Major-General Sir Frederick S. Roberts, bart., V. C., G. C. B., C. I. E., R. A., a memoir

- \

LIEUT.-GENEKAL SIR FKEPE1UCK SLEIGH ItOBEliTS, V.C., G.C.B., ( .l.K.

MAJOR-GENERAL

SIR FREDERICK S. ROBERTS,

BART., V.C., G.C.B., C.I.E., R.A.

A MEMOIR.

CHAELES EATHBONE LOW, I.N., F.E.G.S.,

AUTHOR OF THE " HISTORY OF THE INDIAN NAVY, '

•' MEMOIR OF LORD WOLSELEY,"
"HISTORY OF MARITIME DISCOVERY,"

ETC., ETC.

LONDON:

W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE,
PALL MALL, S.W.

1883.

LONDON :

PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER,
MILFOED LANE, STRAND, W.C.

PKEFACE.

THE practice of writing a memoir * of a living public mail
scarcely stands in need of defence, since it has become of such
common practice. Within recent years, the careers of Lord
Beaconsfield and Mr. Gladstone, Lord Wolseley and Mr. Bright,
have been given to the public during their lifetime ; and the
only question that arises, when considering the advisability of
such a publication, — conceding the necessity of abstaining from
publishing matter that would violate any confidences, or unduly
cause pain to the living or the representatives of the dead, —
would appear to have reference to the public demand in each
particular instance.

Such a question as applied to Sir Frederick Roberts must be
unhesitatingly given in the affirmative. The military achieve-
ments of the gallant officer are great and undeniable, " as a
mountain open, palpable." They have received the unstinted
acknowledgments not only of all classes of his countrymen, but
of the highest professional authorities of the Continent. Count
Von Moltke and the German generals expressed their unbounded
admiration of the great march from Cabul to Candahar ; and
the heroic Skobeleff, whose untimely death was such a crushing
blow to the army he adorned, as well as to the cause of Pan-
slavism, though the peace of Europe was the gainer by his

* It should be stated that this memoir was completed early in 1882, but
circumstances delayed its publication. It has been compiled from the Blue
Books and official despatches, and from personal reminiscences supplied in
conversation and by correspondence with Sir Frederick Roberts, who himself
revised the entire work, chapter by chapter.

2068875

iv Preface.

removal from the scene — was enthusiastic in praise of the
military genius displayed by Roberts throughout the two years
he was the central figure of the war in Afghanistan. And here
we may note a remarkable resemblance in the character and
method of these two distinguished soldiers. Both were gifted
with impetuous valour, complete knowledge of their profession,
a quick intelligence in seizing the features of ground, and
adapting the measures at their disposal to the end sought to be
attained ; an unfailing skill in their tactical combinations, a
perfect yet calm self-reliance, and a faculty for inspiring con-
fidence in others.

Roberts's dispositions for the capture of the Peiwar Kotul were
most masterly, and his rapid march on Cabul with only 8,000
men, his skill in forcing the enemy's position at Charasia, and
his seizure of Cabul were brilliant feats of arms worthy the
best days of British prowess. On the abdication of Yakoob
Khan he was, for a time, the de facto ruler of Afghanistan.
His word was law, and he might have said : —

" Hoc sic jubeo ; sit pro ratione voluntas."

Severe measures were necessary with the wretches who had
murdered a British Envoy, a personage who, in the East as in
every clime, is invested with a special sanctity ; but no Afghan
suffered the extreme penalty who had not been implicated in
that deed of shame. An unworthy attempt was made to impute
blood-thirstiness to Sir Frederick Roberts, but to those who
are conversant with his character, such a charge will scarcely
demand refutation. In his humanity and gentleness of cha-
racter, our hero resembles the " Happy Warrior " sketched by
Wordsworth : —

" He who, though thus endued as with a sense
And faculty for storm and turbulence,
Is yet a soul whose master-bias leans
To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes."

Sir Frederick Roberts displayed in a remarkable degree the

Preface. v

self-reliance to which we have referred, during the memorable
events that occurred at Cabul in December, 1879, when the
cantonment of Sherpur was invested by no less than 100,000 or
120,000 armed men. At no time was there any change in the
serenity of manner for which the General was distinguished,
and which infused a like confidence in his small force belea-
guered in the depth of winter by foes outnumbering them
twenty-fold.

Since the death of the great Ameer, Dost Mahomed Khan, the
political condition of Afghanistan bore a striking analogy to that
of England during the "Wars of the Roses. As the rival Houses
of York and Lancaster contended for the crown, dividing the
nobles and the country into two factions, so Afzul Khan and
Shere Ali, the sons of the Dost, and their sons, Abdul Rahman
and Yakoob Khan, bathed the country in the blood of their
adherents. As in England during the 15th century, so in
Afghanistan during the 19th, " uneasy lies the head that wears
a crown ;" and in the see-saw from the throne to the dungeon,
the epigram might be applied to the rival claimants for the
perilous honour of ruling the turbulent races of Afghanistan : —

" Treason does never prosper ; what's the reason ?
"Why, when it prospers, none dare call it treason."

With the removal of Yakoob Khan to India, and the ap-
pearance of pretenders in the person of his younger brother,
Ayoob Khan, and other claimants for the throne, the task before
Sir Frederick Roberts became more difficult, but with the
assistance of his political officer, Major Hastings, and afterwards
of Mr. (now Sir) Lepel Griffin, he initiated the negotiations
with Abdul Rahman, which have resulted so favourably for the
peace of Afghanistan. Sir Frederick Roberts's final achievement,
the forced march from Cabul to Candahar with 10,000 soldiers
and 8,000 non-combatants, and his brilliant victory over Ayoob
Khan on the day following his arrival under the walls of the
capital of Western Afghanistan, are now historic, and have

vi Preface.

earned for him a prominent place in that illustrious band
of soldiers who have acquired for this country her Eastern
Empire.

The roll of England's victories — chequered at distant inter-
vals by reverses — beginning at Cressy, has been prolonged to
Candahar and Tel-el-Kebir. -Not even the annals of Rome
can show such a record of victory, achieved over races the most
savage and warlike, assisted by the forces of Nature when
arrayed in her most austere and rugged mood. In climes
where the eagles of her great prototype never penetrated, the
standards of Britain have been planted, and countries having
to her people only a legendary existence — West Africa, the land
of Prester John, and China — have been subjugated by her arms
or compelled to sign an ignominious peace.

England has watered her horses on the banks of the classic
Nile and Euphrates, and her legions have driven her hereditary
foe, the Gaul, from America and India, and have triumphed
alike over the Zulu in South Africa, the Afghan in Central
Asia, and the Maori in New Zealand. Soldiers that could
overcome the most renowned and martial races of four con-
tinents must be : — -

" Types of a race who shall to time unborn
Their country leave unconquered as of yore."

But much, if not everything, depends upon leadership, and
should a crisis arise in Europe or in any portion of our world-
encompassing Empire, the eyes of the nation — as after the
massacre of the Cavagnari Mission, the disaster at Maiwand,
and in our ignominious struggle with the Boers — will instinc-
tively turn to Sir Frederick Roberts as conspicuous among that
small band of tried and capable officers to whom will be con-
fided the defence of the honour and interests of the Mother
country and her Colonies.

C. R LOW.
Kensington, June, 1883.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction — Some Account of Sir Frederick Roberta's Family — The
Services of his Father, General Sir Abraham Roberts — His Early
Life, and Career at Eton, Sandhurst, and Woolwich — Proceeds to
India in the Bengal Artillery — Serves on his Father's Staff and
on the Frontier at Peshawur — Outbreak of the Indian Mutiny .

CHAPTER II.

The Siege of Delhi — Roberts joins the i*unjaub Movable Column
— Proceeds to Delhi as Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General
of Artillery — Lieutenant Roberts participates in the Action of
the 9th July — Gallantry of his Friend, Lieutenant Hills —
Roberts is wounded in the Fighting on the 14th July — Prepa-
rations for the Bombardment — Roberts serves in No. 2 Battery
at Ludlow Castle — The Storm and Capture of Delhi— Sir James
Brind's Reminiscences of Sir Frederick Roberts at Delhi . 18

CHAPTER III.

Lieutenant Roberts takes the Field with Colonel Greathed's Movable
Column — The Action at Bolundshur — Narrow Escape of Lieu-
tenant Roberts — The Capture of Allyghur — Roberts is engaged in
the Pursuit with 9th Lancers— The Surprise at Agra of the 10th
of October — lloberts's share in the Severe Fighting and Pursuit —
The March to Mynpoorie — Skirmish and Pursuit of the Rebels
to the Ganges — Arrival at Cawnpore . 48

CHAPTER IV.

Departure of Lieutenant Roberts from Cawnpore with Brigadier Hope
Grant's Column for the Relief of Lucknow — Narrow Escape of
Roberts from Capture by the Rebels at Buntheera — March upon
Lucknow — Roberts as Quartermaster-General of Sir Hope Grant's

viii Contents.

PAGE

Division— He leads the Army from the Alumbagh— Is sent by
Sir Colin Campbell on a Special Mission to Alumbagh— Is
associated with Captain Garnet Wolseley in the Capture of the
32nd Mess-house— The Return March to Cawnpore— The Battle
of Cawnpore on the 6th of December— The Affair at Serai Ghat. 62

CHAPTER V.

Roberts gains the V.C. at Khodagunj— Occupation of Futtehgurh on
the 2nd of January, 1858— A Day's Pig-sticking— The Army
crosses into Oude— Arduous Nature of Roberts's Duties on the
Staff— Storm of Meeangunj— Roberts's Humanity— The Siege of
Lucknow— Operations Trans-Goomtee— The Action of Koorsie—
Roberts is invalided and returns to England .... 76

CHAPTER VI.

Lieutenant Roberts returns to India— la employed in Charge of
the Viceroy's Camp — Lord Clyde's Letter to Lord Canning
recommending Roberts — Promotion to a Brevet-Majority — On
Tour with Sir Hugh Rose — Is ordered on Special Service to
Umbeyla— Critical State of Affairs on the North-West Frontier
in 1863— The Action of Laloo— The Capture of Umbeyla— The
Burning of Mulkah — Major Roberts Compiles a Route Book for
the Bengal Presidency — Returns to England on Sick Leave — On
his return to India proceels to Abyssinia with the Expedition
under Sir Robert Napier — Major Roberts's Services in Abyssinia. 91

CHAPTER VII.

The Looshai Campaign — Description of the Country and Cause of the
War — Colonel Roberts fits out the two Columns of the Expe-
ditionary Force — He joins General Bourchier at Cachar — March
of the Cachar Column —Arrival at Tipai Mookh — Attack on the
Kholel Villages led by Colonel Roberts — Further Operations
against the Looshais — Action of the 25th of January, 1872 —
Colonel Roberts Commands at the Capture of Taikoom — Arrival
at Chumfai — Conclusion of Peace and Return of the Column to
India — Roberts is appointed Quartermaster-General at Army
Head-quarters — His Services in that Capacity — Lord Lytton
and General Roberts— Roberts is nominated Commandant of the
Punjaub Irregular Force and Special Commissioner on the
Sciude-Punjaub Frontier 109

Contents. ix

CHAPTER VIII.

PAGE

The Afghan War — General Roberts is Appointed to the Command
of the Kurram Field Force — Constitution of the Field Force —
Brief Description of the Kurram Valley and its Inhabitants —
The Advance from Thull into Afghan Territory — The Occupa-
tion of the Kurram Fort — The Operations of the 28th November
— Reconnoissances and Preparations for the Attack on the Peiwar
Kotul . 132

CHAPTER IX.

The Midnight March up the Spingawi Ravine — Treachery in the
Ranks — The Capture of the Spingawi Pass — Advance along the
Ridge and Severe Fighting — General Roberts is Wounded — The
Night Bivouac in the Mountains — Occupation of the Peiwar
Kotal — Account of the Operations by an Officer of the Staff —
General Roberts Reconnoitres the Shutargardan Pass . . . 149

CHAPTER X.

General Roberts returns to Kurram by the Sappri Defile — Attack by
the Mangals on the Baggage Escort — Preparations for the Occu-
pation of the Kurram Valley during the Winter — The Court-
Martial on the Treacherous Soldiers of the 29th Punjaub N.I.,
and Roberts's General Order to the Force — Disposal of the
Troops into Winter Quarters — Expedition into the Khost Valley
— The March from Kurram to Hazir Pir, and thence into the
Khost Valley — Occupation of the Fort of Matun— Action of the
7th January and Defeat of the Mangals— Reconnoissance by
General Roberts of the Khost Valley 174

CHAPTER XL

General Roberts makes a Tour of the Valley — Army Signalling in
Khost — Durbar of the Headmen of the Khostiwals and Mangals
— Evacuation of Matun and Return March to Hazir Pir — Prepa-
rations for the Advance on Cabul — Reconnoissance by General
Roberts — Conclusion of the Treaty of Gundamuck — Arrival at
Ali Kheyl of the Cavagnari Mission— General Roberts Returns
to Simla 195

Contents.

CHAPTER XII.

tAOE

.Massacre of the British Mission at Cabul— Receipt of the Intelligenca
by Sir Frederick Roberts at Simla— He Proceeds to take the
Field — Arrival at Ali Kheyl — Preparations for the Advance on
Cabul— Sir Frederick Roberts Moves across the Shutargardan
Pass — He Experiences a Narrow Escape — Arrival at Kooshi —
Interview with Yakoob Khan — Proclamations of Sir Frederick
Roberts to the Army and the People of Cabul .... 218

CHAPTER XIII.

Advance on Cabul — Battle of Charasia — Sir Frederick Roberts
arrives before the Capital — His Visit to the Scene of the
Massacre of the British Mission — Occupation of the Bala His^ar
— Proclamation of the 12th of October — The Punishment Meted
out to Cabul 236

CHAPTER XIV.

The Cabul District after its Occupation by the British — Events at the
Shutargardan Pass — The Explosion in the Bala Hissar — Occu-
pation of the Sherpur Cantonment — Sir Frederick Roberts
Reconnoitres the Passes towards Jugdulluck — Abandonment of
the Shutargardan — The Expedition to Maidan — Unsettled State
of the Country — Deportation of Yakoob Khan to India — A
Review of the Situation in Northern Afghanistan before the
Events of December 1879 . 256

CHAPTER XV.

The National Rising of December, 1879— The Plans of Sir Frederick
Roberts to Check the Movement — The Cavalry Action of the
llth December — Critical Condition of Affairs at Sherpur and in
Cabul — Prompt Action of Sir Frederick Roberts — Movements of
Brigadier- Generals Macpherson and Baker— The Attempt to
Capture the Takht-i-Shah on the 12ta December— Severe fight-
ing on the 13th December— Capture of Koh Asmai— Successful
Counter-Attack by the Enemy — Heavy Losses Experienced by
the British Force— Sir Frederick Roberts Determines to Concen-
trate in Sherpur — Retirement of the British Troops within the
Cantonment 280

Contents.

CHAPTER XVI.

PAGE

The Situation at Sherpur and in Cabul — The City and Bala Ilissar
Seized by the Enemy — Their Movements against Sherpur — Sir
Frederick Roberts places the Cantonment in a Condition of
Defence — Colonel Hudson and the Garrison at Lutterbund —
Desultory Fighting with the Enemy between the 14th and 21st
December — The Attack of the 23rd December — Final Rout
of the Afghans by Sir Frederick Roberts — Arrival of Brigadier-
General Charles Gough with Reinforcements — The Future
Government of Afghanistan — The Rival Pretenders to the
Auieership — Sir Donald Steward succeeds to the Chief Command
in North-Eastern Afghanistan 302

CHAPTER XVII.

Sir Frederick Roberts and the Negotiations with Abdul Rahman —
Appointment of the Sirdar to the Ameership — Restless State
of the Sirdars and People of Afghanistan — Arrival of Abdul
Rahman at Cabul and Assumption of the Ameership — Sir
Frederick Roberts's Views on the Kurram Valley Question —
The Maiwaud Disaster— Sir Frederick Roberts appointed to the
Command of the Relieving Column — His Preparations for the
March on Candahar — Dramatic Aspects of the Afghan War . 328

CHAPTER XVIII.

English Public Opinion on the Projected March through Afghanistan
— Sir Frederick Roberts quits Cabul for Beni Hissar — Incidents of
the Forced March to Ghuznee — Arrival at Ghuznee and Sur-
render of the Town and Citadel — The Forced March to Khelat-i-
Ghilzye — Relief and Removal of the Garrison — Sir Frederick
Roberts on the Line of March — The Advance on Candahar —
Preparations for the Attack on Ayoob Khan's Position . 343

CHAPTER XIX.

Arrival of the Cabul-Candahar Force at Robat — Letter from General
Phayre — Sir Frederick Roberts's State of Health— Arrival before
Candahar — Reconnoissance of the 31st August — Preparations for
the Attack — Dispositions of the Army — The Advance on the
Pir Paimal Position — Storming of the Village of Gundi .Mulla
Sahibdad — Death of Colonel Brownlow — Capture of Pir" Paimal
— Brilliant Advance of Macpherson's and Baker's Brigades —
Gallant Conduct of Major White— Incidents of the Fight —

xii Contents.

Capture of the Enemy's Camp at Mazra — Losses of the British
—Results of the Victory— Sir Frederick Roberts Resigns his
Command in Afghanistan ........ 362

CHAPTER XX.

Sir Frederick Roberts quits Afghanistan — The Question of the Reten-
tion of Candahar — Sir Frederick Roberts Arrives in England — .
His Reception by his Countrymen — Rewards Conferred on Sir V
Frederick Roberts — Precedents in the Case of Rewards for
Military Services — His Speech at the Mansion House — Changes
in Army Reform due to Sir Frederick Roberts's Criticisms — He
is appointed to the Command of the Army sent to Coerce the
Boers — Departure for and Return from South Africa — Sir
Frederick Roberts attends the German Autumn Manoeuvres —
His Comments on the German Army and Military System — Sir
Frederick Roberts is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the
Madras Army — He leaves England for India— Conclusion . . 377

MEMOIR

OF

SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction— Some Account of Sir Frederick Roberts's Family — The Ser-
vices of his Father, General Sir Abraham Roberts — His Early Life, and
Career at Eton, Sandhurst, and Woolwich — Proceeds to India in the
Bengal Artillery — Serves on his Father's Staff and on the Frontier at
Peshawur — Outbreak of the Indian Mutiny.

A MEMOIR of an officer, of whose principal achievement, the
march from Cahul to Candahar, German military critics declare
that it is the most brilliant performance of a British Army
since Waterloo, and which a distinguished officer, who had
served throughout Lord Strathnairn's victorious campaign in
Central India, declared to us was, in his estimation, the finest
exploit achieved by our arms since Sir Charles Napier's con-
quest of Scinde — the memoir of such a soldier cannot be
without interest not only to men of his own cloth, but to the
British public, which reads with avidity biographies of its
military heroes.

Sir Frederick Roberts comes of a military stock, and was
cradled, so to speak, amid arms and soldiers. His father, the
late General Sir Abraham Roberts, G.C.B., lived to attain the
age of ninety, and was the patriarch of Indian Generals. In
his day he had achieved no mean renown ; but though his name
has been commemorated in military history as that of a gallant

'

2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

and capable soldier, it is by the achievements of his still more
remarkable son that the name of Roberts will live in our
history. There are yet surviving a few grizzled and aged
warriors, who can bear witness that Brigadier Roberts, of the
first Afghan War, was a good soldier and true, and more, was
possessed of a sagacity and prescience, which, had it been
found in those responsible for the political and military direc-
tion of affairs in Afghanistan, might have averted a terrible
calamity.

The late Sir Abraham Roberts entered the Royal Army in
July 1801, with the intention of making it his profession, but
the Peace of Amiens in the following year, which caused great
reductions, induced him, with many other officers, to join the
Indian Service, which had then every prospect of active employ-
ment. On the 1st January, 1803, he was gazetted an Ensign
in the Army of the Honourable East India Company, on the
Bengal Establishment, and, in the following year, served under
Lord Lake in his campaign against the Mahrattas. The
young officer lived to see the boundaries of British India ex-
tended from Delhi and Ferozepore to the Khyber Pass, and was
fated to take a prominent part in restoring to his throne that
Shah Soojah, who, with his brother Zematin Shah, at this time
fluttered the Council Chamber at Calcutta with fears of an
Afghan invasion. How vast were the changes, political,
military, and social, he witnessed in India during the seventy
years succeeding his arrival at Calcutta !

The poet Campbell writes of the motives that induced our
forefathers to conquer India : —

" Did Peace descend, to triumph and to save,
When freeborn Britons cross'd the Indian wave 1
Ah, no ! to more than Rome's ambition true,
The nurse of Freedom gave it not to you."

It was the pursuit of commerce that brought us to India, and
were we to own the truth, it is no high-flown sense of duty, but
our own selfish purposes, and our national love of aggrandize-
ment that keeps us there, and has induced us to lavish the
best blood of England in fighting our way to supreme sove-
reignty over an empire vaster than that of Aurungzebe, and
maintaining it against a military revolt that would have ousted

His Fathers Career in India. 3

from the country any other power but ours. However, as was
said by Marshal McMahon on a memorable occasion : — " J'y
sids, etfy rcste."

In 1805, Lieutenant Roberts accompanied Lord Lake in the
pursuit, across the Sutlej, of Holkar and Ameer Khan, and, in
April, 1806, he joined the first battalion 13th Regiment Native
Infantry, then on service in Bundelcund. While so employed
he suffered severely from the prevailing sickness, caused by
fatiguing duties and constant exposure, as, in the absence of
cantonments, the army was under canvas during the hot winds
and rains, and continually employed against Pindarees and
marauders.

Early in 1807, Lieutenant Roberts was appointed Adjutant
of his regiment, being at the time the youngest officer on the
establishment performing this duty. At the close of the year
he acted as Major of Brigade to General Dickens's force at the
sieges of Komona and Gunnowrie, in the Doab, where the
troops suffered severely in killed and wounded. In 1810, he
volunteered for Java, but his services were not accepted.

In May, 1814, Lieutenant Roberts was appointed to the
department of Public "Works, but, in November of that year,
his regiment being warned for service in Nepaul, he obtained
permission to rejoin it, and was present at the storm of
Kullunga, where the gallant General Sir Rollo Gillespie fell.
On the 27th December following, though only a subaltern, he
commanded his regiment, which was actively engaged with the
enemy at the Morle-ke- Tehee, close to the fort of Jetuk. The
force, which was commanded by Major (afterwards General Sir)
William Richards, received the high approbation of the Marquis
of Hastings.* On the 2nd April, 1815, Roberts was Staff Officer

* The Adjutant-General wrote to General G. Martindale, commanding
the column : — " The conduct of Major Richards and his detachment claims
the unqualified approbation of the Commander-in-Chief ; that officer suc-
cessfully accomplished the main object for which he was detached, and
maintained his position against superior numbers for an entire day, during
which Major Richards afforded conspicuous proofs of his judgment, coolness
and deliberate valour. His Excellency desires that his particular thanks
and approbation be expressed to Major Richards for his conduct on the
above arduous occasion, as well as to the whole of the officers and men who
composed his detachment, and so ably supported him by their determined
exertions of bravery, zeal, and discipline, and patient endurance of fatigue
and privations."

B 2

4 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

to a Brigade under the command of Sir William Richards,
which was successfully engaged at Birla-ke-Tebee, capturing
the Nepaul chief, and completely routing the enemy, for which
service he received the thanks of his Commanding Officer, and
of the Governor- General, the Marquis of Hastings, who per-
mitted him on the conclusion of the campaign, as a mark of
favour, to return to his appointment in the Puhlic Works
Department.

On the 9th April, 1816, Lieutenant Roherts again joined his
regiment, which was ordered by express from Moradabad to quell
a rebellion at Bareilly, in Rohilcund, and made the march of
fifty miles without a halt. While in Rohilcund he was placed
in charge of the Famine Fund, and had the satisfaction of
relieving many thousands of poor sufferers. He now again
returned to his appointment in the Public Works Department,
where his zeal and activity were proverbial.* Ever anxious
to see active service, like his distinguished son, Captain
Roberts, in 1824, volunteered for service in the Burmese War,
and received the following reply from Colonel Marley, Military
Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Edward
Paget, G.C.B., dated 30th June, 1824:— "With respect to
yourself, there cannot be a doubt upon the subject, you fill a
very responsible situation under Government, and it is in it
your services will be most useful. Every one who is acquainted
with you knows well, that if storming a stockade formed any
part of your duty, you would go at it like an Irishman."

So valuable were the services in the Public Works Depart-
ment, alluded to above, that, on the 2nd February, 1828, Lord

* Colonel Penson, the Superintendent of Public Works, writing to Mr.
W. B. Bailey, Chief Secretary to Government, under date 30th May, 1817,
submitting letters and bills from Lieutenant Roberts, says : — " The sum
which has been saved on the estimate is considerable, and is highly credit-
able to Lieutenant Roberts. I have likewise the pleasure to submit several
testimonials in behalf of Lieutenant Roberts, which show how great a
favourite this gentleman is in both Civil and Military Departments, and
when I consider how greatly an officer of his activity, practical knowledge,
and integrity, is wanting to look after the valuable public property in the
extensive district of Rohilkund, I hope they may ultimately lead to his
fixture in that province. I lately had an opportunity of examining the
addition to the jail at Mynporee while erecting under this gentleman's
superintendence, and I think he may challenge all India to produce
I etter work."

Services of Major Abraham Roberts. 5

Amlierst, the Governor- General, presented Major Roberts with
a handsome piece of plate, with an inscription testifying to
" the services rendered by him as head of his department."

On the 28th September, 1831, he was promoted to Lieu-
tenant-Colonel, and, in the following year, was selected by Sir
E. Barnes, Commander-in-Chief, to command the 1st Bengal
Fusiliers, the only European regiment then on the Establish-
ment ; and the offer of the appointment was accompanied with
handsome letters from the Adjutant and Quartermaster-Gene-
rals. Colonel Roberts worked up this fine regiment, then
mustering considerably over 1,000 bayonets, to a high state of
efficiency, and the General commanding the Dinapore Division
wrote to him on 18th January, 1833 : — " What I said to the
regiment this morning, was what I really felt, and had I the
power of language, or a greater fluency of speech, a fair field
was open to me to say more. My A.D.C., who has seen many
reviews at home, declared he had not for years seen a better
performance than the one your fine regiment treated us with
this morning." At length, after an uninterrupted service of
over thirty years in India, Colonel Roberts * quitted the
country on his return home to arrange for the education
of his children.

After a residence in England of two years, Colonel Roberts
returned to India. In 1838 took place the Afghan War, and on
the 1st November, Colonel Roberts was placed in command of
the 4th Brigade of the Army of the Indus, composed of his own
regiment and the 35th and 37th Bengal N.I. In February,
1839, he commanded in Upper Scinde, and at Bukker, on the
Indus, had to superintend the crossing of the park, treasure,
Commissariat stores, and baggage of the army, which was done

* When Colonel Roberts -was about to return home from Cawnpore,
General Sir James Sleigh, K.C.B., wrote to him, under date January 5th,
1834: — "As you are about to embark for England, and the Lord knows
when we may again meet, I am induced to send you these few lines to
offer you a memento of my esteem and regard ; and from your having
been so considerable a time stationed at Cawnpore, while I had the honour
of commanding successively the Station and Division, it may not be less
gratifying to you than it is pleasing to myself to assure you how much
that esteem was increased by the assiduity and attention invariably
observed in your exertions to promote the good of the service, and to
fulfil the important duties intrusted to your superintendence."

6 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

without loss. Brigadier Roberts commanded the 4th Brigade
at the storming of Ghuznee on the 23rd July, 1839, and re-
ceived the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief and Governor-
General. Succeeding Sir Robert Sale, who was wounded, in
command of the fortress, under the arrangements he made,
Captain (the late Sir George) Macgregor secured the person of
the commandant, Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, with
many of his followers, for which Sir John Keane personally
thanked Brigadier Roberts.

On the termination of the campaign, the Brigadier was ap-
pointed to the command of the Shah's troops, and Lord Auck-
land promised him the chief command in Afghanistan. Briga-
dier Roberts was an outspoken officer, possessing great expe-
rience of Orientals, and he entirely disagreed with the course
adopted by Sir William Macnaghten, the Envoy and Minister
to the Court of our puppet, Shah Soojah, who, having passed
his life in the secretariat, had no experience of governing a
turbulent race, but took an optimist view of affairs in Afghan-
istan, and persisted in disregarding the warnings of his coad-
jutors and assistants, Burnes, Rawlinson, Macgregor, Nott,
Roberts, and others. Macnaghten being all-powerful at Simla,
carried everything with a high hand, and any one who displayed
independence incurred his displeasure. Thus he counselled the
recall from Candahar of General Nott, because of his blunt out-
spokenness and unco'nciliatory manners ; but the Government
had the good sense to retain this capable officer, who saved
British honour in Southern Afghanistan.

Brigadier Roberts saw the true position of affairs, and, warned
by the unsettled state of the country, and the several minor
disasters that had occurred at outposts, was convinced of the
urgent necessity of precautionary measures. Accordingly he
recommended that the Bala Hissar and detached forts at Cabul
should be strengthened and well armed with artillery ; that in
them all the treasure, with an ample supply of grain, should be
lodged, and the troops quartered, so that a large force might be
available for service in the field. He also remonstrated against
the location of troops in remote or exposed situations where
they could not be efficiently supported, and, above all, entreated
that the force of Afghan levies might be very limited, until

Brigadier Roberts and Sir William Macnaghten. 7

officers were better qualified, by more perfect knowledge of their
language, customs, and feelings, to command them, and until,
from observation and experience, some trustworthy judgment
could be formed of their conduct, trustworthiness and utility.
But his counsels were disregarded, and the levies raised under
Maule, Hopkins, and other officers, eventually proved to be
mutinous and utterly useless. Again, the military chest for the
whole army was kept in the paymaster's quarters in the city,
and Roberts pointed out the great danger of this practice, par-
ticularly as the force at Cabul was often very weak. While at
Cabul, with the consent of the Envoy, he caused the treasure
to be placed in the Bala Hissar, and at the same time stored
therein a supply of grain. However, shortly after, at the
request of the paymaster, but contrary to the wishes of
Brigadier Roberts, the treasure was sent back to the city, and
when, on the fatal 2nd November, 1841, the paymaster's house
was attacked, the money fell into the hands of the insurgents,
not only feeding the rebellion but leaving the British force
without funds.

Thus it was that the most ordinary military precautions in
an enemy's country were deemed superfluous by the ruling civil
authority, and the steps Roberts had taken, and the measures
he had recommended, were considered either unnecessary, or
as indicative of an admission of weakness. After the crash, a
high political officer, writing to Robertson 14th February, 1842,
bears witness to his sagacity : — " How satisfactory it must now
be for you to have written those opinions to which you can refer
as having been calculated to prevent much, if not all, of the sad
disasters that have befallen the fine force you left here."

The Envoy — with whom privately Roberts was on the best of
terms, for Sir William Macnaghten was an accomplished gentle-
man, and possessed a generous, noble nature — looked upon
Roberts as an alarmist, and pitted his own ignorance of mili-
tary affairs against the veteran soldier's experience of forty
years. He accordingly vetoed Roberts's measures and thwarted
his endeavours to provide for the coming storm. Lord Auck-
land, who had confidence in the Brigadier, supported him, and
in the following letter, dated 6th July, 1840, administered some-
thing like a reprimand to his zealous, but injudicious represen-

8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

tative : — "It may, however, I am directed to remark, be of
advantage to both services, as well as to the public finances, if
deference were upon many points paid to the opinion of Briga-
dier Roberts His Lordship in Council has a strong

desire, in which he looks for your concurrence, to uphold the
military position of Brigadier Roberts. Whenever the regular
forces shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, he will be your
first military authority, and every British officer employed in
that country should be led to look up to him. But for the
reasons that have been given, his Lordship in Council, though
he would be glad to know that he is frequently consulted by
you and the Shah, would not have him directly interfere with
the organization and internal management of the corps wbich
are not attached to the Contingent. His Lordship can only
express his approbation of the care which is exhibited by the
Brigadier for the force committed to his charge, and he will be
glad when circumstances will permit him to carry into effect
his views for its discipline and comfort. His Lordship in
Council can have no doubt that in the event of a Corps of
Afghans being substituted for one of the Hindostanee corps of
the Contingent, Brigadier Roberts will regularly attend to any
instructions which he may receive from you upon those ' grave
political considerations' which are attached to every measure
bearing upon the national habits of Afghanistan." Fortified
by this expression of confidence, Roberts continued to press
his advice on the Envoy with a freedom justified by his
responsibilities and the vast interests at stake : but all to no
effect.

He writes of his action in the matter : — " We had ample
means, if properly applied, for any emergency, for Lord Auck-
land had the force most liberally supplied with all requisites
for attack or defence, and he was no doubt disappointed at
receiving such different reports from the Envoy and myself, but
as I was not permitted to use my own judgment in military
matters, or to exercise a salutary control over the force I was
supposed to command, and as I could not convince the ruling
local authority that precaution was necessary, I, with great
regret, wrote to Lord Auckland to say how distressed I was
at all that had occurred, and stated that under existing circum-

Sir Abraham Roberts s Later Services. 9

stances I felt that I could not do justice to the very responsible
situation I had the honour to hold."

On again writing in the same sense, "Roberts was informed
that his resignation wras accepted, and, in 1841, Brigadier
Anquetil, who perished in the passes during the disastrous
retreat in January, 1842, was sent to relieve him, and so his
connection with Afghanistan ceased.

In 1842, when a large force was concentrated at Ferozepore,
Koberts was placed in command of the 4th Brigade of the
Army of Reserve, and, in 1844, proceeded to England, thus
missing the Gwalior Campaign and the Sutlej and Punjaub
Campaigns. In 1851 Colonel Roberts returned to India, and
was appointed to the command of the Lahore and Peshawur
Divisions. On the murder of Colonel Mackeson, Political
Agent at Peshawur, in 1853, Brigadier-General Roberts
restored confidence by his prompt military arrangements. In
December, 1853, he was compelled from very severe illness to
resign his command, and finally returned to England, thus con-
cluding an honourable and useful military career.

Attaining the rank of Major- General in 1854, ten years
later he became a full General, and in 1862 was appointed
Colonel of the 101st Regiment, formerly his old corps, the 1st
Bengal Fusiliers, which boasts of so brilliant a record of
service from Plassey to Lucknow, and which he had commanded
at the time of the birth of the subject of this memoir. A
Companion of the Bath of 1839, General Roberts received the
K.C.B. on the 20th of March, 1865, and, finally, on the 8th
of December, 1873, was decorated by Her Majesty at Windsor
Castle with the Grand Cross of that Order. Within three
weeks of receiving this honour, the aged soldier, who could
speak of the " brave days of old " of Wellesley and Lake,
sank to his rest, full of years and honours.

His widow, through the kindness of the Queen, resided,
until her death last year, in Hampton Court Palace, and had the
gratification, denied to her husband, of surviving to witness
the achievements of her son on the fields where his father had
earned distinction before him.

Our hero's earliest memories were connected with that most

io Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

debatable of all military subjects, the first Afghan War, in
which the varying phases of success and failure became to his
youthful mind an oft-told, but ever entrancing tale. As a boy
at his father's table, the talk was —

" Of sallies and retires ; of trenches, tents ;
Of palisadoes, frontiers, parapets ;
Of basilisks, of cannon, culverin ;
Of prisoners' ransom, and of soldiers slain,
And all the currents of a heady fight."

To him Afghanistan was a word conjuring up memories that
quickened his pulse, and as, round the board of his venerable
father, he heard discussions with old companions-in-arms of
those dramatic scenes of war, of disgraceful capitulation, of
seemingly hopeless imprisonment, and, finally, of glorious
retrieval, the boy often longed for the time when he would
embark on a military career in that distant land, our conquest
of which forms one of the most remarkable episodes in the
world's history. Of those veteran comrades of his father few
indeed now survive, the most distinguished being Sir George
Lawrence, Sir James Airey, Sir Vincent Eyre, Sir George
Macgregor, and General Colin Mackenzie,* — who, though he
did unsurpassed good service during the events at Cabul in
1841-42, alone remains undecorated. Such were the incidents,
having a prominent place in the memories of childhood, that
occupied the thoughts of young Eoberts, and it is scarcely
surprising that the future hero of Peiwar Kotul, Charasiah
and Candahar, should have dreamed of emulating the career of
his sire in the fields which witnessed some of the most painful
and glorious events in our military annals.

Of the family of Sir Frederick Koberts, some particulars
kindly placed at our disposal by Sir Albert W. Woods, Garter-
King-at-Arms, will interest those of genealogical tendencies.
The Eoberts family have been settled for generations in County
Waterford, Ireland. One John Roberts married Mary, daughter
of Major Sautelle, one of the French Protestant refugees, who
fought under William the Third, at the battle of the Boyne.

* Since this was written, nearly two years ago, the three last-named
gallant officers have " gone over to the majority.1'

Genealogy of the Roberts Family. 1 1

Their son was the Rev. John Roberts, Magistrate of Passage,
Co. Waterford, who married, on 23rd January, 1771, Anne,
daughter of Kev. Abraham Sandys, of Dublin, and died in
1814, leaving, among other issue, Captain Sir Samuel Koberts,
C.B., R.N., of Belmont, near Waterford ; Captain Thomas
Roberts, R.N. ; and the father of the subject of this memoir,
born at Waterford, on the llth April, 1784.

The late. Sir Abraham. Roberts married, as his first wife,
Frances Isabella, daughter of George Poyntz Ricketts, Bengal
Civil Service, and by her had one son, Major-General George
Ricketts Roberts, Bengal Army ; and two daughters, Fanny
Eliza, married Major Charles Grant, Bengal Horse Artillery
(died in November, 1853) ; and Maria Isabella, married Lieu-
tenant William Maconachie Wellwood. Sir Abraham married
secondly, on the 2nd August, 1830, Isabella, daughter of
Abraham Bunbury* of Kilfeacle, Co. Tipperary (formerly
captain in the 62nd regiment) and widow of Major Hamilton
George Maxwell, of Ardwell, by whom she had one son,
Colonel Hamilton Maxwell, and one daughter, married to John
Davis Sherston, Esq., of Evercreach, Somerset. Besides our
hero, Frederick Sleighf Roberts, the issue of this marriage
was one daughter, Henrietta Mercer, who died unmarried on
the 8th October, 1880. Sir Abraham Roberts died on the
28th December, 1873, in his 90th year, and was buried in the
parish church of Clifton, where he had continued to reside
after his return from India. \

Sir Frederick Roberts was born at Cawnpore on the 30th
September, 1832, and proceeded to England early in 1834 with
his parents, who, on their return to India, two years later, left

* The Bunburys, who came over to England with the Conqueror, had not
long been resident in Waterford.

f He received his second name of Sleigh from his godmother, widow of
General Sir Francis Sleigh.

J The following is the heraldic description of the arms, crest, and sup-
porters, conferred on Sir Frederick Roberts as G.C.B. : — Arms. Azure, three
estoile3 or, on a chief wavy of the last, an eastern crown gules.

Crest. A Lion rampant or, armed and langued gules, charged in the
shoulder with an eastern crown of the last, and holding in the dexter paw
a sword, the blade wavy argent, hilt and pommel gold.

Supporters — Dexter, a Highlander of the 92nd Regiment, sinister, a
Ghoorka, both habited and holding in their exterior hands a rifle, all proper.
Motto — Virtute et valore.

12 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

him at Clifton. During the succeeding eleven years the home
of young Roberts was at Clifton, where he made many friends,
•who will recall the delicate, rather sickly boy whose buoyant
spirits and indomitable nature even then gave promise of
future eminence.

Frederick Roberts received the rudiments of his education
at Miss Carpenter's, Long Ashton, between 1838-40, and for
the following two years at Monsieur Desprez's, at Clifton.
Between 1842-45 he was a pupil of Mr. Mills, at Hampton,
and, in September of the latter year, was entered at Eton,
where his tutor was the Rev. T. Eyre Young. He was in the
fourth form at Eton, and gained a prize in mathematics, and
recently we have seen how his old school claimed the honour
of welcoming its distinguished Alumnus, to whom the boys
presented a sword.

In July, 1846, young Roberts left Eton, and, in the following
January, entered Sandhurst, of which Sir George Scovell was
Governor, and General Taylor Lieutenant-Governor. At Sand-
hurst, where he remained until June, 1848, he gained a
German prize and took up three out of the six steps required
for a commission without purchase. At this time his father,
who was on leave in England, procured him a nomination
to Addiscombe, through the interest of General Caulfield.

There was, however, no vacancy at the Company's Military
Seminary, and Roberts was entered temporarily as a pupil at
Stoton's (now Brackenbury's) Preparatory Military Academy at
Wimbledon, whence he proceeded to Addiscombe on the 1st
February, 1850. Here his military education was conducted
under the superintendence of General Stannus, and of his
successor in the Governorship, Sir Frederick Abbott, who still
survives to congratulate himself on his successful pupil.

At Addiscombe, where Roberts attained the rank of corporal,
he remained for nearly two years, and, in the winter of 1851,
came out ninth in a batch of between forty and fifty cadets
who passed the qualifying examination. The six at the top of
the list selected the corps of Engineers. The two next, to his
great satisfaction, preferred the Bombay Artillery, and so
Roberts was posted, according to his special wish, to the
Bengal Artillery, — the chances of seeing service, and the field

Roberts s School and Addiscombe Days. 13

of distinction being greater during the present century in that
Presidency than in those of Madras and Bombay.

Among Roberts' s contemporaries, during the four terms he
was at Addiscombe, were Major-General Sir James Hills, V.C.,
K.C.B., whose services at Delhi, in Abyssinia, and in
Afghanistan, shed such lustre on the corps of which, like
Roberts, he was a member ; Captain Elliott Brownlow, of the
Bengal Engineers, who was killed at Lucknow; Colonel
Lambert, of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers; and Colonel ^Eneas
Perkins, R.E., C.B., A.D.C., for whose services as Command-
ing Engineer, Roberts applied when he was first appointed to
the command of the Koorum force, and who served under his
old Addiscombe friend throughout the Afghan War. The two
latter officers were, with Roberts, members of a party of six,
who " chummed " together and had a fund in common which
was placed at the disposal of the fortunate individual who got
leave to London from Saturday to Monday.

While at Addiscombe, Roberts was in very indifferent health,
and suffered so much from heart complaint, that at times he
would have sherry by his bedside at night to revive him.
However, his spirits never flagged, but rose superior to the
ailments of a delicate body, so that he was always remarkable
for his gaiety and cheeriness. Though small and far from
robust, his figure was well knit and very wiry, and his
personal appearance in his Addiscombe days is described as
giving the impression of his being much older than he was,
and he was then, as through life 'under the most discouraging
circumstances, very particular in his dress.

On the 12th December, 1851, Roberts was gazetted a
second Lieutenant in the Bengal Artillery, a branch of the
Company's Service which has reared many eminent soldiers, as
Horsford, D'Arcy Todd, Pollock, Henry Lawrence, Archdale
Wilson, Harry Tombs, and others too numerous to mention.
On the 20th February, 1852, Lieutenant Roberts sailed from
Southampton in the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam-
ship Ripon, by the overland route, which, with its changes
at Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez (and at Aden for the Bombay
passengers), those who went out to India, " Consule Planco,"
will contrast unfavourably with the present through system of

14 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

passage by the Canal. At Suez, Roberts took passage in the
Oriental, which embarked a double complement of passengers,
owing to a delay in the previous steamer. The heat in the
Red Sea was very trying to the " griffins," who had left
England in the depth of winter, and one of the number, a
gallant officer, who has seen much hard service in Delhi and
elsewhere, told us he had never forgotten Roberts remarking to
some of them one day : — " I don't know how we shall ever be
able to fight in India if it is as hot as this." The gallant
youngster, however, learned to fight throughout the terrible heat
of the days at Delhi, and recently we have seen how the fiery
sun of Afghanistan was unable to quench his ardour for the
rough school of war.

Among Roberts's fellow-passengers to Calcutta were Sir
Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice of Bengal, who is still in
harness as a Member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, and that veteran officer, Sir John Gough, G.C.B.,
going out to resume his office of Quartermaster- General of
Queen's troops. On his arrival in India, Roberts reported
himself at Dum Dum, then the head-quarters of the Bengal
Artillery, but, after a brief stay of four months, proceeded up-
country to Peshawur, where his father was Brigadier- General
in command of the Division. Here he served on his father's
staff in the capacity of acting aide-de-camp, not having passed
the languages, but, early in 1852, joined the 1st Peshawur
Mountain Battery, commanded by Captain (now Major-General)
Tom Brougham, who had the satisfaction of giving the first
training in the duties of gunner to the hero of the second
Afghan War. Lieutenant Roberts's activity and smartness in
acquiring his duties procured him the coveted "jacket," and, at
the end of 1854, he was posted to the 1st troop, 2nd Brigade,
Bengal Horse Artillery, — that splendid service which drew
from Lord Hardinge, no mean judge, the avowal that it was
unequalled by any in the world. It was no mean distinction
to serve in this troop, then commanded by Colonel Barr, an
officer who had served with distinction in Afghanistan, and
Roberts, by his zeal and efficiency as an artillery officer, kept
up the prestige it had acquired.

Roberts's early service was uneventful. He was not so

Roberts s Service at Peshawur. 15

fortunate as to be engaged in the war against Burmah, which
took place in the year of his arrival in India, but though a
valuable province was acquired as the result of the campaign,
little honour accrued to our arms in the defeat of so unworthy
a foe. Still it was disappointing to an eager soldier like
Roberts, and a weary five years passed without his seeing a
shot fired. To serve on the staff is in India, as in England,
the ambition of the most capable officers of the army, and, on
the 25th March, 1856, Roberts was appointed to officiate as
Deputy- Assistant - Quartermaster - General of the Peshawur
Division, an appointment he held, with a brief intermission,
until the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857. The question of
the causes of the Mutiny have been discussed by so many
writers that it may almost be said, quot hominis tot sententite.
Many well qualified to speak have attributed that great convul-
sion— which rivalled the French Revolution in its horrors, and
the magnitude of the political and social changes introduced by
its agency — to our recent annexation of Oude, to the bad faith
with which the Native Army was treated, and to our denial of
the rights of adoption to the Hindoo chiefs ; but these, whether
taken singly or together, do not, in our opinion, account for
the Indian Mutiny. The annexation was a measure for the
good of the people of Oude, necessitated by the incredible
misgovernment of its rulers, who had been warned since the
time of Lord Wellesley of its imminence. The question of
adoption had only a contingent interest for the Native rulers,
and in no way concerned the Native Army; and as to the
charge of bad faith, the Sepoys had been petted and spoiled
until they entertained an overweening estimate of their import-
ance— an idea likely to be renewed if the fuss made over the
Indian Contingent for their recent services in Egypt is to be
repeated on every occasion we have need of their services
beyond the Indian frontier.

Rather may we attribute the Mutiny to the lax discipline of
the Native Army, the small power entrusted to the European
officers, which had been so whittled away that, by an order of
Sir William Gomm (Commander-in- Chief in succession to Sir
Charles Napier, in 1851), a Sepoy might appeal against the
Commanding officer to a court-martial. In our opinion Sir

1 6 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Richard Temple, whose experience of Indian questions is un-
surpassed, hit the right nail on the head when, in his " Men
and Events of my Time," he gives the following reason as a
" sufficient and self-evident explanation" of the great Mutiny : —
" The short and plain truth is that the great Mutiny of 1857
arose because the British Government in India had for a long
time maintained a Native Army much too large, and a British
force much too small. The Government thus unwittingly
placed itself in the power of the Sepoys. This, and this alone,
was the main cause of that tremendous event. The Sepoys
would never have revolted unless they had felt themselves able
to do so with some chance of success."

Nothing is so certain in India as the unforeseen. When,
early in 1857, the first symptoms of disaffection manifested
themselves among our Sepoys, few even among the most
sagacious anticipated the deluge of mutiny that was about to
overwhelm the land. It was a time of fierce trial to every
English-speaking individual in the peninsula. In view of the
magnitude of the interests affected, the extent of the area over
which warlike operations raged, and the dramatic nature of
the scenes that enthralled the attention of the civilized world,
well might the portents have been expected, anticipated by
Caesar's wife on the eve of the "Ides of March," so memor-
able in classic history : —

''Fierce fiery warriors fight upon the clouds,
In ranks, and squadrons, and right form of war,
Which drizzled blood upon the Capitol ;
The noise of battle hurtled in the air,
Horses did neigh, and dying men did groan."

But though mutterings of sedition were heard at Barrackpore
and elsewhere, and portended disaster to those " who had ears
to hear," and recalled the scenes before enacted there and at
Vellore, yet no one dreamed of the storm that was about to
burst over the land. Balls and pic-nics enlivened the dulness
of the military stations as in former years, and all " went merry
as a marriage bell " at Meerut, Jhansi, Futtehgurh, and Cawn-
pore — that name of horror to English ears — always one of the
gayest of stations. The fair women, some newly arrived from
England, looked forward with pleasing anticipations to winning

77/6' Eve of the Indian Mutiny. 1 7

the hearts of the gallant men, of which many were so soon to
be stilled in death. And these brave men, whose names are
imperishably recorded in the history of the events of '57, what
recked they of the wrath to come ? Did not a great master of
their art enunciate for their guidance a philosophic truth that
has nerved the hearts -of many in the supreme moment of
battle ?

•' Cowards die many times before their deaths,
The valiant never taste of death but once."

1 8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER II.

The Siege of Delhi — Roberts joins the Punjaub Movable Column — Proceeds
to Delhi as Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General of Artillery —
Lieutenant Roberts participates in the Action of the 9th July —
Gallantry of his Friend, Lieutenant Hills — Roberts is wounded in the
Fighting on the 14th July — Preparations for the Bombardment —
Roberts serves in No. 2 Battery at Ludlow Castle — The Storm and Cap-
ture of Delhi — Sir James Brind's Reminiscences of Sir Frederick
Roberts at Delhi.

ON the 12th May, 1857, news of the mutiny at Meerut and the
seizure of Delhi was received at Peshawur, where Lieutenant
Eoberts was officiating as Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-
General of the division then commanded by Major-General
Eeed. Before noon of the following day, a council of war to
provide for the defence of the Peshawur valley and the Punjaub
generally, -was held at the General's quarters, at which was
assembled a group of officers such as any country might be
proud to number among her sons — Brigadier Sydney Cotton,
commanding the Peshawur garrison ; Lieutenant - Colonel
Herbert Edwardes, Commissioner of the division ; Lieutenant-
Colonel Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur; and
Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, commanding the Punjaub
Frontier Force. It was a meeting fraught with mighty conse-
quences, for on the counsels of the assembled officers rested, in
a measure, the destinies not only of the Punjaub, but of the
entire Peninsula. At Nicholson's suggestion it was decided
that a Movable Column should be formed to operate upon any
point menaced with danger.

General Reed, accompanied by Lieutenant Roberts as the
officer representing the Quartermaster-General's department of
his division, went to Rawul Pindee, whither he had been sum-
moned by Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the
Punjaub, to concert measures for the safety of the border
province of the Empire during the crisis which, that sagacious

The Punjaub Movable Column. 19

statesman recognized with prescient vision, had arrived. After
conferring with Sir John Lawrence, General Reed submitted
to the Commander-in- Chief by telegraph the names of Cotton,
Edwardes, Nicholson, and Chamberlain for the command of the
Movable Column formed on the 20th May, and General Anson
telegraphed back his selection of the last-named officer for the
responsible duty.

General Chamberlain appointed Lieutenant Roberts to be
staff officer of the column, which they joined at Wuzeerabad on
the Chenaub. It consisted of the following troops from Seal-
kote : — H.M.'s 52nd Light Infantry, Colonel Campbell ; Major
Michael Dawes' troop of Horse Artillery ; Captain G. Bourchier's
(No. 17) Field Battery ; the 35th Native Infantry, Colonel
Younghusband; and a wing of the 9th Cavalry. There were also
attached Major Knatchbull's battery of Native Artillery, the 16th
Irregular Cavalry, and wing of the 17th Cavalry. A difficulty
now arose on a question that, in our Army, has so often proved
a stumbling-block to military efficiency — the question of com-
mand as regulated by seniority. Colonel Campbell was senior to
Neville Chamberlain, and declined to serve under his junior ; but
on referring the matter to Lahore, it was soon set at rest, Colonel
Campbell being informed that he must either retire from the
force or serve under his junior's command. Like a good soldier
he selected the latter alternative, and, at a later date, arriving
at Delhi with General Nicholson, did good service at the siege.
As Colonel Herbert Edwardes wrote at the time : — " How
common sense revenges itself upon defective systems when real
dangers assail a State. Had there been no struggle for life or
death when would Neville Chamberlain and John Nicholson, in
the prime of their lives,* with all their faculties of doing and
enduring, have attained the rank of brigadier-general ? Why
should we keep down in peace the men whom we must put up
in war ?"

The Movable Column marched from Wuzeerabad on the 28th
May, and in a few days arrived at Lahore. The troops at Meean
Meer, the military cantonment of Lahore, consisting of three
regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, had already been dis-

* General Nicholson was at this time thirty-five, and General Chamber-
lain two years his senior. Edwardes himself was only thirty- eight.

c 2

2O Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

armed by Brigadier Corbett, and it was now decided to dismount
the 8th Cavalry, a notoriously disaffected corps, like most of
the mounted regiments. The operation was successfully
effected in the following manner. By a slight change in the
usual marching order of the column, H.M.'s 52nd were placed
in front, it having been previously intimated to the officer com-
manding that, while the left wing and the rest of the column
halted at the civil station at Anarkullee, the right wing was to
march on to Meean Meer, the encampment six miles farther
on, and take up ground at the central picket. The wing
arrived in the dim twilight, and drew up alongside the picket,
which consisted of two companies of H.M.'s 81st Foot, four
guns of the Horse Artillery, and Lieutenant Nicholson's *
Irregular Cavalry. The 8th were then ordered out. Over-
awed by the proximity of so large a European force, and with
Coke's unsympathising Punjaubees at their side, they sullenly
obeyed the order to dismount.

General Chamberlain halted with the Movable Column at
Lahore for a few days, during which two Sepoys of the 35th
Native Infantry, the same regiment which had done such good
service at Jellahabad under Sir Robert Sale, were tried for
using seditious language and endeavouring to instigate their
comrades to mutiny, and, being convicted, were, on the 9th of
June, blown away from guns. On the previous evening intelli-
gence had been received by telegraph of the mutiny of the 36th
and 61st Native Infantry at Jullundhur, and, on the night of the
execution, the Movable Column marched thither, and, on the
following day, had covered the distance of thirty miles between
Lahore and Umritsur.

Near the sacred city of the Sikhs is the important fortress of
Govindghur, garrisoned at this time by a company of artillery,
and a company of H.M.'s 81st Regiment. Here General Cham-
berlain received orders to join the Delhi Field Force, to take the
place of Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General, who had been
killed at the action of Budlee-Kee- Serai, on the 9th June ; and
Colonel Denniss, second in command of the 52nd, took tempo-

* Lieutenant Charles Nicholson, who was a brother of General Nicholson,
lost an arm at the storm of Delhi, and died some time later when on a
visit to the grave of his brother, whose death affected his health.

Roberts 's Sewices with the Movable Column. 21

rary command until the arrival of the Column at Jullundhur on
the 21st of June. On the following day, Brigadier-General
Nicholson assumed charge, to the great satisfaction of the
entire force, and, on the 24th, proceeded to Phillour. Lieutenant
Roberts continued on Nicholson's staff in charge of the quar-
termaster-general's department, and soon gained the entire con-
fidence of his chief.

These two soldiers, whose exploits during crises in our Indian
history have placed their names high in the temple of fame,
had much in common. Both possessed that impetuous valour
which refuses to he deterred by difficulties when an object has
to be achieved, and yet both were gifted with that military
insight which correctly gauges the means necessary to effect the
end sought to be attained ; inspired on the field of battle by
the " Gaudia certaminis," the rapture of the strife, referred to
by Attila in his address to his soldiers, these born leaders of men
were never more self-possessed than at such a time. In short,
Nicholson and Roberts were gifted with that spark of heavenly
fire we call genius, whether possessed by the poet, painter, states-
man, or soldier. Speaking of the military qualifications of the
officers under whom he served during the Indian Mutiny,
Roberts gives the palm iucontestably to Nicholson, as not only
the best, but indeed the only one who was possessed of that
rarest of attributes.

From Jullundhur General Nicholson marched to Phillour,
twenty-four miles distant, on the right bank of the Sutlej, in
the direct line of the Grand Trunk Road, a place of such great
strategical value, that Sir Charles Napier described it as the
" key of the Punjaub." The safety of Phillour was of essential
importance, as in the strong fort is a magazine, with munitions
of war only inferior in importance to those stored at Ferozepore
and at Delhi, now feeding the rebellion, owing to the same
system of crass stupidity which cost us an army at Cabul — the
system by which the very sinews of war are placed within the
keeping of those who may be our enemies.

Some difficulty was experienced in crossing the Beas, which
had risen ; but Lieutenant Roberts effected the passage of the
troops and stores with a success that elicited the commendation
of his chief. On the morning of the 25th of June, on his

22 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

arrival at Phillour, General Nicholson put into execution a step
he had been for some time revolving in his mind. This was
the disarming of the 33rd and 35th Regiments of Native
Infantry, the arrangements for which were made by Lieutenant
Roberts, and were carried out with complete success. When
the General made his appearance on the camping-ground, there
were no signs of preparation for any unusual occurrence. The
Europeans and the guns were in advance, and so placed that
when the suspected Sepoy regiments came up in succession to
the camping-ground, they were completely at the mercy of their
•white comrades. These had their instructions, and were so
disposed, many of the Europeans lying on the ground as if for
rest, that the most suspicious could detect no symptom of the
impending disarmament. As, however, the first of the Native
regiments came up, the men were told to pile their arms by
Nicholson, who, leaning over one of the guns, gave his orders
as unconcernedly as though they were of the most ordinary
character.

" If they bolt," he said to Captain Bourchier, of the artillery,
"you follow as hard as you can ; the bridge will have been
destroyed, and we shall have a Sobraon on a small scale."

But the Sepoy regiments, entrapped by the suddenness of the
order, and scarcely knowing what they were doing, piled their
arms at the word of command, and suffered them to be taken
to the fort. This done, Nicholson addressed them, saying that
desertion would be punished with death, and that they could
not possibly escape, as the fords were watched. Eight men
made the attempt, but were brought back, tried, and con-
demned.*

On the following day Lieutenant Roberts severed his con-
nection with the Punjaub Movable Column. Hearing that
artillery officers were urgently required at Delhi, he applied for
permission to resign his appointment, and join the army there.
General Nicholson at first would not give his consent, but
Roberts urged his request so earnestly, that, at length, the
gallant General, who could not but sympathize with the ardour
of the young staff officer, whose ambition to be where blows were

* See " Eight Months' Campaign against the Bengal Sepoy Army," by
Colonel G. Bourchier, C.B., Bengal Horse Artillery.

Roberts s Arrival at Delhi. 23

thickest, struck a responsive chord in his own breast, gave the
required permission.

Quitting the column at Phillour, Lieutenant Roberts trav-
elled in a mail cart with two officers — Lieutenant C. F. Packe,
4th Native Infantry (attached to the 4th Sikh Infantry during
the siege), who was shot in the ankle and maimed for life the
morning after their arrival at Delhi, and Captain W. G. Law,
10th Native Infantry (attached to the 1st Punjaub Infantry,
known as Coke's Rifles, from their gallant leader), who was
killed during the siege.

On arriving at Delhi, on Sunday, the 28th of June, Lieu-
tenant Roberts was first appointed Deputy- Assistant Quarter-
master-General to the cavalry brigade, but, at his own request,
was transferred in the same capacity to the artillery. Within a
few days of his arrival in the camp, beneath the historic " ridge"
whereon the batteries of the immortal Delhi Field Force were
placed, the army was strengthened by some small reinforce-
ments, but at no time did it exceed 9,000 efficient combatants.

The siege, upon which the small British force, under the
command of Sir Henry Barnard, entered in June, 1857, is,
probably, unparalleled in modern times, for the besiegers were
at times equally the besieged, and they were outnumbered as
three to one, so that the labour and fighting were harassing
in the extreme. Such an event as a regular siege undertaken
during the monsoon months was unknown in our Indian history,
and would have horrified such old campaigners as Lord Gough,
being contrary to what honest Fluellen calls "the true and
ancient prerogatifes and laws of the wars." It was a time when
the stubborn character of the English blood was displayed at
its best, and the men who know not when they are beaten clung
with desperate tenacity to their lines and batteries, whilst con-
tinuous bodies of rebels poured into the city, flushed with
murder and rapine, and bent on establishing the truth of the
prophecy held out as a bait to them — that the English Raj,
which was founded at Plassey on the 23rd of June, 1757,
would come to an end on the hundredth anniversary of that
event. It was a time of stern, arduous effort, when every man
had to play his part, and the heroic in the nature of each found
opportunities of display.

24 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Delhi in 1857 was no place for poltroons or fops, such as the
lord Avho excited the ire of the soldierly Percy : —

"Neat, trimly dress'd,

Fresh as a bridegroom ; and his chin, new reap'd,
Show'd like a stubble-land at harvest time.

* * * *

As the soldiers bore dead bodies by,
He called them untaught knaves, unmannerly,
To bring a slovenly unhandsome corse
Betwixt the wind and his nobility."

All eyes in India were centred on Delhi, the focus of rebellion,
and it was universally recognized that upon the ability of the
small British force, scarce stronger at times than a brigade, to
bring the siege to a successful conclusion, depended our hold of
the great Eastern dependency and the safety of every white
man, woman, and child in the country. It was resolved, in
spite of some more timid counsels in high places, to fight it out
on that ridge, and, bull-dog like, to die, if needs be, before
relinquishing their hold on the throat of rebellion.

While the effective strength of the besieging force, even
with the addition of wings of H.M.'s 8th and 61st Regiments,
only numbered 6,600 men, the rebels received constant rein-
forcements, and, on the 1st and 2nd July, the Rohilcund
mutineers marched over the bridge of boats across the Jumna,
in full view of the British troops on the ridge above the camp.
They consisted of No. 15 Horse Battery, two 6-pounder guns,
the 8th Irregular Cavalry, and the 18th, 28th, 29th, and 68th
Native Infantry. The rebels continued to receive accessions
of strength, and, during the month of June, there arrived the
Jhansi troops, consisting of half No. 18 Light Field Battery, a
wing 12th Native Infantry, and the 14th Irregular Cavalry; and
the Neemuch Brigade, which included a troop of Native Horse
Artillery, a wing 1st Light Cavalry, the 72nd Native Infantry,
the 7th Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent, and the cavalry
and infantry of the Kotah Contingent. At the lowest esti-
mate, Lieutenant Norman, Assistant Adjutant-General of the
Field Force, places the rebel strength in August at 30,000
men, exclusive of undisciplined men recruited from the city
and rural population. Their supply of guns and ammunition
was practically inexhaustible, owing to their possession of the

Roberts s First Brush with the Enemy. 25

magazine in Delhi, the British force being scarcely sufficient
to invest one-third of the walls, and access to the left bank of
the Jumna being secured to the rebels by the bridge of boats,
which was protected by the fire of the guns at Selimgurh, and was
fully 2,500 yards from the British batteries. A constant stream
of supplies was poured into the city, the British commanders
being content to be able to keep open their rear, and communi-
cate with the Punjaub, whence all their supplies were derived.
Had the large force of trained regular and irregular cavalry at
the disposal of the rebel leaders been properly handled, it is
certain that communications with Umballa and other points in
the rear could not have been maintained, thus ensuring the
raising of the siege and the temporary success of the rebellion
until the arrival of reinforcements from England ; but through-
out the protracted operations known as the Mutiny, the
rebellious Sepoys were destitute of any directing head or leader
of capacity, and there being no plan of combined action, such
advantages as they possessed were neglected.

Lieutenant Roberts had not been long in camp before his
ardent spirit was gratified by participating in the almost daily
conflicts in which the Field Force was engaged, either repel-
ling an attack or taking the initiative. On the 30th June the
rebels made an attack on the position on the extreme right, at
Hindoo Rao's house, and Lieutenant Roberts witnessed some
sharp fighting, lasting from 9 A.M. till 2 P.M., when the enemy
were repulsed.

During the afternoon of the 3rd July, encouraged by the
arrival of large reinforcements, a body of some 5,000 or 6,000
insurgents moved into the gardens and suburbs on the right of
the British position, and pushed on rapidly from Alipore, one
march in rear of the camp, compelling the squadron of 5th
Punjaub Cavalry stationed there to fall back towards Rhye.
The fire of the enemy's guns could be heard in camp, and at
2 A.M. on the 4th July, Major Coke was sent to intercept the
rebels with a column, consisting of four guns of Captain
Money's troop of Horse Artillery, and two guns of the native
troop, Major Scott's Horse Battery, a squadron Carabineers, a
squadron 9th Lancers, the Guide Cavalry, the wing H.M.'s
61st Regiment, and the 1st Punjaub Rifles. Roberts, in the

26 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

capacity of staff officer, accompanied this column, which num-
bered in all about 300 cavalry, 800 infantry, and 12 guns,
which were all that could be spared from the camp.

At one time grave fears were felt that the rebels might be
pushing on to attack Kurnaul, or, at least, to intercept
treasure on the road under native escort between that station
and Delhi. About sunrise, however, it became known that
they had re-crossed the canal near Alipore, and were returning
towards Delhi along the high and dry ground running nearly
parallel with the canal, and at a distance from it of a mile or
more. Major Coke at once moved to take them in the flank,
but had to proceed over a swampy cross-country road for a
mile and a half to a bridge over the canal, and then had more
than a mile of swampy fields to pass over. The Artillery came
first into action, and were immediately answered by the
insurgents' guns, which had been moved into a village when
they perceived the British approach, their infantry and cavalry
at the same time facing towards the advancing enemy. The
infantry, however, save some posted in the village, soon com-
menced moving off again, their cavalry shortly did the same,
and their artillery fire slackening, it was evident their guns
also were being withdrawn. Major Coke again advanced his
guns, though with much difficulty, owing to the nature of the
ground, and, hurrying on the infantry and mounted men, the
Guide Cavalry on the left were directed to push forward and get
on the line of the enemy's retreat ; owing, however, to the deep
mud, little progress could be made, and the rebels carried off
all their guns. However, all the plunder taken from Alipore
was re-captured, together with some artillery waggons and
ammunition.

On his return towards camp, Major Coke rested his infantry
and some of his cavalry at the canal bank, and, while here, was
attacked by some fresh troops from Delhi, including a body of
800 horse. The firing was sharp, and cavalry and artillery
were sent from camp to Major Coke's support. The attack,
however, had been virtually repulsed before these supports
arrived, and all returned to camp, the Europeans having
suffered much from the intense heat of the sun.

On the 5th of July, the Commander-iu-Chief, Sir Henry

The Sortie of the <^th July. 27

Barnard, an officer much liked and respected, expired of
cholera, after an illness of six hours, and General Reed, as
senior officer in the camp, became Provisional Commander-in-
Chief, being the third since the 23rd of May, when General
Anson had died of that terrible Indian scourge.

On the 9th of July, a severe action was fought with the
enemy, in which Lieutenant Roberts participated in the
capacity of staff officer of the force engaged. During the
morning the rebels, in great force, showed out of the city in
the suburbs on the right, and about ten o'clock a body of horse,
assisted by the treachery of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, made a
determined raid into the British lines. On the right was a
mound, on which was a battery of three 18-pounders, with an
infantry picket, facing the Subzee Mundee suburb, and to the
right again were stationed two Horse Artillery guns, with an
escort of a troop of the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers).
Beyond these, at a position called the Fakir's Enclosure, was a
native officer's picket of the 9th Irregulars, with two vedettes
thrown forward. The folly of placing an inlet of the camp
practically in the keeping of these horsemen, who had shown
by their action at Budlee-Kee- Serai, on the 8th of June, that
little confidence could be reposed in them, was soon made
manifest. The rebel cavalry suddenly charged through the
picket of Irregulars and dashed upon the two Horse Artillery
guns of Major Tomb's troop, commanded by Lieutenant
Hills.* The gallantry and self-sacrifice displayed by this
officer should be chronicled here in a memoir of his old
Addiscombe friend, whom he accompanied in his memorable
advance on Cabul, after the massacre of the Cavagnari
mission.

The Carabineers, only numbering thirty-two troopers, all
young soldiers, turned and broke, with the exception of
Lieutenant Stillman and two or three men. Lieutenant Hills,
seeing the rebel horsemen advancing unopposed, and desirous
of giving his gunners time to unlimber, took the desperate
resolution of charging single-handed the head of the column.
It was a self-sacrificing resolve, worthy to be compared with

* Now Major-General Sir James Hills, V.C., K.C.B.

