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THE MACEDONIAN
CAMPAIGN

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA

By Professor Pasquale Villari
Translated by Linda Villaki
Illustrated. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
NIGGOLO MACHIAVELLI

By Professor Pasquale Villari
Translated by Linda Villari
Illustrated. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD LONDON

GENERAL SIR G. F. MILNE.

FrontUpiece.

THE MACEDONIAN

CAMPAIGN By LUIGI

VILLARI With Illustrations and Maps

\ «

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD

LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE

First published in English 1922

(All rights reserved)

PREFATORY NOTE

The operations of the Allied forces, and in particular
those of the Italian contingent in Macedonia, are less
well known than those of almost any other of the many
campaigns into which the World War is subdivided.
There have already been several published accounts of
it in English and French, but these works have dealt
almost exclusively with the action of the British or
French contingent, and are mostly of a polemical or
journalistic character ; very little has been written
about the other Allied forces, or about the campaign
as a whole. Owing to the position which I held
for two years as Italian liaison officer with the various
Allied Commands in the East, I have been able to collect
a good deal of unpublished material on the subject, and I
felt that it might be useful to give a consecutive account
of these events, correcting many inaccuracies which
have been spread about. The book was written origin-
ally in Italian, and dealt in particular detail with the
operations of the Italian expeditionary force. In the
present English edition I have omitted certain details
concerning the Italian force, which were of less interest
for a non-Italian public, while I have added some further
material of a general character, which I only obtained
since the Italian edition was written.

The published authoritative and reliable sources for
the history of the Macedonian campaign are very few.
A bibliography is appended. Besides my own notes

6 PREFATORY NOTE

and recollections of the events, set down day by day,
and the records of various conversations which I had
with the chief actors in the Balkan war drama, I must
acknowledge the valuable assistance afforded to me by
various Italian and foreign officers and officials. My
especial thanks are due to the following :

General Petitti di Roreto, for information on the
events of the early period of the campaign ;

General Ernesto Mombelli, who supplied me with a
great deal of useful information and advice on the latter
period ;

Colonel Vitale, under whom I worked for some time,
and who first instructed me in the duties of a liaison
officer ;

Colonel Fenoglietto, who kindly provided a part of
the photographs reproduced in the book ;

Commendatore Fracassetti, director of the Museo del
Risorgimento in Rome, who kindly placed a large number
of photographs at my disposal, authorizing me to make
use of them ;

Captain Harold Goad, British liaison officer with the
Italian force from soon after its landing at Salonica until
it was broken up in the summer of 1919, who supplied
me with many details concerning the topography of
the Italian area of the Macedonian front, which he
knew stone by stone, and his notes and recollections of
many political and military episodes. Few men have
done such admirable and disinterested work in favour
of good relations between Britain and Italy, both during
and after the war, as this officer, who was most
deservedly decorated with the Italian silver medal for
valour in the field.

L. V.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFATORY NOTE 5

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION REASONS FOR THE MACEDONIAN CAM-
PAIGN AND FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF ITALY.
POLITICAL INTRIGUES AND FIRST MILITARY OPERA-
TIONS 11

II. OPERATIONS IN THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN OF 1916 . 36

III. THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES IN THE ORIENT.

THE FRENCH TROOPS 56

IV. THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE 68

V. THE SERBIANS 85

VI. THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE .... 96

VII. OPERATIONS IN THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917 . 118

VIII. GREEK AFFAIRS 137

IX. SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER 157

X. IRRITATION AGAINST GENERAL SARRAIL . . . .171

XI. FROM THE SALONICA FIRE TO THE RECALL OF SARRAIL 179

XII. GENERAL GUILLAUMAT 191

XIII. MARKING TIME. ARRIVAL OF GENERAL FRANCHET

D'ESPFOREY 199

XIV. ON THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE 211

7

8 CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

XV. THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS 225

XVI. FINAL OPERATIONS 255

APPENDIX A. LETTER FROM VOIVOD MICHICH TO GENERAL
PETITTI DI RORETO CONCERNING THE FIGHTING ON
HILL 1050 IN FEBRUARY 1917 271

APPENDIX B. LOSSES OF THE BELLIGERENTS DURING THE

MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN 272

APPENDIX C. GENERAL FRANCHET d'eSPEREY'S TELEGRAM TO
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE ARMISTICE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH BULGARIA 273

APPENDIX D. ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND BULGARIA,

SIGNED AT SALONICA ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1918 . . 274

BIBLIOGRAPHY 277

INDEX 279

ILLUSTRATIONS

general sir. g. f. milne Frontispiece

TO FACE PAGE
GENERAL ERNESTO MOMBELLI, COMMANDER OF THE ITALIAN

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN MACEDONIA .... 10

ARCH OF GALERUS, SALONICA 20

GENERAL LEBLOIS BIDDING FAREWELL TO GENERAL PETITTI AT

TEPAVCI 38

LANDING OF ITALIAN TROOPS AT SALONICA 38

CHURCH OF ST. GEORGE, SALONICA 58

TRANSPORT IN WINTER 62

THE ALLIED LIAISON OFFICERS AT G.H.Q., SALONICA. . . 62

THE AUTHOR 76

GENERAL MOMBELLI INAUGURATING A SCHOOL FOR SERB

CHILDREN BUILT BY ITALIAN SOLDIERS AT BROD . . 88

ITALIAN BRIDGE OVER THE CERNA AT BROD .... 88

THE BAND OF THE 35TII DIVISION PLAYING IN THE PLACE DE LA

LIBERTE AT SALONICA 102

GENERAL GUILLAUMAT VISITS GENERAL MOMBELLI AT TEPAVCI . 102

CAMP NEAR THE PARALOVO MONASTERY 122

II. Q. OF AN INFANTRY REGIMENT ON HILL 1050 . . . 122

HELIOGRAPH IN A CAVERN ON HILL 1050 126

ROCK-PERFORATING MACHINE ON HILL 1050 .... 126

CAMP UNDER THE PITON BRULE 134

ITALIAN NATIONAL FESTIVAL (THE RTATUTO) AT SAKULEVO.

HIGH MASS 134

HILL 1075 : ARTILLERY CAMP 140

ARTILLERY O.P. . 140

THE GREEK NATIONAL FESTIVAL ON APRIL 7, 1917 : M. VENI-

ZELOS LEAVING THE CHURCH OF S. SOPHIA, SALONICA . 158

9

10

ILLUSTRATIONS

TO FACE PAGE
KING ALEXANDER OF GREECE VISITS A FRENCH CAMP . .158

A FLOODED ROAD 172

LEAVE PARTY FROM MACEDONIA ON TIIE SANTI QUARANTA ROAD 172

{Photograph by Lieut. Landini.)

BULGARIAN PRISONERS 180

IN THE " CASTELLETTO " TRENCHES 180

THE SALONICA FIRE, NIGHT FROM AUGUST 18 TO 19, 1917 . 192

CAMP OF THE lllTH FLIGHT : ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 192

CRASHED ITALIAN AEROPLANE 246

COMMUNICATION TRENCHES IN THE MEGLENTZI VALLEY . . 246

CRASHED GERMAN AEROPLANE 250

GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY DECORATING GENERALS MILNE

AND MOMBELLI 250

AFTER THE VICTORY : ENEMY PRISONERS 256

GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ITALIANS ON HILL 1050 262

HILL 1050 I HOURS OF REST 262

MONUMENT TO THE FALLEN OF THE 161 ST ITALIAN REGIMENT

ON VRATA HILL 264

MAPS

AREA OF THE ITALIAN FORCE ....

AREA OF THE BRITISH XII CORPS .

AREA OF THE FRANCO-SERB GROUP

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE, SEPTEMBER 15, 1918

THE PRILEP-KRUSHEVO AREA i

GR-SICO-BULGARIAN FRONTIER •

104
129

213
227
236
242

GENERAL ERNESTO MOMBELLI, COMMANDER OF THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY

FORCE IN MACEDONIA.

To face p. 10.

The Macedonian Campaign

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

REASONS FOR THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN AND FOR THE
PARTICIPATION OF ITALY. POLITICAL INTRIGUES AND
FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS.

The great victory of our army on the Italian front with
which the war came to an end made the Italian public
almost forget the deeds achieved by Italian troops on other
fronts, and particularly in Macedonia. This has happened
not only in Italy ; even France and Britain, who had far
larger contingents in Macedonia than ours, do not seem to
have appreciated at their full value the operations in that
area. There was a whole school of strategists, professional
and amateur, competent and incompetent, known as the
' Westerners," who desired that everv effort should be
concentrated exclusively on the French and Italian fronts,
and that the operations on the various Eastern fronts
should be neglected or even abandoned altogether. Until
the Balkan offensive of September 1918, that front, in the
opinion of the great majority of the public and even in
that of many political and military circles, was of small
importance ; according to the pure " Westerners," the
Salonica expedition was an error in its very origin, and a
useless dispersion of troops who might have been more
usefully employed elsewhere. There were even those who
maintained the necessity of withdrawing the troops already
sent to the East, and others who, although they did not
go quite so far, were opposed to any increase of the forces
in Macedonia, and even objected to their being provided

with the necessary reinforcements and materials.

n

12 INTRODUCTION

In support of this view it must be admitted that the
Salonica expedition absorbed a vast quantity of tonnage,
at a moment when tonnage in all the Entente countries
was dangerously scarce, and when the voyage between
England, France, Italy and Macedonia was extremely
risky on account of submarines. It is also true that for
about three years that expedition produced no tangible
results ; so much so that the Germans called it with
ironical satisfaction their largest concentration camp,
" an enemy army, prisoner of itself."

Yet it was with the victorious offensive of September,
1918, that the Entente struck the first knock-down blow
at the Central Powers and produced the first real breach
in the enemy barrier which helped the armies in France and
Italy to achieve final victory. Even Marshal von
Ludendorff, in his memoirs, recognized the enormous
importance of the Allied victory in the Balkans. Until
September 15th, 1918, in fact, the enemy's line of chief
resistance from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier, from
the Stelvio to the mouth of the Piave, from the Voyussa
to the Struma, was intact. When the Balkan front
collapsed, the whole of the rest of the enemy front in the
West as in the East was threatened by a vast encircling
movement, the moral effect of which was not less serious
than its material consequences.

But it was not only at the moment of the victorious
offensive that the Eastern expedition justified itself. Even
in the preceding period of long and enervating suspense,
the presence of the Allied armies in Macedonia had an im-
portance which was far from indifferent with regard to the
general economy of the war. Owing to causes which we
shall subsequently examine, the Army of the Orient 1 had
not been able to carry out the task originally assigned to
it of bringing aid to invaded Serbia and saving her from
her extreme ruin, and it was therefore believed that that
army had no longer any raison d'etre. The truth, however,
is very different, because for months and years it mounted
guard in the Balkans, preventing the Central Empires

1 The official designation of the Macedonian force was " Allied Armies
in the Orient," but it was often abbreviated to "Army of the Orient."

REASONS FOR THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN 13

from reaching Salonica and invading Old Greece,1 where
they might have established innumerable new submarine
bases and thus dominated the whole of the Eastern
Mediterranean. This would have rendered any traffic
with Egypt and consequently with India and Australia
practically impossible, that is to say, with some of the most
important sources of supply for the whole of the Entente
and particularly for Italy. If the Army of the Orient
was enmeshed amidst the marshes and arid rocks of
Macedonia, on the other hand that Army nailed down the
whole of the Bulgarian Army, consisting of close on three-
quarters of a million men,2 amply provided with artillery
both Bulgarian and German, throughout the whole of
the war, and for a time certain German and Turkish
divisions as well, forces which might themselves have
been employed elsewhere. Incidentally, the operations in
Albania against the Austrians could not have been
maintained without the support of the Army of the Orient
on its right.

In Italy, perhaps more than elsewhere, the advantages
of the Macedonian expedition were doubted, and in many
political and military circles, as well as among the mass of
the public, the current of opinion was opposed to any
Italian participation in the operations of that sector.
Even when Italian participation had been decided upon,
and the Italian expeditionary force was actually in
Macedonia, it was not always possible for it to obtain all
that it needed, and the command had to struggle hard to
obtain the indispensable minimum of reinforcements and
materials. Even among the officers of that force, many
considered Italian intervention in the East useless and
even harmful. Various reasons contributed to this opinion.
In the first place, the fact that Italy's war aims were
at the gates of Italy and not in the Balkans influenced
public feeling in general. Secondly, the fact that our
expeditionary force was in a subordinate position seemed

1 I use the expression " Old Greece " to indicate the territory of the
Greek Kingdom as it was before the acquisition of Southern Macedonia
in consequence of the Balkan War of 1912-13.

2 It is not true, as is generally believed, that Bulgarian units were
employed on other fronts except in Roumania.

14 INTRODUCTION

to many to be derogatory to Italian dignity ; a feeling
which may be compared with the one that the war with
Austria was in a certain sense apart from the general
World War. This attitude, which lasted to the end, has
been very injurious to our interests in the Balkans and
elsewhere, and those among us who really felt the inter-
Allied character of the war have had to struggle without
ceasing both to convince our dissident compatriots of
their error, and to prove to the Allies that those who
maintained the purely Italian character of the war only
represented a part of Italian public opinion, and that part
not the best informed.

Yet Italy's participation in the Eastern expedition was
inevitable. Independently of boundary questions of a
general character, it was not possible that Italy should
remain absent from that area, which subsequent events
have proved to be extremely important. Even before the
war we had great political and economic interests in the
Balkans, interests in part destroyed and in part menaced
by the Austrians and Germans in the course of the
campaign ; it was absolutely necessary that we ourselves
should participate in reconstructing them, instead of leaving
this work entirely to others. Further, in the new settle-
ment which the war would create in the Near East, fresh
interests and new currents of trade were bound to be
created. For this reason too it was necessary that Italy
by her presence should participate directly in shaping this
new settlement. We complain now that our interests
in the East are not sufficiently recognized and respected,
but how could we have claimed recognition and respect for
them if we had had no share at all in the Macedonian
campaign ? Above all, what would have been our prestige
among the Balkan peoples if the latter had seen the vic-
torious troops of France, Britain, Serbia and even Greece
marching past, and not those of Italy ? Our victory in
Italy would not have sufficed to affirm our position among
the Balkan peoples if they had not seen us J;ake part in
the victor}^ won in their own homelands. It would indeed
have been better if our participation had been far greal er
and our expeditionary force on a far larger scale.

ITALY'S PARTICIPATION 15

The vicissitudes of the Army of the Orient are much
less known than those of all the other armies in the World
War, and in particular those of the Italian expeditionary
force are largely ignored by the public, even in Italy.
Many believe that it was merely a modest contingent,
because it was called the " 35th Infantry Division,"
whereas in reality its strength was superior to that of an
army corps ; and considering the conditions of the area
where it was fighting, its importance was equal to that of
an army. It is with the object of making known to the
public a little more of the actions of that hue unit and the
debt of gratitude which the country owes to its officers
and men for their long and arduous struggle, conducted
in one of the most pestilent climates in Europe amid great
hardship, and the increase of Italy's prestige obtained by
their merit, that I have undertaken to write these pages.

When the WTorld War broke out, Austria immediately
commenced an offensive against Serbia, and the Entente
Powers could not at first send assistance to the latter on
account of her geographical situation, as she was sur-
rounded on all sides by enemy or neutral States, except
to the south-west, but communications through Montenegro
were extremely difficult, and by that route only a few
volunteers penetrated into Serbia. Supplies and armies
could arrive by way of Salonica, but always in the face
of serious difficulties, both on account of the obstruction
offered by Greece, whose neutrality was not benevolent,
and of the attempts made by Bulgarian bands, with or
without the approval of the Sofia Government, which was
also neutral but still less benevolent, to cut the Vardar
railway. The Serbians, however, had proved themselves
in the first months of the war capable of defending their
country, and they inflicted serious defeats on the Austrians,
first at Tzer, in the loop formed by the Save and the Danube,
in September, 1914, and later on in the winter at Valievo,
where the hostile army, after having occupied Belgrade
and penetrated into the heart of Serbia, was beaten and
put to flight, leaving thousands of prisoners and vast booty
in the hands of the Serbians.

16 INTRODUCTION

Nevertheless the Serbians were in urgent need of
assistance. Their food situation was still very grave,
their supply of arms and munitions quite inadequate, and
a terrible epidemic of spotted typhus was raging throughout
the country. But in addition to material obstacles, the
very psychology of the people rendered it difficult to assist
them. In the spring of 1915, when the intervention of
Italy was certain, the Serbs had a chance of inflicting a
new and perhaps decisive defeat on the Austrians by
co-operating with us. France, Great Britain, and Russia
then brought strong pressure to bear on the Serbian
Government to induce it to launch an offensive in the
direction of Agram at the moment when the Italians were
about to attack on the Isonzo. The Government agreed,
and submitted a plan of operations to the Allies, which
was approved, but just when it should have been put into
execution, the Serbian Army did not move ; as a result
of fresh pressure on the part of the Allies the Government
again promised to attack, but again did nothing. Finally,
when this pressure was renewed for the third time, rein-
forced, it is said, by a personal letter from the Tsar, Belgrade
replied at the last moment that it had decided not to
attack in the direction of Croatia, because it wished to carry
out another plan against Bulgaria, who was still neutral !
The reasons for this sudden change in the decisions of the
Serbian Government must be sought in the influence of
the secret societies which permeate the whole political life
of the country, and especially the army. The most
important of these societies was the notorious " Black
Hand," to which many of the regicide officers belonged.
Although the Government itself was apparently favourable
to the action proposed by the Entente, which offered
great possibilities of success, inasmuch as the Austrians
had only a small body of troops in Croatia, it was
not strong enough to resist the influence of the secret
societies, who placed their veto on any action in co-opera-
tion with Italy.1 The full details of this affair are not

1 From private sources of information. See also in this connexion,
Une Episode de Drame Serbe, by Senator M. Sarraut and Lieut. -Colonel
Revol (Paris, IJachette 1919), passim,

THE SERBS 17

quite clear, but one thing is certain, and that is that owing
to Serbia's inaction Austria was able to withdraw five out
of the six divisions which were left on the Save and send
them to the Italian front. At that period of the war the
Serbian front was considered in the Austrian Army almost
as a rest camp.

In the autumn of 1915 the Serbian debacle took place,
caused chiefly by the Bulgarian attack. The intervention
of Turkey on the side of the Central Empires had rendered
Bulgaria's position extremely difficult, but that was not
the chief reason of the latter's intervention. Bulgaria
had remained profoundly dissatisfied with the results of
the Peace of Bucarest (1913), which brought the Turko-
Balkan War to an end and deprived her of a great part of
the fruits of her victory against the Turks. The fault was
to a large extent her own, because she had attacked her
ex-Allies, Serbia and Greece, and had been completely
defeated by them; she then lost not only the whole of
Macedonia, to conquer which she had entered the war,
but also Eastern Thrace, with Adrianople and Kirk-
Kilisse, which were reoccupied by the Turks when the
Bulgarian Army had been beaten by the Serbs and Greeks,
and a part of Dobrugia which had belonged to her since
the creation of the Bulgarian State in 1878, and had been
annexed by Roumania, who had intervened in the war
at the last moment. This left a bitter feeling of spite in
the soul of the Bulgarians, and sowed the seeds of a future
war of revenge.

This violent irritation against the Serbs, Greeks and
Roumanians was not the only cause which threw the
Bulgarians into the arms of the Central Empires, and of
their former mortal enemies, the Turks. Their main
aspiration — almost their only one since the creation of the
Bulgarian State — has been Macedonia. The Dobrugia and
Thrace are of comparatively small interest to them,
whereas Macedonia, on the contrary, is the bourne of all
their desires. In Thrace and in the Dobrugia the popula-
tion is very mixed, and the Bulgarians, in spite of the
statistics drawn up by the Sofia Government, are a minority,
and the non-Bulgarian elements of the population — Turks,

2

18 INTRODUCTION

Greeks, Roumanians — are racially entirely different. In
Macedonia, on the other hand, at least in Central and
Northern Macedonia, the great majority is Slav, and the
Bulgarians consider it Bulgarian. In reality the population
is racially and linguistically something between Serbian
and Bulgarian, and the predominance of Serbian or Bul-
garian sentiments varies according to the proximity of the
frontier of one or other of these States, the activity of their
respective propagandists, and the greater or less prestige
and strength of the two Governments. I will not quote
statistics which, being drawn up by Balkan writers, have
a doubtful value and no scientific basis, but it is certain
that the Bulgarian peoples are convinced that if Macedonia
were annexed to Bulgaria, in a few years the population
would become wholly Bulgarian, so that the State would
find itself with a considerable increase of inhabitants —
not aliens who cannot be assimilated, such as Greeks,
Roumanians or Turks, whose territories can only be Bul-
garized by massacre or deportation en masse, but of a
race which is already very closely akin to the Bulgarian
race. Further, in Macedonia there are several cities
closely connected with the most ancient and sacred
historical traditions of the Bulgarian peoples, such as
Monastir and Ochrida. The latter was indeed for a time
the capital of the Bulgarian Empire and for many centuries
the see of the Bulgarian patriarchate. Bulgarian pro-
paganda had always been much more active and more
able than that of the Serbians under the Turkish regime,
a propaganda based on excellent schools and assassinations,
and, as until the wars of 1912-13, the Bulgarians appeared
to be the most solid, and from a military point of view the
strongest of the Balkan States, Bulgaria exercised a powerful
force of attraction over the Macedonians. In consequence
of this propaganda and of Turkish persecutions, a large
number of active and intelligent Macedonians migrated
into Bulgaria, where they occupied many important
positions in the country. A large part of the political
men, diplomats, consuls, high officials, professors, school-
masters, officers and merchants in Bulgaria are Mace-
donians, and they have long dominated the internal and

BULGARIA'S ATTITUDE 19

foreign policy of the country, directing it naturally towards
Macedonia. On the whole, Bulgarian feeling predominates
over Serbian or Greek feeling throughout almost the whole
of Macedonia.

During the Turko-Balkan War, the Bulgarians had
conquered a large part of Macedonia and Thrace, and their
legitimate aspirations might thus have been satisfied,
but, owing to the mad ambition of their Government, or
rather of a small number of ambitious officers, they
attempted to obtain a great deal more, and threw themselves
without reflecting into the foolhardy enterprise which was
the second Balkan War. The unfortunate result of that
campaign made them lose the whole of their conquests,
with the exception of Western Thrace and the districts
of Strumitza and Djumaya forming part of Macedonia.
They retained, it is true, the port of Dede-Agatch and the
railway connecting it with the rest of Bulgaria, passing
through a strip of Turkish territory (Sufli— Demotika—
Adrianople— Mustafa Pasha). But if they were justly pre-
vented from obtaining satisfaction for these exaggerated
ambitions, they were on the other hand deprived of
territories to which on national grounds they had some
legitimate claims. The Serbian authorities in Macedonia,
while maintaining that that country was purely Serbian,
showed by their policy that they considered the population
preponderantly Bulgarian, inasmuch as they instituted
a system of such extreme and rigorous terrorism as is
only explicable on the ground that they were ruling over
a conquered territory, whose inhabitants were hostile to
them, and must be kept down by force.

The Bulgarian aspiration to regain Macedonia was by
no means eliminated by the unfortunate outcome of the
second Balkan War. On the contrary, it was strengthened
and embittered, and when the World War broke out Bulgaria
regarded it merely from the point of view of a possible
readjustment of the Macedonian frontier in her own favour.
I have been told that the Bulgarian Prime Minister, when
a British diplomat went to see him a short time before
Bulgaria entered the war, pointed to a map of the Balkans
on the wall and said : " We care little about the British,

20 INTRODUCTION

Germans, French, Russians, Italians or Austrians ; onr only
thought is Macedonia ; whichever of the two groups of
Powers will enable us to conquer it will have our alliance."
I do not know if this anecdote is true, but in any case it
represents crudely but accurately Bulgarian mentality.
The Governments of the Entente understood this state
of feeling, but their situation was embarrassing and delicate.
They tried to convince Serbia of the necessity of handing
over Macedonia, or at least part of it, to Bulgaria, promising
her compensation elsewhere. But they did not care to
insist too much, because Serbia was an ally, and the
compensation offered to her was in territories still retained
by the enemy, whereas Bulgaria was a neutral, but a short
while ago Serbia's enemy, who was attempting a sort of
blackmail, and who hitherto made use of comitadji
bands, or at least gave them a free hand, to blow up the
bridges on the Vardar, Serbia's only line of supply. Serbia
would not hear of this proposal, and in fact intended, as
we have seen, to attack Bulgaria before the latter came to
a decision ; but the Entente, and particularly the Tsar
of Russia, naturally dissuaded them from such action,
which would have been little different from that committed
by the Germans in invading Belgium. Certainly Serbia
would have been wiser had she shown herself more concilia-
tory towards Bulgaria ; if she had done so, she would have
avoided the catastrophe of 1915 and the three terrible
years of German-Bulgarian slavery. But the Serbians,
we must not forget, are a Balkan people. They have no
high political sense nor broad views, and probably even on
this occasion the secret societies, with their insatiable
and megalomaniac ambitions, brought pressure to bear on
the Government to induce it to reject any idea of com-
promise. However this may be, Serbia did not give way,
and the diplomacy of the Entente could do nothing.

The Entente counted much on the sympathy for Russia,
which it believed to be very widespread among the
Bulgarians, but that sympathy carried no weight in the
decisions of the Sofia Government. The Bulgarians, like
other Balkan peoples, are vindictive for all offences suffered,
and understand gratitude largely in the sense of anticipation

ARCH OP GALERUS, SALONICA.

To face p. -20 .- ',

BULGARIAN INTERVENTION 21

of benefits to come. In the case of Russia, moreover, their
gratitude towards her for having freed them from the
Ottoman yoke had been much weakened by the foolish,
overbearing and intriguing conduct of the Russian officials
in Bulgaria after 1878. The Bulgarians quickly forgot
the thousands of Russians who had fallen at Plevna for Bul-
garian liberty, but they retained a lively recollection of
the persecutions and brutality of Generals Kaulbars and
Ernroth, and of their satellites who misgoverned the
country for many years ; of Russia's illicit interference in
their internal affairs at the time of Prince Alexander of
Battenberg ; and of the fact that Russia abandoned Bulgaria
when she was attacked without warning or provocation
by Serbia in 1885. By the summer of 1915 the Bulgarians
had come to the conclusion that the Central Empires were
stronger than the Entente, and that the former therefore
offered them a better chance of reconquering Macedonia
than the latter. On September 10th, 1915, a general
mobilization was ordered in Bulgaria, and on the 29th
Bulgarian troops attacked Serbia at Kadibogaz, without
a formal declaration of war.

Bulgarian intervention had, however, already been
decided upon for some time. Bulgaria had obtained a
loan from Germany which tied her hand and foot, and,
further, after protracted negotiations promoted by Germany,
she had concluded on September 6th an agreement with
Turkey, whereby the latter granted her a rectification of
the frontiers, so that the railway between Dede-Agatch
and the rest of Bulgaria should pass wholly through
Bulgarian territory. There were two immediate conse-
quences of Bulgarian intervention. The first was that
Turkey could now receive supplies from Germany with
greater facility because there was only a small strip of
Serbian territory to be invaded so as to establish com-
munications by way of the Danube, and it was very soon
occupied. The second consequence, which was a result
of the first, was that the situation of the Allies on the
Dardanelles became far more critical. The British Com-
mand knew that the arrival of powerful German artillery
at Gallipoli was imminent, and that as soon as it was in

22 INTRODUCTION

position the situation of the Allied expeditionary force
would become very precarious. The fact that Bulgaria was
now an ally of the Central Powers greatly facilitated the
sending of this artillery, and it was on the eve of its arrival
that the evacuation of the blood-stained peninsula was
decided upon.

Germany, after the various Austrian defeats in Serbia,
determined to take the command of a new punitive expedi-
tion herself, and in view of the co-operation of Bulgaria
she had concentrated a powerful Austro-Gernian army,
amply supplied with artillery, including guns of the heaviest
calibre, in South Hungary under the command of the
German Field-Marshal von Mackensen. The invasion
of Serbia was carried out by the Austrians and Germans
from the north and also from the west (from Bosnia),
and by the Bulgarian Army from the east and south-east.
The Serbians fought heroically, opposing a desperate
resistance on three fronts, and at one moment it seemed
as if they might miraculously succeed ; perhaps indeed
they might have saved themselves, or at least avoided the
extreme disaster, if they had only followed the advice of
the Allies. But although it soon became known that a
new and more formidable attempt was about to be made
by the enemy to crush Serbia definitely, the Serbs refused
to create a modern defensive system of trenches and wire
entanglements, which in a mountainous territory such as
that of Serbia would at least have held up the invaders for
a considerable time. To the suggestions made by the
Allies that these methods be adopted, the Serbs replied
with typical Balkan vaingloriousness : " Wire entangle-
ments and trenches are all very well for the Germans and
Austrians, for the French, Italians, British or Russians,
but we have no use for them ; we fight in the open and
drive out the enemy." Their victories over the Austrians
had made them lose their heads and forget that these
victories were not due solely to their own courage but also,
to a considerable extent, to the serious strategical and
tactical errors of the Austrian commanders, from General
Potiorek downwards, errors which were not repeated by
Marshal von Mackensen. The new invasion carried out by

SERBIA INVADED ONCE MORE 23

the formidable Austro-German Army to which we have
referred, and there came also the stab in the back on the
part of the Bulgarians.

The enemy had 12 German and Austrian divisions
advancing up the Morava valley, and 7 Bulgarian divisions
(divisions of 6 regiments each, many of whose regiments
were of 4 battalions), which pushed forward in the direc-
tion of the Nish-Uskub railway. Altogether these forces
comprised 341 battalions, of which 111 were German,
53 Austro-Hungarian, and 177 Bulgarian ; against these
forces the Serbs could only oppose 194 battalions — 116
against the Austrians and Germans, and 78 against the
Bulgarians. They were, moreover, exhausted by the
long struggle, and reduced to about half their organic
strength. Serbia had been deprived of her lines of
supply via the Morava and Toplitza valleys by the
enemy invasion. The only hope for her army was to
establish a connexion with the relieving forces which the
Allies were preparing to send up from Salonica. On
October 17th the railway was cut at Vrania, thus interrupt-
ing communications with Salonica ; on the 27th Veles and
Uskub were occupied.

As soon as the preparations for a new enemy invasion
of Serbia were known, the Entente decided to send an
expeditionary force to Salonica and at the same time
decided, as we have seen, to withdraw the Dardanelles
force.1 This decision was taken at the end of September,
and on the 29th a mission, comprised of one British and
two French officers departed from Mudros for Salonica
with very vague orders. On reaching their destination,
they set to work to prepare for the disembarkation of the
troops, but they found themselves faced with the most
insidious obstruction on the part of the Greek authorities.
The Athens Government, of which M. Venizelos was
president, had given its unwilling consent to the landing
of the Allies, but the civil officials and the military com-
manders on the spot did everything to interfere with their
operations. The first Allied contingents were British and
French troops from the Dardanelles. They were elements

1 The final withdrawal took place later.

24 INTRODUCTION

of the 10th British Division commanded by General Sir
Bryan Mahon, who for some time commanded all the
British troops in Macedonia, and of the 156th French
Division commanded by General Bailloud. The landing
began on October 5tb, and in a short time the 2 divisions
were complete, although reduced in strength by sickness
and losses to very weak effectives. Later, the 57th
French Division arrived. On October 12th General
Sarrail arrived at Salonica as Commander of all the French
troops in the Orient. For a considerable time nothing
was decided as to the relations between the different
commands in Macedonia, and although the rank of Com-
mander-in-Chief had been conferred on General Sarrail,
the British Commander, and later also the Serbian Com-
mander, insisted on maintaining their own autonomy.
It was not until June 23, 1916, that an agreement was
concluded on this matter between the French and British
General Staffs, but even this was somewhat vague. " The
question of the Command," this document states, " is
regulated by the following formula : Instructions concerning
the initial offensive as well as the line of conduct necessary
for the further development of operations will be established
by mutual agreement between the French and British
Commands. It is thus understood that the Commander of
the British forces will give the Commander of the French
forces assistance and co-operation in proportion to the
effectives and equipment of the troops under his orders.
He will be responsible, however, to the British Government
for the employment of his forces. The Commander of
the French forces will consult with the Commander of the
British forces as to the manner in which the latter shall
be employed ; with this reserve, he will have as Commander-
in-Chief authority to establish the duties and objectives
to be attained, the area of action, and the date for the
commencement of operations." 1 It is easy to see that the
authority of General Sarrail over the British Commander
was quite illusory. His orders might be discussed, and
they were. Field-Marshal French had said clearly to the
British Commander in Macedonia : " You will never be

1 Mermeix, Le comniandement unique, second part, pp. 23-24.

THE ALLIES AT SALONICA 25

in a subordinate position," and in fact every time that
Sarrail sought to make use of the British or even French
troops, temporarily placed under British Command, he
had to conduct negotiations as if it were a political act. We
shall see subsequently why it was that he never succeeded
in imposing his authority, but the fact certainly did not
contribute to the success of the operations in the Near East.

Day by day fresh troops and fresh material arrived at
Salonica, but the ill-will of the Greek authorities rendered
everything difficult. The buildings which the Allies
needed were always found to have been already
requisitioned by the Greeks, so that the French and British
had to encamp on Zeitenlik, a spot at 5 km. to the north of
Salonica, at that time, before the drainage works after-
wards carried out by the Allies, infected with malaria.
In the purchase of foodstuffs and material every sort of
difficulty was encountered. Worse still, every movement
of the Allies was spied upon by and communicated to the
enemy, either indirectly via Athens by the Greek authorities,
or directly by the German, Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish
Consuls, who continued to reside in Salonica. The situation
was absolutely preposterous — an Entente army operating in
a neutral country which was friendly to the enemy.

On November 17th, 1915, the Anglo-French troops were
about 120,000, of whom two-thirds were French, and on
the 20th a fresh British division arrived, but they were
still far from the 300,000 men deemed necessary for opera-
tions on a large scale. There was another greater danger
which was anything but indifferent. The Greek Army,
comprised about 240,000 men, of whom half were in
Macedonia, and if its military value was not very formid-
able, it might have, in alliance with the enemy, represented
a serious menace to the Entente.

The initial objective of the Allies was to bring assistance
to the Serbs who were retreating before the Austro-German
and Bulgarian invasion. This assistance was to have taken
the form of an advance up the Vardar Valley towards
Uskub or towards Monastir. As soon as the troops were
landed at Salonica they were immediately pushed forward
towards the front, the British to the east of the Vardar

26 INTRODUCTION

and the French to the west. On October 20th the French

reached Krivolak on the Vardar and occupied the whole

peninsula formed by that river and the Cerna, while the

British were to the north of lake of Doiran, on the Kosturino

Pass on the Beles Mountains, whence it is possible to

descend into Bulgaria. The Serbs were being driven ever

further south, but a detachment of their army was holding

Monastir. If they had followed the advice of the Allies

and had retreated towards them, perhaps a part of the

army might have been saved ; but, attracted by the mirage

of an outlet on the Adriatic, or for some other motive, they

insisted on deviating towards the west, thus undertaking

that retreat across Albania which was to prove one of the

most terrible tragedies of the whole war. Before the

invasion the Serbian Army comprised 400,000 men, when

it reached Albania it was reduced to 150,000, with some

tens of thousands of Austrian prisoners ; the rest had died

of hunger and suffering. This miserable remnant was

saved by the assistance of the Allies, and particularly of

the Italians, as we shall see further on. The retreat through

Albania rendered the situation of the Anglo-French on the

middle Vardar untenable. When the French learnt that

the Bulgarians had occupied the Babuna Pass between

Veles and Monastir at the beginning of November, they tried

to break the enemy front on the left bank of the Cerna

in the hope of reaching the Serbs to the north-west of that

pass. For fifteen days (November 5-1 9th) a fierce struggle

went on between the French and the Bulgarians, in which

our Allies showed all their admirable military qualities.

The Bulgarians counter-attacked on the Cerna and were

repulsed with heavy losses, but as the bulk of the Serbian

Army had retreated towards Albania and the French had

been unable to capture the dominating position of Mount

Arkhangel (west of Gradsko on the Vardar), the offensive

passed definitely to the Bulgarians. On the 2nd, General

Sarrail ordered a general retreat from Krivolak on Salonica.

Even this operation was anything but easy. It was

necessary to withdraw 3 divisions (the 122nd had been

recently added to the 156th and 57th) and an enormous

quantity of material along the Vardar Valley over a single-

THE RETREAT FROM KRIVOLAK 27

track railway and without decent carriage roads, in a
season when the rains converted the whole country into
a vast muddy swamp. It must be admitted that General
Sarrail conducted this retreat in good order. The
Bulgarians were attacking from the north towards Krivolak
and from the west on the Cerna, while from the cast they
were attacking the British at Kosturino, while irregular
bands were trying to capture convoys along the Vardar,
and enemy artillery from the Beles range dominated the
railway. Added to this there was rain, snow and cold.

There were two plans of retreat, which may be described
as the maximum and the minimum. The first consisted
in withdrawing to the entrenched camp at Salonica, the
other in resisting on an intermediate position between the
Krivolak-Cerna line and Salonica along the Greek frontier.
The first had the advantage of considerably shortening
the line to be defended, and of bringing it nearer to the
base : but on the other hand, besides adversely affecting
the prestige of the Allies, it would have left the road from
Macedonia and Albania into Old Greece open to the enemy,
thus renewing and reinforcing German pressure on King
Constantine in favour of Greek intervention on the side of
the Central Empires. In that case Salonica, and with it the
whole of the Allied Armies, would have been irreparably
lost. Consequently the second plan was adopted.

The French retreat was carried out by echelons. First
the detachments on the left of the Cerna were withdrawn
to the right bank and the bridge at Vozartzi destroyed.
Then a concentration took place at Krivolak, which was
the rail-head, and the troops retreated in four stages. The
Bulgarian attacks near the Cerna having been repulsed,
the French reached Demir-Kapu without difficulty. They
passed through the narrow gorge by night, while the rear-
guard covered the retreat. The Bulgarians tried to out-
flank the French, advancing by mountain paths on the
Marianska Planina so as to fall on them when emerging
from the gorge, but their attempt failed. On December
7th the bridge and tunnel at Strumitza were blown up.
On the 8th, although exhausted by the interminable march,
the French repulsed still other enemy attacks. The great

28 INTRODUCTION

depots at Ghevghcli were evacuated, and on the 10th, as
the Bulgarians were attacking along the river, the convoys
had to continue their retreat over the mountains. The
two African march regiments counter-attacked with great
vigour, and on the 11th, the depots having been burnt
and the railway and the bridge destroyed, all the troops
withdrew beyond the Greek frontier.

The British (10th Division), who occupied the area
between the Vardar, the Lake of Dorian and the Kosturino
Pass, were not attacked until the end of November, but
on December 6th the Germans and Bulgarians attacked
and the British commenced their withdrawal. On the
12th they too had crossed the Greek frontier between
Ghevgheli and Doiran, and the enemy did not advance
farther for the time being.

The enemy had by now occupied the whole of Serbia,
including Monastir, which had been evacuated on December
5th, the Serbian garrison having withdrawn to Salonica,
but for political reasons they did not wish to cross the
Greek frontier, as they considered the Greece of King
Constantine (Venizelos having fallen) a benevolent neutral.
This gave the Allies breathing space and time to reinforce
themselves. On December 3rd, the French Government
ordered General Sarrail to create an entrenched camp at
Salonica. The area from Topshin to Dogandzi and Daudli
was entrusted to the French, that from Daudli to the sea,
passing along the Lakes of Langaza and Besik and through
the Rendina gorge, to the British. The former had their
usual 3 divisions, the British five (22nd, 28th, 26th,
10th, and in addition the 27th without artillery in reserve
at Salonica). Within two months the first positions were
created with three lines of resistance and a barbed wire
entanglement 10 metres broad defended by 30 heavy
batteries. These defences had been made according to
all the latest scientific rules of war, and had the advantage
of not having been constructed under the pressure of the
enemy, as was the case with the great entrenched camps
in France. Of the three lines of defence, the first and
second were in excellent condition, whereas the third was
merely sketched. The works were in groups of three,

THE DEFENCES OF SALONICA 29

so that the two more advanced ones were dominated by
the one in the rear. They were united to each other by
communication trenches, which could also be used as firing
trenches. Beyond the entrenched camp the Allies occupied
advanced positions, the French as far as Sorovich, and
later (March 21st, 191G) Fiorina, and farther east along
the railway between Kilkish and Kilindir ; the British
toAvards the Lake Doiran.

Allies and enemies now stopped along the line which they
were to occupy without important change for several
months. The enemy lines passed to the south of Kenali
(on the railway between Fiorina and Monastir) along the
ridge of Mount Kaimakchalan and thence along the
mountains to Lake Doiran. Beyond the lake they ascended
on to the crest of the Beles mountains, following the
Grseco-Bulgarian frontier of 1913. The enemy attack
was expected from week to week, but it did not come,
and in the meanwhile the Allies continued to receive
reinforcements (French and British) and material, and they
were able to strengthen their defences and improve their
situation.

In all there were at the beginning of 1916 a little less than
100,000 French troops, about as many British and a few
thousand Serbs, altogether about 200,000 men to defend
the entrenched camp, forming an arc of a circle of 120
kilometres, in addition to the advanced positions. There
were 358 French and 350 British guns, but the heaviest
French guns were only long 155 mm. and the heaviest
British were of 6 in. General Sarrail had been appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the Orient.
The British Army, in May, 1916, was commanded by Lieu-
tenant-General George (now Sir George) Milne, under the
superior command, although in a limited measure, of
General Sarrail. The enemy forces amounted to about
280,000 men.

The results of these operations, although disaster had
been avoided, cannot be regarded as brilliant, nor were
they of such character as to raise the prestige of General
Sarrail with the Allies, nor of the Allies in general with the
enemy States and those who were still neutral. A well-

30 INTRODUCTION

executed retreat without heavy losses in men or material
may be a fine operation from a technical point of view,
but it does not arouse enthusiasm. On the other hand,
the relative conditions of the two armies amounted to
a situation of stalemate from which it would not be easy
to emerge. General Lord Kitchener, who had come to
inspect the Macedonian Army in December 1915, had
actually proposed the withdrawal of the expedition,
which appeared to him as to many other experts a useless
dispersion of forces, and the Governments were in doubt
as to whether or not it were advisable to carry out this
suggestion. But in the course of 1916 the Allies received
a new reinforcement, in the shape of the revived Serbian
Army, which was destined to exercise a considerable
political and military influence on the future vicissitudes
of the Oriental campaign.

The disastrous retreat through Albania in which the
Serbian Army had lost nearly all its artillery and more than
half its effectives, took refuge in Corfu, save a few detach-
ments which were sent to Bizerta. In Corfu the exhausted
and worn-out soldiers rested, were re-equipped with every-
thing and thoroughly reorganized. As soon as they began
to recover from their terrible experiences they wished to
go to Macedonia to take part in the Allied operations.
They began to reach Salonica in the spring of 1916, and at
the end of April there were about 15,000 of them, besides
the detachment formed of the men who had escaped from
Monastir. At the end of June they amounted to 120,000
and in July to 152,000. They were divided into three
armies, each comprising two divisions : I Army (Morava
and Vardar Division) ; II (Shumadia and Timok) and III
(Drina and Danube), in addition to the cavalry division
and the volunteer corps, with 72 machine-gun sections.
The artillery was supplied to a great extent by the French,
except for a few guns saved in the retreat, to which some
others captured from the enemy were afterwards added.
They had 6 groups of 75 mm., 6 of 80 mm. mountain
batteries (afterwards replaced by 65 mm. quick-firing guns),
6 groups of Krupp 70 mm. or Schneider 75 mm. mountain
guns, 6 groups of 120 mm. howitzers, 6 batteries of 58 mm.

THE SERBS IN MACEDONIA 31

trench guns. Scattered about the mountains along the
border between Macedonia and Albania and in Macedonia
there were irregular Serbian comitadji bands estimated,
in July 1916, at about 5,000 men, who broke up and
reformed according to circumstances, now attempting a
raid, now hiding among the mountains. Other bands
continued to exist in Old Serbia, and in fact they rose in
revolt in the winter of 1916-17, causing serious anxiety
to the enemy ; the movement, however, was ruthlessly
repressed.

But the situation of the Allies continued to be made
extremely difficult by the conduct of the Greek authorities
who, although officially neutral, were in reality most
unfriendly. They had created a regular system of espionage
in favour of the Central Empires, headed by Colonel
Messalas, who sent reports of every variation in the strength
and distribution of the Allied troops to the Ministry of
War at Athens and to the King and Queen, whence they
reached the German G.H.Q. The Consuls of the enemy
States were naturally extremely active in this work of
espionage and the Allied G.H.Q. , owing to its peculiar
situation, and not wishing to come to a regular breach
with Greece, either because it was feared that she might
definitely go over to the enemy or in the hope of inducing
her to join the Entente, had its hands tied. When,
however, in consequence of information supplied by enemy
agents, German aeroplanes bombed the city, causing
considerable damage, and killing a number of people,
General Sarrail declared that he would henceforth consider
the area occupied by the Allies as a war zone, and on the
night of December 30th Franco-British patrols arrested
the four enemy consuls and seized their archives, whence
they obtained valuable information concerning enemy
spies. A British detachment had on its own account
arrested the German Consul at Drama in the train near
Serres, in spite of violent rhodomontades and protests of
the Greek officers in the same compartment.

Graver anxiety was caused by the Greek Army. At
the end of 1915, its distribution was as follows : The I
and II Corps were in Old Greece, except the artillery, which

32 INTRODUCTION

was between Salonica and Vassilika ; the III Corps was
echeloned between Salonica, Yenidje-Vardar, Verria,
Ekshisu, Banitza and Fiorina ; the IV between Serres
and Drama, and the V between Langaza and Guvesne.
In theory the Greek troops were to guard the frontier,
preventing the Germans and Bulgarians from violating
it, but none of the Allies had the slightest confidence that
they would have offered any resistance to an attempt at
invasion, even if they did not actively co-operate in it.
Further, Greek officers and officials conducted an active
and lucrative contraband in favour of the " hereditary
enemy." The British writer, G. Ward Price, notes that
it is remarkable how instinctively the soldiers of the various
Allied Armies — the most heterogeneous collection of
characters, types and standards of conduct — were agreed
in hating the Greeks at that time.1

The Allies now began to bring pressure to bear on the
Greek Government in order that the Greek Army should
be withdrawn from Macedonia and demobilized. On
January 28th an Anglo-French detachment, with the
co-operation of warships, among which was the Italian
cruiser Piemonte, occupied the forts of Karaburun, south-
east of Salonica, the port of which is dominated by them,
and expelled the Greek garrison. On the night of January
31st-February 1st, a German Zeppelin bombarded Salonica ;
it was afterwards brought down and destroyed near the
mouth of the Vardar, and at the same time luminous
signals were seen coming from the city. General Sarrail,
who since January 15th had assumed the control of the
police, the railways and the telegraph, seized the occasion
to proclaim the state of siege. The chief of the French
Surete and the British A. P.M. proceeded little by little to
cleanse the town of suspicious elements, and there was
good need of it. In the meanwhile the Greek troops
slowly and unwillingly began to evacuate Macedonia.
On May 23rd, 1916, the Germano-Bulgar Army, on the
pretext that the Allies were carrying out threatening
movements in the Serres area, crossed the Greek frontier
and demanded the evacuation of Fort Rupel dominating

1 Story of the British Salonica Army, p. 97.

POLITICAL EVENTS IN GREECE 33

the narrow defile through which the Struma opens its way
to the east Macedonian plain and flows down to the sea.
The Commander of the garrison made a feeble protest,
fired a few shots to salve his conscience, and asked for
instructions from Athens. These were to the effect that
he should hand over the fort with all its material, which
he did with enthusiasm. In conformity with analogous
instructions, the whole of the IV Corps, distributed through
the Serres area and commanded by Colonel Hadzopoulos,
surrendered to the Bulgarians and Germans, except 2,500
men of the Serres Division who, with their Commander,
Colonel Christodoulos, refused to submit to this dishonour
and managed to escape to the island of Thasos, whence in
September they were transported to Salonica and formed
the nucleus of the future Venizelist army.

The conduct of the Greek Government is explained by
some retrospective history. M. Venizelos, although con-
vinced of the erroneous policy pursued by King Constantine,
hesitated to promote an open rebellion against him, also
because he saw much weakness and indecision among the
Allies. The King had dissolved the Chamber in June
1915, and whereas in that Parliament, which had been
elected by 750,000 voters, the majority was in favour of
Venizelos, in the new Chamber, elected by only 200,000
voters in December in an illegal manner under Government
pressure and threats, the majority was hostile to him.
But independently of these illegalities, Greek public
opinion was to a great extent opposed to the polic}^ of
Venizelos, who desired the intervention of Greece in favour
of the Entente, not only in order to meet Greece's obliga-
tions of honour towards Serbia, but also in the higher
interests of Greece herself. Facts have proved that he
was right, but in 1915 the policy of Constantine might well
have been deemed the more prudent. Serbia was, like
Belgium, invaded and devastated; Bulgaria and Turkey
allied to Germany and Austria ; one half of Albania
occupied by the Austrians and the other half by the
Italians— the latter undesired neighbours of Greece — and
German terrorist propaganda, which in Italy had failed
so miserably, in Greece achieved the success of fear.

3

34 INTRODUCTION

" Should we throw ourselves into this conflict and run the
risk of seeing our country invaded and devastated ? "
the Greeks asked themselves, and most of them came to
the conclusion that it was better to remain neutral and to
make money through war trade ; from the point of view
of their immediate interests, they were not altogether
wrong. It is not true, however, that the whole population
was pro-German. The King and the Queen (sister of the
Emperor William) were pro-Germans, and so also were
nearly the whole of the General Staff, and the majority
of the generals and field officers educated in Germany
or at least trained according to German methods. The
masses were indifferent to the respective moral merits
of the two groups of belligerents, and did not want war,
and as Constantine would have found it extremely difficult
to make war in open alliance with the Central Empires,
he tried to help them by remaining neutral. In the popular
mind Venizelos consequently came to be synonymous
with intervention and Constantine with peace ; the people
preferred peace. Further, as the army was still mobilized
there was a good deal of discontent, and the people regarded
Venizelos as responsible for this state of things. Another
reason in favour of neutrality was that if Greece had inter-
vened she would have found herself in alliance with Italy,
against whom she was much irritated owing to the question
of the Dodecannese and Southern Albania. Finally, she
had reason to believe that the Allies had offered a consider-
able part of Macedonia to Bulgaria in September 1915, in
the vain hope of obtaining the latter's intervention against
the Central Powers. In the meanwhile, Venizelos was
awaiting the moment for action. For all these reasons,
the surrender of Rupel and of the IV Army Corps did not
arouse that reaction which was expected, and which in
other circumstances would certainly have occurred. King
Constantine had received as a reward for his policy a loan
from the Central Empires of 75 million drachmae, while
at the same time he was trying to negotiate another for
125 millions from the Allies. In spite of the declaration of
the Prime Minister, M. Skouloudis, in the Chamber, there
was a general belief throughout the Allied countries, as
even M. Coronillas, Greek Minister in Rome, and his

GREECE AND THE CENTRAL POWERS 35

colleague in Paris, M. Caclamanos admitted, that the
Government of King Constantine had concluded an
agreement with Thrace, Germany and Bulgaria.1 The
treachery of Rupel and the 4th Corps produced very
unfavourable results for the Allies. The whole of Eastern
Macedonia fell into the hands of the enemy without a blow
having been struck. Demir-Hissar, Serres, Drama, Ka valla
were occupied by the Bulgarians, and the fighting line was
brought to the course of the Struma from Rupel to the
sea, and although these towns might have been retaken
without great difficulty, they were dominated by very
strong positions on the mountains behind them, which were
immediately fortified. For this reason, Great Britain,
France and Russia renewed their demands on the Govern-
ment at Athens in order that all the remaining Greek troops
be withdrawn into Greece, the army demobilized, and the
anti-Constitutional Government abolished.2 It will be
noted that in all the affairs of Greece it was always these
three Governments who acted, and not the Entente as a
whole. This was due to the fact that, owing to the London
Convention of May 7, 1832, these three Powers were
declared the protectors of the Greek Kingdom and of its
Constitution. The evacuation of Macedonia was carried
out slowly, as was also the demobilization. What remained
of the Greek Army Mras nearly all concentrated in the
Peloponnese, where it could be easily watched and pre-
vented from returning towards Macedonia. But the Royal
Government did everything in its power to avoid fulfilling
its engagements, and while the demobilization was being
carried out, leagues of Epistrates (Reservists) were being
formed. These associations, organized by officers devoted
to King Constantine, constituted a new element hostile
to the Entente. Then also, the Government tried to
maintain armed forces in Northern Greece by strengthening
the gendarmerie and creating hidden deposits of arms.
Although the importance of these attempts were much
exaggerated, they nevertheless caused some anxiety to
the Allied Armies in Macedonia.

1 See Documents Diplomatiques, published by the Greek Foreign Office,
Athens 1917, pp. 60, 61, etc., and R. Recouly Jonnart, p. 37.
3 Ultimatum of June 21, 1916.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS IN THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN

OF 1916

I have already set forth the reasons wherefore I consider
that Italy's participation in the Macedonian expedition
was opportune, and indeed indispensable. Our Govern-
ment was finally convinced of this necessity, but accepted
it somewhat unwillingly, both for political and military
reasons ; consequently our participation was ever main-
tained within modest proportions. In accordance with
the terms of the agreement concluded between ourselves
and our Allies, Italy undertook, in the summer of 1916,
to participate in the Macedonian expedition with a
division, which, however, was only to be provided with
mountain artillery ; the field and heavy artillery attached
to our contingent was to be supplied by the French Army.
There were then some good reasons for not endowing
these troops too generously with artillery ; the Italian
Army in general was inadequately provided with guns,
and during the Austrian offensive from the Trentino in
the spring of that year it had lost many batteries, especially
of medium and heavy calibre. These reasons, however,
did not continue to exist in the later phases of the campaign,
but nevertheless our expeditionary force in the Balkans
was never provided with artillery of its own, except with
the above-mentioned mountain batteries, a fact which
was to cause us considerable difficulties in the future.
Our contingent consisted of the 35th Infantry Division,
a name destined to occupy a high place in the roll of
honour of the Italian Army, although it has been hitherto
less well known than that of many other units. To this
division many other detachments had been added which

36

THE ITALIANS IN MACEDONIA 87

properly belong to an army corps or even an army.
Originally, it had consisted of the Sicilia Brigade (61st
and 62nd Infantry Regiments) x and the Cagliari Brigade
(63rd and 64th), several machine-gun companies, a squad-
ron of the Lucca Light Cavalry (16th Regiment), eight
mountain batteries of four 65 mm. guns each, various
companies of engineers, transport and other services, etc.
The division had achieved an honourable record on the
Alpine front, where it had suffered heavy losses ; but
before coming out to the East it had been reorganized,
brought up to full strength, and admirably equipped.
The command of the force had been entrusted to General
Petitti di Roreto, a very distinguished and gallant officer,
and an excellent organizer ; his Chief of the Staff was
Colonel Garbasso.

The first Italian detachments reached Salonica on
August 11, 1916. The fine appearance, smart equip-
ment, and the vigorous and martial aspect of the men
in their grey-green uniforms and steel helmets, marching
along the quay under the brilliant summer sun, created
an excellent impression. Representatives of the various
Allied armies were there to receive them, with the band
of the Zouaves. The numerous and patriotic Italian
colony, which had seen the troops of almost all the other
Allied armies arrive — there was even a Russian contingent
which had come over from France — was in a paroxysm
of excitement when at last it saw the Italian troops
and admired the battle flags of our fine regiments
fluttering in the breeze. It was not only to strengthen
the Allied front in the Orient that it was advisable to
send an Italian contingent, but also to affirm Italian
prestige among the Balkan peoples, a duty which the
35th Division fulfilled no less well than it accomplished
its purely military tasks.

Our expeditionary force was at first destined to take
part in an action on the Macedonian front, in co-operation
with the Russian and Roumanian offensive, Roumania's

1 An Italian infantry brigade, commanded by a Brigadier-General or
sometimes by a Colonel, comprises two regiments of three battalions
each, each battalion of about 1,000 men.

38 OPERATIONS IN 1916

intervention being already decided. But the total strength
of all the Allied forces in Macedonia was insufficient for
an operation on a large scale, and by the time the Italians
had landed this scheme was hardly thought of any longer.
General Petitti was to take orders directly from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the Orient
(General Sarrail), as regards the tactical employment of
his troops, but he alone was responsible for all the details
of their employment, and it was agreed that the Italian
division should not be split up.

The Italians had not come to the Balkans to stop in
Salonica, and General Petitti was anxious to be sent
to the front at once. He was at first entrusted with the
Krusha Balkan sector, east of Lake Doiran and opposite
the Beles mountains, a formidable and imposing rock
barrier strongly held by the Bulgars. A month after
the landing of the first detachment the bulk of the division
was already at the front. This area, which had been
first held by the 57th French Division, was not then
very active, but we had a front of 48 km. to hold
with only two brigades ; there were no defences to speak
of, and everything had to be created anew. In the short
time which we occupied it we completely transformed it.
Many lines of trenches were dug, wire entanglements
laid down, works of all kinds constructed, and, in addition,
the whole area was provided by us with a complete network
of roads.

At first we were in liaison with the British on our
right and the French on our left ; besides occupying the
Krusha Balkan positions, we also relieved the French in
certain advanced positions in the valley between the
former range and the Beles. General Pettiti from the
first disapproved of this distribution, because the afore-
said advanced positions were isolated and so far from
the main body of his forces that they could not receive
assistance in case of a sudden attack, nor be protected
by artillery, being beyond the range of our guns. General
Sarrail insisted on those positions being maintainedfbut the
Italian Commander repeatedly requested to be authorized
to evacuate them, all the more so as they represented

GENERAL LEBLOIS BIDDING FAREWELL TO GENERAL PETITTI AT TEPAVCI.

LANDING OF ITALIAN TROOPS AT SALONICA.

To face p, 88.

FIGHT AT GORNJI POROJ 39

no military advantage. They were held by a battalion
of the 62nd Regiment, of which one company was at
Gornji Poroj, a large village at the foot of the Beles range,
and the others at other points in the valley. Finally,
on September 17th, he received instructions to evacuate
them, and he immediately gave the necessary orders.
On the day fixed for the withdrawal Gornji Poroj was
suddenly attacked by overwhelming Bulgarian forces,
but it should be noted that the attack had been provoked
by us in order to give support to another attack which
the British were carrying out elsewhere. The Gornji
Poroj Company (the 6th),1 was faced by a battalion and
a half of Bulgars, and had orders to resist at all costs so as
to protect the withdrawal of the other three companies,
and it carried out its task with great gallantry. The
Bulgarian barrage fire prevented the arrival of reinforce-
ments, and the company was soon entirely surrounded.
It continued to hold out throughout the afternoon and
night, and it was not until 36 hours after the commence-
ment of the engagement, when its ammunition had given
out, that the gallant survivors ended their resistance with
a charge. The battalion commander continued to hear
in the far distance the cries " Savoia ! " and " Viva
1' Italia ! " without being able to send assistance. Some
180 men failed to answer the roll call. The 8th Company,
which had remained at Poroj Station, some distance
from the village, to collect stragglers, was also attacked
and almost surrounded by superior hostile forces, but
managed to effect its withdrawal during the night.

General Petitti soon had occasion to be dissatisfied
with the conduct of General Sarrail towards the Italians.
As I have said, we had a French division (the 16th Colonial)
on our left. On September 26th the Italian Command
learned from General Gerome, without any warning from
G.H.Q., that a part of that division was being withdrawn,
as well as certain other detachments on the lines of
communication which were expected to act as reinforce-
ments for our troops. Thus the Italians found them-
selves with their left flank in the air and not a single

1 An Italian regiment comprises 12 companies (4 per battalion).

40 OPERATIONS IN 1916

battalion in support nearer than Salonica, whereas they
had G Bulgarian regiments directly in front of them
and a whole division on their flank. General Sarrail
even wanted them to extend their line towards the left
so as to relieve the departing troops. General Petitti
addressed an energetic protest to General Sarrail against
such conduct, refused to extend his front, and referred
the matter to the Italian Supreme Command. The
protest proved effective, and a British brigade relieved
the departing French.

