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Full text of "The long arm of Lee; or, The history of the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia; with a brief account of the Confederate bureau of ordnance"

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With a Brief Account of the Confederate Bureau 
of Ordnance 























WINTER OF 1863-61 706 


















* A 




SHEPPARD S "VIRGINIA 1861" Frontispiece 


LERY 544 














WHEN Stuart arrived and took command, he was 
entirely ignorant of the situation except as to its 
general features. Rodes plan to wait for the morning 
was approved by him and all activity was postponed 
until dawn. Stuart then set about making a personal 
and general reconnaissance and directed Col. Alexander, 
in his capacity as Chief of Artillery, to examine the 
ground for artillery positions. 

A careful reconnaissance extending throughout the 
night convinced Alexander that a frontal attack through 
the dense woods against the enemy s works and artillery 
position would prove most costly to the Confederates, 
even if successful. The Federal infantry in the far 
edge of the forest not only lay behind exceptionally 
strong breastworks, with the approaches well protected 
by abattis, but a powerful artillery was massed behind 
individual epaulments on the crest of the hill behind and 
within easy canister range of the woods, through which 
an attack would have to be made. He soon found that 
there were but two possible outlets by means of which 
the Confederate artillery could be brought to the front. 
The first was the direct route of the Plank Road de 
bouching from the forest beyond the schoolhouse and 
the junction of that road with the Bullock Road at a 
point not over 400 yards from the position of the hostile 
guns, part of which enfiladed the roadway for a long 
distance towards the woods. In advance of their main 
artillery position, the enemy had placed three pieces of 
Dimick s Battery behind an earthwork across the road 
and abreast of the infantry line. Even a casual ex 
amination of this route was sufficient to convince Alex 
ander of its impracticability for the advance of artillery, 
which could only move up the narrow road in column of 
pieces and would, therefore, be destroyed piecemeal be- 


fore it could be thrown into action. The utmost dash 
and gallantry of the gunners would simply be sacrificed 
in such circumstances. 

The second outlet was a vista, some 200 yards long, a 
lane cleared on both sides to a width of 25 yards, which 
ran parallel to the Plank Road about 400 yards to the 
south. This vista terminated at its eastern end in the 
narrow dirt road leading from Hazel Grove to the 
Plank Road and it was in this clearing that Col. Winn s 
men had abandoned the two guns and three caissons, 
which they had captured from the train of the 3d Corps 
about 6 P. M., subsequently recovered by Sickles. It was 
reached from the Plank Road not only by the dirt road 
running to Hazel Grove 1,000 yards to the south, over 
which route Pleasonton had dispatched the regiment of 
cavalry to Howard s assistance, but by a second road 
half a mile to the rear of the Confederate infantry 
line. Pegram had from the first appreciated the value 
of the opening, and, as we have seen, had posted Cham- 
berlayne with a section in it the evening of the 2d in 
support of McGowan s right, from which position 
Chamberlayne had been able to deliver a more or less 
random fire through the woods when Sickles left col 
lided with McGowan s right, about midnight. 

At dawn, Alexander posted 17 guns as follows: 
Capt. E. A. Marye, of Walker s Battalion, with two 
Napoleons and two rifles in the clearing about the school- 
house, at which point Pender s line crossed the Plank 
Road, and a short distance in rear, and also on the road, 
Capt. Brunson with his battery of four rifles, of the same 
battalion. It was necessary for the latter to fire over 
Marye s head, for in no other way could the guns be 
placed. Capt. R. C. M. Page, of Carter s Battalion, 
was placed with three Napoleons in the thin woods some 
300 yards south of the Plank Road and on the dirt road 
leading to Hazel Grove, to fire upon the enemy s infan 
try lines until ordered elsewhere. Lieut. Chamberlayne 
of Walker s Battalion, with two Napoleons, was masked 
in the pines at the eastern end of the vista to assist the 


infantry in its advance and then accompany it, while 
Maj. Pegram, with Davidson s and McGraw s batteries 
of Walker s Battalion, took position at the western end 
of the vista. Placing four Napoleons on a small cleared 
knoll 400 yards to his rear to fire over the trees at the 
enemy s smoke, he held his entire command well in hand 
to advance down the vista and the dirt road towards 
Hazel Grove, when circumstances should permit the oc 
cupation of that position. Alexander s, Brown s, 
Carter s, Jones , and Mclntosh s battalions were held 
in the rear in column along the Plank Road. 

Col. Alexander convinced Stuart that the Hazel 
Grove position, which commanded Fairview Heights, 
was the key to the Federal line, and Archer s Brigade 
which had come up during the night and formed on 
McGowan s right, thus occupying the extreme right of 
the Confederate line, was ordered at daylight to seize 
the hill, which Sickles had all but abandoned. Archer 
at once advanced through the woods, driving the hand 
ful of Federal skirmishers before him, and charged 
about 400 yards across the open fields in front of the 
Hazel Grove position. Pressing up the slope, his men 
seized the hill and captured the four pieces of artillery. 
Within 90 minutes after the attack commenced, Hazel 
Grove was in possession of the Confederates, its wanton 
desertion by Sickles having destroyed all chance of a 
successful resistance by Hooker, in the lines then oc 
cupied by his troops. 

Stuart was now to reap the benefit of Alexander s 
judicious disposition of the artillery, for at 5 A. M. the 
latter ordered Maj. Pegram to move forward and oc 
cupy Hazel Grove, and Col. Carter to move as many 
of his pieces as possible up to the schoolhouse. Pegram, 
all in readiness, responded, and before 6 A. M. had placed 
Chamberlayne s Battery of his own battalion and 
Page s of Carter s Battalion in position on the forward 
crest of Hazel Grove. The sight that met his eyes was 
one to fill the soul of an artilleryman with joy. Less 
than 1,500 yards to the northeast the enemy s position 


lay before him, and his own guns almost completely en 
filaded those of the enemy in the road and were able to 
deliver an oblique fire upon the others on Fairview 
ridge. Meantime, Col. Carter had moved up to Marye s 
position at the schoolhouse, with six pieces of his own 
battalion. Without hesitating a moment, Pegram 
opened with his eight pieces upon the enemy, joined by 
Carter s group of ten on the road, thus at the outset 
subjecting the enemy s guns to a cross fire. 

But until the Artillery opened fire, Stuart had not 
recognized the vast importance of Archer s capture, and 
while Pegram and Carter were getting into position, a 
useless sacrifice of Lane s and Ramseur s men had been 
made by furiously hurling them against Berry s and 
Williams intrenchments in the woods, from which the 
Federals were, however, driven back upon their main 
line just in front of Fairview. After an hour of 
desperate fighting, Stuart s whole line was in turn 
driven out of the works, and Archer himself was forced 
to fall back to Hazel Grove, where he took up a position 
in support of Pegram s guns. It was clear now that 
extreme efforts would be required to drive the Federals 
from their strong position, for Hooker had established 
the 1st, 2d, and 5th corps on his line, threatening to turn 
the Confederate left where a desperate conflict was 

Meanwhile Stuart had seen the value of Pegram s 
position, to which Alexander had, meantime, ordered 
Moody s and Woolfolk s batteries and Parker s section 
of his own battalion, with ten guns under Maj. Huger, 
and Brooke s, Smith s, and Watson s batteries of 
Brown s Battalion under Capt. Watson, Lusk s, and 
Wooding s batteries of Mclntosh s Battalion under 
Maj. Poague, and Tanner s and Carrington s batteries 
of Jones Battalion, all of which immediately went into 
action. Mclntosh with a rifled section of Thompson s 
Louisiana Battery of Jones Battalion moved down the 
road to Brunson s position, while Maj. Jones with 
portions of W. P. Carter s, Reese s, and Fry s batteries 


of Carter s Battalion, Tanner s Battery of his own, and 
a section of Taylor s Battery of Alexander s Battalion, 
twelve pieces in all, moved further to the front and to 
the left of the schoolhouse group of ten pieces, now 
under Maj. Braxton. Col. Carter about this time as 
sumed control of his own, Huger s, and Poague s bat 
teries at Hazel Grove and Col. Walker of Brown s, 
Pegram s, and Jones batteries at that same point. 

Alexander states that perhaps 50 guns were engaged 
at Hazel Grove, though not over 40 at any one time, 
as the batteries had to be relieved from time to time to 
replenish their ammunition. The fire which Pegram, 
then Walker and Carter, conducted from this point was 
perhaps for an hour the most continuous and rapid ever 
delivered by the Confederate Artillery. Every caisson 
had to be well filled during the night, yet many of them 
were emptied within the hour, some of the better-served 
pieces, those under Pegram, firing as rapidly as three 
rounds a minute, which was an exceptionally rapid rate 
for the time. 

As an artillery position, Hazel Grove was ideal and 
Alexander s battalion commanders made the best of 
it. Somewhat greater in elevation than Fairview, its 
bushy crest all but obscured the Confederate guns, well 
drawn back from the view of the enemy, whose shells 
bursting beyond the narrow ridge, or in the depression 
in front, were quite harmless. Few reached their diffi 
cult target, while the Federal position presented an ex 
tensive and easy target to the Confederate guns. It is 
remarkable how the Federal cannoneers managed to 
maintain their fire against such odds, yet they did so and 
although severely punished by Alexander s artillery, 
their guns formed the rallying point for Hooker s 
troops below them in the woods, and they inflicted 
terrible losses upon Hill s attacking infantry. Had the 
Confederates been provided with good ammunition for 
their guns, it is doubtful if the Federal Artillery could 
have made the stand it did. An extraordinarily large 
percentage of the Confederate shells failed to burst, and 


many were even more ineffective by reason of premature 
explosions. With the very best ammunition the error 
of the fuse, and consequently the area of dispersion, is 
large, but the mean burst is easily ascertained and rang 
ing becomes fairly simple and accurate. On the other 
hand, ranging with the Confederate ammunition was 
extremely difficult. The writer has heard this point dis 
cussed by numerous Confederate artillery officers, who 
declared that ranging with them was ordinarily mere 
guess work, and that frequently a dozen bursts gave 
them no knowledge whatever of the true range. In 
deed it was most discouraging to the Confederate gun 
ners to fire and fire upon a perfectly visible target under 
the easiest conditions, and see not a sign of effect from 
their shells, and this is a fact which must be considered 
by the artillery student of the war. 

Soon Anderson united with Stuart s right, the former 
moving his left up to Mine Creek from the furnace, 
while Hardaway followed with three rifles of Jordan s 
Battery. Before moving off, Hardaway left Capt. 
Dance with one rifle of Jordan s Battery, one Napoleon, 
and one howitzer of Hupp s and two howitzers of 
Hurt s, with instructions to follow Mahone s advance 
along the Plank Road to the east. Dance at once oc 
cupied a fine position on a knoll to the right of the road, 
and about 900 yards from the enemy s breastworks. 

Proceeding along the ravine, Hardaway encountered 
Gen. Lee, who had selected a position on a wooded hill, 
which the Major was directed to prepare for his three 
guns, and from which he opened an active fire upon the 
Fairview guns, after the axmen with great labor had 
cut a roadway thereto. 

By 9 A. M. the Federal artillery fire had appreciably 
slackened, many of the guns having exhausted their am 
munition since no provision was made to resupply them 
in spite of the urgent requests of the officers. Besides, 
the Federal Artillery had suffered severely from the 
terrible cross fire, which Carter, Pegram, and Mclntosh, 
now reenforced by Hardaway s guns, had been directing 
for nearly two hours upon Fairview. 


It was at this juncture that the veteran commander 
of the Richmond Letcher Battery, Capt. Greenlee 
Davidson, received his mortal wound at the very mo 
ment of victory. In the words of Maj. Pegram, he 
was "one of the most gallant, meritorious, and efficient 
officers in the service." 

About this time Col. Walker assumed the active 
direction of his battalion, of which Pegram had sent 
Davidson s and Chamberlayne s, together with Page s 
of Carter s Battalion, to the rear to replenish their am 
munition. Col. Brown also assumed active control of 
the artillery of the 2d Corps. 

Concerning the Federal artillery position and the ef 
fect of the Confederate fire, Capt. Clermont L. Best, 
4th United States Artillery, Chief of Artillery, 12th 
Corps, after explaining how his guns had been in 
trenched during the night of May 3d, had the following 
to say: "Our position would not have been forced had 
the flanks of our line of guns been successfully main 
tained. An important point, an open field about a mile 
to our left and front, guarded by a brigade of our 
troops (not of the 12th Corps) and a battery was 
seemingly taken by a small force of the enemy and the 
battery captured and turned on us with fearful effect, 
blowing up one of our caissons, killing Capt. Hampton, 
and enfilading Gen. Geary s line. It was most un 
fortunate. My line of guns, however, kept to its work 
manfully until 9 A. M., when, finding our infantry in 
front withdrawn, our right and left turned, and the 
enemy s musketry so advanced as to pick off our men 
and horses, I was compelled to withdraw my guns 
to save them. We were also nearly exhausted of am 

The remarks of Capt. Best are much more conclusive 
of the service rendered by Alexander and his batteries 
than anything the Confederate gunners themselves 
might have said. The effect of Alexander s fire Gen. 
Hunt also characterized as fearful. 


The Federal line of battle was now along the heights 
below and a short distance west of Fairview. Sickles 
Corps connecting with Slocum s on the left, occupied 
this line to the Plank Road and across it. On his right 
was a portion of the 2d Corps and beyond behind breast 
works thrown up during the night along the Ely s Ford 
Road, and separated by a small interval from Couch, 
lay the 1st Corps under Reynolds. On Slocum s left 
and facing towards Fredericksburg the 5th Corps op 
posed McLaws, while the remnants of Howard s Corps 
was massing beyond Meade. Thus Hooker still had 60,- 
000 infantry in line while the combined strength of 
Stuart, Anderson, and McLaws, after the losses of the 
1st and 2d, was not over 40,000. But the elan of 
Stuart s men had not waned in spite of the unsuccess 
ful attempts of the morning to drive the enemy from 
their strengthened line, and each minute the efforts of 
the Confederate Artillery became more telling. There 
was nothing for Stuart to do but to organize a fresh at 
tack. The spirit of the brave leader as he rode the lines 
encouraging his men was contagious. Entirely relieved 
of anxiety for his right flank by the union with Ander 
son s line in that quarter, he now massed his infantry on 
the left to drive the enemy out of the position from 
which they were threatening his flank, to the support of 
which Ramseur s Brigade had been sent. Finally, 
about 9 :30 A. M., a third assault was made and the Fed 
eral line was broken by the sheer valour of Jackson s 
infantry. The Artillery had meantime crushed the 
Fairview batteries, the very keystone of the whole 
structure of resistance. 

As the Confederate infantry surged forward through 
the woods, Carter, Jones, and Mclntosh dashed down 
the road and up the slopes of Fairview to the crest, 
while the batteries at Hazel Grove crossed the valley in 
their front, and, joining with the others in action, poured 
a whirlwind of fire upon the retiring Federals and their 
batteries, the latter withdrawing to their ammunition 



Killed at Kellysville. 1S(>:: 


The Federals now endeavored to make a stand near 
the Chancellorsville house, but without success. En 
filaded from the west by Carter s group, fired upon 
from their right front by Pegram s batteries and from 
their front by Jordan s guns, which Hardaway had 
meantime brought upon the southern edge of the 
plateau, and entirely without breastworks, their re 
sistance was gallant but brief. At this juncture, 
Hooker, while standing on the porch of the Chancellor 
house, was put hors de combat by a fragment of brick 
torn from a pillar by one of Jordan s shells, and did not 
recover for several hours. For a time his defeated army 
was without a leader. 

About 1 A. M., Lee joined Stuart near the Chancellor 
house and directed that both infantry and artillery re 
plenish ammunition and renew the assault. The enemy 
having stubbornly fallen back to a line of works pre 
pared by Warren, running along the Ely s Ford and 
United States Ford roads, with its apex at the White 
House, thus covered their avenues of retreat. 

When the Federals fell back to their works after be 
ing shelled for about an hour, the Confederate batteries 
at once advanced to the turnpike and threw up hasty 
intrenchments from which a desultory fire was main 
tained upon that portion of the line near the White 
House. About 3 p. M. Colston s Division, which had 
been temporarily withdrawn, reformed, and, resupplied 
with ammunition, was ordered by Gen. Lee to move for 
ward towards the United States Ford for the purpose of 
developing the enemy s position. Page s Morris Bat 
tery of Napoleons accompanied Colston. Hardly had 
Colston s men been set in motion when the enemy 
opened upon them with twelve pieces of artillery from a 
barbette battery on an eminence, and although Page re 
plied to this fire for half an hour or more, nothing 
serious was attempted and Colston was directed to draw 
off and intrench. Meanwhile Maj. Hardaway with thir 
teen rifled pieces, including two of Fry s, two of 
Marye s, and two of W. P. Carter s, Jordan s four rifles 


and three of Hurt s, was ordered to accompany Gen. 
Anderson to the river for the purpose of shelling the 
enemy s wagon trains on the north bank near Scott s 
Dam, about 1^ miles below the United States Ford. 

The Confederates had before noon practically come 
to a standstill on the Chancellor plateau, for disquieting 
news had reached Gen. Lee from the rear. Sedgwick 
had finally forced Early s flimsy line and compelled the 
Confederates opposite Fredericksburg to fall back. 
Operations about Chancellorsville were perforce sus 
pended while Gen. Lee s attention was directed to the 
new danger. 




WE left Early and Pendleton on the morning of the 
2d disposing their men and guns to oppose as best they 
could Sedgwick s advance, the Federals pretty much in 
the same position and attitude they had assumed the 
evening before. Before 10 A. M. Gen. Early, however, 
directed Maj. Andrews to feel the enemy with his guns, 
and accordingly Maj . Latimer opened with two rifles on 
that portion of the hostile line near Deep Run, while 
Graham s and Brown s Parrotts on Lee s Hill directed 
their fire upon the infantry and batteries massed near 
the Pratt house, driving them to cover. Latimer drew 
no fire, but two batteries on the north bank and several 
on the south side of the river responded with energy to 
that of Graham s and Brown s guns. Soon after this 
affair, Early rode to the left to confer with Pendleton, 
who was directing the disposition of Walton s guns 
along the Stansbury Hill, with a view to firing upon the 
enemy s masses about Falmouth. While he was with 
Pendleton, Col. Chilton, Gen. Lee s Ad jut ant- General, 
arrived with verbal orders for him, directing that he 
move at once to Chancellorsville with all his infantry 
but one brigade, and that Gen. Pendleton should with 
draw all the artillery along the Telegraph Road, 
especially all the heavier pieces, to Chesterfield, ex 
cept eight or ten guns which were to follow the rest when 
forced by the enemy to do so. Early and Pendleton 
both advanced many objections to the withdrawal of 
their forces at such a time, which in their opinion would 
only invite the advance of the enemy, but were informed 
that the commanding general was convinced of the 
wisdom of crushing Hooker s force and that, having 
done so, he could then return to Fredericksburg and 
drive Sedgwick off if necessary. To do this, all his 


infantry was needed, but more artillery about Chancel- 
lorsville would be superfluous, and the small detaining 
force was only expected to delay Sedgwick long enough 
for the Artillery and trains to withdraw. Such was the 
substance of Chilton s remarks. The orders as de 
livered to Gen. Early left him no discretion and, much 
against their will, he and Pendleton, about noon, set 
about executing them. Hays Brigade was directed to 
relieve Barksdale s Regiment in the town and to remain 
with Pendleton s artillery force. It was late in the 
afternoon, however, before the infantry column moved 
off from Early s line along the military road from 
Hamilton s Crossing to the Telegraph Road, and then 
along a cross road leading into the Plank Road, fol 
lowed by Maj. Andrews with his own battalion and 
Graham s Battery. 

Pendleton had, before noon, ordered Nelson s Bat 
talion to withdraw first since it was least exposed to the 
view of the enemy. The three 20-pounder Parrotts of 
Rhett s Battery were replaced by the lighter and less 
valued pieces of Patterson s and Eraser s batteries. 
Lieut. Tunis with the Whitworth moved over from 
the extreme right and with Rhett s Battery and 
Nelson s Battalion retired along the Telegraph Road 
while Richardson s Battery which Walton had detached 
to Early s line rejoined its battalion. Col. Cabell 
also withdrew Carlton s Battery from Lee s Hill and 
moved to the rear in command of the entire column 
of 22 pieces. Pendleton, therefore, retained in position 
after noon but 15 guns. Of these six guns of the Wash 
ington Artillery and Parker s two 10-pounder Parrotts 
were held in position on Marye s Hill and the ridge to 
the left, Eraser s three and one of Patterson s guns on 
Lee s Hill, and three of Patterson s on the ridge back of 
the Howison house. During the withdrawal of his bat 
teries, Pendleton resorted to every subterfuge to make 
it appear to the enemy as if additional guns were being 
brought into position. After remaining idle the greater 
part of the afternoon, the Federals at last began to send 


forward their skirmishers and to mass on the north bank 
as if to cross. Pendleton now ordered Col. Cabell to re 
turn with Carlton s Battery. 

Upon arriving with the head of his column at the 
Plank Road leading to Chancellorsville just before 
dark, Early received a note from Gen. Lee saying that 
he was not expected to withdraw his division from Fred- 
ericksburg, if by remaining Sedgwick could be checked, 
as by neutralizing the 30,000 Federals with his 10,000 
men Early could render far greater service than he could 
at Chancellorsville. Thus had Chilton misunderstood 
the commanding general s directions, and led to an all 
but disastrous movement in Lee s rear by denying 
Early and Pendleton all discretion in the execution of 
the orders he transmitted to them. The incident well 
illustrates the danger of verbal orders and from orders 
in any form emanating from one not actually conversant 
with the conditions in remote quarters of the field of 
operations. What Gen. Lee had intended for instruc 
tions were transmitted as positive orders. 

Early had hardly received the message from Gen. Lee 
when he was informed by Gen. Barksdale through a 
courier, at the rear of his column, that the enemy had ad 
vanced in force against Hays weak line, and that both 
Hays and Pendleton had sent word that all the ar 
tillery would be captured, unless they received immediate 
relief. Meantime Barksdale, with rare good judgment, 
and in the exercise of that initiative on the part of a sub 
ordinate so valuable on such occasions, had retraced his 
steps with his own regiments, followed by Gordon s Bri 
gade. Early at once gave the order for his main column 
to do the same. 

Sedgwick, upon discovering the Confederate with 
drawal, had crossed the remainder of his corps about 
dark, and moved towards the River Road, or Bowling 
Green Road, below the town, driving Col. Penn s Regi 
ment of Hays Brigade back to the line of the railroad, 
and then formed line with his main body along the 
river. Fortunately, he had not seriously attempted to 


take the town. The heavy masses of the enemy seen at 
Falmouth, earlier in the day, were the troops of the 1st 
Corps under Reynolds moving to the left to reenforce 

Between 10 and 11 p. M. Early s Division reoccupied 
its old line and skirmishers were thrown out towards 
the River Road, Barksdale again occupying the town 
and Hays moving to Early s right. Before notice of 
Early s decision to return reached Pendleton he had, 
after deliberate consultation with Hays, withdrawn the 
Artillery, Walton s batteries moving off first, followed 
by those on Lee s Hill. But Pendleton had scarcely 
reached the Telegraph Road with the rear batteries, 
when he met Barksdale returning to the field and was 
told by him that the orders were to hold Fredericks- 
burg at all hazards. Pendleton, as well as Hays, who 
was at Marye s Hill supervising the final preparation 
for the retirement of his brigade, was naturally much 
puzzled by the incomprehensible conflict of orders they 
had received during the day, but was finally assured 
by Early himself that the confusion had resulted from 
Chilton s mistake, and that since Barksdale and Gordon 
had both returned of their own accord he had thought 
best to reoccupy his lines so long as it was possible to do 
so. Pendleton, in complete cooperation with Early, 
though much perplexed, and weakened by having sent 
so many of his guns to the rear, p - mptly directed 
Walton and Cabell to reoccupy their positions, the 
former being assigned to the command of die artillery 
on Marye s Hill and the latter to that on Lee s and the 
Howison Hill. It was 1 p. M. when the 19 guns, includ 
ing those of Carlton s Battery, remaining for the de 
fense of so important a position, were reestablished in 

At 11 P. M. Sedgwick received a much belated order 
from Hooker to march upon Chancellorsville with all 
haste. Leaving one division to cover his rear and skir 
mish with the Confederates in its front, he moved his 
other two divisions up the river towards Fredericks- 


burg. Had Hooker s orders been duly received, his ad 
vance would have been all but unopposed. Even now 
delays occurred, and although Gen. Warren arrived at 
2 A. M. to hasten forward his movement, the head of 
Sedgwick s column did not enter the town, but 3 miles 
from the bridge at Franklin s Crossing, until daylight. 
Having detected the movement of the enemy, and be 
lieving that Sedgwick s main effort would be made on 
the left, Pendleton at once advised Early, who dis 
patched Hays Brigade from his right, to reenforce 
Barksdale near the town. 

Meanwhile, Gibbon had thrown a bridge at the town 
and crossed over with his division of the 2d Corps. With 
the Federal advance were several batteries, to engage 
which Pendleton directed Walton to send a section of 
artillery to the most advanced works on the left. Mean 
time Barksdale had directed Maj. Eshleman to move a 
piece of Miller s Battery, which commanded the Plank 
Road leading from the town, to the left front, thus un 
known to Pendleton uncovering the most important ap 
proach to Marye s Hill. 

To meet the enemy, Early now had 7 companies of 
Barksdale s Brigade between the Marye house and the 
Plank Road, 3 companies on the Telegraph Road at the 
foot of Marye s Hill, and 2 regiments on the ridges of 
Lee s and Howison s hills, while one of Hays regi 
ments covered Barksdale s right and 2 occupied the 
Stansbury ridge. The extreme right was held by Hoke s 
and Smith s brigades with Andrews Battalion of ar 
tillery and Richardson s and Graham s batteries in their 
old works. 

Very shortly after daylight Sedgwick commenced 
demonstrations at Deep Run as if to turn Hoke s line, 
throwing forward his skirmishers up the ravine formed 
by the stream. In spite of Latimer s fire, a large body 
succeeded in reaching the railroad behind which it re 
mained while several Federal batteries played upon 
Latimer s guns. Andrews now brought Graham s and 
Brown s batteries from the right to the support of Lati- 


mer s two Napoleons, and also Carpenter s rifled section, 
which engaged in a duel with the enemy s artillery as 
well as firing upon their infantry. Finally Hoke moved 
out and drove the enemy from behind the railroad em 
bankment, while Andrews batteries played upon the 
retiring troops. 

As soon as the advance division (Newton s) of Sedg- 
wick s Corps had entered the town, four regiments were 
sent forward to attack the Confederate line in rear of 
it, advancing over the ground made famous in Decem 
ber by the desperate charges of Burnside s divisions. 
Once more the brave Federal infantry pressed up to 
within a few paces of the stone wall and rifle pits at the 
base of the hills, while Pendleton s batteries poured 
shell and canister into their ranks with dreadful effect, 
and Barksdale s men, reserving their fire until the last 
moment, hurled the attacking columns back in a blizzard 
of musketry fire. Once more the enemy withdrew to 
cover behind the accidents of the ground, while their bat 
teries in the town poured their fire with unrelenting 
vigor upon Marye s Hill. At all points Sedgwick s 
men were repulsed, but it was apparent to the defenders 
that the ever-increasing force in the town was only 
temporarily balked. The glorious news of Jackson s 
victory at Chancellorsville, which had just been received, 
inspired the gray line to redouble its efforts. 

Sedgwick now determined to turn the Confederate 
position and directed Howe with his rear division, on the 
left of Hazel Run, against the opposing line, while 
Gibbon was ordered to move up the river from the town 
and turn the Confederate left. But Howe found the 
works in his front and those which extended beyond his 
left occupied, while the stream on his right deterred him 
from assaulting Marye s Hill in flank, and Gibbon s ad 
vance was barred by the canal behind which on the 
Stansbury Hill were the men of Hays Brigade, and 
the pickets of Wilcox s Brigade on Taylor House Hill. 
Information of Gibbon s movement was at once sent 
Wilcox, who, leaving one section of Lewis Battery and 


50 men at Banks Ford, had hastened down in person 
with the other section of the battery under Lieut. 
Nathan Penick, and threw his guns in action first on the 
Taylor House Hill, then on the Stansbury ridge. Soon 
he also brought up Moore s (Huger s) Battery, two 
rifles of which on the Taylor House Hill engaged the 
enemy s guns in Falmouth and on the plain below, for 
about two hours, while the latter sought to prepare for 
Sedgwick s final efforts. 

When Gibbon and Howe, whose men unable to ad 
vance also sought the cover of the ground, reported the 
impracticability of turning the Confederate position, the 
resolute Sedgwick determined to storm the opposing 
works. For this purpose, Newton s Division in front 
of the town was to be organized into two columns for the 
assault of Marye s Hill, while Howe was to move up 
Hazel Run and attack Lee s Hill. Newton s two col 
umns, of two regiments each, with two regiments in sup 
port, moved forward on the right of the Plank Road 
while Col. Burnham with four regiments in line of bat 
tle, to the left of the road, charged directly upon the 
rifle pits at the base of Marye s Hill. The works against 
which these troops charged were now held by but two 
regiments supported by six guns on the hill above under 
Walton, who directed a withering fire of canister upon 
the enemy. As before, the Federals reeled and broke, 
only to be rallied and led back with the same result. But 
under a flag of truce for the purpose of allowing the 
enemy to recover their dead, the fire in this quarter was 
now suspended. This action by the Confederates was en 
tirely unauthorized by proper authority and was due to 
the strange good nature of a gallant officer, Col. Griffin 
of the 18th Mississippi, who received the flag and hon 
ored the request in spite of the fact that Howe was 
actively engaged in attacking Hays line only a few hun 
dred yards to his right. Not only did Griffin suspend 
the fire on his portion of the line, but he allowed his men 
to show themselves, and when Newton was apprised by 
his returning officers how weak the line was which had 


repulsed him, the three columns were ordered forward 
again upon the termination of the local truce. It was 
now that the full effect of Chilton s dreadful blunder, as 
well as Barksdale s unwarranted interference with 
Pendleton s dispositions, were to be felt. Instead of 37 
guns in position to repel the enemy, there remained less 
than half that number, and the direct approach up the 
Plank Road instead of being completely dominated by 
Miller s guns was exposed only to the fire of the six 
pieces on the hill, above and behind the stone wall, the 
few defenders of which finding themselves assailed from 
every side by superior numbers were unable to check the 
onset. The Federals dashed on up to and over the works, 
completely overpowering the Mississippians, most of 
whom were either killed, wounded or captured in the 
desperate hand-to-hand conflict which ensued. Thus did 
Griffin reap the whirlwind which he had sown. It was 
now 11 A. M., and so rapid had been Newton s final as 
sault that Hays and Wilcox, the latter having by this 
time assembled a portion of his brigade on Taylor s Hill, 
had not had time to come to Barksdale s aid. The 
enemy, after securing the works at its base, swarmed up 
Marye s Hill and seized five of Walton s guns and 
Parker s two to their left, before they could be with 
drawn, but the gunners kept to their work to the last. 
Seeing Newton s success, Pendleton at once caused the 
guns on Lee s Hill to be directed on the enemy 
on Marye s Hill, and brought up two pieces of 
Patterson s Battery from near the Howison house, 
which opened fire from the brow near the Telegraph 
Road. Just at this moment Richardson s Battery ar 
rived at the Howison Hill from the right, from whence 
it had been dispatched by Early, and was sent by 
Pendleton to join Walton, who assumed direction of 
the guns firing upon Marye s Hill, while Barksdale 
formed a regiment in line to the left of the Telegraph 
Road in their support. 

The enemy now advanced his batteries on the plain 
in support of Howe s column, which vigorously assailed 
Lee s Hill. Upon these Carlton s and Eraser s bat- 


teries under direction of Col. Cabell poured a rapid fire 
of canister, but they, too, were forced to withdraw as 
the infantry supports in their front fell back along the 
Telegraph Road, contesting every foot of ground. In 
withdrawing, Richardson was compelled to abandon a 
piece, the horses of which were all shot down. Fraser, 
in the meantime, had been directing the fire of his left 
piece upon Marye s Hill, while his other piece and Carl- 
ton s Battery continued to hurl canister upon Howe s 
men. Not until the enemy all but reached their guns 
did Fraser and Carlton withdraw them, the former 
saving both his guns by substituting a caisson limber for 
a gun limber which had been blown up. While direct 
ing this difficult task under a galling fire, Lieut. F. A. 
Habersham, of Fraser s Battery, was struck in the head 
and killed by a large fragment of shell, but his body 
was borne from the field on the shoulders of his can 
noneers. Cabell now led his two batteries to the rear 
along the Telegraph Road and formed Carlton s for 
action near the pump at the Leach house, while Early 
hurried up with his troops from near Hamilton s Cross 
ing and formed them on the line which the remnants of 
Barksdale s Brigade was holding in front of the Cox 
house, about two miles in rear of Lee s Hill. Walton 
had been ordered to the rear along the Telegraph Road, 
and directed to occupy the first favorable position with 
his remaining guns. Soon the enemy brought a battery 
into action near the brick house in rear of the Howison 
house and engaged Carlton, who replied until his am 
munition was expended, when Walton was ordered to 
bring up his ten pieces and relieve Carlton and Fraser, 
the former having lost one man killed and eight 
wounded in the duel. 

One incident in connection with Carlton s Battery 
should here be mentioned, as it illustrates the coolness 
and heroism of the Confederate gunner. An unex- 
ploded shell fell among Carlton s guns with the fuse 
still burning. Its explosion would have certainly 
caused the death of several men. Without pausing an 


instant in his work, Lieut. Thomas A. Murray, who was 
busily engaged in sighting his piece, called private 
Richard W. Saye s attention to the dangerous projectile 
which lay at their feet and Saye, picking it up, hurled 
it over the parapet of the work. The shell burst as it 
fell to the ground in the ditch beyond. 

Pendleton in his report mentions the mortification he 
experienced in seeing Walton s and Patterson s guns 
captured by the enemy. Fortunately the day has come 
when it is considered an honor and not a disgrace for the 
artillerymen to lose guns in such circumstances. In 
this affair it does not appear that any criticism can be 
made to the discredit of the gunners, for they remained 
at their posts until the last, and by the nature of the 
ground were cut off from saving their guns. The ar 
tilleryman who feels that he must save his pieces, or be 
disgraced before his comrades in arms, finds a strong 
incentive to "pull out" before actually necessary, and 
where such a spirit prevails the subaltern who cannot 
view the whole field in its general aspect is too apt to 
anticipate the crisis and retire his guns when by remain 
ing in action a few minutes longer he might materially 
influence the issue. Then, too, the guns give the bravest 
infantry additional assurance. Nothing is more inspir 
ing to a sorely pressed infantry than the nearby crash 
of supporting guns and nothing more disheartening to 
the foot soldiers than the sight of their artillery sup 
ports drawing off from the post of danger. Upon such 
facts the more modern and sounder rule has been based 
that artillery when practicable must seek positions in 
close proximity to the advanced infantry, and remain 
with it until to do so longer becomes but a useless sacri 
fice of men and guns. The mere personal knowledge 
that their batteries are still in the fight is of great moral 
support to the infantrymen who must after all bear the 
ultimate shock of an assault driven home. If by losing 
a single piece or many, the force of the enemy s blow can 
be reduced by the artillery to within the limits of the 
defending infantry s power of resistance, then by all 


means the guns should be gladly lost and much honor 
accorded the gunners who are resolute enough to lose 
them, for it must be remembered that if the infantry is 
overborne and swept from the field, the artillery as a 
rule must fall with it. Let us all be thankful that the 
old idea that under no circumstances must a gun be lost, 
a rule which continued to be accepted from the time of 
the War of Liberation to the Franco-German War, has 
at last been abandoned, and that Bernadotte s proud 
boast that in all his battles he had never lost a piece no 
longer does him any credit in the eyes of the world. 

This point is well covered by Hohenlohe, who dis 
cusses at length the evils which flowed in 1866 from the 
Prussian batteries withdrawing from the front line to 
refit, or when their ammunition ran short. Of course, 
there were exceptions even then, such as in the case of 
Von der Goltz s Battery at Koniggratz. Ordinarily, 
however, they were too prone to fall back when custom 
and the regulations warranted it. But before 1870, the 
German artillerymen had learned that to lose guns was 
not dishonorable and at Chateaudun instead of a battery 
withdrawing when its ammunition had been exhausted 
and its material greatly injured, the battery commander 
made his cannoneers mount the limbers and sing the 
"Wacht am Rhine" until the commanding general 
should see fit to order them to retire or until a fresh 
supply of ammunition might arrive. 

That Pendleton s batteries remained long enough at 
their posts at Fredericksburg is amply attested by their 
losses. In Walton s Battalion of Washington Artillery, 
there were four men killed, and four wounded, including 
Lieut. De Russy, besides the losses in material etc., 
which was two 3-inch rifles of Squire s, one 12-pounder 
howitzer of Richardson s, one 12-pounder Napoleon of 
Miller s, and a 12-pounder howitzer and a 12-pounder 
Napoleon of Eshleman s Battery, four limbers, one cais 
son, and 29 horses. In Lieut. Brown s section of 
Parker s Battery, the loss including the section com 
mander was 23 officers and men captured, two 10- 


pounder Parrotts, 2 limbers, 2 caissons, and 28 horses. 
Patterson of Cutt s Battalion lost 3 men wounded, one 
Napoleon, one 13-pounder howitzer, 2 limbers disabled, 
and 4 horses killed, while Fraser lost one officer killed 
and one caisson and limber by explosion. Carlton s loss 
was one man killed, 10 wounded and 3 horses. Later 
Patterson s two pieces were recaptured, so the total 
loss of the artillery under Pendleton was 6 officers, 64 
men, total 70; 8 guns and limbers, 4 caissons and 64 

Sedgwick, as we have seen, did not press along the 
Telegraph Road, but followed the direct route to Chan 
cellors ville along the Plank Road. Wilcox, cut off by 
the Federal advance from Early, instead of trying to 
establish connection with him, determined to delay 
Sedgwick s progress as much as possible. He, there 
fore, and with a keen perception of the best part he was 
able to play, drew up his brigade in line on a ridge 
running from Stansbury Hill to a point on the Plank 
Road some 500 yards in front of the Guest house, and 
placing two rifled pieces of Moore s and Lieut. Barks- 
dale s section of Penick s (Lewis ) batteries in his 
front, shelled the Federal troops on Marye s Hill and 
the adjacent height at a range of about 800 yards. For 
a time this checked the enemy, but soon their skirmishers 
advanced to within 400 yards of the guns with dense 
lines following. A force that was sent below the Plank 
Road threatened to turn Wilcox s right, whereupon he 
ordered Moore and Penick to retire and withdrew his 
men along the River Road to a point half a mile in rear 
of Dr. Taylor s house. In this affair, Lieut. Barksdale, 
of Lewis Battery, was severely wounded. So active 
were Moore and Penick that Sedgwick mistook them 
for a horse battery. 

The slowness and caution with which the Federals 
advanced encouraged Wilcox to move back to the Plank 
Road and again seek to delay their progress to 
wards Chancellorsville. Deploying a troop of cavalry 
which he happened to have with him, in some pines in 
rear of Downman s house, he moved his brigade and five 


batteries to Salem Church, about five miles from Fred- 
ericksburg, where Cobb s rifled section of Penick s Bat 
tery went into position near the toll gate, while Moore s 
Battery sought a position 1,000 yards to the rear near 
the church itself. In the meantime one of Early s aides 
had informed Gen. Lee of the loss of the position in his 
rear, whereupon, as we have seen, he postponed his as 
sault on Hooker s new lines, and dispatched McLaws 
with Mahone s, Wofford s, Semmes , and Kershaw s 
brigades to the support of Wilcox. 

Upon forming line in front of Salem Church, Wil 
cox calmly awaited the arrival of the head of Sedgwick s 
column, which soon came up pushing Maj. Collins 
small cavalry detachment down the road. Lieut. Cobb 
now opened fire with his two pieces, but was almost im 
mediately driven from his position by a battery with the 
Federal advance guard, and fell back upon Moore s 
position, soon followed by Wilcox s Brigade, which re 
formed on the line already occupied by McLaws 
troops at Salem Church. 

Leaving Wofford at the junction of the turnpike and 
Plank Road, McLaws formed his line of battle perpen 
dicular to the latter in front of the church, with Mahone 
on the left, Semmes next, then Wilcox across the road, 
and Kershaw on the right. Wofford took position on 
Kershaw s right when ordered up, while the two bat 
teries remained in the road. Wllcox placed a number of 
his men in the church and also some in a schoolhouse 
about 60 yards in advance of his line. These dis 
positions had hardly been made when Brooks Division 
moving forward rapidly in line of battle, and athwart 
the road, with Newton s Division in close support, 
rushed into the open space between the toll gate and the 
church, while Sedgwick s batteries drove Moore and 
Penick from the road after the latter had fired a single 
shot. Thus McLaws was left entirely without artillery 
in the engagement which followed. The Confederate 
line, however, lay well retired, in a thick growth of 
woods which afforded much shelter from the hostile 


After shelling the woods for about 20 minutes, the 
Federals advanced, Bartlett s Brigade, which boasted it 
had never been repulsed, on the left of the first line. On 
came the charging troops, cheering as they entered the 
woods, but when they had pressed to within 80 yards of 
the Confederate line they were received by a tremendous 
volley of musketry which momentarily checked the ad 
vance. In spite of the Confederate fire, Bartlett s brave 
men soon recovered their formation and swept on, tak 
ing the schoolhouse and its small garrison as it passed. 
But Wilcox, having held a regiment in reserve, now 
hurled it upon Bartlett s disordered line, and after a 
desperate encounter at close quarters, the Federals 
were broken and pressed back past the schoolhouse. 
Brooks right had also been checked and broken. Sedg- 
wick hurried forward his second line to save the day, 
but all in vain, for Semmes and Wilcox advanced their 
entire brigades and drove the enemy from the field clear 
back to the toll gate in a dangerously prolonged pur 
suit. At that point Sedgwick s massed reserves, to 
gether with the closing in of night, forbade further 
progress on the part of the Confederates. Meanwhile, 
Col. Alexander with his battalion and Maj. Hamilton 
with Manly s and McCarthy s batteries of Cabell s Bat 
talion, had been ordered from the Chancellorsville 
plateau down the Plank Road to the support of Mc- 
Laws, but arrived too late to take part in the engage 
ment. The necessity of withdrawing these guns from 
so critical a point was due simply to the fact that Gen. 
Lee was entirely without an artillery reserve. Every 
piece, except those of Nelson s Battalion, which had 
been ordered to the rear as a result of the disastrous 
verbal order erroneously transmitted by Chilton, was 
engaged. Salem Church was in effect a rear guard 
action, and for use in such a contingency reserve ar 
tillery was created. One cannot fail to see how crippled 
the commander-in-chief had been by the loss of two of his 
battalions. Had they been present, Pendleton s two bat 
talions would no doubt have been available as a reserve, 


instead of being committed at the outset. As a reserve, 
these battalions would have been held at Gen. Lee s 
immediate disposal, and would have, therefore, been 
among the first troops to arrive at Salem Church in sup 
port of Wilcox. McLaws would then have had Nelson s 
and Cutts six fresh batteries, with which to repulse 
Sedgwick instead of parts of two much-damaged ones, 
without ammunition enough to remain in action at the 
critical moment. Since Gen. Lee was able to withdraw 
Alexander s four and Hamilton s two batteries from 
Chancellorsville, it is apparent that he would have been 
free to dispense with Pendleton s six batteries had they 
been present, and without weakening his front by taking 
so many guns from his advanced lines. 

The sturdy Wilcox had, however, almost without ar 
tillery fought a superb rear guard action. Few better 
examples of the kind are to be found. In the nick of 
time, he had interposed his small force between the 
enemy and Lee s rear, after Early and Pendleton had 
been forced from the path. But much credit is also due 
Early and Pendleton, for they with 10,000 men and a 
few guns had for the better part of two days neutralized 
Sedgwick s whole corps of 30,000 men. Wilcox s Bri 
gade had lost 500 officers and men, but Bartlett s Bri 
gade alone of some 1,500 men had experienced casual 
ties aggregating 580. 

Sedgwick s line now extended from the river above 
Banks Ford to Fredericksburg, and during the night 
a bridge was thrown at the ford. 



AN hour before sunset on the 3d, Early was informed 
that McLaws was moving down the Plank Road to 
meet Sedgwick, and that he, Early, was expected, if 
possible, to cooperate with McLaws in overwhelming 
the enemy s column. Early was then three miles from 
Salem Church and, satisfied that he could render no as 
sistance to McLaws at so late an hour, advised him that 
he would concentrate his force during the night, and en 
deavor to drive the enemy from Lee s and Marye s hills 
at dawn, throwing forward his left to connect with 
Wofford on the right of Salem Church. Both Lee and 
McLaws approved this plan. 

It was late in the evening when Early succeeded ir 
concentrating his division, one battery only with a regi 
ment of infantry in support being left on the right of 
the Cox house ridge, so as to guard the flank beyond the 
Telegraph Road against any movement of the enemy 
up the Deep Creek Valley. Early s plan was to ad 
vance along the Telegraph Road with Gordon s Bri 
gade in the front line, followed by Andrews Battalion 
of artillery and Graham s Battery, with Smith s and 
Barksdale s brigades in rear forming a second line, and 
to throw Hays and Hoke s brigades across Hazel Run 
opposite his position so as to move down the left bank 
while he attacked the heights held by the enemy along 
the road. Upon recovering Marye s and Lee s hills, 
he proposed to occupy them with Pendleton s batteries 
and Barksdale s men while Hays and Hoke, crossing 
Hazel Hun at the ford on his left, connected with Mc 
Laws, and Gordon and Smith moved along the Plank 
Road up river. 

At dawn, Gordon moved off along the Telegraph 
Road and found Lee s Hill unoccupied, but a body of 
hostile infantry moving westward along the Plank 


Road halted and took position behind an embankment 
of the road between Marye s Hill and the ridge above. 
In the valley between Guest s and Downman s houses, 
there was also a large body of the enemy s infantry and 
a battery at the latter house. Andrews, who had accom 
panied Gordon, now placed Graham s Battery in 
position on the Telegraph Road along the western face 
of Lee s Hill, and opened on the enemy s troops in the 
valley, while Gordon s skirmishers descended the hill 
and advanced upon them. At this juncture, two large 
bodies of hostile infantry, probably brigades, crossed 
the ridge just beyond the Alum Spring Mill and 
threatened Gordon s left, as his line advanced, but 
Graham shifted his fire upon them and drove them to 
cover. Gordon then made a dash across the run and 
after a sharp encounter drove off the enemy behind the 
road embankment, captured some prisoners, several 
commissary wagons, and a battery wagon and a forge 
with their teams. This gave Early possession of 
Marye s and Cemetery hills again, and while Smith 
moved up to the support of Gordon, Barksdale reoc- 
cupied the sunken road behind the wall at the base of 
Marye s Hill, under a heavy fire from the batteries on 
Stafford Heights, and was ordered to seize the town 
itself, the bridge head, and a large wagon camp seen 
there. But Barksdale was unable to occupy the town, 
which was still held by Gibbon s Division of the 2d 
Corps, and the wagon train decamped. 

Having disposed of the enemy s infantry, Graham 
turned his two 20-pounder Parrotts upon the battery at 
Downman s which had been free to fire upon him, and 
drove it off to the Guest house out of reach. 

The enemy now held a line of shallow trenches ex 
tending from Taylor s Hill to the brow of the hill be 
yond Alum Spring Mill, while Gordon and Smith had 
occupied the trenches along the crests from the Plank 
Road towards Taylor s Hill, with their backs towards 
Fredericksburg. Smith was now ordered to advance 
towards Taylor s Hill, and in pressing forward up the 


slope was opened upon by the Federal batteries at the 
Taylor house with such effect that his movement was 
checked. The enemy appeared in such strength and in 
flicted such losses upon him that his brigade was with 
drawn to its former position. 

Hays and Hoke s brigades had, meanwhile, moved 
down the left bank of Hazel Run, and had taken up a 
position from which they could connect with McLaws 
right, by moving across the ridge on which Downman s 
house stood, and of this fact Early now notified Mc 
Laws. McLaws did not attack, however, but informed 
Early that Anderson was coming up to his support. 
When these troops began to arrive at Salem Church, 
Early drew Hays and Hoke further back to his right, 
placing the former in line at the base of the Alum 
Springs Hill, from which concealed position the brigade 
might move up the wooded slope on to the plain above, 
which was occupied by the enemy. Hoke was concealed 
in the woods on the lower end of the Downman house 
ridge. Gen. Lee now arrived and, personally examining 
Early s dispositions, approved his plan of attack, which 
was for Hays and Hoke to press forward to the Plank 
Road, while Gordon supported by Smith endeavored to 
sweep the crests in front of him, and to turn the Federal 
left resting on the river. 

Sedgwick s main line covered the Plank Road for 
some distance on the south side, its center on the ridge 
along which the road runs and both flanks retired and 
resting on the river above and below. His main ar 
tillery position was within his line and at the Guest 
house, while other guns were on his left front facing 
Early. Skirmishers were thrown out upon the ridges 
in his front. 

When dawn broke, no communication had yet been re 
ceived from Hooker by Sedgwick, and he was still under 
orders to move to Chancellors ville. At an early hour, 
Early s movements in the latter s rear had caused him to 
deploy Howe s Division facing to the rear and perpen 
dicular to the Plank Road. His scouts had reported 


that a column of the enemy, 15,000 strong, had arrived 
from Richmond and occupied the heights at Fredericks- 
burg. At once abandoning all idea of taking the ag 
gressive, Sedgwick was bent only upon crossing the 
river, but this in spite of the bridge at Banks Ford, 
now within his line, he did not dare attempt by day 
light. And so, with a line much attenuated and facing 
in three directions, east, south, and west, he awaited 
events. At last a welcome dispatch from Hooker, which 
authorized him to cross at Banks Ford, or fall back 
upon Fredericksburg, and directing him not to attack, 
was received; but a little later another message arrived 
urging Sedgwick to hold a position on the south bank, 
to which he replied that he was threatened on two 
fronts, that his line was a poor one for defense, and that 
his bridge was endangered, closing with a request for 
assistance. Receiving no reply to this message he de 
cided to remain in position until nightfall. Howe s Di 
vision still extended from the river to a point a short 
distance south of the Plank Road. Brooks Division 
was on the right of Howe, forming line at right angles 
with him, and parallel to the road, while Newton s Divi 
sion formed the west front occupying its position of the 
evening before and extending to the river above the 

Anderson had arrived at Salem Church by midday, 
and after some delay his three brigades were moved into 
line on Early s left. Between Anderson s left and Mc- 
Laws right, the latter confronting Newton s Division, 
a large gap existed which was to be closed as the whole 
line advanced upon the enemy. The Confederate line 
from Lee s Hill to McLaws left was six miles or more 
in extent. 

Pendleton after reestablishing Walton s guns on 
Marye s Hill and Fraser s Battery with a number of 
others on Lee s Hill, moved Carlton s Battery and 
Ross s which had rejoined him from Port Royal during 
the night, as far forward from the Telegraph Road to 
wards the Guest house as possible, and also attempted 


to find a good position for the Whitworth with which 
Lieut. Tunis had returned. Andrews with his battalion 
occupied positions along the Telegraph Road, while 
Alexander had sent Taylor s (Eubank s), Woolf oik s, 
and Moody s batteries of his own battalion under Maj. 
Huger to cooperate with Anderson s brigades. Moody s 
Battery moved far off to Anderson s right towards the 
Telegraph Road. Manly s Battery remained with Wil- 
cox near the church. 

It was not until 6 p. M. that McLaws gave the signal 
for attack, when Hoke moved at once across the plateau 
between Downman s house and Hazel Run, under cover 
of Ross s and Caiiton s fire, then down the slope, across 
the valley, and up the steep ascent of the Plank Road 
ridge, driving the enemy s skirmishers before him, while 
the hostile guns at the Guest house played upon, but 
failed to break, his line. Hays also swept the enemy s 
advance line from his front. These two brigades with 
unsurpassed ardor pressed on without halting for a 
moment, and were lustily cheered by the gunners in their 
rear whose fire was masked by the advance. From the 
artillery positions along the Telegraph Road, the sight 
was indeed an inspiring one, and filled the hearts of the 
artillerymen with enthusiasm and admiration for the 
gallant infantry which they were powerless to assist. 

Gordon had advanced along the Plank Road ravine, 
formed in line, and with the utmost elan swept on to 
wards the Taylor house. Brushing the enemy s 
skirmishers from the forward crests, he forced the ar 
tillery on that flank to retire rapidly, only halting when 
the Federals had been driven pellmell from Taylor s 
Hill towards Banks Ford. Even the guns at the Guest 
house had been compelled to fly in order to escape 
capture. Thus had the enemy been thrown into con 
fusion on all sides when Hoke was wounded, and his 
brigade, colliding with Hays men in the woods, lost its 
direction and was thrown into confusion beyond the 
Plank Road. Hays Brigade pressed on with such men 
of Hoke s as had mingled with it, but having also be- 


come disordered in the woods, was checked by a retir 
ing force of the enemy, which had been rallied to meet 
the advance and which drove the Confederates back to 
the Plank Road. Here Hays succeeded in rallying the 
regiments of the two brigades to the support of which 
Early brought up a part of Smith s Brigade. But be 
fore the Confederates could be reformed, night had 
fallen, and with Smith s two regiments in front, Hays 
and Hoke s brigades rested in position along the Plank 
Road. Gordon had also come to a standstill by reason 
of the approach of darkness, on the Taylor House Hill 
confronting the enemy s left. McLaws Division had 
not advanced at all. Anderson s Division had pressed 
forward on Hoke s left, driving the enemy s skirmishers, 
which confronted his center, from the Downman house 
and the upper part of the ridge, but it did not cross the 
Plank Road until dark, and none of its batteries were 
engaged. When the attack came to an end, Posey ex 
tended Early s left, with Wright further down the road, 
towards Salem Church. Beyond Anderson was Mc 
Laws with two of Alexander s batteries and Harda- 
way s group on the river road on his left. 

During the early morning Alexander had been 
directed to post some of his guns so as to prevent Sedg- 
wick from advancing along the River Road to unite with 
Hooker at Chancellorsville, and for this purpose he had 
placed Jordan s Battery on a bluff commanding the 
road, where the guns were intrenched. These guns were 
now able to fire upon Banks Ford, as were those of 
Andrews Battalion, which had been moved up to 
the Taylor House Hill when the battle ended. Manly s 
Battery was also most effective in firing upon the re 
treating enemy, while Hardaway with a number of bat 
teries was nearby. 

We have seen that after the seizure of the Chancellors 
ville plateau on the 3d, Hardaway had been dispatched 
to Scott s Dam with 13 rifled pieces. Some time 
was required for the assembling of his force, the organi 
zation of his column, and the refilling of his caissons. 


The roads were also very heavy and difficult and it was 
well after dark before Hardaway, moving northward 
along the River Road, came up to the position of the 
3d Virginia Cavalry near the Hayden house, with 10 
of his guns. Gen. Anderson had meantime halted 
Hurt s three pieces on the road some distance in rear, as 
the weight of the carriages was such that it was doubtful 
whether the teams could draw them through the mud. 

Hooker s wagon trains, in park and with camp-fires 
burning, were plainly visible at the base of a hill about 
a mile from the bluffs on the south bank of the river, 
when Hardaway in company with an engineer officer 
reconnoitered the ground. About 3 A. M. he brought 
up his 10 guns to the bluff in front of the Hayden house, 
and after firing 15 rounds per gun, the pieces were 
limbered up and started back through the mud to Chan- 
cellorsville, while Hardaway remained to discover by 
daylight the effect of his fire. The horses of the train 
when fired upon had been picketed in a field on the slope 
of the hill on the river side of the wagon park. Many 
of them had been killed or injured, as well as some of 
the teamsters, and a number of wagons had been 
destroyed by shelling. But the results of such an enter 
prise are never very serious, and have practically no ef 
fect upon the main operations of the enemy. It is ex 
ceedingly doubtful if in this case the injury inflicted by 
Hardaway was worth the ammunition expended. 

While the column was returning the enemy made a 
demonstration on the south side of the river below 
United States Ford as if to cut off Hardaway s com 
mand, whereupon the batteries were hurried to the rear, 
leaving Anderson s skirmishers to check the attack, 
which proved not to be serious. 

Anderson was now ordered to proceed to Salem 
Church, and Hardaway s artillery detachment was 
directed to follow. Upon approaching the church, 
Alexander halted Hardaway s command, directing 
Parker with his remaining section to join it. Send 
ing Jordan s Battery to the position on the River 


Road before referred to he set out to determine what 
position was best for Hardaway to occupy. In a short 
while the latter was directed to move his guns from the 
Plank Road to Smith s Hill to the north and drive off a 
Federal battery on the north bank of the river, which 
had enfiladed McLaws line whenever it attempted to 
advance towards Fredericksburg. It was now about 
10 A. M., and meanwhile Anderson had commenced to 
move forward, directing Hardaway to follow him to the 
right of the church. Under this conflict of orders, 
Hardaway galloped forward to consult Anderson, who 
referred him to Gen. Lee. Since Alexander had sent 
Maj. Huger with the 10 guns of his own battalion to the 
right in support of Anderson, Hardaway was ordered 
to comply with the orders of the Chief of Artillery, 
which he proceeded to do. 

Hardaway had been informed that he would find pits 
for his guns at Smith s Hill, but upon arriving at the 
designated position, found intrenchments for but four 
pieces. Many of his men and horses had been without 
rations for 24 hours, while they had been continually on 
the move since leaving Chancellorsville the evening be 
fore. So sultry and oppressive was the day that a num 
ber of his gunners fainted while engaged in the work 
of clearing away the timber and digging gun pits. But 
at last the axe details from the gun detachments com 
pleted their work, and most of the pieces were in position 
and fairly well protected before the attack was ready to 
be made. 

To the left of Jordan s four pieces, which occupied a 
position across a ravine, and some 900 yards down the 
road, W. P. Carter s four guns were posted on the bluff, 
with Fry s two guns to the left of him. Parker s section 
and three pieces of Penick s (Lewis ) Battery occupied 
pits on a knob to the left rear and some 40 feet higher 
than the bluff on which Carter and Fry were posted. 
Hurt with a Whitworth occupied a pit at the bend of 
the ridge 80 yards or more to the left of the knob, while 
200 yards to the rear and 100 to the left McCarthy s 


two guns and Marye s two held the ridge. Lieut. 
Ferrell s section of Hurt s Battery was kept in reserve. 

The part played in the action of the day by Harda- 
way s command, while a secondary, was quite an im 
portant one. As soon as Early, Anderson, and Mc- 
Laws became engaged, his guns opened upon the Fed 
eral Battery of eight pieces in earthworks about a house 
on the bluff of the north bank, and immediately op 
posite Smith s Hill. Other Federal guns soon came into 
action, two from a point 400 yards below, and two in a 
thicket 200 yards above the main battery. The fire of 
these 12 guns was principally directed at the four guns 
of McCarthy s and Marye s batteries and the Whit- 
worth, all of which stood in the open. At one time the 
fire of Hardaway s right guns was all but silenced, which 
enabled the enemy to concentrate more successfully on 
those to the left. But going to the right of his position, 
Hardaway in person encouraged his gunners to re 
double their efforts. 

Never in the war was a duel with the Federal ar 
tillery conducted under more disadvantageous circum 
stances. Although the shells were provided with the 
fuse-igniter attachment, but one Confederate shell in 
fifteen burst while the Federal ammunition was most ef 
fective. Hardaway, an officer of much scientific knowl 
edge, afterwards declared that the meal powder was 
knocked off the fuses while they were being driven home 
with the mallet, but in spite of the fact that he was in ef 
fect using solid shot almost entirely, six of the enemy s 
guns in the central work were disabled, and the other 
two were driven from their position, while the remaining 
four pieces were practically silenced, though they main 
tained a desultory fire until after dark. Meantime, Mc 
Carthy s section, which had expended its ammunition, 
had been relieved by Ferrell s section of Hurt s Battery, 
and sent to the rear. Hardaway s task had been well 
executed, for by the continuous action of his guns, the 
fire of the Federal artillery on McLaws left, hitherto 
so destructive to the infantry, had been completely 


As night closed in a thick fog had settled over the 
field which added greatly to the difficulties of the Con 
federates, who were thus again balked of the fruits of 
victory by darkness, and the delay in attacking. Under 
cover of the fog, Brooks and Newton s divisions re 
formed about the ford, and upon them Howe s broken 
division fell back and also reformed under cover of 34 
guns on the north bank, protecting the bridge at Banks 
and the one at Scott s Ford, a short distance below. 

Sedgwick had suffered too severely to think of an 
other day s battle with his troops in their present 
position. In two days he had lost over 5,000 of his men. 
He, therefore, advised Hooker that his position was 
commanded by the enemy s guns on the Taylor House 
Hill, and asked if he should risk remaining on the south 
bank. At 1 A. M. he received orders from Hooker s 
Chief of Staff to "withdraw under cover," and by 5 
A. M. the entire corps had crossed the river and taken up 
its bridges. But the crossing had not been accomplished 
without some loss, for Alexander had during the after 
noon busied himself establishing points of direction for 
night firing upon the position about the ford in antici 
pation of Sedgwick s retreat, and during the night 
Jordan was able to fire upon the masses huddled about 
the crossing, causing the enemy much annoyance. 

This was perhaps the first instance of the employment 
of indirect fire by the Confederate Artillery. Jordan s 
position along the bluff to the left of the River Road, 
facing towards Banks Ford, was obscured from the 
latter point by intervening ridges and thickets over 
which by means of Alexander s deflection marks the 
fire could be directed upon the enemy. About 1 A. M. 
Hardaway had also withdrawn Carter s and Fraser s 
four pieces on his right and shifting his line so as to face 
the ford, opened fire down the ravine leading thereto, but 
was soon directed by Alexander to cease firing as Mc- 
Laws was sending two brigades in that direction. Rid 
ing forward to the picket line of the infantry to secure 
the exact direction of the pontoon bridges, and hearing 


the artillery of the enemy crossing, Hardaway re 
turned and again shifted his guns so as to deliver an 
indirect fire upon the approaches to the ford on the 
north side of the river, and caused his guns to fire from 
right to left, at the rate of about one shot a minute. 
About 2 A. M. Hurt s Whitworth was directed upon a 
deep hollow leading towards Falmouth, in which many 
stragglers, wagons, etc., could be seen by the light of 
the numerous fires along the line of retreat. Later it 
was turned upon a large wagon train concentrated at 
the junction of the Aquia Creek and United States 
Ford roads. Although the range was about 3 miles, 
the fire of the Whitworth was soon adjusted and 
created consternation in the wagon park, causing the 
train to disperse in the utmost disorder. The am 
munition for the large rifle being very scarce and ex 
pensive the fire soon ceased. 

All day on the 4th, Brown s, Walker s, Mclntosh s, 
and Jones battalions had been held in position along 
the Chancellorsville plateau, the cannoneers requiring 
no encouragement to throw up hasty works for the guns. 
With the exception of Walker s batteries, which had 
been turned over the night before to Maj. Pegram, none 
of the Artillery was seriously engaged, though most of 
the batteries fired upon the enemy s works from time to 
time. Early in the morning, 18 or 20 Federal guns 
opened fire upon Pegram s position on the Plank Road, 
and, after a somewhat protracted duel, ceased to fire. 
In this affair, Pegram seems to have had the better of 
it, for his guns all remained in position until the morn 
ing of the 6th, when the enemy s withdrawal was dis 

While Sedgwick s last brigade was crossing, he re 
ceived an order from Hooker countermanding the 
authority previously given for the withdrawal to which, 
at 5 A. M. Sedgwick replied that it was too late, and that 
the bridges were already being taken up while his men 
were much exhausted. 


In spite of the fact that the enemy had escaped, it 
was with great elation on the morning of the 5th that 
Huger s and Andrews guns fired the last shots across 
the river at Sedgwick s retreating columns, and that 
the Confederates at sunrise found themselves in com 
plete possession of the southern bank of the river from 
Fredericksburg to Hooker s contracted position above 
Chancellorsville. The movement against Sedgwick had 
been a complete success, and even Gibbon had been with 
drawn across the river from the town during the night, 
while Hooker had not ventured from his works to as 
sist the inferior force which he had ordered up to his 
own relief. The whole situation presents a tactical 
anomaly. Hemming a vastly superior enemy up in his 
works in front of United States Ford, Lee had with 
drawn much of his artillery and the larger part of two 
divisions of infantry from his front to hurl upon an 
equal force, which had already pushed his rear guard 
aside, and, uniting them with that broken rear guard, 
had assailed an entire Federal corps of 30,000 men, rated 
among the best of his adversaries, overthrowing it and 
driving it across the river at Banks Ford, in some dis 
order at least, in the very face of the main army of the 
enemy. But still the bold commander-in-chief was not 
satisfied with what he had done. He knew that Sedg 
wick s Corps had suffered so severely in men and morale 
that it was not available for immediate service, even 
had it been transferred to Chancellorsville, instead of 
being headed for Falmouth. During the afternoon of 
the 5th, therefore, leaving Early s Division, Barks- 
dale s Brigade and Pendleton s artillery to guard the 
river from Banks Ford to the crossings below Fred 
ericksburg, he ordered Anderson and McLaws to re 
turn to Chancellorsville with a view to assailing 
Hooker s position. What was known of that position 
satisfied every man in the Confederate Army that the 
worst was yet to come. Ninety thousand men behind 
works covering a front of five miles, which they had had 
48 hours to prepare, with all the advantages which un- 


limited quantities of timber, broken ground, and diffi 
cult approaches through a dense forest gave them for 
defense, with three-fourths of their front covered by 
streams on their southwest and northwest, and both 
flanks resting on a wide river, this was the propo 
sition now before some 35,000 Confederates. Not only 
would the attack have to be directed squarely on the 
Federal front, but little assistance could be expected 
from the Artillery. Impenetrable abattis covered the 
entire line, and the crest of the works was everywhere 
surmounted by head logs with loopholes, while in rear 
separate structures were provided for officers and sup 
ports from which the former could see and exercise con 
trol over the defenders, and from which the latter could 
be moved up to the advanced works under cover. 

It is doubtful if in the whole military career of Gen. 
Lee, a bolder resolve on his part can be discovered 
than this one to hurl his troops upon Hooker s final 
position at Chancellorsville. But again, it must be 
conceded that in arriving at a decision, seemingly so 
rash, if not desperate, he had considered the moral at 
titude of his adversary. Again he did not count the 
number of noses and muskets as the supreme factor of 
his problem. The moral power of the enemy he re 
garded inversely as the strength of his breastworks and 
preparations for defense. It was the same unflinching 
determination which led him to order Longstreet and 
Jackson back to their lines at Sharpsburg the preceding 
September, that now enabled the great commander to 
approach the task before him in so resolute a manner. 
He saw too well in both cases the results which would 
flow from a more timid course, and he knew that 
Hooker, like McClellan, would fall a victim to im 
position. Lee has been harshly criticised for even con 
templating an assault on Hooker s lines, but the question 
may be asked his critics, what his position would have 
been had he lain supine upon the fields he had won? 
In a frank answer to this query is the vindication of his 
action, if any justification is needed. It was certainly 


not for him to admit to the enemy by inactivity that his 
last bolt was spent, and invite the Federals to move out 
upon his army, weakened as it was by four days of tre 
mendous effort and constant strain. Why, may we also 
ask, should Lee at this juncture, after once having as 
sumed the aggressive, and with unparalleled audacity 
having divided his army in the face of a superior enemy, 
now resort to the defensive? Was the resolve to attack 
Hooker on the 5th more reckless than the actual at 
tack which had been made on the 2d? Of the two de 
cisions, the writer is inclined to consider Jackson s turn 
ing movement by far the more daring. But, whether 
so or not, Lee s willingness to take upon him the con 
sequent risk of the maneuver, retaining under his im 
mediate control but two small divisions, with a power 
ful enemy both in his front and rear, displayed a higher 
courage than was ever evinced by any other mortal man 
upon the field of battle. The maneuver of Jackson, the 
lieutenant, the lustre of which has all but obscured the 
other incidents of the campaign, was indeed brilliant, 
but the courage of Lee, the captain, who permitted it, 
was far more superb, for victory alone was not the 
stake a nation hung in the balance. 

No. On May 5, Lee did just what a general with 
exceptional power to divine the enemy s thoughts, and 
the boldness to act upon the latter s fears, should have 
done. He drew his sword once more to strike, knowing 
that the flash of the blade would itself strike terror to 
a heart already taking counsel of a timorous mind. And 
so, when his forces were again marshalled for attack, 
the blow became unnecessary ; there was no adversary to 
meet him. Critics deal too much in numbers. They 
forget that moral force, in the words of Napoleon, is 
everything in war. Who shall say that the violent 
storm which caused Lee to postpone his attack on the 
afternoon of the 5th was not as welcome to Lee as to 
Hooker? We may surmise this with respect to the 
former. We have evidence from his hasty withdrawal 
across the river under its protection that it was wel 
come to the latter. 


During the afternoon and before Anderson s troops 
had come up from Salem Church, the rain fell in tor 
rents, converting the spongy soil into a vast quagmire. 
In spite of the almost impassable condition of the roads, 
Alexander who had reconnoitered the extreme Federal 
left during the morning, and had directed the scattered 
batteries to report to their respective corps, moved his 
own battalion by the River Road and set his men to 
work digging pits and preparing a position near the 
Childs house, from which to open upon the enemy be 
hind Mine Run. The rain continued to fall, but all 
night the cannoneers kept at their work. Alexander s 
position, partly around the bend of the river and near 
the bank, was such as to enable his guns to deliver an 
oblique fire upon a hostile group of artillery on the 
enemy s extreme left. 

As soon as Hooker learned from Sedgwick that the 
6th Corps had abandoned the southern bank of the 
river, he too determined to withdraw to the north bank, 
but went through the idle form of calling his corps 
commanders together to hear their views. As it hap 
pened, the majority were of his own opinion, but judg 
ing from the frame of mind of the commander-in-chief, 
it is doubtful if he would have waived his own views had 
they all been opposed to them. During the 5th 
preparations were made for recrossing the Rappa- 
hannock and an interior line of works, running from 
Scott s Dam to the mouth of Hunting Run, was con 
structed to cover the withdrawal. At nightfall the re 
treat, greatly favored by the storm, began. First the 
Artillery crossed over the bridges, the ends of which 
were all but submerged by the rising current which 
threatened their destruction. By daylight the great 
mass of the Federal Army was on the north side, and by 
8 A. M. the rear corps under Meade had crossed, leav 
ing behind nothing but several field hospitals full of 
wounded soldiers. Meanwhile, at early dawn on the 
6th, the storm unabated, while Lieut. Taylor of Eu- 
bank s Battery was placing his four Napoleons and 


Killed at Franklin, Tenn., 18C4 


Lieut. J. D. Smith, of Jordan s battery, his section in 
the six epaulments, which Alexander had constructed 
near the river during the night, they were suddenly 
fired upon by a group of guns across the river and 
squarely on their own flank. A number of men and 
horses were wounded and several dismounted limber 
chests exploded before the detachments succeeded in 
getting their pieces under cover. To this fire, Capt. 
Jordan, in command of the guns, was quite unable to re 
ply. During the night the enemy had constructed 
works on the hill some 800 yards distant in which two 
batteries had been placed to prevent the occupation of 
Jordan s position, which commanded the lower bridge 
at Scott s Dam, and it was only now that it was dis 
covered by the Confederate pickets that Hooker had 
abandoned his advanced lines, and that few Federal 
troops remained on the south side of the river. 

The batteries on the north bank continued to ham 
mer at Jordan until 9 A. M. when Alexander brought 
up Moody s Battery, a section of Parker s, and a 24- 
pounder howitzer of Woolf oik s Battery, seven pieces in 
all, which, aided by Jordan s guns, engaged the enemy. 
During the duel which ensued two fresh hostile batteries 
to the right of the others uncovered, and all being well 
protected Alexander commanded his guns to cease fir 
ing. Jordan s six pieces remained under cover in their 
pits, while the enemy continued to fire upon him until 
the other guns were withdrawn. This incident closed 
the operations of the Confederate Artillery in the battle 
of Chancellorsville, in which Alexander s Battalion 
alone had lost Brown s entire section of Parker s Bat 
tery by capture, 6 men killed, 25 wounded, 21 missing, 
and 46 horses killed, disabled, or captured, or a total 
loss in officers and men of 62, which was about twenty 
per cent of those engaged. The losses of Walton s and 
Cabell s battalions of the 1st Corps were 28 and 45, 
respectively, while Garnett s loss was probably not less 
than 25. In the 2d Corps, Brown, Walker, Carter, 
Jones, Mclntosh, and Andrews together lost 150 men, 


while the total loss in Cutts and Nelson s reserve bat 
talions and Beckham s horse batteries was about 30. 
The aggregate Artillery loss in personnel at Chancel 
lor sville was, therefore, not less than 275, or in the 
neighborhood of seven per cent of the number actually 
engaged. For field artillery at this period the loss was 
enormous. But the loss inflicted upon the enemy s ar 
tillery had been still greater. In a report of casualties, 
which Gen. Hunt characterized as "imperfect," he states 
his losses as 5 officers and 50 men killed, 13 officers and 
268 men wounded, 53 captured or missing, or an ag 
gregate loss in personnel of 389, not including the horse 
batteries. In horses the loss was 389, and 14 pieces of 
superior ordnance were taken by the Confederates who 
themselves lost but 8. Although Hooker s entire loss 
aggregated 16,844 of all arms, that of his artillery was 
disproportionately large for the circumstances under 
which it was engaged. 

Nor had the Federal Artillery by any means meas 
ured up to its former standard of efficiency. The reason 
is not difficult to discover. The command of the Artillery 
which had been committed to Hunt by both McClellan 
and Burnside was withdrawn from him by Hooker, and 
the splendid soldier whose services at Malvern Hill, 
Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg had won great fame 
for him as an artillerist, was relegated to a purely ad 
ministrative duty. Not only was the superb organiza 
tion which he had perfected much broken up by scatter 
ing the Artillery here and there, and giving the various 
corps and division commanders too high a degree of 
control over it, but many of the batteries, unknown to 
Hunt, were ordered to be left in camp on the north side 
of the river when Hooker s main force moved to Chan- 
cellorsville. The promotion and transfer of numbers 
of the old regular artillery officers to other branches of 
the service also deprived many of the divisional bat 
talions of experienced commanders, and throughout the 
arm a great deficiency in the quality and number of field 
officers existed. For the command and administration 
of an arm with 412 guns, 980 carriages, 9,543 officers 


and men, and 8,544 horses, besides the immense ammu 
nition trains requisite for such a force of artillery, there 
were during the Chancellorsville campaign but five field 
officers of artillery present with the Army, and they 
were provided with miserably-inefficient staffs! Add 
to this the fact that there was no active head to the Fed 
eral Artillery until Col. Wainwright took command at 
Fairview on the morning of the 3d, and that Gen. Hunt 
was not given entire control until 10 p. M. that night, 
and the wonder is that Hooker s scattered batteries 
maintained themselves as well as they did. If Hooker 
were open to criticism as a general in no other respect 
the gross mismanagement of his artillery, the Federal 
arm par excellence, already famous the world over for 
the superiority of its organization and material and the 
high efficiency of its officers and men, would appear to 
be inexcusable. 

Many writers speak of Hooker s movements up to the 
time his three corps reached Chancellorsville on the 30th, 
as exceptionally fine. If to dispatch one s entire 
cavalry force, with the exception of a small brigade, to 
another quarter of the universe on a wild-goose chase; 
if to leave a great part of one s artillery at the base and 
provide no chief for the rest, but commit it entirely to 
the control of corps and division commanders ; if to pen 
one s infantry up in the heart of a forest without having 
even attempted a reconnaissance of the surrounding 
country, and leave every approach, except a single line 
of communication, open to be blocked by a nearby 
enemy known to be exceptionally bold and active; if 
such movements are correct, then Hooker s conduct of 
the campaign was indeed fine. But it seems to the 
writer that Hooker in disposing of his cavalry and de 
molishing his artillery in the way he did, committed 
acts which alone are enough to condemn any general 
guilty of such acts as inefficient and lacking in the 
fundamental conceptions of the tactics of the three arms 
combined. And such a view, it is believed, will uni 
versally obtain as time progresses and knowledge of 
events at Chancellorsville becomes more general. 


But now as to the tactical employment and services 
of the Confederate Artillery, the actual operations 
of which have been so closely followed. From the 
standpoint of the effectiveness of its fire, we have but to 
consider the results it undoubtedly accomplished in the 
conflict with an artillery superior in numbers and ma 
terial. Again the Federal reports teem with references 
to the severity and accuracy of the Confederate ar 
tillery fire; not one but mentions the Confederate guns 
in a way showing that the writer had in mind their fire as 
bearing a direct influence upon the issue of events at 
every point, and this in spite of the inferior grade of 
ammunition with which Lee s gunners were provided. 
We must at least concede, that with such a serious de 
fect to overcome, an exceptional degree of energy and 
efficiency was required on the part of the personnel to 
accomplish even what might have been expected of 
ordinary artillery. 

The mobility which the Confederate batteries dis 
played in this campaign is astounding when the de 
ficiency in the number and quality of their draught 
animals is considered. In no battle of the war was ar 
tillery called upon for greater activity on the march 
after contact with the enemy had been gained. Be 
ginning with April 29th, when Lee directed his Chief of 
Artillery to set the reserve battalions in motion, there 
was not a day when a great part of his artillery was not 
on the march. The transfer of the Artillery of the 2d 
Corps from below Hamilton s Crossing to the vicinity 
of Chancellorsville on the night of the 30th, was rapid 
and conducted in such a successful manner over a single 
road that there is an entire absence of complaint on the 
part of division and brigade commanders about blocked 
roads, etc., to which infantry commanders are so prone 
to attribute the causes of their own delays. With little 
rest, again the great column was set in motion and 
whirled over 15 miles or more of despicable roads, both 
narrow and difficult, and not only did it arrive at the 
designated point of rendezvous in good order and in 


good time, but some of the battalions were forced im 
patiently to remain in the clearings near the head of 
Jackson s column, when the signal for the infantry at 
tack was given. Indeed, the Artillery seems rather 
to have been too forward, as in Crutchfield s case and 
that of Carter on the night of the 2d, instead of being 
tardy in its arrival. In spite of darkness and the for 
bidding character of the terrain, when dawn of the 3d 
broke every gun of both corps was in the best position 
which those responsible for the posting of the Artillery 
could select, a fact which enabled Alexander, who ac 
companied Archer in his attack on Hazel Grove, to 
secure the position with Pegram s batteries the instant 
the Federals abandoned it, and instead of his lacking 
guns at the critical point, there was actually a surplus 
of them at hand in the foremost line. The cooperation 
of Alexander, with Stuart, was extraordinary and 
elicited from Stuart himself the statement that the 
action of the Artillery was superb, attributing the rapid 
movements of the batteries as he did to the improved 
battalion organization. But, if Alexander s cooperation 
with his corps commander was active and complete, no 
less so was that of Brown, Walker, Jones, Mclntosh, 
Poague, and Huger with their respective chiefs. Every 
where we found them striving to be at the right point 
at the right time. The activity displayed by Hardaway 
was also noticeable. Stumbling through trackless 
thickets, cutting his way with pick and axe to the front, 
we find him moving a part of his guns, at least, forward 
with the infantry as it advanced from the south to the 
Chancellorsville plateau, soon to move to a distant 
point of the theater of operations, only to push on over 
bottomless roads to a more active conflict, after a dis 
tressing night of toil and hunger. On the 4th we find 
Alexander s Battalion whisked from Chancellorsville 
after five days of constant marching or fighting, many 
miles to the rear and then back again to the river, where 
the morning of the 6th it was as active as when "boots 
and saddles" was blown at Hanover Junction a week 


before. In this week a number of the batteries of this 
battalion marched over 100 miles, in addition to being 
actually engaged three days and three nights. We have 
seen that the Horse Artillery under Beckham had lost 
nothing of its old dash so well known to the enemy. Yet, 
at least two of the light batteries, Moore s and Penick s, 
maneuvered with such rapidity in action as they 
dashed from hill to hill before Sedgwick s column on 
the 4th, always in the front and retarding the enemy, 
that they were mistaken by the Federal commander 
himself for horse artillery. 

Another fact to be discerned from the records is the 
entire absence of friction in the Confederate Artillery, 
and between it and the Army as a whole at Chancellors- 
ville, while so much discord and lack of cohesion existed 
in the same arm of the Federal Army in this campaign. 
In Hooker s army, after the battle, there was a wide 
spread feeling that the Federal Artillery had failed, a 
sentiment so prevalent that Gen. Hunt himself saw fit 
to offer explanations of the cause in his report. While 
one is forced to absolve the Federal Artillery itself of 
all blame, yet the fact remains that, though not of its 
own doing, it was rendered collectively inefficient 
throughout the campaign in spite of the individual 
gallantry and prowess of Dilger, Weed, Best, Osborn 
and others. Its very losses, which included about 20 
officers, are sufficient evidence of the courage and fight 
ing capacity of the Federal gunners, and it seems a pity 
that so superb a fighting machine as that which under 
Hunt was inherited by Hooker, should have been 
wantonly sacrificed to the ignorance and stupidity of 
one whom the world at large has seen fit to credit with 
unusual skill as an organizer, palliating in a measure 
thereby his miserable failure as an army commander. 

It has already been remarked that the Confederate 
Reserve Artillery was by necessity perverted from its 
true function in the campaign. Unless battalions which 
must be committed to the first line before a shot is fired 
can be classed as an artillery reserve, Lee had none at 


Chancellorsville, and in this respect was sadly crippled. 
In the narrative of events we have noted numerous oc 
casions when such a force might have been, and had it 
been available would have been, employed with controll 
ing influence upon the issue. All that can be said of the 
nominal reserve artillery is that in the sphere of duty 
assigned it, the services it rendered fully measured up to 
the expectations of the commander-in-chief , who in the 
conclusion of his report paid high tribute to the Ar 
tillery of his army in the following words : 

"Cols. Crutchfield, Alexander, Walker, and Lieut. -Cols. Brown, 
Carter, and Andrews, with the officers and men of their commands, 
are mentioned as deserving especial commendation. The batteries 
under Gen. Pendleton also acted with great gallantry." And later: 
"The Horse Artillery accompanied the infantry, and participated 
with credit to itself in the engagement." 

In concluding this account of the great campaign of 
May, 1863, the direct influence of the Confederate Ar 
tillery upon the issue demands notice by reason of the 
fact that history has almost completely ignored the 
matter. Without calling further attention to the serv 
ice rendered by Pendleton at Fredericksburg, which 
was jointly rendered with that of Early s infantry, at 
least two instances may be cited when the Artillery ex 
ercised a direct and determining influence upon the ulti 
mate result attained by Lee. Had Sickles not been 
checked by Col. Brown at the furnace on May 2, he 
would most certainly have developed the line of least 
resistance in that direction, and thrown the main column 
of his corps towards the southwest instead of, by a more 
easterly movement, becoming involved with the left of 
Anderson s Division. Had he, while engaging Ander 
son with his own left, been free to follow up Jackson s 
column with the force which Brown s prompt action 
balked in its advance, the trend of that column would 
have been more accurately determined, and at an early 
hour in the day, that is before 1 p. M., Hooker would 
most certainly have been advised of its true direction, 
for already the head of the column had turned north- 


ward at a point less than two miles from Brown s posi 
tion, and nothing seems more probable than that this 
fact would have been discovered through flanking par 
ties of Sickles Corps drifting up against it during the 
advance of their main body. Already Berdan, with a di 
vision close behind, had almost reached the unfinished 
railroad ; had he reached and freely possessed himself of 
it, this road would have formed the natural line of exten 
sion for the troops behind in their effort to turn the flank 
of any force which might seek to block their advance. 
Possessed of this railroad Sickles men would have had a 
short route to the Brock Road, from which Jackson s 
movement to the north would have been plainly visible, 
and the very denseness of the country intervening be 
tween the furnace and the Brock Road would have led 
small parties of the Federals to search for points of 
vantage from which to observe the movements of the 
enemy. From the point where Berdan was actually 
checked by Brown to the point along the railroad from 
which a clear view of Jackson s column moving to the 
north across Poplar Run and the railroad itself, and 
ascending the Trigg House Hill might have been had, 
the distance was not over 1% miles. The information 
which Sickles would thus have secured would at once 
have corrected the false impression under which he 
labored, and which he created in Hooker s mind about 
the enemy s movement to the south, and, added to the 
reports coming in from Howard s front, would have 
altered the whole estimate of the situation at head 
quarters, giving Hooker and Howard some five hours 
to prepare to meet the attack. In half that time, the 
llth Corps alone, with such reserve artillery as was 
available for use on the Federal right, could have been 
so disposed behind Hunting Run as to present an im 
pregnable front. With Barlow and every available re 
serve hurrying to Howard s left, and Sickles already 
wedged into the immense gap below the furnace, it 
would not have required a tactician of the first order to 
cut Lee s Army in twain. In fact, Brown s single bat- 


tery at one time stood between Hooker and the ac 
complishment of this task. But let us pass from what 
may appear too speculative, to that which is beyond the 
realm of conjecture, and which savors of reality. 

When Stuart arrived at the scene of action along the 
Plank Road at midnight, May 2, he was totally ignorant 
of the situation, and none of Jackson s staff except 
Col. A. S. Pendleton reported to him. Fortunately, 
however, he found Col. Alexander, who had the situation 
in its broad aspects in hand. Rodes and Colston were 
of course willing and anxious to give Stuart the bene 
fit of all the information in their possession, but their 
observations had been necessarily hasty and local in 
character. It seems certain that no one at the moment 
was so familiar with the situation as the Chief of Ar 
tillery, whose very duties had led him to make a thor 
ough reconnaissance of the paths and roads leading to 
the front. That Stuart appreciated this fact, is evi 
denced by his immediately associating Alexander with 
him for the purpose of making a general examination 
of the ground. It is now important to note from the 
tenor of Stuart s report that Alexander, and not he, 
discovered the Hazel Grove position and at once 
grasped its importance. This fact is proved by the use 
less and costly effort which Stuart made with Lane s 
and Ramseur s brigades in the morning along the road, 
while Alexander was massing his batteries in readiness 
in the vista to seize Hazel Grove, at the first oppor 
tunity. From the moment he had first laid eyes on 
Hazel Grove, Alexander never lost its importance from 
view, and in the light of what transpired, it seems 
fortunate for the Confederates that its seizure was not 
seriously attempted on the night of the 2d, before 
Sickles and Pleasanton abandoned the position. Had 
this been done, the attention of the Federals might have 
been called to the point, and the head instead of the tail 
of Sickles column of attack would have been directed 
towards the Confederates, thereby saving the key-point 


of Hooker s line of defense, and many men who met 
their fate in the midnight fiasco. 

Conceding then, that the occupation of Hazel Grove 
was primarily due to the ready perception of Stuart s 
Chief of Artillery, we must now go further and con 
sider the controlling influence its occupation by the Ar 
tillery exerted upon the issue. In the first place, there 
is no reason to suppose that having twice failed on the 
morning of the 3d to carry the Federal works in front 
of Fairview, although aided by Pegram s artillery, 
Stuart s infantry could have succeeded in a third at 
tempt without artillery. In fact, the Federals them 
selves unanimously ascribed the loss of their line of de 
fense to the Confederate batteries at Hazel Grove, the 
oblique fire of which Best s and Osborn s guns were 
unable to withstand. The great mass of guns at Fair- 
view Cemetery comprised the very bulwark of the Fed 
eral defense, and it was those guns in large measure 
which had swept back Stuart s gallant infantry from the 
works they had taken, while the Confederate left was 
subjected to an increasing pressure. To the threatened 
point, Stuart s attention was more and more directed, 
but meantime Alexander was moving the bulk of his 
artillery to the extreme right, and when finally his ar 
tillery preparations were well under way it must be 
observed that it was not the Federal right, but that 
portion of the line upon which the Confederate Artil 
lery exerted its influence, that yielded, which of course 
relieved the intense pressure on Stuart s left. It is thus 
seen that the superiority of fire attained by Alexander 
over the Federal Artillery, alone made possible the suc 
cess of Stuart s third infantry assault, for it was the 
withdrawal of their artillery that broke the backbone of 
the enemy s resistance. 

There are few better examples to be found than this 
one of the power of artillery when once it has attained 
a superiority of fire. Then it is that the crisis of the 
battle has arrived, and whatever may be the timber of 
the defending infantry, unless there are close at hand 


fresh guns, as in the case of the Confederate short-range 
batteries at Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg, to uncover 
when the hostile artillery becomes masked, the day is 
usually lost if the assaulting infantry is in earnest and 
numerically adequate to its task. Stuart was fortunate 
in possessing such an infantry, and it drove home with 
all the ardor of its old recklessness favored by the fact 
that almost until "cold steel" was the word, the support 
ing batteries were able to maintain over its head a heavy 
fire upon the somewhat elevated line of works held by 
the enemy. 

The loss of Fairview was but the precursor of 
Hooker s withdrawal from the south side of the river, 
for by its fall the Federal left was compelled to retire 
before Anderson and McLaws. Even before it fell, 
Hooker s heart had become set upon a general retro 
grade movement. Otherwise, he would surely have al 
lowed his batteries to be supplied with ammunition, 
however hopeless their struggle might have appeared. 



WHEN it became certain that Hooker had withdrawn 
his immense army from the upper fords and had re 
established his old camps about Fredericksburg and 
Falmouth, Gen. Lee ordered his troops back to the 
lines held by them during the winter. 

Col. Walton immediately placed the bulk of the ar 
tillery of the 1st Corps in camp at Stanard s farm, a 
few miles below Massaponax Church, while Col. Brown 
moved his batteries to the old artillery camping grounds 
in rear of Hamilton s Crossing and about Guiney s 
Station. Alexander, however, moved his battalion to 
the immediate neighborhood of Bowling Green, a point 
which was thought by both Gens. Lee and Pendleton 
to be too far to the rear in case of emergency. Mean 
while, the horses of the various artillery commands, 
which were greatly worn down and depleted by the 
strain of the recent campaign, were turned out to 
pasture, although the orders were general that the Ar 
tillery should be kept well in hand and prepared to 
move at a moment s notice. Reports of the condition of 
the batteries, detailing the number of serviceable guns, 
horses, and the strength in personnel of each were 
directed to be made, in order that all deficiencies might 
be made up as far as possible. 

The old idea that artillery battalions were an integral 
part of infantry divisions had by this time almost dis 
appeared, an advance in the right direction which had 
taken long to accomplish. But still the old view con 
tinued to crop out on occasions, as in the case of Col. 
Cabell, who, instead of moving his battalion along the 
Telegraph Road, as directed, to join Walton and rest 
his horses, maintained his position on Lee s Hill in ac 
cordance with Longstreet s views until he was peremp- 


torily ordered by Pendleton to repair to the rear. Cab- 
ell, it seems, had preferred to consider his command as 
permanently attached to one of Longstreet s divisions, 
and had been most remiss in rendering his reports 
through Col. Walton, Chief of Artillery 1st Corps. 

Gen. Longstreet had arrived at Fredericksburg on 
the 6th of May and soon after Pickett s and Hood s 
divisions began to arrive with Dearing s and Henry s 
battalions of artillery. On the day Longstreet arrived 
A. P. Hill resumed command of the 2d Corps, Stuart 
returning to his own division. Gen. Lee had also urged 
the return of Ransom s Division, which the Secretary 
of War, on the 6th, directed D. H. Hill in North Caro 
lina to set in motion for Fredericksburg, if it could be 
done with safety. 

The great shock of the campaign now occurred, for 
on May 10, Gen. Jackson succumbed. The story of his 
last hours on this earth is one full of pathos, as well as 
of the most inspiring lessons for the soldier. In the 
hour of his death he was as great as when upon the 
various battlefields of his career, with exalted mien and 
superb composure, he led his men to victory. Concern 
ing his wounding and death, Longstreet wrote: "The 
shock was a very severe one to men and officers, but the 
full extent of our loss was not felt until the remains 
of the beloved general had been sent home. The dark 
clouds of the future then began to lower above the 
Confederates." Gen. Lee in a note to the wounded 
general on the 3d, in the midst of battle had already de 
clared that, could he have directed events, he should 
have chosen, for the good of the country, to have been 
disabled in Jackson s stead. In closing his message, he 
congratulated Jackson upon the victory his "skill and 
energy" had won, but the latter, expressing appreciation 
of his superior s remarks, declared that Gen. Lee should 
give the praise to God and not to him. 

Soon after his wounding, he had been removed by 
order of Gen. Lee to the Chandler house near Guiney s 
Station, where Dr. McGuire did all in his power to save 


him, but on Thursday the 7th he developed pneumonia 
of the right lung, doubtless attributable to the fall from 
the litter the night he was wounded. Fortunately for 
the peace of his mind, Mrs. Jackson arrived this day 
with their infant child, and took the place of his chaplain 
who had remained almost constantly with him. By Satur 
day, Drs. Hoge, Breckenridge, and Tucker had joined 
McGuire in an effort to save him, and noting their pres 
ence he said to Dr. McGuire : "I see from the number of 
physicians that you think my condition dangerous, but 
I thank God, if it is His will, that I am ready to go." 
When informed by Mrs. Jackson at daylight the next 
morning that he should prepare for the worst, he was 
silent for a moment and then said, "It will be infinite 
gain to be translated to heaven." And so we see that 
although this wonderful man still clung to a hope of 
recovery, his confidence in the future was as supreme as 
his self-confidence had been on earth. Never once did 
he express a doubt of his ability to rise paramount to 
present difficulties or to meet the future. His sole re 
quest was to be buried in Lexington, in the Valley of 
Virginia, where as a simple and unassuming professor 
of the Science of War he had kept the smothered fire of 
his genius aglow while preparing himself and a host of 
his pupils for the inevitable struggle which he had fore 
seen. When told by his wife that before sundown he 
would be in Heaven, he called for Dr. McGuire and 
asked him if he must die. To the affirmative answer he 
received, his reply was, "Very good, very good, it is all 
right." His efforts then were to comfort his heart 
broken wife, and when Col. Pendleton, whom he had 
trained as a soldier and loved very dearly, entered his 
room about 1 p. M., he asked who was preaching at head 
quarters on this his last Sabbath. Being informed that 
the whole Army was praying for him, he said, "Thank 
God, they are very kind. It is the Lord s day ; my wish 
is fulfilled. I have always desired to die on Sunday." 
His mind now began to weaken while his lips fre 
quently muttered commands as if he were on the field 


of battle, then words of comfort for his wife. When 
tendered a drink of brandy and water, he declined it, 
saying, "It will only delay my departure and do no 
good. I want to preserve my mind, if possible, to the 
last." Again he was told that but few hours remained 
for him, and again he replied, feebly but firmly, "Very 
good, it is all right." In the delirium which preceded 
his death he cried out, "Order A. P. Hill to prepare for 
action, pass the infantry to the front rapidly, tell Maj. 
Hawks " and then, pausing, a smile of ineffable sweet 
ness spread over his pallid face and with an expression 
as if of relief, he said, "No, no. Let us cross over the 
river and rest under the shade of the trees."* Then 
without sign of pain, or the least struggle, his spirit 
passed onward and upward to God. 

Such were the final moments of the great soldier. 
With body all but cold in death, so long as his pulse 
continued the dictates of his heart were pure. Almost 
to the instant that heart ceased to beat, his mind gave 
evidence of the quality of the man in the flash of the 
willy though now subconscious, which possessed his 
spirit. Still his mind dwelt upon rapid action and the 
rush of infantry, which ever filled his soul with joy, but 
then, even in the last flicker of his intellect, he realized 
that the flag of truce had been raised by his enemies and 
interposing the stay of his final words "No, no ," he 
died in the happiness of the earthly victory he had won. 
Let us be thankful that he saw his men preparing to 
rest upon their arms not engaged in the heated 
turmoil of the charge when he bade them farewell. Let 
us be thankful that this dispensation was granted him 
by the Maker who gently led him to the shade of the 
river side where rested all those gallant associates who 
had preceded him. No longer were they his pupils and 
his subordinates in war, but his equals in the eternity of 
peace. But yet an earthly rite remained to those whom 
he had left behind, for far off from the scene of conflict, 
that youthful band, bound together then as it is now, 

"This remark was as given above, according to Capt. James Power Smith 
of Jackson s staff, and not merely as usually quoted without the two first words. 


by the traditions of his fame, bore his body to the grave. 
How fitting that a caisson of the cadet battery with 
which he had for so many years drilled his pupils and 
the Confederate Artillery should form his hearse, and 
that his body should lie in state in the old tower class 
room, wherein he had set so noble an example to 
youth. It was in that very room that he had declared, 
"If war must come, then I will welcome war," and that 
the South in such event should "throw away the scab 

In the shadow of the majestic Blue Ridge, with the 
great North Mountain as his head stone, which like a 
huge sentinel stands guard beside the parade ground of 
his life, tenderly was his body laid to rest by the youth 
ful soldiers he loved so well, but still, wielding the un 
covered blade of immortality, 

"His spirit wraps yon dusky mountain; 
His memory sparkles o er each fountain; 
The meanest rill, the mightiest river, 
Rolls,, mingling with his fame forever." 

For one part of the Army, at least, it was Jackson, 
the artilleryman, that had gone, for he in a higher de 
gree than any of Lee s lieutenants had endeared him 
self to the gunners to whose welfare he was ever at 
tentive and of whose success he was ever proud. The 
old love of the arm which he could not overcome in spite 
of the more general command he had been clothed with, 
coupled with the knowledge of the gunners that their 
leader had once commanded a battery, created and main 
tained a bond of sympathy between Jackson and his ar 
tillery evidenced by innumerable little incidents in his 
career as a general. One thing is certain, he was the 
first of Lee s lieutenants to grasp the idea of artillery 
as an entity and to employ it accordingly, and in this 
he was ably assisted by Col. Crutchfield, between whom 
and his chief the most thorough confidence existed. No 
such relations as theirs existed between Longstreet and 
Walton, neither of whom proceeded upon the principle 
that the Chief of Artillery should be able to read the 


very soul of his commander, and by that constant and 
close association which alone can breed the highest con 
fidence between men, especially between soldiers, be able 
to frame his every action in conformity with his superi 
or s views. Mutual confidence between a commanding 
general and his chief of artillery is certainly essential 
to the success of the artillery, if not to the army as a 
whole, for occasions will arise when the supreme com 
mander must needs direct the movements of his bat 
teries and there is always danger that the limitations and 
necessities of the special arm may be lost sight of by one 
who views the situation in its general aspect. Now, if 
the chief of artillery has by his obedience, by his 
readiness to act, and by his sympathy with the wider 
problems of the general, won a personal place in ad 
dition to his official position on the staff of his com 
mander, he is prepared to suggest, without danger of 
giving offense to his superior, a change here and there 
which will at once inure to the benefit of his arm, and 
enable it to accomplish the best results. If, however, 
there is a want of sympathy between the two, or if the 
subordinate holds himself aloof, or stands upon his 
dignity and receives his orders in a perfunctory way, 
rather suggesting by his conduct a superior specialized 
knowledge, lack of harmony is sure to result with its 
many evil consequences. W^e must concede, in view of 
these facts, that Jackson was most fortunate in possess 
ing Crutchfield, from whose relations with the com 
manding general the artillery of his corps in turn 
directly benefited. 

The loss of Jackson was accepted by Lee in the same 
spirit of Christian fortitude for which he was ever con 
spicuous, and the day following his death the highest 
tribute ever paid a soldier was published in the following 
words : 

"With deep grief, the commanding general announces to the 
Army the death of Lieut. -Col. T. J. Jackson, who expired on the 
10th inst., at 3:15 P. M. The daring, skill, and energy of this great 
and good soldier, by the decree of an all-wise Providence, are now 
lost to us. But while we mourn his death, we feel that his spirit 


still lives and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable 
courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and strength. 
Let his name be a watchword to his corps, who have followed him 
to victory on so many fields. Let his officers and soldiers emulate 
his invincible determination to do everything in the defense of our 
beloved country. 

"R. E. LEE, 


And to Stuart, the bereft Commander-in-Chief wrote, 
"May his spirit pervade our whole army; our country 
will then be secure."* 

These words of Lee are referred to as the greatest 
tribute ever paid a soldier, for never before or since has 
so great a commander-in-chief as Lee appealed to the 
love and memory of a lieutenant as the spirit which dif 
fused should prove the motive power of his army. 

On May llth, the Chief of Artillery, 2d Corps, re 
ported that immediate steps had been undertaken to re 
organize and refit his batteries. As it shows the con 
dition of the Artillery in general, the substance of his 
report is given. 

Many guns were rendered unserviceable through lack 
of horses. The available ones were as follows. 

Walker s Battalion of 5 batteries, 14 guns in camp 
and 4 on picket near Hamilton s Crossing. 

Jones Battalion of 4 batteries, 8 guns in camp and 
4 on picket on the left. 

Carter s Battalion of 4 batteries, 13 guns in camp 
and 3 at the repair train in rear. 

Andrews Battalion of 4 batteries, 14 guns in camp. 

Hardaway s (Brown s) Battalion of 6 batteries, 12 
guns in camp, and 4 on picket in the center. 

Mclntosh s Battalion of 4 batteries, 14 guns in camp. 

Thus it is seen that but three batteries had been left 
along the front while there were 87 guns available for 
service in the 2d Corps. 

Meantime, Col. Brown had sent out two officers from 
each of his battalions amply provided with money to 

Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, pp. 792-3. 


buy fresh horses and authorized to sell the condemned 
battery horses to farmers who might be willing to pur 
chase them for future use. 

The condition of Cabell s Battalion on the 15th is in 
dicative of that of the others of the 1st Corps. Mc 
Carthy s Battery with two 3-inch rifles, two 6-pounders, 
one 4-horse battery wagon and two quartermaster 
wagons, had 54 horses of which 12 were unserviceable. 
Manly s Battery had one 3-inch rifle, two 20-pounder 
howitzers, two 4-horse battery wagons, two quarter 
master wagons, and 90 horses, of which 20 were unserv 
iceable. With Carlton s Battery, there were two 10- 
pounder Parrotts, one 12-pounder howitzer, three bat 
tery wagons with 12 mules and 73 horses, seven mules 
and twelve horses being unserviceable, while Eraser s 
Battery had one 10-pounder Parrot, one 3-inch rifle, one 
12-pounder howitzer, one forge, three wagons, and 62 
horses, of which six were unserviceable. Including 
mounts for the battalion sergeant-major, forge master, 
wagon master, quartermaster-sergeant, and mounted 
courier, 88 horses were required to complete the comple 
ment of this battalion alone, while two Napoleons for 
McCarthy, three for Manly, two for Carlton, and a 12- 
pounder Blakely for Fraser were soon expected to 
arrive from Richmond. 

Gen. Pendleton made every effort to secure the horses 
needed for the Artillery, but before the end of the 
month was able to secure but 396. The condition with 
respect to horses of the various battalions after the pre 
ceding campaign is shown by the distribution of this 
supply, which was as follows : 

Hardaway s Battalion 112 

Jones Battalion 17 

Walker s Battalion 56 

Carter s Battalion 14 

Macintosh s Battalion 34 

Andrews Battalion 40 

Eshleman s Battalion 32 

Garnett s Battalion 26 

Cabell s Battalion 10 

Alexander s Battalion _ 55 


This issue by no means supplied all the wants, which 
fact gives a pretty good idea of the suffering and service 
which the field artillery horses had undergone during 
the short space of a single week, for it will be recalled 
that the batteries were fairly well mounted when they 
left their winter quarters the 29th of April. 

Extraordinary efforts were now being made by the 
Bureau of Ordnance to provide the necessary material, 
and Col. Gorgas himself was present to examine into 
the exact needs of all, and found that in general a 
marked improvement in the ammunition was reported. 
The shells for the 20-pounder Parrotts, due to defects in 
the castings, were still unsatisfactory, for many of them 
were reported to have burst near the muzzle. The new 
projectile for the Whitworths, which had been fabri 
cated in Richmond, however, proved a great success. In 
the main, the field ordnance operations had been well 
conducted during the campaign and satisfaction in that 
respect was general. Capt. William Allan, Chief of 
Ordnance, 2d Corps, had displayed unusual ability, and 
his promotion was again urged by Col. Gorgas. 

Nothing is so indicative of the growing appreciation 
of the importance of the Artillery as the increased inter 
est now displayed in the theoretical features of gunnery. 
By a special order of June 8, a board to consist of not 
less than three nor more than six artillery officers, to be 
designated by the Chief of Artillery, was created and 
directed to meet the first day of each month, or as soon 
thereafter as practicable, to report such facts in regard 
to material, ammunition, and any other matters con 
cerning the Artillery, and to make recommendations 
for its improvement. The board was also directed to 
compile range tables for the various types of guns in 
use. On the 15th, Gen. Pendleton appointed Col. 
Alexander, Majs. Dearing and Henry, Capts. Reilly, 
Blount, and Fraser to the board, and immediately they 
set to work, extending their investigations over a wide 


field and contributing in innumerable ways to the 
betterment of the arm.* 

It was at once found that a number of vacancies ex 
isted among the superior officers of the Field Artillery, 
which hampered the effective administration and leader 
ship of the battalions. The number of guns with the 
Army entitled the arm, under the law, to 3 brigadier- 
generals, 7 colonels, 11 lieutenant-colonels, and 17 
majors, whereas there were actually commissioned but 
1 brigadier-general, 6 colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels, 
there being, however, 19 majors, or two more than for 
which authority of law existed. Already several pro 
motions of importance had been made, among which was 
that of Capt. Benj. T. Eshleman, of the Washington 
Artillery Battalion, as its major with rank as of March 
26, 1863. This battalion had not only furnished the 
Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps, but three majors be 
sides, namely, Garnett, Bearing, and Eshleman, while 
one of its original captains, Thomas L. Rosser, had al 
ready become a colonel of cavalry. Both he and Dear- 
ing later became major-generals of cavalry. t 

It was but a few days before the artillery board of 
which Col. Alexander was president, and in the de 
liberations of which he played a leading role, drafted a 
plan for the reorganization of the Artillery and sub 
mitted it to the commander-in-chief, with what result 
we shall see. 

By special order dated May 30, the Army of North 
ern Virginia was reorganized into three corps with Long- 
street, Ewell, and A. P. Hill as corps commanders. 
The 1st Corps now consisted of McLaws , Hood s, and 
Pickett s divisions, the 2d Corps of Early s, Edward 
Johnson s, and Rodes divisions, and the 3d Corps of 
R. H. Anderson s, Heth s, and Pender s divisions. 
Rodes and Anderson s divisions each contained five, 

Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXVII, pp. 873, 895. 

fRosser, Garnett, and Bearing were members of the graduating class at West 
Point when they resigned in April, 1861. When the Washington Artillery 
Battalion reported in Richmond in May they were assigned to duty with it, 
the first as a captain and the others as lieutenants. 


Pickett s three, and all the others four brigades. The 
Chief of Artillery was directed to designate the artillery 
for the various corps and the General Reserve Artillery 
was abolished.* This order marks a great crisis in the 
development, not only of the Confederate, but of the ar 
tillery organization of the world. For the first time 
practical effect was to be given the growing recognition 
of the fact that a general reserve artillery was no longer 
necessary, and that the better tactical employment of 
the arm required the distribution of all the guns among 
the corps, if the danger of part of them being left in 
active in the rear was to be overcome. The advantages 
of corps artillery have been previously discussed 
at length. Suffice it to repeat that together with the 
change of name came also a change of position in the 
order of march, and that every leader of troops and 
every staff officer were at once compelled to recognize 
that no part of the artillery was to remain in idleness, 
but that all was to take a place in the line of battle since 
improved material with its increased range enabled the 
withdrawal of battalions for special missions, even after 
they had once become engaged. It should here be noted 
that Lee in the employment of his artillery had antici 
pated the actual change in organization, which was, 
therefore, in large measure, but the logical result of a 
gradual process of development in his tactics. What 
ever may be claimed as to the theoretical development 
of artillery organization and tactics, the Confederates 
certainly gave practical form to the conception of corps 
artillery in its highest sense, and the innovation was 
soon accepted and adopted by the armies of the 

On June 2 and 4, Pendleton gave form to the new 
artillery organization by first designating three divi 
sional and two reserve battalions for each of the three 
corps of the Army, and then assigning a chief of artillery 
to each. The completed organization was as follows : 

Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, p. 850, Special Order No. 146. 


IST CORPS (Longstreet) 

Col. James B. Walton, Chief of Artillery 

Col. Henry Coalter Cabell 

1. "A" Battery, 1st N. C. Reg., Capt. Basil C. Manly. 

2. Pulaski (Ga.) Battery, Capt. John C. Fraser. 

3. 1st Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Edward S. McCarthy. 

4. Troup (Ga.) Battery, Capt. Henry H. Carlton. 

Maj. James Dearing 

1. Fauquier Battery, Capt. Robert M. Stribling. 

2. Richmond Hampden Battery, Capt. William H. Caskie. 

3. Richmond Fayette Battery, Capt. Miles C. Macon. 

4. Lynchburg Battery, Capt. Jos. G. Blount. 

Maj. M. W. Henry 

1. Branch (N. C.) Battery, Capt. Alexander C. Latham. 

2. Charleston German Battery, Capt. Wm. K. Bachman. 

3. Palmetto (S. C.) Battery, Capt. Hugh R. Garden. 

4. Rowan (N. C.) Battery, Capt. James Reilly. 

Col. E. Porter Alexander 

1. Ashland Battery, Capt. Pichegru Woolfolk, Jr. 

2. Bedford Battery, Capt. Tyler C. Jordan. 

3. Brooks (S. C.) Battery, Lieut. S. C. Gilbert. 

4. Madison (La.) Battery, Capt. Geo. V. Moody. 

5. Richmond Battery, Capt. William W. Parker. 

6. Bath Battery, Capt. Esmond B. Taylor. 

Maj. Benj. F. Eshleman 

1. 1st Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. C. W. Squires. 

2. 2d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. J. B. Richardson. 

3. 3d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. M. B. Miller. 