28 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

that of the Curtius who sacrificed his life for the good of the
Republic, and it was right gallantly carried out, and gained that
young officer the coveted V.C., which was never more worthily be-
stowed. Charging with impetuosity, Hills cut down the first man
he met with, slashed a second across the face with his sword, and
turned to meet two other horsemen who had made at him. The
horse of the young officer came into violent collision with the
steeds of the sowars, and he was hurled to the ground ; the fall
probably saved his life, for both his enemies had made desperate
cuts at him, which did not take effect, though one laid open his
jacket just below the left arm. Hills lay for a moment stunned,
and the sowars, thinking him killed, passed on ; recovering him-
self, he regained his sword, which lay about ten yards off, and
had just time to secure it before he found himself confronted
with three " Pandies," two on horseback and the third on foot.
The position was as desperate as can well be imagined, but
Hills managed to engage them in detail. The first man he
brought down from his horse by a sword-cut, and as the second
charged him, lance in rest, he dexterously guarded the thrust,
and, with a swinging blow, brought him also off his perch. The
fellow had received a terrible gash across the head and face,
but advanced upon young Hills, who, in a second encounter,
despatched him by a sabre wound on the head. He had
hardly disposed of this antagonist when the third and most for-
midable of the trio, a young and powerful man, was upon him.
Hills was now exhausted, and moreover was almost suffocated
by his cloak, which during the struggle had got tightly twisted
round his throat. A cut he made at his adversary's head was
parried, and the Pandy, running in, seized the hilt of Hills'
sword and wrenched it out of his hand. Having nothing left
but his fists, the young Englishman brought into play the
" noble art " he had acquired at Addiscombe. "Punching the
head " would, however, do little in the case of a man with a sword,
and Hills fell in the struggle, and would have been despatched
had not Major Tombs, at the critical moment, dropped his
antagonist by a lucky " potshot " with his revolver at thirty
yards.

But Hills' penchant for fighting was not yet satisfied. Re-
turning after some time to secure the imlimbered gun which

A Hot Days Work. 29

had been left behind, the two officers saw the man whom they
thought killed making off with a pistol which Hills had
hurled at one of his assailants during the recent melee.
The young officer ran after him, and made a cut at him with
his sword, which the Pandy cleverly avoided by springing on
one side, at the same time inflicting a severe wound on Hills'
head. The latter sprang to his feet, and cutting at his
adversary, nearly severed his hand at the wrist. Major Tombs
now arrived and despatched the plucky native by running
him through the body. Both these gallant artillery officers
received the Victoria Cross, and both acquired great subsequent
distinction.*

Meanwhile, the rebel horsemen riding over and past the
guns, followed the flying Dragoons in at the right of the camp,
but, failing to induce a troop of native horse artillerymen to join
them, were soon driven out by some troops hastily collected
together by Captain Fagan, of the Artillery. During this epi-
sode the rebels maintained a heavy cannonade from the guns
on the city walls and field-pieces in the open, while large bodies
of the enemy, stationed in the enclosures and gardens of the
suburbs, opened fire on the batteries and Subzee Mundee
pickets. To dislodge these a column was formed, under the
command of General Chamberlain, who was accompanied by
Lieutenant Roberts. The force consisted of Major Scott's
Horse Battery, the available men of the wings 8th and 61st
Foot, and the 4th Sikh Infantry, in all about 700 infantry and
six guns, reinforced en route by the head-quarters and two
companies 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. Jones,
the infantry being commanded by Brigadier "W. Jones, C.B.
As this column, under constant and heavy showers of rain,
swept up through the Subzee Mundee, Major Reid, commanding
the Sirmoor Battalion, was instructed to move down from Hindoo
Rao's picket on the ridge and co-operate with such infantry as
could be spared from the main picket. The insurgents were
cleared out of the dense vegetation of the gardens without
difficulty, though at some of the serais they offered a very
obstinate resistance, and were not dislodged without considerable

* Sir Harry Tombs, the very beau ideal of a soldier in character and
personal appearance, died a few years ago of a painful malady.

30 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

loss. The success of the day, says Norman, " was greatly due
to the admirable and steady practice of Major Scott's Battery,
under a heavy fire, eleven men being put liors de combat out of
its small complement." The British loss was one officer and
forty men killed, and eight officers and 163 men wounded ; that
of the enemy being officially computed at 500.

This was the first severe action in which Roberts was en-
gaged, and it so whetted his appetite for fighting that a few
days later, when another " tamasha" came off, he was in the
thick of it, and received a wound which was near putting a
premature termination to his career.

The hardships of camp life were much increased by the
torrents of rain which continued to deluge the British lines,
while that terrible scourge, cholera, decimated the ranks of the
brave little army ; the wings of the 8th and 61st Regiments
being the chief sufferers. Reports were received that the rebel
chiefs, probably encouraged by the destruction of the can-
tonment at Agra by the Neemuch Brigade, had sworn to cap-
ture the British guns on the ridge, and smoke their hookahs
in Hindoo- Rao's house, the key of the position, which was
held throughout the siege by Major Reid with the Sirmoor
Battalion and two companies of the 60th Rifles. Accordingly,
on the morning of the 14th July, they swarmed out in great
force, and attacked the batteries on the right flank, and the
fire for many hours from great guns and small-arms was con-
tinuous and very heavy.

As the batteries on the ridge failed to drive the rebels back,
about four o'clock a column of attack was formed, under Brig-
adier Showers, who was accompanied by General Chamberlain,
on whose staff Roberts served for the day. The column con-
sisted of half of Major Turner's and Captain Money's troops
of Horse Artillery, six guns ; the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, under
Major Jacob ; Coke's Corps of Punjaubees, and Major Reid's
Sirmoor Battalion ; with some details of Guide Cavalry and
Hodson's Horse. The action that ensued was not an unquali-
fied success, for though the rebels lost heavily, our small
army, in which every life was of consequence, also suffered
severely.

The column marched through the Subzee Mundee, and drove

Roberts is Wounded. 31

off the enemy, on whom they inflicted great loss, but, in the
ardour of the pursuit, followed them up close under the walls
of the city, when they got under the range of the heavy guns,
which opened on them with grape. There was nothing to do
but to retreat, when the rebels sallied out, but did not care to
come to close quarters, and a charge of cavalry was effectively
met by Hodson, who, wrote Greathed, in his letter describing
the events of the day, " always turns up in moments of diffi-
culty." The British loss was fifteen men killed and sixteen
officers and 117 men wounded. Among the officers wounded
were Brigadier-General Chamberlain, who had his arm shat-
tered by a grape-shot when leading the troops with all the
ardour that distinguished this beau sabreur.

Roberts, who was actively engaged on the staff, had a narrow
escape of his life. As the force was retreating, a bullet lodged
in his cap-pouch, and broke the skin of his back, making a
severe bruise close to the spine, though had it not been for the
cap-pouch he must have been killed. This article of accoutre-
ment was a small native-made affair, less than three inches
across, similar to what was worn by most officers in carrying
revolver caps, and was always carried in front. By some
means the pouch had worked round to the back, and was thus
the means of saving the life of its wearer, who, on being struck,
put his hand to the part affected, and could not at first make
out what it was he had got there. For more than a month
Lieutenant Roberts was not permitted to go on duty by the
doctor, which was a great trial to him, though he visited the
batteries, and could not be prevailed upon to keep quiet in his
tent.

The enemy suffered severely on the 14th of July, their loss
being estimated at 1,000, and, for hours, carts were seen con-
veying their dead into the city.

A change now again took place in the chief command.
General Reed, who had been in ill-health since he joined the
force on the 8th of June, and was daily growing feebler, re-
signed the command into the hands of Brigadier Archdale
Wilson, commanding the Artillery, an officer who possessed
the confidence of the army, having, in the actions of the 30th
and 31st of May, on the Hindun, displayed considerable skill,

32 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

and with 700 men defeated a rebel force seven times his
strength. There were officers senior to Wilson in the camp,
but the times were too grave for such considerations to have
any weight. The only one of them having superior claims
was General Chamberlain, who would have been selected with
the unanimous approval of the camp had not the severe wound
received on the 14th, incapacitated him from active service
during the remainder of the siege, and even from continuing
his duties as Adjutant-General, which were filled with con-
spicuous ability and success by Lieutenant (now General Sir)
Henry Norman, of the 31st Native Infantry.

On the 18th of July, the last serious fighting took place in
the Subzee Mundee, for, by this time, the Engineers had cleared
away the walls, serais, and gardens for some distance round
the posts held by the British pickets in that suburb, while the
breastwork connecting them with the crest of the Hindoo Rao
range was completed. The nearest post to the city, an old
temple, called by the European soldiers the " Sammy House,"
some way down the slope of the ridge, and within 900 yards'
grape range of the Moree Bastion, was greatly strengthened
and cover provided for its garrison. On the ridge itself, addi-
tional captured field-guns were planted in favourable positions,
thus greatly increasing the duties of the Bengal Artillery, an
unsurpassed body of gunners ; and had it not been for the aid
of the newly-raised Sikh Artillery, and volunteers from Euro-
pean regiments, it would have been impossible to have worked
the guns. In these congenial duties, Lieutenant Roberts,
when time and opportunity offered, participated with the ardour
which, it is said, induces actors, during their evenings of occa-
sional leisure, to witness the performance of their brethren of
the " sock and buskin."

On the 20th of July, a reconnoissance was made by a
column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Seaton, C.B., 35th Native
Infantry, a gallant and able officer, who had served under Sir
Robert Sale throughout the siege of Jellalabad ; and, three days
later, a strong force was sent under Brigadier Showers to drive
away the enemy, who, emerging from the Cashmere Gate, had
occupied Ludlow Castle, and annoyed the pickets with the fire
from some field-guns. The rebels were dispersed after some

Heavy Fighting before Delhi. 33

smart skirmishing ; among the British officers wounded being
Colonels Seaton and Drought, and Captain Money, commanding
a troop of horse artillery, the command of which now devolved
on Captain Blunt.

The enemy at this time displayed great boldness, and, on the
night of the 1st of August, a strong body, with guns and mor-
tars, which had marched out of Delhi on the preceding day with
the intention of getting into the rear of the camp, on their
return moved through the Kissengunj suburb, and attacked the
position on the extreme right of the ridge, coming close up to
the breastworks, as many as 127 bodies being counted in front
of one to the right of the Sammy House. The rebels now
turned their attention to annoying the British position at Met-
calfe's picket on the extreme left, near the river, and in front of
Ludlow Castle and the Khoodsee Bagh. At dawn of the 12th
of August, a column proceeded to drive them out of their
positions, under the command of Brigadier Showers, and was
completely successful, though at considerable loss, among the
severely wounded being those invaluable officers, Brigadier
Showers and Major Coke, the commander of the 1st Punjaub
Infantry, or Coke's Rifles.

Meanwhile Sir John Lawrence was straining every nerve
to reinforce the Delhi Army, for, with characteristic sagacity, he
recognized the fact that, on the early downfall of the head-
quarters of the rebellion, depended the safety of the Empire.
Denuding his province of almost every soldier, he despatched
Brigadier- General Nicholson to the assistance of General
Wilson, with a brigade of all arms, including H.M.'s 52nd
Regiment, 600 bayonets, the remaining wing of H.M.'s 61st
Regiment, and Bourchier's Light Field Battery. Nicholson,
posting on in advance of the column, arrived at the camp on
the 8th of August, and dined that night at the head-quarters
mess, Mr. Greathed* describing him as "a fine, imposing-

* The letters of Mr. Hervey Harris Greathed, Commissioner and Political
Agent with the Delhi Field Force, who died on the 19th of September
before the walls of Delhi, were republished by his widow, and form one of
the most interesting records of that eventful struggle. He was one of three
brothers who served throughout the siege of Delhi, the others being Colonel
(the late General Sir) Edward Greathed, commanding H.M.'s 8th Regiment,
and Lieutenant Wilberforce Greathed, of the Bengal Engineers, who was
severely wounded at the assault on the 14th of September.

D

34 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

looking man, who never speaks if he can help it." Eeturning
to rejoin his brigade, it marched into camp with drums beating
and colours flying on the 13th of August. The advent of
Nicholson was hailed with satisfaction by the entire camp, as
he had a great reputation as a fighting general, like his friend
Neville Chamberlain, but was credited with more caution ; both
had been trained in the Punjaub school, like other soldiers then
before Delhi, the famous Hodson, and Coke, Daly, Probyn,
Watson, and Roberts.

On the 25th August, Nicholson moved with a strong force,
including 16 guns and 800 European infantry, to Nujufgurh, in
which direction a large column of the enemy had marched with
the intention of intercepting the siege train then moving up from
Ferozepore under a weak escort. He asked Roberts to accom-
pany him as staff officer, but on the latter applying to do so,
the doctors refused permission as his wound was not sufficiently
healed. It was a great disappointment to our hero. Nicholson
was completely successful, and the • rebels were defeated with
the loss of thirteen out of eighteen guns they had taken with
them.

On the day this action was fought, the 26th of August, the
enemy turned out of Delhi in great force, under the belief,
apparently, that the camp would be denuded of troops, but
they were repulsed with severe loss.

On the 4th of September, the siege train arrived, and all
the reinforcements expected having come in, the total strength
of all arms, including Lascars and artillery drivers, was
8,748,* of whom the Europeans were : artillery 580, cavalry
443, infantry 2,292. This was exclusive of the men in
hospital, 2,977, and sickness prevailed to such an alarming
extent that some European regiments were mere skeletons, the
52nd Light Infantry, which arrived only three weeks before,
600 strong, having but 242 effectives.

The siege train consisted of forty heavy guns and howitzers,
ten heavy and twelve light mortars, manned by some companies
of artillerymen, and there were, in addition, four troops of

* These numbers are exclusive of the Cashmere Contingent, which was
accompanied by Major (now Lieutenant-General) R. Lawrence, 2,200 men
and four guns, and some few hundred men under the Rajah of Jheend.

Opening of the Breaching Batteries. 35

horse artillery (one, Major Tombs's, having only four guns),
and two field batteries. The engineer force was small, only
consisting of 120 trained sappers, but the officers who planned
the attack, were unsurpassed in the knowledge of their pro-
fession, and included Colonel Baird Smith, chief engineer ;
Captain (now Sir) Alexander Taylor, director of the attack, on
whom the actual responsibilities of the siege operations, pro-
perly so called, devolved owing to his superior being wounded ;
and a band of young officers, including Lieutenants Salkeld,
Home, Maunsell, and Greathed, such as any corps might be
proud to own. The park, under Lieutenant Brownlow, of the
Bengal Engineers, had been assiduous in collecting material,
and 10,000 fascines, an equal number of gabions, and 100,000
sand-bags had been prepared, with scaling-ladders and other
necessaries.

The plan adopted by the General was to hold in check the
enemy's batteries on the right, between the Moree Bastion and
Cabul Gate, and to push the main attack on the left between
the Cabul Gate and Water Bastions, close to the river, which
protected the flank, and where there was better cover. The
Moree, Cashmere, and Water Bastions were very strong, and
the curtain walls connecting them were 24 feet in height, and
protected by a ditch 16 feet deep and 20 feet wide, with an
escarp 8 feet in height, revetted with stone, and a sloping
glacis.

On the evening of the 7th of September, No. 1 Battery was
traced within 700 yards of the Moree Bastion, and by the
following morning it was armed. The battery was in two
portions, the right, for five 18-pounders and one 8-inch
howitzer, to silence the Bastion, and the left portion, for four
18-pounders, to hold the Cashmere Bastion partially in check.
The officer in charge of this battery, forming the right attack,
which succeeded in silencing the enemy's fire exposed to it,
was Major (now General Sir) James Brind, a gallant and
able officer, who commanded the foot artillery throughout
the siege from the 26th June, and subsequently did excellent
service under General Walpole and Sir Colin Campbell.
Setting to work directly his guns were in position, Major
Brind' s practice soon made a visible impression on the Moree

D 2

36 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Bastion. Mr. Greathed says in his letter of the 9th of
September : — " Major Brind has got his sixteen guns at work,
and was firing salvos at the Moree and Cashmere. The effect
on the Moree, which is nearest, is very telling ; every shot
strikes home and sends up a column of dust, and the shells
burst inside it."

The next battery established, known in its proper sequence
as No. 2, is of especial interest as that in which Lieutenant
Roberts served throughout the bombardment. No. 2 Battery
was traced in the evening of the 8th of September, within 600
yards of the city walls, at the advanced position at Ludlow
Castle, which, to their surprise, the rebels allowed the
besiegers to seize without opposition. An Engineer officer —
to whose perspicuous account of the siege operations, pub-
lished in the Lahore Chronicle, under the nom de plume of
" Felix," and to Lieutenant Norman's excellent official narra-
tive, we are indebted for these details — expresses his opinion
that this inertness was due to the belief of the enemy that the
attack was to be on the right, where all the fighting had
hitherto been and the old batteries were mostly located. Lud-
low Castle and the Khoodsee Bagh were occupied with strong
detachments, and formed the chief supports to the left attack.
During the 9th, the rebels opened a sharp musketry fire on
these positions from the jungles in front, and with shot and shell
from the Water and Cashmere Bastions, but the work of com-
pleting the battery went on, and, during the nights of the
9th and 10th, it was completed and partially armed. No. 2 Bat-
tery was in two divisions, one to the left, armed with nine
24-pounders, under command of Major Campbell, whose fire was
directed to breach the curtain between the Cashmere and Water
Bastions, immediately to the left of the former, and to knock
off the parapet to the right and left for some distance so as to
give no cover for musketry. Lieutenant Roberts, having gained
permission of General Wilson, attached himself to this portion
of No. 2 Battery. His ardent spirit could not confine itself to
watching the effects of the fire of our guns, while his services
might be utilized in directing them. Like the fiery Hotspur : —

" His forward spirit
Would lift him where most trade of danger ranged."

Roberts s Services in the Batteries. 37

The second portion of No. 2 Battery, placed 200 yards to
the right, commanded by Major Kaye, consisted of seven
8-inch howitzers and two 18-pounders, and its duty was to
co-operate with the first portion. During the afternoon of the
10th of September, the left section of Major Brind's Battery,
consisting of four guns, under the immediate command of
Major Kaye, met with an accident, to which we will refer here
as Lieutenant Roberts was engaged. Sir James Brind writes
to us : — " On the 10th of September the left section of my
battery was destroyed by the enemy's fire, which would have
been attended by disastrous consequences had we not succeeded
in removing its guns and magazine into the shelter of the
adjacent ravine before he perceived his advantage, and brought
to bear upon the burning mass a greatly increased fire which
caused some casualties. The work of this section of the
battery had fortunately been effected, and as the guns were
urgently required for the Ludlow Castle Battery, Major Johnson
was directed to take them in charge. This energetic officer
claimed my assistance in accomplishing a most difficult task
under the cover of night. He was accompanied by Lieutenant
Roberts ; and by the indefatigable exertions of officers and
men, the operation was effected over difficult ground with-
out accident, though full of incidents of a most engrossing
character, making that night's work memorable in the history
of the siege."

During the night of the 10th September, the arming of
No. 2 Battery was completed by the arrival of the 18-pounders
from Brind's Battery, and No. 3 Battery, for six 18-pounders,
under command of Major Scott, was also finished within 180
yards of the Water Bastion. The audacity with which this
work was completed under a hot musketry fire, was an earnest
of what was to follow. No. 4 Battery, under Major Tombs,
consisting of ten heavy mortars, was completed at the same
time in the Khoodsee Bagh. The only steps taken by the
enemy to break the ring of iron encircling their boasted
defences, were to construct an advanced trench parallel to
these batteries, and about 350 yards from them, from which
they maintained a heavy musketry fusillade throughout the
rest of the siege, and to bring into the open in the Taleewarra

38 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

suburb some field-guns wbich caused considerable annoyance
to Nos. 1 and 2 Batteries by their enfilading fire. Before the
guns of No. 2 Battery opened fire, a sortie was made from the
Cashmere Gate, which was repulsed with loss, and a constant
fire was kept up from the trenches in front. A portion of the
first Punjaub Eifles, under Lieutenant Nicholson, brother of the
General, was, from the 8th to the 14th, engaged in protecting
the battery, being posted behind a low wall in advance, with a
reserve of the same corps together with some European
infantry at Ludlow Castle, and the other batteries were also
guarded by strong parties of infantry.

All being in readiness, the batteries of the left attack opened
fire on the llth, the signal being a salvo from the nine
24-pounders with which Roberts was stationed. The Engineer
officer, already quoted, says that this " salvo showed by the
way it brought down the wall in huge fragments what effect it
might be expected to produce after a few hours. The Cashmere
Bastion attempted to reply, but was quickly silenced, and both
portions of No. 2 went to work in fine style, knocking the
bastion and adjacent curtains to pieces." The fire was kept up
with great spirit during the day, and, in the evening, Roberts
had a narrow escape of being killed. He and the other
officers of the battery, Major Campbell and Captain (now
General Sir) Edwin Johnson, were lying under the parapet, read-
ing a newspaper, when a discharge of grape-shot whizzed over
the parapet, and a piece struck Major Campbell, who was lying
outside, in the thigh, inflicting so severe a wound that he was
compelled to surrender the command of the battery to Captain
Johnson, Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery, who, like
Roberts, had obtained permission from General Wilson to
assist in working the guns of this battery.

No. 3 Battery did not open fire till the 12th, when fifty guns
and mortars were engaged pouring a continuous fire of shot
and shell on the defences of the rebels, who must have had it
brought home to them that the hour of retribution was about
to strike. From 10 A.M. on the llth till the morning of the
14th, when the signal for assault was made, there was no
cessation of the fiery hail, which the enemy bore with that
resignation to the decrees of fate instilled into the hearts of

Narrow Escape of Roberts. 39

the followers of the Prophet as an axiom of their religion, and
though unable to work a gun from any of the three Bastions so
fiercely assailed — the Mores, Cashmere, and Water Bastions —
the rebel gunners stood by their field-pieces in the open, which
partially enfiladed the British batteries, and showed that the
lessons our officers had taught them at Maharajpore, Sobraon,
and Goojerat had been turned to account. Not only from these
light pieces, but from a gun whose fire was brought to bear
from a hole in the curtain wall, from rockets directed from a
Martello tower, and a heavy fusillade from their advanced
trench and from the city walls, the enemy made a vigorous
resistance, and sought to delay the impending hour of doom.

The force of Foot Artillerymen even without relief, being
insufficient to man the guns, nearly all the officers and
men of the Horse Artillery were sent into the batteries and
worked in them until the morning of the assault, when they
rejoined their troops. In addition to these, the Carabineers
and 9th Lancers furnished a quota of volunteers, " whose intel-
ligence and goodwill rendered their services most valuable."
Several infantry officers, who had volunteered their services,
had been under instruction for some days before the breach-
ing batteries opened, and were afterwards most usefully em-
ployed in the latter. The men of the two field batteries of the
force were not taken for the siege guns, as one battery fur-
nished the three divisions of guns for the pickets, and the other
was in reserve in camp.

During the bombardment Lieutenant Eoberts had another
narrow escape. He had charge of the right guns, and on
opening the embrasure to fire, while laying one of them, a
round shot took off the arm of the gunner who was "serving"
the vent and knocked him over, but he escaped without serious
injury.

General Wilson now thought the time had come to storm
the city, and, during the night of the 13th of September, some
Engineer officers stole down and examined the two breaches
near the Cashmere and Water Bastions, Lieutenants Medley
and Lang the former, and Lieutenants Greathed and Home
the latter. Both breaches were reported practicable, and orders
were issued that night for the assault to take place at daybreak

4O Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

on the following morning. Four columns of assault were
formed ; the first, under Brigadier-General Nicholson, to storm
the breach near the Cashmere Bastion, and escalade the face of
that Bastion ; the second, under Brigadier Jones, to storm the
breach in the Water Bastion ; the third, under Colonel Campbell,
to assault by the Cashmere Gate after it had been blown open ;
and the fourth, under Major (now General Sir Charles) Reid,
to attack the Kissengunj suburb and enter by the Lahore
Gate. There was also a reserve column under Brigadier
Longfield. Lieutenant Roberts now rejoined the staff of
General Wilson, as the services of all the officers attached
to the Commander-in- Chief would be in requisition during
the critical operations connected with the assault.

At 4 A.M., on the 14th of September, the different columns
fell in and were marched to their respective places, the heads of
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 columns being kept concealed until the
moment for the actual assault should arrive. The signal was
to be the advance of 200 men of the 60th Rifles, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, as skirmishers to the front to cover
the heads of the columns. It is not our province to describe
the thrilling details of the assault of the breaches at the Cash-
mere and Water Bastions ; the explosion of the Cashmere
Gate by the band of heroes, Lieutenants Home and Salkeld,
and Serjeants Carmichael, Burgess, and Smith ; and the death
of the ever to be lamented Nicholson, when, having carried all
before him at the point of the bayonet, he proceeded, with the
eagerness characteristic of his heroic nature, to clear the ram-
parts between the Moree Bastion and Lahore Gate, and fell
while animating his troops to increased exertions.*

* Roberts says it was impossible for any troops in the world — and none
finer could be found than the well-seasoned soldiers of the Delhi Field
Force — to have carried the Lahore Gate, the narrow streets and passages
leading to which were commanded by loopholes and housetops from which
a hot fire rained down on the heads of every man who showed himself. In
that terrible ordeal Nicholson called on his men for further efforts, and
seven officers stepped to the front to show the way. All were shot down
save his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Kennett Dixon, of the Bengal Cavalry.
" I shall not forget you, Dixon, should we survive,'' said the hero, whose
majestic form was soon laid low by a bullet. The writer has a special
satisfaction in recording this incident of a young officer — his relative — who
was killed a few months later heading a charge of the Mooltanee Horse.

The Storm of Delhi. 41

The storm of Delhi is an oft-told tale, though it is one that
reflects undying lustre on the arms of our country.

The only failure throughout the operations of this eventful
day was that of the fourth column under Major Reid, which,
advancing from the Subzee Mundee suburb towards Kissengunj,
in company with the Cashmere Contingent, was compelled to
fall back with heavy loss, among the severely wounded being
the gallant commandant.

The Cavalry, 600 sabres, under Brigadier Hope Grant, with
a troop and a half of Horse Artillery, under Major Tombs, co-
operated during the assault by checking any attempt of the
enemy to attack the storming columns in flank by a sortie from
the Lahore Gate.

The actual loss, among combatants, during the bombard-
ment between the llth and 14th, was 327 officers and men,
including Captain Fagan of the Artillery, as fine a soldier as
any in the camp, andt during the assault (exclusive of the
casualties sustained by the Cashmere Contingent), no less than
66 officers and 1,104 men were killed and wounded, being
nearly one-third of the force engaged. The Bengal Fusiliers,
of which 250 went into action, lost nine officers, including
Major Jacob commanding; and other regiments suffered in
proportion. Of seventeen Engineer officers on duty at the
assault, ten were placed hors de combat, including the three
officers, Lieutenants Medley, Greathed, and Maunsell, leading
Nos. 1, 2, and 8 columns, and Lieutenants Tandy and Salkeld of
the storming party, the former of whom was killed, and the
latter died of his wounds.* Lieutenant Roberts had his horse
shot during the day. He was going round the position with
Captains Norman and Johnson, and came under a heavy fire
from a party of the enemy. At the time the horse was killed
he had dismounted and was leading the animal.

During the 15th several mortars were got into position to
shell the town and palace, a battery was opened from the
College Gardens of the Palace, and a breach was made also
from the College in the magazine defences. Meanwhile the

* During the siege the 60th Rifles lost in killed and wounded 389 men
out of 640 ; the Sirmoor Battalion, 319 out of 540 ; and the Corps of
Guides, 303 out of 550.

42 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

enemy kept up a cannonade on our portion of the city from the
fortified post known as Selimgurh, and from the magazine a
constant musketry fire was maintained on the College com-
pound. At dawn on the 16th, the magazine was successfully
stormed by H.M's. 61st Eegiment, and Kissengunj was evacu-
ated by the enemy, who left five heavy guns, of which posses-
sion was taken by a party sent forward from Hindoo Rao.
"We were now, for the first time," says Norman, "enabled
to see the immense strength of the insurgents' position here
and in Taleewarra, and which they had spared no labour to
improve."

Gradually pushing on, but making all secure in his rear
before taking another step, General Wilson, on the 17th and
18th, brought his right and left positions at the Cabul Gate
and magazine into direct communication by a line of posts ; the
Bank, Major Abbott's house and the dwelling of Khan Mahomed
were also taken, so that his posts were now close to the Palace
and Chandnee Chouk. "These advances," says the Engineer
officer already quoted, <c were not made without opposition both
from field artillery and musketry, but, being conducted with
great judgment, our loss was trifling." All the mortars, includ-
ing those captured in the magazine, now played constantly
upon the palace and the quarters of the town occupied by the
enemy, who, seeing that all further resistance was hopeless,
made their escape by the gates at the opposite end of the city.
On the evening of the 19th, the Berna Bastion was surprised
and captured by a party from the Cabul Gate, and, early next
morning, the Lahore Gate and Garstin Bastion were likewise
taken and held. By the 20th* the King's palace and Selimgurh,
the old Mogul fortress on the opposite side of the town to the
Lahore Gate, were captured, and, on the morning of the 21st, a
royal salute announced that Delhi had changed masters, and
the headquarters of General Wilson were established in the
Dewan Khas, or Great Hall of Audience, of the palace.

An extraordinary circumstance is narrated by Sir Hope

* The total loss of the Delhi Field Force, from the 30th of May to the
20th of September, was 46 officers and 946 men killed ; 140 officers, and
2,655 men wounded ; and 30 missing.

The Storm of Delhi. 43

Grant in his journal, showing in a striking manner the fatal-
istic sentiments inspiring the breast of the Mussulman.

As the British troops advanced to seize the King's palace,
two sentries were observed pacing their beat, armed and
accoutred according to regulation. They took no heed of the
advancing enemy, and were bayoneted at their posts. Such
indifference in the presence of imminent death is foreign
to the Western nature, which yet can boast a superior
presence of mind, if not courage. But the doomed sentry acted
on the philosophic sentiment of Caesar, who is made to say by
our great dramatist : —

" It seems to me most strange that men should fear,
Seeing that death, a necessary end,
Will come, when it will come."

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Hodson, whose services throughout
the siege were of so important a character that it is scarcely
an exaggeration to say that no officer of the investing army
conduced more to the success of the siege, marching quite
round the city, seized a large camp outside the Delhi Gate,
hastily evacuated by the rebels, and soon his cavalry had
secured the Jumma Musjid, in the heart of the city, where
they were speedily supported by the infantry and guns advanc-
ing from the opposite direction. Following up his success,
the King of Delhi, the miserable descendant of the Grand
Mogul, was captured a few miles from the city, on the 21st
of September, by Lieutenant Hodson, who, on the following
day, marched with a handful of his gallant irregular horsemen,
and completed the good work he had accomplished throughout
the siege by the seizure of two of the King's sons and a
grandson, all deeply implicated in the atrocities committed in
the massacres of the preceding May.

Into the vexed question of the shooting of these princes by
Lieutenant Hodson we will not enter here further than to
remark that — after a careful perusal of Hodson's own account
of the affair, of the Memoir of that gallant 6fficer by his
brother, of the description of the scene by his subaltern,
Lieutenant MacDowell, the only other European eye-witness,
who afterwards died the soldier's death, after carefully

44 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

weighing the considerations that guided Hodson (a man of
nerve and not given to panic) in the commission of the act,
of the necessity of which he must have been the best judge
— we cannot but acquit this gallant soldier of needless blood-
shedding. His career at Delhi,* achieved as the most bril-
liant of free lances, was so remarkable that envy was aroused
in breasts where it might least have been expected, and, sad
to say, this discreditable feeling was not exorcised even by his
death, some months later, in the service of his country, when,
surely, any blots in his career — if any there were, and Lord
Napier of Magdala denied their existence — might have been
buried with him in his grave at Lucknow. This estimate of
the character of the late Major Hodson is in agreement with
that formed by such distinguished soldiers as Sir Donald
Stewart, Sir Frederick Roberts, Sir James Brind, Sir James
Hills, and many others of his comrades at Delhi.

During the operations between the 14th and 21st of Sep-
tember, Lieutenant Roberts was employed in reconnoitring the
streets and defences of Delhi before they successively became
the objects of attack, and the valuable service he was thus
enabled to render may be gathered from one circumstance.
From the information he obtained General Wilson was enabled
to take the Berm Bastion in reverse, and also the enemy's
position in the Chandnee Chouk, in the heart of the city,
without the loss of a man !

A distinguished officer of the Delhi force writes at our
request some reminiscences of Roberts at this time. Major
Brind says : — " My first acquaintance with Sir Frederick
Roberts as a professional associate was in the Peshawur
valley. He was at the time aide-de-camp to his father, the
late General Sir Abraham Roberts, G.C.B., with whom I had a
pleasant acquaintance at Cawnpore in 1833. On my return to
Peshawur from active service, the General, then commanding
the division, sent his son one or two marches to meet me, and
I have a vivid recollection of the interest he took in the
splendid battery I had brought safe through a most difficult

* Mr. Greathed says of him in one of his Delhi letters : — " Hodson keeps
an Argus-eye on the rear and left flank, and is always ready for an adven-
turous ride. He has a rare gift of brains as well as of pluck."

BrincPs Reminiscences of Roberts. 45

country to the point of our meeting. In those days the roads
and ghats leading to Peshawur offered in many places formid-
able difficulties to the safe passage of artillery, and it was,
therefore, particularly gratifying to receive the General's ap-
proval. We were together at Peshawur for a year and a-half,
during which time I was in chief command of the artillery
force at all our field days there. On these occasions young
Roberts acted as my orderly officer most satisfactorily, being
then conspicuous as ever after for energy and ready appreciation
of field operations.

" "We next met in the Delhi Field Force — I in command of
the Foot Artillery, and he as Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-
General to the artillery of the force, so we only accidentally
came across one another, but it was patent to the Delhi Field
Force that this zealous, clever officer never missed an oppor-
tunity of serving the cause we were engaged in, and of laying
in a stock of practical knowledge that proved so valuable to
him in after life. The time at last arrived (and not a day too
soon, for the loyalty of the Punjaub was at its last breath, and
on it, so far as we all could judge, depended the safety of India)
when the actual siege of Delhi became obligatory. Nicholson's
success at Nujjuffgur cleared the road for the safe arrival of the
siege train, which Major Gaitskill, of the Artillery, had been
directed to bring down from Ferozepore, under charge of that
indefatigable Officiating Commissary of Ordnance, Captain
Gray. It was safely parked in our camp, and made ready for
distribution along the line of attack, as the breaching batteries
were reported by the chief engineer ready to receive their ord-
nance and detachments. The Foot Artillery was so weak in
officers and men through the casualties of three months' service
that the batteries had to be further strengthened by large
drafts from the Horse Artillery and European Cavalry, and
volunteers from among the commissioned ranks were called
for, and in like manner distributed and instructed by battery
commanders. The artillery officers on the staff, including
Lieutenant Roberts, had also to take their share of battery
work. From the 14th of September, he reverted to the
Quartermaster -General's department and we had another
seven days' and nights' continuous work in clearing the city of

46 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the enemy. As my duty required I had to visit hatteries —
light and heavy — engaged in these operations, during which I
found him actively employed."

Long before the close of the siege of Delhi, Lieutenant
Roberts had established a reputation in the camp as one of the
most promising officers of the Indian Army. Both Generals
Chamberlain and Wilson, on whose staff he had acted through-
out the siege, except during the bombardment between the llth
and 14th of September, rated his capacity very high, and the
latter, in his recommendation to Government, described him as
"an active and gallant officer." General Nicholson also had
so high an opinion of his capabilities that when, taking time
by the forelock, that brilliant officer had demanded of General
Wilson (and been accorded) the command of the column that
was to pursue the enemy on the fall of Delhi, he selected
Lieutenant Roberts to accompany him. Major Campbell and
Captain Johnson, under whose immediate command he served
during the three days' bombardment, when his battery at
Ludlow Castle had the chief work breaching the curtain
between the Cashmere and Water Bastions, reported in the
highest possible terms of the zeal, intelligence and skill dis-
played by Lieutenant Roberts.

We boast of the qualities of the Anglo-Saxon race, and when
we regard the circumstances under which Delhi was captured
there is good cause for self-glorification. Here was a vast city,
with defences recently placed in efficient order according to
modern military requirements by our own Engineer officers,
containing a magazine with a practically inexhaustible supply of
ordnance and ammunition, garrisoned by a disciplined force of
the three arms, trained and disciplined by our own officers,
flushed with success, and outnumbering as three to one the
besiegers, who, owing to their paucity, could only beleaguer
one-third of the city, while with the remaining two-thirds and
the river-face, over which was a bridge of boats under their con-
trol, they maintained free communication with the surrounding
country, whence supplies and reinforcements were derived to
any extent required. It will not be denied, even by our Conti-
nental detractors, that no nation but the British would have
gravely set about the task of capturing such a city with a

Roberts s Services at Delhi. 47

single weak division ! When the French undertook to subju-
gate the Arab tribes on the Tunis frontier, they dispatched
30,000 men, though, with a similar European force, scattered
throughout the whole Peninsula, we broke the neck of the
rebellion in '57, for Delhi was captured by the Indian Army
before a soldier arrived from England. What the British
soldier did a quarter of a century ago he will do again to-
morrow, provided he is intelligently led.* Taken all in all,
then, the siege of Delhi is unsurpassed in the annals of war,
and bearing in mind that its capture was the turning-point in
the suppression of the Mutiny, each one who took part in it
may repeat, with just pride, the words of the Latin poet,
Quorum pars magna fui.

* The Egyptian campaign has proved that this anticipation, which
recent events in South Africa had, in the opinion of many, tended to dis-
prove, was not hazarded by the writer without warrant.

48 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER III.

Lieutenant Roberts takes the Field with Colonel Greathed's Movable
Column — The Action at Bolundshur — Narrow Escape of Lieutenant
Roberts — The Capture of Allyghur — Roberts is engaged in the Pursuit
with the 9th Lancers— The Surprise at Agra of the 10th of October —
Roberts's share in the Severe Fighting and Pursuit — The March to
Mynpoorie — Skirmish and Pursuit of the Rebels to the Ganges-
Arrival at Cawnpore.

No sooner had General Archdale Wilson' s gallant army fairly
achieved the complete reconquest of Delhi, than a column was
formed to clear the Doab of the enemy, and endeavour to open
communication with General Havelock at Cawnpore. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel E. H. Greathed, of the 8th (the King's) Regi-
ment, was nominated to the command, and Lieutenant Roberts,
who had been serving throughout the siege as Officiating
Deputy Quartermaster-General of Artillery, was appointed to
the charge of the Quartermaster-General's Department, Lieu-
tenant Norman being placed at the head of the Adjutant-
General's Office of the Movable Column.*

The immediate object of the march of Colonel Greathed's
column, after clearing the Doab, was to march direct on Cawn-
pore, as the relief of the Lucknow garrison pressed urgently.

* The strength of the column, according to Lieutenant Norman, was as
follows :—

1st European troop, 1st Brigade Horse Artillery, four 6-pounder guns,
one 12-pounder howitzer ; 2nd European troop, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery,
four 6-pounder guns, one 12-pounder howitzer ; 3rd Company 1st European
Battalion Artillery and No. 17 Horse Field Battery, four 9-pounder guns,
two 24-pounder howitzers. Attached to the Artillery, two 5J-inch mortars.
Effective rank and file in round numbers —

Detachment of the Corps of Sappers and Miners, detach-
ment of Punjaub Sappers and Miners .... 200

H.M.'s 9th Lancers 300

Detachment 1st Punjaub Cavalry, 2nd do., and 6th do. . 320

Detachment Hodsou's Irregular Horse . 180

Head-quarters H.M.'s 8th and 75th Regiments . . . 450

2nd Punjaub Infantry, 4th do. (Rifles) . . . 1,200

GreathecCs Movable Column. 49

There was no thought then of going to Agra, the town and
cantonments of which were in the possession of the enemy, the
European non-combatants and refugees from the surrounding
district being crowded into the fort, an old Mogul structure of
immense size, now held by the 3rd Bengal Europeans and the
late Captain D'Oyley's battery of artillery, both in a numer-
ically weak state.

The Movable Column having a strength of 930 Europeans and
1860 Natives, marched from its encampment outside of the
Ajmere Gate on the morning of the 24th of September, and,
crossing the Jumna by the bridge of boats, made a march of
thirteen miles to Ghazee-ood-deen-nuggur, the point at which
the road from Delhi to Meerut branches off the Grand Trunk
Eoad. Lieutenant Roberta's labours as the officer in charge of
the Quartermaster-General's Department of an army marching
in, practically, an enemy's country, had now begun, but he
achieved a marked success in his first venture in a field with
which his name during the succeeding twenty years has been
so closely identified. His duties required him to proceed in
advance of the column to mark out each encampment, to pro-
cure information of the enemy's movements, and act on the
brigadier's staff during the military operations.

The column halted on the 25th, as the baggage animals were
out of condition, owing to the long halt in the unfavourable cli-
mate of Delhi, and advantage was taken of the delay to search
the baggage of the camp followers for plunder taken at Delhi
in order to relieve the cattle. The halt was also utilised to
institute an examination of the neighbouring villages, where
many rebels were apprehended and executed.

On the 26th, the column marched eleven and a half miles, to
Dadra, the people of which were reported by Mr. Clifford, the
civil officer accompanying the force, as having plundered the
neighbouring village of Secundrabad. Colonel Greathed had
surrounded Dadra at daylight by a squadron of the 1st Punjaub
Cavalry, under Lieutenant (now General) Watson, and, on the
arrival of the main body, the place was destroyed. On the
following day the force marched to Secundrabad, ten miles
distant. The place had been gutted by the " Goojurs," from
Dadra ; but the inhabitants, reassured by the presence of the

E

50 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

British, returned during the day in great numbers to the vil-
lage. The march was continued on the 28th, by the cross road,
to the civil station of Bolundshur, seven and a half miles, with
the object of attacking the fort of Malagurh, fifteen miles from
that place, the residence of the Mussulman Nawaub Wallydad
Khan, who had afforded active assistance to the rebels. On
nearing Bolundshur, Lieutenant Roberts received information
that pointed to a determined opposition on the part of the insur-
gent force, including regular troops and guns. Major Ouvry, of
the 9th Lancers, commanding the cavalry, accompanied by Lieu-
tenants Norman and Roberts, proceeded in advance of the
main column, and about a mile from the city encountered the
rebel picket of horse, which fell back. On continuing the
advance it became evident that a battery had been constructed
across the road, not many hundred yards in advance of the
point at which our cavalry had arrived ; bodies of insurgent
cavalry were likewise seen on each flank, but the ground imme-
diately near the battery being covered with trees, compound
walls, and the ruined residences of the English civil officers,
it was not practicable to ascertain the force of rebel infantry.

The advance party of cavalry was speedily reinforced, and
joined by two guns of Captain Remmington's Battery of Horse
Artillery, which were brought into action to open on the
breastwork in their front, behind which men were constantly
passing. But the enemy were too quick, and before our guns
could open, commenced a fire of round shot, to which Captain
Remmington at once replied. Soon after the remaining guns
of his battery arrived, and came into action about a hundred
yards to the right of the road. Captain Bourchier's Battery
also came up, and, under the direction of Lieutenant Roberts,
who had reconnoitred the ground, took ground more to the
right, thus bringing its fire to bear on the enemy's flank.
The detachments of H.M.'s 8th and 75th Regiments, and '250
of the 2nd Punjaub Infantry, some 700 bayonets, were pushed
forward through the gardens and houses of the civil station,
and Captain Bourchier's Battery moved on at the same time,
supported by a squadron of the 9th Lancers and a squadron
5fch Punjaub Cavalry, while Lieutenant Hugh Gough, with his
squadron of Hodson's Horse moved on the right of the infantry,

Gallant Services of Roberts. 5 1

and kept in check a considerable body of Sowars. Lieutenant
Roberts accompanied Captain Bourchier's Battery, which,
coming into action in an advanced position, fired salvoes of
grape at the breastworks, and the infantry moving forward, the
rebels abandoned their position and fled, leaving a 9-pounder
gun behind their breastwork, which was in a good position across
the junction of two roads, with trenches for infantry on either
flank.* Captain Bourchier says, "By the cross fire which was
kept up upon the enemy's battery, their fire was subdued ; an
advance was then ordered. A few salvoes of grape cleared the
front, and the Commanding officer being anxious that the
position should be secured, ordered an immediate advance of
Artillery. Lieutenant Roberts, of the Artillery, who seemed
ubiquitous, brought the order at a gallop. The guns charged
and took the battery, the enemy scampering before us as we
came up to it. Lieutenant Roberts was first at the guns. A
second burst, after clearing our front with grape, brought us to
the goal : the enemy flying before us like sheep."

The Cavalry did special good service, and the gallant
conduct of the 9th Lancers under Major Ouvry and Captain
Drysdale, in clearing the streets of Bolundshur, was worthy that
distinguished regiment, which had three officers severely
wounded. Lieutenants Probyn, 2nd Punjaub Cavalry, Young-
husband, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and Watson, 1st Punjaub
Cavalry, three as gallant and dashing leaders of irregular horse as
any army ever boasted, did equally good service in encountering
superior bodies of the enemy, who displayed much determina-
tion, and made an attempt on the baggage, which was repulsed
by the reserve. The British loss in the action was six officers
and forty-one men killed and wounded, while that of the rebels,
whose force included the 12th Native Infantry and 14th Irre-
gular Cavalry, was not less than 300.

Lieutenant Roberts accompanied the 9th Lancers, which
distinguished regiment served under his orders with such
credit during the recent Afghan War, and shared the dangers
of its brilliant charge in the crowded street, nearly ending his
career there and then. While passing under a gateway, in

* See Lieutenant Norman's Abstract of Proceedings of Colonel Greathed's
Movable Column.

E 2

52 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

company with Captain Sarel, 9th Lancers, and Lieutenant
Anson, A.D.C., their horses got jammed up with hackeries and
non-combatants seeking to escape, and a Sepoy took a delibe-
rate aim at Roberts from a window within a few feet, and fired.
Providentially his horse, a valuable Wuzeeree charger he had
bought from General Nicholson, reared and received the bullet
in his head, while his master escaped unhurt.

Lieutenant Roberts received the special thanks of Colonel
Greathed, of Major Ouvry, commanding the cavalry, who wrote
of " the most valuable information and assistance" he afforded
him, and of Captain Bourchier, with whose battery the Deputy-
Assistant Quartermaster-General, assuming his double char-
acter of a gunner, advanced. That officer reported of his
conduct to Major Turner, commanding the artillery of the
column, in the following terms : " I should be doing an injus-
tice were I not to bring to notice the assistance I obtained
from Lieutenant Roberts of the Artillery, who showed me my
ground, and in rapid advance down the road first arrived at the
gun we captured."

The enemy being dispersed about 1 P.M., the action having
lasted three hours, the baggage was brought up, and camp
pitched a mile beyond the town. During the evening informa-
tion was received that the rebels had evacuated the fort of
Malagurh, which was occupied by Lieutenant Baker with a
detachment of Hodson's Horse, and, on the following morning,
Colonel Greathed, with the Engineers and staff, including
Lieutenant Roberts, visited the place. It was a fortunate
circumstance that the rebel Nawaub had evacuated the fort, as
there were no heavy guns with the column, and only two small
mortars for shelling, while the place was of great strength,
being surrounded with a deep ditch over twenty-five feet broad.
Each face was about 200 yards in length, with a bastion at each
angle and in the middle, the mud rampart had a strong parapet
all round, and was about ten feet thick at the top, and there
were three gateways, one within the other, with narrow
approaches.

Some guns and much ammunition were found within the
fort, as well as an immense quantity of plundered property.
Colonel Gjeathed halted while the place was being destroyed by

Action at Allyghur. 53

the Engineers, during which Lieutenant Home, of Cashmere
Gate renown, was accidentally killed by a premature explosion,
to the great regret of the force. During the halt, carriage was
sent for to Meerut for the removal of the sick and wounded,
and much good was wrought by the presence of the troops in
restoring confidence among the peaceable inhabitants of the
district, and of Bolundshur, which was found nearly deserted
on their arrival.

The fort of Malagurh being sufficiently destroyed, and a
detachment of troops having arrived from Meerut to protect
the town of Boluudshur, the Movable Column marched thence
on the 3rd of October, to Koorjah, a distance of twelve miles,
and, on the following day, to Somna, thirteen and a half miles.
Here intelligence was received that the insurgent Mohamme-
dans who, under Mungal and Mytaub Singh, had in the pre-
ceding month murdered or expelled the civil authorities, were
prepared to oppose the British advance at Allyghur, and,
further, that the Rohilcund mutineers had reached Hattrass from
Muttra, and by some accounts were going to join the Moham-
medan insurgents at Allyghur.

Colonel Greathed accordingly started on the 5th for Allyghur,
a distance of fourteen miles, to reconnoitre and learn the road
by which the enemy's position could be turned. On approach-
ing the town, the rebels opened fire upon the reconnoitring
party with some guns, and it was found that both roads leading
to the city from the direction of Bolundshur were in their occu-
pation. Roberts halted with the small detachment of cavalry
forming the advanced guard ; but was compelled to fall back a
little to more advantageous ground, on which a number of the
enemy came forward, but gave the cavalry no opportunity of
charging. Two guns, under Captain Blunt, now came up and
joined the cavalry on the right, and, opening fire at short range,
speedily silenced and captured the rebel guns, killing the four
men who were working them. The remaining guns of Captain
Blunt's battery, moving down the left road, silenced and cap-
tured a gun placed at a breastwork newly constructed across the
road, but the rebels had disappeared amid the gardens and
houses in the suburbs. On the arrival of the infantry a
general advance was ordered.

54 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Lieutenants Probyn and Hugh Gough, with their two squad-
rons, swept round to the right of the city, keeping well away
from the walls. Major Ouvry, accompanied hy Lieutenant
Roberts, with the head-quarters of the cavalry and Bourchier's
guns, made a similar detour to the left, passing through the
deserted compounds and gardens of the cantonments, and even-
tually pursued down the Cawnpore road. Major Turner, with
three guns, a detail of cavalry, H.M.'s 75th, and the 4th Pun-
jaub Rifles, followed close round the walls to the right, while
Colonel Greathed with the rest of the force remained in reserve.
The cavalry on both flanks pursued with vigour for some
miles, cutting up the enemy, and Major Turner, pushing
round, broke open the city gates and made his way in various
directions into the town, taking two guns in position, and
destroying a magazine in one of the houses. Moving on thus,
he eventually reached the Sasnee Gate, and was there joined
by Lieutenant Gough's squadron, which had been quite round
the city on the other side. Within the town were to be found
only Bunniahs and shopkeepers of all kinds, who testified the
most lively joy at the return of the British, and it was very
evident that their condition under the rule of the insurgents
had not been a prosperous one. Major Ouvry's column, with
which was our hero, had a chase after "Pandy" of about 3 miles,
and in the high crops with which the country was covered,
some hundreds of Goojurs armed with swords and hatchets,
were put up like game in an English cover, and 200 bit the
dust. Major Turner's column, and the cavalry under Major
Ouvry, now moved to the encamping-ground and joined
Colonel Greathed, who sent the 2nd Regiment of Punjaub
Infantry and a squadron of cavalry to search the town, and
bring away any guns and arms that might be found.

A detachment 2nd Punjaub Infantry, with two European
officers, was left at Allyghur, and on the 6th the column
marched a distance of fourteen miles, to Akbarabad, where
dwelt Mungul and Mytaub Sing, twin brothers, Rajpoot chiefs,
who had made themselves conspicuous in the insurrection.
The cavalry surprised the place, and both the chiefs, with about
100 armed insurgents, were killed. Three small guns were
found loaded and in position at the residence of the chiefs,

Arrival at Agra. 55

besides property and ammunition of various kinds. The house
was blown up and the village destroyed.

The column was halted on the 7th, and, on the following day,
marched seven miles across country to Byjygurh, where says
Norman, "for the first time we found an apparently thriving
town uninjured by the troubles which have desolated every-
thing along and near to the Trunk road." In the course of
the day Colonel Greathed received reports (afterwards ascer-
tained to be unfounded) that the detachment left at Allyghur
was likely to be attacked, and that night sent off a small
reinforcement. He also received urgent calls from Agra, with
an intimation that the mutineers from Dholepore were coming
to attack that place. Accordingly at midnight on the 8th,
seven squadrons of cavalry and the Horse Artillery, with whom
Roberts proceeded, marched to Saidabad, and eventually to
Kundowlee, a distance of thirty-six miles, and were preparing
to proceed to Agra, when intelligence was received that it was
not necessary. In this march they passed Hattrass, which
had a few days previously been plundered by a large force of
7,000 men, armed with eighteen guns, and several thousand
armed " budmashes," passing from Muttra to Oude, under
Bukht Khan, the Bareilly Artillery Subadar.

The remainder of the Movable Column came up early in the
following morning, and, at sunrise on the 10th October, the
whole marched together into Agra, across the bridge of boats
and under the fort, the inhabitants of which turned out to see
the welcome spectacle. Lieutenant Roberts proceeded in
advance of the column to mark out the camping-ground, and
was met by the intelligence that the enemy had disappeared.
He accordingly made preparations for the camping of the
column. So secure from attack did the authorities at Agra
consider themselves that Colonel Cotton, the Brigadier com-
manding the garrison, desired that the camp should be pitched
near the church, on a space that would not have held half the
force, and would have necessitated dispersion amongst com-
pounds ; but after some discussion, and in compliance with
Colonel Greathed' s wishes, Roberts marked out the camp on
the Native Infantry Parade-ground. As the sequel proved,
had the column been thus divided, with houses and compounds

56 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

in front, it must have sustained on that day very severe loss,
and perhaps even annihilation, while it certainly could not
have attained the success which was achieved.

That the action that ensued was in the nature of a surprise
is certainly chiefly attributable to the defective intelligence of
the authorities at Agra, and little blame can attach to Colonel
Greathed, though it was sought in some quarters to fix it on
him, and Brigadier Hope Grant, who was sent to relieve him,
says, " Proper precautions had not apparently been taken by
our force when it marched in by at once posting pickets and
sending out cavalry patrols to examine the country in the
vicinity of the camp. The consequence was that before the
camp was pitched the enemy opened fire with their guns from
three different directions." Mr. (now Sir) William Muir,
Secretary to Government, North-West Provinces, writing to
Grant from Agra, on the day of the action, imputes no blame
to Greathed. He says : — " The enemy came on our camp
with artillery on three sides. Greathed's force had hardly got
the camp into order. The surprise, however, was only
momentary, and the sound and smoke of the artillery dis-
charges show that we have followed them up three or four
miles. It was a most complete surprise in one sense to us,
but a greater one to them. They could have had no idea that
we had so large a force. It entirely justifies the urgent
messages we have been sending for Greathed, but his fellows
must have been wretchedly tired. They had marched some
forty-two miles within thirty or forty hours."

All arms were speedily engaged, some of the troops turning
out in their shirt sleeves, but there was no disorder, for the
old Delhi campaigners had perfect confidence in their leaders
and themselves. While the guns opened fire with vigour and
effect, the Punjaub Cavalry, on the right, charged and beat
back the enemy, and the 9th Lancers, on the left, met in full
career and repulsed a daring charge of the rebel troopers of the
1st Light Cavalry and Irregular Horse. Lieutenant Roberts,
having completed his duties, was breakfasting in the fort
when he heard of the unexpected inroad of the rebels. Riding
quickly to the scene of conflict he found the pickets driven in
and Lieutenant Hugh Gough engaged with the enemy, who

The Action at Agra. 57

were in the camp, in the midst of which hand-to-hand com-
bats were going on. Drawing his sword, Eoberts made his
way through the combatants to the side of his commander.

During the melee, a squadron of the Lancers made a
brilliant charge on a large body of Sowars on the flank of
Blunt' s guns, in which Captain French was killed, and Lieu-
tenant Jones received twenty-two wounds, but survived to wear
the Victoria Cross. The Punjaub Cavalry, under Lieutenants
Watson, Probyn, and Younghusband, equally distinguished
themselves by capturing three guns, and the rout of the
enemy was soon complete, and he was in full retreat, pursued
by all arms, Lieutenant Koberts being with the foremost party
of cavalry. On one or two occasions the rebels attempted to
make a stand at villages on the Gwalior road, but the British
fire was too much for them, and the infantry coming up, their
guns were captured. At a point five miles from cantonments
the rebel camp was taken, and from thence to the Kalee
Nuddee (black stream) the pursuit was one of cavalry and
Horse Artillery. Gun after gun was taken, and strings of
hackeries captured, fugitive Sepoys being cut down at every
yard. On reaching the Kalee Nuddee, which was nearly
unfordable, the 1st Light Cavalry, drawn up on the opposite
side, made a show of forming a rear-guard, but Captain
Kemmington's guns speedily coming up, drove them off.

Twelve guns, being all the rebels had brought over, were
captured, and between 500 and 600 men were killed, and had
the crops not been so high, forming such admirable cover,
their losses would have been far heavier. " There never was,"
says Norman, " a more complete rout, and probably never a
hotter pursuit." After securing the guns, and bringing off or
destroying the standing camp, the troops returned to the can-
tonment about seven o'clock, having performed the almost
unparalleled achievement of fighting an action and marching
sixty-six miles in forty hours, nine miles of which the cavalry
did at a trot through high crops or over ploughed fields.
Roberts says that he saw a Sikh infantry 'soldier drinking
water in the Kalee Nuddee who had marched fifty miles, and
after pursuing to this stream marched back to camp ! The
British loss was small, consisting of twelve killed and fifty-four

58 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

wounded, and the result achieved was considerable, a great
effect having been produced among the insurgent forces, which
consisted of between 6,000 and 8,000 men, including the
mutineers from Mhow, part of those from Neemuch, and
parties from Delhi, Indore, and Gwalior.

Though the attack was in the nature of a surprise, it was
one for both parties, for the rebels had no intelligence of the
near approach of Greathed's column, and fancied they were
dealing with the Agra garrison, and hence they took the offen-
sive, displaying a dash quite foreign to their method of attack.
The disaffected in the city were said to have been engaged to
destroy the bridge of boats, but this was frustrated by the
rapid advance of the British, and it is probable that their
intention to attack such a strong and well-garrisoned fort as
Agra was due to the expected co-operation of the Gwalior
Contingent, with their siege-train, and four batteries of
artillery. But as Norman remarks : — " The most astonishing
part of the whole affair was the utter want of information, or
rather the incorrect information, of the Agra Government.
Within half an hour of fire being opened, the very best
authority (as it was supposed) had declared the mutineers to be
beyond the Kalee river, and yet, at that very time, they must
have been within a mile or so of camp. In fact they crossed
the river with guns, ammunition, waggons, &c. — and as the
water was by no means shallow and the banks steep, this must
have been a work of time — pitched a camp within five miles of
the fort, and close to a village, and advanced to the attack past
many villages without one word of correct information reach-
ing the Agra authorities, who, indeed, that very morning
received intelligence directly opposed to the truth."

Lieutenant Roberts had no small share in the honours of
this hard-fought and most laborious day, and had the gratifica-
tion of seeing his name mentioned in despatches by Colonel
Greathed, Colonel Cotton, and Mr. C. B. Thornhill, the Secre-
tary to Government, North-West Provinces.

Colonel Greathed was very anxious to open communication
with General Havelock's force, and a detachment, with two
guns, having been sent to relieve the party left at Allyghur,
the column crossed the river on the 14th of October, and

Advance on Cawnpore. 59

marched on the following day to Mynpoorie, which they
reached on the 19th, the last march heing twenty-four miles.
On the previous day Brigadier Hope Grant arrived from Delhi
and took command of the Movable Column, and from this time
till the close of his service during the Mutiny, Lieutenant
Koberts served on the staff of that distinguished General, who
was singularly fortunate in his staff, which included such
officers as Wolseley, Roberts, Biddulph, Wilmot, and the late
Augustus Anson.

The column made a rapid march of twenty-four miles to
Mynpoorie, where resistance was expected, but the Rajah and
his followers fled, and some guns and a gun-foundry fell into
the hands of the British, also two and a half lacs of rupees,
saved by the Rao, his brother, who met the column on the line
of march. Brigadier Grant halted on the 20th, and the fort
having been destroyed, marched on the following day to Bewer,
which, on their approach, was abandoned by a rebel force
detached from Futtehgurh by the Nawaub. At Bewer, the
junction of the four roads leading to Cawnpore, Meerut,
Futtehgurh, and Agra, Brigadier Grant received a letter from
Sir James Outram, written in the Greek character, requesting
him to push on to Lucknow to his aid with all speed, as they
were running short of provisions. He determined, accordingly,
not to delay by leaving the road to attack Futtehgurh, and on
the 22nd made a forced march of twenty-eight miles to Goor-
saigunge, and on the following day pushed on to Meerun-kee-
Serai. While Lieutenant Roberts, with his guard, was
reconnoitring close to the town, situated on the banks of a
stream, he was fired upon by a battery on the opposite side,
supported by about 500 infantry, engaged in getting the guns
across. General Grant sent to his assistance a squadron of
Lancers, two of Punjaub Cavalry, and two guns. Our artillery,
getting into action, soon silenced them, and they fled, leaving
their guns, which were captured, while the cavalry, fording the
river, pursued them for several miles, cutting up a considerable
number. Lieutenant Probyn, with the squadron of 2nd
Punjaub Cavalry, continued the pursuit as far as the Ganges,
into which the remnant of the fugitives were driven. The
guns were brought into camp — one 24-pounder howitzer,

60 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

one 9-pounder, and two brass native guns, 3-pounders, besides
ammunition-waggons and two store-carts. During the pursuit
Roberts displayed his accustomed ardour, and crossed swords
with a rebel sowar, who cut his horse across the flank.

On the 24th of October a forced march of twenty- two miles
was made to Poora, and two ordinary marches, on the 25th and
26th, took the column into Cawnpore, where it was directed by
Brigadier Wilson, of H.M.'s 64th Regiment, commanding at
the station, to halt until orders for an advance on Lucknow
were received from Sir Colin Campbell, the newly-arrived
Commander-in-Chief.

As the column, barely numbering 3,000 men, marched into
Cawnpore, it was surrounded by large bodies of the enemy — •
the Gwalior Contingent, a highly-disciplined force of 5,000
men, with batteries and a siege-train, in all amounting to
thirty-six guns, being encamped on the banks of the Jumna, a
few miles distant, and a force under the Nawaub of Futtehgurh
of about the same strength, with artillery, in the rear, and
other bodies of rebels between the Ganges and Lucknow.
But the mutinous Sepoys displayed an unaccountable lack of
enterprise, and feared to attack, though burning to destroy the
troops destined to save the women and children at Lucknow
from the fate that had befallen their unfortunate compatriots at
Cawnpore — that name of horror, the sound of which even now,
to those who were in India in the Mutiny year,

" Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye
That tears shall drown the wind."

Nothing more painful ever met the eye of Roberts and the
officers and men of Grant's column, than the scene presented
by this once handsome station, now gutted and burnt, with
scarce a house standing, but only blackened walls and evidences
of slaughter on every hand. There was the house where was
enacted the last scene in the unhappy tragedy, with its blood-
stained walls and heart-rending inscriptions, telling of the
wounds the writers had received, the deaths of those dear to
them, and breathing agonizing appeals to Heaven for mercy,
and to man for the succour that never came. There was the
hospital, which formed the centre of the position on the open
plain, defended for twenty-two days by Sir Hugh Wheeler

The Scene at Cawnpore. 61

against the artillery and overwhelming forces of the enemy,
and, lying about, scraps of letters, children's shoes, ladies'
bits of ribbon, and other piteous memorials of the ill-fated
occupants ; and there was the terrible well, with its contents
scarcely covered by a thin layer of earth. Once beautiful
women and innocent children lay there in a festering mass,
and the echoes of their voices, though stilled in death, called
in trumpet-tones to the shuddering visitors who crowded round
these sad memorials, to avenge the deed than which the history
of all time can show nothing so black or treacherous.

The officers and men of the Delhi Field Force had seen
much of bloodshed and the horrors of war during the past few
months, but nothing to approach this scene at Cawnpore.
As they turned away horror-stricken from the fatal well, there
was no need for incentives to steel their hearts against wreaking
a full measure of revenge, such as were called to her aid by
Lady Macbeth before perpetrating the murder of Duncan.

" Fill me, from the crown to the toe, top full
Of direst cruelty. Make thick my blood.
Stop up the access and passage to remorse,
That no compunctious visitings of nature.
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep a pace between
The effect and it."

Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER IV.

Departure of Lieutenant Roberts from Cawnpore with Brigadier Hope
Grant's Column for the Relief of Lucknow — Narrow Escape of Roberts
from Capture by the Rebels at Buntheera — March upon Lucknow —
Roberts as Quartermaster-General of Sir Hope Grant's Division — He
leads the Army from the Alumbagh — Is sent by Sir Colin Campbell on
a Special Mission to Alumbagh — Is associated with Captain Garnet
Wolseley in the Capture of the 32nd Mess-house — The return March
to Cawnpore— The Battle of Cawnpore on the 6th of December — The
Affair at Serai Ghat.

AT Cawnpore Brigadier Grant received an accession of
strength, including 350 men of the 93rd Sutherland High-
landers, under Colonel the Honourable Adrian Hope (who fell
at Rooyiah, in Oude), which hrought up the strength of the
column to 3,460 men and twenty guns. With this force he
and his officers felt they could accomplish anything, and all
were inspired with feelings of self-gvatulation when the order
came for them to commence their march for the relief of Luck-
now. The column crossed the Ganges by the bridge of boats
on the 30th October, and pushed on to Bunnee, where the
bridge was found to be destroyed, but the river was forded
without difficulty. The Brigadier now received an order from
Sir Colin Campbell, who arrived at Cawnpore from Calcutta
on the 3rd November, directing him to halt until he joined
him.

As the ground was unfavourable for camping, he determined
to advance a few miles, and, on the morning of 3rd November,
sent Lieutenants Roberts and Mayne, of the Quartermaster-
General's Department, to select a proper site. In executing
this duty Lieutenant Roberts had a narrow escape from capture
by the rebels at a village called Buntheera, which we will give
in his own words to us: — "I was sent by Sir Hope Grant to select
ground for a new camp. We had reconnoitred the country a
few hours previously, and finding no enemy, Lieutenant Mayne,
Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General, like myself, went

Narrow Escape of Roberts. 63

with a few Sowars on ahead. We arrived on the ground and
sent back word to the camp colourmen to come on. While we
were waiting and talking to what appeared pilgrims, we were
shot at, and on looking round saw a considerable number of
the enemy between us and our force. They had been concealed
in the village, so we afterwards heard. We put spurs to our
horses, but had a narrow escape ; my horse, while crossing a
ravine, was slightly wounded and fell, and in doing so my
sword fell from my hand and cut my left thumb badly."

Had he fallen into the hands of the rebels, a cruel death
would have been his fate, for

" Match'd with them

The rudest brute that roams Siberia's wild
Has feelings pure and polish'd as a gem —
The bear is civilized, the wolf is mild."

The Brigadier sent a portion of his force with guns to drive
away the enemy, and they were easily turned out of the village
of Buntheera, and retreated in the direction of Lucknow.

The column now occupied the village of Nawabgunj, in the
middle of a large plain, where the camp was pitched and a
convoy, with suitable escort, was sent to the Alumbagh. Be-
tween the 5th and 10th November, when Sir Colin Campbell
reached Nawabgunj, and assumed the command-in-chief of all
the troops destined for the relief of Lucknow, considerable
reinforcements arrived, and the troops available for the advance
numbered 6,000 men, with eleven heavy guns, two 18-pounders,
eighteen field-pieces, and several mortars.

On the morning of the 12th November, Sir Colin commenced
operations by marching to the Alumbagh, a large walled enclo-
sure, about five miles due south of the Residency, the garrison
of which consisted of 900 men, forming a portion of the force
left by Sir James Outram and General Havelock in their
advance to the first relief of the Residency on the 25th of
September.

Lieutenant Roberts was with the advance guard, which was
attacked by a body of 2,000 rebels, with two guns, but the
latter were taken by Lieutenant H. Gough, of Hodson's Horse,
in a brilliant charge, and the enemy dispersed. The Alumbagh
position having been cleared of the enemy, the garrison was

64 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts,

changed, Her Majesty's 75th Regiment, numbering only 300
war-worn soldiers who had served through the siege of Delhi,
being placed in garrison there. Depositing his heavy baggage
and supplies in the Alumbagh enclosure, and sending back his
cattle and wheeled transport to Cawnpore, Sir Colin made his
arrangements for marching with the remainder of his force,
4,800 men, without encumbrances, which he proposed to leave
in the park of Dilkoosha.*

On the 13th, the advance on Lucknow commenced in earnest,
and Lieutenant Roberts, as the head of the Quartermaster-
General's Department of the division commanded by Brigadier-
Generalf Grant, reconnoitred the road, and had the honour of
leading the army in the advance from the Alumbagh to Dilkoosha,
which initiated the operations resulting in the relief of the
beleaguered garrison and women and children. As the advance
column approached the Dilkoosha park, the leading troops were
met by a heavy musketry fire. Reinforcements were pushed on,
under the command of Colonel Hamilton, 78th Highlanders,
the troops engaged consisting of 2 batteries of Artillery and 3
regiments of Infantry. After a running fight of two hours,
the enemy were driven down the hill to the Martiniere, across
the garden and park of that college, and far beyond the canal
which, running nearly east and west, falls into the Goomtee at
a point to the north of the Martiniere. The Dilkoosha and
Martiniere were both seized by Brigadier Hope's brigade occu-
pying the gardens and enclosures of the latter, abutting on the
canal, Brigadier D. Russell's brigade being on the left, in front
of Dilkoosha, and Brigadier Little, with the Cavalry and Bour-
chier's Battery, occupying the plain in front of the Martiniere.

