The mails as a German war weapon,memorandum on the censorship of mails carried by neutral ships.

'^ij-Oi f/

THE MAILS

AS A

GERMAN WAR WEAPON

MEMORANDUM

ON THE
CENSORSHIP OF MAILS CARRIED BY NEUTRAL SHIPS

London :
Eyre and Spottiswoode, Limited.

1916.

Walter Clinton Jackson Library

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Special Collections & Rare Books

World War I Pamphlet Collection

THE MAILS

AS A

GERMAN WAR WEAPON

MEMORANDUM

ON THE
CENSORSHIP OF MAILS CARRIED BY NEUTRAL SHIPS

L o N D o X :
Eyke and Spottiswoode, Limited.

1916,

n3

The objects of the examination of the mails
passing between Europe and America are : —

(1) To discover and frustrate the
plots hatched by our enemies in their
own or in neutral countries ;

(2) To restrict the enemy's supplies,
and in every other way to impair their
capacity to continue the war.

In pursuance of the former of these two
objects a very large number of letters have
been intercepted, the seizure of which, from
a military and naval point of view, must be
regarded as of the highest importance.

It is regretted that specimens of these
letters cannot be published, nor can details of
them be given, without prejudicing the action
taken to frustrate the designs of the enemy.

But It may be mentioned that they include
numbers of letters of the following types : —

(a) Letters relative to and furthering
the perpetration of acts of violence,
incendiarism and sabotage in the United
States.

(b) Letters embodying plans for inter-
fering with the supply of vital materials
to the Allies from neutral countries.

(c) Letters containing enemy propa-
ganda.

This last item includes a great quantity
of scurrilous leaflets and pamphlets despatched
by the enemy, generally under neutral cover,
to the United States and other neutral coun-
tries in order that they may be re-forwarded for
circulation in British territory (e.j?., British India)
for the sole and deliberate purpose of fostering
disloyalty and rebellion within the Empire.

It will no doubt be readily admitted by all
impartial persons in neutral countries that,
in so far as the British Censorship restricts
the area of intrigue, sedition and outrage,
it is serving not only the cause of the Allies

X (37)1(305 A 2

but the interests of neutrals also. Many tons
of enemy propaganda leaflets and pamphlets
found in the letter mails have been destroyed
each week in the Censorship and sold as
paper waste.

The second of the two objects mentioned
above is effected in three totally distinct

ways : —

1. By stopping supplies to and ex-
ports by the enemy actually found in
the mail bags.

2. By stopping documents the pur-
pose of which is to transfer money or
credit to the enemy.

3. By extracting from letters evid-
ence of attempts to evade the blockade
and information showing the channels
of hostile trade, communication, etc.

1. ENEMY IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY
LETTER MAIL.

It is not thought that anyone now
seriously contends that the British Govern-
ment should allow supplies to reach enemy

>-
z

<

UJ

a
>

CQ
Q

UJ

a!
Z

o

Q

en
-J

oa
D

Cu

UJ

O

<

O

z

<

CO

o

<
>

a: a

< -
a: IS
cQ ^

X o-

O g

Z ^

u *

< .1

C/^ D.

O "

Q- -5

en

3

D

^

S

V

"5

c/2

c

*Di

(0

o

ii

U1

z

S

UJ

o

U

c

UJ

1>

E

X

'o

H

u

u

countries, or merchandise to be exported
from them merely because very high charges
for carriage have been paid. This is the sole
distinction between consignments by letter
post and other consignments, and, as regards
the former, the Censors merely follow the
recognised procedure for dealing with mer-
chandise liable to seizure in time of war.
When the exammation of these first-class
mails was commenced, a considerable quantity
of commodities most urgently required by
the enemy was found addressed direct to con-
signees in Germany, and large quantities of
German exports of small bulk, but relatively
high value, were also found. These goods
had, in many cases, been despatched without
any attempt to conceal their origin or destina-
tion. From the first few mails examined,
over 3,000 packets of raw rubber, as well as
the manufactured article in a great variety of
forms, were seized on their way to Germany,
while the German exports thus intercepted
represented practically every article which that
country could afford to export, and which

1605 B

was capable of being despatched in this costly
manner (viz., inter alia, jewellery, drugs,
machine needles, and violin strings).