4. 4th Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Joe Norcom. 


2D CORPS (Ewell) 

Col. John Thompson Brown, Chief of Artillery 

Lieut.-Col. Thos. H. Carter 

1. Jeff Davis Alabama Battery., Capt. William J. Reese. 

2. King William Battery, Capt. William P. Carter. 

3. Louisa Morris Battery, Capt. R. C. M. Page. 

4. Richmond Orange Battery, Capt. Chas. W. Fry. 

Lieut.-Col. Hilary P. Jones 

1. Charlottesville Battery, Capt. Jas. McD. Carrington. 

2. Richmond Courtney Battery, Capt. W. A. Tanner. 

3. Louisiana Guard Battery, Capt. C. A. Green. 

4. Staunton Battery, Capt. Asher W. Garber. 

Maj. James W. Latimer 

1. 1st Maryland Battery, Capt. Wm. F. Dement. 

2. Alleghany Battery, Capt. John C. Carpenter. 

3. 4th Md. or Chesapeake Battery, Capt. William D. Brown. 

4. Lee Battery, Capt. Charles J. Raine. 



Capt. Willis J. Dance 

1. 2d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. David Watson. 

2. 3d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr. 

3. Powhatan Battery, Lieut. John M. Cunnigham. 

4. 1st Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Archibald Graham. 

5. Salem Battery, Lieut. C. B. Griffin. 

Lieut.-Col. William Nelson 

1. Amherst Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick. 

2. Fluvanna Battery, Capt. John L. Massie. 

3. Georgia Regular Battery, Capt. John Milledge. 


3D CORPS (A. P. Hill) 

Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery 


Maj. David G. Mclntosh 

1. Danville Battery, Capt. R. S. Price. 

2. Alabama Battery, Capt. W. B. Hurt. 

3. 2d Rockbridge Battery, Lieut. Samuel Wallace. 

4. Richmond Battery, Capt. Marmaduke Johnson. 

Lieut. -Col. John J. Garnett 

1. Donaldsonville (La.) Battery, Capt. Victor Maurin. 

2. Norfolk Battery, Capt. Jos. D. Moore. 

3. Pittsylvania Battery, Capt. John W. Lewis. 

4. Norfolk Blues Battery, Capt. Chas. R. Grandy. 

Maj. William T. Poague 

1. Albemarle Battery, Capt. James W. Wyatt. 

2. Charlotte (N. C.) Battery, Capt. Joseph Graham. 

3. Madison (Miss.) Battery, Capt. George Ward. 

4. Warrenton Battery, Capt. J. V. Brooke. 


Maj. William J. Pegram 

1. Richmond Battery, Capt. Wm. G. Crenshaw. 

2. Fredericksburg Battery, Capt. Edward A. Marye. 

3. Richmond Letcher Battery, Capt. Thomas A. Brander. 

4. Pee Dee (S. C.) Battery, Lieut. Wm. E. Zimmerman. 

5. Richmond Purcell Battery, Capt. Jos. McGraw. 


1. "A" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Hugh M. Ross. 

2. "B" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Geo. M. Patterson. 

3. "C" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. John T. Wingfield. 

From the foregoing we see that there were now with 
the Army 15 battalions with a total of 62 light bat- 


teries. Each battalion had a field-officer in addition to 
its commander, and a complete commissioned staff. The 
five battalions comprising the artillery of each corps con 
stituted a division of artillery under the corps chief of 
artillery, who reported to and received orders direct 
from the corps commander, while the chief of ar 
tillery of the Army reported to and represented the 
commander-in-chief in his dealings with the corps ar 
tillery. In the whole scheme of reorganization, one 
cannot but see the features of the brilliant Alexander 
cropping out, and the final success of his efforts to di 
vorce the artillery from the tactical control of Gen. 
Pendleton, except in so far as he represented the com 
mander-in-chief in his capacity as administrative chief 
of artillery. 

By the time the reorganization was completed, Col. 
Baldwin, the Chief of Ordnance, had received a fresh 
consignment of 14 Napoleons from Gorgas, who was 
energetically pushing forward the manufacture of the 
improved gun in Richmond. These, in addition to the 
14 captured pieces, were at once issued to the battalions 
in the field in as equitable a manner as possible, only 
two 3-inch rifles going to the Horse Artillery. The 
distribution of guns was now as follows: 

Cabell s Battalion, 8 rifles, 8 Napoleons. 

Garnett s Battalion, 11 rifles, 4 Napoleons, 2 howitzers, and 
one 6-inch Whitworth. 

Bearing s Battalion, 5 rifles, 12 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one 
6-inch Whitworth. 

Henry s Battalion, 4> rifles, 12 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one 
6-inch Whitworth. 

Eshleman s Battalion, 10 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one 6-inch 

Alexander s Battalion, 11 rifles, 9 Napoleons, 3 howitzers. 

Carter s Battalion, 8 rifles, 6 Napoleons, 2 howitzers. 

Jones Battalion, 4 rifles, 10 Napoleons. 

Mclntosh s Battalion, 10 rifles, 6 Napoleons. 

Andrews Battalion, 10 rifles, 6 Napoleons. 

Pegram s Battalion, 8 rifles, 9 Napoleons, 2 howitzers. 

Dance s Battalion, 10 rifles, 8 Napoleons, 4 howitzers. 

Cutts Battalion, 10 rifles, 3 Napoleons, 5 howitzers. 

Nelson s Battalion, 6 rifles, 8 Napoleons, 4 howitzers. 


Thus, it is seen that about equally distributed among 
the three corps were one hundred and three 3-inch rifles, 
one hundred and seven 12-pounder Napoleons, thirty 
12-pounder howitzers, and four 6-inch Whitworths, or 
a total of 244 guns of comparatively superior type to 
those which had been in use within the past few months. 
But, while the material was much improved by substi 
tuting the captured rifles and the Napoleons of home 
manufacture for the old 6-pounders, and while the bat 
teries were equally equipped in the number of pieces, 
that is four to a battery, a distressing lack of uniformity 
in material existed. This was of course a glaring de 
fect, greatly increasing the difficulty of ammunition 
supply and impairing the general efficiency. Theo 
retically it was capable of correction, but practically 
there were many difficulties in the way. Some batteries 
wanted rifles, others Napoleons, and few were willing 
to be armed with howitzers alone. The gunners in the 
various batteries had become familiar with their material 
of whatever character, and the mere suggestion that uni 
formity of battery armament should be enforced at once 
raised a hue and cry on the part of all for the material 
of their individual preference. For the sake of general 
uniformity none were willing to waive those preferences. 
After all, this attitude was natural, and it would have 
required a bold chief indeed to ignore the human phase 
of the situation. Believing that the good to be accom 
plished by unifying the battery armaments was not com 
mensurate with the general dissatisfaction such a step 
would surely arouse, Gen. Pendleton declined to raise 
the issue and so a great evil was allowed to exist to the 
very end. 

In the selection of a chief of artillery for the new 
corps, the services of one who had been actively engaged 
in every battle from Bull Run to date were recognized. 
In the whole army, there was not one who deserved pro 
motion more than Reuben Lindsay Walker, and his 
elevation was welcomed by all and accepted in a spirit 
of profound satisfaction by the Artillery. Less brilliant 


than Alexander, he yet possessed the highest virtues 
both as a man and as a soldier, and throughout his long 
career gave many evidences of his peculiar ability as an 
artillerist, especially as an organizer. 

Here it should be remarked that in no arm of the 
service was promotion so slow as in the Field Artillery. 
In the list of battery commanders in May, 1863, we find 
a number who had served in that capacity since the out 
break of the war, and less than 30 of the original ar 
tillery officers had attained the rank of field-officers 
after two years of honorable and arduous service. 
Many of these were among the most efficient officers in 
the Army from every standpoint. Col. Long, Lee s 
military secretary, said that the personnel of the Ar 
tillery was unsurpassed by any troops in the Army, 
and many officers in other arms have declared that the 
Artillery was the most distinguished arm of the service. 
It was the esprit de corps of the Artillery alone which 
kept its officers true to their stripe, notwithstanding 
the unfavorable opportunity for their advancement, and 
few sought promotion by transferring to other arms, 
Rosser, Dearing, and J. R. C. Lewis being among the 
exceptions, while Col. Stephen D. Lee was promoted 
out of the Artillery. 

It has become the habit of historians to declare that 
the Federal at all times excelled the Confederate ar 
tillery in material and personnel. Even Col. Hender 
son in his Aldershot lecture on the American Civil War 
fell into the error of making so general and unqualified 
an assertion.* Certainly, as far as the Army of North 
ern Virginia is concerned, the quality of the personnel 
of the Field Artillery was not surpassed if equalled by 
any similar arm then in existence, a fact which seems to 
be indisputable when the inferiority of its material, am 
munition, equipment, stores, horses, training and all the 
other disadvantages under which it labored are con 

*Science of War, G. F. R., Henderson, p. 245. But see Evolution of Modern 
Strategy, by Lieut-Col. P. N. Maude, in which it is said that the three arms of the 
Confederate Army were intrinsically superior at the beginning of the war. 


At the outbreak of the war the regular batteries 
served as models to the Northern volunteers. One of 
these was grouped with three manned by volunteers, and 
the latter very naturally profited by the example set 
them. Again, the supply of horses in the North and 
West was practically inexhaustible, while in the South 
there were few left at the close of the second year of the 
war. Not only did the North possess the national school 
of arms, which it was able to maintain in uninterrupted 
activity for the technical education of its more scientific 
officers, but it also conducted several schools of gunnery 
while its armies operated in the field. In a measure, 
West Point was offset by the Virginia Military Insti 
tute, but had the South been free to conduct schools of 
gunnery for its artillery officers, it would have been un 
able to provide them with ammunition. After the war 
commenced its only school of instruction was that of 
actual experience, and a large majority of its junior ar 
tillery officers fired a gun for the first time on the field of 
battle. Surely the personnel must have possessed equal 
if not superior qualities to those of their antagonists, to 
accomplish the results they did. One need only follow 
the rapid development which they brought about to be 
satisfied that they were not ordinary or inefficient men. 
We have seen what the stage of this development was 
in May, 1863. Now let us examine conditions in the 
Federal Artillery at the time. 

If we accept the evidence of Gen. Henry T. Hunt, 
Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, an officer of 
great ability and unsurpassed special knowledge as an 
artillerist when he wrote, the Federal Artillery in May, 
1863, was in a most unsatisfactory condition.* In spite 
of the splendid organization which McClellan had given 
it and its initial services in the war under Hunt, a gen 
eral decline in the efficiency of the arm had set in be 
fore the end of 1862. Field-officers of artillery had be 
come to be regarded as an unnecessary expense, and their 
muster into the service was forbidden; so just at the time 

*Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill, p. 259. 


the Confederates were doing all in their power to im 
prove the organization of their artillery by creating bat 
talions with an adequate number of competent field and 
staff officers, the Federals were destroying the tactical 
cohesion of their artillery by denying it the necessary 
officers, and instead of remaining in the artillery ir 
respective of promotion, many of the best artillery of 
ficers in the Army of the Potomac at once transferred 
to other arms in which better opportunities for advance 
ment were to be found. Thus, such experienced ar 
tillerists as Hays, De Russy, Getty, Gibbon, Griffin, 
and Ayres sought promotion in the cavalry and infan 
try. While every effort was made to maintain the Con 
federate batteries at full strength, however depleted the 
units of the other arms, in the North no adequate meas 
ures were taken to supply recruits for the artillery, and 
the batteries were frequently dependent on the troops 
to which they were attached for men enough to work 
the guns in action. While Pendleton was maintaining 
a remount depot for his command at Winchester under 
Maj. Richardson, inadequate as it was, and scouring 
the country, even as far as Georgia and Florida, for 
draught animals, always being favored by the Quarter 
master-General in the matter of horses, the Federal bat 
teries were often forced to wait for remounts until the 
cavalry, and even the medical and quartermaster trains 
had been supplied, a fact which illustrated the general 
feeling in the army towards the field artillery. While 
the Confederate organization was being solidified and 
molded along the lines dictated by experience, in the 
North all experience was ignored and the Chief of Ar 
tillery was in effect relieved by Hooker from all but 
administrative work. In lieu of the perfect mechanism 
of the arm under Hunt on the Peninsula, Hooker sub 
stituted chaos. With the command of the Artillery at 
his own headquarters to be exercised by his chief only 
upon specific orders, there resulted such confusion 
and disorder that the artillery had to be practically re 
organized after a splendid organization had already 


been attained and sacrificed. Thus while the Confed 
erates were building up, the Federals had been tearing 
down. During the period in which the former were 
organizing their artillery into corps divisions, all under 
a strongly-centralized command, and appointing more 
and more field officers, the Army of the Potomac had 
no artillery commander- in-chief, and of the 14 artillery 
brigades it possessed, nine were commanded by captains 
and one by a lieutenant, in addition to their battery 
duties, while but four were commanded by field 
officers ! 

Such was the condition of the Federal Field Artillery, 
when it entered upon the Gettysburg campaign, with 
its 65 batteries and 370 splendid guns, It will, there 
fore, as stated by Gen. Hunt himself, be perceived by 
comparison that the organization of the Federal Ar 
tillery was at this period in every way inferior to that 
of the Confederates. Nothing but the same individual 
courage and intelligence among the Northern artillery 
men, as was to be found in the corresponding arm in 
Lee s Army, saved the former from a complete break 
down at Gettysburg. All the more honor is due them 
for the account they there gave of themselves, but let us 
hear nothing more of the superiority of the Federal Ar 
tillery personnel, except in point of numbers. In that 
respect the Confederates were greatly outclassed. 

The return of May 20 gives the artillery personnel 
of Lee s Army as 253 officers and 4,708 men present for 
duty, and a paper aggregate of 7,279. These figures do 
not include Dearing s Battalion and two batteries on 
picket, nor two others with Ransom. The return of May 
31, the last before the battle of Gettysburg, gives the 
Artillery, less Alexander s and Garnett s battalions, a 
total effective strength of 4,460. The 52 batteries re 
ported therefore averaged 86 officers and men present, 
and adding 860 for the 10 batteries not included in the 
return, an effective aggregate of 5,320 is obtained. This 
is not far from correct, since the aggregate present on 
May 10 was 5,010. From these figures it is seen that 
the average battery strength was about 3 officers and 


80 enlisted men, a fact which well illustrates the import 
ance Lee attached to the efficiency of his artillery, and 
the tremendous effort which had been made by the Chief 
of Artillery and his subordinates to maintain the bat 
teries at a serviceable strength. In the infantry and 
cavalry there were battalions and squadrons at this time 
with less than 100 men. 

The aggregate strength of the Federal Artillery en 
gaged in the Gettysburg campaign was 7,183, the num 
ber of batteries 65, and the number of guns 370, or 
about 110 officers and men and 6 pieces to the battery. 

Having examined the organization of the Field Ar 
tillery, let us look into that of the Confederate Horse 

Immediately after the battle of Chancellorsville, 
Stuart was directed to concentrate his division at Cul- 
peper, meanwhile guarding his front and the Confed 
erate left along the Rapidan, and before May 9, Jones 
Brigade with Chew s Battery was ordered from the 
Valley to join him. By May 20, the strength of his 
division, including the Horse Artillery, was 8,193 
present and 11,905 present and absent. 

Early in April the horse batteries had been organized 
into a separate corps under Maj. R. F. Beckham, but 
were temporarily left with the brigades with which they 
had served, subject to the orders of the brigade com 
manders.* The first step in the organization of the 
Horse Artillery into a tactical unit had therefore been 
taken when the Army was reorganized on May 30. 

The growth of the battalion had been slow but sure. 
Stuart from the first had proved an ardent advocate of 
the increase in the number of horse batteries, placing 
great reliance upon their services, and displaying un 
usual interest in their proper development. Indeed, 
though his historians do not include the horse batteries 
in the organization of the cavalry, Stuart considered 
them as much a part of his command as the cavalry regi 
ments themselves. After Ashby raised Chew s Battery 

*Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, p. 858. 



and employed it so successfully, Stuart, it will be re 
called, had organized the Stuart Horse Artillery. Its 
original commander, as we have seen, was John Pelham, 
who, just graduated from West Point, had been com 
missioned by the Confederate Government at Mont 
gomery as a lieutenant of artillery, and sent to Lynch- 
burg in charge of the ordnance office there. From that 
point he was ordered to Winchester, where he organized 
and drilled Alburtis Wise Battery, which he com 
manded at Bull Run with conspicuous efficiency. When 
assigned in the fall of 1861 to the duty of organizing 
Stuart s Horse Battery, he gathered about him a most 
remarkable and superior set of men, mostly from the 
cavalry, some from Virginia, and some from Maryland, 
under Dr. James Breathed. To these were added about 
40 from Talladega County, Alabama, under Lieut. 
William M. McGregor. It was not long before Hart s 
light battery of Washington, South Carolina, was con 
verted into a horse battery. 

The experiences of the first Maryland invasion in 
which the cavalry was so active and opposed to an enemy 
well provided with horse batteries, convinced Stuart of 
the urgent need of more artillery for his own command. 
The day after the battle, Pelham s Battery, which had 
received a large accession of recruits from Maryland, 
was drawn upon for the men with which to create a new 
horse battery, to the command of which Capt. M. W. 
Henry was assigned, and on November 18 the light 
battery of Capt. Marcellus N. Moorman, from Lynch- 
burg, was converted. The men of Moorman s Battery 
had been mustered into the service April 25, 1861, as a 
company of infantry, under the name of the "Beaure- 
gard Rifles," and sent to Norfolk, where for lack of 
muskets it had been temporarily armed with Parrott 
guns. When the Army was reorganized a year later 
it was still serving as artillery at Sewell s Point and else 
where about Hampton Roads, and was then definitely 
mustered into the Confederate service as a battery of 
artillery, and placed in a battalion with Grimes , 


Huger s, and Nichols light batteries, under Maj. 
John S. Saunders. Before its conversion it had, there 
fore, served, and with great credit, throughout the 
Peninsula, Second Manassas, and Maryland campaigns. 

When Pelham was promoted major of horse ar 
tillery, Breathed succeeded to the command of his bat 
tery, while McGregor succeeded Henry upon the lat 
ter s promotion. During the winter of 1862, Brocken- 
brough was promoted major, and his battery, the 2d 
Baltimore Artillery, which had been detached for duty 
in the Valley with Jones and Steuart s brigades, was 
also converted and placed under the command of Capt. 
William H. Griffin. Another horse battery, McClan- 
nahan s, had been formed by converting Imboden s 
Staunton battery, but this battery was not regularly 
brigaded with Stuart s Battalion until 1864, and 
Griffin s battery did not join Beckham s Battalion until 
Jenkins arrived at Gettysburg. 

When Stuart finally concentrated his division at Cul- 
peper towards the end of May, the Stuart Horse Ar 
tillery Battalion was composed as follows : 

Maj. R. F. Beckham 

1. Ashby Battery, Capt. Robert Preston Chew. 

2. 1st Stuart Horse Artillery,, Capt. James Breathed. 

3. Washington (S. C.) Battery, Capt. James F. Hart. 

4. 2d Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. William M. McGregor. 

5. Lynchburg Battery, Capt. Marcellus N. Moorman. 

6. 2d Baltimore Battery, Capt. William H. Griffin. 

There was, therefore, a battery of horse artillery for 
each of the six cavalry brigades under Hampton, Fitz 
Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Jones, Robertson, and Jenkins, 
respectively, as well as one for Imboden s independent 
cavalry command. 

At the end of May, the strength of the five batteries 
of horse artillery present with Stuart at Culpeper was 
18 officers and 519 men present for duty, with a paper 
aggregate of 701, or an average effective battery 
strength of about 107. These five batteries together pos- 


sessed 24 pieces of artillery, three being armed with 
four and two with six pieces. 

Stuart, who was making every effort to increase the 
strength of the Horse Artillery in material, as well as 
in personnel, sought to retain all the captured pieces in 
his possession for his own batteries, and this led to an 
altercation between him and the Chief of Ordnance, 
who was unable to recover the guns for distribution. In 
the correspondence which ensued, Stuart resented the 
use of the expression that these guns had been "ap 
propriated by the Stuart Horse Artillery," which he 
erroneously, and no doubt because of a guilty conscience, 
attributed to Col. Baldwin. The difficulty was finally 
adjusted, however, by Gen. Lee assuming the burden 
of the remark, which he denied was used by him in any 
objectionable sense, and Stuart was allowed to retain 
two 3-inch rifles and directed to turn in the three other 
captured guns in his possession. 

Beckham was endeavoring to provide all his batteries 
with six pieces, a step which met with the disapproval of 
the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chief of Artillery, for 
the sole reason that the additional horses for this increase 
in armament were not available. Even the dismounting 
of some of the light batteries had become almost a neces 
sity for lack of horses, but in some way Beckham soon 
managed to supply the necessary number to complete 
the quota of his battalion in spite of the fact that the 
ambulance and ammunition trains were so poorly pro 
vided with animals as to be almost unserviceable. Con 
cerning Beckham s work in refitting his battalion and 
establishing it upon a sounder basis, Stuart in his letter 
to headquarters was most complimentary. 

Meantime, Hampton, Fitz Lee, and W. H. F. Lee, 
and the horse batteries of Breathed, McGregor, Hart 
and Moorman, lay about Culpeper. The Artillery was 
encamped on the farm of John Minor Botts, who was a 
strong anti-secessionist and bitterly complained that 
"Ten thousand men should burn his rails without 
splitting any." Jenkins Brigade with Griffin s Bat- 


tery had been assigned to duty in the Valley. On the 
22d of May, Gen. Stuart reviewed that portion of his 
division present, many distinguished personages ap 
pearing, among them Gens. Hood and Randolph. 
Great numbers of ladies also attended, which of course 
pleased the gallant cavalry commander. Shortly after 
wards, Robertson s Brigade arrived from North Caro 
lina, and on June 4, Jones Brigade with Chew s Bat 
tery from the Valley, so that the following day another 
review of the entire division was held, at which Gen. 
Lee was expected to be present. In this Stuart was 
much disappointed, but the "pageantry of war pro 
ceeded." Eight thousand cavalry, with the battalion of 
artillery in the lead, passed under the eye of the division 
commander in column of squadrons. 

So unique is this incident in the career of that grim 
fighting machine, the Army of Northern Virginia, that 
especial interest attaches to it. One is involuntarily 
impelled to pause and reflect upon the exuberance of the 
spirit of that youthful soldier, who, in spite of war s 
dreadful tragedy all about him, and in which he himself 
was a leading actor, could so indulge his fancy in the 
very presence of the enemy. The following interesting 
account of the review is taken from the war-time diary 
of one of Stuart s gunners: 

"Early this morning we started to the field, where the troops 
were to be reviewed by passing by the eagle eye of their great 
commander. The place where the review was held is a beautiful 
and nearly level plain about four miles northeast of Culpeper 
Courthouse, and little over a mile southwest of Brandy Station, 
and on the west side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.* 

"When we, Chew s Battery, arrived on the field some of the 
Cavalry regiments were already forming in dress parade order 
for the review procession. At about 10 o clock the whole column, 
which was about two miles long, was ready and in splendid trim 
to pass in review before its illustrious and gallant chief, and his 
brilliant staff. 

"As soon as the whole line was formed, Gen. Stuart and his 
staff dashed on the field. He was superbly mounted. The trap 
pings on his proud, prancing horse all looked bright and new, and 

*Now Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. 


his side arms gleamed in the morning sun like burnished silver. A 
long black ostrich plume waved gracefully from a black slouch hat, 
cocked upon one side, and was held with a golden clasp which also 
stayed the plume. Before the procession started, Gen. Stuart and 
staff rode along the front of the line from one end to the other. He 
is the prettiest and most graceful rider I ever saw. When he 
dashed past us, I could not help but notice with what natural 
ease and comely elegance he sat his steed, as it bounded over the 
field, and his every motion in the saddle was in such strict accord 
ance with the movements of his horse that the rider and his horse 
appeared to be but one and the same machine. Immediately after 
Gen. Stuart and staff had passed along the front of the whole 
line, he galloped to a little knoll in the southwest edge of the field 
near the railroad, wheeled his horse to front face to the field, and 
sat there like a gallant knight errant, under his waving plume, 
presenting in veritable truth every characteristic of a chivalric 
cavalier of the first order. He was then ready for the review, 
and the whole cavalcade began to move and pass in review before 
the steady, martial, and scrutinizing gaze of the greatest cavalry 
chieftain of America. 

"Three bands of music were playing nearly all the time while 
the procession was moving, a flag was fluttering in the breeze from 
every regiment, and the whole army was one grand, magnificent 
pageant, inspiring enough to make even an old woman feel fightish. 

"After the whole cavalcade passed the review station, at a quick 
walk, the column divided up into divisions, brigades, and regiments, 
which maneuvered all over the field. The last and most inspiring 
and impressive act in the scene was a sham battle, the cavalry 
charging several times with drawn sabers and the horse artillery 
firing from four or five different positions on the field. I fired ten 
rounds from my gun. 

"Hundreds of ladies from Culpeper Courthouse and surrounding 
country stood in bunches on the hills and knolls around the field 
looking at the grand military display. 

"A special train from Richmond stood on the track just in rear 
of the review stand, crowded with people, and, judging from the 
fluttering ribbons at the car windows, the most of the occupants 
were ladies. Gen. Hood s Division of infantry was drawn up upon 
the north side of the field, viewing the cavalry display, and also 
for support in case the Yanks would have attempted to take a hand 
in the show. There is a heavy force of Yankees camped on the 
north bank of the Rappahannock, only about five miles from the 
review stand. 

"By about four o clock this evening the whole affair was over, 
and the troops withdrew from the field and repaired to their 
respective camps."* 

* Three Tears in the Confederate Horse Artillery., Neese, p. 168. 


One would have thought that this affair was sufficient 
to satisfy Stuart s love of the "pomp and circumstance" 
of war. But no. When he found that Gens. Lee, 
Longstreet, Ewell, and Pendleton would arrive at his 
camp on the 8th, another pageant was ordered to be 
held. But much less of that display for which Stuart 
had so great a weakness was attempted on the occasion 
of the third review, for Gen. Lee, always careful not to 
tax his men unnecessarily, would not allow the cavalry 
to take the gallop, nor the artillerymen to fire their guns. 

On this occasion an incident occurred which, aside 
from its amusing features, is of valuable interest to the 
student because of its bearing on Stuart s character. 
Capt. Chew had not come to Culpeper with any exalted 
ideas as to the pomp of war. In fact, his battery was 
reduced in point of appearance to the lowest plane to 
which constant hardship and service could bring it. He 
had only arrived from the Valley the night before and 
with horses and men equally worn, found himself sud 
denly on parade before the Commander-in-Chief . What 
wonder then if, conscious of the ungainly appearance 
of his half-starved horses, and in a spirit of pride, the 
battery first sergeant should seek to improve the out 
ward appearance of the battery by bestriding a fine, 
sleek mule ! Just as the far-famed Ashby Battery, the 
senior in rank in its battalion, and certainly the equal of 
any other in point of service, approached the reviewing 
stand in the very lead, Stuart s proud eye detected the 
active ears of the mule at the head of the battery, and 
with extreme impatience and disgust quickly dispatched 
one of his aides to direct Capt. Chew to have both his 
first sergeant and the mule leave the field! Says the 
sergeant in his diary, "I cared very little about the 
matter, but the mule looked a little bit surprised, and, 
I think, felt ashamed of himself and his waving ears, 
which cost him his prominent position in the grand 

"No doubt Gen. Stuart is proud of his splendid 
cavalry, and well he may be, for it certainly is a fine 


body of well mounted and tried horsemen. . . . 
True a mule was not built for the purpose of ornament 
ing a grand review or embellishing an imposing pageant, 
but as mine so willingly bears the hardships and dangers 
of the camp and field, I thought it not indiscreet to let 
it play a little act in some of the holiday scenes of war." 

One can picture the amusement this whole incident 
afforded the youngsters of Stuart s staff, at their chief s 
expense, not to mention Gens. Lee, Pendleton, and the 
distinguished foreigners, who composed the reviewing 
party. Perhaps no other general in the Confederate 
Army would have paid the slightest attention to that 
worthy mule. Of one thing we are certain, there could 
not have been many mules in use as mounts in Stuart s 
Cavalry and Horse Artillery at this time, this one hav 
ing slipped in, so to speak, over night ! 

But few other instances of such military frivolity on 
the part of the Confederates are recorded. When in 
March, 1864, Gen. Pendleton was sent to Dalton, Ga., 
to inspect the artillery of Johnston s Army, after re 
viewing Hood s and Hardee s artillery and seeing it 
drill on a number of occasions, he was tendered a grand 
sham battle by Hood s entire corps, in which blank am 
munition was used. The precedent for this display 
was no doubt that which Hood and Pendleton had both 
witnessed a year before at Culpeper. 

Before Stuart s participation in his "horse play" at 
Culpeper, the movement of Lee s army which resulted 
in the Gettysburg campaign had commenced. Long- 
street s and Swell s corps had already reached Cul 
peper Courthouse, while Hill s Corps was left in 
front of Hooker at Fredericksburg. After the review 
the cavalry brigades were immediately assigned to posts 
along the river, and Beckham proceeded towards 
Beverly Ford that night, and placed four of his batteries 
in camp near Saint James Church. Fitz Lee s Brigade 
under Munford was assigned to the duty of picketing 
the upper Rappahannock. Munford established his 
camp across the Hazel River in the vicinity of Oak 


Shade. W. H. F. Lee established his brigade and 
Breathed s Battery near Welford s house on the Wei- 
ford Ford Road ; Jones Brigade held the Beverly Ford 
Road, and Robertson s remained at the Botts and B ar 
bour farms picketing the lower fords. Saint James 
Church stood about 200 yards to the west of the main 
road to the ford and opposite it, and on the east of that 
road in a large grove of trees stood an old brick house 
known as the Thompson or Gee house, on an elevation 
from which the fields on both sides of the road for a 
distance of 500 yards to the north were commanded. 
The grove was occupied by one regiment of Jones 
Brigade, the others bivouacking in the edge of the 
woods, which skirted the fields to the north of the church. 
Beckham, with Chew s, Moorman s, McGregor s, and 
Hart s batteries, bivouacked in the edge of the woods 
beyond, in sight of though in advance of the cavalry. 
Beyond the camp of the battalion, unbroken woods ex 
tended on both sides of the road for more than a mile, 
and as far as the highland overlooking the river low- 
grounds and Beverly Ford. From the latter point, 
Beckham s and Jones camps were about ll/> to 2 

Stuart, with his train in readiness for an early start, 
had established his headquarters at a residence on 
Fleetwood Hill, about a half mile east of Brandy Sta 
tion, two miles down the road in rear of Saint James 
Church. Fleetwood Hill complete^ commanded the 
large open plain which surrounded it, with the ex 
ception of the B arbour House Hill, of slightly greater 
elevation. Such was the situation on the night of the 
8th when Stuart, entirely ignorant of any concentration 
of the enemy s cavalry on the north side of the river, is 
sued his orders to march at an early hour. 

Meantime, Pleasonton was approaching from the 
north, with orders to make a reconnaissance in force as 
far as Culpeper Courthouse if possible, to verify the re 
ports that the Confederates were moving westward 
from Fredericksburg. Pleasonton s force consisted of 


two small brigades of infantry, some 3,000 men in all, 
and about 8,000 cavalry, including Robertson s Brigade 
of horse artillery of four batteries. Dividing this force 
into two columns of equal strength, he ordered the first 
under Gregg to cross at Kelly s Ford at dawn, and the 
second under Buford, which included all of Ames infan 
try, to move by way of Beverly Ford, about 1% miles 
above the railroad bridge, and 5% miles above Kelly s 
Ford. Great care was exercised by the Federals during 
the night to conceal their presence from Stuart s 
pickets, and in this they succeeded. 

At 4:30 A. M. on the 9th Buford s two leading regi 
ments dashed across Beverly Ford and rapidly drove 
the troops on picket there back towards the woods north 
of Saint James Church. Upon learning that the 
enemy was advancing from the ford, Beckham directed 
Capt. Hart, whose battery was on the right of the bat 
talion, to place a gun in the road by hand, while the bat 
teries were ordered to hitch up and gallop back to the 
Gee House Hill, some 600 yards in rear, and to go into 
position there. Before the teams could be harnessed, 
however, the enemy was almost upon the artillery camp, 
and had begun to fire upon the horses at the picket lines. 
But at this juncture Maj. Flournoy, with about 100 
men of the regiment which had bivouacked in the grove, 
dashed forward and temporarily checked the enemy, 
which not only saved Beckham s guns, but gave time 
for Jones to bring up the 7th Virginia Cavalry from the 
main camp. Meantime, Hart had thrown two pieces into 
action by the road, and Beckham in less than 20 minutes 
after the first alarm was establishing his guns at the 
grove. The 7th Regiment, upon coming up, immedi 
ately charged, but was repulsed and driven back along 
the road past Hart s two guns, leaving them entirely 
isolated. Says Maj. McClellan, of Stuart s staff, "These 
gallant cannoneers on two occasions during this mem 
orable day proved that they were able to care for 
themselves. Although now exposed to the enemy, they 
covered their own retreat with canister, and safely re- 


tired to the line at Saint James Church, where they 
found efficient support."* 

During the charge of the 7th Regiment, the gunners, 
standing in silent awe by their pieces perfectly aligned 
along the wave-like swell north of the brick house, 
watched the savage conflict between the horsemen in 
their front, fascinated by the scene, and as Hart fell 
back, alternately retiring his two guns from point to 
point along the road, a wild cheer from Beckham s line 
preceded the simultaneous flash of his 16 guns. Just as 
the sun rose, the crash of the guns burst upon the ears 
of the enemy s troopers, and soon the woods which they 
had entered were rent with shrieking shells. Beckham s 
steady fire forced the enemy to cover, while they sought 
positions in which to place their artillery, none of which 
had yet arrived from the ford. Thus did the Horse Ar 
tillery hold Buford at bay, having lost nothing but the 
field desk of the major, which jostled from the head- 
quarter s wagon as it galloped off to safety. 

The other regiment of Jones Brigade now took 
position on the left of the church, and Hampton with 
four of his regiments occupied the rise between it and 
Beckham s guns at the grove. About 8 A. M M W. H. F. 
Lee moved down from Welf ord Ford towards the sound 
of the firing and placed his dismounted troopers behind 
a stone fence on the Cunningham farm, while Johnston s 
section of Breathed s Battery moved down stream from 
Freeman s Ford where the battery had been on picket, 
crossed the Hazel River, and took up a position near 
the Green House on a hill behind W. H. F. Lee s line, 
from which it had a clear field of fire in every direction. 
This position soon proved to be the key-point of the 
Confederate line of defense. The other section of 
Breathed s Battery moved back from Freeman s to 
Starke s Ford. 

A determined attack was made by the enemy s dis 
mounted men, supported by a battery of four pieces, 

*The Campaigns of Stuart s Cavalry, McClellan, p. 266. Also see article In 
Philadelphia Weekly Times, June 26, 1880, by Maj. J. F. Hart. 


upon W. H. F. Lee s line, but it was repelled by the 
Confederate sharpshooters, and Johnston s guns, but 
not until several mounted charges made by the 10th Vir 
ginia and 2d North Carolina Cavalry cleared the field, 
driving the Federals back to the cover of the woods 
along the Beverly Ford Road, and seriously threaten 
ing their flank. Hampton had, meantime, extended his 
right beyond the church, so as to partially envelop the 
enemy s left, and together with Jones now advanced. 
From this time until 10 A. M. the lines swayed back and 
forth. During the early morning, the 6th Pennsyl 
vania Cavalry, supported by the 6th United States 
Regiment, made a superb mounted charge upon the 
Confederate artillery position, over a plateau some 800 
yards wide. The regulars, heedless of Beckham s shrap 
nel, shell, and canister, actually reached his guns, and, 
dashing between them, passed on only to be attacked 
simultaneously on both flanks by the Confederate 
troopers, who drove the survivors back. There are few 
instances recorded of a simlar charge upon so strong 
a line of artillery. Scarlett s charge at Balaclava was 
no more daring than the one which Smith led at Saint 
James Church, the latter possessing the additional fea 
ture that it was premeditated and not the result of ac 

Beckham s pieces now redoubled their fire, having 
suffered none from the charge, and furiously shelled the 
woods in their front, where the enemy was gathering in 
increasing numbers. The artillery position was a com 
manding one, and no doubt, had its flanks been guarded, 
could have been held indefinitely. But the situation was 
becoming serious in another quarter, for the head of 
Gregg s column was approaching Stevensburg from 
Kelly s Ford. Stuart had dispatched two regiments 
under Wickham and Butler and one of Moorman s guns 
to the support of Robertson s Brigade, which had moved 
forward to Kelly s Ford early in the morning, and be 
lieving the force of 1,500 men between Brandy Station 
and the ford sufficient to guard the road to Culpeper 


Courthouse, proceeded to the church. His camp of the 
night before had been broken and nothing remained at 
Fleetwood Hill but a section of Chew s Battery under 
Lieut. John W. Carter, which had been retired from 
the fight after its ammunition was all but exhausted. 

When Pleasonton found that Buford s column could 
not overcome the resistance of the three Confederate bri 
gades opposed to it in front of Beverly s Ford, he de 
cided to wait until Gregg could move up to his assist 
ance. The latter had readily effected a crossing at 
Kelly s Ford about 6 A. M., Col. Duffie with four regi 
ments of cavalry and a section of Pennington s Battery 
in the lead. Duffie s orders were to move on Stevens- 
burg, whilst Gregg with the rest of the column pro 
ceeded towards Brandy Station in order to effect a 
junction with Buford. Robertson had fallen back along 
the direct road from Brandy Station to Kelly s Ford, 
and the two regiments dispatched by Stuart to his sup 
port were unable in spite of the most gallant efforts to 
prevent Duffie s advance upon Stevensburg. But orders 
now came for Duffie to join Gregg s main body and he 
at once commenced to retrace his steps towards Mad- 
den s, covering the movement with his guns while Wick- 
ham s regiment retarded his progress in every way pos 
sible. Meantime, unknown to Robertson, Gregg had 
advanced directly upon Brandy Station, and actually 
came within sight of Fleetwood Hill directly in the Con 
federate rear before his approach, which had been con 
cealed by numerous groves, was discovered by Stuart s 
Ad jut ant- General, who had been left behind to main 
tain communications. The leading regiment of Wynd- 
ham s Brigade was already emerging into the open 
about Brandy Station, within cannon shot of Carter s 
guns. Without hesitating an instant, the young lieu 
tenant brought one of his pieces from the road to the top 
of the hill and boldly pushed it to the forward crest. A 
few imperfect shell and some round shot was all the am 
munition in the limbers, but with these a slow fire was at 
once opened upon the enemy s moving column, while 


first one and then another of the mounted cannoneers 
was sent to inform Stuart of the peril. 

The bold front which Carter put up led Gregg and 
Wyndham to conclude that the hill was more formidable 
than it was. At any rate, there was some hesitation on 
their part and considerable delay while Clarke s section 
of Pennington s Battery sought to prepare the road for 
a charge. Every moment of this delay was precious to 
the Confederates, for had Gregg succeeded in planting 
his guns on Fleetwood Hill, Stuart s position would 
have been most precarious. The first courier found 
Stuart among Hart s guns near the church, and not un 
til the second message arrived, and he heard the sound 
of Carter s and Clarke s guns in his rear, did he counter 
mand his order to Capt. Hart to ride back and verify 
the report. 

The 12th Virginia and the 35th Battalion were im 
mediately withdrawn from Jones line, 1^ miles from 
Fleetwood Hill, and ordered by Stuart to gallop back 
to Carter s assistance. Minutes seemed like hours to 
Carter. Not a man but the cannoneers of his section 
and Maj. McClellan of Stuart s staff occupied the hill. 
The enemy had been imposed upon for a time, but at 
last Wyndham s regiment in column of squadrons, with 
standards and guidons fluttering, galloped forward and 
commenced the ascent of the hill. Just as Carter was 
retiring his guns, the enemy not 50 yards away, and the 
last round having been fired, Col. Harman with the 
leading files of the 12th Virginia galloped up to the 
crest from behind, and without hesitating dashed at the 
enemy. The rest of the regiment had strung out along 
the road in great disorder due to the rapidity of his 
movement, and as the men arrived in small groups, they 
were no match for Wyndham s more collected force. 
Stuart arived in a few moments, having ordered Hamp 
ton and Jones to retire from the church and concentrate 
at Fleetwood, while Robertson on the Kelly s Ford 
Road was advised of the situation. 


Reforming his regiment Harman desperately en 
gaged the enemy, while charge and counter-charge 
swept across the face of the hill. Lieut. -Col. White, with 
the 35th Battalion, had arrived shortly after Col. Har 
man, and with two squadrons dashed around the west 
side of the hill, and charged three guns of Martin s Bat 
tery, which Gregg had already brought up, driving off 
the cavalry support. But the gunners stood firm and a 
hand-to-hand struggle ensued, in which neither side 
asked quarter. This battery was the horse battery which 
Pleasonton had with him at Hazel Grove on May 2, 
when together with Huntington s batteries it repulsed 
Winn s attack. In his report, Martin says: "Once 
in the battery, it became a hand-to-hand fight with pistol 
and sabre between the enemy and my cannoneers and 
drivers, and never did men act with more coolness and 
bravery, and show more of a stern purpose to do their 
duty unflinchingly, and above all to save their guns; 
and while the loss of them is a matter of great regret to 
me, it is a consolation and a great satisfaction to know 
that I can point with pride to the fact that, of that little 
band who defended the battery, not one of them flinched 
for a moment from his duty. Of the 36 men that I took 
into the engagement, but 6 came out safely; and of 
these 30, 21 are either killed, wounded, or missing, and 
scarcely one of them is there but will carry the honor 
able mark of the sabre or bullet to his grave." 

White s men did not long retain possession of 
Martin s guns, for the few troopers he had with him 
were soon surrounded by superior numbers and were 
compelled to cut their way out. 

When the retirement of the Confederate line com 
menced, one of Beckham s guns, as we have seen, was 
with Butler s regiments, then engaged with Duffle; one 
of Hart s and two of McGregor s pieces had become dis 
abled from the shock of recoil, a section of Chew s Bat 
tery had been sent to the right to join Robertson, arid 
Carter s section of this battery was at Fleetwood Hill. 
Thus there were but eight guns still in action at the 


church at the time. Leaving Moorman s remaining three 
pieces with Jones llth Virginia Regiment in position 
at the church, Beckham with the rest of the artillery, in 
cluding Hart s and McGregor s batteries, accompanied 
Hampton s brigades to the rear, which came into action 
just after Flournoy s Regiment of Jones Brigade had 
charged the 6th New York Battery, a section of which it 
captured, but soon relinquished. Hampton s Brigade 
advanced at a gallop in magnificent order, in column of 
squadrons, with Hart s and McGregor s batteries 
abreast of the leading line. As the column approached 
the hill, its summit and the plateau east of the hill and 
beyond the railroad was covered with Federal cavalry. 
Diverging to his left, Hampton crossed the railroad 
east of the hill, striking the enemy s flank with the head 
of his column, while Hart galloped his battery to the 
crest of the hill and opened fire on the enemy who had 
been driven from the summit. But he only succeeded 
in firing several shots with a single gun before the car 
riage which had been partly repaired was permanently 
disabled. McGregor now succeeded in placing two 
pieces in position on the crest, and hardly had they gone 
into action when the guns were charged by a party of the 
enemy s cavalry, which from the extreme Federal left 
came thundering down the narrow ridge, striking the 
unsupported batteries in flank, and trying to ride down 
the cannoneers. The charge was met by the gunners 
alone, who, with pistols, sabers and rammer staffs drove 
the hostile troopers from among the guns and caissons. 
Lieuts. Ford and Hoxton with their pistols killed both 
the brave leader of the charge, Lieut.-Col. Broderick, 
and Maj. Shelmire, while private Sudley of McGregor s 
Battery knocked one of the enemy from his saddle with 
a sponge staff. 

About the time the desperate attempt of the 1st New 
Jersey Regiment to take the guns was repulsed by 
Beckham, Jones last Regiment with Moorman s three 
guns arrived from the church, as did Capt. Chew with 
the section which had been with Robertson. Beckham 


quickly placed every available gun in position along the 
crest and opened fire upon the enemy about Brandy 

Hampton was more than holding his own on the 
plain to the east, but the enemy was still contending for 
Brandy Station, and a few were desperately defending 
Martin s silent guns near the eastern base of the hill. 
Lomax s llth Virginia spreading out on both sides of 
the road to the station finally charged the latter, rode 
completely over Martin s guns and pursued the de 
fenders for some distance down the Stevensburg Road. 
In the meantime, Hampton had, after a desperate hand- 
to-hand fight with pistol and saber, overborne the enemy 
in his front and followed upon their heels until com 
pelled by the well-directed fire of Beckham s guns to 
forego the pursuit. It was impossible even at close 
quarters by reason of the dust and smoke to tell friend 
from foe, and Beckham, rather than lose the effect of his 
fire, continued to direct it upon the immense mass of 
horsemen flying down the road in his front. The ar 
tillery fire from Fleetwood Hill was most accurate and 
effective and had, before the withdrawal of the enemy 
commenced, several times broken the formations of his 

Meantime W. H. F. Lee s Brigade with one regiment 
of Jones Brigade and Johnston s section of Breathed s 
Battery had, by threatening Buford s rear, kept the 
latter s force from advancing to the aid of Gregg, in 
spite of the fact that the direct route lay practically 
open, and before dispositions could be made for the ad 
vance Gregg had been repulsed. As soon as Gregg 
withdrew, Stuart promptly formed a new line along 
the eastern slope of the range of hills which, commenc 
ing at Fleetwood, extended irregularly to the river at 
Welford s Ford. Soon after Jones withdrew from the 
church, exposing W. H. F. Lee s right flank, the latter 
retired and occupied the hills overlooking the Thomp 
son house, his line connecting with and prolonging that 
which Stuart had established. Munford, with Fitz 


Lee s Brigade, was momentarily expected to arrive and 
occupy the commanding ground about the Welford 

To the South, Duffie had arrived near Brandy Station 
in time to cover Gregg s withdrawal by Rappahannock 
Ford, and the activity of the Federals was now shifted 
to Buford, who, extending further and further to his 
right, until W. H. F. Lee s left was enveloped, launched 
an attack from the high ground just south and west of 
the Green House. The movement of the enemy had 
forced Johnston to withdraw his guns about 2 p. M., and 
in doing so he was joined by Breathed with the other 
section of his battery, the whole retiring from point to 
point and firing upon the advancing Federals. Buford 
now sent forward a part of his infantry, and followed 
up its advance with a mounted charge of two regiments, 
which was quickly repelled. In the struggle W. H. F. 
Lee was wounded about 4:30 p. M. Before the attack 
had been repulsed Munford arrived on W. H. F. Lee s 
left with three regiments of Fitz Lee s Brigade from 
Oak Shade and at once threw forward a heavy line of 
skirmishers with which Breathed s Battery advanced. 
But Buford was already falling back upon Beverly 
Ford. Munford followed the Federals up closely while 
Breathed doggedly hung upon their heels with three 
guns and plied the retreating column from every avail 
able position until the pursuers were checked by the 
enemy s infantry and several batteries in position near 
the ford. 

Pleasonton afterwards attributed his retirement to 
the fact that the purpose of his reconnaissance had been 
accomplished since the presence of the Confederate 
Infantry at Brandy Station was developed by his 
column. But he must have kept his information from 
Hooker, who on the 12th of June was, according to his 
own words, entirely in the dark as to the Confederate 
movements on his right, and Gen. Lee s intentions.* 
Pleasonton s statement that the Confederate Infantry 

*Oonduct of War, Vol. I, p. 158. 


was seen disentraining at Brandy Station is wholly 
false, for the first division of E well s Corps marched to 
Stuart s assistance from Rixeyville, four miles north of 
Culpeper Courthouse, by way of Botts farm to Brandy 
Station, and did not begin to arrive at the latter point 
until Pleasonton had made his dispositions to withdraw. 
So again it is seen how prone to error this "Knight of 
Romance" was. 

The battle of Brandy Station has been gone into in 
some detail, because it was the first engagement in which 
mounted troops were almost exclusively engaged on 
both sides, and because it was one in which the Confeder 
ate Horse Artillery displayed a most surprising degree 
of mobility. Its successful employment was in marked 
contrast to the comparatively ineffective use of the Fed 
eral batteries. At every important point of the field, we 
have found Beckham s guns playing a leading role, but 
we search in vain for any material influence which the 
guns of Pleasonton s column bore upon the issue. The 
few which were brought into prominent action were 
handled with great courage by the gunners, but they ap 
parently had little or no effect, whereas the position 
taken by Beckham at the church had proved the nucleus 
about which the whole defense formed. Furthermore, 
the fire of Beckham s massed batteries at that point had 
practically brought Buford s column to a standstill, en 
abling W. H. F. Lee to move upon the Federal flank 
and check all hope of successful attack until the Federal 
front could be partially changed to meet his threat, and 
in the defense of Lee s line, almost at right angles to 
that of Jones and Hampton s, Johnston s two guns had 
played an important part. 

Again, when Gregg had all but occupied Fleetwood 
Hill with his batteries, it was Carter s section of Chew s 
Battery which snatched the opportunity from the enemy 
and by the unaided efforts of a handful of bold gunners 
saved Stuart, certainly from defeat, if not from a rout. 
Beckham s rapid movement with Hampton to the rear 
and the prompt massing of his batteries at Fleetwood 


not only secured the position which Carter had pre 
vented Gregg from taking, but contributed materially 
to the breaking of the Federal column on the plain be 
low with which Hampton was desperately engaged, 
and the fire of the batteries was most effective upon the 
retreating enemy. One of Moorman s guns had ren 
dered splendid service with Butler s regiment in oppos 
ing Duffie, while Chew with a section of his battery 
in moving to the support of Robertson s Brigade on the 
Kellysville Road, and then rapidly back to Fleetwood 
at Beckham s summons, had traversed the field from 
end to end in time to arrive at the decisive point at the 
critical moment. The movements of the various bat 
teries of Beckham s command exhibited not only re 
markable mobility, and a rare ability on the battalion 
commander s part to obtain concert of action between 
his battery units, but also a most exceptional amount 
of initiative on the part of his battery commanders who, 
when assigned a special mission by direct order or by 
chance, solved the problem which fell to them with skill 
and determination. 

In no battle of the war did the Artillery display a 
higher degree of independence. This was as it should 
have been, for if one objection to horse artillery exists, 
it is as to its vulnerability on account of the large tar 
get it presents while in motion due to the great number 
of animals it requires. Then, too, it is sometimes 
argued that much time is lost in the care and disposition 
of the cannoneers mounts. But such objections are 
specious, and, even were they material, would be more 
than counterbalanced by the celerity of movement and 
the consequent diminishment in the time of exposure. 
However this may be, Beckham s batteries certainly 
proved the ability of the Confederate Horse Artillery 
to take care of itself, for twice in one day the same 
batteries were ridden over by the enemy s cavalry, and 
yet the gunners managed to save themselves and their 
material from harm by their own defensive power. Not 
so much as a trace was cut, nor a team stampeded by 
the enemy. It is true this immunity from serious injury 


was due, in a measure, to the fact that the troopers 
who got in among the guns on both occasions were 
mounted, and therefore unable to secure the guns, etc., 
which they might have captured had the attacking force 
been dismounted. But, then it must be remembered that 
the speed of the mounted men alone enabled the enemy 
to reach the guns which would have been quite impos 
sible under the circumstances of each case for foot 
troops. It was that same mobility which made it pos 
sible for Hart and McGregor to move at the head of 
Hampton s Brigade from the church to Fleetwood Hill, 
that made it possible for Smith to dash across the open 
in the face of the artillery, and for Broderick to rush 
down upon the flank of the guns before they could 
change front. 

But even when cavalry possesses the requisite bold 
ness and dash to accomplish such feats as those of 
Smith s and Broderick s men, the gunners will always 
possess a great advantage in the brief hand-to-hand 
conflict which will ensue, for the majority of the mounted 
men will as a rule pass on through the guns, unable to 
draw rein. This was certainly the case in both instances 
when Beckham s batteries were reached by the Federal 
cavalry, and also when Flournoy charged Clarke s and 
Martin s batteries. In the last instance, the Federal 
gunners remanned their guns after Flournoy swept by, 
and continued in action until finally overpowered by 
Lomax, by whom the three guns were turned over to 
Hart s Battery, the gunners of which opened fire with 
two of the captured pieces. 

In the battle of Brandy Station, the Confederate Ar 
tillery loss was 1 killed, 10 wounded, and 1 missing, the 
heaviest individual battery loss being in Moorman s 
Battery, in which there were 1 man killed, 3 wounded, 
and 1 captured.* 

*Maj. McClellan, in his history of Stuart s campaigns, does not mention 
Moorman s Battery in connection with this battle, and in the excellent account 
of the battle by Lieut. G. W. Beale, 9th Va. Cavalry, which appeared in the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch,, of August 11, 1912, no mention whatever of Moor 
man s Battery is made. But see Beckham s report and the history of the 
battery by Capt. J. J. Shoemaker, p. 39. The author also has a letter from 
Capt. Shoemaker, who was 1st Lieutenant of the battery at the time, graphically 
describing the part of the battery in the battle. 


Some idea of the ammunition expenditure of the 
Horse Artillery may be gathered from the fact that a 
single piece of Chew s Battery is reported by its gun 
ner to have fired during the engagement 160 rounds. 
But that such an enormous expenditure for a single 
piece was by no means general is proved by the fact that 
this gun burnt out at the breech before the day was over, 
and was turned in as disabled.* 

Of the part of the Artillery in the fight, Stuart in his 
report has to say: "The conduct of the Horse Ar 
tillery, under that daring and efficient officer, Maj. R. F. 
Beckham, deserves the highest praise. Not one piece 
was ever in the hands of the enemy, though at times the 
cannoneers had to fight, pistol and sword in hand, in its 
defense. The officers and men behaved with the great 
est gallantry and the mangled bodies of the enemy 
show the effectiveness of their fire." 

We must now leave Stuart and the Horse Artillery 
in order to follow the movements of the main army. 
But, before doing so, it should be said that in all the 
operations of the cavalry leading up to Gettysburg, 
Beckham s guns took an active part. It should also 
be said that in crossing the Potomac at Rowser s Ford 
on the 27th of June, the practice of submerging the 
guns and caissons and towing them across stream on 
the river bottom while the ammunition was carried over 
in feed bags, was resorted to by Beckham and was, 
therefore, not one exclusively employed by Forrest in 
the west, as some writers seem to think. 

* Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery, Neese, p. 179. 



DURING the winter of 1862-63, Jackson had caused 
his Topographical Engineer to prepare a detailed map 
of the districts through which it would be necessary to 
pass in going from the lower Valley through Maryland 
to Pennsylvania.* This map was the most accurate and 
remarkable one of its kind made during the war. It 
showed every defensive position from Winchester to 
Carlisle, and upon a study of this map Lee matured 
his plans for the next campaign, which he desired to 
make a decisive one. Longstreet proposed to send a 
force into Tennessee to unite with Bragg and Johnston, 
the latter then being at Vicksburg, which place it was im 
possible for him to save. By concentrating such a large 
force in Tennessee, Longstreet believed Rosecrans 
could be crushed, Cincinnati threatened, and Grant 
drawn off from Vicksburg. t But Lee preferred to in 
vade the North, agreeing with Longstreet that in taking 
this step the campaign should be offensive in strategy, 
but defensive in tactics. Lee s idea was to force Hooker 
to attack him in a strong position of his own selection 
and he no doubt felt as Jackson did when he said "we 
sometimes fail to drive the enemy out of his position, 
but they always fail to drive us out of ours." 

Gen. Lee s decision was reached near the close of 
May and by the 1st of June he had completed his ar 
rangements for the ensuing campaign. Before the 
movement began, his plans were so fully matured and 
made with such precision that the exact locality at which 
a conflict with the enemy was expected to take place was 
indicated on his map. This locality was the town of 
Gettysburg.^ He was satisfied that if he could defeat 

*Prepared by Capt. Jed Hotchkiss of his staff. 

t Lee s Invasion of Pennsylvania, Longstreet ; Battles and Leaders, p 245 ; 
also see From Manassas to Appomattox, Longstreet, p. 336. 
^Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, Long, pp. 267, 268. 


the Federal Army he could also drive it across the Sus- 
quehanna and possess himself of Maryland, Western 
Pennsylvania, probably West Virginia and Washing 
ton, as well as relieve the pressure in the west and south 
west. The plan being fully approved by Mr. Davis in 
a personal interview, Lee commenced the movement on 
June 2 by sending Swell s Corps to Culpeper Court 
house, soon followed by Longstreet, while A. P. Hill 
was left in observation of the enemy at Fredericksburg, 
charged with the duty of screening the movement to 
the west. By the 8th of June, the main body of the 
Army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Cul 
peper Courthouse, from which point Lee on the 9th 
was able to send forward some of his infantry and 
Carter s and Alexander s battalions of artillery to the 
relief of Stuart at Brandy Station when, as we have 
seen, he was assailed by Pleasonton. 

On the 5th, when preparations were in progress for 
the removal of army headquarters from Fredericks- 
burg, two corps having already left, the enemy ap 
peared in force on the opposite bank, and in the after 
noon opened a heavy artillery fire near the mouth of 
Deep Run, under cover of which they established a 
pontoon bridge, over which a small body of infantry 
was crossed. The evening and night was spent by 
Pendleton in establishing the artillery defense with 
the batteries of the 3d Corps, but the enemy s move 
ment proved to be a feint, and soon after midday of the 
6th, in company with the Commander-in-Chief, the 
Chief of Artillery proceeded to Culpeper, arriving there 
the morning of the 7th. The Artillery of the 1st and 
2d Corps had accompanied their respective corps to the 
point of concentration. 

June 10, Swell s Corps left Culpeper for the Valley. 
Milroy s Federal Division, about 9,000 strong, oc 
cupied Winchester, while McReynolds Brigade held 
Berryville. Kelly s Division of about 10,000 men was 
at Harper s Ferry with a detachment of 1,200 infantry 
and a battery, under Col. Smith, at Martinsburg. Ewell 


reached Cedarville, via Chester Gap on the evening of 
the 12th, whence he detached Jenkins Cavalry Brigade 
with Griffin s Battery, and Rodes Division with Car 
ter s Battalion to capture McReynolds who, discover 
ing the approach of the Confederates, withdrew to 
Winchester. Rodes then pushed on to Martinsburg, 
and by the fire of Carter s Battalion, almost unaided, 
drove the garrison out of its works and across the Po 
tomac at Shepherdstown. Smith s Federal battery in 
retreating by the Williamsport Road was pursued by 
Jenkins, and lost five guns with all their caissons, teams, 
and 400 rounds of ammunition. In the meantime, 
Ewell with Early s and Johnson s divisions and the 
corps artillery had arrived near Winchester on the 
evening of the 12th. The next morning Early s Divi 
sion, with Jones and Dance s battalions of artillery, 
was ordered to Newtown, where they were joined by a 
battalion of Maryland infantry and Griffin s Battery. 
Johnson moved along the direct road from Front Royal 
to Winchester driving in the enemy s pickets, while 
Early advanced along the pike to Kernstown and then 
to the left so as to gain a position northwest of the 
town, from which the defensive works could be attacked 
with advantage. While Early was maneuvering for 
a position, Johnson formed line of battle two miles from 
the town preparatory to making an attack and was 
opened upon by a battery of artillery near the Mill 
wood Road. Col. Andrews at once brought up Carpen 
ter s Battery in command of Lieut. W. T. Lambie, 
which from a position to the left of the Front Royal 
Road blew up one of the enemy s caissons and drove off 
his guns. But almost immediately 12 or 15 long-range 
pieces in and near the town uncovered and opened upon 
Lambie s guns, forcing them to retire. Dement s Bat 
tery in reserve also suffered some loss and was driven 
from the field. 

It was late in the day before Early was ready to at 
tack. His progress had been opposed by a battery on 
Pritchard s Hill, which compelled him to make a longer 


detour than he had anticipated. But finally Hays 
Brigade was moved around through the woods to the 
Cedar Creek Pike, and along the road to a suitable 
position, from which to assail Pritchard s Hill. This 
hill was found by Hays to be occupied by a considerable 
force of infantry, as well as by the battery, and Gordon 
was sent by the same route pursued by Hays, to join the 
latter in the attack. Together Hays and Gordon drove 
the enemy across the Cedar Creek Pike, and Abraham s 
Creek as far as Milltown Mills, and into their fortifica 
tions on Bower s Hill, the latter being an exceptionally 
strong position, well defended by artillery, and most 
difficult of access by reason of the boggy creek bed in 
its front. During the retirement of the enemy from 
Bower s Hill, Maj. Latimer directed Carpenter from 
the position to which he had retired to open with a section 
of rifled pieces upon them, which was done with ex 
cellent effect, but again the enemy s massed artillery 
actively replied, whereupon about dark Latimer with 
drew the battery and placed it in park with the rest of 
Andrews Battalion, which was not engaged again 
that night or the following day. Early reformed his 
division, three brigades in the front line and one in re 
serve, while the enemy vigorously shelled his troops and 
Lambie s guns further to the right. Night fell before 
the attack could be organized and the men slept in 
position on their arms, while a terrific storm raged and 
torrents of rain fell upon them. 

During the night, the Federal artillery was with 
drawn from Bower s Hill and the south and west side 
of the town, only a thin line of skirmishers being left 
to confront Early and Johnson. Before 9 A. M. on the 
14th, Early gained Bower s Hill, from which Ewell was 
able to see the enemy s main work to the northwest of 
the town. Early was accordingly directed to move to 
the west of the town and seize a small open work near 
the Pughtown Road, which commanded the main work, 
while about 11 A. M. Johnson moved east of the town to 
divert attention from Early and interfere as much as 


possible with the work of fortification which the Fed 
erals were busily engaged in. He accordingly advanced 
to a point between the Millwood and Berry ville roads 
and threw forward a regiment in skirmish order which 
successfully engrossed the enemy s attention. 

Leaving Gordon s Brigade and the Maryland Bat 
talion with Griffin s and Hupp s batteries at Bower s 
Hill, Early with the rest of his division, Jones Bat 
talion of artillery under Capt. Carrington, and Brown s 
Battalion, less Hupp s Battery, under Capt. Dance, 
moved by a long circuit of some ten miles under cover 
of the intervening ridges and woods, and about 4 p. M. 
gained a wooded hill (one of the ranges known as Little 
North Mountain), opposite the enemy s position and 
within easy artillery range of it. While Col. Jones was 
engaged in placing the guns the men were allowed to 
rest. At the north extremity of the ridge, just south 
of the Pughtown Road, a cornfield, and at the south end 
an orchard, afforded excellent positions for artillery to 
fire upon the opposing works. The enemy had no 
pickets thrown out towards the north and west, although 
their main advanced work consisted of a bastion front 
facing Early s position. From this work a line of 
parapets ran northward about 150 yards across the 
Pughtown Road to a small redoubt, occupied by two 
guns and an infantry support. So completely were the 
Federals unaware of Early s presence, that two miles to 
the right of the position he had gained, the rear of their 
line confronting Gordon at Bower s Hill could be seen. 

Jones immediately upon arriving at the ridge care 
fully reconnoitered the position with his battery com 
manders and directed a battery of his own and two 
batteries of Dance s Battalion, 12 guns in all, to be 
brought up by Dance to the position on the right of the 
ridge, which position was about three-fourths of a mile 
to the left front of the bastion. Carrington with two 
of Jones batteries was then directed to occupy the 
cornfield on the left of the ridge, a position somewhat 
nearer the enemy s work, well to its right front, and 


from which it could be partially enfiladed. All of the 
guns were held under cover on the rear crest im 
mediately in rear of the positions assigned them, extra 
ammunition brought up, and each battery commander 
and gunner pointed out his special portion of the target. 
The remaining batteries were held in reserve at the rear 
base of the ridge, ready to relieve those in position. 

Hays Brigade, with Smith in support, was brought 
up by Early and prepared to advance under cover of 
Jones fire. When the infantry had been refreshed 
after a rest of about two hours, Jones gave the signal 
for Dance and Carrington to open. Instantly the 
twenty guns were pushed forward to the military crest 
by hand and opened simultaneously, crossing their fire 
on the opposing works. The Federal guns immediately 
opposite Early s position were helpless from the first, 
although an effort was made to keep them in action. 
As soon as the Confederate fire commenced, the line 
opposite Gordon began to fall back towards the main 
work, and it was upon these troops that Latimer, east of 
the Pike, caused Lambie to fire. 

If the guns in the bastion and the small work on its 
right replied to Carrington s group Dance was free to 
fire upon them with the greatest deliberation, and if 
they shifted to the Confederate right group, Carring 
ton s nearer group had necessarily to be neglected by 
them. Nor were they able under the most accurate 
cross-fire of the two groups to concentrate with effect 
upon Hays line as it advanced leisurely across the in 
tervening space. The works constructed for their 
cover were well defined targets for the Confederate gun 
ners, who had no doubt whatever as to their true ob 
jective, and under such circumstances it was but a 
question of a few minutes before a superiority of fire 
was attained by the Confederate guns in their unex 
pected and suddenly disclosed positions. 

As soon as Early had seen that the Federal defense 
was overwhelmed by the fire of his artillery, he had 
sent Hays Brigade forward, the men of which ad- 


vanced without molestation across the open to within 
200 yards of the enemy s works. Within thirty minutes 
the hostile fire was completely subdued, and the de 
fenders began to leave their intrenchments and fall back 
upon the supports forming in the rear, whereupon the 
signal for Jones to cease firing was given and the Con 
federate assaulting column rushed up the slope, through 
the brushwood abattis, and into the larger work, 
bayoneting the cannoneers who remained at their 
posts. Of the six rifled guns in this work, two were 
immediately turned upon the fleeing enemy and the 
troops forming to advance to the support of the 
captured line. The Federals now abandoned the small 
works to the north of the bastion, which were promptly 
occupied by Smith s men, whereupon Dance shifted 
his fire to the main Federal fort, holding his original 
position in order that he might sweep the opposite ridge, 
should it be recovered by the enemy. 

The occupancy of the whole line of detached works 
gave the Confederates complete command over the main 
Federal position. Thus had the artillery, much as at 
Harper s Ferry the year before, but with even smaller 
loss, enabled the infantry to seize an exceptionally 
strong defensive line. No wonder the latter was filled 
with enthusiasm for the gunners. 

In the operations leading up to so successful a re 
sult Jones and his battery commanders displayed 
marked ability and most excellent judgment. In the 
first place, though always well up to the front in the 
turning movement, they exhibited no undue haste, and 
before rushing into position saved time and guarded 
against mistakes by thoroughly reconnoitering the 
position to be occupied by the guns. This having been 
done, the batteries were brought up quietly, and without 
the slightest confusion assigned their tasks. Nor were 
the pieces exposed until the instant all were ready to 
open fire. The method of bringing them into action on 
this occasion is known as "creeping." Although a most 
ordinary proceedure, and one which common sense 


would always seem to dictate in circumstances like those 
in which Jones found himself placed, a perfect storm of 
discussion concerning "creeping" at one time broke out 
among the artillerymen of the Continent, the pros and 
cons appearing in numerous pamphlets.* It is such 
artificial issues that overcome the patience of practical 
soldiers to whom it seems that they have no place what 
ever in serious treatises on the technique and tactics of 

As soon as Hays and Smith had secured the hill, Car- 
rington moved his eight guns to its crest. In the mean 
time, Hays had been reenf orced by Smith, and had with 
the captured guns dispersed the column which en 
deavored to recapture the position. An attack upon 
Gordon s position at Bower s Hill had also been re 
pulsed, so that the Federals contented themselves by 
turning all the guns in the main fort and those in the 
redoubt on the ridge to its north upon Early, to which 
Jones replied as soon as he had brought up his bat 
teries. From the captured position the Confederate 
guns were able to fire into both of these works, as well 
as upon the infantry masses near them, and continued 
in action until nightfall. Although Hays and Smith s 
brigades had been formed along the rear crest of the 
ridge for an attack upon the main work of the enemy, 
the number of the latter, the difficulty of the interven 
ing ground, and the growing darkness, all combined, 
rendered a further advance unadvisable. But it was 
apparent to all that the enemy had suffered severely 
from Jones fire and that his position was untenable. 
Furthermore, Jones had early in the night brought all 
of his guns up and placed them behind the abandoned 

Anticipating that Milroy would endeavor to escape 
during the night, Ewell, just after dark, ordered John 
son with a part of his division, and Lieut. -Col. Andrews 
with Dement s Battery of Napoleons, and Raine s 

*See Field Artillery With the Other Arms, May. p. 126 ; also see Von. 
Schell, p. 43. 


and Carpenter s rifled sections, eight guns in all, to move 
to a point about 2^ miles north of Winchester on the 
Martinsburg Pike to intercept the enemy s retreat, or 
to attack from the north at daylight, in concert with 
Early and Gordon, should he hold his ground. The 
remainder of Andrews Battalion was left with Lati- 
mer in front of Winchester, somewhat to the southeast 
of the town. 

Finding the direct road to the designated point al 
most impassable in the night, Johnson moved across 
country until he struck the road leading from the Win 
chester and Martinsburg Pike to Charles Town, and 
marched via Jordan Springs towards Stephenson s De 
pot, five miles from Winchester. By 3 A. M. he was 
within four miles of the Martinsburg Pike, marching 
rapidly towards it, Andrews guns well closed up upon 
the infantry. As the head of the column reached the 
railroad some 200 yards from the pike, it was discovered 
that the enemy, who had abandoned all his guns, was 
moving north in full retreat, and almost instantly the fire 
of musketry broke out between the heads of the two 
columns. Johnson promptly formed his infantry in line 
across the Winchester-Harper s Ferry Road, over 
which he had approached the pike, a stone wall provid 
ing excellent cover for the men. In the meantime, the 
batteries had been halted about 200 yards from the rail 
road, and the leading gun of Dement s Battery ordered 
forward to the depot, whence it was directed to be placed 
in the road near the railroad bridge. Soon the other 
piece of the same section of Dement s Battery was 
ordered to occupy a position on the left of the road, and 
well to the front. Neither of these pieces was able to 
fire upon the pike at this time, however, on account of 
the skirmishers in their front. But soon the skirmishers 
fell back, followed by the enemy, and Dement s guns 
opened with canister at a range of less than 150 yards, 
and became desperately engaged in defending them 
selves against the Federal infantry. Andrews now 
posted Dement s second section and Raine s section 


along the edge of the woods to the left of the road, and 
somewhat further from the pike than Dement s two 
guns, and Lambie s section of Carpenter s Battery at 
a point about 200 yards to the right of the road to guard 
the flank of Johnson s line. Hardly had these dis 
positions been made when Milroy came on with his infan 
try and cavalry, and attacked, making repeated and 
desperate efforts to cut his way through to Martinsburg. 
The 1,200 men which Johnson had in his first line were 
now reenforced by Walker s belated brigade, and after 
failing in several frontal attacks, and then in an effort 
to turn the Confederate flanks, a part of the Federal 
column, some 2,300 men, surrendered. The rest 
scattered through the woods and fields, Milroy himself, 
with about 250 cavalry escaping to Harper s Ferry, but 
before morning, the Confederate cavalry had rounded 
up many of the Federal stragglers. 

In the fighting at Stephenson s Depot, Andrews 
handled his guns with remarkable ability, all of them 
being heavily engaged with the enemy s infantry at 
close range for nearly two hours. The guns were shifted 
from point to point with unusual celerity, and met each 
attempt to turn Johnson s flanks with a well directed 
and rapid fire of canister, following up the enemy s 
dispersed groups after his column was broken. One of 
Raine s guns, with an infantry support of but seven men, 
compelled several hundred Federals retreating in dis 
order along the Jordan Springs Road to surrender. 
This instance illustrates the tremendous moral influence 
of pursuing guns upon disorganized troops. Especially 
effective was one of Dement s guns which during the 
action occupied the railroad bridge and held it against 
a large body of the enemy that endeavored to cut its 
way over. In this section commanded by Lieut. Contee, 
the loss was 1 killed and 13 wounded, the latter includ 
ing the section commander. In the same section, 15 
horses were killed or disabled. 

In his account of the affair, Gen. Edward Johnson 
says: "Before closing the report, I beg leave to state 


that I have never seen superior artillery practice to that 
of Andrews Battalion in this engagement, and 
especially the section under Lieut. Contee (Dement s 
Battery), one gun of which was placed on the bridge 
above referred to, and the other a little to the left and 
rear. Both pieces were very much exposed during the 
whole action. Four successive attempts were made to 
carry the bridge. Two sets of cannoneers (13 out of 
16) were killed and disabled. Lieut. -Col. Andrews and 
Lieut. Contee, whose gallantry calls for special mention, 
fell wounded at this point. Lieut. John A. Morgan, 
First North Carolina Regiment, and Lieut. Ran 
dolph H. McKim, took the place of the disabled can 
noneers, rendering valuable assistance, and deserving 
special mention."* 

Johnson s total loss in the operations of the 13th, 
14th, and 15th was but 14 killed, and 74 wounded. 
Some idea of the desperate work done by Andrews 
gunners at Stephenson s Depot may be got from the 
fact that on that occasion he lost 2 men killed, 2 officers 
and 12 men wounded, more than 10 per cent of those en 
gaged, whereas the infantry loss was less than 2 per 
cent of the force engaged. The total number of 
captured Federals was about 4,000, including 108 of 
ficers. The enemy abandoned 300 loaded wagons, 300 
horses, a large quantity of commissary and quarter 
master stores, and all their guns. Including those 
captured by Early, 23 pieces of ordnance were secured. 
Swell s total loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 
missing, aggregate 269. 

Ewell at once informed Rodes at Martinsburg of 
Milroy s flight, but as Jenkins was on the Potomac near 
Williamsport on the morning of the 15th, there was no 
cavalry with which Rodes could intercept the escaping 
Federals. That evening, Rodes crossed the river at 
Williamsport with three brigades, sending Jenkins for 
ward to Chambersburg, and on the 19th moved his entire 

*See account of this affair in Recollections of a Soldier, by the Rev. 
Randolph H. McKim. 

(. 11 IKK lloitsi: AKTI i.i.KUY 


division to Hagerstown, where he encamped on the road 
to Boonsborough, while Johnson crossed to Sharpsburg, 
and Early moved to Shepherdstown to threaten 
Harper s Ferry. In these positions, Ewell s divisions 
rested until June 21, while Longstreet and Hill closed 
up. The 2d Corps in a brief series of operations had not 
only swept the route clear for the advance, with the ex 
ception of 11,000 Federals at Harper s Ferry, but had 
secured 28 pieces of superior ordnance with which to 
complete the armament of its batteries besides turning 
over the surplus guns and a large amount of supplies to 
the Army. 

On June 13, as Ewell s Corps approached Win 
chester, Hooker put his army in motion from Falmouth 
for Manassas. His plan to interpose between Lee s 
flanks was opposed by Lincoln, Halleck and Stanton, 
in spite of the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia 
was spread over a distance of more than 100 miles, and 
as Lincoln surmised, "was very slim somewhere." When 
Hooker abandoned his position along Stafford Heights, 
Hill started on the 14th for the Valley via Culpeper 
Courthouse and Front Royal, Garnett s, Poague s, and 
Cutts battalions accompanying Heth s, Fender s, and 
Anderson s divisions, respectively, with the battalions 
of Mclntosh and Pegram organized as a corps reserve. 

Longstreet s Corps, with Henry s, Cabell s, and 
Dearing s battalions accompanying Hood s, McLaws , 
and Pickett s divisions, respectively, and Alexander s 
and Eshleman s battalions organized as the corps re 
serve, left Culpeper on the 15th and moved along the 
eastern slope of the Blue Ridge to cover the gaps. Hill 
passed in rear of Longstreet, and when he was safely in 
the Valley, the latter moved westward through Snicker s 
and Ashby s gaps, the two corps uniting near Win 
chester about the 20th. The march along the eastern 
slope of the Blue Ridge had been an arduous one for 
Walton s battalions, for not only were the roads fol 
lowed extremely rough and difficult, and the heat op 
pressive, but the artillery was frequently called upon to 


make long digressions from the route to support the 
cavalry and detachments of infantry in meeting the 
threats of the enemy on the flank of the column. The 
Cavalry with the Horse Artillery had, while endeavor 
ing to screen the movement, been almost constantly en 
gaged, encountering the enemy at Aldie, Middleburg, 
and Upperville, and losing over 500 men in these 

On the 16th the Chief of Artillery, after a week of 
strenuous labor at Culpeper supervising the organiza 
tion of the artillery trains, and assisting in arranging 
for the reserve supply of ammunition, left for the 
Valley and soon joined army headquarters which was 
with the 1st Corps. Between the 23d and 25th, after 
resting in camp near Millwood and Berryville for four 
or five days, the 1st Corps crossed the Potomac at 
Williamsport, and the 3d Corps at Shepherdstown. 
Robertson s and Jones brigades of cavalry with Moor 
man s and Breathed s batteries remained at Ashby s 
Gap, while Chew s, McGregor s, and Hart s batteries, 
as we have seen, accompanied Stuart in his movement 
around the enemy s rear with Hampton s, Fitz Lee s, 
and W. H. F. Lee s brigades. 

On the 21st, Gen. Lee ordered Ewell to move for 
ward and take possession of Harrisburg, and the fol 
lowing day Rodes and Johnson with Carter s and An 
drews battalions, the latter under Latimer, and Early 
with Jones Battalion, took up the march. Rodes and 
Johnson proceeded via Chambersburg to Carlisle, and 
Early s Division moved via Greenwood and Gettysburg 
to York, with orders to join the main body at Carlisle 
after destroying the Northern Central Roalroad, and 
the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. 
Brown s and Nelson s battalions organized as the corps 
reserve accompanied Johnson s Division. 

On the 25th and 26th, Hooker also crossed his army 
over the Potomac at Edward s Ferry, and moved to the 
vicinity of Frederick. Here he threatened the Con 
federate rear through the South Mountain passes, 
should Lee move north, and also covered Washington, 


but he soon found that his hands were tied by Stanton 
and Halleck, who did everything possible to compel his 
resignation, which was tendered and accepted on the 
27th. At midnight, Meade was placed in command of 
the Army of the Potomac. Meanwhile, Lee with the 
1st and 3d corps had reached Chambersburg and 
ordered Longstreet and Hill to join Ewell at Harris- 
burg. Ewell with Johnson s and Rodes divisions had 
reached Carlisle. The following day, the 28th, Early 
reached York and sent Gordon forward to destroy the 
bridge, which was done, however, by a small party of 
Federal militia, falling back before the Confederate ad 
vance. Gen Lee did not learn until this day of Hooker s 
crossing, for Stuart with the larger part of the cavalry 
was entirely out of touch with the Army, and Robert 
son with his own and Jones Brigade had not moved 
into Pennsylvania with the Army. Therefore, Lee was 
in utter ignorance of the movements of the enemy (just 
as Hooker had been at Chancellorsville), until one of 
Longstreet s spies arrived about midnight on the 28th, 
with accurate information as to the position of five of 
Meade s corps, and Lee now learned that Meade was 
at Frederick. That the absence of Stuart from the 
immediate front and flank of the Army during its ad 
vance into Pennsylvania was a grievous error on some 
body s part seems certain, but the point cannot be gone 
into at length here. It is by no means clear, however, 
that the mistake is justly attributable to Stuart. Be 
fore he separated from the Army with the larger part 
of his division, he placed one brigade and part of another 
in immediate touch with army headquarters, and this 
force was at all times subject to the directions of 
Stuart s superiors. The force was not used, but that was 
not Stuart s fault. Stuart certainly had the sanction of 
Gen. Lee for the movement he undertook, and if the 
troops he left with the Army had been properly em 
ployed, irrespective of what orders Stuart may have left 
with Robertson, the absence of the cavalry would never 
have been assigned as one of the causes of the Confeder- 


ate reverses in Pennsylvania. There is much ground for 
the belief that Lee counted on Stuart doing that which 
he had authorized Stuart to leave for Robertson to do, 
whereas Robertson, without direct orders from Lee 
failed to do without any fault on his part what Stuart 
would have done in similar circumstances. It would, 
therefore, seem that Lee suffered more from the ab 
sence of Stuart than from that of the cavalry, some of 
which he had but did not use ; and again, it may be said, 
that since Stuart was authorized to separate from the 
Army of Lee, the latter as commander-in-chief must 
bear the blame for all consequent mishaps.* 

As soon as Lee learned of Hooker s move across the 
Potomac and that the Federal army was marching to 
wards South Mountain, he at once arrested the move 
ments of his corps which had been hitherto ordered and 
determined to concentrate his army at Cashtown. Hill s 
Corps was accordingly ordered to move toward that 
point on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next 
day, leaving Pickett s Division at Chambersburg to 
guard the rear until relieved by Imboden s command 
from the Valley. Ewell was also recalled from Carlisle 
to the point of concentration, and on the evening of the 
30th his reserve artillery and trains with Johnson s 
Division as an escort arrived near Chambersburg, and 
Ewell himself with Early and Rodes reached Heidlers- 
burg. Since Jenkins Brigade with Griffin s Battery, 
which had covered Swell s advance towards Harrisburg, 
were the only mounted troops present, the advance of 
the Federals upon Gettysburg was unknown. Heth s 
Division of Hill s Corps had reached Cashtown on the 
29th, and the following morning Pettigrew s Brigade 
of that division, which had been sent forward to pro 
cure a supply of shoes, found Gettysburg occupied by 
the enemy, and returned nine miles to Cashtown, its 
commander being unwilling to hazard an attack with his 

*See Stuart s Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign, Mosby ; also Col. Mosby s 
and Col. Robertson s articles in Battles and Leaders; Campaigns of Stuart s 
Cavalry, McClellan ; The Battle of Gettysburg, Henderson ; and numerous other 
authorities pro and con. 


single brigade. Buford had early on the morning of 
the 29th crossed into and moved up the Cumberland 
Valley, via Boonesborough and Fairfield, with Gamble s 
and Devens cavalry brigades, after sending Merritt s 
to Mechanicstown as a guard for his trains, and on 
Tuesday afternoon, June 30, under instructions from 
Pleasonton had entered Gettysburg. 

Meade, who, like Lee, desired to fight a defensive 
battle, very soon after taking command on the 28th 
selected a strong position for his line along Parr s Ridge, 
behind Pipe Creek. This ridge formed the divide be 
tween the waters of the Potomac and Chesapeake Bay. 
From Gettysburg, near the eastern base of the Green 
Ridge and covering all the upper passes into Cumber 
land Valley, good roads led to all important points be 
tween the Susquehanna and the Potomac, as a result 
of which the town was of great strategic importance. 
On the west of the town, distant nearly half a mile, there 
is a somewhat elevated ridge running north and south 
with the Lutheran Seminary on the crest. This ridge, 
known as Seminary Ridge, was covered throughout its 
whole length with open woods. From the crest the 
ground slopes gradually to the west, and again rising 
forms another ridge about 500 yards from the first, 
upon which, nearly opposite the Seminary, stood the 
McPherson farm buildings. The western ridge, wider, 
smoother, and lower than the first, intersects the latter 
at Oak Hill, a commanding knoll at its northern ex 
tremity, and about one and a half miles north of the 
Seminary. From Oak Hill, the southern face of which 
was bare, there is a clear view of the slopes of both ridges 
and the valley between them. West of McPherson s 
ridge, Willoughby Run flows south into Marsh Creek, 
and south of the farm buildings and directly opposite 
the Seminary, a wood bordered the run for about 300 
yards, and stretched back to the crest behind. The 
Seminary stands midway between two roads and about 
300 yards from each, the first running from Gettysburg 
southwesterly to Hagerstown, via Fairfield ; the second 


northwesterly to Chambersburg, via Cashtown. Paral 
lel to and 150 yards north of the Chambersburg Pike 
is the bed of an unfinished railroad, with deep cuttings 
through the two ridges. North of the town the country 
is comparatively flat and open; on the east of it Rock 
Creek flows south. South of the town, and overlooking 
it, is a ridge of bold high ground, terminated on the west 
by Cemetery Hill, and on the east by Gulp s Hill, which 
bending around to the south extends half a mile or more 
and terminates in low grounds near Spangler s Spring. 
Gulp s Hill is steep and well wooded on its eastern face, 
which slopes downward to Rock Creek. From Ceme 
tery Hill, a ridge known as Cemetery Ridge extends 
southward for a mile or more nearly parallel to 
Seminary Ridge, 1,000 yards to the west. On a line in 
prolongation of Cemetery Ridge rise two bold knolls, 
known as Little Round Top and Big Round Top, re 
spectively. The configuration of the ground compris 
ing Cemetery Ridge is such that its crest forms a line 
similar to the shank of a fish hook, with the crest line 
of Gulp s Hill as the barb. The intervening ground 
between Cemetery and Seminary ridges consisted of 
rolling fields, intersected by numerous fences. Between 
the two ridges runs the Emmittsburg Road, which 
leaving the southern extremity of Seminary Ridge 
crosses the depression in a northeasterly direction, and 
passing over Cemetery Hill descends to the town. Such 
are the general features of the battlefield of Gettysburg. 

So impressed was Buford with the strength of the 
various positions about Gettysburg, that no sooner had 
Pettigrew withdrawn before his advance, than he de 
cided to secure them to Meade. Expecting the early 
appearance of the Confederates in force, he assigned 
Devens Brigade to the quarter of the field north, and 
Gamble s to that west of the town, sent out scouting 
parties along all the roads to collect imformation, and 
informed Reynolds of the situation. His pickets ex 
tended from below the Fairfield Road along the eastern 
bank of Willoughby Run to the railroad cut, then 


easterly some 1,500 yards north of the town to a wooded 
hillock near Rock Creek. Meade arrived on the night 
of the 30th, with his headquarters and the Reserve Ar 
tillery under Hunt at Taneytown, about 12 miles south 
of Gettysburg. The 1st Corps was at Marsh Run, the 
llth at Emmittsburg, the 3d at Bridgeport, the 12th 
at Littletown, the 2d at Uniontown, the 5th at Union 
Mills, the 6th and Gregg s cavalry at Manchester, and 
Kilpatrick s cavalry was at Hanover. Thus, while the 
Confederates were concentrating near Gettysburg, the 
Federal Army was widely scattered over the region to 
the south and east of it. But Meade was soon convinced 
that the movement of the enemy towards the Susque- 
hanna had been abandoned, and while he issued care 
fully drawn orders to prepare the Pipe Creek line for 
defense, he also provided for an offensive movement in 
case developments should justify it. 

At this time the three Confederate corps were con 
verging by easy marches on Cashtown, where Lee, now 
more or less conversant with the positions of the Fed 
eral corps, proposed to await an attack. Stuart was 
still out of touch with the Army, and Robertson and 
Imboden had not had time to come up. Pickett s Divi 
sion had been left at Chambersburg to await Imboden s 
arrival, and Law s Brigade had been detached from 
Hood s Division and sent to New Guilford Courthouse, 
a few miles south of Fayettesville, with orders to remain 
there until Robertson s command arrived. 

As soon as Hill on the 30th learned from Pettigrew 
that the enemy was in Gettysburg, he informed Lee of 
the fact and also Ewell that he intended to advance the 
next morning and discover what was in his front. His 
orders were specific not to bring on an action, but his 
thirst for battle was unquenchable, and like the German 
lieutenants in 1870 he rushed on, and, as we shall see, 
took the control of the situation out of the hands of the 
commander-in-chief. It was Hill, therefore, who 
committed the second great mistake of the Confederate 
campaign, the practical elimination of the cavalry being 
the first. 



THE Confederate situation on the morning of July 
1 was briefly as follows: Of the nine divisions, eight 
with the exception of Law s Brigade were in motion to 
wards Gettysburg, Ewell, in conformity with Hill s 
plan, having at an early hour ordered Rodes and Early 
to move on that point from the roads they were pursuing 
toward Cashtown. Six of the divisions with the reserve 
artillery of the three corps and the trains were concen 
trated upon the turnpike from Fayettesville to Gettys 

At 5 A. M., Hill with Heth s and Fender s divisions 
and Pegram s and Macintosh s battalions of artillery 
had left Cashtown, and at 8 A. M. Buford s scouts, about 
three miles west of Gettysburg, on the Cashtown Road, 
reported Heth s advance. Heth pressed on and found 
Gamble s cavalry brigade in position on the McPher- 
son Ridge from the Fairfield Road to the railroad cut, 
supported by Calef s regular battery, one section of 
which was stationed near the left of the line and the 
other two across the Chambersburg or Cashtown Pike.* 
Devens squadrons prolonged Gamble s line to Oak 

As Heth advanced, he threw Archer s Brigade to the 
right and Davis to the left of the Cashtown Pike with 
Pettigrew s and Brockenbrough s brigades in support. 
Pegram s and Mclntosh s battalions, though well up, 
were unable to gain positions from which to prepare 
the attack before Heth launched his brigades, and the 
batteries were left to act as best they could, without 
any definite plan or objective. Hence, Heth s first at 
tack was well resisted by Buford s dismounted troopers, 
who would have been unable to hold their lines had they 
been first subjected to a heavy artillery fire. Heth 

*This battery was distinguished as Duncan s Battery in the Mexican War. 


would almost certainly have been able by a proper con 
cert with Pegram and Mclntosh to seize Buford s po 
sition before the latter was reinforced. 

Upon receiving Buford s report, Reynolds started 
for Gettysburg with Wadsworth s small division of two 
brigades, and Hall s 2d Maine Battery, ordering 
Doubleday and Howard to follow with their corps. 
Hearing the sound of battle as he approached the town, 
Reynolds directed his troops to cross the fields towards 
the firing, and himself joined Buford at the Seminary. 
It was now past 10 o clock, and Heth had formed for 
attack. Reynolds placed three of the regiments which 
he had brought up north of the railroad cut, and two 
south of the pike, substituting Hall s Battery for 
Calef s, thus relieving the dismounted troopers, who 
had alone opposed Hill for the past two hours. Cutler s 
regiments were hardly in position when they were 
furiously charged by Davis Brigade and swept back 
to Seminary Ridge under the fire of Pegram s guns, 
which also forced Hall to retire his battery by sections. 
Reynolds had meantime sent to the rear to hurry 
Doubleday forward and one of the latter s regiments, 
together with the two which had been posted south of the 
pike under Col. Fowler, charged Davis Brigade and 
drove it from the cut with terrible loss to both sides. The 
Confederate brigade, losing all its field-officers but two, 
and many of its men, was disabled for the rest of the 
day. Just as Davis Brigade overlapped Cutler s on 
the right, so Meredith s, the other brigade which Rey 
nolds had brought up, overlapped Archer s on the 
latter s right. As Meredith s Brigade entered the wood 
west of the Seminary, it was ordered forward by Rey 
nolds in a furious charge upon Archer s Brigade, turn 
ing the Confederate flank, capturing Archer and most 
of his men, and pursuing the others beyond Willoughby 
Run. Almost at the moment of victory, the superb 
Reynolds, who with that magnanimity which character 
ized his soul, had disregarded the affront of Meade s ap 
pointment over him, and had only sought to aid his 


new commander and serve his country to the utmost 
of his ability, was killed in the wood by a sharpshooter. 
But with Wadsworth s Division he had, with rare 
promptitude and gallantry, "determined the decisive 
field of the war." In the words of Gen. Hunt, it may be 
said that " to him may be applied in a wider sense than 
in its original one Napier s happy eulogium on Ridge: 
No man died on that field with more glory than he, 
yet many died, and there was much glory. 

Soon after the repulse of Davis and Archer, Rowley s 
and Robinson s divisions of two brigades each with the 
four remaining batteries of the Corps arrived. Of Row 
ley s Division, Stone s Brigade occupied the interval be 
tween Meredith and Cutler, and Biddle s Brigade with 
Cooper s Battery took position on the ridge between the 
Fairfield Road and the wood. Reynolds Battery re 
placed Hall s, and Calef s rejoined Gamble s Brigade, 
which with Devens had been withdrawn from the field 
about 11 A. M. and stationed as a reserve in rear of the 
Federal left. Robinson s Division was also held as a re 
serve near the base of Seminary Ridge. Gen. Howard 
arrived about noon and, assuming command, directed 
Gen. Schurz commanding the llth Corps to prolong 
Doubleday s line towards Oak Hill with two of his divi 
sions and three batteries, and to post his third division 
and two batteries on Cemetery Hill as a rallying point. 

Heth had, meantime, been preparing to renew the 
attack, and, as soon as Fender arrived to support him, 
was ordered to advance by Hill. The greater portion 
of Heth s line now moved to the attack south of the 
Cashtown Pike, with Fender s Division formed in a 
second line. The nine batteries of Pegram s and Mcln- 
tosh s battalions occupied positions west of Willoughby 
Run, with Lane s, Poague s, Cutts , and Garnett s 
battalions held in reserve along the pike some distance 
to the rear. Pegram s entire battalion went into action 
on a low crest just to the right of the turnpike, while 
Rice s Battery and Hurt s section of Whitworths 
joined it. Johnson s Battery and Hurt s other section 


occupied a commanding hill further to the right near 
the Fairfield Road, while the 2d Rockbridge Battery, 
under Lieut. Wallace, was stationed just to the left of 
the pike. The two battalions at once opened with a slow 
fire which gradually grew in intensity as the Federal 
guns uncovered. Hurt s Whitworths were energetically 
employed in shelling the woods and soon Maurin s Bat 
tery of Garnett s Battalion moved up to the relief of 
one of Pegram s batteries, which had exhausted its am 

At this juncture there were nine batteries engaged on 
either side. But Hill was not to deliver the attack un 
aided, for, approaching Gettysburg and guided by the 
sound of battle, Rodes had directed his march along the 
prolongation of Seminary Ridge, with three brigades on 
the western and two on the eastern slope, while Ewell 
ordered Carter to seize Oak Hill for his battalion of ar 
tillery. By 1 o clock the approach of Ewell had been 
detected, and by 2 o clock the column had begun to 
arrive over the Middletown Road and Carter was es 
tablishing his guns in position. Whereupon Howard 
called on Sickles at Emmittsburg, and Slocum at Two 
Taverns, for aid. 

Col. Carter moved out ahead of Rodes line, and plac 
ing W. P. Carter s and Fry s batteries in position on 
Oak Hill opened a destructive fire upon the enemy s 
line running along the ridge west of the town to the 
railroad cut. The effect of these two batteries, 
though in a position much exposed to the ar 
tillery and musketry fire of the enemy, was such as to 
cause Schurz, who had prolonged Doubleday s line to 
the right, to change front with his two divisions and oc 
cupy a low ridge half a mile north of the town. This 
change of front left a gap between his left and Double- 
day s right covered only by the fire of Dilger s and 
Wheeler s batteries posted behind it. To meet the 
movement effected by Schurz, whose line was now at 
right angles to that of Doubleday and confronting 
Rodes, Carter moved Page s and Reese s batteries to the 


Confederate left. Page s Battery went into action at 
the foot of the ridge occupied by O Neal s Brigade, and 
opened with canister upon the enemy s infantry, which 
advanced to the attack. Disregarding at first the fire 
of the Federal batteries, a number of which had taken 
position in the valley north of the town and had con 
centrated upon him, Page was finally driven back to a 
more retired position. How persistently W. P. Carter 
at Oak Hill and Page maintained their fire is shown by 
the fact that within a short space of time the former 
lost 4 men killed and 7 wounded, while the latter lost 
4 men killed and 26 wounded, and 17 horses. 

Mclntosh and Pegram had from the first crossed fire 
with Carter, and from their positions had not only as 
sisted in forcing Schurz to abandon his original line, 
but had been able, by advancing two of Mclntosh s bat 
teries to the hollow east of Willoughby Run, to enfilade 
a large mass of infantry in the railroad cut, completely 
clearing it of the enemy. 

The Federal attack on Rodes left had become 
serious. Not only was Page s Battery compelled to re 
tire, but Iverson had lost three of his regiments, or 
about 1,000 of his men, and the flank was being 
gradually turned. Leaving Fry s Battery in its original 
position on the ridge, Col. Carter rapidly moved 
Carter s, Page s, and Reese s batteries to its eastern 
base behind Doles Brigade, which now held the extreme 
Confederate left. These batteries, by a tremendous ef 
fort, succeeded almost single-handed in checking the 
Federal advance and driving back both the infantry and 
artillery of the enemy from the threatened point. 
Carter s Battery, though much depleted and damaged, 
delivered a most effective fire with reckless daring. 

At this juncture, about 3:30 p. M., Early s Division 
began to arrive on Rodes left, and Devens dis 
mounted troopers who had been holding a hillock on 
Rock Creek were driven off by Doles skirmishers. 
Barlow, however, advanced his division supported by 
Wilkerson s Battery, and recovered the position, but in 


order to connect with Barlow s left, it was necessary 
for Schurz to push forward his center, and still further 
attenuate his line. 

As Early arrived, he took in the situation at a glance, 
and directed Jones to throw his battalion into action 
east of Rock Creek, and somewhat north of Barlow s 
position. With twelve pieces Jones soon opened at easy 
range upon the flank of Barlow s massed division, tak 
ing part of it in reverse. No troops could withstand 
such a fire long. No sooner had Jones opened than 
Gordon s, Hays , and Avery s brigades in line, with 
Smith s in support, moved out and attacked Barlow, 
Gordon on the right connecting with Doles on Rodes 
left. The Confederate line was now, about 4 p. M., 
thoroughly reestablished, and from right to left con 
sisted of Heth s, Rodes , and Early s divisions, sup 
ported by four battalions of artillery, or seventeen bat 
teries, all in action. 

A bloody contest now ensued between Barlow and 
Early in which the former was desperately wounded, 
and Wilkerson s Battery severely punished after losing 
its commander. The whole llth Corps or right wing 
of the Federal line was soon driven back almost to the 
town, where Schurz sought to establish a new line upon 
a brigade and Heckman s Battery which he drew from 
Cemetery Hill for the purpose. Jones had suffered 
the loss of several men and one gun, which was struck 
and bent by a solid shot. Three of his pieces had also 
been rendered temporarily unserviceable by projectiles 
wedging in the bore. But as soon as Early s advance 
had masked his fire upon Barlow s retreating masses, 
he sent Carrington s Battery across the creek in 
order that it might secure a better position in front of 
the town. 

Doubleday had been vigorously attacked by Rodes 
on his right, and both Heth and Fender of Hill s Divi 
sion on his left. Early s success completely uncovered 
his right, which was overlapped a quarter of a mile or 
more by Rodes. But still retiring slowly to the base 


of Seminary Ridge, where Col. Wainwright command 
ing the artillery of the 1st Corps had massed 12 guns 
south of the Cashtown pike, and Stewart s Battery 
slightly north of it, the Federals offered a desperate re 
sistance. Buford had thrown about half of Gamble s 
dismounted troopers forward on the left, south of the 
Fairfield Road. Heth s Division had suffered severely 
and Fender had moved into the front line. On the Con 
federate side, Gen. Pendleton was seeking to move 
Johnson s Battery to a position well to Heth s right, 
from which to enfilade Doubleday s left, and had 
ordered Garnett s Battalion forward along the pike and 
Poague s Battalion to move up under cover to the right 
between Johnson and Pegram. The artillery cordon 
was thus almost completed from the Fairfield Road to 
Rock Creek, when about 4 p. M. the whole Confederate 
line advanced to the final attack. Schurz, then Double- 
day, gave the order to fall back upon Cemetery Hill, but 
not until Davison s section of Stewart s Battery had 
raked Scale s Brigade in column on the pike, and 
Wain Wright s guns had inflicted great punishment upon 
Perrin in spite of Pegram s and Mclntosh s fire. Wain 
wright, mistaking the order, had clung to Seminary 
Hill, until, seeing the infantry retreating to the town, 
he moved his batteries down the Cashtown Pike, where 
they were overlapped on both sides by the Confederate 
skirmishers at close range. There, he was compelled to 
abandon a gun all the horses of which were killed. 
Schurz was also compelled to leave a gun on the field. 

The Confederate batteries now advanced rapidly 
from their several positions, and at once went into 
action along Seminary Ridge, while the infantry pur 
sued the retreating Federals through the town, which 
was taken about 4:30 p. M. along with some 5,000 
prisoners, principally men of the llth Corps, who had 
lost their way in the streets on the way to the rear. 

Doubleday s and Schurz s men rallied upon Stein- 
wehr s Division of the llth Corps. Stein wehr s men 
had been well posted behind the stone walls along the 


slopes of the hill, and in the houses thereon. As they 
arrived, the troops of Doubleday s Corps were formed 
on Steinwehr s left and Schurz s on his right. Buford 
assembled his squadrons on the plain west of Cemetery 
Hill, covering the Federal left flank and checking the 
pursuit, while Wainwright and Osborn posted the ten 
batteries of the two corps in strong positions on the hill 
covering every approach to its summit. A regiment 
comprising the train guard was promptly placed by 
Wadsworth on Gulp s Hill. Hancock, much beloved 
and admired by the Federal troops, now arrived and 
assumed command, and soon under the energetic 
direction of Hancock, Howard and Warren, strong en 
trenchments of stone, earth and timber began to appear 
all along the crests of Cemetery and Gulp s hills. The 
sorely-tried Federals, much inspired by Hancock s 
presence and the knowledge that his corps would soon 
arrive, had no thought of abandoning their small Gibral 
tar upon which the tide of defeat had washed them, 
without the most desperate resistance. 

While the Federals were busily occupied in prepar 
ing their position for defense, Gen. Pendleton with his 
staff was engaged in reconnoitering Seminary Ridge 
as far south as the road leading eastward from the ridge, 
through the Peach Orchard and Devil s Den. Gar- 
nett s Battalion had already been ordered up along the 
Fairfield Road to the ridge, where Pendleton had in 
tended to mass a large number of guns, within easy 
range of Cemetery Hill, but Gen. Ramseur, whose bri 
gade had just occupied the town, met Pendleton while 
selecting positions for his guns and urged him not to go 
into action at the point decided upon, lest the enemy s 
batteries should be provoked into firing upon his men, 
who were much exposed. Leaving Capt. Maurin with 
the batteries of Garnett s Battalion in park just behind 
the crest opposite the town, Pendleton again set about 
the exploration of the ridge, soon sending Col. Walker 
an order to move up his battalions, and the Commander- 
in-Chief detailed information about the road leading 
past the enemy s left flank. 


From his station on Seminary Hill, Gens. Lee and 
Longstreet had witnessed the enemy retreating to 
Cemetery Hill. Lee s desire was to have Ewell secure 
possession of the heights in his front. An order to do 
this was sent Ewell by Lee, but with the caution not 
to bring on a general engagement until the Army was 
all up. The position was a formidable one, and its 
strength was being rapidly increased. The 2d Corps 
had been much cut up. Rodes had lost 3,000 men or 
more, and besides a loss of about 500 of his men, Early 
had sent two of his brigades well out to his left to watch 
the York Road, over which the approach of part of the 
12th Corps was reported. Hill s two divisions had been 
very roughly handled and had lost heavily. They had 
been withdrawn to Seminary Hill, as soon as Early s 
troops entered the town, leaving Ewell with only about 
8,000 men to hold it and secure the prisoners. Ewell, 
by acquiescing in the order he received, led Lee to be 
lieve that the attempt to take the hill would be made and 
offered no objection to its execution. But Johnson s 
Division with Latimer s, Dance s, and Nelson s bat 
talions of artillery under Col. Brown, were momentarily 
expected by Ewell, and he delayed pending their ar 
rival. These troops, however, did not arrive until near 
sunset, and meantime the firing had all but died out. 
During the fatal delay, portions of the Federal 12th 
and 3d Corps arrived. Before Johnson s Division came 
up, the enemy was reported to Ewell to be moving to 
his left flank, and upon its arrival he ordered it to move 
around to meet the threat and occupy Gulp s Hill, half 
a mile to the east of Cemetery Hill, and Col. Brown at 
once set about a search for a route by which to move his 
artillery into position on Gulp s Hill, which he expected 
would soon be in Johnson s possession. At this junc 
ture, orders arrived from Gen. Lee for Ewell to draw 
his corps to the right, but Ewell in person persuaded the 
Commander-in-Chief to permit him to carry out his 
original design. Unknown to Ewell, Gulp s Hill had 
been occupied early in the evening by Wadsworth s Di- 


vision, and so when at midnight Johnson s Division was 
moved around to its base, a reconnoitering party found 
the enemy in possession, and no attempt was made to 
seize it. Latimer had meantime moved his battalion to 
the extreme left by a wide detour, and gone into 
position on Benner s Hill, between the York and Balti 
more roads in front of Gulp s Hill, where the batteries 
were parked for the night. 

General Hunt states that a Confederate attack on 
Cemetery Hill was impracticable before 5 :30 P. M., and 
that after that the position was perfectly secure. But 
this statement is too general, and therefore not at all 
satisfactory. That Ewell was guilty of unnecessarily 
delaying seems quite clear. The truth seems to be that 
he did not grasp the rare opportunity presented him 
and that it slipped by while he intentionally awaited the 
arrival of Johnson s Division and Brown s Artillery. 
It is not contended that Ewell should have assaulted 
after 5 :30 p. M. After that time, the Federal position 
on Cemetery Hill was, as Gen. Hunt declares, no doubt 
perfectly secure against the force Ewell could hurl 
against it, and Johnson was undoubtedly too weak to 
carry Gulp s Hill later in the night. The time at which 
Ewell should have taken the position was when Schurz 
fell back in more or less disorder before him. At that 
time, Gulp s Hill was entirely unoccupied, and Stein- 
wehr was alone in position on Cemetery Hill. It would 
seem that Swell s troops could have followed Schurz 
up the slopes practically protected against the fire of 
Steinwehr s men by the enemy retreating in his front. 
Gordon had practically routed Barlow s Division and 
was actually among the latter s men when Ewell himself 
ordered the pursuit to cease. Hear what Gordon has 
to say: "The whole of that portion of the Union Army 
in my front was in inextricable confusion and in flight. 
They were necessarily in flight, for my troops were upon 
the flank and rapidly sweeping down the lines. The fir 
ing upon my men had almost ceased. Large bodies of 
Union troops were throwing down their arms and sur- 


rendering because in disorganized and confused masses 
they were wholly powerless either to check the move 
ment or return the fire. As far down the lines as my 
eye could reach, the Union troops were in retreat.* 
Those at a distance were still resisting, but giving 
ground, and it was only necessary for me to press for 
ward in order to insure the same results which in 
variably follow such flank movements. In less than half 
an hour, my troops would have swept up and over those 
hills, the possession of which was of such momentous 
consequence. It is not surprising, with a full realization 
of the consequences of a halt, that I should have refused 
at first to obey the order. Not until the third or fourth 
order of the most peremptory character reached me, did 
I obey."t Now, here it is to be observed that if Double- 
day was still resisting well out to Gordon s right, as he 
certainly was at the time Gordon pressed forward to 
the town, he could not have been securely intrenched 
on Cemetery Hill. As a matter of fact, Steinwehr 
alone, as we have seen, was there. Gen. Hunt himself 
states that Doubleday reached the hill after Howard s 
two divisions fell back on Steinwehr, and also that the 1st 
Corps was reformed before the llth Corps. He also 
states that the llth Corps was reformed with some diffi 
culty and that not until Doubleday and Howard had 
established their line did Wadsworth occupy Gulp s 
Hill with the 500 men of the train guard. It appears 
then, from his own words, that during the interim be 
tween Gordon s enforced halt north of the hill and near 
its base and the time Doubleday reformed, a period of 
at least half an hour, there were no troops whatever on 
Gulp s Hill and only Steinwehr and the two other divi 
sions of the llth Corps, the latter in a state of disorgani 
zation, on Cemetery Hill. Little should have been ex 
pected by Ewell in the way of an artillery preparation 
for his attack. In fact, the terrain offered few good 
positions for his artillery, and even had it been capable 

*No doubt Gordon could see the retrograde movement of Doubleday s line 
before Rodes and Fender. 

^-Reminiscences of the Civil War, John B. Gordon. 


of rendering him valuable aid, that fact does not ex 
tenuate the grievous error of his allowing the enemy to 
intrench and reinforce himself. When he did move, it 
was in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, though the latter s consent was finally 
secured and Johnson s entire division, too weak to 
carry Gulp s Hill, was placed in a position from which 
communication with the rest of the Army was most 
difficult. In fact, it was practically eliminated from the 
field of utility for the remainder of the battle. 

As to the point of Swell s ability to take Gulp s Hill 
and Cemetery Hill on the evening of the 1st, there is, 
however, the greatest diversity of authority. One of 
his own staff officers declares as the result of a personal 
reconnaissance that it was perfectly practicable.* At 
any rate, Lee s original orders should have been obeyed 
and the attempt made. In failing to do this, Ewell 
committed the third great mistake of the campaign. 
The fact that Lee s consent to the movement of John 
son s Division around to the left had been secured does 
not in any way signify that his original views were al 
tered by Swell s representations. When that division 
arrived, Lee had learned through the personal recon 
naissance of Col. Long of his staff that it was no longer 
practicable to assault Cemetery Hill. He knew that 
Ewell had by his procrastination allowed the golden 
opportunity to slip through his fingers, and that some 
other move was necessary. 

But now let us view the situation from another stand 
point. Let us regard Ewell s action in the most favor 
able light possible, assuming, contrary to the fact, 
that he received no order from Lee to follow up Schurz. 
Even then it would seem he was guilty of a most inex 
cusable tactical blunder, for certain it is no general 
should halt his troops in pursuit, with a hill immediately 
in front obviously offering a rallying point for the 
enemy. The mere fact that a routed or even a defeated 

*Capt. James Power Smith. See his valuable paper, "General Lee at 
Gettysburg," read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, 
April 4, 1905. 


enemy makes for a particular point is sufficient to 
prompt an energetic commander to seek in every way 
possible to deny his adversary access thereto. Cemetery 
and Gulp s hills by their very nature should have filled 
Ewell with a consuming desire to reach their crests and 
discover what lay beyond them. He should have longed 
to secure their summits if for no other reason than to 
keep the enemy from doing so. So long as a single regi 
ment of his corps was capable of pushing on in fairly 
good order, it should never have been allowed to halt un 
til stopped by exhaustion or by the enemy. Troops, how 
ever weary, do not rest on ordinary hillsides with the 
great unknown on the rear crest, and had whatever force 
Ewell may have sent forward in this case been checked 
in its ascent by Steinwehr, the strength and exact loca 
tion of the latter would have been discovered. The in 
formation thus secured would have at once enabled 
Ewell to seize Gulp s Hill, if not Cemetery Hill, 
and with the former in his possession the latter would 
have soon become untenable along with the whole posi 
tion subsequently occupied by Meade s troops. 