The enemy however, did not acquiesce in their defeat, but
attacked the position with spirit, though without success. Our
troops drove them off and advanced across the canal, and,
during the fighting, two officers were killed, Captain Wheatley,
of the Carabineers, and Lieutenant Mayne, Royal Horse Artil-
tery, Lieutenant Roberts' companion in the affair at Buntheera.

* Dilkoosha signifies " Heart's Delight."

f Hope Grant had been advanced to this rank by Sir Colin Campbell, an
old friend with whom he had served in China and on the Sutloj. Sir Colin
placed him in command of the whole force, though practically the operations
for the relief of Lucknow were conducted by the Commander-in-Chief. .

Roberts on Special Service. 65

No further advance was made for a few days, but Roberts
was selected by the Commauder-in-Chief for a duty which
showed that he had already made himself a name as an active,
capable officer. He writes to us : "The evening previous to the
advance from the Martiniere, Sir Colin Campbell sent for me,
and said that he had not sufficient reserve ammunition, and
that more must be brought from the Alumbagh before morning ;
he asked me if I could find my way to the Alumbagh in the
dark ; I replied I thought I could, and was told to go, to take
what escort I required and a sufficient number of camels. I
took Hugh Gough's and Younghusband's squadrons of Native
Cavalry. We had great difficulty in avoiding the enemy's
pickets, but we performed the duty during the night, and
returned to the Martiniere shortly before daybreak. Sir Colin
expressed himself greatly pleased ; I had just time for a hasty
breakfast when I was ordered to lead the column towards the
Secunderbagh."

Storing his heavy baggage and supplies for fourteen days in
the Alumbagh, Sir Colin Campbell rested his army, and the
advance on the Secunderbagh took place on the morning of the
16th of November, the rear guard, under Colonel Ewart, 93rd
Highlanders, having closed up with the column only on the
preceding day. Leaving in garrison at Dilkoosha, H.M.'s 8th
Regiment, like the 75th one of the Delhi battalions, and therefore
entitled to a well-earned repose, early on the 16th Sir Colin
advanced direct on Secunderbagh, Lieutenant Roberts leading
the column to what proved one of the hardest contested fights
of the war.

The Secunderbagh is described by the Commauder-in-Chief
as a high walled enclosure of strong masonry, 120 yards
square, and carefully loopholed all round. It was held in great
strength by the enemy, and opposite to it, at a distance of a
hundred yards, was a village also loopholed and filled with
men. On the head of the column advancing up the lane to
the left of the Secunderbagh, fire was opened on them. The
infantry of the advance guard was quickly thrown into skirmish-
ing order, to line a bank to the right, and Captain Blunt's*

* Now Major-General C. H. Blunt, C.B.

66 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

troop of Bengal Horse Artillery, passing at a gallop through, a
cross-fire from the village and Secuuderbagh, opened fire within
musketry range in a most daring manner. As soon as they
could be pushed up a steep bank, two 18-pounder guns, under
Captain Travers, were also brought to bear on the building.
While this was being effected, says the Commander-in- Chief,
the leading brigade of infantry, under Brigadier the Hon.
Adrian Hope, coming rapidly into action, caused the loopholed
village to be abandoned, the whole fire being then directed on
the Secunderbagh. After a time a large body of the enemy,
who were holding ground to the left of the advance, were driven
in, when the 93rd Highlanders pursued their advantage and
seized the barracks, and immediately converted them into a
military post. While this was going on, the two 18-pounders
had been battering the Secunderbagh, which was stormed in
the most brilliant manner by the 93rd Highlanders and 4th
Punjabees. "There never was a bolder feat of arms," wrote
the Commander-in- Chief, who had stormed the breach of San
Sebastian, and stood on the ridge at Barrosa ; and thus the
crime of Cawnpore was avenged at Secunderbagh, within the
small area of which over 2,000* dead bodies were counted by
the burying parties.

The next point attacked was the Shah Nujeef, a domed
mosque, with a garden enclosed within a loopholed wall. The
place was first cannonaded for three hours by the heavy guns of
Captain Peel's Naval Brigade, an action almost unexampled
in war, and then stormed by the 93rd Highlanders, led by
Brigadier Hope, supported by a battalion of detachments under
Major Barnston, of the 90th Eegiment, who received a wound
which ultimately proved fatal. This brought the operations of
the 16th of November to a close.

On the following morning took place the storm of the 32nd
Mess-house, formerly known as the Khoorsheyd Munzil (Happy
Palace), a building of considerable size, defended by a ditch
twelve feet broad and scarped with masonry, and a strong mud-
wall loopholed for musketry. The task of leading the stormers

* So says Sir Colin Campbell in his despatch. Bourchier places the
number at about 3,000, and Lord Wolseley, who was with the burying party,
informed us that the exact number was, by a singular coincidence, 1,857.

Roberts and Wolseley. 67

was entrusted to Captain Wolseley,* of the 90th Regiment, by
Sir Colin Campbell, who mentions that officer's name first in
his despatch briefly recording the events of the day. With
Captain Wolseley was associated a picket of the 53rd Regiment,
under Captain Hopkins, and he was supported by the battalion
of detachments formerly commanded by Major Barnston, and
now by Captain F. C. Guise,f both of the 90th Regiment.

The difficulty of writing history correctly even when the
actors are alive, has received an exemplification in the published
accounts of the storm of the Mess-house, one of the most
gallant feats of arms performed during the war. The writer,
in the first edition of his " Memoir of Lord Wolseley,"
(published in 1874,) gave an account of this affair derived
from the gallant leader of the storming party, who received
his instructions from Sir Colin Campbell in person, and it
was extracted by Colonel Malleson in his " History of the
Mutiny." But in the third and concluding volume of his
work, the historian, in correction of this account, inserted an
Appendix, in which Captain Hopkins is credited with the
honour of having led the storming party across the drawbridge
into the Mess-house, and Wolseley is only mentioned as
" attacking the houses on the right of the building." Since
this was published the writer has been assured by the late
Mr. Kavanagh, V.C., who guided Wolseley's party, that his
account is absolutely correct, and that Wolseley, and not
Hopkins, was the leader of the party that first crossed the
drawbridge into the Mess-house. Colonel Malleson, in the
Appendix referred to (see pages 505-506, Vol. III.), further
states that Captain Hopkins received a flag from Lieutenant
Roberts, and himself hoisted it, and on its being shot down,
replaced it on the summit of the Mess-house ; but the following
is Sir Frederick Roberts' account, in a letter to us, of his
share of the business : — " I took the flag of the 2nd Punjaub
Infantry, by Sir Colin Campbell's orders, and placed it on the
Mess-house to show Outrarn and Havelock where we were. The
enemy knocked the flagstaff down three times, breaking the

* Now General Lord Wolseley, G.C.B.
f Now Major-General Guise, C.B., V.C.

P 2

68 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

pole once. The staff is, I believe, still in the possession of the
2nd Punjaub Infantry."

The Motee Mahal was gained the same day by Captain
Wolseley's exertions, and a communication opened that evening
with the Kesidency. Lieutenant Roberts accompanied his Chief
at the meeting between the three Generals — Sir Colin Campbell,
Sir James Outram, and General Havelock — a memorable scene
that has been depicted with graphic force by Barker in his
famous painting.

Roberts took up his quarters with Brigadier General Grant
in the Shah Nujeef, where the occasional welcome of a round
shot through the building warned them that their work was
not yet ended. The withdrawal of the immense train of non-
combatants and sick and wounded and stores, was confided to
Sir James Outram, who performed the task with the success
that might have been anticipated from his antecedents.

At his own suggestion, Outram remained in command of
some 4,000 men and thirty-five pieces of ordnance at the
position of Alumbagh, while, on the 27th, the remainder of the
army, under Sir Colin Campbell and Brigadier-General Hope
Grant, who had continued, throughout the operations connected
with the Relief, in immediate command of the division, retraced
their steps towards Cawnpore, with the object of sending the
Lucknow women and children on to Allahabad and Calcutta.
But an unexpected even^t had occurred at Cawnpore, and in
place of a little rest after the weary months of watching passed
in the Residency, the sorely tried ladies and children again
heard the familiar boom of cannon and rattle of musketry,
and found themselves in a beleaguered camp, the garrison
of which had no easy task in defeating and dispersing their
aggressors.

When Sir Colin Campbell quitted Cawnpore, he left Major-
General "Windham (" Redan Win dham" as he was called) in
command of the camp, with strict orders to remain on the
defensive. General Windham had at first only 500 Europeans
under his orders, but received constant small accessions of
strength, until his force numbered between 2,000 and 3,000
men. Hearing of the advance of the Gwalior mutineers from
Calpee, notwithstanding the stringent orders of the Com-

The Fighting at Cawnpore. 69

mander-in- Chief to stand on the defensive, he resolved to
strike a blow. On the 26th of November, he moved out eight
miles along the canal in a due westerly direction, and meeting
the advance guard of the enemy, consisting of 3,000 men, at
a place called Bhowsee, on the Pando Nuddee, he attacked and
routed them, capturing three guns. On his return Windham
encamped in a position with brushwood on one side and the
city in his rear, and the enemy, making a detour in the night,
appeared close on his left flank in the morning of the 27th of
November. Meanwhile Windham, leaving his camp standing,
had advanced in another direction, and found himself suddenly
attacked from an unexpected quarter, and was compelled to
retreat to his intrenchments, leaving in the possession of the
enemy his standing camp with all its contents. That night
the rebel force, consisting of the Gwalior Contingent and Koer
Singh's men, was joined by the Nana Sahib, and, advancing
upon Cawnpore, which fell into their hands, invested the
intrenchmeuts, their left resting on the Ganges, and their right
on the city at the point where it touches the canal. Doubtless
the treacherous and sanguinary monster leading the mutineers
promised himself a second " Cawnpore," and the vigour with
which the attack was pushed on the morning of the 28th of
November, augured well for his hopes, and showed that the
rebels had a leader of some ability in the person of Tantia
Topee, who now appeared on the scene.

Advancing at dawn with their overwhelming artillery, which
had been trained by the late Sir Vincent Eyre, the Gwalior
Contingent, Horse, Foot, and Artillery, forming the most
highly disciplined native troops in India, reinforced by other
levies, making up a formidable army of 25,000 men, with 42
guns, captured the Assembly Rooms, with all its vast collection
of private and public stores and ammunition, and, possessing
themselves of the Grand Trunk Road, moved down to attack
the intrenchments. During the fighting that ensued, the 64th,
numbering only 300 bayonets, one of Havelock's regiments in
Persia and in his advance up country, made a gallant charge
and spiked three guns, but not being supported, were driven
back with heavy loss, including Brigadier Wilson and several
officers killed. At this time of doubt and disaster, Sir Colin

70 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Campbell arrived on the scene with Hope Grant's weak division,
and speedily the aspect of affairs was changed.

The Commander-in- Chief, having made his dispositions for
leaving Sir James Outram at Alurnbagh, set out on his return
inarch to Cawnpore with the non-combatants and wounded
from Lucknow, about 2,000 souls, escorted by the remainder
of his troops, some 3,000 men, including the garrison of the
Residency. On the morning of the 27th, Sir Colin encamped
at Bunnee, about thirty miles distant from Cawnpore, and,
about noon of the following day, received a missive from
General Windham, headed " most urgent," reporting his
critical position in terms that, for a moment, almost unnerved
the veteran of a hundred fights. A writer in Blackivood's
Magazine for October, 1858, gives a graphic account of the
position of affairs as the column pressed on to the bridge of
boats over the Ganges: — "The impatience and anxitey of all
became extreme. Louder and louder grew the roar, faster and
faster became the march, long and weary was the way, tired
and footsore grew the infantry, death fell on the exhausted
wounded with terrible rapidity, the travel-worn bearers could
hardly stagger along under their loads, the sick men groaned
and died ; but still on, on, on, was the cry."

After progressing in the usual order for a short time, the
tension became too great for Sir Colin. Leaving the infantry
to march on with the convoy, he pressed forward with the
cavalry and horse artillery. On reaching Mungulwar, about
five miles on the Lucknow side of the Ganges, he halted his
troops, directed the artillery to fire salvoes to announce the
approach of assistance, and galloped forward with his staff, in
mingled hope and fear regarding the condition in which he
might find the bridge of boats. As he approached the river,
a glance dissipated every doubt on this head. Through the
glimmering light, for evening had set in, the bridge was seen
to be intact. Flames rising in every direction, mingling with
the light of the setting sun, showed that the enemy must have
taken the city and a large part of the cantonments, that the
tents intended for the ladies and children and the sick and
wounded from Lucknow, and the stores of clothing for the
defenders of the Residency, must have been destroyed ; whilst

Roberts Conmmnicates with Cawnpore. 71

the artillery fire occasionally directed at the bridge, and the
fusillade near the river-bank, proved that a sharp crisis
was impending. In a word, to use the language of an officer
on Sir Colin's staff, "the veil which had so long shrouded us
from Wiudham was rent asunder, and the disaster stood before
us in all its calamity."

Lieutenant Roberts was ordered to communicate with General
Windham, and ascertain the state of affairs. Biding at top
speed he was the first to cross the bridge of boats leading to
the entrenchment, now so hardly beset by an enemy flushed
with unaccustomed victory, and communicating with "VVindham,
returned to the Commander-in-Chief and placed him in posses-
sion of the situation. Pushing on, Sir Colin crossed the
stream, and the language the veteran employed towards
Windham on learning the loss of all the stores he had
accumulated with such labour, was, to use a mild term,
unparliamentary.*

On the 28th the enemy began to bombard the intrenchment,
but their opportunity was lost ; for, during the 29th, the British
troops began to cross the Ganges, and the old chief set to work
in his trenchant style to repair the disaster brought about by
rashness. By the following evening the whole of his division
was on the Cawnpore side of the Ganges,' the British resting
on the river, and the front and left covering the Grand Trunk
Road, which, passing through Cawnpore, unites Delhi, Allaha-
bad, and Calcutta. By the 3rd December, the convoy, "which,"
says Sir Colin, " had given me so much anxiety, including the
families and half the wounded, was finally despatched on its
way," and, on the evening of the 5th, every arrangement had
been made for a general attack on the enemy the next morning.
The city of Cawnpore lay in front of the British camp, the
larger portion of the town being on the northern side of the
canal running east and west towards the Ganges, and the smaller
portion lying on its southern bank. At this time the enemy
were on the north side of the canal, which divided them from
the British, who occupied also an advanced post, the General

* General Windham was superseded by Brigadier Inglis, the commander
of the Lucknow garrison, and General Dupuis, K.A., commanding the
artillery, was sent to Dum Dum.

72 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Gunj, an old bazaar, of considerable extent, held by Brigadier
Greathed.

On the 6th December, the morning of the attack, the British
force did not exceed 7,000 or 8,000 men, and that of the
enemy amounted to 25,000, with thirty- six guns. The Gwalior
Contingent had come westward from Calpee, on the Jumna, a
distance of fifty-one miles by the road which, joining that from
Delhi, enters the city of Cawnpore on the north ; and the Nana
Sahib's people had come southward from Bithoor down the
Ganges. The rebel camp was about two miles from Cawnpore
on the Calpee Eoad.

There was some desultory fighting on the 5th, in which
Lieutenant Roberts took part on Sir Hope Grant's staff ; but at
9 A.M. on the following morning, Sunday, 6th December, Sir
Colin had his force, with thirty-five guns, ready disposed for
action, and commenced operations for the dispersal of the enemy
by a heavy bombardment from the works near the Ganges to
the east of Cawnpore, with the object of inducing the rebels
to believe that the attack was to be made in that quarter.
Brigadier Greathed's three regiments were reinforced by the
64th, and he was directed to occupy the General Gunj, the
bazaar on the canal, opposite the enemy's centre, where he had
been posted for some days. The rest of the British force, con-
sisting of an artillery brigade, including Captain Peel's heavy
guns, a cavalry brigade, under Sir Hope Grant, and three weak
infantry brigades under the Hon. A. Hope, Walpole, and Inglis
of Lucknow, were drawn up in contiguous columns, and effect-
ually masked from the observation of the enemy.

Soon after eleven all was ready. The infantry then deployed
in parallel lines fronting the canal. Hope was in advance in
one line, Inglis in rear with the second. General Grant was sent
with the cavalry and horse artillery to cross the canal by the
bridge a mile and a half to the westward, and to threaten the
enemy's rear. Immediately to the left of Brigadier Greathed
was another bridge across the canal, which was crossed by
Walpole, who drove the enemy from some brick-kilns. The
Sikhs and the men of the 53rd did the same on the left, and
then the whole line advanced, with Peel's heavy guns. Sir
Colin Campbell wrote ; " On this occasion there was the sight

The Pursuit after the Battle. 73

beheld of 24-pounder guns advancing with the first line of
skirmishers. "

The troops were soon over the canal, and the enemy were
driven back at all points. His camp two miles in rear, and
covering his line of retreat, was reached and taken at one
o'clock in the afternoon, and his rout was complete. For four-
teen miles along the Calpee road the enemy was hotly pursued
with cavalry and artillery, and Sir Colin Campbell expressed
his belief that not one gun or ammunition waggon which had
been on the right of the enemy's position, escaped.

Lieutenant Roberts rode by the side of his chief in this
chase and capture. Captain Bourchier commanding No. 17
Battery, which first took up the pursuit, says : — " Gun after
gun is spiked, cartloads of ammunition lay strewed along the
road; Pandies are bolting in all directions. For two miles
without a check the pursuit was carried on by the battery alone,
accompanied by Sir Hope Grant and his staff. Four times in
that distance did we come into action, to clear our front and
flanks, until General Grant, thinking wisely we were too far
from our supports, determined to wait until the cavalry arrived.
A halt was called ; not until it was required, for the horses,
though in the condition of racers, had felt the pace. A small
cloud coming nearer and nearer is seen on the left. The head
of the cavalry column debouches from a grove. The order for
a further pursuit is given. The cavalry spread like lightning
over the plain in skirmishing order, and Sir Colin takes the
lead. The pursuit is continued to the fourteenth milestone,
assuming all the character of a fox-hunt. "

Meantime, as the Commander-in-Chief passed the enemy's
camp, he ordered General Mansfield, his Chief of the Staff, to
secure it, and take the position of the Subadar's Tank, which
stood in rear of the rebel left. Owing to a defect in Mans-
field's arrangements, the enemy escaped with their guns down
the Bithoor Road. The rebel centre, however, finding them-
selves taken in rear and their camp captured, abandoned the
town by the same road, and so ended the battle of Cawnpore.

Sir Colin Campbell selected General Hope Grant to deal the
final blow by dispersing the enemy concentrated at Bithoor, the
seat of the Nana Sahib, and capturing his guns. The complete

74 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

manner in which the task was executed justified the choice,
and Lieutenant Roberts, who participated in the succeeding
operations received his meed of praise from his immediate
Chief.

Giving his wearied men one day's rest, soon after noon of
the 8th December, General Grant marched from Cawnpore
with a compact force of 2,800 men, consisting of Brigadier
Hon. Adrian Hope's Infantry Brigade — the 42nd and 93rd
Highlanders, and 4th Punjaubees — and 520 sabres, with eleven
guns.

Lieutenant Roberts, who accompanied the column as head of
the Quartermaster-General's Department, had a difficult task in
obtaining information from the natives passed on the road, as
to whether the rebels in the retreat had conveyed the guns to
Bithoor, or were about to cross into Oude by the ferry, called
Serai Ghat, twenty-five miles up the river. At length he
learned from one man that six guns, including a 24-pounder,
which had been captured but was subsequently lost, had been
conveyed by the latter route. Sir Hope Grant resolved to march
thither, and the same night, leaving his baggage under a
guard, started by a cross country road for Sheorajpore, three
miles from Serai Ghat. Soon after marching a rebel sowar
was captured, from whom information was obtained that the
guns, which formed the chief object of the expedition, were
still on the banks of the river. The General and his staff, with a
small Sikh escort, pushed on and soon saw the enemy, on
which he sent back orders for the remainder of his cavalry and
the artillery to come up immediately, and the infantry to
follow. On the arrival of the cavalry and guns, the General
pushed on over very difficult and swampy ground, in which the
24-pounder that had been lost on the 6th, was discovered
embedded up to the axle.

The men worked with a will, and soon the leading guns of
Captain Middleton's battery, under Lieutenant Warren, reached
sounder ground and opened fire, advancing to within 500 yards
of the rebels clustered on the river's bank. Presently the
remainder of the battery and Captain Remmington's troop of
horse artillery arrived, and came into action at a range of 200
yards. The enemy, consisting of a confused mass of guns,

Services of Roberts, 75

bullocks, baggage, and men, soon gave way, and fled along the
marshy banks of the river, where they were pursued and cut
up by the Irregular Cavalry.

In this well arranged affair, fifteen guns, belonging to the
Gwalior Contingent, were captured. Sir Colin Campbell,
writing to congratulate Sir Hope Grant on the following day,
said : " It is impossible to over-estimate the advantage to our
interests, military and political, which will result from the
taking of the only guns remaining with the Gwalior Contingent.
All the discontented chiefs with their rabble of villains, will
lose hope and heart at once on learning the result of your
pursuit and attack of the body of men protecting the guns that
had been left to them, with the loss of the latter. All this is
matter for real rejoicing, and will cause great satisfaction in
Calcutta."

In his report Brigadier-General Grant specially referred to
the services rendered by Lieutenant Roberts, and the Com-
mander-in-Chief endorsed his acknowledgments in a letter to
Lord Canning, the Governor- General.

76 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER V.

Roberts gains the V.C. at Khodagunj — Occupation of Futtehgurh on the
2nd of January, 1858 — A Day's Pig-sticking — The Army crosses into
Oude — Arduous Nature of Roberts's Duties on the Staff — Storm of
Meeangunj — Roberts's Humanity — The Siege of Lucknow — Operations
Trans-Goomtee — The Action of Koorsie — Roberts is invalided and
returns to England.

FROM Serai Ghat the column marched on the llth to Bithoor,
the residence of the infamous Nana Sahib, which was com-
pletely destroyed, the temple and palace being blown up, and
the contents burnt — and thus Bithoor, with its terrible memo-
ries, became a thing of the past. Sir Hope Grant marched
on the 24th December for Mynpoorie, halting for Christmas-
day at Chahbepore, where he was joined by the Commander-
in-Chief with the main force from Cawnpore. Pursuing their
course on the following day to Poonwah, they arrived on the
30th at Goorshaigunj.

Learning that the rebels had partially broken down the
suspension bridge over the Kala Nuddee, Sir Colin Campbell,
on the first day of the new year, detached a force, with engineers,
to repair it, and the work was so rapidly executed that, by the
following morning, the bridge was pronounced practicable. The
Cornmander-in- Chief went down to examine the position, and
was received by a heavy fire of musketry and field-pieces from the
enemy, who, coming up in great force from Futtehgurh during
the night, had taken up a position in the village near the head
of the bridge. Sending for the brigades under Hope Grant
and Greathed from Goorshaigunj, some four miles distant, the
Commander-in-Chief directed Brigadier Hope to cross the river
and hold the enemy in check.

On the arrival of the main force, the village of Khodagunj
was stormed by General Grant, who was accompanied by Lieu-
tenant Roberts. The cavalry, in echelon of squadrons, first

Gallant Condiict of Roberts. 77

charged the enemy as they emerged from the village, and then
followed in hot pursuit, sabring the flying foe at every stride.
The scene enacted at the battle of Agra was repeated, and the
rebels, fleeing in panic, did not even halt on reaching Futteh-
gurh, but fled into Bundelcund, leaving eight guns and much
stores in the hands of the victors. Says the writer in Black-
wood already quoted : — " Then despair seized upon the rebel
mass ; breaking their ranks, throwing aside their arms, they
fled in wild confusion ; but the horsemen were upon them and
amongst them, and the slaughter was terrible ; for several
miles they rode along spearing and cutting down at every step;
and the progress of their swift advance might be marked by
the smoke of exploded tumbrils curling up amidst the dark
green trees."

In the pursuit a very gallant young officer of Irregular
Cavalry, Lieutenant Younghusband, met his death, and the
subject of this Memoir performed an act of personal gallantry
which secured him the Victoria Cross, that most coveted of all
military distinctions.

While following up the retreating enemy with the ardour of
a fox-hunter across country, Lieutenant Roberts saw two
Sepoys making off with a standard. Putting spurs to his horse
he overtook them just as they were about to enter the village,
and made for them sword in hand. They immediately turned
at bay and presented their muskets at him. It was a critical
moment, as one of them pulled the trigger, but a merciful
Providence had preserved the young officer to render priceless
services to his country, and add a glorious page to her history.
The cap snapped almost in Roberts' s face, and, the next moment,
he laid the Sepoy carrying the standard dead at his feet by a
tremendous cut across the head, and seized the trophy as it
fell from his lifeless grasp. Meantime the companion of the
standard-bearer made off into the village. But this was not
the only exploit performed by Lieutenant Roberts on this 2nd
of January.

Following up the rebels, he came up with a group, consisting
of a Sikh Sowar and a rebel Sepoy standing at bay with musket
and bayonet. The cavalryman with his sword felt himself no
match for the foot-soldier armed with what Napier calls " the

78 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

queen of weapons ;" but Roberts, on arriving on the scene, did
not wait to count the odds, if they were against him, but rode
straight at the Sepoy, and with one stroke of his sword slashed
him across the face, killing him on the spot.

For these two acts of personal prowess Brigadier- General
Grant recommended him for the decoration of the Victoria
Cross, which was conferred on the following 14th of September,
by a General Order of the Commander-iu- Chief, issued at
Allahabad.

On the rebels being completely dispersed, the cavalry
returned to camp after a hard day's work, and, on the following
moi'ning, a march of twelve miles brought the army to
Futtehgurh, which was found deserted by the mutineers, as
well as a strong fort on the banks of the Ganges, in the midst
of the town which it commanded. The town of Furruckabad,
three miles distant, also surrendered without firing a shot ;
and the Nawab, Azim Khan, who had committed frightful
atrocities on the occasion of the massacre of Europeans at
Futtehgurh, was hanged, and his body left on the gallows as a
warning to the townspeople.

The day after his arrival at Futtehgurh, the Commander-in-
Chief was joined by Walpole's and Seaton's brigades, escorting
an immense convoy, when the force placed at his disposal
numbered over 10,000 men. The task set before Sir Colin
Campbell in undertaking the operations terminating with his
arrival at Futtehgurh, had been accomplished ; the Doab had
been cleared of the enemy, communications with the North-
west Provinces had been reopened, and to complete the pacifi-
cation of the country, there remained the formidable task of
the reconquest of Rohilcund and Oude, into which the rebels
had been driven as birds into a net by the fowler. The Com-
mander-in-Chief, therefore, made preparations for the final
capture of Lucknow, which had become a vast stronghold,
requiring a large army and a siege-train for its reduction.

Sir Colin Campbell, with his staff, escorted by some cavalry
and horse artillery, broke up his camp on the 1st of February,
and, making double marches, reached Cawnpore in three days.
General Grant followed on the same day with the remainder of
the force, when the column retraced its steps towards the Kala

A Pig-sticking Incident. 79

Nuddee, passing over the ground which was strewed with the
unburied corpses and skeletons of the rebels killed a month
before.

On the 3rd of February, when a halt was made near Kunoge,
Sir Hope Grant, who was a keen shekari and fearless rider,
indulged in a day's " pig- sticking " to the gratification of his
staff, among whom were horsemen not inferior to himself.
The sport afforded a pleasant relaxation from the tedious
marches and more exciting operations of war, and was impro-
vised on an extensive scale. On arrival at the ground, on a
tongue of land between the Kala Nuddee and the Ganges,
thirty-five elephants, marshalled in line, moved through the
high grass, the pig-stickers armed with lances riding in front.
The sport was indifferent, but there was excellent opportunity
for the reckless riding over ground invisible a yard in front,
which characterises this species of Indian hunting.

General Grant made the following entry in his journal of an
incident of the day's sport: — ""We singled out a young boar,
and I was on the point of spearing him, when Augustus Anson,
my aide-de-camp, and Roberts, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-
General, full of ardour, dashed up at a gallop, as if they were
riding for their lives, and simultaneously cannoned against both
flanks of my horse, fairly lifting him off his legs and shutting
me up completely. However, strange to say, the horse did not
roll over. After all, the young gentlemen did not spear the
pig ; he was run into by some dogs which held him fast, as
he was not full grown, until we came up and despatched him.
"We afterwards put up a large fox, which gave us a fine chevy.
Three greyhounds followed him up splendidly for about a mile
and a half, until one of them caught him by the brush and
rolled him over, but could not hold him. Reynard then
doubled and escaped."

After this interlude in the more serious game of war, the
march was resumed and the column proceeded to Surajpore.
On arriving here General Grant received a message from the
Commaiider-in-Ghief, requesting him to join him at Cawnpore.
Accompanied by his staff, he started after breakfast and rode
into the station, when he received instructions from Sir Colin
Campbell to assume temporary command of the whole army

80 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

between Cawnpore and Bunnee during his absence at Allaha-
bad, where he was about to proceed to confer with the Governor-
General, who had taken up his headquarters at this city, so as
to be in communication with the army during the approaching
operations in Oude.

On Sunday, the 7th of February, Grant's division arrived at
Cawnpore, and, on the following day, the General crossed the
Ganges and took up his command at Oonao, where the army
was gathering for the capture of Lucknow.

It was no light task transporting the vast train of ammuni-
tion, artillery, and stores, with the camp followers and
impedimenta considered necessary for an Indian Army until
the gallant subject of this Memoir demonstrated by his advance
on Cabul after Cavagnari's murder, and on his more renowned
but less arduous march on Candahar, that Oriental warfare can be
undertaken under conditions more nearly approximating to those
enforced in the armies of the West, and with increased efficiency
and a due regard to the health of British troops, even though
there is some sacrifice of the comforts of life in a cantonment.
Lieutenant Roberts's duties at this time were of a very ardu-
ous character, superintending the passage of troops and stores
across the bridge of boats, and marking out the camps of the
respective brigades on the vast level plain at Oonao, where a
halt was made pending the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief.

An officer who was present with Grant's force, gives the
following description of the extent of this encampment : —
" The encampment around Oonao was a very large one, as the
immense parks of artillery and ordnance stores had been massed
here, and the enormous quantity of ground covered by the army
and its belongings is incredible, and would not be believed out
of India. A division of the army, and that not a very large
one, moved from one side to the other of Oonao, a distance of
two miles, and it took eight hours from the time the advanced
guard left the old ground till the rear guard arrived at the new
encampment ; true they were escorting a large part of the siege
train, and, besides the guns and mortars, they had carts upon
carts of ammunition, each drawn by five bullocks, which again
required carts upon carts more, also drawn by five bullocks
each, to carry food and fodder for these numberless bullocks.

Roberts s Duties on the Staff. 81

The Naval Brigade, for instance, which had only sixteen guns —
but they are monsters — and ten rocket tubes, had no less than
800 bullocks attached to the guns and their belongings. Be-
sides bullocks there are elephants, camels, horses, ponies, goats,
fowls, geese, £c., and camp followers innumerable. Every
officer has from four to twelve servants, and the men also have
several attached to each company, for a private in India cannot
draw his own water, nor cook his own victuals, nor could he, till
lately, clean his o\vn boots, nor shave his own chin, but shoe-
cleaners and barbers were attached to each regiment. There is
a bazaar also which follows every corps, and which is under the
control of the commanding officer. It supplies all the things
which are required by soldiers on a campaign, such as soap,
tobacco, &c., also gram* for horses." Bad as this state of
affairs was in 1857, it was far worse in the days before the time
of Sir Charles Napier, whose soldierly instincts induced him to
cut down the establishments which encumbered the march of
an Indian Army.

While at Oonao, General Grant undertook a dour (or flying
expedition) to clear the country north of the Cawnpore and
Lucknow road of insurgents, especially at a stronghold called
Futtehpore Churassie, twenty miles distant, on the banks of the
Ganges, where the Nana was supposed to be. The column,
consisting of some 3,000 men,f quitted camp on the 15th of
February, and, marching over a difficult country, intersected by
nullahs, arrived at Futtehpore. Roberts reconnoitred the fort,
which was found to be deserted, but the cavalry succeeded in
cutting up some fleeing rebels, from whom two guns were cap-
tured. After destroying the town and blowing up the fort, as
well as another stronghold six miles distant, the column
marched to Bunghurmow, the inhabitants of which sent a
deputation expressing their loyalty and promising to furnish
supplies. The General spared the place, but a portion of the
53rd Regiment were guilty of looting, which he punished by

* A species of vetch.

t The 34th, 38th, and 53rd Regiments ; two squadrons of the 7th Hussars,
two squadrons of the 9th Lancers ; Anderson's and Turner's troops of Horse
Artillery, an 18-pounder, and an 8-inch howitzer, and a company of
Sappers.

82 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

summarily flogging a dozen of them who were caught flagrante
delicto.

On Sunday, the 21st, the column arrived at Sultangunj, and,
two days later, were before Meeangunj, which 2,000 rebel in-
fantry, besides some cavalry, had made preparations to defend.
The town, of rectangular shape, was surrounded with a high
loop-holed brick wall, with circular bastions at the angles and
along the sides ; the gates also were fortified with ditch and
palisade. The General, with Roberts and the other members
of his staff, rode forward to reconnoitre. A suitable spot for
breaching having been selected, an 18-pounder and 8-inch
howitzer were dragged forward by elephants to effect a breach,
while Captain Turner's troop of horse artillery took up a posi-
tion to sweep the walls, and the cavalry were sent round to
intercept the fugitives, the infantry being kept in the rear ready
to storm. After about two hours' firing a practicable breach
was reported, and the 53rd were ordered to advance, and
marched cheerily to the assault, thinking little of what the
poet calls

" That awful pause, dividing life from death."

Some sharp fighting took place, but the rebels were beaten
at every point, and, as they issued from the gates on the other
side of the town, were pursued by the cavalry, who cut them
down relentlessly. The slaughter at Meeangunj was great,
for no quarter was expected or given, and every man found
with arms in his hands or seeking to escape was shot or sabred.
Corpses strewed the plain and streets of the town, which was
burning in different parts. Captain (now Admiral) Oliver Jones,
of the Royal Navy, a gallant officer, who was present with the
force as a volunteer, speaking of the distressing scenes he wit-
nessed, describes one in which the subject of this memoir
figures in a manner most creditable to his humanity : " Roberts,
the Assistant Quartermaster-General, was giving directions
about burning a part of the town, when an old, infirm man, who
was sitting at the door of a house, entreated him to spare it,
saying, ' tbat yesterday morning he was the happy father of
five sons, three of them lie there, pointing to three corpses,
where the other two are, God only knows ; that he was old, and

Humane Conduct of Roberts. 83

a cripple, and that if his house was burned he would have
nothing left but to lie down and die.' Roberts, who is as good
as he is brave, gave directions for sparing the old man's house,
and I hope that the two missing sons have escaped, and have
returned to comfort his few remaining days."*
As the author of " Don Juan" cynically observes :

" However habit sears

Men's hearts against whole millions, when their trade
Is butchery, sometimes a single sorrow
Will touch even heroes."

Captain Jones, in another part of his interesting journal,
which was published on the conclusion of the war just as he
penned it on the spot, writes of Roberts in terms which those
who have served with or under him on active service can vouch
are not exaggerated : " He is one of those rare men who, to un-
common daring and bravery in the field, and unflinching hard-
working discharge of duty in the camp, adds the charm of
cheering and unaffected kindness and hospitality in the tent,
and his acquaintance and friendship are high prizes to those
who obtain them."

After a day's rest the column resumed its march, and, on the
1st March, reached Buntheera, where Sir Colin Campbell had
arrived shortly before from Allahabad. On the arrival three
days later of Brigadier-General Franks, who, in thirteen days,
had marched from the other side of Oude, a distance of 130
miles, and beaten the enemy in four general actions, the force
placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief consisted of
20,000 men,f the greater portion Europeans, with 180 pieces
of ordnance, forming the finest army assembled under any
British General in India. General Hope Grant was placed in
command of the cavalry division, and, accompanied by Roberts,
proceeded with the Commander-in-Chief, on the 2nd March,
when he moved from Buntheera to put into execution his plan
of campaign.

Sir Colin took with him the second division of infantry,

* '• Recollections of a Winter Campaign in India in 1857-58," by Captain
Oliver J. Jones, R.N.

t This was exclusive of the Nepaul troops under Jung Bahadur, which
brought up the number to 40,000.

G 2

84 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts,

under Sir Edward Lugard, the head-quarters of the artillery
division, under Sir Archdale Wilson (of Delhi), and three troops
of horse artillery, two 24-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers of
the Naval brigade, under Captain Peel, K.N., and the head-
quarters of the cavalry division, with Little's Brigade. Passing
the fort of Jellalabad, the force, after a skirmish, seized and
occupied the Dilkoosha palace and the Mohamed Bagh, where
batteries were erected to keep down the fire of the enemy's
guns along the canal. Lieutenant Roberts accompanied his
Chief, who was engaged in placing the outposts entrusted to
his care by the Commander-in-Chief, who placed great reliance
on General Grant's well-known ability in effecting this duty,
one of the most important in the conduct of the operations of
war. Both Sir Frederick Roberts and Lord Wolseley, who
served at different periods on Sir Hope Grant's staff, have
expressed to the wYiter how much they owe to their late chief
in the matter of outpost duty, and both these distinguished
Generals put in practice, the one in Ashantee and Egypt and
the other in Afghanistan, the lessons learnt in the school of
war under this careful cavalry officer. While engaged in placing
the guns, the Generals and their staffs were exposed to a biting
fire, and Brigadier Little was severely wounded.

The canal referred to runs into the Goomtee, and formed
the outer line of defence on the southern and eastern sides,
the bridges over it having been broken down, and an earthen
rampart, with bastions mounted with guns, having been con-
structed on the inner face.

Lucknow was defended by a second line of works, starting
from the Goorntee in front of the Motee Mahal palace, and
covering the 3'2nd Mess-House, the building called the Imam-
bara, and the street known as Huzrutgunj. The third or inner
line of defence was in front of the great palace and enclosure
called the Kaiser Bagh, which, as well as the buildings of the
outer line, had been greatly strengthened and mounted with
guns by the rebels during the period the city had been in their
undisputed possession, while the houses in the streets leading
to them had been loopholed. In short, preparations had been
made for a desperate defence, to overcome which the British
commander had to undertake siege operations, the conduct of

The Siege of Liicknow. 85

which was placed in the hands of Brigadier Robert Napier, of
the Bengal Engineers, better known to fame as Lord Napier
of Magdala.

The Commander-in-Chief, seeing that the rebel leaders had
neglected defending the Goomtee — probably anticipating that
the advance would be made either by the route adopted by
Havelock in September, 1857 (by the Charbagh bridge and
through the centre of the city), or by the Secunder Bagh and
Shah Nujeef, the road by which he himself advanced in the
following November — decided to send a division across the
river to operate from that side, so that he might take all the
fortified works in reverse. The command of this force was
entrusted to Sir James Outram — it could not have been placed
in better hands — and Sir Hope Grant, who accompanied him as
second in command, was directed to superintend the passage of
the river by two pontoon bridges which the engineers threw
across with great celerity. The Commander-in-Chief was very
anxious to secure the uncontested passage of the Goomtee, as
the operation, always a dangerous one over a broad and swift
stream unless executed before the enemy has intimation of
what was intended, might have caused heavy loss. It was to
have been carried out on the night of the 5th March, but some
delay occurred in bringing the troops and guns over the sedgy,
heavy ground at Bibiapore, on the banks of the river. Sir
Hope Grant and his staff, on all preparations being completed,
rested on the ground smoking philosophically, and the Com-
mander-in-Chief, on coming up, was very irate that the passage
of the troops was not in progress, as he apprehended opposition.
But the enemy, though close at hand and mustering in over-
whelming force (some place the number in Lucknow at 50,000,
or even 100,000), knew not what was in progress, or lacked
initiative and enterprise, as they did all through the Mutiny.

"Hark ! through the silence of the cold dull night,
The hum of armies gathering rank on rank !
Lo ! dusky masses steal in dubious sight
Along the leaguer'd wall and bristling bank
Of the arm'd river, while, with straggling light,
The stars peep through the vapours dim and dark,
Which curl in curious wreaths."

The troops forming Sir James Outram1 s division arrived after

86 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

midnight, and, by daybreak of the 6th March, had crossed the
Goomtee with all their guns and stores, an operation reflecting
great credit on all concerned in carrying it into effect, includ-
ing Lieutenant Koberts, on whom the brunt of the duty fell.

Advancing towards Lucknow a cavalry skirmish took place,
in which Major Percy Smith, of the Bays, was killed, and the
division encamped that evening within four miles of the city.
On the following day, as Sir Hope Grant, accompanied by his
staff, rode down the Fyzabad road to reconnoitre, the enemy
opened fire with artillery, whereupon he brought up some
cavalry and guns. Under orders from the Commander-in-
Chief, Outram remained in his camp till the 9th, when he
attacked the enemy's works in two divisions, that on the right
being under the command of Sir Hope Grant, and the left
under his personal direction.

The action was commenced by a fire from two heavy batteries,
mounting twelve guns, constructed by the British during the
previous night, within 600 yards of the rebel works on the old
race-course ; and Sir Hope, advancing his infantry, under
Walpole, on the right, took the enemy's position in reverse, but
found that the guns had been removed. Outram, with the left
column, crossed the Kokrail stream, captured the Chukur
Kotee (Yellow House), the key of the position, as it enfiladed
the enemy's works on the right bank of the Goomtee, and
pressing forward, driving the enemy before him, occupied the
left bank as far as the Badshah Bagh, and effected a junction
with Sir Hope Grant. The buildings and works on the banks
of the river were now occupied, and, under cover of a heavy
musketry fire, two batteries were erected to enfilade the works
in rear of the Martiniere and keep down the rebel fire. Profit-
ing by this success, the Commander-in-Chief captured the
Martiniere without resistance, and the whole line of works up
to Banks's house, which was captured on the following day.

On the 10th Sir James Outram was engaged strengthening
his position, his batteries keeping up a fire on the Kaiser Bagh
and other works, and Sir Hope Grant sent out strong parties
of cavalry to prevent supplies being brought into the town, and
some smart skirmishing took place. During the night Outram
erected fresh batteries, which played on the Kaiser Bagh and

Capture of Luc know. 87

enfiladed the enemy's works, and, on the following morning,
he advanced and captured the works covering the iron bridge,
leading to the Residency, and the stone bridge, leading to the
Muchee Bhawun, as well as a camp between these two points,
during which Lieutenant Moorsom, his Deput}--Assistant-
Quartermaster-Greneral, a very accomplished officer, was killed.
Outram was now occupied erecting fresh batteries of heavy guns
and mortars to play on the Kaiser Bagh, which was, in a
measure, the enemy's citadel.

Meanwhile, on the other bank, the buildings forming the
second line of defence fell to the brilliant valour of the troops
under the personal direction of the Commander-in-Chief. The
Secunder Bagh and Shah Nujeef, which had been so severely
contested in the memorable Eelief of the previous November,
were captured without opposition, and, by nightfall on the llth,
the series of palaces and enclosures known as the Begum
Kotee, were stormed by the 93rd Highlanders and 4th Punjaub
Rifles with their wonted dash, though the brilliancy of the
achievement was dimmed by the loss of that gallant and most
admirable soldier, Hodson, whom the Cornmander-in-Chief,
who attended his funeral, described as surpassed by no officer
of his army.

On the 14th the Imambara, having been breached, was
stormed by detachments of the 10th Foot and Ferozepore
Regiment of Sikhs, who, following up the fleeing rebels, entered
the Teera Kotee and Mess-house, and soon the Motee Mahal
and other palaces, and the Kaiser Bagh itself, were won, when
the demon of plunder seized the troops, and an indescribable
scene of rapine ensued. The 14th was the decisive day in the
operations resulting in the capture of Lucknow. The slaughter
had been terrible, and as when, " on the gentle Severn's sedgy
bank," Mortimer engaged Glendower, so now, when Christian
and Pandy met in desperate conflict, the Goomtee

" Ran fearfully among the trembling reeds,
And hid his crisp head in the hollow tank,
Blood-stain'd."

Unhappily, owing to over-caution on the part of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, the success was not so complete as it might
have been, as when Outram applied for leave to advance across

88 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the iron bridge and intercept the retreat of the enemy, he was
directed only to do so if it could be done " without the loss of
a single man." The proverbial difficulty of making omelets
without breaking eggs prevented the gallant "Bayard of India"
from carrying out an advance which would have made the
operations of the day complete.

On the 15th Sir Hope Grant proceeded, under orders from
Sir Colin Campbell, to Seetapore, with 1,100 sabres and twelve
horse artillery guns, to pursue the enemy in that direction, and
Brigadier Campbell was directed to move in co-operation from
Alumbagh along the Sandila road, but the movement left open
the Fyzabad road, by which the enemy in large numbers effected
their escape, thus requiring the subsequent protracted opera-
tions in Oude which resulted in considerable loss, due more to
disease and heat apoplexy than the sword. Sir Hope was
recalled after making one march, and, on the 19th, co-operated
from the left bank with Outram (who had crossed the river with
Douglas's brigade and captured the Residency and other build-
ings) in the attack on the Moosa Bagh ; the rebels, who held
the stronghold in great force, abandoned it, and, owing to the
unfortunate inaction of Brigadier Campbell, whose splendid
force of cavalry was suffered to remain idle, effected their escape
unmolested.

Lucknow was now once more in possession of the British,
and, on the 22nd of March, Sir Hope Grant was directed to
proceed to Koorsie, twenty-five miles distant, on the Fyzabad
road, where a strong force of the enemy had taken post. At
midnight he marched with a brigade of the three arms, and, on
coming up with the enemy, attacked them with spirit ; in this
affair Captain, (now General Sir) Samuel Browne, commanding
two squadrons of Punjaub Cavalry, and Captain Cosserat, com-
manding a detachment of Watson's Horse, displayed conspi-
cuous gallantry, the latter officer being killed. The column now
returned to Lucknow, in command of which Sir Hope Grant
was placed with a fine division.

The action at Koorsie was the last at which Lieutenant
Roberts was present during the Mutiny, in the three principal
episodes of which, the Siege of Delhi, and the Relief and
Siege of Lucknow, he had taken so distinguished a part. His

Roberts returns to England. 89

health had long been indifferent, but his brave heart and high
sense of duty kept him up while there was the incentive to exer-
tion derived from an urgent demand for his services. Now
that the neck of the revolt was broken, his health completely
gave way, and he was ordered to proceed to England 011
medical certificate. He, accordingly, gave over charge of the
Quartermaster-General's Department to Captain Garnet Wolse-
ley, of the 90th Regiment, and thus for a second time — the
former occasion being at the capture of the Mess-house in
November, 1857 — these two officers were associated together,
whose names within the past few years have been much in the
mouths of their countrymen as the two Generals (excluding
Lords Napier and Strathnairn, by reason of their age), on whom
this country chiefly relies as the future leaders of her armies,
should any emergency arise.

Lieutenant Roberts proceeded to Calcutta, and, on the 3rd of
May, embarked in a Peninsular and Oriental steamer, in
company with several wounded and sick officers. On his arrival
at Alexandria he took the Austrian Lloyd's steamer to Trieste,
and thence journeyed through Switzerland to England. It was
more than six years since he quitted his native land, and
Wordsworth's lines on landing in England well expressed his
feelings, as they have those of many a returning wanderer
from home : —

"Ttie cock that crows, the smoke that curls, that sound
Of bells, — those boys who in yon meadow ground
In white-sleeved shirts are playing, — and the roar
Of the waves, breaking on the chalky shore, —
All, all are English."

The past twelve months had been, indeed, eventful in the
life of our hero. The "battles and sieges" in which he had
participated, and the " hairbreadth escapes " he had experienced
during that period, were sufficient to render any career extra-
ordinary, and he emerged from the campaign a veteran in war
though still young in years. But what were the rewards he
received at the hands of a grateful country for his meritorious
services ? He had entered the war as a subaltern, and a
subaltern he remained at the end, without promotion or brevet,
according to the inexorable " rules of the service, " until in

90 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

due course he should obtain his captaincy. In common with
every private soldier he was awarded the medal with three
clasps, and he had earned that decoration, " for valour, " which,
though only of bronze, is of priceless value in the estimation
of every one privileged to wear Her Majesty's uniform. But
beyond repeated thanks from every General Officer under wrhom
he bad served, as also from the Commander-in-Chief and the
Governor- General in Council, he had received nothing save
what his humbler comrades in the ranks had shared. As
Byron writes of a battle field and its rewards : —

" Here the still varying pangs, which multiply
Until their very number makes men hard
By the infinities of agony,
Which meet the gaze, whate'er it may regard —
The groan, the roll in dust, the all white eye
Turned back within its socket — these reward
Your rank and file by thousands, while the rest
May win, perhaps, a riband at the breast ! "

CHAPTER VI.

Lieutenant Roberts returns to India — Is employed in Charge of the
Viceroy's Camp — Lord Clyde's Letter to Lord Canning recommending
Roberts — Promotion to a Brevet-Majority — On Tour with Sir Hugh
Rose — Is ordered on Special Service lo Umbeyla — Critical State of
Affairs on the North-West Frontier in 1863 — The Action of Laloo —
The Capture of Umbeyla — The Burning of Mulkah — Major Roberts
Compiles a Route Book for the Bengal Presidency — Returns to England
on Sick Leave — On his return to India proceeds to Abyssinia with the
Expedition under Sir Robert Napier — Major Roberts's Services in
Abyssinia.

LIEUTENANT EGBERTS remained only twelve months in England,
and, on the 17th of May, 1859, shortly hefore his return to
India, married Miss Nora Henrietta Bews, daughter of Captain
Bews, of the 73rd Regiment, afterwards Paymaster-General of
Constabulary. The issue of this marriage was six children, of
whom three survive — a son, Frederick Hugh Sherston, born 8th
July, 1872, and two daughters.

In June, 1859, Lieutenant Roberts quitted England for
India, travelling overland, and, on reporting himself, was
attached to Army Head-Quarters for the purpose of taking
charge of the Camp of the Viceroy, Earl Canning, during the
customary tour in the approaching cold weather. Hitherto he
had only held an acting appointment in the Quartermaster-
General's Department, but, immediately after the capture of
Lucknow, Lord Clyde, in recognition of his meritorious services
and his marked aptitude for the duties of this important branch
of the staff, placed him on the permanent establishment, to
which he had been gazetted on the 15th April, 1858. The
Quartermaster-General was Colonel (now General Sir) Arthur
Becher, who was head of the Department at the Siege of Delhi,
where he was seriously wounded, and now welcomed his old
associate in that arduous struggle, during which he had formed
a high opinion of Roberts's capacity and aptitude for organ-
ization. f

92 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

The terms under which Lieutenant Roberts was recom-
mended by the Commander-in-Chief to the charge of the Vice-
roy's Camp were of a nature that were specially complimentary
to him. Writing privately to the Viceroy from Simla on the
29th August, 1859, Lord Clyde said : " With respect to Major
Garden, whom your Lordship proposed to be the Quarter-
master-General with your Camp, should you particularly wish
for that officer, of course he is at your service, but Colonel
Becher, the head of the Department, has observed that as
Major Garden is the next senior officer to himself in the office,
it will be more convenient for the Service, if equally agreeable
to your Lordship, that Lieutenant Roberts should attend your
camp. Believe me, &c., CLYDE." " P.S. — Lieutenant Roberts
is a particularly gentlemanlike, intelligent and agreeable young
officer."

And so, doubtless, Lord Canning found the young artillery
officer, while the mode in which he discharged the arduous
duties of his post was such as to elicit the commendation of
his lordship, and the surprise even of those accustomed to the
efficiency of the Quartermaster-General's Department in India.
We have been assured by one qualified to know, that the
arrangements for the camp were simply perfect, and only those
can appreciate the labour, who are conversant with the details
of a Viceregal progress in India, with its large body of troops,
the thousands of camp followers and servants, the daily march,
and the durbars, with the elaborate etiquette and attendant form-
alities as regards the reception and precedence of the princes
and nobles, with whom such ceremonies assume an importance
inexplicable to any European mind save, perhaps, that of the
chamberlain of a third-rate German court.

The Viceroy's first tour was of a very extended character,
embracing a visit to Cawnpore, Lucknow, Futtehghur, Agra,
Meerut, Roorkee, Delhi, Umballa, Lahore, Jullundur, Umritsur,
Peshawur, Sealkote, and Cashmere. The tour of 1860-61 was
to Jubbulpore, and thence through the Central Provinces. On
the 12th November, 1860, Lieutenant Roberts was gazetted to
his regimental captaincy, and thus having attained qualifying
rank, on the following day he was promoted to a brevet-majority
for his services during the Mutiny, so that he was addressed

The Umbeyla Campaign. 93

for only one day as a captain. In the winter of 1861-62, and
again in the following winter, Major Roberts accompanied the
Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose, in his several tours
through the Derajat and Central India, and the gallant soldier,
whose march from Bombay to Gwalior, in 1858, forms one of
the most striking episodes of the quelling of the great Sepoy
revolt, formed, like his predecessor and all who were thrown into
official contact with the hero of the second Afghan War, a high
opinion of his military capacity.

From the close of the Mutiny to 1863 not a shot was fired
in India, but, in the latter part of that year, the Indian
Government were involved in what is known as the Umbeyla
Campaign. The column destined to subdue the tribes in that
remote corner of the British Empire, was commanded by Sir
Neville Chamberlain, but the campaign was more protracted
than was anticipated, and the gallant mountaineers oifered so
desperate a resistance to the passage of our troops, and our
losses were so severe, that large reinforcements were ordered
to the front, and at one time the Viceregal Government and
Sir Hugh Rose himself were anxious lest the movement should
spread, involving a costly and extended struggle with the fierce
and fanatical tribes in that portion of the North- West frontier.

In November of this year Major Roberts received orders
from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed, in conjunction with
Colonel (now General Sir) John Adye, of the Royal Artillery,
to the British camp at Umbeyla on special duty, to represent
Army Head-Quarters, and make himself generally useful to the
officer in command. Before Roberta's arrival at the British
camp some desperate fighting took place in the dark glens
and steep mountain sides of the Umbeyla defile, the nine
miles of which it took the British troops some two months to
force, and none of those engaged are likely to forget the hand-to-
hand combats at the " Crag " and " Eagle's Nest " pickets. Be-
fore the close of that brief campaign some 25,000 troops were in
motion north of the Jhelum, and our loss was 19 officers and
238 men killed, and 47 officers and 672 men wounded. In
the action of 20th November Sir Neville Chamberlain, who
had displayed his wonted impetuous valour, received, with his
usual fortune, a severe wound, the eighth in the service of his

94 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

country. Colonel Hope, his second in command, was also
dangerously wounded.

At the time Major Roberts arrived at the British camp the
position of affairs was indeed critical, and Major James, C.B.,
an officer of great ability and experience, who had just arrived
from England, and assumed political charge of the expedition,
reported to Government : " The excitement was spreading far
and wide. The Momunds on the Peshawur border were begin-
ning to make hostile demonstrations at Shubkudder, for the
first time since their signal defeat near the same place, in 1852,
by the late Lord Clyde. Rumours were also reaching me from
Kohat of expected raids by the Wuzeerees and Othman-Khail.
Emissaries from Cabul and Jellalabad were with the Akhoond,
who had been also further reinforced by Ghuzzun Khan, the
Chief of Dher, and 6,000 men. On December the 5th the
Momunds made a raid into our territories at Shubkudder, in
repelling which Lieutenant Bishop was killed."

So threatening had the aspect of affairs become that the
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub telegraphed to Sir Neville
Chamberlain and Major James, authorizing the retirement of
the troops. Though suffering greatly from his wound, the
gallant Chamberlain, supported by the opinion of his political
coadjutor, declined to retire, rightly judging that the effect
on our prestige would be disastrous ; and Sir Hugh Rose,
(Lord Elgin, the Governor-General, being then in a dying
state),* strenuously opposed so pusillanimous a course, but
was overruled by a majority of the Council, and, on the
25th November, orders for withdrawal, involving a humiliating
confession of defeat, were actually issued, when Sir William
Denison, Governor of Madras, who arrived from that Presi-
dency to assume temporary charge of the government, induced
the Council to reconsider their decision, and, on the arrival of
General Garvockt with a brigade, raising the force to 9,000 men,
operations were resumed and crowned with complete success.

Once more Roberts found himself on that North- West fron-
tier in which he had gained his earliest military experiences,
and where and in the countries beyond he was to earn for

* Lord Elgin expired on the 20th of November,
t The late General Sir John Garvock, K.C.B.

Decisive Action of the War. 95

himself undying fame as one of England's most daring and
successful Generals. Speaking to us of the North-West frontier,
he enlarged on the advantages it affords to the Indian Service
as the great training school of our officers. It is the only
department in which young officers have a chance of earning
distinction, as they are there placed in positions of responsibility
at an early age, and the manner in which they acquit themselves
of this responsibility is the measure of their capacity. Nearly
all our best officers have been reared on the North-West frontier,
from Sir Henry Lawrence and Major Broadfoot to the Lums-
dens, Coke, Watson, Probyn, Sam Browne, Daly, Hodson, the
Battyes, Brownlow, Keyes, Abbott, and Cavagnari.

At daylight of the 15th December, General Garvock, leaving
3,000 men to guard his camp, marched out with the remainder,
divided into two brigades, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde,
C.B.,* of the Guides, and Colonel W. M. Turner, C.B., of the
97th Regiment. Major Roberts accompanied the General, and
witnessed the succeeding operations, which had for their object
the capture of Laloo, two miles beyond the Crag picket, and of
Umbeyla, at the Chumla valley end of the pass. On arriving
before Umbeyla it was found that the enemy, with standards
flying, had taken up a position in great force on the conical
peak of one of the spurs running up from the Chumla valley,
dominating the whole ridge and the village nestling at its feet.
On the arrival of the troops Colonel Wilde's Brigade was told
off to make the direct assault on the peak, the natural strength
of which was greatly increased by breastworks all the way up
the mountain ; the second brigade being detailed to turn the
right of the position and storm the village of Laloo.

All being ready, at the signal, the British troops, with their
Sikh, Pathan, and Goorkha comrades, raised a cheer, and
rapidly crossing the intervening open ground, commenced to
scale the steep ascent with admirable elan, the 101st Regiment,
gallantly led by Colonel Salusbury, being conspicuous in the
advance. The determination to win evinced by these veteran
soldiers struck terror into the hearts of the mountaineers, who
sought to stop their assailants by a rapid musketry fire and

* The late General Sir Alfred Wilde, K.C.B., Member of the Council of
India.

96 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

hurling rocks on their heads ; but all was in vain, and the
breastworks were carried in succession at the point of the bay-
onet, the almost inaccessible peak itself being soon crowned by
the victorious soldiers of the Queen. In the meantime Colonel
Turner was equally successful, and the village of Laloo fell
into the hands of the 7th Fusiliers and the native corps of his
brigade, and the hillmen were driven down the steep glens and
through the pine woods clothing the Chumla valley. Not
anticipating such vigorous action, a large force of the enemy
had attacked the camp from the Umbeyla Pass, but were
repulsed.

Following up his success, early on the following morning
Colonel Wilde, accompanied by Major Roberts, who, throughout
the operations, proceeded sometimes with one brigade, some-
times with the other, wherever the work promised to be the hot-
test, marched down the hills on Umbeyla with the brigade of
Infantry, and 400 sabres, commanded by Colonel Probyn, who,
anticipating a fight in the valley, had brought up his regiment
from Eusofzye, and afforded the mountaineers the unwonted
spectacle of troopers leading their horses down a breakneck
declivity, and then, on gaining the valley below, mounting them
in readiness for action. The enemy were drawn up in front of
Umbeyla, but with one brigade in front, and Colonel Turner's
brigade, which had made a detour by Laloo, on their flank,
they fell back under cover of the broken ground. Later in the
day, as Colonel Turner, with his Sikh regiments in line, and a
wing of the 7th Fusiliers in support, was advancing from
Umbeyla towards the hills which divide the Chumla and Bonair
valleys, several hundred Ghazees, or fanatic swordsmen, who
had been concealed at the base of the ridge, made a furious
attack on the British line, but were exterminated almost to a
man. From the slopes and crests above many thousands of
the hillmen witnessed this scene, which was the last military
incident of this brief campaign, and, as they dispersed under
the shell fire from the guns of Captain Griffin's battery, sta-
tioned in the valley beneath, they tacitly owned that they were
no match for such soldiers. That the fighting during these
two days had been severe was attested by the British loss,
which was 172 killed and wounded.

End of the Umbeyla Campaign. 97

The alliance of the chiefs against us was now broken up, the
Bajourees returned to their fastnesses, the Akhoond of Swat,
that fanatical semi-ecclesiastical semi- military enemy to our
rule, seeing that the game was up, returned with his followers
to his valley, and the chiefs of Bonair, relieved from their
allies, agreed to terms. Nothing now remained but to destroy
the town of Mulkah, the teterrima causa belli, the nest whence
these birds of prey issued, some twenty-five miles distant. This
place became the seat of the Wahabee fanatics who, driven
from Sitana in 1858, by a British force commanded by Sir
Sydney Cotton, had returned thither four years later, and
established themselves at Mulkah, on the north side of the
Mahabun mountain, that vast natural stronghold, extending
about thirty miles from east to west, whose rugged and steep
ridges rise to an altitude of 8,000 feet.

Instead of despatching a brigade to destroy Mulkah, General
Garvock, anxious to terminate the war, resolved on the some-
what hazardous step of sending to this cradle of treachery and
fanaticism some British officers, with an escort, to witness its
destruction, which was to be effected by the Bonair chiefs.
Major Roberts, Colonel Adye, Captain Jenkins, commanding
the Guides, and some other officers accompanied Colonel
Reynell Taylor, the Commisioner of Peshawur, to Mulkah,
which was found to be a large village, standing on a northern
slope of the Mahabun, with numerous workshops and a powder
factory.* The place was burnt on the 22nd December, in pre-
sence of the British officers and of the natives, who collected
near the spot, and, with feelings of bitter resentment, watched
the destruction of their homes. On the return of the British
officers, the force broke up its encampment, and marched to the
plain of Eusofzye within our borders, on the Christmas- day
of 1863. For his services Major Roberts was mentioned in des-
patches by General Garvock, who expressed to him and Colonel
Adye, his "best thanks for their aid on many occasions. "

Major Roberts returned to his duties in the Quartermaster-
General's Department, and, during the following year, was
employed in compiling a new Route-book for the Bengal Presi-

* See Colonel Adye's " Sitana."

98 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts,

dency. This work was published in January, 1865, when the
author received the thanks of the Governor-General in Council,
and of the Commander-in-Chief.* In the words of Colonel
Norman, the Military Secretary to the Government of India,
when conveying the thanks of the Viceroy, Major Eoberts
displayed "care and ability" in the compilation of this useful
work, and the service is rendered the more meritorious from the
circumstance that it was written at a time when he was suffer-
ing from liver complaint, which necessitated a return to Eng-
land in the month succeeding the publication of the book.

Major Roberts sailed by the Cape route in Messrs. Green's
ship, the " Renown," and, in March of the following year (1866),
returned overland. On his reporting himself he was posted to
the charge of the Quartermaster-General's Department in the
Allahabad Division, where he served under Generals Troup
and Beatson, until October, 1867, when he was ordered to pro-
ceed once more on active service.

Our Government having resolved to chastise Theodore,
"Negoos," or Emperor, of Abyssinia, for imprisoning several
British subjects, including Consul Cameron and Mr. Rassarn,
Assistant Political Resident at Aden, who had been dispatched
in July, 1864, with a letter from the Queen to Theodore, it was
not until the 13th of August, 1867, that Lord Derby's Cabinet,
yielding at length to the persistent representations of Brigadier. -
General William Merewether, at that time the able Political
Resident at Aden, finally resolved on a military expedition to

* From Colonel Paton, Quartermaster-General, to the Secretary to the
Government of India. Fort William, 3ist of January, 1865.

" I am instructed in forwarding for submission to Government a copy of
the new edition of ' Routes in the Bengal Presidency,' to state that His
Excellency the Commander-in-Chief desires most fully to acknowledge the
exertions and services of Major Roberts, V.C., Assistant Quartermaster-
General, attached to this office, by whom the work has been entirely com-
piled and carried through the press."

From Colonel H. W. Norman, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department, to the Quartermaster-General. Fort William, 18th
of February, 1865.

" In reply to yours, dated 31st ult., I am directed to acquaint you, for the
information of the Commander-in-Chief, that the Right Honourable the
Governor-General in Council very cordially concurs in His Excellency's
acknowledgments of the care and ability displayed by Major Roberts, V.C.
Assistant-Quartermaster-General, in the compilation of the New Route
Book for this Presidency, a copy of which accompanied your letter.''

The Abyssinian Expedition. 99

compel Theodore to release his prisoners. This remarkable
man was favourably inclined to the British, and his two chief
officers, killed in his service, were Englishmen ; but his pride
was deeply hurt by no answer being sent for some years to a
letter he addressed to Her Majesty, and he gave rein to his
savage nature, which had been soured by recent defeat — an un-
wonted experience to one who was above all things a gallant
soldier, and was of the opinion of Hector that —

" The field of combat is the sphere for men ;
Where heroes war the foremost place I claim,
The first in danger as the first in fame."

The command of the army was entrusted to Sir Robert
Napier, the Commander-ill- Chief at Bombay, from which Presi-
dency the expeditionary force was drawn, with the addition of a
Bengal brigade, to the command of which Brigadier-General
Donald M. Stewart* was appointed, with Major Roberts as head
of his Quartermaster-General's Department. In nominating
him, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Mansfield, under
date 30th September, 1867, addressed the Government of India
in the following terms : — " Sir William Mansfield would re-
commend Major F. S. Roberts, V.C., now Assistant-Quarter-
master-General, Allahabad Division, for the post. This officer
is eminently qualified for the appointment by his activity and
well known military qualities, as well as by his experience in
the Quartermaster-General's Department in peace and war for
nearly ten years. "

The following were the troops drawn from the Bengal Presi-
dency to take part in the Abyssinian Campaign, and placed
under the command of Brigadier- General Stewart. No. 5
Battery 25th Brigade, Royal Artillery, and Mountain Battery
with mortars attached, Major A. H. Bogle, R.A. ; 10th Bengal
Cavalry (Lancers), Major C. H. Palliser ; 12th Bengal Cavalry,
Major H. H. Gough, V.C. ; 21st Punjaub N.I., Major J. B.
Thelwall; and 23rd Punjaub N.I. (Pioneers), Major C. F.
Chamberlain. The Bengal troopsf took mule transport with

* Now General Sir Donald Stewart, Bart., G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief
in India.

t The total strength of the Bengal Brigade was 38 officers, 77 warrant
officers, and 2,436 non-commissioned officers and men, besides camp
followers.

H 2

IOO Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

them, so that they were in a condition to move forward almost
immediately after landing at Zoolla ; and, in addition to com-
plete transport for the corps proceeding from Calcutta, the
Punjaub Government collected a large number of mules and
ponies, which embarked at Kurrachee for the seat of war. For
the conveyance of the Bengal contingent of troops and stores,
forty-three* transports (twenty-four sailing vessels and nine-
teen steamers) were taken up by the Marine Department at
Calcutta, and on Major Koberts devolved the superintendence
of the arrangements for embarkation, which were concluded
without a hitch.

On the 16th of September a reconnoitring party, under com-
mand of Brigadier-General Merewether, C.B.,f left Bombay
for Massowah to select a landing-place for the force, and fixed
on Zoolla, the ancient Adulis, in Annesley Bay ; and, on the 7th
of October, an advance brigade, under Colonel Field, 10th
Bombay N.I., sailed from Bombay. Sir Eobert Napier landed
at Zoolla on the 2nd of January, 1868, and took over the com-
mand from Sir Charles Staveley, commanding one of the two
divisions.

At this time the greater portion of the expeditionary force had
arrived, including a detachment of the 23rd Punjaub Pioneers
from Calcutta, which was attached to the brigade, stationed
at Zoolla, under Brigadier- General Schneider. On the 25th of
January, 1868, Sir Kobert Napier proceeded to the front, and
Sir Charles Staveley remained temporarily in command at
Zoolla. On the 27th of January the 21st Punjaubees arrived
at Zoolla, and, on the following day, the remainder of the
Pioneers, who marched up to the Senafe Pass to join their
comrades.

On the 9th of February, Major Roberts arrived in the " Gol-
conda," on board which was the 5th Battery 25th Brigade, R. A.,
with a strength of eight officers, and 139 non-commissioned
officers and men, and though the greater portion marched no

* The total number of transports employed in this expedition was 205
sailing vessels, and 75 steamers, besides native craft and lighters and
barges, and the total number of seamen and others employed on board
vessels in the transport service was 14,255.

t The late Sir William Merewether, K.C.S.I., C.B., Member of the Council
of India.