We now found ourselves with the British on our left
as well as on our right. From the very first our relations
with the British Army had always been of the friendliest
nature. This complete collaboration between the armies
of the two Allied countries was afterwards intensified
on the Italian front, but I do not think that the feeling
was anywhere more intimate or cordial than in Macedonia,
and this in spite of the insinuations of General Sarrail to
General Petitti. During the two years in which the
Italians fought on the Macedonian front there was never
the slightest conflict or disagreement between our-
selves and the British, which is more, I venture to
think, than can be said for any other two armies on
that front.

Knowledge of the incidents with the Italians reached
the French G.H.Q. and General Sarrail received a
reprimand from his superiors in consequence. On
October 2nd he came to our H.Q. at Karamudi with
the Prince Regent of Serbia and two French parliamentary
commissioners, and after the usual exchange of compli-
ments, he complained to General Petitti that he had
caused him (Sarrail) to be reproved by Marshal Joffre.
General Petitti replied that he had merely communicated
to the Italian Comando Supremo the protest which he
had sent to General Sarrail himself. The latter showed
him Joffre's telegram, in which it was stated that he had
failed to maintain a spirit of camaraderie with Petitti ;
General Petitti then showed him the text of his own
telegram to the Comando Supremo, whereupon General
Sarrail, addressing himself to the Prince Regent of Serbia

BULGARO-GERMAN ATTACK 41

and the two deputies, said : " From the cordial manner
in which General Petitti has received us, you will gather
by what a friendly spirit of camaraderie we are united,
and how a trifling incident has been magnified." This
explained the reason why Sarrail had induced the Prince
Regent of Serbia and the two French political men to
accompany him to Karamudli.

Our troops suffered a great deal from malaria, their
area being one of the unhealthiest in the country. The
broad valley between the Krusha Balkan and the Beles
ranges, which had once been thickly populated and well
cultivated, was now a desert ; having been abandoned
for two years, it constituted a terrible hotbed of malarial
fever. The shores of the lakes of Doiran and Butkova,
at the two ends of the valley, are marshy, and muddy
watercourses flow sluggishly down, widening the fen zone.
The troops in the lower positions near the plain were the
worst sufferers, and a large part of the malaria cases in
the Cerna loop in 1917 and 1918 were in reality relapses
from the Krusha Balkan period.

During the spring of 1916 the Germans and Bulgars
had been busy preparing for an offensive on a large scale
against the Allies. The 11th Bulgarian Division, composed
of Macedonian troops, who were not too trustworthy
and provided a number of deserters, was dissolved. The
Monastir front was strengthened with units drawn from
the Dobrugia and Eastern Macedonia. In the spring
there were 3 Bulgarian divisions between Strumitza
and Xanthi, 3 in the Dobrugia and 5 in the Monastir
area, in addition to 2 German divisions, and in July
we have the following distribution of forces ; 3 divisions
and 1 cavalry brigade in the Dobrugia, 2 brigades and
some other units on the Struma, 2 Bulgarian and 1 German
division (the only one left in Macedonia) on the Vardar,
all these forces being detailed for the attack on the
entrenched camp at Salonica. In the Monastir plain
there was a mobile reserve for attack consisting of two
infantry divisions and 3 cavalry brigades. In all,
8 Bulgarian infantry and 1 cavalry division, 1 German
division, and 1 or 2 Turkish divisions. The plan consists

42 OPERATIONS IN 1916

of a rapid offensive on the two wings, with the object of
cutting the Allies' retreat towards Greece or Albania,1
so as to oblige General Sarrail to fight a siege battle
and perhaps to capitulate. Since the retreat along the
Vardar down to the summer of 1916 Sarrail had had orders
to remain on the defensive, but now that the alliance
with Roumania had been concluded, the Entente Powers
contemplated, as we have seen, an operation in Macedonia
to give support to the Roumanian Army and perhaps
effect a junction with it. Roumania declared war on
August 28th, but she had asked that the Army of the
Orient should attack ten days before. It was, on the
contrary, the enemy who was the first to attack.

General Sarrail was now " Commander-in-Chief of the
Allied Armies in the Orient," and his command was known
as the Commandement des Armies Alliees, abbreviated
" C.A.A." The French troops under his orders were
grouped together under the name of Armee francaise
d* Orient (commonly called the " A.F.O."), and then
commanded by General Cordonnier. It was the latter
who conducted the operations of the summer and autumn
of 1916.

On August 17th the Bulgarians crossed the Greek
frontier at two points, advancing eastward to the mouth
of the Struma and westward towards Lake Ostrovo,
which they reached on the 23rd. Soon after they
occupied Fiorina and Banitza, obliging the Serbs, who
were holding that area, to fall back on Ekshisu and
Sorovich.

Against the enemy the Allies disposed of the following
forces : rather less than 200,000 French and British,
120,000 Serbs, 10,000 Russians (who had arrived in July)
and 30,000 Italians. The French artillery amounted to
346 guns, the British to 370, the Serbian to 284, ours to 32.
The machine guns were a little over 1,300, the cavalry
about 3300 sabres. In all 360,000 men, but in reality

1 It should be borne in mind that there was as yet no contact between
the Italian forces in Albania and the Allies in Macedonia. Between the
two there was a vast mountain area, sparsely inhabited by Albanians,
and almost without roads.

FIGHTING ROUND MONASTIR 43

the strengths were much reduced owing to malaria and
the difficulties of communications, so that barely half of
that number was available.

The enemy had one great advantage as compared with
the Allies — the real and effective unity of command.
While the greater part of the enemy forces were Bulgarian
the chief command was German, and it was exercised
without question. The Allies on the other hand only
resigned themselves to the unity of command — that of
General Sarrail — in July, 1916, and even then most
unwillingly. The other Allied commanders had no
confidence in Sarrail's military qualities, and above all
distrusted him for his taste for petty political intrigue.
Consequently he could never exercise that absolute
authority which is an indispensable condition for success.

Our expeditionary force took orders from General
Sarrail, but when any question of great importance arose,
such as the change of sector of the division or of a part
of it, the extension of its front, etc., the consent of the
Italian Comando Supremo was necessary. All this of
course interfered with the development of the operations,
and General Sarrail complains about his situation in
that connexion very bitterly in his memoirs, but it was
due to his own defects as recognized by all.

The Bulgarian advance in the Monastir area at one
moment made the situation of the Allies appear really
critical, because if the enemy had succeeded in breaking
through the line on the mountains north of Vodena
there would have been nothing more to stop them from
descending to the plain and consequently penetrating
into Greece, and the Allies would have had to remain
besieged within the entrenched camp of Salonica. But
the further they advanced the more they became exhausted,
whereas while the Serbs fell back they were more and
more strongly reinforced. The critical point was the
Lake of Ostrovo ; on August 22nd the Serb left repulsed
five successive attacks on the heights west of the lake
between the Kayalar plain and the Rudnik basin, and
was subsequently reinforced by a part of the 156th
Freneh division. The Allies immediately launched their

44 OPERATIONS IN 1916

counter-offensive, which was also designed to assist the
Roumanians, then just commencing hostilities.

On August 25th an Anglo-French incident occurred,
neither the first nor the last. General Cordonnier had
requested General Sarrail that the French Division on
the Vardar, then at the disposal of the British, should
be placed under his own orders for the imminent operations
towards Monastir. General Sarrail not having authority
to give orders to General Milne, merely passed on the
request to him ; but General Milne would not agree to
the departure of more than one French regiment. At
the same time General Cordonnier, having placed some
French batteries at the disposal of the Serbs, at their
own request, sent a French general to the Serbian Army
as " artillery commander." This aroused vigorous protests
at the Serbian G.H.Q. in Salonica, and the French
artillery general had to be satisfied with the title of
" adviser."

The duty of the British and of the Italians in the eastern
area was to watch the enemy and keep them occupied
with demonstrative actions, while the Serbs' objectives
were the Malka Nidze and Kaimakchalan mountains,
and the French and Russians under Cordonnier were to
attack the Bulgarians' flank further west. The attack
was to take place on the 12th of September on the
western sector, but there were considerable difficulties
owing to the great distance from Verria where the
reserves were concentrated, and it was by no means
easy to distribute them so that they should be at the
disposal of General Cordonnier. On the 13th the Serbs
advanced fighting, and occupied the Malka Nidze and
Ostrovo, capturing 25 guns, the 156th Division pushed
on from Kayalar and Rudnik towards Banitza, the
Russians towards the Neretzka and the 57th French
Division, with the two regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique,
towards Kastoria. On the 17th the French and Russians
occupied Fiorina, and the Serbs, after having driven the
Bulgarians from the bare sinister heights of Gornichevo
— the pass between the lake of Ostrovo and the Monastir
plain — attacked them with fierce energy on the Kaimak-

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATIONS 45

chalan. The Bulgarians resisted desperately, but the
Serbs, spurred on by the incentive of wresting from the
enemy a first tract of their invaded fatherland, after a
long protracted struggle captured the positions. Barely
a hundred Bulgars were taken prisoners ; the other
defenders were all dead. On September 29th the Bulgars
still held a line south of Monastir, passing through Kenali
and along the north bank of the Cerna ; the French and
the Serbs had been ordered by Sarrail to attack once more,
but they were repulsed owing to the failure of the
artillery preparation.

General Sarrail was determined to achieve a theatrical
success at all costs, and on the 28th he ordered a fresh
attack for October 2nd in the plain south of Monastir.
General Cordonnier, after having conferred with the
commander of one of the Russian brigades, replied that,
owing to the state of exhaustion of his troops, it was
impossible to demand this fresh effort from them so
soon. But Sarrail, still conducting the campaign from
his office in Salonica, reiterated the order. The date
of the attack was adjourned for a few days, then again
anticipated, thus imposing a vast amount of work on
the Staff to keep up with these various changes. Finally
the Franco-Russian attack was launched on October 6th,
but it achieved no other result than that of costing the
Allies heavy losses, without gaining any ground to
speak of. But the surrender of a whole Bulgarian battalion
convinced the C.-in-C. that the moral of the enemy was
very much depressed, and he ordered yet another attack
which took place on the 14th. It was no more successful
than the previous one, and cost the French 1,500 casualties.
General Sarrail then went to General Cordonnier's H.Q.,
and in the presence of various French and foreign officers
of inferior rank, made a violent scene to the Commander
of the A.F.O. He declared that it was only the Serbs
who had done anything at all, and refused to listen to
his excuses. General Dietrich, commanding one of the
Russian brigades, wrote a letter protesting against the
order of attack addressed to Cordonnier, but intended for
Sarrail, and sent a copy of it to the Russian Government.

46 OPERATIONS IN 1916

General Petitti was anxious that the 35th Division
should not remain inactive during these operations.
In October the Ivrea brigade (161st and 162nd Regiments),
commanded by General Beltramo, had arrived, together
with a second squadron of the Lucca Cavalry Regiment
and some other detachments, which brought our effectives
up to over 50,000 men. General Sarrail now asked
General Petitti whether he preferred to extend his front
to the left, so as to relieve the British, or, making an
exception to the principle that the division was not to
be split up, to send a brigade to take part in the operations
in the Monastir area. For political reasons, i.e. to render
our co-operation more effective, and also because he was
certain that the arrangements for any extension of his
front would be made regardless of the forces actually at
at his disposal, General Petitti chose the second alternative.
Having asked for and obtained the necessary authority
from the Comando Sujiremo, he sent the Cagliari Brigade
with a squadron of cavalry and some mountain batteries
towards Monastir.

It was then possible to realize how appalling was the
state of communications in Macedonia. The Salonica—
Monastir railway had a very small carrying capacity,
and we could only dispose of three trains a day for
transport of our troops. The movement began on
October 22nd, and the Command had orders to advance
from Ekshisu on November 7th, but as the various services
had not yet all arrived the march was unable to com-
mence until the 11th. When General Roques, the French
Minister of War, came to Macedonia, he spoke of sending
out fresh contingents of troops, but General Petitti
wisely reminded him that in the present state of the
roads these reinforcements would be immobilized and
useless.

The task of the Cagliari Brigade was to relieve the left
brigade of the 57th French Division and advance along
the crest of the Baba range south-west of Monastir,
towards Kichevo and Gradeshnitza. A French" column
was to advance in a direction parallel to ours, between
the crest of the ridge and the plain, while a Franco-Russian

ALLIED SUCCESSES 47

group marched forward across the plain directly towards
Monastir. On the right the Serbs were operating in
the Kaimakchalan— Cerna loop area. The advance of
our troops was extremely hard, as the Cagliari Brigade,
besides having to overcome the vigorous resistance of
the enemy, had to struggle against the snow blizzards
over very broken ground, some 2,000 m. above the
sea. The brigade had a front of attack of 12 km., and
advanced slowly, gaining ground step by step, amid very
deep snow. On the 18th it occupied the Ostretz hill,
on the 19th the 63rd Regiment conquered the " tooth "
of Velusina and occupied Hill 2209.

In the meanwhile the Serbs had made considerable
progress at the extreme right. On October 31st they
reached Tepavci in the Cerna loop (our future H.Q.);
on November 2nd, Jaratok; on the 5th, Hill 1378, the
culminating point of the southern part of the loop. In
the centre the Franco-Russian column advanced fighting
and broke through the Kenali line. But here the Germans
and Bulgarians offered a more stubborn resistance, and
on the 14th they repulsed an Allied attack with heavy
loss. The fall of Hill 1378 and the Italian advance along
the Baba range, however, threatened all the enemy
positions round Monastir, which were now no longer
tenable. On the 15th the Bulgarians abandoned their
lines and soon afterwards evacuated Monastir. On the
19th a platoon of French cavalry entered the town,
followed by the rest of the Franco-Russian column.

The Cagliari Brigade and the French at its right were
to have pushed on towards the Tzrvena Stena so as to
capture the positions north-west of Monastir. In fact, on
the 21st the 63rd Regiment, after having overcome the
enemy's resistance, captured Bratindol. But the French
column lower down, instead of continuing its advance
in a parallel direction towards the Tzervena Stena,
effected a conversion to the right and entered Monastir
where it should never have gone. This obliged the
Cagliari Brigade to deviate also towards Monastir, as
it could not advance with its right flank as well as its
left uncovered. Our troops were disappointed in not

48 OPERATIONS IN 1916

having been able, through no fault of their own, to parti-
cipate directly in the taking of Monastir, to which they
had so greatly contributed, nor to drive the enemy from
the positions dominating the town from the north and
north-west. Then there came an order from G.H.Q.,
Salonica, suspending any further advance beyond
Monastir, and the French who had occupied some heights
5 km. from the town, advanced no more. This brief
respite gave the enemy, who had been in full retreat
towards Prilep, fresh courage, and they now returned
and re-occupied some important positions on Hill 1248 ;
thence they proceeded to bombard Monastir, which re-
mained under fire until the offensive of September 1918.
The bad weather and the complete defeat of the
Roumanians induced the Entente Governments to
suspend operations in Macedonia.

The Italian troops entered Monastir soon after its occu-
pation, and on that occasion General Petitti, Brigadier-
General Desenzani and some other officers and men
were wounded by the explosion of a shell near the Italian
Consulate, and Major Tamajo, engineer-in-chief of the
expeditionary force was killed.

The Serbs continued to advance, fighting from height
to height and had even captured Hill 1050, destined to
become so famous, but worn out and exhausted as they
were with the long-drawn struggle and endless marching,
they were unable to withstand the fierce counter-attacks
of the enemy and the highest summit was lost. One
of their armies was reduced from 30,000 men to 6,000,
and they were for the time being incapable of any further
effort.

On November 26th General Sarrail called on General
Petitti in the hospital at Salonica and informed him
that the whole Italian expeditionary force was to be
relieved on the Krusha Balkan by the British, and thence
transferred to the Monastir area. This transfer gave
yet another opportunity for realizing how badly organized
was the inter- Allied G.H.Q. The British were sent into
our area without the Italian Command having been
warned, so that the Italian troops were not yet ready to

SARRAIL AND PETITTI 49

leave ; the arrangements for the movement of troops
were extremely faulty, and the Italian Command and
above all the Intendenza were over-burdened with work
necessary to make good deficiencies for which they were
not themselves responsible. The march proved extremely
arduous, above all owing to the lack of roads, the destruc-
tion of the villages and the floods, which, especially between
Sarigol and Naresh and between Topshin and Vertekop,
had been very serious. For weeks our troops never
had a dry resting place. Even the horse-drawn cavalry
lorries could not proceed, and had to be substituted by
the small battalion carts. An English journalist tells
the story of a M.T. driver who was seen by his comrades
buried up to the neck in mud, and while they were trying
to extricate him from his difficulties, he said gaily : "I
am all right, I am standing on the roof of my lorry ! "

During this period there were fears of an attack by the
Greeks, and General Sarrail decided to send some troops
to the south to defend the defiles from a possible Greek
invasion from Thessaly. He therefore asked General
Petitti to send the two brigades of the 35th Division,
which had come from the Krusha Balkan, to Verria
instead of to Veretekop. General Petitti consented,
although the movement promised to be very difficult
owing to the state of the roads. The information supplied
by G.H.Q. in this connexion proved absolutely erroneous,
and orders and counter-orders followed each other in
quick succession. Finally, on December 12th, General
Sarrail ordered the concentration of the whole division
at Negochani, 15 km. east of Monastir, as news had been
received of the arrival of a German division at Prilep
and an enemy counter-attack was expected. The move-
ment was carried out, and on the 18th Sarrail ordered
our troops to relieve the French in the sector due north
of Monastir.

General Petitti raised objections to the arrangement
proposed. In the first place his troops, who had been
on the march since the beginning of the previous month
without a break, their services being completely dis-
organized owing to the confusion reigning at G.H.Q.,

4

50 OPERATIONS IN 1916

were in absolute need of rest. The Cagliari Brigade in
particular was exhausted by the long and difficult march
through the snows of Mount Baba. For the defence of
Monastir, which was one of the most ticklish sectors
of the whole front, at least one brigade was needed as
a mobile reserve, but the 35th Division was not in a
position to provide it. Further, it was necessary that
the question of field and medium calibre artillery to be
assigned to our expeditionary force should be settled.
" I do not propose," wrote General Petitti to General
Sarrail, " to undertake the responsibility of the defence
of Monastir unless I am placed in a position to do so
with at least a probability of success ; I do not intend
to sacrifice my troops and the honour of my Army by
exposing myself to an almost certain defeat, thus allowing
it afterwards to be said that the Italians were unable
to hold what the other Allies had conquered." As a
matter of fact, he felt sure that General Sarrail would
not place at his disposal the means necessary for the
defence of Monastir, and he believed that the C.-in-C.
merely wished to rid himself of this awkward task by
handing it over to us, so as to be able to wash his hands
of all responsibility if the enemy succeeded in reconquering
the town. The true reason of the objections of the
Italian Commander was his want of confidence in the
loyalty and military qualities of General Sarrail.

On December 18th Sarrail again called on Petitti at
the hospital, and asked him to choose his own sector
himself, undertaking to place at his disposal two groups
of 75 mm. batteries and the medium calibre artillery
which happened to be already in the sector chosen, and
to leave the division which the 35th was about to relieve
in its immediate rear, unless and until it became necessary
to employ it elsewhere owing to exceptional circumstances.
Subsequently General Petitti, who was now recovered,
went to Fiorina, and, by agreement with General Leblois,
the new Commander of the A.F.O. who had relieved
General Cordonnier, he chose the western part of the
Cerna loop, from Novak to Makovo as his sector, and
this arrangement was approved by General Sarrail. Our

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ALLIED FORCES 51

division relieved one and a half French divisions and
one Serbian division. As the whole of the 35th Division
would now be supported on either side by troops of the
A.F.O., Petitti himself proposed that he should be placed
tactically under the orders of the Command of the latter.
During the month of December the whole expeditionary
force was concentrated in its new sector in the Cerna
loop (except of course the base units at Salonica and the
L.O.C. detachments), and there it remained until September
1918, save for a few slight rectifications of the line.

After the occupation of Monastir, the distribution
of the Allied forces was stabilized as follows. From
Ersek, where a liaison had been effected with our
Albanian force (I shall deal later with the relations
between the armies in Macedonia and those in Al-
bania) to the eastern arm of the Cerna, the line was
held by the A.F.O. The latter now comprised seven
French divisions, viz. the 30th, the 57th, the 76th, the
156th, and the 11th Colonial, the two Russian brigades,
the 35th Italian, the 16th and 17th French Colonial
Divisions. Of the two Russian brigades which were for a
short time in the Cerna loop, one was soon afterwards
transferred to the lake of Presba and the other to the
east of the Cerna. Later, when they were amalgamated
into one division, they were concentrated in the Presba
area, where they remained until their final break up.
The 16th and 17th Colonial Divisions were on our right
in the Cerna loop. Between the Cerna and a point near
Nonte there were the three Serbian armies, afterwards
reduced to two. The line between Nonte and the Vardar
was held by the 122nd French Division, subsequently
strengthened by one, later on by two, and finally by three
Greek divisions. The A.F.O. was divided into two
" groupements de divisions" (corresponding to army
corps), one between the Cerna and Albania, one in the
Cerna loop (comprising the Italian troops) ; the 122nd
Division with the Greek forces afterwards added to it
formed the " ler groupement." Between the Vardar
and the mouth of the Struma in the Gulf of Orfano was
the British area— the XII Corps (10th, 22nd and 26th

52 OPERATIONS IN 1916

Divisions) from the Vardar to lake Butkova, and the
XVI Corps (27th, 28th and 60th Divisions) from Butkova
to the sea. There were in addition the 228th Garrison
Brigade and two cavalry brigades. The 10th and 60th
Divisions and the cavalry brigades were transferred to
the Palestine front in the summer of 1917.

The medium and heavy calibre artillery was wholly
French and British, and in the A.F.O. all the artillery
was French, except for the Italian mountain batteries,
to which the Greek ones were afterwards added. A
fixed quantity of French field and medium calibre artillery
had been assigned to our division, and it was placed under
the orders of the Italian artillery commander. Some
other medium and heavy artillery, which was under
the orders of the Army Command, was from time to
time assigned to the Italian sector in varying quantities,
according to necessity.

The Allied strengths at the beginning of 1917 were
roughly as follows :

Hation Strength. Rifles.

French 210,000 50,000

British 180,000 50,000

Italian 55,000 18,000

Serbs 152,000 80,000

Total 597,000 198,000

I shall subsequently have occasion to mention the
variations in these strengths.

This distribution shows how General Sarrail's object
was to have French detachments always dovetailed in
between troops of other nationalities. Thus the Russians,
who were at first divided into two separate groups, were
between two French divisions, the 35th Italian Division
was also between two French divisions, while French
units separated the Italians from the Serbs and the latter
from a British and the Greeks. He knew that he did
not enjoy sufficient prestige with the other Allies to be
able to do what he liked with them, so that he kept
French troops scattered about all over the front, and he
stated that he acted thus in order to avoid incidents
between Allies who did not get on with each other. But

ENEMY FORCES 53

he never succeeded in having the whole of the Armee
cV Orient under his absolute control, and for every operation
undertaken in common or transfers of non-French units,
diplomatic negotiations were necessary, in which the
interested Governments took part and did not always
decide according to Sarrail's desires. General Leblois
commanded the A.F.O. for a short time, and was subse-
quently relieved by General Grossetti, an excellent officer
with whom our Command was always on the best of
terms. Unfortunately he became seriously ill, and had
to return to France, where he died. General Regnault
succeeded him temporarily, and finally General Henrys,
who commanded the A.F.O. until the end of the war.
With him, too, our Command always got on satisfactorily.

The Allies were faced by the enemy's Army of the Orient,
under a German Commander-in-Chief, General von
Scholtz, whose G.H.Q. was at Uskub, with a German
Staff. In the early part of the campaign, until after
the fall of Monastir, the Army comprised several German
divisions, 2 Turkish ones and some Austrian battalions.
But gradually the German units were withdrawn, except
the Staffs of the C.-in-C, of one of the armies, 2 corps
and 1 division, some infantry battalions (at first they
were about 20, afterwards reduced to 3 or 4), the artillery
and some detachments of specialists (air force, engineers,
machine gunners, trench-mortar companies, Flammen-
werfer, etc). The Turkish forces were all withdrawn,
except the 177th Infantry Regiment, which remained until
the beginning of 1918. Several Austrian battalions
remained in the area west of the lake of Ochrida, some
of whom took orders from the Macedonian Command,
whereas others, although they were facing detachments of
the Allied armies in Macedonia, belonged to the Austrian
Army in Albania. All the rest of the infantry was
Bulgarian, and there was also a considerable amount
of Bulgarian artillery.

The area between the lake of Ochrida and the Mala
Rupa (east of Nonte) was held by the so-called XI German
Army (German, as we have seen, only in name and
regards the command, but composed almost entirely of

54 OPERATIONS IN 1916

Bulgarian troops), with its H.Q. at Prilep and commanded
by General von Steuben. It comprised two corps, the
LXI and LXII German Corps, whose liaison was at the
western curve of the Cerna. The LXI consisted of some
Austrian battalions, the mixed Bulgarian division, the
4th, 1st, and 6th Bulgarian Divisions. The LXII Corps
comprised the 301st German Division consisting of a few
German battalions, and several Bulgarian regiments. It
occupied the whole of the Cerna loop opposite our division
and the two French colonial divisions. Further east
were the 2nd and 3rd Bulgarian Divisions. From the
Mala Rupa to a point on the Beles range opposite Dova
Tepe (east of Lake Doiran) the line was held by the
I Bulgarian Army comprising the 5th, 9th and Mountain
Divisions. Next, from Dova Tepe to the sea, came
the II Bulgarian Army (commanded by General Lukoff),
together with elements of the IV Army ; the II comprised
the 7th, 8th and 10th Divisions. Along the Aegean
coast as far as the river Mesta, the Aegean Coast Defence
Group was spread out. The II Army was nominally
independent of the German Command, but practically
it was, like the whole of the rest of the Bulgarian Army,
at the complete disposal of the Germans. The Bulgarian
Commander-in-Chief was General Gekoff. The total
strength of the enemy on the Orient front varied from
600,000 to 800,000. The number of battalions was
slightly inferior to that of the Allies, but the battalions
were stronger, and whereas all Allied reinforcements
had to be transported by sea, with great difficulties and
still greater risks, the enemy's depots were close at hand.
Moreover, Germany and Austria were, until the beginning
of 1918, ever able to send troops to the Balkans with
much greater facility and speed than we could. Even
Turkey might have sent reinforcements to Macedonia
by rail ; but Germany did not wish to make use of this
assistance, because the Bulgarians were jealous of
Turkish co-operation in a country like Macedonia, which
until a few years ago had formed part of the Ottoman
Empire.

The number of the enemy's field and mountain guns

DEFENCES IN MACEDONIA 55

was slightly inferior to that of the Allies, but they were
much stronger in medium and heavy calibre guns ; they
also had a number of guns of greater calibre and range
than anything of which we could boast, and they kept
their forces on the Macedonian front supplied with their
best and most up-to-date material, whereas the Allies
neglected theirs.

The enemy defences, which were rudimentary at first,
were gradually perfected until they came to constitute
a system of really formidable fortifications, especially
in the Monastir area, Hill 1050, and the sector west of
Lake Doiran. Opposite the Serbian area and in certain
other sectors there were fewer artificial defences, but the
enemy positions were there, as indeed along almost the
whole of the front, infinitely superior to ours. In the
Italian sector, as we shall see, the summits of the ridge
were all in the hands of the enemy, by whom our lines
of access were to a large extent dominated ; the same
conditions existed opposite the II Serbian Army (Dobro-
polje-Vetrenik area) and opposite the British, west of
Lake Doiran.

It should always be borne in mind that the war in
Macedonia, owing to the nature of the country in which
the operations took place, the scarcity of railways, roads
and resources, the pestilent climate, the sparse population
and the great distances which separated us from our
centres of supplies, was essentially a colonial campaign.
But the Germans, and the Bulgars organized and trained
by the Germans, had all the means and materials of
modern war at their disposal. During the early days
of the expedition the Allied Command was not even
provided with staff officers who were well acquainted
with modern warfare, and the material means which the
armies received from Europe were of inferior quality.
The C.A.A. never attributed sufficient weight to these
difficulties.

CHAPTER III

THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES IN THE
ORIENT. THE FRENCH TROOPS.

Let us now see how the Chief Command of the Allied
Armies at Salonica was organized. This should have
been essentially an inter- Allied Command. But in practice
it always remained a French Command, to which some
liaison officers were attached representing the other Allied
armies. Instead of devoting his attention to operations
exclusively, and particularly to those executed by several
Allied forces in collaboration, General Sarrail, and to
a lesser extent even his successors, was principally occupied
with the Armee frangaise d'Orient, although the latter
had its own Command and Staff. Sarrail moreover
attended personally to a number of other matters, such
as the police, the Press and postal censorship, trade,
archaeology etc., which ought not to have required the
attention of the Commander-in-Chief, or at least should
have been delegated by him to subordinates.

General Sarrail came to Salonica from the French
front, where he had commanded the III Army. He had
proved himself a gallant soldier, and had distinguished
himself at the Marne and at the first battle of Verdun.
But he was not a good army commander, nor was he
popular at G.H.Q. or account of his intriguing nature.
The French Government wished to get rid of him, and,
having recalled him from the command of the III Army,
contemplated sending him to the East to take command
of an expedition which was to have operated in the
Dardanelles and in Asia Minor. But when the impossibility
of holding the Dardanelles became manifest that scheme
was abandoned, and General Sarrail was appointed to

56

GENERAL SARRAIL 57

command the troops in Macedonia. He at first did not
wish to go, as he regarded that command as inferior to
his rank, but he soon saw that the choice lay between
Salonica and Limoges, so that he had to accept.

He therefore reached Macedonia under the shadow
of failure, and this was the initial reason which prevented
him from exercising great authority or personal prestige
over the other Allied commanders. His policy of intrigue
increased this lack of confidence in him. In a certain
passage of his memoirs he makes the characteristic
admission that, while he was still in Paris before coming
out to take up his duties in the East, M. Millerand, then
Minister of War, enjoined on him at their last interview
' not to frequent members of Parliament." He was
extremely ambitious and had high political aspirations,
so that from the beginning of his reign at Salonica we
find him deeply involved in diplomatic questions, and
he subordinated his whole military activity to political
considerations. He never showed himself a really inter-
Allied commander; he constantly acted in what he
thought were the interests of France, but he understood
French interests only in the narrowest and most exclusive
sense, not only to the detriment of the interests of the
other Allies, but also to that of a common friendly
agreement of all the Allies, and consequently even of the
real higher interests of his own country. Many of the
far more serious disagreements which have subsequently
developed between France and her Allies have their
remote origins in the bickerings engendered by General
Sarrail's policy in Macedonia.

In appearance he was a handsome, attractive-looking
man, of martial bearing, in spite of his white hair, and
he was affable with everybody. He affected a slightly
exaggerated bonhomie which occasionally assumed a
somewhat vulgar tone, easily degenerating into coarseness.
Nor did he always maintain that dignity which should
characterize the bearing of every officer, but particularly
of one invested with such important functions. He
allowed Captain Mathieu, attached to his Staff (an officer
of whom I shall have more to say later) to behave and

58 THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

adopt a tone towards him at his own mess which scandalized
the other French or Allied officers who were present at
these unedifying scenes. A freemason, an anti-Clerical,
of strong Radical-Socialist sympathies, he had composed
his Staff of officers having the same views, many of whom
had no other qualifications for their jobs. The great
majority of the French officers were anything but enthu-
siastic towards Sarrail's military and political conduct ;
they complained of favouritism in the matter of promotions
for merit, which were reserved for a small clique of officers
in his immediate entourage, and were seldom granted
to the real fighters. He rarely visited the front, save
on the occasion of ceremonies, conferring of medals,
official visits, etc. He prepared his plans of operations
in his office at Salonica, where he spent nearly all his time,
even during important offensives.

His amorous relations were the subject of a vast
amount of gossip. His friendship for a Russian lady
of high rank reached such a point that she was allowed
to enter his office at G.H.Q. at any moment, even when
he himself was not there and confidential documents
were spread about his desk. The lady in question was
actually suspected of espionage, and apart from this
charge, which was probably unfounded, she was also
accused of illicit interference in political and military
affairs. In this connexion she once said to an Italian
officer, some time after Sarrail's departure ; " It has
been stated that when General Sarrail was here, it was
I who commanded the Armee d' Orient. Unfortunately,
this was untrue ; if I had commanded it, far fewer betises
would have been committed." The greatest surprise
caused by General Sarrail was his marriage with a French
Red Cross nurse attached to one of the military hospitals
in Salonica, in the spring of 1917. The affair caused a
considerable scandal, as all Allied officers were forbidden
to bring their wives out to Macedonia, whereas Sarrail
not only married, but kept his wife with him in Salonica.

The absolute want of confidence of the Allied commanders
under his orders in General Sarrail's military qualities,
his position became ever more impossible. To command

CHURCH OF ST. GEORGE, SALONICA.

To face p. 58.

SARRAIL'S CONDUCT 59

an army composed of soldiers belonging to five different
nationalities, two of them indigenous to the country,
each with its own military organization, is at best no
easy task, and only a leader endowed with great tact,
a conciliatory spirit and a keen respect for the national
feelings of others could have done so with success. In
a national army the orders of the commander are obeyed
without discussion ; but in a force like the Armee d'Orient
the Allied commanders under General Sarrail were re-
presentatives of their respective G.H.Q.'s and Govern-
ments, to whom they could always apply if he gave
orders which appeared to them out of place. Sarrail
ever gave the first consideration to the political effect
which this or that event would produce, and he often
gave orders for an operation simply because he believed
that it would make a good impression on the public
and on the Press, and consequently on the world of
politicians, even if it were of no real military value. It
was clear that with such a leader, even if he had had
military qualities superior to those which he actually
possessed, and if he had had really abundant re-
sources at his disposal, it would have been very difficult
to carry out an offensive on a large scale with any likeli-
hood of success. In fact, while the Monastir offensive
was only half a success and produced hardly any results,
the offensive of May, 1917 was, as we shall see, a complete
failure. Sarrail's only real achievement was the deposition
of King Constantine, and that was a political rather than
a military enterprise.

A characteristic side of General Sarrail's activities
was his commercial policy. He took a lively interest
in the promotion of French economic development in
Macedonia, to the detriment, not of enemy interests,
which were non-existent, but of those of the other Allies.
He had instituted a very well-organized commercial
bureau, but it was generally regarded as not quite correct
that an inter-Allied Commander should avail himself
of his position as such to develop the trade of his own
country alone. To attain this object he also made use
of the postal censorship, to which he devoted consider-

60 THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

able attention. By its means he learnt which local
merchants sent their orders to France and which to other
countries ; the latter were not infrequently the objects
of thinly veiled threats and persecutions, inflicted with
a view to inducing them to alter their ways. Matters
reached such a point that the other Governments ended
by establishing postal censorships of their own over the
correspondence between Salonica and their respective
countries.

General Sarrail had numerous conflicts with the Italian
Command. I have already mentioned the incidents which
occurred in connexion with the Monastir operations
and the transfer of the division. But incidents were of
almost daily occurrence. One day a movement order
concerning our own troops was not communicated to
the Italian Command; another time a communique
from G.Q.G. on some operation in which an Italian detach-
ment had greatly distinguished itself failed to mention
the Italians at all. On one occasion the local French or
Greek press was allowed or inspired to print articles
attacking and libelling Italy, while on another the local
Italian paper La Voce aVItalia was suspended for having
replied in a somewhat violent tone. It might be thought
that the Italians were too susceptible on these matters,
but incidents of this kind occurred with such frequency
in connexion with them that it was impossible to avoid
the conclusion that there was considerable animosity
on Sarrail's part against them. But above all our Com-
mand was convinced that he had no notion of what
war in the Balkans really was. In this it was in perfect
agreement with the other Allied Commands.

With the other Allies too Sarrail's relations were anything
but cordial. He was in constant disagreement with the
British, whose commander had succeeded in getting himself
invested with the rank of Commander-in-Chief so as to
reduce his dependance on Sarrail to a minimum. Even
with the Serbs he was not on good terms. They complained
that French help had come too late to save their country
from disaster, and that the French never forgot to remind
them of their debt to France. They did not wish to take

SARRAIL AND THE ALLIES CI

orders in matters of tactics from the C.A.A., both because
their army was commanded by the Crown Prince who
refused to accept a subordinate position, and because they
considered that they knew a good deal more about Balkan
warfare than Sarrail, and in this they were not altogether
wrong. They were moreover irritated by the fact that
the French communiques never gave sufficient prominence
to the actions of the Serbian troops, so that their G.H.Q.
ended by issuing communiques of its own. Even with
the Greeks, to whom, after the Venizelist revolution,
he always spoke " honeyed words " in public, he was
on the worst of terms, as appears from his memoirs and
articles published since the war. The street in Salonica
which had been gratefully baptized " Odos Sarrail " has
recently had its name altered.

It can be fairly stated that General Sarrail stands
condemned by his own memoirs more severely than by
any outside criticism. The volume is very interesting
and well written, but, as a distinguished Italian officer
stated, "on a background of undeniable truths, he has
woven a tissue of venemous untruths, with which he
has sought in vain to justify his action in the Orient."
His political intrigues, his conduct towards the Allies,
the manner in which he treated many gallant French
officers, such as General Cordonnier — to mention one
case alone — all this appears in the clearest light in his
Apologia pro vita sua.

The G.H.Q. of the C.A.A. was of course at Salonica.
It was, like other French Army Commands, divided into
two main branches — the Etat-major de VAvant and the
Direction de VArriere. The Chief of the General Staff
under General Sarrail was first Colonel George and then
General Michaud. The Avant was divided into four
bureaux : 1st, effectives and materials ; 2nd, information
(intelligence) ; 3rd, operations ; 4th, supply and transport.
Relations between the liaison officers and the Command
and its bureaux were as a rule extremely cordial, and
for my own part I shall always have the pleasantest
remembrance of them, especially of my connexion with
the Deuxieme Bureau, to which we liaison officers

62 THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

were for a long time attached ; its successive chiefs
(these unfortunately were constantly changing) were
regular, and usually very distinguished, officers of field
rank, and the other members of it were reserve officers,
some of them eminent men in different walks of life —
university professors, archaeologists, jurists, etc. With
the 3rd bureau too, to which we were afterwards attached,
I always got on well. But it should be added that with
the French Command (advisedly, I call it French, although
in theory it was inter-Allied) there was never that same
camaraderie that there was with the British. With the
former we were welcome guests, whereas the latter treated
us as brothers and hid nothing from us. Let me quote
an instance of this difference with regard to the question of
strength returns. It was very important for all the Allies
to know each other's respective strengths. We naturally
communicated ours to the C.A.A. and the other Commands
periodically and in the greatest detail. To learn the
French strength required immense labour and ingenuity
in collecting, collating and completing the figures ; they
were communicated to us unwillingly, in an incomplete
form and with considerable delay — it was indeed far
easier to learn what were the enemy's effectives than those
of the French. The British on the other hand placed
their statistical returns at our disposal, showing the organic
strength, the actual strength, the reinforcements asked
for and those known to be on their way out, for each
unit and speciality. Nor did the Serbs or Greeks have
any objection to communicating their strengths to us.
It was generally believed that the reason of this reticence
on the part of the French was that, while they maintained
the number of their units unchanged, their effective
strength was greatly reduced, and that they feared that
the Allies, especially the British, might avail themselves
of this state of things as a pretext for refusing to recognize
France's right to the supreme command of operations
in Macedonia. I do not know whether this wasT;he real
or only reason, but the fact in itself is undoubted, and it
certainly rendered co-operation much more difficult than
it ought to have been.

TRANSPORT IN WINTER.

*m

<t»*

THE ALLIED LIAISON OFFICERS AT G.H.Q., SALONICA.

To faco p, C2.

THE FRENCH G.H.Q. 63

The services of the Army were carried out partly by
the 1st and 4th bureaux of the Avant, and partly by the
Direction de VArriere, the latter being for a long time
under the sympathetic and jovial General Boucher. The
organization was not perfect, and transport and supplies
were sometimes faulty. The Italian expeditionary force
in particular often suffered from these defects whenever
its services had to be supplied by the French, not on
account of any ill-will on the part of the latter, but owing
to the defects of the system and the imperfect manner
in which orders were executed. The French themselves
were wont to say that more time was needed for a letter
to go from the Avant to the Arriere than to ask for and
obtain instructions from Paris.

Of the 8 French divisions 5 were Metropolitan (i.e.
raised in France proper) — the 30th, 57th, 76th, 122nd,
and 156th— and 3 Colonial— the 11th, 16th and 17th.
At first they were all of 4 regiments of 3 battalions each.
But subsequently, owing to the reduction of strengths
and also to the general reorganization of the French Army,
the Metropolitan divisions were reduced to 3 regiments each,
and the brigades (which had been of 2 regiments each)
abolished. Each regiment in the colonial divisions
comprised 2 white and 1 coloured battalion. The divisions,
as we have seen, were formed into groups, corresponding
to army corps but of somewhat looser formation, of whom
there were at first 2 and afterwards 3, and they also included
non-French troops. Special units were from time to time
constituted according to necessity for special operations,
etc. There was in addition the Cavalrv Division, com-
prising the 1st and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique and the Morocco
Spahis (coloured), commanded by General Jouinot-
Gambetta. There were also some units not forming
part of any division such as the 2nd bis Zouaves, the
Algerian, Annamite, Madagascar, Indo-Chinese tirailleurs,
the Koritza gendarmerie, etc.

It was generally admitted that the French artillery
in Macedonia was excellent. In spite of the defective
and seldom renovated material the gunners accomplished

64 THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

wonders, and although the enemy during the early period
of the campaign had a larger number of guns than the
Allies, and was supplied to the very end with guns of
heavier calibre and greater range, the French batteries
held their own admirably. The French artillery officers
attached to our force were always on the best of terms
with their Italian comrades, and they learned to appreciate
each others' fine military qualities.

As regards general education, the French officers
were superior to those of any of the other Allied armies.
There was hardly one of them who had not a literary,
political and historical culture which we should have
regarded as above the average, and in this they also
ranked above the British ; their conversation was nearly
always extremely agreeable owing to their high intellectual
level, wide range of interests and their keen wit. Their
knowledge of foreign languages on the other hand was
very slight ; regular officers usually knew German, and
among the reserve officers one occasionally came across
some who for business or other reasons knew foreign
languages, but the great majority only understood French.
Personally they were generally attractive, had good
manners, made a great many compliments and very
keenly appreciated any courtesy extended to them.
At mess their behaviour was decorous, and they spoke
less loudly than their Italian colleagues, many of whom
invariably raised their voices to add strength to the
arguments they were sustaining. But they had a some-
what exaggerated idea of the absolute superiority of
the French over all other nations in everything, and they
did not hide it ; for this reason they sometimes appeared
ungenerous, and succeeded in irritating their foreign
colleagues of all the Allied armies. The officers attached
to the General Staff seldom made any attempt to disguise
their weakness for foreign decorations, and the extremely
transparent allusions which they made to the subjects
when conversing with liaison officers or others whom
they believed to have ribbons galore at their disposal
contributed not a little to make the horrors of war quite
bearable.

FRENCH OFFICERS AND MEN 65

French Staff officers were always under the incubus of
the mot aVordre. One day the word would be passed round
that optimism was to be the keynote, and then one saw
nothing but smiling faces, cheerfulness and confidence
in the final victory within a month. Another day the
mot cfordre was in a minor key ; that meant long faces,
black pessimism, le cafard, no end to the war in sight,
the Germans invincible, peace goodness knows when and
at goodness knows what conditions. All this had nothing
to do with the actual military events either fortunate
or the reverse, but was the result of orders from above.
Similarly, their attitude towards the Allies varied from
day to day, being warmly cordial at one moment and
coldly courteous the next.

But whatever the faults of the French may have been,
it must be admitted that in actual combat they were
marvellous. Officers and soldiers vied with each other
in patriotism and courage. When they were in the
front lines no one could fail to admire their dash and
gallantry; their battle discipline was magnificent. On
the other hand, their discipline at the rear and on
the lines of communication left much to be desired,
and the behaviour of the soldiers and even of not a
few officers at some distance from the front, especially
at Salonica, often led to unpleasant incidents. Once
they were away from the front these men seemed to
forget the respect due to their officers, who seldom dared
to reprimand them even for quite serious disciplinary
offences. They often behaved riotously, got drunk,
appeared with their uniforms in disorder, and it was an
unusual sight to see two men dressed alike. A British
officer connected with the officers' clothing store told the
writer that as long as French officers were forbidden
to wear Sam Brown belts he was constantly receiving
applications for authority to purchase them (they could
not be sold to non-British officers without written authority
from the A.Q.M.G.), but as soon as their G.Q.G. issued
a circular removing the ban on that article of equipment
the applications from the French fell off !

Rioting among French soldiers was by no means

5

66 THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

unknown, and encounters were particularly frequent
between French and Allied soldiers, whereas other allies
seldom had rows among themselves. Even the French
camps were less orderly and well-arranged than those
of the British or Italian troops. Where French and
Italian troops were in direct liaison at the front relations
were excellent, and the former often had recourse to
the latter's assistance in constructing huts.

But it was enough to see a French unit in fighting
kit on the march towards the front lines or returning from
them to realize the high military and warlike spirit of
the French nation. Patriotic feeling was extremely
developed among all. " Defeatist " talk, expressions of
sympathy, or complaisant admiration for the enemy, such
as were heard among the officers of some other armies,
were unknown, and would indeed not have been tolerated
for an instant. They might, as I have said, often talk
in a pessimistic tone, but anything like sympathy for the
enemy was inconceivable. The tradition of ten centuries
of splendid military history was not belied.

Of the sectors held by the French two were particularly
hard — that of Hill 1248, north of Monastir, and around
the city, and the eastern part of the Cerna loop, which
presented features similar to those of our own sector.
The other French sectors were extremely uncomfortable,
as was indeed the whole of the Macedonian front, but
less dangerous from a purely military point of view.
The Monastir area was exceptionally hard, inasmuch
as the town exercised a peculiar fascination over the
Bulgars — to them it was the symbol of Macedonia,
the Mecca of their Balkan aspirations ; indeed almost
the only territory not yet occupied by them to which
they laid claim, and which they had reasonable hopes of
acquiring. They therefore maintained a relentless and
vigorous pressure on those lines in the hope of breaking
through and achieving not only a strategic victory
of considerable importance, but also a highly^significant
moral and sentimental success. The German Command
at one time was anxious to withdraw from the Monastir
area altogether, but the opposition of Bulgaria to this

THE FRENCH FRONT 67

plan for once prevailed. The struggle round the town
therefore continued with great violence, and the troops
on Hill 1248 had to keep a ceaseless vigil, sustain perpetual
attacks or deliver counter-attacks, and were always
under the fire of heavy bombardments. Monastir itself
suffered severely as it sheltered various staffs, and also
many batteries of artillery.

The A.F.O. front was reached by railway to Armenohor
(the station for Fiorina) or Sakulevo, and thence by road
and decauville to the first lines, but supply trains at
night went almost into Monastir. For the troops west
of the Pisoderi pass a " telepheric " line was used for
supplies, but it sufficed only for a small part of the necessary
materials, and the rest had to be conveyed by lorry or
cart. The two divisions in the eastern half of the Cerna
loop were supplied by the same routes as those used by
the Italians. The H.Q. of the A.F.O. was at Fiorina,
a pleasant little town at the foot of the Pisoderi pass,
well watered by many runnels and adorned with trees.
The troops of the Premier groupement (122nd Division
and Greek units) were supplied by the Vardar railway
to a certain point, and thence by road.

CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

The British Army in Macedonia, officially known as
the B.S.F. (British Salonica Force), originally consisted,
like the French force, of units transported from the
Dardanelles. Later it was reinforced by fresh divisions
and became on autonomous army, although always
under the superior command of the French C.-in-C. It
comprised 2 Army Corps (the XII and the XVI), at first
of 3 infantry divisions each (10th, 22nd, 26th, 27th,
28th, and 60th), the 228th Garrison Brigade and 2 cavalry
brigades ; in the course of 1917, as we have seen, two
of these divisions — the 10th and the 60th — and the
cavalry brigades were withdrawn and sent to Egypt,
so that only four divisions remained, plus the garrison
brigade, composed of men not fit for the front line.
The artillery was strengthened in 1918 by a fairly large
number of 6-in. guns and howitzers. Each division con-
sisted as usual of 3 brigades, and each brigade at first
of 4 battalions, but later on, when strengths had fallen
very low, they were reduced to three. Each division had
its own artillery, cavalry, engineers, and other services,
and sometimes even the brigades were so provided, and
there were in addition the army corps and army artillery
and services, and the air force. The troops and services in
the base area and on the lines of communication were under
the Base Commandant ; later a G.O.C. Lines of Communica-
tion was also appointed. As regards effectives, strengths
were allowed to fall dangerously low, because the War
Office was always somewhat hostile to the Macedonian
enterprise — at a certain moment, as we shall see, a proposal

68

THE BRITISH G.H.Q. 69

was made that it should be withdrawn into the Salonica
entrenched camp. Consequently, reinforcements were
sent out grudgingly and in insufficient numbers, while
disease and to a lesser extent war losses caused serious
inroads into the strength of the B.S.F. During the last
phase of the war the battalions rarely had more than
500 men each.

G.H.Q. , Salonica, attempted to make good these losses
by repeated " combings out," sending to the battalions
at the front all the men who could justly be regarded as
fit, and reducing the number of British transport drivers,
muleteers and soldiers attached to the base and lines-of-
communication units to a minimum, and substituting them
with Indians, Cypriots and Macedonian natives ; a school
for these new transport drivers was instituted at Lembet
near Salonica and gave good results, while a great deal of
useful work was accomplished by native labour battalions ;
the latter were also employed by other Allied armies,
and there was a considerable amount of lively com-
petition among the different forces to secure as large
a share as possible of the available supply of native
workers.

The British G.H.Q. was, as I have said, at Salonica,
and Lieutenant-General Sir George Milne, who relieved
General Mahon, was appointed Commander-in-Chief. He
took orders from the C.A.A. only in the case of joint
operations, and as long as General Sarrail was in Macedonia
General Milne was his subordinate only in name, as he
refused to tolerate any interference on the part of the
former in whom he had no confidence, and whom he
always suspected of political intrigue. General Sarrail on
his part disliked General Milne, so that combined opera-
tions were practically impossible. General Milne was a man
of uncommon intelligence, with extremely shrewd powers
of observation and insight, and, unlike Sarrail, he was
exclusively a soldier and did not take any interest in
political matters. Our relations with him were always
of the most cordial character. For General Mombelli
he had a special regard, which was thoroughly reciprocated
by the Italian Commander. He was a fine-looking man?

70 THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

a great lover of sport, a hard worker, a gentleman in
every sense of the word ; and he had a keen dislike for
the atmosphere of Salonica as a hotbed of mean political
and personal potins and petty jealousies. He resided a
great part of the year at Guvesne, some 24 km. from
Salonica, where he had established his advanced G.H.Q.,
equally handy for reaching either of his two Corps H.Q.'s.
While staying at Guvesne he usually motored into Salonica
every morning, except when he went out to the Corps H.Q.
of the front lines.

I knew his three successive Chiefs of the Staff — General
Gilman, a singularly attractive personality, with whom
our relations were more than cordial, especially in the
dark days of the spring of 1917, when after the collapse
of Russia it was felt to be particularly important that
the armies of the only two Monarchies left among the
great Powers of the Entente should keep on the terms
of the closest friendship. He said to me when I called
to bid him farewell on his departure for Mesopotamia :
" Our two Armies out here have always been on such
friendly terms that I can see no reason why this state of
things should not continue under my successor." General
Cory, in fact (a Canadian by birth), followed on General
Gilman's footsteps, and when he left to take command
of the 27th Division, General Duncan, who was appointed
M.G.G.S. in his place, showed himself if possible even
more cordial ; he is now British Military Attache in
Rome. The Intelligence and Operations branches were
in charge of lieutenant-colonels, assisted by numerous dis-
tinguished officers, many of whom were reserve or tem-
porary officers, especially those in "I," chosen for their
knowledge of the country and the local languages. In
both branches I was always received in the most friendly
manner, and kept informed of everything of interest,
even of extremely confidential matters, strengths, details
concerning unsuccessful actions, etc.

In dealing with the British one had, in a word, the
sensation that one was among real Allies. And this
does not only refer to the General Staff, but also to all
the other branches and the commands of units at the

BRITISH ORGANIZATION 71

front. The Quartermaster-General's branch (Q), corre-
sponding roughly to our Intendenza, was organized on
essentially business lines, with all the methods in use in
business houses ; many of the officers attached to those
services were in fact business men in private life. Archae-
ologists were found particularly useful in " I " work,
because their training rendered them thoroughly capable of
weighing, sifting, and co-ordinating evidence, and deducing
accurate or at least reasonable conclusions. If a larger
proportion of men of this stamp had been employed in
these services, not only in the British, but also in other
armies, a great many unfortunate and sometimes disastrous
mistakes would have been avoided. Unluckily, however,
a number of Staff officers seemed to have no other qualifi-
cation for their work than an extensive knowledge of
the novels of William Le Queux and Phillips Oppenheim,
or the adventures of Arsene Lupin, whose situations
they attempted to realize in practice. At the head of
the Q branch was the Deputy Quartermaster-General,
of whom I knew two; the first was Major-General Travers-
Clarke, afterwards Q.M.G. in France, the second and
last Major-General Ry croft, both of them very capable
officers and organizers. With the Adjutant-General's
branch, which dealt with personnel, I came less frequently
into contact. There were also many offices and special
services, among which that of the Military Secretary,
whose duties comprised such matters as the promotion
of officers, decorations, official visits and dinners and
protocol generally ; for a long time this position was
held by the brilliant and agreeable Major Dudley-Carleton.
The British War Office made a point of selecting
the officers for the B.S.F. with peculiar care, especially
those destined for Staff appointments. As they would
naturally come into frequent contact with foreign officers,
it was considered very important not to send any
officer to Macedonia who was not a thorough gentleman,
so as to avoid unpleasant incidents ; officers were
chosen for these services not only for their technical
ability, but also and above all for their high moral character
and good manners, points to which insufficient importance

72 THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

was attached in some other armies. I cannot say that
I ever came across a man of the " T.G." type in any re-
sponsible post. British officers never caused scandals
or provoked inter-Allied incidents, and cases of financial
shortcomings were extremely rare and severely punished
as soon as they were discovered. In the conduct of
operations they showed, if not genius — in this the French
were very superior — considerable efficiency and a
thoroughly practical spirit. The most complicated
transactions were carried out with the utmost simplicity —
a couple of telephone calls, the sending of two or three
" chits " (usually written in pencil), and the thing
was done. In my position as liaison officer I had wide
experience of the practical character of British military
methods. We were constantly in need of assistance
from the Allies for many of our services, especially in
the matter of transport, because our expeditionary force
was in certain respects incomplete, and according to
the terms of the previous agreements, it was the C.A.A.
that was bound to supply the deficiencies. The British
were therefore under no obligation to assist us. But
when we applied to the French we were bandied about
from pillar to post before arriving at some useful result ;
very often we obtained nothing at all, or if we did obtain
what we required we had first to overcome innumerable
obstacles and refusals. The British on the contrary
did everything in their power to satisfy our requests,
and when they refused it was because the thing was really
impossible, so that it was useless to go back on the
matter. What was particularly agreeable about the
British was their manner of rendering services as though
it were the most natural thing in the world. I remember
how on one occasion, I had to make an urgent application
to the British G.H.Q. for some fifty motor ambulances
to transport a large number of Italian wounded from
the station to the hospitals after the action of May 1917 ;
although I had received no instructions on the subject
until late in the evening and some of the British officers
responsible for that service had gone to bed, the whole
matter was arranged without the slightest difficulty,

BRITISH OFFICERS 73

and the next morning the motor ambulances were ready
at the station punctual to the minute. I afterwards
went to thank the A.Q.M.G. on behalf of our Command,
and all that he replied was : " We've got to win the war
together."

Another instance of the admirable organization of the
British services occurred during the great fire at Salonica.
When the conflagration began to approach the port,
the building containing the British Army telephone
exchange was menaced, and in fact it caught fire soon
after ; in less than an hour the exchange was transferred to
a place of safety, and at once began to function regularly.

British officers not only had a very high sense of duty,
but some of them seemed to have an almost fanatical
attachment to their particular job, which occasionally
had its amusing side. One very distinguished officer,
whose duties were connected with the topographical
section, looked at every event on the Macedonian or
other fronts exclusively from the point of view of map-
making. His only comment on the deposition of King
Constantine and the return of Venizelos to Athens was
that he trusted that it would now be possible for him
to obtain certain maps of Thessaly which the Royalist
Staff had hitherto refused to give him. During the gloomy
days of the great German push in March 1918, what he
chiefly deplored was the probable capture by the enemy
of the topographical plant and depot at the V Army
H.Q. in Albert. After the collapse of Bulgaria in Sep-
tember following, he regretted that the end had come
so soon because there was a certain sector of the British
front which he had not quite finished mapping, and now he
would be unable to complete the work; not to mention
the fact that all the beautiful maps which he had prepared
with so much care were now mere wastepaper !

In the British Army differences between the various
arms and services seemed to be less marked than in
others, but the esprit de corps among officers and men
of the same regiment was extremely strong, even though
a regiment was not an effective unit. What appeared
to many officers of other Allied armies as a most excellent

74 THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

institution was that of temporary rank. The fact that
an officer entrusted with duties pertaining to a higher
rank than his own, on account of his peculiar fitness
for the position, could be temporarily promoted to that
higher rank, even though for administrative reasons it
was not possible to give him the effective rank, was
very useful and presented many advantages. With us,
subalterns who in civil life held important positions,
in the army were either detailed for duties far below
their real capabilities and were thus wasted, or if they were
entrusted with more responsible duties, they retained
their modest military rank and often came into conflict
with superior officers of the regular army who were
jealous of them. As a liaison officer, although only
a lieutenant, I seldom did any business with foreign
officers below the rank of major, and usually dealt in
generals, but as I represented a foreign army I was
treated practically as an equal, which of course was not
the case when I had to do with Italian officers of superior
rank.

There was a very strong sense of equality between
officers of different rank when off duty — at mess, in
sport, etc. Officers belonging to the same mess never
waited for each other when dinner was announced,
whatever the rank of the absent colleague might be,
nor were inferiors expected to salute their superiors at
mess or at the clubs, even in the case of a general. This
custom sometimes caused offence to certain Italian
generals or field officers, who could not understand
why they were not saluted by British subalterns whom
they met at a restaurant or club ; it was of course
not due to lack of deference on the part of the latter, but
to that tendency to exclude all feeling of malaise between
inferiors and superiors when off duty. The one real
distinction between categories of officers in the British
Army was that existing between those attached to the
Staff and those who were not. The feelings of fhe latter,
especially of regimental officers, towards the former
were sometimes rather bitter, as indeed has been the case
in all armies from the days of the Iliad downward ;

DISCIPLINE 75

in our own army the distinction was particularly marked.
In the B.S.F., as I suppose in other British armies, the
Staff officer considered himself superior intellectually
to the average regimental or A.S.C. officer — and he
generally was — while the latter had a certain contempt
not unmixed with envy for the red-tabbed super-man
enjoying the privileges and comforts of G.H.Q., and
proximity to that magnificent divinity the C.-in-C,
or even of such minor divinities as corps or divisional
commanders, and avoiding the dangers of life in the
front lines. " We run all the risks and do all the really
hard work, whereas they get all the plums," expresses
the general attitude. But the conflict is inevitable and
universal, and should not be taken too seriously, the
more so as the majority of staff officers had usually been
through the mill of trench warfare themselves, and often
had been given staff appointments only after having
been badly wounded. If anything, in the British Army
the feeling against supposed embusques was less virulent
than in others.

The discipline of the British troops in the East was
really admirable, and was all the more remarkable inasmuch
as a very large part of the army was improvised ; the
men, however, had acquired a military bearing equal
to that of their professional comrades, but without
a trace of that militarism which made the Prussian so
justly disliked. If at the front the British Tommy was
a first-class fighting man, his discipline was equally
well maintained at the base or along the lines of communi-
cation. His personal cleanliness was remarkable, and
so was that of his kit and quarters. At Salonica drunken-
ness was by no means uncommon, even among officers,
especially those who had come down from the trenches
on a few days' leave, but it seldom led to violence and
riotousness, and the much-dreaded A. P.M. was apt to
come down with a heavy hand on delinquents. British
road discipline was also excellent, and blocks seldom
occurred even along the most frequented roads and in
moments of exceptionally heavy traffic. What greatly
impressed the local population, accustomed through

76 THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

centuries to the passage of native or foreign armies,
was the fact that this was the first war in which, as regards
the British area, women could move about the country
freely, without fear of being molested. This applied
also to the smaller Italian area, but not always to those
of all the other Allied armies.

