen.  Lee  should 
give  the  praise  to  God  and  not  to  him. 

Soon  after  his  wounding,  he  had  been  removed  by 
order  of  Gen.  Lee  to  the  Chandler  house  near  Guiney's 
Station,  where  Dr.  McGuire  did  all  in  his  power  to  save 


558  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

him,  but  on  Thursday  the  7th  he  developed  pneumonia 
of  the  right  lung,  doubtless  attributable  to  the  fall  from 
the  litter  the  night  he  was  wounded.  Fortunately  for 
the  peace  of  his  mind,  Mrs.  Jackson  arrived  this  day 
with  their  infant  child,  and  took  the  place  of  his  chaplain 
who  had  remained  almost  constantly  with  him.  By  Satur 
day,  Drs.  Hoge,  Breckenridge,  and  Tucker  had  joined 
McGuire  in  an  effort  to  save  him,  and  noting  their  pres 
ence  he  said  to  Dr.  McGuire :  "I  see  from  the  number  of 
physicians  that  you  think  my  condition  dangerous,  but 
I  thank  God,  if  it  is  His  will,  that  I  am  ready  to  go." 
When  informed  by  Mrs.  Jackson  at  daylight  the  next 
morning  that  he  should  prepare  for  the  worst,  he  was 
silent  for  a  moment  and  then  said,  "It  will  be  infinite 
gain  to  be  translated  to  heaven."  And  so  we  see  that 
although  this  wonderful  man  still  clung  to  a  hope  of 
recovery,  his  confidence  in  the  future  was  as  supreme  as 
his  self-confidence  had  been  on  earth.  Never  once  did 
he  express  a  doubt  of  his  ability  to  rise  paramount  to 
present  difficulties  or  to  meet  the  future.  His  sole  re 
quest  was  to  be  buried  in  Lexington,  in  the  Valley  of 
Virginia,  where  as  a  simple  and  unassuming  professor 
of  the  Science  of  War  he  had  kept  the  smothered  fire  of 
his  genius  aglow  while  preparing  himself  and  a  host  of 
his  pupils  for  the  inevitable  struggle  which  he  had  fore 
seen.  When  told  by  his  wife  that  before  sundown  he 
would  be  in  Heaven,  he  called  for  Dr.  McGuire  and 
asked  him  if  he  must  die.  To  the  affirmative  answer  he 
received,  his  reply  was,  "Very  good,  very  good,  it  is  all 
right."  His  efforts  then  were  to  comfort  his  heart 
broken  wife,  and  when  Col.  Pendleton,  whom  he  had 
trained  as  a  soldier  and  loved  very  dearly,  entered  his 
room  about  1  p.  M.,  he  asked  who  was  preaching  at  head 
quarters  on  this  his  last  Sabbath.  Being  informed  that 
the  whole  Army  was  praying  for  him,  he  said,  "Thank 
God,  they  are  very  kind.  It  is  the  Lord's  day ;  my  wish 
is  fulfilled.  I  have  always  desired  to  die  on  Sunday." 
His  mind  now  began  to  weaken  while  his  lips  fre 
quently  muttered  commands  as  if  he  were  on  the  field 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  559 

of  battle,  then  words  of  comfort  for  his  wife.  When 
tendered  a  drink  of  brandy  and  water,  he  declined  it, 
saying,  "It  will  only  delay  my  departure  and  do  no 
good.  I  want  to  preserve  my  mind,  if  possible,  to  the 
last."  Again  he  was  told  that  but  few  hours  remained 
for  him,  and  again  he  replied,  feebly  but  firmly,  "Very 
good,  it  is  all  right."  In  the  delirium  which  preceded 
his  death  he  cried  out,  "Order  A.  P.  Hill  to  prepare  for 
action,  pass  the  infantry  to  the  front  rapidly, — tell  Maj. 
Hawks—  "  and  then,  pausing,  a  smile  of  ineffable  sweet 
ness  spread  over  his  pallid  face  and  with  an  expression 
as  if  of  relief,  he  said,  "No,  no.  Let  us  cross  over  the 
river  and  rest  under  the  shade  of  the  trees."*  Then 
without  sign  of  pain,  or  the  least  struggle,  his  spirit 
passed  onward  and  upward  to  God. 

Such  were  the  final  moments  of  the  great  soldier. 
With  body  all  but  cold  in  death,  so  long  as  his  pulse 
continued  the  dictates  of  his  heart  were  pure.  Almost 
to  the  instant  that  heart  ceased  to  beat,  his  mind  gave 
evidence  of  the  quality  of  the  man  in  the  flash  of  the 
willy  though  now  subconscious,  which  possessed  his 
spirit.  Still  his  mind  dwelt  upon  rapid  action  and  the 
rush  of  infantry,  which  ever  filled  his  soul  with  joy,  but 
then,  even  in  the  last  flicker  of  his  intellect,  he  realized 
that  the  flag  of  truce  had  been  raised  by  his  enemies  and 
interposing  the  stay  of  his  final  words  "No,  no — ,"  he 
died  in  the  happiness  of  the  earthly  victory  he  had  won. 
Let  us  be  thankful  that  he  saw  his  men  preparing  to 
rest  upon  their  arms — not  engaged  in  the  heated 
turmoil  of  the  charge  when  he  bade  them  farewell.  Let 
us  be  thankful  that  this  dispensation  was  granted  him 
by  the  Maker  who  gently  led  him  to  the  shade  of  the 
river  side  where  rested  all  those  gallant  associates  who 
had  preceded  him.  No  longer  were  they  his  pupils  and 
his  subordinates  in  war,  but  his  equals  in  the  eternity  of 
peace.  But  yet  an  earthly  rite  remained  to  those  whom 
he  had  left  behind,  for  far  off  from  the  scene  of  conflict, 
that  youthful  band,  bound  together  then  as  it  is  now, 

"This  remark  was  as  given  above,  according  to  Capt.  James  Power  Smith 
of  Jackson's  staff,  and  not  merely  as  usually  quoted  without  the  two  first  words. 


560  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

by  the  traditions  of  his  fame,  bore  his  body  to  the  grave. 
How  fitting  that  a  caisson  of  the  cadet  battery  with 
which  he  had  for  so  many  years  drilled  his  pupils  and 
the  Confederate  Artillery  should  form  his  hearse,  and 
that  his  body  should  lie  in  state  in  the  old  tower  class 
room,  wherein  he  had  set  so  noble  an  example  to 
youth.  It  was  in  that  very  room  that  he  had  declared, 
"If  war  must  come,  then  I  will  welcome  war,"  and  that 
the  South  in  such  event  should  "throw  away  the  scab 
bard." 

In  the  shadow  of  the  majestic  Blue  Ridge,  with  the 
great  North  Mountain  as  his  head  stone,  which  like  a 
huge  sentinel  stands  guard  beside  the  parade  ground  of 
his  life,  tenderly  was  his  body  laid  to  rest  by  the  youth 
ful  soldiers  he  loved  so  well,  but  still,  wielding  the  un 
covered  blade  of  immortality, 

"His  spirit  wraps  yon  dusky  mountain; 
His  memory  sparkles  o'er  each  fountain; 
The  meanest  rill,  the  mightiest  river, 
Rolls,,  mingling  with  his  fame  forever." 

For  one  part  of  the  Army,  at  least,  it  was  Jackson, 
the  artilleryman,  that  had  gone,  for  he  in  a  higher  de 
gree  than  any  of  Lee's  lieutenants  had  endeared  him 
self  to  the  gunners  to  whose  welfare  he  was  ever  at 
tentive  and  of  whose  success  he  was  ever  proud.  The 
old  love  of  the  arm  which  he  could  not  overcome  in  spite 
of  the  more  general  command  he  had  been  clothed  with, 
coupled  with  the  knowledge  of  the  gunners  that  their 
leader  had  once  commanded  a  battery,  created  and  main 
tained  a  bond  of  sympathy  between  Jackson  and  his  ar 
tillery  evidenced  by  innumerable  little  incidents  in  his 
career  as  a  general.  One  thing  is  certain,  he  was  the 
first  of  Lee's  lieutenants  to  grasp  the  idea  of  artillery 
as  an  entity  and  to  employ  it  accordingly,  and  in  this 
he  was  ably  assisted  by  Col.  Crutchfield,  between  whom 
and  his  chief  the  most  thorough  confidence  existed.  No 
such  relations  as  theirs  existed  between  Longstreet  and 
Walton,  neither  of  whom  proceeded  upon  the  principle 
that  the  Chief  of  Artillery  should  be  able  to  read  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  561 

very  soul  of  his  commander,  and  by  that  constant  and 
close  association  which  alone  can  breed  the  highest  con 
fidence  between  men,  especially  between  soldiers,  be  able 
to  frame  his  every  action  in  conformity  with  his  superi 
or's  views.  Mutual  confidence  between  a  commanding 
general  and  his  chief  of  artillery  is  certainly  essential 
to  the  success  of  the  artillery,  if  not  to  the  army  as  a 
whole,  for  occasions  will  arise  when  the  supreme  com 
mander  must  needs  direct  the  movements  of  his  bat 
teries  and  there  is  always  danger  that  the  limitations  and 
necessities  of  the  special  arm  may  be  lost  sight  of  by  one 
who  views  the  situation  in  its  general  aspect.  Now,  if 
the  chief  of  artillery  has  by  his  obedience,  by  his 
readiness  to  act,  and  by  his  sympathy  with  the  wider 
problems  of  the  general,  won  a  personal  place  in  ad 
dition  to  his  official  position  on  the  staff  of  his  com 
mander,  he  is  prepared  to  suggest,  without  danger  of 
giving  offense  to  his  superior,  a  change  here  and  there 
which  will  at  once  inure  to  the  benefit  of  his  arm,  and 
enable  it  to  accomplish  the  best  results.  If,  however, 
there  is  a  want  of  sympathy  between  the  two,  or  if  the 
subordinate  holds  himself  aloof,  or  stands  upon  his 
dignity  and  receives  his  orders  in  a  perfunctory  way, 
rather  suggesting  by  his  conduct  a  superior  specialized 
knowledge,  lack  of  harmony  is  sure  to  result  with  its 
many  evil  consequences.  W^e  must  concede,  in  view  of 
these  facts,  that  Jackson  was  most  fortunate  in  possess 
ing  Crutchfield,  from  whose  relations  with  the  com 
manding  general  the  artillery  of  his  corps  in  turn 
directly  benefited. 

The  loss  of  Jackson  was  accepted  by  Lee  in  the  same 
spirit  of  Christian  fortitude  for  which  he  was  ever  con 
spicuous,  and  the  day  following  his  death  the  highest 
tribute  ever  paid  a  soldier  was  published  in  the  following 
words : 

"With  deep  grief,  the  commanding  general  announces  to  the 
Army  the  death  of  Lieut. -Col.  T.  J.  Jackson,  who  expired  on  the 
10th  inst.,  at  3:15  P.  M.  The  daring,  skill,  and  energy  of  this  great 
and  good  soldier,  by  the  decree  of  an  all-wise  Providence,  are  now 
lost  to  us.  But  while  we  mourn  his  death,  we  feel  that  his  spirit 


562  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

still  lives  and  will  inspire  the  whole  army  with  his  indomitable 
courage  and  unshaken  confidence  in  God  as  our  hope  and  strength. 
Let  his  name  be  a  watchword  to  his  corps,  who  have  followed  him 
to  victory  on  so  many  fields.  Let  his  officers  and  soldiers  emulate 
his  invincible  determination  to  do  everything  in  the  defense  of  our 
beloved  country. 

"R.  E.  LEE, 

"General." 

And  to  Stuart,  the  bereft  Commander-in-Chief  wrote, 
"May  his  spirit  pervade  our  whole  army;  our  country 
will  then  be  secure."* 

These  words  of  Lee  are  referred  to  as  the  greatest 
tribute  ever  paid  a  soldier,  for  never  before  or  since  has 
so  great  a  commander-in-chief  as  Lee  appealed  to  the 
love  and  memory  of  a  lieutenant  as  the  spirit  which  dif 
fused  should  prove  the  motive  power  of  his  army. 

On  May  llth,  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  2d  Corps,  re 
ported  that  immediate  steps  had  been  undertaken  to  re 
organize  and  refit  his  batteries.  As  it  shows  the  con 
dition  of  the  Artillery  in  general,  the  substance  of  his 
report  is  given. 

Many  guns  were  rendered  unserviceable  through  lack 
of  horses.  The  available  ones  were  as  follows. 

Walker's  Battalion  of  5  batteries,  14  guns  in  camp 
and  4  on  picket  near  Hamilton's  Crossing. 

Jones'  Battalion  of  4  batteries,  8  guns  in  camp  and 
4  on  picket  on  the  left. 

Carter's  Battalion  of  4  batteries,  13  guns  in  camp 
and  3  at  the  repair  train  in  rear. 

Andrews'  Battalion  of  4  batteries,  14  guns  in  camp. 

Hardaway's  (Brown's)  Battalion  of  6  batteries,  12 
guns  in  camp,  and  4  on  picket  in  the  center. 

Mclntosh's  Battalion  of  4  batteries,  14  guns  in  camp. 

Thus  it  is  seen  that  but  three  batteries  had  been  left 
along  the  front  while  there  were  87  guns  available  for 
service  in  the  2d  Corps. 

Meantime,  Col.  Brown  had  sent  out  two  officers  from 
each  of  his  battalions  amply  provided  with  money  to 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  pp.  792-3. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  563 

buy  fresh  horses  and  authorized  to  sell  the  condemned 
battery  horses  to  farmers  who  might  be  willing  to  pur 
chase  them  for  future  use. 

The  condition  of  Cabell's  Battalion  on  the  15th  is  in 
dicative  of  that  of  the  others  of  the  1st  Corps.  Mc 
Carthy's  Battery  with  two  3-inch  rifles,  two  6-pounders, 
one  4-horse  battery  wagon  and  two  quartermaster 
wagons,  had  54  horses  of  which  12  were  unserviceable. 
Manly's  Battery  had  one  3-inch  rifle,  two  20-pounder 
howitzers,  two  4-horse  battery  wagons,  two  quarter 
master  wagons,  and  90  horses,  of  which  20  were  unserv 
iceable.  With  Carlton's  Battery,  there  were  two  10- 
pounder  Parrotts,  one  12-pounder  howitzer,  three  bat 
tery  wagons  with  12  mules  and  73  horses,  seven  mules 
and  twelve  horses  being  unserviceable,  while  Eraser's 
Battery  had  one  10-pounder  Parrot,  one  3-inch  rifle,  one 
12-pounder  howitzer,  one  forge,  three  wagons,  and  62 
horses,  of  which  six  were  unserviceable.  Including 
mounts  for  the  battalion  sergeant-major,  forge  master, 
wagon  master,  quartermaster-sergeant,  and  mounted 
courier,  88  horses  were  required  to  complete  the  comple 
ment  of  this  battalion  alone,  while  two  Napoleons  for 
McCarthy,  three  for  Manly,  two  for  Carlton,  and  a  12- 
pounder  Blakely  for  Fraser  were  soon  expected  to 
arrive  from  Richmond. 

Gen.  Pendleton  made  every  effort  to  secure  the  horses 
needed  for  the  Artillery,  but  before  the  end  of  the 
month  was  able  to  secure  but  396.  The  condition  with 
respect  to  horses  of  the  various  battalions  after  the  pre 
ceding  campaign  is  shown  by  the  distribution  of  this 
supply,  which  was  as  follows : 

Hardaway's    Battalion 112 

Jones'  Battalion 17 

Walker's   Battalion 56 

Carter's  Battalion 14 

Macintosh's   Battalion 34 

Andrews'  Battalion 40 

Eshleman's  Battalion 32 

Garnett's  Battalion 26 

Cabell's  Battalion 10 

Alexander's  Battalion  _  55 


564  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

This  issue  by  no  means  supplied  all  the  wants,  which 
fact  gives  a  pretty  good  idea  of  the  suffering  and  service 
which  the  field  artillery  horses  had  undergone  during 
the  short  space  of  a  single  week,  for  it  will  be  recalled 
that  the  batteries  were  fairly  well  mounted  when  they 
left  their  winter  quarters  the  29th  of  April. 

Extraordinary  efforts  were  now  being  made  by  the 
Bureau  of  Ordnance  to  provide  the  necessary  material, 
and  Col.  Gorgas  himself  was  present  to  examine  into 
the  exact  needs  of  all,  and  found  that  in  general  a 
marked  improvement  in  the  ammunition  was  reported. 
The  shells  for  the  20-pounder  Parrotts,  due  to  defects  in 
the  castings,  were  still  unsatisfactory,  for  many  of  them 
were  reported  to  have  burst  near  the  muzzle.  The  new 
projectile  for  the  Whitworths,  which  had  been  fabri 
cated  in  Richmond,  however,  proved  a  great  success.  In 
the  main,  the  field  ordnance  operations  had  been  well 
conducted  during  the  campaign  and  satisfaction  in  that 
respect  was  general.  Capt.  William  Allan,  Chief  of 
Ordnance,  2d  Corps,  had  displayed  unusual  ability,  and 
his  promotion  was  again  urged  by  Col.  Gorgas. 

Nothing  is  so  indicative  of  the  growing  appreciation 
of  the  importance  of  the  Artillery  as  the  increased  inter 
est  now  displayed  in  the  theoretical  features  of  gunnery. 
By  a  special  order  of  June  8,  a  board  to  consist  of  not 
less  than  three  nor  more  than  six  artillery  officers,  to  be 
designated  by  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  was  created  and 
directed  to  meet  the  first  day  of  each  month,  or  as  soon 
thereafter  as  practicable,  to  report  such  facts  in  regard 
to  material,  ammunition,  and  any  other  matters  con 
cerning  the  Artillery,  and  to  make  recommendations 
for  its  improvement.  The  board  was  also  directed  to 
compile  range  tables  for  the  various  types  of  guns  in 
use.  On  the  15th,  Gen.  Pendleton  appointed  Col. 
Alexander,  Majs.  Dearing  and  Henry,  Capts.  Reilly, 
Blount,  and  Fraser  to  the  board,  and  immediately  they 
set  to  work,  extending  their  investigations  over  a  wide 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  565 

field    and   contributing   in    innumerable   ways   to   the 
betterment  of  the  arm.* 

It  was  at  once  found  that  a  number  of  vacancies  ex 
isted  among  the  superior  officers  of  the  Field  Artillery, 
which  hampered  the  effective  administration  and  leader 
ship  of  the  battalions.  The  number  of  guns  with  the 
Army  entitled  the  arm,  under  the  law,  to  3  brigadier- 
generals,  7  colonels,  11  lieutenant-colonels,  and  17 
majors,  whereas  there  were  actually  commissioned  but 
1  brigadier-general,  6  colonels,  6  lieutenant-colonels, 
there  being,  however,  19  majors,  or  two  more  than  for 
which  authority  of  law  existed.  Already  several  pro 
motions  of  importance  had  been  made,  among  which  was 
that  of  Capt.  Benj.  T.  Eshleman,  of  the  Washington 
Artillery  Battalion,  as  its  major  with  rank  as  of  March 
26,  1863.  This  battalion  had  not  only  furnished  the 
Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  1st  Corps,  but  three  majors  be 
sides,  namely,  Garnett,  Bearing,  and  Eshleman,  while 
one  of  its  original  captains,  Thomas  L.  Rosser,  had  al 
ready  become  a  colonel  of  cavalry.  Both  he  and  Dear- 
ing  later  became  major-generals  of  cavalry. t 

It  was  but  a  few  days  before  the  artillery  board  of 
which  Col.  Alexander  was  president,  and  in  the  de 
liberations  of  which  he  played  a  leading  role,  drafted  a 
plan  for  the  reorganization  of  the  Artillery  and  sub 
mitted  it  to  the  commander-in-chief,  with  what  result 
we  shall  see. 

By  special  order  dated  May  30,  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  was  reorganized  into  three  corps  with  Long- 
street,  Ewell,  and  A.  P.  Hill  as  corps  commanders. 
The  1st  Corps  now  consisted  of  McLaws',  Hood's,  and 
Pickett's  divisions,  the  2d  Corps  of  Early's,  Edward 
Johnson's,  and  Rodes'  divisions,  and  the  3d  Corps  of 
R.  H.  Anderson's,  Heth's,  and  Pender's  divisions. 
Rodes'  and  Anderson's  divisions  each  contained  five, 


•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXVII,  pp.  873,  895. 

fRosser,  Garnett,  and  Bearing  were  members  of  the  graduating  class  at  West 
Point  when  they  resigned  in  April,  1861.  When  the  Washington  Artillery 
Battalion  reported  in  Richmond  in  May  they  were  assigned  to  duty  with  it, 
the  first  as  a  captain  and  the  others  as  lieutenants. 


566  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Pickett's  three,  and  all  the  others  four  brigades.  The 
Chief  of  Artillery  was  directed  to  designate  the  artillery 
for  the  various  corps  and  the  General  Reserve  Artillery 
was  abolished.*  This  order  marks  a  great  crisis  in  the 
development,  not  only  of  the  Confederate,  but  of  the  ar 
tillery  organization  of  the  world.  For  the  first  time 
practical  effect  was  to  be  given  the  growing  recognition 
of  the  fact  that  a  general  reserve  artillery  was  no  longer 
necessary,  and  that  the  better  tactical  employment  of 
the  arm  required  the  distribution  of  all  the  guns  among 
the  corps,  if  the  danger  of  part  of  them  being  left  in 
active  in  the  rear  was  to  be  overcome.  The  advantages 
of  corps  artillery  have  been  previously  discussed 
at  length.  Suffice  it  to  repeat  that  together  with  the 
change  of  name  came  also  a  change  of  position  in  the 
order  of  march,  and  that  every  leader  of  troops  and 
every  staff  officer  were  at  once  compelled  to  recognize 
that  no  part  of  the  artillery  was  to  remain  in  idleness, 
but  that  all  was  to  take  a  place  in  the  line  of  battle  since 
improved  material  with  its  increased  range  enabled  the 
withdrawal  of  battalions  for  special  missions,  even  after 
they  had  once  become  engaged.  It  should  here  be  noted 
that  Lee  in  the  employment  of  his  artillery  had  antici 
pated  the  actual  change  in  organization,  which  was, 
therefore,  in  large  measure,  but  the  logical  result  of  a 
gradual  process  of  development  in  his  tactics.  What 
ever  may  be  claimed  as  to  the  theoretical  development 
of  artillery  organization  and  tactics,  the  Confederates 
certainly  gave  practical  form  to  the  conception  of  corps 
artillery  in  its  highest  sense,  and  the  innovation  was 
soon  accepted  and  adopted  by  the  armies  of  the 
continent. 

On  June  2  and  4,  Pendleton  gave  form  to  the  new 
artillery  organization  by  first  designating  three  divi 
sional  and  two  reserve  battalions  for  each  of  the  three 
corps  of  the  Army,  and  then  assigning  a  chief  of  artillery 
to  each.  The  completed  organization  was  as  follows : 

•Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  850,  Special  Order  No.  146. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  567 

IST  CORPS  (Longstreet) 

Col.  James  B.  Walton,  Chief  of  Artillery 
DIVISIONAL  BATTALIONS 

CABELL'S  BATTALION 
Col.  Henry  Coalter  Cabell 

1.  "A"  Battery,  1st  N.  C.  Reg.,  Capt.  Basil  C.  Manly. 

2.  Pulaski    (Ga.)    Battery,  Capt.  John  C.  Fraser. 

3.  1st  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Edward  S.  McCarthy. 

4.  Troup  (Ga.)   Battery,  Capt.  Henry  H.  Carlton. 

DEARING'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  James  Dearing 

1.  Fauquier  Battery,  Capt.  Robert  M.  Stribling. 

2.  Richmond  Hampden  Battery,  Capt.  William  H.  Caskie. 

3.  Richmond  Fayette  Battery,  Capt.  Miles  C.  Macon. 

4.  Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  G.  Blount. 

HENRY'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  M.  W.  Henry 

1.  Branch  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  Alexander  C.  Latham. 

2.  Charleston  German  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  K.  Bachman. 

3.  Palmetto   (S.  C.)   Battery,  Capt.  Hugh  R.  Garden. 

4.  Rowan  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  James  Reilly. 

ALEXANDER'S  BATTALION 
Col.  E.  Porter  Alexander 

1.  Ashland  Battery,  Capt.  Pichegru  Woolfolk,  Jr. 

2.  Bedford  Battery,  Capt.  Tyler  C.  Jordan. 

3.  Brooks  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Lieut.  S.  C.  Gilbert. 

4.  Madison  (La.)   Battery,  Capt.  Geo.  V.  Moody. 

5.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Parker. 

6.  Bath  Battery,  Capt.  Esmond  B.  Taylor. 

ESHLEMAN'S   BATTALION 
Maj.  Benj.  F.  Eshleman 

1.  1st  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Squires. 

2.  2d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  B.  Richardson. 

3.  3d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  M.  B.  Miller. 

4.  4th  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  Joe  Norcom. 


568  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

2D  CORPS   (Ewell) 

Col.  John  Thompson  Brown,  Chief  of  Artillery 
DIVISIONAL  BATTALIONS 

CARTER'S  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.  Thos.  H.  Carter 

1.  Jeff  Davis  Alabama  Battery.,  Capt.  William  J.  Reese. 

2.  King  William  Battery,  Capt.  William  P.  Carter. 

3.  Louisa  Morris  Battery,  Capt.  R.  C.  M.  Page. 

4.  Richmond  Orange  Battery,  Capt.  Chas.  W.  Fry. 

JONES'  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.  Hilary  P.  Jones 

1.  Charlottesville  Battery,  Capt.  Jas.  McD.  Carrington. 

2.  Richmond  Courtney  Battery,  Capt.  W.  A.  Tanner. 

3.  Louisiana  Guard  Battery,  Capt.  C.  A.  Green. 

4.  Staunton  Battery,  Capt.  Asher  W.  Garber. 

ANDREWS'  BATTALION 
Maj.  James  W.  Latimer 

1.  1st  Maryland  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  F.  Dement. 

2.  Alleghany  Battery,  Capt.  John  C.  Carpenter. 

3.  4th  Md.  or  Chesapeake  Battery,  Capt.  William  D.  Brown. 

4.  Lee  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  J.  Raine. 

CORPS  RESERVE  BATTALION 

FIRST  VIRGINIA  ARTILLERY 

Capt.  Willis  J.  Dance 

1.  2d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  David  Watson. 

2.  3d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Benj.  H.  Smith,  Jr. 

3.  Powhatan  Battery,  Lieut.  John  M.  Cunnigham. 

4.  1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  Archibald  Graham. 

5.  Salem  Battery,  Lieut.  C.  B.  Griffin. 

NELSON'S  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.  William  Nelson 

1.  Amherst  Battery,  Capt.   Thomas  J.   Kirkpatrick. 

2.  Fluvanna  Battery,  Capt.  John  L.  Massie. 

3.  Georgia  Regular  Battery,  Capt.  John  Milledge. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  569 

3D  CORPS  (A.  P.  Hill) 

Col.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 

MC!NTOSH'S  BATTALION 

Maj.  David  G.  Mclntosh 

1.  Danville  Battery,  Capt.  R.  S.  Price. 

2.  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  W.  B.  Hurt. 

3.  2d  Rockbridge  Battery,  Lieut.  Samuel  Wallace. 

4.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Marmaduke  Johnson. 

GARNETT'S  BATTALION 
Lieut. -Col.  John  J.  Garnett 

1.  Donaldsonville  (La.)  Battery,  Capt.  Victor  Maurin. 

2.  Norfolk  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  D.  Moore. 

3.  Pittsylvania  Battery,  Capt.  John  W.  Lewis. 

4.  Norfolk  Blues  Battery,  Capt.  Chas.  R.  Grandy. 

POAGUE'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  William  T.  Poague 

1.  Albemarle  Battery,  Capt.  James  W.  Wyatt. 

2.  Charlotte  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  Joseph  Graham. 

3.  Madison  (Miss.)  Battery,  Capt.  George  Ward. 

4.  Warrenton  Battery,  Capt.  J.  V.  Brooke. 

CORPS  RESERVE  BATTALIONS 

PEGRAM'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  William  J.  Pegram 

1.  Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  G.  Crenshaw. 

2.  Fredericksburg  Battery,  Capt.  Edward  A.  Marye. 

3.  Richmond  Letcher  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  A.  Brander. 

4.  Pee  Dee  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Lieut.  Wm.  E.  Zimmerman. 

5.  Richmond  Purcell  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  McGraw. 

CUTTS'  BATTALION 

1.  "A"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,    Capt.   Hugh  M.   Ross. 

2.  "B"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,    Capt.  Geo.   M.  Patterson. 

3.  "C"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,    Capt.  John  T.  Wingfield. 

From  the  foregoing  we  see  that  there  were  now  with 
the  Army  15  battalions  with  a  total  of  62  light  bat- 


570  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

teries.  Each  battalion  had  a  field-officer  in  addition  to 
its  commander,  and  a  complete  commissioned  staff.  The 
five  battalions  comprising  the  artillery  of  each  corps  con 
stituted  a  division  of  artillery  under  the  corps  chief  of 
artillery,  who  reported  to  and  received  orders  direct 
from  the  corps  commander,  while  the  chief  of  ar 
tillery  of  the  Army  reported  to  and  represented  the 
commander-in-chief  in  his  dealings  with  the  corps  ar 
tillery.  In  the  whole  scheme  of  reorganization,  one 
cannot  but  see  the  features  of  the  brilliant  Alexander 
cropping  out,  and  the  final  success  of  his  efforts  to  di 
vorce  the  artillery  from  the  tactical  control  of  Gen. 
Pendleton,  except  in  so  far  as  he  represented  the  com 
mander-in-chief  in  his  capacity  as  administrative  chief 
of  artillery. 

By  the  time  the  reorganization  was  completed,  Col. 
Baldwin,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  had  received  a  fresh 
consignment  of  14  Napoleons  from  Gorgas,  who  was 
energetically  pushing  forward  the  manufacture  of  the 
improved  gun  in  Richmond.  These,  in  addition  to  the 
14  captured  pieces,  were  at  once  issued  to  the  battalions 
in  the  field  in  as  equitable  a  manner  as  possible,  only 
two  3-inch  rifles  going  to  the  Horse  Artillery.  The 
distribution  of  guns  was  now  as  follows: 

Cabell's  Battalion,  8  rifles,  8  Napoleons. 

Garnett's  Battalion,  11  rifles,  4  Napoleons,  2  howitzers,  and 
one  6-inch  Whitworth. 

Bearing's  Battalion,  5  rifles,  12  Napoleons,  1  howitzer,  and  one 
6-inch  Whitworth. 

Henry's  Battalion,  4>  rifles,  12  Napoleons,  1  howitzer,  and  one 
6-inch  Whitworth. 

Eshleman's  Battalion,  10  Napoleons,  1  howitzer,  and  one  6-inch 
Whitworth. 

Alexander's  Battalion,  11  rifles,  9  Napoleons,  3  howitzers. 

Carter's  Battalion,  8  rifles,  6  Napoleons,  2  howitzers. 

Jones'  Battalion,  4  rifles,  10  Napoleons. 

Mclntosh's  Battalion,  10  rifles,  6  Napoleons. 

Andrews'  Battalion,  10  rifles,  6  Napoleons. 

Pegram's  Battalion,  8  rifles,  9  Napoleons,  2  howitzers. 

Dance's  Battalion,  10  rifles,  8  Napoleons,  4  howitzers. 

Cutts'  Battalion,  10  rifles,  3  Napoleons,  5  howitzers. 

Nelson's  Battalion,  6  rifles,  8  Napoleons,  4  howitzers. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  571 

Thus,  it  is  seen  that  about  equally  distributed  among 
the  three  corps  were  one  hundred  and  three  3-inch  rifles, 
one  hundred  and  seven  12-pounder  Napoleons,  thirty 
12-pounder  howitzers,  and  four  6-inch  Whitworths,  or 
a  total  of  244  guns  of  comparatively  superior  type  to 
those  which  had  been  in  use  within  the  past  few  months. 
But,  while  the  material  was  much  improved  by  substi 
tuting  the  captured  rifles  and  the  Napoleons  of  home 
manufacture  for  the  old  6-pounders,  and  while  the  bat 
teries  were  equally  equipped  in  the  number  of  pieces, 
that  is  four  to  a  battery,  a  distressing  lack  of  uniformity 
in  material  existed.  This  was  of  course  a  glaring  de 
fect,  greatly  increasing  the  difficulty  of  ammunition 
supply  and  impairing  the  general  efficiency.  Theo 
retically  it  was  capable  of  correction,  but  practically 
there  were  many  difficulties  in  the  way.  Some  batteries 
wanted  rifles,  others  Napoleons,  and  few  were  willing 
to  be  armed  with  howitzers  alone.  The  gunners  in  the 
various  batteries  had  become  familiar  with  their  material 
of  whatever  character,  and  the  mere  suggestion  that  uni 
formity  of  battery  armament  should  be  enforced  at  once 
raised  a  hue  and  cry  on  the  part  of  all  for  the  material 
of  their  individual  preference.  For  the  sake  of  general 
uniformity  none  were  willing  to  waive  those  preferences. 
After  all,  this  attitude  was  natural,  and  it  would  have 
required  a  bold  chief  indeed  to  ignore  the  human  phase 
of  the  situation.  Believing  that  the  good  to  be  accom 
plished  by  unifying  the  battery  armaments  was  not  com 
mensurate  with  the  general  dissatisfaction  such  a  step 
would  surely  arouse,  Gen.  Pendleton  declined  to  raise 
the  issue  and  so  a  great  evil  was  allowed  to  exist  to  the 
very  end. 

In  the  selection  of  a  chief  of  artillery  for  the  new 
corps,  the  services  of  one  who  had  been  actively  engaged 
in  every  battle  from  Bull  Run  to  date  were  recognized. 
In  the  whole  army,  there  was  not  one  who  deserved  pro 
motion  more  than  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker,  and  his 
elevation  was  welcomed  by  all  and  accepted  in  a  spirit 
of  profound  satisfaction  by  the  Artillery.  Less  brilliant 


572  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

than  Alexander,  he  yet  possessed  the  highest  virtues 
both  as  a  man  and  as  a  soldier,  and  throughout  his  long 
career  gave  many  evidences  of  his  peculiar  ability  as  an 
artillerist,  especially  as  an  organizer. 

Here  it  should  be  remarked  that  in  no  arm  of  the 
service  was  promotion  so  slow  as  in  the  Field  Artillery. 
In  the  list  of  battery  commanders  in  May,  1863,  we  find 
a  number  who  had  served  in  that  capacity  since  the  out 
break  of  the  war,  and  less  than  30  of  the  original  ar 
tillery  officers  had  attained  the  rank  of  field-officers 
after  two  years  of  honorable  and  arduous  service. 
Many  of  these  were  among  the  most  efficient  officers  in 
the  Army  from  every  standpoint.  Col.  Long,  Lee's 
military  secretary,  said  that  the  personnel  of  the  Ar 
tillery  was  unsurpassed  by  any  troops  in  the  Army, 
and  many  officers  in  other  arms  have  declared  that  the 
Artillery  was  the  most  distinguished  arm  of  the  service. 
It  was  the  esprit  de  corps  of  the  Artillery  alone  which 
kept  its  officers  true  to  their  stripe,  notwithstanding 
the  unfavorable  opportunity  for  their  advancement,  and 
few  sought  promotion  by  transferring  to  other  arms, 
Rosser,  Dearing,  and  J.  R.  C.  Lewis  being  among  the 
exceptions,  while  Col.  Stephen  D.  Lee  was  promoted 
out  of  the  Artillery. 

It  has  become  the  habit  of  historians  to  declare  that 
the  Federal  at  all  times  excelled  the  Confederate  ar 
tillery  in  material  and  personnel.  Even  Col.  Hender 
son  in  his  Aldershot  lecture  on  the  American  Civil  War 
fell  into  the  error  of  making  so  general  and  unqualified 
an  assertion.*  Certainly,  as  far  as  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  is  concerned,  the  quality  of  the  personnel 
of  the  Field  Artillery  was  not  surpassed  if  equalled  by 
any  similar  arm  then  in  existence,  a  fact  which  seems  to 
be  indisputable  when  the  inferiority  of  its  material,  am 
munition,  equipment,  stores,  horses,  training  and  all  the 
other  disadvantages  under  which  it  labored  are  con 
sidered. 

*Science  of  War,  G.  F.  R.,  Henderson,  p.  245.  But  see  Evolution  of  Modern 
Strategy,  by  Lieut-Col.  P.  N.  Maude,  in  which  it  is  said  that  the  three  arms  of  the 
Confederate  Army  were  intrinsically  superior  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  573 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  regular  batteries 
served  as  models  to  the  Northern  volunteers.  One  of 
these  was  grouped  with  three  manned  by  volunteers,  and 
the  latter  very  naturally  profited  by  the  example  set 
them.  Again,  the  supply  of  horses  in  the  North  and 
West  was  practically  inexhaustible,  while  in  the  South 
there  were  few  left  at  the  close  of  the  second  year  of  the 
war.  Not  only  did  the  North  possess  the  national  school 
of  arms,  which  it  was  able  to  maintain  in  uninterrupted 
activity  for  the  technical  education  of  its  more  scientific 
officers,  but  it  also  conducted  several  schools  of  gunnery 
while  its  armies  operated  in  the  field.  In  a  measure, 
West  Point  was  offset  by  the  Virginia  Military  Insti 
tute,  but  had  the  South  been  free  to  conduct  schools  of 
gunnery  for  its  artillery  officers,  it  would  have  been  un 
able  to  provide  them  with  ammunition.  After  the  war 
commenced  its  only  school  of  instruction  was  that  of 
actual  experience,  and  a  large  majority  of  its  junior  ar 
tillery  officers  fired  a  gun  for  the  first  time  on  the  field  of 
battle.  Surely  the  personnel  must  have  possessed  equal 
if  not  superior  qualities  to  those  of  their  antagonists,  to 
accomplish  the  results  they  did.  One  need  only  follow 
the  rapid  development  which  they  brought  about  to  be 
satisfied  that  they  were  not  ordinary  or  inefficient  men. 
We  have  seen  what  the  stage  of  this  development  was 
in  May,  1863.  Now  let  us  examine  conditions  in  the 
Federal  Artillery  at  the  time. 

If  we  accept  the  evidence  of  Gen.  Henry  T.  Hunt, 
Chief  of  Artillery  Army  of  the  Potomac,  an  officer  of 
great  ability  and  unsurpassed  special  knowledge  as  an 
artillerist  when  he  wrote,  the  Federal  Artillery  in  May, 
1863,  was  in  a  most  unsatisfactory  condition.*  In  spite 
of  the  splendid  organization  which  McClellan  had  given 
it  and  its  initial  services  in  the  war  under  Hunt,  a  gen 
eral  decline  in  the  efficiency  of  the  arm  had  set  in  be 
fore  the  end  of  1862.  Field-officers  of  artillery  had  be 
come  to  be  regarded  as  an  unnecessary  expense,  and  their 
muster  into  the  service  was  forbidden;  so  just  at  the  time 

*Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  259. 


574  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

the  Confederates  were  doing  all  in  their  power  to  im 
prove  the  organization  of  their  artillery  by  creating  bat 
talions  with  an  adequate  number  of  competent  field  and 
staff  officers,  the  Federals  were  destroying  the  tactical 
cohesion  of  their  artillery  by  denying  it  the  necessary 
officers,  and  instead  of  remaining  in  the  artillery  ir 
respective  of  promotion,  many  of  the  best  artillery  of 
ficers  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  once  transferred 
to  other  arms  in  which  better  opportunities  for  advance 
ment  were  to  be  found.  Thus,  such  experienced  ar 
tillerists  as  Hays,  De  Russy,  Getty,  Gibbon,  Griffin, 
and  Ayres  sought  promotion  in  the  cavalry  and  infan 
try.  While  every  effort  was  made  to  maintain  the  Con 
federate  batteries  at  full  strength,  however  depleted  the 
units  of  the  other  arms,  in  the  North  no  adequate  meas 
ures  were  taken  to  supply  recruits  for  the  artillery,  and 
the  batteries  were  frequently  dependent  on  the  troops 
to  which  they  were  attached  for  men  enough  to  work 
the  guns  in  action.  While  Pendleton  was  maintaining 
a  remount  depot  for  his  command  at  Winchester  under 
Maj.  Richardson,  inadequate  as  it  was,  and  scouring 
the  country,  even  as  far  as  Georgia  and  Florida,  for 
draught  animals,  always  being  favored  by  the  Quarter 
master-General  in  the  matter  of  horses,  the  Federal  bat 
teries  were  often  forced  to  wait  for  remounts  until  the 
cavalry,  and  even  the  medical  and  quartermaster  trains 
had  been  supplied,  a  fact  which  illustrated  the  general 
feeling  in  the  army  towards  the  field  artillery.  While 
the  Confederate  organization  was  being  solidified  and 
molded  along  the  lines  dictated  by  experience,  in  the 
North  all  experience  was  ignored  and  the  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery  was  in  effect  relieved  by  Hooker  from  all  but 
administrative  work.  In  lieu  of  the  perfect  mechanism 
of  the  arm  under  Hunt  on  the  Peninsula,  Hooker  sub 
stituted  chaos.  With  the  command  of  the  Artillery  at 
his  own  headquarters  to  be  exercised  by  his  chief  only 
upon  specific  orders,  there  resulted  such  confusion 
and  disorder  that  the  artillery  had  to  be  practically  re 
organized  after  a  splendid  organization  had  already 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  575 

been  attained  and  sacrificed.  Thus  while  the  Confed 
erates  were  building  up,  the  Federals  had  been  tearing 
down.  During  the  period  in  which  the  former  were 
organizing  their  artillery  into  corps  divisions,  all  under 
a  strongly-centralized  command,  and  appointing  more 
and  more  field  officers,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had 
no  artillery  commander- in-chief,  and  of  the  14  artillery 
brigades  it  possessed,  nine  were  commanded  by  captains 
and  one  by  a  lieutenant,  in  addition  to  their  battery 
duties,  while  but  four  were  commanded  by  field 
officers ! 

Such  was  the  condition  of  the  Federal  Field  Artillery, 
when  it  entered  upon  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  with 
its  65  batteries  and  370  splendid  guns,  It  will,  there 
fore,  as  stated  by  Gen.  Hunt  himself,  be  perceived  by 
comparison  that  the  organization  of  the  Federal  Ar 
tillery  was  at  this  period  in  every  way  inferior  to  that 
of  the  Confederates.  Nothing  but  the  same  individual 
courage  and  intelligence  among  the  Northern  artillery 
men,  as  was  to  be  found  in  the  corresponding  arm  in 
Lee's  Army,  saved  the  former  from  a  complete  break 
down  at  Gettysburg.  All  the  more  honor  is  due  them 
for  the  account  they  there  gave  of  themselves,  but  let  us 
hear  nothing  more  of  the  superiority  of  the  Federal  Ar 
tillery  personnel,  except  in  point  of  numbers.  In  that 
respect  the  Confederates  were  greatly  outclassed. 

The  return  of  May  20  gives  the  artillery  personnel 
of  Lee's  Army  as  253  officers  and  4,708  men  present  for 
duty,  and  a  paper  aggregate  of  7,279.  These  figures  do 
not  include  Dearing's  Battalion  and  two  batteries  on 
picket,  nor  two  others  with  Ransom.  The  return  of  May 
31,  the  last  before  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  gives  the 
Artillery,  less  Alexander's  and  Garnett's  battalions,  a 
total  effective  strength  of  4,460.  The  52  batteries  re 
ported  therefore  averaged  86  officers  and  men  present, 
and  adding  860  for  the  10  batteries  not  included  in  the 
return,  an  effective  aggregate  of  5,320  is  obtained.  This 
is  not  far  from  correct,  since  the  aggregate  present  on 
May  10  was  5,010.  From  these  figures  it  is  seen  that 
the  average  battery  strength  was  about  3  officers  and 


576  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

80  enlisted  men,  a  fact  which  well  illustrates  the  import 
ance  Lee  attached  to  the  efficiency  of  his  artillery,  and 
the  tremendous  effort  which  had  been  made  by  the  Chief 
of  Artillery  and  his  subordinates  to  maintain  the  bat 
teries  at  a  serviceable  strength.  In  the  infantry  and 
cavalry  there  were  battalions  and  squadrons  at  this  time 
with  less  than  100  men. 

The  aggregate  strength  of  the  Federal  Artillery  en 
gaged  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign  was  7,183,  the  num 
ber  of  batteries  65,  and  the  number  of  guns  370,  or 
about  110  officers  and  men  and  6  pieces  to  the  battery. 

Having  examined  the  organization  of  the  Field  Ar 
tillery,  let  us  look  into  that  of  the  Confederate  Horse 
Artillery. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
Stuart  was  directed  to  concentrate  his  division  at  Cul- 
peper,  meanwhile  guarding  his  front  and  the  Confed 
erate  left  along  the  Rapidan,  and  before  May  9,  Jones' 
Brigade  with  Chew's  Battery  was  ordered  from  the 
Valley  to  join  him.  By  May  20,  the  strength  of  his 
division,  including  the  Horse  Artillery,  was  8,193 
present  and  11,905  present  and  absent. 

Early  in  April  the  horse  batteries  had  been  organized 
into  a  separate  corps  under  Maj.  R.  F.  Beckham,  but 
were  temporarily  left  with  the  brigades  with  which  they 
had  served,  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  brigade  com 
manders.*  The  first  step  in  the  organization  of  the 
Horse  Artillery  into  a  tactical  unit  had  therefore  been 
taken  when  the  Army  was  reorganized  on  May  30. 

The  growth  of  the  battalion  had  been  slow  but  sure. 
Stuart  from  the  first  had  proved  an  ardent  advocate  of 
the  increase  in  the  number  of  horse  batteries,  placing 
great  reliance  upon  their  services,  and  displaying  un 
usual  interest  in  their  proper  development.  Indeed, 
though  his  historians  do  not  include  the  horse  batteries 
in  the  organization  of  the  cavalry,  Stuart  considered 
them  as  much  a  part  of  his  command  as  the  cavalry  regi 
ments  themselves.  After  Ashby  raised  Chew's  Battery 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXV,  Part  II,  p.  858. 


LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  ROBERT  PRESTON  CHEW 
CHIEF   HORSE   ARTILLERY 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  577 

and  employed  it  so  successfully,  Stuart,  it  will  be  re 
called,  had  organized  the  Stuart  Horse  Artillery.  Its 
original  commander,  as  we  have  seen,  was  John  Pelham, 
who,  just  graduated  from  West  Point,  had  been  com 
missioned  by  the  Confederate  Government  at  Mont 
gomery  as  a  lieutenant  of  artillery,  and  sent  to  Lynch- 
burg  in  charge  of  the  ordnance  office  there.  From  that 
point  he  was  ordered  to  Winchester,  where  he  organized 
and  drilled  Alburtis'  Wise  Battery,  which  he  com 
manded  at  Bull  Run  with  conspicuous  efficiency.  When 
assigned  in  the  fall  of  1861  to  the  duty  of  organizing 
Stuart's  Horse  Battery,  he  gathered  about  him  a  most 
remarkable  and  superior  set  of  men,  mostly  from  the 
cavalry,  some  from  Virginia,  and  some  from  Maryland, 
under  Dr.  James  Breathed.  To  these  were  added  about 
40  from  Talladega  County,  Alabama,  under  Lieut. 
William  M.  McGregor.  It  was  not  long  before  Hart's 
light  battery  of  Washington,  South  Carolina,  was  con 
verted  into  a  horse  battery. 

The  experiences  of  the  first  Maryland  invasion  in 
which  the  cavalry  was  so  active  and  opposed  to  an  enemy 
well  provided  with  horse  batteries,  convinced  Stuart  of 
the  urgent  need  of  more  artillery  for  his  own  command. 
The  day  after  the  battle,  Pelham's  Battery,  which  had 
received  a  large  accession  of  recruits  from  Maryland, 
was  drawn  upon  for  the  men  with  which  to  create  a  new 
horse  battery,  to  the  command  of  which  Capt.  M.  W. 
Henry  was  assigned,  and  on  November  18  the  light 
battery  of  Capt.  Marcellus  N.  Moorman,  from  Lynch- 
burg,  was  converted.  The  men  of  Moorman's  Battery 
had  been  mustered  into  the  service  April  25,  1861,  as  a 
company  of  infantry,  under  the  name  of  the  "Beaure- 
gard  Rifles,"  and  sent  to  Norfolk,  where  for  lack  of 
muskets  it  had  been  temporarily  armed  with  Parrott 
guns.  When  the  Army  was  reorganized  a  year  later 
it  was  still  serving  as  artillery  at  Sewell's  Point  and  else 
where  about  Hampton  Roads,  and  was  then  definitely 
mustered  into  the  Confederate  service  as  a  battery  of 
artillery,  and  placed  in  a  battalion  with  Grimes', 


578  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Huger's,  and  Nichols'  light  batteries,  under  Maj. 
John  S.  Saunders.  Before  its  conversion  it  had,  there 
fore,  served,  and  with  great  credit,  throughout  the 
Peninsula,  Second  Manassas,  and  Maryland  campaigns. 

When  Pelham  was  promoted  major  of  horse  ar 
tillery,  Breathed  succeeded  to  the  command  of  his  bat 
tery,  while  McGregor  succeeded  Henry  upon  the  lat 
ter 's  promotion.  During  the  winter  of  1862,  Brocken- 
brough  was  promoted  major,  and  his  battery,  the  2d 
Baltimore  Artillery,  which  had  been  detached  for  duty 
in  the  Valley  with  Jones'  and  Steuart's  brigades,  was 
also  converted  and  placed  under  the  command  of  Capt. 
William  H.  Griffin.  Another  horse  battery,  McClan- 
nahan's,  had  been  formed  by  converting  Imboden's 
Staunton  battery,  but  this  battery  was  not  regularly 
brigaded  with  Stuart's  Battalion  until  1864,  and 
Griffin's  battery  did  not  join  Beckham's  Battalion  until 
Jenkins  arrived  at  Gettysburg. 

When  Stuart  finally  concentrated  his  division  at  Cul- 
peper  towards  the  end  of  May,  the  Stuart  Horse  Ar 
tillery  Battalion  was  composed  as  follows : 

Maj.  R.  F.  Beckham 

1.  Ashby  Battery,  Capt.  Robert  Preston  Chew. 

2.  1st  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,,  Capt.  James  Breathed. 

3.  Washington  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  James  F.  Hart. 

4.  2d  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  Capt.  William  M.  McGregor. 

5.  Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  Marcellus  N.  Moorman. 

6.  2d  Baltimore  Battery,  Capt.  William  H.  Griffin. 

There  was,  therefore,  a  battery  of  horse  artillery  for 
each  of  the  six  cavalry  brigades  under  Hampton,  Fitz 
Lee,  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  Jones,  Robertson,  and  Jenkins, 
respectively,  as  well  as  one  for  Imboden's  independent 
cavalry  command. 

At  the  end  of  May,  the  strength  of  the  five  batteries 
of  horse  artillery  present  with  Stuart  at  Culpeper  was 
18  officers  and  519  men  present  for  duty,  with  a  paper 
aggregate  of  701,  or  an  average  effective  battery 
strength  of  about  107.  These  five  batteries  together  pos- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  579 

sessed  24  pieces  of  artillery,  three  being  armed  with 
four  and  two  with  six  pieces. 

Stuart,  who  was  making  every  effort  to  increase  the 
strength  of  the  Horse  Artillery  in  material,  as  well  as 
in  personnel,  sought  to  retain  all  the  captured  pieces  in 
his  possession  for  his  own  batteries,  and  this  led  to  an 
altercation  between  him  and  the  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
who  was  unable  to  recover  the  guns  for  distribution.  In 
the  correspondence  which  ensued,  Stuart  resented  the 
use  of  the  expression  that  these  guns  had  been  "ap 
propriated  by  the  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,"  which  he 
erroneously,  and  no  doubt  because  of  a  guilty  conscience, 
attributed  to  Col.  Baldwin.  The  difficulty  was  finally 
adjusted,  however,  by  Gen.  Lee  assuming  the  burden 
of  the  remark,  which  he  denied  was  used  by  him  in  any 
objectionable  sense,  and  Stuart  was  allowed  to  retain 
two  3-inch  rifles  and  directed  to  turn  in  the  three  other 
captured  guns  in  his  possession. 

Beckham  was  endeavoring  to  provide  all  his  batteries 
with  six  pieces,  a  step  which  met  with  the  disapproval  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  for 
the  sole  reason  that  the  additional  horses  for  this  increase 
in  armament  were  not  available.  Even  the  dismounting 
of  some  of  the  light  batteries  had  become  almost  a  neces 
sity  for  lack  of  horses,  but  in  some  way  Beckham  soon 
managed  to  supply  the  necessary  number  to  complete 
the  quota  of  his  battalion  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
ambulance  and  ammunition  trains  were  so  poorly  pro 
vided  with  animals  as  to  be  almost  unserviceable.  Con 
cerning  Beckham's  work  in  refitting  his  battalion  and 
establishing  it  upon  a  sounder  basis,  Stuart  in  his  letter 
to  headquarters  was  most  complimentary. 

Meantime,  Hampton,  Fitz  Lee,  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee, 
and  the  horse  batteries  of  Breathed,  McGregor,  Hart 
and  Moorman,  lay  about  Culpeper.  The  Artillery  was 
encamped  on  the  farm  of  John  Minor  Botts,  who  was  a 
strong  anti-secessionist  and  bitterly  complained  that 
"Ten  thousand  men  should  burn  his  rails  without 
splitting  any."  Jenkins'  Brigade  with  Griffin's  Bat- 


580  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

tery  had  been  assigned  to  duty  in  the  Valley.  On  the 
22d  of  May,  Gen.  Stuart  reviewed  that  portion  of  his 
division  present,  many  distinguished  personages  ap 
pearing,  among  them  Gens.  Hood  and  Randolph. 
Great  numbers  of  ladies  also  attended,  which  of  course 
pleased  the  gallant  cavalry  commander.  Shortly  after 
wards,  Robertson's  Brigade  arrived  from  North  Caro 
lina,  and  on  June  4,  Jones'  Brigade  with  Chew's  Bat 
tery  from  the  Valley,  so  that  the  following  day  another 
review  of  the  entire  division  was  held,  at  which  Gen. 
Lee  was  expected  to  be  present.  In  this  Stuart  was 
much  disappointed,  but  the  "pageantry  of  war  pro 
ceeded."  Eight  thousand  cavalry,  with  the  battalion  of 
artillery  in  the  lead,  passed  under  the  eye  of  the  division 
commander  in  column  of  squadrons. 

So  unique  is  this  incident  in  the  career  of  that  grim 
fighting  machine,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  that 
especial  interest  attaches  to  it.  One  is  involuntarily 
impelled  to  pause  and  reflect  upon  the  exuberance  of  the 
spirit  of  that  youthful  soldier,  who,  in  spite  of  war's 
dreadful  tragedy  all  about  him,  and  in  which  he  himself 
was  a  leading  actor,  could  so  indulge  his  fancy  in  the 
very  presence  of  the  enemy.  The  following  interesting 
account  of  the  review  is  taken  from  the  war-time  diary 
of  one  of  Stuart's  gunners: 

"Early  this  morning  we  started  to  the  field,  where  the  troops 
were  to  be  reviewed  by  passing  by  the  eagle  eye  of  their  great 
commander.  The  place  where  the  review  was  held  is  a  beautiful 
and  nearly  level  plain  about  four  miles  northeast  of  Culpeper 
Courthouse,  and  little  over  a  mile  southwest  of  Brandy  Station, 
and  on  the  west  side  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad.* 

"When  we,  Chew's  Battery,  arrived  on  the  field  some  of  the 
Cavalry  regiments  were  already  forming  in  dress  parade  order 
for  the  review  procession.  At  about  10  o'clock  the  whole  column, 
which  was  about  two  miles  long,  was  ready  and  in  splendid  trim 
to  pass  in  review  before  its  illustrious  and  gallant  chief,  and  his 
brilliant  staff. 

"As  soon  as  the  whole  line  was  formed,  Gen.  Stuart  and  his 
staff  dashed  on  the  field.  He  was  superbly  mounted.  The  trap 
pings  on  his  proud,  prancing  horse  all  looked  bright  and  new,  and 

*Now  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.  R. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  581 

his  side  arms  gleamed  in  the  morning  sun  like  burnished  silver.  A 
long  black  ostrich  plume  waved  gracefully  from  a  black  slouch  hat, 
cocked  upon  one  side,  and  was  held  with  a  golden  clasp  which  also 
stayed  the  plume.  Before  the  procession  started,  Gen.  Stuart  and 
staff  rode  along  the  front  of  the  line  from  one  end  to  the  other.  He 
is  the  prettiest  and  most  graceful  rider  I  ever  saw.  When  he 
dashed  past  us,  I  could  not  help  but  notice  with  what  natural 
ease  and  comely  elegance  he  sat  his  steed,  as  it  bounded  over  the 
field,  and  his  every  motion  in  the  saddle  was  in  such  strict  accord 
ance  with  the  movements  of  his  horse  that  the  rider  and  his  horse 
appeared  to  be  but  one  and  the  same  machine.  Immediately  after 
Gen.  Stuart  and  staff  had  passed  along  the  front  of  the  whole 
line,  he  galloped  to  a  little  knoll  in  the  southwest  edge  of  the  field 
near  the  railroad,  wheeled  his  horse  to  front  face  to  the  field,  and 
sat  there  like  a  gallant  knight  errant,  under  his  waving  plume, 
presenting  in  veritable  truth  every  characteristic  of  a  chivalric 
cavalier  of  the  first  order.  He  was  then  ready  for  the  review, 
and  the  whole  cavalcade  began  to  move  and  pass  in  review  before 
the  steady,  martial,  and  scrutinizing  gaze  of  the  greatest  cavalry 
chieftain  of  America. 

"Three  bands  of  music  were  playing  nearly  all  the  time  while 
the  procession  was  moving,  a  flag  was  fluttering  in  the  breeze  from 
every  regiment,  and  the  whole  army  was  one  grand,  magnificent 
pageant,  inspiring  enough  to  make  even  an  old  woman  feel  fightish. 

"After  the  whole  cavalcade  passed  the  review  station,  at  a  quick 
walk,  the  column  divided  up  into  divisions,  brigades,  and  regiments, 
which  maneuvered  all  over  the  field.  The  last  and  most  inspiring 
and  impressive  act  in  the  scene  was  a  sham  battle,  the  cavalry 
charging  several  times  with  drawn  sabers  and  the  horse  artillery 
firing  from  four  or  five  different  positions  on  the  field.  I  fired  ten 
rounds  from  my  gun. 

"Hundreds  of  ladies  from  Culpeper  Courthouse  and  surrounding 
country  stood  in  bunches  on  the  hills  and  knolls  around  the  field 
looking  at  the  grand  military  display. 

"A  special  train  from  Richmond  stood  on  the  track  just  in  rear 
of  the  review  stand,  crowded  with  people,  and,  judging  from  the 
fluttering  ribbons  at  the  car  windows,  the  most  of  the  occupants 
were  ladies.  Gen.  Hood's  Division  of  infantry  was  drawn  up  upon 
the  north  side  of  the  field,  viewing  the  cavalry  display,  and  also 
for  support  in  case  the  Yanks  would  have  attempted  to  take  a  hand 
in  the  show.  There  is  a  heavy  force  of  Yankees  camped  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  only  about  five  miles  from  the 
review  stand. 

"By  about  four  o'clock  this  evening  the  whole  affair  was  over, 
and  the  troops  withdrew  from  the  field  and  repaired  to  their 
respective  camps."* 

*  Three  Tears  in  the  Confederate  Horse  Artillery.,  Neese,  p.  168. 


582  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

One  would  have  thought  that  this  affair  was  sufficient 
to  satisfy  Stuart's  love  of  the  "pomp  and  circumstance" 
of  war.  But  no.  When  he  found  that  Gens.  Lee, 
Longstreet,  Ewell,  and  Pendleton  would  arrive  at  his 
camp  on  the  8th,  another  pageant  was  ordered  to  be 
held.  But  much  less  of  that  display  for  which  Stuart 
had  so  great  a  weakness  was  attempted  on  the  occasion 
of  the  third  review,  for  Gen.  Lee,  always  careful  not  to 
tax  his  men  unnecessarily,  would  not  allow  the  cavalry 
to  take  the  gallop,  nor  the  artillerymen  to  fire  their  guns. 

On  this  occasion  an  incident  occurred  which,  aside 
from  its  amusing  features,  is  of  valuable  interest  to  the 
student  because  of  its  bearing  on  Stuart's  character. 
Capt.  Chew  had  not  come  to  Culpeper  with  any  exalted 
ideas  as  to  the  pomp  of  war.  In  fact,  his  battery  was 
reduced  in  point  of  appearance  to  the  lowest  plane  to 
which  constant  hardship  and  service  could  bring  it.  He 
had  only  arrived  from  the  Valley  the  night  before  and 
with  horses  and  men  equally  worn,  found  himself  sud 
denly  on  parade  before  the  Commander-in-Chief .  What 
wonder  then  if,  conscious  of  the  ungainly  appearance 
of  his  half-starved  horses,  and  in  a  spirit  of  pride,  the 
battery  first  sergeant  should  seek  to  improve  the  out 
ward  appearance  of  the  battery  by  bestriding  a  fine, 
sleek  mule !  Just  as  the  far-famed  Ashby  Battery,  the 
senior  in  rank  in  its  battalion,  and  certainly  the  equal  of 
any  other  in  point  of  service,  approached  the  reviewing 
stand  in  the  very  lead,  Stuart's  proud  eye  detected  the 
active  ears  of  the  mule  at  the  head  of  the  battery,  and 
with  extreme  impatience  and  disgust  quickly  dispatched 
one  of  his  aides  to  direct  Capt.  Chew  to  have  both  his 
first  sergeant  and  the  mule  leave  the  field!  Says  the 
sergeant  in  his  diary,  "I  cared  very  little  about  the 
matter,  but  the  mule  looked  a  little  bit  surprised,  and, 
I  think,  felt  ashamed  of  himself  and  his  waving  ears, 
which  cost  him  his  prominent  position  in  the  grand 
cavalcade. 

"No  doubt  Gen.  Stuart  is  proud  of  his  splendid 
cavalry,  and  well  he  may  be,  for  it  certainly  is  a  fine 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  583 

body  of  well  mounted  and  tried  horsemen.  .  .  . 
True  a  mule  was  not  built  for  the  purpose  of  ornament 
ing  a  grand  review  or  embellishing  an  imposing  pageant, 
but  as  mine  so  willingly  bears  the  hardships  and  dangers 
of  the  camp  and  field,  I  thought  it  not  indiscreet  to  let 
it  play  a  little  act  in  some  of  the  holiday  scenes  of  war." 

One  can  picture  the  amusement  this  whole  incident 
afforded  the  youngsters  of  Stuart's  staff,  at  their  chief's 
expense,  not  to  mention  Gens.  Lee,  Pendleton,  and  the 
distinguished  foreigners,  who  composed  the  reviewing 
party.  Perhaps  no  other  general  in  the  Confederate 
Army  would  have  paid  the  slightest  attention  to  that 
worthy  mule.  Of  one  thing  we  are  certain, — there  could 
not  have  been  many  mules  in  use  as  mounts  in  Stuart's 
Cavalry  and  Horse  Artillery  at  this  time,  this  one  hav 
ing  slipped  in,  so  to  speak,  over  night ! 

But  few  other  instances  of  such  military  frivolity  on 
the  part  of  the  Confederates  are  recorded.  When  in 
March,  1864,  Gen.  Pendleton  was  sent  to  Dalton,  Ga., 
to  inspect  the  artillery  of  Johnston's  Army,  after  re 
viewing  Hood's  and  Hardee's  artillery  and  seeing  it 
drill  on  a  number  of  occasions,  he  was  tendered  a  grand 
sham  battle  by  Hood's  entire  corps,  in  which  blank  am 
munition  was  used.  The  precedent  for  this  display 
was  no  doubt  that  which  Hood  and  Pendleton  had  both 
witnessed  a  year  before  at  Culpeper. 

Before  Stuart's  participation  in  his  "horse  play"  at 
Culpeper,  the  movement  of  Lee's  army  which  resulted 
in  the  Gettysburg  campaign  had  commenced.  Long- 
street's  and  Swell's  corps  had  already  reached  Cul 
peper  Courthouse,  while  Hill's  Corps  was  left  in 
front  of  Hooker  at  Fredericksburg.  After  the  review 
the  cavalry  brigades  were  immediately  assigned  to  posts 
along  the  river,  and  Beckham  proceeded  towards 
Beverly  Ford  that  night,  and  placed  four  of  his  batteries 
in  camp  near  Saint  James  Church.  Fitz  Lee's  Brigade 
under  Munford  was  assigned  to  the  duty  of  picketing 
the  upper  Rappahannock.  Munford  established  his 
camp  across  the  Hazel  River  in  the  vicinity  of  Oak 


584  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Shade.  W.  H.  F.  Lee  established  his  brigade  and 
Breathed's  Battery  near  Welford's  house  on  the  Wei- 
ford  Ford  Road ;  Jones'  Brigade  held  the  Beverly  Ford 
Road,  and  Robertson's  remained  at  the  Botts  and  B ar 
bour  farms  picketing  the  lower  fords.  Saint  James 
Church  stood  about  200  yards  to  the  west  of  the  main 
road  to  the  ford  and  opposite  it,  and  on  the  east  of  that 
road  in  a  large  grove  of  trees  stood  an  old  brick  house 
known  as  the  Thompson  or  Gee  house,  on  an  elevation 
from  which  the  fields  on  both  sides  of  the  road  for  a 
distance  of  500  yards  to  the  north  were  commanded. 
The  grove  was  occupied  by  one  regiment  of  Jones' 
Brigade,  the  others  bivouacking  in  the  edge  of  the 
woods,  which  skirted  the  fields  to  the  north  of  the  church. 
Beckham,  with  Chew's,  Moorman's,  McGregor's,  and 
Hart's  batteries,  bivouacked  in  the  edge  of  the  woods 
beyond,  in  sight  of  though  in  advance  of  the  cavalry. 
Beyond  the  camp  of  the  battalion,  unbroken  woods  ex 
tended  on  both  sides  of  the  road  for  more  than  a  mile, 
and  as  far  as  the  highland  overlooking  the  river  low- 
grounds  and  Beverly  Ford.  From  the  latter  point, 
Beckham's  and  Jones'  camps  were  about  ll/£>  to  2 
miles. 

Stuart,  with  his  train  in  readiness  for  an  early  start, 
had  established  his  headquarters  at  a  residence  on 
Fleetwood  Hill,  about  a  half  mile  east  of  Brandy  Sta 
tion,  two  miles  down  the  road  in  rear  of  Saint  James 
Church.  Fleetwood  Hill  complete^  commanded  the 
large  open  plain  which  surrounded  it,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  B  arbour  House  Hill,  of  slightly  greater 
elevation.  Such  was  the  situation  on  the  night  of  the 
8th  when  Stuart,  entirely  ignorant  of  any  concentration 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  is 
sued  his  orders  to  march  at  an  early  hour. 

Meantime,  Pleasonton  was  approaching  from  the 
north,  with  orders  to  make  a  reconnaissance  in  force  as 
far  as  Culpeper  Courthouse  if  possible,  to  verify  the  re 
ports  that  the  Confederates  were  moving  westward 
from  Fredericksburg.  Pleasonton's  force  consisted  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  585 

two  small  brigades  of  infantry,  some  3,000  men  in  all, 
and  about  8,000  cavalry,  including  Robertson's  Brigade 
of  horse  artillery  of  four  batteries.  Dividing  this  force 
into  two  columns  of  equal  strength,  he  ordered  the  first 
under  Gregg  to  cross  at  Kelly's  Ford  at  dawn,  and  the 
second  under  Buford,  which  included  all  of  Ames'  infan 
try,  to  move  by  way  of  Beverly  Ford,  about  1%  miles 
above  the  railroad  bridge,  and  5%  miles  above  Kelly's 
Ford.  Great  care  was  exercised  by  the  Federals  during 
the  night  to  conceal  their  presence  from  Stuart's 
pickets,  and  in  this  they  succeeded. 

At  4:30  A.  M.  on  the  9th  Buford's  two  leading  regi 
ments  dashed  across  Beverly  Ford  and  rapidly  drove 
the  troops  on  picket  there  back  towards  the  woods  north 
of  Saint  James  Church.  Upon  learning  that  the 
enemy  was  advancing  from  the  ford,  Beckham  directed 
Capt.  Hart,  whose  battery  was  on  the  right  of  the  bat 
talion,  to  place  a  gun  in  the  road  by  hand,  while  the  bat 
teries  were  ordered  to  hitch  up  and  gallop  back  to  the 
Gee  House  Hill,  some  600  yards  in  rear,  and  to  go  into 
position  there.  Before  the  teams  could  be  harnessed, 
however,  the  enemy  was  almost  upon  the  artillery  camp, 
and  had  begun  to  fire  upon  the  horses  at  the  picket  lines. 
But  at  this  juncture  Maj.  Flournoy,  with  about  100 
men  of  the  regiment  which  had  bivouacked  in  the  grove, 
dashed  forward  and  temporarily  checked  the  enemy, 
which  not  only  saved  Beckham's  guns,  but  gave  time 
for  Jones  to  bring  up  the  7th  Virginia  Cavalry  from  the 
main  camp.  Meantime,  Hart  had  thrown  two  pieces  into 
action  by  the  road,  and  Beckham  in  less  than  20  minutes 
after  the  first  alarm  was  establishing  his  guns  at  the 
grove.  The  7th  Regiment,  upon  coming  up,  immedi 
ately  charged,  but  was  repulsed  and  driven  back  along 
the  road  past  Hart's  two  guns,  leaving  them  entirely 
isolated.  Says  Maj.  McClellan,  of  Stuart's  staff,  "These 
gallant  cannoneers  on  two  occasions  during  this  mem 
orable  day  proved  that  they  were  able  to  care  for 
themselves.  Although  now  exposed  to  the  enemy,  they 
covered  their  own  retreat  with  canister,  and  safely  re- 


586  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

tired  to  the  line  at  Saint  James  Church,  where  they 
found  efficient  support."* 

During  the  charge  of  the  7th  Regiment,  the  gunners, 
standing  in  silent  awe  by  their  pieces  perfectly  aligned 
along  the  wave-like  swell  north  of  the  brick  house, 
watched  the  savage  conflict  between  the  horsemen  in 
their  front,  fascinated  by  the  scene,  and  as  Hart  fell 
back,  alternately  retiring  his  two  guns  from  point  to 
point  along  the  road,  a  wild  cheer  from  Beckham's  line 
preceded  the  simultaneous  flash  of  his  16  guns.  Just  as 
the  sun  rose,  the  crash  of  the  guns  burst  upon  the  ears 
of  the  enemy's  troopers,  and  soon  the  woods  which  they 
had  entered  were  rent  with  shrieking  shells.  Beckham's 
steady  fire  forced  the  enemy  to  cover,  while  they  sought 
positions  in  which  to  place  their  artillery,  none  of  which 
had  yet  arrived  from  the  ford.  Thus  did  the  Horse  Ar 
tillery  hold  Buford  at  bay,  having  lost  nothing  but  the 
field  desk  of  the  major,  which  jostled  from  the  head- 
quarter's  wagon  as  it  galloped  off  to  safety. 

The  other  regiment  of  Jones'  Brigade  now  took 
position  on  the  left  of  the  church,  and  Hampton  with 
four  of  his  regiments  occupied  the  rise  between  it  and 
Beckham's  guns  at  the  grove.  About  8  A.  MM  W.  H.  F. 
Lee  moved  down  from  Welf ord  Ford  towards  the  sound 
of  the  firing  and  placed  his  dismounted  troopers  behind 
a  stone  fence  on  the  Cunningham  farm,  while  Johnston's 
section  of  Breathed's  Battery  moved  down  stream  from 
Freeman's  Ford  where  the  battery  had  been  on  picket, 
crossed  the  Hazel  River,  and  took  up  a  position  near 
the  Green  House  on  a  hill  behind  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  line, 
from  which  it  had  a  clear  field  of  fire  in  every  direction. 
This  position  soon  proved  to  be  the  key-point  of  the 
Confederate  line  of  defense.  The  other  section  of 
Breathed's  Battery  moved  back  from  Freeman's  to 
Starke's  Ford. 

A  determined  attack  was  made  by  the  enemy's  dis 
mounted  men,  supported  by  a  battery  of  four  pieces, 

*The  Campaigns  of  Stuart's  Cavalry,  McClellan,  p.  266.  Also  see  article  In 
Philadelphia  Weekly  Times,  June  26,  1880,  by  Maj.  J.  F.  Hart. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  587 

upon  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  line,  but  it  was  repelled  by  the 
Confederate  sharpshooters,  and  Johnston's  guns,  but 
not  until  several  mounted  charges  made  by  the  10th  Vir 
ginia  and  2d  North  Carolina  Cavalry  cleared  the  field, 
driving  the  Federals  back  to  the  cover  of  the  woods 
along  the  Beverly  Ford  Road,  and  seriously  threaten 
ing  their  flank.  Hampton  had,  meantime,  extended  his 
right  beyond  the  church,  so  as  to  partially  envelop  the 
enemy's  left,  and  together  with  Jones  now  advanced. 
From  this  time  until  10  A.  M.  the  lines  swayed  back  and 
forth.  During  the  early  morning,  the  6th  Pennsyl 
vania  Cavalry,  supported  by  the  6th  United  States 
Regiment,  made  a  superb  mounted  charge  upon  the 
Confederate  artillery  position,  over  a  plateau  some  800 
yards  wide.  The  regulars,  heedless  of  Beckham's  shrap 
nel,  shell,  and  canister,  actually  reached  his  guns,  and, 
dashing  between  them,  passed  on  only  to  be  attacked 
simultaneously  on  both  flanks  by  the  Confederate 
troopers,  who  drove  the  survivors  back.  There  are  few 
instances  recorded  of  a  simlar  charge  upon  so  strong 
a  line  of  artillery.  Scarlett's  charge  at  Balaclava  was 
no  more  daring  than  the  one  which  Smith  led  at  Saint 
James  Church,  the  latter  possessing  the  additional  fea 
ture  that  it  was  premeditated  and  not  the  result  of  ac 
cident. 

Beckham's  pieces  now  redoubled  their  fire,  having 
suffered  none  from  the  charge,  and  furiously  shelled  the 
woods  in  their  front,  where  the  enemy  was  gathering  in 
increasing  numbers.  The  artillery  position  was  a  com 
manding  one,  and  no  doubt,  had  its  flanks  been  guarded, 
could  have  been  held  indefinitely.  But  the  situation  was 
becoming  serious  in  another  quarter,  for  the  head  of 
Gregg's  column  was  approaching  Stevensburg  from 
Kelly's  Ford.  Stuart  had  dispatched  two  regiments 
under  Wickham  and  Butler  and  one  of  Moorman's  guns 
to  the  support  of  Robertson's  Brigade,  which  had  moved 
forward  to  Kelly's  Ford  early  in  the  morning,  and  be 
lieving  the  force  of  1,500  men  between  Brandy  Station 
and  the  ford  sufficient  to  guard  the  road  to  Culpeper 


588  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Courthouse,  proceeded  to  the  church.  His  camp  of  the 
night  before  had  been  broken  and  nothing  remained  at 
Fleetwood  Hill  but  a  section  of  Chew's  Battery  under 
Lieut.  John  W.  Carter,  which  had  been  retired  from 
the  fight  after  its  ammunition  was  all  but  exhausted. 

When  Pleasonton  found  that  Buford's  column  could 
not  overcome  the  resistance  of  the  three  Confederate  bri 
gades  opposed  to  it  in  front  of  Beverly's  Ford,  he  de 
cided  to  wait  until  Gregg  could  move  up  to  his  assist 
ance.  The  latter  had  readily  effected  a  crossing  at 
Kelly's  Ford  about  6  A.  M.,  Col.  Duffie  with  four  regi 
ments  of  cavalry  and  a  section  of  Pennington's  Battery 
in  the  lead.  Duffie's  orders  were  to  move  on  Stevens- 
burg,  whilst  Gregg  with  the  rest  of  the  column  pro 
ceeded  towards  Brandy  Station  in  order  to  effect  a 
junction  with  Buford.  Robertson  had  fallen  back  along 
the  direct  road  from  Brandy  Station  to  Kelly's  Ford, 
and  the  two  regiments  dispatched  by  Stuart  to  his  sup 
port  were  unable  in  spite  of  the  most  gallant  efforts  to 
prevent  Duffie's  advance  upon  Stevensburg.  But  orders 
now  came  for  Duffie  to  join  Gregg's  main  body  and  he 
at  once  commenced  to  retrace  his  steps  towards  Mad- 
den's,  covering  the  movement  with  his  guns  while  Wick- 
ham's  regiment  retarded  his  progress  in  every  way  pos 
sible.  Meantime,  unknown  to  Robertson,  Gregg  had 
advanced  directly  upon  Brandy  Station,  and  actually 
came  within  sight  of  Fleetwood  Hill  directly  in  the  Con 
federate  rear  before  his  approach,  which  had  been  con 
cealed  by  numerous  groves,  was  discovered  by  Stuart's 
Ad  jut  ant- General,  who  had  been  left  behind  to  main 
tain  communications.  The  leading  regiment  of  Wynd- 
ham's  Brigade  was  already  emerging  into  the  open 
about  Brandy  Station,  within  cannon  shot  of  Carter's 
guns.  Without  hesitating  an  instant,  the  young  lieu 
tenant  brought  one  of  his  pieces  from  the  road  to  the  top 
of  the  hill  and  boldly  pushed  it  to  the  forward  crest.  A 
few  imperfect  shell  and  some  round  shot  was  all  the  am 
munition  in  the  limbers,  but  with  these  a  slow  fire  was  at 
once  opened  upon  the  enemy's  moving  column,  while 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  589 

first  one  and  then  another  of  the  mounted  cannoneers 
was  sent  to  inform  Stuart  of  the  peril. 

The  bold  front  which  Carter  put  up  led  Gregg  and 
Wyndham  to  conclude  that  the  hill  was  more  formidable 
than  it  was.  At  any  rate,  there  was  some  hesitation  on 
their  part  and  considerable  delay  while  Clarke's  section 
of  Pennington's  Battery  sought  to  prepare  the  road  for 
a  charge.  Every  moment  of  this  delay  was  precious  to 
the  Confederates,  for  had  Gregg  succeeded  in  planting 
his  guns  on  Fleetwood  Hill,  Stuart's  position  would 
have  been  most  precarious.  The  first  courier  found 
Stuart  among  Hart's  guns  near  the  church,  and  not  un 
til  the  second  message  arrived,  and  he  heard  the  sound 
of  Carter's  and  Clarke's  guns  in  his  rear,  did  he  counter 
mand  his  order  to  Capt.  Hart  to  ride  back  and  verify 
the  report. 

The  12th  Virginia  and  the  35th  Battalion  were  im 
mediately  withdrawn  from  Jones'  line,  1^  miles  from 
Fleetwood  Hill,  and  ordered  by  Stuart  to  gallop  back 
to  Carter's  assistance.  Minutes  seemed  like  hours  to 
Carter.  Not  a  man  but  the  cannoneers  of  his  section 
and  Maj.  McClellan  of  Stuart's  staff  occupied  the  hill. 
The  enemy  had  been  imposed  upon  for  a  time,  but  at 
last  Wyndham's  regiment  in  column  of  squadrons,  with 
standards  and  guidons  fluttering,  galloped  forward  and 
commenced  the  ascent  of  the  hill.  Just  as  Carter  was 
retiring  his  guns,  the  enemy  not  50  yards  away,  and  the 
last  round  having  been  fired,  Col.  Harman  with  the 
leading  files  of  the  12th  Virginia  galloped  up  to  the 
crest  from  behind,  and  without  hesitating  dashed  at  the 
enemy.  The  rest  of  the  regiment  had  strung  out  along 
the  road  in  great  disorder  due  to  the  rapidity  of  his 
movement,  and  as  the  men  arrived  in  small  groups,  they 
were  no  match  for  Wyndham's  more  collected  force. 
Stuart  arived  in  a  few  moments,  having  ordered  Hamp 
ton  and  Jones  to  retire  from  the  church  and  concentrate 
at  Fleetwood,  while  Robertson  on  the  Kelly's  Ford 
Road  was  advised  of  the  situation. 


590  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Reforming  his  regiment  Harman  desperately  en 
gaged  the  enemy,  while  charge  and  counter-charge 
swept  across  the  face  of  the  hill.  Lieut. -Col.  White,  with 
the  35th  Battalion,  had  arrived  shortly  after  Col.  Har 
man,  and  with  two  squadrons  dashed  around  the  west 
side  of  the  hill,  and  charged  three  guns  of  Martin's  Bat 
tery,  which  Gregg  had  already  brought  up,  driving  off 
the  cavalry  support.  But  the  gunners  stood  firm  and  a 
hand-to-hand  struggle  ensued,  in  which  neither  side 
asked  quarter.  This  battery  was  the  horse  battery  which 
Pleasonton  had  with  him  at  Hazel  Grove  on  May  2, 
when  together  with  Huntington's  batteries  it  repulsed 
Winn's  attack.  In  his  report,  Martin  says:  "Once 
in  the  battery,  it  became  a  hand-to-hand  fight  with  pistol 
and  sabre  between  the  enemy  and  my  cannoneers  and 
drivers,  and  never  did  men  act  with  more  coolness  and 
bravery,  and  show  more  of  a  stern  purpose  to  do  their 
duty  unflinchingly,  and  above  all  to  save  their  guns; 
and  while  the  loss  of  them  is  a  matter  of  great  regret  to 
me,  it  is  a  consolation  and  a  great  satisfaction  to  know 
that  I  can  point  with  pride  to  the  fact  that,  of  that  little 
band  who  defended  the  battery,  not  one  of  them  flinched 
for  a  moment  from  his  duty.  Of  the  36  men  that  I  took 
into  the  engagement,  but  6  came  out  safely;  and  of 
these  30,  21  are  either  killed,  wounded,  or  missing,  and 
scarcely  one  of  them  is  there  but  will  carry  the  honor 
able  mark  of  the  sabre  or  bullet  to  his  grave." 

White's  men  did  not  long  retain  possession  of 
Martin's  guns,  for  the  few  troopers  he  had  with  him 
were  soon  surrounded  by  superior  numbers  and  were 
compelled  to  cut  their  way  out. 

When  the  retirement  of  the  Confederate  line  com 
menced,  one  of  Beckham's  guns,  as  we  have  seen,  was 
with  Butler's  regiments,  then  engaged  with  Duffle;  one 
of  Hart's  and  two  of  McGregor's  pieces  had  become  dis 
abled  from  the  shock  of  recoil,  a  section  of  Chew's  Bat 
tery  had  been  sent  to  the  right  to  join  Robertson,  arid 
Carter's  section  of  this  battery  was  at  Fleetwood  Hill. 
Thus  there  were  but  eight  guns  still  in  action  at  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  591 

church  at  the  time.  Leaving  Moorman's  remaining  three 
pieces  with  Jones'  llth  Virginia  Regiment  in  position 
at  the  church,  Beckham  with  the  rest  of  the  artillery,  in 
cluding  Hart's  and  McGregor's  batteries,  accompanied 
Hampton's  brigades  to  the  rear,  which  came  into  action 
just  after  Flournoy's  Regiment  of  Jones'  Brigade  had 
charged  the  6th  New  York  Battery,  a  section  of  which  it 
captured,  but  soon  relinquished.  Hampton's  Brigade 
advanced  at  a  gallop  in  magnificent  order,  in  column  of 
squadrons,  with  Hart's  and  McGregor's  batteries 
abreast  of  the  leading  line.  As  the  column  approached 
the  hill,  its  summit  and  the  plateau  east  of  the  hill  and 
beyond  the  railroad  was  covered  with  Federal  cavalry. 
Diverging  to  his  left,  Hampton  crossed  the  railroad 
east  of  the  hill,  striking  the  enemy's  flank  with  the  head 
of  his  column,  while  Hart  galloped  his  battery  to  the 
crest  of  the  hill  and  opened  fire  on  the  enemy  who  had 
been  driven  from  the  summit.  But  he  only  succeeded 
in  firing  several  shots  with  a  single  gun  before  the  car 
riage  which  had  been  partly  repaired  was  permanently 
disabled.  McGregor  now  succeeded  in  placing  two 
pieces  in  position  on  the  crest,  and  hardly  had  they  gone 
into  action  when  the  guns  were  charged  by  a  party  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  which  from  the  extreme  Federal  left 
came  thundering  down  the  narrow  ridge,  striking  the 
unsupported  batteries  in  flank,  and  trying  to  ride  down 
the  cannoneers.  The  charge  was  met  by  the  gunners 
alone,  who,  with  pistols,  sabers  and  rammer  staffs  drove 
the  hostile  troopers  from  among  the  guns  and  caissons. 
Lieuts.  Ford  and  Hoxton  with  their  pistols  killed  both 
the  brave  leader  of  the  charge,  Lieut.-Col.  Broderick, 
and  Maj.  Shelmire,  while  private  Sudley  of  McGregor's 
Battery  knocked  one  of  the  enemy  from  his  saddle  with 
a  sponge  staff. 

About  the  time  the  desperate  attempt  of  the  1st  New 
Jersey  Regiment  to  take  the  guns  was  repulsed  by 
Beckham,  Jones'  last  Regiment  with  Moorman's  three 
guns  arrived  from  the  church,  as  did  Capt.  Chew  with 
the  section  which  had  been  with  Robertson.  Beckham 


592  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

quickly  placed  every  available  gun  in  position  along  the 
crest  and  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy  about  Brandy 
Station. 

Hampton  was  more  than  holding  his  own  on  the 
plain  to  the  east,  but  the  enemy  was  still  contending  for 
Brandy  Station,  and  a  few  were  desperately  defending 
Martin's  silent  guns  near  the  eastern  base  of  the  hill. 
Lomax's  llth  Virginia  spreading  out  on  both  sides  of 
the  road  to  the  station  finally  charged  the  latter,  rode 
completely  over  Martin's  guns  and  pursued  the  de 
fenders  for  some  distance  down  the  Stevensburg  Road. 
In  the  meantime,  Hampton  had,  after  a  desperate  hand- 
to-hand  fight  with  pistol  and  saber,  overborne  the  enemy 
in  his  front  and  followed  upon  their  heels  until  com 
pelled  by  the  well-directed  fire  of  Beckham's  guns  to 
forego  the  pursuit.  It  was  impossible  even  at  close 
quarters  by  reason  of  the  dust  and  smoke  to  tell  friend 
from  foe,  and  Beckham,  rather  than  lose  the  effect  of  his 
fire,  continued  to  direct  it  upon  the  immense  mass  of 
horsemen  flying  down  the  road  in  his  front.  The  ar 
tillery  fire  from  Fleetwood  Hill  was  most  accurate  and 
effective  and  had,  before  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy 
commenced,  several  times  broken  the  formations  of  his 
cavalry. 

Meantime  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Brigade  with  one  regiment 
of  Jones'  Brigade  and  Johnston's  section  of  Breathed's 
Battery  had,  by  threatening  Buford's  rear,  kept  the 
latter' s  force  from  advancing  to  the  aid  of  Gregg,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  direct  route  lay  practically 
open,  and  before  dispositions  could  be  made  for  the  ad 
vance  Gregg  had  been  repulsed.  As  soon  as  Gregg 
withdrew,  Stuart  promptly  formed  a  new  line  along 
the  eastern  slope  of  the  range  of  hills  which,  commenc 
ing  at  Fleetwood,  extended  irregularly  to  the  river  at 
Welford's  Ford.  Soon  after  Jones  withdrew  from  the 
church,  exposing  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  right  flank,  the  latter 
retired  and  occupied  the  hills  overlooking  the  Thomp 
son  house,  his  line  connecting  with  and  prolonging  that 
which  Stuart  had  established.  Munford,  with  Fitz 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  593 

Lee's  Brigade,  was  momentarily  expected  to  arrive  and 
occupy  the  commanding  ground  about  the  Welford 
house. 

To  the  South,  Duffie  had  arrived  near  Brandy  Station 
in  time  to  cover  Gregg's  withdrawal  by  Rappahannock 
Ford,  and  the  activity  of  the  Federals  was  now  shifted 
to  Buford,  who,  extending  further  and  further  to  his 
right,  until  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  left  was  enveloped,  launched 
an  attack  from  the  high  ground  just  south  and  west  of 
the  Green  House.  The  movement  of  the  enemy  had 
forced  Johnston  to  withdraw  his  guns  about  2  p.  M.,  and 
in  doing  so  he  was  joined  by  Breathed  with  the  other 
section  of  his  battery,  the  whole  retiring  from  point  to 
point  and  firing  upon  the  advancing  Federals.  Buford 
now  sent  forward  a  part  of  his  infantry,  and  followed 
up  its  advance  with  a  mounted  charge  of  two  regiments, 
which  was  quickly  repelled.  In  the  struggle  W.  H.  F. 
Lee  was  wounded  about  4:30  p.  M.  Before  the  attack 
had  been  repulsed  Munford  arrived  on  W.  H.  F.  Lee's 
left  with  three  regiments  of  Fitz  Lee's  Brigade  from 
Oak  Shade  and  at  once  threw  forward  a  heavy  line  of 
skirmishers  with  which  Breathed' s  Battery  advanced. 
But  Buford  was  already  falling  back  upon  Beverly 
Ford.  Munford  followed  the  Federals  up  closely  while 
Breathed  doggedly  hung  upon  their  heels  with  three 
guns  and  plied  the  retreating  column  from  every  avail 
able  position  until  the  pursuers  were  checked  by  the 
enemy's  infantry  and  several  batteries  in  position  near 
the  ford. 

Pleasonton  afterwards  attributed  his  retirement  to 
the  fact  that  the  purpose  of  his  reconnaissance  had  been 
accomplished  since  the  presence  of  the  Confederate 
Infantry  at  Brandy  Station  was  developed  by  his 
column.  But  he  must  have  kept  his  information  from 
Hooker,  who  on  the  12th  of  June  was,  according  to  his 
own  words,  entirely  in  the  dark  as  to  the  Confederate 
movements  on  his  right,  and  Gen.  Lee's  intentions.* 
Pleasonton's  statement  that  the  Confederate  Infantry 

*Oonduct  of  War,  Vol.  I,  p.  158. 


594  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

was  seen  disentraining  at  Brandy  Station  is  wholly 
false,  for  the  first  division  of  E well's  Corps  marched  to 
Stuart's  assistance  from  Rixeyville,  four  miles  north  of 
Culpeper  Courthouse,  by  way  of  Botts'  farm  to  Brandy 
Station,  and  did  not  begin  to  arrive  at  the  latter  point 
until  Pleasonton  had  made  his  dispositions  to  withdraw. 
So  again  it  is  seen  how  prone  to  error  this  "Knight  of 
Romance"  was. 

The  battle  of  Brandy  Station  has  been  gone  into  in 
some  detail,  because  it  was  the  first  engagement  in  which 
mounted  troops  were  almost  exclusively  engaged  on 
both  sides,  and  because  it  was  one  in  which  the  Confeder 
ate  Horse  Artillery  displayed  a  most  surprising  degree 
of  mobility.  Its  successful  employment  was  in  marked 
contrast  to  the  comparatively  ineffective  use  of  the  Fed 
eral  batteries.  At  every  important  point  of  the  field,  we 
have  found  Beckham's  guns  playing  a  leading  role,  but 
we  search  in  vain  for  any  material  influence  which  the 
guns  of  Pleasonton's  column  bore  upon  the  issue.  The 
few  which  were  brought  into  prominent  action  were 
handled  with  great  courage  by  the  gunners,  but  they  ap 
parently  had  little  or  no  effect,  whereas  the  position 
taken  by  Beckham  at  the  church  had  proved  the  nucleus 
about  which  the  whole  defense  formed.  Furthermore, 
the  fire  of  Beckham's  massed  batteries  at  that  point  had 
practically  brought  Buford's  column  to  a  standstill,  en 
abling  W.  H.  F.  Lee  to  move  upon  the  Federal  flank 
and  check  all  hope  of  successful  attack  until  the  Federal 
front  could  be  partially  changed  to  meet  his  threat,  and 
in  the  defense  of  Lee's  line,  almost  at  right  angles  to 
that  of  Jones'  and  Hampton's,  Johnston's  two  guns  had 
played  an  important  part. 

Again,  when  Gregg  had  all  but  occupied  Fleetwood 
Hill  with  his  batteries,  it  was  Carter's  section  of  Chew's 
Battery  which  snatched  the  opportunity  from  the  enemy 
and  by  the  unaided  efforts  of  a  handful  of  bold  gunners 
saved  Stuart,  certainly  from  defeat,  if  not  from  a  rout. 
Beckham's  rapid  movement  with  Hampton  to  the  rear 
and  the  prompt  massing  of  his  batteries  at  Fleetwood 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  595 

not  only  secured  the  position  which  Carter  had  pre 
vented  Gregg  from  taking,  but  contributed  materially 
to  the  breaking  of  the  Federal  column  on  the  plain  be 
low  with  which  Hampton  was  desperately  engaged, 
and  the  fire  of  the  batteries  was  most  effective  upon  the 
retreating  enemy.  One  of  Moorman's  guns  had  ren 
dered  splendid  service  with  Butler's  regiment  in  oppos 
ing  Duffie,  while  Chew  with  a  section  of  his  battery 
in  moving  to  the  support  of  Robertson's  Brigade  on  the 
Kellysville  Road,  and  then  rapidly  back  to  Fleetwood 
at  Beckham's  summons,  had  traversed  the  field  from 
end  to  end  in  time  to  arrive  at  the  decisive  point  at  the 
critical  moment.  The  movements  of  the  various  bat 
teries  of  Beckham's  command  exhibited  not  only  re 
markable  mobility,  and  a  rare  ability  on  the  battalion 
commander's  part  to  obtain  concert  of  action  between 
his  battery  units,  but  also  a  most  exceptional  amount 
of  initiative  on  the  part  of  his  battery  commanders  who, 
when  assigned  a  special  mission  by  direct  order  or  by 
chance,  solved  the  problem  which  fell  to  them  with  skill 
and  determination. 

In  no  battle  of  the  war  did  the  Artillery  display  a 
higher  degree  of  independence.  This  was  as  it  should 
have  been,  for  if  one  objection  to  horse  artillery  exists, 
it  is  as  to  its  vulnerability  on  account  of  the  large  tar 
get  it  presents  while  in  motion  due  to  the  great  number 
of  animals  it  requires.  Then,  too,  it  is  sometimes 
argued  that  much  time  is  lost  in  the  care  and  disposition 
of  the  cannoneers'  mounts.  But  such  objections  are 
specious,  and,  even  were  they  material,  would  be  more 
than  counterbalanced  by  the  celerity  of  movement  and 
the  consequent  diminishment  in  the  time  of  exposure. 
However  this  may  be,  Beckham's  batteries  certainly 
proved  the  ability  of  the  Confederate  Horse  Artillery 
to  take  care  of  itself,  for  twice  in  one  day  the  same 
batteries  were  ridden  over  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and 
yet  the  gunners  managed  to  save  themselves  and  their 
material  from  harm  by  their  own  defensive  power.  Not 
so  much  as  a  trace  was  cut,  nor  a  team  stampeded  by 
the  enemy.  It  is  true  this  immunity  from  serious  injury 


596  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

was  due,  in  a  measure,  to  the  fact  that  the  troopers 
who  got  in  among  the  guns  on  both  occasions  were 
mounted,  and  therefore  unable  to  secure  the  guns,  etc., 
which  they  might  have  captured  had  the  attacking  force 
been  dismounted.  But,  then  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  speed  of  the  mounted  men  alone  enabled  the  enemy 
to  reach  the  guns  which  would  have  been  quite  impos 
sible  under  the  circumstances  of  each  case  for  foot 
troops.  It  was  that  same  mobility  which  made  it  pos 
sible  for  Hart  and  McGregor  to  move  at  the  head  of 
Hampton's  Brigade  from  the  church  to  Fleetwood  Hill, 
that  made  it  possible  for  Smith  to  dash  across  the  open 
in  the  face  of  the  artillery,  and  for  Broderick  to  rush 
down  upon  the  flank  of  the  guns  before  they  could 
change  front. 

But  even  when  cavalry  possesses  the  requisite  bold 
ness  and  dash  to  accomplish  such  feats  as  those  of 
Smith's  and  Broderick's  men,  the  gunners  will  always 
possess  a  great  advantage  in  the  brief  hand-to-hand 
conflict  which  will  ensue,  for  the  majority  of  the  mounted 
men  will  as  a  rule  pass  on  through  the  guns,  unable  to 
draw  rein.  This  was  certainly  the  case  in  both  instances 
when  Beckham's  batteries  were  reached  by  the  Federal 
cavalry,  and  also  when  Flournoy  charged  Clarke's  and 
Martin's  batteries.  In  the  last  instance,  the  Federal 
gunners  remanned  their  guns  after  Flournoy  swept  by, 
and  continued  in  action  until  finally  overpowered  by 
Lomax,  by  whom  the  three  guns  were  turned  over  to 
Hart's  Battery,  the  gunners  of  which  opened  fire  with 
two  of  the  captured  pieces. 

In  the  battle  of  Brandy  Station,  the  Confederate  Ar 
tillery  loss  was  1  killed,  10  wounded,  and  1  missing,  the 
heaviest  individual  battery  loss  being  in  Moorman's 
Battery,  in  which  there  were  1  man  killed,  3  wounded, 
and  1  captured.* 

*Maj.  McClellan,  in  his  history  of  Stuart's  campaigns,  does  not  mention 
Moorman's  Battery  in  connection  with  this  battle,  and  in  the  excellent  account 
of  the  battle  by  Lieut.  G.  W.  Beale,  9th  Va.  Cavalry,  which  appeared  in  the 
Richmond  Times-Dispatch,,  of  August  11,  1912,  no  mention  whatever  of  Moor 
man's  Battery  is  made.  But  see  Beckham's  report  and  the  history  of  the 
battery  by  Capt.  J.  J.  Shoemaker,  p.  39.  The  author  also  has  a  letter  from 
Capt.  Shoemaker,  who  was  1st  Lieutenant  of  the  battery  at  the  time,  graphically 
describing  the  part  of  the  battery  in  the  battle. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  597 

Some  idea  of  the  ammunition  expenditure  of  the 
Horse  Artillery  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  a 
single  piece  of  Chew's  Battery  is  reported  by  its  gun 
ner  to  have  fired  during  the  engagement  160  rounds. 
But  that  such  an  enormous  expenditure  for  a  single 
piece  was  by  no  means  general  is  proved  by  the  fact  that 
this  gun  burnt  out  at  the  breech  before  the  day  was  over, 
and  was  turned  in  as  disabled.* 

Of  the  part  of  the  Artillery  in  the  fight,  Stuart  in  his 
report  has  to  say:  "The  conduct  of  the  Horse  Ar 
tillery,  under  that  daring  and  efficient  officer,  Maj.  R.  F. 
Beckham,  deserves  the  highest  praise.  Not  one  piece 
was  ever  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  though  at  times  the 
cannoneers  had  to  fight,  pistol  and  sword  in  hand,  in  its 
defense.  The  officers  and  men  behaved  with  the  great 
est  gallantry  and  the  mangled  bodies  of  the  enemy 
show  the  effectiveness  of  their  fire." 

We  must  now  leave  Stuart  and  the  Horse  Artillery 
in  order  to  follow  the  movements  of  the  main  army. 
But,  before  doing  so,  it  should  be  said  that  in  all  the 
operations  of  the  cavalry  leading  up  to  Gettysburg, 
Beckham's  guns  took  an  active  part.  It  should  also 
be  said  that  in  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Rowser's  Ford 
on  the  27th  of  June,  the  practice  of  submerging  the 
guns  and  caissons  and  towing  them  across  stream  on 
the  river  bottom  while  the  ammunition  was  carried  over 
in  feed  bags,  was  resorted  to  by  Beckham  and  was, 
therefore,  not  one  exclusively  employed  by  Forrest  in 
the  west,  as  some  writers  seem  to  think. 

*  Three  Years  in  the  Confederate  Horse  Artillery,  Neese,  p.   179. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

FROM  FREDERIC  KSBURG  TO  GETTYSBURG 

DURING  the  winter  of  1862-63,  Jackson  had  caused 
his  Topographical  Engineer  to  prepare  a  detailed  map 
of  the  districts  through  which  it  would  be  necessary  to 
pass  in  going  from  the  lower  Valley  through  Maryland 
to  Pennsylvania.*  This  map  was  the  most  accurate  and 
remarkable  one  of  its  kind  made  during  the  war.  It 
showed  every  defensive  position  from  Winchester  to 
Carlisle,  and  upon  a  study  of  this  map  Lee  matured 
his  plans  for  the  next  campaign,  which  he  desired  to 
make  a  decisive  one.  Longstreet  proposed  to  send  a 
force  into  Tennessee  to  unite  with  Bragg  and  Johnston, 
the  latter  then  being  at  Vicksburg,  which  place  it  was  im 
possible  for  him  to  save.  By  concentrating  such  a  large 
force  in  Tennessee,  Longstreet  believed  Rosecrans 
could  be  crushed,  Cincinnati  threatened,  and  Grant 
drawn  off  from  Vicksburg.  t  But  Lee  preferred  to  in 
vade  the  North,  agreeing  with  Longstreet  that  in  taking 
this  step  the  campaign  should  be  offensive  in  strategy, 
but  defensive  in  tactics.  Lee's  idea  was  to  force  Hooker 
to  attack  him  in  a  strong  position  of  his  own  selection 
and  he  no  doubt  felt  as  Jackson  did  when  he  said  "we 
sometimes  fail  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  his  position, 
but  they  always  fail  to  drive  us  out  of  ours." 

Gen.  Lee's  decision  was  reached  near  the  close  of 
May  and  by  the  1st  of  June  he  had  completed  his  ar 
rangements  for  the  ensuing  campaign.  Before  the 
movement  began,  his  plans  were  so  fully  matured  and 
made  with  such  precision  that  the  exact  locality  at  which 
a  conflict  with  the  enemy  was  expected  to  take  place  was 
indicated  on  his  map.  This  locality  was  the  town  of 
Gettysburg.^  He  was  satisfied  that  if  he  could  defeat 

*Prepared  by  Capt.   Jed  Hotchkiss  of  his  staff. 

t Lee's   Invasion  of   Pennsylvania,   Longstreet ;     Battles   and  Leaders,  p   245  ; 
also  see  From  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  Longstreet,  p.  336. 
^Memoirs  of  Robert  E.  Lee,  Long,  pp.  267,  268. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  599 

the  Federal  Army  he  could  also  drive  it  across  the  Sus- 
quehanna  and  possess  himself  of  Maryland,  Western 
Pennsylvania,  probably  West  Virginia  and  Washing 
ton,  as  well  as  relieve  the  pressure  in  the  west  and  south 
west.  The  plan  being  fully  approved  by  Mr.  Davis  in 
a  personal  interview,  Lee  commenced  the  movement  on 
June  2  by  sending  Swell's  Corps  to  Culpeper  Court 
house,  soon  followed  by  Longstreet,  while  A.  P.  Hill 
was  left  in  observation  of  the  enemy  at  Fredericksburg, 
charged  with  the  duty  of  screening  the  movement  to 
the  west.  By  the  8th  of  June,  the  main  body  of  the 
Army  was  concentrated  in  the  neighborhood  of  Cul 
peper  Courthouse,  from  which  point  Lee  on  the  9th 
was  able  to  send  forward  some  of  his  infantry  and 
Carter's  and  Alexander's  battalions  of  artillery  to  the 
relief  of  Stuart  at  Brandy  Station  when,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  was  assailed  by  Pleasonton. 

On  the  5th,  when  preparations  were  in  progress  for 
the  removal  of  army  headquarters  from  Fredericks- 
burg,  two  corps  having  already  left,  the  enemy  ap 
peared  in  force  on  the  opposite  bank,  and  in  the  after 
noon  opened  a  heavy  artillery  fire  near  the  mouth  of 
Deep  Run,  under  cover  of  which  they  established  a 
pontoon  bridge,  over  which  a  small  body  of  infantry 
was  crossed.  The  evening  and  night  was  spent  by 
Pendleton  in  establishing  the  artillery  defense  with 
the  batteries  of  the  3d  Corps,  but  the  enemy's  move 
ment  proved  to  be  a  feint,  and  soon  after  midday  of  the 
6th,  in  company  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the 
Chief  of  Artillery  proceeded  to  Culpeper,  arriving  there 
the  morning  of  the  7th.  The  Artillery  of  the  1st  and 
2d  Corps  had  accompanied  their  respective  corps  to  the 
point  of  concentration. 

June  10,  Swell's  Corps  left  Culpeper  for  the  Valley. 
Milroy's  Federal  Division,  about  9,000  strong,  oc 
cupied  Winchester,  while  McReynolds'  Brigade  held 
Berryville.  Kelly's  Division  of  about  10,000  men  was 
at  Harper's  Ferry  with  a  detachment  of  1,200  infantry 
and  a  battery,  under  Col.  Smith,  at  Martinsburg.  Ewell 


600  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

reached  Cedarville,  via  Chester  Gap  on  the  evening  of 
the  12th,  whence  he  detached  Jenkins'  Cavalry  Brigade 
with  Griffin's  Battery,  and  Rodes'  Division  with  Car 
ter's  Battalion  to  capture  McReynolds  who,  discover 
ing  the  approach  of  the  Confederates,  withdrew  to 
Winchester.  Rodes  then  pushed  on  to  Martinsburg, 
and  by  the  fire  of  Carter's  Battalion,  almost  unaided, 
drove  the  garrison  out  of  its  works  and  across  the  Po 
tomac  at  Shepherdstown.  Smith's  Federal  battery  in 
retreating  by  the  Williamsport  Road  was  pursued  by 
Jenkins,  and  lost  five  guns  with  all  their  caissons,  teams, 
and  400  rounds  of  ammunition.  In  the  meantime, 
Ewell  with  Early's  and  Johnson's  divisions  and  the 
corps  artillery  had  arrived  near  Winchester  on  the 
evening  of  the  12th.  The  next  morning  Early's  Divi 
sion,  with  Jones'  and  Dance's  battalions  of  artillery, 
was  ordered  to  Newtown,  where  they  were  joined  by  a 
battalion  of  Maryland  infantry  and  Griffin's  Battery. 
Johnson  moved  along  the  direct  road  from  Front  Royal 
to  Winchester  driving  in  the  enemy's  pickets,  while 
Early  advanced  along  the  pike  to  Kernstown  and  then 
to  the  left  so  as  to  gain  a  position  northwest  of  the 
town,  from  which  the  defensive  works  could  be  attacked 
with  advantage.  While  Early  was  maneuvering  for 
a  position,  Johnson  formed  line  of  battle  two  miles  from 
the  town  preparatory  to  making  an  attack  and  was 
opened  upon  by  a  battery  of  artillery  near  the  Mill 
wood  Road.  Col.  Andrews  at  once  brought  up  Carpen 
ter's  Battery  in  command  of  Lieut.  W.  T.  Lambie, 
which  from  a  position  to  the  left  of  the  Front  Royal 
Road  blew  up  one  of  the  enemy's  caissons  and  drove  off 
his  guns.  But  almost  immediately  12  or  15  long-range 
pieces  in  and  near  the  town  uncovered  and  opened  upon 
Lambie's  guns,  forcing  them  to  retire.  Dement's  Bat 
tery  in  reserve  also  suffered  some  loss  and  was  driven 
from  the  field. 

It  was  late  in  the  day  before  Early  was  ready  to  at 
tack.  His  progress  had  been  opposed  by  a  battery  on 
Pritchard's  Hill,  which  compelled  him  to  make  a  longer 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  601 

detour  than  he  had  anticipated.  But  finally  Hays' 
Brigade  was  moved  around  through  the  woods  to  the 
Cedar  Creek  Pike,  and  along  the  road  to  a  suitable 
position,  from  which  to  assail  Pritchard's  Hill.  This 
hill  was  found  by  Hays  to  be  occupied  by  a  considerable 
force  of  infantry,  as  well  as  by  the  battery,  and  Gordon 
was  sent  by  the  same  route  pursued  by  Hays,  to  join  the 
latter  in  the  attack.  Together  Hays  and  Gordon  drove 
the  enemy  across  the  Cedar  Creek  Pike,  and  Abraham's 
Creek  as  far  as  Milltown  Mills,  and  into  their  fortifica 
tions  on  Bower's  Hill,  the  latter  being  an  exceptionally 
strong  position,  well  defended  by  artillery,  and  most 
difficult  of  access  by  reason  of  the  boggy  creek  bed  in 
its  front.  During  the  retirement  of  the  enemy  from 
Bower's  Hill,  Maj.  Latimer  directed  Carpenter  from 
the  position  to  which  he  had  retired  to  open  with  a  section 
of  rifled  pieces  upon  them,  which  was  done  with  ex 
cellent  effect,  but  again  the  enemy's  massed  artillery 
actively  replied,  whereupon  about  dark  Latimer  with 
drew  the  battery  and  placed  it  in  park  with  the  rest  of 
Andrews'  Battalion,  which  was  not  engaged  again 
that  night  or  the  following  day.  Early  reformed  his 
division,  three  brigades  in  the  front  line  and  one  in  re 
serve,  while  the  enemy  vigorously  shelled  his  troops  and 
Lambie's  guns  further  to  the  right.  Night  fell  before 
the  attack  could  be  organized  and  the  men  slept  in 
position  on  their  arms,  while  a  terrific  storm  raged  and 
torrents  of  rain  fell  upon  them. 

During  the  night,  the  Federal  artillery  was  with 
drawn  from  Bower's  Hill  and  the  south  and  west  side 
of  the  town,  only  a  thin  line  of  skirmishers  being  left 
to  confront  Early  and  Johnson.  Before  9  A.  M.  on  the 
14th,  Early  gained  Bower's  Hill,  from  which  Ewell  was 
able  to  see  the  enemy's  main  work  to  the  northwest  of 
the  town.  Early  was  accordingly  directed  to  move  to 
the  west  of  the  town  and  seize  a  small  open  work  near 
the  Pughtown  Road,  which  commanded  the  main  work, 
while  about  11  A.  M.  Johnson  moved  east  of  the  town  to 
divert  attention  from  Early  and  interfere  as  much  as 


602  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

possible  with  the  work  of  fortification  which  the  Fed 
erals  were  busily  engaged  in.  He  accordingly  advanced 
to  a  point  between  the  Millwood  and  Berry ville  roads 
and  threw  forward  a  regiment  in  skirmish  order  which 
successfully  engrossed  the  enemy's  attention. 

Leaving  Gordon's  Brigade  and  the  Maryland  Bat 
talion  with  Griffin's  and  Hupp's  batteries  at  Bower's 
Hill,  Early  with  the  rest  of  his  division,  Jones'  Bat 
talion  of  artillery  under  Capt.  Carrington,  and  Brown's 
Battalion,  less  Hupp's  Battery,  under  Capt.  Dance, 
moved  by  a  long  circuit  of  some  ten  miles  under  cover 
of  the  intervening  ridges  and  woods,  and  about  4  p.  M. 
gained  a  wooded  hill  (one  of  the  ranges  known  as  Little 
North  Mountain),  opposite  the  enemy's  position  and 
within  easy  artillery  range  of  it.  While  Col.  Jones  was 
engaged  in  placing  the  guns  the  men  were  allowed  to 
rest.  At  the  north  extremity  of  the  ridge,  just  south 
of  the  Pughtown  Road,  a  cornfield,  and  at  the  south  end 
an  orchard,  afforded  excellent  positions  for  artillery  to 
fire  upon  the  opposing  works.  The  enemy  had  no 
pickets  thrown  out  towards  the  north  and  west,  although 
their  main  advanced  work  consisted  of  a  bastion  front 
facing  Early 's  position.  From  this  work  a  line  of 
parapets  ran  northward  about  150  yards  across  the 
Pughtown  Road  to  a  small  redoubt,  occupied  by  two 
guns  and  an  infantry  support.  So  completely  were  the 
Federals  unaware  of  Early 's  presence,  that  two  miles  to 
the  right  of  the  position  he  had  gained,  the  rear  of  their 
line  confronting  Gordon  at  Bower's  Hill  could  be  seen. 

Jones  immediately  upon  arriving  at  the  ridge  care 
fully  reconnoitered  the  position  with  his  battery  com 
manders  and  directed  a  battery  of  his  own  and  two 
batteries  of  Dance's  Battalion,  12  guns  in  all,  to  be 
brought  up  by  Dance  to  the  position  on  the  right  of  the 
ridge,  which  position  was  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile 
to  the  left  front  of  the  bastion.  Carrington  with  two 
of  Jones'  batteries  was  then  directed  to  occupy  the 
cornfield  on  the  left  of  the  ridge,  a  position  somewhat 
nearer  the  enemy's  work,  well  to  its  right  front,  and 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  603 

from  which  it  could  be  partially  enfiladed.  All  of  the 
guns  were  held  under  cover  on  the  rear  crest  im 
mediately  in  rear  of  the  positions  assigned  them,  extra 
ammunition  brought  up,  and  each  battery  commander 
and  gunner  pointed  out  his  special  portion  of  the  target. 
The  remaining  batteries  were  held  in  reserve  at  the  rear 
base  of  the  ridge,  ready  to  relieve  those  in  position. 

Hays'  Brigade,  with  Smith  in  support,  was  brought 
up  by  Early  and  prepared  to  advance  under  cover  of 
Jones'  fire.  When  the  infantry  had  been  refreshed 
after  a  rest  of  about  two  hours,  Jones  gave  the  signal 
for  Dance  and  Carrington  to  open.  Instantly  the 
twenty  guns  were  pushed  forward  to  the  military  crest 
by  hand  and  opened  simultaneously,  crossing  their  fire 
on  the  opposing  works.  The  Federal  guns  immediately 
opposite  Early's  position  were  helpless  from  the  first, 
although  an  effort  was  made  to  keep  them  in  action. 
As  soon  as  the  Confederate  fire  commenced,  the  line 
opposite  Gordon  began  to  fall  back  towards  the  main 
work,  and  it  was  upon  these  troops  that  Latimer,  east  of 
the  Pike,  caused  Lambie  to  fire. 

If  the  guns  in  the  bastion  and  the  small  work  on  its 
right  replied  to  Carrington's  group  Dance  was  free  to 
fire  upon  them  with  the  greatest  deliberation,  and  if 
they  shifted  to  the  Confederate  right  group,  Carring 
ton's  nearer  group  had  necessarily  to  be  neglected  by 
them.  Nor  were  they  able  under  the  most  accurate 
cross-fire  of  the  two  groups  to  concentrate  with  effect 
upon  Hays'  line  as  it  advanced  leisurely  across  the  in 
tervening  space.  The  works  constructed  for  their 
cover  were  well  defined  targets  for  the  Confederate  gun 
ners,  who  had  no  doubt  whatever  as  to  their  true  ob 
jective,  and  under  such  circumstances  it  was  but  a 
question  of  a  few  minutes  before  a  superiority  of  fire 
was  attained  by  the  Confederate  guns  in  their  unex 
pected  and  suddenly  disclosed  positions. 

As  soon  as  Early  had  seen  that  the  Federal  defense 
was  overwhelmed  by  the  fire  of  his  artillery,  he  had 
sent  Hays'  Brigade  forward,  the  men  of  which  ad- 


604  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

vanced  without  molestation  across  the  open  to  within 
200  yards  of  the  enemy's  works.  Within  thirty  minutes 
the  hostile  fire  was  completely  subdued,  and  the  de 
fenders  began  to  leave  their  intrenchments  and  fall  back 
upon  the  supports  forming  in  the  rear,  whereupon  the 
signal  for  Jones  to  cease  firing  was  given  and  the  Con 
federate  assaulting  column  rushed  up  the  slope,  through 
the  brushwood  abattis,  and  into  the  larger  work, 
bayoneting  the  cannoneers  who  remained  at  their 
posts.  Of  the  six  rifled  guns  in  this  work,  two  were 
immediately  turned  upon  the  fleeing  enemy  and  the 
troops  forming  to  advance  to  the  support  of  the 
captured  line.  The  Federals  now  abandoned  the  small 
works  to  the  north  of  the  bastion,  which  were  promptly 
occupied  by  Smith's  men,  whereupon  Dance  shifted 
his  fire  to  the  main  Federal  fort,  holding  his  original 
position  in  order  that  he  might  sweep  the  opposite  ridge, 
should  it  be  recovered  by  the  enemy. 

The  occupancy  of  the  whole  line  of  detached  works 
gave  the  Confederates  complete  command  over  the  main 
Federal  position.  Thus  had  the  artillery,  much  as  at 
Harper's  Ferry  the  year  before,  but  with  even  smaller 
loss,  enabled  the  infantry  to  seize  an  exceptionally 
strong  defensive  line.  No  wonder  the  latter  was  filled 
with  enthusiasm  for  the  gunners. 

In  the  operations  leading  up  to  so  successful  a  re 
sult  Jones  and  his  battery  commanders  displayed 
marked  ability  and  most  excellent  judgment.  In  the 
first  place,  though  always  well  up  to  the  front  in  the 
turning  movement,  they  exhibited  no  undue  haste,  and 
before  rushing  into  position  saved  time  and  guarded 
against  mistakes  by  thoroughly  reconnoitering  the 
position  to  be  occupied  by  the  guns.  This  having  been 
done,  the  batteries  were  brought  up  quietly,  and  without 
the  slightest  confusion  assigned  their  tasks.  Nor  were 
the  pieces  exposed  until  the  instant  all  were  ready  to 
open  fire.  The  method  of  bringing  them  into  action  on 
this  occasion  is  known  as  "creeping."  Although  a  most 
ordinary  proceedure,  and  one  which  common  sense 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  605 

would  always  seem  to  dictate  in  circumstances  like  those 
in  which  Jones  found  himself  placed,  a  perfect  storm  of 
discussion  concerning  "creeping"  at  one  time  broke  out 
among  the  artillerymen  of  the  Continent,  the  pros  and 
cons  appearing  in  numerous  pamphlets.*  It  is  such 
artificial  issues  that  overcome  the  patience  of  practical 
soldiers  to  whom  it  seems  that  they  have  no  place  what 
ever  in  serious  treatises  on  the  technique  and  tactics  of 
artillery. 

As  soon  as  Hays  and  Smith  had  secured  the  hill,  Car- 
rington  moved  his  eight  guns  to  its  crest.  In  the  mean 
time,  Hays  had  been  reenf orced  by  Smith,  and  had  with 
the  captured  guns  dispersed  the  column  which  en 
deavored  to  recapture  the  position.  An  attack  upon 
Gordon's  position  at  Bower's  Hill  had  also  been  re 
pulsed,  so  that  the  Federals  contented  themselves  by 
turning  all  the  guns  in  the  main  fort  and  those  in  the 
redoubt  on  the  ridge  to  its  north  upon  Early,  to  which 
Jones  replied  as  soon  as  he  had  brought  up  his  bat 
teries.  From  the  captured  position  the  Confederate 
guns  were  able  to  fire  into  both  of  these  works,  as  well 
as  upon  the  infantry  masses  near  them,  and  continued 
in  action  until  nightfall.  Although  Hays'  and  Smith's 
brigades  had  been  formed  along  the  rear  crest  of  the 
ridge  for  an  attack  upon  the  main  work  of  the  enemy, 
the  number  of  the  latter,  the  difficulty  of  the  interven 
ing  ground,  and  the  growing  darkness,  all  combined, 
rendered  a  further  advance  unadvisable.  But  it  was 
apparent  to  all  that  the  enemy  had  suffered  severely 
from  Jones'  fire  and  that  his  position  was  untenable. 
Furthermore,  Jones  had  early  in  the  night  brought  all 
of  his  guns  up  and  placed  them  behind  the  abandoned 
works. 

Anticipating  that  Milroy  would  endeavor  to  escape 
during  the  night,  Ewell,  just  after  dark,  ordered  John 
son  with  a  part  of  his  division,  and  Lieut. -Col.  Andrews 
with  Dement's  Battery  of  Napoleons,  and  Raine's 

*See  Field  Artillery  With  the  Other  Arms,  May.  p.  126 ;  also  see  Von. 
Schell,  p.  43. 


606  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

and  Carpenter's  rifled  sections,  eight  guns  in  all,  to  move 
to  a  point  about  2^  miles  north  of  Winchester  on  the 
Martinsburg  Pike  to  intercept  the  enemy's  retreat,  or 
to  attack  from  the  north  at  daylight,  in  concert  with 
Early  and  Gordon,  should  he  hold  his  ground.  The 
remainder  of  Andrews'  Battalion  was  left  with  Lati- 
mer  in  front  of  Winchester,  somewhat  to  the  southeast 
of  the  town. 

Finding  the  direct  road  to  the  designated  point  al 
most  impassable  in  the  night,  Johnson  moved  across 
country  until  he  struck  the  road  leading  from  the  Win 
chester  and  Martinsburg  Pike  to  Charles  Town,  and 
marched  via  Jordan  Springs  towards  Stephenson's  De 
pot,  five  miles  from  Winchester.  By  3  A.  M.  he  was 
within  four  miles  of  the  Martinsburg  Pike,  marching 
rapidly  towards  it,  Andrews'  guns  well  closed  up  upon 
the  infantry.  As  the  head  of  the  column  reached  the 
railroad  some  200  yards  from  the  pike,  it  was  discovered 
that  the  enemy,  who  had  abandoned  all  his  guns,  was 
moving  north  in  full  retreat,  and  almost  instantly  the  fire 
of  musketry  broke  out  between  the  heads  of  the  two 
columns.  Johnson  promptly  formed  his  infantry  in  line 
across  the  Winchester-Harper's  Ferry  Road,  over 
which  he  had  approached  the  pike,  a  stone  wall  provid 
ing  excellent  cover  for  the  men.  In  the  meantime,  the 
batteries  had  been  halted  about  200  yards  from  the  rail 
road,  and  the  leading  gun  of  Dement 's  Battery  ordered 
forward  to  the  depot,  whence  it  was  directed  to  be  placed 
in  the  road  near  the  railroad  bridge.  Soon  the  other 
piece  of  the  same  section  of  Dement's  Battery  was 
ordered  to  occupy  a  position  on  the  left  of  the  road,  and 
well  to  the  front.  Neither  of  these  pieces  was  able  to 
fire  upon  the  pike  at  this  time,  however,  on  account  of 
the  skirmishers  in  their  front.  But  soon  the  skirmishers 
fell  back,  followed  by  the  enemy,  and  Dement's  guns 
opened  with  canister  at  a  range  of  less  than  150  yards, 
and  became  desperately  engaged  in  defending  them 
selves  against  the  Federal  infantry.  Andrews  now 
posted  Dement's  second  section  and  Raine's  section 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  607 

along  the  edge  of  the  woods  to  the  left  of  the  road,  and 
somewhat  further  from  the  pike  than  Dement's  two 
guns,  and  Lambie's  section  of  Carpenter's  Battery  at 
a  point  about  200  yards  to  the  right  of  the  road  to  guard 
the  flank  of  Johnson's  line.  Hardly  had  these  dis 
positions  been  made  when  Milroy  came  on  with  his  infan 
try  and  cavalry,  and  attacked,  making  repeated  and 
desperate  efforts  to  cut  his  way  through  to  Martinsburg. 
The  1,200  men  which  Johnson  had  in  his  first  line  were 
now  reenforced  by  Walker's  belated  brigade,  and  after 
failing  in  several  frontal  attacks,  and  then  in  an  effort 
to  turn  the  Confederate  flanks,  a  part  of  the  Federal 
column,  some  2,300  men,  surrendered.  The  rest 
scattered  through  the  woods  and  fields,  Milroy  himself, 
with  about  250  cavalry  escaping  to  Harper's  Ferry,  but 
before  morning,  the  Confederate  cavalry  had  rounded 
up  many  of  the  Federal  stragglers. 

In  the  fighting  at  Stephenson's  Depot,  Andrews 
handled  his  guns  with  remarkable  ability,  all  of  them 
being  heavily  engaged  with  the  enemy's  infantry  at 
close  range  for  nearly  two  hours.  The  guns  were  shifted 
from  point  to  point  with  unusual  celerity,  and  met  each 
attempt  to  turn  Johnson's  flanks  with  a  well  directed 
and  rapid  fire  of  canister,  following  up  the  enemy's 
dispersed  groups  after  his  column  was  broken.  One  of 
Raine's  guns,  with  an  infantry  support  of  but  seven  men, 
compelled  several  hundred  Federals  retreating  in  dis 
order  along  the  Jordan  Springs  Road  to  surrender. 
This  instance  illustrates  the  tremendous  moral  influence 
of  pursuing  guns  upon  disorganized  troops.  Especially 
effective  was  one  of  Dement's  guns  which  during  the 
action  occupied  the  railroad  bridge  and  held  it  against 
a  large  body  of  the  enemy  that  endeavored  to  cut  its 
way  over.  In  this  section  commanded  by  Lieut.  Contee, 
the  loss  was  1  killed  and  13  wounded,  the  latter  includ 
ing  the  section  commander.  In  the  same  section,  15 
horses  were  killed  or  disabled. 

In  his  account  of  the  affair,  Gen.  Edward  Johnson 
says:  "Before  closing  the  report,  I  beg  leave  to  state 


608  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

that  I  have  never  seen  superior  artillery  practice  to  that 
of  Andrews'  Battalion  in  this  engagement,  and 
especially  the  section  under  Lieut.  Contee  (Dement's 
Battery),  one  gun  of  which  was  placed  on  the  bridge 
above  referred  to,  and  the  other  a  little  to  the  left  and 
rear.  Both  pieces  were  very  much  exposed  during  the 
whole  action.  Four  successive  attempts  were  made  to 
carry  the  bridge.  Two  sets  of  cannoneers  (13  out  of 
16)  were  killed  and  disabled.  Lieut. -Col.  Andrews  and 
Lieut.  Contee,  whose  gallantry  calls  for  special  mention, 
fell  wounded  at  this  point.  Lieut.  John  A.  Morgan, 
First  North  Carolina  Regiment,  and  Lieut.  Ran 
dolph  H.  McKim,  took  the  place  of  the  disabled  can 
noneers,  rendering  valuable  assistance,  and  deserving 
special  mention."* 

Johnson's  total  loss  in  the  operations  of  the  13th, 
14th,  and  15th  was  but  14  killed,  and  74  wounded. 
Some  idea  of  the  desperate  work  done  by  Andrews' 
gunners  at  Stephenson's  Depot  may  be  got  from  the 
fact  that  on  that  occasion  he  lost  2  men  killed,  2  officers 
and  12  men  wounded,  more  than  10  per  cent  of  those  en 
gaged,  whereas  the  infantry  loss  was  less  than  2  per 
cent  of  the  force  engaged.  The  total  number  of 
captured  Federals  was  about  4,000,  including  108  of 
ficers.  The  enemy  abandoned  300  loaded  wagons,  300 
horses,  a  large  quantity  of  commissary  and  quarter 
master  stores,  and  all  their  guns.  Including  those 
captured  by  Early,  23  pieces  of  ordnance  were  secured. 
Swell's  total  loss  was  47  killed,  219  wounded,  and  3 
missing,  aggregate  269. 

Ewell  at  once  informed  Rodes  at  Martinsburg  of 
Milroy's  flight,  but  as  Jenkins  was  on  the  Potomac  near 
Williamsport  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  there  was  no 
cavalry  with  which  Rodes  could  intercept  the  escaping 
Federals.  That  evening,  Rodes  crossed  the  river  at 
Williamsport  with  three  brigades,  sending  Jenkins  for 
ward  to  Chambersburg,  and  on  the  19th  moved  his  entire 

*See  account  of  this  affair  in  Recollections  of  a  Soldier,  by  the  Rev. 
Randolph  H.  McKim. 


MA.TOIl   .JAMES   BREATHED 
(.'11  IKK    lloitsi:    AKTI  i.i.KUY 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  609 

division  to  Hagerstown,  where  he  encamped  on  the  road 
to  Boonsborough,  while  Johnson  crossed  to  Sharpsburg, 
and  Early  moved  to  Shepherdstown  to  threaten 
Harper's  Ferry.  In  these  positions,  Ewell's  divisions 
rested  until  June  21,  while  Longstreet  and  Hill  closed 
up.  The  2d  Corps  in  a  brief  series  of  operations  had  not 
only  swept  the  route  clear  for  the  advance,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  11,000  Federals  at  Harper's  Ferry,  but  had 
secured  28  pieces  of  superior  ordnance  with  which  to 
complete  the  armament  of  its  batteries  besides  turning 
over  the  surplus  guns  and  a  large  amount  of  supplies  to 
the  Army. 

On  June  13,  as  Ewell's  Corps  approached  Win 
chester,  Hooker  put  his  army  in  motion  from  Falmouth 
for  Manassas.  His  plan  to  interpose  between  Lee's 
flanks  was  opposed  by  Lincoln,  Halleck  and  Stanton, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
was  spread  over  a  distance  of  more  than  100  miles,  and 
as  Lincoln  surmised,  "was  very  slim  somewhere."  When 
Hooker  abandoned  his  position  along  Stafford  Heights, 
Hill  started  on  the  14th  for  the  Valley  via  Culpeper 
Courthouse  and  Front  Royal,  Garnett's,  Poague's,  and 
Cutts'  battalions  accompanying  Heth's,  Fender's,  and 
Anderson's  divisions,  respectively,  with  the  battalions 
of  Mclntosh  and  Pegram  organized  as  a  corps  reserve. 

Longstreet's  Corps,  with  Henry's,  Cabell's,  and 
Dearing's  battalions  accompanying  Hood's,  McLaws', 
and  Pickett's  divisions,  respectively,  and  Alexander's 
and  Eshleman's  battalions  organized  as  the  corps  re 
serve,  left  Culpeper  on  the  15th  and  moved  along  the 
eastern  slope  of  the  Blue  Ridge  to  cover  the  gaps.  Hill 
passed  in  rear  of  Longstreet,  and  when  he  was  safely  in 
the  Valley,  the  latter  moved  westward  through  Snicker's 
and  Ashby's  gaps,  the  two  corps  uniting  near  Win 
chester  about  the  20th.  The  march  along  the  eastern 
slope  of  the  Blue  Ridge  had  been  an  arduous  one  for 
Walton's  battalions,  for  not  only  were  the  roads  fol 
lowed  extremely  rough  and  difficult,  and  the  heat  op 
pressive,  but  the  artillery  was  frequently  called  upon  to 


610  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

make  long  digressions  from  the  route  to  support  the 
cavalry  and  detachments  of  infantry  in  meeting  the 
threats  of  the  enemy  on  the  flank  of  the  column.  The 
Cavalry  with  the  Horse  Artillery  had,  while  endeavor 
ing  to  screen  the  movement,  been  almost  constantly  en 
gaged,  encountering  the  enemy  at  Aldie,  Middleburg, 
and  Upperville,  and  losing  over  500  men  in  these 
operations. 

On  the  16th  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  after  a  week  of 
strenuous  labor  at  Culpeper  supervising  the  organiza 
tion  of  the  artillery  trains,  and  assisting  in  arranging 
for  the  reserve  supply  of  ammunition,  left  for  the 
Valley  and  soon  joined  army  headquarters  which  was 
with  the  1st  Corps.  Between  the  23d  and  25th,  after 
resting  in  camp  near  Millwood  and  Berryville  for  four 
or  five  days,  the  1st  Corps  crossed  the  Potomac  at 
Williamsport,  and  the  3d  Corps  at  Shepherdstown. 
Robertson's  and  Jones'  brigades  of  cavalry  with  Moor 
man's  and  Breathed's  batteries  remained  at  Ashby's 
Gap,  while  Chew's,  McGregor's,  and  Hart's  batteries, 
as  we  have  seen,  accompanied  Stuart  in  his  movement 
around  the  enemy's  rear  with  Hampton's,  Fitz  Lee's, 
and  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  brigades. 

On  the  21st,  Gen.  Lee  ordered  Ewell  to  move  for 
ward  and  take  possession  of  Harrisburg,  and  the  fol 
lowing  day  Rodes  and  Johnson  with  Carter's  and  An 
drews'  battalions,  the  latter  under  Latimer,  and  Early 
with  Jones'  Battalion,  took  up  the  march.  Rodes  and 
Johnson  proceeded  via  Chambersburg  to  Carlisle,  and 
Early's  Division  moved  via  Greenwood  and  Gettysburg 
to  York,  with  orders  to  join  the  main  body  at  Carlisle 
after  destroying  the  Northern  Central  Roalroad,  and 
the  bridge  across  the  Susquehanna  at  Wrightsville. 
Brown's  and  Nelson's  battalions  organized  as  the  corps 
reserve  accompanied  Johnson's  Division. 

On  the  25th  and  26th,  Hooker  also  crossed  his  army 
over  the  Potomac  at  Edward's  Ferry,  and  moved  to  the 
vicinity  of  Frederick.  Here  he  threatened  the  Con 
federate  rear  through  the  South  Mountain  passes, 
should  Lee  move  north,  and  also  covered  Washington, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  611 

but  he  soon  found  that  his  hands  were  tied  by  Stanton 
and  Halleck,  who  did  everything  possible  to  compel  his 
resignation,  which  was  tendered  and  accepted  on  the 
27th.  At  midnight,  Meade  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Meanwhile,  Lee  with  the 
1st  and  3d  corps  had  reached  Chambersburg  and 
ordered  Longstreet  and  Hill  to  join  Ewell  at  Harris- 
burg.  Ewell  with  Johnson's  and  Rodes'  divisions  had 
reached  Carlisle.  The  following  day,  the  28th,  Early 
reached  York  and  sent  Gordon  forward  to  destroy  the 
bridge,  which  was  done,  however,  by  a  small  party  of 
Federal  militia,  falling  back  before  the  Confederate  ad 
vance.  Gen  Lee  did  not  learn  until  this  day  of  Hooker's 
crossing,  for  Stuart  with  the  larger  part  of  the  cavalry 
was  entirely  out  of  touch  with  the  Army,  and  Robert 
son  with  his  own  and  Jones'  Brigade  had  not  moved 
into  Pennsylvania  with  the  Army.  Therefore,  Lee  was 
in  utter  ignorance  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy  (just 
as  Hooker  had  been  at  Chancellorsville),  until  one  of 
Longstreet's  spies  arrived  about  midnight  on  the  28th, 
with  accurate  information  as  to  the  position  of  five  of 
Meade's  corps,  and  Lee  now  learned  that  Meade  was 
at  Frederick.  That  the  absence  of  Stuart  from  the 
immediate  front  and  flank  of  the  Army  during  its  ad 
vance  into  Pennsylvania  was  a  grievous  error  on  some 
body's  part  seems  certain,  but  the  point  cannot  be  gone 
into  at  length  here.  It  is  by  no  means  clear,  however, 
that  the  mistake  is  justly  attributable  to  Stuart.  Be 
fore  he  separated  from  the  Army  with  the  larger  part 
of  his  division,  he  placed  one  brigade  and  part  of  another 
in  immediate  touch  with  army  headquarters,  and  this 
force  was  at  all  times  subject  to  the  directions  of 
Stuart's  superiors.  The  force  was  not  used,  but  that  was 
not  Stuart's  fault.  Stuart  certainly  had  the  sanction  of 
Gen.  Lee  for  the  movement  he  undertook,  and  if  the 
troops  he  left  with  the  Army  had  been  properly  em 
ployed,  irrespective  of  what  orders  Stuart  may  have  left 
with  Robertson,  the  absence  of  the  cavalry  would  never 
have  been  assigned  as  one  of  the  causes  of  the  Confeder- 


612  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

ate  reverses  in  Pennsylvania.  There  is  much  ground  for 
the  belief  that  Lee  counted  on  Stuart  doing  that  which 
he  had  authorized  Stuart  to  leave  for  Robertson  to  do, 
whereas  Robertson,  without  direct  orders  from  Lee 
failed  to  do  without  any  fault  on  his  part  what  Stuart 
would  have  done  in  similar  circumstances.  It  would, 
therefore,  seem  that  Lee  suffered  more  from  the  ab 
sence  of  Stuart  than  from  that  of  the  cavalry,  some  of 
which  he  had  but  did  not  use ;  and  again,  it  may  be  said, 
that  since  Stuart  was  authorized  to  separate  from  the 
Army  of  Lee,  the  latter  as  commander-in-chief  must 
bear  the  blame  for  all  consequent  mishaps.* 

As  soon  as  Lee  learned  of  Hooker's  move  across  the 
Potomac  and  that  the  Federal  army  was  marching  to 
wards  South  Mountain,  he  at  once  arrested  the  move 
ments  of  his  corps  which  had  been  hitherto  ordered  and 
determined  to  concentrate  his  army  at  Cashtown.  Hill's 
Corps  was  accordingly  ordered  to  move  toward  that 
point  on  the  29th,  and  Longstreet  to  follow  the  next 
day,  leaving  Pickett's  Division  at  Chambersburg  to 
guard  the  rear  until  relieved  by  Imboden's  command 
from  the  Valley.  Ewell  was  also  recalled  from  Carlisle 
to  the  point  of  concentration,  and  on  the  evening  of  the 
30th  his  reserve  artillery  and  trains  with  Johnson's 
Division  as  an  escort  arrived  near  Chambersburg,  and 
Ewell  himself  with  Early  and  Rodes  reached  Heidlers- 
burg.  Since  Jenkins'  Brigade  with  Griffin's  Battery, 
which  had  covered  Swell's  advance  towards  Harrisburg, 
were  the  only  mounted  troops  present,  the  advance  of 
the  Federals  upon  Gettysburg  was  unknown.  Heth's 
Division  of  Hill's  Corps  had  reached  Cashtown  on  the 
29th,  and  the  following  morning  Pettigrew's  Brigade 
of  that  division,  which  had  been  sent  forward  to  pro 
cure  a  supply  of  shoes,  found  Gettysburg  occupied  by 
the  enemy,  and  returned  nine  miles  to  Cashtown,  its 
commander  being  unwilling  to  hazard  an  attack  with  his 

*See  Stuart's  Cavalry  in  the  Gettysburg  Campaign,  Mosby ;  also  Col.  Mosby's 
and  Col.  Robertson's  articles  in  Battles  and  Leaders;  Campaigns  of  Stuart's 
Cavalry,  McClellan  ;  The  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  Henderson  ;  and  numerous  other 
authorities  pro  and  con. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  613 

single  brigade.  Buford  had  early  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th  crossed  into  and  moved  up  the  Cumberland 
Valley,  via  Boonesborough  and  Fairfield,  with  Gamble's 
and  Devens'  cavalry  brigades,  after  sending  Merritt's 
to  Mechanicstown  as  a  guard  for  his  trains,  and  on 
Tuesday  afternoon,  June  30,  under  instructions  from 
Pleasonton  had  entered  Gettysburg. 

Meade,  who,  like  Lee,  desired  to  fight  a  defensive 
battle,  very  soon  after  taking  command  on  the  28th 
selected  a  strong  position  for  his  line  along  Parr's  Ridge, 
behind  Pipe  Creek.  This  ridge  formed  the  divide  be 
tween  the  waters  of  the  Potomac  and  Chesapeake  Bay. 
From  Gettysburg,  near  the  eastern  base  of  the  Green 
Ridge  and  covering  all  the  upper  passes  into  Cumber 
land  Valley,  good  roads  led  to  all  important  points  be 
tween  the  Susquehanna  and  the  Potomac,  as  a  result 
of  which  the  town  was  of  great  strategic  importance. 
On  the  west  of  the  town,  distant  nearly  half  a  mile,  there 
is  a  somewhat  elevated  ridge  running  north  and  south 
with  the  Lutheran  Seminary  on  the  crest.  This  ridge, 
known  as  Seminary  Ridge,  was  covered  throughout  its 
whole  length  with  open  woods.  From  the  crest  the 
ground  slopes  gradually  to  the  west,  and  again  rising 
forms  another  ridge  about  500  yards  from  the  first, 
upon  which,  nearly  opposite  the  Seminary,  stood  the 
McPherson  farm  buildings.  The  western  ridge,  wider, 
smoother,  and  lower  than  the  first,  intersects  the  latter 
at  Oak  Hill,  a  commanding  knoll  at  its  northern  ex 
tremity,  and  about  one  and  a  half  miles  north  of  the 
Seminary.  From  Oak  Hill,  the  southern  face  of  which 
was  bare,  there  is  a  clear  view  of  the  slopes  of  both  ridges 
and  the  valley  between  them.  West  of  McPherson's 
ridge,  Willoughby  Run  flows  south  into  Marsh  Creek, 
and  south  of  the  farm  buildings  and  directly  opposite 
the  Seminary,  a  wood  bordered  the  run  for  about  300 
yards,  and  stretched  back  to  the  crest  behind.  The 
Seminary  stands  midway  between  two  roads  and  about 
300  yards  from  each,  the  first  running  from  Gettysburg 
southwesterly  to  Hagerstown,  via  Fairfield ;  the  second 


614  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

northwesterly  to  Chambersburg,  via  Cashtown.  Paral 
lel  to  and  150  yards  north  of  the  Chambersburg  Pike 
is  the  bed  of  an  unfinished  railroad,  with  deep  cuttings 
through  the  two  ridges.  North  of  the  town  the  country 
is  comparatively  flat  and  open;  on  the  east  of  it  Rock 
Creek  flows  south.  South  of  the  town,  and  overlooking 
it,  is  a  ridge  of  bold  high  ground,  terminated  on  the  west 
by  Cemetery  Hill,  and  on  the  east  by  Gulp's  Hill,  which 
bending  around  to  the  south  extends  half  a  mile  or  more 
and  terminates  in  low  grounds  near  Spangler's  Spring. 
Gulp's  Hill  is  steep  and  well  wooded  on  its  eastern  face, 
which  slopes  downward  to  Rock  Creek.  From  Ceme 
tery  Hill,  a  ridge  known  as  Cemetery  Ridge  extends 
southward  for  a  mile  or  more  nearly  parallel  to 
Seminary  Ridge,  1,000  yards  to  the  west.  On  a  line  in 
prolongation  of  Cemetery  Ridge  rise  two  bold  knolls, 
known  as  Little  Round  Top  and  Big  Round  Top,  re 
spectively.  The  configuration  of  the  ground  compris 
ing  Cemetery  Ridge  is  such  that  its  crest  forms  a  line 
similar  to  the  shank  of  a  fish  hook,  with  the  crest  line 
of  Gulp's  Hill  as  the  barb.  The  intervening  ground 
between  Cemetery  and  Seminary  ridges  consisted  of 
rolling  fields,  intersected  by  numerous  fences.  Between 
the  two  ridges  runs  the  Emmittsburg  Road,  which 
leaving  the  southern  extremity  of  Seminary  Ridge 
crosses  the  depression  in  a  northeasterly  direction,  and 
passing  over  Cemetery  Hill  descends  to  the  town.  Such 
are  the  general  features  of  the  battlefield  of  Gettysburg. 

So  impressed  was  Buford  with  the  strength  of  the 
various  positions  about  Gettysburg,  that  no  sooner  had 
Pettigrew  withdrawn  before  his  advance,  than  he  de 
cided  to  secure  them  to  Meade.  Expecting  the  early 
appearance  of  the  Confederates  in  force,  he  assigned 
Devens'  Brigade  to  the  quarter  of  the  field  north,  and 
Gamble's  to  that  west  of  the  town,  sent  out  scouting 
parties  along  all  the  roads  to  collect  imformation,  and 
informed  Reynolds  of  the  situation.  His  pickets  ex 
tended  from  below  the  Fairfield  Road  along  the  eastern 
bank  of  Willoughby  Run  to  the  railroad  cut,  then 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  615 

easterly  some  1,500  yards  north  of  the  town  to  a  wooded 
hillock  near  Rock  Creek.  Meade  arrived  on  the  night 
of  the  30th,  with  his  headquarters  and  the  Reserve  Ar 
tillery  under  Hunt  at  Taneytown,  about  12  miles  south 
of  Gettysburg.  The  1st  Corps  was  at  Marsh  Run,  the 
llth  at  Emmittsburg,  the  3d  at  Bridgeport,  the  12th 
at  Littletown,  the  2d  at  Uniontown,  the  5th  at  Union 
Mills,  the  6th  and  Gregg's  cavalry  at  Manchester,  and 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry  was  at  Hanover.  Thus,  while  the 
Confederates  were  concentrating  near  Gettysburg,  the 
Federal  Army  was  widely  scattered  over  the  region  to 
the  south  and  east  of  it.  But  Meade  was  soon  convinced 
that  the  movement  of  the  enemy  towards  the  Susque- 
hanna  had  been  abandoned,  and  while  he  issued  care 
fully  drawn  orders  to  prepare  the  Pipe  Creek  line  for 
defense,  he  also  provided  for  an  offensive  movement  in 
case  developments  should  justify  it. 

At  this  time  the  three  Confederate  corps  were  con 
verging  by  easy  marches  on  Cashtown,  where  Lee,  now 
more  or  less  conversant  with  the  positions  of  the  Fed 
eral  corps,  proposed  to  await  an  attack.  Stuart  was 
still  out  of  touch  with  the  Army,  and  Robertson  and 
Imboden  had  not  had  time  to  come  up.  Pickett's  Divi 
sion  had  been  left  at  Chambersburg  to  await  Imboden's 
arrival,  and  Law's  Brigade  had  been  detached  from 
Hood's  Division  and  sent  to  New  Guilford  Courthouse, 
a  few  miles  south  of  Fayettesville,  with  orders  to  remain 
there  until  Robertson's  command  arrived. 