Roberts s Work at Zoolla. 101

farther than Senafe, a detachment, with two eight-inch mortars,
under Major Roherts's Addisconibe friend, Major James Hills,
performed excellent service at the capture of Magdala. On the
same day the first detachment of the 12th Bengal Cavalry
arrived, and proceeded to the front, and the remainder were
landed between the 18th and 28th of February, and a detach-
ment of 100 men, under Major Gough, shared in the attack on
Magdala. The 10th Bengal Cavalry, with a strength of 460
officers and men, and 463 horses, landed on the 6th of March,
and, with the 12th, was employed in keeping open the com-
munications between the Antalo and the Takazze river.

Major Roberts was placed in charge of the Quartermaster-
General's Department at Zoolla, and, as the pressure of work
gradually increased, it was found that his services were too
urgently required at Zoolla to permit of his going inland.* On
the 23rd of February Sir Charles Staveley left the port of dis-
embarkation for the front, and Brigadier-General Donald
Stewart temporarily assumed command at Zoolla, until the
arrival of Major-General Russell, Political Agent and Com-

* Captain H. M. Hozier writes in his " British Expedition to Abyssinia " :
— "At Zoolla beat the heart from which the life-stream flowed that must
pulsate through the long artery of the line of communications, and carry

food to the farthest outposts The army throughout the campaign

depended almost entirely for everything, except meat and firewood, on the
ships and on the Senafe depot stored from the harbour. Never were oper-
ations carried on in a country so unfavourable for war ; the very base of
operations, where at the end of January there was a population of about
12,000 men and animals, had to be supplied with water from the condensers
and from the shipping. An accident to a delicate piece of machinery, or
the breaking of the valve of a pump, caused the stock of the precious fluid
to run short, and inflicted a great inconvenience on the camp, where the
water had to be doled out in daily portions of limited quantity, and a
reduction of the ration told heavily on man and beast. A storm of sufficient
severity to drive the condensing ships away from their anchorage would
have caused a terrible calamity. To provide against such an accident, every
effort was made to provide a reserve of water in a great reservoir, which
was formed partly of ships' tanks and partly of a tank sent in pieces from
England put together on the spot. -There was no timber in the country,
there was no stone near the sea coast, every block of coral and every beam
of wood for the construction of piers or storehouses had to be imported ;
every inch of rope had to be brought from the ships ; every yard of road
had to be made to allow the convoys to pass ; every boat had to be brought
to the coast for the disembarkation of troops and stores, for none were
found there, though a liberal supply was expected by some who should
have been better informants. The boats that there were could not at first
approach the beach, as the water shoaled slowly and the beach was very
flat."

IO2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

mandant at Aden. At Zoolla, under these officers, Major
Roberts laboured till the end of the campaign with an inde-
fatigability beyond praise. We have been assured by an officer
well qualified to form an opinion, from having served at Zoolla
throughout the Abyssinian campaign, that nothing could ex-
ceed the zeal and success with which the subject of this
Memoir performed the very arduous duties committed to his
charge. As an ardent soldier, confident in his ability to be of
service at the front, he longed to be with the advance, and
when the news of the capture of Magdala and death of Theo-
dore, on the 13th of April, arrived in the camp, Roberts must
have experienced a natural disappointment that he was toiling
in the less glorious, though equally essential, duties of his de-
partment ; but he had learned the secret of success in his pro-
fession, as in every other, to do with all his heart and ability
the work allotted to him, and with patience to wait for the time
when such good honest service will bring its reward — the
opportunity for displaying in a more prominent capacity the
military aptitude he felt within him, and of which those who
had watched his career recognized that he was possessed.

By the 1st of April there was landed in Abyssinia 10,800
fighting men, and 14,500 camp followers, and the total number
of persons re-embarked at Zoolla for Suez and India on the
conclusion of the campaign, was 42,699, of whom 4,868 were
embarked before the 18th of April, the date on which the news
of the fall of Magdala was received at Zoolla, and 37,831 were
embarked after that date. The total number of animals
landed at Zoolla was 36,094,* of which 14,842 were re-em-
barked, the remainder being either disposed of at Massowah
by Mr. Munzinger, the British Consul, or having died during
the campaign. Colonel Phayre, head of the Quartermaster-
General's Department, proceeded to the front, leaving Major
Roberts as senior officer at Zoolla, so that the chief portion of
the work of disembarkation of this vast mass of men and
animals devolved on Roberts, who, on the 21st of March, had
received instructions, through Major-General Russell, to make
the necessary arrangements for their despatch. This he com-

* Of this total there were 2,538 horses, 44 elephants, 17,943 mules and
ponies, 5,735 camels, 8,075 bullocks, and 1,759 donkeys.

Conclusion of the Campaign. 103

pleted without hitch or miscarriage, though suffering almost
continuously from ill-health, caused by over- work and the
tropical heat of the burning plain on which Zoolla is situated,
aggravated by a limited supply of water, and " perpetual clouds
of dust lodging in every pore."

On the 13th of April the gloomy tyrant of Abyssinia saw the
power he had built up at the cost of hecatombs of his country-
men, slain in battle or murdered in captivity, passing away
from him as the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment and Engineers
stormed his mountain fastness. Theodore had truly waded
through seas of slaughter to the throne, and of him may be
used the words Byron applied to another warrior : —

" The greatest chief

That ever peopled hell with heroes slain,
Or plunged a province or a realm in grief."

True to his nature, his last act on the previous night was to
order hundreds of his enemies, captives in Magdala, to be
hurled headlong from the summit of the cliff at the back of
that fortress, which fulfilled the purposes of the Tarpeian rock
at Rome, and having thus satisfied his lust for blood, he
awaited the morrow with unabated resolution. When the gate-
way of his stronghold was forced and British soldiers poured in
upon him, the tyrant resolved not to outlive his disgrace, but
putting a pistol into his mouth, blew out his brains. Like the
Homeric hero who falls beneath the spear of "the godlike
Thrasimed": —

" He sinks, with endless darkness cover'd o'er,
And vents his soul, effused with gushing gore."

On the 22nd of May, while on the march down from Mag-
dala, Sir Robert Napier, through his Assistant-Quartermaster-
General, wrote to General Russell in the following terms of
Major Roberts' s services : — "I have the honour, by desire of
the Commander-in-Chief, to request that you will be so good
as to convey to Major Roberts, V.C., Assistant-Quartermaster-
General at Zoolla, the thanks of His Excellency for the efficient
manner in which he has performed his duties since the date of
his arrival at Zoolla. His Excellency has received with plea-

IO4 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

sure most favourable reports regarding the able and energetic
manner in which Major Roberts has carried on the duties of
this department at Zoolla, and it has been a source of regret to
the Commander-iu-Chief that he has been unable to avail him-
self of Major Roberts's services in the front. His Excellency
however considers that work performed by those at Zoolla has
been as valuable to the interests of the expedition as any duty
they might have been called upon to perform with the advanced
portion of the army."

Two days later General Russell received a telegram directing
Roberts to proceed to Bombay to arrange for the return of the
troops, which was, however, countermanded, as Roberts had
rendered himself indispensable, and was a persona grata with
the naval and transport authorities, who fully appreciated his
geniality, resource, and powers of organization, which were the
wonder of every person with whom he was thrown in contact.
General Russell wrote an urgent letter requesting that he
might be allowed to remain at Zoolla, which was granted. No
one knew so well the value of these services as General Russell,
who, from being on the spot, had the best opportunities of
judging of the capacity of the officer in charge of his Quarter-
master-General's Department. The following was the letter
he addressed to Colonel Phayre on this occasion : — " Major
Roberts has for some months conducted the duties of the
department at Zoolla ; during the time I have held command
he has done so most entirely to my satisfaction. He has lately
had very arduous duties in surveying and allotting vessels and
arranging embarkations, and has, in his communications with
the Naval and Transport authorities, carried on the duties to
the satisfaction of all. Major Roberts has taken such interest
in the embarkation, and has been so energetic, I had hoped he
might have remained to see the whole embarkation carried out,
but as his services are required elsewhere, I think it just to
represent to His Excellency the Commander- in -Chief the good
services he has performed."

In sending Major Roberts a copy of the above letter, General
Russell wrote : — " You will see how I appreciate your energy ;
I have to thank you for your valuable assistance to me."

On the 2nd of June Sir Robert Napier arrived at Zoolla,

Services of Roberts during the War. 105

and, on the 10th, accompanied by Major Koberts and other
officers, embarked in H.M.S. " Feroze " for Suez, whence he
proceeded to England to receive the honours that were so justly
his due, and the Abyssinian Expedition came to an end. The
25th Bombay N.I., remained as a guard for the stores, and, on
the embarkation, on the 17th of June, of the last of these and
the followers, the headquarters of the regiment quitted Zoolla.
On the following day, the rear-guard, being two companies
of the 25th Kegiment, embarked, and Annesley Bay returned
to its normal condition of solitude, save for the presence of a
guard of Egyptian troops to look after the railway* and sundry
sheds and trucks left behind.

During the campaign now brought to a conclusion, while
other officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department were
enjoying the excitement of active service and the invigorating
breezes of the Abyssinian highlands, it was Major Roberta's
fortune to work on the burning plain of Zoolla, but his heroic
struggles against the disabilities of a constitution always
weakly, and now borne down by lassitude and fever, were
appreciated and recorded by those who had witnessed his self-
sacrificing efforts, or had the discernment to contrast to his
advantage these qualities with the self-assertion of others more
highly placed.

Sir Robert Napier paid Roberts the high compliment of
selecting him to carry his final despatches to H.R.H. the Duke
of Cambridge, and his letter to the Military Secretary at the
Horse Guards, written at Zoolla on the 5th of June, though
very flattering to Major Roberts, was only his due. He said,
" I have the honour to acquaint you for the information of His
Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, that
I have selected Major Roberts, V.C., Royal Artillery, to convey,
for submission to His Royal Highness, the continuation of my
despatch of the 12th May, reporting the concluding operations
and re-embarkation of the troops which composed the Abyssinian

* From returns by the Quartermaster-General's Department it appears
that the railway from Zoolla to Koomayli, twelve miles in length, conveyed
in three months 9,000 tons of commissariat stores, 2,400 tons of materiel,
10,000 troops and 14,500 followers, with 2,000 tons of baggage, the whole
•without accident or delay.

io6 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Expeditionary Force. I would beg of you to be so good as to
bring Major Roberts to the favourable notice of His Eoyal
Highness. He performed the duties of Assistant-Quarter-
master-General at Zoolla throughout the campaign. It was
not possible to spare this officer from his important office at
our base with the duties of which he was thoroughly acquainted.
It will be, I am sure, satisfactory to His Royal Highness to
learn that, although the orders for the re-embarkation of the
force were issued near Magdala, and the greatest portion of the
troops had to traverse several hundred miles to reach their
ships, the embarkation took place nearly on the dates fixed.
The regiments generally embarked within forty-eight hours
after their departure from Senafe, marching fifty-five miles
through the passes to Koomailee, whence they were conveyed
by rail to the pier at Zoolla, and immediately sent to sea. By
this they were spared any unnecessary exposure in the extreme
heat of Zoolla. I beg to forward for submission to His Royal
Highness a copy of a demi-official letter* from Major-General
Russell, commanding at Zoolla, relative to the manner in
which the embarkation was carried out, and also an extract
from a report from that officer on the highly valuable assist-
ance afforded him by Major Roberts at all times, and more espe-
cially in the re-embarkations referred to in General Russell's
letter."

Roberts left Sir Robert Napier at Suez, and, proceeding from
Alexandria via Brindisi, with the despatches with which he was
entrusted, hurried across the continent, and landed in England
after an absence of ten years. ' His feelings on treading again

* From Major-General Russell, commanding at Zoolla, to the Military
Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief Abyssinia Expeditionary Force,
dated Zoolla, 3rd of June, 1868.

"From Major Roberts, V.C., the Assistant-Quartermaster-General, I have
received most valuable assistance, and he has conducted the duties of the
department at Zoolla most entirely to my satisfaction. He has lately had
very arduous duties in surveying and allotting vessels and arranging the
re -embarkation of the troops, and has in his communications with the Naval
and Transport authorities carried on the duties to the satisfaction of all.
He has taken such interest in the re-embarkation and has been so energetic
and efficient that I submitted a request for him to be permitted to remain
at Zoolla and complete there-embarkation, which request has been granted.
I am specially indebted to him for his very valuable assistance."

Roberts Compiles the Transport Regulations. 107

the soil of his native country were, doubtless, not inaptly
expressed by the lines of Coleridge : —

" If aught on earth demands an unmixed feeling,
'Tis surely this — after long years of exile,
To step forth on firm land, and gazing round us,
To hail at once our country and our birth-place."

On the arrival of Sir Kobert Napier in England, he participated
in the banquets and fetes that were given to the successful
General.

For his services during the campaign, Koberts received the
brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel, and, while in England, was
offered by Sir William Mansfield, the Commander-in-Chief in
India, the post of First Assistant-Quartermaster-General at
Army headquarters, and, in February, 1869, sailed for India
and took up the appointment in the following month. At this
time Colonel P. S. Lumsden was Quartermaster-General, but
during the two succeeding winters, in the absence of his chief,
Colonel Roberts was in charge of the department, and, with his
usual energy, employed such leisure as he could command in
compiling Parts I. and II. of the Transport Regulations, " By
Sea," and "By Rail." He writes to us, " I felt there was a
great want for transport regulations, and I compiled Parts I.
and II. which form the basis of the present regulations as used
in India."

Colonel Roberts added to the Mutiny medal, with three clasps,
and the India medal for the Umbeyla campaign, the medal for
Abyssinia.

Alone among our wars this campaign is remarkable for
having been brought to a conclusion, not absolutely without
spilling a drop of blood — for seventeen officers and men were
wounded at the action of Arogie, and fifteen at the capture of
Magdala — but without the loss of a single life in action on the
British side. Lord Napier merited all the honours and enco-
miums he received for his conduct of the operations in what
has well been called an " Engineers' War," though it was
scarcely less a Quartermaster-General's War, for the difficulties
of transporting supplies along the 400 miles intervening be-
tween Zoolla and Magdala, were of a nature that may be said,
without exaggeration, to be almost unparalleled. To Colonel

io8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Roberts the experience he had gained in this campaign was
priceless, and no long time elapsed before he was in a position
to put in practice the lessons he had learned under a master
in the art of mountain warfare. To a man who (to paraphrase
a famous saying) " was an excellent official if you will, but a
soldier above all," the kudos he gained as being "indispensable"
at Zoolla, must have been dashed by the thought that he was
not present at the capture of the stronghold of the Abyssinian
Emperor. To a soldier combining the impetuous valour that
gained him the V.C., with the strategic skill of which he has
given such striking examples in Afghanistan, the perils of the
assault were the most congenial experiences of military life,
and he would agree with the fiery Hotspur : —

" Send danger from the East unto the West,
So honour cross it from the North to the South."

CHAPTER VII.

The Looshai Campaign — Description of the Country and Cause of the War
— Colonel Roberts fits out the two Columns of the Expeditionary
Force — He joins General Bourchier at Cachar — March of the Cachar
Column — Arrival at Tipai Mookh — Attack on the Kholel Villages led
by Colonel Roberts — Further Operations against the Looshais — Action
of the 25th of January, 1872 — Colonel Roberts Commands at the
Capture of Taikoom — Arrival at Chumfai — Conclusion of Peace and
Return of the Column to India — Roberts is appointed Quartermaster-
General at Army Head-quarters — His Services in that Capacity —
Lord Lytton and General Roberts — Roberts is nominated Commandant
of the Punjaub Irregular Force and Special Commissioner on the
Sciude-Punjaub Frontier.

IN 1871 the Indian Government was involved in hostilities with
the wild tribes on the south-east frontier of Bengal, known by
the common name of Looshai, and Colonel Roberts' s services
were again brought into requisition. Their country, almost a
terra incognita, is situated between the southern extremity of
the Cachar district and the northern boundary of the Chitta-
gong Hill Tracts, and consists of a belt of land about 100 miles
in length, traversed by high ranges of mountains running
nearly due north and south. On the Chittagong side of the
Looshai portion of the country, these mountains are more or
less inhabited, but towards the Cachar frontier the broad and
swampy valleys are almost entirely devoid of population, a
result due not so much to their unhealthiuess as to the raids of
more powerful neighbours.

The Looshais, says Colonel Roberts,* are a family of the
great Kokie tribe, who may be found in Independent, or Hill,
Tipperah, which bounds the Looshai country on the west. The
Looshais first raided on British territory in 1850, and, in
January of the following year, Colonel Lyster, political agent

* See " Narrative of the Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force,''
published in vol. ii. of the "Journal of the United Service Institution of
India," in which the author minutely describes the organization of the
Expedition.

1 1 o Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

in the Cossyah and Jynteah Hills, and Commandant of the
Sylhet Light Infantry, marched from Cachar with a small force,
and penetrated their country a distance of 100 miles, inflicting
severe punishment and releasing 400 captives, but he expressed
his " confirmed impression that this rohber tribe will not cease
to infest the frontier until they shall have been most severely
dealt with." Matters remained tolerably quiet until 1862,
when aggressions occurred in Sylhet, culminating in 1868-69
in a series of outrages on the tea-gardens of Cachar, when the
Government despatched two columns, under Brigadier- General
Nuthall and Major Stephenson, 7th Native Infantry, with twenty-
days' provisions. But the expedition started too late in the
season, and was ill-organized, and returned without meeting
with opposition or effecting any of the objects sought to be
attained.

The Supreme Government now tried the policy of concilia-
tion, and, on the 20th December, 1869, Mr. Edgar, Deputy
Commissioner of the district, accompanied by Major Macdonald
of the Survey Department, and a small escort of police, left
Cachar and visited Soonai and Beparee Bazaar, the centre of
the territory of Sookpilal, the most powerful of the chiefs
raiding on British territory, who paid him a visit on the 23rd
March, and discussed the question of the boundary between
the Looshai and British States. In the following December,
Majors Macdonald and Graham, the Civil Officer, were deputed
to proceed with a small police escort on a friendly mission to
the country of the Sylhoos, situated to the south of Sookpilal' s
territory, and Mr. Edgar penetrated to Dullesur, where he had
an interview with Sookpilal, who, on the part of the western
chiefs, agreed to the boundary clearly denned in a " sunnud,"
or written engagement, but declared that he could not negotiate
on behalf of the tribes to the east of the Soonai river. But
the old chief was acting with duplicity, and at this time the
Sylhoos and Howlongs, tribes to the north and north-east of
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and the north-eastern Looshais,
under Lalboorah, entered Sylhet and Cachar, destroying villages
and property, killing the coolies and Mr. Winchester, a tea-
grower, whose daughter, six years of age, was carried off.
To recover this second little Helen of Troy, " the direful spring

Origin of the Looshai Expedition. 1 1 1

of woes unnumbered," a considerable force was assembled, and
the Indian Government found itself involved in hostilities.

At this time Lord Napier of Magdala, the Commander-in-
Chief, accompanied by Brigadier- General George Bourchier,
C.B., commanding the eastern frontier, whose name has
appeared before in these pages, happened to be on a tour of
inspection through the district, and, under his lordship's in-
structions, the Brigadier- General proceeded to Shillong to take
steps for the protection of that frontier, and despatched a small
force up the Soonai river, which succeeded in ensuring the
safety of Mr. Edgar, then returning from his mission to Sook-
pilal. On the 24th February the Commander-in-Chief, having
inspected Dibrooghur and the other stations on the Brahma-
pootra, reached Cachar, and, as the season was too far advanced
for active operations, in conjunction with the General command-
ing the district, he made arrangements for defending the frontier,
forts and stockades being established at suitable points, with
roads communicating between them.

Acting on the recommendation of Lord Napier, the Supreme
Government, on the 30th June, 1871, directed the Military
Department to organize an expedition in the Looshai country,
to consist of two columns, starting from Cachar and Chittagong,
with the forces of the Rajahs of Muunepore and Tipperah
acting in co-operation, while the services of Sookpilal were to
be brought in requisition on the north, and of Button Pooea, a
powerful chief, on the south, from which side the Chittagong
column would attack. Lord Napier, in the previous March,
had impressed on the Government that all the details connected
with the organization and equipment of the force and supply
of carnage, should be carefully considered beforehand, so that
there might be no chance of failure, such as had lately over-
taken some mountain expeditions.

On the 13th July his lordship was definitely called upon to
submit his proposals for giving effect to the measures decided
upon against the Looshais, and, four days later, the Commander-
in-Chief submitted his scheme, the main features of which
were that each column was to consist of 1,500 picked men from
the Regular Native Infantry, half a Peshawur Mountain
battery, with two steel guns, and two 5^-inch mortars carried

I i 2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

on elephants, and one company of Sappers and Miners. No
tents were to be carried, each fighting man being supplied with
a waterproof sheet, and baggage and camp followers were to be
reduced to a minimum, every one being rationed by the Com-
missariat. These recommendations were adopted, as well as
others suggesting that the co-operation of the Munnepore and
Tipperah Rajahs should be limited to the protection of their
own frontiers, the opening out of roads, and maintaining com-
munications through their own territories. The Commander-
in-Chief also strongly insisted on the Political Officers with the
columns acting in subordination to the Generals, and Colonel
Roberts writes : — " This move was attended with the happiest
results ; indeed, it is not too much to say that to it, as much
as to the efficiency of the troops, the ultimate success of the
expedition was due."

The suggestions of the Commander-in-Chief having received
the approval of Government, orders were at once issued to the
several departments concerned, and, by the beginning of Sep-
tember, the fitting out of the two columns had been fairly
commenced.

The experience Colonel Roberts had acquired during fifteen
years' service in the Quartermaster-General's Department, and
more recently in the Abyssinian campaign, was now to be put
to the test, and the completeness with which he fitted out this
small expedition was an earnest of what he could do on a larger
scale and in a more important crisis, and evidenced that he
possessed the qualities for a successful chief of which the
" sage Polydamas " declared that Hector, with all his valour,
was deficient.

" To few, and wondrous few, has Jove assign'd
A wise, extensive, all-considering mind."

Lord Napier, who had formed, from personal observation in
Abyssinia, a high estimate of the energy and professional
capacity of Colonel Roberts, placed the entire preparation of
the columns in his hands, and the result was that nothing
could be more complete and efficient than the organization and
equipment of the expedition. For this service he received
from the Commander-in-Chief, through his immediate chief,

Roberts Organizes the Columns. 1 1 3

Colonel R. S. Lumsden, " the expression of his Excellency's
approbation of tbe highl}7 satisfactory manner in which tbe
duties entrusted to you for tbe preparation of tbe Loosbai
expedition and its despatcb from Calcutta, bave been carried
out."

Colonel Roberts was appointed Senior Staff Officer of tbe
Force, and, baving despatched tbe stores and equipment of tbe
columns by tbe 3rd November, joined Brigadier-General
Bourcbier, commanding tbe Cacbar column* (bis old comrade
at Delbi), at Silcbar, tbe Sudder, or principal station of tbe
district. Tbe Cbittagong column was commanded by Brigadier-
General Charles Brownlow, C.B., but with its operations we
are not concerned.

On arriving at Silcbar, Colonel Roberts, accompanied by
Colonel Nutball, of the 44th Native Infantry, went out to
explore the route over the Burban range, but tbe difficulties
appeared so great that it was decided that the advance should
be made by the alternative route, round by Luckipore and the
banks of the Barak. On the 21st November, a wing of tbe
44th Native Infantry marched to Luckipore, and, on the 23rd,
General Bourcbier and his staff followed with one wing of the
44th and tbe Sappers, when road-making towards Tipai Mookb
commenced, a labour which never ceased until the end of
January, by which time 110 miles bad been completed. This
last-named place had been fixed upon as the base of operations
for the left column, after a lengthy discussion, as it was
believed that from there the tribes of the chiefs about to be

* The Caehar, or left, Column consisted of : — " Half Peshawur Mountain
Battery, Captain Blackwood, R.A. ; one company Sappers and Miners,
Lieutenant Harvey, R.E. ; 500 men of the 22nd Punjaub Native Infantry,
Colonel Stafford ; 500 of the 42nd Assam Light Infantry, Colonel Rattray,
C.B. ; 500 44th Assam Light Infantry, Colonel Hicks ; and 100 police,
under Mr. Daly. There were 1,400 coolies, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Davidson of the Commissariat ; also a Coolie Corps of 800 men for the
carriage of the Sepoys' baggage, under Major Moore. In addition 600
Coolies joined during the campaign to replace casualties. There were 121
elephants, and 32 others arrived later ; of which 20 died in the campaign.
The Staff Officers, besides Colonel Roberts, were Captain Thompson, Brigade-
Major, and Captain Butter, Aide-de-Camp. Dr. Buckle, Inspector-General
of Hospitals, was in medical charge, and Mr. Edgar was Political Officer of
the Column, acting in subordination to the General. The Topographical
survey was under Captain Badgley, and the telegraph under Mr. Pitman.

I

114 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

coerced — Vonpilal, Poiboy, and Vouolel — could be most easily
reached. Had the meeting of the two columns been the pri-
mary object of the expedition, a more westerly course, either
by the valley of the Soonai or the Dullesur, would have been
adopted, but it was hoped that, by whichever route the columns
advanced, they would be able to effect a junction after the
Looshais had been sufficiently punished.

For the greater part of this way there was not even the
vestige of a path, and many a long and weary reconnoissauce
was made by Colonel Eoberts before the best line for the
advance could be selected. The troops, however, worked with
a will, and the Sappers, under Lieutenant Harvey, traced out
the road, which was widened to a suitable extent by the lead-
ing wing of the 44th Eegiment, the other corps following in
succession by wings, each doing their share. Colonel Roberts
writes of the work done under somewhat adverse circum-
stances : — " Notwithstanding the extreme heat of the climate,
and the difficult nature of the country, which was one suc-
cession of rolling hills covered with dense jungle and huge
creepers, and intersected by numerous rivers and watercourses,
a good road from six to eight feet wide was constructed, with a
gradient easy enough for laden elephants to travel over."

This sort of campaigning is not exhilarating, and is more
trying for regular troops than the excitement of battle, when
discipline and superior arms inspire confidence. Byron
justly speaks of

" The nightly muster and the silent march
In the chill dark, when courage doth not glow
So much as under a triumphal arch."

On the 29th November, General Bourchier arrived at Mynad-
hur, on the farther side of the Burban range, where commis-
sariat stores for three months had been collected, and ordnance
and other stores were rapidly arriving. Here, also, a telegraph
had been carried, and a daily post established, so that by the
first week in December, headquarters were in postal and tele-
graphic communication with Calcutta. Between Mynadhur and
Tipai Mookh, four camps close to the Barak bank, were estab-
lished, each consisting of comfortable huts made by the troops
and coolies, the framework consisting of bamboo leaves, and

Roberts Leads the Advance. 1 1 5

grass, fastened together with strips of bark, and the interior
furnished with a low raised bamboo floor for sleeping purposes.
As opposition was expected, General Bourchier, accompanied
by Colonel Koberts, reconnoitred the place, which was found to
be deserted, when it was occupied and made the base of opera-
tions. Tipai Mookh (the junction between the Tipai and Barak)
is eighty-four miles from Cachar, but in this short distance the
river Barak had to be crossed four times.

By the 4th December preparations for an advance were com-
pleted, and headquarters marched two days later ; but the diffi-
culties as to roads and water on the route were so considerable
that the Toweeboom river, distant twenty miles from Tipai
Mookh, was only reached on the 22nd of the month. Crossing
the river, the column encamped a little above its junction with
the Tipai. During the advance, small bodies of Looshais were
encountered, but they retired on the approach of the recon-
noitring parties. General Bourchier determined at once to
attack the Kholel villages before the people had time to
strengthen them, and, early on the morning of the 23rd,
leaving a guard in camp, marched with the remainder of the
troops up the hill. Colonel Koberts, with fifty men of the
22nd Punjaub Native Infantry, under Major Stafford, led the
advance up the ascent, which was very steep, and through
thick jungles. On arriving at a clearing in the forest, where
was a stockade, Colonel Roberts collected the troops, who,
owing to the narrowness of the path, straggled up, and could
not keep any proper order, and advanced towards the work in
which the enemy had taken up a position. As the detachment
emerged into the open, the Looshais fired two volleys, which
wounded two men, but before the Punjaubees could reach them
with the bayonet, they had evacuated the place and disappeared
into the jungle. The work, which was full of rice, was de-
stroyed, and the column continued its toilsome chase after the
enemy, who were driven from stockade to stockade.

The tactics adopted by the enemy were to post themselves at
the top of each ascent, fire a volley, and retreat ; but, never-
theless, the British troops were able to inflict some loss upon
them, as was evident by the traces of blood that marked their
line of flight, though they took care to remove their slain, as,

i 2

1 1 6 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

according to a superstition prevalent among them, the man
who loses his head in battle becomes the slave of the victor
in the next world.

Storehouses full of grain were found in each stockade, and
were destroyed, together with the contents. Advancing in this
way for several hours, through thick jungle, with an occasional
hamlet, the column came upon a large village, which the
General determined to occupy, as there was a good stream of
water close at hand. He accordingly sent back to Tipai for
the baggage. Meantime, accompanied by Roberts and his
staff, he took a detachment of the 44th higher up the hill, to
look for the Chief Kalhi's principal village, which had been
seen from the camp on the Seubong range. The ascent was
very steep, the village being situated at an elevation of 3,300
feet above the point left in the morning. The Looshais made
an attempt to defend the village, but the 44th drove them out,
and the place was burnt, when the detachment retraced its
steps to the village fixed upon for occupation. During the
day the losses had been only two men killed and four severely
wounded.

The troops were so exhausted by their exertions that it was
with great difficulty the pickets could be prevailed upon to con-
struct breastworks, though materials in abundance were at
hand. Throughout the night the Looshais kept up a harass-
ing fire under cover of the forest which surrounded the village,
and as soon as morning dawned, a party moved out to clear the
ground near the pickets. Later in the day the General pro-
.ceeded, with Colonel Roberts and sixty-two men of all ranks,
being all that were available for the duty, to attack another
village a short distance to the south, which was carried with a
rush, the enemy evacuating the place after firing a volley.

Christmas day was spent burning the stockades and gran-
aries in the neighbourhood, and, at night, the officers celebrated
the day in the fashion usual among Englishmen in all parts of
the world, and under the most depressing circumstances. All
the officers assembled at the headquarters mess, and dined at a
table " raised in a conspicuous position, with candles burning
before them and Looshais firing from the jungle close by. "

* " The Looshai Expedition," by Lieutenant R. G. Woodthorpe, R.E.

He Conducts the Retirement. 1 1 7

Though some of the sentries were wounded, none of the officers,
though presenting such excellent marks, were hit, and that
"music hath charms the savage breast to quell," was proved
by a singular circumstance. When, after dinner, the officers
in turn favoured the company with a song, the auditory included
the fierce children of the forest, who stopped firing when each
song commenced, and resumed it on its conclusion.

When starting from Tipai, on the 23rd, it was understood
that the route to Lalboorah's village lay by the Voombong
mountain and the new Kholel villages, but from a closer in-
spection of the country it became evident that they had taken
the wrong road, and that it would be necessary to retrace their
steps to the Toweebooin, and take a fresh departure thence for
old Kholel, a collection of deserted villages near Pachowee,
visible at some distance on the opposite bank of the Tipai. As
there were only 250 fighting men available, and the nature of
the country necessitated proceeding in single file, it was difficult
to guard the long line of sick, wounded, and coolies ; but the
retirement was planned by Colonel Roberts, and executed with
skill and success, and reflected great credit on all concerned.
By 10 o'clock on the 26th the preparations were complete, and
the column marched, Colonel Stafford's detachment of the 22nd
Punjaubees leading, a detachment of the 44th, under Captain
Lightfoot, guarding the coolies and non-combatants, and
Colonel Nuthall and Captain Robertson bringing up the rear
with the remainder of the 44th. As the rearguard, accompanied
by General Bourchier and Colonel Roberts, quitted the village,
after setting it on fire, the Looshais entered at the other end,
yelling and screaming like fiends, but were kept off by the
steady fire of the skirmishers of the 44th. All the way down
the hill, a distance of five miles, to the river, the savages en-
deavoured to get past the rearguard to attack the coolies with
the baggage, but, says Roberts, " they were invariably baffled
by the little Goorkhas, who, extending rapidly where the ground
allowed, retired through their supports in admirable order, and
gave the enemy no chance of passing.

On the 27th and 28th December, Colonel Roberts was em-
ployed reconnoitring the route, and, on the following day, the
General, accompanied by his staff and Mr. Edgar, and taking

1 1 8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

with him a wing of the 22nd Punjaubees, under Colonel Rat-
tray, which had joined the camp, returned to the Kholel vil-
lages that had been burnt to show the natives that it was not
fear that had caused the retirement. Here an envoy was
received from the Chief named Poiboy, soliciting peace, and a
cessation of hostilities was arranged. Meanwhile the Sappers
and Goorkhas commenced road-making, and, on the arrival of
a sufficiency of supplies for a further advance, the General,
with Colonel Roberts and his staff, left the camp on the 6th
January, 1872, and halting at the Sapper camp for the night,
arrived at the river Tuitu on the following morning.

On the 8th, headquarters, with the Sappers, marched to a
deserted village on the Kholel range, called Daidoo, where a
wet night was passed, there being no shelter, or bamboos to
construct huts, and the rain coming down in torrents. On the
following day camp was formed at Pachowee, officially known
as No. 9, where an agent arrived from Sookpilal with a message
from that Chief and Khalkom that they would soon come in to
make their submission. The General sent him back with an
intimation that he would not delay his march, and a road was
at once commenced to Lalboora, through Poiboy's country.
Three miles from No. 9 post were the deserted villages of
old Kholel, where is the tomb of Vonpilal, the once powerful
Looshai chief, who ruled over Daidoo, Poiboy and Kholel. On
the 13th, the 22nd Regiment arrived, and, three days after, the
two steel guns (the mortars were never brought to the front),
and also Major Moore, bringing the Goorkha coolies, of whom
nearly 300 had died of cholera since leaving Calcutta. All the
troops of the Cachar column, with the exception of a guard at
Mvnadhur, were now distributed at the posts between Tipai
Mookh and No. 9.

On the 17th, the General and staff, including Colonel Roberts
and Mr. Edgar, leaving behind a guard of fifty men, marched
from Pachui, with a wing of the 44th, and, crossing the Tuivai,
and passing a stockade where 200 men armed with muskets
were collected, ascended to Chepui, a height of 2,200 feet
above the river's bed, where the column passed the night in
some unfinished houses. Here the troops remained till the
22ud, Colonel Roberts employing the interval in reconnoitring.

A Smart Skirmish. 1 1 9

The villagers sought to mislead him by pointing out a round-
about route, but, says Lieutenant Woodthorpe, " Colonel
Roberts, feeling convinced that there must be a more direct
road, was untiring in his endeavours to discover it, and at last
success rewarded his efforts." As the time did not admit of
constructing roads, General Bourchier determined to use the
country paths, taking on only the artillery elephants, the sup-
plies being brought on from Chepui by coolies.

On the 22nd January the advance was continued along a
rocky path to Station No. 11, whence Colonel Roberts, taking
a guide with him, reconnoitred the roads which diverged shortly
after reaching the camp. He resolved to adopt the road across
the Tuila and over a spur of the Surklang, but Poiboy, expect-
ing the invaders would use the route by Gnaupa, had fortified
several strong points, and determined to make a stand. On
arriving at the next camp the General and Colonel Roberts
went on ahead to reconnoitre, and, on the 25th, the force came
into collision with the enemy.

The advance, consisting of fifty men of the 44th, accom-
panied by the General and his staff, had advanced about half a
mile from camp, and were climbing over a steep, rocky part of
the path, when suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon them,
the General's orderly being killed, and the General himself
receiving wounds in the left arm and hand. There was a
sharp struggle on the bank of the purling, swiftly-flowing
brook, whose waters ran stained with blood, while the fierce
yell of the Looshai mountaineer was answered by the wild cry
of the little Goorkha, who was not less at home on the rocky
hill- side, which reminded him of his sequestered valleys in
distant Nepaul. Thirteen Looshais fell almost in one spot in
the stream, victims to the terrible "kookrie, " or knife, which
these hardy mountaineers wield with such dexterity. One
young Looshai, panic- struck at the fate which had befallen so
many of his countrymen, was seen, in trying to make his
escape up the slippery rock, to lose his footing, and before he
could recover himself was cut down at one blow by a Goorkha.
As when Sarpedon fell beneath Patroclus' " never-erring dart "

" The Fates suppress'd his labouring breath,
Aud his eyes darken'd with the shades of death."

1 20 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

On General Bourcbier being disabled, Colonel Roberts tem-
porarily assumed tbe command, and tbe troops dasbing into tbe
stream, drove tbe enemy up tbe bill and tbrougb tbe jungle.
After having his wounds bound up, General Bourcbier followed
tbe column, which had pushed on rapidly for the village by a
path running along the face of a precipice. At this point a
stockade bad been constructed, but tbe enemy were so panic-
striken that they abandoned it and fled wildly towards another
large stockade, which they prepared to defend ; the position was,
however, turned by a party of the 44th, and the Looshais, find-
ing themselves^ taken in flank, abandoned the stockade and the
village of I£ungnung, 200 yards beyond, and disappeared into
the forest and down the hill-side. In this spirited affair the
British loss was only two killed and five wounded, and that of
the Looshais over sixty. Speaking of Colonel Roberts's services
the General reported : — " At the outset I was wounded by two
slugs in the left arm and hand, and although not disabled for
the rest of the subsequent advance, I was so at one time, and
have to thank Colonel Roberts and my staff for carrying out the
details which ended so successfully."

As the attack thus successfully repelled had been made by
Poiboy's men, the General determined to burn the village of
Taikoom, and, at noon on the following day, despatched Colonel
Roberts in command of a small column, consisting of 100 men
from the 22ud and 44th regiments, and the two mountain
7-pounder guns, which had only arrived that morning in camp.
During tbe course of the reconnoissance made two days before,
it was ap arent that, owing to the nature of the country, these
guns, if conveyed by elephants, could not be conveyed to
Taikoom in one day, so it was decided that they should be
carried by coolies. Accordingly, six men were told off to each
gun, which weighed only 1501bs. apiece, six to each carriage,
two for each wheel, and four for the ammunition boxes, each
containing nine rounds. By noon tbe small column, under
the command of Colonel Roberts, was on the march towards
Taikoom, which lay due east. The path descended for about a
mile and a half till it reached the bend of the stream just
below the saddle connecting Muthilen, a great hill rising to an
altitude of 6,000 feet, with the Soorklang, a wild mass of

Roberts s first Command in Action. 121

peaks, whence, ascending again, it joined the path reconnoitred
by Eoberts on the 24th.

Passing a stockade containing granaries, Colonel Roberts
continued his march between two spurs of the neighbouring
hills, about a mile beyond which, on the farther side of a
valley, was a strong stockade, built across a road which it quite
commanded, and having on its right flank a steep rocky ravine,
in which a large party of the enemy were collected. As the
nature of the ground did not permit of a direct attack with the
limited force of infantry under his command, Colonel Roberts
resolved on making a flank movement, a feature of military
tactics with which these unsophisticated hillmen. were unac-
quainted. This entailed a fatiguing march over steep spurs, at
one time attaining a height of 6,000 feet, but, at length, the party
came out on the road, about a mile beyond the stockade. The
Looshais, on finding their position turned, retired to Taikoom,
upon which Colonel Roberts continued his march with all expe-
dition, but it was five o'clock before he came in sight of it.

The village, which contained about 200 houses, surrounded
by a strong palisade, is situated on the top of a small hill, and
was found to be full of men, who were collected in a large open
space at the upper end. The position Colonel Roberts took up
completely commanded the village, from which it was some
1,200 yards distant, and the guns were brought into action on
a level space on the right of the road. Captain Blackwood,
who was in command, opened fire, and his practice was so
good, the second shell bursting amid a group of men, that,
after a few rounds, Colonel Roberts led the infantry in person,
and entered the village at one end as the enemy evacuated it at
the other. Taikoom was set on fire, and as it was past six
o'clock, the troops, having secured some live stock, which were
slaughtered by the Goorkhas, commenced the return march,
guided by the light of the moon. Camp was reached in safety
at 11 P.M., every officer and man being thoroughly fatigued.
Thus successfully terminated Colonel Roberts's first indepen-
dent command, which was an earnest of what he was capable
of doing.

General Bourchier, in forwarding to Lord Napier of Magdala,
a copy of Colonel Roberts's despatch, observes : — " I need

122 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

scarcely add orie word to what he has described therein, except
acknowledging in the warmest terms the services on this and
every occasion of this distinguished officer ; the distance he
had to travel was more than anticipated, and he did not return
to camp until half-past ten at night. This was the first occa-
sion on which the guns had been taken into action, and while
I was perfectly confident in the officer to whom I had entrusted
this expedition, I felt somewhat anxious, being unable to wit-
ness their first effect upon the enemy."

The Quartermaster- General at army headquarters, in for-
warding enclosures from General Bourchier, referring to
Colonel Roberta's services, to the Milrhary Department of the
Government of India, says, Lord Napier desires " to draw
the attention of Government to the skilfully and judiciously
planned, and ably and boldly executed operations therein set
forth, and to the praiseworthy services of Lieutenant-Colonel
Roberts, V.C., and the other officers brought to notice by the
Brigadier- General."

On the 29th January, 1872, a telegram was received at
Kungnung, announcing that Sookpilal had delivered up the
child, Mary Winchester, to General Brownlow, commanding
the right, or Chittagong, column, and, during the following two
days, the Looshais arrived in camp, bringing in the indemnity
in kind, demanded from Poiboy for his share in the attack of
the 25th.

On the 1st February, General Bourchier, accompanied by
his staff, including Colonel Roberts and Mr. Edgar, marched
with a detachment of the 22nd and 44th regiments for Chelam,
Poiboy's chief village, taking the road along the steep slope of
the western face of Muthilen. On the following day the
column arrived at Chelam, which was perched on the side of a
hill at an elevation of 5,800 feet, and consisted of about 200
houses enclosed in a strong stockade, with two other smaller
villages, also stockaded, on other peaks. Chelam, which had
just been vacated by its inhabitants, was occupied by the trcops,
who made themselves comfortable in the houses in which the
fires were still smouldering, and there being a plentiful supply
of pigs, the hill coolies killed as many as were required, and
Europeans and natives alike revelled in a plethora of pork, for

A Forced March. 123

which viand the Goorkha has a great predilection. During the
night a fire occurred, which consumed twenty-five houses and
some of the public buildings, but it was extinguished by the
exertions of the soldiers and camp followers.

In order to obviate the danger to life and property from a
recurrence of these fires, Colonel Roberts was sent, early on
the following morning, to search for a suitable camping ground,
and one having been selected, the troops moved thither, and
huts were quickly constructed, the cold — for the thermometer
marked one degree above freezing-point at night — rendering a
bivouac out of the question. As one of the chief objects of
the expedition was to effect the reduction of the village of
Chumfai, 110 miles distant from Tipai Mookh, belonging to
the powerful chief, Lalbourah, General Bourchier commenced
collecting twelve days' supplies for his force, and telegraphed
his intention to General Brownlow, via Calcutta, so that if
possible the two columns might effect a junction at that spot.
A wing of the 42nd arrived at Chelam on the llth January, and
the General, making up his flying column to 400 men, drawn
from the 22nd and 44th regiments and artillery, with the two
guns, on the following day marched from Chelam, leaving
Colonel Eattray to occupy the camp. Baggage had been re-
duced to the utmost extent, the officers taking with them only
two blankets, one change of clothes, and a few cooking utensils.

The route, as before, was along the sides of mountains and
across ravines and valleys, but everywhere the fortified villages
were deserted, and the stockades unoccupied. One of these, at
Tulcheng, was of considerable strength, and displayed great
ingenuity, as there were flanking defences. On the 16th
February the column entered Lalbourah' s valley of Chumfai,
having an elevation of nearly 5,000 feet, and, on the following
day, took possession of Lungvel, the deserted village of Vonolel,
in which was that chiefs tomb, a curious structure, decked
with horns and human heads, according to Looshai custom.
At this spot the British flag was hoisted amid hearty cheers,
and General Bourchier, addressing the troops, said that they
had reached the limit of their march into the enemy's
country.

The village, which consisted of 1,000 houses, was fired, and

124 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the troops retired to pitch their camp in the valley below,
where, on the following day, the General received a deputation
of headmen from Chonchim, who came to make their sub-
mission. The British terms were, the surrender of Lalbourah,
or of three headmen in his place, the admission of Government
agents to their villages if required, the surrender of captured
firearms, and the payment of a fine in kind. After the meet-
ing General Bourchier took with him 150 men and ascended
the hill to Chonchim, which was strongly stockaded and filled
with armed Looshais, and for a time it seemed as if a resort
would have to be made to hostile measures, but after a parley
the General and his staff with twenty men were admitted into
the enclosure. Thus the submission of the tribe was com-
plete, and could not be explained away by the sophistries
barbarous chiefs employ in such cases to explain their humili-
ation.

In the evening the troops returned to Chumfai, and parties
were sent out on the following day, to make a cursory examina-
tion of the country. The British terms were all complied with,
three muntris, or chiefs, being chosen as hostages, and then, as
agreed on by telegraph with General Brownlow, on the night of
the 20th February, rockets were sent up to advise him of their
position, but were not visible owing to the height of the inter-
vening mountain ranges, the distance between the two columns
being some fifty miles as the crow flies. It was a subject for
regret that the meeting of the columns, which was one of the
original intentions sought to be attained in framing the plan
of campaign, was not effected ; but for this the Cachar force
was in no way to blame, as it attained the objective point of
its march. According to Captain East, the accomplished
Chief Staff Officer of the Chittagong column, the results to be
attained by a junction of the two columns did not warrant a
march over more than eighty miles of unknown and moun-
tainous country, inhabited by independent tribes.*

* The following, to borrow General Brownlow's own language, were the
results of his four months' campaign : — " The complete subjection of two
powerful tribes, inhabiting upwards of sixty villages, of which twenty that
resisted were attacked and destroyed ; the personal submission of fifteen
chiefs, and their solemn engagement on behalf of themselves and tributaries
for future good behaviour ; the recovery of Mary Winchester, and the

End of the Campaign. 125

On the evening of the 21st, further signals, blue lights and
rockets, were sent up from the Murklang hill, which received
no response, and, on the morning of the 22nd February, the
homeward march was commenced, to the satisfaction alike of
the European officers and Sepoys.

The withdrawal from the Looshai country was conducted
without any contretemps, a result due to the admirable arrange-
ments of Colonel Koberts, who also earned the thanks of the
officers of the column for the regularity with which throughout
the expedition, the dawk, or post, was despatched, " not a day
having passed," says an officer of the force, " without despatch-
ing the dawk, and scarcely a day without receiving the letters
and papers."

Tipai Mookh was reached on the 7th March, and as the heat
was great and cholera prevailed, the column proceeded thence
by boat, but the dreaded pestilence pursued the troops after
their arrival at Cachar, and even up country to the hill- station
of Shillong. There was much sickness also, due to the priva-
tions endured by the force, which had campaigned without
tents, and two officers, Captain Harrison, 42nd Native In-
fantry, and Captain Cookesley, Koyal Artillery, belonging to
the half-battery, who was the photographer of the column,
died from the effects of climate. The former officer was quite
unfit to proceed on active service, and was on his way to Cal-
cutta to return to England, but when his regiment was ordered
to the front, got his leave cancelled in the hope of gaining
some glory in a campaign which could not afford much scope
for military distinction. But as Byron says :

" Oh, glorious laurel ! since for one sole leaf
Of thine imaginary deathless tree,
Of blood and tears must flow the unebbing sea."

liberation of upwards of 150 British subjects, who had from time to time
been made captives. In addition the operations of the column, which, by
frequent departures from the main line of advance, covered a large area,
enabled the officers of the Survey to triangulate 3,000 square miles of
country, more than half of which was surveyed in detail, and also to com-
plete the connection between the Cachar and Chittagong districts." To
effect this success, the casualties of Brownlow's column were trifling, and
consisted of seven killed and thirteen wounded ; from sickness, there were
thirty deaths amongst the fighting men, and amongst the coolies and
followers, 118.

126 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

A. large number of officers suffered from ill-health, including
General Bourchier* and Colonel Roberts, who writes to us that
" the privations were great, and the climate of Looshai most
trying." To the invaluable services of his Chief Staff officer
the General did no more than justice when he recorded them
in the following terms in his final despatch to the Quarter-
master-General at Army headquarters : — " Lieutenant-Colonel
Roberts's untiring energy and sagacity are beyond all praise ;
working without guides, even without map and geography,
thwarted by the Looshais, whose game was to delay our pro-
gress, he seemed never at a loss ; but not only in his own
department was it that he exerted himself. Whether piloting
the advance guard through the trackless forest, or solving a
commissariat or transport difficulty, his powerful aid was will-
ingly given."

Colonel Roberts received the thanks of the Governor- General
in Council, was awarded the Companionship of the Bath,f
and added a clasp, inscribed Looshai, to the Indian medal
gained at Umbeyla, making the fourth decoration he had won

* General Bourchier issued a valedictory order to the column on its
arrival at Cachar, dated 19th March, in which he expressed his thanks to
the officers and men, and added : — " The Brigadier-General has unfeigned
pleasure in according his belief that its discipline, energy, and devotion to
the Service could not have been surpassed. From the beginning of Novem-
ber, when the troops were first put in motion, to the present time, every
man has been employed in hard work, cheerfully performed, often under the
most trying circumstances of heat and frost, always bivouacking on the
mountain side, in rude huts of grass or leaves, officers and men sharing in
the same accommodation, marching day by day over precipitous mountains,
rising at one time to 6,000 feet, and having made a road fit for elephants
from Luckipur to Chipowee, a distance of 103 miles. The spirits of the
troops never flagged, and when they met the enemy, they drove them from
their stockades and strongholds until they were glad to sue for mercy. The
history of the Expedition from first to last has been sheer hard work.
Each regiment has shared in actual fighting, the 44th more than either of
the other corps (22nd and 42nd Native infantry) ; but to the officers in the
rear most important duties were assigned in protecting a line of communi-
cations extending over 110 miles from Tipai Mookh to Vonolel's stronghold
of Chumfai, and watching through spies the attitude of the inhabitants of
the neighbouring villages, conveying provisions and the post, and keeping
the road constantly patrolled. The Frontier Police did equally good service
with the troops in this way. Each field-( fficer in the rear had assigned to
him a certain number of posts for which he was responsible, and to their
vigilance may be attributed the fact that our communications have not for
a day been interrupted."

f Both Brigadier- Generals Bourchier and Bruwrilow received the K.C.B.
for their services in Looshai.

Roberts s Services on the Staff. 127

in the service of his country. So remarkable had been these
services that we find his name mentioned twenty-three times
in despatches up to the close of the Looshai campaign ; but
when he again took the field it was as a writer of despatches,
describing military achievements of so exceptionally brilliant a
character that they will be for ever inscribed in the page of
history.

Colonel Roberts rejoined Army headquarters as Deputy
Quartermaster-General, to which promotion he had been
gazetted in the previous January while campaigning ; and, in
the following winter, 1872-73, accompanied the Commander-in-
Chief, Lord Napier of Magdala, on his tour through the Pun-
jaub and to the camp of exercise held at Hussan Abdul.

In the ensuing February, on the departure for England of
Major-General P. S. Lumsden, C.S.I.,* Colonel Roberts was
appointed to officiate as Quartermaster-General, and he per-
formed the duties for a period of five months to the satisfaction
of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Viceroy, Lord North-
brook, who, on receiving a copy of a circular memorandum on
"Intelligence and Topography," drawn up by Colonel Roberts
for the information of the officers of his department, wrote to
him, on the 19th July, through his military secretary, in the
following terms : — " His Excellency desires me to thank you
for it, and to take the occasion of your handing over charge
of the Quartermaster-General's Department to Major-General
E. B. Johnson, to express to you the sense he entertains of the
ability and thoroughness which mark several important papers
which you have recently prepared, and which have been brought
under his notice."

On the 17th March, 1874, on Major-General E. B. John-
son'sf transfer to the post of Adjutant-General in India, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Roberts again " officiated " as Quartermaster-
General, as by the rules of the Service he was ineligible for
holding the substantive appointment until he became a full
Colonel, and the office carried with it the local rank of Major-
General. It was recognized that Roberts, from his services

* Now Sir Peter S. Lumsden, K.C.B., C.S.I., A.D.C.
t Now General Sir Edwin Johnson, K.C.B.

128 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

and abilities, was the only possible head of the department in
which he had graduated for seventeen years, and so the appoint-
ment was kept open until the 31st January, 1875, when, on
obtaining the qualifying rank of Colonel, he was confirmed in
the office by Lord Napier of Magdala, in a letter to the Secretary
to the Government of India, in which his lordship wrote : —
" The duties of the Quartermaster-General in India require
attainments of a character which can only be possessed by
officers of long Indian experience, and His Excellency considers
himself fortunate at the present time in being able to nominate
an officer of such ability and varied experience in the field and
quarters as Colonel Frederick Roberts, C.B., V.C.*

In laying down the chief command of Her Majesty's forces
in India, on the 10th April, 1875, Lord Napier of Magdala,
referring to General Roberts's services, expressed himself in
Army Orders as follows : — " I cannot sufficiently express my
obligations to the Adjutant-General, Major-General Lumsden,
the Quartermaster-General, Major-General Roberts, and their
departments, and to my Military Secretary, Colonel Dillon. It
would be impossible to enumerate the many occasions on which
I have been indebted to them for their opinions or suggestions
for the benefit of the Army." And his lordship's successor,
Sir Frederick Haines, found the Quartermaster-General of the
Army equally valuable as an adviser of varied experience and
great sagacity.

In the cold season of 1876-77, General Roberts accompanied
the new Commander-in-Chief on a tour of inspection of the
Punjaub and Scinde frontiers, and thence proceeded with him
to Bombay before returning to Army headquarters.

In 1873-74 broke out one of those terrible famines which
periodically desolate the fairest provinces of our Indian Empire,
and the mitigation of which — for prevention is impossible until
we can regulate the rainfall, or cover the country with a net-
work of railways and canals, and, moreover, induce the people
to use the latter — forms one of the great tests of successful
Indian administration. In February, 1874, on the outbreak of

* By Governor- General's Order, dated the 26th April, 1875, Colonel
Roberts was confirmed as Quartermaster-General, and received the local
rank of Major-General whilst holding the appointment.

The Prince of Wales s Visit to India. 129

the Tirhoot famine, General Roberts was sent by Lord North-
brook to Patna, to assist the Commissioner with his advice.
After giving his opinions on the measures to be adopted, he
left one of his assistants, Colonel Macgregor,* to carry his
proposals into practice.

How changed are the sentiments with which Government
officials now administer India, from those in the times when
the agents of the East India Company turned to their advan-
tage seasons of scarcity to secure a monopoly in the trade in
cereals, f and when the author of the "Pleasures of Hope"
could write : —

" Rich in the gems of India's gaudy zone,
And plunder piled from kingdoms not their own,
Degenerate trade ! thy minions could despise
The heart-born anguish of a thousand cries ;
And lock, with impious hands, their teeming store,
While famished nations died along the shore."

General Roberts had hitherto mostly exhibited his aptitude
for the post of Quartermaster-General in the tented field, or in
the routine duties of the onerous office, during which his
energetic nature found scope in the compilation of transport
regulations, route-books, or other military topographical works,
which are so essential for the modern requirements of war.
But he was to exhibit his singular capacity for organisation in
another field, and one of a nature that, in any country but
India, would be confided to the civil department. We have
seen how admirably he conducted the duties of executive officer
of Lord Canning's camp when that Viceroy undertook his tour
through Central India and the Punjaub, soon after the con-
clusion of the Mutiny. The experience he then gained in the
ceremonial duties attendant upon the reception by Her Majesty's

* Now Major-General Sir C. M. Macgregor, K.C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E , Quarter-
master-General at Army Headquarters in India.

f The author of a " Short History of the English Transactions in the
East Indies " says : — " Some of the agents saw themselves well situated for
collecting the rice into stores. They did so. They knew the Gentoos would
rather die than violate the principles of their religion by eating flesh. The
alternative would, therefore, be between giving what they had or dying.
The inhabitants sunk ; — they that had cultivated the land and saved the
harvest at the disposal of others, planted in doubt — scarcity ensued. Then
the monopoly was easier managed — sickness ensued. In some districts the
languid living left the bodies of their numerous dead unburied."

130 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

representative of the great feudatory Indian princes, was to be
exercised on a still larger and more important scale in the
preparation of the camps and management of the durbars held
at Delhi on the occasion of the memorable visit to India, in
1875-76, of His Eoyal Highness the Prince of Wales, and the
Imperial assemblage on the 1st of January, 1877, when the
Viceroy, Lord Lytton, with more than Eastern pomp and
circumstance, declared to the assembled princes and potentates
the assumption by Her Majesty of the title of Kaiser-i-Hind,
or Empress of India.

To a practical soldier like Roberts, the continuous durbars,
with their elaborate etiquette, must have been most wearisome,
and doubtless the endless succession of scenes of Oriental
pomp, which amused and elicited the wonder of the ground-
lings, palled on one who found a more congenial sphere for his
talents on the arid sands of Zoolla, or the lonely valleys and
difficult passes of the Looshai country. General Roberts
superintended the preparation and arrangements of the Royal
and Vice-regal camps to the entire satisfaction of the Prince of
Wales, whom he first met at Calcutta, and of the Viceroy. In
connection with the Imperial assemblage he was also specially
appointed by Lord Lytton a member of the general committee
for devising and carrying into effect the requisite measures in
pursuance of the Government policy.

The energy and powers of organisation displayed by General
Roberts attracted the notice of Lord Lytton, who was led to
form a very high opinion of his capacity, and from that time
an intimacy sprang up between these two remarkable men,
which ripened into a warm personal friendship ; and when the
post of Commandant of the Irregular Force stationed on the
Punjaub Frontier (which is under the direct control of the
Viceroy, and not of the Commander-in-Chief), became vacant
by the retirement of Brigadier- General (now Sir) Charles
Keyes, Lord Lytton offered him the appointment, with the
additional duties of Special Commissioner in the Scinde-Punjaub
frontier. Thus, in accepting the double post, Roberts found
himself once more connected with the force, in a mountain
battery of which he commenced his military career. The offer
of the appointment was due to the circumstance that Lord

Roberts and the Punjaub Frontier Force. 131

Lytton, while in England, bad seen a report of General
Roberts on Afghanistan, which displayed great familiarity with
the military aspect of the Afghan question, then forcing itself
prominently into public notice.

The appointment of General Roberts was hailed with approval
by all India, as it was generally acknowledged that than Roberts
there was no fitter man in the army for the post of Warden of
the Marches, the occupant of which should be a soldier com-
bining with military experience a certain measure of the sagacity
of the statesman.

Whatever may be said against the Indian career of Lord
Lytton, and the success or failure of his policy, it should be
noted in his favour that he correctly gauged the military talents
of General Roberts, and when the time came for assigning the
chief commands in one of the most important Avars undertaken
during the present reign, he nominated him to one of the three
columns about to take the field for the invasion of Afghanistan,
and, moreover, in spite of the grumblings of an influential
minority at so young a general being placed in command, took
care that his requirements to place his small force in a state of
efficiency were attended to. Lord Lytton's discrimination in
appointing General Roberts was generally acknowledged, even
before the massacre of the Cavagnari mission demanded the
despatch of an army of retribution ; and the victorious advance
from the Shutargardan Pass to Cabul, one of the most re-
markable achievements of our arms since Waterloo, showed that
a great soldier had arisen in the military firmament, which the
renowned march from Cabul to Candahar, crowned with the
rapidly delivered battle under the walls of that city, made
manifest to the whole world, even the phlegmatic German
temperament being roused into approval.

K 2

1 32 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Afghan War — General Roberts is Appointed to the Command of the
Kurram Field Force — Constitution of the Field Force — Brief Descrip-
tion of the Kurram Valley and its Inhabitants — The Advance from
Thull into Afghan Territory — The Occupation of the Kurram Fort —
The Operations of the 28th November — Reconnoissances and Pre-
parations for the Attack on the Peiwar Kotul.

IT is foreign to our purpose to enter into a disquisition on the
political events which led to the war with Afghanistan. These
events are viewed by Englishmen of Conservative or Liberal
bias, in such opposite lights, and have afforded so measureless
a field for envenomed discussion on the platform and in the
press, that we, in our anxiety to avoid such combustible ma-
terials, will confine ourselves to the military events so far as
they affect the hero of this memoir.

General Roberts, at the time of the outbreak of hostilities
with the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, had made for himself such a
name in his profession that it was generally allowed in Anglo-
Indian society, as well as by the best and most active section
of the officers of the Indian Army, that, in the event of war,
his name would be found among those submitted by the mili-
tary authorities to the Viceroy for a high command. In a
remarkable degree he commanded the confidence of the Indian
public and Army, but though his merits were not equally
appreciated at Army Headquarters, where they should have
most commanded recognition, in the Viceroy Roberts had a
friend more powerful than the Commander-in-Chief, and one
who correctly gauged the capacity of the young General.

In September, 1878, when the Afghan Commandant at the
Fort of Ali Musjid, in the Khyber Pass, refused to admit the
passage (" forcibly repulsed," as Lord Lytton declared in his
summary of events) of the Mission under Sir Neville Chamber-
lain, of the advent and importance of which he had been duly

Roberts Appointed to a Command. 133

notified by a letter from the Viceroy, his lordship, after proffer-
ing to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, "a last opportunity of
escaping the punishment merited by his acts," issued a formal
Declaration of War against the ruler of Afghanistan, while
absolving the sirdars and people of that country " from all
responsibility for the recent acts of the Ameer," and expressing
the determination " to respect their independence, and not
willingly to injure or interfere with them."

Early in October a column for field service in the Kurram
Valley was formed at Kohat, where General Roberts, who then
held the command of the Punjaub Frontier Force, arrived on
the 9th of that month, and assumed command. On the issue
of the Declaration of War, an amended Government General
Order, dated 9th November, was issued, constituting a column*

* General Roberts's staff consisted of Major W. Galbraith, 85th Regi-
ment, Assistant-Adjutaut-General ; Major H. Collett, Bengal Staff Corps,
Assistant-Quartermaster-General (whose assistants were Captain R. G.
Kennedy, Bengal Staff Corps, and Captain F. S. Carr, 5th Punjaub
Cavalry) ; and Captain G. T. Pretyman, R.A., and Lieutenant Neville
Chamberlain, Central India Horse, aides-de-camp. The Commanding
Engineer was Lieutenant Colonel .^Eneas Perkins, R.E. ; Lieutenant-Colonel
A. II. Lindsay commanded the Artillery ; the Principal Medical Officer was
Deputy-Surgeon-General F. F. Allen, C.B. (succeeded at a later period by
Deputy-Surgeon-General Townsend) ; the Commissariat Department was
under Captain A. R. Badcock ; and the Superintendent of the Transport
Department was Major D. Moriarty, Bengal Staff Corps, and from the 18th
December, Major A. P. Palmer, 9th Bengal Cavalry. Captain A. S. Wynne
was Superintendent of Field Telegraphs, but was subsequently succeeded
by Captain E. Straton, 22nd Regiment. Colonel G. Waterfiefd was Chief
Political Officer to the column, but he and his successors, Colonel J. Gordon,
C.S.I., and Captain R. II. F. Rennick, were invalided, when Captain A.
Conolly, Bengal Staff Corps — a name having an intimate but melancholy
significance in our relations with Afghanistan — became head of the depart-
ment. The Survey was under Captain R. G. Woodthorpe, R.E., who had
campaigned with Roberts in Looshai, and the Chaplain's Department con-
sisted of the Rev. J. Jolly, 72nd Highlandeis, and the Rev. J. W. Adams,
who was attached to the General's personal staff throughout the entire
operations of the war, and rendered excellent service on many critical
occasions.

The following were the troops forming the Kurrum Field Force : —
Engineers — 7th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners ; 23rd Bengal Native
Infantry (Pioneers), Colonel Currie ; Engineer Field Park. Artillery — F
Battery, A. Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling ;
G Battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, Major Sidney Parry; No. 1
Mountain Battery, Captain Kelso, and No. 2 Mountain Battery, Captain
G. Swinley. Ordnance Field Park, Captain Colquhoun, R.A. Cavalry —
10th Hussars, I squadron, Captain Berkeley ; 12th Bengal Cavalry, Colonel
Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C. First Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General
A. H. Cobbe. — 2nd Battalion, 8th Regiment, Colonel Barry Drew ;

134 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

to be assembled in the Kurram Valley, under the command of
Major- General Eoberts, which was to act in combination with,
though independently of, two other columns, intended for the
invasion of Afghanistan by the Khyber and Bolan Passes,
which were placed under the command respectively of Lieuteu-
ant-G-eneral Sir Samuel Browne, K.C.S.L, C.B., V.C., who
had served with Koberts in Sir Hope Grant's Division during
the Mutiny, and Lieutenant-General Donald Stewart, C.B., a
comrade of his on the Staff at the siege of Delhi, and the
commander of the Bengal Brigade in the Abyssinian campaign.
Until General Stewart assumed command of the Caudahar
corps d'armee, Major-General A. S. Biddulph, R.A., held com-
mand of a smaller column called the " Quetta Field Force."

The Kurram Valley, on the borders of Afghanistan, had been
visited by Sir Neville Chamberlain in 1856, when he marched a
force to punish the people who had raided within our territories,
and again, in the following year, Colonel (now General Sir)
H. B. Lumsden travelled by this route when he proceeded on
his mission to the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, just before the
Mutiny. The scanty information gained by these officers was
compiled into a Manual for the use of the force by Major
Collett, of the 23rd Pioneers, General Koberts's Assistant-
Quartermaster-General. The valley receives its -name from the
Kurram river, which at Thull has a bed about 500 yards
broad, and at the Kurram fort only half that breadth, but in
the winter months the river itself shrinks to very narrow pro-
portions, being only about forty feet wide, with a depth of three
feet. The entire valley to the north is dominated by the
Sufeid Koh range of mountains, having an average altitude of
14,000 feet, from which spurs run out enclosing narrow valleys
of great beauty, but affording in their sterility a scanty sub-
sistence to their hardy inhabitants, who only cultivate the land
along the banks of the river or its feeders. The average width
of the Kurram valley, at its broadest part, is about twelve

29th Bengal N.I., Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Gordon ; 5th Punjaub N.I.,
Major McQueen. Second Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General J. B. Thel-
wail, C.B. — 72nd Highlanders (now known as the 1st Seaforth Highlanders),
Lieutenant Colonel P. Brownlow ; wing 21st N.I., Major Collis ; 2nd Pun-
jaub Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndall ; and £ th Goorkha Regiment,
Major FitzHugh.

Description of the Kurram Valley. 135

miles, and towards Keraiah it narrows to about two miles on
either side the river, the intervening distance between it and
the Sufeid Koh range being rilled up with an upland valley
called the Hurriab, which descends gradually from the Peiwar
Kotul towards the west, a distance of twelve miles, to AH
Kheyl, near the Kurram river, and is bounded on the south by
a high range of mountains, which occupies the space between
the Hurriab and Kurram valleys, both of which were carefully
surveyed by British officers during the occupation.*

The Turis, who were the original possessors of the Kurram
valley, were much oppressed by their Afghan rulers, and hailed
General Eoberts as a deliverer, and at no time during the
occupation of the Kurram valley did they give any trouble.
The few villages at the head of the valley are inhabited by a
people called Chumkunnies, and beyond the border are the
lands of the Man gals, further on again along the river banks
being the Ahmed Kheyl and Hassan Kheyl section of Jajis,
whose territory extends close to Ali Kheyl, at the west end of
the Hurriab valley. The mountainous district to the south of
this valley belongs to the Mangals, whence they harry the
villages on either side.

There are several passes from the Hurriab to the lower valley
of the Kurram, which were explored, including the Sappri
defile, from Ali Kheyl to Keraiah, a very difficult pass, in
which a rear-guard of our troops guarding a convoy experienced
some loss. The village of Ali Kheyl, in the Hurriab valley f,
which has an elevation of 6,800 feet, consists of about fifty
houses, inhabited by Jajis, and is surrounded with cultivation
and fruit trees. About a mile from the village is a level
"rnerg," or plateau, divided into three parts by ravines about
two miles long and 400 yards wide, and between it and the
village a spur from the mountain Matungi, which, as well as
the nearest portion of the plateau, General Roberts caused to

* See Major Colquhoun's work, " With the Kurram Field Force," to
which, and to Sir Frederick Roberta's despatches, of which copies were
supplied to us by the General, we are indebted in the compilation of
the following pages.

f The Afghans did not attempt to hold the Valley of Ilurriab, which
v>as inhabited by Jajis who are Soonies like themselves, the Turis being of
the Sheeah feet of Mahommedans, between whom, all over the East, the
feeling is as bitter as between Protestants and Roman Catholics.