The British military authorities took special care of
the well-being of the troops, which was particularly
important in the case of armies like the B.S.F. operating at
a great distance from home and deprived of all the amenities
which made life on other fronts more tolerable. Not
only were all possible measures for safeguarding the
health of the men rigorously applied, but nothing was
neglected that could contribute to keep up their moral.
Great importance was rightly attached to every form of
sport. Wherever a British detachment was stationed,
football and cricket fields and tennis courts were provided,
and even the newly invented game of handball was
introduced. Gymnastic competitions of all kinds, boxing
matches and horse races were organized. Horse-shows
were held on a large scale, and it was very interesting
for foreign officers to attend them, not merely for the
shows themselves — although these were usually attractive
spectacles — but because they enabled them to see how
admirably the British kept their horses and mules, in
spite of the enormous difficulties of supply and the terrible
scarcity of forage. Horses of the very first class were
rare, but the average level was extremely high, and one
never saw lean or ill-groomed animals. At the horse-
shows there were competitions for troop horses, artillery
and transport teams, and points were also based on the
state of the harness ; if the brass was not properly polished
several points would be lost. Above all, the mules were
magnificent, and if, as a British remount officer said to
me, the prices paid for them were likewise magnificent,
the services they rendered were invaluable. Even when
the greater part of the British Tommies had been with-
drawn from those services and substituted with Indians,
Cypriots or Macedonians, British officers and N.C.O.'s
succeeded in getting their animals almost as carefully

THE AUTHOE.

To face p. 76.

SPORTS 77

groomed as before. When General Lukoff, Commander
of the II Bulgarian Army, came to Salonica to negotiate
the armistice, he was enormously impressed with the
British mules, and he said that if he had had such
transport animals his army would by that time have
been at Athens.

The various sporting events were not only held in
Salonica or in other parts of the base area, but also in
the vicinity of the front lines, at a few kilometres from
the trenches. They were occasions for large gatherings
of officers, soldiers and nurses, and proved a most valuable
means for alleviating the monotony of life in Macedonia
and eliminating the cafard. Anyone who attended these
entertainments felt, if only for a few hours, that he had
returned to civilian and civilized life and to home habits,
and the preparations for them aroused great interest and
distracted men's thoughts from the discomforts and dangers
of the campaign, while the physical exercise that they
involved had an excellent effect on the health of all those
who took part in the matches, and these were very
numerous. Officers of all arms, and not merely those
of the mounted services, took part in races and horse-
shows ; I have been present at jumping competitions
in which army chaplains and even naval officers took
part with distinction. The British school of horsemanship
is not so perfect and artistic as the Italian or French
schools, and few British officers have the same wonderful
mastery of the art as some of their Italian or French
colleagues. But there is a far larger number of officers
who ride well than in either of the other two armies,
as that form of sport is far more widespread.

It had been noticed that the enemy hardly ever opened
fire or dropped bombs on these large sports gatherings,
which appeared to offer ideal targets, and certain fields
near the front lines, which were sometimes used as exercise
grounds and sometimes for football or other matches,
were constantly fired at in the first instance, but never
in the latter. This suggested that brother Bulgar had
certain sporting instincts, which enhanced the respect
which the British Tommy had for him. After the Armistice,

78 THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

hoAvever, it was discovered that the real reason for the
immunity which sports enjoyed was somewhat different.
Orders were discovered among the enemy's papers that
no form of sport was to be interfered with because the
big matches and horse-shows always involved the sending
of many telephone messages as to the movement of
details of the various units from their regular quarters
to the scene of the event ; the enemy listening posts
were often able to intercept them and thus gather valuable
information as to the distribution of British troops.
Thus was another pretty war legend knocked on the
head.

Another aspect of British military life in Macedonia
was the soldiers' theatres. They were not instituted
until the second year of the campaign, and at first en-
countered a good deal of opposition on the part of the
recognized officers of the old school. But gradually all
opposition was overcome, and the theatre became a
recognized institution. Each army corps, each division
and many smaller units had their own theatres. Officers
attached to the postal censorship assured me that these
performances produced extraordinarily good results, as
appeared from the soldiers' letters, the general tone of
which showed a marked improvement since the intro-
duction of the theatres. " These entertainments," a
British Staff officer told me, " are equivalent to an
increase of several battalions." Officers and soldiers
who took part in them were usually exempted from all
other duties while the rehearsals and performances lasted,
and no one dreamt of talking about embusques in this
connexion because everyone appreciated the importance
of this form of activity. Soldiers' theatres were also intro-
duced into other armies, including our own, but the chief
feature of the British system was the fact that the per-
formances were acted exclusively by officers and soldiers,
usually belonging to the same units as the bulk of the
audience. This interested and amused the 'men far
more than a more ambitious performance, even if acted
bv professional artists of the first rank. The writer
was so much impressed by the British soldiers' theatres

THEATRICALS 79

that he sent a detailed report about them to the Italian
Commander ; the report was forwarded to the Comando
Supremo, and as a result General Mombelli was authorized
to introduce theatrical performances into the 35th Division.
They proved a great success.

I assisted at several of these entertainments, which were
all admirably acted and elaborately staged. On one
occasion I witnessed a first-rate performance of the
" Chocolate Soldier "—quite a piece de circonstance, as
the scene is laid in Bulgaria during the Serbo-Bulgarian
war of 1885 — at the theatre of the 22nd Division at Rates,
only 5 km. from the front lines ; and on another a variety
entertainment at the XII Corps theatre at Janes,
especially built by the Y.M.C.A. ; the tenor of the troupe
had been detailed for a bombing expedition that very
night, but as he was the best artist available he was let
off duty when it was known that the Italian liaison officer
at G.H.Q. was to be present ! I was much flattered.

At Salonica there were comparatively few British

troops. There were of course a great many officers

at G.H.Q. with their orderlies, clerks, batmen, guards, etc,

and the magazines, depots and hospitals required a

numerous personnel. Along the Monastir and Lambet

roads these vast stores and dumps extended mile

upon mile. Immense engineer parks, mountains of

packing-cases, clothing stores without end, remount

squadrons, veterinary hospitals etc., occupied huge areas ;

on the other side of the town, on the hill of Kalamaria

and towards the bay of Mikra there was a whole city of

hospitals in huts or tents, and close by a colossal M.T.

heavy repair workshop. The other armies in Macedonia

also had enormous supply depots and establishments

of all kinds, but those of the British struck one as being

on the most imposing scale, erected regardless of cost

or labour ; this system may have its drawbacks, as the

British tax-payer has discovered, but it certainly did

contribute to efficiency, and if it was also designed to

impress Allies and natives with the might and wealth

of the British Empire it achieved its purpose. The

hospitals were magnificent ; they increased considerably

80 THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

in numbers during the last two years of the war, because
the Q branch was anxious to free the largest possible
number of ships from hospital service and the transport
of the wounded and sick. During the early days of the
campaign serious cases were sent to Malta or Alexandria.
But it was found that malaria and dysentery patients
recovered very slowly in those places, and many succumbed;
at the same time their transport monopolized a large
number of ships at a moment when the ravages of sub-
marine warfare made it necessary that the largest possible
amount of tonnage should be available for the transport
of troops and supplies. Consequently General Rycroft,
on assuming the duties of D.Q.M.G. thought that it would
be better to increase the hospitals at Salonica and in
the neighbourhood, and the convalescent hospitals on
Mount Hortiach, where the air is excellent, and evacuate
only the most serious cases requiring a very long period
in hospital. Thus the transport of the sick was much
reduced and the patients benefited by the new system.
But in spite of the great care which the British Command
devoted to the sick, malarial cases were extremely
numerous. In the summer of 1916 there were 11,500
beds in the British hospitals at Salonica, and some 30,000
malarial cases admitted. These figures increased during
the succeeding summers, because, in addition to the new
cases, there were the relapses of the preceding years.
Thus in 1917 malarial cases rose to 63,000, and in 1918,
when the total strength was much reduced, to 67,000.
Early in 1918 the so-called " Y " system was introduced,
whereby chronic malarial cases were sent home.

To reach the British front there were two main arteries
— the Janesh road and the Serres road. Both had
existed before the war, but were then in such an appalling
state of neglect as to be in places almost impassable,
and full of holes throughout their entire length ; they
were indeed little better than tracks, save for a few
kilometres here and there. The British military authorities
had had practically to rebuild them, and they made
them into really magnificent thoroughfares. Their
construction and maintenance required armies of native

THE XII CORPS AREA 81

labourers and cost vast sums. But the expenditure
was in a sense an economy, because it spared the wear
and tear of the lorries, the renewal of which would not
only have cost far more if the roads had been neglected,
but they would have been difficult to replace owing to
the scarcity of tonnage and submarine risks. These
roads and the others built by the French and the Italians,
were a magnificent legacy left to Greece and Serbia,
but a few weeks of Balkan regime, after the greater Allies
had handed them over, sufficed to reduce them to their
original state of hopeless dilapidation and ruin once more.
Transport to the XII Corps area was effected by means
of the Constantinople railway as far as Sarigol or Kilindir
(goods were conveyed by rail as far as lake Doiran),
and thence by the various decauville and the network
of ordinary roads to the infantry and artillery positions.
Beyond Janesh the country opens out into a wide plateau,
somewhat undulated, surrounded by mountain ranges ;
those to the east and west are fairly high, while immediately
to the north they appear insignificant, but in reality
constitute formidable defences. As occurred almost
invariably on all the mountain fronts in the war, from the
Stelvio to the Struma, the enemy held all the higher
and stronger positions, dominating those of the Allies.
Immediately to the west of Lake Doiran rises the terrible
group of the Grand and Petit Couronnes * and the " P "
ridges, which cost so much blood to the British troops
in their heroic efforts in 1917 and 1918. The " P" ridges
spread out in a succession of hills — Pi, P2, P3, P4, P4^, P4|,
P5 — west of the Grand Couronne, forming with it an obtuse
angle; the "P" ridges dominated all the approaches to
the Grand Couronne and the latter those to the former.
The Grand Couronne, which I visited immediately after
it had been evacuated by the enemy, was formidably
defended by the most perfect system of fortifications
known to modern military art ; the dug-outs and O.P.'s
were cut out of the living rock, and often the sides and
roof were several metres thick in solid stone. A huge

1 These names had been given to the positions by the French troops
who were first in this area, from supposed resemblance to places in France.

6

82 THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

white splash near the summit, visible for many miles
in all directions, proved on inspection to be due to the
tremendous but useless bombardment of the British artillery.

It was on this sector that the enemy first tried his famous
Gotha aeroplanes on the Balkan front — it was, I believe,
the first time that they were used at all in the war, and
then they were more formidable than any machine
possessed by the Allies. The officer in charge of the O.P.
who first noticed them, telephoned at once to the XII
Corps H.Q. that a new type of aeroplane had appeared
above the lines ; he was immediately asked in a sceptical
tone on what evidence he based his assertion that they
were of a new type, to which he replied : "In about
five minutes you will find out yourselves from personal
experience." In fact immediately afterwards the Gothas
were bombing Janesh for all they were worth.

On this sector the Allied and enemy lines were often
quite close to each other as on the French and Italian
fronts. East of Lake Doiran there was a wide gap beween
the two lines, formed by a valley running from that lake
to Butkova. The main line of resistance extended along
the Krusha Balkan range south of the valley, but there
were advanced positions further down, such as the fort
of Dova Tepe.

Between the eastern end of the lake and the western
spur of the Beles is a broad gap, and there many British
officers believed that a break through might be effected,
although it was dominated by the batteries on the Beles.
But no attempt was made here, save an attack during the
last operations in September 1918, and even then it proved
abortive and was soon abandoned.

The XVI Corps area was reached by the great Serres
road, some 70 km. in length from Salonica to the Struma.
For the first 25 km., as far as Guvesne, transport could
also be effected by means of a normal-gauge railway
built by the British during the war ; at railhead there
was a M.T. park, whence innumerable lorries conveyed
men and supplies to the Struma. Various decauvilles
spread out from the end of the road towards the front
lines. The road climbed over several steep ranges of

THE XVI CORPS AREA 83

hills and plunged down into deep gullies, for the mountain
chains in this part of the country all run parallel to
the Struma. The Corps H.Q. was at Sivri in summer,
a charmingly situated village just below the last range
of hills before the drop into the Struma valley ; in winter
it moved down to a spot nearer the main road. The
positions of chief resistance were along this ridge in parallel
lines, but there were also a series of important bridge-
heads along the river. Beyond the river there were two
or three lines of villages, some of them quite large, others
merely chifliks or farms, abandoned by the inhabitants
and partly in ruins. Sometimes the first and even the
second lines would be held by the British, while the Bulgars
held others further away, along the foot of the mountains
behind Serres. But in the summer of 1917, owing to
the great heat and the ravages of malaria, the villages
beyond the Struma were evacuated by the British, and
the bridge-heads held with only an indispensible minimum
of troops, while the defence of the spaces between the
bridge-heads was entrusted to the river itself, which
is difficult to wade, and to the cross-fire of the ports
defending the bridge-heads ; in any case, in order to
attempt the passage of the Struma the enemy would
have had to traverse a broad tract of open country before
reaching its banks, exposed to the fire of the British
batteries hidden amid the dense vegetation or in the
crevices of the hills to the west of the right bank. In
order to maintain contact with the enemy the British
made frequent raids with infantry and cavalry patrols
into the villages occupied by isolated detachments of
Bulgars ; the Bulgarian patrols and outposts did not
show much fighting spirit and usually retired precipitously.
Sometimes the British patrols penetrated into positions
held by permanent enemy garrisons. The most important
and successful of these raids was that on Homondos in
the autumn of 1917, where many prisoners and some
machine guns were captured, as well as a voluminous
official correspondence, whence valuable information was
acquired, especially concerning the enemy's moral, which
appeared at that time to be considerably shaken.

84 THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE

On the whole this was a quieter front than that of the
XII Corps, as there were no positions corresponding to
those of the Couronnes and the " P " ridge, and a no-man's-
land some 12 km. wide separated the two armies. For
this reason it was deemed possible to hand it over to
the Greeks to hold when the rest of the Allied troops were
being concentrated elsewhere for attacks on a large scale.

The houses of Serres and Demir Hissar are easily visible
to the naked eye, and beyond the latter town I had pointed
out to me from an O.P. on a ruined belfry well beyond
the river a large white slab on the mountain side, and
I was told that in 1913, after their victories over the
Bulgars, the Greeks had engraved on it an inscription
in honour of King Constantine (then still Diadoch)
" Bulgaroctonos," or slayer of the Bulgarians, thus
reviving the title of a famous Byzantine Emperor ! The
Bulgarians I imagine must have erased it, perhaps with
the approval of him in whose honour it had been engraved.

CHAPTER V

THE SERBIANS

Of all the peoples who participated in the Great War
the fate of the Serbs represent the most tragic. Our
subsequent disagreements with the Yugo-Slavs should
not make us forget the heroic part played by the Serbians
even though unfortunately they have forgotten the
immense benefits which we conferred upon them. It
is the merit of the Italians if the miserable remnants of
the Serbian Army, after the disastrous retreat through
Albania, were saved from death by starvation, together
with thousands and thousands of Serbian civilians, who
found a refuge and a warm welcome in Italy, when their
country was overrun by the enemy. Let us hope that
in the not too distant future the Serbs will remember
these facts, and also remember the many Italians who
died on Serbian soil fighting for the liberation of
Serbia.

After the retreat through Albania the Serbian Army
found itself in the most appalling condition. Before
the third enemy invasion it comprised some 400,000 men,
with 70,000 horses and 65,000 oxen (the mechanical
transport service was extremely limited). By the time it
reached the Adriatic it was reduced by hunger, cold and
sickness, as well as by fighting, to barely 150,000 men,
40,000 horses and 10,000 oxen. Part of the army marched
towards Scutari and Alessio and the rest towards Durazzo.
The second group was accompanied by several thousand
civilian refugees, and also by old King Peter, who was
seriously ill, and the Prince Regent Alexander, who was
ill, too, for a part of the time. As regards armament,
equipment and food, everything was lacking. The

85

86 THE SERBIANS

soldiers had been living for many months on 200 to 300
grammes of biscuit every five days.

The work of the Italian Navy in saving the Serbians
has often been ignored. The Serbians appear to have for-
gotten or altogether denied it, as have also some of their
foreign apologists. It may therefore be of interest to
repeat what Admiral Sechi, the Italian Minister of Marine,
said in the Senate on July 19, 1920 in this connexion.
After reminding his hearers that the transport of the
remnants of the Serbian Army with their supplies, from
the ports of Northern Albania, where they had arrived
exhausted and famished, to Valona, was the work of the
Italian Navy, it was, he said, one of the Allied Govern-
ments that, at the end of October 1915 requested the Italian
Government to provide for these necessities, and " in spite
of the almost insuperable difficulties of the operation,
especially on account of the insidious enemy attacks,
and the almost total lack of any landing facilities in the
places of disembarkation, the Italian Navy granted the
request and the transport was carried out successfully
and without interruption." It was the Italian Navy
which provided the transport of supplies for the Serbian
Army (about 28,000 tons). In all about 245,000 Serbian
soldiers, 25,000 Austrian prisoners whom they brought
with them, over 10,000 animals, and a great deal of
material, was thus transported. In spite of the ever-
present danger of enemy submarines, in all this vast
movement not a single ship was lost, nor did a single
Serbian soldier die.1 But we did not only provide transport
and food for these most unfortunate warriors and civilians.
Our military and naval medical officers worked admirably
for the assistance of the Serbians, saving thousands from
death by hunger, exhaustion and infection, as typhus
and cholera were raging among the Serbians. An English
writer has described in eloquent language this work in
a book on the Italian Navy. " Day and night," writes
Archibald Hurd, " caring nothing for the risk of infection,
striving with all weapons of modern research to prevent
this plague spot from infecting half a continent, the
1 Quoted in the Cor$iere delta Sera, July 20, 1920,

THE SERBIAN RETREAT 87

naval and military doctors, with their sailor and soldier
orderlies, fed, tended, bandaged, and with hands soft as
women's nursed these poor spectres of fellow creatures." x
On December 17 it was decided to send the Serbs to Corfu.
They were now reduced to 100,000 men with 54,000 rifles
160 machine guns, and 70 guns. When they were trans-
ported to Valona King Peter also went to Corfu and
embarked on the Italian torpedo boat destroyer, G. C.
Abba. He wished to receive the salute of the officers of the
ship thanking them with generous words for all they had
done and the dangers they had faced on their mission of
charity. Reminding them of Garibaldi, their own national
hero— to many of them already, perhaps, almost a legendary
figure — he told them that he had himself twice met that
famous soldier. Recalling to them the dark pages of
their own national history, with its eventual triumph,
he suggested to them that possibly Serbia might be
the Piedmont of all the Serbians, and even in this,
its blackest hour, the forerunner of an undreamed of
and triumphant unity.2 The Austrian prisoners were
re-embarked for Italy and interned in Sardinia, but many
of them died of cholera during the voyage. It may
be added that while the most generous material assistance
was lavished on the Serbians by our Command, as well as
by our officers and men, the moral treatment accorded
them by one or two of our officers left something to
be desired. Although this does not in any way justify the
ingratitude which the Serbs have subsequently shown
towards Italy, it may serve in part to explain it. Even
a cruel phrase or a lack of consideration for anyone
who has suffered so terribly are enough to cancel the
memory of the great benefits received. As we shall
see, Generals Petitti and Mombelli did everything in their
power to make the Serbians forget these unfortunate inci-
dents, and they succeeded, at least for the time being.

The bulk of the Serbian troops were concentrated at
Corfu, save a small number at Bizerta. The first convoy

1 Archibald Hurd : Italian Sea Power in the, Great War (Constable,
1918), p. 65.
a Hurd, ibid.

88 THE SERBIANS

embarked on January 6, 1916 and during the winter
the Allies, especially the British and the French, set to
work to re-equip and reorganize the army, and it must
be said the soldiers were greatly desirous of going to
Salonica as soon as possible to take part once more in
the struggle against the invader, although at that time
to hope for success seemed madness. The Serbian Govern-
ment and Parliament also established themselves at
Corfu, where they remained until after the Armistice.
The reorganization of the army was carried out fairly
quickly, and about the middle of April the first detach-
ments began to arrive at Salonica ; to these were added
the troops who escaped from Monastir or down the Vardar
Valley. Throughout the second half of 1916 and the
winter of 1916-17 the Serbians continued to arrive,
and in May 1917 the army was complete. But the Serbs
did not wait until then to begin fighting, because, as
we have seen, they took a very prominent part in the
operations of the summer and autumn of 1916. As
each detachment reached Salonica it was first concentrated
in the Serbian camp at Mikra near the city, and then
sent towards the front, and its training in modern war
methods was completed in Macedonia.

The reorganized Serbian Army then comprised about
150,000 men, divided, as we have seen, into 3 armies
of 2 divisions each. Each division comprised 3 regi-
ments of 3 battalions each. As regards armament they
were fairly well equipped, and the number of rifles x was
higher than in the other armies in Macedonia because
they had very few transport or lines-of-communication
troops. The Allies to a very great extent supplied them
with these services.

The Crown Prince Alexander, nominally Commander-
in-Chief, kept his modest Court at Salonica, but he
spent a good part of the year at the Serbian front
with the soldiers, with whom he was very popular. King
Peter also resided habitually at Salonica, where he led

1 By rifles I mean soldiers who habitually use their rifles, viz. the
infantry, excluding machine-gunners, men attached to the transport
service, etc., who are also armed with rifles.

ENERAL MOMEELLI INAUGURATING A SCHOOL FOR SERB CHILDREN BUILT BY ITALIAN

SOLDIERS AT BROD.

:#t-*.-

—

ITALIAN BRIDGE OVER THE CERNA AT BROD.

To face p. 68.

THE SERBIAN COMMAND 89

an extremely retired life an account of his illness, and he
saw hardly anyone. The military household of the
Prince was composed for the most part of field officers
who had been seriously wounded, and as Minister of
the Royal Household he afterwards appointed M. Balugich,
who was considered to be one of the shrewdest diplomats
in the Balkans. The various foreign Governments had
their representatives at Corfu, as the Serbian Foreign
Office was there, but the Prince Regent wished to have
a small diplomatic corps attached to his own person.
The British and French Governments acceded to this
wish immediately, the former sending Admiral Troubridge
and the latter Commander Picot as honorary A.D.C.'s.
Later on he also wished to have an Italian officer,
in the person of Colonel Bodrero, formerly Commander
of the Italian troops in Salonica and afterwards in Valona,
and the request was finally granted. Admiral Troubridge,
an attractive type of naval officer, had been Commander
of the squadron which had pursued the Goeben and
Breslau at the beginning of the war, and had afterwards
commanded the British naval batteries on the Danube.
After the Serbian debacle he followed the remnants
of the army to Corfu, and it was on that occasion that
Prince Alexander got to know and appreciate him.
Admiral Troubridge had great affection for Italy, whose
language and literature he knew extremely well, and he
liked to be in the company of Italian officers whom he
often invited to his house, and in turn, he often went to
their mess. He did his best to maintain friendly relations
between Serbians and Italians, and gave excellent advice
to Prince Alexander.

The actual Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Army
was the Chief of the General Staff, General Boyovich, and
the armies, afterwards reduced to two, were commanded
by the Voivods Michich and Stepanovich.

In the spring of 1916, Voivod Michich, Commander
of the I Army, was appointed Chief of the General Staff
in the place of General Boyovich, who took command
of the said army in his place. The change was made
on the eve of the general offensive, because the plan

90 THE SERBIANS

of operation was to a large extent the work of Michich
himself. Although General Boyovich was an excellent
soldier and had always greatly distinguished himself,
Voivod Michich was a man of genius, one of the ablest
leaders that the Balkans has ever produced. Personally
he was a very sympathetic figure, jovial, always serene
and good-tempered, even in the most tragic moments,
and always certain of final victory. The soldiers had
such great confidence in him that during the long period
in which illness kept him in hospital, they used to say :
" We shall never be able to return to our country if we
have not Michich to lead us to victory." He never ceased
to show cordiality towards Italy, and even after the Armis-
tice, in spite of the infatuation of hatred against Italy
with which the Serbian people had been filled, probably as
a result of a propaganda conducted by persons interested
in sowing dissension, his feelings towards us never changed,
and if one day Italo-Serbian relations improve, it will
certainly be due in part to the work of the gallant Voivod.
His death, which occurred a short time ago, is a real loss
from every point of view.

In a general way the Serbians in Salonica conducted
themselves modestly, as was but becoming in their
condition of exiles living on charity — I use the word
without any intention of offence. In this connexion
they offered a notable contrast to the Russian officers
after the Bolshevik revolution. Even their Commands
and offices were very simple, and their leaders were
singularly free from bureaucratic formalities,

The Serbs were supplied by the British and French,
but even the material supplied by the former reached
them through the French Intendance. They were not
however, satisfied with this system, and often complained
of the manner in which the French treated them, both
on account of the insufficiency and the bad quality of
part of the supplies — they actually declared that the
goods of excellent quality supplied by the British were
exchanged during transit through the French offices, for
others of inferior quality. They also objected to the
tone which the French adopted towards them, never

THE SERBIAN TROOPS 91

letting them forget that it was they (the French) who
were maintaining them. The French on their part
complained of the excessive demands of the Serbians,
to whom they attributed what they called la mentalite
des sinistres.

Relations between officers and soldiers were not always
good. The soldiers complained of being neglected and
ill-treated by their officers, and even accused some of
them of financial dishonesty. An American doctor,
who had lived long in Serbia and with the Serbian Army
and knew the language well, assured me that these accusa-
tions were justified, and that the Serbian civil and military
administration was both corrupt and incompetent. He
believed, indeed, that when the Serbian Government
succeeded in re-establishing itself in Serbia it would
encounter serious difficulties with the population because
the Austrian Government, although politically oppressive,
had accustomed it to a more honest and competent civil
service than that of the Serbian State. These difficulties
were due in part, according to this same American, to
the great gap existing between the slightly educated
classes, to whom the officers belonged, and the ignorant
peasants, who formed the common soldiers. The officers
did not take sufficient care for the well-being of their
men, and a very large number of them lived comfortably
at Salonica, where they had little to do, while the soldiers
and the rest of the officers were fighting and suffering
great hardships at the front. There is certainly some
exaggeration in all this, but there is also some truth.
In a general way, the officers of the old Serbian Army
were excellent, but as a really educated bourgeoisie does
not exist in the country, most of the reserve officers,
drawn from the semi-educated middle classes, left a
great deal to be desired. Another difficulty was due to
the fact that the Government was at Corfu while the army,
which represented all that remained of the nation, was
in Macedonia, and the former soon lost all touch with
the latter. The atmosphere of Corfu had become a
hotbed of personal ambitions, intrigues and petty spite.
The Serbians themselves called it their Capua. Among

92 THE SERBIANS

the Serbians moreover, as I have said, secret societies
flourished, and these found a field of great activity in
the conditions of the moment. Even exile did not make
the Serbians forget the habit of conspiracy.

From the moment the Serbian Army took up its position
in Macedonia its front extended from the eastern arm
of the Cerna to the neighbourhood of Nonte. Divided
after its reorganization into 3 armies, these were as we
have seen, in consequence of the reduction of the effectives,
reduced to 2 of 3 divisions each, plus the cavalry division.
The I Army (Drina, Morava and Timok Divisions) com-
manded by Voivod Michich, had its H.Q. at Votchtaran
and occupied the western sector ; the II (Vardar, Danube
and Shumadia Divisions), commanded by Voivod
Stepanovich, occupied the eastern sector, with its H.Q.
at Dragomantzi. Although the Serbian G.H.Q. was at
Salonica, there was also an advanced G.H.Q. near Mount
Floka. The ground on the Serbian front was extremely
rough, with huge masses of rock, high peaks and great forests
spread over it. The area of the II Army was a particularly
uncomfortable one, as it was almost everywhere exposed
to the enemy fire. The roads were few and bad, and
communications extremely difficult. For its supplies,
the I Army made use of the Monastir railway as far as
Sakulevo, then of the decauville for a few kilometres,
and finally of the ordinary roads. The II Army could
not use the railway beyond Vertekop. At the railway
terminus there were motor parks supplied by the British,
who organized an excellent service, principally with
small Ford lorries which could go anywhere, even over
the most impossible roads. The Serbians knew how to
make the best use of the scanty agricultural resources of
the country, and although they complained that the least
fertile areas had been assigned to them, they managed
so well that their horses never lacked forage and always
appeared fat and well fed. They were indeed excellent
horse-masters.

In the early days of the Macedonian campaign our
relations with the Serbs were somewhat cold. We could
not help admiring their splendid military qualities and

ITALO-SERB RELATIONS 93

burning patriotism, although we did not fail to notice
their serious defects of character, due to Oriental tradition.
The Serbs, on their part, were irritated against us on
account of the incidents in Albania already mentioned.
General Petitti, however, made every effort to eliminate
misunderstandings by means of a conciliatory and cordial
policy. He began by the cession of materials, of which
the Serbians were in sore need> and did it with the
greatest possible tact, so as to avoid in any way hurting
their feelings. The Serbs, as we have said, were dependent
on the French for their services, and General Petitti,
knowing that the latter were not always adequate, often
assisted them with motor vehicles, movable huts, etc.,
whenever the occasion arose. As it was necessary to
evacuate the civilian population from a part of the Italian
area, he made a point of always consulting the Serbian
authorities, to whom he showed the greatest possible defer-
ence, before taking any action, and he provided transport
and even food for the people who were being evacuated.
Relations between our troops and the Serbian troops and
the civilian population never gave rise to any incident,
and the Serbians could not help admiring the order and
efficiency of our transport and other services and the con-
dition of our animals, to which they were not accustomed
in Macedonia, except in the case of their own horses. In
his work of conciliating the Serbians, General Petitti found
useful collaborators in Lieutenant Cangia, Italian liaison
officer with the I Serbian Army, in Captain Goad, British
liaison officer with the 35th Division, and in Dr. Reiss the
Swiss scientist, who was a good friend of ours and of the
Serbians.

When General Petitti was requested to grant facilities
for the journey of Voivod Michich's wife from Italy,
he arranged that she should cross on one of our best
steamers and then travel on an Italian staff car from
Santi Quaranta, escorted by an Italian officer. The
Voivod had first applied to the French authorities, who
informed him that his wife must travel via Patras.
He therefore preferred that she should avail herself of
the facilities offered by the Italians.

94 THE SERBIANS

On the occasion of the fighting in February 1917 on
Hill 1050, Voivod Michich, who had been present, sent
a message to General Petitti * expressing his unbounded
admiration for the dash and gallantry of our troops,
which was sent to Italy and published, and made a very
good impression.

Personal relations between our officers and soldiers
and the Serbians went on improving, and many cordial
individual friendships were formed. General Mombelli
continued General Petitti's policy for a rapprochement
with the Serbians and intensified it. He was on excellent
terms with the Prince Regent and neglected nothing to
render himself a persona grata with him and his army.
Our Command was very generous in concessions of motor
transport to Serbian officers and officials travelling between
Salonica, the Serbian front, and Corfu, and they constantly
applied to us for this purpose, preferring our service
even to that which was subsequently instituted by their
own Command.

We also co-operated in Serbian propaganda in Macedonia.
In the small strip of Serbian territory reoccupied after
the capture of Monastir, there was a mixed Serbo-Rulgarian
population of somewhat uncertain political sentiments,
but predominantly Bulgarian. The Serbian Govern-
ment did everything to spread the Serbian idea among
the inhabitants by means of schools and propaganda.
In the villages of Brod and Tepavci, which were in our
military area, General Mombelli had some schools built
by Italian soldiers for the native children. The Serbian
Relief Fund (a British association) and the American
Red Cross provided food, clothes, furniture etc. and also
some nurses, while the Serbian Government provided the
teachers. The inauguration of the school at Brod was
a very pleasant festival of Italo-Serb cordiality.

The great weakness of the Serbian Army was its deficiency
in effectives, and this became more serious day by day.
While all the Allies in Macedonia suffered from the same
trouble, because the Governments and General Staffs were
reluctant to send reinforcements (only our expeditionary

1 See Appendix A.

SERBIAN DIFFICULTIES 95

force was kept up to strength, at all events until the
autumn of 1917), the condition of the Serbs was far
more serious, because, save for small groups of volunteers
from Europe and America, very often of advanced age and
unable to endure hardships, there was no source whence
reinforcements could be drawn to make good the constant
losses caused by righting and sickness. " Our reinforce-
ments," said a field officer attached to the Serbian
G.H.Q., " are always the same — the men who come out
of hospital more or less cured." This was a cause of
great depression among the Serbians, and in spite of their
intense patriotism, there were, as we shall see, moments
in which their faith faltered and they contemplated
the possibility of concluding a separate peace. This
tendency among certain parties was very marked, and
resulted in sundry plots and intrigues.

CHAPTER VI

THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The Italian expeditionary force, as we have seen, reached
Macedonia in August 1916 ; after a short stay at Salonica
it was transferred to the Krusha Balkan near Lake Doiran,
and then to the Cerna loop, where it remained until the
offensive of September 1918. At Salonica the Italian
base was created, which subsequently became a detached
section of the Intendenza at Taranto (commonly known in
" initial " language, adopted in the Italian Army in imitation
of the British, as the " U.S.I.A.M." — Ufficio staccato Inten-
denza Albania- Macedonia). The latter comprised the sani-
tary branch, the commissariat department, the engineer
command, artillery and engineer parks, the H.Q. of the M.T.
service, many depots of various kinds, ammunition dumps,
the garrison command, the Comando di Tappa (where
officers and men were forwarded to their destinations)
the court martial,1 the convalescent camp, the remount
camp, etc. Part of these establishments were at Zeitenlik,
some 4 or 5 km. from the town, and on the outskirts were
the three military hospitals, one of which was the old Italian
civilian hospital, enlarged and militarized.

Our base had to.be created in very difficult conditions,
because when we came to Salonica most of the scanty
resources of the country had already been requisitioned by
the French and British Armies, who had been in the country
for ten months, so that we had to be content with leavings.
Furthermore, owing to the comparatively small size of
our contingent, we had to do without many institutions
which would have contributed to the welfare of our men

1 Military tribunals in the Italian Army are organized on a permanent
basis.

96

THE ITALIAN BASE 97

as well as to our national prestige. Unlike the British
and French, we had few officers accustomed to dealing
with Oriental conditions. Nevertheless we managed to
create a base which in many respects was a model of its
kind, and our soldiers with their great ingenuity succeeded
in making up for other material deficiencies. A British
medical officer, whom I escorted on a visit of inspection
to our military hospitals, was quite astonished at the sight
of what Italian soldiers had been able to create out of
nothing, and at the comparatively low cost at which these
results had been achieved. The men showed a love for
their work which aroused the admiration of everyone.
When the Italian troops left the Krusha Balkan, where
they were relieved by the British, there was a certain
bridge which they had begun ; the men engaged on the
work asked to be left behind to finish it, because they feared
that their British successors might not carry out the plan
according to the original design.

The Italians at the base and on the lines of communi-
cation maintained an excellent discipline, and were always
noted for their good conduct and almost total absence of
drunkenness. Nor did one ever see Italian officers take
part in the outrageous orgies at the Tour Blanche or other
night resorts. If one criticism can be made it is addressed
to those who were responsible for selecting the officers to be
sent to Macedonia ; only the most educated, best mannered
and most gentlemanly men should have been chosen for
a force which was to be in such constant contact with
other armies. Whereas the great majority did fulfil
these requisites, the same cannot be said of all ; if they
never got drunk, there were some who were not a la hauteur
as regards character and conduct. The French made the
same mistake, and indeed not a few of their officers were
sent to Macedonia as a punishment. It was only the
British who, as we have seen, made a point of sending out
their best men, especially those on Staff appointments.
If this insufficient consideration of character and manners
is a general defect of our whole bureaucratic system, a
special effort should have been made to overcome it in
connexion with the Eastern expedition.

7

98 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The excellent organization of our base services was
largely due to the merit of Major (now Colonel) Fenoglietto,
director of the Intendenza, who in all the confusion of
Macedonian conditions never lost his head or his temper,
and succeeded in conciliating the most opposite tendencies
and the most crotchetty characters. Organizing capacity
such as his was particularly necessary, inasmuch as Salonica
was our only base for supplying a force of over 50,000 men ;
even when the Santi Quaranta route was opened up and
reinforcements and men going home on leave or returning
began to travel that way, supplies, munitions, and material
of all sorts continued to be landed at Salonica, and every-
thing was concentrated at that base.

There was not on the front in Italy a division or even
an army corps whose first lines were so far from their
base as were those of the 35th Division. The distance from
Salonica to Hill 1050 was not less than 170 km., most of
which had to be covered either by the Monastir railway,
which also supplied seven French divisions, all the Serbian
Army, and at different times sundry Greek and Russian
units, or by the high road, which also was in part used to
supply those same forces. The railway journey was not
a pleasant experience ; one spent the night in a sordid
dilapidated coach, often enlivened by bugs, with broken
windows and torn cushions. This train de luxe conveyed
us to Armenohor (the station for Fiorina), whence one
continued the journey by lorry. It was more interesting
to go the whole way by lorry or car, as well as quicker
and more comfortable.

On emerging from the narrow ill-paved streets of Salonica
we get on to the wide and very dusty Monastir road, over-
coming numerous obstacles in the shape of holes and other
irregularities. Right and left the British depots and dumps
spread out over vast areas. Once the last huts and sheds
are left behind, we cross the wide desert plain of the Vardar,
partly marshy and very little cultivated, enclosed on the
north-east by the mountains behind Vodena. The vast
pastures and the silvery patches of water, with the back-
ground of distant blue mountains, remind one of the Roman
Campagna, but on a larger scale, less populated and lacking

THE ROAD TO THE FRONT 99

in those stately ruins which render the country round Rome
so deeply suggestive and give it that sense of vitality
derived from the remains of the past. Here too there
are historic memories in abundance, for many splendid
civilizations flourished in this land, but the innumerable
Barbarian invasions which devastated Macedonia have
wiped out almost every trace of them, and it would be
necessary to excavate in order to find ancient remains.

Shortly before reaching Yenidje- Vardar a strange-looking
structure appears to the right of the road ; it consists of mas-
sive walls and great blocks of stone into which iron pipes
have been introduced, whence water pours out in abundance.
It is popularly known as the Fountain of Alexander, and
is, in fact, on the site of the ancient Pellas, Alexander the
Great's capital ; not far off, amid the fields, the ruined
arches of an ancient aqueduct may be seen. The fountain
has been restored by the Allied troops and is used by their
pack and transport animals. It was probably in the main
piazza of the town ; there, where the horses of the great
Macedonian king were watered twenty-two centuries ago,
those of the Chasseurs d'Afrique and of the Cavalleggeri
di Lucca and of the A.S.C. of the Armee d'Orient were
watered but yesterday.

Every now and then our car is held up by a Senegalese
sentry — the French make much use of these troops for their
lines-of-communication services — but as soon as he sees that
it contains Allied officers we are allowed to pass on. Soon
after Alexander's fountain we reach Yenidje- Vardar.
It is a large village, the only place of any importance
along the 85 km. between Salonica and Vodena, built
on a ridge which declines gradually towards the high
road ; it is very Oriental and picturesque, dirty, and in a
state of utter dilapidation. The open shops, with their
poor wares exposed on their window sills, are typically
Turkish ; the narrow, tortuous, dirty side-streets, the large
trees and the abundance of greenery, and the numerous
minarets are signs that we are in the really Turkish East.
The largest of the mosques is externally handsome in
appearance and imposing, but internally almost a ruin.
It had been occupied successively by Turkish troops

100 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

in flight, by Greeks in pursuit, and then by French, Serbs,
Italians and Russians passing through ; even up to the
end of the war it served as a temporary shelter for French
transport animals. The walls around the courtyard had
been adorned by the Greeks with the names of their
victories in the two Balkan wars — Yenidje-Vardar, for
it was here that the battle which decided the fate of
Salonica took place on November lst-2nd, 1912, — a
victory due to the Diadoch Constantine — Kilkish (July
4th, 1913), Doiran (July 7th), etc. Close to the mosque is
the mausoleum, also in ruins, of the Hadzi-Evremos
family, who have a curious history. Its founder was a
Greek converted to Islam in the reign of Osman (1317)
and appointed Governor of Brussa ; in the expedition for
the conquest of Salonica (1428), when Yenidje-Vardar
was the capital of Turkish Macedonia, several members
of the family distinguished themselves as stout warriors
and pious Moslems. For these merits the Sultan Murad
II endowed them with the tithe of Yenidje-Vardar in
perpetuity, i.e. he granted them the right to raise and
enjoy the taxes in that district. This constituted an
important revenue, and the Hadji-Evremos became one
of the wealthiest families in the Empire, retaining their
riches until our own times — a rare distinction in Turkey.
But with the Greek conquest of Salonica the Hellenic
Government refused to recognize their right which it regarded
as derogatory to the prerogatives of the State. There
were protracted discussions on this point during the peace
negotiations, but the Turkish Government in the end had
to give way, and the Hadji Evremos lost their revenues.
The story of this family thus marks the beginning and
the end of Turkish rule in Salonica. Yenidje has lost
almost all its ancient importance. It is still frequented
as an agricultural centre in a townless territory ; the
country round is fertile and fairly well cultivated, but
malarious.

Some 25 km. further on, after crossing several branches
of the Nisi Voda river, we reach Vertekop, at the foot of
the mountains ; here we again meet the Monastir railway,
which has made a wide curve from Salonica, passing

VODENA 101

Verria and Niaussa, before reaching Vertekop and
beginning the steep ascent. After Vertekop the road
enters one of the few really smiling tracts of land in this
forbidding Macedonia. The Nisi river falling from the
heights of Vodena on to the plain, whence it reaches
the Vardar, forms innumerable cascades and runnels,
glimmering white amid the thick vegetation, reminding
us of

The green steep

Whence Anio leaps

In floods of snow-white foam.

On reaching the plain below it divides again into many
branches and channels, irrigating a tract of country which
is thus rendered green and fertile. The road follows one
of these streams, and the sight of many fine trees, cultivated
fields and orchards is very restful to the eye. There are
a few buildings amid the greenery, of the usual Turco-
Macedonian type, and the Orthodox monastery of Agia-
Triada, in whose grounds many antique fragments have
been found, including some fine statues. Along the route
one occasionally encounters wayside posts guarded by aged
Serbian soldiers.

Then the road begins to ascend the steep incline up to
the edge of the cliff at Vodena. Looking back, we have a
magnificent vista of the Vardar plain, spreading out to the
sea in the south-west and surrounded by wild bare
mountains. Vodena is a pleasant little town, which the
Greeks are trying to Hellenize, but they have not yet been
able to destroy its semi-Slav semi-Turkish appearance.
Narrow streets, flanked by picturesque houses of wood
and plaster, the windows barred by musharabieh screens,
all somewhat dilapidated ; here and there a few more
pretentious modern buildings, large trees in the middle
of the streets and many runnels along the side walks,
Oriental bazaars and cafes — the usual Macedonian
ensemble. Of antiquity we see no trace, save a few
fragments of ancient walls, but it is certain that if
excavations were made remains at least of the Byzan-
tine epoch would be unearthed. Amid the variegated

102 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Oriental crowd, French and Serbian officers and soldiers
strut about, and occasionally a few Senegalese.

Just beyond Vodena is Vladovo, a large Bulgarian village,
after which the road ascends a broad, fresh, green valley,
the sides of which, in spite of the ruthless destruction, are
still clad with forests of high trees and thick undergrowth.
The forest of Kindrovo had been assigned to our army,
and it was there that timber was cut for trench and barbed
wire supports, and firewood for the bakeries and heating.
There was plenty of raw material, but every now and then
a breakdown occurred on the railway and for a time no
more wood could be transported ; and then every expedient
had to be resorted to to procure the indispensable fuel.

The scenery now becomes less smiling, and soon after
we emerge into the arid basin of Ostrovo with its pretty
blue lake amid high bare mountains. We are now in a
rocky, mountainous region, without a tree or a house ; at
every turn we have a fresh glimpse of the Lake of Ostrovo,
whose irregular bays penetrate into the folds of the
mountains, and then further off we see the silvery surface
of Lake Petrsko. Gornichevo, at the top of the pass, is a
gloomy, forbidding village, of primitive houses of rough
stone, swept by icy winds in winter. Here were fought
fierce combats between Serbs and Bulgars in the summer of
1916, and here the former held up the advance of the
enemy who, if they had reached the lake, would have had
an open road before them to Vodena, and perhaps even
to Salonica.

From Gornichevo the road descends by a series of hairpin
bends into the vast plain of Fiorina, which merges in-
sensibly into that of Monastir and Prilep. We pass
through Vrbeni, a picturesque village, which still bears
the traces of the fighting in 1916, and close by are the vast
French and Italian dumps and depot of Sakulevo ; here
begins a d^cauville which goes to Brod and beyond, and
is used by the Italians, the I Serbian Army and two French
divisions. Just beyond is Hasan Oba, where there is the
Italian M.T. park. Here reigned my good friend Major
Anziani, famous throughout Macedonia for his exceptional
efficiency and cordial hospitality ; he had made of his unit

THE BAND OP THE 35TH DIVISION PLAYING IN THE PEACE DE LA LIBERTE AT SALONICA.

GENERAL GUILLACMAT VISITS GENERAL .MOMBELLI AT TEPAVCI.

To fuc« p. 103.

INTO SERBIA 103

a model of its kind, and indeed the Italian M.T. services in
Macedonia, although far less richly endowed than those of
the other Allies, always worked admirably, and in spite
of the fearful strain to which they were subjected, never
broke down.

A few kilometres from Hasan Oba we pass the Graeco-
Bulgarian frontier, but without noticing it because it
is war time, and this is the Zone des Armees, where
only the writ of the inter- Allied Command runs. The
Serbs, however, clung to this, the first tract of their father-
land to be reconquered, and although the civilian population
was still very scanty — the area was too near the front —
the Serbian Government had instituted prefects, sub-
prefects and mayors, and even a military-agricultural
commission to introduce scientific improvements in local
farming. The first Serbian village is Batch, where the
Crown Prince often stayed, his H.Q. being the local school.
Close by was our aviation camp, with a flight commanded
by Captain Aimone, a very gallant officer, many times
decorated for valour and a perfect fanatic of flying, who,
together with other Italian airmen, had occasion to
distinguish themselves several times during the campaign.
Here, too, but on the Greek side of the frontier, was one
of the Scottish Women's hospitals, where, I believe,
occurred the celebrated incident of the Russian soldier,
knocked down and injured by an Italian lorry, conveyed
in a French ambulance to a Scotch hospital in Greek
territory which looked after the Serbian wounded ; there
he was attended to by a Canadian doctor, and the only
language in which the two could converse was German !
This gives one some idea of the mixed conditions of the
Macedonian campaign.

After leaving Batch we reach Brod on the Cerna, where
the decauville divides into two branches, one going to the
front of the I Serbian Army and the other to the Italian
lines. The Cerna, which is crossed here by several military
bridges, is a slow, muddy, winding river ; it makes a vast
loop in the Monastir plain and amid the mountains west
of the Vardar, within which the whole of the Italian sector,
as well as those of the 16th and 17th French Colonial

104 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Divisions were comprised. A good road, built by Italian
soldiers, leads to Tepavci, which for twenty-two months
was our H.Q.

Tepavci is a wretched little Macedonian village, half
way up one of the barest of the nameless hills of this barren
land. Close by a camp was made, which for six months
sheltered the Italian Command. But during one of the
long periods of inactivity on this sector, the interim
commander thought of having a few stone huts built, as
it seemed as though this front were to remain immobile
for years. When General Mombelli took command he
continued the work, and by the autumn of 1917 there was
a smart new village of stone, with quarters for the officers,
offices for the command, a wireless station, and a commo-
dious mess hut decorated with clever caricatures (types of
the Allied armies) by an Italian lorry driver, in which
one was well sheltered from the intolerable heat of the
summer as from the rigours of winter. The whole thing
was done at a minimum of expense, as the raw material
was there in abundance and the labour was supplied by
the army. At no other H.Q. in Macedonia were the officers
better housed and fed, and nowhere else were passers-by
more cordially and hospitably received. General Mombelli
did everything handsomely, and Tepavci became a favourite
resort for Allied officers. Many indeed were the visitors
to Tepavci, Italian and foreign. Among the latter was
the Crown Prince of Serbia, who came there often, and
was alwavs on the best terms with General Mombelli ; on
the eve of the last offensive he expressed his deep regret
that the Serbian Army was not to be in direct contact,
during the coming operations, with the Italians, because,
as he said himself, there was always cordiality between
Serbs and Italians. The other Alexander, King of Greece,
also came, a fanatic of motoring and an excellent horse-
man. Besides the three successive Commanders-in-Chief
(Sarrail, Guillaumat and Franchet d'Esperey), and many
other French generals, several British officers came up,
including Generals Cory, the M.G.G.S., and Fairholme the
Military Attache at Athens, where he had been a colleague
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THE ITALIAN H.Q. 105

espionage. Comic relief was supplied by a British north-
country doctor who came out, not as a doctor, but as
something else ; a dissenting parson wholly innocent of
papers who got through the Zone des Armies goodness knows
how ; a well-known explorer in black town clothes and a
bowler hat who refused to put his horse to a canter when the
road was being heavily shelled from fear of breaking his
photographic plates, and was held up by the French on
the charge of supposed pro-German sentiments ; and an
aged and amiable Transatlantic General who had not the
remotest notion of what was going on in the Balkans and
was chiefly interested in the farming possibilities and
prospects of the country.

To get a good general idea of the Italian sector it was
best to begin with a visit to the Trident, as the divisional
O.P. was called, reached on horseback by mountain paths,
or by motor along the new road built partly by us and
partly by the French (it also supplied the two French
divisions on our right). Some dug-outs had been arranged
for the G.O.C. and a few officers of his Staff, who often
remained there for days at a time when operations were in
progress. The view was very extensive and grand.
Opposite arises the famous Hill 1050, with other peaks
to the right — the Piton Rocheux, the Piton Brule, Hill
1378, etc. Still further to the right were the French
positions. Between the O.P. and Hill 1050 was a sea of
rocks, gullies and hillocks, amid which the second and third
lines of defence wended their way ; they had been cleverly
planned and executed by General Mombelli, and greatly
reduced the danger of an enemy break-through. Beyond
Hill 1050 the broad plain of Prilep spreads out, the optatus
alveus of our desires, which seemed, when I ascended the
Trident for the first time, so hopelessly far and unattainable.
Behind Prilep, to the north, were other mountains, higher
and more arduous yet — the Babuna and the Baba — so
that we could not help asking ourselves : " If we do succeed
in piercing the enemy lines on the terrible 1050 and reaching
Prilep, shall we not find ourselves faced by other obstacles
equally formidable, guarded by not less imposing
defences ? " More to the west lies the plain of Monastir,

106 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

once all cultivated with wheat, vegetables and fruit, but
now almost deserted as it was under enemy fire. A white
patch at the foot of the mountain is Monastir itself, and
behind it we can make out other terrible peaks — Hill
1248, the Tzervena Stena, the Peristeri, and all the mighty
barrier which separates Macedonia from Albania. To the
extreme right is another wild sea of mountains, peaks
and rocks extending to the Vardar — the area of the
Serbian Army. Thus the whole of the western half of
the Macedonian front is spread out before us like a
topographical chart.

Hill 1050 is reached from Tepavci by a road, the first
part of which can be used by lorries ; and during the last
months of the war the decauville from Brod had been
prolonged almost to the foot of the mountain. The land-
scape is quite fantastic. From a wilderness of stone rise
up pinnacles of black rock, suggestive of the scenery in
the pictures of the Italian primitives representing the
hermitages of the Thebaid, and one would hardly have
been surprised if a thin, ascetic, monkish figure had
suddenly emerged from a cave, or from the crevices
of the rocks some monstrous dragon or serpent. Instead,
we met Italian infantrymen escorting heavily laden mules,
and in the little valleys we came upon A.S.C. camps or
sanitary units, while from the dug-outs emerged officers in
shirt-sleeves, shaving. The last bit of the road is on the
flat, and being in sight of the enemy we always did it at
a canter. The enemy did not keep up a systematic fire
on the lines of approach, but the shell holes which we
frequently encountered proved that they did fire sometimes.
On other parts of our sector the approaches were so
persistently shelled that supplies could only be carried
up after dark.

We descend into a gully where we are fairly sheltered,
and cross a broad torrent-bed, nearly dry in summer.
Beyond it are sundry dug-outs excavated out of the rock,
as enemy shells and trench-mortar bombs are frequently
dropped. Here are detachments of Italian mountain
artillery and trench-mortar batteries and of the French
field and medium calibre artillery assigned to the Italian

HILL 1050 107

force, but the Italian guns and trench mortars are not
here ; the former are higher up and further back on the
slopes towards the east, hidden amid the undergrowth
and rocks, whence they can fire without being discovered.
The trench mortars are also higher up, but further forward,
half way up Hill 1050. We now begin painfully to toil
up the famous mountain, which for over twenty months
has been the centre of Italian military life in Macedonia.
All roads lead to 1050, all thoughts are concentrated on
its hideous slopes. Steamers convey hundreds of thousands
of tons of food and munitions to feed men and guns on the
hill ; the Santi Quaranta road has been built in the face
of immense difficulties so that lorries may transport the
reinforcements sent to take the place of the killed,
the wounded and the sick. From Italy and foreign
countries all sorts of improved scientific instruments are
brought up to help in the study of the 1050. A map
department has been created at the Divisional H.Q.,
the principal duty of which is to portray the topography
of 1050. Amid these wild rocks and lower down towards
the plain numerous cemeteries have been made where sleep
the victims of the pitiless monster, and they are not few.
The whole activity of the Italian Command is concentrated
on the study of the hill in all its details, the officers on the
Staff visit it day and night without respite, risking death
so that they may know it better, the officers and men of
the infantry regiments live on its slopes and in its caverns,
and each one tries to know his own sector stone by stone,
sod by sod. Every peak, every topographical detail,
every gully, every tiny watercourse, every irregularity
has its own fancy name, conferred on it by the soldiers
on account of some fancied resemblance or remembrance
— II Pane (bread), II Capello di Napoleone (Napoleon's
hat), La Graziosa (the gracious one), UAlbero isolato (the
lonely tree). Curiously enough, the figure whereby the
hill is known is inaccurate ; it is called Hill 1050 owing to
an error in the original triangulation, and is in fact consider-
ably higher. But as that figure appeared on the first maps
of the area it has always been maintained. Seen from a
distance, the hill looks like an enormous tooth, and indeed

108 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

it is a poisoned tooth, which pierces and kills. For the
soldiers it has acquired a character of almost diabolical
malignity. Other positions on the sector — the Piton
Brule, the Piton Rocheux — are no less terrible, but none
exercises the same baleful fascination as the 1050.

The Italian sector is not all on 1050 ; it begins at the
extreme western end of the Cerna loop in the plain. The
loop encircles a chain of rocky heights, arid and broken,
which are a extension of the Prilep mountains, constituting
what is known as the Selechka Planina, rising here and there
to the height of 1,500 metres. The Cerna, which has its
source in the mountains north of Monastir, flows across
the plain in a southerly direction, broadening out at certain
points into a marshy lake ; south-east of Monastir it makes
a conversion towards the east at the foot of the Kaimak-
chalan, passing Brod and Skochivir, and then turns
northward through a narrow mountain gorge to its con-
fluence with the Vardar. The slopes of the Selechka
Planina, high and steep in the eastern part of the loop,
decline towards the west, and all the western part is flat.
The Monastir-Prilep plain is one of the rare gaps through
the rugged mountain chains extending across the country
from east to west, a passage through which innumerable
hordes and armies have made their way since the dawn
of history. It is, however, dominated by the heights
within the Cerna loop. The possession of those heights
was therefore indispensable for dominating the Monastir
corridor ; and as half of them were in the hands of the
Allies and half in those of the enemy, neither side could
be regarded as master of the plain and of the passage.
Had we lost our positions, the road would have been open
to the enemy towards Greece ; if we had succeeded in
capturing the whole of the range all the enemy's communica-
tions in the Vardar valley would have been menaced. That
is the meaning of the long-protracted struggle for the
possession of those arid rocks.

The lowest point of the ridge is the Makovo pass ; to the
north of it a long spur stretches out, whose culminating
point is the famous 1050. The position, as we have seen,
had been reached by the Serbs in the autumn of 1916,

HILL 1050 109

and its conquest had obliged the enemy to evacuate
Monastir. But the Serbs were so exhausted with the long
and desperate struggle that they were unable to hold their
ground, and a Bulgaro-German counter-attack drove
them off the ridge. This enabled the enemy to hold their
own in the Monastir area for many months longer. In
order to secure the position the enemy Command garrisoned
it with some of their best troops and provided it with all
the most perfect defences known to the modern art of war.
The fighting which took place on these rocks left their
traces in the corpses with which they were covered, and
the mere fact of remaining there cost the lives of innumer-
able Italian, French, Serbian, Russian, Bulgarian and
German soldiers. The 1050 was as famous among the
enemy as among our own men ; in the Bulgarian town
of Dubnitza the chief restaurant was called — even after
the Armistice — the " Restaurant of Hill 1050 of the
Cerna."

The enemy line followed the crest of the mountains
comprised within the loop to north of the valley of the
Morihovo torrent in the eastern part, and that of Hill
1050 and of the great pitons to the north of the Suha torrent
in the western part, and then crossed the plain to a point
north of Novak on the Cerna. The Allied line was a little
below the crest, but at many points very close to that of
the enemy. The total length of the line within the loop
was about 25 km., of which the western part (a little more
than half) was held by the Italians, and the rest by the
French.

To the north of the Makovo pass rises a great mass of
rock known as the Piton Rocheux, from whose summit
the enemy dominated our lines to the right and the left,
as well as the Morihovo and Suha valleys. In the Piton
Rocheux the enemy had excavated numerous caverns and
dug-outs, which hid machine-gun nests and sheltered the
troops from the fire of Allied artillery. The Italians here
occupied a series of irregular tooth-like rocks, between which
were lines protected with sand-bags. But they were
dominated by the enemy on the Piton Rocheux, so that
one could not go from one position to another with com-

110 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

parative safety except at night. Further west the enemy-
held another dominant position, the Piton Brul6, whose
fire dominated the Italian positions which were out of the
range of that of the Rocheux. Our infantrymen in the
front lines had no other shelter in this part of the sector
than the shallow holes dug into the rock known as
" Serb holes," with low parapets of heaped up stones and
sand-bags in front of them ; they were about 30 m.
from the enemy and 10 m. below them. The communi-
cation trenches between these holes were so exposed
that they could only be used after dark. In no other
sector of the Macedonian front were the troops more
exposed to the burning heat of summer, to cold, snow
and wind in winter, and to enemy fire at all
seasons.

Beyond the Piton Brule the enemy trenches receded
to some extent from ours, ascending to the summit of
1050, which was also bristling with machine guns. The
enemy positions on 1050 and on the Rocheux sustained
each other mutually, so that if we had succeeded in
occupying the one we should have been exposed to an
infernal fire from the other.

Hill 1050, seen from on high, may be compared to a long
arrow-head pointing towards the north-east, with two
sharp barbs, and a triangular depression between the two,
about 1 km. broad at its widest. We held the south-west
barb and the depressions of the Meglentzi valley ; our line
of main resistance ascended this spur, and at the head of
the Meglentzi valley met the first line. Thence it pushed
on until just below the highest ridge known as the Ca-
stelletto (little castle).

From the Castelletto the enemy could observe the whole
Italian front from the Piton Rocheux to Novak, as well
as the lines of approach, except certain little gullies hidden
beneath the steep rocks, where the batteries were placed.
Not a supply column, not a lorry, nor even «n isolated
horseman or pedestrian could escape observation. In
order to give some shelter to the troops holding these
positions trenches had been cut out of the rocks, every
little irregularity utilized, caverns excavated in the

THE ITALIAN DEFENCES 111

mountain side. But the enemy bombardments, which
were often concentrated on these defences — sometimes as
many as a thousand shells were dropped in one day on
a very narrow tract of the line — had reduced the hill
to a mass of shingle and sand which offered but slight
protection.

At the head of the Meglentzi valley our front line fol-
lowed a zig-zag course down into the triangular depression
described. Although comparatively far from the enemy,
this was one of our worst positions because it was exposed
more directly to the fire of the trenches above. Here no
movement at all was possible along the line in day-time,
and even the wounded had to be evacuated at night, as
the enemy did not hesitate to fire on them. The com-
munication trench with the line of main resistance was
equally impassable by day, although a whole battalion
had to be supplied by this, the only route.