As  soon  as  Hill  on  the  30th  learned  from  Pettigrew 
that  the  enemy  was  in  Gettysburg,  he  informed  Lee  of 
the  fact  and  also  Ewell  that  he  intended  to  advance  the 
next  morning  and  discover  what  was  in  his  front.  His 
orders  were  specific  not  to  bring  on  an  action,  but  his 
thirst  for  battle  was  unquenchable,  and  like  the  German 
lieutenants  in  1870  he  rushed  on,  and,  as  we  shall  see, 
took  the  control  of  the  situation  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  It  was  Hill,  therefore,  who 
committed  the  second  great  mistake  of  the  Confederate 
campaign,  the  practical  elimination  of  the  cavalry  being 
the  first. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

GETTYSBURG JULY  1 

THE  Confederate  situation  on  the  morning  of  July 
1  was  briefly  as  follows:  Of  the  nine  divisions,  eight 
with  the  exception  of  Law's  Brigade  were  in  motion  to 
wards  Gettysburg,  Ewell,  in  conformity  with  Hill's 
plan,  having  at  an  early  hour  ordered  Rodes  and  Early 
to  move  on  that  point  from  the  roads  they  were  pursuing 
toward  Cashtown.  Six  of  the  divisions  with  the  reserve 
artillery  of  the  three  corps  and  the  trains  were  concen 
trated  upon  the  turnpike  from  Fayettesville  to  Gettys 
burg. 

At  5  A.  M.,  Hill  with  Heth's  and  Fender's  divisions 
and  Pegram's  and  Macintosh's  battalions  of  artillery 
had  left  Cashtown,  and  at  8  A.  M.  Buford's  scouts,  about 
three  miles  west  of  Gettysburg,  on  the  Cashtown  Road, 
reported  Heth's  advance.  Heth  pressed  on  and  found 
Gamble's  cavalry  brigade  in  position  on  the  McPher- 
son  Ridge  from  the  Fairfield  Road  to  the  railroad  cut, 
supported  by  Calef's  regular  battery,  one  section  of 
which  was  stationed  near  the  left  of  the  line  and  the 
other  two  across  the  Chambersburg  or  Cashtown  Pike.* 
Devens'  squadrons  prolonged  Gamble's  line  to  Oak 
Hill. 

As  Heth  advanced,  he  threw  Archer's  Brigade  to  the 
right  and  Davis'  to  the  left  of  the  Cashtown  Pike  with 
Pettigrew's  and  Brockenbrough's  brigades  in  support. 
Pegram's  and  Mclntosh's  battalions,  though  well  up, 
were  unable  to  gain  positions  from  which  to  prepare 
the  attack  before  Heth  launched  his  brigades,  and  the 
batteries  were  left  to  act  as  best  they  could,  without 
any  definite  plan  or  objective.  Hence,  Heth's  first  at 
tack  was  well  resisted  by  Buford's  dismounted  troopers, 
who  would  have  been  unable  to  hold  their  lines  had  they 
been  first  subjected  to  a  heavy  artillery  fire.  Heth 

*This  battery  was  distinguished  as  Duncan's  Battery  in  the  Mexican  War. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  617 

would  almost  certainly  have  been  able  by  a  proper  con 
cert  with  Pegram  and  Mclntosh  to  seize  Buford's  po 
sition  before  the  latter  was  reinforced. 

Upon  receiving  Buford's  report,  Reynolds  started 
for  Gettysburg  with  Wadsworth's  small  division  of  two 
brigades,  and  Hall's  2d  Maine  Battery,  ordering 
Doubleday  and  Howard  to  follow  with  their  corps. 
Hearing  the  sound  of  battle  as  he  approached  the  town, 
Reynolds  directed  his  troops  to  cross  the  fields  towards 
the  firing,  and  himself  joined  Buford  at  the  Seminary. 
It  was  now  past  10  o'clock,  and  Heth  had  formed  for 
attack.  Reynolds  placed  three  of  the  regiments  which 
he  had  brought  up  north  of  the  railroad  cut,  and  two 
south  of  the  pike,  substituting  Hall's  Battery  for 
Calef's,  thus  relieving  the  dismounted  troopers,  who 
had  alone  opposed  Hill  for  the  past  two  hours.  Cutler's 
regiments  were  hardly  in  position  when  they  were 
furiously  charged  by  Davis'  Brigade  and  swept  back 
to  Seminary  Ridge  under  the  fire  of  Pegram' s  guns, 
which  also  forced  Hall  to  retire  his  battery  by  sections. 
Reynolds  had  meantime  sent  to  the  rear  to  hurry 
Doubleday  forward  and  one  of  the  latter's  regiments, 
together  with  the  two  which  had  been  posted  south  of  the 
pike  under  Col.  Fowler,  charged  Davis'  Brigade  and 
drove  it  from  the  cut  with  terrible  loss  to  both  sides.  The 
Confederate  brigade,  losing  all  its  field-officers  but  two, 
and  many  of  its  men,  was  disabled  for  the  rest  of  the 
day.  Just  as  Davis'  Brigade  overlapped  Cutler's  on 
the  right,  so  Meredith's,  the  other  brigade  which  Rey 
nolds  had  brought  up,  overlapped  Archer's  on  the 
latter's  right.  As  Meredith's  Brigade  entered  the  wood 
west  of  the  Seminary,  it  was  ordered  forward  by  Rey 
nolds  in  a  furious  charge  upon  Archer's  Brigade,  turn 
ing  the  Confederate  flank,  capturing  Archer  and  most 
of  his  men,  and  pursuing  the  others  beyond  Willoughby 
Run.  Almost  at  the  moment  of  victory,  the  superb 
Reynolds,  who  with  that  magnanimity  which  character 
ized  his  soul,  had  disregarded  the  affront  of  Meade's  ap 
pointment  over  him,  and  had  only  sought  to  aid  his 


618  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

new  commander  and  serve  his  country  to  the  utmost 
of  his  ability,  was  killed  in  the  wood  by  a  sharpshooter. 
But  with  Wadsworth's  Division  he  had,  with  rare 
promptitude  and  gallantry,  "determined  the  decisive 
field  of  the  war."  In  the  words  of  Gen.  Hunt,  it  may  be 
said  that  "  to  him  may  be  applied  in  a  wider  sense  than 
in  its  original  one  Napier's  happy  eulogium  on  Ridge: 
'No  man  died  on  that  field  with  more  glory  than  he, 
yet  many  died,  and  there  was  much  glory.' ' 

Soon  after  the  repulse  of  Davis  and  Archer,  Rowley's 
and  Robinson's  divisions  of  two  brigades  each  with  the 
four  remaining  batteries  of  the  Corps  arrived.  Of  Row 
ley's  Division,  Stone's  Brigade  occupied  the  interval  be 
tween  Meredith  and  Cutler,  and  Biddle's  Brigade  with 
Cooper's  Battery  took  position  on  the  ridge  between  the 
Fairfield  Road  and  the  wood.  Reynolds'  Battery  re 
placed  Hall's,  and  Calef's  rejoined  Gamble's  Brigade, 
which  with  Devens'  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  field 
about  11  A.  M.  and  stationed  as  a  reserve  in  rear  of  the 
Federal  left.  Robinson's  Division  was  also  held  as  a  re 
serve  near  the  base  of  Seminary  Ridge.  Gen.  Howard 
arrived  about  noon  and,  assuming  command,  directed 
Gen.  Schurz  commanding  the  llth  Corps  to  prolong 
Doubleday's  line  towards  Oak  Hill  with  two  of  his  divi 
sions  and  three  batteries,  and  to  post  his  third  division 
and  two  batteries  on  Cemetery  Hill  as  a  rallying  point. 

Heth  had,  meantime,  been  preparing  to  renew  the 
attack,  and,  as  soon  as  Fender  arrived  to  support  him, 
was  ordered  to  advance  by  Hill.  The  greater  portion 
of  Heth's  line  now  moved  to  the  attack  south  of  the 
Cashtown  Pike,  with  Fender's  Division  formed  in  a 
second  line.  The  nine  batteries  of  Pegram's  and  Mcln- 
tosh's  battalions  occupied  positions  west  of  Willoughby 
Run,  with  Lane's,  Poague's,  Cutts',  and  Garnett's 
battalions  held  in  reserve  along  the  pike  some  distance 
to  the  rear.  Pegram's  entire  battalion  went  into  action 
on  a  low  crest  just  to  the  right  of  the  turnpike,  while 
Rice's  Battery  and  Hurt's  section  of  Whitworths 
joined  it.  Johnson's  Battery  and  Hurt's  other  section 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  619 

occupied  a  commanding  hill  further  to  the  right  near 
the  Fairfield  Road,  while  the  2d  Rockbridge  Battery, 
under  Lieut.  Wallace,  was  stationed  just  to  the  left  of 
the  pike.  The  two  battalions  at  once  opened  with  a  slow 
fire  which  gradually  grew  in  intensity  as  the  Federal 
guns  uncovered.  Hurt's  Whitworths  were  energetically 
employed  in  shelling  the  woods  and  soon  Maurin's  Bat 
tery  of  Garnett's  Battalion  moved  up  to  the  relief  of 
one  of  Pegram's  batteries,  which  had  exhausted  its  am 
munition. 

At  this  juncture  there  were  nine  batteries  engaged  on 
either  side.  But  Hill  was  not  to  deliver  the  attack  un 
aided,  for,  approaching  Gettysburg  and  guided  by  the 
sound  of  battle,  Rodes  had  directed  his  march  along  the 
prolongation  of  Seminary  Ridge,  with  three  brigades  on 
the  western  and  two  on  the  eastern  slope,  while  Ewell 
ordered  Carter  to  seize  Oak  Hill  for  his  battalion  of  ar 
tillery.  By  1  o'clock  the  approach  of  Ewell  had  been 
detected,  and  by  2  o'clock  the  column  had  begun  to 
arrive  over  the  Middletown  Road  and  Carter  was  es 
tablishing  his  guns  in  position.  Whereupon  Howard 
called  on  Sickles  at  Emmittsburg,  and  Slocum  at  Two 
Taverns,  for  aid. 

Col.  Carter  moved  out  ahead  of  Rodes'  line,  and  plac 
ing  W.  P.  Carter's  and  Fry's  batteries  in  position  on 
Oak  Hill  opened  a  destructive  fire  upon  the  enemy's 
line  running  along  the  ridge  west  of  the  town  to  the 
railroad  cut.  The  effect  of  these  two  batteries, 
though  in  a  position  much  exposed  to  the  ar 
tillery  and  musketry  fire  of  the  enemy,  was  such  as  to 
cause  Schurz,  who  had  prolonged  Doubleday's  line  to 
the  right,  to  change  front  with  his  two  divisions  and  oc 
cupy  a  low  ridge  half  a  mile  north  of  the  town.  This 
change  of  front  left  a  gap  between  his  left  and  Double- 
day's  right  covered  only  by  the  fire  of  Dilger's  and 
Wheeler's  batteries  posted  behind  it.  To  meet  the 
movement  effected  by  Schurz,  whose  line  was  now  at 
right  angles  to  that  of  Doubleday  and  confronting 
Rodes,  Carter  moved  Page's  and  Reese's  batteries  to  the 


620  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Confederate  left.  Page's  Battery  went  into  action  at 
the  foot  of  the  ridge  occupied  by  O'Neal's  Brigade,  and 
opened  with  canister  upon  the  enemy's  infantry,  which 
advanced  to  the  attack.  Disregarding  at  first  the  fire 
of  the  Federal  batteries,  a  number  of  which  had  taken 
position  in  the  valley  north  of  the  town  and  had  con 
centrated  upon  him,  Page  was  finally  driven  back  to  a 
more  retired  position.  How  persistently  W.  P.  Carter 
at  Oak  Hill  and  Page  maintained  their  fire  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  within  a  short  space  of  time  the  former 
lost  4  men  killed  and  7  wounded,  while  the  latter  lost 
4  men  killed  and  26  wounded,  and  17  horses. 

Mclntosh  and  Pegram  had  from  the  first  crossed  fire 
with  Carter,  and  from  their  positions  had  not  only  as 
sisted  in  forcing  Schurz  to  abandon  his  original  line, 
but  had  been  able,  by  advancing  two  of  Mclntosh' s  bat 
teries  to  the  hollow  east  of  Willoughby  Run,  to  enfilade 
a  large  mass  of  infantry  in  the  railroad  cut,  completely 
clearing  it  of  the  enemy. 

The  Federal  attack  on  Rodes'  left  had  become 
serious.  Not  only  was  Page's  Battery  compelled  to  re 
tire,  but  Iverson  had  lost  three  of  his  regiments,  or 
about  1,000  of  his  men,  and  the  flank  was  being 
gradually  turned.  Leaving  Fry's  Battery  in  its  original 
position  on  the  ridge,  Col.  Carter  rapidly  moved 
Carter's,  Page's,  and  Reese's  batteries  to  its  eastern 
base  behind  Doles'  Brigade,  which  now  held  the  extreme 
Confederate  left.  These  batteries,  by  a  tremendous  ef 
fort,  succeeded  almost  single-handed  in  checking  the 
Federal  advance  and  driving  back  both  the  infantry  and 
artillery  of  the  enemy  from  the  threatened  point. 
Carter's  Battery,  though  much  depleted  and  damaged, 
delivered  a  most  effective  fire  with  reckless  daring. 

At  this  juncture,  about  3:30  p.  M.,  Early's  Division 
began  to  arrive  on  Rodes'  left,  and  Devens'  dis 
mounted  troopers  who  had  been  holding  a  hillock  on 
Rock  Creek  were  driven  off  by  Doles'  skirmishers. 
Barlow,  however,  advanced  his  division  supported  by 
Wilkerson's  Battery,  and  recovered  the  position,  but  in 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  621 

order  to  connect  with  Barlow's  left,  it  was  necessary 
for  Schurz  to  push  forward  his  center,  and  still  further 
attenuate  his  line. 

As  Early  arrived,  he  took  in  the  situation  at  a  glance, 
and  directed  Jones  to  throw  his  battalion  into  action 
east  of  Rock  Creek,  and  somewhat  north  of  Barlow's 
position.  With  twelve  pieces  Jones  soon  opened  at  easy 
range  upon  the  flank  of  Barlow's  massed  division,  tak 
ing  part  of  it  in  reverse.  No  troops  could  withstand 
such  a  fire  long.  No  sooner  had  Jones  opened  than 
Gordon's,  Hays',  and  Avery's  brigades  in  line,  with 
Smith's  in  support,  moved  out  and  attacked  Barlow, 
Gordon  on  the  right  connecting  with  Doles  on  Rodes' 
left.  The  Confederate  line  was  now,  about  4  p.  M., 
thoroughly  reestablished,  and  from  right  to  left  con 
sisted  of  Heth's,  Rodes',  and  Early's  divisions,  sup 
ported  by  four  battalions  of  artillery,  or  seventeen  bat 
teries,  all  in  action. 

A  bloody  contest  now  ensued  between  Barlow  and 
Early  in  which  the  former  was  desperately  wounded, 
and  Wilkerson's  Battery  severely  punished  after  losing 
its  commander.  The  whole  llth  Corps  or  right  wing 
of  the  Federal  line  was  soon  driven  back  almost  to  the 
town,  where  Schurz  sought  to  establish  a  new  line  upon 
a  brigade  and  Heckman's  Battery  which  he  drew  from 
Cemetery  Hill  for  the  purpose.  Jones  had  suffered 
the  loss  of  several  men  and  one  gun,  which  was  struck 
and  bent  by  a  solid  shot.  Three  of  his  pieces  had  also 
been  rendered  temporarily  unserviceable  by  projectiles 
wedging  in  the  bore.  But  as  soon  as  Early's  advance 
had  masked  his  fire  upon  Barlow's  retreating  masses, 
he  sent  Carrington's  Battery  across  the  creek  in 
order  that  it  might  secure  a  better  position  in  front  of 
the  town. 

Doubleday  had  been  vigorously  attacked  by  Rodes 
on  his  right,  and  both  Heth  and  Fender  of  Hill's  Divi 
sion  on  his  left.  Early's  success  completely  uncovered 
his  right,  which  was  overlapped  a  quarter  of  a  mile  or 
more  by  Rodes.  But  still  retiring  slowly  to  the  base 


622  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

of  Seminary  Ridge,  where  Col.  Wainwright  command 
ing  the  artillery  of  the  1st  Corps  had  massed  12  guns 
south  of  the  Cashtown  pike,  and  Stewart's  Battery 
slightly  north  of  it,  the  Federals  offered  a  desperate  re 
sistance.  Buford  had  thrown  about  half  of  Gamble's 
dismounted  troopers  forward  on  the  left,  south  of  the 
Fairfield  Road.  Heth's  Division  had  suffered  severely 
and  Fender  had  moved  into  the  front  line.  On  the  Con 
federate  side,  Gen.  Pendleton  was  seeking  to  move 
Johnson's  Battery  to  a  position  well  to  Heth's  right, 
from  which  to  enfilade  Doubleday's  left,  and  had 
ordered  Garnett's  Battalion  forward  along  the  pike  and 
Poague's  Battalion  to  move  up  under  cover  to  the  right 
between  Johnson  and  Pegram.  The  artillery  cordon 
was  thus  almost  completed  from  the  Fairfield  Road  to 
Rock  Creek,  when  about  4  p.  M.  the  whole  Confederate 
line  advanced  to  the  final  attack.  Schurz,  then  Double- 
day,  gave  the  order  to  fall  back  upon  Cemetery  Hill,  but 
not  until  Davison's  section  of  Stewart's  Battery  had 
raked  Scale's  Brigade  in  column  on  the  pike,  and 
Wain  Wright's  guns  had  inflicted  great  punishment  upon 
Perrin  in  spite  of  Pegram's  and  Mclntosh's  fire.  Wain 
wright,  mistaking  the  order,  had  clung  to  Seminary 
Hill,  until,  seeing  the  infantry  retreating  to  the  town, 
he  moved  his  batteries  down  the  Cashtown  Pike,  where 
they  were  overlapped  on  both  sides  by  the  Confederate 
skirmishers  at  close  range.  There,  he  was  compelled  to 
abandon  a  gun  all  the  horses  of  which  were  killed. 
Schurz  was  also  compelled  to  leave  a  gun  on  the  field. 

The  Confederate  batteries  now  advanced  rapidly 
from  their  several  positions,  and  at  once  went  into 
action  along  Seminary  Ridge,  while  the  infantry  pur 
sued  the  retreating  Federals  through  the  town,  which 
was  taken  about  4:30  p.  M.  along  with  some  5,000 
prisoners,  principally  men  of  the  llth  Corps,  who  had 
lost  their  way  in  the  streets  on  the  way  to  the  rear. 

Doubleday's  and  Schurz's  men  rallied  upon  Stein- 
wehr's  Division  of  the  llth  Corps.  Stein wehr's  men 
had  been  well  posted  behind  the  stone  walls  along  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  623 

slopes  of  the  hill,  and  in  the  houses  thereon.  As  they 
arrived,  the  troops  of  Doubleday's  Corps  were  formed 
on  Steinwehr's  left  and  Schurz's  on  his  right.  Buford 
assembled  his  squadrons  on  the  plain  west  of  Cemetery 
Hill,  covering  the  Federal  left  flank  and  checking  the 
pursuit,  while  Wainwright  and  Osborn  posted  the  ten 
batteries  of  the  two  corps  in  strong  positions  on  the  hill 
covering  every  approach  to  its  summit.  A  regiment 
comprising  the  train  guard  was  promptly  placed  by 
Wadsworth  on  Gulp's  Hill.  Hancock,  much  beloved 
and  admired  by  the  Federal  troops,  now  arrived  and 
assumed  command,  and  soon  under  the  energetic 
direction  of  Hancock,  Howard  and  Warren,  strong  en 
trenchments  of  stone,  earth  and  timber  began  to  appear 
all  along  the  crests  of  Cemetery  and  Gulp's  hills.  The 
sorely-tried  Federals,  much  inspired  by  Hancock's 
presence  and  the  knowledge  that  his  corps  would  soon 
arrive,  had  no  thought  of  abandoning  their  small  Gibral 
tar  upon  which  the  tide  of  defeat  had  washed  them, 
without  the  most  desperate  resistance. 

While  the  Federals  were  busily  occupied  in  prepar 
ing  their  position  for  defense,  Gen.  Pendleton  with  his 
staff  was  engaged  in  reconnoitering  Seminary  Ridge 
as  far  south  as  the  road  leading  eastward  from  the  ridge, 
through  the  Peach  Orchard  and  Devil's  Den.  Gar- 
nett's  Battalion  had  already  been  ordered  up  along  the 
Fairfield  Road  to  the  ridge,  where  Pendleton  had  in 
tended  to  mass  a  large  number  of  guns,  within  easy 
range  of  Cemetery  Hill,  but  Gen.  Ramseur,  whose  bri 
gade  had  just  occupied  the  town,  met  Pendleton  while 
selecting  positions  for  his  guns  and  urged  him  not  to  go 
into  action  at  the  point  decided  upon,  lest  the  enemy's 
batteries  should  be  provoked  into  firing  upon  his  men, 
who  were  much  exposed.  Leaving  Capt.  Maurin  with 
the  batteries  of  Garnett's  Battalion  in  park  just  behind 
the  crest  opposite  the  town,  Pendleton  again  set  about 
the  exploration  of  the  ridge,  soon  sending  Col.  Walker 
an  order  to  move  up  his  battalions,  and  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  detailed  information  about  the  road  leading 
past  the  enemy's  left  flank. 


624  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

From  his  station  on  Seminary  Hill,  Gens.  Lee  and 
Longstreet  had  witnessed  the  enemy  retreating  to 
Cemetery  Hill.  Lee's  desire  was  to  have  Ewell  secure 
possession  of  the  heights  in  his  front.  An  order  to  do 
this  was  sent  Ewell  by  Lee,  but  with  the  caution  not 
to  bring  on  a  general  engagement  until  the  Army  was 
all  up.  The  position  was  a  formidable  one,  and  its 
strength  was  being  rapidly  increased.  The  2d  Corps 
had  been  much  cut  up.  Rodes  had  lost  3,000  men  or 
more,  and  besides  a  loss  of  about  500  of  his  men,  Early 
had  sent  two  of  his  brigades  well  out  to  his  left  to  watch 
the  York  Road,  over  which  the  approach  of  part  of  the 
12th  Corps  was  reported.  Hill's  two  divisions  had  been 
very  roughly  handled  and  had  lost  heavily.  They  had 
been  withdrawn  to  Seminary  Hill,  as  soon  as  Early 's 
troops  entered  the  town,  leaving  Ewell  with  only  about 
8,000  men  to  hold  it  and  secure  the  prisoners.  Ewell, 
by  acquiescing  in  the  order  he  received,  led  Lee  to  be 
lieve  that  the  attempt  to  take  the  hill  would  be  made  and 
offered  no  objection  to  its  execution.  But  Johnson's 
Division  with  Latimer's,  Dance's,  and  Nelson's  bat 
talions  of  artillery  under  Col.  Brown,  were  momentarily 
expected  by  Ewell,  and  he  delayed  pending  their  ar 
rival.  These  troops,  however,  did  not  arrive  until  near 
sunset,  and  meantime  the  firing  had  all  but  died  out. 
During  the  fatal  delay,  portions  of  the  Federal  12th 
and  3d  Corps  arrived.  Before  Johnson's  Division  came 
up,  the  enemy  was  reported  to  Ewell  to  be  moving  to 
his  left  flank,  and  upon  its  arrival  he  ordered  it  to  move 
around  to  meet  the  threat  and  occupy  Gulp's  Hill,  half 
a  mile  to  the  east  of  Cemetery  Hill,  and  Col.  Brown  at 
once  set  about  a  search  for  a  route  by  which  to  move  his 
artillery  into  position  on  Gulp's  Hill,  which  he  expected 
would  soon  be  in  Johnson's  possession.  At  this  junc 
ture,  orders  arrived  from  Gen.  Lee  for  Ewell  to  draw 
his  corps  to  the  right,  but  Ewell  in  person  persuaded  the 
Commander-in-Chief  to  permit  him  to  carry  out  his 
original  design.  Unknown  to  Ewell,  Gulp's  Hill  had 
been  occupied  early  in  the  evening  by  Wadsworth's  Di- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  625 

vision,  and  so  when  at  midnight  Johnson's  Division  was 
moved  around  to  its  base,  a  reconnoitering  party  found 
the  enemy  in  possession,  and  no  attempt  was  made  to 
seize  it.  Latimer  had  meantime  moved  his  battalion  to 
the  extreme  left  by  a  wide  detour,  and  gone  into 
position  on  Benner's  Hill,  between  the  York  and  Balti 
more  roads  in  front  of  Gulp's  Hill,  where  the  batteries 
were  parked  for  the  night. 

General  Hunt  states  that  a  Confederate  attack  on 
Cemetery  Hill  was  impracticable  before  5 :30  P.  M.,  and 
that  after  that  the  position  was  perfectly  secure.  But 
this  statement  is  too  general,  and  therefore  not  at  all 
satisfactory.  That  Ewell  was  guilty  of  unnecessarily 
delaying  seems  quite  clear.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that 
he  did  not  grasp  the  rare  opportunity  presented  him 
and  that  it  slipped  by  while  he  intentionally  awaited  the 
arrival  of  Johnson's  Division  and  Brown's  Artillery. 
It  is  not  contended  that  Ewell  should  have  assaulted 
after  5 :30  p.  M.  After  that  time,  the  Federal  position 
on  Cemetery  Hill  was,  as  Gen.  Hunt  declares,  no  doubt 
perfectly  secure  against  the  force  Ewell  could  hurl 
against  it,  and  Johnson  was  undoubtedly  too  weak  to 
carry  Gulp's  Hill  later  in  the  night.  The  time  at  which 
Ewell  should  have  taken  the  position  was  when  Schurz 
fell  back  in  more  or  less  disorder  before  him.  At  that 
time,  Gulp's  Hill  was  entirely  unoccupied,  and  Stein- 
wehr  was  alone  in  position  on  Cemetery  Hill.  It  would 
seem  that  Swell's  troops  could  have  followed  Schurz 
up  the  slopes  practically  protected  against  the  fire  of 
Steinwehr's  men  by  the  enemy  retreating  in  his  front. 
Gordon  had  practically  routed  Barlow's  Division  and 
was  actually  among  the  latter's  men  when  Ewell  himself 
ordered  the  pursuit  to  cease.  Hear  what  Gordon  has 
to  say:  "The  whole  of  that  portion  of  the  Union  Army 
in  my  front  was  in  inextricable  confusion  and  in  flight. 
They  were  necessarily  in  flight,  for  my  troops  were  upon 
the  flank  and  rapidly  sweeping  down  the  lines.  The  fir 
ing  upon  my  men  had  almost  ceased.  Large  bodies  of 
Union  troops  were  throwing  down  their  arms  and  sur- 


626  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

rendering  because  in  disorganized  and  confused  masses 
they  were  wholly  powerless  either  to  check  the  move 
ment  or  return  the  fire.  As  far  down  the  lines  as  my 
eye  could  reach,  the  Union  troops  were  in  retreat.* 
Those  at  a  distance  were  still  resisting,  but  giving 
ground,  and  it  was  only  necessary  for  me  to  press  for 
ward  in  order  to  insure  the  same  results  which  in 
variably  follow  such  flank  movements.  In  less  than  half 
an  hour,  my  troops  would  have  swept  up  and  over  those 
hills,  the  possession  of  which  was  of  such  momentous 
consequence.  It  is  not  surprising,  with  a  full  realization 
of  the  consequences  of  a  halt,  that  I  should  have  refused 
at  first  to  obey  the  order.  Not  until  the  third  or  fourth 
order  of  the  most  peremptory  character  reached  me,  did 
I  obey."t  Now,  here  it  is  to  be  observed  that  if  Double- 
day  was  still  resisting  well  out  to  Gordon's  right,  as  he 
certainly  was  at  the  time  Gordon  pressed  forward  to 
the  town,  he  could  not  have  been  securely  intrenched 
on  Cemetery  Hill.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Steinwehr 
alone,  as  we  have  seen,  was  there.  Gen.  Hunt  himself 
states  that  Doubleday  reached  the  hill  after  Howard's 
two  divisions  fell  back  on  Steinwehr,  and  also  that  the  1st 
Corps  was  reformed  before  the  llth  Corps.  He  also 
states  that  the  llth  Corps  was  reformed  with  some  diffi 
culty  and  that  not  until  Doubleday  and  Howard  had 
established  their  line  did  Wadsworth  occupy  Gulp's 
Hill  with  the  500  men  of  the  train  guard.  It  appears 
then,  from  his  own  words,  that  during  the  interim  be 
tween  Gordon's  enforced  halt  north  of  the  hill  and  near 
its  base  and  the  time  Doubleday  reformed,  a  period  of 
at  least  half  an  hour,  there  were  no  troops  whatever  on 
Gulp's  Hill  and  only  Steinwehr  and  the  two  other  divi 
sions  of  the  llth  Corps,  the  latter  in  a  state  of  disorgani 
zation,  on  Cemetery  Hill.  Little  should  have  been  ex 
pected  by  Ewell  in  the  way  of  an  artillery  preparation 
for  his  attack.  In  fact,  the  terrain  offered  few  good 
positions  for  his  artillery,  and  even  had  it  been  capable 

*No   doubt   Gordon    could   see   the   retrograde   movement   of   Doubleday's   line 
before  Rodes  and  Fender. 

•^-Reminiscences  of  the  Civil  War,  John  B.  Gordon. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  627 

of  rendering  him  valuable  aid,  that  fact  does  not  ex 
tenuate  the  grievous  error  of  his  allowing  the  enemy  to 
intrench  and  reinforce  himself.  When  he  did  move,  it 
was  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  though  the  latter's  consent  was  finally 
secured  and  Johnson's  entire  division,  too  weak  to 
carry  Gulp's  Hill,  was  placed  in  a  position  from  which 
communication  with  the  rest  of  the  Army  was  most 
difficult.  In  fact,  it  was  practically  eliminated  from  the 
field  of  utility  for  the  remainder  of  the  battle. 

As  to  the  point  of  Swell's  ability  to  take  Gulp's  Hill 
and  Cemetery  Hill  on  the  evening  of  the  1st,  there  is, 
however,  the  greatest  diversity  of  authority.  One  of 
his  own  staff  officers  declares  as  the  result  of  a  personal 
reconnaissance  that  it  was  perfectly  practicable.*  At 
any  rate,  Lee's  original  orders  should  have  been  obeyed 
and  the  attempt  made.  In  failing  to  do  this,  Ewell 
committed  the  third  great  mistake  of  the  campaign. 
The  fact  that  Lee's  consent  to  the  movement  of  John 
son's  Division  around  to  the  left  had  been  secured  does 
not  in  any  way  signify  that  his  original  views  were  al 
tered  by  Swell's  representations.  When  that  division 
arrived,  Lee  had  learned  through  the  personal  recon 
naissance  of  Col.  Long  of  his  staff  that  it  was  no  longer 
practicable  to  assault  Cemetery  Hill.  He  knew  that 
Ewell  had  by  his  procrastination  allowed  the  golden 
opportunity  to  slip  through  his  fingers,  and  that  some 
other  move  was  necessary. 

But  now  let  us  view  the  situation  from  another  stand 
point.  Let  us  regard  Ewell's  action  in  the  most  favor 
able  light  possible,  assuming,  contrary  to  the  fact, 
that  he  received  no  order  from  Lee  to  follow  up  Schurz. 
Even  then  it  would  seem  he  was  guilty  of  a  most  inex 
cusable  tactical  blunder,  for  certain  it  is  no  general 
should  halt  his  troops  in  pursuit,  with  a  hill  immediately 
in  front  obviously  offering  a  rallying  point  for  the 
enemy.  The  mere  fact  that  a  routed  or  even  a  defeated 

*Capt.  James  Power  Smith.  See  his  valuable  paper,  "General  Lee  at 
Gettysburg,"  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts, 
April  4,  1905. 


628  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

enemy  makes  for  a  particular  point  is  sufficient  to 
prompt  an  energetic  commander  to  seek  in  every  way 
possible  to  deny  his  adversary  access  thereto.  Cemetery 
and  Gulp's  hills  by  their  very  nature  should  have  filled 
Ewell  with  a  consuming  desire  to  reach  their  crests  and 
discover  what  lay  beyond  them.  He  should  have  longed 
to  secure  their  summits  if  for  no  other  reason  than  to 
keep  the  enemy  from  doing  so.  So  long  as  a  single  regi 
ment  of  his  corps  was  capable  of  pushing  on  in  fairly 
good  order,  it  should  never  have  been  allowed  to  halt  un 
til  stopped  by  exhaustion  or  by  the  enemy.  Troops,  how 
ever  weary,  do  not  rest  on  ordinary  hillsides  with  the 
great  unknown  on  the  rear  crest,  and  had  whatever  force 
Ewell  may  have  sent  forward  in  this  case  been  checked 
in  its  ascent  by  Steinwehr,  the  strength  and  exact  loca 
tion  of  the  latter  would  have  been  discovered.  The  in 
formation  thus  secured  would  have  at  once  enabled 
Ewell  to  seize  Gulp's  Hill,  if  not  Cemetery  Hill, 
and  with  the  former  in  his  possession  the  latter  would 
have  soon  become  untenable  along  with  the  whole  posi 
tion  subsequently  occupied  by  Meade's  troops. 

The  Confederates  had  now  become  hopelessly  com 
mitted  to  the  offensive,  and  just  as  Lee  was  compelled  to 
abandon  the  position  near  Cashtown  as  his  line  of  de 
fense,  so  Meade  was  being  gradually  drawn  away  by 
circumstances  from  the  defensive  position  he  had  se 
lected  behind  Pipe  Creek.  Gettysburg,  like  a  great 
magnet,  had  drawn  both  armies  forward  from  their 
chosen  fields  of  action,  for  neither  Lee  nor  Meade  was 
able  to  overcome  its  attraction.  Meade  was  compelled 
to  reinforce  Buford,  then  Reynolds,  then  Howard,  then 
Hancock,  to  save  them,  while  Lee  was  unable  to  re 
linquish  the  contact  which  Hill,  contrary  to  the  general 
plan  of  campaign  and  specific  orders,  had  brought 
about. 

When  Meade  was  thoroughly  informed  of  the  situa 
tion  at  Cemetery  Hill  by  Hancock  and  others,  he  im 
mediately  set  his  remaining  troops  in  motion  for 
Gettysburg  by  forced  marches,  wisely  recognizing  Gen. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  629 

Hunt  as  his  tactical  Chief  of  Artillery  and  directing 
him  to  make  all  necessary  dispositions  concerning  the 
arm.  Leaving  Taneytown  about  11  P.  M.  Meade  and 
Hunt  reached  the  battlefield  shortly  after  midnight  and 
soon  reconnoitered  the  position.  The  general  features 
of  the  field  have  been  explained.  The  Federal  line, 
though  hurriedly  established  upon  the  natural  ridges, 
overlooked  the  open  country  to  the  north  and  the  de 
pression  to  the  west.  From  Big  Round  Top  on  the 
south  to  Gulp's  Hill  at  the  point  of  the  fish  hook  on  the 
east,  the  distance  was  about  three  miles.  The  line  pos 
sessed  a  great  advantage  in  that  troops  could  be  quickly 
transferred  from  point  to  point  of  the  crest  line  by  mov 
ing  them  across  the  interior  area.  Meade  saw  at  once 
that  the  position  and  his  force  would  permit  him  to  es 
tablish  about  25,000  infantry  and  100  guns  along  each 
mile  of  his  front,  and  that  his  flanks  were  at  once  unas 
sailable  and  unturnable  if  properly  defended.  Not  only 
did  the  natural  flanks  of  the  position  rest  upon  precipi 
tous  and  rocky  slopes,  but  they  were  screened  from  ar 
tillery  fire  by  thick  growths  of  trees.  As  he  viewed  the 
favor  which  fortune  had  bestowed  upon  him,  Meade's  re 
grets  concerning  the  necessary  abandonment  of  Pipe 
Creek  were  dispelled. 

Running  roughly  parallel  to  the  shank  of  the  Federal 
hook,  which  was  some  two  miles  long  from  Little  Round 
Top  to  the  bend  at  Cemetery  Hill,  nature  with  a  bold 
hand  had  marked  out  the  main  Confederate  position 
along  Seminary  Ridge.  At  the  close  of  the  1st  of  July, 
Ewell's  Corps  covered  the  front  from  Benner's  Hill 
around  Gulp's  and  Cemetery  Hill,  to  Seminary  Hill 
and  the  Fairfield  Road,  his  line  passing  through  the 
town.  Johnson  was  on  the  left,  Early  in  the  center,  and 
Rodes  on  the  right.  Hill's  line  occupied  Seminary 
Ridge,  his  left  connecting  with  Ewell.  Trimble,  vice 
Fender,  was  on  the  left,  Anderson  on  the  right,  and 
Pettigrew,  vice  Heth,  in  reserve  on  the  rear  slope  of  the 
ridge.  The  Artillery  of  the  2d  and  3d  Corps  bivouacked 
that  night  along  the  line,  generally  in  rear  of  the  in  fan- 


630  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

try.  Latimer  occupied  Banner's  Hill,  while  Brown  held 
Jones'  and  Dance's  battalions  for  the  night  somewhat 
in  Johnson's  rear  in  readiness  to  be  moved  to  Gulp's 
Hill  should  it  be  taken.  Carter's  batteries  remained  in 
position  along  the  ridge  north  of  the  town,  together  with 
Nelson's  Battalion.  Col.  Walker  held  Pegram's,  Mc- 
Intosh's,  Lane's,  Poague's,  and  that  part  of  Garnett's 
Battalion  which  had  not  been  placed  in  position  by 
Pendleton,  along  the  rear  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge, 
ready  to  take  up  positions  on  the  forward  crest  at  dawn. 

The  exterior  line  of  the  Confederates  is  thus  seen  to 
have  been  not  less  than  5  miles  in  extent  with  communi 
cation  from  point  to  point  rendered  most  roundabout 
and  difficult  by  reason  of  its  concavity  towards  the 
enemy.  Furthermore,  Lee's  force  enabled  him  to  oc 
cupy  this  line  with  not  over  13,000  infantry,  and  50  guns 
per  mile,  or  about  half  the  number  of  guns  and  muskets 
per  mile  of  the  enemy's  position.  The  Federal  forma 
tion  was  deep  and  narrow,  while  that  of  the  Confeder 
ates  was  extensive  in  width  and  shallow.  The  relative 
disposition  of  the  two  armies  was,  therefore,  such  that 
the  utmost  cooperation  between  the  various  parts  of  the 
exterior  line,  together  with  the  concentration  of  its  fire 
effect,  was  essential  to  compensate,  in  an  attack  upon  the 
interior  line,  for  the  lack  of  the  momentum  of  a  superior 
mass  at  any  given  point  of  assault.  Without  these  two 
elements,  it  now  seems  evident  that  any  attack,  how 
ever  gallantly  delivered,  was  predestined  to  fail  through 
sheer  lack  of  momentum.  No  problem  could  be  pre 
sented  which  involves  to  a  higher  degree  than  did 
Gettysburg  the  absolute  necessity  of  fire  superiority  to 
the  success  of  the  offensive. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  at  the  close  of  the 
1st  of  July.  While  Lee's  original  desire  to  seize  Ceme 
tery  Hill  during  the  early  part  of  the  evening  had  been 
thwarted,  he  still  believed  the  important  position  could 
be  successfully  assailed  at  daybreak  in  spite  of  Long- 
street's  advice  to  turn  his  attention  to  the  enemy's 
left  in  the  vulnerable  quarter  to  which  Pendleton  had 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  631 

called  attention.  But  while  the  views  of  Lee  and  Long- 
street  differed  at  this  time,  the  fact  remains  that  the 
latter  had  already  been  urged  to  hasten  forward  his 
troops  in  order  to  be  ready  to  discharge  and  carry  out 
the  part  which  circumstances  might  dictate.  But  Long- 
street  at  heart  never  accepted  the  necessity  for  the 
abandonment  of  the  original  plan  to  fight  a  de 
fensive  battle.  While  with  Lee  on  Seminary  Hill  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  1st,  he  openly  expressed  his  disap 
proval  of  the  former's  intention  to  attack  Cemetery 
Hill  in  the  morning,  saying,  "If  the  enemy  is  there  in 
the  morning,  it  is  because  he  wants  to  be  attacked." 
He  left  his  commander-in-chief,  according  to  his  own 
statement,  with  these  parting  words  upon  his  lips,  and 
such  an  expression  on  his  part  gives  a  fair  insight  into 
the  spirit  in  which  he  set  about  the  task  of  conforming 
to  the  general  plan.  To  say  the  least,  he  was  not  en 
thusiastic,  and  lacking  enthusiasm,  that  great  lubricant 
of  the  military  machine,  it  is  small  wonder  that  his  sub 
sequent  movements  were  characterized  by  delays. 
When  one's  heart  is  not  in  his  work,  difficulties  which 
otherwise  might  be  easily  disregarded,  and  in  a  large 
measure  overcome,  at  once  become  all  but  insurmount 
able.  To  understand  Longstreet's  movements  from  now 
on,  one  must  recognize  the  fact  that  he  was  at  least  an 
unwilling  actor  of  a  most  important  role,  a  role  in  which 
every  particle  of  his  old  energy  and  enthusiasm  was 
necessary  to  bring  about  success. 

Whatever  orders  were  given  Longstreet  and  the 
other  corps  commanders,  it  seems  certain  that  on  the 
night  of  July  1  every  available  man  was  expected  to  be 
at  the  front  early  the  following  morning,  and  so  when 
late  in  the  evening,  after  conferring  with  some  of  his 
corps  and  division  commanders,  Lee  finally  accepted 
their  view  and  decided  to  attack  as  advised  by  Long- 
street,  he  had  every  reason  to  expect  that  the  1st  Corps 
would  be  on  hand  and  ready  to  undertake  its  mission. 
After  the  engagement  of  the  first  day,  Gen.  Pendleton 
had  again  examined  the  ground  southwest  of  the  town, 


632  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

and  finding  the  ground  in  front  of  the  southern  part  of 
Cemetery  Ridge  much  less  difficult  than  that  opposite 
Hill's  troops  which  were  already  in  position  opposite 
Cemetery  Hill,  its  practicable  character  was  again  re 
ported  to  Gen.  Lee.  By  that  time,  Col.  Long  had  re- 
connoitered  the  Federal  right  and  reported  adversely 
against  the  chances  of  a  successful  attack  in  the  morning 
in  that  quarter,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  con 
ferred  with  Ewell  and  his  division  commanders  whose 
views  coincided  with  Pendleton's  about  the  proper 
quarter  in  which  to  make  an  assault.  Gen.  Pendleton 
declared  that  Lee  told  him  when  he  reported  the  result 
of  his  second  reconnaissance  that  he  had  already 
ordered  Longstreet  to  attack  by  way  of  the  Peach 
Orchard  at  sunrise  the  next  morning,  and  requested 
him  to  reexamine  the  ground  in  that  direction  at  dawn.* 
Whether  Longstreet  was  directly  ordered  by  Lee  to 
attack  the  Federal  left  at  daybreak  on  the  2d  or  not,  is 
immaterial  to  this  record.  Suffice  it  to  say,  a  great 
blunder,  the  fourth  of  the  campaign,  was  committed 
either  by  Gen.  Lee  or  by  Gen.  Longstreet.  Much 
authority  both  adverse  to,  and  in  support  of,  the  latter 
exists.  If  he  was  not  ordered  to  attack  at  an  early  hour, 
he  should  have  been,  and  if  he  was  directed  to  do  so,  he 
failed  to  execute  his  orders. t 

*Longstreet,  in  a  vicious  article  in  Battles  and  Leaders  and  later  in  his 
book,  endeavored  to  discredit  the  statements  of  Gen.  Pendleton  relative  to  this 
reconnaissance.  Not  only  has  he  been  the  only  one  to  question  the  word  of  the 
Rev.  Wm.  Nelson  Pendleton,  whose  whole  life  was  devoted  to  truth  and  the 
service  of  God,  but  he  has,  also,  been  the  only  soldier  of  the  Confederacy  to 
impugn  the  character  of  Gen.  Lee.  In  expressing  sentiments  in  his  writings 
entirely  at  variance  with  those  of  Longstreet,  the  general,  Longstreet,  the  em 
bittered  politician,  simply  weakened  the  force  of  his  arguments.  Into  this  he 
was  undoubtedly  provoked  by  the  animosities  and  criticisms  of  post-bellum 
politics.  One  is  almost  glad  to  believe,  as  claimed  by  many,  that  he  never 
really  wrote  From  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  but,  after  all,  whether  he  did  or 
not,  he  is  responsible  for  the  sentiments  expressed  by  his  literary  agent,  and  it 
is  doubtful  if  so  much  jealousy  of  Virginia  and  Virginians  as  that  which  is 
evidenced  in  this  book  could  have  been  engendered  in  his  soul  subsequent  to  the 
war,  unless  the  germ  had  lain  there  from  the  first.  The  writer,  though  but  a 
child  of  six  years  at  the  time,  vividly  recalls  a  conversation  between  his  father 
and  Gen.  William  Mahone,  while  he  was  perched  upon  the  latter's  knee,  in 
which  the  General  said.  "It  is  too  bad  Longstreet  has  let  them  goad  him  into 
mixing  up  his  military  record  with  politics,"  or  words  to  that  effect.  Both 
Mahone  and  the  writer's  father  were  victims  of  much  the  same  political  odium 
attaching  to  Longstreet,  at  the  time,  but  Mahone  was  wiser  than  Longstreet, 
and  though  the  superb  little  soldier  was  actually  charged  by  his  more  un 
scrupulous  enemies  with  cowardice,  he  was  never  provoked  into  defending  him 
self  against  the  absurd  accusation.  His  remark  made  a  lasting  impression  upon 
the  writer's  mind,  though  its  meaning  was  not  fully  comprehended  for  many 
years. 

tSee  Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  Alexander,  and  Advance  and  RetreatJ 
Hood,  both  in  support  of  Longstreet. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  633 

Longstreet's  supporters  make  entirely  too  much  of 
the  technicality  of  whether  or  not  a  specific  order  was  re 
ceived  by  him  to  attack  at  an  early  hour.  He  was 
culpable  in  not  having  his  corps  on  the  field  ready  to 
attack,  should  the  developments  of  the  night  require  it. 
He  was  with  Lee  the  afternoon  of  the  1st,  and  has  fre 
quently  declared  that  he  was  conscious  of  a  state  of 
mental  distress  and  uncertainty  on  the  part  of  his  com- 
mander-in-chief.  Since  he  did  not  know  himself  and 
did  not  believe  that  Lee  knew  what  to  expect  on  the 
morrow,  all  the  more  incumbent  was  it  upon  him  to 
have  his  troops  present  and  prepared  for  any  con 
tingency.  Longstreet  knew  that  Ewell  and  Hill  had 
both  been  heavily  engaged  and  that  they  had  run  up 
against  a  snag.  From  this  he  must  have  known  that  the 
exigency  of  the  occasion  required  the  immediate  pres 
ence  of  the  1st  Corps.  His  troops  had  been  set  in 
motion  for  Gettysburg.  The  question  whether  or  not 
he  was  to  attack  the  next  day  was  immaterial.  His 
duty,  irrespective  of  an  order  for  attack,  or  further 
orders  of  any  kind,  was  to  bring  his  command  up  at  the 
first  practicable  hour.  That  a  large  part  of  the  1st 
Corps  could  have  arrived  much  earlier  than  it  did  is  not 
denied,  for  the  main  body  of  that  corps  went  into  bivouac 
within  four  miles  of  the  field  at  midnight.  In  not  appear 
ing  as  soon  as  possible,  Longstreet  was  guilty  of  the 
same  lack  of  the  spirit  of  cooperation  which  kept  him 
away  from  Chancellorsville.  Had  he  done  at  Gettys 
burg  what  the  situation  as  known  to  him  should  have 
disclosed  to  the  commander  of  one-third  of  the  entire 
army  to  be  necessary,  he  would  have  been  present  when 
needed  and  no  delay  would  ever  have  occurred,  even 
had  no  orders  for  attack  been  issued  on  the  1st.  But 
here  it  should  be  said  that  Longstreet's  delay  was  not 
the  sole  mistake  made  at  Gettysburg,  though  many 
people  entirely  lose  sight  of  those  which  had  preceded  it. 
Had  Stuart  been  present,  no  battle  would  have  been 
fought  on  the  1st.  Had  Hill  obeyed  orders,  no  battle 
would  have  been  fought  on  the  1st.  Had  Ewell  risen 


634  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

to  the  occasion  on  the  1st,  Longstreet's  attack  on  the  2d 
would  not  have  been  necessary.  How  can  it  be  justly 
said  that  Longstreet  lost  the  battle  of  Gettysburg? 
Longstreet,  Ewell,  and  Hill  together  and  in  an  equal 
degree  contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  campaign.  As 
to  the  battle  itself,  it  is  inconceivable  how  one  can  dis 
tinguish  between  the  wanton  sacrifice  of  opportunity 
on  the  part  of  Ewell,  and  the  delay  of  Longstreet, 
in  favor  of  the  former. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

GETTYSBURG JULY  2D 

THE  Artillery  of  the  2d  and  3d  corps,  as  well  as  all 
the  divisions  thereof,  were  upon  the  field  and  in  position 
on  the  morning  of  the  2d.  The  Reserve  Artillery  of 
the  1st  Corps  had  been  held  in  camp  near  Greenwood 
the  preceding  day,  and  Cabell's,  Henry's,  and  Dear- 
ing's  battalions  were  attached  to  McLaws,  Hoods,  and 
Pickett's  divisions,  respectively,  as  usual.  Little  in 
formation  had  sifted  back  to  the  rear  during  the  day  of 
the  events  transpiring  at  the  front.  Early  in  the  even 
ing,  however,  the  news  reached  the  various  portions  of 
the  1st  Corps  that  Hill  and  Ewell  had  been  heavily  en 
gaged  and  were  driving  the  enemy.  At  4  P.  M.^  Mc 
Laws  and  Hood  with  Cabell's  and  Henry's  battalions 
left  Greenwood,  and  marching  13  miles  went  into 
bivouac  at  Marsh  Creek,  four  miles  west  of  Gettysburg. 
Marching  again  at  dawn  they  arrived  near  the  field  be 
tween  6  and  8  A.  M. 

Late  in  the  evening  of  the  1st,  information  was  re 
ceived  in  the  rear  that  Hill  and  Ewell  had  come  to  a 
standstill  before  the  enemy  in  a  strong  defensive  posi 
tion,  and  soon  orders  arrived  for  the  Reserve  Artillery  of 
the  1st  Corps  consisting  of  Eshleman's  Battalion,  9  guns, 
and  Alexander's,  26  guns,  to  move  forward  at  1  A.  M. 
Marching  steadily  over  good  roads  with  a  bright  moon, 
the  two  battalions  halted  in  a  grassy,  open  grove  about 
a  mile  west  of  Seminary  Ridge  at  7  A.  M.,  where  the 
animals  were  watered  and  fed.  At  this  juncture,  Col. 
Alexander  was  sent  for  by  Longstreet,  and  riding  for 
ward  found  him  with  Lee  on  Seminary  Ridge.  It  was 
explained  to  Alexander  that  the  1st  Corps  would  as 
sault  the  enemy's  left  flank  and  he  was  directed  to  take 
command  of  the  corps  artillery  and  reconnoiter  the 
sector  assigned  him.  He  was  particularly  cautioned 
to  keep  his  batteries  out  of  sight  of  the  signal  station  on 


636  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Big  Round  Top,  in  moving  them  into  position.  Plac 
ing  Maj.  Huger  in  command  of  his  own  battalion,  Alex 
ander  at  once  set  about  making  his  reconnaissance, 
which  was  most  thorough,  extending  over  about  three 
hours.  By  noon  Alexander  had  led  his  own,  Cabell's, 
and  Henry's  battalions  by  a  meadow  screened  from  the 
Federal  signal  station  to  a  point  in  the  valley  of 
Willoughby  Run,  where  they  remained  behind  that  por 
tion  of  Seminary  Ridge  to  be  occupied  by  Longstreet's 
infantry.  After  disposing  his  batteries  he  rode  back 
to  learn  the  cause  of  the  non-arrival  of  Hood  and  Mc- 
Laws.  Dearing's  Battalion  was  with  Pickett,  and 
Eshleman's  was  held  in  reserve  by  Alexander  in  rear  of 
the  ridge,  with  the  ordnance  train. 

Col.  Walker  had  early  in  the  morning  posted  the  ar 
tillery  of  the  3d  Corps  along  Seminary  Ridge  with  the 
exception  of  Poague's  and  part  of  Garnett's  battalions, 
the  latter  under  Maj.  Richardson,  both  of  which  he  held 
in  reserve  on  the  rear  crest.  Thus  Alexander's  line  of 
guns  was  extended  to  the  left  by  Walker's  as  far  as  the 
Seminary.  In  the  2d  Corps  Col.  Brown  still  held  the 
extreme  left  with  Latimer's  Battalion.  About  4  A.  M. 
Latimer  had  after  a  most  careful  reconnaissance  se 
lected  the  only  eligible  position  which  was  on  the  face  of 
Benner's  Hill,  where  he  experienced  much  difficulty  in 
securing  proper  cover  for  his  caissons  and  limbers.  His 
position  was  directly  in  front  of  Culp's  Hill,  and  just 
across  Rock  Creek  therefrom.  Brown's  Battery  oc 
cupied  the  right  of  the  line,  Carpenter's  the  center,  and 
Dement's  and  one  section  of  Raine's  the  left.  The  guns 
were  much  crowded,  and  no  room  existed  for  the  20- 
pounder  Parrott  section  of  Raine's  Battery,  which 
under  Lieut.  Hardwicke,  with  Graham's  Battery  of 
Dance's  Battalion,  was  posted  further  to  the  rear  and 
right  near  the  toll  gate  on  the  Hanover  Road.  Carter's 
Battalion  still  occupied  the  ridge  held  by  Rodes'  Divi 
sion  northwest  of  the  town.  Dance's  Battalion  was 
placed  under  Col.  Carter's  command  early  in  the  morn 
ing,  and,  after  sending  Graham's  Battery  to  the  left, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  637 

Carter  posted  Watson's  Battery  on  the  ridge  just  to  the 
left  of  the  railroad  cut,  Smith's  on  its  right  near  the 
Seminary,  and  Dance's  own  battery  under  Lieut.  Cun 
ningham  on  the  right  of  Seminary  Hill  and  to  the  left 
of  the  Fairfield  Road.  Hupp's  Salem  Battery  under 
Lieut.  Griffin  was  held  in  reserve.  Jones'  Battalion 
was  held  well  in  rear  of  Swell's  left  to  guard  against 
any  attempt  to  turn  that  flank  and  was  therefore  elimi 
nated  from  the  action  of  the  day.  Just  before  sunset, 
he  sent  the  Parrott  section  of  Green's  Battery  at  the  re 
quest  of  Stuart  to  join  Hampton  at  Hunter stown,  three 
miles  distant,  and  at  3  P.  M.  Tanner's  Battery,  which 
had  exhausted  its  ammunition  on  the  1st,  was  ordered 
to  the  rear  with  the  trains.  Nelson's  Battalion  was  held 
in  reserve  in  rear  of  the  ridge  and  about  500  yards  to 
the  left  of  the  Cashtown  Pike  until  11  A.  M.,  when  it  was 
moved  into  park  immediately  in  rear  of  the  Seminary, 
where  it  remained  until  dark  in  readiness  to  occupy 
a  selected  position  in  the  front  line.  Thus  it  is  seen 
that  Ewell  and  Brown  had  not  more  than  48  of  their 
80-odd  guns  actually  in  position,  and  bearing  on  the 
Federal  lines  on  the  2d  of  July,  for  Jones'  and  Nelson's 
battalions  and  Hupp's  Battery  were  not  engaged  during 
the  day.  Yet,  Gen.  Lee  had  directed  Ewell  to  create  a 
diversion  in  Longstreet's  favor,  as  soon  as  the  guns  of 
the  1st  Corps  were  heard,  converting  it  into  a  real  at 
tack  if  a  favorable  opportunity  offered. 

Early  in  the  morning  when  nearly  all  the  Confederate 
Army  had  reached  Gettysburg,  or  its  immediate  vicin 
ity,  a  great  number  of  Meade's  troops  were  still  on  the 
road.  The  2d  Corps  and  two  divisions  of  the  5th  under 
Sykes  arrived  about  7  A.  MV  and  Crawford's  Division 
joined  about  noon.  Lockwood's  Brigade  arrived  from 
Baltimore  at  8;  De  Trobriand's  and  Burling's  bri 
gades  of  the  3d  Corps  at  9,  and  the  Artillery  Reserve, 
with  an  ammunition  train  close  in  its  rear,  containing 
besides  the  usual  supply,  20  additional  rounds  of  am 
munition  for  every  gun  in  the  Army,  from  Emmitts- 
burgat  10:30  A.  M. 


638  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  lack  of  energy  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates 
in  completing  their  dispositions  for  attack  was  in 
marked  contrast  to  Meade's  activity.  At  every  point 
of  his  line  of  defense,  the  Federal  commander  and  his 
staff  officers  were  to  be  seen.  As  the  Federal  troops 
came  up,  all  but  exhausted  by  their  long  forced 
marches,  which  extended  throughout  the  night  and 
morning  in  spite  of  the  oppressive  heat,  they  were  not 
allowed  to  rest  until  placed  in  position.  The  12th 
Corps  (Slocum's  under  Williams)  occupied  Gulp's 
Hill  on  Wadsworth's  right,  the  2d  Corps  Cemetery 
Ridge  from  which  the  3d  Corps  was  drawn  to  prolong 
the  line  to  Round  Top ;  the  5th  Corps  was  placed  in  re 
serve  along  the  Baltimore  Road  near  Rock  Creek;  and 
the  Reserve  Artillery,  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Gen.  Tyler,  in  a  central  position  on  a  cross  road  from 
the  Baltimore  Pike  to  the  Taneytown  Road.  A  part  of 
Buford's  cavalry  occupied  the  left,  while  Kilpatrick's 
and  Gregg's  cavalry  divisions  were  posted  well  out  on 
the  right  flank.  The  1st  and  llth  Corps  still  held  Ceme 
tery  Hill.  The  batteries  of  the  various  corps  were 
strongly  posted  in  rear  of  the  infantry  lines,  and  the 
more  advanced  guns  on  Cemetery  and  Gulp's  hills  were 
protected  by  epaulments  and  gun  pits. 

Some  slight  demonstrating  on  the  part  of  Ewell  at 
daybreak  had  led  Meade  to  order  Slocum  to  attack  the 
Confederate  left  with  the  5th  and  12th  Corps,  so  soon 
as  the  6th  Corps  should  arrive  to  support  him,  but  as 
the  ground  in  his  front  was  found  unfavorable  by 
Slocum,  and  the  6th  Corps  did  not  arrive  before  Swell's 
activity  ceased,  the  offensive  was  not  assumed  in  this 
quarter  by  the  Federals.  Furthermore,  Meade  was  ap 
prehensive  about  his  left,  and  was  well  satisfied  to  re 
main  passive  as  long  as  each  hour  enabled  him  to 
strengthen  his  line  in  that  quarter  with  the  constantly 
arriving  troops.  In  the  meantime,  Gen.  Hunt,  by  his 
foresight  in  providing  extra  reserve  ammunition,  was 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  639 

able  to  replenish  the  caissons  of  the  1st  and  llth  Corps, 
which  had  been  practically  emptied  the  preceding  day.* 
At  the  first  blush  of  dawn,  Gen.  Pendleton  made  his 
reconnaissance  as  directed,  examining  the  ground  al 
most  up  to  the  Federal  position.  Finding  no  difficulties 
which  appeared  to  him  insuperable,  but  detecting  the 
movements  of  large  masses  of  the  enemy's  infantry  in 
the  rear  of  the  hostile  line,  he  communicated  with  both 
Lee  and  Longstreet,  urging  upon  them  both  that  an  im 
mediate  attack  be  made.  Again  and  again  he  sent 
messages  to  the  Commander-in- Chief  by  his  staff  of 
ficers,  to  impress  him  with  the  necessity  of  prompt 
action,  and  was  informed  that  they  were  invariably 
transmitted  to  Longstreet  by  Gen.  Lee,  who  was  much 
annoyed  by  the  latter's  procrastination.  But  Long- 
street  did  not  arrive  with  Lee  to  examine  the  ground 
until  noon.  As  they  finally  viewed  the  enemy's  position 
from  Seminary  Ridge,  near  the  Warfield  house,  the 
main  features  of  the  enemy's  position  appeared  as  fol 
lows:  near  the  base  of  Cemetery  Hill  was  Zeigler's 
Grove  a  mile  and  a  half  due  north  of  the  base  of  Little 
Round  Top.  From  Zeigler's  Grove  Cemetery  Ridge, 
with  a  well  defined  crest,  ran  900  yards  or  more  south 
to  a  smaller  but  prominent  clump  of  trees,  where  it 
turned  sharply  back  for  200  yards,  then  south  again  for 
700  yards  to  Weikert's  house.  So  far  the  ridge  was 
smooth  and  open,  in  full  view  of  and  from  1,400  to 
1,600  yards  distant  from  Seminary  Ridge.  At 
Weikert's,  it  was  lost  in  a  large  body  of  rocks,  hills,  and 
woods,  lying  athwart  the  direct  line  to  Big  Round  Top, 
the  Taneytown  Road  bending  around  to  the  east  of  the 
broken  ground.  This  rough  space  extended  some  400 
yards  west  of  the  line  of  the  ridge  prolonged  toward 
Plum  Run.  Along  its  southern  edge,  it  was  bounded 
by  low  marshy  ground,  stretching  back  to  the  base  of 
Little  Round  Top,  half  a  mile  or  more  from  Weikert's 
house,  and  its  western  boundary  was  wooded  from  north 

*Hunt  had  formed  the  special  ammunition  train  previously  referred  to  upon 
his  own  responsibility  and  unknown  to  Hooker,  who  had  never  accorded  his 
Chief  of  Artillery  much  consideration  in  the  way  of  assigning  him  to  the 
tactical  direction  of  the  arm. 


10 


640  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

to  south.  In  front  of  these  woods  and  Plum  Run, 
stretched  an  open  space  300  yards  wide,  a  continuation 
of  the  rolling  fields  in  front  of  Cemetery  Ridge.  Plum 
Run  flows  in  a  southeasterly  direction  towards  Little 
Round  Top,  and  then  bends  to  the  southwest  at  a  point 
where  it  receives  a  small  branch  from  Seminary  Ridge. 
In  the  angles  formed  by  these  streams  is  a  bold,  rocky 
height,  100  feet  lower  than  and  500  yards  due  west  of 
Little  Round  Top.  With  a  steep  eastern  face  the  hill 
is  prolonged  as  a  ridge  generally  in  a  northwesterly 
direction  between  Plum  Run  on  the  north  and  Plum 
Run  Branch  on  the  south  to  Seminary  Ridge  from 
which  it  springs  towards  the  east  as  a  spur.  The  sur 
face  of  the  northern  face  of  Devil's  Den  Hill  proper  is 
intersected  by  innumerable  ledges  and  outcroppings 
of  rocks,  among  which  are  many  holes  and  bowlders. 
From  these  peculiar  formations  the  hill  takes  its  name. 
The  marshy  bottom  forming  the  valley  of  Plum  Run, 
and  the  slopes  of  the  two  conical  hills  known  as  the 
Round  Tops,  are  also  strewn  with  massive  bowlders.  A 
cross  road  running  along  the  north  of  Devil's  Den  and 
the  Taneytown  Road  intersected  the  Emmittsburg  Road 
at  a  peach  orchard  on  the  Devil's  Den  Ridge,  1,100 
yards  west  of  Plum  Run.  For  a  distance  of  400  yards 
from  the  stream,  the  road  was  bounded  on  the  north  by 
trees  and  on  the  south  by  a  wheat  field.  From  the  Peach 
Orchard,  the  Emmittsburg  Road  ran  diagonally  across 
the  rolling  fields  between  the  Seminary  and  Cemetery 
ridges,  a  mile  and  a  half  to  Zeigler's  Grove.  For  half 
a  mile  from  the  orchard  the  road  ran  along  a  ridge  per 
pendicular  to  the  Devil's  Den  Ridge,  and  nearly  parallel 
to  and  600  yards  distant  from  Seminary  Ridge.  From 
Devil's  Den  to  the  wooded  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge  the 
distance  was  therefore  about  1,700  yards.  The  junction 
of  the  two  bold  ridges  at  the  orchard  formed  the  salient 
of  the  Federal  lines,  and  it  was  upon  this  point  that 
Longstreet's  Corps  was  to  be  hurled.  If  the  enemy 
could  be  driven  from  the  orchard  by  Longstreet,  Gen. 
Lee  believed  the  latter's  artillery  massed  at  that  com- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  641 

manding  position  would  be  able  to  assist  the  infantry  in 
reaching  Cemetery  Ridge.  From  the  Peach  Orchard 
Longstreet's  attack  would  be  in  oblique  order,  and  if 
driven  home  would  roll  up  the  Federal  left.  Had  the 
attack  been  rendered  before  9  A.  M.,  before  the  Federal 
3d  and  6th  Corps  and  the  Reserve  Artillery  were  in 
position,  and  before  the  enemy's  lines  were  strengthened 
by  nearly  a  whole  day  of  energetic  labor  on  the  defensive 
works,  the  Confederates  would  undoubtedly  have  ac 
complished  their  design.  The  first  indication  the  Fed 
erals  had  of  Longstreet's  presence  was  when  Sickles  at 
Hunt's  suggestion  sent  forward  a  party  to  reconnoiter 
the  woods  600  yards  in  his  front.  The  presence  of  the 
enemy,  however,  when  detected  gave  Sickles  little  con 
cern,  for  already  news  of  Sedgwick's  near  approach  with 
the  6th  Corps,  the  largest  in  the  Federal  Army,  had 
been  received,  and  Hunt,  who  from  Devil's  Den  Ridge 
had  been  attracted  by  the  superior  command  of  Big 
Round  Top,  had  set  off  to  examine  the  extreme  left  and 
see  that  proper  precautions  were  taken  in  that  quarter 
to  save  the  conical  height  from  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  Confederates.  When  Hunt  returned  to  the  Peach 
Orchard  after  visiting  Round  Top  and  reporting  all 
safe  to  Meade,  Birney's  Division  was  posted  along  the 
Emmittsburg  Road  on  the  Devil's  Den  Ridge,  Gra 
ham's  on  Birney's  right  in  two  lines  in  front  of  the 
Smith  house,  and  Burling  had  been  ordered  up  to  re 
inforce  Birney  at  the  salient.  Hunt  had  already  sent 
to  the  Reserve  Artillery  for  some  of  his  batteries,  and 
as  Turnbull's  arrived,  he  replaced  with  it  Seeley's  Bat 
tery  of  the  3d  Corps,  which  Capt.  Randolph  had  placed 
on  Graham's  right,  the  latter  shifting  its  position  to 
the  left  of  the  Smith  house.  Randolph  had  also  posted 
Smith's  Battery  on  the  rocky  hill  at  Devil's  Den,  Wins- 
low's  in  the  wheatfield,  Clark's  on  the  left  face  of  the 
salient  or  southern  slope  of  the  ridge,  and  his  own  at  the 
angle  looking  west. 

Sickles'  Corps  was  obviously  too  weak  to  hold  the 
advanced  line  or  salient  formed  by  the  junction  of  the 


642  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

two  ridges  at  the  orchard,  and  Sykes'  5th  Corps  which 
had  been  ordered  to  reinforce  him  was  momentarily  ex 
pected.  No  sooner  did  the  Confederate  fire  open  than 
Meade  also  sent  for  C  aid  well's  Division  on  Cemetery 
Ridge,  a  division  of  the  12th  Corps  on  Gulp's  Hill,  and 
soon  after  for  part  of  the  recently  arrived  6th  Corps. 
McGilvery's  Artillery  Brigade  also  soon  arrived  from 
the  Reserve,  and  Bigelow's,  Phillips',  Hart's,  Ames', 
and  Thompson's  batteries  were  ordered  into  position 
along  the  crests. 

Pickett's  Division  had  left  Chambersburg  at  2  A.  M., 
but  after  a  march  of  22  miles  went  into  camp,  three 
miles  from  the  field  at  4  p.  M.  Yet  McLaws'  entire  divi 
sion  and  Hood's,  with  the  exception  of  Law's  Brigade, 
had  arrived  within  striking  distance  of  the  field  early  in 
the  morning.  Longstreet  deliberately  waited  for  the  ar 
rival  of  Law's  Brigade  before  he  made  the  slightest 
effort  to  place  his  infantry  in  position.  This  alone 
was  not  the  only  cause  of  delay,  for  leaving  New  Guil- 
ford  Courthouse  with  Bachman's  Battery  at  3  A.  M. 
Law  had  rejoined  Hood  before  noon.  At  this  time 
Hood  and  McLaws  were  on  the  Chambersburg  Road 
about  a  mile  west  of  the  town.  We  have  seen  that 
Alexander  had  easily  avoided  the  exposed  point  with 
his  artillery  column,  and  had  ridden  back  to  discover  the 
cause  of  Longstreet's  delay.  Yet,  he  has  subsequently 
sought  to  defend  that  delay  when  it  is  proved  by  his 
own  action  that  there  was  no  reason  for  it.  Longstreet 
had  caused  his  infantry  to  countermarch  and  take  a 
devious  route  via  Black  Horse  Tavern,  in  order  to  avoid 
detection  from  the  Federal  signal  station.  At  length, 
after  many  vexatious  and  useless  halts,  his  column  ar 
rived,  Hood  in  front,  at  the  Emmittsburg  Road  along 
Seminary  Ridge  opposite  Little  Round  Top,  and  on 
the  right  of  Anderson's  Division  of  the  3d  Corps  which 
had  been  extended  towards  the  south  during  the  morn 
ing.  In  spite  of  Longstreet's  devious  route  to  screen 
his  flank  movement,  it  had  been  discovered  by  the  Fed 
eral  signal  party. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  643 

Both  Pendleton  and  Col.  Long  of  Lee's  staff  had  ex 
amined  the  positions  which  Walker's  batteries  had 
taken  along  Seminary  Ridge  from  which  to  support  the 
advance  of  the  1st  Corps,  and  all  was  at  last  ready. 
Gen.  Lee  had  been  sorely  tried  throughout  the  day  by 
what  appeared  to  him,  at  least,  to  be  an  inexplicable  de 
lay  on  Longstreet's  part.  EwelFs  and  Hill's  artillery 
had  already  opened  upon  Cemetery  Hill  by  way  of 
diversion  in  favor  of  the  1st  Corps. 

Upon  arriving  Longstreet  deployed  his  divisions  each 
in  two  lines  with  Hood  on  the  right  and  extending  east 
of  the  road  to  a  point  about  1,000  yards  south  of  the 
orchard,  his  left  prolonged  by  McLaws,  whose  line 
crossed  the  road  to  the  rear.  Reilly's,  Latham's, 
Garden's,  and  Bachman's  batteries  of  Henry's  Bat 
talion  of  20  guns,  were  posted  among  the  trees  on  the 
ridge  in  rear  of  Hood.  Although  there  was  no  sign  of 
any  enemy  on  the  right,  as  a  precaution  a  regiment 
was  detached  and  stationed  at  Kern's  house,  half  a  mile 
down  the  Emmittsburg  Road.  While  forming  his  line, 
Law  had  been  greatly  attracted  by  Big  Round  Top, 
and  learning  from  some  prisoners,  which  the  mounted 
scouts  he  had  sent  to  reconnoiter  its  southern  base  had 
captured,  that  it  was  weakly  held  and  that  the  Federal 
medical  and  ordnance  trains  were  unguarded  in  its  rear, 
and  could  be  reached  by  a  good  farm  road,  he  protested 
to  Hood  against  a  frontal  attack  and  begged  to  be  al 
lowed  to  make  a  detour  around  the  Federal  flank. 
Hood's  orders  were  positive,  but  he  was  induced  by 
Law's  persistent  representations  to  communicate  the 
information  the  latter  had  secured  to  Longstreet.  Soon 
Capt.  Hamilton  of  his  staff,  by  whom  the  message  was 
sent  to  the  corps  commander,  returned  and  directed 
Hood  by  Longstreet's  order  to  begin  the  attack  at  once 
as  previously  planned.  If  Hood's  message  reached 
Longstreet,  he,  Longstreet,  had  no  just  ground  for  his 
subsequent  contention,  that  he  had  urged  in  vain  to  be 
allowed  to  turn  the  Federal  left,  instead  of  making  a 
frontal  attack.  Whether  Lee  had  previously  insisted 


644  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

upon  such  an  attack  or  not,  it  seems  certain  that  his 
views  would  have  been  materially  altered  by  such  infor 
mation  as  that  in  Law's  possession.  And,  again,  while 
the  ground  in  his  front  was  such  that  Longstreet's  at 
tack  necessarily  became  a  frontal  one,  the  movement  of 
his  corps  with  respect  to  the  whole  army  was  designed  to 
be  tactically  a  flank  attack.  Upon  discovering  that  his 
blow  would  fall  short  of  the  flank,  a  fact  unknown  ex 
cept  to  him,  it  was  Longstreet's  duty  to  inform  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief.  Yet,  he  subsequently  had  the  ef 
frontery  to  declare  that  "he  would  and  could  have  saved 
every  man  lost  at  Gettysburg,  had  he  been  permitted  to 
do  so."  No.  Longstreet  was  stubborn.  He  had  been 
ordered  to  do  that  which  he  did  not  want  to  do,  which 
was  to  participate  in  an  offensive  engagement,  and  he 
did  not  propose  to  contribute  anything  on  his  own  initia 
tive  to  the  success  of  a  battle,  the  fighting  of  which  he 
had  all  along  opposed.  The  severest  arraignment  of 
Longstreet  ever  penned  is  the  account  of  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg  by  Gen.  Law,  in  which,  in  an  attempt  to 
shoulder  the  blame  on  Lee  for  its  loss,  he  unwittingly 
fixes  the  responsibility  for  Longstreet's  failure  to  turn 
the  left  flank,  beyond  peradventure  of  a  doubt,  upon 
Longstreet  himself.* 

The  order  of  attack  issued  by  Longstreet  as  soon  as 
his  divisions  were  in  line  of  battle  was  for  the  movement 
to  begin  on  the  right,  Law's  Brigade  leading,  the  others 
taking  it  up  successively  toward  the  left.  It  was 
near  5  p.  M.  when  the  infantry  advanced.  The 
artillery  on  both  sides  had  already  been  warmly  en 
gaged  the  better  part  of  an  hour.  Alexander's  Bat 
talion  with  18,  Cabell's  with  18,  and  Henry's  with 
10  guns  had  been  in  action  since  about  3:45  p.  M. 
Henry's  Battalion  had  moved  out  with  Hood,  and 
as  the  Federal  Artillery  was  well  posted  and  pre 
pared  for  the  attack,  his  batteries  were  soon  after  com 
ing  into  view  heavily  engaged.  Cabell's  Battalion  had 

*See  "The  Struggle  for  Round  Top,"  E.  M.  Law,  Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol. 
Ill,  p.  322. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  645 

at  once  gone  into  action  behind  a  stone  fence  near 
Snyder's  house,  about  700  yards  from  the  Federal  bat 
teries,  to  support  Henry.  His  position  afforded  little 
cover  for  the  guns,  and  the  well-directed  fire  of  the  op 
posing  artillery  at  once  caused  him  serious  loss  in  men 
and  horses.  To  help  him,  Alexander  had  Huger  move 
Moody's,  Ficklin's,  Parker's,  and  Taylor's  batteries  with 
their  18  guns  to  the  Warfield  house  and  open  at  a  range 
of  500  yards  from  the  orchard.  Alexander  now  had  54 
guns  of  the  1st  Corps  in  action,  which  he  and  Longstreet 
both  believed  would  in  a  short  while  be  able  to  crush  in 
Sickles'  line  and  silence  his  batteries.  But  so  accurate 
was  the  practice  of  the  Federal  guns,  that  two  of 
Fickling's  pieces  were  soon  dismounted.  The  labor  of 
running  the  guns  up  after  each  recoil  to  the  crest  of  the 
rocky  slope  was  so  exhausting  to  his  cannoneers  that 
Moody  was  compelled  to  call  for  volunteers  from 
Barksdale's  Brigade  nearby  to  handle  his  four  24- 
pounder  Parrotts  and  two  12-pounder  Napoleons. 
Eight  infantrymen  promptly  responded,  two  of  whom 
were  killed  and  three  wounded  before  night. 

When  Hood  finally  launched  his  infantry,  it  ad 
vanced  rapidly  across  the  valley  in  front  of  the  left 
leg  of  the  salient  angle  held  by  the  Federals,  all  the 
time  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's  batteries,  and 
brushing  his  skirmishers  out  of  the  way,  soon  struck 
Sickles'  main  line.  The  advance  continued  steadily, 
driving  the  enemy  to  the  confines  of  Devil's  Den,  where 
the  troops  of  both  sides  on  this  portion  of  the  field 
seemed  to  dissolve  in  the  rugged  area.  In  less  than  an 
hour  Hood's  troops  had  carried  Devil's  Den  opposite 
his  center  and  captured  three  pieces  of  Smith's  Battery, 
which  from  the  rocky  height  had  severely  punished  the 
attacking  infantry.  In  the  meantime,  Law,  supported 
by  a  part  of  Robertson's  Brigade,  had  in  spite  of  Hood's 
orders,  swept  over  the  northern  slope  of  Big  Round 
Top,  cleared  it  of  the  enemy,  and,  turning  somewhat  to 
the  left,  advanced  upon  Little  Round  Top  in  rear  of 
the  hill  which  Hood's  center  had  carried.  Henry's  Bat- 


646  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

talion  had  done  all  in  its  power  to  support  Hood's 
infantry,  devoting  much  attention  to  Smith's  Battery 
on  Devil's  Den  Road,  which  had  enfiladed  and  inflicted 
much  loss  upon  the  attacking  troops.  Cabell  had  also 
turned  two  of  his  guns  upon  this  battery  with  fine  effect. 
In  the  meantime,  however,  Hood's  left  brigade  had 
been  subjected  to  great  annoyance  and  loss  by  the  fire 
of  the  enemy  along  the  ridge  on  its  left  and  had  been 
frequently  compelled  in  its  advance  to  change  front  to 
repel  the  movements  against  its  flank.  McLaws  had 
held  his  men  well  under  cover  during  the  artillery  prep 
aration.  In  spite  of  the  superior  number  and  metal  of 
the  enemy's  guns,  Alexander's  own  batteries  stood  man 
fully  to  their  task,  determined  to  shake  the  Federal  line 
at  the  angle,  and  save  McLaws'  infantry  as  much  as 
possible  in  their  advance.  The  ammunition  expenditure 
was  enormous,  but  fortunately  the  reserve  supply  was 
close  at  hand  behind  the  ridge.  At  such  close  range,  the 
Confederate  fire  was  more  accurate  than  usual,  while 
many  of  the  Federal  projectiles  passed  over  the  crest 
behind  the  Confederate  batteries,  and  were  lost  in  the 
valley  beyond.  The  thick  growth  of  trees  on  the  ridge 
also  served  to  reduce  the  effect  of  the  shells  that  burst 
short  of  the  crest.  But  the  Federal  batteries  were  still 
holding  their  own  when  Alexander,  about  6  p.  M., 
ordered  Maj.  Dearing,  who  had  arrived  in  advance  of 
his  battalion,  and  reported  to  him,  to  move  up  Wool- 
folk's  and  Jordan's  batteries  with  their  ten  pieces,  which 
had  been  held  in  reserve  behind  the  ridge,  to  the  support 
of  the  other  four  batteries  of  the  battalion  under  Huger. 
But  before  these  batteries  joined  Huger,  at  the  War- 
field  house,  Cabell  had  ceased  firing  and  given  the  signal 
with  three  guns  for  McLaws'  Division  to  charge. 
Leaping  the  wall  behind  which  they  had  lain,  McLaws' 
men  rushed  past  the  guns  in  Kershaw's  front,  crushed 
in  the  angle  of  Sickles'  line  by  seizing  the  Peach 
Orchard,  and  drove  the  enemy  back  in  confusion  from 
their  salient  position,  thereby  relieving  the  pressure  on 
Hood's  left. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  647 

The  breaking  in  of  the  Peach  Orchard  angle  exposed 
the  flanks  of  the  batteries  on  the  advanced  crests,  which 
fell  back  firing  in  order  to  cover  the  retirement  of  the 
infantry  behind  Plum  Run.  Many  guns  of  different 
batteries  had  to  be  abandoned  by  the  Federals  because 
of  the  destruction  of  their  teams  and  cannoneers.  Some 
were  hauled  off  by  hand,  but  the  loss  was  heavy.  Bige- 
low's  9th  Massachusetts  Battery  made  a  stand  close  by 
the  Trostle  house  in  a  corner  of  a  field  to  which  the  guns 
were  hauled  by  prolonges,  where  it  was  ordered  by 
McGilvery  to  remain  in  action  at  all  hazards  until  a  line 
of  artillery  could  be  formed  in  front  of  the  wood  beyond 
Plum  Run.  This  line  was  soon  formed  by  collecting  all 
the  serviceable  batteries  and  fragments  of  batteries 
which  had  been  withdrawn,  and,  together  with  Dow's 
Maine  Battery  fresh  from  the  reserve,  Bigelow  suc 
ceeded  in  checking  the  pursuit  and  enabling  all  but  one 
of  the  abandoned  guns  to  be  recovered. 

As  McLaws'  Division  rushed  past  the  guns  at  the 
Warfield  house,  masking  their  fire,  Alexander  ordered 
all  six  of  his  batteries  to  limber  to  the  front,  and  charged 
with  them  in  line  across  the  plain,  going  into  action 
again  at  the  orchard.  Perhaps  no  more  superb  feat  of 
artillery  drill  on  the  battlefield  was  ever  witnessed  than 
this  rapid  change  of  position  of  Alexander's  Battalion. 
For  500  yards  the  foaming  horses  dashed  forward,  under 
whip  and  spur,  the  guns  in  perfect  alignment,  and  the 
carriages  fairly  bounding  over  the  fields.  Every  officer 
and  non-commissioned  officer  rode  at  his  post,  and  not 
a  team  swerved  from  the  line,  except  those  which  were 
struck  down  by  the  blizzard  of  Federal  shell.  Fortu 
nately  most  of  the  enemy's  projectiles  overshot  their 
mark,  and  as  the  great  line  of  six  batteries  with  over 
400  horses  reached  the  position  abandoned  by  the  enemy, 
"action  front"  was  executed  as  if  by  a  single  piece. 
Hardly  had  the  teams  wheeled,  and  the  trails  of  the 
pieces  cleared  the  pintle-hooks  when  again  a  sheet  of 
flame  burst  from  the  24  guns  of  Alexander's  magnificent 
battalion.  Few  artillerymen  have  experienced  the  sen- 


648  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

sation  which  must  have  come  to  Alexander  at  this  mo 
ment,  for  seldom  has  such  a  maneuver  been  executed  on 
the  battlefield. 

The  ground  over  which  the  battalion  had  advanced 
was  generally  good,  but  obstructed  in  one  place  by  a  rail 
fence.  Seeing  a  body  of  Federal  prisoners  being  moved 
to  the  rear,  Dearing  had  shouted  to  them  to  remove  the 
rails  in  the  path  of  the  artillery.  "Never  was  an  order 
executed  with  more  alacrity.  Every  prisoner  seemed  to 
seize  a  rail,  and  the  fence  disappeared  as  if  by  magic." 
But  the  joy  of  the  charge  was  not  all.  It  was  the  ar 
tillerist's  heaven  to  follow  the  routed  enemy  after  a 
prolonged  duel  with  his  guns,  and  to  hurl  shell  and 
canister  into  his  disorganized  and  fleeing  masses.  To 
Alexander's  ears,  the  reports  of  his  guns  sounded  louder 
and  more  powerful  than  ever  before,  and  the  shouts  of 
his  gunners  directing  the  fire  in  rapid  succession  thrilled 
his  own  and  the  soul  of  every  witness  of  the  fight  with 
exultant  pride. 

There  is  no  excitement  on  earth  like  that  of  gallop 
ing  at  the  head  of  a  rapidly  advancing  line  of  artillery, 
with  the  awe-inspiring  rumble  of  the  wheels,  mingling 
with  the  clatter  of  innumerable  feet  close  behind.  The 
momentum  of  the  great  mass  of  men,  animals,  and  car 
riages  almost  seems  to  forbid  the  thought  of  attempting 
to  check  the  force  which  has  been  set  in  motion.  With  his 
mount  bounding  along  almost  as  if  borne  on  the  breeze 
of  the  pursuing  storm,  the  eye  of  the  commander  in 
stinctively  searches  the  terrain  for  his  position,  while 
a  hundred,  perhaps  five  hundred,  human  beings,  and  as 
many  dumb  warriors,  joyfully  laboring  in  the  traces, 
watch  his  every  movement.  At  last  the  leader's  right 
arm  shoots  upward,  then  outward.  No  words  are  neces 
sary,  and  if  spoken  would  be  superfluous.  In  that  dull 
roar  of  the  onrushing  mass  no  voice  but  that  of  Jove 
could  be  heard.  The  swoop  of  the  fleetest  hawk  is  not 
more  graceful  nor  more  sudden  than  that  which  follows. 
Every  man  and  horse  knows  his  part  and  must  perform 
it,  for  mistakes  at  such  a  moment  are  fatal.  But,  first 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  649 

of  all,  out  of  the  orderly  chaos  which  ensues,  the  dark 
warriors  come  to  rest  as  if  in  the  ominous  silence  gath 
ering  breath  with  which  to  shout  their  defiance,  while  the 
attending  men  and  beasts  are  springing  to  their  posts. 
The  joy  of  the  charge  is  forgotten.  Though  every  hand 
and  limb  is  still  trembling  with  the  old  thrill,  a  greater 
joy  is  now  in  store  for  all,  for  flash!  bang!  scre-e-ch — bo 
om — a  shell  has  burst  among  the  flying  foe.  Small 
wonder  then  that  Alexander  cherished  no  regret  over 
having  declined  the  command  of  a  brigade  of  infantry. 
Surely  there  was  glory  enough  for  any  soldier  to  be 
found  at  the  head  of  such  a  command  as  he  led  across 
the  fields  and  into  action  in  front  of  Little  Round  Top ! 

After  the  enemy  fell  back  upon  the  ridge  in  their 
rear,  Longstreet's  batteries  fired  upon  every  part  of  the 
hostile  line  in  range,  especially  devoting  their  attention 
to  McGilvery's  group  of  28  guns  behind  Plum  Run. 
Three  of  Anderson's  brigades,  Wilcox's,  Perry's,  and 
Wright's,  pressed  forward  against  Humphreys'  line 
and  forced  it  back  to  Cemetery  Ridge,  under  cover  of 
two  of  Gibbon's  regiments  and  Brown's  Rhode  Island 
Battery.  Later  they  succeeded  in  breaking  the  Federal 
line  and  seized  many  guns,  but  were  driven  out  and  fell 
back  about  dusk  under  a  heavy  artillery  fire  from  Mc 
Gilvery's  massed  batteries. 

Further  to  the  right  one  Confederate  regiment  alone 
succeeded  in  crossing  Plum  Run  and  actually  got  in 
among  Bigelow's  Battery  fighting  hand  to  hand  with 
the  cannoneers.  Although,  of  the  104  men  and  88  horses 
of  this  battery,  28  men  and  65  horses  were  killed  or 
wounded,  still  it  maintained  itself  without  losing  a  gun, 
and  the  gallant  captain,  who  himself  was  wounded,  faith 
fully  discharged  the  important  trust  committed  to  him. 
In  doing  so,  he  gave  evidence,  as  in  the  case  of  Beck- 
ham's  gunners  at  Brandy  Station,  of  the  great  resisting 
power  of  artillery,  even  when  unsupported. 

Hood's  center,  as  we  have  seen,  had  seized  and  still 
held  Devil's  Den,  but  Law,  who  had  reached  the  slope  of 
Little  Round  Top,  had  been  driven  back  to  its  base  by 


650  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Weed's  and  Vincent's  brigades  and  Hazlett's  Battery, 
which  Warren  on  his  own  initiative  had  stationed  at  the 
summit,  just  as  Longstreet's  attack  commenced.  The 
placing  of  Hazlett's  six  guns  in  this  position  was  a 
marvelous  feat,  and  one  which,  in  view  of  the  precipitous 
and  rugged  slope  of  the  mountain  would  have  seemed 
impossible  under  ordinary  circumstances.  But,  to 
gether  the  infantry  and  the  cannoneers  dragged  them  to 
the  top  just  in  time  to  repel  Law's  troops,  who  were 
already  clambering  up  the  slopes.  The  fighting  for  the 
possession  of  Little  Round  Top  was  desperate.  Weed 
and  Hazlett  were  both  killed  and  Vincent  wounded. 
The  first  had  himself  won  great  distinction  in  the  Penin 
sula  campaign,  as  an  artillerist,  and  again  at  Chancel- 
lorsville,  where  he  served  as  chief  of  his  corps  artillery. 
Shortly  before  his  death  he  had  been  promoted  from  a 
captain  of  artillery  to  a  brigadier-general  of  infantry. 
Brave  Hazlett,  whom  we  have  met  on  other  fields,  fell 
while  bending  over  his  former  chief  to  receive  his  last 
message.  Hood's  men,  however,  clung  to  the  base  of 
the  mountain,  Devil's  Den  and  its  woods,  and  captured 
three  of  Smith's  guns. 

It  was  now  after  7  p.  M.  and  Longstreet's  troops,  who 
had  become  disjointed  in  their  attack,  were  engaged  in 
more  or  less  isolated  combats.  His  artillery  took  part 
wherever  it  could.  "The  fuses  of  the  flying  shells 
streaked  the  darkening  sky  like  little  meteors." 

As  the  Federal  reinforcements  had  arrived  piece 
meal,  they  had  been  beaten  in  detail  until  by  successive 
accretions  they  greatly  outnumbered  Hood  and  Mc- 
Laws.  The  fighting  had  been  confined  largely  to  the 
Peach  Orchard,  Little  Round  Top,  and  the  rugged  area 
of  Devil's  Den,  behind  the  ledges  and  bowlders  of  which 
the  sharpshooters  of  both  sides  had  been  thickly  posted. 
At  the  close  of  the  day,  the  Confederates  held  the  base 
of  both  the  Round  Tops,  Devil's  Den,  and  the  Emmitts- 
burg  Road,  with  skirmishers  thrown  out  as  far  as  the 
Trostle  house.  The  Federals  held  the  summits  of  the 
Round  Tops,  the  Plum  Run  line,  and  Cemetery  Ridge. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  651 

Before  8  p.  M.  the  fire  on  both  sides  began  to  slacken, 
and  by  9  the  field  was  silent  and  Longstreet's  men  rested 
on  their  arms  conscious  of  the  fact  that  their  work  had 
only  begun. 

Now  let  us  see  what  had  been  done  on  other  parts  of 
the  field  to  support  Longstreet's  attack.  We  have  seen 
that  Anderson's  three  brigades  assaulted  Humphreys 
on  the  left  of  the  1st  Corps.  In  this  movement  Wilcox 
was  ably  supported  by  Patterson's  Battery  of  six  pieces, 
and  one  gun  of  Ross's  Battery,  all  of  Lane's  Battalion. 
That  Anderson's  troops  were  desperately  engaged  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  at  one  time  Wilcox  took  8  and 
Wright  about  20  pieces  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 

Of  Hill's  artillery,  Poague's  Battalion  took  position 
along  Anderson's  line  in  two  groups.  The  left  group 
consisting  of  five  pieces  of  Graham's  and  Wyatt's  bat 
teries  under  Capt.  Wyatt  occupied  the  ridge  behind 
Anderson's  left,  while  Capt.  Ward  with  five  guns  of  his 
own  and  Brooke's  Warrenton  Battery  moved  out  to  the 
crest  some  500  yards  in  advance  of  the  ridge,  when  An 
derson's  brigades  advanced.  On  Poague's  left,  Pe- 
gram's  Battalion  under  Brunson  occupied  a  position  be 
hind  a  stone  wall  on  the  ridge  opposite  Cemetery  Ridge, 
losing  during  the  day  9  men  and  25  horses.  Further  to 
the  left  and  behind  the  same  wall,  Mclntosh  was  posted. 
Poague  and  Brunson  both  succeeded  in  partially  en 
filading  the  Federal  batteries  along  the  Emmittsburg 
Road  and  greatly  aided  Alexander  in  subduing  their 
fire  and  driving  them  from  their  advanced  positions. 
In  this  Mclntosh  also  assisted,  but  was  principally  en 
gaged  in  diverting  the  fire  of  the  batteries  on  Cemetery 
Ridge  from  Longstreet's  and  Anderson's  troops.  On 
Mclntosh's  left,  Lane  with  the  two  20-pounder  Par- 
rotts  and  three  3-inch  navy  rifles  of  Wingfield's  Battery, 
and  the  five  remaining  pieces  of  Ross's  Battery,  engaged 
the  Federal  Artillery  on  Cemetery  Hill.  Beyond  Lane, 
and  just  to  the  right  of  the  Fairfield  Road,  Maj. 
Richardson  with  nine  pieces  of  Garnett's  Battalion  also 
fired  actively  upon  the  same  guns,  and  was  late  in  the 


652  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

day  able  to  divert  the  fire  of  some  of  them  from  E well's 
troops.  So  much  for  the  part  of  the  3d  Corps.  In  the 
main,  Walker's  batteries  were  active  and  effective,  and 
no  complaint  whatever  is  to  be  made  of  the  support 
rendered  by  the  artillery  of  the  2d  Corps,  55  guns  of 
which  were  engaged  though  mostly  at  extreme  range. 

Ewell  like  Hill  had  been  ordered  to  support  Long- 
street's  attack  by  active  demonstrations.  The  success 
ful  performance  of  his  role  was  essential  to  the  success 
of  the  main  attack  in  order  that  Meade  might  not  draw 
troops  from  the  point  of  the  hook  to  support  those  at  the 
end  of  the  shank.  We  have  seen  that  but  48  pieces  of  his 
artillery  had  been  placed  in  position  in  the  morning,  a 
fact  which  almost  presaged  a  lack  of  energy  on  his 
part.  But  32  of  these  were  actively  engaged.  About 
4  P.  M.  Latimer  was  ordered  to  open  from  his  position 
at  Benner's  Hill.  As  soon  as  his  guns  were  unmasked, 
the  enemy  replied  with  a  superior  number  of  guns  from 
Cemetery  Hill  and  Gulp's  Hill,  causing  many  casualties 
in  the  battalion.  Soon  the  Federals  planted  some  guns 
well  out  to  Latimer 's  left  front,  enfilading  Carpen 
ter's  Battery  and  practically  silencing  it.  By  this  time 
one  section  of  Dement's  Battery  had  entirely  exhausted 
its  ammunition,  and  one  of  Brown's  pieces  had  been  dis 
abled.  Brown  himself  was  wounded  and  his  men  so  cut 
up  that  but  two  pieces  could  be  maintained  in  action. 
Latimer  was  now  compelled  to  retire  his  battalion  with 
the  exception  of  four  pieces  which  he  left  under  cover  to 
repel  any  advance  which  the  enemy  might  attempt. 

It  was  now  sunset.  Jones'  Battalion  was  absent 
from  the  field  altogether,  and  neither  Carter's  nor  Nel 
son's  had  fired  a  shot.  The  three  batteries  of  Dance's 
battalion  in  position  behind  Swell's  right  had  alone,  of 
all  the  artillery  of  the  2d  Corps,  supported  Latimer  by 
firing  upon  Cemetery  Hill  and  the  batteries  posted 
there.  Latimer's  contest  had  been  most  unequal. 
Ewell's  demonstration  which  should  of  course  have 
been  made  soon  after  Latimer  opened  fire  was  delayed, 
and  the  infantry  only  got  fairly  to  work  after  he  had 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  653 

been  terribly  cut  up  and  compelled  to  withdraw  his 
guns.  Finally  Johnson's  Division  advanced  and  Lati- 
mer  boldly  opened  with  the  four  pieces  which  he  had  left 
in  position,  drawing  the  overwhelming  fire  of  the  massed 
batteries  of  the  enemy  upon  him.  Perceiving  that  the 
Federals  were  shifting  the  position  of  many  of  their  guns 
so  as  to  play  upon  Latimer  and  Johnson,  Richardson  on 
Hill's  left  redoubled  his  efforts  to  divert  their  fire  and 
partially  succeeded.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  the 
overbold  and  youthful  Latimer  was  struck  down,  while 
heroically  cheering  on  the  few  cannoneers  that  remained 
at  their  posts.  The  wound  which  the  "boy  major,"  as 
he  was  called,  received  in  his  arm,  resulted  in  his  death 
from  gangrene  on  August  1st.  Col.  John  Thompson 
Brown,  the  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  2d  Corps,  char 
acterized  Latimer  as  a  gallant  and  accomplished  officer, 
and  a  noble  young  man.  "No  heavier  loss,"  said  he, 
"could  have  befallen  the  Artillery  of  this  corps."  And 
Ewell,  who  was  not  given  to  flattery  as  his  reports  will 
show,  wrote  of  him,  "The  gallant  young  officer  served 
with  me  from  March,  1862,  to  the  second  battle  of  Ma- 
nassas.  I  was  particularly  struck  at  Winchester,  May 
25,  1862,  his  first  warm  engagement,  by  his  coolness, 
self-possession,  and  bravery  under  a  very  heavy  artillery 
fire,  showing  when  most  needed  the  full  possession  of  all 
his  faculties.  Though  not  twenty-one  when  he  fell,  his 
soldierly  qualities  had  impressed  me  as  deeply  as  those 
of  any  officer  in  my  command."  And  writing  of  the 
battle  Gen.  Pendleton  said,  "Here  the  gallant  Maj. 
Latimer,  so  young  and  yet  so  exemplary,  received  the 
wound  which  eventuated  in  his  death."  While  Gen. 
Lee  did  not  mention  Latimer  in  his  report  of  the  battle 
his  admiration  of  the  youthful  artillerist  was  unbounded 
and  frequently  expressed. 

Entering  the  Virginia  Military  Institute  in  1859, 
Latimer  promptly  volunteered  when  the  Corps  of  Ca 
dets  was  sent  to  Richmond  in  April,  was  at  once  assigned 
to  duty  with  the  artillery  being  organized  in  the  camp  of 
instruction,  and  was  soon  commissioned  a  lieutenant  in 


656  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

to  the  peculiar  character  of  the  Federal  position,  which 
was  so  compact,  as  well  as  covered  by  the  accidents  of 
the  ground,  that  troops  could  easily  be  shifted  from 
point  to  point.  Nevertheless,  full  advantage  was  taken 
of  this  fortunate  circumstance  by  Meade.  Again  Hunt 
proved  to  be  the  Nemesis  of  the  Confederates,  and  time 
and  again  his  artillery  was  found  massed  just  at  the 
right  point  to  deny  them  success,  for  it  was  McGilvery 
at  Plum  Run,  who  checked  Longstreet,  and  it  was 
Stevens  on  the  right  who  hurled  Early  from  the  ridge 
he  had  all  but  won.  During  Longstreet's  attack,  Hunt 
had  supported  Sickles  with  11  batteries  with  60  guns  of 
his  general  reserve  alone.  In  addition  to  these  guns, 
the  2d,  3d,  and  5th  Corps  had  80  guns  in  action.  Against 
these  140  pieces,  Longstreet  had  but  62  guns  on  the  field, 
and  Anderson's  Division  but  5  in  advance  of  Seminary 
Ridge. 

While  the  artillery  on  both  sides  suffered  severely  in 
men  and  horses,  the  total  loss  of  ordnance  was  three  Fed 
eral  guns,  two  of  which  only  could  be  removed  by  the 
Confederates  from  the  field. 

The  fire  of  the  Confederate  Artillery  was  most  effect 
ive,  but  it  was  hopelessly  outmatched  in  numbers. 
Longstreet's  batteries  were  assigned  an  almost  impos 
sible  task,  for  after  driving  battery  after  battery  from 
the  field,  fresh  ones  continued  to  appear.  Hunt's  report 
says:  "The  batteries  were  exposed  to  heavy  front  and 
enfilading  fires  and  suffered  terribly,  but  as  rapidly  as 
any  were  disabled  they  were  retired  and  replaced  by 
others."  And  so,  after  the  most  persistent  and  heroic 
efforts  on  the  part  of  Alexander's  artillerymen  to  silence 
the  enemy's  batteries,  at  the  close  of  the  day  they  were 
rewarded  by  seeing  not  less  than  75  Federal  guns  in 
position  with  ever-increasing  infantry  supports  near-by. 
Yet  there  was  no  sign  of  discouragement  in  the  Artil 
lery. 

When  night  fell,  the  Confederate  Infantry,  with  the 
exception  of  Hood's  and  McLaws'  Division  on  the 
right,  and  Johnson's  on  the  extreme  left,  bivouacked  ap 
proximately  in  the  positions  it  had  occupied  in  the  morn- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  657 

ing.  But  while  the  Infantry  rested,  it  was  necessary  for 
the  Artillery  to  be  refitted  for  the  morrow.  A  splendid 
moon  lit  up  the  field  and  greatly  assisted  the  work.  The 
sound  horses  were  watered  and  fed,  while  those  killed 
and  disabled  were  replaced  by  drafts  from  the  wagon 
trains  in  rear.  Extra  caissons  were  brought  up,  am 
munition  issued,  the  lines  rectified  and  such  cover 
as  was  possible  provided  for  the  guns  and  their  detach 
ments. 

The  losses  in  Alexander's  own  battalion  had  been 
very  heavy,  probably  not  less  than  75  men  and  twice 
that  number  of  horses.  Taylor's  Battery  alone  lost  9 
men.  But  the  heaviest  loss  was  in  Fickling's  (Rhett's 
or  Brook's)  South  Carolina  Battery,  which  had  two  12- 
pounder  howitzers  dismounted  and  40  cannoneers  killed 
or  wounded. 

An  incident  in  connection  with  Taylor's  or  Eubank's 
Battery  is  especially  worthy  of  being  preserved.  While 
it  was  dashing  forward  to  the  orchard  corporal 
Joseph  T.  V.  Lantz,  a  veteran  gunner,  was  struck  down 
by  a  shell,  which  broke  both  his  legs  above  the  knees, 
and  soon  died.  When  some  of  his  companions  at 
tempted  to  remove  him  from  the  field,  he  said,  "You  can 
do  me  no  good;  I  am  killed;  follow  your  piece." 
Nearby  lay  the  body  of  a  young  cadet,  Hill  Carter 
Eubank,  who  only  a  few  days  before  had  left  the  Vir 
ginia  Military  Institute  to  enlist  in  the  battery  originally 
commanded  by  his  father.  The  facts  are  stated  simply 
to  show  the  character  of  the  men  who  manned  the  Con 
federate  guns.  No  artillery  ever  possessed  a  more 
superb  personnel,  and  equally  heroic  incidents  concern 
ing  them  might  be  recounted  indefinitely. 

In  Cabell's  Battalion,  the  losses  were  unusually 
severe.  McCarthy's  Battery  lost  9  men  and  13  horses. 
Lieuts.  R.  M.  Anderson  and  John  Nimmo,  with  the 
rifled  section  of  this  battery  alone,  expended  200  rounds 
of  ammunition  in  less  than  2  hours,  in  a  duel  with 
Smith's  Battery  on  Devil's  Den  Hill.  Manly's  Battery 
had  moved  forward  to  the  orchard  with  Alexander's 


658  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Battalion  and  suffered  accordingly.  Eraser's  Battery 
not  only  lost  its  veteran  commander,  but  one  of  its  lieu 
tenants  and  11  men.  When  Lieut.  Furlong  succeeded 
to  the  command  of  the  battery,  he  was  able  to  man  but 
two  pieces.  Capt.  Carlton  was  also  wounded,  Lieut. 
Motes  succeeding  to  the  command  of  the  Troup  Battery. 
During  the  night  it  was  withdrawn  to  be  refitted.  In 
Henry's  Battalion,  which  had  been  actively  engaged 
from  the  first  in  support  of  Hood,  the  losses  were  also 
severe.  One  of  Reilly's  3-inch  rifles  had  burst,  but  two 
10-pounder  Parrotts  captured  by  Hood's  men  from 
Smith's  Battery  were  turned  over  to  and  secured  by  the 
battalion.  Although  Dearing  had  reported  in  person 
to  Alexander  before  the  capture  of  the  Peach  Orchard 
and  had  taken  part  in  the  fight,  his  battalion  did  not  ar 
rive  upon  the  field  until  after  dark,  when  it  went  into 
bivouac  behind  the  ridge. 

During  the  night  it  became  known  that  the  artillery 
along  the  whole  line  would  be  called  upon  to  open  at  an 
early  hour,  and  before  morning  Eshleman's  and  Dear- 
ing's  battalions  were  moved  up  to  Alexander's  left,  with 
Cabell  and  Henry  on  his  right.  Gen.  Pendleton  and 
Col.  Long  visited  every  portion  of  the  line  before  morn 
ing,  verified  the  positions  of  the  guns,  and  gave  specific 
directions  to  the  Artillery  of  all  three  corps  as  to  its 
part  on  the  morrow.  With  the  exception  of  the  massing 
of  all  the  batteries  of  the  1st  Corps  along  the  ridge  at 
the  Peach  Orchard,  the  positions  of  the  Artillery  re 
mained  generally  unchanged.  Brown  and  Walker,  like 
Alexander,  made  every  effort  to  prepare  their  batteries 
for  the  renewal  of  the  battle,  and  everywhere  the  fullest 
confidence  reigned  in  the  Artillery.  Apparently  there 
was  no  uneasiness  over  the  small  supply  of  reserve  am 
munition  at  hand,  a  matter  with  which  the  gunners,  as 
a  whole,  were  unfamiliar,  perhaps  fortunately  so.  But 
it  seems  certain  that  some  account  should  have  been 
taken  of  the  condition  of  the  ammunition  supply,  as  a 
matter  of  extreme  importance  to  the  success  of  subse 
quent  operations.  The  expenditure  of  the  past  two  days 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  659 

had  been  enormous,  and  it  was  apparent  to  all  that  an 
unusual  amount  would  be  required  the  day  following. 
It  would  be  interesting  indeed  to  be  able  to  follow  the 
movements  of  the  ammunition  trains  and  their  methods 
of  supply,  but  one  searches  in  vain  for  a  record  of  these 
things.  Fortunately,  nowadays,  the  trains,  especially 
the  ordnance  trains,  are  both  regarded  and  treated  as 
an  integral  part  of  an  army. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

GETTYSBURG JULY  3D 

THE  dawn  of  July  3d  found  the  two  armies  approxi 
mately  in  the  positions  occupied  by  them  at  the  close  of 
the  fighting  the  evening  before.  Though  Cemetery 
Ridge  remained  intact  in  the  hands  of  the  Federals, 
yet  the  operations  had  resulted  at  every  point  in  an  ad 
vantage  to  the  Confederates  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
they  had  failed  to  accomplish  all  they  had  attempted  to 
do.  Longstreet  had  seized  and  occupied  the  advanced 
Federal  position  on  the  left,  E well's  left  held  the  breast 
works  on  Gulp's  Hill  on  the  extreme  Federal  right,  and 
tremendous  loss  had  been  inflicted  on  Meade's  army. 
The  advantage  gained  by  Ewell  would,  it  was  believed, 
enable  him  to  take  the  Federal  line  in  reverse.  Gen. 
Lee,  therefore,  determined  to  renew  the  assault.  Long- 
street,  in  accordance  with  this  decision,  was  reinforced  by 
Pickett's  three  brigades  and  Dearing's  Battalion  of  ar 
tillery,  which  arrived  after  dark,  and  ordered  to  assail 
the  heights  in  his  front  at  dawn,  while  Ewell  was  di 
rected  to  make  a  simultaneous  assault  on  the  enemy's 
right.  But  Meade  did  not  supinely  await  the  develop 
ment  of  the  Confederate  attack  as  planned.  A  great 
group  of  guns  was  placed  in  position  during  the  night, 
to  bear  on  Johnson's  Division,  which  had  been  strongly 
reinforced,  and  at  4  A.  M.  Geary  and  Ruger  advanced 
under  cover  of  the  artillery  to  wrest  their  intrench- 
ments  from  the  Confederates.  By  8  A.  M.  Ewell,  in  spite 
of  the  most  desperate  efforts  on  the  part  of  Johnson's 
men,  was  forced  to  relinquish  the  captured  works.  Long- 
street's  dispositions  had  again  been  delayed  and  the 
fighting  on  the  left  had  commenced  long  before  the  1st 
Corps  was  ready  to  cooperate.  It  rendered  Ewell  no 
effectual  support  whatever.  The  sixth  great  mistake 
had  been  committed  in  this  failure  on  the  part  of  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  661 

2d  and  3d  Corps  to  attack  simultaneously,  and  again 
Meade  had  been  free  to  reinforce  one  of  his  flanks  at 
the  expense  of  the  other. 

The  change  in  the  condition  of  affairs  compelled  Gen. 
Lee  to  alter  his  plan  of  attack.  A  reconnaissance  dis 
closed  to  him  that  the  Federal  position  from  Round  Top 
to  Gulp's  Hill  was  occupied  at  every  point  by  infantry 
and  artillery.  There  was,  however,  one  point  upon  which 
an  assault  could  be  directed  with  a  reasonable  prospect 
of  success.  The  word  reasonable  is  used  because  sub 
sequent  events  showed  that  success  would  have  been  at 
tained  had  Lee's  orders  been  executed.  This  point  was 
where  Cemetery  Ridge  sloped  westward  to  form  the 
saddle  over  which  the  Emmittsburg  Road  passed.  Lee 
believed  that  by  forcing  the  hostile  line  at  that  point 
and  directing  his  attack  toward  Cemetery  Hill,  he  could 
take  the  Federal  right  in  flank.  He  also  perceived  that 
once  having  gained  the  saddle  in  the  ridge,  the  fire  of 
the  enemy's  left  would  be  neutralized,  since  it  would  be 
as  destructive  to  friend  as  to  foe.  The  task  was  accord 
ingly  assigned  to  Longstreet,  while  as  before  Hill  and 
Ewell  were  to  support  him,  and  about  150  guns  were  to 
be  massed  to  prepare  for  the  assault.  These  conclu 
sions  were  reached  at  a  conference  held  during  the  morn 
ing  on  the  field  in  front  and  within  cannon  range  of 
Round  Top,  there  being  present  Gens.  Lee,  Longstreet, 
A.  P.  Hill,  and  various  staff  officers.  The  plan  of  at 
tack  was  fully  discussed  and  it  was  decided  that  Pickett, 
whose  men  were  fresh  and  thirsting  for  battle,  should 
lead  the  assaulting  column  supported  by  McLaws  and 
Hood.  A.  P.  Hill  was  also  to  support  the  attack  with 
such  force  as  he  could  spare.  It  was  never  in  any  way 
contemplated  that  Pickett  should  alone  make  the  as 
sault.  He  was  to  be  given  the  lead  for  the  sole  reason 
that  since  his  troops  were  un weakened  by  previous  fight 
ing  it  was  naturally  assumed  they  would  be  more  effec 
tive  than  Hood's  and  McLaws',  which  had  been  terribly 
punished.  Any  one  familiar  with  war  knows  that 
soldiers  are  not  like  wolves  which  become  more  fierce  at 


662  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

the  sight  of  blood.  The  best  troops  are  the  most  human 
men,  and  while  the  best  troops  are  able  temporarily  to 
set  aside,  they  are  never  able  entirely  to  dispel,  their 
fears  of  death.  The  more  losses  they  sustain,  the  more 
difficult  it  is  for  them  to  set  aside  those  fears.  Pickett's 
men  were  not  only  fresh,  but  were  inspired  by  a  desire 
to  reap  their  share  of  the  glory  of  the  battle,  which  had 
been  denied  them  by  their  absence  from  the  field  the  day 
before.  While  it  had  remained  in  the  rear,  its  veteran 
soldiers,  though  individually  glad  to  escape  the  horrors 
of  battle,  were  none  the  less  collectively  fearful  less  they 
might  arrive  too  late  to  satisfy  the  pride  of  their  com 
mand. 

The  sole  objection  offered  by  Longstreet  to  the  plan 
proposed  at  the  conference  was  that  the  guns  on  Little 
Round  Top  might  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  right  flank 
of  his  column,  but  this  point  was  disposed  of  apparently 
to  his  entire  satisfaction  by  Col.  Long  of  Lee's  staff, 
who  suggested  that  they  could  be  neutralized,  if  not 
silenced,  by  a  group  of  Confederate  guns  massed  for  the 
purpose.  None  of  the  awful  forebodings  which  Long- 
street  has  subsequently  declared  he  entertained  were  ex 
pressed  by  him.  He  made  no  attempt  to  point  out  the 
inevitable  failure  of  the  attack,  and  gave  no  evidence 
of  a  feeling  that  the  post  of  honor  assigned  his  corps 
was  virtually  a  forlorn  hope,  in  which  it  was  to  be  ruth 
lessly  sacrificed  by  the  "blood-thirsty  Lee."*  Yet  he 
has  declared  that  he  used  the  following  words  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  at  the  conference:  "That  will 
give  me  15,000  men.  I  have  been  a  soldier,  I  may  say, 
from  the  ranks  up  to  the  position  I  now  hold.  I  have 
been  in  pretty  much  all  kinds  of  skirmishes,  from  those 
of  two  or  three  soldiers  up  to  those  of  an  army  corps,  and 
I  think  I  can  safely  say  there  never  was  a  body  of  15,000 
men  who  could  make  that  attack  successfully."  These 
remarks,  which  Longstreet  in  fact  would  hardly  have 
dared  make,  are  important  if  they  were  actually  made, 
for  they  show  that  his  heart  was  still  not  in  his  work,  and 

*See  Longstreet's  absurd  article  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  339,  and 
also  his  book. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  663 

prove  as  previously  stated  that  his  spirit  throughout  the 
battle  was  not  one  of  cooperation,  and  also,  that  he 
positively  did  not  gather  from  the  discussion  at  the  con 
ference  that  Pickett's  Division  was  alone  to  assault.  Yet 
he  also  argues  that  Pickett  was  wantonly  sacrificed  by 
Lee  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he,  Longstreet,  made  not 
the  slightest  effort  to  support  the  division  which, 
actually  by  his  own  words,  accomplished  all  the  entire 
corps  was  expected  to  do.  The  narrative  will  show  that 
it  was  Longstreet  himself  who  sacrificed  Pickett's  Divi 
sion,  and  also  that  its  much  misunderstood  charge,  so 
commonly  and  erroneously  attributed  as  a  grievous 
error  to  Lee,  was  in  fact  a  feat  which  vindicates  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  any  possible  blame  for  having 
attempted  the  impossible.  To  believe  Longstreet  is  to 
recognize  that  he  had  in  a  sense  staked  his  professional 
opinion  against  the  possibility  of  the  successful  issue 
of  the  battle.  It  was  then  with  his  moral  force,  the 
greatest  power  of  any  general,  set  against  the  successful 
performance  of  his  part,  that  Longstreet  undertook  the 
execution  of  his  orders.  He  says,  "With  my  knowledge 
of  the  situation,  I  could  see  the  desperate  and  hopeless 
nature  of  the  charge,  and  the  cruel  slaughter  it  would 
cause.  My  heart  was  heavy  when  I  left  Pickett/' 
Picture  Longstreet,  the  "old  war-horse,"  the  "Sledge 
Hammer"  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  beset 
with  anticipations  of  loss  in  battle!  Can  anything  be 
more  absurd,  for  among  all  his  other  virtues  as  a  general 
that  of  ability  to  steel  his  heart  against  inevitable  losses 
and  not  count  the  cost  when  occasion  demanded  was  by 
far  the  finest.  Well  might  his  heart  have  been  heavy 
when  he  left  Pickett,  for  he  must  have  known  that  no 
steps  had  been  taken,  and  that  he  did  not  intend  to  take 
any,  to  support  him. 

Upon  the  representation  that  he  could  not  uncover 
his  right  by  withdrawing  Hood  and  McLaws,  Long- 
street  was  assigned  seven  brigades  of  Hill's  Corps. 
These  with  Pickett's  made  ten  brigades  for  the  column 
of  attack. 


664  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Alexander  was  early  apprised  of  the  alteration  of  the 
plan,  and  in  order  to  bring  his  guns  to  bear  on  Cemetery 
Hill  a  good  many  changes  in  the  positions  of  the  1st 
Corps  batteries  were  necessary.  The  batteries  had  been 
posted  before  daylight  on  the  rolling  ground  about  the 
Peach  Orchard,  and  by  reason  of  the  open  character  of 
the  position  were  necessarily  exposed.  The  enemy's 
guns  were  generally  in  pits  or  behind  epaulments  along 
the  ridge  opposite,  and  though  they  fired  occasional 
shots  during  the  morning,  Alexander  reserved  his  fire 
in  order  to  save  ammunition.  The  shifting  of  his  bat 
teries  to  meet  the  change  of  orders  was  conducted  as 
quietly  as  possible  by  Alexander,  but  with  his  usual 
energy  and  skill,  and  although  the  enemy's  artillery  be 
came  somewhat  more  active,  the  new  line  was  established 
by  10  A.  M.  Alexander  now  had  in  position  75  guns,  all 
well  advanced,  in  an  irregular  curved  line  about  1,300 
yards  long,  beginning  in  the  Peach  Orchard  and  ending 
near  the  northeast  corner  of  the  Spangler  wood.  Along 
this  line  Cabell's,  Dearing's,  Eshleman's,  Alexander's 
under  Huger,  and  Henry's  battalions  were  posted  in  the 
order  named  from  left  to  right.  Maj.  Richardson,  with 
the  nine  12-pounder  howitzers  of  Garnett's  Battalion, 
also  reported  to  Alexander  by  Pendleton's  orders,  and 
his  pieces  which  were  of  too  short  range  to  be  effective 
along  Hill's  front  were  directed  to  be  held  under  cover 
close  in  rear  of  the  forming  columns  of  infantry,  with 
which  it  was  intended  they  should  advance.  Pickett's 
Division  had  already  arrived  at  the  orchard  and  the  men 
were  eating  and  resting,  ignorant  of  the  fate  which 
awaited  them,  but  all  conscious  of  serious  work  ahead. 

A  few  hundred  yards  to  the  left  and  rear  of  Alex 
ander's  line  began  Walker's  line  of  60  guns,  the  batteries 
of  which  were  generally  posted  as  on  the  previous  day, 
extending  along  the  ridge  as  far  as  the  Hagerstown 
Road.  Nearly  a  mile  to  the  north  of  Walker's  left,  two 
Whitworth  rifles  of  Hurt's  Battery  were  posted  on  the 
same  ridge.  In  the  interval  10  guns  of  Carter's  Bat 
talion  occupied  positions  on  the  right  and  left  of  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  665 

railroad  cut,  and  to  their  right  connecting  with  Walker's 
left,  Watson's  and  Smith's  batteries  and  a  section  of 
Hupp's  of  Dance's  Battalion,  with  10  guns,  took  po 
sition.  Latimer's  Battalion,  now  under  Capt.  Raine, 
remained  in  rear  of  Johnson's  left,  as  did  Jones'  Bat 
talion,  while  Nelson's  Battalion  had  also  been  ordered 
to  that  point  with  directions  to  engage  the  enemy's  guns 
on  Gulp's  Hill,  if  practicable.  Capt.  Graham,  with  four 
guns,  occupied  a  hill  about  2,500  yards  northeast  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  was  alone  of  the  three  battalions  on 
Ewell's  left  engaged  during  the  day.  Thus  in  the  2d 
Corps,  Brown  placed  in  position  but  25  pieces  on  the 
morning  of  the  3d,  and  these  were  restricted  to  the  use 
of  solid  shot  because  of  the  utter  unreliability  of  the 
fuses  provided  for  their  shell. 

The  sole  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  Ar 
tillery  during  the  morning  had  been  that  of  Wyatt's  five 
guns,  or  the  left  group  of  Poague's  Battalion,  which 
opened  fire  upon  the  enemy's  position  about  7  A.  M.  A 
number  of  Federal  batteries  soon  concentrated  their  fire 
on  Wyatt,  and  Poague  promptly  ordered  him  to  desist 
from  a  further  waste  of  ammunition  in  so  unequal  a  con 
test,  in  which  nothing  was  accomplished  but  the  ex 
plosion  of  a  Federal  caisson,  and  the  loss  of  8  Confed 
erate  horses.  Col.  Poague  afterwards  learned  that 
Wyatt  had  been  ordered  by  A.  P.  Hill  to  engage  the 
enemy. 

On  the  Federal  side,  Hunt  had  placed  166  guns  in 
position  before  the  attack  commenced,  and  during  the 
engagement  10  more  batteries  from  the  reserve  were 
brought  in  action,  raising  the  number  of  his  guns  to  220, 
as  against  172  employed  by  the  Confederates.  If  there 
was  ever  an  occasion  when  every  available  piece  was 
needed  in  the  front  line,  it  was  that  of  the  artillery 
preparation  preceding  Longstreet's  assault,  yet  there 
remained  unemployed  in  the  2d  Corps  25  rifles  and  16 
Napoleons,  and  in  the  3d  Corps  fifteen  12-pounder 
howitzers.  As  the  Chief  of  Artillery  had  since  daybreak 
on  the  3d  been  busily  engaged  visiting  every  portion  of 


666  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

the  Confederate  position  from  left  to  right  he  must  have 
known  of  the  absence  of  many  of  these  guns  from  the 
line.  Specific  orders  were  personally  given  by  him  to 
the  various  group  and  even  battery  commanders.  His 
aim  was  to  secure  a  concentrated  and  destructive  fire, 
under  cover  of  which  the  infantry  might  advance.  The 
problem  now  seems  to  have  been  a  simple  one  so  far 
as  the  posting  of  the  batteries  was  concerned,  for  even 
had  it  been  impracticable  to  place  them  all  actually  in 
position,  they  might  have  all  been  held  in  readiness  under 
cover.  Most  careful  instructions  were  given  by  Pendle- 
ton  on  this  point,  and  while  he  did  actually  supervise  the 
convenient  placing  of  the  ordnance  trains,  he  seems  to 
have  failed  for  some  reason  to  verify  personally  the  post 
ing  of  the  batteries.  Subordinate  artillery  commanders 
are  of  course  responsible  for  such  neglects  as  the  actual 
failure  to  bring  their  own  guns  into  action,  and  in  this 
respect,  Col.  Brown,  of  the  2d  Corps,  was  undoubtedly 
remiss,  subject,  however,  to  the  limitations  imposed 
upon  him  by  the  orders  of  his  corps  commander,  and 
those  orders,  it  would  seem,  were  responsible  for  the 
elimination  of  Nelson's,  Jones',  and  Raine's  battalions. 
Walker's  failure  to  engage  his  15  howitzers  was  due 
solely  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  their  range,  so  no  fault 
is  to  be  found  with  the  artillery  dispositions  of  the  3d 
Corps,  and  Alexander  brought  every  piece  of  the  1st 
Corps  into  action. 

Viewing  the  disposition  of  the  Confederate  Artillery 
before  the  attack,  a  grave  error  should  have  been  de 
tected,  and  for  this  error  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  subject 
also  to  the  orders  from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  was 
responsible.  Since  Lee  assumed  no  direct  control  over 
his  artillery,  only  informing  himself  of  its  general  situa 
tion  through  Col.  Long  of  his  staff,  Pendleton  must 
receive  the  blame.  Not  only  did  he  permit  56  of  his 
guns  to  remain  idle  as  pointed  out  before,  but  he  al 
lowed  80  of  the  84  guns  of  the  2d  and  3d  Corps,  which 
were  engaged,  to  be  brought  into  action  on  a  mathe 
matically  straight  line,  parallel  to  the  position  of  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  667 

enemy  and  constantly  increasing  in  range  therefrom  to 
the  left  or  north!  It  was  indeed  a  phenomenal  over 
sight  on  his  part,  as  declared  by  Col.  Alexander,  not  to 
place  a  part  of  the  Artillery,  at  least,  north  of  the  town 
and  east  of  the  prolongation  of  his  line  of  guns  at  the 
center  to  enfilade  the  shank  of  the  fish-hook,  and  cross 
fire  with  the  guns  on  Seminary  Ridge.  Even  had  Nel 
son's  and  Jones'  battalions,  or  either  of  them,  both  of 
which  remained  idle  with  the  exception  of  Milledge's 
Battery  of  the  former,  been  massed  in  such  a  position, 
far  greater  effect  would  have  been  obtained  by  the  Ar 
tillery,  and  the  actual  disposition  of  the  rest  of  the  bat 
talions,  which  for  some  reason  unknown  to  us  might  have 
been  necessary,  need  not  have  been  altered.  Concen 
trated  fire  does  not  necessarily  mean  massed  batteries. 
And  especially  is  this  true  when  the  artillery  of  the  of 
fense  may  be  disposed  about  the  arc  of  an  enveloping 
line.  With  batteries  widely  dispersed  about  such  an 
arc,  the  enemy  at  the  more  interior  or  more  restricted 
position  is  at  a  great  disadvantage,  for  just  as  the 
sheafs  of  the  surrounding  groups  converge  upon  a  com 
paratively  small  area,  so  the  artillery  fire  of  the  defense 
becomes  divergent  and  hence  less  concentrated.  No 
more  beautiful  illustration  could  exist  of  the  possible 
relative  effectiveness  of  artillery  fire  under  such  circum 
stances  than  the  terrain  of  Gettysburg.  There,  artillery 
disposed  about  the  outer  arc  would  necessarily  inflict 
overwhelming  and  simultaneous  losses  upon  the 
thickly-massed  batteries  and  infantry  supports  on  Ceme 
tery  Ridge  and  its  adjoining  spurs,  whereas  the  fire  of 
the  defending  batteries  would,  by  virtue  of  the  depres 
sion  in  their  front,  either  be  compelled  to  ignore  the  at 
tacking  infantry,  or  the  opposing  batteries  beyond  and 
above  it.  And  even  if  part  of  the  artillery  of  the  de 
fense  was  assigned  to  each  of  these  missions,  concentra 
tion  would  be  greatly  reduced.  Furthermore,  artillery 
fire  directed  at  Seminary  Ridge  was  either  effective  to 
the  highest  degree,  or  totally  noneffective,  for  "overs" 
and  "shorts"  were  lost.  There  was  no  infantry  between 


666  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

the  Confederate  position  from  left  to  right  he  must  have 
known  of  the  absence  of  many  of  these  guns  from  the 
line.  Specific  orders  were  personally  given  by  him  to 
the  various  group  and  even  battery  commanders.  His 
aim  was  to  secure  a  concentrated  and  destructive  fire, 
under  cover  of  which  the  infantry  might  advance.  The 
problem  now  seems  to  have  been  a  simple  one  so  far 
as  the  posting  of  the  batteries  was  concerned,  for  even 
had  it  been  impracticable  to  place  them  all  actually  in 
position,  they  might  have  all  been  held  in  readiness  under 
cover.  Most  careful  instructions  were  given  by  Pendle- 
ton  on  this  point,  and  while  he  did  actually  supervise  the 
convenient  placing  of  the  ordnance  trains,  he  seems  to 
have  failed  for  some  reason  to  verify  personally  the  post 
ing  of  the  batteries.  Subordinate  artillery  commanders 
are  of  course  responsible  for  such  neglects  as  the  actual 
failure  to  bring  their  own  guns  into  action,  and  in  this 
respect,  Col.  Brown,  of  the  2d  Corps,  was  undoubtedly 
remiss,  subject,  however,  to  the  limitations  imposed 
upon  him  by  the  orders  of  his  corps  commander,  and 
those  orders,  it  would  seem,  were  responsible  for  the 
elimination  of  Nelson's,  Jones',  and  Raine's  battalions. 
Walker's  failure  to  engage  his  15  howitzers  was  due 
solely  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  their  range,  so  no  fault 
is  to  be  found  with  the  artillery  dispositions  of  the  3d 
Corps,  and  Alexander  brought  every  piece  of  the  1st 
Corps  into  action. 

Viewing  the  disposition  of  the  Confederate  Artillery 
before  the  attack,  a  grave  error  should  have  been  de 
tected,  and  for  this  error  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  subject 
also  to  the  orders  from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  was 
responsible.  Since  Lee  assumed  no  direct  control  over 
his  artillery,  only  informing  himself  of  its  general  situa 
tion  through  Col.  Long  of  his  staff,  Pendleton  must 
receive  the  blame.  Not  only  did  he  permit  56  of  his 
guns  to  remain  idle  as  pointed  out  before,  but  he  al 
lowed  80  of  the  84  guns  of  the  2d  and  3d  Corps,  which 
were  engaged,  to  be  brought  into  action  on  a  mathe 
matically  straight  line,  parallel  to  the  position  of  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  667 

enemy  and  constantly  increasing  in  range  therefrom  to 
the  left  or  north!  It  was  indeed  a  phenomenal  over 
sight  on  his  part,  as  declared  by  Col.  Alexander,  not  to 
place  a  part  of  the  Artillery,  at  least,  north  of  the  town 
and  east  of  the  prolongation  of  his  line  of  guns  at  the 
center  to  enfilade  the  shank  of  the  fish-hook,  and  cross 
fire  with  the  guns  on  Seminary  Ridge.  Even  had  Nel 
son's  and  Jones'  battalions,  or  either  of  them,  both  of 
which  remained  idle  with  the  exception  of  Milledge's 
Battery  of  the  former,  been  massed  in  such  a  position, 
far  greater  effect  would  have  been  obtained  by  the  Ar 
tillery,  and  the  actual  disposition  of  the  rest  of  the  bat 
talions,  which  for  some  reason  unknown  to  us  might  have 
been  necessary,  need  not  have  been  altered.  Concen 
trated  fire  does  not  necessarily  mean  massed  batteries. 
And  especially  is  this  true  when  the  artillery  of  the  of 
fense  may  be  disposed  about  the  arc  of  an  enveloping 
line.  With  batteries  widely  dispersed  about  such  an 
arc,  the  enemy  at  the  more  interior  or  more  restricted 
position  is  at  a  great  disadvantage,  for  just  as  the 
sheafs  of  the  surrounding  groups  converge  upon  a  com 
paratively  small  area,  so  the  artillery  fire  of  the  defense 
becomes  divergent  and  hence  less  concentrated.  No 
more  beautiful  illustration  could  exist  of  the  possible 
relative  effectiveness  of  artillery  fire  under  such  circum 
stances  than  the  terrain  of  Gettysburg.  There,  artillery 
disposed  about  the  outer  arc  would  necessarily  inflict 
overwhelming  and  simultaneous  losses  upon  the 
thickly-massed  batteries  and  infantry  supports  on  Ceme 
tery  Ridge  and  its  adjoining  spurs,  whereas  the  fire  of 
the  defending  batteries  would,  by  virtue  of  the  depres 
sion  in  their  front,  either  be  compelled  to  ignore  the  at 
tacking  infantry,  or  the  opposing  batteries  beyond  and 
above  it.  And  even  if  part  of  the  artillery  of  the  de 
fense  was  assigned  to  each  of  these  missions,  concentra 
tion  would  be  greatly  reduced.  Furthermore,  artillery 
fire  directed  at  Seminary  Ridge  was  either  effective  to 
the  highest  degree,  or  totally  noneffective,  for  "overs" 
and  "shorts"  were  lost.  There  was  no  infantry  between 


668  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

and  beyond  to  suffer  from  wild  shots  as  there  was  on 
the  heights  occupied  by  the  Federals.  Again,  whatever 
the  target  selected  by  the  inner  batteries,  their  fire  would 
have  been  frontal  with  respect  to  the  guns  on  the  outer 
arc,  whereas  every  group  on  the  latter  line  would  have 
crossed  its  fire  with  that  of  some  other  group.  Hunt 
occupied  a  position  similar  to  that  at  the  hub  of  a 
wheel;  Pendleton  could  have  and  should  have  grouped 
his  batteries  about  a  part  of  the  rim.  The  lines  of  the 
spokes  clearly  illustrate  what  the  comparative  result 
of  the  fire  of  the  two  artilleries  would  have  been,  and  it 
is  not  unreasonable  to  assume  that  the  superiority  of  the 
Federal  guns  in  number  and  weight  of  metal  would 
have  been  more  than  compensated  for  by  the  natural 
advantages  of  the  Confederate  position  in  so  far  as  the 
artillery  was  concerned.  Certainly  Hunt  would  have 
been  put  to  it  to  shift  his  batteries  from  point  to  point. 
In  fact,  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  him  to  do 
so,  for  they  were  terribly  cut  up  even  by  the  frontal 
fire  which  was  actually  encountered. 

These  conclusions  are  not  speculative,  but  are  fully 
borne  out  by  an  incident  of  the  battle,  which  shows 
what  the  possibilities  really  were.  Quite  by  accident, 
during  the  cannonade  preceding  Pickett's  charge, 
Milledge's  Battery  of  Nelson's  Battalion  fired  48 
rounds  upon  Cemetery  Hill — the  most  vulnerable  point 
to  artillery  fire,  by  reason  of  the  practicability  of  en 
filading  it,  along  the  whole  Federal  line.  The  effect  of 
Milledge's  fire  is  described  by  Col.  Osborn,  Chief  of 
Artillery,  llth  Corps,  as  follows: 

"The  fire  from  our  west  front  had  progressed  15  to 
20  minutes  when  several  guns  opened  on  us  from  the 
ridge  beyond  and  east  of  Cemetery  Hill.  The  line  of 
fire  from  the  last  batteries,  and  the  line  of  fire  from  the 
batteries  on  our  west  front,  were  such  as  to  leave  the 
town  between  the  two  lines  of  fire.  These  last  guns 
opened  directly  on  the  right  flank  of  my  line  of  batteries. 
The  gunners  got  our  range  at  almost  the  first  shot. 
Passing  low  over  Wainwright's  guns,  they  caught  us 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  669 

square  in  flank  and  with  the  elevation  perfect.  It  was 
admirable  shooting.  They  raked  the  whole  line  of  bat 
teries,  killed  and  wounded  the  men  and  horses,  and  blew 
up  the  caissons  rapidly.  I  saw  one  shell  go  through  6 
horses  standing  broadside. 

"To  meet  this  new  fire  I  drew  from  the  batteries  fac 
ing  west  the  20-pounder  Parrott  Battery  of  Capt.  Taft, 
and  wheeling  it  half  round  to  the  right  brought  it  to  bear 
on  them.  I  also  drew  from  the  reserve  one  battery  and 
placed  it  in  position  on  Taft's  right. 

"Fortunately  for  us,  these  batteries,  placed  in  the 
new  line,  at  once  secured  the  exact  range  of  their  im 
mediate  adversaries.  In  a  few  minutes  the  enemy's  fire 
almost  ceased,  and  when  it  again  opened,  and  while  the 
fire  was  progressing,  it  was  irregular  and  wild.  They 
did  not  again  get  our  range  as  they  had  it  before  we 
replied."* 

Col.  Osborn  had  in  position  over  60  guns  along  the 
line  of  the  llth  Corps.  If  less  than  50  rounds  of  Con 
federate  ammunition  caused  so  much  damage  to  that 
enormous  group  of  artillery,  what,  may  we  ask,  would 
several  thousand  have  done? 

The  formation  of  the  column  of  attack  consumed 
more  time  than  had  been  contemplated,  and  about  11 
A.  M.  before  it  had  been  completed  some  of  Hill's 
skirmishers  provoked  the  enemy  into  premature  activity 
by  attempting  to  seize  a  barn  between  the  lines. 
Gradually  the  Federal  Artillery  opened  up,  which 
tempted  Walker's  guns  to  reply,  and  before  long  Hill's 
line  was  subjected  to  the  cannonade  of  over  100  guns. 
But  soon  the  roar  of  artillery  died  out  and  the  field  was 
again  as  silent  as  a  churchyard. 

On  the  Federal  side,  Hancock's  Corps  held  Cemetery 
Ridge  with  Robinson's  Division  of  the  1st  Corps  on 
Hays'  right  in  support,  and  Doubleday's  at  the  angle 
between  Gibbon  and  Caldwell.  Newton,  who  had  suc 
ceeded  to  the  command  of  the  1st  Corps,  vice  Reynolds, 
was  in  charge  of  the  ridge  held  by  Caldwell.  Com- 

*Philadelphia  Weekly  Times,  May  31,  1877. 


670  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

pactly  arrayed  on  its  crest  was  McGilvery's  artillery 
consisting  of  his  own  batteries  and  a  number  from  the 
Artillery  Reserve.  This  group  consisted  of  41  pieces. 
Well  to  the  right  of  McGilvery,  Capt.  Hazard  had 
massed  the  26  guns  of  the  2d  Corps  in  front  of  Hays 
and  Gibbon.  Woodruff's  Battery  was  posted  in  front 
of  Zeigler's  Grove,  and  on  his  left  in  succession  were 
posted  Arnold's  Rhode  Island,  Cushing's  United  States, 
Brown's  Rhode  Island,  and  Roity's  New  York  batter 
ies.  The  two  last  named  batteries  had  been  heavily 
engaged  the  day  before,  and  so  much  cut  up  that  they 
now  brought  into  action  but  four  guns  each.  Besides 
these,  Daniel's  Horse  Battery  was  posted  at  the  angle, 
and  soon  after  the  action  commenced  Cowan's  First 
New  York  Battery  with  6  rifles  was  placed  on  Roity's 
left.  A  number  of  the  guns  on  Cemetery  Hill,  as  well  as 
those  of  Rittenhouse  on  Little  Round  Top,  could  also  be 
brought  to  bear  on  the  point  selected  for  Longstreet's 
assault.  Leaving  out  the  latter,  which  were  partially 
neutralized  by  hostile  groups,  there  were,  therefore,  77 
guns  in  two  groups  along  the  front  of  the  2d  Corps,  oc 
cupying  the  actual  crest  and  plainly  visible  to  the  Con 
federates,  who  had  brought  to  bear  upon  them  approxi 
mately  150  pieces. 

Aware  of  the  great  strength  of  their  position,  the  Fed 
erals,  after  the  early  cannonade  died  out,  simply  sat 
still  and  waited  for  developments.  On  the  Confederate 
side,  it  had  been  arranged  that  when  the  infantry 
column  was  ready,  Longstreet  should  announce  the  fact 
by  the  fire  of  two  guns  of  the  Washington  Artillery.  At 
this  signal  all  the  Confederate  guns  were  to  open  simul 
taneously  on  the  batteries  on  Cemetery  Hill,  and  the 
ridge  extending  towards  Little  Round  Top.  Alex 
ander  was  to  observe  the  fire  and  give  Pickett  the  order 
to  charge.  Accordingly  he  established  his  observing 
station  about  noon  at  a  favorable  point  near  the  left  of 
his  line  of  guns.  Soon  after  establishing  his  station, 
Alexander  received  the  following  note  from  Longstreet : 

"COLONEL — If  the  artillery  fire  does  not  have  the  effect  to  drive 
the  enemy  or  greatly  demoralize  him,  so  as  to  make  our  efforts 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  671 

pretty  certain,  I  would  prefer  that  you  should  not  advise  Gen. 
Pickett  to  make  the  charge.  I  shall  rely  a  great  deal  on  your  good 
judgment  to  determine  the  matter,  and  shall  expect  you  to  let 
Gen.  Pickett  know  when  the  moment  offers." 

This  note  naturally  startled  Longstreet's  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery,  who  did  not  wish  to  substitute  his  judgment  for 
that  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  who  had  ordered  the 
attack  to  be  made.  No  matter  what  Alexander  may 
have  thought  at  the  time,  he  must  have  felt  that  too  much 
responsibility  was  being  shifted  upon  his  shoulders  by 
his  corps  commander.  He  therefore  sent  Longstreet  the 
following  message : 

"GENERAL — I  will  only  be  able  to  judge  of  the  effect  of  our  fire 
on  the  enemy  by  his  return  fire,  for  his  infantry  is  but  little  exposed 
to  view  and  the  smoke  will  obscure  the  whole  field.  If,  as  I  infer 
from  your  note,  there  is  any  alternative  to  this  attack,  it  should  be 
carefully  considered  before  opening  fire,  for  it  will  take  all  the 
artillery  ammunition  we  have  left  to  test  this  one  thoroughly,  and 
if  the  result  is  unfavorable  we  will  have  none  left  for  another  effort. 
And,  even  if  this  is  entirely  successful,  it  can  only  be  so  at  a  very 
bloody  cost." 

Oh,  the  wisdom  of  that  message,  the  able  cunning, 
may  we  say,  of  the  subaltern  who  sent  it !  Nothing  that 
has  ever  been  written  or  said  can  half  so  well  give  us  an 
insight  into  Alexander's  character.  It  shows  us  that 
not  only  was  this  able  artilleryman  prepared  to  execute 
his  orders  irrespective  of  personal  views  concerning  the 
advisability  of  the  general  plan,  that  not  only  did  he 
have  a  most  thorough  grasp  of  the  situation  in  its 
present,  as  well  as  it  future  aspects,  but  that  he  also  had 
an  eye  to  the  propriety  of  the  shifting  of  authority  upon 
subordinates.  He  at  least  did  not  propose  to  subject 
himself  nor  the  Artillery  to  the  possibility  of  becoming 
a  scape-goat  in  event  of  a  disaster,  and  promptly  put 
the  matter  up  to  the  subtle  Longstreet  in  that  light.  "If3 
as  I  infer  from  your  note,  there  is  any  alternative  to  this 
attack,  it  should  be  carefully  considered  before  opening 
our  fire,  etc."  Well  did  Alexander  use  these  words,  and 
it  may  be  said  here  that  when  the  Chief  of  Artillery  him- 


12 


672  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

self,  whose  duty  it  was  to  prepare  the  assault,  inferred 
from  the  tone  of  the  orders  of  the  Corps  Commander 
that  there  was  an  alternative  plan,  no  other  fact  is  neces 
sary  to  prove  that  Longstreet  entertained  such  an  alter 
native.  Where,  may  we  require,  did  he  find  authority 
for  it?  Certainly  his  orders  had  been  specific  to  make 
the  attack,  and  those  orders  have  been  repeatedly  held 
up  to  the  world  by  him  as  not  only  faulty  in  the  extreme, 
but  as  allowing  him  no  alternative.  He  has  even  de 
clared  that  he  did  not  "dispute  them  further,  because  he 
saw  that  Lee's  mind  was  made  up,"  or  words  to  that 
effect.*  It  is  such  fallacies  as  those  which  Long- 
street  has  recorded  that  makes  the  world  cry  out, 
"Would  that  mine  enemy  would  write  a  book!"  And 
when  one's  enemy  writes  several  books,  it  is  even  more 
delightful  to  read  them. 

To  Alexander's  astute  dispatch,  the  following  reply 
soon  came  from  Longstreet : 

"COLONEL — The  intention  is  to  advance  the  infantry,  if  the 
artillery  has  the  desired  effect  of  driving  the  enemy  off,  or  having 
other  effect  such  as  to  warrant  us  in  making  the  attack.  When  the 
moment  arrives,  advise  Gen.  Pickett,  and  of  course  advance  such 
artillery  as  you  can  use  in  aiding  the  attack." 

Let  us  underscore  the  "if"  in  this  message,  and  again 
ask  whence  came  the  pernicious  word.  There  was  no 
"if"  in  Lee's  orders.  It  was  clearly  of  Longstreet's 
adoption.  In  other  words  he  had  set  about  his  task  pre 
pared  to  complete  it  "if"  he  chose  to  do  so,  and  this  is  not 
the  spirit  of  a  lieutenant  who  is  committed  heart  and 
soul  to  the  success  of  his  superior.  Jackson  used  no 
"ifs"  in  his  orders  for  the  execution  of  Lee's  plans.  He 
made  his  orders  mandatory,  and  said  to  his  subordinates, 
"You  will  do  so  and  so,"  nor  did  he  ever  seek  to  shift 
responsibility  upon  his  Chief  of  Artillery.  He  loved 
responsibility  and  never  parted  with  it.  This  is  what 
Lee  subsequently  meant  when  he  said  he  would  have 
won  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  had  Jackson  been  present. 
Lee  must  have  been  keenly  conscious  of  Longstreet's 

*See  Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  343. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  673 

unsympathetic  support  from  the  very  beginning  of  the 
campaign,  and  cognizant  of  that  dragging  influence 
imposed  upon  his  operations  by  the  latter  from  the 
start,  he  would  most  certainly  have  assigned  the  1st 
Corps  to  the  less  active  part  assigned  to  Hill  after  the 
first  day,  and  placed  the  more  enthusiastic  Jackson  on 
his  right,  where  energy  and  promptitude  were  most  re 
quired.  Who  can  doubt  that  Jackson  and  not  Alex 
ander,  Brown,  or  Walker,  would  have  occupied  the  im 
portant  station  actually  turned  over  by  Longstreet  to 
Alexander?  Can  we  doubt  that  Jackson  and  not  a  sub 
ordinate,  however  able,  would  have  himself  selected  the 
moment  for  the  advance  of  his  infantry?  He  did  it  at 
Chancellorsville,  and  why  would  he  not  have  done  it  at 
Gettysburg? 

Upon  the  receipt  of  Longstreet 's  reply,  which  on  the 
whole,  however,  was  couched  in  quite  a  different  tone 
from  his  first  message,  Alexander  was  still  unable  to  de 
termine  the  extent  of  his  discretion,  nor  was  Gen. 
Wright,  who  happened  to  be  present,  able  to  help  him 
out.  Wright  did  say,  however,  that  the  Federal  position 
was  not  as  difficult  to  reach  as  it  appeared  to  be,  for  he 
had  almost  carried  a  part  of  it  the  day  before.  In 
fluenced  by  Wright's  minimizing  the  difficulties  to  be 
encountered,  and  somewhat  as  he  tells  us  "by  a  sort  of 
camp  rumor  which  I  had  heard  that  morning  that  Gen. 
Lee  had  said  that  he  was  going  to  send  every  man  he 
had  upon  that  hill,"  Alexander  was  reassured  that  no 
discretion  as  to  the  attack  was  intended  and  resolved 
to  carry  out  his  part  in  the  way  he  believed  to  be  in  con 
formity  with  the  decision  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
His  position  was  not  an  enviable  one,  and  it  is  not  sur 
prising  if  his  confidence  was  somewhat  shaken  by  that 
intangible  evidence  of  irresolution  on  the  part  of  his  im 
mediate  superior,  which  in  some  indefinable  way  makes 
itself  so  quickly  felt  to  all.  In  this  spirit  it  was  that  he 
rode  back  to  see  Pickett,  whose  division  was  but  a  short 
distance  in  his  rear.  Alexander  did  not  express  his  feel 
ings  to  Pickett,  nor  did  he  question  him  as  to  his  views. 