136 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

be fortified with redoubts and intrenchments to protect tbe
camps which were placed on the plateau. From the southern
face of the Sika Earn, of which the Peiwar Kotul forms a spur,
descends a watercourse, known as the Spingawi, or the White
Track, which, joining another watercourse, runs to the south
into the Kurram river, passing the village of Peiwar on the
right hand, and leaving the deserted Afghan cantonment of
Habib Killa on the left, as it debouches into the plain. This
watercourse was the road used by General Roberts on the night
of the 2nd December, in his attack on the Peiwar Kotul,
which has an elevation of 8,500 feet above sea level.

No description could do justice to the wild and difficult
nature of the country about the Peiwar Kotul, with its tremen-
dous mountain defiles and narrow plateaus, only reached by a
track winding through a pine forest, and amazement at Geneial
Roberts' s success is not confined to those who formed a portion
of the force with which he effected his brilliant capture of the
Peiwar Kotul on the 2nd December, but is shared by all mili-
tary critics. A very competent one, General C. L. Showers,
who afterwards went over the ground with the victor as his
guide, assured us that the Afghan position was apparently
impregnable, and an attack on disciplined troops, such as those
of the Ameer stationed in the Pass, with the limited means at
Roberta's disposal, appeared an act of rashness which only
success could justify.

The mass of mountains to the left of the Kurram river cul-
minates in a peak called Saratiga, whose spurs and branches,
says Major Colquhoun, fill up the whole of the ground between
the road from Ali Kheyl to Cabul by the Pass of the Shutar-
gardan (" Camel's Neck ") and the road to Ghuznee. The
great Ghilzai tribe — who are just now paramount in Afghan-
istan, having defeated their ancient rivals, the Dooranees,
whose cause is identified with Ayoob Khan — have fixed then-
boundary at a place known as Karatiga (" Black Rock") on the
southern side of the Shutargardan, and have spread over the
crest of the pass unopposed by their weak neighbours, the
Jajis. Other formidable passes in the vicinity are the Hazar-
darakht (" 1,000 trees "), and Surkhai Kotul. At the foot of
the Shutargardan runs the Logar river, with the usual belt of

Physical Difficulties of the Kurram Valley. 137

vegetation marking its course, and on the farther side of the
river lie the Pughmari mountains, the southern continuation of
the mighty Hindoo Koosh. At the foot of the hills on the
Afghan side the road goes over an open plain, and crossing a
low spur known as the Shinkai Kotul, then turns westward to
Kooshi, a large village where General Roberts was joined by
Yakoob Khan in his memorable dash on Cabul, after the mas-
sacre of the Cavagnari Mission. The city of Cabul, which is
only thirty-seven miles distant from Shutargardan, as also the
course of the Logar, which flows into the Cabul river below
the capital, is shut out from view by a spur that closes the
valley of the " Camel's Neck."

Starting from Kurram Fort, and proceeding along the bed of
the river past the Chumkunnies and the Suffee Mangals, the
Ahmed Kheyl district is reached, in which lies the Ghuznee, or
Surki river, with a Kotul, or saddle, over which is the road to
Ghuzuee. Another track turns off from this road and leads
to Cabul. The road down the valley from AH Kheyl joins the
first of these roads at the Ghuznee river, which is the road
taken by those great conquerors, Genghiz Khan and Timour
the Tartar, when invading India.

" The physical difficulties of the road between the Peiwar
Kotul and Kooshi," says General Roberts, " are certainly far
greater than any which present themselves in the Khyber route.
Doubtless in time they could be materially lessened, and at no
very considerable outlay ; but the construction of a really, good
cart road between the points indicated would be a matter of
great difficulty and vast expense. In the event of our re-occupy-
ing the Kurram valley, and a line of railway being constructed
to the foot of the Peiwar Kotul, there would only remain a dis-
tance of ninety miles between it and Cabul, though the diffi-
culties of this short space are almost insurmountable at certain
seasons of the year save to an enterprising commander." To
such an one, General Roberts is of opinion, even during the
months from the middle of December to the end of March, the
Shutargardan would not be impassable, so that he adds " prac-
tically troops quartered in the upper portion of the Kurram
valley are capable of being pushed on to Cabul all the year
round."

138 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

But though the Peiwar Kotul, All Kheyl and the tableland
of the Hurriab are admirably suited for the location of troops,
General Eoberts deprecated the continued occupation of Kurram
valley as it " proved very unhealthy to native troops, through-
out the valley pneumonia and fever being very prevalent."
On the other hand, the military advantages of the Kurram
valley route to Cabul are, in General Roberta's opinion, great
and manifest. From Rawul Pindee to Kohat and Thull the
country, though sparsely inhabited, is under British jurisdic-
tion, and from Thull to Peiwar Kotul the territory belongs to the
friendly Turis, now declared independent of the Ameer. The
Shutargardan passed and Kooshi reached, " the force enters
the rich and fertile valley by the Logar, where supplies are
procurable," and from thence "Cabul is approached by the least
defensive and least difficult line, a defile within five miles of
Cabul being the only point at which an effective stand could
be made, and this could be turned by the Indki route."

Of the races of the Kurram valley, the Bungash occupy the
lower portion as well as the fertile plains of the Miranzai
valley, within the British border between Thull and Kohat,
and muster 15,000 fighting men. The powerful Afreedee
tribes inhabiting the mountainous district between the Miranzai
and Kurram valleys, are the Orakzais, who are subdivided into
Alizais and Alisharzais, and the Zymookhts, about 5,000 men.
The Turis of the Kurram valley, divided into five clans or
sections, and the Jajis, chiefly inhabiting the Hurriab, each
muster an equal number of fighting men, and many of the
latter opposed Roberta's advance at the Peiwar Kotul. The
Mangals, a powerful tribe, inhabit the country to the south of
the Kurram river, and might number 20,000 fighting men ;
and the territory to the south of the Khost valley is the habitat
of a section of the Waziris, one of the most powerful and the
bravest of the tribes on our north-west frontier, who extend
from this point to Thull and thence eastward towards Bunnoo,
and south as far as the Gomul Pass, their main road into
India. Finally there only remains to mention the Jadrans, a
cognate tribe to the Mangals, inhabiting the western hills of
the Khost valley.

Kohat, where General Eoberts joined the Kurram Field

Roberts Assumes the Command. 139

Force placed under bis orders, is a cantonment lying to the
south of Peshawur, from which it is separated by a range
of mountains. On assuming command of the force on the
9th October, General Roberts set to work with characteristic
energy, organizing it for the advance, and, this completed, on the
18th November reached Thull, sixty- three miles distant, whither
he had already despatched the greater portion of the force.

Between the 9th October, the date of his arrival at Kohat,
and the 18th November, when he reached Thull, General
Boberts's labours had been great, and he had infused into his
force some of his own energy and a sense of perfect confidence
in their leader. The orders he issued during his stay at
Kohat, while engaged organizing the small division which proved
such an efficient weapon in his hands, are multifarious, and
embrace every provision for the efficiency and comfort of his
men, no detail being considered too trivial or unimportant.
His European troops were the 2nd Battalion 8th Regiment,
and a wing of the 72nd Highlanders. The former corps had
arrived from Rawul Pindee, and, owing to sickness, chiefly
fever, was scarcely in a fit state to take the field ; the battalion
had been only a short time in India, and was composed of
young and unacclimatized soldiers.

General Roberts, like Sir George Pollock, a brother officer of
the Bengal Artillery and former commander of an army invad-
ing Afghanistan, almost daily visited the hospitals and person-
ally inquired into each case. The effect was remarkable on
both doctors and patients. The former looked forward to the
visits, and the men began at once to improve. General
Roberts's speciality always has been organization, and now
everything was prepared, even to the postal arrangements, which
were as perfect as in Looshai, before a move in advance was
made. During the day he would work for many hours without
cessation in organization and correspondence, and during the
morning and evening he was ubiquitous, inquiring into every-
thing, and permitting no minutiae of detail to escape his notice.

At Thull, two months' supplies of provisions were collected,
and preparations made for the advance across the frontier, on
receipt of the reply to the ultimatum addressed by Lord Lytton
to the Ameer Shere Ali ; and, on the 20th November the

140 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

General issued orders for an advance into Afghan territory on
the following morning. This was effected by the 29th Punjaub
N.I. crossing the river by a trestle-bridge, with the 10th
Hussars and 12th Bengal Cavalry acting as flanking parties ;
and thus " the Rubicon was passed," and the invasion of
Afghanistan commenced.

The Afghan fort of Kapiyang was found deserted by Colonel
Gordon, who commanded the advance, which was accompanied
by the General. The cavalry followed in pursuit, but without
overtaking the enemy, and the Infantry, with No. 1 Mountain
Battery, followed, and encamped that night at Ahmed-i-Shama,
eight miles distant. On the two following days a further
portion of the troops, under the command of Colonel Stirling,
R.H.A., and Brigadier- General Cobbe, joined the advance, and
the General moved from Kapiyang, with headquarters, on the
23rd, to Hazir Pir, a distance of fifteen miles, where the troops
in advance were now encamped, the fort in the rear being
occupied by Brigadier-General Thelwall, who moved up from
Thull. The difficulties of the first portion of the road between
Ahmed-i-Shama and Hazir Pir were very great. There was no
road for the wheeled guns of the battery of Horse Artillery,
and the advance, under Colonel Gordon, consisting of the 23rd
Pioneers, wing of 5th Punjaub Infantry, and the company of
Sappers, had to make a passage for the guns under the
General's personal directions. The troops, therefore, got no
further than the village of Esoar, four miles from Hazir Pir, to
which place General Roberts proceeded with headquarters.

As he passed along the road, the headmen of the villages
paid their respects, and, on approaching Hazir Pir, he found a
repast in the native style, prepared for him, spread out sub
tegmine fagi. The villagers also turned out with milk, eggs,
and dried fruit, which they offered to the troops for sale, and
supplies of grass and fuel were also brought in abundance.
General Roberts held a durbar of the leading men in the lower
Kurram valley, and assured them of the friendly feelings enter-
tained towards them by the British Government, and promised
his protection so long as they committed no act of hostility.

On the following day, Sunday, the 24th November, the
General marched to an encamping ground about a mile distant

Arrival at the Kurram Fort. 141

from the southern end of the Durwazi (Gate) Pass, with Head-
quarters and the following troops : — Squadron 10th Hussars,
12th Bengal Cavalry, No. 1 Mountain Battery, 29th Punjaub
N.I., and Wing 5th Punjaub N.I. The march presented no
difficulties, and the country was uninhabited, though streams
of water, stocked with fish, were crossed. During the day
intelligence was received of the evacuation of the Kurram Fort
by the Ameer's troops, who were retreating by the Peiwar
Kotul, and, on the following morning, the General moved across
the Durwazi Pass — which leads over the chain of mountains
which bounds the Kurram valley on the south, and has an
ascent of about five miles, and a descent of three miles — and
occupied the Kurram Fort, which was found in good condition,
save for the roofing which the Turis had carried off as soon as
the place had been evacuated by Shere Ali's troops. On the
same day Brigadier-General Cobbe marched from Hazir Pir to
the camp at the Durwazi Pass, and Brigadier-General Thelwall
took his place from Ahmed-i-Shama.

Camp was pitched on an open plain between two nullahs,
about half a mile to the west of the Kurram fort, a mud work
about 120 yards square, with round bastions at the corners,
a keep in the centre, about fifty square yards, and only one
gateway protected by an outwork. The thickness of the outer
wall was about 6 feet, height 20 feet, that of the keep being 10
feet higher ; outside the wall was a broad fausse braye* about
12 yards wide, to the edge of the ditch, on the west and south
sides of which were parapet walls. The Governor's quarters
were in one of the bastions, which was raised into a three-
storied house, but, like the rest of the fort, with the exception
of a small mosque, it had been wrecked by the Turis ; both
these buildings were used as hospitals as soon as the necessary
alterations and repairs had been effected. About a quarter ol
a mile distant from the Kurram fort, was a walled barrack
enclosure, about 100 square yards in extent, having stables for
horses as well as huts for the troops, which was known as the
Upper Fort. These military works were found useful for
storing the Commissariat, Engineer, and Ordnance park stores,

* A. fausse Iraye is a kind of counter-guard, or low rampart, for the pro-
tection of the lower part of the main escarp in the rear.

142 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

as well as for a hospital. In the vicinity was a large fruit
garden, amply stocked, and a two-roomed edifice, surrounded
with a verandah, which was transferred to the political officers
for use as a Court-house.

General Koberts was received, on approaching the fort, by
Mahomed Noor, one of the leading men of the valley, who
came to pay his respects, escorted by a following of mounted
men and footmen. Having completed the inspection of the
fort, the General, accompanied by two squadrons of the 12th
Bengal Cavalry, proceeded to reconnoitre in the direction of
the Peiwar Kotul, twelve miles distant. On approaching the
village of Peiwar, two other villages were seen to be in flames,
and a report was brought that the Ameer's troops, consisting
of three regiments of infantry, with twelve guns, had evacuated
the cantonment of Habib Killa, about a mile to the east of
Peiwar, through which they were passing. General Roberts
was able, by the aid of glasses, to see the enemy retiring
towards the valley leading to the foot of the Peiwar Pass, but
his means did not permit of an attack, and he retired to the
camp at Kurram.

On the following day, the 26th November, the General
issued orders for the advance, which was to be made " as light
as possible," officers' baggage being limited to half a mule
load, and two officers occupying one tent of 80 Ibs. The
soldiers were to have one tent of two palls (having a superficial
area of 512 square feet and a height of 8 feet) between 40
Europeans, 50 Sepoys, and 60 camp followers ; and a bell tent
between 25 British soldiers or 20 natives. The troops selected
for the advance were put in orders on the 26th, on which day
Brigadier-Generals Cobbe and Thelwall crossed the river and
came into the Kurrain Camp, so that the whole Division was
now massed ready for the advance. A small garrison was de-
tailed to hold the fort, and the remainder of the force, which
General Roberts held in readiness to accompany him in the
first critical operation of the war, numbered 83 officers and
969 effective European soldiers of all ranks, and 2,854 effective
Native troops, with nine 9-pounders, and four 7-pounders.

We have seen how the French required 50,000 men to
subdue the Arabs of the small territory of Tunis, each of the

The Advance towards the Enemy s Position. 143

operating columns exceeding the strength of General Roberta's
entire force, and in contrast we find a British General, with
the utmost confidence, advancing against one of the strongest
positions in the world with less than 4,000 men, of whom only
one quarter were Europeans. That a favourable result accrued
was due mainly to the genius of the commander, who possessed
the true admixture of caution and dash, and whose dispositions
were admirably framed for the operation in hand. But none
the less was it a desperate undertaking, for we remember a
distinguished member of the Indian Council informing us
during the brief interval that elapsed between Roberts's departure
from his camp and the report of his victory, that he and his
colleagues were " very anxious " for the safety of the force.

At 5 A.M. on the 28th November, the morning being very
dark and the cold severe, the troops formed up in two parallel
columns,* and before six the start was made, General Roberts
marching at the head of the left column, which arrived about
ten, near Habib Killa, having made a fatiguing march of four-
teen miles. On his arrival the General received intelligence,
which afterwards proved to be false, that the Afghans had
abandoned their guns at the foot of the Peiwar Kotul, and
were retreating in disorder, and he determined, without loss
of time, to make the march of seven miles and take possession
of the guns. General Roberts sent Brigadier-General Cobbe
to the left with his brigade, with instructions to turn a ridge
forming the southern boundary of the valley, through which
was the road from the village of Peiwar to the Kotul, and to
seize the Mangal village of Turrai ; and Brigadier- General
Thelwall was ordered to move in support of the left column by
proceeding past the village of Habib Killa up the regular road
to the Pass.

* Left column. — One squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry ; two guns No. 1
Mountain Battery ; four companies 5th Punjaub N.I. ; remainder of the
1st, or Brigadier General Cobbe's, Brigade, consisting of 5th Punjatibees ;
23rd Pioneers ; 29th Punjaub N.I. ; 8th Regiment ; and two guns, F
Battery, A Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, on elephants.

Right Column. — One squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry ; two guns No. 1
Mountain Battery ; four companies N.I. ; remainder of 2nd, or Brigadier-
General Thelwall's, Brigade, consisting of 5th Goorkhas ; wing 72nd High-
landers ; 2nd Punjaub N.I., and two guns F Battery, A Brigade, Royal
Horse Artillery, on elephants.

144 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

General Cobbe carried out his orders with the 5th and 29th
Punjaubees and two mountain guns, and, as the enemy were
seen on the side of the spur, he moved down towards the vil-
lage of Turrai, but the remainder of the brigade, disposed in
support, did not round the southern side of the spur, but
keeping to the north, eventually met the right brigade as they
moved up the road. General Cobbe, in descending the moun-
tain path towards Turrai, finding the passage into a valley,
called "the Punch-Bowl," barred by precipices, had to make
a retrograde movement, which always excites the warlike ardour
of Pathan mountaineers, who are in their element in harassing
warfare, but rarely make a direct attack on regular troops un-
less in overwhelming force. A party of them now moved down
from a spur and commenced an attack, as the 29th N.I., with a-
wing of the 5th Punjaubees in support, moved towards the village.

It was 2 P.M. when General Roberts arrived at Turrai,
and at the same time the right brigade came in. Observing
that an engagement was in progress between our men and the
Afghans, which formed no part of his programme, the General
proceeded with the 5th Goorkhas to the assistance of General
Cobbe, and the force was withdrawn by alternate regiments.
The loss in this affair was slight, and included Lieutenant A.
Reed, of the 29th N.I., severely wounded. At 3 P.M., during
General Roberts' s absence, the camp was marked out by Briga-
dier-General Thelwall, in some terraced fields below the village,
and the troops were waiting the arrival of the baggage, when
the Afghans, having sent to the main ridge in the rear for a
gun, opened fire with shell at a range of 1,700 yards, which
was replied to by the guns of F Battery, A Brigade, Horse
Artillery, which also fired on some riflemen who were annoying
a picket of the 5th Punjaubees. It accordingly became neces-
sary to move back the camp, and a spot was selected 1^ miles
in the rear, but it was not until a late hour that the different
corps could find their baggage and take rest, after a very fatigu-
ing day and a march of more than twenty miles over diffi-
cult ground.

That General Roberts should pitch his camp under fire of
the enemy's guns was a proceeding so completely at variance
with the military antecedents of so experienced a soldier, and

True Account of Roberts s Strategy. 145

the war correspondent of one of the London daily papers
having, in conversation with us, animadverted upon the Gene-
ral's strategy in this respect, we asked General Roberts for the
true story, and he, with that soldierly frankness which is so
distinguishing a feature of his character, far from taking
offence at the outspoken question and the opinions that had
given rise to it, described, in the following words, the circum-
stances under which his camp became exposed to the enemy's
fire, necessitating a retrograde movement : — " Having received
information that the enemy were in a hollow and could not
get their guns away — which proved incorrect, as at this time
the Afghan army was securely entrenched on top of the Peiwar
Kotul — I sent Brigadier-General Cobbe's Brigade round the
enemy's right to prevent their getting on the crest of the
Peiwar Kotul, while Brigadier-General Thelwall's Brigade was
directed to attack in front, so as to get the enemy between
two fires. Soon the advance regiment of Cobbe's Brigade got
under fire from the enemy's flanking positions near the Peiwar
Kotul, when I went on to see what was happening in the front,
leaving orders for the main column to be halted and pitch
tents at a point about two miles from the foot of the ascent
to the Kotul. This order was not carried out, and during my
absence in front with the leading regiments of Cobbe's Brigade,
some of the baggage animals were allowed to come too far in
advance, and the camp was marked out on a spur which proved
to be within the range of the enemy's guns on the Kotul. On
seeing this, I ordered the baggage animals to be taken to the
rear, and camp to be pitched on the spur I had first selected.
This movement gave rise in the minds of those ignorant of
the facts, to the opinion that there had been a retirement,
which was due to a misconception on the part of the Brigadier-
General who had been ordered to pitch the camp in a safe
position."

On the following morning a portion of the camp was moved
to a more suitable spot, and the troops were given a day's rest
in order that the supplies might be moved up and the neces-
sary reconnoissances made. Colonel .ZEneas Perkins, Com-
manding Royal Engineers, Roberts's friend at Addiscombe, for
whose services he had specially applied, escorted by two com-

L

146 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

panies of the 23rd Pioneers, proceeded up the valley beyond
the north picket, with the object of ascertaining whether the
ridge was connected with the Peiwar Kotul. Colonel Perkins
reported that a deep valley lay between the picket ridge and
the Kotul itself, and that it was impossible to direct an attack
from this side.

A second reconnoissance, conducted by Major Collett, Assis-
tant-Quartermaster-General, accompanied by his assistant, Cap-
tain Carr, and Captain "VVoodthorpe, Pi.E., escorted by two
companies of the Pioneers, proceeded to ascertain the practic-
ability of the route by the Spingawi ravine. Marching by a
road unsuited for wheeled guns, they reached the summit of a
ridge about five miles distant from the British camp, over-
looking the Spingawi nullah. It was ascertained that " the
road up the Kotul itself appeared to be on the same ridge as
the Peiwar Kotul, and that a force working from the former
towards the latter would pass over a series of dominating posi-
tions." Major Collett was of opinion that the enemy did not
occupy the Spingawi Pass in force, though there was a picket
and a gun on a commanning knoll to the south of the Pass,
and one apparently on the Kotul itself. Colonel Gordon, with
a company of his regiment, the 29th N.I., reconnoitred the
south ridge of the valley, and ascertained that it was contin-
uous with the main ridge, and that an attack could be con-
ducted along it.

During the day the troops were engaged making roads in the
camp, which was wretchedly situated, being surrounded by a
thick oak jungle, but no better site could be found without
moving back three or four miles towards the village of Peiwar,
and the camp itself was protected from attack by strong pickets
on the hill sides. That the enemy were mustering in consider-
able strength to meet the apprehended attack on the Peiwar
Kotul appeared certain, from the circumstance that their posi-
tion had been considerably extended on both flanks, but little
information could be procured.

At dawn on the following morning, the 30th November, — as
Montague says : —

"So soon as the all-cheering sun
Should in the further East begin to draw
The shady curtains from Aurora's bed," —

General Roberts s Plans. 147

General Koberts was astir, and proceeded to reconnoitre
in the direction Colonel Perkins bad taken, being accom-
panied by Colonel Currie, 23rd Pioneers, and Captain Eicbard
Kennedy,* Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-Geueral, an officer
of singular promise, in whom bis commander recognized a
soldier, who, had he lived, must have attained great distinc-
tion in bis country's service. Colonel Gordon again recon-
noitred the hills on the enemy's right, and Major Collett and
Captain Carr made a secret reconnoissance,f unaccompanied by
troops, from the village of Peiwar up the regular road to the
Spingawi, and succeeded in reaching a point about \\ miles
distant from the Kotul, and getting a fairly good view of the
approaches thereto. General Roberts carefully considered the
reports of these officers, and, on the evening of the 30th,
decided to abandon any attempt at attacking the Peiwar Kotul
in front, which would certainly entail great loss. He would
however make a feint in front on the Peiwar Kotul, to be deve-
loped into an attack at the proper moment, while the real attack
would be a flanking movement to the right rear round by the
village of Peiwar, and thence by the Spingawi ravine to the
plateau of hills on the right of the Peiwar Kotul. This,
which was to be the main attack, he resolved to conduct in
person, but he kept his councils to himself, the only officer
whom he brought into his confidence being Major Collett, who,
from his reconnoissances, was conversant with the road as far as
the Spingawi plateau.

Having formed his plans, including the portioning off of the
regiments, without reference to any one, at 4 P.M. on Sun-
day, the 1st December, General Roberts convened a meeting
in his tent of the brigadiers, officers commanding regiments
and batteries, and chief staff officers, and laid before them in
detail his plans. In his address to the assembled officers,
General Roberts enjoined on them the strictest secrecy, as
were his intentions to get wind, the consequences would be
fatal to success. He requested them not to speak of them
to any one, and not even to look in the direction of what he

* The late Colonel Kennedy, who met with a premature death by drown-
ing soon after his return to Ireland from service in Afghanistan,
t See Sir F. Roberta's despatch of the 5th of December, 1878.

L 2

148 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

intended should be the main attack. He pointed out the
difficulties of a long night march, where so much depended on
discipline and endurance, and enjoined upon his hearers the
absolute necessity for silence in the ranks, and, above all, that
the regiments should keep touch of each other in the darkness,
as otherwise they might lose their way, and cause a mis-
carriage of the enterprise. The entire force at his disposal to
capture a strong position defended by a superior force of
regular troops with artillery, was 3,314 men, of whom only
899 were Europeans.

The night march by the Spingawi Pass, he proposed to
undertake himself with Brigadier- General Thelwall's Brigade,
the direct attack on the Peiwar Kotul to be made by Brigadier-
General Cobbe. In order to encourage the belief among the
enemy that the attack was to be a front one on the Peiwar
Pass, General Koberts sent ostentatious reconnoitring parties
to both flanks of the Peiwar Kotul, and directed a party of
pioneers, under an engineer officer, and a covering party of the
8th Regiment, to construct a battery near the village of Turrai,
in advance of the camp. The enemy fired shells at this de-
tachment from the Kotul battery, but without doing much
damage. General Roberts discovered that the Afghan strength
was concentrated on the centre and right, while their left,
which was to be the objective point of the turning movement,
was comparatively weak. So well was the secret kept that not
only the Afghans expected a front attack on the Kotul, but
every man in camp anticipated that the morrow would see
them engaged in storming by a direct movement the formidable
Pass, behind which lay the enemy in unknown strength. In
order to strengthen this impression, the half battery of G
battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, and the squadron of the
12th Bengal Cavalry, which had been brought from the Kurram
Fort on the previous day, were paraded in full view of the
enemy.

149

CHAPTER IX.

The Midnight March up the Spingawi Ravine — Treachery in the Ranks —
The Capture of the Spingawi Pass — Advance along the Ridge and
Severe Fighting — General Roberts is Wounded — The Night Bivouac
in the Mountains — Occupation of the Peiwar Kotal — Account of the
Operations by an Officer of the Staff — General Roberts Reconnoitres
the Shutargardan Pass.

THE operation in which General Roberts was about to embark
was one calculated to daunt all but the very brave. Behind
the wall of rock that barred his advance lay an enemy of whose
numbers and composition he could gain no information. The
regular army of the Ameer Shere Ali numbered " at least
50,000 men, with over 300 guns and ammunition in abun-
dance,"* and in a country where every adult male bears arms,
the nucleus afforded by the garrisons of the posts stationed in
the Kurram could be strengthened at short notice by large
numbers of tribesmen, who would flock with religious ardour
to war against the infidel invader. The Afghan force of
regulars that had retired before the British Army, was known
to consist of 1,800 men, with 11 guns, and, by the end of
November, reinforcements of infantry and a battery of artillery
had arrived, while they had the advantage of superior artillery,
and an almost impregnable position, besides the aid of the war-
like mountaineers and tribesmen.

Not until after " tattoo " were the troops of the turning
force, drawn from Brigadier- General Thelwall's brigade, warned
to be ready to march. At 10 P.M., the column, under the
immediate command of General Roberts, numbering 43 officers
and 2,220 men, with the hospital dhoolies and ammunition
mules in rear of each regiment, marched off in silence, without
sound of drum or bugle, and, passing from the light of the
camp fires, which were kept brightly burning, disappeared into

* See General Roberta's Memorandum, dated " Cabul, 29th May, 1880."

150 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the darkness, and commenced the march for the Spingawi
nullah by the circuitous route of the village of Peiwar in the
rear.

The 29th Punjaubees, 5th Goorkhas, and Mountain Bat-
tery, under Colonel J. Gordon, 29th P.N.I., led the column,
followed by the wing of the 72nd Highlanders, 2nd Punjaub In-
fantry, 23rd Pioneers, and four guns of the F-A Horse Artillery,
on elephants, escorted by two companies of the Pioneers, under
General Thelwall. The first part of the march to Peiwar was
about three and a half miles, over broken ground, the tracks,
for there was no road, passing through oak jungle, and
crossing many ravines and stony watercourses, before the
cultivated ground surrounding the village was reached, when
the road ran along a terrace on the cultivated slope to the edge
of the Spingawi nullah. A watercourse flowed swiftly along
the bed of the nullah, the banks of which and the boulders on
the slope were thickly covered with ice, rendering the descent
tedious and difficult for man and beast. It was fortunate that
General Roberts started as early as 10 P.M., which was done
with the intention of giving the troops time to rest on the road,
as it was correctly surmised that, owing to the slow rate of
progression, the Spingawi Pass, involving a further march of
at least six miles from the village of Peiwar, would be reached
none too soon to allow of a surprise at early dawn.

There was a cutting wind blowing, the elevation at starting
being 7,000 feet, while the ascent was continuous to the top of
the Pass, which had an elevation of 9,400 feet. The labour of
keeping one's feet or holding up the horses was excessive,
owing to the broken nature of the road, and the boulders with
which it was covered, while the difficulties of the march were
much increased by the extreme darkness of the night. But
the men kept on bravely, and there was no murmuring, all
looking forward with eagerness to the hour of conflict, and
placing implicit confidence in the skill of their leader. Owing
to the darkness and the difficulties of the road, which had only
before been traversed by Major Collett, the 2nd Punjaubees
lost touch of the 72nd Highlanders, and, instead of turning up
the nullah, crossed it, thinking the turning point was further
on. The 23rd Pioneers and the Horse Artillery followed in

The Night-March. 151

their track, and it was not for some time that Brigadier-General
Thelwall, riding at the head of this portion of the column,
hecame aware of the absence of half his force. On discovering
this fact he sent his orderly officer, Lieutenant Turner, of the
8th Regiment, to bring them back, which that officer did after
a ride of two miles ; owing to this mishap the Brigadier-
General, and the 2nd and 23rd Kegiments and four guns with
him, were practically " out of the hunt." The further the
column marched, the worse appeared the road, if the bed of the
nullah could be dignified by the term, as it was, says General
Roberts, " nothing but a mass of stones, heaped into ridges
and furrowed into deep hollows by the action of the water."

After General Roberts had advanced with the troops still
accompanying him for a mile and a half up the nullah, an
incident occurred, which showed the risky nature of the
operation in which the column was engaged, and nearly caused
the miscarriage of the surprise which the General had prepared
with such care. From the ranks of the 29th Punjaub N.I.,
marching at the head of the column, suddenly a shot was fired,
quickly followed by a second. What could this mean but
treachery ? General Roberts found himself confronted with a
danger on which he had not counted. With everything against
him in conducting a critical operation, save his skill and the
valour of his troops, it was a terrible revelation thus flashed on
him from the rifles of his own men, but the trial found him
equal to the occasion. Colonel Gordon, commanding the 29th,
halted his regiment, and the General, who was riding close
behind the advance party, immediately ordered the 5th
Goorkhas and two companies of the 72nd Highlanders to pass
them and head the column. But it was feared that the mis-
chief had been done, and the alarm had been given to the
Afghans, though this was not so, owing to the accidental cir-
cumstance of the direction of the wind and the conformation of
the hills at this spot preventing the sound travelling towards
the enemy's position.* But this Roberts knew not at the time,
and his anxiety at the success of his plans was greatly in-

* Major Colquhoun says, that it was afterwards ascertained that " an
Afghan sentry heard the shots, and woke up the commander of the post
who took no action in the matter, hearing no further cause for alarm."

152 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

creased, though he had no hesitation or thought of changing
them. Like Hotspur,

" He walk'd o'er perils as on an edge,
More likely to fall in than to get o'er."

But such dangers acted as a spur to his ardent nature,
and he took the course great spirits adopt in crises when lesser
men fail — he "plucked the flower, safety, out of the nettle,
danger."

Colonel Gordon endeavoured to discover the men who had
fired their rifles, but none of their comrades could or would
identify them. One of the native officers of the regiment
examined the rifles of several men, and found out some which
had recently been discharged, but being a co-religionist he
sought to screen the delinquents, and affected not to have
discovered them.

During the Umbeyla Campaign, the Punjaub regiments
engaged at the Mahabun, were mostly recruited from Pathans,
and proved faithful to their salt under the most trying circum-
stances, as they have on numberless occasions in our border
wars, and no doubt was now entertained of their fidelity ; but
this deed of treachery revealed a -new source of dread, and, but
for a fortunate circumstance, the well-laid plans of the British
General might have been baulked, and a sanguinary struggle,
if not a repulse, might have changed the fortunes of the
campaign. But General Eoberts had embarked his fortunes
and the lives of the handful of troops with him, in the perilous
task of snatching a victory by a surprise, and he resolved to
prosecute the attempt to the end at whatever hazard. As
Cassius said before Philippi : —

"Why now, blow wind, swell billow, and swim bark !
The storm is up, and all is in the hazard."

The advance was now resumed, the 5th Goorkhas and two
companies of the 72nd Highlanders leading, and about four
in the morning the main bed of the watercourse was quitted,
and the march was continued along the ravine to the left, at
the top of which, distant three miles, was the Spingawi Kotul.
The General had intended to halt the column for an hour or
two in order to rest the men, but owing to the distance that yet

Treachery in the Ranks. 153

remained to be traversed being greater than was anticipated, he
had to abandon the intention.

Plodding doggedly along, the troops made their way up the
ravine, the obscurity of which was scarcely relieved by the light
of the stars, and, at length, shortly before six in the morning,
the head of the column reached the foot of the pass, where the
track left the ravine and turned up the spur. The guides, who
had led the troops up to this point, were dismissed at their own
request, and the men moved on expecting momentarily to fall
in with the enemy. Presently, just as day was breaking, the
challenge of a double sentry was heard, and two shots, fired in
rapid succession, warned every one that the struggle had begun.
The order, " Front form companies," rang out on the morning
air, and an advance party of the 5th Goorkhas, gallantly led by
Major FitzHugh and Captain Cook, made a rush for the first
stockade, fifty yards up the hill, while the remainder of the
regiment extended and swarmed round the flanks of the
obstacle.

Sir Frederick Eoberts has given us the following account of
the advance up the Spingawi ravine, and the act of treachery
by the 29th Punjaub Native Infantry, which nearly proved fatal
to the success of his operations : — " I was going along just in
rear of the advance, and began to be aware that gradually the
pace was becoming slower and slower, with great straggling
among the men of the 29th Kegiment, and as I had given
special orders that the regiments were to keep touch, I halted
the column to find out if the remainder of the troops were with
me. On the return of the staff officer , whom I had sent back
for this purpose, I found that the 5th Goorkhas, the four com-
panies of the 72nd Highlanders, and the mountain battery were
following the 29th, but the remainder of the column had lost
touch ; the 23rd Pioneers I did not see again till 11 A.M. on the
following day, and Brigadier- General Thelwall till 1 P.M.

" While the column was halting, I heard two shots fired in
the ranks of the 29th, and immediately gave orders to Colonel
Gordon to find which men of his regiment had been guilty of
the act. He reported that he could not identify them. I then
said that the 29th could no longer lead the advance because of
the slow pace at which they marched, and ordered the Goorkhas

154 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

and Highlanders to head the column. This caused some delay,
and I hecame anxious, as it was necessary we should reach the
Spingawi Pass before daylight, which broke about six o'clock.
I asked Colonel Villiers the time. Taking out his watch he
said, ' Three o'clock.' This reassured me, as it would give
time to reach the enemy's position before daylight ; but soon
after he came to me and said he had made a mistake, that it was
four o'clock. This renewed my anxiety, as we were travelling
over ground unfamiliar to us. The Goorkhas were now leading,
and soon a further delay occurred owing to the regiment taking
a wrong road, which at this point bifurcated. I halted the
column and sent an officer to find them, and they soon returned,
but this caused a further delay of half an hour.

" The ground now began to ascend rapidly, and I knew from
this that we must be nearing the final slope. I now told Major
FitzHugh, commanding the 5th Goorkhas, that I should give
him no further orders, but that he was to move on rapidly, and
on reaching the foot of the Afghan position he was to give the
order, ' Front form companies,' and go at the enemy as hard as
he could, and I promised to support him with the 72nd High-
landers and other regiments as fast as I could bring them into
action. At the first streak of dawn I heard the order, ' Front
form companies,' and a few seconds after the enemy began
firing."

The firing became general on both sides, and the dense pine
woods were illuminated by the discharges of the rifles, for day-
light was only just beginning to break. The Afghan fire is
described to us by one who was present, as a perfect rain of
bullets, but it was almost ineffective, as, owing to the steepness
of the hill, the bullets passed over the men's heads. With
admirable dash the Goorkhas stormed the stockade after a brief
hand-to-hand struggle. The Afghans fell back on a second
stockade, eighty yards in the rear, but the spur here being a
little wider, the flanks of the stockade were turned, and the
agile little Goorkhas, assisted by the Highlanders, under
Colonel Brownlow, were in the midst of the stalwart Afghans,
who speedily gave way.

Meantime General Koberts directed Captain Kelso to take his
mountain battery to the front, which that officer did with great

Capture of the Stockades. 155

gallantry, and himself advanced up the hill with the remaining
companies of the wing of the Highlanders, who, forcing their
way through the timher that grew on the precipitous sides of
the spur, came up on the right flank of the advance, and push-
ing on in support of the latter, followed the fleeing Afghans up
the hills to their last defences near the crest. From the second
stockade to the crest of the hill the ground was open, "the
track ascending in short zigzags," while the crest itself was
covered by the enemy, who kept up a heavy musketry fire on the
troops, and also maintained an ineffective shell fire. The
obstacles of the attack were increased by the felled timber lying
across the slope of the hill, and by a knoll on the flank pro-
tected by shelter-trenches, which it was necessary to take as it
occupied a commanding position.

The Goorkhas and Highlanders pressed up the hill, and soon
captured the third stockade, the Afghans suffering heavily,
though they succeeded in removing the gun which commanded
the line of advance. The 29th Punjaubees were in support,
and, later, repelled an attack on the right flank, while General
Roberts, on foot, accompanied the 72nd Highlanders on the
right, and seized the knoll which commanded the ground above
the third stockade. At this time the force suffered a loss in the
death of Captain Kelso. This officer, following the Goorkhas
and Highlanders, had brought two of his guns into action in
the battery vacated by the Afghans, and not being aware, owing
to the dim light, that the enemy had temporarily returned to
the first stockade, after the advance had pushed up the hill,
was proceeding through the work with his chief native officer
to find a position for one gun on the knoll, when too late
he discovered his mistake, and as he turned round was shot
through the back of the head and fell dead on his face. Im-
mediately afterwards the 29th Regiment advanced, and a second
time turned the enemy out of the stockade.

Meantime, the Highlanders, led by Colonel Brownlow, and
accompanied by General Roberts, pushed up the ascent, the
enemy falling back till they were driven among the pine woods
which clothed the spur. The Goorkhas also carried on a front
attack up the hill above the last stockade, when a party of
Afghans charged down, but were met by the gallant Captain

156 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Cook, who rescued Major Galbraith, the Assistant-Adjutant-
General from death at the hands of a powerful Pathan.* The
fighting was severe throughout, and within the first, or great,
stockade, seventy-eight dead bodies of Afghans were found,
proving that they had defended the position with resolution.

The troops were now formed up on the edge of the " merg,"
or small grass plain, beyond the last stockade. By 6.30 the
whole of the Spingawi stockades had changed hands, and the
line of the enemy's defence was completely turned, while he
withdrew towards the Peiwar Kotul, and along the edge of the
woods to the north. General Koberts heliographed the news
of his success to Brigadier- General Cobbe, and instructed him
to co-operate vigorously from below in attacking the Kotul.
Having re-formed the troops on the crest of the hill, he sent for
the supports, which were still some way in the rear, under
the command of Brigadier-General Thelwall.

After giving the men a rest, at 9.30 General Roberts,
feeling the importance of pressing the enemy while they were
dispirited, determined to push on without waiting for the sup-
ports. Sending word to General Thelwall to come to his assis-
tance, he marched with the troops then with him — the 72nd,
Goorkhas, and 29th — to dislodge the enemy from the dense
woods surrounding the plateau in the direction of the Peiwar
Kotul, in which they had sought shelter.

The 29th now led the way, followed by the Goorkhas, the
72nd, and the mountain battery, under Lieutenant Jervis.
The column crossed the plateau unopposed, and then plunged
into the pine wood on the rocky hill-side in skirmishing order,
a species of fighting which tries the discipline and courage of
troops, who are less under the leadership of their officers. The
men skirmished through the forest and over rocks and bushes
j n a way that spoke well for their training, driving the enemy
before them, and reached the crest of the hill, a very steep
acclivity, with slopes towards the Peiwar, which afterwards
received the name of Picnic Hill, as the troops later in the day
dined here out of the contents of their haversacks, — and were

* For this act of gallantry Captain Cook received the V.C., but did not
long survive to enjoy the distinction and a brevet majority he had well
earned, as he fell at Cabul, hi December of the following year.

Critical Position of the Column. 157

soon met by a hot fire from the Afghans assembled in great
strength on an equally steep hill on the opposite side of the
narrow valley, only fifty yards in breadth at this point.

General Roberts took up a position, amid a heavy fire, on
the left of the line in rear of the 29th, opposite the neck
which communicated with the hill on which the Afghans
were crowded in great strength, but from which they would
have to be driven if the Peiwar Kotul was to be stormed. The
enemy exhibited great hardihood, and relying on their numbers,
which enabled them to extend along the crest of the hill, a
mile to the left and half a mile to the right of the neck, and
also on the strength of their position, poured in a hot fire,
and even charged down the hill towards the British troops,
but each time were driven back. Though the time for the
advance had not yet arrived, as the attack in front, by Briga-
dier-General Cobbe, was not developed, it was foreign to
General Roberta's nature to act only on the defensive, and he
directed the 29th to proceed down the hill and, covered by the
fire of the mountain guns, attack the enemy on the opposite
slope, and sent word to the Goorkhas and Highlanders to act
in support.

The Punjaubees succeeded in reaching the top of the oppo-
site hill, but unfortunately the Goorkhas and Highlanders lost
their way in the dense forest, and there being no support, the
29th were driven back. General Roberts accompanied the last
company of the regiment, and was about halfway up the opposite
hill, believing the Goorkhas and Highlanders were close behind,
when he met the 29th rushing back, having been driven down
by the Afghans, who were in overwhelming force. The General
had sent one after the other all the members of his Staff, in-
cluding even the chaplain, Rev. J. Adams, to find out where
Brigadier-General Thelwall was with the supports, and where
the Highlanders and Goorkhas had strayed to, but neither his
officers returned with news, nor did the wished for troops make
an appearance.

The position now became very critical. In vain the General
sought by voice and example to rally the panic-stricken Pun-
jaubees. With his wonted valour, freely exposing his person,
he was now the centre of a storm of bullets, and that he

158 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

escaped death was a marvel, though a contusion in the hand
from a spent bullet bore evidence to the personal danger to
which he was exposed.

At this time General Koberts's attention was attracted by an
act of devotion towards himself, which should find a place in
this personal record. When returning up Picnic Hill from the
Afghan position, after vainly endeavouring to rally the discom-
fited Punjaubees, on turning round to look back, he beheld his
Sikh orderly, Dhyan Singh by name, of the 5th Punjaub Infan-
try, walking close behind him with his arms stretched out to
cover the body of his master, exposed to the Afghan fire across
the narrow valley, which, as before said, was only fifty yards in
width. Officers who have served on the North-West frontier can
recall many instances of a like devotion on the part of those
serving under them, whether Sikhs or Pathans, and it is a dis-
graceful calumny to say that the virtue of gratitude is unknown
to the inhabitants of the Indian Peninsula.

At this anxious moment, when all seemed lost, as neither
General Thelwall, with the supports, nor the Highlanders and
Goorkhas, had made an appearance, a party of the 23rd Pion-
eers appeared, coming down the hill, under Colonel Currie, who
informed General Roberts that Major Anderson, of his regi-
ment, was close by with more of his men. The Pioneers were
soon under fire, and a few minutes afterwards, Major Anderson
was killed, a little to the left ; but his death was avenged by
Colonel Currie, who drove back the enemy. This timely assis-
tance saved a further retirement, and soon afterwards the Goor-
khas and Highlanders, finding the right direction by the sound
of the heavy firing, returned to the hill, having lost their way in
the dense wood.* Even now the 2nd Punjaub N.I., and the
four Horse Artillery guns, forming, with the Pioneers, General
Thelwall's brigade, had not arrived.

The action had proceeded for two hours all along the front,
with great expenditure of ammunition, but with small loss,
owing to the cover, when a portion of General Cobbe's troops
came on the scene, and their presence prevented the necessity

* General Roberts said he afterwards tried to find out whither the
Highlanders had wandered, but no one could explain, though the dense-
ness of the forest and the want of guides was perhaps a sufficient excuse.

A Further Flank Movement. 159

of driving the enemy from their strong position by a front
attack. The 5th Punjaub N.I. and 2nd Battalion 8th Regi-
ment had been detailed for the front attack on the Peiwar
Kotul, and the former, in order to co-operate with the
flank attack, began ascending one of the principal spurs that
run down from the range between the Peiwar and Spingawi
Passes. Leaving camp before dawn, the Punjaubees were six
hours reaching the summit, when, guided by the sound of the
firing, Major Macqueen, the commanding officer, accompanied
by Colonel Perkins, commanding Koyal Engineers, who gave
most valuable information regarding the enemy's position on
the Peiwar Kotul, led his men up to the rear of the hill where
the duel was progressing between the British and Afghan main
forces.

General Eoberts, acting on the information brought by
Colonel Perkins, sent two mountain-guns to shell the Afghan
camp, which was exposed to view by an opening in the woods,
the range being about 1,000 yards across the face of the pre-
cipitous Peiwar range. The shells set fire to the tents and
caused a panic among the men and animals, which was in-
creased when, about noon, the elephants arrived with the four
Horse Artillery guns, under Colonel Stirling, which were
brought into action on the left of the hill that the Afghans had
lately held so tenaciously. On the arrival of the 2nd Punjaub
N.I., which had been absent, with the remainder of the sup-
ports, from the fighting line, General Roberts ordered them to
hold the crest of the hill, while the troops, who had been
marching and fighting continuously for more than fourteen
hours, rested and refreshed themselves with the cooked provi-
sions they had brought in their haversacks, and hence the hill,
that had witnessed such hot work, received the name of Picnic
Hill.

General Eoberts says : — " I walked across to the hill lately
held by the enemy for the purpose of reconnoitring, the horses
of the mounted officers having been left at the foot of the
ascent ; but it was impossible to pursue the Afghans in this
direction through the thick forest and undergrowth, and as
guides could not be had, and as there were only two or three
hours more daylight, I decided to make a further flank move-

160 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

merit with the object of getting still further round the enemy's
rear, and to make an attack on the following morning.
Leaving the 2nd Punjaubees on Picnic Hill, on the north of
the Kotul, and the 29th to hold the hill overlooking the
Spingawi and protect the field hospital which had been estab-
lished there, I took the remainder of the troops I had brought
with me from camp, including 5th Punjaub Infantry, and pro-
ceeded on the endeavour to get round the enemy's rear." Just
before dark he reached a hill having an elevation of nearly
10,000 feet, where he bivouacked, amidst intense cold, the
thermometer marking 25 degs. of frost.

Though the troops, the 5th Goorkhas leading, commenced
the march from Picnic Hill at 2 P.M., it was four before the
head of the column emerged from the forest on to the open
slopes above the highest cultivation in the Hurriab Valley. No
enemy was in sight, and as the short December day was already
closing in, and the troops were quite worn out with their
exertions, the General gave the order to bivouac, and soon
huge fires were lit, and afforded the troops the only means of
keeping out the piercing cold of this elevated spot. General
Roberts shared the discomfort of his men and shivered in his
greatcoat; but he had the added trouble caused by anxiety
as to the absence of news from Brigadier- General Cobbe, of
whom he had not heard since Colonel Perkins left him in the
morning, as owing to the intervening hills, he had been unable
to communicate by heliograph with the camp after the first
signal in the morning reporting the capture of the Spingawi
Pass.

About eight o'clock in the evening, however, the General's
anxiety was relieved by a hastily scribbled note from Colonel
Waterfield, Political Officer with the Force, announcing that
six companies of the 2nd Battalion 8th Ptegiment, under
Colonel Barry Drew, were in possession of the Peiwar Kotul.
The column for the front attack,* numbering 30 officers and 838

* The column consisted of the 8th Regiment ; 5th Punjaub Infantry ;
12th Bengal Cavalry ; 2 guns F— A, R.H.A. ; 3 guns G— 3, R.A. ; and the
Turi and other levies. General Cobbe received general instructions to
open fire on the enemy about 6 A.M. ; to get his troops into position in
front of the Peiwar Kotul by 8.30, and to storm the place when the flank
attack had become sufficiently developed to shake the enemy's defence.

The Front Attack. 161

men, under command of Brigadier-General Cobbe, had moved
from camp at 5.30 A.M., and about seven o'clock, having reached
the last spur (separated from the Pel war Kotul by a glen), became
engaged with the enemy, whose artillery also opened fire on
our guns, which returned the compliment with vigour. The
duel went ou till about ten o'clock, when the enemy, trying to
outflank the skirmishing line of the 2nd Battalion 8th Regi-
ment, a squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry charged across the
line of fire and forced them to retire. An hour later General
Cobbe was wounded in the leg, when the command devolved on
Colonel Drew. The Afghans held their ground in the Kotul,
until, panic-stricken at the success of the further flank move-
ment made by General Roberts, and fearful of having their
line of retreat cut off, they evacuated the Kotul, which was
occupied at 2.30 P.M.

So hastily had the enemy abandoned their position that they
left their tents standing, and dinners ready cooked, and the
road towards Ali Kheyl was strewed for some distance with
guns, limber boxes, and other materiel. The camp was plun-
dered by the Turis, who had been directed to move in co-
operation on the enemy's right, but kept out of harm's way
until the camp was in the occupation of the British. Colonel
Hugh Gough, commanding the cavalry, proceeded in pursuit
of the enemy, but they had had too long a start, no signs of
them were visible, and the cavalry returned to the camp at the
foot of the hill, whence tents and rations were sent for the
men of the 8th Regiment, who passed the night on the Kotul.

The loss in the action, which was chiefly confined to the
column under General Roberts' s immediate command, was
twenty-one killed, including two officers — Major Anderson,
23rd Pioneers, and Captain Kelso, R.A. — and seventy-two
wounded, including two officers — Brigadier-General Cobbe and
Lieutenant Monro, 72nd Highlanders. The enemy, though occu-
pying a defensive position, suffered far more heavily, and the
wounded, who were removed, crowded the villages in the Hur-
riab Valley, while six field-pieces and twelve mountain-guns
were captured.

The victory achieved was in every way a remarkable one.
The Afghans had everything in their favour — an almost im-

M

1 62 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

pregnable position, perfect knowledge of the ground, superior
numbers, and a stronger force of artillery, with an ample
supply of provisions and ammunition ; but all were neutralised
by the genius of the British General and the valour of his
troops.

An officer of the Staff who was by General Roberts's side
throughout the operations that resulted in the capture of the
Peiwar Kotul has given us the following interesting account
of the proceedings : —

" On the 28th of November we reached the foot of Peiwar
Kotul about three in the afternoon. The General had in-
formation to the effect that the enemy were entrenched at the
entrance of the Pass, and had six guns. The whole force at
the General's disposal marched from Kurram at 5A.M., reached
the ground opposite the Afghan cantonment of Habibkila about
10 A.M., when dispositions were made for attacking what was
supposed to be the enemy's position. Colonel T. Gordon, com-
manding the 29th P.N.I., was ordered to proceed to the left,
and turn their right flank, and he was given his own regiment,
the 5th P.I., under Major McQueen, and two mountain guns.
Brigadier-General Cobbe, with the 28th Foot and four moun-
tain guns, was ordered to advance on the enemy's centre ; and
the General, with Thelwall's brigade, moved against the enemy's
left.

" The ground was covered with a kind of dwarf ilex, which
grew like a thick shrub rather than a tree, and which was well
calculated to conceal even a large body of men. It was also inter-
sected by several deep ravines. Along this ground, then, Thel-
wall's brigade advanced, and we were on the tiptoe of expecta-
tion, believing that the enemy were close in front, and that at
any moment we might see the leading men of our skirmishers
open fire. But on we went, and still there was no sign of the
enemy. Then the ground was reached where they were said to
be entrenched, but still no sign of either enemy or entrench-
ment, and the idea that the Afghans had fled began to gain
ground amongst those of us who were new to Asiatic methods
of warfare. At last a bit of open ground was reached, where
there were signs of the enemy's last encampment, and a halt
was made.

The Staff Officer's Account. 163

" We had seen Colonel Gordon, with part of his force, cross
a hill on our left and dip down into a valley behind a spur just
in front of us, and we could see Colonel McQueen, with part of
his regiment, holding a commanding position on this spur.
Glasses were directed towards the top of the Kotul, but nothing
could be discerned at first, and the idea that the enemy had
fled, or had moved back to some stronger position, began to
gain ground. Meanwhile, the General had directed a search
to be made for water, and the open bit of ground to be
examined with a view to encamping on it for-the night.

" About this time officers with good glasses detected men
moving about on the top of the Kotul, and the dress of these
men was so like that of our 29th P.N.I, that many declared
them to be our men, who had worked round through the valley
behind the spur on the end of which was Major McQueen. All
doubt, however, as to whether they were friends or foes was
soon dissipated as the sounds of very heavy firing reached us
from the gorge or narrow valley along which Colonel Gordon
had advanced.

" The General immediately sent Captain Kennedy, A.Q.M.G.,
back to stop the baggage, and to choose a place for a camp a
little further down the pass, and giving directions as to what
was to be done on the spot where he then was, he sent an
officer to McQueen to hold his position till Colonel Gordon and
the force with him had retired, for the General had determined
not to attack the enemy's position that day, it being far too
strong to attempt to take at that late hour in the afternoon,
with troops who had been marching from before daylight. One
great point effected by Colonel Gordon's move, and by the
advance of the whole force to the foot of the Pass, was that the
whole of the enemy's position in our front was unmasked. The
General himself, and some of his Staff, went up the valley by
which Colonel Gordon had advanced, and when he saw the
strength of the enemy's position he ordered the 5th Punjaub
Infantry to advance and cover the retirement of Colonel Gordon's
force. This was most satisfactorily accomplished, the whole of
the casualties amounting, I think, to only eleven. The artillery
and rifle fire was exceedingly heavy for a considerable time,
and the small number of casualties on our side is another in-

M 2

164 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

stance of how ineffectual a heavy fire often is from a very
elevated position.

" The troops were all got back comfortably into camp, and we
were all thoroughly satisfied at having found the enemy at last,
though his position was much stronger than we should have
supposed. The General seemed satisfied that he had now got
them within striking distance, and next morning he prepared
for a thorough reconnoissance of the different spurs which led
from the Peiwar Kotul into the plain below. Those on the
right and left of our camp were carefully examined, and towards
evening the impression gained ground that the General would
probably order the attack along the spur on our left, the
highest point of which was held by a picket of McQueen's regi-
ment. Our camp was almost under the spur on our right,
where we had a very strong picket also of 23rd Pioneers.
These pickets were inspected continually, as well as those in
front and rear of our camp, by Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. G.
Villiers,* whom the General had appointed Superintendent of
Outposts. Next day reconnoitring still went on, and the
General himself went up to the picket of the 23rd Pioneers, and
from that commanding position was able to get a very good
view both of the enemy's position and of the spur on our left,
along which it was thought he would probably deliver his attack
on Monday, the 2nd December, as the General said he would rest
quietly until that day in order to give the troops, who had had some
very harassing marches, time to recover from the effects before
tasking their energies with the attack of so strong a position as
that chosen by the enemy. But he had not as yet said how,
or at what hour on Monday he would attack.

" On Sunday morning there was divine service in the open
air just a little out of range of the enemy's artillery. The
General and all his Staff attended, and there was a very large
number of communicants. Towards the middle of the day an
attempt was made to throw up an earthwork in front of our
position, which had the desired effect of leading the enemy to
suppose that the principal attack would be made on their centre
and along the high road that led to the top of the Kotul. This

* Colonel Villiers was Military Secretary of the Viceroy, and subsequently
did good service in Zululand, under Sir Garnet Wolseley.

The Staff Officer's Account. 165

attempt was, I believe, ordered to be carried on until it drew
the enemy's fire, when the working party was to retire. About
four in the afternoon the General summoned all officers com-
manding brigades, regiments, and batteries to a council in his
own camp, and he then explained to them that he had had the
road leading to the Spin Gawai Kotul carefully reconnoitred by
Major Collett, Assistant Quartermaster-General to the Division,
and Captain Carr, Deputy- Assistant Quartermaster- General of
Cavalry, and that the report was so favourable he had determined
upon making his chief attack on that point. He then ex-
plained how this was to be done, and all the details of the
movement had been so carefully worked out by Major Collett
that no little point was forgotten.

" The General's plan, briefly, was this : — Not to warn the
troops till 1 P.M., when the regiments appointed for the attack
were all to turn out without any noise or speaking, and with-
out sound of drum, bugle, or trumpet. The fires in the camp
were to be kept alight, and all the tents were to be kept stand-
ing. The men were each to carry one day's cooked rations,
and the march was to continue all night till about 4 A.M., when
it was calculated we should be tolerably close to the Spin Gawai
Kotul. It was then intended to halt until a little before dawn,
when it was proposed to time the movement so that the attack
should be actually delivered at dawn.

" Brigadier-General Cobbe was left in command of the camp
with the 2nd battalion 8th Foot, four guns G battery 3rd
brigade Koyal Artillery, and two guns F battery A brigade Eoyal
Horse Artillery, and one squadron of cavalry. With this force
he had orders to attack the enemy's centre as soon as he found
the enemy's left had been turned at Spin Gawai.

" A few minutes after ten General Roberts, with the re-
mainder of his force, marched off in silence. There was a
little moonlight for the first hour, but that help to marching
soon vanished, and the troops marched on as best they could
in the darkness, in the teeth of a cutting wind. The road lay
up the bed of the Spin Gawai Nullah, which was covered by
huge boulders, over which the men had to pick their way as best
they could.

" The march proceeded without incident till about 2 A.M.,

1 66 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

when two shots were fired by men of the 29th P.N.I., apparently
with the intention of giving warning to the enemy of our
approach. Their object, however, was frustrated by two causes.
First, the wind blowing strongly down the Nullah prevented the
sound from travelling upwards, and secondly, the conformation
of the hills at that particular spot was unfavourable to sound
travelling in the direction of the enemy. This conduct of the
two men of the 29th P.N.I, necessitated a change in the order
of the march. The 5th Goorkhas and a company of the 72nd
Highlanders, under Colonel Brownlow, took the place in front
that had hitherto been held by the 29th.

" As soon as this arrangement was made the line marched
on again in the darkness, and without incident or mishap, until
the foot of Spin G-awai Kotul was reached. So little did the
enemy suspect our approach that our leading men had actually
come within a few hundred yards of their advanced double
sentry before they were aware of our presence. Two shots fired
by the double sentry gave the alarm, and then rang out the
orders on our side for the attack. It was still quite dark, and
under the pine trees, through which our men advanced, the
flashes of our rifles and those of the enemy from the big
stockade on the top of the Pass lit up fitfully the whole scene.
This stockade was gallantly taken by the 5th Goorkhas and the
company of 72nd Highlanders, and two other stockades on the
left of the enemy's position were also attacked and taken. The
two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, under Major Kelso, who
had taken up a position, by the General's direction, on a knoll
that commanded the stockade, contributed greatly to the rapid
success of the movement. The firing having ceased, and it
being still almost dark, Major Kelso advanced with one gun
through the stockade, hoping to get a shot at the retreating
enemy, but the force which held the stockade, finding that they
were unpursued in the darkness, and that the line of attack had
followed the direction of the two stockades on their left, re-
turned again to their first position in the big stockade. These
men were dressed so much like our 29th P.N.I, that Major
Kelso, seeing them in the stockade in the dim light of the early
dawn, supposed they were men of that regiment, and did not
discover his mistake till he was close upon them, when they

The Staff Officers Account. 167

fired and shot him through the head. A similar mistake was
also made hy Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., at whom they also
fired, but he escaped almost by a miracle, the hilt of his
revolver and part of his coat being shot away, and for some
months afterwards he bore on his skin the mark or burn which
the graze of the bullet left upon it.

" The enemy's return necessitated the taking of the stockade
a second time, which was done by the 29th P.N.I., and the
whole position, held so strongly by a very large body of the
enemy, was in our hands a little before 7 A.M. As an instance
of the difficulty of shooting down hill, I may mention that very
few of our men were hit during the advance up the hill. The
enemy's fire Avas very heavy and well sustained, but was just
too high to be destructive to our people. They themselves,
though occupying what appeared to be a secure position inside
the big stockade, suffered heavily, and seventy-eight dead bodies
were counted next day lying in and around the stockade.

"As soon as the Spin Gawai Kotul was in our hands the
troops were formed up, and an advance made across the open
ground in the direction of Peiwar Kotul. The 29th P.N.I, led
the advance, and every effort was made to press on the retreat-
ing enemy as fast as possible. Leaving the ' merg,' the line of
advance lay along thickly-wooded spurs, covered with a great
deal of undergrowth. After some distance had been traversed
our advanced skirmishers suddenly drew the fire of the enemy,
who, having retreated from Spin Gawai, had joined their com-
rades at Peiwar, and now took up a strong position on the route
we were following to Peiwar Kotul. General Roberts never
hesitated, but he sent back at once for the 5th Goorkhas and
72nd Highlanders, and with a view to encouraging the men of
the 29th P.N.I., went down the hill with them, and up the
opposite side under a very heavy fire. With this small force he
actually reached the top of the hill occupied by the enemy ;
but there was delay in getting up the 72nd and the 5th
Goorkhas, caused by the thick undergrowth and the nature of
the ground, which both prevented the regiments seeing what
point to make for, and the officers of the General's staff sent in
quest of them, from finding them easily. In consequence of
this short delay the men of the 29th P.N.I, were forced to

1 68 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

retire to the opposite hill, which we then held with the Goorkhas,
72nd, 23rd Pioneers, and 2nd P.I., all of whom had now come
up. Holding this position, General Roberts then tried to open
communication with General Cobhe's force, which it was under-
stood was at this time attacking the enemy in front. But the
nature of the ground prevented the signallers from opening
communication.

" Shortly afterwards, Colonel Perkins, E.E., and Major
McQueen, 5th P. I., who were in the front attack, contrived to
ascend the spur to the right of their line of attack, and to join
General Roberts, thereby giving him full information of what
had taken place in front up to the time when they left. After
consulting with them and the commanding officers of the force
he had with him, the General resolved to get round in the rear
of the enemy, and to leave a regiment, the 2nd P.I., to hold
the position he then occupied. Before making this move two
mountain guns were brought into action at a spot pointed out
by Colonel Perkins, who, on his road up, had observed that the
enemy's camp at the Peiwar Kotul would be exposed to artillery
fire at that point.

" The General, about one o'clock, commenced his march to
the flank and rear of the enemy, and this movement, being
observed by them, caused at once their retreat on all sides within
our view ; but their position was so extended that we could not
tell how far the retreat was general, nor whether it included
the force opposed to Cobbe's brigade. It was impossible with
our tired troops, who had been marching all night and fighting
all day, to follow up an enemy who took no one line of retreat,
but fled in many directions. The General, therefore, having
completed the flank movement, and got in rear of the enemy's
position, bivouacked for the night on a hill above the village of
Gandigan.

" At this time we did not know how completely the flank
movement had routed the enemy, but we afterwards learned that
the enemy, seeing it, and fearing it would cut off their retreat,
had all of them fled precipitately. Meanwhile, the front attack,
finding that the enemy's fire had altogether ceased, began to
advance in the direction of the road leading up to the Kotul,
their attack hitherto having followed the line of a spur on the

Roberts in the Enemy's Works. 169

proper left of that road. Colonel Waterfield and Colonel Hugh
(rough were, I believe, the first to reach the top of the Kotul,
which they found utterly deserted. This was about 3 P.M.
Immediately afterwards the troops followed, under the command
of Colonel Drew, 2nd battalion 8th Foot, and occupied the
ground lately held by the Afghans on the top of the Kotul.
About 8 P.M. a messenger from Colonel Waterfield (or Colonel
Gough, I forget which) reached us, with a letter which informed
the General that the enemy had fled, and that what remained
of their camp was in the possession of Cobbe's brigade."

General Eoberts had a cheerless bivouac on the night of the
2nd of December, and, on the following morning, he moved his
force, comprising four guns, Eoyal Horse Artillery, and two
mountain guns, wing 72nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas, and
23rd Pioneers, to the open ground about half a mile from
Zabberdasht Killa,* where the camp was pitched on the arrival
of the tents from the camp at the foot of the Peiwar Kotul.
During the afternoon the 2nd Punjaub N.I. joined him from
Picnic Hill, and the 29th N.I. were sent back to the standing
camp on the other side cf the Kotul. General Roberts was of
opinion that it would be useless to attempt the pursuit of the
enemy over a hilly and, in parts, thickly-wooded country, as
they had not retreated in a compact body, but, like the
Israelites of old, fled " every man to his city, and every man to
his own country." During the forenoon he rode, with his Staff,
to the Peiwar Kotul, and carefully examined the position, of
which his admirably designed and executed strategy had dis-
possessed the enemy. Along the whole line of the narrow pass,
extending from Zabberdasht Killa to the Kotul, appeared the
usual indications of a precipitate flight. He describes it as
" a place of enormous natural strength, and the enemy's dis-
positions for repelling any attack on it from the front were very
complete and judicious. It is also evident, from the enormous
stores of ammunition and supplies which have been captured,
that it was the intention of the Afghan Government that their
troops should remain here for the winter, and that they fully
expected to be able to maintain their position against the British

* Zabberdasht means " high-handed," and Killa is a fort.

j 70 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

forces." The strength of the enemy on the 2nd December was
ascertained to be 8,500 regular infantry with 18 guns, and a
large number of tribesmen. After an interview with Colonel
Drew he rode down the hill to the camp, and directed that the
hospital, which was under the protection of the 29th Kegiment,
should be moved back to the Kurrum Fort, where he had
established the base hospital.

On arriving at headquarters General Roberts sat down at a
little camp-table, in the open air, to wTrite the despatch an-
nouncing his splendid achievement, and his Aides-de-Camp
and the officers of his Staff wrote as best they could at the
same table, sending news of their safety to anxious relatives
and friends. They were not long thus occupied when an orderly
came to announce that the trench was ready for the reception
of those who had fallen on the previous day, upon which the
General immediately left his writing, and, accompanied by the
officers of his Staff, followed the bodies to the grave, where they
were interred with as much ceremony as the circumstances
permitted. Towards evening he returned to his camp near
Zabberdasht Killa, and, writes the officer of his Staff, already
quoted, " while riding back it was a matter of general comment
how admirably the enemy had chosen their position at Peiwar,
and also a matter of congratulation that so difficult a task had
been performed with the loss of so few officers and men." On
the following day, the 4th December, the bodies of the two
officers killed, Major Anderson and Captain Kelso, were com-
mitted to the grave, on a little hill between Zabberdasht Killa
and Gandigan, in the presence of the General and other officers.

During the day General Roberts issued a congratulatory
order* to his gallant troops, and, on the 7th, he had the grati-

* The following is General Roberts's order to his troops : — " Major-
General Roberts congratulates the Kurram Field Force on the successful
result of the operations of the 2nd December against the Peiwar Kotul, a
position of extraordinary strength, and held by an enemy resolute and well
armed. Not only had the enemy the advantage of ground, but also of
numbers, as they were largely reinforced from Cabul the evening previous
to the 'attack. A position apparently impregnable has been gained, a con-
siderable portion of the Afghan army has been completely routed, and
seventeen guns, with large stores of ammunition and supplies, have been
captured. The result is most honourable, and could only have been attained
by troops in a high state of discipline, capable of enduring hardships, and
able to fight as soldiers of the British Army have always fought. Major-

Arrival at Alt Kheyl. 171

fication of announcing to them the following telegram from her
Majesty the Queen, forwarded through the "Viceroy, who added
his" warm congratulations on the success achieved:" — "I
have received the news of the decisive victory of General
Roberts and the splendid behaviour of my brave soldiers with
pride and satisfaction, though I must ever deplore the unavoid-
able loss of life. Pray inquire after the wounded in my name.
May we continue to receive good news."

The troops halted in their positions on the 3rd December,
when the 5th Punjaub N.I., under Major MacQueen, proceeded
to bring in a large quantity of provisions left by the Afghans in
the neighbouring villages, and the 2nd Battalion 8th Regiment
furnished working parties to assist in taking the captured guns
back to the camp for transmission to the Kurram Fort, a work
of no small difficulty, owing to the steepness of the hill, but
which was facilitated by using the long drag-ropes employed by
the Afghans in bringing the ordnance up the ascent.