The southern barb of Hill 1050 was cut at one point
by a pass or saddle, which separated the rocks of the 1050
proper from three isolated heights known as the " Mamelons
of Lebac," on which were Italian defensive works ; they
were very important because they dominated the Meglentzi
valley. The first line was here at about 1 km. to the north
of them and a little beyond the ruins of the village. Below
the pass there was a group of trees, which were soon
reduced to mere skeletons by the constant bombardment.
On the crest of the southern spur were enemy trenches,
culminating in the O.P. known as " Point A," dominating
the whole valley and our line as far as the Cerna. The
H.Q. of the battalion defending the positions below the
village of Meglentzi was in caverns dug into the side of a
gully formed by a torrent, which was so steep that in
some places there were two tiers of holes, one above the
other.

From Meglentzi our lines followed the gully, being at
one point very close to those of the enemy. Finally they
left the mountain area, which here gradually declined,
and crossed the swampy plain as far as the Cerna. The
last 6 km. of trenches were on the flat and at some distance
from the enemy. The 9 km. of mountainous front were

112 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

held by 3 regiments, whereas for the 6 km. of plain one
was enough. Beyond the lines were elaborate wire
entanglements. The centre of the defences in the plain
was the village of Novak, east of Monastir. A tumulus
in the second line, probably an ancient sepulchre, and
the only eminence over a wide stretch of country, made an
excellent O.P. The trenches here were all underground,
and although the sector was quieter than the mountainous
part, the troops suffered from floods in winter and malaria
in summer.

The whole plain, which was once cultivated, was now a
waste, but the grass grew high and flourished, and at night
the troopers of the Lucca Cavalry went out beyond the
barbed wire entanglements to mow it and bring it back
to their camp — often it was the only forage available for
the poor horses and mules of the 35th Division. In these
agricultural-military expeditions occasionally shots were
exchanged, generally without consequences.

The Cerna marked the end of our sector, and here the
French area began. A wooden bridge, well defended by
earthworks armed with machine guns, united the two areas.
For a long time (in Macedonia units seldom changed their
quarters) the division adjoining ours was the 11th Colonial,
with whose officers ours were always on the best of terms.
From this point a road led to Monastir, but although it
was the shortest route between that town and our H.Q.
no one was allowed to go along it on horseback or by motor,
as it was under enemy fire. Monastir itself, which could
be reached by another road, although constantly under fire,
offered to those who lived on the Macedonian front the
attractions of a city. A large part of the population
had returned, and the shopkeepers simply coined money
with their modest establishments, as they could demand
what prices they liked. By the end of the war about
two-thirds of the houses were in ruins, and few were
those which did not bear traces of the -two years'
bombardment.

Let us now visit the front lines near the summit of 1050.
Firing trenches, communication trenches, dug-outs, shelters
of all kinds, are cut out of the living rock and it would be

IN THE TRENCHES 118

difficult to imagine more uncomfortable positions than these
Near the summit our lines are but a few metres from those
of the enemy, and through the loop-holes one may see
the tin hats of the Germans and Bulgars. Here there
have always been some German battalions. After the
operations of the autumn of 1916 the German units were to
a large extent withdrawn from Macedonia, and the number
of German battalions from about twenty was gradually
reduced to three or four ; but some of them constantly
remained on 1050 opposite our troops. The enemy
command considered this to be the most important point
of the whole defensive system, and therefore garrisoned
it with the troops in which it felt most confidence. A tour
through our trenches offered some curious sights. As
most of the work had to be done at night, a daylight
visitor found the great majority of the men fast asleep ;
he saw nothing but emerging feet, because the shelters
opened on to the communication trenches and the soldiers
slept with their heads inside and their feet stretching
out towards the opening. At intervals, in some wider
space, he came upon groups of soldiers washing, shaving,
playing cards, reading or writing letters. There were
always some, officers or men, who " did the honours "
and pointed out the curiosities ; it was impossible to pass
near a mess without being asked in to drink a glass of good
wine and eat biscuits or even cake, but if it was anywhere
near meal time he was forced by friendly and cordial
comrades to stay to lunch or dinner. The ingenuity with
which officers and men managed to make themselves
fairly comfortable in quite impossible situations was really
wonderful. Hanging on to a bare mountain side, the
summit of which was held by the enemy, who dominated
the lines of approach and supply, who spied our every
movement, in an extremely variable and always detestable
climate, life under such circumstances might have seemed
well-nigh unbearable. Yet our men held on there for
nearly two years, in the face of an enemy stronger in
numbers and in material means, as well as in more favour-
able positions. Nor should we forget the deadly grey
monotony of life amid those rocks, varied only by

8

114 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

bombardments and raids — ours or the enemy's — and more
rarely by attacks on a large scale, sometimes with poison
gas. But the men knew that they were holding one of
the keystones of the whole Macedonian defensive system,
that if they gave way everything would collapse, and that
the Allied armies would risk being driven into the sea.
They were moreover kept up by a sense of pride and a
desire to cut a good figure before the other Allies. It
was considered absolutely indispensable that the Italian
line should hold ; and although theoretically the position
was untenable, it was held without wavering, until the
final victory.

There were of course long periods in which there was
no fighting. On some days not a shot was heard. But it
sufficed for one man to discharge his rifle to provoke a
hurricane of fire from the other side. Certain visitors to
our front were not at all welcome because, wishing to make
themselves conspicuous, they insisted on firing a few shots
or throwing a hand grenade just for the fun of the thing.
The enemy replied, and a quiet day was converted into
one of lively but quite useless exchange of rifle fire
and shelling. This of course happened when the im-
portunate visitor had already left for some more sheltered
spot.

When the Italian troops took over this sector from the
Serbs in December, 1916, it was almost completely un-
protected. The Serbs had not had time to carry out
important defensive works, and had limited themselves
to digging those small holes in the earth or rock which I
have already described. General Petitti at once set to
work to fortify the area, and his work was continued,
completed and extended by General Mombelli. During
the period of our occupation, over 100 km. of trenches
and communication trenches, two metres deep, were dug,
500 caverns cut out of the rock as shelters, and
120 km. of wire entanglements laid down^ All this
vast labour was accomplished by troops who were
supposed to be at rest, for while two of the brigades
were in the line the third was employed in preparing
these defences.

STRENGTH OF THE POSITIONS 115

During the early days of the campaign there was a
tendency, as on all other fronts, to concentrate the largest
possible number of men in the front line defences, but
later the opposite tendency prevailed, viz. that the first
lines should be held by an indispensable minimum of troops
only, the rest of the forces being kept in reserve in well-
protected shelters, ready to hasten forward at the moment
of attack, and that powerful second and third lines of main
resistance should be constructed. In this way the constant
drain of small losses when there was no real fighting going
on was avoided, and at the same time the consequences of a
possible break-through in the first line were guarded against,
as the enemy, in attacking the second lines would have
been exposed to the fire of batteries which could easily
find their range on ground perfectly well known to them.
It was General Mombelli who reconstructed and reinforced
the second line and created the third, which was the most
powerful of the three, ex novo. The enemy knew very
little about these defences behind the first line, and,
in fact, on a German Staff map found on a prisoner,
whereas the first line is represented with a fair amount
of accurate detail, the second is barely sketched and
in an inaccurate manner, while the third is merely
hinted at with the indication " old Bulgarian trenches."
This is one of the signs that the enemy was less
well-informed about the Allied armies than was generally
supposed.

The Italian front in Macedonia had, as we have seen, an
extension of 15 km., afterwards reduced, with the diminu-
tion of strengths, to about 12. Several times, especially
during Sarrail's regime, the C.A.A. tried to induce the Italian
Command to extend the line towards the right, but all the
three generals who successively commanded the Italian
expeditionary force refused to do so, there being no reason
for making the 35th Division occupy a sector wholly out
of proportion to its strength as compared with those held
by other Allied forces ; the fact that the sector in question
was one of the hardest and had the most difficult com-
munications, so that all movements from one point to
another were anything but simple, had also to be considered.

116 THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The C.A.A., in fact, ended by dropping the matter.1 It
was not until the summer of 1918 that we again somewhat
extended our front in view of the coming offensive. As
compared with conditions in Italy the Italian front in
Macedonia was certainly less deadly, but in some respects
it was one of the most objectionable. Unlike the troops
in Italy, those in Macedonia were to a very large
extent precluded from leave, and at the time of the
Armistice there were no less than 30,000 men, out of a
total of 50,000, who, although entitled to leave, were
unable to avail themselves of the privilege ; among them
there were 6,000 who had been at the front for twenty-
five months on end without leave. When General Mombelli
took command, eleven months after the arrival of the
force, no one had been on leave at all from Macedonia,
and many had been at the front for many months in Italy
before crossing the sea. It was at that time believed
that leave for the troops in Macedonia was impossible,
because they must not be exposed to the risks of the long
sea-crossing when it was not absolutely indispensable, while
even the journey via Santi Quaranta by lorry (which
involved a shorter crossing) seemed too complicated and
difficult. But General Mombelli realized the enormous
importance of leave, even if comparatively few men had
a chance of enjoying it ; the mere thought of not being
cut off from all hope of leave exercised a very great and
beneficial effect on the moral of the troops. He therefore
succeeded in overcoming the thousand obstacles in his
way and organized the transport of leave parties by
lorry via Santi Quaranta. This was one of his services
to the 35th Division, and one which made him particu-
larly popular with the men.

Yet in spite of the moral and material suffering, the
unhealthy climate, malaria, the constant small losses, and
the long enervating inaction, whenever there was something

1 On the front in Italy the average sector held by a division of two
brigades (the 35th had three) was 10,900 metres, but on the Western
sectors of that front the troops were spread out very thin, whereas on
the Asiago plateau and on the Carso the front of each division was much
shorter. After Caporetto the average was reduced to 3,800 metres.

MORAL OF THE ITALIANS 117

to be done, the men went to the attack with the most
admirable dash. Their moral always remained high, and
there was never among the Italian soldiers any movement
of revolt or even an outward expression of discontent such
as occurred among certain French units, not to speak of
the Greeks and Russians, among whom mutinies were
frequent.

CHAPTER VII

OPERATIONS IN THE WINTER AND SPRING OF

1917

From the capture of Monastir to the great offensive of
September 1918, there were no notable changes in the
situation of the two opposing armies. This does not mean
that there were no military operations ; there were indeed
quite a number of them, some fairly important, but
they produced no practical results of great moment, and
the. line which was stabilized in November, 1916, changed
but slightly during the next twenty-two months. The
Germans declared themselves satisfied with this state
of things, because they considered that the Allied troops
in Macedonia were immobile and therefore prevented from
being sent to other fronts. Events were to prove the
Germans in the wrong, but even in the Entente countries,
there were persons who continued to insist, ever more
strongly, on the uselessness of the Eastern campaign.

The autumn operations came to an end with the capture
of Monastir, after which the enemy was not vigorously
pursued, partly owing to the wish of General Sarrail
himself, who was always more influenced by political
considerations regarding Greece than by military con-
ditions, and partly on account of the exhaustion of
the troops. The Armee d 'Orient had thus conquered the
important positions on the Cerna only by half. The town
of Monastir was in the hands of the French, but the heights
immediately to the N.W., N. and N.E., which dominated
it, were still held by the enemy. In the Cerna loop, we
occupied part of Hill 1050, but as we have seen, the enemy
held the topmost ridge which dominated our positions,
and many of our trenches could be enfiladed. The same

118

AFTER THE CAPTURE OF MON ASTIR 119

conditions obtained in the eastern half of the loop held
by the French. The Serbs, too, especially the units of
the II Army, were dominated by the enemy, and so also
were the British to the west and east of Lake Doiran.
The situation was certainly not satisfactory for the Allies,
and the events in Roumania, where the Austrians, Germans
and Bulgarians had proved completely victorious, might
at any moment be followed by the arrival of enemy rein-
forcements on the Macedonian front and consequently
by a general attack. General Sarrail, in his memoirs,
attributes the suspension of the operations to the losses
suffered by all the Allies, particularly by the French and
Serbs, to the inorganic plans of the British and to their
small desire to risk fresh operations, to the want of energy
of the Italians, due to orders from Rome to General
Petitti not to act but to limit himself to being present, and
to a divergence of views between the two Russian generals.
In reality, the primary cause was, as usual, the want of
confidence in General Sarrail on the part of the Allied
commanders subordinate to him, and even on the part
of some of the French commanders, and to his own want
of energy in not seizing the opportune moment, after the
fall of Monastir, when the enemy was in full retreat and
demoralized. He might then have occupied the heights
dominating the town and constituted a far better defensive
line, whence it would have been possible, later on, to launch
a fresh offensive in more favourable conditions. But he
let the occasion slip by, and the enemy, who had been
beaten but not crushed, had time to reorganize and rein-
force themselves in their positions, rendering them
practically impregnable.

We have seen what was the distribution of the Armee
d'Orient after the fall of Monastir. Some units of the
Army were not yet available — the 16th French Colonial
Division, which had been sent out from France, had not
yet all landed — the 60th British Division was at Ekaterini
to watch the Greeks, and a Serbian division was performing
a similar duty at Grevena. At this time (December,
1916) the conditions of the Serbian Army were causing
anxiety. General Boyovich had requested that it should

120 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

all be brought into the second line, as it was thoroughly
exhausted. General Sarrail was unable to satisfy his wish,
save in the case of three divisions. The most serious
aspect of the situation was the internal political crisis
through which the Serbian officers were passing. General
Sarrail himself telegraphed to Paris on January 3, 1917 :
" Influential partisans of Black Hand have been sent to
Bizerta. Commander Morava Division, several Brigade
Commanders, Chief of Staff Shumadia Division, Assistant
Chief of Staff III Army have been relieved of their positions."1
Soon after he telegraphed that, according to a Serbian
order : "In consequence of plot some officers have been
cashiered and will be replaced by officers friendly to
present regime." He also mentioned that several regicide
officers to whom the present Dynasty owed the throne had
been punished. " Movement among officers seems to
continue — colonel who ripped open Queen Draga's corpse
has been imprisoned." In March he telegraphed that there
had been a new plot against the Prince Regent, and that
he believed that shots had been fired at him. Later
this statement was confirmed. It was a conspiracy on the
part of officers affiliated to the secret societies, and who
wished to murder the Prince Regent and to accept the
Austrian peace proposals. The movement was crushed,
and several officers condemned to death or imprisonment.

In Albania, the situation was still insecure and chaotic.
The Italian XVI Corps was spread over the area from the
mouth of the Voyussa to the neighbourhood of Liaskoviki.
Along the lower Voyussa there were regular defensive
lines, but beyond there were only isolated posts and
mobile detachments composed largely of Albanian
irregulars. Opposite the Italians was the XIX Austro-
Hungarian Corps composed of the 47th Division and the
l/19th Gruppenkommando, which extended to the neigh-
bourhood of Lake Ochrida. There was not yet any liaison
between our XVI Corps and the Armee d'Orient.

North of Koritza towards Pogradetz on Lake Ochrida,
there were some Austrian forces, about a brigade, and some
Bulgarian detachments ; it was always feared that these

1 Sarrail, op. cit. p. 219.

EVENTS IN ALBANIA 121

troops might menace the left flank of the French. The
latter therefore wished to extend their occupation so as to
establish a connexion with our troops in Albania, who,
throughout the autumn of 1916, had been advancing from
the coast towards the interior. Besides the Austrians and
Hungarians, there were several Albanian bands enrolled
by the celebrated Salih Butka between Koritza and Tchafa
Kiarit, and those of Hussein Nikolitza between Koritza
and Ersek. General Sarrail thought it advisable to
reinforce the garrison at Koritza, where he sent the 76th
Division, recently arrived from France, so as to ward off
any danger on the part of the Albanian bands and the
Austro-Bulgarian detachments, and also to menace the
right flank of the enemy's forces in Macedonia. He
communicated with General Ferrero, Commander of our
troops in Albania by wireless and by means of flying
officers, and thus a common Franco-Italian operation was
arranged to commence on February 17th, with the object
of freeing the road between Koritza and Ersek. But
General Sarrail also wished to extend his own operation
area in Albania, perhaps with a view to having something
with which to negotiate in his dealings with M. Venizelos,
and therefore, in spite of the agreement with General
Ferrero, he commenced operations before the date
established, and began his advance from Koritza on the
15th. After a small skirmish with the Albanian bands
he occupied Kamenitza, Hill 907, to the right and to
the left of the Ersek road, on the 16th Tchafa Kiarit,
Helmiz, and Lubonia, sending reconnaissances as far as
Ersek, and on the 17th the French infantrj'-, under
General de Vassart, met our troops under Colonel Rossi
at Ersek. General Sarrail wished Ersek to remain in
possession of the French troops, and had tried to obtain
this result by means of the little trick of anticipating the
date for commencing operations. In his memoirs he
states that he had asked General Ferrero's permission to
occupy Ersek and that the latter refused, saying : " Ersek
must be left for the Italians." In reality it had always
been agreed that Ersek was to be included in our area,
and General Sarrail knew it. Otherwise he would not

122 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

have made the above-mentioned attempt. He ended by
recognizing his error, or rather, he threw the blame on the
commander of the detachment operating towards Tchafa
Kiarit, who, according to the General, had acted on his
own initiative.

A definite connexion between the French and Italians
across Albania was thus established, and the whole
road from Santi Quaranta to Fiorina was opened up for
communications between the Allies, and closed to Greece
and the Central Empires.

As we have seen, the Allies in Macedonia, at the beginning
of 1917, were not in a position to attempt an offensive on
a large scale. On the other hand, even the enemy did not
seem to be very anxious to attack. In Roumania, Germany
and Austria had lost many men, and all their available
reinforcements, in spite of the progressive weakening of
Russia, were absorbed on the French or Italian fronts.
The Bulgarians might perhaps have done more, but they
were not enthusiastic over the idea of throwing themselves
headlong into an offensive, the result of which might have
been the conquest of Salonica, while they knew that that
city was reserved for Austria and not for them. Conse-
quently, except for the town of Monastir, for which they
had a special sentiment, all the territorial aims to which
they might reasonably aspire were in their own hands, so
that they had no strong inducement to face fresh risks.
These are the reasons why the enemy did not then attempt
a great offensive in the Mackensen style, when the Allies
were weak and divided, and when their Governments
refused to send large reinforcements to the East. This does
not mean that they remained passive. In February they
attempted operations which might have had dangerous
results for the whole of the Armee d'Orient, if it had not
been held up by the gallant defence of the 35th Division.

On the evening of February 12th, at 18.45 hours the
trenches occupied by two companies of the 162nd Infantry
(Ivrea Brigade) in the west sector of Hill 1050, were
subjected to a tremendous bombardment by artillery,
hand grenades, trench mortars and flame-throwers. It
was the first time that the latter terrible weapon was

.4

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V V*.

i^~ ■

CAMP NEAR THE PARALOVO MONASTERY.

HEADQUARTERS OF AN INFANTRY REGIMENT ON HILL 1050.

To face p. 122.

FIGHTING ON 1050 123

employed on the Balkan front, so that its effects came as
a complete surprise. Our first lines were smashed up by
the explosions, about 600 m. of trench were wrested
from their gallant defenders, and half a company was
destroyed in a horrible manner by the flames. The sur-
vivors, strengthened by another company under the com-
mand of Captain Odello, were able to hold up the enemy
advance along a lower line in the rear, and immediately
afterwards a counter-attack was launched. Fighting
continued throughout the night and the next day. In
the evening, Colonel Basso, Commander of the regiment,
personally took command of the troops destined for the
counter-attack. He reorganized the battalions, re-
established the communications which had been cut and,
after a bombardment by our artillery, the infantry
moved to attack at 15 hours on the 15th. Two of the lost
trenches were then recaptured, although the enemy
reacted vigorously by means of artillery, trench-mortar
and machine-gun fire, our infantry continued slowly to
advance during the whole of the day. After a short halt
in the afternoon, rendered necessary by the visibility,
the attack was resumed and several more trenches re-
captured.

About a fortnight later our Command decided to make
another attack. On the evening of February 27th, we
opened a violent bombardment on the enemy positions
with 150 guns, which fired some 20,000 rounds on the
enemy defences on Hill 1050 on the Piton Brule, east of
the latter. After about two hours' fire with good results,
the infantry attack to recapture the remaining positions
which had been lost on February 11th was launched.
The enemy kept up a very hot fire on our positions on Hill
1050 and on the lines of approach. At about 18 hours
the scout section and the 11th Company of the 162nd
Infantry, followed by the 9th and 2nd Companies issued
from the trenches, and hurled themselves with splendid
dash on the enemy positions, recapturing them and reaching
the enemy dug-outs, where they captured about 70
prisoners. The 11th Company was able to hold the
captured ground for some time, but while the scouts were

124 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

trying to strengthen themselves in the conquered positions,
a mine, prepared by the enemy, exploded and blew up the
trench, killing nearly the whole of the detachment. The
few survivors, supported by part of the 9th Company,
clung desperately to the captured ground ; two of the three
scout officers and four of those of the 9th Company (in-
cluding the captain) and many other ranks had fallen.
A violent machine-gun fire and a furious enemy counter-
attack obliged these gallant survivors to fall back on their
original positions. Two more companies were sent to rein-
force them, with Major Negro commanding the attacking
troops, together with the remnants of the company already
so hardly hit, returned to the charge ; but the machine-guns
on Hill 1050 rendered even this new attack fruitless. The
11th Company, now reduced to its captain and a few men,
and reinforced by part of the 2nd Company, continued to
hold the conquered position, although it was isolated and
subjected to a heavy enfilading fire from the enemy
artillery, which ours was not able to silence, because the
range of the enemy's emplacements had not been found.
The brave detachment consequently had to be recalled.

We had thus recaptured all the lost positions except a
small hummock on the crest of Hill 1050 which remained
abandoned by both sides. It was the object of vigorous
shelling and neither we nor the enemy were able to occupy
it definitely. Its form was altered by the bombardment.

Our losses in this engagement amounted to about 400
men ; those of the enemy were probably equally numerous.
The episode is interesting inasmuch as this was the first
time in which Italian troops were engaged in a hand-to-
hand encounter with the Germans, and the 74 prisoners
captured by our men were all Germans, belonging to the
9th and 10th Jager Battalions, and to the 205th Company
of Engineers. All our detachments which took part in
the action behaved admirably. If the attack did not
succeed in driving the enemy from the crest of Hill 1050,
it served to prove that that position could not be taken
by a frontal attack unless the Piton Rocheux on the right
had been first captured, because it was the batteries behind
the latter that dominated Hill 1050, so that even though

PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE 125

the latter had been captured, the troops who occupied
it would have been exposed to the enfilading fire of the said
batteries. The Piton Rocheux was the chief protection
of the enemy artillery, which could not be identified nor
silenced on account of the deep gullies with steep sides in
which they were hidden, and also because of the insufficiency
of our air force. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied
Armies had learnt the lesson from this episode he would have
avoided the failure and heavy losses which he suffered in
subsequent attacks, but General Sarrail does not appear
to have known exactly how this action had taken place
nor its result. At least that is what we must conclude
from what he writes in his memoirs,1 in which he says that
we had lost Hill 1050 on February 12th, and that in the
operations of February 28th we had not been able to
recapture it, though losing 400 men. In fact, he says
" malgre, parait-il, 400 hommes hors de combat,'''' as though
he doubted that we had had such losses. It is easy to see
how many inaccuracies, not to use a cruder expression, this
statement contains. We did not lose Hill 1050 on the 12th
of February for the good reason that we had never occupied
it. It was, as we have seen, the Serbs who had lost it
some months before, immediately after capturing it ; of
the trenches which we had actually lost on February 12th
we recaptured nearly all, partly in the attack on February
13th, and the others in that on the 27th. There only
remained the very small bit which I have mentioned, and
even the enemy could not hold this permanently.

These operations, and others on other sectors of the
front, were only a prelude to a wider action which General
Sarrail intended to conduct in the spring in order to try
to break through the enemy line. As regards our own
sector, General Petitti had proposed a very promising and
well thought out plan of operations. The enemy positions
on Hill 1050 were to be outflanked and only a demonstrative
frontal action was to be developed against them, whereas
the line was to be broken at the salient of Vlaklar, and the
Piton Rocheux occupied in order to destroy the artillery
behind it. But in the month of March our sector of

1 Pages 206-7.

126 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

front was shortened and part of the positions on the
Piton Rocheux were given over to the French, so that
this area remained divided between the Italians and the
French.

The first phase of the offensive, according to Sarrail's
plan, was to consist of a flanking movement with the
object of breaking the enemy line between the Lakes
of Ochrida and Presba ; Allied forces were then to march
round the latter, occupy Resna, and thence threaten the
enemy's communications behind the Monastir front.
At the same time a frontal attack from Monastir was to
be delivered against Hill 1248 so as to give the town, which
was always under enemy fire, a wider breathing space. On
March 11th, the operations between the two lakes began
with an attack by the 76th French Division. Important
preparations had been made for transport along the
difficult Pisoderi road between Fiorina and Koritza, but the
enemy's resistance proved more vigorous than was expected,
and this fact, together with the extremely bad weather
which set in just then, caused the flanking movement to
fail, and it was soon abandoned. On the 13th a small
operation was carried out by detachments of the 63rd
Italian Infantry Regiment on Hill 1050 and certain
enemy trenches, which formed a troublesome salient within
our lines, were captured. The French attack on Hill 1248,
which was to have been delivered at the same time, did not
commence until the 14th. After an intense bombardment,
the French attacked the Tzrvena-Stena west of Monastir,
and captured some strong entrenchments ; others were
captured on Hill 1248. On the 18th, after other lively
engagements, the French captured the whole of Hill 1248
as well as the fortified village of Krklina, taking 1,200
prisoners. But the enemy succeeded, by a counter-attack,
in recapturing part of Hill 1248, whose summit remained
abandoned by both sides. Monastir was somewhat
relieved, but the town continued to remain under fire until
the Armistice, and more than half of it was destroyed.
It cannot be said that the bombardment was unjustified
because, besides various Commands, the French had placed
a number of batteries there.

HELIOGRAPH IN A CAVERN ON HILL 1050.

ROCK-PERFORATING MACHINE ON HILL 1050.

Tn face o. 126.

FRENCH AND BRITISH ATTACKS 127

On March 25th, the enemy again attacked the positions
of the 63rd Infantry Regiment on Hill 1050, but were
repulsed. After another quiet period the offensive was
to be resumed in April, and this time the British were to
deliver the attack. General Sarrail wanted them to
advance simultaneously on Serres and Doiran, but General
Milne replied that with his weak effectives he could not
attempt an offensive on both sectors, and he decided to
limit himself to the Doiran front. He probably realized
that General Sarrail wanted him to attack Serres solely
for political reasons, because Serres, being a place which
even the ordinary public had heard of, its capture would
have been a good advertisement for the Armee d'Orient,
but if the capture of the town appeared fairly easy,
it would have been very difficult to hold it, as it was
dominated by formidable Bulgarian positions on the hills
behind it.

On April 25th the British attack was launched. The
immediate objective was the capture of the Grand and
Petit Couronne, extremely strong positions defending the
passage between Lake Doiran and the Vardar. Their
capture would have opened two roads, that of the Vardar
Valley with the railway along the river, and that of the
Kosturino Pass towards Strumitza and the interior of
Bulgaria. This sector of the front was, like that of the
Cerna loop and that of Hill 1248, similar to the fronts of
Italy and France, inasmuch as it was provided with all
the defensive systems known to modern warfare, and the
lines of the two adversaries were very close together,
but it differed from the European fronts as all the
sectors of Macedonia differed from them, owing to the
far greater difficulties of supply and communications.
Between Lake Doiran and the Vardar the 22nd and 26th
Divisions were distributed (XII Corps), and they had held
that sector for almost a year. The ground was extremely
broken, and if the mountains occupied by the enemy
were not very high, they dominated the British positions
and were very well adapted for a strenuous defence. The
most conspicuous point of the British position was a long
hill like a hump, which the French had named La Tortue,

128 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

on account of its resemblance to the back of a tortoise.
The British trenches lay along the ridge on La Tortue,
beside which rose the Petit Couronne of about the same
height, which was the principal bastion of the first line
defences of the Bulgarians. Between the two heights
there was a deep gully, known as the Ravin des
Jumeaux. Behind La Tortue were other hills, all
dominated by the two formidable positions of the Grand
Couronne near the lake, and the P ridges, the former
600 m. above the sea, and the highest point of the latter
(P 2), 700 m.

On April 22nd the British artillery opened a heavy
preparatory bombardment which lasted throughout the
24th, so that the Bulgarians had no difficulty in knowing
that an attack was imminent, and they took the necessary
precautions. On the night of the 24th-25th the attack
was delivered — the 65th and 66th Brigades of the 22nd
Division to the left, and the 78th and 79th Brigades of the
26th Division to the right, took part in it. Various trenches
in the enemy line were occupied, both on the Petit Couronne"
near the lake, and further to the left. The losses were
heavy, especially in the Jumeaux Ravine, and the Bulgarian
defences proved stronger than had been anticipated. The
enemy, moreover, was able to bring up reinforcements
more rapidly than the British could do, both on account
of the shorter distance that they had to traverse and the
fact that the ground was less broken on their side. The
British were violently counter-attacked and mown down
by machine-gun fire, and consequently had to withdraw
to their original positions, except on the extreme left of the
sector of attack where they were able to hold some of
the captured trenches in the Dolzeli-Krastali sector. The
Bulgarian counter-offensive against these positions, between
the 26th and 28th, was driven back with heavy losses ;
the total British losses amounted to about 3,000. The
troops had all behaved with conspicuous gallantry, the
battalions of the Devonshire and Berkshire Regiments
being specially mentioned.

Early in May, General Petitti di Roreto was recalled
to Italy to take up an important Command ; he was

BULCA Rl A

<y

Ghevghili

AREA OF THE BRITISH XII CORPS.

— To face p. 129.

BRITISH OFFENSIVE 129

succeeded in Macedonia by General PenneHa, who arrived
at Tepavci on the eve of the important offensive of that
month. This attack was to have been delivered
simultaneously in the Cerna loop by the Italians and the
French, on the Dobropolje by the Serbs, and in the Vardar-
Doiran sector by the British. But General Sarrail was
anxious about other matters besides military considera-
tions. In Greece the political situation was becoming
ever more critical, and while he was preparing for the
offensive on the Macedonian front, an offensive which
everybody knew about, including of course, the enemy,
he was already contemplating an expedition to Greece,
which prevented him from concentrating all his efforts
against the Bulgarians and Germans. He even told an
Italian field officer that he did not hope to obtain more
than a partial success on the front and perhaps reach
Prilep, and that, as soon as he had achieved some advantage,
he would send 3 divisions to Thessaly to obtain possession
of the harvest. This was important both for the supplies
of the Armee d'Orient and to prevent the Greeks, then
under the rule of King Constantine, from getting supplies.
Greece would thus have been placed at the mercy of the
Entente. But he was already meditating, as we shall
see, a broader offensive against King Constantine, and his
chief error was to have attempted the offensive against
the Bulgarians and Germans whilst his attention was
being attracted towards the south.

On May 6th, the British resumed their bombardment
of the Bulgarian positions west of Lake Doiran, and on
the night of the 8th-9th, the infantry attacked. The
60th, 22nd and 26th Divisions took part in the operations,
but the principal effort was made by the latter between
the Ravin des Jumeaux and the lake ; to the left only
demonstrative actions were to take place. The positions
to the right and left of the Petit Couronne were captured
at the cost of heavy lossess, a battalion of the Argyll and
Sutherlands greatly distinguishing itself. Two detach-
ments of the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry and the
Berkshire Regiment assaulted the eastern end of the hill
and ascended its slopes, but the violent machine-gun and

9

130 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

trench-mortar fire and the counter-attacks of the enemy
rendered these positions untenable and they had to be
evacuated. The British were unable to hold the captured
trenches except in one or two sectors to the west of Krastali,
where the enemy had offered no serious resistance. Their
conduct throughout this action, as in that of the Ravin
des Jumeaux, was admirable, but the losses were very
heavy — from 4,000 to 5,000 men — and no advantage was
gained.

On May 9th, the attack was also delivered in the Cerna
loop. The plan of operations proposed by our Command
was not, as we have seen, accepted by General Sarrail,
who, after having studied the ground on which the action
was to take place for one hour only, an inspection which he
made from the summit of Mount Tchuka, he decided to
deliver a frontal attack on the whole of Hill 1050 from
point " A " to the Piton Rocheux. None of the Com-
manders who were to carry out this operation, Italian or
French, had any confidence in its success. The attack
was planned in order to make it coincide with that of the
Serbs, but actually it did not do so. This fact, and the
preliminary bombardment to destroy the wire entangle-
ments and other defences of the enemy, which lasted for
several days, gave the enemy ample warning as to the
points at which the attack was to be delivered. The
troops detailed for the operation were the 61st, 161st,
and 162nd Italian Infantry detachments, with the 62nd
in support, the 16th French Colonial Division and a Russian
brigade. The artillery consisted of three French batteries
of short 155-mm. guns, 7 French batteries of old naval guns
of 120 mm. (long), 9 French field batteries of 75 mm., the
32 Italian mountain guns of 65 mm., and two groups (16
pieces) of 240 mm. Italian trench-mortars. But all this
was insufficient to destroy the enemy defences. The
destructive barrage was resumed with greater vigour,
and at 6.30 the infantry attack began. On the'left, the
1st Battalion of the 61st Regiment reached and passed
beyond the enemy lines on the crest of Hill 1050 between
points "A" and "A 2," but there it was met by very
heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, suffered serious losses

ITALIAN ATTACK 131

and had to fall back on point " A 1," where it remained
until evening. The 3rd Battalion recaptured the old
trenches, lost by the Serbs after the fall of Monastir, to
the south and south-east of point " A " and went beyond
them, but were attacked in the flank as well as in front by
the enemy fire ; they had to fall back after having suffered
heavy losses, including the Battalion Commander, who
was mortally wounded. In the centre, a detachment of
the 161st succeeded in getting round Hill 1050 on the
right, whilst others in the centre and on the left reached
points " A 2 " and " A 3." These troops were also
subjected to very heavy artillery, trench-mortar and
machine-gun fire, were counter-attacked by strong detach-
ments of the enemy, and suffered serious losses. One
company was almost completely destroyed by the explosion
of a mine which had been laid in the trench from which
the enemy had been driven. Nevertheless the few sur-
vivors advanced with great energy and surprised the
enemy in their dug-outs, capturing many German prisoners
and killing others. But the fire from the battery positions
which our artillery could not silence, rendered their position
untenable, and they, too, had to fall back on their original
trenches, which in the meanwhile had been wrecked by
the enemy bombardment. On the right, the attack by
the 162nd Regiment encountered the same fate as the
others. Our men succeeded in their first dash in occupying
the whole of the enemy's first line on the Piton Brule, on
to which they also carried their machine-guns. Then
perhaps they might have been able to hold their ground,
but support failed them on the right, because even the
troops of the 16th French Colonial Division had been
unable to maintain themselves on the Piton Rocheux
which they had at first captured, so that the Italians
were met by a very heavy artillery, machine-gun and
hand-grenade fire from behind, and by machine-gun fire
on their right coming from the Piton Rocheux. They were
thus obliged to fall back, partly on their own trenches and
partly on positions between the old and the new trenches.
At 9.45, the attack was resumed, but conditions not
having improved in our favour, no better success was

132 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

achieved, whereas fresh heavy losses were suffered. About
midday the order to suspend the attack was given.
Altogether we had lost about 2,700 men killed and
wounded. The troops had behaved splendidly, and
perhaps they might have broken through on the right if,
as I have said, the support from the Rocheux sector, where
the French had been unable to reach the ridge, had not
failed them.

On the following day a new attack was ordered. As
the French Command had realized that the artillery at
its disposal was not sufficient for a general attack along
the whole line, a fact which the Italians had known for
some time, it was decided to concentrate the whole of
it on the Piton Brule and the Piton Rocheux. At 5 a.m.
a demonstrative bombardment was commenced on Hill
1050, and a concentrated fire on the Brule and Rocheux
from the Italian and French batteries further east. At
8 a.m. the range was lengthened, and the infantry (161st
Regiment) began the attack, but they were met by the
usual hurricane of enemy fire which held up the advance,
As early as 7.30, our Command had noticed a diminution
in the intensity of the artillery fire against the Rocheux,
and in answer to a question by telephone, the French
Command replied that the bombardment was merely a
feint because the attack had been adjourned to the follow-
ing day. The explanation was afterwards given that, as
everybody at the French H.Q. knew of this adjournment,
nobody had thought of communicating it to our Command.
The batteries were immediately ordered to cease fire and
the two attacking battalions to remain in their trenches ;
the battalion on the right suspended its advance, but the
one on the left, the telephone having been destroyed by
the enemy bombardment, could not be warned in time,
and attacked impetuously, reached the enemy trenches
and occupied them, but found itself without jmpport,
because the battalion on the right and the French had not
moved, and consequently it had to retire with heavy losses.

On the 11th the attack was repeated in identical
conditions, but the enemy fire made any advance impossible,
and the troops fell back on the trenches whence they had

SERBIAN ATTACK 133

started. A detachment of Italian infantry which had
pushed further forward remained under a rocky ridge
the whole day, the men shamming dead because they
could not raise their heads, and re-entered our lines
after nightfall. The French attack was no more successful.
Our total losses were 3,000 men — those of the French
about the same.

In the meanwhile, the II Serbian Army had attacked Hill
1824, south of the Dobropolje on May 9th, capturing it with
small losses, and prepared to attack Vetrenik. But after
some operations of slight importance, in which a little
progress was made, the Serbs too, on account of the enemy
resistance and the bad weather, were held up, having lost
about 1,000 men, and the Serbian Command asked the
C.A.A. to suspend the offensive. General Sarrail attributes
this request to various causes, among which was the fear
of the Prince Regent of a movement among the Serbs
similar to that which was taking place among the Russians,
to the reaction of events on the Western front, and to
the failure and losses on other sectors of the Macedonian
front, but chiefly to the crisis in the internal political
situation of the Serbs, and to the intrigues of the
French General Lebouc, commanding the French troops
in the Cerna loop, who, being unable to aspire to the post
of Commander-in-Chief on account of his inferior rank,
had tried, according to General Sarrail, to get the Prince
Regent of Serbia appointed to that post in the place of
General Sarrail in order to become his " Major General."
There was some truth in all this, but the chief cause of
the reluctance of the Prince Regent to continue the
offensive was, as usual, lack of confidence on the part
of the Serbs in the strategic qualities of Sarrail, and the
fear of incurring useless losses which could not be made
good.

Further to the right, the I Group of Divisions, commanded
by General Regnault, and composed of the 122nd French
Division, the Greek Archipelago Division (2 Regiments),
and a Russian brigade commanded by General Dietrich,
had begun to explore the ground as early as May 5th, and
on the 10th it advanced a little. On the Struma the British

134 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917

attacked on the 15th and captured a few prisoners, and
on the 16th and 18th they repulsed Bulgarian counter-
attacks, inflicting losses on the enemy. A few sporadic
actions were conducted on various sectors of the front,
and on the 21st General Sarrail ordered the French and
British battalions to suspend all attacks, and on the 23rd
he extended the same order to the Serbs. The final result
of these and other operations, the losses in which were
about 13,000 to 14,000, was absolutely nil. A few enemy
trenches had been captured, but no positions which
could in any way improve the situation of the Allies. The
moral situation of the latter had suffered considerably,
both on account of the depression caused by the unsuccess-
ful attacks and of the heavy losses, and above all, owing to
the encouragement of the Bulgarians and Germans. Until
that moment the enemy moral had been declining as a con-
sequence of the long period of inaction after their defeat
in the autumn of 1916, the pressure of the Allies, and the
conviction that, whatever was the outcome of the war,
the Bulgarians would obtain but slight advantages besides
those already achieved, even if the latter could be preserved
in their entirety. The possibility of a separate peace was
not excluded. Now, however, victory — the unsuccessful
offensive of the Allies appeared a victory to them —
strengthened their determination to carry on the war to
the bitter end.

The reasons for the failure are various. In the first
place, the enemy, with their successive lines of trenches,
well defended by barbed wire, with dug-outs excavated
in the rock, and their great abundance of artillery and
machine guns, occupied everywhere the dominating posi-
tions. Their artillery was more numerous and included
heavier calibres than that of the Allies. On the other hand,
the Allied effectives, weakened by sickness, the gaps
not being filled up by adequate reinforcements, were inferior
to those of the enemy. The Allied Air Force "was also
inferior, as it was not provided with machines capable
of facing the swift and powerful German Gothas. But the
chief cause of the failure must be set down to the absolute
deficiency of the Chief Command. General Sarrail was

CAMP UNDER THE PITON BRULE.

ITALIAN NATIONAL FESTIVAL (THE STATUTO) AT SAKULEVO. HIGH MASS.

To faea p. 131.

CAUSES OF FAILURE 135

peculiarly unsuited to hold a command over troops of
different nationalities on account of his lack of tact and
consideration in dealing with the various commanders,
nor did he possess the true qualities of a commander of
a large unit. He lacked clearness of vision and genius in
his strategic ideas, and firmness in carrying them out.
He always affected great contempt for the enemy forces,
he acted on sudden decisions taken almost at haphazard
and without sufficient knowledge of the topographical and
military situation. As we have seen, he had decided on
the plan of operations in the Cerna loop after a flying visit
to Mount Tchuka, and adopted one very different from
that elaborated by our Command after a residence of nearly
six months in that sector. Nor would he listen to Voivod
Michich, who knew more about Balkan mountain warfare
than most generals. He had no idea of the methods of
liaison, and instead of carrying out the operations in the
various sectors simultaneously, or else concentrating all his
efforts on one sector, he ordered a series of disconnected
actions, carried out at different moments ; he began the
attack between Lakes Ochrida and Presba and that opposite
Monastir in the month of March, he attacked with the
British west on Lake Doiran on April 25th, and in May he
conducted four attacks on as many sectors — with the French
and Italians in the Cerna loop, with the Serbs east of the
Cerna, with the French, Russians and Greeks west of
the Vardar, and with the French and British east of the
Vardar, dispersing the artillery so that in no sector was there
a sufficiency of heavy and medium calibres to make an
impression on the extremely strong defensive lines of the
enemy or silence their batteries. He allowed each con-
tingent to act on its own account, without ever letting the
guiding hand of the Commander-in-Chief be felt, save occa-
sionally in exceptional circumstances, and at moments when
it was out of place. Apart from all this, while the Allied
effectives were too weak for a serious offensive, he would
not concentrate them all at the front, but withdrew
3 divisions to keep themselves ready to operate in Greece.
The lack of confidence on the part of the Allies, and even of
a considerable section of the French, in his military qualities

136 THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 191?

was thus very much enhanced, because he was seen
to be always preoccupied by political questions, and
those not of inter-Allied policy. If the Greek situation
was such as to require the intervention of the Armee
d'Orient, he should not have attempted an offensive against
the Germans and Bulgarians at that moment.1

If the enemy had thought of conducting a counter-
attack, after the unsuccessful attack by the Allies and the
consequent reduction of their strengths, in addition to
that occasioned by the withdrawal of troops to be sent
to Greece, a disaster to the entire Armee d'Orient would
not have been impossible. If it did not take place, this
was certainly not due to the merits of the Commander-
in-Chief.

1 General Sarrail in his memoirs tries to defend himself by publishing
the orders of the French Government, which enjoined on him now an
action in Greece, now an offensive on the front ; but he does not appear
to have put the question in clear language — either one thing or the other ;
if one was to be carried out he must have no arriere pensee for the other.

CHAPTER VIII

GREEK AFFAIRS

We have already seen what difficulties and anxieties were
inflicted on the Allied armies by the attitude of Greece.
The surrender of Rupel and of the IV Greek Army Corps
aroused a strong reaction in a part of Greek public opinion
— that part which still supported Venizelos in his pro-
Entente policy. As early as February, 1916, General
Sarrail had gone to Athens to try to induce the King and
the Government to alter their policy, at all events in the
sense of a benevolent neutrality. He received the impression
that the King wished to remain neutral at all costs, that
the Premier, M. Skouloudis, and the General Staff were
frankly pro-German, and that Venizelos still hoped for
the intervention of Greece on the side of the Allies ;
Venizelos, however, stated that it would be necessary to
reconstitute and re-equip the whole army before it could
take the field. After the treachery of Rupel, the situation
became more critical, and a sort of Committee of Public
Safety was created at Salonica for the defence of the
nation's interests and honour. Sarrail did not interfere
with the movement, but was sceptical as to its success.

In June, the Powers seemed at last inclined to take
strong measures against the Athens Government. Venize-
lists were being constantly arrested in Greece and the
Allies insulted, so that a naval demonstration was decided
on, together with the landing of a strong contingent of
Allied troops to be sent from Salonica. But Britain and
France were not in absolute agreement as to the line of
action to be taken, while both Governments hesitated
before deciding on measures capable of provoking an open
rupture and of driving Greece definitely into the arms of

137

138 GREEK AFFAIRS

the Central Empires. Nor was there complete under-
standing between General Sarrail and the French Admiral,
Dartige du Fournet, as each of them wished to have the
operations under his own control. But when the troops
were embarked at Salonica and ready to sail for the
Piraeus, M. Skouloudis resigned (June 20th), and was
succeeded by M. Zai'mis, a statesman apparently more
favourable to the Entente ; the King thereupon accepted
the Allies' Note demanding the demobilization of part
of the army, the withdrawal of all Greek troops from
Macedonia and Thessaly, and the cession to the Allies of
the fleet and a certain amount of war material — with the
firm intention of doing nothing of the kind. The expedition
was therefore suspended.

In August, 1916, Venizelos was already contemplating
a revolutionary movement at Salonica, under the protection
of the Allies, but he did not yet dare to act, hesitating at
the thought of provoking civil war. His followers were
bolder, and on August 30th an insurrection against the
Athens Government broke out, under the leadership of
Colonels Zimbrakakis and Mazarakis, the ex-Prefect
Argyropoulo and M. Tsanas. The gendarmerie and the
artillery joined the insurgents, whereas the infantry,
commanded by Colonel Tricoupis, Chief of the Staff of the
III Corps, remained faithful to the King. There were
some encounters on the Place d'Armes, near the barracks,
and General Sarrail seized the occasion to order the
immediate evacuation of Salonica by the Royalist troops,
" to liberate Macedonia from all armed forces who were
vassals of Germany." x The Committee of Public Safety,
with the assent of Sarrail, took possession of the administra-
tion, and Colonel Zimbrakakis summoned Venizelos to
Salonica. The latter arrived on September 9th, unhindered
by the Royal Government. According to General Sarrail,
with whom other observers are also in agreement on this
point, there was a tacit understanding between Cohstantine
and Venizelos. There is, however, no proof of it, and the
personal hostility which had long existed between the two
seems to incompatible with such a supposition. But it is

1 Sarrail, " La Grece Venizeliste," Revue de Paris, December 15, 1919.

THE SALONICA REVOLUTION 139

certain that with the arrival of Venizelos at Salonica
that city was secured for Greece, whatever the outcome of
the war might be, and with Salonica the future of the
kingdom was also assured. If the Central Empires won,
King Constantine might count, owing to his anti-Entente
policy, on their benevolence, whereas if the Allies won
Venizelos might claim anything of them. If Constantine
had been a little more astute he might have taken advantage
of this curious situation, in his own interest.

Venizelos, with General Danglis and Admiral Coun-
douriotis, constituted a " triumvirate " which assumed
authority under the name of " Provisional Government of
National Defence." Its rule was limited to Greek Mace-
donia (except the territories beyond the Struma occupied
by the Bulgarians and Germans), Crete and the other
islands of the Archipelago. Even in those territories
the new Government had many adversaries, and without
the support of the Armee d'Orient and of the Allied fleets
it would have been unable to hold its own, because its
professedly interventionist attitude was not very popular.
Epirus, the Greeks of Koritza, and Thessaly hesitated,
and Sarrail, in order to avoid conflicts between Greeks,
created the so-called Neutral Zone between Macedonia
and Thessaly. This territory was never violated, a fact
which proved advantageous to King Constantine, as it
prevented the penetration of Venizelist elements into
the kingdom.

Venizelos at once set to work to raise an army capable
of fighting by the side of the Allies in Macedonia. It was
a case not only of creating an army out of nothing, but also
of rehabilitating Greece from the discredit which the
ambiguous policy of the King, her intriguing politicians, and
the inadequate sense of dignity and lack of political instinct
of a great part of the army and of the people, had cast
on her. Deserted as he was by almost everyone in Greece,
the undertaking seemed well nigh impossible, and the fact
that he succeeded at all is a proof of his eminent qualities
as well as of unhoped for good luck.

On September 22, 1916, a first Greek battalion was formed
and sent to the Struma incorporated in a French unit under

140 GREEK AFFAIRS

a British Command. On November 14th it was joined by
two more battalions, and thus the first regiment was formed.
In March, 1917, two more regiments were created, and
the three constituted a division which was called the
Serres Division, because the first nucleus was formed of
men belonging to the old Serres Division who had escaped
after the surrender of the IV Corps. During the spring,
drafts from the islands arrived and were formed into a
second division — that of the Archipelago, and some months
later the Cretan Division also arrived. The three divisions
were welded into an Army Corps, known as the National
Defence Army Corps ; this was in fact the National
Defence Army, commanded by General Zimbrakakis
(whom we have seen as Colonel).1 Immense efforts had
been necessary to achieve this result. In Macedonia, real
Greeks were few, and not all of them very keen on inter-
vention ; the other elements of the population were
decidedly opposed to it, or, like the Turks, openly pro-
German. Everybody did their best to evade military
service, with such pretexts as commerce, work necessary
for the Allied armies, propaganda, or the production of
documents and certificates of some neutral nationality
acquired with lightning speed.

The National Defence Government had to resort to
every kind of violence to raise even a few volunteers.
General Sarrail has published in the article already quoted
a series of telegrams from that Government to the local
authorities in the various territories which had recognized
Venizelos containing very stringent instructions to force
the inhabitants to join the colours.2

But in any case tins Government had to be considered
an ally ; France and Britain recognized it officially and
sent diplomatic agents to Salonica as their representatives,
although they did not break off relations with the Athens
Government. Italy never recognized the new__ Govern-

1 The regiments of this force were numbered from 1 to 9, but they
were always described as National Defence Regiments, to distinguish
them from regiments of the regular army having the same numbers.

2 The authorities in the island of Samos were instructed to promise
land in Asia Minor to all volunteers, and if that was not enough " a reign
of terror must be established " (Sarrail, ibid.).

HILL, 1075. ARTILLERY CAMP.

ARTILLERY O.P.

ITALY AND THE VENIZELISTS 141

ment, a fact which was the cause of disagreement between
us and our Allies. The Greeks of both persuasions did not
fail to take advantage of this lack of unity in the Allies'
policy, and incidents between them and all the Allies were
by no means infrequent. The Salonica Venizelists were par-
ticularly incensed against us. Their Press did not scruple
to attack us in the most violent and coarsest manner,
circulating the most idiotic libels, such as the statement
that the Italian Government was starving the inhabitants
of the Dodecannese to death, when it was notorious that
it was feeding them and selling them food below cost
price, so that prices were lower in those islands than in
Italy. A more serious incident was the absolutely un-
provoked murder, by a Greek sergeant, of two unarmed
Italian soldiers of the Territorial Militia while they were
washing clothes in a stream. The assassin was discovered
and arrested by our carabinieri and handed over to the
Greek authorities for punishment. The Greek court ac-
quitted him and the Public Prosecutor actually exalted him
as a hero! The British, too, were irritated against the
Greeks, and even the French, who protected them officially,
in private conversation expressed the greatest contempt
for them. General Sarrail states that, as soon as it had
been recognized by France and Britain, the National
Defence Government tried to revive a number of old claims
for preposterous indemnities demanded by Salonica
natives for requisitions or doubtful damages. The Finance
Minister at one moment had even decreed that the State
Treasury was to refuse French bank notes, so that the
C. A.A. had to buy drachmas at the rate of 80 for 100 francs,
even when the money was to be spent for the Venizelist
Army.

On September 11th the Zai'mis Cabinet, which was
moderately pro-Entente, fell and was succeeded by that
of M. Kalogheropoulo, but as the Allies refused to treat
with the latter, it too fell on October 4th. Professor
Lambros then became Premier, with a frankly anti-Ally
policy, and thus we come to the catastrophe of December
1st. The Greek Government, after having undertaken
to withdraw the troops from Thessaly and to hand over

142 GREEK AFFAIRS

the fleet and war material, failed to do so. After endless
shuffling, the Allied fleets were sent to the Piraeus and a
policy of coercion was decided on. As a pledge for the
cession of war material, the Government was to hand over
10 mountain batteries at once. Admiral Dartige had
certain strategic points in Athens and the road between
the capital and the Piraeus occupied by detachments of
French seamen with machine guns. Then he went himself
to Athens, and communicated his plan of operations to the
King.1 Suddenly there was a general burst of rifle fire.
The detachment at the Zappeion and those along the
Athens-Piraeus road were surrounded by Greek soldiers,
as were also the Allied legations. The French seamen
had fallen into a regular ambush, and 200 of them were
killed. Admiral Dartige and several detachments of sea-
men were taken prisoners and escorted to the Piraeus.
Both he and the Foreign Ministers then agreed to accept
six batteries instead of ten, while the rest of the material
was to be handed over on December 15th.

General Sarrail received the most contradictory
instructions (which he quotes textually in his memoirs).
Whereas the French G.H.Q. and the Government ordered
him to take the military measures necessary to re-establish
the prestige of the Entente in Greece and sent out the 16th
Colonial Division, which he was to reinforce with other
troops from Salonica, the French Minister at Athens and
Admiral Dartige, anxious for the safety of the foreign
colonies, insisted on nothing being done. Sarrail himself
wanted to take action, occupying various strategic points
in Greece and blowing up the railway bridges at Corinth
and Lamia. The French Government had entrusted
General Sarrail with the conduct of the operations to be
carried out in Greece, but Admiral Dartige had held back
the 16th Division. The British and Italian Governments
were adverse to any energetic action against King
Constantine because, in view of the general military
situation and of that on the Macedonian front in particular,
they thought that it would be dangerous to brusquer les
choses. Thus, while the Greek Government had suppressed
J Sarrail, Mm Commandement en Orient, p. 194,

DIPLOMACY AT ATHENS 143

all the Allied controls, the Athens wireless station began
to communicate with Sofia once more, and the Venizelists
were subjected to the most ferocious persecution, the
Allies presented a fresh ultimatum to Greece (these
documents now came to be called j9m-ultimatums) on
December 14th, demanding merely the withdrawal of
the troops from Thessaly, without mentioning the cession
of war material or claiming any satisfaction for the massacre
of December 1st. The Greek Government accepted with-
out hesitation, and the 16th Colonial Division departed
for Salonica.

These events undoubtedly weakened the prestige of

the Entente in the East, because it was clearly seen that

the Allies were by no means agreed as to the policy to be

followed and that they dare not take strong measures.

This consequently strengthened King Constantine and the

pro-German and neutralist elements. The only thing

that the Allies did decide to do was to impose a blockade

on Greece, which aroused great irritation against them

without being sufficient to reduce the Athens Government

to obedience. At the Rome Conference in January, 1917,

at which General Sarrail had been present, although little

attention was paid to him, no conclusion concerning

Greece was arrived at, except that of doing nothing for

the present. But the situation at Athens rendered that

of the Armee d'Orient ever more difficult, and it was

necessary to find some solution for the former if the

Macedonian front were to be made safe. The Greek

Government, although it had withdrawn its troops from

Thessaly, left many officers and strong detachments of

gendarmerie there, which might serve as cadres for the

reservists. From the Peloponnese many soldiers were

allowed to go to Thessaly on leave. Whereas at Athens

provisions were lacking, they were being concentrated

in abundance in the north ; every now and then the

control officers, who had been re-established, found arms

and ammunition depots. Bands, comprising soldiers and

reservists, were also formed.1 It was to oppose these

1 Telegrams sent by General Sarrail between January and May, 1917
(Sarrail, op. cit. pp. 231-32).

144 GREEK AFFAIRS

bands and to prevent them from pentrating into the
Neutral Zone that General Sarrail sent detachments to
Kozani and Grevena. But the Greek question continued
to provoke inter- Allied incidents ; according to Sarrail,
General Phillips, the Chief of the British Military Mission
in Greece, tried to minimize the importance of the trickery
and chicanes of the Greeks ; even two French officers
supported King Constantine — General Bousquier, Chief
of the French Military Mission at Athens, and General
Baumann at Corfu (always according to the French
C.-in-C.).

The Greeks at Salonica having assumed a truculent
attitude towards ourselves, the Italian troops received
orders that, while they were to avoid giving rise to any
incidents, they were to ensure respect for the Italian
name and uniform. An Italian soldier who, having been
insulted without the slightest provocation by a Greek,
gave him a sound thrashing, received an encomium and a
reward. General Petitti, in accordance with instructions
from his own Government, did not recognize the National
Defence Government in any way, and merely exchanged
visiting cards with M. Venizelos, to whom he had been
introduced by the Italian Consul. But he refused to allow
forced recruiting for the National Defence Army among
the inhabitants of the Italian area in the Krusha Balkan.
Subsequently our Command agreed that the native
labourers in our employ, if subject to military service,
should be exchanged with others who were exempt from
such duties. Colonel Bodrero, commanding the Italian
garrison at Salonica, was, however, on terms of friendship
with M. Venizelos, and saw him often. He also assisted
at a religious ceremony of a political Venizelist character
at Santa Sofia, at a moment when it was reported that Italy
was about to recognize the Provisional Government.
But nothing came of these avarices.

Finally, in April, the Powers decided to occupy Thessaly,
and General Sarrail received instructions to keep himself
in readiness for the operation, but the date was not yet
fixed. He was then ordered to proceed to Thessaly after
the offensive in Macedonia, scheduled for May, had been

THE EXPEDITION TO GREECE 145

carried out. At first the intention was merely to secure
the harvest in Thessaly, both because it would be useful
for the Armee d'Orient, and because it would render the
blockade of Greece more effective. But Sarrail wished to
go much further ; he actually proposed to upset King
Constantine and establish a republic in Greece with
Venizelos as President. To this, however, both Britain
and Italy raised strong objection ; two monarchies were
certainly not going to co-operate in upsetting another one,
especially in view of the Russian situation. After pro-
tracted discussions, it was agreed that Constantine should
be forced to abdicate, and that his son Prince Alexander
should be placed on the throne, with Venizelos as Prime
Minister. The conduct of the Allied action in Greece
was entrusted to M. Jonnart, former Governor-General
of Algeria, as High Commissioner for the Entente. Even
Sarrail was placed under his orders, which did not please
the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the Orient.
On June 3rd he sent a detailed report on the situation to
M. Jonnart, to whom he submitted the plan of operations
which he proposed to execute. On the 6th, Jonnart
reached Salonica to make his final arrangements with
Sarrail and Venizelos. In order to avoid any possibility
of resistance on the part of King Constantine, it was decided
to occupy simultaneously Thessaly to secure the harvest,
the Isthmus of Corinth to prevent the troops in the Pelo-
ponnesus, who were faithful to the King, from entering
Continental Greece, and the Piraeus with a view to advan-
cing on Athens and forcing the King to abdicate.

M. Jonnart immediately left for the Piraeus. On June
8th, a French column commanded by General Venel
advanced across the Neutral Zone into Thessalv, while a
Franco-British-Russian force, commanded by General Reg-
nault, embarked for the Piraeus and the Isthmus of Corinth.
In Thessaly there was no resistance, except at Larissa,
where a Greek regiment opened fire on the French cavalry,
but was soon reduced to impotence. On the 10th,
M. Jonnart, who had established his quarters on board the
French battleship Justice, had a meeting with M. Zaimis,
the new Greek Premier. The Isthmus of Corinth was

10

146 GREEK AFFAIRS

occupied, and the ships conveying the troops destined for
Athens were anchored off the Piraeus. On the 11th,
Jonnart, in the name of the Protecting Powers of Greece
(France, Britain and Russia), sent an ultimatum to Zai'mis.
in which the abdication of King Constantine was de-
manded, in order that Constitutional Government might
be re-established in the country, as the Constitution had
been violated by the illegal dissolution of the Chamber;
the King himself was invited to choose his successor,
who, however, was not to be the Diadoch on account of
his notoriously anti-German sentiments. A reply was
demanded within twenty-four hours. Constantine now
realized that all resistance was useless — his own capital
was within range of the guns of the fleet, and troops were
ready to land at the Piraeus. That same evening M. Zai'mis
informed M. Jonnart that the ultimatum had been accepted
unconditionally, and on the 12th he sent him the official
reply of the Greek Government to the same effect.
When the news of the King's abdication became known
in the city, there were some demonstrations in his favour ;
but the landing of the French and Russian troops (the
British were at Corinth) removed all danger of a rising,
In order to preclude any contact with the population and
to draw off the attention of the crowd, some empty Royal
motor cars, with the blinds down, issued from the main
entrance of the Palace and drove towards the Zappeion,
while the King and his family departed secretly at about
17 hrs. in the direction of the Royal villa of Tato'i, and
thence proceeded to the little port of Oropos in the Eubcea
Channel, where they embarked on the Royal yacht
Sphacteria. Together with another vessel for the suite
and the baggage, and escorted by two French destroyers,
the Sphacteria sailed for Italy, whence the ex-King and
his family went into exile in Switzerland.