674  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

But  by  those  means  which  human  natures  possess,  he 
adroitly  discovered  Pickett's  sentiments.  Pickett  he 
found  to  be  unusually  sanguine  of  success  and  highly 
gratified  that  his  luck  had  favored  him  by  giving  him 
the  chance  to  make  the  charge.  This  was  the  soldier 
over  whose  fate  Longstreet's  heart  was  so  heavy.  What 
a  pity  it  seems  that  some  of  Pickett's  spirit  was  not 
transmitted  to  Longstreet,  and  that  the  "camp  rumor" 
concerning  Lee's  resolution,  which  in  itself  bespoke  the 
high  moral  of  the  troops,  did  not  engender  more  confi 
dence  in  his  lieutenant.  But,  while  his  troops  were  burn 
ing  with  ardor  for  the  fight,  their  great,  soft-hearted 
leader  was  sorely  oppressed — his  heart  was  already 
bleeding  for  them! 

A  few  minutes  with  the  fiery  Pickett  sufficed  to  dis 
pel  Alexander's  uncertainty  of  mind,  and  he  returned 
to  his  post  stimulated  by  the  contagious  spirit  of  the 
gallant  infantry  leader.  No  delay  could  now  be  made, 
and  no  indecision  on  his  part  should  contribute  to  the 
miscarriage  of  the  attack,  so  he  wrote  Longstreet: 
"General:  When  our  artillery  fire  is  at  its  best,  I  shall 
order  Pickett  to  charge."  Note  the  word  "shall"  in  this 
message.  That  word  spelt  a  resolution  born  of  Pickett 
which  had  supplanted  the  previous  irresolution  born  of 
Longstreet. 

All  these  things  are  moral  factors  it  is  true,  and  are 
no  part  of  the  tactics  employed  in  the  battle,  but  never 
theless  it  is  such  things  that  induce  victories  and  de 
feats,  and  in  them  is  often  to  be  found  the  reasons  for 
what  would  otherwise  remain  inexplicable.  Not  only 
the  esprit  of  the  officers  and  men  at  the  moment  of 
attack  and  the  physical  condition  of  the  troops,  but  the 
general  state  of  their  military  digestion,  so  to  speak,  is 
important  when  one  undertakes  to  reason  from 
effect  to  cause.  It  is  not  the  mere  tactical  conception 
as  included  in  orders  that  wins  battles,  and  yet  with 
absolutely  no  other  knowledge  we  frequently  arrive  at 
conclusions  concerning  the  reasons  for  the  military 
failures  and  successes  of  the  past.  The  most  faultless 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  675 

tactics  are  frequently  set  at  nought  by  adverse  psycho 
logical  conditions,  whereas  the  sheer  elan  of  the  troops 
will  often  counteract  the  most  egregious  tactical 
blunders.  In  the  final  analysis  the  whole  theory  of  at 
tack  may  be  resolved  into  the  truth  that  poor  tactics, 
executed  with  spirit  and  confidence  in  the  leaders,  will 
more  often  guarantee  success  than  those  of  the  most  ap 
proved  form  when  the  driving  force  of  enthusiasm  is 
lacking.  This  fact  is  more  readily  grasped  if  one  but 
realizes  that  the  culmination  of  attack  is  close  contact, 
and  that  there  will  be  no  close  contact  gained  by  the  of 
fense  unless  the  tactical  plan,  however  perfect,  is  de 
veloped  with  a  certain  amount  of  rapidity,  in  order  that 
changes  may  not  be  enforced  by  the  enemy's  movements. 
Enthusiasm  alone  will  produce  rapidity  of  execution. 
All  this  well  illustrates  the  causes  of  Longstreet's  lapses 
at  Gettysburg.  He  himself  has  admitted  that  he  was 
woefully  lacking  in  enthusiasm  for  the  part  assigned 
him.  Lacking  this  fundamental  element  of  success,  his 
movements  were  consequently  not  only  tardy  as  a  rule, 
but,  when  finally  undertaken  were  not  characterized  by 
that  vigorous  push  for  which  he  was  noted. 

We  have  examined  the  situation  on  the  Confederate 
side.  Now  let  us  view  it  from  Cemetery  Ridge  as  it 
appeared  to  Gen.  Hunt  about  11  A.  M.,  using  his  own 
graphic  description:  "Here  a  magnificent  display 
greeted  my  eyes.  Our  whole  front  for  two  miles  was 
covered  by  batteries  already  in  line,  or  going  into 
position.  They  stretched — apparently  in  one  unbroken 
mass — from  opposite  the  town  to  the  Peach  Orchard, 
which  bounded  the  view  to  the  left,  the  ridges  of  which 
were  planted  thick  with  cannon.  Never  before  had 
such  a  sight  been  witnessed  on  this  continent,  and  rarely, 
if  ever,  abroad.*  What  did  it  mean?  It  might  possibly 
be  to  hold  that  line  while  its  infantry  was  sent  to  aid 
Ewell,  or  to  guard  against  a  counter-stroke  from  us,  but 
it  most  probably  meant  an  assault  on  our  center,  to  be 
preceded  by  a  cannonade  in  order  to  crush  our  batteries 

*K6niggratz  and  Sedan  had  not  then  been  fought. 


676  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

and  shake  our  infantry;  at  least  to  cause  us  to  exhaust 
our  ammunition  in  reply,  so  that  the  assaulting  troops 
might  pass  in  good  condition  over  the  half-mile  of  open 
ground,  which  was  beyond  our  effective  musketry  fire." 
Here  let  it  be  interpolated  that  Hunt,  with  the  skill  of 
the  fine  soldier  that  he  was,  accurately  divined  the  in 
tentions  of  the  Confederates,  expressing  his  conclusions 
as  follows:  "With  such  an  object,  the  cannonade  would 
be  long,  and  followed  immediately  by  the  assault,  their 
whole  army  being  held  in  readiness  to  follow  up  a  suc 
cess.  From  the  great  extent  of  ground  occupied  by  the 
enemy's  batteries,  it  was  evident  that  all  the  Artillery 
on  our  west  front,  whether  of  the  Army  Corps  or  of  the 
reserve,  must  concur  as  a  unit  under  the  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery  in  the  defense.  This  is  provided  for  in  all  well- 
organized  armies  by  special  rules,  which  formerly  were 
contained  in  our  own  army  regulations,  but  they  had 
been  condensed  in  successive  editions  into  a  few  short 
lines,  so  obscure  as  to  be  virtually  worthless,  because 
like  the  rudimentary  toe  of  the  dog's  paw,  they  had  be 
come,  from  lack  of  use,  mere  survivals, — unintelligible 
except  to  the  specialist.  It  was  of  the  first  importance  to 
subject  the  enemy's  infantry,  from  the  first  moment  of 
their  advance,  to  such  a  cross  fire  of  our  artillery  as 
would  break  their  formation,  check  their  impulse,  and 
drive  them  back,  or  at  least  bring  them  to  our  lines  in 
such  condition  as  to  make  them  an  easy  prey.  There 
was  neither  time  nor  necessity  for  reporting  this  to  Gen. 
Meade,  and  beginning  on  the  right,  I  instructed  the 
chiefs  of  artillery  and  battery  commanders  to  withhold 
their  fire  for  15  or  20  minutes  after  the  cannonade  com 
menced,  then  to  concentrate  their  fire  with  all  possible 
accuracy  on  those  batteries  which  were  most  destructive 
to  us, — but  slowly,  so  that  when  the  enemy's  ammunition 
was  exhausted,  we  should  have  sufficient  left  to  meet  the 
assault." 

Before  the  Confederate  Artillery  was  ordered  to  open, 
Alexander  sent  a  courier  to  the  rear  with  directions  to 
Maj .  Richardson  to  move  up  with  Garnett's  nine  howit- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  677 

zers,  which  he  had  decided  to  lead  forward  nearly  to 
musket  range  at  the  head  of  Pickett's  Infantry,  where 
they  would  be  of  more  service  than  in  its  rear.  But  un 
fortunately  for  Pickett,  though  fortunately  perhaps  for 
Pickett's  batteries,  Gen.  Pendleton  had  sent  them  to 
cover  behind  Hill's  line,  where  they  were  not  found  in 
time  to  be  used  by  Alexander.  Inasmuch  as  the  Chief 
of  Artillery  had  placed  these  batteries  at  Alexander's 
disposal  he  was  guilty  of  a  grave  mistake  in  detaching 
them  without  advising  his  subordinate.  True,  he  moved 
them  in  order  to  shelter  them  more  thoroughly,  but  the 
act  was  one  of  unwarranted  interference,  in  the  circum 
stances  in  which  it  was  done. 

Just  before  1  p.  M.  a  courier  dashed  up  to  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery  and  handed  its  commander  an  order 
written  on  the  fly  leaf  of  a  memorandum  book.  Ad 
dressed  to  Col.  Walton,  its  contents  were  as  follows: 
"Headquarters,  July  3,  1863.  Colonel:  Let  the  bat 
teries  open.  Order  great  care  and  precision  in  firing.  If 
the  batteries  at  the  Peach  Orchard  cannot  be  used 
against  the  point  we  intend  attacking,  let  them  open 
on  the  enemy  on  the  rocky  hill.  Most  respectfully,  J. 
Longstreet,  Lieutenant- General  commanding."  The 
order  to  fire  the  signal  guns  was  immediately  communi 
cated  to  Maj.  Eshleman,  and  the  report  of  the  first  gun 
of  Miller's  Battery  soon  rang  out  upon  the  still  summer 
air.  There  was  a  moment's  delay  with  the  second  gun, 
a  friction  primer  having  failed  to  explode.  The  inter 
val  was  but  a  short  one,  but  during  it  the  heart  of  two 
great  armies  could  almost  be  heard  to  throb.  Instantly 
a  canopy  of  smoke  spread  over  the  Peach  Orchard,  and 
exactly  at  1  o'clock,  the  roar  and  flash  of  138  Confeder 
ate  guns  announced  the  opening  of  the  conflict.  In  a 
few  seconds,  the  artillery  of  both  armies  rent  the  air 
with  the  deep  notes  of  the  guns,  and  the  crescendo  of 
bursting  shell,  while  the  earth  trembled  as  if  Jove  had 
placed  his  feet  upon  the  pedals  of  a  great  organ.  Truly 
might  Mars  have  applauded  the  tremendous  throb  and 
looked  down  with  delight  from  his  Olympic  seat  upon 


678  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

the  fire-wreathed  arena  of  Gettysburg,  for  never  in  this 
world  had  such  a  warlike  scene  been  set  before.  The 
Federal  position  seemed  to  have  broken  out  with  flash 
ing  guns  at  every  point,  and  from  Little  Round  Top 
to  Cemetery  Hill  the  ridge  blazed  like  a  volcano.  Hunt 
had  just  completed  his  dispositions  at  Little  Round  Top 
when  the  Confederate  signal  guns  were  heard.  De 
scribing  the  field  as  he  viewed  it  from  that  point,  he 
says :  "The  scene  was  indescribably  grand.  All  the  Con 
federate  batteries  were  soon  covered  with  smoke,  through 
which  the  flashes  were  incessant,  whilst  the  air  seemed 
filled  with  shells,  whose  sharp  explosions,  with  the 
hurtling  of  their  fragments,  formed  a  running  accom 
paniment  to  the  deep  roar  of  the  guns.  Thence  I  rode 
to  the  Artillery  Reserve  to  order  fresh  batteries  and  am 
munition  to  be  sent  up  to  the  ridge  as  soon  as  the  can 
nonade  ceased;  but  both  the  reserve  and  the  train  had 
gone  to  a  safer  place.  Messengers,  however,  had  been 
left  to  receive  and  convey  orders,  which  I  sent  by  them ; 
then  I  returned  to  the  ridge.  Turning  into  the  Taney- 
town  Pike,  I  saw  evidence  of  the  necessity  under  which 
the  reserve  had  "decamped,"  in  the  remains  of  a  dozen 
exploded  caissons,  which  had  been  placed  under  cover  of 
a  hill,  but  which  the  shells  had  managed  to  search  out. 
In  fact,  the  fire  was  more  dangerous  behind  the  ridge 
than  on  its  crest,  which  I  soon  reached  at  the  position 
occupied  by  Gen.  Newton,  behind  McGilvery's  batter 
ies,  from  which  we  had  a  fine  view,  as  our  guns  were 
now  in  action."  Describing  the  Artillery  fire  of  both 
sides,  Hunt  further  says:  "Most  of  the  enemy's  pro 
jectiles  passed  overhead,  the  effect  being  to  sweep  all 
the  open  ground  in  our  rear,  which  was  of  little  benefit 
to  the  Confederates, — a  mere  waste  of  ammunition,  for 
everything  there  could  seek  shelter.  ...  I  now 
rode  along  the  ridge  to  inspect  the  batteries.  The 
infantry  were  lying  down  on  its  reverse  slope,  near  the 
crest,  in  open  ranks,  waiting  events.  .  .  .  Our  fire 
was  deliberate,  but  on  inspecting  the  chests,  I  found 
that  the  ammunition  was  running  low,  and  hastened  to 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  679 

Gen.  Meade  to  advise  its  immediate  cessation,  and  prep 
aration  for  the  assault,  which  would  certainly  follow. 
The  headquarters  building,  immediately  behind  the 
ridge,  had  been  abandoned,  and  many  of  the  horses  of 
the  staff  lay  dead.  Being  told  that  the  General  had  gone 
to  the  Cemetery,  I  proceeded  thither.  He  was  not 
there,  and  on  telling  Gen.  Howard  my  object,  he  con 
curred  in  its  propriety,  and  I  rode  back  along  the  ridge, 
ordering  the  fire  to  cease.  This  was  followed  by  a  ces 
sation  of  that  of  the  enemy,  under  the  mistaken  impres 
sion  that  he  had  silenced  our  guns,  and  almost  im 
mediately  his  infantry  came  out  of  the  woods  and 
formed  for  the  assault.  On  my  way  to  the  Taneytown 
Road  to  meet  the  fresh  batteries,  which  I  had  ordered 
up,  I  met  Maj.  Bingham,  of  Hancock's  staff,  who  in 
formed  me  that  Gen.  Meade's  aides  were  seeking  me 
with  orders  to  'cease  firing.'  So  I  had  only  anticipated 
his  wishes."  So  much  for  the  Federal  side. 

Before  the  cannonade  opened  Alexander  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  give  Pickett  the  order  to  advance  within 
15  or  20  minutes  after  it  began,  but  when  he  observed 
the  full  development  of  the  Federal  batteries,  knowing 
that  the  enemy's  infantry  was  suffering  little  behind  the 
accidents  of  the  ground  and  the  sheltering  walls  along 
the  ridge,  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  give  the  word. 
He  afterwards  said  that  it  seemed  madness  to  launch 
the  infantry  into  that  fire  with  an  open  area  about  1,300 
yards  wide  to  traverse.  So  he  let  15  minutes  pass  into 
25,  hoping  vainly  that  the  effect  of  the  Confederate  ar 
tillery  fire  might  soon  produce  more  serious  effects.  At 
the  end  of  this  time  he  wrote  Pickett:  "If  you  are  com 
ing  at  all,  you  must  come  at  once,  or  I  cannot  give  you 
proper  support;  but  the  enemy's  fire  has  not  slackened 
at  all;  at  least  18  guns  are  still  firing  from  the  cemetery 
itself."  Five  minutes  after  the  sending  of  the  message, 
Hunt  ordered  his  batteries  to  cease  firing,  and  those  at 
the  Cemetery  were  seen  to  limber  up  and  retire  to  the 
rear.  It  had  not  been  the  custom  in  the  Federal  Ar 
tillery  to  withdraw  temporarily  in  anticipation  of  an 


680  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

infantry  assault,  in  order  to  save  ammunition,  though 
such  a  practice  had  all  along  been  followed  by  the  Con 
federates.  So  Alexander  believed  that  if  fresh  batteries 
were  not  shortly  brought  up  by  the  enemy,  the  position 
could  be  carried.  Observing  with  his  glass  for  five 
minutes  or  more  the  crest  which  was  still  swept  by  the 
fire  of  the  Confederate  guns,  he  was  unable  to  detect  a 
sign  of  life  on  the  deserted  position.  The  dead  and 
wounded  men  and  horses,  together  with  numerous  dis 
abled  carriages,  alone  occupied  the  ground.  He  then 
wrote  Pickett:  "For  God's  sake,  come  quick.  The  18 
guns  are  gone ;  come  quick,  or  my  ammunition  won't  let 
me  support  you  properly." 

Pickett  had  taken  Alexander's  first  note  to  Long- 
street,  who  read  it  and  said  nothing.  Pickett  then  said, 
"General,  shall  I  advance?"  Longstreet,  unwilling  to 
take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  ordering  him  not 
to  do  so,  but  equally  unwilling  to  give  the  word  for  the 
charge  in  pursuance  of  Lee's  orders,  simply  turned  his 
head  away,  with  the  result  that  Pickett,  whose  heart 
was  in  the  right  place,  saluted  and  said,  "I  am  going  to 
move  forward,  sir,"  and  then  galloped  off  to  his  division, 
and  immediately  put  it  in  motion. 

Longstreet  claims  that  he  nodded  his  head  in  answer 
to  Pickett's  question.  But  even  if  he  did,  that  was  a 
remarkable  way  for  a  corps  commander  to  set  his  as 
saulting  column  in  motion.  His  whole  attitude  and 
conduct  was  not  well  calculated  to  impart  to  the  leader 
of  his  column  that  fiery  ardor  which  alone  could  win 
success.  Fortunately,  Pickett's  nerve  was  unimpaired 
by  Longstreet's  conduct.  Had  a  less  bold  spirit  been  in 
the  lead,  the  1st  Corps  would  never  have  made  the  at 
tempt.  The  whole  incident  is  chilling  to  the  spirits  of 
one  who  follows  it,  though  it  had  no  such  effect  on 
Pickett.  In  the  light  of  after  events,  it  seems  almost 
too  bad  he  had  the  resolution  to  make  the  attempt,  for 
we  are  now  able  to  see  that  with  the  exception  of  his 
individual  enthusiasm  and  that  of  his  men,  not  one  ele 
ment  of  success  was  present. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  681 

Most  of  the  Confederate  reports  declare  that  at  this 
juncture  the  Federal  batteries  were  silenced,  in  the  sense 
than  they  were  subdued.  Again  we  see  how  dangerous  it 
is  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  silent  guns  are  harmless 
guns,  for  in  this  instance  their  retirement  was  but  the 
calm  before  the  storm  which  was  to  break  out  with  re 
newed  fury.  The  moment  was  in  fact  far  more  ominous 
of  what  was  to  follow,  than  propitious  for  the  assault. 

Leaving  his  staff,  Longstreet  rode  to  Alexander's 
observing  station.  It  was  then  about  1 :40  p.  M.  Alex 
ander  explained  the  artillery  situation  to  him,  feeling 
then  more  hopeful  of  success,  but  expressing  a  fear  less 
his  ammunition  might  be  exhausted  before  the  crisis  of 
the  attack.  "Stop  Pickett  immediately  and  replenish 
your  ammunition,"  said  Longstreet.  But  Alexander  de 
murred  on  the  ground  that  the  effect  of  the  artillery 
preparation  would  be  lost,  and  also  because  there  was 
but  a  little  reserve  ammunition  left.  Longstreet  then 
said  to  him:  "I  don't  want  to  make  this  attack.  I 
would  stop  it  now,  but  that  Gen.  Lee  ordered  it  and  ex 
pects  it  to  go  on.  I  don't  see  how  it  can  succeed." 

Let  us  pause  again  and  ask  ourselves  if  this  was  not 
a  pitiful  situation  in  which  the  superb  1st  Corps  found 
itself.  Think  of  it !  How  could  aught  but  disaster  ensue 
with  such  a  one  at  its  head?  Its  bold  leader  had  utterly 
succumbed  and  instead  of  being  his  old  self,  the  man 
of  iron  nerve  and  will,  he  was  now  at  the  crucial  instant 
of  the  war,  suffering  from  all  the  frailties  of  a  weak 
mortal.  We  know  that  Longstreet  possessed  great  per 
sonal  courage,  but  as  a  leader,  on  this  occasion,  he  was 
most  certainly,  as  proved  by  his  own  words,  the  victim 
of  "cold  feet."  It  was  his  duty  to  order  that  charge. 
If,  in  his  opinion,  it  was  so  grievous  a  mistake  as  he  later 
declared  it  to  have  been,  his  course  was  clear.  He 
should  have,  in  the  presence  of  Lee  and  his  staff,  made 
his  protest,  in  writing,  if  necessary,  and  upon  being 
overruled,  he  should  have  gone  back  to  his  command 
with  teeth  set  and  sought  to  impress  his  division  and  bri 
gade  commanders  not  only  with  the  necessity  of  success, 


682  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

but  with  the  practicability  of  the  assault.  Had  he  done 
this,  the  attack  would  probably  have  succeeded,  but 
even  had  it  failed,  Longstreet  would  have  been  scot- 
free  of  all  blame  and  Lee  would  have  been  the  first  to 
publish  his  protest,  in  order  that  his  lieutenant  might  be 
promptly  and  absolutely  absolved  before  the  world.  As 
it  was,  the  magnanimous  Lee  assumed  all  the  blame  in 
order  that  his  lieutenant  might  not  be  rendered  less  effi 
cient  as  a  leader,  by  the  destruction  of  the  confidence  of 
his  men.  Lee  knew  that  his  own  character,  record,  and 
motives  alone  could  stand  the  strain  which  the  blame  for 
the  loss  of  Gettysburg  would  impose  upon  the  one  who 
assumed  it,  and  it  was  his  willingness  to  shoulder  the 
responsibility  of  the  many  risks  that  he  took  during  the 
war,  which  made  him  the  moral  equal,  if  not  superior  of, 
any  captain  of  history.  It  is  interesting  to  speculate 
what  the  career  of  a  soldier  with  such  moral  force  might 
have  been  had  he  possessed  the  means  at  the  disposal  of, 
and  the  ambitious  lust  for  power  which  inspired  Alex 
ander,  Caesar,  and  Napoleon.  Though  not  generally 
classed  with  these  as  a  great  captain,  history  will  in  the 
course  of  time  liken  him  with  respect  to  the  higher  virtues 
of  the  soul  to  Hannibal,  who  from  the  dispassionate 
record  now  appears  to  have  been  the  strongest  man  that 
ever  bore  arms.  Eventual  success  in  war  is  the  most 
potent  irrigant  of  that  fame  which  grows  greener  and 
greener  with  time.  Defeat  is  the  blighting  sun  which 
scorches  and  shrivels  military  reputations  until  nothing 
remains  but  the  gullies  and  waste  places  of  failure,  from 
which  no  garlands  are  plucked.  These  are  facts  which 
the  names  of  Hannibal  and  Lee  alone  have  set  at  naught. 
But  to  return  again  to  our  narrative. 

What  Col.  Alexander's  feelings  were  upon  hearing 
Longstreet's  words  is  difficult  to  imagine.  We  can 
hardly  assume  that  he  was  surprised,  but  we  can  be  sure 
of  one  thing, — he  was  not  shaken  in  his  resolve  to  do 
his  best.  The  heart  of  Pickett  himself  was  no  bolder 
than  that  which  beat  in  Alexander's  breast.  He  listened, 
but  dared  not  offer  a  word.  He  realized  that  the  battle 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  683 

was  lost  if  he  ordered  his  guns  to  cease  firing,  for  he 
knew  that  the  ammunition  supply  was  too  low  to  per 
mit  of  another  artillery  preparation;  the  guns  had 
hardly  cooled  during  the  past  three  days.  There  was 
still  a  chance  of  success,  and  it  was  not  his  part  by  word 
or  deed  to  sacrifice  it,  and  though  he  failed  to  see  it,  the 
recordation  of  these  sentiments  on  his  part  remains  one 
of  the  greatest  indictments  of  the  superior  whom  he  has 
so  ardently  sought  to  defend. 

While  Longstreet  was  still  speaking  to  his  Chief  of 
Artillery,  the  die  cast  itself,  for  Pickett's  immortal  divi 
sion  swept  out  of  the  woods  in  rear  of  the  guns  and  pre 
sented  its  gray  breast  to  the  enemy.  The  line  swept  on 
with  bayonets  flashing  in  the  sun  like  the  spray  on  the 
crest  of  a  great  wave.  At  the  head  of  his  brigade  rode 
Gen.  Dick  Garnett,  of  the  old  9th  Infantry,  just  out 
of  the  ambulance,  but  stimulated  with  hope  of  fresh 
glory.  As  he  passed  Longstreet,  he  threw  back  the  cape 
of  his  frazzled  blue  overcoat  and,  raising  himself  erect  in 
the  saddle,  waved  a  grand  salute  to  his  corps  com 
mander. 

After  riding  forward  with  Garnett  a  short  distance, 
Alexander  returned  to  his  line,  with  a  view  to  select  such 
of  his  guns  as  had  enough  ammunition  to  follow  Pickett. 

While  the  great  artillery  duel  had  been  in  progress, 
and  before  the  infantry  advanced,  a  serious  danger 
threatened  Longstreet's  right.  This  was  the  appear 
ance  of  Kilpatrick's  division  of  cavalry,  which  moved 
upon  that  flank  and  commenced  massing  in  the  body 
of  timber  extending  from  the  base  of  Big  Round  Top 
westward  to  Kern's  house  on  the  Emmittsburg  Road. 
Reilly's  and  Bachman's  batteries  of  Henry's  Battalion 
had  been  promptly  ordered  to  change  front  to  the  right 
and  had  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy's  cavalry  with  such 
effect  as  at  once  to  drive  it  beyond  the  wood  and  out  of 
sight.  In  the  meantime,  part  of  Stuart's  Cavalry  was 
arriving  on  the  right  and  soon  formed  line  at  right- 
angles  to  that  of  Hood's  Division,  while  Hart's  Horse 
Battery  was  stationed  on  the  Emmittsburg  Road  at  the 


684  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

angle,  and  later  succeeded  in  driving  off  Merritt's  Fed 
eral  Cavalry  Brigade  which  deployed  for  the  attack. 

The  infantry  column  led  by  Pickett  had  been  poorly 
formed.  Six  brigades,  or  those  of  Brockenbrough, 
Davis,  McGowan,  Archer,  Garnett,  and  Kemper,  with 
about  10,000  men,  were  in  the  first  line,  with  a  second 
line  composed  of  Lane's,  Scale's,  and  Armistead's  bri 
gades,  very  much  shorter  than  the  first  on  its  left,  fol 
lowing  200  yards  in  rear.  The  remaining  brigade,  Wil- 
cox's,  was  posted  in  rear  of  the  right  of  the  column,  both 
flanks  of  which  rested  in  the  air  with  no  support  in  its 
rear.  As  the  infantry  rushed  through  the  line  of  guns 
and  debouched  upon  the  plain  in  front  of  the  ridge, 
the  Federal  Artillery,  which  had  become  almost  silent, 
broke  out  again  with  all  its  batteries,  the  18  guns  at  the 
cemetery  promptly  reappearing  in  action.  The  Con 
federate  batteries,  which  had  been  compelled  to  reserve 
their  fire  while  the  infantry  was  moving  past  them,  re 
opened  over  its  head,  as  soon  as  the  attacking  troops  ad 
vanced  about  200  yards.  But  the  Federal  guns  which 
had  been  so  skillfully  concealed  for  the  time  being  and 
shoved  to  the  forward  crest  to  repel  the  assault,  utterly 
ignored  the  Confederate  batteries,  and  concentrated 
with  the  utmost  precision  upon  the  infantry.  Mean 
time,  Alexander  had  formed  about  18  guns,  including 
five  from  Garden's  and  Flanner's  batteries,  of  Henry's 
Battalion,  on  the  right  under  Maj.  John  C.  Haskell, 
and  four  from  the  Washington  Artillery  on  the  left, 
three  under  Capt.  Miller,  and  one  of  Norcom's  or  Eshle- 
man's  old  battery  under  Lieut.  Battles.  In  the  center 
only  about  one  gun  in  every  four  could  be  ordered  for 
ward.  The  ammunition  had  all  but  run  out  along  the 
line,  and  the  caissons  which  had  been  sent  to  the  ordnance 
train  had  not  returned.  The  train  had  also  been  moved 
by  Pendleton  to  a  more  distant  point  than  the  one  it  first 
occupied,  to  escape  the  fire,  which  had  been  directed  at 
the  batteries  on  the  right  of  Walker's  line  on  the  ridge. 
Alexander  soon  advanced  with  Eshleman's,  Haskell's, 
Lieut.  Motes'  Troup  Artillery  (Capt.  Carlton  having 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  685 

been  wounded),  and  several  other  guns,  to  a  swell  of 
the  ground  just  west  of  the  Emmittsburg  Road,  where 
he  sought  to  protect  Pickett's  column  by  firing  upon  the 
enemy's  troops,  advancing  to  attack  its  right  flank.  The 
four  guns  which  Haskell  advanced  from  the  Peach 
Orchard  and  the  four  on  his  left  under  Capt.  Miller  and 
Lieut.  Battles  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  were  so  far 
to  the  front  of  Pickett's  route  that  they  were  able  to 
enfilade  the  Federal  Infantry  massing  to  meet  the 
assault.  The  effect  of  their  fire  was  for  a  time  terrific, 
but  soon  attracted  that  of  not  less  than  20  guns  which 
practically  silenced  them  after  disabling  a  number  of 
pieces  and  many  men  and  horses. 

The  troops  of  Heth's  Division,  decimated  by  the 
storm  of  deadly  hail  which  tore  through  the  ranks,  had 
faltered  and  fallen  back  before  the  combined  artillery 
and  musketry  fire  of  the  enemy.  This  had  impelled 
Pender's  Division  to  fall  back  also  while  Wilcox's  Bri 
gade,  perceiving  that  the  rest  of  Hill's  troops  were  un 
able  to  reach  the  Federal  position,  had  failed  so  far  to 
move  forward  to  Pickett's  support.  The  disintegration 
of  the  infantry  column  had  set  in  when  the  column  had 
traversed  about  half  the  intervening  space.  The  Fed 
eral  line  overlapped  it  on  the  left  800  yards  or  more, 
and  was  crowded  with  guns.  The  fire  upon  the  un 
supported  left,  the  advance  of  which  was  retarded  by 
numerous  fences,  could  be  endured  but  a  short  time. 
Already  the  artillery  support  which  had  been  expected 
from  the  3d  Corps  was  failing,  by  reason  of  the  batteries 
having  indulged  in  the  earlier  duel  of  the  morning. 
That  useless  waste  of  ammunition  was  now  to  be  sorely 
felt.  Garnett  and  Armistead  had  been  killed,  Kemper 
wounded,  and  over  2,000  of  Pickett's  men  had  fallen 
within  30  minutes,  before  the  end  of  which  time  the 
shattered  remnants  were  driven  from  the  position  they 
had  carried. 

Just  as  the  Confederate  column  began  to  advance,  the 
reserve  batteries  which  Hunt  had  ordered  up  had  ar 
rived,  and  Fitzhugh's,  Weir's,  and  Parsons'  were  put  in 


686  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

near  the  clump  of  trees,  while  Brown's  and  Arnold's 
batteries,  much  crippled,  were  withdrawn,  Cowan's  be 
ing  substituted  for  the  former.  McGilvery's  group  had 
promptly  reappeared  and  opened  a  destructive  oblique 
fire  upon  the  right  of  the  assaulting  column,  greatly 
aided  by  Rittenhouse's  six  rifles  on  Little  Round  Top, 
which  were  served  with  remarkable  accuracy  in  enfilad 
ing  the  Confederate  lines.  The  steady  fire  from  Mc 
Gilvery's  and  Rittenhouse's  groups  caused  the  column 
of  attack  to  drift  to  the  left  out  of  its  true  course,  so 
that  the  weight  of  the  assault  fell  directly  upon  the 
position  occupied  by  Hazard's  group  of  batteries. 
Hunt  had  counted  on  the  cross  fire  of  his  artillery  groups 
halting  the  Confederate  column  before  it  reached  the 
Federal  position,  but  in  this  he  was  disappointed,  for 
Hazard,  who  had  exhausted  his  shell,  was  compelled 
to  remain  silent  until  the  Confederate  Infantry  arrived 
within  the  zone  of  canister  effect.  The  orders  of  the 
corps  commander,  which,  contrary  to  Hunt's  directions, 
had  resulted  in  Hazard's  expenditure  of  all  his  shell  in 
the  artillery  duel  preceding  the  assault,  deprived  the 
defense  of  nearly  one-third  of  its  guns  in  the  early  stage 
of  the  attack,  and  entirely  of  the  effect  of  the  cross  fire 
which  had  been  planned.  Hunt  subsequently  declared 
that  Pickett's  troops  could  never  have  reached  Hazard's 
batteries  had  his  orders  not  been  superseded.  But  this  is 
neither  here  nor  there.  They  did  reach  the  ridge  in 
spite  of  the  tornado  of  canister  fire  which  Hazard 
opened  upon  them  when  within  about  200  yards  of  his 
batteries. 

As  the  Confederate  brigades  closed  upon  the  Federal 
position,  the  fire  fight  of  the  infantry  commenced  in 
earnest.  It  lasted  but  a  short  time  and  soon  Pickett's 
men,  who  with  the  exception  of  the  more-advanced  ones 
had  never  halted,  surged  on.  As  the  rear  line  merged 
with  the  first  the  troops  swarmed  over  the  fences  and 
disappeared  in  the  smoke  and  dust  which  concealed  the 
enemy's  guns.  Already  the  Confederate  guns,  except 
those  with  which  Alexander  was  engaging  the  enemy  on 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  687 

the  right,  had  been  compelled  to  suspend  their  fire.  The 
stars  and  bars  were  now  discerned  fluttering  among  the 
Federal  guns,  but  the  enemy  was  closing  in  upon 
Pickett's  men  from  all  sides  in  spite  of  every  effort 
which  Walker's  and  Alexander's  batteries  made  to  pre 
vent  it.  Ewell's  Infantry  and  Artillery  were  all  silent, 
leaving  Meade  free  to  draw  troops  from  his  right  to  as 
sist  in  the  repulse  of  Pickett. 

From  the  Confederate  position,  the  awesome  tragedy 
was  grand  and  thrilling,  and  the  onlookers  watched  it 
as  if  life  and  death  hung  upon  the  issue.  "If  it  should 
be  favorable  to  us,"  wrote  one  of  the  Confederate  of 
ficers,  "the  war  was  nearly  over;  if  against  us,  we  each 
had  the  risks  of  many  battles  yet  to  go  through.  And 
the  event  culminated  with  fearful  rapidity.  Listening 
to  the  rolling  crashes  of  musketry,  it  was  hard  to  realize 
that  they  were  made  up  of  single  reports,  and  that  each 
musket  shot  represented  nearly  a  minute  of  a  man's 
life  in  that  storm  of  lead  and  iron.  It  seemed  as  if  100,- 
000  men  were  engaged,  and  that  human  lives  were  being 
poured  out  like  water." 

Just  as  Pickett's  troops  had  reached  the  Federal  po 
sition,  Col.  Freemantle,  of  Her  Majesty's  Army,  who 
until  then  had  occupied  a  post  of  vantage  behind  Hill's 
Corps  on  the  ridge,  came  upon  the  field,  and  in  the  be 
lief  that  the  attack  had  fully  succeeded  declared  to 
Longstreet  that  he  would  not  have  missed  the  scene  for 
anything  in  the  world. 

When  Pickett,  who  was  riding  with  his  staff  in  rear 
of  his  division,  saw  that  Hill's  brigades  on  his  left  were 
breaking  up,  after  sending  two  aides  to  rally  them,  a 
third  was  sent  to  Longstreet  to  say  that  the  position  in 
front  would  be  taken,  but  that  reinforcements  would  be 
required  to  hold  it.  Longstreet,  in  reply,  directed 
Pickett  to  order  up  Wilcox,  and  Pickett  sent  three  mes 
sengers  in  succession  to  be  sure  that  the  order  was 
promptly  acted  upon.  As  the  fugitives  from  Petti- 
grew's  Division  came  back,  Wright's  Brigade  of  Ander 
son's  Division  was  moved  forward  a  few  hundred  yards 


13- 


688  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

to  cover  their  retreat.  Already  a  stream  of  fugitive  and 
wounded  soldiers  had  begun  to  flow  from  the  ridge  to 
the  rear,  pursued  by  the  enemy's  fire  from  the  right  and 
left,  and  it  was  apparent  to  all  that  Pickett's  men,  unless 
strongly  reinforced — could  not  hold  on.  After  about  20 
minutes,  when  the  fire  had  all  but  ceased,  and  during 
which  time  ever-increasing  masses  of  Federal  infantry 
were  seen  to  be  moving  from  all  directions  upon  his 
men,  Wilcox's  Brigade  of  about  1,200  men,  with  some 
250  of  Perry's  Florida  Brigade  on  its  left,  charged 
past  the  more-advanced  Confederate  batteries.  Not 
another  man  was  ordered  forward,  and  nothing  re 
mained  for  them  to  support,  for  Pickett's  Division  had 
by  this  time  simply  crumbled  away  under  the  terrific 
infantry  and  artillery  fire,  which  had  been  concentrated 
from  all  sides  upon  it. 

The  victory  which  for  a  moment  had  seemed  within 
their  grasp  had  eluded  the  Confederates,  4,000  of  whom 
had  fallen  or  been  captured  in  the  assault.  No  troops 
could  have  behaved  more  gallantly  than  those  who  par 
ticipated  in  the  attack,  and  none  could  have  displayed 
higher  qualities  of  courage  and  discipline  than  those  of 
the  whole  army  when  it  became  apparent  that  Pickett 
had  been  repulsed.  While  Wilcox's  Brigade  was  mak 
ing  its  charge,  Gen.  Lee,  entirely  alone,  had  joined  Col. 
Alexander.  The  Artillery  of  the  1st  Corp  had  ceased 
firing  in  order  to  save  ammunition  in  case  the  enemy 
should  attempt  a  counter-stroke.  Wilcox's  charge  was 
as  useless  as  it  was  tragic.  The  brigade  advanced  but  a 
short  distance  before  it  was  overcome  by  the  fire  of  the 
enemy,  and  compelled  to  halt,  whereupon  Lee  ordered 
it  to  be  withdrawn  and  placed  in  position  behind  the 
batteries  with  Wright's  Brigade  to  oppose  the  enemy, 
should  they  advance.  The  Commander-in- Chief  was  no 
doubt  apprehensive  of  such  action  on  Meade's  part  and 
personally  did  everything  he  could  to  encourage  his 
troops,  especially  the  disorganized  stream  of  fugitives 
moving  to  the  rear.  "Don't  be  discouraged,"  said  he  to 
them,  "It  was  my  fault  this  time.  Form  your  ranks 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  689 

again  when  you  get  under  cover.  All  good  men  must 
hold  together  now."  Only  when  they  had  all  passed, 
and  it  was  seen  that  no  attack  by  the  enemy  was  in 
tended,  did  Gen.  Lee  leave  the  threatened  point.  The 
officers  of  every  grade  on  that  part  of  the  field  seconded 
his  efforts  to  preserve  order  and  reform  the  broken 
troops,  and  the  men  so  promptly  obeyed  the  call  to  rally 
that  their  thinned  ranks  were  soon  restored  and  the  line 
reestablished.  There  was  no  sign,  whatever,  of  panic  or 
even  discouragement.  The  troops,  though  mortified 
over  their  repulse,  longed  for  the  enemy  to  attack  in 
order  that  they  might  efface  the  blot  of  their  first  serious 
defeat. 

While  the  broken  infantry  was  streaming  to  the  rear 
and  being  reformed,  Alexander's  guns  alone  and  en 
tirely  unsupported  opposed  the  enemy  at  the  Peach 
Orchard.  His  ammunition  was  now  almost  entirely  ex 
hausted,  so  no  notice  was  taken  of  the  desultory  fire  of 
the  hostile  batteries.  Occasionally  Alexander's  batter 
ies  were  compelled  to  fire  with  canister  upon  the  Federal 
skirmishers,  which  were  thrown  forward,  but  the 
enemy's  guns  refrained  from  molesting  the  Confederate 
batteries.  Already  some  of  Alexander's  batteries  had 
withdrawn  entirely  from  the  field  to  refit,  and  those  in 
the  best  condition  now  returned  after  having  partially 
refilled  their  chests  with  ammunition  and  boldly  re 
mained  in  advanced  positions  until  late  in  the  day  with 
out  a  single  infantryman  in  their  fronts  along  certain 
portions  of  the  line.  But  Meade's  Army  was  so  much 
shattered  and  discouraged  by  the  losses  it  had  incurred 
that  he  did  not  feel  able  to  attempt  to  follow  up  his 
success.  He  saw  that  Lee  had  merely  been  repulsed  and 
not  routed,  and  that  two  whole  divisions,  those  of  Mc- 
Laws  and  Hood,  lay  across  his  path.  Swinton  also  de 
clares  that  besides  the  heavy  losses  they  had  sustained  in 
repulsing  the  attack,  the  Federal  troops  were  thrown  in 
much  confusion  by  the  intermingling  of  the  various 
commands.  The  aggregate  Federal  loss  of  the  three 
days  had  reached  the  enormous  figure  of  23,000  men, 


690  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

including  Reynolds,  Gibbon,  and  many  other  of  the 
most  valuable  officers;  Hancock  was  wounded.  While 
the  Confederates  had  been  defeated,  it  is  very  easy  to 
see  why  Meade  was  unable  to  reap  the  fruits  of  his 
victory.  The  idea  that  there  was  a  gap  in  the  Confeder 
ate  right  is  absurd,  and  had  Meade  attacked  Lee,  it 
seems  certain  he  would  have  received  as  bloody  a  repulse 
as  had  been  inflicted  upon  Pickett.  In  this  respect  we 
must  agree  with  Longstreet,  Hunt,  and  Swinton,  in 
preference  to  the  views  of  Alexander.  The  largest  bod 
ies  of  organized  Federal  troops  available  at  the  close  of 
the  attack  were  on  Meade's  left.  An  advance  to  the 
Plum  Run  line  of  the  troops  behind  it,  as  Hunt  points 
out,  would  have  brought  them  directly  in  front  of  Alex 
ander's  batteries,  which  still  crowned  the  ridges  along 
the  Emmittsburg  Road;  a  farther  advance  would  have 
brought  them  under  a  flank  fire  from  McLaws  and 
Hood.  It  is  true  that  Alexander  possessed  little  am 
munition  for  his  guns,  but  most  of  what  was  left  was 
canister  and  the  field  of  fire  which  the  Federal  Infantry 
would  have  had  to  traverse  would  have  presented  the 
opposing  artillery  with  an  opportunity  not  less  favor 
able  than  that  at  Second  Manassas.  Only  a  few  rounds 
per  gun  would  have  been  necessary. 

Finding  that  Meade  was  not  going  to  follow  up  his 
success,  Longstreet  prepared  to  withdraw  his  advanced 
line  to  a  better  defensive  position.  Hood  and  McLaws 
were  ordered  to  fall  back  slowly  before  Meade's  skir 
mishers,  and  during  the  afternoon  Alexander  withdrew 
his  guns  from  the  Peach  Orchard  one  by  one.  By  10 
P.  M.  the  batteries  of  the  1st  Corps  had  been  retired  to 
the  positions  occupied  by  them  along  Seminary  Ridge 
on  the  2d  of  July,  and  the  infantry  was  firmly  estab 
lished  with  the  Peach  Orchard  still  in  its  possession. 
Stuart  had  rejoined  the  Army  on  the  night  of  the  2d, 
and  had  promptly  assumed  the  duty  of  protecting  the 
flanks,  which  he  still  guarded. 

Merritt's  attack  on  the  Confederate  right  had  been 
followed  up  by  a  bold  charge  of  the  Federal  Cavalry  led 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  691 

by  the  gallant  Farnworth,  who  had  lost  his  life  in  the 
fight.  On  the  Confederate  left,  four  of  Stuart's  brigades 
had  successfully  opposed  three  of  Gregg's  near  Cress's 
Ridge,  %y2  miles  east  of  Gettysburg.  Stuart's  position 
offered  excellent  opportunities  for  the  use  of  his  horse 
artillery,  reinforced  by  a  section  of  Green's  Battery  of 
the  2d  Corps,  Griffin's  Horse  Battery  of  Jenkins' 
Cavalry  Brigade,  and  Jackson's  new  horse  battery. 
In  this  affair  Breathed  and  McGregor  had  taken  no  part 
at  first  by  reason  of  lack  of  ammunition,  but  later  in  the 
day  had  appeared  on  the  field  and  rendered  valiant  serv 
ice,  holding  Gregg  in  check  until  nightfall.  In  this 
quarter,  both  Stuart  and  Gregg  held  approximately 
their  original  positions,  but  the  Federal  Cavalry  had 
succeeded  in  foiling  Stuart's  design  to  fall  upon  Meade's 
rear.  Chew's  and  Moorman's  batteries  were  not  en 
gaged  at  Gettysburg  with  the  Cavalry,  having  been  left 
in  the  rear  between  Hagerstown  and  the  river,  and  Im- 
boden's  independent  Cavalry  Brigade  with  McClan- 
nahan's  Horse  Battery  of  six  pieces  only  reached  the 
field  late  on  the  3d.  It  had  been  engaged  throughout  the 
campaign  in  raids  on  the  left  of  the  advancing  army. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  3d,  Lee  abandoned  his 
plan  to  dislodge  Meade  and  determined  upon  immediate 
retreat  to  Virginia,  and  under  cover  of  darkness  with 
drew  Ewell's  Corps  to  the  ridge,  and  drew  back  Long- 
street's  right  to  Willoughby  Run.  Imboden,  with  his 
2,100  men,  was  assigned  the  duty  of  organizing  all  the 
transportation  of  the  Army  into  one  vast  train  14  miles 
long,  and  conducting  it  without  a  halt  to  Williamsport, 
and  from  thence  to  Winchester.  Eshleman's  Battalion 
with  eight  pieces,  Tanner's  4-gun  battery  of  the  2d 
Corps,  Lieut.  Pegram  of  Hurt's  Battery  with  a  Whit- 
worth,  and  Hampton's  Cavalry  Brigade  with  Hart's 
Battery  were  ordered  to  report  to  him,  so  that  the  escort 
included  23  guns  in  all. 

The  great  battle  was  over  with  the  close  of  the  third 
day.  Nothing  will  so  impress  the  student  with  its  mag 
nitude  as  the  statistics  of  the  Artillery  arm. 


692  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Allowing  the  Confederates  a  maximum  of  55,000 
infantry  present  on  the  field  during  the  three  days  and 
272  guns,  we  find  that  in  the  battle  the  proportion  of  ar 
tillery  to  infantry  was  about  five  pieces  per  thousand 
men.  Meade  had  engaged  about  78,000  infantry  with 
310  guns,  exclusive  of  the  Horse  Artillery.  The  Federal 
proportion  of  artillery  to  infantry  was  therefore  smaller 
than  that  of  the  Confederates,  being  about  four  guns  per 
thousand  men.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  pro 
portion  actually  engaged  was  larger,  for  practically  all 
of  Meade's  artillery  was  utilized  at  one  time  or  another, 
while  much  of  Ewell's  artillery  was  idle.  The  supply 
of  ammunition  carried  into  the  field  for  the  Federal  ar 
tillery  consisted  of  270  rounds  per  gun,  whereas  that  for 
the  Confederate  artillery  was  but  150  rounds  per  gun. 
This  fact  still  further  increased  the  relative  superiority 
of  the  Federal  artillery. 

Gen.  Hunt  reported  an  expenditure  in  action  for  the 
Federal  artillery  of  32,781  rounds,  an  average  of  106 
per  gun.  Ewell's  Corps  reported  5,851  rounds  ex 
pended,  and  Hill's  Corps  7,112  rounds.  Ewell,  there 
fore,  averaged  90  rounds  per  gun,  and  Hill  about  110 
for  the  65  guns  which  they  each  brought  into  action. 

The  greatest  reported  individual  expenditure  of  a 
Confederate  battery  was  that  of  Manly's  which  ex 
pended  1,146  rounds  during  the  campaign,  or  an  aver 
age  of  about  287  rounds  per  gun.  This  battery  was 
principally  engaged  on  July  3.  McCarthy's  rifled 
section,  however,  expended  600  rounds,  or  300  per  gun, 
and  one  piece  of  his  battery  under  Lieut.  Williams 
alone  expended  300  rounds  of  shell  and  canister  on  the 
3d. 

The  intensity  of  the  fire  of  the  two  artilleries  was,  as 
may  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  figures,  greatly  in  favor 
of  the  Federals  whose  relative  strength  in  artillery, 
based  upon  the  Confederate  average  expenditure  per 
gun,  was  as  318  to  213,  instead  of  310  to  272,  for  it  is 
not  merely  the  number  of  guns  present  during  the  bat 
tle  that  determines  the  volume  of  fire.  No  report  was 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  693 

made  of  the  expenditure  in  the  1st  Corps,  but  all  83  of 
its  guns  were  engaged  and  undoubtedly  averaged  as 
many  rounds  as  those  of  Hill's  Corps,  or  110  each. 
Their  expenditure  was,  therefore,  fully  9,000  rounds, 
which  brings  up  the  aggregate  for  the  Army  during  the 
battle  to  90,000  rounds.  Thus  for  the  213  guns  en 
gaged,  excluding  the  Horse  Artillery,  the  Confederate 
expenditure  averaged  103  rounds  per  gun  as  compared 
to  106  for  the  Federal  guns.  Again,  losses  alone  do  not 
determine  density  of  fire.  In  the  solution  of  this  prob 
lem  we  must  also  consider  the  relative  positions  of  the 
adversaries.  It  is  apparent  that  a  less  intensive  fire 
upon  the  compact  Federal  position,  upon  which  nearly 
all  the  defenders  were  massed,  would  cause  greater  loss 
per  gun  than  a  much  heavier  fire  upon  the  more  ex 
tended  outer  line.  This  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  the 
killed  and  wounded,  exclusive  of  the  missing,  in  the  Fed 
eral  reserve,  with  108  guns  engaged,  numbered  230  or 
an  average  of  2.1  per  gun,  whereas  in  Longstreet's  Ar 
tillery  with  83  guns,  the  total  loss  was  271  or  an  average 
of  2.6  per  gun.  It  must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that 
normally  the  loss  incurred  by  offensive  artillery  in  the 
open  and  within  the  zone  of  musketry  effect  is  greater 
than  that  inflicted  upon  the  defensive  artillery  more  or 
less  under  cover.  In  Ewell's  Corps,  the  total  artillery 
loss  was  132,  and  in  Hill's  Corps  128,  or  an  average  for 
each  of  2  per  gun. 

The  destruction  of  artillery  horses  on  both  sides  was 
very  great.  In  the  3d  Corps  alone,  with  a  total  of  77 
guns,  190  horses  were  killed  in  action,  80  captured,  187 
abandoned  on  the  road,  and  200  subsequently  con 
demned  as  unserviceable,  or  a  total  of  627  lost  in  the 
campaign!  The  average  loss  per  battery  must,  there 
fore,  have  been  about  50  animals  or  two-thirds  of  the 
original  number. 

The  heaviest  loss  in  personnel  sustained  by  any  bat 
talion  was  of  course  that  of  Huger's,  or  Alexander's  own 
command.  In  that  battalion  with  6  batteries  and  26  guns, 
138  men  and  116  horses,  or  over  5  men  and  4  horses  per 


694  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

gun,  were  killed  or  wounded.  As  the  personnel  of  the 
battalion  did  not  exceed  at  the  outset  a  total  of  480,  its 
loss  in  the  battle  itself,  not  counting  the  missing,  was 
not  less  than  28  per  cent  of  the  whole,  principally  due  to 
artillery  fire.  But  if  these  figures,  applicable  to  a  special 
case,  seem  astounding,  what  of  those  concerning  the 
whole  Artillery  Corps  for  the  campaign?  We  have 
seen  that  the  Artillery  personnel  on  May  31  did  not 
exceed  5,300  officers  and  men  in  number.  Certainly  not 
over  4,500  of  these  came  upon  the  battlefields  of  the 
campaign.  Of  that  number  94  were  killed,  437  wounded, 
and  in  marked  contrast  but  77  were  reported  missing! 
The  aggregate  loss  sustained  by  Lee's  Artillery  between 
July  1  and  his  return  to  Virginia  two  weeks  later,  was, 
therefore,  608,  or  a  loss  of  13.5  per  cent  of  the  entire  ef 
fective  personnel !  When  we  consider  that  but  a  handful 
of  men  were  captured  no  further  evidence  is  necessary  as 
to  the  character  of  the  service  rendered  by  his  artillery 
men.  It  is  such  figures  that  make  one  realize  that  Gettys 
burg  was  more  than  a  defeat.  It  was  a  disaster  from 
which  no  army,  in  fact  no  belligerent  state,  could  soon  re 
cover.  The  destruction  of  artillery  material,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  but  five  guns  were  lost,  was  enormous.  Two 
of  these  guns  were  abandoned  near  the  Potomac  by  rea 
son  of  the  failure  of  their  teams,  two  disabled  pieces  were 
left  on  the  field,  and  a  third  disabled  piece  which  had 
been  withdrawn  was  later  captured  by  the  enemy's 
cavalry.  The  guns  were  more  than  replaced  by  the  seven 
captured  pieces,  but  not  the  harness,  fittings,  equipment, 
and  horses,  and  hundreds  of  its  staunchest  veterans  were 
lost  to  the  Artillery  forever.  Latimer,  Fraser,  and 
Morris,  were  but  three  of  the  six  artillery  officers  who 
sealed  their  devotion  to  the  cause  with  their  life,  but 
among  the  26  wounded  were  such  valuable  men  as  Majs. 
Read  and  Andrews,  and  Capts.  Brown,  Woolfolk, 
Page,  Carlton,  Thompson,  and  Norcom. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 

GETTYSBURG — THE   RETREAT 

JULY  4  found  the  Artillery  generally  posted  along 
Seminary  Ridge,  with  some  of  Alexander's  batteries  on 
the  right  drawn  back  towards  Willoughby  Run.  An 
anxious  inventory  of  the  ammunition  on  hand  had  been 
taken  late  the  day  before,  and  much  to  the  relief  of  all 
it  was  found  that  enough  remained  for  one  day's  fight. 
Fortunately  Meade  was  not  in  an  aggressive  mood  and 
nothing  was  attempted  by  him,  so  the  Artillery  was  not 
engaged  during  the  day. 

Shortly  after  noon,  a  rainstorm  of  almost  unsurpassed 
fury  broke  upon  the  field  and  soon  bemired  the  roads, 
causing  great  difficulty  in  assembling  the  train  about 
Cashtown,  and  much  suffering  to  the  teams.  Wagons, 
ambulances,  and  artillery  carriages  by  hundreds  were 
mingled  in  the  roads  and  adjacent  fields  in  one  great 
and  apparently  inextricable  mass,  while  the  wounded 
found  no  shelter  from  exposure  to  the  storm.  Every 
vehicle  was  loaded  with  wounded  men,  whose  sufferings 
could  not  be  alleviated.  The  situation  was  awful.  But 
about  4  P.  M.  the  head  of  the  train  was  put  in  motion 
from  Cashtown  and  the  ascent  of  the  mountain  in  the 
direction  of  Chambersburg  began.  For  the  terrors  of 
the  retreat,  which  ensued,  one  must  consult  Gen.  Im- 
boden's  graphic  account.*  Suffice  it  here  to  say  that  by 
daylight  on  the  5th  the  head  of  the  column  had  reached 
Greencastle,  15  miles  from  Williamsport,  having  tra 
versed  two-thirds  of  the  distance  to  the  Potomac. 

About  dark  on  the  4th,  the  withdrawal  of  the  Army 
began.  Hill's  Corps  followed  immediately  after  the 
train,  taking  the  Fairfield  Road,  while  Longstreet  fol 
lowed  Hill.  But  the  storm  and  the  consequent  con 
dition  of  the  roads  impeded  the  movement  so  that  Ewell 
was  unable  to  leave  his  position  until  daylight  on  the 
morning  of  the  5th. 

*Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  420. 


696  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  retreat  was  a  terrible  march  for  the  Artillery, 
crippled  as  it  was  by  the  loss  of  so  many  horses  in 
battle,  and  the  exhaustion  of  others.  So  many,  lacking 
shoes,  became  totally  lame  on  the  stony  roads,  that 
squads  of  cannoneers  had  to  scour  the  country  along 
the  route  for  horses  which  were  requisitioned  when  the 
farmers  would  not  sell  them. 

Walker's  battalions  were  withdrawn  from  Hill's  old 
line  about  dusk  and  ordered  to  follow  the  3d  Corps, 
while  Alexander's  moved  to  Black  Horse  Tavern  about 
5  P.  M.  where  they  were  held  in  a  great  meadow  adjoin 
ing  the  Fairfield  Pike  with  orders  to  watch  the  passing 
column,  and  take  their  place  immediately  behind 
Walker's  command.  Here  the  horses,  still  in  harness, 
were  allowed  to  graze  during  the  night  as  Walker's 
batteries  did  not  pass  by  until  6  o'clock  the  following 
morning.  The  refreshment  thus  gained  for  the  worn 
animals  was  most  welcome  and  enabled  them  to  march 
for  19  hours  to  Monterey  Springs  with  hardly  a  halt, 
and  after  resting  from  1  to  4  A.  M.  to  resume  the  march 
for  14  hours  more,  not  going  into  bivouac  until  they 
reached  Hagerstown  at  6  p.  M.  the  7th.  It  was  on  the 
march  of  the  5th  that  Maj  Henry  was  compelled  to 
abandon  two  howitzers  for  lack  of  teams.  Upon  reach 
ing  camp  about  one  mile  from  Hagerstown,  the  Artil 
lery  of  the  1st  and  3d  corps  was  given  a  rest  of  several 
days. 

Swell's  Corps  did  not  withdraw  from  before  Gettys 
burg  until  the  morning  of  the  5th.  Green's  Battery, 
which  had  served  on  the  left  with  Hampton,  had  joined 
its  battalion  the  preceding  night  while  Tanner's  had  ac 
companied  Imboden.  Capt.  Raine,  who  succeeded  Lati- 
mer  in  command  of  Andrews'  Battalion,  had  fallen  back 
on  the  4th  to  a  position  astride  the  Cashtown  Road  with 
Nelson's  Battalion  on  its  left.  Dance's  and  Carter's 
battalions  followed  Johnson's  and  Rodes'  divisions  to 
the  rear  during  the  night  while  Jones'  Battalion  re 
mained  in  position  with  Early's  Division  as  the  rear 
guard.  Brown,  therefore,  held  three  of  his  battalions 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  697 

across  the  enemy's  path  until  the  last  infantrymen 
moved  off.  Practically  all  of  his  field  transportation,  to 
gether  with  that  of  the  other  artillery  commands,  was 
taken  to  convey  the  wounded  to  the  rear.  Carter,  Jones, 
and  Dance,  never  saw  their  wagons  again,  as  they  were 
captured  or  destroyed  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the 
retreat.  Brown's  entire  command  reached  the  artillery 
rendezvous  at  Hagerstown  on  the  morning  of  the  7th 
after  an  arduous  but  undisturbed  march  with  the  rear 
guard  of  the  Army. 

In  spite  of  the  awful  disaster  which  had  befallen  it, 
the  magnitude  of  which  was  not  at  first  realized  by  the 
Army,  the  spirits  of  the  men  were  buoyant  and  the 
Army  as  a  whole  was  by  no  means  discouraged.  They 
simply  viewed  the  unsuccessful  issue  of  the  campaign 
as  unfortunate  because  more  fighting  would  be  neces 
sary,  but  never  once  did  the  idea  of  ultimate  defeat  take 
hold  of  them.  The  storm  of  the  4th  and  5th  was  far 
more  responsible  for  the  gloominess  of  the  situation  than 
the  defeat  of  Gettysburg,  and  with  the  reappearance  of 
sunshine,  the  irrespressible  spirits  of  the  men  quickly 
rose.  Thus  it  was  that  they  plodded  back  to  old  Vir 
ginia  rollicking  and  making  the  best  of  the  hardships  of 
the  retreat.  To  their  good  humor  and  enjoyment  the 
queer  German  inhabitants  of  the  region  through  which 
they  passed  contributed  much. 

The  practice  of  forcible  requisition  was  one  in  which 
the  gunners  especially  had  had  long  experience  at  home, 
as  well  as  abroad,  and  was  known  to  the  service  as 
"pressing  for  shorts."  By  this  process  alone  were  the 
batteries  able  to  save  their  guns  and  it  was  certainly,  in 
the  circumstances,  justifiable.  An  incident  recounted 
by  Col.  Alexander  is  so  amusing  and  full  of  interest  that 
it  is  here  given  in  his  own  words  to  illustrate  the  method 
of  securing  draught  animals  on  the  retreat: 

"Near  Hagerstown  I  had  an  experience  with  an  old  Dunkard 
which  gave  me  a  high  and  lasting  respect  for  the  people  of  that 
faith.  My  scouts  had  had  a  horse  transaction  with  this  old  gentle 
man,  and  he  came  to  see  me  about  it.  He  made  no  complaint,  but 


698  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

said  it  was  his  only  horse,  and  as  the  scouts  had  told  him  we  had 
some  hoof-sore  horses  we  should  have  to  leave  behind,  he  came  to 
ask  if  I  would  trade  him  one  for  his  horse,  as  without  one  his  crop 
would  be  lost. 

"I  recognized  the  old  man  at  once  as  a  born  gentleman  in  his 
delicate  characterization  of  the  transaction  as  a  trade.  I  was 
anxious  to  make  the  trade  as  square  as  circumstances  would  permit. 
So  I  assented  to  his  taking  a  foot-sore  horse,  and  offered  him 
besides  payment  in  Confederate  money.  This  he  respectfully  but 
firmly  declined.  Considering  how  the  recent  battle  had  gone,  I 
waived  argument  on  the  point  of  its  value,  but  tried  another  sug 
gestion.  I  told  him  that  we  were  in  Maryland  as  the  guests  of  the 
United  States.  That  after  our  departure  the  government  would 
pay  all  bills  we  left  behind,  and  that  I  would  give  him  an  order  on 
the  United  States  for  the  value  of  his  horse,  and  have  it  approved 
by  Gen.  Longstreet.  To  my  surprise  he  declined  this  also.  I 
supposed  then  he  was  simply  ignorant  of  the  bonanza  in  a  claim 
against  the  Government  and  I  explained  that;  and  telling  him  that 
money  was  no  object  to  us  under  the  circumstances,  I  offered  to 
include  the  value  of  his  whole  farm.  He  again  said  he  wanted 
nothing  but  the  foot-sore  horse.  Still  anxious  that  the  war  should 
not  grind  this  poor  old  fellow  in  his  poverty,  I  suggested  that  he 
take  two  or  three  foot-sore  horses,  which  we  would  have  to  leave 
anyhow,  when  we  marched.  Then  he  said,  'Well,  sir,  I  am  a 
Dunkard,  and  the  rule  of  our  church  is  an  eye  for  an  eye,  and  a 
tooth  for  a  tooth,  and  a  horse  for  a  horse,  and  I  can't  break  the  rule/ 

"I  replied  that  the  Lord,  who  made  all  horses,  knew  that  a  good 
horse  was  worth  a  dozen  old  battery  scrubs;  and  after  some  time 
prevailed  on  him  to  take  two,  by  calling  one  of  them  a  gift.  But 
that  night,  about  midnight,  we  were  awakened  by  approaching 
hoofs,  and  turned  out  expecting  to  receive  some  order.  It  was  my 
old  Dunkard  on  one  of  his  foot-sores.  "Well,  sir,'  he  said,  'you 
made  it  look  all  right  to  me  to-day  when  you  were  talking;  but 
after  I  went  to  bed  to-night  I  got  to  thinking  it  all  over,  and  I 
don't  think  I  can  explain  it  to  the  Church,  and  I  would  rather  not 
try.'  With  that  he  tied  old  foot-sore  to  a  fence,  and  rode  off 
abruptly.  Even  at  this  late  day  it  is  a  relief  to  my  conscience  to 
tender  his  sect  this  recognition  of  their  integrity  and  honesty,  in 
lieu  of  the  extra  horse  which  I  vainly  endeavored  to  throw  into  the 
trade.  Their  virtues  should  commend  them  to  all  financial  institu 
tions  in  search  of  incorruptible  employees." 

Upon  reaching  Greencastle  on  the  5th  with  his  con 
voy,  Imboden's  trouble  began.  Not  only  did  the  citi 
zens  assail  his  train,  but  the  Federal  Cavalry  in  small 
foraging  parties  began  to  molest  his  progress.  He  was 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  699 

almost  captured  himself,  but  succeeded  in  throwing  a 
section  of  McClannahan's  Horse  Battery  in  action  with 
canister,  which  drove  off  the  largest  band.  After  a 
great  deal  of  desultory  fighting  during  the  day,  he  suc 
ceeded  in  reaching  Williamsport  that  afternoon  with  the 
head  of  his  column,  the  rear  arriving  next  day  with 
Hart's  Battery,  the  cavalry  meanwhile  guarding  the 
route  on  the  west.  Thus  did  this  energetic  officer  reach 
the  Potomac  with  all  the  wagons  of  the  Army,  not  less 
than  10,000  draught  animals,  and  practically  all  the 
wounded  which  were  able  to  be  removed  from  Gettys 
burg — several  thousand  in  number.  Only  a  small  num 
ber  of  wagons  had  been  lost  and  few  horses,  this  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  during  that  awful  march  of  fifty-odd 
miles,  there  were  neither  rations  for  the  men,  nor  forage 
for  the  animals.  But  Imboden  soon  set  the  inhabitants 
to  work  cooking  for  the  wounded  Confederates  and  his 
train  guard,  and  at  last  for  the  first  time  since  leaving 
Gettysburg  the  horses  were  unharnessed  and  turned  out 
to  graze.  This  welcome  halt  was  an  enforced  one,  for 
the  enemy's  cavalry  had  destroyed  the  bridge  across  the 
river,  which  was  unfordable  by  reason  of  the  freshet.  At 
Williamsport  the  train  guard  was  fortunately  strength 
ened  by  the  arrival  of  two  regiments  of  Johnson's  Divi 
sion,  returning  from  Staunton  whither  they  had  escorted 
the  prisoners  taken  at  Winchester  on  the  advance. 
They  brought  a  supply  of  ammunition  both  for  the 
infantry  and  artillery. 

The  morning  of  the  6th  it  was  reported  that  7,000 
Federal  cavalry  with  18  guns  were  approaching  Wil 
liamsport.  Imboden  promptly  placed  his  guns  under 
Capt.  Hart  in  position  on  the  hills  which  concealed  the 
town,  and  set  about  organizing  and  arming  his  team 
sters  as  a  support  for  his  infantry  and  dismounted 
troopers.  By  noon,  about  700  of  the  wagoners,  led  by 
convalescent  officers,  were  available  for  the  defense.  A 
heavy  fight  ensued  in  which  Eshleman's  Battalion, 
Richardson's  two  batteries  of  Garnett's  Battalion, 
Hart's  and  McClannahan's  batteries,  all  took  part. 


700  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

By  making  a  bold  display  of  his  artillery  and  march 
ing  his  wagoners  hither  and  thither,  causing  them 
to  appear  at  widely  separated  points,  Imboden  greatly 
imposed  upon  Buford,  and  Kilpatrick,  and  succeeded  in 
holding  them  in  check  until  Fitz  Lee  arrived  in  their 
rear,  and  caused  them  to  withdraw  along  the  Boons- 
borough  Road.  In  this  affair,  which  was  opened  by  the 
artillery  on  both  sides,  Eshleman,  by  the  bold  advance  of 
his  four  batteries,  secured  an  enfilade  fire  upon  the 
enemy,  and  aided  by  McClannahan's  guns  inflicted  great 
loss  upon  them  while  the  infantry,  a  part  of  which  was 
led  by  Capt.  Hart,  together  with  the  dismounted 
troopers,  charged  the  Federals  and  forced  them  back, 
capturing  125  before  they  reached  their  horses.  The 
teamsters  fought  so  well  that  this  affair  has  been  called 
the  "Wagoners'  Fight."  Very  fortunately  for  the 
Army,  Imboden  had  been  able  to  ferry  two  wagon  loads 
of  shell  across  the  river  from  the  ordnance  train  during 
the  action  in  the  nick  of  time,  Moore's  Battery  having 
already  exhausted  its  ammunition  when  the  fresh  sup 
ply  arrived.  It  may  here  be  added  that  this  ordnance 
train  had  been  ordered  by  Gen.  Lee  to  Gettysburg  from 
Winchester  and  would  have  reached  the  Army  certainly 
by  the  8th  had  it  not  retreated. 

By  extraordinary  energy  and  good  management, 
Gen.  Imboden  had  been  able  to  save  the  transportation 
of  the  entire  Army,  which  could  not  have  been  replaced. 

The  next  morning  the  Army  began  to  arrive  at  Wil- 
liamsport  and  the  work  of  constructing  bridges  com 
menced.  Over  4,000  Federal  prisoners,  who  had  been 
escorted  to  the  rear  by  the  remnants  of  Pickett's  Divi 
sion,  with  Stribling's  and  Macon's  batteries,  were  ferried 
across  the  river  before  the  9th,  and  sent  on  to  Richmond, 
via  Staunton,  in  the  charge  of  Imboden,  with  a  single 
regiment.  In  the  meantime,  Maj.  John  A.  Harman, 
noted  for  his  energy  and  ability,  was  tearing  down 
warehouses  along  the  canal  and  building  pontoons  with 
the  timbers  thus  secured  to  repair  the  bridge  at  Falling 
Waters,  which,  however,  was  not  completed  until  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  701 

night  of  the  13th.  During  the  time  which  intervened 
the  Army  was  in  a  precarious  position.  A  line  of  battle 
had  been  selected  and  prepared  by  the  engineers  with 
its  right  flank  on  the  Potomac  near  Downsville,  passing 
by  St.  James'  College  and  resting  its  left  on  the  Cono- 
cocheague.  The  1st  Corps  held  the  right,  the  3d  the 
center,  and  the  2d  the  left  as  at  Gettysburg.  The  Ar 
tillery  marched  from  Hagerstown  on  the  9th  and  10th 
and  occupied  the  line,  and  for  the  next  three  days  was 
engaged  with  the  infantry  in  continuous  labor  fortify 
ing  the  position.  The  Commander-in-Chief  had  called 
upon  the  whole  Army  for  a  supreme  effort  and  in  fur 
thering  his  plan  of  defense,  Gen.  Pendleton  and  his  sub 
ordinates  were  most  energetic  in  their  cooperation. 
Alexander  with  his  own  and  Dearing's  and  Henry's 
battalions  occupied  a  position  on  the  extreme  right  near 
Downsville.  Three  batteries  of  Cabell's  Battalion  were 
posted  astride  the  Williamsport  and  Sharpsburg  Pike, 
Lieut.  Motes  with  Carlton's  Battery  being  attached  to 
Wofford's  Brigade  near  St.  James'  further  to  the  left. 
Walker's  battalions  occupied  the  center  north  of  St. 
James'  between  Hagerstown  and  the  Potomac.  Mc- 
Intosh's  and  Brunson's  battalions,  or  the  Corps  Re 
serve,  generally  occupied  those  portions  of  the  line  held 
by  Anderson  and  Heth,  respectively,  while  Lane, 
Garnett,  and  Poague  supported  the  divisions  to  which 
they  were  usually  assigned.  Brown's  battalions  oc 
cupied  the  left  of  the  line,  Nelson's  batteries  covering 
the  Williamsport  and  Funkstown  roads.  Carter's  Bat 
talion  was  posted  in  a  strong  position  to  the  rear  in 
front  of  the  bridge  at  Falling  Waters. 

From  the  8th  to  the  12th  of  July,  Stuart  with  Chew's, 
Breathed's,  McGregor's,  Moorman's,  and  Griffin's 
horse  batteries  covered  the  Confederate  front.  These 
days  were  occupied  by  severe  fighting  between  the  Con 
federate  Cavalry  and  the  divisions  of  Buford  and  Kil- 
patrick  at  Boonsborough,  Beaver  Creek,  Funkstown, 
and  on  the  Sharpsburg  front.  While  both  sides  claimed 
the  advantage,  Stuart  succeeded  in  delaying  the  advance 


702  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

of  Meade's  army  until  the  Confederate  Infantry  and 
Artillery  were  thoroughly  intrenched,  so  that  when  he 
uncovered  the  front  the  Federals  found  it  too  strong  to 
be  assailed  without  carefully  maturing  their  plans.  The 
6th  Corps  had  alone  followed  Ewell  on  the  5th  as  far 
as  Fairfield,  the  rest  of  the  Federal  Army  remaining 
on  the  battlefield  for  two  days  burying  the  dead,  caring 
for  the  wounded,  and  bringing  order  out  of  the  chaos  into 
which  the  troops  had  been  thrown  by  their  prolonged 
defense.  A  third  day  was  lost  to  the  pursuit  at  Middle- 
town  to  procure  supplies  and  bring  up  the  trains, 
and  had  it  not  been  for  the  storm  of  the  4th  and 
5th  and  further  rains  on  the  7th  and  8th  the  Con 
federates  would  have  safely  crossed  the  Potomac 
before  they  were  overtaken.  As  it  was,  Meade  might 
have  attacked  on  the  12th,  but  simply  contented  him 
self  with  a  reconnaissance  resulting  in  his  determination 
to  feel  Lee's  line  on  the  13th.  A  general  attack  was  to 
follow  if  a  favorable  opening  was  discovered.  But,  by 
the  13th,  the  ford  at  Williamsport  was  passable, 
the  bridge  lower  down  stream  had  been  completed,  and 
Lee  issued  orders  for  the  crossing  of  his  army  during 
the  night.  Ewell  was  to  cross  at  the  ford,  and  Long- 
street  followed  by  Hill  with  the  Artillery  of  the  three 
corps  at  the  pontoon  bridge.  Caissons  were  ordered  to 
start  from  the  lines  at  5  p.  M.,  and  the  infantry  and  guns 
at  dark.  The  withdrawal  was  effected  with  great  skill 
and  celerity,  in  spite  of  almost  insurmountable  obstacles, 
so  that  when  the  Federals,  after  making  various  demon 
strations  the  day  before,  advanced  to  the  attack  on  the 
14th  they  found  but  a  few  hundred  stragglers  in  their 
path. 

The  night  movement  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates 
entailed  the  utmost  hardship  upon  the  Army,  especially 
upon  the  Artillery.  A  heavy  rainstorm  had  set  in  before 
dusk,  and  continued  almost  until  morning.  The  routes 
to  the  crossings  generally  lay  over  narrow  farm  roads, 
rough  and  hilly,  which  were  soon  churned  into  all  but 
impassable  mires  by  the  leading  artillery  carriages.  No 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  703 

moon  lit  the  way  and  the  night  was  unusually  dark,  but 
large  bonfires  along  the  shore  illuminated  the  crossings. 
From  sunset  to  sunrise  the  artillery  battalions,  in  spite 
of  the  most  tremendous  exertions  on  the  part  of  the  men, 
were  able  to  cover  but  three  or  four  miles,  and  many 
horses  perished  from  exhaustion.  Nevertheless  all  the 
Artillery  was  saved  except  two  unserviceable  howitzers 
of  Henry's  Battalion,  which  became  stalled  and  were 
abandoned.  After  daylight,  the  weather  cleared  so  that 
by  1  P.  M.  Hill's  rear  guard  crossed  the  river  under 
cover  of  Carter's  guns  at  the  bridge  head.  The  Ar 
tillery  then  retired  before  the  enemy's  skirmishers  which 
had  been  pressing  the  pursuit  during  the  morning  and 
took  up  a  strong  position  on  the  south  bank,  while  six  of 
Garnett's,  Lane's  20-pounder  Parrotts,  and  Hart's  two 
Whitworths  were  posted  on  his  right  and  left  by  Gen. 
Pendleton,  who  personally  conducted  the  defense  of  the 
crossing.  For  ten  hours  the  old  officer  remained  at  this 
important  post,  unaided  by  a  single  member  of  his  staff, 
all  of  whom  were  without  horses  and  some  of  whom  them 
selves  were  broken  down  by  their  exertions  of  the  past 
two  weeks.  For  28  hours  the  Chief  of  Artillery  was 
without  a  morsel  of  food,  and  for  40  was  unable  to  gain 
a  moment's  rest. 

Lee  had  intended  to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge  into  Lou- 
doun  County,  and  there  oppose  Meade's  advance,  but 
while  waiting  for  the  Shenandoah  River  to  subside,  the 
Federals  crossed  below  and  seized  the  passes  he  had  ex 
pected  to  use.  Pushing  his  army  southward  along  the 
eastern  slope  of  the  mountains,  Meade  threatened  to 
cut  Lee  off  from  Gordonsville  and  the  railroad.  The 
danger  was  averted,  however,  by  Longstreet's  timely  ar 
rival  at  Culpeper  on  the  24th,  followed  by  Hill,  while 
Ewell  moved  up  the  Valley  and  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge 
at  Thornton  Gap.  By  August  4,  the  entire  Army  was 
united  behind  the  Rapidan  with  Stuart  in  its  front  at 
Culpeper,  and  the  enemy  behind  the  Rappahannock. 
Thus  did  the  second  invasion  of  the  North  terminate. 


14 


704  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Livermore's  estimate,  which  is  believed  to  be  more 
accurate  than  the  Confederate  returns,  places  the  ag 
gregate  Confederate  loss  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  at 
28,063,  of  which  number  3,903  were  killed,  18,735 
wounded,  and  5,425  missing,  as  opposed  to  a  Federal 
loss  of  3,155  killed,  14,529  wounded  and  5,365  missing, 
aggregate  23,049.  The  losses  of  the  Confederate  Ar 
tillery  itemized  by  battalions  were : 

Killed     Wounded  Missing     Total 

Cabell's  Battalion 8  29  0  37 

Bearing's    Battalion 8  17  0  25 

Henry's  Battalion 4  23  0  27 

Alexander's  Battalion 19  114  6  139 

Eshleman's  Artillery 3  26  16  45 

Jones'    Battalion 2  608 

Andrews'  Battalion 10  40  0  50 

Carter's  Battalion 6  35  24  65 

Dance's   Battalion 3  19  0  22 

Nelson's    Battalion 0  0  0  0 

Lane's   Battalion 3  21  6  30 

Garnett's  Battalion 0  5  17  22 

Poague's   Battalion 2  24  6  32 

Mclntosh's   Battalion 7  25  0  32 

Pegram's  Battalion 10  37  1  48 

The  aggregate  loss  of  the  Confederate  Artillery  was 
therefore  582  as  opposed  to  a  loss  of  736  in  the  Federal 
Artillery,  exclusive  of  the  Horse  Artillery  on  both  sides. 

In  the  battle  we  have  had  occasion  to  note  the  absence 
of  a  number  of  prominent  Confederate  Artillery  officers, 
but,  Pegram,  Andrews,  Cutts,  Hardaway,  and  Garnett 
joined  their  commands  either  near  the  end  or  soon  after 
the  close  of  the  campaign.  In  Maj.  John  C.  Haskell,  of 
Henry's  Battalion,  a  new  character  in  the  drama,  and 
one  destined  to  play  a  leading  role  henceforth,  has  ap 
peared.  We  heard  little  of  Col.  Walton  at  Gettysburg, 
though  he  was  present.  As  stated  by  Longstreet,  he 
was  getting  too  old  for  active  command  and  his  health 
had  stood  the  rigours  of  the  Virginia  winters  very 
poorly.  He  had  already  expressed  a  desire  to  be  trans 
ferred  to  the  southern  department,  but  was  retained  as 
Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  1st  Corps  for  some  time.* 

*Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXIX,  Part  II,  p.  699. 


MAJOR    .TAMES    WALTON    THOMSON 
Killed   at    High    Bridyv.    1st;:. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  705 

From  the  magnitude  of  Gettysburg  as  an  artillery 
battle  it  may  seem  at  first  glance  to  require  extended 
criticism,  but  upon  closer  examination  such  is  not  the 
case  as  far  as  the  Confederate  Artillery  is  concerned. 
Other  than  the  criticisms  already  offered,  few  others 
need  be  made.  The  battle  of  the  3d  of  July  was  not  lost 
through  lack  of  artillery  support,  as  asserted  by  many 
critics.  True,  the  artillery  fire  was  not  maintained  as 
vigorously  to  the  end  as  it  might  have  been  had  there 
been  an  abundance  of  ammunition.  But  it  has  been 
clearly  shown  that  the  artillery  preparation  was  as  thor 
ough  in  Longstreet's  front  as  the  position  of  the  guns 
would  allow  up  to  the  very  crisis  of  the  attack  which  was 
when  Pickett's  column  engaged  in  the  infantry  fire  fight. 
Had  Alexander  and  Walker  possessed  all  the  guns  that 
could  have  been  brought  into  action,  they  could  not  have 
maintained  Pickett  in  his  advanced  position  without  the 
timely  cooperation  of  a  large  infantry  support.  In  fact 
the  assaulting  infantry  itself  masked  the  guns  actually 
in  action.  Men,  not  shell,  were  needed  at  the  high 
tide  mark.  Artillery  can  help  infantry  forward,  but 
it  cannot  prevent  overwhelming  numbers  converg 
ing  under  cover  of  the  terrain  upon  it  from  many  di 
rections.  That  there  were  grave  errors  committed  in 
the  disposition  of  the  artillery  is  not  disputed,  but  this 
point  is  not  usually  made.  The  general  criticism  is 
that  the  artillery  preparation  for  Longstreet's  attack 
failed.  That  this  is  not  true  is  proven  by  the  very  fact 
that  Longstreet's  Infantry  did  reach  the  enemy's  guns 
and  advanced  much  of  the  distance  free  from  serious 
opposition  on  the  part  of  the  hostile  artillery.  His 
failure,  then,  was  due  to  the  lack  of  weight  at  the  de 
cisive  point,  both  because  he  attacked  with  lack  of  con 
cert  among  his  troops,  and  because  with  whatever  force 
he  assaulted,  the  enemy  remained  free  to  outnumber 
him  by  transferring  troops  from  other  quarters  of  the 
field.  The  lack  of  cooperation  of  the  2d  Corps  Artillery 
was  not  due  to  Pendleton,  nor  to  Brown,  but  to  Ewell, 
the  corps  commander. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

REORGANIZATION  AFTER  GETTYSBURG THE  WINTER 

or  1863-64 

THE  period  of  several  weeks  of  inactivity  following 
upon  the  arrival  of  the  Army  behind  the  Rapidan  was 
one  of  welcome  and  necessary  rest.  During  this  time 
so  many  convalescents  and  absentees  returned  to  the 
Army  that  soon  it  was  raised  to  a  strength  of  nearly 
60,000  men.  The  organization  of  the  Artillery  remained 
for  a  time  unchanged  with  the  exception  of  the  tem 
porary  addition  of  Capt.  Thomas  E.  Jackson's  Char- 
lottesville  Battery  to  Beckham's  Horse  Artillery  Bat 
talion.  McClannahan's  Horse  Battery,  meantime,  con 
tinued  under  Imboden's  detached  command,  so  that  with 
Stuart's  Division  there  were  now  seven  horse  batteries. 

The  distribution  of  the  Artillery  on  July  31  was  as 
follows : 

1st  Corps,  5  battalions,  22  batteries,  83  guns,  96  of 
ficers,  and  1,724  enlisted  men  present  for  duty,  aggre 
gate  present  and  absent  2,873.* 

2d  Corps,  5  battalions,  20  batteries,  84  guns,  95  of 
ficers,  and  1,448  enlisted  men  present  for  duty,  aggre 
gate  present  and  absent  2,392. 

3d  Corps,  5  battalions,  20  batteries,  62  guns,  86  of 
ficers,  and  1,564  enlisted  men  present  for  duty,  aggre 
gate  present  and  absent  2,7.27. 

The  effective  strength  of  the  Artillery  with  the  Army 
was  therefore  over  5,000,  and  the  paper  strength  nearly 
8,000,  with  229  guns.  Before  August  10  the  present  for 
duty  increased  to  5,747,  and  the  aggregate  paper 
strength  to  8,325.  With  the  1st  Corps  there  were  then 
83,  with  the  2d  Corps  81,  and  with  the  3d  Corps  77 
pieces  of  artillery,  or  a  total  of  241  guns.  Of  this  num- 

*For  guns  of  1st  Corps  at  this  time  see  Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  LI,  Part  II, 
p.  740,  Walton's  letter. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  707 

ber  there  were  twelve  20-pounder  Parrotts,  thirty-nine 
10-pounder  Parrotts,  sixty-four  3-inch  rifles,  two  Whit- 
worths,  ninety-eight  Napoleons,  five  24-pounder  howit 
zers,  and  twenty-one  12-pounder  howitzers.  In  the  en 
tire  Corps  there  were  but  8  battery  wagons,  and  32 
forges,  while  there  were  228  caissons  or  nearly  one  per 
gun.* 

In  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  Lee  had  engaged,  ac 
cording  to  Col.  Taylor,  50,000  infantry,  5,000  cavalry, 
and  4,000  artillery,  but  this  estimate  of  the  Artillery  is, 
we  believe,  too  small  by  500  men.  By  August  10,  how 
ever,  it  is  certain  that  there  was  one  man  in  the  Artillery 
for  every  ten  present  in  the  Infantry.  Thus  it  is  seen 
that  Lee,  like  Frederick  and  Napoleon,  compensated  for 
the  decrease  in  his  infantry  by  maintaining  his  artillery 
in  the  face  of  all  difficulties. 

Besides  the  Field  Artillery  actually  with  the  field 
Army,  there  was  a  large  force  under  Gen.  Arnold 
Elzey,  in  and  about  the  defenses  of  Richmond.  Lieut. - 
Col.  C.  E.  Lightfoot  commanded  a  battalion  consisting 
of  Smoot's  Alexandria,  Thornton's  Caroline,  Rives' 
Nelson,  and  Hankins'  Surry  batteries.  This  battalion 
occupied  the  works  together  with  Col.  T.  S.  Rhett's 
four  heavy  artillery  battalions.  Serving  with  Ransom's 
Division  in  the  Department  of  Richmond  were  four  bat 
talions  as  follows : 

MOSELEY'S  BATTALION 

Maj.  E.  F.  Moseley 

Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  W.  J.  Dabney. 

James  City  Battery,  Capt.  L.  W.  Richardson. 

Goochland  Battery,  Capt.  Jonathan  Talley. 

Yorktown  Battery,  Capt.  E.  R.  Young. 

BOQGS'  BATTALION 

Maj.  F.  J.  Boggs 

Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  S.  Taylor  Martin. 

Albemarle  Battery,  Capt.  N.  A.  Sturdivant. 

North  Carolina  Battery,  Capt.  L.  H.  Webb. 

*See  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXIX,  Part  II,  p.  636,  for  complete 
summary  of  material,  August  10,  1863. 


708  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

BRANCH'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  James  R.  Branch 

Mississippi  Battery,  Capt.  W.  D.  Bradford. 

South  Carolina  Battery,  Capt.  J.  C.  Coit. 

Petersburg  Battery,  Capt.  R.  G.  Pegram. 

Halifax  Battery,  "  Capt.  S.  T.  Wright. 

UNATTACHED 

Battery  "E",  1st  N.  C.  Reg't,  Capt.  Alexander  D.  Moore. 

Macon  (Ga.)  Battery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Staten. 

STARK'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  A.  W.  Stark* 

Mathews'  Battery,  Capt.  A.  D.  Armistead. 

Giles  Battery,  Capt.  D.  A.  French. 

These  15  light  batteries  must  have  possessed  a  total 
personnel  of  not  less  than  1,000  men  and  60  guns. 
There  was,  therefore,  a  large  reserve  force  of  artillery 
in  his  immediate  rear,  which  Lee  could  call  upon  in  an 
emergency,  though  of  course  the  service  of  the  officers 
and  men  who  had  been  held  at  the  base  had  not  been 
such  as  to  make  them  as  efficient  as  those  with  the  main 
army. 

Since  the  reorganization  of  the  Artillery  in  May,  it 
had  greatly  increased  in  efficiency,  but  the  Pennsyl 
vania  campaign  had  practically  destroyed  its  field 
transportation,  and  the  batteries  were  themselves  al 
most  dismounted.  During  the  retreat  it  had,  therefore, 
been  necessary  to  still  further  reduce  the  baggage  al 
lowances  in  order  to  supply  the  batteries  and  ordnance 
trains  with  teams.  At  this  time,  the  artillery  trans 
portation  was  fixed  at  two  4-horse  wagons  for  the  Chief 
of  Artillery  and  his  entire  staff,  including  the  medical 
officers,  one  4-horse  wagon  for  each  corps  chief  and  his 
staff,  one  4-horse  wagon  for  each  battalion  headquarters, 
one  4-horse  wagon  for  all  the  battery  officers  of  each 
battalion,  and  two  4-horse  wagons  for  the  forage  and 

*Attached  to  Wise's  Brigade. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  709 

supplies  of  each  battery.    Surplus  baggage  was  directed 
to  be  turned  over  to  the  Chief  Quartermaster  at  once.* 

The  following  April  a  slight  additional  reduction 
was  made  in  the  allowance  of  transportation,  and  but 
one  4-horse  wagon  was  authorized  for  the  Chiefs  of 
Artillery  and  their  entire  staffs,  while  one  2 -horse  wagon 
for  the  medical  supplies  of  each  battalion  and  one  4- 
horse  wagon  for  the  mess  equipment  of  every  500  men 
actually  present  were  added.  Thus  it  is  seen  that  the 
baggage  train  of  the  Artillery  of  the  Army  when  com 
plete  consisted  of  not  more  than  160  wagons,  requiring 
only  about  650  horses.  It  is  doubtful  if  any  other  equal 
force  of  artillery  ever  took  the  field  with  such  a  limited 
train.  But  we  must  remember  that  but  two  wagons 
were  allowed  army,  corps,  and  division  headquarters, 
and  but  one  for  brigade  headquarters,  at  this  time.  By 
a  rigid  enforcement  of  the  orders  relative  to  the  baggage 
allowance,  the  field  batteries  were  provided  with  an 
average  of  about  50  horses  before  August  10,  though 
some  of  them  were  still  sadly  deficient  in  the  number  of 
their  animals. 

While  the  Artillery  of  the  1st  and  3d  corps  lay  in 
camp  near  Orange  Courthouse  and  that  of  the  2d  Corps 
at  Liberty  Mills,  the  most  strenuous  efforts  were  made 
by  Gen.  Pendleton  to  fully  rehorse  his  command.  His 
investigations  of  the  horse  problem  were  wide  and 
thorough.  Learning  that  horses  temporarily  disabled 
were  not  adequately  cared  for  by  the  agents  of  the 
Quartermaster  Department,  and  that  numbers  of  them 
which  under  a  proper  system  might  be  restored  to  a 
serviceable  condition  were  allowed  to  perish  from 
neglect,  he  reported  the  condition  of  affairs  to  the  Com- 
mander-in- Chief,  t  He  suggested  that  animals  unfit  for 
service  should  be  turned  over  to  individual  farmers  who 
should  be  encouraged  to  save  them  for  their  own  needs, 
and  not  allowed  to  be  herded  in  great  droves.  Under 

*G.  O.  No.  77,  A.  N.  V.,  July  16,  1863. 
^Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXXIII,  p.  1262. 

See  his  interesting  letter,  Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXIX,  Part  II,  p.  643 
August  13,  1863. 


710  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

the  prevailing  system,  diseased  animals  merely  spread 
contagion  and  none  could  receive  individual  attention. 
A  farmer  would  ordinarily  be  only  too  glad  to  secure 
one  or  two  horses  for  light  work,  and  he  would  in  many 
cases  improve  rather  than  impair  their  unfortunate  con 
dition,  which  was  principally  due  to  exposure  and  lack 
of  nourishment.  Gen.  Pendleton  also  declared  that  not 
less  than  300  good  artillery  horses  could  be  secured  in 
Albemarle  County  alone,  if  the  proper  methods  were 
pursued.  Quartermasters  and  their  agents,  unknown  to 
the  people,  could  not  secure  these  animals,  he  said,  but 
artillery  officers,  whose  interest  in  the  service  was  neces 
sarily  greater  than  that  of  mere  purchasing  agents, 
would  by  tact  and  good  judgment  be  able  to  purchase 
them  for  about  $600.00  apiece,  or  even  perhaps  trade 
worn  and  feeble  battery  horses  for  the  fresh  ones.  At 
any  rate,  many  could  be  secured  by  impressment  as  a 
last  resort.  But  very  little  seems  to  have  been  done  at 
this  time,  however,  to  remedy  conditions,  and  again,  on 
September  3,  the  Chief  of  Artillery  called  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief's  attention  to  this  very  vital  matter, 
which  threatened  the  efficiency  of  the  whole  artillery 
arm.  His  recommendations  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Transportation  at  Richmond  were  now  as  follows: 

"First.  The  establishment  of  a  sort  of  general  horse  district  in 
the  counties  of  Halifax,  Pittsylvania,  Henry,  Patrick,  Franklin, 
Campbell,  and  Bedford,  with  depots,  stables,  etc.,  under  the  care 
of  a  responsible  superintendent,  who  should  select  his  own  agents, 
and  have  the  care  of  all  the  horses  of  this  army  to  be  resuscitated, 
etc. 

"Second.  The  procurement  from  time  to  time,  by  this  same 
officer  or  others  in  connection  with  his  charge,  of  a  number  of  fresh 
horses,  to  be  taken  to  the  depots  in  said  district  and  kept  with  those 
renovated,  for  transfer  when  needed  to  the  field. 

"Third.  The  establishment  of  suitable  places  of  accommodation 
for  horses  removed  to  and  from  this  district  and  the  army,  so  as  to 
insure  their  being  suitably  provided  for  in  transit."* 

As  far  as  we  know  this  plan,  which  in  its  general 
aspect  was  adopted,  was  one  of  the  first  attempts  to 

•Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXIX,  Part  II,  p.  697.     Ibid.,  p.  715. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  711 

organize  a  remount  depot  in  this  country,  certainly  in 
the  Confederacy.  It  was  to  be  established  in  a  region 
still  fat  with  forage,  where  slave  labor  was  cheap  and 
plentiful  and  one  well  removed  from  the  theater  of  mili 
tary  operations. 

So  well  received  were  Pendleton's  suggestions  that 
Maj.  Paxton,  whom  he  recommended  to  be  placed  in 
charge  of  the  establishment,  was  soon  appointed  and 
directed  to  organize  the  remount  department,  with 
headquarters  at  Lynchburg.  Before  spring  he  had  ac 
complished  much  in  seggregating  diseased  animals  and 
restoring  them  to  health  by  means  of  infirmaries,  as  well 
as  in  collecting  animals  for  future  use.  Yet,  disease  was 
so  widespread,  extending  throughout  the  section  and 
as  far  as  the  North  Carolina  line,  that  of  the  3,000  ani 
mals  in  Paxton' s  charge  over  600  died  before  February. 
The  system  adopted  by  the  Department  for  parceling 
out  the  animals  in  small  herds,  foraging,  exercising,  and 
caring  for  them,  was  nevertheless  such  an  apparent  im 
provement  over  old  methods  that  the  Chief  of  Artillery 
recommended  that  the  1,500  animals  which  would  be 
required  to  rehorse  his  command  be  left  in  charge  of 
Maj .  Paxton,  until  actually  needed  in  the  spring.  More 
apprehension  was  entertained  at  this  time  concerning 
the  lack  of  transport  animals  than  remounts,  and  Gen. 
Pendleton  urged  that  his  agents  be  allowed  to  draw  upon 
the  supply  of  mules  in  Mississippi,  Georgia,  and  Ala 
bama,  and  this  suggestion  was  approved  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief.* 

Early  in  September  Longstreet's  suggestion  to  trans 
fer  troops  from  Virginia  to  Tennessee  for  the  purpose 
of  reinforcing  Gen.  Bragg  was  adopted.  There  re 
mained  several  months  of  open  weather  and  it  was  hoped 
that  some  success  could  yet  be  won  in  the  West.  But 
before  the  movement  commenced  the  short  route  to 
Chattanooga,  via  Bristol  and  Knoxville,  was  no  longer 
available,  and  Longstreet  was  compelled  to  take  the 
roundabout  route  from  Petersburg  via  Weldon, 

*Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXXIII,  pp.  1182,  1188. 


712  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Wilmington,  and  Augusta.  Leaving  Orange  on  the 
9th,  the  infantry  of  the  1st  Corps  was  moved  to  Peters 
burg  by  rail,  while  Alexander's,  Walton's,  and  Dear- 
ing's  battalions  marched.  Hood's  and  McLaws'  divi 
sions  and  Alexander's  six  batteries  with  26  guns  en 
trained  on  the  17th  and  reached  their  destination  after  a 
tedious  journey,  in  which  it  took  nearly  eight  days  to 
cover  less  than  850  miles.  Meanwhile,  Pickett's  Division 
with  Dearing's  Battalion  of  Artillery  was  assigned  to 
duty  along  the  James  River,  relieving  Jenkins'  and 
Wise's  brigades,  the  former  having  accompanied  Hood 
and  the  latter  going  to  Charleston,  S.  C.  Walton's  Bat 
talion  remained  at  Petersburg.  On  the  23d,  Pickett 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of 
North  Carolina,  with  headquarters  at  Petersburg,  Va. 
Henry's  and  Cabell's  battalions  moved  to  Hanover 
Junction  with  Pickett's  Division,  but  on  the  13th  were 
ordered  by  easy  marches  into  camp  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Gordonsville  via  Louisa  Courthouse.  On  October  5, 
Lamkin's  Nelson  Battery  was  attached  to  Henry's  Bat 
talion,  to  the  permanent  command  of  which  Maj. 
John  C.  Haskell  had  succeeded.  But  on  the  9th  this 
battery,  which  was  unarmed,  was  transferred  to  Cabell's 
Battalion.  Maj.  Henry  had  been  promoted  and  trans 
ferred  to  the  West. 

An  important  promotion  had  meanwhile  been  made 
in  the  Artillery  Corps.  It  was  apparent  that  Col. 
Crutchfield  would  be  hors  de  combat  for  many  months, 
and  a  permanent  Chief  of  Artillery  for  the  2d  Corps 
was  much  needed.  Accordingly  one  of  the  two  existing 
vacancies  in  the  grade  of  brigadier-general  of  artillery 
was  filled  by  the  promotion  of  Col.  Armistead  Lindsay 
Long,  formerly  Military  Secretary  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  and  he  was  assigned  to  duty  as  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery  of  the  2d  Corps.  The  circumstances  connected 
with  the  selection  of  Long  for  this  position  will  be  dis 
cussed  later.  Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  while  he  was  in 
every  way  competent  to  fulfill  the  position  to  which  he 
was  appointed,  yet  his  assignment  to  this  high  tactical 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  718 

command  was  thought  by  some  to  overslaugh  the  claims 
of  Col.  Brown  to  seniority  in  the  Artillery  of  Swell's 
Corps  during  the  absence  of  Crutchfield.  While  there 
was  no  open  resentment  of  his  appointment,  neverthe 
less  it  would  seem  that  Col.  Brown's  claim  to  seniority 
in  the  2d  Corps  was  disregarded  nothwithstanding  the 
fact  that  he  was  a  highly  efficient  officer  and  had  exer 
cised  command  in  every  campaign  since  April,  1861. 
It  will  be  recalled  that  he  was  the  original  battery  com 
mander  of  the  1st  Company  of  Richmond  Howitzers 
when  it  left  Richmond  for  Yorktown.  From  that  time 
to  the  day  of  his  death  he  never  missed  an  hour  of  duty. 
Although  an  officer  with  no  military  training  prior  to 
the  war,  he  was  a  natural  soldier  and  had  no  superiors 
in  point  of  courage.  He  was  a  man  of  too  high  a  sense 
of  duty  to  allow  any  disappointment  which  he  may 
have  felt  to  affect  him.  He  never  complained  to  his  as 
sociates,  and  showed  no  signs  of  bitterness  to  his  superi 
ors.  His  personal  and  family  correspondence  shows 
that  he  himself  accepted  conditions  in  a  most  magnani 
mous  spirit,  but  his  friends  were  less  philosophical  in 
the  matter.  They  felt  that  again  the  West  Point  in 
fluence  had  overreached  a  gallant,  meritorious  officer 
who,  irrespective  of  the  fact  that  he  was  a  civilian  before 
the  war,  had  proved  himself  to  be  eminently  qualified  to 
command  and,  therefore,  entitled  to  consideration  upon 
his  military  record  in  the  service  of  the  Confederacy, 
without  regard  to  circumstances  before  the  war.  This 
belief  was  heightened  by  the  fact  that  Col.  Brown  had 
served  as  Acting  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  2d  Corps 
since  the  day  of  Crutchfield's  elimination,  and  that  al 
though  he  had  not  shown  any  particular  brilliance  at 
Gettysburg,  the  minor  part  played  by  his  command 
there  was  known  to  have  been  due  to  Ewell's  and  not 
his  fault. 

During  the  period  of  inactivity,  in  which  the  Con 
federate  Army  was  gradually  recuperating  its  strength, 
two  corps  were  detached  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  sent  to  reinforce  Sherman's  Army,  and  in  spite  of 


714  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Longstreet's  absence  the  two  armies  were  numerically 
more  nearly  equal  than  in  the  past  campaign.  This 
condition  induced  Lee  to  attempt  to  force  Meade  to 
an  engagement  while  his  army  was  reduced.  Crossing 
the  Rapidan  on  the  9th  of  October,  Lee  moved  to 
Madison  Courthouse  and  thence  eastward,  screening  his 
movements  by  the  cavalry  and  the  mountain  spurs  and 
forests  between  himself  and  his  enemy.  But  before  Lee 
arrived  near  Culpeper  Courthouse  on  the  llth,  Meade 
had  learned  through  his  cavalry  of  the  danger  to  his 
right,  and  withdrew  along  the  railroad  to  the  line  of  the 
Rappahannock,  Stuart  driving  Pleasonton  from  the  old 
field  of  Brandy  Station  back  upon  the  Federal  Army. 
Cabell's  Battalion  had  been  left  in  front  of  Gordons- 
ville,  and  HaskelFs  had  been  moved  forward  to  Liberty 
Mills.  The  rest  of  the  Artillery  accompanied  the  Army 
on  its  circuitous  march  and  throughout  the  subsequent 
campaign  in  which  there  was  much  skillful  maneuver 
ing  on  both  sides  and  very  little  fighting.  By  the  18th, 
Lee  was  back  again  on  the  Rappahannock.  The  main 
Army  lay  in  camp  about  Culpeper,  while  Stuart  oc 
cupied  the  country  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  By 
November  7,  Meade  reached  the  Rappahannock  im 
mediately  behind  which  and  in  his  front  lay  E well's 
Corps,  with  Eaiiy's  Division  behind  Brandy  Station, 
Rodes'  covering  Kelly's  Ford  on  the  right,  and  John 
son's  between  them.  Hill's  Corps  held  the  line  of  the 
river  on  Swell's  left.  A  pontoon  bridge  had  been 
thrown  at  the  site  of  the  old  Rappahannock  Bridge  and 
the  tete  de  pont  on  the  north  bank  was  alternately 
picketed  by  a  single  brigade  of  Early's  and  Johnson's 
divisions  and  a  battery  of  artillery.  When  the  Federals 
reached  the  river  Hays'  Brigade  and  Green's  Louisiana 
Guard  Battery  held  the  work  on  the  north  bank,  while 
Dance's  and  Graham's  batteries  occupied  a  redoubt  on 
the  south  side  of  the  stream  where  they  were  placed 
merely  to  prevent  a  crossing  should  the  bridge-head  be 
taken,  but  they  had  no  command  whatever  of  the  terrain 
on  the  north  shore. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  715 

The  Federal  advance  consisted  of  the  5th  and  6th 
Corps,  which  promptly  occupied  the  hills  in  front  of 
Hays,  and  opened  fire  upon  the  work  on  the  north  bank 
with  a  battery.  To  this,  Lieut.  Moore  in  command  of 
Green's  Battery  boldly  replied,  but  was  soon  over 
whelmed  by  two  other  batteries  while  Graham  and 
Dance  vainly  sought  to  assist  him.  At  dusk  a  heavy 
mass  of  the  enemy's  infantry  rushed  Hays  and  captured 
most  of  his  men,  and  the  Louisiana  Battery.  Of  the  two 
officers  and  76  enlisted  men  of  the  battery,  but  28  of  the 
latter  escaped,  with  9  of  their  54  horses.  The  two  10- 
pounder  Parrotts  and  the  two  3-inch  Dahlgren  rifled 
pieces  of  the  battery  were  taken  by  the  enemy  along  with 
all  the  carriages  and  about  400  rounds  of  ammunition. 

In  the  meantime,  Early  had  ordered  up  his  infantry 
and  Jones'  Battalion,  while  Massie's  Fluvanna  Bat 
tery  of  Nelson's  Battalion  also  arrived  and  engaged  the 
Federals.  But  at  daybreak  on  the  8th,  Lee  withdrew 
to  his  former  position  on  the  Rapidan.  Although  the 
season  was  late,  and  Meade  had  first  eluded  Lee  and 
then  recovered  his  original  position,  he  was  not  willing 
to  go  into  winter  quarters  until  he  had  himself  under 
taken  offensive  maneuvers  in  order,  by  some  success, 
to  satisfy  the  expectations  of  the  administration  in 
Washington. 

Swell's  Corps  now  occupied  a  line  from  the  base  of 
Clark's  Mountain  to  Mine  Run,  a  small  tributary  of  the 
Rappahannock,  and  covered  Mitchell's,  Morton's,  Rac 
coon,  and  Summerville's  fords;  Hill's  Corps  that  from 
Orange  Courthouse  to  Liberty  Mills;  while  Stuart,  as 
usual,  covered  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  Army.  Both 
corps  had  been  much  reduced  by  winter  furloughs,  no 
further  operations  before  winter  being  expected.  Al 
ready  the  Confederates  had  begun  to  prepare  for  a  long 
rest,  when  at  dawn,  on  November  26,  Meade  set  his  en 
tire  army  in  motion  towards  Germanna  Ford,  hoping  to 
cross  the  Rapidan  at  that  point  and  surprise  Lee.  But 
his  movement,  though  shrouded  with  the  utmost 
secrecy,  was  instantly  discovered  by  Stuart.  Lee  at 


716  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

once  ordered  Hill  to  form  a  junction  with  Ewell  at 
Verdierville,  and  the  latter  to  occupy  a  strong  position 
behind  Mine  Run.  In  spite  of  every  precaution,  many 
delays  impeded  the  Federal  advance,  and  Meade's 
troops  did  not  cross  the  Rapidan  until  the  morning  of 
the  27th.  Meanwhile  the  Confederates  had  completed 
their  concentration  and  thrown  up  strong  log  and  earth 
breastworks.  When  Meade  finally  arrived  in  front  of 
Lee  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  he  found  himself  con 
fronted  by  30,000  infantry  and  150  pieces  of  artillery 
behind  works  even  stronger  than  those  his  own  men  had 
thrown  up  at  Chancellor sville.  This  was  a  bitter  dis 
appointment  to  the  Federal  commander,  but  he  dili 
gently  set  to  work  to  find  an  opening  and  next  day 
Warren  reported  favorable  conditions  for  assault  on  the 
Confederate  right,  while  Sedgwick  seemed  to  have  dis 
covered  equally  good  ones  on  the  other  flank.  Orders 
for  the  simultaneous  attack  on  both  flanks  were  issued, 
but  when  the  Federal  artillery  of  the  center  and  right 
opened  not  a  sound  came  from  Warren.  His  men  had 
sized  up  the  strength  of  Lee's  works  more  accurately 
than  their  leader,  for  each  had  pinned  a  slip  of  paper 
on  his  breast  with  his  name  on  it  in  order  that  the  wearer 
might  be  identified.  Reconnaissances  both  by  Warren 
and  Meade  satisfied  them  of  the  futility  of  an  assault, 
which  if  successful  would  be  at  the  cost  of  not  less  than 
30,000  men.  Lee,  too,  was  much  disappointed  by  the 
retreat  of  the  Federals  across  Ely's  Ford  to  Culpeper 
Courthouse  on  the  night  of  December  1,  and  so  suddenly 
and  rapidly  was  it  accomplished  that  he  was  unable  to 
overtake  them  on  the  2d.  Thus  ended  the  Mine  Run 
campaign  and  the  operations  of  1863. 

The  Army  was  now  promptly  prepared  to  go  into 
winter  quarters.  The  Infantry  was  generally  held  along 
the  Rapidan,  while  the  Artillery  with  the  exception  of 
two  or  three  battalions  was  scattered  along  the  line  of 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  for  the  greater  con 
venience  of  foraging  the  horses.  Gen.  Long's  2d  Corps 
Artillery  with  the  exception  of  Nelson's  Battalion, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  717 

which  was  kept  on  picket  duty  along  the  Rapidan,  was 
located  in  and  about  Frederick  Hall,  and  four  of  Col. 
Walker's  3d  Corps  battalions,  after  camping  for  a 
month  on  the  farm  of  Maj.  Lee  near  Madison  Run  in 
Madison  County,  erected  their  huts  in  the  neighbor 
hood  of  Cobham  and  Lindsay  stations,  about  10  miles 
west  of  Gordonsville,  with  headquarters  at  Meeksville, 
while  Cutts'  Battalion  like  Nelson's  remained  on  picket 
near  Rapidan  Station.  It  was  at  this  time  that  Lieut. 
Richard  Walke,  ordnance  officer  on  Mahone's  staff, 
was  promoted  captain  of  artillery  and  assigned  to  duty 
as  Inspector-General  of  the  3d  Corps  Artillery,  while 
Maj.  Herbert  M.  Nash  was  appointed  Surgeon. 
Captain  William  W.  Chamberlaine  had  served  on  Col. 
Walker's  staff  for  some  time  as  Corps  Adjutant. 

The  Horse  Artillery,  which  was  continuously  engaged 
in  the  cavalry  operations  during  the  months  of  Sep 
tember,  October,  November,  and  December,  was 
ordered  into  winter  quarters  at  Charlottesville  on 
December  21st.  Gen.  Lee  and  Governor  Letcher  had 
reviewed  the  infantry  and  Stuart's  command  at  Cul- 
peper  Courthouse  on  November  5,  when  again  Beck- 
ham's  Battalion  passed  before  the  great  soldier  at  the 
head  of  the  cavalry,  to  the  tune  of  Hampton's  mounted 
band. 

Leaving  the  Rapidan  country  the  horse  batteries, 
worn  and  depleted  by  months  of  continuous  fighting 
and  marching,  toiled  over  the  bottomless  roads  to  the 
Rivanna,  which  they  reached  on  the  22d.  The  camp 
site  selected  for  the  battalion  was  located  on  the  Early- 
ville  Road,  about  five  miles  from  Charlottesville.  For 
the  next  two  weeks,  the  men  were  busily  engaged  erect 
ing  log  huts  and  stables.  It  was  in  this  very  locality 
that  Burgoyne's  Hessians  had  been  cantoned  by  Wash 
ington  after  their  capture  at  Saratoga  during  the  Revo 
lutionary  War. 

Officers  of  the  Horse  Artillery  declare  that  the  winter 
of  1863-64,  part  of  which  they  spent  at  Charlottesville, 
was  the  severest  ordeal  through  which  they  passed 


718  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

while  in  the  service.  The  cold  winds  which  swept  over  the 
mountainous  district,  and  the  heavy  falls  of  snow 
caused  the  greatest  suffering  to  men  and  beasts.  Alter 
nately  bemired  and  frozen,  the  roads  were  impassable 
and  the  fields  offered  no  opportunity  for  exercise.  The 
period  of  winter  quarters  was  simply  a  struggle  by 
horses  and  men  for  existence,  with  scant  provender  for 
the  former,  and  an  unusual  deficiency  in  rations  and 
clothing  for  the  latter.  But  these  conditions  were  quite 
general  in  the  artillery  camps. 

Soon  after  placing  his  corps  in  winter  quarters,  Gen. 
Pendleton,  with  headquarters  at  Louisa  Courthouse,  as 
signed  Majs.  Page  and  Wolff e,  and  Lieuts.  Peterkin 
and  Dandridge  of  his  staff  to  the  duty  of  examining  the 
forage  conditions  in  the  region  between  the  railroad  and 
the  James  River,  from  a  point  slightly  west  of  Char- 
lottesville,  to  one  just  east  of  Beaver  Dam  Depot.  These 
officers  were  required  to  locate,  and  report  by  December 
10  upon,  the  available  supply  of  corn,  oats,  hay,  straw, 
and  fodder,  as  well  as  the  grist  mills  in  the  respective 
districts  designated  for  their  inspection.  Thus  it  is 
seen  that  the  rich  farming  lands  of  the  James  River 
Valley,  hitherto  free  from  the  presence  of  the  armies, 
was  expected  to  support  the  Artillery  during  the  winter. 
The  river  counties  with  their  Nile-like  low  grounds  had 
before  the  war  comprised  the  finest  agricultural  section 
of  the  state,  and  although  the  James  River  Nabobs  were 
no  longer  personally  superintending  the  cultivation  of 
their  estates,  being  off  with  the  Army,  their  wives  re 
mained  at  home  and  managed  to  keep  most  of  their 
slaves  at  work,  thus  supporting  their  own  as  well  as  a 
great  number  of  refugee  families  from  the  more  exposed 
parts  of  Virginia.  The  Valley  of  Egypt  was  hardly 
more  fertile  than  the  bottom  lands  between  Lynchburg 
and  Richmond  along  the  James,  and  those  along  the 
Rivanna  from  Charlottesville  to  Columbia. 

Many  vacancies  in  the  Artillery  now  existed,  so  that 
numerous  officers,  who  had  previously  been  confined  to 
the  lower  grades,  at  last  had  before  them  prospects  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  719 

advancement.  Early  in  November,  Gen.  Pendleton  had 
been  called  upon  for  his  recommendations  for  promo 
tion,  and  after  conferring  with  Gen.  Long,  Col.  Walker 
and  Gen.  Stuart,  submitted  them  on  November  20.* 
The  authorized  commissioned  personnel  at  this  time  was 
based,  of  course,  upon  the  number  of  guns  with  the 
Army.  Including  those  of  the  1st  Corps  with  Long- 
street  in  Tennessee,  and  those  of  the  Horse  Artillery, 
the  number  actually  in  service  was  244,  while  the  full 
legitimate  armament  entitled  the  Artillery  to  276.  Ar 
rangements  were  already  nearly  completed  to  supply 
the  deficiency  by  substituting  more  Napoleons  for  the 
howitzers  that  had  been  lost  and  become  unserviceable 
through  ordinary  wear  and  tear.  The  authorized 
complement  of  officers  included,  therefore,  3  brigadier- 
generals,  7  colonels,  11  lieutenant-colonels,  and  17 
majors,  whereas  there  were  actually  commissioned  but 
2  brigadier-generals,  6  colonels,  6  lieutenant-colonels, 
and  17  majors.  The  existing  general  and  field-officers 
were  as  follows: 

Brigadier-Generals — W.   N.    Pendleton  and  A.   L.   Long. 

Colonels— S.  Crutchfield,  J.  B.  Walton,  J.  T.  Brown,  H.  C. 
Cabell,  R.  L.  Walker,  and  E.  P.  Alexander. 

Lieutenant-Colonels — A.  S.  Cutts,  R.  S.  Andrews,  T.  H.  Carter, 
H.  P.  Jones,  W.  Nelson,  and  J.  J.  Garnett. 

Majors— E.  F.  Eshleman,  S.  P.  Hamilton,  F.  Huger,  R.  F. 
Beckham,  James  Bearing,  T.  J.  Page,  W.  J.  Pegram,  D.  G. 
Mclntosh,  W.  T.  Poaajue,  J.  B.  Brockenbrough,  C.  M.  Braxton, 
J.  Lane,  R.  A.  Hardaway,  J.  C.  Haskell,  J.  P.  W.  Read,  C.  Rich 
ardson,  and  Jas.  Reilly. 

Of  these  many  were  unfit  for  active  service.  Col. 
Crutchfield,  whom  Jackson  had  earnestly  sought  to 
have  made  a  brigadier-general,  and  whose  service  had 
been  distinguished  from  the  first,  was  practically  dis 
abled  by  the  wound  he  had  received  at  Chancellorsville. 
For  him,  the  Chief  of  Artillery  recommended  service 
about  the  defenses  of  Richmond.  Col.  Walton  was  no 
longer  capable  of  performing  active  service,  and  his  re- 

*Rebcllion  Records,  Vol.  XXIX,  Part  II,  p.  839,  and  Memoirs  of  W  N 
Pendleton,  p.  309. 


15 


720  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

quest  to  be  assigned  to  duty  at  Mobile  was  endorsed  by 
Pendleton,  while  Alexander  was  recommended  to  be 
made  permanent  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  1st  Corps. 
Col.  Cabell,  an  officer  of  great  integrity  and  personal 
courage,  but  lacking  in  energy  and  ability  as  a  field 
soldier,  was  recommended  to  be  transferred  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  battalion  of  field  artillery  at  Richmond, 
and  Lieut.-Col.  Lightfoot  transferred  to  the  field 
army  and  placed  in  command  of  Cabell's  Battalion. 
Lieut.-Col.  Andrews,  an  officer  of  tried  ability,  was  still 
an  invalid  from  the  wounds  he  had  received  at  Cedar 
Run,  in  1861,  and  Stephenson's  Depot,  in  June,  1863. 
In  justice  to  him,  it  was  declared  that  he  should  be  as 
signed  to  a  less  active  field,  preferably  to  ordnance 
duty,  for  which  he  was  well  qualified.  Lieut.-Col. 
Garnett,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  in 
spite  of  his  training  and  the  high  expectations  of  all, 
had  proved  unsuited  to  the  artillery  service.  It  was  be 
lieved  he  could  be  more  useful  on  conscript  service  than 
in  his  present  position,  and  such  a  change  was  recom 
mended.  Maj.  Brockenbrough,  though  a  most  efficient 
officer,  was  still  disabled  from  the  wound  he  had  re 
ceived  at  Fredericksburg,  and  was  incapable  of  per 
forming  active  duty.  Accordingly  Gen.  Pendleton 
recommended  Col.  Alexander  to  be  brigadier-general; 
Lieut.-Cols.  Carter,  Jones,  and  Cutts  to  be  colonels; 
Majs.  Dearing,  Eshleman,  Huger,  Braxton,  Pegram, 
Mclntosh,  Poague,  Beckham,  Hardaway,  and  Richard 
son,  to  be  lieutenant-colonels;  and  Capts.  Cutshaw, 
Jordan,  Miller,  Stribling,  Raine,  R.  C.  M.  Page,  Wat 
son,  McGraw,  M.  Johnson,  Ward,  Maurin,  Moorman, 
Chew,  and  Breathed,  to  be  majors  with  the  following 
general  assignments: 

Brig.-Gen.  W.  N.  Pendleton,  Chief  of  Artillery 

IST  CORPS 
Brig.-Gen.  E.  P.  Alexander,  Chief  of  Artillery 

TT         »    T>  4.4.  v  (Lieut.-Col.  F.  Huger.  South  Carolina. 

Huger  s  Battalion.         <,,   .    ™    0    T      ,    &     '       .    . 
(Maj.  T.  S.  Jordan,  Virginia. 

T,     ,  ,       ,    T,  .  (Lieut.-Col.  R.  F.  Beckham.  Virginia. 

Beckham  s  Battalion.    4,,   .    T    ^   TTr   „      ,    ~,         . 
(Maj.  J.  P.  W.  Read,  Georgia. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  721 

(Lieut.  -Col.  B.  F.  Eshleman.  Louisiana. 
Eshlemans  Battalion,  |Maj    M    B   Mfflerj  Louisiana. 

RESERVE 
Col.  H.  P.  Jones,  Virginia 

(Lieut.-Col.  C.  E.  Lightfoot,  North  Carolina. 
Lightfoot  s  Battalion,  |Maj    g   p    Hamilto6n?  Georgia 

2D  CORPS 

Brig.-Gen.  A.  L.  Long,  Chief  of  Artillery 
Col.  T.  H.  Carter,  Assistant  Chief  of  Artillery 

(Mai.  R.  C.  M.  Page,  Virginia. 
Page  s  Battalion,  |M|£  M   N   Moorman^  Vi?ginia. 

RESERVE 
Col.  J.  T.  Brown,  Virginia 

/-.  i  i       >    T>  ..   T  (Mai.  W.  E.  Cutshaw,  Virginia. 

Cutshaw  s  Battalion,     -\,  %    ^    ,,    o,   .,  ,.    '   Tr.&  .   . 
Maj.  R.  M.  Striblmg,  Virginia. 


„     j          ,    -o  ,,   v 
Hardaway  s  Battalion, 


Lieut.-Col.  R.  A.  Hardaway,  Alabama. 


Virginia 

3D  CORPS 
Col.  R.  L.  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 


n  ,    T,   ,,   T  (Lieut.-Col.  W.  J.  Pegram,  Virginia. 

Pegram  s  Battalion,       J1l/r   .     T         ,    ^r  ^       *   TT.     .   .& 
Maj.  Joseph  McGraw,  Virginia. 

Lieut.-Col.  D.  G.  Mclntosh,  South  Carolina. 
Maj.  Marmaduke  Johnson,  Virginia. 

„  Lieut.-Col.  W.  T.  Poague,  Virginia. 

Poague  s  Battalion,          ,T   .    ^  TTr     ,    ,  ?.         .    &. 

(Maj.  George  Ward,  Mississippi. 


Mclntosh's  Battalion, 


RESERVE 
Col.  A.  S.  Cutts,  Georgia 


Richardson's  Battalion. 


Cutts'  Battalion, 


Lieut.-Col.  Charles  Richardson,  Virginia. 
Maj*.  Victor  Maurin,  Louisiana. 
Lieut.-Col.  A.  S.  Cutts,  Georgia. 
Maj.  John  Lane,  Georgia. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY 


Lieut.-Col.  James  Bearing,  Chief  of  Artillery 
Chew's  Battalion,          Maj.  R.  P.  Chew,  Virginia. 
Breathed's  Battalion,    Maj.  James  Breathed. 


722  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  foregoing  schedule  includes  2  colonels  less  and 
1  lieutenant-colonel  and  3  majors  more  than  the  law 
allowed,  and  provided  for  7  promotions  from  the  1st, 
8  from  the  2d,  and  9  from  the  3d  Corps,  and  4  from  the 
Horse  Artillery,  which  was  about  as  fair  a  distribution 
as  could  be  made.  It  will  also  be  observed  that  the  two 
reserve  battalions  of  each  corps  were  grouped  under  a 
single  field  officer,  which  was  done  at  the  suggestion  of 
Gen.  Long.  It  is  also  to  be  noticed  that  Maj.  M.  W. 
Henry,  to  the  command  of  whose  battalion  Haskell 
succeeded,  had  dropped  out  by  transfer  to  the  Western 
Army.  It  seems  strange  that  Dearing  should  have  been 
recommended  to  succeed  Beckham  as  senior  officer  in 
the  Horse  Artillery.  This  must  have  been  at  the 
instance  of  Stuart  with  whom  Pendleton  had  conferred, 
for  no  such  transfer  would  have  been  proposed  except 
at  his  request.  Dearing  had  a  natural  love  for  the 
cavalry  and  later  transferred  to  that  arm  as  a  brigadier- 
general. 

The  foregoing  recommendations  of  the  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery  with  the  reasons  upon  which  they  were  based, 
give  one  a  valuable  insight  into  the  affairs  of  the  Ar 
tillery  at  the  time,  but  the  welfare  of  the  arm  seems 
not  to  have  been  the  only  consideration  before  the  ap 
pointing  power.  Influence,  prejudice,  politics,  the 
bane  of  armies,  were  not  foreign  to  the  Confederacy, 
and  it  was  many  months  before  the  needs  of  the  service 
overcame  the  obstacles  thrown  in  the  way  of  final  action. 
Garnett,  meanwhile,  retained  his  command,  while  Col. 
Walton  remained  in  Virginia  until  spring  in  command 
of  the  Artillery  with  Pickett,  consisting  of  Eshleman's 
and  Dearing's  battalions.  Cabell  was  also  retained  and 
his  battalion  was  held  throughout  the  winter  at  the 
front  as  an  army  reserve  with  Eraser's,  Manly's,  and 
McCarthy's  batteries  at  Somerville,  Raccoon,  and 
Morton's  Fords,  and  Carlton's  Battery  in  support  in 
rear  of  the  last  two.  Haskell's  Battalion  was  tempora 
rily  attached  to  the  3d  Corps,  in  the  absence  of  Long- 
street.  Col.  Cabell  seems  to  have  been  well  aware  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  723 

the  fact  that  he  was  not  in  favor,  but  was  determined 
that  he  should  not  be  ousted  and  resolutely  held  on  to 
the  last,  giving  up  his  guns  only  at  Appomattox. 

As  time  wore  on  and  it  became  apparent  to  Pendleton 
that  the  needs  of  the  Artillery  were  simply  being  disre 
garded,  he  again  addressed  Gen.  Lee  on  the  subject  of 
the  necessary  promotions  as  follows: 

"Although  I  know  you  are  anxious  to  secure  the  promotion  of 
our  many  meritorious  officers,  and  regret,  as  I  do,  the  obstacles  that 
have  hitherto  hindered  favorable  action  upon  the  recommendations 
in  their  behalf,  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  submit  for  your  consideration 
some  additional  facts  recently  brought  to  my  notice. 

"First.  Some  of  the  best  officers  in  the  corps,  finding  how 
extremely  difficult  it  is  to  rise  in  it  at  all,  in  proportion  to  service 
and  merit,  are  making  arrangements  for  more  promising  positions 
in  other  arms;  nor  can  this  be  wondered  at  or  even  objected  to  as 
unpatriotic.  Men  the  most  devoted  must  be  expected  to  value  rank 
alike,  as  an  evidence  that  their  services  are  appreciated,  and  as  an 
important  condition  toward  more  extended  service.  No  man  of 
merit  ever  disregards  the  question  of  promotion,  and  much  as 
officers  may  be  willing  to  sacrifice  at  times  like  these,  they  cannot 
ignore  so  universal  and  powerful  a  sentiment  as  that  associated 
with  martial  honor. 

"Even  those  officers  who  have  no  idea  of  seeking  other  service, 
and  whose  simple  sense  of  duty  will  keep  them  steadfast  until  the 
end,  in  spite  of  disproportionate  reward,  are  compelled  to  consider 
themselves  and  their  commands  regarded  with  less  than  justice,  and 
after  all  that  can  be  allowed  for  high  principle,  we  must  conclude 
that  it  is  not  in  human  nature  not  to  be  more  or  less  disturbed  by 
such  a  reflection,  nor  can  such  disturbance  be  without  its  injurious 
effects  upon  the  public  service. 

"In  addition  to  these  considerations,  the  fact  is  worthy  of 
particular  attention  that  a  number  of  the  battalions  have  with 
them  only  one  field  officer,  so  that  in  contingencies  frequently 
occurring,  the  senior  captain,  not  always  well  qualified  for  the 
charge,  has  to  command  a  battalion,  serious  as  are  the  responsi 
bilities  belonging  to  the  position.  It  is  certainly  important  that  this 
difficulty  be  corrected  before  the  next  active  campaign. 

"You  will,  I  know,  appreciate  the  case,  and  again  ask  for  such 
action  on  the  part  of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  as  may  be 
practicable  toward  remedying  the  evil  indicated."* 

These  were  strong  arguments,  and  were  too  true  to 
be  further  neglected.  At  this  time,  there  were  in  the 

*Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXXIII,  p.  1193,  letter  dated  February  22,  1864. 


724  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

three  corps  and  the  Horse  Artillery  214  artillery  officers 
present  for  duty,  with  an  effective  strength  for  their 
arm  of  4,893,  and  a  paper  strength  of  7,137.*  The 
grand  total  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  ex 
clusive  of  Longstreet's  command,  was  but  85,000  of 
ficers  and  men  on  paper,  yet  there  were  2,418  officers 
of  infantry  and  331  of  cavalry.  These  figures  give 
some  idea  of  how  little  opportunity  the  artillery  arm 
afforded  for  promotion  as  compared  to  the  others,  not 
withstanding  the  fact  that  the  proportion  of  the  ar 
tillery  personnel  to  that  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry, 
combined,  was  as  1  to  10.  We  must  also  consider  that 
casualties  in  the  Infantry  and  Cavalry  were  by  virtue 
of  the  nature  of  those  arms  much  greater  among  the 
commissioned  personnel  than  in  the  Artillery. 

That  the  matter  of  promotions  in  the  Artillery  was 
vigorously  pressed  by  Gen.  Lee  is  certain,  for  by  S.  O. 
No.  77,  A.  N.  V.,  March  19,  1864,  the  following  as 
signments  were  made: 

Brig.-Gen.  William  Nelson  Pendleton,  Chief  of  Artillery 

IST  CORPS 
Brig.-Gen.  Edward  Porter  Alexander,  Chief  of  Artillery 


Col.  Henry  Coalter  Cabell. 
Maj.  S.  P.  Hamilton. 

John  Cheves  Haskell. 

James  Reilly. 


Cabell's  Battalion, 

Haskell's  Battalion, 

TT  (Lieut.-Col.  Frank  Huger. 

Huger  s  Battalion,        <..,   .    ™  -,      ^    T     j 

(Maj.  Tyler  C.  Jordan. 

(Col.  Hilary  P.  Jones. 

Jones   Battalion,  <,,   .     T  i.     i»   m   -n     j 

(Maj.  John  P.  W.  Read. 

,17    ,  .  A   ..,,          (Col.  Jas.  Birge  Walton. 

Washington  Artillery,  |Maj    Benj    |   Eshleman. 

2o  CORPS 
Brig.-Gen.  Armistead  Lindsay  Long,  Chief  of  Artillery 

T,  »    T»  . j.  T  (Lieut.-Col.  Carter  M.  Braxton. 

Braxton  s  Battalion.     <,,   .    AT        ,,       XT    ,, 

(Maj.  Marcellus  N.  Moorman. 

,    r>  *  (Col.  John  Thompson  Brown. 

Browns  Battalion,        <T  .         ^  i    -n  i.  '  L  A    cs     j 

(Lieut. -Col.  Robert  A.  Hardaway. 

*Ibid.,  p.  1191. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  725 

(Col.  Thomas  H.  Carter. 
Carter  s  Battalion,         IM&.    Richard  c    M    page 

(Mai.  Wilfred  E.  Cutshaw. 
Cutshaws  Battalion,    |Maj    Robert  M    Stribling. 

(Lieut.-Col.  William  Nelson. 
Nelson  s  Battalion,        |Maj    Dayid  Watson> 

3D  CORPS 
Col.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 

(Lieut.-Col.  Allan  S.  Cutts. 
Cutts   Battalion,  |Maj    John  Lane 

(Lieut.-Col.  William  Johnson  Pegram. 
Pegram  s  Battalion,  Ma     Joseh  McGraw 


(Lieut.-Col.  David  Gregg  Mclntosh. 
Melntosh  s  Battalion,          Maj    Marmaduke  Johnson. 

Lieut.-Col.  William  T.  Poague. 


Poague's  Battalion, 


Maj.  George  Ward. 


Mai.  Charles  Richardson. 
Richardson  s  Battalion,       M^.    M    R 


In  this  assignment,  Jones  was  given  Bearing's  Bat 
talion,  Cutshaw  succeeding  to  the  command  of  Jones' 
old  battalion,  while  Richardson  succeeded  Garnett,  and 
Braxton  succeeded  Andrews. 

Soon  Gen.  Long  divided  his  artillery  into  two  divi 
sions,  the  first  under  Brown,  consisting  of  Nelson's, 
Hardaway's,  and  Braxton's  battalions,  and  the  second 
under  Carter,  consisting  of  Cutshaw's  and  Page's  bat 
talions.*  Hardaway  and  Page  then  commanded 
Brown's  and  Carter's  old  battalions,  respectively. 

Early  in  March  Beckham  was  promoted  and  trans 
ferred  to  the  western  army,  whereupon  Dearing  was 
promoted  and  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  Horse 
Artillery,  the  organization  of  which  was  now  as  fol 
io  ws:f 

HORSE  ARTILLERY{ 

Lieut.-Col.  James  Dearing 
Maj.  Robert  Preston  Chew 

Ashby  Battery,  Capt.  James  W.  Thomson. 

1st  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  Capt.   James   Breathed. 

*Rel>elUon  Records,  Vol.  XXXIII,  p.  1267. 
tFor  Bearing's  assignment  to  H.  A.,  see  Ibid.,  p.  1264. 

JGriffin's  Battery  attached  to  Maryland  line  under  Gen.  Bradley  T.  Johnston. 
Jackson's  Battery  with  Jones  in  Department  of  Western  Virginia. 


726  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

2d  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  Capt.  Wm.  M.  McGregor. 

Lynchburg  Beauregards,  Capt.  J.  J.  Shoemaker. 

Washington  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  J.  F.  Hart. 

Before  the  opening  of  the  next  campaign,  Eshleman 
was  also  promoted  and  given  command  of  a  newly- 
organized  battalion  from  among  the  batteries  around 
Richmond,  and  Capt.  William  Miller  Owen,  formerly 
adjutant  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  became  its  major 
and  battalion  commander.  Thus,  with  the  exception  of 
the  retention  of  Cabell  in  active  command,  we  see  that 
the  original  recommendations  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery 
were  finally  very  closely  followed,  and  general  satis 
faction  prevailed.  It  was  about  this  time  that  Lieut.- 
Gen.  J.  C.  Pemberton,  the  unfortunate  defender  of 
Vicksburg,  tendered  his  resignation  and  requested  to 
be  assigned  to  the  Artillery  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant- 
colonel.*  On  May  12  he  was  assigned  to  Ransom's 
Division  in  the  Richmond  defenses  as  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery,  t 

Favorable  weather  in  February  tempted  Meade  to 
undertake  a  renewal  of  operations,  but  the  prompt  ap 
pearance  of  Lee  induced  the  Federal  commander  to 
forego  his  activity,  not,  however,  until  he  had  attacked 
Swell's  line.  Nearly  all  the  Confederate  pickets  were 
taken.  The  preparedness  of  Brown's  Artillery  alone 
saved  the  breaking  of  the  Confederate  line.  The  bat 
teries  of  the  2d  Corps,  unaided,  hurled  the  Federals 
back  and  administered  a  bloody  repulse  to  them  with 
slight  loss  to  themselves.  But  for  their  prompt  and 
energetic  action,  instead  of  being  a  small  affair,  a  dis 
aster  would  have  befallen  the  Army. 

On  the  29th  of  February,  Gen.  Custer  with  about 
2,500  picked  troopers  and  a  section  of  horse  artillery, 
moving  along  the  Earlyville  Road,  approached  within 
one  mile  of  the  Horse  Artillery  camp  before  he  was  dis 
covered  by  the  merest  accident.  It  so  happened  that 
Capt.  Moorman  with  two  of  his  men  while  going  fishing 

*Ibid..  p.  1296. 

flbid.,  Vol.  XXXVI,  p.  994. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  727 

saw  the  raiders  approaching,  and  galloped  back  to  camp 
to  give  the  alarm.  The  enemy  appeared  so  suddenly 
that  the  parked  guns  were  all  but  captured.  By  the 
time  Maj.  Chew  was  able  to  get  his  batteries  hooked  up, 
the  raiders  were  actually  among  the  huts  looting  the 
camp  and  shooting  down  the  stray  horses  which  it  had 
been  impossible  to  drive  in  from  the  fields  in  which  the 
animals  had  been  turned  out.  A  few  shots  from  Moor 
man's  guns  while  the  teams  were  being  brought  up 
served  to  check  the  enemy  sufficiently  to  enable  Chew 
to  place  his  batteries  in  position  and  open  upon  the 
raiders,  who  were  seemingly  more  intent  upon  the  de 
struction  of  the  camp  than  the  capture  of  the  guns.  The 
artillery  fire  soon  drove  Custer  off,  and  thus  did  Chew 
entirely  unsupported  by  infantry  or  cavalry  save  Char- 
lottesville,  with  about  200  cannoneers,  including  the 
sick  and  the  dismounted  men  who  were  always  called 
in  the  Artillery  Company  "Q".  In  accomplishing  this 
result,  an  interesting  stratagem  was  utilized.  The  16 
guns  present  were  formed  in  line,  and  manned  by  the 
dismounted  cannoneers,  while  the  rest  of  the  men,  bear 
ing  an  old  standard,  were  formed  by  Chew  and  Breathed 
into  a  squadron  behind  the  guns.  There  was  not  a 
musket  or  carbine  in  the  outfit,  few  pistols,  and  fewer 
sabers.  Most  of  the  men,  however,  bore  sticks  and 
clubs  to  represent  arms.  The  few  small  arms  were,  of 
course,  ostentatiously  employed,  with  such  effect  that 
the  enemy  mistook  the  line  of  mounted  cannoneers  for 
a  cavalry  support.  In  the  meantime,  the  guns  were 
actively  plied,  while  Custer  held  most  of  his  men  be 
yond  the  river,  uncertain  as  to  the  number  of  his  enemy. 
He  had  captured  Capt.  Moorman's  two  companions  be 
fore  they  reached  camp.  From  them  little  information 
could  be  secured.  In  fact  they  intentionally  assumed 
a  most  puzzling  manner.  Custer,  himself,  then  ques 
tioned  a  negro  inhabitant  of  the  neighborhood,  who 
stated  with  every  appearance  of  candor  that  the  ar 
tillerymen  had  lied,  and  that  Confederate  troops  were 


728  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

encamped  all  the  way  from  the  river  to  Charlottesville, 
and  had  with  them  not  less  than  60  guns.  This  inter 
view  was  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  on  a  hill  above 
the  bridge  at  Burnley's  Mill,  about  a  mile  from  the 
Artillery  camp,  and  while  it  was  transpiring  several 
shells  burst  near  the  group.  About  the  same  time,  Chew 
moved  his  pseudo  cavalry  to  the  flank  of  the  guns  and 
cried  out  in  a  loud  voice,  "Tell  Col.  Dulaney  to  bring 
up  the  Seventh  Regiment."  The  Federals  heard  the 
command,  and  naturally  assumed  the  superb  cavalry 
regiment  had  been  moved  from  the  Valley,  where  it  was 
actually  in  camp,  to  the  defense  of  Charlottesville. 
That  night  Custer  retired  towards  the  Rappahannock, 
having  accomplished  nothing  but  the  burning  of  the 
Horse  Artillery  cantonments  and  Burnley's  Mill, 
while  Chew  moved  his  battalion  four  miles  down  the 
Scottsville  Road,  unwilling  to  rely  on  Dulaney's  sup 
port.  But  the  next  day,  when  Custer  was  found  to  have 
decamped,  he  returned  to  his  old  quarters,  and  rebuilt 
his  huts.  The  men  had  lost  nearly  everything  they  pos 
sessed  in  the  way  of  surplus  clothing.  The  bountiful 
supply  must  have  greatly  improved  the  outfit  of  the 
Federal  raiders.  For  the  next  few  days  rumors  of 
Custer's  return  were  rife  and  a  bold  lookout  was  main 
tained.  On  the  20th  of  March,  the  battalion  was 
ordered  to  Gordonsville  for  security,  where  it  remained 
until  the  opening  of  the  next  campaign,  in  camp  on  the 
farm  of  Boiling  Haxall.  While  there  a  large  supply 
of  fresh  horses  was  expected  by  the  batteries,  but  the 
total  number  received  was  38. 

Meanwhile  the  following  resolutions  were  received  by 
the  Horse  Artillery  Battalion  from  the  Town  Council 
of  Charlottesville,  as  a  testimonial  of  the  appreciation 
of  its  people: 

"Whereas,  The  recently  attempted  raid  of  the  Yankees  on  this 
place  was  undoubtedly  checked  and  finally  repulsed  by  unequaled 
coolness  and  courage  of  the  gallant  officers  and  men  of  the  artillery 
battalion,  encamped  a  few  miles  north  of  Charlottesville,  wholly 
unsupported  as  they  were  by  either  infantry  or  cavalry ;  and, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  729 

"Whereas,  Our  town  was  thus  unquestionably  saved  from  pillage,, 
and  the  public  stores  and  the  railroad  bridges  from  destruction; 
therefore,  be  it 

"Resolved,  That  on  behalf  of  the  citizens  of  Charlottesville  we, 
the  council  of  the  town,  do  hereby  return  our  thanks  to  the  officers 
and  men  of  the  said  artillery  battalion  for  their  gallant  and  heroic 
conduct  on  the  occasion  above  mentioned,  with  the  assurance  of  our 
lasting  and  grateful  appreciation  of  the  service  thus  rendered  us. 

"Resolved,  That  the  above  preamble  and  resolutions  be  handed 
to  the  commander  of  the  battalion,  in  order  that  he  may  communi 
cate  the  same  to  the  officers  and  men  of  his  command  in  the  manner 
he  may  deem  most  appropriate. 

"By  order  of  the  Council,  March  7,  1864. 

"A.  ROBERT  McKEE,  Clerk. 

"To  Maj.  M.  N.  Moorman, 
"Commanding  Battalion, 

"Stuart  Horse  Artillery." 

It  was  after  the  arrival  of  the  battalion  at  Gordons- 
ville  that  Capt.  Moorman  was  promoted  major  and 
transferred  to  Braxton's  Light  Artillery  Battalion,  then 
at  Frederick's  Hall,  Lieut.  J.  J.  Shoemaker  succeeding 
him  as  Captain  of  the  Beauregard  Rifles  Battery  of 
Lynchburg,  while  Maj.  Chew  became  the  battalion 
commander  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel. 

The  next  hostile  move  after  Custer's  raid  was  in 
March  when  two  columns  of  Federal  cavalry  under 
Gen.  Kilpatrick  and  Col.  Dahlgren,  respectively, 
moved  out  from  Culpeper  Courthouse,  the  first  towards 
Richmond,  and  the  second  with  orders  to  destroy  the 
artillery  at  Frederick  Hall,  and  then  proceed  down 
the  James  River,  form  a  junction  with  Kilpatrick's 
column,  capture  Richmond,  destroy  the  city,  and  liber 
ate  the  prisoners  on  Belle  Isle.  This  was  a  big  order 
for  Dahlgren.  Nearly  succeeding  with  respect  to  reach 
ing  Richmond,  he  would  certainly  have  succeeded  in 
destroying  the  2d  Corps  artillery,  had  it  not  been  for 
the  foresight  of  Gen.  Long.  Anticipating  a  cavalry 
raid  upon  his  camp,  he  had  early  applied  for  two  regi- 


730  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

ments  of  infantry  as  a  guard.  When  refused  this  sup 
port,  he  secured  125  muskets,  which  he  distributed 
among  his  cannoneers  and  organized  them  by  battalions 
into  companies  of  riflemen. 

Dahlgren  captured  the  pickets  at  Germanna  Ford, 
crossed  the  Rapidan,  and  arrived  within  a  few  miles  of 
the  Artillery  camp  before  his  approach  was  reported. 
Gen.  Long,  immediately  upon  learning  of  the  danger, 
ordered  Lieut.-Col.  Braxton  to  place  a  battery  in  po 
sition  to  command  the  road  over  which  the  enemy  was 
approaching,  to  deploy  his  company  of  sharpshooters  as 
skirmishers,  and  to  withdraw  his  other  batteries  to  a 
position  near  the  railway  station.  At  the  same  time, 
Col.  Brown  was  directed  to  place  his  battalion  in 
position  to  guard  the  approaches  below  the  depot,  while 
Cutshaw's  and  Carter's  battalions  were  held  in  rear  of 
Brown's  and  Braxton's,  and  sharpshooters  from  the 
supporting  batteries  were  also  sent  forward  and  de 
ployed.  These  dispositions  were  barely  completed 
when  the  Federal  raiders  came  in  view  of  Marye's 
Battery  on  the  road.  Seeing  the  battle  flag  flying  above 
the  guns,  and  catching  a  glimpse  of  the  bayonets  of  the 
sharpshooters,  Dahlgren  halted  in  some  surprise,  hav 
ing  been  led  to  believe  that  the  artillery  at  Frederick 
Hall  was  without  an  infantry  support.  He  now  in 
quired  of  a  local  contraband  whether  or  not  there  was 
infantry  with  the  artillery,  to  which  the  negro  replied, 
"Yes,  Massa,  plenty  of  it."  Being  doubtful  whether 
the  negro  knew  what  was  meant  by  infantry,  Dahlgren 
asked  how  he  knew  it.  "Because,"  was  the  answer,  "the 
infantry  had  stickers  on  the  ends  of  their  guns."  Con 
vinced  by  the  evidence  of  the  negro  that  the  artillery  was 
not  unprotected,  Dahlgren  made  a  detour  to  the  left, 
keeping  beyond  the  range  of  the  guns.  The  only  loss  sus- 
stained  by  the  Artillery  was  that  of  the  members  of  a 
court-martial,  which  was  in  session  in  a  house  on  the 
enemy's  line  of  march ;  whereupon  a  wag  remarked  that 
as  the  court,  prisoners  and  witnesses  were  all  present  the 
trial  might  go  on  and  the  proceedings  be  sent  to  Gen. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  731 

Long,  from  Point  Lookout,  or  Fort  Delaware.  The 
prisoners  escaped,  however,  with  one  exception,  during 
the  following  night.  The  two  raiding  columns  failed 
to  cooperate,  due  to  Dahlgren  being  led  astray  by  a 
faithful  negro  slave.  Kilpatrick  reached  the  inner  line  of 
defenses  of  Richmond,  and,  attacking  alone,  was  re 
pulsed.  Dahlgren  moving  down  the  James  River  Val 
ley,  some  of  the  distance  on  the  tow  path  of  the  canal, 
burned  many  barns,  seized  all  the  horses  for  his  men  he 
could  lay  his  hands  on,  and  almost  captured  Mr.  Sedden, 
the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  and  Gen.  Wise,  who 
were  visiting  their  families  at  "Sabot  Hill"  and  "East 
wood."  But  these  worthies  escaped  on  fleet  horses,  and 
took  the  news  of  the  Federal  approach  to  Richmond, 
where  the  Richmond  School  Cadets,  and  a  nondescript 
band  of  departmental  clerks  and  Home  Guards,  the 
latter  consisting  of  old  men  and  boys,  were  hastily 
thrown  across  Dahlgren's  path,  while  the  Tredegar 
Iron  Works  Battalion  turned  out  to  guard  Belle  Isle. 
The  raiders  galloped  into  an  ambush  which  had  been 
skillfully  laid  for  them  and  were  signally  defeated.  Dahl 
gren  himself,  and  many  of  his  men,  were  killed,  and  only 
a  remnant  of  his  band  escaped.*  Thus  did  the  Federal 
plans  come  to  naught,  and  thus  did  Gen.  Long  by  the 
most  admirable  foresight  save  the  Artillery  of  the  2d 
Corps.  On  three  separate  occasions  a  negro  had  ma 
terially  befriended  the  Artillery. 