Preparations were now commenced for halting the troops
that were to remain at the Kotul, the company of Sappers and
Miners being ordered up from Kurrana to assist in this and
road-making, and three guns of G Battery, 3rd Brigade R.A.,
were ordered for the defence of the position. Brigadier- General
Thelwall was placed in command of the troops* remaining for
the winter at and near the Peiwar Kotul, and at ten o'clock on
the morning of the 6th December, General Roberts marched
from the camp at Zabberdasht Killa to Ali Kheyl, with the re-
mainder of the troops, f the column being temporarily under
the command of Colonel Barry Drew until Brigadier-General

General Roberts deeply regrets the brave men wbo have fallen in the
gallant discharge of their duty, and feels for the sufferings of the wounded.
In Major Anderson, 23rd Pioneers, and Captain Kelso, Royal Artillery, the
Major- General has lost two personal friends, and the Government two
valuable officers." The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, also
telegraphed his congratulations to General Roberts.

* At the Peiwar village, 12th Bengal Cavalry ; at the Camp, near the
village of Turrai, 29th Punjaub N.I. ; at the Kotul, the 8th Regiment,
three guns G Battery 3rd brigade Royal Artillery, and a company of
Sappers.

t Advance-guard — detachment, 12th Bengal Cavalry ; wing, 23rd
Pioneers, No. 1 Mountain Battery. Main body — 72nd Highlanders, 2nd
Punjaub N.T., 5th Punjaub N.I., and 5th Goorkhas. Rear-guard — Four
guns F Battery A Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, on elephants ; wing, 23rd
Pioneers.

T 72 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Cobbe returned to duty. The march to Ali Kheyl, a distance
of twelve miles, was made without much difficulty, the road
being in the river-bed or along the bank, and camp was pitched
on the plateau beyond the village.

On arriving at Ali Kheyl, General Eoberts, at 1 P.M., pro-
ceeded to examine the road in the direction of the Shutar-
gardan Pass, taking with him as escort 250 men of the 72nd
Highlanders, 250 of the 5th Goorkhas, and two guns of the
Mountain Battery, the whole under the command of the late
Lieutenant- Colonel Brownlow, who fell at Candahar, on the 1st
September, 1880, in the last action of the war. The first
march was made to Rokian, a distance of three and a half
miles, and, on the following day, the General marched to Jaji
Thanna, a force in support, consisting of the 2nd and 5th
Punjaub N.I., under the command of Lieutenant- Colonel Tyn-
dall, of the former regiment, with the two remaining guns of
the Mountain Battery, taking the place of the escort at Eokian.
The cold was intense, the thermometer marking 5° Fahr. at
7 P.M., but the weather was clear, and there was no snow. On
the 9th, General Roberts and Staff, escorted by fifty men of
the Highlanders, and an equal number of the Goorkhas,
leaving his camp standing, pushed on to the crest of the
Shutargardan, a distance of about ten miles, and eagerly
scanned the Logar Valley and the road that led to Cabul,
some fifty miles distant.

Between the Peiwar Kotul and Dreikula, a point eight miles
beyond Ali Kheyl, the route lay through the country of the
Jajis, who had fought against the British in the action of the
2nd December, but who were so completely at the mercy of the
invaders that they were glad to make terms with Colonel
Waterford, the Political Officer, who proceeded to Ali Kheyl,
and promised them good treatment if they assisted the trans-
port of the force, which they continued to do for some months
without giving cause for complaint. Beyond Dreikula to. the
Shutargardan, says General Roberts, " the country was abso-
lutely uninhabited, though Jajis, Mangals, and Ghilzais can
collect there in considerable numbers to oppose the advance of
a force, both in the Hazardarakt defile and on the slopes of the
Shutargardan. "

Roberts at the Shzitargardan Pass. 173

The Government had decided that the Shutargardan was to
be the limit of the advance into Afghan territory at the present
season of the year, and so General Roberts, after wistfully
regarding the land of promise from the summit of the Afghan
Pisgah, returned to Ali Kheyl, leaving on the further slope of
the Shutargardan a battery of brass guns, which the Afghan
reinforcements, under Wali Mahomed Khan, had abandoned
when, climbing the ascent, they met the flood of their retreat-
ing countrymen, and swelled its volume instead of stemming
the tide.

General Roberts returned, on the 10th December, to Ali
Ivheyl, where a company of the 29th Punjaubees was perman-
ently quartered, and the 2nd and 5th Punjaub N.I., and the
four guns of the Horse Artillery, marched for Kurrarn, to
which the General decided to return by the northern route,
over a range of hills occupied by the hostile Mangals, with the
object of exploring the country between the Hurriab and
Kurram valleys, and of acquiring a knowledge of an important
route by which the Peiwar Kotul could be turned.

1 74 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER X.

General Roberts returns to Kurram by the Sappri Defile — Attack by the
Mangals on the Baggage Escort — Preparations for the Occupation of
the Kurram Valley during the Winter — The Court-Martial on the
Treacherous Soldiers of the 29th Punjaub N.I., and Roberta's General
Order to the Force — Disposal of the Troops into Winter Quarters —
Expedition into the Khost Valley — The March from Kurrain to Hazir
Pir, and thence into the Khost Valley — Occupation of the Fort of
Matun — Action of the 7th January and Defeat of the Mangals— Re-
connoissance by General Roberts of the Khost Valley.

GENERAL ROBERTS marched from All Kheyl by the Sappri, or
Manjiar defile at 9 A.M. on the 12th December, with a force
consisting of the 5th Goorkhas, wing 72nd Highlanders, the
23rd Pioneers, and the Mountain Battery. The operation of
marching a considerable force, with its long baggage train,
through a defile held by a hostile tribe of mountaineers is one
of the most difficult in war, and it was not effected on the
present occasion without some loss, which included two excel-
lent officers.

The village of Sappri, distance seven miles from Ali Kheyl,
was reached about mid-day. The road was difficult and wild,
and led along the Hurriab river till the Kurram was reached,
on the right bank of which it continued, until, after passing
the two villages of Kermana, it again recrossed the bed of the
Kurram, and lay up a narrow glen, a part of the route being
through a pine forest.* General Roberts had received inform-
ation that the Mangals intended defending a defile and pass
about two miles beyond the larger village of Kermana, and, at
four in the afternoon, pushed on the 23rd Pioneers to occupy
the Kotul and bivouac near the village. An hour after mid-
night the tents were struck, and at 3 A.M., the night being
bitterly cold and dark, the General resumed his march with the

* See Major Colquhoun's " With the Kurram Field Force."

Threading the Sappri Defile. 175

troops in the following order : — Advance Guard : two companies
of the 23rd Pioneers. Escort for the baggage, four companies.
Baggage. Mountain Battery. Wing, 72nd Highlanders.
Eear-guard : 5th Goorkhas.

The track of the Kotul was steep and difficult for the camels,
owing to the frozen water rendering the footing very slippery,
and it was not until past 8 A.M. that the rear-guard began the
descent from the top of the Kotul. No enemy was in sight,
and it was hoped that the early hour of the march had defeated
any intentions they may have entertained to attack the baggage ;
but this anticipation was not verified by the result. The
descent of the pass was even more difficult for the camels than
the ascent, and the road was about as suitable a one for a
surprise as could be conceived. " The gorge at the foot of the
hill, " says the military historian already quoted, " extended
for five miles, the track for the first part ran through a deep
ravine with perpendicular walls, which narrowed in places to
but a few yards, over-hanging the path till they seemed to meet,
and made a gateway or tunnel through which the road passed.

The ordinary precautions in forcing a pass, of crowning the
hills on either side, could scarcely be put in practice, as these
in their turn were commanded by other ridges running parallel
to the ravine, while there were ample facilities for a lurking
ambush in the side ravines which broke into the road, if that
could be called so which was a rough and stony watercourse.
But this part of the road was passed in safety, and as the more
open part was reached, some of the Mangals were seen perched
high up on the sides of the mountains, looking at the line of
march defiling below.

On reaching the valley, the troops, with the exception of the
Goorkhas, were allowed to push on ahead of the baggage, and
make their way to the camp which was to be pitched at the vil-
lage of Keraiah. But all danger was not yet at an end, and
the mountaineers, seemingly regretting that such a chance of
looting should escape them, began collecting in small detached
parties, which gradually closed in on the rear of the column.
No duty in war is more difficult or hazardous than escorting a
convoy through a long pass in the occupation of a predatory
tribe. Byron graphically describes such a scene : —

176 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

" The rest in length'ning line the while
Wind slowly through the long defile ;
Above, the mountain rears a peak,
Where vultures whet the thirsty beak,
And theirs may be a feast to-night,
Shall tempt them down ere morrow's light."

Captain F. Goad, Transport Officer, was in charge of the
baggage, and was walking close to a small party of the guard,
consisting of a sergeant and three men of the 72nd High-
landers, when some of these Mangals approached salaaming and
making signs. The sergeant in charge, named Green, appre-
hending treachery, asked leave to fire, but Captain Goad, under
the impression that the hillmen were inspired by amicable inten-
tions, refused permission. Immediately afterwards the Mangals
fired a volley, and Captain Goad fell wounded with a bullet
through both legs. Sergeant Green picked him up, and, having
placed him under cover of a rock, prepared with his three men
to defend the unfortunate officer against the enemy pressing on
them now from all sides ; and so close and accurate was the fire
of these brave men that they succeeded in killing several, and
driving off the remainder of their assailants.*

The firing now became general, as the Mangals, seeing their
anticipated prey escaping from their clutches, attacked the rear-
guard, which was hotly engaged under the command of Major
Fitz Hugh, of the 5th Goorkhas. Captain Powell, of the same
regiment, received two wounds, which subsequently proved
fatal. The scene at this time, as the escort, dismounting,
sought to keep the enemy at bay, and the latter, sheltering
behind every rock and inequality of ground, maintained a hot
return fire upon the British troops, may be well described in
that passage in the " Giaour :"-

" With steel unsheathed, and carbine bent,
Some o'er their courser's harness leant,

Half shelter'd by the steed ;
Some fly behind the nearest rock,
And there await the coming shock,

Nor tamely stand to bleed
Beneath the shafts of foes unseen
Who dare not quit their craggy screen."

On General Roberts hearing of the attack on his rear-guard

* For his gallantry Sergeant Green received a commission in his
regiment.

The Fight in the Sappri Defile. 177

he despatched the main body of the Goorkhas back to assist
in driving off the enemy, but this had already been done before
their arrival, and Major Fitz Hugh had the satisfaction of
bringing his convoy in safety into camp without the loss of
a single camel.

On the following day, the 14th December, General Roberts,
leaving his troops in camp 'at Keraiah, proceeded, accompanied
by his staff, to Kurram, a distance of twenty-one miles. The
road, which lay along the bank of the Kurram river, was
covered with boulders, and was altogether too rough for guns
or wheeled transport. The General determined, if possible, to
punish the marauders who attacked his baggage in the Sappri
defile, and sent Mr. A. Christie, of the Civil Service, Assistant-
Commissioner, to Keraiah, to enquire if an attack on their
villages was possible, and also despatched Captain Kennedy,
Deputy- Assistant-Quartermaster-General, to reconnoitre up the
river with the same object ; but the result of these enquiries
proved that there were no villages sufficiently large to be worth
the trouble of destroying, and, furthermore, it was ascertained
that the attacking party was not wholly composed of Mangals,
but was recruited from the Jajis and Chumkunnies, and that
some of the Ameer's soldiers, defeated on the 2nd December,
took part in the attempt on the baggage.

General Roberts issued a complimentary order, thanking the
5th Goorkhas for their " great gallantry and steadiness " in the
affair of the 13th, " when passing through the most difficult
defile the Major-General had ever seen. " On this day Captain
Goad died of the wounds received in the Sappri Pass, and, on
the 16th, was buried at Kurram, whither his body was brought
from Keraiah, with military honours, in the presence of the
General and his staff. On the same day the troops stationed
at Keraiah, under the command of Colonel Drew, left for the
Kurram fort, where they arrived in two marches.

General Roberts arranged for the protection of the wire
between his head-quarters and Thull, which had been frequently
cut of late, detachments of troops being posted at Suddar and
Ahmed-i-Shama, and agreements were made with the head
men of the villages, who were to supply armed men for the
purpose of patrolling the intermediate sections of the line, an

N

178 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

arrangement which worked well. Meanwhile the process of
hutting the 2nd Battalion 8th Eegiment at the Peiwar Kotul
proceeded apace, and three redoubts and block-houses were
commenced on commanding positions, while the hill-sides were
cleared of trees where necessary, and the Sappers and Miners
were engaged in making a practicable road to the Kotul for
laden animals. In order to provide against the contingency
of a sudden attack from the direction of the Hurriab, detach-
ments from the 12th Bengal Cavalry and 2nd Punjaub Infan-
try were stationed at Zubberdasht Killa, and, in his orders and
arrangements generally, General Roberts took all the precautions
for the safety and comfort of his soldiers and camp-followers,
the care of his camels and other transport animals, and the
security of the Kurram valley, that military skill and experience
could suggest.

The troops throughout the valley had to be on the alert, and
on the night of the 16th December, the cavalry post at Ibra-
himzai, three and a half miles from Suddar, was fired into by
some men of the Orakzai tribe, who were reported to be assem-
bling in the adjacent hills. The General immediately strongly
reinforced the post, which he placed under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Cochrane, of the 8th Regiment, and, on the
18th, he rode thither accompanied by his staff, and, having en-
quired into the affair, proceeded to Suddar, where he caused the
destruction of the house of a Moollah who had incited the
people against the British rule, the owner taking care to be non
est inventus.

As soon as he had a little breathing time, General Roberts
convened a general court-martial to bring to justice the soldiers
of the 29th Punjaub N.I., who had been guilty of treachery
during the eventful night of the 2nd December, while making
the flank march on the Peiwar Kotul. The Court-martial as-
sembled on the 20th December, at the Kurram fort, for the
trial of Sepoy Hazrat Shah, " for having unlawfully loaded and
discharged his rifle with intent to communicate intelligence to
the enemy." The prisoner was found guilty of the charge,
and was condemned to death by hanging. Another Sepoy,
Mira Baz, of the same corps, was tried for a similar offence,
but was acquitted, though he was brought in guilty on the

Court-martial on the Traitors. 179

second count, which charged him with firing his rifle, " thereby
causing risk of disclosing to the enemy the position of the
column, and producing alarm and confusion in the same ;" and
was sentenced to he imprisoned with hard labour for two years.
Before the same Court-martial, on the following day, Jemadar*
Kazan Shah, of the 29th Punjaub N.I., was charged with
having, on the same occasion, " after becoming aware that
Hazrat Shah, of his company, had unlawfully fired his rifle,
with intent to communicate intelligence to the enemy, omitted
to disclose the same to his commanding or other superior
officer, and not having reported any of the circumstances of the
case until the 5th December following." The Jemadar was
found guilty, and sentenced to be transported for seven years.
Before the same Court-martial, on the same day, seventeen
other soldiers of the 29th Punjaubees, were arraigned for
" having, in time of war, on the 2nd December, whilst the
regiment was engaged with the enemy near the Spingawi Kotul,
quitted their regiment without leave and returned to camp, and
having thus remained in camp without authority until the
return of the regiment on the following day." The whole of
the prisoners were found guilty of the charge, and were sen-
tenced, five of them to transportation for 14 years, eight for 10
years, two for 7 years, one to be imprisoned with hard labour
for 2 years, and one for 365 days.

General Roberts confirmed all these sentences, and issued a
general order, dated the 23rd December, which he directed to
be read at the head of each Native Regiment under his com-
mand, in Urdu and Pushtu, in which, while expressing his
sorrow " for the stain reflected on a gallant and distinguished
Regiment, by the misconduct of some of its members," he
described the act of the Sepoy under sentence of death as one
" of gross treachery, and which, had it succeeded, would, in all
probability, have involved, not only his own Regiment, but the
rest of the force associated with it, in one common disaster."
The sentences passed on the deserters, the General declared,
" were not more than the crime deserved ; indeed, the Court-
martial would have been justified in sentencing one and all of

* Jemadar is a native officer of the rank of Lieutenant.

N 2

180 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the prisoners to death." Finally, he expressed his trust that
the sentences " will serve as a warning, and that all native
soldiers who enlist in the service of Her Majesty the Queen
of England and Empress of India will clearly understand,
that while in that service, they must loyally and faithfully carry
out all and every duty they may be called upon to perform."

On the following day, at 11 A.M., the sentence of death was
carried out on Hazrat Shah, in presence of the troops of the
Kurram Field Force, who were formed up in a hollow square,
and the prisoner met his fate with the stoicism of his race.
There can be no doubt that the execution proved a salutary
lesson to the native soldiers, who were incited by the Moollahs,
and the proclamations of the Ameer, preaching a "Jehad," or
holy war, to place the requirements of their religion before the
duties they owed to the State whose salt they had eaten.

After the execution, the 5th Punjaub N.I. marched for Thull
and Kohat, with the convoy of sick and wounded, the ordnance
captured on the Peiwar Kotul packed on elephants, and the
prisoners sentenced to transportation and imprisonment. On
their departure the troops prepared to move into winter
quarters, as it was evident from information received that no
attack would be made from Cabul on the British positions in
the Kurram valley, while the inhabitants of this valley were
satisfied to exchange the mild regime of the conqueror for that
of their Afghan oppressor. The 5th Goorkhas and one company
of the 72nd Highlanders, under Major Fitz Hugh, were de-
tailed to occupy the Kurram Fort, where the supplies and am-
munition were stored, the remaining three companies of the
Highlanders being quartered at the Afghan cantonment near
Peiwar, called Habib Killa, after the nearest village (but after-
wards re-christened Peiwar), while they were enabled to give
a support, if required, to the garrison of the Peiwar Kotul,
which consisted of three guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A.,
four companies of the 8th Regiment, and the 2nd Punjaubees.

General Roberts had determined to proceed on an expedition
into the Khost valley, with the object of " investigating its
resources in men and supplies, and to ascertain to what extent
the combination of the inhabitants of the country against us
could affect our line of communications." There were sub-

The Expedition to Khost. 181

sidiary considerations that influenced the General — who had no
intention of annexing the Khost valley, though subsequently it
was formally surrendered to him by the Afghan Governor — in
undertaking this expedition ; among which were the exploration
of the road from the west end of the valley to Ghuznee, and to
discover the practicability of despatching a force for the punish-
ment of the Wuzeerees, who had been giving some trouble on
our frontier, and whose chief town, Kanigorarn, was not far
distant. The Khost country was marked on the map as a
blank, and the streams that run into the Kurrarn valley at
Hazir Pir were only defined at their embouchure. Captain
Carr, Deputy- Assistant Quartermaster-General, had reconnoi-
tred to a little distance beyond the first march into the valley,
and reported the country open and accessible for cavalry, but
beyond this it was a perfect terra incognita.

On the 27th December, General Roberts struck his camp
near the Kurram fort, and marched with a squadron of the
10th Hussars, F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A.,the 29th Punjaub
N.I., and No. 1. Mountain Battery, to Ibrahirnzai, a distance
of 15 miles, on the way threading the Darwaza Pass, in which
a few camp followers were killed by a body of 60 or 80 marau-
ders, who, however, were driven off by a working party of the
23rd Pioneers, and three of their number captured. The
road lay for the first part along the banks of the Kurram, and
then crossed the Kermanah River. About six miles from Kur-
ram was a large fort and a walled village, like others in this
country, where preparation for defence is the only protection
against oppression. As General Roberts passed this and the
other fortified villages on the road, the walls were lined with
women and children, while the men collected on the bank
below and respectfully saluted the lord of the invincible legions.

At two o'clock, camp was pitched near the village of Ibn>
himzai, and, on the following morning, the 28th December,
General Roberts marched with headquarters and wing of the
12th Bengal Cavalry to Hazir Pir, a distance of about sixteen
miles, the road being through or along cultivation the whole
way, except when crossing some ravines. On the way Suddar
was passed, where a company of the 21st Punjaub N.I. was
employed making a road to Hazir Pir, a mile above which the

182 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

column crossed the Kurram Eiver at a ford. At Hazir Pir
was already encamped a force under the command of Colonel
Cochrane, of the 8th Regiment, consisting of No. 2 Mountain
Battery, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and the 21st Punjaub N.I., who
were located on a site sheltered from the north wind by a low
range of hills, at the angle formed by the confluence of a
stream which drained the valley leading to Khost.

On the 2nd January, 1879, at nine in the morning, General
Roberts commenced his march for Khost, with the following
troops, which were drawn chiefly from that portion of the
Kurram Field Force that had not yet been engaged, and had
been concentrated at Hazir Pir: — Squadron 10th Hussars,
three troops 5th Punjaub Cavalry, Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain
Batteries, 21st and 28th regiments of Punjaub N.I., and wing
of the 72nd Highlanders, 200 men, who had marched up from
Kohat. The Infantry was in command of Colonel Barry Drew,
the Cavalry, of Colonel Hugh (rough, C.B., V.C., ; and the
Artillery, of Lieutenant- Colonel A. Lindsay, R.A. Nearly 900
camels accompanied the column for the carriage of supplies,
as the productions of the country were as unknown as its
topography. In the camp at Hazir Pir were left three guns,
F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A., one company 8th Regiment,
wing 12th Bengal Cavalry, and wing 29th Punjaub N.I.* The
23rd Pioneers, who were engaged road-making in the Darwaza
Pass, were under orders to proceed, on its completion, to the
camp at Hazir Pir.

The first day's march of the Khost column was ten miles to
Jaji Maidan, a cluster of about ten villages, situated in a basin
formed by low hills, forming the head of the valley leading to
Khost. This valley or basin, which has a breadth varying
from three to five miles, though fertile, is quite uncultivated,
owing to the insecurity of life and property, for between the

* The remainder of the Kurram Field Force was disposed as follows for
the winter :— At Thull, 3 guns F Battery, A Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery,
one troop 5th Punjaub Cavalry, one company 8th Regiment, and wing
29th Punjaub N.I. ; at Kurram Fort, one company, 72nd Highlanders, half
troop 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 5th Goorkhas. At the Peiwar Kotul
and vicinity, three companies 72nd Highlanders ; wing, 8th Regi-
ment, three guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, one squadron
12th Bengal Cavalry, 2nd Punjaub N.I., and company of Sappers and
Miners.

Entry into the Khost Valley. 183

Afghan rulers and the freebooters inhabiting the mountains
that dominate the valley, the industrious husbandman (if the
term can be applied to the inhabitants of any part of Afghan-
istan and its appanages) had little chance of reaping the fruits
of his toil. Camp was pitched near the chief village in the
rice fields, which are dry and suitable at this season. The
people were very civil, and the camp was abundantly supplied
with provisions.

On the following morning the march was resumed, for five
miles over open country, when it became rough and steep, the
hills closing in on the road on either side. So slow was the
rate of progression, the cavalry having to go in single file, that
it was nearly noon before the rearguard marched out of camp,
the Jaji villagers watching with interest the progress of the
never-ending column. The scene from the Kotulwas extensive
and not wanting in beauty. At the end of the descent lay the
plain of the Khost country, with a distant blue line of moun-
tains blocking the horizon to the south, and smaller ranges in
front. General Roberts reached the summit of the Pass about
noon, but as, owing to the nature of the road, the camels
of the Commissariat convoy, carrying fifteen days' provisions
for the column, could not arrive till dark, he gave instruc-
tions that they should be halted at the village of Dhani, about
one mile on the Jaji Maidan side of the Kotul, and, in order to
guard against an attack of Mangals, a squadron of the 5th
Punjaub Cavalry, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and the 21st
Punjaub N.I., were halted as an escort.

The remainder of the force pitched camp at Nar, one of the
Bakh group of villages at the northern end of the Khost dis-
trict, the total distance traversed from the Jaji villages being
eleven miles, four miles of which, from the Kotul to a nullah,
were very difficult. The headmen of the village showed a
want of friendliness in not presenting themselves before the
General, who thereupon sent for them, and warned them to be
careful against displaying hostility towards the British, and pro-
mised them good treatment if they behaved well ; at the same
time the prices to be paid for stores were settled with them.

During the 4th of January a halt was made at Nar, to
which the Commissariat camels and escort marched on the fol-

] 84 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

lowing morning without molestation, and advantage was taken
of the rest by that indefatigable and excellent surveyor, Captain
"VVoodthorpe, R.E., who commenced the survey of the country,
which, beginning at the highest hill of the range, was prose-
cuted during the stay of the column in Khost, until the whole
of the country was mapped out. Hence, although owing to
political considerations, which demanded its ultimate abandon-
ment, the result of the invasion of this hitherto unknown
valley was nil, at least geographical science benefited largely,
and what was a blank on our map is now accurately delineated.

General Roberts's attention was again drawn to the careless
way in which the camels were loaded, and he issued a stringent
order on this vital question of transport, directing regimental
officers to see personally to proper loading, the neglect of
which, apart from humanitarian considerations, not only causes
the deaths of these valuable animals, and consequent loss to the
Exchequer and crippling of the mobility of a force, but in
traversing passes, or marching in single-file, necessitates the
halt of the entire column while one load is being re-adjusted.

On the 5th January, at the usual hour for marching, 9 A.M.,
the force proceeded, and as the country was open, the baggage
marched in two broad columns, under a guard, the mules on
one side and the camels on the other, so that the march of
seven miles was concluded by 1 P.M. The road lay across a
plain, past a fortified serai and village, and across the Kara
Khost, or little Khost River, to the village of Khubi, contain-
ing about 1,000 souls, near to which the camp was pitched.
General Roberts, accompanied by his Staff, proceeded to recon-
noitre the road over the pass in the range, which would form
the morrow's march, but observing a party of horsemen, whom
he concluded were the Governor of the Khost district — with
whom he had been in correspondence for some weeks — and
escort, coming to pay his respects to him, he rode back to
camp, as a meeting in the road might have borne the appear-
ance of his advancing to meet the Sirdar halfway.*

* The particulars of the marches and events in this expedition to the
Khost country are derived from Major Colquhoun's work, " With the Kur-
ram Field Force," and from General Roberts's despatches, of which he
kindly sent copies of this and his other campaigns in Afghanistan from
Calcutta to the author.

Roberts s Arrival at Matun. 185

His conjecture was correct, and, at 8 P.M., the Acting-
Governor, Akram Khan by name, came with a large number
of attendants and principal maliks, or headmen, and was re-
ceived by the General in the Durbar tent. The Sirdar was
about forty-five or fifty years of age, and the expression of his
face was not of a character to inspire confidence. He had not
been long in Khost, having previously served for seven years
in the Kurram valley as Deputy- Governor under Sirdar Wali
Mahomed, whose deputy he was now at Khost. During the
interview, which was brief, Akram Khan promised, on the
arrival of General Eoberts at Matun, to make over to him the
fort and all the records of the Khost country.

On Monday, the 6th January, the column marched with the
baggage animals and camp followers, under an escort, in the
centre, the force being divided into two equal portions in front
and rear. The road, after passing for three miles across an
open plain, led over a kotul, and then for about two miles
through some low hills, till the plain was reached, in which
are situated Matun and numerous other villages. As the
baggage column defiled through the Pass, flanking parties
crowned the heights on either side. On reaching the brow of
the slope overlooking the Matun valley, the squadron 10th
Hussars, which formed the advance-guard, halted, when the
Governor and his escort rode up, and was soon joined by
General Roberts, who, escorted by the Hussars, proceeded in
company with Akram Khan towards Matun, about three miles
distant. On arriving within half a mile of the fort, the General
halted the Hussars on the open ground where the camp was
subsequently pitched, and, accompanied by his staff and only
a few files of the 10th, rode into the fort up to the door of the
keep, where the Governor had his private quarters.

The fort of Matuu, which is about eight miles distant from
Khubi, is described as a square walled enclosure, with circular
corner bastions, the length of the side being about one hundred
yards. The interior was occupied by huts along the outer
walls, which were used as barracks and stables. Over the
gateway leading into the fort, which was reached by a road
crossing the exterior ditch, was a suite of rooms, which was
occupied by the Governor's brother. In the centre of the

1 86 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.'

fort was the keep, a smaller square enclosure, with round
towers at two of the angles.

As General Koberts neared the fort, the garrison, consisting
of 200 juzailchees, or matchlock-men, were drawn up at the
entrance, in two lines, " with red silk triangular banners at
the end of the lines." The British General was greeted by
the beating of tomtoms, and, as he rode through the gateway,
each man saluted by raising his hand to his forehead. General
Roberts dismounted at the entrance to the keep, and, accom-
panied by his staff, was conducted to a room on the ground
floor, having access to the garden, which occupied the centre
of the enclosure, above the level of which it was raised some
three feet. The floor was covered with a coarse felt cloth,
with strips of a superior quality arranged around three sides
for visitors to sit or recline, but the General preferred to remain
standing. Tea, without milk, according to the Afghan manner,
was handed round during the interview, which lasted about
half an hour, at the conclusion of which General Roberts and
his staff remounted their horses and returned to the escort.
The great defect of the fort as a military position was
the absence of water, which appeared to be derived from
the surface irrigation canal passing close by it ; but as this
could be easily diverted from the point of its leaving the Matun
river, an attempt had been made to find water inside the fort,
and a well had been dug to a depth of about sixty feet, but
without result.

The whole of the force having arrived, the camp was pitched,
facing outwards, the headquarters tent being in the centre,
thus obviating the necessity of rear-guards. General Roberts,
forewarned by Akram Khan, who stated that he had received
information of large numbers of Mangals assembling, and that
they were being joined by some of the inhabitants of the Khost
valley, with the object of attacking the British camp, took
every precaution against a surprise.

The attitude of the people was unfriendly, and the Maliks,
even when summoned to attend General Roberts, appeared
uneasy, and asked permission to return before they accom-
panied him to the camp. The General had hoped that, as had
happened with the Turis and Jajis of the Kurram valley, the

The Camp Surrounded. 187

people would soon become reassured, and accept the presence
of the British troops as inevitable, but Akram Khan undeceived
him, and stated that the moollahs, of which the district pos-
sessed a large number, famous for their fanaticism, had been
engaged in fanning the religious prejudices of the people, who
were summoned to attack the camp and expel the invaders.

Before night closed in, the Mangals commenced to assemble
in the neighbouring villages in the valley, upon which the
General instructed Colonel Waterfield, the political officer with
the column, to send " purwanas," or written notices, to the
Maliks, warning them that if the camp was attacked, summary
and severe retribution would be exacted on the villages which
had harboured the Mangals or other persons having hostile
intentions towards the British. This at first had the desired
effect, for before midnight nearly all the Maliks from Matun,
as the cluster of walled villages is called, came into camp and
informed the General that the Mangals had departed for their
homes, and they offered to remain in camp as hostages for the
good behaviour of the villagers.

The night passed quietly, but, on the following morning,
some Maliks whom General Roberts had sent to ascertain if
the Mangals had really dispersed to their homes, returned with
the information that the men were on their way when they
were met by large numbers of their tribesmen proceeding to
Matun, and that the whole had returned. They also announced
that other hillmen were assembled in the valley, and that
the camp would certainly be attacked that night by many
thousands of men. On receipt of this intelligence the General
sent out a troop of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under Major
J. C. Stewart, accompanied by Captain Carr, Deputy- Assistant-
Quartermaster-General, to endeavour to ascertain the real state
of affairs. The troop had not ridden two miles when it was
fired upon, and soon it became clear that the enemy had collected
round three sides of the camp. " It was evident to me," says
the General in his despatch, "that the time had arrived when
prompt and vigorous action was required to ensure our safety.
The strength of the column, which amounted to about 2,000
men, all told, was insignificant in comparison with the number
we might find arrayed against us. We were separated by

1 88 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

many miles of difficult country from our nearest support, and I
judged it to be a matter of urgent necessity that the tribes who
had dared to organise an attack on our camp should receive
speedy and severe punishment." It became apparent that a
hot day's work was in store for the British force, as these fierce
hillmen, whose country had never yet suffered the humiliation
of a hostile visit from the conquerors of India, were anxious to
measure themselves against the invaders of their valley. On
his part, General Roberts completed his arrangements with
deliberation, and the troops, which had been directed to fall in
about 9.30 A.M., to repel an attack from the north-west, were
dismissed, as it became apparent that the enemy's plan of
action embraced a simultaneous onslaught from all sides. At
about noon a stampede of grasscutters and camelmen from the
north-east direction, where no enemy had been observed,
showed that the Mangals had completed their movement of
surrounding the British camp.

In the first instance General Roberts reinforced Major
Stewart's troops with all his disposable Cavalry, under Colonel
Gough, retaining only 25 sabres, and sent in support six com-
panies of the 28th Punjaubees, under Colonel Hudson, and No.
2 Mountain Battery, under Captain Swinley. These troops
operated to the north-west of the camp, where the enemy
appeared in greatest strength. The villages in the plain were
found to have been evacuated by the enemy, who occupied in
great force the low hills at the foot of the mountains. The
10th Hussars, 70 sabres, under Major Bulkeley, dismounting,
took up a position on the crest of some low mounds, and
opened fire on the enemy, as did the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, 130
men, from the foot of some detached hills on the right. The
Afghans retired, on which the cavalry took up an advanced
position, and a troop of the 5th Punjaubees, under Major
Williams, made a brilliant charge up another hill, in the centre
of the enemy's position, and, rapidly dismounting, commenced
to harass them in their retreat. The cavalry kept up so close
and effective a fire that the enemy gave way at all points and
fled up the rocks, and nothing remained for the 28th Punjau-
bees to do on their arrival, though the Mountain Battery made
excellent practice, and completed their dispersion. A prominent

The Action at Matun. 189

object in the sky line was a Malik, who fearlessly displayed
a banner as a rallying point to his followers, until a well-directed
shell utterly destroyed him, and in Homeric phraseology,

" Everlasting slumber closed his eyes."

While these troops operated to the north-west of the camp,
where the enemy appeared to be in greatest strength, the right,
or eastern, flank was protected by a wing of the 21st Punjaub
N.I., under Major Collis, and two guns of No. 1 Mountain
Battery ; the other wing of the 21st Punjaubees, under Captain
Carruthers, and the remaining two guns of No. 1 Mountain
Battery, covered the rear of the camp, and the front and left
flank were defended by the wing of the 72nd Highlanders,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke. The whole of the troops in
and around the camp were placed under the command of
Colonel Drew, who was directed to hold his own until Colonel
Gough had disposed of the enemy in his front, which he did in
the manner to be expected of an officer of his military talent
and experience.

General Roberts having made his arrangements for the
defence of the camp, started off to watch the progress of the
attack on the heights, under Colonel Gough. He was only
accompanied by his staff, as by some mistake the twenty-five
men of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, who should have remained in
camp under Colonel Drew's orders, had marched with their
regiment ; and he left with that officer his personal escort of
eight Sowars. Immediately after he quitted the camp, says an
officer who was present, the enemy, who occupied the villages
towards the north-east, began to show themselves, on which
Captain Morgan's two guns were brought into action, and threw
shells amidst the masses with such excellent effect, that they
retreated towards the villages in their rear, and to the south.
This they were enabled to do without hindrance, as the few
Sowars sent out against them were brought up by a water-
course, impassable in this direction. The enemy opened a heavy
fusilade in the rear to the south, from some old Afghan cavalry
lines and a walled village, and the fire was returned by
the left wing of the 21st Punjaubees, and two guns of No. 1
Mountain Battery, supported by Captain Spens's detachment of

i go Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Highlanders. The shell fire quickly dislodged the tribesmen,
who retreated beyond the range of the guns, while the dis-
charges of musketry became brisk and roused the echoes on the
hillside in that lonely valley. Byron describes a similar scene : —

"And pealing wide or ringing near
It echoes on the throbbing ear,
The death shot hissing from afar ;
The shock, the shouts, the groan of war,
Reverberate along that vale,
More suited to the shepherd's tale."

Meanwhile, Colonel Gough's attack on the enemy in the
north-west having succeeded in driving them to the mountain
top, he retired the force under his command slowly and steadily,
and so cowed were the enemy that they made no attempt to
harass him. Before this, General Roberts, who had witnessed
the fighting, ordered a troop of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under
Major Stewart, to follow him, and returned to camp about 2.30,
when he directed the wing of the 21st Punjaub N.I., with the
detachment 72nd on their flank, and the mountain guns, to
follow up the enemy retreating to the east and south-east, and
to burn the villages which had harboured them during the
night. Colonel Drew proceeded with the main body for about
three miles and burnt five villages, which were found to be
deserted, and Captain Carruthers, with the left wing of the
21st, occupied and burnt a village in the south-east direction,
and also a second village, which was first shelled, as the enemy
appeared inclined to make a stand. Crossing the Matun
river a third village was fired, the guns meantime shelling a
crowd of the enemy, who streamed across the plain to the spurs
of the range which closed the valley to the south. The troop
of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under Major Stewart, which had
followed General Roberts to camp, made a very effective charge
on a large body of the enemy, who were escaping from the rear
of a village in which Captain Carruthers' wing of the 21st was
advancing. Major Stewart rode them down, killing over 20 of
their number, and many more would have fallen beneath the
" tulwars " of the Punjaubee horsemen but that they got away
to the stony bed of a broad nullah, commanded by a high bank,
lined with matchlock-men whose fire compelled Major Stewart
to withdraw his men. Soon the 21st came up, and the advance

Defeat of the Enemy. 191

was continued against a village beyond the bank, into which
the enemy had retired. On seeing themselves again threat-
ened, the tribesmen evacuated the village, but a party of about
80 of them, finding their retreat cut off, ran back, and, after
some parley, surrendered. On examining them, Colonel
Waterfield, the political officer, discovered that they did not
belong to the Khost country, but were Waziris. Accordingly,
they were taken to the camp, and General Roberts directed that
they should be placed under charge of the 21st Punjaub N.I.,
as it was his intention to demand a ransom of fifty-eight
rupees per man from the Garbaz section of the tribe to which
they belonged.

In the evening, General Roberts sent for the headmen of
Matun, and told them that they had brought this punishment
on themselves, that it had been his earnest desire to have
avoided all bloodshed, and that they must now see the futility
of attempting to withstand disciplined troops, though greatly
inferior in numbers. During the next few days the headmen
of the Khost district came into camp, and the General im-
pressed on them the views he had enunciated to the Matun
maliks, and assured them they had nothing to fear so long
as they abstained from hostile acts, the sole object he had in
view in entering their country being to oust the government
of the Ameer of Cabul. " There is evidence," wrote General
Roberts to the Viceroy, " that the combination against us was
widespread, and that if a severe example had not been made of
those who fought against us on the 7th inst., the ill-feeling
would have extended. It might, under the circumstances,
have become impossible to leave any portion of my small
column here. The aspect of affairs is now changed; the
headmen of nearly all the neighbouring villages have come in,
and the remainder are reported to be anxious to submit."
But the change was more apparent than real, and the opinion,
in which Colonel Waterfield concurred, that " an adequate force
could now be left here with safety, provided that the troops in
the Kurram valley are maintained in sufficient strength to keep
open our long line of communications," was soon proved to be
fallacious. The sturdy tribesmen were irreconcilable in their
enmity, which perhaps was not surprising, as the punishment

1 92 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

they had received was undoubtedly severe, though similar to
what it has always heen the custom to mete out to refractory
hillmen in our dealings on the north-west frontier. Burning
the habitations of the Khostwallies in the depth of winter
appears a harsh measure to our English views, but it was no
more than the people merited, and such as they anticipated,
for the troops found them all deserted ; but the nearest villages
to the west were left uninjured, as the inhabitants had acted up
to their engagements, and warned the camp followers not to
proceed beyond their protection, while those further off in this
direction, which had afforded shelter to the enemy, were spared,
as it was considered that sufficient punishment had been inflicted.

It was estimated that the combined tribes taking part in
this attack, numbered 6,000 men, of whom 2,000, chiefly Man-
gals, attacked the camp from the north-west. The Jadrans and
Waziris, with the Khost people in league with them, were en-
gaged on the south and east sides. The defeat of the com-
bined tribes had been complete, and the effect of it was appa-
rent during the remainder of the stay of the British troops in
the Khost country ; while it had been achieved with the nominal
loss of only two killed and six wounded.

It would appear that this attack was part of a combination
against the infidel invaders, by the Mangals and Jajis, as, at
the same time, taking advantage of the absence of the column
in Khost, these tribes organized an onslaught on the Peiwar
Kotul. 4,000 of them, assisted by 2,000 of the Hasan Kheyl
section of the Jajis, advanced against the British blockhouses
on the crest of the Pass. But Brigadier-General Thelwall —
warned of their approach by the gallant and able Captain
Rennick, of the 29th N.I., political officer at Ali Kheyl, who
kept at his post with only twenty men — ordered up reinforce-
ments from Kurram and Habib Killa, and though, on the 6th
January, a body of 1,500 of the enemy approached close to the
British position, they feared to make the attack, and retired on
finding all preparations complete for their reception.*

* General Roberts had received a report from General Thelwall of this
intended attack on the 6th of January, and sent 200 Goorkhas to his
assistance, but he telegraphed to Government that as everything had been
placed in a state of defence at Peiwar Kotul. he saw no necessity for calling
on Kurram Fort for assistance.

An Attempted Rescue. 193

During the evening of the 8th January the Waziri prisoners
made a desperate attempt to escape, which was frustrated,
though not without some loss of life. About 7 P.M., it being
dark, the moon not having risen, one of them managed to
escape from the guard, a strong party of the 21st Punjaub N.I.,
under a Subadar, but was shot dead by the picket near which
he passed. Instantly a shot was fired from the bank of a
watercourse, showing that the attempt was part of an organized
effort to effect a rescue, upon which the whole of the eighty- six
prisoners, "who were secured by their hands being tied to ropes
which were picketed down to tent poles, rose as one man, and
began to try to free themselves, crying out, ' Now is the time
to run.' ' Subahdar Makkan Singh, in command of the guard,
called out to the prisoners in Pushtoo to sit down or they
would be fired upon, but without avail, and those of the
prisoners who succeeded in freeing themselves rushed at the
sentries and tried to deprive them of their arms. The native
officer gave the order to fire, and on receiving a volley, which
told with fatal effect on the struggling mass, they threw them-
selves flat down, and quiet was immediately restored. On
separating the dead and wounded from the untouched it was
found that nine had been killed, including three who had man-
aged to clear themselves of their bonds, one had escaped, and
fourteen were wounded, five mortally, and one severely, leaving
sixty-three uninjured. The wounded were carefully attended
to, and the remainder of the survivors, by General Roberts's
directions, divided into three parties under separate guards.
The firing created an alarm in the camp, but perfect order pre-
vailed ; the troops fell in and took their appointed stations in
case of a night attack, " and in less than five minutes from the
first alarm, every one was at his post."

During this affair a party of horsemen, under a friendly
Malik, who were passing along the south-west flank of the
camp, failed to return the challenge of the sentry, who fired at
them, when the chief was wounded in the shoulder. The
night's proceedings were concluded by the cavalry being sent
to scour the neighbourhood of the camp, and as they returned
with the report that no enemy was in sight, the troops were
dismissed and quiet reigned once more around.

o

194 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

During the 9th detachments were sent out to bring in the
grain from the deserted and partially burnt villages, and a con-
siderable body of men were observed on the low ranges of hills
to the north, who had come from Yakubi to loot the camp, as
they had been informed that the Mangals had gained a glorious
victory in the fighting of the 7th, and they naturally desired
to share in the plunder ; but on arriving at the end of the pass
overlooking the plain, they found to their amazement the tents
standing and all secure in the British camp. So confident had
they been of the truth of the intelligence brought to them that,
headed by their Maliks, they treacherously seized and ill-
treated a small party of eight Sowars left under their pro-
tection to guard the mail to Hazir Pir. On learning the true
state of affairs the Maliks restored to the troopers their horses,
arms, and clothes, of which they had robbed them, though this
did not satisfy the Sowars, who loading their carbines, forced
the two Maliks who had ill-treated them to accompany them
to the camp. There an investigation was made into the cir-
cumstances of the case, and the Maliks were tried by a General
Court-martial presided over by Colonel Gough (the offence
being against the Military law), and were sentenced to seven
years' transportation.

General Eoberts, having resolved to make a reconnoissance
in force towards the west end of the valley, occupied the fort of
Matun, some rooms in which were utilised as a hospital, tents
being pitched within the area for the remainder of the sick.
Colonel Collis was placed in command of the fort with his
regiment, the 21st Punjaub N.I., and a troop of the 5th Pun-
jaub Cavalry, under Captain Vousden ; and Mr. A. Christie,
Bengal Civil Service, remained with him, as Political Officer.

195

CHAPTER XI.

General Roberts makes a Tour of the Valley — Army Signalling in Khost—
Durbar of the Headmen of the Khostiwals and Mangals — Evacuation
of Matun and Return March to Hazir Fix — Preparations for the
Advance on Cabul — Reconnoissance by General Roberts— Conclusion
of the Treaty of Gundamuck — Arrival at All Kheyl of the Cavag-
nari Mission — General Roberts Returns to Simla.

ON the morning of the 13th January General Roberts, accom-
panied by Akram Khan, marched with the following troops : —
Squadron 10th Hussars, three troops 5th Punjaub Cavalry,
Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain Batteries, left wing 72ud Highlanders,
and 28th Punjaub N.I. The first day's march was to Dehgan,
a village six miles distant from the camp, the route being
across the river Matun and over a deep watercourse and a
nullah, on the opposite bank of which the people assembled in
great numbers as though to oppose the crossing, but, on
inquiry, it was found that their object was the peaceful one of
selling supplies to the strangers, whose custom of paying for
all they required, when they could take what they wanted, was
one that baffled their philosophy. The prices asked were four
annas (sixpence) for a fowl, and four or five shillings for a
sheep.

The column halted at Dehgan for a day, and General
Roberts, escorted by a troop of the 10th Hussars, and one of the
5th Punjaub Cavalry, rode across the plain on which the camp
was pitched, to the village of Durgai, at the southern end of the
valley, occupied by the Thunnies. The General was respect-
fully received by the villagers, and, assembling the head men
in an open spot in the centre, he addressed them in English,
his words being translated, sentence by sentence, by Mahomed
Hyat Khan, Assistant Political Officer, warning them against
any act of hostility, and holding them responsible for keeping
him advised of any projected raids by their brethren in the

o 2

196 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

hills. The headmen presented the General with a sheep as a
peace-offering, after receiving which he rode through the village
with his staff and a small party, and, passing round it, rejoined
his escort.

Thence General Roberts rode to another village in the west
end of the valley, ahout four miles from Dehgan, where he
again assembled and addressed the headmen, and then pro-
ceeded to a third village, where he repeated his warning, and
rested his horses for an hour. Camp was reached about 4.30,
when he was greeted with intelligence of an apprehended
attack by the Mangals that night. But though 2,000 of them
had, it was reported, sworn on the Koran to attack the camp,
the night passed without any alarm, though shelter-trenches were
thrown up, and other arrangements made to receive them. On
the following day the column returned to Matun.

As there was little forage for the camels, 400 of them, whose
loads had been consumed, were sent back to Hazir Pir, under
escort of a body of Turis of the Kurram valley, and, on the
18th, a convoy, with fifteen days' supplies, for which the
General had sent, arrived from Hazir Pir, escorted by the 23rd
Pioneers and a detachment of the 5th Goorkhas, under Captain
Cook, which latter returned on the following morning escort-
ing the remainder of the camels whose loads had been
consumed.

On the 19th January, the survey party, under Captain Wood-
thorpe, escorted by a detachment of the 28th Punjaub N.I.,
proceeded to survey the southern range which lay in Waziri
territory, their safety being guaranteed by the chief of the
Atakheyl section of the Waziris, Keeput by name, who arrived
in camp with some followers, and, after paying his respects to
the General, accompanied the surveyors. Captain Wynne,
Superintendent of Army Signalling, who accompanied the
survey party, on reaching the highest peak of the range, named
Lazam, heliographed to the camp, twenty miles distant, and
also to Bunnoo, on the British side of the frontier, a distance
of thirty miles from the peak, where the message was read by
Colonel Noel Money, commanding the 3rd Sikh Regiment, who
fortunately had been instructed in the code, and Colonel Godby,
commanding the Punjaub Frontier Force, who happened to be

A Threatened Attack. 197

at Bunnoo at the time, flashed back to General Roberts,
through Captain Wynne, the intelligence that the Mahsood
Waziris had raided and burnt Tank. Taking advantage of this
means of communication, General Roberts heliographed to Lord
Lytton, then at Calcutta, and the messages from the distant
Khost valley, over vast ranges of mountains, reached the
Viceroy within two hours, truly one of the most astonishing
instances of army signalling on record.

General Roberts had determined to raise local levies, chiefly
from among the friendly Turis, to hold the valley on the de-
parture of the British troops, and on the arrival of Captain
Arthur Conolly, of the Meywar Bheel Corps (a name that has
an honoured, though painful, memory in our relations with
Afghanistan), who had great experience in converting the wild
tribes of the Indian peninsula into disciplined soldiers, directed
him to embody and command 200 horse and 200 foot, in which
he succeeded, though the subsequent abandonment of the
valley involved their disbandment.

During the 20th January, General Roberts inspected the
cavalry under Colonel Gough, and directed that a royal salute
should be tired in honour of the surrender of Candahar, and
the day concluded with races and athletic sports for the men.
On the following day, the 23rd Pioneers marched on their
return to Hazir Pir, by the eastern road, which they were
directed to improve, as the General intended to return to Kur-
ram by it. On the 22ud January, General Roberts, accom-
panied by his staff, and escorted by a troop of the 10th Hussars,
rode towards the east end of Khost, and examined the villages,
the largest in the valley, assembling and addressing the head-
men as to their duties and responsibilities towards the domi-
nant power, and returned in the afternoon after a ride of over
twenty miles. Information was received on the 23rd that an
attack on the camp was meditated by the Mangals, who had
collected in great force about twelve miles distant ; and to be
prepared against a night attack, General Roberts ordered the
exposed sides of the camp to be defended by an entrenchment
thrown up 100 yards from the tents, and so admirably did the
different regiments and batteries work, under the direction of
Captain Colquhoun, R.A. (in the absence of Colonel Perkins,

198 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

K.E.), tliab before dark the camp was reported secure, an
earthen hank, 3-|- feet high, and the same width, having been
thrown up in exposed parts, which, with the saddles of 1,200
camels, formed a breastwork that would defy a rush of Mangals
on any part of the camp. The cavalry were sent out to recon-
noitre, but returned without finding any large body of the
enemy, though the villagers at the north end of the valley were
defiant, and the enemy were doubtless concealed in the houses;
during the day the survey party came back, having completed
the examination of the Khost ranges, and connected their
work with the triangulation of the Trigonometrical Survey of
India.

General Roberts received in the afternoon a deputation from
a party of Mangals who had settled in the Keraiah end of the
Kurram valley, asking for a share in the distribution of money
and turbans to those who had behaved well to British rule, and
were dismissed fairly satisfied at the extent to which this
request had been complied with. During the night of the
23rd, some star shells were fired to show the Mangals and
other would-be enemies that the British were ready for them ;
the effect was excellent, the light from the shells illuminating
a space, 800 yards by 400, for a distance varying from 400 to
600 yards. During the two succeeding days the defence of
the camp was completed, under Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., by an
earthen rampart being thrown up in place of the camel saddles,
the construction of a new bastion, with abattis, at the south-
east angle, filling the ditches with water, and other works.
In the afternoon of the 25th January, General Roberts held in
the Durbar tent an assembly of the headmen of the Khost
valley, with those of the Mangals and Jadrans who cared to
attend. The General, in a speech translated by Mahomed
Hyat Khan, first addressed the Khost chiefs, to whom he de-
scribed the arrangements that would be made on the evacuation
by his troops of the valley, which would be placed temporarily
under the administration of Shahzada Sultan Jan, who had
been employed at Kohat in the Punjaub commission, and who
would be supported, if necessary, by the British troops at Hazir
Pir. General Roberts also took advantage of the opportunity
to enlarge on the faithlessness of Russia towards the Ameer

Durbar of Hill Chiefs. 199

Sbere Ali, whose troops, defeated in every encounter, had re-
ceived aid neither in men nor money from that Power. Leaving
Colonel Waterfield, the Political Agent, to confer with the
headmen individually, and bestow rewards on those who had
rendered services, the General addressed the chiefs of the hill-
men, wild, fierce-looking fellows, with unkempt hair and dirty
garments, but armed to the teeth, and told them in a good-
humoured way that if they wanted more fighting he and his
men were ready for them, but that he advised them to keep
quiet. The durbars were concluded by a dinner to the head-
men, for which twenty sheep were slaughtered, and the distri-
bution of a few rupees to each man to pay his expenses.

On the 26th, General Roberts received a letter from Sirdar
Wali Mahomed, son of the late Ameer Dost Mahomed by a
Turi woman, and half-brother of Ameer Shere Ali, reporting
his escape from Cabul, and arrival by the Shutargardan Pass at
Rokian, six miles from Ali Kheyl. The General immediately
sent instructions to Captain Rennick, Political Officer at Ali
Kheyl, to treat the Sirdar with consideration, and escort him to
Hazir Pir, where he would meet him. All the arrangements
for the evacuation of the Khost valley being complete, and the
Shahzada Sultan Jan having been installed as temporary Gover-
nor, on the 27th January, the thermometer marking eight
degrees of frost, the return march was begun, the first stage
being to the village of Sabbri, twelve miles distant.

The road from Matun lay past three detached hills, near the
village of Madhi Kheyl, on the crest of the centre one of which
was a field-work, said to have been made by Timour in one of his
invasions of India, and, skirting the range and crossing several
ravines and watercourses, the road led through a pass, about
seven miles from the camp, to the banks of the Kam Khost
river, across the river, and over another gorge leading into the
Sabbri valley. A halt was made here on the 28th, while Gen-
eral Roberts reconnoitred in the direction of Thull, and the
survey party took observations from the hill, about four miles to
the north-east of the camp. At 10 that night the General
received an express from the Governor left at Matun, reporting
that the Mangals were gathering to attack the fort, with the
intention of killing him and the garrison. The General quickly

2oo Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

formed his plans, which were to remove the Khost garrison and
leave the distracted valley to the tender mercies of the Mangals,
or whoever chose to harry it ; and, at daybreak on the 29th
January, leaving as many troops as he could spare in camp at
Sahbri, under the command of Brigadier-General Drew, ha
started for Matun with a detachment 72nd Highlanders, the
squadron 10th Hussars, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, No. 2 Mountain
Battery, and 28th Punjaub N.I.*

Starting at 6.15, the General arrived at the deserted camp at
Matun at 9.80, when the Mangals were observed on the skirts
of the hill where they had been previously defeated, but ex-
pecting an easy prey in the levies, they were evidently disin-
clined to try conclusions with a powerful enemy. Loading
some camels he had brought with him, with grain from the fort,
the General sent them in advance, under charge of the Turi
levies, and, after the column had breakfasted, commenced to
retire, as evacuation having been decided upon, no object would
have been gained by attacking the enemy, for they could not be
followed up to the hills, as General Roberts's troops had already
marched twelve miles, and he was desii'ous of returning to his
camp that day. The Mangals, who were in great force, esti-
mated at quite 6,000, had meanwhile ventured out into the
plain, about two miles off, and formed a line a mile in length,
and it must have been a source of disappointment to the
General, who had already once chastised them severely, that
the exigencies of the public service, and the necessity for hus-
banding the strength of his men, prevented him from attacking
them. With the limited force at his disposal it required mili-
tary capacity in the commander, and steadiness on the part
of the troops, to effect a retirement before these savage moun-
taineers, whose guerilla tactics are conducive to successful
attacks on a retreating force.

The Mangals remained drawn up in anticipation of an
attack, and General Roberts encouraged the belief by advancing
his cavalry, which took up a position about a mile from the
enemy, who commenced skirmishing in regular order, under

* The troops left in the camp, trhich was placed in a condition to repel
an attack, were 200 men of the Highlanders, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and
the 21st Punjaub N.I , being a total of about 1,000 men.

Evacuation of the Khost Fort. 201

the direction of mounted leaders, one of whom, riding a white
horse, was killed by a lucky shot from the Martini-Henry of
a trooper of the 10th Hussars, which had been thrown for-
ward, in skirmishing order, about 600 yards in advance of the
5th Punjaub Cavalry. Shortly before noon the General com-
menced the retirement by moving off the 28th Punjaub N.I.
and mountain battery, and when they had increased their
distance from the Mangals to about three and a half miles, the
cavalry retired, leaving the enemy in doubt as to the object of
this movement. They accordingly halted, fearing to be drawn
into the open plain, where the British horsemen could ride
them down, and only discovered their mistake as the troopers
trotted off and rejoined their comrades. Then the Mangals
swarmed into the deserted entrenchment and fort, while the
column, making its way unopposed, reached the camp at Sabbri
about five in the afternoon, after a most fatiguing day. Pre-
cautions were taken to guard against a night attack, but none
was attempted.

The march was resumed on the following day, the 30th
January, and General Roberts, escorted by a troop of the 5th
Punjaub Cavalry, pushed on to Hazir Pir, about twenty-four
miles distant from Sabbri. The troops, under Brigadier- General
Drew, made a long march of nearly twenty miles, passing
through a defile in the hills intervening between the Khost and
Kurram valleys, and encamped at Baghzai on the following
day, making the short march of four and a half miles to Hazir
Pir.

On the ] st February Sirdar Wali Mahomed, accompanied by
some Maliks from the Logar valley, and escoi«ked by Captain
Rennick, from All Kheyl, arrived at Hazir Pir. General
Roberts and Captain Conolly, now Acting Political Officer, and
the General's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, a
well-known name in Afghan annals, welcomed the Sirdar, and
at noon, on the arrival of the cortege at the camp, Roberts,
accompanied by his staff, met the Wali Mahomed at the end of
the headquarters street of tents, and conducted him to his own
tent, where a guard of honour and the band of the 21st Punjaub
Native Infantry were drawn up to salute the distinguished
guest. The General invited the Wali to dinner, but this, so

2O2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

far as the Sirdar was concerned, was little more than a Barme-
cide repast, as his Mussulman prejudices prevented him from
partaking of anything more than bread and water with un-
believers.

The Indian Government appeared to consider the Wali Ma-
homed in the British camp as a matter of considerable political
importance, which subsequent events hardly justified, as the
Wali was a man of no ability, and by his descent from a low-
born Turi woman could have but slight pretensions to the
Ameership of a people like the Afghans, who think so highly of
" blue blood." Under orders from the Viceroy, on the 4th Feb-
ruary the Sirdar started for Jellalabad, via Thull, Kohat, and
Peshawur, in order to confer with Major Cavagnari, Chief Po-
litical Agent, and with Sir Samuel Browne, commanding the
Khyber column.

On the day before the Wali's departure, General Roberts,
being desirous of examining the roads, rode to Ahmed-i-Shama,
returning by another route through the hills. During the day,
also, the 29th Punjaub Native Infantry, which had been en-
camped at Hazir Pir during the past month, marched for
Thull, and the squadron 10th Hussars, greatly to the regret
of their comrades in the late campaign, proceeded to join the
head-quarters of their regiment with Sir Samuel Browne.

On the 4th February General Roberts broke up his camp
at Hazir Pir, and, escorted by No. 2 Mountain Battery and
the 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, started for Kurram fort and
the Peiwar Kotul, leaving in camp three guns F Battery A
Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, left wing 72nd Highlanders,
12th Bengal Qavalry, wing 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and wing
21st Punjaub Native Infantry. General Roberts entered the
Kurram river at a ford, where it was 50 yards wide and 3 feet
deep, and, visiting the village of Suddar, where the headmen
petitioned him to remit the fines imposed for their ill-treat-
ment of the troopers placed under their protection, a request
he refused, arrived at Ibrahimzai, where his camp was pitched.
On the following day Kurram was reached, and on the 7th,
General Roberts, having inspected the upper and lower forts,
marched with the same escort for the Peiwar Kotul and
Habib Killa ; on the same day Brigadier-General Cobbe, who

The Punjaub Chiefs Contingent. 203

had sufficiently recovered from the wound received on the 2nd
December, left for Thull, and did not return to the command
of the 1st Brigade until the 2nd March following. General
Roberts, after inspecting the British Camp and positions, pro-
ceeded to Thull (at this time garrisoned by the half F Battery
A Brigade Royal Horse Artillery, wing 14th Bengal Lancers,
and 19th Punjaub Native Infantry), and thence to Kohat, his
base of operations.

At this time the Government placed at the General's dis-
posal for keeping up the communications of the Kurram Field
Force, a contingent offered by the Punjaub Chiefs, of whose
services he was glad to avail himself, as it set free his forces
for field operations. The contingent was commanded by Bri-
gadier-General Watson, C.B., V.C., an officer of acknowledged
gallantry and ability, who had served at Delhi and Lucknow,
and was an old comrade and personal friend of the commander
of the Kurram Field Force. Half of the contingent, which
arrived at Kohat on the 9th February, was sent to Bunnoo on the
13th, and the remaining half marched for Thull on the follow-
ing day, and arrived in time to be inspected by General Rooberts
on the 19th.*

After the inspection the General left for Kohatf, 63 miles
distant, which he reached on the following day. During his
rest at Kohat, General Roberts turned his attention to preparing
for the much desired forward movement in the spring, and for-
warding two months' supplies to Kurram, for which, besides
camels and local transports, 2,000 carts, each drawn by 4 bul-
locks, and carrying 20 maunds, or 16 cwt., were employed, the
journey there and back occupying nearly a fortnight. These

* While at Thull General Roberts made a new disposition of the Kurram
Field Force. The 2nd Brigade was to consist of the troops in advance of
Kurram from Habib Killa to Ali Kheyl ; the 1st Brigade, all other troops
across the frontier, at Kurram, Hazir Pir, and on the road from Kurram to
Thull. The troops in British territory at Thull and Kohat to be under
Brigadier General Watson.

f The following was the Kohat garrison at this time : — Squadron 9th
Lancers, half G Battery 3rd Brigade Royal Artillery ; left wing, 2nd
Battalion 8th Regiment ; headquarters wing, 14th Bengal Lancers, and 5th
Punjaub Infantry. During General Roberta's stay at Kohat the 92nd
Gordon Highlanders and 2nd Punjaub Native Infantry joined the Kurram
Field Force. The command at Kuhat was held by Colonel Osboru Wilkin-
son, 3rd Bengal Cavalry.

204 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

arrangements completed, and having inspected the 92nd Gordon
Highlanders — that magnificent Regiment whose name is iden-
tified with the most brilliant achievements of British arms in
Afghanistan — which joined the Field Force under his command,
General Roberts left Kohat, and, on the 4th of March, issued
from Headquarters at the Kurrain Camp, the orders for the
movement of his troops preparatory to their reassembly at
Kurram on the 15th of the month.

On llth March, General Roberts, with his staff, arrived at
Shinnak, 26 miles from Thull, where he was met by Brigadier-
General Watson, who had been making a flying visit to Kurram
Valley and Peiwar Kotul, and they proceeded in company to
Thull, to receive the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines,
who was expected to make an inspection of the Kurram Field
Force. On the arrival of his Excellency with the Head-
quarter Staff of the Army, General Roberts accompanied him
to Kurram, where, on thair arrival on the 22nd, they were
received by Brigadier-General Drew, and in the afternoon the
troops assembled there were inspected, when their smart ap-
pearance elicited the encomiums of Sir Frederick Haines, who,
on the conclusion of the inspection, called the officers to the
front, and complimented General Roberts on the gallantry
and good conduct of his men. During his visit the Com-
mander-in-Chief inspected the Fort and Regimental Hospitals,
and, accompanied by General Roberts, went to Habib Killa,
where he inspected the 72nd Highlanders, No. 2 Mountain
Battery, and 2nd Punjaub Infantry, and thence rode to the
Peiwar Kotul, where the garrison, consisting of half of the
9th Battery 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, and a wing of the 2nd
Battalion 8th Regiment, were inspected, and the party made
their way through six inches of snow to one of the Block
houses in the Pass. On the 26th of March the Commander-
in-Chief left Kurram on his return to India, and was accom-
panied by General Roberts as far as Shinnak, whence he
rode back the twenty-six miles to Kurram, in one day, amid
pouring rain, which made the road across the cultivated land
as heavy as a bog.

During the next few days the 72nd Highlanders and 23rd
and 28th Native Regiments marched to Ali Kheyl, in the

Preparations for the Advance. 205

Hurriab Valley, as it was desirable to occupy that place
before the melting of the snow from the Shutargardan Pass
permitted its seizure by the enemy, and the 67th Regiment,
C. Battery 4th Brigade, Royal Artillery, and Headquarter wing
14th Bengal Lancers, were pushed on into the Kurram Valley,
the 5th Goorkhas and 21st Punjaub Native Infantry, which
were to form part of the force held in readiness for the ap-
prehended march on Cabul, being moved up. Carriage for
supplies and stores was now, as always, the great difficulty,
owing to the death of the camels, and the scarcity of suitable
mules ; but all difficulties were overcome by the energy im-
pressed into the officers of the Transport Department by the
example of General Roberts, who appeared to be ubiquitous, per-
sonally inquiring into everything, and encouraging every one
to increased exertion. There being a paucity of animals for
the transport of Ordnance Stores, the General ordered the
Artillery horses and mules to be employed, and natives were
engaged to carry the ammunition, about 200 tons, over the
Peiwar Kotul itself.

On the 1st of April General Roberts established his head-
quarters at Byan Kheyl, in the Hurriab Valley, on the further
side of the Peiwar Kotul, where he went to inspect the road-
making, and on the 6th, returned to Kurram from visiting
Ali Kheyl where, three days later, he was joined by the 92nd
Higlanders and half of the 9th Battery 3rd Brigade, Royal
Artillery.

On the same day the General, accompanied by Colonels
Gough and Lindsay, commanding the Cavalry and Artillery
of the Force, rode out to pay a visit to a leading Turi Chief,
Noor Mohamed, who lived in a fortified village about six miles
from Kurram. The Chief happened to be absent, but the
General was received by his representative, who offered for
his acceptance a handsome carpet, which, however, he declined.
Noor Mohamed returned the visit next day, attended by a
following of horse and footmen. General Roberts, desirous of
winning the confidence of all classes, paid a visit, two days
later, to the camp of a large number of Ghilzyes, returning to
the Logar valley with their flocks, who appreciated the honour,
and hospitably received the " Lord Sahib.'3

206 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Throughout his stay in the Kurram and Khost valleys
General Roberts adopted what would appear to more timid
natures the hazardous course of throwing, himself on the good
faith of the fierce hillmen. He habitually attended Durbars
and Jirgas of chiefs, sometimes numbering 200 or 300 armed
men, with an escort of four Goorkhas and two Sikh orderlies of
the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, who were kept in the background, and
though his life was exposed to the knife or musket of any
fanatic desirous of earning immortality by slaying an un-
believer, or of the avenger of blood smarting at the loss of a
relative killed in battle, yet he reckoned correctly on the
chivalry of his foes, and led what might be called a charmed
life when conversing freely with the ferocious sectaries, any
one of whom had it in his power to plunge his knife into the
heart of the British general who had overthrown his people in
battle, and robbed his country of her independence.

An immediate advance on Cabul being expected, the General,
after an interview with the commanding officers of the regi-
ments and batteries of his force, published a divisional order
regulating the scale of carriage for all ranks. The Kurram
Field Force was strengthened by the arrival of half C Battery
4th Brigade, Royal Artillery — bringing with them thirty-seven
elephants for carrying the 9-pounder guns over the mountains
— and the 67th Regiment, which had been sent from the
Madras Presidency. The General went out to meet the new
arrivals, and welcome them to the force under his command.
Other reinforcements arrived during the next few days, includ-
ing the llth Bengal Native Infantry, and the Punjaub chiefs'
contingent, consisting of the three arms, numbering nine
British officers and 2,560 men, with seven guns, the whole
under Brigadier-General Watson ; the 2nd Brigade also received
a new commander in Brigadier-General Forbes, General Thel-
wall having returned to India on sick leave. Deputy- Surgeon
General Townsend also became Principal Medical officer of the
Division, while the signalling department received a new chief
in Captain Straton, 22nd Regiment, a gallant officer, who
rendered excellent service to General Roberts during the re-
mainder of his campaign in Afghanistan, and fell at Candahar
on the 1st September, in the last action of the war.

Preparations for the Advance. 207

Meanwhile the regiments and batteries were being pushed on
over the Peiwar Kotul into the Hurriab valley, and at 5 A.M.
on the 20th April, General Roberts, accompanied by Colonel
Colley (the late ill-fated General Sir George Colley), private sec-
retary to the Viceroy, who had arrived at Kurram on the pre-
vious day, started off to ride to Rokian, in the defile beyond Ali
Kheyl, and returned to the Peiwar Kotul, where they passed the
night, having covered during the day no less than seventy miles
of ground, including the Pass, a feat which speaks highly for
the powers of endurance of both these distinguished officers, as
the cold was severe and the weather inclement.

On the following day they returned to Kurram by the Spin-
gawi route, the first visit the commander of the Field Force had
paid to the scene of his memorable achievement of the 2nd
December.

Undeterred by the heavy fall of snow and wretched weather,
General Roberts, whose sleepless activity was the wonder of all
witnesses, on the succeeding day, accompanied by Brigadier-
General Watson, rode to Badesh Kheyl, seventeen miles distant,
returning the same day to inspect the camels, 2,700 in number,
assembled there, of which only 1,900 were passed as fit for
service by a committee presided over by Major Mac Queen, 5th
Punjaub Native Infantry. Every point relating to the advance
and the efficiency of the force he proposed to take with him
was carefully considered ; and as the European portion of the
Kurram garrison would be small, he took steps to render the
forts defensible.