The Confederates had now become hopelessly com 
mitted to the offensive, and just as Lee was compelled to 
abandon the position near Cashtown as his line of de 
fense, so Meade was being gradually drawn away by 
circumstances from the defensive position he had se 
lected behind Pipe Creek. Gettysburg, like a great 
magnet, had drawn both armies forward from their 
chosen fields of action, for neither Lee nor Meade was 
able to overcome its attraction. Meade was compelled 
to reinforce Buford, then Reynolds, then Howard, then 
Hancock, to save them, while Lee was unable to re 
linquish the contact which Hill, contrary to the general 
plan of campaign and specific orders, had brought 

When Meade was thoroughly informed of the situa 
tion at Cemetery Hill by Hancock and others, he im 
mediately set his remaining troops in motion for 
Gettysburg by forced marches, wisely recognizing Gen. 


Hunt as his tactical Chief of Artillery and directing 
him to make all necessary dispositions concerning the 
arm. Leaving Taneytown about 11 P. M. Meade and 
Hunt reached the battlefield shortly after midnight and 
soon reconnoitered the position. The general features 
of the field have been explained. The Federal line, 
though hurriedly established upon the natural ridges, 
overlooked the open country to the north and the de 
pression to the west. From Big Round Top on the 
south to Gulp s Hill at the point of the fish hook on the 
east, the distance was about three miles. The line pos 
sessed a great advantage in that troops could be quickly 
transferred from point to point of the crest line by mov 
ing them across the interior area. Meade saw at once 
that the position and his force would permit him to es 
tablish about 25,000 infantry and 100 guns along each 
mile of his front, and that his flanks were at once unas 
sailable and unturnable if properly defended. Not only 
did the natural flanks of the position rest upon precipi 
tous and rocky slopes, but they were screened from ar 
tillery fire by thick growths of trees. As he viewed the 
favor which fortune had bestowed upon him, Meade s re 
grets concerning the necessary abandonment of Pipe 
Creek were dispelled. 

Running roughly parallel to the shank of the Federal 
hook, which was some two miles long from Little Round 
Top to the bend at Cemetery Hill, nature with a bold 
hand had marked out the main Confederate position 
along Seminary Ridge. At the close of the 1st of July, 
Ewell s Corps covered the front from Benner s Hill 
around Gulp s and Cemetery Hill, to Seminary Hill 
and the Fairfield Road, his line passing through the 
town. Johnson was on the left, Early in the center, and 
Rodes on the right. Hill s line occupied Seminary 
Ridge, his left connecting with Ewell. Trimble, vice 
Fender, was on the left, Anderson on the right, and 
Pettigrew, vice Heth, in reserve on the rear slope of the 
ridge. The Artillery of the 2d and 3d Corps bivouacked 
that night along the line, generally in rear of the in fan- 


try. Latimer occupied Banner s Hill, while Brown held 
Jones and Dance s battalions for the night somewhat 
in Johnson s rear in readiness to be moved to Gulp s 
Hill should it be taken. Carter s batteries remained in 
position along the ridge north of the town, together with 
Nelson s Battalion. Col. Walker held Pegram s, Mc- 
Intosh s, Lane s, Poague s, and that part of Garnett s 
Battalion which had not been placed in position by 
Pendleton, along the rear crest of Seminary Ridge, 
ready to take up positions on the forward crest at dawn. 

The exterior line of the Confederates is thus seen to 
have been not less than 5 miles in extent with communi 
cation from point to point rendered most roundabout 
and difficult by reason of its concavity towards the 
enemy. Furthermore, Lee s force enabled him to oc 
cupy this line with not over 13,000 infantry, and 50 guns 
per mile, or about half the number of guns and muskets 
per mile of the enemy s position. The Federal forma 
tion was deep and narrow, while that of the Confeder 
ates was extensive in width and shallow. The relative 
disposition of the two armies was, therefore, such that 
the utmost cooperation between the various parts of the 
exterior line, together with the concentration of its fire 
effect, was essential to compensate, in an attack upon the 
interior line, for the lack of the momentum of a superior 
mass at any given point of assault. Without these two 
elements, it now seems evident that any attack, how 
ever gallantly delivered, was predestined to fail through 
sheer lack of momentum. No problem could be pre 
sented which involves to a higher degree than did 
Gettysburg the absolute necessity of fire superiority to 
the success of the offensive. 

Such was the condition of affairs at the close of the 
1st of July. While Lee s original desire to seize Ceme 
tery Hill during the early part of the evening had been 
thwarted, he still believed the important position could 
be successfully assailed at daybreak in spite of Long- 
street s advice to turn his attention to the enemy s 
left in the vulnerable quarter to which Pendleton had 


called attention. But while the views of Lee and Long- 
street differed at this time, the fact remains that the 
latter had already been urged to hasten forward his 
troops in order to be ready to discharge and carry out 
the part which circumstances might dictate. But Long- 
street at heart never accepted the necessity for the 
abandonment of the original plan to fight a de 
fensive battle. While with Lee on Seminary Hill on the 
afternoon of the 1st, he openly expressed his disap 
proval of the former s intention to attack Cemetery 
Hill in the morning, saying, "If the enemy is there in 
the morning, it is because he wants to be attacked." 
He left his commander-in-chief, according to his own 
statement, with these parting words upon his lips, and 
such an expression on his part gives a fair insight into 
the spirit in which he set about the task of conforming 
to the general plan. To say the least, he was not en 
thusiastic, and lacking enthusiasm, that great lubricant 
of the military machine, it is small wonder that his sub 
sequent movements were characterized by delays. 
When one s heart is not in his work, difficulties which 
otherwise might be easily disregarded, and in a large 
measure overcome, at once become all but insurmount 
able. To understand Longstreet s movements from now 
on, one must recognize the fact that he was at least an 
unwilling actor of a most important role, a role in which 
every particle of his old energy and enthusiasm was 
necessary to bring about success. 

Whatever orders were given Longstreet and the 
other corps commanders, it seems certain that on the 
night of July 1 every available man was expected to be 
at the front early the following morning, and so when 
late in the evening, after conferring with some of his 
corps and division commanders, Lee finally accepted 
their view and decided to attack as advised by Long- 
street, he had every reason to expect that the 1st Corps 
would be on hand and ready to undertake its mission. 
After the engagement of the first day, Gen. Pendleton 
had again examined the ground southwest of the town, 


and finding the ground in front of the southern part of 
Cemetery Ridge much less difficult than that opposite 
Hill s troops which were already in position opposite 
Cemetery Hill, its practicable character was again re 
ported to Gen. Lee. By that time, Col. Long had re- 
connoitered the Federal right and reported adversely 
against the chances of a successful attack in the morning 
in that quarter, and the Commander-in-Chief had con 
ferred with Ewell and his division commanders whose 
views coincided with Pendleton s about the proper 
quarter in which to make an assault. Gen. Pendleton 
declared that Lee told him when he reported the result 
of his second reconnaissance that he had already 
ordered Longstreet to attack by way of the Peach 
Orchard at sunrise the next morning, and requested 
him to reexamine the ground in that direction at dawn.* 
Whether Longstreet was directly ordered by Lee to 
attack the Federal left at daybreak on the 2d or not, is 
immaterial to this record. Suffice it to say, a great 
blunder, the fourth of the campaign, was committed 
either by Gen. Lee or by Gen. Longstreet. Much 
authority both adverse to, and in support of, the latter 
exists. If he was not ordered to attack at an early hour, 
he should have been, and if he was directed to do so, he 
failed to execute his orders. t 

*Longstreet, in a vicious article in Battles and Leaders and later in his 
book, endeavored to discredit the statements of Gen. Pendleton relative to this 
reconnaissance. Not only has he been the only one to question the word of the 
Rev. Wm. Nelson Pendleton, whose whole life was devoted to truth and the 
service of God, but he has, also, been the only soldier of the Confederacy to 
impugn the character of Gen. Lee. In expressing sentiments in his writings 
entirely at variance with those of Longstreet, the general, Longstreet, the em 
bittered politician, simply weakened the force of his arguments. Into this he 
was undoubtedly provoked by the animosities and criticisms of post-bellum 
politics. One is almost glad to believe, as claimed by many, that he never 
really wrote From Manassas to Appomattox, but, after all, whether he did or 
not, he is responsible for the sentiments expressed by his literary agent, and it 
is doubtful if so much jealousy of Virginia and Virginians as that which is 
evidenced in this book could have been engendered in his soul subsequent to the 
war, unless the germ had lain there from the first. The writer, though but a 
child of six years at the time, vividly recalls a conversation between his father 
and Gen. William Mahone, while he was perched upon the latter s knee, in 
which the General said. "It is too bad Longstreet has let them goad him into 
mixing up his military record with politics," or words to that effect. Both 
Mahone and the writer s father were victims of much the same political odium 
attaching to Longstreet, at the time, but Mahone was wiser than Longstreet, 
and though the superb little soldier was actually charged by his more un 
scrupulous enemies with cowardice, he was never provoked into defending him 
self against the absurd accusation. His remark made a lasting impression upon 
the writer s mind, though its meaning was not fully comprehended for many 

tSee Military Memoirs of a Confederate, Alexander, and Advance and Retreat J 
Hood, both in support of Longstreet. 


Longstreet s supporters make entirely too much of 
the technicality of whether or not a specific order was re 
ceived by him to attack at an early hour. He was 
culpable in not having his corps on the field ready to 
attack, should the developments of the night require it. 
He was with Lee the afternoon of the 1st, and has fre 
quently declared that he was conscious of a state of 
mental distress and uncertainty on the part of his com- 
mander-in-chief. Since he did not know himself and 
did not believe that Lee knew what to expect on the 
morrow, all the more incumbent was it upon him to 
have his troops present and prepared for any con 
tingency. Longstreet knew that Ewell and Hill had 
both been heavily engaged and that they had run up 
against a snag. From this he must have known that the 
exigency of the occasion required the immediate pres 
ence of the 1st Corps. His troops had been set in 
motion for Gettysburg. The question whether or not 
he was to attack the next day was immaterial. His 
duty, irrespective of an order for attack, or further 
orders of any kind, was to bring his command up at the 
first practicable hour. That a large part of the 1st 
Corps could have arrived much earlier than it did is not 
denied, for the main body of that corps went into bivouac 
within four miles of the field at midnight. In not appear 
ing as soon as possible, Longstreet was guilty of the 
same lack of the spirit of cooperation which kept him 
away from Chancellorsville. Had he done at Gettys 
burg what the situation as known to him should have 
disclosed to the commander of one-third of the entire 
army to be necessary, he would have been present when 
needed and no delay would ever have occurred, even 
had no orders for attack been issued on the 1st. But 
here it should be said that Longstreet s delay was not 
the sole mistake made at Gettysburg, though many 
people entirely lose sight of those which had preceded it. 
Had Stuart been present, no battle would have been 
fought on the 1st. Had Hill obeyed orders, no battle 
would have been fought on the 1st. Had Ewell risen 


to the occasion on the 1st, Longstreet s attack on the 2d 
would not have been necessary. How can it be justly 
said that Longstreet lost the battle of Gettysburg? 
Longstreet, Ewell, and Hill together and in an equal 
degree contributed to the failure of the campaign. As 
to the battle itself, it is inconceivable how one can dis 
tinguish between the wanton sacrifice of opportunity 
on the part of Ewell, and the delay of Longstreet, 
in favor of the former. 



THE Artillery of the 2d and 3d corps, as well as all 
the divisions thereof, were upon the field and in position 
on the morning of the 2d. The Reserve Artillery of 
the 1st Corps had been held in camp near Greenwood 
the preceding day, and Cabell s, Henry s, and Dear- 
ing s battalions were attached to McLaws, Hoods, and 
Pickett s divisions, respectively, as usual. Little in 
formation had sifted back to the rear during the day of 
the events transpiring at the front. Early in the even 
ing, however, the news reached the various portions of 
the 1st Corps that Hill and Ewell had been heavily en 
gaged and were driving the enemy. At 4 P. M.^ Mc 
Laws and Hood with Cabell s and Henry s battalions 
left Greenwood, and marching 13 miles went into 
bivouac at Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg. 
Marching again at dawn they arrived near the field be 
tween 6 and 8 A. M. 

Late in the evening of the 1st, information was re 
ceived in the rear that Hill and Ewell had come to a 
standstill before the enemy in a strong defensive posi 
tion, and soon orders arrived for the Reserve Artillery of 
the 1st Corps consisting of Eshleman s Battalion, 9 guns, 
and Alexander s, 26 guns, to move forward at 1 A. M. 
Marching steadily over good roads with a bright moon, 
the two battalions halted in a grassy, open grove about 
a mile west of Seminary Ridge at 7 A. M., where the 
animals were watered and fed. At this juncture, Col. 
Alexander was sent for by Longstreet, and riding for 
ward found him with Lee on Seminary Ridge. It was 
explained to Alexander that the 1st Corps would as 
sault the enemy s left flank and he was directed to take 
command of the corps artillery and reconnoiter the 
sector assigned him. He was particularly cautioned 
to keep his batteries out of sight of the signal station on 


Big Round Top, in moving them into position. Plac 
ing Maj. Huger in command of his own battalion, Alex 
ander at once set about making his reconnaissance, 
which was most thorough, extending over about three 
hours. By noon Alexander had led his own, Cabell s, 
and Henry s battalions by a meadow screened from the 
Federal signal station to a point in the valley of 
Willoughby Run, where they remained behind that por 
tion of Seminary Ridge to be occupied by Longstreet s 
infantry. After disposing his batteries he rode back 
to learn the cause of the non-arrival of Hood and Mc- 
Laws. Dearing s Battalion was with Pickett, and 
Eshleman s was held in reserve by Alexander in rear of 
the ridge, with the ordnance train. 

Col. Walker had early in the morning posted the ar 
tillery of the 3d Corps along Seminary Ridge with the 
exception of Poague s and part of Garnett s battalions, 
the latter under Maj. Richardson, both of which he held 
in reserve on the rear crest. Thus Alexander s line of 
guns was extended to the left by Walker s as far as the 
Seminary. In the 2d Corps Col. Brown still held the 
extreme left with Latimer s Battalion. About 4 A. M. 
Latimer had after a most careful reconnaissance se 
lected the only eligible position which was on the face of 
Benner s Hill, where he experienced much difficulty in 
securing proper cover for his caissons and limbers. His 
position was directly in front of Culp s Hill, and just 
across Rock Creek therefrom. Brown s Battery oc 
cupied the right of the line, Carpenter s the center, and 
Dement s and one section of Raine s the left. The guns 
were much crowded, and no room existed for the 20- 
pounder Parrott section of Raine s Battery, which 
under Lieut. Hardwicke, with Graham s Battery of 
Dance s Battalion, was posted further to the rear and 
right near the toll gate on the Hanover Road. Carter s 
Battalion still occupied the ridge held by Rodes Divi 
sion northwest of the town. Dance s Battalion was 
placed under Col. Carter s command early in the morn 
ing, and, after sending Graham s Battery to the left, 


Carter posted Watson s Battery on the ridge just to the 
left of the railroad cut, Smith s on its right near the 
Seminary, and Dance s own battery under Lieut. Cun 
ningham on the right of Seminary Hill and to the left 
of the Fairfield Road. Hupp s Salem Battery under 
Lieut. Griffin was held in reserve. Jones Battalion 
was held well in rear of Swell s left to guard against 
any attempt to turn that flank and was therefore elimi 
nated from the action of the day. Just before sunset, 
he sent the Parrott section of Green s Battery at the re 
quest of Stuart to join Hampton at Hunter stown, three 
miles distant, and at 3 P. M. Tanner s Battery, which 
had exhausted its ammunition on the 1st, was ordered 
to the rear with the trains. Nelson s Battalion was held 
in reserve in rear of the ridge and about 500 yards to 
the left of the Cashtown Pike until 11 A. M., when it was 
moved into park immediately in rear of the Seminary, 
where it remained until dark in readiness to occupy 
a selected position in the front line. Thus it is seen 
that Ewell and Brown had not more than 48 of their 
80-odd guns actually in position, and bearing on the 
Federal lines on the 2d of July, for Jones and Nelson s 
battalions and Hupp s Battery were not engaged during 
the day. Yet, Gen. Lee had directed Ewell to create a 
diversion in Longstreet s favor, as soon as the guns of 
the 1st Corps were heard, converting it into a real at 
tack if a favorable opportunity offered. 

Early in the morning when nearly all the Confederate 
Army had reached Gettysburg, or its immediate vicin 
ity, a great number of Meade s troops were still on the 
road. The 2d Corps and two divisions of the 5th under 
Sykes arrived about 7 A. M V and Crawford s Division 
joined about noon. Lockwood s Brigade arrived from 
Baltimore at 8; De Trobriand s and Burling s bri 
gades of the 3d Corps at 9, and the Artillery Reserve, 
with an ammunition train close in its rear, containing 
besides the usual supply, 20 additional rounds of am 
munition for every gun in the Army, from Emmitts- 
burgat 10:30 A. M. 


The lack of energy on the part of the Confederates 
in completing their dispositions for attack was in 
marked contrast to Meade s activity. At every point 
of his line of defense, the Federal commander and his 
staff officers were to be seen. As the Federal troops 
came up, all but exhausted by their long forced 
marches, which extended throughout the night and 
morning in spite of the oppressive heat, they were not 
allowed to rest until placed in position. The 12th 
Corps (Slocum s under Williams) occupied Gulp s 
Hill on Wadsworth s right, the 2d Corps Cemetery 
Ridge from which the 3d Corps was drawn to prolong 
the line to Round Top ; the 5th Corps was placed in re 
serve along the Baltimore Road near Rock Creek; and 
the Reserve Artillery, under the immediate command of 
Gen. Tyler, in a central position on a cross road from 
the Baltimore Pike to the Taneytown Road. A part of 
Buford s cavalry occupied the left, while Kilpatrick s 
and Gregg s cavalry divisions were posted well out on 
the right flank. The 1st and llth Corps still held Ceme 
tery Hill. The batteries of the various corps were 
strongly posted in rear of the infantry lines, and the 
more advanced guns on Cemetery and Gulp s hills were 
protected by epaulments and gun pits. 

Some slight demonstrating on the part of Ewell at 
daybreak had led Meade to order Slocum to attack the 
Confederate left with the 5th and 12th Corps, so soon 
as the 6th Corps should arrive to support him, but as 
the ground in his front was found unfavorable by 
Slocum, and the 6th Corps did not arrive before Swell s 
activity ceased, the offensive was not assumed in this 
quarter by the Federals. Furthermore, Meade was ap 
prehensive about his left, and was well satisfied to re 
main passive as long as each hour enabled him to 
strengthen his line in that quarter with the constantly 
arriving troops. In the meantime, Gen. Hunt, by his 
foresight in providing extra reserve ammunition, was 


able to replenish the caissons of the 1st and llth Corps, 
which had been practically emptied the preceding day.* 
At the first blush of dawn, Gen. Pendleton made his 
reconnaissance as directed, examining the ground al 
most up to the Federal position. Finding no difficulties 
which appeared to him insuperable, but detecting the 
movements of large masses of the enemy s infantry in 
the rear of the hostile line, he communicated with both 
Lee and Longstreet, urging upon them both that an im 
mediate attack be made. Again and again he sent 
messages to the Commander-in- Chief by his staff of 
ficers, to impress him with the necessity of prompt 
action, and was informed that they were invariably 
transmitted to Longstreet by Gen. Lee, who was much 
annoyed by the latter s procrastination. But Long- 
street did not arrive with Lee to examine the ground 
until noon. As they finally viewed the enemy s position 
from Seminary Ridge, near the Warfield house, the 
main features of the enemy s position appeared as fol 
lows: near the base of Cemetery Hill was Zeigler s 
Grove a mile and a half due north of the base of Little 
Round Top. From Zeigler s Grove Cemetery Ridge, 
with a well defined crest, ran 900 yards or more south 
to a smaller but prominent clump of trees, where it 
turned sharply back for 200 yards, then south again for 
700 yards to Weikert s house. So far the ridge was 
smooth and open, in full view of and from 1,400 to 
1,600 yards distant from Seminary Ridge. At 
Weikert s, it was lost in a large body of rocks, hills, and 
woods, lying athwart the direct line to Big Round Top, 
the Taneytown Road bending around to the east of the 
broken ground. This rough space extended some 400 
yards west of the line of the ridge prolonged toward 
Plum Run. Along its southern edge, it was bounded 
by low marshy ground, stretching back to the base of 
Little Round Top, half a mile or more from Weikert s 
house, and its western boundary was wooded from north 

*Hunt had formed the special ammunition train previously referred to upon 
his own responsibility and unknown to Hooker, who had never accorded his 
Chief of Artillery much consideration in the way of assigning him to the 
tactical direction of the arm. 



to south. In front of these woods and Plum Run, 
stretched an open space 300 yards wide, a continuation 
of the rolling fields in front of Cemetery Ridge. Plum 
Run flows in a southeasterly direction towards Little 
Round Top, and then bends to the southwest at a point 
where it receives a small branch from Seminary Ridge. 
In the angles formed by these streams is a bold, rocky 
height, 100 feet lower than and 500 yards due west of 
Little Round Top. With a steep eastern face the hill 
is prolonged as a ridge generally in a northwesterly 
direction between Plum Run on the north and Plum 
Run Branch on the south to Seminary Ridge from 
which it springs towards the east as a spur. The sur 
face of the northern face of Devil s Den Hill proper is 
intersected by innumerable ledges and outcroppings 
of rocks, among which are many holes and bowlders. 
From these peculiar formations the hill takes its name. 
The marshy bottom forming the valley of Plum Run, 
and the slopes of the two conical hills known as the 
Round Tops, are also strewn with massive bowlders. A 
cross road running along the north of Devil s Den and 
the Taneytown Road intersected the Emmittsburg Road 
at a peach orchard on the Devil s Den Ridge, 1,100 
yards west of Plum Run. For a distance of 400 yards 
from the stream, the road was bounded on the north by 
trees and on the south by a wheat field. From the Peach 
Orchard, the Emmittsburg Road ran diagonally across 
the rolling fields between the Seminary and Cemetery 
ridges, a mile and a half to Zeigler s Grove. For half 
a mile from the orchard the road ran along a ridge per 
pendicular to the Devil s Den Ridge, and nearly parallel 
to and 600 yards distant from Seminary Ridge. From 
Devil s Den to the wooded crest of Seminary Ridge the 
distance was therefore about 1,700 yards. The junction 
of the two bold ridges at the orchard formed the salient 
of the Federal lines, and it was upon this point that 
Longstreet s Corps was to be hurled. If the enemy 
could be driven from the orchard by Longstreet, Gen. 
Lee believed the latter s artillery massed at that com- 


manding position would be able to assist the infantry in 
reaching Cemetery Ridge. From the Peach Orchard 
Longstreet s attack would be in oblique order, and if 
driven home would roll up the Federal left. Had the 
attack been rendered before 9 A. M., before the Federal 
3d and 6th Corps and the Reserve Artillery were in 
position, and before the enemy s lines were strengthened 
by nearly a whole day of energetic labor on the defensive 
works, the Confederates would undoubtedly have ac 
complished their design. The first indication the Fed 
erals had of Longstreet s presence was when Sickles at 
Hunt s suggestion sent forward a party to reconnoiter 
the woods 600 yards in his front. The presence of the 
enemy, however, when detected gave Sickles little con 
cern, for already news of Sedgwick s near approach with 
the 6th Corps, the largest in the Federal Army, had 
been received, and Hunt, who from Devil s Den Ridge 
had been attracted by the superior command of Big 
Round Top, had set off to examine the extreme left and 
see that proper precautions were taken in that quarter 
to save the conical height from falling into the hands of 
the Confederates. When Hunt returned to the Peach 
Orchard after visiting Round Top and reporting all 
safe to Meade, Birney s Division was posted along the 
Emmittsburg Road on the Devil s Den Ridge, Gra 
ham s on Birney s right in two lines in front of the 
Smith house, and Burling had been ordered up to re 
inforce Birney at the salient. Hunt had already sent 
to the Reserve Artillery for some of his batteries, and 
as Turnbull s arrived, he replaced with it Seeley s Bat 
tery of the 3d Corps, which Capt. Randolph had placed 
on Graham s right, the latter shifting its position to 
the left of the Smith house. Randolph had also posted 
Smith s Battery on the rocky hill at Devil s Den, Wins- 
low s in the wheatfield, Clark s on the left face of the 
salient or southern slope of the ridge, and his own at the 
angle looking west. 

Sickles Corps was obviously too weak to hold the 
advanced line or salient formed by the junction of the 


two ridges at the orchard, and Sykes 5th Corps which 
had been ordered to reinforce him was momentarily ex 
pected. No sooner did the Confederate fire open than 
Meade also sent for C aid well s Division on Cemetery 
Ridge, a division of the 12th Corps on Gulp s Hill, and 
soon after for part of the recently arrived 6th Corps. 
McGilvery s Artillery Brigade also soon arrived from 
the Reserve, and Bigelow s, Phillips , Hart s, Ames , 
and Thompson s batteries were ordered into position 
along the crests. 

Pickett s Division had left Chambersburg at 2 A. M., 
but after a march of 22 miles went into camp, three 
miles from the field at 4 p. M. Yet McLaws entire divi 
sion and Hood s, with the exception of Law s Brigade, 
had arrived within striking distance of the field early in 
the morning. Longstreet deliberately waited for the ar 
rival of Law s Brigade before he made the slightest 
effort to place his infantry in position. This alone 
was not the only cause of delay, for leaving New Guil- 
ford Courthouse with Bachman s Battery at 3 A. M. 
Law had rejoined Hood before noon. At this time 
Hood and McLaws were on the Chambersburg Road 
about a mile west of the town. We have seen that 
Alexander had easily avoided the exposed point with 
his artillery column, and had ridden back to discover the 
cause of Longstreet s delay. Yet, he has subsequently 
sought to defend that delay when it is proved by his 
own action that there was no reason for it. Longstreet 
had caused his infantry to countermarch and take a 
devious route via Black Horse Tavern, in order to avoid 
detection from the Federal signal station. At length, 
after many vexatious and useless halts, his column ar 
rived, Hood in front, at the Emmittsburg Road along 
Seminary Ridge opposite Little Round Top, and on 
the right of Anderson s Division of the 3d Corps which 
had been extended towards the south during the morn 
ing. In spite of Longstreet s devious route to screen 
his flank movement, it had been discovered by the Fed 
eral signal party. 


Both Pendleton and Col. Long of Lee s staff had ex 
amined the positions which Walker s batteries had 
taken along Seminary Ridge from which to support the 
advance of the 1st Corps, and all was at last ready. 
Gen. Lee had been sorely tried throughout the day by 
what appeared to him, at least, to be an inexplicable de 
lay on Longstreet s part. EwelFs and Hill s artillery 
had already opened upon Cemetery Hill by way of 
diversion in favor of the 1st Corps. 

Upon arriving Longstreet deployed his divisions each 
in two lines with Hood on the right and extending east 
of the road to a point about 1,000 yards south of the 
orchard, his left prolonged by McLaws, whose line 
crossed the road to the rear. Reilly s, Latham s, 
Garden s, and Bachman s batteries of Henry s Bat 
talion of 20 guns, were posted among the trees on the 
ridge in rear of Hood. Although there was no sign of 
any enemy on the right, as a precaution a regiment 
was detached and stationed at Kern s house, half a mile 
down the Emmittsburg Road. While forming his line, 
Law had been greatly attracted by Big Round Top, 
and learning from some prisoners, which the mounted 
scouts he had sent to reconnoiter its southern base had 
captured, that it was weakly held and that the Federal 
medical and ordnance trains were unguarded in its rear, 
and could be reached by a good farm road, he protested 
to Hood against a frontal attack and begged to be al 
lowed to make a detour around the Federal flank. 
Hood s orders were positive, but he was induced by 
Law s persistent representations to communicate the 
information the latter had secured to Longstreet. Soon 
Capt. Hamilton of his staff, by whom the message was 
sent to the corps commander, returned and directed 
Hood by Longstreet s order to begin the attack at once 
as previously planned. If Hood s message reached 
Longstreet, he, Longstreet, had no just ground for his 
subsequent contention, that he had urged in vain to be 
allowed to turn the Federal left, instead of making a 
frontal attack. Whether Lee had previously insisted 


upon such an attack or not, it seems certain that his 
views would have been materially altered by such infor 
mation as that in Law s possession. And, again, while 
the ground in his front was such that Longstreet s at 
tack necessarily became a frontal one, the movement of 
his corps with respect to the whole army was designed to 
be tactically a flank attack. Upon discovering that his 
blow would fall short of the flank, a fact unknown ex 
cept to him, it was Longstreet s duty to inform the Com- 
mander-in-Chief. Yet, he subsequently had the ef 
frontery to declare that "he would and could have saved 
every man lost at Gettysburg, had he been permitted to 
do so." No. Longstreet was stubborn. He had been 
ordered to do that which he did not want to do, which 
was to participate in an offensive engagement, and he 
did not propose to contribute anything on his own initia 
tive to the success of a battle, the fighting of which he 
had all along opposed. The severest arraignment of 
Longstreet ever penned is the account of the battle of 
Gettysburg by Gen. Law, in which, in an attempt to 
shoulder the blame on Lee for its loss, he unwittingly 
fixes the responsibility for Longstreet s failure to turn 
the left flank, beyond peradventure of a doubt, upon 
Longstreet himself.* 

The order of attack issued by Longstreet as soon as 
his divisions were in line of battle was for the movement 
to begin on the right, Law s Brigade leading, the others 
taking it up successively toward the left. It was 
near 5 p. M. when the infantry advanced. The 
artillery on both sides had already been warmly en 
gaged the better part of an hour. Alexander s Bat 
talion with 18, Cabell s with 18, and Henry s with 
10 guns had been in action since about 3:45 p. M. 
Henry s Battalion had moved out with Hood, and 
as the Federal Artillery was well posted and pre 
pared for the attack, his batteries were soon after com 
ing into view heavily engaged. Cabell s Battalion had 

*See "The Struggle for Round Top," E. M. Law, Battles and Leaders, Vol. 
Ill, p. 322. 


at once gone into action behind a stone fence near 
Snyder s house, about 700 yards from the Federal bat 
teries, to support Henry. His position afforded little 
cover for the guns, and the well-directed fire of the op 
posing artillery at once caused him serious loss in men 
and horses. To help him, Alexander had Huger move 
Moody s, Ficklin s, Parker s, and Taylor s batteries with 
their 18 guns to the Warfield house and open at a range 
of 500 yards from the orchard. Alexander now had 54 
guns of the 1st Corps in action, which he and Longstreet 
both believed would in a short while be able to crush in 
Sickles line and silence his batteries. But so accurate 
was the practice of the Federal guns, that two of 
Fickling s pieces were soon dismounted. The labor of 
running the guns up after each recoil to the crest of the 
rocky slope was so exhausting to his cannoneers that 
Moody was compelled to call for volunteers from 
Barksdale s Brigade nearby to handle his four 24- 
pounder Parrotts and two 12-pounder Napoleons. 
Eight infantrymen promptly responded, two of whom 
were killed and three wounded before night. 

When Hood finally launched his infantry, it ad 
vanced rapidly across the valley in front of the left 
leg of the salient angle held by the Federals, all the 
time under a heavy fire from the enemy s batteries, and 
brushing his skirmishers out of the way, soon struck 
Sickles main line. The advance continued steadily, 
driving the enemy to the confines of Devil s Den, where 
the troops of both sides on this portion of the field 
seemed to dissolve in the rugged area. In less than an 
hour Hood s troops had carried Devil s Den opposite 
his center and captured three pieces of Smith s Battery, 
which from the rocky height had severely punished the 
attacking infantry. In the meantime, Law, supported 
by a part of Robertson s Brigade, had in spite of Hood s 
orders, swept over the northern slope of Big Round 
Top, cleared it of the enemy, and, turning somewhat to 
the left, advanced upon Little Round Top in rear of 
the hill which Hood s center had carried. Henry s Bat- 


talion had done all in its power to support Hood s 
infantry, devoting much attention to Smith s Battery 
on Devil s Den Road, which had enfiladed and inflicted 
much loss upon the attacking troops. Cabell had also 
turned two of his guns upon this battery with fine effect. 
In the meantime, however, Hood s left brigade had 
been subjected to great annoyance and loss by the fire 
of the enemy along the ridge on its left and had been 
frequently compelled in its advance to change front to 
repel the movements against its flank. McLaws had 
held his men well under cover during the artillery prep 
aration. In spite of the superior number and metal of 
the enemy s guns, Alexander s own batteries stood man 
fully to their task, determined to shake the Federal line 
at the angle, and save McLaws infantry as much as 
possible in their advance. The ammunition expenditure 
was enormous, but fortunately the reserve supply was 
close at hand behind the ridge. At such close range, the 
Confederate fire was more accurate than usual, while 
many of the Federal projectiles passed over the crest 
behind the Confederate batteries, and were lost in the 
valley beyond. The thick growth of trees on the ridge 
also served to reduce the effect of the shells that burst 
short of the crest. But the Federal batteries were still 
holding their own when Alexander, about 6 p. M., 
ordered Maj. Dearing, who had arrived in advance of 
his battalion, and reported to him, to move up Wool- 
folk s and Jordan s batteries with their ten pieces, which 
had been held in reserve behind the ridge, to the support 
of the other four batteries of the battalion under Huger. 
But before these batteries joined Huger, at the War- 
field house, Cabell had ceased firing and given the signal 
with three guns for McLaws Division to charge. 
Leaping the wall behind which they had lain, McLaws 
men rushed past the guns in Kershaw s front, crushed 
in the angle of Sickles line by seizing the Peach 
Orchard, and drove the enemy back in confusion from 
their salient position, thereby relieving the pressure on 
Hood s left. 


The breaking in of the Peach Orchard angle exposed 
the flanks of the batteries on the advanced crests, which 
fell back firing in order to cover the retirement of the 
infantry behind Plum Run. Many guns of different 
batteries had to be abandoned by the Federals because 
of the destruction of their teams and cannoneers. Some 
were hauled off by hand, but the loss was heavy. Bige- 
low s 9th Massachusetts Battery made a stand close by 
the Trostle house in a corner of a field to which the guns 
were hauled by prolonges, where it was ordered by 
McGilvery to remain in action at all hazards until a line 
of artillery could be formed in front of the wood beyond 
Plum Run. This line was soon formed by collecting all 
the serviceable batteries and fragments of batteries 
which had been withdrawn, and, together with Dow s 
Maine Battery fresh from the reserve, Bigelow suc 
ceeded in checking the pursuit and enabling all but one 
of the abandoned guns to be recovered. 

As McLaws Division rushed past the guns at the 
Warfield house, masking their fire, Alexander ordered 
all six of his batteries to limber to the front, and charged 
with them in line across the plain, going into action 
again at the orchard. Perhaps no more superb feat of 
artillery drill on the battlefield was ever witnessed than 
this rapid change of position of Alexander s Battalion. 
For 500 yards the foaming horses dashed forward, under 
whip and spur, the guns in perfect alignment, and the 
carriages fairly bounding over the fields. Every officer 
and non-commissioned officer rode at his post, and not 
a team swerved from the line, except those which were 
struck down by the blizzard of Federal shell. Fortu 
nately most of the enemy s projectiles overshot their 
mark, and as the great line of six batteries with over 
400 horses reached the position abandoned by the enemy, 
"action front" was executed as if by a single piece. 
Hardly had the teams wheeled, and the trails of the 
pieces cleared the pintle-hooks when again a sheet of 
flame burst from the 24 guns of Alexander s magnificent 
battalion. Few artillerymen have experienced the sen- 


sation which must have come to Alexander at this mo 
ment, for seldom has such a maneuver been executed on 
the battlefield. 

The ground over which the battalion had advanced 
was generally good, but obstructed in one place by a rail 
fence. Seeing a body of Federal prisoners being moved 
to the rear, Dearing had shouted to them to remove the 
rails in the path of the artillery. "Never was an order 
executed with more alacrity. Every prisoner seemed to 
seize a rail, and the fence disappeared as if by magic." 
But the joy of the charge was not all. It was the ar 
tillerist s heaven to follow the routed enemy after a 
prolonged duel with his guns, and to hurl shell and 
canister into his disorganized and fleeing masses. To 
Alexander s ears, the reports of his guns sounded louder 
and more powerful than ever before, and the shouts of 
his gunners directing the fire in rapid succession thrilled 
his own and the soul of every witness of the fight with 
exultant pride. 

There is no excitement on earth like that of gallop 
ing at the head of a rapidly advancing line of artillery, 
with the awe-inspiring rumble of the wheels, mingling 
with the clatter of innumerable feet close behind. The 
momentum of the great mass of men, animals, and car 
riages almost seems to forbid the thought of attempting 
to check the force which has been set in motion. With his 
mount bounding along almost as if borne on the breeze 
of the pursuing storm, the eye of the commander in 
stinctively searches the terrain for his position, while 
a hundred, perhaps five hundred, human beings, and as 
many dumb warriors, joyfully laboring in the traces, 
watch his every movement. At last the leader s right 
arm shoots upward, then outward. No words are neces 
sary, and if spoken would be superfluous. In that dull 
roar of the onrushing mass no voice but that of Jove 
could be heard. The swoop of the fleetest hawk is not 
more graceful nor more sudden than that which follows. 
Every man and horse knows his part and must perform 
it, for mistakes at such a moment are fatal. But, first 


of all, out of the orderly chaos which ensues, the dark 
warriors come to rest as if in the ominous silence gath 
ering breath with which to shout their defiance, while the 
attending men and beasts are springing to their posts. 
The joy of the charge is forgotten. Though every hand 
and limb is still trembling with the old thrill, a greater 
joy is now in store for all, for flash! bang! scre-e-ch bo 
om a shell has burst among the flying foe. Small 
wonder then that Alexander cherished no regret over 
having declined the command of a brigade of infantry. 
Surely there was glory enough for any soldier to be 
found at the head of such a command as he led across 
the fields and into action in front of Little Round Top ! 

After the enemy fell back upon the ridge in their 
rear, Longstreet s batteries fired upon every part of the 
hostile line in range, especially devoting their attention 
to McGilvery s group of 28 guns behind Plum Run. 
Three of Anderson s brigades, Wilcox s, Perry s, and 
Wright s, pressed forward against Humphreys line 
and forced it back to Cemetery Ridge, under cover of 
two of Gibbon s regiments and Brown s Rhode Island 
Battery. Later they succeeded in breaking the Federal 
line and seized many guns, but were driven out and fell 
back about dusk under a heavy artillery fire from Mc 
Gilvery s massed batteries. 

Further to the right one Confederate regiment alone 
succeeded in crossing Plum Run and actually got in 
among Bigelow s Battery fighting hand to hand with 
the cannoneers. Although, of the 104 men and 88 horses 
of this battery, 28 men and 65 horses were killed or 
wounded, still it maintained itself without losing a gun, 
and the gallant captain, who himself was wounded, faith 
fully discharged the important trust committed to him. 
In doing so, he gave evidence, as in the case of Beck- 
ham s gunners at Brandy Station, of the great resisting 
power of artillery, even when unsupported. 

Hood s center, as we have seen, had seized and still 
held Devil s Den, but Law, who had reached the slope of 
Little Round Top, had been driven back to its base by 


Weed s and Vincent s brigades and Hazlett s Battery, 
which Warren on his own initiative had stationed at the 
summit, just as Longstreet s attack commenced. The 
placing of Hazlett s six guns in this position was a 
marvelous feat, and one which, in view of the precipitous 
and rugged slope of the mountain would have seemed 
impossible under ordinary circumstances. But, to 
gether the infantry and the cannoneers dragged them to 
the top just in time to repel Law s troops, who were 
already clambering up the slopes. The fighting for the 
possession of Little Round Top was desperate. Weed 
and Hazlett were both killed and Vincent wounded. 
The first had himself won great distinction in the Penin 
sula campaign, as an artillerist, and again at Chancel- 
lorsville, where he served as chief of his corps artillery. 
Shortly before his death he had been promoted from a 
captain of artillery to a brigadier-general of infantry. 
Brave Hazlett, whom we have met on other fields, fell 
while bending over his former chief to receive his last 
message. Hood s men, however, clung to the base of 
the mountain, Devil s Den and its woods, and captured 
three of Smith s guns. 

It was now after 7 p. M. and Longstreet s troops, who 
had become disjointed in their attack, were engaged in 
more or less isolated combats. His artillery took part 
wherever it could. "The fuses of the flying shells 
streaked the darkening sky like little meteors." 

As the Federal reinforcements had arrived piece 
meal, they had been beaten in detail until by successive 
accretions they greatly outnumbered Hood and Mc- 
Laws. The fighting had been confined largely to the 
Peach Orchard, Little Round Top, and the rugged area 
of Devil s Den, behind the ledges and bowlders of which 
the sharpshooters of both sides had been thickly posted. 
At the close of the day, the Confederates held the base 
of both the Round Tops, Devil s Den, and the Emmitts- 
burg Road, with skirmishers thrown out as far as the 
Trostle house. The Federals held the summits of the 
Round Tops, the Plum Run line, and Cemetery Ridge. 


Before 8 p. M. the fire on both sides began to slacken, 
and by 9 the field was silent and Longstreet s men rested 
on their arms conscious of the fact that their work had 
only begun. 

Now let us see what had been done on other parts of 
the field to support Longstreet s attack. We have seen 
that Anderson s three brigades assaulted Humphreys 
on the left of the 1st Corps. In this movement Wilcox 
was ably supported by Patterson s Battery of six pieces, 
and one gun of Ross s Battery, all of Lane s Battalion. 
That Anderson s troops were desperately engaged is 
shown by the fact that at one time Wilcox took 8 and 
Wright about 20 pieces of the enemy s artillery. 

Of Hill s artillery, Poague s Battalion took position 
along Anderson s line in two groups. The left group 
consisting of five pieces of Graham s and Wyatt s bat 
teries under Capt. Wyatt occupied the ridge behind 
Anderson s left, while Capt. Ward with five guns of his 
own and Brooke s Warrenton Battery moved out to the 
crest some 500 yards in advance of the ridge, when An 
derson s brigades advanced. On Poague s left, Pe- 
gram s Battalion under Brunson occupied a position be 
hind a stone wall on the ridge opposite Cemetery Ridge, 
losing during the day 9 men and 25 horses. Further to 
the left and behind the same wall, Mclntosh was posted. 
Poague and Brunson both succeeded in partially en 
filading the Federal batteries along the Emmittsburg 
Road and greatly aided Alexander in subduing their 
fire and driving them from their advanced positions. 
In this Mclntosh also assisted, but was principally en 
gaged in diverting the fire of the batteries on Cemetery 
Ridge from Longstreet s and Anderson s troops. On 
Mclntosh s left, Lane with the two 20-pounder Par- 
rotts and three 3-inch navy rifles of Wingfield s Battery, 
and the five remaining pieces of Ross s Battery, engaged 
the Federal Artillery on Cemetery Hill. Beyond Lane, 
and just to the right of the Fairfield Road, Maj. 
Richardson with nine pieces of Garnett s Battalion also 
fired actively upon the same guns, and was late in the 


day able to divert the fire of some of them from E well s 
troops. So much for the part of the 3d Corps. In the 
main, Walker s batteries were active and effective, and 
no complaint whatever is to be made of the support 
rendered by the artillery of the 2d Corps, 55 guns of 
which were engaged though mostly at extreme range. 

Ewell like Hill had been ordered to support Long- 
street s attack by active demonstrations. The success 
ful performance of his role was essential to the success 
of the main attack in order that Meade might not draw 
troops from the point of the hook to support those at the 
end of the shank. We have seen that but 48 pieces of his 
artillery had been placed in position in the morning, a 
fact which almost presaged a lack of energy on his 
part. But 32 of these were actively engaged. About 
4 P. M. Latimer was ordered to open from his position 
at Benner s Hill. As soon as his guns were unmasked, 
the enemy replied with a superior number of guns from 
Cemetery Hill and Gulp s Hill, causing many casualties 
in the battalion. Soon the Federals planted some guns 
well out to Latimer s left front, enfilading Carpen 
ter s Battery and practically silencing it. By this time 
one section of Dement s Battery had entirely exhausted 
its ammunition, and one of Brown s pieces had been dis 
abled. Brown himself was wounded and his men so cut 
up that but two pieces could be maintained in action. 
Latimer was now compelled to retire his battalion with 
the exception of four pieces which he left under cover to 
repel any advance which the enemy might attempt. 

It was now sunset. Jones Battalion was absent 
from the field altogether, and neither Carter s nor Nel 
son s had fired a shot. The three batteries of Dance s 
battalion in position behind Swell s right had alone, of 
all the artillery of the 2d Corps, supported Latimer by 
firing upon Cemetery Hill and the batteries posted 
there. Latimer s contest had been most unequal. 
Ewell s demonstration which should of course have 
been made soon after Latimer opened fire was delayed, 
and the infantry only got fairly to work after he had 


been terribly cut up and compelled to withdraw his 
guns. Finally Johnson s Division advanced and Lati- 
mer boldly opened with the four pieces which he had left 
in position, drawing the overwhelming fire of the massed 
batteries of the enemy upon him. Perceiving that the 
Federals were shifting the position of many of their guns 
so as to play upon Latimer and Johnson, Richardson on 
Hill s left redoubled his efforts to divert their fire and 
partially succeeded. It was at this juncture that the 
overbold and youthful Latimer was struck down, while 
heroically cheering on the few cannoneers that remained 
at their posts. The wound which the "boy major," as 
he was called, received in his arm, resulted in his death 
from gangrene on August 1st. Col. John Thompson 
Brown, the Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps, char 
acterized Latimer as a gallant and accomplished officer, 
and a noble young man. "No heavier loss," said he, 
"could have befallen the Artillery of this corps." And 
Ewell, who was not given to flattery as his reports will 
show, wrote of him, "The gallant young officer served 
with me from March, 1862, to the second battle of Ma- 
nassas. I was particularly struck at Winchester, May 
25, 1862, his first warm engagement, by his coolness, 
self-possession, and bravery under a very heavy artillery 
fire, showing when most needed the full possession of all 
his faculties. Though not twenty-one when he fell, his 
soldierly qualities had impressed me as deeply as those 
of any officer in my command." And writing of the 
battle Gen. Pendleton said, "Here the gallant Maj. 
Latimer, so young and yet so exemplary, received the 
wound which eventuated in his death." While Gen. 
Lee did not mention Latimer in his report of the battle 
his admiration of the youthful artillerist was unbounded 
and frequently expressed. 

Entering the Virginia Military Institute in 1859, 
Latimer promptly volunteered when the Corps of Ca 
dets was sent to Richmond in April, was at once assigned 
to duty with the artillery being organized in the camp of 
instruction, and was soon commissioned a lieutenant in 


to the peculiar character of the Federal position, which 
was so compact, as well as covered by the accidents of 
the ground, that troops could easily be shifted from 
point to point. Nevertheless, full advantage was taken 
of this fortunate circumstance by Meade. Again Hunt 
proved to be the Nemesis of the Confederates, and time 
and again his artillery was found massed just at the 
right point to deny them success, for it was McGilvery 
at Plum Run, who checked Longstreet, and it was 
Stevens on the right who hurled Early from the ridge 
he had all but won. During Longstreet s attack, Hunt 
had supported Sickles with 11 batteries with 60 guns of 
his general reserve alone. In addition to these guns, 
the 2d, 3d, and 5th Corps had 80 guns in action. Against 
these 140 pieces, Longstreet had but 62 guns on the field, 
and Anderson s Division but 5 in advance of Seminary 

While the artillery on both sides suffered severely in 
men and horses, the total loss of ordnance was three Fed 
eral guns, two of which only could be removed by the 
Confederates from the field. 

The fire of the Confederate Artillery was most effect 
ive, but it was hopelessly outmatched in numbers. 
Longstreet s batteries were assigned an almost impos 
sible task, for after driving battery after battery from 
the field, fresh ones continued to appear. Hunt s report 
says: "The batteries were exposed to heavy front and 
enfilading fires and suffered terribly, but as rapidly as 
any were disabled they were retired and replaced by 
others." And so, after the most persistent and heroic 
efforts on the part of Alexander s artillerymen to silence 
the enemy s batteries, at the close of the day they were 
rewarded by seeing not less than 75 Federal guns in 
position with ever-increasing infantry supports near-by. 
Yet there was no sign of discouragement in the Artil 

When night fell, the Confederate Infantry, with the 
exception of Hood s and McLaws Division on the 
right, and Johnson s on the extreme left, bivouacked ap 
proximately in the positions it had occupied in the morn- 


ing. But while the Infantry rested, it was necessary for 
the Artillery to be refitted for the morrow. A splendid 
moon lit up the field and greatly assisted the work. The 
sound horses were watered and fed, while those killed 
and disabled were replaced by drafts from the wagon 
trains in rear. Extra caissons were brought up, am 
munition issued, the lines rectified and such cover 
as was possible provided for the guns and their detach 

The losses in Alexander s own battalion had been 
very heavy, probably not less than 75 men and twice 
that number of horses. Taylor s Battery alone lost 9 
men. But the heaviest loss was in Fickling s (Rhett s 
or Brook s) South Carolina Battery, which had two 12- 
pounder howitzers dismounted and 40 cannoneers killed 
or wounded. 

An incident in connection with Taylor s or Eubank s 
Battery is especially worthy of being preserved. While 
it was dashing forward to the orchard corporal 
Joseph T. V. Lantz, a veteran gunner, was struck down 
by a shell, which broke both his legs above the knees, 
and soon died. When some of his companions at 
tempted to remove him from the field, he said, "You can 
do me no good; I am killed; follow your piece." 
Nearby lay the body of a young cadet, Hill Carter 
Eubank, who only a few days before had left the Vir 
ginia Military Institute to enlist in the battery originally 
commanded by his father. The facts are stated simply 
to show the character of the men who manned the Con 
federate guns. No artillery ever possessed a more 
superb personnel, and equally heroic incidents concern 
ing them might be recounted indefinitely. 

In Cabell s Battalion, the losses were unusually 
severe. McCarthy s Battery lost 9 men and 13 horses. 
Lieuts. R. M. Anderson and John Nimmo, with the 
rifled section of this battery alone, expended 200 rounds 
of ammunition in less than 2 hours, in a duel with 
Smith s Battery on Devil s Den Hill. Manly s Battery 
had moved forward to the orchard with Alexander s 


Battalion and suffered accordingly. Eraser s Battery 
not only lost its veteran commander, but one of its lieu 
tenants and 11 men. When Lieut. Furlong succeeded 
to the command of the battery, he was able to man but 
two pieces. Capt. Carlton was also wounded, Lieut. 
Motes succeeding to the command of the Troup Battery. 
During the night it was withdrawn to be refitted. In 
Henry s Battalion, which had been actively engaged 
from the first in support of Hood, the losses were also 
severe. One of Reilly s 3-inch rifles had burst, but two 
10-pounder Parrotts captured by Hood s men from 
Smith s Battery were turned over to and secured by the 
battalion. Although Dearing had reported in person 
to Alexander before the capture of the Peach Orchard 
and had taken part in the fight, his battalion did not ar 
rive upon the field until after dark, when it went into 
bivouac behind the ridge. 

During the night it became known that the artillery 
along the whole line would be called upon to open at an 
early hour, and before morning Eshleman s and Dear- 
ing s battalions were moved up to Alexander s left, with 
Cabell and Henry on his right. Gen. Pendleton and 
Col. Long visited every portion of the line before morn 
ing, verified the positions of the guns, and gave specific 
directions to the Artillery of all three corps as to its 
part on the morrow. With the exception of the massing 
of all the batteries of the 1st Corps along the ridge at 
the Peach Orchard, the positions of the Artillery re 
mained generally unchanged. Brown and Walker, like 
Alexander, made every effort to prepare their batteries 
for the renewal of the battle, and everywhere the fullest 
confidence reigned in the Artillery. Apparently there 
was no uneasiness over the small supply of reserve am 
munition at hand, a matter with which the gunners, as 
a whole, were unfamiliar, perhaps fortunately so. But 
it seems certain that some account should have been 
taken of the condition of the ammunition supply, as a 
matter of extreme importance to the success of subse 
quent operations. The expenditure of the past two days 


had been enormous, and it was apparent to all that an 
unusual amount would be required the day following. 
It would be interesting indeed to be able to follow the 
movements of the ammunition trains and their methods 
of supply, but one searches in vain for a record of these 
things. Fortunately, nowadays, the trains, especially 
the ordnance trains, are both regarded and treated as 
an integral part of an army. 



THE dawn of July 3d found the two armies approxi 
mately in the positions occupied by them at the close of 
the fighting the evening before. Though Cemetery 
Ridge remained intact in the hands of the Federals, 
yet the operations had resulted at every point in an ad 
vantage to the Confederates in spite of the fact that 
they had failed to accomplish all they had attempted to 
do. Longstreet had seized and occupied the advanced 
Federal position on the left, E well s left held the breast 
works on Gulp s Hill on the extreme Federal right, and 
tremendous loss had been inflicted on Meade s army. 
The advantage gained by Ewell would, it was believed, 
enable him to take the Federal line in reverse. Gen. 
Lee, therefore, determined to renew the assault. Long- 
street, in accordance with this decision, was reinforced by 
Pickett s three brigades and Dearing s Battalion of ar 
tillery, which arrived after dark, and ordered to assail 
the heights in his front at dawn, while Ewell was di 
rected to make a simultaneous assault on the enemy s 
right. But Meade did not supinely await the develop 
ment of the Confederate attack as planned. A great 
group of guns was placed in position during the night, 
to bear on Johnson s Division, which had been strongly 
reinforced, and at 4 A. M. Geary and Ruger advanced 
under cover of the artillery to wrest their intrench- 
ments from the Confederates. By 8 A. M. Ewell, in spite 
of the most desperate efforts on the part of Johnson s 
men, was forced to relinquish the captured works. Long- 
street s dispositions had again been delayed and the 
fighting on the left had commenced long before the 1st 
Corps was ready to cooperate. It rendered Ewell no 
effectual support whatever. The sixth great mistake 
had been committed in this failure on the part of the 


2d and 3d Corps to attack simultaneously, and again 
Meade had been free to reinforce one of his flanks at 
the expense of the other. 

The change in the condition of affairs compelled Gen. 
Lee to alter his plan of attack. A reconnaissance dis 
closed to him that the Federal position from Round Top 
to Gulp s Hill was occupied at every point by infantry 
and artillery. There was, however, one point upon which 
an assault could be directed with a reasonable prospect 
of success. The word reasonable is used because sub 
sequent events showed that success would have been at 
tained had Lee s orders been executed. This point was 
where Cemetery Ridge sloped westward to form the 
saddle over which the Emmittsburg Road passed. Lee 
believed that by forcing the hostile line at that point 
and directing his attack toward Cemetery Hill, he could 
take the Federal right in flank. He also perceived that 
once having gained the saddle in the ridge, the fire of 
the enemy s left would be neutralized, since it would be 
as destructive to friend as to foe. The task was accord 
ingly assigned to Longstreet, while as before Hill and 
Ewell were to support him, and about 150 guns were to 
be massed to prepare for the assault. These conclu 
sions were reached at a conference held during the morn 
ing on the field in front and within cannon range of 
Round Top, there being present Gens. Lee, Longstreet, 
A. P. Hill, and various staff officers. The plan of at 
tack was fully discussed and it was decided that Pickett, 
whose men were fresh and thirsting for battle, should 
lead the assaulting column supported by McLaws and 
Hood. A. P. Hill was also to support the attack with 
such force as he could spare. It was never in any way 
contemplated that Pickett should alone make the as 
sault. He was to be given the lead for the sole reason 
that since his troops were un weakened by previous fight 
ing it was naturally assumed they would be more effec 
tive than Hood s and McLaws , which had been terribly 
punished. Any one familiar with war knows that 
soldiers are not like wolves which become more fierce at 


the sight of blood. The best troops are the most human 
men, and while the best troops are able temporarily to 
set aside, they are never able entirely to dispel, their 
fears of death. The more losses they sustain, the more 
difficult it is for them to set aside those fears. Pickett s 
men were not only fresh, but were inspired by a desire 
to reap their share of the glory of the battle, which had 
been denied them by their absence from the field the day 
before. While it had remained in the rear, its veteran 
soldiers, though individually glad to escape the horrors 
of battle, were none the less collectively fearful less they 
might arrive too late to satisfy the pride of their com 

The sole objection offered by Longstreet to the plan 
proposed at the conference was that the guns on Little 
Round Top might be brought to bear on the right flank 
of his column, but this point was disposed of apparently 
to his entire satisfaction by Col. Long of Lee s staff, 
who suggested that they could be neutralized, if not 
silenced, by a group of Confederate guns massed for the 
purpose. None of the awful forebodings which Long- 
street has subsequently declared he entertained were ex 
pressed by him. He made no attempt to point out the 
inevitable failure of the attack, and gave no evidence 
of a feeling that the post of honor assigned his corps 
was virtually a forlorn hope, in which it was to be ruth 
lessly sacrificed by the "blood-thirsty Lee."* Yet he 
has declared that he used the following words to the 
Commander-in-Chief at the conference: "That will 
give me 15,000 men. I have been a soldier, I may say, 
from the ranks up to the position I now hold. I have 
been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those 
of two or three soldiers up to those of an army corps, and 
I think I can safely say there never was a body of 15,000 
men who could make that attack successfully." These 
remarks, which Longstreet in fact would hardly have 
dared make, are important if they were actually made, 
for they show that his heart was still not in his work, and 

*See Longstreet s absurd article in Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill, p. 339, and 
also his book. 


prove as previously stated that his spirit throughout the 
battle was not one of cooperation, and also, that he 
positively did not gather from the discussion at the con 
ference that Pickett s Division was alone to assault. Yet 
he also argues that Pickett was wantonly sacrificed by 
Lee in spite of the fact that he, Longstreet, made not 
the slightest effort to support the division which, 
actually by his own words, accomplished all the entire 
corps was expected to do. The narrative will show that 
it was Longstreet himself who sacrificed Pickett s Divi 
sion, and also that its much misunderstood charge, so 
commonly and erroneously attributed as a grievous 
error to Lee, was in fact a feat which vindicates the 
Commander-in-Chief of any possible blame for having 
attempted the impossible. To believe Longstreet is to 
recognize that he had in a sense staked his professional 
opinion against the possibility of the successful issue 
of the battle. It was then with his moral force, the 
greatest power of any general, set against the successful 
performance of his part, that Longstreet undertook the 
execution of his orders. He says, "With my knowledge 
of the situation, I could see the desperate and hopeless 
nature of the charge, and the cruel slaughter it would 
cause. My heart was heavy when I left Pickett/ 
Picture Longstreet, the "old war-horse," the "Sledge 
Hammer" of the Army of Northern Virginia, beset 
with anticipations of loss in battle! Can anything be 
more absurd, for among all his other virtues as a general 
that of ability to steel his heart against inevitable losses 
and not count the cost when occasion demanded was by 
far the finest. Well might his heart have been heavy 
when he left Pickett, for he must have known that no 
steps had been taken, and that he did not intend to take 
any, to support him. 

Upon the representation that he could not uncover 
his right by withdrawing Hood and McLaws, Long- 
street was assigned seven brigades of Hill s Corps. 
These with Pickett s made ten brigades for the column 
of attack. 


Alexander was early apprised of the alteration of the 
plan, and in order to bring his guns to bear on Cemetery 
Hill a good many changes in the positions of the 1st 
Corps batteries were necessary. The batteries had been 
posted before daylight on the rolling ground about the 
Peach Orchard, and by reason of the open character of 
the position were necessarily exposed. The enemy s 
guns were generally in pits or behind epaulments along 
the ridge opposite, and though they fired occasional 
shots during the morning, Alexander reserved his fire 
in order to save ammunition. The shifting of his bat 
teries to meet the change of orders was conducted as 
quietly as possible by Alexander, but with his usual 
energy and skill, and although the enemy s artillery be 
came somewhat more active, the new line was established 
by 10 A. M. Alexander now had in position 75 guns, all 
well advanced, in an irregular curved line about 1,300 
yards long, beginning in the Peach Orchard and ending 
near the northeast corner of the Spangler wood. Along 
this line Cabell s, Dearing s, Eshleman s, Alexander s 
under Huger, and Henry s battalions were posted in the 
order named from left to right. Maj. Richardson, with 
the nine 12-pounder howitzers of Garnett s Battalion, 
also reported to Alexander by Pendleton s orders, and 
his pieces which were of too short range to be effective 
along Hill s front were directed to be held under cover 
close in rear of the forming columns of infantry, with 
which it was intended they should advance. Pickett s 
Division had already arrived at the orchard and the men 
were eating and resting, ignorant of the fate which 
awaited them, but all conscious of serious work ahead. 

A few hundred yards to the left and rear of Alex 
ander s line began Walker s line of 60 guns, the batteries 
of which were generally posted as on the previous day, 
extending along the ridge as far as the Hagerstown 
Road. Nearly a mile to the north of Walker s left, two 
Whitworth rifles of Hurt s Battery were posted on the 
same ridge. In the interval 10 guns of Carter s Bat 
talion occupied positions on the right and left of the 


railroad cut, and to their right connecting with Walker s 
left, Watson s and Smith s batteries and a section of 
Hupp s of Dance s Battalion, with 10 guns, took po 
sition. Latimer s Battalion, now under Capt. Raine, 
remained in rear of Johnson s left, as did Jones Bat 
talion, while Nelson s Battalion had also been ordered 
to that point with directions to engage the enemy s guns 
on Gulp s Hill, if practicable. Capt. Graham, with four 
guns, occupied a hill about 2,500 yards northeast of 
Cemetery Hill, and was alone of the three battalions on 
Ewell s left engaged during the day. Thus in the 2d 
Corps, Brown placed in position but 25 pieces on the 
morning of the 3d, and these were restricted to the use 
of solid shot because of the utter unreliability of the 
fuses provided for their shell. 

The sole activity on the part of the Confederate Ar 
tillery during the morning had been that of Wyatt s five 
guns, or the left group of Poague s Battalion, which 
opened fire upon the enemy s position about 7 A. M. A 
number of Federal batteries soon concentrated their fire 
on Wyatt, and Poague promptly ordered him to desist 
from a further waste of ammunition in so unequal a con 
test, in which nothing was accomplished but the ex 
plosion of a Federal caisson, and the loss of 8 Confed 
erate horses. Col. Poague afterwards learned that 
Wyatt had been ordered by A. P. Hill to engage the 

On the Federal side, Hunt had placed 166 guns in 
position before the attack commenced, and during the 
engagement 10 more batteries from the reserve were 
brought in action, raising the number of his guns to 220, 
as against 172 employed by the Confederates. If there 
was ever an occasion when every available piece was 
needed in the front line, it was that of the artillery 
preparation preceding Longstreet s assault, yet there 
remained unemployed in the 2d Corps 25 rifles and 16 
Napoleons, and in the 3d Corps fifteen 12-pounder 
howitzers. As the Chief of Artillery had since daybreak 
on the 3d been busily engaged visiting every portion of 


the Confederate position from left to right he must have 
known of the absence of many of these guns from the 
line. Specific orders were personally given by him to 
the various group and even battery commanders. His 
aim was to secure a concentrated and destructive fire, 
under cover of which the infantry might advance. The 
problem now seems to have been a simple one so far 
as the posting of the batteries was concerned, for even 
had it been impracticable to place them all actually in 
position, they might have all been held in readiness under 
cover. Most careful instructions were given by Pendle- 
ton on this point, and while he did actually supervise the 
convenient placing of the ordnance trains, he seems to 
have failed for some reason to verify personally the post 
ing of the batteries. Subordinate artillery commanders 
are of course responsible for such neglects as the actual 
failure to bring their own guns into action, and in this 
respect, Col. Brown, of the 2d Corps, was undoubtedly 
remiss, subject, however, to the limitations imposed 
upon him by the orders of his corps commander, and 
those orders, it would seem, were responsible for the 
elimination of Nelson s, Jones , and Raine s battalions. 
Walker s failure to engage his 15 howitzers was due 
solely to the ineffectiveness of their range, so no fault 
is to be found with the artillery dispositions of the 3d 
Corps, and Alexander brought every piece of the 1st 
Corps into action. 

Viewing the disposition of the Confederate Artillery 
before the attack, a grave error should have been de 
tected, and for this error the Chief of Artillery, subject 
also to the orders from the Commander-in-Chief, was 
responsible. Since Lee assumed no direct control over 
his artillery, only informing himself of its general situa 
tion through Col. Long of his staff, Pendleton must 
receive the blame. Not only did he permit 56 of his 
guns to remain idle as pointed out before, but he al 
lowed 80 of the 84 guns of the 2d and 3d Corps, which 
were engaged, to be brought into action on a mathe 
matically straight line, parallel to the position of the 


enemy and constantly increasing in range therefrom to 
the left or north! It was indeed a phenomenal over 
sight on his part, as declared by Col. Alexander, not to 
place a part of the Artillery, at least, north of the town 
and east of the prolongation of his line of guns at the 
center to enfilade the shank of the fish-hook, and cross 
fire with the guns on Seminary Ridge. Even had Nel 
son s and Jones battalions, or either of them, both of 
which remained idle with the exception of Milledge s 
Battery of the former, been massed in such a position, 
far greater effect would have been obtained by the Ar 
tillery, and the actual disposition of the rest of the bat 
talions, which for some reason unknown to us might have 
been necessary, need not have been altered. Concen 
trated fire does not necessarily mean massed batteries. 
And especially is this true when the artillery of the of 
fense may be disposed about the arc of an enveloping 
line. With batteries widely dispersed about such an 
arc, the enemy at the more interior or more restricted 
position is at a great disadvantage, for just as the 
sheafs of the surrounding groups converge upon a com 
paratively small area, so the artillery fire of the defense 
becomes divergent and hence less concentrated. No 
more beautiful illustration could exist of the possible 
relative effectiveness of artillery fire under such circum 
stances than the terrain of Gettysburg. There, artillery 
disposed about the outer arc would necessarily inflict 
overwhelming and simultaneous losses upon the 
thickly-massed batteries and infantry supports on Ceme 
tery Ridge and its adjoining spurs, whereas the fire of 
the defending batteries would, by virtue of the depres 
sion in their front, either be compelled to ignore the at 
tacking infantry, or the opposing batteries beyond and 
above it. And even if part of the artillery of the de 
fense was assigned to each of these missions, concentra 
tion would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, artillery 
fire directed at Seminary Ridge was either effective to 
the highest degree, or totally noneffective, for "overs" 
and "shorts" were lost. There was no infantry between 


the Confederate position from left to right he must have 
known of the absence of many of these guns from the 
line. Specific orders were personally given by him to 
the various group and even battery commanders. His 
aim was to secure a concentrated and destructive fire, 
under cover of which the infantry might advance. The 
problem now seems to have been a simple one so far 
as the posting of the batteries was concerned, for even 
had it been impracticable to place them all actually in 
position, they might have all been held in readiness under 
cover. Most careful instructions were given by Pendle- 
ton on this point, and while he did actually supervise the 
convenient placing of the ordnance trains, he seems to 
have failed for some reason to verify personally the post 
ing of the batteries. Subordinate artillery commanders 
are of course responsible for such neglects as the actual 
failure to bring their own guns into action, and in this 
respect, Col. Brown, of the 2d Corps, was undoubtedly 
remiss, subject, however, to the limitations imposed 
upon him by the orders of his corps commander, and 
those orders, it would seem, were responsible for the 
elimination of Nelson s, Jones , and Raine s battalions. 
Walker s failure to engage his 15 howitzers was due 
solely to the ineffectiveness of their range, so no fault 
is to be found with the artillery dispositions of the 3d 
Corps, and Alexander brought every piece of the 1st 
Corps into action. 

Viewing the disposition of the Confederate Artillery 
before the attack, a grave error should have been de 
tected, and for this error the Chief of Artillery, subject 
also to the orders from the Commander-in-Chief, was 
responsible. Since Lee assumed no direct control over 
his artillery, only informing himself of its general situa 
tion through Col. Long of his staff, Pendleton must 
receive the blame. Not only did he permit 56 of his 
guns to remain idle as pointed out before, but he al 
lowed 80 of the 84 guns of the 2d and 3d Corps, which 
were engaged, to be brought into action on a mathe 
matically straight line, parallel to the position of the 


enemy and constantly increasing in range therefrom to 
the left or north! It was indeed a phenomenal over 
sight on his part, as declared by Col. Alexander, not to 
place a part of the Artillery, at least, north of the town 
and east of the prolongation of his line of guns at the 
center to enfilade the shank of the fish-hook, and cross 
fire with the guns on Seminary Ridge. Even had Nel 
son s and Jones battalions, or either of them, both of 
which remained idle with the exception of Milledge s 
Battery of the former, been massed in such a position, 
far greater effect would have been obtained by the Ar 
tillery, and the actual disposition of the rest of the bat 
talions, which for some reason unknown to us might have 
been necessary, need not have been altered. Concen 
trated fire does not necessarily mean massed batteries. 
And especially is this true when the artillery of the of 
fense may be disposed about the arc of an enveloping 
line. With batteries widely dispersed about such an 
arc, the enemy at the more interior or more restricted 
position is at a great disadvantage, for just as the 
sheafs of the surrounding groups converge upon a com 
paratively small area, so the artillery fire of the defense 
becomes divergent and hence less concentrated. No 
more beautiful illustration could exist of the possible 
relative effectiveness of artillery fire under such circum 
stances than the terrain of Gettysburg. There, artillery 
disposed about the outer arc would necessarily inflict 
overwhelming and simultaneous losses upon the 
thickly-massed batteries and infantry supports on Ceme 
tery Ridge and its adjoining spurs, whereas the fire of 
the defending batteries would, by virtue of the depres 
sion in their front, either be compelled to ignore the at 
tacking infantry, or the opposing batteries beyond and 
above it. And even if part of the artillery of the de 
fense was assigned to each of these missions, concentra 
tion would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, artillery 
fire directed at Seminary Ridge was either effective to 
the highest degree, or totally noneffective, for "overs" 
and "shorts" were lost. There was no infantry between 


and beyond to suffer from wild shots as there was on 
the heights occupied by the Federals. Again, whatever 
the target selected by the inner batteries, their fire would 
have been frontal with respect to the guns on the outer 
arc, whereas every group on the latter line would have 
crossed its fire with that of some other group. Hunt 
occupied a position similar to that at the hub of a 
wheel; Pendleton could have and should have grouped 
his batteries about a part of the rim. The lines of the 
spokes clearly illustrate what the comparative result 
of the fire of the two artilleries would have been, and it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the superiority of the 
Federal guns in number and weight of metal would 
have been more than compensated for by the natural 
advantages of the Confederate position in so far as the 
artillery was concerned. Certainly Hunt would have 
been put to it to shift his batteries from point to point. 
In fact, it would have been impossible for him to do 
so, for they were terribly cut up even by the frontal 
fire which was actually encountered. 

These conclusions are not speculative, but are fully 
borne out by an incident of the battle, which shows 
what the possibilities really were. Quite by accident, 
during the cannonade preceding Pickett s charge, 
Milledge s Battery of Nelson s Battalion fired 48 
rounds upon Cemetery Hill the most vulnerable point 
to artillery fire, by reason of the practicability of en 
filading it, along the whole Federal line. The effect of 
Milledge s fire is described by Col. Osborn, Chief of 
Artillery, llth Corps, as follows: 

"The fire from our west front had progressed 15 to 
20 minutes when several guns opened on us from the 
ridge beyond and east of Cemetery Hill. The line of 
fire from the last batteries, and the line of fire from the 
batteries on our west front, were such as to leave the 
town between the two lines of fire. These last guns 
opened directly on the right flank of my line of batteries. 
The gunners got our range at almost the first shot. 
Passing low over Wainwright s guns, they caught us 


square in flank and with the elevation perfect. It was 
admirable shooting. They raked the whole line of bat 
teries, killed and wounded the men and horses, and blew 
up the caissons rapidly. I saw one shell go through 6 
horses standing broadside. 

"To meet this new fire I drew from the batteries fac 
ing west the 20-pounder Parrott Battery of Capt. Taft, 
and wheeling it half round to the right brought it to bear 
on them. I also drew from the reserve one battery and 
placed it in position on Taft s right. 

"Fortunately for us, these batteries, placed in the 
new line, at once secured the exact range of their im 
mediate adversaries. In a few minutes the enemy s fire 
almost ceased, and when it again opened, and while the 
fire was progressing, it was irregular and wild. They 
did not again get our range as they had it before we 

Col. Osborn had in position over 60 guns along the 
line of the llth Corps. If less than 50 rounds of Con 
federate ammunition caused so much damage to that 
enormous group of artillery, what, may we ask, would 
several thousand have done? 

The formation of the column of attack consumed 
more time than had been contemplated, and about 11 
A. M. before it had been completed some of Hill s 
skirmishers provoked the enemy into premature activity 
by attempting to seize a barn between the lines. 
Gradually the Federal Artillery opened up, which 
tempted Walker s guns to reply, and before long Hill s 
line was subjected to the cannonade of over 100 guns. 
But soon the roar of artillery died out and the field was 
again as silent as a churchyard. 

On the Federal side, Hancock s Corps held Cemetery 
Ridge with Robinson s Division of the 1st Corps on 
Hays right in support, and Doubleday s at the angle 
between Gibbon and Caldwell. Newton, who had suc 
ceeded to the command of the 1st Corps, vice Reynolds, 
was in charge of the ridge held by Caldwell. Com- 

*Philadelphia Weekly Times, May 31, 1877. 


pactly arrayed on its crest was McGilvery s artillery 
consisting of his own batteries and a number from the 
Artillery Reserve. This group consisted of 41 pieces. 
Well to the right of McGilvery, Capt. Hazard had 
massed the 26 guns of the 2d Corps in front of Hays 
and Gibbon. Woodruff s Battery was posted in front 
of Zeigler s Grove, and on his left in succession were 
posted Arnold s Rhode Island, Cushing s United States, 
Brown s Rhode Island, and Roity s New York batter 
ies. The two last named batteries had been heavily 
engaged the day before, and so much cut up that they 
now brought into action but four guns each. Besides 
these, Daniel s Horse Battery was posted at the angle, 
and soon after the action commenced Cowan s First 
New York Battery with 6 rifles was placed on Roity s 
left. A number of the guns on Cemetery Hill, as well as 
those of Rittenhouse on Little Round Top, could also be 
brought to bear on the point selected for Longstreet s 
assault. Leaving out the latter, which were partially 
neutralized by hostile groups, there were, therefore, 77 
guns in two groups along the front of the 2d Corps, oc 
cupying the actual crest and plainly visible to the Con 
federates, who had brought to bear upon them approxi 
mately 150 pieces. 

Aware of the great strength of their position, the Fed 
erals, after the early cannonade died out, simply sat 
still and waited for developments. On the Confederate 
side, it had been arranged that when the infantry 
column was ready, Longstreet should announce the fact 
by the fire of two guns of the Washington Artillery. At 
this signal all the Confederate guns were to open simul 
taneously on the batteries on Cemetery Hill, and the 
ridge extending towards Little Round Top. Alex 
ander was to observe the fire and give Pickett the order 
to charge. Accordingly he established his observing 
station about noon at a favorable point near the left of 
his line of guns. Soon after establishing his station, 
Alexander received the following note from Longstreet : 

"COLONEL If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive 
the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts 


pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Gen. 
Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good 
judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let 
Gen. Pickett know when the moment offers." 

This note naturally startled Longstreet s Chief of Ar 
tillery, who did not wish to substitute his judgment for 
that of the Commander-in-Chief who had ordered the 
attack to be made. No matter what Alexander may 
have thought at the time, he must have felt that too much 
responsibility was being shifted upon his shoulders by 
his corps commander. He therefore sent Longstreet the 
following message : 

"GENERAL I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire 
on the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed 
to view and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer 
from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be 
carefully considered before opening fire, for it will take all the 
artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and 
if the result is unfavorable we will have none left for another effort. 
And, even if this is entirely successful, it can only be so at a very 
bloody cost." 

Oh, the wisdom of that message, the able cunning, 
may we say, of the subaltern who sent it ! Nothing that 
has ever been written or said can half so well give us an 
insight into Alexander s character. It shows us that 
not only was this able artilleryman prepared to execute 
his orders irrespective of personal views concerning the 
advisability of the general plan, that not only did he 
have a most thorough grasp of the situation in its 
present, as well as it future aspects, but that he also had 
an eye to the propriety of the shifting of authority upon 
subordinates. He at least did not propose to subject 
himself nor the Artillery to the possibility of becoming 
a scape-goat in event of a disaster, and promptly put 
the matter up to the subtle Longstreet in that light. "If 3 
as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this 
attack, it should be carefully considered before opening 
our fire, etc." Well did Alexander use these words, and 
it may be said here that when the Chief of Artillery him- 



self, whose duty it was to prepare the assault, inferred 
from the tone of the orders of the Corps Commander 
that there was an alternative plan, no other fact is neces 
sary to prove that Longstreet entertained such an alter 
native. Where, may we require, did he find authority 
for it? Certainly his orders had been specific to make 
the attack, and those orders have been repeatedly held 
up to the world by him as not only faulty in the extreme, 
but as allowing him no alternative. He has even de 
clared that he did not "dispute them further, because he 
saw that Lee s mind was made up," or words to that 
effect.* It is such fallacies as those which Long- 
street has recorded that makes the world cry out, 
"Would that mine enemy would write a book!" And 
when one s enemy writes several books, it is even more 
delightful to read them. 

To Alexander s astute dispatch, the following reply 
soon came from Longstreet : 

"COLONEL The intention is to advance the infantry, if the 
artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy off, or having 
other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When the 
moment arrives, advise Gen. Pickett, and of course advance such 
artillery as you can use in aiding the attack." 

Let us underscore the "if" in this message, and again 
ask whence came the pernicious word. There was no 
"if" in Lee s orders. It was clearly of Longstreet s 
adoption. In other words he had set about his task pre 
pared to complete it "if" he chose to do so, and this is not 
the spirit of a lieutenant who is committed heart and 
soul to the success of his superior. Jackson used no 
"ifs" in his orders for the execution of Lee s plans. He 
made his orders mandatory, and said to his subordinates, 
"You will do so and so," nor did he ever seek to shift 
responsibility upon his Chief of Artillery. He loved 
responsibility and never parted with it. This is what 
Lee subsequently meant when he said he would have 
won the battle of Gettysburg, had Jackson been present. 
Lee must have been keenly conscious of Longstreet s 

*See Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill, p. 343. 


unsympathetic support from the very beginning of the 
campaign, and cognizant of that dragging influence 
imposed upon his operations by the latter from the 
start, he would most certainly have assigned the 1st 
Corps to the less active part assigned to Hill after the 
first day, and placed the more enthusiastic Jackson on 
his right, where energy and promptitude were most re 
quired. Who can doubt that Jackson and not Alex 
ander, Brown, or Walker, would have occupied the im 
portant station actually turned over by Longstreet to 
Alexander? Can we doubt that Jackson and not a sub 
ordinate, however able, would have himself selected the 
moment for the advance of his infantry? He did it at 
Chancellorsville, and why would he not have done it at 

Upon the receipt of Longstreet s reply, which on the 
whole, however, was couched in quite a different tone 
from his first message, Alexander was still unable to de 
termine the extent of his discretion, nor was Gen. 
Wright, who happened to be present, able to help him 
out. Wright did say, however, that the Federal position 
was not as difficult to reach as it appeared to be, for he 
had almost carried a part of it the day before. In 
fluenced by Wright s minimizing the difficulties to be 
encountered, and somewhat as he tells us "by a sort of 
camp rumor which I had heard that morning that Gen. 
Lee had said that he was going to send every man he 
had upon that hill," Alexander was reassured that no 
discretion as to the attack was intended and resolved 
to carry out his part in the way he believed to be in con 
formity with the decision of the Commander-in-Chief. 
His position was not an enviable one, and it is not sur 
prising if his confidence was somewhat shaken by that 
intangible evidence of irresolution on the part of his im 
mediate superior, which in some indefinable way makes 
itself so quickly felt to all. In this spirit it was that he 
rode back to see Pickett, whose division was but a short 
distance in his rear. Alexander did not express his feel 
ings to Pickett, nor did he question him as to his views. 


But by those means which human natures possess, he 
adroitly discovered Pickett s sentiments. Pickett he 
found to be unusually sanguine of success and highly 
gratified that his luck had favored him by giving him 
the chance to make the charge. This was the soldier 
over whose fate Longstreet s heart was so heavy. What 
a pity it seems that some of Pickett s spirit was not 
transmitted to Longstreet, and that the "camp rumor" 
concerning Lee s resolution, which in itself bespoke the 
high moral of the troops, did not engender more confi 
dence in his lieutenant. But, while his troops were burn 
ing with ardor for the fight, their great, soft-hearted 
leader was sorely oppressed his heart was already 
bleeding for them! 

A few minutes with the fiery Pickett sufficed to dis 
pel Alexander s uncertainty of mind, and he returned 
to his post stimulated by the contagious spirit of the 
gallant infantry leader. No delay could now be made, 
and no indecision on his part should contribute to the 
miscarriage of the attack, so he wrote Longstreet: 
"General: When our artillery fire is at its best, I shall 
order Pickett to charge." Note the word "shall" in this 
message. That word spelt a resolution born of Pickett 
which had supplanted the previous irresolution born of 

All these things are moral factors it is true, and are 
no part of the tactics employed in the battle, but never 
theless it is such things that induce victories and de 
feats, and in them is often to be found the reasons for 
what would otherwise remain inexplicable. Not only 
the esprit of the officers and men at the moment of 
attack and the physical condition of the troops, but the 
general state of their military digestion, so to speak, is 
important when one undertakes to reason from 
effect to cause. It is not the mere tactical conception 
as included in orders that wins battles, and yet with 
absolutely no other knowledge we frequently arrive at 
conclusions concerning the reasons for the military 
failures and successes of the past. The most faultless 


tactics are frequently set at nought by adverse psycho 
logical conditions, whereas the sheer elan of the troops 
will often counteract the most egregious tactical 
blunders. In the final analysis the whole theory of at 
tack may be resolved into the truth that poor tactics, 
executed with spirit and confidence in the leaders, will 
more often guarantee success than those of the most ap 
proved form when the driving force of enthusiasm is 
lacking. This fact is more readily grasped if one but 
realizes that the culmination of attack is close contact, 
and that there will be no close contact gained by the of 
fense unless the tactical plan, however perfect, is de 
veloped with a certain amount of rapidity, in order that 
changes may not be enforced by the enemy s movements. 
Enthusiasm alone will produce rapidity of execution. 
All this well illustrates the causes of Longstreet s lapses 
at Gettysburg. He himself has admitted that he was 
woefully lacking in enthusiasm for the part assigned 
him. Lacking this fundamental element of success, his 
movements were consequently not only tardy as a rule, 
but, when finally undertaken were not characterized by 
that vigorous push for which he was noted. 

We have examined the situation on the Confederate 
side. Now let us view it from Cemetery Ridge as it 
appeared to Gen. Hunt about 11 A. M., using his own 
graphic description: "Here a magnificent display 
greeted my eyes. Our whole front for two miles was 
covered by batteries already in line, or going into 
position. They stretched apparently in one unbroken 
mass from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard, 
which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which 
were planted thick with cannon. Never before had 
such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely, 
if ever, abroad.* What did it mean? It might possibly 
be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid 
Ewell, or to guard against a counter-stroke from us, but 
it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be 
preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our batteries 

*K6niggratz and Sedan had not then been fought. 


and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust 
our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops 
might pass in good condition over the half-mile of open 
ground, which was beyond our effective musketry fire." 
Here let it be interpolated that Hunt, with the skill of 
the fine soldier that he was, accurately divined the in 
tentions of the Confederates, expressing his conclusions 
as follows: "With such an object, the cannonade would 
be long, and followed immediately by the assault, their 
whole army being held in readiness to follow up a suc 
cess. From the great extent of ground occupied by the 
enemy s batteries, it was evident that all the Artillery 
on our west front, whether of the Army Corps or of the 
reserve, must concur as a unit under the Chief of Ar 
tillery in the defense. This is provided for in all well- 
organized armies by special rules, which formerly were 
contained in our own army regulations, but they had 
been condensed in successive editions into a few short 
lines, so obscure as to be virtually worthless, because 
like the rudimentary toe of the dog s paw, they had be 
come, from lack of use, mere survivals, unintelligible 
except to the specialist. It was of the first importance to 
subject the enemy s infantry, from the first moment of 
their advance, to such a cross fire of our artillery as 
would break their formation, check their impulse, and 
drive them back, or at least bring them to our lines in 
such condition as to make them an easy prey. There 
was neither time nor necessity for reporting this to Gen. 
Meade, and beginning on the right, I instructed the 
chiefs of artillery and battery commanders to withhold 
their fire for 15 or 20 minutes after the cannonade com 
menced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible 
accuracy on those batteries which were most destructive 
to us, but slowly, so that when the enemy s ammunition 
was exhausted, we should have sufficient left to meet the 

Before the Confederate Artillery was ordered to open, 
Alexander sent a courier to the rear with directions to 
Maj . Richardson to move up with Garnett s nine howit- 


zers, which he had decided to lead forward nearly to 
musket range at the head of Pickett s Infantry, where 
they would be of more service than in its rear. But un 
fortunately for Pickett, though fortunately perhaps for 
Pickett s batteries, Gen. Pendleton had sent them to 
cover behind Hill s line, where they were not found in 
time to be used by Alexander. Inasmuch as the Chief 
of Artillery had placed these batteries at Alexander s 
disposal he was guilty of a grave mistake in detaching 
them without advising his subordinate. True, he moved 
them in order to shelter them more thoroughly, but the 
act was one of unwarranted interference, in the circum 
stances in which it was done. 

Just before 1 p. M. a courier dashed up to the Wash 
ington Artillery and handed its commander an order 
written on the fly leaf of a memorandum book. Ad 
dressed to Col. Walton, its contents were as follows: 
"Headquarters, July 3, 1863. Colonel: Let the bat 
teries open. Order great care and precision in firing. If 
the batteries at the Peach Orchard cannot be used 
against the point we intend attacking, let them open 
on the enemy on the rocky hill. Most respectfully, J. 
Longstreet, Lieutenant- General commanding." The 
order to fire the signal guns was immediately communi 
cated to Maj. Eshleman, and the report of the first gun 
of Miller s Battery soon rang out upon the still summer 
air. There was a moment s delay with the second gun, 
a friction primer having failed to explode. The inter 
val was but a short one, but during it the heart of two 
great armies could almost be heard to throb. Instantly 
a canopy of smoke spread over the Peach Orchard, and 
exactly at 1 o clock, the roar and flash of 138 Confeder 
ate guns announced the opening of the conflict. In a 
few seconds, the artillery of both armies rent the air 
with the deep notes of the guns, and the crescendo of 
bursting shell, while the earth trembled as if Jove had 
placed his feet upon the pedals of a great organ. Truly 
might Mars have applauded the tremendous throb and 
looked down with delight from his Olympic seat upon 


the fire-wreathed arena of Gettysburg, for never in this 
world had such a warlike scene been set before. The 
Federal position seemed to have broken out with flash 
ing guns at every point, and from Little Round Top 
to Cemetery Hill the ridge blazed like a volcano. Hunt 
had just completed his dispositions at Little Round Top 
when the Confederate signal guns were heard. De 
scribing the field as he viewed it from that point, he 
says : "The scene was indescribably grand. All the Con 
federate batteries were soon covered with smoke, through 
which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed 
filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the 
hurtling of their fragments, formed a running accom 
paniment to the deep roar of the guns. Thence I rode 
to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and am 
munition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the can 
nonade ceased; but both the reserve and the train had 
gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been 
left to receive and convey orders, which I sent by them ; 
then I returned to the ridge. Turning into the Taney- 
town Pike, I saw evidence of the necessity under which 
the reserve had "decamped," in the remains of a dozen 
exploded caissons, which had been placed under cover of 
a hill, but which the shells had managed to search out. 
In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge 
than on its crest, which I soon reached at the position 
occupied by Gen. Newton, behind McGilvery s batter 
ies, from which we had a fine view, as our guns were 
now in action." Describing the Artillery fire of both 
sides, Hunt further says: "Most of the enemy s pro 
jectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all 
the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit 
to the Confederates, a mere waste of ammunition, for 
everything there could seek shelter. ... I now 
rode along the ridge to inspect the batteries. The 
infantry were lying down on its reverse slope, near the 
crest, in open ranks, waiting events. . . . Our fire 
was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests, I found 
that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to 


Gen. Meade to advise its immediate cessation, and prep 
aration for the assault, which would certainly follow. 
The headquarters building, immediately behind the 
ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of 
the staff lay dead. Being told that the General had gone 
to the Cemetery, I proceeded thither. He was not 
there, and on telling Gen. Howard my object, he con 
curred in its propriety, and I rode back along the ridge, 
ordering the fire to cease. This was followed by a ces 
sation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impres 
sion that he had silenced our guns, and almost im 
mediately his infantry came out of the woods and 
formed for the assault. On my way to the Taneytown 
Road to meet the fresh batteries, which I had ordered 
up, I met Maj. Bingham, of Hancock s staff, who in 
formed me that Gen. Meade s aides were seeking me 
with orders to cease firing. So I had only anticipated 
his wishes." So much for the Federal side. 

Before the cannonade opened Alexander had made 
up his mind to give Pickett the order to advance within 
15 or 20 minutes after it began, but when he observed 
the full development of the Federal batteries, knowing 
that the enemy s infantry was suffering little behind the 
accidents of the ground and the sheltering walls along 
the ridge, he could not bring himself to give the word. 
He afterwards said that it seemed madness to launch 
the infantry into that fire with an open area about 1,300 
yards wide to traverse. So he let 15 minutes pass into 
25, hoping vainly that the effect of the Confederate ar 
tillery fire might soon produce more serious effects. At 
the end of this time he wrote Pickett: "If you are com 
ing at all, you must come at once, or I cannot give you 
proper support; but the enemy s fire has not slackened 
at all; at least 18 guns are still firing from the cemetery 
itself." Five minutes after the sending of the message, 
Hunt ordered his batteries to cease firing, and those at 
the Cemetery were seen to limber up and retire to the 
rear. It had not been the custom in the Federal Ar 
tillery to withdraw temporarily in anticipation of an 


infantry assault, in order to save ammunition, though 
such a practice had all along been followed by the Con 
federates. So Alexander believed that if fresh batteries 
were not shortly brought up by the enemy, the position 
could be carried. Observing with his glass for five 
minutes or more the crest which was still swept by the 
fire of the Confederate guns, he was unable to detect a 
sign of life on the deserted position. The dead and 
wounded men and horses, together with numerous dis 
abled carriages, alone occupied the ground. He then 
wrote Pickett: "For God s sake, come quick. The 18 
guns are gone ; come quick, or my ammunition won t let 
me support you properly." 

Pickett had taken Alexander s first note to Long- 
street, who read it and said nothing. Pickett then said, 
"General, shall I advance?" Longstreet, unwilling to 
take upon himself the responsibility of ordering him not 
to do so, but equally unwilling to give the word for the 
charge in pursuance of Lee s orders, simply turned his 
head away, with the result that Pickett, whose heart 
was in the right place, saluted and said, "I am going to 
move forward, sir," and then galloped off to his division, 
and immediately put it in motion. 

Longstreet claims that he nodded his head in answer 
to Pickett s question. But even if he did, that was a 
remarkable way for a corps commander to set his as 
saulting column in motion. His whole attitude and 
conduct was not well calculated to impart to the leader 
of his column that fiery ardor which alone could win 
success. Fortunately, Pickett s nerve was unimpaired 
by Longstreet s conduct. Had a less bold spirit been in 
the lead, the 1st Corps would never have made the at 
tempt. The whole incident is chilling to the spirits of 
one who follows it, though it had no such effect on 
Pickett. In the light of after events, it seems almost 
too bad he had the resolution to make the attempt, for 
we are now able to see that with the exception of his 
individual enthusiasm and that of his men, not one ele 
ment of success was present. 


Most of the Confederate reports declare that at this 
juncture the Federal batteries were silenced, in the sense 
than they were subdued. Again we see how dangerous it 
is to reach the conclusion that silent guns are harmless 
guns, for in this instance their retirement was but the 
calm before the storm which was to break out with re 
newed fury. The moment was in fact far more ominous 
of what was to follow, than propitious for the assault. 

Leaving his staff, Longstreet rode to Alexander s 
observing station. It was then about 1 :40 p. M. Alex 
ander explained the artillery situation to him, feeling 
then more hopeful of success, but expressing a fear less 
his ammunition might be exhausted before the crisis of 
the attack. "Stop Pickett immediately and replenish 
your ammunition," said Longstreet. But Alexander de 
murred on the ground that the effect of the artillery 
preparation would be lost, and also because there was 
but a little reserve ammunition left. Longstreet then 
said to him: "I don t want to make this attack. I 
would stop it now, but that Gen. Lee ordered it and ex 
pects it to go on. I don t see how it can succeed." 

Let us pause again and ask ourselves if this was not 
a pitiful situation in which the superb 1st Corps found 
itself. Think of it ! How could aught but disaster ensue 
with such a one at its head? Its bold leader had utterly 
succumbed and instead of being his old self, the man 
of iron nerve and will, he was now at the crucial instant 
of the war, suffering from all the frailties of a weak 
mortal. We know that Longstreet possessed great per 
sonal courage, but as a leader, on this occasion, he was 
most certainly, as proved by his own words, the victim 
of "cold feet." It was his duty to order that charge. 
If, in his opinion, it was so grievous a mistake as he later 
declared it to have been, his course was clear. He 
should have, in the presence of Lee and his staff, made 
his protest, in writing, if necessary, and upon being 
overruled, he should have gone back to his command 
with teeth set and sought to impress his division and bri 
gade commanders not only with the necessity of success, 


but with the practicability of the assault. Had he done 
this, the attack would probably have succeeded, but 
even had it failed, Longstreet would have been scot- 
free of all blame and Lee would have been the first to 
publish his protest, in order that his lieutenant might be 
promptly and absolutely absolved before the world. As 
it was, the magnanimous Lee assumed all the blame in 
order that his lieutenant might not be rendered less effi 
cient as a leader, by the destruction of the confidence of 
his men. Lee knew that his own character, record, and 
motives alone could stand the strain which the blame for 
the loss of Gettysburg would impose upon the one who 
assumed it, and it was his willingness to shoulder the 
responsibility of the many risks that he took during the 
war, which made him the moral equal, if not superior of, 
any captain of history. It is interesting to speculate 
what the career of a soldier with such moral force might 
have been had he possessed the means at the disposal of, 
and the ambitious lust for power which inspired Alex 
ander, Caesar, and Napoleon. Though not generally 
classed with these as a great captain, history will in the 
course of time liken him with respect to the higher virtues 
of the soul to Hannibal, who from the dispassionate 
record now appears to have been the strongest man that 
ever bore arms. Eventual success in war is the most 
potent irrigant of that fame which grows greener and 
greener with time. Defeat is the blighting sun which 
scorches and shrivels military reputations until nothing 
remains but the gullies and waste places of failure, from 
which no garlands are plucked. These are facts which 
the names of Hannibal and Lee alone have set at naught. 
But to return again to our narrative. 

What Col. Alexander s feelings were upon hearing 
Longstreet s words is difficult to imagine. We can 
hardly assume that he was surprised, but we can be sure 
of one thing, he was not shaken in his resolve to do 
his best. The heart of Pickett himself was no bolder 
than that which beat in Alexander s breast. He listened, 
but dared not offer a word. He realized that the battle 


was lost if he ordered his guns to cease firing, for he 
knew that the ammunition supply was too low to per 
mit of another artillery preparation; the guns had 
hardly cooled during the past three days. There was 
still a chance of success, and it was not his part by word 
or deed to sacrifice it, and though he failed to see it, the 
recordation of these sentiments on his part remains one 
of the greatest indictments of the superior whom he has 
so ardently sought to defend. 

While Longstreet was still speaking to his Chief of 
Artillery, the die cast itself, for Pickett s immortal divi 
sion swept out of the woods in rear of the guns and pre 
sented its gray breast to the enemy. The line swept on 
with bayonets flashing in the sun like the spray on the 
crest of a great wave. At the head of his brigade rode 
Gen. Dick Garnett, of the old 9th Infantry, just out 
of the ambulance, but stimulated with hope of fresh 
glory. As he passed Longstreet, he threw back the cape 
of his frazzled blue overcoat and, raising himself erect in 
the saddle, waved a grand salute to his corps com 

After riding forward with Garnett a short distance, 
Alexander returned to his line, with a view to select such 
of his guns as had enough ammunition to follow Pickett. 

While the great artillery duel had been in progress, 
and before the infantry advanced, a serious danger 
threatened Longstreet s right. This was the appear 
ance of Kilpatrick s division of cavalry, which moved 
upon that flank and commenced massing in the body 
of timber extending from the base of Big Round Top 
westward to Kern s house on the Emmittsburg Road. 
Reilly s and Bachman s batteries of Henry s Battalion 
had been promptly ordered to change front to the right 
and had opened fire upon the enemy s cavalry with such 
effect as at once to drive it beyond the wood and out of 
sight. In the meantime, part of Stuart s Cavalry was 
arriving on the right and soon formed line at right- 
angles to that of Hood s Division, while Hart s Horse 
Battery was stationed on the Emmittsburg Road at the 


angle, and later succeeded in driving off Merritt s Fed 
eral Cavalry Brigade which deployed for the attack. 

The infantry column led by Pickett had been poorly 
formed. Six brigades, or those of Brockenbrough, 
Davis, McGowan, Archer, Garnett, and Kemper, with 
about 10,000 men, were in the first line, with a second 
line composed of Lane s, Scale s, and Armistead s bri 
gades, very much shorter than the first on its left, fol 
lowing 200 yards in rear. The remaining brigade, Wil- 
cox s, was posted in rear of the right of the column, both 
flanks of which rested in the air with no support in its 
rear. As the infantry rushed through the line of guns 
and debouched upon the plain in front of the ridge, 
the Federal Artillery, which had become almost silent, 
broke out again with all its batteries, the 18 guns at the 
cemetery promptly reappearing in action. The Con 
federate batteries, which had been compelled to reserve 
their fire while the infantry was moving past them, re 
opened over its head, as soon as the attacking troops ad 
vanced about 200 yards. But the Federal guns which 
had been so skillfully concealed for the time being and 
shoved to the forward crest to repel the assault, utterly 
ignored the Confederate batteries, and concentrated 
with the utmost precision upon the infantry. Mean 
time, Alexander had formed about 18 guns, including 
five from Garden s and Flanner s batteries, of Henry s 
Battalion, on the right under Maj. John C. Haskell, 
and four from the Washington Artillery on the left, 
three under Capt. Miller, and one of Norcom s or Eshle- 
man s old battery under Lieut. Battles. In the center 
only about one gun in every four could be ordered for 
ward. The ammunition had all but run out along the 
line, and the caissons which had been sent to the ordnance 
train had not returned. The train had also been moved 
by Pendleton to a more distant point than the one it first 
occupied, to escape the fire, which had been directed at 
the batteries on the right of Walker s line on the ridge. 
Alexander soon advanced with Eshleman s, Haskell s, 
Lieut. Motes Troup Artillery (Capt. Carlton having 


been wounded), and several other guns, to a swell of 
the ground just west of the Emmittsburg Road, where 
he sought to protect Pickett s column by firing upon the 
enemy s troops, advancing to attack its right flank. The 
four guns which Haskell advanced from the Peach 
Orchard and the four on his left under Capt. Miller and 
Lieut. Battles of the Washington Artillery, were so far 
to the front of Pickett s route that they were able to 
enfilade the Federal Infantry massing to meet the 
assault. The effect of their fire was for a time terrific, 
but soon attracted that of not less than 20 guns which 
practically silenced them after disabling a number of 
pieces and many men and horses. 

The troops of Heth s Division, decimated by the 
storm of deadly hail which tore through the ranks, had 
faltered and fallen back before the combined artillery 
and musketry fire of the enemy. This had impelled 
Pender s Division to fall back also while Wilcox s Bri 
gade, perceiving that the rest of Hill s troops were un 
able to reach the Federal position, had failed so far to 
move forward to Pickett s support. The disintegration 
of the infantry column had set in when the column had 
traversed about half the intervening space. The Fed 
eral line overlapped it on the left 800 yards or more, 
and was crowded with guns. The fire upon the un 
supported left, the advance of which was retarded by 
numerous fences, could be endured but a short time. 
Already the artillery support which had been expected 
from the 3d Corps was failing, by reason of the batteries 
having indulged in the earlier duel of the morning. 
That useless waste of ammunition was now to be sorely 
felt. Garnett and Armistead had been killed, Kemper 
wounded, and over 2,000 of Pickett s men had fallen 
within 30 minutes, before the end of which time the 
shattered remnants were driven from the position they 
had carried. 

Just as the Confederate column began to advance, the 
reserve batteries which Hunt had ordered up had ar 
rived, and Fitzhugh s, Weir s, and Parsons were put in 


near the clump of trees, while Brown s and Arnold s 
batteries, much crippled, were withdrawn, Cowan s be 
ing substituted for the former. McGilvery s group had 
promptly reappeared and opened a destructive oblique 
fire upon the right of the assaulting column, greatly 
aided by Rittenhouse s six rifles on Little Round Top, 
which were served with remarkable accuracy in enfilad 
ing the Confederate lines. The steady fire from Mc 
Gilvery s and Rittenhouse s groups caused the column 
of attack to drift to the left out of its true course, so 
that the weight of the assault fell directly upon the 
position occupied by Hazard s group of batteries. 
Hunt had counted on the cross fire of his artillery groups 
halting the Confederate column before it reached the 
Federal position, but in this he was disappointed, for 
Hazard, who had exhausted his shell, was compelled 
to remain silent until the Confederate Infantry arrived 
within the zone of canister effect. The orders of the 
corps commander, which, contrary to Hunt s directions, 
had resulted in Hazard s expenditure of all his shell in 
the artillery duel preceding the assault, deprived the 
defense of nearly one-third of its guns in the early stage 
of the attack, and entirely of the effect of the cross fire 
which had been planned. Hunt subsequently declared 
that Pickett s troops could never have reached Hazard s 
batteries had his orders not been superseded. But this is 
neither here nor there. They did reach the ridge in 
spite of the tornado of canister fire which Hazard 
opened upon them when within about 200 yards of his 

As the Confederate brigades closed upon the Federal 
position, the fire fight of the infantry commenced in 
earnest. It lasted but a short time and soon Pickett s 
men, who with the exception of the more-advanced ones 
had never halted, surged on. As the rear line merged 
with the first the troops swarmed over the fences and 
disappeared in the smoke and dust which concealed the 
enemy s guns. Already the Confederate guns, except 
those with which Alexander was engaging the enemy on 


the right, had been compelled to suspend their fire. The 
stars and bars were now discerned fluttering among the 
Federal guns, but the enemy was closing in upon 
Pickett s men from all sides in spite of every effort 
which Walker s and Alexander s batteries made to pre 
vent it. Ewell s Infantry and Artillery were all silent, 
leaving Meade free to draw troops from his right to as 
sist in the repulse of Pickett. 

From the Confederate position, the awesome tragedy 
was grand and thrilling, and the onlookers watched it 
as if life and death hung upon the issue. "If it should 
be favorable to us," wrote one of the Confederate of 
ficers, "the war was nearly over; if against us, we each 
had the risks of many battles yet to go through. And 
the event culminated with fearful rapidity. Listening 
to the rolling crashes of musketry, it was hard to realize 
that they were made up of single reports, and that each 
musket shot represented nearly a minute of a man s 
life in that storm of lead and iron. It seemed as if 100,- 
000 men were engaged, and that human lives were being 
poured out like water." 

Just as Pickett s troops had reached the Federal po 
sition, Col. Freemantle, of Her Majesty s Army, who 
until then had occupied a post of vantage behind Hill s 
Corps on the ridge, came upon the field, and in the be 
lief that the attack had fully succeeded declared to 
Longstreet that he would not have missed the scene for 
anything in the world. 

When Pickett, who was riding with his staff in rear 
of his division, saw that Hill s brigades on his left were 
breaking up, after sending two aides to rally them, a 
third was sent to Longstreet to say that the position in 
front would be taken, but that reinforcements would be 
required to hold it. Longstreet, in reply, directed 
Pickett to order up Wilcox, and Pickett sent three mes 
sengers in succession to be sure that the order was 
promptly acted upon. As the fugitives from Petti- 
grew s Division came back, Wright s Brigade of Ander 
son s Division was moved forward a few hundred yards 



to cover their retreat. Already a stream of fugitive and 
wounded soldiers had begun to flow from the ridge to 
the rear, pursued by the enemy s fire from the right and 
left, and it was apparent to all that Pickett s men, unless 
strongly reinforced could not hold on. After about 20 
minutes, when the fire had all but ceased, and during 
which time ever-increasing masses of Federal infantry 
were seen to be moving from all directions upon his 
men, Wilcox s Brigade of about 1,200 men, with some 
250 of Perry s Florida Brigade on its left, charged 
past the more-advanced Confederate batteries. Not 
another man was ordered forward, and nothing re 
mained for them to support, for Pickett s Division had 
by this time simply crumbled away under the terrific 
infantry and artillery fire, which had been concentrated 
from all sides upon it. 

The victory which for a moment had seemed within 
their grasp had eluded the Confederates, 4,000 of whom 
had fallen or been captured in the assault. No troops 
could have behaved more gallantly than those who par 
ticipated in the attack, and none could have displayed 
higher qualities of courage and discipline than those of 
the whole army when it became apparent that Pickett 
had been repulsed. While Wilcox s Brigade was mak 
ing its charge, Gen. Lee, entirely alone, had joined Col. 
Alexander. The Artillery of the 1st Corp had ceased 
firing in order to save ammunition in case the enemy 
should attempt a counter-stroke. Wilcox s charge was 
as useless as it was tragic. The brigade advanced but a 
short distance before it was overcome by the fire of the 
enemy, and compelled to halt, whereupon Lee ordered 
it to be withdrawn and placed in position behind the 
batteries with Wright s Brigade to oppose the enemy, 
should they advance. The Commander-in- Chief was no 
doubt apprehensive of such action on Meade s part and 
personally did everything he could to encourage his 
troops, especially the disorganized stream of fugitives 
moving to the rear. "Don t be discouraged," said he to 
them, "It was my fault this time. Form your ranks 


again when you get under cover. All good men must 
hold together now." Only when they had all passed, 
and it was seen that no attack by the enemy was in 
tended, did Gen. Lee leave the threatened point. The 
officers of every grade on that part of the field seconded 
his efforts to preserve order and reform the broken 
troops, and the men so promptly obeyed the call to rally 
that their thinned ranks were soon restored and the line 
reestablished. There was no sign, whatever, of panic or 
even discouragement. The troops, though mortified 
over their repulse, longed for the enemy to attack in 
order that they might efface the blot of their first serious 

While the broken infantry was streaming to the rear 
and being reformed, Alexander s guns alone and en 
tirely unsupported opposed the enemy at the Peach 
Orchard. His ammunition was now almost entirely ex 
hausted, so no notice was taken of the desultory fire of 
the hostile batteries. Occasionally Alexander s batter 
ies were compelled to fire with canister upon the Federal 
skirmishers, which were thrown forward, but the 
enemy s guns refrained from molesting the Confederate 
batteries. Already some of Alexander s batteries had 
withdrawn entirely from the field to refit, and those in 
the best condition now returned after having partially 
refilled their chests with ammunition and boldly re 
mained in advanced positions until late in the day with 
out a single infantryman in their fronts along certain 
portions of the line. But Meade s Army was so much 
shattered and discouraged by the losses it had incurred 
that he did not feel able to attempt to follow up his 
success. He saw that Lee had merely been repulsed and 
not routed, and that two whole divisions, those of Mc- 
Laws and Hood, lay across his path. Swinton also de 
clares that besides the heavy losses they had sustained in 
repulsing the attack, the Federal troops were thrown in 
much confusion by the intermingling of the various 
commands. The aggregate Federal loss of the three 
days had reached the enormous figure of 23,000 men, 


including Reynolds, Gibbon, and many other of the 
most valuable officers; Hancock was wounded. While 
the Confederates had been defeated, it is very easy to 
see why Meade was unable to reap the fruits of his 
victory. The idea that there was a gap in the Confeder 
ate right is absurd, and had Meade attacked Lee, it 
seems certain he would have received as bloody a repulse 
as had been inflicted upon Pickett. In this respect we 
must agree with Longstreet, Hunt, and Swinton, in 
preference to the views of Alexander. The largest bod 
ies of organized Federal troops available at the close of 
the attack were on Meade s left. An advance to the 
Plum Run line of the troops behind it, as Hunt points 
out, would have brought them directly in front of Alex 
ander s batteries, which still crowned the ridges along 
the Emmittsburg Road; a farther advance would have 
brought them under a flank fire from McLaws and 
Hood. It is true that Alexander possessed little am 
munition for his guns, but most of what was left was 
canister and the field of fire which the Federal Infantry 
would have had to traverse would have presented the 
opposing artillery with an opportunity not less favor 
able than that at Second Manassas. Only a few rounds 
per gun would have been necessary. 

Finding that Meade was not going to follow up his 
success, Longstreet prepared to withdraw his advanced 
line to a better defensive position. Hood and McLaws 
were ordered to fall back slowly before Meade s skir 
mishers, and during the afternoon Alexander withdrew 
his guns from the Peach Orchard one by one. By 10 
P. M. the batteries of the 1st Corps had been retired to 
the positions occupied by them along Seminary Ridge 
on the 2d of July, and the infantry was firmly estab 
lished with the Peach Orchard still in its possession. 
Stuart had rejoined the Army on the night of the 2d, 
and had promptly assumed the duty of protecting the 
flanks, which he still guarded. 