As soon, however, as it became known
that merchandise sent by letter mail was not,
in future, to pass unmolested, firms on both
sides of the Atlantic interested in upholding
the economic position of the Central Powers
were forced to attempt all kinds of subter-
fuges before abandoning this last remaining
expedient for evading the Allied Blockade.
The greatest ingenuity was accordingly exer-
cised to disguise the real origin or destination
of merchandise, and to conceal the goods
themselves. For instance, a careful examina-
tion of the wrapping of certain intercepted
packets of photographs revealed the fact
that a bar of pure nickel was concealed in
each fluting of the corrugated-paper wrapping.
Packets described as, and appearing to con-
tain, photographs, were found, upon closer
examination, to consist, in reality, of a large
number of ingeniously packed sheets of dental
rubber.

It is not suggested that the seizure of mer-
chandise from the letter mails is as important
as many of the other functions performed by
the Censorship. But the letter mails would
certainly be used on a much larger scale for
the conveyance of contraband goods but for
the control exercised by the Censor.

2. SECURITIES AND REMITTANCES.

During the year 1915 numerous indica-
tions proved that Germany was unloading
her foreign securities on a very extensive
scale, and that this policy was approved, if
not actually engineered, by the German
Government. There can be no doubt that
this realisation of foreign securities greatly
assisted the enemy in acquiring funds for
investment in their national war loans, in
improving the American exchange, in bol-
stering up their credit abroad, and in financing
purchases in neutral countries. In the first
two months after the Censorship was ex-
tended to mails carried by neutral ships

B 2 •

8

voluntarily entering British territorial waters,
securities to the approximate face value of
two millions sterling were seized and placed
in the Prize Court on good prima facie evi-
dence of enemy origin. The effect of this
has been greatly to depreciate the value in
neutral markets of securities bearing evidence
of enemy ownership, and to reduce almost
to vanishing point the volume of securities
despatched by mail, directly or indirectly,
from Germany to America for realisation.

REMITTANCES

An enormous number of letters containing
cheques, drafts, money orders and remittances
in various forms, in course of transmission
for enemy benefit, have also been detained,
the value represented by which up to date
is well over £50,000,000.

3. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE EXAMI-
NATION OF THE MAILS
It must be frankly admitted that the
value to the Allies of the information ex-

tracted from letters in the course of their
passage through the Censorship is far greater
than was anticipated, for it could hardly have
been possible to realise, except in the light of
actual experience, the extraordinary thorough-
ness and ingenuity with which the enemy were
exploiting the International Postal Service for
belligerent purposes. Innumerable plots and
devices ot a most ingenious character for
evading the Blockade, and transmitting sup-
plies to the enemy by indirect methods, have
been detected in the course of examining
these mails, and, in consequence, frustrated.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to say that
enemy traders are as well aware as the British
Censors of the importance of their corre-
spondence as evidence of the real origin or
destination of goods shipped from, or to, a
neutral country, and that the most valuable
evidence is not found in letters addressed
direct to, or posted in, enemy territory,
but in correspondence passing between
persons or firms in neutral countries. In an
intercepted letter from a German firm

10

in New York to their Berlin house, the
writers ask the addressees to request all their
friends to forward letters in small envelopes
with addresses written by ladies, and with
covers addressed to ladies, and suggest that,
for this purpose, correspondence should be
subdivided as much as possible when for-
warded. They declare that the principal
object of this is to ascertain whether the
British Censorship is thorough in its examina-
tion of enemy correspondence, or is mainly
guided by the external appearance of the
envelope.

There can be no better evidence of the
importance of the Censorship as a belligerent
weapon than the efforts of the enemy to
excite agitation against it in neutral countries,
and the multiplicity and ingenuity of their
devices for evading it.

METHODS AND ORGANISATION OF THE
CENSORSHIP

The detection of correspondence of the
three classes referred to above involves the

11

examination of a very large number of letters
from one firm to another in regard to trans-
actions with which the British Government
has no desire to interfere. It is probably
this fact which has given rise to the
suspicion, apparently entertained in certain
quarters in the United States, that the British
Censorship is being used as a means of cap-
turing American trade. The British Minister
of Blockade has already denied in the most
formal manner that the Censorship is put to
any such use, but this opportunity may well
be taken to repeat the denial.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised
that the general and statistical mformation
extracted from trade letters, which has proved
so invaluable to the Allied Governments
in checking the supply of materials through
neutral to enemy countries, and in preventing
the export of enemy goods, is used for these
purposes solely, and never as a means of
capturing neutral trade. The activities of
neutral traders are of no interest whatever
to the Postal Censorship, except in so far

12

as they involve transactions for the benefit
of the enemy.