In the meanwhile Prince Alexander, Cojistantine's
second son, who had been designated as successor, had
taken the oath of allegiance to the Constitution. M. Jonnart
then published a proclamation to the Greek people, an-
nouncing the raising of the blockade, the re-establishment
of good relations between the Protecting Powers and

THE ABDICATION OF CONSTANTINE 147

Greece, and the imminent restoration of national unity.
After a conversation with M. Jonnart, M. Zai'mis
ordered the expulsion from Greece of a certain
number of personages implicated in Constantine's policy,
including the ex-Premiers Gounaris, Skouloudis and
Lambros, six other Ministers, General Dousmanis and
another General, Colonel Metaxas, Assistant Chief of
the Staff, and Admiral Hosslin, the head of the German
propaganda service and several others — in all 160 people.
Immediately after ascending the throne, King Alexander
announced in a proclamation to the people that " he would
follow in the glorious footsteps of his father," which was
not exactly what was desired, and the phrase had a some-
what disconcerting effect. But he corrected this faux
pas directly after in a letter to M. Zai'mis in which he
promised faithfully to respect the Constitution and declared
himself ready to co-operate with the Protecting Powers
for the pacification of public feeling and the reconciliation
of the country (June 20th).

On the 21st the delegates of M. Venizelos met those
of M. Zai'mis, and M. Venizelos himself arrived at Salamis,
where he had a conversation with M. Jonnart on board
the Justice. It was then decided to re-convoke the Chamber
elected in 1915, in which the majority was Venizelist and
had been illegally dissolved by Constantine. King
Alexander having agreed to send for Venizelos, Zai'mis
resigned (June 27th), and Venizelos re-entered Athens
under the protection of French troops who had occupied
all the strategic positions in the city, and of 400 Cretan
gendarmes. The new Cabinet comprised Venizelos himself
as Premier and Minister of War, Politis, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Repoulis (Interior), Admiral Coundouriotis
(Marine), Empiricos (Communications), etc. Jonnart had
authorized Venizelos to modify certain points of the Con-
stitution and to suspend the permanency of the judiciary,
so as to cleanse the State of Royalist x officials. The
process was carried out without excessive squeamishness.

1 Although the Monarchy was maintained in Greece, the word " Royal-
ist " came to be applied exclusively to followers of the ex-King ; his
opponents were described as Venizelists or Liberals.

148 GREEK AFFAIRS

Many officials, magistrates and officers were dismissed ;
the trials and convictions for political offences, and the
sentences of deportation or exile were innumerable.
The population, which had attacked the Venizelists after
December 1st with the utmost ferocity, and with the
complicity or the help of the authorities had committed
the most diabolical cruelties against them, accepted the
new regime without resistance, if without enthusiasm.
There was still a strong Royalist party, comprising almost
the whole of the upper class and a great part of the officers.
But its chiefs having been arrested or deported, it was
in no position to offer any resistance. The mass of the
people, although less enthusiastic about Constantine than
the higher classes, was hostile to Venizelos because he
represented war, and they had no wish to fight. But there
was also an ardently Venizelist minority, comprising some
of the best elements of the country, who saw beyond
mean party struggles and immediate material interests.
It was this group which, with support of the Allies, ended
by triumphing.

Thus the National Defence Government came to an end,
and Greece was once more united. In Italy, the Greek
situation was never fully understood, nor the inner
meaning of these events. For some time before the great
war Italo-Greek relations had been unfriendly on account
of the Dodecannese question and our interests in Albania.
Italian public opinion had defended Albanian independence,
whereas Greece aspired to annex the southern part of the
country, including Argyrocastro and Koritza which Greeks
described as " Northern Epirus." During the Balkan War
the Greeks had occupied Epirus and South Albania, but
later they had had to evacuate the latter territory ; on
the outbreak of the Great War they invaded it again and
devastated it. The feelings of Greece towards the Entente
were uncertain ; our intervention rendered her somewhat
hostile because she did not, for the above-mentioned
reasons, wish to find herself in alliance with Italy.1 The

1 By the terms of the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915), Italy under-
took, if a small neutral Albanian State were created, not to oppose Greek
claims over South Albania and those of Serbia and Montenegro over

ITALY AND GREECE 149

insolent and petulant attitude of the Greek press intensified
anti-Greek feeling in Italy. Greece's failure to meet her
engagements arising from the Serbo-Greek Alliance, and
later her whole attitude towards the Allies in Macedonia,
culminating in the surrender of Rupel and the IV Army
Corps, convinced Italian public opinion that the great
majority of the Greek people were pro-German. On the
other hand we were suspicious of Venizelos because he
represented the Imperialist spirit of unlimited Greek
expansion, and Italians did not believe that Greek
Imperialism had a sound basis, because they considered
that the Greeks lacked the qualities required in a race
destined to rule. But in Italy it was not perhaps under-
stood that Venizelos himself was a much bigger man than
the milieu in which his activity was displayed, and that he
was in realitv rendering services to the Entente and there-
fore to us. In Britain and France, on the other hand,
public opinion wrongly believed that he had his people
absolutely behind him and that that people was, as a
whole, up to his standard.

The real reason why Britain and France, especially the
latter, desired Greek intervention in the war and therefore
supported Venizelos, was that a hostile Greece might
prove fatal to the Macedonian expedition. If Greece were
really neutral the Armee d'Orient might hold its own on
its positions, but a new offensive could only be attempted
with any hope of success if fresh reinforcements were
forthcoming. These might have been drawn from the
French front or from Italy; but the British, French
and Italian G.H.Q.'s were irremovably opposed to the
sending of more troops from what were regarded as the
essential fronts to the East. The Serbs were not even
able to fill up the gaps caused by battle and sickness.
The only source of supply for man-power which could

the northern districts, if she was given Valona and all the Adriatic
territories which she claimed, including Northern Dalmatia. Italy was
to direct Albania's foreign policy. But the general trend of public
opinion was in favour of a completely independent Albania, and the
clauses of the Treaty providing for the partition of Albania were even-
tually dropped. The general object of Italian policy had been to prevent
the Albanian coast from being occupied by a potentially hostile Power.

150 GREEK AFFAIRS

still be tapped was Greece. No one really wanted Greek
assistance — neither the French nor the British, and still
less the Italians and the Serbs. Everybody knew that
the Greek Army was torn by political strife, disorganized,
lacking in artillery and equipment, badly led and anything
but friendly to the Entente, and that it could not therefore
represent an important addition of strength to the Allies.
There were, it is true, the three National Defence Divisions
which included good material, and the officers at least
were all volunteers. But they were only nine regiments
in all, with a few mountain batteries. There was therefore
nothing else to be done but to get the whole of Greece,
nolens volens, into the war, and trust to the Allied military
missions and to a vast cleansing operation to make some-
thing useful out of the Greek Army. It would certainly
have been preferable if a few already war-trained divisions
from France or Italy had been available. But the Govern-
ment of the Great Powers were not friendly towards the
Macedonian campaign, and would not realize that 3 or
4 divisions, withdrawn from the fronts of Italy or France
would not have weakened those armies perceptibly, whereas
in Macedonia they might have just tilted the balance in
our favour. But as this course was rejected it was
necessary to have recourse to Greece, a necessity which was
not understood in Italy. We did not desire Greek inter-
vention because we knew what enormous demands for com-
pensation Greece would afterwards make, demands which
were to some extent incompatible with our own interests.
But on the other hand we were even more opposed than
the French or the British to the sending of fresh troops
to Macedonia. The only other solution was to withdraw
the Armee d' Orient altogether, or let it be starved for
men and remain in idleness, with the ever-present risk
of being driven into the sea by the enemy. France and
Britain, who attached a little more importance than we
did — though not very much more — to the Macedonian
expedition, finally decided to apply for Greek help,
trusting in Venizelos. Italy, in her opposition to the
vast aspirations of Venizelist Greece, had the appearance
of supporting Constantine, and this did us a great deal of

THE GREEK ARMY 151

harm. Wc had, perhaps, interests to defend in the Near
East which were to some extent in contrast with those of
other Allies. But in order to defend them adequately
we should have done nothing to make our policy appear
in any way suspected of pro-Germanism — and at that time
to be pro-Constantine was regarded as equivalent to being
pro-German. Instead, Italian public opinion and the
press, and some of our officers and diplomats assumed an
attitude which made our Near Eastern policy suspect in
the eyes of the French, and even of the British. We con-
tinued to suffer the great harm which these circumstances
caused us for a long time afterwards, especially at the
Peace Conference. Moreover, our pro-Constantine policy
did not succeed. France and Britain brought about
Constantine's fall and the return of Venizelos. We
limited ourselves to occupying Epirus for a short time, as
a pendant to the French occupation of Thessaly ; we
made ourselves still more unpopular with the Venizelists,
without gaining the sympathies of the Royalists. Our
true policy should have been to send important reinforce-
ments to the East. Had we done so we should have been,
after the Armistice, in a far better position to defend our
own aspirations and interests in the negotiations with our
Allies.

Let us now see what the Greek Army really was. I have
mentioned the National Defence Army Corps. This was
the best that Greece could produce in the way of a military
force, and subsequently, as we shall see, its regiments
behaved well. But even their moral at first left something
to be desired. Desertions were numerous, and when
M. Jonnart arrived there had been no less than 700 of
them in the Archipelago Division alone.1 Up to that
moment only a few Greek detachments had been sent to
the front, and always incorporated in Allied units and on
relatively quiet sectors. After the fall of Constantine,
Greece entered into a state of war with the Central Empires,
and the French set to work to reorganize the Greek Army
so that it might co-operate effectively in Macedonia.

The task was no easy one. The first thing to be done

1 Sarrail, " La Grece Venizeliate," Revue, de Paris, December 15, 1919.

152 GREEK AFFAIRS

was to proceed to the cleansing of the officers' corps.
This was indispensable, because nearly all the Staff officers
had studied in Germany and, like the great majority of
field officers, were imbued with pro-German sentiments.
But the result of this process was that the Army was left
with hardly any Staff officers at all, and very few officers
of superior rank. It thus became necessary to promote
large numbers of uneducated junior officers and of still
more ignorant N.C.O.'s. A hasty and intensive course
of military training had to be imparted to all. Even the
troops of the National Defence Army had but scanty
notions of modern warfare, trenches, barbed wire, the
scientific use of machine guns, hand grenades, camouflage,
signalling, etc. As for their supply and transport services,
they were even more defective, so that at first everything
had to be provided and transported by the Allies, and the
latter, even at the end of the campaign, had to supply the
Greeks with most of their services. The experience which
the Greeks had gained in the Balkan Wars was of no use
whatever, in fact thev were a hindrance rather than a
help ; the former had been, so to speak, retail wars, whereas
this was a wholesale one. In the former, the armies were
small and could live on the country, in the latter, not only
were the armies much larger, but the country had been
so completely devastated that it could supply practically
nothing. The troops of the National Defence Corps were
now no longer lacking in military spirit, but it was necessary
to infuse it into those of the old regular army. The men
on the whole were not bad, but most of the officers were
inadquately trained, and it was indispensable to instil
into all of them the conviction that intervention in the
war was necessary for the salvation of Greece.

The chief difficulties which the French Military Mission
found itself up against were Oriental indolence, scanty
love of hard work, and dislike of discipline. At the front,
even when they had fought well and successfully, the Greek
soldiers did not want to tire themselves by digging trenches
and strengthening their positions, so that they could not
have held out against vigorous counter-attacks ; conse-
quently, after every successful attack, when an enemy

TRAINING THE GREEK ARMY 153

reaction was feared, the Greeks would be relieved by other
troops. In the training courses the French instructors
had to work themselves to death trying to persuade their
pupils that discipline and military knowledge were in-
dispensable. As one of these officers said to me : " lis
ne nous detestent pas, mats il nous trouvent ires genant."
On the other hand sporadic cases of indiscipline and mutiny
were less alarming than they would have been in a European
army, although they were serious enough in themselves.
Greek detachments, while travelling towards the Macedonian
front, were apt to disperse en route, because, if the men
happened to be passing near their own homes, they could
not resist the temptation of going to visit their families.
There were graver cases of mutiny proper, especially at
Lamia and Larissa, provoked by Royalist propagandists
who spread catastrophic and fantastic rumours or appealed
to the Royalist and neutralist sentiments with which a
part of the army was imbued ; this is not surprising in
view of the violent political passions by which the Army
was torn and of the fact that the men realized the war very
slightly. Cases of desertion to the enemy, although not
infrequent, were far less numerous than was commonly
believed at Salonica. On the whole it must be admitted
that the French Mission carried out its task as well as it
was possible for it to do with the material which it had
to handle. But superhuman patience was necessary,
and we must not be surprised if French officers at times
indulged in the most bitter and often unjustified diatribes
against the Greeks.

The troops of the National Defence Corps were scattered
about the various sectors of the front to complete their
training under the aegis of French units. As their training
progressed, they were incorporated into ever larger units,
so that whereas at first each Greek company was placed
between companies belonging to other armies, later they
were grouped in battalions, then in regiments, and finally
in divisions. For a time there was one Greek division on
the Monastir front, and one with the I Group of Divisions
west of the Vardar ; later on, two were grouped together,
and early in 1918, all three were united in the latter sector,

154 GREEK AFFAIRS

thus constituting a complete army corps. Until that
moment the Greek Command was a Corps Command,
under General Zimbrakakis, with its G.H.Q. at Salonica,
and later at Boemitza, near front of the I Group. The
latter, however, continued to be commanded by a French
General — first General Gerome, and then General d'Anselme.

In the late autumn of 1917, detachments of the Greek
Regular Army began to reach Salonica. Their training
was divided into three periods — the first in Old Greece,
the second at the training camp at Naresh, near Salonica,
and the third in a quiet sector of the front. The last
detachments did not reach Macedonia until the eve of
the offensive of September, 1918. The 1st, 2nd and 13th
Divisions composed the I Army Corps ; the others were
not embodied in corps until after the Armistice, but served
under Allied units in different sectors. To the I Corps
(Gen. Paraskevopoulo) was entrusted the lower Struma
area in the summer of 1918, at first under the command of
the British XVI Corps, and subsequently directly under
the British G.H.Q.

After the revolution of June, 1917, General Danglis was
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army. He
was a good soldier, but rather old ; when the bulk of the
troops had been transferred to Macedonia he moved his own
G.H.Q. from Athens to Salonica. Later on he was relieved
of his Command, and succeeded by General Paraskevopoulo.
But the Greek Chief Command never really operated, save
as an administrative and disciplinary organ, because there
never was a real Greek Army. There were divisions and
even corps, but the effective Army Command was always
French or British. The lines of communication, the com-
missariat, the intendance only existed in embryo. The
mobilization had never been general from fear of provoking
insurrections, and had to be effected gradually and partially;
only the youngest classes were called to the colours, so that
there was a lack of men for the rear services. The Greeks,
like other Oriental peoples, were lacking in the sense of
organization, and even as collaborators they were the despair
of the British Q service which had to supply them. The
Greek officers recognized it themselves openly, and said

VALUE OF GREEK ASSISTANCE 155

that everything with which the British undertook to
supply them arrived regularly, whereas the supplies
for which the Greek intendance was responsible arrived
with considerable delay or remained on the road. Another
difficulty was the inveterate habit of the Greek soldier
of selling his kit to civilians. The temptation was consider-
able, as the prices paid for these articles were very high,
and there was a regular secret organization for such
purchases, besides private transactions between friends
or relations. The result was that certain units had to be
re-equipped two or three times before they had marched
a kilometre. The same thing happened at Salonica even
among other Allied armies, but to a much smaller extent,
and such cases were always severely punished at once.

But with all their faults we must not forget that the
Greeks did give a useful contribution to the Macedonian
campaign. As we shall see later, the units that had occasion
to fight behaved well, and the great sobriety and endurance
of the men proved valuable assets in country as difficult
and as poor in resources as Macedonia. If their losses in
the war were trifling in comparison with those of the other
Allies, and even as a percentage of the total numbers
engaged, their utility lay in having, to some extent, solved
the crisis of effectives from which the Armee d'Orient
was suffering so grievously and which, in view of the
reluctance of Great Powers to send reinforcements to
Macedonia, had seemed well nigh insoluble. By entrusting
to the Greeks, as was done in the summer of 1918, the whole
of the Struma front, which, although it was not one of the
very difficult sectors, required, nevertheless, a considerable
number of troops to hold on account of its extension, the
concentration of British troops elsewhere was rendered
possible.

The Greek front on the Struma was nothing else than the
old front of the British XVI Corps, and was now held by
the three divisions of the Greek I Corps. Three more divi-
sions were with the I Groupement between Nonte and the
Vardar under French command, and another division
was placed under another French General in the Cerna
loop on the eve of the offensive. The rest of the Greek

156 GREEK AFFAIRS

forces remained in reserve. The 9th Division, which was
in Epirus, had originally been intended to co-operate with
the Italian XVI Corps in Albania; but it was considered
advisable to avoid contact between Italians and Greeks,
and it was therefore sent to Macedonia in the summer of
1918, part of it being conveyed by sea via Salonica and
the rest marching overland via Ersek and Koritza. During
their passage through Albania the various units of that
division were supplied, at General Franchet d'Esperey's
request, by the Italian military authorities, and the
latter is said to have stated that the greatest success
of his whole career was to have induced the Italians
to feed the Greeks !

CHAPTER IX

SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER

Salonica was undoubtedly the most curious of all the
" war capitals," and no other was such a centre of
contending claims and political intrigues. Its population
is unlike that of any other city, and although most of the
inhabitants took no active part in the war, all were deeply
interested in its eventual results. The majority are Jews of
Spanish origin, who had settled there after their expulsion
from Spain in the fifteenth century, and they still speak
a bastard Spanish dialect. The next element in importance
are the Greeks, who have largely increased by immigration
since the annexation of Southern Macedonia to Greece.
There is also a considerable number of Turks and other
Moslems, and smaller communities of Bulgars, Serbs,
Albanians, Kutzo-Vlachs, Europeans of various nationali-
ties, and even a few Americans.

The city is in a certain sense an island, for it is surrounded
on three sides by an almost uninhabited country, and on
the fourth by the sea. It cannot be said to belong naturally
to any State or race in particular, and no population looks
to it as a centre of intellectual development and culture.
But it is extremely important for the trade of many lands,
and has consequently been fiercely contested by many
peoples throughout the ages. It is this fatal attraction
that has made its history such a tragedy. P. Risal, the
author of the only modern work on Salonica, has rightly
called it " La ville convoitee." It is indeed better situated
than any other in the iEgean ; along the European shores
of that sea it is half-way between the two extremities,
at the head of the most sheltered gulf, at the outlet of the
Vardar valley and consequently of the easiest road of

157

158 SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER

access to the fertile lands of the interior. As Professor
Hogarth has stated,1 the other ports which might compete
with it are either blocked by mountain barriers or
surrounded by unstable populations. Were it not for
malaria, the backward civilization and the lack of safety
of its immediate hinterland, Salonica might have become
an important agricultural and perhaps even industrial
centre, but the farming methods of the neighbouring
territories are extremely primitive and industry is non-
existent. Its radius of commercial action is considerable.
It is easier to send goods from any part of Macedonia
and even from parts of Albania and Epirus to Salonica
than to the ports of Albania ; even the upper reaches of
the valleys of some of the tributaries of the Danube are
reached more easily from Salonica than from the Black
Sea ports. Salonica is the junction of the railways from
Constantinople, Uskub and Belgrade, and Monastir and
Athens.

Under the Turks, Salonica was the outlet for the trade
of half the Balkan Peninsula, as it ought to be to-day.
But the wars of 1912-13 drove the Turks from Macedonia
and partitioned the hinterland among several States,
so that Greek Salonica is but a short distance from the
frontiers of Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania, and the customs
barriers have placed artificial obstacles in the way of
traffic. The Greek, the Serb, and the Bulgarian each
aspired to the possession of Salonica, hoping, in their
narrow Balkan mentality, to capture its trade and enjoy
its advantages entirely for himself to the exclusion of his
neighbours. None of them understood that the prosperity
of Salonica was bound up with that of the interior as a
whole and of all the peoples of the Peninsula, and that
commercial restrictions to the advantage of one nation
alone were bound to prove detrimental to all, the non beati
possidentes included. The port cannot prosper unless
trade comes to it unhampered from Monastir and Uskub,
from Nish and Belgrade, from Kustendil, Sofia and
Ochrida, and not merely from Verria, Fiorina and Serres.
As a Greek port it will always be a poor thing, and the
1 The Nearer East, by D. G. Hogarth, pp. 238-39.

THE GREEK NATIONAL FESTIVAL ON APRIL 7, 1917.

M. Venizelos leaving the Church of S. Sophia, Salonica.

KING ALEXANDER OF GREECE VISITS A FRENCH CAMP.

To lice p. Wi,

LIFE IN SALONICA 159

Piraeus will never allow an appreciable portion, even of
Greek trade, to be diverted to Salonica, so that in
present circumstances it is destined to fall into decay.
The same would happen if it were to become exclusively a
Serb or Bulgarian port. By its nature it is essentially an
international port, and it should be subjected to a special
regime, such as will probably be applied to many other
ports in the near future. It would in this way not only
prosper, but also become a bond of union to conciliate,
through commercial interest, States and peoples who now
hate each other. Apart from political and administrative
difficulties, a great deal of capital will have to be invested
in the port to carry out important works to prevent it
from being silted up by the Vardar, but the capital will
not be available unless investors are first assured that
trade will be attracted to the port and not driven away
from it by political quarrels.

The climate of Salonica is not an ideal one. In summer
the heat is intolerable, and the summer lasts from May
to the end of September. For weeks on end the thermo-
meter marks 40 degrees Centigrade in the shade. There is
the sea, it is true, but the sea at Salonica does not
contribute to render the heat more tolerable, and sea
bathing is an arduous enterprise.

Distractions were neither very numerous nor particularly
edifying. The hotels were bad and dear ; before the fire
there were some good but expensive restaurants, and
after the fire a few of them were resuscitated. The local
Cercle de Thessalonique was quite attractive before the
fire, but afterwards it was transferred to smaller and more
modest quarters. Naturally, during the war, the military
element was absolutely predominant. Six armies were
represented in the town, of whom three— the French,
the British and the Serb — by very large contingents.
The Italians were less numerous, and the Russians still
fewer at first, ended by disappearing altogether, save for
some derelict officers, whose behaviour was not exactly
exemplary. The masters of the house — the Greeks —
in the early days of the war, kept very much to themselves,
being suspected by the Allies ; then, after the arrival

160 SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER

of Venizelos, they made themselves more conspicuous,
and finally, when Greece was again united and the army
reconstituted, they spread all over the place. Never in
any other city did one see such a collection of different
uniforms as at Salonica during the war years. British
khaki, Highland kilts, French bleu horizon, Italian grigio-
verde, the Serbs in grey, the Greeks in uniforms combining
features of all the others, Russians who invented their
own, Colonials of various kinds — coal-black Sudanese,
swarthy Algerians, yellow Tonkinese and Annamites,
dignified Indians in imposing turbans. Of these various
armies the French, the British, the Serbs, and afterwards
the Greeks, had their respective G.H.Q.'s at Salonica, which
to the outside observer meant chiefly innumerable officers
and swift Staff cars. The French occupied a large, ugly,
inconvenient building near the port ; afterwards, while
retaining that one for their Q services, they removed the
Elat Major de VAvant to a row of villas in the residential
quarter, one of them the ex-Bulgarian Consulate. The
British were scattered all over the town, but most of the
offices of the General Staff, which had at first been
spread over three or four villas, were concentrated in a
huge building, formerly a hospital and orphanage, popularly
known as the " War Office," far more commodious than
the French quarters. The Serbs were modestly housed in
the ex-Austrian Consulate and one or two other buildings,
and the Greeks mostly in the large ex-Turkish barracks in
the Place d'Armes. We were close to the Greeks in a
group of small buildings, some of them constructed for the
purpose by Italian soldiers. The Russians were in the
Russian Consulate.

Military messes were of course a great feature of Salonica
life. British messes were all small, and consequently
numerous ; they were usually installed in private houses
where the members of the mess also resided", and they
were more characteristically bits of England than the
French or Italian messes were bits of Italy or France.
The French and Italian messes were much larger — our
Base mess comprised some forty or fifty officers. Our
M.T. mess, to which I was attached, became essentially

LIFE IN SALONICA 161

the reception mess, as it was here that most foreign officers
were invited ; indeed in few places was the inter- Allied
spirit more sedulously and agreeably cultivated.

The French created a military institution for which
they deserve great credit — the Cercle Militaire. It was
not, as its named implied, a real club, but a large military
restaurant, intended primarily for French officers, but to
which all Allied officers were admitted. Meals were good
and cheap, while if one ordered a special dinner one could
obtain all possible delicacies. Later, the British also
instituted an Officers' Rest House, with a large but not
very good restaurant, and many comfortable bedrooms
reserved for officers who had come down from the front
for a few days. Foreign officers were not admitted,
except the liaison officers and guests.

Of the resorts open to the public there was one deserving
special mention, though not quite in a eulogistic sense —
the famous Tour Blanche, near the historic monument
of that name. It was a large cafe and restaurant, with a
theatre and concert hall, surrounded by a garden. At
all times of the year it was much frequented, but particularly
in summer. The meals were fair, the drinks bad, but sold
at exorbitant prices, the performances less than mediocre,
but the spectators themselves were the most interesting
part of the show. The place was usually crammed, mostly
with officers and soldiers. Even if the artistes had been
Carusos or Tetrazzinis, not a note of their songs would
have been heard on account of the uproarious shouting
of the audience — a large part of which was obviously
" the worse." The Russians excelled in these Bacchanals,
but the British were good seconds. A little trick of the
Russians, which the French sometimes imitated, was to
demolish the partitions between the boxes and to jump
down from the upper circle into the pit. It was by no
means unusual to see officers and soldiers dancing wildly
on the stage. Sometimes the pandemonium got to such
a pitch that serious rioting took place, and then the
C.A.A. would have it closed or declared out of bounds
for Allied troops for several evenings.

The Salonica Press was of some interest. Before the

11

162 SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER

fire there were no less than eighteen daily papers, for a city
of barely 200,000 inhabitants. Even after that catastrophe
their numbers were only reduced to ten. Of these four
were printed in French ; one of them, V Independant,
was the organ of a group of local Jews and was, on the
whole, the best written, while La Tribune was a Greek
paper published in French, opposed to the more extreme
Chauvinism of the Greek people and anxious to bring
about a good understanding with Italy. The other two,
UOpinion and the Echo de France were more or less organs
of the French G.H.Q. and represented the political attitude
of the Commander-in-Chief towards the different Allies.
From a journalistic point of view, none of them ranked
very high, while the two latter belonged to the class
which Bismarck defined as the " reptile press." The
British had only one paper, The Balkan News, edited by
Mr. Collinson Owen. It was purely a paper for the army,
containing the news of the day and a few special articles,
and was well written, bright, full of wholesome cheerfulness
and wit, and wholly free from local political tendencies —
unlike the French papers, it never tried to create bad
feeling between the Allies. We also had only one paper,
La Voce d'ltalia ; it was not badly edited, but was some-
times too violent and inclined to enter into polemics with
other local papers, until the Italian Command undertook
to censor it (a function which, for his sins, was entrusted
to the present writer). There were five papers printed
in Greek, all equally violent, tendentious and wholly free
from scruples or respect for accuracy. The Serbs published
three papers, and the Russians, until their collapse, two.
One of the Serb papers printed long poems in the style of
the Kossovo cycle almost daily ; they were eagerly read
by the Serb soldiers, and a Serb officer told me that his
batman always cut them out and kept them when the
paper was thrown into the waste paper basketr There
were two papers in Hebrew-Spanish, of no particular
character, and several small weeklies in different languages.
There were always plenty of foreign papers, although
they naturally arrived many days or even weeks late.
The Journal de Geneve, which, like all neutral papers, was

ESS AD PASHA 163

banned in most other war zones, was obtainable in Salonica
and much sought after, as it contained the enemy com-
muniques. The British G.H.Q. issued a daily bulletin
of war news from all sources, including those of the enemy,
which was distributed to Allied Commands and Staffs.

A curious figure of Salonica life was Essad Pasha,
the Albanian. An ex-General in the Turkish Army, he
had fought against the Balkan Allies in the war of 1912-13,
and when Prince William of Wied's Government was
set up in Albania, he organized a rebellion against it.
He exercised a certain amount of influence in Central
Albania, where he had large landed estates, and was thus
able to raise some armed bands. After the departure
of Wied he tried to set up a government of his own ; at
one time he professed friendship for Italy, but he ended
by turning against us when he found that Italian policy
was not in conformity with his own personal ambitions.
After the Allied Armies came to Salonica he also repaired
thither, having had to leave Albania in September, 1916,
as he was causing trouble to the Italian military authorities.
General Sarrail received him officially and recognized his
self-styled title of " President of the Albanian Government."
Protected more or less by various Powers, and subsidized
simultaneously by at least four, he does not appear to
have rendered useful services to anyone. He had set
up a miniature opera-bouffe court at Salonica, with a
Government and Ministries of War, Foreign Affairs,
Agriculture, etc., although he had neither a State nor an
Army. He lived in a handsome villa, with his harem,
and he disported himself about the town in the uniform
of an Albanian General, invented by himself, and every
now and then he promoted himself to a higher rank by
adding a fresh star. His suite comprised a very small
number of officers and soldiers, the latter mostly employed
in cultivating a diminutive kitchen garden. In spite of all
this, some of the Allies appeared or professed to take
him seriously : the French, the Greeks and the Serbs
had appointed diplomatic agents to his " Court," and did
not fail to show him a certain deference. Among the
Italian element the mauvaises langues said that he was

164 SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER

thus supported in order to oppose Italian interests in
Albania. As his own influence was limited to Central
Albania, he had no hope of dominating the northern and
southern territories, and was therefore disposed to give
away the former to the Serbs and the latter to the Greeks.
I do not profess to know what motive inspired the attitude
of the French Government towards this disreputable
and ridiculous adventurer, but I believe that the C.A.A.
treated him with consideration for the following reason. He
claimed to be in a position to raise a rebellion in the part
of Albania occupied by Austria, and although the Deuxieme
Bureau was somewhat sceptical as to his professions, it
was thought worth while not to cast him off altogether,
on the chance that something might come of it. As a
matter of fact, he never did anything useful for the Allies,
and was indeed hated by the enormous majority of the
Albanians. According to Miss Durham,1 who knows more
about Albania than almost any other writer, if he had been
thrown over at the beginning of the war a large Albanian
force might have been raised to fight against the Austrians,
and the Serbian debacle prevented. His only merit was
that he contributed something to the gaiety of nations
during the duller periods of the campaign.

After the Armistice, he redoubled his intrigues with
Belgrade and Athens in the hope of carrying off his little
plan for a Central Albania ruled by himself and the rest of
the country sold to Serbia and Greece. But the trick
did not come off, and while he was in Paris he was murdered
by an Albanian student on June 13, 1920. If the deed
must be deplored as an act of violence, it cannot be said
this his death was a loss to humanity in general nor to the
Albanian people in particular. His assassin was acquitted
by a Parisian jury.

The great problem of the Macedonian expedition was
that of communication and transport. Whereas the enemy
could send reinforcements and supplies from Central
Europe to the Macedonian front by rail, every man and
every ton of goods which the Allies sent out had to be
conveyed across submarine-infested seas. This was one

1 Contemporary Review, August, 1920.

ROUTES TO SALONICA 165

of the chief arguments of those who were opposed to the
undertaking altogether, as tonnage was so precious and
so inadequate even for supplying Britain, France and
Italy.

In the early days of the campaign, the Allied bases
were Marseilles, Toulon and certain English ports. Even
from Marseilles the voyage to Salonica required about a
week, and when submarines were sighted immense detours
were made, involving a journey of two or three weeks, or
more. The voyage from England was, of course, longer,
but even the British generally made use of Marseilles.
When Italy decided to take part in the Macedonian
campaign the Italian contingent was embarked at Naples,
but soon afterwards the port of Taranto became the Italian
base, and was eventually used by the British and French
as well, all troops and part of the supplies being trans-
ported by rail through France and Italy. Taranto offered
many advantages ; the port is admirably sheltered, and
the Mare Piccolo is an immense land-locked bay with
unlimited space. Large British French and Italian camps
were established near the town, and in due course the
convoy system was adopted for greater safety. Besides
the important Italian naval base, both the other Allies
instituted naval bases there, and the British drifters and
other anti-submarine craft became regular visitors to the
Apulian port.

The voyage from Taranto to Salonica, via the Ionian
Sea round Cape Matapan, took about three days, which was
a great improvement on the Marseilles route, although
it was by no means free from danger, and at times ships
only travelled at night and had to take shelter in various
intermediate ports, which, of course, increased the time.
The usual precautions against submarines were taken,
and the ships were painted all sorts of colours in curious
geometrical designs, and the systems of intelligence and
signalling were perfected. But in spite of all these efforts,
many ships were lost on the Taranto-Salonica route,
and still more among those which continued to cross
from Marseilles or Southampton. Not infrequently, when
a ship was expected carrying precious reinforcements or

166 SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER

long-desired supplies, the ugly news would be flashed
across the seas that she had been lost. Italian losses were
not very numerous on this route, but among them was the
large steamer Minas which sank with many hundreds
of soldiers.

The possibility of shortening the dangerous passage
was carefully studied. The first idea had been to land the
troops somewhere in Greece and forward them by the
Greek railways. But at that time the Greek Government,
although nominally neutral, was really assisting the
Central Empires and refused to grant permission for
Allied troops to traverse Greek territory, and even if it
had been forced to do so it would certainly have placed
every conceivable obstacle in the way. This plan having
been dropped, the Italians began to study the Santi
Quaranta route. There was an elementary Turkish road
or rather track across Albania, but it was absolutely
impassable for lorries, and even light carts could not always
use it. As soon as the Italian occupation in South Albania
began to extend inland, work was commenced on the road
between Santi Quaranta and Ersek, while the French
started on the section between Fiorina and Ersek over the
Pisoderi pass. By the spring of 1917 a few motor cars
had succeeded in going over the whole route, although
not without serious difficulty. In the summer the immense
work was accomplished, and by the end of July the first
columns of lorries began to circulate regularly between
Santi Quaranta and Fiorina. But the carrying capacity
of the road was limited, as was the capacity of the depots
and magazines at Santi Quaranta, so that the route could
not serve all the Allied armies and was not even sufficient
for all the supplies of the Italian contingent, the more
so as part of it was also used by the Albanian force. It
was therefore decided to use it only for the mails land the
transport of Italian troops ; supplies, save in quite
exceptional cases, continued to be sent by sea to Salonica.
Allied officers, however, especially Serbs going to and from
Corfu, made great use of it. Its main advantage lay in
the fact that the passage from Taranto or Brindisi to
Santi Quaranta was only one night's crossing, so that the

THE SANTI QUARANTA ROUTE 167

danger of submarine attacks was reduced approximately
to one-sixth. Another advantage was that by establish-
ing an uninterrupted line of posts right across from the
Adriatic to the iEgean the passage of messengers between
King Constantine's Government and the Central Empires
was practically precluded, and even after the fall of
Constantine it was just as well to keep watch over the
activities of Royalist sympathizers who might have
continued to carrry on their master's policy. A part of
the route, not far from Santi Quaranta, passed through
Greek territory, and permission to use it had to be negoti-
ated while Constantine was still on the throne.

About half-way between Salonica and Santi Quaranta
is Koritza, a pleasant spot and the centre of many
intrigues. The town, which is situated in a fertile plain
at the junction of several important roads, had been
assigned to Albania by the Ambassadors' Conference in
London (1913) and the Protocol of Florence (1914), the
enormous majority of the population being Albanian.
But as there was an active and intelligent minority pro-
fessing Greek sentiments, Greece laid claim to the town
and district. In 1914, Greek bands occupied it, numbers
of Greek schools were opened by the Greek authorities
which had installed themselves there, and the presence
of a large Albanian population was explained away by
being called " Albanophone Greeks." When the Italian
troops began to advance from the coast towards the
interior, General Sarrail sent a detachment of cavalry
under Colonel Descoins to occupy Koritza (November
1916). There remained the problem of administering
the district ; it could not be given to Greece, because the
Treaty of London had assigned it to Albania, but Sarrail
did not wish to hand it over to the latter as there was no
regularly constituted Albanian Government, and he
intended to make use of the district for eventual military
operations. He solved the difficulty by making of the
Kaza of Koritza an autonomous " Republic." He created
a local council composed of natives, with a certain Themi-
stocles, a noted band-leader, as President, but under
French military control. The Republic had its stamps,

168 SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER

its paper money, its budget. Later the French authorities
believed that they had evidence that Themistocles was
dealing with the Austrians ; he was court -martialled, con-
demned to death and shot. It afterwards appeared that the
sentence was due to a judicial error, and that the members
of the court martial had been deceived by agents of the
local Greek party who wished to get rid of Themistocles
bacause he was an influential Albanian leader. The local
council was then dissolved and the territory administered
very efficiently by the French military authorities. The
Greeks, however, continued their attempts to get Koritza
assigned to them, claiming that both that town and
Moschopolje had been centres of Greek culture since the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They conducted
a vigorous propaganda to induce the inhabitants to send
their children to the Greek schools, but the latter remained
deserted, save by the children of the few Greek subjects
and some Albanians of Greek sentiments. The question
was not finally settled until October, 1921, when the
Conference of Ambassadors definitely assigned Koritza
to Albania and the Albanian State was recognized by the
Powers. The French raised a small local force, known as
the Koritza Gendarmerie and afterwards as the Koritza
Tirailleurs. But they did not prove of much use during
the war, any more than did the so-called Tabur of Essad
Pasha ; between these two forces there was bitter hostility,
and they could not be brought within sight of each other.

From Koritza the road ascends the Tchafa Kiarit range,
then down into the broad Starja plain to Ersek, keeping
at a height varying from 1,000 to 1,200 m. above the sea.
The plain is green and fertile, and surrounded by fairly
high mountains, the Mavri Petra, on the Graeco-Albanian
frontier being 1,960 m. high. Ersek, where one usually
spends the night, is the first Italian post.

The next place of some importance is Liaskoviki ; this
was once a pleasant and prosperous little town, in a very
healthy situation amid grand and wild scenery, where
many wealthy Albanian landowners had their summer
residences in order to escape the malaria of the plains.
But during the Greek invasion of 1914 it was almost

SANTI QUARANTA AND CORFU 169

completely devastated, save for the houses of the few
orthodox Albanians who were presumed to be of Greek
sentiments. In October, 1916, Italian troops occupied
Liaskoviki and the Greeks withdrew. Here I first saw
the Albanian bands in Italian service ; their appearance
was satisfactory, but opinions differed as to their military
qualities and reliability. As a rule those who were more
directly under Italian control were the best ; left to them-
selves they were less useful.

Before the Italian occupation Santi Quaranta was a
wretched village, consisting of large Turkish barracks,
a custom-house and a few fishermen's huts. During the
war it became an important military and naval base ; many
large huts and even some handsome brick buildings were
erected. It had been chosen as a base for transport to
all parts of South Albania and later for Macedonia on
account of its well-sheltered port, easy to defend against
submarine attacks, and protected by the island of Corfu
just opposite. Steamers cannot be moored up to the pier
as the water is too shallow near the shore, and no attempt
was made to deepen it or lengthen the jetties, as it was
realized that after the war Santi Quaranta would lose
much of its importance, Durazzo being a far more suitable
starting point for a trans-Albanian commercial road or
railway. The curious name of this little town is derived
from the legend that forty Christians inhabiting it were
massacred at some unspecified date by the Turks. The old
town was not on the shore, but on a height dominating the
port, and the ruins of two Venetian castles and other
buildings are still visible. A third Venetian castle, with
fine walls, is in the middle of the modern town. Through-
out the latter period of the war Santi Quaranta was a busy
place, when large troopships were constantly arriving
and landing troops and stores, while torpedo boats and
destroyers flitted about the bay, smaller boats plied to
and from Corfu, and lorries dashed up and down the one
long narrow street. At Corfu itself there were various
military forces and more or less vague military missions.
The French had a naval base and a military mission,
the British a convalescent hospital and a mission, the

170 SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER

Serbs a whole Government with the Skuptschina and the
Diplomatic Corps, the Italians a military mission, a
battalion of territorial militia and a squadron of cavalry.
The atmosphere proved as fertile for inter-Allied intrigue
as the soil was for olives, vegetables and fruit.

After the abdication of Constantine and the entry of
Greece into the ranks of the Allies, a new route to Macedonia
was opened up — that via the Gulf of Patras and Itea.
It was used onlv bv the French and the British, but officers
of other Allied armies travelled by it occasionally. The
sea-passage from Taranto to Itea was much longer than
that to Santi Quaranta (forty-eight hours instead of fifteen),
but the part of it exposed to submarine attack was just
the same, as the boats crossed from Taranto in one night
to Corfu, lay off the island all day, sailed again at night-
fall, along the channel between the mainland and the
Ionian Islands, which was practically safe from attack,
to the entrance of the Gulf of Patras, and thence up the
Gulf to Itea on the northern shore.

At Itea there was a small Franco-British base, whence a
a good road leads to Vralo on the Athens-Salonica railway.

Altogether the journey from Taranto to Salonica via
Santi Quaranta could be covered in three days, if one had
a good car, while by lorry it took a little longer ; but the
front of the A.F.O. could be reached in two and a half days.
The route from Itea to Salonica was longer — nearly four
days. Detachments of troops, of course, required more time
to reach their destination, so that the all-sea route was
decidedly shorter, but the latter was infinitely more risky,
and the opening up of the two land, or rather, semi-land
routes reduced the losses from submarines very consider-
ably, and contributed their share to the defeat of the
enemy's submarine campaign.

CHAPTER X

IRRITATION AGAINST GENERAL SARRAIL

One fact which the operations in Greece had made clear
was that the enemy were not at all inclined to carry
out an offensive or were not in a position to do so. If
they had had any such intention, no better occasion could
have offered itself than at the moment when several
Allied divisions had been withdrawn and when the troops
were depressed by the unsuccessful offensive. If they
did not know how greatly reduced was the strength of
the Allied forces, they could not ignore the sending of
troops to Greece. So favourable a chance of attacking was
never likely to occur again, and at Salonica everybody was
expecting an offensive which might have had disastrous
results. But nothing happened, which was a proof either
of disagreement between the Bulgars and Germans, or
of the fact that the enemy did not feel very sure of them-
selves. Soon after, the divisions sent to Greece returned to
the Macedonian front, and the immediate danger was over.
Salonica had now ceased to be a capital, and became
once more a provincial town, but its military importance
remained, inasmuch as it was still the centre of important
military operations, and the hotbed of infinite political
intrigues. General Pennella, after having remained only
a few weeks in Macedonia, was recalled to Italy to assume
the important position of Chief of Staff to H.R.H. the
Duke d'Aosta (III Army), and the temporary command of
the 35th Division was assumed by Brigadier-General
Chiossi. On June 30th Major-General Ernesto Mombelli
arrived at Salonica to take up the Command of the expedi-
tionary force, which he held until it broke up in July 1919,
He had begun his military career in the mountain artillery.

in

172 GENERAL SARRAIL

had passed brilliantly through the Staff College, and then
entered the Staff Corps. In Libya he had distinguished
himself as a Commander of Alpine troops and afterwards
of a mixed force of the three arms. Subsequently he
went to Rhodes as Chief of Staff to General Ameglio.
The plan of operations of the successful battle of Psitos was
his. From Rhodes he was sent to Constantinople as
Military Attache, and remained there until Turkey entered
the war, when he was transferred to Athens. There
he had occasion to display the most valuable activity,
both in counter-espionage and in affirming Italy's steady
loyalty within the Entente. In his dealings with the
French and British on more than one occasion he was able to
thwart the shady manoeuvres of the Germans and their
Royalist satelites. He had a thorough knowledge of
the political and military situation of the near East, was
endowed with great diplomatic tact, and was a man of
the world, of high character, and imbued with all the
best Italian military traditions. As Commander of the
Italian expeditionary force under the orders of a foreign
Commander-in-Chief his position was anything but easy,
as the relations between the 35th Division and the C.A.A.
had never been properly defined. Further, General
Sarrail, as we have seen, was not too favourably inclined
towards us, and never missed an opportunity of giving
proof of his antipathy. Our expeditionary force was not
complete — we had no field or medium calibre artillery,
we were inadequately provided with means of transport
and lacked certain materials with which the C.A.A. were
bound to supply us, but which it very often would not
or could not provide. There was thus constant friction,
and our troops were finally convinced that General Sarrail
wished to exploit them to the utmost limit without
ever recognizing their merits. But General Mombelli,
while defending our rights and dignity with the greatest
possible energy and vivacity in his dealings with the
C.A.A., succeeded in making himself popular, and in
maintaining relations of great courtesy with the successive
Commanders-in-Chief. With the British and Serbian
Commanders, as I have said, his relations were always

A FLOODED ROAD.

LEAVE-PARTY FROM MACEDONIA OX THE SANTI QUARANTA ROAD.

Photo by Lieut. Landini.]

To face p. 172.

SARRAIL'S CONDUCT 173

inspired by the greatest friendliness, especially with
General Milne and Voivod Michich. In all military opera-
tions which he had occasion to carry out, he gave proof
of eminent qualities as a Commander and of gallantry
as a soldier. He was rigid in the matter of discipline,
and devoted the greatest care to the moral and material
walfare of his men. He insisted obstinately on obtaining
leave for his troops, although it was claimed that such
a thing was impossible for detachments beyond the sea
on account of the enormous difficulties and dangers of
sea transport, but he succeeded, and not a single ship
transporting troops going on or returning from leave was
ever torpedoed. He was relentlessly severe against all
who failed in their military duties, or whose conduct was
incompatible with the dignity of an Italian soldier. He
had no consideration for those officers, very few in number
it must be said, who neglected their men at the front.

Among the incidents which occurred between the
Italians and General Sarrail, there was one due to
the obstruction which the latter placed in the way
of the creation of our lines-of-communication posts
along the Santi Quaranta road in the part which
crossed the French zone. Other incidents arose on
account of the attitude of the local Franco-Greek press
which was subsidized by or under the strict control of
the C.A.A. To the Press General Sarrail attributed
enormous importance. Every day he received the
journalists, and daily devoted an hour to listening to the
reports of the censorship officers, even in critical moments
when a Commander-in-Chief should have been occupied
with very different matters. For all these reasons General
Sarrail made himself ever more unpopular and impossible.
As early as the beginning of 1916 the British, Italian and
Russian Governments had brought considerable pressure
to bear on that of France in favour of the recall of Sarrail,
and it appears that the first to demand this was M. Isvolski,
the Russian Ambassador in Paris, who had been informed
of the complaints against Sarrail, especially those which
General Dietrich had made after the autumn operations.1

1 Mermeix, Le Commandement Unique, Part II, pp. 114 and following.

174 GENERAL SARRAIL

At the same time, Lord Bertie, British Ambassador
in Paris, in a note to the French Government, pointed our
General SarraiPs preference for political operations, and
verbally dwelt on the difficulties of the relations between
him and the other Commanders, due to his own character
and to his entourage. He added that he was also speaking
in the name of Italy and Russia. M. Briand, then Prime
Minister, at first showed annoyance and said that France
refused to discuss the merits of a French General in whom
she had confidence, but to this Lord Bertie replied
that if Sarrail was a French General, the Army d'Orient
was international. He quoted the words attributed to
General Cadorna, who is reported to have said : "I shall
send more troops to Macedonia when there is a General
to command them." All this made a certain impression
in France, but the capture of Monastir raised SarraiPs
prestige, although the exaggerated praises lavished on him
by his political friends did him harm, especially those of
M. Painleve, the Minister of Public Instruction. Criticism
did not cease, and an Italian Ambassador is reported to
have said that Sarrail " preferred to reap the grain harvest
in Thessaly rather than laurels round Monastir." An
Italian Minister said to a French diplomat in connexion
with the disagreement among the Allies in Macedonia :
" All this would not have happened if you had given us
a General who besides having our sympathy also enjoyed
our confidence, but you have sent to Salonica, and you
maintain there, a General who is merely imposed on you
by your internal situation." The real reason why Sarrail,
who was not popular even in French Government circles,
where he was admitted to be unsuited to his duties,
continued to be supported must be sought in his political
antecedents. The men at the head of affairs in France
believed at that time that, after the war, there would
be a strong revival of religious, Legitimist and anti-
Republican feeling, and of the generals of high rank
General Sarrail was the only one on whom the Government,
or rather the Radical-Socialist Party, believed that it
could count absolutely for the defence of Republican
institutions. Sarrail, in fact, as I have said, was a Free-

ATTEMPTS TO GET RID OF SARRAIL 175

Mason and an anti-Clerical, and during the Combes Ministry
he had co-operated — the only field officer who would
agree to do so — in the system of jiches de delation against
officers guilty of religious practices. He was therefore
so thoroughly compromised in the eyes of the Clerical,
anti-Masonic, Monarchical parties, that there was no
danger of his coming to an agreement with them.
Naturally he was anything but popular with the enormous
majority of officers of all ranks, and even those who
were not fervent Clericals had no sort of regard for him.
At the same time, the French Government did not wish
to have him in France, because they feared him as an
incorrigible intriguer and wished to keep him out of the
way. For all these reasons, the Government did not dare
to recall him, although they did not wish to entrust him
with an important Command on any part of the front.
They therefore gave evasive replies to the protests of the
Allies.

Nevertheless the Allied Governments again insisted in
demanding his recall. On the eve of the May offensive
in 1917, Mr. Lloyd George had been given the assurance
that General Sarrail would be relieved as soon as the
operations were ended. This would also have given
time to reconsider the whole question of the Command
in the near East. At one time it had been proposed to
send strong Italian reinforcements to that front with
the Duke of Aosta as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied
armies, but the proposal was dropped. When the offen-
sive came to an absolutely unsuccessful end, chiefly
owing to the failure of Sarrail, the latter continued to
hold his Command in spite of the ever-increasing irrita-
tion at his conduct on the part of all the Allies, including
now even the Crown Prince of Serbia. The French
Government, however, now asked that he should be left
in Salonica until the Greek question had been finally
settled. After the abdication of Constantine and the
return of Venizelos, the British Government reopened
the Sarrail question ; but M. Painleve, who had become
Minister of War in the Ribot Cabinet, continued to support
him. On July 25th Mr. Lloyd George said to him :

176 GENERAL SARRAIL

" You assume the whole responsibility, but as a matter of
fact, the Armee d'Orient is now condemned to immobility
because the failure of the Russian offensive (that ordered
by Kerensky) removes all hopes of co-operation between
the Russian and Roumanian Armies and that of the
Orient." But M. Painleve had such a fanatical admiration
for Sarrail that this responsibility caused him no anxiety
Avhatever. A few days later, on the fall of the Ribot
Cabinet, Painleve became Prime Minister.

Although the Allied Governments continued to desire
the recall of Sarrail, they considered that it was advis-
able to suspend their demand for the moment. In
France there was great depression and pessimism about
the progress of the war, owing to the unsuccessful offensive
at the Chemin des Dames and the enormous losses suffered,
as well as to the serious military mutinies organized by
the Socialists, which had to be repressed with ruthless but
just severity. The Allies, therefore, deemed it inadvisable
to add to the embarrassments of the French Government.

After the May operations, the Governments of France,
Great Britain and Italy were more than ever convinced,
as Mr. Lloyd George had said, that an Allied offensive
in Macedonia was impossible, at least for the moment —
perhaps they did not yet understand how large a part
of the failure was due to the strategic errors of General
Sarrail. Although it was not their intention to withdraw
the expeditionary force altogether, a shortening of the
front was contemplated. The British, above all, were
anxious to achieve this, and two Divisions (the 10th
and 60th) were already in course of evacuation, being
destined for Palestine, and the French, although they
did not withdraw any of their units, allowed their strengths
to drop progressively without filling the gaps. We alone
had, until then, maintained our effectives up to strength —
our 3 brigades comprised 18,000 rifles — tout now, seeing
that the Allies were reducing their strengths, we also ended
by sending to Albania and thence to Italy, the so-called
7th Battalions.1 The British Government wished that
the whole front should be withdrawn within the entrenched

1 They were supplementary battalions, one to each brigade.

PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL TO SALONICA 177

camp at Salonica, and the French were not altogether
opposed to this scheme. Its execution, it is true, presented
serious practical difficulties. A withdrawal of this kind
in the face of an enemy in full efficiency is always a very
risky operation. It would probably have caused the loss
of a great many men and of a large part of the artillery,
which it would have been difficult to transport over the
rough ground of Macedonia. Another problem was
how to defend the entrenched camp, if a great deal of
the artillery were lost. The strongest opposition to the
scheme came from the Serbs. The Prince-Regent declared
definitely that a withdrawal would have a disastrous
moral effect on the whole Serbian Army, and that if it
were effected he would have great difficulty in exercising
authority over it. Depressed as the troops already were,
the evacuation of the small tract of Serbian territory
which they had reconquered with so much bloodshed,
would have produced a regular debacle, and as the Austrians
at that time were offering them extremely advantageous
peace terms, which an influential party in the army were
prepared to accept, it was by no means impossible that
the Russian collapse would have been followed by a
Serbian separate peace. Finally, if the Allies had limited
themselves to holding the entrenched camp at Salonica,
the Central Empires would no longer have been prevented
from communicating with their friends in Greece. For
all these reasons the plan, which was really a mad one,
was abandoned.

We had another difficulty with General Sarrail concern-
ing the extension of our front. He was always insisting
that we should extend our line so as to give the French
divisions a chance of more frequent turns of rest, but
our sector was one of the most difficult, and the defences
were anything but complete, so that General Petitti had
constantly opposed this request. General Pennella, to
whom it was presented again, replied to the same effect.
On General Mombelli, General Sarrail brought new and
stronger pressure to bear with the same end in view,
but after a careful study of the situation, he came to the
same conclusion, and appealed to the Italian Comando

12

178 GENERAL SARRAIL

Supremo. The latter referred the question to the Com-
mander-in-Chief in France, who stated that he would try
to convince General Sarrail, but that if the latter insisted
on his plan, he would not be able to take upon himself
the responsibility of giving contrary orders. As a matter
of fact, however, General Sarrail did not insist and the
Italian front remained for the moment unchanged.

CHAPTER XI

FROM THE SALONICA FIRE TO THE RECALL

OF SARRAIL

On August 18, 1917, there occurred one of those
catastrophes in which the history of Salonica is so rich.
At about three p.m. a fire broke out in a small house
occupied by a poor Jewish widow in the central part
of the old town. For four months not a drop of rain
had fallen, and at Salonica there was no adequate organiza-
tion for fighting the flames, except a small and ill-equipped
fire-brigade inherited from the Turks. The Allied Armies
had their own fire-engines, but the C.A.A. had made
no arrangements in view of a possible conflagration in
the city, for which the local authorities were supposed
to provide. Big fires were by no means unknown in
Salonica ; some thirty years before a considerable part
of the town had been destroyed by the flames, and other
fires had occurred fairly frequently. The water supply
was totally inadequate and the pressure very weak. The
great majority of the houses in the old town were of
wood and even in the others there was a great deal of
woodwork ; as if this were not enough, a high wind was
blowing at the time. All circumstances were therefore
propitious for a first-class fire. In a very short time
the flames spread far and wide, and from the poor hovel
of the Jewish widow it soon enveloped a large part of
the city in a vast conflagration. About sunset the
Italian military band was still playing in the Place de la
Liberte near the sea, and no one imagined that the flames
could possibly come so far down (the quarter where it
had broken out was half-way up the hill). But by ten
at night the handsome buildings along the sea front

179

180 THE SALONICA FIRE

were menaced, and had to be rapidly evacuated ; during
the night they, too, caught fire. The heat of the flames
was so terrific that, although these structures were of brick
and stone, they were swept away like the wooden hovels.
Even the rails of the railway along the quay on the side
opposite the houses and many yards away from them, were
twisted out of shape by the heat. Throughout the night
there was a general exodus of the population from the
awful furnace. One saw families abandoning their homes
carrying some clothes, bedding and other household
goods, which were afterwards set alight by sparks scattered
by the wind.

Allied detachments were distributed about the various
quarters of the town to prevent pillaging, to which the
local hooligans and a certain number of soldiers belonging
to one or two of the Allied armies devoted themselves.
We were glad to be able to establish that no Italian
soldiers took part in these operations, and the same may
be said of the British. The military lorries, especially
those of the British Army, accomplished admirable salvage
work ; all through the night and the following day they
plied back and forth between the fire zone and the British
camps outside the city. Our own lorries were for the
most part engaged in clearing our clothing depot, which
was the only military establishment in the centre of
Salonica ; fortunately the flames only just reached its
outer wall, which was blackened, and a few days later
it was possible to occupy it again. The premises occupied
by the C.A.A. were also evacuated for a day or two, as
they were at one moment in danger, but the fire never
actually reached them. Luckily no military establish-
ment was destroyed, save one or two depots of trifling
importance.

The damage to the city was, however, enormous. All
the hotels, very many business houses, all the best shops,
a large number of stores and warehouses, the post office
and other public buildings and a vast number of private
dwellings, especially in the poorer part of the Jewish
quarter, were razed to the ground. The banks - were
spared, and so also were the hospitals, and the flames

BULGARIAN PRISONERS.

IN THE " CASTELLETTO TRENCHES.

To (ace p .ISO.

PROPOSED JEWISH EXODUS 181

never reached the new quarters where all the best private
houses were situated. One of the most serious losses,
because it was irreparable, was that of the beautiful
church of St. Demetrius, historically and artistically the
most important monument in Salonica.

This catastrophe, although it did not directly affect
the Allied armies, created a problem which the military
authorities could not disregard, viz., that of housing and
feeding many thousands of refugees. By far the greater
part of these were Jews, and the Greek authorities, sup-
ported in this by General Sarrail, had at first contemplated
their evacuation, and it was proposed that they should
be sent to Old Greece, to the islands and abroad, so as to
avoid exposing them to hardships and to preserve the
city from the dangers of epidemics, which the excessive
overcrowding in the few remaining houses might easily
have caused. This scheme naturally appeared the soundest
from the point of view of public health. Incidentally
it also presented the advantage, from the Greek point
of view, that with the exodus of a large part of the Jewish
inhabitants, the Greek element would have come to
constitute an absolute majority of the population, thus
eliminating the danger that at the future Peace Conference,
the Salonica Jews, anything but attached to the Greek
regime, might demand autonomy on the basis of " self-
determination."

In any case the question was settled by the Jews
themselves, who, save a very small minority, refused
to depart. They knew that as long as the Allied
armies were there they were assured of a necessary
minimum of food, and that they would be arfle, in a very
short time, to make good the losses they had suffered,
whereas if they went to Old Greece or elsewhere they
would find themselves in the midst of an unfriendly and
poor population, where they could not even manage
to earn their daily bread. It was said of the Salonica
Jews, as of the Armenians, that their idea of paradise
was an endless street of shops with Allied soldiers walking
up and down it ; Salonica, even after the fire, was not
very different from this picture. The Jews whose houses

182 THE SALONICA FIRE

were still standing were very generous in giving hospi-
tality to their less fortunate co-religionists, and everyone
was ready to limit the space occupied. Provisionally,
the British gave shelter to many thousands of the more
needy refugees in some large camps on the outskirts of
the city, while the Greek Government and all the Allied
armies contributed towards feeding them. Little by
little, all found shelter of some sort, goodness knows
how, and soon trading on a small scale began to spring
up again. At first it would be an itinerant pedlar with
a tray full of reels of cotton, a few pairs of stockings, some
yards of linen or canvas, and a little hardware. Then
the tray became a hand-cart, with a somewhat more
abundant stock of goods, and the hand-cart was next
transformed into a stationary cart. A few days later
the cart was sheltered by a few boards ; the whole outfit
soon began to take on the appearance of a modest hut,
a little better stocked, almost a regular shop. The profits
of these traders, owing to the great scarcity of goods, were
quite fabulous.