Merritt s attack on the Confederate right had been 
followed up by a bold charge of the Federal Cavalry led 


by the gallant Farnworth, who had lost his life in the 
fight. On the Confederate left, four of Stuart s brigades 
had successfully opposed three of Gregg s near Cress s 
Ridge, %y 2 miles east of Gettysburg. Stuart s position 
offered excellent opportunities for the use of his horse 
artillery, reinforced by a section of Green s Battery of 
the 2d Corps, Griffin s Horse Battery of Jenkins 
Cavalry Brigade, and Jackson s new horse battery. 
In this affair Breathed and McGregor had taken no part 
at first by reason of lack of ammunition, but later in the 
day had appeared on the field and rendered valiant serv 
ice, holding Gregg in check until nightfall. In this 
quarter, both Stuart and Gregg held approximately 
their original positions, but the Federal Cavalry had 
succeeded in foiling Stuart s design to fall upon Meade s 
rear. Chew s and Moorman s batteries were not en 
gaged at Gettysburg with the Cavalry, having been left 
in the rear between Hagerstown and the river, and Im- 
boden s independent Cavalry Brigade with McClan- 
nahan s Horse Battery of six pieces only reached the 
field late on the 3d. It had been engaged throughout the 
campaign in raids on the left of the advancing army. 

During the afternoon of the 3d, Lee abandoned his 
plan to dislodge Meade and determined upon immediate 
retreat to Virginia, and under cover of darkness with 
drew Ewell s Corps to the ridge, and drew back Long- 
street s right to Willoughby Run. Imboden, with his 
2,100 men, was assigned the duty of organizing all the 
transportation of the Army into one vast train 14 miles 
long, and conducting it without a halt to Williamsport, 
and from thence to Winchester. Eshleman s Battalion 
with eight pieces, Tanner s 4-gun battery of the 2d 
Corps, Lieut. Pegram of Hurt s Battery with a Whit- 
worth, and Hampton s Cavalry Brigade with Hart s 
Battery were ordered to report to him, so that the escort 
included 23 guns in all. 

The great battle was over with the close of the third 
day. Nothing will so impress the student with its mag 
nitude as the statistics of the Artillery arm. 


Allowing the Confederates a maximum of 55,000 
infantry present on the field during the three days and 
272 guns, we find that in the battle the proportion of ar 
tillery to infantry was about five pieces per thousand 
men. Meade had engaged about 78,000 infantry with 
310 guns, exclusive of the Horse Artillery. The Federal 
proportion of artillery to infantry was therefore smaller 
than that of the Confederates, being about four guns per 
thousand men. As a matter of fact, however, the pro 
portion actually engaged was larger, for practically all 
of Meade s artillery was utilized at one time or another, 
while much of Ewell s artillery was idle. The supply 
of ammunition carried into the field for the Federal ar 
tillery consisted of 270 rounds per gun, whereas that for 
the Confederate artillery was but 150 rounds per gun. 
This fact still further increased the relative superiority 
of the Federal artillery. 

Gen. Hunt reported an expenditure in action for the 
Federal artillery of 32,781 rounds, an average of 106 
per gun. Ewell s Corps reported 5,851 rounds ex 
pended, and Hill s Corps 7,112 rounds. Ewell, there 
fore, averaged 90 rounds per gun, and Hill about 110 
for the 65 guns which they each brought into action. 

The greatest reported individual expenditure of a 
Confederate battery was that of Manly s which ex 
pended 1,146 rounds during the campaign, or an aver 
age of about 287 rounds per gun. This battery was 
principally engaged on July 3. McCarthy s rifled 
section, however, expended 600 rounds, or 300 per gun, 
and one piece of his battery under Lieut. Williams 
alone expended 300 rounds of shell and canister on the 

The intensity of the fire of the two artilleries was, as 
may be seen from the foregoing figures, greatly in favor 
of the Federals whose relative strength in artillery, 
based upon the Confederate average expenditure per 
gun, was as 318 to 213, instead of 310 to 272, for it is 
not merely the number of guns present during the bat 
tle that determines the volume of fire. No report was 


made of the expenditure in the 1st Corps, but all 83 of 
its guns were engaged and undoubtedly averaged as 
many rounds as those of Hill s Corps, or 110 each. 
Their expenditure was, therefore, fully 9,000 rounds, 
which brings up the aggregate for the Army during the 
battle to 90,000 rounds. Thus for the 213 guns en 
gaged, excluding the Horse Artillery, the Confederate 
expenditure averaged 103 rounds per gun as compared 
to 106 for the Federal guns. Again, losses alone do not 
determine density of fire. In the solution of this prob 
lem we must also consider the relative positions of the 
adversaries. It is apparent that a less intensive fire 
upon the compact Federal position, upon which nearly 
all the defenders were massed, would cause greater loss 
per gun than a much heavier fire upon the more ex 
tended outer line. This is proved by the fact that the 
killed and wounded, exclusive of the missing, in the Fed 
eral reserve, with 108 guns engaged, numbered 230 or 
an average of 2.1 per gun, whereas in Longstreet s Ar 
tillery with 83 guns, the total loss was 271 or an average 
of 2.6 per gun. It must also be borne in mind that 
normally the loss incurred by offensive artillery in the 
open and within the zone of musketry effect is greater 
than that inflicted upon the defensive artillery more or 
less under cover. In Ewell s Corps, the total artillery 
loss was 132, and in Hill s Corps 128, or an average for 
each of 2 per gun. 

The destruction of artillery horses on both sides was 
very great. In the 3d Corps alone, with a total of 77 
guns, 190 horses were killed in action, 80 captured, 187 
abandoned on the road, and 200 subsequently con 
demned as unserviceable, or a total of 627 lost in the 
campaign! The average loss per battery must, there 
fore, have been about 50 animals or two-thirds of the 
original number. 

The heaviest loss in personnel sustained by any bat 
talion was of course that of Huger s, or Alexander s own 
command. In that battalion with 6 batteries and 26 guns, 
138 men and 116 horses, or over 5 men and 4 horses per 


gun, were killed or wounded. As the personnel of the 
battalion did not exceed at the outset a total of 480, its 
loss in the battle itself, not counting the missing, was 
not less than 28 per cent of the whole, principally due to 
artillery fire. But if these figures, applicable to a special 
case, seem astounding, what of those concerning the 
whole Artillery Corps for the campaign? We have 
seen that the Artillery personnel on May 31 did not 
exceed 5,300 officers and men in number. Certainly not 
over 4,500 of these came upon the battlefields of the 
campaign. Of that number 94 were killed, 437 wounded, 
and in marked contrast but 77 were reported missing! 
The aggregate loss sustained by Lee s Artillery between 
July 1 and his return to Virginia two weeks later, was, 
therefore, 608, or a loss of 13.5 per cent of the entire ef 
fective personnel ! When we consider that but a handful 
of men were captured no further evidence is necessary as 
to the character of the service rendered by his artillery 
men. It is such figures that make one realize that Gettys 
burg was more than a defeat. It was a disaster from 
which no army, in fact no belligerent state, could soon re 
cover. The destruction of artillery material, in spite of 
the fact that but five guns were lost, was enormous. Two 
of these guns were abandoned near the Potomac by rea 
son of the failure of their teams, two disabled pieces were 
left on the field, and a third disabled piece which had 
been withdrawn was later captured by the enemy s 
cavalry. The guns were more than replaced by the seven 
captured pieces, but not the harness, fittings, equipment, 
and horses, and hundreds of its staunchest veterans were 
lost to the Artillery forever. Latimer, Fraser, and 
Morris, were but three of the six artillery officers who 
sealed their devotion to the cause with their life, but 
among the 26 wounded were such valuable men as Majs. 
Read and Andrews, and Capts. Brown, Woolfolk, 
Page, Carlton, Thompson, and Norcom. 



JULY 4 found the Artillery generally posted along 
Seminary Ridge, with some of Alexander s batteries on 
the right drawn back towards Willoughby Run. An 
anxious inventory of the ammunition on hand had been 
taken late the day before, and much to the relief of all 
it was found that enough remained for one day s fight. 
Fortunately Meade was not in an aggressive mood and 
nothing was attempted by him, so the Artillery was not 
engaged during the day. 

Shortly after noon, a rainstorm of almost unsurpassed 
fury broke upon the field and soon bemired the roads, 
causing great difficulty in assembling the train about 
Cashtown, and much suffering to the teams. Wagons, 
ambulances, and artillery carriages by hundreds were 
mingled in the roads and adjacent fields in one great 
and apparently inextricable mass, while the wounded 
found no shelter from exposure to the storm. Every 
vehicle was loaded with wounded men, whose sufferings 
could not be alleviated. The situation was awful. But 
about 4 P. M. the head of the train was put in motion 
from Cashtown and the ascent of the mountain in the 
direction of Chambersburg began. For the terrors of 
the retreat, which ensued, one must consult Gen. Im- 
boden s graphic account.* Suffice it here to say that by 
daylight on the 5th the head of the column had reached 
Greencastle, 15 miles from Williamsport, having tra 
versed two-thirds of the distance to the Potomac. 

About dark on the 4th, the withdrawal of the Army 
began. Hill s Corps followed immediately after the 
train, taking the Fairfield Road, while Longstreet fol 
lowed Hill. But the storm and the consequent con 
dition of the roads impeded the movement so that Ewell 
was unable to leave his position until daylight on the 
morning of the 5th. 

*Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill, p. 420. 


The retreat was a terrible march for the Artillery, 
crippled as it was by the loss of so many horses in 
battle, and the exhaustion of others. So many, lacking 
shoes, became totally lame on the stony roads, that 
squads of cannoneers had to scour the country along 
the route for horses which were requisitioned when the 
farmers would not sell them. 

Walker s battalions were withdrawn from Hill s old 
line about dusk and ordered to follow the 3d Corps, 
while Alexander s moved to Black Horse Tavern about 
5 P. M. where they were held in a great meadow adjoin 
ing the Fairfield Pike with orders to watch the passing 
column, and take their place immediately behind 
Walker s command. Here the horses, still in harness, 
were allowed to graze during the night as Walker s 
batteries did not pass by until 6 o clock the following 
morning. The refreshment thus gained for the worn 
animals was most welcome and enabled them to march 
for 19 hours to Monterey Springs with hardly a halt, 
and after resting from 1 to 4 A. M. to resume the march 
for 14 hours more, not going into bivouac until they 
reached Hagerstown at 6 p. M. the 7th. It was on the 
march of the 5th that Maj Henry was compelled to 
abandon two howitzers for lack of teams. Upon reach 
ing camp about one mile from Hagerstown, the Artil 
lery of the 1st and 3d corps was given a rest of several 

Swell s Corps did not withdraw from before Gettys 
burg until the morning of the 5th. Green s Battery, 
which had served on the left with Hampton, had joined 
its battalion the preceding night while Tanner s had ac 
companied Imboden. Capt. Raine, who succeeded Lati- 
mer in command of Andrews Battalion, had fallen back 
on the 4th to a position astride the Cashtown Road with 
Nelson s Battalion on its left. Dance s and Carter s 
battalions followed Johnson s and Rodes divisions to 
the rear during the night while Jones Battalion re 
mained in position with Early s Division as the rear 
guard. Brown, therefore, held three of his battalions 


across the enemy s path until the last infantrymen 
moved off. Practically all of his field transportation, to 
gether with that of the other artillery commands, was 
taken to convey the wounded to the rear. Carter, Jones, 
and Dance, never saw their wagons again, as they were 
captured or destroyed by the enemy s cavalry on the 
retreat. Brown s entire command reached the artillery 
rendezvous at Hagerstown on the morning of the 7th 
after an arduous but undisturbed march with the rear 
guard of the Army. 

In spite of the awful disaster which had befallen it, 
the magnitude of which was not at first realized by the 
Army, the spirits of the men were buoyant and the 
Army as a whole was by no means discouraged. They 
simply viewed the unsuccessful issue of the campaign 
as unfortunate because more fighting would be neces 
sary, but never once did the idea of ultimate defeat take 
hold of them. The storm of the 4th and 5th was far 
more responsible for the gloominess of the situation than 
the defeat of Gettysburg, and with the reappearance of 
sunshine, the irrespressible spirits of the men quickly 
rose. Thus it was that they plodded back to old Vir 
ginia rollicking and making the best of the hardships of 
the retreat. To their good humor and enjoyment the 
queer German inhabitants of the region through which 
they passed contributed much. 

The practice of forcible requisition was one in which 
the gunners especially had had long experience at home, 
as well as abroad, and was known to the service as 
"pressing for shorts." By this process alone were the 
batteries able to save their guns and it was certainly, in 
the circumstances, justifiable. An incident recounted 
by Col. Alexander is so amusing and full of interest that 
it is here given in his own words to illustrate the method 
of securing draught animals on the retreat: 

"Near Hagerstown I had an experience with an old Dunkard 
which gave me a high and lasting respect for the people of that 
faith. My scouts had had a horse transaction with this old gentle 
man, and he came to see me about it. He made no complaint, but 


said it was his only horse, and as the scouts had told him we had 
some hoof-sore horses we should have to leave behind, he came to 
ask if I would trade him one for his horse, as without one his crop 
would be lost. 

"I recognized the old man at once as a born gentleman in his 
delicate characterization of the transaction as a trade. I was 
anxious to make the trade as square as circumstances would permit. 
So I assented to his taking a foot-sore horse, and offered him 
besides payment in Confederate money. This he respectfully but 
firmly declined. Considering how the recent battle had gone, I 
waived argument on the point of its value, but tried another sug 
gestion. I told him that we were in Maryland as the guests of the 
United States. That after our departure the government would 
pay all bills we left behind, and that I would give him an order on 
the United States for the value of his horse, and have it approved 
by Gen. Longstreet. To my surprise he declined this also. I 
supposed then he was simply ignorant of the bonanza in a claim 
against the Government and I explained that; and telling him that 
money was no object to us under the circumstances, I offered to 
include the value of his whole farm. He again said he wanted 
nothing but the foot-sore horse. Still anxious that the war should 
not grind this poor old fellow in his poverty, I suggested that he 
take two or three foot-sore horses, which we would have to leave 
anyhow, when we marched. Then he said, Well, sir, I am a 
Dunkard, and the rule of our church is an eye for an eye, and a 
tooth for a tooth, and a horse for a horse, and I can t break the rule/ 

"I replied that the Lord, who made all horses, knew that a good 
horse was worth a dozen old battery scrubs; and after some time 
prevailed on him to take two, by calling one of them a gift. But 
that night, about midnight, we were awakened by approaching 
hoofs, and turned out expecting to receive some order. It was my 
old Dunkard on one of his foot-sores. "Well, sir, he said, you 
made it look all right to me to-day when you were talking; but 
after I went to bed to-night I got to thinking it all over, and I 
don t think I can explain it to the Church, and I would rather not 
try. With that he tied old foot-sore to a fence, and rode off 
abruptly. Even at this late day it is a relief to my conscience to 
tender his sect this recognition of their integrity and honesty, in 
lieu of the extra horse which I vainly endeavored to throw into the 
trade. Their virtues should commend them to all financial institu 
tions in search of incorruptible employees." 

Upon reaching Greencastle on the 5th with his con 
voy, Imboden s trouble began. Not only did the citi 
zens assail his train, but the Federal Cavalry in small 
foraging parties began to molest his progress. He was 


almost captured himself, but succeeded in throwing a 
section of McClannahan s Horse Battery in action with 
canister, which drove off the largest band. After a 
great deal of desultory fighting during the day, he suc 
ceeded in reaching Williamsport that afternoon with the 
head of his column, the rear arriving next day with 
Hart s Battery, the cavalry meanwhile guarding the 
route on the west. Thus did this energetic officer reach 
the Potomac with all the wagons of the Army, not less 
than 10,000 draught animals, and practically all the 
wounded which were able to be removed from Gettys 
burg several thousand in number. Only a small num 
ber of wagons had been lost and few horses, this in spite 
of the fact that during that awful march of fifty-odd 
miles, there were neither rations for the men, nor forage 
for the animals. But Imboden soon set the inhabitants 
to work cooking for the wounded Confederates and his 
train guard, and at last for the first time since leaving 
Gettysburg the horses were unharnessed and turned out 
to graze. This welcome halt was an enforced one, for 
the enemy s cavalry had destroyed the bridge across the 
river, which was unfordable by reason of the freshet. At 
Williamsport the train guard was fortunately strength 
ened by the arrival of two regiments of Johnson s Divi 
sion, returning from Staunton whither they had escorted 
the prisoners taken at Winchester on the advance. 
They brought a supply of ammunition both for the 
infantry and artillery. 

The morning of the 6th it was reported that 7,000 
Federal cavalry with 18 guns were approaching Wil 
liamsport. Imboden promptly placed his guns under 
Capt. Hart in position on the hills which concealed the 
town, and set about organizing and arming his team 
sters as a support for his infantry and dismounted 
troopers. By noon, about 700 of the wagoners, led by 
convalescent officers, were available for the defense. A 
heavy fight ensued in which Eshleman s Battalion, 
Richardson s two batteries of Garnett s Battalion, 
Hart s and McClannahan s batteries, all took part. 


By making a bold display of his artillery and march 
ing his wagoners hither and thither, causing them 
to appear at widely separated points, Imboden greatly 
imposed upon Buford, and Kilpatrick, and succeeded in 
holding them in check until Fitz Lee arrived in their 
rear, and caused them to withdraw along the Boons- 
borough Road. In this affair, which was opened by the 
artillery on both sides, Eshleman, by the bold advance of 
his four batteries, secured an enfilade fire upon the 
enemy, and aided by McClannahan s guns inflicted great 
loss upon them while the infantry, a part of which was 
led by Capt. Hart, together with the dismounted 
troopers, charged the Federals and forced them back, 
capturing 125 before they reached their horses. The 
teamsters fought so well that this affair has been called 
the "Wagoners Fight." Very fortunately for the 
Army, Imboden had been able to ferry two wagon loads 
of shell across the river from the ordnance train during 
the action in the nick of time, Moore s Battery having 
already exhausted its ammunition when the fresh sup 
ply arrived. It may here be added that this ordnance 
train had been ordered by Gen. Lee to Gettysburg from 
Winchester and would have reached the Army certainly 
by the 8th had it not retreated. 

By extraordinary energy and good management, 
Gen. Imboden had been able to save the transportation 
of the entire Army, which could not have been replaced. 

The next morning the Army began to arrive at Wil- 
liamsport and the work of constructing bridges com 
menced. Over 4,000 Federal prisoners, who had been 
escorted to the rear by the remnants of Pickett s Divi 
sion, with Stribling s and Macon s batteries, were ferried 
across the river before the 9th, and sent on to Richmond, 
via Staunton, in the charge of Imboden, with a single 
regiment. In the meantime, Maj. John A. Harman, 
noted for his energy and ability, was tearing down 
warehouses along the canal and building pontoons with 
the timbers thus secured to repair the bridge at Falling 
Waters, which, however, was not completed until the 


night of the 13th. During the time which intervened 
the Army was in a precarious position. A line of battle 
had been selected and prepared by the engineers with 
its right flank on the Potomac near Downsville, passing 
by St. James College and resting its left on the Cono- 
cocheague. The 1st Corps held the right, the 3d the 
center, and the 2d the left as at Gettysburg. The Ar 
tillery marched from Hagerstown on the 9th and 10th 
and occupied the line, and for the next three days was 
engaged with the infantry in continuous labor fortify 
ing the position. The Commander-in-Chief had called 
upon the whole Army for a supreme effort and in fur 
thering his plan of defense, Gen. Pendleton and his sub 
ordinates were most energetic in their cooperation. 
Alexander with his own and Dearing s and Henry s 
battalions occupied a position on the extreme right near 
Downsville. Three batteries of Cabell s Battalion were 
posted astride the Williamsport and Sharpsburg Pike, 
Lieut. Motes with Carlton s Battery being attached to 
Wofford s Brigade near St. James further to the left. 
Walker s battalions occupied the center north of St. 
James between Hagerstown and the Potomac. Mc- 
Intosh s and Brunson s battalions, or the Corps Re 
serve, generally occupied those portions of the line held 
by Anderson and Heth, respectively, while Lane, 
Garnett, and Poague supported the divisions to which 
they were usually assigned. Brown s battalions oc 
cupied the left of the line, Nelson s batteries covering 
the Williamsport and Funkstown roads. Carter s Bat 
talion was posted in a strong position to the rear in 
front of the bridge at Falling Waters. 

From the 8th to the 12th of July, Stuart with Chew s, 
Breathed s, McGregor s, Moorman s, and Griffin s 
horse batteries covered the Confederate front. These 
days were occupied by severe fighting between the Con 
federate Cavalry and the divisions of Buford and Kil- 
patrick at Boonsborough, Beaver Creek, Funkstown, 
and on the Sharpsburg front. While both sides claimed 
the advantage, Stuart succeeded in delaying the advance 


of Meade s army until the Confederate Infantry and 
Artillery were thoroughly intrenched, so that when he 
uncovered the front the Federals found it too strong to 
be assailed without carefully maturing their plans. The 
6th Corps had alone followed Ewell on the 5th as far 
as Fairfield, the rest of the Federal Army remaining 
on the battlefield for two days burying the dead, caring 
for the wounded, and bringing order out of the chaos into 
which the troops had been thrown by their prolonged 
defense. A third day was lost to the pursuit at Middle- 
town to procure supplies and bring up the trains, 
and had it not been for the storm of the 4th and 
5th and further rains on the 7th and 8th the Con 
federates would have safely crossed the Potomac 
before they were overtaken. As it was, Meade might 
have attacked on the 12th, but simply contented him 
self with a reconnaissance resulting in his determination 
to feel Lee s line on the 13th. A general attack was to 
follow if a favorable opening was discovered. But, by 
the 13th, the ford at Williamsport was passable, 
the bridge lower down stream had been completed, and 
Lee issued orders for the crossing of his army during 
the night. Ewell was to cross at the ford, and Long- 
street followed by Hill with the Artillery of the three 
corps at the pontoon bridge. Caissons were ordered to 
start from the lines at 5 p. M., and the infantry and guns 
at dark. The withdrawal was effected with great skill 
and celerity, in spite of almost insurmountable obstacles, 
so that when the Federals, after making various demon 
strations the day before, advanced to the attack on the 
14th they found but a few hundred stragglers in their 

The night movement on the part of the Confederates 
entailed the utmost hardship upon the Army, especially 
upon the Artillery. A heavy rainstorm had set in before 
dusk, and continued almost until morning. The routes 
to the crossings generally lay over narrow farm roads, 
rough and hilly, which were soon churned into all but 
impassable mires by the leading artillery carriages. No 


moon lit the way and the night was unusually dark, but 
large bonfires along the shore illuminated the crossings. 
From sunset to sunrise the artillery battalions, in spite 
of the most tremendous exertions on the part of the men, 
were able to cover but three or four miles, and many 
horses perished from exhaustion. Nevertheless all the 
Artillery was saved except two unserviceable howitzers 
of Henry s Battalion, which became stalled and were 
abandoned. After daylight, the weather cleared so that 
by 1 P. M. Hill s rear guard crossed the river under 
cover of Carter s guns at the bridge head. The Ar 
tillery then retired before the enemy s skirmishers which 
had been pressing the pursuit during the morning and 
took up a strong position on the south bank, while six of 
Garnett s, Lane s 20-pounder Parrotts, and Hart s two 
Whitworths were posted on his right and left by Gen. 
Pendleton, who personally conducted the defense of the 
crossing. For ten hours the old officer remained at this 
important post, unaided by a single member of his staff, 
all of whom were without horses and some of whom them 
selves were broken down by their exertions of the past 
two weeks. For 28 hours the Chief of Artillery was 
without a morsel of food, and for 40 was unable to gain 
a moment s rest. 

Lee had intended to cross the Blue Ridge into Lou- 
doun County, and there oppose Meade s advance, but 
while waiting for the Shenandoah River to subside, the 
Federals crossed below and seized the passes he had ex 
pected to use. Pushing his army southward along the 
eastern slope of the mountains, Meade threatened to 
cut Lee off from Gordonsville and the railroad. The 
danger was averted, however, by Longstreet s timely ar 
rival at Culpeper on the 24th, followed by Hill, while 
Ewell moved up the Valley and crossed the Blue Ridge 
at Thornton Gap. By August 4, the entire Army was 
united behind the Rapidan with Stuart in its front at 
Culpeper, and the enemy behind the Rappahannock. 
Thus did the second invasion of the North terminate. 



Livermore s estimate, which is believed to be more 
accurate than the Confederate returns, places the ag 
gregate Confederate loss in the battle of Gettysburg at 
28,063, of which number 3,903 were killed, 18,735 
wounded, and 5,425 missing, as opposed to a Federal 
loss of 3,155 killed, 14,529 wounded and 5,365 missing, 
aggregate 23,049. The losses of the Confederate Ar 
tillery itemized by battalions were : 

Killed Wounded Missing Total 

Cabell s Battalion 8 29 37 

Bearing s Battalion 8 17 25 

Henry s Battalion 4 23 27 

Alexander s Battalion 19 114 6 139 

Eshleman s Artillery 3 26 16 45 

Jones Battalion 2 608 

Andrews Battalion 10 40 50 

Carter s Battalion 6 35 24 65 

Dance s Battalion 3 19 22 

Nelson s Battalion 

Lane s Battalion 3 21 6 30 

Garnett s Battalion 5 17 22 

Poague s Battalion 2 24 6 32 

Mclntosh s Battalion 7 25 32 

Pegram s Battalion 10 37 1 48 

The aggregate loss of the Confederate Artillery was 
therefore 582 as opposed to a loss of 736 in the Federal 
Artillery, exclusive of the Horse Artillery on both sides. 

In the battle we have had occasion to note the absence 
of a number of prominent Confederate Artillery officers, 
but, Pegram, Andrews, Cutts, Hardaway, and Garnett 
joined their commands either near the end or soon after 
the close of the campaign. In Maj. John C. Haskell, of 
Henry s Battalion, a new character in the drama, and 
one destined to play a leading role henceforth, has ap 
peared. We heard little of Col. Walton at Gettysburg, 
though he was present. As stated by Longstreet, he 
was getting too old for active command and his health 
had stood the rigours of the Virginia winters very 
poorly. He had already expressed a desire to be trans 
ferred to the southern department, but was retained as 
Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps for some time.* 

*Rebellion Records, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 699. 

Killed at High Bridyv. 1st;:. 


From the magnitude of Gettysburg as an artillery 
battle it may seem at first glance to require extended 
criticism, but upon closer examination such is not the 
case as far as the Confederate Artillery is concerned. 
Other than the criticisms already offered, few others 
need be made. The battle of the 3d of July was not lost 
through lack of artillery support, as asserted by many 
critics. True, the artillery fire was not maintained as 
vigorously to the end as it might have been had there 
been an abundance of ammunition. But it has been 
clearly shown that the artillery preparation was as thor 
ough in Longstreet s front as the position of the guns 
would allow up to the very crisis of the attack which was 
when Pickett s column engaged in the infantry fire fight. 
Had Alexander and Walker possessed all the guns that 
could have been brought into action, they could not have 
maintained Pickett in his advanced position without the 
timely cooperation of a large infantry support. In fact 
the assaulting infantry itself masked the guns actually 
in action. Men, not shell, were needed at the high 
tide mark. Artillery can help infantry forward, but 
it cannot prevent overwhelming numbers converg 
ing under cover of the terrain upon it from many di 
rections. That there were grave errors committed in 
the disposition of the artillery is not disputed, but this 
point is not usually made. The general criticism is 
that the artillery preparation for Longstreet s attack 
failed. That this is not true is proven by the very fact 
that Longstreet s Infantry did reach the enemy s guns 
and advanced much of the distance free from serious 
opposition on the part of the hostile artillery. His 
failure, then, was due to the lack of weight at the de 
cisive point, both because he attacked with lack of con 
cert among his troops, and because with whatever force 
he assaulted, the enemy remained free to outnumber 
him by transferring troops from other quarters of the 
field. The lack of cooperation of the 2d Corps Artillery 
was not due to Pendleton, nor to Brown, but to Ewell, 
the corps commander. 



or 1863-64 

THE period of several weeks of inactivity following 
upon the arrival of the Army behind the Rapidan was 
one of welcome and necessary rest. During this time 
so many convalescents and absentees returned to the 
Army that soon it was raised to a strength of nearly 
60,000 men. The organization of the Artillery remained 
for a time unchanged with the exception of the tem 
porary addition of Capt. Thomas E. Jackson s Char- 
lottesville Battery to Beckham s Horse Artillery Bat 
talion. McClannahan s Horse Battery, meantime, con 
tinued under Imboden s detached command, so that with 
Stuart s Division there were now seven horse batteries. 

The distribution of the Artillery on July 31 was as 
follows : 

1st Corps, 5 battalions, 22 batteries, 83 guns, 96 of 
ficers, and 1,724 enlisted men present for duty, aggre 
gate present and absent 2,873.* 

2d Corps, 5 battalions, 20 batteries, 84 guns, 95 of 
ficers, and 1,448 enlisted men present for duty, aggre 
gate present and absent 2,392. 

3d Corps, 5 battalions, 20 batteries, 62 guns, 86 of 
ficers, and 1,564 enlisted men present for duty, aggre 
gate present and absent 2,7.27. 

The effective strength of the Artillery with the Army 
was therefore over 5,000, and the paper strength nearly 
8,000, with 229 guns. Before August 10 the present for 
duty increased to 5,747, and the aggregate paper 
strength to 8,325. With the 1st Corps there were then 
83, with the 2d Corps 81, and with the 3d Corps 77 
pieces of artillery, or a total of 241 guns. Of this num- 

*For guns of 1st Corps at this time see Rebellion Records, Vol. LI, Part II, 
p. 740, Walton s letter. 


ber there were twelve 20-pounder Parrotts, thirty-nine 
10-pounder Parrotts, sixty-four 3-inch rifles, two Whit- 
worths, ninety-eight Napoleons, five 24-pounder howit 
zers, and twenty-one 12-pounder howitzers. In the en 
tire Corps there were but 8 battery wagons, and 32 
forges, while there were 228 caissons or nearly one per 

In the Gettysburg campaign, Lee had engaged, ac 
cording to Col. Taylor, 50,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 
and 4,000 artillery, but this estimate of the Artillery is, 
we believe, too small by 500 men. By August 10, how 
ever, it is certain that there was one man in the Artillery 
for every ten present in the Infantry. Thus it is seen 
that Lee, like Frederick and Napoleon, compensated for 
the decrease in his infantry by maintaining his artillery 
in the face of all difficulties. 

Besides the Field Artillery actually with the field 
Army, there was a large force under Gen. Arnold 
Elzey, in and about the defenses of Richmond. Lieut. - 
Col. C. E. Lightfoot commanded a battalion consisting 
of Smoot s Alexandria, Thornton s Caroline, Rives 
Nelson, and Hankins Surry batteries. This battalion 
occupied the works together with Col. T. S. Rhett s 
four heavy artillery battalions. Serving with Ransom s 
Division in the Department of Richmond were four bat 
talions as follows : 


Maj. E. F. Moseley 

Richmond Battery, Capt. W. J. Dabney. 

James City Battery, Capt. L. W. Richardson. 

Goochland Battery, Capt. Jonathan Talley. 

Yorktown Battery, Capt. E. R. Young. 


Maj. F. J. Boggs 

Richmond Battery, Capt. S. Taylor Martin. 

Albemarle Battery, Capt. N. A. Sturdivant. 

North Carolina Battery, Capt. L. H. Webb. 

*See Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 636, for complete 
summary of material, August 10, 1863. 


Maj. James R. Branch 

Mississippi Battery, Capt. W. D. Bradford. 

South Carolina Battery, Capt. J. C. Coit. 

Petersburg Battery, Capt. R. G. Pegram. 

Halifax Battery, " Capt. S. T. Wright. 


Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg t, Capt. Alexander D. Moore. 

Macon (Ga.) Battery, Capt. C. W. Staten. 

Maj. A. W. Stark* 

Mathews Battery, Capt. A. D. Armistead. 

Giles Battery, Capt. D. A. French. 

These 15 light batteries must have possessed a total 
personnel of not less than 1,000 men and 60 guns. 
There was, therefore, a large reserve force of artillery 
in his immediate rear, which Lee could call upon in an 
emergency, though of course the service of the officers 
and men who had been held at the base had not been 
such as to make them as efficient as those with the main 

Since the reorganization of the Artillery in May, it 
had greatly increased in efficiency, but the Pennsyl 
vania campaign had practically destroyed its field 
transportation, and the batteries were themselves al 
most dismounted. During the retreat it had, therefore, 
been necessary to still further reduce the baggage al 
lowances in order to supply the batteries and ordnance 
trains with teams. At this time, the artillery trans 
portation was fixed at two 4-horse wagons for the Chief 
of Artillery and his entire staff, including the medical 
officers, one 4-horse wagon for each corps chief and his 
staff, one 4-horse wagon for each battalion headquarters, 
one 4-horse wagon for all the battery officers of each 
battalion, and two 4-horse wagons for the forage and 

*Attached to Wise s Brigade. 


supplies of each battery. Surplus baggage was directed 
to be turned over to the Chief Quartermaster at once.* 

The following April a slight additional reduction 
was made in the allowance of transportation, and but 
one 4-horse wagon was authorized for the Chiefs of 
Artillery and their entire staffs, while one 2 -horse wagon 
for the medical supplies of each battalion and one 4- 
horse wagon for the mess equipment of every 500 men 
actually present were added. Thus it is seen that the 
baggage train of the Artillery of the Army when com 
plete consisted of not more than 160 wagons, requiring 
only about 650 horses. It is doubtful if any other equal 
force of artillery ever took the field with such a limited 
train. But we must remember that but two wagons 
were allowed army, corps, and division headquarters, 
and but one for brigade headquarters, at this time. By 
a rigid enforcement of the orders relative to the baggage 
allowance, the field batteries were provided with an 
average of about 50 horses before August 10, though 
some of them were still sadly deficient in the number of 
their animals. 

While the Artillery of the 1st and 3d corps lay in 
camp near Orange Courthouse and that of the 2d Corps 
at Liberty Mills, the most strenuous efforts were made 
by Gen. Pendleton to fully rehorse his command. His 
investigations of the horse problem were wide and 
thorough. Learning that horses temporarily disabled 
were not adequately cared for by the agents of the 
Quartermaster Department, and that numbers of them 
which under a proper system might be restored to a 
serviceable condition were allowed to perish from 
neglect, he reported the condition of affairs to the Com- 
mander-in- Chief, t He suggested that animals unfit for 
service should be turned over to individual farmers who 
should be encouraged to save them for their own needs, 
and not allowed to be herded in great droves. Under 

*G. O. No. 77, A. N. V., July 16, 1863. 
^Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1262. 

See his interesting letter, Rebellion Records, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 643 
August 13, 1863. 


the prevailing system, diseased animals merely spread 
contagion and none could receive individual attention. 
A farmer would ordinarily be only too glad to secure 
one or two horses for light work, and he would in many 
cases improve rather than impair their unfortunate con 
dition, which was principally due to exposure and lack 
of nourishment. Gen. Pendleton also declared that not 
less than 300 good artillery horses could be secured in 
Albemarle County alone, if the proper methods were 
pursued. Quartermasters and their agents, unknown to 
the people, could not secure these animals, he said, but 
artillery officers, whose interest in the service was neces 
sarily greater than that of mere purchasing agents, 
would by tact and good judgment be able to purchase 
them for about $600.00 apiece, or even perhaps trade 
worn and feeble battery horses for the fresh ones. At 
any rate, many could be secured by impressment as a 
last resort. But very little seems to have been done at 
this time, however, to remedy conditions, and again, on 
September 3, the Chief of Artillery called the Com- 
mander-in-Chief s attention to this very vital matter, 
which threatened the efficiency of the whole artillery 
arm. His recommendations to the Superintendent of 
Transportation at Richmond were now as follows: 

"First. The establishment of a sort of general horse district in 
the counties of Halifax, Pittsylvania, Henry, Patrick, Franklin, 
Campbell, and Bedford, with depots, stables, etc., under the care 
of a responsible superintendent, who should select his own agents, 
and have the care of all the horses of this army to be resuscitated, 

"Second. The procurement from time to time, by this same 
officer or others in connection with his charge, of a number of fresh 
horses, to be taken to the depots in said district and kept with those 
renovated, for transfer when needed to the field. 

"Third. The establishment of suitable places of accommodation 
for horses removed to and from this district and the army, so as to 
insure their being suitably provided for in transit."* 

As far as we know this plan, which in its general 
aspect was adopted, was one of the first attempts to 

Rebellion Records, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 697. Ibid., p. 715. 


organize a remount depot in this country, certainly in 
the Confederacy. It was to be established in a region 
still fat with forage, where slave labor was cheap and 
plentiful and one well removed from the theater of mili 
tary operations. 

So well received were Pendleton s suggestions that 
Maj. Paxton, whom he recommended to be placed in 
charge of the establishment, was soon appointed and 
directed to organize the remount department, with 
headquarters at Lynchburg. Before spring he had ac 
complished much in seggregating diseased animals and 
restoring them to health by means of infirmaries, as well 
as in collecting animals for future use. Yet, disease was 
so widespread, extending throughout the section and 
as far as the North Carolina line, that of the 3,000 ani 
mals in Paxton s charge over 600 died before February. 
The system adopted by the Department for parceling 
out the animals in small herds, foraging, exercising, and 
caring for them, was nevertheless such an apparent im 
provement over old methods that the Chief of Artillery 
recommended that the 1,500 animals which would be 
required to rehorse his command be left in charge of 
Maj . Paxton, until actually needed in the spring. More 
apprehension was entertained at this time concerning 
the lack of transport animals than remounts, and Gen. 
Pendleton urged that his agents be allowed to draw upon 
the supply of mules in Mississippi, Georgia, and Ala 
bama, and this suggestion was approved by the Com- 

Early in September Longstreet s suggestion to trans 
fer troops from Virginia to Tennessee for the purpose 
of reinforcing Gen. Bragg was adopted. There re 
mained several months of open weather and it was hoped 
that some success could yet be won in the West. But 
before the movement commenced the short route to 
Chattanooga, via Bristol and Knoxville, was no longer 
available, and Longstreet was compelled to take the 
roundabout route from Petersburg via Weldon, 

*Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 1182, 1188. 


Wilmington, and Augusta. Leaving Orange on the 
9th, the infantry of the 1st Corps was moved to Peters 
burg by rail, while Alexander s, Walton s, and Dear- 
ing s battalions marched. Hood s and McLaws divi 
sions and Alexander s six batteries with 26 guns en 
trained on the 17th and reached their destination after a 
tedious journey, in which it took nearly eight days to 
cover less than 850 miles. Meanwhile, Pickett s Division 
with Dearing s Battalion of Artillery was assigned to 
duty along the James River, relieving Jenkins and 
Wise s brigades, the former having accompanied Hood 
and the latter going to Charleston, S. C. Walton s Bat 
talion remained at Petersburg. On the 23d, Pickett 
was assigned to the command of the Department of 
North Carolina, with headquarters at Petersburg, Va. 
Henry s and Cabell s battalions moved to Hanover 
Junction with Pickett s Division, but on the 13th were 
ordered by easy marches into camp in the neighborhood 
of Gordonsville via Louisa Courthouse. On October 5, 
Lamkin s Nelson Battery was attached to Henry s Bat 
talion, to the permanent command of which Maj. 
John C. Haskell had succeeded. But on the 9th this 
battery, which was unarmed, was transferred to Cabell s 
Battalion. Maj. Henry had been promoted and trans 
ferred to the West. 

An important promotion had meanwhile been made 
in the Artillery Corps. It was apparent that Col. 
Crutchfield would be hors de combat for many months, 
and a permanent Chief of Artillery for the 2d Corps 
was much needed. Accordingly one of the two existing 
vacancies in the grade of brigadier-general of artillery 
was filled by the promotion of Col. Armistead Lindsay 
Long, formerly Military Secretary of the Commander- 
in-Chief, and he was assigned to duty as Chief of Ar 
tillery of the 2d Corps. The circumstances connected 
with the selection of Long for this position will be dis 
cussed later. Suffice it to say here that while he was in 
every way competent to fulfill the position to which he 
was appointed, yet his assignment to this high tactical 


command was thought by some to overslaugh the claims 
of Col. Brown to seniority in the Artillery of Swell s 
Corps during the absence of Crutchfield. While there 
was no open resentment of his appointment, neverthe 
less it would seem that Col. Brown s claim to seniority 
in the 2d Corps was disregarded nothwithstanding the 
fact that he was a highly efficient officer and had exer 
cised command in every campaign since April, 1861. 
It will be recalled that he was the original battery com 
mander of the 1st Company of Richmond Howitzers 
when it left Richmond for Yorktown. From that time 
to the day of his death he never missed an hour of duty. 
Although an officer with no military training prior to 
the war, he was a natural soldier and had no superiors 
in point of courage. He was a man of too high a sense 
of duty to allow any disappointment which he may 
have felt to affect him. He never complained to his as 
sociates, and showed no signs of bitterness to his superi 
ors. His personal and family correspondence shows 
that he himself accepted conditions in a most magnani 
mous spirit, but his friends were less philosophical in 
the matter. They felt that again the West Point in 
fluence had overreached a gallant, meritorious officer 
who, irrespective of the fact that he was a civilian before 
the war, had proved himself to be eminently qualified to 
command and, therefore, entitled to consideration upon 
his military record in the service of the Confederacy, 
without regard to circumstances before the war. This 
belief was heightened by the fact that Col. Brown had 
served as Acting Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps 
since the day of Crutchfield s elimination, and that al 
though he had not shown any particular brilliance at 
Gettysburg, the minor part played by his command 
there was known to have been due to Ewell s and not 
his fault. 

During the period of inactivity, in which the Con 
federate Army was gradually recuperating its strength, 
two corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac 
and sent to reinforce Sherman s Army, and in spite of 


Longstreet s absence the two armies were numerically 
more nearly equal than in the past campaign. This 
condition induced Lee to attempt to force Meade to 
an engagement while his army was reduced. Crossing 
the Rapidan on the 9th of October, Lee moved to 
Madison Courthouse and thence eastward, screening his 
movements by the cavalry and the mountain spurs and 
forests between himself and his enemy. But before Lee 
arrived near Culpeper Courthouse on the llth, Meade 
had learned through his cavalry of the danger to his 
right, and withdrew along the railroad to the line of the 
Rappahannock, Stuart driving Pleasonton from the old 
field of Brandy Station back upon the Federal Army. 
Cabell s Battalion had been left in front of Gordons- 
ville, and HaskelFs had been moved forward to Liberty 
Mills. The rest of the Artillery accompanied the Army 
on its circuitous march and throughout the subsequent 
campaign in which there was much skillful maneuver 
ing on both sides and very little fighting. By the 18th, 
Lee was back again on the Rappahannock. The main 
Army lay in camp about Culpeper, while Stuart oc 
cupied the country on the north side of the river. By 
November 7, Meade reached the Rappahannock im 
mediately behind which and in his front lay E well s 
Corps, with Eaiiy s Division behind Brandy Station, 
Rodes covering Kelly s Ford on the right, and John 
son s between them. Hill s Corps held the line of the 
river on Swell s left. A pontoon bridge had been 
thrown at the site of the old Rappahannock Bridge and 
the tete de pont on the north bank was alternately 
picketed by a single brigade of Early s and Johnson s 
divisions and a battery of artillery. When the Federals 
reached the river Hays Brigade and Green s Louisiana 
Guard Battery held the work on the north bank, while 
Dance s and Graham s batteries occupied a redoubt on 
the south side of the stream where they were placed 
merely to prevent a crossing should the bridge-head be 
taken, but they had no command whatever of the terrain 
on the north shore. 


The Federal advance consisted of the 5th and 6th 
Corps, which promptly occupied the hills in front of 
Hays, and opened fire upon the work on the north bank 
with a battery. To this, Lieut. Moore in command of 
Green s Battery boldly replied, but was soon over 
whelmed by two other batteries while Graham and 
Dance vainly sought to assist him. At dusk a heavy 
mass of the enemy s infantry rushed Hays and captured 
most of his men, and the Louisiana Battery. Of the two 
officers and 76 enlisted men of the battery, but 28 of the 
latter escaped, with 9 of their 54 horses. The two 10- 
pounder Parrotts and the two 3-inch Dahlgren rifled 
pieces of the battery were taken by the enemy along with 
all the carriages and about 400 rounds of ammunition. 

In the meantime, Early had ordered up his infantry 
and Jones Battalion, while Massie s Fluvanna Bat 
tery of Nelson s Battalion also arrived and engaged the 
Federals. But at daybreak on the 8th, Lee withdrew 
to his former position on the Rapidan. Although the 
season was late, and Meade had first eluded Lee and 
then recovered his original position, he was not willing 
to go into winter quarters until he had himself under 
taken offensive maneuvers in order, by some success, 
to satisfy the expectations of the administration in 

Swell s Corps now occupied a line from the base of 
Clark s Mountain to Mine Run, a small tributary of the 
Rappahannock, and covered Mitchell s, Morton s, Rac 
coon, and Summerville s fords; Hill s Corps that from 
Orange Courthouse to Liberty Mills; while Stuart, as 
usual, covered the front and flanks of the Army. Both 
corps had been much reduced by winter furloughs, no 
further operations before winter being expected. Al 
ready the Confederates had begun to prepare for a long 
rest, when at dawn, on November 26, Meade set his en 
tire army in motion towards Germanna Ford, hoping to 
cross the Rapidan at that point and surprise Lee. But 
his movement, though shrouded with the utmost 
secrecy, was instantly discovered by Stuart. Lee at 


once ordered Hill to form a junction with Ewell at 
Verdierville, and the latter to occupy a strong position 
behind Mine Run. In spite of every precaution, many 
delays impeded the Federal advance, and Meade s 
troops did not cross the Rapidan until the morning of 
the 27th. Meanwhile the Confederates had completed 
their concentration and thrown up strong log and earth 
breastworks. When Meade finally arrived in front of 
Lee on the morning of the 28th, he found himself con 
fronted by 30,000 infantry and 150 pieces of artillery 
behind works even stronger than those his own men had 
thrown up at Chancellor sville. This was a bitter dis 
appointment to the Federal commander, but he dili 
gently set to work to find an opening and next day 
Warren reported favorable conditions for assault on the 
Confederate right, while Sedgwick seemed to have dis 
covered equally good ones on the other flank. Orders 
for the simultaneous attack on both flanks were issued, 
but when the Federal artillery of the center and right 
opened not a sound came from Warren. His men had 
sized up the strength of Lee s works more accurately 
than their leader, for each had pinned a slip of paper 
on his breast with his name on it in order that the wearer 
might be identified. Reconnaissances both by Warren 
and Meade satisfied them of the futility of an assault, 
which if successful would be at the cost of not less than 
30,000 men. Lee, too, was much disappointed by the 
retreat of the Federals across Ely s Ford to Culpeper 
Courthouse on the night of December 1, and so suddenly 
and rapidly was it accomplished that he was unable to 
overtake them on the 2d. Thus ended the Mine Run 
campaign and the operations of 1863. 

The Army was now promptly prepared to go into 
winter quarters. The Infantry was generally held along 
the Rapidan, while the Artillery with the exception of 
two or three battalions was scattered along the line of 
the Virginia Central Railroad for the greater con 
venience of foraging the horses. Gen. Long s 2d Corps 
Artillery with the exception of Nelson s Battalion, 


which was kept on picket duty along the Rapidan, was 
located in and about Frederick Hall, and four of Col. 
Walker s 3d Corps battalions, after camping for a 
month on the farm of Maj. Lee near Madison Run in 
Madison County, erected their huts in the neighbor 
hood of Cobham and Lindsay stations, about 10 miles 
west of Gordonsville, with headquarters at Meeksville, 
while Cutts Battalion like Nelson s remained on picket 
near Rapidan Station. It was at this time that Lieut. 
Richard Walke, ordnance officer on Mahone s staff, 
was promoted captain of artillery and assigned to duty 
as Inspector-General of the 3d Corps Artillery, while 
Maj. Herbert M. Nash was appointed Surgeon. 
Captain William W. Chamberlaine had served on Col. 
Walker s staff for some time as Corps Adjutant. 

The Horse Artillery, which was continuously engaged 
in the cavalry operations during the months of Sep 
tember, October, November, and December, was 
ordered into winter quarters at Charlottesville on 
December 21st. Gen. Lee and Governor Letcher had 
reviewed the infantry and Stuart s command at Cul- 
peper Courthouse on November 5, when again Beck- 
ham s Battalion passed before the great soldier at the 
head of the cavalry, to the tune of Hampton s mounted 

Leaving the Rapidan country the horse batteries, 
worn and depleted by months of continuous fighting 
and marching, toiled over the bottomless roads to the 
Rivanna, which they reached on the 22d. The camp 
site selected for the battalion was located on the Early- 
ville Road, about five miles from Charlottesville. For 
the next two weeks, the men were busily engaged erect 
ing log huts and stables. It was in this very locality 
that Burgoyne s Hessians had been cantoned by Wash 
ington after their capture at Saratoga during the Revo 
lutionary War. 

Officers of the Horse Artillery declare that the winter 
of 1863-64, part of which they spent at Charlottesville, 
was the severest ordeal through which they passed 


while in the service. The cold winds which swept over the 
mountainous district, and the heavy falls of snow 
caused the greatest suffering to men and beasts. Alter 
nately bemired and frozen, the roads were impassable 
and the fields offered no opportunity for exercise. The 
period of winter quarters was simply a struggle by 
horses and men for existence, with scant provender for 
the former, and an unusual deficiency in rations and 
clothing for the latter. But these conditions were quite 
general in the artillery camps. 

Soon after placing his corps in winter quarters, Gen. 
Pendleton, with headquarters at Louisa Courthouse, as 
signed Majs. Page and Wolff e, and Lieuts. Peterkin 
and Dandridge of his staff to the duty of examining the 
forage conditions in the region between the railroad and 
the James River, from a point slightly west of Char- 
lottesville, to one just east of Beaver Dam Depot. These 
officers were required to locate, and report by December 
10 upon, the available supply of corn, oats, hay, straw, 
and fodder, as well as the grist mills in the respective 
districts designated for their inspection. Thus it is 
seen that the rich farming lands of the James River 
Valley, hitherto free from the presence of the armies, 
was expected to support the Artillery during the winter. 
The river counties with their Nile-like low grounds had 
before the war comprised the finest agricultural section 
of the state, and although the James River Nabobs were 
no longer personally superintending the cultivation of 
their estates, being off with the Army, their wives re 
mained at home and managed to keep most of their 
slaves at work, thus supporting their own as well as a 
great number of refugee families from the more exposed 
parts of Virginia. The Valley of Egypt was hardly 
more fertile than the bottom lands between Lynchburg 
and Richmond along the James, and those along the 
Rivanna from Charlottesville to Columbia. 

Many vacancies in the Artillery now existed, so that 
numerous officers, who had previously been confined to 
the lower grades, at last had before them prospects of 


advancement. Early in November, Gen. Pendleton had 
been called upon for his recommendations for promo 
tion, and after conferring with Gen. Long, Col. Walker 
and Gen. Stuart, submitted them on November 20.* 
The authorized commissioned personnel at this time was 
based, of course, upon the number of guns with the 
Army. Including those of the 1st Corps with Long- 
street in Tennessee, and those of the Horse Artillery, 
the number actually in service was 244, while the full 
legitimate armament entitled the Artillery to 276. Ar 
rangements were already nearly completed to supply 
the deficiency by substituting more Napoleons for the 
howitzers that had been lost and become unserviceable 
through ordinary wear and tear. The authorized 
complement of officers included, therefore, 3 brigadier- 
generals, 7 colonels, 11 lieutenant-colonels, and 17 
majors, whereas there were actually commissioned but 
2 brigadier-generals, 6 colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels, 
and 17 majors. The existing general and field-officers 
were as follows: 

Brigadier-Generals W. N. Pendleton and A. L. Long. 

Colonels S. Crutchfield, J. B. Walton, J. T. Brown, H. C. 
Cabell, R. L. Walker, and E. P. Alexander. 

Lieutenant-Colonels A. S. Cutts, R. S. Andrews, T. H. Carter, 
H. P. Jones, W. Nelson, and J. J. Garnett. 

Majors E. F. Eshleman, S. P. Hamilton, F. Huger, R. F. 
Beckham, James Bearing, T. J. Page, W. J. Pegram, D. G. 
Mclntosh, W. T. Poaajue, J. B. Brockenbrough, C. M. Braxton, 
J. Lane, R. A. Hardaway, J. C. Haskell, J. P. W. Read, C. Rich 
ardson, and Jas. Reilly. 

Of these many were unfit for active service. Col. 
Crutchfield, whom Jackson had earnestly sought to 
have made a brigadier-general, and whose service had 
been distinguished from the first, was practically dis 
abled by the wound he had received at Chancellorsville. 
For him, the Chief of Artillery recommended service 
about the defenses of Richmond. Col. Walton was no 
longer capable of performing active service, and his re- 

*Rebcllion Records, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 839, and Memoirs of W N 
Pendleton, p. 309. 



quest to be assigned to duty at Mobile was endorsed by 
Pendleton, while Alexander was recommended to be 
made permanent Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps. 
Col. Cabell, an officer of great integrity and personal 
courage, but lacking in energy and ability as a field 
soldier, was recommended to be transferred to the com 
mand of the battalion of field artillery at Richmond, 
and Lieut.-Col. Lightfoot transferred to the field 
army and placed in command of Cabell s Battalion. 
Lieut.-Col. Andrews, an officer of tried ability, was still 
an invalid from the wounds he had received at Cedar 
Run, in 1861, and Stephenson s Depot, in June, 1863. 
In justice to him, it was declared that he should be as 
signed to a less active field, preferably to ordnance 
duty, for which he was well qualified. Lieut.-Col. 
Garnett, in the opinion of the Chief of Artillery, in 
spite of his training and the high expectations of all, 
had proved unsuited to the artillery service. It was be 
lieved he could be more useful on conscript service than 
in his present position, and such a change was recom 
mended. Maj. Brockenbrough, though a most efficient 
officer, was still disabled from the wound he had re 
ceived at Fredericksburg, and was incapable of per 
forming active duty. Accordingly Gen. Pendleton 
recommended Col. Alexander to be brigadier-general; 
Lieut.-Cols. Carter, Jones, and Cutts to be colonels; 
Majs. Dearing, Eshleman, Huger, Braxton, Pegram, 
Mclntosh, Poague, Beckham, Hardaway, and Richard 
son, to be lieutenant-colonels; and Capts. Cutshaw, 
Jordan, Miller, Stribling, Raine, R. C. M. Page, Wat 
son, McGraw, M. Johnson, Ward, Maurin, Moorman, 
Chew, and Breathed, to be majors with the following 
general assignments: 

Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery 

Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander, Chief of Artillery 

TT T> 4.4. v (Lieut.-Col. F. Huger. South Carolina. 

Huger s Battalion. <,, . T , & . . 
(Maj. T. S. Jordan, Virginia. 

T, , , , T, . (Lieut.-Col. R. F. Beckham. Virginia. 

Beckham s Battalion. 4,, . T ^ TTr , ~, . 
(Maj. J. P. W. Read, Georgia. 


(Lieut. -Col. B. F. Eshleman. Louisiana. 
Eshlemans Battalion, | Maj M B Mfflerj Louisiana . 

Col. H. P. Jones, Virginia 

(Lieut.-Col. C. E. Lightfoot, North Carolina. 
Lightfoot s Battalion, | Maj g p Hamilto 6 n? Georgia 


Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long, Chief of Artillery 
Col. T. H. Carter, Assistant Chief of Artillery 

(Mai. R. C. M. Page, Virginia. 
Page s Battalion, | M| M N Moorman ^ Vi ? ginia . 

Col. J. T. Brown, Virginia 

/-. i i > T> .. T (Mai. W. E. Cutshaw, Virginia. 

Cutshaw s Battalion, -\, % ^ ,, o, ., ,. Tr . & . . 
Maj. R. M. Striblmg, Virginia. 

j , -o ,, v 
Hardaway s Battalion, 

Lieut.-Col. R. A. Hardaway, Alabama. 


Col. R. L. Walker, Chief of Artillery 

n , T, ,, T (Lieut.-Col. W. J. Pegram, Virginia. 

Pegram s Battalion, J 1l/r . T , ^ r ^ * TT . . . & 
Maj. Joseph McGraw, Virginia. 

Lieut.-Col. D. G. Mclntosh, South Carolina. 
Maj. Marmaduke Johnson, Virginia. 

Lieut.-Col. W. T. Poague, Virginia. 

Poague s Battalion, , T . ^ TTr , , ?. . & . 

(Maj. George Ward, Mississippi. 

Mclntosh s Battalion, 

Col. A. S. Cutts, Georgia 

Richardson s Battalion. 

Cutts Battalion, 

Lieut.-Col. Charles Richardson, Virginia. 
Maj*. Victor Maurin, Louisiana. 
Lieut.-Col. A. S. Cutts, Georgia. 
Maj. John Lane, Georgia. 


Lieut.-Col. James Bearing, Chief of Artillery 
Chew s Battalion, Maj. R. P. Chew, Virginia. 
Breathed s Battalion, Maj. James Breathed. 


The foregoing schedule includes 2 colonels less and 
1 lieutenant-colonel and 3 majors more than the law 
allowed, and provided for 7 promotions from the 1st, 
8 from the 2d, and 9 from the 3d Corps, and 4 from the 
Horse Artillery, which was about as fair a distribution 
as could be made. It will also be observed that the two 
reserve battalions of each corps were grouped under a 
single field officer, which was done at the suggestion of 
Gen. Long. It is also to be noticed that Maj. M. W. 
Henry, to the command of whose battalion Haskell 
succeeded, had dropped out by transfer to the Western 
Army. It seems strange that Dearing should have been 
recommended to succeed Beckham as senior officer in 
the Horse Artillery. This must have been at the 
instance of Stuart with whom Pendleton had conferred, 
for no such transfer would have been proposed except 
at his request. Dearing had a natural love for the 
cavalry and later transferred to that arm as a brigadier- 

The foregoing recommendations of the Chief of Ar 
tillery with the reasons upon which they were based, 
give one a valuable insight into the affairs of the Ar 
tillery at the time, but the welfare of the arm seems 
not to have been the only consideration before the ap 
pointing power. Influence, prejudice, politics, the 
bane of armies, were not foreign to the Confederacy, 
and it was many months before the needs of the service 
overcame the obstacles thrown in the way of final action. 
Garnett, meanwhile, retained his command, while Col. 
Walton remained in Virginia until spring in command 
of the Artillery with Pickett, consisting of Eshleman s 
and Dearing s battalions. Cabell was also retained and 
his battalion was held throughout the winter at the 
front as an army reserve with Eraser s, Manly s, and 
McCarthy s batteries at Somerville, Raccoon, and 
Morton s Fords, and Carlton s Battery in support in 
rear of the last two. Haskell s Battalion was tempora 
rily attached to the 3d Corps, in the absence of Long- 
street. Col. Cabell seems to have been well aware of 


the fact that he was not in favor, but was determined 
that he should not be ousted and resolutely held on to 
the last, giving up his guns only at Appomattox. 

As time wore on and it became apparent to Pendleton 
that the needs of the Artillery were simply being disre 
garded, he again addressed Gen. Lee on the subject of 
the necessary promotions as follows: 

"Although I know you are anxious to secure the promotion of 
our many meritorious officers, and regret, as I do, the obstacles that 
have hitherto hindered favorable action upon the recommendations 
in their behalf, I deem it my duty to submit for your consideration 
some additional facts recently brought to my notice. 

"First. Some of the best officers in the corps, finding how 
extremely difficult it is to rise in it at all, in proportion to service 
and merit, are making arrangements for more promising positions 
in other arms; nor can this be wondered at or even objected to as 
unpatriotic. Men the most devoted must be expected to value rank 
alike, as an evidence that their services are appreciated, and as an 
important condition toward more extended service. No man of 
merit ever disregards the question of promotion, and much as 
officers may be willing to sacrifice at times like these, they cannot 
ignore so universal and powerful a sentiment as that associated 
with martial honor. 

"Even those officers who have no idea of seeking other service, 
and whose simple sense of duty will keep them steadfast until the 
end, in spite of disproportionate reward, are compelled to consider 
themselves and their commands regarded with less than justice, and 
after all that can be allowed for high principle, we must conclude 
that it is not in human nature not to be more or less disturbed by 
such a reflection, nor can such disturbance be without its injurious 
effects upon the public service. 

"In addition to these considerations, the fact is worthy of 
particular attention that a number of the battalions have with 
them only one field officer, so that in contingencies frequently 
occurring, the senior captain, not always well qualified for the 
charge, has to command a battalion, serious as are the responsi 
bilities belonging to the position. It is certainly important that this 
difficulty be corrected before the next active campaign. 

"You will, I know, appreciate the case, and again ask for such 
action on the part of the President and the Secretary as may be 
practicable toward remedying the evil indicated."* 

These were strong arguments, and were too true to 
be further neglected. At this time, there were in the 

*Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1193, letter dated February 22, 1864. 


three corps and the Horse Artillery 214 artillery officers 
present for duty, with an effective strength for their 
arm of 4,893, and a paper strength of 7,137.* The 
grand total of the Army of Northern Virginia, ex 
clusive of Longstreet s command, was but 85,000 of 
ficers and men on paper, yet there were 2,418 officers 
of infantry and 331 of cavalry. These figures give 
some idea of how little opportunity the artillery arm 
afforded for promotion as compared to the others, not 
withstanding the fact that the proportion of the ar 
tillery personnel to that of the infantry and cavalry, 
combined, was as 1 to 10. We must also consider that 
casualties in the Infantry and Cavalry were by virtue 
of the nature of those arms much greater among the 
commissioned personnel than in the Artillery. 

That the matter of promotions in the Artillery was 
vigorously pressed by Gen. Lee is certain, for by S. O. 
No. 77, A. N. V., March 19, 1864, the following as 
signments were made: 

Brig.-Gen. William Nelson Pendleton, Chief of Artillery 

Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Artillery 

Col. Henry Coalter Cabell. 
Maj. S. P. Hamilton. 

John Cheves Haskell. 

James Reilly. 

Cabell s Battalion, 

Haskell s Battalion, 

TT (Lieut.-Col. Frank Huger. 

Huger s Battalion, <.., . -, ^ T j 

(Maj. Tyler C. Jordan. 

(Col. Hilary P. Jones. 

Jones Battalion, <,, . T i. i m -n j 

(Maj. John P. W. Read. 

, 17 , . A ..,, (Col. Jas. Birge Walton. 

Washington Artillery, | Maj Benj | Eshleman . 

Brig.-Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, Chief of Artillery 

T, T . j. T (Lieut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton. 

Braxton s Battalion. <,, . AT ,, XT ,, 

(Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman. 

, r> * (Col. John Thompson Brown. 

Browns Battalion, < T . ^ i -n i. L A cs j 

(Lieut. -Col. Robert A. Hardaway. 

*Ibid., p. 1191. 


(Col. Thomas H. Carter. 
Carter s Battalion, I M& . Richard c M p age 

(Mai. Wilfred E. Cutshaw. 
Cutshaws Battalion, | Ma j Robert M Stribling . 

(Lieut.-Col. William Nelson. 
Nelson s Battalion, | Maj Dayid Watson> 

Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery 

(Lieut.-Col. Allan S. Cutts. 
Cutts Battalion, | Maj John Lane 

(Lieut.-Col. William Johnson Pegram. 
Pegram s Battalion, Ma Joseh McGraw 

(Lieut.-Col. David Gregg Mclntosh. 
Melntosh s Battalion, Maj Marmaduke Johnson . 

Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague. 

Poague s Battalion, 

Maj. George Ward. 

Mai. Charles Richardson. 
Richardson s Battalion, M ^. M R 

In this assignment, Jones was given Bearing s Bat 
talion, Cutshaw succeeding to the command of Jones 
old battalion, while Richardson succeeded Garnett, and 
Braxton succeeded Andrews. 

Soon Gen. Long divided his artillery into two divi 
sions, the first under Brown, consisting of Nelson s, 
Hardaway s, and Braxton s battalions, and the second 
under Carter, consisting of Cutshaw s and Page s bat 
talions.* Hardaway and Page then commanded 
Brown s and Carter s old battalions, respectively. 

Early in March Beckham was promoted and trans 
ferred to the western army, whereupon Dearing was 
promoted and succeeded to the command of the Horse 
Artillery, the organization of which was now as fol 
io ws:f 


Lieut.-Col. James Dearing 
Maj. Robert Preston Chew 

Ashby Battery, Capt. James W. Thomson. 

1st Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. James Breathed. 

*Rel>elUon Records, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1267. 
tFor Bearing s assignment to H. A., see Ibid., p. 1264. 

JGriffin s Battery attached to Maryland line under Gen. Bradley T. Johnston. 
Jackson s Battery with Jones in Department of Western Virginia. 


2d Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. Wm. M. McGregor. 

Lynchburg Beauregards, Capt. J. J. Shoemaker. 

Washington (S. C.) Battery, Capt. J. F. Hart. 

Before the opening of the next campaign, Eshleman 
was also promoted and given command of a newly- 
organized battalion from among the batteries around 
Richmond, and Capt. William Miller Owen, formerly 
adjutant of the Washington Artillery, became its major 
and battalion commander. Thus, with the exception of 
the retention of Cabell in active command, we see that 
the original recommendations of the Chief of Artillery 
were finally very closely followed, and general satis 
faction prevailed. It was about this time that Lieut.- 
Gen. J. C. Pemberton, the unfortunate defender of 
Vicksburg, tendered his resignation and requested to 
be assigned to the Artillery with the rank of lieutenant- 
colonel.* On May 12 he was assigned to Ransom s 
Division in the Richmond defenses as Chief of Ar 
tillery, t 

Favorable weather in February tempted Meade to 
undertake a renewal of operations, but the prompt ap 
pearance of Lee induced the Federal commander to 
forego his activity, not, however, until he had attacked 
Swell s line. Nearly all the Confederate pickets were 
taken. The preparedness of Brown s Artillery alone 
saved the breaking of the Confederate line. The bat 
teries of the 2d Corps, unaided, hurled the Federals 
back and administered a bloody repulse to them with 
slight loss to themselves. But for their prompt and 
energetic action, instead of being a small affair, a dis 
aster would have befallen the Army. 

On the 29th of February, Gen. Custer with about 
2,500 picked troopers and a section of horse artillery, 
moving along the Earlyville Road, approached within 
one mile of the Horse Artillery camp before he was dis 
covered by the merest accident. It so happened that 
Capt. Moorman with two of his men while going fishing 

*Ibid.. p. 1296. 

flbid., Vol. XXXVI, p. 994. 


saw the raiders approaching, and galloped back to camp 
to give the alarm. The enemy appeared so suddenly 
that the parked guns were all but captured. By the 
time Maj. Chew was able to get his batteries hooked up, 
the raiders were actually among the huts looting the 
camp and shooting down the stray horses which it had 
been impossible to drive in from the fields in which the 
animals had been turned out. A few shots from Moor 
man s guns while the teams were being brought up 
served to check the enemy sufficiently to enable Chew 
to place his batteries in position and open upon the 
raiders, who were seemingly more intent upon the de 
struction of the camp than the capture of the guns. The 
artillery fire soon drove Custer off, and thus did Chew 
entirely unsupported by infantry or cavalry save Char- 
lottesville, with about 200 cannoneers, including the 
sick and the dismounted men who were always called 
in the Artillery Company "Q". In accomplishing this 
result, an interesting stratagem was utilized. The 16 
guns present were formed in line, and manned by the 
dismounted cannoneers, while the rest of the men, bear 
ing an old standard, were formed by Chew and Breathed 
into a squadron behind the guns. There was not a 
musket or carbine in the outfit, few pistols, and fewer 
sabers. Most of the men, however, bore sticks and 
clubs to represent arms. The few small arms were, of 
course, ostentatiously employed, with such effect that 
the enemy mistook the line of mounted cannoneers for 
a cavalry support. In the meantime, the guns were 
actively plied, while Custer held most of his men be 
yond the river, uncertain as to the number of his enemy. 
He had captured Capt. Moorman s two companions be 
fore they reached camp. From them little information 
could be secured. In fact they intentionally assumed 
a most puzzling manner. Custer, himself, then ques 
tioned a negro inhabitant of the neighborhood, who 
stated with every appearance of candor that the ar 
tillerymen had lied, and that Confederate troops were 


encamped all the way from the river to Charlottesville, 
and had with them not less than 60 guns. This inter 
view was on the south side of the river on a hill above 
the bridge at Burnley s Mill, about a mile from the 
Artillery camp, and while it was transpiring several 
shells burst near the group. About the same time, Chew 
moved his pseudo cavalry to the flank of the guns and 
cried out in a loud voice, "Tell Col. Dulaney to bring 
up the Seventh Regiment." The Federals heard the 
command, and naturally assumed the superb cavalry 
regiment had been moved from the Valley, where it was 
actually in camp, to the defense of Charlottesville. 
That night Custer retired towards the Rappahannock, 
having accomplished nothing but the burning of the 
Horse Artillery cantonments and Burnley s Mill, 
while Chew moved his battalion four miles down the 
Scottsville Road, unwilling to rely on Dulaney s sup 
port. But the next day, when Custer was found to have 
decamped, he returned to his old quarters, and rebuilt 
his huts. The men had lost nearly everything they pos 
sessed in the way of surplus clothing. The bountiful 
supply must have greatly improved the outfit of the 
Federal raiders. For the next few days rumors of 
Custer s return were rife and a bold lookout was main 
tained. On the 20th of March, the battalion was 
ordered to Gordonsville for security, where it remained 
until the opening of the next campaign, in camp on the 
farm of Boiling Haxall. While there a large supply 
of fresh horses was expected by the batteries, but the 
total number received was 38. 

Meanwhile the following resolutions were received by 
the Horse Artillery Battalion from the Town Council 
of Charlottesville, as a testimonial of the appreciation 
of its people: 

"Whereas, The recently attempted raid of the Yankees on this 
place was undoubtedly checked and finally repulsed by unequaled 
coolness and courage of the gallant officers and men of the artillery 
battalion, encamped a few miles north of Charlottesville, wholly 
unsupported as they were by either infantry or cavalry ; and, 


"Whereas, Our town was thus unquestionably saved from pillage,, 
and the public stores and the railroad bridges from destruction; 
therefore, be it 

"Resolved, That on behalf of the citizens of Charlottesville we, 
the council of the town, do hereby return our thanks to the officers 
and men of the said artillery battalion for their gallant and heroic 
conduct on the occasion above mentioned, with the assurance of our 
lasting and grateful appreciation of the service thus rendered us. 

"Resolved, That the above preamble and resolutions be handed 
to the commander of the battalion, in order that he may communi 
cate the same to the officers and men of his command in the manner 
he may deem most appropriate. 

"By order of the Council, March 7, 1864. 

"A. ROBERT McKEE, Clerk. 

"To Maj. M. N. Moorman, 
"Commanding Battalion, 

"Stuart Horse Artillery." 

It was after the arrival of the battalion at Gordons- 
ville that Capt. Moorman was promoted major and 
transferred to Braxton s Light Artillery Battalion, then 
at Frederick s Hall, Lieut. J. J. Shoemaker succeeding 
him as Captain of the Beauregard Rifles Battery of 
Lynchburg, while Maj. Chew became the battalion 
commander with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. 

The next hostile move after Custer s raid was in 
March when two columns of Federal cavalry under 
Gen. Kilpatrick and Col. Dahlgren, respectively, 
moved out from Culpeper Courthouse, the first towards 
Richmond, and the second with orders to destroy the 
artillery at Frederick Hall, and then proceed down 
the James River, form a junction with Kilpatrick s 
column, capture Richmond, destroy the city, and liber 
ate the prisoners on Belle Isle. This was a big order 
for Dahlgren. Nearly succeeding with respect to reach 
ing Richmond, he would certainly have succeeded in 
destroying the 2d Corps artillery, had it not been for 
the foresight of Gen. Long. Anticipating a cavalry 
raid upon his camp, he had early applied for two regi- 


ments of infantry as a guard. When refused this sup 
port, he secured 125 muskets, which he distributed 
among his cannoneers and organized them by battalions 
into companies of riflemen. 

Dahlgren captured the pickets at Germanna Ford, 
crossed the Rapidan, and arrived within a few miles of 
the Artillery camp before his approach was reported. 
Gen. Long, immediately upon learning of the danger, 
ordered Lieut.-Col. Braxton to place a battery in po 
sition to command the road over which the enemy was 
approaching, to deploy his company of sharpshooters as 
skirmishers, and to withdraw his other batteries to a 
position near the railway station. At the same time, 
Col. Brown was directed to place his battalion in 
position to guard the approaches below the depot, while 
Cutshaw s and Carter s battalions were held in rear of 
Brown s and Braxton s, and sharpshooters from the 
supporting batteries were also sent forward and de 
ployed. These dispositions were barely completed 
when the Federal raiders came in view of Marye s 
Battery on the road. Seeing the battle flag flying above 
the guns, and catching a glimpse of the bayonets of the 
sharpshooters, Dahlgren halted in some surprise, hav 
ing been led to believe that the artillery at Frederick 
Hall was without an infantry support. He now in 
quired of a local contraband whether or not there was 
infantry with the artillery, to which the negro replied, 
"Yes, Massa, plenty of it." Being doubtful whether 
the negro knew what was meant by infantry, Dahlgren 
asked how he knew it. "Because," was the answer, "the 
infantry had stickers on the ends of their guns." Con 
vinced by the evidence of the negro that the artillery was 
not unprotected, Dahlgren made a detour to the left, 
keeping beyond the range of the guns. The only loss sus- 
stained by the Artillery was that of the members of a 
court-martial, which was in session in a house on the 
enemy s line of march ; whereupon a wag remarked that 
as the court, prisoners and witnesses were all present the 
trial might go on and the proceedings be sent to Gen. 


Long, from Point Lookout, or Fort Delaware. The 
prisoners escaped, however, with one exception, during 
the following night. The two raiding columns failed 
to cooperate, due to Dahlgren being led astray by a 
faithful negro slave. Kilpatrick reached the inner line of 
defenses of Richmond, and, attacking alone, was re 
pulsed. Dahlgren moving down the James River Val 
ley, some of the distance on the tow path of the canal, 
burned many barns, seized all the horses for his men he 
could lay his hands on, and almost captured Mr. Sedden, 
the Confederate Secretary of War, and Gen. Wise, who 
were visiting their families at "Sabot Hill" and "East 
wood." But these worthies escaped on fleet horses, and 
took the news of the Federal approach to Richmond, 
where the Richmond School Cadets, and a nondescript 
band of departmental clerks and Home Guards, the 
latter consisting of old men and boys, were hastily 
thrown across Dahlgren s path, while the Tredegar 
Iron Works Battalion turned out to guard Belle Isle. 
The raiders galloped into an ambush which had been 
skillfully laid for them and were signally defeated. Dahl 
gren himself, and many of his men, were killed, and only 
a remnant of his band escaped.* Thus did the Federal 
plans come to naught, and thus did Gen. Long by the 
most admirable foresight save the Artillery of the 2d 
Corps. On three separate occasions a negro had ma 
terially befriended the Artillery. 

Gen. Pendleton had spent the month of January on 
leave of absence in Lexington with his family, but re 
turned to Artillery Headquarters at Louisa Courthouse 
on February 3. He was soon summoned to Richmond, 
and ordered to Dalton, Ga. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, 
commanding the Army of Tennessee, had, upon taking 
command, found the Artillery of that Army in a highly- 
disorganized state^and at once applied to the War De 
partment for Col. Alexander to be sent to straighten 
things out. Writing on December 27 about the con- 

*See Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, Long, p. 320, and Battles and Leaders, Vol. 

p. 95. Also an interesting persoi 
April, 1894, by Mrs. Ellen Wise Mayo. 

IV, p. ^95. Also an interesting personal narrative in the Century Magazine, 


ditions of his army, to Gen. Bragg, who was virtually 
Mr. Davis Chief of Staff, Gen. Johnston said: 

"The artillery also wants organization, and especially a com 
petent commander. I, therefore,, respectfully urge that such a one 
be sent me. I have applied for Col. Alexander, but Gen. Lee 
objects that he is too valuable in his present position to be taken 
from it. His value to the country would be more than doubled, I 
think, by the promotion and assignment I recommend."* To this 
communication, Gen. Bragg replied in March, in part, as follows: 

"Col. Alexander, applied for by you, as Chief of Artillery, is 
deemed necessary by Gen. Lee in his present position. Brig.-Gen. 
W. N. Pendleton, an experienced Officer of Artillery, has been 
ordered to your headquarters to inspect that part of your command, 
and report on its condition. 

"Should his services be acceptable to you, I am authorized to 
say you can retain him. 

"I am exceedingly anxious to gratify you on that point, for I 
know the deficiency existing. 

"It is more than probable that such a junction may soon be made 
as to place Col. Alexander under your command. "f 

The foregoing correspondence gives one an idea of 
the estimation in which Alexander was held throughout 
the service. Since Gen. Pendleton exercised only an 
administrative command of the Artillery, he was 
naturally more available than Alexander for such duty 
as required by Gen. Johnston. Leaving Louisa Court 
house, March 4, he arrived at Dalton, via Atlanta, a 
week later, with Lieuts. Peterkin and Hatcher, of his 
staff, and immediately set to work. There is no reason 
to believe that his assignment was not satisfactory to his 
new commander, notwithstanding the fact that a 
younger officer had been applied for. Gen. Johnston s 
greeting was most cordial, and the artillery situation in 
its general aspects was at once laid before Gen. 

The personnel of Johnston s Artillery at this time 
numbered approximately 4,500, exclusive of Alex 
ander s command. Energetic measures had already 
been taken to supply the western batteries with a full 

*Johnston s Narrative, p. 288. 
^Johnston s Narrative, p. 289. 


complement of horses. Maj. Beckham had recently 
been promoted colonel, and transferred from Stuart s 
Horse Artillery to Johnston s Army, having been suc 
ceeded by Bearing, who had also been promoted. Maj. 
Bondurant had also been promoted at the instance of 
Gen. D. H. Hill, and transferred, as a lieutenant- 
colonel, and Chief of Artillery of D. H. Hill s Division. 
Pendleton at once took occasion to recommend for the 
position of Chief of Artillery, Col. Thomas H. Carter, 
of Virginia. 

Some idea of the old general s energy and his pe 
culiar fitness for work of the character to which he had 
been assigned may be had from the fact that although 
he only arrived in Johnston s camp at daybreak on the 
llth, he commenced his inspection of the three reserve 
battalions commanded by Lieut. -Col. Hollinguist at 
noon the same day. This command constituted about 
one-third of all the artillery with the Army. Accom 
panied by Maj. Preston, Inspector- General of Ar 
tillery, and one of his aides, and provided with one of 
Gen. Johnston s own mounts, he made a minute in 
spection of the battalions assembled on the usual drill 
grounds, including the material, harness, field trans 
portation, horses and stables. He was surprised to find 
the animals in fair condition, the guns, carriages and 
harness in very good order, and much evidence of in 
telligent care and energy. Conditions were so much 
better than he had expected to find them that at once 
he recognized the fact that the trouble lay elsewhere. 

A grand review of the Artillery of Hood s and 
Hardee s corps was appointed for the 12th, to be fol 
lowed by minute daily inspections of their various bat 
talions. By the 16th, the actual work of inspection had 
been completed, and written inquiries submitted to the 
battalion commanders, in which various interrogations 
relative to the service were propounded. On the 16th, 
Gen. Hood conducted an imposing drill of his corps for 
the benefit of Gen. Pendleton, followed by combat exer 
cises in which about 20,000 men, including infantry, ar 
tillery, and cavalry, engaged with blank ammunition. 


Much to the disappointment of the Chief of Artillery 
notice was received the 19th that Brig.-Gen. Shoup had 
been ordered from Mobile to join Johnston as his Chief 
of Artillery. Shoup was a graduate of the United 
States Military Academy, had served at Vicksburg with 
great credit, and was reputed to be an able officer, but 
his preferment over Carter appears to have been only 
another evidence of the advantage held by West 
Pointers. Certain it is that his service had not been as 
illustrious as that of "Tom" Carter, of Pampatyke, a 
distinguished graduate of the Virginia Military Insti 
tute, a kinsman of Gen. Lee, a man of unblemished 
personal character, and with a record as a soldier second 
to none in the Confederacy. 

Another great artillery drill and sham battle was 
tendered Pendleton by Gen. Hardee. But the event, 
while equally inspiring, was less eventful than the 
former one, on which occasion one of Hood s major- 
generals and part of his staff had been unceremoniously 
unhorsed by their affrighted mounts. This incident no 
doubt established the precedent for the grand review in 
Paris in 1910, when the Commander-in-Chief of the 
French Army was thrown at the feet of the President 
of the Republic. Gen. Hardee s bride was evidently 
more at home in the saddle than some of the western 
knights, for she attended the review mounted, and ac 
companied by a number of brilliant staff officers, with 
out accident. 

While in the West, Gen. Pendleton preached to the 
troops on many occasions. His military views and sug 
gestions were in the main approved by Gen. Johnston, 
and reorganization had so far progressed during his 
presence that the task remaining for Gen. Shoup was 
much simplified. The main trouble had been found to 
be with the senior officers. Returning to Richmond, on 
March 29, via Charleston, where he and his staff officers 
inspected the harbor defenses, Pendleton promptly laid 
his report on the Artillery of the Army of Tennessee, 
and his recommendations regarding it, before the Presi- 


dent. A conference with Mr. Davis, Mr. Sedden, and 
Gens. Bragg and Cooper, resulted in his being ordered 
back to Dalton to urge Gen. Johnston to make an ag 
gressive move as speedily as possible, in order to dis 
tract the Federals and prevent the massing of more 
troops under Grant in Virginia. But before returning 
to the West, he visited Gen. Lee at the front, who con 
curred in the importance of his mission. Remaining 
with Johnston but two days, during which time he 
pressed upon him the desires of the administration, 
Gen. Pendleton was back in Richmond again by April 
21, and soon joined the Army. 

We have seen that in personal appearance he much 
resembled Gen. Lee. An amusing incident which oc 
curred during his presence in Richmond should here be 
recounted. One afternoon he was stopped by a tipsy 
Irishman on Broad Street, who began haranguing and 
gesticulating violently as he detailed some fancied 
grievance. The ladies of the party wished to go on, but 
the General insisted on listening patiently for a few 
moments, then said, "My friend, you are talking to the 
wrong person." "My," said Paddy, "ain t you Mass* 
Bob?" "No," replied Gen. Pendleton. "Look and see 
if you don t know me:" This answer seemed to steady 
the excited soldier. He came a little closer, peered into 
the General s face a moment, then giving himself a vio 
lent slap on the leg, exclaimed, "I ll swear if it ain t old 
Artillery." And with many apologies the embarrassed 
soldier allowed the general to pass on. 

When Gen. Pendleton returned to the Army he 
found not only that Longstreet had returned to Vir 
ginia, and that many changes had occurred, but that all 
was not running smoothly in the administration of the 
Artillery. Gen. Long, it seems, desired that all con 
nection between the Artillery and the Infantry in so far 
as the authority of division commanders was concerned, 
should be officially severed by order, and that the corps 
chiefs should be free to administer their commands as 
integral units. While this view was clearly expressed 



in Orders No. 69, June 4, 1863, reorganizing the Ar 
tillery, and while the Commander-in-Chief deprecated 
a clash of authority by reason of its misinterpretation, 
yet he was unwilling to destroy the old associations be 
tween the artillery battalions and the divisions with 
which they had so long served. These associations he 
regarded as a distinct asset. In this respect Gen. Long 
was overruled, and soon a better understanding ensued. 

A further effort was also now made to equalize the 
armament of batteries and the strength of the battalions, 
and as more horse batteries were needed, Alexander 
and Long were each called upon to recommend a bat 
tery for conversion, the first from Huger s, and the 
second from Hardaway s Battalion. Alexander was 
also called upon to use his influence to secure the as 
signment of King s Battalion, to the 1st Corps of the 
Army of Northern Virginia.* Longstreet had re 
turned to Virginia with his two divisions and Alex 
ander s own battalion some time before this and had gone 
into camp near Mechanicsburg, about six miles south of 
Gordonsville. The return of Longstreet s men, who 
had served with marked distinction in the West, was 
honored by their being reviewed by Gen. Lee, the first 
ceremony of the kind he had conducted since October, 
1862, when he reviewed his army in the Shenandoah 
Valley. Describing the scene, Gen. Alexander wrote: 
"It took place in a cleared valley with broad pastures, 
in which our two divisions of infantry, with my old bat 
talion of artillery, could be deployed. . . . It is 
now over 40 years, but in imagination I can see to-day 
the large square gate posts, without gate or fence, for 
troops had been everywhere in that vicinity, marking 
where a country road led out of a tall oak wood upon an 
open knoll in front of the centre of our long double lines. 
And as the well-remembered figure of Lee upon 
Traveller, at the head of his staff, rides between the 
posts and comes out upon the ground, the bugle sounds 

^Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXVI, Part II, pp. 944, 945. This battalion had 
been serving in Southwest Virginia in a different department. 



a signal, the guns thunder out a salute, Lee reins up 
Traveller and bares his good gray head and looks at us, 
and we give the rebel yell and shout and cry and wave 
our flags and look at him once more. For a wave of 
sentiment something like what came a year later at 
Appomattox, when he rode back from his meeting with 
Grant, seemed to sweep over the field. All felt the 
bond which held them together. There was no speaking, 
but the effect was as of a military sacrament." 

Many changes had occurred both in the artillery of 
ficers and the batteries in the Army during the winter 
and spring. Besides Griffin s 2d Maryland Horse Bat 
tery, Dement s and Brown s 1st and 4th Maryland 
batteries, the latter now under Lieut. W. S. Chew, had 
also been transferred to the Maryland line. Blount s, 
Caskie s, Macon s, and the Fauquier Battery, the latter 
now commanded by Marshall, had been transferred 
under Maj. J. P. W. Read to Whiting s Division, and 
Owen s Washington Artillery Battalion to Colquitt s 
Division, both on duty in the Department of North 
Carolina. Early in May, Col. H. P. Jones was assigned 
to the command of these two battalions. The remnants 
of the Louisiana Guard Battery had been sent to Rich 
mond for reorganization. 

On the 1st of May, the Artillery with the Army on 
the Rapidan was organized as follows: 


Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Artillery 


Lieut.-Col. Frank Huger 
Maj. Tyler C. Jordan 

Brooks (S. C.) Battery, Capt. William W. Fickling. 

Madison (La.) Battery, Capt. Geo. V. Moody. 

Richmond Battery, Capt. William W. Parker. 

Bedford Battery, Capt. J. D. Smith. 

Bath Battery, Capt. Esmond B. Taylor. 

Ashland Battery, Capt. Pichegru Woolfolk, Jr. 



Maj. John C. Haskell 
Maj. James Reilly 

Rowan (N. C.) Battery, Capt. John A. Ramsey. 

Palmetto (S. C.) Battery, Capt. Hugh R. Garden. 

Nelson (Va.) Battery, Capt. James N. Lamkin. 

Branch (N. C.) Battery, Capt. John R. Potts. 


Col. Henry Coalter Cabell 
Maj. S. P. Hamilton 

Battery "A", 1st N. C. Reg t, Capt. Basil C. Manly 

1st Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Edward S. McCarthy. 

Pulaski (Ga.) Battery, Lieut. Morgan Callaway. 

Troup (Ga.) Battery, Capt. Henry H. Carlton. 


Brig. -Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, Chief of Artillery 
Col. John Thompson Brown, Chief of First Division 

Lieut.-Col. Robert Archelaus Hardaway 

Powhatan Battery, Capt. Willis J. Dance. 

1st Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Archibald Graham. 

Salem Battery, Capt. Charles B. Griffin. 

2d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Lorraine F. Jones. 

8d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr. 


Lieut.-Col. William Nelson 
Maj. David Watson 

Amherst Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick. 

Fluvanna Battery, Capt. John L. Massie. 

Georgia Battery, Capt. John Milledge. 


Lieut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton 
Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman 

Alleghany Battery, Capt. John C. Carpenter. 

Stafford Battery, Capt. Raleigh L. Cooper. 

Lee Battery, Capt. William W. Hardwicke. 


Col. Thomas H. Carter, Chief of Second Division 

Maj. Wilfred E. Cutshaw 
Maj. Robert M. Stribling 

Charlottesville Battery, Capt. James McD. Carrington. 

Staunton Battery, Capt. Asher W. Garber. 

Richmond Courtney Battery, Capt. Wm. A. Tanner. 

Maj. Richard Channing Moore Page 

King William Battery, Capt. William P. Carter. 

Jeff Davis Alabama Battery, Capt. William J. Reese. 

Louisa Morris Battery, Lieut. . 

Richmond Orange Battery, Capt. Charles W. Fry. 


Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery 

Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague 
Maj. George Ward 

Madison (Miss.) Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Richards. 

Warrenton Battery, Capt. Addison W. Utterback. 

"C" Battery, 1st N. C. Reg t, Capt. Joseph Graham. 

Albemarle Battery, Capt. James W. Wyatt. 


Lieut.-Col. David Gregg Mclntosh 
Maj. Marmaduke Johnson 

Richmond Battery (Johnson s), Capt. Valentine J. Chilton. 

Danville Battery, Capt. Berryman Z. Price. 

2d Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Wm. K. Donald. 

Hardaway s Alabama Battery, Capt. Wm. B. Hurt. 


Lieut.-Col. Wm. Johnson Pegram 
Maj. Jos. McGraw 

Richmond Letcher Battery, Capt. Thomas A. Brander. 

Richmond Purcell Battery, Capt. George M. Cayce. 

Richmond Crenshaw Battery, Capt. Thomas Ellett. 


Pee Dee (S. C.) Battery, Capt. Wm. E. Zimmerman. 

Fredericksburg Battery, Capt. Edward A. Marye. 


Col. Allen S. Cutts 
Maj. John Lane 

"B" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Geo. M. Patterson. 
"A" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Hugh M. Ross. 
"C" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. John T. Wingfield. 


Maj. Charles Richardson 
Maj. M. B. Miller 

Norfolk L. A. Blues, Capt. Chas. R. Grandy. 

Donaldsonville (La.) Battery, Capt. R. Prosper Landry. 

Norfolk Battery, Capt. Jos. D. Moore. 

Pittsylvania Battery, Capt. Nathan Penick. 

Maj. Robert Preston Chew, Chief of Artillery 

Maj. James Breathed 

Washington (S. C.) Battery, Capt. James F. Hart. 

1st Stuart H. A. Battery, Capt. Philip Preston Johnston. 

2d Stuart H. A. Battery, Capt. Wm. M. McGregor. 

Lynchburg Beauregards, Capt. J. J. Shoemaker. 

Ashby Battery, Capt. James W. Thomson. 

With Ransom s Division near Petersburg was Lieut.- 
Col. C. E. Lightfoot s Battalion, consisting of 
Hankins Surry, Rives Nelson, and Thornton s Caro 
line batteries; with Hoke was Eshleman s Battalion 
consisting of Martin s, Owen s, and Payne s batteries; 
and at Chaffin s farm was Maj. A. W. Stark s Bat 
talion, consisting of Armistead s Mathews, and French s 
Giles batteries, Lieut.-Col. E. F. Moseley s Battalion 
of Gumming s and Miller s North Carolina, Staten s 
Georgia, and Young s Yorktown batteries, and Maj. 
J. C. Coit s Battalion of Bradford s Mississippi, Kelly s 
South Carolina, Pegram s Petersburg, and Wright s 
Halifax batteries. Including the eight batteries of 


Owen and Eshleman, with Colquitt and Whiting, and 
Green s Louisiana and Sturdivant s Albemarle batteries, 
unassigned, there were then not less than 26 field batter 
ies in the neighborhood of Richmond and Petersburg, 
while there were 52 light and 5 horse, or a total of 57 
field batteries with the Army on the Rapidan. With 
this army there were exactly 213 guns.* The artillery 
personnel numbered May 1st about 4,800 effectives. 
Deducting this number from the effective strength of 
the Army, and we have 213 guns for 57,000 infantry 
and cavalry, or a proportion of nearly 4 guns per thou 
sand men of the other arms. The proportion of horse 
guns to cavalry was exactly 2.5 per thousand, there be 
ing 8,000 troopers and 5 horse batteries of 4 guns each. 
At this time the effective strength of the Federal Army 
under Grant was about 119,000, including an artillery 
personnel of 10,210 and 318 guns, or a proportion of 
about 3 guns per 1,000 of the other arms. One must 
admire the ability of Lee to maintain so high a pro 
portion of artillery in spite of the seemingly insur 
mountable difficulties in his way. Yet his field army 
was outnumbered in guns by the enemy by nearly a 

*Rebellion Records, Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 1036. Gens. Humphreys and 
Alexander estimated that there were 224. 



BEFORE taking up the narrative of the next cam 
paign, it may be interesting to glance once more at the 
four senior artillery officers of the Army at the time the 
Artillery arm had attained its maximum efficiency in 
personnel, material, and organization. At the close of its 
third year, it was truly a formidable corps, though 
somewhat reduced in the number of its guns. With the 
purely military record of its commanders, we are al 
ready quite familiar, but what was the contemporary 
and what is a fair estimate of them at this time? 

Gen. William Nelson Pendleton, by far the senior 
in age as well as in rank among the officers of this arm, 
like Bishop Polk of the Western Army, entered the 
service of the Confederacy, as we have seen, from the 
service of the church. Born at Lexington, Virginia, 
December 23d, 1809, he was appointed a cadet at the 
United States Military Academy in 1826, graduating 
with his class. While at West Point he formed a lasting 
friendship with Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis. 
Assigned to the Artillery, he served one year in the 
garrison of Augusta, Ga., with the rank of second lieu 
tenant, and was then ordered back to the Academy as 
assistant professor of mathematics. Subsequent to this 
duty, he served with troops at Fort Hamilton, where he 
resigned in 1833 to accept the chair of mathematics at 
Bristol College, Pennsylvania, later becoming con 
nected with the faculty of Delaware College. In 1837, 
he became a clergyman in the Episcopal Church, in 
fluenced to enter the ministry by the spirit of revival, 
which reigned at West Point while he was a cadet, many 
of his school-day companions doing the same. When 
the war broke out, he was serving as rector of the Lex 
ington parish. His entrance into the Confederate 


military service as the original commander of the Rock- 
bridge Artillery has already been mentioned. 

While Gen. Pendleton possessed many virtues as an 
administrator, he lacked the dash requisite to popularity 
as a soldier. The officers and men of the Army knew 
little about his ceaseless activity in matters pertaining 
to the equipment and arming of his command. His 
constant attention to the care and preservation of the 
material and horses was practically unknown to them, 
nor are such things of a nature calculated to add to the 
reputation of a soldier. They are regarded as matters 
of course, and little interest is shown by the troops in 
them. Boldness and dash in the presence of the enemy 
appeal to the soldiery of an army. With such qualities 
an officer, entirely lacking in administrative ability and 
skill as an organizer, will acquire repute quite incom 
mensurate with his true merit. The faithful perform 
ance of the drudgery of the service adds little to the 
lustre of a military name. 

Pendleton was never conspicuous as a leader in battle, 
though, as we have shown, he was by no means lacking 
in courage. He was regarded from the first as slow and 
lacking in aggressive spirit, and his natural caution due 
to his age led to unfounded accusations. His name was 
unjustly coupled with the midnight route at Shepherds- 
town, after the battle of Sharpsburg, in an unpleasant 
way. Notwithstanding a court of inquiry, appointed to 
investigate the incident, clearly established the fact that 
no blame attached to him for his conduct on that oc 
casion, yet a military reputation is bound to suffer, even 
when unjustly involved in such an incident. In this 
case, the tongue of the scandal monger was simply set 
to wagging all the more. Unfortunately, Pendleton 
was again present and in command when the Artillery 
was withdrawn from the heights of Fredericksburg be 
fore Sedgwick s advance. Not only was he absolutely 
free of blame on this occasion, but as has been shown 
and testified to by Gen. Early, who was with him, the 
guns were removed over the protest of the Chief of Ar- 


tillery. The withdrawal on this occasion was the result 
of a serious mistake on the part of one of Gen. Lee s 
own staff officers. Pendleton s critics entirely over 
looked the fact that Early, who was really in command 
at Fredericksburg, withdrew his troops at the same time, 
yet no question ever arose over the conduct of Early. 
The readiness with which Pendleton s action was taken 
up and adversely discussed shows the sentiment in the 
Army with respect to him. The feeling was not un 
known to Pendleton. His staff officers got wind of the 
calumnies that were being circulated and very promptly 
informed him, in order that he might defend himself 
against such gross injustice. Gen. Pendleton at once 
addressed Gen. Lee upon the subject, with the result 
that he received the following letter from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, which should for all time dispose of 
any doubts as to the propriety of his conduct on this 

"ORANGE,, September 15, 1863. 

"GENERAL Your letter of 8th inst., inclosing one from Maj. 
Page, reached me at a time when I was pressed by business that 
had accumulated during my absence. I cannot now give the matter 
much attention, and have only been able to read partially Maj. 
Page s letter. I think the report of my dissatisfaction at your 
conduct is given upon small grounds, the statement apparently of 
your courier, upon whom I turned my back. I must acknowledge 
I have no recollection of the circumstances, or of anything upon 
which it could have been based. The guns were withdrawn from 
the heights of Fredericksburg under general instructions given by 
me. It is difficult now to say, with the after-knowledge of events, 
whether these instructions could, at the time, have been better 
executed, or whether if all the guns had remained in position, as 
you state there was not enough infantry supports for those retained, 
more might not have been captured. 

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"R. E. LEE, 


It would seem that Pendleton s critics did not know 
that some of the batteries, which were withdrawn in 
obedience to the order which Chilton transmitted er- 


roneously, had proceeded too far towards the rear to re 
turn in time to take part in the final action. They only 
knew a part of the story that is, that all the Artillery 
was withdrawn, and that some of it did not return.* 
What was known was sufficient, however, for those who 
were willing enough to put the worst construction on 
the affair. They took full account of Pendleton s haste 
to withdraw his guns, in obedience to the peremptory 
order he received, the tenor of which order they did not 
know, but they overlooked the haste with which he re 
turned to his position when the error in that order was 

The fact that Gen. Lee suggested the permanent 
retention of his Chief of Artillery in the West by Gen. 
Johnston while it certainly proves Pendleton was not 
indispensable to the Army of Northern Virginia, does 
not prove his services were not valued. The Artillery 
had gradually attained a corps organization under three 
most competent corps chiefs. These officers were not 
only administrative, but tactical commanders, and under 
their immediate control fell all the artillery of the 
Army. Very naturally Pendleton, whose duties had 
become in the process of evolution purely administra 
tive, could be better spared than Alexander, who was 
applied for by Johnston, or either of the other two 
tactical commanders, Long and Walker. It must not 
be thought, however, that Pendleton had become super 
fluous because no tactical command remained to him. 
One only need recall the splendid service he rendered the 
Artillery by that general supervision, which led in one 
instance to the creation of the remount department, and 
in another to the establishment of forage districts in the 
winter of 1863-64. The Artillery, in fact the Army, 
owed much to his foresight in innumerable matters of 
this character, which were quite beyond the province of 
the corps commanders and their chiefs of artillery. 

After everything is said in his favor that can be said, 
the fact remains that Gen. Pendleton, though admired 

*For foregoing incident see chapter on battle of Chancellorsville. 


by those who knew him for the integrity of his character, 
was not rated by the officers and men of the Army of 
Northern Virginia as an efficient field soldier. We be 
lieve, however, that it has been shown that he was far 
more efficient than he was thought to be by his con 
temporaries, who were generally ignorant of his true 
worth and services. In the popular and contemporary 
estimate of Pendleton, an element entered, the influence 
of which we can now fully appreciate. The delicate 
task of the various reorganizations of the Artillery from 
the beginning to the end of the war fell solely upon his 
shoulders. Promotion was necessarily very slow, and 
much discontent existed among officers really entitled by 
their services to reward, but for whom the number of 
vacancies at no time afforded promotion. Under such 
circumstances, dissatisfaction was as general as it was 
inevitable, and to Pendleton, whose recommendations 
were final, the malcontents of course attributed the fact 
that their merits were not recognized. His position was 
not an enviable one, and, lacking those qualities which 
enable a commander to silence the voice of the malcon 
tents under him by the brilliancy of his achievements, 
it was not strange that Pendleton s popularity as a 
soldier suffered. The old officer fully appreciated the 
unenviable character of the duty he was called upon 
to perform, but never once did he complain. He set 
about his task with the utmost resolution to perform it 
as best he could, and relieve Gen. Lee of as much of the 
burden of command as he could take upon himself. His 
recommendations, as we have seen, were invariably the 
result of the most careful consultation of the wishes of 
the corps and division commanders of the Army, and 
were never submitted until he had brought to bear upon 
the claims of all the most mature deliberation, with the 
result that the selections of the Chief of Artillery were 
quite generally believed by unprejudiced parties to be 
judicious and eminently fair in every respect. The 
knowledge on the part of Gen. Lee that Pendleton 
would allow no political or personal considerations to 


influence him in making his recommendations, was 
alone a sufficient reason for his retention as Chief of 
Artillery, especially since there was no necessity for his 
exercising a tactical command. It would indeed have 
been difficult to find another as conscientious and as 
free of all bias as was Pendleton. 

Personally Gen. Pendleton, so much like Gen. Lee 
in appearance, was a most lovable man. His influence 
for good in the Army was great, and never once, despite 
the asperities of war, did he lose sight of his mission as 
a minister of the gospel, for he was a Christian of the 
highest order, in fact as well as by profession. It is a 
well-authenticated fact that on more than one occasion 
his entrance into battle was preceded by an invocation 
of a blessing upon the enemy. It is related that at 
Haynesville, his first engagement, before giving the 
word of command to open fire he raised his hand aloft 
and in a loud voice, so that his men might hear, ex 
claimed: "May God have mercy upon their souls."* 

After the war, Gen. Pendleton, who had made a noble 
sacrifice to the cause in the loss of his only son, 
Col. A. S. Pendleton, returned to his pulpit in Lex 
ington, where he spent a part of his remaining years in 
close and constant companionship with his immortal 
leader. Together Pendleton and Lee ceaselessly 
labored, the one as rector, the other as a vestryman, in 
building up the Episcopal Parish of their community. 
Outliving Gen. Lee some years, Pendleton died Janu 
ary 25, 1883, and, like his former commander and de 
voted friend, is buried in Lexington, beside his son, 
and within the shadow of Jackson s monument. 

Brig.-Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, next in order 
of seniority to Pendleton in the Artillery, was an of 
ficer of exceptional merit and high accomplishments. 
Born in Campbell County, Virginia, September 3, 
1825, he was graduated from the United States Mili- 

*When asked if this were true by a brother minister, the Rev. Mr. Royce, 
now rector of New Windsor Parish on the Hudson, Gen. Pendleton admitted 
that it was. Thus the incident seems to be without the vale of mere tradition. 
The Rev. W. N. Pendleton was granted the degree of Doctor of Divinity in 1868. 


tary Academy in the Class of 1850. On duty as a 
second lieutenant in the 2d Artillery at Fort Moultrie 
for two years, he was then promoted first lieutenant, 
serving for the next nine years on the frontier of New 
Mexico, at Barrancas Barracks, Fort McHenry, Fort 
Monroe, and taking part in the various Indian cam 
paigns in Indian Territory, Kansas, and Nebraska. 
When the crisis between the States arrived, he was on 
duty at Augusta, Georgia, from which point he was 
transferred to the National Capital, where he resigned 
his commission June 10, 1861, after 11 years of service. 
While in the Old Army, he had been placed under Capt. 
Hunt, later Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, 
for special instruction, and under the tutelage of that 
able artillerist he had acquired an exceptional knowledge 
of the theory as well as the practice of gunnery. He 
also served, in 1860, as aide on Gen. E. V. Sumner s 

An interesting anecdote concerning Gen. Hunt 
and Long may here be recounted. At Appomattox 
Gen. Hunt sought out Gen. Long to render him such 
services as he could. In the course of their conversa 
tion, Hunt told his old friend that he was not satisfied 
with the artillery preparation at Gettysburg, inasmuch 
as he, Long, had not done justice to his instruction; that 
the Confederate batteries, instead of concentrating their 
fire on the point of attack, were scattered over the whole 
field. Long was much amused at the criticism of his 
former tutor and said: "I remembered my lessons at 
the time, and when the fire became so scattered won 
dered what you would think about it." 

Repairing to Richmond immediately after resigning 
from the Old Army, he accepted a commission as Maj. 
of Artillery in the Confederate service, and soon ac 
companied Gen. Loring in the capacity of Chief of Ar 
tillery to West Virginia.* After this service in the 
Trans-Alleghany Department, he was assigned in the 

Resigned June 1, 1861 ; reached Richmond July 18, on which day he was 
appointed Major of Artillery. 


fall of 1861 to duty under Gen. Lee as chief -of -staff in 
the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Florida. When Gen. Lee was given command of the 
Army of Northern Virginia Long was appointed his 
military secretary with the rank of colonel. In this 
capacity he was recognized as the artillery expert of 
Gen. Lee s staff, and rendered valuable service in con 
nection with the Artillery at Fredericksburg, Chancel- 
lorsville, and Gettysburg. In his professional ability 
and special knowledge of artillery Gen. Lee reposed 
great confidence, and it is readily seen that his assign 
ment to tactical command was most acceptable to Army 
Headquarters. His preferment over Col. Brown as 
Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps was not viewed at 
headquarters as a slight in any sense to that officer, and 
as he ranked Alexander and Walker, and held his com 
mission in the Artillery, his prior appointment to them 
as brigadier-general was not a technical promotion over 
their heads. Yet, in a sense, his preferment over Alex 
ander, Walker, and Brown especially, was felt to be at 
the time not wholly justifiable, in spite of his eminent 
ability and long service. This was most natural, since 
he had not been so thoroughly identified with the Ar 
tillery as they and others had been. It was the old story 
of the claims of line officers and staff officers. The 
former always feel that active duty with troops entitles 
them to more consideration than officers, even superior 
in rank, whose service has been principally on the staff. 
In the selection of Long for Chief of Artillery of the 
2d Corps, the personal equation undoubtedly entered, 
and such influences must never be lost sight of in the 
consideration of army, as well as other appointments. 
It must also be remembered that his service in the Old 
Army had been longer than that of any other artillery 
officer of the Confederate Army. 

Thirty-nine years of age at the time of his appoint 
ment as brigadier-general, he was six feet tall and of 
handsome and commanding presence. His hair was 
dark, and his complexion swarthy. A small military 


mustache gave him a decided French appearance. In 
manner Gen. Long was most affable, even gentle, but 
beneath his pleasing exterior there lay a sternness of 
character apparent to all. Of wide intellectual attain 
ments and rare culture, he was perhaps one of the most 
profound military scholars in the Army. He certainly 
had no superior in the Confederacy in the theoretical 
knowledge of his special arm, and beside was a tactician 
of exceptional merit. As an organizer, he was superior 
to Alexander, and probably the equal of Walker, but 
he lacked the unusual dash of the former. We believe 
it is a fair estimate of Gen. Long to say that taken all 
in all he was one of the most accomplished officers in the 
Army of Northern Virginia. 

As to his personal character, no one who has read his 
Memoirs of Gen. Lee, the best military historial work 
of the kind yet written, can entertain a doubt. Bereft 
of his eyesight after the war and at the time this 
splendid work was written, he displayed in its prepara 
tion the most remarkable patience and persistence, and 
evidenced a lack of bias and prejudice equalled by few 
writers on the war. It also testifies to the careful mental 
training of the author, and his wide knowledge of the 
military science in all its branches.* Gen. Lee enter 
tained a high regard for him as evidenced by the fol 
lowing testimonial written after the war: "Gen. A. L. 
Long entered the Confederate service in 1861, and has 
served continuously till the surrender of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, April 9, 1865. His conduct during 
that time has been marked by zeal and gallantry. ..." 

Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery 3d 
Corps, was the last to attain the rank of brigadier- 

*After the war closed, Gen. Long was appointed Chief Engineer of the 
James River and Kanawha Canal Company. In 1869 he lost his eyesight from 
injuries received from the explosion of a caisson in the service, and subsequent 
exposure. He then removed to Charlottesville, where he resided until his death, 
April 29, 1891. It was during the last twenty years of his life that he wrote 
his Memoirs of General Lee, which were published in 1886. He also wrote 
reminiscences of his own career, a comparative sketch of Stonewall and Andrew 
Jackson, and a History of America in the Seventeenth Century. By reason of 
his infirmity, he was compelled to use a slate prepared for the use of the blind, 
and to depend upon the members of his familv and on his friends for much 
assistance. Under all these disadvantages he labored on uncomplainingly, record 
ing the history of his immortal leader of whom he was a most devoted admirer, 
cheerful and courageous to the end. 


general in Lee s Artillery. He was born on his paternal 
estate, Logan, Albemarle County, Virginia, May 29, 
1827, and was therefore about the same age as his kins 
man, Gen. Long. In his veins flowed the best blood of 
the Old Dominion, being a son of Capt. Lewis Walker, 
and a descendant of forebears who had been prominent 
in the early settlement of the western part of the State. 
By every influence of blood, environment, and tra 
dition, he was trained to be a leader of his fellows, and 
was perhaps the most picturesque figure in Lee s 
Army. Of immense frame and exceptionally broad 
shoulders, he was as handsome in figure as in counte 
nance. Six feet four inches or more in height, his hair 
was long and dark, and a sweeping mustache and im 
perial beard added to his soldierly appearance. Above 
all he was a superb horseman and seemed to have been 
born to the saddle in spite of his immense stature. In 
repose his face wore a grave expression, and a piercing 
black eye, capable of great intensity, enhanced the indi 
viduality of his features. His brow was massive and 
his head sat gracefully upon his shoulders. Looking 
into his handsome face, no man could doubt the deter 
mination and the will-power which animated and char 
acterized his being. In manner Walker was not par 
ticularly alert, and while by no means dull, his mind was 
not an active one. In physical hardihood, fixity of pur 
pose, dogged determination, and dauntless courage, he 
was unexcelled by any officer in the Army. But while 
he was bold, he cannot be said to have possessed the dash 
of Alexander, Pelham, Pegram, Chew, or Breathed, or 
the intellectual brilliance of Long and Alexander. His 
forte was organization, and it was generally conceded 
that he had throughout the war the best organized ar 
tillery in the Army, whether it were a battery, a bat 
talion, or a corps division under his command. His 
character was distinguished by great integrity, resolu 
tion and devotion to duty. His admiration for and 
confidence in Gen. Lee were unbounded, and few 
soldiers were ever as much beloved by officers and men 



under their command as was Reuben Lindsay Walker. 
Upon being asked to give his estimate of Walker as a 
soldier, his old adjutant, Capt. William W. Chamber- 
laine, declared that in addition to Gen. Walker s ability 
as an organizer, his most striking characteristics were 
his intuitive knowledge of country, his appreciation of 
terrain, and his ability to select and occupy the best 
available positions for his guns and then to hold them 
with great pertinacity. From this, one sees how his ex 
perience as an engineer stood him in good stead as a 

The following incident well illustrates Walker s 
character. As a cadet at the Virginia Military Insti 
tute, where he was graduated with the Class of 1845, he 
had for three years committed every offense, short of 
one which would have resulted in his dismissal. Gen. 
Smith, the Superintendent, narrates that he sought to 
reduce him to good order and submission in many ways. 
Threats, penalties, and punishments of the severest 
nature only sufficed to confirm the imperious youth in 
his course of utter disregard of all regulations. Ad 
miring the young man for his lovable nature, his superb 
physique, and his unflinching courage in adversity, the 
Superintendent at last sought to appeal to his pride by 
appointing him a lieutenant in his first class year. From 
that time on, Cadet Walker was an example of all that 
was conscientious, dutiful and soldierly. Never once 
did he prove derelict in the discharge of the trust re 
posed in him. And this may be said of his career as an 
officer in the Army. 