It has been suggested that, although in-
formation in regard to purely neutral trade
may not be obtained by the Censorship for
official use, the individuals engaged in reading
the correspondence may divulge its contents
to British firms, who may themselves make
use of it for their own benefit. The answer
to this suggestion is that the employment in
the Censorship of men who would break, in
such a manner, their solemn obligation to
secrecy would be as great a danger from the
British as it would from the neutral point of
view. A man of this stamp could, for ex-
ample, reveal to one British firm the trade
secrets of another and otherwise improperly
use his opportunities of information to the
detriment of British interests. A Censorship
conducted by such persons would be worse
than useless, and every precaution is taken
to select for the work men whose credentials
are unimpeachable.

It is true that, as in every other service

13

of this kind, a black sheep is occasionally
admitted in spite of all preliminary precautions.
But a carefully organised system of control
and supervision has been established, and the
discovery of any irregularity of the nature
referred to is followed by instant dismissal.

This accusation against the British Cen-
sors is only one of many made or inspired by
those who suffer, and who are mtended to
suffer, by the Censorship, but who prefer to
make themselves the champions of neutral
mterests rather than of their own.

Other groundless accusations which have
been circulated in this manner are : —

(1) That the letters are read and their
fate decided by young girls ; and

(2) That the letters are forwarded
or destroyed according to the momentary
whim of the reader.

(1) The true facts are that women, none of
whom are less than twenty-five years of age,
are employed to read those letters only which
do not require a business education to under-

14

stand them, with instructions to pass to
properly qualified male Censors any letter
dealing with commercial or financial matters
which has been, in the first place, distributed
to the women instead of to the men, owing
to its havmg purposely been disguised as
a '* private " letter.

(2) No letter is detained without reference
to a competent Officer of the Censorship, and
no letters are ever destroyed.

It is admitted that, at the outset, neutral
correspondence in which enemy interests were
in no way concerned was subjected to a delay
which is greatly regretted, and which has
since been reduced to a minimum. It must
not be imagined that the mails were removed
from neutral ships for examination without
careful consideration of the arrangements
which would be required to deal with them as
quickly as possible. All preparations which
seemed necessary were made with this object,
but, unfortunately, those responsible for them
were not aware of some of the difficulties which
would be encountered. For instance, there

15

was no reason to suppose that (as proved to
be the case) bags purporting to contain mails
from one neutral country to another would
contain nothing but mails to or from an
enemy country, or that bags represented as
containing printed matter would contain not
only correspondence of all kinds, registered
and unregistered, but also articles such as
rubber, coffee, jewellery, etc. It was not,
moreover, anticipated that persons writing to
or from enemy countries would have already
adopted the practice of sending their letters
under cover to intermediaries in neutral
countries, or that great numbers of com-
plete sacks, appearing to contain merely
business circulars from neutral countries,
would contain, in reality, nothing but propa-
ganda from Germany under covers bearing
neutral postage stamps.

These and similar unforeseen peculiarities
made it impossible, until the staff engaged had
been largely increased and had become accus-
tomed to them, to select on any fixed prin-
ciple those mail bags which, when all could

16

not be examined within a reasonable period,
should be forwarded without examination.

SHIPPING DOCUMENTS

The delay to shipping documents was,
at one time, the subject of complaints.
But this difficulty has now been ob-
viated by arrangements for the transmission
of such documents in specially marked bags,
which are dealt with by a special staif of
Censors at the port of call, and are forwarded
to destination by the same ship in which they
were despatched.

DELAY TO THE MAILS

Every effort has been made to reduce to
the utmost extent possible the delay to which
ordinary mails are subjected by their removal
for censorship, and so great has been the
desire not to injure legitimate neutral business
that in the past, in cases where the staff has
been insufficient to cope with a particular
mail in a given time, large numbers of letters

17

have been sent on uncensored. Increases of
staff and various improvements in organisation
which are the outcome of practical experience
have now reduced the period of delay to a
minimum. (Vide Appendix.)

It must be explained that, in spite of the
assertions of those who wish to make the
Censorship a scapegoat for every inconveni-
ence suffered by correspondents at the present
time, the British authorities are in no way
responsible for the fact that mails from the
United States to Holland and Scandinavia
are not despatched by the quickest route,
viz., by the fast British or American liners
to Liverpool, a course which would greatly
mitigate the delays complained of.