For a long time the Greek Government refused to
grant any permits to rebuild in the burnt area, because
it contemplated a grandiose plan of reconstruction,
based on an elaborate scheme which should have made
of Salonica a model city, with broad piazze, wide
boulevards, imposing public buildings, stately residences,
perfect workmen's dwellings, Rowton houses, an elaborate
electric tramway system, electric undergrounds, a uni-
versity, opera houses, concert halls, and even a forest
on the outskirts. But as all this was in the dim and
distant future and the inhabitants insisted on being
allowed to make some temporary arrangements, per-
mission was finally granted to rebuild the ground floors
of the houses, the authorities reserving the right to
demolish them without compensation if the general
reconstruction plan were carried out. The Salonica
merchants did not hesitate to take that risk, and at once
began to rebuild. In a few months they had recouped
themselves for their losses with a broad margin of profit.
One cannot help admiring their persistence, which was

PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION 183

amply rewarded. But the problem of general reconstruc-
tion has remained unsolved to this day. A wealthy
business man told me (and his opinion was confirmed
by other experts) that everything depended on the future
political status of the city. If it should be endowed with
local autonomy and become a free port, the money would
easily be found, not only for rebuilding Salonica, but also
for the necessary works to prevent the silting up of the
harbour ; the local Jews, with their own resources and
those of their co-religionists abroad, would provide it.
But if Salonica were to remain a Greek provincial town,
without autonomy, at the mercy of the Athens politicians,
no one would invest any capital in it. Indeed, many
of the most far-sighted and enterprising business men
would leave altogether. I do not know whether this
opinion is right, but it certainly represented the con-
viction of almost the whole of the city's business
community.

On August 31st an Italian detachment made a surprise
attack on the summit of Hill 1050. The position was
captured with brilliant dash, but before the troops could
entrench themselves adequately they were exposed to
such a terrific artillery and trench-mortar fire that it
was not possible to remain, and General Mombelli, in
order to avoid useless losses, recalled the detachment.
There were no enemy counter-attacks.

Early in September, General Sarrail undertook an
action at his extreme left against the Austrians and
Bulgarians in Albania, to liberate the road between
Fiorina and Ersek from the menace of hostile attack,
and to push on the Pogradetz on the Lake of Ochrida.
With this object in view he made up a group consisting
of 3 infantry regiments, some mountain artillery and
other minor units. The French line just skirted the
Lake of Ochrida and then turned sharp to the south, east
of the river Cerava, reached Lake Malik near Nishavetz
and continued to the south of the lake, almost parallel
with the Koritza-Ersek road. On September 7th, a
column of the 176th Regiment occupied Placa between
the Lakes of Ochrida and Malik, and drove back the enemy

184 THE SALONICA FIRE

beyond the Cerava. On the 8th, another column forced
the passage of the Devoli river, west of Lake Malik. On
the 9th, Pogradetz was occupied, this being the only place
where some resistance was offered, the enemy forces con-
sisting of Bulgarians, Austrians, Albanians in the Austrian
service, and some Saxon troops sent over expressly from
another sector of the front. The French pushed forward
along the west shore of Lake Ochrida as far as Udunista
(9 km. north of Pogradetz) and spread westward as far as
Hill 1704, whence they hoped to command the Durazzo-
Struga road, one of the lines of supply of the extreme
right wing of the enemy. At the same time a column
composed of French troops and Albanian irregulars
advanced along the upper Skumbi, and on the 21st a
French detachment delivered a surprise attack on Golik
(6 or 7 km. south of the Durazzo-Struga road), capturing
480 prisoners and putting a similar number of the enemy
hors de combat, with the loss of only 16 men. Altogether
the French made about a thousand prisoners in these
operations. In October, there was a slight renewal of
activity in this area, but the line occupied varied little,
and was finally stabilized along the following points :
Udunista, Hill 1704, Velichani Mokra, Gora Top, and
thence southward. There was not, however, a continuous
line, as on the Western fronts or even in other parts
of the Macedonian front, but only a series of more or less
isolated posts. The troops in this sector were formed
into what was called the Provisional Infantry Division,
commanded by General Jacquemot. The detachments
forming it soon afterwards returned to their respective
units, but subsequently, in consequence of information
received concerning a probable Bulgarian counter-offensive
along the west shore of Lake Ochrida, with the object
of recapturing Pogradetz and perhaps again menacing
the Santi Quaranta road, the Provisional Division was
reconstituted ; but the threatened attack never took
place.

The French had thus obtained some not indifferent
territorial advantages by means of this very weH con-
ducted operation. But they now found themselves with

OPERATIONS IN ALBANIA 185

an extended front and their left flank in the air, a situation
which, in the face of an enterprising enemy, might have
been very dangerous, all the more so as their supplies
had to be transported on mule-back over very difficult
country. But neither the Bulgarians nor the Austrians
were then in a position to attempt operations in that
area, which was as arduous for them as for the
French.

During the month of November, in consequence of
the terrible disaster of Caporetto, there were persistent
rumours from various sources of an imminent enemy
offensive on the Macedonian and Albanian fronts. The
landing of several German divisions at Durazzo and
the arrival of numerous reinforcements on the Macedonian
front from Roumania were reported, chiefly from neutral
countries (Spain and Switzerland). The Austro-German
victory on the Italian front was enthusiastically feted
by the enemy forces in the Balkans, and a vigorous propa-
ganda was conducted, especially among the Serbs, by
means of grandiloquent proclamations and invitations
to make a separate peace, dropped into the Allied lines.
General Sarrail did not believe in this offensive, and
as things turned out his scepticism proved well founded.
All that actually did happen was a slight increase in the
enemy's battalion strength. The number of enemy
battalions, which had risen from 239 in February to
267 in May, and had fallen to 237 in August, again rose
to 285 in November. These battalions were nearly all
Bulgarian, save for a variable but ever-decreasing number
of German battalions — they were then eight or nine —
and the 177th Turkish Regiment, the last remnant of
the 2 Turkish divisions which had been formerly on the
Macedonian front ; even this was soon afterwards with-
drawn. It appears, however, that the actual strength
of the battalions had been progressively weakened, so
that the increase was more apparent than real.

Besides all their other difficulties, the Russian trouble
was now added. In the early days of the campaign the
Russian troops had fought very well, especially in the
operations round Monastir. But the revolution in Russia

186 THE SALONICA FIRE

had its reaction, although in an attenuated form, also
in Macedonia. At first the trouble was caused by the
partisans of the old regime, who appeared unwilling
to go on fighting for the Russian Republic, and among
these there was, it is said, a Brigadier-General. Then
the poisonous Bolshevik infection began to spread among
the troops, destroying all discipline and patriotic sentiment.
Whereas formerly many of the officers had neglected and
brutally ill-treated their men, and often embezzled the
army funds, now the brutalized and ignorant soldiers
began to refuse to obey them. The famous soldiers'
committees were formed, the result of which was the
abolition of all respect for authority and the placing of
a premium on cowardice and treachery. It was impossible
to punish a soldier even if he were guilty of the most
infamous crime without the judgment of the committee,
and the latter invariably acquitted the accused. If the
idiotic blunders of Kerenski and the ignoble infamies of
Lenin and Trotzky did not produce such immediate and
disastrous effects in Macedonia as they did in Russia,
it is because the Russians were but a small minority
among the other Allied troops who were not infected
by the plague.

At the time of the expedition to Greece the effects of
revolutionary ideas among the Russian troops became
even more visible, the conduct of the men being disgrace-
fully undisciplined and scandalous. Then there were
rumours of " fraternization " at the front between Russians
and Bulgarians, and, although no very serious incidents
seem to have occurred, the mere possibility of them was
in itself alarming. The 7th and 8th Regiments gave
most signs of insubordination and demoralization, and
one of the most culpable individuals appear to have been
Colonel Mindru, the Commander of the 7th Regiment,
who hoped to make himself popular by placing himself
at the head of the revolutionary movement. General
Dietrich, an excellent officer, had been recalled to Russia
in the summer of 1917, and after a series of temporary
Commanders, General Taranowski had arrived ^at the
beginning of November to take command of the division.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE RUSSIANS 187

But by that time the Bolshevik revolution was triumphant,
and the Russian division was going to pieces. At the
beginning of January 1918, the Soviets of the 3rd, 7th
and 8th Regiments demanded to be withdrawn to the
second line, whereas the 4th was ready to remain in the
trenches. The more insubordinate elements were sent
to North Africa to perform almost forced labour. The
others were offered the choice of either continuing to fight
or of working in Macedonia as paid labourers. A small
minority requested to be sent to fight, and were shipped
off to France where they were incorporated in the Russian
legion, and so did those of Polish nationality, who joined
the Polish Legion. Some of the others agreed to work,
but the great majority would neither fight nor work,
and these were consequently forced to work, practically
as prisoners of war. It is not likely that the French
officers and men who had charge of them were particularly
tender towards these blackguards who had betrayed the
cause of the Entente and were responsible for the indefinite
prolongation of the war, to the total advantage of the
German.

Gradually the Russian Division was dissolved, by no
means a simple matter, owing to the administrative
chaos in which its officers had left it. The Russian
officers remaining in Macedonia or relegated to Greece
did not, save a few exceptions, give a very edifying spectacle
of themselves. They continued their unseemly riotous
living, extravagantly spending money obtained no one
knew how, and bombarded the French Intendance, to
whom the liquidation of the force was entrusted, for
increases of salary, advances, demobilization bonuses,
etc. The total number of Russian troops in Macedonia
had been about 15,000, so that their disappearance con-
stituted an appreciable reduction of effectives.

The discipline of the French troops of the A.F.O. under
Sarrail's regime had been getting worse and worse, as
was proved by the mutinies which occurred in the 57th
Division. The immediate cause of the trouble was the
impossibility of granting leave to the majority of the men
who were entitled to it. Salonica was full of soldiers on

188 THE SALONICA FIRE

their way home on leave, but who could not depart owing
to the scarcity of tonnage. The worst disorders occurred
among the men of the 242nd Infantry Regiment, who
after the end of their period of rest, refused to return to
the trenches. The Command was not in a position to
apply extreme measures, and had to adopt sometimes
the strong and sometimes the gentle manner. Order
was, however, finally re-established, and the last ninety
mutineers were surrounded and disarmed without blood-
shed (July 1917). Similar incidents occurred in the
2bis Zouaves. General Sarrail attributed the trouble to
the officers who had, he declares, first encouraged them
and then tried to keep in the background.1

All these episodes were signs of a very unsatisfactory
spirit, and were calculated to make the French Govern-
ment ever more doubtful of Sarrail's military qualities.
Another incident was now to prove the last straw. We
have already spoken of General Sarrail's situation with
regard to the Allies and to French policy. Partly from
a legitimate desire to see the Armee d'Orient treated with
more consideration and adequately supplied with rein-
forcement and material, but still more from his incorrigible
tendency to political intrigue, he tried, while M. Briand
was still in office, to provoke a political campaign against
him in France, as he considered him responsible for the
troubles of his Army and attributed to his influence the
fact that the French Government often gave way to
the Allies in matters concerning the Macedonian Campaign.
He had sent to Paris a report on the Armee d'Orient
whose conditions he described in the darkest colours,
insisting that this state of things should be remedied
adequately, so as to avoid an otherwise inevitable disaster.
So far there was, of course, no harm. But when the
Bonnet Rouge scandal broke out it appeared from the
papers of the traitor Almereyda that he had had a copy
of the Sarrail report in his hands and that he had com-
municated it to agents of the German Government, who
thus came to know the state of weakness of the Macedonian
force ; had the enemy been in a position to act Upon this

1 Sarrail, Mon Cornmandement en Orient.

THE RECALL OF SARRAIL 189

knowledge the Macedonian campaign might have ended
in a very disastrous manner. But who had communicated
the precious document to Almereyda ? It was discovered
in the course of the inquiry that he had received it from
a certain Sergeant Paix-Seailles, a journalist and politician,
who in all probability ignored the fact that Almereyda
was a traitor, but wished to make use of him for the cam-
paign against M. Briand. Paix-S6ailles had obtained the
document from Captain Mathieu, an officer attached to
the Staff of General Sarrail. Mathieu took upon himself
the whole responsibility for the affair, and received a
disciplinary punishment from the court martial, but
it was impossible to eliminate the general conviction that
he would never have made such use of so confidential
a document if he had not been authorized to do so by his
Chief, whose full confidence he enjoyed and whose hostility
to Briand was notorious. About the same time the famous
Caillaux dossier came to light, in which was a plan for
the appointment of General Sarrail as Commander-in-
Chief of the French Army ; the appointment was to be
made after the coup d'etat which Caillaux was contem-
plating. Even if Sarrail himself had no knowledge of
this scheme, the mere fact that his name appeared among
the persons in whom Caillaux had confidence made a very
bad impression.

On November 13th the Painleve Cabinet fell and was
succeeded by that of M. Clemenceau. To the latter
the Allied Ministers, in the Versailles meeting of
December 2nd, communicated all the complaints against
Sarrail. M. Clemenceau studied the various files concerning
him very carefully, and thus became acquainted with the
above-mentioned episodes. In spite of the pressure of the
General's political friends, Clemenceau had the courage
to cut the Gordian knot without hesitating ; on December
7th Sarrail received his order of recall, on the 22nd he
left Salonica, and after a series of inquiries he was placed
on the retired list.

His departure was welcomed with a sense of relief
and satisfaction by all the Allies, and even among the
French officers it caused no regret, save in a small group

190 THE SALONICA FIRE

of persons in his immediate entourage who had taken
advantage of his friendship to obtain exceptional promo-
tion and other advantages for themselves. With General
Sarrail his Chief of the Staff, General Michaud, also
departed.

CHAPTER XII

GENERAL GUILLAUMAT

General Sarrail was succeeded by General Guillaumat.
The latter was a man of very different stamp. A good
soldier and a thorough gentleman, he immediately acquired
an authority over the other Allied Commanders such as
had never been enjoyed by his predecessor. In France
he had given proof of high military qualities, but he
remained a short time in Macedonia and had no opportunity
of carrying out an offensive. His earnestness of purpose
and conduct, however, which were soon made manifest,
argued well for the future, and while the merit of the
victory is justly attributed to General Franchet d'Esperey,
the plan of operations is due, in no small part, to General
Guillaumat. Above all he restored the discipline of the
A.F.O., which had been badly shaken under the unfortu-
nate Sarrail regime. He brought a new Chief of the Staff
with him, General Charpy, who was certainly superior
to General Michaud, but he was to prove not too friendly
towards the Italians ; he retained his post until after the
end of the campaign.

The Commander of the A.F.O. was also changed in the
autumn of 1918, but for other reasons. General Grossetti
was forced to leave Macedonia owing to a serious illness,
which had a fatal ending ; he left an excellent memory
of himself, for his fine military qualities and his character.
He was succeeded by General Regnault, late Commander
of a group of divisions in Macedonia ; he in his turn was
succeeded by General Henrys. With the successive
Commanders of the A.F.O. our relations were always
cordial and friendly, even when they were less so with
the C.A.A. It was in fact much easier for two fine soldiers

191

192 GENERAL GUILLAUMAT

such as Generals Petitti and Mombelli to agree with
fighting leaders endowed with qualities similar to their
own than with Generals whose attention was largely
monopolized by political affairs.

While the Armee d'Orient had suffered a reduction of
strength in consequence of the Russian defection, it
received in the winter of 1917-18 an unexpected rein-
forcement in the Serbian Army. During the early period
of the war a large number of Yugoslav subjects of Austria-
Hungary — Serbs, Bosnians and Herzegovinians, Croatians,
Slovenes, etc. — had been made prisoners by the Russians.
Not a few had, in fact, from hatred of their own Govern-
ment, voluntarily surrendered. They afterwards declared
themselves ready to enlist in the Russian Army to fight
against the Dual Monarchy, and as there were very few
officers among them (the Austro-Hungarian Command
was careful to bestow commissions only on persons on
whose loyalty it could depend), a number of regular officers
of the Serbian Army were sent out to command them.
Thus some Yugoslav divisions were formed which fought
gallantly on the Russian side against the Austrians and
Germans. When the revolution broke out in Russia they
continued to fight in spite of the gradual defection of the
Russian Army, and in the last offensive in June and July
1917 in Galicia, which began with a success and ended in
disaster, they found themselves abandoned by their
erstwhile comrades in arms, and suffered enormous
losses, as the Russians, infected with Bolshevism, either
ran away or began to " fraternize " with their own worst
enemies. Finally, when the Russian situation had become
manifestly hopeless, they determined to go and join
their brothers in Macedonia. The enterprise was no
easy ones, for if the distance between the borders of Galicia
and Macedonia was short, invaded Roumania and hostile
Bulgaria stood between. It was therefore necessary to
cross the whole of Russia. The first detachments went
to Archangel, where they embarked for England, thence
they travelled across France to Toulon, there they re-
embarked for Italy, and finally came on by road and rail
to Salonica, where they began to arrive at the end of.

I^H^i^

THE SALONICA FIEE (NIGHT FROM AUGUST 18TH TO 19TH, 1917).

CAMP OF THE lllTH FLIGHT (ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE).

To face p. 192.

THE SERBS FROM RUSSIA 193

November, 1917, after a journey of many months. Others
followed in December and January. Those of them
whom I saw in the train between Vralo and Salonica were
really fine-looking soldiers ; indeed, only picked men
could have had the endurance to face all these difficulties
voluntarily. But the last detachments underwent even
more dramatic vicissitudes. They found themselves in the
midst of Bolshcvizcd Russia, hostile to themselves and a
vassal to Germany. Lenin, acting in Germany's interests,
did not wish to allow them to leave, and it was only
thanks to the absolute anarchy then dominant in the
country that they were able, after infinite difficulties,
to continue their journey. The Bolsheviks at first
demanded that the infamous soldiers' councils should be
instituted among them, but the Yugoslavs refused to
destroy their own discipline. Lenin insisted that every
single man should state individually that he wished to
go to Macedonia, and the great majority did so. But
during the journey they had to give up their arms and
encountered every sort of obstacle and obstruction,
while Russian employers and contractors, by offering them
very high wages, tried to induce them to remain in Russia,
where no one else wanted to work any longer ; a certain
number could not withstand the temptation and remained
behind. The Archangel route being no longer practicable,
they had to travel by the Trans-Siberian railway, so that
to go from the Danube to Salonica they crossed the whole
of European Russia, Siberia, Manchuria and on to Dalny,
where they embarked, crossed the China Sea, the Indian
Ocean, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean,
finally landing at Salonica — a trifle of some 15,000 km.
On reaching Salonica they were sent to the camp at
Mikra, re-equipped, armed and sent on to the front.
In all they were 8,000 to 10,000 men ; part of them
were distributed among the existing units, so as to infuse
fresh blood into their reduced effectives, but some 3,500
to 4,000 were embodied in a new brigade of 2 regiments
attached to the Vardar Division, which thenceforth assumed
the name of Yugoslav Division ; its other brigade, made
up of the effectives of its 3 original regiments (reduced to 2)

13

194 GENERAL GUILLAUMAT

was called the Vardar Brigade. This division was the
only one in the Serbian Army which comprised 4 regiments.

The arrival of these reinforcements produced a moral
effect wholly out of proportion with the material increase
of strength which it represented. The spirit of the
soldiers had been gradually becoming more and more
depressed owing to the long-delayed expectation and
the constant losses which were never made good. They
saw everything in the gloomiest colours and had lost
practically all hope of final victory ; the influence of
the party favourable to a separate peace with Austria
steadily grew stronger. But the mere sight of these
8,000 new combatants, who had faced such fearful hard-
ships to reach Macedonia and who knew that if they were
taken prisoners they would receive but short shrift,
spread a new spirit of hope throughout the Serbian Army.
These were the first reinforcements which it had received
for about a year.

I went to see some of the Yugoslav detachments which
had arrived from Russia at their camp, and I learned
that the great majority of them were Orthodox Bosnians
and Herzegovinians. The Catholic Croatians, Dalmatians
and Slovenes were but a trifling minority. In fact, most of
the Yugoslavs of Croatia, Dalmatia and the Slovene lands,
who had been captured in Russia refused to enrol them-
selves to fight against Austria, with very few exceptions,
for the inhabitants of those territories remained faithful
henchmen of the Dual Monarchy until the Armistice.

In Italy there were some 30,000 more Yugoslav prisoners,
part of whom had been captured by the Serbs and then
conducted into Albania after the collapse of the Serbian
Army, whence they were afterwards shipped to Italy.
In consequence of the serious crisis of effectives which
paralysed the Serbian Army in Macedonia, the Serbian
Government, then established at Corfu, made applica-
tion to that of Italy that all the prisoners of Yugoslav
race should be given into its charge. Negotiations were
instituted with this object, but the Italian Government
raised objections of various kinds. There was at first
some hesitation in handing them over to the Serbs for

THE YUGOSLAV PRISONERS 195

fear of reprisals by Austria against our own prisoners.
It also transpired that at least a large part of them had no
desire to go to light in Macedonia, especially those who
were not Orthodox. Furthermore, the Serbian Govern-
ment committed the gaffe of sending as its representative
to visit the prisoners in question an officer of the Serbian
Army, who was a Slovene from Opcina near Trieste
and consequently a future Italian citizen. On the eve
of the general offensive in Macedonia the negotiations
had led to no result, and the Serbian Government made
a show of great irritation against us, attributing our
reluctance to ill-will against the Yugoslav nation. But
as a matter of fact, while the Serbian G.H.Q. at Salonica
and the Government at Corfu were officially and ostenta-
tiously insisting that the prisoners should be consigned
to them, I learned from Serbian officers in very close
touch with the leading generals that the latter were by
no means too anxious to swell the ranks of their army
with elements whose loyalty was regarded with consider-
able doubt. A few days before the offensive, one of those
officers admitted to me in confidence : " Just now our
Command is so fully occupied with preparations for
the coming action that it has no time to think about the
prisoners in Italy. And then we do not particularly
trust these semi- Austrian gentry." The difficulties raised
by us were the object of complaints made to the other
Allies regarding our conduct, but in truth the Serbian
Government was by no means sorry to have an excuse
for dropping the scheme.

By this time almost the whole of the Greek Army had
been transported to Macedonia. The three divisions of
the National Defence Army Corps (except for one regiment
retained in Athens) was united under the command of
General Zimbrakakis, and distributed between Nonte
and the Vardar, forming part of the 1st Group of Divi-
sions. Other divisions belonging to the regular army and
reorganized by the French Military Mission, were moving
towards the Struma front. Their effectives were con-
siderable, as the divisions were all up to strength and almost
free from war losses. But in spite of the intensive training

196 GENERAL GUILLAUMAT

to which they had been subjected by the French officers
at the Naresh camp, both officers and men still had very
scanty notions ol* modern methods of warfare. Among
the officers, moreover, even after the severe cleansing,
Royalist feeling had by no means disappeared, and a
British officer attached to the Greek Army assured me
that at more than one Greek mess the health of the exiled
King was still drunk. The great unknown factor
was the fighting value of these soldiers. Those of the
National Defence Corps were now sufficiently inured to
war, but about the others nothing was known.

As it was necessary, in view of reports of a coming
enemy offensive, to obtain reliable information, local
operations were intensified. On the night of April 14-15,
1918, Greek and British detachments made an incursion
beyond the Struma (north-west of Lake Tahinos), and
occupied various villages ; the Bulgars counter-attacked
and regained some of the lost positions. The Greeks
had behaved well, although the engagement was of small
importance. The local Greek press, and also the French
papers, inspired by the C.A.A., extolled this episode
to the skies as though it were a first-class victory. Even
in the restaurants at Athens banquets were given, with
abundance of champagne, to celebrate the great triumph.

At the end of May the National Defence Forces carried
out a much more important operation. The enemy
occupied a strong position on the massif known as the
Srka di Legen 1 near Huma, which formed a very awkward
salient for the Allies. During the last days of May, a
powerful group of French artillery, together with 2 British
8-inch guns, were concentrated in that area and opened
a heavy bombardment on the enemy lines. The British
heavy batteries on the Smol (left bank of the Vardar)
also contributed their share. On the 29th, the attack
began, and the Greek troops rushed the enemy trenches
at dawn on the 30th, supported by a powerful barrage
fire. The 1st (Serres), 5th and 6th (Archipelago) Regi-
ments gained possession of the defensive positions of the

1 The name appears in this odd semi-Italian form in the^-Austrian
1/200000 staff map.

OPERATIONS OF THE GREEK TROOPS 197

Srka di Legen, while the 7th (Cretan) Regiment occupied
the heights between the two branches of the Ljumnitza
River. On a front of 12 km. and for a depth of 2 km.
the whole complicated maze of formidable defences was
thus conquered. The action was so rapid that the
Bulgarian barrage did not begin until the attacking troops
were already well out of their trenches. The enemy
counter-attacks, weakly pushed, were easily repulsed,
and the Greeks captured some 1,700 prisoners and a
considerable amount of booty, losing from 500 to 600
men, killed and wounded. The Greeks behaved extremely
well, and their Commander, General Ioannou, greatly distin-
guished himself for his personal courage. A fresh Bulgarian
counter-attack was expected during the next few days,
especially as the Bulgarians were known to despise the
Greeks and it was believed that they would never submit
to a defeat at their hands without attempting a return
match ; elaborate defensive preparations were made,
and the Greek troops were sent into the second lines to
recuperate, and relieved by French units. But the
counter-attack never materialized, and this was one of
the first really significant signs of the enemy's depressed
moral. From Field Marshal Hindenburg's memoirs and
other sources we gather that the troops detailed for the
counter-attack and for a general attack on the British
lines had refused to march.

The operation had been admirably prepared by the
French Staff, and the artillery concentrated in that area
formed a formidable mass. Its objectives were almost
more political than military, and full success having been
achieved, it was very largely exploited and advertised.
The battle of the Srka was indeed a strong encouragement
for the Venizelist party in Greece, and public opinion
came to have somewhat more confidence in the Greek
Army. It seems almost paradoxical, but the Greeks them-
selves, who were ready to extol in the most exaggerated
way the most modest successes of their troops, in their
heart of hearts did not feel much confidence in them, and
as a French officer said to me, they still believed that the
Bulgarians trained by the Germans were worth more

198 GENERAL GUILLAUMAT

than the Greeks trained by the French. But in one
of those fits of sudden exaltation, characteristic of all
Balkan peoples, the Greeks swerved from a belief in
German invincibility and terror of a Bulgaro-German
invasion to the absolute confidence in a complete and
immediate Allied victory obtained by virtue of Greek
aid. In the cafes of Athens there was little to choose
between the Marne, Gorizia, the Somme, Brusiloff's
offensive and the Srka di Legen.

But in spite of all exaggerations, we must remember
that this was a really creditable episode ; it exercised
a favourable influence on the Greek mobilization, and
showed that the Allies could count on at least a part of
the Greek Army.

CHAPTER XIII

MARKING TIME. ARRIVAL OF GENERAL
FRANCHET D'ESP^REY

The spring of 1918 had been the most menacing period
for the Entente. At that time the first effects of the
Russian collapse were felt on the Western front as they
had been felt on the Italian front in October, 1917.
On all fronts the Allies were standing still, held down
without the possibility of attempting any offensive.
The " war map " was wholly in favour of the Central
Powers. Germany occupied almost the whole of Belgium,
a large and rich part of France. The Austrians were
on the Piave. Russia, after the shameful surrender of
Brest-Litovsk, had seen the German and Austrian armies
spread over a vast part of her territory. The Turks,
after the withdrawal of the Russians from Armenia,
had invaded the Caucasus. Roumania, betrayed by the
Russians, had two-thirds of her territory occupied by
the enemy, and after a heroic resistance on the Sereth,
had been forced to submit to peace on disastrous terms.
Now the Germans on the Western front and the Austrians
in Italy were preparing new and vast offensives which
should finally bring the struggle to an end with a colossal
victory. The British, French and Italians hoped to be
able to resist, but all were filled with deep anxiety.
American assistance was arriving very slowly, while the
defeatist propaganda, conducted by Socialists and others
in the pay of Germany, was spreading secretly through-
out all the Allied countries.

On March 21, the German offensive in France was
launched and its successes were more rapid and more
terrible than could have been expected. After a few

199

200 MARKING TIME

d.tys all the territory laboriously conquered at the cost
of enormous losses by the Allied forces in the spring
and summer of 1917, were lost, and the enemy still
advanced irresistibly towards Amiens, to separate the
British from the French Armies. Immediately after-
wards the offensive in Flanders began, which, although
less rapid than the other, achieved menacing successes.
In May there was another great German offensive on
the Chemin des Dames, and in two days the enemy
regained the ground won by the French in the preceding
summer, and pushed much further on, crossing the Maine
at several points and again threatening Paris. It seemed
as though nothing could now hold up the overwhelming
advance.

At this grave moment the Macedonian front was more
neglected than ever, and the Army in the East was indeed
made use of to provide reinforcements for the Western
front. In the despairing search for effectives to fill
up the gaps in the French front it was decided to withdraw
certain units from the East. During the winter of 1917-18
the French Army in Macedonia had received sufficient
reinforcements to bring the battalions up to a semblance
of their organic strength. The total of the French Army
which had been reduced to 180,000 men, had been again
raised to 210,000. The British, too, received some rein-
forcements. We continued to maintain our own strength,
except for the withdrawal of the 7th battalion in the
summer of 1917, which I have already mentioned. But
with the German offensive in France, the French and
British Commands sent a commission to the East to
examine the possibility of withdrawing troops, and it
was decided to send to France the equivalent of 12
battalions from each of the two armies. From the
British contingent, which comprised 12 brigades of
4 battalions each, one whole battalion per brigade was
withdrawn ; the French instead withdrew a corre-
sponding number of men from various units, while a few
regiments, whose strength had been greatly reduced,
were broken up. This gave increasing importance to
the Greek Army, which was in a position to supply the

GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY 201

Macedonian front with a number of men, not by any
means equivalent in fighting quality or training to the
French and British battalions withdrawn, but stronger
in effectives. This decision was generally deplored,
because 24 battalions represented a very negligible
increase of strength on the French front where vast
armies millions strong were engaged, whereas by with-
drawing them from Macedonia they constituted a reduction
of force which was anything but indifferent, and could
not be compensated by even twice that number of Greek
battalions ; this made the situation of the Allied troops
remaining at that front — our own included — much
harder.

In the East, another result of the German offensive
in France was the change in the Commander-in-Chief.
General Guillaumat was very highly thought of in France,
and rightly so. In Macedonia he had, as I have said,
restored the shaken discipline of the French troops and
had entirely reorganized them, but in the extremely
critical situation in which Paris found itself in view of
the German advance in May, it was decided to entrust
him with the defence of the Capital, and consequently
on June 8, he quietly departed from Salonica and was
succeeded by General Franchet d'Esperey. The loss of
the Chemin des Dames, where the latter had commanded
an army, had not exactly caused him to fall into disgrace,
because the defeat does not appear to have been due to
any fault of his own, but it rendered him less highly
considered than he had been before, and consequently
he was sent to take command at Salonica, where it was
not believed that important operations would ever take
place again. General Franchet d'Esperey is a man of
high historical and literary as well as military culture,
he has travelled a great deal abroad and belongs to an
aristocratic family ; he is somewhat brusque in his manner,
impulsive and sometimes dominated by the last incident
which had happened and had put him in a good or bad
humour with everybody. When he was in a good humour,
he was gay, bon camarade, and one could tell him or ask
him anything, whereas when something had gone amiss

202 MARKING TIME

he was irritable and difficult to deal with. For General
Mombelli he had great sympathy, and even when our
Commander had occasion to complain energetically about
some deficiency in the services for which we were de-
pendent on the C.A.A. — and occasions were not lacking —
he always accepted his remarks in a friendly spirit and did
everything that was possible to satisfy him. He did not
enter into discussions on the various questions submitted
to him and often made remarks that were not absolutely
accurate, basing his opinion on something that he had
read or heard without going into the matter thoroughly.
But as a strategist he showed in Macedonia qualities of the
highest rank, and he commanded with success the extremely
mixed team of the Armee d'Orient.

General Guillaumat deserves credit for having thought
out the Macedonian offensive, basing it on Voivod Michich's
old plan of 1916, for the part which concerned him ;
General d'Esperey perfected the plan, completed it, and
then carried it out.

The engagement on the Srka di Legen was the last
on the Macedonian front before the great offensive,
with the exception of a few small raids on many sectors.
The British were particularly active during this period,
both as regards raids in the Struma and in aerial bombard-
ments. Whereas, until about the middle of 1917, the
enemy were decidedly stronger than the Allies in the air,
they had since then been steadily losing their superiority
and finally found themselves in a state of absolute in-
feriority. The British were so constantly bringing down
German machines that the enemy hardly dared any
longer to appear in the air beyond their own lines.

There was now considerable activity in Albania in
the sector where the Armee d'Orient co-operated with the
Italian 16th Corps, and on May 15, a French column, com-
manded by Colonel Care, composed of the 58th Battalion
of Chasseurs a pied, 10 platoons of Albanian Gendarmerie,
a battalion of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 3 mountain
batteries, and a regiment of Moroccan Spahis, plus
a reserve of 7 Colonial companies, took the offensive
between the junction of the Kelizoni and the Devoli

OPERATIONS IN ALBANIA 20.3

and the height of Mali Korori (south-west of Moschopolje) ;
an Italian column was to deliver an attack at the same
time from the line of the Osum, near Cerevoda. The
object of the Allies was to reduce the strong enemy
salient formed as a result of the French attack at Pogradetz,
which penetrated wedge-like between the positions then
captured and the Italian positions to the north and north-
west of the Ersek road, menacing the Santi Quaranta road
between Ersek and Koritza. The two attacks met with
vigorous resistance, especially at the extreme left of the
Italians and the extreme right of the French ; both the
Italians and the French captured some positions, lost
them, and recaptured them definitely. Towards the
centre the resistance was weaker. On the 17th the liaison
between the two forces was realized at Backa. according
to plan. Mount Lesetz alone (cast of Protopapa and
south of the Devoli) could not be captured by the French.
A definite result was the elimination of the enemy salient,
the reduction of the French and Italian front by about
40 kilometres, and the occupation of the numerous villages
contained in the salient itself. The new lines went from
the junction of the Devoli and the Kelizoni, passing by
Tchafa Becit, Maya Frenkut, Backa to Cerevoda. Thus
the Santi Quaranta road was now safe. The enemy
made no attempt at a counter-offensive, save for artillery
fire, and the Italians and French were able to reinforce
the new lines unmolested.

On June 10 the French resumed the offensive, but
this time without Italian co-operation, as the advance
was not in that sector. Various positions were occupied,
including Mount Lesetz, which they had been unable
to capture in the preceding operation ; a new line was
constituted, reducing the enemy salient on Mount Kamia
from Lungi to the old line near Tchafa Becit, passing
along Hill 1900, Sinapremte, Gopes and Mount Tembet.
The operation ended on the 14th ; 400 prisoners, 10 guns
and some machine guns having been captured.

The French and Italians resumed the offensive on
a larger scale on July 6. The French objective was to
advance along the valley of the Devoli as far as its great

204 MARKING TIME

loop at a short distance from the valley of the Skumbi,
whereas ours was to turn the Malakastra — the best defended
position in the whole of Albania — occupy Fieri and Berat
and then push on towards the Skumbi. Both corps were
to try to reach the Durazzo-Elbasan road, but the latter
town was to be reserved for Italian occupation. The
general objective was not so much territorial occupation
as the weakening of the enemy, so as to prevent Austrian
forces in Albania from coming to the assistance of the
Bulgarians in Macedonia during the Allied offensive
which was about to take place in the latter territory.

The French force, commanded by Colonel Foulon,
comprised the 372nd Infantry Regiment, the 58th Battalion
of Chasseurs a pied, the Spahis and three mountain
batteries. The positions between the old line of the
junction of the Devoli and the Tomoritza were occupied
without resistance, and so was the whole of the triangle
formed by these two rivers and the chain of the Bofnia
and Kosnitza mountains. The French pushed forward
still further between the Devoli and Holta, occupied Gramsi,
an important base of supplies for the enemy, on the 13th,
and the Austrians withdrew to the heights east of Chekina,
Strori and Kruya, to the south-west of the Tomoritza where
the Italians were operating, and the French and Italian
liaison was being constantly advanced northwards. On
the 15th, Lubin was taken, a little to the east of the
confluence of the Devoli and the Tomoritza.

But the Italians were also advancing towards Berat
and Fieri. The latter town was captured as the result
of a brilliant operation by the cavalry, which turned the
extreme north-west spur of the Malakastra, while infantry
detachments forced a passage between Levani and
Fieri. Thus the whole enemy defensive organization of
the Malakastra, the only one, it may be said, which the
Austrians had created in Albania, fell. Beyond Fieri
the Italians pressed on to the river Semeni, which they
forced at the Metali bridge. Another column occupied
Berat, the II. Q. of an Austrian brigade, and reached the
southern loop of the Devoli.

During these operations a misunderstanding arose

AUSTRIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE 205

between the Italian and French Commands, due probably
to the imperfect liaison, communications being indeed
very difficult, on account of the broken nature of the
ground. Our Command wished to push forward in
a northerly direction, as far as the apex of the loop of
the Devoli, so as to occupy the whole of the mountain
range of the Mali Siloves, which dominates the left bank
of the river, while the French, in view of their weak
effectives in Albania, were opposed to this advance which
seemed to them too risky. The advance, however, was
effected, and a part of the above mountain range was
occupied, but the Austrian Supreme Command, alarmed
by the rapid success of the various French and Italian
offensives in Albania, the result of which had been not
only an important strategic loss for them, but also a
serious danger of insurrection on the part of the untrust-
worthy natives on account of the weakened Austrian
prestige, and represented a menace in the direction of
Montenegro, changed the Commander-in-Chief and sent
out important reinforcements. General Pflanzer-Baltin
flew by aeroplane to Albania, where he took command.
At the same time the Italians were suffering terribly
from malaria. The coastal zone of Albania is verv un-
healthy ; as long as the troops remained in their camps
or were making no great effort, they held out fairly well,
but as soon as they began the advance and had to sleep
in the open, often in marshy places, they were mown
down by fever, especially the detachments operating
along the lower Semeni. To give one instance, in a whole
regiment of cavalry only 70 men were not on the sick
list. From Italy no reinforcements arrived, because
preparations in course made for the great offensive
on the Italian front, which had originally been intended
to take place in the month of August. Thus, when the
enemy, in the second half of July, strengthened by large
reinforcements arriving from healthy places and not yet
infected by malaria, launched a counter-offensive, the
Italian troops were forced to withdraw to some extent.
This they did in good order and without serious losses in
prisoners or material, and if the evacuation of Fieri and

206 MARKING TIME

Berat were regrettable episodes, our situation still remained
far better than it had been before the offensive, as we
maintained our positions on the heights to the south of
those towns, and especially on the important lines of
the Malakastra. Enemy pressure made itself felt also
in the Mali Siloves area, where our column had to withdraw
so as not to remain with its left flank uncovered. The
French now opposed this withdrawal, as they did not
believe in the existence of Austrian reinforcements,
simply because the latter had not been seen in the French
sector. This led to a disagreement between the two Com-
mands, which, however, was soon settled, and the French
column also withdrew a little further back. Our line was
then stabilized as follows : Sinya (south-west of Berat)-
Barguliasi-Tchafa Glunaka-Oyanik, where the French line
began. The latter had abandoned a part of the triangle
formed by the Tomoritza and the Devoli, but held the
heights of Mount Kosnitza. Their line then followed
the direction of Lungi and the Gora Top.1 Towards the
middle of August the operations in Albania were suspended.
We were in positions easy to defend and the Austrians,
exhausted by their advance, also began to feel the full effects
of the climate in that season. Now they were no longer
receiving any reinforcements, partly because the Italian
Navy rendered transport from Dalmatia by sea almost
impossible, while General Ferrero had been reinforced by
two brigades and some other detachments from Italy.

In the second half of June there was a general detente
in the European military situation. After the great
German push in May, the operations in France had been
suspended, and on the 15th of June the Austrians launched
their offensive on the Piave. It failed completely, and
the enemy did not succeed in retaining any part of the
ground conquered in the first attack — in fact on the
Lower Piave, they lost some which they had held since
the previous November. This event had a repercussion
on all fronts, and encouraged all the Allies, because it
was the first great Allied victory in 1918, and also the

1 By line in the Albanian sector, whether Italian or French, -J do not
mean a continuous line of trenches, but merely a series of isolated posts.

PACIFIST TENDENCIES IN BULGARIA 207

first time that a vast offensive, launched with all the
apparatus of modern warfare, was held up at once
without achieving even the smallest lasting advantage.
On the Macedonian front, too, the effect of it was felt
in the shape of signs of exhaustion on the part of
the enemy. Deserters were ever more numerous, and
they were unanimous in stating that the causes of
their desertion were the difficulty of supply due by the
continuous requisitions of foodstuffs by Germany in
Bulgaria to be sent to Germany, the fact that the
Bulgarians, having obtained all the territories they
wanted, were not anxious to go fighting simply for the
convenience of Germany, and the general lack of confidence
in the victory of the latter. This corresponded with the
information obtained from the interior of Bulgaria, where
the pro-German policy of King Ferdinand and the
Radoslavoff Ministry were becoming every day more
unpopular. The Cabinet fell in June and was succeeded
by that of M. Malinoff, who was of pacifist tendencies.
There was also a party in the country more or less in
favour of the Entente, and now it was working hard to
convince public opinion that it was possible, if peace
were made with the Allies, to obtain recognition of
Bulgaria's right to the conquered territory as a reward.
In Great Britain there had been since the early days
of Bulgaria's intervention, a party in favour of making
concessions to Bulgaria with the object of inducing her
to abandon the Central Empires. Apart from the Bulgaro-
phil movement, the Buxton brothers had always supported
Bulgarian claims as a sentimental memory of the struggle
of the Bulgarians against the Turks, when the latter
dominated Macedonia and Thrace, and even in Government
spheres this tendency had its supporters. As early as
August, 1917, a British officer of high rank, who expressed
the ideas of Government circles in his country and in
Paris, told me that both in France and Britain people
were convinced of the advisability of offering very
advantageous concessions to Bulgaria, and there was
talk of granting to her the Serbian part of Eastern
Macedonia as far as the Vardar, excluding Uskub,

208 MARKING TIME

but, perhaps, including Monastir, the Greek part of
Eastern Macedonia as far as the Struma, the Dobrugia
up to the frontiers existing before the Balkan War, and
further generous pecuniary compensation in addition ;
the Serbians would be indemnified by means of other
territories at the expense of Austro-Hungary. In any
case the Serbian population, according to this officer,
were so weakened and reduced by five years of unin-
terrupted warfare, that it would not have been in a position
to govern Southern Macedonia, where the population is
mostly Bulgarian in feeling and opposed to Serbian rule.
According to him, it only remained to convince the Italian
Government of the possibility and advisability of this
policy.

On the other hand, there were also pro-Serbian ten-
dencies amongst the British, which strongly opposed any
idea of conferring favours on the Bulgarians. Another
British officer, occupying an important position in con-
nexion with Serbia, told me that the attitude of those
who wished to make such concessions at the expense of
Serbia was the cause of very injurious consequences in
Serbian circles, where such a tendency was regarded
as nothing less than treachery against those who had
fought from the beginning on the side of the Allies, and
had suffered terribly, especially at the hands of those
very Bulgarians whom it was now proposed to reward.

I know that some definite proposals were made
to the Bulgarians, and in any case it is certain that
the idea of a separate peace with her, to be obtained
in this way, was in the air. In June, 1918, General
Bartlett, the United States Military Attache at Athens,
came to Salonica, and it was believed that his presence
there had something to do with the rumours of the
possible intervention of the United States in the Balkans.
America had never declared war against Turkey or
Bulgaria and had no troops in Macedonia, and although
Turkey had immediately broken off diplomatic relations
with her, diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and
America continued through the whole of the war, and
an American Charge d'Affaires continued to" reside

U.S. POLICY IN BULGARIA 209

at Sofia. There was mueh speculation in the Entente

countries as to the reasons for this attitude on the part
of the United States, and even in America the public
could not understand it. In the spring of 1918 some
members of the American House of Representatives and of
the Senate had presented a motion to Congress in favour
of a declaration of war against those two States, but
President Wilson requested the authors of that motion to
suspend all discussion on the subject, without giving any
reason for his request, and nothing more was said about
the matter. The above-mentioned general had come
to Salonica to call on General Franchct d'Esperey and
the other Allied Commanders, and he visited various
sectors of the front, including our own. Although he
maintained the utmost reserve regarding the attitude
of his country in connexion with Bulgaria, he ended
by saying that in America it was believed that the cause
of the Allies in the East might be better served by keeping
the threat of declaring war against Bulgaria hanging like
the sword of Damocles over the head of that State,
instead of actually declaring it. In fact, Bulgaria strongly
desired to avoid a break with the United States ; she now
began to realize that the defeat of the Central Empires
was possible if not probable, and she hoped to see the
United States at the future Peace Conference, if not as
a friend, at least as a benevolent neutral who would
defend her from the extreme retribution of the Allies,
especially of Serbia, Roumania and Greece. In the
meanwhile, Mr. Murphy, the American Charge d 'Affaires
at Sofia was able to conduct an active, although prudent
propaganda, in favour of a separate peace, hinting that
the sooner the Bulgarians abandoned the now hopeless
cause of the Central Empires, the better would be the
conditions which the Entente would offer them.

The shrewdest observers of the Balkan situation did
not yet believe in the possibility of a Bulgarian
secession, and to many it seemed unjust to sacrifice
Serbia or Roumania in favour of Bulgaria. Some
concessions might have been offered her at the expense
of Turkey, but it should not be forgotten that even

14

210 MARKING TIME

with Turkey the possibility of a separate peace was con-
templated, and this was not conceivable if the concession
of Turkish territories to Bulgaria were to be the object of
negotiations. As long as Greece was under Constantine,
neutral, and pro-German, the possibility of giving Bulgaria
some Greek territory in Eastern Macedonia might be
considered — Cavalla, Drama, Serres, etc. — but the Bul-
garians already occupied these places, and from the
moment that Greek soldiers had begun to co-operate
with the Allies, such proposals could not be entertained
without the consent of Greece, who would never have
given it. General Mombelli was convinced that the
talk about separate peace with Bulgaria had no serious
foundation and that the Bulgarians would never decide
to take the fatal step until they were first convinced
of the marked superiority of the Allies ; they had not
yet that absolute conviction, and it was therefore necessary
to persuade them by means of a military defeat. General
Franchet d'Esperey was of the same way of thinking, and
he told the writer that the Bulgarians would be more
likely to abandon their Allies " apres la pile que je vais
leur flanquer quand mes preparatifs seront termines."

The French national fete of the 14th of July was
celebrated in Salonica with special solemnity, and King
Alexander of Greece was also present. In spite of the
weak effectives available and the limited space, the
spectacle proved fairly imposing and made a good
impression on the public. The feeling of victory was
now in the air. Our success on the Piave had raised
the moral of all the Allies, and on July 15th the last
German offensive was launched, which after three days
of small successes, was repulsed by the great counter-
offensive of Marshal Foch beginning on the 18th. I remem-
ber that when I congratulated a French General on this
victory, he replied : " Mais ce sont les Italiens sur le
Piave que nous ont donne le premier exemple."

CHAPTER XIV

ON THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

As soon as General Franchet d'Esperey reached Salonica
he undertook to execute the offensive planned by his
predecessor. But he encountered very decided opposition
on the part of his own Government, as well as on that
of the other Allied Governments. The former did not
believe in the possibility of a successful offensive on
the Macedonian front, and it seems not to have had
too much confidence in General Franchet d'Esperey him-
self. It refused to send him reinforcements, and limited
itself to supplying him grudgingly with some artillery
and other material, but always in insufficient quantities.
Britain and Italy adopted a similar policy. Nevertheless
he insisted on the advisability of making the attempt.
Two months were needed for the preparations, and in
spite of the opposition of the Governments, he at
once took them in hand. During the month of
July at the Allied Councils many members were
doubtful, and believed that better results might be
obtained by attempting to secure a separate peace
with Bulgaria. The diplomatic and military com-
mission before breaking up ordered General Franchet
d'Esperey to go ahead with his preparations, but forbade
him to commence the offensive without a definite authoriza-
tion from the Governments. At the beginning of August
nothing had yet been decided, and the British and Italian
Governments were still opposed to the idea of an offensive.
General Guillaumat in Paris had supported the projected
operation in his conversation with members of the French
Government and had succeeded in convincing M. Clemen-
ceau. At the beginning of September he went to London

211

212 THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

and Rome to speak in favour of the plan, but it was not
until September 11th that the Commander-in-Chief in
Salonica was authorized to attack when he thought it
advisable. There was, however, so little confidence in
the success of the plan that General Guillaumat, who
then had no Command, had instructions to hold himself
in readiness to proceed to Macedonia by aeroplane to
relieve General Franchet d'Esperey in case of failure.

Let us now see what were the respective conditions of
the two opposing armies. The enemy front was divided
geographically into four sectors — Albania, Monastir,
Vardar-Doiran, and Struma — against any one of which
the attack might be launched. The Albanian sector
offered some advantages, inasmuch as it was less provided
with defensive works. But General Franchet d'Esperey
did not wish to begin operations on a large scale in that
area because the Italian XVI Corps was not under his
orders ; moreover, and this was the principal reason,
communications were so difficult there as to render the
transport of troops in large numbers impossible. An
advocate of the action of the French G.H.Q. states that
General Ferrero refused to make use of Essad Pasha
for the operations in Albania, and almost blames him
for it,1 but General Franchet d'Esperey had no more
confidence in the assistance which that shady adventurer
might afford to the cause of the Allies than had General
Ferrero, and they were both right.2

In the Monastir sector it was possible to attack in
the direction of Pribilci-Kichevo-Gostivar-Kalkandelen
(Tetovo), or towards Prilep-Babuna-Veles, or Prilep-
Gradsko-Negotin. But here the enemy defences were
in the highest possible state of efficiency, and as this
was one of the sectors in which an attack was always
expected, the Bulgaro-Germans held themselves con-
stantly in readiness for it. The same objections applied

1 Constantin Photindes, " La Victoire des Allies en Orient," Revue de
Paris, September 15, 1919.

2 General F. d'Esperey himself, in reply to a question from his Govern-
ment as to the strength of Essad's army, telegraphed that it consisted
of 13 men.

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VARIOUS PLANS DISCUSSED 213

to the Vardar-Doiran area, which has always been one
of the traditional routes for Macedonian invasions, and
was the only one provided with a railway throughout
its whole length.

The Struma sector extended along a very broad and
marshy valley, and the enemy positions on the mountains
east of the river were extremely strong. Moreover, a
success in this direction would not have offered the chance
of striking a blow at the heart of the enemy, such as
was necessary to obtain really decisive results.

The vital centre of the enemy defences was the middle
Vardar. From Uskub, from Veles, and from Gradsko,
all their lateral communications spread out fan- wise.
The Vardar railway put them in direct communication
with the Central Empires and their supply centres.
From Uskub there was a branch railway to Kalkandelen,
whence a road, with a decauville along a part of it,
descended into the plain of Monastir. From Veles and
Gradsko all the troops in the area between Prilep and
the Vardar, and to some extent also those immediately
to the east of the river, were supplied. The enemy,
however, counted on the very powerful defences, natural
and artificial, on both sides of it, in the Demir Kapu
gorge, to the west of Lake Doiran, and on the Beles range.

There was, however, another route which the enemy
had not thought of fortifying, relying on its formidable
natural defences. Between the Cerna and Nonte there
is a group of high peaks rising from a wilderness of rocks
around a basin hidden among the mountains. The area
is called the Moglena, and it is here that the Moglenitza
river has its source. The mountains of this group are
among the highest in Macedonia ; several summits,
such as Floka, Kaimakchalan, Dzena, are over 2,000 m.,
the Mala Rupa is over 1,900 m., Sokol, Dobropolje,
Vetrenik, Kuchkov Kamen and Kravitza are about
1,700-1,800 m. In the offensive of the autumn of 1916
the Serbs had conquered the Kaimakchalan range and
the Moglena area, which was afterwards entrusted to
the II Serbian Army. Since then the sector had been
a peaceful one, except for the engagements in the spring

214 THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

of 1917. Voivod Michich had repeatedly insisted on
the advisability of an offensive against the Dobropolje,
as offering the best chances of success. General Sarrail
had refused to trust the man who knew far more about
Balkan warfare than he did. General Guillaumat, on
the other hand, believed the plan to be possible, and
began the preliminary studies for an operation in that
direction. But more and heavier artillery was needed
than the Armee d'Orient as yet possessed. Guillaumat,
therefore, only executed the attack on the Srka di Legen.
To General Franchet d'Esperey is due the merit of having
taken up the plan once more, perfected it and finally
executed it. As a result of his inspections along the
front, he convinced himself that while the vital ganglion
of the whole enemy organization was the middle Vardar,
an attack on any of the four traditional sectors was,
with the means at his disposal, impossible. From Mount
Floka he studied the conditions of the ground with
minute attention, and realized that a surprise attack
in the Moglena area might succeed, because the Bulgars
were not likely to expect it. It was necessary to break
through in the centre, and once the breach was made to
spread out in a fan-like formation to reach Gradsko and
Demir Kapu, thus cutting the enemy's communications
and separating the XI German Army from the I Bulgarian
Army. At the same time powerful diversive actions on
the right and left wings (Doiran sector and Cerna loop)
would nail down the enemy and prevent them from
sending reinforcements to the centre.

To carry out this plan it was indispensable to concentrate
a mass of powerful artillery in the central area, have
strong reserves, and at the same time hold the vast line
throughout the whole of its length. The scheme appeared
impossible owing to the absence of one of these requisites —
the reserves. But General Franchet d'Esperey — and
this was the touch of genius of his conception — created
the reserves out of nothing, by thinning out his line and
reducing the number of troops on all the other sectors
to the minimum indispensable for safety and sometimes
going dangerously below it, so as to concentrate the

ALLIED STRENGTHS 215

largest possible number of men on the points where the
decisive effort was to be made. In this way, although
the total strength of the Allies was slightly below that
of the enemy, he managed to have an overwhelming
superiority at the points where he attacked.

The following were the forces of the Armee d'Orient.
It comprised : 8 French divisions (30th, 57tli, 76th,
122nd and 156th Metropolitan Divisions, and 11th, 16th
and 17th Colonial Divisions), one cavalry group (1st
and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique and Morocco Spahis), some
units not forming part of any division (2nd bis Zouaves,
58th Battalion of Chasseurs a pied, various battalions
of Senegalese, Algerians, Annamites, etc.) ; one Italian
division equal to rather more than two French divisions,
and including two squadrons of cavalry and other units ;
4 British divisions (22nd, 26th, 27th and 28th), each
with some cavalry detachments, and the 228th Garrison
Brigade ; 6 Serbian infantry divisions (Shumadia, Danube,
Morava, Yugoslav, Drina and Timok) and one cavalry
division ; 10 Greek divisions (Archipelago, Crete and Serres
of the National Defence Army, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th, 13th
and 14th of the regular army), of whom one — the 9th —
was not trained and was never sent to the front throughout
the operations, and some cavalry ; finally a few Albanian
detachments.1 In all there were 29f divisions, of which
the British, Serbian, Greek and the 5 Metropolitan French
divisions comprised 9 battalions each, the French Colonial
ones 12 each, and the Italian 18. The total strength
was as follows :

Divisions

French 8

British 4£

Italians 1

Serbs 6

Greeks 10

Total 29J 286 574,000 157,000

The Allied artillery amounted to 1,600 guns, the machine
guns were 2,680, the aeroplanes 200.

1 These had nothing to do with Essad Pasha, but were local levies
raised and trained by the French or under leaders friendly to the Allies.

talion

s Ration Strength

Rifles

87

200,000

45,000

40

135,000

32,000

18

44,000

10,000

57

95,000

30,000

84

100,000

40,000

216 THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

The total number of enemy battalions was somewhat
less than that of the Allies (282), but their effectives
were stronger — they amounted to about 700,000 men,
including 204,000 rifles, while the men who could be
regarded as combatants were 400,000. Their artillery
was weaker as regards the number of guns (1,300). Until
a few months previously they had been far stronger in
artillery, but during the summer the Germans had with-
drawn many of their batteries from the Eastern front
and sent them to France, whereas the Allied artillery
had been steadily strengthened. The enemy, however,
still retained a larger number of heavy and medium
calibre guns than we had, as well as several guns of
greater calibre and range than anything on our side.
Their machine guns were 2,530, and their aeroplanes
only 80.

In view of the Allies' inferioritv in numbers, an attack
could be delivered only by concentrating large forces
on one point, and leaving the other sectors to be held
by weak forces or by Greek troops of uncertain value.

General Franchet d'Esperey began by forming a new
Army Group, called the Central Franco-Serbian Group,
concentrated in the Moglena area. He withdrew from
the Serbian front the Danube and Shumadia divisions,
leaving the other four, reinforced by two French
divisions — the 122nd (General Topard) and the 17th
Colonial (General Pruneau) — attached to the II Serbian
Army, by 13 heavy batteries and 30 trench guns,
besides several flights of aeroplanes, engineer detach-
ments, etc. He had asked for and obtained fresh technical
material from France. The whole group was commanded
by Voivod Michich. The Commander-in-Chief had de-
cided on this plan as early as the end of June, and
had devoted the following two and a half months to the
necessary preparations. New roads and decauvilles had
to be constructed, heavy artillery transported to a height
of 1,800 metres, new aviation camps laid out, certain
units specially trained. The 17th Colonial and the
122nd Divisions did not take over their sectors -.until
the beginning of September. Although all movements

PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK 217

were carried out at night, the enemy became aware that
something was in preparation. In order to deceive
them as to the point where the attack was to be delivered,
a number of raids were carried out on various sectors.

The general distribution was as follows : The A.F.O.
(General Henrys) from the river Tomoritza in Albania
to a point between the Ccrna and Gradesnitza ; it
comprised the 30th, 76th, 57th and 15Gth French Divisions
and several minor units not forming part of any division,
between the Tomoritza and the western end of the
Cerna loop, the 35th Italian Division from that point
to a point a little to the west of Makovo, while the
line from hence to a point just beyond the east end of
the Cerna loop was held by the 11th French Colonial
Division and the 3rd Greek Division. Here began the
area of the Franco-Serb group (Voivod Michich), with
the Drina and Morava Divisions of the I Army to the
left and the Yugoslav and Timok Divisions of the II Army
to the left, reinforced by the 122nd and 17th French
Divisions, extending as far as the neighbourhood of
Nonte. To the right of the Serbs, was the area of the
I Group of Divisions (General d'Anselme) reaching to
the Vardar and comprising the 16th French Colonial
Division, the Greek Archipelago Division and for a short
time the 27th British. East of the Vardar was the British
Army (General Milne), with the XII Corps, commanded
by General Wilson, comprising the 22nd and 26th British
Divisions, the 2nd bis Zouaves Regiment and the Greek
Serres Division, west of Lake Doiran, and the XVI Corps
(General Briggs) east of the lake, comprising the 28th
British Division and Greek Cretan Division. From Lake
Butkova to the sea the sector was held by the I Greek
Corps (General Ioannou), under the orders of the British
Commander-in-Chief, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 13th
Divisions. The 4th and 14th Greek Divisions constituted
a reserve for the British Army, and the 9th was still
in training near Fiorina.

In the central sector, where the attack was to be first
launched, the distribution was as follows : The I Serbian
Army held a front of 16| km. from the river Lesnitza

218 THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

to the Sokol, with the Danube and Drina Divisions in
the first line and the Morava behind the centre. The
II Army held a front of 17 km. from the Sokol to the
river Sushitza, with the French 122nd and 17th Colonial
to the left, the Shumadia to the right, the Yugoslav
and the Timok in reserve. On the whole Franco-Serbian
front were concentrated 36,000 rifles, 2,000 light machine
guns, 81 aeroplanes and 600 guns — more than a third
of the whole artillery of the Armee d'Orient and almost
the whole of its heavy artillery, so that other sectors
were stripped to a dangerous degree. These 600 guns
comprised 8 batteries of short 120 mm., 17 of short 155 mm.,
4 of long 105 mm., 3 of long 120 mm., 5 of long 155 mm.,
48 of 75 mm. field guns, 35 of 65 mm. mountain guns,
72 trench mortars of 58 mm., and 12 of 240 mm. Thus
the Allies had, on this sector, an overwhelming artillery
superiority over the enemy.