Walker followed the profession of Civil Engineer 
ing until the outbreak of the war. Visiting Richmond 
in February, 1861, he was promptly seized upon by Mr. 
Purcell, a patriotic citizen, who had undertaken to re 
cruit and equip a light battery at his own expense, and 
placed in command of it. Not even was Capt. Walker 
permitted to return to his home, then at New Kent 
Courthouse, but he was hustled off with the famous Pur- 


cell Battery to Aquia Creek, without even bidding his 
wife farewell. From the day of this unceremonious de 
parture for the front, he had never had a day s leave of 
absence from his command, and when next he met his 
wife he was introduced to a child nearly a year old which 
had been born to his wife in his absence. Such was the 
fortitude of both men and women in those days. But 
this particular mother had suffered separation enough 
from her husband. From thenceforth she accompanied 
her soldier husband in the field. Mrs. Walker s ambu 
lance and mules, driven by a faithful white retainer, was 
a familiar sight to the men of the Army of Northern 
Virginia. From battlefield to battlefield she moved with 
the ammunition trains, often bivouacking with her 
children along the roadsides in her improvised house on 
wheels, when the neighborhood afforded no shelter in the 
homes of friends and relatives. In her determination 
to remain close to her husband s side, not only did she 
accept all the hardships of campaign, but she also added 
a new member to her family. For a brief space only did 
this Spartan mother desert her husband in the midst of 
the perils of war. She followed him to the end, ready 
to carry his stricken body from the field, or minister to 
him in sickness and disease. On one occasion while her 
driver was absent Mrs. Walker s team of horses was 
impressed by a not-overscrupulous Confederate team 
ster. Other horses could not be purchased, but so in 
sistent was the good lady that means of transport be 
secured for her ambulance, that soon her faithful re 
tainer appeared with a fine pair of mules branded with 
the familiar "U. S." It has never been explained 
whence they came. 

Strange to say that with all this loving care and con 
stant attendance on the part of his wife, Walker was 
never once wounded, in the sixty-three engagements in 
which he participated during the war, nor was he in 
valided at any time. In latter years he even grew 
sensitive to the inquiry. "Why General, not wounded 
in the war?" Invariably he would draw himself up to 


the full height of the giant that he was, and, squaring his 
massive shoulders, reply, "No, sir, and it was not my 

And now we come to Alexander, who among the 
senior officers was the artilleryman par excellence of 
Lee s Army, though third in rank in his arm. A 
graduate of West Point in the Class of 1857, his service 
in the Engineer Corps, then as Commandant of the 
Corps of Cadets and instructor of gunnery, his service 
on the plains and in connection with the development 
of the Myer signal system, we are already familiar with, 
as well as with his early service in the Confederacy, first 
as artillery instructor, then as signal officer on Beaure- 
gard s staff, and then as Chief of Ordnance of the Army 
of Northern Virginia. To repeat, entering the Con 
federate service April 3, 1861, as a captain, at the age 
of 24 years, he was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of 
artillery in December, 1861, and colonel a year later. 
After the most distinguished service in every battle from 
Fredericksburg to date, he was commissioned brigadier- 
general of artillery February 26, 1864. 

Although Alexander had accompanied Longstreet to 
Tennessee, and served in the capacity of his Chief of 
Artillery in the Knoxville campaign, not having reached 
Chickamauga with his battalion in time to participate 
in the battle, he was in fact, up to the time of his pro 
motion, the inferior in rank of Colonels Walton and 
Cabell, though of the same grade with them. But while 
their inferior, he had for some time practically directed 
the tactical employment of the artillery of his corps. 

* Surrendering with the army at Appomattox, Walker, who was promoted 
Brigadier-General of Artillery in January, 1865, retired to private life as a 
farmer, with a record of having participated in sixty-three engagements during 
the four years of his military service. In 1872 he removed to Selma, Ala., 
where he was Superintendent of the Marine and Selma Railroad. In 1876 he 
returned to Virginia in the employment of the Richmond and Danville Railroad, 
and was later Superintendent of the Richmond Street Railway Company. Soon 
he was engaged as constructing engineer of the Richmond and Alleghany Rail 
road, or the present James River Division of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway. 
In 1884 he became superintendent of construction of the Texas State Capitol, and 
resided at Austin until 1888. Much scandal in connection with the previous 
management of the work led the authorities to place it in his hands, by reason 
of his known integrity. He was handsomely rewarded for the faithfulness and 
efficiency with which he discharged the trust. He died at his home, "Point of 
Forks," on the James River. June 7, 1890, where he spent the last two years of 
his life as a farmer. 


At Fredericksburg, he was the directing genius of 
Longstreet s defense. It was there, in referring to the 
positions of his guns on Marye s Hill, that he remarked 
to his corps commander: "We cover that ground so 
well, that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A 
chicken could not live on that field when we open on 
it." And as has been seen, Alexander s forecast was 
quite fulfilled. Again at Gettysburg where Col. Wal 
ton, his senior, and the nominal Chief of Artillery, was 
present, Alexander was in complete control of the Ar 
tillery in the fight. On former occasions, his recognized 
ability had merely enabled him to influence the disposi 
tion of the artillery under Walton s immediate control, 
but at Gettysburg we find him as a junior officer 
actually in command, while his senior was present and 
participating in the battle. This has always seemed a 
remarkable anomaly, not so much as to the wisdom of 
it, but that Walton would consent to it. A careful in 
vestigation and study of the matter discloses that it 
came about in the following way : Col. Walton was old, 
and physically unequal to the exertions of the campaign. 
Though a meritorious officer, of dauntless courage, and 
with a fine military record, he now lacked the energy 
to keep pace with events. Already one of his former 
battery commanders, Eshleman, had supplanted him as 
active leader of the celebrated Washington Artillery 
Battalion. Longstreet knew Walton s capabilities full 
well, and while he retained the gallant old officer as 
Chief of Artillery of his corps, both for political and 
personal reasons, he did not feel that he would be justi 
fied in committing the tactical leadership of the ar 
tillery to his hands, for those or any other considera 
tions. In the movement upon Gettysburg, Walton s 
Battalion was held back, whether intentionally or not 
cannot be determined, but at any rate, Alexander ar 
rived on the field some time in advance of Walton and 
was placed in charge of the artillery already up. An 
important mission was entrusted to him, and upon its 
discharge the young officer had already entered when 


his senior arrived. The situation was such that when 
Walton did come up, no consideration of rank could 
be allowed to jeopardize the success of the battle al 
ready under way. Such arguments were unanswerable, 
and however chagrined Col. Walton may have felt, he 
was powerless to deny the force of the circumstances 
which debarred him from the exercise of the tactical 
command to which his rank entitled him. That he was 
chagrined is quite well established by the verbal testi 
mony of his contemporaries and his own letters, and it 
was not long before he expressed the desire to be trans 
ferred to service at Mobile. In justice to the old of 
ficer, his wish should have been instantly complied with. 
In fact, he should have been given the opportunity to 
transfer, before being publicly overslaughed. But he 
was retained on the roll of the 1st Corps, and after be 
ing gradually sidetracked by being assigned to duty as 
Inspector- General of Artillery at Large and placed on 
detached duty, relinquished his commission in the 1st 
Corps July 8, 1864. 

From the time of his first appearance in the Artillery, 
in fact in the Army, young Alexander was a marked 
man and one destined to attain preeminence in his arm. 
Rapidly he acquired a reputation which extended far 
beyond the Army in which he was actually serving. 
First Jackson sought to have him appointed a general 
officer in the infantry, then Johnston urged his transfer 
to the Western Army, with advanced rank. But he 
was too well appreciated in the Army of Northern Vir 
ginia to permit of his loss. Stephen D. Lee might be 
spared to the far South, but not Alexander to the West. 
The young Georgian was needed in Virginia. 

In appearance, Alexander did not present so fine a 
military figure as did Long and Walker. Of about 
the average height, and of muscular build, yet he was 
by no means a handsome man. In fact, his features 
were rather irregular, and the scraggly, ill-shapen beard, 
which his youth afforded, failed to hide a decidedly 
ugly mouth. But his eye was bright and penetrating, 


and about the man, both in his general appearance and 
carriage, was the unmistakable evidence of high breed 
ing and exceptional intellect, and these appearances did 
not belie the facts, for he was the scion of a noble stock, 
and brilliant beyond his years. To the latter fact, his 
whole career at West Point and in the Old Army testi 
fies. No man becomes an engineer officer and the Com 
mandant of the Corps of Cadets at the United States 
Military Academy unless he possesses rare qualities of 
mind and heart combined. 

In manner, Alexander was active and alert, and his 
whole character was vibrant with intenseness. Strong 
in likes and prejudices, he was yet most amiable and 
possessed the traits which make men socially popular. 
As an officer, he was quick to estimate the situation be 
fore him, prompt to direct, and inexorably firm in hold 
ing his subordinates to their duty. He possessed won 
derful personal magnetism, and transmitted much of his 
own enthusiasm and spirit to his subordinates. Above all 
things, he detested delay. Full of dash and the love of 
responsibility, he perhaps expected too much of others, 
in this respect forgetting that few men possessed that 
elan which characterized himself. His was a nature which 
loved prompt action; he liked rapidity of motion; any 
thing that savoured of slowness, of lack of energy, of ex 
cessive deliberation, provoked him sorely. His mind was 
the kind that had figured out and matured the plans in 
advance which most men pause to consider when the 
time for action comes. He courted favor from no one, 
and while immensely energetic and ambitious he was yet 
able to forego an offered advancement in another arm 
in the evident knowledge that he was needed in his own. 
Endowed with such a nature and exuberant with 
vigorous youth, it was natural that he should have 
chafed at the shortcomings of others, for in his genuine 
lack of vanity he was unable to appreciate the fact that 
he himself was not like other men. He invariably meas 
ured others by his own standard, and few came up to it. 
This habit made him rather critical, and he never hesi- 


tated to express his views, hit whom they did, but he was 
never disloyal to Gen. Lee, nor to the memory of Gen. 
Longstreet. In fact, his devotion to the latter carried 
him, in an attempt to defend his old corps commander, 
beyond the limits of sound reasoning, as one who 
studies his book, in other respects a masterpiece of 
critical analysis, will discover.* Like Long, his writ 
ings prove him to be a man of exceptional intellect, a 
wide student of war and human nature, and to have 
possessed a remarkable lack of bias. In his memoirs, 
much after-acquired information was of course brought 
to bear upon the solution of the military problems of 
the war, however conscientiously he may have sought to 
view things from a contemporary standpoint. The 
author was a much wiser man when he wrote his book 
than when he was actually confronted by the problems 
which others were called upon to solve, but no one is 
misled by his sagacity after the event, for it is not 
difficult to distinguish between his contemporaneous 
foresights, and the maturer reflections of the author, or 
his hindsights. 

Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, age 27 years, 
was a soldier, who, had he served Napoleon, would have 
been rewarded by a baton, for he possessed those 
soldierly characteristics so dear to the Emperor. He was 
far and away the superior of all others in his arm, whose 
opportunity was equal to his own. Like Gen. Hunt of 
the Federal Army, he was preeminent in the Artillery 
of his army. His opportunities were never equal to 
those of Senarmont and Drouot, for even Gettysburg 
cannot properly be compared to Friedland and Wa- 
gram; the tactical combinations were so different that 
the number of guns engaged forms no basis for com 
parison. Nevertheless, as written by Maj. May, R. H. 
A., the names of Hunt and Alexander are as worthy of 
remembrance as are those of the two great artillerists of 
the Grand Army. Then, too, it must be remembered 

*Military Memoirs of a Confederate, published by Charles Scribner s Sons 
in 1908. 


that Alexander had no leader who held him always in 
hand, prepared to throw his masses of guns into action, 
as did Napoleon at the crisis of the combat, thus en 
abling the Artillery to reap the fame of victory, when 
the way to inevitable success had been carefully paved. 
On the contrary he, like the other artillery commanders, 
while given a free hand, was always expected to shoulder 
a burden from the first, which precluded the more 
brilliant maneuvers of the battlefields of the French. 
Their services were none the less valuable; they simply 
show in a different light. The issue largely depended 
on the efforts of the Confederate artillerymen, but no 
great reserve masses existed to be employed at the psy 
chological instant, and win for their leaders the credit of 
having capped the climax, so to speak.* 

From now on, the historical narrative of events will 
trace the military careers of Lee s senior artillerymen 
subsequent to the period of which we write. The fore 
going discussion of their characters should give a better 
insight into the affairs of the Artillery in general. 

*General Alexander, as we shall see, played a leading role in the Artillery 
until the close of the War. After the Surrender at Appomattox, he became 
Professor of Mathematics and of Civil and Military Engineering at the Univer 
sity of South Carolina, in which position he served from January, 1866, to 
October, 1869. He then became President of the Columbia Oil Company. In 
May, 1871, he became Superintendent of the Charlotte and Augusta Railroad, 
and in October, 1871, President of the Savannah and Memphis Railroad. In 
1875 he became President and General Manager of the Western Railroad of 
Alabama, and of the Georgian Railroad and Banking Company. He was Vice- 
President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad from 1880 to 1882, Capital 
Commissioner of the State of Georgia from 1883 to 1888, and from 1887 to 
1893 President of the Central Railroad and Banking Company, and the Ocean 
Steamship Company. He wrote a valuable treatise on Railroad Practice. His 
death occurred in 1911. 



FOR six months the hostile armies had confronted each 
other along the Rapidan, and every man in both knew 
that the next campaign was to be the most serious one 
yet conducted. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who had been 
called from the West to take supreme command of the 
Federal forces, arrived in Virginia in March, establish 
ing his headquarters at Culpeper Courthouse on the 
26th. He had been by far the most successful Federal 
commander up to that time, and possessed an iron de 
termination, which, coupled with the unlimited military 
resources placed at his disposal, served to revive the 
spirits of the North. Furthermore, his selection was a 
guarantee to those who knew him that military opera 
tions would be conducted from Army headquarters and 
not by the President, his cabinet, the press, and the 
politicians of the North. 

Grant s strategy cannot be discussed here. Suffice it 
to say that his general plan was well formulated and 
it contemplated the thorough cooperation of the various 
Federal armies under his control, with a definite end in 
view. While that end was the subjugation of the South 
in the shortest possible time, the objective of the Army 
of the Potomac, under the immediate command of 
Meade, was the Army of Northern Virginia, and in 
directly Richmond, since the two were by circumstances 
almost inseparably identified. Previous commanders 
had failed to appreciate the fundamental strategic prin 
ciple that an enemy s capital must fall with the army 
which defends it, wherever that army may be. This fact 
was not ignored by Grant. 

When Grant took charge the situation in Virginia 
was as follows: West Virginia was in the hands of the 
North, and all that part of old Virginia north of the 
Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge. On the sea-coast, 


Butler with the Army of the James, numbering about 
30,000 men, held Fort Monroe and Norfolk. In North 
Carolina, the Federals held Plymouth, Washington, 
and New Berne, from which points Richmond could 
also be threatened. The 9th Corps under Burnside, 
20,000 strong, was soon rendezvoused at Annapolis, 
Maryland, from which point it could reinforce Meade or 
operate independently along the coast. 

Longstreet s Corps was at Gordonsville, Swell s 
along the south bank of the Rapidan above Mine Run, 
and Hill s on his left, and higher up the river. The Con 
federate line was partially intrenched in position. Gen. 
Lee s headquarters were two miles northeast of Orange 
Courthouse. Meade s Army, consisting of Hancock s, 
Warren s, and Sedgwick s, or the 2d, 5th and 6th 
Corps, lay along the north bank of the Rapidan. The 
Army of the Potomac had never been so thoroughly 
equipped before, nor as powerful as a fighting machine. 
It was lavishly supplied with all a rich country could 
give it. The Army of Northern Virginia, on the other 
hand, little more than half as large as its persistent 
antagonist, was practically devoid of everything in the 
way of clothing and supplies. Its arms and the temper 
of the veterans which wielded them were, however, per 
haps never better. Such was the situation on the 2d 
of May, when Gen. Lee with the utmost confidence ex 
amined with his glasses from Clark s Mountain on the 
south side of the Rapidan the Federal lines on the op 
posite bank. 

Meade s activity in the direction of the upper fords 
had not deceived Lee for an instant, and on the 3d of 
May the Federals were discovered moving to his right, 
just as he had predicted they would be. He at once 
prepared to move upon Meade s flank with his whole 
force as soon as the enemy crossed the Rapidan and 
became entangled in the Spotsylvania Wilderness, 
through which the route selected by Grant lay. Again 
was Lee willing to forego the defense of a natural ob 
stacle, which could in time be turned by superior num- 


bers, in order to avail himself of the great advantage of 
a most difficult terrain, which he knew to be a terra 
incognita to his adversary. And again did the Fed 
erals play into his hands by entangling themselves in 
the gloomy wilderness, thus, in a measure, at least, neu 
tralizing their numerical superiority. 

The Army of the Potomac began to cross the Rapi- 
dan at noon, May 3, its way having been prepared by 
Sheridan s Cavalry. Bridges were laid in advance at 
Germanna, Ely s, and at Culpeper Mine fords, cover 
ing a front of about seven miles. Hancock, preceded by 
Gregg s Cavalry, crossed at Ely s Ford, and moved to 
Chancellorsville, which placed him on the left ; Warren, 
with Wilson s Cavalry in front, followed by Sedgwick, 
crossed at Germanna Ford and followed the Germanna 
Plank Road, due southeast, to Wilderness Tavern. 
Sedgwick encamped for the night three miles south of 
the river. In these positions Meade s corps remained 
until 2 p. M. of the 5th, while the 65 miles of trains were 
crossing at Germanna and Culpeper Mine fords, the 
movement of which was more difficult than anticipated, 
and to which fact the unexpected delay in the advance 
was attributed. The situation was now about as fol 
lows: Near the Lacy house, where Grant, Meade, and 
Warren had established their headquarters, there were 
two roads, the Orange Turnpike on the right or south, 
and the Orange Plank Road on the north or left, both 
following the general direction of the river from 
Orange Courthouse to Fredericksburg and nearly 
parallel to each other. The route of the Federal Army 
lay directly across the two roads along the western 
border of the Spotsylvania Wilderness. When the 
Confederates gained contact with the Federal advance, 
Sedgwick s Corps in general occupied the Germanna, 
and Hancock s the Brock Road, while Warren s oc 
cupied the space within the obtuse angle made by the 

About noon on the 4th of May, Lee put Ewell s 
Corps in motion along the Orange Turnpike, while 


A. P. Hill with two divisions moved along the Orange 
Plank Road. The two divisions of Longstreet s Corps, 
in camp near Gordonsville, were ordered to move 
rapidly across the country and follow Hill s advance. 

It was apparent from the first that the terrain se 
lected by Lee for his initial operations would afford no 
opportunity for the effective employment of the Ar 
tillery, but instant steps were taken to bring it up and 
assemble it from its widely dispersed camps. 

In the 1st Corps, Huger s Battalion which was re 
cruiting at Cobham Depot, Haskell s Battalion, also 
in camp at that point, and Cabell s Battalion at Mor 
ton s Ford, where it had been on picket duty during the 
winter, were ordered on the 4th to rendezvous at 
Richard s Shop, where they arrived late in the night on 
the 5th, and at 3 A. M. on the 6th they marched for 
Parker s Store on the Plank Road in rear of the Army. 
Gen. Long s five battalions which had wintered at 
Frederick Hall, and which later in the spring had 
been moved to grazing camps near Liberty Mills in 
Orange County, also received orders to march on the 
4th, and were concentrated early on the 5th at Locust 
Grove on the turnpike in rear of Ewell s Infantry. 
Walker, with four battalions of the 3d Corps, left Cob- 
ham and Lindsay depots on the 4th, and bivouacked 
that night near Verdierville, joining Hill on the 5th and 
accompanying Heth and Wilcox down the Plank Road. 
Cutts Battalion of this corps, which had been on picket 
duty during the winter in the neighborhood of Rapidan 
Station, was directed to remain with Anderson s Divi 
sion, which constituted the rear guard of the Army. 
The five batteries of the Horse Artillery which had 
wintered at Charlottesville and then moved to Gordons 
ville, were now operating with Stuart on Lee s right, 
and were constantly engaged in harassing the enemy s 
advance. The batteries had been ordered up from camp 
on the 4th, and most of them were engaged the next day 
with Rosser on the Catharpin Road. 


The rapid concentration of the Artillery at the front 
was effected in a most creditable manner, and is suffi 
cient evidence of the high state of efficiency of the arm 
at this time. Nothing so tests the metal of field artillery 
as long and rapid marching. In this instance it was 
assembled without a hitch of any kind, every battalion 
moving as if by clockwork. One need only measure 
on the map the distances covered by the various bat 
teries between the 4th and 5th of May to appreciate 
the celerity of their movements. Suffice it to say that 
many of the batteries covered 30 miles or more in less 
than 24 hours, all finding their appointed positions with 
out mishap of any kind. 

Swell s Corps was the first to gain close contact with 
the enemy. As it advanced along the turnpike on the 
morning of the 5th, the Federal column was seen cross 
ing the road from the direction of Germanna Ford. 
Ewell had been instructed to regulate his advance by 
the head of Hill s column, which Stuart was to lead to 
the south of him, and not to bring on a general engage 
ment until Longstreet arrived. Promptly forming 
Johnson s Division across the road, he refrained from 
provoking the enemy, and communicated with Lee, who 
was still with Hill, but the position he occupied was on 
the flank of the Federal line of march, and very 
naturally such a collision soon led to active hostilities. 
Warren, whose troops were passing when Ewell came 
upon them, halted them and, turning to the right, made 
a vigorous attack upon Johnson s Division, with which 
Nelson s Battalion of artillery had been deployed. 
Milledge s Battery in front of Jones Brigade on the 
right of the road was soon withdrawn when the infantry 
support was forced to fall back about two miles to the 
Flat Run Road, where it intersects the turnpike. Jones 
was roughly handled, but Steuart s Brigade was pushed 
forward and Rodes Division was thrown in on its right, 
south of the road. When the line was thus reestablished, 
the Confederates pressed forward vigorously and, after 
desperate fighting in the dense woods which hid friends 


and foe alike, drove back the enemy. Swell s entire 
corps had now come up, Johnson s Division across the 
turnpike, Rodes on his right, and Early in reserve. 
Few practicable positions were available for ar 
tillery, but Nelson had placed some of his guns on a 
commanding ridge with a small field in their front on 
the right and about a mile from the Lacy house. Two 
of his guns were also placed on the road leading to the 
Germanna Road to operate with the infantry of the 
left wing. In these positions the Artillery rendered 
such aid as it could in repelling the attacks of the Fed 
erals during the afternoon. 

Soon after Warren s repulse, Sedgwick moved up to 
his right to oppose Early, who moved into the front line 
and, supported by several of Nelson s guns, clung to his 
position on the Federal flank, in spite of every effort to 
dislodge him. The Federal efforts continued until 

The collision with Ewell at first led Meade to believe 
Lee had only left a division to oppose his progress, and 
to impose upon him while the main army was being con 
centrated across his path on the North Anna, but when 
Hill s advance was also discovered on the Plank Road, 
Meade abandoned his original view. It was but a short 
time after Ewell became engaged when Hill struck the 
Federal outposts near Parker s Store, just at the edge 
of the Wilderness, and drove them in upon Sedgwick s 
column which was moving along the Stevensburg and 
Brock roads to Spotsylvania Courthouse. Heth s Di 
vision, followed by the corps artillery with Poague s 
Battalion in the lead, first encountered the enemy s 
cavalry, whereupon Richards Battery was thrown for 
ward and assisted in driving in the outposts. The head 
of Hill s column reached an opening on the left of the 
Plank Road at midday, at a point about two miles from 
its intersection with the Brock Road, and was halted. 
From the ridge occupied by Heth, the enemy was seen 
in force to the north and dispositions were at once made 
for an encounter. The small clearing on the ridge af- 


forded the only practicable position for artillery. There, 
near the Widow Tabb s house, Gen. Pendleton, after 
consultation with the Commander-in- Chief, established 
Poague s Battalion. Poague moved one of his pieces 
down the road a few hundred yards and placed it in 
line with Heth s Infantry. This, as will be seen later, 
was most fortunate for the Confederates. 

Immediately upon discovering Hill s presence, Meade 
recalled Hancock s Corps, which was marching from 
Chancellorsville to Spotsylvania Courthouse, and at 
4 P. M. Hancock was ordered to drive Hill "out of the 
Wilderness," which he had entered. Wilcox was 
brought up to Heth s support and then ensued a 
desperate encounter between the individuals of both 
sides. Division, brigade, regimental, and even com 
pany leading was out of the question. At no time were 
more than a handful of men in sight from any one point, 
and the troops simply fell upon each other and locked 
in a death embrace, as chance directed their steps. As 
darkness approached, the flashing muskets alone marked 
the contending and intermingled lines. But never once 
was the road occupied in force by the enemy, for 
Poague s single piece, with the gallant battalion com 
mander himself beside it, swept the approach and com 
pletely dominated it from first to last. The battalion 
from its position on the ridge was practically debarred 
from participating in the struggle, as its fire would 
have been as dangerous to friend as to foe in that seeth 
ing cauldron which boiled beneath its muzzles. Mean 
while the other battalions of the 3d Corps were held in 
the immediate rear of Hill s Infantry. 

When the battle closed at 8 o clock, Swell s and Hill s 
Corps had already formed a junction at a point about 
halfway between Parker s Store and the Orange Turn 
pike. Longstreet was now ordered to make a forced 
march during the night and arrive upon the field before 
dawn. Moving at 1 A. M. of the 6th, it was daylight 
when he reached Parker s Store on the Plank Road, 
three miles in rear of Heth and Wilcox. 


All night Hill s advanced troops, who had maintained 
themselves so resolutely and successfully against Han 
cock s six divisions, heard the Federals preparing to 
renew the attack in the morning. Worn and much cut 
up by the fighting of the previous afternoon and expect 
ing relief during the night, the infantry failed to pre 
pare to meet the inevitable attack. The lines were much 
disordered, and commands were mixed. But not so with 
Poague s Battalion on the ridge in the clearing. 

At 5 A. M. Hancock s troops swept forward and soon 
overlapped Wilcox s Division south of the road, rolling 
it up and compelling Hill s whole line to retire in con 
fusion past the single battalion of artillery, which stood 
alone like a wall of flame across the enemy s path. Not 
until the great masses of Hancock s troops came face 
to face with the artillery did they cease to press for 
ward, but no troops could pass through such a storm of 
fire as that which Poague now opened upon them. The 
gunners worked with almost superhuman energy, the 
muzzles belched their withering blasts, the twelve pieces 
blended their discharges in one continuous roar, and 
there among them stood beneath the dense canopy of 
smoke, which hovered above the four batteries, Lee him 
self as if with a halo of war above his head. The great 
commander knew then full well that between him and 
disaster Poague s Battalion stood alone. What glory 
for a soldier! This single incident brought more of 
honor to the little colonel of artillery than most soldiers 
attain in a life of service. It would be hard for some to 
imagine in those soft, mild eyes, so familiar to the 
writer, the light which must have radiated from them as 
he stood among his guns on the 6th of May, 1864, the 
bulwark of Lee s defense, and in the very presence of 
his immortal commander. But one who has been thrown 
with him, who has learned to know the quality of the 
man, must feel that no heroism could transcend the limits 
of his soul. And yet the incident is not referred to by 
the historians of our time. We read that Poague s Bat 
talion was present in the battle of the Wilderness. No 



more. Even Morris S chaff, whose writings are inspired 
with the noblest sentiments of appreciation, and whose 
studious work on the battle of the Wilderness is by far 
the best yet written, overlooks the heroic deeds of 
Poague, though no more ready hand than his ever 
brought the pen to bear with sweeter touch for friend 
and foe alike. In the saving of such incidents to 
posterity, of deeds unrecorded by contemporaries, al 
most unknown even to the present generation, one must 
feel thankful to the Goddess of Fame, nay, more, to the 
Almighty that it may be done. 

For awhile as Gen. Lee stood among Poague s unsup 
ported guns, matters were indeed in a critical condition 
for the Confederates. After sending a courier to hasten 
the advance of the 1st Corps, and another to prepare the 
trains to be moved to the rear, he at last discerned the 
dust thrown up by the hurrying feet of Longstreet s 
men. In perfect order, with ranks well closed and no 
stragglers, the double column swung down the road at 
a trot, and, regardless of the confusion which beset their 
path, these splendid troops pressed on to the point of 
danger. At their head rode Longstreet at his best, 
ardent for the fray, as if but now he had slipped the 
leash which held his tugging columns in check. Rapidly 
deploying into line on the right of the road, Kershaw s 
Division obliqued to the right under a withering fire to 
meet the Federal left which had all but outflanked 
Poague s batteries, and which was working havoc among 
them. On the left of the road, Field s Division also de 
ployed and swept past the guns, among which the men 
detected Gen. Lee, whom they cheered lustily. When 
they perceived that "Marse Robert" contemplated lead 
ing them in the charge, they cried loudly for him to 
forego his intention. "We won t go unless you go 
back," shouted the Texans, while one of the gallant fel 
lows seized his bridle rein and turned Traveller to the 
rear. Gen. Gregg then urged Gen. Lee to do as the 
men desired him to do, but it was with evident disap 
pointment that Lee turned off and joined Gen. Long- 


Mortally wounded at Gettysburg. ISGo 


As Longstreet s men swept onward, Mclntosh s Bat 
talion was thrown into position by Walker on Poague s 
left, while three of the guns of Price s Battery advanced 
along the Plank Road with the infantry. Pegram s 
Battalion soon went into action on the ridge, half a mile 
to the left of Mclntosh s, to oppose the efforts of the 
enemy to penetrate between Ewell and Hill. Later on 
Cutts moved up to the support of Pegram, while 
Richardson s Battalion and Alexander s entire corps 
artillery were held in reserve at Parker s Store. 

Longstreet s charge was irresistible; the Federals 
were first checked in their advance and then driven back 
past their first line of log works. Back and forth for 
two hours the lines of battle surged, settling down at 
length almost where they had rested during the night 

Simultaneously with these events on the Confederate 
right, the Federals had made an unsuccessful effort to 
turn E well s left next the river, the brunt of the attack 
falling upon Early s Division, behind the flank of which 
Col. Carter had massed a number of his guns. The bat 
teries there posted were heavily engaged and rendered 
splendid service in repelling the attack upon Gordon s 
Brigade. Cutshaw s Battalion was placed by Gen. 
Long on the right of the turnpike, relieving Nelson s 
batteries in their old position, while Hardaway s Bat 
talion relieved those guns of Nelson s Battalion on the 
Germanna Road. Braxton s Battalion occupied a posi 
tion further to the right, about midway between the 
turnpike and the Plank Road, from which point it was 
able to cross fire to a certain extent with Pegram s 
guns behind Hill s left. While seeking an advanced 
and much exposed position for the three battalions of 
his division early in the morning, the veteran artillery 
officer, Col. John Thompson Brown, fell, instantly 
killed by the bullet of a sharpshooter, adding another 
illustrious name to the list of artillery officers lost in 
battle. Little can be added concerning Col. Brown to 
what his superiors in his own arm have written of him. 


In his report, Pendleton wrote of this much lamented 
officer: "To the fine qualities of a Christian gentleman 
of superior and cultivated intellect were added in Col. 
Brown very high excellencies as a soldier. Judicious, 
prompt, energetic and of dauntless gallantry, he had 
rendered conspicuous service in every campaign of the 
war. His example will not be forgotten in the arm to 
which he was an ornament, nor his memory be un- 
cherished by a grateful country." And, of him Gen. 
Long, whose senior artillery division commander he 
was, wrote: "His loss was deeply felt throughout the 
whole army. He not only exhibited the highest social 
qualities, but was endowed with the first order of mili 
tary talents. On every field where he was called to act 
he was distinguished for gallantry and skill. The Ar 
tillery will ever remember him as one of its brightest 

By 8 A. M. Anderson s Division had rejoined Hill s 
Corps. Meanwhile, it had been discovered by Gen. 
Lee s engineer that the Federal left flank rested in the 
air only a short distance south of the Plank Road, near 
the unfinished railroad. When this was reported to 
Longstreet about 10 A. M. he at once organized a column 
of four brigades, G. B. Anderson s and Wofford s of 
his own, and Mahone s and Davis of Hill s Corps, for 
the purpose of turning the Federal flank. Moving 
rapidly to the right and then forward, the column was 
deployed along the railroad at right angles to the hos 
tile line. About 11 A. M. the four brigades, led by Col. 
Sorrell in person, Longstreet s Adjutant-General, ad 
vanced, striking the flank of the Federal line in reverse, 
while a general attack was instituted along the Confed 
erate front. The success of Longstreet s brilliant move 
ment was complete. From a tactical point of view no 
more beautiful movement was executed during the war, 
and it only serves to show the remarkable ability of 
Longstreet as a tactician when his was the plan that was 

*For full and accurate account of the life and military career of this superb 
officer, see The University Memorial, p. 560. 


being executed. Brigade after brigade of the enemy 
was rolled up and routed. Hancock, totally unable, in 
spite of the noted influence he exercised over his men, 
to stay their flight, was compelled to content himself 
with reforming them along the Brock Road, where 
luckily he had thrown up hasty intrenchments the pre 
ceding day. Panic had seized upon two whole Federal 
corps, and a great Confederate victory seemed assured 
when Longstreet, who rode forward south of the Plank 
Road, at the head of five fresh brigades to press his ad 
vantage, fell before a volley from one of Mahone s regi 
ments advancing at right angles to his own course, and 
which mistook Longstreet and the group of officers 
about him for Federals. But Longstreet was not so 
seriously wounded that he could not place Gen. Field in 
command and direct him how to proceed. He explained 
that one of his columns should continue the direct at 
tack, while the other moved further around Hancock s 
left by a route which Gen. Smith had reconnoitered and 
was thoroughly familiar with. If this were done, the 
already-broken enemy would be forced to surrender 
or be destroyed. Before Field, however, got under 
way, Gen. R. H. Anderson, his senior, then Gen. 
Lee himself, arrived. Longstreet s knowledge of the 
situation was of course not possessed by either Lee or 
Anderson. They only found the lines much disordered, 
and before the realignment which the former directed to 
be made could be effected, much delay had ensued. It 
was 4:15 p. M. before Field s and Anderson s divisions 
renewed the attack. Thus at the very crisis of the battle, 
when the enemy was not only already defeated, but an 
appalling disaster stared Meade in the face, Lee s second 
great lieutenant was smitten and this almost within gun 
shot of the field where Jackson fell just twelve months 
before. In fact part of the enemy s forces occupied the 
old Chancellorsville battlefield at the time. 

It would almost seem that Providence was fighting 
against the Confederates. Certain it is that Fate was 
against them, for in the battle of the Wilderness even 


another ill-fortune had fallen upon Lee s Army. Be 
fore 9 A. M. Gordon had discovered the exposed char 
acter of the Federal right wing, and had later verified 
the reports of his patrols by personal reconnaissance in 
its rear. He at once reported the fact to Early, and 
begged to be allowed to attack Sedgwick, with a view to 
rolling up his line. But Early objected on the ground 
that Burnside, whose troops were arriving on the field, 
would be found behind Sedgwick. Gordon knew from 
personal observation that Burnside was not there, and 
in vain he appealed, first to his division commander, 
then to Ewell, to be allowed to attack, urging them both 
to verify his own information. Ewell was completely 
dominated, however, by Early, and neither went himself 
nor sent any one to investigate the situation for him. 
About 5 :30 p. M. Gen. Lee, astounded by the inactivity 
on the left, rode over from the right where Longstreet 
and Hill had been so heavily engaged, to discover the 
cause of Swell s silence. Gordon, in the presence of both 
Ewell and Early, explained the situation to Gen. Lee as 
he knew it to be, with the result that he was ordered 
to attack at once. The attack took place just as the sun 
went down, too late to reap the fruits of a surprise which 
to Sedgwick was as great as Longstreet s flanking at 
tack had been to Hancock. Moving around to their rear, 
Gordon alone drove the Federals from a large portion 
of their works and took 600 prisoners, and among them 
two general officers. But darkness intervened to save 
Sedgwick just as a bullet had saved Hancock and War 
ren, and so Grant s army was saved from destruction 
and enabled to fall back and establish a new line for the 
defense of which Burnside s entire and almost wholly 
fresh corps was now available. 

Viewing Meade s precarious situation throughout the 
6th, it seems certain that had Gordon been permitted to 
attack when he desired to, his effort, which would have 
been closely connected in time with Longstreet s success 
on the right, would surely have brought complete 
disaster to the Army of the Potomac. What he accom- 


plished at 6 P. M. could have been done at 11 A. M., and 
with an enemy in his front and in rear of both flanks, it 
is inconceivable that Meade could have successfully with 
drawn his army, even had the terrain favored him instead 
of practically eliminating all possibility of the move 
ment of broken troops. 

During the day, Stuart had persistently sought to 
penetrate to the left rear of Meade s Army, but found 
Sheridan confronting him at all points. The conflict 
between the cavalry of the two armies was continuous, 
and in the various more or less disjointed affairs between 
Stuart s brigades and those of Sheridan, the Horse Ar 
tillery was actively engaged. Johnston s Battery re 
mained in position near Shady Grove, Thomson s and 
Shoemaker s being heavily engaged near Rowe s farm, 
and Hart s not far from Todd s Tavern. McGregor s 
Battery remained at Orange Courthouse, with 
W. H. F. Lee s Brigade. The nature of the cavalry 
operations in the dense country was such, of course, as 
to preclude the possibility of Chew s handling the bat 
talion as a unit. On the 6th, when with Rosser, who was 
engaging Wilson on the Catharpin Road, Chew per 
sonally led Thomson s Battery in the charge of the 
cavalry brigade, and, throwing the guns into action just 
before the troopers struck the enemy, did fine execution 
with them. The next day at Rose s farm, where Stuart 
was in command, he again accompanied the cavalry in a 
charge with his old battery, much to the delight of 
Stuart, who now seems to have realized for the first time 
that in Maj. Chew, Pelham had a worthy successor.* 
Stuart s previous lack of appreciation of Chew was most 
natural, for the two had scarcely ever been thrown to 
gether before this time. It seems unfortunate that the 
association of such bold and congenial spirits was so 
brief. But the wide recognition of this artilleryman s 

*"GEN. W. N. PENDLETON Your note concerning Bearing is just received. 
Maj. Chew, the officer now in charge of the Stuart Horse Artillery, is doing so 
well that I am disinclined to put any one over him, although I have a high 
appreciation of the officer you propose. I think Chew will answer as the 
permanent commander, and, being identified with the Horse Artillery, is there 
fore preferable to others. 

"J. B. B. STUART, Major-General, April 6, 1864." 


ability and the reputation as an unexcelled leader of 
horse artillery which he had established for himself 
were all the more to his credit since he owed nothing to 
the great Stuart for them. Indeed, his service since 
Ashby s death had been quite independent of illustrious 
commanders, and he therefore reflected none of the lus 
tre of others. He was a self-made soldier in the highest 
sense of the word, and the fact that he could by his own 
merit acquire precedence over such an officer as 
Breathed, so long and so familiarly associated with 
Stuart, may seem remarkable to those who have never 
known the man. Slight personal contact with him is 
sufficient, however, to brush away all surprise. Near 
seventy years old at the time this is written, Col. Robert 
Preston Chew retains the mental activity and much of 
the physical hardihood of youth. Erect, of full muscular 
development and above the average height, with a hand 
some face upon which character has delineated its un 
mistakable features, in appearance he is the ideal 
soldier, and he is as much beloved by those with whom 
he is now associated in his peaceful pursuits, as he was 
by the splendid men of the Confederate Horse Artillery 
during the war.* 

*Col. Chew now resides in Charles Town, West Virginia. He tells the writer 
that he is engaged in writing the history of the Horse Artillery. May God spare 
him until he has completed the priceless record he alone is now capable of 
preparing, and for many years to come. 



GRANT had utterly failed on the 5th and 6th of May 
to carry out his plan of "swinging past" Lee s Army 
and placing himself between it and Richmond, and while 
Lee had delivered the Federal Army a stunning blow, 
it still remained on its route, now secure behind strong 
works, and with Hunt s tremendous force of artillery 
established in position with the usual skill of its com 
mander. It was impracticable for the Confederates, 
who had established themselves upon the flank of 
Grant s line of operations, to attack Meade s Army. 
Whatever the conditions may have been in the Federal 
Infantry, which had been so roughly handled, and which 
had escaped complete disaster by the merest chance, Lee 
knew that Hunt was undismayed and that no troops 
could sweep over that superb line of guns in the Wilder 
ness. So both armies lay behind their intrenchments on 
the 7th, contenting themselves with skirmishing along 
the front. Meanwhile, Lee kept a close lookout for a 
movement of the enemy to his right and directed the 
Chief of Artillery to open roads for the movement of 
the artillery in that direction, should it be needed there. 
The work was quickly accomplished by working parties 
from the various batteries of the 3d Corps, under the 
immediate direction of Col. Walker. At the same time, 
Gen. Long made a reconnaissance under orders from 
Gen. Ewell on the extreme left. Taking Jones infan 
try brigade and W. P. Carter s Battery, Long moved 
around to Beale s house on the Germanna Road, where 
he struck several regiments of Federal cavalry, which 
were quickly dispersed by the battery. No other hostile 
troops being found, it was evident that the enemy was 
withdrawing from before the Confederate left, for the 
dead and wounded still lay upon the field in that quarter. 
Soon after Long made the report of his reconnaissance 


to Lee, Stuart, about 3 p. M.^ discovered Meade s trains 
moving to the Confederate right, and later the unmis 
takable rumble of moving columns along the Brock 
Road was heard. 

With roads clear of the trains, Meade had been 
ordered by Grant to move his troops at 8 :30 p. M., and 
to establish one of his corps at the Courthouse, twelve 
miles distant, one at the crossroads known as the Brock 
House, and one at Todd s Tavern. 

About dusk, Gen. Lee directed Pendleton to send 
a staff officer to Anderson, who had succeeded Long- 
street in command of the 1st Corps, to guide him over 
the roads cut through the woods. Without a doubt in 
his mind as to Grant s intention, Lee had taken up the 
race for position at Spotsylvania. Going himself to 
Anderson, Pendleton described the route and left with 
him a competent staff officer to lead the column. Ander 
son s orders were to start at 3 A. M.,, but he knew the 
route he would have to follow to the Courthouse was 
longer than that pursued by the Federals, so he set 
his troops in motion at 11 p. M., four hours earlier than 
ordered. We shall see later how fortunate was the ex 
ercise of this initiative on his part. The Artillery of the 
1st Corps, which had not been engaged the two preced 
ing days, was ordered to follow the infantry column 
from Parker s Store. 

Anderson s two divisions, with Alexander s Artillery, 
had about 15 miles to travel, but Fitz Lee and Hamp 
ton kept the road open and held back the cavalry dur 
ing the night in front of Spotsylvania and at Corbin s 
Bridge, by blockading the narrow avenues of approach 
through the forest with felled timber. Alexander moved 
during the night by way of the Shady Grove Road and 
Corbin s Bridge, rejoining the infantry about daylight 
near the Po River, where the 1st Corps rested and pre 
pared breakfast. Already the efforts of the Federals to 
brush the cavalry from their front could be heard in the 
heavy firing to the left. Grant and Meade, as was their 


entire army, were sure the race had been won by them, 
and heavy attacks were being made by Wilson s 
Cavalry, on Rosser at the Courthouse, and by War 
ren s Corps on Fitz Lee at the Spindler farm on the 
Brock Road. Reaching the Brock House at 7 A. M., 
Anderson sent Kennedy s and Humphreys brigades, 
with two batteries of Haskell s Battalion, to the assist 
ance of Fitz Lee about a mile away, and Wofford s 
and Bryan s brigades with the rest of the Artillery to 
Rosser half a mile further to the front. Haskell s two 
batteries at once became involved in a desperate con 
flict, in which Capt. Potts was mortally wounded. 
After two hours they exhausted their ammunition, but 
not until they had rendered most effective service in re 
pulsing a charge of three of Warren s brigades. Field s 
Division now came up to the support of Kershaw s two 
brigades, and extended his line to the left. Five batter 
ies of Huger s Battalion were then posted by Alexander 
on a ridge in the edge of the pine thicket on the Todd s 
Tavern Road, where the cavalry had made its stand, 
and Cabell s Battalion was held in reserve. Fitz Lee 
when thus relieved joined Rosser at the Courthouse 
and together they compelled Wilson to retire before 
them. This enabled Wofford and Bryan to rejoin Ker- 

After Robinson s repulse, Griffin s Division rendered 
two assaults, the first suffering a complete repulse, the 
second enabling the Federals to establish themselves 
under cover about 400 yards to the right front of the 
Confederate line, where they began to intrench. Craw 
ford s Division next came up and extended Griffin s 
line to the left, and then Cutler s Division attacked the 
Confederate left without success, and prolonged 
Griffin s line of intrenchments to the right. During the 
latter s attack, all five of Cabell s batteries under Maj. 
Hamilton were brought into action. Meantime 
Haskell s two batteries, which had suffered severely on 
the Todd s Tavern Road under a reverse fire from a 
horse battery near the Courthouse, were withdrawn. 


Anderson had won his race and Warren s whole 
corps had been halted over a mile short of its goal by 
two small Confederate divisions, and the bold use of 
the artillery, which in places had been brought into 
action within 400 yards of the enemy, and not over 100 
yards from their skirmishers. Instead of being in posi 
tion waiting for Lee at Spotsylvania Courthouse, the 
advance of Meade s Army was completely cut off from 
it and the direct routes thereto. 

Both Lee and Meade now began to hurry forward 
their troops. Ewell had left the Wilderness at dawn 
and arrived in position on Anderson s right just in time 
to assist in severely repulsing the combined attack 
about 5:30 p. M., of Warren s and Sedgwick s corps 
upon Anderson s line. In this affair nearly every gun 
of Alexander s command was actually engaged, but only 
a few of Long s that were in position in front of the 
Courthouse took part, the bulk of the 2d Corps Ar 
tillery arriving later and going into park near the Court 
house for the night. The 3d Corps, under Early, which 
had been left behind as a rear guard, did not leave its 
old position until late on the 8th, bivouacking for the 
night near Shady Grove. During the day a single 
section of Mclntosh s Battalion was engaged with the 
enemy s cavalry, which pressed upon the flanks of the 
3d Corps as it advanced. 

Upon arriving at Spotsylvania, early on the 9th, the 
3d Corps, with the exception of Mahone s Division, ex 
tended Swell s line of intrenchments to the right, while 
Mahone moved to a commanding position on Ander 
son s left, overlooking the Po. The Confederates had 
now established a line covering Spotsylvania Court 
house, with the 1st Corps on the left resting across the 
Po River, the 2d Corps in the center north of the Court 
house, and the 3d on the right crossing the Fredericks- 
burg Road. While the brigades and divisions were fre 
quently shifted, these positions were generally main 
tained during the battles that ensued. 


During the 9th, while no attack was made by either 
side, an incessant sharpshooting was kept up, resulting 
in many losses to both sides, including the gallant Gen. 
Sedgwick, who was killed on the Brock Road. The day 
was largely devoted to the strengthening of old and the 
construction of new breastworks. The Confederate bat 
teries were extended along the entire front of the line, 
and most of the guns placed in pits or behind slight 
epaulments. Cabell s Battalion occupied an elevation 
in rear of and slightly above Anderson s left, with four 
guns under Maj. Gibbes on the extreme left of the 
infantry line. On Cabell s right and in the second line 
were posted Haskell s Battalion, and Woolfolk s Bat 
tery. Huger s remaining five batteries were placed in 
the infantry line. Beyond them and also with the 
infantry, Page s and Braxton s battalions were in posi 
tion with the 2d Corps. The field of fire for the guns 
at this point, as at the Wilderness, was very limited and 
the terrain afforded little opportunity for the effective 
use of artillery. Further to the right and on the left 
of the Courthouse clearing, Long posted Hardaway s 
and Nelson s battalions, while Cutshaw s was held in re 
serve on the road behind them. In the 3d Corps, 
Walker, upon arriving, dispatched Mclntosh s Bat 
talion to the extreme left, where it went into position 
behind Mahone at a point where the Shady Grove Road 
crosses the Po River. Poague s Battalion occupied the 
infantry works on the left of the 3d Corps line, Pe- 
gram s the line where it crossed the Fredericksburg 
Road several hundred yards from the Courthouse, 
and Cutts a position on the extreme right in advance 
of the road to Massaponax Church. Richardson s 
Battalion was held in reserve behind the center. Thus 
it is seen that nearly every gun in Lee s Army was in 
position either in the advanced line, or in works close be 
hind. The nature of the terrain absolutely forbade the 
effective massing of guns for the more effective com 
mand of a given field of fire. The situation demanded, 
if artillery were to be employed at all, that it should 


fight with the infantry, and simply endeavor to sweep 
the field in its immediate front, and thus supplement 
the musketry fire. Truly the Artillery was to fight as 
infantry at Spotsylvania. There was to be no such 
thing as artillery tactics there. It was simply a question 
of how much it could increase the intensity of the fire of 
the defense. No question of the time and the manner 
in which that fire was to be delivered was open to dis 
cussion, for tactics were ruled out in favor of the knock- 
down-and-drag-out method, which the topography im 
posed upon the Artillery. Never in all the war was the 
Confederate Artillery called upon to serve in such a 
manner as in the days of Spotsylvania. 

The principal activity of the enemy on the 9th was 
in front of the Confederate left and center, but the Ar 
tillery fired only a few rounds and those principally at 
the enemy s sharpshooters whenever they were seen to 
gather in sufficient numbers to afford a reasonable tar 

Hancock crossed his three divisions over the Po on 
the afternoon of the 9th and occupied the Shady Grove 
Road, thus threatening the Confederate rear and en 
dangering the trains which were parked on the road 
leading by the old Courthouse to Louisa Courthouse. 
Lee s main line was north of the Po, with its left, 
Field s Division of the 1st Corps, resting on the stream 
at a point just above the crossing of the Shady Grove 
Road. Mahone, as we have seen, had been posted with 
Mclntosh s Battalion on the other side of the stream 
to protect the flank. Lee ordered Early on the morning 
of the 10th to move around Mahone s left and strike 
Hancock s right. Taking Heth s Division, Richard 
son s Battalion and Ellett s Battery of Pegram s Bat 
talion, Early moved to the rear and then followed the 
Louisa Courthouse Road across the Po until he 
reached a road coming in from Waite s Shop on the 
Shady Grove Road. Moving about a mile along this 
road, he met Hampton s Cavalry falling back before 
Hancock, who had pushed out a column of infantry 


somewhat to the rear of the Confederate line. After 
driving the Federal advance back to the Shady Grove 
Road, Early reached Waite s Shop, from which point 
Heth attacked in earnest, but he was twice repulsed in 
his effort to gain the ridge upon which only two of Bar 
low s brigades were posted with artillery, for Hancock 
had already withdrawn his other divisions. In this at 
tack, Richardson s Battalion came under a heavy artil 
lery fire, and was suffering severely, when Pendleton 
caused Cabell s Battalion, from its elevated position be 
hind Anderson s left, to concentrate upon the enemy s 
guns. The effect was instant and Richardson was re 
lieved from a nasty situation. A fire now broke out in 
the woods, and although Barlow had not been driven 
from his ridge by Early, Meade ordered him to with 
draw to the north side of the stream. Mahone s Divi 
sion now crossed from the east bank, as the road was 
clear, with several of Macintosh s batteries, and inflicted 
some loss upon the retiring Federals, who were com 
pelled to abandon a gun which had been wedged between 
two trees by its affrighted team. Night was now ap 
proaching, and as the enemy was found with artillery 
well intrenched on the north bank, Early refrained 
from further attempts and soon Heth returned to the 
right, leaving Mahone in possession of the position on 
the Shady Grove Road, from which Barlow had been 
driven. To this point, all of Macintosh s guns were 
brought up during the night and intrenched. 

During the fighting on the extreme left, Meade had 
made a tremendous effort to break Lee s line. First a 
demonstration was made against the right immediately 
in front of Spotsylvania Courthouse, but the attack 
ing infantry was roughly handled and driven back to 
their trenches by Cutts and Pegram s battalions. The 
main attack was directed against Field s Division on the 
left, and meeting with a bloody repulse was renewed at 
3 P. M. with the same result. In these affairs Cabell, 
Huger, and Haskell were all heavily engaged. Alex 
ander had posted their guns in such a way that they 


partially enfiladed the approaches to the infantry line, 
and as Warren s troops advanced through the dense 
thickets in Anderson s front, the woods were riddled 
with canister, which effectually broke the enemy s forma 
tion. As the Federals emerged in bad order, unable 
to reform under the Confederate musketry fire, but 
few of them were able to press home, and these were 
cared for by the infantry, many of the men of which 
were double armed with the muskets previously aban 
doned in front of the works by the enemy earlier in the 
day. The intensity of the Confederate musketry fire, 
thus increased, was unusual. A lull of several hours 
now ensued. About 7 P. M. Hancock made the third 
assault on Anderson s line with Birney s and Gibbon s 
divisions supported by the 5th Corps. Near sunset, 
Anderson s skirmishers were suddenly swept back, and 
almost without warning the successive lines of the 
enemy were soon seen surging forward at the trot. 
Rushing forward, the front line dissolved, but on came 
the determined supports, driving the Confederates from 
their works, but failing to break their resistance. The 
line of the defenders was nearly bent back by the pres 
sure and the fight continued in the rear of the breast 
works until Anderson s Brigade, which had cleared its 
front, was able to turn upon the flank of the assailants 
and drive them over and beyond the works which they 
had so gallantly taken. 

As to the character of the work the Artillery per 
formed in these attacks, a vivid description of the fore 
going affair by the adjutant of Cabell s Battalion is 
here inserted:* 

"The troops supporting the two Napoleon guns of the Howitzers 
(1st company) were, as I remember,, the Seventh (or Eighth) 
Georgia and the First Texas. Toward the close of the day, 
everything seemed to have quieted down, in a sort of implied truce. 
There was absolutely no fire,, either of musketry or cannon. Our 
weary, hungry infantry stacked arms and were cooking their mean 
and meager little rations. Some one rose up and looking over the 
works it was shading down a little toward the dark cried out: 

*Four Years under Marse Robert, Stiles, p. 254. 


Hello! what s this? Why, here come our men on the run, from 
no, by Heavens! it s the Yankees! And before any one could 
realize the situation or even start towards the stacked muskets, the 
Federal column broke over the little works, between our troops and 
their arms, bayoneted or shot two or three who were asleep, before 
they could awake, and dashed upon the men who were at their 
low fires, with cooking utensils instead of weapons in their hands. 
Of course they ran. What else could they do? 

"The Howitzers only the left, or Napoleon section was there 
sprang to their guns, swinging them around to bear inside our 
lines, double shotted them with canister, and fairly spouted it into 
the Federals, whose formation had been broken in the rush and 
plunge over the works, and who seemed to be somewhat massed 
and huddled and hesitating, but only a few rods away. Quicker 
almost than I can tell it, our infantry supports, than whom there 
were not two better regiments in the army, had rallied and gotten 
to their arms, and then they opened out into a V shape and fairly 
tore the head of the Federal columns to pieces. In an incredibly 
short time those who were able to do so turned to fly and our 
infantry were following them over the intrenchments ; but it is 
doubtful whether this would have been the result had it not been 
for the prompt and gallant action of the artillery. 

"There was an old Capt. Hunter, it seems difficult to determine 
whether of the Texas or the Georgia Regiment, who had the 
handle of his frying-pan in his hand, holding the pan over the coals, 
with his little slice of meat sizzling in it, when the enemy broke 
over. He had his back to them, and the first thing he knew his 
men were scampering past him like frightened sheep. He had not 
been accustomed to that style of movement among them, and he 
sprang up and tore after them, showering them with hot grease and 
hotter profanity, but never letting go his pan. On the contrary, 
he slapped right and left with his sooty, burning bottom, dis 
tributing his favors impartially on Federal and Confederate alike 
several of his own men bearing the black and ugly brand on their 
cheeks for a long time after, and occasionally having to bear also 
the captain s curses for having made him lose his meat that evening. 
He actually led the counter-charge, leaping the works, wielding and 
waving his frying-pan, at once a sword and a banner." 

Now exactly how accurate this interesting account 
is, the writer cannot pretend to say, but it is valuable 
as is the following incident from the same pen: 

"There were two men in the First Howitzers older than most 
of us, of exceptionally high character and courage, who, because 
of the deafness of the one, and the lack of certain physical 
flexibility and adaptation in the other, were not well fitted for 



regular places in the detachment, or service about the gun. For a 
time,, one or both of them took the position of driver, but this 
scarcely seemed fitting, and one or both were finally classed as 
supernumeraries/ but with special duties under the surgeon of the 
battalion, as bearers of our camping litters and our other simple 
medical and surgical outfit. For this and other reasons the elder 
of these two good and gritty soldiers was always called Doctor. 

"When the break occurred these two men, always at the front, 
were overwhelmed with amazement, not so much at the irruption of 
the enemy, as at what seemed to be the demoralized route of the 
Georgians and Texans. They ran in among them asking explana 
tion of their conduct, then appealing to them and exhorting them, 
the Doctor in most courteous and lofty phrase: Gentlemen, what 
does this mean? You certainly are not flying before the enemy! 
Turn, for God s sake; turn, and drive them out! Then with 
indignant outburst: Halt, you infernal cowards! and suiting the 
action to the words, these choleric cannoneers tore the carrying 
poles out of their litters, and sprang among and in front of the 
fugitives, belaboring them right and left, till they turned, and 
then turned with them, following up the retreating enemy with their 
wooden spears. 

"Some weeks later, after we had reached Petersburg in the 
nick of time to keep Burnside out of the town, and had taken up 
what promised to be a permanent position and were just dozing off 
into our first nap in forty-eight hours, an infantry command passing 
by, in the darkness, stumbled over the trail handspikes of our 
guns, and broke out in the usual style: Oh, of course! Here s 
that infernal artillery again ; always in the way, blocking the roads 
by day and tripping us up at night. What battery is this anyway? 
Some fellow, not yet clean gone in slumber, grunted out: First 
Company Richmond Howitzers. What a change! Instantly there 
was a perfect chorus of greetings from the warm-hearted Texans. 
Boys, here are the Howitzers! Where s your old deaf man? 
Trot out your old Doctor. They re the jockeys for us. We are 
going to stay right here. We won t get a chance to run if these 
plucky Howitzer boys are with us. "* 

Clearly Meade could not break Anderson s line. But 
he met with better success in the center, where he had 
massed about 40,000 of his men against Ewell s line. 
With the eye of an engineer, he had detected the weak 
point, where a long salient jutted out in advance of the 

*The Richmond Howitzers had a splendid reputation throughout the Army. 
The personnel was unusual. Stiles and others tell us that it included many 
professional and college men, and that one of the privates actually kept a 
diary throughout the war in Greek. There was a law club in the battery, a 
trained Glee Club, and orations were frequently delivered in Latin at the gather 
ings of the men, as well as Greek odes. 


general line, and in front of which there was a most 
limited field of fire. He saw that an overwhelming 
force massed near the enemy s line could by sheer weight 
break it at that point. In the hasty extension of the 
Confederate line on the 8th, Ewell, to keep on high 
ground, had occupied with his left and center an ele 
vation running nearly a mile in advance of Anderson s 
line, then bending back so abruptly that the gorge of 
the immense salient was but three-fourths of a mile 
wide. The forward angle of this salient was occupied 
by Doles Brigade, of Rodes Division, and Smith s 
Howitzer Battery of Hardaway s Battalion. It has 
since the events of the 10th been known as the "Bloody 

From the first, Meade had been reconnoitering and 
feeling Swell s weak point. The Confederates behind 
the works had thrown up traverses on both sides of the 
salient at close intervals to protect themselves against 
the enfilade fire of the Federal skirmishers, and other 
than this no effort had been made to correct the evils of 
the position. On the morning of the 10th, Long had 
relieved Braxton s and Page s battalions, substituting 
Nelson s and Hardaway s battalions for them. Nelson 
now occupied Johnson s and Hardaway Rodes front. 

At 5 p. M. Col. Emory Upton silently led twelve regi 
ments with fixed bayonets and loaded muskets through 
the thicket in Doles front, after carefully explaining 
the part each was to play. Upon reaching the works, 
half the leading column of attack was to sweep to the 
right and half to the left down the faces of the salient, 
while a second line was to remain in position at the angle 
and open fire to the front. 

Upton s men succeeded in rushing the works at the 
angle, and after a desperate hand-to-hand encounter, 
swept the Confederates from behind their traverses; 
many combatants on both sides were killed and 
wounded. But as the Federals swept through the gap 
thus made, Daniels Brigade on one side, and Steuart s 
on the other drew back from their lines and fell upon 


the flanks of the enemy, while Battle s and Johnson s 
brigades were hurried up from the left and thrown 
across the gorge. Mott s Division was to have sup 
ported Upton on the left, but upon forming for the 
advance, found itself the target of Hardaway s and 
Nelson s batteries on Swell s right, and were compelled 
to abandon the task assigned it. In fact, Mott s bri 
gades were broken by the Confederate Artillery, and 
driven back in confusion to the cover of their works at 
the base of the hill in Ewell s front. Assailed on three 
sides at once and unsupported, Upton s men were first 
forced back into the angle, in turn seeking cover behind 
the traverses, and then over the works, retiring in dis 
order to their own lines, after a loss of 1,000 men, or 20 
per cent of the number engaged in the assault, while 
Ewell lost 650 men, 350 of whom were captured. 

In the melee following upon the irruption of the 
Federals into Ewell s works, Smith s Richmond 
Howitzer Battery at the angle was seized by the enemy, 
but later recovered, the battery commander maintaining 
his fire until he with a number of his cannoneers was 
actually snatched from among the guns by the as 
sailants. In the subsequent repulse of the Federals, 
Hardaway s remaining batteries were alone engaged. 
Thrown into position on the right of the salient, these 
four batteries had relentlessly poured canister into 
Upton s huddled troops and pursued them with their 
fire until they left the works. Two of Cutshaw s bat 
teries which had been held in reserve near the Court 
house were rushed to the gorge, but were too late to 
assist in the repulse. As the Federals withdrew, some 
of the men of Garber s Battery of Cutshaw s Battalion, 
under their captain, entered the works and turned two 
of Smith s guns, for which no cannoneers remained, 
upon the fleeing masses. Both Lieut-Col. Hardaway, 
and his field-officer, Ma j . David Watson, were wounded, 
the former slightly, the latter mortally, but in spite of 
a painful wound, Hardaway with his clothes riddled 
with bullets remained at his post and directed the fire of 


his batteries. The loss of Maj. David Watson was a 
serious one. In the words of the Chief of Artillery, 
this veteran artilleryman who had served from the very 
first of the war as a lieutenant at Yorktown with Ma- 
gruder, then as captain of the 2d Company of Richmond 
Howitzers until his recent promotion, was "an accom 
plished gentleman, a faithful, patriot, and gallant 

Grant attributed the failure of Upton s attempt of 
the 10th to Mott s inability to advance, and on the llth 
planned a much more powerful attack to be made by 
the whole of the 2d and 9th Corps. The angle was 
again selected for the focus of the assault. 

A much exaggerated report of Federal activity on 
the Confederate left led Lee to believe that Meade 
would attempt to move in that direction during the 
night, so the chiefs of artillery were ordered to with 
draw all their guns from the front line, in order that 
the Confederates might move under cover of darkness 
without being heard. Mahone s Division on the ex 
treme left was ordered to march during the night and 
occupy Shady Grove before daylight. Gen. Long had 
in the morning placed Cutshaw s and Page s battalions 
in position along Johnson s front, the weakest part of 
Ewell s line, relieving some of Hardaway s batteries. 
Late in the afternoon the orders came to him to have 
"all of his batteries which were difficult of access" pre 
pared to be removed before dark and was informed that 
the projected movement required him to be ready to 
take up the march at a minute s notice. He immediately 
ordered all the artillery on Johnson s front, except two 
of Cutshaw s batteries, to be withdrawn, as it had to pass 
through a wood by a narrow and difficult road, and 
the night bid fair to be very dark. Alexander showed 
more foresight on this occasion than Long, for he 
ventured to accomplish the intent of the order without 

*For full and accurate account of his life and military career, see The 
University Memorial, p. 570. He was the devoted friend and companion of Col. 
Brown, who fell but four days before him. The sad coincidence of their deaths 
and the similar features of their characters and careers lead us to paraphrase 
what Tacitus wrote of Agricola, "Similes non mice tantum claritate, sed etiam 
opportunitate mortis." 


literal compliance with it. Thus while Long withdrew 
twenty-two guns of Page s and Cutshaw s battalions 
from the salient, Alexander visited every one of his 
batteries in person, had their ammunition chests placed 
on the limbers (they were usually dismounted and 
placed beside the guns in the pits), and the carriages 
so placed and the roads leading from the works so 
marked and prepared that they could easily withdraw 
without making the slightest noise. All of Longstreet s 
guns, therefore, remained in position. 

About 3 A. M., Lee discovered that Meade was mass 
ing for an assault upon Ewell instead of withdrawing 
from his lines, and the orders to the Artillery were at 
once countermanded. But already Swell s line, which 
had been caused to conform to the terrain for the sole 
purpose of affording the Artillery good positions, was 
practically stripped of its guns and now remained a 
dangerously weak projection, with a very poor field 
for musketry fire. Naturally defective, yet with ar 
tillery so posted as to sweep its faces, many of the ob 
jections to the salient line had been overcome. Now 
the line was totally lacking in defensive qualities, with 
the exception that a hasty line of intrenchment had been 
partially completed across the gorge. 

All night Meade was engaged in massing Barlow s, 
Birney s, Mott s, and Gibbon s divisions in front of 
Johnson. The charge was ordered for 4 A. M., but owing 
to a fog Hancock, who was to direct the attack, delayed 
until 4 :35. The distance to the Confederate works was 
about 1,200 yards. The Federal masses were very com 
pactly arranged, too much so for freedom of action over 
the ground to be traversed. Moving off quietly and 
slowly, it was not until the Confederate pickets gave 
the alarm that the Federals broke into a run and com 
menced to cheer. 

Johnson s men had heard the enemy s column form 
ing, and repeated calls had been sent for the Artillery. 
Long had already received orders to return the guns to 
the works, and Cutshaw and Page were hastening back 
by separate routes. 


The Federals came on, to use Gen. Johnson s words, 
"in great disorder, with a narrow front, but extending 
back as far as I could see." But there was hardly a gun 
to fire upon the seething, confused mass of Federals. 
Truly a great opportunity had been sacrificed, for it is 
dreadful to contemplate what the effect of Long s 
twenty-two guns would have been had they opened 
a concentrated fire on the Federal column. It is not 
difficult to picture the result, however, for that dense, 
overcrowded column would never have reached the 
Confederate works. What an opportunity was this 
for the artillery! Never since Pope uncovered Porter s 
flank at Second Manassas to Reilly s guns had the 
breast of the Federal Infantry been so bared. "No 
where else in the whole history of the war was such a 
target presented to so large a force of artillery. Ranks 
had already been lost in the crowd, and officers could 
neither show example nor exercise authority. A few 
discharges would have made of it a mob, which could 
not have been rallied. There was a thick abattis of 
felled trees in front, and chevaux de frise, which, Bar 
low says, would have been difficult to get through under 
a cool fire. For the mob, which his division would have 
soon formed, there would have been no escape but 
flight, with phenomenal loss for the time exposed to 
fire. * 

"Had the Artillery been in position the result might 
have been different, or had the weather been favorable, 
the disaster might have been avoided; but the morning 
was so dark and foggy that it was with difficulty that 
we could distinguish friend from foe." These are the 
comments and explanations of Gen. Long, himself, but 
his guns were not there and he had lost his great chance. 
And here it may be said that nothing so well illustrates 
the difference between Alexander and Long as the man 
ner in which they both complied with their orders on 
this occasion. We sometimes hear that great soldiers 
have often been the product of opportunity. But this 
is not generally true. The casual observer fails to de- 

*Military Memoirs of a, Confederate, Alexander, p. 520. 


tect the fact that it is preparedness to profit by oppor 
tunity, and not merely the favor of fortune that enables 
soldiers to win great reputations. Take for instance the 
case just considered. Alexander sized up the situation 
at a glance, and stood prepared to grasp what he foresaw 
as a great opportunity, should it be presented to him. 
Long failed utterly to realize what might be in store for 
him, and neglecting to prearrange therefor, the great 
est opportunity of his military career passed him by. 
True he obeyed his orders and cannot be censured. The 
point made is not one of blame, nor does opportunity 
weigh orders. 

The two leading guns of Page s Battalion only ar 
rived in time to unlimber and fire three rounds between 
them into the Federal masses before they were sur 
rounded and seized. Twelve of Page s, and eight of Cut- 
shaw s guns were then captured along with two-thirds 
of Johnson s Division, including the division com 
mander and Brig.-Gen. Steuart. Only the two rearmost 
guns of Montgomery s Louisa Battery of Page s Bat 
talion escaped. 

The Confederate Infantry in the salient, deprived of 
their artillery, had done all it could to check the onward 
rush of the Federals. The whole thing happened so 
quickly that neither Hancock nor Ewell at first realized 
the extent of the disaster to the Confederates. After 
their first success, the disordered Federals paused in the 
advance to reform; as the fugitives from the salient 
streamed to the rear, they met reinforcements from 
the brigades of Johnston and Gordon on the right, and 
from those of Daniel and Ramseur on the left, who 
promptly checked the disorganized pursuers. The situa 
tion was indeed a critical one for the Confederates, and 
Gordon s (Early s) Division had only arrived in the 
nick of time to establish the new line. Again Gen. Lee 
had placed himself at the head of his troops to lead them 
forward, and again the men had insisted on his retiring 
before they charged the enemy and pressed them back 
to the head of the salient. 


Upon learning that Hancock s advance was being 
checked, Grant ordered eight brigades of the 6th Corps 
to reinforce him, and about 8 A. M. these additional 
troops increased the confusion and crowding in the 
limited space within the salient. Burnside had also been 
ordered to assault the Confederate lines and about 5 
A. M. fell upon A. P. Hill on the right. On Hill s left 
center, Burnside met with no success whatever, Nel 
son s, Poague s, and Pegram s battalions simply tearing 
the dense attacking columns to pieces as they appeared 
in the open, but on the extreme right Potter s Division 
swept Lane s Brigade from its trenches and seized two 
guns of Cutts Battalion. But Lane reformed his men 
some distance to the rear and recovered both his works 
and the guns, driving Potter off. Failing in his attack, 
Burnside was then ordered to move to his right and con 
nect with Hancock s line, which he did by 9:15 A. M. 
Meanwhile both sides had moved up artillery to bear 
on the salient space, across the gorge of which the Con 
federates had formed behind the uncompleted breast 
works. About this time a most gallant act occurred. 
Unable to draw off two guns of the Staunton Battery, 
which they had seized, the Federals had left them be 
tween the lines. Cutshaw and Garber, the latter the 
battery commander, now saw these guns standing idle 
in the lead-swept space. Not a moment did they hesi 
tate, but, followed by those men of the battery who had 
escaped capture, rushed to the pieces, turned them upon 
the enemy and maintained their fire until the Federal 
line again swept forward. There between the strug 
gling lines they plied the guns with many thousand eyes 
upon them, and not a cannoneer faltered at his post. 
But if this exploit was superb what of that of the gallant 
Capt. Charles R. Montgomery, who had saved two of 
his pieces when the other guns of Page s Battalion were 
captured? Appreciating the seriousness of the situation 
he had moved without a word of direction one of his 
guns with great labor down a small ravine on the right 
of the Harris house to a point within two hundred yards 


of the enemy, and from that position maintained his fire 
against all odds until three full caissons had been ex 

The conspicuous gallantry of Cutshaw, Garber, and 
Montgomery on this occasion won the plaudits of two 
armies, but alone they could not resist the increasing 
pressure on their front. Braxton s, Nelson s, and a 
part of Hardaway s Battalion had been promptly 
posted by Col. Carter under the direction of Gen. Long 
on a second line in rear of them at the gorge, and to the 
left of the Courthouse. From this group, therefore, 
Capt. Dance with Hardaway s batteries now moved 
forward to the gorge, but by noon Long was compelled 
to call for artillery reinforcements from the other 
corps. Accordingly Col. Cabell with the 1st Com 
pany of Richmond Howitzers was ordered to Ewell s 
line from the left and went into action at the left base 
of the salient just to the left of Dance s batteries while 
Mclntosh, with two batteries, also arrived, going into 
position at the Harris house, and posting two guns 
above the McCool house. 

A tremendous infantry combat had been raging 
for some time before the artillery reinforcements ar 
rived. Lee had brought up Perrin s, Harris and Mc- 
Gowan s brigades from his left, and Grant had as 
sembled twenty-four brigades in and about the angle 
of the salient. He had also posted field batteries to rake 
its faces, while eight 24-pounder Coehorn mortars from 
the reserve were placed so as to drop shells behind the 
work at the gorge and behind the traverses along the 
western face. Before 10 o clock, Gen. Lee had brought 
up every man and gun to the salient that could be spared 
for the defense of his broken center. From then on, it 
was but a question of endurance, for all day long the 
struggle continued, neither side being able to make a 
successful advance. During the day diversions were 
made on both sides in favor of the center, the most 
serious fighting being that between Warren and Ander 
son west of the salient. 


At dawn, Warren had opened all his guns and sent 
forward skirmishers to prevent Anderson from detach 
ing troops to Swell s support. Alexander s guns, all 
in position, replied slowly to those of Warren, their 
presence seeming to deter him in his attack. Finally, at 
9:15 A. M.^ Grant ordered him to attack at once, and 
about 10 A. M. his men appeared in the open. By com 
mon consent, Anderson s Infantry and the Artillery 
in the trenches both held their fire until the Federal lines 
were within 100 yards, then opened, while the guns 
which Alexander held in his second line engaged the 
enemy s batteries and diverted their fire from the works. 
No sooner did the blizzard of Confederate fire burst 
upon them than Warren s men turned and fled in such 
utter consternation that it would seem two of his divi 
sions lost their bearings in retiring, and engaged in a 
fire fight with each other for some time, in which both 
lost heavily, while the amazed Confederates merely 
listened as at Chancellorsville during Sickles attack. 
The havoc worked with Warren s assaulting columns, 
not half so dense as those of Hancock, gives some indi 
cation of what would have happened to the latter had 
Long s Artillery, like Alexander s, been in position. 

Soon after Warren s failure, his corps, with the ex 
ception of four brigades, was transferred to the angle, 
adding eight more brigades to the twenty-four already 
massed there for a fresh attack, but Grant abandoned 
his determination when it was discovered that Lee had 
greatly strengthened the gorge line and brought many 
batteries to bear on the space in front, in addition to hav 
ing reinforced his infantry. The Federals for the rest 
of the day simply contented themselves by keeping up a 
heavy infantry and artillery fire to which the Confeder 
ate Infantry replied, while the Artillery maintained 
only a desultory fire in order to save ammunition. 

When night fell, Grant had lost in his great assault, 
6,820 men; Lee 9,000, of which 4,000 were prisoners, 
and twenty guns. Hancock s attack had failed by rea 
son of the excessive number of men required to maneu- 


ver over so limited a space, and nothing of importance 
had been accomplished but the compelling of Lee to 
correct a faulty line, and a certain advance in the relent 
less process of attrition, which comprised the major 
part of the Federal strategy. 

During the night, the remnant of Swell s Corps 
abandoned the faces of the salient, the rear portions of 
which it held throughout the day, and established itself 
behind and improved the works at the gorge. Before 
morning, Long s Artillery, with the batteries sent to its 
assistance, was well intrenched in strong positions, com 
pletely dominating the space within the abandoned faces 
of the salient. The 13th, therefore, proved a day of rest 
since Grant wisely gave up his efforts to break Lee s 
new line. In fact, his troops themselves rendered the 
verdict, for while as brave as any that ever lived, they 
were after all human, and conscious of the futility of 
further assaults. 

On this day, Maj. Cutshaw was assigned to the com 
mand of Hardaway s Battalion, Hardaway having at 
last been compelled by his wounds to relinquish active 
command. The remnants of Cutshaw s and Page s bat 
talions were united under Maj. Page. 

The losses in the 2d Corps Artillery had been un 
usually heavy, but in the other corps little damage had 
been received. First Lieut. Dent Burroughs, command 
ing Moody s Battery, Huger s Battalion, had been 
killed by a shot which penetrated the works. He was 
said by Alexander to have been a superb young officer. 
Several of the 1st Corps guns in the infantry trenches 
had been struck and disabled in the repulse of Warren s 

While the Light Artillery was engaged at Spotsyl- 
vania, the Horse Artillery was winning laurels on 
other fields. Pelham s and Breathed s old battery, 
now under Capt. P. P. Johnston, had again dis 
tinguished itself while operating with Fitz Lee on the 
8th. On that occasion, the battery was near the Court 
house, and well to the front of a portion of Anderson s 


Corps. A strong line of the enemy suddenly advanced 
against Johnston s unsupported guns, which he held in 
position, firing rapidly, while the led horses and dis 
mounted men were retired. The Federals were so 
numerous that four guns were unequal to the task of 
holding them back, and on they pressed, bent on seizing 
the battery. Maj. Breathed, who was present, finally 
ordered Johnston to retire his left section, leaving the 
other with him to cover the withdrawal, but the captain 
declined to leave any of his guns while in action, and 
undertook to withdraw them piece by piece. When the 
enemy had begun to cry for their surrender, and while 
he was preparing to move off the last piece, Johnston 
was shot through the shoulder, and before the gun could 
be limbered the drivers and horses of the lead and swing 
teams were struck down, and the arm of the driver of the 
wheel team was shattered. As if unconscious of the 
presence of the enemy, Maj. Breathed sprang from his 
horse, cut loose the disabled teams that were struggling 
on the ground, mounted a wheel horse, and brought off 
the gun almost as if by a miracle, while the surging 
enemy mingled their cheers with those of Anderson s 
men, who now crossed the crest in rear of the battery, 
and stopped the pursuit. Breathed, Breathed, what a 
name is thine! How justly are thy praises sung by com 
rades and the erstwhile foe alike. It was you of whom 
Wade Hampton wrote, "A braver and more gallant sol 
dier never lived" ; whom Fitz Lee characterized as "one 
of the bravest and best soldiers the Confederacy pro 
duced" ; of whom Wickman said, "Capt. Breathed is the 
best man for the management of a battery of horse ar 
tillery that I have ever known" ; whom Rosser declared 
to be "one of the most noted officers in the Confederacy 
for fighting qualities," and whom Munford claimed to 
be "as brave an officer and as hard a fighter as appeared 
in the war." Of him Fitzhugh Lee, years after the war, 
also wrote, "Should I, for any reason, go to the field 
again, and get in the saddle once more, no one would I 
rather have by my side, were he living, than the gallant 


Breathed." Stuart s opinion of Breathed is amply testi 
fied to by the following letter from him to Lee concern 
ing him: "I will never consent for Capt. Breathed to 
quit the Horse Artillery, with which he has rendered 
such distinguished service, except for certain promotion, 
which he has well earned." 

But, see what the Commander-in-Chief, himself* 
is said to have written of this young officer "With an 
army of Breathed s, I could have conquered the world." 

During the 8th, Sheridan concentrated his cavalry 
in rear of the Federal Army, and moved to the vicinity 
of Fredericksburg. On the morning of the 9th, with 
about 12,000 troops and a large body of horse artillery, 
he struck the Telegraph Road, via Hamilton s Crossing, 
and advanced upon Richmond. At Mitchell s Station, 
he was resisted by Wickham, who was then reinforced by 
Stuart with Fitz Lee s and Gordon s brigades, John 
ston s, Griffin s, and a section of Hart s batteries. Again 
the Confederate Cavalry sought to check Sheridan s 
column at Beaver Dam, but failed. After resting his 
exhausted men for a few hours, Stuart moved rapidly 
to Yellow Tavern, which he reached at 10 A. M., on the 
10th, in advance of Sheridan, and there posted Wick- 
ham on his right and Lomax on the left. The latter s 
line followed the Telegraph Road a short distance, then 
crossed it to a hill on which Breathed had placed a single 
piece of Hart s Battery, a section of which also oc 
cupied the road, while Johnston s Battery was posted 
on an elevation in rear of the line. 

About 4 P. M., the enemy suddenly attacked, captur 
ing most of the men and horses of Griffin s Battery on 
the left, but no guns, and driving back Lomax s line. 
Stuart assembled a handful of men on the road where 
Hart with two guns remained undaunted, firing into 
the flank of the enemy as they swept by. The Federals 
were soon checked by a charge of the 1st Virginia 
Cavalry and driven past the guns, which continued to 
fire upon the surging masses. As the enemy s line re 
tired, a dismounted trooper turned as he passed and dis- 


charged his pistol at Stuart. Thus was the fatal wound 
inflicted upon the great cavalry leader while he stood 
mounted among his guns, seeking by his example to 
rally his cavalry. He died two days later in Richmond. 

The Confederate Cavalry was now badly broken 
up, and Hart almost alone remained between the fallen 
chieftain and the enemy. On this occasion, Hart s con 
duct was as heroic as Poague s had been at the Wilder 
ness. The result of the battle is known. The Confed 
erate Cavalry certainly met with defeat, but Sheridan 
had been delayed and failed to enter Richmond. We 
search in vain, however, for reference to the leading 
part which the Horse Artillery took in this delaying 
action, notwithstanding the fact that it bore the brunt 
of the Federal attack, saved the Cavalry from a com 
plete rout, and remained alone in action long enough 
for the bulk of the Cavalry to rally and retire in order. 
One cavalry regiment, the 1st Virginia, kept its organi 
zation and supported the batteries after the enemy was 

Meanwhile, Shoemaker s Battery remained with 
W. H. F. Lee, near the Army, while Thomson s and 
McGregor s under Chew were operating with Hampton 
and Rosser on the left. 

No account of the Artillery at Spotsylvania would be 
complete without a brief mention, at least, of Maj. 
Joseph McGraw of Pegram s Battalion. 

This remarkable soldier had been discovered by Pe- 
gram, who rapidly caused his advancement from a team 
ster, through the lower grades. He was a man of 
enormous stature and unusual ability, possessing those 
rare qualities which distinguish the born commander. 
His courage was proverbial; the character of the man 
is well illustrated by the following anecdotes related to 
the writer by Capt. W. Gordon McCabe, Adjutant of 
Pegram s Battalion. 

While sitting on his horse at Spotsylvania a solid shot 
tore Maj. McGraw s left arm from his body, leaving 
only a stump in the shoulder socket. For an instant 


his officers and men hesitated in their work to proffer 
aid to their much beloved field-officer. "Don t mind 
me, men," he cried, "I m all right give it to em," and 
with such words on his lips he fell forward from the 
saddle without a cry of pain. 

Upon regaining consciousness, McGraw refused 
to receive the usual anaesthetic, and exercising the 
prerogative of his authority as senior officer to the 
surgeon in attendance, commanded the latter to remove 
the shattered remains of his arm, which was done with 
out eliciting a groan from the patient or a blink from his 
marvelous blue eyes. 

One of his officers undertook to commiserate with 
the Major over his wound. "Pretty bad," replied Mc 
Graw, "I reckon I ll be off duty thirty days." 

Sometime after McGraw s wounding, Col. Pegram 
and his adjutant, who like Damon and Pythias were in 
separable, were sitting in their tents in the lines at 
Petersburg. Orders had been given that no one should 
approach the lines mounted, as the danger from Fed 
eral sharpshooters was very great. The hoof falls of a 
horse were heard approaching, and running to the tent 
door to see who the reckless equestrian might be Col. 
Pegram was confronted by McGraw, who calmly and 
in the most soldierly manner saluted with his right hand 
and reported, "Sir, Maj. Joseph McGraw returns to 

Just before the withdrawal of the Army from the 
Petersburg lines McGraw was promoted lieutenant- 
colonel and placed in charge of 24 guns with their 
horses. A few days later on the retreat he jocularly de 
clared that he held an unparalleled military record in 
that he had lost 23 guns in 24 days ! McGraw knew that 
the man did not live who could justly criticize the recti 
tude of his conduct in battle. 



IN the interval between the 12th and 18th of May, 
Lee gradually moved his army eastward to meet cor 
responding movements of the enemy. The first Corps 
was shifted on the night of the 15th, from the extreme 
left to the extreme right beyond the Fredericksburg 
Road and extending to the Po. Huger s and Haskell s 
battalions were placed in position along the new line, 
while Cabell s was held in reserve. On the morning of 
the 18th, Meade again attempted to break Lee s line 
at the salient where Ewell remained in position with 
thirty pieces of artillery well posted. Long withheld 
his fire until the dense attacking column came within 
short range, when Col. Carter in command of Page s re 
organized battalion gave the word to fire. The murder 
ous fire of canister and spherical case at once arrested 
the advance, threw the enemy into confusion, and hurled 
them back in disorder, and this before they entered the 
zone of effective musketry fire. Indeed before emerging 
from the woods, the attacking infantry was much 
shaken; some of the enemy s brigades were almost at 
once eliminated by the furious fire of the hostile artillery. 
Only a few of the assailants reached the abattis, none 
penetrated it, and the attack over the identical ground, 
which had formed the battlefield of the 12th, was not re 
newed. Few of the Confederate infantrymen discharged 
their muskets, and practically no loss was sustained 
either by the Confederate Artillery or Infantry. The 
Federal medical returns state that "five hundred and 
fifty-two wounded was the result, and the character of 
the wounds were unusually severe, a large portion being 
caused by shell and canister." Thus did the twenty- 
nine guns actually engaged by Carter overthrow 12,000 
picked infantry. One pauses to contemplate what might 
have been the result on the 12th had Long been prepared 



to meet Hancock s attack. When we consider the effect 
of Alexander s Artillery on that same day, and of 
Carter s guns on the 18th, the contention that Hancock s 
crowded masses would never have reached the Bloody 
Angle on the 12th, had the artillery been in position, 
seems well supported. 

During the afternoon, and after the failure of the 
Federal assault, Ewell determined to make a flank 
movement around Meade s right. Braxton, with six 
guns of select caliber, was ordered to accompany the 
column, but the roads proving impassable, due to the 
heavy rains of the past week, he was soon compelled to 
return to the lines. Simultaneously with his attack on 
Ewell, Meade had assailed Hill s line in front of the 
Courthouse. Placing a number of batteries in a posi 
tion from which they could partially enfilade the works 
of the 3d Corps, Meade attempted to advance a large 
number of guns under cover of their fire, and with them 
prepare the way for a large infantry assault in force. 
Pegram s and Cutts batteries bore the brunt of the 
furious cannonade, which ensued during the next hour, 
and succeeded in silencing the more advanced batteries 
of the enemy, which caused the attack to be abandoned. 
In the artillery duel Maj. Joseph McGraw, of Pe 
gram s Battalion, was severely wounded, as were sev 
eral other officers. Richardson s Battalion further to 
the right and Alexander s Artillery beyond were not 

Unsupported by artillery, Ewell had lost 900 men, 
but he learned on the 19th that the enemy had not only 
moved from Anderson s front, leaving his dead and 
wounded on the ground, but was also preparing to move 
from his own front. Early on the 21st he discovered 
that he was unopposed, so the 2d Corps, with all its ar 
tillery, was moved to the right, passing by the other 
corps to the Telegraph Road south of the Po, and then 
by that road toward Hanover Junction. Later in the 
day, the 1st Corps, with its artillery and some of 
Walker s battalions, followed Ewell. That night the 



3d Corps with its remaining artillery brought up the 
rear after a collision with Warren s troops, in which 
sharp skirmishing occurred. A. P. Hill then moved 
upon Hanover Junction by a road slightly west of and 
almost parallel to the Telegraph Road. About noon on 
the 22d, after a march of thirty miles, the head of Lee s 
column reached the North Anna, and before night the 
whole army was in position on the south bank, having 
moved over the chord of the arc which Grant had been 
compelled to follow. 

In the new position near Hanover Junction, the 1st 
Corps occupied the center at the Telegraph Road 
bridge, the 2d extending down and the 3d up the river 
on the right and left, respectively. The small works at 
the crossing, which had been prepared in advance, were 
now greatly strengthened and every available gun was 
placed in position, the Artillery with an extensive and 
unrestricted field of fire completely commanding every 

Breckinridge s Division from the Valley joined the 
Army here with two battalions of artillery under Maj. 
William McLaughlin ; these troops were held in reserve 
at Hanover Junction. 

The reinforcement which Breckinridge brought to 
Lee did not number over 3,500 men, but they were sea 
soned troops and the additional artillery more than made 
up for the loss in guns at Spotsylvania. Breckinridge 
had fought one of the most brilliant small engagements 
of the war on the 15th at New Market in the Valley, 
where with about 4,500 men of all arms, he had defeated 
Sigel with not less than 6,000 men and 28 guns, thus 
preventing him from seizing the upper Valley and mov 
ing around Lee s flank. It was in this interesting bat 
tle, of far more importance than the numbers engaged 
would seem to indicate, that the Corps of Cadets of the 
Virginia Military Institute with four companies under 
its commandant and a section of artillery under Cadet 
Capt. C. H. Minge, aggregating about 250, saved the 


Confederates from defeat by a brilliant charge at the 
crisis of the combat, losing 9 killed and 48 wounded, or 
over twenty per cent of the Corps.* But the charge of 
the cadets was not the only brilliant incident of the bat 
tle, for Maj. William McLaughlin, formerly captain of 
the 1st Rockbridge Battery, in command of Breckin- 
ridge s Artillery, there won fresh laurels for his arm of 
the service. His command consisted of Chapman s, 
Jackson s, and McClannahan s batteries, with six, four, 
and six guns, respectively, and a total personnel of about 
250 men, to which was added in the battle, the cadet 
section of two rifles and thirty men. This battalion of 
artillery was one of those which Breckinridge now 
brought to the Army. The most careful research fails to 
disclose with certainty the composition of the other bat 
talion at this time under McLaughlin s command. It 
will be recalled, however, that Pendleton had urged 
Alexander to endeavor to secure two batteries of Col. J. 
Floyd King s Battalion for the 1st Corps, but before 
January this battalion was transferred from the south, 
where it had been operating, to Gen. Samuel Jones 
command in the Department of Western Virginia with 
the following organization: 

Capt. George L. Davidson 

Davidson s Lynchburg Battery, Lieut. John T. Johnson. 

Lowry s Wise Legion Battery, Lieut. J. H. Pence. 

Richmond Otey Battery, Capt. David N. Walker. 

Danville Ringgold Battery, Capt. Crispen Dickenson. 

But on May 1, the return of Breckinridge s Division 
shows the following batteries : 

Monroe Virginia Battery, Capt. George B. Chapman. 

Lewisburg Battery, Capt. Thomas A. Bryan. 

Roanoke Battery, Capt. Warren S. Lurty. 

Botetourt Battery. Capt. Henry C. Douthat. 

Rhett (Tenn.) Battery, Capt. William H. Burroughs. 

Tennessee Battery, Capt. Hugh L. W. McClung. 

Charlottes ville Battery, Capt. Thomas E. Jackson. 

*For full account of this heroic incident, see The Military History of the 
V. M. I., J. C. Wise, and The Battle of New Market, John S. Wise. 


The effective personnel of these seven batteries num 
bered 30 officers and 597 men. Before Breckinridge 
joined Lee, he himself was joined by Imboden with Mc- 
Clannahan s Battery, which as we have seen with Chap 
man s and Jackson s batteries comprised McLaughlin s 
Battalion. On May 5th, Breckinridge was ordered to 
send Col. King with two of his four batteries to the 
Army of Northern Virginia for assignment to the 1st 
Corps, and the other two were to remain with Breckin 
ridge. According to statements in the history of the 
Washington Artillery, by Maj. Wm. M. Owen, pp. 
328, 347, the 13th Virginia Battalion which he had com 
manded in East Tennessee was in the trenches with 
Breckinridge at Cold Harbor on June 6, and was com 
manded by Lieut.-Col. King, himself, and when 
he was reassigned to its command July 31 it consisted 
of Davidson s, Dickenson s and Walker s batteries. 

Exclusive of these two battalions, Lee s Artillery per 
sonnel now numbered : 

1st Corps, 465; 2d Corps, 1,977; and 3d Corps, 2,632; 
total 4,074, with an aggregate present and absent of 
6,563.* The twenty pieces lost at Spotsylvania and the 
casualties in personnel, were more than compensated for 
by the reinforcement with Breckinridge, so that at the 
North Anna, Lee had in the strongest position he had 
yet occupied in this campaign, and by far the most 
favorable one for artillery, not less than 225 guns 
manned by the most numerous artillery personnel ever 
brought by him into action. 

At this time, the Federal Army, with the reinforce 
ments it had received, numbered about 100,000 men with 
an undiminished force of artillery, while the entire Con 
federate force, including an additional reinforcement 
which soon arrived under Pickett, did not exceed 40,000 
men, or about 35,000 infantry and 5,000 artillery. Ac 
cording to Col. Taylor s estimate, the reinforcement re 
ceived by the Confederates from the Wilderness to Cold 

*See Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1136. 
Horse Artillery, 473 present for duty. Aggregate present and absent, 674. 


Harbor, was about 14,400 men, while during the same 
time Grant brought up 50,000 fresh troops. Thus it is 
seen that the proportion of artillery to infantry con 
tinued to increase as the infantry failed in numbers, be 
ing now nearly seven guns per thousand infantry, with 
the artillery personnel comprising about one-seventh of 
the field army. Truly were the precedents of Frederick 
and Napoleon being followed. 

The Confederates had hardly commenced intrenching 
on the 23d, when the enemy appeared on the north bank 
in the forenoon, and opened fire with artillery upon the 
bridge-head works at the north ends of the railroad and 
Telegraph Road bridges, which had been constructed the 
year before. Eight guns of Huger s and a like number 
of Haskell s Battalion were quickly placed in position 
near the river by Alexander for the defense of these 
works, while the Chief of Artillery reconnoitered the de 
fensive line above and below them. The fords on the 
right were soon protected by the Artillery of the 2d 
Corps, Braxton s Battalion being posted well in advance 
near the Doswell house. About 4:30 p. M. Warren s 
Corps crossed the river without opposition at Jericho 
Ford, four miles above the Chesterfield bridge on the 
Telegraph Road, while Hancock advanced along the 
Telegraph Road, and Burnside on his right moved to 
wards Ox Ford Crossing. Burnside was unable to cross 
and Hancock was held back in reserve. From the 3d 
Corps, Heth s Division with Poague s Battalion, and 
Wilcox s Division with Pegram s Battalion, were now 
sent to oppose Warren, while Macintosh s Battalion was 
placed in position to cover Anderson s Ford on Hill s 
right, and below him near the center of the position Maj. 
Lane with six rifles of Cutts Battalion was posted on a 
bluff back of the Montgomery house, which commanded 
both the Chesterfield bridge and Anderson s Ford above. 

Warren had formed line of battle in a very favorable 
position with his front concealed within the edge of a 
wood. His left rested on the river, which made a large 
concave bend in his rear, and again drew near his right. 


The open ground in front of his right flank was com 
manded by his artillery. But, while his position was a 
strong one, his situation in relation to the rest of Meade s 
Army was precarious, for a river lay between him and 
his supports. As Hill s two divisions formed for attack, 
Poague and Pegram advanced under cover of rising 
ground behind the right of the line, until within good 
supporting distance of the infantry, and as the Con 
federates moved out to attack, their batteries, hitherto 
unseen, galloped to the crest in their front and opened 
with destructive effect upon the enemy s reserves at the 
ford. Cutler s Division on the Federal right was broken 
and pursued by Hill s troops, but the Federal artillery 
on that .flank first checked the Confederates and then 
engaged in a duel with Pegram and Poague, who had 
meanwhile thrown the Federal reserves massed near the 
left into great disorder. In the Federal center, Griffin s 
Division in the woods maintained itself with great reso 
lution, and Hill was compelled to forego the attack. 
In the artillery duel which ensued, Maj. Ward, a most 
valuable officer of Poague s Battalion, was killed by a 
cannon shot. Meanwhile, Mclntosh had also become en 
gaged with the enemy s artillery, losing Lieutenant 
Pearce, in command of Clutter s Battery, and a limber 
by explosion. In the center, Haskell and Huger had 
held the bridges in their front, but the small infantry line 
in the works on the north bank had either been captured 
or forced to retire, leaving the works in the hands of the 
enemy, who had aproached under cover of the ravines 
leading to the river and which the Confederate batteries 
were unable to search effectively. At nightfall, the south 
end of the railroad bridge was burned, and soon the 
Confederate center and right was moved back to a line 
further from the river and on more advantageous 
ground. This line, according to Gen. Alexander, was 
too good, for its apparent strength defeated Lee s ob 
ject, which was to induce the enemy, by withdrawing, to 
attack him. Its center rested on the river half a mile 
above the Ox Ford bridge, and thence, leaving the 


North Anna, it ran across the narrow peninsula formed 
by the bend in the river, one and a half miles to Little 
River, where its left rested. From the center on the 
river the line ran southeast across another bend of the 
river and rested three miles below near Morris Bridge. 
Along the center and right, the batteries of the 1st and 
2d Corps were posted with their infantry while the 3d 
Corps held the left. 

On the morning of the 24th, the enemy s 5th and 6th 
Corps formed in front of Lee s left wing, while the 2d 
and part of the 9th crossed to the south bank and ap 
peared in front of his right. Occasional skirmishing and 
artillery firing broke out during the morning, but while 
Meade s troops were massing nothing serious occurred. 
Demonstrations on the Confederate left caused 
Poague s Battalion to be sent to the extreme flank at 
Little River, Pegram s, Mclntosh s, and Lane s bat 
talions retaining their positions of the previous day, 
while Richardson s with Mahone s Division occupied a 
second line near the Anderson house. Gordon s Divi 
sion, with Braxton s Battalion, soon joined Mahone, and 
Breckinridge s Division with its two artillery battalions 
was moved up to take Gordon s place on the right. 

One need only look at the map to appreciate the pe 
culiar situation of Meade s Army. To say the least, it 
was a dangerous one, affording a tactical opportunity 
to the Confederates, which eluded them by reason of the 
illness of Gen. Lee. The point cannot here be discussed 
further. The possibilities of the situation belong to the 
realm of speculation, for the only activity was on the 
part of the Federals. Burnside was first ordered to at 
tack and carry Ox Ford, which, if done, would at 
once unite the Federal wings and correct the evils of 
Meade s position. If successful, the attack would also 
divide Lee s wings. But Burnside pronounced the task 
assigned to him impossible, and did not even attempt it. 
Hancock, on his left and Warren, on his right, each ad 
vanced skirmishers and felt Lee s lines, but both re 
ported against a serious attack, for they had acquired 


from their recent experiences the utmost respect for the 
defensive abilities of the Confederates. Furthermore, 
they now saw the Confederate Artillery well intrenched 
and bearing upon every portion of the field over which 
they would have to advance, and well knew the power of 
its guns in such a position. The lesson of Fredericks- 
burg had not been forgotten to say nothing of recent 
events at Spotsylvania, where artillery alone had 
hurled their splendid columns back on several occasions, 
almost without the aid of infantry. They saw here 
these same guns in the most favorable position they had 
yet occupied, with a clear field of fire unbroken by cov 
ered approaches of any kind, and they knew that to pass 
through the zone of artillery fire was but the first stage 
of the attack, for those guns could not be silenced and 
would remain in the front line to add their canister 
to the musketry effect of an infantry, never yet driven 
from its works. Thus Lee, who, in spite of his 
physical condition, was seeking to impress his army with 
the necessity of striking the enemy a crushing blow when 
the opportunity arrived, was deprived of his chance by 
the forbidding aspect of his position. Nor was Lee 
capable at the psychological moment of supplying his 
army with the necessary energy to enable it to assume 
the offensive. His subordinates assigned the same ob 
jections to an attack on the Federals that the latter had 
advanced against the plan to assault Lee s position. 
The country occupied by the Federals on both flanks, 
and especially on their left, was flat and open, allowing 
the most effective use of their artillery and infantry be 
hind well prepared intrenchments, and the Confederates 
knew full well that Hunt was in command of Meade s 
Artillery. Others might blunder, but they were satis 
fied that Hunt would make the most of any natural or 
artificial aid afforded by the terrain, and that as at 
Malvern Hill, Sharpsburg, and Gettysburg, the Fed 
eral Artillery would prove a bulk-head, which could not 
be battered in, even after the infantry had been driven 
to cover. If the Federals had learned to respect Lee s 


Artillery, none the less had the Confederates learned to 
respect Hunt. They never entertained the least mis 
giving as to their ability to drive the enemy s infantry, 
nor were they especially mindful of the Federal guns 
in other hands, but there was not a man in Lee s Army 
who had not been impressed by the splendid abilities of 
Hunt as an artillerist, and they never counted on his 
making a mistake. A close study of the struggle be 
tween the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of 
the Potomac will satisfy the student that no officer in 
the Federal Army, from first to last, commanded the 
same respect from his enemy that Henry J. Hunt did. 

Had Lee been entirely invalided and absent from his 
army, as it lay in position on the North Anna, with the 
Federals in a dilemma before it, it is possible something 
might have been attempted by the Confederates. Some 
strong will might have improved the opportunity which 
Meade s position afforded. But, with Lee present, 
neither the collective nor any individual will was capable 
of asserting itself. It was impossible for the Army 
to realize that he was really incapacitated, and the most 
natural inertia of his subordinates under the circum 
stances was heightened by a confidence in his genius, 
almost sublime. Such is the effect of a master mind 
upon mediocrity. It may be frequently noted in the 
history of war. Who would have dared take the lead 
in Italy with Hannibal present? And in the whole list 
of Napoleon s marshals, however brilliant as fighting 
lieutenants they may have been, we fail to detect a 
single captain. The one man beside Lee in the Army 
of Northern Virginia, who may be classed as a captain, 
had fallen at Chancellorsville. Had he been present, 
even Lee no doubt would have temporarily surrendered 
the reins of control with a confidence born of experience, 
impossible in the case of Ewell, A. P. Hill, or Ander 
son, his corps commanders. This is an assertion which 
must not be taken as a reflection upon any of the 
three gallant lieutenants then leading the Confederate 
Corps, for we are not discussing their potentialities as 


captains, but conditions as they actually were. We 
are projecting our view deep into the human side of 
the situation, which is the only way a true understand 
ing of many military problems may be had, and the 
more the historian cultivates this habit, the more cor 
rectly will history be written. When Napoleon declared 
that history was essentially false, he did so in the full 
knowledge that the historian commonly reasoned from 
effect to cause, and not from cause to effect. Conscious 
of the motives which guided his own career and the cir 
cumstances which dictated his military maneuvers, his 
faith in the history of his time based, as it was, upon the 
imperfect perceptions of his critics, was entirely de 
stroyed, and he realized that what was true in his own 
case was true in the case of others. With what scorn 
must he have viewed historians who insisted upon 
logic for the satisfaction of their formulae! "Here is a 
result," said the military critic; "give us that orderly 
process of reasoning and events which led to it, and in 
such a way that the science of war as propounded in 
our manuals will be exemplified." And, so to meet 
their demands and to discourage his opponents, who in 
variably sought to observe every rule of war, failing 
of course in the attempt, he caused Berthier to manu 
facture what they required. Thus was the world mis 
led, and yet it still continues in the attempt to formu 
late the operations of one who was neither guided by, 
nor observed, any rule. All this is true of every great 
soldier, and never until this fact is grasped will the 
world appreciate the loss it suffered when Lee died 
without writing the history of his military career. In 
that work, had it been written, the mist which en 
shrouds the science of war, especially the leading of an 
army, would have been dissipated, for free as he was 
of all vanity, deceit, and personal interest, he would 
have set forth no false formulae as the guiding princi 
ples of Chancellorsville, and the Wilderness, and he 
would have acknowledged many blunders which proved 
both successful and unsuccessful, and for the commis- 


sion of which science has been called upon to supply 
the reasons. An account of his military operations 
would have set forth the human side of war as never be 
fore or since disclosed, and the full truth of Moltke s 
definition of war as "the practical adaptation of the 
means at hand to the accomplishment of the end in 
view" would have dawned upon every reader. The 
usual manual of military field engineering prescribes 
in detail the kind of intrenchments suited to a given 
position, and even declares how many men are required, 
and how long it will take them, to erect these works. 
But suppose the first blow of the mattock uncovers 
stone instead of sinking the tool in unresisting earth? 
What then of position and time? Shall the troops lay 
exposed on the rugged slope simply because the posi 
tion is the correct one according to formulas and Krieg- 
spiel? Will the enemy lie dormant, while dynamite is 
brought forward to supply the place of pick and spade? 
How better, than by these queries, can the real meaning 
of the science of war be illustrated, or the tactics of 
Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, and the Wilder 
ness be explained? The leader of troops is but a mili 
tary engineer by whom every expedient must be em 
ployed. In the solution of the problem, if the human, 
the psychological element, is ignored, the troops will 
be exposed on the prescribed position. 

The foregoing disgression may appear at first sight 
to have little bearing upon the situation at Hanover 
Junction. In truth it has all to do with it, for in the 
problem the human element is the unknown factor to 
the ordinary critic, which, when introduced into the 
equation, solves it. 

Before Lee recovered his motive power sufficiently to 
take advantage of his opportunity at the North Anna, 
Grant removed the temptation by withdrawing his 
troops across the river and setting them in motion for the 
Pamunkey. During the last two days of his presence 
before the Confederates, Lee s Artillery had been little 
engaged. But two incidents in connection with the use 


of the guns should be preserved. On the 24th, Lane s 
Battalion had been actively employed in harassing the 
enemy near the Telegraph Road bridge, and in doing 
so had drawn upon itself a heavy fire from the hostile 
batteries across the river, which caused some loss. Burst 
ing in one of Lane s pits, where several detachments of 
men were under cover, a shell ignited the tow in a 
dismounted ammunition chest, which it shattered. The 
explosion of the ammunition, which was momentarily 
expected, would probably have killed every man in the 
pit. Seeing the danger, Capt. John R. Wingfield and 
private Hemington, without thought for their own 
safety, sprang to the chest and extinguished the blaze 
with their hands. The other incident also concerns 
a battery of this (Cutts or Lane s) battalion. Bat 
tery "A," in command of Lieut. Lucius G. Rees, had 
been left with McGowan s Brigade as the rear guard of 
the 3d Corps in the movement from Spotsylvania to the 
North Anna. It was, therefore, at the very rear of the 
whole army. When Hill collided with the enemy, Rees 
with his four guns was cut off by a large force of infan 
try, and with unusual presence of mind dashed past 
them to prevent the capture of his battery. This 
brought him in the enemy s rear, but he unlimbered and, 
firing a piece at a time, while the others withdrew, he 
managed to elude his pursuers with the loss of but one 
man mortally wounded. Moving by a long circuit to 
the west and south, he then passed around the enemy s 
right at Little River, and rejoined his battalion on the 
24th, after two days of separation, most of which time 
he was in the enemy s rear. 

Pickett s Division of about 3,300 men rejoined from 
Petersburg about this time. 