Gen.  Pendleton  had  spent  the  month  of  January  on 
leave  of  absence  in  Lexington  with  his  family,  but  re 
turned  to  Artillery  Headquarters  at  Louisa  Courthouse 
on  February  3.  He  was  soon  summoned  to  Richmond, 
and  ordered  to  Dalton,  Ga.  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
commanding  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  had,  upon  taking 
command,  found  the  Artillery  of  that  Army  in  a  highly- 
disorganized  state^and  at  once  applied  to  the  War  De 
partment  for  Col.  Alexander  to  be  sent  to  straighten 
things  out.  Writing  on  December  27  about  the  con- 


*See  Memoirs  of  Robert  E.  Lee,  Long,  p.  320,  and  Battles  and  Leaders,  Vol. 

p.   95.      Also   an    interesting   persoi    ' 
April,  1894,  by  Mrs.  Ellen  Wise  Mayo. 


IV,    p.  ^95.      Also   an    interesting   personal   narrative    in    the    Century   Magazine, 


732  THE  LONG  ABM  or  LEE 

ditions  of  his  army,  to  Gen.  Bragg,  who  was  virtually 
Mr.  Davis'  Chief  of  Staff,  Gen.  Johnston  said: 

"The  artillery  also  wants  organization,  and  especially  a  com 
petent  commander.  I,  therefore,,  respectfully  urge  that  such  a  one 
be  sent  me.  I  have  applied  for  Col.  Alexander,  but  Gen.  Lee 
objects  that  he  is  too  valuable  in  his  present  position  to  be  taken 
from  it.  His  value  to  the  country  would  be  more  than  doubled,  I 
think,  by  the  promotion  and  assignment  I  recommend."*  To  this 
communication,  Gen.  Bragg  replied  in  March,  in  part,  as  follows: 

"Col.  Alexander,  applied  for  by  you,  as  Chief  of  Artillery,  is 
deemed  necessary  by  Gen.  Lee  in  his  present  position.  Brig.-Gen. 
W.  N.  Pendleton,  an  experienced  Officer  of  Artillery,  has  been 
ordered  to  your  headquarters  to  inspect  that  part  of  your  command, 
and  report  on  its  condition. 

"Should  his  services  be  acceptable  to  you,  I  am  authorized  to 
say  you  can  retain  him. 

"I  am  exceedingly  anxious  to  gratify  you  on  that  point,  for  I 
know  the  deficiency  existing. 

"It  is  more  than  probable  that  such  a  junction  may  soon  be  made 
as  to  place  Col.  Alexander  under  your  command. "f 

The  foregoing  correspondence  gives  one  an  idea  of 
the  estimation  in  which  Alexander  was  held  throughout 
the  service.  Since  Gen.  Pendleton  exercised  only  an 
administrative  command  of  the  Artillery,  he  was 
naturally  more  available  than  Alexander  for  such  duty 
as  required  by  Gen.  Johnston.  Leaving  Louisa  Court 
house,  March  4,  he  arrived  at  Dalton,  via  Atlanta,  a 
week  later,  with  Lieuts.  Peterkin  and  Hatcher,  of  his 
staff,  and  immediately  set  to  work.  There  is  no  reason 
to  believe  that  his  assignment  was  not  satisfactory  to  his 
new  commander,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  a 
younger  officer  had  been  applied  for.  Gen.  Johnston's 
greeting  was  most  cordial,  and  the  artillery  situation  in 
its  general  aspects  was  at  once  laid  before  Gen. 
Pendleton. 

The  personnel  of  Johnston's  Artillery  at  this  time 
numbered  approximately  4,500,  exclusive  of  Alex 
ander's  command.  Energetic  measures  had  already 
been  taken  to  supply  the  western  batteries  with  a  full 

*Johnston's  Narrative,  p.  288. 
•^Johnston's  Narrative,  p.  289. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  733 

complement  of  horses.  Maj.  Beckham  had  recently 
been  promoted  colonel,  and  transferred  from  Stuart's 
Horse  Artillery  to  Johnston's  Army,  having  been  suc 
ceeded  by  Bearing,  who  had  also  been  promoted.  Maj. 
Bondurant  had  also  been  promoted  at  the  instance  of 
Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  and  transferred,  as  a  lieutenant- 
colonel,  and  Chief  of  Artillery  of  D.  H.  Hill's  Division. 
Pendleton  at  once  took  occasion  to  recommend  for  the 
position  of  Chief  of  Artillery,  Col.  Thomas  H.  Carter, 
of  Virginia. 

Some  idea  of  the  old  general's  energy  and  his  pe 
culiar  fitness  for  work  of  the  character  to  which  he  had 
been  assigned  may  be  had  from  the  fact  that  although 
he  only  arrived  in  Johnston's  camp  at  daybreak  on  the 
llth,  he  commenced  his  inspection  of  the  three  reserve 
battalions  commanded  by  Lieut. -Col.  Hollinguist  at 
noon  the  same  day.  This  command  constituted  about 
one-third  of  all  the  artillery  with  the  Army.  Accom 
panied  by  Maj.  Preston,  Inspector- General  of  Ar 
tillery,  and  one  of  his  aides,  and  provided  with  one  of 
Gen.  Johnston's  own  mounts,  he  made  a  minute  in 
spection  of  the  battalions  assembled  on  the  usual  drill 
grounds,  including  the  material,  harness,  field  trans 
portation,  horses  and  stables.  He  was  surprised  to  find 
the  animals  in  fair  condition,  the  guns,  carriages  and 
harness  in  very  good  order,  and  much  evidence  of  in 
telligent  care  and  energy.  Conditions  were  so  much 
better  than  he  had  expected  to  find  them  that  at  once 
he  recognized  the  fact  that  the  trouble  lay  elsewhere. 

A  grand  review  of  the  Artillery  of  Hood's  and 
Hardee's  corps  was  appointed  for  the  12th,  to  be  fol 
lowed  by  minute  daily  inspections  of  their  various  bat 
talions.  By  the  16th,  the  actual  work  of  inspection  had 
been  completed,  and  written  inquiries  submitted  to  the 
battalion  commanders,  in  which  various  interrogations 
relative  to  the  service  were  propounded.  On  the  16th, 
Gen.  Hood  conducted  an  imposing  drill  of  his  corps  for 
the  benefit  of  Gen.  Pendleton,  followed  by  combat  exer 
cises  in  which  about  20,000  men,  including  infantry,  ar 
tillery,  and  cavalry,  engaged  with  blank  ammunition. 


734  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Much  to  the  disappointment  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery 
notice  was  received  the  19th  that  Brig.-Gen.  Shoup  had 
been  ordered  from  Mobile  to  join  Johnston  as  his  Chief 
of  Artillery.  Shoup  was  a  graduate  of  the  United 
States  Military  Academy,  had  served  at  Vicksburg  with 
great  credit,  and  was  reputed  to  be  an  able  officer,  but 
his  preferment  over  Carter  appears  to  have  been  only 
another  evidence  of  the  advantage  held  by  West 
Pointers.  Certain  it  is  that  his  service  had  not  been  as 
illustrious  as  that  of  "Tom"  Carter,  of  Pampatyke,  a 
distinguished  graduate  of  the  Virginia  Military  Insti 
tute,  a  kinsman  of  Gen.  Lee,  a  man  of  unblemished 
personal  character,  and  with  a  record  as  a  soldier  second 
to  none  in  the  Confederacy. 

Another  great  artillery  drill  and  sham  battle  was 
tendered  Pendleton  by  Gen.  Hardee.  But  the  event, 
while  equally  inspiring,  was  less  eventful  than  the 
former  one,  on  which  occasion  one  of  Hood's  major- 
generals  and  part  of  his  staff  had  been  unceremoniously 
unhorsed  by  their  affrighted  mounts.  This  incident  no 
doubt  established  the  precedent  for  the  grand  review  in 
Paris  in  1910,  when  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
French  Army  was  thrown  at  the  feet  of  the  President 
of  the  Republic.  Gen.  Hardee's  bride  was  evidently 
more  at  home  in  the  saddle  than  some  of  the  western 
knights,  for  she  attended  the  review  mounted,  and  ac 
companied  by  a  number  of  brilliant  staff  officers,  with 
out  accident. 

While  in  the  West,  Gen.  Pendleton  preached  to  the 
troops  on  many  occasions.  His  military  views  and  sug 
gestions  were  in  the  main  approved  by  Gen.  Johnston, 
and  reorganization  had  so  far  progressed  during  his 
presence  that  the  task  remaining  for  Gen.  Shoup  was 
much  simplified.  The  main  trouble  had  been  found  to 
be  with  the  senior  officers.  Returning  to  Richmond,  on 
March  29,  via  Charleston,  where  he  and  his  staff  officers 
inspected  the  harbor  defenses,  Pendleton  promptly  laid 
his  report  on  the  Artillery  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee, 
and  his  recommendations  regarding  it,  before  the  Presi- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  735 

dent.  A  conference  with  Mr.  Davis,  Mr.  Sedden,  and 
Gens.  Bragg  and  Cooper,  resulted  in  his  being  ordered 
back  to  Dalton  to  urge  Gen.  Johnston  to  make  an  ag 
gressive  move  as  speedily  as  possible,  in  order  to  dis 
tract  the  Federals  and  prevent  the  massing  of  more 
troops  under  Grant  in  Virginia.  But  before  returning 
to  the  West,  he  visited  Gen.  Lee  at  the  front,  who  con 
curred  in  the  importance  of  his  mission.  Remaining 
with  Johnston  but  two  days,  during  which  time  he 
pressed  upon  him  the  desires  of  the  administration, 
Gen.  Pendleton  was  back  in  Richmond  again  by  April 
21,  and  soon  joined  the  Army. 

We  have  seen  that  in  personal  appearance  he  much 
resembled  Gen.  Lee.  An  amusing  incident  which  oc 
curred  during  his  presence  in  Richmond  should  here  be 
recounted.  One  afternoon  he  was  stopped  by  a  tipsy 
Irishman  on  Broad  Street,  who  began  haranguing  and 
gesticulating  violently  as  he  detailed  some  fancied 
grievance.  The  ladies  of  the  party  wished  to  go  on,  but 
the  General  insisted  on  listening  patiently  for  a  few 
moments,  then  said,  "My  friend,  you  are  talking  to  the 
wrong  person."  "My,"  said  Paddy,  "ain't  you  Mass* 
Bob?"  "No,"  replied  Gen.  Pendleton.  "Look  and  see 
if  you  don't  know  me:"  This  answer  seemed  to  steady 
the  excited  soldier.  He  came  a  little  closer,  peered  into 
the  General's  face  a  moment,  then  giving  himself  a  vio 
lent  slap  on  the  leg,  exclaimed,  "I'll  swear  if  it  ain't  old 
Artillery."  And  with  many  apologies  the  embarrassed 
soldier  allowed  the  general  to  pass  on. 

When  Gen.  Pendleton  returned  to  the  Army  he 
found  not  only  that  Longstreet  had  returned  to  Vir 
ginia,  and  that  many  changes  had  occurred,  but  that  all 
was  not  running  smoothly  in  the  administration  of  the 
Artillery.  Gen.  Long,  it  seems,  desired  that  all  con 
nection  between  the  Artillery  and  the  Infantry  in  so  far 
as  the  authority  of  division  commanders  was  concerned, 
should  be  officially  severed  by  order,  and  that  the  corps 
chiefs  should  be  free  to  administer  their  commands  as 
integral  units.  While  this  view  was  clearly  expressed 


18 


736  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

in  Orders  No.  69,  June  4,  1863,  reorganizing  the  Ar 
tillery,  and  while  the  Commander-in-Chief  deprecated 
a  clash  of  authority  by  reason  of  its  misinterpretation, 
yet  he  was  unwilling  to  destroy  the  old  associations  be 
tween  the  artillery  battalions  and  the  divisions  with 
which  they  had  so  long  served.  These  associations  he 
regarded  as  a  distinct  asset.  In  this  respect  Gen.  Long 
was  overruled,  and  soon  a  better  understanding  ensued. 

A  further  effort  was  also  now  made  to  equalize  the 
armament  of  batteries  and  the  strength  of  the  battalions, 
and  as  more  horse  batteries  were  needed,  Alexander 
and  Long  were  each  called  upon  to  recommend  a  bat 
tery  for  conversion,  the  first  from  Huger's,  and  the 
second  from  Hardaway's  Battalion.  Alexander  was 
also  called  upon  to  use  his  influence  to  secure  the  as 
signment  of  King's  Battalion,  to  the  1st  Corps  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia.*  Longstreet  had  re 
turned  to  Virginia  with  his  two  divisions  and  Alex 
ander's  own  battalion  some  time  before  this  and  had  gone 
into  camp  near  Mechanicsburg,  about  six  miles  south  of 
Gordonsville.  The  return  of  Longstreet's  men,  who 
had  served  with  marked  distinction  in  the  West,  was 
honored  by  their  being  reviewed  by  Gen.  Lee,  the  first 
ceremony  of  the  kind  he  had  conducted  since  October, 
1862,  when  he  reviewed  his  army  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  Describing  the  scene,  Gen.  Alexander  wrote: 
"It  took  place  in  a  cleared  valley  with  broad  pastures, 
in  which  our  two  divisions  of  infantry,  with  my  old  bat 
talion  of  artillery,  could  be  deployed.  .  .  .  It  is 
now  over  40  years,  but  in  imagination  I  can  see  to-day 
the  large  square  gate  posts,  without  gate  or  fence,  for 
troops  had  been  everywhere  in  that  vicinity,  marking 
where  a  country  road  led  out  of  a  tall  oak  wood  upon  an 
open  knoll  in  front  of  the  centre  of  our  long  double  lines. 
And  as  the  well-remembered  figure  of  Lee  upon 
Traveller,  at  the  head  of  his  staff,  rides  between  the 
posts  and  comes  out  upon  the  ground,  the  bugle  sounds 

^Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXXVI,  Part  II,  pp.  944,  945.  This  battalion  had 
been  serving  in  Southwest  Virginia  in  a  different  department. 


COLONKL  DAVID  GIJKGG   McINTOSN 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  737 

a  signal,  the  guns  thunder  out  a  salute,  Lee  reins  up 
Traveller  and  bares  his  good  gray  head  and  looks  at  us, 
and  we  give  the  rebel  yell  and  shout  and  cry  and  wave 
our  flags  and  look  at  him  once  more.  For  a  wave  of 
sentiment — something  like  what  came  a  year  later  at 
Appomattox,  when  he  rode  back  from  his  meeting  with 
Grant, — seemed  to  sweep  over  the  field.  All  felt  the 
bond  which  held  them  together.  There  was  no  speaking, 
but  the  effect  was  as  of  a  military  sacrament." 

Many  changes  had  occurred  both  in  the  artillery  of 
ficers  and  the  batteries  in  the  Army  during  the  winter 
and  spring.  Besides  Griffin's  2d  Maryland  Horse  Bat 
tery,  Dement 's  and  Brown's  1st  and  4th  Maryland 
batteries,  the  latter  now  under  Lieut.  W.  S.  Chew,  had 
also  been  transferred  to  the  Maryland  line.  Blount's, 
Caskie's,  Macon's,  and  the  Fauquier  Battery,  the  latter 
now  commanded  by  Marshall,  had  been  transferred 
under  Maj.  J.  P.  W.  Read  to  Whiting's  Division,  and 
Owen's  Washington  Artillery  Battalion  to  Colquitt's 
Division,  both  on  duty  in  the  Department  of  North 
Carolina.  Early  in  May,  Col.  H.  P.  Jones  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  these  two  battalions.  The  remnants 
of  the  Louisiana  Guard  Battery  had  been  sent  to  Rich 
mond  for  reorganization. 

On  the  1st  of  May,  the  Artillery  with  the  Army  on 
the  Rapidan  was  organized  as  follows: 

IST  CORPS 

Brig.-Gen.  Edward  Porter  Alexander,  Chief  of  Artillery 

HUGER'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  Frank  Huger 
Maj.  Tyler  C.  Jordan 

Brooks'  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Fickling. 

Madison  (La.)  Battery,  Capt.  Geo.  V.  Moody. 

Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Parker. 

Bedford  Battery,  Capt.  J.  D.  Smith. 

Bath  Battery,  Capt.  Esmond  B.  Taylor. 

Ashland  Battery,  Capt.  Pichegru  Woolfolk,  Jr. 


738  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

HASKELL'S  BATTALION 

Maj.  John  C.  Haskell 
Maj.  James  Reilly 

Rowan  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  John  A.  Ramsey. 

Palmetto  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  Hugh  R.  Garden. 

Nelson  (Va.)  Battery,  Capt.  James  N.  Lamkin. 

Branch  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  John  R.  Potts. 

CABELI/S  BATTALION 

Col.  Henry  Coalter  Cabell 
Maj.  S.  P.  Hamilton 

Battery  "A",  1st  N.  C.  Reg't,  Capt.  Basil  C.  Manly 

1st  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Edward  S.  McCarthy. 

Pulaski  (Ga.)  Battery,  Lieut.   Morgan  Callaway. 

Troup  (Ga.)  Battery,  Capt.  Henry  H.  Carlton. 

2D  CORPS 

Brig. -Gen.  Armistead  Lindsay  Long,  Chief  of  Artillery 
Col.  John  Thompson  Brown,  Chief  of  First  Division 

HARDAWAY'S  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.  Robert  Archelaus  Hardaway 

Powhatan  Battery,  Capt.  Willis  J.  Dance. 

1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.   Archibald  Graham. 

Salem  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  B.  Griffin. 

2d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Lorraine  F.  Jones. 

8d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Benj.  H.  Smith,  Jr. 

NELSON'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  William  Nelson 
Maj.  David  Watson 

Amherst  Battery,  Capt.   Thomas  J.   Kirkpatrick. 

Fluvanna  Battery,  Capt.  John  L.  Massie. 

Georgia  Battery,  Capt.  John  Milledge. 

BRAXTON'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  Carter  M.  Braxton 
Maj.  Marcellus  N.  Moorman 

Alleghany  Battery,  Capt.  John  C.  Carpenter. 

Stafford  Battery,  Capt.  Raleigh  L.  Cooper. 

Lee  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Hardwicke. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  739 

Col.  Thomas  H.  Carter,  Chief  of  Second  Division 
CUTSHAW'S  BATTALION 

Maj.  Wilfred  E.  Cutshaw 
Maj.  Robert  M.  Stribling 

Charlottesville  Battery,  Capt.  James  McD.  Carrington. 

Staunton  Battery,  Capt.  Asher  W.  Garber. 

Richmond  Courtney  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  A.  Tanner. 

PAGE'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  Richard  Channing  Moore  Page 

King  William  Battery,  Capt.  William  P.  Carter. 

Jeff  Davis  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  William  J.  Reese. 

Louisa  Morris  Battery,  Lieut.    . 

Richmond  Orange  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  W.  Fry. 

3D  CORPS 

Col.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery 
POAGUE'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  William  T.  Poague 
Maj.  George  Ward 

Madison  (Miss.)  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  J.  Richards. 

Warrenton  Battery,  Capt.   Addison   W.    Utterback. 

"C"  Battery,  1st  N.  C.  Reg't,  Capt.  Joseph  Graham. 

Albemarle  Battery,  Capt.  James  W.  Wyatt. 

MC!NTOSH'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  David  Gregg  Mclntosh 
Maj.  Marmaduke  Johnson 

Richmond  Battery  (Johnson's),  Capt.  Valentine  J.  Chilton. 

Danville  Battery,  Capt.  Berryman  Z.  Price. 

2d  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  K.  Donald. 

Hardaway's  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  B.  Hurt. 

PEGRAM'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  Wm.  Johnson  Pegram 
Maj.  Jos.  McGraw 

Richmond  Letcher  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  A.  Brander. 

Richmond  Purcell  Battery,  Capt.  George  M.  Cayce. 

Richmond  Crenshaw  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  Ellett. 


740  THE  LONG  ABM  OF  LEE 

Pee  Dee  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  E.  Zimmerman. 

Fredericksburg  Battery,  Capt.  Edward  A.  Marye. 

CUTTS*  BATTALION 

Col.  Allen  S.  Cutts 
Maj.  John  Lane 

"B"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,     Capt.  Geo.  M.  Patterson. 
"A"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,     Capt.  Hugh  M.  Ross. 
"C"  Battery,  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,     Capt.  John  T.  Wingfield. 

RICHARDSON'S  BATTALION 

Maj.  Charles  Richardson 
Maj.  M.  B.  Miller 

Norfolk  L.  A.  Blues,  Capt.  Chas.  R.  Grandy. 

Donaldsonville   (La.)  Battery,  Capt.  R.  Prosper  Landry. 

Norfolk  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  D.  Moore. 

Pittsylvania  Battery,  Capt.   Nathan  Penick. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY 
Maj.  Robert  Preston  Chew,  Chief  of  Artillery 

BREATHED'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  James  Breathed 

Washington  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  James  F.  Hart. 

1st  Stuart  H.  A.  Battery,  Capt.  Philip  Preston  Johnston. 

2d  Stuart  H.  A.  Battery,  Capt.  Wm.  M.  McGregor. 

Lynchburg  Beauregards,  Capt.  J.  J.  Shoemaker. 

Ashby  Battery,  Capt.  James  W.  Thomson. 

With  Ransom's  Division  near  Petersburg  was  Lieut.- 
Col.  C.  E.  Lightfoot's  Battalion,  consisting  of 
Hankins'  Surry,  Rives'  Nelson,  and  Thornton's  Caro 
line  batteries;  with  Hoke  was  Eshleman's  Battalion 
consisting  of  Martin's,  Owen's,  and  Payne's  batteries; 
and  at  Chaffin's  farm  was  Maj.  A.  W.  Stark's  Bat 
talion,  consisting  of  Armistead's  Mathews,  and  French's 
Giles  batteries,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  F.  Moseley's  Battalion 
of  Gumming' s  and  Miller's  North  Carolina,  Staten's 
Georgia,  and  Young's  Yorktown  batteries,  and  Maj. 
J.  C.  Coit's  Battalion  of  Bradford's  Mississippi,  Kelly's 
South  Carolina,  Pegram's  Petersburg,  and  Wright's 
Halifax  batteries.  Including  the  eight  batteries  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  741 

Owen  and  Eshleman,  with  Colquitt  and  Whiting,  and 
Green's  Louisiana  and  Sturdivant's  Albemarle  batteries, 
unassigned,  there  were  then  not  less  than  26  field  batter 
ies  in  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg, 
while  there  were  52  light  and  5  horse,  or  a  total  of  57 
field  batteries  with  the  Army  on  the  Rapidan.  With 
this  army  there  were  exactly  213  guns.*  The  artillery 
personnel  numbered  May  1st  about  4,800  effectives. 
Deducting  this  number  from  the  effective  strength  of 
the  Army,  and  we  have  213  guns  for  57,000  infantry 
and  cavalry,  or  a  proportion  of  nearly  4  guns  per  thou 
sand  men  of  the  other  arms.  The  proportion  of  horse 
guns  to  cavalry  was  exactly  2.5  per  thousand,  there  be 
ing  8,000  troopers  and  5  horse  batteries  of  4  guns  each. 
At  this  time  the  effective  strength  of  the  Federal  Army 
under  Grant  was  about  119,000,  including  an  artillery 
personnel  of  10,210  and  318  guns,  or  a  proportion  of 
about  3  guns  per  1,000  of  the  other  arms.  One  must 
admire  the  ability  of  Lee  to  maintain  so  high  a  pro 
portion  of  artillery  in  spite  of  the  seemingly  insur 
mountable  difficulties  in  his  way.  Yet  his  field  army 
was  outnumbered  in  guns  by  the  enemy  by  nearly  a 
third. 

*Rebellion   Records,   Vol.    XXXVI,    Part   I,   p.    1036.      Gens.    Humphreys    and 
Alexander  estimated  that  there  were  224. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 

THE  ARTILLERY   COMMANDERS   OF   THE   ARMY   COMPARED 

BEFORE  taking  up  the  narrative  of  the  next  cam 
paign,  it  may  be  interesting  to  glance  once  more  at  the 
four  senior  artillery  officers  of  the  Army  at  the  time  the 
Artillery  arm  had  attained  its  maximum  efficiency  in 
personnel,  material,  and  organization.  At  the  close  of  its 
third  year,  it  was  truly  a  formidable  corps,  though 
somewhat  reduced  in  the  number  of  its  guns.  With  the 
purely  military  record  of  its  commanders,  we  are  al 
ready  quite  familiar,  but  what  was  the  contemporary 
and  what  is  a  fair  estimate  of  them  at  this  time? 

Gen.  William  Nelson  Pendleton,  by  far  the  senior 
in  age  as  well  as  in  rank  among  the  officers  of  this  arm, 
like  Bishop  Polk  of  the  Western  Army,  entered  the 
service  of  the  Confederacy,  as  we  have  seen,  from  the 
service  of  the  church.  Born  at  Lexington,  Virginia, 
December  23d,  1809,  he  was  appointed  a  cadet  at  the 
United  States  Military  Academy  in  1826,  graduating 
with  his  class.  While  at  West  Point  he  formed  a  lasting 
friendship  with  Robert  E.  Lee  and  Jefferson  Davis. 
Assigned  to  the  Artillery,  he  served  one  year  in  the 
garrison  of  Augusta,  Ga.,  with  the  rank  of  second  lieu 
tenant,  and  was  then  ordered  back  to  the  Academy  as 
assistant  professor  of  mathematics.  Subsequent  to  this 
duty,  he  served  with  troops  at  Fort  Hamilton,  where  he 
resigned  in  1833  to  accept  the  chair  of  mathematics  at 
Bristol  College,  Pennsylvania,  later  becoming  con 
nected  with  the  faculty  of  Delaware  College.  In  1837, 
he  became  a  clergyman  in  the  Episcopal  Church,  in 
fluenced  to  enter  the  ministry  by  the  spirit  of  revival, 
which  reigned  at  West  Point  while  he  was  a  cadet,  many 
of  his  school-day  companions  doing  the  same.  When 
the  war  broke  out,  he  was  serving  as  rector  of  the  Lex 
ington  parish.  His  entrance  into  the  Confederate 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  743 

military  service  as  the  original  commander  of  the  Rock- 
bridge  Artillery  has  already  been  mentioned. 

While  Gen.  Pendleton  possessed  many  virtues  as  an 
administrator,  he  lacked  the  dash  requisite  to  popularity 
as  a  soldier.  The  officers  and  men  of  the  Army  knew 
little  about  his  ceaseless  activity  in  matters  pertaining 
to  the  equipment  and  arming  of  his  command.  His 
constant  attention  to  the  care  and  preservation  of  the 
material  and  horses  was  practically  unknown  to  them, 
nor  are  such  things  of  a  nature  calculated  to  add  to  the 
reputation  of  a  soldier.  They  are  regarded  as  matters 
of  course,  and  little  interest  is  shown  by  the  troops  in 
them.  Boldness  and  dash  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
appeal  to  the  soldiery  of  an  army.  With  such  qualities 
an  officer,  entirely  lacking  in  administrative  ability  and 
skill  as  an  organizer,  will  acquire  repute  quite  incom 
mensurate  with  his  true  merit.  The  faithful  perform 
ance  of  the  drudgery  of  the  service  adds  little  to  the 
lustre  of  a  military  name. 

Pendleton  was  never  conspicuous  as  a  leader  in  battle, 
though,  as  we  have  shown,  he  was  by  no  means  lacking 
in  courage.  He  was  regarded  from  the  first  as  slow  and 
lacking  in  aggressive  spirit,  and  his  natural  caution  due 
to  his  age  led  to  unfounded  accusations.  His  name  was 
unjustly  coupled  with  the  midnight  route  at  Shepherds- 
town,  after  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg,  in  an  unpleasant 
way.  Notwithstanding  a  court  of  inquiry,  appointed  to 
investigate  the  incident,  clearly  established  the  fact  that 
no  blame  attached  to  him  for  his  conduct  on  that  oc 
casion,  yet  a  military  reputation  is  bound  to  suffer,  even 
when  unjustly  involved  in  such  an  incident.  In  this 
case,  the  tongue  of  the  scandal  monger  was  simply  set 
to  wagging  all  the  more.  Unfortunately,  Pendleton 
was  again  present  and  in  command  when  the  Artillery 
was  withdrawn  from  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg  be 
fore  Sedgwick's  advance.  Not  only  was  he  absolutely 
free  of  blame  on  this  occasion,  but  as  has  been  shown 
and  testified  to  by  Gen.  Early,  who  was  with  him,  the 
guns  were  removed  over  the  protest  of  the  Chief  of  Ar- 


744  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

tillery.  The  withdrawal  on  this  occasion  was  the  result 
of  a  serious  mistake  on  the  part  of  one  of  Gen.  Lee's 
own  staff  officers.  Pendleton's  critics  entirely  over 
looked  the  fact  that  Early,  who  was  really  in  command 
at  Fredericksburg,  withdrew  his  troops  at  the  same  time, 
yet  no  question  ever  arose  over  the  conduct  of  Early. 
The  readiness  with  which  Pendleton's  action  was  taken 
up  and  adversely  discussed  shows  the  sentiment  in  the 
Army  with  respect  to  him.  The  feeling  was  not  un 
known  to  Pendleton.  His  staff  officers  got  wind  of  the 
calumnies  that  were  being  circulated  and  very  promptly 
informed  him,  in  order  that  he  might  defend  himself 
against  such  gross  injustice.  Gen.  Pendleton  at  once 
addressed  Gen.  Lee  upon  the  subject,  with  the  result 
that  he  received  the  following  letter  from  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  which  should  for  all  time  dispose  of 
any  doubts  as  to  the  propriety  of  his  conduct  on  this 
occasion. 

"ORANGE,,  September  15,  1863. 

"GENERAL — Your  letter  of  8th  inst.,  inclosing  one  from  Maj. 
Page,  reached  me  at  a  time  when  I  was  pressed  by  business  that 
had  accumulated  during  my  absence.  I  cannot  now  give  the  matter 
much  attention,  and  have  only  been  able  to  read  partially  Maj. 
Page's  letter.  I  think  the  report  of  my  dissatisfaction  at  your 
conduct  is  given  upon  small  grounds,  the  statement  apparently  of 
your  courier,  upon  whom  I  turned  my  back.  I  must  acknowledge 
I  have  no  recollection  of  the  circumstances,  or  of  anything  upon 
which  it  could  have  been  based.  The  guns  were  withdrawn  from 
the  heights  of  Fredericksburg  under  general  instructions  given  by 
me.  It  is  difficult  now  to  say,  with  the  after-knowledge  of  events, 
whether  these  instructions  could,  at  the  time,  have  been  better 
executed,  or  whether  if  all  the  guns  had  remained  in  position,  as 
you  state  there  was  not  enough  infantry  supports  for  those  retained, 
more  might  not  have  been  captured. 

"I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  E.  LEE, 

"General." 

It  would  seem  that  Pendleton's  critics  did  not  know 
that  some  of  the  batteries,  which  were  withdrawn  in 
obedience  to  the  order  which  Chilton  transmitted  er- 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  745 

roneously,  had  proceeded  too  far  towards  the  rear  to  re 
turn  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  final  action.  They  only 
knew  a  part  of  the  story — that  is,  that  all  the  Artillery 
was  withdrawn,  and  that  some  of  it  did  not  return.* 
What  was  known  was  sufficient,  however,  for  those  who 
were  willing  enough  to  put  the  worst  construction  on 
the  affair.  They  took  full  account  of  Pendleton's  haste 
to  withdraw  his  guns,  in  obedience  to  the  peremptory 
order  he  received,  the  tenor  of  which  order  they  did  not 
know,  but  they  overlooked  the  haste  with  which  he  re 
turned  to  his  position  when  the  error  in  that  order  was 
discovered. 

The  fact  that  Gen.  Lee  suggested  the  permanent 
retention  of  his  Chief  of  Artillery  in  the  West  by  Gen. 
Johnston  while  it  certainly  proves  Pendleton  was  not 
indispensable  to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  does 
not  prove  his  services  were  not  valued.  The  Artillery 
had  gradually  attained  a  corps  organization  under  three 
most  competent  corps  chiefs.  These  officers  were  not 
only  administrative,  but  tactical  commanders,  and  under 
their  immediate  control  fell  all  the  artillery  of  the 
Army.  Very  naturally  Pendleton,  whose  duties  had 
become  in  the  process  of  evolution  purely  administra 
tive,  could  be  better  spared  than  Alexander,  who  was 
applied  for  by  Johnston,  or  either  of  the  other  two 
tactical  commanders,  Long  and  Walker.  It  must  not 
be  thought,  however,  that  Pendleton  had  become  super 
fluous  because  no  tactical  command  remained  to  him. 
One  only  need  recall  the  splendid  service  he  rendered  the 
Artillery  by  that  general  supervision,  which  led  in  one 
instance  to  the  creation  of  the  remount  department,  and 
in  another  to  the  establishment  of  forage  districts  in  the 
winter  of  1863-64.  The  Artillery,  in  fact  the  Army, 
owed  much  to  his  foresight  in  innumerable  matters  of 
this  character,  which  were  quite  beyond  the  province  of 
the  corps  commanders  and  their  chiefs  of  artillery. 

After  everything  is  said  in  his  favor  that  can  be  said, 
the  fact  remains  that  Gen.  Pendleton,  though  admired 

*For  foregoing  incident  see  chapter  on  battle  of  Chancellorsville. 


746  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

by  those  who  knew  him  for  the  integrity  of  his  character, 
was  not  rated  by  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  as  an  efficient  field  soldier.  We  be 
lieve,  however,  that  it  has  been  shown  that  he  was  far 
more  efficient  than  he  was  thought  to  be  by  his  con 
temporaries,  who  were  generally  ignorant  of  his  true 
worth  and  services.  In  the  popular  and  contemporary 
estimate  of  Pendleton,  an  element  entered,  the  influence 
of  which  we  can  now  fully  appreciate.  The  delicate 
task  of  the  various  reorganizations  of  the  Artillery  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  war  fell  solely  upon  his 
shoulders.  Promotion  was  necessarily  very  slow,  and 
much  discontent  existed  among  officers  really  entitled  by 
their  services  to  reward,  but  for  whom  the  number  of 
vacancies  at  no  time  afforded  promotion.  Under  such 
circumstances,  dissatisfaction  was  as  general  as  it  was 
inevitable,  and  to  Pendleton,  whose  recommendations 
were  final,  the  malcontents  of  course  attributed  the  fact 
that  their  merits  were  not  recognized.  His  position  was 
not  an  enviable  one,  and,  lacking  those  qualities  which 
enable  a  commander  to  silence  the  voice  of  the  malcon 
tents  under  him  by  the  brilliancy  of  his  achievements, 
it  was  not  strange  that  Pendleton' s  popularity  as  a 
soldier  suffered.  The  old  officer  fully  appreciated  the 
unenviable  character  of  the  duty  he  was  called  upon 
to  perform,  but  never  once  did  he  complain.  He  set 
about  his  task  with  the  utmost  resolution  to  perform  it 
as  best  he  could,  and  relieve  Gen.  Lee  of  as  much  of  the 
burden  of  command  as  he  could  take  upon  himself.  His 
recommendations,  as  we  have  seen,  were  invariably  the 
result  of  the  most  careful  consultation  of  the  wishes  of 
the  corps  and  division  commanders  of  the  Army,  and 
were  never  submitted  until  he  had  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  claims  of  all  the  most  mature  deliberation,  with  the 
result  that  the  selections  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery  were 
quite  generally  believed  by  unprejudiced  parties  to  be 
judicious  and  eminently  fair  in  every  respect.  The 
knowledge  on  the  part  of  Gen.  Lee  that  Pendleton 
would  allow  no  political  or  personal  considerations  to 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  747 

influence  him  in  making  his  recommendations,  was 
alone  a  sufficient  reason  for  his  retention  as  Chief  of 
Artillery,  especially  since  there  was  no  necessity  for  his 
exercising  a  tactical  command.  It  would  indeed  have 
been  difficult  to  find  another  as  conscientious  and  as 
free  of  all  bias  as  was  Pendleton. 

Personally  Gen.  Pendleton,  so  much  like  Gen.  Lee 
in  appearance,  was  a  most  lovable  man.  His  influence 
for  good  in  the  Army  was  great,  and  never  once,  despite 
the  asperities  of  war,  did  he  lose  sight  of  his  mission  as 
a  minister  of  the  gospel,  for  he  was  a  Christian  of  the 
highest  order,  in  fact  as  well  as  by  profession.  It  is  a 
well-authenticated  fact  that  on  more  than  one  occasion 
his  entrance  into  battle  was  preceded  by  an  invocation 
of  a  blessing  upon  the  enemy.  It  is  related  that  at 
Haynesville,  his  first  engagement,  before  giving  the 
word  of  command  to  open  fire  he  raised  his  hand  aloft 
and  in  a  loud  voice,  so  that  his  men  might  hear,  ex 
claimed:  "May  God  have  mercy  upon  their  souls."* 

After  the  war,  Gen.  Pendleton,  who  had  made  a  noble 
sacrifice  to  the  cause  in  the  loss  of  his  only  son, 
Col.  A.  S.  Pendleton,  returned  to  his  pulpit  in  Lex 
ington,  where  he  spent  a  part  of  his  remaining  years  in 
close  and  constant  companionship  with  his  immortal 
leader.  Together  Pendleton  and  Lee  ceaselessly 
labored,  the  one  as  rector,  the  other  as  a  vestryman,  in 
building  up  the  Episcopal  Parish  of  their  community. 
Outliving  Gen.  Lee  some  years,  Pendleton  died  Janu 
ary  25,  1883,  and,  like  his  former  commander  and  de 
voted  friend,  is  buried  in  Lexington,  beside  his  son, 
and  within  the  shadow  of  Jackson's  monument. 

Brig.-Gen.  Armistead  Lindsay  Long,  next  in  order 
of  seniority  to  Pendleton  in  the  Artillery,  was  an  of 
ficer  of  exceptional  merit  and  high  accomplishments. 
Born  in  Campbell  County,  Virginia,  September  3, 
1825,  he  was  graduated  from  the  United  States  Mili- 

*When  asked  if  this  were  true  by  a  brother  minister,  the  Rev.  Mr.  Royce, 
now  rector  of  New  Windsor  Parish  on  the  Hudson,  Gen.  Pendleton  admitted 
that  it  was.  Thus  the  incident  seems  to  be  without  the  vale  of  mere  tradition. 
The  Rev.  W.  N.  Pendleton  was  granted  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Divinity  in  1868. 


748  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

tary  Academy  in  the  Class  of  1850.  On  duty  as  a 
second  lieutenant  in  the  2d  Artillery  at  Fort  Moultrie 
for  two  years,  he  was  then  promoted  first  lieutenant, 
serving  for  the  next  nine  years  on  the  frontier  of  New 
Mexico,  at  Barrancas  Barracks,  Fort  McHenry,  Fort 
Monroe,  and  taking  part  in  the  various  Indian  cam 
paigns  in  Indian  Territory,  Kansas,  and  Nebraska. 
When  the  crisis  between  the  States  arrived,  he  was  on 
duty  at  Augusta,  Georgia,  from  which  point  he  was 
transferred  to  the  National  Capital,  where  he  resigned 
his  commission  June  10,  1861,  after  11  years  of  service. 
While  in  the  Old  Army,  he  had  been  placed  under  Capt. 
Hunt,  later  Chief  of  Artillery  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
for  special  instruction,  and  under  the  tutelage  of  that 
able  artillerist  he  had  acquired  an  exceptional  knowledge 
of  the  theory  as  well  as  the  practice  of  gunnery.  He 
also  served,  in  1860,  as  aide  on  Gen.  E.  V.  Sumner's 
staff. 

An  interesting  anecdote  concerning  Gen.  Hunt 
and  Long  may  here  be  recounted.  At  Appomattox 
Gen.  Hunt  sought  out  Gen.  Long  to  render  him  such 
services  as  he  could.  In  the  course  of  their  conversa 
tion,  Hunt  told  his  old  friend  that  he  was  not  satisfied 
with  the  artillery  preparation  at  Gettysburg,  inasmuch 
as  he,  Long,  had  not  done  justice  to  his  instruction;  that 
the  Confederate  batteries,  instead  of  concentrating  their 
fire  on  the  point  of  attack,  were  scattered  over  the  whole 
field.  Long  was  much  amused  at  the  criticism  of  his 
former  tutor  and  said:  "I  remembered  my  lessons  at 
the  time,  and  when  the  fire  became  so  scattered  won 
dered  what  you  would  think  about  it." 

Repairing  to  Richmond  immediately  after  resigning 
from  the  Old  Army,  he  accepted  a  commission  as  Maj. 
of  Artillery  in  the  Confederate  service,  and  soon  ac 
companied  Gen.  Loring  in  the  capacity  of  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery  to  West  Virginia.*  After  this  service  in  the 
Trans-Alleghany  Department,  he  was  assigned  in  the 

'Resigned  June  1,  1861 ;  reached  Richmond  July  18,  on  which  day  he  was 
appointed  Major  of  Artillery. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  749 

fall  of  1861  to  duty  under  Gen.  Lee  as  chief -of -staff  in 
the  Department  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and 
Florida.  When  Gen.  Lee  was  given  command  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  Long  was  appointed  his 
military  secretary  with  the  rank  of  colonel.  In  this 
capacity  he  was  recognized  as  the  artillery  expert  of 
Gen.  Lee's  staff,  and  rendered  valuable  service  in  con 
nection  with  the  Artillery  at  Fredericksburg,  Chancel- 
lorsville,  and  Gettysburg.  In  his  professional  ability 
and  special  knowledge  of  artillery  Gen.  Lee  reposed 
great  confidence,  and  it  is  readily  seen  that  his  assign 
ment  to  tactical  command  was  most  acceptable  to  Army 
Headquarters.  His  preferment  over  Col.  Brown  as 
Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  2d  Corps  was  not  viewed  at 
headquarters  as  a  slight  in  any  sense  to  that  officer,  and 
as  he  ranked  Alexander  and  Walker,  and  held  his  com 
mission  in  the  Artillery,  his  prior  appointment  to  them 
as  brigadier-general  was  not  a  technical  promotion  over 
their  heads.  Yet,  in  a  sense,  his  preferment  over  Alex 
ander,  Walker,  and  Brown  especially,  was  felt  to  be  at 
the  time  not  wholly  justifiable,  in  spite  of  his  eminent 
ability  and  long  service.  This  was  most  natural,  since 
he  had  not  been  so  thoroughly  identified  with  the  Ar 
tillery  as  they  and  others  had  been.  It  was  the  old  story 
of  the  claims  of  line  officers  and  staff  officers.  The 
former  always  feel  that  active  duty  with  troops  entitles 
them  to  more  consideration  than  officers,  even  superior 
in  rank,  whose  service  has  been  principally  on  the  staff. 
In  the  selection  of  Long  for  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the 
2d  Corps,  the  personal  equation  undoubtedly  entered, 
and  such  influences  must  never  be  lost  sight  of  in  the 
consideration  of  army,  as  well  as  other  appointments. 
It  must  also  be  remembered  that  his  service  in  the  Old 
Army  had  been  longer  than  that  of  any  other  artillery 
officer  of  the  Confederate  Army. 

Thirty-nine  years  of  age  at  the  time  of  his  appoint 
ment  as  brigadier-general,  he  was  six  feet  tall  and  of 
handsome  and  commanding  presence.  His  hair  was 
dark,  and  his  complexion  swarthy.  A  small  military 


750  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

mustache  gave  him  a  decided  French  appearance.  In 
manner  Gen.  Long  was  most  affable,  even  gentle,  but 
beneath  his  pleasing  exterior  there  lay  a  sternness  of 
character  apparent  to  all.  Of  wide  intellectual  attain 
ments  and  rare  culture,  he  was  perhaps  one  of  the  most 
profound  military  scholars  in  the  Army.  He  certainly 
had  no  superior  in  the  Confederacy  in  the  theoretical 
knowledge  of  his  special  arm,  and  beside  was  a  tactician 
of  exceptional  merit.  As  an  organizer,  he  was  superior 
to  Alexander,  and  probably  the  equal  of  Walker,  but 
he  lacked  the  unusual  dash  of  the  former.  We  believe 
it  is  a  fair  estimate  of  Gen.  Long  to  say  that  taken  all 
in  all  he  was  one  of  the  most  accomplished  officers  in  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

As  to  his  personal  character,  no  one  who  has  read  his 
Memoirs  of  Gen.  Lee,  the  best  military  historial  work 
of  the  kind  yet  written,  can  entertain  a  doubt.  Bereft 
of  his  eyesight  after  the  war  and  at  the  time  this 
splendid  work  was  written,  he  displayed  in  its  prepara 
tion  the  most  remarkable  patience  and  persistence,  and 
evidenced  a  lack  of  bias  and  prejudice  equalled  by  few 
writers  on  the  war.  It  also  testifies  to  the  careful  mental 
training  of  the  author,  and  his  wide  knowledge  of  the 
military  science  in  all  its  branches.*  Gen.  Lee  enter 
tained  a  high  regard  for  him  as  evidenced  by  the  fol 
lowing  testimonial  written  after  the  war:  "Gen.  A.  L. 
Long  entered  the  Confederate  service  in  1861,  and  has 
served  continuously  till  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  April  9,  1865.  His  conduct  during 
that  time  has  been  marked  by  zeal  and  gallantry.  ..." 

Reuben  Lindsay  Walker,  Chief  of  Artillery  3d 
Corps,  was  the  last  to  attain  the  rank  of  brigadier- 

*After  the  war  closed,  Gen.  Long  was  appointed  Chief  Engineer  of  the 
James  River  and  Kanawha  Canal  Company.  In  1869  he  lost  his  eyesight  from 
injuries  received  from  the  explosion  of  a  caisson  in  the  service,  and  subsequent 
exposure.  He  then  removed  to  Charlottesville,  where  he  resided  until  his  death, 
April  29,  1891.  It  was  during  the  last  twenty  years  of  his  life  that  he  wrote 
his  Memoirs  of  General  Lee,  which  were  published  in  1886.  He  also  wrote 
reminiscences  of  his  own  career,  a  comparative  sketch  of  Stonewall  and  Andrew 
Jackson,  and  a  History  of  America  in  the  Seventeenth  Century.  By  reason  of 
his  infirmity,  he  was  compelled  to  use  a  slate  prepared  for  the  use  of  the  blind, 
and  to  depend  upon  the  members  of  his  familv  and  on  his  friends  for  much 
assistance.  Under  all  these  disadvantages  he  labored  on  uncomplainingly,  record 
ing  the  history  of  his  immortal  leader  of  whom  he  was  a  most  devoted  admirer, 
cheerful  and  courageous  to  the  end. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  751 

general  in  Lee's  Artillery.  He  was  born  on  his  paternal 
estate,  Logan,  Albemarle  County,  Virginia,  May  29, 
1827,  and  was  therefore  about  the  same  age  as  his  kins 
man,  Gen.  Long.  In  his  veins  flowed  the  best  blood  of 
the  Old  Dominion,  being  a  son  of  Capt.  Lewis  Walker, 
and  a  descendant  of  forebears  who  had  been  prominent 
in  the  early  settlement  of  the  western  part  of  the  State. 
By  every  influence  of  blood,  environment,  and  tra 
dition,  he  was  trained  to  be  a  leader  of  his  fellows,  and 
was  perhaps  the  most  picturesque  figure  in  Lee's 
Army.  Of  immense  frame  and  exceptionally  broad 
shoulders,  he  was  as  handsome  in  figure  as  in  counte 
nance.  Six  feet  four  inches  or  more  in  height,  his  hair 
was  long  and  dark,  and  a  sweeping  mustache  and  im 
perial  beard  added  to  his  soldierly  appearance.  Above 
all  he  was  a  superb  horseman  and  seemed  to  have  been 
born  to  the  saddle  in  spite  of  his  immense  stature.  In 
repose  his  face  wore  a  grave  expression,  and  a  piercing 
black  eye,  capable  of  great  intensity,  enhanced  the  indi 
viduality  of  his  features.  His  brow  was  massive  and 
his  head  sat  gracefully  upon  his  shoulders.  Looking 
into  his  handsome  face,  no  man  could  doubt  the  deter 
mination  and  the  will-power  which  animated  and  char 
acterized  his  being.  In  manner  Walker  was  not  par 
ticularly  alert,  and  while  by  no  means  dull,  his  mind  was 
not  an  active  one.  In  physical  hardihood,  fixity  of  pur 
pose,  dogged  determination,  and  dauntless  courage,  he 
was  unexcelled  by  any  officer  in  the  Army.  But  while 
he  was  bold,  he  cannot  be  said  to  have  possessed  the  dash 
of  Alexander,  Pelham,  Pegram,  Chew,  or  Breathed,  or 
the  intellectual  brilliance  of  Long  and  Alexander.  His 
forte  was  organization,  and  it  was  generally  conceded 
that  he  had  throughout  the  war  the  best  organized  ar 
tillery  in  the  Army,  whether  it  were  a  battery,  a  bat 
talion,  or  a  corps  division  under  his  command.  His 
character  was  distinguished  by  great  integrity,  resolu 
tion  and  devotion  to  duty.  His  admiration  for  and 
confidence  in  Gen.  Lee  were  unbounded,  and  few 
soldiers  were  ever  as  much  beloved  by  officers  and  men 


17 


752  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

under  their  command  as  was  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker. 
Upon  being  asked  to  give  his  estimate  of  Walker  as  a 
soldier,  his  old  adjutant,  Capt.  William  W.  Chamber- 
laine,  declared  that  in  addition  to  Gen.  Walker's  ability 
as  an  organizer,  his  most  striking  characteristics  were 
his  intuitive  knowledge  of  country,  his  appreciation  of 
terrain,  and  his  ability  to  select  and  occupy  the  best 
available  positions  for  his  guns  and  then  to  hold  them 
with  great  pertinacity.  From  this,  one  sees  how  his  ex 
perience  as  an  engineer  stood  him  in  good  stead  as  a 
soldier. 

The  following  incident  well  illustrates  Walker's 
character.  As  a  cadet  at  the  Virginia  Military  Insti 
tute,  where  he  was  graduated  with  the  Class  of  1845,  he 
had  for  three  years  committed  every  offense,  short  of 
one  which  would  have  resulted  in  his  dismissal.  Gen. 
Smith,  the  Superintendent,  narrates  that  he  sought  to 
reduce  him  to  good  order  and  submission  in  many  ways. 
Threats,  penalties,  and  punishments  of  the  severest 
nature  only  sufficed  to  confirm  the  imperious  youth  in 
his  course  of  utter  disregard  of  all  regulations.  Ad 
miring  the  young  man  for  his  lovable  nature,  his  superb 
physique,  and  his  unflinching  courage  in  adversity,  the 
Superintendent  at  last  sought  to  appeal  to  his  pride  by 
appointing  him  a  lieutenant  in  his  first  class  year.  From 
that  time  on,  Cadet  Walker  was  an  example  of  all  that 
was  conscientious,  dutiful  and  soldierly.  Never  once 
did  he  prove  derelict  in  the  discharge  of  the  trust  re 
posed  in  him.  And  this  may  be  said  of  his  career  as  an 
officer  in  the  Army. 

Walker  followed  the  profession  of  Civil  Engineer 
ing  until  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Visiting  Richmond 
in  February,  1861,  he  was  promptly  seized  upon  by  Mr. 
Purcell,  a  patriotic  citizen,  who  had  undertaken  to  re 
cruit  and  equip  a  light  battery  at  his  own  expense,  and 
placed  in  command  of  it.  Not  even  was  Capt.  Walker 
permitted  to  return  to  his  home,  then  at  New  Kent 
Courthouse,  but  he  was  hustled  off  with  the  famous  Pur- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  753 

cell  Battery  to  Aquia  Creek,  without  even  bidding  his 
wife  farewell.  From  the  day  of  this  unceremonious  de 
parture  for  the  front,  he  had  never  had  a  day's  leave  of 
absence  from  his  command,  and  when  next  he  met  his 
wife  he  was  introduced  to  a  child  nearly  a  year  old  which 
had  been  born  to  his  wife  in  his  absence.  Such  was  the 
fortitude  of  both  men  and  women  in  those  days.  But 
this  particular  mother  had  suffered  separation  enough 
from  her  husband.  From  thenceforth  she  accompanied 
her  soldier  husband  in  the  field.  Mrs.  Walker's  ambu 
lance  and  mules,  driven  by  a  faithful  white  retainer,  was 
a  familiar  sight  to  the  men  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  From  battlefield  to  battlefield  she  moved  with 
the  ammunition  trains,  often  bivouacking  with  her 
children  along  the  roadsides  in  her  improvised  house  on 
wheels,  when  the  neighborhood  afforded  no  shelter  in  the 
homes  of  friends  and  relatives.  In  her  determination 
to  remain  close  to  her  husband's  side,  not  only  did  she 
accept  all  the  hardships  of  campaign,  but  she  also  added 
a  new  member  to  her  family.  For  a  brief  space  only  did 
this  Spartan  mother  desert  her  husband  in  the  midst  of 
the  perils  of  war.  She  followed  him  to  the  end,  ready 
to  carry  his  stricken  body  from  the  field,  or  minister  to 
him  in  sickness  and  disease.  On  one  occasion  while  her 
driver  was  absent  Mrs.  Walker's  team  of  horses  was 
impressed  by  a  not-overscrupulous  Confederate  team 
ster.  Other  horses  could  not  be  purchased,  but  so  in 
sistent  was  the  good  lady  that  means  of  transport  be 
secured  for  her  ambulance,  that  soon  her  faithful  re 
tainer  appeared  with  a  fine  pair  of  mules  branded  with 
the  familiar  "U.  S."  It  has  never  been  explained 
whence  they  came. 

Strange  to  say  that  with  all  this  loving  care  and  con 
stant  attendance  on  the  part  of  his  wife,  Walker  was 
never  once  wounded,  in  the  sixty-three  engagements  in 
which  he  participated  during  the  war,  nor  was  he  in 
valided  at  any  time.  In  latter  years  he  even  grew 
sensitive  to  the  inquiry.  "Why  General,  not  wounded 
in  the  war?"  Invariably  he  would  draw  himself  up  to 


754  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

the  full  height  of  the  giant  that  he  was,  and,  squaring  his 
massive  shoulders,  reply,  "No,  sir,  and  it  was  not  my 
fault."* 

And  now  we  come  to  Alexander,  who  among  the 
senior  officers  was  the  artilleryman  par  excellence  of 
Lee's  Army,  though  third  in  rank  in  his  arm.  A 
graduate  of  West  Point  in  the  Class  of  1857,  his  service 
in  the  Engineer  Corps,  then  as  Commandant  of  the 
Corps  of  Cadets  and  instructor  of  gunnery,  his  service 
on  the  plains  and  in  connection  with  the  development 
of  the  Myer  signal  system,  we  are  already  familiar  with, 
as  well  as  with  his  early  service  in  the  Confederacy,  first 
as  artillery  instructor,  then  as  signal  officer  on  Beaure- 
gard's  staff,  and  then  as  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia.  To  repeat,  entering  the  Con 
federate  service  April  3,  1861,  as  a  captain,  at  the  age 
of  24  years,  he  was  commissioned  lieutenant-colonel  of 
artillery  in  December,  1861,  and  colonel  a  year  later. 
After  the  most  distinguished  service  in  every  battle  from 
Fredericksburg  to  date,  he  was  commissioned  brigadier- 
general  of  artillery  February  26,  1864. 

Although  Alexander  had  accompanied  Longstreet  to 
Tennessee,  and  served  in  the  capacity  of  his  Chief  of 
Artillery  in  the  Knoxville  campaign,  not  having  reached 
Chickamauga  with  his  battalion  in  time  to  participate 
in  the  battle,  he  was  in  fact,  up  to  the  time  of  his  pro 
motion,  the  inferior  in  rank  of  Colonels  Walton  and 
Cabell,  though  of  the  same  grade  with  them.  But  while 
their  inferior,  he  had  for  some  time  practically  directed 
the  tactical  employment  of  the  artillery  of  his  corps. 

*  Surrendering  with  the  army  at  Appomattox,  Walker,  who  was  promoted 
Brigadier-General  of  Artillery  in  January,  1865,  retired  to  private  life  as  a 
farmer,  with  a  record  of  having  participated  in  sixty-three  engagements  during 
the  four  years  of  his  military  service.  In  1872  he  removed  to  Selma,  Ala., 
where  he  was  Superintendent  of  the  Marine  and  Selma  Railroad.  In  1876  he 
returned  to  Virginia  in  the  employment  of  the  Richmond  and  Danville  Railroad, 
and  was  later  Superintendent  of  the  Richmond  Street  Railway  Company.  Soon 
he  was  engaged  as  constructing  engineer  of  the  Richmond  and  Alleghany  Rail 
road,  or  the  present  James  River  Division  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railway. 
In  1884  he  became  superintendent  of  construction  of  the  Texas  State  Capitol,  and 
resided  at  Austin  until  1888.  Much  scandal  in  connection  with  the  previous 
management  of  the  work  led  the  authorities  to  place  it  in  his  hands,  by  reason 
of  his  known  integrity.  He  was  handsomely  rewarded  for  the  faithfulness  and 
efficiency  with  which  he  discharged  the  trust.  He  died  at  his  home,  "Point  of 
Forks,"  on  the  James  River.  June  7,  1890,  where  he  spent  the  last  two  years  of 
his  life  as  a  farmer. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  755 

At  Fredericksburg,  he  was  the  directing  genius  of 
Longstreet's  defense.  It  was  there,  in  referring  to  the 
positions  of  his  guns  on  Marye's  Hill,  that  he  remarked 
to  his  corps  commander:  "We  cover  that  ground  so 
well,  that  we  will  comb  it  as  with  a  fine-tooth  comb.  A 
chicken  could  not  live  on  that  field  when  we  open  on 
it."  And  as  has  been  seen,  Alexander's  forecast  was 
quite  fulfilled.  Again  at  Gettysburg  where  Col.  Wal 
ton,  his  senior,  and  the  nominal  Chief  of  Artillery,  was 
present,  Alexander  was  in  complete  control  of  the  Ar 
tillery  in  the  fight.  On  former  occasions,  his  recognized 
ability  had  merely  enabled  him  to  influence  the  disposi 
tion  of  the  artillery  under  Walton's  immediate  control, 
but  at  Gettysburg  we  find  him  as  a  junior  officer 
actually  in  command,  while  his  senior  was  present  and 
participating  in  the  battle.  This  has  always  seemed  a 
remarkable  anomaly,  not  so  much  as  to  the  wisdom  of 
it,  but  that  Walton  would  consent  to  it.  A  careful  in 
vestigation  and  study  of  the  matter  discloses  that  it 
came  about  in  the  following  way :  Col.  Walton  was  old, 
and  physically  unequal  to  the  exertions  of  the  campaign. 
Though  a  meritorious  officer,  of  dauntless  courage,  and 
with  a  fine  military  record,  he  now  lacked  the  energy 
to  keep  pace  with  events.  Already  one  of  his  former 
battery  commanders,  Eshleman,  had  supplanted  him  as 
active  leader  of  the  celebrated  Washington  Artillery 
Battalion.  Longstreet  knew  Walton's  capabilities  full 
well,  and  while  he  retained  the  gallant  old  officer  as 
Chief  of  Artillery  of  his  corps,  both  for  political  and 
personal  reasons,  he  did  not  feel  that  he  would  be  justi 
fied  in  committing  the  tactical  leadership  of  the  ar 
tillery  to  his  hands,  for  those  or  any  other  considera 
tions.  In  the  movement  upon  Gettysburg,  Walton's 
Battalion  was  held  back,  whether  intentionally  or  not 
cannot  be  determined,  but  at  any  rate,  Alexander  ar 
rived  on  the  field  some  time  in  advance  of  Walton  and 
was  placed  in  charge  of  the  artillery  already  up.  An 
important  mission  was  entrusted  to  him,  and  upon  its 
discharge  the  young  officer  had  already  entered  when 


756  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

his  senior  arrived.  The  situation  was  such  that  when 
Walton  did  come  up,  no  consideration  of  rank  could 
be  allowed  to  jeopardize  the  success  of  the  battle  al 
ready  under  way.  Such  arguments  were  unanswerable, 
and  however  chagrined  Col.  Walton  may  have  felt,  he 
was  powerless  to  deny  the  force  of  the  circumstances 
which  debarred  him  from  the  exercise  of  the  tactical 
command  to  which  his  rank  entitled  him.  That  he  was 
chagrined  is  quite  well  established  by  the  verbal  testi 
mony  of  his  contemporaries  and  his  own  letters,  and  it 
was  not  long  before  he  expressed  the  desire  to  be  trans 
ferred  to  service  at  Mobile.  In  justice  to  the  old  of 
ficer,  his  wish  should  have  been  instantly  complied  with. 
In  fact,  he  should  have  been  given  the  opportunity  to 
transfer,  before  being  publicly  overslaughed.  But  he 
was  retained  on  the  roll  of  the  1st  Corps,  and  after  be 
ing  gradually  sidetracked  by  being  assigned  to  duty  as 
Inspector- General  of  Artillery  at  Large  and  placed  on 
detached  duty,  relinquished  his  commission  in  the  1st 
Corps  July  8,  1864. 

From  the  time  of  his  first  appearance  in  the  Artillery, 
in  fact  in  the  Army,  young  Alexander  was  a  marked 
man  and  one  destined  to  attain  preeminence  in  his  arm. 
Rapidly  he  acquired  a  reputation  which  extended  far 
beyond  the  Army  in  which  he  was  actually  serving. 
First  Jackson  sought  to  have  him  appointed  a  general 
officer  in  the  infantry,  then  Johnston  urged  his  transfer 
to  the  Western  Army,  with  advanced  rank.  But  he 
was  too  well  appreciated  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  to  permit  of  his  loss.  Stephen  D.  Lee  might  be 
spared  to  the  far  South,  but  not  Alexander  to  the  West. 
The  young  Georgian  was  needed  in  Virginia. 

In  appearance,  Alexander  did  not  present  so  fine  a 
military  figure  as  did  Long  and  Walker.  Of  about 
the  average  height,  and  of  muscular  build,  yet  he  was 
by  no  means  a  handsome  man.  In  fact,  his  features 
were  rather  irregular,  and  the  scraggly,  ill-shapen  beard, 
which  his  youth  afforded,  failed  to  hide  a  decidedly 
ugly  mouth.  But  his  eye  was  bright  and  penetrating, 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  757 

and  about  the  man,  both  in  his  general  appearance  and 
carriage,  was  the  unmistakable  evidence  of  high  breed 
ing  and  exceptional  intellect,  and  these  appearances  did 
not  belie  the  facts,  for  he  was  the  scion  of  a  noble  stock, 
and  brilliant  beyond  his  years.  To  the  latter  fact,  his 
whole  career  at  West  Point  and  in  the  Old  Army  testi 
fies.  No  man  becomes  an  engineer  officer  and  the  Com 
mandant  of  the  Corps  of  Cadets  at  the  United  States 
Military  Academy  unless  he  possesses  rare  qualities  of 
mind  and  heart  combined. 

In  manner,  Alexander  was  active  and  alert,  and  his 
whole  character  was  vibrant  with  intenseness.  Strong 
in  likes  and  prejudices,  he  was  yet  most  amiable  and 
possessed  the  traits  which  make  men  socially  popular. 
As  an  officer,  he  was  quick  to  estimate  the  situation  be 
fore  him,  prompt  to  direct,  and  inexorably  firm  in  hold 
ing  his  subordinates  to  their  duty.  He  possessed  won 
derful  personal  magnetism,  and  transmitted  much  of  his 
own  enthusiasm  and  spirit  to  his  subordinates.  Above  all 
things,  he  detested  delay.  Full  of  dash  and  the  love  of 
responsibility,  he  perhaps  expected  too  much  of  others, 
in  this  respect  forgetting  that  few  men  possessed  that 
elan  which  characterized  himself.  His  was  a  nature  which 
loved  prompt  action;  he  liked  rapidity  of  motion;  any 
thing  that  savoured  of  slowness,  of  lack  of  energy,  of  ex 
cessive  deliberation,  provoked  him  sorely.  His  mind  was 
the  kind  that  had  figured  out  and  matured  the  plans  in 
advance  which  most  men  pause  to  consider  when  the 
time  for  action  comes.  He  courted  favor  from  no  one, 
and  while  immensely  energetic  and  ambitious  he  was  yet 
able  to  forego  an  offered  advancement  in  another  arm 
in  the  evident  knowledge  that  he  was  needed  in  his  own. 
Endowed  with  such  a  nature  and  exuberant  with 
vigorous  youth,  it  was  natural  that  he  should  have 
chafed  at  the  shortcomings  of  others,  for  in  his  genuine 
lack  of  vanity  he  was  unable  to  appreciate  the  fact  that 
he  himself  was  not  like  other  men.  He  invariably  meas 
ured  others  by  his  own  standard,  and  few  came  up  to  it. 
This  habit  made  him  rather  critical,  and  he  never  hesi- 


758  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

tated  to  express  his  views,  hit  whom  they  did,  but  he  was 
never  disloyal  to  Gen.  Lee,  nor  to  the  memory  of  Gen. 
Longstreet.  In  fact,  his  devotion  to  the  latter  carried 
him,  in  an  attempt  to  defend  his  old  corps  commander, 
beyond  the  limits  of  sound  reasoning,  as  one  who 
studies  his  book,  in  other  respects  a  masterpiece  of 
critical  analysis,  will  discover.*  Like  Long,  his  writ 
ings  prove  him  to  be  a  man  of  exceptional  intellect,  a 
wide  student  of  war  and  human  nature,  and  to  have 
possessed  a  remarkable  lack  of  bias.  In  his  memoirs, 
much  after-acquired  information  was  of  course  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  solution  of  the  military  problems  of 
the  war,  however  conscientiously  he  may  have  sought  to 
view  things  from  a  contemporary  standpoint.  The 
author  was  a  much  wiser  man  when  he  wrote  his  book 
than  when  he  was  actually  confronted  by  the  problems 
which  others  were  called  upon  to  solve,  but  no  one  is 
misled  by  his  sagacity  after  the  event,  for  it  is  not 
difficult  to  distinguish  between  his  contemporaneous 
foresights,  and  the  maturer  reflections  of  the  author,  or 
his  hindsights. 

Brig.-Gen.  Edward  Porter  Alexander,  age  27  years, 
was  a  soldier,  who,  had  he  served  Napoleon,  would  have 
been  rewarded  by  a  baton,  for  he  possessed  those 
soldierly  characteristics  so  dear  to  the  Emperor.  He  was 
far  and  away  the  superior  of  all  others  in  his  arm,  whose 
opportunity  was  equal  to  his  own.  Like  Gen.  Hunt  of 
the  Federal  Army,  he  was  preeminent  in  the  Artillery 
of  his  army.  His  opportunities  were  never  equal  to 
those  of  Senarmont  and  Drouot,  for  even  Gettysburg 
cannot  properly  be  compared  to  Friedland  and  Wa- 
gram;  the  tactical  combinations  were  so  different  that 
the  number  of  guns  engaged  forms  no  basis  for  com 
parison.  Nevertheless,  as  written  by  Maj.  May,  R.  H. 
A.,  the  names  of  Hunt  and  Alexander  are  as  worthy  of 
remembrance  as  are  those  of  the  two  great  artillerists  of 
the  Grand  Army.  Then,  too,  it  must  be  remembered 

*Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  published  by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons 
in  1908. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  759 

that  Alexander  had  no  leader  who  held  him  always  in 
hand,  prepared  to  throw  his  masses  of  guns  into  action, 
as  did  Napoleon  at  the  crisis  of  the  combat,  thus  en 
abling  the  Artillery  to  reap  the  fame  of  victory,  when 
the  way  to  inevitable  success  had  been  carefully  paved. 
On  the  contrary  he,  like  the  other  artillery  commanders, 
while  given  a  free  hand,  was  always  expected  to  shoulder 
a  burden  from  the  first,  which  precluded  the  more 
brilliant  maneuvers  of  the  battlefields  of  the  French. 
Their  services  were  none  the  less  valuable;  they  simply 
show  in  a  different  light.  The  issue  largely  depended 
on  the  efforts  of  the  Confederate  artillerymen,  but  no 
great  reserve  masses  existed  to  be  employed  at  the  psy 
chological  instant,  and  win  for  their  leaders  the  credit  of 
having  capped  the  climax,  so  to  speak.* 

From  now  on,  the  historical  narrative  of  events  will 
trace  the  military  careers  of  Lee's  senior  artillerymen 
subsequent  to  the  period  of  which  we  write.  The  fore 
going  discussion  of  their  characters  should  give  a  better 
insight  into  the  affairs  of  the  Artillery  in  general. 

*General  Alexander,  as  we  shall  see,  played  a  leading  role  in  the  Artillery 
until  the  close  of  the  War.  After  the  Surrender  at  Appomattox,  he  became 
Professor  of  Mathematics  and  of  Civil  and  Military  Engineering  at  the  Univer 
sity  of  South  Carolina,  in  which  position  he  served  from  January,  1866,  to 
October,  1869.  He  then  became  President  of  the  Columbia  Oil  Company.  In 
May,  1871,  he  became  Superintendent  of  the  Charlotte  and  Augusta  Railroad, 
and  in  October,  1871,  President  of  the  Savannah  and  Memphis  Railroad.  In 
1875  he  became  President  and  General  Manager  of  the  Western  Railroad  of 
Alabama,  and  of  the  Georgian  Railroad  and  Banking  Company.  He  was  Vice- 
President  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad  from  1880  to  1882,  Capital 
Commissioner  of  the  State  of  Georgia  from  1883  to  1888,  and  from  1887  to 
1893  President  of  the  Central  Railroad  and  Banking  Company,  and  the  Ocean 
Steamship  Company.  He  wrote  a  valuable  treatise  on  Railroad  Practice.  His 
death  occurred  in  1911. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

THE  WILDERNESS 

FOR  six  months  the  hostile  armies  had  confronted  each 
other  along  the  Rapidan,  and  every  man  in  both  knew 
that  the  next  campaign  was  to  be  the  most  serious  one 
yet  conducted.  Gen.  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  who  had  been 
called  from  the  West  to  take  supreme  command  of  the 
Federal  forces,  arrived  in  Virginia  in  March,  establish 
ing  his  headquarters  at  Culpeper  Courthouse  on  the 
26th.  He  had  been  by  far  the  most  successful  Federal 
commander  up  to  that  time,  and  possessed  an  iron  de 
termination,  which,  coupled  with  the  unlimited  military 
resources  placed  at  his  disposal,  served  to  revive  the 
spirits  of  the  North.  Furthermore,  his  selection  was  a 
guarantee  to  those  who  knew  him  that  military  opera 
tions  would  be  conducted  from  Army  headquarters  and 
not  by  the  President,  his  cabinet,  the  press,  and  the 
politicians  of  the  North. 

Grant's  strategy  cannot  be  discussed  here.  Suffice  it 
to  say  that  his  general  plan  was  well  formulated  and 
it  contemplated  the  thorough  cooperation  of  the  various 
Federal  armies  under  his  control,  with  a  definite  end  in 
view.  While  that  end  was  the  subjugation  of  the  South 
in  the  shortest  possible  time,  the  objective  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Meade,  was  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  in 
directly  Richmond,  since  the  two  were  by  circumstances 
almost  inseparably  identified.  Previous  commanders 
had  failed  to  appreciate  the  fundamental  strategic  prin 
ciple  that  an  enemy's  capital  must  fall  with  the  army 
which  defends  it,  wherever  that  army  may  be.  This  fact 
was  not  ignored  by  Grant. 

When  Grant  took  charge  the  situation  in  Virginia 
was  as  follows:  West  Virginia  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
North,  and  all  that  part  of  old  Virginia  north  of  the 
Rapidan  and  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  On  the  sea-coast, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  761 

Butler  with  the  Army  of  the  James,  numbering  about 
30,000  men,  held  Fort  Monroe  and  Norfolk.  In  North 
Carolina,  the  Federals  held  Plymouth,  Washington, 
and  New  Berne,  from  which  points  Richmond  could 
also  be  threatened.  The  9th  Corps  under  Burnside, 
20,000  strong,  was  soon  rendezvoused  at  Annapolis, 
Maryland,  from  which  point  it  could  reinforce  Meade  or 
operate  independently  along  the  coast. 

Longstreet's  Corps  was  at  Gordonsville,  Swell's 
along  the  south  bank  of  the  Rapidan  above  Mine  Run, 
and  Hill's  on  his  left,  and  higher  up  the  river.  The  Con 
federate  line  was  partially  intrenched  in  position.  Gen. 
Lee's  headquarters  were  two  miles  northeast  of  Orange 
Courthouse.  Meade's  Army,  consisting  of  Hancock's, 
Warren's,  and  Sedgwick's,  or  the  2d,  5th  and  6th 
Corps,  lay  along  the  north  bank  of  the  Rapidan.  The 
Army  of  the  Potomac  had  never  been  so  thoroughly 
equipped  before,  nor  as  powerful  as  a  fighting  machine. 
It  was  lavishly  supplied  with  all  a  rich  country  could 
give  it.  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  on  the  other 
hand,  little  more  than  half  as  large  as  its  persistent 
antagonist,  was  practically  devoid  of  everything  in  the 
way  of  clothing  and  supplies.  Its  arms  and  the  temper 
of  the  veterans  which  wielded  them  were,  however,  per 
haps  never  better.  Such  was  the  situation  on  the  2d 
of  May,  when  Gen.  Lee  with  the  utmost  confidence  ex 
amined  with  his  glasses  from  Clark's  Mountain  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Rapidan  the  Federal  lines  on  the  op 
posite  bank. 

Meade's  activity  in  the  direction  of  the  upper  fords 
had  not  deceived  Lee  for  an  instant,  and  on  the  3d  of 
May  the  Federals  were  discovered  moving  to  his  right, 
just  as  he  had  predicted  they  would  be.  He  at  once 
prepared  to  move  upon  Meade's  flank  with  his  whole 
force  as  soon  as  the  enemy  crossed  the  Rapidan  and 
became  entangled  in  the  Spotsylvania  Wilderness, 
through  which  the  route  selected  by  Grant  lay.  Again 
was  Lee  willing  to  forego  the  defense  of  a  natural  ob 
stacle,  which  could  in  time  be  turned  by  superior  num- 


762  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

bers,  in  order  to  avail  himself  of  the  great  advantage  of 
a  most  difficult  terrain,  which  he  knew  to  be  a  terra 
incognita  to  his  adversary.  And  again  did  the  Fed 
erals  play  into  his  hands  by  entangling  themselves  in 
the  gloomy  wilderness,  thus,  in  a  measure,  at  least,  neu 
tralizing  their  numerical  superiority. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  began  to  cross  the  Rapi- 
dan  at  noon,  May  3,  its  way  having  been  prepared  by 
Sheridan's  Cavalry.  Bridges  were  laid  in  advance  at 
Germanna,  Ely's,  and  at  Culpeper  Mine  fords,  cover 
ing  a  front  of  about  seven  miles.  Hancock,  preceded  by 
Gregg's  Cavalry,  crossed  at  Ely's  Ford,  and  moved  to 
Chancellorsville,  which  placed  him  on  the  left ;  Warren, 
with  Wilson's  Cavalry  in  front,  followed  by  Sedgwick, 
crossed  at  Germanna  Ford  and  followed  the  Germanna 
Plank  Road,  due  southeast,  to  Wilderness  Tavern. 
Sedgwick  encamped  for  the  night  three  miles  south  of 
the  river.  In  these  positions  Meade's  corps  remained 
until  2  p.  M.  of  the  5th,  while  the  65  miles  of  trains  were 
crossing  at  Germanna  and  Culpeper  Mine  fords,  the 
movement  of  which  was  more  difficult  than  anticipated, 
and  to  which  fact  the  unexpected  delay  in  the  advance 
was  attributed.  The  situation  was  now  about  as  fol 
lows:  Near  the  Lacy  house,  where  Grant,  Meade,  and 
Warren  had  established  their  headquarters,  there  were 
two  roads,  the  Orange  Turnpike  on  the  right  or  south, 
and  the  Orange  Plank  Road  on  the  north  or  left,  both 
following  the  general  direction  of  the  river  from 
Orange  Courthouse  to  Fredericksburg  and  nearly 
parallel  to  each  other.  The  route  of  the  Federal  Army 
lay  directly  across  the  two  roads  along  the  western 
border  of  the  Spotsylvania  Wilderness.  When  the 
Confederates  gained  contact  with  the  Federal  advance, 
Sedgwick's  Corps  in  general  occupied  the  Germanna, 
and  Hancock's  the  Brock  Road,  while  Warren's  oc 
cupied  the  space  within  the  obtuse  angle  made  by  the 
two. 

About  noon  on  the  4th  of  May,  Lee  put  Ewell's 
Corps  in  motion  along  the   Orange   Turnpike,   while 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  763 

A.  P.  Hill  with  two  divisions  moved  along  the  Orange 
Plank  Road.  The  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  Corps, 
in  camp  near  Gordonsville,  were  ordered  to  move 
rapidly  across  the  country  and  follow  Hill's  advance. 

It  was  apparent  from  the  first  that  the  terrain  se 
lected  by  Lee  for  his  initial  operations  would  afford  no 
opportunity  for  the  effective  employment  of  the  Ar 
tillery,  but  instant  steps  were  taken  to  bring  it  up  and 
assemble  it  from  its  widely  dispersed  camps. 

In  the  1st  Corps,  Huger's  Battalion  which  was  re 
cruiting  at  Cobham  Depot,  Haskell's  Battalion,  also 
in  camp  at  that  point,  and  Cabell's  Battalion  at  Mor 
ton's  Ford,  where  it  had  been  on  picket  duty  during  the 
winter,  were  ordered  on  the  4th  to  rendezvous  at 
Richard's  Shop,  where  they  arrived  late  in  the  night  on 
the  5th,  and  at  3  A.  M.  on  the  6th  they  marched  for 
Parker's  Store  on  the  Plank  Road  in  rear  of  the  Army. 
Gen.  Long's  five  battalions  which  had  wintered  at 
Frederick  Hall,  and  which  later  in  the  spring  had 
been  moved  to  grazing  camps  near  Liberty  Mills  in 
Orange  County,  also  received  orders  to  march  on  the 
4th,  and  were  concentrated  early  on  the  5th  at  Locust 
Grove  on  the  turnpike  in  rear  of  Ewell's  Infantry. 
Walker,  with  four  battalions  of  the  3d  Corps,  left  Cob- 
ham  and  Lindsay  depots  on  the  4th,  and  bivouacked 
that  night  near  Verdierville,  joining  Hill  on  the  5th  and 
accompanying  Heth  and  Wilcox  down  the  Plank  Road. 
Cutts'  Battalion  of  this  corps,  which  had  been  on  picket 
duty  during  the  winter  in  the  neighborhood  of  Rapidan 
Station,  was  directed  to  remain  with  Anderson's  Divi 
sion,  which  constituted  the  rear  guard  of  the  Army. 
The  five  batteries  of  the  Horse  Artillery  which  had 
wintered  at  Charlottesville  and  then  moved  to  Gordons 
ville,  were  now  operating  with  Stuart  on  Lee's  right, 
and  were  constantly  engaged  in  harassing  the  enemy's 
advance.  The  batteries  had  been  ordered  up  from  camp 
on  the  4th,  and  most  of  them  were  engaged  the  next  day 
with  Rosser  on  the  Catharpin  Road. 


764  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  rapid  concentration  of  the  Artillery  at  the  front 
was  effected  in  a  most  creditable  manner,  and  is  suffi 
cient  evidence  of  the  high  state  of  efficiency  of  the  arm 
at  this  time.  Nothing  so  tests  the  metal  of  field  artillery 
as  long  and  rapid  marching.  In  this  instance  it  was 
assembled  without  a  hitch  of  any  kind,  every  battalion 
moving  as  if  by  clockwork.  One  need  only  measure 
on  the  map  the  distances  covered  by  the  various  bat 
teries  between  the  4th  and  5th  of  May  to  appreciate 
the  celerity  of  their  movements.  Suffice  it  to  say  that 
many  of  the  batteries  covered  30  miles  or  more  in  less 
than  24  hours,  all  finding  their  appointed  positions  with 
out  mishap  of  any  kind. 

Swell's  Corps  was  the  first  to  gain  close  contact  with 
the  enemy.  As  it  advanced  along  the  turnpike  on  the 
morning  of  the  5th,  the  Federal  column  was  seen  cross 
ing  the  road  from  the  direction  of  Germanna  Ford. 
Ewell  had  been  instructed  to  regulate  his  advance  by 
the  head  of  Hill's  column,  which  Stuart  was  to  lead  to 
the  south  of  him,  and  not  to  bring  on  a  general  engage 
ment  until  Longstreet  arrived.  Promptly  forming 
Johnson's  Division  across  the  road,  he  refrained  from 
provoking  the  enemy,  and  communicated  with  Lee,  who 
was  still  with  Hill,  but  the  position  he  occupied  was  on 
the  flank  of  the  Federal  line  of  march,  and  very 
naturally  such  a  collision  soon  led  to  active  hostilities. 
Warren,  whose  troops  were  passing  when  Ewell  came 
upon  them,  halted  them  and,  turning  to  the  right,  made 
a  vigorous  attack  upon  Johnson's  Division,  with  which 
Nelson's  Battalion  of  artillery  had  been  deployed. 
Milledge's  Battery  in  front  of  Jones'  Brigade  on  the 
right  of  the  road  was  soon  withdrawn  when  the  infantry 
support  was  forced  to  fall  back  about  two  miles  to  the 
Flat  Run  Road,  where  it  intersects  the  turnpike.  Jones 
was  roughly  handled,  but  Steuart's  Brigade  was  pushed 
forward  and  Rodes'  Division  was  thrown  in  on  its  right, 
south  of  the  road.  When  the  line  was  thus  reestablished, 
the  Confederates  pressed  forward  vigorously  and,  after 
desperate  fighting  in  the  dense  woods  which  hid  friends 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  765 

and  foe  alike,  drove  back  the  enemy.  Swell's  entire 
corps  had  now  come  up,  Johnson's  Division  across  the 
turnpike,  Rodes  on  his  right,  and  Early  in  reserve. 
Few  practicable  positions  were  available  for  ar 
tillery,  but  Nelson  had  placed  some  of  his  guns  on  a 
commanding  ridge  with  a  small  field  in  their  front  on 
the  right  and  about  a  mile  from  the  Lacy  house.  Two 
of  his  guns  were  also  placed  on  the  road  leading  to  the 
Germanna  Road  to  operate  with  the  infantry  of  the 
left  wing.  In  these  positions  the  Artillery  rendered 
such  aid  as  it  could  in  repelling  the  attacks  of  the  Fed 
erals  during  the  afternoon. 

Soon  after  Warren's  repulse,  Sedgwick  moved  up  to 
his  right  to  oppose  Early,  who  moved  into  the  front  line 
and,  supported  by  several  of  Nelson's  guns,  clung  to  his 
position  on  the  Federal  flank,  in  spite  of  every  effort  to 
dislodge  him.  The  Federal  efforts  continued  until 
nightfall. 

The  collision  with  Ewell  at  first  led  Meade  to  believe 
Lee  had  only  left  a  division  to  oppose  his  progress,  and 
to  impose  upon  him  while  the  main  army  was  being  con 
centrated  across  his  path  on  the  North  Anna,  but  when 
Hill's  advance  was  also  discovered  on  the  Plank  Road, 
Meade  abandoned  his  original  view.  It  was  but  a  short 
time  after  Ewell  became  engaged  when  Hill  struck  the 
Federal  outposts  near  Parker's  Store,  just  at  the  edge 
of  the  Wilderness,  and  drove  them  in  upon  Sedgwick's 
column  which  was  moving  along  the  Stevensburg  and 
Brock  roads  to  Spotsylvania  Courthouse.  Heth's  Di 
vision,  followed  by  the  corps  artillery  with  Poague's 
Battalion  in  the  lead,  first  encountered  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  whereupon  Richards'  Battery  was  thrown  for 
ward  and  assisted  in  driving  in  the  outposts.  The  head 
of  Hill's  column  reached  an  opening  on  the  left  of  the 
Plank  Road  at  midday,  at  a  point  about  two  miles  from 
its  intersection  with  the  Brock  Road,  and  was  halted. 
From  the  ridge  occupied  by  Heth,  the  enemy  was  seen 
in  force  to  the  north  and  dispositions  were  at  once  made 
for  an  encounter.  The  small  clearing  on  the  ridge  af- 


766  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

forded  the  only  practicable  position  for  artillery.  There, 
near  the  Widow  Tabb's  house,  Gen.  Pendleton,  after 
consultation  with  the  Commander-in- Chief,  established 
Poague's  Battalion.  Poague  moved  one  of  his  pieces 
down  the  road  a  few  hundred  yards  and  placed  it  in 
line  with  Heth's  Infantry.  This,  as  will  be  seen  later, 
was  most  fortunate  for  the  Confederates. 

Immediately  upon  discovering  Hill's  presence,  Meade 
recalled  Hancock's  Corps,  which  was  marching  from 
Chancellorsville  to  Spotsylvania  Courthouse,  and  at 
4  P.  M.  Hancock  was  ordered  to  drive  Hill  "out  of  the 
Wilderness,"  which  he  had  entered.  Wilcox  was 
brought  up  to  Heth's  support  and  then  ensued  a 
desperate  encounter  between  the  individuals  of  both 
sides.  Division,  brigade,  regimental,  and  even  com 
pany  leading  was  out  of  the  question.  At  no  time  were 
more  than  a  handful  of  men  in  sight  from  any  one  point, 
and  the  troops  simply  fell  upon  each  other  and  locked 
in  a  death  embrace,  as  chance  directed  their  steps.  As 
darkness  approached,  the  flashing  muskets  alone  marked 
the  contending  and  intermingled  lines.  But  never  once 
was  the  road  occupied  in  force  by  the  enemy,  for 
Poague's  single  piece,  with  the  gallant  battalion  com 
mander  himself  beside  it,  swept  the  approach  and  com 
pletely  dominated  it  from  first  to  last.  The  battalion 
from  its  position  on  the  ridge  was  practically  debarred 
from  participating  in  the  struggle,  as  its  fire  would 
have  been  as  dangerous  to  friend  as  to  foe  in  that  seeth 
ing  cauldron  which  boiled  beneath  its  muzzles.  Mean 
while  the  other  battalions  of  the  3d  Corps  were  held  in 
the  immediate  rear  of  Hill's  Infantry. 

When  the  battle  closed  at  8  o'clock,  Swell's  and  Hill's 
Corps  had  already  formed  a  junction  at  a  point  about 
halfway  between  Parker's  Store  and  the  Orange  Turn 
pike.  Longstreet  was  now  ordered  to  make  a  forced 
march  during  the  night  and  arrive  upon  the  field  before 
dawn.  Moving  at  1  A.  M.  of  the  6th,  it  was  daylight 
when  he  reached  Parker's  Store  on  the  Plank  Road, 
three  miles  in  rear  of  Heth  and  Wilcox. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  767 

All  night  Hill's  advanced  troops,  who  had  maintained 
themselves  so  resolutely  and  successfully  against  Han 
cock's  six  divisions,  heard  the  Federals  preparing  to 
renew  the  attack  in  the  morning.  Worn  and  much  cut 
up  by  the  fighting  of  the  previous  afternoon  and  expect 
ing  relief  during  the  night,  the  infantry  failed  to  pre 
pare  to  meet  the  inevitable  attack.  The  lines  were  much 
disordered,  and  commands  were  mixed.  But  not  so  with 
Poague's  Battalion  on  the  ridge  in  the  clearing. 

At  5  A.  M.  Hancock's  troops  swept  forward  and  soon 
overlapped  Wilcox's  Division  south  of  the  road,  rolling 
it  up  and  compelling  Hill's  whole  line  to  retire  in  con 
fusion  past  the  single  battalion  of  artillery,  which  stood 
alone  like  a  wall  of  flame  across  the  enemy's  path.  Not 
until  the  great  masses  of  Hancock's  troops  came  face 
to  face  with  the  artillery  did  they  cease  to  press  for 
ward,  but  no  troops  could  pass  through  such  a  storm  of 
fire  as  that  which  Poague  now  opened  upon  them.  The 
gunners  worked  with  almost  superhuman  energy,  the 
muzzles  belched  their  withering  blasts,  the  twelve  pieces 
blended  their  discharges  in  one  continuous  roar,  and 
there  among  them  stood  beneath  the  dense  canopy  of 
smoke,  which  hovered  above  the  four  batteries,  Lee  him 
self  as  if  with  a  halo  of  war  above  his  head.  The  great 
commander  knew  then  full  well  that  between  him  and 
disaster  Poague's  Battalion  stood  alone.  What  glory 
for  a  soldier!  This  single  incident  brought  more  of 
honor  to  the  little  colonel  of  artillery  than  most  soldiers 
attain  in  a  life  of  service.  It  would  be  hard  for  some  to 
imagine  in  those  soft,  mild  eyes,  so  familiar  to  the 
writer,  the  light  which  must  have  radiated  from  them  as 
he  stood  among  his  guns  on  the  6th  of  May,  1864,  the 
bulwark  of  Lee's  defense,  and  in  the  very  presence  of 
his  immortal  commander.  But  one  who  has  been  thrown 
with  him,  who  has  learned  to  know  the  quality  of  the 
man,  must  feel  that  no  heroism  could  transcend  the  limits 
of  his  soul.  And  yet  the  incident  is  not  referred  to  by 
the  historians  of  our  time.  We  read  that  Poague's  Bat 
talion  was  present  in  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness.  No 


18 


768  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

more.  Even  Morris  S chaff,  whose  writings  are  inspired 
with  the  noblest  sentiments  of  appreciation,  and  whose 
studious  work  on  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  is  by  far 
the  best  yet  written,  overlooks  the  heroic  deeds  of 
Poague,  though  no  more  ready  hand  than  his  ever 
brought  the  pen  to  bear  with  sweeter  touch  for  friend 
and  foe  alike.  In  the  saving  of  such  incidents  to 
posterity,  of  deeds  unrecorded  by  contemporaries,  al 
most  unknown  even  to  the  present  generation,  one  must 
feel  thankful  to  the  Goddess  of  Fame,  nay,  more,  to  the 
Almighty  that  it  may  be  done. 

For  awhile  as  Gen.  Lee  stood  among  Poague's  unsup 
ported  guns,  matters  were  indeed  in  a  critical  condition 
for  the  Confederates.  After  sending  a  courier  to  hasten 
the  advance  of  the  1st  Corps,  and  another  to  prepare  the 
trains  to  be  moved  to  the  rear,  he  at  last  discerned  the 
dust  thrown  up  by  the  hurrying  feet  of  Longstreet's 
men.  In  perfect  order,  with  ranks  well  closed  and  no 
stragglers,  the  double  column  swung  down  the  road  at 
a  trot,  and,  regardless  of  the  confusion  which  beset  their 
path,  these  splendid  troops  pressed  on  to  the  point  of 
danger.  At  their  head  rode  Longstreet  at  his  best, 
ardent  for  the  fray,  as  if  but  now  he  had  slipped  the 
leash  which  held  his  tugging  columns  in  check.  Rapidly 
deploying  into  line  on  the  right  of  the  road,  Kershaw's 
Division  obliqued  to  the  right  under  a  withering  fire  to 
meet  the  Federal  left  which  had  all  but  outflanked 
Poague's  batteries,  and  which  was  working  havoc  among 
them.  On  the  left  of  the  road,  Field's  Division  also  de 
ployed  and  swept  past  the  guns,  among  which  the  men 
detected  Gen.  Lee,  whom  they  cheered  lustily.  When 
they  perceived  that  "Marse  Robert"  contemplated  lead 
ing  them  in  the  charge,  they  cried  loudly  for  him  to 
forego  his  intention.  "We  won't  go  unless  you  go 
back,"  shouted  the  Texans,  while  one  of  the  gallant  fel 
lows  seized  his  bridle  rein  and  turned  Traveller  to  the 
rear.  Gen.  Gregg  then  urged  Gen.  Lee  to  do  as  the 
men  desired  him  to  do,  but  it  was  with  evident  disap 
pointment  that  Lee  turned  off  and  joined  Gen.  Long- 
street. 


MAJOR   JAMES    WHITE   LATIMKK 

Mortally   wounded   at   Gettysburg.    ISGo 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  769 

As  Longstreet's  men  swept  onward,  Mclntosh's  Bat 
talion  was  thrown  into  position  by  Walker  on  Poague's 
left,  while  three  of  the  guns  of  Price's  Battery  advanced 
along  the  Plank  Road  with  the  infantry.  Pegram's 
Battalion  soon  went  into  action  on  the  ridge,  half  a  mile 
to  the  left  of  Mclntosh's,  to  oppose  the  efforts  of  the 
enemy  to  penetrate  between  Ewell  and  Hill.  Later  on 
Cutts  moved  up  to  the  support  of  Pegram,  while 
Richardson's  Battalion  and  Alexander's  entire  corps 
artillery  were  held  in  reserve  at  Parker's  Store. 

Longstreet's  charge  was  irresistible;  the  Federals 
were  first  checked  in  their  advance  and  then  driven  back 
past  their  first  line  of  log  works.  Back  and  forth  for 
two  hours  the  lines  of  battle  surged,  settling  down  at 
length  almost  where  they  had  rested  during  the  night 
before. 

Simultaneously  with  these  events  on  the  Confederate 
right,  the  Federals  had  made  an  unsuccessful  effort  to 
turn  E well's  left  next  the  river,  the  brunt  of  the  attack 
falling  upon  Early's  Division,  behind  the  flank  of  which 
Col.  Carter  had  massed  a  number  of  his  guns.  The  bat 
teries  there  posted  were  heavily  engaged  and  rendered 
splendid  service  in  repelling  the  attack  upon  Gordon's 
Brigade.  Cutshaw's  Battalion  was  placed  by  Gen. 
Long  on  the  right  of  the  turnpike,  relieving  Nelson's 
batteries  in  their  old  position,  while  Hardaway's  Bat 
talion  relieved  those  guns  of  Nelson's  Battalion  on  the 
Germanna  Road.  Braxton's  Battalion  occupied  a  posi 
tion  further  to  the  right,  about  midway  between  the 
turnpike  and  the  Plank  Road,  from  which  point  it  was 
able  to  cross  fire  to  a  certain  extent  with  Pegram's 
guns  behind  Hill's  left.  While  seeking  an  advanced 
and  much  exposed  position  for  the  three  battalions  of 
his  division  early  in  the  morning,  the  veteran  artillery 
officer,  Col.  John  Thompson  Brown,  fell,  instantly 
killed  by  the  bullet  of  a  sharpshooter,  adding  another 
illustrious  name  to  the  list  of  artillery  officers  lost  in 
battle.  Little  can  be  added  concerning  Col.  Brown  to 
what  his  superiors  in  his  own  arm  have  written  of  him. 


770  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

In  his  report,  Pendleton  wrote  of  this  much  lamented 
officer:  "To  the  fine  qualities  of  a  Christian  gentleman 
of  superior  and  cultivated  intellect  were  added  in  Col. 
Brown  very  high  excellencies  as  a  soldier.  Judicious, 
prompt,  energetic  and  of  dauntless  gallantry,  he  had 
rendered  conspicuous  service  in  every  campaign  of  the 
war.  His  example  will  not  be  forgotten  in  the  arm  to 
which  he  was  an  ornament,  nor  his  memory  be  un- 
cherished  by  a  grateful  country."  And,  of  him  Gen. 
Long,  whose  senior  artillery  division  commander  he 
was,  wrote:  "His  loss  was  deeply  felt  throughout  the 
whole  army.  He  not  only  exhibited  the  highest  social 
qualities,  but  was  endowed  with  the  first  order  of  mili 
tary  talents.  On  every  field  where  he  was  called  to  act 
he  was  distinguished  for  gallantry  and  skill.  The  Ar 
tillery  will  ever  remember  him  as  one  of  its  brightest 
ornaments."* 

By  8  A.  M.  Anderson's  Division  had  rejoined  Hill's 
Corps.  Meanwhile,  it  had  been  discovered  by  Gen. 
Lee's  engineer  that  the  Federal  left  flank  rested  in  the 
air  only  a  short  distance  south  of  the  Plank  Road,  near 
the  unfinished  railroad.  When  this  was  reported  to 
Longstreet  about  10  A.  M.  he  at  once  organized  a  column 
of  four  brigades,  G.  B.  Anderson's  and  Wofford's  of 
his  own,  and  Mahone's  and  Davis'  of  Hill's  Corps,  for 
the  purpose  of  turning  the  Federal  flank.  Moving 
rapidly  to  the  right  and  then  forward,  the  column  was 
deployed  along  the  railroad  at  right  angles  to  the  hos 
tile  line.  About  11  A.  M.  the  four  brigades,  led  by  Col. 
Sorrell  in  person,  Longstreet's  Adjutant-General,  ad 
vanced,  striking  the  flank  of  the  Federal  line  in  reverse, 
while  a  general  attack  was  instituted  along  the  Confed 
erate  front.  The  success  of  Longstreet's  brilliant  move 
ment  was  complete.  From  a  tactical  point  of  view  no 
more  beautiful  movement  was  executed  during  the  war, 
and  it  only  serves  to  show  the  remarkable  ability  of 
Longstreet  as  a  tactician  when  his  was  the  plan  that  was 

*For  full  and  accurate  account  of  the  life  and  military  career  of  this  superb 
officer,  see  The  University  Memorial,  p.  560. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  771 

being  executed.  Brigade  after  brigade  of  the  enemy 
was  rolled  up  and  routed.  Hancock,  totally  unable,  in 
spite  of  the  noted  influence  he  exercised  over  his  men, 
to  stay  their  flight,  was  compelled  to  content  himself 
with  reforming  them  along  the  Brock  Road,  where 
luckily  he  had  thrown  up  hasty  intrenchments  the  pre 
ceding  day.  Panic  had  seized  upon  two  whole  Federal 
corps,  and  a  great  Confederate  victory  seemed  assured 
when  Longstreet,  who  rode  forward  south  of  the  Plank 
Road,  at  the  head  of  five  fresh  brigades  to  press  his  ad 
vantage,  fell  before  a  volley  from  one  of  Mahone's  regi 
ments  advancing  at  right  angles  to  his  own  course,  and 
which  mistook  Longstreet  and  the  group  of  officers 
about  him  for  Federals.  But  Longstreet  was  not  so 
seriously  wounded  that  he  could  not  place  Gen.  Field  in 
command  and  direct  him  how  to  proceed.  He  explained 
that  one  of  his  columns  should  continue  the  direct  at 
tack,  while  the  other  moved  further  around  Hancock's 
left  by  a  route  which  Gen.  Smith  had  reconnoitered  and 
was  thoroughly  familiar  with.  If  this  were  done,  the 
already-broken  enemy  would  be  forced  to  surrender 
or  be  destroyed.  Before  Field,  however,  got  under 
way,  Gen.  R.  H.  Anderson,  his  senior,  then  Gen. 
Lee  himself,  arrived.  Longstreet 's  knowledge  of  the 
situation  was  of  course  not  possessed  by  either  Lee  or 
Anderson.  They  only  found  the  lines  much  disordered, 
and  before  the  realignment  which  the  former  directed  to 
be  made  could  be  effected,  much  delay  had  ensued.  It 
was  4:15  p.  M.  before  Field's  and  Anderson's  divisions 
renewed  the  attack.  Thus  at  the  very  crisis  of  the  battle, 
when  the  enemy  was  not  only  already  defeated,  but  an 
appalling  disaster  stared  Meade  in  the  face,  Lee's  second 
great  lieutenant  was  smitten  and  this  almost  within  gun 
shot  of  the  field  where  Jackson  fell  just  twelve  months 
before.  In  fact  part  of  the  enemy's  forces  occupied  the 
old  Chancellorsville  battlefield  at  the  time. 

It  would  almost  seem  that  Providence  was  fighting 
against  the  Confederates.  Certain  it  is  that  Fate  was 
against  them,  for  in  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  even 


772  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

another  ill-fortune  had  fallen  upon  Lee's  Army.  Be 
fore  9  A.  M.  Gordon  had  discovered  the  exposed  char 
acter  of  the  Federal  right  wing,  and  had  later  verified 
the  reports  of  his  patrols  by  personal  reconnaissance  in 
its  rear.  He  at  once  reported  the  fact  to  Early,  and 
begged  to  be  allowed  to  attack  Sedgwick,  with  a  view  to 
rolling  up  his  line.  But  Early  objected  on  the  ground 
that  Burnside,  whose  troops  were  arriving  on  the  field, 
would  be  found  behind  Sedgwick.  Gordon  knew  from 
personal  observation  that  Burnside  was  not  there,  and 
in  vain  he  appealed,  first  to  his  division  commander, 
then  to  Ewell,  to  be  allowed  to  attack,  urging  them  both 
to  verify  his  own  information.  Ewell  was  completely 
dominated,  however,  by  Early,  and  neither  went  himself 
nor  sent  any  one  to  investigate  the  situation  for  him. 
About  5 :30  p.  M.  Gen.  Lee,  astounded  by  the  inactivity 
on  the  left,  rode  over  from  the  right  where  Longstreet 
and  Hill  had  been  so  heavily  engaged,  to  discover  the 
cause  of  Swell's  silence.  Gordon,  in  the  presence  of  both 
Ewell  and  Early,  explained  the  situation  to  Gen.  Lee  as 
he  knew  it  to  be,  with  the  result  that  he  was  ordered 
to  attack  at  once.  The  attack  took  place  just  as  the  sun 
went  down,  too  late  to  reap  the  fruits  of  a  surprise  which 
to  Sedgwick  was  as  great  as  Longstreet's  flanking  at 
tack  had  been  to  Hancock.  Moving  around  to  their  rear, 
Gordon  alone  drove  the  Federals  from  a  large  portion 
of  their  works  and  took  600  prisoners,  and  among  them 
two  general  officers.  But  darkness  intervened  to  save 
Sedgwick  just  as  a  bullet  had  saved  Hancock  and  War 
ren,  and  so  Grant's  army  was  saved  from  destruction 
and  enabled  to  fall  back  and  establish  a  new  line  for  the 
defense  of  which  Burnside's  entire  and  almost  wholly 
fresh  corps  was  now  available. 

Viewing  Meade's  precarious  situation  throughout  the 
6th,  it  seems  certain  that  had  Gordon  been  permitted  to 
attack  when  he  desired  to,  his  effort,  which  would  have 
been  closely  connected  in  time  with  Longstreet's  success 
on  the  right,  would  surely  have  brought  complete 
disaster  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  What  he  accom- 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  773 

plished  at  6  P.  M.  could  have  been  done  at  11  A.  M.,  and 
with  an  enemy  in  his  front  and  in  rear  of  both  flanks,  it 
is  inconceivable  that  Meade  could  have  successfully  with 
drawn  his  army,  even  had  the  terrain  favored  him  instead 
of  practically  eliminating  all  possibility  of  the  move 
ment  of  broken  troops. 

During  the  day,  Stuart  had  persistently  sought  to 
penetrate  to  the  left  rear  of  Meade's  Army,  but  found 
Sheridan  confronting  him  at  all  points.  The  conflict 
between  the  cavalry  of  the  two  armies  was  continuous, 
and  in  the  various  more  or  less  disjointed  affairs  between 
Stuart's  brigades  and  those  of  Sheridan,  the  Horse  Ar 
tillery  was  actively  engaged.  Johnston's  Battery  re 
mained  in  position  near  Shady  Grove,  Thomson's  and 
Shoemaker's  being  heavily  engaged  near  Rowe's  farm, 
and  Hart's  not  far  from  Todd's  Tavern.  McGregor's 
Battery  remained  at  Orange  Courthouse,  with 
W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Brigade.  The  nature  of  the  cavalry 
operations  in  the  dense  country  was  such,  of  course,  as 
to  preclude  the  possibility  of  Chew's  handling  the  bat 
talion  as  a  unit.  On  the  6th,  when  with  Rosser,  who  was 
engaging  Wilson  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  Chew  per 
sonally  led  Thomson's  Battery  in  the  charge  of  the 
cavalry  brigade,  and,  throwing  the  guns  into  action  just 
before  the  troopers  struck  the  enemy,  did  fine  execution 
with  them.  The  next  day  at  Rose's  farm,  where  Stuart 
was  in  command,  he  again  accompanied  the  cavalry  in  a 
charge  with  his  old  battery,  much  to  the  delight  of 
Stuart,  who  now  seems  to  have  realized  for  the  first  time 
that  in  Maj.  Chew,  Pelham  had  a  worthy  successor.* 
Stuart's  previous  lack  of  appreciation  of  Chew  was  most 
natural,  for  the  two  had  scarcely  ever  been  thrown  to 
gether  before  this  time.  It  seems  unfortunate  that  the 
association  of  such  bold  and  congenial  spirits  was  so 
brief.  But  the  wide  recognition  of  this  artilleryman's 

*"GEN.  W.  N.  PENDLETON — Your  note  concerning  Bearing  is  just  received. 
Maj.  Chew,  the  officer  now  in  charge  of  the  Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  is  doing  so 
well  that  I  am  disinclined  to  put  any  one  over  him,  although  I  have  a  high 
appreciation  of  the  officer  you  propose.  I  think  Chew  will  answer  as  the 
permanent  commander,  and,  being  identified  with  the  Horse  Artillery,  is  there 
fore  preferable  to  others. 

"J.  B.  B.  STUART,  Major-General,  April  6,  1864." 


774  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

ability  and  the  reputation  as  an  unexcelled  leader  of 
horse  artillery  which  he  had  established  for  himself 
were  all  the  more  to  his  credit  since  he  owed  nothing  to 
the  great  Stuart  for  them.  Indeed,  his  service  since 
Ashby's  death  had  been  quite  independent  of  illustrious 
commanders,  and  he  therefore  reflected  none  of  the  lus 
tre  of  others.  He  was  a  self-made  soldier  in  the  highest 
sense  of  the  word,  and  the  fact  that  he  could  by  his  own 
merit  acquire  precedence  over  such  an  officer  as 
Breathed,  so  long  and  so  familiarly  associated  with 
Stuart,  may  seem  remarkable  to  those  who  have  never 
known  the  man.  Slight  personal  contact  with  him  is 
sufficient,  however,  to  brush  away  all  surprise.  Near 
seventy  years  old  at  the  time  this  is  written,  Col.  Robert 
Preston  Chew  retains  the  mental  activity  and  much  of 
the  physical  hardihood  of  youth.  Erect,  of  full  muscular 
development  and  above  the  average  height,  with  a  hand 
some  face  upon  which  character  has  delineated  its  un 
mistakable  features,  in  appearance  he  is  the  ideal 
soldier,  and  he  is  as  much  beloved  by  those  with  whom 
he  is  now  associated  in  his  peaceful  pursuits,  as  he  was 
by  the  splendid  men  of  the  Confederate  Horse  Artillery 
during  the  war.* 

*Col.  Chew  now  resides  in  Charles  Town,  West  Virginia.  He  tells  the  writer 
that  he  is  engaged  in  writing  the  history  of  the  Horse  Artillery.  May  God  spare 
him  until  he  has  completed  the  priceless  record  he  alone  is  now  capable  of 
preparing,  and  for  many  years  to  come. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII 

SPOTSYLVANIA 

GRANT  had  utterly  failed  on  the  5th  and  6th  of  May 
to  carry  out  his  plan  of  "swinging  past"  Lee's  Army 
and  placing  himself  between  it  and  Richmond,  and  while 
Lee  had  delivered  the  Federal  Army  a  stunning  blow, 
it  still  remained  on  its  route,  now  secure  behind  strong 
works,  and  with  Hunt's  tremendous  force  of  artillery 
established  in  position  with  the  usual  skill  of  its  com 
mander.  It  was  impracticable  for  the  Confederates, 
who  had  established  themselves  upon  the  flank  of 
Grant's  line  of  operations,  to  attack  Meade's  Army. 
Whatever  the  conditions  may  have  been  in  the  Federal 
Infantry,  which  had  been  so  roughly  handled,  and  which 
had  escaped  complete  disaster  by  the  merest  chance,  Lee 
knew  that  Hunt  was  undismayed  and  that  no  troops 
could  sweep  over  that  superb  line  of  guns  in  the  Wilder 
ness.  So  both  armies  lay  behind  their  intrenchments  on 
the  7th,  contenting  themselves  with  skirmishing  along 
the  front.  Meanwhile,  Lee  kept  a  close  lookout  for  a 
movement  of  the  enemy  to  his  right  and  directed  the 
Chief  of  Artillery  to  open  roads  for  the  movement  of 
the  artillery  in  that  direction,  should  it  be  needed  there. 
The  work  was  quickly  accomplished  by  working  parties 
from  the  various  batteries  of  the  3d  Corps,  under  the 
immediate  direction  of  Col.  Walker.  At  the  same  time, 
Gen.  Long  made  a  reconnaissance  under  orders  from 
Gen.  Ewell  on  the  extreme  left.  Taking  Jones'  infan 
try  brigade  and  W.  P.  Carter's  Battery,  Long  moved 
around  to  Beale's  house  on  the  Germanna  Road,  where 
he  struck  several  regiments  of  Federal  cavalry,  which 
were  quickly  dispersed  by  the  battery.  No  other  hostile 
troops  being  found,  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy  was 
withdrawing  from  before  the  Confederate  left,  for  the 
dead  and  wounded  still  lay  upon  the  field  in  that  quarter. 
Soon  after  Long  made  the  report  of  his  reconnaissance 


776  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

to  Lee,  Stuart,  about  3  p.  M.^  discovered  Meade's  trains 
moving  to  the  Confederate  right,  and  later  the  unmis 
takable  rumble  of  moving  columns  along  the  Brock 
Road  was  heard. 

With  roads  clear  of  the  trains,  Meade  had  been 
ordered  by  Grant  to  move  his  troops  at  8 :30  p.  M.,  and 
to  establish  one  of  his  corps  at  the  Courthouse,  twelve 
miles  distant,  one  at  the  crossroads  known  as  the  Brock 
House,  and  one  at  Todd's  Tavern. 

About  dusk,  Gen.  Lee  directed  Pendleton  to  send 
a  staff  officer  to  Anderson,  who  had  succeeded  Long- 
street  in  command  of  the  1st  Corps,  to  guide  him  over 
the  roads  cut  through  the  woods.  Without  a  doubt  in 
his  mind  as  to  Grant's  intention,  Lee  had  taken  up  the 
race  for  position  at  Spotsylvania.  Going  himself  to 
Anderson,  Pendleton  described  the  route  and  left  with 
him  a  competent  staff  officer  to  lead  the  column.  Ander 
son's  orders  were  to  start  at  3  A.  M.,,  but  he  knew  the 
route  he  would  have  to  follow  to  the  Courthouse  was 
longer  than  that  pursued  by  the  Federals,  so  he  set 
his  troops  in  motion  at  11  p.  M.,  four  hours  earlier  than 
ordered.  We  shall  see  later  how  fortunate  was  the  ex 
ercise  of  this  initiative  on  his  part.  The  Artillery  of  the 
1st  Corps,  which  had  not  been  engaged  the  two  preced 
ing  days,  was  ordered  to  follow  the  infantry  column 
from  Parker's  Store. 

Anderson's  two  divisions,  with  Alexander's  Artillery, 
had  about  15  miles  to  travel,  but  Fitz  Lee  and  Hamp 
ton  kept  the  road  open  and  held  back  the  cavalry  dur 
ing  the  night  in  front  of  Spotsylvania  and  at  Corbin's 
Bridge,  by  blockading  the  narrow  avenues  of  approach 
through  the  forest  with  felled  timber.  Alexander  moved 
during  the  night  by  way  of  the  Shady  Grove  Road  and 
Corbin's  Bridge,  rejoining  the  infantry  about  daylight 
near  the  Po  River,  where  the  1st  Corps  rested  and  pre 
pared  breakfast.  Already  the  efforts  of  the  Federals  to 
brush  the  cavalry  from  their  front  could  be  heard  in  the 
heavy  firing  to  the  left.  Grant  and  Meade,  as  was  their 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  777 

entire  army,  were  sure  the  race  had  been  won  by  them, 
and  heavy  attacks  were  being  made  by  Wilson's 
Cavalry,  on  Rosser  at  the  Courthouse,  and  by  War 
ren's  Corps  on  Fitz  Lee  at  the  Spindler  farm  on  the 
Brock  Road.  Reaching  the  Brock  House  at  7  A.  M., 
Anderson  sent  Kennedy's  and  Humphreys'  brigades, 
with  two  batteries  of  Haskell's  Battalion,  to  the  assist 
ance  of  Fitz  Lee  about  a  mile  away,  and  Wofford's 
and  Bryan's  brigades  with  the  rest  of  the  Artillery  to 
Rosser  half  a  mile  further  to  the  front.  Haskell's  two 
batteries  at  once  became  involved  in  a  desperate  con 
flict,  in  which  Capt.  Potts  was  mortally  wounded. 
After  two  hours  they  exhausted  their  ammunition,  but 
not  until  they  had  rendered  most  effective  service  in  re 
pulsing  a  charge  of  three  of  Warren's  brigades.  Field's 
Division  now  came  up  to  the  support  of  Kershaw's  two 
brigades,  and  extended  his  line  to  the  left.  Five  batter 
ies  of  Huger's  Battalion  were  then  posted  by  Alexander 
on  a  ridge  in  the  edge  of  the  pine  thicket  on  the  Todd's 
Tavern  Road,  where  the  cavalry  had  made  its  stand, 
and  Cabell's  Battalion  was  held  in  reserve.  Fitz  Lee 
when  thus  relieved  joined  Rosser  at  the  Courthouse 
and  together  they  compelled  Wilson  to  retire  before 
them.  This  enabled  Wofford  and  Bryan  to  rejoin  Ker- 
shaw. 

After  Robinson's  repulse,  Griffin's  Division  rendered 
two  assaults,  the  first  suffering  a  complete  repulse,  the 
second  enabling  the  Federals  to  establish  themselves 
under  cover  about  400  yards  to  the  right  front  of  the 
Confederate  line,  where  they  began  to  intrench.  Craw 
ford's  Division  next  came  up  and  extended  Griffin's 
line  to  the  left,  and  then  Cutler's  Division  attacked  the 
Confederate  left  without  success,  and  prolonged 
Griffin's  line  of  intrenchments  to  the  right.  During  the 
latter's  attack,  all  five  of  Cabell's  batteries  under  Maj. 
Hamilton  were  brought  into  action.  Meantime 
Haskell's  two  batteries,  which  had  suffered  severely  on 
the  Todd's  Tavern  Road  under  a  reverse  fire  from  a 
horse  battery  near  the  Courthouse,  were  withdrawn. 


778  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Anderson  had  won  his  race  and  Warren's  whole 
corps  had  been  halted  over  a  mile  short  of  its  goal  by 
two  small  Confederate  divisions,  and  the  bold  use  of 
the  artillery,  which  in  places  had  been  brought  into 
action  within  400  yards  of  the  enemy,  and  not  over  100 
yards  from  their  skirmishers.  Instead  of  being  in  posi 
tion  waiting  for  Lee  at  Spotsylvania  Courthouse,  the 
advance  of  Meade's  Army  was  completely  cut  off  from 
it  and  the  direct  routes  thereto. 

Both  Lee  and  Meade  now  began  to  hurry  forward 
their  troops.  Ewell  had  left  the  Wilderness  at  dawn 
and  arrived  in  position  on  Anderson's  right  just  in  time 
to  assist  in  severely  repulsing  the  combined  attack 
about  5:30  p.  M.,  of  Warren's  and  Sedgwick's  corps 
upon  Anderson's  line.  In  this  affair  nearly  every  gun 
of  Alexander's  command  was  actually  engaged,  but  only 
a  few  of  Long's  that  were  in  position  in  front  of  the 
Courthouse  took  part,  the  bulk  of  the  2d  Corps  Ar 
tillery  arriving  later  and  going  into  park  near  the  Court 
house  for  the  night.  The  3d  Corps,  under  Early,  which 
had  been  left  behind  as  a  rear  guard,  did  not  leave  its 
old  position  until  late  on  the  8th,  bivouacking  for  the 
night  near  Shady  Grove.  During  the  day  a  single 
section  of  Mclntosh's  Battalion  was  engaged  with  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  which  pressed  upon  the  flanks  of  the 
3d  Corps  as  it  advanced. 

Upon  arriving  at  Spotsylvania,  early  on  the  9th,  the 
3d  Corps,  with  the  exception  of  Mahone's  Division,  ex 
tended  Swell's  line  of  intrenchments  to  the  right,  while 
Mahone  moved  to  a  commanding  position  on  Ander 
son's  left,  overlooking  the  Po.  The  Confederates  had 
now  established  a  line  covering  Spotsylvania  Court 
house,  with  the  1st  Corps  on  the  left  resting  across  the 
Po  River,  the  2d  Corps  in  the  center  north  of  the  Court 
house,  and  the  3d  on  the  right  crossing  the  Fredericks- 
burg  Road.  While  the  brigades  and  divisions  were  fre 
quently  shifted,  these  positions  were  generally  main 
tained  during  the  battles  that  ensued. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  779 

During  the  9th,  while  no  attack  was  made  by  either 
side,  an  incessant  sharpshooting  was  kept  up,  resulting 
in  many  losses  to  both  sides,  including  the  gallant  Gen. 
Sedgwick,  who  was  killed  on  the  Brock  Road.  The  day 
was  largely  devoted  to  the  strengthening  of  old  and  the 
construction  of  new  breastworks.  The  Confederate  bat 
teries  were  extended  along  the  entire  front  of  the  line, 
and  most  of  the  guns  placed  in  pits  or  behind  slight 
epaulments.  Cabell's  Battalion  occupied  an  elevation 
in  rear  of  and  slightly  above  Anderson's  left,  with  four 
guns  under  Maj.  Gibbes  on  the  extreme  left  of  the 
infantry  line.  On  Cabell's  right  and  in  the  second  line 
were  posted  Haskell's  Battalion,  and  Woolfolk's  Bat 
tery.  Huger's  remaining  five  batteries  were  placed  in 
the  infantry  line.  Beyond  them  and  also  with  the 
infantry,  Page's  and  Braxton's  battalions  were  in  posi 
tion  with  the  2d  Corps.  The  field  of  fire  for  the  guns 
at  this  point,  as  at  the  Wilderness,  was  very  limited  and 
the  terrain  afforded  little  opportunity  for  the  effective 
use  of  artillery.  Further  to  the  right  and  on  the  left 
of  the  Courthouse  clearing,  Long  posted  Hardaway's 
and  Nelson's  battalions,  while  Cutshaw's  was  held  in  re 
serve  on  the  road  behind  them.  In  the  3d  Corps, 
Walker,  upon  arriving,  dispatched  Mclntosh's  Bat 
talion  to  the  extreme  left,  where  it  went  into  position 
behind  Mahone  at  a  point  where  the  Shady  Grove  Road 
crosses  the  Po  River.  Poague's  Battalion  occupied  the 
infantry  works  on  the  left  of  the  3d  Corps  line,  Pe- 
gram's  the  line  where  it  crossed  the  Fredericksburg 
Road  several  hundred  yards  from  the  Courthouse, 
and  Cutts'  a  position  on  the  extreme  right  in  advance 
of  the  road  to  Massaponax  Church.  Richardson's 
Battalion  was  held  in  reserve  behind  the  center.  Thus 
it  is  seen  that  nearly  every  gun  in  Lee's  Army  was  in 
position  either  in  the  advanced  line,  or  in  works  close  be 
hind.  The  nature  of  the  terrain  absolutely  forbade  the 
effective  massing  of  guns  for  the  more  effective  com 
mand  of  a  given  field  of  fire.  The  situation  demanded, 
if  artillery  were  to  be  employed  at  all,  that  it  should 


780  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

fight  with  the  infantry,  and  simply  endeavor  to  sweep 
the  field  in  its  immediate  front,  and  thus  supplement 
the  musketry  fire.  Truly  the  Artillery  was  to  fight  as 
infantry  at  Spotsylvania.  There  was  to  be  no  such 
thing  as  artillery  tactics  there.  It  was  simply  a  question 
of  how  much  it  could  increase  the  intensity  of  the  fire  of 
the  defense.  No  question  of  the  time  and  the  manner 
in  which  that  fire  was  to  be  delivered  was  open  to  dis 
cussion,  for  tactics  were  ruled  out  in  favor  of  the  knock- 
down-and-drag-out  method,  which  the  topography  im 
posed  upon  the  Artillery.  Never  in  all  the  war  was  the 
Confederate  Artillery  called  upon  to  serve  in  such  a 
manner  as  in  the  days  of  Spotsylvania. 

The  principal  activity  of  the  enemy  on  the  9th  was 
in  front  of  the  Confederate  left  and  center,  but  the  Ar 
tillery  fired  only  a  few  rounds  and  those  principally  at 
the  enemy's  sharpshooters  whenever  they  were  seen  to 
gather  in  sufficient  numbers  to  afford  a  reasonable  tar 
get. 

Hancock  crossed  his  three  divisions  over  the  Po  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  9th  and  occupied  the  Shady  Grove 
Road,  thus  threatening  the  Confederate  rear  and  en 
dangering  the  trains  which  were  parked  on  the  road 
leading  by  the  old  Courthouse  to  Louisa  Courthouse. 
Lee's  main  line  was  north  of  the  Po,  with  its  left, 
Field's  Division  of  the  1st  Corps,  resting  on  the  stream 
at  a  point  just  above  the  crossing  of  the  Shady  Grove 
Road.  Mahone,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  posted  with 
Mclntosh's  Battalion  on  the  other  side  of  the  stream 
to  protect  the  flank.  Lee  ordered  Early  on  the  morning 
of  the  10th  to  move  around  Mahone's  left  and  strike 
Hancock's  right.  Taking  Heth's  Division,  Richard 
son's  Battalion  and  Ellett's  Battery  of  Pegram's  Bat 
talion,  Early  moved  to  the  rear  and  then  followed  the 
Louisa  Courthouse  Road  across  the  Po  until  he 
reached  a  road  coming  in  from  Waite's  Shop  on  the 
Shady  Grove  Road.  Moving  about  a  mile  along  this 
road,  he  met  Hampton's  Cavalry  falling  back  before 
Hancock,  who  had  pushed  out  a  column  of  infantry 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  781 

somewhat  to  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  line.  After 
driving  the  Federal  advance  back  to  the  Shady  Grove 
Road,  Early  reached  Waite's  Shop,  from  which  point 
Heth  attacked  in  earnest,  but  he  was  twice  repulsed  in 
his  effort  to  gain  the  ridge  upon  which  only  two  of  Bar 
low's  brigades  were  posted  with  artillery,  for  Hancock 
had  already  withdrawn  his  other  divisions.  In  this  at 
tack,  Richardson's  Battalion  came  under  a  heavy  artil 
lery  fire,  and  was  suffering  severely,  when  Pendleton 
caused  Cabell's  Battalion,  from  its  elevated  position  be 
hind  Anderson's  left,  to  concentrate  upon  the  enemy's 
guns.  The  effect  was  instant  and  Richardson  was  re 
lieved  from  a  nasty  situation.  A  fire  now  broke  out  in 
the  woods,  and  although  Barlow  had  not  been  driven 
from  his  ridge  by  Early,  Meade  ordered  him  to  with 
draw  to  the  north  side  of  the  stream.  Mahone's  Divi 
sion  now  crossed  from  the  east  bank,  as  the  road  was 
clear,  with  several  of  Macintosh's  batteries,  and  inflicted 
some  loss  upon  the  retiring  Federals,  who  were  com 
pelled  to  abandon  a  gun  which  had  been  wedged  between 
two  trees  by  its  affrighted  team.  Night  was  now  ap 
proaching,  and  as  the  enemy  was  found  with  artillery 
well  intrenched  on  the  north  bank,  Early  refrained 
from  further  attempts  and  soon  Heth  returned  to  the 
right,  leaving  Mahone  in  possession  of  the  position  on 
the  Shady  Grove  Road,  from  which  Barlow  had  been 
driven.  To  this  point,  all  of  Macintosh's  guns  were 
brought  up  during  the  night  and  intrenched. 

During  the  fighting  on  the  extreme  left,  Meade  had 
made  a  tremendous  effort  to  break  Lee's  line.  First  a 
demonstration  was  made  against  the  right  immediately 
in  front  of  Spotsylvania  Courthouse,  but  the  attack 
ing  infantry  was  roughly  handled  and  driven  back  to 
their  trenches  by  Cutts'  and  Pegram's  battalions.  The 
main  attack  was  directed  against  Field's  Division  on  the 
left,  and  meeting  with  a  bloody  repulse  was  renewed  at 
3  P.  M.  with  the  same  result.  In  these  affairs  Cabell, 
Huger,  and  Haskell  were  all  heavily  engaged.  Alex 
ander  had  posted  their  guns  in  such  a  way  that  they 


782  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

partially  enfiladed  the  approaches  to  the  infantry  line, 
and  as  Warren's  troops  advanced  through  the  dense 
thickets  in  Anderson's  front,  the  woods  were  riddled 
with  canister,  which  effectually  broke  the  enemy's  forma 
tion.  As  the  Federals  emerged  in  bad  order,  unable 
to  reform  under  the  Confederate  musketry  fire,  but 
few  of  them  were  able  to  press  home,  and  these  were 
cared  for  by  the  infantry,  many  of  the  men  of  which 
were  double  armed  with  the  muskets  previously  aban 
doned  in  front  of  the  works  by  the  enemy  earlier  in  the 
day.  The  intensity  of  the  Confederate  musketry  fire, 
thus  increased,  was  unusual.  A  lull  of  several  hours 
now  ensued.  About  7  P.  M.  Hancock  made  the  third 
assault  on  Anderson's  line  with  Birney's  and  Gibbon's 
divisions  supported  by  the  5th  Corps.  Near  sunset, 
Anderson's  skirmishers  were  suddenly  swept  back,  and 
almost  without  warning  the  successive  lines  of  the 
enemy  were  soon  seen  surging  forward  at  the  trot. 
Rushing  forward,  the  front  line  dissolved,  but  on  came 
the  determined  supports,  driving  the  Confederates  from 
their  works,  but  failing  to  break  their  resistance.  The 
line  of  the  defenders  was  nearly  bent  back  by  the  pres 
sure  and  the  fight  continued  in  the  rear  of  the  breast 
works  until  Anderson's  Brigade,  which  had  cleared  its 
front,  was  able  to  turn  upon  the  flank  of  the  assailants 
and  drive  them  over  and  beyond  the  works  which  they 
had  so  gallantly  taken. 

As  to  the  character  of  the  work  the  Artillery  per 
formed  in  these  attacks,  a  vivid  description  of  the  fore 
going  affair  by  the  adjutant  of  Cabell's  Battalion  is 
here  inserted:* 

"The  troops  supporting  the  two  Napoleon  guns  of  the  Howitzers 
(1st  company)  were,  as  I  remember,,  the  Seventh  (or  Eighth) 
Georgia  and  the  First  Texas.  Toward  the  close  of  the  day, 
everything  seemed  to  have  quieted  down,  in  a  sort  of  implied  truce. 
There  was  absolutely  no  fire,,  either  of  musketry  or  cannon.  Our 
weary,  hungry  infantry  stacked  arms  and  were  cooking  their  mean 
and  meager  little  rations.  Some  one  rose  up  and  looking  over  the 
works — it  was  shading  down  a  little  toward  the  dark — cried  out: 

*Four  Years  under  Marse  Robert,  Stiles,  p.  254. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  783 

'Hello!  what's  this?  Why,  here  come  our  men  on  the  run,  from — 
no,  by  Heavens!  it's  the  Yankees!'  And  before  any  one  could 
realize  the  situation  or  even  start  towards  the  stacked  muskets,  the 
Federal  column  broke  over  the  little  works,  between  our  troops  and 
their  arms,  bayoneted  or  shot  two  or  three  who  were  asleep,  before 
they  could  awake,  and  dashed  upon  the  men  who  were  at  their 
low  fires, — with  cooking  utensils  instead  of  weapons  in  their  hands. 
Of  course  they  ran.  What  else  could  they  do? 

"The  Howitzers — only  the  left,  or  Napoleon  section  was  there — 
sprang  to  their  guns,  swinging  them  around  to  bear  inside  our 
lines,  double  shotted  them  with  canister,  and  fairly  spouted  it  into 
the  Federals,  whose  formation  had  been  broken  in  the  rush  and 
plunge  over  the  works,  and  who  seemed  to  be  somewhat  massed 
and  huddled  and  hesitating,  but  only  a  few  rods  away.  Quicker 
almost  than  I  can  tell  it,  our  infantry  supports,  than  whom  there 
were  not  two  better  regiments  in  the  army,  had  rallied  and  gotten 
to  their  arms,  and  then  they  opened  out  into  a  V  shape  and  fairly 
tore  the  head  of  the  Federal  columns  to  pieces.  In  an  incredibly 
short  time  those  who  were  able  to  do  so  turned  to  fly  and  our 
infantry  were  following  them  over  the  intrenchments ;  but  it  is 
doubtful  whether  this  would  have  been  the  result  had  it  not  been 
for  the  prompt  and  gallant  action  of  the  artillery. 

"There  was  an  old  Capt.  Hunter, — it  seems  difficult  to  determine 
whether  of  the  Texas  or  the  Georgia  Regiment, — who  had  the 
handle  of  his  frying-pan  in  his  hand,  holding  the  pan  over  the  coals, 
with  his  little  slice  of  meat  sizzling  in  it,  when  the  enemy  broke 
over.  He  had  his  back  to  them,  and  the  first  thing  he  knew  his 
men  were  scampering  past  him  like  frightened  sheep.  He  had  not 
been  accustomed  to  that  style  of  movement  among  them,  and  he 
sprang  up  and  tore  after  them,  showering  them  with  hot  grease  and 
hotter  profanity,  but  never  letting  go  his  pan.  On  the  contrary, 
he  slapped  right  and  left  with  his  sooty,  burning  bottom,  dis 
tributing  his  favors  impartially  on  Federal  and  Confederate  alike — 
several  of  his  own  men  bearing  the  black  and  ugly  brand  on  their 
cheeks  for  a  long  time  after,  and  occasionally  having  to  bear  also 
the  captain's  curses  for  having  made  him  lose  his  meat  that  evening. 
He  actually  led  the  counter-charge,  leaping  the  works,  wielding  and 
waving  his  frying-pan,  at  once  a  sword  and  a  banner." 

Now  exactly  how  accurate  this  interesting  account 
is,  the  writer  cannot  pretend  to  say,  but  it  is  valuable 
as  is  the  following  incident  from  the  same  pen: 

"There  were  two  men  in  the  First  Howitzers  older  than  most 
of  us,  of  exceptionally  high  character  and  courage,  who,  because 
of  the  deafness  of  the  one,  and  the  lack  of  certain  physical 
flexibility  and  adaptation  in  the  other,  were  not  well  fitted  for 


19 


784  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

regular  places  in  the  detachment,  or  service  about  the  gun.  For  a 
time,,  one  or  both  of  them  took  the  position  of  driver,  but  this 
scarcely  seemed  fitting,  and  one  or  both  were  finally  classed  as 
'supernumeraries/  but  with  special  duties  under  the  surgeon  of  the 
battalion,  as  bearers  of  our  camping  litters  and  our  other  simple 
medical  and  surgical  outfit.  For  this  and  other  reasons  the  elder 
of  these  two  good  and  gritty  soldiers  was  always  called  'Doctor.' 

"When  the  break  occurred  these  two  men,  always  at  the  front, 
were  overwhelmed  with  amazement,  not  so  much  at  the  irruption  of 
the  enemy,  as  at  what  seemed  to  be  the  demoralized  route  of  the 
Georgians  and  Texans.  They  ran  in  among  them  asking  explana 
tion  of  their  conduct,  then  appealing  to  them  and  exhorting  them, 
the  Doctor  in  most  courteous  and  lofty  phrase:  'Gentlemen,  what 
does  this  mean?  You  certainly  are  not  flying  before  the  enemy! 
Turn,  for  God's  sake;  turn,  and  drive  them  out!'  Then  with 
indignant  outburst:  'Halt,  you  infernal  cowards!'  and  suiting  the 
action  to  the  words,  these  choleric  cannoneers  tore  the  carrying 
poles  out  of  their  litters,  and  sprang  among  and  in  front  of  the 
fugitives,  belaboring  them  right  and  left,  till  they  turned,  and 
then  turned  with  them,  following  up  the  retreating  enemy  with  their 
wooden  spears. 

"Some  weeks  later,  after  we  had  reached  Petersburg  in  the 
nick  of  time  to  keep  Burnside  out  of  the  town,  and  had  taken  up 
what  promised  to  be  a  permanent  position  and  were  just  dozing  off 
into  our  first  nap  in  forty-eight  hours,  an  infantry  command  passing 
by,  in  the  darkness,  stumbled  over  the  trail  handspikes  of  our 
guns,  and  broke  out  in  the  usual  style:  'Oh,  of  course!  Here's 
that  infernal  artillery  again ;  always  in  the  way,  blocking  the  roads 
by  day  and  tripping  us  up  at  night.  What  battery  is  this  anyway?' 
Some  fellow,  not  yet  clean  gone  in  slumber,  grunted  out:  'First 
Company  Richmond  Howitzers.'  What  a  change!  Instantly  there 
was  a  perfect  chorus  of  greetings  from  the  warm-hearted  Texans. 
'Boys,  here  are  the  Howitzers!  Where's  your  old  deaf  man? 
Trot  out  your  old  Doctor.  They're  the  jockeys  for  us.  We  are 
going  to  stay  right  here.  We  won't  get  a  chance  to  run  if  these 
plucky  Howitzer  boys  are  with  us.'  "* 

Clearly  Meade  could  not  break  Anderson's  line.  But 
he  met  with  better  success  in  the  center,  where  he  had 
massed  about  40,000  of  his  men  against  Ewell's  line. 
With  the  eye  of  an  engineer,  he  had  detected  the  weak 
point,  where  a  long  salient  jutted  out  in  advance  of  the 

*The  Richmond  Howitzers  had  a  splendid  reputation  throughout  the  Army. 
The  personnel  was  unusual.  Stiles  and  others  tell  us  that  it  included  many 
professional  and  college  men,  and  that  one  of  the  privates  actually  kept  a 
diary  throughout  the  war  in  Greek.  There  was  a  law  club  in  the  battery,  a 
trained  Glee  Club,  and  orations  were  frequently  delivered  in  Latin  at  the  gather 
ings  of  the  men,  as  well  as  Greek  odes. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  785 

general  line,  and  in  front  of  which  there  was  a  most 
limited  field  of  fire.  He  saw  that  an  overwhelming 
force  massed  near  the  enemy's  line  could  by  sheer  weight 
break  it  at  that  point.  In  the  hasty  extension  of  the 
Confederate  line  on  the  8th,  Ewell,  to  keep  on  high 
ground,  had  occupied  with  his  left  and  center  an  ele 
vation  running  nearly  a  mile  in  advance  of  Anderson's 
line,  then  bending  back  so  abruptly  that  the  gorge  of 
the  immense  salient  was  but  three-fourths  of  a  mile 
wide.  The  forward  angle  of  this  salient  was  occupied 
by  Doles'  Brigade,  of  Rodes'  Division,  and  Smith's 
Howitzer  Battery  of  Hardaway's  Battalion.  It  has 
since  the  events  of  the  10th  been  known  as  the  "Bloody 
Angle." 

From  the  first,  Meade  had  been  reconnoitering  and 
feeling  Swell's  weak  point.  The  Confederates  behind 
the  works  had  thrown  up  traverses  on  both  sides  of  the 
salient  at  close  intervals  to  protect  themselves  against 
the  enfilade  fire  of  the  Federal  skirmishers,  and  other 
than  this  no  effort  had  been  made  to  correct  the  evils  of 
the  position.  On  the  morning  of  the  10th,  Long  had 
relieved  Braxton's  and  Page's  battalions,  substituting 
Nelson's  and  Hardaway's  battalions  for  them.  Nelson 
now  occupied  Johnson's  and  Hardaway  Rodes'  front. 

At  5  p.  M.  Col.  Emory  Upton  silently  led  twelve  regi 
ments  with  fixed  bayonets  and  loaded  muskets  through 
the  thicket  in  Doles'  front,  after  carefully  explaining 
the  part  each  was  to  play.  Upon  reaching  the  works, 
half  the  leading  column  of  attack  was  to  sweep  to  the 
right  and  half  to  the  left  down  the  faces  of  the  salient, 
while  a  second  line  was  to  remain  in  position  at  the  angle 
and  open  fire  to  the  front. 

Upton's  men  succeeded  in  rushing  the  works  at  the 
angle,  and  after  a  desperate  hand-to-hand  encounter, 
swept  the  Confederates  from  behind  their  traverses; 
many  combatants  on  both  sides  were  killed  and 
wounded.  But  as  the  Federals  swept  through  the  gap 
thus  made,  Daniels'  Brigade  on  one  side,  and  Steuart's 
on  the  other  drew  back  from  their  lines  and  fell  upon 


786  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

the  flanks  of  the  enemy,  while  Battle's  and  Johnson's 
brigades  were  hurried  up  from  the  left  and  thrown 
across  the  gorge.  Mott's  Division  was  to  have  sup 
ported  Upton  on  the  left,  but  upon  forming  for  the 
advance,  found  itself  the  target  of  Hardaway's  and 
Nelson's  batteries  on  Swell's  right,  and  were  compelled 
to  abandon  the  task  assigned  it.  In  fact,  Mott's  bri 
gades  were  broken  by  the  Confederate  Artillery,  and 
driven  back  in  confusion  to  the  cover  of  their  works  at 
the  base  of  the  hill  in  Ewell's  front.  Assailed  on  three 
sides  at  once  and  unsupported,  Upton's  men  were  first 
forced  back  into  the  angle,  in  turn  seeking  cover  behind 
the  traverses,  and  then  over  the  works,  retiring  in  dis 
order  to  their  own  lines,  after  a  loss  of  1,000  men,  or  20 
per  cent  of  the  number  engaged  in  the  assault,  while 
Ewell  lost  650  men,  350  of  whom  were  captured. 

In  the  melee  following  upon  the  irruption  of  the 
Federals  into  Ewell's  works,  Smith's  Richmond 
Howitzer  Battery  at  the  angle  was  seized  by  the  enemy, 
but  later  recovered,  the  battery  commander  maintaining 
his  fire  until  he  with  a  number  of  his  cannoneers  was 
actually  snatched  from  among  the  guns  by  the  as 
sailants.  In  the  subsequent  repulse  of  the  Federals, 
Hardaway's  remaining  batteries  were  alone  engaged. 
Thrown  into  position  on  the  right  of  the  salient,  these 
four  batteries  had  relentlessly  poured  canister  into 
Upton's  huddled  troops  and  pursued  them  with  their 
fire  until  they  left  the  works.  Two  of  Cutshaw's  bat 
teries  which  had  been  held  in  reserve  near  the  Court 
house  were  rushed  to  the  gorge,  but  were  too  late  to 
assist  in  the  repulse.  As  the  Federals  withdrew,  some 
of  the  men  of  Garber's  Battery  of  Cutshaw's  Battalion, 
under  their  captain,  entered  the  works  and  turned  two 
of  Smith's  guns,  for  which  no  cannoneers  remained, 
upon  the  fleeing  masses.  Both  Lieut-Col.  Hardaway, 
and  his  field-officer,  Ma j .  David  Watson,  were  wounded, 
the  former  slightly,  the  latter  mortally,  but  in  spite  of 
a  painful  wound,  Hardaway  with  his  clothes  riddled 
with  bullets  remained  at  his  post  and  directed  the  fire  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  787 

his  batteries.  The  loss  of  Maj.  David  Watson  was  a 
serious  one.  In  the  words  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery, 
this  veteran  artilleryman  who  had  served  from  the  very 
first  of  the  war  as  a  lieutenant  at  Yorktown  with  Ma- 
gruder,  then  as  captain  of  the  2d  Company  of  Richmond 
Howitzers  until  his  recent  promotion,  was  "an  accom 
plished  gentleman,  a  faithful,  patriot,  and  gallant 
soldier."* 

Grant  attributed  the  failure  of  Upton's  attempt  of 
the  10th  to  Mott's  inability  to  advance,  and  on  the  llth 
planned  a  much  more  powerful  attack  to  be  made  by 
the  whole  of  the  2d  and  9th  Corps.  The  angle  was 
again  selected  for  the  focus  of  the  assault. 

A  much  exaggerated  report  of  Federal  activity  on 
the  Confederate  left  led  Lee  to  believe  that  Meade 
would  attempt  to  move  in  that  direction  during  the 
night,  so  the  chiefs  of  artillery  were  ordered  to  with 
draw  all  their  guns  from  the  front  line,  in  order  that 
the  Confederates  might  move  under  cover  of  darkness 
without  being  heard.  Mahone's  Division  on  the  ex 
treme  left  was  ordered  to  march  during  the  night  and 
occupy  Shady  Grove  before  daylight.  Gen.  Long  had 
in  the  morning  placed  Cutshaw's  and  Page's  battalions 
in  position  along  Johnson's  front,  the  weakest  part'  of 
Ewell's  line,  relieving  some  of  Hardaway's  batteries. 
Late  in  the  afternoon  the  orders  came  to  him  to  have 
"all  of  his  batteries  which  were  difficult  of  access"  pre 
pared  to  be  removed  before  dark  and  was  informed  that 
the  projected  movement  required  him  to  be  ready  to 
take  up  the  march  at  a  minute's  notice.  He  immediately 
ordered  all  the  artillery  on  Johnson's  front,  except  two 
of  Cutshaw's  batteries,  to  be  withdrawn,  as  it  had  to  pass 
through  a  wood  by  a  narrow  and  difficult  road,  and 
the  night  bid  fair  to  be  very  dark.  Alexander  showed 
more  foresight  on  this  occasion  than  Long,  for  he 
ventured  to  accomplish  the  intent  of  the  order  without 

*For  full  and  accurate  account  of  his  life  and  military  career,  see  The 
University  Memorial,  p.  570.  He  was  the  devoted  friend  and  companion  of  Col. 
Brown,  who  fell  but  four  days  before  him.  The  sad  coincidence  of  their  deaths 
and  the  similar  features  of  their  characters  and  careers  lead  us  to  paraphrase 
what  Tacitus  wrote  of  Agricola,  "Similes  non  mice  tantum  claritate,  sed  etiam 
opportunitate  mortis." 


788  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

literal  compliance  with  it.  Thus  while  Long  withdrew 
twenty-two  guns  of  Page's  and  Cutshaw's  battalions 
from  the  salient,  Alexander  visited  every  one  of  his 
batteries  in  person,  had  their  ammunition  chests  placed 
on  the  limbers  (they  were  usually  dismounted  and 
placed  beside  the  guns  in  the  pits),  and  the  carriages 
so  placed  and  the  roads  leading  from  the  works  so 
marked  and  prepared  that  they  could  easily  withdraw 
without  making  the  slightest  noise.  All  of  Longstreet's 
guns,  therefore,  remained  in  position. 

About  3  A.  M.,  Lee  discovered  that  Meade  was  mass 
ing  for  an  assault  upon  Ewell  instead  of  withdrawing 
from  his  lines,  and  the  orders  to  the  Artillery  were  at 
once  countermanded.  But  already  Swell's  line,  which 
had  been  caused  to  conform  to  the  terrain  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  affording  the  Artillery  good  positions,  was 
practically  stripped  of  its  guns  and  now  remained  a 
dangerously  weak  projection,  with  a  very  poor  field 
for  musketry  fire.  Naturally  defective,  yet  with  ar 
tillery  so  posted  as  to  sweep  its  faces,  many  of  the  ob 
jections  to  the  salient  line  had  been  overcome.  Now 
the  line  was  totally  lacking  in  defensive  qualities,  with 
the  exception  that  a  hasty  line  of  intrenchment  had  been 
partially  completed  across  the  gorge. 

All  night  Meade  was  engaged  in  massing  Barlow's, 
Birney's,  Mott's,  and  Gibbon's  divisions  in  front  of 
Johnson.  The  charge  was  ordered  for  4  A.  M.,  but  owing 
to  a  fog  Hancock,  who  was  to  direct  the  attack,  delayed 
until  4 :35.  The  distance  to  the  Confederate  works  was 
about  1,200  yards.  The  Federal  masses  were  very  com 
pactly  arranged,  too  much  so  for  freedom  of  action  over 
the  ground  to  be  traversed.  Moving  off  quietly  and 
slowly,  it  was  not  until  the  Confederate  pickets  gave 
the  alarm  that  the  Federals  broke  into  a  run  and  com 
menced  to  cheer. 