The plan of operations provided for an initial destructive
barrage to wreck the enemy's first line defences opposite
the II Serbian Army ; then their artillery positions were
to be bombarded and reinforcements prevented from
coming up ; finally, when a breach for the II Army was
made, the artillery was to alter its direction and open
up another gap for the I Army. The duty of the infantry
was to try to capture all the positions between the Sokol
and the Vetrenik, so as to penetrate as deeply as possible
into the enemy's lines in the direction of the apex of
the triangle formed by the Cerna and the Vardar. If
this plan succeeded, the enemy's communications to
the right and the left would be threatened. In a second
phase the British XII Corps was to attack the two
Couronnes and the P ridges to the west of Lake Doiran,
while the XVI Corps was to attempt to turn the positions
to the north-east of the lake, so as to threaten the road
leading into Bulgaria by the Kosturino Pass and Strumitza.
Above all it was to be the task of the British to prevent
the enemy opposing them from sending reinforcements
to the Serbian front, just as our forces were to fulfil
a similar function on the Hill 1050 sector. Indeed, the
best troops of the whole of the enemy Army were those

THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS 219

opposite the British and the Italian sectors. In the
third phase the Italians were to attack the famous 1050,
with Prilep as their objective, while the Franco-Greek
Group to our right was to advance along the Cerna. In
the fourth phase the rest of the A.F.O. would enter the
lists, attacking the positions around Monastir, also with
Prilep as their objective. The final phase was to be an
offensive by the I Greek Corps beyond the Struma, with
a view to capturing Serres, Demir Hissar and the Rupel
road leading into Bulgaria towards Djumaya. In view
of the weakness of the effectives, it would be necessary
to transfer the scanty available reserves and the artillery
from one sector to another, and the various phases of
the action were so arranged as to give those forces time
to effect the movements contemplated — by no means an
easy task on account of the state of communications in
Macedonia.

It must be borne in mind that the objectives which
General Franchet d'Esperey originally had in view were
relatively modest, and many of his subordinate Com-
manders doubted that even these could be fully attained.
The idea, even of the most optimistic, was that the Bul-
garian first lines would probably be broken through, but that
the enemy would offer a desperate resistance on the second
and third lines, and that it would then be necessary for
the Allies to entrench themselves again in new positions
for another long period of waiting. The Commanders
of the different Allied contingents, therefore, made super-
human efforts to collect all the necessary material with the
object of reconstituting the defences on the new advanced
lines which they expected to occupy. The scarcity of
barbed wire was a source of grave anxiety for all
Commands, and Staff officers lay awake at night
wondering how on earth the troops could entrench them-
selves after having abandoned all the barbed wire in front
of their present positions.

The Serbs alternated between the most unlimited
hopes and the blackest pessimism. A great many of
them doubted the possibility of breaking through the
Vetrenik-Dobropolje line, while on the other hand the

220 THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

officers of the Serbian G.H.Q. openly declared that an
offensive which did not result in an advance beyond
Uskub would be an irreparable disaster, because the
Army would suffer such losses that, if the troops did not
re-enter Old Serbia, it would be impossible to fill up the
gaps and they would be incapable of carrying out any
more operations. General Franchet d'Esperey himself,
to judge by his statements, did expect to strike a formid-
able blow at the Bulgarians and thus render them inclined
to conclude a separate peace, to which the Allied victories
in France and the fact that neither the Germans nor
the Austro-Hungarians were now in a position to send
help to their satellites in the East, would contribute.
But even he did not dream of a complete and overwhelming
victory.

There were no important changes in the enemy
distribution on the eve of the offensive. The Com-
mander-in-Chief was still General von Scholtz, with his
G.H.Q. at Uskub. The Bulgarian Army was temporarily
commanded by General Todoroff, the effective Com-
mander-in-Chief, General Gekoff, being under treatment
in an Austrian clinique. The enemy forces opposed to
the Allies comprised three armies and part of a fourth,
plus some ten Austro-Hungarian battalions on their
extreme right, between the Tomoritza river and the
Gora Top, belonging to General Pflanzer-Baltin's force
in Albania. The area from the Gora Top to Nonte
was held by the XI German Army, commanded by
General von Steuben, with headquarters at Prilep ; this
comprised two German army corps — the LXII from
the Gora Top to the west end of the Cerna loop and
the LXI from thence to a point north-west of Stara-
vina — and the 2nd and 3rd Bulgarian Divisions. The
XLII Corps comprised the Mixed Division (from the
Gora Top to the Lake of Prespa), the 6th Division (as far
as Magarevo), and the 1st (as far as the west end of the
Cerna loop). The LXI comprised the 302nd German
Division, composed of German and Bulgarian battalions
(from the Cerna west to Makovo, i.e. opposite the Italians)
and the 4th (as far as Staravina). The 2nd Division

ENEMY FORCES 221

extended to the Dobropolje, and the 3rd to Nonte. The

I Bulgarian Army, commanded by General Nerezoff,
with headquarters at Valandovo, held the line from
Nonte to Gornji Poroj (between Lakes Doiran and
Butkova, and comprised the 5th Division (to the
Vardar), the 9th (to Lake Doiran), and two more regi-
ments taken from the 5th at the extreme left. The

II Bulgarian Army, commanded by General Lukoi'f,
whose headquarters were at Livunovo, extended to
Lake Tahinos, and comprised the 11th (as far as the
Struma east of Lake Butkova), the 7th as far as Serres,
and the 8th to Lake Tahinos. Besides these forces there
were various detachments of the IV Army, also called the
iEgean Defence Force, with its headquarters at Xanthi,
holding the line as far as Dede-Agatch — 10th and 14th
Divisions and several regiments of Militia.

The communications of the Allies were as follows :
(1) The railway from Salonica to Monastir, which operated
as far as Armenohor (Fiorina) for troops and to Sakulevo
for goods ; occasionally a train went into Monastir at
night, but the last section of the line was still under enemy
fire. (2) The Vardar railway from Salonica to a point
south of Ghevgheli. (3) The Constantinople railway from
Salonica to Lake Doiran ; the section from Doiran to
the Demir Hissar bridge (blown up by the French in
1916) was between the British and Bulgarian lines and
therefore useless. (4) The branch line between Karasuli
on N 2 and Kilindir on N 3. (5) A short branch line
built by the British during the war, from Salonica to
Guvesne on the Serres road. (6) The line from the
station of Salonica across the town to Mikra Bay. There
were many decauvilles, some of them very long, which ren-
dered most valuable services. The following were the most
important : Florina-Armensko (in the direction of Albania)
unfinished, but continued with a telepheric to the Pisoderi
Pass ; Sakulevo-Brod with an extension towards the
Italian front and another towards that of the I Serbian
Army ; Vertekop (on the Monastir railway) to the II Ser-
bian Army front ; Sarigol-Janesh, with branches towards
the British XII Corps front ; several along the Struma,

222 THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

north-west of Lake Tahinos ; one from Arakli to the
British trenches beyond the Struma, south of that lake.
Many excellent roads had been built throughout the Zone
des Armees, except in the Franco-Albanian area and in
that of the II Serbian Army, where communications
were very deficient, owing to the extremely broken
nature of the ground, but in the latter area several
new roads had been built, as we have seen, in view of
the coming offensive.

To sum up, the troops of the A.F.O. and of the I Serbian
Army were supplied by the Monastir railway as far as
Fiorina and Sakulevo, by the Fiorina- Armensko decauville
and the Pisoderi telepheric, and the Sakulevo-Brod
decauville with its extensions ; the II Serbian Army by
the railway as far as Vertekop and thence by decauville ;
the I Group of Divisions by the Vardar railway to Karasuli
and thence by road ; the British XII Corps by rail to
Sarigol and Kilindir and thence by decauville ; the
British XVI Corps, as long as it was on the Struma, by
rail to Guvesne and thence by road to the Struma, whence
a decauville reached various sectors ; the brigade on
the lower Struma, by rail to Arakli and thence by decau-
ville. When the XVI Corps was moved to the area
east of Lake Doiran, it was supplied by the same routes
as the XII Corps, while the communications to the Struma
now served the Greek I Corps. Everywhere the inadequacy
of the railways was made good by the excellent M.T.
services, and this not only for the areas where there were
no railways at all, because the motor lorries helped to
intensify transport even towards sectors served by railways,
the carrying capacity of the latter being wholly inadequate
to the immense needs of the armies. The British and
French had several thousand lorries, we had about 400,
the Greeks and Serbs were supplied by French and
British lorries.

If communications between the base at Salonica and
the various sectors of the front had been rendered fairly
satisfactory, lateral communications were extremely
difficult, and this was particularly felt during the
September offensive, when it was frequently necessary

COMMUNICATIONS 223

(though not so often as was expected beforehand) to
transfer troops and artillery from one sector to another.
The enemy's communications were the following : The
vital artery of the whole army was the Belgrade-Nish-
Uskub-Veles-Ghevgheli railway, with a branch from
Uskub to Kalkandelen (Tetovo). The Nish-Sofia-Con-
stantinople line supplied the troops further east.
From the former, several decauvilles and telepherics
branched off. The most important was the one from
Gradsko to Prilep, whence others extended to all the
chief points of that area. Prilep, in fact, was a sort of
Clapham Junction for decauvilles, with an imposing
station. From Radomir on the Sofia-Kutstendil-Guye-
shevo railway there was a very long decauville to the
Demir Hissar bridge, which supplied almost the whole
of the II Army. The enemy was richer in decauvilles
than we were, but their road system was much poorer.
As they had few lorries, and these without rubber
tyres, the iron wheels reduced the roads to an appalling
state. The Bulgarian Army made great use of the peasants'
ox-carts and of mules and small mountain ponies. On
the whole the enemy's transport was inadequate. Their
only advantage was the possibility of obtaining supplies
from Central Europe by rail. Salonica, it is true, was
nearer to the Allied front than Belgrade, Nish or Sofia
to that of the enemy, but the sea passage to Salonica
was still exposed to submarine dangers, and tonnage was
scarce, especially in the summer of 1918, on account of
the transport of American troops to France. The enemy
could, moreover, obtain reinforcements from the German
garrisons in Roumania and from the depots in Bulgaria.
What the Allies did not know was how far the Germans
could reduce their garrisons in Roumania and whether
the Bulgarians were still provided with abundant reserves.
The Bulgarian battalions at the front were much stronger
than those of the Allies, but according to information
obtained by the Allied intelligence services it appeared
that the depots were almost empty and that there were
not more than three or four Bulgarian militia regiments
available in Serbia or Bulgaria to be sent to the front.

224 THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

The conditions of the Germans in Roumania and South
Russia were even less well known. The Bulgarian moral
was, as we have seen, becoming even more depressed.
War weariness was spreading and led to increased deser-
tions, and in a few cases to mutiny. The German troops
which served to stiffen the Bulgarians had been greatly
reduced, and relations between the two were by no means
too friendly.

What was certain was that neither the French, the
British nor the Italian Commands intended to send out
another man to Macedonia, so that the C.A.A. must
count exclusively on the troops actually in the country
for the coming struggle. The Italian forces in Albania
being about equal to those of the Austrians, there was
no likelihood of reinforcements being available on
either side.

CHAPTER XV

THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

The C.A.A. had succeeded in keeping the secret of its
plan of operations up to the very last moment. The
enemy, who dominated the lines of access on many parts
of the front, could see that an offensive was in preparation,
but, according to statements of prisoners and deserters,
it had no precise idea as to the front or fronts where the
attack was to be launched. It appears that only on
September 14th they were convinced that the Serbian
sector had been selected, but then it was too late to
take precautions. The uncertainty which had reigned
until that day had left them hesitating as to which area
needed reinforcements. On the 14th, at eight o'clock,
a heavy destructive barrage was opened on the enemy
lines opposite the Franco-Serb positions. The following
morning, at 5.30, the French infantry (122nd Division)
advanced to the attack against the enemy positions on
the Dobropolje. The enemy's barrage fire began too
late, and after two hours of hard fighting the Dobropolje
fell. The French had lost 700 men, losses which were
largely due to the failure of the Serbian infantry to
co-operate. General Topard, commanding the division,
now pushed forward against Hill 1765, behind Dobropolje,
where the enemy still resisted, and in the early hours of
the afternoon even that position was captured. Further
to the left the enemy held out on the Sokol, where the
bombardment had not yet destroyed the defences. But
its capture was indispensable for the movement of the
I Serbian Army, which was to commence on the follow-
ing day ; the Serbians were so much impressed by the
difficulties, that the French had to act alone. Two
battalions of the French 148th Regiment did not succeed

15 225

226 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

in reaching the summit of the mountain, so that a third
was sent up to reinforce them. The soldiers descended
into the valley of the Matova, and, mounted on mules
belonging to the divisional train, rapidly reached the
positions of the first battalion, which renewed the
attack, and at 21 hours the Sokol fell. To the right
the 17th Colonial Division and the Serbian Shumadia
Division took the Kravitza-Vetrenik group, advancing in
broken order. The Serbians, creeping from rock to
rock, reached the Slonovo Uvo at seven o'clock. In the
afternoon they were on the eastern and western slopes of
Vetrenik and near the Shlen and the Golo Bilo, where
they were joined by the 17th Division on the left. The
17th Division deployed on the plateau of the Kravitza,
in spite of the vigorous resistance of the enemy, who,
having been reinforced, counter-attacked rapidly, but
at 15.30 hours, the highest point of the Kravitza was
occupied and the Bulgarian defenders captured or
destroyed. In the evening, at 21 hours, the whole of
the Sokol-Dobropolje-Kravitza— Vetrenik fortified system
was in the hands of the Allies, and the great breach was
made. The losses had not been very heavy, 1,700 French,
of whom 1,200 of the 17th Division and 500 of the 122nd
Division, and 200 Serbs.

It was necessary to develop this success at once so as
to widen the breach, and in the night of the 15th-16th
the I Serbian Army (General Boyovich) came into action,
while Voivod Stepanovich pushed forward the Jugoslav
and Timok Divisions, which had been hitherto kept in
reserve, beyond the lines occupied by the assaulting
divisions ; this he was able to do because General
Franchet d'Esperey had insisted that they should be
kept close at hand, although the Serbian Command
wished to leave them much further back. At 15.45
hours the Timok Division passed beyond the outposts
of the 17th Colonial Division, and as the trenches captured
corresponded roughly to the Greco-Serb frontier, the
Serbian troops made a demonstration of sympathy to
the French, whose splendid victorious effort had enabled
them to re-enter their fatherland. The same day the

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THE BREAK THROUGH 227

Yugoslav Division, after a long march, attacked on the
Koziak (Hill 1550, north of the Vctrenik), captured Hills
1810 and 1825, lost the former in consequence of a
counter-attack delivered by Bulgarian reinforcements
which had just arrived, but recaptured it definitely.
To the extreme left, the Franco-Serb Group and the
1st Group of Divisions came into action with the attack
of the 16th Colonial Division on Zborsko, where the
trenches to the west were captured, but the enemy man-
aged to hold the village. In the night of the 16th-17th,
on the left of the I Serbian Army, the advance of the
11th Colonial Division began, together with elements
of the 3rd Greek Division ; while to the right and left
of the Ccrna (east) a battalion of Senegalese occupied
Staravina, the Greeks occupied Zovik.

The next objective to be reached was the Vardar at
its confluence with the Cerna, so as to occupy not only
the whole of the triangle formed by the two rivers, but
to threaten the communications of the enemy troops
south of Monastir and in the Cerna loop, as well as on
Lake Doiran. The II Serbian Army pushed on towards
the lower valley, crossed the Cerna, with the Morava
Division (in reserve) between the two, and the 11th
Colonial Division advanced echeloned obliquely so as to
occupy as great a part as possible of the area to the
right of the Ccrna. The enemy grasped the seriousness
of the situation, and the Command of the XI German
Army gave orders to resist at all costs on the Kuchkov
Kamen (Hill 1800 north of the Kozjak). On the 17th
the attacks of the II Serbian Army on that position
and further east on the Topolatz, on the Studena Voda
(Hill 1201), developed. The enemy resistance was
desperate, and their counter-attacks were sometimes
successful, but the Serbian advance continued irresistibly,
and the enemy abandoned one position after another,
losing a great deal of material. General Russoff, Com-
mander of the 2nd Bulgarian Division, was relieved by
order of the German Command, and succeeded by General
Nikoloff, but neither this change of Command nor the
sending of some feeble reinforcements could hold up the

228 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

advance. On the same day the I Serbian Army attacked
the Mount Beshista-Pandeli-Trezia line ; on the 18th
the Danube Division captured the important bridge of
Razim Bey on the Cerna, and the entire army commenced
a vast turning movement to occupy the whole of the
right bank of the river from Selo-Monastir to Polosko.
The Bulgarians defended themselves obstinately, hoping
to save their vast depots filled with supplies, but being
unable to succeed in this object, they were forced to
fall back, burning the bridges between Polosko and
Cebren, and everything they could not remove. On
the 18th-19th the Danube Division created a bridge-
head at Razin Bey on the Cerna, which it afterwards
consolidated so as to co-operate with the French and
Greeks on the left bank. It was, however, necessary to
complete the operation by reaching the middle Vardar,
as a frontal advance by Ghevgheli offered serious diffi-
culties. The Serbian Cavalry Division, commanded by
Colonel Georgevich, which had been brought to the
immediate rear of the Serbian main lines, was now
pushed forward to Kavadar, the important road centre
a little to the south of the confluence of the
Vardar and the Cerna. This was the extreme point
reached by the Armee d'Orient in the autumn of 1915.
But the advance of the Serbians had been very rapid,
whereas the forces on their flanks were still on their old
positions, so that an apparently dangerous salient had
been created. At the same time the C.A.A. had received
information from reliable sources that some German
reinforcements had arrived on the Struma front ; in
fact, a Greek patrol had captured some prisoners of the
256th Reserve Regiment, a unit now identified for the
first time in Macedonia, and which was believed to be
in Roumania. This and other information concerning
German movements led to the belief that an attack was
being threatened against the right flank of the Armee
d'Orient, which was held only by Greek troops without
heavy artillery, and therefore regarded as the weakest
sector. For a moment the Staff of the C.A.A. "contem-
plated the possibility of suspending the offensive, and

THE ADVANCE OF THE SERBS 220

even of recalling the more advanced troops, but after
short reflection, and in consequence of the earnest
insistence of the Serbian Command, General Franchet
d'Esperey decided to stick to his original plan. The
advance thus continued ; the Morava Division occupied
Mount Chaterna, and crossed the Belasnitza torrent,
the Yugoslav Division occupied Mount Rozden and
advanced on the village of Mrzetzko ; the Timok Division,
after a lively engagement, captured the Studena Voda
and the Blatetz ; the I Group of Divisions, having over-
come the enemy's resistance at Zborsko, captured all
the positions in that area and occupied Nonte and Mount
Preslap. On the 19th, the line attained was the following :
North of Nonte, north of Mount Blatetz, north of Rozden,
Mrzetzko, course of the Belsnitza (which had been crossed
at various points), Vrbetzko, course of the Cerna, passing
by Vprchani, the bridge head of Razim Bey, then in a
south-westerly direction towards the front of the 11th
Colonial Division on the left of the Cerna. But the
Serbian Cavalry Division had pushed ahead a great deal
further towards Kavadar with such rapidity that the
C.A.A. could no longer follow its operations. On the
20th the Danube Division was deployed along the left
bank of the Cerna from Razim Bey to Godiak, the Morava
Division from Godiak to Polosko, the Yugoslav Division
on the Drachevatzko Brdo and on the heights north of
Brusani, the Timok Division to the north-west of Radina
and at the village of Bohila, while its divisional cavalry (not
to be confused with the Cavalry Division) was descending
into the vallev of Boshava. News was received that the
Cavalry Division was already in Kavadar, and had reached
Marena and Sopot ; soon afterwards it reached the
Vardar at Negotin, and cut the Uskub-Ghevgheli railway.
The I Group continued to advance, and on the 21st
detachments of the 16th Colonial, the Greek Archipelago
and 4th Divisions captured Mounts Dzena and Yarena,
the chief points of the Eastern Moglena ; there only
remained Mount Porta, obstinately held by a Bulgarian
detachment. But even this position fell soon after.
The I Group now descended from a height of 2,000 m.

230 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

to 100 m., reaching the Vardar and Demir Kapu. The
same day the river was reached by troops of the II Serbian
Army between Demir Kapu and Krivolak. The 122nd
Division and all the heavy artillery was now being trans-
ferred towards the Cerna loop, with a view to new opera-
tions in that area. The speed of the advance had shown
the diminishing combative spirit of the Bulgarians, who,
in spite of the fact that the famous second and third
lines did not exist, might have resisted on the many
extremely strong natural positions. The number of
prisoners captured was not very large, about 6,000, and
the guns a little more than 100. It therefore seemed as
though the Bulgarians were anxious to save their artillery
and keep their army in being in order to defend them-
selves on positions further north, perhaps on the frontiers
of Bulgaria.

In the morning the attack was commenced on the
right flank with the object of preventing the enemy from
sending reinforcements against the Serbs, and from
threatening the salient that the advance of the latter
had created. West and north of Lake Doiran the enemy
had concentrated some of the best Bulgarian regiments,
with three in reserve and two to the north-east of the
lake. As we have seen, the British XII Corps was
spread out to the west of the lake, comprising the British
22nd and 26th Divisions (Generals Duncan and Gay),
the Greek Serres Division (in all 27 battalions), and the
French 2nd bis Zouave Regiment, with a great deal of
artillery, including nearly all the medium and heavy
calibre guns not employed on the Serbian front. To the
north-east there was the XVI Corps, comprising the 28th
British Division (General Croker) and the Greek Cretan
Division. After a very intense bombardment, lasting
several days, the attack was launched at 5.15 hours on
both sectors. The objectives of General Wilson's attack
were the same as those of the attacks in the spring of
1917, and the enemy positions were of immense strength.
The hard rocky ground, as General Milne wrote in his
dispatch of December 1, 1918, makes the consolidation
of newly won positions very difficult, and gives over-

ANGLO-GREEK ATTACK 231

whelming advantage to the defender in trenches that have
been the work of three years, while deep cut ravines hold
up progress and afford every opportunity for enfilading fire.

Soon after six o'clock, the Greeks on the right had stormed
the enemy positions up to Doiran Hill, and had taken
many prisoners, while on the left the 66th Brigade
advanced on P ridge " with consummate self-sacrifice
and gallantry." The enemy had here three strong lines
of defence, teeming with concrete machine-gun emplace-
ments, whence they could mow down the advancing
columns. After very severe fighting the 12th Battalion,
Cheshire Regiment, and the 9th South Lancashire, sup-
ported by the 8th King's Shropshire Light Infantry,
reached the third line. But the devastating machine-gun
fire and the explosion of a mine, which held them up for
a little, made it impossible for the attacking force to
hold their positions and obliged them to fall back on
their lines of departure. The brigade lost 65 per cent,
of its effectives, including two battalion commanders,
Lieutenant-Colonel Clegg Hill and Lieutenant-Colonel
Bishop, who fell at the head of their troops. In the
centre British and Greek forces attacked the positions
between the Grand Couronne and the P ridge, and,
in spite of the enemy's desperate resistance and machine-
gun fire, penetrated about one mile, and reached the
lower slopes of the Grand Couronne. But the failure of
the attack on the P ridge made it impossible for
them to retain their ground, and they were forced to
fall back, " the last to leave being the survivors of the
7th Battalion, South Wales Borderers — 19 unwounded
men and one wounded officer."

To the north-east of the lake the Cretan Division and
troops of the 28th Division had advanced across the plain
between the lake and the Beles range, and at dawn
attacked the enemy positions ; the outpost lines were
carried, and the main lines penetrated at two points, but
the ground gained could not be maintained, and General
Milne authorized the force to fall back on the railway.

In order to assist the progress of the Serbs and to pre-
vent the enemy on the Doiran front from sending

232 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

reserves against them, it was decided to renew the attack
the next day. General Wilson's force had been strength-
ened by the 14th Greek Division sent up from the
training camp at Naresh to relieve the Serres Division,
which had suffered heavily.

On the 19th, at five o'clock, after an all-night bom-
bardment, Scottish and Greek troops again attacked the
Bulgarian positions on the lower slopes of the Grand
Couronne, and captured a good deal of ground, in spite
of the desperate resistance and heavy machine-gun fire
of the enemy. But the 65th Brigade, which had come
up from an influenza observation camp in the night to
relieve the 6Gth, failed in its gallant attack on the P
ridge. The troops at the centre and on the right thus
found their left exposed, and were forced to fall back,
and part of the ground gained on the previous day had
also to be abandoned. The retreat was covered by the
12th Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the
8th Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the 11th Scottish Rifles,
who suffered severe casualties, including all their Com-
manding Officers killed or wounded. By midday General
Milne decided to consolidate the ground won, which
included the Petit Couronne, the Teton Hill, and Doiran
town ; but the P ridge and the Grand Couronne
still held out.

The total losses of the British had been about 3,900,
and of the Greeks 2,300. The Bulgarians, too, had lost
heavily — some 4,600 men, including 1,200 prisoners. It
was impossible to renew the attack owing to the greatly
reduced strength of the British, whose battalions, even
before the attack, were only about 400 men each, and
now the slopes of the Grand Couronne and the P
ridges were covered with British dead. Although the
Bulgarians had been almost without food for four days
as the British barrage had prevented the arrival of supplies,
they still occupied their terrible positions, and the whole
thing seemed a useless tragedy in spite of the great
heroism shown. " Rather than miss the opportunity
for which they had waited three years, officers and men
remained in the ranks till often they dropped from sheer

BULGARIAN RETREAT FROM DOIRAN 233

exhaustion," wrote General Milne in his report — but
nothing had been gained. The real objective, however, had
been achieved : not a single Bulgarian soldier had been
able to leave this sector to help in resisting the Serbian
advance.

It was at this moment that the defeat of the enemv

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began to take shape. A great part of the Vardar-Cerna
triangle was lost, the few troops remaining between
Demir Kapu and Ghevgheli had now to fall back beyond
the Vardar in a north-easterly direction, and this fact
constituted a menace even for the troops round Lake
Doiran, to whom no other line of supply was left but
the Doiran-Kosturino-Strumitza road. On the 21st
signs that a retreat was beginning were noted on the
British front. Everywhere depots were observed to be
in flames, and munitions dumps exploding. General
Milne, with his XII Corps strengthened by the
14th Greek Division, renewed the offensive. The
9th Bulgarian Division having offered but slight resist-
ance, the formidable defences collapsed without much
effort, and the whole II Bulgarian Army fell back,
seeking safety over the narrow Kosturino Pass. While
the British infantry and cavalry pursued them, flights
of aeroplanes, flying only a few metres from the ground,
bombarded the Bulgarians and shot down men with
machine guns along the Strumitza road, encumbered
with vehicles, artillery, etc., by now in indescribable dis-
order. The spectacle offered by that road was one of
appalling confusion and terror. From all sides fires
broke out ; guns were abandoned in gullies, rifles, equip-
ment, baggage were thrown away, and the demoralized
armv fled towards its homeland.

On the 21st the A.F.O. came into action. The enemy
troops on this sector were less threatened than on the
other sectors, because, if they had lost the Prilep-Gradsko
road, they still retained that over the Babuna Pass
between Prilep and Veles, which could be easily defended,
and the Kichevo— Kalkandelen road. But they were now
threatened in another quarter. Day by day the communi-
cations between the XI German Army and Bulgaria were

234 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

becoming more difficult, and it could be foreseen that
at any moment they might be cut altogether, and
then that Army would have had no other alternative
but to retreat across Albania to reach the Herzegovina and
Dalmatia. It was the fate of the Serbian Army in 1915
which seemed about to be repeated. On that day detach-
ments of the 11th Colonial Division (General Farret)
and the 3rd Greek Division (General Tricoupis) crossed
the Cerna (east) between Selo-Monastir and Cebren, and
advanced in the direction of Prilep. General Henrys,
commanding the A.F.O., now ordered the advance of his
whole army, beginning with an attack launched by the
Italian Expeditionary Force.

The duties assigned to the latter were : 1st, to carry
out, during the Franco-Serbian offensive, an intensive
demonstrative action, to prevent the enemy in front of
it from withdrawing troops to reinforce the centre (a
duty similar to that of the British) ; 2nd, the Franco-
Serbian attack having been launched, the I.E.F. was to
continue to act demonstratively and to resist any counter-
attack which might be attempted by the enemy,
in fact, to provoke such counter-attacks so as to make
the enemy believe that we ourselves intended to attack
immediately, and to make of our sector the pivot of an
enveloping movement on the part of the Serbs ; 3rd,
as soon as this movement had produced its effect on the
right flank of the 302nd German Division (the one opposite
to us) and on the lines of communication in the Cerna
loop, to attack and pursue the enemy in the direction
of Prilep, their chief centre of supplies west of the Vardar
and headquarters of the XI German Army.

The first and second of these tasks were carried out
in the period from the 14th to the 21st of September,
and the Italian troops nailed down the enemy on its front
by means of bombardments and repeated local attacks
of so fierce a character as not only to prevent them from
sending any help against the Franco-Serbs, but to make
them believe that the attack in the centre was to be
followed immediately by one on our area. In order to
forestall this supposed intention, they attacked vigorously,

ITALIAN ATTACK 2.35

so much so, that the object desired by the Commander
in-Chief was more than achieved, but at the cost of heavy
losses on our side. Our defences were seriously wrecked
by the German and Bulgarian artillery, but the Italian
infantry resisted admirably under this terrific fire, and
the enemy attacks were all repulsed. On September
22nd the threat of an enveloping movement in the direction
of the Cerna (east) began to be perceived by the enemy,
and General Mombelli ordered the attack. At 17.30 hours
our infantry sprang out of the trenches, where they had
been held down for two years, unable to advance a step ;
an hour later they were beyond the enemy's first lines, and
the whole mighty defensive system collapsed. The terrible
Hill 1050, which had been so powerfully fortified, which
we had studied with such minute care and attention
as though it were a zone of great archaeological interest,
and whose crest we had never been able to hold, was finally
in our hands. Those cruel eyes of the enemy's observa-
tion posts on the topmost ridge, whose pitiless glance
had inflicted death or wounds to so many gallant soldiers,
were now closed for ever.

The defences proved even stronger than we had suspected.
Immense caverns there were, cut out of the solid rock on
the northern slopes of the hill, which our shells had never
been able to reach, illuminated by electricity and supplied
with special appliances, by means of which the various
detachments were warned of every different kind of bom-
bardment, so that each man knew at once where to take
refuge — nothing, in fact, had been neglected to make of
this mountain an impregnable fortress.

In this first attack we took few prisoners, about 150,
because the broken nature of the ground enabled the
bulk of the enemy forces to escape us, as had happened
to the Franco-Serbians for the same reasons on the first
days. The Lucca Light Cavalry and the detachments of
machine gunners on motor lorries, which General Mombelli
had kept ready near the front, dashed forward in pursuit
of the enemy and had some heavy engagements at
Kanatlarci. The whole division then advanced. On
the morning of the 22nd the battalions were 10 km.

236 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

beyond the enemy lines, and were pursuing the Bul-
garian rearguard. The Command also pushed forward
its G.H.Q., and Tepavci was abandoned for good. In
the Monastir-Prilep plain, behind Hill 1050, there were
several heights on which the enemy might have made
a stand, but as on the Serbian front, there were no second
lines, except a few lines of insignificant wire entangle-
ments and some isolated trenches. The Bulgarians offered
a certain resistance on the heights of Cepik (Hill 664),
Kalabak (Hill 1772), and Topolchani (Hill 603), on both
sides of the Monastir-Prilep road, while our troops occu-
pied the edge of these same heights. From that point
the advance on Prilep would have been easy, but at 14
hours on the 23rd our Command received orders from
the G.Q.G. to let Prilep be occupied by the 11th Colonial
Division on our right, and to advance on Krushevo.
The reason for this change of programme was to prevent
the enemy troops in the Monastir area from retreating
towards Kichevo, whence a road leads across the moun-
tains to Gostivar and Kalkandelen, the terminus of the
railway from Uskub. This task was really important,
because its object was to prevent numerous Bulgarian
regiments from reaching Uskub and to facilitate the
action of the Franco-Serb offensive towards that very im-
portant railway and road junction, the only point through
which the remains of the XI German Army could hope
to rejoin the rest of the enemy troops. But it cannot be
denied that this change of programme was a disappoint-
ment for our officers and men. Prilep was a well-known
objective, and had been much talked about as it was
the headquarters of the Army Command, and was pro-
vided with depots and shelters ; it had to be occupied
by someone, and its occupation by our troops would have
been a slight moral and material satisfaction for the 35th
Division such as it was not accustomed to. The matter
was really of small importance, but it would have pleased
us had it been known that that important centre had
been first occupied by the Italians. The fact that French
troops were sent there instead of ours was not, perhaps,
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ROUNDING UP THE BULGARS 237

of the C.A.A., but it appeared in that light, all the more
so as the same thing had happened when we were acting
in liaison with the French in the Monastir operations,
and it would have been better to avoid even the appearance
of unfriendliness.

But the Division at once set to work to execute this
new plan, and after effecting a conversion of 90 degrees
in a westerly direction, it set forth on an exhausting march,
after the long and arduous fighting advance of the previous
days. The troops, however, gave no signs of fatigue,
and reached the line between Cepik and the bridge over
the Belavitza. On the 24th our right wing (Sicilia
Brigade with 6 mountain batteries), which was advancing
towards Zapolchani, was temporarily held up by the
enemy artillery, firing from the heights of Novo Selani,
while the centre and the left (Cagliari Brigade with 2
mountain batteries, 9 French field batteries, 1 heavy
French battery, and 2 squadrons of the Lucca cavalry)
reached the Vodiani-Krivogastani line, and found itself
confronted by the enemy infantry in strong positions
on the edge of the heights of Krushevo (Hill 1176),
and of the Draghisetz (Hills 1150 and 1291), and in
the gorge of the Cerna, near the Buchin bridge and
Vodiani. The Ivrea Brigade, which was in reserve,
followed towards the left.

On the 25th the Sicilia Brigade, strengthened by
detachments of the 11th French Colonial Division, which
had just come up, reached the heights of Godivla, north-
east of Krushevo ; the centre halted on the edge of the
heights of Krushevo, rising precipitously 550 m. above
the plain, while the left began the attack on Buchin,
where it became engaged in a vigorous combat. On
the 26th the whole Division, having overcome the enemy
resistance, crossed the great barrier of the Baba Planina
and Draghisetz mountains, its right pushed forward to
the foot of Mount Cesma, the centre at Krushevo and
Ostreltze, and its left along the line Sveta-Hill 1150-
Hill 1291 of the Draghisetz. Thus the Bulgarians, in
retiring from the Monastir area, could no longer fall back
on Prilep, but were forced to try to reach the Kichevo-

238 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

Kalkandelen gorge, which was becoming more crowded
every hour. The same evening we pushed a strong column
westward from Krushevo in the direction of Karaul
Kruska and Sop, while another, which had also started
from Krushevo, advanced through Ostreltze towards
Tzer.

On the 27th, our positions were as follows. The right
wing occupied the greater part of Mount Cesma, and,
together with the French troops, drove back the enemy
from the Harilovo-Diviak area. The main column of
the centre, having advanced beyond Pustareka, had
reached Karaul Kruska, and the flanking column on the
left, which, after having passed through Kochista, reached
the neighbourhood of Tzer ; the left, after occupying
Priblitzi, pushed forward through Dolentzi to Sop, along
the Monastir-Kichevo road. On the 28th, the right
column completed the occupation of Mount Cesma, and
advanced towards the Stramol and Baba mountains, north-
east of Sop ; the principal column and the centre, after
overcoming the enemy's vigorous resistance, occupied a
line of heights 3 km. to the east of that village, while its
left flanking column co-operated in the action from
Tzer. The left reached Hill 932 to the south of Sop,
in support of the action of the centre.

The Bulgarians here were in very strong positions.
With numerous forces of infantry, a great many machine
guns, and several field and heavy batteries withdrawn
from the Monastir front, they had entrenched themselves
on formidable lines in the Sop gorge, where they were
prepared to offer a desperate resistance. The following
day the Sicilia Brigade succeeded in driving the enemy
from Mounts Stramol and Baba, and after occupying
these positions pushed on towards Plasnitza to co-operate
with the 11th Colonial Division, which was attacking
the enemy entrenched on the heights of Izitza to the
north of the Yelika valley. In the centre our battalions
renewed the attack on Sop from the south-east and east
so as to pin down the enemy, while those of the right
column executed a turning movement from Karaul Kruska
towards the north-east to cut off their retreat. The

OPERATIONS OF THE A.F.O. 239

fighting during those days was very fierce, and cost us
500 casualties. The Bulgars had been strengthened on
the night of the 28th-29th by two more regiments and
several machine-gun companies, which had fallen back
from Monastir, but had been recalled. The behaviour of
our troops in all these very stiff engagements against
an enemy superior in numbers, in dominating positions,
and supplied with great abundance of artillery of all
calibres and machine-guns, had been admirable, and
it must be remembered that they were exhausted by the
long and tiring marches over very rough country. If
the Serbs had advanced further, they had, however,
after the first two days found an enemy that resisted
far less vigorously than was the case in our sector.
Furthermore, the enemy opposed to us was directly under
German Command — Army Command, Corps Command,
and partly Divisional Command — and was stiffened by
the presence of several German detachments.

The French divisions of the A.F.O. (30th, 57th, 76th,
156th) came into action almost at the same moment as
the Italians. General Henrys wished to cut off the enemy's
retreat by the Kichevo-Kalkandelen road, the only one
which still remained open, but in the sector of Hill 1248
the Bulgarians still resisted tenaciously and held up the
advance. To the west, the 302nd German Division had
begun to fall back, the 6th and 1st Bulgarian Divisions
were forced to follow suit, and this enabled the French to
deploy along the Dihovo-Dragarina line to the north-west
of Monastir, finally liberating that unfortunate city from
a bombardment that had lasted nearly two years. On
the 23rd the French occupied Berantzi and Topolchani,
and on the evening of that day, while the Italians were ad-
vancing towards Krushevo to the north-west, they reached
the line Kukurechani-Novo Selani-Prilep, cutting across
the line of our advance, and the French cavalry entered

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Prilep, followed on the 24th by the 11th Colonial Division.
On the 25th the Bulgars still held out to the west of
Monastir, and with the help of three regiments, which
had retired but had been subsequently recalled, repulsed
the attacks of the 76th Division ; the 156th was at

240 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

Stari Srptzi, and beyond the sector occupied by the
35th, the 3rd Greek Division (attached to the 11th Colonial)
was deployed across the Prilep-Brod road.1 It was then
suspected by the C.A.A. that a new defensive plan had
been evolved by the enemy — and its existence has been
subsequently confirmed by Marshal von Hindenburg's
Memoirs — to withdraw the centre and right, making a
pivot of the Doiran sector, and resisting at Uskub, until
the arrival of the Bulgarians retreating from the Monastir
area, via Kichevo-Kalkandelen, and of the reinforce-
ments expected from Germany and Austria. The
Bulgarians, as we have seen, tried to delay the advance
of the French and Italians, calling back regiments that
had begun to retire but this decision proved fatal.
The troops that had withdrawn on the 25th found their
line of retreat cut to the north by Allied detachments.
On the same day the 30th Division reached Prevaletz
(Hill 912), on the road from Monastir to Resna, and on
the 26th it reached the latter place ; the 76th crossed
the Semnitza river, and the 156th occupied Hill 1493
on the Drvenik, to the south of Vodiani. In the mean-
while General Franchet d'Esperey had created a new
unit, called the Groupement Tranie, composed of the
42nd and 44th Regiments of the 11th Colonial Division,
the 58th Battalion of Chasseurs a pied, the Cavalry
Brigade, a group of 75 mm. batteries and one of 65 mm.,
with orders to push on towards Uskub. Later the 76th
Division rapidly left the Babuna road from Prilep towards
Veles and Uskub, and along the heights to the north-west
of it. On the 26th the line held by the A.F.O. (the 35th
Division included) was the following : Resna-Sveti Petar-
Murgas-west of Krushevo-Belushin-Yakrenovo-Ropotovo
(on the Prilep-Kichevo road). On the 28th, with the
occupation of Ochrida by the 57th, the line passed by
Hill 975, Demir Hissar (on the Monastir-Kichevo road),
and Brod on the Prilep-Kichevo road. The French
reached Trebuniste, to the north of Ochrida on the 29th,
and advancing along the west shore of the lake, cut the

1 Brod to the north of Monastir, not to be confused with the other Brod
in the Cerna loop.

THE PURSUIT CONTINUED 241

Elbasan-Ochrida road at Lin, and thus the last line of
escape across Albania which remained to the XI German
Army was closed.

The I Serbian Army pushed on down Cerna valley to the
west of the river, and advanced in a north-westerly direction,
reaching the Leniste-Pletvar-Troyatzi-Toplitza-Drenovo
(to the north-west of the Prilep-Gradsko road) line. Along
this road the Serbs captured a great deal of booty and
many vehicles. The Bulgarians, urged by the German
Command, made every effort to defend Gradsko, a vital
centre of their communications, full of large military
depots, against the Franco-Serbs (Yugoslav Division and
17th Colonial Division), but on the 23rd, after the 11th
Colonial Division had captured the monastery and the
village of Chichevo, Gradsko fell into the hands of the
Serbs. Once Gradsko was lost, the enemy tried to defend
Veles, but the Tranie Group was, as we have seen, on
the Babuna road, and on the same day the Serbian Army
reached the same road beyond Izvor. On the 25th the
Serbian cavalry entered Istip, and on the 26th the II Army,
after a fairly brisk engagement, occupied Veles, and
pushed on towards the north-west. Immediately after-
wards the Serbian cavalry reached Kochana, Grlena and
Tzarevo Selo, this latter an important point whence the
upper valley of the Struma, which is in Bulgaria, could
be menaced. The cavalry was followed by the infantry,
conveyed in British and French lorries, and entered
Kochana. On the 29th the French cavalry, commanded
by General Jouinot-Gambetta, to which a part of the
Serbian Cavalry was attached, after a forced march,
entered Uskub, the chief city of Northern Macedonia,
and erstwhile German G.H.Q. in the Balkans, a junction of
four railways and of numerous roads. Thus the enemy's
hope of resisting, by effecting a junction between the
detachments of the XI German Army, arriving from
Kalkandelen (which, according to Von Hindenburg, was
in excellent condition), and the Austrian and German
reinforcements from the north, was rendered vain. Soon
afterwards the remainder of the Tranie Group arrived,
while the Serbian Yugoslav and Timok Divisions pushed

16

242 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

eastwards towards the Bulgarian frontier. The Bulgarians
still held out on the Tzrni Kamen and in the Tzarevo
Selo, Bogdanovatz, and Chavka area, and protected
the retreat of the remnants of the I Army towards
Djumaya. The Yugoslav Division and the cavalry
occupied Tzar Vrh (Hill 2104), Tzrkvenetz, and Ostretz,
and spread out to Tzarevo Selo, thus dominating the
approaches to Kustendil. Contemporaneously with these
operations, the I Group of Divisions (from which the
27th British Division had been detached to rejoin the
rest of the British Army) had cleaned up the whole of
the area to the north-west of Ghevgheli and to the north-
east of the Vardar on the Gradetz mountains. On the
29th it occupied Radovista, and effected a junction with
the Serbs.

The British now continued their pursuit of the enemy
in their desperate retreat towards Strumitza, and soon
occupied the whole of the area to the west and north of
Lake Doiran. On the 25th the troops of the XVI Corps
advanced to the right and left of the Doiran-Strumitza
road, and penetrated into Bulgaria by the Kosturino
pass ; on the 26th they occupied Strumitza itself.1 These
were the first Allied detachments to penetrate into enemy
territory in the Balkans ; actually the first to enter were
the Derbyshire Yeomanry. The XII Corps had, in the
meanwhile, pushed towards the right of the XVIth, and
on the 25th commenced the attack on the Beles to the
east and the right. On the same day General Milne
transferred his G.H.Q. from Salonica to Janesh in order
to be nearer the scene of operations. On the 26th,
detachments of the British 22nd and 20th Divisions and
the Cretan Division, and of the 2nd bis Zouaves regiment
attacked the Bulgarians entrenched on the Beles, that
vast mountain wall from 1,100 m. to 1,600 m. high,
which for two years has seemed an absolutely impregnable
barrier. The enemy offered but slight resistance, because
they were already beaten, and the heights were occupied

1 It must be remembered that Strumitza station is in Serbian territory,
whereas the town was then in Bulgaria. Now the town too has been
assigned to Serbia.

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THE ENEMY CUT IN TWO 243

one after the other. On the 28th a regiment of the
Cretan Division pushed along the ridge from west to
east, another, together with the British 228th Brigade,
advanced along the valley below towards Lake Butkova,
and a third column of the XVI Corps followed the parallel
valley to the north, down the course of the River Strumitza.
The object of this triple advance was to reach the Struma
towards the Rupel and Kresna gorges, and thus cut off
the retreat of the forces of the II Army, which had
remained until then on the lower Struma.

Thus the enemy armies were cut in two. The rapid
advance of the French and Serbs had driven a deep
wedge in between the XI German Army and the rest of
the hostile forces. The XI Army was partly on the
mountains to the north of the Monastir-Prilep plain,
and partly in the Kalkandelen area ; the 2nd, 4th, 5th,
9th, and 13th Divisions of the I Bulgarian Army were
echeloned between the Uskub-Kumanovo road and the
valley of the Strumitza, but they had lost a large part
of their artillery ; the II Army was still on the lower
Struma, and its retreat towards Bulgaria was seriously
threatened by the Anglo-Greek advance. Bulgaria was
invaded by the British in the Strumitza Valley, the
Serbians were watching on the Bulgarian-Macedonian
frontier between Tzarevo Selo and Pehtzevo, ready to
descend on the territory of the hated enemy and take
vengeance for their past sufferings. The I Greek Corps,
which until then had remained inactive, was now ready
to cross the valley of the Struma and launch an attack
on Serres and Demir Hissar.

General Mombelli was making his preparations for a
general attack on Sop, where large Bulgarian forces were
concentrated. The attack was to take place on the
morning of the 30th in order to compel the enemy to
surrender. The German Commands of the XI Army, of
the LXI and LXII Corps, and of the 302nd Division, as
well as the artillery, machine-gun companies and German
specialist detachments, realizing that the Bulgarian defeat
was now inevitable, fled in the night, after having cut
all the telegraph and telephone wires, so that for several

244 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

days the Bulgarian Army had no communication with
the rest of the army or with their country. It had to
improvise new Commands and Staffs for its units, which
had been abandoned by their erstwhile omnipotent
Allies. The attack on Sop was to have been launched
from the north and north-east by the Sicilia Brigade, and
contemporaneously from the south and south-west by the
Ivrea and Cagliari Brigades, but at 5.30 General Mombelli
received a wireless message announcing the conclusion
of the Armistice, which was to come into force on that
very day. The attack was therefore suspended, and the
Bulgarian Commander invited to surrender. But as the
communications with their G.H.Q. and with the Sofia
Government had been cut, he refused at first to believe
the news, and it took two days of discussion, conducted
on the Italian side by General Freri, Commander of the
Cagliari Brigade, to convince the Bulgarians, and it was
only on October 3rd that the surrender took place. The
capitulation was unconditional, the officers alone being
allowed to retain their swords and revolvers. The
prisoners comprised a Divisional Commander, two Briga-
diers, 16 field officers, 224 junior officers, and 7,727
men ; 8 guns and 70 machine guns, and a large quantity
of other booty were captured. At the same time, the rest
of the troops who had been fighting against us on the
Stramol and Baba mountains — over 10,000 men and
many batteries — surrendered to the 11th French Colonial
Division near Kichevo, because it was easier of access.
It was thus against a total of nearly 18,000 men with a
large number of batteries and machine guns that the
troops of the 35th Division, inferior in numbers and
material, had fought for three days and won. Except
for the fighting of the British at Lake Doiran, it had been
the bitterest struggle of the great battle of the Balkans.
For several days the Bulgarians had realized that they
had lost the war. After the fall of Gradsko, which
Marshal von Hindenburg attributes to " pusillanimity or
worse," there was no longer any hope, because the vital
centre of communications had been cut. The great bulk
of the Bulgarian soldiers had had enough of fighting,

THE BULGARIAN COLLAPSE 245

and desertions en masse from the divisions at the centre
towards the interior began. The German Command, not
having succeeded, in spite of the reserves which had been
drawn from the right and the left, in saving Gradsko,
decided to retreat. As Marshal von Hindcnburg rightly
observes, the great natural defensive positions in the
Balkan peninsula extend one behind the other, so that
an army which retires in good order has always fresh
lines on which to fall back ; the Bulgarian generals,
however, were of the opinion that the army could hold
out only on condition that it remained where it was,
but that it would go to pieces if the order for a general
retreat were given. In fact, as soon as the withdrawal
of the troops on the Doiran sector began, it soon degener-
ated into a rout. According to the German Field Marshal,
all the Staffs failed in their duty, especially those of the
I Bulgarian Army. The only man who did not lose his
head was the German Commander-in-Chief, General
von Scholtz. The Bulgarian Government made desperate
appeals for help to Germany and Austria, but to these
" S.O.S. " signals the Central Powers were no longer in
a position to reply adequately. The armies of Germany
had been seriously beaten in France, and were falling
back, fighting a desperate and hopeless battle ; the
Austrians were pinned down on the Piave and in the
Seven Communes in front of the Italian Army, which
was preparing to launch the final attack. A few divisions
collected here and there were hurried forward ; the
Alpen Corps from France, two infantry divisions from
the Crimea, and some other units. Then there was in
Roumania a fairly large army, although not in a fit
condition to go into the first line. A mixed brigade
destined for the Caucasus, and already half-way across
the Black Sea, was recalled by wireless, landed at Varna
and Constanza, and hurried off to Macedonia. The German
troops who arrived in Sofia found everything quiet, but
parties of Bulgarian soldiers were constantly pouring in,
having abandoned the front lines. They did not molest
their officers, nor oblige them to desert if they wished to
remain ; they were even ready to help the Germans

246 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

who were going towards the front ; but they were fed
up and wished to return to their fields and their families.
They had ceased to take any further interest in Mace-
donia. Even an Army Commander telegraphed to the
Tzar insisting that an armistice should be asked for, but
received the reply : " Go and get killed in your present
lines." The assurances given by the Imperial Chancellor
to the Reichstag that help for Bulgaria had been provided
for, and that powerful reinforcements were being hurried
up, no longer deceived anybody.

On September 26th a Bulgarian officer with a white
flag appeared before the British lines ; General Milne
sent him to General Franchet d'Esperey, who, however,
replied that he could only deal with parlementaires pro-
vided with proper credentials. The Bulgarian Govern-
ment, in the meanwhile, was trying, through Mr. Murphy,
the American Charge d'Affaires in Sofia, to obtain the
intervention of that Government, which was not in a
state of war with Bulgaria. Mr. Murphy, in fact, had
tried to intervene, and asked permission to accompany
the plenipotentiaries which the Sofia Government decided
to send to Salonica, but the C.A.A. did not see fit to adhere
to this request. The useful part played by Mr. Murphy
with his propaganda in Bulgaria in favour of a separate
peace with the Entente should not be forgotten, but it
appears that he tried, without success, to obtain favourable
armistice conditions for the Bulgarians. In the meanwhile
General Franchet d'Esperey had telegraphed to Paris,
asking for authority to negotiate an armistice. The
authorization arrived on the 27th, together with instruc-
tions as to the terms of the agreement to be negotiated.
On the 28th, the official Bulgarian delegation reached the
British front. It was composed of M. Liapcheff, Finance
Minister, General Lukoff, Commander of the II Army,
and the diplomat, M. Radeff, with two A.D.C.'s. Soon
afterwards a huge German Staff car, adorned with the
Royal arms of Bulgaria, flashed down the Janesh road
and reached Salonica, conveying the first enemy pleni-
potentiaries coming to sue for peace with the JEntente,
After a first meeting with General Franchet d'Esperey,

CRASHED ITALIAN AEROPLANE.

COMMUNICATION TRENCHES IN THE MEGLENTZI VALLEY.

To face p. 246.

ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS 247

the delegates withdrew to their lodgings, and the official
meetings began on the morning of the 29th, at the house
of the Commander-in-Chief. The negotiations were short
and business-like, but the Bulgarians tried to turn to
account the fact that their country had never been very
enthusiastic about the war, and had no particular sym-
pathy for the Germans, nor animosity against the Allies.
M. Liapcheff even went so far as to suggest that Bulgaria
had now become a neutral State, and might almost be
considered an ally. But General Franchet d'Esperey
curtly replied : " You are defeated, and you must submit
to the Allies' terms. Bulgaria is not a neutral country,
but a military zone, and it is inadmissible that we should
not pass through it." x

The Bulgarian delegates, duly authorized by their
Government, accepted all the conditions imposed on
them by the Armistice. They only raised some difficulties
over the occupation of Bulgarian territory by the Serbs
and Greeks (one of the secret clauses of the Armistice
gave the Allies the right to occupy certain areas in the
interior of Bulgaria), but General Franchet d'Esperey
waived aside these objections, saying that the Entente
was a group of peoples, great and small, but all free,
whereas in the enemy Alliance Germany was the mistress
and the others were her vassals. Therefore the Greeks
and Serbs should be able to take part in the occupation of
Bulgaria like the other Allies. However, the Prince Regent
of Serbia, having heard that some of his Generals were
insisting on being allowed to occupy Bulgarian territory,
in order to satisfy their national pride and avenge the
persecutions inflicted on Serbia by the Bulgarians,
telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief that he preferred
to waive this right in order not to embitter relations
between Serbia and Bulgaria still more ; he wished, on
the contrary, to contribute to the pacification of the
Balkans. M. Venizelos made a similar pronouncement.
The decision was certainly a wise one ; reprisals and
acts of revenge were thus avoided, for the Serbs and
Greeks, if they had been in occupation of the land of

1 Fhotiades, op. tit.

Mfl THE BATTLE OF THE BALKAN'S

the hated enemy, would not have been able to restrain
themselv-

The Armistice prodded : —

(1) The immediate evacuation of the territories still
occupied by the Bulgarians in Serbian and
Greek Macedonia ;

2 1 The immediate demobilization of the whole Bul-
garian Army, except 3 infantry divisions and 4
cavalrv regiments for the defence of the Turkish
frontier and the Dobrugia, and for guarding the
railway? ;

' The arms and other material of the demobilized
units to be stored in places to be subsequently
determined, under Allied control ;

-? All material of the TV Greek Army Corps (which
had surrendered to Germany), and was still in
Bulgaria, to be handed over to Greece ;

(5) The Bulgarian troops to the west of the meridian

of L'skub were to surrender as prisoners of
war :

(6) The Allies had the right to use all Bulgarian

prisoners of war until peace was signed, but
Bulgaria must hand over to the Allied authorities
all Allied prisoners and deported civilians without
reciprocity ;

" | The troops and diplomatic and consular repre-
ntatives of Germany and Austria must leave
Bulgaria within four weeks.1

The secret clauses authorized the Allies to make use
of the railways, roads, and other means of communica-
tion and transport in Bulgaria for the movement of
their troops and to occupy certain strategic points. Sofia
was not to be occupied save in exceptional circumstanc

-pendix.
1 The capital was, however, actually occupied.

THE CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE 249

At 22.30 hours on September 29th the Armistice was
concluded. It was signed by General Franchet d'Esperey
for the Allies and by the Finance Minister, Liapcheff,
and General Lukoff for Bulgaria ; it came into force on
September 30th at noon.

On September 30th the number of prisoners captured
by the Allies was not very great, about 15,000 to 20,000
(those opposite the 35th Division did not surrender, as
we know, until a few days later). But the Bulgarians
had lost about one-third of their artillery ; 350 guns had
been captured, and many others, which had been aban-
doned or hidden in the woods and gullies, were found
subsequently, and the ammunition dumps had been
blown up.

The causes of the Allied victory may be summed up
as follows :

1. The great military qualities of General Franchet
d'Esperey should be recognized ; his able dispositions,
based partly on the old plan of Voivod Michich, after-
wards elaborated by General Guillaumat, consisted in
the concentration in the Moglena sector of a mobile reserve
for attack, created even at the cost of withdrawing troops
from other areas and leaving them weaklv defended.
The Moglena sector had been chosen because, as it pre-
sented the greatest natural difficulties, the Bulgarians had
taken less trouble over its artificial defences. In view
of the great scarcity of Allied reserves, those that were
available had to be transported from one area to the
other according to necessity. This was done in the case
of the 122nd French Division and the heavy- artillery :
as soon as a breach had been made they were transferred
to the sector of the A.F.O., but as a matter of fact there
was no need of the 122nd Division, because the A.F.O.
was able to act on its own account ; the division there-
fore went into army reserve.

2. The admirable dash and excellent discipline and
staying power of all the Allied contingents over extremely
difficult ground and under a semi-tropical sun, until the
rainv season began, when the whole countrv became a
muddy swamp. To the French troops, above all, was

250 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

due the breach in the enemy front on September 15th ;
the British distinguished themselves for the magnificent
tenacity in their attack on the terrible positions of the
Lake Doiran area, an attack, which if it did not succeed,
yet contributed very materially, according to the Bul-
garians themselves, to the victory ; our own troops had
the great merit first of having held on for two years on
the theoretically untenable sector of Hill 1050, and
afterwards of having developed the rapid pursuit of the
enemy with an extremely arduous battle at the end,
when the Bulgarians were outflanked at Sop, a battle,
the continuation of which, was interrupted at the last
moment by the Armistice. The Serbians played a valiant
part in the attack at the centre, but the outstanding
feature of their action was their magnificent and fantastic
march towards the Fatherland, regardless of the impervious
mountain ranges, extending one behind the other across
the line of advance, almost without food, with few muni-
tions and practically no equipment. Inspired by patriotic
enthusiasm which was a religious faith, they drove the
enemy from height to height, from valley to valley,
without troubling to see if they were followed by their
supplies, which, in fact, never came up with them. One
saw old soldiers who had been detailed as hospital
orderlies on the lines of communication, because they
were regarded as unfit for active service, abandoning
their posts, seizing rifles and haversacks filled with biscuit,
hurry forward to join in the pursuit. In every village
deserters from the Bulgarian Army, who were Serbs
enrolled by force, were discovered, and now rejoined the
Serbian Army. When the latter reached Serbia proper,
these increases in strength were even more considerable,
because there were many Serbian soldiers who had
remained hidden in the mountains during the Bulgarian
occupation of the country, and who, the moment they
saw the liberating army of their brothers arrive, also
joined in the pursuit of the enemy. It is said that in
the Morava Division, which at the beginning of the
offensive numbered only 3,500 rifles in all, one regiment
alone, after a few weeks, had no less than 5,000.

CRASHED GERMAN AEROPLANE.

GENERAL FRANCHET D ESPKREY DECORATING GENERALS MILNE AND MOMBELLI.

To face p. 2C0.

CAUSES OF BULGARIA'S SURRENDER 251

Nor must the Greeks be forgotten. With all the defects
of their Army, many detachments fought valiantly,
especially the Serres Division, which, fighting under the
British, distinguished itself at the battle of Doiran and
suffered severe losses. The French and Serbian cavalry,
once the breach had been made, were in the vanguard
of the pursuit, and pushed forward by forced marches
which have few equals in the annals of the war.

3. The perfect co-operation between armies of different
nationalities, a co-operation which Sarrail had never been
able to achieve. This was one of General Franchet
d'Esperey's main successes. There were, in fact, the
Central Franco-Serbian Group, composed of 6 Serbian
Divisions and 2 French ; the I Group of Divisions, with
1 French, 2 Greek, and for a short time 1 British Division ;
the A.F.O., comprising 5 French, 1 Italian, and 1 Greek
Division ; the British Army with 3, and afterwards 4
British, 5 Greek Divisions, and one French Regiment.
Nevertheless everything functioned regularly as if it had
been a perfectly homogeneous force.

4. The faulty dispositions of the enemy. Although,
as we have seen, the latter were stronger in effectives
than the Allied forces, they had failed to create reserves.
In Bulgaria there were only three regiments available,
and the Germans had withdrawn all their battalions
from the Balkan front, except three, to which a few
others were added during the offensive. In Serbia and
Roumania, the German and Austrian garrisons were
numerous, but they were composed of units whence
nearly all the younger soldiers had been withdrawn.
The enemy thus had only small area reserves, and no
army reserves. When the central sector was broken
through the enemy Command tried to stem the advancing
tide by concentrating regiments withdrawn from distant
sectors, such, for instance, as the 14th, which was
notorious for its mutinies ; but it was then too late.
Only in the Doiran sector, where some of the best
regiments were collected, was it possible to hold up the
British and Greeks for a few days, and also in the Cerna
loop, where the German Command made its influence

252 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

more directly felt, and there the resistance was more
vigorous.