AT noon on the 26th, Grant sent Sheridan, who had 
rejoined the Army with the cavalry after a raid to the 
James River, with the pontoon train to Hanover Town 
on the Pamunkey River, under orders to prepare the 
crossing, and after dark the infantry followed. Screened 
by cavalry pickets, the withdrawal of the enemy was 
not discovered by the Confederates until the morning 
of the 27th, when Lee again took up the race. Moving 
by the Telegraph and parallel roads, towards Ashland, 
thence towards Atlee s Station, the Army bivouacked 
for the night after an exhausting march of about fifteen 
miles near Half Sink and Hughes Shop. While the 
Army was covering the remaining thirteen miles to the 
Totopotomoy on the 28th, Hampton and Fitz Lee, with 
all the Horse Artillery, were opposing Sheridan s ad 
vance at Hawe s Shop on the road from Hanover Town 
to Atlee s Station. This affair was one of the severest 
cavalry engagements of the war, and was only broken 
off by both armies arriving and taking up positions con 
fronting each other. As the Confederates arrived, 
Breckinridge s Division with McLaughlin s Battalion 
of artillery occupied the southwest bank of Totopoto 
moy Creek on the left of Lee s line, at the Hanover 
Town Road. Next came the 1st Corps, Alexander 
promptly placing every available gun in position on 
Anderson s right, then the 2d Corps now under Early, 
with Long s batteries well placed. The right of the 
line near and beyond Pole Green Church was occupied 
by the 3d Corps, while Walker s battalions were parked 
in reserve behind Breckinridge s Division on the left. 
Again had Lee won the race, in which at one time the 
Federals were eight miles nearer Richmond than the 


The next morning, Walker posted Macintosh s Bat 
talion on the left of the Hanover Town Road to sup 
port Breckinridge, before whom the enemy had ap 
peared in force, and the following day some of Lane s 
batteries were placed in position between Mclntosh 
and McLaughlin. Alexander had skillfully placed bat 
teries from Cabell s and Huger s battalions on Breckin 
ridge s right, so as to secure for them an enfilade fire 
down his front and a cross-fire with Walker s batteries, 
and during the 30th and 31st all these guns were con 
stantly and most effectively engaged against the 
enemy s infantry and artillery. While the enemy 
demonstrated throughout these two days against Lee s 
left, active efforts were also directed upon the 2d Corps, 
the Artillery of which now under Carter, Gen. Long 
having been incapacitated by a severe illness, proved 
most effective. Nelson s Battalion on the evening of 
the 30th accompanied Rodes Division on the Old 
Church Road and took a prominent part in the attack 
which drove the enemy s left from Johnson s farm to 
Bethesda Church. In this affair, First Lieut. Ancell, 
of the Fluvanna Battery, a meritorious officer, was 
killed. Returning to the lines that night with the infan 
try division, Nelson s Battalion resumed its old posi 
tion, while Hardaway who had recovered from his 
wound and rejoined his battalion on the 21st, posted his 
guns on Nelson s left. Braxton, Cutshaw, and Page 
held their battalions in reserve. 

Though maintaining the greatest activity in Lee s 
front along the Totopotomoy, Meade could not bring 
himself to the point of a real assault on the Confeder 
ate lines. Again he found Lee well intrenched; the 
activity of the Confederate artillery alone sufficed to 
give the warning, for here as before the Confederate bat 
teries held the Federals at arm s length, while the infan 
try for the most part rested in the trenches. With the 
exception of Rodes brilliant attack on the Federal left, 
the infantry was not called upon to exert itself. On the 
left where the threat was the most serious, the front was 


so thoroughly dominated by Mclntosh, McLaughlin, 
Lane, Cabell and Huger, with upwards of fifty guns, 
that the Federal Infantry hardly disturbed the men in 
the trenches. Verily was the Artillery doing its part 
by its sister arm in this campaign. Shoulder to shoulder 
it stood with the Infantry and watched and fought while 
the latter conserved its strength. 

On May 30, Hoke s Division with Dearing s old 
battalion, now commanded by Maj. J. P. W. Read, 
was ordered to march from Drewry s Bluff and join the 
Army. The battalion still consisted of Blount s, 
Caskie s, Macon s, and Marshall s (Stribling s) bat 
teries, with a personnel of 17 officers and 355 men pre 
sent for duty, and 16 guns.* But one battalion re 
mained absent from the 1st Corps, and that, the Wash 
ington Artillery now under Maj. Owen, was stationed 
near Drewry s Bluff, having rendered distinguished 
service in the operations against Butler, south of the 

Before resuming the narrative, it seems proper to 
give a brief account of the operations of Read s or 
Dearing s old battalion while detached from the Army 
with Pickett, especially as no history of the Artillery of 
the Army of Northern Virginia would be complete 
without reference to the heroic service rendered by one 
of the batteries in particular. 

On the 1st of February, Pickett with Hoke s, Cling- 
man s, and a part of Corse s Brigade, and Read s Bat 
talion, had moved from Kinston, N. C., to threaten 
Newberne, while Dearing in command of the cavalry 
covered the front. Barton s three brigades and a naval 
force on the Neuse were to cooperate with Pickett. 

Dearings movement towards the north was success 
ful in diverting the attention of the Federals from 
Pickett s columns, and Col. R. Taylor Wood, with his 
small flotilla, effected a complete surprise, capturing a 
gunboat under the very walls of the fort at JSTewberne. 
By 2 o clock in the morning Pickett reached Bache- 

*Now designated 38th Battalion Virginia Artillery. 


lor s Creek, seven miles distant, where he struck the 
enemy s troops whose pickets were captured, but being 
reinforced the Federal force checked the Confederate 
advance, after the outer defenses had been lost. Pickett 
now impatiently awaited the result of Barton s flank 
movement, which was to open his way to Newberne, but 
Barton failed to cooperate as planned and after remain 
ing in position all the next day, Pickett was compelled 
to retire to Kinston after inflicting some damage upon 
the enemy, including the capture of a section of artillery 
and a large number of horses, wagons, etc. In Pickett s 
assault upon the enemy, in front of Newberne, Capt. 
William H. Caskie in command of the Richmond 
Hampden Battery, with his teams in a gallop actually 
led the charge of the infantry. Almost instantly his 
horse was wounded, but the gallant young officer seized 
a musket and continued on foot at the head of his bat 
tery. Seeing that he was dismounted, Gen. Pickett 
sent him a fresh horse, upon which he continued in the 
fight, not halting to unlimber his guns until within 
a stone s throw of the enemy s infantry. For his 
superb conduct on this occasion, he was soon promoted, 
Capt. J. E. Sullivan succeeding to the command of his 

The oldest of Read s batteries was the Richmond 
Fayette, named as we have seen in honor of LaFayette, 
who was visiting Richmond when it was formed, May 
27, 1824. In acknowledgement of the compliment, the 
distinguished Frenchman presented the battery with 
two brass 6-pounders, which he had brought to this 
country during the Revolution. Col. John Rutherford 
was its first commander, Col. Henry Coalter Cabell 
commanding it in April, 1861, when it volunteered for 
duty, soon being assigned to Magruder at Yorktown, 
from which time it had served in every great battle of 
Lee s Army. 

The Fauquier, or Stribling s original battery, had 
also served with great distinction from the first, having 
been specially mentioned in the Federal reports of the 



fighting at Turkey Island just after Malvern Hill, 
where without support it repulsed a cavalry charge. It 
was one of the few batteries to pursue the enemy on their 
retreat from Second Manassas. Later it accompanied 
Longstreet on the Suffolk campaign, in which it was 
surrounded by an overwhelming force and lost its guns 
and officers. After the latter were exchanged the bat 
tery was reorganized and rearmed with six Napoleons 
at Richmond, and took part in the Gettysburg campaign 
as we have seen. Stribling was soon thereafter promoted 
and succeeded by Lieut. William C. Marshall, who in 
command of the battery escaped with it from Appo- 
mattox, disbanded his men and destroyed his guns at 

The remaining or the Latham-Dearing-Blount Bat 
tery was organized in Lynchburg in April, 1861, and 
served under its first commander at First Manassas. It 
is said by some to have fired the first Confederate gun 
on that day. Serving throughout the war with great 
distinction, it also escaped the Surrender and disbanded 
at Lynchburg, after destroying its guns. After 
Latham transferred to the Branch, N. C., Battery, 
Dearing established his brilliant reputation as an ar 
tillerist with this Lynchburg battery. 

Such was the record of this battalion, which more than 
any other had served apart from the army to which it 
belonged. The foregoing facts have been given lest its 
detached service on other fields might be thought to have 
injured its record. 

On the 31st, Sheridan took possession of Cold Har 
bor, to which point Meade at once sent the 6th 
Corps. The sidling movement was again met by Lee, 
who dispatched the 1st Corps, a part of the 3d, and 
Breckinridge s and Hoke s divisions, the last having just 
arrived from Petersburg, with Read s Battalion of ar 
tillery, to his right with a view towards turning and at 
tacking Meade s left. Cabell s, Huger s, Haskell s, and 
Read s battalions were to cooperate with Kershaw s, 


Pickett s, Field s, and Hoke s divisions, respectively, 
while McLaughlin operated with Breckinridge. 

Grant had also ordered Gen. W. F. Smith with the 
18th Corps, just landed at the White House with 10,- 
000 men and 16 guns, to Cold Harbor. With but fifteen 
miles to march, Smith lost his way and it was 4 p. M. 
of the 1st when the 18th united with the 6th Corps, 
which arrived about 10 A. M., after a distressing night 

Kershaw had arrived and attacked Sheridan about 
6 A. M., but putting in only two brigades, they were re 
pulsed by the Federal troopers with their magazine car 
bines. Hoke, on Kershaw T s right, who had not been 
placed under Anderson s command, failed to attack, and 
the remainder of the long column with practically all 
the Artillery remained halted in rear on the roads, 
while the 6th Corps was arriving in support of Sheridan. 
The whole movement was a distinct failure, and through 
lack of leadership and clear orders a brilliant oppor 
tunity to strike the 6th Corps en route, which was well 
assembled by 1 P. M., was lost. Meantime, the Con 
federate column had been ordered to intrench as it stood, 
and the guns were ordered up and placed along the line. 
The works were no more than kneeling intrenchments, 
however, when Grant about 5 p. M. ordered the 6th and 
18th corps to assault the Confederate line over an in 
tervening space of about 1,400 yards. Between Ker- 
shaw s and Hoke s divisions was an interval of about 
50 yards occupied by a strip of marshy ground. The 
Confederates had given up all ideas of an attack that 
evening, when a sudden increase of fire along the picket 
line 300 yards in front of the main line and the opening 
of the enemy s guns interrupted their digging. It was 
soon learned that the enemy had been successfully re 
sisted by Hoke, Kershaw, and Pickett, upon whose 
divisions the attack had fallen, except at the gap, 
from which a thicket extended well forward, allow 
ing the Federals as at Second Manassas and Fredericks- 
burg to approach the line unobserved. A large Fed- 


eral force had worked through this interval to the rear 
of the Confederate line, and soon compelled Kershaw 
and Hoke to refuse their adjacent brigades and extend 
across the gap in its rear. This action, which should have 
been taken long before, checked the enemy after they 
had taken several hundred prisoners. Hinton s and 
Gregg s brigades of the 1st Corps were now hurried to 
the spot and driving back the enemy reestablished the 
line, while the Federals intrenched themselves about 300 
yards in its front. Darkness put an end to the fight. 
The Artillery had hardly fired a shot, for so dense were 
the woods that no position was available for its use. 
During the night a Napoleon gun of Cabell s Battalion, 
under Lieut. Falligant, was posted in the rear of the 
gap in a position much exposed to the enemy s sharp 
shooters, and not more than 50 yards distant from them. 
The other pieces of Cabell s Battalion were now posted 
along Kershaw s, while Huger s and Haskell s batter 
ies occupied Pickett s and Field s line extending to the 

Meade had also made a serious attempt against the 
3d Corps on Anderson s left, but the assault fell upon 
Heth s position, where Hardaway s Battalion had by 
merest good fortune been posted near the Mander 
house. Under cover of a skirt of woods, the Federals 
advanced to within 50 yards of the Confederate in- 
trenchments, but at that point were overwhelmed by 
Hardaway s canister fire. Having very little protec 
tion, Hardaway s batteries suffered severely and were 
relieved during the night by Poague s Battalion. 

By the morning of the 2d of June, the opposing lines 
had settled down in their intrenchments closer to each 
other than ever before, the hostile troops so close that 
every exposed movement was plainly discernible. Three 
Federal corps now confronted Lee s right at Cold Har 
bor, while the other two lay opposite Early s or the 2d 
Corps, at Bethesda Church. The fighting opened with a 
renewed effort on the part of the Federals to force the 
gap in Anderson s line, but Falligant s single piece was 


kept constantly in action, and by the expenditure of an 
enormous amount of canister passed along the line by 
hand to it for several hundred yards, kept the swampy 
space clear of the enemy while his gallant detachment 
was relieved from time to time from the batteries 

In the afternoon, Gen. Early, perceiving a move 
ment that indicated a withdrawal of the enemy from his 
front, advanced against Burnside s right flank, making 
a half wheel with the Johnson house position as his 
pivot. Gen. Long, though still ill, had returned to duty 
the day before. Cutshaw moved his battalion out of its 
works and posted it in line with Garber s Battery on the 
right just beyond the old Church Road. 

This was a most fortunate disposition, and one which 
enabled Garber with canister to check the pursuit of 
one of Gordon s brigades, which pursuit was repulsed 
and driven back by the guns. But Early s movement 
was as a whole most successful. Striking Burnside s 
Corps while in motion and sweeping down on Warren s 
right, he not only took a number of prisoners with small 
loss to himself, but prevented two entire corps from 
taking part in the attack at Cold Harbor, which had 
been planned by Grant. Long s Artillery had been 
greatly assisted by Haskell s Battalion on Field s front, 
which Alexander had moved out in front of the works 
in order to get an enfilade fire. This battalion kept up 
a constant fire upon Warren s line and prevented it 
from changing front. All day the sharpshooting and 
artillery practice were incessant. During this day a 
number of Alexander s gun carriages in Pickett s and 
Kershaw s front were actually disabled by bullets which 
passed through the embrasures and cut the spokes of 
the wheels. The terrain behind the intrenchments was 
so flat that it was fully exposed to even the frontal fire 
of the enemy, which prevented all movements of men 
and horses. 

During the day, Grant received a fresh reinforcement 
of 5,000 troops, who were to take part with Wilson s 


Cavalry in a flank attack on Early in the morning, 
while Burnside and Warren made a frontal assault. 
Meanwhile, Lee had by marching Breckinridge s, Wil- 
cox s, and Mahone s divisions across his rear, extended 
Hoke s line to the Chickahominy, picketing the south 
bank of the river with Fitz Lee s Cavalry and John 
ston s and Shoemaker s batteries. During the night, 
Cutshaw was relieved by Hardaway, and the position 
of Kershaw s left at the gap was slightly changed and 
greatly strengthened by placing there four guns of Ca- 
bell s Battalion, behind good epaulments, to one of 
which Falligant s gun was noiselessly withdrawn after 
the old works were levelled to the ground. Law s Bri 
gade was also moved up as a support and intrenched in 
rear of the line at this point, for the massing of the 
enemy s columns opposite had been plainly heard. 

The Confederates in the best of spirits and utmost 
confidence were waiting under arms for the attack, when 
at the first blush of dawn the fire of the pickets in the 
gap announced the appearance of the enemy. As the 
Federals burst from the thickets, not over 100 yards 
away, wildly cheering and with bands playing in their 
rear, the Confederates, who for several hours had been 
fearful less the attack would not come off, set their 
teeth and took a firmer hold of their muskets. Pushing 
forward to the point where the Confederate works stood 
in the gap the night before, for a moment it seemed to 
the Federals as if they had succeeded, but not so. Cab- 
ell s four pieces under Lieut. Callaway, concealed in 
their individual works, two on either flank of the infan 
try trench, which traversed the gap somewhat in rear of 
the old line, burst forth as if but one gun with doubled 
charges of canister, partially enfilading the enemy and 
crossing their fire at the deserted line. Of course, the 
repulse of the enemy at this point was immediate and 
bloody, and though Callaway s men suffered from 
musketry fire at the closest range, alone he would have 
been able to clear his front. For his superb conduct on 
this occasion, he was specially mentioned in orders. 


Read s guns along Hoke s and those of Cabell on 
Kershaw s line were equally active, the approach of the 
Federals generally being arrested about 50 yards from 
the works. From Kershaw s right, Huger s Battalion 
delivered a withering enfilade fire upon the space over 
which the assault was rendered, while Pickett sent for 
ward a line of skirmishers to fire upon the flank of the 
attacking column. Haskell also opened to aid the troops 
on his left. 

On Early s front, Hardaway secured a most effective 
oblique fire on the enemy and Cutshaw from his posi 
tion in reserve moved rapidly to the front of the line and 
to the left of Hardaway, when the attack developed and 
from a most exposed point opened a terrific enfilade fire 
upon the column which assaulted Rodes works. Heth s 
Division held the extreme left of Early s advanced line, 
and to it Poague s Battalion had been assigned. The 
division commander directed Col. Poague to post two 
batteries, Wyatt s and Richards , on the left, but after 
a rapid reconnaissance, Col. Poague reported in favor 
of a better position, as the one indicated was plainly un 
tenable. Heth, however, reiterated his orders, and 
nothing was left the gallant Poague but to obey them. 
As the batteries galloped forward, the heavy line of 
skirmishers, with artillery in support, which Poague had 
discovered not over 250 yards away, simply riddled the 
teams and shot down many of the cannoneers. After 
firing but a few rounds, the two batteries were so badly 
crippled that they were no longer able to remain in 
action. Poague was struck by a fragment of a shell, 
narrowly escaping death. Capt. Wyatt and Lieut. 
Rives were killed, many men and horses were killed or 
disabled, and nothing but the most heroic efforts of the 
survivors saved the guns from capture. Thus did an 
infantry commander usurp the function of his artillery 
leader, and by disregarding the advice and experience 
of one of the most competent and daring artillerymen 
in the Army, uselessly sacrifice two superb batteries, 
which might have rendered valuable service under the di- 


rection of their proper leader. It was such ignorance 
that had long since caused the Artillery to be given 
a more independent organization, for the experiences 
of the first year of the war had taught that division 
and brigade commanders as a rule neither understood 
nor were capable of handling artillery in camp, on 
the march, or in action. The employment of the ar 
tillery as a whole at Cold Harbor, and in the entire cam 
paign, was marked by a degree of independence of the 
infantry hitherto unknown. Frequently we have found 
a battalion of one corps in the line of another corps. It 
was a fatal mistake to turn Poague over to Heth s 
mercies, but the error had its good effects, as it simply 
emphasized the impracticability of the repetition of 
such a practice, for Col. Walker s protest was prompt 
and forceful. 

On the right, Breckinridge s Division and the 3d 
Corps, minus Heth s Division and Poague s Battalion, 
had taken position about Games farm, with the flank 
of their line resting on the Chickahominy. Pegram s 
Battalion, to which Dement s and Chew s Maryland 
batteries from Richmond had now been added, occupied 
a fine position on Turkey Ridge, with Macintosh s, 
Richardson s, and Lane s battalions in order on its left. 
In the rear of his batteries, Mclntosh posted a 24- 
pounder howitzer, which he had adjusted for high angle 
fire over the ridge, and which he successfully employed 
with indirect fire against the enemy s working parties 
in his front. On this part of the field the Federals were 
generally held at arm s length by the Artillery which was 
most actively employed. The action proper lasted but 
about one hour, though at isolated points small attacks 
reoccurred, and long-range artillery fire was kept 
up by the enemy until noon. At one point only was the 
Confederate parapet carried, and this on the right by 
Barlow s Division, which approaching under cover to 
within 75 yards of the works swept over them and seized 
three pieces of artillery. But here Finnegan s Brigade 
succeeded in driving out the enemy and recovering the 


By 7 A. M., Grant had authorized Meade to discon 
tinue his efforts, and gradually the futility of further at 
tack became apparent even to Meade, who had lost over 
7,000 men during the morning, while the Confederate 
casualties did not exceed 1,500, including several hun 
dred captured. 

The bulk of the Federal casualties was due to the Ar 
tillery which had been superbly handled throughout the 
day, as testified to by the complaints in the reports of 
every Federal corps. At many points the enemy had 
either been enfiladed, as by Cutshaw and Huger, or had 
met with destructive oblique and cross fires, which, ac 
cording to Gen. Humphreys, swept through the ranks 
"from the right of Smith to the left of Hancock." 
Again he states, "The assault on the 2d Corps could 
not be renewed unless the enemy s enfilade artillery fire 
could be silenced," and of the 6th Corps he writes: 
"During all this time, besides the direct fire, there was 
an enfilade artillery fire that swept though the ranks 
from right to left." Here he undoubtedly refers to the 
effect of Hardaway s, Cabell s, Haskell s, and Huger s 
guns, which literally tore the assaulting column to 
pieces. In writing of Smith s attack, he also says: "The 
fire from the right came from a part of the enemy s 
works against which no part of our attack was directed, 
and Gen. Smith was unable to keep it down with his 
artillery," which is but another reference to the 24 guns 
which Huger pushed out in front of Pickett and Field. 
After reading such statements, is it any wonder that 
when Meade attempted to renew the assault his troops 
laid down? The order for this fresh effort did not come 
from Grant, who as we have seen had had enough early 
in the morning. Meade s was the unconquerable will. 
He desired to try conclusions again, and would have 
done so had he been able, but "His immobile lines pro 
nounced a verdict against further slaughter," declared 
Swinton. Gen. Alexander denies this. He asserts that 
no such mute protest on the part of Meade s men oc 
curred, and that they lay down merely pending the 


organization of a fresh attack, in order to find cover 
while the arrangements which necessarily consumed 
much time were being made. This may be true, and as 
it is more in consonance with the conduct of the Fed 
eral Infantry on many other occasions, it probably is. 
Swinton did not like Grant. He had been caught, it is 
said, eavesdropping about Grant s headquarters, and re 
proved by the stern soldier in no gentle terms. Besides 
he was writing for home consumption, for already depu 
tations were calling upon Lincoln for the removal of 
"that butcher Grant." Just as he erred in imputing the 
order for the renewal of the assault to Grant, so may 
Swinton have been mistaken in other respects. A good 
authority declares that Meade s troops, as if by general 
agreement, after their bloody repulse in the early morn 
ing, pinned white badges on their breasts bearing their 
names and addresses, in order that they might be identi 
fied by the enemy since they felt certain that they could 
not successfully cross the Confederate fire zone. This 
circumstance, if true, does not indicate that the troops 
were unwilling and did not intend to renew their efforts, 
for in no way can that badge be likened to a white fea 
ther. On the contrary, it showed that the men who 
wore it were resolved to do or die, and rather expected 
to die. That many of his officers and men criticised 
Grant for what they ignorantly styled the merciless 
slaughter of his troops cannot be denied. They failed 
to see that in no other way could he defeat Lee except 
by fighting, and that to attack the Army of Northern 
Virginia behind breastworks, under the most favorable 
conditions, meant heavy losses. If their lack of faith in 
Grant, coupled with the devotion of the Confederates 
in Lee, enhanced the chances of Federal losses, that was 
not Grant s fault, as a general. His was not the char 
acter, however, which could make a veteran on the battle 
field cry out: "God bless Marse Robert. I wish you 
were Emperor of this country, and I were your carriage 


After all criticism has been passed upon Grant and 
Meade, the latter a soldier whose great ability was un 
fortunately overshadowed by the presence of Grant, and 
who grows in stature with the passing of time, Cold 
Harbor was but the exemplification of Jackson s state 
ment two years before: "We sometimes fail to drive 
the Federals from their intrenchments, but they always 
fail to drive the Confederates out." Let it be asked 
then, who had succeeded before Grant failed? 

To return to our narrative. On June 3 and 4, the 
Chief of Artillery made a thorough reconnaissance of 
the Chickahominy fords below Hill s right. On the 2d, 
Ma j . Owen with the 2d, 3d, and 4th companies of Wash 
ington Artillery, had been ordered to report to Gen. 
Ransom at Bolton s Bridge, and to leave the 1st Com 
pany at Drewry s Bluff where the battalion had been 
engaged on the 21st of May with Butler s troops and the 
Federal gunboats. At 10 A. M. on the 3d the batteries 
reached Bolton s Bridge, during the fighting at Cold 
Harbor, and were the next day posted at the fords as 
far down as the York River railroad bridge by Pendle- 
ton. Col. Eshleman now arrived and assumed com 
mand. In the meantime, Lieut. -Col. Pemberton, of 
Vicksburg fame, arrived with the Richmond Defense 
Battalion, in command of Lieut.-Col. C. E. Lightfoot. 
This battalion, with Fitz Lee s Division and Shoe 
maker s and Johnston s batteries, were held in Bottom s 
Ford to guard Lee s right flank. During the 4th, the 
enemy appeared, and made strong demonstrations as if 
to cross the river, but the fire of the Artillery prevented 
their near approach to the ford. 

After several days of inactivity, Lee assumed the of 
fensive. On the 6th, he endeavored to turn Meade s 
right flank by sending Early to the north of Matade- 
quin Creek, and again on the 7th by a movement south 
of that stream, but the swampy and impassable character 
of the terrain prevented any success on both occasions. 

When it was discovered on the 7th that the enemy had 
withdrawn from Field s front, Haskell s Battalion was 


transferred to the south bank of the Chickahominy, and 
posted at the Grape Vine and Federal bridges. Dur 
ing the better part of the next week, skirmishing at 
short range all along the lines from Pickett s front to 
the river was incessant, and the Artillery was constantly 
engaged, though in a desultory way. So close were the 
lines that the guns had to be thoroughly covered, in spite 
of which many casualties were incurred, especially in 
Cabell s Battalion, which lost the veteran battery com 
mander of the 1st Richmond howitzers. No officer in 
the Artillery had seen more service than Capt. Ed 
ward S. McCarthy, who was shot in the head and killed 
on the 4th. 

One matter of particular interest in connection with 
this random fighting was the employment and develop 
ment of Mclntosh s high angle fire with howitzers ad 
justed as mortars, a practice which was the outgrowth 
of the conditions. This indirect method of fire, ex 
tensively employed here for the first time, offered many 
advantages inasmuch as it could be delivered without 
the exposure of the cannoneers to the vigilant sharp 
shooters of the enemy. Exceptionally good effect seems 
to have been obtained by Mclntosh with his first howit 
zer, which led to the use of others, and this is the only 
instance of indirect fire met with so far, except Alex 
ander s cannonade of Bank s Ford the preceding year. 
It was subsequently used quite extensively at Peters 
burg, where it was also necessary to screen the guns and 
detachments, but never fully appreciated, nor did it at 
tract the attention it warranted. It was to be many 
years before Gen. Langlois was to give to the world in 
direct fire in its modern stage of perfection. 

It was in connection with Mclntosh s experiments 
with his howitzers that Pendleton sought the assistance 
of the Chief of Ordnance in the preparation of "stink- 
shells." In other words he desired to secure a pro 
jectile from the bursting of which in the enemy s works 
a suffocating effect would be obtained. "It seems at 
least worth a trial," he wrote. He also urged that hand 


grenades be provided the Confederate troops to be used 
by them in assaulting the enemy s works.* The grenades 
were reported to be available for issue, but no "stink- 
shells" were made and nothing seems to have come of 
the proposal. 

On June 5th, Hunter, who had succeeded Milroy, de 
feated Jones, who had succeeded Breckinridge, and on 
the 12th Breckinridge was ordered to return to the 
Valley with his division, and McLaughlin s Battalion of 
artillery, to the command of which Lieut. -Col. King 
was now assigned, while Maj. Gibbes was transferred 
from Cabell s to the command of King s Battalion. 
Three days later, when it was discovered that Meade had 
again moved towards the Confederate right, Lee also 
detached Early s Corps with Nelson s and Braxton s 
battalions under Gen. Long, and dispatched the force 
via Charlottesville to the Valley. Early s instructions 
were to attack Hunter in the rear, and after uniting 
with Breckinridge to move down the Valley, cross the 
Potomac, and threaten Washington. These orders were 
given in the hope that the movement might result in 
Grant s recall for the defense of the Capital. 

While the main army was engaged with Meade, the 
Horse Artillery had been actively employed with the 
cavalry divisions. McGregor s Battery, after being 
sharply engaged at Stanard s Mill on the Po, from the 
16th of May to the 19th, accompanied W. H. F. Lee s 
Division as rear guard of the Army to Hanover Junc 
tion, and from there to Hanover Courthouse, where on 
the 31st it had again been heavily engaged. In this last 
action, Lieut. Ford, conspicuous for his gallantry, was 
killed. Hart s Battery participated in a small affair at 
Ashland on the 1st, and on the same day Shoemaker s 
and Johnston s batteries under Breathed were warmly 
engaged at Bottom s Bridge, and Cold Harbor, where 
three years before Pelham had won such undying 
laurels. The story of the service of these batteries is one 
in itself, and at the time of which we write perhaps no 

*RebclUon Records, Series I, Vol. XXXVI. Part III, pp. 888-889. 


organization in the Army commanded the admiration 
and appealed to the pride of the Army as a whole as did 
Chew s Battalion of Horse Artillery.* Its record in 
marching and fighting is not excelled by that of any ar 
tillery battalion that ever took the field. 

During the fighting of the first few days of June, 
Sheridan had drawn off around Meade s rear and at 
tempted another raid on Lynchburg, via Gordonsville, 
in cooperation with Hunter s movement up the Valley. 
Accordingly on the 8th, Col. Chew and Maj. Breathed 
with Hart s, Thomson s, Johnston s, McGregor s, and 
Shoemaker s batteries, moved with Hampton s and Fitz 
Lee s divisions to intercept the Federal Cavalry, which 
they did at Trevillian Depot, on the Virginia Central 
Railroad. In this affair, Hart s, Thomson s, and 
Johnston s batteries only were engaged, and ably main 
tained themselves against Pennington s four horse bat 
teries. Next to Brandy Station, this was the largest 
purely cavalry combat fought in Virginia, and Chew s 
handling of the horse batteries on this occasion was es 
pecially brilliant. 

It may prove interesting to note the condition of the 
Horse Artillery at this time. The report of Capt. John 
Esten Cooke, Assistant Inspector General of Artillery 
on Pendleton s staff, dated May 25, fully sets forth the 

Johnston s Battery had lost 33 horses since the first 
of the month, most of them in action, and many others 
were badly broken down. Two guns had teams of but 
five and two of but four horses. Shoemaker s Battery, 
while it had lost fewer horses in action, was in a worse 
plight than Johnston s as to the condition of its teams. 
These batteries each required a minimum of 30 horses 
to make them fully effective. The five batteries had 
lost in all 99 animals and many of the cannoneers had 
been relegated to Battery "Q," in order to supply 
draught teams. 

*Let us hope for the promised history of his battalion, by its commander, 
before referred to. 


Requisition was immediately made by Pendleton on 
the receipt of the report for 100 fresh horses, and he 
endorsed Col. Chew s request that McClannahan s and 
Jackson s horse batteries of McLaughlin s Battalion be 
assigned to his command. Capt. Cooke reported that 
every care was being taken of the animals, which were 
being grazed whenever possible, in addition to receiving 
eight pounds of corn daily.* On the 8th of June, Cooke 
inspected Thomson s and Hart s batteries under the 
immediate command of Chew, in camp with Hampton s 
Division on the Brooke Turnpike above Meadow 
Bridge. Their condition he reported as exceptionally 
good under the circumstances, especially Thomson s, 
as a result of that officer s efficiency and ceaseless care. 
At this time, Thomson had 98 and Hart 112 men. The 
limbers and caissons were full and the ordnance wagons 
well supplied, except with Blakely ammunition, but 
mules were needed by the train. The requisition for 
horses for the battalion had been filled. So that in spite 
of its service and an enormous loss of horses and 
casualties aggregating about 100 men for the past 
month, the Horse Artillery was in fine fettle, when it 
encountered Sheridan at Trevillian s a few days later. t 

Griffin s Horse Battery with Chew s and Dement s 
4th and 1st Maryland batteries had been detached from 
the cavalry in the field and attached to the Maryland 
Line, stationed at Richmond under command of Gen. 
Bradley T. Johnston. 

Notwithstanding the demands upon him incident to 
the field operations of the campaign, the Chief of Ar 
tillery had not only hastened forward the refitting of 
the Horse Artillery, but he had also found time to urge 
legislation upon the President for the more complete 
organization of the entire artillery arm. In conference 
with Long, Alexander, and Walker, on the 3d of May, 
he had accepted certain radical proposals drawn up by 
Long and at once forwarded them to Gen. Lee. But 
hearing nothing from them, he addressed the President 

*RebelUon Records, Series I, Vol. XXXVI. Part III, pp 831-847 
tlbid., pp. 883, 884, and Part I, p. 1053. 


direct concerning them on June 8, urging that a more 
just rule be adopted by Congress with respect to the 
authorized quota of artillery officers. The abstract of 
the proposed bill follows : 

"A battery of field artillery to consist of 4 guns. For such a 
battery 100 to 125 effective privates,, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 1 
sergeant-major, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 2 buglers, 2 artificers, 
1 guidon, 1 captain, 2 first lieutenants, and one second lieutenant. 
Six gun batteries now existing may so remain till their number of 
men is reduced to the above standard. The batteries shall be 
organized into battalions of 3 or 4 batteries, and whenever it can 
be done without detriment to the service, batteries from the same 
state shall be thrown together. To each battalion of 4 batteries 
there should be a lieutenant-colonel and major; 1 adjutant, with 
the rank of first lieutenant ; assistant quartermaster, with the rank 
of captain; a chaplain, surgeon, and assistant surgeon. Battalions 
of 3 batteries may have officers of each grade, or fewer and of less 
rank, as commanding generals may recommend. Two or three 
battalions may constitute a regimental group, to be commanded by 
a colonel, entitled to 1 adjutant, with the rank of captain, and 
1 aide with the rank of first lieutenant. Two regimental groups to 
form a brigade, to be commanded by a brigadier-general. Staff 
of a brigade to be 1 adjutant-general, rank of captain; 1 aide-de 
camp, rank of first lieutenant; 1 quartermaster, rank of major; 
1 commissary, rank of major; and 1 chief surgeon. The artillery 
of an army, provided it consists of two or more brigades, to con 
stitute a corps of artillery, to be commanded by a general of 
superior rank to a brigadier-general, with a staff as designated by 
law for generals of like grade. All appointments above the rank 
of captain to be made by selection." 

These indeed were radical proposals, but certainly 
very wise ones. The contemplated reorganization would 
have provided for many promotions in the arm, and re 
lieved a situation which was fraught with many diffi 
culties. It would not only have greatly enhanced the 
efficiency of the arm, but would have enabled many de 
serving officers to be awarded well earned promotions. 
Again, it would have ruled out politics to a large ex 
tent, for Congress would have been restricted to the 
appointment of junior officers only, all others depend 
ing upon their military records for preferment. 

Pendleton s communication was referred by Mr. 
Davis to Gen. Bragg, his military adviser, who disap- 


proved the proposed method of determining the num 
ber of officers in the arm, and declared the gun to be the 
proper unit upon which to base the strength of the com 
missioned personnel. But he very justly said that the 
present proportion of officers to guns was inadequate, 
and that he saw no valid reason for restricting the senior 
artillery grade to that of brigadier-general. u The Ar 
tillery of an army of three corps like Gen. Lee s is 
equivalent in importance to either corps of infantry," 
wrote Bragg. Gen. Lee also declared in favor of the 
gun as the proper unit. Every battalion should have 
two field officers, and his army was entitled to a major- 
general of artillery, while each corps chief, whose com 
mand was far more important than that of a brigade of 
infantry, should bear the rank of brigadier-general, he 

The matter was referred in September by the Presi 
dent to the Secretary of War for conference with the 
Committee of Military Affairs, as to the legislation 
recommended in his annual message, and in the report 
of the Secretary of War advocating an increase in the 
commissioned personnel of the Artillery. 

At the end of June, the artillery material of the three 
corps proper consisted of ninety-four Napoleons, four 
24-pounder and six 12-pounder howitzers, twelve 20- 
pounder and forty-eight 10-pounder Parrotts, and 
thirty- two 3-inch rifles, or a total of 196 pieces including 
those of Gibbes , or King s old battalion, which had been 
assigned to the 1st Corps in lieu of the Washington Ar 
tillery, and not including those of Read s Battalion. 
The 2d Corps also had then but four battalions, Cut- 
shaw having been assigned to the command of the one 
formed by the consolidation of the remnants of his own, 
and Page s upon Hardaway s return to duty, Page be 
ing relieved from command. If we take King s Bat 
talion as counterbalancing the loss of Page s 20 guns, it- 
will be seen that Lee had 16 more guns, not including 
McLaughlin s, Eshleman s, Lightfoot s, and Owen s, at 
Cold Harbor than he started with, and allowing four 



pieces for each of the 15 batteries of those four battalions 
he must have had, exclusive of the Horse Artillery, at 
Cold Harbor, not less than 275 pieces of artillery, while 
his infantry had diminished in numbers in spite of rein 
forcements by at least 10,000 men. His proportion of 
guns to infantry had therefore risen to nearly nine guns 
per thousand infantry before he reached Petersburg. In 
the meantime, Meade had lost near 60,000 men, killed, 
wounded and missing, but had gained fully 40,000 by 
reinforcement. His original proportion of artillery had 
diminished, however, for nearly one hundred guns had 
been returned to the base. 

Little remains to be said concerning the Artillery in 
the campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, 
which included a rapid series of tremendous combats. 
The narrative has traced the movement of the various 
commands in detail, and those movements fully expose 
the tactics of the arm. It can only be added that nothing 
is so accurate a test of efficiency as results, and even the 
casual reader must have been impressed by the wonder 
ful results obtained by Alexander, Long, and Walker. 
It is inconceivable that Lee s Infantry, however superb 
it was, could have withstood the shock of the blows which 
Grant and Meade aimed at it, had there not been 
mingled with its men in the foremost line, and shoulder 
to shoulder with them, willing toilers at the muzzles and 
the lanyards of the guns. As has been said before, little 
opportunity was found to employ artillery in masses, 
and it was understood by the gunners from the first that 
their part lay in taking the brunt of the Federal at 
tacks from the shoulders of the Infantry by ceaseless 
vigilance and instant readiness to stem the tide of as 
sault before it washed up against the Infantry lines. 
They were called upon to do this over and over again, 
always, except at North Anna, where no great effort 
was made by the enemy, under the most adverse circum 
stances, for they found neither commanding positions 
nor extensive fields of fire. For the time being, one 
might say, they simply took the place of the Infantry, 


and only once, at the Bloody Angle, did they allow the 
enemy to cross bayonets with their sister arm. What a 
record indeed is this ! 

To one more point must attention be called. From 
the day of the rapid concentration of the Artillery along 
the Rapidan on the 5th of May, there was never an hour 
when every battery of Lee s Army was not either in 
position, in immediate support, or on the march and 
actually with the infantry divisions. Not one single 
instance of delay in the movement of the Artillery, or 
of a single battery, has been encountered, for the simple 
reason that the wonderful organization it had been given 
and the remarkable artillery leaders the war had de 
veloped, always enabled the batteries to be in the first 
line. One may search military history in vain for a 
parallel. It will not be found in the Napoleonic cam 
paigns, nor will it be found in the French War of 1859, 
the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 
1866, or in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. Read 
Hohenlohe, who never fails to present the record of the 
Prussian Artillery in its best garb, and see how great 
masses of artillery remained idle at the critical moment ; 
how the unwieldy columns blocked the roads in the rear 
of the armies, and then remember that the beautiful 
countries of Bohemia and France, with their wide 
chausses and rolling hills afforded ideal artillery terrain 
as compared to the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, and the 
almost pathless forests of Hanover, where scarce a clear 
ing a mile wide or a commanding position is to be found. 
Then pursue the investigation further and study the 
operations of the Federal Artillery with Grant, and it 
will be found that near 100 of his guns were returned 
to Washington because no adequate use could be made 
of them, nor were those which he retained wholly em 
ployed at any one time. As a matter of fact, fewer 
were engaged in any one battle than remained idle, and 
this in spite of Hunt with all his skill and ability. 



AFTER dispatching the 2d Corps to the Valley, Gen. 
Lee moved the 1st and 3d Corps across White Oak 
Swamp to the neighborhood of Riddles Shop, at which 
point Wilcox s Division and Pegram s and Macintosh s 
battalions relieved the Cavalry and pressed back the 
enemy s advance. In this affair, Pegram with his old 
battery, now commanded by Capt. Cayce, made a most 
superb attack upon the enemy s leading troops, display 
ing all the dash and strength of his character. During 
the past campaign, he had, though constantly engaged, 
found little opportunity to exhibit his rarest quality, 
which was rapidity of action, but nevertheless his serv 
ices had been distinguished and his reputation as a 
fighter was unsurpassed by that of any artilleryman in 
the Army. Very small, slight of figure, and only about 
twenty-four years old, he had the heart of a lion and, as 
the men said, "was always itching for a fight." Fortun 
ate indeed is the officer who acquires such a reputation, 
for it is such men that instill in those under their com 
mand the elan which carries them on to victory. Illus 
trative of the feeling of the soldiers who knew him to 
wards this youthful and dashing artilleryman, the fol 
lowing anecdote is recounted. On a certain occasion 
when it was doubtful if there was to be a fight, Pegram 
was seen galloping down the line of the infantry from 
position to position occupied by his batteries, followed 
by Capt. W. Gordon McCabe, his adjutant, who, like 
Pegram, was a veritable game-cock. The troops were in 
the humor for fighting, and as an old veteran spied the 
pair of artillerymen approaching, he rose from the 
trenches, waved his hat aloft and cried, "Come on, boys! 
Here comes that d n little man with the glasses. 
We re going to fight em now." 

On the 12th, Read s Battalion, accompanying Hoke s 
Division, marched from Cold Harbor to Petersburg, ar- 


riving there on the 15th, and was immediately thrown 
into position near the Hare house to repel the threatened 
attaek. During the 14th, 15th, and 16th, the 1st and 3d 
corps remained in observation of the enemy near Mal- 
vern Hill, while part of Lee s Army opposed Butler 
on the south side of the river. It was from their 
present position that Lee expected the enemy to attempt 
an advance against Richmond, but Grant had deter 
mined to cross the James at Wilcox s Landing, ten 
miles below City Point and entirely out of Lee obser 
vation, and to move thence directly upon Petersburg 
with his whole army. This movement had been sug 
gested to him by Halleck some days before, and Grant 
was also, no doubt, familiar with McClellan s intention 
to do the same thing just three years before. His pro 
posed line of operations would lead him in the rear of 
Butler and enable him to fall on the extreme right of 
the Confederate defensive line, which now rested at 
Petersburg, for the defense of which only a part of the 
troops of the Department of North Carolina and South 
ern Virginia under Gen. Beauregard were immediately 
available, in addition to Lee s Army, which he hoped to 
elude and outmarch. This was all but accomplished, 
for while Lee remained on the north bank of the James, 
watching what he believed to be the entire Federal force, 
Grant had performed a feat unheard of before, and with 
secrecy and celerity transferred nearly his entire army 
across the river. On the 15th, 16th, and 17th, part of 
his troops were actually arriving at Petersburg and en 
deavoring to take the city, and were only prevented 
from doing it, on the 15th, by Wise s Brigade, not more 
than 1,200 strong, two small regiments of cavalry under 
Dearing, Moseley s Battalion and Sturdivant s and 
Martin s batteries with 22 guns, and some old men and 
boys called Local Reserves, or a total force of less than 
3,000 of all arms and conditions. The resistance of these 
troops was grandly heroic and they have never received 
the credit their conduct deserved, for they stood between 
Lee and disaster, against odds perhaps never before 


paralleled. It was only upon the most urgent repre 
sentations that Lee was persuaded by Beauregard to 
send reinforcements to Petersburg, for the great soldier 
could not believe that the Federals had crossed the river. 
He finally sent Hoke s Division and Read s Battalion 
of artillery from Drewry s Bluff on the morning of the 
18th. With 18 miles to go, the head of Hoke s column 
reached Petersburg at sunset, having traveled partly by 
rail; the bulk of the division by forced marching, at 9 
p. M. All that day, while Wise and Dearing were re 
sisting the ever-increasing pressure at Petersburg, Lee 
remained near Malvern Hill, his attention occupied by 
the Federal Cavalry, but when on the morrow he finally 
concluded that a part of Grant s troops had crossed the 
James, he set the 1st Corps in motion for the south side 
of the river. 

Early in the morning, Pickett s and Field s divisions 
with Huger s, Haskell s, and Gibbes battalions, crossed 
the pontoon bridge near Drewry s Bluff and advanced 
towards the Bermuda Hundred lines, from which Beau- 
regard had been compelled to withdraw Bushrod John 
son s Division on the night of the 15th for the support 
of Wise at Petersburg. 

Kershaw s Division was halted near Drewry s Bluff. 
The next day Pickett and Field, after a skirmish with 
Butler s troops near Port Walthall, in which Alexan 
der s two battalions were engaged, recovered Beaure- 
gard s abandoned lines. On that same day, Kershaw s 
Division, with Cabell s Battalion, and the 3d Corps with 
its artillery, which had encamped the previous day near 
Chaffin s Bluff, also crossed the river upon the bridge 
near Drewry s Bluff, and was ordered to Bermuda Hun 
dred. On the 18th, Pickett s Division, with Huger s 
Battalion, established itself on a line fronting Bermuda 
Hundred from Howie tt s on the James River, to the 
confluence of Swift Creek with the Appomattox. 

During the 15th, 16th, and 17th, Beauregard had 
made a grand fight against the head of Grant s Army, 


but at last was compelled to request reinforcements or 
instructions for his retreat. The fighting at Petersburg 
had lasted until midnight on the 17th, and he knew that 
his small force, now consisting of Wise s, Elliott s, and 
Johnson s brigades of Bushrod Johnson s Division, and 
Hoke s Division, a total of about 14,000 infantry, could 
no longer maintain the lines. Already he had been 
forced to relinquish the outer works of the eastern de 
fenses and fall back upon a new line hastily laid off from 
the river and running from the Hare house and Bland- 
ford Cemetery to the Rives house. 

After the receipt of Beauregard s dispatch on the 
night of the 17th, Kershaw was ordered to march to 
Petersburg, though Lee was not yet convinced that 
Beauregard was correctly informed about the enemy. 
It was not until a third staff officer arrived from Beau- 
regard at 3 A. M. on the 18th, that Lee was convinced 
that Grant s entire army was massing in front of Peters 
burg. He now sent orders to Anderson to march with 
Field s and Pickett s divisions for Petersburg, where 
Kershaw arrived about 7 :30 A. M. 

Upon his new line, Beauregard had skillfully posted 
his artillery under Col. Hilary P. Jones. It consisted 
of Read s, Moseley s, Coit s, and Boggs battalions. 
This large artillery force of sixteen batteries and 53 
guns had proved of inestimable value to him in his 
defense of Petersburg. Without it he could never have 
maintained the front he did from the 15th to the 17th. 
As it was now merged into Lee s Army, let us examine 
its organization. With the organization of Read s Bat 
talion, we are already familiar. That of the other bat 
talions was as follows: 


Maj. Edgar F. Moseley 

Yorktown Battery, Capt. Edward R, Young. 

Macon (Ga.) Battery, Capt. C. W. Staten. 

Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg% Capt. John O. Miller. 

Battery "C", 13th N. C. Batt., Capt. James D. Gumming. 


Maj. James C. Coit 

Halifax Battery, Capt. Samuel T. Wright. 

Petersburg Battery, Capt. Richard G. Pegram. 

S. C. "Chesterfield" Battery, Capt. James I. Kelly. 

Miss. Confederate Guards Battery, Capt. William D. Bradford. 


Maj. Francis J. Boggs 

Albemarle Battery, Capt. N. C. Sturdivant. 

Richmond Battery, Capt. S. Taylor Martin. 

Read s Battalion after being engaged at Cold Har 
bor on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of June, had reached Peters 
burg on the afternoon of the 17th in time to materially 
assist in the defense. Moseley s Battalion which had 
been organized about the time of Butler s advance, had 
been engaged in the fighting at Drewry s Bluff, and on 
the Bermuda Hundred lines, when Beauregard bot 
tled up the Army of the James so successfully. Its 
commander had formerly served as a field officer in the 
1st Virginia Regiment of Artillery, after its organiza 
tion by Col. John Thompson Brown as part of Ma- 
gruder s Army in 1861. Coit s Battalion had been 
organized for service in North Carolina in the early 
spring, later operating with Beauregard against But 
ler. Both Moseley s and Coit s battalions had rendered 
excellent service. Boggs Battalion had only been 
organized on the 17th as such. Hitherto its two batter 
ies had operated independently in the vicinity of Peters 
burg, and had been engaged against Butler. On June 
5, Capt. Sturdivant and two of his guns had been 

The batteries of these battalions averaged about four 
guns and 90 men, and therefore comprised a valuable 
addition to Pendleton s command, depleted by the de 
taching of Long s two battalions, especially since Lee 
was now called upon to defend so extensive a line. 

On the morning of the 18th, before Lee s troops ar 
rived, Bradford s three 20-pounder Parrotts and 


Wright s five Napoleons of Coit s Battalion were placed 
in position on the north bank of the Appomattox to en 
filade the approaches to Beauregard s left. The rest of 
Jones Artillery was either placed along or in rear of the 
infantry trenches of the new line, and all of it was most 
effectively employed during the day. 

At 4 A. M., the 18th, Grant made a general advance 
with the 2d, 5th, and 7th Corps, while the 6th and 18th 
were held in reserve. He learned during the morning 
with the utmost surprise that Beauregard s whole force 
during the preceding days consisted of but two small 
divisions, and very much chagrined he now urged his 
corps commanders to press forward with energy and 
carry the new line before it could be materially strength 
ened. Meade himself fixed noon as the hour of attack. 
By that time, Kershaw had relieved Johnson, and 
Jones guns had been skillfully disposed. Field s Divi 
sion had also begun to arrive and occupy the trenches 
on Kershaw s left, while Hoke and Wise remained in 

About midday the assault commenced, falling princi 
pally on Wise and Hoke next to the river, but was re 
pulsed with loss, Wright and Bradford simply tearing 
the Federal ranks to shreds with their enfilade fire, while 
the other batteries of Beauregard s command swept the 
approaches with a most destructive frontal fire. So suc 
cessfully did Jones battalions perform their task that a 
variance occurs in the reports of the fighting this day, 
which can only be attributed to the effect of the "long 
arm." Humphreys states that every Federal Corps as 
saulted in force and that they were repulsed with loss, 
while on the Confederate side the day was not considered 
as one of general battle by the infantry, but as one of 
artillery fighting alone. 

"It was necessary to wait until night before Beauregard s 
artillery could receive its plaudit of Well done,, good and faithful 
servant/ and be relieved by fresh battalions of Longstreet s Corps. 
Of all the moonlight nights I can remember, I recall that Saturday 
night as perhaps the most brilliant and beautiful. The weather 
was exceedingly dry., the air perfectly calm, with an exhilarating 


electrical quality in it. The dust rose with every movement and 
hung in the air. The whole landscape was bathed and saturated 
in silver,, and sounds were unusually distinct and seemed to be 
alive and to travel everywhere. It was not a night for sleep in 
the trenches. There was a great deal to be done at all points to 
strengthen and improve them., and every man was personally inter 
ested in working at his immediate location. 

"In spite of all pains, the drawing out of old guns and approach 
of new was attended with sounds which wandered far, and with 
luminous clouds of dust gradually rising in the air. Then the 
enemy would know we were moving, and there would come crashes 
of musketry at random and volleys of artillery from their lines. 
Then our infantry would imagine themselves attacked, and would 
respond in like fashion, and the fire would run along the parapet 
to right and left, and gradually subside for a while, to break out 
presently somewhere else." 

Such is Gen. Alexander s graphic description of the 
night of the 18th of June, when with his accustomed 
energy and bravery he was engaged with Lieut. -Col. 
Branch of Beauregard s Artillery in replacing the lat- 
ter s guns with his own. All through this work, his ex 
posure was constant and to the verge of recklessness, but 
there was work to be done, and in spite of the protests of 
his men he galloped back and forth, ordering here, sug 
gesting there, and utterly regardless of his own safety 
until all was done that the exigencies of the situation re 
quired. As the 1st Corps arrived, it had taken position 
on Beauregard s right. After substituting Huger s 
guns for Jones along Hoke s and Wise s front, Alex 
ander then placed two batteries of Haskell s and 
Gibbes Battalion in the trenches between the Baxter 
Road and the Rives house. Haskell s remaining batter 
ies were then posted on elevated positions in the second 

Beginning at the salient formed by the junction of 
the new with the old works, known as the Rives salient, 
where he posted Richardson s Battalion, Col. Walker, to 
whose command the Washington Artillery had now been 
assigned, occupied the line with the batteries of the 3d 
Corps on Alexander s right, and extending around to 
the south and west as far as the Weldon Railroad. 


The works comprising the line of defense at Peters 
burg were by far the most pretentious which the Con 
federates had yet occupied. With the exception of the 
portion of the line recently established by Beauregard 
when forced back on the 17th, they had been laid out by 
engineer officers and constructed in advance by slave 
labor. Every advantage of terrain had been taken and 
a broad field of fire for artillery cleared in front of the 
line. Of course there were defects, but to a large ex 
tent these were corrected as they developed, and the 
works throughout were rapidly extended and improved. 
The trenches at Cold Harbor had barely afforded cover 
for the infantry, and the epaulments for the guns 
were there of the crudest kind, but now the artillery was 
to fight behind real cover and placed to the best ad 
vantage after careful reconnaissance of the approaches. 

The morning after Pendleton s Artillery arrived, the 
Chief of Artillery accompanied by Gen. Beauregard 
visited the north bank of the river and, after a rapid in 
spection of the terrain, ordered Lane s Battalion and 
Penick s Battery of Richardson s to move over and 
fortify the commanding eminence at the Archer House, 
while Chew s and Clutter s batteries of Mclntosh s Bat 
talion, under Maj. Marmaduke Johnson, were ordered 
to be intrenched on a lower elevation half a mile higher 
up the river. Poague s Battalion under Capt. Utter- 
back joined Bradford s and Wright s batteries im 
mediately opposite the point where the main line rested 
on the south bank of the river. There were now, there 
fore, about fifty guns placed to enfilade the approaches 
to the Confederate left. But Grant did not renew his 
assaults on the 19th, and his troops occupied themselves 
intrenching where they had bivouacked during the night 
in close proximity to the Confederate works. The op 
posing lines thus established by accident in a measure 
remained substantially unchanged until Lee s evacua 
tion ten months later.* 

*Por a detailed account of the Richmond Artillery defenses at this time, 
see Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXXVI, Part III, pp. 809-11. There were 
38 pieces of position on the lines, with a force of Heavy Artillery aggregating 
2,893 present for duty, and the 1st, 2d, and 4th Maryland field batteries with 
232 men and 10 guns. Ibid., p. 861. 



FROM the day the two armies confronted each other, 
sharpshooting and artillery practice were incessant, 
while both sides labored constantly, improving their 
works. The great enfilading group of guns north of the 
river to the command of which Col. Cutts had been as 
signed, and to which several 30-pounder Parrotts and 
12-pounder Whitworths were added and placed in po 
sition at the Archer house, at once attracted the atten 
tion of the Federal Artillery. When Cutts opened on 
the enemy s line on the 20th, the effect of his fire, enfi 
lade, and on some points of the opposing line reverse, 
was so overwhelming as to cause great confusion among 
the Federals, and lead to an almost immediate change 
of position. A great effort was now made by Hunt to 
silence the Confederate group. During the next few 
days, Abbott s reserve artillery regiment of 1,700 men 
with 60 mortars, ranging from 24-pounder Coehorns to 
10-inch sea coast pieces, was brought up and undertook 
to subdue Cutts fire, but all in vain. His men toiled 
all the harder at their fortifications and soon protected 
themselves and their guns with bomb proofs and works 
of the most substantial character. In the meantime, 
however, they had suffered many casualties from Ab 
bott s terrific mortar fire, including Lieut. Lucius G. 
Rees, of Cutts Battalion, who had so distinguished him 
self on the North Anna, killed, and Lieut. James of the 
same battery, wounded. 

The effect of the Federal mortar fire was also felt at 
other points of the line, and steps were now taken by 
Gen. Alexander to counteract it. Fortunately, he had 
ordered some 12-pounder mortars constructed in Rich 
mond several weeks before, and these began to ar 
rive on the 24th. They were light and convenient to 
handle, and with characteristic energy and skill Alex- 


ander placed them at points where they could best as 
sist in the defense of the weaker salients of the line, up 
against which the enemy had pressed to short range. 
The number of these mortars was gradually increased 
until twenty-seven 12-pounder, 24-pounder, and 8-inch 
mortars were in position along Beauregard s line, and 
thirteen of like caliber beyond the Rives salient. Inte 
rior lines were now constructed at the gorges of the 
salients, a number of heavy pieces of position from Rich 
mond placed therein to reply to six 100-pounder and 
forty 30-pounder Parrotts, which Abbott had drawn 
from his seige train and mounted in the permanent works 
along Beauregard s abandoned line. These redoubts, 
with the infantry trenches which connected them, formed 
a veritable citadel, behind which a small force of de 
fenders were secure against assault, and enabled Grant 
to constantly extend his lines to the west, while a system 
of redans and infantry trenches in their front and 
pushed close up to the Confederate works made detach 
ment of the Confederate troops from their front ex 
tremely risky. But the weakest part of the Confederate 
line was Elliott s salient, named from the brigade as 
signed to its defense. Here the edge of the deep valley 
of Poor Creek, which ran nearly parallel to the 
Confederate line of works, was but 133 yards distant, 
while the depression afforded ample space and perfect 
cover for the massing of a large body of infantry. Along 
the rear edge of this valley, the Federals threw up strong 
rifle pits with elaborate head-logs and loop-holes from 
which an incessant fire was kept up upon the Confed 
erates. At this point, Col. Walker posted Cayce s Bat 
tery of Pegram s Battalion, and under cover of night 
the men managed to place obstructions in front of the 

On the 20th, Thomson s, Hart s, Shoemaker s and 
Johnston s batteries were engaged the entire day at the 
White House with Fitz Lee and Hampton, who had 
returned from Trevillian s, and underwent the unusual 
experience of horse artillery fighting both field artillery 


and gunboats at the same time.* Two days later, Mc 
Gregor s Battery was engaged with W. H. F. Lee in 
an affair with Wilson s and Kautz s Cavalry at the 
Davis house on the Weldon Railroad. The Federal 
Cavalry was followed by W. H. F. Lee to the Staunton 
River, where its progress was barred by local militia and 
a force of artillery at the bridge. Attacked in rear by 
the Confederate Cavalry, with an impassable stream in 
their front, Wilson and Kautz decided after having done 
much damage to the railroads to return to Petersburg, 
and in doing so were assailed by Hampton s, Fitz Lee s, 
and W. H. F. Lee s brigades, two brigades of infantry 
under Mahone, Cayce s Battery under Pegram and the 
entire Horse Battalion under Chew and Breathed at 
Reams Station, where they were completely routed, 
losing 1,500 men, two horse batteries complete with 
twelve guns, and their wagon trains. In this affair, Pe 
gram, Chew, and Breathed were in their glory, and in no 
engagement of the war did the Horse Artillery display 
greater dash, notwithstanding the preceding weeks of 
constant marching and fighting. 

Another affair in which the Artillery shone with par 
ticular brilliance had, meantime, occurred at Petersburg, 
in which Mclntosh was the bright star. 

Advised on the 22d of a movement by the 2d and 6th 
Federal Corps from their works opposite Hill, against 
the railroads on his right, Lee sent Hill with Wilcox s 
and Mahone s divisions, supported by Johnson s, to 
meet it. Mclntosh with the 1st Maryland Battery 
under Lieut. Gale was to move out with the infantry. 
Hill s orders were to strike the enemy while stretched 
out to the left, while Col. Walker s Artillery cooperated 
with him from the lines. When all was ready, Mc 
lntosh with Gale s section of Clutter s Battery galloped 
forward to within a few hundred yards of the enemy s 
intrenchments and opened upon their columns, instantly 
causing confusion among them, while the infantry 

*It will be recalled that the artillery had engaged gunboats on the Rappa- 
hannock in 1862. Forrest also attacked gunboats on the Tennessee River with 
Morton s horse batteries. 


rushed forward under cover of his fire and carried the 
Federal line. Lieut. Wilkes section of Capt. Valentine 
J. Clutter s Richmond Battery, recently added to Mc- 
Intosh s Battalion, now moved out and supported Gale. 
While Wilcox obstructed the advance of the 6th Corps, 
Mahone and Johnson passed through a gap between it 
and the 2d Corps, and struck Barlow s Division, which 
was moving around the 6th Corps, in the rear, capturing 
1,700 prisoners and four guns, which were successfully 
brought off during the night by Hill after also routing 
Mott s Division. The conduct of Mclntosh, Gale, and 
Wilkes on this occasion elicited the highest praise from 
all arms, and gives us a rare instance of light batteries 
actually maneuvering between intrenchments. One is 
almost compelled to inquire if there were any limitation 
upon what the artillerymen would attempt. 

Lee now planned an attack on Meade s right to be 
preceded by a great artillery preparation. It was hoped 
that the infantry under cover of Cutts enfilading and 
Alexander s frontal fire might reach the Federal mortar 
batteries and recover the outer line. Promptly on the 
morning of the 24th, the Artillery opened the greatest 
cannonade which the siege had yet seen, but for some 
reason no infantry assault occurred. The cannonade was 
not without its effect, however, for the enemy was im 
pressed with the futility of making subsequent attempts 
in that quarter, by the tremendous power which the Ar 
tillery developed. 

During the next few days, Gen. Alexander s atten 
tion was especially attracted by the enemy s activity in 
front of the Elliott salient. Having been an engineer 
officer of some experience, he detected signs, which con 
vinced him that underground work was going on. He 
had confidently expected each morning to see a "Flying 
Dutchman" in that quarter, or some other evidence of 
the opening of approaches across the narrow space in 
front of the salient, but instead he had noted an increase 
of musketry fire from the Federal works there, and a 
diminishment of alertness among the enemy s sharp- 


shooters on either side. Each day he visited the salient 
and carefully watched what was going on. On his way 
back to his headquarters on the 30th, he was slightly 
wounded by a sharpshooter, and before leaving the 
Army the next day, for six weeks, to visit his home in 
Georgia, he called at Gen. Lee s headquarters in per 
son and reported his views about the mine. Mr. Law- 
ley, an English war correspondent of the London 
Times,, was present and inquired how far it would be 
necessary for the Federals to mine, and when told by 
Alexander the distance was 500 feet, he replied that 
the tunnel at the Siege of Delhi, the longest ever dug, 
was but 400 feet, and that it was found impossible to 
ventilate a longer gallery. Alexander replied that there 
were many Pennsylvania miners in Meade s Army, and 
that military precedents would not deter them from 
making the attempt. It so happened that upon the 
advice of Lieut.-Col. Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsyl 
vania Regiment, a coal miner, against the advice of 
every engineer in Meade s Army, the Federals had 
opened a gallery on the 27th of June, just two days be 
fore Alexander called Lee s attention to the danger. 

Alexander did not return to the Army until August 
18, Cabell commanding the Artillery of the 1st Corps 
in his absence, but upon his advice Huger was assigned 
to the command of the guns and mortars near the 
salient. The day after his departure Gen. Lee directed 
his engineers to open countermines. Shafts with listen 
ing galleries were promptly sunk, unfortunately, on the 
flanks of the salient, for the Federals were tunneling 
straight for its apex and their operations were not 
heard. Had Alexander been present, it is safe to say 
the battle of the Crater would never have been fought, 
for having devoted so much attention to the salient, he 
would most certainly have been placed in charge of the 
countermines and would have caused the first one to be 
opened at the apex. From that point the enemy s mining 
20 feet below the surface would readily have been de 
tected and their gallery destroyed by the explosion of a 
camoufletj or smothered mine. 



THE strength of the Artillery about Richmond and 
Petersburg had been greatly enhanced during the past 
month while the Infantry composed of Johnson s and 
Hoke s divisions of Beauregard s Army, Pickett s, 
Field s, and Kershaw s divisions of the 1st Corps, An 
derson s, Heth s, and Wilcox s divisions of the 3d 
Corps, showed a marked diminishment. In fact, re 
cruiting for the Infantry had almost come to a standstill, 
and on July 10, while the paper strength of the fore 
going commands aggregated 103,178 men, there were 
but 51,867 present for duty. In the Cavalry Corps com 
posed of Hampton s, Fitz Lee s, and W. H. F. Lee s 
divisions, with 23,180 men on the rolls, there were but 
10,493 effectives in the field. In marked contrast to 
these figures are those of the Artillery which, not in 
cluding Long s command in the Valley, numbered 
6,472 present for duty, with an aggregate present and 
absent of 9,435. In other words, while Lee was able 
to muster but half his infantry and cavalry in the field, 
but one-third of his artillery personnel was absent, a 
fact which seems to testify to a comparatively high state 
of discipline in the artillery arm. 

To the work of maintaining his corps, Pendleton 
constantly addressed himself. Furthermore, he now 
sought to bring order in his arm out of the chaos into 
which the recent campaign, with its heavy losses, had 
necessarily thrown the Army. 

It will be recalled that when Longstreet moved to 
Petersburg en route to Tennessee, he had started from 
the Rapidan with Alexander s, Walton s, and Dearing s 
battalions, but that the first only through a change of 
plans accompanied him to the West, the Washington 
Artillery and Dearing s Battalion remaining through 
out the winter in the Department of North Carolina 



and Southern Virginia with Pickett. Since that time, 
these two battalions had considered themselves no 
longer an integral part of the 1st Corps to which they 
had been assigned by G. O. No. 19, June 4, 1863. True, 
they had rejoined the Army at Cold Harbor in June, 
but they had not fallen under Alexander s immediate 
control. In fact, Dearing s old command under Read 
had again been detached to Petersburg with Hoke s Di 
vision, and the Washington Artillery, to the command 
of which Lieut. -Col. Eshleman had been assigned, after 
his provisional battalion had been broken up, later ac 
companied the 3d Corps to Petersburg. 

Since the battle of Gettysburg, where Walton was 
so rudely displaced by his junior, the Washington 
Artillery had not been well disposed towards Alex 
ander. These troops were serving in a foreign land and 
were naturally sensitive to anything in the nature of a 
slight to their old commander, so they had welcomed 
their separation from the 1st Corps Artillery to the com 
mand of which Alexander had been assigned, March 1, 
1864, with advanced rank from February 26. And so, 
when on June 13, Lee commenced his movement from 
Cold Harbor, the Washington Artillery applied direct 
to the President to be allowed to attach itself to the 3d 
Corps. * This was of course a violation of army regu 
lations, but it must be remembered that state politics 
entered into the affairs of the Army of Northern Vir 
ginia, as in the case of all other armies that have ever 
taken the field. Dissatisfaction on the part of these 
troops with the persistent disregard of Walton s claims 
was now open, and as his case was undoubtedly the 
principal matter in the politics of the Artillery Corps, 
the facts should be cited. 

On coming into the field in May, 1861, Maj. Walton 
was the senior artillery officer in the Army and com 
manded the largest artillery organization. After First 
Manassas, an act of Congress was passed at the instance 
of Beauregard to authorize the promotion of artillery 

*In Camp and Battle With the Washington Artillery Battalion, Owen, p. 329. 


officers, Walton s case being especially mentioned as a 
deserving one. Under this provision, Walton was pro 
moted Colonel and assigned to duty as Chief of Ar 
tillery of the Army of the Potomac, retaining immediate 
command of the Louisiana Battalion. Soon after this, 
Pendleton, who had been advanced from the grade of 
captain, subsequent to Walton s arrival in Virginia, 
was promoted to the grade of colonel with temporary 
rank, under the law authorizing the President to con 
fer such rank. Though still Walton s junior, he was 
again promoted and made brigadier-general and 
chief of artillery, when the reorganization in the 
winter occurred, and Col. Walton was assigned to duty 
as chief of artillery of the 1st Corps. In the mean 
time, Beauregard and Longstreet repeatedly recom 
mended the promotion of Walton, who was by service 
the senior artillery officer in the Confederate armies, 
but it was announced that no more brigadier-generals 
of artillery would be appointed. All this, and his dis 
placement at Gettysburg was taken by Walton with 
commendable grace, though naturally he was much 
chagrined. Beauregard had, just after the reorganiza 
tion, written him as follows : "I regret to hear that you 
have not been promoted to the rank of brigadier- 
general of artillery, which in the estimation of your 
friends you have won by your efficient services on so 
many glorious battlefields, commencing with Bull Run. 
If my testimony to your efficiency, zeal and capacity, 
whilst commanding the Battalion of Washington Ar 
tillery in the Army of the Potomac and acting as chief 
of artillery of the First Corps of that Army, can be 
of any service to you I will willingly give it to you, not 
as a favor, but as a right to which you are entitled." 
And Longstreet, before the reorganization, wrote him: 
"I have on three occasions and several times in conver 
sation expressed my opinion and wishes in favor of hav 
ing you promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. I 
still think your services give you the best claim to the 
promotion of any officer in the service, and I am quite 


satisfied you are as well qualified to fill the office. I 
still hope your promotion may soon come." But it will 
be recalled that these letters were written early in the 
war and before experience showed the necessity of 
trained artillery leaders. Beauregard was from Louisi 
ana himself, and Longstreet from Georgia, and it is a 
fact that before the tremendous campaigns of 1862 
welded the Army of Northern Virginia into a thor 
oughly organized and disciplined fighting machine, 
state prejudices were rife and entered into every ap 
pointment. In fact, Longstreet, above all others, per 
sisted to the end in harping on the favoritism he 
imagined was shown Virginians. But it must be re 
called that Pendleton owed his preferment over Walton 
largely to Mr. Davis influence, with whom he had been 
a cadet at West Point, and besides the day was one 
when graduates of the United States Military Academy 
were in the ascendant. 

Though a veteran of the Mexican War, Walton was 
not a West Pointer. To soothe his disappointment, he 
was now offered the command of a Louisiana Brigade 
with advanced rank in the infantry, but this he refused, 
as he could not see how assignment to the command of 
an infantry brigade of 1,000 men, in lieu of that over 
80 guns, was really a promotion. The next affronts to 
Walton were the appointment of Long as brigadier- 
general September 21, 1863, Shoup during the winter 
in the Western Army, and Alexander, his second rank 
ing battalion commander, March 1, 1864, with rank 
from February 26. In the meantime, Col. Stephen D. 
Lee, of the Artillery, had been promoted and assigned 
to the command of an infantry brigade in the West, 
November 6, 1862, soon to be again promoted August 
3, 1863. Whatever Longstreet s early views about 
Walton may have been, it would not seem that he had 
long retained them, for he supplanted him, as we have 
seen, at Gettysburg by Alexander and intentionally 
left him behind when he made his expedition to Tennes 
see. One thing seems certain. If Longstreet still, in 


1863, professed the advocacy of Walton s promotion, 
he was not acting in good faith or was doing so to secure 
his transfer from the 1st Corps. 

In the meantime, Walton was not the only artillery 
officer sidetracked. Col. Cabell had been persistently 
overslaughed because of his age. His own adjutant has 
recorded that this distinguished member of a proud and 
historic family "lacked self-assertion and aggression; 
to some extent, too, he lacked the manner and bearing 
of a soldier, and he never maneuvered for position for 
himself or his battalion."* "His essential characteristics 
were a pure and unselfish nature, tender and affectionate 
heart, gentle and unfailing courtesy, single-hearted and 
devoted partiotism, quiet but indomitable courage." 
"He was a man of intellect and culture, as well as char 
acter." But all these virtures together did not spell 
fitness for high command in the Artillery and their very 
enumeration points to the fact that his military confi 
dante knew he lacked the dash and ability requisite for 
successful leadership and confirms the estimate of him 
entertained at headquarters which has been previously 
stated. A serious effort, it will be recalled, was made 
to sidetrack Cabell by transferring him to the defenses 
of Richmond, and there was even the suggestion that he 
be given advanced rank in order that it might be accom 
plished. Upon learning from his friends of this sug 
gested promotion, the gallant old soldier was much 
gratified, until by accident he discovered the motive, 
when he flamed into an ungovernable rage and de 
manded to know if he was taken for a "damned sneak 
and coward and fool." He surrendered his old bat 
talion, it is true, but not until Appomattox. 

We have seen how Col. Brown was overslaughed in 
the interest of Long, not by reason of lack of ability, 
for he was an exceptionally fine officer, competent and 
successful, but because Long s claims were more ac 
ceptable at headquarters. Cabell and Brown, like Wal 
ton, were not West Pointers. From the foregoing 

*Four Years Under Marse Robert, Stiles, p. 155. 


facts, it does not appear that Walton was the only one 
who was overslaughed, whether justly or not, or that 
state politics alone controlled in his case. Indeed, we 
can go still further in tracing the effort to hand the 
tactical reins of the Artillery over to young and trained 
soldiers, for was not Pendleton himself, at first seized 
upon with such avidity as the senior artilleryman, 
gradually displaced from tactical command? The ef 
fort to dispose of him on the battlefield has been clearly 
perceptible in every reorganization of the arm. In fact, 
except with regard to his actual rank, his case was not 
dissimilar to that of Walton s, and an unprejudiced stu 
dent of the Army of Northern Virginia will be com 
pelled to admit that all these unfortunate maneuvers, 
disappointing as they were to certain faithful soldiers 
and their friends, were in the interest of artillery effi 
ciency. Of course Walton and Cabell could not ap 
preciate this. Soon after Alexander s promotion, Wal 
ton had applied to be relived from duty with the Army 
of Northern Virginia, and at his own suggestion was 
assigned to duty as Inspector of Field Artillery at 
Large. During his absence, a strong effort developed 
in the Artillery arm to declare all positions not actually 
filled in the mobile army vacant, in order that adequate 
promotion might be given officers present in the field. 
In pursuance of this hard plan, concerning which much 
is to be said on both sides, Maj. S. F. Pierson, who had 
not served with the Army in the field for several years, 
but who still held his commission therein, was trans 
ferred to the Virginia Reserves on July 21, and Lieut. - 
Col. John S. Saunders was transferred to the Inspector 
Generals Department.* But Walton had a friend at 
court in Gen. Bragg, who had him ordered back to the 
Army to prevent his elimination. Returning to the 
Army after an arduous tour of duty in the South, Wal 
ton now found it necessary to accept service under those 
formerly his juniors, or resign. While he did not dis 
parage the ability of Long and Alexander, yet he did 

*Rel)enion Records, Series I, Vol. XL, Part III, pp. 790, 797. 


not feel that such a course was consistent with his 
dignity. Furthermore, he was forced to the conclusion 
upon a review of events than his services were no longer 
valued. Accordingly on July 18, he tendered his 
resignation and addressed a remarkable and pathetic 
communication to his gallant command, in which much 
of the foregoing matter is included. "It is with re 
luctance," wrote he, "that I have been forced from the 
service, with grief that I find myself separated from 
you, with whom, I had hoped, should Providence per 
mit, to return to the city of our home. Circumstances 
have denied me this privilege ; but harsh as may be their 
decree, they cannot rob me of the consolatory conviction 
that while with you I tried to deserve your affection 
and esteem, nor of the hope that while absent I may 
retain them." 

In the diary of the Washington Artillery as an entry 
of July 20, the following is found: "The resignation 
of our gallant old chief, Col. Walton, has been accepted. 
We shall never cease to regret the circumstances that 
have induced this action. All our hearts are so attached 
to him, that no one, no matter how capable he may 
prove himself, can command the Washington Artillery 
as he has done, in peace as well as in war." Such were 
the sentiments which animated the men of that splendid 
command, whose services in Virginia were so heroic and 
so unselfish from first to last. But it is not difficult to 
see in the pages of the diary quoted from that the cir 
cumstances which entailed the resignation of Walton 
were appreciated in their proper light, as well as la 
mented. The devotion of his officers and men to Wal 
ton could not blind them to the fact that his age (54 
years) and physical strength had rendered him un- 
suited to further activity in the field. 

On the day of Walton s resignation, the Washington 
Artillery was ordered to rejoin the 1st Corps, and 
regularly report through its chief. This order of Gen. 
Pendleton s no doubt precipitated Walton s final action. 
But special authority was obtained from the President 


overruling Pendleton s order, and the battalion was as 
signed to Col. Walker s 3d Corps Artillery, although 
desirous of being attached to Beauregard s command. 
This transfer met with Pendleton s approval, provided 
another battalion were assigned to the 1st Corps in its 
place. On July 31, however, Maj. Owen was again as 
signed to the command of the 13th Virginia Battalion, 
which he bad previously commanded in Tennessee, re 
lieving Maj. Gibbes and reporting to Lieut. -Col. Frank 
Huger, Acting Chief of Artillery 1st Corps, in the ab 
sence of Alexander. The 13th Virginia Battalion then 
consisted of Davidson s, Walker s "Otey," and Dicken- 
son s batteries, with 12 guns and 450 men. 

Another matter affecting the artillery organization 
now came up for final adjustment. During the month 
of July, Maj. Edgar F. Moseley, who, though holding 
his commission in the 1st Virginia Regiment of Ar 
tillery, had for some time commanded a battalion under 
Beauregard, was promoted lieutenant-colonel and reas 
signed to the same battalion. From the first it had ap 
peared an incongruity to allow officers of a single inde 
pendent regiment to be promoted without reference to 
other commands and to command battalions while hold 
ing a commission in this regiment. Before Col. Brown s 
death, he had sought to have Maj . Moseley promoted in 
the 1st Regiment vice Lieut. -Col. Coleman, but met 
with Pendleton s opposition on the ground that there 
could be no such independent regimental promotion. 
But at last Moseley was promoted without reference to 
Pendleton s views, whereupon the Chief of Artillery 
strenuously protested against the disregard of the 
claims of other officers in the arm, senior in rank, and 
with infinitely more service than Moseley had to his 
credit. Furthermore, Pendleton now sought to have 
the old regimental organization of the 1st Virginia Ar 
tillery abolished as inconsistent with the general 
scheme of artillery organization, 

This regiment was organized under state authority in 
1861, in the Army of the Peninsula under Magruder, 


and turned over to the Confederacy as such by Vir 
ginia. Magruder, it will be recalled, was an artilleryman 
himself, and had with Alexander, from the first urged 
the organization of artillery in large groups, and this 
he proceeded to do in his own army. The original of 
ficers elected in the regiment were Col. George W. 
Randolph, afterwards Brigadier-General and Secre 
tary of War, Lieut. -Col. Henry Coalter Cabell, and 
Maj. John Thompson Brown. When Randolph was 
promoted, Cabell became colonel and Brown lieutenant- 
colonel, but the majority remained vacant for some time. 
The companies associated to form the regiment were 
the Richmond Fayette, originally commanded by 
Randolph, then Cabell; the 2d Richmond Howitzers, 
originally commanded by Brown; the 3d Richmond 
Howitzers, orginally commanded by Robert Stanard; 
Sands or Ritter s Henrico; Southall s or Wyatt s 
Albemarle; and Allen s Hampton; Cosnahan s Penin 
sula; Coke s Williamsburg ; Young s Yorktown; and 
Richardson s James City, batteries. Of these Allen s 
was soon detached from the Army of Northern Vir 
ginia, being brigaded with another to form Allen s Bat 
talion, while Cosnahan s and Coke s were merged in 
the spring of 1862 under Capt. John Coke. In October, 
Coke s and Ritter s batteries were broken up and the 
men and guns distributed among other batteries, so that 
but six of its original batteries remained in the Army 
after the reorganization, the Fayette being sooner or 
later assigned to Dearing s, then Read s, the 2d and 3d 
Howitzers to the 1st Virginia Regiment under Brown, 
and Wyatt s to Poague s Battalion, while Young s and 
Richardson s only remained with Moseley when elected 
major of the regiment in the summer of 1862. 

In July, 1864, Young s Battery alone remained in 
Moseley s Battalion, Richardson s being on detached 
duty at Chaffin s Bluff, so that the original regiment 
was virtually defunct and was entitled to no field- 


Pendleton s recommendation for the official disband- 
ment of the regiment was forwarded approved by Gen. 
Lee and referred to Gen. Bragg by the Secretary of 
War, who endorsed the views of the Chief of Artillery. 
The upshot of the whole matter was the official dis- 
bandment of the regiment on August 29, 1864, and its 
recognition as a battalion of six companies to which no 
extraordinary rule of promotion should apply. 

Having taken steps to accomplish this end, though 
failing in having the Washington Artillery reassigned 
to the 1st Corps, Pendleton now called on Col. Jones 
for the return of Read s Battalion to Pickett s Division, 
from which it had been detached to operate with Hoke. 

When Lee crossed the James on June 17 and 18, he 
had left behind near Malvern Hill Cutshaw s and 
Hardaway s battalions of the 2d Corps under Col. 
Carter to patrol the river and resist the approach of 
transports and gunboats. On the 13th of July, Col. 
Carter, with Cutshaw s Battalion, had moved to 
Walker s farm, while a small Confederate cavalry 
force advanced towards Rowland s Mill and a regiment 
to the vicinity of Charles City Court House. Carter s 
scouts along the river reported that no vessels of any 
kind had passed down the river since the llth, but about 
4 P. M. he discerned two vessels, one a passenger and 
the other a freight steamer, moving up stream. Throw 
ing Cutshaw s guns into action on the bank, among 
them a Whitworth rifle, Carter opened fire on these 
vessels, injuring the freighter to some extent and strik 
ing the transport, which caused it to turn back to Fort 
Powhatan before reaching the channel nearest the guns. 
That night the battalion withdrew to Phillip s Farm, 
six miles back from the river, and went into camp. On 
the 14th, Carter reappeared at Malvern Hill and with 
the Whitworth drove off a picket gunboat opposite 
Turkey Island House. Two days later the Whitworth 
successfully drove back down the river three small gun 
boats which had steamed up stream to clear the river of 
the Confederate artillery, while Graham s Battery of 


Hardaway s Battalion, with four 20-pounder Parrotts 
opened from Tilghman s Gate upon the pontoon bridge, 
a gunboat, and the Federal camp at Deep Bottom. 
The gunboat was struck several times and finally re 
tired to the cover of the river bank and the camp was 
thrown into such a commotion that an entire brigade left 
the woods near Four-Mile Creek at a double-quick and 
took shelter in the trenches. Carter also employed his 
cannoneers in these expeditions as sharpshooters, hav 
ing armed them with captured cavalry carbines, and pro 
posed thereafter to operate with a single battery fully 
mounted. Again it may be said, this was remarkable 
service for field artillery, but it showed the ready 
adaptability of that arm to meet the exigencies of any 

Carter s activity along the James shelling the Federal 
transports, gunboats, and landings, kept Butler in such 
a constant state of alarm, that soon Grant s attention 
was directed to this quarter. On the 26th, Hancock 
with 20,000 infantry and 22 pieces of artillery, and 
Sheridan with 6,000 cavalry, were started for Deep 
Bottom to cooperate with Butler in surprising the Con 
federates, and making a dash upon Richmond. Wilcox s 
Division was already at Drewry s Bluff, for noting a 
movement among the enemy towards the James, Lee 
had sent it and Kershaw s Division on the 24th to re- 
enforce Conner s Brigade and Carter s artillery force 
on the north bank of the river. During the night of the 
26th, Hancock and Sheridan crossed the river and at 
dawn advanced. Kershaw s Infantry almost at once 
fell back, leaving Graham s 1st Rockbridge Battery 
without supports in an advanced position, where after 
defending itself with superb coolness for some time its 
four large Parrotts were captured. On hearing of Han 
cock s crossing, Lee immediately sent over W. H. F. 
Lee s Division of cavalry with McGregor s Battery, 
and Heth s Division of the 2d Corps, while on the night 
of the 28th, Poague s Battalion and Penick s Battery 
were ordered from their positions north of the Appomat- 


tox to join Col. Carter. When Grant found that his 
movement had been anticipated, he ordered Hancock to 
recross the river on the night of the 29th. Col. Poague 
was now directed to take position on the left of Pickett s 
line, and guard that flank against the approach of the 
enemy from Dutch Gap, where he remained through 
out the winter shelling Butler s working parties along 
the canal with guns and mortars. 

On the north side of the river, the Confederate line 
extended from New Market toward White Oak Swamp, 
the right resting near the Chaffin farm. When Hancock 
first appeared before this line, Gen. Ewell, who com 
manded the Richmond defenses, had urged the turning 
out of the Local Defense troops, but to this the Secre 
tary of War had objected on account of the inconven 
ience and interruption it caused the government depart 
ments, from which the men were mostly drawn. The 
dispatch of Anderson to the James by Gen. Lee, with 
Wilcox s and Kershaw s divisions, had rendered the step 
unnecessary, but Lieut.-Col. Pemberton, in charge of 
the Artillery defenses of the city, had on the 27th 
posted two batteries of Lightfoot s Battalion at the 
intersection of the Mill and Varina Roads, behind Con 
ner s right, and the other battery near the New Market 
Road, all on the exterior line of works, while Maj. 
Stark s Battalion, composed of the Mathews and 
Giles batteries under Capts. Andrew D. Armistead 
and David A. French, respectively, were posted near 
the Barton house. Pemberton s two battalions num- 
ered 700 men with 22 guns, or about 100 men per bat 
tery. Soon the Louisiana Guard Battery, Capt. 
Charles A. Green, Jr., which had been on duty in 
Richmond since its misfortune on the Rapidan, joined 
Stark s Battalion. 



WE have seen that Gen. Alexander had detected 
signs of the enemy s mining operations, and that on 
July 1 the Confederate engineers had opened counter 
mines. By July 10, the Confederates had done enough 
work, had it been done at the salient, to have heard the 
enemy, who would have been directly beneath them. 
Besides those on the flanks of the salient, two other 
shafts farther to the left near Colquitt s and Gracie s 
salients were opened on the 10th and 19th, respectively, 
and were being vigorously pushed. A perfect mania 
for tunneling seemed to have broken out among the 
Confederates. On the llth, Bushrod Johnson urged 
that listening galleries be constructed along his lines, 
all of which goes to show that no one but Alexander 
had really perceived the enemy s objective. On the 
12th, the enemy opened upon Wise s Brigade an un 
usually heavy mortar fire, which not only necessitated 
night work on the bomb-proofs, but caused Johnson to 
order greater efforts on Maj. Moseley s part to sub 
due this fire. 

Before leaving the Army, Alexander had placed 
about half a dozen Coehorn mortars in the ravines im 
mediately in rear of Elliott s salient, and on June 20 
he had posted the 16 guns of Haskell s Battalion in the 
sunken Jerusalem Road, 600 yards in its rear, all under 
Col. Haskell. Though somewhat exposed to the 
enemy s fire, which overshot the works in their front, 
Haskell s batteries were not permitted to break ground 
or show any sign of their presence. This disposition of 
these guns was a foresight for which the entire Army, as 
we shall see, should have been grateful to Alexander. 

On the 27th, Alexander, before being ordered to the 
north of the James River, carefully inspected his lines 
and was by no means satisfied with the protection Col. 


Huger had provided for the 1st Corps guns. The 
works of Huger s and CabelFs battalions were in his 
opinion entirely too slight to withstand the fire of the 
heavy pieces, which he expected the enemy to bring to 
bear on them. Accordingly Huger was directed to em 
ploy his cannoneers in strengthening these works, as no 
infantry or other labor was available. 

The next day, Col. Walker, who still had Pegram s, 
Mclntosh s, and Richardson s battalions less Penick s 
Battery, in position on Huger s right, reported that the 
enemy were strengthening their works in his front, and 
increasing the number of their guns to such an extent 
that he was working his cannoneers in reliefs of from 40 
to 100 men day and night, while Mahone s Division of 
the 3d Corps alone remained in the trenches in support 
of his guns. On the night of the 28th, Colquitt s Bri 
gade of Hoke s Division, and Wise s of Johnson s Di 
vision were secretly transferred to the portion of the line 
which had been held by Field s Division before it was 
moved across the James River with Anderson to oppose 
Hancock, while Gracie s Division was placed in the 
works on Johnson s left. The utmost caution and silence 
was enjoined upon the troops. Capt. Richard G. Pe 
gram s Petersburg Battery, of Coit s Battalion, still oc 
cupied Elliott s salient. 

Having practically completed his mine, Grant had 
sought, as we have seen, to draw off a large portion of 
the Confederates to the north side of the river, before 
springing it. A gallery 511 feet long, with two branch 
galleries at the end, to the right and left, each 37 feet 
long, had been successfully dug. Col. Pleasants method 
of ventilation was a simple one. "When the tunnel had 
penetrated the hill far enough to need it, a close par 
tition was built across it near the entrance with a close- 
fitting door. Through the partition on the side of this 
door was passed the open end of a large square box, or 
closed trough, which was built along on the floor of the 
tunnel, conveying the fresh outside air to the far end 
of the tunnel, where the men extending it were at work. 


"To create a draught through the air box, a fireplace 
was excavated in the side of the tunnel, within the par 
tition, and a chimney was pierced through the hill above 
it. A small fire in this chimney place, and the outside 
air would pass through the air-box to the far end of the 
tunnel, whence it would return and escape up the chim 
ney, taking with it the foul air of the tunnel." This 
gallery was finished July 17th, the flank galleries on the 
23d, and on the 28th, the very day Lee was moving his 
troops from his line to oppose Grant s feint to the north, 
each gallery was charged with 4,000 pounds of gun 

The Federals knew that Lee had detected their opera 
tions, for they themselves could hear the Confederates 
at work in the countermines. Nevertheless, they de 
termined to delay the explosion until preparations for a 
grand charge to succeed it could be completed. For the 
assault a large force of infantry was to be employed, 
which was to rush forward under cover of the concen 
trated fire of many batteries. From their signal towers, 
the Federal lookouts had located the position of nearly 
every gun in the Confederate lines, and 81 heavy guns 
and mortars, and about as many field pieces were 
brought up and placed in position to bear on them. But 
Haskell s Battalion was overlooked, thanks to Alex 

Having failed in his effort against Swell s outer line, 
Grant at Deep Bottom on the 28th gave orders for the 
explosion of the mine on the morning of the 30th. "The 
explosion might have been arranged for the afternoon 
of the 29th, but the morning of the 30th was chosen, as 
it permitted the placing of more heavy guns and mor 
tars for the bombardment, which would follow the ex 
plosion as well as preliminary arrangements, such as 
massing the troops, removing parapets and abattis to 
make passages for the assaulting columns, and posting 
of pioneers to remove our abattis and open passages for 
artillery through our lines. Depots of intrenching tools, 
with sand bags, gabions, fascines, etc., were established, 


that lodgments might be more quickly made, though the 
pioneers of all regiments were already supplied with 
tools." Engineer officers were detailed to accompany 
each corps, and the Chief Engineer was directed to park 
his pontoon trains at a convenient point, ready to move 
at a moment s warning, for Meade having assured him 
self that the Confederates had no second line on Ceme 
tery Hill, as he had formerly supposed, and as had been 
positively reported to him, was now sanguine of success, 
and made these preparations to meet the contingency of 
the meagre Confederate force retiring beyond the Ap- 
pomattox and burning the bridges. In such an event, 
he proposed to push immediately across the river and 
Swift Creek and open up communications with Butler 
at Bermuda Hundred, before Lee could send any re 
inforcements from his five divisions north of the 

On the afternoon of the 29th, when Meade issued 
his orders for the attack, Lee had but three small divi 
sions, Johnson s, Hoke s, and Mahone s behind his 
works, and Alexander s, Jones , and three battalions of 
Walker s Artillery. As soon as it was dark, Burnside 
was to mass his troops in the valley opposite Elliott s 
salient and remove the abattis in his front, so that the 
columns of assault might debouch rapidly. He was 
to spring the mine at about 3:30 A. M., and, moving 
rapidly through the breach, seize the crest of Cemetery 
Hill, a ridge four hundred yards in rear of the Con 
federate lines. 

Ord was to mass the 18th Corps in rear of the 9th, 
and to follow and support Burnside s right. 

Warren was to reduce the number of men holding his 
front to the minimum, concentrate heavily on the right 
of his corps, and support Burnside s left. Hancock 
was to mass the 2d Corps in rear of Ord s trenches, and 
be prepared to support the assault as developments 
might dictate, while Hunt was to concentrate his ar 
tillery on the hostile guns in, and commanding the 
salient. Thus did Grant mass 60,000 men to fall upon 


a single point of Lee s ten miles of line, behind the 
whole of which there was hardly one man for every six 
in the assaulting column. Now let another describe 
what occurred:* 

"Long before dawn of the 30th the troops were in position, and 
at half past three,, punctually to the minute, the mine was fired. 
Then the news passed swiftly down the lines, and the dark columns, 
standing in serried masses, waited in dread suspense the signal, 
knowing that death awaited many of them on yonder crest, yet not 
animated by the stern joy of coming fight, nor yet rosolved that 
though death stalked forth with horrid mien from the dreadful 
breach, it should be but to greet victory. 

"Minute followed minute of anxious waiting, a trial to even 
the most determined veterans, and now the east was streaked with 
gray, yet the tender beauty of the dim tranquillity remained unvexed 
of any sound of war, save one might hear a low hum amid the 
darkling swarm as grew the wonder at delay. Nor was the cause 
of hindrance easy to ascertain, for should it prove that the fuse 
was still alight, burning but slowly, to enter the mine was certain 
death. Thus time dragged slowly on, telegram upon telegram of 
inquiry meanwhile pouring in from Meade, who, unmindful of the 
dictum of Napoleon, that in assaults a general should be with his 
troops, had fixed his headquarters full a mile away. But these 
were all unheeded, for Burnside knew not what to answer. 

"Then it was that two brave men, whose names should be men 
tioned with respect whenever courage is honored, Lieut. Jacob 
Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees, both of the Forty-eighth Pennsyl 
vania, volunteered for the peculiar service and entered the mine. 
Crawling on their hands and knees, groping in utter darkness, they 
found that the fuse had gone out about 50 feet from the mouth of 
the main gallery, relighted it and retired. 

" In eleven minutes now the mine will explode, Pleasants re 
ports to Burnside at thirty-three minutes past four, and a small 
group of officers of the Forty-eighth, standing upon the slope of 
the main parapet, anxiously await the result. 

" It lacks a minute yet, says Pleasants, looking at his watch. 

Not a second, cried Douty, for there she goes. 

"A slight tremor of the earth for a second, then the rocking 
as of an earthquake, and with a tremendous burst which rent the 
sleeping hills beyond, a vast column of earth and smoke shoots 
upward to a great height, its dark sides flashing out sparks of 

"The following narrative of events from the pen of Capt. William Gordon 
McCabe is the best account of the battle of the Crater ever written, and so 
recognized both North, South, and abroad. It has stood the severest tests of 
both time and criticism. Capt. McCabe was the gallant adjutant of Col. 
William J. Pegram s Artillery Battalion, and reflected all the dash and courage 
of his celebrated young commander. 



fire, hangs poised for a moment in mid-air, and then hurtling down 
ward with a roaring sound, showers of stones, broken timbers, and 
blackened human limbs, subsides the gloomy pall of darkening 
smoke flushing to an angry crimson as it floats away to meet the 
morning sun. Pleasants has done his work with terrible complete 
ness, for now the site of the Elliott Salient is marked by a horrid 
chasm, 135 feet in length, 97 feet in breadth, and 30 feet deep, and 
its brave garrison all asleep, save the guards, when thus surprised 
by sudden death, lie buried beneath the jagged blocks of blackened 
clay in all, 256 officers and men of the 18th and 22d South 
Carolina, 2 officers and 20 men of Pegram s Petersburg Battery." 

Two of Pegram s guns were hurled through the air 
to a great distance. Of the two Confederate galleries 
on the flanks of the mine, one, which was unoccupied, 
was destroyed by the explosion, while the miners at 
work in the other were badly shaken up but climbed out 
and escaped as the gallery was not crushed in. 

"The dread upheaval has rent in twain Elliott s Brigade, and 
the men to the right and left of the large abyss recoil in terror 
and dismay. Nor shall we censure them, for so terrible was the 
explosion that even the assaulting column sunk back aghast, and 
nearly ten minutes elapsed before it could be reformed. 

"Now a storm of fire bursts in red fury from the Federal front, 
and in an instant all the valley between the hostile lines lies 
shrouded in bellowing smoke. Then Marshall, putting himself at 
the head of the stormers, sword in hand, bids his men to follow. 

"But there comes no response befitting the stern grandeur of the 
scene no trampling charge no rolling drums of austerity no 
fierce shouts of warlike joy as burst from men of the Light 
Division when they mounted the breach of Badajos, or from 
Frazier s Royals, as they crowned the crimson slopes of Saint 

"No, none of this there. But a straggling line of men of the 
Second Brigade, First Division, uttering a mechanical cheer, slowly 
mounts the crest, passes unmolested across the intervening space, 
and true to the instinct, fostered by long service in the trenches, 
plunges into the Crater, courting the friendly shelter of its 
crumbling sides. 

"Yonder lies Cemetery Hill in plain view, naked of men, and 
hard beyond the brave old town, nestling whitely in its wealth of 

"Silence still reigned along the Confederate lines, yet Ledlie s 
men did not advance, and now the supporting brigade of the same 
division running forward over the same crest, and with an incredible 



folly crowding in upon their comrades, already huddled together 
in the shelving pit,, all regimental and company organization was 
lost, and the men speedily passed from the control of their officers. 

"If we except Elliott, who with the remnant of his brigade was 
occupying the ravine to the left and rear of the Crater, no officer 
of rank was present on the Confederate side to assume immediate 
direction of affairs, and a considerable time elapsed before 
Beauregard and Lee, both beyond the Appomattox, were in 
formed by Col. Paul, of Beauregard s staff, of the nature and 
locality of the disaster. 

"But almost on the moment, John Haskell, of South Carolina, a 
glorious young battalion commander, whose name will be forever 
associated with the Artillery Corps of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, galloped to the front, followed by two light batteries, 
and having disposed these pieces along the Plank Road, and opened 
Planner s light guns from the Gee house, passed to his left to 
speak a word of cheery commendation to Lamkin of his battalion, 
who was already annoying the swarming masses of the enemy with 
his Virginia Battery of eight-inch mortars. Passing through the 
covered way, Haskell sought Elliott, and, pointing out to him the 
defenseless position of the guns on the Plank Road, urged him to 
make such dispositions as would afford them protection. Essaying 
this, Elliott sprang forward, followed by a mere handful of brave 
fellows, but, almost on the instant, fell stricken by a grievous hurt 
and was borne from his last field of battle. 

"The fire of the enemy s artillery was now very severe, owing 
to their superior weight of metal, and the guns of the Plank Road, 
exposed in addition to the fire of the sharpshooters, were suffering 
such loss that it was determined to retire all but six pieces, and, as 
the situation seemed rather hopeless, to call for volunteers to man 
these. To Haskell s proud delight every gun detachment 
volunteered to remain. 

"Nor did the artillery to the right and left fail to bear them 
selves with the resolution of men conscious that, for the time, the 
hope of the Army was centered in their steadiness, and that their 
guns alone barred the road to Petersburg; for, let me repeat, 
Cemetery Hill was naked of men." 

With the superb Haskell encouraging them to every 
effort, his cannoneers labored at their pieces like fiends. 
He actually moved two detachments with their mor 
tars forward to the trenches within fifty yards of the 
Crater, into which they burst their shell at a surpris 
ing rate. No less active was Maj. Hampton Gibbes, 
whose battalion, on the right of the Crater, opened 
as soon as the pieces could be brought to bear on the 


enemy s massed troops. At first the left gun of David 
son s Battery alone had an effective command of the 
Crater, and it was left for a time unserved through the 
misbehavior of the acting battery commander, Lieut. 
James C. Otey, who, owing to a combination of cir 
cumstances, was the only officer at the time present 
with the battery. This unfortunate young officer, the 
first and the last in the whole career of Lee s Artillery 
Corps to abandon his guns in cowardice, seems to have 
been entirely unmanned by the awfulness of the cata 
clysm, in which he and his men had all but been en 
gulfed. Let us not be too harsh in our judgment of 
him. Let us imagine ourselves in his position and ask 
if the mere thought of such an experience as that 
through which he had passed does not shake our reso 
lution. If poor Otey were at fault, then he has long 
since atoned for his misdoing. To the writer he is more 
to be pitied, and demands more of charity than any 
other soldier in that grand artillery corps of Lee s 
Army. Would that his name might not be mentioned, 
but there it is in black and white in the record for all 
time. The hand of mortal cannot obliterate it, the stain 
is indelible. The incident is not recounted here to hold 
Otey up to scorn, but to show that misconduct before 
the enemy was so rare, so unheard of in Lee s Artillery, 
that even on the part of a miserable, insignificant youth, 
it attracted the attention of an army. 

If Otey allowed his guns to remain inactive, it was 
not to be for long, for Gibbes and Maj. Samuel Pres 
ton, of Wise s Brigade, personally manned one of the 
pieces and worked them with excellent effect, until they 
both fell desperately wounded, thus making glorious 
the spot of Otey s defection. Again the guns became 
silent, and again a number of artillery officers, heedless 
of all personal danger, rushed to the position to man the 
pieces. This time it was Lieut.-Col. Huger, Acting 
Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps, with Capts. Win- 
throp, Mason, and Haskell, of Gen. Alexander s staff, 
that reopened the fire, soon joined by Private L. T. 


Covington, of Pegram s destroyed battery. "Frank 
Huger, who like Edward Freer of the Forty-third had 
seen more combats than he could count years, was, as 
always, to the fore, working as a simple cannoneer at 
his heated Napoleons, cheering and encouraging his men 
by joyful voice and valiant example." Thus did Gibbes, 
Preston, Huger, and the other gallant artillerymen 
maintain their fire at the critical moment in spite of the 
concentration of the enemy s guns upon them until, 
spurring hard from the hospital, with the fever still 
upon him, came Lieut. John Hampden Chamberlayne, 
of the 3d Corps Artillery, who with volunteers from 
other batteries and Wise s infantrymen, so handled the 
guns which had been abandoned by their men and until 
then only manned by a few officers, that from that day 
the battery bore his name, and he wore another bar 
upon his collar. 

The left gun of Davidson s Battery in the next salient 
on the right of the Crater, which in the hands of those 
we have mentioned did such fearful execution, was so 
well protected that it could never be kept silent by 
Hunt s concentrated fire. Whenever the Federals 
showed themselves it reopened. Gibbes alone fired 
forty or more rounds, at a range of less than 400 yards, 
with it, before he was wounded. Five hundred yards to 
the left was Wright s Halifax Battery of Coit s Bat 
talion. These guns, which had a flanking fire on the 
left of the destroyed salient and across all the ap 
proaches thereto, were posted in the depression behind 
the infantry line and thoroughly masked from the hostile 
artillery fire not only by the ground in their front, but 
by a heavy fringe of pines in advance of the Federal 
line, which the enemy had carelessly neglected to level. 
^Wight s fire was rapid, incessant, and accurate, caus 
ing great loss. The Federal Artillery made vain efforts 
to locate him with their mortar shells, which tore up the 
ground all around, but could never hit him or silence his 
four guns. Besides these, a half dozen or more of 
HaskelTs 8-inch Coehorn mortars, from two or three ra- 


vines in the rear, threw shell aimed at the Crater, and 
Langhorne s 10-inch mortars along the Baxter Road 
also took part in the work of destruction. It was now, 
too, that Alexander s foresight was to yield such fine re 
sults, for Haskell s sixteen guns which he had so long 
kept concealed in the sunken Jerusalem Plank Road 
were in position 600 yards directly in rear of the Crater. 
The group simply swept the front from first to last. 

As soon as the Federal attack developed, Cutts great 
group of guns north of the Appomattox opposite the 
enemy s right, and Jones batteries along Beauregard s 
front near the river, opened upon the hostile artillery 
and kept up a furious cannonade to prevent Hunt from 
concentrating his fire upon the point to be assaulted, and 
on the Confederate right Walker s batteries also sought 
to divert the enemy s fire.* 

"On the Federal side, Griffin of Potter s Division, not waiting 
for Wilcox, pushed forward his brigade, and gained ground to the 
north of the Crater, and Bliss s Brigade of the same division, 
coming to his support, still further ground was gained in that 
direction. But his leading regiments, deflected by the hostile fire, 
bore to their left, and, mingling with Ledlie s men swarming along 
the sides of the great pit, added to the confusion. Wilcox now 
threw forward a portion of his division and succeeded in occupying 
about one hundred and fifty yards of the works south of the Crater, 
but stopped by the fire of Chamberlayne s guns, and, whenever 
occasion offered, by the fire of the infantry, his men on the exposed 
flank gave ground, and, pushing the right regiment into the Crater, 
the confusion grew worse confounded. Some of the men, indeed, 
from fear of suffocation, had already emerged from the pit and 
spread themselves to the right and left, but this was a matter 
of danger and difficulty, for the ground was scored with covered 
ways and traverses, honeycombed with bomb-proofs, and swept by 
the artillery. Others of them pressed forward and got into the 
ditch of the unfinished gorge lines, while not a few creeping along 
the glacis of the exterior line, made their way over the parapet into 
the main trench. In all this there was much hand-to-hand fighting, 
for many men belonging to the dismembered brigades still found 
shelter behind the traverses and bomb-proofs and did not easily 

*As regards the execution of Chamberlayne s guns, see especially statement 
of Gen. Warren, Report of Conduct of the War (1865), Vol. I, p. 166; Gen. 
Hunt, pp. 98, 184 ; Duane, p. 100. 

For the efficiency of the Confederate artillery fire, see Meade s report, Ibid., 
p. 31 ; Col. Loring s statement, p. 95 ; Gen. Potter, pp. 87, 177. 


"Meanwhile, Gen. Meade, groping in the dark, to use his own 
phrase, sent telegram upon telegram to Burnside to know how 
fared the day, but received answer to none. At fifteen minutes 
to six, however, one hour after Ledlie s men had occupied the 
breach, an orderly delivered him a note in pencil, written from the 
Crater by Gen. Loring, Inspector General of the 9th Corps, and 
addressed to Gen. Burnside. This was Meade s first information 
from the front and was little cheer, for Loring stated briefly that 
Ledlie s men were in confusion and would not go forward. 

"Ord was now directed to push forward the 18th Corps, and the 
following dispatch was sent to Richmond: 


" July 30, 1864, 6 A. M. 

MAJ.-GEN. BURNSIDE Prisoners taken say that there is no 
line in their rear, and that their men were falling back when ours 
advanced, that none of their troops have returned from the James. 
Our chance is now. Push your men forward at all hazards, white 
and black, and don t lose time in making formations, but rush for 
the crest. 


" Major-General, Commanding. 

"But Ord could not advance, for the narrow debouches were 
still choked up by the men of the 9th Corps and by the wounded 
borne from the front, and although Burnside promptly transmitted 
the order to his subordinates, the troops in rear moved with 
reluctant step, while no general of division was present with those 
in front to urge them forward. 

"Again did Meade telegraph to Burnside: Every moment is 
most precious; the enemy are undoubtedly concentrating to meet 
you on the crest. But not until 20 minutes past seven did he 
receive a reply to the effect that Burnside hoped to carry the crest, 
but it was hard work. 

"Then Meade s patience seems fairly to have broken down. 
What do you mean by hard work to take the crest? he asks. I 
understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy s line, which 
you occupied immediately after exploding the mine. Do you mean 
to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance? 
If not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire 
an immediate answer. 

" GEORGE G. MEADE, Major-General. 

"To which Burnside, in hot wrath, straightway replied: 


" 7:35 A. M. 

" GEN. MEADE Your dispatch by Capt. Jay received. The 
main body of Gen. Potter s Division is beyond the Crater. 


I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey 
my orders to advance. I mean to say that it is very hard to 
advance to the crest. I have never in any report said anything 
different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not in 
subordinate, I would say that the latter remark of your note was 
unofficerlike and ungentlemanly. 

" A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General. 

"Griffin, it is true, in obedience to orders to advance straight 
for Cemetery Hill, had during this time attempted several charges 
from his position north of the Crater, but his men displayed little 
spirit, and, breaking speedily under the fire of the artillery, sought 
their old shelter behind the traverses and covered ways. The rest 
of Potter s Division moved out slowly and it was fully eight o clock, 
more than three hours after the explosion, when Ferrero s negro 
division, the men beyond question inflamed with drink, burst from 
the advance line, cheering vehemently, passed at a double quick 
over the crest under a heavy fire, and, rushing with scarce a check 
over the heads of the white troops in the Crater, spread to their 
right, capturing more than two hundred prisoners, and one stand 
of colors." 

The negroes, however, could not traverse the space 
which Haskell s guns dominated. No troops with their 
formation could have done so. As the dense mass came 
in sight, partly emerging from the Crater, the sixteen 
guns concentrated upon it and drove the assailants to 
cover without the aid of a hundred muskets. A single 
negro private, with his musket at support arms, charged 
home to the guns and was felled with a rammer staff, as 
he sprung into the sunken road among the pieces. 

At the same time that Ferrero made his effort, 
Turner, of the 10th Corps, pushed forward a brigade 
over the 9th Corps parapets, seized the Confederate 
line further to the north, and quickly disposed the re 
maining brigades of his division to confirm his success. 

"Now was the crisis of the day, and fortunate was it for maiden 
and matron of Petersburg, that even at this moment there was 
filing into the ravine, between Cemetery Hill and the drunken 
battalions of Ferrero, a stern array of silent men, clad in faded 
gray, resolved with grim resolve to avert from the mother town a 
fate as dreadful as that which marked the three days sack of 


"Lee, informed of the disaster at 6:10 A. M., had bidden his aide, 
Col. Charles Venable, to ride quickly to the right of the army and 
bring up two brigades of Anderson s old division, commanded by 
Mahone, for time was too precious to observe military etiquette, and 
send the orders through Hill. Shortly after the General in Chief 
reached the front in person, and all men took heart when they 
descried the grave and gracious face, and Traveller stepping 
proudly, as if conscious that he bore upon his back the weight of a 
nation. Beauregard was already at the Gee house, a commanding 
position five hundred yards in rear of the Crater, and Hill had 
galloped to the right to organize an attacking column, and had 
ordered down Pegram, and even now the light batteries of Brander 
and Ellett were rattling through the town at a sharp trot^ with 
cannoneers mounted, the sweet, serene face of their boy-colonel lit 
up with that glow which to his men meant hotly impending fight. 

"Venable had sped upon his mission and found Mahone s men 
already standing to their arms ; but the Federals from their lofty 
lookouts were busily interchanging signals, and to uncover such 
a length of front without exciting observation demanded the nicest 
precaution. Yet was the difficulty overcome by a single device, 
for the men being ordered to drop back one by one, as if going for 
water, obeyed with such intelligence that Warren continued to 
report to Meade that not a man had left his front. 

"Then forming in the ravine in rear, the men of the Virginia and 
Georgia brigades came pressing down the Valley with swift, 
swinging stride, not with the discontented bearing of soldiers 
whose discipline alone carries them to what they feel to be a scene 
of fruitless sacrifice, but with the glad alacrity and aggressive 
ardor of men impatient for battle, and who, from long knowledge 
of war, are conscious that Fortune has placed within their grasp 
an opportunity which, by the magic touch of veteran steel, may be 
transformed to swift-winged victory. 