Johnson's  men  had  heard  the  enemy's  column  form 
ing,  and  repeated  calls  had  been  sent  for  the  Artillery. 
Long  had  already  received  orders  to  return  the  guns  to 
the  works,  and  Cutshaw  and  Page  were  hastening  back 
by  separate  routes. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  789 

The  Federals  came  on,  to  use  Gen.  Johnson's  words, 
"in  great  disorder,  with  a  narrow  front,  but  extending 
back  as  far  as  I  could  see."  But  there  was  hardly  a  gun 
to  fire  upon  the  seething,  confused  mass  of  Federals. 
Truly  a  great  opportunity  had  been  sacrificed,  for  it  is 
dreadful  to  contemplate  what  the  effect  of  Long's 
twenty-two  guns  would  have  been  had  they  opened 
a  concentrated  fire  on  the  Federal  column.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  picture  the  result,  however,  for  that  dense, 
overcrowded  column  would  never  have  reached  the 
Confederate  works.  What  an  opportunity  was  this 
for  the  artillery!  Never  since  Pope  uncovered  Porter's 
flank  at  Second  Manassas  to  Reilly's  guns  had  the 
breast  of  the  Federal  Infantry  been  so  bared.  "No 
where  else  in  the  whole  history  of  the  war  was  such  a 
target  presented  to  so  large  a  force  of  artillery.  Ranks 
had  already  been  lost  in  the  crowd,  and  officers  could 
neither  show  example  nor  exercise  authority.  A  few 
discharges  would  have  made  of  it  a  mob,  which  could 
not  have  been  rallied.  There  was  a  thick  abattis  of 
felled  trees  in  front,  and  'chevaux  de  frise,'  which,  Bar 
low  says,  'would  have  been  difficult  to  get  through  under 
a  cool  fire.'  For  the  mob,  which  his  division  would  have 
soon  formed,  there  would  have  been  no  escape  but 
flight,  with  phenomenal  loss  for  the  time  exposed  to 
fire.'* 

"Had  the  Artillery  been  in  position  the  result  might 
have  been  different,  or  had  the  weather  been  favorable, 
the  disaster  might  have  been  avoided;  but  the  morning 
was  so  dark  and  foggy  that  it  was  with  difficulty  that 
we  could  distinguish  friend  from  foe."  These  are  the 
comments  and  explanations  of  Gen.  Long,  himself,  but 
his  guns  were  not  there  and  he  had  lost  his  great  chance. 
And  here  it  may  be  said  that  nothing  so  well  illustrates 
the  difference  between  Alexander  and  Long  as  the  man 
ner  in  which  they  both  complied  with  their  orders  on 
this  occasion.  We  sometimes  hear  that  great  soldiers 
have  often  been  the  product  of  opportunity.  But  this 
is  not  generally  true.  The  casual  observer  fails  to  de- 

*Military  Memoirs  of  a,  Confederate,  Alexander,  p.  520. 


790  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

tect  the  fact  that  it  is  preparedness  to  profit  by  oppor 
tunity,  and  not  merely  the  favor  of  fortune  that  enables 
soldiers  to  win  great  reputations.  Take  for  instance  the 
case  just  considered.  Alexander  sized  up  the  situation 
at  a  glance,  and  stood  prepared  to  grasp  what  he  foresaw 
as  a  great  opportunity,  should  it  be  presented  to  him. 
Long  failed  utterly  to  realize  what  might  be  in  store  for 
him,  and  neglecting  to  prearrange  therefor,  the  great 
est  opportunity  of  his  military  career  passed  him  by. 
True  he  obeyed  his  orders  and  cannot  be  censured.  The 
point  made  is  not  one  of  blame,  nor  does  opportunity 
weigh  orders. 

The  two  leading  guns  of  Page's  Battalion  only  ar 
rived  in  time  to  unlimber  and  fire  three  rounds  between 
them  into  the  Federal  masses  before  they  were  sur 
rounded  and  seized.  Twelve  of  Page's,  and  eight  of  Cut- 
shaw's  guns  were  then  captured  along  with  two-thirds 
of  Johnson's  Division,  including  the  division  com 
mander  and  Brig.-Gen.  Steuart.  Only  the  two  rearmost 
guns  of  Montgomery's  Louisa  Battery  of  Page's  Bat 
talion  escaped. 

The  Confederate  Infantry  in  the  salient,  deprived  of 
their  artillery,  had  done  all  it  could  to  check  the  onward 
rush  of  the  Federals.  The  whole  thing  happened  so 
quickly  that  neither  Hancock  nor  Ewell  at  first  realized 
the  extent  of  the  disaster  to  the  Confederates.  After 
their  first  success,  the  disordered  Federals  paused  in  the 
advance  to  reform;  as  the  fugitives  from  the  salient 
streamed  to  the  rear,  they  met  reinforcements  from 
the  brigades  of  Johnston  and  Gordon  on  the  right,  and 
from  those  of  Daniel  and  Ramseur  on  the  left,  who 
promptly  checked  the  disorganized  pursuers.  The  situa 
tion  was  indeed  a  critical  one  for  the  Confederates,  and 
Gordon's  (Early's)  Division  had  only  arrived  in  the 
nick  of  time  to  establish  the  new  line.  Again  Gen.  Lee 
had  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  his  troops  to  lead  them 
forward,  and  again  the  men  had  insisted  on  his  retiring 
before  they  charged  the  enemy  and  pressed  them  back 
to  the  head  of  the  salient. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  791 

Upon  learning  that  Hancock's  advance  was  being 
checked,  Grant  ordered  eight  brigades  of  the  6th  Corps 
to  reinforce  him,  and  about  8  A.  M.  these  additional 
troops  increased  the  confusion  and  crowding  in  the 
limited  space  within  the  salient.  Burnside  had  also  been 
ordered  to  assault  the  Confederate  lines  and  about  5 
A.  M.  fell  upon  A.  P.  Hill  on  the  right.  On  Hill's  left 
center,  Burnside  met  with  no  success  whatever,  Nel 
son's,  Poague's,  and  Pegram's  battalions  simply  tearing 
the  dense  attacking  columns  to  pieces  as  they  appeared 
in  the  open,  but  on  the  extreme  right  Potter's  Division 
swept  Lane's  Brigade  from  its  trenches  and  seized  two 
guns  of  Cutts'  Battalion.  But  Lane  reformed  his  men 
some  distance  to  the  rear  and  recovered  both  his  works 
and  the  guns,  driving  Potter  off.  Failing  in  his  attack, 
Burnside  was  then  ordered  to  move  to  his  right  and  con 
nect  with  Hancock's  line,  which  he  did  by  9:15  A.  M. 
Meanwhile  both  sides  had  moved  up  artillery  to  bear 
on  the  salient  space,  across  the  gorge  of  which  the  Con 
federates  had  formed  behind  the  uncompleted  breast 
works.  About  this  time  a  most  gallant  act  occurred. 
Unable  to  draw  off  two  guns  of  the  Staunton  Battery, 
which  they  had  seized,  the  Federals  had  left  them  be 
tween  the  lines.  Cutshaw  and  Garber,  the  latter  the 
battery  commander,  now  saw  these  guns  standing  idle 
in  the  lead-swept  space.  Not  a  moment  did  they  hesi 
tate,  but,  followed  by  those  men  of  the  battery  who  had 
escaped  capture,  rushed  to  the  pieces,  turned  them  upon 
the  enemy  and  maintained  their  fire  until  the  Federal 
line  again  swept  forward.  There  between  the  strug 
gling  lines  they  plied  the  guns  with  many  thousand  eyes 
upon  them,  and  not  a  cannoneer  faltered  at  his  post. 
But  if  this  exploit  was  superb  what  of  that  of  the  gallant 
Capt.  Charles  R.  Montgomery,  who  had  saved  two  of 
his  pieces  when  the  other  guns  of  Page's  Battalion  were 
captured?  Appreciating  the  seriousness  of  the  situation 
he  had  moved  without  a  word  of  direction  one  of  his 
guns  with  great  labor  down  a  small  ravine  on  the  right 
of  the  Harris  house  to  a  point  within  two  hundred  yards 


792  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

of  the  enemy,  and  from  that  position  maintained  his  fire 
against  all  odds  until  three  full  caissons  had  been  ex 
hausted. 

The  conspicuous  gallantry  of  Cutshaw,  Garber,  and 
Montgomery  on  this  occasion  won  the  plaudits  of  two 
armies,  but  alone  they  could  not  resist  the  increasing 
pressure  on  their  front.  Braxton's,  Nelson's,  and  a 
part  of  Hardaway's  Battalion  had  been  promptly 
posted  by  Col.  Carter  under  the  direction  of  Gen.  Long 
on  a  second  line  in  rear  of  them  at  the  gorge,  and  to  the 
left  of  the  Courthouse.  From  this  group,  therefore, 
Capt.  Dance  with  Hardaway's  batteries  now  moved 
forward  to  the  gorge,  but  by  noon  Long  was  compelled 
to  call  for  artillery  reinforcements  from  the  other 
corps.  Accordingly  Col.  Cabell  with  the  1st  Com 
pany  of  Richmond  Howitzers  was  ordered  to  Ewell's 
line  from  the  left  and  went  into  action  at  the  left  base 
of  the  salient  just  to  the  left  of  Dance's  batteries  while 
Mclntosh,  with  two  batteries,  also  arrived,  going  into 
position  at  the  Harris  house,  and  posting  two  guns 
above  the  McCool  house. 

A  tremendous  infantry  combat  had  been  raging 
for  some  time  before  the  artillery  reinforcements  ar 
rived.  Lee  had  brought  up  Perrin's,  Harris'  and  Mc- 
Gowan's  brigades  from  his  left,  and  Grant  had  as 
sembled  twenty-four  brigades  in  and  about  the  angle 
of  the  salient.  He  had  also  posted  field  batteries  to  rake 
its  faces,  while  eight  24-pounder  Coehorn  mortars  from 
the  reserve  were  placed  so  as  to  drop  shells  behind  the 
work  at  the  gorge  and  behind  the  traverses  along  the 
western  face.  Before  10  o'clock,  Gen.  Lee  had  brought 
up  every  man  and  gun  to  the  salient  that  could  be  spared 
for  the  defense  of  his  broken  center.  From  then  on,  it 
was  but  a  question  of  endurance,  for  all  day  long  the 
struggle  continued,  neither  side  being  able  to  make  a 
successful  advance.  During  the  day  diversions  were 
made  on  both  sides  in  favor  of  the  center,  the  most 
serious  fighting  being  that  between  Warren  and  Ander 
son  west  of  the  salient. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  793 

At  dawn,  Warren  had  opened  all  his  guns  and  sent 
forward  skirmishers  to  prevent  Anderson  from  detach 
ing  troops  to  Swell's  support.  Alexander's  guns,  all 
in  position,  replied  slowly  to  those  of  Warren,  their 
presence  seeming  to  deter  him  in  his  attack.  Finally,  at 
9:15  A.  M.^  Grant  ordered  him  to  attack  at  once,  and 
about  10  A.  M.  his  men  appeared  in  the  open.  By  com 
mon  consent,  Anderson's  Infantry  and  the  Artillery 
in  the  trenches  both  held  their  fire  until  the  Federal  lines 
were  within  100  yards,  then  opened,  while  the  guns 
which  Alexander  held  in  his  second  line  engaged  the 
enemy's  batteries  and  diverted  their  fire  from  the  works. 
No  sooner  did  the  blizzard  of  Confederate  fire  burst 
upon  them  than  Warren's  men  turned  and  fled  in  such 
utter  consternation  that  it  would  seem  two  of  his  divi 
sions  lost  their  bearings  in  retiring,  and  engaged  in  a 
fire  fight  with  each  other  for  some  time,  in  which  both 
lost  heavily,  while  the  amazed  Confederates  merely 
listened  as  at  Chancellorsville  during  Sickles'  attack. 
The  havoc  worked  with  Warren's  assaulting  columns, 
not  half  so  dense  as  those  of  Hancock,  gives  some  indi 
cation  of  what  would  have  happened  to  the  latter  had 
Long's  Artillery,  like  Alexander's,  been  in  position. 

Soon  after  Warren's  failure,  his  corps,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  four  brigades,  was  transferred  to  the  angle, 
adding  eight  more  brigades  to  the  twenty-four  already 
massed  there  for  a  fresh  attack,  but  Grant  abandoned 
his  determination  when  it  was  discovered  that  Lee  had 
greatly  strengthened  the  gorge  line  and  brought  many 
batteries  to  bear  on  the  space  in  front,  in  addition  to  hav 
ing  reinforced  his  infantry.  The  Federals  for  the  rest 
of  the  day  simply  contented  themselves  by  keeping  up  a 
heavy  infantry  and  artillery  fire  to  which  the  Confeder 
ate  Infantry  replied,  while  the  Artillery  maintained 
only  a  desultory  fire  in  order  to  save  ammunition. 

When  night  fell,  Grant  had  lost  in  his  great  assault, 
6,820  men;  Lee  9,000,  of  which  4,000  were  prisoners, 
and  twenty  guns.  Hancock's  attack  had  failed  by  rea 
son  of  the  excessive  number  of  men  required  to  maneu- 


794  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

ver  over  so  limited  a  space,  and  nothing  of  importance 
had  been  accomplished  but  the  compelling  of  Lee  to 
correct  a  faulty  line,  and  a  certain  advance  in  the  relent 
less  process  of  attrition,  which  comprised  the  major 
part  of  the  Federal  strategy. 

During  the  night,  the  remnant  of  Swell's  Corps 
abandoned  the  faces  of  the  salient,  the  rear  portions  of 
which  it  held  throughout  the  day,  and  established  itself 
behind  and  improved  the  works  at  the  gorge.  Before 
morning,  Long's  Artillery,  with  the  batteries  sent  to  its 
assistance,  was  well  intrenched  in  strong  positions,  com 
pletely  dominating  the  space  within  the  abandoned  faces 
of  the  salient.  The  13th,  therefore,  proved  a  day  of  rest 
since  Grant  wisely  gave  up  his  efforts  to  break  Lee's 
new  line.  In  fact,  his  troops  themselves  rendered  the 
verdict,  for  while  as  brave  as  any  that  ever  lived,  they 
were  after  all  human,  and  conscious  of  the  futility  of 
further  assaults. 

On  this  day,  Maj.  Cutshaw  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  Hardaway's  Battalion,  Hardaway  having  at 
last  been  compelled  by  his  wounds  to  relinquish  active 
command.  The  remnants  of  Cutshaw's  and  Page's  bat 
talions  were  united  under  Maj.  Page. 

The  losses  in  the  2d  Corps  Artillery  had  been  un 
usually  heavy,  but  in  the  other  corps  little  damage  had 
been  received.  First  Lieut.  Dent  Burroughs,  command 
ing  Moody's  Battery,  Huger's  Battalion,  had  been 
killed  by  a  shot  which  penetrated  the  works.  He  was 
said  by  Alexander  to  have  been  a  superb  young  officer. 
Several  of  the  1st  Corps  guns  in  the  infantry  trenches 
had  been  struck  and  disabled  in  the  repulse  of  Warren's 
assault. 

While  the  Light  Artillery  was  engaged  at  Spotsyl- 
vania,  the  Horse  Artillery  was  winning  laurels  on 
other  fields.  Pelham's  and  Breathed's  old  battery, 
now  under  Capt.  P.  P.  Johnston,  had  again  dis 
tinguished  itself  while  operating  with  Fitz  Lee  on  the 
8th.  On  that  occasion,  the  battery  was  near  the  Court 
house,  and  well  to  the  front  of  a  portion  of  Anderson's 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  795 

Corps.  A  strong  line  of  the  enemy  suddenly  advanced 
against  Johnston's  unsupported  guns,  which  he  held  in 
position,  firing  rapidly,  while  the  led  horses  and  dis 
mounted  men  were  retired.  The  Federals  were  so 
numerous  that  four  guns  were  unequal  to  the  task  of 
holding  them  back,  and  on  they  pressed,  bent  on  seizing 
the  battery.  Maj.  Breathed,  who  was  present,  finally 
ordered  Johnston  to  retire  his  left  section,  leaving  the 
other  with  him  to  cover  the  withdrawal,  but  the  captain 
declined  to  leave  any  of  his  guns  while  in  action,  and 
undertook  to  withdraw  them  piece  by  piece.  When  the 
enemy  had  begun  to  cry  for  their  surrender,  and  while 
he  was  preparing  to  move  off  the  last  piece,  Johnston 
was  shot  through  the  shoulder,  and  before  the  gun  could 
be  limbered  the  drivers  and  horses  of  the  lead  and  swing 
teams  were  struck  down,  and  the  arm  of  the  driver  of  the 
wheel  team  was  shattered.  As  if  unconscious  of  the 
presence  of  the  enemy,  Maj.  Breathed  sprang  from  his 
horse,  cut  loose  the  disabled  teams  that  were  struggling 
on  the  ground,  mounted  a  wheel  horse,  and  brought  off 
the  gun  almost  as  if  by  a  miracle,  while  the  surging 
enemy  mingled  their  cheers  with  those  of  Anderson's 
men,  who  now  crossed  the  crest  in  rear  of  the  battery, 
and  stopped  the  pursuit.  Breathed,  Breathed,  what  a 
name  is  thine!  How  justly  are  thy  praises  sung  by  com 
rades  and  the  erstwhile  foe  alike.  It  was  you  of  whom 
Wade  Hampton  wrote,  "A  braver  and  more  gallant  sol 
dier  never  lived" ;  whom  Fitz  Lee  characterized  as  "one 
of  the  bravest  and  best  soldiers  the  Confederacy  pro 
duced"  ;  of  whom  Wickman  said,  "Capt.  Breathed  is  the 
best  man  for  the  management  of  a  battery  of  horse  ar 
tillery  that  I  have  ever  known" ;  whom  Rosser  declared 
to  be  "one  of  the  most  noted  officers  in  the  Confederacy 
for  fighting  qualities,"  and  whom  Munford  claimed  to 
be  "as  brave  an  officer  and  as  hard  a  fighter  as  appeared 
in  the  war."  Of  him  Fitzhugh  Lee,  years  after  the  war, 
also  wrote,  "Should  I,  for  any  reason,  go  to  the  field 
again,  and  get  in  the  saddle  once  more,  no  one  would  I 
rather  have  by  my  side,  were  he  living,  than  the  gallant 


796  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Breathed."  Stuart's  opinion  of  Breathed  is  amply  testi 
fied  to  by  the  following  letter  from  him  to  Lee  concern 
ing  him:  "I  will  never  consent  for  Capt.  Breathed  to 
quit  the  Horse  Artillery,  with  which  he  has  rendered 
such  distinguished  service,  except  for  certain  promotion, 
which  he  has  well  earned." 

But,  see  what  the  Commander-in-Chief,  himself* 
is  said  to  have  written  of  this  young  officer — "With  an 
army  of  Breathed' s,  I  could  have  conquered  the  world." 

During  the  8th,  Sheridan  concentrated  his  cavalry 
in  rear  of  the  Federal  Army,  and  moved  to  the  vicinity 
of  Fredericksburg.  On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  with 
about  12,000  troops  and  a  large  body  of  horse  artillery, 
he  struck  the  Telegraph  Road,  via  Hamilton's  Crossing, 
and  advanced  upon  Richmond.  At  Mitchell's  Station, 
he  was  resisted  by  Wickham,  who  was  then  reinforced  by 
Stuart  with  Fitz  Lee's  and  Gordon's  brigades,  John 
ston's,  Griffin's,  and  a  section  of  Hart's  batteries.  Again 
the  Confederate  Cavalry  sought  to  check  Sheridan's 
column  at  Beaver  Dam,  but  failed.  After  resting  his 
exhausted  men  for  a  few  hours,  Stuart  moved  rapidly 
to  Yellow  Tavern,  which  he  reached  at  10  A.  M.,  on  the 
10th,  in  advance  of  Sheridan,  and  there  posted  Wick- 
ham  on  his  right  and  Lomax  on  the  left.  The  latter's 
line  followed  the  Telegraph  Road  a  short  distance,  then 
crossed  it  to  a  hill  on  which  Breathed  had  placed  a  single 
piece  of  Hart's  Battery,  a  section  of  which  also  oc 
cupied  the  road,  while  Johnston's  Battery  was  posted 
on  an  elevation  in  rear  of  the  line. 

About  4  P.  M.,  the  enemy  suddenly  attacked,  captur 
ing  most  of  the  men  and  horses  of  Griffin's  Battery  on 
the  left,  but  no  guns,  and  driving  back  Lomax's  line. 
Stuart  assembled  a  handful  of  men  on  the  road  where 
Hart  with  two  guns  remained  undaunted,  firing  into 
the  flank  of  the  enemy  as  they  swept  by.  The  Federals 
were  soon  checked  by  a  charge  of  the  1st  Virginia 
Cavalry  and  driven  past  the  guns,  which  continued  to 
fire  upon  the  surging  masses.  As  the  enemy's  line  re 
tired,  a  dismounted  trooper  turned  as  he  passed  and  dis- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  797 

charged  his  pistol  at  Stuart.  Thus  was  the  fatal  wound 
inflicted  upon  the  great  cavalry  leader  while  he  stood 
mounted  among  his  guns,  seeking  by  his  example  to 
rally  his  cavalry.  He  died  two  days  later  in  Richmond. 

The  Confederate  Cavalry  was  now  badly  broken 
up,  and  Hart  almost  alone  remained  between  the  fallen 
chieftain  and  the  enemy.  On  this  occasion,  Hart's  con 
duct  was  as  heroic  as  Poague's  had  been  at  the  Wilder 
ness.  The  result  of  the  battle  is  known.  The  Confed 
erate  Cavalry  certainly  met  with  defeat,  but  Sheridan 
had  been  delayed  and  failed  to  enter  Richmond.  We 
search  in  vain,  however,  for  reference  to  the  leading 
part  which  the  Horse  Artillery  took  in  this  delaying 
action,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  bore  the  brunt 
of  the  Federal  attack,  saved  the  Cavalry  from  a  com 
plete  rout,  and  remained  alone  in  action  long  enough 
for  the  bulk  of  the  Cavalry  to  rally  and  retire  in  order. 
One  cavalry  regiment,  the  1st  Virginia,  kept  its  organi 
zation  and  supported  the  batteries  after  the  enemy  was 
checked. 

Meanwhile,  Shoemaker's  Battery  remained  with 
W.  H.  F.  Lee,  near  the  Army,  while  Thomson's  and 
McGregor's  under  Chew  were  operating  with  Hampton 
and  Rosser  on  the  left. 

No  account  of  the  Artillery  at  Spotsylvania  would  be 
complete  without  a  brief  mention,  at  least,  of  Maj. 
Joseph  McGraw  of  Pegram's  Battalion. 

This  remarkable  soldier  had  been  discovered  by  Pe- 
gram,  who  rapidly  caused  his  advancement  from  a  team 
ster,  through  the  lower  grades.  He  was  a  man  of 
enormous  stature  and  unusual  ability,  possessing  those 
rare  qualities  which  distinguish  the  born  commander. 
His  courage  was  proverbial;  the  character  of  the  man 
is  well  illustrated  by  the  following  anecdotes  related  to 
the  writer  by  Capt.  W.  Gordon  McCabe,  Adjutant  of 
Pegram's  Battalion. 

While  sitting  on  his  horse  at  Spotsylvania  a  solid  shot 
tore  Maj.  McGraw's  left  arm  from  his  body,  leaving 
only  a  stump  in  the  shoulder  socket.  For  an  instant 


798  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

his  officers  and  men  hesitated  in  their  work  to  proffer 
aid  to  their  much  beloved  field-officer.  "Don't  mind 
me,  men,"  he  cried,  "I'm  all  right — give  it  to  'em,"  and 
with  such  words  on  his  lips  he  fell  forward  from  the 
saddle  without  a  cry  of  pain. 

Upon  regaining  consciousness,  McGraw  refused 
to  receive  the  usual  anaesthetic,  and  exercising  the 
prerogative  of  his  authority  as  senior  officer  to  the 
surgeon  in  attendance,  commanded  the  latter  to  remove 
the  shattered  remains  of  his  arm,  which  was  done  with 
out  eliciting  a  groan  from  the  patient  or  a  blink  from  his 
marvelous  blue  eyes. 

One  of  his  officers  undertook  to  commiserate  with 
the  Major  over  his  wound.  "Pretty  bad,"  replied  Mc 
Graw,  "I  reckon  I'll  be  off  duty  thirty  days." 

Sometime  after  McGraw's  wounding,  Col.  Pegram 
and  his  adjutant,  who  like  Damon  and  Pythias  were  in 
separable,  were  sitting  in  their  tents  in  the  lines  at 
Petersburg.  Orders  had  been  given  that  no  one  should 
approach  the  lines  mounted,  as  the  danger  from  Fed 
eral  sharpshooters  was  very  great.  The  hoof  falls  of  a 
horse  were  heard  approaching,  and  running  to  the  tent 
door  to  see  who  the  reckless  equestrian  might  be  Col. 
Pegram  was  confronted  by  McGraw,  who  calmly  and 
in  the  most  soldierly  manner  saluted  with  his  right  hand 
and  reported,  "Sir,  Maj.  Joseph  McGraw  returns  to 
duty." 

Just  before  the  withdrawal  of  the  Army  from  the 
Petersburg  lines  McGraw  was  promoted  lieutenant- 
colonel  and  placed  in  charge  of  24  guns  with  their 
horses.  A  few  days  later  on  the  retreat  he  jocularly  de 
clared  that  he  held  an  unparalleled  military  record  in 
that  he  had  lost  23  guns  in  24  days !  McGraw  knew  that 
the  man  did  not  live  who  could  justly  criticize  the  recti 
tude  of  his  conduct  in  battle. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX 

THE  NORTH  ANNA 

IN  the  interval  between  the  12th  and  18th  of  May, 
Lee  gradually  moved  his  army  eastward  to  meet  cor 
responding  movements  of  the  enemy.  The  first  Corps 
was  shifted  on  the  night  of  the  15th,  from  the  extreme 
left  to  the  extreme  right  beyond  the  Fredericksburg 
Road  and  extending  to  the  Po.  Huger's  and  Haskell's 
battalions  were  placed  in  position  along  the  new  line, 
while  Cabell's  was  held  in  reserve.  On  the  morning  of 
the  18th,  Meade  again  attempted  to  break  Lee's  line 
at  the  salient  where  Ewell  remained  in  position  with 
thirty  pieces  of  artillery  well  posted.  Long  withheld 
his  fire  until  the  dense  attacking  column  came  within 
short  range,  when  Col.  Carter  in  command  of  Page's  re 
organized  battalion  gave  the  word  to  fire.  The  murder 
ous  fire  of  canister  and  spherical  case  at  once  arrested 
the  advance,  threw  the  enemy  into  confusion,  and  hurled 
them  back  in  disorder,  and  this  before  they  entered  the 
zone  of  effective  musketry  fire.  Indeed  before  emerging 
from  the  woods,  the  attacking  infantry  was  much 
shaken;  some  of  the  enemy's  brigades  were  almost  at 
once  eliminated  by  the  furious  fire  of  the  hostile  artillery. 
Only  a  few  of  the  assailants  reached  the  abattis,  none 
penetrated  it,  and  the  attack  over  the  identical  ground, 
which  had  formed  the  battlefield  of  the  12th,  was  not  re 
newed.  Few  of  the  Confederate  infantrymen  discharged 
their  muskets,  and  practically  no  loss  was  sustained 
either  by  the  Confederate  Artillery  or  Infantry.  The 
Federal  medical  returns  state  that  "five  hundred  and 
fifty-two  wounded  was  the  result,  and  the  character  of 
the  wounds  were  unusually  severe,  a  large  portion  being 
caused  by  shell  and  canister."  Thus  did  the  twenty- 
nine  guns  actually  engaged  by  Carter  overthrow  12,000 
picked  infantry.  One  pauses  to  contemplate  what  might 
have  been  the  result  on  the  12th  had  Long  been  prepared 


20 


800  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

to  meet  Hancock's  attack.  When  we  consider  the  effect 
of  Alexander's  Artillery  on  that  same  day,  and  of 
Carter's  guns  on  the  18th,  the  contention  that  Hancock's 
crowded  masses  would  never  have  reached  the  Bloody 
Angle  on  the  12th,  had  the  artillery  been  in  position, 
seems  well  supported. 

During  the  afternoon,  and  after  the  failure  of  the 
Federal  assault,  Ewell  determined  to  make  a  flank 
movement  around  Meade's  right.  Braxton,  with  six 
guns  of  select  caliber,  was  ordered  to  accompany  the 
column,  but  the  roads  proving  impassable,  due  to  the 
heavy  rains  of  the  past  week,  he  was  soon  compelled  to 
return  to  the  lines.  Simultaneously  with  his  attack  on 
Ewell,  Meade  had  assailed  Hill's  line  in  front  of  the 
Courthouse.  Placing  a  number  of  batteries  in  a  posi 
tion  from  which  they  could  partially  enfilade  the  works 
of  the  3d  Corps,  Meade  attempted  to  advance  a  large 
number  of  guns  under  cover  of  their  fire,  and  with  them 
prepare  the  way  for  a  large  infantry  assault  in  force. 
Pegram's  and  Cutts'  batteries  bore  the  brunt  of  the 
furious  cannonade,  which  ensued  during  the  next  hour, 
and  succeeded  in  silencing  the  more  advanced  batteries 
of  the  enemy,  which  caused  the  attack  to  be  abandoned. 
In  the  artillery  duel  Maj.  Joseph  McGraw,  of  Pe 
gram's  Battalion,  was  severely  wounded,  as  were  sev 
eral  other  officers.  Richardson's  Battalion  further  to 
the  right  and  Alexander's  Artillery  beyond  were  not 
engaged. 

Unsupported  by  artillery,  Ewell  had  lost  900  men, 
but  he  learned  on  the  19th  that  the  enemy  had  not  only 
moved  from  Anderson's  front,  leaving  his  dead  and 
wounded  on  the  ground,  but  was  also  preparing  to  move 
from  his  own  front.  Early  on  the  21st  he  discovered 
that  he  was  unopposed,  so  the  2d  Corps,  with  all  its  ar 
tillery,  was  moved  to  the  right,  passing  by  the  other 
corps  to  the  Telegraph  Road  south  of  the  Po,  and  then 
by  that  road  toward  Hanover  Junction.  Later  in  the 
day,  the  1st  Corps,  with  its  artillery  and  some  of 
Walker's  battalions,  followed  Ewell.  That  night  the 


LIEUTENANT-COLONEL    WILFUKI*    E.    <TTSIIA\Y 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  801 

3d  Corps  with  its  remaining  artillery  brought  up  the 
rear  after  a  collision  with  Warren's  troops,  in  which 
sharp  skirmishing  occurred.  A.  P.  Hill  then  moved 
upon  Hanover  Junction  by  a  road  slightly  west  of  and 
almost  parallel  to  the  Telegraph  Road.  About  noon  on 
the  22d,  after  a  march  of  thirty  miles,  the  head  of  Lee's 
column  reached  the  North  Anna,  and  before  night  the 
whole  army  was  in  position  on  the  south  bank,  having 
moved  over  the  chord  of  the  arc  which  Grant  had  been 
compelled  to  follow. 

In  the  new  position  near  Hanover  Junction,  the  1st 
Corps  occupied  the  center  at  the  Telegraph  Road 
bridge,  the  2d  extending  down  and  the  3d  up  the  river 
on  the  right  and  left,  respectively.  The  small  works  at 
the  crossing,  which  had  been  prepared  in  advance,  were 
now  greatly  strengthened  and  every  available  gun  was 
placed  in  position,  the  Artillery  with  an  extensive  and 
unrestricted  field  of  fire  completely  commanding  every 
approach. 

Breckinridge's  Division  from  the  Valley  joined  the 
Army  here  with  two  battalions  of  artillery  under  Maj. 
William  McLaughlin ;  these  troops  were  held  in  reserve 
at  Hanover  Junction. 

The  reinforcement  which  Breckinridge  brought  to 
Lee  did  not  number  over  3,500  men,  but  they  were  sea 
soned  troops  and  the  additional  artillery  more  than  made 
up  for  the  loss  in  guns  at  Spotsylvania.  Breckinridge 
had  fought  one  of  the  most  brilliant  small  engagements 
of  the  war  on  the  15th  at  New  Market  in  the  Valley, 
where  with  about  4,500  men  of  all  arms,  he  had  defeated 
Sigel  with  not  less  than  6,000  men  and  28  guns,  thus 
preventing  him  from  seizing  the  upper  Valley  and  mov 
ing  around  Lee's  flank.  It  was  in  this  interesting  bat 
tle,  of  far  more  importance  than  the  numbers  engaged 
would  seem  to  indicate,  that  the  Corps  of  Cadets  of  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute  with  four  companies  under 
its  commandant  and  a  section  of  artillery  under  Cadet 
Capt.  C.  H.  Minge,  aggregating  about  250,  saved  the 


802  THE  LONG  ABM  OF  LEE 

Confederates  from  defeat  by  a  brilliant  charge  at  the 
crisis  of  the  combat,  losing  9  killed  and  48  wounded,  or 
over  twenty  per  cent  of  the  Corps.*  But  the  charge  of 
the  cadets  was  not  the  only  brilliant  incident  of  the  bat 
tle,  for  Maj.  William  McLaughlin,  formerly  captain  of 
the  1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  in  command  of  Breckin- 
ridge's  Artillery,  there  won  fresh  laurels  for  his  arm  of 
the  service.  His  command  consisted  of  Chapman's, 
Jackson's,  and  McClannahan's  batteries,  with  six,  four, 
and  six  guns,  respectively,  and  a  total  personnel  of  about 
250  men,  to  which  was  added  in  the  battle,  the  cadet 
section  of  two  rifles  and  thirty  men.  This  battalion  of 
artillery  was  one  of  those  which  Breckinridge  now 
brought  to  the  Army.  The  most  careful  research  fails  to 
disclose  with  certainty  the  composition  of  the  other  bat 
talion  at  this  time  under  McLaughlin's  command.  It 
will  be  recalled,  however,  that  Pendleton  had  urged 
Alexander  to  endeavor  to  secure  two  batteries  of  Col.  J. 
Floyd  King's  Battalion  for  the  1st  Corps,  but  before 
January  this  battalion  was  transferred  from  the  south, 
where  it  had  been  operating,  to  Gen.  Samuel  Jones' 
command  in  the  Department  of  Western  Virginia  with 
the  following  organization: 

Capt.  George  L.  Davidson 

Davidson's  Lynchburg  Battery,  Lieut.  John  T.  Johnson. 

Lowry's  Wise  Legion  Battery,  Lieut.  J.  H.  Pence. 

Richmond  Otey  Battery,  Capt.  David  N.  Walker. 

Danville  Ringgold  Battery,  Capt.   Crispen  Dickenson. 

But  on  May  1,  the  return  of  Breckinridge 's  Division 
shows  the  following  batteries : 

Monroe  Virginia  Battery,  Capt.  George  B.  Chapman. 

Lewisburg  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  A.  Bryan. 

Roanoke  Battery,  Capt.  Warren  S.  Lurty. 

Botetourt  Battery.  Capt.  Henry  C.  Douthat. 

Rhett   (Tenn.)   Battery,  Capt.  William  H.  Burroughs. 

Tennessee  Battery,  Capt.  Hugh  L.  W.  McClung. 

Charlottes ville  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  E.  Jackson. 

*For  full  account  of  this  heroic  incident,  see   The  Military  History  of  the 
V.  M.  I.,  J.  C.  Wise,  and  The  Battle  of  New  Market,  John  S.  Wise. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  803 

The  effective  personnel  of  these  seven  batteries  num 
bered  30  officers  and  597  men.  Before  Breckinridge 
joined  Lee,  he  himself  was  joined  by  Imboden  with  Mc- 
Clannahan's  Battery,  which  as  we  have  seen  with  Chap 
man's  and  Jackson's  batteries  comprised  McLaughlin's 
Battalion.  On  May  5th,  Breckinridge  was  ordered  to 
send  Col.  King  with  two  of  his  four  batteries  to  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  for  assignment  to  the  1st 
Corps,  and  the  other  two  were  to  remain  with  Breckin 
ridge.  According  to  statements  in  the  history  of  the 
Washington  Artillery,  by  Maj.  Wm.  M.  Owen,  pp. 
328,  347,  the  13th  Virginia  Battalion  which  he  had  com 
manded  in  East  Tennessee  was  in  the  trenches  with 
Breckinridge  at  Cold  Harbor  on  June  6,  and  was  com 
manded  by  Lieut.-Col.  King,  himself,  and  when 
he  was  reassigned  to  its  command  July  31  it  consisted 
of  Davidson's,  Dickenson's  and  Walker's  batteries. 

Exclusive  of  these  two  battalions,  Lee's  Artillery  per 
sonnel  now  numbered : 

1st  Corps,  465;  2d  Corps,  1,977;  and  3d  Corps,  2,632; 
total  4,074,  with  an  aggregate  present  and  absent  of 
6,563.*  The  twenty  pieces  lost  at  Spotsylvania  and  the 
casualties  in  personnel,  were  more  than  compensated  for 
by  the  reinforcement  with  Breckinridge,  so  that  at  the 
North  Anna,  Lee  had  in  the  strongest  position  he  had 
yet  occupied  in  this  campaign,  and  by  far  the  most 
favorable  one  for  artillery,  not  less  than  225  guns 
manned  by  the  most  numerous  artillery  personnel  ever 
brought  by  him  into  action. 

At  this  time,  the  Federal  Army,  with  the  reinforce 
ments  it  had  received,  numbered  about  100,000  men  with 
an  undiminished  force  of  artillery,  while  the  entire  Con 
federate  force,  including  an  additional  reinforcement 
which  soon  arrived  under  Pickett,  did  not  exceed  40,000 
men,  or  about  35,000  infantry  and  5,000  artillery.  Ac 
cording  to  Col.  Taylor's  estimate,  the  reinforcement  re 
ceived  by  the  Confederates  from  the  Wilderness  to  Cold 

*See  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXXIII,  p.  1136. 
Horse  Artillery,  473  present  for  duty.     Aggregate  present  and  absent,  674. 


804  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Harbor,  was  about  14,400  men,  while  during  the  same 
time  Grant  brought  up  50,000  fresh  troops.  Thus  it  is 
seen  that  the  proportion  of  artillery  to  infantry  con 
tinued  to  increase  as  the  infantry  failed  in  numbers,  be 
ing  now  nearly  seven  guns  per  thousand  infantry,  with 
the  artillery  personnel  comprising  about  one-seventh  of 
the  field  army.  Truly  were  the  precedents  of  Frederick 
and  Napoleon  being  followed. 

The  Confederates  had  hardly  commenced  intrenching 
on  the  23d,  when  the  enemy  appeared  on  the  north  bank 
in  the  forenoon,  and  opened  fire  with  artillery  upon  the 
bridge-head  works  at  the  north  ends  of  the  railroad  and 
Telegraph  Road  bridges,  which  had  been  constructed  the 
year  before.  Eight  guns  of  Huger's  and  a  like  number 
of  Haskell's  Battalion  were  quickly  placed  in  position 
near  the  river  by  Alexander  for  the  defense  of  these 
works,  while  the  Chief  of  Artillery  reconnoitered  the  de 
fensive  line  above  and  below  them.  The  fords  on  the 
right  were  soon  protected  by  the  Artillery  of  the  2d 
Corps,  Braxton's  Battalion  being  posted  well  in  advance 
near  the  Doswell  house.  About  4:30  p.  M.  Warren's 
Corps  crossed  the  river  without  opposition  at  Jericho 
Ford,  four  miles  above  the  Chesterfield  bridge  on  the 
Telegraph  Road,  while  Hancock  advanced  along  the 
Telegraph  Road,  and  Burnside  on  his  right  moved  to 
wards  Ox  Ford  Crossing.  Burnside  was  unable  to  cross 
and  Hancock  was  held  back  in  reserve.  From  the  3d 
Corps,  Heth's  Division  with  Poague's  Battalion,  and 
Wilcox's  Division  with  Pegram's  Battalion,  were  now 
sent  to  oppose  Warren,  while  Macintosh's  Battalion  was 
placed  in  position  to  cover  Anderson's  Ford  on  Hill's 
right,  and  below  him  near  the  center  of  the  position  Maj. 
Lane  with  six  rifles  of  Cutts'  Battalion  was  posted  on  a 
bluff  back  of  the  Montgomery  house,  which  commanded 
both  the  Chesterfield  bridge  and  Anderson's  Ford  above. 

Warren  had  formed  line  of  battle  in  a  very  favorable 
position  with  his  front  concealed  within  the  edge  of  a 
wood.  His  left  rested  on  the  river,  which  made  a  large 
concave  bend  in  his  rear,  and  again  drew  near  his  right. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  805 

The  open  ground  in  front  of  his  right  flank  was  com 
manded  by  his  artillery.  But,  while  his  position  was  a 
strong  one,  his  situation  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  Meade's 
Army  was  precarious,  for  a  river  lay  between  him  and 
his  supports.  As  Hill's  two  divisions  formed  for  attack, 
Poague  and  Pegram  advanced  under  cover  of  rising 
ground  behind  the  right  of  the  line,  until  within  good 
supporting  distance  of  the  infantry,  and  as  the  Con 
federates  moved  out  to  attack,  their  batteries,  hitherto 
unseen,  galloped  to  the  crest  in  their  front  and  opened 
with  destructive  effect  upon  the  enemy's  reserves  at  the 
ford.  Cutler's  Division  on  the  Federal  right  was  broken 
and  pursued  by  Hill's  troops,  but  the  Federal  artillery 
on  that  .flank  first  checked  the  Confederates  and  then 
engaged  in  a  duel  with  Pegram  and  Poague,  who  had 
meanwhile  thrown  the  Federal  reserves  massed  near  the 
left  into  great  disorder.  In  the  Federal  center,  Griffin's 
Division  in  the  woods  maintained  itself  with  great  reso 
lution,  and  Hill  was  compelled  to  forego  the  attack. 
In  the  artillery  duel  which  ensued,  Maj.  Ward,  a  most 
valuable  officer  of  Poague's  Battalion,  was  killed  by  a 
cannon  shot.  Meanwhile,  Mclntosh  had  also  become  en 
gaged  with  the  enemy's  artillery,  losing  Lieutenant 
Pearce,  in  command  of  Clutter's  Battery,  and  a  limber 
by  explosion.  In  the  center,  Haskell  and  Huger  had 
held  the  bridges  in  their  front,  but  the  small  infantry  line 
in  the  works  on  the  north  bank  had  either  been  captured 
or  forced  to  retire,  leaving  the  works  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  who  had  aproached  under  cover  of  the  ravines 
leading  to  the  river  and  which  the  Confederate  batteries 
were  unable  to  search  effectively.  At  nightfall,  the  south 
end  of  the  railroad  bridge  was  burned,  and  soon  the 
Confederate  center  and  right  was  moved  back  to  a  line 
further  from  the  river  and  on  more  advantageous 
ground.  This  line,  according  to  Gen.  Alexander,  was 
too  good,  for  its  apparent  strength  defeated  Lee's  ob 
ject,  which  was  to  induce  the  enemy,  by  withdrawing,  to 
attack  him.  Its  center  rested  on  the  river  half  a  mile 
above  the  Ox  Ford  bridge,  and  thence,  leaving  the 


806  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

North  Anna,  it  ran  across  the  narrow  peninsula  formed 
by  the  bend  in  the  river,  one  and  a  half  miles  to  Little 
River,  where  its  left  rested.  From  the  center  on  the 
river  the  line  ran  southeast  across  another  bend  of  the 
river  and  rested  three  miles  below  near  Morris'  Bridge. 
Along  the  center  and  right,  the  batteries  of  the  1st  and 
2d  Corps  were  posted  with  their  infantry  while  the  3d 
Corps  held  the  left. 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th,  the  enemy's  5th  and  6th 
Corps  formed  in  front  of  Lee's  left  wing,  while  the  2d 
and  part  of  the  9th  crossed  to  the  south  bank  and  ap 
peared  in  front  of  his  right.  Occasional  skirmishing  and 
artillery  firing  broke  out  during  the  morning,  but  while 
Meade's  troops  were  massing  nothing  serious  occurred. 
Demonstrations  on  the  Confederate  left  caused 
Poague's  Battalion  to  be  sent  to  the  extreme  flank  at 
Little  River,  Pegram's,  Mclntosh's,  and  Lane's  bat 
talions  retaining  their  positions  of  the  previous  day, 
while  Richardson's  with  Mahone's  Division  occupied  a 
second  line  near  the  Anderson  house.  Gordon's  Divi 
sion,  with  Braxton's  Battalion,  soon  joined  Mahone,  and 
Breckinridge's  Division  with  its  two  artillery  battalions 
was  moved  up  to  take  Gordon's  place  on  the  right. 

One  need  only  look  at  the  map  to  appreciate  the  pe 
culiar  situation  of  Meade's  Army.  To  say  the  least,  it 
was  a  dangerous  one,  affording  a  tactical  opportunity 
to  the  Confederates,  which  eluded  them  by  reason  of  the 
illness  of  Gen.  Lee.  The  point  cannot  here  be  discussed 
further.  The  possibilities  of  the  situation  belong  to  the 
realm  of  speculation,  for  the  only  activity  was  on  the 
part  of  the  Federals.  Burnside  was  first  ordered  to  at 
tack  and  carry  Ox  Ford,  which,  if  done,  would  at 
once  unite  the  Federal  wings  and  correct  the  evils  of 
Meade's  position.  If  successful,  the  attack  would  also 
divide  Lee's  wings.  But  Burnside  pronounced  the  task 
assigned  to  him  impossible,  and  did  not  even  attempt  it. 
Hancock,  on  his  left  and  Warren,  on  his  right,  each  ad 
vanced  skirmishers  and  felt  Lee's  lines,  but  both  re 
ported  against  a  serious  attack,  for  they  had  acquired 


THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE  807 

from  their  recent  experiences  the  utmost  respect  for  the 
defensive  abilities  of  the  Confederates.  Furthermore, 
they  now  saw  the  Confederate  Artillery  well  intrenched 
and  bearing  upon  every  portion  of  the  field  over  which 
they  would  have  to  advance,  and  well  knew  the  power  of 
its  guns  in  such  a  position.  The  lesson  of  Fredericks- 
burg  had  not  been  forgotten  to  say  nothing  of  recent 
events  at  Spotsylvania,  where  artillery  alone  had 
hurled  their  splendid  columns  back  on  several  occasions, 
almost  without  the  aid  of  infantry.  They  saw  here 
these  same  guns  in  the  most  favorable  position  they  had 
yet  occupied,  with  a  clear  field  of  fire  unbroken  by  cov 
ered  approaches  of  any  kind,  and  they  knew  that  to  pass 
through  the  zone  of  artillery  fire  was  but  the  first  stage 
of  the  attack,  for  those  guns  could  not  be  silenced  and 
would  remain  in  the  front  line  to  add  their  canister 
to  the  musketry  effect  of  an  infantry,  never  yet  driven 
from  its  works.  Thus  Lee,  who,  in  spite  of  his 
physical  condition,  was  seeking  to  impress  his  army  with 
the  necessity  of  striking  the  enemy  a  crushing  blow  when 
the  opportunity  arrived,  was  deprived  of  his  chance  by 
the  forbidding  aspect  of  his  position.  Nor  was  Lee 
capable  at  the  psychological  moment  of  supplying  his 
army  with  the  necessary  energy  to  enable  it  to  assume 
the  offensive.  His  subordinates  assigned  the  same  ob 
jections  to  an  attack  on  the  Federals  that  the  latter  had 
advanced  against  the  plan  to  assault  Lee's  position. 
The  country  occupied  by  the  Federals  on  both  flanks, 
and  especially  on  their  left,  was  flat  and  open,  allowing 
the  most  effective  use  of  their  artillery  and  infantry  be 
hind  well  prepared  intrenchments,  and  the  Confederates 
knew  full  well  that  Hunt  was  in  command  of  Meade's 
Artillery.  Others  might  blunder,  but  they  were  satis 
fied  that  Hunt  would  make  the  most  of  any  natural  or 
artificial  aid  afforded  by  the  terrain,  and  that  as  at 
Malvern  Hill,  Sharpsburg,  and  Gettysburg,  the  Fed 
eral  Artillery  would  prove  a  bulk-head,  which  could  not 
be  battered  in,  even  after  the  infantry  had  been  driven 
to  cover.  If  the  Federals  had  learned  to  respect  Lee's 


808  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Artillery,  none  the  less  had  the  Confederates  learned  to 
respect  Hunt.  They  never  entertained  the  least  mis 
giving  as  to  their  ability  to  drive  the  enemy's  infantry, 
nor  were  they  especially  mindful  of  the  Federal  guns 
in  other  hands,  but  there  was  not  a  man  in  Lee's  Army 
who  had  not  been  impressed  by  the  splendid  abilities  of 
Hunt  as  an  artillerist,  and  they  never  counted  on  his 
making  a  mistake.  A  close  study  of  the  struggle  be 
tween  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  will  satisfy  the  student  that  no  officer  in 
the  Federal  Army,  from  first  to  last,  commanded  the 
same  respect  from  his  enemy  that  Henry  J.  Hunt  did. 

Had  Lee  been  entirely  invalided  and  absent  from  his 
army,  as  it  lay  in  position  on  the  North  Anna,  with  the 
Federals  in  a  dilemma  before  it,  it  is  possible  something 
might  have  been  attempted  by  the  Confederates.  Some 
strong  will  might  have  improved  the  opportunity  which 
Meade's  position  afforded.  But,  with  Lee  present, 
neither  the  collective  nor  any  individual  will  was  capable 
of  asserting  itself.  It  was  impossible  for  the  Army 
to  realize  that  he  was  really  incapacitated,  and  the  most 
natural  inertia  of  his  subordinates  under  the  circum 
stances  was  heightened  by  a  confidence  in  his  genius, 
almost  sublime.  Such  is  the  effect  of  a  master  mind 
upon  mediocrity.  It  may  be  frequently  noted  in  the 
history  of  war.  Who  would  have  dared  take  the  lead 
in  Italy  with  Hannibal  present?  And  in  the  whole  list 
of  Napoleon's  marshals,  however  brilliant  as  fighting 
lieutenants  they  may  have  been,  we  fail  to  detect  a 
single  captain.  The  one  man  beside  Lee  in  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  who  may  be  classed  as  a  captain, 
had  fallen  at  Chancellorsville.  Had  he  been  present, 
even  Lee  no  doubt  would  have  temporarily  surrendered 
the  reins  of  control  with  a  confidence  born  of  experience, 
impossible  in  the  case  of  Ewell,  A.  P.  Hill,  or  Ander 
son,  his  corps  commanders.  This  is  an  assertion  which 
must  not  be  taken  as  a  reflection  upon  any  of  the 
three  gallant  lieutenants  then  leading  the  Confederate 
Corps,  for  we  are  not  discussing  their  potentialities  as 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  809 

captains,  but  conditions  as  they  actually  were.  We 
are  projecting  our  view  deep  into  the  human  side  of 
the  situation,  which  is  the  only  way  a  true  understand 
ing  of  many  military  problems  may  be  had,  and  the 
more  the  historian  cultivates  this  habit,  the  more  cor 
rectly  will  history  be  written.  When  Napoleon  declared 
that  history  was  essentially  false,  he  did  so  in  the  full 
knowledge  that  the  historian  commonly  reasoned  from 
effect  to  cause,  and  not  from  cause  to  effect.  Conscious 
of  the  motives  which  guided  his  own  career  and  the  cir 
cumstances  which  dictated  his  military  maneuvers,  his 
faith  in  the  history  of  his  time  based,  as  it  was,  upon  the 
imperfect  perceptions  of  his  critics,  was  entirely  de 
stroyed,  and  he  realized  that  what  was  true  in  his  own 
case  was  true  in  the  case  of  others.  With  what  scorn 
must  he  have  viewed  historians  who  insisted  upon 
logic  for  the  satisfaction  of  their  formulae!  "Here  is  a 
result,"  said  the  military  critic;  "give  us  that  orderly 
process  of  reasoning  and  events  which  led  to  it,  and  in 
such  a  way  that  the  science  of  war  as  propounded  in 
our  manuals  will  be  exemplified."  And,  so  to  meet 
their  demands  and  to  discourage  his  opponents,  who  in 
variably  sought  to  observe  every  rule  of  war,  failing 
of  course  in  the  attempt,  he  caused  Berthier  to  manu 
facture  what  they  required.  Thus  was  the  world  mis 
led,  and  yet  it  still  continues  in  the  attempt  to  formu 
late  the  operations  of  one  who  was  neither  guided  by, 
nor  observed,  any  rule.  All  this  is  true  of  every  great 
soldier,  and  never  until  this  fact  is  grasped  will  the 
world  appreciate  the  loss  it  suffered  when  Lee  died 
without  writing  the  history  of  his  military  career.  In 
that  work,  had  it  been  written,  the  mist  which  en 
shrouds  the  science  of  war,  especially  the  leading  of  an 
army,  would  have  been  dissipated,  for  free  as  he  was 
of  all  vanity,  deceit,  and  personal  interest,  he  would 
have  set  forth  no  false  formulae  as  the  guiding  princi 
ples  of  Chancellorsville,  and  the  Wilderness,  and  he 
would  have  acknowledged  many  blunders  which  proved 
both  successful  and  unsuccessful,  and  for  the  commis- 


810  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

sion  of  which  science  has  been  called  upon  to  supply 
the  reasons.  An  account  of  his  military  operations 
would  have  set  forth  the  human  side  of  war  as  never  be 
fore  or  since  disclosed,  and  the  full  truth  of  Moltke's 
definition  of  war  as  "the  practical  adaptation  of  the 
means  at  hand  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  end  in 
view"  would  have  dawned  upon  every  reader.  The 
usual  manual  of  military  field  engineering  prescribes 
in  detail  the  kind  of  intrenchments  suited  to  a  given 
position,  and  even  declares  how  many  men  are  required, 
and  how  long  it  will  take  them,  to  erect  these  works. 
But  suppose  the  first  blow  of  the  mattock  uncovers 
stone  instead  of  sinking  the  tool  in  unresisting  earth? 
What  then  of  position  and  time?  Shall  the  troops  lay 
exposed  on  the  rugged  slope  simply  because  the  posi 
tion  is  the  correct  one  according  to  formulas  and  Krieg- 
spiel?  Will  the  enemy  lie  dormant,  while  dynamite  is 
brought  forward  to  supply  the  place  of  pick  and  spade? 
How  better,  than  by  these  queries,  can  the  real  meaning 
of  the  science  of  war  be  illustrated,  or  the  tactics  of 
Second  Manassas,  Chancellorsville,  and  the  Wilder 
ness  be  explained?  The  leader  of  troops  is  but  a  mili 
tary  engineer  by  whom  every  expedient  must  be  em 
ployed.  In  the  solution  of  the  problem,  if  the  human, 
the  psychological  element,  is  ignored,  the  troops  will 
be  exposed  on  the  prescribed  position. 

The  foregoing  disgression  may  appear  at  first  sight 
to  have  little  bearing  upon  the  situation  at  Hanover 
Junction.  In  truth  it  has  all  to  do  with  it,  for  in  the 
problem  the  human  element  is  the  unknown  factor  to 
the  ordinary  critic,  which,  when  introduced  into  the 
equation,  solves  it. 

Before  Lee  recovered  his  motive  power  sufficiently  to 
take  advantage  of  his  opportunity  at  the  North  Anna, 
Grant  removed  the  temptation  by  withdrawing  his 
troops  across  the  river  and  setting  them  in  motion  for  the 
Pamunkey.  During  the  last  two  days  of  his  presence 
before  the  Confederates,  Lee's  Artillery  had  been  little 
engaged.  But  two  incidents  in  connection  with  the  use 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  811 

of  the  guns  should  be  preserved.  On  the  24th,  Lane's 
Battalion  had  been  actively  employed  in  harassing  the 
enemy  near  the  Telegraph  Road  bridge,  and  in  doing 
so  had  drawn  upon  itself  a  heavy  fire  from  the  hostile 
batteries  across  the  river,  which  caused  some  loss.  Burst 
ing  in  one  of  Lane's  pits,  where  several  detachments  of 
men  were  under  cover,  a  shell  ignited  the  tow  in  a 
dismounted  ammunition  chest,  which  it  shattered.  The 
explosion  of  the  ammunition,  which  was  momentarily 
expected,  would  probably  have  killed  every  man  in  the 
pit.  Seeing  the  danger,  Capt.  John  R.  Wingfield  and 
private  Hemington,  without  thought  for  their  own 
safety,  sprang  to  the  chest  and  extinguished  the  blaze 
with  their  hands.  The  other  incident  also  concerns 
a  battery  of  this  (Cutts'  or  Lane's)  battalion.  Bat 
tery  "A,"  in  command  of  Lieut.  Lucius  G.  Rees,  had 
been  left  with  McGowan's  Brigade  as  the  rear  guard  of 
the  3d  Corps  in  the  movement  from  Spotsylvania  to  the 
North  Anna.  It  was,  therefore,  at  the  very  rear  of  the 
whole  army.  When  Hill  collided  with  the  enemy,  Rees 
with  his  four  guns  was  cut  off  by  a  large  force  of  infan 
try,  and  with  unusual  presence  of  mind  dashed  past 
them  to  prevent  the  capture  of  his  battery.  This 
brought  him  in  the  enemy's  rear,  but  he  unlimbered  and, 
firing  a  piece  at  a  time,  while  the  others  withdrew,  he 
managed  to  elude  his  pursuers  with  the  loss  of  but  one 
man  mortally  wounded.  Moving  by  a  long  circuit  to 
the  west  and  south,  he  then  passed  around  the  enemy's 
right  at  Little  River,  and  rejoined  his  battalion  on  the 
24th,  after  two  days  of  separation,  most  of  which  time 
he  was  in  the  enemy's  rear. 

Pickett's  Division  of  about  3,300  men  rejoined  from 
Petersburg  about  this  time. 


CHAPTER  XL 

COLD  HARBOR 

AT  noon  on  the  26th,  Grant  sent  Sheridan,  who  had 
rejoined  the  Army  with  the  cavalry  after  a  raid  to  the 
James  River,  with  the  pontoon  train  to  Hanover  Town 
on  the  Pamunkey  River,  under  orders  to  prepare  the 
crossing,  and  after  dark  the  infantry  followed.  Screened 
by  cavalry  pickets,  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  was 
not  discovered  by  the  Confederates  until  the  morning 
of  the  27th,  when  Lee  again  took  up  the  race.  Moving 
by  the  Telegraph  and  parallel  roads,  towards  Ashland, 
thence  towards  Atlee's  Station,  the  Army  bivouacked 
for  the  night  after  an  exhausting  march  of  about  fifteen 
miles  near  Half  Sink  and  Hughes'  Shop.  While  the 
Army  was  covering  the  remaining  thirteen  miles  to  the 
Totopotomoy  on  the  28th,  Hampton  and  Fitz  Lee,  with 
all  the  Horse  Artillery,  were  opposing  Sheridan's  ad 
vance  at  Hawe's  Shop  on  the  road  from  Hanover  Town 
to  Atlee's  Station.  This  affair  was  one  of  the  severest 
cavalry  engagements  of  the  war,  and  was  only  broken 
off  by  both  armies  arriving  and  taking  up  positions  con 
fronting  each  other.  As  the  Confederates  arrived, 
Breckinridge's  Division  with  McLaughlin's  Battalion 
of  artillery  occupied  the  southwest  bank  of  Totopoto 
moy  Creek  on  the  left  of  Lee's  line,  at  the  Hanover 
Town  Road.  Next  came  the  1st  Corps,  Alexander 
promptly  placing  every  available  gun  in  position  on 
Anderson's  right,  then  the  2d  Corps  now  under  Early, 
with  Long's  batteries  well  placed.  The  right  of  the 
line  near  and  beyond  Pole  Green  Church  was  occupied 
by  the  3d  Corps,  while  Walker's  battalions  were  parked 
in  reserve  behind  Breckinridge's  Division  on  the  left. 
Again  had  Lee  won  the  race,  in  which  at  one  time  the 
Federals  were  eight  miles  nearer  Richmond  than  the 
Confederates. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  813 

The  next  morning,  Walker  posted  Macintosh's  Bat 
talion  on  the  left  of  the  Hanover  Town  Road  to  sup 
port  Breckinridge,  before  whom  the  enemy  had  ap 
peared  in  force,  and  the  following  day  some  of  Lane's 
batteries  were  placed  in  position  between  Mclntosh 
and  McLaughlin.  Alexander  had  skillfully  placed  bat 
teries  from  Cabell's  and  Huger's  battalions  on  Breckin 
ridge' s  right,  so  as  to  secure  for  them  an  enfilade  fire 
down  his  front  and  a  cross-fire  with  Walker's  batteries, 
and  during  the  30th  and  31st  all  these  guns  were  con 
stantly  and  most  effectively  engaged  against  the 
enemy's  infantry  and  artillery.  While  the  enemy 
demonstrated  throughout  these  two  days  against  Lee's 
left,  active  efforts  were  also  directed  upon  the  2d  Corps, 
the  Artillery  of  which  now  under  Carter,  Gen.  Long 
having  been  incapacitated  by  a  severe  illness,  proved 
most  effective.  Nelson's  Battalion  on  the  evening  of 
the  30th  accompanied  Rodes'  Division  on  the  Old 
Church  Road  and  took  a  prominent  part  in  the  attack 
which  drove  the  enemy's  left  from  Johnson's  farm  to 
Bethesda  Church.  In  this  affair,  First  Lieut.  Ancell, 
of  the  Fluvanna  Battery,  a  meritorious  officer,  was 
killed.  Returning  to  the  lines  that  night  with  the  infan 
try  division,  Nelson's  Battalion  resumed  its  old  posi 
tion,  while  Hardaway  who  had  recovered  from  his 
wound  and  rejoined  his  battalion  on  the  21st,  posted  his 
guns  on  Nelson's  left.  Braxton,  Cutshaw,  and  Page 
held  their  battalions  in  reserve. 

Though  maintaining  the  greatest  activity  in  Lee's 
front  along  the  Totopotomoy,  Meade  could  not  bring 
himself  to  the  point  of  a  real  assault  on  the  Confeder 
ate  lines.  Again  he  found  Lee  well  intrenched;  the 
activity  of  the  Confederate  artillery  alone  sufficed  to 
give  the  warning,  for  here  as  before  the  Confederate  bat 
teries  held  the  Federals  at  arm's  length,  while  the  infan 
try  for  the  most  part  rested  in  the  trenches.  With  the 
exception  of  Rodes'  brilliant  attack  on  the  Federal  left, 
the  infantry  was  not  called  upon  to  exert  itself.  On  the 
left  where  the  threat  was  the  most  serious,  the  front  was 


814  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

so  thoroughly  dominated  by  Mclntosh,  McLaughlin, 
Lane,  Cabell  and  Huger,  with  upwards  of  fifty  guns, 
that  the  Federal  Infantry  hardly  disturbed  the  men  in 
the  trenches.  Verily  was  the  Artillery  doing  its  part 
by  its  sister  arm  in  this  campaign.  Shoulder  to  shoulder 
it  stood  with  the  Infantry  and  watched  and  fought  while 
the  latter  conserved  its  strength. 

On  May  30,  Hoke's  Division  with  Dearing's  old 
battalion,  now  commanded  by  Maj.  J.  P.  W.  Read, 
was  ordered  to  march  from  Drewry's  Bluff  and  join  the 
Army.  The  battalion  still  consisted  of  Blount's, 
Caskie's,  Macon's,  and  Marshall's  (Stribling's)  bat 
teries,  with  a  personnel  of  17  officers  and  355  men  pre 
sent  for  duty,  and  16  guns.*  But  one  battalion  re 
mained  absent  from  the  1st  Corps,  and  that,  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery  now  under  Maj.  Owen,  was  stationed 
near  Drewry's  Bluff,  having  rendered  distinguished 
service  in  the  operations  against  Butler,  south  of  the 
James. 

Before  resuming  the  narrative,  it  seems  proper  to 
give  a  brief  account  of  the  operations  of  Read's  or 
Dearing's  old  battalion  while  detached  from  the  Army 
with  Pickett,  especially  as  no  history  of  the  Artillery  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  would  be  complete 
without  reference  to  the  heroic  service  rendered  by  one 
of  the  batteries  in  particular. 

On  the  1st  of  February,  Pickett  with  Hoke's,  Cling- 
man's,  and  a  part  of  Corse's  Brigade,  and  Read's  Bat 
talion,  had  moved  from  Kinston,  N.  C.,  to  threaten 
Newberne,  while  Dearing  in  command  of  the  cavalry 
covered  the  front.  Barton's  three  brigades  and  a  naval 
force  on  the  Neuse  were  to  cooperate  with  Pickett. 

Dearings  movement  towards  the  north  was  success 
ful  in  diverting  the  attention  of  the  Federals  from 
Pickett's  columns,  and  Col.  R.  Taylor  Wood,  with  his 
small  flotilla,  effected  a  complete  surprise,  capturing  a 
gunboat  under  the  very  walls  of  the  fort  at  JSTewberne. 
By  2  o'clock  in  the  morning  Pickett  reached  Bache- 

*Now  designated  38th  Battalion  Virginia  Artillery. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  815 

lor's  Creek,  seven  miles  distant,  where  he  struck  the 
enemy's  troops  whose  pickets  were  captured,  but  being 
reinforced  the  Federal  force  checked  the  Confederate 
advance,  after  the  outer  defenses  had  been  lost.  Pickett 
now  impatiently  awaited  the  result  of  Barton's  flank 
movement,  which  was  to  open  his  way  to  Newberne,  but 
Barton  failed  to  cooperate  as  planned  and  after  remain 
ing  in  position  all  the  next  day,  Pickett  was  compelled 
to  retire  to  Kinston  after  inflicting  some  damage  upon 
the  enemy,  including  the  capture  of  a  section  of  artillery 
and  a  large  number  of  horses,  wagons,  etc.  In  Pickett's 
assault  upon  the  enemy,  in  front  of  Newberne,  Capt. 
William  H.  Caskie  in  command  of  the  Richmond 
Hampden  Battery,  with  his  teams  in  a  gallop  actually 
led  the  charge  of  the  infantry.  Almost  instantly  his 
horse  was  wounded,  but  the  gallant  young  officer  seized 
a  musket  and  continued  on  foot  at  the  head  of  his  bat 
tery.  Seeing  that  he  was  dismounted,  Gen.  Pickett 
sent  him  a  fresh  horse,  upon  which  he  continued  in  the 
fight,  not  halting  to  unlimber  his  guns  until  within 
a  stone's  throw  of  the  enemy's  infantry.  For  his 
superb  conduct  on  this  occasion,  he  was  soon  promoted, 
Capt.  J.  E.  Sullivan  succeeding  to  the  command  of  his 
battery. 

The  oldest  of  Read's  batteries  was  the  Richmond 
Fayette,  named  as  we  have  seen  in  honor  of  LaFayette, 
who  was  visiting  Richmond  when  it  was  formed,  May 
27,  1824.  In  acknowledgement  of  the  compliment,  the 
distinguished  Frenchman  presented  the  battery  with 
two  brass  6-pounders,  which  he  had  brought  to  this 
country  during  the  Revolution.  Col.  John  Rutherford 
was  its  first  commander,  Col.  Henry  Coalter  Cabell 
commanding  it  in  April,  1861,  when  it  volunteered  for 
duty,  soon  being  assigned  to  Magruder  at  Yorktown, 
from  which  time  it  had  served  in  every  great  battle  of 
Lee's  Army. 

The  Fauquier,  or  Stribling's  original  battery,  had 
also  served  with  great  distinction  from  the  first,  having 
been  specially  mentioned  in  the  Federal  reports  of  the 


21 


816  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

fighting  at  Turkey  Island  just  after  Malvern  Hill, 
where  without  support  it  repulsed  a  cavalry  charge.  It 
was  one  of  the  few  batteries  to  pursue  the  enemy  on  their 
retreat  from  Second  Manassas.  Later  it  accompanied 
Longstreet  on  the  Suffolk  campaign,  in  which  it  was 
surrounded  by  an  overwhelming  force  and  lost  its  guns 
and  officers.  After  the  latter  were  exchanged  the  bat 
tery  was  reorganized  and  rearmed  with  six  Napoleons 
at  Richmond,  and  took  part  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign 
as  we  have  seen.  Stribling  was  soon  thereafter  promoted 
and  succeeded  by  Lieut.  William  C.  Marshall,  who  in 
command  of  the  battery  escaped  with  it  from  Appo- 
mattox,  disbanded  his  men  and  destroyed  his  guns  at 
Lynchburg. 

The  remaining  or  the  Latham-Dearing-Blount  Bat 
tery  was  organized  in  Lynchburg  in  April,  1861,  and 
served  under  its  first  commander  at  First  Manassas.  It 
is  said  by  some  to  have  fired  the  first  Confederate  gun 
on  that  day.  Serving  throughout  the  war  with  great 
distinction,  it  also  escaped  the  Surrender  and  disbanded 
at  Lynchburg,  after  destroying  its  guns.  After 
Latham  transferred  to  the  Branch,  N.  C.,  Battery, 
Dearing  established  his  brilliant  reputation  as  an  ar 
tillerist  with  this  Lynchburg  battery. 

Such  was  the  record  of  this  battalion,  which  more  than 
any  other  had  served  apart  from  the  army  to  which  it 
belonged.  The  foregoing  facts  have  been  given  lest  its 
detached  service  on  other  fields  might  be  thought  to  have 
injured  its  record. 

On  the  31st,  Sheridan  took  possession  of  Cold  Har 
bor,  to  which  point  Meade  at  once  sent  the  6th 
Corps.  The  sidling  movement  was  again  met  by  Lee, 
who  dispatched  the  1st  Corps,  a  part  of  the  3d,  and 
Breckinridge's  and  Hoke's  divisions,  the  last  having  just 
arrived  from  Petersburg,  with  Read's  Battalion  of  ar 
tillery,  to  his  right  with  a  view  towards  turning  and  at 
tacking  Meade's  left.  Cabell's,  Huger's,  Haskell's,  and 
Read's  battalions  were  to  cooperate  with  Kershaw's, 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  817 

Pickett's,  Field's,  and  Hoke's  divisions,  respectively, 
while  McLaughlin  operated  with  Breckinridge. 

Grant  had  also  ordered  Gen.  W.  F.  Smith  with  the 
18th  Corps,  just  landed  at  the  White  House  with  10,- 
000  men  and  16  guns,  to  Cold  Harbor.  With  but  fifteen 
miles  to  march,  Smith  lost  his  way  and  it  was  4  p.  M. 
of  the  1st  when  the  18th  united  with  the  6th  Corps, 
which  arrived  about  10  A.  M.,  after  a  distressing  night 
march. 

Kershaw  had  arrived  and  attacked  Sheridan  about 
6  A.  M.,  but  putting  in  only  two  brigades,  they  were  re 
pulsed  by  the  Federal  troopers  with  their  magazine  car 
bines.  Hoke,  on  KershawT's  right,  who  had  not  been 
placed  under  Anderson's  command,  failed  to  attack,  and 
the  remainder  of  the  long  column  with  practically  all 
the  Artillery  remained  halted  in  rear  on  the  roads, 
while  the  6th  Corps  was  arriving  in  support  of  Sheridan. 
The  whole  movement  was  a  distinct  failure,  and  through 
lack  of  leadership  and  clear  orders  a  brilliant  oppor 
tunity  to  strike  the  6th  Corps  en  route,  which  was  well 
assembled  by  1  P.  M.,  was  lost.  Meantime,  the  Con 
federate  column  had  been  ordered  to  intrench  as  it  stood, 
and  the  guns  were  ordered  up  and  placed  along  the  line. 
The  works  were  no  more  than  kneeling  intrenchments, 
however,  when  Grant  about  5  p.  M.  ordered  the  6th  and 
18th  corps  to  assault  the  Confederate  line  over  an  in 
tervening  space  of  about  1,400  yards.  Between  Ker- 
shaw's  and  Hoke's  divisions  was  an  interval  of  about 
50  yards  occupied  by  a  strip  of  marshy  ground.  The 
Confederates  had  given  up  all  ideas  of  an  attack  that 
evening,  when  a  sudden  increase  of  fire  along  the  picket 
line  300  yards  in  front  of  the  main  line  and  the  opening 
of  the  enemy's  guns  interrupted  their  digging.  It  was 
soon  learned  that  the  enemy  had  been  successfully  re 
sisted  by  Hoke,  Kershaw,  and  Pickett,  upon  whose 
divisions  the  attack  had  fallen,  except  at  the  gap, 
from  which  a  thicket  extended  well  forward,  allow 
ing  the  Federals  as  at  Second  Manassas  and  Fredericks- 
burg  to  approach  the  line  unobserved.  A  large  Fed- 


818  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

eral  force  had  worked  through  this  interval  to  the  rear 
of  the  Confederate  line,  and  soon  compelled  Kershaw 
and  Hoke  to  refuse  their  adjacent  brigades  and  extend 
across  the  gap  in  its  rear.  This  action,  which  should  have 
been  taken  long  before,  checked  the  enemy  after  they 
had  taken  several  hundred  prisoners.  Hinton's  and 
Gregg's  brigades  of  the  1st  Corps  were  now  hurried  to 
the  spot  and  driving  back  the  enemy  reestablished  the 
line,  while  the  Federals  intrenched  themselves  about  300 
yards  in  its  front.  Darkness  put  an  end  to  the  fight. 
The  Artillery  had  hardly  fired  a  shot,  for  so  dense  were 
the  woods  that  no  position  was  available  for  its  use. 
During  the  night  a  Napoleon  gun  of  Cabell's  Battalion, 
under  Lieut.  Falligant,  was  posted  in  the  rear  of  the 
gap  in  a  position  much  exposed  to  the  enemy's  sharp 
shooters,  and  not  more  than  50  yards  distant  from  them. 
The  other  pieces  of  Cabell's  Battalion  were  now  posted 
along  Kershaw's,  while  Huger's  and  Haskell's  batter 
ies  occupied  Pickett's  and  Field's  line  extending  to  the 
left. 

Meade  had  also  made  a  serious  attempt  against  the 
3d  Corps  on  Anderson's  left,  but  the  assault  fell  upon 
Heth's  position,  where  Hardaway's  Battalion  had  by 
merest  good  fortune  been  posted  near  the  Mander 
house.  Under  cover  of  a  skirt  of  woods,  the  Federals 
advanced  to  within  50  yards  of  the  Confederate  in- 
trenchments,  but  at  that  point  were  overwhelmed  by 
Hardaway's  canister  fire.  Having  very  little  protec 
tion,  Hardaway's  batteries  suffered  severely  and  were 
relieved  during  the  night  by  Poague's  Battalion. 

By  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  June,  the  opposing  lines 
had  settled  down  in  their  intrenchments  closer  to  each 
other  than  ever  before,  the  hostile  troops  so  close  that 
every  exposed  movement  was  plainly  discernible.  Three 
Federal  corps  now  confronted  Lee's  right  at  Cold  Har 
bor,  while  the  other  two  lay  opposite  Early's  or  the  2d 
Corps,  at  Bethesda  Church.  The  fighting  opened  with  a 
renewed  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Federals  to  force  the 
gap  in  Anderson's  line,  but  Falligant's  single  piece  was 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  819 

kept  constantly  in  action,  and  by  the  expenditure  of  an 
enormous  amount  of  canister  passed  along  the  line  by 
hand  to  it  for  several  hundred  yards,  kept  the  swampy 
space  clear  of  the  enemy  while  his  gallant  detachment 
was  relieved  from  time  to  time  from  the  batteries 
nearby. 

In  the  afternoon,  Gen.  Early,  perceiving  a  move 
ment  that  indicated  a  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  from  his 
front,  advanced  against  Burnside's  right  flank,  making 
a  half  wheel  with  the  Johnson  house  position  as  his 
pivot.  Gen.  Long,  though  still  ill,  had  returned  to  duty 
the  day  before.  Cutshaw  moved  his  battalion  out  of  its 
works  and  posted  it  in  line  with  Garber's  Battery  on  the 
right  just  beyond  the  old  Church  Road. 

This  was  a  most  fortunate  disposition,  and  one  which 
enabled  Garber  with  canister  to  check  the  pursuit  of 
one  of  Gordon's  brigades,  which  pursuit  was  repulsed 
and  driven  back  by  the  guns.  But  Early's  movement 
was  as  a  whole  most  successful.  Striking  Burnside's 
Corps  while  in  motion  and  sweeping  down  on  Warren's 
right,  he  not  only  took  a  number  of  prisoners  with  small 
loss  to  himself,  but  prevented  two  entire  corps  from 
taking  part  in  the  attack  at  Cold  Harbor,  which  had 
been  planned  by  Grant.  Long's  Artillery  had  been 
greatly  assisted  by  Haskell's  Battalion  on  Field's  front, 
which  Alexander  had  moved  out  in  front  of  the  works 
in  order  to  get  an  enfilade  fire.  This  battalion  kept  up 
a  constant  fire  upon  Warren's  line  and  prevented  it 
from  changing  front.  All  day  the  sharpshooting  and 
artillery  practice  were  incessant.  During  this  day  a 
number  of  Alexander's  gun  carriages  in  Pickett's  and 
Kershaw's  front  were  actually  disabled  by  bullets  which 
passed  through  the  embrasures  and  cut  the  spokes  of 
the  wheels.  The  terrain  behind  the  intrenchments  was 
so  flat  that  it  was  fully  exposed  to  even  the  frontal  fire 
of  the  enemy,  which  prevented  all  movements  of  men 
and  horses. 

During  the  day,  Grant  received  a  fresh  reinforcement 
of  5,000  troops,  who  were  to  take  part  with  Wilson's 


820  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Cavalry  in  a  flank  attack  on  Early  in  the  morning, 
while  Burnside  and  Warren  made  a  frontal  assault. 
Meanwhile,  Lee  had  by  marching  Breckinridge's,  Wil- 
cox's,  and  Mahone's  divisions  across  his  rear,  extended 
Hoke's  line  to  the  Chickahominy,  picketing  the  south 
bank  of  the  river  with  Fitz  Lee's  Cavalry  and  John 
ston's  and  Shoemaker's  batteries.  During  the  night, 
Cutshaw  was  relieved  by  Hardaway,  and  the  position 
of  Kershaw's  left  at  the  gap  was  slightly  changed  and 
greatly  strengthened  by  placing  there  four  guns  of  Ca- 
bell's  Battalion,  behind  good  epaulments,  to  one  of 
which  Falligant's  gun  was  noiselessly  withdrawn  after 
the  old  works  were  levelled  to  the  ground.  Law's  Bri 
gade  was  also  moved  up  as  a  support  and  intrenched  in 
rear  of  the  line  at  this  point,  for  the  massing  of  the 
enemy's  columns  opposite  had  been  plainly  heard. 

The  Confederates  in  the  best  of  spirits  and  utmost 
confidence  were  waiting  under  arms  for  the  attack,  when 
at  the  first  blush  of  dawn  the  fire  of  the  pickets  in  the 
gap  announced  the  appearance  of  the  enemy.  As  the 
Federals  burst  from  the  thickets,  not  over  100  yards 
away,  wildly  cheering  and  with  bands  playing  in  their 
rear,  the  Confederates,  who  for  several  hours  had  been 
fearful  less  the  attack  would  not  come  off,  set  their 
teeth  and  took  a  firmer  hold  of  their  muskets.  Pushing 
forward  to  the  point  where  the  Confederate  works  stood 
in  the  gap  the  night  before,  for  a  moment  it  seemed  to 
the  Federals  as  if  they  had  succeeded,  but  not  so.  Cab- 
ell's  four  pieces  under  Lieut.  Callaway,  concealed  in 
their  individual  works,  two  on  either  flank  of  the  infan 
try  trench,  which  traversed  the  gap  somewhat  in  rear  of 
the  old  line,  burst  forth  as  if  but  one  gun  with  doubled 
charges  of  canister,  partially  enfilading  the  enemy  and 
crossing  their  fire  at  the  deserted  line.  Of  course,  the 
repulse  of  the  enemy  at  this  point  was  immediate  and 
bloody,  and  though  Callaway 's  men  suffered  from 
musketry  fire  at  the  closest  range,  alone  he  would  have 
been  able  to  clear  his  front.  For  his  superb  conduct  on 
this  occasion,  he  was  specially  mentioned  in  orders. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  821 

Read's  guns  along  Hoke's  and  those  of  Cabell  on 
Kershaw's  line  were  equally  active,  the  approach  of  the 
Federals  generally  being  arrested  about  50  yards  from 
the  works.  From  Kershaw's  right,  Huger's  Battalion 
delivered  a  withering  enfilade  fire  upon  the  space  over 
which  the  assault  was  rendered,  while  Pickett  sent  for 
ward  a  line  of  skirmishers  to  fire  upon  the  flank  of  the 
attacking  column.  Haskell  also  opened  to  aid  the  troops 
on  his  left. 

On  Early's  front,  Hardaway  secured  a  most  effective 
oblique  fire  on  the  enemy  and  Cutshaw  from  his  posi 
tion  in  reserve  moved  rapidly  to  the  front  of  the  line  and 
to  the  left  of  Hardaway,  when  the  attack  developed  and 
from  a  most  exposed  point  opened  a  terrific  enfilade  fire 
upon  the  column  which  assaulted  Rodes'  works.  Heth's 
Division  held  the  extreme  left  of  Early's  advanced  line, 
and  to  it  Poague's  Battalion  had  been  assigned.  The 
division  commander  directed  Col.  Poague  to  post  two 
batteries,  Wyatt's  and  Richards',  on  the  left,  but  after 
a  rapid  reconnaissance,  Col.  Poague  reported  in  favor 
of  a  better  position,  as  the  one  indicated  was  plainly  un 
tenable.  Heth,  however,  reiterated  his  orders,  and 
nothing  was  left  the  gallant  Poague  but  to  obey  them. 
As  the  batteries  galloped  forward,  the  heavy  line  of 
skirmishers,  with  artillery  in  support,  which  Poague  had 
discovered  not  over  250  yards  away,  simply  riddled  the 
teams  and  shot  down  many  of  the  cannoneers.  After 
firing  but  a  few  rounds,  the  two  batteries  were  so  badly 
crippled  that  they  were  no  longer  able  to  remain  in 
action.  Poague  was  struck  by  a  fragment  of  a  shell, 
narrowly  escaping  death.  Capt.  Wyatt  and  Lieut. 
Rives  were  killed,  many  men  and  horses  were  killed  or 
disabled,  and  nothing  but  the  most  heroic  efforts  of  the 
survivors  saved  the  guns  from  capture.  Thus  did  an 
infantry  commander  usurp  the  function  of  his  artillery 
leader,  and  by  disregarding  the  advice  and  experience 
of  one  of  the  most  competent  and  daring  artillerymen 
in  the  Army,  uselessly  sacrifice  two  superb  batteries, 
which  might  have  rendered  valuable  service  under  the  di- 


822  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

rection  of  their  proper  leader.  It  was  such  ignorance 
that  had  long  since  caused  the  Artillery  to  be  given 
a  more  independent  organization,  for  the  experiences 
of  the  first  year  of  the  war  had  taught  that  division 
and  brigade  commanders  as  a  rule  neither  understood 
nor  were  capable  of  handling  artillery  in  camp,  on 
the  march,  or  in  action.  The  employment  of  the  ar 
tillery  as  a  whole  at  Cold  Harbor,  and  in  the  entire  cam 
paign,  was  marked  by  a  degree  of  independence  of  the 
infantry  hitherto  unknown.  Frequently  we  have  found 
a  battalion  of  one  corps  in  the  line  of  another  corps.  It 
was  a  fatal  mistake  to  turn  Poague  over  to  Heth's 
mercies,  but  the  error  had  its  good  effects,  as  it  simply 
emphasized  the  impracticability  of  the  repetition  of 
such  a  practice,  for  Col.  Walker's  protest  was  prompt 
and  forceful. 

On  the  right,  Breckinridge's  Division  and  the  3d 
Corps,  minus  Heth's  Division  and  Poague's  Battalion, 
had  taken  position  about  Games'  farm,  with  the  flank 
of  their  line  resting  on  the  Chickahominy.  Pegram's 
Battalion,  to  which  Dement's  and  Chew's  Maryland 
batteries  from  Richmond  had  now  been  added,  occupied 
a  fine  position  on  Turkey  Ridge,  with  Macintosh's, 
Richardson's,  and  Lane's  battalions  in  order  on  its  left. 
In  the  rear  of  his  batteries,  Mclntosh  posted  a  24- 
pounder  howitzer,  which  he  had  adjusted  for  high  angle 
fire  over  the  ridge,  and  which  he  successfully  employed 
with  indirect  fire  against  the  enemy's  working  parties 
in  his  front.  On  this  part  of  the  field  the  Federals  were 
generally  held  at  arm's  length  by  the  Artillery  which  was 
most  actively  employed.  The  action  proper  lasted  but 
about  one  hour,  though  at  isolated  points  small  attacks 
reoccurred,  and  long-range  artillery  fire  was  kept 
up  by  the  enemy  until  noon.  At  one  point  only  was  the 
Confederate  parapet  carried,  and  this  on  the  right  by 
Barlow's  Division,  which  approaching  under  cover  to 
within  75  yards  of  the  works  swept  over  them  and  seized 
three  pieces  of  artillery.  But  here  Finnegan's  Brigade 
succeeded  in  driving  out  the  enemy  and  recovering  the 
guns. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  823 

By  7  A.  M.,  Grant  had  authorized  Meade  to  discon 
tinue  his  efforts,  and  gradually  the  futility  of  further  at 
tack  became  apparent  even  to  Meade,  who  had  lost  over 
7,000  men  during  the  morning,  while  the  Confederate 
casualties  did  not  exceed  1,500,  including  several  hun 
dred  captured. 

The  bulk  of  the  Federal  casualties  was  due  to  the  Ar 
tillery  which  had  been  superbly  handled  throughout  the 
day,  as  testified  to  by  the  complaints  in  the  reports  of 
every  Federal  corps.  At  many  points  the  enemy  had 
either  been  enfiladed,  as  by  Cutshaw  and  Huger,  or  had 
met  with  destructive  oblique  and  cross  fires,  which,  ac 
cording  to  Gen.  Humphreys,  swept  through  the  ranks 
"from  the  right  of  Smith  to  the  left  of  Hancock." 
Again  he  states,  "The  assault  on  the  2d  Corps  could 
not  be  renewed  unless  the  enemy's  enfilade  artillery  fire 
could  be  silenced,"  and  of  the  6th  Corps  he  writes: 
"During  all  this  time,  besides  the  direct  fire,  there  was 
an  enfilade  artillery  fire  that  swept  though  the  ranks 
from  right  to  left."  Here  he  undoubtedly  refers  to  the 
effect  of  Hardaway's,  Cabell's,  Haskell's,  and  Huger's 
guns,  which  literally  tore  the  assaulting  column  to 
pieces.  In  writing  of  Smith's  attack,  he  also  says:  "The 
fire  from  the  right  came  from  a  part  of  the  enemy's 
works  against  which  no  part  of  our  attack  was  directed, 
and  Gen.  Smith  was  unable  to  keep  it  down  with  his 
artillery,"  which  is  but  another  reference  to  the  24  guns 
which  Huger  pushed  out  in  front  of  Pickett  and  Field. 
After  reading  such  statements,  is  it  any  wonder  that 
when  Meade  attempted  to  renew  the  assault  his  troops 
laid  down?  The  order  for  this  fresh  effort  did  not  come 
from  Grant,  who  as  we  have  seen  had  had  enough  early 
in  the  morning.  Meade's  was  the  unconquerable  will. 
He  desired  to  try  conclusions  again,  and  would  have 
done  so  had  he  been  able,  but  "His  immobile  lines  pro 
nounced  a  verdict  against  further  slaughter,"  declared 
Swinton.  Gen.  Alexander  denies  this.  He  asserts  that 
no  such  mute  protest  on  the  part  of  Meade's  men  oc 
curred,  and  that  they  lay  down  merely  pending  the 


824  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

organization  of  a  fresh  attack,  in  order  to  find  cover 
while  the  arrangements  which  necessarily  consumed 
much  time  were  being  made.  This  may  be  true,  and  as 
it  is  more  in  consonance  with  the  conduct  of  the  Fed 
eral  Infantry  on  many  other  occasions,  it  probably  is. 
Swinton  did  not  like  Grant.  He  had  been  caught,  it  is 
said,  eavesdropping  about  Grant's  headquarters,  and  re 
proved  by  the  stern  soldier  in  no  gentle  terms.  Besides 
he  was  writing  for  home  consumption,  for  already  depu 
tations  were  calling  upon  Lincoln  for  the  removal  of 
"that  butcher  Grant."  Just  as  he  erred  in  imputing  the 
order  for  the  renewal  of  the  assault  to  Grant,  so  may 
Swinton  have  been  mistaken  in  other  respects.  A  good 
authority  declares  that  Meade's  troops,  as  if  by  general 
agreement,  after  their  bloody  repulse  in  the  early  morn 
ing,  pinned  white  badges  on  their  breasts  bearing  their 
names  and  addresses,  in  order  that  they  might  be  identi 
fied  by  the  enemy  since  they  felt  certain  that  they  could 
not  successfully  cross  the  Confederate  fire  zone.  This 
circumstance,  if  true,  does  not  indicate  that  the  troops 
were  unwilling  and  did  not  intend  to  renew  their  efforts, 
for  in  no  way  can  that  badge  be  likened  to  a  white  fea 
ther.  On  the  contrary,  it  showed  that  the  men  who 
wore  it  were  resolved  to  do  or  die,  and  rather  expected 
to  die.  That  many  of  his  officers  and  men  criticised 
Grant  for  what  they  ignorantly  styled  the  merciless 
slaughter  of  his  troops  cannot  be  denied.  They  failed 
to  see  that  in  no  other  way  could  he  defeat  Lee  except 
by  fighting,  and  that  to  attack  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  behind  breastworks,  under  the  most  favorable 
conditions,  meant  heavy  losses.  If  their  lack  of  faith  in 
Grant,  coupled  with  the  devotion  of  the  Confederates 
in  Lee,  enhanced  the  chances  of  Federal  losses,  that  was 
not  Grant's  fault,  as  a  general.  His  was  not  the  char 
acter,  however,  which  could  make  a  veteran  on  the  battle 
field  cry  out:  "God  bless  Marse  Robert.  I  wish  you 
were  Emperor  of  this  country,  and  I  were  your  carriage 
driver." 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  825 

After  all  criticism  has  been  passed  upon  Grant  and 
Meade,  the  latter  a  soldier  whose  great  ability  was  un 
fortunately  overshadowed  by  the  presence  of  Grant,  and 
who  grows  in  stature  with  the  passing  of  time,  Cold 
Harbor  was  but  the  exemplification  of  Jackson's  state 
ment  two  years  before:  "We  sometimes  fail  to  drive 
the  Federals  from  their  intrenchments,  but  they  always 
fail  to  drive  the  Confederates  out."  Let  it  be  asked 
then,  who  had  succeeded  before  Grant  failed? 

To  return  to  our  narrative.  On  June  3  and  4,  the 
Chief  of  Artillery  made  a  thorough  reconnaissance  of 
the  Chickahominy  fords  below  Hill's  right.  On  the  2d, 
Ma j .  Owen  with  the  2d,  3d,  and  4th  companies  of  Wash 
ington  Artillery,  had  been  ordered  to  report  to  Gen. 
Ransom  at  Bolton's  Bridge,  and  to  leave  the  1st  Com 
pany  at  Drewry's  Bluff  where  the  battalion  had  been 
engaged  on  the  21st  of  May  with  Butler's  troops  and  the 
Federal  gunboats.  At  10  A.  M.  on  the  3d  the  batteries 
reached  Bolton's  Bridge,  during  the  fighting  at  Cold 
Harbor,  and  were  the  next  day  posted  at  the  fords  as 
far  down  as  the  York  River  railroad  bridge  by  Pendle- 
ton.  Col.  Eshleman  now  arrived  and  assumed  com 
mand.  In  the  meantime,  Lieut. -Col.  Pemberton,  of 
Vicksburg  fame,  arrived  with  the  Richmond  Defense 
Battalion,  in  command  of  Lieut.-Col.  C.  E.  Lightfoot. 
This  battalion,  with  Fitz  Lee's  Division  and  Shoe 
maker's  and  Johnston's  batteries,  were  held  in  Bottom's 
Ford  to  guard  Lee's  right  flank.  During  the  4th,  the 
enemy  appeared,  and  made  strong  demonstrations  as  if 
to  cross  the  river,  but  the  fire  of  the  Artillery  prevented 
their  near  approach  to  the  ford. 

After  several  days  of  inactivity,  Lee  assumed  the  of 
fensive.  On  the  6th,  he  endeavored  to  turn  Meade's 
right  flank  by  sending  Early  to  the  north  of  Matade- 
quin  Creek,  and  again  on  the  7th  by  a  movement  south 
of  that  stream,  but  the  swampy  and  impassable  character 
of  the  terrain  prevented  any  success  on  both  occasions. 

When  it  was  discovered  on  the  7th  that  the  enemy  had 
withdrawn  from  Field's  front,  Haskell's  Battalion  was 


826  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

transferred  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  and 
posted  at  the  Grape  Vine  and  Federal  bridges.  Dur 
ing  the  better  part  of  the  next  week,  skirmishing  at 
short  range  all  along  the  lines  from  Pickett's  front  to 
the  river  was  incessant,  and  the  Artillery  was  constantly 
engaged,  though  in  a  desultory  way.  So  close  were  the 
lines  that  the  guns  had  to  be  thoroughly  covered,  in  spite 
of  which  many  casualties  were  incurred,  especially  in 
Cabell's  Battalion,  which  lost  the  veteran  battery  com 
mander  of  the  1st  Richmond  howitzers.  No  officer  in 
the  Artillery  had  seen  more  service  than  Capt.  Ed 
ward  S.  McCarthy,  who  was  shot  in  the  head  and  killed 
on  the  4th. 

One  matter  of  particular  interest  in  connection  with 
this  random  fighting  was  the  employment  and  develop 
ment  of  Mclntosh's  high  angle  fire  with  howitzers  ad 
justed  as  mortars,  a  practice  which  was  the  outgrowth 
of  the  conditions.  This  indirect  method  of  fire,  ex 
tensively  employed  here  for  the  first  time,  offered  many 
advantages  inasmuch  as  it  could  be  delivered  without 
the  exposure  of  the  cannoneers  to  the  vigilant  sharp 
shooters  of  the  enemy.  Exceptionally  good  effect  seems 
to  have  been  obtained  by  Mclntosh  with  his  first  howit 
zer,  which  led  to  the  use  of  others,  and  this  is  the  only 
instance  of  indirect  fire  met  with  so  far,  except  Alex 
ander's  cannonade  of  Bank's  Ford  the  preceding  year. 
It  was  subsequently  used  quite  extensively  at  Peters 
burg,  where  it  was  also  necessary  to  screen  the  guns  and 
detachments,  but  never  fully  appreciated,  nor  did  it  at 
tract  the  attention  it  warranted.  It  was  to  be  many 
years  before  Gen.  Langlois  was  to  give  to  the  world  in 
direct  fire  in  its  modern  stage  of  perfection. 

It  was  in  connection  with  Mclntosh's  experiments 
with  his  howitzers  that  Pendleton  sought  the  assistance 
of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  in  the  preparation  of  "stink- 
shells."  In  other  words  he  desired  to  secure  a  pro 
jectile  from  the  bursting  of  which  in  the  enemy's  works 
a  suffocating  effect  would  be  obtained.  "It  seems  at 
least  worth  a  trial,"  he  wrote.  He  also  urged  that  hand 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  827 

grenades  be  provided  the  Confederate  troops  to  be  used 
by  them  in  assaulting  the  enemy's  works.*  The  grenades 
were  reported  to  be  available  for  issue,  but  no  "stink- 
shells"  were  made  and  nothing  seems  to  have  come  of 
the  proposal. 

On  June  5th,  Hunter,  who  had  succeeded  Milroy,  de 
feated  Jones,  who  had  succeeded  Breckinridge,  and  on 
the  12th  Breckinridge  was  ordered  to  return  to  the 
Valley  with  his  division,  and  McLaughlin's  Battalion  of 
artillery,  to  the  command  of  which  Lieut. -Col.  King 
was  now  assigned,  while  Maj.  Gibbes  was  transferred 
from  Cabell's  to  the  command  of  King's  Battalion. 
Three  days  later,  when  it  was  discovered  that  Meade  had 
again  moved  towards  the  Confederate  right,  Lee  also 
detached  Early's  Corps  with  Nelson's  and  Braxton's 
battalions  under  Gen.  Long,  and  dispatched  the  force 
via  Charlottesville  to  the  Valley.  Early's  instructions 
were  to  attack  Hunter  in  the  rear,  and  after  uniting 
with  Breckinridge  to  move  down  the  Valley,  cross  the 
Potomac,  and  threaten  Washington.  These  orders  were 
given  in  the  hope  that  the  movement  might  result  in 
Grant's  recall  for  the  defense  of  the  Capital. 

While  the  main  army  was  engaged  with  Meade,  the 
Horse  Artillery  had  been  actively  employed  with  the 
cavalry  divisions.  McGregor's  Battery,  after  being 
sharply  engaged  at  Stanard's  Mill  on  the  Po,  from  the 
16th  of  May  to  the  19th,  accompanied  W.  H.  F.  Lee's 
Division  as  rear  guard  of  the  Army  to  Hanover  Junc 
tion,  and  from  there  to  Hanover  Courthouse,  where  on 
the  31st  it  had  again  been  heavily  engaged.  In  this  last 
action,  Lieut.  Ford,  conspicuous  for  his  gallantry,  was 
killed.  Hart's  Battery  participated  in  a  small  affair  at 
Ashland  on  the  1st,  and  on  the  same  day  Shoemaker's 
and  Johnston's  batteries  under  Breathed  were  warmly 
engaged  at  Bottom's  Bridge,  and  Cold  Harbor,  where 
three  years  before  Pelham  had  won  such  undying 
laurels.  The  story  of  the  service  of  these  batteries  is  one 
in  itself,  and  at  the  time  of  which  we  write  perhaps  no 

*RebclUon  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXXVI.   Part  III,  pp.   888-889. 


828  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

organization  in  the  Army  commanded  the  admiration 
and  appealed  to  the  pride  of  the  Army  as  a  whole  as  did 
Chew's  Battalion  of  Horse  Artillery.*  Its  record  in 
marching  and  fighting  is  not  excelled  by  that  of  any  ar 
tillery  battalion  that  ever  took  the  field. 

During  the  fighting  of  the  first  few  days  of  June, 
Sheridan  had  drawn  off  around  Meade's  rear  and  at 
tempted  another  raid  on  Lynchburg,  via  Gordonsville, 
in  cooperation  with  Hunter's  movement  up  the  Valley. 
Accordingly  on  the  8th,  Col.  Chew  and  Maj.  Breathed 
with  Hart's,  Thomson's,  Johnston's,  McGregor's,  and 
Shoemaker's  batteries,  moved  with  Hampton's  and  Fitz 
Lee's  divisions  to  intercept  the  Federal  Cavalry,  which 
they  did  at  Trevillian  Depot,  on  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad.  In  this  affair,  Hart's,  Thomson's,  and 
Johnston's  batteries  only  were  engaged,  and  ably  main 
tained  themselves  against  Pennington's  four  horse  bat 
teries.  Next  to  Brandy  Station,  this  was  the  largest 
purely  cavalry  combat  fought  in  Virginia,  and  Chew's 
handling  of  the  horse  batteries  on  this  occasion  was  es 
pecially  brilliant. 

It  may  prove  interesting  to  note  the  condition  of  the 
Horse  Artillery  at  this  time.  The  report  of  Capt.  John 
Esten  Cooke,  Assistant  Inspector  General  of  Artillery 
on  Pendleton's  staff,  dated  May  25,  fully  sets  forth  the 
facts. 

Johnston's  Battery  had  lost  33  horses  since  the  first 
of  the  month,  most  of  them  in  action,  and  many  others 
were  badly  broken  down.  Two  guns  had  teams  of  but 
five  and  two  of  but  four  horses.  Shoemaker's  Battery, 
while  it  had  lost  fewer  horses  in  action,  was  in  a  worse 
plight  than  Johnston's  as  to  the  condition  of  its  teams. 
These  batteries  each  required  a  minimum  of  30  horses 
to  make  them  fully  effective.  The  five  batteries  had 
lost  in  all  99  animals  and  many  of  the  cannoneers  had 
been  relegated  to  Battery  "Q,"  in  order  to  supply 
draught  teams. 

*Let  us  hope  for  the  promised  history  of  his  battalion,  by  its  commander, 
before  referred  to. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  829 

Requisition  was  immediately  made  by  Pendleton  on 
the  receipt  of  the  report  for  100  fresh  horses,  and  he 
endorsed  Col.  Chew's  request  that  McClannahan's  and 
Jackson's  horse  batteries  of  McLaughlin's  Battalion  be 
assigned  to  his  command.  Capt.  Cooke  reported  that 
every  care  was  being  taken  of  the  animals,  which  were 
being  grazed  whenever  possible,  in  addition  to  receiving 
eight  pounds  of  corn  daily.*  On  the  8th  of  June,  Cooke 
inspected  Thomson's  and  Hart's  batteries  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Chew,  in  camp  with  Hampton's 
Division  on  the  Brooke  Turnpike  above  Meadow 
Bridge.  Their  condition  he  reported  as  exceptionally 
good  under  the  circumstances,  especially  Thomson's, 
as  a  result  of  that  officer's  efficiency  and  ceaseless  care. 
At  this  time,  Thomson  had  98  and  Hart  112  men.  The 
limbers  and  caissons  were  full  and  the  ordnance  wagons 
well  supplied,  except  with  Blakely  ammunition,  but 
mules  were  needed  by  the  train.  The  requisition  for 
horses  for  the  battalion  had  been  filled.  So  that  in  spite 
of  its  service  and  an  enormous  loss  of  horses  and 
casualties  aggregating  about  100  men  for  the  past 
month,  the  Horse  Artillery  was  in  fine  fettle,  when  it 
encountered  Sheridan  at  Trevillian's  a  few  days  later. t 

Griffin's  Horse  Battery  with  Chew's  and  Dement's 
4th  and  1st  Maryland  batteries  had  been  detached  from 
the  cavalry  in  the  field  and  attached  to  the  Maryland 
Line,  stationed  at  Richmond  under  command  of  Gen. 
Bradley  T.  Johnston. 

Notwithstanding  the  demands  upon  him  incident  to 
the  field  operations  of  the  campaign,  the  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery  had  not  only  hastened  forward  the  refitting  of 
the  Horse  Artillery,  but  he  had  also  found  time  to  urge 
legislation  upon  the  President  for  the  more  complete 
organization  of  the  entire  artillery  arm.  In  conference 
with  Long,  Alexander,  and  Walker,  on  the  3d  of  May, 
he  had  accepted  certain  radical  proposals  drawn  up  by 
Long  and  at  once  forwarded  them  to  Gen.  Lee.  But 
hearing  nothing  from  them,  he  addressed  the  President 

*RebelUon  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXXVI.  Part  III,  pp    831-847 
tlbid.,  pp.  883,  884,  and  Part  I,  p.  1053. 


830  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

direct  concerning  them  on  June  8,  urging  that  a  more 
just  rule  be  adopted  by  Congress  with  respect  to  the 
authorized  quota  of  artillery  officers.  The  abstract  of 
the  proposed  bill  follows : 

"A  battery  of  field  artillery  to  consist  of  4  guns.  For  such  a 
battery  100  to  125  effective  privates,,  4  sergeants,  8  corporals,  1 
sergeant-major,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  2  buglers,  2  artificers, 
1  guidon,  1  captain,  2  first  lieutenants,  and  one  second  lieutenant. 
Six  gun  batteries  now  existing  may  so  remain  till  their  number  of 
men  is  reduced  to  the  above  standard.  The  batteries  shall  be 
organized  into  battalions  of  3  or  4  batteries,  and  whenever  it  can 
be  done  without  detriment  to  the  service,  batteries  from  the  same 
state  shall  be  thrown  together.  To  each  battalion  of  4  batteries 
there  should  be  a  lieutenant-colonel  and  major;  1  adjutant,  with 
the  rank  of  first  lieutenant ;  assistant  quartermaster,  with  the  rank 
of  captain;  a  chaplain,  surgeon,  and  assistant  surgeon.  Battalions 
of  3  batteries  may  have  officers  of  each  grade,  or  fewer  and  of  less 
rank,  as  commanding  generals  may  recommend.  Two  or  three 
battalions  may  constitute  a  regimental  group,  to  be  commanded  by 
a  colonel,  entitled  to  1  adjutant,  with  the  rank  of  captain,  and 
1  aide  with  the  rank  of  first  lieutenant.  Two  regimental  groups  to 
form  a  brigade,  to  be  commanded  by  a  brigadier-general.  Staff 
of  a  brigade  to  be  1  adjutant-general,  rank  of  captain;  1  aide-de 
camp,  rank  of  first  lieutenant;  1  quartermaster,  rank  of  major; 
1  commissary,  rank  of  major;  and  1  chief  surgeon.  The  artillery 
of  an  army,  provided  it  consists  of  two  or  more  brigades,  to  con 
stitute  a  corps  of  artillery,  to  be  commanded  by  a  general  of 
superior  rank  to  a  brigadier-general,  with  a  staff  as  designated  by 
law  for  generals  of  like  grade.  All  appointments  above  the  rank 
of  captain  to  be  made  by  selection." 

These  indeed  were  radical  proposals,  but  certainly 
very  wise  ones.  The  contemplated  reorganization  would 
have  provided  for  many  promotions  in  the  arm,  and  re 
lieved  a  situation  which  was  fraught  with  many  diffi 
culties.  It  would  not  only  have  greatly  enhanced  the 
efficiency  of  the  arm,  but  would  have  enabled  many  de 
serving  officers  to  be  awarded  well  earned  promotions. 
Again,  it  would  have  ruled  out  politics  to  a  large  ex 
tent,  for  Congress  would  have  been  restricted  to  the 
appointment  of  junior  officers  only,  all  others  depend 
ing  upon  their  military  records  for  preferment. 

Pendleton's  communication  was  referred  by  Mr. 
Davis  to  Gen.  Bragg,  his  military  adviser,  who  disap- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  831 

proved  the  proposed  method  of  determining  the  num 
ber  of  officers  in  the  arm,  and  declared  the  gun  to  be  the 
proper  unit  upon  which  to  base  the  strength  of  the  com 
missioned  personnel.  But  he  very  justly  said  that  the 
present  proportion  of  officers  to  guns  was  inadequate, 
and  that  he  saw  no  valid  reason  for  restricting  the  senior 
artillery  grade  to  that  of  brigadier-general.  uThe  Ar 
tillery  of  an  army  of  three  corps  like  Gen.  Lee's  is 
equivalent  in  importance  to  either  corps  of  infantry," 
wrote  Bragg.  Gen.  Lee  also  declared  in  favor  of  the 
gun  as  the  proper  unit.  Every  battalion  should  have 
two  field  officers,  and  his  army  was  entitled  to  a  major- 
general  of  artillery,  while  each  corps  chief,  whose  com 
mand  was  far  more  important  than  that  of  a  brigade  of 
infantry,  should  bear  the  rank  of  brigadier-general,  he 
thought. 

The  matter  was  referred  in  September  by  the  Presi 
dent  to  the  Secretary  of  War  for  conference  with  the 
Committee  of  Military  Affairs,  as  to  the  legislation 
recommended  in  his  annual  message,  and  in  the  report 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  advocating  an  increase  in  the 
commissioned  personnel  of  the  Artillery. 

At  the  end  of  June,  the  artillery  material  of  the  three 
corps  proper  consisted  of  ninety-four  Napoleons,  four 
24-pounder  and  six  12-pounder  howitzers,  twelve  20- 
pounder  and  forty-eight  10-pounder  Parrotts,  and 
thirty- two  3-inch  rifles,  or  a  total  of  196  pieces  including 
those  of  Gibbes',  or  King's  old  battalion,  which  had  been 
assigned  to  the  1st  Corps  in  lieu  of  the  Washington  Ar 
tillery,  and  not  including  those  of  Read's  Battalion. 
The  2d  Corps  also  had  then  but  four  battalions,  Cut- 
shaw  having  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  one 
formed  by  the  consolidation  of  the  remnants  of  his  own, 
and  Page's  upon  Hardaway's  return  to  duty,  Page  be 
ing  relieved  from  command.  If  we  take  King's  Bat 
talion  as  counterbalancing  the  loss  of  Page's  20  guns,  it- 
will  be  seen  that  Lee  had  16  more  guns,  not  including 
McLaughlin's,  Eshleman's,  Lightfoot's,  and  Owen's,  at 
Cold  Harbor  than  he  started  with,  and  allowing  four 


22 


832  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

pieces  for  each  of  the  15  batteries  of  those  four  battalions 
he  must  have  had,  exclusive  of  the  Horse  Artillery,  at 
Cold  Harbor,  not  less  than  275  pieces  of  artillery,  while 
his  infantry  had  diminished  in  numbers  in  spite  of  rein 
forcements  by  at  least  10,000  men.  His  proportion  of 
guns  to  infantry  had  therefore  risen  to  nearly  nine  guns 
per  thousand  infantry  before  he  reached  Petersburg.  In 
the  meantime,  Meade  had  lost  near  60,000  men,  killed, 
wounded  and  missing,  but  had  gained  fully  40,000  by 
reinforcement.  His  original  proportion  of  artillery  had 
diminished,  however,  for  nearly  one  hundred  guns  had 
been  returned  to  the  base. 

Little  remains  to  be  said  concerning  the  Artillery  in 
the  campaign  from  the  Wilderness  to  Cold  Harbor, 
which  included  a  rapid  series  of  tremendous  combats. 
The  narrative  has  traced  the  movement  of  the  various 
commands  in  detail,  and  those  movements  fully  expose 
the  tactics  of  the  arm.  It  can  only  be  added  that  nothing 
is  so  accurate  a  test  of  efficiency  as  results,  and  even  the 
casual  reader  must  have  been  impressed  by  the  wonder 
ful  results  obtained  by  Alexander,  Long,  and  Walker. 
It  is  inconceivable  that  Lee's  Infantry,  however  superb 
it  was,  could  have  withstood  the  shock  of  the  blows  which 
Grant  and  Meade  aimed  at  it,  had  there  not  been 
mingled  with  its  men  in  the  foremost  line,  and  shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  them,  willing  toilers  at  the  muzzles  and 
the  lanyards  of  the  guns.  As  has  been  said  before,  little 
opportunity  was  found  to  employ  artillery  in  masses, 
and  it  was  understood  by  the  gunners  from  the  first  that 
their  part  lay  in  taking  the  brunt  of  the  Federal  at 
tacks  from  the  shoulders  of  the  Infantry  by  ceaseless 
vigilance  and  instant  readiness  to  stem  the  tide  of  as 
sault  before  it  washed  up  against  the  Infantry  lines. 
They  were  called  upon  to  do  this  over  and  over  again, 
always,  except  at  North  Anna,  where  no  great  effort 
was  made  by  the  enemy,  under  the  most  adverse  circum 
stances,  for  they  found  neither  commanding  positions 
nor  extensive  fields  of  fire.  For  the  time  being,  one 
might  say,  they  simply  took  the  place  of  the  Infantry, 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  833 

and  only  once,  at  the  Bloody  Angle,  did  they  allow  the 
enemy  to  cross  bayonets  with  their  sister  arm.  What  a 
record  indeed  is  this ! 

To  one  more  point  must  attention  be  called.  From 
the  day  of  the  rapid  concentration  of  the  Artillery  along 
the  Rapidan  on  the  5th  of  May,  there  was  never  an  hour 
when  every  battery  of  Lee's  Army  was  not  either  in 
position,  in  immediate  support,  or  on  the  march  and 
actually  with  the  infantry  divisions.  Not  one  single 
instance  of  delay  in  the  movement  of  the  Artillery,  or 
of  a  single  battery,  has  been  encountered,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  the  wonderful  organization  it  had  been  given 
and  the  remarkable  artillery  leaders  the  war  had  de 
veloped,  always  enabled  the  batteries  to  be  in  the  first 
line.  One  may  search  military  history  in  vain  for  a 
parallel.  It  will  not  be  found  in  the  Napoleonic  cam 
paigns,  nor  will  it  be  found  in  the  French  War  of  1859, 
the  Danish  War  of  1864,  the  Austro-Prussian  War  of 
1866,  or  in  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870-71.  Read 
Hohenlohe,  who  never  fails  to  present  the  record  of  the 
Prussian  Artillery  in  its  best  garb,  and  see  how  great 
masses  of  artillery  remained  idle  at  the  critical  moment ; 
how  the  unwieldy  columns  blocked  the  roads  in  the  rear 
of  the  armies,  and  then  remember  that  the  beautiful 
countries  of  Bohemia  and  France,  with  their  wide 
chausses  and  rolling  hills  afforded  ideal  artillery  terrain 
as  compared  to  the  Wilderness  of  Spotsylvania,  and  the 
almost  pathless  forests  of  Hanover,  where  scarce  a  clear 
ing  a  mile  wide  or  a  commanding  position  is  to  be  found. 
Then  pursue  the  investigation  further  and  study  the 
operations  of  the  Federal  Artillery  with  Grant,  and  it 
will  be  found  that  near  100  of  his  guns  were  returned 
to  Washington  because  no  adequate  use  could  be  made 
of  them,  nor  were  those  which  he  retained  wholly  em 
ployed  at  any  one  time.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  fewer 
were  engaged  in  any  one  battle  than  remained  idle,  and 
this  in  spite  of  Hunt  with  all  his  skill  and  ability. 


CHAPTER  XLI 

COLD   HARBOR  TO  PETERSBURG 

AFTER  dispatching  the  2d  Corps  to  the  Valley,  Gen. 
Lee  moved  the  1st  and  3d  Corps  across  White  Oak 
Swamp  to  the  neighborhood  of  Riddles  Shop,  at  which 
point  Wilcox's  Division  and  Pegram's  and  Macintosh's 
battalions  relieved  the  Cavalry  and  pressed  back  the 
enemy's  advance.  In  this  affair,  Pegram  with  his  old 
battery,  now  commanded  by  Capt.  Cayce,  made  a  most 
superb  attack  upon  the  enemy's  leading  troops,  display 
ing  all  the  dash  and  strength  of  his  character.  During 
the  past  campaign,  he  had,  though  constantly  engaged, 
found  little  opportunity  to  exhibit  his  rarest  quality, 
which  was  rapidity  of  action,  but  nevertheless  his  serv 
ices  had  been  distinguished  and  his  reputation  as  a 
fighter  was  unsurpassed  by  that  of  any  artilleryman  in 
the  Army.  Very  small,  slight  of  figure,  and  only  about 
twenty-four  years  old,  he  had  the  heart  of  a  lion  and,  as 
the  men  said,  "was  always  itching  for  a  fight."  Fortun 
ate  indeed  is  the  officer  who  acquires  such  a  reputation, 
for  it  is  such  men  that  instill  in  those  under  their  com 
mand  the  elan  which  carries  them  on  to  victory.  Illus 
trative  of  the  feeling  of  the  soldiers  who  knew  him  to 
wards  this  youthful  and  dashing  artilleryman,  the  fol 
lowing  anecdote  is  recounted.  On  a  certain  occasion 
when  it  was  doubtful  if  there  was  to  be  a  fight,  Pegram 
was  seen  galloping  down  the  line  of  the  infantry  from 
position  to  position  occupied  by  his  batteries,  followed 
by  Capt.  W.  Gordon  McCabe,  his  adjutant,  who,  like 
Pegram,  was  a  veritable  game-cock.  The  troops  were  in 
the  humor  for  fighting,  and  as  an  old  veteran  spied  the 
pair  of  artillerymen  approaching,  he  rose  from  the 
trenches,  waved  his  hat  aloft  and  cried,  "Come  on,  boys! 
Here  comes  that  d—  — n  little  man  with  the  glasses. 
We're  going  to  fight  'em  now." 

On  the  12th,  Read's  Battalion,  accompanying  Hoke's 
Division,  marched  from  Cold  Harbor  to  Petersburg,  ar- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  835 

riving  there  on  the  15th,  and  was  immediately  thrown 
into  position  near  the  Hare  house  to  repel  the  threatened 
attaek.  During  the  14th,  15th,  and  16th,  the  1st  and  3d 
corps  remained  in  observation  of  the  enemy  near  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  while  part  of  Lee's  Army  opposed  Butler 
on  the  south  side  of  the  river.  It  was  from  their 
present  position  that  Lee  expected  the  enemy  to  attempt 
an  advance  against  Richmond,  but  Grant  had  deter 
mined  to  cross  the  James  at  Wilcox's  Landing,  ten 
miles  below  City  Point  and  entirely  out  of  Lee  obser 
vation,  and  to  move  thence  directly  upon  Petersburg 
with  his  whole  army.  This  movement  had  been  sug 
gested  to  him  by  Halleck  some  days  before,  and  Grant 
was  also,  no  doubt,  familiar  with  McClellan's  intention 
to  do  the  same  thing  just  three  years  before.  His  pro 
posed  line  of  operations  would  lead  him  in  the  rear  of 
Butler  and  enable  him  to  fall  on  the  extreme  right  of 
the  Confederate  defensive  line,  which  now  rested  at 
Petersburg,  for  the  defense  of  which  only  a  part  of  the 
troops  of  the  Department  of  North  Carolina  and  South 
ern  Virginia  under  Gen.  Beauregard  were  immediately 
available,  in  addition  to  Lee's  Army,  which  he  hoped  to 
elude  and  outmarch.  This  was  all  but  accomplished, 
for  while  Lee  remained  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James, 
watching  what  he  believed  to  be  the  entire  Federal  force, 
Grant  had  performed  a  feat  unheard  of  before,  and  with 
secrecy  and  celerity  transferred  nearly  his  entire  army 
across  the  river.  On  the  15th,  16th,  and  17th,  part  of 
his  troops  were  actually  arriving  at  Petersburg  and  en 
deavoring  to  take  the  city,  and  were  only  prevented 
from  doing  it,  on  the  15th,  by  Wise's  Brigade,  not  more 
than  1,200  strong,  two  small  regiments  of  cavalry  under 
Dearing,  Moseley's  Battalion  and  Sturdivant's  and 
Martin's  batteries  with  22  guns,  and  some  old  men  and 
boys  called  Local  Reserves,  or  a  total  force  of  less  than 
3,000  of  all  arms  and  conditions.  The  resistance  of  these 
troops  was  grandly  heroic  and  they  have  never  received 
the  credit  their  conduct  deserved,  for  they  stood  between 
Lee  and  disaster,  against  odds  perhaps  never  before 


836  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

paralleled.  It  was  only  upon  the  most  urgent  repre 
sentations  that  Lee  was  persuaded  by  Beauregard  to 
send  reinforcements  to  Petersburg,  for  the  great  soldier 
could  not  believe  that  the  Federals  had  crossed  the  river. 
He  finally  sent  Hoke's  Division  and  Read's  Battalion 
of  artillery  from  Drewry's  Bluff  on  the  morning  of  the 
18th.  With  18  miles  to  go,  the  head  of  Hoke's  column 
reached  Petersburg  at  sunset,  having  traveled  partly  by 
rail;  the  bulk  of  the  division  by  forced  marching,  at  9 
p.  M.  All  that  day,  while  Wise  and  Dearing  were  re 
sisting  the  ever-increasing  pressure  at  Petersburg,  Lee 
remained  near  Malvern  Hill,  his  attention  occupied  by 
the  Federal  Cavalry,  but  when  on  the  morrow  he  finally 
concluded  that  a  part  of  Grant's  troops  had  crossed  the 
James,  he  set  the  1st  Corps  in  motion  for  the  south  side 
of  the  river. 

Early  in  the  morning,  Pickett's  and  Field's  divisions 
with  Huger's,  Haskell's,  and  Gibbes'  battalions,  crossed 
the  pontoon  bridge  near  Drewry's  Bluff  and  advanced 
towards  the  Bermuda  Hundred  lines,  from  which  Beau- 
regard  had  been  compelled  to  withdraw  Bushrod  John 
son's  Division  on  the  night  of  the  15th  for  the  support 
of  Wise  at  Petersburg. 

Kershaw's  Division  was  halted  near  Drewry's  Bluff. 
The  next  day  Pickett  and  Field,  after  a  skirmish  with 
Butler's  troops  near  Port  Walthall,  in  which  Alexan 
der's  two  battalions  were  engaged,  recovered  Beaure- 
gard's  abandoned  lines.  On  that  same  day,  Kershaw's 
Division,  with  Cabell's  Battalion,  and  the  3d  Corps  with 
its  artillery,  which  had  encamped  the  previous  day  near 
Chaffin's  Bluff,  also  crossed  the  river  upon  the  bridge 
near  Drewry's  Bluff,  and  was  ordered  to  Bermuda  Hun 
dred.  On  the  18th,  Pickett's  Division,  with  Huger's 
Battalion,  established  itself  on  a  line  fronting  Bermuda 
Hundred  from  Howie tt's  on  the  James  River,  to  the 
confluence  of  Swift  Creek  with  the  Appomattox. 

During  the  15th,  16th,  and  17th,  Beauregard  had 
made  a  grand  fight  against  the  head  of  Grant's  Army, 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  837 

but  at  last  was  compelled  to  request  reinforcements  or 
instructions  for  his  retreat.  The  fighting  at  Petersburg 
had  lasted  until  midnight  on  the  17th,  and  he  knew  that 
his  small  force,  now  consisting  of  Wise's,  Elliott's,  and 
Johnson's  brigades  of  Bushrod  Johnson's  Division,  and 
Hoke's  Division,  a  total  of  about  14,000  infantry,  could 
no  longer  maintain  the  lines.  Already  he  had  been 
forced  to  relinquish  the  outer  works  of  the  eastern  de 
fenses  and  fall  back  upon  a  new  line  hastily  laid  off  from 
the  river  and  running  from  the  Hare  house  and  Bland- 
ford  Cemetery  to  the  Rives  house. 

After  the  receipt  of  Beauregard's  dispatch  on  the 
night  of  the  17th,  Kershaw  was  ordered  to  march  to 
Petersburg,  though  Lee  was  not  yet  convinced  that 
Beauregard  was  correctly  informed  about  the  enemy. 
It  was  not  until  a  third  staff  officer  arrived  from  Beau- 
regard  at  3  A.  M.  on  the  18th,  that  Lee  was  convinced 
that  Grant's  entire  army  was  massing  in  front  of  Peters 
burg.  He  now  sent  orders  to  Anderson  to  march  with 
Field's  and  Pickett's  divisions  for  Petersburg,  where 
Kershaw  arrived  about  7 :30  A.  M. 

Upon  his  new  line,  Beauregard  had  skillfully  posted 
his  artillery  under  Col.  Hilary  P.  Jones.  It  consisted 
of  Read's,  Moseley's,  Coit's,  and  Boggs'  battalions. 
This  large  artillery  force  of  sixteen  batteries  and  53 
guns  had  proved  of  inestimable  value  to  him  in  his 
defense  of  Petersburg.  Without  it  he  could  never  have 
maintained  the  front  he  did  from  the  15th  to  the  17th. 
As  it  was  now  merged  into  Lee's  Army,  let  us  examine 
its  organization.  With  the  organization  of  Read's  Bat 
talion,  we  are  already  familiar.  That  of  the  other  bat 
talions  was  as  follows: 

MOSELEY'S   BATTALION 

Maj.  Edgar  F.  Moseley 

Yorktown  Battery,  Capt.  Edward  R,  Young. 

Macon   (Ga.)   Battery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Staten. 

Battery  "E",  1st  N.  C.  Reg%  Capt.  John  O.  Miller. 

Battery  "C",  13th  N.  C.  Batt.,  Capt.  James  D.  Gumming. 


838  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

COIT'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  James  C.  Coit 

Halifax  Battery,  Capt.  Samuel  T.  Wright. 

Petersburg  Battery,  Capt.  Richard  G.  Pegram. 

S.  C.  "Chesterfield"  Battery,  Capt.  James  I.  Kelly. 

Miss.  Confederate  Guards  Battery,  Capt.  William  D.  Bradford. 

BOGGS'  BATTALION 

Maj.  Francis  J.  Boggs 

Albemarle  Battery,  Capt.  N.  C.  Sturdivant. 

Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  S.  Taylor  Martin. 

Read's  Battalion  after  being  engaged  at  Cold  Har 
bor  on  the  1st,  2d,  and  3d  of  June,  had  reached  Peters 
burg  on  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  in  time  to  materially 
assist  in  the  defense.  Moseley's  Battalion  which  had 
been  organized  about  the  time  of  Butler's  advance,  had 
been  engaged  in  the  fighting  at  Drewry's  Bluff,  and  on 
the  Bermuda  Hundred  lines,  when  Beauregard  bot 
tled  up  the  Army  of  the  James  so  successfully.  Its 
commander  had  formerly  served  as  a  field  officer  in  the 
1st  Virginia  Regiment  of  Artillery,  after  its  organiza 
tion  by  Col.  John  Thompson  Brown  as  part  of  Ma- 
gruder's  Army  in  1861.  Coit's  Battalion  had  been 
organized  for  service  in  North  Carolina  in  the  early 
spring,  later  operating  with  Beauregard  against  But 
ler.  Both  Moseley's  and  Coit's  battalions  had  rendered 
excellent  service.  Boggs'  Battalion  had  only  been 
organized  on  the  17th  as  such.  Hitherto  its  two  batter 
ies  had  operated  independently  in  the  vicinity  of  Peters 
burg,  and  had  been  engaged  against  Butler.  On  June 
5,  Capt.  Sturdivant  and  two  of  his  guns  had  been 
captured. 

The  batteries  of  these  battalions  averaged  about  four 
guns  and  90  men,  and  therefore  comprised  a  valuable 
addition  to  Pendleton's  command,  depleted  by  the  de 
taching  of  Long's  two  battalions,  especially  since  Lee 
was  now  called  upon  to  defend  so  extensive  a  line. 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th,  before  Lee's  troops  ar 
rived,  Bradford's  three  20-pounder  Parrotts  and 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  839 

Wright's  five  Napoleons  of  Coit's  Battalion  were  placed 
in  position  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Appomattox  to  en 
filade  the  approaches  to  Beauregard's  left.  The  rest  of 
Jones'  Artillery  was  either  placed  along  or  in  rear  of  the 
infantry  trenches  of  the  new  line,  and  all  of  it  was  most 
effectively  employed  during  the  day. 

At  4  A.  M.,  the  18th,  Grant  made  a  general  advance 
with  the  2d,  5th,  and  7th  Corps,  while  the  6th  and  18th 
were  held  in  reserve.  He  learned  during  the  morning 
with  the  utmost  surprise  that  Beauregard's  whole  force 
during  the  preceding  days  consisted  of  but  two  small 
divisions,  and  very  much  chagrined  he  now  urged  his 
corps  commanders  to  press  forward  with  energy  and 
carry  the  new  line  before  it  could  be  materially  strength 
ened.  Meade  himself  fixed  noon  as  the  hour  of  attack. 
By  that  time,  Kershaw  had  relieved  Johnson,  and 
Jones'  guns  had  been  skillfully  disposed.  Field's  Divi 
sion  had  also  begun  to  arrive  and  occupy  the  trenches 
on  Kershaw's  left,  while  Hoke  and  Wise  remained  in 
position. 

About  midday  the  assault  commenced,  falling  princi 
pally  on  Wise  and  Hoke  next  to  the  river,  but  was  re 
pulsed  with  loss,  Wright  and  Bradford  simply  tearing 
the  Federal  ranks  to  shreds  with  their  enfilade  fire,  while 
the  other  batteries  of  Beauregard's  command  swept  the 
approaches  with  a  most  destructive  frontal  fire.  So  suc 
cessfully  did  Jones'  battalions  perform  their  task  that  a 
variance  occurs  in  the  reports  of  the  fighting  this  day, 
which  can  only  be  attributed  to  the  effect  of  the  "long 
arm."  Humphreys  states  that  every  Federal  Corps  as 
saulted  in  force  and  that  they  were  repulsed  with  loss, 
while  on  the  Confederate  side  the  day  was  not  considered 
as  one  of  general  battle  by  the  infantry,  but  as  one  of 
artillery  fighting  alone. 

"It  was  necessary  to  wait  until  night  before  Beauregard's 
artillery  could  receive  its  plaudit  of  'Well  done,,  good  and  faithful 
servant/  and  be  relieved  by  fresh  battalions  of  Longstreet's  Corps. 
Of  all  the  moonlight  nights  I  can  remember,  I  recall  that  Saturday 
night  as  perhaps  the  most  brilliant  and  beautiful.  The  weather 
was  exceedingly  dry.,  the  air  perfectly  calm,  with  an  exhilarating 


840  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

electrical  quality  in  it.  The  dust  rose  with  every  movement  and 
hung  in  the  air.  The  whole  landscape  was  bathed  and  saturated 
in  silver,,  and  sounds  were  unusually  distinct  and  seemed  to  be 
alive  and  to  travel  everywhere.  It  was  not  a  night  for  sleep  in 
the  trenches.  There  was  a  great  deal  to  be  done  at  all  points  to 
strengthen  and  improve  them.,  and  every  man  was  personally  inter 
ested  in  working  at  his  immediate  location. 

"In  spite  of  all  pains,  the  drawing  out  of  old  guns  and  approach 
of  new  was  attended  with  sounds  which  wandered  far,  and  with 
luminous  clouds  of  dust  gradually  rising  in  the  air.  Then  the 
enemy  would  know  we  were  moving,  and  there  would  come  crashes 
of  musketry  at  random  and  volleys  of  artillery  from  their  lines. 
Then  our  infantry  would  imagine  themselves  attacked,  and  would 
respond  in  like  fashion,  and  the  fire  would  run  along  the  parapet 
to  right  and  left,  and  gradually  subside  for  a  while,  to  break  out 
presently  somewhere  else." 

Such  is  Gen.  Alexander's  graphic  description  of  the 
night  of  the  18th  of  June,  when  with  his  accustomed 
energy  and  bravery  he  was  engaged  with  Lieut. -Col. 
Branch  of  Beauregard's  Artillery  in  replacing  the  lat- 
ter's  guns  with  his  own.  All  through  this  work,  his  ex 
posure  was  constant  and  to  the  verge  of  recklessness,  but 
there  was  work  to  be  done,  and  in  spite  of  the  protests  of 
his  men  he  galloped  back  and  forth,  ordering  here,  sug 
gesting  there,  and  utterly  regardless  of  his  own  safety 
until  all  was  done  that  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  re 
quired.  As  the  1st  Corps  arrived,  it  had  taken  position 
on  Beauregard's  right.  After  substituting  Huger's 
guns  for  Jones'  along  Hoke's  and  Wise's  front,  Alex 
ander  then  placed  two  batteries  of  Haskell's  and 
Gibbes'  Battalion  in  the  trenches  between  the  Baxter 
Road  and  the  Rives  house.  Haskell's  remaining  batter 
ies  were  then  posted  on  elevated  positions  in  the  second 
line. 

Beginning  at  the  salient  formed  by  the  junction  of 
the  new  with  the  old  works,  known  as  the  Rives  salient, 
where  he  posted  Richardson's  Battalion,  Col.  Walker,  to 
whose  command  the  Washington  Artillery  had  now  been 
assigned,  occupied  the  line  with  the  batteries  of  the  3d 
Corps  on  Alexander's  right,  and  extending  around  to 
the  south  and  west  as  far  as  the  Weldon  Railroad. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  841 

The  works  comprising  the  line  of  defense  at  Peters 
burg  were  by  far  the  most  pretentious  which  the  Con 
federates  had  yet  occupied.  With  the  exception  of  the 
portion  of  the  line  recently  established  by  Beauregard 
when  forced  back  on  the  17th,  they  had  been  laid  out  by 
engineer  officers  and  constructed  in  advance  by  slave 
labor.  Every  advantage  of  terrain  had  been  taken  and 
a  broad  field  of  fire  for  artillery  cleared  in  front  of  the 
line.  Of  course  there  were  defects,  but  to  a  large  ex 
tent  these  were  corrected  as  they  developed,  and  the 
works  throughout  were  rapidly  extended  and  improved. 
The  trenches  at  Cold  Harbor  had  barely  afforded  cover 
for  the  infantry,  and  the  epaulments  for  the  guns 
were  there  of  the  crudest  kind,  but  now  the  artillery  was 
to  fight  behind  real  cover  and  placed  to  the  best  ad 
vantage  after  careful  reconnaissance  of  the  approaches. 

The  morning  after  Pendleton's  Artillery  arrived,  the 
Chief  of  Artillery  accompanied  by  Gen.  Beauregard 
visited  the  north  bank  of  the  river  and,  after  a  rapid  in 
spection  of  the  terrain,  ordered  Lane's  Battalion  and 
Penick's  Battery  of  Richardson's  to  move  over  and 
fortify  the  commanding  eminence  at  the  Archer  House, 
while  Chew's  and  Clutter's  batteries  of  Mclntosh's  Bat 
talion,  under  Maj.  Marmaduke  Johnson,  were  ordered 
to  be  intrenched  on  a  lower  elevation  half  a  mile  higher 
up  the  river.  Poague's  Battalion  under  Capt.  Utter- 
back  joined  Bradford's  and  Wright's  batteries  im 
mediately  opposite  the  point  where  the  main  line  rested 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  river.  There  were  now,  there 
fore,  about  fifty  guns  placed  to  enfilade  the  approaches 
to  the  Confederate  left.  But  Grant  did  not  renew  his 
assaults  on  the  19th,  and  his  troops  occupied  themselves 
intrenching  where  they  had  bivouacked  during  the  night 
in  close  proximity  to  the  Confederate  works.  The  op 
posing  lines  thus  established  by  accident  in  a  measure 
remained  substantially  unchanged  until  Lee's  evacua 
tion  ten  months  later.* 

*Por  a  detailed  account  of  the  Richmond  Artillery  defenses  at  this  time, 
see  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXXVI,  Part  III,  pp.  809-11.  There  were 
38  pieces  of  position  on  the  lines,  with  a  force  of  Heavy  Artillery  aggregating 
2,893  present  for  duty,  and  the  1st,  2d,  and  4th  Maryland  field  batteries  with 
232  men  and  10  guns.  Ibid.,  p.  861. 


CHAPTER  XLII 

PETERSBURG THE   SIEGE    COMMENCES 

FROM  the  day  the  two  armies  confronted  each  other, 
sharpshooting  and  artillery  practice  were  incessant, 
while  both  sides  labored  constantly,  improving  their 
works.  The  great  enfilading  group  of  guns  north  of  the 
river  to  the  command  of  which  Col.  Cutts  had  been  as 
signed,  and  to  which  several  30-pounder  Parrotts  and 
12-pounder  Whitworths  were  added  and  placed  in  po 
sition  at  the  Archer  house,  at  once  attracted  the  atten 
tion  of  the  Federal  Artillery.  When  Cutts  opened  on 
the  enemy's  line  on  the  20th,  the  effect  of  his  fire,  enfi 
lade,  and  on  some  points  of  the  opposing  line  reverse, 
was  so  overwhelming  as  to  cause  great  confusion  among 
the  Federals,  and  lead  to  an  almost  immediate  change 
of  position.  A  great  effort  was  now  made  by  Hunt  to 
silence  the  Confederate  group.  During  the  next  few 
days,  Abbott's  reserve  artillery  regiment  of  1,700  men 
with  60  mortars,  ranging  from  24-pounder  Coehorns  to 
10-inch  sea  coast  pieces,  was  brought  up  and  undertook 
to  subdue  Cutts'  fire,  but  all  in  vain.  His  men  toiled 
all  the  harder  at  their  fortifications  and  soon  protected 
themselves  and  their  guns  with  bomb  proofs  and  works 
of  the  most  substantial  character.  In  the  meantime, 
however,  they  had  suffered  many  casualties  from  Ab 
bott's  terrific  mortar  fire,  including  Lieut.  Lucius  G. 
Rees,  of  Cutts'  Battalion,  who  had  so  distinguished  him 
self  on  the  North  Anna,  killed,  and  Lieut.  James  of  the 
same  battery,  wounded. 

The  effect  of  the  Federal  mortar  fire  was  also  felt  at 
other  points  of  the  line,  and  steps  were  now  taken  by 
Gen.  Alexander  to  counteract  it.  Fortunately,  he  had 
ordered  some  12-pounder  mortars  constructed  in  Rich 
mond  several  weeks  before,  and  these  began  to  ar 
rive  on  the  24th.  They  were  light  and  convenient  to 
handle,  and  with  characteristic  energy  and  skill  Alex- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  843 

ander  placed  them  at  points  where  they  could  best  as 
sist  in  the  defense  of  the  weaker  salients  of  the  line,  up 
against  which  the  enemy  had  pressed  to  short  range. 
The  number  of  these  mortars  was  gradually  increased 
until  twenty-seven  12-pounder,  24-pounder,  and  8-inch 
mortars  were  in  position  along  Beauregard's  line,  and 
thirteen  of  like  caliber  beyond  the  Rives  salient.  Inte 
rior  lines  were  now  constructed  at  the  gorges  of  the 
salients,  a  number  of  heavy  pieces  of  position  from  Rich 
mond  placed  therein  to  reply  to  six  100-pounder  and 
forty  30-pounder  Parrotts,  which  Abbott  had  drawn 
from  his  seige  train  and  mounted  in  the  permanent  works 
along  Beauregard's  abandoned  line.  These  redoubts, 
with  the  infantry  trenches  which  connected  them,  formed 
a  veritable  citadel,  behind  which  a  small  force  of  de 
fenders  were  secure  against  assault,  and  enabled  Grant 
to  constantly  extend  his  lines  to  the  west,  while  a  system 
of  redans  and  infantry  trenches  in  their  front  and 
pushed  close  up  to  the  Confederate  works  made  detach 
ment  of  the  Confederate  troops  from  their  front  ex 
tremely  risky.  But  the  weakest  part  of  the  Confederate 
line  was  Elliott's  salient,  named  from  the  brigade  as 
signed  to  its  defense.  Here  the  edge  of  the  deep  valley 
of  Poor  Creek,  which  ran  nearly  parallel  to  the 
Confederate  line  of  works,  was  but  133  yards  distant, 
while  the  depression  afforded  ample  space  and  perfect 
cover  for  the  massing  of  a  large  body  of  infantry.  Along 
the  rear  edge  of  this  valley,  the  Federals  threw  up  strong 
rifle  pits  with  elaborate  head-logs  and  loop-holes  from 
which  an  incessant  fire  was  kept  up  upon  the  Confed 
erates.  At  this  point,  Col.  Walker  posted  Cayce's  Bat 
tery  of  Pegram's  Battalion,  and  under  cover  of  night 
the  men  managed  to  place  obstructions  in  front  of  the 
parapet. 

On  the  20th,  Thomson's,  Hart's,  Shoemaker's  and 
Johnston's  batteries  were  engaged  the  entire  day  at  the 
White  House  with  Fitz  Lee  and  Hampton,  who  had 
returned  from  Trevillian's,  and  underwent  the  unusual 
experience  of  horse  artillery  fighting  both  field  artillery 


844  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

and  gunboats  at  the  same  time.*  Two  days  later,  Mc 
Gregor's  Battery  was  engaged  with  W.  H.  F.  Lee  in 
an  affair  with  Wilson's  and  Kautz's  Cavalry  at  the 
Davis  house  on  the  Weldon  Railroad.  The  Federal 
Cavalry  was  followed  by  W.  H.  F.  Lee  to  the  Staunton 
River,  where  its  progress  was  barred  by  local  militia  and 
a  force  of  artillery  at  the  bridge.  Attacked  in  rear  by 
the  Confederate  Cavalry,  with  an  impassable  stream  in 
their  front,  Wilson  and  Kautz  decided  after  having  done 
much  damage  to  the  railroads  to  return  to  Petersburg, 
and  in  doing  so  were  assailed  by  Hampton's,  Fitz  Lee's, 
and  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  brigades,  two  brigades  of  infantry 
under  Mahone,  Cayce's  Battery  under  Pegram  and  the 
entire  Horse  Battalion  under  Chew  and  Breathed  at 
Reams  Station,  where  they  were  completely  routed, 
losing  1,500  men,  two  horse  batteries  complete  with 
twelve  guns,  and  their  wagon  trains.  In  this  affair,  Pe 
gram,  Chew,  and  Breathed  were  in  their  glory,  and  in  no 
engagement  of  the  war  did  the  Horse  Artillery  display 
greater  dash,  notwithstanding  the  preceding  weeks  of 
constant  marching  and  fighting. 

Another  affair  in  which  the  Artillery  shone  with  par 
ticular  brilliance  had,  meantime,  occurred  at  Petersburg, 
in  which  Mclntosh  was  the  bright  star. 

Advised  on  the  22d  of  a  movement  by  the  2d  and  6th 
Federal  Corps  from  their  works  opposite  Hill,  against 
the  railroads  on  his  right,  Lee  sent  Hill  with  Wilcox's 
and  Mahone's  divisions,  supported  by  Johnson's,  to 
meet  it.  Mclntosh  with  the  1st  Maryland  Battery 
under  Lieut.  Gale  was  to  move  out  with  the  infantry. 
Hill's  orders  were  to  strike  the  enemy  while  stretched 
out  to  the  left,  while  Col.  Walker's  Artillery  cooperated 
with  him  from  the  lines.  When  all  was  ready,  Mc 
lntosh  with  Gale's  section  of  Clutter's  Battery  galloped 
forward  to  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's 
intrenchments  and  opened  upon  their  columns,  instantly 
causing  confusion  among  them,  while  the  infantry 

*It  will  be  recalled  that  the  artillery  had  engaged  gunboats  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock  in  1862.  Forrest  also  attacked  gunboats  on  the  Tennessee  River  with 
Morton's  horse  batteries. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  845 

rushed  forward  under  cover  of  his  fire  and  carried  the 
Federal  line.  Lieut.  Wilkes'  section  of  Capt.  Valentine 
J.  Clutter's  Richmond  Battery,  recently  added  to  Mc- 
Intosh's  Battalion,  now  moved  out  and  supported  Gale. 
While  Wilcox  obstructed  the  advance  of  the  6th  Corps, 
Mahone  and  Johnson  passed  through  a  gap  between  it 
and  the  2d  Corps,  and  struck  Barlow's  Division,  which 
was  moving  around  the  6th  Corps,  in  the  rear,  capturing 
1,700  prisoners  and  four  guns,  which  were  successfully 
brought  off  during  the  night  by  Hill  after  also  routing 
Mott's  Division.  The  conduct  of  Mclntosh,  Gale,  and 
Wilkes  on  this  occasion  elicited  the  highest  praise  from 
all  arms,  and  gives  us  a  rare  instance  of  light  batteries 
actually  maneuvering  between  intrenchments.  One  is 
almost  compelled  to  inquire  if  there  were  any  limitation 
upon  what  the  artillerymen  would  attempt. 

Lee  now  planned  an  attack  on  Meade's  right  to  be 
preceded  by  a  great  artillery  preparation.  It  was  hoped 
that  the  infantry  under  cover  of  Cutts'  enfilading  and 
Alexander's  frontal  fire  might  reach  the  Federal  mortar 
batteries  and  recover  the  outer  line.  Promptly  on  the 
morning  of  the  24th,  the  Artillery  opened  the  greatest 
cannonade  which  the  siege  had  yet  seen,  but  for  some 
reason  no  infantry  assault  occurred.  The  cannonade  was 
not  without  its  effect,  however,  for  the  enemy  was  im 
pressed  with  the  futility  of  making  subsequent  attempts 
in  that  quarter,  by  the  tremendous  power  which  the  Ar 
tillery  developed. 

During  the  next  few  days,  Gen.  Alexander's  atten 
tion  was  especially  attracted  by  the  enemy's  activity  in 
front  of  the  Elliott  salient.  Having  been  an  engineer 
officer  of  some  experience,  he  detected  signs,  which  con 
vinced  him  that  underground  work  was  going  on.  He 
had  confidently  expected  each  morning  to  see  a  "Flying 
Dutchman"  in  that  quarter,  or  some  other  evidence  of 
the  opening  of  approaches  across  the  narrow  space  in 
front  of  the  salient,  but  instead  he  had  noted  an  increase 
of  musketry  fire  from  the  Federal  works  there,  and  a 
diminishment  of  alertness  among  the  enemy's  sharp- 


846  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

shooters  on  either  side.  Each  day  he  visited  the  salient 
and  carefully  watched  what  was  going  on.  On  his  way 
back  to  his  headquarters  on  the  30th,  he  was  slightly 
wounded  by  a  sharpshooter,  and  before  leaving  the 
Army  the  next  day,  for  six  weeks,  to  visit  his  home  in 
Georgia,  he  called  at  Gen.  Lee's  headquarters  in  per 
son  and  reported  his  views  about  the  mine.  Mr.  Law- 
ley,  an  English  war  correspondent  of  the  London 
Times,,  was  present  and  inquired  how  far  it  would  be 
necessary  for  the  Federals  to  mine,  and  when  told  by 
Alexander  the  distance  was  500  feet,  he  replied  that 
the  tunnel  at  the  Siege  of  Delhi,  the  longest  ever  dug, 
was  but  400  feet,  and  that  it  was  found  impossible  to 
ventilate  a  longer  gallery.  Alexander  replied  that  there 
were  many  Pennsylvania  miners  in  Meade's  Army,  and 
that  military  precedents  would  not  deter  them  from 
making  the  attempt.  It  so  happened  that  upon  the 
advice  of  Lieut.-Col.  Pleasants,  of  the  48th  Pennsyl 
vania  Regiment,  a  coal  miner,  against  the  advice  of 
every  engineer  in  Meade's  Army,  the  Federals  had 
opened  a  gallery  on  the  27th  of  June,  just  two  days  be 
fore  Alexander  called  Lee's  attention  to  the  danger. 