5. The Bulgarian demoralization. The Bulgarians had
for some time been fed up with the war. They believed
that they had obtained definitely everything to which
they aspired, and they did not see why they should
continue to fight simply to please the Germans. They,
like the Serbs, were drawn by an irresistible desire towards
their homes, but the Serbs in order to do this had to
fight, while the Bulgarians saw that the only way to
achieve their object was to make peace. The Allied
victories in France, although the Command tried to
suppress all news of them, ended by becoming known to
the masses and produced a depressing effect. The over-
bearing attitude of the Germans, who treated Bulgaria
almost as a conquered country and not as an ally, and
especially the requisitions of foodstuffs in Bulgaria to
be sent to Germany, provoked serious discontent. Then
there was the question of Dobrugia, which aroused much
disaffection. The Bulgarians hoped that, after the defeat
of Roumania, the whole of that province would have
been ceded to them, instead of only the southern district,
as was provided for in the treaty of alliance with Germany.
The latter did not wish to hand over the whole province,
because she intended to keep control over the Cernavoda-
Constanza railway, and also because Turkey objected
to that line being in the hands of the Bulgarians.
Actually they were granted the southern district (the part
ceded to Roumania by the peace of 1913), while the rest
was administered by Turkey, an arrangement against
which the Bulgarian Government, and finally even the
Commander-in-Chief, General Gekoff, protested vigorously,
putting the blame on the German General Staff. There
was discontent also over the question of Adrianople.
Signs of demoralization appeared in the numerous
mutinies and the ever more frequent desertions. The
fact of having forcibly applied conscription to the
inhabitants of the occupied territories, although it helped
to strengthen the Army with fresh effectives, weakened
it in its moral unity, because the inhabitants of the

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ALLIED VICTORY 253

province of Nish were true Serbs and hated the Bulgarians,
and those of Macedonia, if they had more sympathy for
the Bulgarians than for the Serbs, did not wish to fight
for either. The Allied Commands were fairly well
informed of this state of feeling, and appreciated it at
its proper value. The pro-German Radoslavoff Cabinet
had resigned in June, and the Malinoff Cabinet, by which
it had been succeeded, was disposed to seek to come to
some agreement with the Entente.

6. Finally, there was the hope on the part of the
Bulgarians, who now realized that German power was
shaken, of obtaining favourable conditions from the
Entente by means of a separate peace. If they could
no longer dream of the creation of that big Bulgaria
which had been promised to them by Germany, they
hoped at least to preserve some part of their conquests,
to keep the territories gained from Turkey, and perhaps
to receive substantial financial assistance. The Entente
had promised nothing of all this, but its semi-official
propaganda gave the Bulgarians to understand that the
sooner they surrendered the better would their treat-
ment be.

The immediate consequences of the Bulgarian capitula-
tion were of great importance. This was the first decisive
blow struck at the Central Powers. Until September
15th the main line of the enemy resistance from the
North Sea to the Swiss frontier, from the Stelvio to the
mouth of the Piave, from the mouth of the Semeni to
that of the Struma, was intact. In France the Germans
had had to fall back before the Anglo-Franco-American
attacks, but the famous Hindenburg line was not yet
broken, and their Armies had been beaten, but not van-
quished ; on the Piave the Austrians had been seriously
defeated in their June attack, but they had lost very
little ground, and their Army was still in full efficiency.
It was on the Macedonian front that the first fatal breach
was made. The Central Powers not only had one ally
the less, but they were threatened from behind, and had
to consider the necessity of creating a new front on their
eastern gateway, which until then had been defended

254 THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS

by the Bulgarians. Turkey, moreover, already staggering
under the sledge-hammer blows delivered by General
Allenby in Palestine and Syria, now no longer possessed
any line of communication by land with Germany and
Austria.

CHAPTER XVI

FINAL OPERATIONS

The armistice with Bulgaria marked the final collapse of
German influence in that country. The Tzar Ferdinand
abdicated and went into exile, and was succeeded by his
son Boris. The capitulation created a profound impres-
sion in Germany. The Press published violent invectives
against the " treacherous " ally, there was a panic on
the stock exchange, and on September 30th the Imperial
Chancellor, von Hertling, resigned, and was succeeded
by Prince Max of Baden. Marshal von Hindenburg, in
a letter addressed to the latter on October 5th, admitted
that the collapse of the Macedonian front was one of the
causes which excluded all hope — as far as man can judge,
of forcing the enemy to make peace. Some German
papers demanded that Bulgaria should be driven back
into the fold by force. But the necessary force was now
wanting. There was nothing for it but to reconstitute
a new front in Serbia and Roumania, and this the Germans
and Austrians tried to do.

The German units of the XI Army who had escaped
capture, withdrew into Serbia to join the other German
and Austrian forces already there or on their way from
other sectors. Thus the 21st Infantry Regiment, elements
of the 256th Reserve Regiment (the one which had
appeared recently on the Struma front), of the 275th
Regiment, which was in Macedonia, and of the
12th Landwehr concentrated in Serbia. From France the
Alpen Corps arrived, which had only just come out of the
line after much hard fighting, the 50th Landwehr from
Minsk, and from South Russia the 217th and 219th
Infantry Divisions, while Austria sent the 9th Division

255

256 FINAL OPERATIONS

withdrawn from Italy, and the 25th. But these troops
did not all reach the new front at the same time, except
those who were already in Serbia or who had retreated
from Macedonia ; the other reinforcements arrived par
petits paquets. In Roumania there was a still more
numerous Army — on paper — commanded by Marshal
von Mackensen, consisting of 3 German divisions,
strengthened by 7 Landwehr divisions from Russia. This
force, echeloned along the Danube from the Iron Gates to
Cernavoda and along the railway from Cernavoda to
Constantza, was divided into two armies, one of which
assumed the name of the XI German Army which
had gone to pieces in Macedonia, and was commanded
by General von Scholtz himself, and the other, called
the Army of Occupation in Roumania, commanded by
General Koch. These forces were, in appearance, by no
means negligible, but were spread over too vast a front,
and the difficulties of communications south of Belgrade
rendered their concentration very slow. Many of the
men, moreover, belonged to the older classes and were
partially unfit.

Even for the Allies communications were now extremely
difficult. As far as the line of the old front they were
comparatively good. But beyond it the retreating enemy
had destroyed the railways, and the roads were in an
appalling condition. From Ghevgheli to Veles the line
was destroyed in many places, but it was repaired fairly
quickly, so that by October 15th trains were already
running with one interruption. From Veles to Uskub
the destruction had been almost complete, as was also
the case north of Uskub. The Constantinople railway
was interrupted at Demir Hissar, where the bridge, as
we have seen, had been blown up by the French early
in the war. The C.A.A. had therefore to limit the number
of troops pushing north to an indispensable minimum.
Nothing, however, could restrain the Serbs, irresistibly
drawn forward by the longing to return to their homeland.
For supplies they had to rely on lorries, and the British
provided them with 300 Fords, carrying 500 kilograms each,
for the roads over which heavier vehicles could not pass.

«

o

M

O

ADVANCE INTO SERBIA 257

The objectives of the Allies were now four : the libera-
tion of Serbia, the occupation of Bulgaria, the liberation
of Roumania, and the capture of Constantinople. The
territory over which the Armee d'Orient was operating,
already vast before the Bulgarian capitulation, had now
become immense ; it was, we may say, the whole of the
Balkan Peninsula, except Albania, which was left to the
Italian XVI Corps, and Eastern Thrace, still in Turkish
hands. To the north its operations were intended to
link up eventually with those of the Italian Army, and
General Franchet d'Esperey said that he hoped soon to
shake hands with General Diaz in Croatia.

The I Serbian Army, the Danube Division leading,
undertook the first of these tasks, supported by the
French and Serbian cavalry, while the II Army still remained
for a little to mount guard on the Bulgarian western
frontier. The left flank of the I Army in the Mitrovitza
area was covered by the Tranie Group, which, however,
was relieved between the 5th and the 20th of October
by the II Serbian Army and moved eastward. On the
7th the I Army was at Leskovatz in Old Serbia1 and
advancing on Nish, which the Austro-Germans had orders
to hold at all costs, as it was the chief centre of the area,
with immense depots and dumps, and the junction of
the Belgrade-Salonica railway with the line towards
Sofia and Constantinople ; a local line also branches off
to Zayetchar. A force consisting of troops of 3 German
divisions (217th, 219th and Alpen Corps) and of 2
Austrian divisions (9th and 25th) tried to hold back the
Serbs. But the latter on the 11th had occupied the
heights dominating the town from the south, thus obliging
the enemy to evacuate it after a brief engagement. The

I Army continued its advance along the Morava valley,
preceded by the cavalry, and did not trouble to await
the two forces that were to support its flanks — the

II Army on the left and the French divisions of the
A.F.O. on the right, which had been delayed by the state
of the roads — but was content with the support afforded

1 I use the expression " Old Serbia " to designate the Serbian State
as it was before the Balkan Wars, i.e. exclusive of Macedonia.

17

258 FINAL OPERATIONS

by the Serbian and French cavalry. The enemy offered
some resistance at Bukovich, and then at Parachin,
where the fighting was more obstinate (October 23rd-24th) ;
but the Serbs, although inferior in numbers, inflicted a
serious defeat on them. This obliged them to evacuate
even their positions at Kraguyevatz to the west of the
railway, with its important arsenal. This town was
occupied by the Drina Division on the 26th, which the
following day conquered Mounts Ovchar and Chablatz,
dominating positions and the scene of Voivod Michich's
great victory in the winter of 1914. On the 30th the
I Army reached the Danube, and occupied the Biskuplje-
Semendria line, while other detachments, after a sharp
struggle, captured Mount Kosmaj and then Stoinik,
38 km. from Belgrade, whose outer defences are dominated
from that point. On November 1st the Serbs re-entered
their capital in triumph.

In the meanwhile the II Army was advancing through
the Sanjak of Novibazar and Western Serbia, while the
Tranie Group was pushing on towards Montenegro and
Bosnia. On October 7th it had reached Ferizovich, on
the 12th, after a sharp fight, Mitrovitza, and on the 15th,
Ipek (Montenegro), where it captured 600 prisoners ;
900 more fell into its hands on the 20th, after which it
effected a conversion to the east, leaving the Yugoslav
Division in charge of that area. The only French detach-
ment remaining there was the 58th Battalion of Chasseurs
a pied, while the 57th Division returned to Macedonia to
be broken up.

The II Group of Divisions (General Patey), comprising
the 17th Colonial and the 76th Divisions, to which the
Tranie Group was now also attached, extended its occu-
pation to Western Serbia and Eastern Bulgaria, which
it entered by rail. On the 17th it was at Pirot, whence
it pushed on an advanced force to Kniazhevatz, and on
the 19th it reached Zayetchar. The 76th Division
reached the Danube, and occupied the loop of the river
between Vidin and Lorn Palanka, thus interrupting the
navigation on the Danube for the Central Empires.
General Jouinot-Gambetta's cavalry group had already

SERBIA LIBERATED 259

reached the river, after a fantastic raid from Uskub.
On the 27th it occupied Mount Antonov-Kladenatz,
beyond Zayetchar, and then Dolnji Milanovatz near the
Danube. On the 30th it was north-west of Negotin and
in liaison with the Serbian cavalry, followed at a short
distance by the 17th Colonial Division.

By November 1st the whole of Serbia was free of the
enemy, except the north-west territory ; but out of this,
too, they were soon driven by the II Serbian Army, which
then spread over into Bosnia and Montenegro. The
remnants of the German and Austrian Divisions, exhausted
and without supplies, recrossed the Danube and the Save.
The whole of Bosnia arose in favour of the Yugoslav
State, and also in Croatia and Slavonia there were demon-
strations in the same sense. In the Banat, which the
Serbs entered after crossing the Danube at Moldova and
Basiatz, some final engagements occurred with the German
troops, who were invariably defeated.

The demonstrations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Croatia-
Slavonia, and in the Banat were in favour of a Yugoslav
Federation. This was the idea that united the various
peoples of Yugoslav race, of whose aspirations Serbia
had made herself the standard-bearer. It would have
been more difficult to raise similar enthusiasm for the
purely pan-Serb idea, which the Government, and above
all the iVrmy, always had in mind, even though they
did not proclaim it openly. To this fact are due, to a
large extent, the conflicts which subsequently divided
the different parts of the new kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes.

It should be borne in mind that the Serbian advance
was enormously facilitated by the events on the Italian
front. If Austria could only send weak and totally
inadequate reinforcements to stem the Serbian advance,
it was because her whole Army was nailed down on the
Piave and on the Asiago Plateau by the menace of the
coming Italian offensive, and afterwards overwhelmed
in the irreparable disaster of Vittorio Veneto. The last
vigorous resistance of the enemy in Serbia was at Parachin
on October 23rd and 24th. On the 24th the Italian

260 FINAL OPERATIONS

offensive was launched. The latter also contributed very
largely to the outbreak of the revolt of the Yugoslavs,
who until that moment had been the most faithful subjects
of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.

There were still the other two tasks to be accomplished
— Roumania and Constantinople. General Allenby had
been rapidly conquering Northern Palestine and Syria,1
and the moment seemed to have arrived to deliver the
coup-de-grdce against Turkey by an attack on Constanti-
nople. Britain attached great importance to the new
expedition, which might be regarded as the long-expected
retribution for the bloody but heroic check at the Dar-
danelles. General Sir George Milne was to command it.
He brought back his G.H.Q. from Janesh to Salonica,
and preparations were at once commenced in Eastern
Macedonia, which had just been evacuated by the
Bui gars. The expeditionary force, officially described as
the " Oriental Section of the Allied Armies," was formed
on October 6th, and comprised the 22nd, 26th and 28th
British Divisions (the 26th was at Mustafa Pasha on the
Turco-Bulgarian frontier, and the other two between
Stavros and Dede-Agatch), the Italian Sicilia Brigade,
which had been brought back to Salonica from the
Monastir-Prilep area, and was commanded by General
Garruccio, the 122nd French Division (General Topard),
the I Greek Corps (General Ioannou), to which two more
divisions of the National Defence Corps were to be added.
The British divisions, greatly reduced in strength after
the very heavy fighting at Lake Doiran, had been rein-
forced by some Indian battalions, which had arrived too
late to take part in the offensive.

According to reliable information, the scanty forces
detailed for the defence of Constantinople had been
strengthened by four Caucasus divisions,2 already arrived
or en route, and by some others from Anatolia, while
Germany was sending German troops by way of the
Black Sea. But the Turkish units were greatly reduced

1 The British first broke through the enemy lines on September 19th.

2 The Caucasus divisions, created during the war for the "campaign
in that area, were numbered apart.

PREPARATIONS AGAINST TURKEY 261

in strength by battle losses, sickness, and above all by
desertions, and it was estimated that their total number
of rifles was not more than 12,000 to 15,000. Towards
the end of October it was known that the German troops
were already leaving Thrace for Roumania, perhaps on
their way to the Western front. The plan of operations
of the new Allied expeditionary force was the following :
The river Maritza was to be crossed by a surprise move-
ment, and three bridge-heads were to be built on its
banks, whence three columns would advance on Adrianople,
Kuleli Burgas and Ipsala respectively. Immediately
afterwards the bulk of General Milne's forces would cut
the Turkish Army in two, separating those in the Gallipoli
Peninsula from those in Thrace, and occupying the Lule
Burgas-Muradli-Rosdosto line, while the Allied fleets
would bombard the enemy batteries in the Gulf of Enos.
Finally, the Isthmus of Bulair would be attacked, with
the object of seizing the whole of the European shore
of the Dardanelles. Then the artillery fire would be
concentrated on the batteries on the Asiatic shore. Once
the Dardanelles were conquered the fleets could penetrate
into the Sea of Marmara, whence it would be easy to
force Constantinople to capitulate.

In the meanwhile, General Allenby was advancing by
leaps and bounds ; he had conquered the whole of Syria,
and captured two Turkish armies, with many guns and
immense booty. The expeditionary force in Mesopo-
tamia was also pushing ahead rapidly. The Turkish
Army was visibly dwindling away, and the deserters
numbered several hundreds of thousands, so that it was
obvious that Turkey was not in a position to resist the blow
which General Milne was about to strike ; he had indeed
already seized the bridgehead at Ipsala and was about
to cross the Maritza at other points. On October 29th,
General Townshend, who had been taken prisoner by the
Turks at Kut-el-Amara in 1916, was set free, and sent
to the inter-Allied Naval Command at Mudros, bearing
a request for an armistice. The Turkish Cabinet, which
emanated from the notorious Committee of Union and
Progress, had fallen, and was succeeded by another,

262 FINAL OPERATIONS

constituted with the express object of concluding peace.
Enver and Talaat, the two evil geniuses of Turkey, had
fled with their most compromised satellites and large
funds embezzled from the Government Treasury and
from private persons. The Turkish proposals were con-
sidered, and as soon as the Turkish plenipotentiaries
arrived, among whom was Raouff Bey, the Minister of
Marine in the new Cabinet and a well-known Ententophil,
negotiations were commenced between them and Admiral
Calthorpe, Commander of the British Naval Forces in the
iEgean, as representing the Allies. After a short dis-
cussion, the Armistice was concluded on October 30th,
and came into force on the 31st. The order to advance
from the Maritza was therefore suspended.

The Allied fleets, commanded by Admiral Calthorpe,
passed through the Dardanelles on November 10th, and
anchored in the Bosphorus off the Sultan's palace at
Dolma Bagshe. It was the first time that a hostile fleet
passed through the Straits and trained its guns on the
Ottoman capital since the conquest in 1453. The previous
day, General Sir Henry Wilson, Commander of the British
XII Corps, had reached Constantinople, where he had
been sent with a small Staff by General Franchet
d'Esperey as his representative in Turkey. He was
given command of all the Allied troops destined for
the occupation of the city and of European Turkey
(including the Asiatic shores of the Straits). These forces
comprised the 28th British Division, the 122nd French
and later an Italian regiment (the 61st) and a Greek
battalion, besides some detachments of gendarmes. The
points occupied were the city itself, Scutari, and various
places on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Subse-
quently the occupation was extended to other areas.

A few weeks later Sir George Milne removed to Con-
stantinople with his whole Staff, and on February 8,
1919, General Franchet d'Esperey also arrived with the
C.A.A. The further vicissitudes of the Allied occupation
of Turkey belong to another chapter of history.

Let us now return to the 35th Division. After the
Armistice with Bulgaria began a veritable Odyssey for

GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY 1HE ITALIANS ON HILL 1050.

HILL 1050. HOURS OF REST.

To face p. ti).

THE 35th DIVISION AGAIN 263

the Italian troops, a constant marching and counter-
marching along roads deep in mud, without shelter for
the night, across wild mountains, under torrents of rain,
and later amid snowstorms ; the soldiers, however, were
cheered by the thought that they had won the war and
that their homecoming was near. From Sop the division
at once began to march in a north-easterly direction, as
it appeared then that it was destined, as General Mombelli
strongly desired, to take part in the operations in Serbia.
On October 9th the headquarters were at Prilep, and a large
part of the troops were encamped in the neighbourhood of
that town. Squads of Bulgarian prisoners, guarded by Allied
infantry and reinforced by Italian engineer companies,
set to work to improve the impossible roads and to repair
the Monastir-Prilep decauville. A few days later the
whole force crossed the Babuna Pass, except the
Sicilia Brigade, which, as we have seen, was to take
part in the Constantinople expedition, and was sent to
Monastir, and the newly-created Spezia Brigade, made
up out of elements of the others, which remained at
Prilep.

General Mombelli's wish that his troops should be
sent to Serbia to co-operate with the Serbian Army was
shared by the Prince Regent Alexander, who expressed
himself very decidedly in that sense. Had the 35th
Division been given that destination, and had been able
to fight on Serbian soil by the side of Voivod Michich's
soldiers, the relations between the two peoples, which
at that time were very good, would have become ever
friendlier. The Italian soldiers, had they been left to
garrison Serbia, Slavonia and the Banat, would certainly
have made themselves popular with the inhabitants, as
occurred in Bulgaria, still technically an enemy country,
and our relations with the Serbian State would have
been very different from what they actually became.
This was then desired on both sides.

But tendencies and forces hostile to an Italo-Serb
understanding unfortunately prevailed. The destination
of the 35th Division was altered by order of the C.A.A.,
and the bulk of its troops were sent towards Bulgaria.

264 FINAL OPERATIONS

Hence new and exhausting marches, with supplies never
arriving up to time on account of the badness of the
roads and the deficiencies of certain services of the C.A.A.
on which they still had to depend. After various inter-
mediate halts, the Command reached Kustendil on
November 13th, with the troops echeloned between
Guyeshevo and Sofia, and soon after removed to Sofia
itself. The division now spread over a large part of
Bulgaria — Kustendil, Sofia, Vidin, Lorn Palanka, etc.
For some time there was a battalion at Burgas, and one
at Philippopolis, belonging to the Sicilia Brigade, most
of Avhich had now left Salonica. When the British
garrisons left the Dobrugia they were relieved by Italian
troops.

Although the French forces in Bulgaria were now very
few, the Inter-Allied Command in that country was
entrusted to the French General Chretien. His position
was certainly anomalous, as hitherto the principle had
been always applied that the Command in any given
area should be entrusted to a general of the nation which
had most troops in it. But the tact, character and
excellent military qualities of General Chretien rendered
this illogical situation tolerable.

With the break-up of Austria-Hungary thousands of
Italian prisoners were set free or freed themselves.
While the bulk of them made for Italy, many tens of
thousands who were in Hungary, Roumania, Galicia and
Russia proceeded towards Salonica, as they knew that
there were Italian troops in Macedonia. They had been
cast adrift without food, with insufficient clothing, often
in rags and unshod, when they set forth on their wretched
pilgrimage towards their victorious comrades across the
icy-cold, wind-swept tracks of the Balkans. The country
was almost denuded of resources and, owing to the
execrable state of the communications, it was impossible
to send up supplies from Salonica, where they abounded.
General Mombelli made superhuman efforts to bring
relief to these unfortunate wanderers ; he sent detach-
ments of troops to Serbia, and with immense difficulty
organized a service of supply and transport. Gradually

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HUNGARIAN AFFAIRS 265

the liberated prisoners were conducted to Salonica,
Burgas, or Constantza, and thence embarked for Italy.
But large numbers perished from cold and hardships at
the very moment when all were rejoicing over the glorious
victory.

On November 4th the Villa Giusti Armistice between
General Diaz, representing the Allies, and the Austro-Hun-
garian Command, was signed. But it was not clear whether
and to what extent it was applicable to Hungary. On
November 3rd two Magyar Field Officers presented them-
selves at the outposts of the Armee d'Orient in the Banat,
stating that Hungary wished to conclude an armistice
on her own account. In Hungary there was indeed no
longer any recognized central authority, and the country
was rushing headlong towards anarchy. Count Karolyi,
the head of the Government, but almost without any
authority, wished to enter into negotiations with General
Franchet d'Esperey, who, however, had no instructions
for dealing with such a situation. On the 7th a meeting
between them took place ; Count Karolyi declared that
he had no army which he could rely on to hold the troops
of Marshals von Mackensen and von Koevess in check,
and asked for certain political concessions, which General
Franchet d'Esperey was unable to grant. The latter added
that he would proceed with the offensive as long as Hungary
did not ratify the Villa Giusti Armistice, and, in con-
formity with instructions received from Paris, he threat-
ened to send British and French divisions to Budapest.
Karolyi then agreed immediately to his request, and on
the 13th an armistice was signed between General Henrys
(General Franchet d'Esperey had returned to Macedonia)
and Voivod Michich for the Allies and M. Bela Linder
for Hungary. According to the terms of this agree-
ment, the Hungarian troops were to withdraw behind a
line passing by Fiinfkirchen, Baja, Mariatheresienstadt,
the course of the Maros and the upper valley of the
Great Szamos. Otherwise the terms of the Villa Giusti
Armistice were reproduced as far as they were applicable
to Hungary, save that the latter was authorized to keep
six divisions on a war footing for the maintenance of

266 FINAL OPERATIONS

order, which was threatened by criminal Bolshevism.
The further vicissitudes of Hungary were to cause the
Allies more trouble yet.

There still remained the army of Marshal von Mackensen
in Roumania to be dealt with. On October 19th, French
troops reached the Danube. A few days previously
General Berthelot had arrived at Salonica, with instruc-
tions to create a new " Army of the Danube " out of
units of the Armee d'Orient to conduct operations in
Roumania. This new organization, which appeared cum-
bersome and practically useless, comprised two French
divisions, parts of two others, a cavalry regiment, a
British division and the Garrison Brigade. All these
forces were echeloned along the Danube within the month
of October, three bridge-heads were built near Rustchuk,
at Giurgiu, and between Shistov and Nicopolis, and on
November 10th the troops began to cross the river.
Roumania, after a heroic resistance, had been obliged, in
consequence of the treachery of the Russian Bolsheviks
acting on behalf of Germany, to sign the disastrous Peace
of Bucarest, but now that the liberators were at the
gates she was able to shake off the hated yoke ; the
Government ordered a fresh mobilization, and declared
war against the Central Empires. This gave her after-
wards the right to take part in the Peace Conference, in
Paris, among the Allies. The day that the French troops
crossed the Danube the Roumanian Army reappeared on
the scene.

Marshal von Mackensen's troops offered but slight
resistance. They soon gave up all hope of holding the
Danube line, and thought only of retiring through Hungary
into Austria and Germany. But it was an army in
dissolution, almost without discipline, and its passage
through Hungary might have led to serious trouble.
On the other hand, if it were forced to surrender, there
were no means of feeding it in the Balkans, nor ships
to convey it home by sea. In the meanwhile the Serbian
troops, in order to cut the communications between
Roumania and Germany, occupied Vershetz and-Neusatz,
and pushed on towards Temesvar. The Armistice with

VON MACKENSEN'S END 267

Germany having been concluded on November 11th,
von Mackensen's army would have had only eight days
in which to make use of the Hungarian railways, which,
moreover, were in such bad condition as to be of little help ;
but it was granted an extension of the time limit, as it
was generally felt that, on the whole, the wisest course
was to allow it to go home. Difficulties, however, arose
with the Hungarian Government. Von Mackensen had
been interned in the Castle of Pott, near Budapest, but
it was feared that his Hungarian guards might leave
him free to range through Hungary and perhaps promote
disorders and insurrections. Consequently, to avoid
trouble, a couple of squadrons of Morocco Spahis were
sent to Pott, and on January 5, 1919 they escorted the
Field Marshal to the Castle of Futtek near Neusatz, in
an area occupied by troops of the Armee d'Orient, and
later to Salonica. In that city which he had expected to
enter one day in triumph, acclaimed by the inhabitants —
who would not have failed to become pro-German for
the occasion — he remained interned for some months.

The Armee d'Orient was now scattered over an immense
territory. The Commander-in-Chief, still General Franchet
d'Esperey, remained at Constantinople with his Staff.
The city and the adjoining area was garrisoned by
General Wilson's inter-Allied Force. At Salonica there
remained fragments of the various Allied armies, com-
manded by General Genin, with detachments in other
parts of Macedonia, especially in the old fighting zone,
to collect the vast quantities of war material and to
guard the prisoners. The latter were regarded as public
nuisances, difficult to feed, and of little use for labour
as there was very little work for them to do, so that the
various Commands who had fought so hard to capture
them were only too delighted when some of them escaped.
The old Italian headquarters at Tepavci was occupied
by the Bulgarian generals and field officers captured
by our troops.

The bulk of the Italian Expeditionary Force was now
in Bulgaria. The Dobrugia was occupied by Franco-
British, and afterwards by Italian, detachments. In

268 FINAL OPERATIONS

Roumania, besides some Roumanian divisions, there was
part of General Berthelot's army ; the rest of it was for
a short time in South Russia, together with some Greek
and White Russian units, commanded by General
d'Anselme.

The remnants of the A.F.O. and the Serbian Army
were scattered about the new provinces occupied by
Serbia, which were destined to form the new S.H.S.
State, principally in the Banat and in Croatia-Slavonia.
Small French detachments were in Montenegro, Cattaro,
Ragusa, etc. In many of these places there were also
Italian troops, and at Fiume there was a mixed Italian-
French-British garrison. At Scutari the pre-war inter-
Allied occupation was reconstituted, and a garrison con-
sisting of a French, an Italian and a British battalion,
commanded by General Foulon, was sent there.

All these troops took orders from General Franchet
d'Esperey in Constantinople. The Italian troops in
Bulgaria, in European Turkey and in Macedonia, belonging
to the 35th Division, formed part of the Armee d' Orient.
But the Italian detachments at Scutari and along the
mid-Adriatic coast took orders from the Albanian Com-
mand, while those at Fiume were under the Italian
III Army. Neither the former nor the latter had any-
thing to do with the C.A.A. at Constantinople, whereas
the French detachments in the same places were under it.
The British Army, still commanded by General Milne,
was under the C.A.A., but to a very limited extent, while
the British troops in Asia Minor, in the Caucasus, etc.,
were also under General Milne, who, as far as they were
concerned, had nothing whatever to do with the C.A.A.
The Serbian Army was now acting entirely on its own.

All this Chinese puzzle of Commands seemed to have
been invented for the express purpose of promoting
inter-Allied disagreements — and it certainly succeeded in
doing so. But the subsequent political and military
vicissitudes of the Allied troops in the East do not belong
to the history of the Balkan Campaign, but to that of
the Peace Conference. ^

The Italian troops remained in Bulgaria until July

FINALE 269

1919, when the 35th Division was broken up and its
various elements repatriated, except the Regimental
Command and one battalion of the 61st Regiment, which
remained in Constantinople. During this period General
Mombelli and his officers and men had occasion to show
how high was the level of Italian civilization. No operation
is more thankless nor more likely to become odious than
the occupation of a vanquished country. But the Italian
Expeditionary Force, which had borne itself so well
during the war, also proved, in the eyes of the Bul-
garians, whom it had so valiantly contributed to defeat,
generous and dignified during the Armistice period. No
unpleasant incident marred the relations between the
troops and the inhabitants, but at the same time our
men showed a proper reserve in their dealings with a
nation with whom we were still technically at war.
Further, the Italian soldiers did many acts of kindness
and courtesy towards the natives that left indelible
traces for the future good relations between the two
peoples. We were fortunately spared the odium of
garrisoning the country at the time when the dura lex
sed lex of the Treaty of Neuilly had to be applied. On
their departure the Italian troops were bidden farewell
with numerous demonstrations of sympathy, which those
who had some interest in presenting Italy in an
unfavourable light tried to misrepresent as signs of
deep and dark intrigues on her part, but which were in
reality nothing more than manifestations of gratitude.

Here we shall end our brief chronicle of the Balkan
Campaign. Let us hope that the remembrance of the
common effort for the common cause, and of the great
victory by which it was crowned, prove an earnest for the
future brotherhood of the peoples who fought together,
in the hard struggles for the peace of the world.

APPENDIX A

LETTER FROM VOIVOD MICHICH TO GENERAL
PETITTI DI RORETO CONCERNING THE FIGHT-
ING ON HILL 1050 IN FEBRUARY 1917

" The magnificent exploit of your gallant troops, who, in
spite of the desperate resistance of the enemy and their in-
fernal fire, in spite of the enormous difficulties of the ground,
yesterday, with irresistible dash, captured Hill 1050 by assault,
has filled me with admiration ; the two columns of your
heroic 162nd Infantry Regiment have covered themselves
with glory, inscribing a new and splendid page in the annals
of the Italian Army, which are already so glorious. Under
your high leadership your officers and men have given brilliant
proof of their great valour.

' I congratulate you with all my heart, my dear General,
and I beg you to inform them all of the deep homage of my
admiration and of that of my whole army. I am really heart-
broken, my dear General and dear comrade-in-arms, that
a terrible accident, impossible to foresee and to prevent,
should have obliged you to evacuate the positions captured
so gallantly and at such cost. I deeply regret with you the
death of all the dear and gallant comrades-in-arms who have
so heroically fallen on the soil of my Fatherland, and I bow
my head with the most profound respect before their sublime
self-sacrifice, before their proud contempt of death in the
struggle for the Great Common Cause. If you have had to
abandon temporarily the positions occupied, it is a material
loss easy to make good with troops such as yours. The great
moral result so brilliantly obtained yesterday by your intrepid
troops remains intact.

" Happy and proud to fight by your side, I beg you, my
dear General, to accept the assurances of my high consideration
and of my best sentiments.

(Signed) " Michich."

2T1

APPENDIX B

LOSSES OF THE BELLIGERENTS DURING THE
MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN

Killed Wounded Prisoners Missing

French1 20,000 — —

British 9,800 16,914 — 2,642

Italians 2,841 5,353 — —

Serbs2 45,000 133,000 70,423 82,535

Greeks 5,000 21,000 — 1,000

Bulgarians ... 63,0003 152,390 10.6234 13,729

1 Including men who died of disease and missing ; no more detailed
figures for the French Army are available.

2 Including losses in operations before the Macedonian campaign.
8 Including 888 accidentally killed and 13,198 died of wounds.

4 Not including the large number of prisoners captured during the
final retreat in September 1918.

272

APPENDIX C

GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY'S TELEGRAM TO
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE
ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS WITH BULGARIA

This evening a Bulgarian Field Officer presented himself with
a flag of truce, asking in the name of General Todoroff, who
describes himself as Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian
Army, for a suspension of hostility for 48 hours to allow for
the arrival of two delegates authorized by the Bulgarian
Government, the Finance Minister Liapcheff and General
Lukoff, Commander of the II Army, who are coming, with
the consent of the Tzar Ferdinand, to arrange the conditions
for an armistice and eventually for peace.

As this request may be merely a stratagem to permit a
re-grouping of forces or the arrival of reinforcements, I have
replied as follows :

" The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Armies
in the Orient, to H.E. the General Officer Commanding-
in-Chief, Bulgarian Army.
" I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter
which you have forwarded to me through the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Army in the Orient.
My reply, which I am delivering to the Bulgarian Field
Officer bearer of the letter in question, can, in view of the
military situation, be only as follows.

" I cannot grant any armistice or suspension of hostilities
interrupting the operations now in course of execution. I
shall, however, receive with all suitable courtesy, the pro-
perly accredited delegates of the Royal Bulgarian Govern-
ment to whom Your Excellency alludes in your letter.
These gentlemen should present themselves before the
British lines, accompanied by an officer bearing a flag of
truce."

18 273

APPENDIX D

ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND BULGARIA,
SIGNED AT SALONICA ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1918

Military Convention regulating the conditions for the sus-
pension of hostilities between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria.

1. Immediate evacuation, in accordance with an agree-
ment to be concluded, of the territories still occupied (by
the Bulgarians) in Greece and Serbia. No cattle, wheat or
foodstuffs of any kind shall be removed from these territories.
No damage shall be inflicted while evacuating them. The Bul-
garian administration shall continue to function in the parts
of Bulgaria at present occupied by the Allies.

2. Immediate demobilization of the whole Bulgarian Army,
except for a group of all arms, to be kept on a war footing,
comprising :

3 divisions of 16 battalions each,
5 regiments of cavalry.

Two divisions to be employed for the defence of the Eastern
frontier and the Dobrugia, and one for guarding the railways.

3. The arms, munitions, military vehicles belonging to the
demobilized units to be deposited at points which will be
designated by the High Command of the Armies in the Orient ;
they will be put into store by the Bulgarian authorities under
Allied control. The horses will also be handed over to the
Allies.

4. The material of IV Greek Army Corps, taken from the
Greek Army when Eastern Macedonia was occupied, to be
handed over to Greece, except such part of it as may have
been sent to Germany.

5. Bulgarian troops who at present are to the west of the
Uskub meridian and belonging to the XI German Army shall
lay down their arms and be considered prisoners of war until
further notice ; the officers will retain their arms.

274

THE SALONICA ARMISTICE 275

6. The Allied Armies will employ Bulgarian prisoners in
the Orient until peace is signed, without reciprocity as regards
Allied prisoners of war. The latter shall be handed over to
the Allies without delay, and interned civilians shall be
absolutely free to return to their homes.

7. Germany and Austria-Hungary will be granted a delay
of four weeks in which to withdraw their troops and military
organization, from Bulgaria. During the same period the
diplomatic and consular representatives of the Central Powers
and their nationals shall leave Bulgaria.

(Signed) Franchet D'Esperey

Andre Liapcheff.
General Lukoff.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Sarrail, " Mon Commandement en Orient." (Paris, 1920.)
" La Grece Venizeliste." (Revue de Paris, December 15,
1919.)

Mermeix, " Le Commandement unique, II partie : Sarrail et
l'Armee d'Orient." (Paris, Ollendorf, 1920.)

Sarraut, Maurice, et Lieut.-Colonel Revol, " Un Episode du Drame
serbe." (Paris, Hachette, 1919.)

Vaucher, Robert, " Constantin detrone." (Paris, Perrin, 1918.)

Recouly, Raymond, " M. Jonnart en Grece et 1' Abdication de
Constantin." (Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1918.)

" Documents Diplomatiques " (1913-1917), a collection of docu-
ments published by the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
(Athens, 1917.)

General Sir George Milne's Dispatches in Naval and Military
Dispatches, Part VI, p. 178 (1917), and Part VIII, p. 147
(1919).

P. Risal, "La Ville Convoitee." (Paris, Perrin, 1917.)

Ward Price, G., "The Story of the British Salonika Army."
(London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1918.)

Owen, Collinson, " Salonika and After." (London, 1919.)

Frappa, Jean Jose, " A Salonique sous l'CEuil des Dieux." (Paris,
Flammarion, 1917.)

Photiades, Constantin, " La Victoire des Allies en Orient." (Revue
de Paris, September 15th and November 15, 1919, and
February 15, 1920.)

Ancel, Jacques, " La Croisade Francaise en Macedoine." (Revue
des Deux Mondes, February 1 and 15, 1920.)

Marshal von Hindenburg's " Out of My Life " (London, 1920)
contains some useful information, especially on the reaction
in Germany produced by the last phase of the Balkan
campaign.

Colonel F. Feyler, "La Campagne de Macedoine" in two parts.
(Geneva, Boissonnas, 1921.)

277

INDEX

Adrianoplo, 261

^Egean Sea, 167

Air Force —

Allied, 134, 202, 215, 218
Enemy, 134

Albania, Albanians, 26, 51, 53,
85-87, 120, 121, 148, 156,
158, 163-166, 183-185, 202-
206, 212, 217, 220, 224, 234,
257

Alexander, King of Greece, 104,
145 sq.

Alexander, Prince Regent of Serbia,
40, 41, 85, 88, 89, 103, 104,
120, 133, 175-177, 247, 263

Allenby, General, 254, 261

Almereyda, 188, 189

America, see U.S.

American Red Cross, 95

Anselme, General d', 154, 217, 268

Antonov-Kladenatz, mt. 259

Archipelago, 139

Argyrocastro, 148

Argyropoulo, M., 138

Arkhangel, mt., 26

Armee d'Orient, 42, 53, 59, 119,
127, 129, 135, 145, 174, 188,
192, 202, 214 sq., 228 sq., 268

Armee francaise d'Orient, 42, 45,
50, 51, 53, 56, 191, 217, 219,
222, 239, 257

Armenohor, 222

Armensko, 221, 222

Armistice —

with Bulgaria, 244 sq., 274-275
with Austria-Hungary, 265
with Hungary, 265
with Turkey, 262

Austria, Austrians, 53, 91, 120, 121,
183-185, 192, 204-206, 20S,
245, 248, 255 sq., 264, 266,
275

Austrian prisoners, 87, 192

Baba range, 46, 47, 105, 237, 238, 244

Babuna pass, 26, 105, 212, 240,
241, 263

Backa, 203

Bailloud, General, 24

Baja, 265

Balkan Netvs, 162

Balugich, M., 89

Banat, 259, 263, 268

Banitza, 42

Bartlett, General, 208

Baumann, General, 144

Belasnitza river, 229

Belavitza river, 237

Belgrade, 15, 158, 223, 258

Beles range, 26, 27, 38, 39, 41, 54,
82, 231

Beltramo, General, 46

Belushin, 240

Berantzi, 239

Berthelot, General, 266, 268

Bertie, Lord, 174

Beshista mt., 228

Biskuplje, 258

Blatetz, 229

Bodrero, Colonel, 89, 144

Boemitza, 154

Bofnia, 204

Bogdanovatz, 242

Bohila, 229

Bolsheviks, 186, 192 sq., 266

Bonnet Rouge, 188

Boshava, 229

Bosnia, Bosnians, 192, 258, 259

Bosphortis, 262

Bousquier, General, 144

Boyovich, General, 89, 90, 119, 226

Briggs, General Sir Charles, 217

British Army, 26 sq., 40, 42, 46,
48, 51, 52, 60, 68 sq., 119,
127, 129 sq., 159 sq., 196, 200,
202, 215 sq., 230 sq., 242, 243,
250, 260-262, 267, 268

279

280

THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN

British policy, 137, 140, 145, 149-
151, 173 s?., 207, 208, 211

Brod on the Cerna, 94, 103, 108,
221, 222

Brod, north of Monastir, 240

Brusani, 229

Budapest, 265

Bucarest, 266

Buchin, 237

Bukovich, 258

Bulaiir, 261

Bulgaria, Bulgarians, 13, 17-22,
40, 41, 43-45, 47, 53-55, 83,
122, 127, 129, 133, 183-185,
196-198, 204, 207-211, 218 sq.,
244 sq., 250 sq., 255 sq., 263-
265, 267-269, 273-275

Burgas, 264, 265

Butkova, lake, 52, 82, 217, 221, 243

Caclamanos, M., 35

Cagliari Brigade, 37, 47, 50, 237, 244

Caillaux, M., 189

Calthorpe, Admiral the Hon. Gough,

262
Care, Colonel, 202
Cattaro, 268
Cepik, 236, 237
Cerava river, 183, 184
Cerevoda, 203
Cerna river, 26 sq., 47, 50, 51, 54,

92, 96, 103, 108, 109, 112,

118, 129 sq., 155, 213, 214,

217-220, 227 sq.
Cernavoda, 252, 256
Cesma, mt. 237
Chablatz, 258
Chaterna, 229
Chavka, 242
Chekina, 204
Chichevo, 241
Chretien, General, 264
Christodoulos, Colonel, 33
Constantine, King of Greece, 28,

33-35, 59, 137 sg., 142 sq.,

167, 196, 210
Constantinople, 158, 221-223, 257,

260, 262, 267, 268
Constantza, 245, 256, 265
Cordonnier, General, 44, 45, 50
Corfu, 87-89, 91, 169, 170
Corinth, 145
Cory, General 70, 104

Coundouriotis, Admiral, 139, 147
Couronne, Grand, 81, 127, 128,

218, 231, 232

Couronne, Petit, 81, 127, 128, 218,

232
Crete, 139

Croatia, Croatians, 192, 257, 259, 268
Croker, General, 230
Cypriots, 69

Danglis, General, 139, 154
Danube, river, 158, 256, 268
Dardanelles, 260-262
Dartige du Fournet, Admiral, 138,

142
Dede-Agatch, 221, 260
Demir Hissar on the Struma, 84,

219, 221, 223, 243, 256
Demir Hissar, north of Monastir, 240
Demir Kapu, 27, 35, 213, 214, 229,

230, 233
Descoins, Colonel, 167
Devoli river, 184, 202, 203 sq.
Dietrich, General, 45, 133, 173, 187
Dihovo, 239
Diviak, 238
Djumaya, 219, 242
Dobropolje, 55, 129, 213, 214, 219,

221, 225
Dobrugia, 17, 208, 248, 264, 274
Dodecannese, 141, 148
Doiran, lake of, 26 sq., 38, 41, 55,

81, 96, 127, 129 sq., 212 sq.,

217, 221, 227, 230-233, 240,

242, 250
Dousmanis, General, 147
Dova Tepe, 54, 82
Drachevatzko Brdo, 229
Dragarina, 239
Draghisetz, 237
Dragomantzi, 92
Drama, 35, 210
Drenovo, 241
Drvenik, 240
Duncan, General, 70, 230
Durazzo, 185, 204
Dzena, 213, 229

Echo de France, 162
Effectives —

Allied, 25, 30, 32, 55, 62^176,
185, 200, 201, 215, 216, 218

Enemy, 23, 54, 55, 185, 216

INDEX

281

Elbasan, 204, 241
Empiricos, M., 147
Enver Pasha, 262
Epirus, 139, 148, 156, 158
Ersek, 51, 121, 166, 183, 203
Essad Pasha, 163, 164

Fairholme, General, 104

Farret, General, 234

Fenoglietto, Colonel, 98

Ferdinand, Tzar of Bulgaria, 207,
246, 255, 273

Ferizovich, 258

Ferrero, General, 121, 206, 212

Fieri, 204, 205

Floka mt., 92, 213, 214

Fiorina, 42, 44, 122, 158, 166, 183,
217, 221, 222

Foulon, General, 268

Franchet d'Esperey, General, 104,
156, 201, 202, 209, 210,
211 sq., 240, 246-249, 251,
257, 262, 265, 267, 268, 273,
275

French Army, 26, 27 sq., 42, 46-48,
51, 52, 59, 61 sq., 64-66, 119,
121, 126, 129 sq., 159 sq., 183-
185, 187, 188, 200 sq., 215 sq.,
225, 239 sq., 243 sq., 249, 250,
262

French Military Mission in Greece,
151 sq., 195

French Policy, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62,
137, 140, 149-151, 163, 164,
173 sq., 188 sq., 211 sq.

Freri, General, 244

Gallipoli, 261

Gay, General, 230

Gekoff, General 54, 220, 252

Genin, General, 267

George, Colonel, 61

German Army, 22, 53, 54, 151 sq.,
159 sq., 197, 220, 223, 224,
228, 233 sq., 239, 243-246,
248, 252 sq., 266, 274, 275

German Policy, 22, 43, 47, 53-55,
113, 124, 129, 131, 207, 212-
214, 245 sq., 254 sq.

Gerome, General, 39, 154

Ghevgheli, 28, 221, 223, 229, 233,
242, 256

Gilman, General, 70

Giurgiu, 266

Goad, Captain, 10, 93

Godiak, 229

Godivla, 237

Golo Bilo, 226

Gopes, 203

Gora Top, 206, 220

Gornichevo, 102

Gornji Poroj, 39, 221

Gostivar, 212, 236

Gounaris, M., 145

Gradetz, 242

Gradsko, 212-214, 223, 233, 241

Gramsi, 204

Greece —

Greek Army, 31-35, 49, 51, 133,
138 sq., U5sq., 149, 177, 181-
183, 193 sq., 200, 201, 215,
228 sq., 242, 243, 247, 250,
268, 274
Greek Policy, 23, 25, 28, 31, 33,
61, 118, 129, 133, 137 s?., 165

Grlena, 241

Grossetti, General, 191

Guillaumat, General, 104, 191 sq.,
201, 211, 214

Guvesne, 70, 82, 221, 222

Guyeshevo, 233, 264

Hadzopoulo, Colonel, 33

Henrys, General, 191, 217, 239,

265
Hertling, Herr von, 255
Hill 1050, 48, 55, 98, 105 sq., 118,

122-125, 130-133, 183, 218,

219, 235, 250, 271
Hill 1248, 48, 66, 67, 126
Hill 1378, 47, 105
Hindenburg, Marshal von, 197, 240,

241, 244, 245, 255
Hoesslin, Admiral, 147
Holta, 204
Homondos, 83
Hortiach, mt., 80
Huma 196
Hungary, 265-267
Hussein Nikolitza, 121

Independant, 162
Ioannou, General, 197, 217
Ipek, 258
Ipsala, 261
Istip, 241

282

THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN

Italian Army, 13, 14, 36 sq., 55,
60, 63, 96 sg., 120, 122 sq.,
126, 129, 144, 159 s?., 203-
206, 215, 217, 220, 234 sq.,
243 sg., 250, 257, 259, 262-
264, 267-269

Italian Navy, 86, 87

Italian Policy, 14, 140, 141, 148-
151, 173 5?, 211

Itea, 170

Ivrea Brigade, 46, 122, 237, 244

Izitza, 238

Izvor, 241

Jacquemot, General, 184
Janesh, 81, 221, 242, 260
Jews of Salonica, 157 sq., 182-183
Jonnart, M., 145 sq.
Jouinot-Gambetta, General, 63, 241,

258
Jumeaux ravine, 128-130

Kaimakchalan range, 44, 47, 108,

213
Kalabak, 236
Kalkandelen, 212, 213, 223, 233,

236, 238 sg., 241, 243
Kalogheropoulo, M., 141
Kamia, mt., 203
Kanatlarci, 235
Karamudli, 40, 41
Karasuli, 221, 222
Karaul-Kruska, 238
Karolyi, Count, 265
Kavadar, 229
Kavalla, 35, 210
Kayalar, 43
Kelizoni river, 202, 203
Kichevo, 212, 233, 236, 237, 239,

240, 244
Kilindir, 221, 222
Kindrovo, 102
Kitchener, General Lord, 30
Kniazhevatz, 258
Koch, General, 256
Kochana, 241
Koevess, Marshal von, 265
Koritza, 121, 139, 148, 167, 183,

203
Kosmaj, rat., 258
Kosnitza, mt., 206
Kosturino pass, 26 s?., 218, 233,

242

Kozani, 144

Koziak, 227

Kraguyevatz, 258

Krastali, 130

Kravitza, 213, 226

Kresna, 243

Krivogastani, 237

Krivolak, 26, 230

Krklina, 126

Krusha Balkan range, 38 sg., 41,

48, 49, 96, 144
Krushevo, 236-239
Kruya, 204

Kuchkov Kamen, 213, 227
Kukurechani, 239
Kuleli Burgas, 261
Kumanovo, 243
Kustendil, 158, 223, 264

Larnbros, Professor, 141, 147

Lamia, 153

Larissa, 145, 153

Leblois, General, 50, 53

Lebouc, General, 133

Leniste, 241

Lesetz, mt., 203

Leskovatz, 257

Lesnitza, 217

Levani, 204

Liapcheff, M., 246, 247, 249, 273,

275
Lin, 241

Linder, Bela, 265
Ljumnitza river, 197
Lom Palanka, 258, 264
Losses —

Allied, 272

Enemy, 272
Lubin, 204
Lule Burgas, 261
Lukoff, General, 54, 77, 221, 246,

249, 273, 275
Lungi, 203, 205

Macedonia, 17-20, 23, 46, 48, 53-
55, 59, 62, 91, 96, 97, 138,
144, 157 sg., 185, 191 sg.,
200 sg., 207 sg., 211, 224, 248,
255, 256, 260, 264, 267

Mackensen, Marshal von, 22, 256,
265-267

Magarevo, 220

Mahon, General Sir Bryan, 24

INDEX

283

Makovo, 220

Malakastra, 204-206

Mala Rupa, 53

Malik, lake, 183

Mali Korori, 203

Malinoff, M., 207, 253

Mali Siloves, 205, 206

Marena, 229

Maritza river, 261

Marmara, Sea of, 261

Maros river, 265

Matapan, Cape, 165

Mathieu, Captain, 189

Matova, 226

Maya Frenkut, 203

Mazarakis, Colonel, 138

Meglentzi, 110, 111

Messalas, Colonel, 31

Metali bridge, 204

Metaxas, Colonel, 147

Michaud, General, 61, 190

Michich, Voivod, 89, 90, 92-94,

173, 214, 216, 217, 249, 263,

265, 271
Mikra, 88, 193, 221
Milne, General Sir George, 29, 44,

69, 70, 173, 217, 230-233,

242, 244, 260-262, 268, 273
Mindru, Colonel, 187
Mitrovitza, 257, 258

Moglena, 213, 214, 216, 249

Moglenitza, 213

Mombelli, General, 69, 79, 87, 94,
104, 105, 114, 115, 171 sq.,
Ill, 178, 183, 202, 235 52.,

243, 244, 263, 264
Monastir, 28, 41, 43, 45-48, 50, 66,

67, 105, 106, 108, 112, 119,
122, 158, 174, 185, 208, 212,
213, 219, 221, 222, 227, 236,
237, 239, 240, 243, 263

Montenegro, 205, 258, 259, 268

Morava river, 257

Mrzetzko, 229

Muradli, 261

Mudros, 261

Murgas, 240

Murphy, Mr., 209, 246

Mustafa Pasha, 260

National Defence Army, 140, 144
National Defence Government,
J 39 sq., 144, 148

Naresh, 154, 196, 232

Negochani, 49

Negotin, 212, 229

Nerezoff, General, 221

Neuilly, treaty of, 269

Neusatz, 266

Neutral Zone, 139, 144, 145

Nicopolis, 266

Nikoloff, General, 227

Nish, 158, 223, 253, 257

Nishavetz, 183

Nisi Voda, 100

Nonte, 51, 92, 155, 195, 213, 217,

220, 229
Novak, 109, 110, 112
Novibazar, Sanjak of, 258
Novo Selani, 237, 239

Ochrida, lake of, 53, 126, 133, 158,

183, 184, 241
Odello, Captain, 123
Opinion, 162
Orfano, Gulf of, 51
Ostreltze, 238
Ostretz, 242

Ostrovo, lak« of, 43, 102
Osum, river, 203
Ovchar, 258
Owen, Collinson, 162

" P " ridges, 81, 128, 218, 231, 232

Painleve, M., 174-176

Paix-Seailles, M., 189

Palestine, 260, 261

Pandeli, 228

Parachin, 257

Paraskevopoulo, General, 154

Patras, Gulf of, 170

Pehtzevo, 243

Peloponnesus, 143

Pennella, General, 171, 177

Peristeri mts., 106

Peter, King of Serbia, 85, 86, 87

Petitti di Roreto, General, 37-41,
46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 87, 93, 94,
114, 119, 128, 144, 177, 271

Petrsko, lake of, 102

Pflanzer-Baltin, General, 205, 220

Phillips, General, 144

Philippopolis, 264

Picot, Commander, 89

Piraeus, 138, 142, 145 sq., 159

Pirot, 258

284

THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN

Pisoderi pass, 126, 221, 222

Piton Brule, 105, 110, 123, 131, 132

Piton Rocheux, 105, 109, 110, 124-

126, 130-132
Placa, 183
Plasnitza, 238
Pletvar, 241

Pogradetz, 183, 184, 203
Polosko, 228, 229
Porta, 229

Presba, lake of, 51, 126, 133, 220
Preslap, mt., 229
Press, 59, 60, 161, 173
Prevaletz, 240
Pribilci, 212
Prilep, 48, 105, 212, 219, 220, 233,

236, 239-241, 243, 263
Protopapa, 203
Pruneau, General, 216
Pustareka, 238

Radeff, M., 246

Radomir, 223

Radoslavoff, M., 207, 253

Radovista, 242

Razim Bey, 228, 229

Regnault, General, 133, 145, 191

Repoulis, M., 147

Resna, 240

Ribot, M., 175, 176

Rodosto, 261

Ropotovo, 240

Roumania, 37, 38, 48, 176, 185,

192, 209, 223, 228, 245, 252,

257, 260, 261, 266, 268
Rozden, 229

Rupel, 32-34. 137, 219, 243
Russia, Russians, 42, 45-47, 51, 52,

133, 159, 173, 174, 176, 185-

187, 192, 268
Rustchuk, 266
Ryeroft, General, 71, 80
Russoff, General, 227

Sakulevo, 221, 222

Salonica, 23, 28, 29, 32, 56-58, 70,
88, 92, 96, 98, 137-139, 144,
145, 157 sq., 171, 177, 192,
221, 222, 246, 260, 264, 267

Salonica fire, 179 sq.

Salih Butka, 121

Santi Quaranta, 116, 122, 165 sq.,
173, 184

Sarigol, 221, 222

Sarrail, General, 24, 26, 38-40, 44-
46, 48-50, 53, 56-59, 61, 70,
104, 116, 118-121, 125, 127,
129 sq., 137 sq., 140 sq., 145,
163, 164, 167, 173 sq., 177,
178, 183, 187-190 214

Scholtz, General von, 53, 220, 245,
256

Seleehka Planina, 108

Selo Monastir, 228

Semendria, 258

Semeni river, 204, 205

Semnitza, 240

Serbia, Serbs, 15-17, 26, 30, 31, 42,
43, 51, 52, 55-57, 60, 61,
85 sq., 108, 109, 114, 119, 120,
129, 130, 133, 149, 159 sq.,
213, 215 sq., 223, 225 sq., 243,
247, 250 sq., 259, 263, 268, 274

Serbian Relief Fund, 95

Serbian Prisoners, 192 sq.

Serres, 35, 83, 84, 127, 158, 210,
219, 221, 243

Shistov, 266

Shlen, 226

Sicilia Brigade, 37, 237, 238, 244,
260, 263

Sinapremte, 203

Sivri, 83

Skouloudis, M., 35, 137 sq., 147

Skumbi, 204

Slavonia, 259, 263, 268

Slovenes, 192, 259

Smol, 196

Sofia, 158, 209, 223, 245, 248, 264

Sokol, 213, 218, 225, 226

Sop, 238, 244, 264

Sopot, 229

Spezia Brigade, 263

Srka di Legen, 196-198, 214

Staravina, 220, 227

Stari Srptzi, 240

Stavros, 260

Stepanovich, General, 89, 92, 226

Steuben, General von, 54, 220

Stoinik, 258

Stramol, mt., 238, 244

Strori, 204

Struma, 51, 82, 83, 133, 134, 155,
195-197, 212, 213, 221,-. 222,
243

Strumitza, 27, 218, 242, 243

INDEX

285

Studena Voda, 227, 229

Sushitza, 218

Sveta, 237

Sveti Petar, 240

Syria, 260, 261

Szamos, Great, river, 265

Tahinos, lake, 221, 222

Talaat Pasha, 262

Tama jo, Major, 48

Taranowski, General, 187

Taranto, 96, 165, 166, 170

Tchafa Becit, 203

Tchafa Kiarit, 121, 122

Tembet, mt., 203

Temesvar, 268

Tepavci, 47, 95, 104, 236, 267

Teton Hill, 232

Themistocles, 167, 168

Thessaly, 129, 138, 139, 141-145,

174
Thrace, 207, 257, 261
Todoroff, General, 220, 273
Tomoritza river, 204, 206, 217, 220
Topard, General, 216, 225, 260
Topolatz, 227
Topolchani, 236, 239
Topolitza, 241
Tortue Hill, 127, 128
Toulon, 165

Tranie, General, 240, 241, 258
Travers Clarke, General, 71
Trebuniste, 240
Trezia, 228
Tribune, 162
Tricoupis, M., 138
Tricoupis, General, 234
Troubridge, Admiral, 89
Troyatzi, 241
Tsanas, M., 138
Turkey, Turks, 53, 54, 158, 185,

207-209, 252, 254, 260, 261
Tzarevo Selo, 243
Tzar Vrh, 242
Tzer, 238
Tzrkvenetz, 252
Tzrni Kamen, 242
Tzrvena Stena, 47, 106, 126

Udunista, 184

Union and Progress, Committee of,
261

United States Policy, 208, 209
Uskub, 23, 53, 158, 207, 213, 220,

223, 229, 236, 240, 241, 243,

248, 256, 259, 274

Valandovo, 220

Valona, 86

Vardar, 25 sq., 51, 52, 98, 127, 133,

155, 159, 195, 207, 212 s?.,

218, 221, 229 sq.
Varna, 245

Vassart, General de, 121
Veles, 23, 212, 213, 223, 231, 240,

241, 256
Venel, General, 145
Venizelos, M., 33, 34, 121, 137 sq.,

U5sq., 247
Verria, 49, 158
Vershetz, 264
Vertekop, 49, 100, 221
Vetrenik, 55, 213, 219, 226
Vidin, 258, 264
Vladovo, 102
Voce tf Italia, 162
Vodiani, 237, 240
Vodena, 98, 101
Votchtaran, 92
Voyussa, 120
Vprchani, 229
Vrania, 23
Vrbetzko, 229

Westerners, 11, 12
Wilson, President, 209
Wilson, General Sir Henry, 217,
230, 232, 262, 267

Xanthi, 221

Yakrenovo, 240
Yarena, 229
Yelika, 238
Yenidje-Vardar, 99
Yugoslavs, 192 sq., 259, 260

Zaimis, M., 138, 141, 145-147

Zapolchani, 237

Zayetchar, 257-259

Zborsko, 227, 229

Zimbrakakis, General, 138, 140,

154, 195
Zovik, 227

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