"Halting for a moment in rear of the Ragland House, Mahone 
bade his men strip off blankets and knapsacks, and prepare for 

"Then riding quickly to the front, while the troops marched in 
single file along the covered way, he drew rein at Bushrod Johnson s 
headquarters and reported in person to Beauregard. Informed 
that Johnson would assist in the attack with the outlying troops 
about the Crater, he rode still further to the front, dismounted, 
and, pushing along the covered way from the Plank Road, came 
out into the ravine in which he formed his men. Mounting the 
embankment at the head of the covered way, he descried within 
one hundred and sixty yards a forest of glittering bayonets, and 
beyond, floating proudly from the captured works, eleven Union 
flags. Estimating rapidly from the hostile colors the probable 
force in his front, he at once despatched his courier to bring up the 


Alabama Brigade from the right, assuming thereby a grave 
responsibility, yet was the wisdom of the decision vindicated by 
the event. * 

"Scarcely had the order been given when the head of the 
Virginia Brigade began to debouch from the covered way. Direct 
ing Col. Weisiger, its commanding officer,, to file to the right and 
form line of battle, Mahone stood at the angle, speaking quietly 
and cheerily to the men. Silently and quickly they moved out and 
formed with that precision dear to every soldier s eyes the sharp 
shooters leading, followed by the 6th, 16th, 61st, 41st, and 12th 
Virginia the men of Second Manassas and Crampton Gap ! 

"But one caution was given, to reserve their fire until they 
reached the brink of the ditch; but one exhortation, that they 
were counted on to do this work, and do it quickly. 

"Now the leading regiment of the Georgia Brigade began to 
move out, when suddenly a brave Federal officer, seizing the colors, 
called on his men to charge. Descrying this hostile movement on 
the instant, Weisiger, a veteran of stern countenance, which did not 
belie the personal intrepidity of the man, uttered to the Virginians 
the single word, Forward. 

"Then the sharpshooters and the men of the 6th on the right, 
running swiftly forward, for theirs was the greater distance to 
traverse, the whole line sprang along the crest and there burst 
from more than eight hundred warlike voices that fierce yell, which 
no man ever yet heard unmoved on field of battle. Storms of 
case shot from the right mingled with the tempest of bullets which 
smote upon them from the front, yet was there no answering volley, 
for these were veterans, whose fiery enthusiasm had been wrought 
to a finer temper by the stern code of discipline, and even in the 
tumult the men did not forget their orders. Still pressing forward 
with steady fury, while the enemy, appalled by the inexorable 
advance, gave ground, they reached the ditch of the inner works 
then one volley crashed from the whole line, and the 6th and 16th, 
with the sharpshooters clutching their empty guns and redoubling 
their fierce cries, leaped over the retrenched cavalier, and all down 
the line the dreadful work of the bayonet began. 

"How long it lasted none may say with certainty, for in those 
fierce moments no man heeded time, no man asked, no man gave 
quarter; but in an incredibly brief space, as seemed to those who 
looked on, the whole of the advanced line north of the Crater was 
taken, the enemy in headlong fight, while the tattered battle flags 
planted along the parapets from left to right told Lee, at the Gee 
house, that from this nettle danger, valor had plucked the flower, 
safety for an army. 

*The young courier by whom this order was transmitted was Jimmy Blake- 
more, an ex-cadet of the Virginia Military Institute, to whom Mahone constantly 
entrusted the most important missions. Mahone, it will be recalled, was himself 
an old cadet. 


"Redoubling the sharpshooters on his right, Mahone kept down 
all fire from the Crater, the vast rim of which frowned down upon 
the lower line occupied by his troops. 

"And now the scene within the horrid pit was as might be 
fitly portrayed only by the pencil of Dante, after he had trod 
nine-circle Hell. From the great mortars to the right and left, 
huge missiles, describing graceful curves, fell at regular intervals 
with dreadful accuracy and burst among the helpless masses 
huddled together, and every explosion was followed by piteous 
cries, and oftentimes the very air seemed darkened by flying human 
limbs. Haskell, too, had moved up his Eprouvette mortars among 
the men of the 16th Virginia, so close, indeed, that his powder 
charge was but one ounce and a half and, without intermission, 
the storm of fire beat upon the hapless mass imprisoned within. 

"Mahone s men watched with great interest this easy method 
of reaching troops behind cover, and then, with the initiative in 
genuity of soldiers, gleefully gathered up the countless muskets 
with bayonets fixed, which had been abandoned by the enemy, and 
propelled them with such nice skill that they came down upon 
Ledlie s men like the rain of the Norman arrows at Hastings. 

"At half past ten the Georgia Brigade advanced and attempted 
to dislodge Wilcox s men, who still held a portion of the line south 
of the Crater, but so closely was every inch of the ground searched 
by artillery, so biting was the fire of musketry, that obliquing to 
their left, they sought cover behind the cavalier trench won by the 
Virginia Brigade, many officers and men testifying by their blood 
how gallantly the venture had been essayed. 

"Half an hour later the Alabamians under Saunders arrived, but 
further attack was postponed until after 1 p. M., in order to 
arrange for cooperation from Colquitt on the right. Sharply to 
the minute agreed upon, the assaulting line moved forward, and 
with such astonishing rapidity did these glorious soldiers rush 
across the intervening space that ere their first wild cries subsided 
their battle flags had crowned the works. The Confederate bat 
teries were now ordered to cease firing, and forty volunteers were 
called for to assault the Crater, but so many of the Alabamians 
offered themselves for the service that the ordinary system of 
detail was necessary. Happily, before the assaulting party could 
be formed, a white handkerchief, made fast to a ramrod, was 
projected above the edge of the Crater, and, after a brier pause, 
a motley mass of prisoners poured over the side and ran for their 
lives to the rear. 

"In this grand assault on Lee s line for which Meade had massed 
65,000 troops, the enemy suffered a loss of above 5,000 men, 
including 1,101 prisoners, among whom were two brigade com 
manders, while vast quantities of small arms and twenty-one 
standards fell into the hands of the victors. 


"Yet many brave men perished on the Confederate side. 
Elliott s Brigade lost severely in killed and prisoners. The Virginia 
Brigade, too, paid the price which glory ever exacts. The 6th 
carried in 98 men and lost 88, one company the dandies/ of 
course, Old Company F of Norfolk, losing every man killed or 
wounded. Scarcely less was the loss in other regiments. 

"Such was the battle of the Crater, which excited the liveliest 
satisfaction throughout the Army and the country. Mahone was 
created major-general from that date; Weisiger, who was wounded, 
brigadier-general ; Capt. Girardey, of Mahone s staff, also brigadier, 
the latter an extraordinary but just promotion, for he was a young 
officer whose talents and decisive vigor qualified him to conduct 
enterprises of the highest movement. Yet, fate willed that his 
career should be brief, for within a fortnight he fell in battle north 
of the James, his death dimming the joy of victory." 

We search in vain for any such recognition of those 
dauntless gunners, who alone stood between the enemy 
and Petersburg after the explosion of the mine. "Ham" 
Chamberlayne became a captain, but glory was the only 
reward Gibbes and Haskell and Huger, and the others 
received. Such was the lot of the artillerymen. In 
deed no one seemed to think promotion, in an arm whose 
officers distinguished themselves on every occasion, was 
necessary. It would seem that the Army had come to 
regard deeds of heroism and feats of extraordinary 
valor as matters to be expected and not rewarded, in 
the Artillery. 

"On the Federal side, crimination and recrimination 
followed what Gen. Grant styled this miserable fail 
ure. There was a Court of Inquiry, and a vast array of 
dismal testimony, which disclosed the fact that of four 
generals of division belonging to the assaulting Corps, 
not one had followed his men into the Confederate 
lines. Nay, that the very commander of the storming 
division, finding, like honest Nym, the humor of the 
breach too hot, was at the crisis of the fight palpitating 
in a bomb-proof, beguiling a Michigan surgeon into 
giving him a drink of rum, on the plea that he had 
malaria, and that he had been struck by a spent ball, - 


legends of a hoary antiquity, whereof, let us humbly 
confess, we ourselves have heard." 

Although few promotions in the arm resulted from 
the conduct of the Artillery in the Crater fight, the 
Army, Petersburg, and the whole South knew that the 
gunners had saved the day. They knew that the batter 
ies had stood their ground without infantry supports, 
and hurled back the enemy in their front. They knew 
how Haskell, and Pegram, and Coit, from rear, from 
right, and from left had formed a circle of fire about 
the threatened point and, unaided, denied the enemy s 
advance to the town, while Mahone was bringing his 
men up from the right just in time to prevent Ayres 
Division of Warren s Corps from charging Chamber- 
layne s "one-gun battery," as the enemy called the piece 
which Gibbes and Huger and the other gallant officers 
had heroically kept in action. The deeds of the ar 
tillerymen were upon every tongue. Indeed, even in the 
Federal accounts of the affair, a large part of every 
report is devoted to the overwhelming and destructive 
effect of the Confederate Artillery and never once did 
the enemy thereafter forget the power of the guns which 
occupied the works in their front. 



WHILE the Federals were mining, and the Confed 
erates countermining, many things of interest to the 
Artillery were occurring besides the gathering of un- 
exploded Federal shells from in front of the lines by 
night, and the incessant artillery practice by day. 

Between July 6 and 9, Grant had detached three divi 
sions of the 6th Corps to Washington to oppose Early 
and Breckinridge, who had reached Lynchburg ahead of 
Hunter and without a fight sent him whirling back 
through West Virginia, after he had devastated the 
Valley and destroyed much private property usually 
exempt from destruction, against both Lincoln s and 
Grant s orders. Perhaps the greatest feat of Hunter s 
ruthless campaign was the demolition of the Virginia 
Military Institute. As a measure of military necessity, 
this was of course justified, in so far as the burning of 
its buildings and military equipment was concerned, but 
the wanton burning of its valuable library, its scientific 
apparatus, and the private houses and property of its 
professors, over the protest of his officers, was an act 
for which Hunter s government will yet have to pay.* 

Nelson s and Braxton s battalions of artillery which 
under Gen. Long were alone detached from the Army 
with the 2d Corps, though marching continuously and 
with great speed, failed to reach Lynchburg before 
Hunter decamped. On June 22, however, these two 
battalions were united with Breckinridge s Artillery 
near Salem. Thence the Army of the Valley moved by 
the direct route to Staunton. During the halt of two 
days at that point, Gen. Long organized his entire force 

*At the time this is written, a bill is pending in the United States Senate, 
providing for an indemnity to the Institution for $214,000, which includes 
no interest. This bill was drawn and introduced by Senator Henry A. Du Pont, 
of Delaware, who like William McKinley was an officer in Hunter s army, and 
both of whom protested against the destruction of the school. Senator Du Pont 
was Hunter s Chief of Artillery and commanded the 5th United States Battery, 
solid shot from the guns of which still remain in the walls of the barrack. 


of artillery. The least efficient batteries of Breckin- 
ridge s Division were to be left in a reserve artillery 
camp at Staunton, in command of Maj. Leyden, while 
Nelson s, Braxton s, and McLaughlin s battalions were 
fully horsed, armed, and equipped. The three bat 
talions thus organized, with forty pieces, were placed 
under the immediate command of Col. J. Floyd King, 
while Jackson s, Lurty s, and McClannahan s horse bat 
teries with ten guns were organized into another bat 
talion to operate with McCausland s force of 1,500 
cavalry. The 2d Corps and Breckinridge s Division to 
gether numbered 8,000 infantry. 

Hunter s retreat to the Ohio, or flight, it might be 
more properly styled, left the Valley open to Early, who 
promptly moved down it, and after encountering little 
resistance crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown July 
5 and 6. On the 9th, he advanced upon Fredericks- 
town, whereupon Gen. Wallace withdrew his force of 
about 5,000 men and placed them in line of battle along 
the Monocacy a mile or two east of the town. 

When Early determined to attack that portion of the 
line opposite the railroad bridge, the ford, and across 
the Georgetown Road, Gen. Long skillfully posted a 
number of guns on the west bank which soon effectively 
prepared the way for McCausland and Gordon to cross 
the stream. These troops were soon assailed by the 
enemy, whose line of battle was formed at right angles 
to the river, presenting an opportunity to Long, of 
which he immediately availed himself. Gordon hardly 
became engaged before the supporting artillery raked 
the Federal line from flank and in reverse, immediately 
crushing it and driving the enemy in a route from the 
ford and bridge. Never was victory more complete, 
and seldom has one of equal magnitude been attained 
with so little effort and cost to the assailants. The re 
sult was due entirely to the skillful employment by 
Long of his artillery in the operations of which the 
most thorough cooperation between Nelson, Braxton, 
and McLaughlin was obtained. On this occasion a 


few batteries only were used to clear the crossings, the 
others being held in readiness under cover while the 
infantry and cavalry tempted Wallace to assail them. 
The plan worked to perfection, and no sooner had the 
Federal line advanced and exposed its flank, than Long 
and King threw every gun into action with decisive ef 
fect, with the loss of but a score of men and two officers. 
Lieut. Hobson, of the Amherst Battery, fell mortally, 
and Lieut. Southall, Acting Assistant Adjutant- 
General on Long s staff, severely wounded. 

The conduct of the brave old Col. Nelson on this oc 
casion and throughout the succeeding campaign, as well 
as that of McLaughlin and Braxton, was highly com 
mendable. William Nelson, closely connected by blood 
with Lee, Pendleton, Page, Braxton, Carter, and many 
other officers of the Artillery, was a picturesque char 
acter. Among the first to raise a battery in the spring 
of 1861, he had gradually risen to high rank. Like 
Cabell, he was not noted for dash, nor was he by train 
ing a soldier. But he possessed an unblemished char 
acter, was sternly courageous, as dependable as any 
officer in the Army, and was adored by his men who re 
garded him as a father. The young farmer boys of 
Hanover, and Louisa counties, flocked by hundreds to 
his standard, and followed him from first to last with a 
devotion which military prowess alone could not have 
commanded. In appearance, the "Old Colonel," as his 
men affectionately styled him, was truly a remarkable 
figure. Gen. Bushrod Johnson commonly wore a linen 
duster and straw hat, Gen. William Smith, ex-Governor 
of Virginia and known as "Extra Billy," usually car 
ried an umbrella on the march, Gen. Mahone a cow 
in his headquarters train, but Col. Nelson alone adorned 
himself with a high silk hat! On many occasions as he 
rode past strange troops, the men with shouts of merri 
ment cried after him, "Old man, come out of that hat!" 
and similar humorous gibes. This eccentricity of dress, 
however, was not abandoned by him in spite of the 
derisive comments of the soldiery. His own men knew 


and loved him, for after all it was the head and heart 
and not the helmet of their leader that mattered. 

On the 10th, Early advanced rapidly against Wash 
ington, which beside its garrison of near 20,000 troops 
was now defended by the two divisions of the 6th Corps 
detached from Petersburg, and 6,000 men of the 19th 
just arrived from New Orleans. After creating great 
alarm in the north, Early withdrew from before the 
Capital on the night of the 12th, conscious of his inability 
to carry the strong Federal works by storm, re- 
crossed the Potomac at White s Ford on the 14th, en 
camped for a few days at Leesburg, and then moved 
through Snicker s Gap to Berryville, picketing the ad 
jacent fords of the Shenandoah River with his artillery. 

McLaughlin at Castleman s Ferry was soon heavily 
engaged in repelling an attempt of the enemy s advance 
guard to cross, but as the main column began to arrive 
Early retired from Berryville via White Post to New- 
town. Col. Nelson with two batteries then accompanied 
Ramseur s Division to Winchester where they made an 
unsuccessful attack upon the enemy, losing the guns of 
Kirkpatrick s Amherst Battery. Nelson had advanced 
his guns so close to the Federal line that when Ram- 
seur s troops met with a severe reverse and fell back 
in confusion, the battalion commander, whose conduct 
was heroic on this occasion, was unable to save Kirk 
patrick s guns. The battery was rearmed, however, 
August 20. 

After retiring to Strasburg and allowing the enemy 
to occupy Winchester and push their advance to New- 
town, Early turned upon them a few days later and 
drove them in great haste through Winchester toward 
Martinsburg. The Federal retreat was so rapid that al 
though it was followed across the Potomac at Williams- 
port, no punishment could be inflicted upon the enemy, 
and Early resumed his position at Strasburg. During 
these operations the Artillery, while little engaged, was 
called upon for the most tremendous exertions in march 
ing and countermarching. 


At this juncture, Sheridan assumed command of a 
large Federal force in the Valley, and Early fell back 
before him to Fisher s Hill. Before the end of July, 
Early s command had marched by road over 400 miles, 
losing less than 3,000 men, and dispersing two armies of 
an aggregate strength of double his own. During this 
period, the Artillery was constantly with the infantry 
column and with the exception of the physical break 
down of Gen. Long, was in as good order as when it left 
Cold Harbor. As a record of field artillery marching 
this campaign is worthy of the most careful study, for 
in that respect it excelled all others of the war and 
shows to what a high degree of mobility field batteries 
may be brought. Horses now are just as capable of 
performing such work as they were in 1864, and yet 
it is doubtful if a single battery in our army could march 
400 miles on short provender, in less than 60 days, and 
engage in a pitched battle with any degree of effect.* 

Meanwhile Anderson with Kershaw s Division and 
Cutshaw s Battalion of artillery had joined Early, and 
on the 14th of August, Fitz Lee s Division of cavalry 
with Johnston s and Shoemakers s horse batteries ar 
rived at Front Royal. Early again drove the enemy 
out of Winchester. On the 19th, Gen. Long was com 
pelled to relinquish his command, placing Col. Nelson 
in charge of the Artillery, while Capt. Kirkpatrick as 
sumed command of Nelson s Battalion. 

After much marching and skirmishing, in all of which 
the Artillery was constantly engaged, the enemy re 
tired to Harper s Ferry on the 21st. Early remained 
in the neighborhood of Charles Town until the 25th, 
moving thence to Shepherdstown, and then into camp 
at Bunker Hill. On the 31st, Milledge s and Massie s 
batteries accompanied Rodes Division to Martinsburg, 
where the latter battery was heavily engaged. Early 
then concentrated his army near Stephenson s Depot. 

Col. Carter had been relieved from his more or less 
amphibious duties along the James on August 2, and 

* Early made enforced requisition upon the Maryland farmers for horses, but 
only a few were assigned to the artillery. See his Memoirs, p. 395. 


ordered to join Early as Chief of Artillery. He reported 
for duty September 9. His selection to fill Gen. Long s 
place was as wise as it was merited. In all that great 
army, there was not a more gallant artilleryman than 
Tom Carter, of Pampatyke, devoted friend and near 
kinsman of Lee. Graduating from the Virginia Mili 
tary Institute in the Class of 1849, he studied medi 
cine at the University of Virginia. He soon forsook 
his profession, however, and settled upon his fine estate 
in King William County. There during the years im 
mediately preceding the war, he reigned in lordly state 
among his kinsmen and people, as his father had done 
before him. Noted for the purity and strength of his 
character, beloved and respected by all, dispensing 
hospitality to his friends and charity to the poor and 
needy of the country-side, he peacefully awaited the 
call to arms, ready to repay with blood and valor his 
State for the education it had given him. No sooner was 
the summons issued than he called together his slaves, 
admonished them to be faithful in his absence, and com 
mitting them to the care of a young and beautiful wife, 
saddled his thoroughbred charger and rode proudly to 
the Court House where the guidon of his battery was 
planted, and assumed command as if by inherited right. 
A few days, nay hours, saw the King William Artillery 
ready to receive its guns, for a hundred feminine hands 
had toiled ceaselessly with needle and thread upon the 
uniforms for his men. With a score of young kinsmen 
of the country-side, consumed with martial ardor, there 
was no lack of material for the officers and noncommis 
sioned officers of the battery, mounted as they were 
upon the best blooded animals which Virginia could 
boast. There was no need to teach these men horse 
manship, and the influence a century of association 
among their projenitors and a lifetime spent with their 
captain supplied the discipline of regular troops. A 
cousin of Robert E. Lee, Tom Carter combined more 
of the modesty, simplicity, and valor of his great kins 
man than any other man in Virginia. It is recounted 


that at Seven Pines, while he sat with one foot in his 
stirrup and the other thrown across the pommel of his 
saddle, coolly directing under a hail of fire the remaining 
fragment of his battery, up rode D. H. Hill, of iron 
nerve, and in the midst of the carnage about him, rose 
in his stirrups and after saluting Carter declared that 
he would rather be the captain of the King William 
Artillery than President of the Confederate States. 

From that day when Carter first fought under the 
eye of Lee, his name was the very synonym of valor. 
Promotion meant nothing to him. It came it is true, 
and was well earned, but his sole desire was to serve 
Lee and Virginia faithfully and well. On several oc 
casions he was not rewarded by increased rank when it 
should have been given him, but he was the kinsman of 
Lee and knew that in spite of his merit his claims must 
not be pressed. So it was that when Shoup was pro 
moted in the Western Army, Carter preferred to remain 
in Virginia, to the soil of which every tie of blood and 
duty bound him. It was in Virginia that he belonged 
and there he remained. As the great invading host 
swept around Lee s Army, trampling Carter s crops, 
driving off his horses and cattle, demolishing his barns 
and fences, it was there on the very lawns of his ancestral 
estate that he planted his guns while a devoted wife, 
with the sublime courage of womanhood, ministered 
tenderly to the victims of his fire. Soon the crash of the 
guns ceased to disturb the peace of Pampatyke, but not 
until it lay a rent and bleeding wreck in the path of the 
great armies. But still at her post its mistress remained, 
surrounded only by a score of faithful blacks, who 
looked upon the tragic scenes of war, and bewildered 
could not understands Hardly a week that the cavalry 
patrols of one army or the other did not pass and repass, 
or that the heroic wife of the absent artilleryman did not 
like a sainted creature beckon some ambulance with 
its woeful burden through the gates of Pampatyke. 
Friend and foe alike there found relief, for while the 
lips of Sue Roy bade her soldier husband struggle on to 


the last, her angelic hands and heart were animated 
only by the spirit of Christ in the alleviation of the suf 
fering about her. Her deeds were known to all to both 
armies, and so when her gallant husband returned 
from Appomattox, he was able to receive into his home, 
wrecked but not wholly destroyed, the weary chieftain 
whom he had followed on a hundred battlefields. Ah! 
who can say what were the emotions of Robert E. Lee, 
and Tom Carter, and Sue Roy during those bitter days 
after Appomattox. Let us not profane the sanctity of 
their haven of retreat. Let us avert our eyes after see 
ing the great master of war dismount at the doorway, 
and grasp in silence the outstretched hand of the kins 
man whose blood had proved his devotion. More of the 
sacred scene is not for us. Let us leave them, as an 
ancient negro respectfully slips the martial trappings 
from the back of old Traveller, and turns him out to 
rest and graze beneath the patriarchal oaks of Pampa- 
tyke, where no longer the manger is full, where no 
longer the grain bins are laden with the golden freight 
of yore, where no longer the fields are flooded by a sea 
of tasseled wheat. But leaving them, how can it be 
otherwise than with regret that ours is not the brush 
to place on canvas this scene, so sweetly pathetic, and 
yet so fraught with lessons of fortitude and courage that 
no man might look thereon without seeing through his 
tears a flash of the unconquerable spirit of Lee and Vir 

Such as we have described him, was Col. Thomas H. 
Carter, the man who now succeeded Gen. Long in com 
mand of Early s Artillery. He came to this important 
post just as he did to the county courthouse in the spring 
of 1861, received by all not only with respect, but with 
affectionate regard. He did riot come to displace Nel 
son. He merely received his long deferred due.* 

At daylight on the 19th of September, the Confed 
erate cavalry pickets at the crossing of the Opequon 
and Berry ville Road, were driven in, and information 

*After the war Col. Carter became Rector of the University of Virginia. 


having been received by Early of the fact, he immedi 
ately ordered all the troops at Stephenson s Depot to be 
in readiness to move, while Gordon, who had arrived 
from Bunker Hill, was directed to move at once. By 
some mistake, Gordon failed to receive his orders. Ram- 
seur was already in position across the Berryville Road 
skirmishing with the enemy, when Early reached him 
and learned that Gordon was not moving up. He at 
once directed Breckinridge and Rodes to hasten for 
ward as rapidly as possible. The position occupied by 
Ramseur was about one mile and a half out from Win 
chester on an elevated plateau between Abraham s 
Creek and Red Bud Run, in the angle formed by the 
Martinsburg and Front Royal roads. In his right 
front the country was open, while to his left the ground 
sloped off to Red Bud Run along which there were 
some patches of woods which afforded cover for troops. 
In his front and towards the Opequon ran the Berry 
ville Road with hills and woods on both sides, which 
also afforded admirable cover for the approach of the 

Nelson s Battalion was posted on Ramseur s line, 
covering the approaches as far as practicable, and 
Lomax with Jackson s Cavalry and part of Johnson s 
was on the right, watching the valley of Abraham s 
Creek and the Front Royal Road beyond, while Fitz 
Lee was on the left, across the Red Bud, with his 
cavalry and Johnston s Horse Battery. 

Gordon s Division reached the field a little after 10 
A. M. and was placed under cover in rear of a wood be 
hind the interval between Ramseur and the Red Bud. 
Knowing that it would not do to await the shock of the 
heavy assaulting columns, which were being formed, 
Early ordered Gordon to examine the ground on his 
left with a view to making an attack himself, and placed 
Rodes three brigades as they came up on Gordon s 
right, also in some woods. The enemy was now dis 
covered moving in great force both against Ramseur s 
front and left. Already Ramseur s men were falling 


back behind Nelson s batteries, which remained stead 
fast, however, and single-handed checked the advance 
while Early made his dispositions to hurl Gordon and 
Rodes on the right of the Federal column. Meanwhile, 
Nelson s batteries were being severely punished, but 
gallantly continued to pour a most destructive fire into 
the enemy s ranks, while Braxton s Battalion galloped 
into position in front of Gordon and also opened fire 
upon the Federal flank. Evans Brigade of Gordon s 
Division, passing beyond the guns, was soon overcome 
and followed by the enemy, who rolled back the Con 
federate left wing until it rested at right angles to Ram- 
seur s line with seven of Braxton s guns at the salient. 
The onrushing enemy actually approached to within 
musket range of these pieces, which were totally unsup 
ported, but could not drive the gunners from their posi 
tion. Of the situation at this juncture Early wrote: 
"This caused a pause in our advance and the position 
was most critical, for it was apparent that unless this 
force was driven back the day was lost. Braxton s guns, 
in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood their 
ground, and under the personal superintendence of 
Lieut.-Col. Braxton, and Col. T. H. Carter, my then 
Chief of Artillery, opened with canister on the enemy. 
This fire was so rapid and well directed that the enemy, 
staggered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving 
a battle flag on the ground whose bearer was cut down 
by a canister shot. Just then, Battle s Brigade of 
Rodes Division, which had arrived and had been formed 
in line for the purpose of advancing to the support of 
the rest of the division, moved forward and swept 
through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while 
Evans Brigade was rallied and brought back to the 

Ramseur s Division, which with Nelson s batteries al 
ways in front bore the brunt of the attack, was at first 
forced back a little, but rallying behind the guns soon 
recovered itself. Lomax on the right had greatly as 
sisted Ramseur by making a gallant charge against the 


left flank of the attacking infantry, and Breathed s bat 
teries with Fitz Lee managed to secure a destructive 
flank fire across the Red Bud on the left, while in the 
words of Early, "Nelson s and Braxton s battalions had 
performed wonders." 

Although the Confederates had before noon won a 
splendid victory, it was not without paying a high price, 
for the superb Rodes had been killed at the very mo 
ment of success. Thus one by one were Jackson s 
veterans falling, and who should take their places was 
already becoming a problem. 

The attack so far had been rendered by the Federal 
6th and 19th Corps, but another remained. Early s 
lines were now formed from Abraham s Creek across to 
the Red Bud and were much attenuated. 

About 2 o clock, Breckinridge s and Wharton s divi 
sions, and McLaughlin s Battalion reached the field 
after a heavy engagement during the morning with the 
enemy s cavalry on the Charles Town Road. Patton s 
Brigade of Wharton s Division was then sent to re- 
enforce Fitz Lee, while Col. King placed his batteries 
on a hill in rear of Breckinridge s line, which now faced 
to the left. Later in the afternoon two divisions of the 
enemy s cavalry drove in the pickets north of the Rose 
Bud and Crook s infantry corps, which had not been 
engaged, forced back Patton and Fitz Lee. The Fed 
eral Cavalry then swept around Early s left flank to op 
pose which Wharton s other two brigades, King s Ar 
tillery, and one of Braxton s guns were double-timed to 
the rear. Breckinridge, after driving back the enemy, 
formed his division in line in rear of Early s left and at 
right angles to the Martinsburg Road, again repulsing 
the enemy. But many of the men on Early s front line 
hearing Breckinridge s fire in their rear, and thinking 
they were flanked and about to be cut off, commenced 
falling back, thus producing great confusion. At the 
same time, Crook advanced against Gordon and struck 
his line while in confusion. The whole front line now 
gave way, but a large number of the men were rallied 


behind a line of breastworks, which had been thrown up 
just outside of Winchester during the first year of the 
war. At this point, the Artillery was gradually massed 
and checked all pursuit. Of this movement of the Ar 
tillery, Col. Carter wrote in his report: "Fortunately 
the Artillery was under perfect control to the last, and 
maneuvered and fought with untiring courage. The 
guns retired from point to point, halting, unlimbering, 
and firing, while efforts were made by general officers 
to rally the infantry." 

Wharton s Division maintained its organization on 
the left, and Ramseur fell back in good order on the 
right. But, again, the Federal Cavalry got around 
Early s left and he was compelled to retire through the 
town under cover of Wickham s Brigade of cavalry, 
and Breathed s guns on Fort Hill. A new line was 
formed east of the town, which was maintained until 
nightfall, when Early retired without serious molesta 
tion to Newtown. 

Near the close of the day, Col. Carter received a pain 
ful wound from a fragment of shell, which compelled 
him to turn over the command of the Artillery to Nel 
son, but he was not permanently disabled. 

While many recriminations followed upon this af 
fair, the whole army testified to the stout resistance 
made by the Artillery in the long and exhausting 
struggle which lasted from dawn to dark. The ulti 
mate loss of the battle was due to the Federal superior 
ity in cavalry, which was free to encircle the left flank, 
gradually compelling Early s line to fall back before the 
infantry in its front. Had Carter had sufficient ar 
tillery to crown the heights northwest of the town, he 
might have prevented the movement of the enemy s 
cavalry in that direction. Unfortunately Cutshaw was 
off with Kershaw s Division on an expedition east of 
the Blue Ridge. 

Three guns of King s Battalion were lost in this bat 
tle, two of which were loaned the cavalry, and one of 
which was abandoned on the retreat, after its teams were 
shot down. 


After Early s reverse at Winchester, he retreated 
during the night with all his trains secure to Fisher s 
Hill, and formed line of battle on the morning of the 
20th, with McLaughlin s Battalion on the right, Brax- 
ton s in the center, and Nelson s on the left. The after 
noon of the 20th, Sheridan appeared on the banks of 
Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher s Hill, and 
for the greater part of the next two days was engaged 
in reconnoitering Early s line. After some sharp skir 
mishing the enemy began to fortify in Early s front, 
but it was soon discovered that an attack was intended 
on the Confederate left. Early now gave orders to re 
tire, but just before sunset Crook s infantry drove back 
Lomax s dismounted cavalry and involved Ramseur s 
left before the withdrawal could be effected. Ramseur 
made an attempt to meet this movement by throwing his 
brigades successively into line to the left, and Wharton s 
Division was sent for from the right, but it did not ar 
rive. Pegram s brigades were also thrown into line in 
the same manner as Ramseur s, but the movement re 
sulted in confusion in both divisions and as soon as this 
was noticed by the enemy, a general advance along the 
whole Federal line was ordered. After very little re 
sistance the Confederate Infantry made for the rear in 
confusion, leaving the Artillery in the lurch, as it had 
never done before. Of this incident Early wrote, "The 
men and officers of the Artillery behaved with great cool 
ness, fighting to the very last, and I had to ride to some 
of the officers and order them to withdraw their guns, 
before they would move. In some cases, they had held 
out so long, and the roads leading from their positions 
into the pike were so rugged, that eleven guns fell into 
the hands of the enemy."* 

Early is in error as to the number of guns. There 
were fourteen lost, four of Nelson s, two of Lomax s 
Horse Artillery, seven of Braxton s and one of King s 
taken by the enemy on this occasion. Again Col. Nel 
son s conduct was conspicuously gallant as he withdrew 

*Gen. Jubal A. Early, etc., p. 430. 


his pieces in small groups, alternately unlimbering and 
firing and entirely without infantry support. 

From near Fisher s Hill, Early fell back on the 26th, 
in line of battle beyond New Market, Nelson, Braxton, 
and McLaughlin in the rear guard occupying every 
practicable position from which to retard the pursuers. 
In this retreat in which Nelson led the Artillery 
with consummate skill, Capt. John L. Massie, of the 
Fluvanna Battery, fell mortally, and Lieut. N. B. 
Cooke, of Braxton s Battalion severely, wounded. 
Early then moved toward Port Republic, arriving at 
Brown s Gap on the 25th, where he was rejoined by 
Kershaw s Division, and Cutshaw s Battalion. On the 
same day, Col. Carter resumed command of the Ar 
tillery, of which Carpenter s and Hardwicke s batteries 
were engaged on the 26th and 27th. 

On the 28th, Early again put his army in motion down 
the Valley, marching via Waynesborough to Mount 
Sidney, and thence by slow stages to Hupp s Hill be 
low Strasburg, which position he reached October 13th. 
Here an affair occurred in which Fry s Richmond 
Orange Battery participated with great credit and in 
which Lieut. S. S. French, adjutant on Carter s staff, 
was severely wounded. 

The Cavalry had meanwhile been moving by the back 
road, and on the morning of the 8th had encountered 
the enemy. In this affair the Cavalry broke badly, leav 
ing Thomson s and Johnston s batteries entirely iso 
lated, but the gunners managed to cut their way to 
the rear, not, however, without the loss of six pieces. 
The very next day Shoemaker s Battery and the re 
maining section of Thomson s, which were serving with 
Lomax s Cavalry as a guard to Early s wagon trains 
near Woodstock, were again deserted by the Cavalry, 
which fled precipitately to the rear. With the ex 
ception of one of Thomson s, all the guns were saved 
by the extraordinary heroism of the horse artillery 
men. On this occasion Capt. Carpenter of the Alle- 
ghany Battery, a classmate and devoted friend of 


Jimmie Thomson s at the Institute, particularly dis 
tinguished himself. Observing the danger to which his 
comrades were exposed, he quickly rallied a number of 
the fugitive troopers and again and again formed them 
across the Valley Pike to check the pursuers. In this 
way he contributed materially towards saving the guns 
and trains, losing an arm as a result of his reckless ex 
posure. But what was an arm to Carpenter, if by los 
ing it he could save the gallant Jimmie Thomson ! 

The following extract from the diary of a horse ar 
tilleryman of Thomson s Battery throws some light 
on the affair of October 9th: "The shameful way that 
our Cavalry, especially that portion that tried to operate 
on the North Mountain Road, fought, bled, and died, 
a running rearward, was enough to make its old com 
mander, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, weep in his grave. Ring 
down the curtain on that scene, for the Cavalry played 
a regular exeunt act." 

This was the famous battle of Tom s Brook, some 
times called by the Federals in a spirit of derision, "The 
Woodstock Races." At any .rate, like the one the 
preceding day, it was a disgraceful affair on the part 
of the Confederate Cavalry. Soon after a Washington 
paper contained a card signed by Gen. Custer to the 
effect that he had captured all the guns of the Stuart 
Horse Artillery but one, and offering a reward of 
$1,000.00 for that. The reward was never claimed. 

On October 19, at a very early hour, Early moved 
forward to attack the enemy beyond Cedar Creek, and 
by 10 A. M. not only had he routed two Federal Corps, 
seized their camps with twenty-four pieces of artillery, 
but Carter s battalions almost unaided by the Infantry 
had dislodged the 6th Corps near Middletown. It was 
here that a fatal halt by Early occurred in spite of Gor 
don s and Carter s urgent requests to be allowed to fol 
low up the success of the morning. Carter even went 
so far as to declare that with his guns alone he could 
crush out all resistance of the enemy and begged that 
he be allowed to follow the Federals up, but Early de- 


layed to reform the disordered troops which he found in 
the captured trains, and gave Sheridan time to stay the 
route of his army and lead part of it back to the field 
of battle. Early then formed his line across the pike 
north of Middletown and at right angles thereto with 
Wofford s Brigade on the right, then Wharton s Divi 
sion, then Pegram s Division across the road, then Ram- 
seur considerably in advance, with Kershaw and Gordon 
in order to the left. Between Gordon and Rosser s 
Cavalry, with Thomson s Battery on the extreme Con 
federate left, was an interval of about a mile in which 
about 3 P. M. Carter, of his own accord, placed six of 
Cutshaw s and two of Jones guns. Shortly after, about 
3 :30 P. M., the enemy assailed Gordon in force and again 
the Infantry gave way while the guns were retired only 
upon Gordon s order. Nelson s, Braxton s and Mc- 
Laughlin s battalions and the other batteries of Cut 
shaw s, posted from right to left along the infantry line, 
resolutely held their positions until the left began to 
roll up, whereupon Carter withdrew them to a com 
manding elevation several hundred yards in rear of the 
infantry line. Soon the Infantry began to break and 
move to the rear, but the Artillery maintained its fire, 
holding the Federals for over an hour, and not until 
its ammunition was exhausted was the order to retire 
given. Meantime, Carter had placed a small group of 
guns on the heights south of Cedar Creek to cover the 
withdrawal of the Infantry and Artillery. 

Again Early s Infantry had failed him after winning 
a splendid victory, the Artillery as at Winchester alone 
saving the retreat from becoming a rout. Night at 
last came and under cover of darkness and the fire of 
Carter s rearmost guns, the Army was falling back in 
apparent safety. While the main body of the Artillery 
was marching in column towards Hupp s Hill, a small 
body of Federal cavalry burst into the fields on the right 
of the turnpike and charged the column and trains in 
rear. The bugle blasts, cheers, the rush of horses feet, 
and pistol shots in the darkness, at once created a panic 


in the infantry support, already much disorganized. The 
artillery officers and men appealed in vain to the panic- 
stricken infantrymen for muskets to defend the trains, 
but could not secure them, and as the cannoneers were 
totally unarmed they were compelled to abandon a 
large number of guns and wagons. Not only did the 
enemy recover all the guns captured from them in the 
morning, but twenty-three others besides. "One hun 
dred men in an organized state, with muskets, could 
have saved the train," wrote Col. Carter. 

This incident was as disgraceful to the Confederates 
as it was pleasing to Sheridan. It was not, however, the 
fault of the Artillery. The attack, in the nature of an 
ambush, occurred at a very narrow passage south of 
Strasburg, between the precipitous bank of the river on 
the one side and bluffs for the most part on the other. 
A bridge on the turnpike had failed and caused the road 
to become congested with ordnance and medical trains, 
and a long column of over 1,400 prisoners. There was 
absolutely no chance, therefore, for escape, and the can 
noneers could not be expected to engage with fence rails 
or stones, even had they been available, in a night con 
flict with armed troopers. That their conduct was in 
every way commendable is attested by Col. Carter, who 
declared that throughout the night, with confusion and 
disorder all about them, the artillerymen remained cool 
and thoroughly under control, and as a guarantee 
against the repetition of such occurrences, he took oc 
casion to recommend at once that a certain proportion of 
artillerymen be armed with carbines. 

After this misfortune, Early retreated to New 
Market, in the neighborhood of which he remained until 
the last of November, when the Army proceeded to 
Harrisonburg, the Artillery going into winter quarters 
near Staunton. Thus did Early s Valley Campaign of 
1864 come to a close, brilliant in many respects yet, 
in the main, ill-fated. With the exception of the Ar 
tillery it hardly seemed possible that the troops which 
broke so badly at Winchester, at Fisher s Hill, at Wood- 


stock, and on several other occasions were the men which 
had fought under Longstreet, Jackson, Stuart, and Lee 
himself. It has been attempted to explain the poor con 
duct of Early s troops by saying that these men were 
simply fought out, that they had reached the limit of 
physical endurance, and that with a failure of physical 
stamina came their demoralization as a natural conse 
quence. This explanation is on a par with that which 
makes of Jackson a religious fanatic at Games Mill and 
White Oak Swamp. Neither are satisfactory. Why, if 
Early s Infantry was exhausted, was the Artillery still 
capable of performing deeds of unsurpassed valor on the 
field of battle, as well as the same marches which fell to 
the Infantry? No. Some other explanation is necessary 
and the correct one would seem to concern the discipline 
of the several arms. Is it too much to suggest a com 
parison of the field-officers and battery commanders of 
the Artillery with the officers of equal rank in the 
Infantry and Cavalry? Is it too much to say that in the 
comparatively long service and training of the junior 
officers of the Artillery, many of whom had served in 
the lower grades of their arm since the beginning of the 
war, lies the explanation? Is it too much to say that 
in the artillery enlisted personnel, there may be found 
a further cause for the superior conduct of the gunners 
over that of the other troops, large numbers of whose 
best men had fallen in battle, while an ever-increasing 
number of conscripts, and inferior material filled their 
places? Some such explanation seems reasonable, for 
certain it is that there was a marked difference which 
Early fully recognized. It is well known that he made 
some harsh criticisms of his troops, and in this connec 
tion an incident concerning the Artillery should be re 

On a certain occasion it was reported that Early, in 
his natural disappointment over the result of his cam 
paign, had impugned the fighting qualities of his army. 
Whereupon, Col. Carter, politely but firmly, demanded 
a retraction in favor of the Artillery and got it. It is 


not difficult in reading Early s memoirs to see that such 
a discrimination was sincere on his part. Again and 
again he bears tribute to the Artillery of his command, 
when only veiled reproaches are found for the others. 
The principal artillery lessons to be drawn from 
Early s operations in the Valley are as to the endurance 
of artillery, and what may be exacted of it in rear guard 
actions, in the face of a superior force superior not 
only in point of numbers, but moral as well. Carter s 
Artillery formed the very backbone of Early s Army 
from Winchester to the end of the campaign. Without 
it, on more than one occasion, withdrawals from before 
the enemy would have been decisive defeats, and re 
treats would have become disgraceful routs. It was 
always at hand, as we have shown, in the forefront of 
the advance, and on every hilltop on the retreat, either 
to open the battle with encouragement to the Infantry, 
or to deny Sheridan s superb and overwhelming force 
of cavalry the full fruits of victory. 



GRANT had learned a lesson, and for three weeks after 
the Crater fight comparative quiet reigned at Peters 
burg, though many brave men perished in the trenches. 
Picket firing and artillery practice was continuous, 
"while the fiery curves of mortar-shell by night, told 
that the portentous game of war still went on." 

About August 10th, Fitz Lee s Division of cavalry, 
with Johnston s and Shoemaker s batteries under Capt. 
Johnston, received orders to join Early in the Valley. 
Maj. Breathed had been wounded in a skirmish on June 
29. This force reached Front Royal on August 14, and 
thenceforth participated in all of Early s operations in 
the Valley. 

Upon Alexander s return to the Army August 18, he 
at once examined the Artillery defenses with the Chief 
of Artillery, and steps were instantly taken by the 
latter to have the works in rear of the Crater greatly 
strengthened. A number of Blakelys, Columbiads, 
and 30-pounder Parrotts were issued to the 3d Corps 
and caused to be mounted and manned by the can 
noneers of Penick s Battery, while more careful in 
structions were drawn up for the Artillery in general, 
in order to secure the most systematic routine of duty 
possible and guard against all surprises. In connection 
with this work, Gen. Pendleton was constantly in the 
works and trenches. 

About this time Lieut.-Col. Pemberton renewed 
Carter s proposal to organize a special body of horse 
artillery for the purpose of harassing the enemy along 
the river, a duty which required great mobility, but 
nothing was accomplished in that direction. Towards 
the end of the month, Col. Hilary P. Jones was ordered 
to Wilmington to organize the Artillery of the 3d Mili 
tary District on the same basis as that of the Army in 



Virginia, leaving Lieut.-Col. Moseley in command of 
Beauregard s Artillery. 

Grant s next move after the Crater was an attempt 
to seize the Weldon Railroad by gradually extending 
his left. To meet this threat, Heth s Division and 
Brander s Battery of Pegram s Battalion moved out on 
the 18th and attacked the enemy at the Davis house on 
the railroad, the affair resulting successfully for the 
Confederates. The next day, Mahone s Division and 
Pegram, with the rest of his battalion, joined Heth and 
Brander and renewed the attack. In this engagement 
in which the Federals lost nearly 3,000 prisoners, Pe- 
gram greatly distinguished himself, and together with 
a part of Heth s Division bore the brunt of the battle. 
Again on the 21st, Pegram with twelve guns was heavily 
engaged at Poplar Spring Church, where Mahone, at 
tacking with six small brigades, failed to dislodge the 
enemy. On this occasion instead of encountering a 
small force as expected, he found an army corps well en 
trenched with every approach to the hostile works swept 
by a powerful array of artillery. On the 24th, Pegram 
was directed, with Brander s and Cayce s batteries of his 
own battalion, Ross s of Lane s, and sections of Hurt s 
and Clutter s of Macintosh s, to accompany Heth s 
column in its attack upon the enemy at Reams Station. 
The following day Heth made a splendid effort captur 
ing twelve stands of colors, nine pieces of artillery, ten 
caissons, 2,150 prisoners, and 3,100 muskets, losing him 
self but 720 men. In this brilliant affair Pegram, with 
characteristic dash and skill, prepared the way to 
victory. While the conduct of the North Carolina 
troops was superb and won fresh laurels for the old 
North State, Heth himself declared that he did not be 
lieve any troops could have carried the works of the 
enemy without such assistance as Pegram rendered the 
North Carolinians, by first shaking the hostile line with 
the fire of his guns. 

By the end of August, however, Grant was firmly es 
tablished across the Weldon Road and had thus taken 


another important line of communication from Lee. To 
seize it had cost him in the four engagements of August 
not less than 8,500 men, as opposed to a loss of one- 
fourth that number to his adversary, but the advantage 
was worth the cost. He knew that similar successes, 
even at such disproportionate losses, would soon enable 
him to accomplish his purpose. 

In the severe fighting of August on the right, Hamp 
ton had also won fresh laurels for the Cavalry, eliciting 
high praise for his regiments and Hart s and Mc 
Gregor s batteries from Lee himself. From September 
14 to 30, these two batteries with Edward Graham s 
Petersburg Battery of Beauregard s Artillery, now con 
verted from light to horse artillery, rendered service 
of the most brilliant character, in cooperation with the 

On the 29th of September, the enemy succeeded in 
carrying by surprise, a commanding salient of the Con 
federate works, known as Fort Harrison, near 
Chaffin s Bluff. To meet this threat against Richmond, 
Gen. Alexander, who had rejoined his command in 
August, accompanied Field s Division that night with 
Clutter s Battery of Macintosh s Battalion, and Marye s 
Battery of Pegram s Battalion, both under Maj. Mar- 
maduke Johnson. The next morning Haskell s Bat 
talion joined Alexander north of the James, and Lieut.- 
Col. Hardaway, who had been placed in command of the 
Artillery on the James when Carter was ordered to join 
Early, September 2, reported to Alexander with his 
own and Stark s Battalion. 

Immediately an effort was made to recover Fort 
Harrison. Hardaway s and Stark s battalions co 
operated as far as practicable with Johnson s and 
Haskell s in the unsuccessful effort of the 30th to re 
cover the fort from Butler, but the nature of the terrain 
and the advantageous position of the enemy placed 
Alexander at a great disadvantage. When the attack 
was resumed October 1, Haskell s Battalion was united 
with Hardaway s and Stark s on the right near the 


river, and Lamkin s Battery, which had gained much 
experience with high angle fire in the trenches at Peters 
burg, was assigned the task of shelling the hostile works 
with a number of mortars. But again the attempt to 
drive Butler out of Fort Harrison proved unsuccessful, 
and the Artillery was withdrawn to the defensive lines 
with the exception of Lamkin s Battery, which remained 
in the advanced position with the mortars. 

While the Confederates were thus opposing Butler on 
their extreme left, heavy fighting was also taking place 
on the right, brought on by the continuous extension of 
the enemy in that direction. In the affairs of Sep 
tember 30 and October 1, known as the "Battles of the 
Jones House," Pegram with Brander s and Ellett s 
batteries on the first day operated with Heth in his at 
tack on the Federal left, and on the second day with 
Brander s and Cayce s batteries in the combined attack 
of Heth and Wilcox. On the 2d, Pegram with Ellett s, 
Cayce s under command of Lieut. Hollis, who greatly 
distinguished himself the preceding day, and Gregg s 
batteries, took a prominent part in repulsing the Fed 
eral assault on Heth s position. In these affairs, the 
Federals again lost heavily and again the reports teem 
with references to the extraordinary effectiveness of the 
Confederate Artillery. 

Repeatedly during the siege was Pegram praised by 
the generals of the divisions with which he served, as well 
as by his corps commander. In the action of September 
30, when Heth s and Wilcox s divisions were assigned 
the task of recovering the extension of the line of rifle- 
pits to the right of Petersburg, he shone with especial 
brilliance. On this occasion McGowan s Brigade after 
a gallant resistance was borne back by sheer weight of 
opposing numbers. Seeing that the South Carolinans 
were giving ground, Pegram, who had gone forward 
with them in their initial advance, rode through the line 
of battle, snatched the colors from the ensign and rode 
with them straight toward the enemy. "When forty or 
fifty yards in advance of the whole line, placing the 


color-staff on his stirrup and turning halfway round in 
his saddle, he dropped the reins on his horse s neck, 
raised his hat and shouted out in tones sweet and clear 
as a bugle, Follow me, men! It was a scene never to 
be forgotten the glorious sunset, the lithe, boyish 
form, now sharply cut against the crimson western sky, 
then hid for a moment by the smoke of battle, the tat 
tered colors, the cheering lines of men. With a rousing 
yell, the sturdy brigade closed up, and never after gave 
back a single inch. The color-bearer ran out to him, the 
tears standing in his eyes, and cried out: Give me back 
my colors, Colonel! I ll carry them wherever you say! 
Oh! I m sure of that, he answered cheerily, it was 
necessary to let the whole line see the colors; that s the 
only reason I took them. "* 

On the 7th, Haskell s and Johnson s battalions shared 
in the repulse of the enemy by Field s Division, along 
the New Market and Darbytown roads north of the 
James and were particularly effective, the gallant 
Haskell being struck in the head by a bullet and Lieut. 
McQueen of Garden s Battery also falling severely 
wounded. Haskell s Battalion was again engaged on 
the 13th under Capt. Garden, in an affair memorable 
in the Artillery for the heroic conduct of Corporal 
Fulcher, of Flanner s Battery. A Federal shell burst 
ing among the ammunition, wounded six men and 
ignited the fuses of a number of shell, which had been 
improperly exposed. Though himself wounded, Fulcher 
seized the shells and carrying them under fire to a 
nearby pool extinguished the burning fuses. 

The Presidential election in the North was now near 
at hand, and before settling down into winter quarters, 
Gen. Grant determined to make one more vigorous ef 
fort to turn Lee s right, seize the southside road, and 
compel the evacuation of Petersburg. For this pur 
pose, he concentrated on his left the greater portion of 
three army corps, at the same time directing pressure to 
be exerted all along the line, and especially north of the 

*See W. Gordon McCabe s sketch of Pegram in The University Memorial. 


James. On the 27th, a simultaneous attack was made 
on the lines below Richmond, and on Lee s right flank, 
resulting in the latter quarter in the battle of Hatcher s 

The Federal advance below Richmond, though gen 
eral and in considerable force, was easily repelled. 
While the enemy delivered a frontal attack upon the 
Confederates in position, with Hardaway s and Stark s 
battalions between the Darbytown Road and Fort 
Harrison, Haskell s and Johnson s battalions moved out 
around the extreme left of Field s Division and secured 
a most destructive flank fire upon the attacking columns, 
literally sweeping the approaches along the Williams- 
burg, and Nine Mile Roads, and even as far as the 
Charles City Road. The entire shock of the assault was 
in this way diverted from the Infantry and the attack 
was abandoned before it developed serious proportions. 
Lieut. Wilkes, commanding Clutter s Battery, a young 
officer of distinction, fell mortally wounded. 

In connection with this affair it is to be noted what 
might have been accomplished with artillery in June, 
1861, on the same ground had it been in the same hands. 
But at that time, there were no Alexanders, Haskells, 
and Hardaways, but only a great mass of disintegrated 
artillery, without organization and operating solely as 
individual batteries. It was the experience of four 
years of constant fighting that now enabled the Artillery 
to maneuver in large groups over country which had 
formerly precluded the movement of a single battery. 
The time had come when the modern belief that artillery 
can go with the infantry was everywhere entertained, 
and it seems surprising that so soon as Lee s Artillery 
surrendered its guns, or buried them, that the world 
should have ignored the lessons which it had been taught 
by Alexander, Long, and Walker, only after nearly 
half a century to be retaught by Langlois, the father of 
modern field artillery. 

On the extreme right, the Federal attack was no more 
successful than below Richmond. Advancing through 


the most densely wooded region, confusion added to the 
resolute resistance of the Confederates, brought failure 
to the movement. At first the enemy advanced, 
gradually forcing Hampton back to and across the 
Boydton Plank Road. While rendering splendid serv 
ice with the advanced line, Capt. Hart fell at the head 
of his battery with a severe wound. 

After the enemy had crossed Hatcher s Run and 
pressed forward to Burgess s Mill, Lee hurled a part of 
Hill s Corps upon Hancock s isolated column, de 
termined to recover the Boydton Road which was now 
of so much importance to him, since the Weldon Rail 
road had been lost. Here Pegram, with Ellett s Bat 
tery under Lieut. Hollis, and Gregg s Battery, again 
fought his guns with the most desperate courage. In 
action the mild appearing youth seemed to have become 
a fiend incarnate, and innumerable tales of his reckless 
daring and total disregard of danger to himself and 
his men might be recounted. In the fighting around 
Petersburg he had become one of the foremost figures 
in the Artillery and such a reputation had he acquired 
for valor that in all that splendid artillery corps, no 
name was more prominently before the Army. 

At the same time that Hill s troops and Pegram 
hurled themselves upon the head of Hancock s column, 
Hampton s cavalry division which with Hart s, Mc 
Gregor s, and Graham s batteries had worked its way 
around to the right, fell upon the Federal left and rear, 
with the result that Hancock was compelled to with 
draw in confusion after losing about 1,500 men. 

After these signal reverses Grant refrained for some 
time from further attempts on Lee s flanks, contenting 
himself with a ceaseless cannonade and redoubling the 
activity of the sharpshooters. And so the inexorable 
process of attrition wore on, every loss of life in the 
trenches placing the Federals that much nearer the in 
evitable issue. 

On the 12th of October, orders were received to arm 
all cannoneers that could be spared from the guns with 


muskets for the defense of the trenches. In this way 
only could the rapidly failing infantry lines be rein 
forced. In the Washington Artillery Battalion alone 
one-half of the drivers were thus armed and organized 
as an infantry garrison for Fort Gregg. After six 
months of service in the trenches, exposed day and night 
to hostile fire, this battalion was at last relieved by that 
of Lieut. -Col. Moseley, and ordered to the extreme right 
to serve thereafter with the 3d Corps. It would seem 
certain that Longstreet s recent return to the command 
of his corps had something to do with the transfer. Not 
only was Eshleman s Battalion transferred, but Gibbes 
old battalion, now commanded by Maj . Owen, formerly 
of the Washington Artillery, was transferred Novem 
ber 3, from the 1st to Beauregard s old command, or 
Anderson s Corps. But on the 15th, Owen s Battalion 
was again transferred, this time to the 3d Corps. 

On November 4, an order was published permanently 
assigning assistant adjutant-generals in the Artillery 
Corps, as follows : 


Capt. Dudley D. Pendleton 

1st Corps, Capt. S. Winthrow, and Capt. J. C. Haskell. 
2d Corps, Capt. W. A. Percy. 

3d Corps, Capt. William W. Chamberlaine and Capt. Richard 

Pendleton now again sought to have the measure 
proposed in May, in the form of a bill for the increase of 
the commissioned personnel, adopted. With this end 
in view he addressed the Secretary of War, November 
8, but soon received a reply from Mr. Sedden, in which 
it was apparent that with the exception of allowing in 
creased rank to general officers in the Artillery Corps, 
no help from the War Department need be expected.* 
This was not what Pendleton wanted. His efforts were 
not in the interest of himself but for the welfare of the 
Corps, and he promptly pointed out to the Secretary the 
injustice being done artillery officers by the Government 

*Rcl)ellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part III, pp. 1205, 1211. 


continuing the old system. In arguing the case of his 
corps, Pendleton wrote on the 15th to the Secretary of 
War as follows: 

"DEAR SIR Permit me, in acknowledging your kind favor of 
the 12th instant, to submit additional considerations in reply to 
your objections to our proposed bill. 

"First. You regard such legislation as objectionable, because 
in the main unnecessary, since the organization asked for virtually 
exists in this army by regulation and can be similarly introduced 
in any other. 

"Second. It will prove, you apprehend, embarrassing in several 
respects: First, a system fixed by law allows to the commanding 
general less freedom in adapting his resources to emergencies; 
second, a plan suitable for a large army may not be adapted to 
smaller commands; third, officers attached under law cannot be as 
freely transferred as the commanding general may desire. 

"The considerations in reply to both of these objections seem 
to me to be really decisive. First, as to the necessity of the case; 
although we have artillery battalions formed under orders of the 
commanding general, sanctioned by the Department, and although 
this organization has proved one of the most efficient instru 
mentalities in our great struggle, the result is attained at the cost 
of very serious injustice to a large class of most deserving officers; 
is attended by inconveniences which experience satisfied us ought 
to be obviated, and is liable to depreciate in the future, if remedial 
measures be not adopted. The injustice of which I speak results 
partly from the fact that the status of artillery officers as now 
determined by number of guns, 80 for a brigadier, 40 for a colonel, 
24 for a lieutenant-colonel, and 16 for a major, is entirely dispro- 
portioned to their merit and services. A single case may illustrate: 
The Chief of Artillery of one of our Army Corps, although his 
command in extent, importance, and responsibility greatly exceeds 
that of any infantry brigadier, must remain a colonel, as our roll 
already has 3 brigadiers of artillery, and we have not four times 
80 guns.* In like manner, battalion commanders, whose commands, 
admirably managed, in difficulty and importance far surpass 
ordinary infantry regiments, must remain lieutenant-colonels, or 
majors, because we have not a sufficient number of times 40 or 24 
guns to allow of their being rewarded with another grade. In 
truth, my dear sir, there ought to be more scope for promotion in 
this arm. Officers painfully feel that they are not fairly estimated, 
that in spite of noblest service they are often needlessly far behind 
their brethren of other arms. This might, indeed, be remedied in 
part by reducing the number of guns required for the several 

*Pendleton here, of course, refers to Col. Walker of the 3d Corps. 


grades. But this is not the whole case, our artillery field officers 
feel that in the present plan they occupy rather a false position; 
it seems to regard them somewhat as exceptional and almost 
superfluous, instead of as an essential element of the structure and 
efficiency of the army. Their arm they know to be of eminent 
value. Their power they are equally satisfied is greatly enhanced 
by combination, the significance of its extensive organization they 
have seen fully proved, and to leave them nearly unrecognized by 
legal sanction, appears to them something like a degradation of 
their branch of the service. There are, besides, others on whom 
the present plan operates hardly. Every regiment of infantry or 
cavalry has its own non-commissioned staff provided by law; our 
artillery battalion as now existing, though imperatively needing 
such officers, are not allowed them except by temporary detail, 
without recognized authority. The service cannot but suffer from 
these things, and especially from the insufficient number of field 
officers. It not unfrequently now occurs that instead of two field 
officers to a battalion, we cannot under the casualties of service get 
one; and if, as is sometimes the case, the eldest captain be not 
efficient for larger command, hazard may ensue, which ought not 
to be permitted. 

"These, my dear sir, are not matters of speculation, or fancy; 
they are realities seriously felt by some of the best men we have 
in service, and they seem conclusively to show that some such 
legislation as that proposed is really called for in justice to our 
arm, and with a view to the best interests of the service. With 
regard, in the second place, to embarrassments involved in apply 
ing law to this organization, first that the general cannot arrange 
detachments as readily as he may wish, the breaking of batteries 
has rarely been found necessary during the past two years, nor 
could there be difficulty in doing it if necessary, were batteries 
fully legalized. The same great principle of military control 
under which commanding generals can send infantry or cavalry 
companies, regiments, brigades, etc., where he deems it necessary, 
must, of course, apply to artillery organizations of whatever kind, 
and, besides, as you observe, we expressly guard that point in our 
bill. Gen. Lee would undoubtedly have commented unfavorably 
on this feature of the plan had it constituted in his judgment a 
real objection. Second, that which may suit a large army may 
not be adapted to smaller commands. This the bill also provides 
for; it is not mandatory, only permissive, each case can be arranged 
according to its own conditions. Third, officers assigned under 
the law become inconvenient fixtures. There is undoubtedly an evil 
here, though we guard against it by a clause in the bill, and besides, 
whatever be the evil, it pertains equally to the infantry and cavalry 
regiments, brigades, etc., yet the advantages of a definite legal 


system for these have been found greatly to overbear the dis 
advantages suggested; and so it would prove for similar reasons 
in the artillery. 

"These views,, my dear sir., I submit with kind candor, yet 
with sincere deference. Impartial observers like yourself,, survey 
ing processes from a position allowing wide range of view., can 
often detect errors which escape the notice of those more occupied 
with details ; but in a case of this nature, where all the chief 
officers of an arm, under frequent appeals from those of highest 
authority associated with them, concur in recommending a specific 
as well tested by experience and approved in their judgment; and 
when that recommendation is enforced by the deliberate approval 
of so rigidly careful a judge as Gen. Lee, I feel that there can be 
little danger of mistake in asking for the legislation in question, as 
really needed and likely to promote the best interests of the 

The foregoing communication from the Chief of Ar 
tillery is given in full, for to the careful reader, it is a 
history of the conditions in the Artillery arm as they 
existed at the time of its writing. Not only did Pendle- 
ton decline to be brushed aside, but he made bold to put 
the matter squarely up to the Department, in such a way 
that to disapprove meant to accept full responsibility 
for further neglect of the claims of artillery officers. 

December 7, the enemy s cavalry set out in force upon 
a raid toward Belfield and beyond, which movement 
called forth Hampton s Division and his horse batteries. 
At Hicksf ord, Hampton met the raiding column and re 
pelled it. An infantry column accompanied by Pe- 
gram s Battalion and the Washington Artillery was un 
able to overtake the main body of the enemy, and after 
seven arduous days of marching and some skirmishing 
with the rear guards, returned to the lines worn out by 
the incessant toil over frozen and all but impassable 

Both armies now settled down for the winter, but with 
ever-watchful eyes upon each other. The Confederate 
Artillery had indeed borne its share of the struggle. 
The weeks which followed witnessed privations un 
dreamed of before. The awful monotony of life in the 
trenches was occasionally broken, however, by the ex- 


citement of Hill s activities during January and Febru 
ary on the right. On several occasions the Washington 
Artillery was called upon to march and countermarch 
in that quarter, finally going into cantonments near 
Burgess s Mill. 

Again did the spirit of revival sweep over the Army, 
and serve in a great measure to hold the weary troops 
steadfast. In the diary of the Washington Artillery 
is found the following significant passage: "January 
29 The men have built a chapel just behind my tent, 
and have prayer-meetings nightly. The whole army 
has taken to praying, and if prayer accomplish any 
thing, we should whip the fight yet. Peace commis 
sioners started for Washington yesterday. No good is 
expected from the mission. We will certainly have a 
campaign in the spring of some sort or other." The 
men who were now "praying nightly" were the gay 
Louisianians, who but a short while before enlivened the 
camps with their music and dancing. Thus had time, 
adversity, and starvation wrought a change in the spirit 
of the troops. But with the love and fear of God had 
come an unconquerable resolve to die at their posts, a re 
solve unknown in the earlier stages of the war. Then it 
was the joy of victory which inspirited the troops to 
deeds of valor. Now it was a sacred devotion to duty, to 
a cause, to God, that animated the Confederate soldier 
and enabled him to bear the travail of war and slow 
death in the trenches, without even the hope of eventual 
success. Before it was the innate bravery of the race; 
in the winter of 1864-65, as at Fredericksburg, it was a 
sterner God-given courage which held the men to their 

To foster the spirit of sacrifice among the men of his 
command Gen. Pendleton was constantly at work. His 
love for them was great, and he watched over them with 
the spirit of one personally responsible for their future 
state. Of his command at this time he wrote: "In the 
whole of the eventful campaign of 1864, the Artillery 
of the Army of Northern Virginia bore a distinguished 


part, and in every portion of the widely-extended field 
of operation rendered signal service. It was every 
where and at all times proved reliable, howsoever great 
the emergency. In the wildest fury of battle and cease 
less harassment and exposure from sharpshooters and 
shelling on the lines, on the toilsome march, amid all the 
hardships of the trenches, through summer, fall, and 
winter, and when steadily breasting the tide of reverse 
against friends unnerved or overpowered, and foe 
flushed with triumph, the brave officers and men of this 
branch of our army have almost without exception ex 
emplified the very highest virtues of Christian soldiers 
battling for their faith, their honor, and their homes." 

At this time the staff of the Chief of Artillery was 
as follows: Capt. Dudley D. Pendleton, Assistant 
Ad jut ant- General; Lieut. George W. Peterkin, and 
Acting Lieut. Charles Hatcher, aides-de-camp; Capt. 
John Esten Cooke, and Lieut. E. P. Dandridge, As 
sistant Inspector Generals; Maj. John C. Barn well, 
Ordnance Officer; Dr. John Graham, Surgeon; Maj. 
John Page, Quartermaster; and of them their chief re 
ported, "It is but just that I should say they have uni 
formly discharged their duties with faithful alacrity and 
to my entire satisfaction." 

Artillery headquarters were located during the winter 
near the railroad cut on the extension of Halifax Street, 
and about this center the most ceaseless activity reigned. 
The labors of the Chief and his staff and of the artillery 
corps commanders were incessant in the effort to secure 
and care for the horses and maintain the material in 
serviceable condition. Then, too, there were many 
vacancies to fill and where so many were deserving of 
reward the problem of promotion imposed no light task. 

The difficulty of securing needed supplies at this 
time can be illustrated in no better way than by giving 
the following extract from the record of purchases, with 


Confederate money, by an artillery officer traveling 
from Augusta, Ga., to Petersburg, in the early days of 

1 curry comb $ 10.00 

Mending pants 20.00 

Hair cutting and shave 10.00 

Meal on road 20.00 

Cigars and bitters 60.00 

Pair of eyeglasses 135.00 

Candles 50.00 

Coat, vest,, and pants 2,700.00 

1 gallon whiskey 400.00 

1 pair pants 700.00 

6-yd. linen, 2% ft. wide 1,200.00 

1 oz. sulphate quinine 1,700.00 

2 weeks board 700.00 

1 doz. Catawba wine 900.00 

Shad and sundries 75.00 

Matches 25.00 

Penknife 125.00 

1 package brown Windsor soap 50.00 

Army boots were selling in Richmond at this time 
for from $500.00 to $600.00 a pair, and artillery of 
ficers commonly paid $175.00 for the leather and $75.00 
for the fabrication of the coarsest kind of military 
boots. One may easily imagine the difficulty encoun 
tered in replacing and repairing artillery harness, equip 
ments, etc., the price of leather being $5.30 per pound. 
The matter of securing draught animals was even more 
serious. The schedule of prices established by the War 
Department in August, 1864, which provided for the 
impressment of animals, fixed the value of first-class 
artillery horses and mules at $500.00.* The price was 
bad enough. The main difficulty was to find the animals 
and to feed those already on hand. The schedule prices 
for feed at this time were as follows : 

Corn, per bu. 56 Ibs $4.00 

Unshelled corn 3.95 

Cleaned oats, per bu. 32 Ibs 2.50 

Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part II, p. 1153. 


Wheat bran, per bu. 17 Ibs $ .50 

Hay, unbaled, per 100 Ibs 3.00 

Sheaf oats, baled 4.40 

Sheaf oats, unbaled 3.50 

Blade fodder, baled 3.90 

Shucks, baled 2.60 

Wheat straw, baled, per 100 Ibs 2.20 

We have followed its trials and tribulations in some 
detail, but nothing can so impress one with the severity 
of the ordeal through which the Artillery had passed 
since the first of May, as a summary of its losses, which 
itemized by corps and battalions were as follows: 

Huger s Battalion 37 

Cabell s Battalion 47 

Haskell s Battalion .. 68 

Hardaway s Battalion 4 

Stark s Battalion 2 

Gibbes Battalion 20 

Johnson s Battalion.. 19 

Total 1st Corps 197 

Field and Staff 3 

Page s Battalion 177 

Cutshaw s Battalion 191 

Hardaway s Battalion 74 

Nelson s Battalion 116 

Braxton s Battalion 128 

McLaughlin s Battalion 103 

Total 2d Corps 788 

Pegram s Battalion 78 

Poague s Battalion 82 

Mclntosh s Battalion 84 

Richardson s Battalion 51 

Lane s Battalion 64 

Owen s Battalion 33 

Washington Artillery 18 

Total 3d Corps 370 

Stribling s Battalion 132 

12th Virginia Battalion 41 


Moseley s Battalion 87 

Coit s Battalion _ 58 

Total Anderson s Corps (Beauregard) 318 

Horse Artillery 79 


1st Army Corps 197 

2d Army Corps 788 

3d Army Corps 370 

Anderson s Corps 318 

Horse Artillery 79 

Aggregate 1,752 

Of this number, exactly 500 were reported as missing, 
principally in the 2d Corps, due to captures at Spotsyl- 
vania, where 7 officers and 137 men of Page s, and 4 of 
ficers and 128 men of Cutshaw s Battalion were taken 
by the enemy. Deducting 17 officers and 483 men miss 
ing from the aggregate loss and the casualties in battle 
are found to be 1 ? 252, of which number 72 were officers. 
In the 3d Corps alone 7 officers were killed and 25 
wounded, Poague s Battalion losing 12 of the number, 
Lane s 8, Mclntosh s 6, and Pegram s 4. In the 2d 
Corps there were 9 officers killed, 18 wounded, and 16 

If we take the aggregate loss at 1,752, we find the 
loss of the Artillery Corps to have been over thirty per 
cent of its original strength, with a total loss in killed 
and wounded of over twenty-eight per cent ! It is small 
wonder that Lee s Artillery was so highly regarded by 
both friend and foe. The writer knows of no such 
figures as these as applicable to any other artillery.* 

In spite of the great drain on the personnel incident 
to such a list of casualties, never was the Artillery Corps 
allowed to become depleted to the point of ineffective 
ness. The total artillery personnel of the 1st, 3d, and 
Anderson s Corps, as stated in the returns of October 
20, 31, November 10, and December 10, being 5,339, 

* Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 1052. 


6,167, 6,277, and 6,179, respectively. It was not until 
after the opening of spring that disintegration began to 
set in. 

On December 28, 1864, the distribution and arma 
ment of the Artillery was as follows: 


Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander 

Col. Henry Coalter Cabell 

1st Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Robert M. Anderson. 

4 Napoleons. 
Troup (Ga.) Battery, Capt. Henry H. Carlton. 

4 10-pounder Parrotts. 
Battery "A", 1st N. C. Reg t, Capt. Basil C. Manly. 

2 Napoleons, 2 3-inch rifles. 
Pulaski (Ga.) Battery, Lieut. Morgan Callaway. 

4 Napoleons. 


Lieut. -Col. Frank Huger 
Maj. Tyler C. Jordan 

Brooks (S. C.) Battery, Capt. William W. Fickling. 

14 12-pounder howitzers. 

Madison (La.) Battery, Lieut. Jordan C. Parkinson. 

2 12-pounder, 4 24-pounder howitzers. 

Richmond Battery, Capt. William W. Parker. 

4 3-inch rifles. 

Bedford Battery, Capt. John D. Smith. 

4 3-inch rifles. 

Bath Battery, Capt. Esmond B. Taylor. 

4 Napoleons. 

Ashland Battery, Lieut. James Woolfolk. 

2 Napoleons, 2 20-pounder Parrotts. 

Maj. John C. Haskell 

Branch (N. C.) Battery, Capt. Henry G. Flanner. 

4 Napoleons. 
Palmetto (S. C.) Battery, Capt. Hugh R. Garden. 

3 Napoleons, 1 10-pounder Parrott. 



Nelson Battery, Capt. James N. Lamkin. 

26 mortars. 
Rowan (N. C.) Battery, Capt. John A. Ramsey. 

1 12-pounder Whitworth, 2 8-pounder Armstrongs. 

Lieut. -Col. Richard A. Hardaway 

Powhatan Battery, Capt. Willis J. Dance. 

4 3-inch rifles. 
3d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr. 

4 Napoleons. 
1st Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Archibald Graham. 

2 3-inch rifles, 2 10-pounder Parrotts. 

Salem Battery, Capt. Charles B. Griffin. 

4 Napoleons. 

Maj. Alexander W. Stark 

Mathews Battery, Capt. Andrew D. Armistead. 

4 Napoleons. 
Louisiana Guard Battery, Capt. Charles A. Green. 

4 Napoleons. 
Giles Battery, Capt. David A. French. 

4 Napoleons. 

Maj. Marmaduke Johnson 

Clutter s Richmond Battery, Lieut. Lucas Mclntosh. 

2 Napoleons, 2 3-inch rifles. 
Fredericksburg Battery, Lieut. John G. Pollock. 

4 Napoleons. 


Col. Thomas Hill Carter 

Lieut.-Col. William Nelson 

Amherst Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick. 

2 Napoleons, 1 3-inch rifle. 

Georgia Regular Battery, Capt. John Milledge, Jr. 

3 3-inch rifles. 

Fluvanna Battery, Capt. Charles G. Snead. 

2 12-pounder howitzers. 



Lieut. -Col. Carter M. Braxton 
Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman 
Alleghany Battery, Capt. John C. Carpenter. 

2 Napoleons. 
Stafford Battery, Capt. R. L. Cooper. 

2 10-pounder Parrotts. 

Lee Battery, Capt. William W. Hardwicke. 

2 Napoleons. 

Maj. Wilfred Emmet Cutshaw 
Richmond Orange Battery, Capt. Chas. W. Fry. 

2 12-pounder howitzers. 
Staunton Battery, Capt. Asher W. Garber. 

2 3-inch rifles. 

2d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Lorraine F. Jones. 

2 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts. 


Lieut.-Col. J. Floyd King 
Maj. William McLaughlin 
Lewisburg (W. Va.) Battery, Capt. Thomas A. Bryan. 

2 3-inch rifles. 
Monroe Battery, Capt. George B. Chapman. 

2 Napoleons. 
Wise Legion Battery, Capt. William M. Lowry. 

2 Napoleons. 


Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker 


Lieut.-Col. David Gregg Mclntosh 

Maj. Marmaduke Johnson 
1st Maryland Battery, Capt. William F. Dement. 

4 Napoleons. 
4th Maryland Battery, Capt. Walter S. Chew. 

1 10-pounder Parrott, 2 3-inch rifles. 

2d Rockbridge Battery, Capt. William K. Donald. 

3 24-pounder Parrotts. 

Hardaway s Alabama Battery, Capt. William B. Hurt. 

2 3-inch rifles, 1 12-pounder Whitworth. 

Danville Battery, Capt. Berryman Z. Price. 

4 Napoleons. 



Lieut.-Col. William J. Pegram 
Maj. Joseph McGraw 

Richmond Letcher Battery,, Capt. Thomas A. Brander. 

4 Napoleons. 
Richmond Crenshaw Battery, Capt. Thomas Ellett. 

4 3-inch rifles. 
Richmond Purcell Battery, Capt. George M. Cayce. 

4 Napoleons. 
Fredericksburg Battery, Lieut. John G. Pollock. 

4 Napoleons. 
Battery "B", 1st N. C. Reg t, Capt. Thomas E. Gregg. 

4 Napoleons. 

Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague 

Albemarle Battery, Capt. Charles F. Johnston. 

1 Napoleon, 2 10-pounder Parrotts. 

Madison (Miss.) Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick. 

4 Napoleons. 
Pittsylvania Battery, Capt. Nathan Penick. 

2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2 3-inch rifles. 

Warrenton Battery, Capt. Addison W. Utterback. 

4 Napoleons. 
Graham s N. C. Battery, Capt. Arthur B. Williams. 

2 Napoleons, 1 3-inch rifle. 


Lieut.-Col. Charles Richardson 
Maj. Victor Maurin 

Norfolk Blues Battery, Capt. Charles R. Grandy. 

2 Napoleons, 2 3-inch rifles. 
Donaldsonville (La.) Battery, Capt. R. Prosper Landry. 

2 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts. 
Norfolk Battery, Capt. Jos. D. Moore. 

4 Napoleons. 


Col. Allen S. Cutts 
Maj. John Lane 

Battery "A", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Hugh M. Ross. 

4 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts. 
Battery "B", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. George M. Patterson. 

6 Napoleons. 


Battery "C", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. John T. Wingfield. 
4 Napoleons, 2 10-poimder Parrotts, 2 3-inch rifles. 


Lieut.-Col. Benj. F. Eshleman 

Maj. M. B. Miller 
1st Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Edward Owen. 

1 10-pounder Parrott, 3 3-inch rifles. 

2d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. J. B. Richardson. 

4 Napoleons. 
3d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Andrew Hero, Jr. 

4 Napoleons. 
4th Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Joe Norcom. 

3 Napoleons, 1 10-pounder Parrott. 


Maj. William W. Owen 

Lynchburg Battery, Capt. John Hampden Chamberlayne. 

4 Napoleons. 

Ringgold Battery, Capt. Crispen Dickenson. 

4 Napoleons. 
Richmond Otey Battery, Capt. David N. Walker. 

4 Napoleons. 


Col. Hilary P. Jones 

Maj. William H. Caskie 
Battery "C", 13th N. C. Battalion, Capt. James D. dimming. 

2 Napoleons. 

Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg t, Capt. John O. Miller. 

4 10-pounder Parrotts. 
Macon (Ga.) Battery, Capt. C. W. Staten. 

4 Napoleons. 
Yorktown Battery, Capt. Edward R. Young. 

4 Napoleons. 


Lieut.-Col. James R. Branch 

Maj. James C. Coit 
Confederate Guards, Miss. Battery, Capt. William D. Bradford. 

2 12-pounder, 3 20-pounder Parrotts. 

Petersburg Battery, Capt. Richard G. Pegram. 

4 Napoleons. 


Halifax Battery, Capt. Samuel T. Wright. 

4 Napoleons. 
S. C. "Chesterfield" Battery, Capt. James I. Kelly. 

2 Napoleons. 


Maj. Robert M. Stribling 

Maj. Joseph G. Blount 
Lynchburg Battery, Capt. James M. Dickerson. 

4 Napoleons. 
Fauquier Battery, Capt. William C. Marshall. 

4 Napoleons. 
Richmond Fayette Battery, Capt. Miles C. Macon. 

2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2 3-inch rifles. 
Richmond Hampden Battery, Capt. J. E. Sullivan. 

4 Napoleons. 

Maj. Francis J. Boggs 
Martin s Richmond Battery, Lieut. Samuel H. Pulliam. 

3 Napoleons, 1 12-pounder howitzer. 

Albemarle Battery, Lieut. William H. Weisiger. 

4 Napoleons. 

Lieut.-Col. Robert Preston Chew 

Lieut.-Col. Robert Preston Chew 
Petersburg Battery, Capt. Edward Graham. 

2 3-inch rifles, 2 12-pounder howitzers. 
Washington (S. C.) Battery, Lieut. E. Lindsay Halsey. 

4 3-inch rifles. 

2d Stuart H. A. Battery, Capt. William M. McGregor. 

4 3-inch rifles. 

Maj. James Breathed 

1st Stuart H. A. Battery, Capt. Philipp P. Johnston. 

Lynchburg Battery, Capt. John J. Shoemaker. 

Ashby Battery, Capt. James W. Thomson. 

Roanoke Battery, Capt. Warren S. Lurty. 

2d Maryland Battery, Capt. William H. Griffin. 

Charlottesville Battery, Capt. Thomas E. Jackson. 

Staunton Battery, Capt. John H. McClannahan. 


Chew s own battalion was serving with Hampton 
near Petersburg and Breathed s with Rosser and Fitz 
Lee in the Valley. The Horse Artillery had gradually 
been increased to ten batteries. 

At the beginning of the New Year, Haskell s, Harda- 
way s, Johnson s and Stark s battalions under Gen. 
Alexander were still north of the James and had been 
recently joined by Poague s Battalion. Cutts and 
Richardson s battalions remained in position north of 
the Appomattox, with the exception of Penick s Bat 
tery, which had been attached to Poague s Battalion. 
The 2d Corps Artillery was in the Valley, while Cab- 
ell s and Huger s battalions of the 1st Corps, Jones 
battalions of Anderson s, and Pegram s, Macintosh s 
and Gibbes remained in the trenches, and Eshleman s 
near Burgess s Mill. 

In addition to the twenty-six mortars manned by 
Lamkin s Battery, Poague manned four, Mclntosh two 
8-inch howitzers and two 8-inch mortars, Pegram two 
8-inch and two 24-pounder mortars, Cutts one 8-inch 
columbiad and seven 24-pounder mortars. In Ander 
son s Corps, Coit, Blount, arid Caskie manned four 30- 
pounder Parrotts, one 8-inch Columbiad, four 8-inch, 
twelve 24-pounder, nine 12-pounder mortars, and about 
25 howitzers of various calibers. Exclusive of the heavy 
guns and pieces of position, and the guns of the Horse 
Artillery there were in the four corps of Lee s Army, 
January 1, 1865, 282 field guns, including 192 Na 
poleons and howitzers, and 90 rifled pieces.* 

Of the field-officers, Col. Moseley had been killed 
December 16, Gibbes had been wounded on July 30, 
Caskie was absent on indefinite sick leave, Boggs was 
on duty in Richmond, Maurin at High Bridge, and 
Branch was absent on leave. Maj. Miller was therefore 
assigned to duty with Richardson s Battalion in the 
absence of Maurin, while Maj. Blount had succeeded to 
the command of Dearing s, or Read s, and Maj. Owen 

*For tabular report showing heavy artillery In position and manned by field 
artillery at Richmond and Petersburg, see Rebellion Records. Series I, Vol 
XLII, Part III, p. 1354. 


to Gibbes Battalion. Dement s Battery, leaving its 
guns in the trenches at Petersburg, was on duty at 
Drewry s Bluff. 

Notwithstanding the strenuous service which it had 
rendered and losses which almost seem to have been an 
nihilating, the condition of the Artillery at the close of 
the year 1864 was actually better than when it left 
winter quarters the preceding spring. On this point, 
Pendleton, in his report, wrote February 28, 1865: "In 
conclusion I am able to report that our artillery remains 
at the close of this arduous campaign in a condition of 
most encouraging efficiency, and that with reasonable 
effort toward supplying it with a few guns to replace 
some lost in unfortunate affairs that have been described 
(here he refers to loss in the Valley) , and with horses to 
reestablish a number of teams disabled in action or 
worn down by hard service, it will be in full strength 
for the campaign of the ensuing spring. It may be con 
fidently relied upon to accomplish, by the Divine bless 
ing during the next season, as it has so well done through 
the last, its entire share in the defense of our country."* 

*For condition of Walker s Artillery of the 3d Corps, September 30, 1864, 
see Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part II, p. 1309. 



WHEN Longstreet rejoined the Army and was as 
signed to the command of the troops north of the James, 
he found the outer artillery defenses in a state not al 
together satisfactory, and, it would seem, held Lieut. - 
Col. J. C. Pemberton responsible for the condition of 
affairs. But in this Longstreet was in error, for what 
ever may have been Pemberton s shortcomings at Vicks- 
burg, he had labored incessantly upon the works below 
Richmond, and had with little encouragement greatly 
improved them. Longstreet s criticisms, however, soon 
led to dissatisfaction, and on January 7, Pemberton was 
relieved from his former duties and assigned to duty as 
Inspector General of Artillery and Ordnance with 
Capt. L. S. Marye as his assistant. Alexander was 
now placed in entire charge of the artillery defenses 
north of the river, while Col. Stapleton Crutchfield, 
still quite unfit to perform active field service, was as 
signed to the command of the garrison at Chaffin s Bluff, 
where Hardaway had for some time been stationed with 
his battalion. On January 16, Alexander was again 
compelled to rest from his duties for a brief space, leav 
ing Col. Cabell in control as Acting Chief of Artillery 
of the 1st Corps. 

At the close of January, the entire effective strength 
of Carter s four battalions of artillery in the Valley was 
but 35 officers and 538 men present for duty, with an 
aggregate present and absent of 2,082. Of the latter 
number, 16 officers and 383 men were carried as 
prisoners of war. The rolls showed 32 guns in service. 

The condition of Early s command in camp near 
Staunton was most unsatisfactory, particularly with 
respect to the artillery horses, for which on account of 
Sheridan s activities and long droughts during the 
past summer sufficient forage could not be secured. 


After sending Fitz Lee s Cavalry Division to Peters 
burg, Lomax s Brigade to the pasture lands in the Alle- 
ghanies, and temporarily disbanding Rosser s Brigade, 
the men of which were allowed to return to their homes 
with their horses, the situation was still serious. Ac 
cordingly the men and horses of King s or McLaugh- 
lin s artillery battalion were sent to southwestern Vir 
ginia to be wintered, while the officers and men of 
Braxton s and Cutshaw s battalions under Col. Carter 
were ordered to report to Gen. Lee to man the works 
about Richmond. Col. Nelson with six pieces of his bat 
talion remained with Early. About this time Gen. 
Long again reported to Early for duty, and caused the 
guns of the 2d Corps, from which the men and horses 
had been taken, to be shipped by rail to Lynchburg. 
This was a deplorable state of affairs, but it could not 
be avoided, as the horses of the Cavalry and Artillery 
would have perished had they been kept in the Valley. 

Two very small brigades of Wharton s Division, and 
Nelson s artillery command now comprised Early s 
whole force, which was placed in camp near Fishersville 
between Staunton and Waynesborough. 

At the time Braxton and Cutshaw were ordered to 
Richmond, there were Lieut.-Col. Atkinson s four bat 
talions of heavy artillery under Majs. Hensley, Hardin, 
Cary, and Robertson, respectively, and Lightfoot s 
Local Defense Battalion and Leyden s 9th Georgia 
Battalion of light artillery manning the lines, with a 
total of 68 officers and 1,517 men present for duty. 
Other forces of heavy artillery were assigned to the de 
fenses of Petersburg, and the Richmond and Danville 
Railroad under Lieut.-Col. Howard and Maj. Boggs, 

Genls. Lee and Pendleton were now making every 
effort to secure horses for the artillery in order that it 
might be placed in condition before spring to take the 
field. On the 1st of February, it was estimated that 

*For detailed distribution of this force and that at Petersburg along the 
Richmond and Danville Railroad, see Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, 
I art II, PP. 1196-97-98 and 1185. 


6,000 horses and 4,000 mules were needed for the armies 
of the Confederacy, and that the number which could 
possibly be secured before spring was 5,000 ; 3,000 from 
Mississippi and 2,000 in Virginia. The Inspector Gen 
eral of Transportation estimated that with ample funds 
15,000 animals might sooner or later be secured in 
Mexico and Texas, at $70.00 gold per head, but these 
animals were totally unsuited to artillery service. In 
Mississippi the animals would have to be purchased 
from within the enemy s lines at a vastly greater cost, 
while in Virginia the available supply would only be 
forthcoming for cash payments in gold.* Such was the 
condition of affairs and well might Pendleton have 
despaired of remounting his batteries. 

A suggestion was now made by Col. Carter to drive 
the unserviceable animals of the Artillery west to the 
counties of Augusta and Rockbridge, where they could 
be exchanged with the farmers for fresh ones, should 
authority to that effect be granted. He reported that 
a fairly large supply of horses could be had in this 
section, calling attention to the fact that Sheridan had 
but recently taken therefrom over 1,700 animals in spite 
of the drain of the war. This plan was promptly pro 
posed to the Inspector General of Transportation, and 
again Pendleton protested against the practice of herd 
ing the condemned artillery horses in great droves only 
to perish from neglect, and consume forage, when they 
might be distributed among the farmers for purposes 
both of recuperation and aid to agriculture. 

In a report dated February 14, Maj. Cole states that 
2,482 horses and 1,370 mules were immediately required 
by the Army at Petersburg, and a grand total of 3,270 
horses and 2,409 mules for all the forces in Virginia. 
Having been provided with $100,000 in gold and $3,- 
000,000 in treasury notes, he was hopeful of securing 
2,500 animals in Virginia and North Carolina, pro 
vided he was allowed to impress and pay for them at 

"Letter of Inspector General of Transportation, February ... 1865, Rebellion 
Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, p. 1190. 


local appraisements. In addition to this number, he 
reported that 700 artillery horses would be returned 
from the infirmaries before April 1.* 

The horse depots which had been established at 
Pendleton s suggestion had proved of great benefit to 
the service, for by means of them large numbers of ex 
hausted animals had been rendered serviceable and re 
issued. But the losses in the field continued to be 
greater than the supply, especially in the tidewater 
section of Virginia. Many of the animals were bred 
and raised in the mountainous regions of the west, 
and were not acclimated to the lowlands about Peters 
burg, nor could they be made to flourish, in spite of 
every effort, when taken from their accustomed pastures 
and placed on army forage. Glanders and farcy, the 
most dreaded equine diseases, became prevalent in the 
corrals at Petersburg, and Owen s 13th Virginia Bat 
talion was almost dismounted before the close of the 
winter from these maladies of the horses. t 

So vehemently had Braxton and Cutshaw protested 
against the unhorsing of their commands, that early in 
March it was decided to issue horses and new guns to 
the former, and it was ordered to relieve Poague s Bat 
talion on duty under Alexander. But after issuing the 
horses, and before the guns arrived from Richmond, the 
issue of forage became so scarce that many of the ani 
mals perished. About this time Cutshaw applied to 
have his battalion converted into cavalry for more active 
service than that which he was performing as heavy 
artillery. Both the officers and men of his command, 
he declared, were desirous of this change and were will 
ing to repair to the Valley, where in small groups they 
would secure their own mounts. 

Conditions were indeed becoming desperate. Even 
the Horse Artillery which Pendleton was endeavoring 
to reorganize and place upon a more efficient footing for 
the anticipated campaign, was in urgent need of guns 

*Rcbellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, p. 1232. 
flbid, p. 1305. 


and equipment, necessitating a call upon Alexander for 
rifles for its armament. But to this Alexander ob 
jected, urging that howitzers be issued the horse bat 
teries, instead of his much-needed rifle pieces, of which 
he already had too few. He was even now compelled to 
strengthen the line he was defending by planting sensi 
tive shell among the abattis in his front, illuminating 
his field of fire by night with fire balls, etc., and to take 
from him his best ordnance was an act of folly, which he 
strenuously opposed. 

As spring approached conditions in the Army in gen 
eral grew worse and worse. From the trials of the late 
winter, "history would fain avert her eyes." They were 
such as can never be forgotten by those who watched 
and waited; such as can never be credited by those who 
read the story in peace and plenty. To guard the long 
line of intrenchments from the Chickahominy to 
Hatcher s Run, there was now left but a gaunt remnant 
of that valiant host which had hurled back nearly thrice 
its number at Cold Harbor, and wrought humiliation 
to the Army of the Potomac on a score of fields in this 
vigorous campaign. 

"Living on one-sixth of a ration of cornmeal and 
rancid pork, thinly clad, their bodies indeed shivered 
under the freezing blasts of heaven, but their dauntless 
spirits cowered not under the fiery blasts of war. But 
there was to be added a pang deeper than the pang of 
hunger; sharper than the rigor of the elements or hurt 
of shot and steel. For now from the cotton lands of 
Georgia and the rice fields of Carolina, came borne on 
every blast the despairing cry, which wives with little 
ones raised to wintry skies, lit by the glare of burning 
homes, and the men of the Old North State bethought 
them of the happy homesteads which lay in the path of 
the ruthless conqueror, who was waging war with an 
audacious cruelty, capable of destroying a whole nation. 
A subtle enemy, till then well-nigh unknown, attacked 
in rear the Army which still haughtily held its front, 


and men, with bated breath and cheeks flushing through 
their bronze, whispered the dread word desertion/ 

On the 28th of February, Gen. Lee reported to the 
Secretary of War a total of 1,094 desertions between the 
15th and 25th of the month! Of this number, 586 were 
in Hill s and 217 in Anderson s Corps. During the ten 
days ending March 8, 779 men abandoned their colors, 
450 from these same corps. 

"The historian, far removed from the passions of the 
time, may coldly measure out his censure ; but we, com 
rades, bound to these men by countless proud traditions, 
can only cry with the old Hebrew prophet, Alas! my 
brother! and remember that these were valiant souls, 
too sorely tried."* 

In response to a circular of March 7, calling for sug 
gestions as to how to cure the dread malady which now 
unabated threatened to destroy the Army of Northern 
Virginia, Gen. Alexander promptly proposed the classi 
fication of offenses with appropriate punishments and 
an increase of the authority of regimental courts, to be 
employed in lieu of the cumbersome system of Corps 
Courts hitherto in use. The proceedings under the 
proposed system were to be more summary and the 
death penalty more frequent, t But it is exceedingly 
doubtful if desertion could have been checked by more 
drastic punishment, or in any way. The Army of 
Northern Virginia was doomed the Confederacy had 
long since shown the hectic flush upon its check. 

Gen. Lee had already disclosed his plans to Gen. 
Pendleton and given him confidential instructions re 
garding the proposed withdrawal of the Army. In ac 
cordance with these plans Pendleton redoubled his ef 
forts to place the Artillery on the most efficient footing 
possible, and at last, with the support of Gen. Lee, he 
succeeded in securing the many needed promotions in his 
corps, for which he had so long struggled, and authority 

*Address of W. Gordon McCabe on the Siege of Petersburg, Army of Northern 
Virginia Memorial, p. 169. 

tA careful study of Gen. Alexander s plan will repay the student, Rebellion 
Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, pp. 1300, 1301. 


to reorganize his battalions. On March 1, the following 
promotions were announced, with rank from February 

To be Brigadier-General Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker. 

To be Colonels Lieut.-Col. William Nelson, D. G. Mclntosh, 
Frank Huger, and W. J. Pegram. 

To be Lieutenant-Colonels Majs. John C. Haskell, W. M. 
Owen,, John Lane, R. P. Chew, W. E. Cutshaw, Marmaduke 
Johnson, and R. M. Stribling. 

To be Majors Capts. H. W. Ross, T. J. Kirkpatrick, W. J. 
Dance, B. C. Manly, T. O. Brander, S. T. Wright, N. V. Sturdivant, 
J. F. Hart, P. P. Johnston, J. A. Thomson, and W. G. McGregor. 

Never in its history was the Artillery Corps so well 
provided with field-officers as now. It seems too bad 
that Pendleton s insistence could not have been re 
warded before. He now set about the task of reorgani 
zation with renewed energy, and everywhere found the 
greatest encouragement reigning among his officers. 
But there had as usual been some oversights. Harda- 
way, who well deserved promotion, was left out and 
Alexander, calling attention to his merits, suggested 
the consolidation of Johnson s Battalion with Leyden s 
in order that the necessary vacancy in the grade of 
colonel might be created. He also recommended Gar 
den, Parker, Lamkin, Woolfolk, and Moody to be pro 
moted majors, and Leyden a lieutenant-colonel. 

Pendleton himself was not promoted, but it is prob 
able he would have been had time permitted. From a 
confidential communication from Gen. Pendleton 
written some years after the war the following extract 
is taken. 

"On the ground, probably, that this arm of the service, all 
essential as it is, can never be independent, but always only 
cooperative with others, Confederate law allowed in it no grade 
above that of Brigadier-General. Only such, therefore, was I to 
the last, though having under me three other Brigadier-Generals, 
and, consequently serving in fact as a Major-General. But no 
exaltation of name was, so far as I know myself, a ruling motive 
with me, the incongruity never disturbed me. It was about to be 
corrected on Gen. Lee s recommendation when irremediable reverse 
befell our army and cause." 


Instead of consenting to the conversion of Cutshaw s 
Battalion, Pendleton at once addressed himself to the 
task of reorganizing the entire Artillery of the 2d Corps. 
Sending Col. Carter to Gen. Long, he proposed through 
him to fully remount Nelson s, Braxton s, and Cut 
shaw s battalions, and place them on the most effective 
basis. For this purpose, McLaughlin s Battalion was 
to be ordered East, dismounted, placed in the stationary 
batteries, and its horses, guns, and equipment used for 
the other battalions. Gen. Long promptly assented to 
the plan, and at once Cutshaw was withdrawn from 
Fort Clifton, Braxton from Chamn s Bluff, Nelson 
ordered to Lynchburg and the work undertaken. Cut 
shaw s Battalion at this time consisted of Fry s, Mont 
gomery s, Reese s, Carter s, Garber s, Carrington s, 
Tanner s, and Jones batteries, with 674 officers and men 
present for duty and 1,047 on the rolls. It, therefore, 
afforded a surplus which was to be used in completing 
the personnel of Nelson s and Braxton s battalions. Ac 
cordingly, on March 17, McLaughlin was ordered to re 
port to Col. Carter at Lynchburg, turn over his horses 
and material to Nelson, and proceed by the canal with 
his men to Richmond. 

Other changes in the Artillery were also now neces 
sary. In the 3d Corps, Chew s 1st Maryland Battery, in 
which there were but 36 men present for duty, was 
recommended to be consolidated with Griffin s horse, or 
the 2d Maryland Battery, of Breathed s Battalion. 

Martin s and Dickenson s batteries of Sturdivant s 
and Owen s battalions, respectively, were relieved of 
their guns and formed into a battalion with Douthat s 
Battery, which was brought from the southwest with 
McLaughlin s Battalion. This new battalion under 
command of King was assigned to duty in the stationary 
batteries of Alexander s line. Walker s Battery of 
Owen s Battalion was assigned to Sturdivant s Bat 
talion, in place of Martin s, and Chamberlayne s to Mc- 
Intosh s Battalion in place of Chew s, while Maj. Owen 
was assigned to duty under Mclntosh. Thus was the 


13th Virginia Battalion disbanded and sufficient ma 
terial from Martin s, Dickenson s, and Chew s batteries 
secured in addition to that of McLaughlin s Battalion to 
fully rearm and equip Nelson s, Cutshaw s, and Brax- 
ton s veteran battalions.* These changes were officially 
promulgated March 20, and on that same day the Horse 
Artillery, with Chew as Chief, was reorganized, as fol 

Maj. Hart s Battalion: 

Hart s Battery and Graham s Battery,, to serve with Gen. 
Butler s Division. 

Maj. McGregor s Battalion: 

McGregor s Battery and McClannahan s Battery, to serve with 
Gen. W. H. C. Lee s Division. 

Maj. Breathed s Battalion: 

Shoemaker s Battery and Griffin s Battery, to serve with Gen. 
Fitz Lee s Division. 

Maj. Johnston s Battalion: 

Johnston s Battery and Jackson s Battery, to serve with Gen. 
Lomax s Division. 

Maj. Thomson s Battalion: 

Thomson s Battery and Lurty s Battery, to serve with Gen. 
Rosser s Division. 

Col. Chew, like all the other artillery commanders, was 
now admonished to be prepared for active operations, 
however early or unexpectedly the call might come. 

*Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part III, pp. 1316-17-19-21-22-23- 
27-28 and 1333. 




WELL might Pendleton caution his subordinates that 
their measures should be prompt, for already the evacu 
ation had been too long deferred. How Lee was over 
ruled and compelled to remain in the Petersburg lines 
against his will cannot be discussed here. Nor how, 
when the object of the peace conference failed, the 
Army, although bitterly disappointed, set its teeth, once 
more resolved to struggle on to the end, whatever 
that might be. We must content ourselves solely with 
tracing the events which concerned the Artillery. 

Sheridan s cavalry divisions were circling about Lee s 
Army like great vultures impatient for their prey. One 
of his columns was marching upon Lynchburg, and to 
meet the danger Pendleton was directed to send enough 
of his men there to man the field guns which Early had 
turned in during the winter. Accordingly, Garber s, 
Jones , and Carrington s batteries were dispatched to 
Col. Carter, who with his usual energy and skill pre 
pared to meet the raiders. 

On the morning of March 25, the Chief of Artillery 
was summoned to meet the commanding general at the 
headquarters of Gen. Gordon at 5 A. M. Gen. Lee 
had decided to make a daring attempt to break Grant s 
line near the center by an attack upon Fort Steadman, 
which, it was believed, could be carried by surprise. 
How Gordon s sudden blow was at first crowned with 
success; how his guides ran away and left his storming 
columns groping in ignorance; how his supports failed 
to reach him, must be read elsewhere. Suffice it here to 
say that what bid fair to be a brilliant success through 
unwonted misfortune, dereliction, or what not, re 
sulted in miserable failure. 

This unsuccessful effort, in which, however, the Ar 
tillery fully performed its allotted task, was quickly fol- 

Killed at Second Cold Harbor, 1S(54 


lowed by a vigorous advance on the part of Grant. 
Early on the morning of the 29th, the corps of Warren 
and Humphreys moved toward Lee s intrenchments 
on the extreme right, while the inexorable Sheridan 
swept around the flank and occupied Dinwiddie Court 
house, six miles southwest of the infantry column. Lee, 
quickly divining the intention of the enemy, moved out 
along the White Oak Road with 15,000 infantry and 
2,000 cavalry, leaving Longstreet north of the James 
and Gordon alone in front of Petersburg. On the 31st, 
he attacked the Federals in flank, but after pursuing 
as far as the nature of the country permitted, was com 
pelled to return to his works. On the same day, Sheri 
dan advanced to Five Forks, driving Fitz Lee and part 
of Pickett s command before him. The following morn 
ing, Sheridan was reinforced by Warren and Hum 
phreys, and in the evening defeated the 3d Corps. Per 
ceiving that his forces were too weak to combat success 
fully with the enemy, Lee ordered Longstreet on the 
evening of the 1st to move rapidly across the river to 

In the battle of Five Forks, the Artillery suffered a 
loss indeed irreparable, a loss directly due to Gen. 
Pickett s orders. On this occasion Gen. Pickett as 
sumed to designate the position for Pegram s guns a 
position with every defect known to artillerymen. But 
Pegram with that spirit of blind obedience which con 
stituted his sole fault did not question his orders and 
died like a rat in the trap to which he was assigned. 

No finer tribute to Pegram can be penned than that 
which his gallant adjutant and comrade has already 
given to the world, and so those eloquent lines are quoted 
here: "Of him I almost fear to speak, lest I should do 
hurt to that memory which I would honor. For to those 
who knew him not, the simplest outline of a character so 
finely tempered by stern and gentle virtues would seem 
but an ideal picture touched with the tender exaggera 
tion of retrospective grief ; while to so many of you who 
knew him, as he was, the gentle comrade and the 


brilliant fighter, any portrait must prove, at best, but a 
blurred semblance of the young soldier, whose simple, 
heroic, godly life rejects, as it were, all human pane 
gyric. Yet even the coldest must allow that it was a 
life which afforded a notable example of how great a 
career may be crowded within the compass of a few 
years. In the spring of 61, a youth of modest de 
meanor, he entered the military service as a private 
soldier; in the spring of 65, still a mere lad, he fell in 
action, Colonel of Artillery, mourned by an Army. 

"More than once in desperate and critical events were 
grave trusts confided to his prudence, skill and courage ; 
more than once did he win emphatic praise from Hill, 
from Jackson and from Lee. Thus it was his lot to be 
tried in great events, and his fortune to be equal to the 
trial, and having filled the measure of perfect knight 
hood, chaste in his thoughts, modest in his words, 
liberal and valiant in deeds, there was at last awarded 
him on field of battle the death counted sweet and 

"Such was William Johnson Pegram, of the Third 
Corps, who at the early age of twenty-two died, sword 
in hand, at the head of his men, with all his honor owing 
wounds in front to make a soldier s passage for his 
soul. And may the author add, such was the soldier 
who was sacrificed by the ignorance of his division com 
mander an infantry officer who undertook to direct 
the placing of his artillery without discretion on the 
part of his artillery commander. 

Had Col. Pegram lived and the war continued he 
would have attained to high command. Already Gen. 
Lee had expressed his intention to give the young 
soldier a brigade at the first opportunity which pre 
sented, but it is doubtful if the gallant artilleryman 
would have exchanged his sixteen guns for such a com 

Early on the morning of the 2d, the Federals re 
newed the attack, breaking the lines of the Confederates 
and forcing them from their position covering the Boyd- 


ton Plank Road, and Gibbon s Division of Ord s Corps 
boldly essayed to break through into the town. The 
morning of the 1st, Pendleton had ordered seven guns 
of Poague s command, which had been held in reserve 
near Hewlett s, to march for Petersburg, and that night 
the whole battalion was directed to follow. When the 
first two batteries arrived they were ordered to proceed 
to the right and conceal themselves before dawn near 
the Turnbull house. 

After capturing all the works to the south and west, 
Grant found a more difficult task before him at the town, 
for Ord s way was barred by two open profiles, known 
as Battery Gregg and Fort Whit worth, the latter from 
the character of a gun mounted therein. These works 
were about 200 yards apart and 1,000 in front of the 
main line of intrenchments. The gorge of Battery 
Gregg was closed by a palisade and its ditch was gener 
ally impassable. On the right flank, however, a line to 
connect with Whitworth had been started, and here the 
unfinished ditch and parapet gave a narrow access to 
the parapet of Gregg. It was by this route that the 
enemy finally reached it. It was defended by two guns 
of the Washington Artillery, under Lieut. McElroy, 
and the 12th and 16th Mississippi, 214 men in all. Fort 
Whitworth was open at the gorge and was held by 
three guns of the Washington Artillery, under Lieut. 
Battles, and two Mississippi regiments. 

Thrice Gibbon s columns, above 5,000 strong, surged 
against Gregg and each time were repulsed by the de 
voted garrison, McElroy fighting his guns with great 
valor while his drivers armed with muskets aided the 
infantry. The day was an eventful one for the Wash 
ington Artillery, for early in the morning when Battles 
was ordered to withdraw from the outer line, before his 
horses could be brought up the enemy rushed to the 
works and seized his guns. But, McElroy in the fort, 
seeing Battles surrounded and cut off led a charge of 
his pseudo-infantry, and recovered the pieces. 


Shortly before noon, Gibbon, reinforced by two bri 
gades of Turner s Division, while the third advanced 
against Whitworth, again assailed Gregg, and this time 
his men swarmed over the parapet and captured Mc- 
Elroy s guns. Of the garrison 55 were killed, 129 
were wounded, and only 30 were found uninjured, while 
Gibbon lost 122 killed and 592 wounded in the four as 

McElroy had again performed a splendid feat of 
arms. Surely he felt no shame over the loss of those two 
guns, which "taught prudence to the enemy for the rest 
of the day." It was the unflinching character of Lee s 
artillerymen as exemplified by McElroy that prompted 
Meade in July to telegraph Grant, "I cannot advise 
an assault. . . . It is not the number of the enemy, 
which oppose our taking Petersburg ; it is their artillery 
and their works, which can be held by reduced numbers 
against direct assault."* 

The seven guns of Poague s Battalion from near the 
Turnbull house assisted Eshleman s other batteries on 
the Boydton Road in checking the enemy s pursuit, and 
while heavily engaged had been joined by Poague with 
the remainder of his command. Maj. Brander had also 
posted three guns on the north bank of the Appomattox, 
from whence they were able to enfilade the Federal left 
as it swung towards the river, while Chew threw four 
pieces into action on the right of the Cox Road. But 
by noon the Federals had seized Gregg and Whitworth, 
and fully established their line from these works to the 
river. Nevertheless, McElroy, Poague, Brander, and 
Chew had checked the enemy and given Field s Divi 
sion time to reach Petersburg before the outer line fell. 
Kershaw now alone remained north of the James to 
confront Weitzel. A. P. Hill, veteran of many fields, 
a knight sans peur et sans reproche, had fallen. But all 
was not yet lost. 

During the day, the artillery fire on the east of the 
city had been unusually severe. Beginning the previous 

*Written July 26. 


night, the enemy s mortars and guns had been kept 
incessantly at work. 

Lee and Longstreet had watched the defense of Fort 
Gregg, with the utmost admiration, fully expecting the 
compact Federal masses to assail the inner works, be 
hind which Field had been placed. Early in the morn 
ing, Lee had advised the President that he must aban 
don the lines that night, and having noted Grant s 
pause, about 3 p. M., issued the formal orders for the 
evacuation in time to begin the move by dark, and the 
troops north of the James were directed to march 
through Richmond and join the Army on the roads 
leading westward. While Alexander stood at the north 
end of the pontoon bridge, near Drewry s Bluff, watch 
ing his batteries file by, Walker and Jones withdrew 
their battalions from the Petersburg lines. Pendleton 
had ordered all the guns to move out at 8 p. M. This 
was accomplished with great success in spite of the 
enemy s ceaseless cannonade. But ten pieces had to be 
abandoned and these by Jones for lack of teams, all 
being disabled. Even a number of mortars were saved, 
and by 2 A. M. all the field artillery had crossed the 
Appomattox and commenced the march westward along 
the Hickory Road. Thus did Lee evacuate the forty 
miles of intrenchments which for nine months had been 
"clothed in thunder," and for the defense of which the 
line of defenders had at last been overstretched. 

Along the north bank of the Appomattox moved the 
long lines of artillery and dark silent columns of infan 
try through the gloom of the night towards Amelia 
Courthouse, where rations had been ordered to be col 
lected for the Army. "As the troops moved noiselessly 
onward in the darkness that just precedes the dawn, a 
bright light like a broad flash of lightning illumined the 
heavens for an instant, then followed a tremendous ex 
plosion. The magazine at Ft. Drewry is blown up, 
ran whispers through the ranks, and again silence 
reigned." All knew now that Alexander and Ker- 
shaw had spiked their heavy guns and were on the way 


to join the main column. Passing through Manchester 
at daybreak, Alexander s column marched 24 miles on 
the 3d, going into camp that night near Tomahawk 
Church, while the main column halted about nine miles 
from Goode s Bridge after a distressing night and day 
of toil, broken only by a brief halt at Chesterfield Court 
house, about dawn that morning. 