Alexander  did  not  return  to  the  Army  until  August 
18,  Cabell  commanding  the  Artillery  of  the  1st  Corps 
in  his  absence,  but  upon  his  advice  Huger  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  guns  and  mortars  near  the 
salient.  The  day  after  his  departure  Gen.  Lee  directed 
his  engineers  to  open  countermines.  Shafts  with  listen 
ing  galleries  were  promptly  sunk,  unfortunately,  on  the 
flanks  of  the  salient,  for  the  Federals  were  tunneling 
straight  for  its  apex  and  their  operations  were  not 
heard.  Had  Alexander  been  present,  it  is  safe  to  say 
the  battle  of  the  Crater  would  never  have  been  fought, 
for  having  devoted  so  much  attention  to  the  salient,  he 
would  most  certainly  have  been  placed  in  charge  of  the 
countermines  and  would  have  caused  the  first  one  to  be 
opened  at  the  apex.  From  that  point  the  enemy's  mining 
20  feet  below  the  surface  would  readily  have  been  de 
tected  and  their  gallery  destroyed  by  the  explosion  of  a 
camoufletj  or  smothered  mine. 


CHAPTER  XLIII 

THE  TRENCHES  IN  JULY 

THE  strength  of  the  Artillery  about  Richmond  and 
Petersburg  had  been  greatly  enhanced  during  the  past 
month  while  the  Infantry  composed  of  Johnson's  and 
Hoke's  divisions  of  Beauregard's  Army,  Pickett's, 
Field's,  and  Kershaw's  divisions  of  the  1st  Corps,  An 
derson's,  Heth's,  and  Wilcox's  divisions  of  the  3d 
Corps,  showed  a  marked  diminishment.  In  fact,  re 
cruiting  for  the  Infantry  had  almost  come  to  a  standstill, 
and  on  July  10,  while  the  paper  strength  of  the  fore 
going  commands  aggregated  103,178  men,  there  were 
but  51,867  present  for  duty.  In  the  Cavalry  Corps  com 
posed  of  Hampton's,  Fitz  Lee's,  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee's 
divisions,  with  23,180  men  on  the  rolls,  there  were  but 
10,493  effectives  in  the  field.  In  marked  contrast  to 
these  figures  are  those  of  the  Artillery  which,  not  in 
cluding  Long's  command  in  the  Valley,  numbered 
6,472  present  for  duty,  with  an  aggregate  present  and 
absent  of  9,435.  In  other  words,  while  Lee  was  able 
to  muster  but  half  his  infantry  and  cavalry  in  the  field, 
but  one-third  of  his  artillery  personnel  was  absent,  a 
fact  which  seems  to  testify  to  a  comparatively  high  state 
of  discipline  in  the  artillery  arm. 

To  the  work  of  maintaining  his  corps,  Pendleton 
constantly  addressed  himself.  Furthermore,  he  now 
sought  to  bring  order  in  his  arm  out  of  the  chaos  into 
which  the  recent  campaign,  with  its  heavy  losses,  had 
necessarily  thrown  the  Army. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  when  Longstreet  moved  to 
Petersburg  en  route  to  Tennessee,  he  had  started  from 
the  Rapidan  with  Alexander's,  Walton's,  and  Dearing's 
battalions,  but  that  the  first  only  through  a  change  of 
plans  accompanied  him  to  the  West,  the  Washington 
Artillery  and  Dearing's  Battalion  remaining  through 
out  the  winter  in  the  Department  of  North  Carolina 


2?, 


848  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

and  Southern  Virginia  with  Pickett.  Since  that  time, 
these  two  battalions  had  considered  themselves  no 
longer  an  integral  part  of  the  1st  Corps  to  which  they 
had  been  assigned  by  G.  O.  No.  19,  June  4, 1863.  True, 
they  had  rejoined  the  Army  at  Cold  Harbor  in  June, 
but  they  had  not  fallen  under  Alexander's  immediate 
control.  In  fact,  Dearing's  old  command  under  Read 
had  again  been  detached  to  Petersburg  with  Hoke's  Di 
vision,  and  the  Washington  Artillery,  to  the  command 
of  which  Lieut. -Col.  Eshleman  had  been  assigned,  after 
his  provisional  battalion  had  been  broken  up,  later  ac 
companied  the  3d  Corps  to  Petersburg. 

Since  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  where  Walton  was 
so  rudely  displaced  by  his  junior,  the  Washington 
Artillery  had  not  been  well  disposed  towards  Alex 
ander.  These  troops  were  serving  in  a  foreign  land  and 
were  naturally  sensitive  to  anything  in  the  nature  of  a 
slight  to  their  old  commander,  so  they  had  welcomed 
their  separation  from  the  1st  Corps  Artillery  to  the  com 
mand  of  which  Alexander  had  been  assigned,  March  1, 
1864,  with  advanced  rank  from  February  26.  And  so, 
when  on  June  13,  Lee  commenced  his  movement  from 
Cold  Harbor,  the  Washington  Artillery  applied  direct 
to  the  President  to  be  allowed  to  attach  itself  to  the  3d 
Corps.  *  This  was  of  course  a  violation  of  army  regu 
lations,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  state  politics 
entered  into  the  affairs  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  as  in  the  case  of  all  other  armies  that  have  ever 
taken  the  field.  Dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of  these 
troops  with  the  persistent  disregard  of  Walton's  claims 
was  now  open,  and  as  his  case  was  undoubtedly  the 
principal  matter  in  the  politics  of  the  Artillery  Corps, 
the  facts  should  be  cited. 

On  coming  into  the  field  in  May,  1861,  Maj.  Walton 
was  the  senior  artillery  officer  in  the  Army  and  com 
manded  the  largest  artillery  organization.  After  First 
Manassas,  an  act  of  Congress  was  passed  at  the  instance 
of  Beauregard  to  authorize  the  promotion  of  artillery 

*In  Camp  and  Battle  With  the  Washington  Artillery  Battalion,  Owen,  p.  329. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  849 

officers,  Walton's  case  being  especially  mentioned  as  a 
deserving  one.  Under  this  provision,  Walton  was  pro 
moted  Colonel  and  assigned  to  duty  as  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  retaining  immediate 
command  of  the  Louisiana  Battalion.  Soon  after  this, 
Pendleton,  who  had  been  advanced  from  the  grade  of 
captain,  subsequent  to  Walton's  arrival  in  Virginia, 
was  promoted  to  the  grade  of  colonel  with  temporary 
rank,  under  the  law  authorizing  the  President  to  con 
fer  such  rank.  Though  still  Walton's  junior,  he  was 
again  promoted  and  made  brigadier-general  and 
chief  of  artillery,  when  the  reorganization  in  the 
winter  occurred,  and  Col.  Walton  was  assigned  to  duty 
as  chief  of  artillery  of  the  1st  Corps.  In  the  mean 
time,  Beauregard  and  Longstreet  repeatedly  recom 
mended  the  promotion  of  Walton,  who  was  by  service 
the  senior  artillery  officer  in  the  Confederate  armies, 
but  it  was  announced  that  no  more  brigadier-generals 
of  artillery  would  be  appointed.  All  this,  and  his  dis 
placement  at  Gettysburg  was  taken  by  Walton  with 
commendable  grace,  though  naturally  he  was  much 
chagrined.  Beauregard  had,  just  after  the  reorganiza 
tion,  written  him  as  follows :  "I  regret  to  hear  that  you 
have  not  been  promoted  to  the  rank  of  brigadier- 
general  of  artillery,  which  in  the  estimation  of  your 
friends  you  have  won  by  your  efficient  services  on  so 
many  glorious  battlefields,  commencing  with  Bull  Run. 
If  my  testimony  to  your  efficiency,  zeal  and  capacity, 
whilst  commanding  the  Battalion  of  Washington  Ar 
tillery  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  acting  as  chief 
of  artillery  of  the  First  Corps  of  that  Army,  can  be 
of  any  service  to  you  I  will  willingly  give  it  to  you,  not 
as  a  favor,  but  as  a  right  to  which  you  are  entitled." 
And  Longstreet,  before  the  reorganization,  wrote  him: 
"I  have  on  three  occasions  and  several  times  in  conver 
sation  expressed  my  opinion  and  wishes  in  favor  of  hav 
ing  you  promoted  to  the  rank  of  brigadier-general.  I 
still  think  your  services  give  you  the  best  claim  to  the 
promotion  of  any  officer  in  the  service,  and  I  am  quite 


850  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

satisfied  you  are  as  well  qualified  to  fill  the  office.  I 
still  hope  your  promotion  may  soon  come."  But  it  will 
be  recalled  that  these  letters  were  written  early  in  the 
war  and  before  experience  showed  the  necessity  of 
trained  artillery  leaders.  Beauregard  was  from  Louisi 
ana  himself,  and  Longstreet  from  Georgia,  and  it  is  a 
fact  that  before  the  tremendous  campaigns  of  1862 
welded  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  into  a  thor 
oughly  organized  and  disciplined  fighting  machine, 
state  prejudices  were  rife  and  entered  into  every  ap 
pointment.  In  fact,  Longstreet,  above  all  others,  per 
sisted  to  the  end  in  harping  on  the  favoritism  he 
imagined  was  shown  Virginians.  But  it  must  be  re 
called  that  Pendleton  owed  his  preferment  over  Walton 
largely  to  Mr.  Davis'  influence,  with  whom  he  had  been 
a  cadet  at  West  Point,  and  besides  the  day  was  one 
when  graduates  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy 
were  in  the  ascendant. 

Though  a  veteran  of  the  Mexican  War,  Walton  was 
not  a  West  Pointer.  To  soothe  his  disappointment,  he 
was  now  offered  the  command  of  a  Louisiana  Brigade 
with  advanced  rank  in  the  infantry,  but  this  he  refused, 
as  he  could  not  see  how  assignment  to  the  command  of 
an  infantry  brigade  of  1,000  men,  in  lieu  of  that  over 
80  guns,  was  really  a  promotion.  The  next  affronts  to 
Walton  were  the  appointment  of  Long  as  brigadier- 
general  September  21,  1863,  Shoup  during  the  winter 
in  the  Western  Army,  and  Alexander,  his  second  rank 
ing  battalion  commander,  March  1,  1864,  with  rank 
from  February  26.  In  the  meantime,  Col.  Stephen  D. 
Lee,  of  the  Artillery,  had  been  promoted  and  assigned 
to  the  command  of  an  infantry  brigade  in  the  West, 
November  6,  1862,  soon  to  be  again  promoted  August 
3,  1863.  Whatever  Longstreet's  early  views  about 
Walton  may  have  been,  it  would  not  seem  that  he  had 
long  retained  them,  for  he  supplanted  him,  as  we  have 
seen,  at  Gettysburg  by  Alexander  and  intentionally 
left  him  behind  when  he  made  his  expedition  to  Tennes 
see.  One  thing  seems  certain.  If  Longstreet  still,  in 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  851 

1863,  professed  the  advocacy  of  Walton's  promotion, 
he  was  not  acting  in  good  faith  or  was  doing  so  to  secure 
his  transfer  from  the  1st  Corps. 

In  the  meantime,  Walton  was  not  the  only  artillery 
officer  sidetracked.  Col.  Cabell  had  been  persistently 
overslaughed  because  of  his  age.  His  own  adjutant  has 
recorded  that  this  distinguished  member  of  a  proud  and 
historic  family  "lacked  self-assertion  and  aggression; 
to  some  extent,  too,  he  lacked  the  manner  and  bearing 
of  a  soldier,  and  he  never  maneuvered  for  position  for 
himself  or  his  battalion."*  "His  essential  characteristics 
were  a  pure  and  unselfish  nature,  tender  and  affectionate 
heart,  gentle  and  unfailing  courtesy,  single-hearted  and 
devoted  partiotism,  quiet  but  indomitable  courage." 
"He  was  a  man  of  intellect  and  culture,  as  well  as  char 
acter."  But  all  these  virtures  together  did  not  spell 
fitness  for  high  command  in  the  Artillery  and  their  very 
enumeration  points  to  the  fact  that  his  military  confi 
dante  knew  he  lacked  the  dash  and  ability  requisite  for 
successful  leadership  and  confirms  the  estimate  of  him 
entertained  at  headquarters  which  has  been  previously 
stated.  A  serious  effort,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  made 
to  sidetrack  Cabell  by  transferring  him  to  the  defenses 
of  Richmond,  and  there  was  even  the  suggestion  that  he 
be  given  advanced  rank  in  order  that  it  might  be  accom 
plished.  Upon  learning  from  his  friends  of  this  sug 
gested  promotion,  the  gallant  old  soldier  was  much 
gratified,  until  by  accident  he  discovered  the  motive, 
when  he  flamed  into  an  ungovernable  rage  and  de 
manded  to  know  if  he  was  taken  for  a  "damned  sneak 
and  coward  and  fool."  He  surrendered  his  old  bat 
talion,  it  is  true,  but  not  until  Appomattox. 

We  have  seen  how  Col.  Brown  was  overslaughed  in 
the  interest  of  Long,  not  by  reason  of  lack  of  ability, 
for  he  was  an  exceptionally  fine  officer,  competent  and 
successful,  but  because  Long's  claims  were  more  ac 
ceptable  at  headquarters.  Cabell  and  Brown,  like  Wal 
ton,  were  not  West  Pointers.  From  the  foregoing 

*Four  Years  Under  Marse  Robert,  Stiles,  p.  155. 


852  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

facts,  it  does  not  appear  that  Walton  was  the  only  one 
who  was  overslaughed,  whether  justly  or  not,  or  that 
state  politics  alone  controlled  in  his  case.  Indeed,  we 
can  go  still  further  in  tracing  the  effort  to  hand  the 
tactical  reins  of  the  Artillery  over  to  young  and  trained 
soldiers,  for  was  not  Pendleton  himself,  at  first  seized 
upon  with  such  avidity  as  the  senior  artilleryman, 
gradually  displaced  from  tactical  command?  The  ef 
fort  to  dispose  of  him  on  the  battlefield  has  been  clearly 
perceptible  in  every  reorganization  of  the  arm.  In  fact, 
except  with  regard  to  his  actual  rank,  his  case  was  not 
dissimilar  to  that  of  Walton's,  and  an  unprejudiced  stu 
dent  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  will  be  com 
pelled  to  admit  that  all  these  unfortunate  maneuvers, 
disappointing  as  they  were  to  certain  faithful  soldiers 
and  their  friends,  were  in  the  interest  of  artillery  effi 
ciency.  Of  course  Walton  and  Cabell  could  not  ap 
preciate  this.  Soon  after  Alexander's  promotion,  Wal 
ton  had  applied  to  be  relived  from  duty  with  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  and  at  his  own  suggestion  was 
assigned  to  duty  as  Inspector  of  Field  Artillery  at 
Large.  During  his  absence,  a  strong  effort  developed 
in  the  Artillery  arm  to  declare  all  positions  not  actually 
filled  in  the  mobile  army  vacant,  in  order  that  adequate 
promotion  might  be  given  officers  present  in  the  field. 
In  pursuance  of  this  hard  plan,  concerning  which  much 
is  to  be  said  on  both  sides,  Maj.  S.  F.  Pierson,  who  had 
not  served  with  the  Army  in  the  field  for  several  years, 
but  who  still  held  his  commission  therein,  was  trans 
ferred  to  the  Virginia  Reserves  on  July  21,  and  Lieut. - 
Col.  John  S.  Saunders  was  transferred  to  the  Inspector 
Generals  Department.*  But  Walton  had  a  friend  at 
court  in  Gen.  Bragg,  who  had  him  ordered  back  to  the 
Army  to  prevent  his  elimination.  Returning  to  the 
Army  after  an  arduous  tour  of  duty  in  the  South,  Wal 
ton  now  found  it  necessary  to  accept  service  under  those 
formerly  his  juniors,  or  resign.  While  he  did  not  dis 
parage  the  ability  of  Long  and  Alexander,  yet  he  did 

*Rel)enion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XL,  Part  III,  pp.  790,  797. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  853 

not  feel  that  such  a  course  was  consistent  with  his 
dignity.  Furthermore,  he  was  forced  to  the  conclusion 
upon  a  review  of  events  than  his  services  were  no  longer 
valued.  Accordingly  on  July  18,  he  tendered  his 
resignation  and  addressed  a  remarkable  and  pathetic 
communication  to  his  gallant  command,  in  which  much 
of  the  foregoing  matter  is  included.  "It  is  with  re 
luctance,"  wrote  he,  "that  I  have  been  forced  from  the 
service,  with  grief  that  I  find  myself  separated  from 
you,  with  whom,  I  had  hoped,  should  Providence  per 
mit,  to  return  to  the  city  of  our  home.  Circumstances 
have  denied  me  this  privilege ;  but  harsh  as  may  be  their 
decree,  they  cannot  rob  me  of  the  consolatory  conviction 
that  while  with  you  I  tried  to  deserve  your  affection 
and  esteem,  nor  of  the  hope  that  while  absent  I  may 
retain  them." 

In  the  diary  of  the  Washington  Artillery  as  an  entry 
of  July  20,  the  following  is  found:  "The  resignation 
of  our  gallant  old  chief,  Col.  Walton,  has  been  accepted. 
We  shall  never  cease  to  regret  the  circumstances  that 
have  induced  this  action.  All  our  hearts  are  so  attached 
to  him,  that  no  one,  no  matter  how  capable  he  may 
prove  himself,  can  command  the  Washington  Artillery 
as  he  has  done,  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war."  Such  were 
the  sentiments  which  animated  the  men  of  that  splendid 
command,  whose  services  in  Virginia  were  so  heroic  and 
so  unselfish  from  first  to  last.  But  it  is  not  difficult  to 
see  in  the  pages  of  the  diary  quoted  from  that  the  cir 
cumstances  which  entailed  the  resignation  of  Walton 
were  appreciated  in  their  proper  light,  as  well  as  la 
mented.  The  devotion  of  his  officers  and  men  to  Wal 
ton  could  not  blind  them  to  the  fact  that  his  age  (54 
years)  and  physical  strength  had  rendered  him  un- 
suited  to  further  activity  in  the  field. 

On  the  day  of  Walton's  resignation,  the  Washington 
Artillery  was  ordered  to  rejoin  the  1st  Corps,  and 
regularly  report  through  its  chief.  This  order  of  Gen. 
Pendleton's  no  doubt  precipitated  Walton's  final  action. 
But  special  authority  was  obtained  from  the  President 


854  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

overruling  Pendleton's  order,  and  the  battalion  was  as 
signed  to  Col.  Walker's  3d  Corps  Artillery,  although 
desirous  of  being  attached  to  Beauregard's  command. 
This  transfer  met  with  Pendleton's  approval,  provided 
another  battalion  were  assigned  to  the  1st  Corps  in  its 
place.  On  July  31,  however,  Maj.  Owen  was  again  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  the  13th  Virginia  Battalion, 
which  he  bad  previously  commanded  in  Tennessee,  re 
lieving  Maj.  Gibbes  and  reporting  to  Lieut. -Col.  Frank 
Huger,  Acting  Chief  of  Artillery  1st  Corps,  in  the  ab 
sence  of  Alexander.  The  13th  Virginia  Battalion  then 
consisted  of  Davidson's,  Walker's  "Otey,"  and  Dicken- 
son's  batteries,  with  12  guns  and  450  men. 

Another  matter  affecting  the  artillery  organization 
now  came  up  for  final  adjustment.  During  the  month 
of  July,  Maj.  Edgar  F.  Moseley,  who,  though  holding 
his  commission  in  the  1st  Virginia  Regiment  of  Ar 
tillery,  had  for  some  time  commanded  a  battalion  under 
Beauregard,  was  promoted  lieutenant-colonel  and  reas 
signed  to  the  same  battalion.  From  the  first  it  had  ap 
peared  an  incongruity  to  allow  officers  of  a  single  inde 
pendent  regiment  to  be  promoted  without  reference  to 
other  commands  and  to  command  battalions  while  hold 
ing  a  commission  in  this  regiment.  Before  Col.  Brown's 
death,  he  had  sought  to  have  Maj .  Moseley  promoted  in 
the  1st  Regiment  vice  Lieut. -Col.  Coleman,  but  met 
with  Pendleton's  opposition  on  the  ground  that  there 
could  be  no  such  independent  regimental  promotion. 
But  at  last  Moseley  was  promoted  without  reference  to 
Pendleton's  views,  whereupon  the  Chief  of  Artillery 
strenuously  protested  against  the  disregard  of  the 
claims  of  other  officers  in  the  arm,  senior  in  rank,  and 
with  infinitely  more  service  than  Moseley  had  to  his 
credit.  Furthermore,  Pendleton  now  sought  to  have 
the  old  regimental  organization  of  the  1st  Virginia  Ar 
tillery  abolished  as  inconsistent  with  the  general 
scheme  of  artillery  organization, 

This  regiment  was  organized  under  state  authority  in 
1861,  in  the  Army  of  the  Peninsula  under  Magruder, 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  855 

and  turned  over  to  the  Confederacy  as  such  by  Vir 
ginia.  Magruder,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  an  artilleryman 
himself,  and  had  with  Alexander,  from  the  first  urged 
the  organization  of  artillery  in  large  groups,  and  this 
he  proceeded  to  do  in  his  own  army.  The  original  of 
ficers  elected  in  the  regiment  were  Col.  George  W. 
Randolph,  afterwards  Brigadier-General  and  Secre 
tary  of  War,  Lieut. -Col.  Henry  Coalter  Cabell,  and 
Maj.  John  Thompson  Brown.  When  Randolph  was 
promoted,  Cabell  became  colonel  and  Brown  lieutenant- 
colonel,  but  the  majority  remained  vacant  for  some  time. 
The  companies  associated  to  form  the  regiment  were 
the  Richmond  Fayette,  originally  commanded  by 
Randolph,  then  Cabell;  the  2d  Richmond  Howitzers, 
originally  commanded  by  Brown;  the  3d  Richmond 
Howitzers,  orginally  commanded  by  Robert  Stanard; 
Sands'  or  Ritter's  Henrico;  Southall's  or  Wyatt's 
Albemarle;  and  Allen's  Hampton;  Cosnahan's  Penin 
sula;  Coke's  Williamsburg ;  Young's  Yorktown;  and 
Richardson's  James  City,  batteries.  Of  these  Allen's 
was  soon  detached  from  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  being  brigaded  with  another  to  form  Allen's  Bat 
talion,  while  Cosnahan's  and  Coke's  were  merged  in 
the  spring  of  1862  under  Capt.  John  Coke.  In  October, 
Coke's  and  Ritter's  batteries  were  broken  up  and  the 
men  and  guns  distributed  among  other  batteries,  so  that 
but  six  of  its  original  batteries  remained  in  the  Army 
after  the  reorganization,  the  Fayette  being  sooner  or 
later  assigned  to  Dearing's,  then  Read's,  the  2d  and  3d 
Howitzers  to  the  1st  Virginia  Regiment  under  Brown, 
and  Wyatt's  to  Poague's  Battalion,  while  Young's  and 
Richardson's  only  remained  with  Moseley  when  elected 
major  of  the  regiment  in  the  summer  of  1862. 

In  July,  1864,  Young's  Battery  alone  remained  in 
Moseley's  Battalion,  Richardson's  being  on  detached 
duty  at  Chaffin's  Bluff,  so  that  the  original  regiment 
was  virtually  defunct  and  was  entitled  to  no  field- 
officers. 


856  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Pendleton's  recommendation  for  the  official  disband- 
ment  of  the  regiment  was  forwarded  approved  by  Gen. 
Lee  and  referred  to  Gen.  Bragg  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  who  endorsed  the  views  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery. 
The  upshot  of  the  whole  matter  was  the  official  dis- 
bandment  of  the  regiment  on  August  29,  1864,  and  its 
recognition  as  a  battalion  of  six  companies  to  which  no 
extraordinary  rule  of  promotion  should  apply. 

Having  taken  steps  to  accomplish  this  end,  though 
failing  in  having  the  Washington  Artillery  reassigned 
to  the  1st  Corps,  Pendleton  now  called  on  Col.  Jones 
for  the  return  of  Read's  Battalion  to  Pickett's  Division, 
from  which  it  had  been  detached  to  operate  with  Hoke. 

When  Lee  crossed  the  James  on  June  17  and  18,  he 
had  left  behind  near  Malvern  Hill  Cutshaw's  and 
Hardaway's  battalions  of  the  2d  Corps  under  Col. 
Carter  to  patrol  the  river  and  resist  the  approach  of 
transports  and  gunboats.  On  the  13th  of  July,  Col. 
Carter,  with  Cutshaw's  Battalion,  had  moved  to 
Walker's  farm,  while  a  small  Confederate  cavalry 
force  advanced  towards  Rowland's  Mill  and  a  regiment 
to  the  vicinity  of  Charles  City  Court  House.  Carter's 
scouts  along  the  river  reported  that  no  vessels  of  any 
kind  had  passed  down  the  river  since  the  llth,  but  about 
4  P.  M.  he  discerned  two  vessels,  one  a  passenger  and 
the  other  a  freight  steamer,  moving  up  stream.  Throw 
ing  Cutshaw's  guns  into  action  on  the  bank,  among 
them  a  Whitworth  rifle,  Carter  opened  fire  on  these 
vessels,  injuring  the  freighter  to  some  extent  and  strik 
ing  the  transport,  which  caused  it  to  turn  back  to  Fort 
Powhatan  before  reaching  the  channel  nearest  the  guns. 
That  night  the  battalion  withdrew  to  Phillip's  Farm, 
six  miles  back  from  the  river,  and  went  into  camp.  On 
the  14th,  Carter  reappeared  at  Malvern  Hill  and  with 
the  Whitworth  drove  off  a  picket  gunboat  opposite 
Turkey  Island  House.  Two  days  later  the  Whitworth 
successfully  drove  back  down  the  river  three  small  gun 
boats  which  had  steamed  up  stream  to  clear  the  river  of 
the  Confederate  artillery,  while  Graham's  Battery  of 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  857 

Hardaway's  Battalion,  with  four  20-pounder  Parrotts 
opened  from  Tilghman's  Gate  upon  the  pontoon  bridge, 
a  gunboat,  and  the  Federal  camp  at  Deep  Bottom. 
The  gunboat  was  struck  several  times  and  finally  re 
tired  to  the  cover  of  the  river  bank  and  the  camp  was 
thrown  into  such  a  commotion  that  an  entire  brigade  left 
the  woods  near  Four-Mile  Creek  at  a  double-quick  and 
took  shelter  in  the  trenches.  Carter  also  employed  his 
cannoneers  in  these  expeditions  as  sharpshooters,  hav 
ing  armed  them  with  captured  cavalry  carbines,  and  pro 
posed  thereafter  to  operate  with  a  single  battery  fully 
mounted.  Again  it  may  be  said,  this  was  remarkable 
service  for  field  artillery,  but  it  showed  the  ready 
adaptability  of  that  arm  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  any 
situation. 

Carter's  activity  along  the  James  shelling  the  Federal 
transports,  gunboats,  and  landings,  kept  Butler  in  such 
a  constant  state  of  alarm,  that  soon  Grant's  attention 
was  directed  to  this  quarter.  On  the  26th,  Hancock 
with  20,000  infantry  and  22  pieces  of  artillery,  and 
Sheridan  with  6,000  cavalry,  were  started  for  Deep 
Bottom  to  cooperate  with  Butler  in  surprising  the  Con 
federates,  and  making  a  dash  upon  Richmond.  Wilcox's 
Division  was  already  at  Drewry's  Bluff,  for  noting  a 
movement  among  the  enemy  towards  the  James,  Lee 
had  sent  it  and  Kershaw's  Division  on  the  24th  to  re- 
enforce  Conner's  Brigade  and  Carter's  artillery  force 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  During  the  night  of  the 
26th,  Hancock  and  Sheridan  crossed  the  river  and  at 
dawn  advanced.  Kershaw's  Infantry  almost  at  once 
fell  back,  leaving  Graham's  1st  Rockbridge  Battery 
without  supports  in  an  advanced  position,  where  after 
defending  itself  with  superb  coolness  for  some  time  its 
four  large  Parrotts  were  captured.  On  hearing  of  Han 
cock's  crossing,  Lee  immediately  sent  over  W.  H.  F. 
Lee's  Division  of  cavalry  with  McGregor's  Battery, 
and  Heth's  Division  of  the  2d  Corps,  while  on  the  night 
of  the  28th,  Poague's  Battalion  and  Penick's  Battery 
were  ordered  from  their  positions  north  of  the  Appomat- 


858  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

tox  to  join  Col.  Carter.  When  Grant  found  that  his 
movement  had  been  anticipated,  he  ordered  Hancock  to 
recross  the  river  on  the  night  of  the  29th.  Col.  Poague 
was  now  directed  to  take  position  on  the  left  of  Pickett's 
line,  and  guard  that  flank  against  the  approach  of  the 
enemy  from  Dutch  Gap,  where  he  remained  through 
out  the  winter  shelling  Butler's  working  parties  along 
the  canal  with  guns  and  mortars. 

On  the  north  side  of  the  river,  the  Confederate  line 
extended  from  New  Market  toward  White  Oak  Swamp, 
the  right  resting  near  the  Chaffin  farm.  When  Hancock 
first  appeared  before  this  line,  Gen.  Ewell,  who  com 
manded  the  Richmond  defenses,  had  urged  the  turning 
out  of  the  Local  Defense  troops,  but  to  this  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  had  objected  on  account  of  the  inconven 
ience  and  interruption  it  caused  the  government  depart 
ments,  from  which  the  men  were  mostly  drawn.  The 
dispatch  of  Anderson  to  the  James  by  Gen.  Lee,  with 
Wilcox's  and  Kershaw's  divisions,  had  rendered  the  step 
unnecessary,  but  Lieut.-Col.  Pemberton,  in  charge  of 
the  Artillery  defenses  of  the  city,  had  on  the  27th 
posted  two  batteries  of  Lightfoot's  Battalion  at  the 
intersection  of  the  Mill  and  Varina  Roads,  behind  Con 
ner's  right,  and  the  other  battery  near  the  New  Market 
Road,  all  on  the  exterior  line  of  works,  while  Maj. 
Stark's  Battalion,  composed  of  the  Mathews  and 
Giles  batteries  under  Capts.  Andrew  D.  Armistead 
and  David  A.  French,  respectively,  were  posted  near 
the  Barton  house.  Pemberton's  two  battalions  num- 
ered  700  men  with  22  guns,  or  about  100  men  per  bat 
tery.  Soon  the  Louisiana  Guard  Battery,  Capt. 
Charles  A.  Green,  Jr.,  which  had  been  on  duty  in 
Richmond  since  its  misfortune  on  the  Rapidan,  joined 
Stark's  Battalion. 


CHAPTER  XLIV 

THE  CKATER 

WE  have  seen  that  Gen.  Alexander  had  detected 
signs  of  the  enemy's  mining  operations,  and  that  on 
July  1  the  Confederate  engineers  had  opened  counter 
mines.  By  July  10,  the  Confederates  had  done  enough 
work,  had  it  been  done  at  the  salient,  to  have  heard  the 
enemy,  who  would  have  been  directly  beneath  them. 
Besides  those  on  the  flanks  of  the  salient,  two  other 
shafts  farther  to  the  left  near  Colquitt's  and  Gracie's 
salients  were  opened  on  the  10th  and  19th,  respectively, 
and  were  being  vigorously  pushed.  A  perfect  mania 
for  tunneling  seemed  to  have  broken  out  among  the 
Confederates.  On  the  llth,  Bushrod  Johnson  urged 
that  listening  galleries  be  constructed  along  his  lines, 
all  of  which  goes  to  show  that  no  one  but  Alexander 
had  really  perceived  the  enemy's  objective.  On  the 
12th,  the  enemy  opened  upon  Wise's  Brigade  an  un 
usually  heavy  mortar  fire,  which  not  only  necessitated 
night  work  on  the  bomb-proofs,  but  caused  Johnson  to 
order  greater  efforts  on  Maj.  Moseley's  part  to  sub 
due  this  fire. 

Before  leaving  the  Army,  Alexander  had  placed 
about  half  a  dozen  Coehorn  mortars  in  the  ravines  im 
mediately  in  rear  of  Elliott's  salient,  and  on  June  20 
he  had  posted  the  16  guns  of  Haskell's  Battalion  in  the 
sunken  Jerusalem  Road,  600  yards  in  its  rear,  all  under 
Col.  Haskell.  Though  somewhat  exposed  to  the 
enemy's  fire,  which  overshot  the  works  in  their  front, 
Haskell's  batteries  were  not  permitted  to  break  ground 
or  show  any  sign  of  their  presence.  This  disposition  of 
these  guns  was  a  foresight  for  which  the  entire  Army,  as 
we  shall  see,  should  have  been  grateful  to  Alexander. 

On  the  27th,  Alexander,  before  being  ordered  to  the 
north  of  the  James  River,  carefully  inspected  his  lines 
and  was  by  no  means  satisfied  with  the  protection  Col. 


860  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Huger  had  provided  for  the  1st  Corps  guns.  The 
works  of  Huger's  and  CabelFs  battalions  were  in  his 
opinion  entirely  too  slight  to  withstand  the  fire  of  the 
heavy  pieces,  which  he  expected  the  enemy  to  bring  to 
bear  on  them.  Accordingly  Huger  was  directed  to  em 
ploy  his  cannoneers  in  strengthening  these  works,  as  no 
infantry  or  other  labor  was  available. 

The  next  day,  Col.  Walker,  who  still  had  Pegram's, 
Mclntosh's,  and  Richardson's  battalions  less  Penick's 
Battery,  in  position  on  Huger's  right,  reported  that  the 
enemy  were  strengthening  their  works  in  his  front,  and 
increasing  the  number  of  their  guns  to  such  an  extent 
that  he  was  working  his  cannoneers  in  reliefs  of  from  40 
to  100  men  day  and  night,  while  Mahone's  Division  of 
the  3d  Corps  alone  remained  in  the  trenches  in  support 
of  his  guns.  On  the  night  of  the  28th,  Colquitt's  Bri 
gade  of  Hoke's  Division,  and  Wise's  of  Johnson's  Di 
vision  were  secretly  transferred  to  the  portion  of  the  line 
which  had  been  held  by  Field's  Division  before  it  was 
moved  across  the  James  River  with  Anderson  to  oppose 
Hancock,  while  Gracie's  Division  was  placed  in  the 
works  on  Johnson's  left.  The  utmost  caution  and  silence 
was  enjoined  upon  the  troops.  Capt.  Richard  G.  Pe 
gram's  Petersburg  Battery,  of  Coit's  Battalion,  still  oc 
cupied  Elliott's  salient. 

Having  practically  completed  his  mine,  Grant  had 
sought,  as  we  have  seen,  to  draw  off  a  large  portion  of 
the  Confederates  to  the  north  side  of  the  river,  before 
springing  it.  A  gallery  511  feet  long,  with  two  branch 
galleries  at  the  end,  to  the  right  and  left,  each  37  feet 
long,  had  been  successfully  dug.  Col.  Pleasants'  method 
of  ventilation  was  a  simple  one.  "When  the  tunnel  had 
penetrated  the  hill  far  enough  to  need  it,  a  close  par 
tition  was  built  across  it  near  the  entrance  with  a  close- 
fitting  door.  Through  the  partition  on  the  side  of  this 
door  was  passed  the  open  end  of  a  large  square  box,  or 
closed  trough,  which  was  built  along  on  the  floor  of  the 
tunnel,  conveying  the  fresh  outside  air  to  the  far  end 
of  the  tunnel,  where  the  men  extending  it  were  at  work. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  861 

"To  create  a  draught  through  the  air  box,  a  fireplace 
was  excavated  in  the  side  of  the  tunnel,  within  the  par 
tition,  and  a  chimney  was  pierced  through  the  hill  above 
it.  A  small  fire  in  this  chimney  place,  and  the  outside 
air  would  pass  through  the  air-box  to  the  far  end  of  the 
tunnel,  whence  it  would  return  and  escape  up  the  chim 
ney,  taking  with  it  the  foul  air  of  the  tunnel."  This 
gallery  was  finished  July  17th,  the  flank  galleries  on  the 
23d,  and  on  the  28th,  the  very  day  Lee  was  moving  his 
troops  from  his  line  to  oppose  Grant's  feint  to  the  north, 
each  gallery  was  charged  with  4,000  pounds  of  gun 
powder. 

The  Federals  knew  that  Lee  had  detected  their  opera 
tions,  for  they  themselves  could  hear  the  Confederates 
at  work  in  the  countermines.  Nevertheless,  they  de 
termined  to  delay  the  explosion  until  preparations  for  a 
grand  charge  to  succeed  it  could  be  completed.  For  the 
assault  a  large  force  of  infantry  was  to  be  employed, 
which  was  to  rush  forward  under  cover  of  the  concen 
trated  fire  of  many  batteries.  From  their  signal  towers, 
the  Federal  lookouts  had  located  the  position  of  nearly 
every  gun  in  the  Confederate  lines,  and  81  heavy  guns 
and  mortars,  and  about  as  many  field  pieces  were 
brought  up  and  placed  in  position  to  bear  on  them.  But 
Haskell's  Battalion  was  overlooked,  thanks  to  Alex 
ander. 

Having  failed  in  his  effort  against  Swell's  outer  line, 
Grant  at  Deep  Bottom  on  the  28th  gave  orders  for  the 
explosion  of  the  mine  on  the  morning  of  the  30th.  "The 
explosion  might  have  been  arranged  for  the  afternoon 
of  the  29th,  but  the  morning  of  the  30th  was  chosen,  as 
it  permitted  the  placing  of  more  heavy  guns  and  mor 
tars  for  the  bombardment,  which  would  follow  the  ex 
plosion  as  well  as  preliminary  arrangements,  such  as 
massing  the  troops,  removing  parapets  and  abattis  to 
make  passages  for  the  assaulting  columns,  and  posting 
of  pioneers  to  remove  our  abattis  and  open  passages  for 
artillery  through  our  lines.  Depots  of  intrenching  tools, 
with  sand  bags,  gabions,  fascines,  etc.,  were  established, 


862  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

that  lodgments  might  be  more  quickly  made,  though  the 
pioneers  of  all  regiments  were  already  supplied  with 
tools."  Engineer  officers  were  detailed  to  accompany 
each  corps,  and  the  Chief  Engineer  was  directed  to  park 
his  pontoon  trains  at  a  convenient  point,  ready  to  move 
at  a  moment's  warning,  for  Meade  having  assured  him 
self  that  the  Confederates  had  no  second  line  on  Ceme 
tery  Hill,  as  he  had  formerly  supposed,  and  as  had  been 
positively  reported  to  him,  was  now  sanguine  of  success, 
and  made  these  preparations  to  meet  the  contingency  of 
the  meagre  Confederate  force  retiring  beyond  the  Ap- 
pomattox  and  burning  the  bridges.  In  such  an  event, 
he  proposed  to  push  immediately  across  the  river  and 
Swift  Creek  and  open  up  communications  with  Butler 
at  Bermuda  Hundred,  before  Lee  could  send  any  re 
inforcements  from  his  five  divisions  north  of  the 
James. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  when  Meade  issued 
his  orders  for  the  attack,  Lee  had  but  three  small  divi 
sions,  Johnson's,  Hoke's,  and  Mahone's  behind  his 
works,  and  Alexander's,  Jones',  and  three  battalions  of 
Walker's  Artillery.  As  soon  as  it  was  dark,  Burnside 
was  to  mass  his  troops  in  the  valley  opposite  Elliott's 
salient  and  remove  the  abattis  in  his  front,  so  that  the 
columns  of  assault  might  debouch  rapidly.  He  was 
to  spring  the  mine  at  about  3:30  A.  M.,  and,  moving 
rapidly  through  the  breach,  seize  the  crest  of  Cemetery 
Hill,  a  ridge  four  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  Con 
federate  lines. 

Ord  was  to  mass  the  18th  Corps  in  rear  of  the  9th, 
and  to  follow  and  support  Burnside's  right. 

Warren  was  to  reduce  the  number  of  men  holding  his 
front  to  the  minimum,  concentrate  heavily  on  the  right 
of  his  corps,  and  support  Burnside's  left.  Hancock 
was  to  mass  the  2d  Corps  in  rear  of  Ord's  trenches,  and 
be  prepared  to  support  the  assault  as  developments 
might  dictate,  while  Hunt  was  to  concentrate  his  ar 
tillery  on  the  hostile  guns  in,  and  commanding  the 
salient.  Thus  did  Grant  mass  60,000  men  to  fall  upon 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  863 

a  single  point  of  Lee's  ten  miles  of  line,  behind  the 
whole  of  which  there  was  hardly  one  man  for  every  six 
in  the  assaulting  column.  Now  let  another  describe 
what  occurred:* 

"Long  before  dawn  of  the  30th  the  troops  were  in  position,  and 
at  half  past  three,,  punctually  to  the  minute,  the  mine  was  fired. 
Then  the  news  passed  swiftly  down  the  lines,  and  the  dark  columns, 
standing  in  serried  masses,  waited  in  dread  suspense  the  signal, 
knowing  that  death  awaited  many  of  them  on  yonder  crest,  yet  not 
animated  by  the  stern  joy  of  coming  fight,  nor  yet  rosolved  that 
though  death  stalked  forth  with  horrid  mien  from  the  dreadful 
breach,  it  should  be  but  to  greet  victory. 

"Minute  followed  minute  of  anxious  waiting, — a  trial  to  even 
the  most  determined  veterans, — and  now  the  east  was  streaked  with 
gray,  yet  the  tender  beauty  of  the  dim  tranquillity  remained  unvexed 
of  any  sound  of  war,  save  one  might  hear  a  low  hum  amid  the 
darkling  swarm  as  grew  the  wonder  at  delay.  Nor  was  the  cause 
of  hindrance  easy  to  ascertain,  for  should  it  prove  that  the  fuse 
was  still  alight,  burning  but  slowly,  to  enter  the  mine  was  certain 
death.  Thus  time  dragged  slowly  on,  telegram  upon  telegram  of 
inquiry  meanwhile  pouring  in  from  Meade,  who,  unmindful  of  the 
dictum  of  Napoleon,  that  'in  assaults  a  general  should  be  with  his 
troops,'  had  fixed  his  headquarters  full  a  mile  away.  But  these 
were  all  unheeded,  for  Burnside  knew  not  what  to  answer. 

"Then  it  was  that  two  brave  men,  whose  names  should  be  men 
tioned  with  respect  whenever  courage  is  honored,  Lieut.  Jacob 
Douty  and  Sergt.  Henry  Rees,  both  of  the  Forty-eighth  Pennsyl 
vania,  volunteered  for  the  peculiar  service  and  entered  the  mine. 
Crawling  on  their  hands  and  knees,  groping  in  utter  darkness,  they 
found  that  the  fuse  had  gone  out  about  50  feet  from  the  mouth  of 
the  main  gallery,  relighted  it  and  retired. 

"  'In  eleven  minutes  now  the  mine  will  explode,'  Pleasants  re 
ports  to  Burnside  at  thirty-three  minutes  past  four,  and  a  small 
group  of  officers  of  the  Forty-eighth,  standing  upon  the  slope  of 
the  main  parapet,  anxiously  await  the  result. 

"  'It  lacks  a  minute  yet,'  says  Pleasants,  looking  at  his  watch. 

'  'Not  a  second,'  cried  Douty,  'for  there  she  goes.' 

"A  slight  tremor  of  the  earth  for  a  second,  then  the  rocking 
as  of  an  earthquake,  and  with  a  tremendous  burst  which  rent  the 
sleeping  hills  beyond,  a  vast  column  of  earth  and  smoke  shoots 
upward  to  a  great  height,  its  dark  sides  flashing  out  sparks  of 

"The  following  narrative  of  events  from  the  pen  of  Capt.  William  Gordon 
McCabe  is  the  best  account  of  the  battle  of  the  Crater  ever  written,  and  so 
recognized  both  North,  South,  and  abroad.  It  has  stood  the  severest  tests  of 
both  time  and  criticism.  Capt.  McCabe  was  the  gallant  adjutant  of  Col. 
William  J.  Pegram's  Artillery  Battalion,  and  reflected  all  the  dash  and  courage 
of  his  celebrated  young  commander. 


24 


864  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

fire,  hangs  poised  for  a  moment  in  mid-air,  and  then  hurtling  down 
ward  with  a  roaring  sound,  showers  of  stones,  broken  timbers,  and 
blackened  human  limbs,  subsides — the  gloomy  pall  of  darkening 
smoke  flushing  to  an  angry  crimson  as  it  floats  away  to  meet  the 
morning  sun.  Pleasants  has  done  his  work  with  terrible  complete 
ness,  for  now  the  site  of  the  Elliott  Salient  is  marked  by  a  horrid 
chasm,  135  feet  in  length,  97  feet  in  breadth,  and  30  feet  deep,  and 
its  brave  garrison  all  asleep,  save  the  guards,  when  thus  surprised 
by  sudden  death,  lie  buried  beneath  the  jagged  blocks  of  blackened 
clay — in  all,  256  officers  and  men  of  the  18th  and  22d  South 
Carolina, — 2  officers  and  20  men  of  Pegram's  Petersburg  Battery." 

Two  of  Pegram's  guns  were  hurled  through  the  air 
to  a  great  distance.  Of  the  two  Confederate  galleries 
on  the  flanks  of  the  mine,  one,  which  was  unoccupied, 
was  destroyed  by  the  explosion,  while  the  miners  at 
work  in  the  other  were  badly  shaken  up  but  climbed  out 
and  escaped  as  the  gallery  was  not  crushed  in. 

"The  dread  upheaval  has  rent  in  twain  Elliott's  Brigade,  and 
the  men  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  large  abyss  recoil  in  terror 
and  dismay.  Nor  shall  we  censure  them,  for  so  terrible  was  the 
explosion  that  even  the  assaulting  column  sunk  back  aghast,  and 
nearly  ten  minutes  elapsed  before  it  could  be  reformed. 

"Now  a  storm  of  fire  bursts  in  red  fury  from  the  Federal  front, 
and  in  an  instant  all  the  valley  between  the  hostile  lines  lies 
shrouded  in  bellowing  smoke.  Then  Marshall,  putting  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  stormers,  sword  in  hand,  bids  his  men  to  follow. 

"But  there  comes  no  response  befitting  the  stern  grandeur  of  the 
scene — no  trampling  charge — no  rolling  drums  of  austerity — no 
fierce  shouts  of  warlike  joy  as  burst  from  men  of  the  'Light 
Division'  when  they  mounted  the  breach  of  Badajos,  or  from 
Frazier's  Royals,  as  they  crowned  the  crimson  slopes  of  Saint 
Sebastian. 

"No,  none  of  this  there.  But  a  straggling  line  of  men  of  the 
Second  Brigade,  First  Division,  uttering  a  mechanical  cheer,  slowly 
mounts  the  crest,  passes  unmolested  across  the  intervening  space, 
and  true  to  the  instinct,  fostered  by  long  service  in  the  trenches, 
plunges  into  the  Crater,  courting  the  friendly  shelter  of  its 
crumbling  sides. 

"Yonder  lies  Cemetery  Hill  in  plain  view,  naked  of  men,  and 
hard  beyond  the  brave  old  town,  nestling  whitely  in  its  wealth  of 
green. 

"Silence  still  reigned  along  the  Confederate  lines,  yet  Ledlie's 
men  did  not  advance,  and  now  the  supporting  brigade  of  the  same 
division  running  forward  over  the  same  crest,  and  with  an  incredible 


LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  JOHN   CHKVKS   IIASKELL 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  865 

folly  crowding  in  upon  their  comrades,  already  huddled  together 
in  the  shelving  pit,,  all  regimental  and  company  organization  was 
lost,  and  the  men  speedily  passed  from  the  control  of  their  officers. 

"If  we  except  Elliott,  who  with  the  remnant  of  his  brigade  was 
occupying  the  ravine  to  the  left  and  rear  of  the  Crater,  no  officer 
of  rank  was  present  on  the  Confederate  side  to  assume  immediate 
direction  of  affairs,  and  a  considerable  time  elapsed  before 
Beauregard  and  Lee, — both  beyond  the  Appomattox, — were  in 
formed  by  Col.  Paul,  of  Beauregard's  staff,  of  the  nature  and 
locality  of  the  disaster. 

"But  almost  on  the  moment,  John  Haskell,  of  South  Carolina,  a 
glorious  young  battalion  commander,  whose  name  will  be  forever 
associated  with  the  Artillery  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  galloped  to  the  front,  followed  by  two  light  batteries, 
and  having  disposed  these  pieces  along  the  Plank  Road,  and  opened 
Planner's  light  guns  from  the  Gee  house,  passed  to  his  left  to 
speak  a  word  of  cheery  commendation  to  Lamkin  of  his  battalion, 
who  was  already  annoying  the  swarming  masses  of  the  enemy  with 
his  Virginia  Battery  of  eight-inch  mortars.  Passing  through  the 
covered  way,  Haskell  sought  Elliott,  and,  pointing  out  to  him  the 
defenseless  position  of  the  guns  on  the  Plank  Road,  urged  him  to 
make  such  dispositions  as  would  afford  them  protection.  Essaying 
this,  Elliott  sprang  forward,  followed  by  a  mere  handful  of  brave 
fellows,  but,  almost  on  the  instant,  fell  stricken  by  a  grievous  hurt 
and  was  borne  from  his  last  field  of  battle. 

"The  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  was  now  very  severe,  owing 
to  their  superior  weight  of  metal,  and  the  guns  of  the  Plank  Road, 
exposed  in  addition  to  the  fire  of  the  sharpshooters,  were  suffering 
such  loss  that  it  was  determined  to  retire  all  but  six  pieces,  and,  as 
the  situation  seemed  rather  hopeless,  to  call  for  volunteers  to  man 
these.  To  Haskell's  proud  delight  every  gun  detachment 
volunteered  to  remain. 

"Nor  did  the  artillery  to  the  right  and  left  fail  to  bear  them 
selves  with  the  resolution  of  men  conscious  that,  for  the  time,  the 
hope  of  the  Army  was  centered  in  their  steadiness,  and  that  their 
guns  alone  barred  the  road  to  Petersburg;  for,  let  me  repeat, 
Cemetery  Hill  was  naked  of  men." 

With  the  superb  Haskell  encouraging  them  to  every 
effort,  his  cannoneers  labored  at  their  pieces  like  fiends. 
He  actually  moved  two  detachments  with  their  mor 
tars  forward  to  the  trenches  within  fifty  yards  of  the 
Crater,  into  which  they  burst  their  shell  at  a  surpris 
ing  rate.  No  less  active  was  Maj.  Hampton  Gibbes, 
whose  battalion,  on  the  right  of  the  Crater,  opened 
as  soon  as  the  pieces  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  the 


866  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

enemy's  massed  troops.  At  first  the  left  gun  of  David 
son's  Battery  alone  had  an  effective  command  of  the 
Crater,  and  it  was  left  for  a  time  unserved  through  the 
misbehavior  of  the  acting  battery  commander,  Lieut. 
James  C.  Otey,  who,  owing  to  a  combination  of  cir 
cumstances,  was  the  only  officer  at  the  time  present 
with  the  battery.  This  unfortunate  young  officer,  the 
first  and  the  last  in  the  whole  career  of  Lee's  Artillery 
Corps  to  abandon  his  guns  in  cowardice,  seems  to  have 
been  entirely  unmanned  by  the  awfulness  of  the  cata 
clysm,  in  which  he  and  his  men  had  all  but  been  en 
gulfed.  Let  us  not  be  too  harsh  in  our  judgment  of 
him.  Let  us  imagine  ourselves  in  his  position  and  ask 
if  the  mere  thought  of  such  an  experience  as  that 
through  which  he  had  passed  does  not  shake  our  reso 
lution.  If  poor  Otey  were  at  fault,  then  he  has  long 
since  atoned  for  his  misdoing.  To  the  writer  he  is  more 
to  be  pitied,  and  demands  more  of  charity  than  any 
other  soldier  in  that  grand  artillery  corps  of  Lee's 
Army.  Would  that  his  name  might  not  be  mentioned, 
but  there  it  is  in  black  and  white  in  the  record  for  all 
time.  The  hand  of  mortal  cannot  obliterate  it,  the  stain 
is  indelible.  The  incident  is  not  recounted  here  to  hold 
Otey  up  to  scorn,  but  to  show  that  misconduct  before 
the  enemy  was  so  rare,  so  unheard  of  in  Lee's  Artillery, 
that  even  on  the  part  of  a  miserable,  insignificant  youth, 
it  attracted  the  attention  of  an  army. 

If  Otey  allowed  his  guns  to  remain  inactive,  it  was 
not  to  be  for  long,  for  Gibbes  and  Maj.  Samuel  Pres 
ton,  of  Wise's  Brigade,  personally  manned  one  of  the 
pieces  and  worked  them  with  excellent  effect,  until  they 
both  fell  desperately  wounded,  thus  making  glorious 
the  spot  of  Otey's  defection.  Again  the  guns  became 
silent,  and  again  a  number  of  artillery  officers,  heedless 
of  all  personal  danger,  rushed  to  the  position  to  man  the 
pieces.  This  time  it  was  Lieut.-Col.  Huger,  Acting 
Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  1st  Corps,  with  Capts.  Win- 
throp,  Mason,  and  Haskell,  of  Gen.  Alexander's  staff, 
that  reopened  the  fire,  soon  joined  by  Private  L.  T. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  867 

Covington,  of  Pegram's  destroyed  battery.  "Frank 
Huger,  who  like  Edward  Freer  of  the  Forty-third  had 
seen  more  combats  than  he  could  count  years,  was,  as 
always,  to  the  fore,  working  as  a  simple  cannoneer  at 
his  heated  Napoleons,  cheering  and  encouraging  his  men 
by  joyful  voice  and  valiant  example."  Thus  did  Gibbes, 
Preston,  Huger,  and  the  other  gallant  artillerymen 
maintain  their  fire  at  the  critical  moment  in  spite  of  the 
concentration  of  the  enemy's  guns  upon  them  until, 
spurring  hard  from  the  hospital,  with  the  fever  still 
upon  him,  came  Lieut.  John  Hampden  Chamberlayne, 
of  the  3d  Corps  Artillery,  who  with  volunteers  from 
other  batteries  and  Wise's  infantrymen,  so  handled  the 
guns  which  had  been  abandoned  by  their  men  and  until 
then  only  manned  by  a  few  officers,  that  from  that  day 
the  battery  bore  his  name,  and  he  wore  another  bar 
upon  his  collar. 

The  left  gun  of  Davidson's  Battery  in  the  next  salient 
on  the  right  of  the  Crater,  which  in  the  hands  of  those 
we  have  mentioned  did  such  fearful  execution,  was  so 
well  protected  that  it  could  never  be  kept  silent  by 
Hunt's  concentrated  fire.  Whenever  the  Federals 
showed  themselves  it  reopened.  Gibbes  alone  fired 
forty  or  more  rounds,  at  a  range  of  less  than  400  yards, 
with  it,  before  he  was  wounded.  Five  hundred  yards  to 
the  left  was  Wright's  Halifax  Battery  of  Coit's  Bat 
talion.  These  guns,  which  had  a  flanking  fire  on  the 
left  of  the  destroyed  salient  and  across  all  the  ap 
proaches  thereto,  were  posted  in  the  depression  behind 
the  infantry  line  and  thoroughly  masked  from  the  hostile 
artillery  fire  not  only  by  the  ground  in  their  front,  but 
by  a  heavy  fringe  of  pines  in  advance  of  the  Federal 
line,  which  the  enemy  had  carelessly  neglected  to  level. 
^Wight's  fire  was  rapid,  incessant,  and  accurate,  caus 
ing  great  loss.  The  Federal  Artillery  made  vain  efforts 
to  locate  him  with  their  mortar  shells,  which  tore  up  the 
ground  all  around,  but  could  never  hit  him  or  silence  his 
four  guns.  Besides  these,  a  half  dozen  or  more  of 
HaskelTs  8-inch  Coehorn  mortars,  from  two  or  three  ra- 


868  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

vines  in  the  rear,  threw  shell  aimed  at  the  Crater,  and 
Langhorne's  10-inch  mortars  along  the  Baxter  Road 
also  took  part  in  the  work  of  destruction.  It  was  now, 
too,  that  Alexander's  foresight  was  to  yield  such  fine  re 
sults,  for  Haskell's  sixteen  guns  which  he  had  so  long 
kept  concealed  in  the  sunken  Jerusalem  Plank  Road 
were  in  position  600  yards  directly  in  rear  of  the  Crater. 
The  group  simply  swept  the  front  from  first  to  last. 

As  soon  as  the  Federal  attack  developed,  Cutts'  great 
group  of  guns  north  of  the  Appomattox  opposite  the 
enemy's  right,  and  Jones'  batteries  along  Beauregard's 
front  near  the  river,  opened  upon  the  hostile  artillery 
and  kept  up  a  furious  cannonade  to  prevent  Hunt  from 
concentrating  his  fire  upon  the  point  to  be  assaulted,  and 
on  the  Confederate  right  Walker's  batteries  also  sought 
to  divert  the  enemy's  fire.* 

"On  the  Federal  side,  Griffin  of  Potter's  Division,  not  waiting 
for  Wilcox,  pushed  forward  his  brigade,  and  gained  ground  to  the 
north  of  the  Crater,  and  Bliss's  Brigade  of  the  same  division, 
coming  to  his  support,  still  further  ground  was  gained  in  that 
direction.  But  his  leading  regiments,  deflected  by  the  hostile  fire, 
bore  to  their  left,  and,  mingling  with  Ledlie's  men  swarming  along 
the  sides  of  the  great  pit,  added  to  the  confusion.  Wilcox  now 
threw  forward  a  portion  of  his  division  and  succeeded  in  occupying 
about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  the  works  south  of  the  Crater, 
but  stopped  by  the  fire  of  Chamberlayne's  guns,  and,  whenever 
occasion  offered,  by  the  fire  of  the  infantry,  his  men  on  the  exposed 
flank  gave  ground,  and,  pushing  the  right  regiment  into  the  Crater, 
the  confusion  grew  worse  confounded.  Some  of  the  men,  indeed, 
from  fear  of  suffocation,  had  already  emerged  from  the  pit  and 
spread  themselves  to  the  right  and  left,  but  this  was  a  matter 
of  danger  and  difficulty,  for  the  ground  was  scored  with  covered 
ways  and  traverses,  honeycombed  with  bomb-proofs,  and  swept  by 
the  artillery.  Others  of  them  pressed  forward  and  got  into  the 
ditch  of  the  unfinished  gorge  lines,  while  not  a  few  creeping  along 
the  glacis  of  the  exterior  line,  made  their  way  over  the  parapet  into 
the  main  trench.  In  all  this  there  was  much  hand-to-hand  fighting, 
for  many  men  belonging  to  the  dismembered  brigades  still  found 
shelter  behind  the  traverses  and  bomb-proofs  and  did  not  easily 
yield. 

*As  regards  the  execution  of  Chamberlayne's  guns,  see  especially  statement 
of  Gen.  Warren,  Report  of  Conduct  of  the  War  (1865),  Vol.  I,  p.  166;  Gen. 
Hunt,  pp.  98,  184  ;  Duane,  p.  100. 

For  the  efficiency  of  the  Confederate  artillery  fire,  see  Meade's  report,  Ibid., 
p.  31 ;  Col.  Loring's  statement,  p.  95  ;  Gen.  Potter,  pp.  87,  177. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  869 

"Meanwhile,  Gen.  Meade,  'groping  in  the  dark,'  to  use  his  own 
phrase,  sent  telegram  upon  telegram  to  Burnside  to  know  how 
fared  the  day,  but  received  answer  to  none.  At  fifteen  minutes 
to  six,  however,  one  hour  after  Ledlie's  men  had  occupied  the 
breach,  an  orderly  delivered  him  a  note  in  pencil,  written  from  the 
Crater  by  Gen.  Loring,  Inspector  General  of  the  9th  Corps,  and 
addressed  to  Gen.  Burnside.  This  was  Meade's  first  information 
from  the  front  and  was  little  cheer,  for  Loring  stated  briefly  that 
Ledlie's  men  were  in  confusion  and  would  not  go  forward. 

"Ord  was  now  directed  to  push  forward  the  18th  Corps,  and  the 
following  dispatch  was  sent  to  Richmond: 

'  'HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  'July  30,  1864,  6  A.  M. 

'  'MAJ.-GEN.  BURNSIDE — Prisoners  taken  say  that  there  is  no 
line  in  their  rear,  and  that  their  men  were  falling  back  when  ours 
advanced,  that  none  of  their  troops  have  returned  from  the  James. 
Our  chance  is  now.  Push  your  men  forward  at  all  hazards,  white 
and  black,  and  don't  lose  time  in  making  formations,  but  rush  for 
the  crest. 

"  'GEORGE  G.  MEADE, 

"  'Major-General,  Commanding.' 

"But  Ord  could  not  advance,  for  the  narrow  debouches  were 
still  choked  up  by  the  men  of  the  9th  Corps  and  by  the  wounded 
borne  from  the  front,  and  although  Burnside  promptly  transmitted 
the  order  to  his  subordinates,  the  troops  in  rear  moved  with 
reluctant  step,  while  no  general  of  division  was  present  with  those 
in  front  to  urge  them  forward. 

"Again  did  Meade  telegraph  to  Burnside:  'Every  moment  is 
most  precious;  the  enemy  are  undoubtedly  concentrating  to  meet 
you  on  the  crest.'  But  not  until  20  minutes  past  seven  did  he 
receive  a  reply  to  the  effect  that  Burnside  'hoped  to  carry  the  crest, 
but  it  was  hard  work.' 

"Then  Meade's  patience  seems  fairly  to  have  broken  down. 
'What  do  you  mean  by  hard  work  to  take  the  crest?'  he  asks.  'I 
understand  not  a  man  has  advanced  beyond  the  enemy's  line,  which 
you  occupied  immediately  after  exploding  the  mine.  Do  you  mean 
to  say  your  officers  and  men  will  not  obey  your  orders  to  advance? 
If  not,  what  is  the  obstacle?  I  wish  to  know  the  truth,  and  desire 
an  immediate  answer. 

"  'GEORGE  G.  MEADE,  Major-General.' 

"To  which  Burnside,  in  hot  wrath,  straightway  replied: 

"  'HEADQUARTERS,   NINTH   CORPS, 

"  '7:35  A.  M. 

"  'GEN.  MEADE — Your  dispatch  by  Capt.  Jay  received.  The 
main  body  of  Gen.  Potter's  Division  is  beyond  the  Crater. 


870  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

'  'I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  my  officers  and  men  will  not  obey 
my  orders  to  advance.  I  mean  to  say  that  it  is  very  hard  to 
advance  to  the  crest.  I  have  never  in  any  report  said  anything 
different  from  what  I  conceived  to  be  the  truth.  Were  it  not  in 
subordinate,  I  would  say  that  the  latter  remark  of  your  note  was 
unofficerlike  and  ungentlemanly. 

"  'A.  E.  BURNSIDE,  Major-General.' 

"Griffin,  it  is  true,  in  obedience  to  orders  to  advance  straight 
for  Cemetery  Hill,  had  during  this  time  attempted  several  charges 
from  his  position  north  of  the  Crater,  but  his  men  displayed  little 
spirit,  and,  breaking  speedily  under  the  fire  of  the  artillery,  sought 
their  old  shelter  behind  the  traverses  and  covered  ways.  The  rest 
of  Potter's  Division  moved  out  slowly  and  it  was  fully  eight  o'clock, 
more  than  three  hours  after  the  explosion,  when  Ferrero's  negro 
division,  the  men  beyond  question  inflamed  with  drink,  burst  from 
the  advance  line,  cheering  vehemently,  passed  at  a  double  quick 
over  the  crest  under  a  heavy  fire,  and,  rushing  with  scarce  a  check 
over  the  heads  of  the  white  troops  in  the  Crater,  spread  to  their 
right,  capturing  more  than  two  hundred  prisoners,  and  one  stand 
of  colors." 

The  negroes,  however,  could  not  traverse  the  space 
which  Haskell's  guns  dominated.  No  troops  with  their 
formation  could  have  done  so.  As  the  dense  mass  came 
in  sight,  partly  emerging  from  the  Crater,  the  sixteen 
guns  concentrated  upon  it  and  drove  the  assailants  to 
cover  without  the  aid  of  a  hundred  muskets.  A  single 
negro  private,  with  his  musket  at  support  arms,  charged 
home  to  the  guns  and  was  felled  with  a  rammer  staff,  as 
he  sprung  into  the  sunken  road  among  the  pieces. 

At  the  same  time  that  Ferrero  made  his  effort, 
Turner,  of  the  10th  Corps,  pushed  forward  a  brigade 
over  the  9th  Corps  parapets,  seized  the  Confederate 
line  further  to  the  north,  and  quickly  disposed  the  re 
maining  brigades  of  his  division  to  confirm  his  success. 

"Now  was  the  crisis  of  the  day,  and  fortunate  was  it  for  maiden 
and  matron  of  Petersburg,  that  even  at  this  moment  there  was 
filing  into  the  ravine,  between  Cemetery  Hill  and  the  drunken 
battalions  of  Ferrero,  a  stern  array  of  silent  men,  clad  in  faded 
gray,  resolved  with  grim  resolve  to  avert  from  the  mother  town  a 
fate  as  dreadful  as  that  which  marked  the  three  days'  sack  of 
Badajos. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  871 

"Lee,  informed  of  the  disaster  at  6:10  A.  M.,  had  bidden  his  aide, 
Col.  Charles  Venable,  to  ride  quickly  to  the  right  of  the  army  and 
bring  up  two  brigades  of  Anderson's  old  division,  commanded  by 
Mahone,  for  time  was  too  precious  to  observe  military  etiquette,  and 
send  the  orders  through  Hill.  Shortly  after  the  General  in  Chief 
reached  the  front  in  person,  and  all  men  took  heart  when  they 
descried  the  grave  and  gracious  face,  and  'Traveller'  stepping 
proudly,  as  if  conscious  that  he  bore  upon  his  back  the  weight  of  a 
nation.  Beauregard  was  already  at  the  Gee  house,  a  commanding 
position  five  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  Crater,  and  Hill  had 
galloped  to  the  right  to  organize  an  attacking  column,  and  had 
ordered  down  Pegram,  and  even  now  the  light  batteries  of  Brander 
and  Ellett  were  rattling  through  the  town  at  a  sharp  trot^  with 
cannoneers  mounted,  the  sweet,  serene  face  of  their  boy-colonel  lit 
up  with  that  glow  which  to  his  men  meant  hotly  impending  fight. 

"Venable  had  sped  upon  his  mission  and  found  Mahone's  men 
already  standing  to  their  arms ;  but  the  Federals  from  their  lofty 
lookouts  were  busily  interchanging  signals,  and  to  uncover  such 
a  length  of  front  without  exciting  observation  demanded  the  nicest 
precaution.  Yet  was  the  difficulty  overcome  by  a  single  device, 
for  the  men  being  ordered  to  drop  back  one  by  one,  as  if  going  for 
water,  obeyed  with  such  intelligence  that  Warren  continued  to 
report  to  Meade  that  not  a  man  had  left  his  front. 

"Then  forming  in  the  ravine  in  rear,  the  men  of  the  Virginia  and 
Georgia  brigades  came  pressing  down  the  Valley  with  swift, 
swinging  stride, — not  with  the  discontented  bearing  of  soldiers 
whose  discipline  alone  carries  them  to  what  they  feel  to  be  a  scene 
of  fruitless  sacrifice,  but  with  the  glad  alacrity  and  aggressive 
ardor  of  men  impatient  for  battle,  and  who,  from  long  knowledge 
of  war,  are  conscious  that  Fortune  has  placed  within  their  grasp 
an  opportunity  which,  by  the  magic  touch  of  veteran  steel,  may  be 
transformed  to  'swift-winged'  victory. 

"Halting  for  a  moment  in  rear  of  the  'Ragland  House,'  Mahone 
bade  his  men  strip  off  blankets  and  knapsacks,  and  prepare  for 
battle. 

"Then  riding  quickly  to  the  front,  while  the  troops  marched  in 
single  file  along  the  covered  way,  he  drew  rein  at  Bushrod  Johnson's 
headquarters  and  reported  in  person  to  Beauregard.  Informed 
that  Johnson  would  assist  in  the  attack  with  the  outlying  troops 
about  the  Crater,  he  rode  still  further  to  the  front,  dismounted, 
and,  pushing  along  the  covered  way  from  the  Plank  Road,  came 
out  into  the  ravine  in  which  he  formed  his  men.  Mounting  the 
embankment  at  the  head  of  the  covered  way,  he  descried  within 
one  hundred  and  sixty  yards  a  forest  of  glittering  bayonets,  and 
beyond,  floating  proudly  from  the  captured  works,  eleven  Union 
flags.  Estimating  rapidly  from  the  hostile  colors  the  probable 
force  in  his  front,  he  at  once  despatched  his  courier  to  bring  up  the 


872  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Alabama  Brigade  from  the  right,  assuming  thereby  a  grave 
responsibility,  yet  was  the  wisdom  of  the  decision  vindicated  by 
the  event. * 

"Scarcely  had  the  order  been  given  when  the  head  of  the 
Virginia  Brigade  began  to  debouch  from  the  covered  way.  Direct 
ing  Col.  Weisiger,  its  commanding  officer,,  to  file  to  the  right  and 
form  line  of  battle,  Mahone  stood  at  the  angle,  speaking  quietly 
and  cheerily  to  the  men.  Silently  and  quickly  they  moved  out  and 
formed  with  that  precision  dear  to  every  soldier's  eyes — the  sharp 
shooters  leading,  followed  by  the  6th,  16th,  61st,  41st,  and  12th 
Virginia — the  men  of  Second  Manassas  and  Crampton  Gap ! 

"But  one  caution  was  given, — to  reserve  their  fire  until  they 
reached  the  brink  of  the  ditch;  but  one  exhortation,  that  they 
were  counted  on  to  do  this  work,  and  do  it  quickly. 

"Now  the  leading  regiment  of  the  Georgia  Brigade  began  to 
move  out,  when  suddenly  a  brave  Federal  officer,  seizing  the  colors, 
called  on  his  men  to  charge.  Descrying  this  hostile  movement  on 
the  instant,  Weisiger,  a  veteran  of  stern  countenance,  which  did  not 
belie  the  personal  intrepidity  of  the  man,  uttered  to  the  Virginians 
the  single  word,  'Forward.' 

"Then  the  sharpshooters  and  the  men  of  the  6th  on  the  right, 
running  swiftly  forward,  for  theirs  was  the  greater  distance  to 
traverse,  the  whole  line  sprang  along  the  crest  and  there  burst 
from  more  than  eight  hundred  warlike  voices  that  fierce  yell,  which 
no  man  ever  yet  heard  unmoved  on  field  of  battle.  Storms  of 
case  shot  from  the  right  mingled  with  the  tempest  of  bullets  which 
smote  upon  them  from  the  front,  yet  was  there  no  answering  volley, 
for  these  were  veterans,  whose  fiery  enthusiasm  had  been  wrought 
to  a  finer  temper  by  the  stern  code  of  discipline,  and  even  in  the 
tumult  the  men  did  not  forget  their  orders.  Still  pressing  forward 
with  steady  fury,  while  the  enemy,  appalled  by  the  inexorable 
advance,  gave  ground,  they  reached  the  ditch  of  the  inner  works — 
then  one  volley  crashed  from  the  whole  line,  and  the  6th  and  16th, 
with  the  sharpshooters  clutching  their  empty  guns  and  redoubling 
their  fierce  cries,  leaped  over  the  retrenched  cavalier,  and  all  down 
the  line  the  dreadful  work  of  the  bayonet  began. 

"How  long  it  lasted  none  may  say  with  certainty,  for  in  those 
fierce  moments  no  man  heeded  time,  no  man  asked,  no  man  gave 
quarter;  but  in  an  incredibly  brief  space,  as  seemed  to  those  who 
looked  on,  the  whole  of  the  advanced  line  north  of  the  Crater  was 
taken,  the  enemy  in  headlong  fight,  while  the  tattered  battle  flags 
planted  along  the  parapets  from  left  to  right  told  Lee,  at  the  Gee 
house,  that  from  this  nettle  danger,  valor  had  plucked  the  flower, 
safety  for  an  army. 

*The  young  courier  by  whom  this  order  was  transmitted  was  Jimmy  Blake- 
more,  an  ex-cadet  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  to  whom  Mahone  constantly 
entrusted  the  most  important  missions.  Mahone,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  himself 
an  old  cadet. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  873 

"Redoubling  the  sharpshooters  on  his  right,  Mahone  kept  down 
all  fire  from  the  Crater,  the  vast  rim  of  which  frowned  down  upon 
the  lower  line  occupied  by  his  troops. 

"And  now  the  scene  within  the  horrid  pit  was  as  might  be 
fitly  portrayed  only  by  the  pencil  of  Dante,  after  he  had  trod 
'nine-circle  Hell.'  From  the  great  mortars  to  the  right  and  left, 
huge  missiles,  describing  graceful  curves,  fell  at  regular  intervals 
with  dreadful  accuracy  and  burst  among  the  helpless  masses 
huddled  together,  and  every  explosion  was  followed  by  piteous 
cries,  and  oftentimes  the  very  air  seemed  darkened  by  flying  human 
limbs.  Haskell,  too,  had  moved  up  his  Eprouvette  mortars  among 
the  men  of  the  16th  Virginia,  so  close,  indeed,  that  his  powder 
charge  was  but  one  ounce  and  a  half — and,  without  intermission, 
the  storm  of  fire  beat  upon  the  hapless  mass  imprisoned  within. 

"Mahone's  men  watched  with  great  interest  this  easy  method 
of  reaching  troops  behind  cover,  and  then,  with  the  initiative  in 
genuity  of  soldiers,  gleefully  gathered  up  the  countless  muskets 
with  bayonets  fixed,  which  had  been  abandoned  by  the  enemy,  and 
propelled  them  with  such  nice  skill  that  they  came  down  upon 
Ledlie's  men  like  the  rain  of  the  Norman  arrows  at  Hastings. 

"At  half  past  ten  the  Georgia  Brigade  advanced  and  attempted 
to  dislodge  Wilcox's  men,  who  still  held  a  portion  of  the  line  south 
of  the  Crater,  but  so  closely  was  every  inch  of  the  ground  searched 
by  artillery,  so  biting  was  the  fire  of  musketry,  that  obliquing  to 
their  left,  they  sought  cover  behind  the  cavalier  trench  won  by  the 
Virginia  Brigade, — many  officers  and  men  testifying  by  their  blood 
how  gallantly  the  venture  had  been  essayed. 

"Half  an  hour  later  the  Alabamians  under  Saunders  arrived,  but 
further  attack  was  postponed  until  after  1  p.  M.,  in  order  to 
arrange  for  cooperation  from  Colquitt  on  the  right.  Sharply  to 
the  minute  agreed  upon,  the  assaulting  line  moved  forward,  and 
with  such  astonishing  rapidity  did  these  glorious  soldiers  rush 
across  the  intervening  space  that  ere  their  first  wild  cries  subsided 
their  battle  flags  had  crowned  the  works.  The  Confederate  bat 
teries  were  now  ordered  to  cease  firing,  and  forty  volunteers  were 
called  for  to  assault  the  Crater,  but  so  many  of  the  Alabamians 
offered  themselves  for  the  service  that  the  ordinary  system  of 
detail  was  necessary.  Happily,  before  the  assaulting  party  could 
be  formed,  a  white  handkerchief,  made  fast  to  a  ramrod,  was 
projected  above  the  edge  of  the  Crater,  and,  after  a  brier  pause, 
a  motley  mass  of  prisoners  poured  over  the  side  and  ran  for  their 
lives  to  the  rear. 

"In  this  grand  assault  on  Lee's  line  for  which  Meade  had  massed 
65,000  troops,  the  enemy  suffered  a  loss  of  above  5,000  men, 
including  1,101  prisoners,  among  whom  were  two  brigade  com 
manders,  while  vast  quantities  of  small  arms  and  twenty-one 
standards  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors. 


874  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

"Yet  many  brave  men  perished  on  the  Confederate  side. 
Elliott's  Brigade  lost  severely  in  killed  and  prisoners.  The  Virginia 
Brigade,  too,  paid  the  price  which  glory  ever  exacts.  The  6th 
carried  in  98  men  and  lost  88,  one  company  'the  dandies/  of 
course, — 'Old  Company  F'  of  Norfolk,  losing  every  man  killed  or 
wounded.  Scarcely  less  was  the  loss  in  other  regiments. 


"Such  was  the  battle  of  the  Crater,  which  excited  the  liveliest 
satisfaction  throughout  the  Army  and  the  country.  Mahone  was 
created  major-general  from  that  date;  Weisiger,  who  was  wounded, 
brigadier-general ;  Capt.  Girardey,  of  Mahone's  staff,  also  brigadier, 
the  latter  an  extraordinary  but  just  promotion,  for  he  was  a  young 
officer  whose  talents  and  decisive  vigor  qualified  him  to  conduct 
enterprises  of  the  highest  movement.  Yet,  fate  willed  that  his 
career  should  be  brief,  for  within  a  fortnight  he  fell  in  battle  north 
of  the  James,  his  death  dimming  the  joy  of  victory." 

We  search  in  vain  for  any  such  recognition  of  those 
dauntless  gunners,  who  alone  stood  between  the  enemy 
and  Petersburg  after  the  explosion  of  the  mine.  "Ham" 
Chamberlayne  became  a  captain,  but  glory  was  the  only 
reward  Gibbes  and  Haskell  and  Huger,  and  the  others 
received.  Such  was  the  lot  of  the  artillerymen.  In 
deed  no  one  seemed  to  think  promotion,  in  an  arm  whose 
officers  distinguished  themselves  on  every  occasion,  was 
necessary.  It  would  seem  that  the  Army  had  come  to 
regard  deeds  of  heroism  and  feats  of  extraordinary 
valor  as  matters  to  be  expected  and  not  rewarded,  in 
the  Artillery. 

"On  the  Federal  side,  crimination  and  recrimination 
followed  what  Gen.  Grant  styled  'this  miserable  fail 
ure.'  There  was  a  Court  of  Inquiry,  and  a  vast  array  of 
dismal  testimony,  which  disclosed  the  fact  that  of  four 
generals  of  division  belonging  to  the  assaulting  Corps, 
not  one  had  followed  his  men  into  the  Confederate 
lines.  Nay,  that  the  very  commander  of  the  storming 
division,  finding,  like  honest  Nym,  'the  humor  of  the 
breach  too  hot,'  was  at  the  crisis  of  the  fight  palpitating 
in  a  bomb-proof,  beguiling  a  Michigan  surgeon  into 
giving  him  a  drink  of  rum,  on  the  plea  that  'he  had 
malaria,  and  that  he  had  been  struck  by  a  spent  ball,'- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  875 

legends  of  a  hoary  antiquity,  whereof,  let  us  humbly 
confess,  we  ourselves  have  heard." 

Although  few  promotions  in  the  arm  resulted  from 
the  conduct  of  the  Artillery  in  the  Crater  fight,  the 
Army,  Petersburg,  and  the  whole  South  knew  that  the 
gunners  had  saved  the  day.  They  knew  that  the  batter 
ies  had  stood  their  ground  without  infantry  supports, 
and  hurled  back  the  enemy  in  their  front.  They  knew 
how  Haskell,  and  Pegram,  and  Coit,  from  rear,  from 
right,  and  from  left  had  formed  a  circle  of  fire  about 
the  threatened  point  and,  unaided,  denied  the  enemy's 
advance  to  the  town,  while  Mahone  was  bringing  his 
men  up  from  the  right  just  in  time  to  prevent  Ayres' 
Division  of  Warren's  Corps  from  charging  Chamber- 
layne's  "one-gun  battery,"  as  the  enemy  called  the  piece 
which  Gibbes  and  Huger  and  the  other  gallant  officers 
had  heroically  kept  in  action.  The  deeds  of  the  ar 
tillerymen  were  upon  every  tongue.  Indeed,  even  in  the 
Federal  accounts  of  the  affair,  a  large  part  of  every 
report  is  devoted  to  the  overwhelming  and  destructive 
effect  of  the  Confederate  Artillery  and  never  once  did 
the  enemy  thereafter  forget  the  power  of  the  guns  which 
occupied  the  works  in  their  front. 


CHAPTER  XLV 

THE  SECOND  CORPS  IN  THE  VALLEY 

WHILE  the  Federals  were  mining,  and  the  Confed 
erates  countermining,  many  things  of  interest  to  the 
Artillery  were  occurring  besides  the  gathering  of  un- 
exploded  Federal  shells  from  in  front  of  the  lines  by 
night,  and  the  incessant  artillery  practice  by  day. 

Between  July  6  and  9,  Grant  had  detached  three  divi 
sions  of  the  6th  Corps  to  Washington  to  oppose  Early 
and  Breckinridge,  who  had  reached  Lynchburg  ahead  of 
Hunter  and  without  a  fight  sent  him  whirling  back 
through  West  Virginia,  after  he  had  devastated  the 
Valley  and  destroyed  much  private  property  usually 
exempt  from  destruction,  against  both  Lincoln's  and 
Grant's  orders.  Perhaps  the  greatest  feat  of  Hunter's 
ruthless  campaign  was  the  demolition  of  the  Virginia 
Military  Institute.  As  a  measure  of  military  necessity, 
this  was  of  course  justified,  in  so  far  as  the  burning  of 
its  buildings  and  military  equipment  was  concerned,  but 
the  wanton  burning  of  its  valuable  library,  its  scientific 
apparatus,  and  the  private  houses  and  property  of  its 
professors,  over  the  protest  of  his  officers,  was  an  act 
for  which  Hunter's  government  will  yet  have  to  pay.* 

Nelson's  and  Braxton's  battalions  of  artillery  which 
under  Gen.  Long  were  alone  detached  from  the  Army 
with  the  2d  Corps,  though  marching  continuously  and 
with  great  speed,  failed  to  reach  Lynchburg  before 
Hunter  decamped.  On  June  22,  however,  these  two 
battalions  were  united  with  Breckinridge's  Artillery 
near  Salem.  Thence  the  Army  of  the  Valley  moved  by 
the  direct  route  to  Staunton.  During  the  halt  of  two 
days  at  that  point,  Gen.  Long  organized  his  entire  force 

*At  the  time  this  is  written,  a  bill  is  pending  in  the  United  States  Senate, 
providing  for  an  indemnity  to  the  Institution  for  $214,000,  which  includes 
no  interest.  This  bill  was  drawn  and  introduced  by  Senator  Henry  A.  Du  Pont, 
of  Delaware,  who  like  William  McKinley  was  an  officer  in  Hunter's  army,  and 
both  of  whom  protested  against  the  destruction  of  the  school.  Senator  Du  Pont 
was  Hunter's  Chief  of  Artillery  and  commanded  the  5th  United  States  Battery, 
solid  shot  from  the  guns  of  which  still  remain  in  the  walls  of  the  barrack. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  877 

of  artillery.  The  least  efficient  batteries  of  Breckin- 
ridge's  Division  were  to  be  left  in  a  reserve  artillery 
camp  at  Staunton,  in  command  of  Maj.  Leyden,  while 
Nelson's,  Braxton's,  and  McLaughlin's  battalions  were 
fully  horsed,  armed,  and  equipped.  The  three  bat 
talions  thus  organized,  with  forty  pieces,  were  placed 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Col.  J.  Floyd  King, 
while  Jackson's,  Lurty's,  and  McClannahan's  horse  bat 
teries  with  ten  guns  were  organized  into  another  bat 
talion  to  operate  with  McCausland's  force  of  1,500 
cavalry.  The  2d  Corps  and  Breckinridge's  Division  to 
gether  numbered  8,000  infantry. 

Hunter's  retreat  to  the  Ohio,  or  flight,  it  might  be 
more  properly  styled,  left  the  Valley  open  to  Early,  who 
promptly  moved  down  it,  and  after  encountering  little 
resistance  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Shepherdstown  July 
5  and  6.  On  the  9th,  he  advanced  upon  Fredericks- 
town,  whereupon  Gen.  Wallace  withdrew  his  force  of 
about  5,000  men  and  placed  them  in  line  of  battle  along 
the  Monocacy  a  mile  or  two  east  of  the  town. 

When  Early  determined  to  attack  that  portion  of  the 
line  opposite  the  railroad  bridge,  the  ford,  and  across 
the  Georgetown  Road,  Gen.  Long  skillfully  posted  a 
number  of  guns  on  the  west  bank  which  soon  effectively 
prepared  the  way  for  McCausland  and  Gordon  to  cross 
the  stream.  These  troops  were  soon  assailed  by  the 
enemy,  whose  line  of  battle  was  formed  at  right  angles 
to  the  river,  presenting  an  opportunity  to  Long,  of 
which  he  immediately  availed  himself.  Gordon  hardly 
became  engaged  before  the  supporting  artillery  raked 
the  Federal  line  from  flank  and  in  reverse,  immediately 
crushing  it  and  driving  the  enemy  in  a  route  from  the 
ford  and  bridge.  Never  was  victory  more  complete, 
and  seldom  has  one  of  equal  magnitude  been  attained 
with  so  little  effort  and  cost  to  the  assailants.  The  re 
sult  was  due  entirely  to  the  skillful  employment  by 
Long  of  his  artillery  in  the  operations  of  which  the 
most  thorough  cooperation  between  Nelson,  Braxton, 
and  McLaughlin  was  obtained.  On  this  occasion  a 


878  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

few  batteries  only  were  used  to  clear  the  crossings,  the 
others  being  held  in  readiness  under  cover  while  the 
infantry  and  cavalry  tempted  Wallace  to  assail  them. 
The  plan  worked  to  perfection,  and  no  sooner  had  the 
Federal  line  advanced  and  exposed  its  flank,  than  Long 
and  King  threw  every  gun  into  action  with  decisive  ef 
fect,  with  the  loss  of  but  a  score  of  men  and  two  officers. 
Lieut.  Hobson,  of  the  Amherst  Battery,  fell  mortally, 
and  Lieut.  Southall,  Acting  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General  on  Long's  staff,  severely  wounded. 

The  conduct  of  the  brave  old  Col.  Nelson  on  this  oc 
casion  and  throughout  the  succeeding  campaign,  as  well 
as  that  of  McLaughlin  and  Braxton,  was  highly  com 
mendable.  William  Nelson,  closely  connected  by  blood 
with  Lee,  Pendleton,  Page,  Braxton,  Carter,  and  many 
other  officers  of  the  Artillery,  was  a  picturesque  char 
acter.  Among  the  first  to  raise  a  battery  in  the  spring 
of  1861,  he  had  gradually  risen  to  high  rank.  Like 
Cabell,  he  was  not  noted  for  dash,  nor  was  he  by  train 
ing  a  soldier.  But  he  possessed  an  unblemished  char 
acter,  was  sternly  courageous,  as  dependable  as  any 
officer  in  the  Army,  and  was  adored  by  his  men  who  re 
garded  him  as  a  father.  The  young  farmer  boys  of 
Hanover,  and  Louisa  counties,  flocked  by  hundreds  to 
his  standard,  and  followed  him  from  first  to  last  with  a 
devotion  which  military  prowess  alone  could  not  have 
commanded.  In  appearance,  the  "Old  Colonel,"  as  his 
men  affectionately  styled  him,  was  truly  a  remarkable 
figure.  Gen.  Bushrod  Johnson  commonly  wore  a  linen 
duster  and  straw  hat,  Gen.  William  Smith,  ex-Governor 
of  Virginia  and  known  as  "Extra  Billy,"  usually  car 
ried  an  umbrella  on  the  march,  Gen.  Mahone  a  cow 
in  his  headquarters  train,  but  Col.  Nelson  alone  adorned 
himself  with  a  high  silk  hat!  On  many  occasions  as  he 
rode  past  strange  troops,  the  men  with  shouts  of  merri 
ment  cried  after  him,  "Old  man,  come  out  of  that  hat!" 
and  similar  humorous  gibes.  This  eccentricity  of  dress, 
however,  was  not  abandoned  by  him  in  spite  of  the 
derisive  comments  of  the  soldiery.  His  own  men  knew 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  879 

and  loved  him,  for  after  all  it  was  the  head  and  heart 
and  not  the  helmet  of  their  leader  that  mattered. 

On  the  10th,  Early  advanced  rapidly  against  Wash 
ington,  which  beside  its  garrison  of  near  20,000  troops 
was  now  defended  by  the  two  divisions  of  the  6th  Corps 
detached  from  Petersburg,  and  6,000  men  of  the  19th 
just  arrived  from  New  Orleans.  After  creating  great 
alarm  in  the  north,  Early  withdrew  from  before  the 
Capital  on  the  night  of  the  12th,  conscious  of  his  inability 
to  carry  the  strong  Federal  works  by  storm,  re- 
crossed  the  Potomac  at  White's  Ford  on  the  14th,  en 
camped  for  a  few  days  at  Leesburg,  and  then  moved 
through  Snicker's  Gap  to  Berryville,  picketing  the  ad 
jacent  fords  of  the  Shenandoah  River  with  his  artillery. 

McLaughlin  at  Castleman's  Ferry  was  soon  heavily 
engaged  in  repelling  an  attempt  of  the  enemy's  advance 
guard  to  cross,  but  as  the  main  column  began  to  arrive 
Early  retired  from  Berryville  via  White  Post  to  New- 
town.  Col.  Nelson  with  two  batteries  then  accompanied 
Ramseur's  Division  to  Winchester  where  they  made  an 
unsuccessful  attack  upon  the  enemy,  losing  the  guns  of 
Kirkpatrick's  Amherst  Battery.  Nelson  had  advanced 
his  guns  so  close  to  the  Federal  line  that  when  Ram- 
seur's  troops  met  with  a  severe  reverse  and  fell  back 
in  confusion,  the  battalion  commander,  whose  conduct 
was  heroic  on  this  occasion,  was  unable  to  save  Kirk 
patrick's  guns.  The  battery  was  rearmed,  however, 
August  20. 

After  retiring  to  Strasburg  and  allowing  the  enemy 
to  occupy  Winchester  and  push  their  advance  to  New- 
town,  Early  turned  upon  them  a  few  days  later  and 
drove  them  in  great  haste  through  Winchester  toward 
Martinsburg.  The  Federal  retreat  was  so  rapid  that  al 
though  it  was  followed  across  the  Potomac  at  Williams- 
port,  no  punishment  could  be  inflicted  upon  the  enemy, 
and  Early  resumed  his  position  at  Strasburg.  During 
these  operations  the  Artillery,  while  little  engaged,  was 
called  upon  for  the  most  tremendous  exertions  in  march 
ing  and  countermarching. 


880  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

At  this  juncture,  Sheridan  assumed  command  of  a 
large  Federal  force  in  the  Valley,  and  Early  fell  back 
before  him  to  Fisher's  Hill.  Before  the  end  of  July, 
Early's  command  had  marched  by  road  over  400  miles, 
losing  less  than  3,000  men,  and  dispersing  two  armies  of 
an  aggregate  strength  of  double  his  own.  During  this 
period,  the  Artillery  was  constantly  with  the  infantry 
column  and  with  the  exception  of  the  physical  break 
down  of  Gen.  Long,  was  in  as  good  order  as  when  it  left 
Cold  Harbor.  As  a  record  of  field  artillery  marching 
this  campaign  is  worthy  of  the  most  careful  study,  for 
in  that  respect  it  excelled  all  others  of  the  war  and 
shows  to  what  a  high  degree  of  mobility  field  batteries 
may  be  brought.  Horses  now  are  just  as  capable  of 
performing  such  work  as  they  were  in  1864,  and  yet 
it  is  doubtful  if  a  single  battery  in  our  army  could  march 
400  miles  on  short  provender,  in  less  than  60  days,  and 
engage  in  a  pitched  battle  with  any  degree  of  effect.* 

Meanwhile  Anderson  with  Kershaw's  Division  and 
Cutshaw's  Battalion  of  artillery  had  joined  Early,  and 
on  the  14th  of  August,  Fitz  Lee's  Division  of  cavalry 
with  Johnston's  and  Shoemakers's  horse  batteries  ar 
rived  at  Front  Royal.  Early  again  drove  the  enemy 
out  of  Winchester.  On  the  19th,  Gen.  Long  was  com 
pelled  to  relinquish  his  command,  placing  Col.  Nelson 
in  charge  of  the  Artillery,  while  Capt.  Kirkpatrick  as 
sumed  command  of  Nelson's  Battalion. 

After  much  marching  and  skirmishing,  in  all  of  which 
the  Artillery  was  constantly  engaged,  the  enemy  re 
tired  to  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  21st.  Early  remained 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Charles  Town  until  the  25th, 
moving  thence  to  Shepherdstown,  and  then  into  camp 
at  Bunker  Hill.  On  the  31st,  Milledge's  and  Massie's 
batteries  accompanied  Rodes'  Division  to  Martinsburg, 
where  the  latter  battery  was  heavily  engaged.  Early 
then  concentrated  his  army  near  Stephenson's  Depot. 

Col.  Carter  had  been  relieved  from  his  more  or  less 
amphibious  duties  along  the  James  on  August  2,  and 

*  Early  made  enforced  requisition  upon  the  Maryland  farmers  for  horses,  but 
only  a  few  were  assigned  to  the  artillery.  See  his  Memoirs,  p.  395. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  881 

ordered  to  join  Early  as  Chief  of  Artillery.  He  reported 
for  duty  September  9.  His  selection  to  fill  Gen.  Long's 
place  was  as  wise  as  it  was  merited.  In  all  that  great 
army,  there  was  not  a  more  gallant  artilleryman  than 
Tom  Carter,  of  Pampatyke,  devoted  friend  and  near 
kinsman  of  Lee.  Graduating  from  the  Virginia  Mili 
tary  Institute  in  the  Class  of  1849,  he  studied  medi 
cine  at  the  University  of  Virginia.  He  soon  forsook 
his  profession,  however,  and  settled  upon  his  fine  estate 
in  King  William  County.  There  during  the  years  im 
mediately  preceding  the  war,  he  reigned  in  lordly  state 
among  his  kinsmen  and  people,  as  his  father  had  done 
before  him.  Noted  for  the  purity  and  strength  of  his 
character,  beloved  and  respected  by  all,  dispensing 
hospitality  to  his  friends  and  charity  to  the  poor  and 
needy  of  the  country-side,  he  peacefully  awaited  the 
call  to  arms,  ready  to  repay  with  blood  and  valor  his 
State  for  the  education  it  had  given  him.  No  sooner  was 
the  summons  issued  than  he  called  together  his  slaves, 
admonished  them  to  be  faithful  in  his  absence,  and  com 
mitting  them  to  the  care  of  a  young  and  beautiful  wife, 
saddled  his  thoroughbred  charger  and  rode  proudly  to 
the  Court  House  where  the  guidon  of  his  battery  was 
planted,  and  assumed  command  as  if  by  inherited  right. 
A  few  days,  nay  hours,  saw  the  King  William  Artillery 
ready  to  receive  its  guns,  for  a  hundred  feminine  hands 
had  toiled  ceaselessly  with  needle  and  thread  upon  the 
uniforms  for  his  men.  With  a  score  of  young  kinsmen 
of  the  country-side,  consumed  with  martial  ardor,  there 
was  no  lack  of  material  for  the  officers  and  noncommis 
sioned  officers  of  the  battery,  mounted  as  they  were 
upon  the  best  blooded  animals  which  Virginia  could 
boast.  There  was  no  need  to  teach  these  men  horse 
manship,  and  the  influence  a  century  of  association 
among  their  projenitors  and  a  lifetime  spent  with  their 
captain  supplied  the  discipline  of  regular  troops.  A 
cousin  of  Robert  E.  Lee,  Tom  Carter  combined  more 
of  the  modesty,  simplicity,  and  valor  of  his  great  kins 
man  than  any  other  man  in  Virginia.  It  is  recounted 


882  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

that  at  Seven  Pines,  while  he  sat  with  one  foot  in  his 
stirrup  and  the  other  thrown  across  the  pommel  of  his 
saddle,  coolly  directing  under  a  hail  of  fire  the  remaining 
fragment  of  his  battery,  up  rode  D.  H.  Hill,  of  iron 
nerve,  and  in  the  midst  of  the  carnage  about  him,  rose 
in  his  stirrups  and  after  saluting  Carter  declared  that 
he  would  rather  be  the  captain  of  the  King  William 
Artillery  than  President  of  the  Confederate  States. 

From  that  day  when  Carter  first  fought  under  the 
eye  of  Lee,  his  name  was  the  very  synonym  of  valor. 
Promotion  meant  nothing  to  him.  It  came  it  is  true, 
and  was  well  earned,  but  his  sole  desire  was  to  serve 
Lee  and  Virginia  faithfully  and  well.  On  several  oc 
casions  he  was  not  rewarded  by  increased  rank  when  it 
should  have  been  given  him,  but  he  was  the  kinsman  of 
Lee  and  knew  that  in  spite  of  his  merit  his  claims  must 
not  be  pressed.  So  it  was  that  when  Shoup  was  pro 
moted  in  the  Western  Army,  Carter  preferred  to  remain 
in  Virginia,  to  the  soil  of  which  every  tie  of  blood  and 
duty  bound  him.  It  was  in  Virginia  that  he  belonged 
and  there  he  remained.  As  the  great  invading  host 
swept  around  Lee's  Army,  trampling  Carter's  crops, 
driving  off  his  horses  and  cattle,  demolishing  his  barns 
and  fences,  it  was  there  on  the  very  lawns  of  his  ancestral 
estate  that  he  planted  his  guns  while  a  devoted  wife, 
with  the  sublime  courage  of  womanhood,  ministered 
tenderly  to  the  victims  of  his  fire.  Soon  the  crash  of  the 
guns  ceased  to  disturb  the  peace  of  Pampatyke,  but  not 
until  it  lay  a  rent  and  bleeding  wreck  in  the  path  of  the 
great  armies.  But  still  at  her  post  its  mistress  remained, 
surrounded  only  by  a  score  of  faithful  blacks,  who 
looked  upon  the  tragic  scenes  of  war,  and  bewildered 
could  not  understands  Hardly  a  week  that  the  cavalry 
patrols  of  one  army  or  the  other  did  not  pass  and  repass, 
or  that  the  heroic  wife  of  the  absent  artilleryman  did  not 
like  a  sainted  creature  beckon  some  ambulance  with 
its  woeful  burden  through  the  gates  of  Pampatyke. 
Friend  and  foe  alike  there  found  relief,  for  while  the 
lips  of  Sue  Roy  bade  her  soldier  husband  struggle  on  to 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  883 

the  last,  her  angelic  hands  and  heart  were  animated 
only  by  the  spirit  of  Christ  in  the  alleviation  of  the  suf 
fering  about  her.  Her  deeds  were  known  to  all — to  both 
armies, — and  so  when  her  gallant  husband  returned 
from  Appomattox,  he  was  able  to  receive  into  his  home, 
wrecked  but  not  wholly  destroyed,  the  weary  chieftain 
whom  he  had  followed  on  a  hundred  battlefields.  Ah! 
who  can  say  what  were  the  emotions  of  Robert  E.  Lee, 
and  Tom  Carter,  and  Sue  Roy  during  those  bitter  days 
after  Appomattox.  Let  us  not  profane  the  sanctity  of 
their  haven  of  retreat.  Let  us  avert  our  eyes  after  see 
ing  the  great  master  of  war  dismount  at  the  doorway, 
and  grasp  in  silence  the  outstretched  hand  of  the  kins 
man  whose  blood  had  proved  his  devotion.  More  of  the 
sacred  scene  is  not  for  us.  Let  us  leave  them,  as  an 
ancient  negro  respectfully  slips  the  martial  trappings 
from  the  back  of  old  Traveller,  and  turns  him  out  to 
rest  and  graze  beneath  the  patriarchal  oaks  of  Pampa- 
tyke,  where  no  longer  the  manger  is  full,  where  no 
longer  the  grain  bins  are  laden  with  the  golden  freight 
of  yore,  where  no  longer  the  fields  are  flooded  by  a  sea 
of  tasseled  wheat.  But  leaving  them,  how  can  it  be 
otherwise  than  with  regret  that  ours  is  not  the  brush 
to  place  on  canvas  this  scene,  so  sweetly  pathetic,  and 
yet  so  fraught  with  lessons  of  fortitude  and  courage  that 
no  man  might  look  thereon  without  seeing  through  his 
tears  a  flash  of  the  unconquerable  spirit  of  Lee  and  Vir 
ginia. 

Such  as  we  have  described  him,  was  Col.  Thomas  H. 
Carter,  the  man  who  now  succeeded  Gen.  Long  in  com 
mand  of  Early's  Artillery.  He  came  to  this  important 
post  just  as  he  did  to  the  county  courthouse  in  the  spring 
of  1861,  received  by  all  not  only  with  respect,  but  with 
affectionate  regard.  He  did  riot  come  to  displace  Nel 
son.  He  merely  received  his  long  deferred  due.* 

At  daylight  on  the  19th  of  September,  the  Confed 
erate  cavalry  pickets  at  the  crossing  of  the  Opequon 
and  Berry ville  Road,  were  driven  in,  and  information 

*After  the  war  Col.  Carter  became  Rector  of  the  University  of  Virginia. 


884  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

having  been  received  by  Early  of  the  fact,  he  immedi 
ately  ordered  all  the  troops  at  Stephenson's  Depot  to  be 
in  readiness  to  move,  while  Gordon,  who  had  arrived 
from  Bunker  Hill,  was  directed  to  move  at  once.  By 
some  mistake,  Gordon  failed  to  receive  his  orders.  Ram- 
seur  was  already  in  position  across  the  Berryville  Road 
skirmishing  with  the  enemy,  when  Early  reached  him 
and  learned  that  Gordon  was  not  moving  up.  He  at 
once  directed  Breckinridge  and  Rodes  to  hasten  for 
ward  as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  position  occupied  by 
Ramseur  was  about  one  mile  and  a  half  out  from  Win 
chester  on  an  elevated  plateau  between  Abraham's 
Creek  and  Red  Bud  Run,  in  the  angle  formed  by  the 
Martinsburg  and  Front  Royal  roads.  In  his  right 
front  the  country  was  open,  while  to  his  left  the  ground 
sloped  off  to  Red  Bud  Run  along  which  there  were 
some  patches  of  woods  which  afforded  cover  for  troops. 
In  his  front  and  towards  the  Opequon  ran  the  Berry 
ville  Road  with  hills  and  woods  on  both  sides,  which 
also  afforded  admirable  cover  for  the  approach  of  the 
enemy. 

Nelson's  Battalion  was  posted  on  Ramseur's  line, 
covering  the  approaches  as  far  as  practicable,  and 
Lomax  with  Jackson's  Cavalry  and  part  of  Johnson's 
was  on  the  right,  watching  the  valley  of  Abraham's 
Creek  and  the  Front  Royal  Road  beyond,  while  Fitz 
Lee  was  on  the  left,  across  the  Red  Bud,  with  his 
cavalry  and  Johnston's  Horse  Battery. 

Gordon's  Division  reached  the  field  a  little  after  10 
A.  M.  and  was  placed  under  cover  in  rear  of  a  wood  be 
hind  the  interval  between  Ramseur  and  the  Red  Bud. 
Knowing  that  it  would  not  do  to  await  the  shock  of  the 
heavy  assaulting  columns,  which  were  being  formed, 
Early  ordered  Gordon  to  examine  the  ground  on  his 
left  with  a  view  to  making  an  attack  himself,  and  placed 
Rodes'  three  brigades  as  they  came  up  on  Gordon's 
right,  also  in  some  woods.  The  enemy  was  now  dis 
covered  moving  in  great  force  both  against  Ramseur's 
front  and  left.  Already  Ramseur's  men  were  falling 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  885 

back  behind  Nelson's  batteries,  which  remained  stead 
fast,  however,  and  single-handed  checked  the  advance 
while  Early  made  his  dispositions  to  hurl  Gordon  and 
Rodes  on  the  right  of  the  Federal  column.  Meanwhile, 
Nelson's  batteries  were  being  severely  punished,  but 
gallantly  continued  to  pour  a  most  destructive  fire  into 
the  enemy's  ranks,  while  Braxton's  Battalion  galloped 
into  position  in  front  of  Gordon  and  also  opened  fire 
upon  the  Federal  flank.  Evans'  Brigade  of  Gordon's 
Division,  passing  beyond  the  guns,  was  soon  overcome 
and  followed  by  the  enemy,  who  rolled  back  the  Con 
federate  left  wing  until  it  rested  at  right  angles  to  Ram- 
seur's  line  with  seven  of  Braxton's  guns  at  the  salient. 
The  onrushing  enemy  actually  approached  to  within 
musket  range  of  these  pieces,  which  were  totally  unsup 
ported,  but  could  not  drive  the  gunners  from  their  posi 
tion.  Of  the  situation  at  this  juncture  Early  wrote: 
"This  caused  a  pause  in  our  advance  and  the  position 
was  most  critical,  for  it  was  apparent  that  unless  this 
force  was  driven  back  the  day  was  lost.  Braxton's  guns, 
in  which  now  was  our  only  hope,  resolutely  stood  their 
ground,  and  under  the  personal  superintendence  of 
Lieut.-Col.  Braxton,  and  Col.  T.  H.  Carter,  my  then 
Chief  of  Artillery,  opened  with  canister  on  the  enemy. 
This  fire  was  so  rapid  and  well  directed  that  the  enemy, 
staggered,  halted,  and  commenced  falling  back,  leaving 
a  battle  flag  on  the  ground  whose  bearer  was  cut  down 
by  a  canister  shot.  Just  then,  Battle's  Brigade  of 
Rodes'  Division,  which  had  arrived  and  had  been  formed 
in  line  for  the  purpose  of  advancing  to  the  support  of 
the  rest  of  the  division,  moved  forward  and  swept 
through  the  woods,  driving  the  enemy  before  it,  while 
Evans'  Brigade  was  rallied  and  brought  back  to  the 
charge." 

Ramseur's  Division,  which  with  Nelson's  batteries  al 
ways  in  front  bore  the  brunt  of  the  attack,  was  at  first 
forced  back  a  little,  but  rallying  behind  the  guns  soon 
recovered  itself.  Lomax  on  the  right  had  greatly  as 
sisted  Ramseur  by  making  a  gallant  charge  against  the 


886  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

left  flank  of  the  attacking  infantry,  and  Breathed's  bat 
teries  with  Fitz  Lee  managed  to  secure  a  destructive 
flank  fire  across  the  Red  Bud  on  the  left,  while  in  the 
words  of  Early,  "Nelson's  and  Braxton's  battalions  had 
performed  wonders." 

Although  the  Confederates  had  before  noon  won  a 
splendid  victory,  it  was  not  without  paying  a  high  price, 
for  the  superb  Rodes  had  been  killed  at  the  very  mo 
ment  of  success.  Thus  one  by  one  were  Jackson's 
veterans  falling,  and  who  should  take  their  places  was 
already  becoming  a  problem. 

The  attack  so  far  had  been  rendered  by  the  Federal 
6th  and  19th  Corps,  but  another  remained.  Early's 
lines  were  now  formed  from  Abraham's  Creek  across  to 
the  Red  Bud  and  were  much  attenuated. 

About  2  o'clock,  Breckinridge's  and  Wharton's  divi 
sions,  and  McLaughlin's  Battalion  reached  the  field 
after  a  heavy  engagement  during  the  morning  with  the 
enemy's  cavalry  on  the  Charles  Town  Road.  Patton's 
Brigade  of  Wharton's  Division  was  then  sent  to  re- 
enforce  Fitz  Lee,  while  Col.  King  placed  his  batteries 
on  a  hill  in  rear  of  Breckinridge's  line,  which  now  faced 
to  the  left.  Later  in  the  afternoon  two  divisions  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  drove  in  the  pickets  north  of  the  Rose 
Bud  and  Crook's  infantry  corps,  which  had  not  been 
engaged,  forced  back  Patton  and  Fitz  Lee.  The  Fed 
eral  Cavalry  then  swept  around  Early's  left  flank  to  op 
pose  which  Wharton's  other  two  brigades,  King's  Ar 
tillery,  and  one  of  Braxton's  guns  were  double-timed  to 
the  rear.  Breckinridge,  after  driving  back  the  enemy, 
formed  his  division  in  line  in  rear  of  Early's  left  and  at 
right  angles  to  the  Martinsburg  Road,  again  repulsing 
the  enemy.  But  many  of  the  men  on  Early's  front  line 
hearing  Breckinridge's  fire  in  their  rear,  and  thinking 
they  were  flanked  and  about  to  be  cut  off,  commenced 
falling  back,  thus  producing  great  confusion.  At  the 
same  time,  Crook  advanced  against  Gordon  and  struck 
his  line  while  in  confusion.  The  whole  front  line  now 
gave  way,  but  a  large  number  of  the  men  were  rallied 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  887 

behind  a  line  of  breastworks,  which  had  been  thrown  up 
just  outside  of  Winchester  during  the  first  year  of  the 
war.  At  this  point,  the  Artillery  was  gradually  massed 
and  checked  all  pursuit.  Of  this  movement  of  the  Ar 
tillery,  Col.  Carter  wrote  in  his  report:  "Fortunately 
the  Artillery  was  under  perfect  control  to  the  last,  and 
maneuvered  and  fought  with  untiring  courage.  The 
guns  retired  from  point  to  point,  halting,  unlimbering, 
and  firing,  while  efforts  were  made  by  general  officers 
to  rally  the  infantry." 

Wharton's  Division  maintained  its  organization  on 
the  left,  and  Ramseur  fell  back  in  good  order  on  the 
right.  But,  again,  the  Federal  Cavalry  got  around 
Early's  left  and  he  was  compelled  to  retire  through  the 
town  under  cover  of  Wickham's  Brigade  of  cavalry, 
and  Breathed's  guns  on  Fort  Hill.  A  new  line  was 
formed  east  of  the  town,  which  was  maintained  until 
nightfall,  when  Early  retired  without  serious  molesta 
tion  to  Newtown. 

Near  the  close  of  the  day,  Col.  Carter  received  a  pain 
ful  wound  from  a  fragment  of  shell,  which  compelled 
him  to  turn  over  the  command  of  the  Artillery  to  Nel 
son,  but  he  was  not  permanently  disabled. 

While  many  recriminations  followed  upon  this  af 
fair,  the  whole  army  testified  to  the  stout  resistance 
made  by  the  Artillery  in  the  long  and  exhausting 
struggle  which  lasted  from  dawn  to  dark.  The  ulti 
mate  loss  of  the  battle  was  due  to  the  Federal  superior 
ity  in  cavalry,  which  was  free  to  encircle  the  left  flank, 
gradually  compelling  Early's  line  to  fall  back  before  the 
infantry  in  its  front.  Had  Carter  had  sufficient  ar 
tillery  to  crown  the  heights  northwest  of  the  town,  he 
might  have  prevented  the  movement  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  in  that  direction.  Unfortunately  Cutshaw  was 
off  with  Kershaw's  Division  on  an  expedition  east  of 
the  Blue  Ridge. 

Three  guns  of  King's  Battalion  were  lost  in  this  bat 
tle,  two  of  which  were  loaned  the  cavalry,  and  one  of 
which  was  abandoned  on  the  retreat,  after  its  teams  were 
shot  down. 


888  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

After  Early 's  reverse  at  Winchester,  he  retreated 
during  the  night  with  all  his  trains  secure  to  Fisher's 
Hill,  and  formed  line  of  battle  on  the  morning  of  the 
20th,  with  McLaughlin's  Battalion  on  the  right,  Brax- 
ton's  in  the  center,  and  Nelson's  on  the  left.  The  after 
noon  of  the  20th,  Sheridan  appeared  on  the  banks  of 
Cedar  Creek,  about  four  miles  from  Fisher's  Hill,  and 
for  the  greater  part  of  the  next  two  days  was  engaged 
in  reconnoitering  Early 's  line.  After  some  sharp  skir 
mishing  the  enemy  began  to  fortify  in  Early 's  front, 
but  it  was  soon  discovered  that  an  attack  was  intended 
on  the  Confederate  left.  Early  now  gave  orders  to  re 
tire,  but  just  before  sunset  Crook's  infantry  drove  back 
Lomax's  dismounted  cavalry  and  involved  Ramseur's 
left  before  the  withdrawal  could  be  effected.  Ramseur 
made  an  attempt  to  meet  this  movement  by  throwing  his 
brigades  successively  into  line  to  the  left,  and  Wharton's 
Division  was  sent  for  from  the  right,  but  it  did  not  ar 
rive.  Pegram's  brigades  were  also  thrown  into  line  in 
the  same  manner  as  Ramseur's,  but  the  movement  re 
sulted  in  confusion  in  both  divisions  and  as  soon  as  this 
was  noticed  by  the  enemy,  a  general  advance  along  the 
whole  Federal  line  was  ordered.  After  very  little  re 
sistance  the  Confederate  Infantry  made  for  the  rear  in 
confusion,  leaving  the  Artillery  in  the  lurch,  as  it  had 
never  done  before.  Of  this  incident  Early  wrote,  "The 
men  and  officers  of  the  Artillery  behaved  with  great  cool 
ness,  fighting  to  the  very  last,  and  I  had  to  ride  to  some 
of  the  officers  and  order  them  to  withdraw  their  guns, 
before  they  would  move.  In  some  cases,  they  had  held 
out  so  long,  and  the  roads  leading  from  their  positions 
into  the  pike  were  so  rugged,  that  eleven  guns  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy."* 

Early  is  in  error  as  to  the  number  of  guns.  There 
were  fourteen  lost,  four  of  Nelson's,  two  of  Lomax's 
Horse  Artillery,  seven  of  Braxton's  and  one  of  King's 
taken  by  the  enemy  on  this  occasion.  Again  Col.  Nel 
son's  conduct  was  conspicuously  gallant  as  he  withdrew 

*Gen.  Jubal  A.  Early,  etc.,  p.  430. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  889 

his  pieces  in  small  groups,  alternately  unlimbering  and 
firing  and  entirely  without  infantry  support. 

From  near  Fisher's  Hill,  Early  fell  back  on  the  26th, 
in  line  of  battle  beyond  New  Market,  Nelson,  Braxton, 
and  McLaughlin  in  the  rear  guard  occupying  every 
practicable  position  from  which  to  retard  the  pursuers. 
In  this  retreat  in  which  Nelson  led  the  Artillery 
with  consummate  skill,  Capt.  John  L.  Massie,  of  the 
Fluvanna  Battery,  fell  mortally,  and  Lieut.  N.  B. 
Cooke,  of  Braxton's  Battalion  severely,  wounded. 
Early  then  moved  toward  Port  Republic,  arriving  at 
Brown's  Gap  on  the  25th,  where  he  was  rejoined  by 
Kershaw's  Division,  and  Cutshaw's  Battalion.  On  the 
same  day,  Col.  Carter  resumed  command  of  the  Ar 
tillery,  of  which  Carpenter's  and  Hardwicke's  batteries 
were  engaged  on  the  26th  and  27th. 

On  the  28th,  Early  again  put  his  army  in  motion  down 
the  Valley,  marching  via  Waynesborough  to  Mount 
Sidney,  and  thence  by  slow  stages  to  Hupp's  Hill  be 
low  Strasburg,  which  position  he  reached  October  13th. 
Here  an  affair  occurred  in  which  Fry's  Richmond 
Orange  Battery  participated  with  great  credit  and  in 
which  Lieut.  S.  S.  French,  adjutant  on  Carter's  staff, 
was  severely  wounded. 

The  Cavalry  had  meanwhile  been  moving  by  the  back 
road,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  had  encountered 
the  enemy.  In  this  affair  the  Cavalry  broke  badly,  leav 
ing  Thomson's  and  Johnston's  batteries  entirely  iso 
lated,  but  the  gunners  managed  to  cut  their  way  to 
the  rear,  not,  however,  without  the  loss  of  six  pieces. 
The  very  next  day  Shoemaker's  Battery  and  the  re 
maining  section  of  Thomson's,  which  were  serving  with 
Lomax's  Cavalry  as  a  guard  to  Early 's  wagon  trains 
near  Woodstock,  were  again  deserted  by  the  Cavalry, 
which  fled  precipitately  to  the  rear.  With  the  ex 
ception  of  one  of  Thomson's,  all  the  guns  were  saved 
by  the  extraordinary  heroism  of  the  horse  artillery 
men.  On  this  occasion  Capt.  Carpenter  of  the  Alle- 
ghany  Battery,  a  classmate  and  devoted  friend  of 


890  THE  LONG  AKM  OF  LEE 

Jimmie  Thomson's  at  the  Institute,  particularly  dis 
tinguished  himself.  Observing  the  danger  to  which  his 
comrades  were  exposed,  he  quickly  rallied  a  number  of 
the  fugitive  troopers  and  again  and  again  formed  them 
across  the  Valley  Pike  to  check  the  pursuers.  In  this 
way  he  contributed  materially  towards  saving  the  guns 
and  trains,  losing  an  arm  as  a  result  of  his  reckless  ex 
posure.  But  what  was  an  arm  to  Carpenter,  if  by  los 
ing  it  he  could  save  the  gallant  Jimmie  Thomson ! 

The  following  extract  from  the  diary  of  a  horse  ar 
tilleryman  of  Thomson's  Battery  throws  some  light 
on  the  affair  of  October  9th:  "The  shameful  way  that 
our  Cavalry,  especially  that  portion  that  tried  to  operate 
on  the  North  Mountain  Road,  fought,  bled,  and  died, 
a  running  rearward,  was  enough  to  make  its  old  com 
mander,  Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  weep  in  his  grave.  Ring 
down  the  curtain  on  that  scene,  for  the  Cavalry  played 
a  regular  exeunt  act." 

This  was  the  famous  battle  of  Tom's  Brook,  some 
times  called  by  the  Federals  in  a  spirit  of  derision,  "The 
Woodstock  Races."  At  any  .rate,  like  the  one  the 
preceding  day,  it  was  a  disgraceful  affair  on  the  part 
of  the  Confederate  Cavalry.  Soon  after  a  Washington 
paper  contained  a  card  signed  by  Gen.  Custer  to  the 
effect  that  he  had  captured  all  the  guns  of  the  Stuart 
Horse  Artillery  but  one,  and  offering  a  reward  of 
$1,000.00  for  that.  The  reward  was  never  claimed. 

On  October  19,  at  a  very  early  hour,  Early  moved 
forward  to  attack  the  enemy  beyond  Cedar  Creek,  and 
by  10  A.  M.  not  only  had  he  routed  two  Federal  Corps, 
seized  their  camps  with  twenty-four  pieces  of  artillery, 
but  Carter's  battalions  almost  unaided  by  the  Infantry 
had  dislodged  the  6th  Corps  near  Middletown.  It  was 
here  that  a  fatal  halt  by  Early  occurred  in  spite  of  Gor 
don's  and  Carter's  urgent  requests  to  be  allowed  to  fol 
low  up  the  success  of  the  morning.  Carter  even  went 
so  far  as  to  declare  that  with  his  guns  alone  he  could 
crush  out  all  resistance  of  the  enemy  and  begged  that 
he  be  allowed  to  follow  the  Federals  up,  but  Early  de- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  891 

layed  to  reform  the  disordered  troops  which  he  found  in 
the  captured  trains,  and  gave  Sheridan  time  to  stay  the 
route  of  his  army  and  lead  part  of  it  back  to  the  field 
of  battle.  Early  then  formed  his  line  across  the  pike 
north  of  Middletown  and  at  right  angles  thereto  with 
Wofford's  Brigade  on  the  right,  then  Wharton's  Divi 
sion,  then  Pegram's  Division  across  the  road,  then  Ram- 
seur  considerably  in  advance,  with  Kershaw  and  Gordon 
in  order  to  the  left.  Between  Gordon  and  Rosser's 
Cavalry,  with  Thomson's  Battery  on  the  extreme  Con 
federate  left,  was  an  interval  of  about  a  mile  in  which 
about  3  P.  M.  Carter,  of  his  own  accord,  placed  six  of 
Cutshaw's  and  two  of  Jones'  guns.  Shortly  after,  about 
3 :30  P.  M.,  the  enemy  assailed  Gordon  in  force  and  again 
the  Infantry  gave  way  while  the  guns  were  retired  only 
upon  Gordon's  order.  Nelson's,  Braxton's  and  Mc- 
Laughlin's  battalions  and  the  other  batteries  of  Cut 
shaw's,  posted  from  right  to  left  along  the  infantry  line, 
resolutely  held  their  positions  until  the  left  began  to 
roll  up,  whereupon  Carter  withdrew  them  to  a  com 
manding  elevation  several  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the 
infantry  line.  Soon  the  Infantry  began  to  break  and 
move  to  the  rear,  but  the  Artillery  maintained  its  fire, 
holding  the  Federals  for  over  an  hour,  and  not  until 
its  ammunition  was  exhausted  was  the  order  to  retire 
given.  Meantime,  Carter  had  placed  a  small  group  of 
guns  on  the  heights  south  of  Cedar  Creek  to  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Infantry  and  Artillery. 

Again  Early's  Infantry  had  failed  him  after  winning 
a  splendid  victory,  the  Artillery  as  at  Winchester  alone 
saving  the  retreat  from  becoming  a  rout.  Night  at 
last  came  and  under  cover  of  darkness  and  the  fire  of 
Carter's  rearmost  guns,  the  Army  was  falling  back  in 
apparent  safety.  While  the  main  body  of  the  Artillery 
was  marching  in  column  towards  Hupp's  Hill,  a  small 
body  of  Federal  cavalry  burst  into  the  fields  on  the  right 
of  the  turnpike  and  charged  the  column  and  trains  in 
rear.  The  bugle  blasts,  cheers,  the  rush  of  horses'  feet, 
and  pistol  shots  in  the  darkness,  at  once  created  a  panic 


892  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

in  the  infantry  support,  already  much  disorganized.  The 
artillery  officers  and  men  appealed  in  vain  to  the  panic- 
stricken  infantrymen  for  muskets  to  defend  the  trains, 
but  could  not  secure  them,  and  as  the  cannoneers  were 
totally  unarmed  they  were  compelled  to  abandon  a 
large  number  of  guns  and  wagons.  Not  only  did  the 
enemy  recover  all  the  guns  captured  from  them  in  the 
morning,  but  twenty-three  others  besides.  "One  hun 
dred  men  in  an  organized  state,  with  muskets,  could 
have  saved  the  train,"  wrote  Col.  Carter. 

This  incident  was  as  disgraceful  to  the  Confederates 
as  it  was  pleasing  to  Sheridan.  It  was  not,  however,  the 
fault  of  the  Artillery.  The  attack,  in  the  nature  of  an 
ambush,  occurred  at  a  very  narrow  passage  south  of 
Strasburg,  between  the  precipitous  bank  of  the  river  on 
the  one  side  and  bluffs  for  the  most  part  on  the  other. 
A  bridge  on  the  turnpike  had  failed  and  caused  the  road 
to  become  congested  with  ordnance  and  medical  trains, 
and  a  long  column  of  over  1,400  prisoners.  There  was 
absolutely  no  chance,  therefore,  for  escape,  and  the  can 
noneers  could  not  be  expected  to  engage  with  fence  rails 
or  stones,  even  had  they  been  available,  in  a  night  con 
flict  with  armed  troopers.  That  their  conduct  was  in 
every  way  commendable  is  attested  by  Col.  Carter,  who 
declared  that  throughout  the  night,  with  confusion  and 
disorder  all  about  them,  the  artillerymen  remained  cool 
and  thoroughly  under  control,  and  as  a  guarantee 
against  the  repetition  of  such  occurrences,  he  took  oc 
casion  to  recommend  at  once  that  a  certain  proportion  of 
artillerymen  be  armed  with  carbines. 

After  this  misfortune,  Early  retreated  to  New 
Market,  in  the  neighborhood  of  which  he  remained  until 
the  last  of  November,  when  the  Army  proceeded  to 
Harrisonburg,  the  Artillery  going  into  winter  quarters 
near  Staunton.  Thus  did  Early's  Valley  Campaign  of 
1864  come  to  a  close,  brilliant  in  many  respects  yet, 
in  the  main,  ill-fated.  With  the  exception  of  the  Ar 
tillery  it  hardly  seemed  possible  that  the  troops  which 
broke  so  badly  at  Winchester,  at  Fisher's  Hill,  at  Wood- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  893 

stock,  and  on  several  other  occasions  were  the  men  which 
had  fought  under  Longstreet,  Jackson,  Stuart,  and  Lee 
himself.  It  has  been  attempted  to  explain  the  poor  con 
duct  of  Early's  troops  by  saying  that  these  men  were 
simply  fought  out,  that  they  had  reached  the  limit  of 
physical  endurance,  and  that  with  a  failure  of  physical 
stamina  came  their  demoralization  as  a  natural  conse 
quence.  This  explanation  is  on  a  par  with  that  which 
makes  of  Jackson  a  religious  fanatic  at  Games'  Mill  and 
White  Oak  Swamp.  Neither  are  satisfactory.  Why,  if 
Early's  Infantry  was  exhausted,  was  the  Artillery  still 
capable  of  performing  deeds  of  unsurpassed  valor  on  the 
field  of  battle,  as  well  as  the  same  marches  which  fell  to 
the  Infantry?  No.  Some  other  explanation  is  necessary 
and  the  correct  one  would  seem  to  concern  the  discipline 
of  the  several  arms.  Is  it  too  much  to  suggest  a  com 
parison  of  the  field-officers  and  battery  commanders  of 
the  Artillery  with  the  officers  of  equal  rank  in  the 
Infantry  and  Cavalry?  Is  it  too  much  to  say  that  in  the 
comparatively  long  service  and  training  of  the  junior 
officers  of  the  Artillery,  many  of  whom  had  served  in 
the  lower  grades  of  their  arm  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  lies  the  explanation?  Is  it  too  much  to  say  that 
in  the  artillery  enlisted  personnel,  there  may  be  found 
a  further  cause  for  the  superior  conduct  of  the  gunners 
over  that  of  the  other  troops,  large  numbers  of  whose 
best  men  had  fallen  in  battle,  while  an  ever-increasing 
number  of  conscripts,  and  inferior  material  filled  their 
places?  Some  such  explanation  seems  reasonable,  for 
certain  it  is  that  there  was  a  marked  difference  which 
Early  fully  recognized.  It  is  well  known  that  he  made 
some  harsh  criticisms  of  his  troops,  and  in  this  connec 
tion  an  incident  concerning  the  Artillery  should  be  re 
corded. 

On  a  certain  occasion  it  was  reported  that  Early,  in 
his  natural  disappointment  over  the  result  of  his  cam 
paign,  had  impugned  the  fighting  qualities  of  his  army. 
Whereupon,  Col.  Carter,  politely  but  firmly,  demanded 
a  retraction  in  favor  of  the  Artillery  and  got  it.  It  is 


894  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

not  difficult  in  reading  Early's  memoirs  to  see  that  such 
a  discrimination  was  sincere  on  his  part.  Again  and 
again  he  bears  tribute  to  the  Artillery  of  his  command, 
when  only  veiled  reproaches  are  found  for  the  others. 
The  principal  artillery  lessons  to  be  drawn  from 
Early's  operations  in  the  Valley  are  as  to  the  endurance 
of  artillery,  and  what  may  be  exacted  of  it  in  rear  guard 
actions,  in  the  face  of  a  superior  force — superior  not 
only  in  point  of  numbers,  but  moral  as  well.  Carter's 
Artillery  formed  the  very  backbone  of  Early's  Army 
from  Winchester  to  the  end  of  the  campaign.  Without 
it,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  withdrawals  from  before 
the  enemy  would  have  been  decisive  defeats,  and  re 
treats  would  have  become  disgraceful  routs.  It  was 
always  at  hand,  as  we  have  shown,  in  the  forefront  of 
the  advance,  and  on  every  hilltop  on  the  retreat,  either 
to  open  the  battle  with  encouragement  to  the  Infantry, 
or  to  deny  Sheridan's  superb  and  overwhelming  force 
of  cavalry  the  full  fruits  of  victory. 


CHAPTER  XL VI 

PETERSBURG THE  WINTER  OF  1864 

GRANT  had  learned  a  lesson,  and  for  three  weeks  after 
the  Crater  fight  comparative  quiet  reigned  at  Peters 
burg,  though  many  brave  men  perished  in  the  trenches. 
Picket  firing  and  artillery  practice  was  continuous, 
"while  the  fiery  curves  of  mortar-shell  by  night,  told 
that  the  portentous  game  of  war  still  went  on." 

About  August  10th,  Fitz  Lee's  Division  of  cavalry, 
with  Johnston's  and  Shoemaker's  batteries  under  Capt. 
Johnston,  received  orders  to  join  Early  in  the  Valley. 
Maj.  Breathed  had  been  wounded  in  a  skirmish  on  June 
29.  This  force  reached  Front  Royal  on  August  14,  and 
thenceforth  participated  in  all  of  Early's  operations  in 
the  Valley. 

Upon  Alexander's  return  to  the  Army  August  18,  he 
at  once  examined  the  Artillery  defenses  with  the  Chief 
of  Artillery,  and  steps  were  instantly  taken  by  the 
latter  to  have  the  works  in  rear  of  the  Crater  greatly 
strengthened.  A  number  of  Blakelys,  Columbiads, 
and  30-pounder  Parrotts  were  issued  to  the  3d  Corps 
and  caused  to  be  mounted  and  manned  by  the  can 
noneers  of  Penick's  Battery,  while  more  careful  in 
structions  were  drawn  up  for  the  Artillery  in  general, 
in  order  to  secure  the  most  systematic  routine  of  duty 
possible  and  guard  against  all  surprises.  In  connection 
with  this  work,  Gen.  Pendleton  was  constantly  in  the 
works  and  trenches. 

About  this  time  Lieut.-Col.  Pemberton  renewed 
Carter's  proposal  to  organize  a  special  body  of  horse 
artillery  for  the  purpose  of  harassing  the  enemy  along 
the  river,  a  duty  which  required  great  mobility,  but 
nothing  was  accomplished  in  that  direction.  Towards 
the  end  of  the  month,  Col.  Hilary  P.  Jones  was  ordered 
to  Wilmington  to  organize  the  Artillery  of  the  3d  Mili 
tary  District  on  the  same  basis  as  that  of  the  Army  in 


26 


896  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Virginia,  leaving  Lieut.-Col.  Moseley  in  command  of 
Beauregard's  Artillery. 

Grant's  next  move  after  the  Crater  was  an  attempt 
to  seize  the  Weldon  Railroad  by  gradually  extending 
his  left.  To  meet  this  threat,  Heth's  Division  and 
Brander's  Battery  of  Pegram's  Battalion  moved  out  on 
the  18th  and  attacked  the  enemy  at  the  Davis  house  on 
the  railroad,  the  affair  resulting  successfully  for  the 
Confederates.  The  next  day,  Mahone's  Division  and 
Pegram,  with  the  rest  of  his  battalion,  joined  Heth  and 
Brander  and  renewed  the  attack.  In  this  engagement 
in  which  the  Federals  lost  nearly  3,000  prisoners,  Pe- 
gram  greatly  distinguished  himself,  and  together  with 
a  part  of  Heth's  Division  bore  the  brunt  of  the  battle. 
Again  on  the  21st,  Pegram  with  twelve  guns  was  heavily 
engaged  at  Poplar  Spring  Church,  where  Mahone,  at 
tacking  with  six  small  brigades,  failed  to  dislodge  the 
enemy.  On  this  occasion  instead  of  encountering  a 
small  force  as  expected,  he  found  an  army  corps  well  en 
trenched  with  every  approach  to  the  hostile  works  swept 
by  a  powerful  array  of  artillery.  On  the  24th,  Pegram 
was  directed,  with  Brander's  and  Cayce's  batteries  of  his 
own  battalion,  Ross's  of  Lane's,  and  sections  of  Hurt's 
and  Clutter's  of  Macintosh's,  to  accompany  Heth's 
column  in  its  attack  upon  the  enemy  at  Reams  Station. 
The  following  day  Heth  made  a  splendid  effort  captur 
ing  twelve  stands  of  colors,  nine  pieces  of  artillery,  ten 
caissons,  2,150  prisoners,  and  3,100  muskets,  losing  him 
self  but  720  men.  In  this  brilliant  affair  Pegram,  with 
characteristic  dash  and  skill,  prepared  the  way  to 
victory.  While  the  conduct  of  the  North  Carolina 
troops  was  superb  and  won  fresh  laurels  for  the  old 
North  State,  Heth  himself  declared  that  he  did  not  be 
lieve  any  troops  could  have  carried  the  works  of  the 
enemy  without  such  assistance  as  Pegram  rendered  the 
North  Carolinians,  by  first  shaking  the  hostile  line  with 
the  fire  of  his  guns. 

By  the  end  of  August,  however,  Grant  was  firmly  es 
tablished  across  the  Weldon  Road  and  had  thus  taken 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  897 

another  important  line  of  communication  from  Lee.  To 
seize  it  had  cost  him  in  the  four  engagements  of  August 
not  less  than  8,500  men,  as  opposed  to  a  loss  of  one- 
fourth  that  number  to  his  adversary,  but  the  advantage 
was  worth  the  cost.  He  knew  that  similar  successes, 
even  at  such  disproportionate  losses,  would  soon  enable 
him  to  accomplish  his  purpose. 

In  the  severe  fighting  of  August  on  the  right,  Hamp 
ton  had  also  won  fresh  laurels  for  the  Cavalry,  eliciting 
high  praise  for  his  regiments  and  Hart's  and  Mc 
Gregor's  batteries  from  Lee  himself.  From  September 
14  to  30,  these  two  batteries  with  Edward  Graham's 
Petersburg  Battery  of  Beauregard's  Artillery,  now  con 
verted  from  light  to  horse  artillery,  rendered  service 
of  the  most  brilliant  character,  in  cooperation  with  the 
Cavalry. 

On  the  29th  of  September,  the  enemy  succeeded  in 
carrying  by  surprise,  a  commanding  salient  of  the  Con 
federate  works,  known  as  Fort  Harrison,  near 
Chaffin's  Bluff.  To  meet  this  threat  against  Richmond, 
Gen.  Alexander,  who  had  rejoined  his  command  in 
August,  accompanied  Field's  Division  that  night  with 
Clutter's  Battery  of  Macintosh's  Battalion,  and  Marye's 
Battery  of  Pegram's  Battalion,  both  under  Maj.  Mar- 
maduke  Johnson.  The  next  morning  Haskell's  Bat 
talion  joined  Alexander  north  of  the  James,  and  Lieut.- 
Col.  Hardaway,  who  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the 
Artillery  on  the  James  when  Carter  was  ordered  to  join 
Early,  September  2,  reported  to  Alexander  with  his 
own  and  Stark's  Battalion. 

Immediately  an  effort  was  made  to  recover  Fort 
Harrison.  Hardaway's  and  Stark's  battalions  co 
operated  as  far  as  practicable  with  Johnson's  and 
Haskell's  in  the  unsuccessful  effort  of  the  30th  to  re 
cover  the  fort  from  Butler,  but  the  nature  of  the  terrain 
and  the  advantageous  position  of  the  enemy  placed 
Alexander  at  a  great  disadvantage.  When  the  attack 
was  resumed  October  1,  Haskell's  Battalion  was  united 
with  Hardaway's  and  Stark's  on  the  right  near  the 


898  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

river,  and  Lamkin's  Battery,  which  had  gained  much 
experience  with  high  angle  fire  in  the  trenches  at  Peters 
burg,  was  assigned  the  task  of  shelling  the  hostile  works 
with  a  number  of  mortars.  But  again  the  attempt  to 
drive  Butler  out  of  Fort  Harrison  proved  unsuccessful, 
and  the  Artillery  was  withdrawn  to  the  defensive  lines 
with  the  exception  of  Lamkin's  Battery,  which  remained 
in  the  advanced  position  with  the  mortars. 

While  the  Confederates  were  thus  opposing  Butler  on 
their  extreme  left,  heavy  fighting  was  also  taking  place 
on  the  right,  brought  on  by  the  continuous  extension  of 
the  enemy  in  that  direction.  In  the  affairs  of  Sep 
tember  30  and  October  1,  known  as  the  "Battles  of  the 
Jones  House,"  Pegram  with  Brander's  and  Ellett's 
batteries  on  the  first  day  operated  with  Heth  in  his  at 
tack  on  the  Federal  left,  and  on  the  second  day  with 
Brander's  and  Cayce's  batteries  in  the  combined  attack 
of  Heth  and  Wilcox.  On  the  2d,  Pegram  with  Ellett's, 
Cayce's  under  command  of  Lieut.  Hollis,  who  greatly 
distinguished  himself  the  preceding  day,  and  Gregg's 
batteries,  took  a  prominent  part  in  repulsing  the  Fed 
eral  assault  on  Heth's  position.  In  these  affairs,  the 
Federals  again  lost  heavily  and  again  the  reports  teem 
with  references  to  the  extraordinary  effectiveness  of  the 
Confederate  Artillery. 

Repeatedly  during  the  siege  was  Pegram  praised  by 
the  generals  of  the  divisions  with  which  he  served,  as  well 
as  by  his  corps  commander.  In  the  action  of  September 
30,  when  Heth's  and  Wilcox 's  divisions  were  assigned 
the  task  of  recovering  the  extension  of  the  line  of  rifle- 
pits  to  the  right  of  Petersburg,  he  shone  with  especial 
brilliance.  On  this  occasion  McGowan's  Brigade  after 
a  gallant  resistance  was  borne  back  by  sheer  weight  of 
opposing  numbers.  Seeing  that  the  South  Carolinans 
were  giving  ground,  Pegram,  who  had  gone  forward 
with  them  in  their  initial  advance,  rode  through  the  line 
of  battle,  snatched  the  colors  from  the  ensign  and  rode 
with  them  straight  toward  the  enemy.  "When  forty  or 
fifty  yards  in  advance  of  the  whole  line,  placing  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  899 

color-staff  on  his  stirrup  and  turning  halfway  round  in 
his  saddle,  he  dropped  the  reins  on  his  horse's  neck, 
raised  his  hat  and  shouted  out  in  tones  sweet  and  clear 
as  a  bugle,  'Follow  me,  men!'  It  was  a  scene  never  to 
be  forgotten — the  glorious  sunset,  the  lithe,  boyish 
form,  now  sharply  cut  against  the  crimson  western  sky, 
then  hid  for  a  moment  by  the  smoke  of  battle,  the  tat 
tered  colors,  the  cheering  lines  of  men.  With  a  rousing 
yell,  the  sturdy  brigade  closed  up,  and  never  after  gave 
back  a  single  inch.  The  color-bearer  ran  out  to  him,  the 
tears  standing  in  his  eyes,  and  cried  out:  'Give  me  back 
my  colors,  Colonel!  I'll  carry  them  wherever  you  say!' 
'Oh!  I'm  sure  of  that,'  he  answered  cheerily,  'it  was 
necessary  to  let  the  whole  line  see  the  colors;  that's  the 
only  reason  I  took  them.'  "* 

On  the  7th,  Haskell's  and  Johnson's  battalions  shared 
in  the  repulse  of  the  enemy  by  Field's  Division,  along 
the  New  Market  and  Darbytown  roads  north  of  the 
James  and  were  particularly  effective,  the  gallant 
Haskell  being  struck  in  the  head  by  a  bullet  and  Lieut. 
McQueen  of  Garden's  Battery  also  falling  severely 
wounded.  Haskell's  Battalion  was  again  engaged  on 
the  13th  under  Capt.  Garden,  in  an  affair  memorable 
in  the  Artillery  for  the  heroic  conduct  of  Corporal 
Fulcher,  of  Flanner's  Battery.  A  Federal  shell  burst 
ing  among  the  ammunition,  wounded  six  men  and 
ignited  the  fuses  of  a  number  of  shell,  which  had  been 
improperly  exposed.  Though  himself  wounded,  Fulcher 
seized  the  shells  and  carrying  them  under  fire  to  a 
nearby  pool  extinguished  the  burning  fuses. 

The  Presidential  election  in  the  North  was  now  near 
at  hand,  and  before  settling  down  into  winter  quarters, 
Gen.  Grant  determined  to  make  one  more  vigorous  ef 
fort  to  turn  Lee's  right,  seize  the  southside  road,  and 
compel  the  evacuation  of  Petersburg.  For  this  pur 
pose,  he  concentrated  on  his  left  the  greater  portion  of 
three  army  corps,  at  the  same  time  directing  pressure  to 
be  exerted  all  along  the  line,  and  especially  north  of  the 

*See  W.   Gordon  McCabe's  sketch  of  Pegram  in   The   University  Memorial. 


900  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

James.  On  the  27th,  a  simultaneous  attack  was  made 
on  the  lines  below  Richmond,  and  on  Lee's  right  flank, 
resulting  in  the  latter  quarter  in  the  battle  of  Hatcher's 
Run. 

The  Federal  advance  below  Richmond,  though  gen 
eral  and  in  considerable  force,  was  easily  repelled. 
While  the  enemy  delivered  a  frontal  attack  upon  the 
Confederates  in  position,  with  Hardaway's  and  Stark's 
battalions  between  the  Darbytown  Road  and  Fort 
Harrison,  Haskell's  and  Johnson's  battalions  moved  out 
around  the  extreme  left  of  Field's  Division  and  secured 
a  most  destructive  flank  fire  upon  the  attacking  columns, 
literally  sweeping  the  approaches  along  the  Williams- 
burg,  and  Nine  Mile  Roads,  and  even  as  far  as  the 
Charles  City  Road.  The  entire  shock  of  the  assault  was 
in  this  way  diverted  from  the  Infantry  and  the  attack 
was  abandoned  before  it  developed  serious  proportions. 
Lieut.  Wilkes,  commanding  Clutter's  Battery,  a  young 
officer  of  distinction,  fell  mortally  wounded. 

In  connection  with  this  affair  it  is  to  be  noted  what 
might  have  been  accomplished  with  artillery  in  June, 
1861,  on  the  same  ground  had  it  been  in  the  same  hands. 
But  at  that  time,  there  were  no  Alexanders,  Haskells, 
and  Hardaways,  but  only  a  great  mass  of  disintegrated 
artillery,  without  organization  and  operating  solely  as 
individual  batteries.  It  was  the  experience  of  four 
years  of  constant  fighting  that  now  enabled  the  Artillery 
to  maneuver  in  large  groups  over  country  which  had 
formerly  precluded  the  movement  of  a  single  battery. 
The  time  had  come  when  the  modern  belief  that  artillery 
can  go  with  the  infantry  was  everywhere  entertained, 
and  it  seems  surprising  that  so  soon  as  Lee's  Artillery 
surrendered  its  guns,  or  buried  them,  that  the  world 
should  have  ignored  the  lessons  which  it  had  been  taught 
by  Alexander,  Long,  and  Walker,  only  after  nearly 
half  a  century  to  be  retaught  by  Langlois,  the  father  of 
modern  field  artillery. 

On  the  extreme  right,  the  Federal  attack  was  no  more 
successful  than  below  Richmond.  Advancing  through 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  901 

the  most  densely  wooded  region,  confusion  added  to  the 
resolute  resistance  of  the  Confederates,  brought  failure 
to  the  movement.  At  first  the  enemy  advanced, 
gradually  forcing  Hampton  back  to  and  across  the 
Boydton  Plank  Road.  While  rendering  splendid  serv 
ice  with  the  advanced  line,  Capt.  Hart  fell  at  the  head 
of  his  battery  with  a  severe  wound. 

After  the  enemy  had  crossed  Hatcher's  Run  and 
pressed  forward  to  Burgess's  Mill,  Lee  hurled  a  part  of 
Hill's  Corps  upon  Hancock's  isolated  column,  de 
termined  to  recover  the  Boydton  Road  which  was  now 
of  so  much  importance  to  him,  since  the  Weldon  Rail 
road  had  been  lost.  Here  Pegram,  with  Ellett's  Bat 
tery  under  Lieut.  Hollis,  and  Gregg's  Battery,  again 
fought  his  guns  with  the  most  desperate  courage.  In 
action  the  mild  appearing  youth  seemed  to  have  become 
a  fiend  incarnate,  and  innumerable  tales  of  his  reckless 
daring  and  total  disregard  of  danger  to  himself  and 
his  men  might  be  recounted.  In  the  fighting  around 
Petersburg  he  had  become  one  of  the  foremost  figures 
in  the  Artillery  and  such  a  reputation  had  he  acquired 
for  valor  that  in  all  that  splendid  artillery  corps,  no 
name  was  more  prominently  before  the  Army. 

At  the  same  time  that  Hill's  troops  and  Pegram 
hurled  themselves  upon  the  head  of  Hancock's  column, 
Hampton's  cavalry  division  which  with  Hart's,  Mc 
Gregor's,  and  Graham's  batteries  had  worked  its  way 
around  to  the  right,  fell  upon  the  Federal  left  and  rear, 
with  the  result  that  Hancock  was  compelled  to  with 
draw  in  confusion  after  losing  about  1,500  men. 

After  these  signal  reverses  Grant  refrained  for  some 
time  from  further  attempts  on  Lee's  flanks,  contenting 
himself  with  a  ceaseless  cannonade  and  redoubling  the 
activity  of  the  sharpshooters.  And  so  the  inexorable 
process  of  attrition  wore  on,  every  loss  of  life  in  the 
trenches  placing  the  Federals  that  much  nearer  the  in 
evitable  issue. 

On  the  12th  of  October,  orders  were  received  to  arm 
all  cannoneers  that  could  be  spared  from  the  guns  with 


902  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

muskets  for  the  defense  of  the  trenches.  In  this  way 
only  could  the  rapidly  failing  infantry  lines  be  rein 
forced.  In  the  Washington  Artillery  Battalion  alone 
one-half  of  the  drivers  were  thus  armed  and  organized 
as  an  infantry  garrison  for  Fort  Gregg.  After  six 
months  of  service  in  the  trenches,  exposed  day  and  night 
to  hostile  fire,  this  battalion  was  at  last  relieved  by  that 
of  Lieut. -Col.  Moseley,  and  ordered  to  the  extreme  right 
to  serve  thereafter  with  the  3d  Corps.  It  would  seem 
certain  that  Longstreet's  recent  return  to  the  command 
of  his  corps  had  something  to  do  with  the  transfer.  Not 
only  was  Eshleman's  Battalion  transferred,  but  Gibbes' 
old  battalion,  now  commanded  by  Maj .  Owen,  formerly 
of  the  Washington  Artillery,  was  transferred  Novem 
ber  3,  from  the  1st  to  Beauregard's  old  command,  or 
Anderson's  Corps.  But  on  the  15th,  Owen's  Battalion 
was  again  transferred,  this  time  to  the  3d  Corps. 