By the 29th April the arrangements for the advance from
Ali Kheyl, including the storing of provisions and ammunition,
and the ordnance and Engineer parks, were complete, and, on
the following day, the General established his headquarters at
that place, where the greater portion of the Kurram Field Force
was now assembled.* The camps of the 1st and 2nd Brigades,

* The following was the constitution of the Kurram Field Force : — Royal
Artillery under Colonel G. H. Lindsay. F Battery A Brigade Royal Horse
Artillery, G Battery 3rd Brigade Royal Artillery, No "2 Mountain Battery.
Cavalry Brigade, under Colonel H. H. Gough, V.C., C.B., squadron 9th
Lancers, 12th Bengal Cavalry. 14th Bengal Cavalry (Lancers). First
Brigade Infantry, under Brigadier-General Cobbe, 72nd Highlanders, 5th
Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers, 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, 7th Company
Sappers and Miners. Second Brigade, under Brigadier-General H. Forbes,

208 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

with the former being the headquarters, and with the latter the
Artillery, were pitched on two plateaus and fortified, being sur-
rounded by loose stone walls, with picket towers on commanding
sites. The spur jutting out from Matungi, between the two
plateaus and the village of AH Kheyl, had been crowned with
a series of works, the highest of which consisted of picket
towers protected by ditches and scarps ; also a redoubt, with
emplacements for guns and parapets for infantry, and other
positions on the slope of the hill were also occupied. General
Roberts inspected all these works, and, on the 1st of May,
accompanied by Brigadier-General Watson, rode up the Hazar-
darakht defile as far as Dreikulla.

On the 3rd of May a grand parade of all the troops * at Ali
Kheyl and Byan Kheyl was held, and was witnessed by a con-
course of the native population of the neighbourhood ; but the
effect of the review was much marred by a heavy thunderstorm,
with rain and hail. In the afternoon the General, accompanied
by the brigadiers, political officers (Colonel T. Gordon, C.S.I.,
and Captain Rennick) and Staff, held a durbar, which was largely
attended by the headmen of the Hurriab valley. Turbans and
dresses of honour as rewards for friendly conduct were distri-
buted, and then the General made a speech, which was translated
into Pushtoo by Mahomed Hyat Khan, C.S.I., Assistant-Political
Officer, in which he assured his audience of the intention of
the British Government to annex the Kurram and Hurriab
valleys, a determination which was altered at a later period.
He also warned the Jajis to keep on their good behaviour, or
he would pay a hostile visit to their most secluded vales.

92nd Highlanders, 5th Punjaub Native Infantry, 21st Pui jaub Native In-
fantry. The Kurram Valley Reserve, under Brigadier- General Watson, V.G ,
C B., half C Battery A Brigade Royal Artillery, No. 1 Mountain Battery, 5th
Punjaub Cavalry. First Infantry Brigade, 2nd Battalion 8th King's
Regiment, and llth Bengal Native Infantry. Second Infantry Brigade,
67th Regiment, and 29th Punjaub Native Infantry.

* The strength of the Kurram Field Force, including the Punjaub chiefs'
contingent, was as follows on the 1st of May : — 212 British officers and
3,511 European soldiers of all ranks, exclusive of five officers and 95 men
sick and wounded ; 9,180 native officers, non-commissioned officers, and
men effective, and 259 in hospital ; grand total, 13,269 ; 15 9-pounder and
12 mountain guns ; 4,673 public, and 2,230 private, camp followers. Of
animals for the service of the guns and cavalry there were 2.613 horses,
277 mules, 26 bullocks, and 58 elephants. Also 800 grass cutters' ponies.

The Treaty of Gundamuck. 209

Advantage was taken of the halt by the Survey department
to examine the Shutargardan, and a party returned by the
Thabai pass, which enters the Hazardarakht defile at Jaji
Thanna, a route which was pronounced impracticable for camels.
Survey parties, under Captains Woodthorpe and Martin, with a
strong escort, also explored the neighbouring country, including
the range between the Manjiar Pass and the Peiwar Kotul; also
the Jahtra Pass, opposite Byan Kheyl, and the ranges over-
looking the Ahmed Kheyl villages, by which much valuable in-
formation was procured, and a considerable tract of country,
with the course of the Hazardarakht, or upper Kurram River,
mapped out.

On the 9th May, the General, with his staff, rode to Shalu-
zan, to select a site out of some that had been examined by
Major Collett, the head of the Quartermaster-General's depart-
ment, and a few days later proceeded to the Kurram valley,
returning to Ali Kheyl on the 14th. On the following day he
issued a lengthy order detailing the system on which the Trans-
port was to be worked from the 1st June.

But all these preparations appeared as if they were to end in
naught, for, on the 13th May, intelligence was received in camp
that Yakoob Khan had accepted the terms on which was based
the instrument known in history as the treaty of Gundamuck,
thus concluding all probability, as it was mistakenly supposed
at the time, of a further prosecution of hostilities. On the
following day the chiefs of the Ahmed Kheyl section of the
Jajis, who had been consistently hostile to the British, came
into camp and made their submission, saying that they had
been informed that they were freed from allegiance to the
Ameer of Cabul.

General Roberts, now that there was slight chance of an
advance on Cabul, occupied himself in conducting a series of
reconnoissances, by which he personally gained an intimate
knowledge of the surrounding mass of mountains, with their
peaks and passes, within two days' march of the British camp
at Ali Kheyl. Accompanied by his staff he made a reconnois-
sance in force, on the 22nd May, of a peak on the south-western
side of the camp, between the points visited in the reconnois-
sances of the 10th and 17th of the month. The escort con-

2io Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

sisted of four companies of the 72nd Highlanders, two com-
panies of the 3rd Goorkhas, with a reserve of two companies
of the 92nd Highlanders, two companies of the 21st Pimjaub
Native Infantry, and two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery ;
and some of the lately hostile Ahmed Kheyls accompanied the
party, with which also went the survey officers. The peak
which General Koberts ascended, had an altitude of 10,300 feet,
whence a magnificent view was obtained, and signals were ex-
changed with the camp and reserves by means of an interme-
diate party on the further side of the Sappri valley, overlooking
Ali Kheyl. So important were the results obtained in these
reconnoissances that the General issued a divisional order, in
which, after thanking the troops, and the officers for their
sketches and reports, he declared that " the results obtained
possess a political, in addition to their topographical, value, and
the people of this country now understand that the paths over
their precipitous mountains can be traversed by British troops
as easily as by themselves."

On the Queen's Birthday (24th May) General Koberts held a
grand parade of all the troops forming the Kurram Field Force,
the regiments and batteries coming up from Peiwar to take
part in the display. On the ground, drawn up in three lines,
were 5,500 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, with twenty-seven guns and
two Gatliugs. After the usual three cheers and feu-de-joie, the
General rode up to the 5th Goorkhas, and decorated Captain
Cook with the Victoria Cross for his gallantry on the 2nd De-
cember, in saving the life of Major Galbraith, Assistant- Adjutant-
General, and conferred on two native officers and seven non-
commissioned officers and men of the regiment, the 3rd class
Order of Merit, for distinguished gallantry at the Peiwar Kotul.
He then addressed Major Fitz Hugh on the pleasure it afforded
him to have his distinguished regiment under his command,
and eulogized Captain Cook as an officer of established repu-
tation in the Punjaub Frontier Forces before the present cam-
paign. A march past of the division concluded the ceremony,
and during the day, the orders for the return of the troops to
the Kurram valley were published.

On the following day the division broke up, and on the 26th
General Koberts marched with headquarters to Shaluzan, where

Reconnaissances by General Roberts. 2 1 1

Brigadier-General Watson, on behalf of the Punjaub chiefs,
gave an open air luncheon to General Roberts and his staff,
and about 100 other officers, who were regaled on luxuries such
as they had not enjoyed since the commencement of the cam-
paign. When the company had done justice to the delicacies
spread before them, General Roberts made a speech, thanking
the Punjaub chiefs for the assistance they had afforded the
government, to which General Watson returned thanks, and then
proposed the health of the gallant commander of the Kurram
Field Forces, which was drunk with enthusiasm. During the
day a telegram was received, reporting the signature of the
treaty of Gundamuck.

General Roberts returned to Kurram and thence to the Pei-
war Kotul, inspecting the site of an artillery camp halfway
between Shaluzan and the Peiwar (or Habib Killa) cantonment.
Having ordered a re-distribution of troops on the return of the
Punjaub Chiefs' Contingent* to India on the 31st May, the
General returned with headquarters to Ali Kheyl ; and, on the
1st June, rode up the Lakkerai Pass, a distance of eighteen
miles, with the object of meeting Captain Strahan, R.E., and
Major Stewart, Guide Corps, who had been sent from Gunda-
muck to report on the road ; but after waiting some time, he
returned to camp, and a telegram was afterwards received, re-
porting that they had been unable to cross the pass as their
baggage animals had been seized by robbers. But Mr. Scott,
of the Survey Department of the Khyber column, reached the
summit of the Peak of Sikaram, whence he saw the Kurram
and Hurriab valleys spread out like a map at his feet, but
though a lookout was kept at Ali Kheyl in anticipation of a
heliographic signal, he was unable for some reasons to com-
municate with the signallers below, f

* On the 2nd of June General Roberts issued a farewell order, express-
ing "his high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Brigadier-
General Watson, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men,
during the three months they had been under his command, when they
were employed in escorting convoys and protecting the line of communica-
tion." So excellent had been the behaviour of the n-.en, both in camp and
on the line of march, that he added, " Their conduct has not been the
subject of a single complaint by the inhabitants of the country, and their
steadiness and good discipline reflect honour on those chiefs whom they
serve."

t Captain Colquhoun's " With the Kurram Force."

P 2

212 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

On the 2nd June General Roberts, escorted by two companies
of the 92nd, four companies of Goorkhas, and two mountain
guns, marched on a reconnoissance of the country of the
Ahmed Kheyl section of the Jajis, which had not yet been
visited, though visible from the ranges to the south of Ali
Kheyl. The people did not appear friendly, and the chief
failed to put in an appearance to pay his respects, on which
the General sent a native assistant political officer to require
his presence, when he came into camp, which was pitched for
the day at a ridge called Dobozai. Accompanied by his staff,
and an armed escort of the villagers, locally called a " badragga,"
the General ascended a spur running south from Saratiga
(white rock), a peak forming the centre of a series of spurs,
which spread out like a fan from the neighbourhood of the
Shutargardan. The view from this point was of a sea of
mountain chains and peaks, the Zermatt valley in Afghanistan
being visible, but the General was unable to see Ghuznee,
which lay on the further side of a low range of hills which
bounded the horizon to the south-west. As soon as the
Mangals in the valley below saw the party on the ridge which
overlooked their country, they raised the alarm, and began to
collect with the object of intercepting their return, on which
the General, who besides the "badragga," was accompanied
by only a few orderlies, returned to camp, and thence proceeded
to Ali Kheyl that night.

In order to complete his knowledge of the network of
mountains to the south of the Hurriab valley, General Roberts
proceeded, on 6th June, with his staff, and some officers of
the survey, escorted by two companies 28th Punjaub Native
Infantry, and No. 1 Mountain Battery, and a "badragga " of
Jajis, to explore the route by the Ishtiar Pass, which, starting
from Byan Kheyl, leads across the range, and emerges in the
upper Kurram valley. In order to co-operate against an attack
by Mangals, the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 300 men of the
5th Punjaub Native Infantry had been ordered on the 1st June
to march from the camp at Peiwar to Keraiah, in the upper
Kurram valley. The destination of the reconnoissance was
kept secret, so that no opposition was experienced. The pass
was found to be less steep and rugged than the Manjiar defile,

A Critical Time. 213

and the camp was pitched in a broad open valley, at the
west end of the range that slopes down from the Peiwar Kotul.
On the following day the march was made to Keraiah, eight
miles distant, near the mouth of the Manjiar Pass. The survey
officers connected their survey of the Kurram valley with that
of Khost, which lay to the south, on the other side of the range
of mountains, and several reconnoissances were made in this
direction across the Kurram river. On the 15th June the last
of these was to be made, enabling the survey officers to map
the course of the Kurram river between Keraiah and the
country of the Ahmed Kheyls, the chiefs of whom, Zaib and
Cassim, the headmen of the Hassan Kheyls, were in camp,
and guaranteed the safety of the party with which General
Roberts intended to proceed. A part of the road, however,
passed through the territory of the Lajji Mangals, who sent
into camp ten hostages for their good behaviour.

General Roberts started with the survey officers and an
escort, consisting of No. 1 Mountain Battery, a detachment of
the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and the 5th Punjaub Native Infantry,
and was about entering a difficult gorge by which the Kurram
river enters the valley, one mile and a half from camp, when
a man of the " badragga," consisting of Chumkunnies, who
owned this part of the river bed, observed that the Mangals
would make an objection to the advance of the party the
General intended to take with him, which consisted of only
the survey officers, eight men of the 5th Native Infantry under
Major Mac Queen, and four orderlies of his escort. General
Roberts sent the Assistant-Political officer, Mahomed Hyat
Khan, to ascertain if this was so, and on his reporting the
road clear, the party continued their march, and reached the
first Mangal village, two miles further on, where the headmen
paid their respects to the General.

Pushing on along the hillsides, a body of Mangals were
seen about 400 yards distant, who assumed a hostile attitude,
on which the General ordered a halt, as the Ahmed Kheyl
villages, which were the goal of the expedition, lay three miles
higher up, and it would have been unwise, if not impossible,
to have pushed on there against opposition, while their return
would have been cut off. Accordingly, a halt was called under

214 Memoir of Sir. Frederick Roberts.

a plane-tree, at the entrance of a glen leading to the bed of the
river, while an attempt was made to bring the Mangals to
terras ; but they refused to permit the passage of the party.
While the General was discussing the matter with the head-
men, under the shade of the plane-tree, suddenly a party of
Mangals poured in a volley from a peak overlooking the glen.
Had it not been for a wall of rock, thirty feet high, which
screened most of the party, few would have escaped. Colonel
Mark Heathcote and Major Collett, both officers of the Quarter-
master-General's Department, had narrow escapes, and one
sapper and a nephew of the Hassan Kheyl Chief, were
wounded.

The General had already taken the precaution to order the
return of the survey party, and had sent word to the supports
to be ready to advance, if necessary, and now gave the order to
retire, which was done with order and deliberation. Meanwhile
the badragga had disappeared, and the enemy swarmed down
from the peak, and kept up a hot fire on the small escort,
which, under the leadership of Major Mac Queen, managed to
keep them off until the supports were reached.

On the return of General Roberts to the camp at Keraiah,
the Man gal hostages were sent to Kurram for detention till
their tribe had paid a fine of 1,000 rupees for breaking their
engagements.* The maliks of Keraiah were also sent prisoners
to Kurram for failing to warn the General of the treachery of
their neighbours.

On the 17th of June the camp at Keraiah was broken up,
and General Roberts returned to Shaluzan, whence the head-
quarters were moved to the Peiwar Kotul, as being more
salubrious. In the second week of July, Brigadier-General
Dunham Massy arrived to relieve General Roberts, and take
up the command of the advanced brigade of the Kurram Field
Force, now reduced by the breaking up of the 2nd Brigade,
commanded by Brigadier-General Forbes, Brigadier-General
Cobbe, commanding the 1st Brigade, having been appointed to
command at Agra. On the 15th July arrived Major Cavagnari,

* The Mangals made their submission on the 5th of July, and paid up
500 rupees, expressing their inability to pay tb.3 remainder, which was
remitted.

General Roberts and Major Cavagnari. 215

C.B., the recently appointed Envoy to the Court of the Ameer
Yakoob Khan, and, on the following day, the remaining officers
of the Mission, Mr. Jenkins, C.I.E., Secretary, Surgeon-Major
Kelly, and Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C., of the Guide Corps,
who commanded the escort of fifty men from the infantry, and
twenty-five from the cavalry, of his own regiment.

General Roberts and Major Cavagnari proceeded together
to Ali Kheyl, the 5th Punjaub Infantry escorting the rest of
the Mission, which encamped near Zubberdusht Killa. In
order to impress the natives with a proper sense of respect due
to Her Majesty's Envoy, and also to give as many officers as
circumstances permitted the opportunity of visiting the Shutar-
gardan Pass, General Roberts detailed a strong force, under
Brigadier- General Massy, consisting of two companies from
each of the three British regiments, a squadron of the 12th
Bengal Cavalry, 4* guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, and the
5th Goorkhas, which inarched on to Dreikulla, ten miles up
the Hazardarakht defile, where they were joined, on the 18th
July, by the General and Envoy from Ali Kheyl.

The camp was pitched that afternoon at Saratiga,f and in
the evening Major Cavagnari gave a farewell dinner to General
Roberts, at which mutual good wishes were exchanged between
the host and his guest, which subsequent events too sadly
belied. On the following morning, the 19th July, Sirdar
Khusdil Khan, formerly Governor of Afghan Turkestan, de-
puted by Yakoob Khan to welcome the British Envoy, arrived
at the camp. He was received by General Roberts and Major
Cavagnari, and as soon as all was ready, the cavalcade started
on the mission for the Afghan camp at Cassirn Kheyl, in the
Shutargardan plain, and General Roberts, accompanied by his
staff, and all the officers on leave, marched for the Pass, from
the summit of which they viewed the Logar valley and the
road to Cabul, which all thought with a sigh they were not to
traverse.

* The two mountain batteries had used only four guns during the cam-
paign, but when the preparations for the advance on Cabul were in progress
they were made up to the strength of six guns.

t Saratiga derives its name from a light- coloured cliff near, forming
the boundary of the Jaji territory.

216 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

On his return, General Eoberts visited Khusdil Khan, who
received him with ceremony, hut created anything but a favour-
able impression, owing to the sinister expression of his face
and want of cordiality. Among the chiefs accompanying the
Sirdar was Padshah Khan, chief of the Eastern Ghilzyes,
whom the late Ameer Shere Ali had appointed "VYuzeer, or
Prime Minister, and who had received gifts from the British
for his friendliness towards them. After the interview a dinner
was served in the Afghan fashion, in large trays raised about
six inches off the ground, but the cuisine was by no means
despicable, and the menu was varied, though there was only
one spoon on each tray, and no plates or knives and forks, the
former being represented by large " chupatties," or flat cakes
of flour, and the latter by the fingers of each guest. Only four
chairs were provided — for the Sirdar, the General, the Envoy,
and his secretary, the remaining officers participating in the
banquet having to sit cross-legged on the floor. After the
guests had washed their hands in basins passed round by the
attendants, tea was served, and then hot milk, sweetened and
spiced, completed the entertainment.

On this day General Roberts was gazetted, in London, to a
Knight Commandership of the Bath, and never had the honour
been more worthily earned, and many officers of the staff and
of the force under his orders received decorations and pro-
motion. Major Cavagnari was also made a K.C.S.I.

Sir Frederick Roberts remained for the night at Cassim
Kheyl, and, on the following morning, bade farewell to his
entertainer, and the ill-fated British Envoy, who, with his
officers and escort, was seen no more by his countrymen. As
the newly-made Knight of the Star of India watched the last
of the gallant array that disappeared from view with Sir
Frederick Roberts, it may well be a subject of speculation
whether such thoughts presented themselves to his mind as
Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Henry IV., who gloomily
exclaimed, when insurrection, which he had employed to over-
throw the unhappy Richard, raised its head to eject him from
the throne,

" 0 heaven ! that we might read the book of fate,
And see the revolution of the times."

Roberts returns to Simla. 217

Though, recognizing the wisdom that hides our fortunes under
the pall of futurity, the King adds —

" If this were seen,

The happiest youth — viewing his progress through,
What perils past, what crosses to ensue —
Would shut the book, and sit him down and die."

Sir Frederick Boberts returned to AH Kheyl, where he held
a farewell durbar of the chiefs of the surrounding tribes and
clans, to whom, in the name of the Government, he made
presents. Handing over the command of the Kurram Field
Force in its diminished strength, to Brigadier-General Massy,
he left the scenes of his triumphs and returned to Simla,
where he had been summoned as a member of the Army Com-
mission, which Lord Lyttou had assembled for the purpose of
considering the reorganization of the Indian Army.

2 1 8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTEE XII.

Massacre of the British Mission at Gabul — Receipt of the Intelligence by
Sir Frederick Roberts at Simla — He Proceeds to take the Field —
Arrival at Ali Kheyl — Preparations for the Advance on Cabul — Sir
Frederick Roberts Moves across the Shutargardan Pass — He Experi-
ences a Narrow Escape — Arrival at Kooshi — Interview with Yakoob
Khan — Proclamations of Sir Frederick Roberts to the Army and the
People of Cabul.

SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS was received at Simla with much
distinction by the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, who gave a grand
banquet in his honour, at which, in the presence of the highest
dignitaries of the State, his Lordship designated his guest,
" the hero of the Afghan War," a title he had fairly won as
the victor of the Peiwar Kotul, by far the most brilliant and
prominent achievement of the campaign, which, as regards the
Khyber and Bolan columns, was rather barren of military
exploits. But hardly had the congratulations of the General's
friends and well-wishers ceased to sound in his ears, and
scarcely was the ink dry on the proclamation of the Viceroy,
announcing the conclusion of the peace of Gundamuck, than
that much-vaunted instrument was torn to shreds by an act of
more than Oriental treachery, and the paean of triumph sung
by the Viceroy was turned into expressions of horror and
lamentation at the fall of his friend, Sir Louis Cavagnari, and
the gallant officers and men who composed the mission to
Cabul.

Before proceeding with the narrative we will interpolate a
brief account of the circumstances attendant on the perpetra-
tion of this tragedy, as they bear on the relations that later
existed between Yakoob Khan and Sir Frederick Roberts.

On the conclusion of the treaty of Gundamuck the Ameer
Yakoob Khan returned to Cabul, accompanied by Habibulla
Khan, the Mustaufi, or Finance Minister, Daoud Shah, his

Massacre of the Cavagnari Mission. 219

Coniniander-in-Chief, and a native agent in the employ of
Sir Louis Cavagnari, named Buktiar Khan, who was entrusted
with the duty of preparing for the reception of the British
mission. Sir Louis Cavagnari, after bidding farewell to
Sir Frederick Eoberts, on the 19th of July, proceeded by
the Shutargardan pass to Cabul, which he entered on the
24th of July, having been received en route with the utmost
consideration and ceremony by the Ameer's ministers and
troops, and in his reception by Yakoob Khan was treated
with every mark of esteem and honour. Unfortunately
Buktiar Khan died a few days before the Envoy's arrival at
Cabul, and the death of so tried an agent was a great loss to
Sir Louis; but beyond some trivial disputes in the Bazaar
between the Ameer's troops and the Envoy's escort, all went
well, and, says the Viceroy in his letter to the Secretary of
State for India, dated September 15th, 1879, detailing the
events preceding the massacre, the Envoy's last private letter,
dated 30th of August, concluded with the words : " I per-
sonally believe that Yakoob Khan will turn out to be a good
ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements."
The Ameer spoke with pleasure of his proposed visit to the
Viceroy, in which he was to be accompanied by the Envoy, and
on the 2nd September, Sir Louis Cavagnari despatched a
telegram to Lord Lytton, the last received from him, conclud-
ing with the words, " all well."

On the following day the British Residency in the Bala
Hissar, or Citadel of Cabul, was attacked by three regiments,
called the Ordal Regiments, who had come to the pay office in
the Bala Hissar to receive their arrears, and on hearing that they
were not to be paid in full, two of the regiments attacked the
Residency, and being joined by the mob, succeeded in setting
the buildings on fire and destroying its defenders after a despe-
rate resistance.

The news of this extraordinary outrage was conveyed to
Ali Kheyl, in the form of a letter addressed by Yakoob Khan
to Sir Frederick Roberts. In the first, dated 4 P.M., the 3rd
September, the Ameer reports the attack, at 8 A.M., on the
Residency by the troops and " people from city and surround-

22O Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

ing country," and adds that he had sent without avail his son
and Daoud Shah, whom he reported as "dying;" and the
second letter, dated 4th September, reported that the attack on
the Residency had gone on from " morning till evening," when
the building was set on fire, but added, that he had no " certain
news " of the fate of the Envoy, and that he himself, "with
five attendants, had been besieged." The statements of the
messenger who brought these letters, an uncle of Padshah
Khan, the great Ghilzye Chief, left no doubt as to the fate of
the mission and escort.

In Sir Louis Cavagnari, Sir Frederick Roberts lost a per-
sonal friend, of whom Lord Lytton spoke in no exaggerated
terms when he said, that " by his life and death he had
bequeathed to the Service he adorned a splendid example, and to
the Empire for whose interests he lived and died, the grateful
guardianship of his honoured memory and spotless name."
But he did not die unavenged, for his friend the British General
swiftly appeased his manes, as did Achilles those of Patroclus :

" Whole hecatombs of Trojan ghosts shall pay."

Thousands of Afghans bled for the treacherous deed enacted
on the 3rd September, and the faineant monarch — who sur-
veyed the scene from his palace windows while he despatched
messengers, and ultimately his Commander-in-Chief, Daoud
Shah, the only honest man of them all, to check his mutinous
soldiery — suffered for his want of good faith by the sacrifice
of his throne.

The fate of Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C., who commanded
the escort, an officer young in years, but of great distinction
and still higher promise, was especially tragic, and had in its
circumstances all the elements of the heroic. Standing at bay,
sword and revolver in hand, the heart of the young hero
quailed not, while he confronted the surging mob thirsting for
his blood.

A melancholy interest attaches to some lines, displaying
considerable poetic merit, written, shortly before his death, by
Lieutenant Hamilton, and sent from Cabul on the 25th of
that August, eight days before he was massacred : —

Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C. 221

"THE VILLAGE BEHMAEU."
(Scene of outbreak of Cabul disaster, 1841. Revisited, August, 1879.)

" Though all is changed, yet remnants of the past
Point to the scenes of bloodshed, and, alas !
Of murder foul ; and ruined houses cast
Their mournful shadow o'er the graves of grass
Of England's soldiery, who faced a lot
That few, thank Heaven ! before or since have shared ; -
Slain by the hand of treachery, and not
In open combat, where the foe ne'er dared
To show themselves. The fatal, honest trust
Placed in an enemy who loved a lie
And knew not honour was a trust that cost
The lives of those that gave it. Yet to die
Game to the last, as they did, well upheld
Their English name. E'en now their former foe
Frankly avers the British arms were quelled
By numbers only and the cruel snow.
'Tis forty years since British soldiers turned
To look their last on this now peaceful scene,
Whose lingering gaze spoke volumes as it yearned
For vengeance due to treachery so mean.
And vengeance true did Pollock, Sale, and Nott
Deal with a timely and unerring hand
As they with victory effaced the blot
Which first had dimmed the annals of our land.
And, now, while standing here, where side by side
Fell many fighting with a fruitless bent,
Regret were uppermost were't not for pride
Which gives no place for weaker sentiment.
And Pride might well be foremost if one thought
That though fair Fortune smiled not for awhile,
How England's fame shone brighter as she fought,
And wrenched lost laurels from their funeral pile,
And rose at last from out misfortune's tide
Supreme — for God and right were on her side."

Sir Frederick Koberts was at Simla, engaged on the Army
Commission to which he had been appointed before the out-
break of the war, when, at 1 o'clock on the morning of the 5th
September, he was suddenly roused from his sleep with a
telegram from Captain Arthur Conolly, Political Officer at Ali
Kheyl, announcing the astounding news of the murder of the
British Envoy at Cabul, with the other members of the
Mission, and all save nine men of the escort. Sir Frederick
immediately sent the telegram to Lord Lytton, and proceeded
in person shortly afterwards to Government House. The
Viceroy settled with him the composition of the force that

222 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

was to be launched against the city of Cabul, and a meetirg of
the Council was summoned, at which the Commander-in- Chief
attended.

General Koberts's achievements in the first phase of the
Afghan War pointed him out as the man for the crisis that
had arisen, and Lord Lytton, who had hailed him as " the
hero of the Afghan "War," now that hostilities had so unex-
pectedly broken out, with a discrimination that does his judg-
ment infinite credit, selected the young General for the Com-
mand of the Force that was to vindicate the outraged name
of England. It was a high honour, but Koberts's whole
career pointed to him as the man pre-eminently fitted to cope
with the emergency that had arisen. As Warwick says :

" There is a history in all men's lives,
Fixing the nature of the times deceased,
The which observ'd, a man may prophesy,
With a near aim, of the main chance of things
As yet not come to life."

Those who had watched Roberts' s career since he made his
name at Delhi, recognized in him the man of the hour, and
public opinion fully endorsed the Governor- General's action in
appointing him to the command of the army of retribution, in
spite of the claims of seniority. It was admitted that the
campaign in the Kurram Valley had introduced to the world a
soldier of uncommon excellence, one combining the caution of
Nestor with the fiery valour of Achilles, " impiyer, iracundns,
inexorabilis, acer"

In the afternoon of the following day, the 6th September,
Sir Frederick Roberts started for Ali Kheyl, with orders to
advance rapidly on Cabul with a force of -about 6,500 men.
He travelled post by night and day, taking the rail to Jhelum,
and thence proceeding by mail-cart and riding, and arrived at
Thull on the 10th September, and at Ali Kheyl on the 12th.
Meanwhile Brigadier-General Massy had been instructed by
telegraph to occupy the Shutargardan Pass, and General
Stewart, who had evacuated Candahar, was directed by the
Viceroy to return to the city, whilst Jellalabad was re-occupied,
and a reserve of 5,000 men assembled between Rawul Piudee
and Peshawur.

By the llth September, the 5th Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers,

Roberts s arrival at AH Kheyl. 223

and No. 2 Mountain Battery, the whole under Colonel Currie,
commanding the Pioneers, acting under Sir Frederick Eoberts's
instructions, were securely entrenched on the crest of the
Shutargardan Pass. As it was a matter of the greatest im-
portance that every facility should be afforded for the easy
passage of the artillery across the Shutargardan, Sir Frederick
Roberts telegraphed orders on the 9th September, directing the
7th Company of Sappers and Miners, then at Shaluzan, to
march with all speed towards the Pass. This order was
executed promptly, and by the 13th inst. they were at work
on the Sirkai Kotul, a steep and awkward ascent about three
miles beyond the summit of the Pass.

Sir Frederick Roberts was accompanied, or followed, by the
following officers whom he had selected for high command.
Brigadier-Generals H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., and T. D.
Baker, C.B., to command the two infantry Brigades ; Brigadier-
General J. Gordon to command the column of 4,000 men
holding the country from Shutargardan to Thull ; Brigadier-
General H. Gough, C.B., V.C., to be Road Commandant.
Brigadier-General D. Massy, now commanding at Ali Kheyl,
was nominated to command the Cavalry Brigade. He selected
as Chief of the Staff, Colonel C. M. Macgregor, C.B., of the
Quartermaster-General's Department, an officer, though young
in years, of great military experience and considerable talent.

General Baker proceeded, on the 13th September, to take
command of the troops at Shutargardan, the position at which
was strongly entrenched, and every precaution taken against a
surprise. With the energy that distinguished this gallant
officer while serving under Sir Garnet Wolseley in Ashantee,
he made a reconnoissance on the 16th, as far as Shinkai
Kotul, but met with no resistance. Two days before, Nawab
Sir Gholam Hussein Khan passed thourgh Shutargardan and
proceeded to Ali Kheyl where he joined Sir Frederick Roberts.
This distinguished native officer was proceeding from Candahar
to Cabul, to assist Sir Louis Cavagnari, but fortunately heard
on the road of the massacre of the British Mission.

Sir Frederick Roberts's first consideration was transport for
the force of between 6,000 to 7,000 men, whom he was going
to take with him to Cabul. With the usual want of fore-

224 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

thought at Army Headquarters, where a renewal of hostilities
was not anticipated, the animals of the transport department
of the Kurram Field Force were suffered to fall below the
strength essential to maintain its efficiency. Sir Frederick
Koberts writes : — " Transport was the great difficulty which had
to be met. Owing to the continuous and hard work to which
the animals had been subjected, their numbers had steadily but
rapidly diminished until, at the commencement of the month
of September, there remained about 1,500 mules, 500 sickly
camels, and 800 bullocks, or barely sufficient to enable the
Commissariat to feed the force which it was presumed would
remain in the Kurram valley for the winter. It is true that a
large number of pack bullocks had been despatched for the
Commissariat service in the valley, but of these many had
been knocked up by the journey from the Punjaub, or were
suffering from semi-starvation to such an extent as to be
practically useless." As he said to the writer, " On arriving
at Ali Kheyl I found that there was only transport for half the
force I was to take to Cabul. Little provisions were in store,
and there was no communication with the Khyber Column."
And yet within about six weeks, his communications would be
transferred by the snowing up of the Shutargardan route to
that by the Khyber.

In his endeavours to improvise a transport Roberts had the
support of the Viceroy, a functionary whose word is law in our
despotically-governed dependency. By Lord Lytton's orders, the
Peshawur district was swept clean of transport cattle, but still the
number was insufficient, owing to the enormous loss among the
camels and the improvidence of the Indian authorities, who, not
anticipating a renewal of hostilities, had suffered the transport
to lapse into its chronic state of unpreparedness. Sir
Frederick Roberts, and, before his arrival at Ali Kheyl, the
able political officer, Captain Conolly, exerted themselves to
procure carriage, and his old allies, the Turis of the Kurram
Valley, and the Jajis, brought in all the animals they could
spare, with drivers, and Padshah Khan, the G-hilzye Chief,
whom Sir Frederick had met in the previous July, gave his
aid, so that the commissariat were enabled to collect a con-
siderable amount of supplies at the Shutargardan, "quite

Roberts and the Ameers Emissaries. 225

sufficient," he says, " to relieve any anxiety as to the immediate
want of the troops left there, and to move still larger stores
forward for the force advancing upon Cabul."

The position of Yakoob Khan, brought on by his vacillation
and timidity, if not treachery, was not an enviable one at this
time, between his countrymen who hated him for signing an igno-
minious treaty and receiving a British Envoy, and the British
Government, whom he knew would call him to strict account
for suffering the murder of their representative.

In order to conciliate Sir Frederick Roberts, he sent to Ali
Kheyl the Mustaufi, Habibullah Khan, and the Wuzeer, Shah
Mahomed, with a letter declaring his fidelity to the British
alliance, and announcing his intention of seeking the protection
of the British Commander ; but the real object of the visit of
these ministers of the Ameer was, in Sir Frederick's opinion,
to use their influence in preventing him from getting supplies,
to blind him as to the real state of affairs, and, above all, to
seek by every argument in their power to deter him from ad-
vancing on Cabul. The Ameer's ministers arrived at Ali Kheyl
on the 23rd September, and during their stay, which extended
over three days, were treated with becoming consideration and
respect. In their conversations with Roberts and his political
officers, they pretended that their master desired the assistance
and protection of a British force, but at a later period ; while at
the same time they wrote to Lord Lytton deprecating an imme-
diate advance, and secretly used all their influence to deter the
Jajis, Turis, Ghilzyes, and others from furnishing supplies.

In the Commander of the Cabul Field Force these wily
Orientals found one versed in the treacherous ways of East-
erns, a man whose open, truthful nature did not blind him to the
insincerity and downright lying which is untlushingly practised
among Asiatics of the governing class from Constantinople to
the wall of China. Taking this view of the Afghan character
in general, and that of the two emissaries of Yakoob Khan in
particular, Sir Frederick Roberts was civil to them, but let them
clearly understand that they did not blind him by their protesta-
tions and pretences, and that as soon as he had collected suffi-
cient supplies for the advance he would move on Cabul without fail.

It would be almost impossible to exaggerate the difficulties of
Sir Frederick Roberts's position at this time. With a force of

Q

226 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

6,500 men, and with supplies and transport for only one half
that number, he was required to advance upon Cabul before a
fall of snow had rendered the Shutargardan impassable, and
mete a swift and crushing punishment on that city and the
Ameer's Army for their treachery towards a British Ambas-
sador. During the winter, once across the Shutargardan, he
would be thrown on the resources of the country and the sup-
plies forwarded by the line of the Kyber Pass, with open
enemies to contest his hold of the country, and secret foes in
his camp. He could not also blind himself to the difficulties
of the march on the capital. The Afghan Army, so carefully
raised and disciplined by Shere AH, had not yet been broken by
defeat on their own soil, and the populace were numerous, fana-
tical, and inured to the use of arms. They had taken up
positions selected by themselves of enormous strength, while
the Intelligence Department of the British General was defec-
tive, and he was embarrassed -by the attitude, and, a few days
later, by the presence of the Ameer, as whose ostensible ally
he was about to restore his authority over his rebellious capital.

Sir Frederick Roberts' s orders from the Viceroy requiring him
to keep on terms with the Ameer, he wrote to him a conciliatory
letter from AH Kheyl, to which he received a reply, suggestive,
in the General's opinion, of a guilty conscience, and in this
view he was strengthened by the conduct of Yakoob's envoys,
and, at a later date, of the Ameer himself, who, Sir Frederick
knew, though he was obliged to treat him as a friend and ally,
was seeking from the vantage point of the British Camp to
thwart his every move.

In contrasting to us the difficulties and achievements of his
world-famed march from Cabul to Candahar, in August, 1880,
with the advance on Cabul, in September to October of the pre-
vious year, Sir Frederick Roberts expressed his opinion that
the latter was incomparably a more arduous and brilliant
feat of arms, and this opinion, he added, would be endorsed by
every competent military critic ; but the world was struck by
the boldness and rapidity of the masterly advance through
Afghanistan, bringing to mind Napoleon's march into Italy, or
across Spain in pursuit of Sir John Moore, while the swift
reconnoissance of the 31st August, and battle of the following
day, was quite in the " reni, vidi, vici " style, so familiar to

General Order to the Army. 227

every schoolboy, and commanded the popular applause, which,
indeed, it well merited.

So successful were the arrangements made by Sir Frederick
Roberts for collecting supplies, that, before the snow had cut off
his communications with Ali Kheyl, three or four months' sup-
plies were collected for his troops and camp followers, and six
weeks' forage for his animals. By the 18th September he had
firmly established on the summit of the Pass the 72nd High-
landers, 5th Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers, No. 2 Mountain Battery,
and the 7th Company of Sappers and Miners. In addition 200
men of the 5th Punjaubees were posted in the walled serai at
Karatiga, 1|- miles from the Sirkai Kotul.

On the 24th September, while at Ali Kheyl, Sir Frederick
Roberts issued the following general order to the troops under
his command : —

" The Government of India having decided that the Kurram
Field Force shall proceed with all possible despatch to Cabul,
in response to his Highness the Ameer's appeal for aid, and
with the object of avenging the dastardly murder of the British
representative and his escort, Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure
that the troops under his command will respond to the call with
a determination to prove themselves worthy of the sacred duty
entrusted to them and of the high reputation they have main-
tained during the recent campaign.

" The Major-General need address no words of exhortation
to soldiers whose courage and fortitude have been so well
proved. The Afghan tribes are numerous, but without organi-
zation ; the regular army is undisciplined, and, whatever may
be the disparity in numbers, such foes can never be formidable
to British troops. The dictates of humanity require that a
distinction should be made between the peaceable inhabitants
of Afghanistan and the treacherous murderers for whom a just
retribution is in store, and Sir Frederick Roberts desires to
impress on all ranks the necessity for treating the inoffensive
population with justice, forbearance, and clemency. The
future comfort and well-being of the force depend largely on
the friendliness of our relations with the districts from which
our supplies must be drawn ; prompt payment is enjoined for
all articles purchased by departments and individuals, and all
disputes must be at once referred to a political officer for deci-

O 2

228 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

sion. The Major- General confidently looks forward to the
successful accomplishment of the object of the expedition, and
the re-establishment of order, and a settled government in
Afghanistan."

The first shot fired in the campaign was on the 22nd
September, when a combined attack was made by Mangals and
Ghilzyes upon a telegraph party whilst on the march between
the Sirkai Kotul and Karatiga. Between 200 and 300 of these
tribesmen attacked the party, who were escorted by eleven
sepoys of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and killed seven of the
latter, one telegraph linesman, twelve muleteers, and five coolies,
and captured the eighty-four mules intended to convey the
telegraph poles from Karatiga to Shutargardan. They also
attacked a party of 50 men of the 72nd Highlanders, stationed
in a block-house on the Sirkai Kotul, but were repulsed with
loss. A detachment of this regiment from Kazim Kheyl was
sent in pursuit of the marauders, but without success.

On the 24th Brigadier-General Baker moved from Shutar-
gardan with a column,* and, passing through Dobandi, which
was found to have been deserted by its inhabitants, crossed
over the Shinkai Kotul, and reached Kooshi the same evening,
thus securing the entrance into the Logar Valley.

Three days later Sir Frederick Roberts moved from Ali
Kheyl to the Shutargardan in company with the headquarters
of the Cavalry Brigade, one squadron 9th Lancers, 5th Pun-
jaub Cavalry, 28th Punjaub N.I., and a detachment of the
5th Punjaub Infantry. The infantry were directed to bring
up the rear, whilst the General, with his staff and the cavalry,
pushed forward in order to reach Kazim Kheyl or the Pass
before dark. On the road he had a narrow escape, and the
event proved that the tribesmen all along the line of route
were in a dangerous state of excitement. About 10.30 the
General was fortunately joined by twenty-five men of the 92nd
Highlanders, whom Colonel Perkins had taken the precaution
to send from Karatiga to act as an advance guard, in conse-
quence of a rumoured gathering of Mangals and Ghilzyes in
the Hazardarakht defile. At 11 A.M., whilst halting to allow

* The following troops accompanied General Baker : — F Battery A
Brigade Royal Horse Artillery ; 12th Bengal Cavalry ; 2 guns No. 2
Mountain Battery ; one Company 72nd Highlanders ; 7th Company Sappers
and Miners ; 5th Goorkhas, and 23rd Pioneers.

Roberts has a Narrow Escape. 229

the luggage to come up, General Roberts received a report that
2,000 Mangals barred his advance, occupying the Pass between
Jaji Thanna and Karatiga, and Captain Vousden, 5th Punjaub
Cavalry, who was ordered to reconnoitre, reported that the
enemy held in force both sides of the ravine half a mile
beyond Jaji Thanna. Suddenly a large party of Mangals, who
had been lying in ambush, fired a volley at the General and
the headquarter staff, and Deputy Surgeon-General Townsend,
head of the Medical Department, was severely wounded by a
bullet which entered his right cheek. The Highlanders and a
troop of dismounted Lancers cleared the northern side of the
gorge, but the enemy clung to the precipitous hills on the south,
and some time elapsed before they were driven from their posi-
tion. The 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, on arriving, held a
commanding hill until the rearguard had passed.

General Hills, C.B., V.C., Roberta's old Addiscombe friend,
who had joined him at Ali Kheyl, having received leave from
the Commander-in-Chief to accompany him to Cabul in an
unofficial capacity, describes the narrow escape General Roberts
had on this occasion : — " We pushed forward towards the pass,
when suddenly we were confronted with a party of Afghans,
who had taken up a position commanding the road, which lay
up the dry bed in the Hazardarakht defile. Waiting till the
headquarters came up, the enemy let drive into the 'brown' of
them. I was riding alongside Townsend, who received a slug
in his cheek, and General Roberts was a little ahead. Roberts
dismounted the Lancers, and they, and the company of the
92nd, fortunately sent from Shutargardan, drove them off."

Meanwhile a smart affair had been in progress in the
direction of Karatiga, whence had been despatched a small
detachment consisting of eighteen men of the 92nd Highlanders
and forty-five of the 3rd Sikhs, led by Colour-Sergeant Hector
Macdonald and Jemadar Shere Mahomed. This gallant band
fought their way up a steep spur commanding the Hazardarakht
defile, and drove off the enemy, inflicting severe loss, and thus
cleared the way for the General and his staff.

These events showed that caution would be necessary, and
Brigadier- General Macpherson, commanding the troops thai
moved, on the 29th September, from Ali Kheyl to join the
General, took precautions to guard the large convoy of 1,500

230 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

laden animals he was escorting. A feeble attack was made
in the Hazardarakht defile on the rear-guard of the column
by a small party of marauders, but they were beaten off by
the 67th Regiment.

Pushing on, Sir Frederick Roberts only rested one night
at the Shutargardan Pass. A General Officer who accompanied
Mm described to us the rapidity of the movements of his
friend, who, in order to economize transport, made the cavalry
horses carry rations and arms, while the men walked beside
their steeds over the Pass. . On the 28th September General
Roberts reached Kooshi, where the Ameer Yakoob Khan,
accompanied by his eldest son, by Sirdars Yahya Khan,
Daoud Shah, the Mustaufi, "VVuzeer Gholam Mahomed Khan,
and a suite of forty-five persons, with an escort of 200 horse-
men, had arrived on the preceding day, and been received by
Brigadier- General Baker, commanding the advance. Sir
Frederick Roberts paid a formal visit to the Ameer, accom-
panied by his staff, Brigade Commanders, and by Major-
General James Hills. He was received by Daoud Shah, late
Commander-in-Chief, and conducted into the presence of the
Ameer, where the usual inquiries as to health were made,
after which the British General left. During the course of the
afternoon the Ameer, accompanied by his son and the nobles
of his suite, returned the visit.

Sir Frederick replied to the Ameer's pleading for delay, that not
even for one day would he defer his march on Cabul, and the
latter returned to his tent, having failed to convince or turn his
host, whose suavity of manner was only equalled by his determina-
tion, the pressure of the iron hand being apparent beneath
the velvet glove. Yakoob's treacherous attitude in the British
Camp may be described in the words Cassius used of Antony :

" The posture of your blows are yet unknown,
But for your words, they rob the Hybla bees,
And leave them honeyless."

Roberts firmly declined to delay his advance or listen to
the pleadings of Yakoob, to whom his reply was similar to
that of Octavius :

" I draw a sword against conspirators ;
When think you that the sword goes up again ?
Never till Caesar's three-and-thirty wounds
Be well avenged."

Roberts s Determination of Character. 231

Yakoob Khan, who now practised deception, had himself
learnt by painful experience to value aright the word of an
Afghan ruler. Though Shere Ali guaranteed his safe conduct
by an oath on the Koran, yet even the father, when he got
his sou into his power, threw him into a dungeon, where he
pined for many years in darkness and solitude.

Transport was the weak point of the situation, and only four-
teen days'supplies could be taken, but with such tried Regiments
as the 72nd Highlanders and 5th Goorkhas, and magnificent
corps like the 92nd Highlanders and 67th Regiment, commanded
by Brigadiers like Baker and Macpherson, General Roberts
had no fear as to the result of his daring move, while his
soldiers on their part reciprocated the feeling of confidence.

On the 29th September the Cavalry Brigade, under General
Massy, with two guns of the Horse Artillery, two Companies
72nd Highlanders, and the 5th Punjaub Infantry, moved from
Kooshi to Zerghan Shah to collect supplies. The same day the
rear-guard, under General Macpherson, marched to the Shutar-
gardan, and next day arrived at Kooshi. On the 1st October
the last of the troops intended for the advance on Cabul arrived
at Kooshi from Ali Kheyl, when the force* at Sir Frederick
Roberts's disposal numbered 192 officers, 2,558 Europeans, and
3,867 natives, with 18 guns.

* The following were the troops that accompanied Sir Frederick Roberts
to Cabul : —

Divisional and Brigade Staff Officers, 60.

F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A.

G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A.

No. 2 Mountain Battery

9th Lancers

5th Bengal Cavalry .

12th Bengal Cavalry

14th Bengal Cavalry

67th Regiment

72nd Highlanders .

92nd Highlanders .

5th Punjaub Infantry

23rd Pioneers .

28th Punjaub Native Infantry

5 Goorkhas . .

7th Company Sappers

Two Gatling Guns .

Also about 6,000 camp followers and 3,500 transport animals.

Officers.
[.A 7
A 7

Men.
118
137

3

223

4

118

7

325

6

328

7

407

18

686

23

746

17

717

8

610

6

671

ntry

8

636

,

7

574

Miners

3

95

.

1

34

232 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

On the preceding day Sir Frederick went to Zerghan Shah,
where he met Wall Mahomed Khan and several other Sirdars,
chiefly Barukzyes, from Cabul, all of whom professed great
friendship for the Indian Government. The rapidity with
which the two Batteries of Horse and Foot Artillery had crossed
the Shutargardan Pass, hitherto deemed impracticable for
wheeled guns, filled these Sirdars and all Afghans with
astonishment.

Sir Frederick returned to Kooshi the same day, and, on the
1st October, issued the following notification to the Troops,
impressing upon them the necessity for discipline and self-
restraint : — " Sir Frederick Roberts desires general officers, and
officers commanding corps, to impress upon all officers under
their command the necessity for constant vigilance in prevent-
ing irregularities likely to arouse the personal jealousies of the
people of Cabul, who are, of all races, most susceptible as
regards their women. The deep-seated animosity of the
Afghans towards the English has been mainly ascribed to in-
discretions committed during the first occupation of Cabul, and
the Major-General trusts that the same discipline so long
exhibited by the troops under his command will remove the
prejudices of past years, and cause the British name to be
as highly respected in Afghanistan as it is throughout the
civilized world."

The references to the personal jealousies of the people of
Cabul, and the "indiscretions committed during the first occu-
pation of Cabul," referred to a delicate subject touched upon by
Sir John Kayeinhis " History of the first Afghan War," which
greatly incensed against their conquerors the Afghan nation,
who, like all Mahornedan nations, Are sensitive as regards
their women.

In his general order, issued at Ali Kheyl on the 24th Sep-
tember, Sir Frederick Roberts, with the humanity for which he
was conspicuous, enjoined on his army, " the necessity for
treating the inoffensive population with justice, forbearance, and
clemency," and, on the 3rd October, he issued a proclamation to
the people of Cabul, copies of which were sent in advance of
the column, requiring those who had taken no part in the
massacre of the Cavaguari Mission, and the well-disposed, and

Proclamation to the People of Cabul. 233

especially the women and children, to arrange for their safety
by either coming into his camp or by removing from the city.
In conclusion, he gave warning that, after the receipt of this
proclamation, " all persons found armed in or about Cabul will
be treated as the enemies of the British Government."*1

A little before noon on the 2nd October Sir Frederick
Roberts, accompanied by the Ameer and his Sirdars, marched
with two infantry brigades from Kooshi for Zerghan Shah,
where Generals Baker and Massy were posted. On the fol-
lowing day the march was resumed by headquarters and
Massy's and Macpherson's Brigades for Zahidabad, a distance
of fifteen miles. The road lay along the Logar Valley, past
several villages, which formed a pleasant contrast to the inhos-
pitable region about the Shutargardan, and over the Logar
River. The movements of the Cabul Field Force were much
hampered by the presence in the camp of so many Princes
and Sirdars, with their retinue. There were now Yakoob
Khan and his father-in-law, Yahya Khan, and his troop of
nobles and large escort ; Wali Mahomed Khan, and the
Barukzye Sirdars, all antagonistic towards each other, and
only as one in their distrust and hatred of the foreign invader.

* The following is the text of this proclamation issued at Zerghan Shah
on the 3rd of October : —

" Be it known to all, that the British Army is advancing on Cabul to take
possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peaceably, well and good,
if not, the city will be seized by force. Therefore all well-disposed persons
who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Embassy,
or in the plunder of the Residency, are warned that if they are unable to
prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British Army, and to
the authority of his Highness the Ameer, they should make immediate
arrangements for their own safety, either by coming into the British camp,
or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as the British
Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given
that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the
reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with
justice, and to respect their religious feelings and customs, while exacting
full retribution from offenders. Every effort will therefore be made to pre-
vent the innocent suffering with the guilty. But it is necessary that the
utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition. Therefore,
after the receipt of the proclamation, all persons found armed in or about
Cabul will be treated as the enemies of the British Government ; and further,
it must be clearly understood, that if the entry of the British force is
resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental mischief which
may be done to persons and property, even of well-disposed people who may
have neglected this warning."

234 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

On the 2nd October, the day Sir Frederick Roberts quitted
Zerghan Shah, the Mangals and Ghilzyes made a most deter-
mined attack on the entrenched camp at the Shutargardan,
where the General had left, as a permanent garrison, 4 guns
No. 1 Mountain Battery, the 3rd Sikhs and 21st Punjaub
Native Infantry, under Colonel G. N. Money, of the 3rd Sikhs,
an officer in whose coolness and judgment he placed a reliance
which was justified by subsequent events. The enemy,
emboldened by the weakening of the force, and calculating on
an easy victory, took up a position on the hills overlooking the
crest of the pass at 7 A.M. on the 2nd October. As it was
necessary to secure this crest in order to maintain heliographic
communication with Sir Frederick Roberts in the Logar Valley,
Colonel Money sent Major Griffiths with 100 men of the 3rd
Sikhs, together with a party of signallers, to occupy it. But
a strong body of the enemy anticipated the movement, and
seized the crest, on which Colonel Money sent 100 men of the
3rd Sikhs to reinforce Major Griffiths, who was desired to halt
for a short time at the request of Captain Turner, the Political
Officer, who expected the arrival in Camp of Alla-ood-deen,
brother of Padshah Khan, Chief of the Ghilzyes, who, it was
hoped, would exercise a moderating influence and induce the
tribesmen to withdraw.

The enemy, some 1,500 men, mistaking this hesitation for
pusillanimity, began firing on Major Griffiths' s party, on which
Colonel Money ordered the advance. Captain Morgan opened
fire with his Mountain Battery, and Major Griffiths attacked
with 200 men of his regiment, and 50 of the 21st Punjaub
Native Infantry, with 150 of the same regiment in reserve, and
carried the position at the point of the bayonet, himself receiving
a wound. The enemy fled in all directions, and for some time
the Shutargardan force received no more molestation.

Owing to the deficiency in the transport animals, which were
required to work double tides, General Baker's Brigade halted
one day at Zerghan Shah, when they pushed on for Zahidabad.
On nearing the bridge over the Logar River, the rear-guard,
under the command of Major C. M. Stockwell, 72nd High-
landers (now Colonel Stockwell, C.B., A.D.C.), was attacked
by the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. Captain R. G.

Fighting at the Shutargardan. 235

Kennedy, Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, who was
superintending the passage of the river, was wounded. At
one time, says the General, the enemy approached so close that
it became necessary for the covering companies of the 72nd
Highlanders to drive them back at the point of the bayonet.
Nothing could exceed the steadiness throughout the campaign
of this fine regiment, which repeated in Egypt the lessons they
learned in Afghanistan under the leadership of soldiers like
Brownlow and Stockwell. As Campbell, the national poet,
sings : —

"Triumphant be the thistle still unfurled,
Dear symbol wild ! on Freedom's hill it grows,
Where Fingal stemmed the tyrants of the world,
And Roman eagles found unconquered foes."

The villagers repeated these hostile acts on the 4th October,
and on the following morning, before leaving Zahidabad, Sir
Frederick Koberts despatched a force to punish them.*

* Sir Frederick Roberts, after perusal of the MS. of this chapter of the
Memoir, wrote to us : — " I have just been reading with great interest
chapter XII. of the Memoir. It was the part I was most anxious should
be carefully written, and I must congratulate you on having done it
extremely well."

236 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTEE XIII.

Advance on Cabul— Battle of Charasia — Sir Frederick Roberts arrives
before the Capital — His Visit to the Scene of the Massacre of the
British Mission — Occupation of the Bala Hissar — Proclamation of the
12th of October — The Punishment Meted out to Cabul.

ON the 5th October Sir Frederick Koberts, accompanied by
General Baker's Brigade, strengthened by the 92nd Highlanders,
marched to Charasia, eleven miles distant from Cabul, and with
Baker's and Massy's Brigades he had the honour of adding to
the achievements of the British Army, not the least brilliant
of the many History records. As the insufficiency of carriage
did not permit of both brigades moving together, Brigadier-
General Macpherson was left to protect the reserve ammunition
and commissariat stores at Zahidabad, with a wing of the 67th
Regiment, 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, two guns of No. 2
Mountain Battery, and a squadron of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry.

General Roberta's camp was pitched about a mile from the
orchards, south of the village of Charasia, which lies at the foot
of the ranges of steep and high hills, extending east and west,
the Chardeh Valley lying on the left front over a more gradual
slope, and in front a mass of mountains, excluding all view of
Cabul.

Charasia is a highly cultivated valley, having a breadth of
about two miles. The ranges of hills overlooking the village of
the same name rise one behind the other, that in the imme-
diate rear being very precipitous, with four or five peaks stand-
ing out in bold relief. Between this range and another lies the
Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, through which the Logar River passes
into the Cabul valley. The road beside the river, being com-
manded by the high hills on either side, would be difficult to
force if properly defended, and the Afghan Commander, Sirdar
Nek Mahomed Elian (son of the great Ameer, Dost Mahomed, and

Sir Frederick Roberts s Plans. 237

uncle of Yakoob Khan), posted twelve guns on the heights,
and three or four others on the plains below. But he counted
without his host, for the British General intended to make a
feint attack by the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, and his main attack
by the road skirting the hills into the Chardeh valley.

Immediately on arriving at Charasia Sir Frederick Koberts
sent reconnoitring parties of cavalry along the three roads lead-
ing towards Cabul, but though a few shots were fired at them,
there were no traces visible of any large body of the enemy.
When night set in the General threw strong pickets all round
the camp, and gave directions to the commander of his cavalry
brigade to despatch patrols at daybreak to feel for the enemy, of
whose intention to attack him, or bar his advance on the capi-
tal, he was convinced, though he could obtain no information
from the Ameer or his Ministers and Sirdars. But this want
of intelligence, and apparent absence of the enemy, did not
influence him in his determination to seize as soon as possible
after dawn the crest of the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, by which road
to Cabul he had decided to advance, and which was between
five and six miles in advance of his camp at Charasia. During
the course of the same day the 1,500 baggage animals were
sent back to Zahidabad to bring up the stores under escort
of Macpherson's Brigade. There was much difficulty in pro-
curing supplies from the neighbouring villages, and Yakoob
Khan, who anticipated that the British would meet with a
repulse, made no effort to assist them.

Having formed his plans with the rapidity he had displayed
on the eve of the memorable capture of Peiwar Kotul, Sir Fred-
erick resolved to attack before the enemy, who were already in
great force, had further strengthened their position. He came
to this resolution, though he had with him little more than
half his infantry ; but with the intuition of genius, he divined
that no considerations could outweigh those demanding im-
mediate action, although the enemy outnumbered him probably
three to one, and held positions along the ridge, which sloped
on one side to the Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, and on the other to
the road by the Chardeh Valley to Cabul, which would be re-
garded as impregnable to attack by any but a large force of the
best troops. Such were those under Roberts's command,

238 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

seasoned and highly-disciplined soldiers, for the most part
veterans who had learnt to despise the enemy when led by a
General in whom they had confidence, and whose eagerness was
increased by a strong desire to measure themselves with the re-
creants who had committed the cowardly massacre of the British
Envoy and his escort.

Soon after daybreak on the 6th October, as Benvolio says : —

" An hour before the worshipp'd sun
Peer'd forth the golden window of the East,"

Sir Frederick Koberts sent some infantry to work on a difficult
place on the road through the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, and was
about to follow himself to examine personally the pass and the
ground beyond, when, before these arrangements could be carried
out, the cavalry patrols were fired upon and compelled to return,
and all doubts as to the intentions of the enemy were dispelled.
He writes : — " Troops could be seen in large numbers and
regular formation, crowning the crest line of the hills which
extended from the narrow defile of the Sang-i-Nawishta (both
sides of which were held) in their extreme left, to the heights
above the Chardeh valley which formed their right. No hurry
nor confusion marked their movements ; positions were taken
up and guns placed with so much deliberation and coolness that
it was evident a large number of regular troops were massed
against us." Soon afterwards Sir Frederick Roberts received
a report that the cavalry patrols had been fired upon, and were
retiring slowly.

Meantime General Macpherson's Brigade was making its
way from Zahidabad, and a report was received that the road
was blocked, and the column, with its endless string of baggage
animals, would be attacked. Sir Frederick sent a squadron of
cavalry to Macpherson's assistance, and directed him to push on
with all despatch to join him.

The condition of affairs at this time was most critical. The
enemy occupied in front a position, described to us by a General
officer who was present, as " impregnable to a direct attack,
but from which it was imperatively necessary that they should
be dislodged before dark." Their occupation of the heights
intervening between the British advance and Cabul could not be
tolerated, while it was evident that they were mustering in strong

Critical Position of the British. 239

force on the hills on both sides of the camp, with the object of
waiting for nightfall or a favourable opportunity to attack.
General Eoberts had only two-thirds of his small force at his
disposal, and yet he decided on an immediate advance on the
enemy's position, for every hour he knew would add to its
strength, as behind those hills, and the forces arrayed thereon
against him, lay the city of Cabul, with its extensive suburbs of
Chardeh and Deh-i-Afghan, and the villages of the Cabul
Plain, filled with a teeming population, every male adult of
whom was inured to bear arms from his youth, and which, as
the events of the following December showed, could turn out
over 100,000 fighting men. A reverse, of course, under the
circumstances, would mean annihilation, and success could
only be achieved by a vigorous offensive movement, such
as General Eoberts was the officer to conceive and his brave
troops the men to execute.

The preparations for capturing the heights above Charasia
completed, the General put once more into execution the
flanking tactics he had adopted with such success on the 2nd
December. " Their position," says the General, " was so strong
and could only have been carried with such loss, that I deter-
mined the real attack should be made by an outflanking move-
ment upon the right of the enemy, while their left continued to
be occupied by a feint from our right." Dividing his force*
into two parts, he entrusted to Brigadier-General Baker the
difficult task of dislodging the enemy from the heights above
the Chardeh valley, which formed their extreme right, and
placed at his disposal a force of about 2,000 men, while a
second column, under Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders,
was directed to proceed towards the Sang-i-Nawishta defile,

* General Baker's Column consisted of the 72nd Highlanders, under
Colonel Clarke ; 4 guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, Captain Swinley, R.A. ;
and 2 Gatling Guns, Captain Broadfoot, R.A. ; 7th Company of Sappers
and Miners, Lieutenant Nugent, R.E. ; 6 Companies 5th Goorkhas, Major
Fitzhugh ; 200 bayonets 5th Punjaub Infantry, Captain Hall ; and 450
of the 23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Currie. Major White took with
him 3 guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, Major Parry ; wing of
92nd Highlanders, Major Hay ; 2 squadrons of Cavalry made up of the 9th
Lancers, 5th Punjaub Cavalry and 12th Bengal Cavalry, under Major
Hammond ; 5th Punjaub Cavalry ; and 100 men of the 23rd Pioneers,
Captain Paterson.

240 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

where the enemy had concentrated all their guns, in the belief
that the main British attack would be on that point.

Owing to his numerical weakness Sir Frederick Roberts could
not retain in camp any considerable number of troops from the
two attacking columns, and as General Macpherson's Brigade
was advancing from the rear, he decided to incur the danger
that would have arisen from a determined attack on his camp,
which was one of those inseparable from the conduct of war-
like operations. He was in constant communication with the
operating columns by means of the heliograph, directed by
Captain Straton, and indeed without this novel but valuable
adjunct to the equipment of an army in the field, he could not
have conducted the operations to a successful conclusion with
such precision.

General Baker assembled his little force in the wooded enclo-
sures of Charasia, a collection of detached villages, such as are
common in the country, in the most convenient of which he
placed his reserve ammunition and Field Hospital, and helio-
graphed to General Roberts to increase the strength of the
guard he was able to leave in charge. The General, accord-
ingly, sent at once 100 rifles of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, fol-
lowed by the remainder of the regiment as soon as he could
procure sufficient transport for their ammunition. The troops
defending the camp were now reduced to between 600 and 700
infantry and 450 cavalry.*

Having secured his base, General Baker advanced over
" some bare undulating hills, forming a position easily defen-
sible, and flanked by steep, rocky crags, varying in height from
1,000 to 1,800 feet above the sloping plain which our troops
had to cross." The main position of the enemy, which com-
manded their entire front, and was only accessible in a few
places, was about 400 feet higher. Seeing the great natural
strength of the position, General Baker directed Major White,
who was placed under his orders, " to continue threatening the
Sang-i-Nawishta Defile, to prevent the enemy occupying the
village of Charasia, and to advance within artillery fire of the

* See Sir Frederick Roberta's despatch, dated " Bala Hissar, Cabul, 20th
October, 1879," to which we are mainly indebted for the account of the
action of Charasia.

Battle of Charasia. 241

enemy's main position," and finally, as soon as the outflanking
movement was fully developed, and the enemy were in full
retreat, to pursue through the pass with his cavalry, all which
instructions Major White carried out with the soldierly ability
anticipated by General Eoberts when he selected him to com-
mand the supporting column. The first portion of Brigadier-
General Baker's force to become engaged was Captain Brooke-
Hunt's Company of the 92nd Highlanders, which was ex-
tended to crown the heights on the left, the remainder of the
regiment, protected by the fire of two mountain guns, making
the attack in front. Soon the Highlanders found their advance
checked by the extremely difficult nature of the ground on their
left flank, where the enemy, ensconced behind " sungas," or
stone breastworks, opened a hot fire. General Baker brought
forward two companies of the 5th Goorkhas, under Captain
Cook, V.C., to strengthen Captain Brooke-Hunt, and two more
companies of that regiment, under Major Fitzhugh, and 200
rifles of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, under Captain Hall, were
sent to reinforce the direct attack. The Afghan commander
now seeing that the real attack was directed against his right,
brought his men from the direction of the Sang-i-Nawishta
Defile, and his British antagonist strained every nerve to carry
the position before it could be reinforced.

After some spirited fighting, in which Lieutenant Martin, of
the Goorkhas, specially distinguished himself, about two o'clock
the British troops succeeded in seizing the ridge on the left of the
position, thus exposing the enemy to a heavy cross-fire, which in-
flicted great loss. The general advance was now sounded, and
soon the British troops were in possession of the first position.
The Afghans now took up a position about 600 yards in the rear,
but from this they were driven, after some sharp fighting, our
troops advancing in rushes, supported by the fire of the
mountain guns. In this affair, says the General, the attack
made by a company of the 23rd Pioneers, led by Lieutenant
Chesney, supported by the 72nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas,
and two companies of the 92nd Highlanders, " proved irre-
sistible."

By 3.45 the entire ridge was gained, thus exposing the
enemy's line of defence to being taken in reverse, which caused

B

242 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

them to retire precipitately from their position on the Sang-i-
Nawishta, in which quarter the operations were conducted by
Major White with a judgment and skill that fully justified the
trust reposed in him by Sir Frederick Roberts. When the
enemy, perceiving that the real attack was on the right of their
position, weakened their left resting on the defile, Major White
attacked with spirit, himself leading his men with characteristic
gallantry. The Afghans gave way, leaving some guns in his
hands, on which he pursued them through the pass and effected
a junction with General Baker in the rear of the enemy's
position. Their loss was estimated by Sir Frederick Roberts
at upwards of 300 men killed, besides a large number wounded.
All their guns, 20 in number, brought out from Cabul to assist
in the defence of the position, were captured. Sir Frederick
Roberts calculated that thirteen regiments of regular infantry
were opposed to him, and they were aided by contingents from
the city and neighbouring villages. In addition there was a
large muster of tribesmen, chiefly Ghilzyes, on the hills which
lay to the east and west of the camp, who caused some annoy-
ance, but were dislodged by a detachment of the 92nd High-
landers, and prevented from venturing into the plain by patrols
of cavalry. General Macpherson's advance from Zahidabad,
with a large convoy of stores and reserve ammunition, was also
opposed, but he easily drove off his assailants, and after his
arrival at the camp, all anxiety on the score of its safety ceased.
The British loss in the action of Charasia was 16 soldiers and
4 camp followers killed, and 3 officers, 59 men and 5 camp
followers wounded ; of these 38 belonged to the 72nd High-
landers, of whom several died.

Sir Frederick Roberts struck his tents at sunset, as with
characteristic promptitude he resolved to follow up the enemy
and march through the Sang-i-Nawishta Defile towards Cabul,
before they had time to recover themselves and organize further
resistance. Events soon proved that had he delayed in attack-
ing the enemy on the 6th October, even to the extent of waiting
for the arrival of General Macpherson's Brigade, the resistance
to be overcome would have been vastly increased, as the regular
regiments of the Afghan Army acted as a nucleus, around
which the natives rallied, and every hour brought accessions

The Strength of the Enemy. 243

to the ranks of the opposing force. On this point the Viceroy,
writing to the Secretary of State on the 16th October, from
Simla, says — "It is now known that the plans for arresting the
advance of our troops upon Cabul had been carefully laid, and
that the Ghilzyes had been instructed to act against the flanks
and rear of our column, while the regular troops and the
Cabul people undertook to bar its passage across the hills in
front."

It was the receipt of information to this effect that decided
the General to attack at once the force on the heights, since
delay would have given the enemy time to bring up reinforce-
ments from the city, and to strengthen a position rendered
sufficiently formidable by nature.