It has been suggested that considerable
loss of time would be avoided if mails landed
at Kirkwall were examined at and despatched
from that port instead of being brought to
London. The advisability of such a course
received careful consideration, but, quite apart
from the obvious practical difficulty of accom-
modating, supervising and controlling a suffi-

18

ciently large staff in such a remote and isolated
place as Kirkwall, two insuperable difficulties
presented themselves, viz. : —

(1) Either the ship must be kept
waiting while the mail was examined
and replaced, a course which, m the case
of a heavy mail, would obviously result
in serious delay to ship, cargo and pas-
sengers ;

(2) Or the mail must be kept waiting
for the next ship calling at Kirkwall, which
might not arrive for many days, and,
when she did arrive, might not be able
to take the mail on board.

It was therefore decided that the only
safe method of ensuring prompt re-transmis-
sion was to despatch the bags from the great
English ports where there are frequent and
regular sailmgs, and, in order to do this, the
mails have to be sent south as far as Liverpool,
Newcastle, Hull, Tilbury or Harwich. London
was thought to be the most convenient centre
for distribution to these ports, and it has been
found that the advantages derived from cen-

19

tralisation far outweigh the loss of a few hours
at the most in railway transit

CONCLUSION

The creation of entirely new departmenta
machinery in time of war is a task of extra-
ordinary difficulty, and defects are bound to
arise which can only be rectified m the light
of practical experience. Every complaint
received from neutral sources, which has
appeared to be susceptible of remedy, has
received careful and sympathetic con-
sideration, and, wherever possible, without
impairing the efficiency of the Censorship or
defeating its primary objects, has been made
the basis of improvements in method and
routine.

It may be stated with confidence that the
work of the Censorship could not be executed
with greater expedition or with less detriment
to neutral interests than it is at present by the
immense and vigilantly supervised organisation
which has been established for the purpose
in London.

20

APPENDIX
I. — Mails from United States to Holland.
(a) If not removed from the ship by
which they were despatched : —

Arrive Falmouth - - 1 st June.
Leave Falmouth - - 3rd June.
Arrive Rotterdam - 6th June.

Total

6 days.

{b) If removed from the ship by which

they were despatched : —
Arrive Falmouth -

1 st June.

Received in London -

1st June (or 3.30
a.m., 2nd June)

Despatched after examination : —
At earliest - - 2nd June.

At latest

5th June.

Arrive Rotterdam : —
At earliest

3rd June.

At latest

7th June.*

Total (minimum) -

3 days.

Total (maximum) -

7 days.

* Extra day allowed, as there is no despatch to
Holland on three days in the week.

II. — Mads from Holland to United States.

(a) If not removed from the ship by
which they were despatched : —

Arrive Falmouth - - 2nd June.
Leave Falmouth - 4th June.

Arrive New York - 1 2th June.

Total - - 1 1 days.

(b) If removed from the ship by which
they were despatched : —

Arrive Falmouth - 2nd June.

Received in London - 3rd June (or 3.30

a.m., 4th June).

Despatched after examination : —
At earliest - - 4th June.
At latest - - 5th June

Arrive New York : —
At earliest - - 13th June.
At latest - - 14th June.

Total (minimum) - 13 days.
Total (maximum) - 14 days.

22

III. — Mails from United States to Denmark.

(a) If not removed from the ship by
which they were despatched : —

Arrive Kirkwall - 1 st June.

Arrive Copenhagen - 4th June.

Total - - 4 days.

(b) If removed from the ship by which
they were despatched : —

Arrive Kirkwall - 1 st June.

Received in London - 3rd June.

Despatched after examination : —
At earliest - - 4th June.
At latest - - 7th June.

Arrive Copenhagen : —

At earliest - - 7th June.
At latest - - 10th June.

Total (minimum) - 7 days.
Total (maximum) - 10 days.

23

IV. — Mails from Denmark to United States.

(a) If not removed from the ship by
which they were despatched : —

Arrive Kirkwall - - 1 st June.
Arrive New York - 1 1 th June.

Total - - 1 1 days.

(b) If removed from the ship by which
they were despatched : —

Arrive Kirkwall - 1 st June.

Received in London - 3rd June.

Despatched after examination : —
At earliest - - 4th June.
At latest - - 5th June.

Arrive New York : —

At earliest - - 13th June.
At latest - - 15th June.

Total (minimum) - 13 days.
Total (maximum) - 15 days.

24

N.B. — These figures are based on the
experience of the summer months, but, so far
as they relate to the saihngs and duration of
voyages of the ships concerned, they cannot
be absolutely vouched for, owing to alterations
and uncertainties to which the movements of
all ships are continually subject.

Printed in Great Britain by Eyre S Spottisxvoode, Ltd.
P,ast Hcfrding Street, London, E,C,