On  November  4,  an  order  was  published  permanently 
assigning  assistant  adjutant-generals  in  the  Artillery 
Corps,  as  follows : 

STAFF  OF  CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY 

Capt.  Dudley  D.  Pendleton 

1st  Corps,  Capt.  S.  Winthrow,  and  Capt.  J.  C.  Haskell. 
2d  Corps,  Capt.  W.  A.  Percy. 

3d  Corps,  Capt.  William  W.  Chamberlaine  and  Capt.  Richard 
Walke. 

Pendleton  now  again  sought  to  have  the  measure 
proposed  in  May,  in  the  form  of  a  bill  for  the  increase  of 
the  commissioned  personnel,  adopted.  With  this  end 
in  view  he  addressed  the  Secretary  of  War,  November 
8,  but  soon  received  a  reply  from  Mr.  Sedden,  in  which 
it  was  apparent  that  with  the  exception  of  allowing  in 
creased  rank  to  general  officers  in  the  Artillery  Corps, 
no  help  from  the  War  Department  need  be  expected.* 
This  was  not  what  Pendleton  wanted.  His  efforts  were 
not  in  the  interest  of  himself  but  for  the  welfare  of  the 
Corps,  and  he  promptly  pointed  out  to  the  Secretary  the 
injustice  being  done  artillery  officers  by  the  Government 

*Rcl)ellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XLII,  Part  III,  pp.  1205,  1211. 


THE  LONG  AEM  OF  LEE  903 

continuing  the  old  system.  In  arguing  the  case  of  his 
corps,  Pendleton  wrote  on  the  15th  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  as  follows: 

"DEAR  SIR — Permit  me,  in  acknowledging  your  kind  favor  of 
the  12th  instant,  to  submit  additional  considerations  in  reply  to 
your  objections  to  our  proposed  bill. 

"First.  You  regard  such  legislation  as  objectionable,  because 
in  the  main  unnecessary,  since  the  organization  asked  for  virtually 
exists  in  this  army  by  regulation  and  can  be  similarly  introduced 
in  any  other. 

"Second.  It  will  prove,  you  apprehend,  embarrassing  in  several 
respects:  First,  a  system  fixed  by  law  allows  to  the  commanding 
general  less  freedom  in  adapting  his  resources  to  emergencies; 
second,  a  plan  suitable  for  a  large  army  may  not  be  adapted  to 
smaller  commands;  third,  officers  attached  under  law  cannot  be  as 
freely  transferred  as  the  commanding  general  may  desire. 

"The  considerations  in  reply  to  both  of  these  objections  seem 
to  me  to  be  really  decisive.  First,  as  to  the  necessity  of  the  case; 
although  we  have  artillery  battalions  formed  under  orders  of  the 
commanding  general,  sanctioned  by  the  Department,  and  although 
this  organization  has  proved  one  of  the  most  efficient  instru 
mentalities  in  our  great  struggle,  the  result  is  attained  at  the  cost 
of  very  serious  injustice  to  a  large  class  of  most  deserving  officers; 
is  attended  by  inconveniences  which  experience  satisfied  us  ought 
to  be  obviated,  and  is  liable  to  depreciate  in  the  future,  if  remedial 
measures  be  not  adopted.  The  injustice  of  which  I  speak  results 
partly  from  the  fact  that  the  status  of  artillery  officers  as  now 
determined  by  number  of  guns,  80  for  a  brigadier,  40  for  a  colonel, 
24  for  a  lieutenant-colonel,  and  16  for  a  major,  is  entirely  dispro- 
portioned  to  their  merit  and  services.  A  single  case  may  illustrate: 
The  Chief  of  Artillery  of  one  of  our  Army  Corps,  although  his 
command  in  extent,  importance,  and  responsibility  greatly  exceeds 
that  of  any  infantry  brigadier,  must  remain  a  colonel,  as  our  roll 
already  has  3  brigadiers  of  artillery,  and  we  have  not  four  times 
80  guns.*  In  like  manner,  battalion  commanders,  whose  commands, 
admirably  managed,  in  difficulty  and  importance  far  surpass 
ordinary  infantry  regiments,  must  remain  lieutenant-colonels,  or 
majors,  because  we  have  not  a  sufficient  number  of  times  40  or  24 
guns  to  allow  of  their  being  rewarded  with  another  grade.  In 
truth,  my  dear  sir,  there  ought  to  be  more  scope  for  promotion  in 
this  arm.  Officers  painfully  feel  that  they  are  not  fairly  estimated, 
that  in  spite  of  noblest  service  they  are  often  needlessly  far  behind 
their  brethren  of  other  arms.  This  might,  indeed,  be  remedied  in 
part  by  reducing  the  number  of  guns  required  for  the  several 

*Pendleton  here,  of  course,  refers  to  Col.  Walker  of  the  3d  Corps. 


904  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

grades.  But  this  is  not  the  whole  case, — our  artillery  field  officers 
feel  that  in  the  present  plan  they  occupy  rather  a  false  position; 
it  seems  to  regard  them  somewhat  as  exceptional  and  almost 
superfluous,  instead  of  as  an  essential  element  of  the  structure  and 
efficiency  of  the  army.  Their  arm  they  know  to  be  of  eminent 
value.  Their  power  they  are  equally  satisfied  is  greatly  enhanced 
by  combination,  the  significance  of  its  extensive  organization  they 
have  seen  fully  proved,  and  to  leave  them  nearly  unrecognized  by 
legal  sanction,  appears  to  them  something  like  a  degradation  of 
their  branch  of  the  service.  There  are,  besides,  others  on  whom 
the  present  plan  operates  hardly.  Every  regiment  of  infantry  or 
cavalry  has  its  own  non-commissioned  staff  provided  by  law;  our 
artillery  battalion  as  now  existing,  though  imperatively  needing 
such  officers,  are  not  allowed  them  except  by  temporary  detail, 
without  recognized  authority.  The  service  cannot  but  suffer  from 
these  things,  and  especially  from  the  insufficient  number  of  field 
officers.  It  not  unfrequently  now  occurs  that  instead  of  two  field 
officers  to  a  battalion,  we  cannot  under  the  casualties  of  service  get 
one;  and  if,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  the  eldest  captain  be  not 
efficient  for  larger  command,  hazard  may  ensue,  which  ought  not 
to  be  permitted. 

"These,  my  dear  sir,  are  not  matters  of  speculation,  or  fancy; 
they  are  realities  seriously  felt  by  some  of  the  best  men  we  have 
in  service,  and  they  seem  conclusively  to  show  that  some  such 
legislation  as  that  proposed  is  really  called  for  in  justice  to  our 
arm,  and  with  a  view  to  the  best  interests  of  the  service.  With 
regard,  in  the  second  place,  to  embarrassments  involved  in  apply 
ing  law  to  this  organization,  first  that  the  general  cannot  arrange 
detachments  as  readily  as  he  may  wish,  the  breaking  of  batteries 
has  rarely  been  found  necessary  during  the  past  two  years,  nor 
could  there  be  difficulty  in  doing  it  if  necessary,  were  batteries 
fully  legalized.  The  same  great  principle  of  military  control 
under  which  commanding  generals  can  send  infantry  or  cavalry 
companies,  regiments,  brigades,  etc.,  where  he  deems  it  necessary, 
must,  of  course,  apply  to  artillery  organizations  of  whatever  kind, 
and,  besides,  as  you  observe,  we  expressly  guard  that  point  in  our 
bill.  Gen.  Lee  would  undoubtedly  have  commented  unfavorably 
on  this  feature  of  the  plan  had  it  constituted  in  his  judgment  a 
real  objection.  Second,  that  which  may  suit  a  large  army  may 
not  be  adapted  to  smaller  commands.  This  the  bill  also  provides 
for;  it  is  not  mandatory,  only  permissive,  each  case  can  be  arranged 
according  to  its  own  conditions.  Third,  officers  assigned  under 
the  law  become  inconvenient  fixtures.  There  is  undoubtedly  an  evil 
here,  though  we  guard  against  it  by  a  clause  in  the  bill,  and  besides, 
whatever  be  the  evil,  it  pertains  equally  to  the  infantry  and  cavalry 
regiments,  brigades,  etc.,  yet  the  advantages  of  a  definite  legal 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  905 

system  for  these  have  been  found  greatly  to  overbear  the  dis 
advantages  suggested;  and  so  it  would  prove  for  similar  reasons 
in  the  artillery. 

"These  views,,  my  dear  sir.,  I  submit  with  kind  candor,  yet 
with  sincere  deference.  Impartial  observers  like  yourself,,  survey 
ing  processes  from  a  position  allowing  wide  range  of  view.,  can 
often  detect  errors  which  escape  the  notice  of  those  more  occupied 
with  details ;  but  in  a  case  of  this  nature,  where  all  the  chief 
officers  of  an  arm,  under  frequent  appeals  from  those  of  highest 
authority  associated  with  them,  concur  in  recommending  a  specific 
as  well  tested  by  experience  and  approved  in  their  judgment;  and 
when  that  recommendation  is  enforced  by  the  deliberate  approval 
of  so  rigidly  careful  a  judge  as  Gen.  Lee,  I  feel  that  there  can  be 
little  danger  of  mistake  in  asking  for  the  legislation  in  question,  as 
really  needed  and  likely  to  promote  the  best  interests  of  the 
service." 

The  foregoing  communication  from  the  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery  is  given  in  full,  for  to  the  careful  reader,  it  is  a 
history  of  the  conditions  in  the  Artillery  arm  as  they 
existed  at  the  time  of  its  writing.  Not  only  did  Pendle- 
ton  decline  to  be  brushed  aside,  but  he  made  bold  to  put 
the  matter  squarely  up  to  the  Department,  in  such  a  way 
that  to  disapprove  meant  to  accept  full  responsibility 
for  further  neglect  of  the  claims  of  artillery  officers. 

December  7,  the  enemy's  cavalry  set  out  in  force  upon 
a  raid  toward  Belfield  and  beyond,  which  movement 
called  forth  Hampton's  Division  and  his  horse  batteries. 
At  Hicksf  ord,  Hampton  met  the  raiding  column  and  re 
pelled  it.  An  infantry  column  accompanied  by  Pe- 
gram's  Battalion  and  the  Washington  Artillery  was  un 
able  to  overtake  the  main  body  of  the  enemy,  and  after 
seven  arduous  days  of  marching  and  some  skirmishing 
with  the  rear  guards,  returned  to  the  lines  worn  out  by 
the  incessant  toil  over  frozen  and  all  but  impassable 
roads. 

Both  armies  now  settled  down  for  the  winter,  but  with 
ever-watchful  eyes  upon  each  other.  The  Confederate 
Artillery  had  indeed  borne  its  share  of  the  struggle. 
The  weeks  which  followed  witnessed  privations  un 
dreamed  of  before.  The  awful  monotony  of  life  in  the 
trenches  was  occasionally  broken,  however,  by  the  ex- 


906  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

citement  of  Hill's  activities  during  January  and  Febru 
ary  on  the  right.  On  several  occasions  the  Washington 
Artillery  was  called  upon  to  march  and  countermarch 
in  that  quarter,  finally  going  into  cantonments  near 
Burgess's  Mill. 

Again  did  the  spirit  of  revival  sweep  over  the  Army, 
and  serve  in  a  great  measure  to  hold  the  weary  troops 
steadfast.  In  the  diary  of  the  Washington  Artillery 
is  found  the  following  significant  passage:  "January 
29 — The  men  have  built  a  chapel  just  behind  my  tent, 
and  have  prayer-meetings  nightly.  The  whole  army 
has  taken  to  praying,  and  if  prayer  accomplish  any 
thing,  we  should  whip  the  fight  yet.  Peace  commis 
sioners  started  for  Washington  yesterday.  No  good  is 
expected  from  the  mission.  We  will  certainly  have  a 
campaign  in  the  spring  of  some  sort  or  other."  The 
men  who  were  now  "praying  nightly"  were  the  gay 
Louisianians,  who  but  a  short  while  before  enlivened  the 
camps  with  their  music  and  dancing.  Thus  had  time, 
adversity,  and  starvation  wrought  a  change  in  the  spirit 
of  the  troops.  But  with  the  love  and  fear  of  God  had 
come  an  unconquerable  resolve  to  die  at  their  posts,  a  re 
solve  unknown  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war.  Then  it 
was  the  joy  of  victory  which  inspirited  the  troops  to 
deeds  of  valor.  Now  it  was  a  sacred  devotion  to  duty,  to 
a  cause,  to  God,  that  animated  the  Confederate  soldier 
and  enabled  him  to  bear  the  travail  of  war  and  slow 
death  in  the  trenches,  without  even  the  hope  of  eventual 
success.  Before  it  was  the  innate  bravery  of  the  race; 
in  the  winter  of  1864-65,  as  at  Fredericksburg,  it  was  a 
sterner  God-given  courage  which  held  the  men  to  their 
colors. 

To  foster  the  spirit  of  sacrifice  among  the  men  of  his 
command  Gen.  Pendleton  was  constantly  at  work.  His 
love  for  them  was  great,  and  he  watched  over  them  with 
the  spirit  of  one  personally  responsible  for  their  future 
state.  Of  his  command  at  this  time  he  wrote:  "In  the 
whole  of  the  eventful  campaign  of  1864,  the  Artillery 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  bore  a  distinguished 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  907 

part,  and  in  every  portion  of  the  widely-extended  field 
of  operation  rendered  signal  service.  It  was  every 
where  and  at  all  times  proved  reliable,  howsoever  great 
the  emergency.  In  the  wildest  fury  of  battle  and  cease 
less  harassment  and  exposure  from  sharpshooters  and 
shelling  on  the  lines,  on  the  toilsome  march,  amid  all  the 
hardships  of  the  trenches,  through  summer,  fall,  and 
winter,  and  when  steadily  breasting  the  tide  of  reverse 
against  friends  unnerved  or  overpowered,  and  foe 
flushed  with  triumph,  the  brave  officers  and  men  of  this 
branch  of  our  army  have  almost  without  exception  ex 
emplified  the  very  highest  virtues  of  Christian  soldiers 
battling  for  their  faith,  their  honor,  and  their  homes." 

At  this  time  the  staff  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery  was 
as  follows:  Capt.  Dudley  D.  Pendleton,  Assistant 
Ad  jut  ant- General;  Lieut.  George  W.  Peterkin,  and 
Acting  Lieut.  Charles  Hatcher,  aides-de-camp;  Capt. 
John  Esten  Cooke,  and  Lieut.  E.  P.  Dandridge,  As 
sistant  Inspector  Generals;  Maj.  John  C.  Barn  well, 
Ordnance  Officer;  Dr.  John  Graham,  Surgeon;  Maj. 
John  Page,  Quartermaster;  and  of  them  their  chief  re 
ported,  "It  is  but  just  that  I  should  say  they  have  uni 
formly  discharged  their  duties  with  faithful  alacrity  and 
to  my  entire  satisfaction." 

Artillery  headquarters  were  located  during  the  winter 
near  the  railroad  cut  on  the  extension  of  Halifax  Street, 
and  about  this  center  the  most  ceaseless  activity  reigned. 
The  labors  of  the  Chief  and  his  staff  and  of  the  artillery 
corps  commanders  were  incessant  in  the  effort  to  secure 
and  care  for  the  horses  and  maintain  the  material  in 
serviceable  condition.  Then,  too,  there  were  many 
vacancies  to  fill  and  where  so  many  were  deserving  of 
reward  the  problem  of  promotion  imposed  no  light  task. 

The  difficulty  of  securing  needed  supplies  at  this 
time  can  be  illustrated  in  no  better  way  than  by  giving 
the  following  extract  from  the  record  of  purchases,  with 


908  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Confederate  money,  by  an  artillery  officer  traveling 
from  Augusta,  Ga.,  to  Petersburg,  in  the  early  days  of 
1865. 

1  curry  comb $     10.00 

Mending    pants 20.00 

Hair  cutting  and  shave 10.00 

Meal   on   road 20.00 

Cigars    and   bitters 60.00 

Pair   of   eyeglasses 135.00 

Candles     50.00 

Coat,  vest,,  and  pants 2,700.00 

1  gallon  whiskey 400.00 

1    pair   pants 700.00 

6-yd.  linen,  2%  ft.  wide 1,200.00 

1  oz.  sulphate  quinine 1,700.00 

2  weeks'   board 700.00 

1   doz.  Catawba  wine 900.00 

Shad   and  sundries 75.00 

Matches    25.00 

Penknife 125.00 

1   package  brown  Windsor  soap 50.00 

Army  boots  were  selling  in  Richmond  at  this  time 
for  from  $500.00  to  $600.00  a  pair,  and  artillery  of 
ficers  commonly  paid  $175.00  for  the  leather  and  $75.00 
for  the  fabrication  of  the  coarsest  kind  of  military 
boots.  One  may  easily  imagine  the  difficulty  encoun 
tered  in  replacing  and  repairing  artillery  harness,  equip 
ments,  etc.,  the  price  of  leather  being  $5.30  per  pound. 
The  matter  of  securing  draught  animals  was  even  more 
serious.  The  schedule  of  prices  established  by  the  War 
Department  in  August,  1864,  which  provided  for  the 
impressment  of  animals,  fixed  the  value  of  first-class 
artillery  horses  and  mules  at  $500.00.*  The  price  was 
bad  enough.  The  main  difficulty  was  to  find  the  animals 
and  to  feed  those  already  on  hand.  The  schedule  prices 
for  feed  at  this  time  were  as  follows : 

Corn,  per  bu.  56  Ibs $4.00 

Unshelled    corn 3.95 

Cleaned  oats,  per  bu.  32  Ibs 2.50 


'Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XLII,  Part  II,  p.  1153. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  909 

Wheat  bran,  per  bu.  17  Ibs $  .50 

Hay,  unbaled,  per  100  Ibs 3.00 

Sheaf  oats,  baled 4.40 

Sheaf  oats,  unbaled 3.50 

Blade    fodder,    baled 3.90 

Shucks,    baled 2.60 

Wheat  straw,  baled,  per  100  Ibs 2.20 

We  have  followed  its  trials  and  tribulations  in  some 
detail,  but  nothing  can  so  impress  one  with  the  severity 
of  the  ordeal  through  which  the  Artillery  had  passed 
since  the  first  of  May,  as  a  summary  of  its  losses,  which 
itemized  by  corps  and  battalions  were  as  follows: 

Huger's  Battalion 37 

Cabell's  Battalion 47 

Haskell's    Battalion .. 68 

Hardaway's    Battalion 4 

Stark's    Battalion 2 

Gibbes'    Battalion    20 

Johnson's    Battalion..  19 


Total    1st    Corps 197 

Field  and  Staff 3 

Page's    Battalion 177 

Cutshaw's    Battalion 191 

Hardaway's   Battalion 74 

Nelson's   Battalion 116 

Braxton's    Battalion 128 

McLaughlin's    Battalion 103 


Total  2d  Corps 788 

Pegram's  Battalion 78 

Poague's    Battalion 82 

Mclntosh's    Battalion 84 

Richardson's  Battalion 51 

Lane's    Battalion 64 

Owen's    Battalion 33 

Washington   Artillery 18 


Total    3d    Corps 370 

Stribling's  Battalion 132 

12th  Virginia  Battalion 41 


910  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 


Moseley's    Battalion 87 

Coit's    Battalion  _  58 


Total  Anderson's  Corps   (Beauregard) 318 

Horse  Artillery 79 

RECAPITULATION 

1st  Army   Corps 197 

2d  Army  Corps 788 

3d  Army  Corps 370 

Anderson's    Corps 318 

Horse  Artillery 79 


Aggregate     1,752 

Of  this  number,  exactly  500  were  reported  as  missing, 
principally  in  the  2d  Corps,  due  to  captures  at  Spotsyl- 
vania,  where  7  officers  and  137  men  of  Page's,  and  4  of 
ficers  and  128  men  of  Cutshaw's  Battalion  were  taken 
by  the  enemy.  Deducting  17  officers  and  483  men  miss 
ing  from  the  aggregate  loss  and  the  casualties  in  battle 
are  found  to  be  1?252,  of  which  number  72  were  officers. 
In  the  3d  Corps  alone  7  officers  were  killed  and  25 
wounded,  Poague's  Battalion  losing  12  of  the  number, 
Lane's  8,  Mclntosh's  6,  and  Pegram's  4.  In  the  2d 
Corps  there  were  9  officers  killed,  18  wounded,  and  16 
missing. 

If  we  take  the  aggregate  loss  at  1,752,  we  find  the 
loss  of  the  Artillery  Corps  to  have  been  over  thirty  per 
cent  of  its  original  strength,  with  a  total  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  of  over  twenty-eight  per  cent !  It  is  small 
wonder  that  Lee's  Artillery  was  so  highly  regarded  by 
both  friend  and  foe.  The  writer  knows  of  no  such 
figures  as  these  as  applicable  to  any  other  artillery.* 

In  spite  of  the  great  drain  on  the  personnel  incident 
to  such  a  list  of  casualties,  never  was  the  Artillery  Corps 
allowed  to  become  depleted  to  the  point  of  ineffective 
ness.  The  total  artillery  personnel  of  the  1st,  3d,  and 
Anderson's  Corps,  as  stated  in  the  returns  of  October 
20,  31,  November  10,  and  December  10,  being  5,339, 

•* Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XXXVI,  Part  I,  p.  1052. 


THE  LONG  ABM  or  LEE  911 

6,167,  6,277,  and  6,179,  respectively.  It  was  not  until 
after  the  opening  of  spring  that  disintegration  began  to 
set  in. 

On  December  28,  1864,  the  distribution  and  arma 
ment  of  the  Artillery  was  as  follows: 

IST  CORPS 

Brig.-Gen.  Edward  Porter  Alexander 

CABELL'S  BATTALION 
Col.  Henry  Coalter  Cabell 

1st  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Robert  M.  Anderson. 

4  Napoleons. 
Troup  (Ga.)  Battery,  Capt.   Henry   H.   Carlton. 

4  10-pounder  Parrotts. 
Battery  "A",  1st  N.  C.  Reg't,  Capt.  Basil  C.  Manly. 

2  Napoleons,  2  3-inch  rifles. 
Pulaski  (Ga.)  Battery,  Lieut.  Morgan  Callaway. 

4  Napoleons. 

HUGER'S  BATTALION 

Lieut. -Col.  Frank  Huger 
Maj.  Tyler  C.  Jordan 

Brooks'  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Fickling. 

14  12-pounder  howitzers. 

Madison  (La.)  Battery,  Lieut.  Jordan  C.  Parkinson. 

2  12-pounder,  4  24-pounder  howitzers. 

Richmond  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Parker. 

4  3-inch  rifles. 

Bedford  Battery,  Capt.  John  D.  Smith. 

4  3-inch  rifles. 

Bath  Battery,  Capt.  Esmond  B.  Taylor. 

4  Napoleons. 

Ashland  Battery,  Lieut.  James  Woolfolk. 

2  Napoleons,  2  20-pounder  Parrotts. 

HASKELL'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  John  C.  Haskell 

Branch  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  Henry  G.  Flanner. 

4  Napoleons. 
Palmetto  (S.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  Hugh  R.  Garden. 

3  Napoleons,  1   10-pounder  Parrott. 


27 


912  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Nelson  Battery,  Capt.  James  N.  Lamkin. 

26  mortars. 
Rowan  (N.  C.)  Battery,  Capt.  John  A.  Ramsey. 

1  12-pounder  Whitworth,  2  8-pounder  Armstrongs. 

HARDAWAY'S  BATTALION 
Lieut. -Col.  Richard  A.  Hardaway 

Powhatan  Battery,  Capt.  Willis  J.  Dance. 

4  3-inch  rifles. 
3d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Benj.  H.  Smith,  Jr. 

4  Napoleons. 
1st  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  Archibald  Graham. 

2  3-inch  rifles,  2  10-pounder  Parrotts. 

Salem  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  B.  Griffin. 

4  Napoleons. 

STARK'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  Alexander  W.  Stark 

Mathews  Battery,  Capt.  Andrew  D.  Armistead. 

4  Napoleons. 
Louisiana  Guard  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  A.  Green. 

4  Napoleons. 
Giles  Battery,  Capt.  David  A.  French. 

4  Napoleons. 

JOHNSON'S  BATTALION   (Improvised) 
Maj.  Marmaduke  Johnson 

Clutter's  Richmond  Battery,  Lieut.  Lucas  Mclntosh. 

2  Napoleons,  2  3-inch  rifles. 
Fredericksburg  Battery,  Lieut.  John  G.  Pollock. 

4  Napoleons. 

2D  CORPS 

Col.  Thomas  Hill  Carter 

NELSON'S  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.  William  Nelson 

Amherst  Battery,  Capt.   Thomas  J.   Kirkpatrick. 

2  Napoleons,  1  3-inch  rifle. 

Georgia  Regular  Battery,  Capt.  John  Milledge,  Jr. 

3  3-inch  rifles. 

Fluvanna  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  G.  Snead. 

2  12-pounder  howitzers. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  913 

BRAXTON'S  BATTALION 

Lieut. -Col.  Carter  M.  Braxton 
Maj.  Marcellus  N.  Moorman 
Alleghany  Battery,  Capt.  John  C.  Carpenter. 

2  Napoleons. 
Stafford  Battery,  Capt.  R.  L.  Cooper. 

2  10-pounder  Parrotts. 

Lee  Battery,  Capt.  William  W.  Hardwicke. 

2  Napoleons. 

CUTSHAW'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  Wilfred  Emmet  Cutshaw 
Richmond  Orange  Battery,  Capt.  Chas.  W.  Fry. 

2  12-pounder  howitzers. 
Staunton  Battery,  Capt.  Asher  W.  Garber. 

2  3-inch  rifles. 

2d  Co.  Richmond  Howitzers,  Capt.  Lorraine  F.  Jones. 

2  Napoleons,  2  10-pounder  Parrotts. 

KING'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  J.  Floyd  King 
Maj.  William  McLaughlin 
Lewisburg  (W.  Va.)  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  A.  Bryan. 

2  3-inch  rifles. 
Monroe  Battery,  Capt.  George  B.  Chapman. 

2  Napoleons. 
Wise  Legion  Battery,  Capt.  William  M.  Lowry. 

2  Napoleons. 

3D  CORPS 

Col.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker 

MC!NTOSH'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  David  Gregg  Mclntosh 

Maj.  Marmaduke  Johnson 
1st  Maryland  Battery,  Capt.  William  F.  Dement. 

4  Napoleons. 
4th  Maryland  Battery,  Capt.  Walter  S.  Chew. 

1  10-pounder  Parrott,  2  3-inch  rifles. 

2d  Rockbridge  Battery,  Capt.  William  K.  Donald. 

3  24-pounder  Parrotts. 

Hardaway's  Alabama  Battery,  Capt.  William  B.  Hurt. 

2  3-inch  rifles,  1  12-pounder  Whitworth. 

Danville  Battery,  Capt.  Berryman  Z.  Price. 

4  Napoleons. 


914  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

PEGRAM'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  William  J.  Pegram 
Maj.  Joseph  McGraw 

Richmond  Letcher  Battery,,  Capt.  Thomas  A.  Brander. 

4  Napoleons. 
Richmond  Crenshaw  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  Ellett. 

4  3-inch  rifles. 
Richmond  Purcell  Battery,  Capt.  George  M.  Cayce. 

4  Napoleons. 
Fredericksburg  Battery,  Lieut.  John  G.  Pollock. 

4  Napoleons. 
Battery  "B",  1st  N.  C.  Reg't,  Capt.  Thomas  E.  Gregg. 

4  Napoleons. 

POAGUE'S  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.  William  T.  Poague 

Albemarle  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  F.  Johnston. 

1  Napoleon,  2  10-pounder  Parrotts. 

Madison  (Miss.)   Battery,  Capt.   Thomas  J.   Kirkpatrick. 

4  Napoleons. 
Pittsylvania  Battery,  Capt.  Nathan  Penick. 

2  10-pounder  Parrotts,  2  3-inch  rifles. 

Warrenton  Battery,  Capt.  Addison  W.  Utterback. 

4  Napoleons. 
Graham's  N.  C.  Battery,  Capt.  Arthur  B.  Williams. 

2  Napoleons,  1  3-inch  rifle. 

RICHARDSON'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  Charles  Richardson 
Maj.  Victor  Maurin 

Norfolk  Blues  Battery,  Capt.  Charles  R.  Grandy. 

2  Napoleons,  2  3-inch  rifles. 
Donaldsonville   (La.)   Battery,  Capt.  R.  Prosper  Landry. 

2  Napoleons,  2  10-pounder  Parrotts. 
Norfolk  Battery,  Capt.  Jos.  D.  Moore. 

4  Napoleons. 

CUTTS'  BATTALION 

Col.  Allen  S.   Cutts 
Maj.  John  Lane 

Battery  "A",  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,     Capt.  Hugh  M.  Ross. 

4  Napoleons,  2  10-pounder  Parrotts. 
Battery  "B",  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,     Capt.  George  M.  Patterson. 

6  Napoleons. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  915 

Battery  "C",  Sumter  (Ga.)  Batt.,     Capt.  John  T.  Wingfield. 
4  Napoleons,  2   10-poimder  Parrotts,  2  3-inch  rifles. 

ESHLEMAN'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  Benj.  F.  Eshleman 

Maj.  M.  B.  Miller 
1st  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  Edward  Owen. 

1  10-pounder  Parrott,  3  3-inch  rifles. 

2d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.   J.    B.   Richardson. 

4  Napoleons. 
3d  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  Andrew  Hero,  Jr. 

4  Napoleons. 
4th  Co.  Washington  Artillery,  Capt.  Joe  Norcom. 

3  Napoleons,  1    10-pounder  Parrott. 

GIBBES'   BATTALION 

Maj.  William  W.  Owen 

Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  John  Hampden  Chamberlayne. 

4  Napoleons. 

Ringgold  Battery,  Capt.  Crispen  Dickenson. 

4  Napoleons. 
Richmond  Otey  Battery,  Capt.  David  N.  Walker. 

4  Napoleons. 

ANDERSON'S  CORPS 

Col.  Hilary  P.  Jones 

MOSELEY'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  William  H.  Caskie 
Battery  "C",  13th  N.  C.  Battalion,   Capt.  James  D.  dimming. 

2  Napoleons. 

Battery  "E",  1st  N.  C.  Reg't,  Capt.  John  O.  Miller. 

4   10-pounder  Parrotts. 
Macon  (Ga.)  Battery,  Capt.  C.  W.  Staten. 

4  Napoleons. 
Yorktown  Battery,  Capt.  Edward  R.  Young. 

4  Napoleons. 

BRANCH'S  BATTALION 

Lieut.-Col.  James  R.  Branch 

Maj.  James  C.  Coit 
Confederate  Guards,  Miss.  Battery,   Capt.  William  D.   Bradford. 

2  12-pounder,  3  20-pounder  Parrotts. 

Petersburg  Battery,  Capt.  Richard  G.  Pegram. 

4  Napoleons. 


916  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Halifax  Battery,  Capt.  Samuel  T.  Wright. 

4  Napoleons. 
S.  C.  "Chesterfield"  Battery,  Capt.  James  I.  Kelly. 

2  Napoleons. 

STRIBLING'S  BATTALION 

Maj.  Robert  M.  Stribling 

Maj.  Joseph  G.  Blount 
Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  James  M.  Dickerson. 

4  Napoleons. 
Fauquier  Battery,  Capt.   William  C.   Marshall. 

4  Napoleons. 
Richmond  Fayette  Battery,  Capt.  Miles  C.  Macon. 

2  10-pounder  Parrotts,  2  3-inch  rifles. 
Richmond  Hampden  Battery,  Capt.  J.  E.  Sullivan. 

4  Napoleons. 

BOGGS'  BATTALION 
Maj.  Francis  J.  Boggs 
Martin's  Richmond  Battery,  Lieut.  Samuel  H.  Pulliam. 

3  Napoleons,  1  12-pounder  howitzer. 

Albemarle  Battery,  Lieut.  William  H.  Weisiger. 

4  Napoleons. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY 
Lieut.-Col.  Robert  Preston  Chew 

CHEW'S  BATTALION 
Lieut.-Col.   Robert  Preston  Chew 
Petersburg  Battery,  Capt.  Edward  Graham. 

2  3-inch  rifles,  2  12-pounder  howitzers. 
Washington   (S.  C.)   Battery,  Lieut.  E.  Lindsay  Halsey. 

4  3-inch  rifles. 

2d  Stuart  H.  A.  Battery,  Capt.    William    M.    McGregor. 

4  3-inch  rifles. 

BREATHED'S  BATTALION 
Maj.  James  Breathed 

1st  Stuart  H.  A.  Battery,  Capt.  Philipp  P.  Johnston. 

Lynchburg  Battery,  Capt.  John  J.  Shoemaker. 

Ashby  Battery,  Capt.  James  W.  Thomson. 

Roanoke  Battery,  Capt.  Warren  S.  Lurty. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY  BATTALION  OF  LOMAX'S  DIVISION 
2d  Maryland  Battery,  Capt.  William  H.  Griffin. 

Charlottesville  Battery,  Capt.  Thomas  E.  Jackson. 

Staunton  Battery,  Capt.   John  H.   McClannahan. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  917 

Chew's  own  battalion  was  serving  with  Hampton 
near  Petersburg  and  Breathed's  with  Rosser  and  Fitz 
Lee  in  the  Valley.  The  Horse  Artillery  had  gradually 
been  increased  to  ten  batteries. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  New  Year,  Haskell's,  Harda- 
way's,  Johnson's  and  Stark's  battalions  under  Gen. 
Alexander  were  still  north  of  the  James  and  had  been 
recently  joined  by  Poague's  Battalion.  Cutts'  and 
Richardson's  battalions  remained  in  position  north  of 
the  Appomattox,  with  the  exception  of  Penick's  Bat 
tery,  which  had  been  attached  to  Poague's  Battalion. 
The  2d  Corps  Artillery  was  in  the  Valley,  while  Cab- 
ell's  and  Huger's  battalions  of  the  1st  Corps,  Jones' 
battalions  of  Anderson's,  and  Pegram's,  Macintosh's 
and  Gibbes'  remained  in  the  trenches,  and  Eshleman's 
near  Burgess's  Mill. 

In  addition  to  the  twenty-six  mortars  manned  by 
Lamkin's  Battery,  Poague  manned  four,  Mclntosh  two 
8-inch  howitzers  and  two  8-inch  mortars,  Pegram  two 
8-inch  and  two  24-pounder  mortars,  Cutts  one  8-inch 
columbiad  and  seven  24-pounder  mortars.  In  Ander 
son's  Corps,  Coit,  Blount,  arid  Caskie  manned  four  30- 
pounder  Parrotts,  one  8-inch  Columbiad,  four  8-inch, 
twelve  24-pounder,  nine  12-pounder  mortars,  and  about 
25  howitzers  of  various  calibers.  Exclusive  of  the  heavy 
guns  and  pieces  of  position,  and  the  guns  of  the  Horse 
Artillery  there  were  in  the  four  corps  of  Lee's  Army, 
January  1,  1865,  282  field  guns,  including  192  Na 
poleons  and  howitzers,  and  90  rifled  pieces.* 

Of  the  field-officers,  Col.  Moseley  had  been  killed 
December  16,  Gibbes  had  been  wounded  on  July  30, 
Caskie  was  absent  on  indefinite  sick  leave,  Boggs  was 
on  duty  in  Richmond,  Maurin  at  High  Bridge,  and 
Branch  was  absent  on  leave.  Maj.  Miller  was  therefore 
assigned  to  duty  with  Richardson's  Battalion  in  the 
absence  of  Maurin,  while  Maj.  Blount  had  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  Dearing's,  or  Read's,  and  Maj.  Owen 

*For  tabular  report  showing  heavy  artillery  In  position  and  manned  by  field 
artillery  at  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  see  Rebellion  Records.  Series  I,  Vol 
XLII,  Part  III,  p.  1354. 


918  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

to  Gibbes'  Battalion.  Dement's  Battery,  leaving  its 
guns  in  the  trenches  at  Petersburg,  was  on  duty  at 
Drewry's  Bluff. 

Notwithstanding  the  strenuous  service  which  it  had 
rendered  and  losses  which  almost  seem  to  have  been  an 
nihilating,  the  condition  of  the  Artillery  at  the  close  of 
the  year  1864  was  actually  better  than  when  it  left 
winter  quarters  the  preceding  spring.  On  this  point, 
Pendleton,  in  his  report,  wrote  February  28,  1865:  "In 
conclusion  I  am  able  to  report  that  our  artillery  remains 
at  the  close  of  this  arduous  campaign  in  a  condition  of 
most  encouraging  efficiency,  and  that  with  reasonable 
effort  toward  supplying  it  with  a  few  guns  to  replace 
some  lost  in  unfortunate  affairs  that  have  been  described 
(here  he  refers  to  loss  in  the  Valley) ,  and  with  horses  to 
reestablish  a  number  of  teams  disabled  in  action  or 
worn  down  by  hard  service,  it  will  be  in  full  strength 
for  the  campaign  of  the  ensuing  spring.  It  may  be  con 
fidently  relied  upon  to  accomplish,  by  the  Divine  bless 
ing  during  the  next  season,  as  it  has  so  well  done  through 
the  last,  its  entire  share  in  the  defense  of  our  country."* 

*For  condition  of  Walker's  Artillery  of  the  3d  Corps,  September  30,  1864, 
see  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XLII,  Part  II,  p.  1309. 


CHAPTER  XL VII 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  END 1865 

WHEN  Longstreet  rejoined  the  Army  and  was  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  the  troops  north  of  the  James, 
he  found  the  outer  artillery  defenses  in  a  state  not  al 
together  satisfactory,  and,  it  would  seem,  held  Lieut. - 
Col.  J.  C.  Pemberton  responsible  for  the  condition  of 
affairs.  But  in  this  Longstreet  was  in  error,  for  what 
ever  may  have  been  Pemberton's  shortcomings  at  Vicks- 
burg,  he  had  labored  incessantly  upon  the  works  below 
Richmond,  and  had  with  little  encouragement  greatly 
improved  them.  Longstreet's  criticisms,  however,  soon 
led  to  dissatisfaction,  and  on  January  7,  Pemberton  was 
relieved  from  his  former  duties  and  assigned  to  duty  as 
Inspector  General  of  Artillery  and  Ordnance  with 
Capt.  L.  S.  Marye  as  his  assistant.  Alexander  was 
now  placed  in  entire  charge  of  the  artillery  defenses 
north  of  the  river,  while  Col.  Stapleton  Crutchfield, 
still  quite  unfit  to  perform  active  field  service,  was  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  the  garrison  at  Chaffin's  Bluff, 
where  Hardaway  had  for  some  time  been  stationed  with 
his  battalion.  On  January  16,  Alexander  was  again 
compelled  to  rest  from  his  duties  for  a  brief  space,  leav 
ing  Col.  Cabell  in  control  as  Acting  Chief  of  Artillery 
of  the  1st  Corps. 

At  the  close  of  January,  the  entire  effective  strength 
of  Carter's  four  battalions  of  artillery  in  the  Valley  was 
but  35  officers  and  538  men  present  for  duty,  with  an 
aggregate  present  and  absent  of  2,082.  Of  the  latter 
number,  16  officers  and  383  men  were  carried  as 
prisoners  of  war.  The  rolls  showed  32  guns  in  service. 

The  condition  of  Early's  command  in  camp  near 
Staunton  was  most  unsatisfactory,  particularly  with 
respect  to  the  artillery  horses,  for  which  on  account  of 
Sheridan's  activities  and  long  droughts  during  the 
past  summer  sufficient  forage  could  not  be  secured. 


920  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

After  sending  Fitz  Lee's  Cavalry  Division  to  Peters 
burg,  Lomax's  Brigade  to  the  pasture  lands  in  the  Alle- 
ghanies,  and  temporarily  disbanding  Rosser's  Brigade, 
the  men  of  which  were  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes 
with  their  horses,  the  situation  was  still  serious.  Ac 
cordingly  the  men  and  horses  of  King's  or  McLaugh- 
lin's  artillery  battalion  were  sent  to  southwestern  Vir 
ginia  to  be  wintered,  while  the  officers  and  men  of 
Braxton's  and  Cutshaw's  battalions  under  Col.  Carter 
were  ordered  to  report  to  Gen.  Lee  to  man  the  works 
about  Richmond.  Col.  Nelson  with  six  pieces  of  his  bat 
talion  remained  with  Early.  About  this  time  Gen. 
Long  again  reported  to  Early  for  duty,  and  caused  the 
guns  of  the  2d  Corps,  from  which  the  men  and  horses 
had  been  taken,  to  be  shipped  by  rail  to  Lynchburg. 
This  was  a  deplorable  state  of  affairs,  but  it  could  not 
be  avoided,  as  the  horses  of  the  Cavalry  and  Artillery 
would  have  perished  had  they  been  kept  in  the  Valley. 

Two  very  small  brigades  of  Wharton's  Division,  and 
Nelson's  artillery  command  now  comprised  Early's 
whole  force,  which  was  placed  in  camp  near  Fishersville 
between  Staunton  and  Waynesborough. 

At  the  time  Braxton  and  Cutshaw  were  ordered  to 
Richmond,  there  were  Lieut.-Col.  Atkinson's  four  bat 
talions  of  heavy  artillery  under  Majs.  Hensley,  Hardin, 
Cary,  and  Robertson,  respectively,  and  Lightfoot's 
Local  Defense  Battalion  and  Leyden's  9th  Georgia 
Battalion  of  light  artillery  manning  the  lines,  with  a 
total  of  68  officers  and  1,517  men  present  for  duty. 
Other  forces  of  heavy  artillery  were  assigned  to  the  de 
fenses  of  Petersburg,  and  the  Richmond  and  Danville 
Railroad  under  Lieut.-Col.  Howard  and  Maj.  Boggs, 
respectively.* 

Genls.  Lee  and  Pendleton  were  now  making  every 
effort  to  secure  horses  for  the  artillery  in  order  that  it 
might  be  placed  in  condition  before  spring  to  take  the 
field.  On  the  1st  of  February,  it  was  estimated  that 

*For  detailed  distribution  of  this  force  and  that  at  Petersburg  along  the 
Richmond  and  Danville  Railroad,  see  Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XLVI, 
I'art  II,  PP.  1196-97-98  and  1185. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  921 

6,000  horses  and  4,000  mules  were  needed  for  the  armies 
of  the  Confederacy,  and  that  the  number  which  could 
possibly  be  secured  before  spring  was  5,000 ;  3,000  from 
Mississippi  and  2,000  in  Virginia.  The  Inspector  Gen 
eral  of  Transportation  estimated  that  with  ample  funds 
15,000  animals  might  sooner  or  later  be  secured  in 
Mexico  and  Texas,  at  $70.00  gold  per  head,  but  these 
animals  were  totally  unsuited  to  artillery  service.  In 
Mississippi  the  animals  would  have  to  be  purchased 
from  within  the  enemy's  lines  at  a  vastly  greater  cost, 
while  in  Virginia  the  available  supply  would  only  be 
forthcoming  for  cash  payments  in  gold.*  Such  was  the 
condition  of  affairs  and  well  might  Pendleton  have 
despaired  of  remounting  his  batteries. 

A  suggestion  was  now  made  by  Col.  Carter  to  drive 
the  unserviceable  animals  of  the  Artillery  west  to  the 
counties  of  Augusta  and  Rockbridge,  where  they  could 
be  exchanged  with  the  farmers  for  fresh  ones,  should 
authority  to  that  effect  be  granted.  He  reported  that 
a  fairly  large  supply  of  horses  could  be  had  in  this 
section,  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  Sheridan  had 
but  recently  taken  therefrom  over  1,700  animals  in  spite 
of  the  drain  of  the  war.  This  plan  was  promptly  pro 
posed  to  the  Inspector  General  of  Transportation,  and 
again  Pendleton  protested  against  the  practice  of  herd 
ing  the  condemned  artillery  horses  in  great  droves  only 
to  perish  from  neglect,  and  consume  forage,  when  they 
might  be  distributed  among  the  farmers  for  purposes 
both  of  recuperation  and  aid  to  agriculture. 

In  a  report  dated  February  14,  Maj.  Cole  states  that 
2,482  horses  and  1,370  mules  were  immediately  required 
by  the  Army  at  Petersburg,  and  a  grand  total  of  3,270 
horses  and  2,409  mules  for  all  the  forces  in  Virginia. 
Having  been  provided  with  $100,000  in  gold  and  $3,- 
000,000  in  treasury  notes,  he  was  hopeful  of  securing 
2,500  animals  in  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  pro 
vided  he  was  allowed  to  impress  and  pay  for  them  at 

"Letter  of  Inspector  General  of  Transportation,  February  ...  1865,  Rebellion 
Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XLVI,  Part  II,  p.  1190. 


922  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

local  appraisements.  In  addition  to  this  number,  he 
reported  that  700  artillery  horses  would  be  returned 
from  the  infirmaries  before  April  1.* 

The  horse  depots  which  had  been  established  at 
Pendleton's  suggestion  had  proved  of  great  benefit  to 
the  service,  for  by  means  of  them  large  numbers  of  ex 
hausted  animals  had  been  rendered  serviceable  and  re 
issued.  But  the  losses  in  the  field  continued  to  be 
greater  than  the  supply,  especially  in  the  tidewater 
section  of  Virginia.  Many  of  the  animals  were  bred 
and  raised  in  the  mountainous  regions  of  the  west, 
and  were  not  acclimated  to  the  lowlands  about  Peters 
burg,  nor  could  they  be  made  to  flourish,  in  spite  of 
every  effort,  when  taken  from  their  accustomed  pastures 
and  placed  on  army  forage.  Glanders  and  farcy,  the 
most  dreaded  equine  diseases,  became  prevalent  in  the 
corrals  at  Petersburg,  and  Owen's  13th  Virginia  Bat 
talion  was  almost  dismounted  before  the  close  of  the 
winter  from  these  maladies  of  the  horses. t 

So  vehemently  had  Braxton  and  Cutshaw  protested 
against  the  unhorsing  of  their  commands,  that  early  in 
March  it  was  decided  to  issue  horses  and  new  guns  to 
the  former,  and  it  was  ordered  to  relieve  Poague's  Bat 
talion  on  duty  under  Alexander.  But  after  issuing  the 
horses,  and  before  the  guns  arrived  from  Richmond,  the 
issue  of  forage  became  so  scarce  that  many  of  the  ani 
mals  perished.  About  this  time  Cutshaw  applied  to 
have  his  battalion  converted  into  cavalry  for  more  active 
service  than  that  which  he  was  performing  as  heavy 
artillery.  Both  the  officers  and  men  of  his  command, 
he  declared,  were  desirous  of  this  change  and  were  will 
ing  to  repair  to  the  Valley,  where  in  small  groups  they 
would  secure  their  own  mounts. 

Conditions  were  indeed  becoming  desperate.  Even 
the  Horse  Artillery  which  Pendleton  was  endeavoring 
to  reorganize  and  place  upon  a  more  efficient  footing  for 
the  anticipated  campaign,  was  in  urgent  need  of  guns 

*Rcbellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XLVI,  Part  II,  p.  1232. 
flbid,    p.    1305. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  923 

and  equipment,  necessitating  a  call  upon  Alexander  for 
rifles  for  its  armament.  But  to  this  Alexander  ob 
jected,  urging  that  howitzers  be  issued  the  horse  bat 
teries,  instead  of  his  much-needed  rifle  pieces,  of  which 
he  already  had  too  few.  He  was  even  now  compelled  to 
strengthen  the  line  he  was  defending  by  planting  sensi 
tive  shell  among  the  abattis  in  his  front,  illuminating 
his  field  of  fire  by  night  with  fire  balls,  etc.,  and  to  take 
from  him  his  best  ordnance  was  an  act  of  folly,  which  he 
strenuously  opposed. 

As  spring  approached  conditions  in  the  Army  in  gen 
eral  grew  worse  and  worse.  From  the  trials  of  the  late 
winter,  "history  would  fain  avert  her  eyes."  They  were 
such  as  can  never  be  forgotten  by  those  who  watched 
and  waited;  such  as  can  never  be  credited  by  those  who 
read  the  story  in  peace  and  plenty.  To  guard  the  long 
line  of  intrenchments  from  the  Chickahominy  to 
Hatcher's  Run,  there  was  now  left  but  a  gaunt  remnant 
of  that  valiant  host  which  had  hurled  back  nearly  thrice 
its  number  at  Cold  Harbor,  and  wrought  humiliation 
to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  a  score  of  fields  in  this 
vigorous  campaign. 

"Living  on  one-sixth  of  a  ration  of  cornmeal  and 
rancid  pork,  thinly  clad,  their  bodies  indeed  shivered 
under  the  freezing  blasts  of  heaven,  but  their  dauntless 
spirits  cowered  not  under  the  fiery  blasts  of  war.  But 
there  was  to  be  added  a  pang  deeper  than  the  pang  of 
hunger;  sharper  than  the  rigor  of  the  elements  or  hurt 
of  shot  and  steel.  For  now  from  the  cotton  lands  of 
Georgia  and  the  rice  fields  of  Carolina,  came  borne  on 
every  blast  the  despairing  cry,  which  wives  with  little 
ones  raised  to  wintry  skies,  lit  by  the  glare  of  burning 
homes,  and  the  men  of  the  'Old  North  State'  bethought 
them  of  the  happy  homesteads  which  lay  in  the  path  of 
the  ruthless  conqueror,  who  was  waging  war  with  an 
audacious  cruelty,  capable  of  destroying  a  whole  nation. 
A  subtle  enemy,  till  then  well-nigh  unknown,  attacked 
in  rear  the  Army  which  still  haughtily  held  its  front, 


924  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

and  men,  with  bated  breath  and  cheeks  flushing  through 
their  bronze,  whispered  the  dread  word  'desertion/  ' 

On  the  28th  of  February,  Gen.  Lee  reported  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  a  total  of  1,094  desertions  between  the 
15th  and  25th  of  the  month!  Of  this  number,  586  were 
in  Hill's  and  217  in  Anderson's  Corps.  During  the  ten 
days  ending  March  8,  779  men  abandoned  their  colors, 
450  from  these  same  corps. 

"The  historian,  far  removed  from  the  passions  of  the 
time,  may  coldly  measure  out  his  censure ;  but  we,  com 
rades,  bound  to  these  men  by  countless  proud  traditions, 
can  only  cry  with  the  old  Hebrew  prophet,  'Alas!  my 
brother!'  and  remember  that  these  were  valiant  souls, 
too  sorely  tried."* 

In  response  to  a  circular  of  March  7,  calling  for  sug 
gestions  as  to  how  to  cure  the  dread  malady  which  now 
unabated  threatened  to  destroy  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  Gen.  Alexander  promptly  proposed  the  classi 
fication  of  offenses  with  appropriate  punishments  and 
an  increase  of  the  authority  of  regimental  courts,  to  be 
employed  in  lieu  of  the  cumbersome  system  of  Corps 
Courts  hitherto  in  use.  The  proceedings  under  the 
proposed  system  were  to  be  more  summary  and  the 
death  penalty  more  frequent,  t  But  it  is  exceedingly 
doubtful  if  desertion  could  have  been  checked  by  more 
drastic  punishment,  or  in  any  way.  The  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  was  doomed — the  Confederacy  had 
long  since  shown  the  hectic  flush  upon  its  check. 

Gen.  Lee  had  already  disclosed  his  plans  to  Gen. 
Pendleton  and  given  him  confidential  instructions  re 
garding  the  proposed  withdrawal  of  the  Army.  In  ac 
cordance  with  these  plans  Pendleton  redoubled  his  ef 
forts  to  place  the  Artillery  on  the  most  efficient  footing 
possible,  and  at  last,  with  the  support  of  Gen.  Lee,  he 
succeeded  in  securing  the  many  needed  promotions  in  his 
corps,  for  which  he  had  so  long  struggled,  and  authority 

*Address  of  W.  Gordon  McCabe  on  the  Siege  of  Petersburg,  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  Memorial,  p.  169. 

tA  careful  study  of  Gen.  Alexander's  plan  will  repay  the  student,  Rebellion 
Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XLVI,  Part  II,  pp.  1300,  1301. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  925 

to  reorganize  his  battalions.  On  March  1,  the  following 
promotions  were  announced,  with  rank  from  February 
18. 

To  be  Brigadier-General — Col.  Reuben  Lindsay  Walker. 

To  be  Colonels— Lieut.-Col.  William  Nelson,  D.  G.  Mclntosh, 
Frank  Huger,  and  W.  J.  Pegram. 

To  be  Lieutenant-Colonels — Majs.  John  C.  Haskell,  W.  M. 
Owen,,  John  Lane,  R.  P.  Chew,  W.  E.  Cutshaw,  Marmaduke 
Johnson,  and  R.  M.  Stribling. 

To  be  Majors— Capts.  H.  W.  Ross,  T.  J.  Kirkpatrick,  W.  J. 
Dance,  B.  C.  Manly,  T.  O.  Brander,  S.  T.  Wright,  N.  V.  Sturdivant, 
J.  F.  Hart,  P.  P.  Johnston,  J.  A.  Thomson,  and  W.  G.  McGregor. 

Never  in  its  history  was  the  Artillery  Corps  so  well 
provided  with  field-officers  as  now.  It  seems  too  bad 
that  Pendleton's  insistence  could  not  have  been  re 
warded  before.  He  now  set  about  the  task  of  reorgani 
zation  with  renewed  energy,  and  everywhere  found  the 
greatest  encouragement  reigning  among  his  officers. 
But  there  had  as  usual  been  some  oversights.  Harda- 
way,  who  well  deserved  promotion,  was  left  out  and 
Alexander,  calling  attention  to  his  merits,  suggested 
the  consolidation  of  Johnson's  Battalion  with  Leyden's 
in  order  that  the  necessary  vacancy  in  the  grade  of 
colonel  might  be  created.  He  also  recommended  Gar 
den,  Parker,  Lamkin,  Woolfolk,  and  Moody  to  be  pro 
moted  majors,  and  Leyden  a  lieutenant-colonel. 

Pendleton  himself  was  not  promoted,  but  it  is  prob 
able  he  would  have  been  had  time  permitted.  From  a 
confidential  communication  from  Gen.  Pendleton 
written  some  years  after  the  war  the  following  extract 
is  taken. 

"On  the  ground,  probably,  that  this  arm  of  the  service,  all 
essential  as  it  is,  can  never  be  independent,  but  always  only 
cooperative  with  others,  Confederate  law  allowed  in  it  no  grade 
above  that  of  Brigadier-General.  Only  such,  therefore,  was  I  to 
the  last,  though  having  under  me  three  other  Brigadier-Generals, 
and,  consequently  serving  in  fact  as  a  Major-General.  But  no 
exaltation  of  name  was,  so  far  as  I  know  myself,  a  ruling  motive 
with  me,  the  incongruity  never  disturbed  me.  It  was  about  to  be 
corrected  on  Gen.  Lee's  recommendation  when  irremediable  reverse 
befell  our  army  and  cause." 


926  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Instead  of  consenting  to  the  conversion  of  Cutshaw's 
Battalion,  Pendleton  at  once  addressed  himself  to  the 
task  of  reorganizing  the  entire  Artillery  of  the  2d  Corps. 
Sending  Col.  Carter  to  Gen.  Long,  he  proposed  through 
him  to  fully  remount  Nelson's,  Braxton's,  and  Cut 
shaw's  battalions,  and  place  them  on  the  most  effective 
basis.  For  this  purpose,  McLaughlin's  Battalion  was 
to  be  ordered  East,  dismounted,  placed  in  the  stationary 
batteries,  and  its  horses,  guns,  and  equipment  used  for 
the  other  battalions.  Gen.  Long  promptly  assented  to 
the  plan,  and  at  once  Cutshaw  was  withdrawn  from 
Fort  Clifton,  Braxton  from  Chamn's  Bluff,  Nelson 
ordered  to  Lynchburg  and  the  work  undertaken.  Cut 
shaw's  Battalion  at  this  time  consisted  of  Fry's,  Mont 
gomery's,  Reese's,  Carter's,  Garber's,  Carrington's, 
Tanner's,  and  Jones'  batteries,  with  674  officers  and  men 
present  for  duty  and  1,047  on  the  rolls.  It,  therefore, 
afforded  a  surplus  which  was  to  be  used  in  completing 
the  personnel  of  Nelson's  and  Braxton's  battalions.  Ac 
cordingly,  on  March  17,  McLaughlin  was  ordered  to  re 
port  to  Col.  Carter  at  Lynchburg,  turn  over  his  horses 
and  material  to  Nelson,  and  proceed  by  the  canal  with 
his  men  to  Richmond. 

Other  changes  in  the  Artillery  were  also  now  neces 
sary.  In  the  3d  Corps,  Chew's  1st  Maryland  Battery,  in 
which  there  were  but  36  men  present  for  duty,  was 
recommended  to  be  consolidated  with  Griffin's  horse,  or 
the  2d  Maryland  Battery,  of  Breathed's  Battalion. 

Martin's  and  Dickenson's  batteries  of  Sturdivant's 
and  Owen's  battalions,  respectively,  were  relieved  of 
their  guns  and  formed  into  a  battalion  with  Douthat's 
Battery,  which  was  brought  from  the  southwest  with 
McLaughlin's  Battalion.  This  new  battalion  under 
command  of  King  was  assigned  to  duty  in  the  stationary 
batteries  of  Alexander's  line.  Walker's  Battery  of 
Owen's  Battalion  was  assigned  to  Sturdivant's  Bat 
talion,  in  place  of  Martin's,  and  Chamberlayne's  to  Mc- 
Intosh's  Battalion  in  place  of  Chew's,  while  Maj.  Owen 
was  assigned  to  duty  under  Mclntosh.  Thus  was  the 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  927 

13th  Virginia  Battalion  disbanded  and  sufficient  ma 
terial  from  Martin's,  Dickenson's,  and  Chew's  batteries 
secured  in  addition  to  that  of  McLaughlin's  Battalion  to 
fully  rearm  and  equip  Nelson's,  Cutshaw's,  and  Brax- 
ton's  veteran  battalions.*  These  changes  were  officially 
promulgated  March  20,  and  on  that  same  day  the  Horse 
Artillery,  with  Chew  as  Chief,  was  reorganized,  as  fol 
lows: 

Maj.  Hart's  Battalion: 

Hart's  Battery  and  Graham's  Battery,,  to  serve  with  Gen. 
Butler's  Division. 

Maj.  McGregor's  Battalion: 

McGregor's  Battery  and  McClannahan's  Battery,  to  serve  with 
Gen.  W.  H.  C.  Lee's  Division. 

Maj.  Breathed' s  Battalion: 

Shoemaker's  Battery  and  Griffin's  Battery,  to  serve  with  Gen. 
Fitz  Lee's  Division. 

Maj.  Johnston's  Battalion: 

Johnston's  Battery  and  Jackson's  Battery,  to  serve  with  Gen. 
Lomax's  Division. 

Maj.  Thomson's  Battalion: 

Thomson's  Battery  and  Lurty's  Battery,  to  serve  with  Gen. 
Rosser's  Division. 

Col.  Chew,  like  all  the  other  artillery  commanders,  was 
now  admonished  to  be  prepared  for  active  operations, 
however  early  or  unexpectedly  the  call  might  come. 

*Rebellion  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  XLVI,  Part  III,  pp.  1316-17-19-21-22-23- 
27-28  and  1333. 


28 


CHAPTER  XLVIII 

"LE  DEBACLE" 

WELL  might  Pendleton  caution  his  subordinates  that 
their  measures  should  be  prompt,  for  already  the  evacu 
ation  had  been  too  long  deferred.  How  Lee  was  over 
ruled  and  compelled  to  remain  in  the  Petersburg  lines 
against  his  will  cannot  be  discussed  here.  Nor  how, 
when  the  object  of  the  peace  conference  failed,  the 
Army,  although  bitterly  disappointed,  set  its  teeth,  once 
more  resolved  to  struggle  on  to  the  end,  whatever 
that  might  be.  We  must  content  ourselves  solely  with 
tracing  the  events  which  concerned  the  Artillery. 

Sheridan's  cavalry  divisions  were  circling  about  Lee's 
Army  like  great  vultures  impatient  for  their  prey.  One 
of  his  columns  was  marching  upon  Lynchburg,  and  to 
meet  the  danger  Pendleton  was  directed  to  send  enough 
of  his  men  there  to  man  the  field  guns  which  Early  had 
turned  in  during  the  winter.  Accordingly,  Garber's, 
Jones',  and  Carrington's  batteries  were  dispatched  to 
Col.  Carter,  who  with  his  usual  energy  and  skill  pre 
pared  to  meet  the  raiders. 

On  the  morning  of  March  25,  the  Chief  of  Artillery 
was  summoned  to  meet  the  commanding  general  at  the 
headquarters  of  Gen.  Gordon  at  5  A.  M.  Gen.  Lee 
had  decided  to  make  a  daring  attempt  to  break  Grant's 
line  near  the  center  by  an  attack  upon  Fort  Steadman, 
which,  it  was  believed,  could  be  carried  by  surprise. 
How  Gordon's  sudden  blow  was  at  first  crowned  with 
success;  how  his  guides  ran  away  and  left  his  storming 
columns  groping  in  ignorance;  how  his  supports  failed 
to  reach  him,  must  be  read  elsewhere.  Suffice  it  here  to 
say  that  what  bid  fair  to  be  a  brilliant  success  through 
unwonted  misfortune,  dereliction,  or  what  not,  re 
sulted  in  miserable  failure. 

This  unsuccessful  effort,  in  which,  however,  the  Ar 
tillery  fully  performed  its  allotted  task,  was  quickly  fol- 


.MAJOR    DAVID    WA'LXJX 
Killed  at   Second   Cold   Harbor,    1S(54 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  929 

lowed  by  a  vigorous  advance  on  the  part  of  Grant. 
Early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  the  corps  of  Warren 
and  Humphreys  moved  toward  Lee's  intrenchments 
on  the  extreme  right,  while  the  inexorable  Sheridan 
swept  around  the  flank  and  occupied  Dinwiddie  Court 
house,  six  miles  southwest  of  the  infantry  column.  Lee, 
quickly  divining  the  intention  of  the  enemy,  moved  out 
along  the  White  Oak  Road  with  15,000  infantry  and 
2,000  cavalry,  leaving  Longstreet  north  of  the  James 
and  Gordon  alone  in  front  of  Petersburg.  On  the  31st, 
he  attacked  the  Federals  in  flank,  but  after  pursuing 
as  far  as  the  nature  of  the  country  permitted,  was  com 
pelled  to  return  to  his  works.  On  the  same  day,  Sheri 
dan  advanced  to  Five  Forks,  driving  Fitz  Lee  and  part 
of  Pickett's  command  before  him.  The  following  morn 
ing,  Sheridan  was  reinforced  by  Warren  and  Hum 
phreys,  and  in  the  evening  defeated  the  3d  Corps.  Per 
ceiving  that  his  forces  were  too  weak  to  combat  success 
fully  with  the  enemy,  Lee  ordered  Longstreet  on  the 
evening  of  the  1st  to  move  rapidly  across  the  river  to 
Petersburg. 

In  the  battle  of  Five  Forks,  the  Artillery  suffered  a 
loss  indeed  irreparable,  a  loss  directly  due  to  Gen. 
Pickett's  orders.  On  this  occasion  Gen.  Pickett  as 
sumed  to  designate  the  position  for  Pegram's  guns — a 
position  with  every  defect  known  to  artillerymen.  But 
Pegram  with  that  spirit  of  blind  obedience  which  con 
stituted  his  sole  fault  did  not  question  his  orders  and 
died  like  a  rat  in  the  trap  to  which  he  was  assigned. 

No  finer  tribute  to  Pegram  can  be  penned  than  that 
which  his  gallant  adjutant  and  comrade  has  already 
given  to  the  world,  and  so  those  eloquent  lines  are  quoted 
here:  "Of  him  I  almost  fear  to  speak,  lest  I  should  do 
hurt  to  that  memory  which  I  would  honor.  For  to  those 
who  knew  him  not,  the  simplest  outline  of  a  character  so 
finely  tempered  by  stern  and  gentle  virtues  would  seem 
but  an  ideal  picture  touched  with  the  tender  exaggera 
tion  of  retrospective  grief ;  while  to  so  many  of  you  who 
knew  him,  as  he  was,  the  gentle  comrade  and  the 


930  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

brilliant  fighter,  any  portrait  must  prove,  at  best,  but  a 
blurred  semblance  of  the  young  soldier,  whose  simple, 
heroic,  godly  life  rejects,  as  it  were,  all  human  pane 
gyric.  Yet  even  the  coldest  must  allow  that  it  was  a 
life  which  afforded  a  notable  example  of  how  great  a 
career  may  be  crowded  within  the  compass  of  a  few 
years.  In  the  spring  of  '61,  a  youth  of  modest  de 
meanor,  he  entered  the  military  service  as  a  private 
soldier;  in  the  spring  of  '65,  still  a  mere  lad,  he  fell  in 
action,  Colonel  of  Artillery,  mourned  by  an  Army. 

"More  than  once  in  desperate  and  critical  events  were 
grave  trusts  confided  to  his  prudence,  skill  and  courage ; 
more  than  once  did  he  win  emphatic  praise  from  Hill, 
from  Jackson  and  from  Lee.  Thus  it  was  his  lot  to  be 
tried  in  great  events,  and  his  fortune  to  be  equal  to  the 
trial,  and  having  filled  the  measure  of  perfect  knight 
hood,  'chaste  in  his  thoughts,  modest  in  his  words, 
liberal  and  valiant  in  deeds,'  there  was  at  last  awarded 
him  on  field  of  battle  the  death  counted  'sweet  and 
honorable.' 

"Such  was  William  Johnson  Pegram,  of  the  Third 
Corps,  who  at  the  early  age  of  twenty-two  died,  sword 
in  hand,  at  the  head  of  his  men,  with  all  his  'honor  owing 
wounds'  in  front  'to  make  a  soldier's  passage  for  his 
soul.'  '  And  may  the  author  add,  such  was  the  soldier 
who  was  sacrificed  by  the  ignorance  of  his  division  com 
mander — an  infantry  officer  who  undertook  to  direct 
the  placing  of  his  artillery  without  discretion  on  the 
part  of  his  artillery  commander. 

Had  Col.  Pegram  lived  and  the  war  continued  he 
would  have  attained  to  high  command.  Already  Gen. 
Lee  had  expressed  his  intention  to  give  the  young 
soldier  a  brigade  at  the  first  opportunity  which  pre 
sented,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  the  gallant  artilleryman 
would  have  exchanged  his  sixteen  guns  for  such  a  com 
mand. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  the  Federals  re 
newed  the  attack,  breaking  the  lines  of  the  Confederates 
and  forcing  them  from  their  position  covering  the  Boyd- 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  931 

ton  Plank  Road,  and  Gibbon's  Division  of  Ord's  Corps 
boldly  essayed  to  break  through  into  the  town.  The 
morning  of  the  1st,  Pendleton  had  ordered  seven  guns 
of  Poague's  command,  which  had  been  held  in  reserve 
near  Hewlett's,  to  march  for  Petersburg,  and  that  night 
the  whole  battalion  was  directed  to  follow.  When  the 
first  two  batteries  arrived  they  were  ordered  to  proceed 
to  the  right  and  conceal  themselves  before  dawn  near 
the  Turnbull  house. 

After  capturing  all  the  works  to  the  south  and  west, 
Grant  found  a  more  difficult  task  before  him  at  the  town, 
for  Ord's  way  was  barred  by  two  open  profiles,  known 
as  Battery  Gregg  and  Fort  Whit  worth,  the  latter  from 
the  character  of  a  gun  mounted  therein.  These  works 
were  about  200  yards  apart  and  1,000  in  front  of  the 
main  line  of  intrenchments.  The  gorge  of  Battery 
Gregg  was  closed  by  a  palisade  and  its  ditch  was  gener 
ally  impassable.  On  the  right  flank,  however,  a  line  to 
connect  with  Whitworth  had  been  started,  and  here  the 
unfinished  ditch  and  parapet  gave  a  narrow  access  to 
the  parapet  of  Gregg.  It  was  by  this  route  that  the 
enemy  finally  reached  it.  It  was  defended  by  two  guns 
of  the  Washington  Artillery,  under  Lieut.  McElroy, 
and  the  12th  and  16th  Mississippi,  214  men  in  all.  Fort 
Whitworth  was  open  at  the  gorge  and  was  held  by 
three  guns  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  under  Lieut. 
Battles,  and  two  Mississippi  regiments. 

Thrice  Gibbon's  columns,  above  5,000  strong,  surged 
against  Gregg  and  each  time  were  repulsed  by  the  de 
voted  garrison,  McElroy  fighting  his  guns  with  great 
valor  while  his  drivers  armed  with  muskets  aided  the 
infantry.  The  day  was  an  eventful  one  for  the  Wash 
ington  Artillery,  for  early  in  the  morning  when  Battles 
was  ordered  to  withdraw  from  the  outer  line,  before  his 
horses  could  be  brought  up  the  enemy  rushed  to  the 
works  and  seized  his  guns.  But,  McElroy  in  the  fort, 
seeing  Battles  surrounded  and  cut  off  led  a  charge  of 
his  pseudo-infantry,  and  recovered  the  pieces. 


932  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

Shortly  before  noon,  Gibbon,  reinforced  by  two  bri 
gades  of  Turner's  Division,  while  the  third  advanced 
against  Whitworth,  again  assailed  Gregg,  and  this  time 
his  men  swarmed  over  the  parapet  and  captured  Mc- 
Elroy's  guns.  Of  the  garrison  55  were  killed,  129 
were  wounded,  and  only  30  were  found  uninjured,  while 
Gibbon  lost  122  killed  and  592  wounded  in  the  four  as 
saults. 

McElroy  had  again  performed  a  splendid  feat  of 
arms.  Surely  he  felt  no  shame  over  the  loss  of  those  two 
guns,  which  "taught  prudence  to  the  enemy  for  the  rest 
of  the  day."  It  was  the  unflinching  character  of  Lee's 
artillerymen  as  exemplified  by  McElroy  that  prompted 
Meade  in  July  to  telegraph  Grant,  "I  cannot  advise 
an  assault.  .  .  .  It  is  not  the  number  of  the  enemy, 
which  oppose  our  taking  Petersburg ;  it  is  their  artillery 
and  their  works,  which  can  be  held  by  reduced  numbers 
against  direct  assault."* 

The  seven  guns  of  Poague's  Battalion  from  near  the 
Turnbull  house  assisted  Eshleman's  other  batteries  on 
the  Boydton  Road  in  checking  the  enemy's  pursuit,  and 
while  heavily  engaged  had  been  joined  by  Poague  with 
the  remainder  of  his  command.  Maj.  Brander  had  also 
posted  three  guns  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Appomattox, 
from  whence  they  were  able  to  enfilade  the  Federal  left 
as  it  swung  towards  the  river,  while  Chew  threw  four 
pieces  into  action  on  the  right  of  the  Cox  Road.  But 
by  noon  the  Federals  had  seized  Gregg  and  Whitworth, 
and  fully  established  their  line  from  these  works  to  the 
river.  Nevertheless,  McElroy,  Poague,  Brander,  and 
Chew  had  checked  the  enemy  and  given  Field's  Divi 
sion  time  to  reach  Petersburg  before  the  outer  line  fell. 
Kershaw  now  alone  remained  north  of  the  James  to 
confront  Weitzel.  A.  P.  Hill,  veteran  of  many  fields, 
a  knight  sans  peur  et  sans  reproche,  had  fallen.  But  all 
was  not  yet  lost. 

During  the  day,  the  artillery  fire  on  the  east  of  the 
city  had  been  unusually  severe.  Beginning  the  previous 

*Written  July  26. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  933 

night,  the  enemy's  mortars  and  guns  had  been  kept 
incessantly  at  work. 

Lee  and  Longstreet  had  watched  the  defense  of  Fort 
Gregg,  with  the  utmost  admiration,  fully  expecting  the 
compact  Federal  masses  to  assail  the  inner  works,  be 
hind  which  Field  had  been  placed.  Early  in  the  morn 
ing,  Lee  had  advised  the  President  that  he  must  aban 
don  the  lines  that  night,  and  having  noted  Grant's 
pause,  about  3  p.  M.,  issued  the  formal  orders  for  the 
evacuation  in  time  to  begin  the  move  by  dark,  and  the 
troops  north  of  the  James  were  directed  to  march 
through  Richmond  and  join  the  Army  on  the  roads 
leading  westward.  While  Alexander  stood  at  the  north 
end  of  the  pontoon  bridge,  near  Drewry's  Bluff,  watch 
ing  his  batteries  file  by,  Walker  and  Jones  withdrew 
their  battalions  from  the  Petersburg  lines.  Pendleton 
had  ordered  all  the  guns  to  move  out  at  8  p.  M.  This 
was  accomplished  with  great  success  in  spite  of  the 
enemy's  ceaseless  cannonade.  But  ten  pieces  had  to  be 
abandoned  and  these  by  Jones  for  lack  of  teams,  all 
being  disabled.  Even  a  number  of  mortars  were  saved, 
and  by  2  A.  M.  all  the  field  artillery  had  crossed  the 
Appomattox  and  commenced  the  march  westward  along 
the  Hickory  Road.  Thus  did  Lee  evacuate  the  forty 
miles  of  intrenchments  which  for  nine  months  had  been 
"clothed  in  thunder,"  and  for  the  defense  of  which  the 
line  of  defenders  had  at  last  been  overstretched. 

Along  the  north  bank  of  the  Appomattox  moved  the 
long  lines  of  artillery  and  dark  silent  columns  of  infan 
try  through  the  gloom  of  the  night  towards  Amelia 
Courthouse,  where  rations  had  been  ordered  to  be  col 
lected  for  the  Army.  "As  the  troops  moved  noiselessly 
onward  in  the  darkness  that  just  precedes  the  dawn,  a 
bright  light  like  a  broad  flash  of  lightning  illumined  the 
heavens  for  an  instant,  then  followed  a  tremendous  ex 
plosion.  'The  magazine  at  Ft.  Drewry  is  blown  up,' 
ran  whispers  through  the  ranks,  and  again  silence 
reigned."  All  knew  now  that  Alexander  and  Ker- 
shaw  had  spiked  their  heavy  guns  and  were  on  the  way 


934  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

to  join  the  main  column.  Passing  through  Manchester 
at  daybreak,  Alexander's  column  marched  24  miles  on 
the  3d,  going  into  camp  that  night  near  Tomahawk 
Church,  while  the  main  column  halted  about  nine  miles 
from  Goode's  Bridge  after  a  distressing  night  and  day 
of  toil,  broken  only  by  a  brief  halt  at  Chesterfield  Court 
house,  about  dawn  that  morning. 

At  8:15  A.  M.  Richmond  in  flames  had  been  sur 
rendered  to  Weitzel,  and  the  sun  was  hardly  up  before 
Meade's  troops  entered  the  works  about  Petersburg. 

Alexander's  command  had  just  gone  into  bivouac 
when  he  was  ordered  to  accompany  some  engineer  of 
ficers  to  prepare  a  wagon  route  for  the  Artillery  and 
trains  to  an  overhead  railroad  bridge  across  the  Ap- 
pomattox  River.  Marching  all  night  in  the  mud,  the 
entire  column  was  safely  gotten  across  during  the  4th 
and  went  into  camp  near  sundown  about  three  miles 
from  Amelia  Courthouse.  During  the  day,  Pendle- 
ton  was  busily  engaged  making  arrangements  for  the 
reduction  of  the  Artillery  to  a  basis  proportionate  to  the 
other  troops,  and  to  dispose  of  the  surplus.  Only  the 
best  equipped  battalions  were  to  remain  with  the  Army, 
while  all  the  rest  were  to  be  taken  by  Gen.  Walker  to 
Lynchburg. 

The  morning  of  the  5th,  Walker  set  out  by  a  road  to 
the  right  and  west  of  the  main  column  after  destroying 
ninety-five  caissons  with  a  great  quantity  of  ammu 
nition,  which  had  early  in  the  winter  been  sent  to  Amelia 
from  Petersburg. 

As  soon  as  Grant  learned  of  Lee's  line  of  retreat,  he 
pushed  forward  his  whole  available  force,  numbering 
near  80,000  men,  in  order  to  intercept  him  on  the  Rich 
mond  and  Danville  Railroad.  The  Federal  pursuit  was 
as  rapid  as  the  progress  of  Lee's  Army  was  slow.  The 
heavy  rains,  bottomless  roads,  and  utter  lack  of  forage 
soon  reduced  the  artillery  teams  and  transport  to  a 
most  distressing  state  of  exhaustion,  and  hundreds  of 
men  were  forced  to  leave  the  ranks  from  hunger. 
The  long  wagon  trains  with  their  broken-down  teams 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  935 

encumbered  the  roads  at  every  turn,  the  men  cheered 
on  at  first  by  the  promise  of  food  at  Amelia  Courthouse. 
But,  disappointment  there  awaited  them,  for  Lee's 
orders  had  miscarried  and  the  rations  and  forage  in 
tended  for  the  Army  lay  in  the  storehouses  in  Richmond. 
Nothing  remained  but  the  wide  dispersion  of  the 
troops  for  foraging  purposes,  and  dissolution  under 
these  conditions  was  inevitable.  The  delay  at  Amelia 
entailed  by  the  necessity  of  collecting  food  was  fatal,  for 
already  Sheridan's  troopers  were  harassing  the  flank 
and  even  the  head  of  the  column,  while  Grant's  whole 
force  well  fed  and  carried  forward  by  the  stimulating 
hope  of  early  victory  was  marching  on  nearly  parallel 
roads. 

In  the  words  of  one  of  Pendleton's  staff  officers,  "It 
was  a  period  in  which  no  note  was  taken  of  day  or  night ; 
one  long,  confused,  dreadful  day.  There  seemed  to  be 
no  front,  no  rear,  for  firing  might  be  heard  ahead  and  be 
hind,  and  on  both  sides  at  once.  There  were  no  head 
quarters,  except  where  the  ambulance  happened  to  be." 
Small  wonder  that  the  brave  men  and  their  horses  fell 
by  the  roadside  exhausted  by  want  and  weariness. 

Such  was  the  condition  when  it  was  learned  that  Sheri 
dan  was  across  Lee's  path  at  Jetersville,  whereupon  the 
Army  was  formed  into  line  of  battle  to  attack  him.  But 
it  was  now  reported  that  the  2d  and  6th  Corps  were  in 
front  of  the  Army,  and  in  order  to  pass  them  the 
column  was  countermarched  a  short  distance,  turned 
off  to  the  right  through  Amelia  Springs,  and  after 
marching  all  night  reached  Rice's  Station  six  miles 
west  of  Burkeville  at  daylight. 

During  the  night  a  serious  panic  was  started  by  a 
large  black  stallion  carrying  a  fence  rail  swinging  to  his 
bridle,  and  running  through  the  column.  In  the  long 
continued  firing  which  broke  out,  many  officers  and  men 
were  killed,  among  them  Maj.  Smith,  who  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  detachment  of  heavy  artillerymen  from 
Drewry's  Bluff. 


936  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

At  Rice's  Station,  Alexander  was  directed  to  select 
a  line  of  battle  upon  which  Lee  soon  formed  his  army, 
now  reduced  to  about  10,000  men,  while  Pendleton 
placed  his  battalions  in  positions  commanding  the 
Burke ville  Road  and  from  which  they  could  sweep  the 
approaches  on  the  left. 

All  day  the  2d  Corps  had  closely  pressed  Lee's  rear, 
while  the  cavalry  and  the  6th  Corps  struck  Swell's 
column  at  Sailor's  Creek.  The  latter  force  of  about 
8,000  men  consisted  of  Kershaw's  Division,  a  number 
of  departmental  employees  under  Gen.  Custis  Lee,  the 
marines  and  sailors  of  the  fleet  under  Admiral  Tucker, 
and  the  heavy  artillery  from  Drewry's  and  Chaffin's 
bluffs,  under  Col.  Crutchfield  and  Maj.  Stiles.  After  a 
most  desperate  conflict  in  which  Ewell's  nondescript 
force  first  repulsed,  then  charged  the  enemy,  it  was  over 
borne  by  numbers  and  captured.  Gen.  Lee  had  gone  in 
person  to  try  to  save  Ewell's  command,  but  now  re 
turned  to  the  other  troops,  and  told  Gen.  Pendleton  on 
coming  up  with  him,  "General,  half  of  our  army  is 
destroyed." 

Toward  noon,  the  enemy  began  to  appear  in  Lee's 
front  at  Rice's  Station,  but  were  easily  held  off  by 
Pendleton  and  Alexander  with  the  Artillery.  During 
the  day  Dearing's  and  Rosser's  cavalry  had  met  and 
captured  a  small  mixed  force  of  the  enemy  which  had 
been  sent  forward  to  destroy  the  High  Bridge  on  the 
Lynchburg  Road.  In  this  affair,  both  Gen.  Dearing 
and  Maj.  James  W.  Thomson  were  killed.  Thus  two 
more  officers,  whose  names  will  be  remembered  as  long 
as  any  others  in  Lee's  Artillery,  laid  down  their  lives. 

The  combat  was  short  and  bloody,  the  Confederate 
victory  complete,  and  Dearing  and  the  gallant  Col. 
Boston  of  the  Cavalry  both  fell  in  the  first  flush  of 
victory.  Opposite  the  Confederate  center  and  left,  the 
enemy  sent  up  the  white  flag.  But  on  the  extreme  right, 
Thomson,  in  ignorance  of  the  surrender,  pressed  for 
ward  with  his  mounted  cannoneers.  As  he  did  so,  he 
caught  sight  of  the  white  flag  away  down  the  line  and 


THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE  937 

gave  a  shout  of  joy.  At  that  very  moment  he  was 
struck  with  two  balls,  either  of  which  would  have  proved 
fatal.  With  a  deep  groan  he  reeled  from  his  saddle  and 
fell  dead.  A  moment  later  not  a  shot  was  to  be  heard. 
About  the  stricken  body  of  the  youthful  major,  his 
gunners  grouped  themselves  in  silence,  among  them  his 
devoted  friend  and  comrade,  Maj.  James  Breathed, 
who,  as  he  sighed  and  turned  away,  said,  "With  ten 
thousand  such  men  as  Jimmie  Thomson,  I  could  whip 
Grant's  Army." 

So  died  this  martial  youth,  who  from  the  day  he 
entered  the  Virginia  Military  Institute  in  September, 
1860,  until  the  hour  of  his  death,  personified  all  that  was 
valiant,  all  that  was  noble.  No  space  here  to  tell  of  the 
many  fields  upon  which  he  had  won  fame.  But  a  lad 
of  eighteen  when  as  a  lieutenant  he  helped  Chew 
organize  Ashby's  Horse  Battery,  but  twenty  when 
captain  of  that  battery,  and  but  twenty-one  when  he  be 
came  a  battalion  commander  in  the  Horse  Artillery, 
yet  he  was  a  veteran  when  he  died,  and  was  able  to 
boast  continuous  service  from  the  very  beginning  to  the 
very  end  of  the  war.  With  Ashby,  Jackson,  and 
Stuart,  he  had  fought  upon  every  field  made  famous  by 
their  names,  and  on  many  an  unknown  field  he  had 
followed  Chew  who  fought  while  others  rested. 

There  beside  Bearing  and  Boston  he  lay,  all  of  them 
covered  by  their  rubber  blankets,  suggestive  of  the 
curtain  which  had  fallen  upon  these  heroic  lives.  But  an 
other  scene  in  the  tragedy  remained.  An  officer  quickly 
searches  the  field.  It  is  Jimmie  Thomson's  roommate 
at  the  Institute,  the  son  of  Admiral  Smith  Lee,  who  has 
heard  of  his  death  and  is  looking  for  his  body,  and 
more, — for  the  letter  and  the  picture  which  he  knows 
will  be  found  in  the  breast  pocket  of  that  stained  gray 
jacket.  And  on  another  portion  of  the  field  is  found  by 
a  Confederate  officer,  in  the  haversack  of  a  Federal 
soldier,  a  slip  of  paper  containing  a  description  of 
Thomson's  death,  and  on  it  is  written  the  following 
verse : 


938  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

"His  life  burned  not  to  ashes,  white  with  doubt, 
But  flaring  up  in  battles'  breath  went  out, 
His  young  blood  pulsing  years  in  a  wild  route, 
Then  halting  at  high  tide. 

"In  the  loud  trumpet  blast,  in  the  grand  rush  of  lifted  banners  met, 
With  his  cheeks  flushing  and  his  saber  wet, 
His  young  eyes  flashing  and  his  young  lips  set ; 
So  his  rich  spirit  passed. 

"Just  when  the  field  was  won, 

When  the  clouds  broke  from  off  the  hard-won  fight, 
And  the  pierced  flag  leaped  out  upon  our  sight, 
In  victory  upspringing  from  the  right, 
His  brave  young  soul  went  out."* 

During  the  afternoon  Lee  received  information  of 
an  attack  by  the  Federal  Cavalry  on  his  wagon  train 
two  miles  in  rear,  whereupon  he  requested  Gen.  Pendle- 
ton  to  go  back  and  see  what  could  be  done  to  save 
further  loss.  Meeting  the  remnants  of  Harris'  Bri 
gade,  Pendleton  gathered  together  about  twenty  volun 
teers  and  soon  joined  by  a  regiment  of  Cooke's  Cavalry 
moved  back  to  the  train  on  which  the  enemy  had  fired. 
Pendleton  and  Cooke  attacked  the  hostile  cavalry,  but 
were  soon  compelled  to  fall  back,  unable  to  save  the 
wagons,  and  pursued  for  some  distance  by  the  enemy. 

About  sundown  the  Federals  began  massing  in  front 
of  the  line  at  Rice's  Station  for  an  attack  in  force,  and 
Lee  gave  orders  to  resume  the  retreat.  The  Army,  now 
cut  off  from  Danville,  marched  towards  Lynchburg, 
reaching  Farmville  at  sunrise,  after  great  hardships. 
During  the  entire  night  but  six  miles  were  covered.  At 
Farmville,  the  weary  column  crossed  to  the  north  side 
of  the  Appomattox,  and  received  a  small  supply  of 
rations.  As  the  Artillery  began  crossing  the  bridges  at 
Farmville,  the  enemy  pressed  closely  upon  the  rear 
guard,  whereupon  Pendleton  placed  several  batteries  in 
position  on  the  heights  on  the  north  bank  to  cover  the 
crossing. 

*The  finder  of  this  paper  was  the  Hon.  W.  L.  Wilson,  Member  United  States 
Congress  from  West  Virginia,  and  later  President  of  Washington  and  Lee 
University. 

For  a  beautiful  and  most  interesting  account  of  Maj.  Thomson's  career,  see 
"A  Modern  Greek,"  by  John  S.  Wise,  Bob  Taylor's  Magazine,  December,  1906. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  939 

Gen.  Lee  now  sent  for  Alexander,  and  with  his  map 
explained  to  him  that  the  enemy  had  taken  a  highway 
bridge  across  the  Appomattox  near  the  High  Bridge, 
were  crossing  on  it  and  would  come  in  upon  his  road 
about  three  miles  ahead  of  him.  Directing  Alexander  to 
send  artillery  to  cover  this  passage,  he  placed  the  two 
bridges  at  Farmville  under  the  latter's  personal  charge 
with  orders  to  destroy  them  after  the  troops  had  all 
crossed.  After  pointing  out  on  the  map  a  shorter  route 
to  Lynchburg  than  that  which  Lee  was  following,  and 
producing  a  resident  of  the  section  to  confirm  the  map, 
Gen.  Alexander  retired  and  immediately  set  fire  to  the 
railroad  bridge  as  the  enemy  was  already  in  sight. 

Poague's  Battalion  of  artillery  had  been  sent  ahead 
to  the  point  indicated  by  Lee,  and  Mahone's  Division 
supported  by  Poague's  guns  took  up  a  good  position 
and  began  to  intrench.  Persistently  assailed  by  Miles' 
Division  throughout  the  day,  Mahone  held  his  own, 
while  Poague  fought  his  guns  with  desperate  determina 
tion,  losing  then  recovering  one  of  his  pieces.  The  serv 
ice  which  the  stern  and  indomitable  Poague  here  ren 
dered  fully  satisfied  the  confidence  reposed  in  him  by 
Pendleton,  who  selected  the  gallant  little  hero  of  the 
Wilderness  in  preference  to  all  others  for  the  delicate 
task  of  opening  the  way  for  the  Army. 

At  midnight,  the  main  column  moved  on  the  road  to 
ward  Buckingham  Courthouse,  with  Mahone  and 
Poague  forming  the  rear  guard.  During  a  truce,  after 
sundown  on  the  7th,  which  Mahone  secured  for  the  re 
moval  of  his  wounded,  a  letter  from  Grant  was  trans 
mitted  to  Lee  through  him,  in  which  Grant  first  sug 
gested  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
to  which  Lee  promptly  replied,  inquiring  what  terms 
would  be  offered. 

In  spite  of  the  roads,  a  long  march  was  made  during 
the  night,  and  the  morning  of  the  8th  found  the  head  of 
the  Confederate  column  near  Appomattox  Courthouse. 

During  the  march  on  the  8th,  as  Pendleton  and  Alex 
ander  rode  together,  the  Chief  of  Artillery  mentioned 


940  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

the  fact  that  a  number  of  the  senior  officers  of  the  Army 
had  conferred  together  and  concluded  it  should  be 
represented  to  Lee  that  in  their  opinion  further  resist 
ance  was  futile,  in  order  that  he  might  surrender  with 
out  incurring  the  odium  of  first  proposing  the  step. 

According  to  Alexander,  Pendleton' s  contemporary 
account  was  about  as  follows : 

It  being  the  concensus  of  opinion  among  certain  of 
ficers  that  Longstreet  should  approach  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  on  the  subject,  he,  Pendleton,  had 
suggested  such  action  to  Longstreet,  but  his  proposal 
had  been  indignantly  rejected,  with  the  emphatic  re 
mark  that  it  was  his  duty  to  support  and  not  hamper 
his  superior  in  the  execution  of  his  trust;  that  his,  the 
1st  Corps,  could  still  whip  twice  its  number,  and  that  as 
long  as  that  was  so,  he  would  never  suggest  surrender. 
Failing  to  enlist  Longstreet 's  services  for  the  purpose 
proposed,  he,  Pendleton,  had  himself  made  bold  to  sug 
gest  a  surrender  to  Gen.  Lee,  but  was  snubbed  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  who  coldly  declared  that  "There 
are  too  many  men  here  to  talk  of  laying  down  their 
arms  without  fighting." 

Gen.  Alexander  further  asserted  that  in  recounting 
these  events,  Pendleton  was  plainly  embarrassed  by  the 
reception  he  had  been  given  by  Gen.  Lee,  which  he, 
Alexander,  at  the  time  inferred  to  have  been  much  in 
the  nature  of  a  rebuke.  Concerning  this  whole  inci 
dent,  however,  there  are  many  recorded  discrepancies. 

In  later  years,  Pendleton,  always  loth  to  discuss  the 
sad  circumstances  connected  with  the  retreat  and  sur 
render  of  the  Army,  gave  the  following  account  of  his 
discharge  of  the  mission  upon  which  he  was  deputed  by 
his  fellow  officers. 

"Fighting  was  going  on,  but  not  very  severely,  so  that  con 
versation  was  practicable.  Gen.  Gordon  had  an  interview  with  me; 
told  me  of  discouraging  intelligence  from  the  South,  and  of  a 
conference  which  had  been  held  between  other  responsible  officers 
and  himself,  and  announced  their  joint  wish  that,  if  my  views 
agreed  with  theirs,  I  should  convey  to  Gen.  Longstreet,  as  second 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  941 

in  command,  and  then,,  if  he  agreed,  to  Gen.  Lee,  our  united  judg 
ment  that  the  cause  had  become  hopeless,  so  we  thought  it  wrong 
longer  to  have  men  killed  on  either  side,  and  not  right,  moreover, 
that  our  beloved  commander  should  be  left  to  bear  the  entire  trial 
of  initiating  the  idea  of  terms  with  the  enemy.  My  judgment  not 
conflicting  with  those  expressed,  it  seemed  to  me  to  be  my  duty  to 
convey  them  to  Gen.  Lee.  At  first,  Gen.  Longstreet  dissented,  but 
on  second  thought  preferred  that  he  himself  should  be  represented 
with  the  rest.  Gen.  Lee  was  lying  alone,  resting,  at  the  base  of  a 
large  pine  tree.  I  approached  and  sat  by  him.  To  a  statement  of 
the  case  he  quietly  listened,  and  then,  courteously  expressing  thanks 
for  the  consideration  of  his  subordinates  in  desiring  to  relieve  him 
in  part  of  existing  burdens,  spoke  in  about  these  words:  'I  trust 
it  has  not  come  to  that.  We  certainly  have  too  many  brave  men  to 
think  of  laying  down  our  arms.  They  still  fight  with  great  spirit, 
whereas  the  enemy  do  not.  And,  besides,  if  I  were  to  intimate  to 
Gen.  Grant  that  I  would  listen  to  terms,  he  would  at  once  regard 
it  as  such  an  evidence  of  weakness  that  he  would  demand  uncon 
ditional  surrender,  and  sooner  than  that  I  am  resolved  to  die. 
Indeed,  we  must  all  determine  to  die  at  our  posts.'  My  reply  could 
only  be  that  every  man  would  no  doubt  cheerfully  meet  death  with 
him  in  the  discharge  of  duty,  and  that  we  were  perfectly  willing 
that  he  should  decide  the  question." 

This  account  differs  widely  from  Alexander's.  It 
may  be  that  as  time  wore  on,  Gen.  Pendleton  saw  mat 
ters  in  a  softer  light,  and  felt  that  what  had  at  first  ap 
peared  as  a  rebuke  to  him,  was  in  fact  the  result  of 
overwrought  nerves. 

After  Pendleton's  conversation  on  the  march  with 
Gen.  Alexander,  he  pushed  on  to  communicate  in  per 
son  with  Gen.  Walker,  whose  column  he  found  about 
two  miles  beyond  the  Courthouse  on  the  road  to  Ap- 
pomattox  Station.  While  he  was  conversing  with 
Walker,  whose  batteries  were  parked  and  who  himself 
was  engaged  in  the  duty  of  shaving,  a  large  force  of 
Federal  cavalry  burst  upon  the  camp  and  began  firing 
upon  the  defenseless  men  and  their  horses.  The  situa 
tion  was  desperate,  but  with  great  coolness,  and  the  ut 
most  presence  of  mind,  Gen.  Walker  remained  master 
of  the  situation.  Almost  instantly  Walker's  and  Dicken- 
son's  batteries,  which  had  been  relieved  of  their  guns 
and  armed  as  a  guard  with  muskets,  formed  line  in  a 


942  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

fringe  of  pines,  and  held  the  enemy  at  bay  until  a  num 
ber  of  guns  could  be  thrown  into  action,  while  the  train 
was  withdrawn.  Thus  did  Walker's  Artillery,  entirely 
unsupported,  maintain  itself  against  the  enemy.  There 
was  no  panic  whatever  among  these  brave  gunners.  The 
following  interesting  account  of  this  affair  is  taken 
from  the  diary  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  written  by 
Maj.  W.  M.  Owen. 

"After  we  went  into  bivouac  this  evening,  the  artillery  firing 
we  had  heard  in  front  late  in  the  afternoon  seemed  to  be  approach 
ing  nearer.  It  was  not  a  great  while  before  long  trains  of  wagons 
came  tearing  down  the  road  from  the  front,  the  drivers  whipping 
up  their  mules  and  shouting  lustily.  I  mounted  my  horse  and 
rode  forward  to  see  what  was  the  matter.  I  had  not  gone  far 
before  I  came  up  to  a  force  of  infantry  that  were  being  aligned 
across  the  road  and  preparing  for  defense.*  Here  I  met  some 
officers  and  men  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  from  whom  I  learned 
that  Gen.  Walker's  column  of  artillery  (about  sixty  pieces)  had 
been  marching  in  front  of  the  Army  all  day,  and  at  about  4  p.  M. 
had  halted  in  a  grove  just  before  reaching  Appomattox  station,  on 
the  Lynchburg  railroad.  Everything  had  been  so  quiet  that  they 
concluded  to  have  a  good  rest,  the  officers  and  men  taking  ad 
vantage  of  the  time  to  wash  up  and  refresh  themselves.  It  was 
not  thought  necessary  to  put  out  pickets,  as  the  enemy  was  sup 
posed  to  be  pushing  only  our  rear.  While  enjoying  this  supposed 
security,  all  of  a  sudden  a  bugle  call  rang  out  upon  the  air,  and  a 
squadron  of  Federal  cavalry  was  seen  preparing  to  charge.  Men 
rushed  to  their  guns  in  a  hurry,  horses  were  hitched  up,  and  as 
the  enemy  advanced  they  were  met  by  a  raking  fire  of  canister, 
which  repulsed  them.  But  again  and  again  the  enemy,  reinforced, 
charged.  They  were  Sheridan's  cavalry,  f  The  guns  that  could 
be  gotten  off  fired  retiring,  and  fell  back  to  Appomattox  Court 
house,  where  in  the  streets  of  the  town  they  met  infantry  coming 
to  their  support,  who  in  turn  drove  the  enemy's  cavalry  back  with 
loss.  But  the  Washington  Artillery,  fighting  to  the  last  and 
evading  capture  with  difficulty,  destroyed  their  gun  carriages,  buried 
their  guns  in  the  woods,  and  nearly  all  the  officers  and  men  went 
to  the  mountains.  They  fired  their  last  shot  to-day,  after  three 
years  and  nine  months  of  service  in  the  field,  since  Bull  Run, 
July,  1861." 

This  account  explains  the  fact  that  some  of  the  Ar 
tillery  known  to  have  been  with  Walker's  column  sur 
rendered  the  following  day  with  Pendleton's  command. 

""These  were  Walker's  dismounted  cannoneers. — Author's  note. 
fCuster's  command. — Author's  note. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  943 

While  with  Walker,  and  after  the  repulse  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  Pendleton  received  a  summons  from 
Gen.  Lee,  and  setting  out  to  rejoin  the  main  column 
narrowly  eluded  a  hostile  force  of  cavalry,  which  was 
sweeping  through  the  village,  by  leaping  his  horse  over  a 
fence  and  skirting  the  fields.  When  he  reported  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  about  1  A.  M.  of  the  9th,  he  found 
him  "dressed  in  his  neatest  style,  new  uniform,  snowy 
linen,  etc."  To  Gen.  Pendleton's  expression  of  sur 
prise,  Gen.  Lee  explained,  "I  have  probably  to  be  Gen. 
Grant's  prisoner,  and  thought  I  must  make  my  best  ap 
pearance." 

Here  the  question  suggests  itself,  was  Lee  really  pre 
paring  to  meet  his  victorious  adversary,  or  was  he, 
prompted  by  that  spirit,  the  flash  of  which  Pendleton 
has  described,  resolved  to  die  at  the  head  of  his  army  in 
the  event  Grant  failed  to  grant  him  honorable  terms? 
He  had  placed  himself  on  several  occasions  at  the  head 
of  his  troops,  with  the  evident  determination  to  die  at 
their  head  if  need  be.  It  would  almost  seem  that  he  was 
now  clothing  himself  for  the  final  sacrament  in  the  cause 
which  he  held  to  be  holy. 

Grant  was  now  hurrying  forward  his  troops  and  mass 
ing  a  large  force  in  Lee's  front,  having  despatched  a 
column  by  the  short  route  pointed  out  to  Lee  by  Gen. 
Alexander.  Almost  before  Pendleton  rejoined  Lee,  he 
heard  the  firing  of  artillery  beyond  the  Courthouse, 
which  could  only  mean  the  capture  of  Walker's  Ar 
tillery  column.  Against  cavalry  alone,  the  sturdy  gun 
ners  could  contend,  but  not  against  the  infantry,  which 
was  soon  brought  up  by  the  defeated  troopers. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  8th,  Lee  had  received 
Grant's  reply  to  his  note  of  the  evening  before,  and 
again  he  addressed  the  Federal  commander,  proposing 
a  meeting  between  them  at  10  A.  M.  the  next  day,  this 
communication  being  delivered  to  Grant  about  mid 
night.  But  as  the  terms  of  Lee's  note  rather  suggested 
a  discussion  of  political  character,  Grant  in  a  third  note 
declined  the  interview. 


944  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

At  daylight,  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy  was  in 
great  force  astride  the  Confederate  line  of  retreat,  and 
that  Walker's  command  had  been  captured.  A  col 
lision  was  unavoidable.  Indeed  Gordon,  now  in  com 
mand  of  the  2d  Corps,  and  leading  the  column,  had  been 
directed  to  clear  the  road  at  dawn. 

At  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  April, 
the  Confederates  moved  silently  forward.  Reaching  the 
heights  a  little  beyond  the  Courthouse  Gordon  found 
the  enemy  disposed  to  dispute  his  way,  and  at  once  de 
ployed  the  2,000  men  of  his  corps,  while  Gen.  Long 
brought  forward  the  thirty  pieces  of  artillery  which 
were  all  that  were  left  of  Carter's,  Poague's,  Johnson's, 
and  Stark's  battalions.  A  well  directed  fire  from  the 
Artillery  and  an  attack  by  Fitz  Lee  quickly  dislodged 
the  force  immediately  in  Gordon's  front,  but  beyond  he 
could  already  discover  the  dark  masses  of  the  enemy's 
infantry,  and  knew  further  effort  unaided  was  useless. 
In  this  affair  Fitz  Lee  actually  took  a  number  of 
prisoners,  and  two  12-pounder  Napoleons,  but  it  was 
apparent  to  all  that  the  sacrifice  of  life  incident  to  fur 
ther  fighting  would  be  as  useless  as  it  would  be  culpable. 

Though  Gordon,  Long,  and  Fitz  Lee  fought  with 
great  spirit,  still  at  noon  the  main  column  had  not  ad 
vanced  beyond  the  Courthouse.  When  Lee  early  in 
the  morning  inquired  of  Gordon  how  he  was  progress 
ing,  the  answer  was  that  nothing  could  be  accomplished 
without  heavy  reinforcements  from  Longstreet.  Where 
upon  Lee  took  immediate  steps  to  bring  the  fighting  to 
an  end  and  reopened  negotiations  with  Grant.  This 
was  the  only  thing  left,  for  Field's  and  Mahone's  divi 
sions  and  Alexander's  Artillery  were  holding  Meade 
back  in  the  rear  and  could  not  be  spared  for  an  attack  in 
the  front. 

Meanwhile,  the  march  of  the  Army  had  been  brought 
to  a  halt  by  Gordon's  inability  to  advance,  and  the  rear 
was  closing  up.  Longstreet  directed  Alexander  to  form  a 
line  of  battle,  on  which  Mahone's  and  Field's  divisions 
were  to  be  rallied  for  a  last  stand,  Alexander  at  once 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  945 

placed  all  his  artillery  and  all  the  organized  infantry 
in  position  behind  the  North  Fork  of  the  Appomattox. 
While  the  enemy  were  extending  their  lines  to  the  left 
the  battery  commanders  begged  to  be  allowed  to  open 
upon  them,  but  this  Alexander  would  not  permit. 

A  flag  of  truce  was  now  sent  Grant,  requesting  a 
suspension  of  hostilities  pending  negotiations  for  sur 
render,  and  an  order  to  Gordon's  troops  to  suspend  their 
fire.  This  order,  when  received  by  Gen.  Long,  was 
sent  by  him  through  Majs.  Southall,  Parker,  and  other 
members  of  his  staff  to  the  different  batteries,  while  he, 
himself,  proceeded  to  the  Courthouse.  On  reaching 
that  point  he  discovered  that  the  order  had  not  carried 
to  Clutter's  Battery  under  Lieut.  Mclntosh,  a  brother 
of  the  battalion  commander.  This  battery  occupied  a 
hill  immediately  above  the  village,  and  continued  to  fire 
rapidly  upon  an  advancing  line  of  the  enemy's  infantry. 
Gen.  Long  at  once  rode  in  person  to  the  battery,  and 
ordered  the  captain  to  cease  firing  and  to  withdraw  his 
battery  to  a  small  valley  east  of  the  village,  where  the 
Artillery  was  being  parked. 

According  to  Gen.  Long,  the  shots  which  Lieut. 
Wright's  section  of  Clutter's  Battery  fired  were  the 
last  fired  in  battle  by  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Some  time  before  the  order  to  cease  firing  was  given, 
as  Alexander  came  upon  Lee  and  his  staff  by  the  road 
side  at  the  top  of  the  hill,  the  General  called  him  aside 
and  again  laid  the  map  before  him  saying  that  the  Army 
had  come  to  the  junction  and  inquired,  "What  have 
we  got  to  do  to-day?" 

After  talking  with  Gen.  Pendleton,  Alexander  had 
formulated  a  plan  in  his  own  mind  and  now  proceeded 
to  present  it.  His  own  words  are  here  quoted : 

"My  command  having  been  north  of  the  James  had  had  no  share 
in  the  fighting  about  Petersburg,  and  but  little  in  the  retreat.  They 
had  now  begun  to  hear  of  a  surrender,  and  would  hint  their  senti 
ments  in  loud  voices  when  I  rode  by. 

'  'We  don't  want  to  surrender  any  ammunition.  We've  been 
saving  ammunition  all  this  war.  Hope  we  are  not  saving  it  for  a 
surrender.' 


946  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

"I  told  the  general  of  this,  and  said  that  if  he  saw  fit  to  try  to 
cut  our  way  out,  my  command  would  do  as  well  as  they  had  ever 
done. 

"He  answered: 

'  'I  have  left  only  two  divisions,  Field's  and  Mahone's,  suffi 
ciently  organized  to  be  relied  upon.  All  the  rest  have  been  broken 
and  routed  and  can  do  little  good.  Those  divisions  are  now  scarcely 
4,000  apiece,  and  that  is  far  too  little  to  meet  the  force  now  in 
front  of  us.' 

"This  was  just  the  opportunity  I  wished,  and  I  hastened  to  lay 
my  plans  before  him.  I  said: 

'  'Then  we  have  only  choice  of  two  courses.  Either  to  surrender, 
or  take  to  the  woods  and  bush,  with  orders  either  to  rally  on 
Johnston,  or  perhaps,  better,  on  the  Governors  of  the  respective 
States.  If  we  surrender  this  army,  it  is  the  end  of  the  Confederacy. 
I  think  our  best  course  would  be  to  order  each  man  to  go  to  the 
Governor  of  his  own  State  with  his  arms.' 

'  'What  would  you  hope  to  accomplish  by  that?'  said  he. 

'  'In  the  first  place,'  said  I,  'to  stand  the  chances.  If  we 
surrender  this  army  every  other  army  will  have  to  follow  suit.  All 
will  go  like  a  row  of  bricks,  and  if  the  rumors  of  help  from  France 
have  any  foundation  the  news  of  our  surrender  will  put  an  end 
to  them. 

'  'But  the  only  thing  which  may  be  possible  in  our  present 
situation  is  to  get  some  kind  of  terms.  None  of  our  armies  are 
likely  to  be  able  to  get  them,  and  that  is  why  we  should  try  with 
the  different  States.  Already  it  has  been  said  that  Vance  can  make 
terms  with  North  Carolina,  and  Jo  Brown  with  Georgia.  Let  the 
Governor  of  each  State  make  some  sort  of  a  show  of  force  and  then 
surrender  on  terms,  which  may  save  us  from  trial  for  treason  and 
confiscation/ 

"As  I  talked  it  all  looked  to  me  so  reasonable  that  I  hoped  he 
was  convinced,  for  he  listened  in  silence.  So  I  went  on  more 
confidently : 

'  'But,  General,  apart  from  all  that — if  all  fails  and  there  is 
no  hope — the  men  who  have  fought  under  you  for  four  years  have 
got  the  right  this  morning  to  ask  one  favor  of  you.  We  know  that 
you  do  not  care  for  military  glory.  But  we  are  proud  of  the 
record  of  this  army.  We  want  to  leave  it  untarnished  to  our 
children.  It  is  a  clear  record  so  far,  and  now  is  about  to  be  closed. 
A  little  blood  more  or  less  now  makes  no  difference,  and  we  have 
the  right  to  ask  of  you  to  spare  us  the  mortification  of  having 
you  ask  Grant  for  terms,  and  have  him  answer  that  he  has  no 
terms  to  offer.  That  it  is  "U.  S. — Unconditional  Surrender."  That 
was  his  reply  to  Buckner  at  Fort  Donelson,  and  to  Pemberton  at 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  947 

Vicksburg,  and  that  is  what  threatens  us.  General,  spare  us  the 
mortification  of  asking  terms  and  getting  that  reply.' 

"He  heard  it  all  so  quietly  and  it  was  all  so  true,  it  seemed  to 
me,  and  so  undeniable,  that  I  felt  sure  that  I  had  him  convinced. 
His  first  words  were: 

'  'If  I  should  take  your  advice,  how  many  men  do  you  suppose 
would  get  away?' 

'  'Two-thirds  of  us,'  I  answered.  'We  would  be  like  rabbits 
and  partridges  in  the  bushes,  and  they  could  not  scatter  to 
follow  us.' 

"He  said:  'I  have  only  15,000  muskets  left.  Two-thirds  of  them 
divided  among  the  States,  even  if  all  could  be  collected,  would  be 
too  small  a  force  to  accomplish  anything.  All  could  not  be  collected. 
Their  homes  have  been  overrun,  and  many  would  go  to  look  after 
their  families. 

'  'Then,  General,  you  and  I  as  Christian  men  have  no  right  to 
consider  only  how  this  would  affect  us.  We  must  consider  the 
effect  on  the  country  as  a  whole.  Already  it  is  demoralized  by 
four  years  of  war.  If  I  took  your  advice,  the  men  would  be  without 
rations  and  under  no  control  of  officers.  They  would  be  compelled 
to  rob  and  steal  in  order  to  live.  They  would  become  mere  bands 
of  marauders,  and  the  enemy's  cavalry  would  pursue  them  and  over 
run  many  wide  sections  they  may  never  have  occasion  to  visit. 
We  would  bring  on  a  state  of  affairs  it  would  take  the  country 
years  to  recover  from. 

"  'And  as  for  myself,  you  young  fellows  might  go  to  bush 
whacking,  but  the  only  dignified  course  for  me  would  be  to  go  to 
Gen.  Grant  and  surrender  myself  and  take  the  consequences  of 
my  acts.' 

"He  paused  for  only  a  moment  and  then  went  on. 

'  'But  I  can  tell  you  one  thing  for  your  comfort.  Grant  will 
not  demand  an  unconditional  surrender.  He  will  give  us  as  good 
terms  as  this  army  has  a  right  to  demand,  and  I  am  going  to  meet 
him  in  the  rear  at  10  A.  M.  and  surrender  the  army  on  condition  of 
not  fighting  again  until  exchanged.' 

"I  had  not  a  single  word  to  say  in  reply.  He  had  answered 
my  suggestion  from  a  plane  so  far  above  it  that  I  was  ashamed  of 
having  made  it.  With  several  friends  I  had  planned  to  make  an 
escape  on  seeing  a  flag  of  truce,  but  that  idea  was  at  once  abandoned 
by  all  of  them  on  hearing  my  report." 

Thus  did  the  plan  upon  which  the  bold  young  Alex 
ander  had  cogitated  during  the  preceding  days  come  to 
naught,  dissipated  like  thin  smoke  in  the  air  of  Lee's 
nobility  of  soul.  In  maturer  years,  Gen.  Alexander  came 
to  see  the  folly  of  his  proposals,  and  magnanimously  ac- 


948  THE  LONG  AKM  or  LEE 

knowledged  the  error  of  his  hot  youth,  accepting  the 
inevitable  in  the  same  spirit  it  was  received  by  Lee. 
Let  us  not  censure  him  if  in  the  enthusiasm  of  his  youth 
he  failed  to  perceive  that  in  defeat  there  was  a  greater 
courage  than  prolonged  resistance  with  the  useless  sacri 
fice  of  brave  lives.  Such  an  end  to  a  struggle  for  liberty 
may  have  been  suited  to  Cronge  and  de  Wett,  but  it 
was  beneath  a  Lee,  from  whose  view  that  higher  duty  to 
God  was  not  obscured  by  any  false  sense  of  obligation 
to  his  army  and  his  people. 

About  8 :30  A.  M.,  Gen.  Lee,  in  his  full  new  uniform, 
begirt  with  sword  and  sash,  rode  to  the  rear  to  meet 
Grant,  and  soon  received  the  communication  from  the 
latter  before  mentioned.  He  at  once  wrote  the  Federal 
chieftain,  again  requesting  an  interview,  but  in  terms 
which  suggested  fuller  compliance  with  the  original  pro 
posal.  While  this  last  message  was  being  prepared,  a 
messenger  riding  like  the  wind  dashed  around  a  curve 
and,  seeing  Lee,  brought  his  superb  charger  to  a  halt. 
It  was  the  gallant,  one-armed  John  Haskell  of  artillery 
fame  at  Petersburg,  nay,  more,  of  world  fame.  All 
recognized  the  rider,  who  with  his  good  arm  only  suc 
ceeded  in  drawing  up  his  lathered  steed  one  hundred 
yards  or  more  beyond  the  group.  Gen.  Lee  went  to  meet 
him,  exclaiming:  "What  is  it?  What  is  it?"  and  then 
seeing  the  sad  plight  of  Col.  HaskelFs  magnificent  ani 
mal  so  well  known  to  the  Army,  without  waiting  for  a 
reply,  sorrowfully  said:  "Oh,  why  did  you  do  it?  You 
have  killed  your  beautiful  horse!"* 

Col.  Haskell  explained  that  Fitz  Lee  had  sent  in  a 
report  that  he  had  found  a  road  by  which  the  Army 
could  escape,  and  that  Longstreet  had  ordered  him  to 
overtake  Lee,  before  he  could  send  a  note  to  Grant,  and 
to  kill  his  horse  if  necessary  to  do  it. 

Lee,  however,  did  not  credit  the  report,  which  later 
proved  to  be  a  mistake. 

*This  animal  was  noted  for  its  beauty  and  speed.  It  had  been  led  all  the 
way  from  Richmond  on  the  retreat,  with  a  view  to  making  an  escape  in  case  of 
surrender.  The  horse  recovered  and  was  sold  to  a  Federal  officer  for  a  handsome 
sum  in  gold. 


THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE  949 

What  need  to  describe  the  sad  rites  which  now  en 
sued?  Or  to  tell  of  the  anguish  which  showed  in  the 
eyes  of  those  heroic  men  that  had  for  four  horror-laden 
years  toiled  wearily  on  to  Appomattox,  whither  the  in 
exorable  sign  posts  of  Fate  had  led  them — to  which  we 
now  know  the  fickle  dame,  ofttimes  disguising  the 
route  with  cajoling  flatteries,  had  guided  them  from  the 
first?  Was  it  another  trick  of  Fate  that  the  very  roof 
which  shielded  the  proud  Lee  from  the  gaze  of  the 
curious,  as  he  conferred  with  Grant,  was  the  haven  in 
which  its  owner  had  sought  refuge  from  the  stricken 
field  of  First  Manassas?  Well  may  it  be  said  that  no 
home  in  all  that  bleeding  Southland  was  free  from  the 
merciless  intrusions  of  war?* 

After  the  formal  surrender  of  his  army,  Gen.  Lee 
appointed  Gens.  Longstreet,  Gordon,  and  Pendleton 
to  conduct  the  transfer  of  property,  and  to  supervise  the 
paroling  of  the  officers  and  men.  In  accordance  with 
the  stipulations  of  the  agreement  the  guns  and  troops 
were  withdrawn  from  the  lines,  and  the  work  was 
promptly  undertaken. 

The  return  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  for  the  morning 
of  April  9  showed  7,892  organized  infantry,  with  75 
rounds  of  ammunition  each,  and  63  field  guns  with  an 
average  of  93  rounds.  But  61  guns  and  13  caissons, 
however,  remained,  for  two  pieces  had  been  destroyed 
during  the  morning. 

The  infantry  were  first  massed  near  the  Courthouse, 
and  after  stacking  arms  were  directed  to  retire,  while 
the  Federal  officers  took  charge.  Alexander  was  di 
rected  to  form  all  the  guns  and  caissons  in  a  single 
column  along  the  road,  that  the  Federal  ordnance  of 
ficers  might  conduct  them  into  their  lines.  The  animals 
had  been  practically  without  forage  of  any  kind  for  sev 
eral  days.  Alexander  writes :  "With  a  heart  full  of  sym 
pathy  for  the  poor  brutes,  I  formed  the  column  on 
Tuesday,  April  11,  and  left  them  standing  in  the  road, 

*The  house  in  which  the  articles  of  surrender  were  signed  was  the  residence 
of  Maj.  McLean,  to  which  he  had  removed  after  his  home  at  Manassas  was 
destroyed  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  July  21,  1861. 


950  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

which  they  filled  for  about  a  mile.  The  next  morning 
I  bade  good-bye  to  Appomattox,  and  as  I  rode  off  from 
the  scene  I  saw  the  mournful  column  of  artillery  still 
standing  in  the  road  unattended,  but  with  many  of  its 
poor  horses  now  down  in  the  mud  and  unable  to  rise." 

Let  us  avert  our  eyes  from  the  sad  picture  and  be 
thankful  that  a  large  number  of  the  artillery  horses, 
including  all  the  mounts,  had  been  claimed  by  the  of 
ficers  and  men. 

Many  batteries  had  escaped  the  surrender,  both  from 
Walker's  column  on  the  8th,  and  from  the  Army  at  Ap 
pomattox  the  following  day.  Some  made  their  way  to 
Lynchburg,  where  the  guns  were  destroyed,  and  others 
buried  their  guns  by  the  roadside  and  disbanded.  Of 
all  that  great  corps  of  near  three  hundred  pieces,  little 
more  than  half  a  hundred  were  surrendered.  Many  of 
the  artillerymen  joined  Johnston,  among  them  a  large 
detachment  of  horse  artillery  under  Col.  Chew,  who 
escaped  with  Rosser's  Cavalry  Division  and  reported  at 
Greensboro,  N.  C.,  April  30.  They  were  not  allowed 
to  engage  in  hostilities  against  Sherman,  for  the  view 
was  taken  that  they  were  an  integral  part  of  Lee's 
Army,  and  therefore  embraced  in  the  surrender.  Later 
they  were  paroled  with  Johnston's  troops. 

The  total  number  of  officers  and  men  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  paroled  by  Grant  during  the  10th 
and  llth  of  April  was  28,231,  for  large  numbers  of 
stragglers  soon  joined  the  organized  force  which  stacked 
arms  on  the  9th. 

It  is  difficult  to  determine  with  certainty  the  exact 
composition  of  the  Artillery  present  at  the  Surrender. 
The  parole  lists  indicate  that  the  remaining  organiza 
tions  were  as  follows  :* 

f  Giles  Battery 
Stark's  Battalion. _  __J  Louisiana  Guard  Battery 

^Richmond  Hampden  Battery 

*See  Vol.  XV,  Southern  Historical  Papers.  In  this  valuable  volume  the 
names  of  the  artillery  officers  who  surrendered,  as  well  as  of  the  enlisted  men, 
are  given. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 


951 


Cutshaw's  Battalion. 


Lightfoot's  Battalion. 


Hardaway's   Battalion. 


Johnson's  Battalion. 


Haskell's  Battalion. 


Huger's  Battalion. 


Macintosh's   Battalion. 


Richardson's  Battalion. 
Poague's   Battalion 


Braxton's  Battalion. 


2d  Richmond  Howitzers 
Staunton  Battery 
King  William  Battery 
Richmond  Orange  Battery 
Reese's  Alabama  Battery 
^Louisa  Morris  Battery 
(  Caroline  Battery 
{  Surry  Battery 
3d  Richmond  Howitzers 
1st  Richmond  Howitzers 
Norfolk  Blues  Battery 
Salem  Battery 
1st  Rockbridge  Battery 
^Powhatan  Battery 
f  Fredericksburg  Battery 

I  Clutter's  Battery 

I  1st  Maryland  Battery 
I^Southside  Battery 
f  Lamkin's  Nelson  Battery 
1  Palmetto  (S.  C.)  Battery 
]  Rowan  (N.  C.)  Battery 
t Branch's  (N.  C.)  Battery 
f  Bedford  Battery 

Madison  (La.)  Battery 
--• s  Ashland  Battery 

Parker's  Richmond  Battery 
I  Bath  Battery 
4th  Maryland  Battery 
Danville  Battery  (Price's) 
Lynchburg  Battery  (Chamberlayne's) 
2d  Rockbridge  Battery 
Ringgold  Danville  Battery 
Graham's  Petersburg  Battery 
Jeff  Davis  (Ala.)  Battery 

Donaldsonville  (La.)  Battery 

"Manly's  N.  C.  Battery 
Pittsylvania  Battery 
Warrenton  Battery 
Williams'  N.  C.  Battery 
Albemarle  Everett  Battery 
.N.  C.  Battery  (?) 
Lynchburg  Lee  Battery 


With  the  Army  were  fragments  of  other  batteries,  in 
cluding  men  from  the  four  companies  of  the  Washing 
ton  Artillery  Battalion  who  attached  themselves,  after 


952 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 


escaping  from  Walker's  column,  to  Alexander's  and 
Long's  commands.  Some  of  the  batteries  enumerated 
as  present  with  the  Army  at  the  Surrender  numbered 
but  a  mere  handful  of  men.  The  strength  of  the  various 
battalions  may  be  determined  from  the  following 
enumeration : 

ARTILLERY  PAROLE  ROLLS,  DATED  APRIL  9,  1865 


General    Headquarters,    Brig.-Gen.    Pen- 
dleton  and  Staff  

Officers 
12 

Enlisted 
Men 

13 

Total 
25 

First     Army     Corps,     Brig.-Gen.     E.     P. 
Alexander  and  Staff        

11 

36 

47 

Haskell's     Battalion,     Lieut.-Col.     J.     C. 
Haskell                                             

15 

139 

154 

Huger's  Battalion,  Maj.  Tyler  C.  Jordan.... 
Macintosh's  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  Wm.  M. 
Owen 

21 

14 

307 

268 

328 

282 

Poague's    Battalion,    Lieut.-Col.    Wm.    T. 
Poague                                                 

17 

279 

296 

13th    Virginia    Battalion,    Capt.    D.    N. 
Walker                                                   

2 

10 

12 

Richardson's  Battalion,  Capt.  R.  Prosper 
Landry 

4 

77 

81 

Total  First  Army  Corps  

84 

1,116 

1,200 

Second    Army    Corps,    Brig.-Gen.    A.    L. 
Long  and  Staff 

8 

22 

30 

Carter's  Command,  Col.  Thomas  H.  Car 
ter 

2 

4 

6 

Braxton's  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  Carter  M. 
Braxton 

7 

19 

26 

Cutshaw's  Battalion,  Capt.  C.  W.  Fry  
Hardaway's   Battalion,   Lieut.-Col.  R.   A. 
Hardawav   

12 

19 

199 

382 

211 
401 

Johnson's   Battalion,   Lieut.-Col.   Marma- 
duke  Johnson  

8 

135 

143 

Lightfoot's   Battalion,   Asst.   Surg.   J.   B. 
Coakley    

1 

29 

30 

Stark's    Battalion,    Lieut.-Col.    Alex.    W. 
Stark 

11 

154 

165 

Total  Second  Army  Corps 

68 

944 

1,012 

Anderson's  Corps,  Col.  Hilary  P.  Jones.... 
Blount's   Battalion   

2 
3 

1 
21 

3 
24 

Coit's  Battalion 

37 

37 

Strihling's    Battalion 

2 

8 

10 

Total  Anderson's  Corps  . 

7 

67 

74 

Smith's  Battalion,  Capt.  W.  F.  Dement.... 

13 

252 

265 

Total   Artillery   .... 

184 

2,392 

2,676 

THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  953 

The  foregoing  rolls  partially  disclose  the  organization 
of  the  Artillery  as  effected  by  Pendleton  at  Amelia 
Courthouse,  when  the  reduction  in  the  force  with  the 
Army  became  necessary,  and  at  which  time  parts  of 
Coit's,  Eshleman's,  Cabell's,  King's,  Nelson's,  Pegram's, 
and  Sturdivant's  battalions  were  placed  under  Gen. 
Walker  to  be  taken  to  Lynchburg.  According  to  Custer, 
there  were  over  thirty  pieces  of  artillery  with  Walker, 
besides  a  large  train,  and  twenty-four  of  these  guns  and 
many  prisoners  were  captured,  but  Sheridan  places  the 
number  of  guns  captured  by  Custer  from  Walker  at 
twenty-five.  Custer  claims  that  during  the  ten  days 
preceding  the  Surrender  his  command  captured  forty- 
six  guns.* 

The  exact  composition  of  the  various  artillery  com 
mands  after  leaving  Amelia  is  difficult  to  determine,  but 
the  following  order,  the  last  issued  by  Gen.  Walker, 
and  for  which  the  author  is  indebted  to  Gen.  Walker's 
Assistant  Ad  jut  ant- General,  Capt.  William  W.  Cham- 
berlayne,  throws  some  light  on  the  subject. 

"Ho.  QRS.  RESERVE  ARTY,  A.  N.  VIRGINIA 

"April  7,  1865. 
"CIRCULAR. 

"This  command  will  move  at  1  o'clock  A.  M.,  in  the  following 
order : 

"Lightfoot's  Battalion, 

"Coit's  Division, 

"Eshleman's  Division, 

"Cabell's  Division, 

"Walker's   Battalion. 

"Leyden's   Battalion, 

"Col.  Cabell  will  furnish  a  section  of  Napoleons  to  march  with 
the  Rear  Guard. 

"The  wagons  in  rear  of  their  respective  Battalions. 

"By  command  of  Gen.  Walker. 

"WM.  W.  CHAMBERLAYNE, 

"A.  A. -General." 
[Receipted  on  the  back.] 

*It  will  be  recalled  that  some  of  Walker's  batteries  had  buried  their  guns, 
others  joined  the  main  column,  and  others  dispersed  before  Custer's  final  attack. 


— j 

[!on>    \  Rear   Guard. 
Lion,   3 


954  THE  LONG  ARM  OF  LEE 

Hd.  Qrs.  Cabell's  Batt., 
Received  by  WALTER  B.  CARR, 
April  7,  '65.  Sergeant  Major. 

Hd.  Qrs.  Reserve  Arty  3d  Corps, 
April  7,  '65.     B.  F.  ESHLEMAN, 

Lt.-Col.  Commanding. 

Received  by  JAS.  C.  COIT, 

Maj.  Commanding  Batt. 

[Other  receipts  torn  off.] 

If  we  allow  Walker  a  force  of  500  men,  and  the 
various  batteries  which  escaped  to  Lynchburg  and  the 
ten  batteries  of  horse  artillery  800,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  Artillery  personnel  numbered  not  less  than  3,800 
officers  and  men  April  8,  1865.  Thus,  whatever  may  be 
said  of  the  state  of  disorganization  of  the  Infantry  and 
Cavalry,  there  being  not  more  than  2,000  of  the  latter 
towards  the  end  of  the  retreat,  it  is  apparent  that  the  Ar 
tillery  maintained  its  organization  in  a  comparatively 
high  state  of  efficiency  to  the  end,  with  its  personnel 
only  slightly  reduced  since  its  departure  from  Peters 
burg.*  No  higher  tribute  can  be  paid  its  commanders 
than  this  fact,  for  the  Artillery  in  the  nature  of  things 
should  have  been  the  first  to  show  signs  of  dissolution. 

Grant's  terms  were  honorable.  The  arms,  artillery, 
such  of  it  as  was  left,  and  all  public  property  were  to  be 
turned  over  to  the  victors,  all  officers  retaining  their  side- 
arms,  private  horses  and  baggage.  In  addition  to  this 
and  in  the  interest  of  the  desolate  Southern  people, 
every  soldier  in  the  Confederate  Army  who  claimed  to 
own  a  horse  or  mule  was  to  be  permitted  to  retain  it  for 
farming  purposes.  And  so  many  of  the  artillery 
teams,  for  the  preservation  and  care  of  which  Pendleton 
had  labored  so  incessantly,  were  now  to  exchange  the 
gun  and  the  caisson  for  the  plow  and  the  harrow,  the 
implements  in  that  struggle  for  existence,  which  for 

*Shoemaker's  Horse  Battery  contained  00  men  when  it  surrendered.  There 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  the  other  horse  batteries  were  not  as  strong,  so  the  fore 
going  estimate  is  extremely  conservative.  Three  full  batteries  of  Blount's 
Battalion  with  certainly  50  men  each  escaped  to  Lynchburg. 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  955 

the  next  decade  proved  to  be  far  more  cruel  and  dis 
tressing  than  the  mere  war  for  liberty,  through  which 
the  South  had  passed.  Who  can  tell  what  were  the 
emotions  of  those  gallant  gunners  when  first  they  struck 
the  plowshare  of  peace  into  the  poverty-stricken  soil 
of  their  native  fields?  Did  not  the  war-stained  harness, 
which  still  hung  from  the  backs  of  those  weary,  worn 
animals,  recall  to  mind  the  charger  and  the  martial 
trappings  of  a  hundred  battlefields  ?  Did  not  the  dumb 
patience  of  those  faithful  brutes,  bearing  like  their 
masters  the  wounds  and  scars  of  battle,  hold  for  Lee's 
men  a  lesson  of  fortitude  and  admonish  them 
that  together  the  old  war  horse  and  the  veteran  must 
labor  on  for  the  salvation  of  the  land?  Ah!  it  is  sweet  to 
believe  that  these  brave  gunners,  often  as  at  dawn  they 
led  their  old  artillery  teams  from  the  leaky  shelters  that 
stabled  them,  recalled  the  reveille  of  other  days,  and  per 
haps  with  a  manly  tear  in  their  eyes  gently  stroked  the 
muzzles  of  those  faithful  steeds.  Or  perhaps,  as  they 
rested  together,  man  and  beast,  in  the  heat  of  noon-tide, 
'neath  the  generous  shade  of  some  ancient  oak,  the  sigh 
ing  of  the  nearby  pines  recalled  to  their  minds  the  rush 
of  the  guns,  the  hastening  feet,  the  roar  of  battle,  of  an 
other  day,  and  admonished  them  to  be  brave  so  that 
when  the  final  Appomattox  came  upon  them  they 
might  be  released  from  the  plow  of  life  with  the  same 
consciousness  of  duty,  well  performed,  that  filled  their 
souls  on  that  April  day  in  1 865 — that  day  when  nature 
with  her  sweet  scented  fields  and  budding  trees  sought 
to  sweeten  the  bitterness  of  defeat,  and  soothe  with  her 
beauties  the  fevered  brow  of  a  vanquished  army. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  shots  fired  by  Lieut.  Wright 
were  the  last,  but  let  us  accept  Page's  beautiful  story  as 
one  of  fact.  Two  weeks  before  the  Surrender  an  old  ar 
tillery  officer  had  been  sent  with  a  small  column  and 
a  battery  to  guard  an  important  pass  in  the  Blue 
Ridge,  through  which  a  Federal  column  from  South 
west  Virginia  was  expected  to  attempt  to  move  upon 
Lee's  rear. 


956  THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE 

The  "Old  Colonel"  had  seized  and  held  the  crossing. 
The  position  for  his  guns  had  been  carefully  selected. 
It  was  at  the  highest  point  of  the  pass  just  where  the 
road  crawled  over  the  shoulders  of  the  mountain  along 
the  limestone  cliff,  a  hundred  feet  sheer  above  the  deep 
river,  where  its  waters  had  cut  their  way  in  ages  past, 
and  now  lay  deep  and  silent  as  if  resting  after  their 
arduous  toil  before  they  began  to  boil  over  the  great 
bowlders  which  filled  the  bed  of  the  stream.  The  posi 
tion  was  impregnable,  and  the  "Old  Colonel"  had  been 
ordered  to  hold  it  until  relieved. 

Late  on  the  10th,  the  enemy  assailed  the  battery, 
but  all  in  vain.  Numbers  counted  for  little  in  that  wild 
eyrie,  where  a  single  gun  could  hold  out  against  a  host. 
On  the  llth,  the  Federals  attempted  under  a  flag  of 
truce  to  convince  the  "Old  Colonel"  that  Lee  had  sur 
rendered,  but  still  he  remained  at  his  post,  awaiting 
some  order  to  withdraw.  No  order  came,  but  soon  un 
doubted  news  arrived  of  the  sad  event.  At  last,  as  the 
sun  set  in  all  its  glory,  throwing  the  great  western  peaks 
in  dark  relief  against  the  golden  sky,  and  the  shades  of 
night  spread  through  the  silent  vales,  the  pickets  were 
called  in  and  the  old  battery  formed  as  if  for  parade. 
Once  more  the  men  were  to  be  allowed  to  make  the 
mountains  echo  with  the  crash  of  their  guns. 

The  embers  of  the  sinking  camp-fires  threw  a  faint 
light  on  the  guns,  standing  so  grim  and  silent  in  the  em 
brasures  of  the  little  work;  nearby  stood  the  caissons 
with  the  harness  hanging  limply  from  the  poles.  Not  a 
word  was  spoken,  except  that  of  command.  "At  the 
order  each  detachment  went  to  its  piece;  the  guns  were 
run  back,  and  the  men  with  their  own  hands  ran  them 
upon  the  edge  of  the  perpendicular  bluff  above  the 
river,  where,  sheer  below,  the  waters  washed  its  base.  The 
pieces  stood  ranged  in  the  order  in  which  they  had  so 
often  stood  in  battle,  and  the  gray,  thin  fog  rising 
slowly  and  silently  from  the  river  deep  down  between 
the  cliffs,  and  wreathing  the  mountain  side  above, 
might  have  been  the  smoke  from  some  unearthly  battle 


THE  LONG  ARM  or  LEE  957 

fought  by  ghostly  guns,  posted  there  in  the  darkness  and 
manned  by  phantom  cannoneers.  At  the  word  the  gun 
ners  drew  their  lanyards  taut — as  if  a  single  piece 
the  six  guns  belched  forth  a  sheet  of  flame,  roared  a  last 
challenge  on  the  misty  night,  and  sent  their  thunder 
reverberating  through  the  darkening  mountain  tops, 
while  startling  alike  the  blue-coated  warriors  in  their 
camp  below,  the  browsing  deer  and  the  prowling  fox." 

A  deadly  silence  now  fell  upon  the  scene,  broken  only 
by  the  sighing  of  the  tree-tops  above  and  the  rushing 
torrent.  Then  came  another  command — "Let  them  go, 
and  God  be  our  helper.  Amen !" 

For  a  few  moments  there  was  utter  silence ;  then  one 
prolonged,  deep,  resounding  splash,  as  the  war-worn 
guns  plunged  into  the  pool,  spreading  over  its  once- 
placid  surface  a  spray,  as  if  some  titan  hand  had  lain  a 
floral  tribute  upon  the  abysmal  tomb  of  Lee's  Artillery. 
Such  was  the  final  sacrament  of  those  men,  whose  record 
is  enshrined  in  the  names  of  Pendleton,  Long,  Alex 
ander,  Walker,  Walton,  Crutchfield,  Brown,  Pelham, 
Pegram,  Chew,  Breathed,  Latimer,  Thomson,  Landry, 
Cutshaw,  Mclntosh,  Poague,  Carter,  Braxton,  Haskell, 
Huger,  Hardaway,  Cabell,  Gibbes,  Watson,  McGregor, 
McGraw,  McCarthy,  Nelson,  Chamberlayne,  Caskie, 
and  a  host  of  their  peers  too  numerous  to  mention,  the 
like  of  whom  the  world  has  never  known  before  or  since 
their  time.  Such  was  the  hallowed  rite  that  marked  the 
"Burial  of  Lee's  Guns"  and  the  end  of  that  strife  in 
which  Sumter  was  the  primer  that  discharged  the  ex 
plosive  compounded  of  political  antagonism.  An  ap 
parent  motive  only  had  been  needed,  both  north  and 
south,  for  the  pulling  of  the  lanyard  to  expand  an 
energy  stored  up  through  years  of  cherished  animosity. 
But  now,  the  end  had  come  and  once  more  the  placid 
waters  settled  over  a  cause,  buried  but  not  forgotten. 

If  in  its  record  there  is  a  single  incident  to  inspire 
other  generations  to  emulate  the  devotion  to  duty,  the 
valor,  the  Christian  fortitude,  of  the  men  who  fought 
its  guns,  then  the  "Long  Arm  of  Lee"  did  not  exist, 
struggle,  and  perish  in  vain. 


GENERAL  INDEX 


Battery  and  battalion  organizations  are  not  included  in  the  General 
Index,  but  in  the  "Battery  Index"  and  the  ''Battalion  Index,"  which  follow. 
The  records  of  the  batteries  and  battalions  are  the  records  of  their  com 
manders,  who  are  referred  to  in  the  General  Index  in  their  individual 
capacity  only.  Thus,  if  it  be  desired  to  trace  the  record  of  Captain,  later 
Colonel,  Thomas  H.  Carter,  the  references  to  Carter's  Battery  and  Carter's 
Battalion  should  be  consulted,  as  well  as  the  item,  "Carter,  Col.  T.  H.,"  in 
the  General  Index.  Statistics,  such  as  numbers  engaged,  organization, 
personnel,  material,  captures,  losses,  ammunition  expenditure,  tactical 
features  and  dispositions,  topography,  Confederate  and  Federal,  are  not 
generally  indexed,  but  will  readily  be  found  in  the  appropriate  chrono 
logical  chapter  of  the  text. 

PAGE 
Administrative  Regulations  for 

Artillery 199 

Alburtis,  Capt 335 

Aldie,  action  at 218 

Alexander,  E.  P.,  appointed  Col. 

and  Chief  of  Ordnance ....      72 

his  former  record 73 

mentioned, 

115,  130,  136,  140,  141,  155 

criticisms  of 193,  194,  195 

quoted    218,  226,  227,  239 

his  attack  on  Pendleton, 

227,231,  232 

referred  to.  .288,  292,  293,  319, 
337,  343,  351,  363,  372,  376, 
378,  387,  400,  413,  416,  424, 
440,  445,  490,  494,  505,  507, 
508,  509,  511,  534,  536,  537, 
539,  545,  549,  551,  553,  554, 
564,  565,  570,  572,  635,  642, 
645,  646,  647,  658,  664,  667, 
670,  671,  672,  674,  676,  680, 
681,  682,  684,  686,  688,  689, 
695,  696,  697,  704,  720,  731, 
736,  754,  776,  781,  787,  789, 
793,  823,  840,  842,  845,  850, 
868,  895,  897,  900,  919,  923, 
924,  933,  934,  936,  939,  940, 

944,  945,  947,  949 
Allan,  Col.  William,  quoted.  .  .  .    195 

mentioned 564 

Alphabetical      designation      for 

battalions   415 

Altercation    over    use    of    land 

torpedoes    178 

Ambuscade  of  artillery  column, 

891,  892 

American  tactics   160,  161 

"American     Artillerist's     Com 
panion"     149 


PAGE 
Ammunition,  fixed,  introduction 

of    32 

purchased  in  Europe,   1861 .  .  37 
seized     with     Baton      Rouge 

arsenal    38 

laboratories    40 

manufacture  of 42 

capacity   of   laboratories ...  45,  46 

purchased  up  to  1863 55 

amount  made 56 

furnished     by      West     Point 

Foundry    64 

lack  of  in  1861 76,  139,  140 

expenditure    of    at    Coggin's 

Point     234 

supply  of    243 

expenditures  compared  .  .  269,  274 

expenditure    326 

improved    in    1862 340 

report  on    424 

poor   quality    at    Chancellors- 

ville  509 

influence  of    548 

Board  for  study  of 564 

expenditures     597 

Federal     reserve     at     Gettys 
burg    637,  638 

Anderson,  Jos.  R.  &  Co.,  pro 
prietors  of  R  i  c  h  m  o  n  d 
Tredegar  Works,  the  Con 
federate  "Krupps"  51 

mentioned     341 

Anderson,  Lieut.  R.  M 657 

Anderson,      Capt.      Robt.,      his 

manual 154 

Andrews,  Lt.-Col.  R.  Snowden, 
244,  414,  416,  515,  516,  551, 

605,  704,  720 
Anecdote,     concerning     cavalry 

trooper    196 


30 


960 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

Antietam,   Battle   of 294 

Antimony,   sulplmret  of 47 

Appropriations      for      ordnance 

work     36,  37 

Archer,    Dr.    Junius    L.,    manu 
facturer  of  guns 68 

Archer  Projectiles,  defects  of..    128 
Armament   of   batteries   on   the 

Peninsula    201 

of  army  in   1862,  tabulated..    284 

Armored  car    216 

Armistead,   Capt.   George 90 

Arms,      captured,      regulations 

concerning 39,  59 

purchased  abroad   55 

destroyed   at  Harper's   Ferry     68 
Armstrong,   Sir  William,  devel- 

opes  breech-loader    29 

Armstrong    Guns    243 

Arsensals,    seizure    of    Federal 

by    Confederates    24,  41 

U.  S.,  created 26 

erected  by  C.  S.   A 35,  36 

material  seized  with  Federal     38 

location   of   Confederate 40 

Articles  of  War,  C.  S.  A 109 

Artificers,    pay    of 108 

Artillery,  American,  reputation 

of  in   1861 31 

amount  of  Confederate  origi 
nally   proposed    42 

officers  detailed  for  ordnance 

work    39,  52,  53 

of  Virginia,  armament  of.. 62,  67 

early   American    85 

early  instruction    85,  91 

in    Mexican    War 93 

merged  with  Engineer   Corps     89 

status  of  in  1808 88 

in  1815    90 

in  1837   91 

in   I860    94 

officers  in  from  West  Point.  .  95 
Corps  of,  C.  S.  A...  108,  109,  117 
law  creating  officers.  108,  109,  117 

pay  of  officers  in 108 

Provisional,  C.  S.  A.,  created  107 

of    Virginia    112,   115 

strength   of   in    1861 140 

French  Schools    152 

mass  tactics    152,  153 

proportion  of  to  infantry    151,   153 

Federal  organization   156 

administration  of  Confederate    199 

nature  of  the  arm 209 

efficiency   of    277,  278 

reorganization  of  C.  S.  A.  .  .    279 


PAGE 
organization  at  Sharpsburg, 

282,  283 

reorganization  of  1862 332 

reduction  of  in  1862 337 

strength  of  in  Oct.,  1862.339,  346 

assignment  of  in   1862 345 

strength  of  in  Dec.,  1862 411 

organization  of  in  April,  1863 .   419 
organization  of  in  May,  1863,    442 
error  of  at  Chancellorsville.  .    490 
mobility    of    at    Chancellors 
ville     491 

fire  effect   of  at  Chancellors 
ville     511 

status  of  Federal  in   1863, 

546,  550 

Confederate  and  Federal  com 
pared  547,  548,  573 

number  and  grades  of  officers 

in  1863   565 

reorganization  of   1863 565 

organization  of  in  1863 ....  567 
strength  of  in  July,  1863...  575 
of  Western  Army,  inspected 

by  Pendleton   583 

charged  by  cavalry, 

585,  587,  591,  596 
movement  of  to  Gettysburg .  .  599 
reconnaissances, 

623,  631,  639,  643,  658 

resisting    power    of 649 

faulty      disposition      of      at 

Gettysburg     666 

efforts    to    secure    promotion 

for  officers  in 719,  723,  724 

divisions  created    722,  725 

of  Western  Army  reorganized  731 
character    of    C.    S.    A.    com 
manders    742 

proposed    organization    of    in 

1864     830 

superior  personnel  of  in  1864.  893 
proposed  increase  of  C.  S.  A. 