At 8:15 A. M. Richmond in flames had been sur 
rendered to Weitzel, and the sun was hardly up before 
Meade s troops entered the works about Petersburg. 

Alexander s command had just gone into bivouac 
when he was ordered to accompany some engineer of 
ficers to prepare a wagon route for the Artillery and 
trains to an overhead railroad bridge across the Ap- 
pomattox River. Marching all night in the mud, the 
entire column was safely gotten across during the 4th 
and went into camp near sundown about three miles 
from Amelia Courthouse. During the day, Pendle- 
ton was busily engaged making arrangements for the 
reduction of the Artillery to a basis proportionate to the 
other troops, and to dispose of the surplus. Only the 
best equipped battalions were to remain with the Army, 
while all the rest were to be taken by Gen. Walker to 

The morning of the 5th, Walker set out by a road to 
the right and west of the main column after destroying 
ninety-five caissons with a great quantity of ammu 
nition, which had early in the winter been sent to Amelia 
from Petersburg. 

As soon as Grant learned of Lee s line of retreat, he 
pushed forward his whole available force, numbering 
near 80,000 men, in order to intercept him on the Rich 
mond and Danville Railroad. The Federal pursuit was 
as rapid as the progress of Lee s Army was slow. The 
heavy rains, bottomless roads, and utter lack of forage 
soon reduced the artillery teams and transport to a 
most distressing state of exhaustion, and hundreds of 
men were forced to leave the ranks from hunger. 
The long wagon trains with their broken-down teams 


encumbered the roads at every turn, the men cheered 
on at first by the promise of food at Amelia Courthouse. 
But, disappointment there awaited them, for Lee s 
orders had miscarried and the rations and forage in 
tended for the Army lay in the storehouses in Richmond. 
Nothing remained but the wide dispersion of the 
troops for foraging purposes, and dissolution under 
these conditions was inevitable. The delay at Amelia 
entailed by the necessity of collecting food was fatal, for 
already Sheridan s troopers were harassing the flank 
and even the head of the column, while Grant s whole 
force well fed and carried forward by the stimulating 
hope of early victory was marching on nearly parallel 

In the words of one of Pendleton s staff officers, "It 
was a period in which no note was taken of day or night ; 
one long, confused, dreadful day. There seemed to be 
no front, no rear, for firing might be heard ahead and be 
hind, and on both sides at once. There were no head 
quarters, except where the ambulance happened to be." 
Small wonder that the brave men and their horses fell 
by the roadside exhausted by want and weariness. 

Such was the condition when it was learned that Sheri 
dan was across Lee s path at Jetersville, whereupon the 
Army was formed into line of battle to attack him. But 
it was now reported that the 2d and 6th Corps were in 
front of the Army, and in order to pass them the 
column was countermarched a short distance, turned 
off to the right through Amelia Springs, and after 
marching all night reached Rice s Station six miles 
west of Burkeville at daylight. 

During the night a serious panic was started by a 
large black stallion carrying a fence rail swinging to his 
bridle, and running through the column. In the long 
continued firing which broke out, many officers and men 
were killed, among them Maj. Smith, who was in com 
mand of the detachment of heavy artillerymen from 
Drewry s Bluff. 


At Rice s Station, Alexander was directed to select 
a line of battle upon which Lee soon formed his army, 
now reduced to about 10,000 men, while Pendleton 
placed his battalions in positions commanding the 
Burke ville Road and from which they could sweep the 
approaches on the left. 

All day the 2d Corps had closely pressed Lee s rear, 
while the cavalry and the 6th Corps struck Swell s 
column at Sailor s Creek. The latter force of about 
8,000 men consisted of Kershaw s Division, a number 
of departmental employees under Gen. Custis Lee, the 
marines and sailors of the fleet under Admiral Tucker, 
and the heavy artillery from Drewry s and Chaffin s 
bluffs, under Col. Crutchfield and Maj. Stiles. After a 
most desperate conflict in which Ewell s nondescript 
force first repulsed, then charged the enemy, it was over 
borne by numbers and captured. Gen. Lee had gone in 
person to try to save Ewell s command, but now re 
turned to the other troops, and told Gen. Pendleton on 
coming up with him, "General, half of our army is 

Toward noon, the enemy began to appear in Lee s 
front at Rice s Station, but were easily held off by 
Pendleton and Alexander with the Artillery. During 
the day Dearing s and Rosser s cavalry had met and 
captured a small mixed force of the enemy which had 
been sent forward to destroy the High Bridge on the 
Lynchburg Road. In this affair, both Gen. Dearing 
and Maj. James W. Thomson were killed. Thus two 
more officers, whose names will be remembered as long 
as any others in Lee s Artillery, laid down their lives. 

The combat was short and bloody, the Confederate 
victory complete, and Dearing and the gallant Col. 
Boston of the Cavalry both fell in the first flush of 
victory. Opposite the Confederate center and left, the 
enemy sent up the white flag. But on the extreme right, 
Thomson, in ignorance of the surrender, pressed for 
ward with his mounted cannoneers. As he did so, he 
caught sight of the white flag away down the line and 


gave a shout of joy. At that very moment he was 
struck with two balls, either of which would have proved 
fatal. With a deep groan he reeled from his saddle and 
fell dead. A moment later not a shot was to be heard. 
About the stricken body of the youthful major, his 
gunners grouped themselves in silence, among them his 
devoted friend and comrade, Maj. James Breathed, 
who, as he sighed and turned away, said, "With ten 
thousand such men as Jimmie Thomson, I could whip 
Grant s Army." 

So died this martial youth, who from the day he 
entered the Virginia Military Institute in September, 
1860, until the hour of his death, personified all that was 
valiant, all that was noble. No space here to tell of the 
many fields upon which he had won fame. But a lad 
of eighteen when as a lieutenant he helped Chew 
organize Ashby s Horse Battery, but twenty when 
captain of that battery, and but twenty-one when he be 
came a battalion commander in the Horse Artillery, 
yet he was a veteran when he died, and was able to 
boast continuous service from the very beginning to the 
very end of the war. With Ashby, Jackson, and 
Stuart, he had fought upon every field made famous by 
their names, and on many an unknown field he had 
followed Chew who fought while others rested. 

There beside Bearing and Boston he lay, all of them 
covered by their rubber blankets, suggestive of the 
curtain which had fallen upon these heroic lives. But an 
other scene in the tragedy remained. An officer quickly 
searches the field. It is Jimmie Thomson s roommate 
at the Institute, the son of Admiral Smith Lee, who has 
heard of his death and is looking for his body, and 
more, for the letter and the picture which he knows 
will be found in the breast pocket of that stained gray 
jacket. And on another portion of the field is found by 
a Confederate officer, in the haversack of a Federal 
soldier, a slip of paper containing a description of 
Thomson s death, and on it is written the following 
verse : 


"His life burned not to ashes, white with doubt, 
But flaring up in battles breath went out, 
His young blood pulsing years in a wild route, 
Then halting at high tide. 

"In the loud trumpet blast, in the grand rush of lifted banners met, 
With his cheeks flushing and his saber wet, 
His young eyes flashing and his young lips set ; 
So his rich spirit passed. 

"Just when the field was won, 

When the clouds broke from off the hard-won fight, 
And the pierced flag leaped out upon our sight, 
In victory upspringing from the right, 
His brave young soul went out."* 

During the afternoon Lee received information of 
an attack by the Federal Cavalry on his wagon train 
two miles in rear, whereupon he requested Gen. Pendle- 
ton to go back and see what could be done to save 
further loss. Meeting the remnants of Harris Bri 
gade, Pendleton gathered together about twenty volun 
teers and soon joined by a regiment of Cooke s Cavalry 
moved back to the train on which the enemy had fired. 
Pendleton and Cooke attacked the hostile cavalry, but 
were soon compelled to fall back, unable to save the 
wagons, and pursued for some distance by the enemy. 

About sundown the Federals began massing in front 
of the line at Rice s Station for an attack in force, and 
Lee gave orders to resume the retreat. The Army, now 
cut off from Danville, marched towards Lynchburg, 
reaching Farmville at sunrise, after great hardships. 
During the entire night but six miles were covered. At 
Farmville, the weary column crossed to the north side 
of the Appomattox, and received a small supply of 
rations. As the Artillery began crossing the bridges at 
Farmville, the enemy pressed closely upon the rear 
guard, whereupon Pendleton placed several batteries in 
position on the heights on the north bank to cover the 

*The finder of this paper was the Hon. W. L. Wilson, Member United States 
Congress from West Virginia, and later President of Washington and Lee 

For a beautiful and most interesting account of Maj. Thomson s career, see 
"A Modern Greek," by John S. Wise, Bob Taylor s Magazine, December, 1906. 


Gen. Lee now sent for Alexander, and with his map 
explained to him that the enemy had taken a highway 
bridge across the Appomattox near the High Bridge, 
were crossing on it and would come in upon his road 
about three miles ahead of him. Directing Alexander to 
send artillery to cover this passage, he placed the two 
bridges at Farmville under the latter s personal charge 
with orders to destroy them after the troops had all 
crossed. After pointing out on the map a shorter route 
to Lynchburg than that which Lee was following, and 
producing a resident of the section to confirm the map, 
Gen. Alexander retired and immediately set fire to the 
railroad bridge as the enemy was already in sight. 

Poague s Battalion of artillery had been sent ahead 
to the point indicated by Lee, and Mahone s Division 
supported by Poague s guns took up a good position 
and began to intrench. Persistently assailed by Miles 
Division throughout the day, Mahone held his own, 
while Poague fought his guns with desperate determina 
tion, losing then recovering one of his pieces. The serv 
ice which the stern and indomitable Poague here ren 
dered fully satisfied the confidence reposed in him by 
Pendleton, who selected the gallant little hero of the 
Wilderness in preference to all others for the delicate 
task of opening the way for the Army. 

At midnight, the main column moved on the road to 
ward Buckingham Courthouse, with Mahone and 
Poague forming the rear guard. During a truce, after 
sundown on the 7th, which Mahone secured for the re 
moval of his wounded, a letter from Grant was trans 
mitted to Lee through him, in which Grant first sug 
gested the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
to which Lee promptly replied, inquiring what terms 
would be offered. 

In spite of the roads, a long march was made during 
the night, and the morning of the 8th found the head of 
the Confederate column near Appomattox Courthouse. 

During the march on the 8th, as Pendleton and Alex 
ander rode together, the Chief of Artillery mentioned 


the fact that a number of the senior officers of the Army 
had conferred together and concluded it should be 
represented to Lee that in their opinion further resist 
ance was futile, in order that he might surrender with 
out incurring the odium of first proposing the step. 

According to Alexander, Pendleton s contemporary 
account was about as follows : 

It being the concensus of opinion among certain of 
ficers that Longstreet should approach the Com- 
mander-in-Chief on the subject, he, Pendleton, had 
suggested such action to Longstreet, but his proposal 
had been indignantly rejected, with the emphatic re 
mark that it was his duty to support and not hamper 
his superior in the execution of his trust; that his, the 
1st Corps, could still whip twice its number, and that as 
long as that was so, he would never suggest surrender. 
Failing to enlist Longstreet s services for the purpose 
proposed, he, Pendleton, had himself made bold to sug 
gest a surrender to Gen. Lee, but was snubbed by the 
Commander-in-Chief, who coldly declared that "There 
are too many men here to talk of laying down their 
arms without fighting." 

Gen. Alexander further asserted that in recounting 
these events, Pendleton was plainly embarrassed by the 
reception he had been given by Gen. Lee, which he, 
Alexander, at the time inferred to have been much in 
the nature of a rebuke. Concerning this whole inci 
dent, however, there are many recorded discrepancies. 

In later years, Pendleton, always loth to discuss the 
sad circumstances connected with the retreat and sur 
render of the Army, gave the following account of his 
discharge of the mission upon which he was deputed by 
his fellow officers. 

"Fighting was going on, but not very severely, so that con 
versation was practicable. Gen. Gordon had an interview with me; 
told me of discouraging intelligence from the South, and of a 
conference which had been held between other responsible officers 
and himself, and announced their joint wish that, if my views 
agreed with theirs, I should convey to Gen. Longstreet, as second 


in command, and then,, if he agreed, to Gen. Lee, our united judg 
ment that the cause had become hopeless, so we thought it wrong 
longer to have men killed on either side, and not right, moreover, 
that our beloved commander should be left to bear the entire trial 
of initiating the idea of terms with the enemy. My judgment not 
conflicting with those expressed, it seemed to me to be my duty to 
convey them to Gen. Lee. At first, Gen. Longstreet dissented, but 
on second thought preferred that he himself should be represented 
with the rest. Gen. Lee was lying alone, resting, at the base of a 
large pine tree. I approached and sat by him. To a statement of 
the case he quietly listened, and then, courteously expressing thanks 
for the consideration of his subordinates in desiring to relieve him 
in part of existing burdens, spoke in about these words: I trust 
it has not come to that. We certainly have too many brave men to 
think of laying down our arms. They still fight with great spirit, 
whereas the enemy do not. And, besides, if I were to intimate to 
Gen. Grant that I would listen to terms, he would at once regard 
it as such an evidence of weakness that he would demand uncon 
ditional surrender, and sooner than that I am resolved to die. 
Indeed, we must all determine to die at our posts. My reply could 
only be that every man would no doubt cheerfully meet death with 
him in the discharge of duty, and that we were perfectly willing 
that he should decide the question." 

This account differs widely from Alexander s. It 
may be that as time wore on, Gen. Pendleton saw mat 
ters in a softer light, and felt that what had at first ap 
peared as a rebuke to him, was in fact the result of 
overwrought nerves. 

After Pendleton s conversation on the march with 
Gen. Alexander, he pushed on to communicate in per 
son with Gen. Walker, whose column he found about 
two miles beyond the Courthouse on the road to Ap- 
pomattox Station. While he was conversing with 
Walker, whose batteries were parked and who himself 
was engaged in the duty of shaving, a large force of 
Federal cavalry burst upon the camp and began firing 
upon the defenseless men and their horses. The situa 
tion was desperate, but with great coolness, and the ut 
most presence of mind, Gen. Walker remained master 
of the situation. Almost instantly Walker s and Dicken- 
son s batteries, which had been relieved of their guns 
and armed as a guard with muskets, formed line in a 


fringe of pines, and held the enemy at bay until a num 
ber of guns could be thrown into action, while the train 
was withdrawn. Thus did Walker s Artillery, entirely 
unsupported, maintain itself against the enemy. There 
was no panic whatever among these brave gunners. The 
following interesting account of this affair is taken 
from the diary of the Washington Artillery, written by 
Maj. W. M. Owen. 

"After we went into bivouac this evening, the artillery firing 
we had heard in front late in the afternoon seemed to be approach 
ing nearer. It was not a great while before long trains of wagons 
came tearing down the road from the front, the drivers whipping 
up their mules and shouting lustily. I mounted my horse and 
rode forward to see what was the matter. I had not gone far 
before I came up to a force of infantry that were being aligned 
across the road and preparing for defense.* Here I met some 
officers and men of the Washington Artillery, from whom I learned 
that Gen. Walker s column of artillery (about sixty pieces) had 
been marching in front of the Army all day, and at about 4 p. M. 
had halted in a grove just before reaching Appomattox station, on 
the Lynchburg railroad. Everything had been so quiet that they 
concluded to have a good rest, the officers and men taking ad 
vantage of the time to wash up and refresh themselves. It was 
not thought necessary to put out pickets, as the enemy was sup 
posed to be pushing only our rear. While enjoying this supposed 
security, all of a sudden a bugle call rang out upon the air, and a 
squadron of Federal cavalry was seen preparing to charge. Men 
rushed to their guns in a hurry, horses were hitched up, and as 
the enemy advanced they were met by a raking fire of canister, 
which repulsed them. But again and again the enemy, reinforced, 
charged. They were Sheridan s cavalry, f The guns that could 
be gotten off fired retiring, and fell back to Appomattox Court 
house, where in the streets of the town they met infantry coming 
to their support, who in turn drove the enemy s cavalry back with 
loss. But the Washington Artillery, fighting to the last and 
evading capture with difficulty, destroyed their gun carriages, buried 
their guns in the woods, and nearly all the officers and men went 
to the mountains. They fired their last shot to-day, after three 
years and nine months of service in the field, since Bull Run, 
July, 1861." 

This account explains the fact that some of the Ar 
tillery known to have been with Walker s column sur 
rendered the following day with Pendleton s command. 

""These were Walker s dismounted cannoneers. Author s note. 
fCuster s command. Author s note. 


While with Walker, and after the repulse of the 
enemy s cavalry, Pendleton received a summons from 
Gen. Lee, and setting out to rejoin the main column 
narrowly eluded a hostile force of cavalry, which was 
sweeping through the village, by leaping his horse over a 
fence and skirting the fields. When he reported to the 
Commander-in-Chief about 1 A. M. of the 9th, he found 
him "dressed in his neatest style, new uniform, snowy 
linen, etc." To Gen. Pendleton s expression of sur 
prise, Gen. Lee explained, "I have probably to be Gen. 
Grant s prisoner, and thought I must make my best ap 

Here the question suggests itself, was Lee really pre 
paring to meet his victorious adversary, or was he, 
prompted by that spirit, the flash of which Pendleton 
has described, resolved to die at the head of his army in 
the event Grant failed to grant him honorable terms? 
He had placed himself on several occasions at the head 
of his troops, with the evident determination to die at 
their head if need be. It would almost seem that he was 
now clothing himself for the final sacrament in the cause 
which he held to be holy. 

Grant was now hurrying forward his troops and mass 
ing a large force in Lee s front, having despatched a 
column by the short route pointed out to Lee by Gen. 
Alexander. Almost before Pendleton rejoined Lee, he 
heard the firing of artillery beyond the Courthouse, 
which could only mean the capture of Walker s Ar 
tillery column. Against cavalry alone, the sturdy gun 
ners could contend, but not against the infantry, which 
was soon brought up by the defeated troopers. 

Late in the afternoon of the 8th, Lee had received 
Grant s reply to his note of the evening before, and 
again he addressed the Federal commander, proposing 
a meeting between them at 10 A. M. the next day, this 
communication being delivered to Grant about mid 
night. But as the terms of Lee s note rather suggested 
a discussion of political character, Grant in a third note 
declined the interview. 


At daylight, it was discovered that the enemy was in 
great force astride the Confederate line of retreat, and 
that Walker s command had been captured. A col 
lision was unavoidable. Indeed Gordon, now in com 
mand of the 2d Corps, and leading the column, had been 
directed to clear the road at dawn. 

At three o clock on the morning of the 9th of April, 
the Confederates moved silently forward. Reaching the 
heights a little beyond the Courthouse Gordon found 
the enemy disposed to dispute his way, and at once de 
ployed the 2,000 men of his corps, while Gen. Long 
brought forward the thirty pieces of artillery which 
were all that were left of Carter s, Poague s, Johnson s, 
and Stark s battalions. A well directed fire from the 
Artillery and an attack by Fitz Lee quickly dislodged 
the force immediately in Gordon s front, but beyond he 
could already discover the dark masses of the enemy s 
infantry, and knew further effort unaided was useless. 
In this affair Fitz Lee actually took a number of 
prisoners, and two 12-pounder Napoleons, but it was 
apparent to all that the sacrifice of life incident to fur 
ther fighting would be as useless as it would be culpable. 

Though Gordon, Long, and Fitz Lee fought with 
great spirit, still at noon the main column had not ad 
vanced beyond the Courthouse. When Lee early in 
the morning inquired of Gordon how he was progress 
ing, the answer was that nothing could be accomplished 
without heavy reinforcements from Longstreet. Where 
upon Lee took immediate steps to bring the fighting to 
an end and reopened negotiations with Grant. This 
was the only thing left, for Field s and Mahone s divi 
sions and Alexander s Artillery were holding Meade 
back in the rear and could not be spared for an attack in 
the front. 

Meanwhile, the march of the Army had been brought 
to a halt by Gordon s inability to advance, and the rear 
was closing up. Longstreet directed Alexander to form a 
line of battle, on which Mahone s and Field s divisions 
were to be rallied for a last stand, Alexander at once 


placed all his artillery and all the organized infantry 
in position behind the North Fork of the Appomattox. 
While the enemy were extending their lines to the left 
the battery commanders begged to be allowed to open 
upon them, but this Alexander would not permit. 

A flag of truce was now sent Grant, requesting a 
suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for sur 
render, and an order to Gordon s troops to suspend their 
fire. This order, when received by Gen. Long, was 
sent by him through Majs. Southall, Parker, and other 
members of his staff to the different batteries, while he, 
himself, proceeded to the Courthouse. On reaching 
that point he discovered that the order had not carried 
to Clutter s Battery under Lieut. Mclntosh, a brother 
of the battalion commander. This battery occupied a 
hill immediately above the village, and continued to fire 
rapidly upon an advancing line of the enemy s infantry. 
Gen. Long at once rode in person to the battery, and 
ordered the captain to cease firing and to withdraw his 
battery to a small valley east of the village, where the 
Artillery was being parked. 

According to Gen. Long, the shots which Lieut. 
Wright s section of Clutter s Battery fired were the 
last fired in battle by the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Some time before the order to cease firing was given, 
as Alexander came upon Lee and his staff by the road 
side at the top of the hill, the General called him aside 
and again laid the map before him saying that the Army 
had come to the junction and inquired, "What have 
we got to do to-day?" 

After talking with Gen. Pendleton, Alexander had 
formulated a plan in his own mind and now proceeded 
to present it. His own words are here quoted : 

"My command having been north of the James had had no share 
in the fighting about Petersburg, and but little in the retreat. They 
had now begun to hear of a surrender, and would hint their senti 
ments in loud voices when I rode by. 

We don t want to surrender any ammunition. We ve been 
saving ammunition all this war. Hope we are not saving it for a 


"I told the general of this, and said that if he saw fit to try to 
cut our way out, my command would do as well as they had ever 

"He answered: 

I have left only two divisions, Field s and Mahone s, suffi 
ciently organized to be relied upon. All the rest have been broken 
and routed and can do little good. Those divisions are now scarcely 
4,000 apiece, and that is far too little to meet the force now in 
front of us. 

"This was just the opportunity I wished, and I hastened to lay 
my plans before him. I said: 

Then we have only choice of two courses. Either to surrender, 
or take to the woods and bush, with orders either to rally on 
Johnston, or perhaps, better, on the Governors of the respective 
States. If we surrender this army, it is the end of the Confederacy. 
I think our best course would be to order each man to go to the 
Governor of his own State with his arms. 

What would you hope to accomplish by that? said he. 

In the first place, said I, to stand the chances. If we 
surrender this army every other army will have to follow suit. All 
will go like a row of bricks, and if the rumors of help from France 
have any foundation the news of our surrender will put an end 
to them. 

But the only thing which may be possible in our present 
situation is to get some kind of terms. None of our armies are 
likely to be able to get them, and that is why we should try with 
the different States. Already it has been said that Vance can make 
terms with North Carolina, and Jo Brown with Georgia. Let the 
Governor of each State make some sort of a show of force and then 
surrender on terms, which may save us from trial for treason and 

"As I talked it all looked to me so reasonable that I hoped he 
was convinced, for he listened in silence. So I went on more 
confidently : 

But, General, apart from all that if all fails and there is 
no hope the men who have fought under you for four years have 
got the right this morning to ask one favor of you. We know that 
you do not care for military glory. But we are proud of the 
record of this army. We want to leave it untarnished to our 
children. It is a clear record so far, and now is about to be closed. 
A little blood more or less now makes no difference, and we have 
the right to ask of you to spare us the mortification of having 
you ask Grant for terms, and have him answer that he has no 
terms to offer. That it is "U. S. Unconditional Surrender." That 
was his reply to Buckner at Fort Donelson, and to Pemberton at 


Vicksburg, and that is what threatens us. General, spare us the 
mortification of asking terms and getting that reply. 

"He heard it all so quietly and it was all so true, it seemed to 
me, and so undeniable, that I felt sure that I had him convinced. 
His first words were: 

If I should take your advice, how many men do you suppose 
would get away? 

Two-thirds of us, I answered. We would be like rabbits 
and partridges in the bushes, and they could not scatter to 
follow us. 

"He said: I have only 15,000 muskets left. Two-thirds of them 
divided among the States, even if all could be collected, would be 
too small a force to accomplish anything. All could not be collected. 
Their homes have been overrun, and many would go to look after 
their families. 

Then, General, you and I as Christian men have no right to 
consider only how this would affect us. We must consider the 
effect on the country as a whole. Already it is demoralized by 
four years of war. If I took your advice, the men would be without 
rations and under no control of officers. They would be compelled 
to rob and steal in order to live. They would become mere bands 
of marauders, and the enemy s cavalry would pursue them and over 
run many wide sections they may never have occasion to visit. 
We would bring on a state of affairs it would take the country 
years to recover from. 

" And as for myself, you young fellows might go to bush 
whacking, but the only dignified course for me would be to go to 
Gen. Grant and surrender myself and take the consequences of 
my acts. 

"He paused for only a moment and then went on. 

But I can tell you one thing for your comfort. Grant will 
not demand an unconditional surrender. He will give us as good 
terms as this army has a right to demand, and I am going to meet 
him in the rear at 10 A. M. and surrender the army on condition of 
not fighting again until exchanged. 

"I had not a single word to say in reply. He had answered 
my suggestion from a plane so far above it that I was ashamed of 
having made it. With several friends I had planned to make an 
escape on seeing a flag of truce, but that idea was at once abandoned 
by all of them on hearing my report." 

Thus did the plan upon which the bold young Alex 
ander had cogitated during the preceding days come to 
naught, dissipated like thin smoke in the air of Lee s 
nobility of soul. In maturer years, Gen. Alexander came 
to see the folly of his proposals, and magnanimously ac- 


knowledged the error of his hot youth, accepting the 
inevitable in the same spirit it was received by Lee. 
Let us not censure him if in the enthusiasm of his youth 
he failed to perceive that in defeat there was a greater 
courage than prolonged resistance with the useless sacri 
fice of brave lives. Such an end to a struggle for liberty 
may have been suited to Cronge and de Wett, but it 
was beneath a Lee, from whose view that higher duty to 
God was not obscured by any false sense of obligation 
to his army and his people. 

About 8 :30 A. M., Gen. Lee, in his full new uniform, 
begirt with sword and sash, rode to the rear to meet 
Grant, and soon received the communication from the 
latter before mentioned. He at once wrote the Federal 
chieftain, again requesting an interview, but in terms 
which suggested fuller compliance with the original pro 
posal. While this last message was being prepared, a 
messenger riding like the wind dashed around a curve 
and, seeing Lee, brought his superb charger to a halt. 
It was the gallant, one-armed John Haskell of artillery 
fame at Petersburg, nay, more, of world fame. All 
recognized the rider, who with his good arm only suc 
ceeded in drawing up his lathered steed one hundred 
yards or more beyond the group. Gen. Lee went to meet 
him, exclaiming: "What is it? What is it?" and then 
seeing the sad plight of Col. HaskelFs magnificent ani 
mal so well known to the Army, without waiting for a 
reply, sorrowfully said: "Oh, why did you do it? You 
have killed your beautiful horse!"* 

Col. Haskell explained that Fitz Lee had sent in a 
report that he had found a road by which the Army 
could escape, and that Longstreet had ordered him to 
overtake Lee, before he could send a note to Grant, and 
to kill his horse if necessary to do it. 

Lee, however, did not credit the report, which later 
proved to be a mistake. 

*This animal was noted for its beauty and speed. It had been led all the 
way from Richmond on the retreat, with a view to making an escape in case of 
surrender. The horse recovered and was sold to a Federal officer for a handsome 
sum in gold. 


What need to describe the sad rites which now en 
sued? Or to tell of the anguish which showed in the 
eyes of those heroic men that had for four horror-laden 
years toiled wearily on to Appomattox, whither the in 
exorable sign posts of Fate had led them to which we 
now know the fickle dame, ofttimes disguising the 
route with cajoling flatteries, had guided them from the 
first? Was it another trick of Fate that the very roof 
which shielded the proud Lee from the gaze of the 
curious, as he conferred with Grant, was the haven in 
which its owner had sought refuge from the stricken 
field of First Manassas? Well may it be said that no 
home in all that bleeding Southland was free from the 
merciless intrusions of war?* 

After the formal surrender of his army, Gen. Lee 
appointed Gens. Longstreet, Gordon, and Pendleton 
to conduct the transfer of property, and to supervise the 
paroling of the officers and men. In accordance with 
the stipulations of the agreement the guns and troops 
were withdrawn from the lines, and the work was 
promptly undertaken. 

The return of the Chief of Ordnance for the morning 
of April 9 showed 7,892 organized infantry, with 75 
rounds of ammunition each, and 63 field guns with an 
average of 93 rounds. But 61 guns and 13 caissons, 
however, remained, for two pieces had been destroyed 
during the morning. 

The infantry were first massed near the Courthouse, 
and after stacking arms were directed to retire, while 
the Federal officers took charge. Alexander was di 
rected to form all the guns and caissons in a single 
column along the road, that the Federal ordnance of 
ficers might conduct them into their lines. The animals 
had been practically without forage of any kind for sev 
eral days. Alexander writes : "With a heart full of sym 
pathy for the poor brutes, I formed the column on 
Tuesday, April 11, and left them standing in the road, 

*The house in which the articles of surrender were signed was the residence 
of Maj. McLean, to which he had removed after his home at Manassas was 
destroyed in the battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861. 


which they filled for about a mile. The next morning 
I bade good-bye to Appomattox, and as I rode off from 
the scene I saw the mournful column of artillery still 
standing in the road unattended, but with many of its 
poor horses now down in the mud and unable to rise." 

Let us avert our eyes from the sad picture and be 
thankful that a large number of the artillery horses, 
including all the mounts, had been claimed by the of 
ficers and men. 

Many batteries had escaped the surrender, both from 
Walker s column on the 8th, and from the Army at Ap 
pomattox the following day. Some made their way to 
Lynchburg, where the guns were destroyed, and others 
buried their guns by the roadside and disbanded. Of 
all that great corps of near three hundred pieces, little 
more than half a hundred were surrendered. Many of 
the artillerymen joined Johnston, among them a large 
detachment of horse artillery under Col. Chew, who 
escaped with Rosser s Cavalry Division and reported at 
Greensboro, N. C., April 30. They were not allowed 
to engage in hostilities against Sherman, for the view 
was taken that they were an integral part of Lee s 
Army, and therefore embraced in the surrender. Later 
they were paroled with Johnston s troops. 

The total number of officers and men of the Army of 
Northern Virginia paroled by Grant during the 10th 
and llth of April was 28,231, for large numbers of 
stragglers soon joined the organized force which stacked 
arms on the 9th. 

It is difficult to determine with certainty the exact 
composition of the Artillery present at the Surrender. 
The parole lists indicate that the remaining organiza 
tions were as follows :* 

f Giles Battery 
Stark s Battalion. _ __J Louisiana Guard Battery 

^Richmond Hampden Battery 

*See Vol. XV, Southern Historical Papers. In this valuable volume the 
names of the artillery officers who surrendered, as well as of the enlisted men, 
are given. 



Cutshaw s Battalion. 

Lightfoot s Battalion. 

Hardaway s Battalion. 

Johnson s Battalion. 

Haskell s Battalion. 

Huger s Battalion. 

Macintosh s Battalion. 

Richardson s Battalion. 
Poague s Battalion 

Braxton s Battalion. 

2d Richmond Howitzers 
Staunton Battery 
King William Battery 
Richmond Orange Battery 
Reese s Alabama Battery 
^Louisa Morris Battery 
( Caroline Battery 
{ Surry Battery 
3d Richmond Howitzers 
1st Richmond Howitzers 
Norfolk Blues Battery 
Salem Battery 
1st Rockbridge Battery 
^Powhatan Battery 
f Fredericksburg Battery 

I Clutter s Battery 

I 1st Maryland Battery 
I^Southside Battery 
f Lamkin s Nelson Battery 
1 Palmetto (S. C.) Battery 
] Rowan (N. C.) Battery 
t Branch s (N. C.) Battery 
f Bedford Battery 

Madison (La.) Battery 
-- s Ashland Battery 

Parker s Richmond Battery 
I Bath Battery 
4th Maryland Battery 
Danville Battery (Price s) 
Lynchburg Battery (Chamberlayne s) 
2d Rockbridge Battery 
Ringgold Danville Battery 
Graham s Petersburg Battery 
Jeff Davis (Ala.) Battery 

Donaldsonville (La.) Battery 

"Manly s N. C. Battery 
Pittsylvania Battery 
Warrenton Battery 
Williams N. C. Battery 
Albemarle Everett Battery 
.N. C. Battery (?) 
Lynchburg Lee Battery 

With the Army were fragments of other batteries, in 
cluding men from the four companies of the Washing 
ton Artillery Battalion who attached themselves, after 



escaping from Walker s column, to Alexander s and 
Long s commands. Some of the batteries enumerated 
as present with the Army at the Surrender numbered 
but a mere handful of men. The strength of the various 
battalions may be determined from the following 
enumeration : 


General Headquarters, Brig.-Gen. Pen- 
dleton and Staff 





First Army Corps, Brig.-Gen. E. P. 
Alexander and Staff 




Haskell s Battalion, Lieut.-Col. J. C. 




Huger s Battalion, Maj. Tyler C. Jordan.... 
Macintosh s Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Wm. M. 







Poague s Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Wm. T. 




13th Virginia Battalion, Capt. D. N. 




Richardson s Battalion, Capt. R. Prosper 




Total First Army Corps 




Second Army Corps, Brig.-Gen. A. L. 
Long and Staff 




Carter s Command, Col. Thomas H. Car 




Braxton s Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Carter M. 




Cutshaw s Battalion, Capt. C. W. Fry 
Hardaway s Battalion, Lieut.-Col. R. A. 






Johnson s Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Marma- 
duke Johnson 




Lightfoot s Battalion, Asst. Surg. J. B. 




Stark s Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Alex. W. 




Total Second Army Corps 




Anderson s Corps, Col. Hilary P. Jones.... 
Blount s Battalion 




Coit s Battalion 



Strihling s Battalion 




Total Anderson s Corps . 




Smith s Battalion, Capt. W. F. Dement.... 




Total Artillery .... 





The foregoing rolls partially disclose the organization 
of the Artillery as effected by Pendleton at Amelia 
Courthouse, when the reduction in the force with the 
Army became necessary, and at which time parts of 
Coit s, Eshleman s, Cabell s, King s, Nelson s, Pegram s, 
and Sturdivant s battalions were placed under Gen. 
Walker to be taken to Lynchburg. According to Custer, 
there were over thirty pieces of artillery with Walker, 
besides a large train, and twenty-four of these guns and 
many prisoners were captured, but Sheridan places the 
number of guns captured by Custer from Walker at 
twenty-five. Custer claims that during the ten days 
preceding the Surrender his command captured forty- 
six guns.* 

The exact composition of the various artillery com 
mands after leaving Amelia is difficult to determine, but 
the following order, the last issued by Gen. Walker, 
and for which the author is indebted to Gen. Walker s 
Assistant Ad jut ant- General, Capt. William W. Cham- 
berlayne, throws some light on the subject. 


"April 7, 1865. 

"This command will move at 1 o clock A. M., in the following 
order : 

"Lightfoot s Battalion, 

"Coit s Division, 

"Eshleman s Division, 

"Cabell s Division, 

"Walker s Battalion. 

"Leyden s Battalion, 

"Col. Cabell will furnish a section of Napoleons to march with 
the Rear Guard. 

"The wagons in rear of their respective Battalions. 

"By command of Gen. Walker. 


"A. A. -General." 
[Receipted on the back.] 

*It will be recalled that some of Walker s batteries had buried their guns, 
others joined the main column, and others dispersed before Custer s final attack. 


[! on > \ Rear Guard. 
Lion, 3 


Hd. Qrs. Cabell s Batt., 
Received by WALTER B. CARR, 
April 7, 65. Sergeant Major. 

Hd. Qrs. Reserve Arty 3d Corps, 
April 7, 65. B. F. ESHLEMAN, 

Lt.-Col. Commanding. 

Received by JAS. C. COIT, 

Maj. Commanding Batt. 

[Other receipts torn off.] 

If we allow Walker a force of 500 men, and the 
various batteries which escaped to Lynchburg and the 
ten batteries of horse artillery 800, it will be seen that 
the Artillery personnel numbered not less than 3,800 
officers and men April 8, 1865. Thus, whatever may be 
said of the state of disorganization of the Infantry and 
Cavalry, there being not more than 2,000 of the latter 
towards the end of the retreat, it is apparent that the Ar 
tillery maintained its organization in a comparatively 
high state of efficiency to the end, with its personnel 
only slightly reduced since its departure from Peters 
burg.* No higher tribute can be paid its commanders 
than this fact, for the Artillery in the nature of things 
should have been the first to show signs of dissolution. 

Grant s terms were honorable. The arms, artillery, 
such of it as was left, and all public property were to be 
turned over to the victors, all officers retaining their side- 
arms, private horses and baggage. In addition to this 
and in the interest of the desolate Southern people, 
every soldier in the Confederate Army who claimed to 
own a horse or mule was to be permitted to retain it for 
farming purposes. And so many of the artillery 
teams, for the preservation and care of which Pendleton 
had labored so incessantly, were now to exchange the 
gun and the caisson for the plow and the harrow, the 
implements in that struggle for existence, which for 

*Shoemaker s Horse Battery contained 00 men when it surrendered. There 
is no reason to suppose the other horse batteries were not as strong, so the fore 
going estimate is extremely conservative. Three full batteries of Blount s 
Battalion with certainly 50 men each escaped to Lynchburg. 


the next decade proved to be far more cruel and dis 
tressing than the mere war for liberty, through which 
the South had passed. Who can tell what were the 
emotions of those gallant gunners when first they struck 
the plowshare of peace into the poverty-stricken soil 
of their native fields? Did not the war-stained harness, 
which still hung from the backs of those weary, worn 
animals, recall to mind the charger and the martial 
trappings of a hundred battlefields ? Did not the dumb 
patience of those faithful brutes, bearing like their 
masters the wounds and scars of battle, hold for Lee s 
men a lesson of fortitude and admonish them 
that together the old war horse and the veteran must 
labor on for the salvation of the land? Ah! it is sweet to 
believe that these brave gunners, often as at dawn they 
led their old artillery teams from the leaky shelters that 
stabled them, recalled the reveille of other days, and per 
haps with a manly tear in their eyes gently stroked the 
muzzles of those faithful steeds. Or perhaps, as they 
rested together, man and beast, in the heat of noon-tide, 
neath the generous shade of some ancient oak, the sigh 
ing of the nearby pines recalled to their minds the rush 
of the guns, the hastening feet, the roar of battle, of an 
other day, and admonished them to be brave so that 
when the final Appomattox came upon them they 
might be released from the plow of life with the same 
consciousness of duty, well performed, that filled their 
souls on that April day in 1 865 that day when nature 
with her sweet scented fields and budding trees sought 
to sweeten the bitterness of defeat, and soothe with her 
beauties the fevered brow of a vanquished army. 

It has been said that the shots fired by Lieut. Wright 
were the last, but let us accept Page s beautiful story as 
one of fact. Two weeks before the Surrender an old ar 
tillery officer had been sent with a small column and 
a battery to guard an important pass in the Blue 
Ridge, through which a Federal column from South 
west Virginia was expected to attempt to move upon 
Lee s rear. 


The "Old Colonel" had seized and held the crossing. 
The position for his guns had been carefully selected. 
It was at the highest point of the pass just where the 
road crawled over the shoulders of the mountain along 
the limestone cliff, a hundred feet sheer above the deep 
river, where its waters had cut their way in ages past, 
and now lay deep and silent as if resting after their 
arduous toil before they began to boil over the great 
bowlders which filled the bed of the stream. The posi 
tion was impregnable, and the "Old Colonel" had been 
ordered to hold it until relieved. 

Late on the 10th, the enemy assailed the battery, 
but all in vain. Numbers counted for little in that wild 
eyrie, where a single gun could hold out against a host. 
On the llth, the Federals attempted under a flag of 
truce to convince the "Old Colonel" that Lee had sur 
rendered, but still he remained at his post, awaiting 
some order to withdraw. No order came, but soon un 
doubted news arrived of the sad event. At last, as the 
sun set in all its glory, throwing the great western peaks 
in dark relief against the golden sky, and the shades of 
night spread through the silent vales, the pickets were 
called in and the old battery formed as if for parade. 
Once more the men were to be allowed to make the 
mountains echo with the crash of their guns. 

The embers of the sinking camp-fires threw a faint 
light on the guns, standing so grim and silent in the em 
brasures of the little work; nearby stood the caissons 
with the harness hanging limply from the poles. Not a 
word was spoken, except that of command. "At the 
order each detachment went to its piece; the guns were 
run back, and the men with their own hands ran them 
upon the edge of the perpendicular bluff above the 
river, where, sheer below, the waters washed its base. The 
pieces stood ranged in the order in which they had so 
often stood in battle, and the gray, thin fog rising 
slowly and silently from the river deep down between 
the cliffs, and wreathing the mountain side above, 
might have been the smoke from some unearthly battle 


fought by ghostly guns, posted there in the darkness and 
manned by phantom cannoneers. At the word the gun 
ners drew their lanyards taut as if a single piece 
the six guns belched forth a sheet of flame, roared a last 
challenge on the misty night, and sent their thunder 
reverberating through the darkening mountain tops, 
while startling alike the blue-coated warriors in their 
camp below, the browsing deer and the prowling fox." 

A deadly silence now fell upon the scene, broken only 
by the sighing of the tree-tops above and the rushing 
torrent. Then came another command "Let them go, 
and God be our helper. Amen !" 

For a few moments there was utter silence ; then one 
prolonged, deep, resounding splash, as the war-worn 
guns plunged into the pool, spreading over its once- 
placid surface a spray, as if some titan hand had lain a 
floral tribute upon the abysmal tomb of Lee s Artillery. 
Such was the final sacrament of those men, whose record 
is enshrined in the names of Pendleton, Long, Alex 
ander, Walker, Walton, Crutchfield, Brown, Pelham, 
Pegram, Chew, Breathed, Latimer, Thomson, Landry, 
Cutshaw, Mclntosh, Poague, Carter, Braxton, Haskell, 
Huger, Hardaway, Cabell, Gibbes, Watson, McGregor, 
McGraw, McCarthy, Nelson, Chamberlayne, Caskie, 
and a host of their peers too numerous to mention, the 
like of whom the world has never known before or since 
their time. Such was the hallowed rite that marked the 
"Burial of Lee s Guns" and the end of that strife in 
which Sumter was the primer that discharged the ex 
plosive compounded of political antagonism. An ap 
parent motive only had been needed, both north and 
south, for the pulling of the lanyard to expand an 
energy stored up through years of cherished animosity. 
But now, the end had come and once more the placid 
waters settled over a cause, buried but not forgotten. 

If in its record there is a single incident to inspire 
other generations to emulate the devotion to duty, the 
valor, the Christian fortitude, of the men who fought 
its guns, then the "Long Arm of Lee" did not exist, 
struggle, and perish in vain. 


Battery and battalion organizations are not included in the General 
Index, but in the "Battery Index" and the Battalion Index," which follow. 
The records of the batteries and battalions are the records of their com 
manders, who are referred to in the General Index in their individual 
capacity only. Thus, if it be desired to trace the record of Captain, later 
Colonel, Thomas H. Carter, the references to Carter s Battery and Carter s 
Battalion should be consulted, as well as the item, "Carter, Col. T. H.," in 
the General Index. Statistics, such as numbers engaged, organization, 
personnel, material, captures, losses, ammunition expenditure, tactical 
features and dispositions, topography, Confederate and Federal, are not 
generally indexed, but will readily be found in the appropriate chrono 
logical chapter of the text. 

Administrative Regulations for 

Artillery 199 

Alburtis, Capt 335 

Aldie, action at 218 

Alexander, E. P., appointed Col. 

and Chief of Ordnance .... 72 

his former record 73 


115, 130, 136, 140, 141, 155 

criticisms of 193, 194, 195 

quoted 218, 226, 227, 239 

his attack on Pendleton, 

227,231, 232 

referred to. .288, 292, 293, 319, 
337, 343, 351, 363, 372, 376, 
378, 387, 400, 413, 416, 424, 
440, 445, 490, 494, 505, 507, 
508, 509, 511, 534, 536, 537, 
539, 545, 549, 551, 553, 554, 
564, 565, 570, 572, 635, 642, 
645, 646, 647, 658, 664, 667, 
670, 671, 672, 674, 676, 680, 
681, 682, 684, 686, 688, 689, 
695, 696, 697, 704, 720, 731, 
736, 754, 776, 781, 787, 789, 
793, 823, 840, 842, 845, 850, 
868, 895, 897, 900, 919, 923, 
924, 933, 934, 936, 939, 940, 

944, 945, 947, 949 
Allan, Col. William, quoted. . . . 195 

mentioned 564 

Alphabetical designation for 

battalions 415 

Altercation over use of land 

torpedoes 178 

Ambuscade of artillery column, 

891, 892 

American tactics 160, 161 

"American Artillerist s Com 
panion" 149 

Ammunition, fixed, introduction 

of 32 

purchased in Europe, 1861 . . 37 
seized with Baton Rouge 

arsenal 38 

laboratories 40 

manufacture of 42 

capacity of laboratories ... 45, 46 

purchased up to 1863 55 

amount made 56 

furnished by West Point 

Foundry 64 

lack of in 1861 76, 139, 140 

expenditure of at Coggin s 

Point 234 

supply of 243 

expenditures compared . . 269, 274 

expenditure 326 

improved in 1862 340 

report on 424 

poor quality at Chancellors- 

ville 509 

influence of 548 

Board for study of 564 

expenditures 597 

Federal reserve at Gettys 
burg 637, 638 

Anderson, Jos. R. & Co., pro 
prietors of R i c h m o n d 
Tredegar Works, the Con 
federate "Krupps" 51 

mentioned 341 

Anderson, Lieut. R. M 657 

Anderson, Capt. Robt., his 

manual 154 

Andrews, Lt.-Col. R. Snowden, 
244, 414, 416, 515, 516, 551, 

605, 704, 720 
Anecdote, concerning cavalry 

trooper 196 





Antietam, Battle of 294 

Antimony, sulplmret of 47 

Appropriations for ordnance 

work 36, 37 

Archer, Dr. Junius L., manu 
facturer of guns 68 

Archer Projectiles, defects of.. 128 
Armament of batteries on the 

Peninsula 201 

of army in 1862, tabulated.. 284 

Armored car 216 

Armistead, Capt. George 90 

Arms, captured, regulations 

concerning 39, 59 

purchased abroad 55 

destroyed at Harper s Ferry 68 
Armstrong, Sir William, devel- 

opes breech-loader 29 

Armstrong Guns 243 

Arsensals, seizure of Federal 

by Confederates 24, 41 

U. S., created 26 

erected by C. S. A 35, 36 

material seized with Federal 38 

location of Confederate 40 

Articles of War, C. S. A 109 

Artificers, pay of 108 

Artillery, American, reputation 

of in 1861 31 

amount of Confederate origi 
nally proposed 42 

officers detailed for ordnance 

work 39, 52, 53 

of Virginia, armament of.. 62, 67 

early American 85 

early instruction 85, 91 

in Mexican War 93 

merged with Engineer Corps 89 

status of in 1808 88 

in 1815 90 

in 1837 91 

in I860 94 

officers in from West Point. . 95 
Corps of, C. S. A... 108, 109, 117 
law creating officers. 108, 109, 117 

pay of officers in 108 

Provisional, C. S. A., created 107 

of Virginia 112, 115 

strength of in 1861 140 

French Schools 152 

mass tactics 152, 153 

proportion of to infantry 151, 153 

Federal organization 156 

administration of Confederate 199 

nature of the arm 209 

efficiency of 277, 278 

reorganization of C. S. A. . . 279 

organization at Sharpsburg, 

282, 283 

reorganization of 1862 332 

reduction of in 1862 337 

strength of in Oct., 1862.339, 346 

assignment of in 1862 345 

strength of in Dec., 1862 411 

organization of in April, 1863 . 419 
organization of in May, 1863, 442 
error of at Chancellorsville. . 490 
mobility of at Chancellors 
ville 491 

fire effect of at Chancellors 
ville 511 

status of Federal in 1863, 

546, 550 

Confederate and Federal com 
pared 547, 548, 573 

number and grades of officers 

in 1863 565 

reorganization of 1863 565 

organization of in 1863 .... 567 
strength of in July, 1863... 575 
of Western Army, inspected 

by Pendleton 583 

charged by cavalry, 

585, 587, 591, 596 
movement of to Gettysburg . . 599 

623, 631, 639, 643, 658 

resisting power of 649 

faulty disposition of at 

Gettysburg 666 

efforts to secure promotion 

for officers in 719, 723, 724 

divisions created 722, 725 

of Western Army reorganized 731 
character of C. S. A. com 
manders 742 

proposed organization of in 

1864 830 

superior personnel of in 1864. 893 
proposed increase of C. S. A. 

Corps in 1864 902 

Pendleton s tribute to his ... 906 
headquarters of at Peters 
burg 907 

staff of in 1864 902, 907 

losses of at Petersburg 909 

heavy batteries about Rich 
mond 920 

promotions in, in 1865 925 

Ashby, Gen. Turner 162, 163 

Atkinson, Lt.-Col 920 

Atlanta Arsenal 57 

Augusta Arsenal 40 

Ausrusta Powder Mills 40 




erected 43 

site and capacity of 45 

Superintendent of 57 

Austerlitz, Battle of 153 

Austrian, guns purchased. . . .37, 55 

artillery 155 

tactics in 1859 172 

ammunition expenditure .... 274 
Auxonne, Artillery School. . 152, 159 

Badajos 864 

Baggage allowance 428, 708, 709 

Balaclava, charge of Light 
Brigade at, compared to 

Brandy Station 587 

Balck, quoted 106 

Baldwin, Col. J. B 116 

Baldwin, Col. Briscoe G., Chief 

of Ordnance 341, 351, 570 

Balloons, Federal observation, 

234, 366, 376 

Barefooted gunners 355, 356 

Barksdale, Lieut 526 

Barnwell, Maj. J. C...198, 319, 

380, 387, 388, 417, 423, 907 

Barry, Lieut 216 

Barry, Col. Wm. F., Chief of 

Artillery 133, 157 

Baton Rouge Arsenal 37, 40 

powder seized with 38 

Battalions, organization of pro 
posed 141 

created 155 

use of 344 

organization of 413, 415 

no longer part of infantry 

commands 556 

proposed composition of in 

1864 830 

Battery, the organization of a, 

109, 110 

material of a 110 

complement of horses Ill 

authority to raise 144 

strength of a Va. militia. . . 144 

mobility of 165 

Lee discourages raising of 

additional 197 

those disbanded in 1862 284 

proposed organization of a, 

in 1864 830 

Battles, Lieut. ..684, 685, 931, 932 

Bautzen, Battle of 153 

Bayard, Gen. Geo. D., killed by 

shell 350 

Bayne, Maj. T. L., command 
ing Blockade Service 56 

Beauregard, Gen., at Petersburg 836 
Beaver Dam, Battle of 207, 211 

Beckham, Col. R. F..128, 162, 

597, 733, 720, 722, 725 
(See Beckham s Battery and 
Beckham s Battalion) 

Beef, issued in 1862 374 

cattle 427 

Bellona Arsenal, created 26 

mentioned 51 

guns seized at 68 

Bercier s Orleans French Bat 
tery of La 93 

Bermuda Agency 56 

Bernadotte, his proud boast 
that he had never lost a 

gun 525 

Bernard, Col. Simon 97 

Besancon, Artillery School.... 152 

Best, Capt 550, 554 

Bethesda Church, Battle of .... 207 

Beverly Ford 259 

Big Bethel, Battle of, rifle guns 

used in 64 

described 118 

Blackburn s Ford 127 

Blacksmiths, pay of 108 

Blakely guns, purchased 55 

mentioned 243 

in Horse Artillery 346 

Blankets 115 

Blockade Running Service 56 

Blount, Maj. J. G 564, 917 

(See Blount s Battery) 
Bliicher, calls for more guns.. 153 

Blumenau, Battle of 274 

Board of War, 1776 25 

Boggs, Maj. Francis J., 838, 917, 920 

(See Boggs Battalion) 
Bombardment of Fredericksburg 362 
Bomford, Col. George, Chief of 

Ordnance 26, 91 

Boonsboro, Battle of 292 

Boots, price of in 1864 908 

Borman fuses, defective 122 

Boston, Col 936 

Bourcet 160 

Bowen & Co., of Pendleton, 

S. C., powder contractors.. 43 

saltpetre contractors 44 

Bowling Green, Artillery Camp 

at 410, 556 

Bragg s Battery (Horse Artil 
lery) 164 

Bran, price of in 1864 909 

Branch, Col. James R 840, 917 

( See Branch s Petersburg 
Battery and Branch s Bat 
Brander, Maj 932 




Brandy Station 434, 584 

Braxton, Lt.-Col. Carter M., 

416, 421, 509, 720, 878, 885 
(See Braxton s Battery and 

Braxton s Battalion) 
Breathed, Maj. James. . 162, 338, 

346, 440, 577, 720, 795, 937 
(See Breathed s Battery and 

Breathed s Battalion) 
Breech-loading gun, develop 
ment of 29 

origin of 31 

varieties of 32 

Brenizer, Capt. A. C., Supt. 

Salisbury Foundry 57 

Bridge, gallant defense of a, at 

Stephenson s Depot 607 

Bridles, number issued 56, 114 

Brigade groups, proposed in 

1864 830 

Brockenbrough, Maj. J. P., 

380, 382, 383, 384, 408, 417, 

421, 423, 720 

( See Brockenbrough s Bat 
tery and Brockenbrough s 
Brooke, Capt. John Mercer, 

invents gun 67 

Brooke gun, invention of 51 

Brown, Capt. J. S 335 

Brown, Lieut. J. Thompson, Jr. 454 
Brown, Col. John Thompson, 
114, 118, 226, 338, 417, 469, 
470, 494, 545, 549, 551, 552, 
556, 562, 568, 624, 625, 636, 
637, 658, 665, 666, 673, 696, 
697, 701, 704, 713, 769, 851, 855 
( See Brown s Battery, Brown s 
Battalion, and Brown s 
Broun, Lieut.-Col. W. LeRoy, 

Supt. Richmond Arsenal. 52, 57 

Buddecke s Battle Orders 229 

Bull Run, Battle of 127, 130 

reason for victory of 99 

Bullet, the perfect expansion, 

origin of 28 

Billow, quoted 106 

Bunker Hill, camp at 327 

Bureau of Artillery and 

Ordnance, proposed 38 

Bureau of Foreign Supplies, 

created 35 

work of 55, 56 

Bureau of Mining and Niter, 

created 35, 44, 49 

officers of . 53 

Bureau of Ordnance, C. S. A., 

organized 34, 38 

officers of 39, 52, 53, 54 

work of 40 

laborers impressed 44 

organization and operations, 

52, 54, 55 

expenditures of 54, 55 

its fleet of blockade runners 56 

credits allowed 56 

gradual restriction of its 

field of operations 59 

"Burial of the Guns" 956 

Burnside, his escape from 

Fredericksburg 402 

his "Mud March" 445 

Burroughs, Lieut. Dent 794 

Burton, Supt. J. H., Macon 

armory 57 

Burton Projectiles, defects of. . 128 

Burwell, Lieut 460, 461 

Cabell, Col. Henry Coalter, 

280, 372, 386, 387, 391, 396, 
415, 517, 523, 556, 720, 722, 

846, 851, 852, 855, 919 
( See Cabell s Richmond 
"Fayette" Battery, and 
Cabell s Battalion) 
Cadets, of V. M. I., as in 
structors 99, 115 

Cadets, Richmond School 731 

Caesar 431 

Caisson, of Cadet Battery, 

Jackson s hearse 560 

Caissons, number made 56 

Callaway, Lieut. Morgan.. 820, 911 
(See Pulaski, Ga., Battery) 

Camp Meetings, Religious 430 

Camps, Artillery, in 1863, 

556, 716, 717 
Cantonments, Artillery, winter 

of 1861-2 ." 145 

Cape Fear River, fishery estab 
lished on 48 

Captured arms, regulations con 
cerning 39, 59 

Carbines, for cannoneers recom 
mended 892 

Carpenter, Capt. John C., 

337, 338, 440, 889, 890 
( See Carpenter s Alleghany 

Carpenter, Capt. Joseph, 

337, 338, 440 

(See Carpenter s Alleghany 




Carter, Capt. J. W., 

347, 588, 589, 594 
(See Carter s "Ashby" Bat 
Carter, Col. Thomas Hill, 

326, 337, 379, 380, 399, 416, 
440, 507, 508, 509, 551, 720, 
733, 769, 799, 813, 856, 857, 
880, 881, 882, 883, 885, 887, 
889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 895, 

897, 920, 921, 926, 928, 944 
(See Carter s King William 
Battery, Carter s Battalion, 
and Carter s Division) 

Carthaginian Army 431 

Gary, Maj ". 920 

Caskie, Maj. William H...440, 815 
( See C a s k i e s Richmond 

"Hampden" Battery ) 
Cavalli, designs breech-loader.. 29 
Cavalry, ordered to help bat 
teries 195 

anecdote concerning 196 

Cavalry charges vs. Artillery, 

585, 587, 591, 596 

Cavalry tactics, proper 404 

Cayce, Capt 834 

( See Richmond "Purcell" 

Battery ) 
Cedar Mountain, Battle of.... 241 

Chalons, school at 152 

Chamberlaine, Capt. W. W., 717, 902 
Chamberlayne, Capt. John 

Hampden. . .493, 506, 867, 874 
( See Chamberlayne s Battery ) 

Chancellorsville, Battle of 442 

May 3 505, 515 

May 4 530 

Chaplains, inadequate number 

of 430 

Charcoal, how procured 42 

Charges, made by horse bat 
teries 166, 168 

of Cavalry vs. Artillery. 

585, 587, 591, 596 

Charleston Arsenal 40, 57 

Charlotte Chemical Works.... 40 
Charlottesville, Horse Artillery 

saves 726 

resolutions of thanks of town 728 
Chateaudun, Prussian battery 

at 525 

Chatham Artillery of Savannah 88 
Chemists, Ordnance, discov 
eries of 43, 45, 47 

Chesterfield Depot, Artillery 

Headquarters, in 1863.... 450 


Chew, Lt.-Col. Robert Preston, 
162, 326, 337, 349, 423, 440, 
720, 727, 773.774, 927, 937, 950 
(See Chew s "Ashby" Battery 
and Chew s Battalion) 

Chew, Capt. Walter E 

(See 4th Md. Battery) 
Chief of Artillery, proper rela 
tions of a, with his com 
mander 560 

Childs, Maj. F. L., Supt. 

Fayetteville Arsenal 57 

Cliildsburg, Artillery Camp at. 410 
Chinese multiple firing guns.. 31 

Christ, in the camp 430 

Cigars and tobacco, price of in 

1864 908 

Clarksville Harness Shops 57 

Clausewltz, quoted 106, 183, 238 

Cleveland, Tenn., manufactured 

copper found at 47 

Clothing, men without reported 

sick 425 

condition of in 1863 425 

anecdote concerning 426 

cost of in 1864-5 908 

Clutter, Capt. Valentine C 378 

( See Clutter s Richmond 


Cocke, Gen. Philip St. George 115 
Cog-gin s Point, bombardment at 234 

Coit, Maj. James C 838 

(See Coit s Battery and 

Coit s Battalion) 
Cold Harbor, 1st Battle of .211, 212 

Cold Harbor, 2d Battle of 812 

Cold Harbor to Petersburg. . . . 834 
Colemaii, Lt. Col. Lewis M..204 392 

Colonial Artillery 85 

Colston, Gen. R. E 105 

Columbus Arsenal 57 

Combat unit, the 344 

the battalion as the 413 

Commanders, artillery, char 
acter of 742 

Commissioner of Artillery, 1776 25 

Company "Q" 727 

Confederacy formed 107 

Confederate Powder Mills 40 

site and capacity of 45 

Contee, Lieut 607, 608 

Contractors for sulphur 42 

Contribution from Washington 
Artillery for people of 

Fredericksburg 410 

Cooke, John Esten, his tribute 

to Pelham 434, 435 

mentioned 828, 907 




Cooke, Lieut. N. B 889 

Copper, how obtained 47 

Corn, ration of 428 

price of in 1864 908 

Cornmeal, component of ration 374 
Corps artillery, use of, 

160, 284, 285, 287, 568 

Corps Reserve 284, 285, 287, 568 

Corps Chief of Artillery, pro 
posed 415 

Corps Groups, proposed in 1864, 830 
Court of Inquiry for Artillery 341 
Courtney, Maj. A. R..244, 281, 654 
(See Courtney s Battery and 
Courtney s Battalion) 

Covington, Private L. T 866, 867 

Cowardice, case of 866 

Crater at Petersburg, 

846, 847, 859, 863 
Creeping, practice in artillery. . 605 

Cross Keys, Battle of 173 

Crozet, Col. Claudius 96 

Crutchfield, Col. Stapleton, 

105, 170, 246, 258, 264, 267, 
272, 276, 278, 281, 290, 291, 
293, 298, 325, 326, 327, 328, 
337, 358, 377, 378, 379, 381, 
384, 385, 391, 392, 410, 413, 
420, 423, 424, 428, 440, 450, 
468, 489, 490, 491, 493, 494, 
549, 551, 560, 561, 712, 713, 

719, 919, 936 
Culpeper, Artillery cantonments 

near 145 

Cummings, Col. A. C 133 

Curry combs, number issued, 56, 114 

price of in 1864 908 

Custer, Gen., advertises for 

Confederate guns 890 

Cutshaw, Lt.-Col. Wilfred Em 
met .337, 440, 720, 791 

(See Cutshaw s Battery and 

Cutshaw s Battalion) 
Cutts, Col. Allan S., 

417, 427, 704, 720, 842 
(See Cutts Battery and 
Cutts Sumter, Ga., Bat 
Cuyler, Lt.-Col. R. M., Supt. 

Macon Arsenal 57 

Dabney, Lieut., of King Wil 
liam Battery 322 

Dahlgren s Raid 729 

Dance, Capt. Willis J., 

510, 568, 600, 792 
(See Dance s Powhatan Bat 
tery and Dance s Battalion) 

Dandridge, Capt. Edward P., 

198, 412, 424, 718, 907 

Danville Depot 57 

Daum, Lieut.-Col. Philip 169 

Davidson, Capt. Geo. L 802 

(See Lynchburg Battery) 
Davidson, Capt. Greenlee, 

380, 382, 383, 384, 393, 511 
( See Richmond "Letcher" 

Battery ) 
Davis, Gen., manufactures 

powder 43 

Davis, Jefferson, false accusa 
tion against 24 

Dearing, Col. James, 

415, 564, 565, 572, 646, 647, 

658, 720, 722, 725, 816, 936 

(See Dearing s Lynchburg 

Battery, Dearing s Light 

Battalion, and Dearing s 

Horse Artillery Battalion) 

Deflection marks, used at 

Banks Ford 539 

De Lisle, Maj. Roman 87 

Depots, horse 710 

De Russy, Lieut., killed 525 

Desertion, becomes prevalent . . 923 

proposals to stop 924 

Deshler, Col. James 202, 205 

(See Deshler s Battery and 

Deshler s Battalion) 
Dilger, Capt. Hubert, his ex 
ploits 475, 480, 

481, 482, 484, 550 
(See Dilger s Federal Bat 
tery ) 
Dimmock, Col. Charles, Chief 

of Ordnance of Va 69 

his efforts 70 

Disbanded, organizations, in 

1862 284 

Diseases of horses, 332, 709, 710, 922 
Divisions of artillery created, 

570, 722, 725 

Divisional reserves created .... 200 
Downer, Supt. W. S., Rich 
mond Armory and Clarks- 

ville Harness Shops 57 

Douay, Artillery School 152 

Drivers, experience of 331 

Drouot 159, 230 

Drunken negro troops 870 

Ducktown, Tenn., copper smelt 
ing at 47 

Duel, artillery, only one on 

Peninsula 237 

at Cedar Mountain 250 




Du Teil, original exponent of 

masses 159 

Early s Valley Campaign, 827, 876 

Ellett, Capt. Thomas 378 

(See Ellett s Richmond Bat 

Elliott, Lieut., of Maurin s Bat 
tery 311 

Employees of Bureau of Ord 
nance, number of 57 

organized as armed guards. . 58 
Engineer Corps, merged with 

Artillery 89 

Entente Cordiale, between Ar 
tillery and Infantry 406 

Epaulments, use of 545 

Eshleman, Lt.-Col. Benj. F., 

129, 356, 519, 565, 720 
(See Eshleman s Battery and 

Eshleman s Battalion) 
Eubank, Cadet Hill Carter.... 657 
"Eugenia," blockade runner... 56 
European agent of Bureau of 

Ordnance appointed .... 35, 37 
Evelington Heights, Pelham s 

and Stuart s blunder at. . . 233 
Exemptions of mechanics .... 48, 57 

Explosion of Parrotts 388 

Fair Oaks or Seven Pines, 

Battle of 192 

Fallagant, Lieut 820 

Farcy, disease of 922 

Farriers, pay of 108 

Fayetteville Arsenal and 

Armory 40, 57 

Federal Artillery, organization 

of * 156 

sorry condition of in 1863. . . 573 

its status in 1863 546, 550 

Infantry, immobile at Cold 

Harbor 823, 824 

Ferrell, Lieut 538 

Field Officers for battalions ... 570 
Artillery, in 1863, list of... 719 

assignment of 720 

in 1865 925 

Fishery, established for oil 

supply 48 

Fire balls used at Petersburg . . 923 
"First American" Regiment, 89, 93 
Fleet, of Bureau of Ordnance . . 56 

Fleetwood, affair at 349 

Floyd, Mr., Secretary of State, 

accusation against 24 

Fodder, price of in 1864 909 

Forage, hauled by batteries . . . 425 

where secured 425, 426 

how collected . . 428 


measures to procure in 1863, 718 

price of in 1864-5 908 

lack of in 1864-5 919, 920 

Ford, Lieut 827 

Forges, number made 56 

Forno, Capt. Henry, of La .... 93 

Fort Drewry, blown up 933 

Fort Gregg, action of 902, 931 

Fort Harrison, action of 897 

Fort Pulaski, rifled guns used 

in defense of 66 

Fort Steadman, action of 928 

Fort Whitworth, action of 931 

Fortress Monroe 91 

Foundries, created 40 

Franco-German War, artillery 

experience of 239 

Fraser, Capt 564, 694 

(See Pulaski, Ga., Battery) 

Frazier s Farm, Battle of 215 

Friedland, Battle of 153 

Friction-tubes, purchased in 

Europe in 18G1 37 

manufactured 47 

purchased abroad 55 

number made 56 

Frobel, Maj. B. W 257, 280 

(See Frobel s Battalion) 

Fry, Capt 334 

Frederick the Great, his artil 
lery 150, 153 

mentioned 432, 707 

Fredericksburg, Battle of 362 

Freemantle, Col., witnesses 

Gettysburg 687 

French, Lieut. S. S 889 

French, influence of the on 

American system .... 87, 88, 89 
French Artillery, organization of 150 

in 1859 190 

Artillery Schools 152 

"French Detachment," of 

Henry s Battery 352 

French Gunners of Louisiana, 

heroism of 389 

Fuel, in 1862 373 

Fuentes de Onoro, horse artil- 

tery at 166 

Fulcher, Corporal, his gallantry 899 
Fulminate of mercury, sub 
stitute for 47 

Fuzes, time, new invented 47 

purchased abroad 55 

number made 56 

Borman type defective 122 

igniter attachment fails to 

" work 538 

Games Mill, Battle of 210 




Gainesville, Battle of 255 

Gale, Lieut 844, 845 

Garber, Capt. Asher W....383, 791 
(See Garber s Staunton Bat 
"Garde Royale," manual of... 154 

Garden, Capt. Hugh R 899 

(See Palmetto, S. C., Battery) 
Garnett, Maj. John J., In 
spector of Ordnance, 

355, 415, 565, 704, 720, 722 
(See Garnett s Battalion) 

Garnett, Lieut. J. M 164 

Gatling, Dr. R. J., his gun first 

used 32, 33 

General Chief of Artillery.... 415 
Georgia, supplies and provi 
sions in 427 

German artillery experience in 

1870 191 

Getty, Capt. C. T., Supt. Lynch- 

burg Depot " . . . . 57 

Gettysburg, Battle of 221 

movement of army upon .... 598 

errors in campaign of 611 

faulty artillery positions of 667 
strategic situation of town. . 613 
tactical features of battlefield 614 
disposition of troops at.... 615 

action of July 1 616 

action of July 2 635 

action of July 3 660 

retreat from 695 

Gibbes, Maj. J. Hampton, 

779, 865, 866, 867, 874, 902 
(See Gibbes Battalion) 
Gibbon s Artillerist s Manual, 

1859 29 

Gilham, Col. William 96, 98 

his manual 99, 154 

referred to 337 

Girths 115 

Gitschin 238 

Glanders, disease of 922 

Glendale, Battle of 216 

Gneisenau 238 

Golly, Maj., of Louisiana 93 

Gorey, Lieut., his gallantry at 

Sharpsburg 301 

Gorgas, Brig.-Gen. Josiah, ap 
pointed Chief of Ordnance 34 
his character and work. . . .35, 36 

statement of 39, 40 

recommendations of 35, 54 

referred to 564 

Graham, Dr. John 907 

Graham, Lieut 385 

Grain, where secured 425, 426 


Grant, Gen. U. S., remarks of 

on artillery 190 

discussion of his character, 

823, 824 

Gravellotte, Battle of 274 

Greased Heel, horse disease. . . . 348 

Greble, Lieut. John T., killed.. 118 
Greener, William, C. E., his 

treatise on arms 28 

inventions 28 

Grenades, proposed use of 827 

Grenoble, Artillery School 152 

GribeauvaPs system 150 

Gridley, Col. Richard 86 

Grimes, Capt. Cary F 92 

( See Grimes Portsmouth Bat 

Grooved guns, origin of 28, 29 

experiments with 31 

Groveton, Battle of 255 

Gunboats, artillery encounters 

with 844, 857 

Gun carriages, manufacture of 48 

number made 56 

made in Va. in 1861 78, 79 

Guns, manufacture of 51 

Austrian purchased 37, 55 

Blakely purchased 55 

number made at Tredegar 

Works 56 

furnished by West Point 

Foundry 64 

brought by Washington Ar 
tillery 71 

captured at First Manassas 71 
list of those made in 1861. . . 78 
number of Federal and Con 
federate in 1862 148, 286 

number and proportion of at 

Sharpsburg 286, 325 

kinds favored by Gen. Lee. . . 340 
mortification over loss of. ... 524 
proper spirit over loss of .... 525 
Prussian rule as to with 
drawal from action 525 

Gunners defend their pieces, 

585, 587, 591, 597 
Gunnery, theory of, provision 

for study of in 1863 564 

Board of, appointed in 1863 564 

Guibert 160 

Guidon, pay of 110 

Gustavus, his artillery propor 
tion 153 

Gwynn, Maj.-Gen. Walter 113 

Hai nesville, Battle of 66, 125 

Halters, number issued 56, 114 







Hamburg, ordnance material 

shipped from 

Hamilton, Gen. Alexander, his 

drill regulations 

Hamilton, Maj. S. P., 

280, 370, 386, 391, 396, 415, 

419, 450, 451, 466, 468, 528, 

(See Hamilton s Battalion) 

Hardaway, Lieut. -Col. Robert 


319, 380, 417, 421, 423, 468, 
469, 510, 513, 535, 536, 537, 
538, 540, 549, 704, 720, 786, 

813, 897, 900, 919, 925 
(See Hardaway s Ala. Bat 
tery and Hardaway s Bat 

Hardin, Maj. M. B 920 

Hardwicke, Capt 636 

(See Hardwicke s Lynchburg 

"Lee" Battery) 
Harness, purchased in Europe 

1861 37 

leather for manufacture of.. 47 

made from oiled canvas 48 

purchased abroad 55 

number of sets made 56 

Clarksville shops 57 

condition of 424 

price of in 1864 908 

Harper, Maj. -Gen. Kenton, re 
lieved . 113 

Harper s Ferry Arsenal, created 26 

value of 68 

destroyed by Federals 68 

reconstructed 70, 71 

Harper s Ferry, Battle of 288 

Harrison, Col. Charles 87 

Harrison s Landing 233 

Hart, Maj. James F 332, 901 

(See Hart s Battery and 

Hart s Battalion") 
Harvie, Col. E. J., Inspector- 
General 355 

Haskell, Col. J. C., 

440, 684, 685, 704, 865, 866, 

873, 874, 899, 900, 902, 948 
(See HaskelPs Battalion) 

Haskell, Capt. J. C 907 

Hatcher, Lieut. Charles, 

198, 732, 907 

Hatcher s Run, Battle of 900 

Havana Agency 56 

Hawes, Lieut. *S. H 334 

Hay, where and how secured, 

425, 426 
price of in 1864 909 


Hazard, Capt 670 

( See Hazard s Federal Bat 
tery ) 
Heavy Artillery, in defenses of 

Richmond * 920 

Hemini>ton. Private, his gal 
lantry 811 

Henderson, Col. G. F. R., 

quoted 106, 219 

his error 378 

Henry, Capt. M. W...346, 564, 712 
(See Henry s Battery and 
Henry s Battalion) 

Hensley, Maj 920 

(See Hensley s Battery) 
High angle fire at Cold Harbor, 

822, 826 

High Bridge, action at 936 

Hill, A. P., erroneous use of 

artillery by 208, 211, 213 

his fatal error at Gettysburg 615 

Hill. Gen. D. II . 122 

Hindman, Col., Saltpetre con 
tractor 44 

Hobson, Lieut 878 

Hohenlohe, Prince Kraft 160 

quoted 238 

Hollinguist, Lieut.-Col 733 

Hollis, Lieut 901 

Holman, Maj. Christian 87 

Hooker, Gen., his movements 

discussed 455, 472 

destroys artillery organiza 
tion 547, 550, 574 

Horse Artillery, origin of.. 150, 151 

C. S. A. created 162 

charges made by 166, 168 

operations of in 1862 347 

operations of in 1863 446, 448 

at Chancellorsville, 460, 467, 471 

at Brandy Station 585 

organization and status of in 

1863 576 

reviews of in 1863 580, 581 

organization, 1863 706, 725 

camp of in 1863 717 

fight of at Charlottesville . . . 726 

receives thanks of town 728 

criticism of 773, 774 

condition of in 1864 828 

proposed increase of 895 

reorganization of in 1864, 

922, 923, 927 
Horses, complement of a battery 111 

efforts to secure 114 

taken from cavalry for guns 178 

extra for batteries 214 

scarcity of in 1862 327, 328 




number per battery 328, 333 

regulations concerning ...... 330 

experience of artillerymen 

with 331 

character of animals 331, 332 

purchased in Texas 332 

diseases of 332, 348 

shelters for . 356 

for artillery secured in 

Georgia 418 

care of demanded of officers 423 

reported condition of 424 

number required in 1863 427 

sickness among 427, 428 

deficiency of 412 

condition of in May, 1863, 

556, 562, 563 

sale of condemned to farmers 563 
number distributed in 1863.. 563 

mentioned 574 

requisitioned 697 

"pressing for shorts" 698 

provisions for care of 709 

diseases of 710 

price of in 1863 710 

where obtained 711 

condition of in 1864 829 

price of in 1864 908, 921 

great effort to procure. . .921, 922 

care of in depots 922 

fate of the artillery horses, 

949, 954, 955 
Horseshoes, manufacture of. ... 48 

supply of -49, 115 

Horse brushes, number issued 56 
Horse equipment, deficiency of 

in 1862 412 

Horsemen, artillerymen as 331 

Hotchkiss Guns 243 

Howard, Lieut. James 277 

Huckstep, Capt 334 

(See Huckstep s 1st Flu- 

vanna Battery) 

Huger, Benj., Col. U. S. Ord 
nance Corps 26 

appointed Inspector General 
Artillery and Ordnance, C. 

S. A 53 

Huger, Lieut. -Col. Frank, 

338, 420, 508, 534, 537, 541, 
549, 636, 645, 646, 664, 720, 

846, 866, 867, 874 
( See Huger s Norfolk Battery 
and Huger s Battalion) 

Huger, Capt. Francis K 90 

Humphreys, Maj. F. C., Supt. 

Columbus Arsenal 57 


Hunt, Gen. Henry J., 

222, 230, 233, 243, 276, 298, 
546, 629, 638, 641, 675, 678, 

748, 775 

Huse, Caleb, Foreign Purchas 
ing Agent 37 

purchases Austrian batteries 37 
inspects Armstrong and 

Blakely plants 37 

his purchases abroad 55 

Hutter, Capt. E. S., Supt. Dan 
ville Depot 57 

Illuminators, at Petersburg. . . . 923 
Incendiary shells, prepared by 

Pendleton 398 

Indirect fire, first instance of. . 539 
employed at Cold Harbor by 

Mclntosh 822, 826 

Infantry supports for artillery 177 

Initiative, opportunity for 482 

Inspection, of batteries. .. .354, 355 

of artillery, Jan., 1863 412 

results of" 413 

of Johnston s Artillery by 

Pendleton in 1864 732 

Inspector General Artillery and 

Ordnance 53 

Inspector of Ordnance and Ar 
tillery 355 

Instruction, Artillery, Early, 

85, 86, 89, 91 

in the South 98, 101, 149 

Intrenchments, constructed at 

Fredericksburg. . .369, 372,429 

constructed by gunners 537 

Iron Clads, armor for, made. . . 51 

Iron Mines and Ores 50 

Iron Pyrites, of Louisiana and 
Alabama used in produc 
tion of sulphur 42 

Izard, Capt. George 90 

Jackson, Gen. T. J., referred to 30 

tests Parrott gun 64 

favors rifled guns 65 

element of his success 103 

anecdote concerning 106 

appointed Colonel 113 

mentioned 114, 123, 126 

at Bull Run 134 

his failure on Peninsula 218 

himself again 246 

congratulates Beckham on 

field 481 

death of described 557 

his wife arrives at his death 
bed 558 

Cadet caisson his hearse.... 560 
affection for in artillery. . . . 560 




James, Lieut 842 

James rifles, captured at 

Manassas 72 

Jealousy, caste; in service 405 

Johnson, Capt. John R 339 

(See Johnson Bedford Bat 
Johnson, Maj. Marmaduke, 

720, 897, 898 

(See Johnson s Richmond 
Battery and Johnson s Bat 

Johnston, Jos. E., his inability 
to advance on Washington, 

24, 76, 139 

knew little of rifling 64 

preferred smooth bores .... 65, 75 
lacked ammunition in 1861.. 76 
appointed Major-General .... 113 

Jomini, quoted 106 

Jones. Col. Hilary P., 

416, 423, 508, 549, 720, 725, 

737, 837, 895, 933 
(See Jones Battalion) 
Jones House, Battles of the ... 898 

Jordan, Maj. Tyler C 720 

(See Bedford Battery) 

Kelly s Ford, Battle of 432, 714 

Kellysville 432 

Kemper, Maj. Del 415 

( See Kemper s Alexandria 

Kernstown, Battle of 169 

King, Col. J. Floyd... 802, 803, 877 
(See King s Battalion) 

Kirkpatrick, Capt. T. J 880 

( See Amherst Battery and 
"Madison," Mis s., Bat 
Knox, Col. Henry, recommends 

artillery schools, etc 86, 89 

Koniggratz, Battle of, 221, 238, 274 
Kosciusko, Gen., his manual for 

artillery 149 

Kostenetski, at Austerlitz 168 

Kuropatkin s Cavalry tactics . . 404 
Labor, skilled and unskilled. .48, 57 

training of 58 

Ladies, visit Cavalry Camp .... 580 
"Lady Davis" blockade runner 56 

La Fere, Artillery School 152 

Lahitte system of rifling 30 

Laidley, Maj., revises Ordnance 

Manual 26 

Lallemand s treatise 149 

Lambie, Lieut, W. T 600, 607 


Lamkin, Capt 925 

(See Amherst-Nelson Bat 

Lancaster grooved gun 29 

Landry, Capt., heroism of 389 

(See Donaldsonville, La., Bat 
tery ) 

Lane, Maj. John* 417, 422 

(See Lane s Ga. Battery and 

Lane s Battalion) 
Lantz, Corporal Joseph T. V. . . 657 

his gallantry 423 

Latham, Capt. A. C 816 

(See Latham s Battery) 
Latimer, Maj. Joseph White, 
337, 379, 380, 384, 393, 399, 
416, 421, 440, 453, 568, 601, 

610, 636, 651, 653, 694 
( See Richmond "Courtney" 
Battery and Latimer s Bat 
Latrobe, Capt. 0., his gallantry 389 

Lead, supply and price of 49 

purchased abroad 55 

Leather, supply and curing of . . 47 

contracts for 48 

purchased abroad 55 

price of in 1864 908 

"R, E. Lee," blockade runner.. 56 

Lee, Gen. Charles 87 

Lee, Lieut. H. H 164 

Lee, Gen. Robert E., assists in 

ordnance work of Va 70 

appointed Maj. -Gen 113, 116 

his policy respecting promo 
tion 413, 418 

his boldness at Chancellors- 

ville 542 

his dispatch on Jackson s 

death 562 

his Gettysburg plans 598 

his conduct after Pickett s 

charge 688 

his lost opportunity at the 

North Anna 799 

Lee, Robert E., Jr., Private, in 
cident concerning 310 

Lee, Col. Stephen Dill, 

201, 278, 299, 312, 313, 323, 

326, 337, 338, 351 
(See Lee s Battalion) 

Leipzig, Battle of 153, 274 

Leonard and Riddle, Saltpetre 

contractors 43 

Letcher. Gov. John, of Va 63 

Lewis, Maj. J. R. C 416, 572 

Lewisburg, Va., powder manu 
factured in . . 43 




Leyden, Maj 877 

( See Leyden s Battalion ) 

Liaoyang, Battle of 274 

Lichtenstein 230 

Light batteries mistaken for 

horse 550 

Lishtfoot, Lieut.-Col. C. E., 

277, 720 

(See Lightfoot s Battalion) 
Linseed oil, used in manufac 
ture of harness 48 

Little Rock Arsenal 40 

Local Reserves 835 

Lombardy Campaign of 1859.. 190 
Long, Brig.-Gen. Armistead 

Lindsay 95, 712, 716, 

719, 729, 731, 736, 747, 770, 
775, 785, 787, 788, 789, 792, 
793, 813, 819, 827, 852, 876, 
877, 880, 881, 900, 920, 926, 945 
Longstreet, Gen., detaches valu 
able artillery force 443 

difference between him and 

Jackson 444 

Alexander s defense of 445 

at Gettysburg 630, et seq. 

his orders to artillery 635 

his Tennessee Campaign 711 

his 1ST. C. Campaign 814 

"Long Toms," or 30-pounder 

Parrotts 370 

Losses, no test of artillery ef 
ficiency 267 

of artillery at Petersburg. . . 909 
Louisiana batteries in Mexican 

War 93 

Liitzen, Battle of 153 

Lynchburg Depot 57 

Machine Guns, first use of ... 32, 33 
Machinery, imported for powder 

mills 46 

made at Richmond Tredegar 

Works 46 

loss and destruction of 58 

saved at Harper s Ferry 69 

Macon Armory 57 

Macon Arsenal 57 

Macon Ammunition Labora 
tories, nature and capacity 

of 45, 57 

erected 46 

Maddox, Lieut 319 

Magruder, Gen. J. B., 114, 118, 337 

Magruder, Lieut 336 

Mahone, Gen. William, at the 

Crater 871 

Mallet, Col. Jno. W., Supt. of 

Laboratories 45 

his work and character .... 45, 46 

Malvern Hill, instance of cited 191 

battle of 221 

Manassas, First, Battle of 127 

Manassas, Second, Battle of... 266 

great artillery victory 267 

Manuals for artillery 149 

Marceau, Pelham likened to ... 440 
March, remarkable, by artillery 261 

Markham s, affair at 352 

Marching, ability of batteries. . 165 
"Marseillaise Hymn," gunners 

sing \ 353 

Martinsburg, 1863 600 

Marye, Capt. E. A 311, 378 

(See Fredericksburg Battery) 

Marye, Capt. L. S 919 

( See Richmond "Hampden" 


Marye s Hill, remarkable artil 
lery position 397 

Maryland Invasion, First 277 

Maryland, preparation for sec 
ond invasion of 556 

Masked Batteries, caution as to 138 

Mason, Capt 866 

Masses, use of artillery 141 

used by Napoleon. ...... 152, 153 

originated 159 

effect of 160 

employed by Porter 208, 212 

why not employed at first. . . 237 
employed at Second Manassas 275 

Hunt s, at Sharpsburg 324 

Massie, Capt. J. L 125, 334, 889 

(See Massie s Fluvanna Bat 

Material, of a battery 110, 111 

captured at Manassas. .. .71, 136 

defects of at Big Bethel 123 

Confederate at Manassas. . . . 136 
number of guns comprising 

in 1861 115 

at Sharpsburg 284 

on Peninsula 201 

in Oct., 1862 340 

condition of in 1863, 

556, 562, 583, 564 
distribution of by battalions 570 
of horse artillery in 1863 . . . 579 
character of in 1863.... 706, 707 

in June, 1864 831 

siege issued at Petersburg. . . 895 

number of guns in 1864 917 

(See also Ordnance Material) 

Maurin, Maj. Victor 720, 917 

( See Maurin s Donaldsonville, 
La., Battery) 




May, Maj., quoted 221 

McCabe, Capt. W. Gordon, 

quoted 250 

referred to 344, 440 

quoted 797, 708, 

834, 863, 864, 865, 866, 899, 929 

McCarthy, Capt. Edward S 826 

(See 1st Co. Richmond How 
McClellan, reorganizes artillery 156 

McCorkle, Lieut 392 

McDowell, Battle of 170 

McElroy, Lieut 931, 932 

McGilvery Artillery Brigade, at 

642, 647, 670, 678, 686 
McGraw, Maj. Joseph, 

440, 720, 797, 798, 800 
(See Richmond "Purcell" 
Battery ) 

McGregor, Capt. Wm. M 577 

( See McGregor s Battery and 

McGregor s Battalion) 
Mclntosh, Col. David Gregg, 

423, 440, 508, 549, 720, 822, 912 
( See Mclntosh s Battery and 

Mclntosh s Battalion) 
McKim, Lieut. Randolph TL, 

his gallantry 608 

McLaughlin, Maj. William, 

801, 802, 878 

( See McLaughlin s Battery 
and McLaughlin s Battal 

McQueen, Lieut 899 

Meade, Gen., his plan at Get 
tysburg 613 

Meade, Capt. William 198 

Meade, Lieut. R. H 164 

Mechanics, exemptions of those 

employed 48 

number of employed 57 

Mechanicsville, Battle of 206 

Medical supplies 709 

Medicine, price of in 1864 908 

Memphis Depot 41 

Mercury, imported 47 

Metals, how obtained 49 

Metz, Artillery School 152, 154 

Mexican War, Southern artil 
lery in . 93 

Mexico, purchases of material 

and powder in 38, 43 

mercury imported from 47 

leather supply from cut off . . 48 

lead purchased in 49 

horses from 921 

Middleburg, affair at 353, 610 


Middletown, Battle of, 1864... 890 
Militia, of Virginia, provisions 

for . 61 

armament of 62, 67 

artillery, early 89 

organization of in 1792 91 

Miller, Maj. M. B 720, 917 

(See 3d Co. Washington Ar 

Mine Run Campaign 715 

Mining Bureau, created.. 35, 44, 49 

remarkable work of 49, 50 

officers of 53 

Mining at Petersburg, 845, 846, 860 
Mobility, of artillery, instances, 
165, 261, 548, 549, 832, 833, 

894, 900 

Monocacy, Battle of 877 

Montgomery Depot 40 

Montgomery, Capt. Chas. R. . . . 791 
( See Louisa "Morris" Bat 

Moody, Capt 925 

(See Moody s "Madison," 
La., Battery) 

Moore, David, gunner 125 

Moorman, Maj. Marcellus N., 

308, 346, 720, 726, 729 
( See Moorman s Battery and 

Moorman s Battalion) 
Morel, Corporal, heroism of ... 389 
Mordecai, Capt. Alfred, Ord 
nance Corps 26, 91 

Morgan, S. D., of Nashville, 

Tenn., powder contractor . . 43 
Mortars, at Petersburg and 

Crater 868, 873 

Moseley, Lieut.-Col. E. F., 

120, 121, 838, 854, 896, 902 
(See Moseley s Battery and 
Moseley s Battalion ) 

Motes, Lieut. 658, 684 

Motienling, Battle of 482 

Mount Vernon Arsenal 40 

Mountain rifles 27 

Mountain howitzers, at Port 

Republic 174 

Mt. Carmel Church, Artillery 

Camp in 63 450 

Mukden, Battle of 221 

Mules, conduct of in battery at 

Port Republic 175 

supply of for trains 332 

amusing incident concerning 
in Stuart s Cavalry review 582 

Munchengratz 238 

Munford, Gen. T. T 105 

Murat, Pelham likened to 440 




Murray, Lieut. Thomas A., his 

coolness 524 

Musicians, pay of 108 

Muskets for gunners, recom 
mended 892 

Nachod 238 

Napoleon, remarks on artillery, 

152, 153 

his principles 159 

cited 238, 310, 362, 365, 707 

his rules of war 809 

Napoleons, 12-pounder, demand 

for 340 

substituted for howitzers. ... 719 

Nash, Maj. Herbert N 717 

Nashville Arsenal 41 

Nassau Agency 56 

"Native American" Artillery of 

Louisiana 93 

Negro, misleads Dahlgren. . 730, 731 
Negro Troops at the Crater ... 870 
Nelson, Capt. G. W., 

335, 380, 387, 388, 412 
(See Hanover Battery) 

Nelson. Col. William .417, 

878, 880, 883, 885, 888, 889, 920 
(See Hanover Battery and 
Nelson s Battalion) 

New Berne Campaign 814 

New Cold Harbor, battle near 211 
New Market, Battle of.... 801, 802 

New Orleans Depot 41 

New York, 71st Reg. Battery, 

132, 136 

Night Attack, by artillery 234 

Nimmo, Lieut. John 657 

Niter, secured in Alabama and 

Tennessee 42, 44 

purification of 43 

supply of in 1864 44 

Niter Bureau created 35. 44, 49 

officers of 44, 53 

Nitric acid, made 47 

Non-commissioned staff, pro 
posed in 1864 830 

Norfolk Navy Yard, destruc 
tion of . ." 69 

North Anna, Battle of 799 

Artillery Camp on the 410 

Norton, Capt., inventor of ex 
plosive lead shell 28 

Oats, price of in 1864, 

803, 908, 909, 942 

Observers, Federal aerial 234 

Officers, furnished Confederacy 

by West Point 95 

to artillery by West Point 
and V. M. I.. . 101 


artillery, rank and pay of ... 108 
proportion of based on guns, 

145^ 423 

efficiency of 337 

proportion of from Virginia, 

413, 418 

Jackson on appointment of . . 423 

authorized number 423 

Lee s estimate of artillery. . . 424 

inefficient culled out 430 

individuality of artillery. . . . 440 
number and distribution of 

artillery in 1863 565 

promotion of in 1863 565 

slowness in promotion of .... 572 

few transfers among 572 

supply drawn from 573 

authorized number of and 

grades 719, 722 

list of artillery field officers in 

1863 " 719 

assignments of 720, 724 

increase of proposed in 1864, 

830, 902 

conditions concerning 903 

Old Point Comfort Arsenal, 

created 26 

Orders, error in transmitting at 

Fredericksburg. . .516, 517,522 
Ordnance Department, U. S. A., 

created, 25 

developed 26 

Ordnance Material, character of 

in 1861 27, 28 

purchase of foreign 27 

rifled employed by French in 

Italy 30 

employed by Prussians in 

1864 30 

multiple firing guns 31, 32 

material (C. S. A.) on hand 

1861 37 

purchased in Europe in 1861 37 
seized with Federal arsenals, 

37, 41 

first made at 41, 42 

most important plant for 

manufacture of 51 

amount procured up to 1863 55 

statement of amount made.. 56 

obtained by capture 59 

of Virginia in 1861 67 

issued in Virginia in 1861. . . 70 
in possession of Washington 

artillery 71 

captured at 1st Manassas... 71 
list of that secured in Vir 
ginia in 1861 78, 79 




character of in 1862 284 

captured at Harper s Ferry. . 291 

demand for in 1802 . . 340 

types made in 1862 340, 341 

heavy demanded by Gen. Lee 411 

new "issued ." 426, 427 

Ordnance Manuals, U. S. A. . . . 26 

C. S. A 26 

Ordnance Officers, proposals 

concerning 38 

regulations concerning 39 

improved processes developed 

by 46 

discoveries of 47 

authorized and rank of .... 52, 53 
educational requisites and 

promotion 52, 53 

recommendations concerning 

rank of 54 

mentioned 109, 110 

efforts of 288 

Ordnance Operations, field, suc 
cessful in 1863 564 

Ordnance Regulations, U. S. A., 

26, 27 

C. S. A. adopted. ..38, 52, 53, 54 
Ordnance Rifles, 3-inch, demand 

for 340 

Ordnance Storekeepers, pay and 

rank of 57 

Ordnance Train, Reserve. . .243, 292 
Organization, of Artillery 

Corps 108 

of field batteries 109 

of Virginia troops 116 

of artillery in Dec., 61 142 

of artillery in 1864, 903, 905, 927 

at surrender 950, 951, 952 

Orleans Artillery, in Mexican 

War 93 

Osborn, Maj 550, 554, 623, 668 

Ostendorff & Co., J. M., of Wal- 
halla, S. C., powder con 
tractors 43 

Otey, Lieut. James C 866 

Owen, Maj. W 917 

(See 1st Co. Washington Ar 
tillery and Owen s Bat 
talion ) 

Page, Maj. John, 198, 427, 718, 907 
Page, Maj. R. C. M...506, 718, 720 
(See Louisa "Morris" Bat 
tery and Page s Battalion) 
Page, Maj. T. J., Jr., 

336, 380, 415, 422, 718 
( See Page s Yorktown "Ma- 

gruder" Battery) 
Page, Dr. Isham Randolph.... 198 


Paris, affair at 348 

Parker, Capt. W. W 925 

(See Richmond Battery) 
Parkinson, Lieut. Jordan C.... 911 

Parole lists 952 

Parrott, Capt. R. P., his rifled 

gun 30, 63 

Parrott Rifles, tested at V. M. I., 

63, 64, 80 

captured at Manassas 71 

number furnished during war 64 

first used at Big Bethel 64 

mentioned 119, 197 

demand for 340 

20-pounders 344 

explosion of 30-pounders. . . . 388 
Patchenko s Russian Battery.. 274 
Paxton, Maj., Horse Agent. ... 711 

Pay of Artillery Officers 108 

Pearce, Lieutenant 805 

Peas, black-eye, component of 

ration 374 

Pegram, Col. William Johnson, 
249, 250, 278, 366, 416, 420, 
440, 461, 489, 494, 506, 507, 
508, 511, 540, 549, 554, 704, 
720, 798, 834, 896, 898, 899, 

901, 929, 930 

(See Pegram s Richmond 
"Purcell" Battery and 
Pegram s Battalion) 

Pegram, Capt. R. G 691 

(See Pegram s Petersburg 

Peet, Lieut. W. T 459 

Pelham, Col. John, 

162, 178, 233, 298, 299, 326, 
337, 346, 349, 350, 352, 354, 
382, 383, 384, 385, 392, 403, 
404, 433, 434, 435, 439, 577, 773 
(See Pelham s Battery and 

Pelham s Battalion) 
Pemberton, Lieut.-Col. J. C., 

726, 895, 919 
Pendleton, Gen. Wm. N., favors 

rifled guns 64, 65 

sent to Richmond to procure 

ordnance 75 

his splendid work 76, 77, 78 

mentioned 95, 124, 

125, 127, 134, 137, 140, 143, 
146, 147, 155, 182, 192, 193, 
194, 195, 198, 200, 225, 234, 
239, 243, 255, 257, 277, 278, 
318, 319, 333, 338, 341, 343, 
346, 372, 373, 410, 413, 425, 
430, 450, 451, 454, 515, 516- 
24, 530, 551, 557, 563-74, 




583, 610, 622, 623, 630, 631, 
632, 639, 643, 653, 658, 664, 
666, 668, 677, 701, 703, 704, 
709, 718, 719, 722, 731, 734, 
735, 742, 766, 770, 776, 826, 
829, 847, 849, 850, 853, 854, 
895, 902, 903, 906, 918, 920, 
922, 925, 928, 934, 938, 939, 

940, 942, 945, 949 

Pendleton, Maj. A. S., his letter 429 
Pendleton, Capt. Dudley D., 

198, 334, 902, 907 

Peninsula Campaign 176 

summary of 239 

Penick, Capt. Nathan 521 

(See Pittsylvania Battery) 
Percussion Caps, manufactured 47 

Percy, Capt. W. A 902 

Personnel, character of artil 
lery 165 

of Confederate Artillery su 
perior 572 

Henderson s error as to 

character of 572 

Peterkin, Lieut. George W., 

198, 718, 732, 907 
Petersburg, Grant s movement 

upon 835 

siege of 842 

winter of 1864 at 895 

Petersburg Smelting Works 

created 40 

erection of 49 

Peyton, Capt. T. J 334 

( See Richmond "Orange" 
Battery ) 

Phelps, Lieut 448 

Pickens Heavy Artillery 135 

Picket ropes 114 

Pickett, his interference with 

the artillery 821 

his charge 683 

Pierson, Maj. S. F 852 

(See Pierson s Battalion) 
Pigott, Dr., lead-smelting proc 
ess of 49 

Pinckney, Gen., his drill regu 
lations 149 

Plater, Lieut 384 

Pleasants, Lieut. -Col., designs 
mine at Petersburg, 

846, 860, 863 

Pleasants, Lieut 385 

Pleasonton, Gen., his misstate- 

ments 486, 487, 496, 593 

Plevna, Battle of. . 221 


Poague, Col. William Thomas, 
326, 344, 417, 421, 440, 508, 

549, 720, 767, 768, 939 
( See Poague s Battery and 
Poague s Battalion) 

Pollock, Lieut. John G 912 

Poplar Spring Church, action of 896 

Pork Packeries 51 

Port fires, number made 56 

Port Republic, Battle of 173 

Position, artillery, at Second 

Manassas 264 

Potash, chloral 47 

Potts, Capt 378, 777 

(See N. C. Battery) 
Powder, purchase of in Europe, 

1861 37 

amount ordered in 1861 37 

Confederate mills 40 

amount on hand in 1861 .... 41 
amount required in 1861. ... 42 
manufacture of, and mills, 

42, 43, 45, 46 

contracts for 43 

Powder Mills, created 40 

necessity for 42 

location of private 42, 43 

Preparation, lack of artillery, 

208, 213 

at White Oak Swamp 219 

plan for at Malvern Hill 224 

utter lack of at Malvern Hill, 

225, 226, 230, 237 

by artillery 324 

lack of at Fredericksburg. . . 397 
splendid artillery at Win 
chester, 1863 602, 603 

Preston, Col. John T. L 96, 97 

Preston, Maj. Samuel 866, 867 

Prices, for articles in 1864 908 

Pringle, Lieut., of Garden s 

Battery 322 

Projectiles, defects of 128 

for Whitworth guns 564 

Promotion, in continental artil 
lery 88 

discussed 413, 418 

slowness of in C. S. Artillery 572 
proposed regulation of in 

1864 830 

for artillery officers urged. . . 902 

granted March 1, 1865 925 

Proportion of field officers to 

guns 423 

Provisional Army C. S. A. 

created 107 

Prussian Artillery 155 

tactics 160, 161 




in 1866 171 

lack of masses in 1866 238 

ammunition expenditure of . . 274 

experiences of 1866 and 1870 287 

Prussian Horse Artillery .. 166, 168 

Railroad battery 197, 216 

Raine, Maj. Chas. J 720 

(See Lynchburg "Lee" Bat 
Rains, Gen. G. W., Bureau of 

Ordnance 43 

invents new powder process. . 47 

Ramsey, Capt 309 

(See Rowan, N. C., Battery) 
Ramsey s Horse Battery (Brit 
ish) 166 

Randolph, Geo. W., 

114, 118, 123, 141 

Randolph, Capt 641 

Randolph, Lieut. Thos. N 198 

Ranging, difficulty of with poor 

shell 510 

Rapidity of fire, at Cold Har 
bor 212 

Rappahannock Bridge, Battle of 714 

Rations in 1862 374 

Read, Maj. J. P. W 415, 420 

(See Read s Ga. Battery and 

Read s Battalion) 
Reconnaissance, lack of, 

208, 213, 219, 224, 225, 226 
at Sharpsburg by Col. Lee, 

312. 316 

mentioned 505 

Reduction, of Artillery Corps.. 337 
Reed, Dr., invents shell for 

rifled guns 32, 66 

manufacture of his shell .... 47 

Rees, Lieut. Lucius G 811, 842 

Regimental Groups, proposed in 

1864 830 

Regimental promotion 88 

Regulations, for Federal Artil 
lery 157 

for artillery administration.. 199 

for Artillery Corps 330 

Reilly, Maj. James 564 

(See Reilly s Rowan, N. C., 

Religious, interest, in artillery 430 

spirit, at Petersburg 906 

Remedies, proposed to overcome 

evils of the artillery 414 

Remount depots 574, 710 

Reorganization, of artillery, 

278, 279 
in 1862. . . 327 


in 1863 413 

proposed in 1863 565 

in Aug., 1863 906 

in Dec., 1864 911 

Reserve Artillery, winter quar 
ters of 146 

use of as tactical unit dis 
cussed 160 

movements of on Peninsula, 

178, 192, 193, 237 

divisional, created 200 

composition of 242, 255 

referred to 277, 278, 287, 292 

use of as tactical unit 287 

involved in investigation. . . . 341 

composition of in 1862-3 345 

camp of in 1862 354 

strength of in 1862 361 

mentioned 370, 371 

lack of at Chancellorsville 
keenly felt by Lee, 

455, 467, 528, 550 

corps, in 1863 568 

at Gettysburg 616 

captured in April, 1865.. 942, 944 
Reserve Ordnance Train, 

292, 293, 327 

Respect, mutual, between artil 
lery and infantry 406 

Retreat, The 933 

Reviews, of Stuart s Cavalry 

and Horse Artillery in 1863 580 
of army at Culpeper in 1863 717 
of artillery of Western Army, 

733, 734 

of Longstreet s Corps 736 

Revival Meetings, in Camp .... 430 
Reynolds, Gen., nobility of.... 617 

Rhett, Col. T. S 52, 277, 707 

Rhode Island, Colonial battery 86 
Rice s Station, action at... 936, 938 
Richardson, Gen. W. H., of Va. 97 
Richardson, Lieut. -Col. Charles, 
327, 415, 419, 574, 636, 651, 

664, 676, 699, 720 
(See Richardson s Battalion) 
Richmond, Armory and Arsenal, 

40, 62 

issues of during war 56 

superintendents of 57 

Richmond Artillery defenses. . . 841 

Richmond Tredegar Works. . . . 341 

Rifling, knowledge of in 1861 . . 28 

Napoleon s experiments with 29 

Lahitte System 30 

experiments with rifling 31 

of ordnance recommended ... 63 




slight knowledge of in Amer 
ica 64, 65, 66 

sudden developments of 80 

Ringold, Maj., his manual 154 

Rives, Lieut 821 

Roads, condition of on Penin 
sula 177, 190, 191 

Roberts, Lieut. -Col. Owen 87 

Robertson, Maj 920 

Robertson, Lieut 334 

Rockets, number issued 56 

Rodes, Gen. R. E 105 

Rodman guns, reputation of... 31 

Rogers, Maj. A. L 417 

(See Loudoun Battery) 

Rolling mills created 40 

Rome, Ga., guns cast at 42 

Romney, loss of guns at 164 

Ross, Richard, Saltpetre con 
tractor 44 

Rosser, Gen. Thos. L 565 

Rouse, Lieut. Milton 162, 338 

Rubber, India, lack of 48 

Ruggles, Gen 115 

Russian ammunition expendi 
ture 274 

Sacrament, the final 956 

Saddles, number issued 56 

how made 114 

Sailor s Creek, Battle of 936 

Saint Privat, Battle of . . . .274, 287 

Saint Sebastian 864 

Salisbury Foundry 57 

Saltpetre, contracts for 43 

supplies of 44 

yield of Tennessee beds 44 

price of 44 

location of beds 44 

purchased abroad 55 

San Antonio Arsenal 40 

Saunders, Maj. J. S 280, 852 

(See Saunders Battalion) 

Savage s Station, Battle of. ... 215 

Savannah Depot 40 

Saye, Private Richard W., his 

gallantry 524 

Scarlett s charge at Balaclava 587 

Scharnhorst 238 

School of Fire, Fortress Monroe 91 
School, training for officers of 

C. S. A 99 

Schools, French Artillery 152 

Schoolfield s Battery uses ma 
chine gun 32 

Scoffern, his treatise on warfare 

and arms 29 

Scott, Gen. Winfield. . . .89, 90, 149 

Second Manassas, Battle of. ... 266 

Sedan, instance of cited... 191, 221 

Prussian Artillery at 287 

compared with Harper s 

Ferry 291 

compared with Fredericks- 
burg 402 

Sedden, Mr., Secretary of War 731 

Selma Arsenal 57 

Senarmont 153, 159, 230 

Sensitive shell, used at Peters 
burg 923 

Seven Days fighting 197, 235 

Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, Bat 
tle of 192 

Sha-ho, Battle of 274 

Sham battles 580, 583 

Sharpsburg, Battle of 294 

Shell, with copper band, in 
vented 32, 47 

polygonal cavity invented... 47 

purchased abroad 55 

number issued 56 

fail to explode 509, 538 

burst at muzzle 564 

Shelters, for horses 356 

for men 373 

Sherman s Artillery 191 

Shepherdstown, affair at 341 

Shields, Capt. J. C 114 

(See 1st Co. Richmond How 
itzer Battalion) 
Ships, owned and operated by 

Bureau of Ordnance 56 

Shoemaker, Capt. J. J 449, 729 

(See Shoemaker s Lynchburg 

Shoes, men without reported 

sick 425 

lack of 355 

Shoup, Brig.-Gen 734 

Shrapnel, purchased abroad. ... 55 

Shumaker, Maj. L. M 257, 258 

(See Shumaker s Danville 
Battery and Shumaker s 
Battalion ) 
Sickness, in the artillery. ..... 425 

Sloan, Capt. Benj., Ordnance 

Corps 53 

Smith, Lieut. J. D 545 

Smith, Capt. B. H., Jr., his 

gallantry 347 

(See 3d Co. Richmond Howit 
zer Battalion) 

Smith, Gen. Francis H 98 

Smith, Maj. F. W 935 

Smith, Col. Persifer F 93 

Soft Hoof, horse disease 332 

Sor. Battle of.. . 238 




Sore Tongue, disease of horses 332 
South Carolina, early artillery 

of 87 

South Mountain, Battle of 292 

Southern Artillery, early 85, 92 

in Mexican War 93 

Spotsylvania, Battle of 775 

Spurs, number pairs issued. ... 56 

Squires, Capt 129 

Staff, of Chief of Artillery. ... 198 

proposed for artillery 830 

of Artillery Corps in 1864, 

902, 907 

"Stag," blockade runner 56 

Stanard s Farm, Artillery Camp 

at in 1863 556 

Stansbury, Maj. S., Ordnance 

Corps 53 

Steaming, improved process ... 46 

invented by Gen. Rains 47 

Stephenson s Depot, 1863 606 

Stevens, Capt., his book of tac 
tics 149 

Stink-shells, proposed 826 

Stiles, Maj. Robert, quoted, 782, 783 

mentioned 936 

Stockton, Capt. Isaac F., of La. 93 

Strasburg, Artillery School 152 

Strategy, of Lee at Fredericks- 
burg 364 

Straw, price of in 1864 909 

Stribling, Maj 720 

Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., his trib 
ute to Pelham 233 

his reviews and sham battles 580 
amusing incident concerning 582 
effect of his absence from 

Gettysburg 611 

Subterfuges, artillery, in use.. 516 
Suffocating Projectile, proposed 826 
Sulphur, secured in Louisiana 42 

contracts for supply of 42 

Superintendents of armories, 

rank and pay of 57 

Supplies, lack of at Petersburg 907 

Surrender, proposed 939 

the 948 

"Swamp Angel," rifled gun used 

at Sumter 66 

Tactics, for use of horses of 

battery Ill 

of light artillery 141 

early American 149 

of Federal Artillery 156 

originated by Chew 166, 168 

for divisional reserves 200 

erroneous 208, 213 

improvement of execution of 275 


peculiar at Sharpsburg 324 

at Fredericksburg ..372, 402, 404 
at Chancellorsville, discussed, 

542, 548 

in 1864 832, 833, 900 

Talcott, Col., Chief of Ordnance, 

U. S. A 26 

Talcott, Capt 91 

Tashichiao, Battle of 274 

Taylor, Capt. E. B 458, 544 

(See Eubank s Bath Battery) 
Taylor, Capt. J. S....281, 300, 322 

Teamsters, character of 331 

Tennessee Campaign of Long- 
street 711 

Tentage, allowance of 429 

Terry, Lieut. Nathaniel 247 

Texas, horses for artillery. .332, 921 

Texas Arsenal 40 

Thomas, Lieut., "A", 4th U. S. 

F. A 305 

Thomson, Maj. James Walton, 
162, 338, 440, 890, 891, 936, 

937, 938 

( See Thomson s "Ashby" Bat 
tery and Thomson s Bat 
talion ) 

Thurmond, Lieut 334 

Tin, how obtained 49 

purchased abroad 55 

Tobacco, price of in 1864-5. . . . 908 
Tom s Brook, Battle of . . . .889, 890