Corps  in  1864 902 

Pendleton's  tribute  to  his ...    906 
headquarters     of     at     Peters 
burg     907 

staff  of  in  1864 902,  907 

losses  of   at  Petersburg 909 

heavy    batteries    about    Rich 
mond      920 

promotions  in,  in   1865 925 

Ashby,  Gen.  Turner 162,  163 

Atkinson,    Lt.-Col 920 

Atlanta  Arsenal    57 

Augusta  Arsenal    40 

Ausrusta  Powder  Mills 40 


GENERAL  INDEX 


961 


PAGE 

erected     43 

site  and  capacity  of 45 

Superintendent   of    57 

Austerlitz,  Battle  of 153 

Austrian,  guns  purchased.  .  .  .37,  55 

artillery    155 

tactics 'in   1859 172 

ammunition  expenditure  ....    274 
Auxonne,  Artillery  School.  .  152,   159 

Badajos     864 

Baggage  allowance 428,  708,  709 

Balaclava,      charge      of      Light 
Brigade    at,    compared    to 

Brandy  Station 587 

Balck,  quoted    106 

Baldwin,   Col.  J.  B 116 

Baldwin,  Col.  Briscoe  G.,  Chief 

of  Ordnance 341,  351,  570 

Balloons,  Federal  observation, 

234,  366,  376 

Barefooted  gunners 355,  356 

Barksdale,  Lieut 526 

Barnwell,  Maj.  J.  C...198,  319, 

380,  387,  388,  417,  423,  907 

Barry,  Lieut 216 

Barry,    Col.    Wm.    F.,    Chief   of 

Artillery    133,  157 

Baton    Rouge   Arsenal 37,  40 

powder   seized  with 38 

Battalions,  organization  of  pro 
posed     141 

created    155 

use  of    344 

organization   of    413,  415 

no    longer    part    of    infantry 

commands     556 

proposed    composition    of    in 

1864     830 

Battery,  the  organization  of  a, 

109,  110 

material   of   a 110 

complement  of  horses Ill 

authority  to  raise 144 

strength  of  a  Va.  militia.  .  .    144 

mobility   of    165 

Lee     discourages     raising     of 

additional     197 

those  disbanded   in    1862 284 

proposed    organization    of    a, 

in    1864     830 

Battles,   Lieut.  ..684,   685,   931,  932 

Bautzen,    Battle   of 153 

Bayard,  Gen.  Geo.  D.,  killed  by 

shell     350 

Bayne,    Maj.    T.    L.,    command 
ing   Blockade   Service 56 

Beauregard,  Gen.,  at  Petersburg  836 
Beaver  Dam,  Battle  of 207,  211 


PAGE 
Beckham,   Col.   R.   F..128,  162, 

597,   733,  720,  722,  725 
(See  Beckham's  Battery  and 
Beckham's  Battalion) 

Beef,  issued  in   1862 374 

cattle     427 

Bellona  Arsenal,  created 26 

mentioned     51 

guns  seized  at 68 

Bercier's    Orleans    French    Bat 
tery  of  La 93 

Bermuda  Agency    56 

Bernadotte,     his     proud     boast 
that   he   had   never    lost   a 

gun    525 

Bernard,  Col.  Simon 97 

Besancon,    Artillery   School....    152 

Best,  Capt 550,  554 

Bethesda  Church,  Battle  of ....    207 

Beverly  Ford   259 

Big  Bethel,  Battle  of,  rifle  guns 

used  in    64 

described     118 

Blackburn's  Ford   127 

Blacksmiths,   pay   of 108 

Blakely   guns,   purchased 55 

mentioned     243 

in  Horse  Artillery 346 

Blankets    115 

Blockade  Running  Service 56 

Blount,  Maj.  J.  G 564,  917 

(See  Blount's  Battery) 
Bliicher,  calls  for  more  guns..    153 

Blumenau,  Battle  of 274 

Board  of  War,   1776 25 

Boggs,  Maj.  Francis  J.,  838,  917,  920 

(See  Boggs'  Battalion) 
Bombardment  of  Fredericksburg  362 
Bomford,  Col.  George,  Chief  of 

Ordnance   26,  91 

Boonsboro,  Battle  of 292 

Boots,  price  of  in  1864 908 

Borman  fuses,  defective 122 

Boston,  Col 936 

Bourcet  160 

Bowen    &     Co.,     of     Pendleton, 

S.  C.,  powder  contractors..      43 

saltpetre  contractors   44 

Bowling  Green,  Artillery  Camp 

at    410,  556 

Bragg's   Battery    (Horse   Artil 
lery)     164 

Bran,  price  of  in  1864 909 

Branch,    Col.   James    R 840,  917 

( See      Branch's      Petersburg 
Battery  and  Branch's  Bat 
talion) 
Brander,  Maj 932 


962 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

Brandy  Station    434,  584 

Braxton,  Lt.-Col.  Carter  M., 

416,  421,  509,  720,  878,  885 
(See   Braxton's    Battery    and 

Braxton's  Battalion) 
Breathed,  Maj.  James.  .  162,  338, 

346,  440,  577,  720,  795,  937 
(See  Breathed's  Battery  and 

Breathed's  Battalion) 
Breech-loading      gun,      develop 
ment  of 29 

origin  of 31 

varieties  of 32 

Brenizer,    Capt.     A.    C.,    Supt. 

Salisbury  Foundry 57 

Bridge,  gallant  defense  of  a,  at 

Stephenson's  Depot    607 

Bridles,  number   issued 56,  114 

Brigade     groups,     proposed     in 

1864 830 

Brockenbrough,  Maj.   J.   P., 

380,  382,  383,  384,  408,  417, 

421,  423,  720 

( See     Brockenbrough's     Bat 
tery    and    Brockenbrough's 
Battalion) 
Brooke,     Capt.     John     Mercer, 

invents  gun   67 

Brooke  gun,  invention  of 51 

Brown,  Capt.  J.  S 335 

Brown,  Lieut.  J.  Thompson,  Jr.  454 
Brown,    Col.    John    Thompson, 
114,  118,  226,  338,  417,  469, 
470,  494,  545,  549,  551,  552, 
556,  562,  568,  624,  625,  636, 
637,  658,  665,  666,  673,  696, 
697,  701,  704,  713,  769,  851,  855 
( See  Brown's  Battery,  Brown's 
Battalion,      and      Brown's 
Division) 
Broun,    Lieut.-Col.    W.    LeRoy, 

Supt.  Richmond  Arsenal. 52,  57 

Buddecke's    Battle    Orders 229 

Bull  Run,  Battle  of 127,  130 

reason  for  victory  of 99 

Bullet,    the    perfect    expansion, 

origin    of    28 

Billow,  quoted   106 

Bunker  Hill,  camp  at 327 

Bureau    of    Artillery     and 

Ordnance,  proposed    38 

Bureau     of     Foreign     Supplies, 

created    35 

work  of   55,  56 

Bureau    of    Mining    and    Niter, 

created    35,  44,  49 

officers  of    .  53 


PAGE 
Bureau  of  Ordnance,   C.  S.  A., 

organized 34,  38 

officers  of  39,  52,  53,  54 

work  of 40 

laborers  impressed   44 

organization    and    operations, 

52,  54,  55 

expenditures   of    54,  55 

its   fleet  of  blockade  runners     56 

credits  allowed    56 

gradual      restriction      of     its 

field  of  operations 59 

"Burial  of  the  Guns" 956 

Burnside,      his      escape      from 

Fredericksburg    402 

his   "Mud   March" 445 

Burroughs,  Lieut.   Dent 794 

Burton,    Supt.    J.     H.,     Macon 

armory    57 

Burton  Projectiles,  defects  of.  .    128 

Burwell,   Lieut 460,  461 

Cabell,  Col.  Henry  Coalter, 

280,  372,  386,  387,  391,  396, 
415,  517,  523,  556,  720,  722, 

846,  851,  852,  855,  919 
( See    Cabell's    Richmond 
"Fayette"      Battery,      and 
Cabell's  Battalion) 
Cadets,    of    V.    M.    I.,    as    in 
structors    99,  115 

Cadets,    Richmond    School 731 

Caesar    431 

Caisson,      of      Cadet      Battery, 

Jackson's  hearse  560 

Caissons,   number   made 56 

Callaway,   Lieut.   Morgan..  820,  911 
(See   Pulaski,   Ga.,    Battery) 

Camp  Meetings,  Religious 430 

Camps,  Artillery,  in   1863, 

556,  716,  717 
Cantonments,   Artillery,   winter 

of   1861-2    ." 145 

Cape  Fear  River,  fishery  estab 
lished   on    48 

Captured  arms,  regulations  con 
cerning     39,  59 

Carbines,  for  cannoneers  recom 
mended      892 

Carpenter,  Capt.  John  C., 

337,   338,  440,   889,  890 
( See     Carpenter's    Alleghany 

Battery) 
Carpenter,  Capt.  Joseph, 

337,  338,  440 

(See     Carpenter's    Alleghany 
Battery) 


GENERAL  INDEX 


963 


PAGE 

Carter,  Capt.  J.  W., 

347,  588,  589,  594 
(See    Carter's    "Ashby"    Bat 
tery) 
Carter,  Col.  Thomas  Hill, 

326,  337,  379,  380,  399,  416, 
440,  507,  508,  509,  551,  720, 
733,  769,  799,  813,  856,  857, 
880,  881,  882,  883,  885,  887, 
889,  890,  891,  892,  893,  895, 

897,  920,  921,  926,  928,  944 
(See   Carter's   King   William 
Battery,  Carter's  Battalion, 
and  Carter's  Division) 

Carthaginian  Army   431 

Gary,  Maj ". 920 

Caskie,  Maj.  William  H...440,  815 
( See    C  a  s  k  i  e  '  s    Richmond 

"Hampden"  Battery ) 
Cavalli,  designs  breech-loader..      29 
Cavalry,    ordered    to    help    bat 
teries   195 

anecdote  concerning 196 

Cavalry  charges  vs.  Artillery, 

585,  587,  591,  596 

Cavalry  tactics,  proper 404 

Cayce,   Capt 834 

( See      Richmond       "Purcell" 

Battery ) 
Cedar  Mountain,  Battle  of....    241 

Chalons,    school    at 152 

Chamberlaine,  Capt.  W.  W.,  717,  902 
Chamberlayne,      Capt.      John 

Hampden.  .  .493,    506,    867,  874 
( See  Chamberlayne's  Battery ) 

Chancellorsville,  Battle  of 442 

May  3    505,  515 

May  4   530 

Chaplains,    inadequate    number 

of   430 

Charcoal,  how  procured 42 

Charges,    made    by    horse    bat 
teries    166,  168 

of  Cavalry  vs.  Artillery. 

585,  587,  591,  596 

Charleston  Arsenal   40,  57 

Charlotte   Chemical   Works....      40 
Charlottesville,  Horse  Artillery 

saves    726 

resolutions  of  thanks  of  town  728 
Chateaudun,    Prussian    battery 

at     525 

Chatham  Artillery  of  Savannah     88 
Chemists,      Ordnance,      discov 
eries  of   43,  45,  47 

Chesterfield      Depot,      Artillery 

Headquarters,   in    1863....    450 


PAGE 

Chew,  Lt.-Col.  Robert  Preston, 
162,  326,  337,  349,  423,  440, 
720,  727,  773.774,  927,  937,  950 
(See  Chew's  "Ashby"  Battery 
and  Chew's  Battalion) 

Chew,  Capt.  Walter  E 

(See  4th  Md.  Battery) 
Chief  of  Artillery,  proper  rela 
tions    of    a,   with    his   com 
mander    560 

Childs,      Maj.      F.      L.,      Supt. 

Fayetteville  Arsenal    57 

Cliildsburg,  Artillery  Camp  at.    410 
Chinese   multiple   firing  guns..      31 

Christ,  in  the  camp 430 

Cigars  and  tobacco,  price  of  in 

1864     908 

Clarksville  Harness  Shops 57 

Clausewltz,  quoted 106,  183,  238 

Cleveland,  Tenn.,  manufactured 

copper  found  at 47 

Clothing,  men  without  reported 

sick    425 

condition  of  in   1863 425 

anecdote  concerning 426 

cost  of  in   1864-5 908 

Clutter,  Capt.  Valentine  C 378 

( See   Clutter's    Richmond 

Battery) 

Cocke,    Gen.    Philip   St.    George  115 
Cog-gin's  Point,  bombardment  at  234 

Coit,  Maj.  James  C 838 

(See      Coit's      Battery      and 

Coit's    Battalion) 
Cold  Harbor,  1st  Battle  of  .211,  212 

Cold  Harbor,  2d  Battle  of 812 

Cold  Harbor  to  Petersburg.  .  .  .    834 
Colemaii,  Lt.  Col.  Lewis  M..204  392 

Colonial    Artillery    85 

Colston,  Gen.  R.  E 105 

Columbus  Arsenal    57 

Combat  unit,  the 344 

the  battalion  as  the 413 

Commanders,      artillery,      char 
acter   of    742 

Commissioner  of  Artillery,  1776     25 

Company  "Q"    727 

Confederacy  formed 107 

Confederate  Powder  Mills 40 

site  and  capacity  of 45 

Contee,  Lieut ' 607,  608 

Contractors  for  sulphur 42 

Contribution   from    Washington 
Artillery      for      people      of 

Fredericksburg    410 

Cooke,  John  Esten,  his  tribute 

to  Pelham   434,  435 

mentioned    828,  907 


964 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

Cooke,  Lieut.  N.  B 889 

Copper,  how  obtained 47 

Corn,  ration  of 428 

price  of  in  1864 908 

Cornmeal,  component  of  ration  374 
Corps  artillery,  use  of, 

160,  284,  285,  287,  568 

Corps  Reserve 284,  285,  287,  568 

Corps    Chief    of    Artillery,    pro 
posed     415 

Corps  Groups,  proposed  in  1864,  830 
Court  of   Inquiry   for   Artillery  341 
Courtney,  Maj.  A.  R..244,  281,  654 
(See  Courtney's  Battery  and 
Courtney's   Battalion) 

Covington,  Private  L.  T 866,  867 

Cowardice,  case  of 866 

Crater  at  Petersburg, 

846,  847,  859,  863 
Creeping,  practice  in  artillery. .   605 

Cross  Keys,  Battle  of 173 

Crozet,  Col.   Claudius 96 

Crutchfield,  Col.  Stapleton, 

105,  170,  246,  258,  264,  267, 
272,  276,  278,  281,  290,  291, 
293,  298,  325,  326,  327,  328, 
337,  358,  377,  378,  379,  381, 
384,  385,  391,  392,  410,  413, 
420,  423,  424,  428,  440,  450, 
468,  489,  490,  491,  493,  494, 
549,  551,  560,  561,  712,  713, 

719,  919,  936 
Culpeper,  Artillery  cantonments 

near  145 

Cummings,  Col.  A.  C 133 

Curry  combs,  number  issued,   56,  114 

price  of  in  1864 908 

Custer,     Gen.,     advertises     for 

Confederate  guns    890 

Cutshaw,   Lt.-Col.  Wilfred  Em 
met   .337,  440,  720,  791 

(See   Cutshaw's   Battery   and 

Cutshaw's  Battalion) 
Cutts,  Col.  Allan  S., 

417,  427,  704,  720,  842 
(See      Cutts'      Battery      and 
Cutts'    Sumter,    Ga.,    Bat 
talion) 
Cuyler,    Lt.-Col.    R.    M.,    Supt. 

Macon  Arsenal    57 

Dabney,    Lieut.,    of    King    Wil 
liam   Battery 322 

Dahlgren's  Raid    729 

Dance,  Capt.  Willis  J., 

510,  568,  600,  792 
(See  Dance's  Powhatan  Bat 
tery  and  Dance's  Battalion) 


PAGE 
Dandridge,  Capt.  Edward  P., 

198,  412,  424,  718,  907 

Danville  Depot    57 

Daum,  Lieut.-Col.  Philip 169 

Davidson,  Capt.  Geo.  L 802 

(See  Lynchburg  Battery) 
Davidson,  Capt.  Greenlee, 

380,  382,  383,  384,  393,  511 
( See    Richmond    "Letcher" 

Battery ) 
Davis,        Gen.,        manufactures 

powder    43 

Davis,    Jefferson,    false    accusa 
tion    against    24 

Dearing,   Col.   James, 

415,  564,  565,  572,  646,  647, 

658,  720,  722,  725,  816,  936 

(See      Dearing's      Lynchburg 

Battery,     Dearing's     Light 

Battalion,     and     Dearing's 

Horse  Artillery  Battalion) 

Deflection      marks,       used      at 

Banks'   Ford    539 

De  Lisle,  Maj.  Roman 87 

Depots,   horse    710 

De   Russy,   Lieut.,   killed 525 

Desertion,  becomes   prevalent .  .    923 

proposals  to  stop 924 

Deshler,  Col.  James 202,  205 

(See    Deshler's '  Battery    and 

Deshler's  Battalion) 
Dilger,    Capt.    Hubert,    his    ex 
ploits  475,   480, 

481,  482,  484,  550 
(See    Dilger's    Federal    Bat 
tery  ) 
Dimmock,    Col.    Charles,    Chief 

of  Ordnance  of  Va 69 

his   efforts    70 

Disbanded,      organizations,      in 

1862     284 

Diseases  of  horses,  332,  709,  710,  922 
Divisions  of  artillery  created, 

570,  722,  725 

Divisional  reserves  created ....    200 
Downer,     Supt.     W.     S.,     Rich 
mond  Armory  and  Clarks- 

ville  Harness  Shops 57 

Douay,    Artillery    School 152 

Drivers,    experience   of 331 

Drouot     159,  230 

Drunken   negro   troops 870 

Ducktown,  Tenn.,  copper  smelt 
ing  at   47 

Duel,     artillery,     only     one     on 

Peninsula     237 

at  Cedar  Mountain 250 


GENERAL  INDEX 


965 


PAGE 

Du    Teil,    original    exponent    of 

masses     159 

Early's   Valley   Campaign,   827,  876 

Ellett,   Capt.   Thomas 378 

(See   Ellett's  Richmond  Bat 
tery) 

Elliott,  Lieut.,  of  Maurin's  Bat 
tery    311 

Employees    of    Bureau    of    Ord 
nance,    number    of 57 

organized  as  armed  guards.  .      58 
Engineer    Corps,    merged    with 

Artillery     89 

Entente   Cordiale,   between    Ar 
tillery   and  Infantry 406 

Epaulments,  use  of 545 

Eshleman,  Lt.-Col.  Benj.  F., 

129,  356,  519,  565,  720 
(See  Eshleman's  Battery  and 

Eshleman's  Battalion) 
Eubank,  Cadet  Hill  Carter....    657 
"Eugenia,"    blockade    runner...      56 
European    agent    of    Bureau    of 

Ordnance  appointed    ....  35,  37 
Evelington     Heights,     Pelham's 

and  Stuart's  blunder  at.  .  .    233 
Exemptions  of  mechanics ....  48,  57 

Explosion  of  Parrotts 388 

Fair     Oaks     or     Seven     Pines, 

Battle  of 192 

Fallagant,  Lieut 820 

Farcy,  disease  of 922 

Farriers,  pay  of 108 

Fayetteville      Arsenal      and 

Armory    40,  57 

Federal   Artillery,   organization 

of    * 156 

sorry  condition  of  in  1863.  .  .    573 

its  status  in  1863 546,  550 

Infantry,    immobile    at    Cold 

Harbor   823,  824 

Ferrell,  Lieut 538 

Field  Officers  for  battalions ...    570 
Artillery,  in   1863,  list  of...    719 

assignment  of    720 

in  1865    925 

Fishery,      established      for      oil 

supply     48 

Fire  balls  used  at  Petersburg .  .  923 
"First  American"  Regiment,  89,  93 
Fleet,  of  Bureau  of  Ordnance .  .  56 

Fleetwood,   affair   at 349 

Floyd,  Mr.,  Secretary  of  State, 

accusation  against    24 

Fodder,  price  of  in   1864 909 

Forage,   hauled  by  batteries .  .  .    425 

where   secured    425,  426 

how   collected    .  .    428 


PAGE 

•measures  to  procure  in  1863,  718 

price  of  in   1864-5 908 

lack  of  in  1864-5 919,  920 

Ford,    Lieut 827 

Forges,  number  made 56 

Forno,  Capt.  Henry,  of  La ....      93 

Fort  Drewry,  blown  up 933 

Fort  Gregg,   action   of 902,  931 

Fort  Harrison,  action  of 897 

Fort   Pulaski,   rifled   guns   used 

in  defense  of 66 

Fort  Steadman,  action  of 928 

Fort  Whitworth,  action  of 931 

Fortress  Monroe 91 

Foundries,  created    40 

Franco-German    War,    artillery 

experience  of   239 

Fraser,  Capt 564,  694 

(See    Pulaski,    Ga.,    Battery) 

Frazier's  Farm,  Battle  of 215 

Friedland,   Battle   of 153 

Friction-tubes,      purchased      in 

Europe   in    18G1 37 

manufactured     47 

purchased    abroad    55 

number   made    56 

Frobel,  Maj.  B.  W 257,  280 

(See  Frobel's  Battalion) 

Fry,  Capt 334 

Frederick  the  Great,  his   artil 
lery     150,  153 

mentioned    432,  707 

Fredericksburg,  Battle  of 362 

Freemantle,        Col.,       witnesses 

Gettysburg   687 

French,  Lieut.  S.  S 889 

French,     influence     of     the     on 

American  system ....  87,  88,  89 
French  Artillery,  organization  of  150 

in  1859    190 

Artillery   Schools    152 

"French      Detachment,"      of 

Henry's  Battery    352 

French    Gunners    of    Louisiana, 

heroism  of    389 

Fuel,   in    1862 373 

Fuentes  de   Onoro,  horse  artil- 

tery  at    166 

Fulcher,  Corporal,  his  gallantry  899 
Fulminate     of     mercury,     sub 
stitute  for    47 

Fuzes,  time,  new  invented 47 

purchased  abroad   55 

number   made 56 

Borman    type    defective 122 

igniter    attachment    fails    to 

"  work    538 

Games'  Mill,  Battle  of 210 


966 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

Gainesville,  Battle  of 255 

Gale,  Lieut 844,  845 

Garber,  Capt.  Asher  W....383,  791 
(See  Garber's  Staunton  Bat 
tery) 
"Garde   Royale,"  'manual   of...    154 

Garden,   Capt.   Hugh   R 899 

(See  Palmetto,  S.  C.,  Battery) 
Garnett,     Maj.     John     J.,     In 
spector  of  Ordnance, 

355,  415,  565,  704,  720,  722 
(See    Garnett's    Battalion) 

Garnett,  Lieut.  J.  M 164 

Gatling,  Dr.  R.  J.,  his  gun  first 

used    32,  33 

General   Chief   of  Artillery....    415 
Georgia,     supplies     and     provi 
sions  in 427 

German   artillery   experience   in 

1870     191 

Getty,  Capt.  C.  T.,  Supt.  Lynch- 

burg   Depot    " .  .  .  .      57 

Gettysburg,  Battle  of 221 

movement  of  army  upon ....    598 

errors  in  campaign  of 611 

faulty  artillery  positions  of  667 
strategic  situation  of  town.  .  613 
tactical  features  of  battlefield  614 
disposition  of  troops  at....  615 

action   of   July    1 616 

action  of  July   2 635 

action   of  July   3 660 

retreat   from    695 

Gibbes,  Maj.  J.  Hampton, 

779,   865,   866,   867,   874,  902 
(See    Gibbes'    Battalion) 
Gibbon's     Artillerist's     Manual, 

1859     29 

Gilham,  Col.  William 96,  98 

his  manual 99,   154 

referred  to 337 

Girths    115 

Gitschin     238 

Glanders,  disease  of 922 

Glendale,   Battle  of 216 

Gneisenau     238 

Golly,  Maj.,  of  Louisiana 93 

Gorey,  Lieut.,  his  gallantry  at 

Sharpsburg     301 

Gorgas,    Brig.-Gen.    Josiah,    ap 
pointed   Chief   of   Ordnance     34 
his  character  and  work.  .  .  .35,  36 

statement  of 39,  40 

recommendations    of 35,  54 

referred  to 564 

Graham,  Dr.  John 907 

Graham,  Lieut 385 

Grain,  where  secured 425,  426 


PAGE 

Grant,   Gen.   U.   S.,   remarks  of 

on    artillery 190 

discussion    of    his    character, 

823,  824 

Gravellotte,  Battle  of 274 

Greased  Heel,  horse  disease.  .  .  .  348 

Greble,  Lieut.  John  T.,  killed..  118 
Greener,    William,    C.    E.,    his 

treatise    on    arms 28 

inventions     28 

Grenades,  proposed  use  of 827 

Grenoble,  Artillery  School 152 

GribeauvaPs  system 150 

Gridley,   Col.  Richard 86 

Grimes,  Capt.  Cary  F 92 

( See  Grimes'  Portsmouth  Bat 
tery) 

Grooved  guns,  origin  of 28,  29 

experiments   with 31 

Groveton,  Battle  of 255 

Gunboats,    artillery    encounters 

with    844,  857 

Gun   carriages,   manufacture   of  48 

number   made 56 

made  in  Va.  in   1861 78,  79 

Guns,  manufacture  of 51 

Austrian  purchased 37,  55 

Blakely   purchased 55 

number     made     at     Tredegar 

Works    56 

furnished     by      West      Point 

Foundry    64 

brought    by    Washington    Ar 
tillery    71 

captured    at    First    Manassas  71 
list  of  those  made  in  1861.  .  .  78 
number   of   Federal   and   Con 
federate   in   1862 148,  286 

number  and  proportion  of  at 

Sharpsburg    286,  325 

kinds  favored  by  Gen.  Lee.  .  .  340 
mortification  over  loss  of.  ...  524 
proper  spirit  over  loss  of ....  525 
Prussian     rule     as     to    with 
drawal  from  action 525 

Gunners  defend  their  pieces, 

585,  587,  591,  597 
Gunnery,    theory    of,    provision 

for  study  of  in   1863 564 

Board   of,   appointed   in    1863  564 

Guibert    160 

Guidon,  pay  of 110 

Gustavus,  his  artillery   propor 
tion    153 

Gwynn,   Maj.-Gen.   Walter 113 

Hai'nesville,    Battle   of 66,  125 

Halters,  number  issued 56,  114 


GENERAL  INDEX 


967 


PAGE 

37 

149 

777 


Hamburg,      ordnance     material 

shipped  from 

Hamilton,    Gen.   Alexander,    his 

drill  regulations 

Hamilton,  Maj.  S.  P., 

280,  370,  386,  391,  396,  415, 

419,  450,  451,  466,  468,  528, 

(See    Hamilton's     Battalion) 

Hardaway,     Lieut. -Col.     Robert 

Arehelaus, 

319,  380,  417,  421,  423,  468, 
469,  510,  513,  535,  536,  537, 
538,  540,  549,  704,  720,  786, 

813,  897,  900,  919,  925 
(See    Hardaway's    Ala.    Bat 
tery   and   Hardaway's   Bat 
talion) 

Hardin,   Maj.   M.   B 920 

Hardwicke,   Capt 636 

(See   Hardwicke's   Lynchburg 

"Lee"    Battery) 
Harness,    purchased    in    Europe 

1861     37 

leather  for  manufacture  of..      47 

made  from  oiled  canvas 48 

purchased  abroad 55 

number  of  sets  made 56 

Clarksville  shops 57 

condition  of 424 

price  of  in   1864 908 

Harper,    Maj. -Gen.    Kenton,    re 
lieved     '. 113 

Harper's  Ferry  Arsenal,  created     26 

value  of 68 

destroyed  by  Federals 68 

reconstructed     70,  71 

Harper's   Ferry,  Battle  of 288 

Harrison,   Col.   Charles 87 

Harrison's    Landing 233 

Hart,  Maj.  James  F 332,  901 

(See     Hart's      Battery      and 

Hart's  Battalion") 
Harvie,    Col.    E.    J.,    Inspector- 
General    355 

Haskell,  Col.  J.  C., 

440,  684,  685,  704,  865,  866, 

873,  874,  899,  900,  902,  948 
(See  HaskelPs  Battalion) 

Haskell,   Capt.  J.   C 907 

Hatcher,  Lieut.  Charles, 

198,  732,  907 

Hatcher's  Run,  Battle  of 900 

Havana  Agency 56 

Hawes,  Lieut.  *S.  H 334 

Hay,  where  and  how  secured, 

425,  426 
price  of  in  1864 909 


PAGE 

Hazard,   Capt 670 

( See    Hazard's    Federal    Bat 
tery  ) 
Heavy  Artillery,  in  defenses  of 

Richmond  * 920 

Hemini>ton.     Private,     his     gal 
lantry    811 

Henderson,      Col.      G.      F.      R., 

quoted     106,  219 

his    error 378 

Henry,  Capt.  M.  W...346,  564,  712 
(See     Henry's     Battery     and 
Henry's  Battalion) 

Hensley,   Maj 920 

(See  Hensley's   Battery) 
High  angle  fire  at  Cold  Harbor, 

822,  826 

High  Bridge,  action  at 936 

Hill,    A.    P.,    erroneous    use    of 

artillery   by 208,  211,  213 

his  fatal  error  at  Gettysburg  615 

Hill.  Gen.  D.  II '. 122 

Hindman,    Col.,    Saltpetre    con 
tractor     44 

Hobson,  Lieut 878 

Hohenlohe,   Prince  Kraft 160 

quoted    238 

Hollinguist,  Lieut.-Col 733 

Hollis,    Lieut 901 

Holman,  Maj.  Christian 87 

Hooker,     Gen.,    his    movements 

discussed    455,  472 

destroys     artillery     organiza 
tion    547,  550,  574 

Horse  Artillery,  origin  of..  150,  151 

C.  S.  A.  created 162 

charges  made  by 166,  168 

operations  of  in  1862 347 

operations  of  in  1863 446,  448 

at   Chancellorsville,   460,  467,  471 

at  Brandy  Station 585 

organization  and  status  of  in 

1863     576 

reviews  of  in   1863 580,  581 

organization,    1863 706,  725 

camp  of  in  1863 717 

fight  of  at  Charlottesville .  .  .    726 

receives  thanks  of  town 728 

criticism    of 773,  774 

condition  of  in   1864 828 

proposed  increase  of 895 

reorganization  of  in  1864, 

922,  923,  927 
Horses,  complement  of  a  battery  111 

efforts  to  secure 114 

taken   from  cavalry   for  guns   178 

extra  for  batteries 214 

scarcity  of  in  1862 327,  328 


968 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

number  per  battery 328,  333 

regulations   concerning  ......    330 

experience      of      artillerymen 

with   331 

character  of  animals 331,  332 

purchased  in  Texas 332 

diseases  of 332,  348 

shelters  for .    356 

for      artillery      secured      in 

Georgia   418 

care   of   demanded   of   officers  423 

reported   condition   of 424 

number  required  in  1863 427 

sickness  among 427,  428 

deficiency  of 412 

condition    of    in    May,    1863, 

556,  562,  563 

sale  of  condemned  to  farmers  563 
number  distributed  in  1863..    563 

mentioned     574 

requisitioned     697 

"pressing   for    shorts" 698 

provisions  for  care  of 709 

diseases  of 710 

price  of  in  1863 710 

where   obtained 711 

condition  of  in  1864 829 

price  of  in  1864 908,  921 

great  effort  to  procure.  .  .921,  922 

care  of  in  depots 922 

fate   of   the    artillery   horses, 

949,  954,  955 
Horseshoes,  manufacture  of.  ...      48 

supply   of -49,  115 

Horse    brushes,    number    issued     56 
Horse    equipment,    deficiency   of 

in   1862 412 

Horsemen,  artillerymen  as 331 

Hotchkiss  Guns 243 

Howard,   Lieut.   James 277 

Huckstep,    Capt 334 

(See     Huckstep's      1st     Flu- 

vanna  Battery) 

Huger,   Benj.,    Col.    U.    S.    Ord 
nance    Corps 26 

appointed    Inspector    General 
Artillery  and  Ordnance,  C. 

S.   A 53 

Huger,  Lieut. -Col.  Frank, 

338,  420,  508,  534,  537,  541, 
549,  636,  645,  646,  664,  720, 

846,  866,  867,  874 
( See  Huger's  Norfolk  Battery 
and  Huger's  Battalion) 

Huger,  Capt.  Francis  K 90 

Humphreys,   Maj.    F.    C.,    Supt. 

Columbus    Arsenal 57 


PAGE 

Hunt,  Gen.  Henry  J., 

222,  230,  233,  243,  276,  298, 
546,  629,  638,  641,  675,  678, 

748,  775 

Huse,  Caleb,  Foreign  Purchas 
ing  Agent 37 

purchases   Austrian   batteries     37 
inspects     Armstrong     and 

Blakely  plants 37 

his  purchases  abroad 55 

Hutter,  Capt.  E.  S.,  Supt.  Dan 
ville  Depot 57 

Illuminators,  at  Petersburg.  .  .  .    923 
Incendiary    shells,   prepared   by 

Pendleton    398 

Indirect  fire,  first  instance  of.  .    539 
employed  at   Cold  Harbor  by 

Mclntosh    822,  826 

Infantry   supports   for   artillery   177 

Initiative,  opportunity  for 482 

Inspection,  of  batteries.  ..  .354,  355 

of  artillery,  Jan.,   1863 412 

results   of" 413 

of     Johnston's     Artillery     by 

Pendleton  in   1864 732 

Inspector  General  Artillery  and 

Ordnance     53 

Inspector  of  Ordnance  and  Ar 
tillery  355 

Instruction,     Artillery,     Early, 

85,  86,  89,  91 

in  the  South 98,  101,  149 

Intrenchments,     constructed     at 

Fredericksburg.  .  .369,    372,429 

constructed    by   gunners 537 

Iron  Clads,  armor  for,  made.  .  .      51 

Iron  Mines  and  Ores 50 

Iron  Pyrites,  of  Louisiana  and 
Alabama  used  in  produc 
tion  of  sulphur 42 

Izard,  Capt.  George 90 

Jackson,  Gen.  T.  J.,  referred  to     30 

tests    Parrott    gun 64 

favors  rifled  guns 65 

element  of  his  success 103 

anecdote    concerning 106 

appointed   Colonel 113 

mentioned     114,  123,  126 

at   Bull   Run 134 

his  failure  on  Peninsula 218 

himself  again 246 

congratulates      Beckham      on 

field    481 

death  of  described 557 

his  wife  arrives  at  his  death 
bed   558 

Cadet  caisson  his  hearse....    560 
affection   for  in  artillery.  .  .  .    560 


GENERAL  INDEX 


969 


PAGE 

James,  Lieut 842 

James     rifles,    captured    at 

Manassas    72 

Jealousy,  caste;  in  service 405 

Johnson,  Capt.  John  R 339 

(See    Johnson    Bedford    Bat 
tery) 
Johnson,  Maj.  Marmaduke, 

720,  897,  898 

(See  Johnson's  Richmond 
Battery  and  Johnson's  Bat 
talion) 

Johnston,  Jos.  E.,  his  inability 
to  advance  on  Washington, 

24,  76,   139 

knew  little  of  rifling 64 

preferred  smooth  bores ....  65,  75 
lacked  ammunition  in  1861..  76 
appointed  Major-General ....  113 

Jomini,    quoted 106 

Jones.   Col.  Hilary  P., 

416,  423,  508,  549,  720,  725, 

737,  837,  895,  933 
(See  Jones'  Battalion) 
Jones'  House,  Battles  of  the ...    898 

Jordan,  Maj.  Tyler  C 720 

(See  Bedford  Battery) 

Kelly's  Ford,  Battle  of 432,  714 

Kellysville    432 

Kemper,  Maj.  Del 415 

( See      Kemper's      Alexandria 
Battery) 

Kernstown,   Battle  of 169 

King,  Col.  J.  Floyd... 802,  803,  877 
(See  King's   Battalion) 

Kirkpatrick,  Capt.  T.  J 880 

( See    Amherst    Battery    and 
"Madison,"     Mis  s.,     Bat 
tery) 
Knox,   Col.  Henry,  recommends 

artillery  schools,  etc 86,  89 

Koniggratz,  Battle  of,  221,  238,  274 
Kosciusko,  Gen.,  his  manual  for 

artillery    149 

Kostenetski,  at  Austerlitz 168 

Kuropatkin's   Cavalry   tactics .  .    404 
Labor,  skilled  and  unskilled.  .48,  57 

training   of 58 

Ladies,  visit  Cavalry  Camp ....    580 
"Lady  Davis"  blockade   runner     56 

La  Fere,  Artillery  School 152 

Lahitte  system  of  rifling 30 

Laidley,  Maj.,  revises  Ordnance 

Manual    26 

Lallemand's  treatise 149 

Lambie,  Lieut,  W.  T 600,  607 


PAGE 

Lamkin,    Capt 925 

(See  Amherst-Nelson  Bat 
tery) 

Lancaster  grooved  gun 29 

Landry,  Capt.,  heroism  of 389 

(See  Donaldsonville,  La.,  Bat 
tery  ) 

Lane,  Maj.  John* 417,  422 

(See  Lane's  Ga.  Battery  and 

Lane's  Battalion) 
Lantz,  Corporal  Joseph  T.  V. .  .    657 

his   gallantry 423 

Latham,  Capt.  A.  C 816 

(See   Latham's   Battery) 
Latimer,  Maj.   Joseph  White, 
337,  379,  380,  384,  393,  399, 
416,  421,  440,  453,  568,  601, 

610,  636,  651,  653,  694 
( See     Richmond     "Courtney" 
Battery  and  Latimer's  Bat 
talion) 
Latrobe,  Capt.  0.,  his  gallantry  389 

Lead,  supply  and  price  of 49 

purchased  abroad 55 

Leather,  supply  and  curing  of .  .      47 

contracts   for 48 

purchased  abroad 55 

price  of  in  1864 908 

"R,  E.  Lee,"  blockade  runner..      56 

Lee,  Gen.  Charles 87 

Lee,  Lieut.  H.  H 164 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert  E.,  assists  in 

ordnance  work  of  Va 70 

appointed  Maj. -Gen 113,  116 

his   policy   respecting   promo 
tion     413,  418 

his    boldness    at    Chancellors- 

ville   542 

his     dispatch     on     Jackson's 

death   562 

his  Gettysburg  plans 598 

his     conduct     after    Pickett's 

charge    688 

his    lost    opportunity    at    the 

North  Anna 799 

Lee,  Robert  E.,  Jr.,  Private,  in 
cident   concerning 310 

Lee,  Col.  Stephen  Dill, 

201,  278,  299,  312,  313,  323, 

326,  337,  338,  351 
(See  Lee's   Battalion) 

Leipzig,  Battle  of 153,  274 

Leonard   and    Riddle,    Saltpetre 

contractors     43 

Letcher.   Gov.  John,  of  Va 63 

Lewis,  Maj.  J.  R.  C 416,  572 

Lewisburg,   Va.,   powder   manu 
factured  in  .  .  43 


970 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

Leyden,  Maj 877 

(  See   Leyden's    Battalion ) 

Liaoyang,  Battle  of 274 

Lichtenstein   230 

Light     batteries     mistaken     for 

horse    550 

Lishtfoot,  Lieut.-Col.  C.  E., 

277,  720 

(See    Lightfoot's    Battalion) 
Linseed    oil,    used    in   manufac 
ture  of  harness 48 

Little  Rock  Arsenal 40 

Local  Reserves 835 

Lombardy  Campaign  of   1859..    190 
Long,     Brig.-Gen.     Armistead 

Lindsay 95,  712,  716, 

719,  729,  731,  736,  747,  770, 
775,  785,  787,  788,  789,  792, 
793,  813,  819,  827,  852,  876, 
877,  880,  881,  900,  920,  926,  945 
Longstreet,  Gen.,  detaches  valu 
able  artillery  force 443 

difference    between    him    and 

Jackson     444 

Alexander's   defense  of 445 

at  Gettysburg 630,  et  seq. 

his  orders  to   artillery 635 

his  Tennessee  Campaign 711 

his  1ST.   C.   Campaign 814 

"Long     Toms,"     or     30-pounder 

Parrotts    370 

Losses,  no  test  of  artillery  ef 
ficiency    267 

of  artillery  at  Petersburg.  .  .    909 
Louisiana  batteries  in  Mexican 

War   93 

Liitzen,  Battle  of 153 

Lynchburg  Depot 57 

Machine  Guns,  first  use  of ...  32,  33 
Machinery,  imported  for  powder 

mills    46 

made   at  Richmond  Tredegar 

Works   46 

loss  and   destruction  of 58 

saved  at  Harper's  Ferry 69 

Macon   Armory 57 

Macon    Arsenal 57 

Macon      Ammunition      Labora 
tories,  nature  and  capacity 

of     45,  57 

erected     46 

Maddox,  Lieut 319 

Magruder,  Gen.  J.  B.,  114,  118,  337 

Magruder,    Lieut 336 

Mahone,   Gen.   William,   at   the 

Crater    871 

Mallet,   Col.   Jno.   W.,   Supt.   of 

Laboratories     45 

his  work  and  character ....  45,  46 


PAGE 
Malvern  Hill,  instance  of  cited  191 

battle  of 221 

Manassas,  First,  Battle  of 127 

Manassas,  Second,  Battle  of...    266 

great  artillery  victory 267 

Manuals  for  artillery 149 

Marceau,  Pelham  likened  to ...    440 
March,  remarkable,  by  artillery  261 

Markham's,    affair   at 352 

Marching,  ability  of  batteries.  .    165 
"Marseillaise    Hymn,"    gunners 

sing    \ 353 

Martinsburg,    1863 600 

Marye,   Capt.   E.   A 311,  378 

(See'Fredericksburg  Battery) 

Marye,  Capt.   L.   S 919 

( See    Richmond    "Hampden" 

Battery) 

Marye's  Hill,  remarkable  artil 
lery   position 397 

Maryland   Invasion,    First 277 

Maryland,   preparation   for   sec 
ond    invasion   of 556 

Masked  Batteries,  caution  as  to  138 

Mason,    Capt 866 

Masses,  use  of  artillery 141 

used  by  Napoleon.  ......  152,   153 

originated     159 

effect  of 160 

employed  by  Porter 208,  212 

why  not  employed  at  first.  .  .    237 
employed  at  Second  Manassas  275 

Hunt's,   at  Sharpsburg 324 

Massie,  Capt.  J.  L 125,  334,  889 

(See  Massie's  Fluvanna  Bat 
tery) 

Material,  of  a  battery 110,   111 

captured  at  Manassas.  ..  .71,  136 

defects  of  at  Big  Bethel 123 

Confederate  at  Manassas.  .  .  .    136 
number    of    guns    comprising 

in  1861 115 

at    Sharpsburg 284 

on  Peninsula 201 

in  Oct.,   1862 340 

condition  of  in  1863, 

556,  562,  583,  564 
distribution  of  by  battalions  570 
of  horse  artillery  in  1863 .  .  .  579 
character  of  in  1863.... 706,  707 

in  June,   1864 831 

siege  issued  at  Petersburg.  .  .    895 

number  of  guns  in  1864 917 

(See  also  Ordnance  Material) 

Maurin,   Maj.   Victor 720,  917 

( See  Maurin's  Donaldsonville, 
La.,  Battery) 


GENERAL  INDEX 


971 


PAGE 

May,    Maj.,    quoted 221 

McCabe,    '  Capt.      W.      Gordon, 

quoted    250 

referred  to 344,  440 

quoted   797,  708, 

834,  863,  864,  865,  866,  899,  929 

McCarthy,  Capt.  Edward  S 826 

(See  1st  Co.  Richmond  How 
itzers) 
McClellan,  reorganizes  artillery  156 

McCorkle,   Lieut 392 

McDowell,   Battle  of 170 

McElroy,  Lieut 931,  932 

McGilvery  Artillery  Brigade,  at 
Gettysburg, 

642,  647,  670,  678,  686 
McGraw,  Maj.  Joseph, 

440,  720,  797,  798,  800 
(See  Richmond  "Purcell" 
Battery ) 

McGregor,  Capt.  Wm.  M 577 

( See  McGregor's  Battery  and 

McGregor's  Battalion) 
Mclntosh,  Col.  David  Gregg, 

423,  440,  508,  549,  720,  822,  912 
( See  Mclntosh's  Battery  and 

Mclntosh's   Battalion) 
McKim,     Lieut.     Randolph    TL, 

his  gallantry 608 

McLaughlin,  Maj.  William, 

801,  802,  878 

( See  McLaughlin's  Battery 
and  McLaughlin's  Battal 
ion) 

McQueen,  Lieut 899 

Meade,   Gen.,   his   plan   at   Get 
tysburg    613 

Meade,    Capt.    William 198 

Meade,  Lieut.  R.  H 164 

Mechanics,  exemptions  of  those 

employed     48 

number  of  employed 57 

Mechanicsville,   Battle  of 206 

Medical    supplies 709 

Medicine,  price  of  in  1864 908 

Memphis   Depot 41 

Mercury,  imported 47 

Metals,   how   obtained 49 

Metz,  Artillery  School 152,   154 

Mexican    War,    Southern    artil 
lery  in  . 93 

Mexico,    purchases    of    material 

and  powder  in 38,  43 

mercury   imported   from 47 

leather  supply  from  cut  off .  .      48 

lead  purchased  in 49 

horses   from 921 

Middleburg,  affair  at 353,  610 


PAGE 

Middletown,  Battle  of,   1864...    890 
Militia,  of  Virginia,   provisions 

for    . 61 

armament   of 62,  67 

artillery,    early 89 

organization  of  in   1792 91 

Miller,  Maj.  M.  B 720,  917 

(See  3d  Co.  Washington  Ar 
tillery) 

Mine  Run  Campaign 715 

Mining  Bureau,  created.. 35,  44,  49 

remarkable  work  of 49,  50 

officers  of 53 

Mining  at  Petersburg,  845,  846,  860 
Mobility,  of  artillery,  instances, 
165,  261,  548,  549,  832,  833, 

894,  900 

Monocacy,   Battle  of 877 

Montgomery  Depot 40 

Montgomery,  Capt.  Chas.  R. .  .  .    791 
( See    Louisa    "Morris"    Bat 
tery) 

Moody,    Capt 925 

(See   Moody's    "Madison," 
La.,  Battery) 

Moore,  David,  gunner 125 

Moorman,    Maj.    Marcellus    N., 

308,  346,  720,  726,  729 
( See  Moorman's  Battery  and 

Moorman's   Battalion) 
Morel,  Corporal,  heroism  of ...    389 
Mordecai,     Capt.     Alfred,    Ord 
nance   Corps 26,  91 

Morgan,    S.    D.,    of    Nashville, 

Tenn.,  powder  contractor .  .      43 
Mortars,     at     Petersburg     and 

Crater     868,  873 

Moseley,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  F., 

120,  121,  838,  854,  896,  902 
(See    Moseley's    Battery    and 
Moseley's  Battalion ) 

Motes,    Lieut.' 658,  684 

Motienling,  Battle  of 482 

Mount  Vernon  Arsenal 40 

Mountain  rifles 27 

Mountain    howitzers,     at     Port 

Republic    174 

Mt.    Carmel    Church,    Artillery 

Camp   in   '63 450 

Mukden,  Battle  of 221 

Mules,  conduct  of  in  battery  at 

Port  Republic 175 

supply  of  for  trains 332 

amusing    incident    concerning 
in  Stuart's  Cavalry  review  582 

Munchengratz    238 

Munford,  Gen.  T.  T 105 

Murat,  Pelham  likened  to 440 


972 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

Murray,  Lieut.  Thomas  A.,  his 

coolness     524 

Musicians,   pay   of 108 

Muskets     for     gunners,     recom 
mended    892 

Nachod    238 

Napoleon,  remarks  on  artillery, 

152,  153 

his  principles 159 

cited 238,  310,  362,  365,  707 

his  rules  of  war 809 

Napoleons,   12-pounder,   demand 

for    340 

substituted  for  howitzers.  ...    719 

Nash,  Maj.  Herbert  N 717 

Nashville   Arsenal 41 

Nassau  Agency 56 

"Native  American"  Artillery  of 

Louisiana    93 

Negro,  misleads  Dahlgren.  .  730,  731 
Negro  Troops  at  the  Crater ...  870 
Nelson,  Capt.  G.  W., 

335,  380,  387,  388,  412 
(See  Hanover  Battery) 

Nelson.  Col.  William '.417, 

878,  880,  883,  885,  888,  889,  920 
(See    Hanover    Battery    and 
Nelson's   Battalion) 

New  Berne  Campaign 814 

New  Cold  Harbor,  battle  near  211 
New  Market,  Battle  of.... 801,  802 

New  Orleans  Depot 41 

New   York,    71st    Reg.    Battery, 

132,  136 

Night  Attack,  by  artillery 234 

Nimmo,   Lieut.   John 657 

Niter,   secured  in  Alabama  and 

Tennessee     42,  44 

purification    of 43 

supply  of   in    1864 44 

Niter  Bureau  created 35.  44,  49 

officers  of 44,  53 

Nitric   acid,   made 47 

Non-commissioned      staff,      pro 
posed  in  1864 830 

Norfolk    Navy    Yard,     destruc 
tion  of  .  ." 69 

North  Anna,  Battle  of 799 

Artillery  Camp  on  the 410 

Norton,    Capt.,    inventor   of   ex 
plosive  lead  shell 28 

Oats,  price  of  in  1864, 

803,  908,  909,  942 

Observers,  Federal  aerial 234 

Officers,    furnished    Confederacy 

by  West  Point 95 

to    artillery    by    West    Point 
and  V.  M.  I..  .    101 


PAGE 

artillery,  rank  and  pay  of ...  108 
proportion  of  based  on  guns, 

145^  423 

efficiency   of 337 

proportion   of   from   Virginia, 

413,  418 

Jackson  on  appointment  of .  .  423 

authorized    number 423 

Lee's  estimate  of  artillery.  .  .  424 

inefficient  culled  out 430 

individuality  of  artillery.  .  .  .  440 
number    and    distribution    of 

artillery   in    1863 565 

promotion  of  in   1863 565 

slowness  in  promotion  of ....  572 

few  transfers  among 572 

supply  drawn  from 573 

authorized     number     of     and 

grades     719,  722 

list  of  artillery  field  officers  in 

1863     " 719 

assignments  of 720,  724 

increase  of  proposed  in  1864, 

830,  902 

conditions  concerning 903 

Old     Point     Comfort     Arsenal, 

created    26 

Orders,  error  in  transmitting  at 

Fredericksburg.  .  .516,    517,522 
Ordnance  Department,  U.  S.  A., 

created,    25 

developed    26 

Ordnance  Material,  character  of 

in  1861 27,  28 

purchase  of  foreign 27 

rifled  employed  by  French  in 

Italy    30 

employed     by     Prussians     in 

1864     30 

multiple    firing    guns 31,  32 

material    (C.  S.  A.)    on  hand 

1861     37 

purchased  in  Europe  in  1861  37 
seized  with  Federal  arsenals, 

37,  41 

first  made  at 41,  42 

most     important     plant     for 

manufacture  of 51 

amount  procured  up  to   1863  55 

statement  of  amount  made..  56 

obtained   by   capture 59 

of  Virginia  in  1861 67 

issued  in  Virginia  in  1861.  .  .  70 
in   possession   of   Washington 

artillery    71 

captured  at  1st  Manassas...  71 
list   of   that   secured   in   Vir 
ginia  in  1861 78,  79 


GENERAL  INDEX 


973 


PAGE 

character  of  in  1862 284 

captured  at  Harper's  Ferry.  .    291 

demand   for   in    1802 .  .    340 

types  made  in   1862 340,  341 

heavy  demanded  by  Gen.  Lee  411 

new  "issued ." 426,  427 

Ordnance  Manuals,  U.  S.  A. .  .  .      26 

C.   S.  A 26 

Ordnance      Officers,      proposals 

concerning    38 

regulations  concerning 39 

improved  processes  developed 

by     46 

discoveries  of 47 

authorized  and  rank  of ....  52,  53 
educational      requisites      and 

promotion    52,  53 

recommendations      concerning 

rank  of 54 

mentioned    109,  110 

efforts  of 288 

Ordnance  Operations,  field,  suc 
cessful  in  1863 564 

Ordnance  Regulations,  U.  S.  A., 

26,  27 

C.  S.  A.  adopted.  ..38,  52,  53,  54 
Ordnance  Rifles,  3-inch,  demand 

for    340 

Ordnance  Storekeepers,  pay  and 

rank    of 57 

Ordnance  Train,  Reserve.  .  .243,  292 
Organization,    of    Artillery 

Corps     108 

of   field   batteries 109 

of  Virginia  troops 116 

of  artillery  in  Dec.,  '61 142 

of  artillery  in  1864,  903,  905,  927 

at   surrender 950,   951,  952 

Orleans    Artillery,    in    Mexican 

War     93 

Osborn,  Maj 550,   554,   623,  668 

Ostendorff  &  Co.,  J.  M.,  of  Wal- 
halla,  S.  C.,  powder  con 
tractors  43 

Otey,   Lieut.   James   C 866 

Owen,  Maj.  W 917 

(See  1st  Co.  Washington  Ar 
tillery  and  Owen's  Bat 
talion  ) 

Page,  Maj.  John,  198,  427,  718,  907 
Page,  Maj.  R.  C.  M...506,  718,  720 
(See    Louisa    "Morris"    Bat 
tery  and  Page's  Battalion) 
Page,   Maj.   T.   J.,   Jr., 

336,  380,  415,  422,  718 
( See    Page's   Yorktown    "Ma- 

gruder"  Battery) 
Page,  Dr.  Isham  Randolph....    198 


PAGE 

Paris,    affair    at 348 

Parker,   Capt.  W.  W 925 

(See    Richmond    Battery) 
Parkinson,  Lieut.  Jordan  C....    911 

Parole    lists 952 

Parrott,  Capt.  R.  P.,  his  rifled 

gun    30,  63 

Parrott  Rifles,  tested  at  V.  M.  I., 

63,  64,  80 

captured  at  Manassas 71 

number  furnished  during  war     64 

first  used  at  Big  Bethel 64 

mentioned    119,   197 

demand    for 340 

20-pounders    344 

explosion  of  30-pounders.  .  .  .  388 
Patchenko's  Russian  Battery..  274 
Paxton,  Maj.,  Horse  Agent.  ...  711 

Pay  of  Artillery  Officers 108 

Pearce,  Lieutenant 805 

Peas,    black-eye,    component    of 

ration    374 

Pegram,  Col.  William  Johnson, 
249,  250,  278,  366,  416,  420, 
440,  461,  489,  494,  506,  507, 
508,  511,  540,  549,  554,  704, 
720,  798,  834,  896,  898,  899, 

901,  929,  930 

(See  Pegram's  Richmond 
"Purcell"  Battery  and 
Pegram's  Battalion) 

Pegram,  Capt.  R.  G 691 

(See  Pegram's  Petersburg 
Battery) 

Peet,  Lieut.  W.  T 459 

Pelham,  Col.  John, 

162,  178,  233,  298,  299,  326, 
337,  346,  349,  350,  352,  354, 
382,  383,  384,  385,  392,  403, 
404,  433,  434,  435,  439,  577,  773 
(See    Pelham's    Battery    and 

Pelham's  Battalion) 
Pemberton,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  C., 

726,  895,  919 
Pendleton,  Gen.  Wm.  N.,  favors 

rifled  guns 64,  65 

sent  to  Richmond  to  procure 

ordnance    75 

his  splendid  work 76,  77,  78 

mentioned 95,    124, 

125,  127,  134,  137,  140,  143, 
146,  147,  155,  182,  192,  193, 
194,  195,  198,  200,  225,  234, 
239,  243,  255,  257,  277,  278, 
318,  319,  333,  338,  341,  343, 
346,  372,  373,  410,  413,  425, 
430,  450,  451,  454,  515,  516- 
24,  530,  551,  557,  563-74, 


974 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

583,  610,  622,  623,  630,  631, 
632,  639,  643,  653,  658,  664, 
666,  668,  677,  701,  703,  704, 
709,  718,  719,  722,  731,  734, 
735,  742,  766,  770,  776,  826, 
829,  847,  849,  850,  853,  854, 
895,  902,  903,  906,  918,  920, 
922,  925,  928,  934,  938,  939, 

940,  942,  945,  949 

Pendleton,  Maj.  A.  S.,  his  letter  429 
Pendleton,  Capt.  Dudley  D., 

198,  334,  902,  907 

Peninsula    Campaign 176 

summary  of 239 

Penick,  Capt.  Nathan 521 

(See  Pittsylvania  Battery) 
Percussion   Caps,   manufactured     47 

Percy,  Capt.  W.  A 902 

Personnel,    character    of    artil 
lery    165 

of    Confederate    Artillery    su 
perior     572 

Henderson's      error      as      to 

character    of 572 

Peterkin,  Lieut.  George  W., 

198,  718,  732,  907 
Petersburg,    Grant's    movement 

upon     835 

siege  of 842 

winter  of  1864  at 895 

Petersburg    Smelting    Works 

created     40 

erection   of 49 

Peyton,  Capt.  T.  J 334 

( See    Richmond    "Orange" 
Battery ) 

Phelps,   Lieut 448 

Pickens'  Heavy  Artillery 135 

Picket   ropes 114 

Pickett,    his    interference    with 

the  artillery 821 

his    charge 683 

Pierson,  Maj.  S.  F 852 

(See  Pierson's  Battalion) 
Pigott,   Dr.,   lead-smelting  proc 
ess  of  49 

Pinckney,   Gen.,   his   drill    regu 
lations     149 

Plater,  Lieut 384 

Pleasants,     Lieut. -Col.,     designs 
mine  at  Petersburg, 

846,  860,  863 

Pleasants,   Lieut 385 

Pleasonton,    Gen.,   his   misstate- 

ments 486,  487,  496,  593 

Plevna,  Battle  of.  .  221 


PAGE 

Poague,    Col.    William    Thomas, 
326,  344,  417,  421,  440,  508, 

549,  720,  767,  768,  939 
( See    Poague's    Battery    and 
Poague's  Battalion) 

Pollock,  Lieut.  John  G 912 

Poplar  Spring  Church,  action  of  896 

Pork   Packeries 51 

Port  fires,  number  made 56 

Port  Republic,  Battle  of 173 

Position,     artillery,    at    Second 

Manassas    264 

Potash,  chloral 47 

Potts,    Capt 378,  777 

(See  N.  C.  Battery) 
Powder,  purchase  of  in  Europe, 

1861     37 

amount  ordered  in  1861 37 

Confederate    mills 40 

amount  on  hand  in  1861 ....  41 
amount  required  in  1861.  ...  42 
manufacture  of,  and  mills, 

42,  43,  45,  46 

contracts   for 43 

Powder  Mills,  created 40 

necessity    for 42 

location  of  private 42,  43 

Preparation,    lack    of    artillery, 

208,  213 

at  White  Oak  Swamp 219 

plan  for  at  Malvern  Hill 224 

utter  lack  of  at  Malvern  Hill, 

225,  226,  230,  237 

by    artillery 324 

lack  of  at  Fredericksburg.  .  .    397 
splendid     artillery     at     Win 
chester,   1863 602,  603 

Preston,  Col.  John  T.  L 96,  97 

Preston,   Maj.    Samuel 866,  867 

Prices,  for  articles  in   1864 908 

Pringle,     Lieut.,     of     Garden's 

Battery    322 

Projectiles,   defects  of 128 

for   Whitworth  guns 564 

Promotion,  in  continental  artil 
lery    88 

discussed    413,  418 

slowness  of  in  C.  S.  Artillery  572 
proposed  regulation  of  in 

1864      830 

for  artillery  officers  urged.  .  .    902 

granted  March  1,  1865 925 

Proportion    of    field    officers    to 

guns     423 

Provisional     Army     C.     S.     A. 

created     107 

Prussian   Artillery 155 

tactics     160,  161 


GENERAL  INDEX 


975 


PAGE 

in  1866 171 

lack  of  masses  in  1866 238 

ammunition  expenditure  of .  .    274 

experiences  of  1866  and  1870  287 

Prussian   Horse  Artillery ..  166,  168 

Railroad  battery 197,  216 

Raine,  Maj.  Chas.  J 720 

(See    Lynchburg    "Lee"    Bat 
tery) 
Rains,   Gen.   G.   W.,   Bureau   of 

Ordnance     43 

invents  new  powder  process.  .      47 

Ramsey,   Capt 309 

(See' Rowan,  N.  C.,  Battery) 
Ramsey's  Horse  Battery    (Brit 
ish)    166 

Randolph,  Geo.  W., 

114,   118,   123,   141 

Randolph,   Capt 641 

Randolph,  Lieut.  Thos.  N 198 

Ranging,  difficulty  of  with  poor 

shell     510 

Rapidity  of  fire,   at   Cold  Har 
bor 212 

Rappahannock  Bridge,  Battle  of  714 

Rations  in   1862 374 

Read,  Maj.  J.  P.  W 415,  420 

(See  Read's  Ga.  Battery  and 

Read's  Battalion) 
Reconnaissance,   lack   of, 

208,  213,  219,  224,  225,  226 
at  Sharpsburg  by  Col.  Lee, 

312.  316 

mentioned     505 

Reduction,  of  Artillery  Corps..    337 
Reed,     Dr.,     invents     shell     for 

rifled  guns 32,  66 

manufacture  of  his  shell ....      47 

Rees,  Lieut.  Lucius  G 811,  842 

Regimental  Groups,  proposed  in 

1864     830 

Regimental   promotion 88 

Regulations,   for  Federal  Artil 
lery    157 

for  artillery  administration..    199 

for  Artillery  Corps 330 

Reilly,  Maj.   James 564 

(See   Reilly's    Rowan,   N.    C., 

Battery) 
Religious,   interest,   in   artillery  430 

spirit,  at  Petersburg 906 

Remedies,  proposed  to  overcome 

evils  of  the  artillery 414 

Remount    depots 574,  710 

Reorganization,  of  artillery, 

278,  279 
in  1862. .  .    327 


PAGE 

in  1863 413 

proposed  in   1863 565 

in  Aug.,   1863 906 

in  Dec.,  1864 911 

Reserve  Artillery,  winter  quar 
ters   of 146 

use   of    as    tactical    unit    dis 
cussed    160 

movements   of   on    Peninsula, 

178,  192,  193,  237 

divisional,    created 200 

composition  of 242,  255 

referred  to 277,  278,  287,  292 

use  of  as  tactical  unit 287 

involved  in  investigation.  .  .  .    341 

composition  of  in  1862-3 345 

camp  of  in  1862 354 

strength  of  in  1862 361 

mentioned    370,  371 

lack     of     at     Chancellorsville 
keenly  felt  by  Lee, 

455,  467,  528,  550 

corps,  in  1863 568 

at   Gettysburg 616 

captured  in  April,  1865.. 942,  944 
Reserve  Ordnance  Train, 

292,  293,  327 

Respect,  mutual,  between  artil 
lery  and  infantry 406 

Retreat,    The 933 

Reviews,    of     Stuart's     Cavalry 

and  Horse  Artillery  in  1863  580 
of  army  at  Culpeper  in  1863  717 
of  artillery  of  Western  Army, 

733,  734 

of  Longstreet's  Corps 736 

Revival  Meetings,  in  Camp ....    430 
Reynolds,  Gen.,  nobility  of....    617 

Rhett,  Col.  T.  S 52,  277,  707 

Rhode   Island,    Colonial   battery     86 
Rice's  Station,  action  at...  936,  938 
Richardson,  Gen.  W.  H.,  of  Va.     97 
Richardson,  Lieut. -Col.  Charles, 
327,  415,  419,  574,  636,  651, 

664,  676,  699,  720 
(See  Richardson's  Battalion) 
Richmond,  Armory  and  Arsenal, 

40,  62 

issues  of  during  war 56 

superintendents  of 57 

Richmond  Artillery  defenses.  .  .    841 

Richmond  Tredegar  Works.  .  .  .    341 

Rifling,  knowledge  of  in  1861 .  .      28 

Napoleon's   experiments   with     29 

Lahitte  System 30 

experiments  with  rifling 31 

of   ordnance   recommended ...      63 


976 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

slight  knowledge  of  in  Amer 
ica    64,  65,  66 

sudden   developments   of 80 

Ringold,  Maj.,  his  manual 154 

Rives,   Lieut 821 

Roads,    condition   of   on    Penin 
sula    177,  190,  191 

Roberts,   Lieut. -Col.    Owen 87 

Robertson,    Maj 920 

Robertson,   Lieut 334 

Rockets,  number  issued 56 

Rodes,  Gen.  R.  E 105 

Rodman  guns,  reputation  of...  31 

Rogers,  Maj.  A.  L 417 

(See  Loudoun  Battery) 

Rolling  mills  created 40 

Rome,  Ga.,  guns  cast  at 42 

Romney,  loss  of  guns  at 164 

Ross,    Richard,    Saltpetre    con 
tractor     44 

Rosser,  Gen.  Thos.  L 565 

Rouse,  Lieut.   Milton 162,  338 

Rubber,  India,  lack  of 48 

Ruggles,  Gen 115 

Russian     ammunition     expendi 
ture    274 

Sacrament,  the  final 956 

Saddles,   number   issued 56 

how   made 114 

Sailor's  Creek,  Battle  of 936 

Saint  Privat,  Battle  of .  .  .  .274,  287 

Saint  Sebastian 864 

Salisbury    Foundry 57 

Saltpetre,   contracts   for 43 

supplies  of 44 

yield  of  Tennessee  beds 44 

price   of 44 

location   of  beds 44 

purchased  abroad 55 

San  Antonio  Arsenal 40 

Saunders,  Maj.  J.  S 280,  852 

(See   Saunders'    Battalion) 

Savage's  Station,  Battle  of.  ...  215 

Savannah   Depot 40 

Saye,   Private   Richard  W.,   his 

gallantry     524 

Scarlett's    charge    at    Balaclava  587 

Scharnhorst    238 

School  of  Fire,  Fortress  Monroe  91 
School,   training   for   officers   of 

C.   S.  A 99 

Schools,  French  Artillery 152 

Schoolfield's    Battery    uses    ma 
chine  gun 32 

Scoffern,  his  treatise  on  warfare 

and    arms 29 

Scott,  Gen.   Winfield.  .  .  .89,  90,  149 

Second  Manassas,  Battle  of.  ...  266 


PAGE 
Sedan,  instance  of  cited...  191,  221 

Prussian  Artillery  at 287 

compared      with      Harper's 

Ferry     291 

compared     with     Fredericks- 
burg     402 

Sedden,  Mr.,  Secretary  of  War  731 

Selma  Arsenal 57 

Senarmont    153,   159,  230 

Sensitive  shell,  used  at  Peters 
burg     923 

Seven  Days'   fighting 197,  235 

Seven  Pines  or  Fair  Oaks,  Bat 
tle  of  192 

Sha-ho,  Battle  of 274 

Sham  battles 580,  583 

Sharpsburg,  Battle  of 294 

Shell,    with    copper    band,    in 
vented     32,  47 

polygonal   cavity  invented...      47 

purchased  abroad 55 

number    issued 56 

fail  to  explode 509,  538 

burst  at  muzzle 564 

Shelters,  for  horses 356 

for  men 373 

Sherman's   Artillery 191 

Shepherdstown,   affair  at 341 

Shields,  Capt.  J.  C 114 

(See  1st  Co.  Richmond  How 
itzer  Battalion) 
Ships,    owned   and   operated  by 

Bureau  of  Ordnance 56 

Shoemaker,  Capt.  J.  J 449,  729 

(See  Shoemaker's  Lynchburg 

Battery) 
Shoes,    men    without    reported 

sick    425 

lack  of 355 

Shoup,    Brig.-Gen 734 

Shrapnel,  purchased  abroad.  ...      55 

Shumaker,  Maj.  L.  M 257,  258 

(See     Shumaker's     Danville 
Battery     and     Shumaker's 
Battalion ) 
Sickness,  in  the  artillery. .....   425 

Sloan,     Capt.    Benj.,    Ordnance 

Corps     53 

Smith,  Lieut.  J.  D 545 

Smith,    Capt.    B.    H.,    Jr.,    his 

gallantry     347 

(See  3d  Co.  Richmond  Howit 
zer   Battalion) 

Smith,  Gen.  Francis  H 98 

Smith,  Maj.   F.  W 935 

Smith,   Col.   Persifer  F 93 

Soft  Hoof,  horse  disease 332 

Sor.  Battle  of..  .    238 


GENERAL  INDEX 


977 


PAGE 

Sore  Tongue,  disease  of  horses  332 
South  Carolina,  early  artillery 

of    87 

South  Mountain,  Battle  of 292 

Southern  Artillery,   early 85,  92 

in  Mexican  War 93 

Spotsylvania,  Battle  of 775 

Spurs,  number  pairs  issued.  ...      56 

Squires,  Capt 129 

Staff,  of  Chief  of  Artillery.  ...    198 

proposed  for  artillery 830 

of    Artillery    Corps    in    1864, 

902,  907 

"Stag,"  blockade  runner 56 

Stanard's  Farm,  Artillery  Camp 

at  in   1863 556 

Stansbury,    Maj.    S.,    Ordnance 

Corps     53 

Steaming,    improved   process ...      46 

invented  by  Gen.  Rains 47 

Stephenson's  Depot,  1863 606 

Stevens,  Capt.,  his  book  of  tac 
tics     149 

Stink-shells,    proposed 826 

Stiles,  Maj.  Robert,  quoted,  782,  783 

mentioned     936 

Stockton,  Capt.  Isaac  F.,  of  La.     93 

Strasburg,  Artillery  School 152 

Strategy,  of  Lee  at  Fredericks- 
burg     364 

Straw,  price  of  in  1864 909 

Stribling,    Maj 720 

Stuart,  Gen.  J.  E.  B.,  his  trib 
ute  to    Pelham 233 

his  reviews  and  sham  battles  580 
amusing  incident  concerning  582 
effect  of  his  absence  from 

Gettysburg    611 

Subterfuges,  artillery,  in  use..  516 
Suffocating  Projectile,  proposed  826 
Sulphur,  secured  in  Louisiana  42 

contracts  for  supply  of 42 

Superintendents     of      armories, 

rank  and  pay  of 57 

Supplies,  lack  of  at  Petersburg  907 

Surrender,   proposed 939 

the    948 

"Swamp  Angel,"  rifled  gun  used 

at  Sumter 66 

Tactics,    for    use    of    horses    of 

battery    Ill 

of   light  artillery 141 

early    American 149 

of   Federal  Artillery 156 

originated  by   Chew 166,  168 

for  divisional  reserves 200 

erroneous     208,  213 

improvement  of  execution   of  275 


PAGE 

peculiar    at    Sharpsburg 324 

at   Fredericksburg  ..372,  402,  404 
at  Chancellorsville,  discussed, 

542,  548 

in  1864 832,  833,  900 

Talcott,  Col.,  Chief  of  Ordnance, 

U.  S.  A 26 

Talcott,    Capt 91 

Tashichiao,   Battle   of 274 

Taylor,   Capt.  E.  B 458,  544 

(See  Eubank's  Bath  Battery) 
Taylor,  Capt.  J.   S....281,  300,  322 

Teamsters,   character  of 331 

Tennessee    Campaign    of    Long- 
street     711 

Tentage,  allowance  of 429 

Terry,   Lieut.   Nathaniel 247 

Texas,  horses  for  artillery.  .332,  921 

Texas  Arsenal 40 

Thomas,  Lieut.,  "A",  4th  U.  S. 

F.  A 305 

Thomson,    Maj.    James   Walton, 
162,  338,  440,  890,  891,  936, 

937,  938 

( See  Thomson's  "Ashby"  Bat 
tery  and  Thomson's  Bat 
talion  ) 

Thurmond,  Lieut 334 

Tin,  how  obtained 49 

purchased  abroad 55 

Tobacco,  price  of  in  1864-5.  .  .  .  908 
Tom's  Brook,  Battle  of .  .  .  .889,  890 
Torpedoes,  first  manufactured  51 

explosive   for  land  use 178 

altercation  over 179 

invented  by  Gen.  Rains 180 

Torres  Vedras 429 

Torstenson    153 

Toulouse,  Artillery  School 152 

Tousard,     Col.     Louis     de,     his 

manual    149 

Tracy,  Gen.  E.  L.,  of  Louisiana     93 

Trains,    Reserve   Ordnance 243 

regulations  for  wagon 429 

Transfers,  few  among  Artillery 

Officers    572 

Transportation,  Field  Artillery, 

428,  708 

Trautenau,  Battle  of 238 

Tredegar      Works,      Richmond, 

makes  machine  gun 32 

referred  to 36,  41,  46 

sketch  of ;     its  work 50 

immense  importance  of 51 

work  of  during  war 56 

military  organization   of  em 
ployees    58 

troops  of  called  out 731 


978 


GENERAL  INDEX 


PAGE 

Trevillian  Depot,  Battle  of 828 

Trezevant,    Maj.    T.    J.,    Supt. 

Charleston  Arsenal 57 

Truehart,  Maj.  Daniel 164,  337 

Tunis,  Lieut 452,  453,  516,  534 

Tyler,  Lieut.,  sent  to  Metz 154 

Tyler,  Col.  Robert  0 223 

Ullmann,     Dr.,      sulphur      con 
tractor     42 

Upperville,  Battle  at 348 

action  at 610 

Utterback,  Capt 841 

Utz,  Lieut 385 

Valley  Campaign  of  1864.. 827,  876 
Valley   Campaign,    Artillery   in 

Jackson's     162 

Vessels,  operated  by  Bureau  of 

Ordnance     56 

Vionville,  Battle  of 274 

Virginia,    Commission    for    the 

Public  Defense 63 

appropriations  of  for  defense, 

62,  69 
officers  in  Colonial  Artillery, 

87,  88 

early  artillery  of 87,  88 

volunteer  artillery  of .  ...  112,  113 

strength  of  batteries 145 

proportion    of    Artillery    Of 
ficers     413,  418 

Virginia      Military      Institute, 

rifled  gun  sent  to  for  test     64 

ordnance   material   at 67 

mentioned     80 

as  a  school  of  arms 95 

its   influence 100,  155,  170 

Jackson  at  the 246 

mentioned    337,  351 

graduates  of  at   Chancellors- 

ville   477 

burial  of  Jackson  at 560 

mentioned     573 

demolished  by  Hunter 876 

Von  Caemmerer,  quoted 159 

Von  der  Goltz,  quoted 106 

his  battery  at  Koniggratz.  .  .    525 
Von   Hindersin,   Inspector   Gen 
eral  of  Artillery 30 

compared  with  Jackson 30 

referred  to 161 

Von  Kiesling's  Battle  Orders .  .    229 

Von  Moltke,  quoted 106,  365 

"Wacht    am    Rhine,"    Prussian 
gunners   sing  when   out   of 

ammunition    525 

Wagner,  Col.,  quoted 230 

Wagons,     transport,     manufac 
ture   of . .  48 


PAGE 

shortage  of  in  1862 327 

regulations  concerning 330 

number  of  per  battery 425 

allowance  of 428,  429 

field    708,  709 

Wagram,   Battle  of 153 

Wahrendorff  gun 29 

Wainwright,      Col.,      commands 
Federal  Artillery, 

547,  622,  623,  668 

Walke,   Capt.   Richard 717,  902 

Walker,     Brig.-Gen.     Reuben 

Lindsay 95,  113,  246, 

248,  251,  252,  253,  278,  281, 
289,  290,  291,  293,  311,  321, 
326,  337,  378,  379,  380,  383, 
384,  391,  416,  440,  511,  549, 
551,  569,  571,  623,  630,  636, 
643,  658,  664,  669,  673,  684, 
686,  696,  704,  719,  750,  775, 
900,  918,  925,  933,  934,  941, 

942,  953 

(See  Walker's  "Purcell"  Bat 
tery  and  Walker's  Bat 
talion  ) 

Wallace,  Lieut 619 

Walton,  Col.  James  Birge, 

93,  94,  117,  127,  130,  135, 
143,  146,  155,  258,  281,  326, 
338,  377,  379,  410,  523,  556, 
560,  677,  704,  719,  722,  755, 

848,  849,  850,  851,  852,  853 
( See  Walton's  Battalion  and 
Washington     Artillery     of 
La.) 

Ward,  Maj.  Geo 720,  805 

(See  Mississippi  Battery) 
Washington  Regiment,  of  Louisi 
ana    93,  94 

Waterloo  Bridge   (Va.), 

259,  260,  261 
Watson,  Maj.  David, 

508,  720,  786;  787 
( See  2d  Co.  Richmond  Howit 
zer  Battalion) 

Weed,   Capt 550 

West  Point  Foundry 63 

guns  furnished  by  during  war     64 
"West    Point    of    the    Confeder 
acy"     96 

West    Pointers,    number    of    in 

Confederate  Artillery ..  .95,  101 
influence  of  upon  promotion, 

713,  734,  851 

Western  Army,  artillery  of  in 
spected  by   Pendleton 583 

Westover     234 

Wheat,  price  of  in  1864 909 


GENERAL  INDEX 


979 


PAGE 

White,   Lieut.-Col.   J.   L.,   Supt. 

Selma  Arsenal 57 

White   Oak   Swamp,   Battle   of, 

215,  216 

Whiskey,  price  of  in  1864 708 

Whitworth  Guns, 

243,  344,  389,  452,  453,  454, 

516,  534,  538,  540,  564 

Wilderness,  Battle  of  the 760 

Wilkes,  Lieut 845,  900 

Wilkinson,     Gen.      James,     his 

drill  regulations 149 

Williams,  Lieut 692 

Williams,   Capt.   R.    S.,    his   in 
vention    antedates    that    of 

Gatling    32 

his  gun  used  at  Seven  Pines     32 

specifications  of  his  gun 32 

Willis,   Lieut.    Ed 164 

Willisen,   quoted 106 

Winchester,   First  Battle  of .  .  .    171 

Battle  of,  1863 600 

Wingfield,  Capt.  John  R 811 

(See    Georgia    Battery) 

Winter  quarters  for  1863 410 

Winthrop,  Capt.  S 866,  902 


PAGE 
Wise,  Gen.  H.  A.,  his  defense  of 

Petersburg     731,  835 

Withdrawal   of   guns,    Prussian 

practice     525 

Wolffe,  Maj.   B.  L 198,  718 

Wooding,    Capt 384 

(See  Danville  Battery) 

"Woodstock   Races" 890 

Woolfolk,  Capt.  Pichegru 925 

(See  Ashland   Battery) 
Woolfolk,  Lieut.  James,  his  gal 
lantry    458 

Woolwich,  Artillery  School 86 

Worley,       William,       Saltpetre 

contractor     44 

Wright,   Col.  M.  H.,   Supt.   At 
lanta    Arsenal 57 

Wright,  Capt.  S.  T....277,  945,  955 
(See  Halifax  Battery) 

Wyatt,  Capt.  J.  W 821 

( See      Albemarle      "Everett" 

Battery ) 
Yale,  C.  D.,  of  Virginia,  powder 

contractor     43 

Yellow  Tavern,  Battle  of 796 


BATTERY  INDEX 

The  battery  organizations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  always 
bore  two,  and  sometimes  three  names,  a  fact  which  leads  to  much  con 
fusion  in  the  study  of  the  Artillery  records.  The  following  index  is 
arranged  under  two  heads:  "A",  according  to  the  locality  in  which  the 
batteries  were  recruited;  "B",  according  to  the  names  of  the  battery 
commanders.  Text  references  will  be  found  under  heading  "A"  only. 

Thus  the  references  to  Pegram's  Richmond  "Purcell"  Battery  will  be 
found  under  "A",  opposite  Richmond,  while  Chew's  "Ashby"  Battery,  and 
Brown's  "Wise"  Battery,  which  were  not  local  organizations,  will  be  found 
under  "A",  opposite  "Ashby"  and  "Wise",  respectively.  In  order  to  trace 
the  complete  record  of  a  particular  battery  it  is  essential  to  know  to  what 
battalion  it  belonged  at  various  periods,  as  the  Artillery  was  frequently 
referred  to  in  the  records  by  battalions,  especially  during  the  latter  years 
of  the  War  when  the  battalion  was  the  tactical  unit.  The  record  of  a 
battalion  embraces  the  record  of  the  constituent  batteries. 

Federal  batteries  are  indexed  under  index  "B"  only. 


BATTERY  INDEX  "A" 


PAGE 

Alabama  Battery  ( Hardaway, 

Hurt) 202,  203,  282,  285, 

297,  350,  352,  358,  380,  410, 
421,  510,  514,  538,  540,  569, 
618,  619,  664,  691,  739,  896,  913 

Alabama  Battery  ( Bondurant, 
Reese,  "Jeff  Davis"), 

142,  184,   189,  202,  203,  211, 
212,  282,  285,  298,  336,  358, 
421,  508,   568,   619,   620,   739,  926 

Albemarle     Battery     ( Southall, 
Wyatt,   "Everett"), 
241,  242,  334,  569,   665,   739, 

821,  855 

Albemarle  Battery  (Sturdivant, 
W.  H.  Weisiger,  C.  F.  John 
ston)  707,  741,  835, 

838,  914,  916 
Alexandria    Battery     ( Kemper, 

Smoot) 130,  131,  132, 

134,   142,   184,   189,   201,  203, 

215,  707 

Alleghany  Battery  (Jos.  Car 
penter,  J.  C.  Carpenter), 

143,  164,   169,   170,   171,   172, 
173,   174,  203,  230,  244,  245, 
248,  258,  262,  266,  270,  282, 

.  284,  285,  290,  327,  329,  358, 
378,  408,  410,  421,  520,  568, 
600,  601,  606,  607,  636,  651, 

738,  889,  913 

Amherst  Battery  (T.  J.  Kirk- 
patrick) 143,  205,  242, 


PAGE 


283,  285,   293,   319,  335,  360, 
380,  422,  454,  568,  738,   878, 

879,  912 

Amherst-Nelson  Battery  (W.  G. 
Latham,  Lamkin ) , 

712,  738,  865,  898,  912,  917 

Andrews'  Battery,  Co.  "A", 
Stark's  Batt.  Heavy  Artillery  205 

Ashland  Battery  (Woolfolk), 
143,  202,  205,  242,  281,  284, 
299,  300,  303,  322,  335,  336, 
358,  371,  396,  397,  420,  452, 
508,  534,  545,  567,  646,  737, 

779,  911 

"Ashby"  Horse  Battery  (Chew, 
Thomson,  J.  W.  Carter), 
143,  162,  163,  164,  166,  167, 
170,  173,  205,  259,  283,  296, 
346,  347,  422,  446,  576,  578, 
580,  584,  588,  594,  595,  597, 
610,  691,  701,  725,  740,  773, 
796,  828,  829,  845,  889,  890, 

891,  916,  927,  937 

Baltimore,  2d  Battery  (See 
Maryland  Horse  Battery) 

Bath  Battery  (Eubank,  Taylor) , 
256,  257,  271,  281,  285,  296, 
303,  309,  310,  358,  371,  420, 
452,  458,  509,  534,  544,  567, 

645,  657,  737,  911 

"Beauregard  Rifles"  Battery 
( See  Lynchburg  Battery ) 


BATTERY  INDEX 


981 


PAGE 

Bedford  Battery  (Jordan,  Hens- 
ley,  Claytor,  J.  D.  Smith), 

201,  256,  257,   271,  281,  285, 
296,  300,   303,  308,  321,  338, 
358,  371,  396,  397,  420,  450, 
452,  458,  459,  466,  469,  510, 
513,   535,  536,  537,  539,  545, 

567,  646,  737,  911 

Bedford  Battery  (Bowyer,  J.  R. 
Johnson).  Disbanded  Oct., 
1862  and  merged  with  Dear- 
ing's  and  Stribling's  batteries, 
142,  204,  211,  244,  245,  247, 

259,  270,  281,  284,  335 

Botetourt  Battery  ( Douthat, 
Anderson ) .  Converted  into 
heavy  artillery  in  1865.. 802,  926 

Cadet  Battery  (See  Va.  Mil. 
Inst.  Battery) 

Campbell  Battery  (Clarke, 
Wimbish,  "Long  Island"). 
Mustered  out  Oct.,  1862, 

202,  203,   205,  242,  282,  284,  334 
Cape  Fear  Battery    (See  North 

Carolina) 

Caroline  Battery  ( Thornton ) , 

707,  740 

Charleston  Battery  (See  South 
Carolina  Battery) 

Charlotte  Battery  ( Bruce, 
"Staunton  Hill  Artillery") 

Charlotte  Battery  (See  North 
Carolina  Battery) 

Charlottesville  Battery  ( Car- 

rington) 173,  174,  203, 

211,  242,  244,  281,  285,  358, 

421,  508,  568,  602,  603,  621 

Charlottesville  Horse  Battery 

(Jackson) 691,  699,  706, 

802,  803,  829,  877,  916,  927 

"Chesapeake"  Battery  (See  4th 
Maryland  Battery) 

Chesterfield  Battery  ( E  p  e  s, 
"Johnston" ) 

Chesterfield  Battery  (See  South 
Carolina) 

"Cockade  Artillery"  ( See  Peters 
burg  Battery) 

"Confederate  Guards"  Battery 
(See  Mississippi  Battery) 

"Courtney"  Battery  (See^Rich- 
mond  Battery) 

Danville  Battery  ( Stamps, 
Dickenson,  "Ringgold") .  Con 
verted  into  heavy  artillery 
in  1865... 282,  284,  285,  327, 
329,  358,  378,  384,  421,  508, 

802,  803,  854,  915,  926,  941 


PAGE 

Danville     Battery      ( Shumaker, 
Wooding,  B.  Z*  Price), 
170,    173,   174,  203,  218,  258, 
262,   270,  569,  618,   739,   769,  913 

"Dixie  Artillery"  (See  Monroe 
Battery) 

Donaldsonville  Battery  ( See 
Louisiana  Battery) 

"Eighth  Star"  Battery  (See 
Page-Shenandoah  Battery) 

"Everett  Artillery"  (See  Albe- 
marle  Battery) 

Fairfax  Battery  (Young).  Be 
came  Co.  "G",  14th  Va.  Infty. 
in  Oct.,  1862,  but  later  served 
as  a  light  battery. 

Fauquier     Battery      ( Stribling, 

Marshall) 142,   184,   188, 

202,  204,   258,  273,  280,  285, 
336,   358,   370,  410,   420,  445, 

567,  700,  737,  814,  815,  916 

"Fayette  Artillery"  (See  Rich 
mond  Battery) 

Fluvanna,  1st  Battery  (Cocke, 
Huckstep).  Merged  with  2d 
Fluvanna  to  form  Massie's 
Fluvanna  Battery,  Oct.  4, 

1862 143,   205,   242,   283, 

294,  319,  320,  322,  336 

Fluvanna,  2d  Battery  (Hoi- 
man,  Ancell ) .  Merged  with 
1st  Fluvanna  Battery  to  form 
Massie's  Fluvanna  Battery, 
Oct.  4,  1862..  .  .143,  205.  242, 
283,  294,  319,  320,  322,  334,  336 

Fluvanna  Battery  ( Massie, 
Snead)  .  .  .  .285,  360,  380,  422, 
454,  568,  715,  738,  813.  880,  912 

Fredericksburg  Battery  ( Brax- 
ton,  E.  A.  Marye), 

142,  164,    185,   188,  204,   211, 
245,  258,  267,  281,  285,  289, 
311,  312,  319,  358,  378,   420, 
506,  508,  513,  538,   569,  730, 

740,  897,  912,  914 
Georgia    Battery,    "A",    Sumter 
Battalion    (Cutts,  Ross), 

143,  205,   242,  282,  285,  298, 
334,  360,   373,  380,  422,  454, 

533,  569,  651,  740,  896,  914 

Georgia    Battery,    "B",    Sumter 

Battalion    (Price,  Patterson), 

205,   242,   282,   285,  298,   334, 

360,  380,  422,  454,  516,  522, 

524,   525,   569.   740,  915 
Georgia    Battery,    "C",    Sumter 
Battalion     (Crawford,    Wing- 
field)  241,   242,  282, 


982 


BATTERY  INDEX 


PAGE 

285,  298,   360,  422,  569,   651, 

740,  811,  914,  915 

Georgia  Battery,  "D",  Sumter 
Battalion  (Blackshear) . 
Mustered  out  Oct.,  1862, 

205,  242,  282,  284,  298,  334 

Georgia    Battery,    "E",    Sumter 
Battalion    (Lane), 
143,  201,  205,  242,  334,  363, 

369,  380,  388,  410,  450,  454 

Georgia     Battery      ( Carlton, 

"Troup") 201,  203,  280, 

284,  289,  321,  357,  369,  419, 
450,  451,  454,  516,  517,  518, 
522,  523,  525,  533,  563,  567, 

657,  684,  701,  722,  738,  911 

Georgia  Battery,  Regular  (Mil- 
ledge)  125,  205,  234, 

242,  283,  285,  293,  319,  320, 
322,  360,  366,  422,  454,  568, 

668,  738,  764,   850,  912 

Georgia  Battery,  Regular 
(Hamilton)  143,  205 

Georgia  Battery  (Read,  Eraser, 
"Pulaski")  ..  ..184,  189,  201, 
203,  280,  284,  289,  304,  321, 
357,  369,  410,  419,  450,  451, 
454,  516,  522,  523,  525,  533, 
539,  563,  567,  657,  722,  738, 

820,  911 

Georgia  Battery    (Blodget) 142 

Georgia   Battery    (Ells,   Staten, 

Macon) 360,   370,   380, 

708,  740,  837,  915 

"German  Artillery"  (See  South 
Carolina  Battery) 

Giles  Battery   (McComas,  D.  A. 

French) 202,  205,  280, 

708,  740,   858,  912,  950 

Gloucester  Battery  ( Montague, 
Yeatman ) .  Heavy  artillery 
company  but  served  as  light 
battery.  Became  Co.  "A", 
34th  Va.  Infty.,  in  1864. 

Goochland  Battery  ( Roemer, 
Turner,  Leake ) .  Mustered 
out  Oct.,  1862,  and  merged 
with  King  William  Battery, 
202,  204,  242,  258,  280,  282, 

284,  333,  334,  336 

Goochland  Battery  (Guy,  Tal- 
ley)  707 

Halifax  Battery    (Wright), 

708,  740,  838,  839,  867,  916 

"H  a  m  p  d  e  n  Artillery"  ( See 
Richmond  Battery) 

Hampton  Battery   (Allen) 855 


PAGE 

Hanover  Battery  (W.  Nelson, 
G.  W.  Nelson).  Mustered 
out  Oct.,  1862,  and  merged 
with  Amherst  and  Ashland 
batteries 202,  203,  335,  360 

"Harbor  Guards"  (See  Norfolk 
Battery) 

Henrico  Battery  (Sands,  Rit- 
ter) .  Mustered  out  Oct.,  1862, 

184,   189,  202,  242,  334,  855 

Irwin     Battery     (See     Georgia 
Battery.     Wingfield) 

James  City  Battery  (Hankins, 
Richardson), 

202,  203,  242,  707,  853 

"Jeff  Davis  Artillery"  (See 
Alabama  Battery) 

"Johnston  Artillery"  ( See  Ches 
terfield  Battery) 

King  and  Queen  Battery 
(Groves,  "Newtown")  .  .  .  128,  134 

King  William  Battery  (T.  H. 
Carter,  W.  P.  Carter), 
111,  142,  184,  189,  202,  203, 
282,  285,  298,  309,  310,  312, 
322,  323,  336,  358,  421,  425, 
489,  507,  508,  513,  537,  539, 
568,  619,  620,  739,  775,  881, 

882,  926 

"Lee  Artillery"  (See  Lynchburg 
Battery) 

"Letcher"  Battery  (See  Rich 
mond  Battery) 

Lewisburg  (W.  Va.)  Battery 
(Bryan)  802,  913 

"Long  Island"  Battery  (See 
Campbell  Battery) 

Loudoun  Battery  ( Rogers ) . 
Mustered  out  Oct.,  1862,  and 
merged  with  the  Fauquier 
Battery 130,  131,  135, 

142,  187,   188,  202,  203,  258, 

280,  284,  336 

Louisa  Battery  (Coleman,  R. 
C.  M.  Page,  Montgomery, 

"Morris") 143,   184,  189, 

205,  242,  282,   285,  358,  421, 
506,   511,  513,  568,  619,  620, 

739,  790,  791,  926 
Louisiana    Battery,    1st    Co. 
Washington     Artillery     Bat 
talion    (Squires,  Owen), 

143,  204,  258,  273,  280,  285, 
297,  303,  308,  310,  319,  358, 

371,  420,  425,  567,  915 
Louisiana    Battery,    2d    Co. 
Washington     Artillery     Bat- 


BATTERY  INDEX 


983 


PAGE 

talion  (Rosser,  J.  B.  Richard 
son)  143,  204,  257,  273, 

281,  285,  296,  309,  310,  319, 
358,  371,  420,  454,  519,  522, 

525,  567,  915 

Louisiana  Battery,  3d  Co. 
Washington  Artillery  Bat 
talion  (M.  B.  Miller,  Hero), 
143,  204,  258,  273,  280,  285, 
307,  310,  319,  358,  371,  396, 
420,  519,  522,  525,  567,  677, 

684,  915 

Louisiana  Battery,  4th  Co. 
Washington  Artillery  Bat 
talion  (Eshleman,  Norcom), 
143,  257,  280,  204,  285,  309, 
310,  319,  358,  371,  420,  525, 

567,  684,  915 

Louisiana  Battery  ( Girardey, 
D'Aquin,  Thompson,  Green, 
"Louisiana  Guard" ) , 
241,  245,  248,  258,  259,  270, 
281,  285,  358,  385,  414,  421, 
443,  508,  568,  637,  696,  714, 

715,  737,  741,  858,  912,  950 

Louisiana      Battery       ( Maurin, 
Landry,   "Donaldsonville" ) , 
204,   258,  273,  280,  284,  312, 
319,  320,  322,  357,  370,  371, 
377,  379,  386,  387,  388,  397, 

419,  447,  914 

Louisiana     Battery      (Moody, 

"Madison") 185,  188,  202, 

281,  285,  300,  303,  308,  321, 
327,  358,  371,  386,  387,  396, 
397,  400,  420,  452,  458,  508, 
534,  545,  567,  645,  737,  794,  911 

Lynchburg  Battery  (G.  S.  Da 
vidson,  Chamberlayne), 

802,    854,   866,   867,  926 

Lynchburg  Horse  Battery 
(Shoemaker,  Moorman, 
"Beauregard  Rifles"), 
204,  230,  258,  280,  284,  285, 
322,  335,  336,  346,  370,  422, 
446,  448,  449,  460,  467,  471, 
480,  481,  577,  578,  584,  587, 
591,  596,  610,  691,  701,  726, 
729,  740,  773,  796,  823,  828, 

845,  880,  889,  895,  916,  927 

Lynchburg     Battery      ( Deshler, 
Raine,   Hardwicke,   "Lee" ) , 
170,   173,   174,  258,  282,  285, 
299,  300,  328,  378,  384,  421, 
568,   605,  636,  665,  738,  889,  913 

Lynchburg  Battery  (H.  G. 
Latham,  Dearing,  Blount, 


PAGE 
Dickerson) 114,   130,   142, 

184,  188,   189,   202,  204,   420, 
445,  567,   737,  803,  814,   815, 

915,  916,  926,  941 

"Macbeth  Artillery"  ( See  South 
Carolina  Battery) 

Macon  Battery  ( See  Georgia 
Battery) 

"Madison"  Battery  (See  Louisi 
ana  Battery) 

"Madison"  Battery  (See  Missis 
sippi  Battery) 

"Magruder  Artillery"  (See 
Yorktown  Battery) 

Manchester  Battery   (Weisiger)    244 

Maryland  Battery  ( Brocken- 
brough,  W.  H.  Griffin,  2d 
Baltimore  L.  A. ) .  Converted 
into  horse  artillery  in  1863, 
142,  170,  173,  174,  203,  211, 
244,  258,  262,  266,  270,  282, 
285,  327,  446,  578,  600,  602, 
612,  691,  701,  737,  796,  829, 

841,  916,  926,  927 

Maryland,  1st  Battery  (R.  S. 
Andrews,  Dement ) , 

185,  188,  204,   205,  211,  245, 
248,  259,  262,  266,  281,  285, 
289,  293,  298,  414,  421,  568, 
600,   605,   606,  607,  608,   636, 
651,  737,  822,   829,  841,   913, 

918,  926 

Maryland,  4th  Battery  (W.  D. 
Brown,  W.  F.  Chew,  "Chesa 
peake"  ) .  Converted  into 
heavy  artillery  in  1865, 
204,  211,  244,  245,  248,  259, 
281,  284,  285,  290,  293,  298, 
309,  310,  358,  384,  410,  421, 
515,  519,  568,  636,  651,  737, 

822,  829,  841,  913 

Masters'  Battery  (Masters). 
Heavy  siege  battery  employed 
as  field  artillery  iii  Peninsula 
Campaign  204 

Mathews  Battery    (Armistead), 

185,  708,  740,  858,  912 

"McComas  Artillery"  ( See  Giles 
Battery) 

Mercer  (W.  Va.)  Battery  (N. 
B.  French) 

Mississippi  Battery  (Richards, 
Ward,  T.  J.  Kirkpatrick, 
"Madison"), 

569,  651,  739,  765,  821,  914 

Mississippi  Battery  (Bradford, 
"Confederate  Guards" ) , 

708,  740,  838,  915 


984 


BATTERY  INDEX 


PAGE 

Middlesex  Battery  ( Fleet, 
Hardy).  Mustered  out  Oct., 
1862,  and  distributed  among 
Ashland,  2d  Fluvanna,  and 
Johnson's  Richmond  batteries, 
241,  246,  248,  258,  281,  284,  336 

Monroe  Battery   (Booton,  Chap 
man,  "Dixie"), 
202,  204,  257,  273,  283,  284, 

319,  335,  802,  913 

"Morris  Artillery"  (See  Louisa 
Battery) 

Nelson  Battery    (Rives), 

205,  284,  707,  740 

Nelson-Amherst  Battery  ( See 
Amherst-Nelson  Battery) 

"Newtown"  Battery  (See  King 
and  Queen  Battery) 

Norfolk  Battery  (J.  J.  Young, 
"Harbor  Guards"), 

183,  202,  242,  334 

Norfolk  Battery  ( Vickery, 
G  r  a  n  d  y,  "Light  Artillery 
Blues") 92,  112,  113,  202, 

257,  284,  369,   419,  447,  452, 

459,  569,  740,  914 
Norfolk  Battery    (Huger,  J.  D. 
Moore) 113,  202,  204, 

258,  280,  284,  335,   357,  370, 
371,  419,  447,  521,   526,  527, 

569,  578,  700,  740,  914 

North  Carolina  Battery,  "C", 
13th  N.  C.  Batt.  (Gumming), 

740,  837,  915 

North  Carolina  Battery,  "F", 
13th  N.  C.  Batt.  (Branch, 
H.  G.  Latham,  Potts,  Flan- 

ner) 202,   205,   245, 

258,  267,  280,  281,  285,   358, 
414,  420,  425,  445,  567,  643, 

684,  738,  899,  911 

North    Carolina    Battery,    "A", 
1st  N.  C.  Reg.    (Manly), 
184,    189,   202,   203,   280,   284, 
335,  357,  369,  419,  450,  451, 
452,  466,  528,  534,  535,   563, 

567,   657,  722,  738,  911 

North  Carolina  Battery,  "B", 
1st  N.  C.  Reg.  (Gregg)  .  .901,  914 

North  Carolina  Battery,  "C", 
1st  N.  C.  Reg.  (Brem,  J. 
Graham,  Williams,  Char 
lotte), 

202,  205,  241,  569,  739,  914 

North    Carolina    Battery,    "D", 
1st  N.  C.  Reg.    (Reilly,  Ram 
sey,  Rowan ) , 
142,   185,  203,  237,  269,  272, 


PAGE 

280,  285,  296,  300,  309,  310, 
335,  355,  358,  370,  410,  420, 
445,  567,  643,  658,  683,  737, 

789,  912 

North  Carolina  Battery,  "E", 
1st  N.  C.  Reg.  (Moore,  J.  0. 
Miller,  Wilmington,  "Cape 
Fear") 708,  740,  837,  915 

North  Carolina  Battery 
(Lloyd).  Mustered  out  Oct., 
1862,  and  merged  with  Man- 
ly's  and  Reilly's  N.  C.  bat 
teries, 

202,  282,  284,  298,  321,  335 

North  Carolina  Battery  (Webb)    707 

"Orange"  Battery  (See  Rich 
mond  Battery) 

"Otey"  Battery  ( See  Richmond 
Battery ) 

Page-Shenandoah  Battery  ( Rice, 
8th      Star).        Merged      with 
Wooding's    Danville    Battery, 
Sept.  26,   1862, 
170,   173,  244,   258,  270,  283, 

284,  327,  329 

"Palmetto  Artillery"  (See 
South  Carolina  Battery) 

"Pee  Dee  Artillery"  (See  South 
Carolina  Battery) 

"Peninsula"  Battery  ( Cosna- 
han,  W.  B.  Jones).  Merged 
with  Williamsburg  Battery 
in  April,  1862, 

184,  189,  201,  282,  322,  855 

Petersburg  Battery  ( Rambout, 
Stoope,  "Cockade  Artillery") 

Petersburg  Battery  (J.  R. 
Branch,  R.  G.  Pegram ) .  Con 
verted  into  horse  artillery  in 

1864 202,   205,   280, 

285,  296,  303,  358,  369,  370, 
377,  708,  740,  838,  860,  864, 

875,  901,  915 

Petersburg     Battery      (Nichols, 
E.  Graham).     Converted  into 
horse   battery   in    1864, 
202,  205,  378,  569,  897,   901, 

916,  927 

Pittsylvania     Battery      (Lewis, 

Penick) 284,  357,  362, 

369,  377,  379,  410,  419,  447, 
452,  461,  520,  526,  527,  537, 
550,  569,  740,  841,  857,  895, 

914,  917 

Portsmouth  Battery  ( Grimes, 
Thompson,  "Light  Artillery") . 
Mustered  out  Oct.,  1862,  and 
merged  with  Moorman's 


BATTERY  INDEX 


985 


PAGE 

Lynchburg  and  Huger's  Nor 
folk  batteries, 
92,    112,    202,   204,    230,    256, 

257,  280,  284,   335,  377 

Powhatan  Battery   (Dance), 
143,  241,  242,  282,  285,  360, 
385,  392,  421,  510,  568,  637, 

665,  714,  715,  738,  912 

"Pulaski"  Battery  (See  Georgia 
Battery ) 

"Purcell"  Battery  (See  Rich 
mond  Battery) 

Richmond  Battery,  1st  Co. 
Howitzers  (J.  C.  Shields, 
Palmer,  McCarthy,  R.  M. 

Anderson) 114,  130,  142, 

184,   189,  203,  280,  284,   304, 

357,  370,   419,  450,   451,  452, 
466,  528,  537,  538,  563,  567, 
657,  692,  713,  722,  738,  782, 

783,   784,  792,  826,  911 
Richmond      Battery,      2d      Co. 
Howitzers      (J.      T.      Brown, 
Hudnall,     Watson,     L.     F. 

Jones) 118,  202,  205, 

242,  282,  285,  293,  360,  385, 
421,  508,  568,  637,  665,  738, 

785,  787,  855,  913 
Richmond      Battery,      3d      Co. 
Howitzers  (R.  Stanard,  Mose- 
ley,  B.  H.  Smith,  Jr.), 
114,    134,   141,   187,   188,  202, 
204,  242,  282,  285,  347,  360, 
385,  421,   508,  568,  637,   665, 
738,   785,   786,   855,  912,  926,  928 
Richmond      "Purcell"      Battery 
(R.      L.      Walker,      W.      J. 
Pegram,  McGraw,  Cayce ) , 
113,   131,   132,   133,   134,   142, 
204,  211,  230,   236,  245,  248, 
249,  250,  258,  266,   281,  285, 
289,  290,   291,  311,   312,   335, 

358,  378,  395,  420,  425,  466, 
507,  511,  569,  739,  834,  843, 

844,  896,  898,  914 
Richmond    "Hampden"    Battery 
(Caskie,   L.   S.   Marye,   Sulli 
van)  170,  173,  203, 

244,  245,  248,  258,  282,  285, 
327,  336,  358,  378,  420,  445, 
567,  569,  730,  737,  814,  815, 

916,  950 

Richmond      "Letcher"     Battery 
(G.   Davidson,  Brander), 
204,  230,  236,  258,   281,  285, 
289,  293,  378,  420,  466,  507, 
511,  569,  739,  780,  871,   891, 

896,  898,  914 


PAGE 

Richmond  "Thomas"  Battery 
(P.  Stanard,  E.  J.  Ander 
son).  Merged  with  "Hamp 
den"  Battery  in  1862, 
128,  142,  202,  203,  204,  230, 
257,  258,  267,  281,  283,  284, 

333,  336 

Richmond  "Otey"  Battery 
(Otey,  D.  N.  Walker), 

802,  854,  915,  941 

Richmond      "Orange"      Battery 
(Peyton,  Fry), 
202,   203,  205,   242,  282,  285, 
334,   358,  421,  508,  513,  537, 
568,   619,   620,   739,   889,  913,  926 

Richmond  "Fayette"  Battery 
(Cabell,  Macon,  Fleming), 
114,  184,  188,  202,  205,  242, 

280,  285,   357,  370,  420,  445, 
567,  700,  737,   814,  815,  855,  916 

Richmond  "Courtney"  Battery 
( Courtney,  Latimer,  Tanner ) , 
142,  170,  173,  174,  203,  211, 
244,  245,  247,  259,  262,  270, 

281,  285,  289,  293,  298,  358, 
421,   508,  509,   568,   637,   691,  926 

Richmond  Battery  (Parker,  J. 
T.  Brown,  Jr.), 
241,  256,  257,  271,  281,  285, 
296,  299,  300,  303,  308,  321, 
358,  371,  378,  387,  396,  420, 
452,  454,  458,  508,  516,  522, 
525,  536,  537,  545,  567,  645, 

737,  911 

Richmond    Battery    (Crenshaw, 

Ellett) 204,  211,  258, 

267,  281,  285,  289,  290,  311, 
312,  358,  420,  466,  569,   739, 

871,  901,  914 

Richmond    Battery     (M.    John 
son,  Clutter,  Chilton), 
283,  285,  294,   319,   320,   322, 
336,  358,  377,  421,   569,  618, 
622,   739,   805,   840,  845,   912,  945 

Richmond  Battery  (Martin). 
Converted  into  heavy  artil 
lery  in  1865, 

707,  740,  838,  844,  916,  926 

Richmond  Battery    (Dabney)..    707 

"Ringgold  Artillery"  ( See  Dan 
ville  Battery) 

Roanoke  Battery  (Lurty).  Con 
verted  into  horse  artillery  in 
1864 802,  877,  916,  927 

Rockbridge,    1st   Battery    (Pen- 
dleton,    McLaughlin,  ^Poague, 
A.  Graham), 
116,   124,   126,   127,   141,   143, 


986 


BATTERY  INDEX 


PAGE 

164,  169,  170,  171,  172,  173, 
174,  175,  202,  203,  205,  230, 
244,  245,  246,  248,  258,  263, 
266,  270,  279,  282,  285,  297, 
298,  300,  301,  310,  323,  327, 
360,  366,  385,  391,  401,  408, 
410,  421,  453,  515,  516,  519, 
530,  531,  568,  636,  665,  714, 

715,  738,  856,  912 

Rockbridge,  2d  Battery  (Miller, 
Lusk,  Donald), 
170,   173,   174,  244,  285,  358, 

421,  508,  569,  618,  739,  913 

Rowan  Battery  (See  North 
Carolina  Battery) 

Salem  Battery  (Hupp,  C.  B. 
Griffin,  "Flying  Artillery"), 
241,  242,  282,  285,  360,  395, 
421,  510,  536,  568,  637,  664, 

738,  912 

Shenandoah-Page  Battery  ( See 
Page-Shenandoah  Battery) 

South  Carolina  Battery  (Bach- 
man,  "Charleston  German 
Artillery")  .  .  .  .204,  257,  269, 
272,  280,  285,  296,  297,  300, 
303,  308,  309,  310,  322,  355, 
358,  370,  420,  445,  567,  642, 

643,  683 

South  Carolina  Battery  (Boyce, 
"Macbeth"), 

258,  280,  284,  307,  308,  310 

South  Carolina  Battery   ( Coit ) , 

241,  708 

South  Carolina  Battery  ( Rives )    142 

South  Carolina  Battery  (Rhett, 
Brooks,  Ficklin), 
203,  205,  236,  242,  256,  257, 
271,  281,  285,  296,  299,  300, 
303,  308,  321,  358,  371,  378, 
380,  387,  410,  420,  454,  458, 

516,  567,  645,  737,  911 

South    Carolina    Battery    (Gar 
den,  "Palmetto"), 
257,  269,  280,  355,  358,  370, 
420,  445,  567,  643,   684,  738, 

899,  911 

South  Carolina  Horse  Battery 
( Hart,  "Washington" ) , 
203,  215,  283,  346,  422,  446, 
449,  577,  578,  584,  585,  586, 
589,  590,  591,  596,  610,  683, 
691,  699,  700,  703,  726,  740, 
773,  796,  797,  827,  828,  829, 

897,  901,  916,  927 


PAGE 

South  Carolina  Battery   (Mcln- 
tosh,      Brunson,      Zimmer 
man,  "Pee  Dee"), 
204,  211,  258,  281,  285,  289, 
311,  358,  378,  395,  420,  466, 

506,  569,  740 

South  Carolina  Battery  (Kelly, 
"Chesterfield") 740,  838,  916 

Stafford  Battery    (Cooke,  T.  B. 
French,  Cooper), 
142,  202,   205,  280,  285,   296, 
303,  358,  360,  370,  377,  410, 

738,  913 

Staunton       Battery       (Balthis, 

Garber) 128,  132,  175, 

185,  188,  203,  230,  244,  259, 
262,  266,  281,  285,  288,  289, 
293,  298,  358,  385,  421,  568, 

913,  926 

Staunton  Battery  ( Imboden, 
McClannahan ) .  Light,  1861, 
Mountain,  1862,  Horse,  1863- 

5 128,   132,   142, 

175,    185,   188,  578,   691,   699, 

700,  706,   803,  829,  877,  916,  927 
"Staunton  Hill  Artillery"    (See 

Charlotte  Battery) 

"Stonewall  Artillery"  (See  Al- 
leghany  and  1st  Rockbridge 
batteries) 

Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  1st  Bat 
tery  (Pelham,  Breathed,  Mc 
Gregor,  P.  P.  Johnston), 
178,  185,  186,  187,  189,  205, 
211,  233,  256,  259,  262,  283, 
296,  346,  348,  422,  424,  448, 
460,  467,  471,  477,  478,  480, 
483,  577,  578,  586,  610,  691, 

701,  725,  740,  773,  794,  796, 
825,   827,  843,  880,  884,   889, 

895,  916,  927 

Stuart  Horse  Artillery,  2d  Bat 
tery  (Henry,  McGregor), 
346,  348,  352,  353,  422,  448, 
460,  471,  483,  577,  578,  584, 
590,  591,  596,  610,  691,  701, 
726,  740,  773,  796,  827,  828, 

843,   857,  897,  901,  916,  927 
Sumter    Battery     (See    Georgia 

Battery) 
Surry  Battery   (Ruffin), 

241,  707,  746 

Tennessee  Battery  (Rhett,  Bur 
roughs)  802 

Tennessee  Battery  (McClung)  .  .    802 
"Thomas"    Battery    (See    Rich 
mond  Battery) 


BATTERY  INDEX 


987 


PAGE 

"Troup  Artillery"   (See  Georgia 

Battery ) 
Va.  Mil.  Inst.  Battery  (Minge), 

114,  124,  320,  801 
Warrenton  Battery   (Utterback, 

Brooke)    285, 

360,  421,  508,   569,   651,  739,  914 
"Washington"      Battery       ( See 

South  Carolina  Battery) 
"Washington     Artillery"      ( See 

Louisiana  batteries) 
"West      Augusta"      Battery 

(Waters)      164,  169 

Williamsburg  Battery  (Garrett, 
Coke).      Mustered    out    Oct., 

1862 183,  188, 

202,  205,  242,  282,  284,   334,  855 
Wilmington  Battery  ( See  North 
Carolina) 


PAGE 

Winchester  Battery  ( Cutshaw ) . 
Mustered     out     and     merged 
with     Carpenter's     Alleghany 
Battery  Sept.  26,   1862, 
164,   169,   170,   171,   172,   173, 

258,   283,   284,   327,   329,  380 

"Wise   Artillery"    (Alburtis,   J. 
S.     Brown).       Mustered    out 
and   merged  with   Lynchburg 
"Lee"  Battery  Oct.,   1862, 
128,   141,   142,  201,  203,  280, 

284,  285,  335,  377,  577 

"W  i  s  e  Legion"  Battery 
(Lowry)  802,  913 

Yorktown  Battery  (E.  R. 
Young)  .  .  .707,  740,  837,  853,  915 

Yorktown  Battery  (T  J.  Page, 
"Magruder  Artillery" ) .  Mus 
tered  out  and  distributed 
among  Lee's  Battalion  Oct., 
1862.  .202,  203,  283,  284,  336,  787 


BATTERY  INDEX  "B" 
CONFEDERATE 


Aiken's  Battery  ( Henrico  "Varina" ) 
Alburtis'     Battery      ("Wise     Artil 
lery"  ) 

Allen's  Battery    (Hampton) 
Ancell's  Battery    (2d  Fluvanna) 
Anderson's   Battery    ( 1st   Richmond 

Howitzers) 

Anderson's  Battery  (Botetourt) 
Anderson's    Battery     ( Richmond 

"Thomas") 

Andrews'  Battery    (1st  Maryland) 
Andrews'  Battery   (Co.  "A",  Stark's 
Battalion   Heavy   Artillery,    1861. 
This   battery   was    detached   from 
the  defenses  at  Drewry's  Bluff  and 
served  with  the  Light  Artillery  in 
the  Peninsula  Campaign) 
Armistead's  Battery    (Mathews) 
Bachman's      Battery       (Charleston, 

"German,"  S.   C.) 
Balthis'  Battery    (Staunton) 
Beckham's    Battery     (Groves'    King 

and  Queen.     Improvised) 
Blackshear's  Battery    ("D"  Sumter, 

Ga.     Disbanded  Oct.,  1862) 
Blodget's  Battery   (Georgia) 
Blount's    Battery    (Lynchburu) 
Bondurant's  Battery    ("Jeff  Davis," 

Ala, ) 

Booton's  Battery  (Dixie  or  Monroe) 
Bowyer's  Battery   (Bedford) 
Boyce's  Battery '( "Macbeth,"  S.  C.) 


Bradford's      Battery      ( Confederate 

Guards,  Miss.) 

Branch's  Battery    (Petersburg) 
Branch's  Battery    (H.   C.  Latham's, 

N.  C.) 
Brander's     Battery      (Richmond 

Letcher ) 

Braxton's  Battery   (Fredericksburg) 
Breathed's      Battery      ( 1st      Stuart 

Horse  Artillery) 

Brem's  Battery    (North  Carolina) 
Brockenbrough's      Battery       ( Balti 
more  Light  Artillery  or  2d  Balti 
more) 

Brooks'  Battery   (Rhett's,  S.  C.) 
Brooke's   Battery    ( Warrenton ) 
Brown's  Battery   (Wise  Artillery) 
Brown's     Battery     (Parker's     Rich 
mond) 

Brown's  Battery  (4th  Md.  or  "Ches 
apeake"  ) 
Brown's     Battery      (2d      Richmond 

Howitzers ) 
Bruce's       Battery       (Charlotte      or 

"Staunton   Hill") 
Bryan's     Battery      (Lewisburg,     W. 

Va.) 

Burroughs'  Battery    (Tennessee) 
Cabell's    Battery    (Richmond    "Fay- 

ette" ) 

Carlton's    Battery     ("Troup,"    Ga.) 
Carter's  Battery    (King  William) 


988 


BATTERY  INDEX 


Carter's    Battery     ("Ashby"    Horse 

Artillery) 

Carpenter's    Battery    (Alleghany) 
Carrington's     Battery      ( Charlottes- 

ville) 
Caskie's      Battery       (Richmond, 

"Hampden" ) 

Cayce's    Battery     (Richmond    "Pur- 
cell") 
Chamberlayne's      Battery       (Lynch- 

burg) 
Chapman's     Battery      ("Dixie"     or 

Monroe) 
Chew's     Battery      ("Ashby"     Horse 

Artillery) 

Chew's  Battery  (4th  Md.  or  "Chesa 
peake"  ) 

Chilton's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Clarke's    Battery     ("Long    Island," 

Campbell) 

Claytor's  Battery   (Bedford) 
Clutter's    Battery    ( Richmond ) 
Cocke's  Battery    (1st  Fluvanna) 
Coit's    Battery    (South    Carolina) 
Coke's  Battery    ( Williamsburg) 
Coleman's    Battery    (Louisa,    "Mor 
ris") 

Cooke's   Battery    (Stafford) 
Cooper's  Battery    (Stafford) 
Cosnahan's  Battery    (Peninsula) 
Courtney's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Crawford's    Battery     ("C",    Sumter, 

Ga.) 

Crenshaw's  Battery   (Richmond) 
Cumming's    Battery    ("C",    13th   N. 

C.  Battalion) 

Cutshaw's       Battery       (Winchester. 
Merged     with     Carpenter's     Alle 
ghany  Battery  in   1862) 
Cutts'  Battery   (Sumter,  Ga.) 
Dabney's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Dance's  Battery  (Powhatan) 
D'Aquin's    Battery     ( "Louisiana 

Guard" ) 
Davidson's    Battery     (Richmond 

"Letcher") 

Davidson's   Battery    (Lynchburg) 
Dearing's    Battery    (Lynchburg) 
Dement's  Battery    (1st  Maryland) 
Deshler's     Battery      ( Lynchburg 

"Lee" ) 
Dickenson's     Battery     (Danville 

"Ringgold") 

Dickerson's  Battery    (Lynchburg) 
Donald's    Battery    (2d    Rockbridge) 
Douthat's  Battery    (Botetourt) 
Drewry's  Battery    ("South  Side") 
Ellett's   Battery    (Richmond   "Cren- 
shaw" ) 


Ellett's  Battery    ("Pamunkey") 
Ells'  Battery    (Macon,  Ga.) 
Epes'  Battery    (Chesterfield) 
Eshleman's  Battery   (4th  Co.  Wash 
ington   Artillery,   La.) 
Eubank's   Battery    (Bath) 
Ficklin's  Battery  (Brooks',  S.  C.) 
Planner's  Battery   ("F",  13th  N.  C. 

Battalion) 

Fleet's  Battery  (Middlesex) 
Fleming's  Battery  (Richmond  "Fay- 

ette") 

Eraser's  Battery    (Pulaski,  Ga.) 
French's  Battery   (Stafford) 
French's  Battery    (Mercer,  W.  Va.) 
French's   Battery    (Giles) 
Fry's  Battery  ( Richmond  "Orange" ) 
Garber's  Battery    (Staunton) 
Garden's  Battery   (Palmetto,  S.  C.) 
Garrett's    Battery    (Williamsburg) 
Girardey's       Battery        ( "Louisiana 

Guard" ) 

Graham's  Battery   (North  Carolina) 
Graham's  Battery   (1st  Rockbridge) 
Graham's  Battery    (Petersburg) 
Grandy's    Battery     (Norfolk    L.    A. 

Blues) 
Green's      Battery      ("Louisiana 

Guard") 

Griffin's   Battery    (Salem  "Flying") 
Griffin's      Battery      (2d      Baltimore 

Light  Artillery) 
Gregg's    Battery     ("B",    1st    N.    C. 

Reg.) 
Grimes'  Battery   (Portsmouth  Light 

Artillery) 
Groves'  Battery    ("Newtown,"  King 

and  Queen) 

Guy's  Battery    (Goochland) 
Hamilton's  Battery    (Georgia  Regu 
lar) 

Hankins'  Battery  (James  City) 
Hardaway's  Battery  (Alabama) 
Hardwicke's  Battery  ( Lynchburg 

"Lee") 
Hart's    Battery    ("Washington,"    S. 

C.) 
Henry's   Battery    (2d   Stuart   Horse 

Artillery) 

Hensley's  Battery    (Bedford) 
Hero's  "Battery   (3d  Co.  Washington 

Artillery,  La.) 

Holman's  Battery   (2d  Fluvanna) 
Huckstep's  Battery   (1st  Fluvanna) 
HudnalPs     Battery     (2d    Richmond 

Howitzers) 
Huger's  Battery   (Norfolk.     Formed 

from  Norfolk  L.  A.  Blues  1861 ) 
Hupp's  Battery   (Salem) 


BATTERY  INDEX 


989 


Hurt's  Battery  (Alabama) 
Imboden's   Battery    (Staunton) 
Jackson's  Battery    (Charlottesville) 
Jolmson's  Battery    (Bedford) 
Johnson's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Johnston's      Battery      (1st      Stuart 

Horse  Artillery) 
Johnston's  Battery    (Albemarle) 
Jones'    Battery    ("Peninsula") 
Jones'   Battery    ("Pamunkey") 
Jones'  Battery   (2d  Richmond  How 
itzers) 

Jordan's  Battery    (Bedford) 
Kelly's  Battery    (South  Carolina) 
Kemper's  Battery    (Alexandria) 
Kirkpatrick's  Battery    (Amherst) 
Lamkin's  Battery  (Amherst-Nelson) 
Landry's     Battery     (Donaldsonville, 

La.) 

Lane's  Battery    ("E",  Sumter,  Ga.) 
Latham's  Battery  (Nelson-Amherst) 
Latham's  Battery   (Lynchburg) 
Latham's  Battery   (Branch's,  N.  C.) 
Latimer's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Leake's  Battery    (Goochland) 
Lewis'   Battery    ( Pittsylvania ) 
Lloyd's  Battery   (N.  C.) 
Lowry's  Battery    ("Wise  Legion") 
Lusk's  Battery    (2d  Rockbridge) 
Lurty's   Battery    (Roanoke) 
Macon's    Battery    (Richmond   "Fay- 

ette" ) 
Manly's    Battery     ("A",    1st    N.    C. 

Reg.) 

Marshall's  Battery    (Fauquier) 
Martin's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Marye's   Battery    (Fredericksburg) 
Marye's  Battery  (Richmond  "Hamp- 

den" ) 

Massie's    Battery     ( Fluvanna    Con 
solidated) 

Masters'  Battery  (Erroneously  re 
ferred  to  in  Rebellion  Records  as 
a  Virginian  Light  Battery.  It 
was  composed  of  4  siege  guns  and 
was  commanded  by  Captain  L. 
Masters,  Assistant  Inspector,  Gen 
eral  A.  P.  Hill's  Staff,  Captain 
Artillery,  Provisional  Army,  C.  S. 
A.) 
Maurin's  Battery  (Donaldsonville, 

La.) 
McCarthy's  Battery    ( 1st  Richmond 

Howitzers ) 

McClannahan's  Battery    (Staunton) 
McClung's  Battery    (Tennessee) 
McComas'  Battery    (Giles) 
McGregor's      Battery      (2d      Stuart 
Horse  Artillery) 


Mclntosh's   Battery    ("Pee   Dee,"   S. 

C.) 

McLaughlin's     Battery     (1st    Rock- 
bridge) 

Milledge's    Battery    (Georgia    Regu 
lar) 

Miller's  Battery   (2d  Rockbridge) 
Miller's   Battery    (3d   Co.   Washing 
ton  Artillery) 
Miller's    Battery     ("E",    1st    N.    C. 

Reg.) 

Minge's  Battery   (V.  M.  I.  Cadet) 
Montague's      Battery       (Gloucester. 
Transformed   into    Co.    "A",    34th 
Va,  Infantry,  in   1864) 
Montgomery's     Battery      (Louisa 

"Morris") 

Moody's   Battery    ("Madison,"   La.) 
Moore's    Battery     ("E",    1st    N.    C. 

Reg.) 

Moore's  Battery.  (Norfolk) 
Moorman's  Battery    (Lynchburg) 
Moseley's     Battery     (3d     Richmond 

Howitzers ) 

Nelson's  Battery    (Hanover) 
Nichols'  Battery    (Petersburg) 
Norcom's    Battery    (4th    Co.    Wash 
ington  Artillery) 
Otey's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Owen's   Battery    ( 1st   Co.   Washing 
ton  Artillery,  La.) 
Page's     Battery      (Yorktown     "Ma- 

gruder") 

Page's  Battery   (Louisa  "Morris") 
Palmer's     Battery     (1st     Richmond 

Howitzers) 

Parker's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Patterson's    Battery    ("B",    Sumter, 

Ga.,  Batt.) 

Pegram's  Battery    (Richmond  "Pur- 
cell") 

Pegram's   Battery    (Petersburg) 
Pelham's  Battery  ( 1st  Stuart  Horse 

Artillery) 

Pendleton's      Battery      (1st      Rock- 
bridge) 

Penick's   Battery    (Pittsylvania) 
Peyton's    Battery     (Richmond    "Or 
ange"  ) 

Poague's   Battery    (1st  Rockbridge) 
Potts'   Battery    (North   Carolina) 
Price's  Battery    (Danville) 
Price's  Battery   ("B",  Sumter,  Ga.) 
Raine's  Battery   (Lynchburg  "Lee") 
Rambout's       Battery        ( Petersburg 
"Cockade") 

Ramsey's   Battery    (Rowan  or   "D", 

1st  N.  C.  Reg.) 
Read's  Battery    (Pulaski,  Ga.) 


990 


BATTERY  INDEX 


Reese's  Battery  ("Jeff  Davis,"  Ala.) 
Reilly's   Battery    (Rowan,  N.   C.) 
Rhett's  Battery    (South  Carolina) 
Rhett's  Battery    (Tennessee) 
Rice's  Battery "( "8th  Star"  or  Shen- 
andoah-Page.    Merged  with  Wood- 
ing's  Danville  Battery  in  1862) 
Richards'     Battery     ( "Madison," 

Miss.) 

Richardson's  Battery  (2d  Co.  Wash 
ington  Artillery,  La.) 
Richardson's  Battery    (James  City) 
Ritter's  Battery   (Henrico) 
Rives'  Battery   ( South  Carolina ) 
Rives'  Battery   (Nelson) 
Robertson's    Battery     ( "Appomattox 

Invincibles" ) 

Roemer's  Battery   (Goochland) 
Rogers'     Battery     (Loudoun.       Dis 
banded  Oct.,  1862) 
Ross's  Battery    ("A",  Sumter,  Ga.) 
Rosser's  Battery    (2d  Co.  Washing 
ton  Artillery,  La. ) 
Ruffin's  Battery   (Surry) 
Sands'   Battery    (Henrico) 
Shields'     Battery      (1st     Richmond 

Howitzers ) 

Shoemaker's  Battery    (Lynchburg) 
Shumaker's  Battery    (Danville) 
Smith's  Battery   (Bedford) 
Smith's      Battery       (3d      Richmond 

Howitzers ) 

Smoot's    Battery    ( Alexandria ) 
Snead's  Battery    (Fluvanna) 
Southall's     Battery      ( Albemarle 

"Everett") 

Squires'  Battery    (1st  Co.  Washing 
ton  Artillery,  La.) 
Stamps'    Battery     (Danville    "Ring- 
gold") 
Stanard's      Battery      ( Richmond 

"Thomas") 
Stanard's     Battery     (3d     Richmond 

Howitzers) 

Staten's  Battery    (Macon,  Ga.) 
Stoope's  Battery  (Petersburg  "Cock 
ade") 

Stribling's  Battery    (Fauquier) 
Sturdivant's  Battery  (Albemarle) 


Sullivan's     Battery     (Richmond 

"Hampden") 

Talley's  Battery   (Goochland) 
Tanner's  Battery    (Richmond) 
Taylor's  Battery    (Bath) 
Thompson's      Battery      ( "Louisiana 

Guard" ) 
Thompson's     Battery     ( Portsmouth. 

Mustered  out  Oct.,   1862) 
Thomson's  Battery    ("Ashby"  Horse 

Artillery) 

Thornton's   Battery    (Caroline) 
Turner's  Battery    (Goochland) 
Utterback's  Battery   (Warrenton) 
Vickery's    Battery     (Norfolk    L.    A. 

Blues) 

Walker's  Battery    (Richmond  "Pur- 
cell") 
Walker's      Battery      (Richmond 

"Otey") 

Ward's  Battery   ("Madison,"  Miss.) 
Waters'  Battery   (West  Augusta) 
Watson's     Battery      (2d     Richmond 

Howitzers ) 

Webb's  Battery  (North  Carolina) 
Weisiger's   Battery    (Manchester) 
Weisiger's  Battery    (Albemarle) 
Williams'   Battery    ("C",   1st  N.   C. 

Reg.,   Charlotte) 
Wimbish's  Battery    ("Long  Island," 

Campbell.     Disbanded  Oct.,  1862) 
Winfield's     Battery     ("C",     Sumter 

Batt.,   Irwin,   Ga.) 
Wood  ing's  Battery    (Danville) 
Woolf oik's  Battery  (Ashland) 
Wright's  Battery    (Halifax) 
Wyatt's  Battery   (Albemarle,  "Ever 
ett") 

Yeatman's  Battery    (Gloucester) 
Young's   Battery    (Norfolk   "Harbor 

Guards") 

Young's    Battery    ( Yorktown ) 
Young's  Battery   (Fairfax.     Became 

Co.  "G",  14th  Va.  Infty.,  in  Oct., 

1862,  but  later  transformed   into 

a  light  battery) 
Zimmerman's    Battery    ("Pee   Dee," 

S.  C.) 


FEDERAL 


PAGE 


PAGE 


Arnold's  Battery, 

132,  136,  388,  670,  683 
Ayres'    Battery 136 


Brady's   Battery 194 

Brown's    Battery 647,  670,  685 

Calef's  Battery 617,  618 


Bigelow's   Battery 642,  647       Campbell's  Battery 299 

~D«-,-:^-»V,:^>'^    T>n-t-4-^  one     01  r»         r^nvKol.^'^     ~Dr>  4-4-  m-*T  ~\1fi 


Benjamin's   Battery 298,  310 

Best's   Battery 171 


Carlisle's    Battery 136 

Cothran's  Battery 171,  305 


BATTERY  INDEX 


991 


Clark's   Battery  ..  169,  310, 
Cook's    Battery  ........... 

Cooper's  Battery  ......... 

Cowan's    Battery  .......... 

Cushing's  Battery  ........ 

Daniel's  Battery  .......... 

Dickenson's   Battery  ...... 

Dieckmann's    Battery  ..... 

Dilger's   Battery  ......  475, 

Dimick's    Battery  ......... 

Dow's  Maine  Battery  ..... 

Durrell's  Battery  ......... 

Edwards'    Battery  ........ 

Fitzhugh's  Battery  ....... 

Frank's   Battery  .......... 

Gibson's   Battery  ......... 

Graham's  Battery  ........ 

Greene's   Battery  ......... 

Griffin's  Battery  ..  132,  133, 
Hall's  2d  Maine  Battery  .  .  . 
Hampton's    Battery  ....... 

Hart's    Battery  ........... 

Hazlett's  Bakery  ......... 

Hazzard's   Battery, 

215,   391, 
Heckman's    Battery  ....... 

Hill's  Battery  ............ 

Hunt's  Battery  ........... 

Kirby's    Battery  .......... 

Knapp's    Battery 
Martin's  Battery 
Muhlenberg's    Battery 
McMullen's  Battery 


PAGE 

468,  641 

310 

. . . .  618 

305,  686 

. . . .  670 

. . . .  670 

. . . .  387 

.  .  .  .  479 

479,  619 

.  .  .  .  505 

. . . .  647 

.  .  .  .  310 

136 

685 

.  .  .  .  305 

.  .  .  .  319 

. . . .  308 

136 

136,  223 

617,  618 

. . ..  171 

. . . .  642 

.  650 


171, 


395,  686 

621 

393,  480 
.  .  .  .  136 
.  .  .  .  194 
249,  305 
.  .  .  .  596 
. . . .  310 
.  310 


PAGE 

Osborn's  Battery 215 

Parson's  Battery 685 

Pendleton's  Battery 348 

Pennington's  Battery 589 

Pettit's  Battery 215,  363 

Phillips'  Battery 642 

Randall's  Battery 395 

Randolph's  Battery 216 

Reynolds'  Battery 618 

Rhode  Island  Battery 132,  136 

Rickett's  Battery,  132,  133,  136,  655 
Robertson's  Battery, 

210,  308,  309,  319,  585 

Roity's  Battery 670 

Seeley's  Battery 641 

Simmon's  Battery 310 

Smith's  Battery.  .641,  645,  646,  657 

Stevens'  Battery 655 

Stewart's  Battery 622 

Taft's  Battery 310,  669 

Thompson's  Battery 393,  642 

Tidball's  Battery, 

136,  210,  309,  319,  350 

Von  Kleiser's  Battery 310 

Weeden's  Battery 223 

Weed's  Battery 310,  459 

Weidrick's  Battery 479,  480 

Weir's  Battery 685 

Wheeler's  Battery.  ..  .479,  480,  619 

Wilkerson's  Battery 620,  621 

Winslow's  Battery 641 

Woodruff's  Battery 670 


BATTALION  INDEX 


The  battalion  organizations  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  always 
bore  two,  and  sometimes  three  names,  a  fact  which  leads  to  much  confusion 
in  the  study  of  the  Artillery  records.  The  records  of  the  battalions,  which 
were  referred  to  as  such  in  the  latter  part  of  the  War,  embrace  the  records 
of  the  constituent  batteries.  It  is,  therefore,  essential  for  the  student  to 
know  to  what  battalion  a  particular  battery  belonged  in  order  to  trace 
the  complete  record  of  the  latter.  The  battalion  organizations  are  fre 
quently  included  in  the  text  in  order  to  simplify  a  study  of  the  various 
batteries. 


Alexander's  Battalion  (Lee's 
old  battalion), 

358,  361,  371,  374,  377.  388, 
396,  416,  420,  442.  450,  452, 
467,  507,  509,  528,  535,  549, 
563,  567,  575,  599,  635,  636, 
644,  647,  656,  657,  664,  689, 

693,  696,   701,  704,  712 

Andrews'  Battalion, 

244,  245,  248,  345,  358,  379, 
393,  399,  408,  421,  442,  451, 
453,  454,  458,  515,  516,  519, 
520,  530,  534,  535,  541,  545, 
562,  563,  568,  600,  601,  606, 
608,  610,  624,  625,  630,  636, 

651,  665,  666,  696,  704 

Beckham's  Battalion  (Pelham's 
old  battalion.  See  Horse  Ar 
tillery  Battalion) 

Boggs' Battalion ..  707,  837,  909,  916 

Branch's   Battalion 708,  915 

Braxton's  Battalion  (Andrews' 
old  battalion), 
724,  730,  738,  769,  779,  785, 
792,  800,  804,  806,  813,  827, 
876,  885,  886,  888,  889,  891, 
909,  913,  917,  920,  922,  926,  944 

Breathed's  Battalion  (Horse 
Artillery) 916,  917,  927 

Brockenbrough's  Battalion,  345,  358 

Brown's  Division  (Nelson's  and 
Hardaway's  battalions), 

725,   726,   730,  738 

Brown's  Battalion  (See  First 
Virginia  Regiment) 

Brunson's  Battalion  ( See 
Pegram's  Battalion) 

Cabell's  Battalion  (See  also 
Hamilton's  Battalion), 
189,  199,  304,  305,  321,  328, 
357,  369,  370,  371,  377,  379, 
380,  391,  396,  408,  409,  419, 
442,  450,  451,  452,  518,  545, 


PAGE 

563,  567,  609,  635,  636,  643, 
646,  657,  658,  664,  701,  704, 
712,  714,  722,  738,  763,  777, 
779,  781,  782,  792,  799,  813, 
816,  818,  820,  821,  823.  825, 

836,  860,  865,  909,  911,  917 

Carter's  Division  ( Cutshaw's 
and  Page's  battalions ) , 

725,  726,  730,  739 

Carter's  Battalion, 

421,  442,  489,  490,  493,  494, 
506,  507,  509,  510,  512,  513, 
545,  562,  563,  568,  599,  600, 
610,  619,  620,  630,  636,  651, 

664,   696,   697,   701,   703,  709 

Chew's  Battalion  (Pelham's  old 
battalion.  See  Horse  Artil 
lery) 

Coit's   Battalion, 

740,  837,  860,  867,  875,  909 

Courtney's  Battalion, 

244,  245,  258,  259,  281,  328, 

329,  358 

Cutshaw's    Battalion    (Original 

battalion) 725,  730,  739, 

769,  779,  786,  787,  788,  790, 
792,  813,  819,  820,  821,  823, 
831,  856,  889,  909,  913,  917, 

920,  922,  926,  944 

Cutshaw's  Battalion  ( Page's 
and  Cutshaw's  consolidated ) 

Cutts'  Battalion  (See  Sumter 
Battalion) 

Dance's  Battalion  (See  First 
Virginia  Regiment) 

Dearing's  Battalion  (See  also 
Jones'  Battalion  and  Read's 

Battalion) 358,  411,  420, 

442,  445,  455,  567,  575,  577, 
609,  635,  636,  646,  647,  658, 
664,  701,  704,  712,  722,  723, 

814,  847,  855 


BATTALION  INDEX 


993 


PAGE 

Bearing's  Battalion  ( Pelham's 
old  battalion.  See  Horse  Ar 
tillery)  725 

De  Lagnel's  Battalion 204 

Deshler's    Battalion.  .  .205,  831,  909 

Eslileman's  Battalion  (See 
Washington  Artillery) 

Eslileman's  Battalion  ( Impro 
vised)  , 

722,  726,  740,  848,  902,  909 

First  Virginia  Regiment 
( Brown's,  Dance's,  Harda- 

way's) 205,  234,  236, 

242,  280,  282,  287,  292,  293, 
325,  333,  339,  345,  346,  360, 
374,  379,  385,  395,  408,  421, 
442,  466,  469,  507,  540,  545, 
562,  563,  568,  600,  602,  610, 
624,  630,  636,  696,  697,  704, 

854,  909 

Frobel's  Battalion, 

257,  269,  272,  280,  297,   300, 

309,  322,   328,   333,  370,  377 

Garnett's  Battalion    (See  Rich 
ardson's  Battalion), 
419,  442,  450,  452,  467,  545, 
569,  575,  609,   618,  622,   623, 
630,   636,  651,  664,   677,  699, 

701,  703,  704 

Gibbes'    Battalion     (King's  old 

battalion) 827,  831,  836, 

840,   854,  865,   902,  909,   915,  917 

Hamilton's  Battalion  (See  also 
Cabell's  Battalion),  280,  289,  380 

Hart's  Battalion  (Horse  Artil 
lery)  927 

Hardaway's  Battalion  (Brown's 
old  battalion), 
725,   736,  738,  769,   779,  785, 
786,   787,  813,   818,   820,  821, 
823,  831,  856,  897,  909,  912, 

917,  919 

HaskelPs  Battalion  ( Henry's 
old  battalion), 
712,  714,  722,  725,  738,  763, 
777,  779,  781,  799,  804,  805, 
816,  818,  819,  821,  823,  825, 
836,  840,  859,  861,  868,  875, 

897,  900,   909,   911,  917 

Henry's     Battalion      (See     also 
Haskell's  Battalion), 
411,  420,  442,  445,  453,  557, 
567,  609,   635,   636,  642,  643, 
645,   658,  664,  696,   701,  703, 

704,  712 


PAGE 

Horse  Artillery  Battalion  (Pel- 
ham,  B  e  c  k  h  a  m,  Dearing, 

Chew) 298,   299,   300, 

301,  302,  303,  305,  310,  312, 
317,  323,  346,  347,  349,  350, 
352,  354,  366,  373,  379,  380, 
408,  422,  434,  442,  460,  461, 
468,  480,  494,  550,  576,  578, 
583,  584,  585,  586,  587,  590, 
591,  592,  594,  595,  706,  717, 
747,  763,  773,  794,  828,  829, 

904,  909,  916,  917,  932 

Huger's  Battalion  (Alexander's 
old  battalion), 

724,  736,  737,  763,  777,  787, 
794,  799,  804,  805,  813,  816, 
818,  821,  823,  836,  840,  859, 

860,  909,  911,  917 

Johnson's  Battalion  ( Impro 
vised)  897, 

898,  900,   909,  912,   917,  925,  944 

Johnston's  Battalion  (Horse 
Artillery)  927 

Jones'  Division  (Read's  and 
Owen's  battalions) 737 

Jones'  Battalion  (See  also  Cut- 
shaw's  Battalion ) , 

203,  205,   236,  242,  279,  282, 
297,  306,   307,  328,  334,  339, 
345,   358,  391,  421,  442,  467, 
494,  507,  512,  545,   562,  563, 
568,   600,   602,  603,   604,   605, 
610,   621,  630,   637,  651,   665, 

666,  697,   704,  715,   891,  909 
King's     Battalion      (13th     Va. 

Batt.) 736,    801,    802, 

806,   826,  827,  831,  854,  887,  909 
King's  Battalion  ( McLaughlin's 
old  battalion), 

887,  909,  913,  917,  920 
King's    Battalion     ( Improvised. 
Dismounted)  .  .  .913,  917,  920,  926 

Lane's  Battalion  ( See  Sumter 
Battalion) 

Latimer's  Battalion  (See  An 
drews'  Battalion) 

Lee's  Battalion  (See  also  Alex 
ander's  Battalion), 

204,  257,  269,  270,  271,  272, 
275,  276,  281,  287,  292,  297, 
300,  303,   306,  307,  328,  335, 

336,  339 

Leyden's  Battalion  (9th  Georgia 
Battalion )  920,  925 


994 


BATTALION  INDEX 


PAGE 

Lightfoot's      Battalion       (Rich 
mond  Defense  Battalion), 
825,  707,  740,  825,  831,  858, 

909,  920 

McGregor's  Battalion  (Horse 
Artillery)  927 

Mclntosh's  Battalion, 

421,  442,  467,  494,  507,  510, 
512,  540,  545,  562,  563,  569, 
609,  616,  618,  620,  621,  630, 
651,  701,  704,  739,  769,  778, 
779,  780,  781,  792,  804,  805, 
806,  813,  822,  826,  834,  844, 
845,  860,  896,  897,  899,  909, 

910,  913,  917,  926 

McLaughlin's     Battalion      ( See 
also  King's  Battalion), 
801,  802,  877,  879,  886,  888, 

891,  909,  926,  927 

Moore's  Battalion  (3d  North 
Carolina  Battalion) 335,  361 

Moseley's  Battalion, 

707,   740,  805,  837,  838,  859,  915 

Nelson's  Battalion, 

199,  205,  234  237,  242,  283, 
292,  293,  318,  325,  335,  339, 
345,  346,  360,  380,  397,  422, 
442,  450,  454,  516,  528,  546, 
568,  610,  624,  630,  637,  651, 
666,  696,  701,  704,  715,  716, 
717,  738,  764,  765,  769,  779, 
785,  792,  813,  827,  876,  879, 
880,  885,  886,  888,  891,  909, 

912,  917,   920,  926 

Owen's  Battalion  (King's  old 
battalion,  13th  Va.  Batt.), 
722,  737,  814,  825,  831,  854, 

902,  909,  922,  926 

Owen's  Battalion  (See  Wash 
ington  Artillery) 

Page's   Battalion    (Carter's   old 

battalion) 779,  785,  787, 

788,  790,  791,  799,  813,  831,  909 

Page's  Battalion  (Page's  and 
Cutshaw's  consolidated) 

Pegram's  Battalion  ( Walker's 
old  battalion), 

564,  609,  616,  618,  619,  620, 
622,  630,  651,  701,  704,  739, 
769,  779,  780,  781,  791,  797, 
800,  804,  805,  806,  822,  834, 
841,  871,  875,  896,  905,  906, 

909,  910,  914,  917,  929 

Pelham's  Battalion  (See  Horse 
Artillery  Battalion) 


PAGE 

Pendleton's  Battalion  (Reserve 
Battalion) 143,  185,  189,  205 

Pierson's  Battalion 203, 

279,  282,  297,  303,  307,  322,  327 

Poague's  Battalion, 

569,  609,  618,  622,  630,  636, 
651,  665,  701,  704,  739,  767, 
768,  769,  791,  804,  805,  818, 
821,  822,  857,  858,  909,  910, 

914,  917,  931,  932,  939,  944 

Read's  Battalion  (Dearing's  old 
battalion ) , 
737,  814,   816,  821,  831,  834, 

837,  838,  848,  855,  856,  909 

Richardson's  Battalion  ( Origi 
nal)  199,  205,  237,  242 

Richardson's     Battalion      ( Gar- 
nett's  old  battalion ) , 
740,  769,  779,  780,  781,  800, 

806,   840,   860,   909,  914,  917 

Richmond  Howitzer  Battalion 
(See  also  Richmond  Bat 
teries  ) , 

114,  115,  118,  130,  141,  142, 
184,  188,  189,  202,  204,  242,  280 

Saunders'  Battalion.  .  .280,  289,  380 

Shumaker's  Battalion, 

257,  258,  266,  282,  327 

Stark's  Battalion, 

708,  740,  858,  897,   912,  917,  944 

Stribling's  Battalion 909,  916 

Sturdivant's  Battalion 926 

Sumter  Battalion  (llth  Georgia 
Artillery  Battalion,  Cutts', 
Lane's.  See  also  Georgia 

Batteries) 143,   184,  199, 

201,  205,  234,  237,  241,  242, 
282,  283,  292,  297,  303,  306, 
307,  328,  334,  335,  339,  345, 
346,  360,  380,  422,  442,  450, 
454,  528,  546,  569,  609,  618, 
622,  630,  651,  701,  703,  704, 
717,  740,  763,  781,  791,  800, 
804,  806,  842,  845,  909,  910, 

914,  917 

Thomson's  Battalion  (Horse 
Artillery)  927 

Walker's  Battalion  (See  also 
Pegram's  Battalion), 
204,  245,  254,  258,  281,  311, 
323,  328,  335,  345,  358,  379, 
399,  408,  420,  442,  461,  466, 
467,  489,  494,  506,  507,  510, 

513,  540,  545,  562,  563 


BATTALION  INDEX 


995 


PAGE 

Walton's  Division    (Eshleman's 
and  Dealing's  battalions)  .  .  .    722 

Walton's  Battalion    ( See  Wash 
ington  Artillery) 

Washington  Artillery  Battalion 
of  Louisiana  (Walton's,  Esh 
leman's,  Owen's.  See  also 
Louisiana  Batteries), 
38,  71,  94,  116,  128,  130,  135, 
141,  143,  185,  189,  199,  204, 
205,  258,  273,  281,  285,  287, 
296,  297,  300,  303,  306,  307, 


PAGE 

309,  310,  319,  321,  322,  328, 

333,  336,  339,   355,  356,   357, 

358,  361,  370,  374,  377,  386, 

387,  388,  390,   396,  397,   409, 

410,  414,  415,  420,  442,  450, 

451,  454,  515,  516,  518,   522, 

524,  525,  532,  545,  563,  567, 

609,  635,  636,  664,  670,  677, 

684,  685,  691,  699,  700,  704, 

712,  722,  726,  737,  814,  825, 

831,  840,  847,  848,  853,  902, 

905,  909,  915,  931 


ERRATA 

Graham's  N.  C.  Battery,  p.  205,  should  be  Graham's  Petersburg 
Battery. 

Andrews'    Henry    Battery,    p.    205,    should   be    Andrews'    heavy 
battery,  improvised  light. 

Fairfax  Battery,  Capt.  E.  R.  Young,  p.  242,  should  be  Yorktown 
Battery,  Capt.  E.  R.  Young. 

Ellis'  Battery,  pp.  360,  370,  380,  should  be  Ells'   Macon,  Ga., 
Battery. 

Major  James  White   Latimer,   facing  p.   768,  should  be   Major 
Joseph  White  Latimer. 


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