Early in the morning of the 7th October Sir Frederick
moved out of his camp to Beni Hissar (or Ben-i-Shahr, as it
is indifferently called) on the Cabul Eoad, with the cavalry
brigade, two guns of F-A, Horse Artillery, two guns of G-3,
Royal Artillery, a wing of the 92nd Highlanders, 7th company
Sappers and Miners, the 23rd Pioneers, and the Gatling guns,
his intention being to gather his whole force at Beni Hissar
prior to the final advance on Cabul.* Marching by way of

* The following geographical description of the country about Cabul,
which was the scene of stirring events during the next three months, is by
the correspondent of the Times (writing from Cabul on the 19th of June :)
— " As Sir Frederick Roberts's force debouched from the Sang-i-Nawishta
Pass into the Cabul Valley, it had on its left a range of hills running
almost due north and south, which commencing near Char-Asia, is first
broken at the Deh-i-Mazung defile, as it has been convenient to call it. The
highest point of this range is the Takht-i-Shah, or King's Throne, a little to
the south of Cabul. North of the Takht-i-Shah the range makes a dip,
and rises again to what is locally known as the Shahr-Dawaza (City Gate)
hill, under which to the east nestles the city of Cabul. The Takht-i-Shah
is about 7,600 feet, and the Shah-Dawaza, 7,166 feet above the sea level. A
long spur, with a tolerably easy slope, is thrown off from the Takht i-Shah
due east to the villages of Beni-Hissar, and another from the Shahr-Dawaza,
on the lowest extremity of which latter is placed the Upper and Lower
Bala Hissar. This last spur encloses the city of Cabul to the south. In
very ancient times the safety of the city from attack from the west was
provided for by a masonry wall, which starting from where the Bala Hissar
wall ends, is continued. first up the spur and thence along the whole crest
of the Shahr-Dawaza, and down the precipitous northern face of it, into
the bed of the Cabul river. Tbe range of hills described above is continued
on the northern side of the Cabul river, and here changes its course to
north-west. The hill immediately above the Cabul river, and facing the
northern slopes of the Shah-Dawaza, is known as Asmai, or Koh-Asmai.

B 2

244 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the Sang-i-Nawishta Defile, where some parties of hillmen
opened fire upon his troops, but were easily dispersed, he
arrived at Beni Hissar, where Brigadier-General Baker joined
him with the main portion of his force during the same
afternoon.

It must have been with no little eagerness that Sir Frederick
Roberts first cast his glance on the towers and ramparts of
the Bala Hissar, that famous citadel whose name arouses
such painful recollections in the minds of those conversant
with the Indian history of 40 years ago. To Roberts the
sight must have called up memories of his father, whose
services during the Afghan war were so distinguished, and
whose warnings were disregarded by a Government who con-
tinued to call "Peace, Peace, when there was no Peace." By
a strange fatality the son was destined by services that are
historical to associate his own name with a fortress which in
its blood-stained records has played a part similar to our
Tower of London, that palace, prison and fortress in one. Once
again, after the lapse of 40 years, the Bala Hissar was to
receive a hostile British Army.

History has indeed repeated itself in a remarkable way, and
the writer of this memoir, — who, in a work on the first

The Koh-Asmai is 6,790 feet above the sea at its highest point, just above
the Deh-i-Mazung defile. The wall mentioned as starting from the Bala-
Hissar is continued up the Koh-Asmai also, and meets at the culminating
point a second wall, also carried up the face of the hill from the village or
rather suburb of Cabul called Deh-Afghana. The Koh-Asmai has a length
of about a mile, when it sinks into a Kotul or saddle ; over it passes one
road to Urghundeh and Ghazni, and on the right of the road the hill
rises again to a conical point. The whole surface of Koh-Asmai is of the
most rugged character, offering numerous peaks and monster rocks most
favourable for defence. In conclusion, this range of hills continues a north-
westerly course, broken by occasional gaps, until it joins the Pughman
range about twenty-two miles from Chara^ia. It forms the northern limit
of the beautiful Chardeh Valley, from whence it alters its direction to
north-west, just as during its noithern course it had formed the eastern
boundary of that valley. It is further the watershed which divides the
drainage of the Cabul river from that of the Juibar stream, which runs
through the Kohistan country. The Cabul valley itself is a plain only
broken by the low flat-topped Siah-Sung hills. The Cabul river approaches
the city through the Deh-i Mazung defile, and is over-hung by the Shahr-
Dawaza on one side and Koh-Asmai on the other. After passing through
the city it takes a north-westerly course, and crossing the road which con-
nects the Bala Hissar with Sherpur, it flows about midway between Sherpur
and the northern part of the Siah Sung Hills."

The Afghan Wars of 1839 and 1878. 245

Afghan war,* (drawn from the papers of the late General
Augustus Abbott, who served throughout those protracted
operations, and commanded the artillery of Sir Robert Sale's
force,) published in 1878, deprecated the outbreak of hostilities,
and drew a parallel of the circumstances under which war was
declared by the Governments of Lords Auckland and Lytton
— could scarcely have supposed that the coincidences would
be still further borne out by the murder of a British envoy,
followed by the arrival before Cabul of a British Army of
retribution, which, moreover, was commanded, as in 1842,
by an officer of the old Bengal Artillery.

It was ascertained that the Bala Hissar had been evacuated,
and the Ameer assured the General that he would meet with
no further opposition. Little reliance, however, could be
placed on the statements of a man who confidentially informed
the British General that he would meet with no resistance at
Charasia, whereas it was afterwards discovered that he was
kept informed of the true state of affairs by Afghan emis-
saries, who visited him in the British Camp during the advance
from Kushi, and it was even confidently stated that Nek
Mohamed, the Afghan commander at Charasia, was among his
visitors, and tried to induce him to place himself at the head
of the Army.

On the morning of the 8th October Sir Frederick Roberts,
having received information that those of the enemy who had
not dispersed to their homes would probably retreat towards
Kohistan, directed General Massy to proceed with the cavalry
brigade, consisting of 8 squadrons, or 720 sabres, and take
up a position across their line of retreat. From General
Massy's report it appears that a hostile force, consisting of
remnants of the regiments which had fought at Charasia, to-
gether with three fresh regiments, which had arrived on the
preceding day from Kohistan, supported by the " budmashes,"
or bad characters, of the city and neighbouring villages, had
taken up a strong position, which was further strengthened by

* The writer will be pardoned for mentioning that this work found its
way into the British Camp before Cabul in 1879-80, and Sir Frederick
Roberts informed him that the special correspondent of the Times placed it
in his hands for perusal.

246 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

twelve guns, on a high hill beyond the Bala Hissar, called the
Asmai heights, immediately overlooking the city on the north-
west side. The enemy were under the leadership of Mahomed
Jan, a soldier whose name appears prominently in the suc-
ceeding operations ; among other chiefs present being Khusdil
Khan, who had been deputed by Yakoob Khan to receive and
escort to Cabul the Cavagnari mission.

In order to dislodge the enemy and compel them to fall back
on the cavalry, Roberts directed Brigadier- General Baker to
advance with a column,* consisting of 1,044 infantry, two guns,
and one Gatling. Owing, however, to the difficult nature of
the ground, much delay ensued, and the day. was far advanced
before Baker found himself near enough to open fire with his
guns on the enemy, who were posted in the angle formed by
the two walls running up the Koh Asmai from the Bala Hissar
and suburb of Deh Afghan, and on the slopes of the hill to the
westward. Reinforcements, consisting of a wing of the 67th
Regiment, two companies of the 5th Goorkhas, and the remain-
ing two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, were despatched to
his aid from camp, but did not reach him until past five o'clock,
when there was not sufficient daylight to render an attack
advisable. About this time Sir Frederick Roberts received
intelligence that three regiments of regular infantry and twelve
guns had started from Ghuznee a few days before in order to
join Mohamed Jan's troops on the Asmai heights, and helio-
graphed to General Baker his intention to strengthen him dur-
ing the night with four guns of F-A, Royal Horse Artillery,
on elephants, the remaining wing of the 67th Regiment, and
the 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, under General Macpherson,
who, as senior officer, would assume chief command. General
Baker was also informed that Brigadier-General Gough had
been sent with two Horse Artillery guns, and two squadrons of
cavalry to watch the Kohistan road.

Meanwhile General Massy, who had left the camp an hour
before noon, had crossed the low Siah-Sung range of hills, and

* The following was the constitution of General Baker's command : — 2
guns, No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Lieutenant E. A. Smith, R.A. ; 1
Gatliiig, Captain A. Broadfoot, R.A. ; 2 Companies 72nd Highlanders,
Captain C. Guinness ; Headquarters wing, 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-
Colonel Parker ; 23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Currie.

Capture of Sherpur. 247

proceeding northwards, entered and took possession of the
fortified camp at Sherpur, which had been abandoned by the
enemy, who had left therein seventy-three guns of various
calibre, and three howitzers. Thence General Massy marched
to the west, and then, making a great detour to the north, in
order to get in rear of the enemy's position on the Asmai
heights, eventually, about sunset, he debouched into the
Chardeh plain, thus blocking the line of the enemy's retreat,
and took up a position of observation to the westward of the
village of Deh Mazung, though when night fell, he drew in his
brigade and bivouacked under cover of the walled enclosures
near the road running past Aliabad.*

Unfortunately Sir Frederick Roberts's carefully laid plans
were foiled by the roughness of the road, which prevented the
reinforcements sent to General Baker from reaching the ground
in time to deliver an attack before nightfall, a miscalculation
which had a disastrous result in prolonging the struggle and
rendering possible the combination of the following December,
which required such vigorous measures before it could be dis-
persed. During the night General Baker, fearing that the
enemy might abandon their position under cover of the dark-
ness, sent a strong patrol, at 1.30 A.M., to ascertain if any
change had taken place, and three hours later it was reported
to him that the camp, containing twelve guns, some ele-
phants, and a large supply of camp equipage, was deserted.
General Baker immediately communicated this intelligence to
General Massy, and informed him that in accordance with
instructions received from Sir Frederick Roberts, any move-
ment of the cavalry in pursuit would be supported both by the
troops under his command and those under General Macpher-
son, who joined General Baker about dawn. Accordingly,
General Massy went in pursuit with his cavalry, sending, under
instructions from Sir Frederick Roberts, two squadrons across
country, up to and beyond the Kohistan road, but such an
extraordinary faculty have Afghan levies in dispersing and
mixing with the peaceful portion of the community that, though
the entire country was scoured throughout the day, of the

* See despatch of Sir Frederick Roberts.

248 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

thousands assembled on the Asmai heights only a small party
of fugitives was overtaken on the Ghuznee road by the 5th
Punjaub Cavalry, who sabred twenty or thirty of them. General
Massy detached two squadrons of the 12th Bengal Cavalry to
continue the pursuit, and returned to camp late in the evening
with the remainder of his brigade, who had suffered much from
fatigue and scanty food. The troops under Generals Macpherson
and Baker, and the small force of cavalry and guns, under
Brigadier-General Gough, also arrived in camp before night-
fall.*

On the 9th General Roberts moved the camp of the whole
of the division from Beni Hissar to the Siah-Sung hills, a
low flat-topped ridge, the scene of severe fighting during the
first Afghan war, which completely dominates the city of Cabul.
The only troops not in camp were the 5th Goorkhas and four
guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, which were stationed on the
upper Bala Hissar hill. It soon became apparent, as might
have been anticipated, that the villagers of the Cabul Valley,
and almost the entire people, were hostile to the invaders, and
shooting at the sentinels became a nightly practice, while efforts
were made to raise the tribesmen for an organized attack on
the camp.

On the following day, the 10th October, Sir Frederick Roberts
visited the Sherpur cantonment, f and despatched the 5th Pun-
jaub Cavalry thither for the protection of the guns and stores.

* See despatch of Sir Frederick Roberts.

t Sherpur is thus described by the Times correspondent : — " Shere Ali's
great straggling cantonment of Sherpur takes the shape of a huge parallel-
ogram, the long sides of which lie north and south. The length of the
long slies is about 2,700 yards, and of the short sides 1,100. When our
troops entered it in October the west and south faces only were completed,
and even these were much out of repair. The north side was and is still
formed by the Behmaru heights, a round-topped ridge of hill, broken in
the centre by a broad gorge, and rising, perhaps, 800 feet above the plain.
The fourth side, that on the east, was only traced. Shere Ali's original
design is believed to have been to carry the walls all round the Behrnaru
heights, and thus to form a great square, with the heights in the centre,
upon which he had already laid the foundation of a citadel. He had also
laid the foundation of a palace for himself at the southern foot of the
heights. What was the ultimate object of this ambitious design can only
be conjectured. It was possibly part of the same idea which led him to
devote such pains to the manufacture of guns, of which, when the war
broke out, he possessed no less a number than 379, of which 34 were of
siege calibre, 145 field, and 150 mountain. It has also been found, from

Roberts Visits the Bala Hissar. 249

It was the general belief that Shere All contemplated the
removal of Cabul to Sherpur, and the demolition of the Bala
Hissar, which is commanded from the adjacent heights ; but
his false move in throwing himself into the arms of Russia put
an end to his plans, and resulted in his dying a miserable
fugitive at Mazar-i- Sheriff.

On the llth October Sir Frederick Roberts, with his staff
and a small escort, accompanied by the Ameer's ministers and
Daoud Shah, paid an informal visit to the Bala Hissar, where
crumbling walls and neglected buildings attested the decay
which awaits everything in this distracted land. The General,
after closely examining the fortress, visited the ruined buildings
of the late Residency, where Cavagnari and his gallant band
made their desperate stand for life. Very great, albeit painful,
was the interest with which the British General, ascending to a
point in the shattered walls affording a commanding view,
surveyed the scene of desolation in the immediate foreground,
with the beautiful Cabul Valley spread out at his feet.

The quarters occupied by the Guides, adjoining the Resi-
dency, were also visited, and the gate where Lieutenant Hamil-
ton made his memorable defence, when, sword and revolver in
hand, he three times charged out into the thick of the enemy,
like the swift-footed son of Peleus : —

" High o'er the scene of death Achilles stood,
All grim with dust, all horrible in blood ;
Yet still insatiate, still with rage in flame,
Such is the lust of never-dying fame."

Leaving this scene of sadness and pride to every English-
man, Sir Frederick Roberts visited the Ameer's Palace, and
returned to camp after an inspection not likely ever to be for-
gotten.

At noon on the day succeeding this visit, the Bala Hissar
was formally occupied by a portion of the British troops. The
whole division having lined both sides of the road from the
camp to the citadel, a distance of over a mile, Sir Frederick

examination of the magazine records, that he possessed no less than 50,000
small arms of all sorts, of which all but about 12,000 were either English, or
cleverly imitated, like many of his guns, from English models by Native
artificers."

250 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Roberts, accompanied by General Hills and his four Brigadier-
Generals, Macpherson, Massy, Baker, and Gough, and a large
number of the most influential Sirdars of Cabul, rode slowly
along the splendid display of the flower of our British and
Indian troops to the Bala Hissar, the infantry presenting arms,
the cavalry trumpets braying forth a salute, and the bands
playing. As the head of the brilliant procession entered the
fortress, the British flag was hoisted over the gateway, under a
royal salute of thirty-one guns fired on the glacis. From the
gateway one company of the 67th Regiment, followed by the
band, led the way to the Diwan-i-Aum, or Grand Reception
Room, Sir Frederick and his Generals, with their respective
Staffs, following, and the procession being closed by the remain-
der of the 67th Regiment.

The scene in the Diwan-i-Aum was singular and suggestive.
Around the British Commander crowded the Afghan Sirdars,
ready to make any promises to their conqueror, and equally ready,
as the event proved, to break them. At his side stood Moosa
Khan, a child six years of age, heir-apparent of the Ameer,
who excused himself from attending on the score of indispo-
sition. This was the ostensible cause of his absence, but the
real reason, which was kept secret for manifest considerations
of state, is set forth in the following account given by Sir
Frederick Roberts : — " Early on the morning of this day the
Ameer walked to my camp, accompanied by only two attendants,
and expressed his determination to resign the Ameership. He
said he had intended doing so before going to Kushi, but had
allowed himself to be over-persuaded. He was in very low
spirits ; said his life had been a miserable one ; that he would
rather be a grass cutter in the English camp than Ruler of
Afghanistan, and begged he might live in this camp until he
could be sent to India, or London, or wherever the Viceroy
might desire to send him. I placed a tent at his disposal ;
ordered breakfast to be prepared for him, and begged him to
think over the matter for two or three hours, and said I would
see him at ten o'clock, the time appointed the previous evening
for His Highness to come to my camp, and accompany me to
the Bala Hissar. The Ameer knew nothing of the proposed
proclamation, and was quite ignorant of my intentions towards

The Durbar in the Bala Hissar. 251

the Mustaufi, the AVuzeer, Yaliya Khan and his brother. At
ten I had a second interview with the Ameer, who stated that
he had quite decided to give up the throne of Cabul ; that he
could not possibly accompany me to the Bala Hissar, but that
he would send his eldest son, and all his Ministers would be in
attendance. I again pointed out the serious step His High-
ness was taking ; but finding his mind was made up, I said I
would telegraph to the Viceroy for instructions ; that of course
he could not be forced to remain on as Ameer against his will ;
but that I should ask him to retain the title until I could re-
ceive a reply to the telegram."

Sir Frederick Roberts addressed the assembled Sirdars, and
then read to them a proclamation* indicating the intentions of

* The following is the text of the proclamation : — ''Bala Hissar, Cabul,
12th October, 1879. — In my proclamation of the 3rd October, dated Zerghun
Shah, I informed the people of Cabul that a British Army was advancing
to take possession of the city, and I warned them against offering any
resistance to the entry of the troops, and the authority of His Highness
the Ameer. That warning has been disregarded. The force under my
command has now reached Cabul, and occupied the Bala Hissar ; but its
advance has been pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city
have taken a conspicuous part in the opposition offered. They have there-
fore become rebels against His Highness the Ameer, and have added to the
guilt already incurred by them, in abetting the murder of the British
Envoy and of his companions, a treacherous and cowardly crime, which has
brought indelible disgrace on the Afghan people. It would be but a just
and fitting reward for such misdeeds if the city of Cabul was totally
destroyed and its very name blotted out. But the great British Govern-
ment is ever desirous to temper justice with mercy, and I now announce to
the inhabitants of Cabul that the city will be spared. Nevertheless it is
necessary that they should not escape all penalty, and that the punishment
inflicted should be such as will be felt and remembered. Therefore such of
the buildings as now interfere with the proper military occupation of the
Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the British troops quartered in
it, will be at once levelled with the ground ; and further, a heavy fine,
the amount of which will be notified hereafter, will be imposed upon the
inhabitants, to be paid according to their several capabilities. This punish-
ment, inflicted upon the whole city, will not, of course, absolve from
further penalties those whose individual guilt may be hereafter proved. A
full and searching inquiry will be held into all the circumstances of the
late outbreak, and all persons convicted of bearing a part in it will be
dealt with according to their desert. I further give notice to all, that, in
order to provide for the restoration and maintenance of order, the city of
Cabul and the surrounding country, to a distance of ten miles, are placed
under martial law. With the consent of the Ameer, a Military Governor
of Cabul will be appointed to administer justice, and to punish with a
strong hand ail evil doers. The inhabitants of Cabul and of the neighbour-
ing villages are hereby warned to submit to his authority. For the future
the carrying of dangerous weapons, whether swords, knives, or firearms,

252 Memoir of Sir .Frederick Roberts.

the British Government, and the punishment he intended to mete
out to the people of Cabul for offering resistance to his advance
and the authority of the Ameer, contrary to the warning con-
veyed in his proclamation of the 3rd Octoher. He said that he
would spare the city, though were he to raze it to the ground,
for the treacherous murder of the British Mission, and the
rebellion against their sovereign the Ameer, he would only be
meting out a just retribution. But he could not permit that
the Gabulees should escape all punishment, and he intended
to destroy certain buildings that interfered with the military
occupation of the Bala Hissar, and to inflict a fine on the whole
city, while a full and searching inquiry into the circumstances of
the massacre would be held, and all persons convicted of par-
ticipating in it, would be dealt with according to their deserts.
He also declared that the city of Cabul and the surrounding
country, for a radius of ten miles, was placed under martial
law, and a military governor would be appointed to administer
justice and inflict punishment on all evil doers. The carrying
of arms was prohibited in Cabul, or within a distance of five
miles, and after a week from the date of the proclamation, any
person found armed within these limits would be liable to the
punishment of death. All arms delivered up would be paid
for at a stipulated rate, and finally, rewards, graduated from

within the streets of Cabul, or within a distance of five miles from the city
gates, is forbidden. After a week from the date of this proclamation any
person found armed within these limits will be liable to the penalty of
death. Persons having in their possession any article whatever which
formerly belonged to members of the British Embassy, are required to bring
them forthwith to the British Camp. Anyone neglecting this warning will,
if found hereafter in possession of any such articles, be subjected to the
severest penalties. Further, all persons who may have in their possession
any firearms or ammunition formerly issued to, or seized by the Afghan
troops, are required to produce them. For every country-made rifle,
whether breech or muzzle-loading, a sum of three rupees will be given on
delivery ; and for every rifle of European manufacture, five rupees. Any
one found hereafter in possession of such weapons will be severely pun-
ished. Finally, I notify that I will give a reward of fifty rupees for the
surrender of any person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the
attack on the British Embassy, or for such information as may lead directly
to his capture. A similar sum will be given in case of any person who may
have fought against the British troops, since the 3rd September last, and
has therefore become a rebel against the Ameer. If any such person so
surrendered or captured be a captain or a subaltern officer of the Afghan
Army, the reward will be increased to seventy-five rupees ; and if a field
officer, to 120 rupees."

Roberts and the Cabulees. 253

120 rupees for a field officer, 75 rupees for officers of inferior
rank, and 50 rupees for a soldier or civilian, were offered for the
surrender of any persons concerned in the attack on the British
Residency, or for such information as might lead to their cap-
ture ; and similar rewards were offered for the apprehension of
any person who had fought against the British Army since the
3rd September, the date of the massacre, as they had placed
themselves by this act within the category of rebels against
the authority of their sovereign the Ameer, who had issued a
proclamation from the British Gamp at Kushi, requiring his
subjects to abstain from resorting to arms.

Very severe strictures were passed in the House of Com-
mons and by a portion of the English Press on those provi-
sions of this proclamation punishing with death persons found
armed within five miles of Cabul, and those who had been en-
gaged in the recent fighting; but the fact was, that they re-
mained a dead letter, never having been acted upon. Sir Fred-
erick Roberts, writing to us of these provisions, says: — " The
order must of course be read in connection with my other
orders, and with a clear understanding of the position I was
placed in, with Yakoob Khan in my camp, ostensibly as my
friend, as being rebelled against by his own soldiers." The
order referred to by Sir Frederick Roberts is the proclamation
to the people of Cabul, issued at Kushi on the 3rd October,
warning them against resisting his advance, and the general
orders to his troops of the 24th September and 1st October
appealing to the officers and men to exercise mercy and for-
bearance— orders which the gallant General copied out for us
with his own hand, so desirous is he that his countrymen
should do justice to the feelings of humanity with which he
was actuated in his dealings with the Afghan nation. Those
who have a personal knowledge of Sir Frederick Roberts needed
no such disclaimer as the above, for a more humane officer
does not exist, and no detractor, if any there now be, can point
to an incident in his career when he displayed harshness
towards the weak or vanquished. No officer in India had
acquired a better title to be regarded as humane in a calling
which tends to sear the heart, and Roberts fulfilled the
requirements of Wordsworth's ideal Christian Warrior : —

254 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

" Who, doom'd to go in company with pain,
And fear, and bloodshed, miserable train !
Turns his necessity to glorious gain ;
In face of those doth exercise a power
Which is our human nature's highest dower ;
Controls them, and subdues, transmutes, bereaves
Of their bad influence, and their good receives ;
By objects, which might force the soul to abate
Her feeling, rendered more compassionate."

The comments of Admiral Oliver Jones, in an incident at
the storm of Meeangunj in the Oude Campaign (given in a
preceding chapter) testify that from an early period in his
military career the subject of this memoir had earned a charac-
ter for humanity in times and under circumstances when this
virtue was not a distinguishing trait of the British soldier.

When dismissing the Sirdars from his presence after the
durbar, Sir Frederick Roberts directed the arrest of the Mus-
taufi, Habibullah Khan, the Wuzeer, Shah Mahomed, and Yahya
Khan, whom he informed of his intention to retain them until
the circumstances connected with the attack on the Residency
had been inquired into. The 67th Regiment was ordered to
encamp in the gardens which lie immediately in front of the
Diwan-i-Aum, and six companies of the 5th Goorkhas were
moved into the upper Bala Hissar fort.

On the day following the reading of the proclamation of the
3rd October, the inhabitants of Cabul had to submit to the
humiliation of seeing a foreign army march through the streets
of the capital. " Horse, Foot, and Dragoons," the whole
gallant array, the Cavalry Brigade leading, followed by the
General with his Staff and escort, five regiments of Infantry
bringing up the rear, traversed its principal streets and
bazaars, including the famous Char Chonk, one of the finest
in Central Asia, which was partially blown up by Sir George
Pollock in 1842 as a punishment for the treachery of the
Cabulees. In accordance with the terms of the proclamation,
Major-General James Hills, C.B., V.C., who had accompanied
the army as the guest of the Commander, was appointed
Military Governor of Cabul, and under his rule mercy tempered
the stern requirements of martial law.

For the investigation of the causes and circumstances of the
late outbreak, and the collection of all possible evidence regard-

The Military Commission. 255

ing the conduct of individuals since the arrival of the British
Embassy in Cabul, Sir Frederick Roberts nominated a com-
mission, consisting of his Chief of the staff, Colonel C. M.
Macgregor, C.B., C.S.I., Surgeon-Major Bellew, C.S.I., and
Mahammed Hyat Khan, C.S.I. Their duties were comprehen-
sive, and included the submission of recommendations regard-
ing the punishment to be inflicted on all persons whom they
found guilty of participation in the attack on the Residency.
The actual trial of the prisoners was confided to a second
military commission, consisting of a Brigadier- General and
two other officers.

Meanwhile, Sir Frederick Roberts made strenuous efforts to
collect a reserve of supplies, for winter was approaching, and he
was anxious to guard against any eventualities. As the son
of an officer whose warning voice was raised, and raised in
vain, during the first Afghan War, he knew well the danger
of under-estimating the powers of resistance of the Afghan
people, even when seemingly beaten to the earth and powerless,
so he kept his troops prepared for a sudden crisis, and busied
himself in collecting supplies and perfecting his transport.

256 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Cabul District after its Occupation by the British — Events at the
Shutargardan Pass — The Explosion in the Bala Hissar — Occupation of
the Sherpur Cantonment — Sir Frederick Roberts Reconnoitres .the
Passes towards Jugdulluck — Abandonment of the Shutargardan — The
Expedition to Maidan — Unsettled State of the Country — Deportation
of Yakoob Khan to India — A Review of the Situation in Northern
Afghanistan before the Events of December 1879.

THE people of Afghanistan, truculent and treacherous though
they are, and tainted, like Byron's Corsair, with " a thousand
crimes," possess, like him, "one virtue," and that is a sturdy
love of independence. This they displayed in the darkest hour
of the first Afghan War, and ultimately compelled a British
force to evacuate the country under a humiliating Convention.
In the present instance they had to deal with a General of a
different calibre to General Elphinstone, but they struggled
manfully to shake off the yoke of the invader. During the
stirring events of the following December it seemed to the
outside world that a terrible tragedy was about to be enacted on
the very scene of the disasters of 1841-42. Sir Frederick
Roberts' s countrymen in England watched with bated breath the
struggle for mastery under the walls of Cabul, but never for
one moment did the gallant upholder of England's cause, who
displayed in the crisis the " antique heroism" with which Lord
Raglan was credited by Marshal St. Arnaud, lose his calmness
and confidence in the success of his plans.

In the middle of October, to which the course of events has
brought us, the Afghans, utterly defeated in the field, and with
their capital occupied by a foreign foe, did not lose heart, but,
within a few days of the public entry of Sir Frederick Roberts
into Cabul, reports were current that a strong force was on the
march for the city from Afghan Turkistan. On receiving
information to this effect, on the 14th October, Sir Frederick

Fighting at the Shutargardan. 257

Roberts immediately sent some Cavalry to reconnoitre, but
nothing definite could be ascertained of their movements.

On the 13th October, the day Sir Frederick Roberts made
his triumphal march through Cabul, he received intelligence
from Colonel Money, commanding at the Shutargardan, that
he expected to be attacked by the Ghilzyes, who were assem-
bling in great strength in his neighbourhood. This information
proved correct, and at 8 A.M. on the following morning, some
2,000 of these tribesmen fired upon the party sent to relieve
the detachment occupying the blockhouse in the Sirkai Kotul,
which had before been strengthened. Colonel Money ordered
Major Griffiths to proceed with two companies of the 3rd Sikhs
and two of the 21st Punjaub Native Infantry, with one gun, tc
hold the steep ridge near the camp, and this post he not only
defended throughout the day, notwithstanding every effort of the
enemy to dislodge him, but carried at the point of the bayonet
a position they had taken up on a rocky ridge and pursued them
for two miles.

On the 17th, Sir Frederick Roberts sent Brigadier- General
Gough to the Shutargardan with a force consisting of 4 guns
No. 2 Mountain Battery, 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and 5th Punjaub
Infantry, together with a large convoy of transport animals for
the three-fold object of opening out his communications, bring-
ing up supplies, and rendering aid to Colonel Money. Briga-
dier-General Gough arrived at a most opportune moment, for
the tribes that had attacked the Shutargardan position, though
defeated, were by no means disheartened, and, on the 15th, had
received such large accessions from Zurmat, Hazara, and else-
where, that by nightfall they were calculated to number about
10,000 men. They dismantled the unoccupied post of Karatiga,
and were so confident of overwhelming the British garrison
that they brought their women to witness their triumph, and
actually offered to spare the lives of the garrison if they would
lay down their arms. Colonel Money rejected the terms with
scorn, and took the wise precaution of concentrating his strength
by withdrawing the garrison of the Sirkai Kotul, but adopted no
offensive steps. Encouraged by his apparent inactivity, and
strengthened by some hundreds of men belonging to the
mutinous regiments of the regular army, the enemy's sharp-

s

258 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

shooters opened fire on the garrison. But the tables were
soon turned.

On the morning of the 19th Colonel Money learnt by
heliographic signal of the arrival of Brigadier- General Gough
at Kooshi, and immediately took the offensive. Moving out
his skirmishers he opened fire with four guns of the Kohat
Mountain Battery, and the enemy finding that their oppor-
tunity had gone, quitted their positions, and by the evening
not a man was to be seen. Alla-ood-deen, brother of the great
Ghilzye Chief, Padshah Khan, was severely wounded by a shell
while approaching the advance picket on his return from
making an attempt to break up the hostile combination of his
countrymen, and paid the penalty of his conduct, which was
supposed to be treacherous, with his life, as his wound proved
mortal.*

On the 16th October, about 1 P.M., the British troops and
the inhabitants of Cabul were startled by a loud report from
the direction of the upper Bala Hissar, and a vast column
of smoke and showers of debris showed that an explosion had
occurred in the Arsenal, in which were stored over one million
pounds of powder, as roughly calculated by Colonel Perkins,
Commanding the Royal Engineers. The 67th Regiment were
in tents in the Ameer's garden, and the 5th Goorkhas in the
upper Bala Hissar fort, and both Corps suffered some loss.
One soldier of the 67th and twelve of the latter regiment,
were killed; also three Sowars of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry,
and five Ordnance Lascars, fell victims to the explosion, and
Captain Shafto, R.A., Commissary of Ordnance, who was ex-
amining the godowns containing the ammunition, and making
an inventory of the contents, shared the same fate. In addition
to these, four men were seriously injured.

Sir Frederick Roberts immediately ordered the 5th Goorkhas
to leave their camp, and also directed the 67th Regiment to
remove from the garden of the Dewan-i-Aum, which was in
dangerous proximity to tLe now burning ruins. He would
not even permit them to remove their tents or kit, and with
the exception of their regimental ammunition, everything was

* See despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, dated Shutargardan,
19th October, 1879.

The Explosions at CabuL 259

left behind. The wisdom of this precipitate evacuation was
soon apparent, as exactly two and a half hours after the first
explosion, a second occurred of greater violence, by which some
natives, upwards of 400 yards distant from the magazine, were
killed by falling stones and debris. The 67th Kegiment was
accommodated for the night in the tents of the 72nd and 92nd
Highlanders, and an instance of the camaraderie (to use an
expressive French term) existing between the 72nd and the
5th Goorkhas, brothers-in-arms at the Peiwar Kotul and com-
panions in many a bivouac, was exhibited by a large number of
the Highlanders coming forward and insisting upon lending
their great coats for the night to the brave little mountaineers
of Nepaul. This was no small act of self denial, as the nights
were bitterly cold.*

Sir Frederick Roberts's anxiety was not lessened for some
days, as a terrible danger threatened the entire city in the
possible ignition of the main magazine, in which were stored
upwards of 450 tons of gunpowder. Barely ninety yards
intervened between this magazine and the flames, and during
the night of the 16th, its explosion was momentarily expected ;
indeed, its walls, which were by no means of substantial con-
struction, were considerably scorched. Providentially, towards
morning the wind went down, and with it the flames began to
subside, and the explosions, which had never ceased, became
less frequent. On the following afternoon, the 17th October,
Sir Frederick Roberts deemed the danger so considerably
lessened as to allow of working parties endeavouring to ex-
tinguish the conflagration. Even then, he says, the work was
one of considerable danger, as the main magazine (to prevent
the fire spreading to which was the principal task) was fitted
with a weak roof, much projecting woodwork, and badly-fitted
doors of the same inflammable material. However, the officers
and men worked with energy and devotion, and though the
fire smouldered for days, all anxiety as to the safety of the
main magazine ceased.

* A similar instance of soldierly feeling was afforded during the defence
of Jellalabad in the last Afghan War, between Her Majesty's 13th ilegi-
ment and the 35th Bengal Native Infantry, a regiment which unhappily
subsequently disgraced itself by mutinying in the Punjaub in 1857, as
already detailed in a preceding chapter.

s 2

260 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

" The Arsenal," writes Sir Frederick Roberts to us, "was in the
form of an oblong, on slightly sloping ground, and the long
low buildings in which the ammunition was placed were
simply constructed of mud, the doorways being wooden ones.
The powder was stored in the upper buildings of the enclosure,
and the small arms ammunition and shells below ; but between
the end of the long shed containing the various loaded shells,
and the wooden door of the nearest building containing powder,
there was a distance of barely fifteen yards. The first ex-
plosion, which proceeded from a large quantity of powder
stored underneath the small arms ammunition, not only ignited
a large quantity of cartridges and shells, and caused the death
of Captain Shafto, R.A., and the men of the Goorkhas, as you
have stated, but the concussion alone was sufficient to burst
open the doors of the main powder magazines. These
magazines were each filled up to the doorway with large jars,
or "Kappas," of hide, each containing some 2001bs of powder,
and had any one of these been pierced by the thousands of
bullets or fragments of shell that were flying about from the
lower buildings, the friction would no doubt have caused an
explosion which would have communicated itself to the sur-
rounding powder, and an enormous loss of human life and
destruction to property would have been the result.

" Throughout the night the conflagration went on, varied by
rushes of flame, and columns of smoke as the fire reached
more powder which had hitherto escaped, but still, to the
wonder of the watchers on the Siah-Sung heights, the big
magazine gave no sign, though at any moment they were
prepared for some almost supernatural explosion. Next day
the fire had abated, and though it was not entirely extinguished
till some time afterwards, an exploring party managed to
make their way inside. The place was a heap of smouldering
ruins, and they were reminded by the constant explosion of
an eight-inch shell or a box of Snider cartridges, that it was
anything but a safe mission they were bound on. Leaning
against the wooden frame of the door of the end powder
magazine was a burning beam, which was removed by Lieu-
tenant Neville Chamberlain. It had already commenced to
char the door itself, and there can be no doubt that another

General Roberts on the Explosions. 261

half-hour would have sufficed to ignite the powder — 800,000 Ibs !
We have, perhaps, no record of any such amount having
exploded at once, and though it was believed by the Engineer
Officers with the Cabul Field Force, that the shock would
have caused the large town of Cabul to be levelled in one
vast ruin, it requires a skilled mathematician, and one learned
in the force of explosives, to tell us, after learning the precise
configuration of the ground on which the magazine stood, how
far, and to what extent, that gigantic mass would have made
its power felt.

" Engineer Officers were immediately ordered to destroy
the powder in the most expeditious manner, and daily a
large quantity was run down a steep slope in a kind of trough,
into the water, which flows round the Bala Hissar ; but the
place being abandoned during the fighting which took place
early in December, a considerable amount remained, which
fell into the hands of the Afghans." Sir Frederick Roberts
has been blamed for not having destroyed the powder at once,
but clearly he has been misjudged. Handling powder at any
time is necessarily a delicate and dangerous operation, and
must be slowly and cautiously carried on ; but when one con-
siders that this enormous mass of powder was in skin jars,
which could not be moved without tumbling to pieces, and
that it was impossible to blow it up without causing a disaster,
it would seem clear that General Eoberts took the best measures
possible for its destruction, and he cannot be blamed if this
was not completed before the troubles of December began.

In the Cabul Force there was at first a decided suspicion of
treachery. It was believed that the Afghans had hidden in the
vaults of the Magazine some infernal machine which was to
explode after our troops had filled the Bala Hissar ; but in
Sir Frederick Roberts' s opinion, subsequent inquiries proved
that this was scarcely possible. The General, accompanied by
his Staff, visited the magazine the day before the explosion, and
found everything in a state of the utmost confusion. Instead
of the order which ought to reign supreme in any Arsenal,
loose powder, percussion caps, cartridges, loaded shells, fuses,
and friction tubes were strewed about indiscriminately. Poor
Captain Shafto commented on this at the time, and expressed

262 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

his intention of getting everything safely arranged, each in its
proper place, as soon as possible ; and it was probably the case
that, on the following day, as he and his men were at work,
some one of them trod on a friction tube or a. percussion cap,
or powder exploded, which communicated the fire to the whole
magazine.

The Military Commission, presided over by Brigadier- General
Massy, convicted five persons of participating in the attack on
the Residency, and on the 20th October, they were executed in
the Bala Hissar. One of these men was the Kotwali, or Police
Magistrate, of Cabul, who was implicated in the massacre of
the Cavagnari Mission and urged the people of Cabul to resist
the advance of Sir Frederick Roberts's force. Another of the
prisoners was a Mollah, or priest, of great sanctity, who
exerted his religious influence over a fanatical people to induce
them to wage war against the unbelievers, and who had taken
an active part in the attack on the Residency. The other
culprits were a Chief of the Barukzye, or reigning clan, and an
officer of the Ameer's Army, who fought against the British on
the 6th October. The fifth and most culpable of all was a man
who had actually imbrued his hands in the blood of the victims
of the treacherous and savage deed of the 3rd September.
These and others convicted of participation in the Massacre
were executed, and met their doom with the stolidity, or forti-
tude, whichever we may regard it, characteristic of the Oriental,
whose fatalistic creed is embodied in the words Hector addressed
to his spouse in his final memorable interview : —

" Fixed is the term of all the race of men ;
And such the hard condition of our birth,
No force can then resist, no flight can save,
All sink alike, the fearful and the brave."

Since the 12th October, when Yakoob Khan resigned the
Ameership into the hands of Sir Frederick Roberts, saying
he would rather be a grass-cutter in the British Camp than
ruler of so turbulent a race as his quondam subjects, the British
General, while awaiting tne orders of the Government, had
been the de facto sovereign of North-Eastern Afghanistan, and
exercised autocratic power over life and property. On the 27th

Abdication of Yakoob Khan, 263

October, he received instructions from the Viceroy, and issued
the following proclamation to the people of Cabul. — " I, Gen-
eral Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby pro-
claim that the Ameer having by his own free will abdicated, has
left Afghanistan without a government. In consequence of the
shameful outrage upon its Envoy and since the British Govern-
ment has been compelled to occupy by force Cabul, the Capital,
and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan,
the British Government now commands that all Afghan author-
ities, Chiefs, and Sirdars, do continue their functions in main-
taining order, referring to me whenever necessary. The British
Government desires that the people should be treated with
justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings and
customs be respected. The services of such Sirdars and Chiefs
as assist in preserving order will be duly recognized, but all
disturbers of the peace and persons concerned in attacks
upon the British authority will meet with condign punishment.
The British Government, after consultation with the principal
Sirdars, tribal Chiefs, and others representing the interests and
.wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will
as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the
good government of the people."

As for the ex- Ameer, he appeared much relieved since he
had ceased to wield the sovereignty of the Afghan nation, and
it was his habit, occasionally, in the evening to emerge from his
tent in the British camp, and walk with the General while the
band discoursed sweet music. " The Ameer," writes Sir Fred-
erick Roberts to us, " was treated with the greatest kindness
and consideration, and it was not until I was satisfied from
the results of the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, over
which Colonel Macgregor presided, that the attack on the Resi-
dency, if not actually instigated, might at least have been
checked by Yakoob Khan, that the guard which had hitherto
been a guard of honour, was made responsible for his safe custody.
Even then, all possible courtesy was shown to the Ameer, but
this restraint was rendered still more necessary by inform-
ation I received, from which I was convinced that Yakoob
Khan was contemplating flight, which, if he had succeeded

264 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

in effecting, would have been the signal for a general
rising."*

The General reported to the Viceroy that "the Ameer seems
much broken in spirits, and wholly unfit to resume his former
position and responsibilities." The despotic ruler of a martial
nation found himself a close prisoner under the walls of his

* Some time before the Ameer's deportation from Cabul, Sir Frederick
Roberts had a conversation with him regarding the political events imme-
diately preceding the rupture between his father, Shere Ali, and the
British Government. Sir Frederick took notes of the conversation, the
substance of which he stated to be as follows : — " In 1869 my father was
fully prepared to throw in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses
before making himself secure on the throne of Afghanistan, and he had
come to the conclusion that his best chance of holding what he had won,
lay in an alliance with the British Government. He did not receive from
Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped,
but, nevertheless, he returned to Cabul fairly satisfied, and so he had re-
mained until the visit of Nur Mahammud Shah to India in 1873. This
visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from Nur Mahammud
Shah during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on
his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain
from the British Government all the aid that he wanted, and from that
time he began to turn his attention to the thought of a Russian alliance.
You know how that ended. When my father received from the Govern-
ment of India the letter informing him that a British Mission was about to
proceed to Cabul, he read it out in Durbar. The members of the Russian
Embassy were present. After the reading was finished, Colonel Stolietoff
rose, saluted the Ameer, and asked permission to leave Cabul. If permitted,
he would, he said, travel without delay to Tashkend, and report the state
of affairs to General KaufFmann, who would inform the Tzar, and thus
bring pressure to bear on England. He promised to return in six weeks or
two months, and urged the Ameer to do everything in his power meanwhile
to prevent the British Mission from reaching Cabul.

" Colonel Stolietoff' never returned to Cabul. He lost no time in reaching
Tashkend, where he remained for a few weeks, and he then started for
Russia. The Afghan official, Mirza Muhammad Hassan Khan, generally
known as the Dabir-ul-Mulk, who had travelled with Colonel Stolietoff*
from the Oxus to Cabul, accompanied him on his return journey to Tash-
kend. Here the Mirza was detained under pretence that orders would
shortly be received from the Emperor, until the news of my father's flight
from Cabul reached General KaufFmann. He was then permitted to leave.
Two Aides-de-Camp were sent with him, one a European, the other a native
of Bokhara. My father was strongly urged by General KaufFmann not to
leave Cabul. At the same time the members of the Embassy were ordered
to return to Tashkend, the doctor being permitted to remain with my
father, if his services were required. Throughout, the Russian Embassy
were treated with great honour, and at all stations between Mazar-i-SharifF
and Cabul, orders were given for the troops to turn out, and for a salute to
be fired on their arrival and departure."

Sir Frederick Roberts in his letter to the Viceroy giving this summary,
refers to the prevalence of Russian ware and coins in Cabul, no less than
13,000 gold pieces having been found in the late Ameer's treasury.

Occupation of Sherpur. 265

Capital, and bitterly must he have rued his timidity, or trea-
chery, in not restraining the mutinous regiments when they
first turned upon the Eesidency on that fatal 3rd September.
With the unhappy cause of Ilium's woes he might have ex-
claimed : —

" Would heaven, ere all these dreadful deeds were done,
The day that show'd me to the golden sun,
Had seen my death."

On the last day of this eventful month of October, the British
troops moved into the Sherpur Cantonments, the barracks of
which had been cleared and made habitable by an army of
artisans and coolies, and further accommodation was in course
of construction to quarter the entire force. A variety of rea-
sons influenced Sir Frederick Roberts in adopting this course,
the Chief of which were, that the works raised with such care
by Shere Ali, and called after him, afforded better shelter, and
were more defensible during the winter ; also the Commissariat
Depot was there, to protect which required a guard, and as
guards were stationed in the Bala Hissar and City, the strength
of the troops was not only unduly taxed, but they were more
scattered than was judicious. The wisdom of concentration and
keeping the supplies within the lines occupied by the troops,
were among the chief lessons inculcated by the disastrous
teachings of the first Afghan War, and soon again received a
striking illustration.

Writing of the reasons that influenced him in his choice of
Sherpur Sir Frederick Roberts says : — " The advantage of using
all existing roof accommodation at the first glance pointed out the
Bala Hissar as the quarter which promised best to meet my
requirements ; but its dangerous proximity to the large maga-
zine which had escaped destruction, and the fact that it would
not accommodate all my force, and that the troops would have
to be more or less scattered, eventually led me to decide upon
occupying the large, and for the most part fortified, cantonment
of Sherpur, which was built by the late Ameer as winter quar-
ters for his regular troops. This Cantonment lies rather less
than a mile north-east of the city, and contains long ranges of
brick buildings, which will at once enable me to house the
entire European portion of my force, and also provide accommo-

266 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

datiou for the Commissariat Stores. The Native troops are
engaged hutting themselves, and, aided by the materials at
hand and woodwork brought from the dismantled portion of the
Bala Hissar, have already made considerable progress." The
Cantonment, though more extensive than was desirable for this
small force, was enclosed on three sides by a lofty and massive
loop-holed wall, with numerous flanking towers, while the rear
was protected by the Behmaroo heights (on which General
Roberts proposed erecting certain defensive works), at the base
of which lay the Cantonment. The site was close to the old
British Cantonment, and actually embraced in its defences the
heights which were such a danger in 1841, and for the possession
of which many sanguinary struggles took place, as recorded in
the pages of Lady Sale and Sir Vincent Eyre. By the end of
October Sir Frederick Roberts had laid in sufficient supplies to
relieve him of all anxiety regarding the provisioning of the
force during the winter.

As regards the fort of the Bala Hissar, the General wrote to
the Government proposing to raze it to the ground, as an act
of retributive justice, which he considered would have a deeper
significance than the destruction of any number of houses
belonging to obscure individuals in the city. It was historical,
its name was symbolical of Afghan power, and it was inti-
mately connected with the past history of the country.
Moreover, the fact that it had been destroyed and levelled with
the ground, would spread throughout the length and breadth
of Afghanistan, bearing with it a political significance that
could not be under-rated. As a further reason for its demolition
he urged, that from its walls a heavy fire was kept up on the
defenders of the Residency, and he was of opinion that not a
vestige of any place which bore a part in that day's doings
should be allowed to remain.

Of the preparations made by the Ameer Shere Ali to engage
in hostilities with the British, the General wrote : ' ' Before
the outbreak of hostilities last year the Ameer had raised and
equipped with arms of precision, sixty-eight regiments of
Infantry, and sixteen of Cavalry. The Afghan Artillery
amounted to near 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans
were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon

Roberts s Reasons for Occupying Sherpur. 267

and breach-loading small arms. More than a million pounds
of powder, and, I believe, several million rounds of home-
made Snider ammunition were in the Arsenal at the time of
the late explosion, and swords, helmets, uniforms and other
articles of military equipment, were stored in proportionate
quantities. Finally, Shere Ali had expended upon the con-
struction of the Sherpur Cantonments, an astonishing amount
of labour and money. The extent and cost of these works may
be judged of from the fact that the whole of the troops under
my command, will find cover during the winter within the
Cantonment and its outlying buildings, and the bulk of them
in the main line of parapet itself, which extends to a length of
nearly two miles under the southern and western slopes of the
Behmaroo hills. Shere Ali's original design was apparently to
carry the wall entirely round the hills, a distance of five miles,
and the foundations were already laid for a considerable portion
of this length."

The reasons given by Sir Frederick Roberts for occupying
Sherpur Cantonment dispose of certain statements by an
historian of the war, which have given rise to inferences that
the occupation of Sherpur was done in a hap-hazard sort of
way, and that the commanding General, having overcome the
Afghans in the field, had grown careless.

But nothing could be more erroneous than such a supposi-
tion, which was opposed to the character of the subject of this
Memoir, who never left anything to chance, and, from his
knowledge of Afghan warfare, derived not only in the field,
but from the lessons inculcated by his father, would have been
the last man to regard a lull in the active resistance of such a
turbulent people as the Afghans, as aught but evidence of the
existence of a ground-swell which experienced mariners know
is the prelude to a coming storm. Regarding his reasons for
placing his force in Sherpur in October, Sir Frederick Roberts
writes to us : — " The fact is, that I thought over our position
most carefully before I decided on occupying this Sherpur Can-
tonment. Instead of being deceived by the state of quiet we
happened to be then in, I felt very sure we should have trouble
once winter set in. I knew that it was essential to keep my
force together, and that it would be very difficult in the short

268 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

time before snow usually fell, to house the troops and followers,
and collect a sufficiency of supplies and forage. I examined
the Bala Hissar most particularly, for I quite appreciated the
advantages it offered. I found that it would not contain one
third of my force, and that the remainder, with all the transport
animals, would have to go elsewhere. There were no villages
or forts near the Bala Hissar that would answer; — in fact,
there was hut the one place, Sherpur, which could accommo-
date all the troops and animals, as well as the required amount
of supplies, — added to which, shelter already existed in Sherpur
for the whole of the British troops, and three-quarters of the
native ones. The fault of Sherpur was its size, too large for
my forces to defend properly — a fault which would have been
far more serious had I diminished my strength by occupying
the Bala Hissar as well. Another drawback was that the
whole of the City of Cabul intervened between Sherpur and
the Bala Hissar, and holding the Bala Hissar would not have
prevented the enemy from occupying the city, once we had been
beaten off the Asmai heights — which we were by the sheer
force of numbers on the 14th December, 1879. I had about
6,000 men, and the enemy were certainly not less than 100,000.
In my despatch, I said about 60,000, as I wished to be well
within the mark, and it was impossible to get any accurate
estimate, — but many influential natives, who had the means of
judging, told me that the enemy numbered 100,000 or 120,000.
I mention all this as Hensman's book is certainly misleading ;
he, no doubt, never knew how much thought I had given to
our position during the winter. So anxious was I to hold the
Bala Hissar, that I consulted the Commanding R.E., as to
the possibility of hutting the balance of the troops on the Siah-
Sung ridges, where we first encamped, but it was pronounced
an impossibility within the time."

On the 26th October, Sir Frederick Roberts visited Boot-
kak, where he selected a position for an outpost in the direction
of the line of advance of the Khyber column, which, under the
command of Major-General Bright, had entered Jellalabad two
days before. On the 1st November, Brigadier-General Mac-
pherson proceeded to Bootkak to open communications with
General Bright's column, the line by the Shutargardan being

Roberts Reconnoitres towards the Khyber. 269

closed for the winter. Many chiefs of the Tezeen* valley and
neighbouring country between it and Jellalabad, came into his
camp to make their submission and get the best terms procurable
from the British Commander.

On the following day Sir Frederick Eoberts, accompanied by
Colonel Macgregor, Chief of the Staff, and Daoud Shah, the
Commander-in-Chief of the late Afghan Army, rode out to
Bootkak, and, joining General Macpherson there, proceeded
with a strong escort to reconnoitre the Lutterbund Pass. On
the following morning the General, who was joined by the
headmen of the neighbouring Ghilzyes, reconnoitred to within
three or four miles of Tezeen, proceeding thence to the Khoord-
Cabul, that terrible defile which bears such an ominous sound
in the ears of those who remember the fearful scene of
slaughter enacted within its savage and precipitous gorges.
Threading the Khoord-Cabul, the General returned to Bootkak,
and in the evening rode back a further distance of ten miles to
the Sherpur Cantonment by the line of Telegraph just com-
pleted, making over forty miles of country covered during the
day.

As the result of this examination, General Roberts decided
to use the Lutturbund Pass for the future line of communica-
tion with General Bright at Jellalabad, the road by the Khoord-
Cabul (which General Macpherson was directed to use in
forming a junction near Jugdulluck with Brigadier-General
Charles Gough* advancing from Jellalabad with a portion of
General Bright's division) being considerably longer.

On the 4th November the General rode out towards Beni
Hissar to meet Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, who arrived at
Sherpur escorting a large convoy, and bringing with him the
troops lately stationed at Shutargardan, under Colonel Money.
The General warmly congratulated Colonel Money and thanked
the 3rd Sikhs and the Mountain Battery for their gallant re-

* This officer must not be confounded with his brother, Hugh Gough,
though both were at Delhi in Hodson's Horse. Hugh Gough served in Sir
Hope Grant's force throughout the mutiny with the subject of this Memoir ;
Charles Gough was also a cavalry officer, and, like his distinguished brother,
earned the Victoria Cross in the mutiny ; and during the first phase of the
Afghan War, ending with the Treaty of Gundamuck, commanded the cavalry
of the Khyber, or Sir Samuel Browne's, Division.

270 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

pulse of the attack by an overwhelming force of Mangals and
Ghilzyes. And these brave native soldiers received an ovation
from their comrades on their arrival in camp. On the way the
General was met by Padshah Khan, the intriguing Ghilzye
Chief, to whom he gave a cool reception. The British force at
Cabul had been seriously weakened by the absence of the
troops under Generals Macpherson and Gough, and the return
of the latter with the Shutargardan garrison, made a welcome
addition to a force of insufficient strength, as later events
proved, to cope with a combination of the tribes.

During the next few days Sir Frederick Eoberts visited the
Chardeh valley, and inspected the scene of the fighting on the
6th and 8th October ; and a column proceeded under command
of Brigadier-General Baker to the villages in the same valley,
and brought away some soldiers of the regiments who had
taken part in the attack on the Residency, whose names and
addresses were found on the regimental muster rolls. These
men were handed over for trial to the Military Commission,
under Brigadier- General Massy, and such as were found to be
guilty were hanged. The claims of justice being satisfied, on
the 12th November Sir Frederick Eoberts issued a Proclamation
of Amnesty* to all persons who had fought against the British

* The following is the text of the proclamation : — " To all whom it may
concern. On the 12th October, Shawal, a proclamation was issued in which
I offered a reward for the surrender of any person who had fought against
the British troops since the 3rd September, fifteenth Ramazan, and had
thereby become a rebel against the Ameer Yakoob Khan. I have now
received information which tends to show that some at least of those who
shared in the opposition encountered by the British troops during their
advance on Cabul, were led to do so by the belief that the Ameer was a
prisoner in my camp, and had called upon the soldiery and people of Cabul
to rise on his behalf. Such persons, although enemies to the British Govern-
ment, were not rebels against their own sovereign. And the great British
Government does not seek for vengeance against enemies who no longer
resist. It may be that few only of those who took up arms were thus led
away by the statements of evil-minded men ; but rather than punish the
innocent with the guilty, I am willing to believe that all were alike
deceived. On behalf of the British Government, therefore, I proclaim a
free and complete amnesty to all persons who have fought against the
British troops since the 3rd September, fifteenth Ramazan, provided that
they now give up any arms in their possession and return to their homes.
The offer of a reward for the surrender of such persons is now withdrawn,
and they will not for the future be molested in any way on account of
their opposition to the British advance. But it must be clearly understood
that the benefits of this amnesty do not extend to any one, whether soldier

The Moolah Mooskh-i-Ahim. 271

troops since the 3rd September, provided that they gave up
any arms in their possession and returned to their homes ; but
those persons who took part in the attack on the Residency, or
who might be found in possession of any property belonging to
members of the Embassy, were exempted. Up to the 15th
November, the executions at Cabul, under the recommendation
of the Military Commissioners, were seventy- eight, chiefly'
soldiers of the regiments which attacked the Residency.

A more pleasing duty to a humane officer like Sir Frederick
Roberts was the establishment in Cabul of a Civil Dispensary,
of which not only the male inhabitants but the ladies of the
Sirdars' families availed themselves.

Sir Frederick Roberts appointed as Governor of Afghan
Turkestan, Sirdar Wali Mahomed Barukzye, to whom an ad-
vance of two lacs of rupees (£20,000) was made for the pay of
levies, and to the charge of Kohistan, always a turbulent
district, he commissioned Shahbaz Khan. Besides these
Sirdars there were in the British Camp during the month two
leading Ghilzye Chiefs, from Hissarak, near Jugdulluck, who
agreed to keep open the road, and Mahomed Said, Governor of
Ghuznee, where disturbances had already broken out, under the
fiery exhortations of the aged Moollah, Mooskh-i-Alum, who
now appeared on the stormy sea of Afghan politics. The
influence wielded by this turbulent priest was enormous, though
we have seen its counterpart in Mediaeval Europe, with which
Central Asia, at the present time, bears a striking resemblance,
both in its religious and political conditions. The monks in
the priest-ridden courts and peoples of Europe, a thousand
years ago, possessed an influence paralleled by the Moollahs
among the ignorant and fanatical clansmen of Afghanistan and
our frontier, or in the cabinet of such a bigot as the late Nas-

or civilian, who was concerned directly, or indirectly, in the attack upon the
Residency, or who may hereafter be found in possession of any property
belonging to members of the Embassy. To such persons no mercy will be
shown. Further, I hold out no promise of pardon to those who, well know-
ing the Ameer's position in the British camp, instigated the troops and
people of Cabul to take up arms against the British troops. They have
been guilty of wilful rebellion against the Ameer's authority, and they will
be considered and treated as rebels whenever found." Up to the 13th
November the Cabulees surrendered 6,729 rifles and muskets, of which 742
were Enfields, and 560 Sniders.

272 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

rullah Khan, Ameer of Bokhara. The ninety years of Mooskh-
i-Alum (literally " Scent of the Universe ") had not softened his
fanatical hatred of the unbeliever. He was zealous in the
cause of the faith, and his saintly life gave him great influence
over his countrymen, who placed implicit faith in the assurances
of one

"Whose beard the silver hand of peace hath touch' d,
Whose white investments figure innocence."

But now his utterances breathed not of peace, as became his
years and calling, but of slaughter and extermination. The
"Jehad" was preached from every minaret and mosque, and the
Minister of Peace dedicated the remainder of his days to urging
futile resistance in which thousands of his countrymen perished.

" Turning his books to graves, his ink to blood,
His pens to lances, and his tongue divine,
To a loud trumpet and a point of war."

It was the old intolerant spirit of the Israelitish priest who
maddened the people to deeds of blood by appeals to "the
Sword of the Lord and of Gideon," though in this instance the
call was to defend his countrymen's hearths from aggression,
and therefore justifiable, if affording a chance of success.

Meanwhile the General took active steps to provide against
the contingencies of the coming winter, and busied himself in
collecting a reserve of supplies from Maidan, Logar, and Kohis-
tan, advances being made to the Sirdars for its transmission,
and all ineffective transport animals were sent back to India, in
order to economize forage. To facilitate the transport of
supplies from India the road on the Lutterbund was improved
by the Pioneers ; at this time also the British Camp was put
in communication with Jellalabad by means of the telegraph
wire.

Sir Frederick Roberts found his hand strengthened against
the possibility of the dangers of a divided command by his
promotion to the local rank of Lieutenant-General, with the
command of all the troops as far as Jamrood at the mouth of
the Khyber Pass, so that General Bright' s division of 12,000
men was placed in subordination to him. Towards the end of
November, on the return of General Macpherson's Brigade to

Disturbed State of Affairs. 273

Sherpur, Sir Frederick Roberts despatched Brigadier- General
Baker with a strong force to Maidan, about twenty-five miles
from Cabul, in the direction of Ghuznee, to enforce the collection
of grain and forage, which is ordinarily due from that district
as part of the revenues of the State. On the following day,
taking with him a small Cavalry escort, Sir Frederick joined
General Baker. A chief of some local importance proved
recalcitrant, and refused to send in his quota of supplies ; on
which Captain Turner, Assistant Political Officer, was sent with
two Squadrons of Cavalry, to bring him in ; but the troopers
were fired upon and compelled to retire.

In order to compel his submission, at daybreak on the 24th
November, Sir Frederick moved against the rebel chief's fort,
but it was found to be deserted. Having burnt the fort and
the neighbouring villages he returned to Maidan, and, on the
following day, rode back to Sherpur, leaving General Baker to
complete his mission.

On his arrival he was greeted with reports of the disturbed
state of Afghan Turkestan and Kohistan, where large bodies of
men were collecting, and the Governor recently appointed to
the latter district found his position untenable. General
Baker returned to Sherpur early in December, having collected
the forage demanded from Maidan. He reported that he left
all quiet in the district ; but it was a deceptive lull, for hardly
had he left the valley than the Governor he had installed, a
Barukzye Sirdar and a son of the great Ameer Dost Mahom-
med, was murdered. The Governor appointed to the Logar
District was equally an object of suspicion and contempt by
the people, who refused to recognize the authority which
lacked the support of British bayonets. On every hand there
were portents, and the situation resembled that of 1840, when
Sir "William Macnaghten represented the British power in
Afghanistan, and Shah Sojah was his puppet. The catas-
trophe, doubtless, would have been equally fatal to British
interests and prestige had not there been in Sir Frederick
Roberts an officer wielding supreme political and military
command, who was fully alive to the dangers of the situation,
and quite capable of coping with them. Meanwhile, the ques-
tion of supplies, especially forage for the thousands of troop-

274 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

horses and transport animals, continued to engross the
General' s attention, over 100,000 maunds (80 Ibs. to the
maund) heing necessary to complete the supply for the winter.
He had also not completed the storage of fuel and provisions
for six months, which, with wise prevision he had set himself
to collect from the day of his arrival at Cabul.

The winter set in with severity early in December, the
thermometer marking 20° of frost, and Sir Frederick Roberts
was reluctantly compelled to forego an expedition he had
meditated to Ghuznee, the head-quarters of the malcontents on
that side of Cabul, as it would expose his soldiers to consider-
able hardship.

Early in the morning of the 1st December, before the camp
was astir, the ex- Ameer Yakoob Khan turned his back on his
late Capital and proceeded a prisoner to India, guarded by an
escort of Cavalry. The Commission of Inquiry into the circum-
stances of the massacre of the British Mission at Cabul, consist-
ing of Colonel Macgregor, Dr. Bellew, and Mahomed Hyat
Khan, had presented their report to the General on the 18th
November, and the Government of India, on learning its
conclusions, ordered the deportation of the ex-Ameer. Sir
Frederick Roberts and some of his Staff were present to bid
him farewell, and so ended the brief and stormy reign of the
son of Shere Ali, who shared the vicissitudes which make the
history of the family of his grandfather, Dost Mahommed, one
of the most interesting and romantic recorded in the annals of
any country.

Little more than a twelvemonth before, his father, Shere
Ali, had attained a more powerful position than " the Dost"
or any of the Ameers of the preceding Suddozye dynasty since
the time of Ahmed Shah ; but evil advisers and a reliance on
Russian promises of support, which he found the broken reed
it proved in the hands of his father forty years before, brought
him down to the dust. His armies, defeated at Ali Musjid
and the Peiwar Kotul, and his southern capital, Candahar, cap-
tured, Shere Ali fled to Afghan Turkestan, but in vain sought
permission to proceed to the throne of the Czar, there to plead
his cause against the Indian Viceroy. After a few weeks' illness,
broken-hearted at all his ambitious schemes having so utterly

Shere Ali and Yakoob Khan. 275

failed, be died at Mazar-i- Sheriff, and, like Wolsey, there were
" none so poor to do him reverence."

" But yesterday, and who had mightier breath 1
A thousand warriors by his word were kept
In awe ; he said, as the Centurion saith,
' Go,' and he goeth ; ' Come,' and forth he stepp'd.
The trump and bugle till he spake were dumb,
And now nought left him but the muffled drum."

Scarcely more fortunate was his son and successor, Yakoob
Khan, at one time one of the most fiery and successful warriors
in Central Asia. To the sword of Yakoob Khan his father
owed his throne, for when quite a youth he wrested Candahar
from his enemies, when Shere Ali's fortunes were at their
lowest ebb, and inflicted a crushing defeat on his uncle Azim,
and his cousin Abdurrahman, now, in the see- saw of Afghan
politics, the ruler of a united Afghanistan. The most brilliant
anticipations were formed of Yakoob's future. But whether it
was that his successes were due to fortune, and not to superior
skill, or that his energies and spirit were broken by five years'
incarceration in a dungeon, Yakoob Khan displayed none of
the royal qualities that distinguished many of the Barukzyes,
and specially his father and grandfather. His cowardice on
the 3rd September, when a display of personal energy would
have saved the life of the man he called his friend, rendered
him an object of contempt, and was the measure of his degra-
dation from the Yakoob Khan who was the " King-maker" of
Afghanistan. He was still in the prime of youth, not being
over thirty years of age, was prepossessing and distinguished in
appearance, and his personal valour had been the theme of all
tongues.* But he had signally failed to rule his turbulent

* Writing of Yakoob Khan before the outbreak of the Afghan war, one
well versed in Oriental politics says : — " The character of Yakoob Khan
shines out from among that of all his countrymen, not only as the most able
and the most intelligent, but also as the most courteous, the most moderate,
and the most refined. The life of such a man is a study in itself, and its
recital will arouse sympathy in the hearts of all true lovers of brave deeds
and noble actions. His life is also conterminous with the most eventful
portion of modern Afghan history, and his career is closely intertwined
with the fortunes of Shere Ali." The following is a brief sketch of his
history : —

Yakoob Khan was born in or about the year 1849 of a noble mother.
Arminius Vambery speaks of him in November, 1863, when the Afghan
Prince appeared to the traveller "a good-humoured, inexperienced child."

T 2

276 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

countrymen, and, while not possessing the courage to strike a
blow in defence of his throne, suffered his chiefs and soldiers
to engage in a strife from which he would profit in the event of
success, while he was careful that failure should compro-
mise only his honour. How fallen he was from the warrior
prince whom his countrymen had regarded as the pink of
chivalry and the mould of form !

" Unlike that Arthur, who, with lance in rest,
From spear to plume a star of tournament,
Dashed through the lists at Camelot and charged
Before the eyes of ladies and of knights."

The General political situation, as it developed itself in the
early part of December, and the causes which contributed to pro-
duce a state of affairs that at one time appeared to be fraught
with disaster, may be summarised from a despatch by Sir Frede-
rick Roberts to the Adjutant-General in India.

After the outbreak of September and the massacre of the

His career in the history of his country commenced very shortly after his
interview with the Hungarian traveller ; for, in 1864, Shere Ali's brother
disputed his possession of the crown, and Yakoob Khan was left in command
at the recently captured fortress of Herat. While Shere Ali was carrying
on the war with varying fortune — victorious at Kujhbaz, routed at Shaikha-
bad, losing his eldest son in the former fight, and deserted by his best general,
Mahomed Eefik, on the eve of the latter, but in the end expelled from
Candaharand all the eastern country— Yakoob Khan was slowly but surely
consolidating his rule over Herat and Ferrah, and propitiating, in so far as
he was able, the northern Khan of Maimene. So it happened that when
Shere Ali suffered his last overthrow beneath the walls of Khelat-i-Ghilzye
and fled to Herat, he had not abandoned all hope of restoring the declining
fortunes of his cause. During three years Yakoob Khan had preserved
peace in the west, had restrained the Persians, and had sent many a wel-
come contingent of hardy troops to the scene of battle in Candahar and
Cabul. There was yet one chance left ; but the degree of success that
might be attained no longer rested with Shere Ali. In the field of battle
he had been worsted, both by Azim and Abdurrahman, and his own reputa-
tion had become dimmed by disaster. The fate of Cabul trembled in the
balance when its real arbiter advanced on Candahar in the early days of
1868. That city fell at once after a sharp fight in the outskirts of the
town, and then once more Candahar became Shere Ali's base for the recon-
quest of Cabul. At first the joint army of Shere Ali and Yakoob Khan
encountered little opposition. Cabul, after an absence of more than three
years, was entered in triumph, and south of the Hindoo Koosh there
remained no rebel. Azim in the meanwhile had fled to Balkh to join his
nephew, and in face of the great emergency they each agreed to forego
their jealousies. With a large force they advanced against Cabul, but their
adversary had been more prompt, Yakoob Khan held the Bamian Pass aa
they came forth from the Sighan Valley, and worsted them in a pitched
encounter. But they found their retreat cut off. The Khan of Maimene
had declared for Shere Ali, and was operating in their rear. They had no

The Situation at Cabul. 277

Envoy, the advance of the British force from All Kheyl was too
rapid to give the Afghans as a nation time to create an effective
opposition, and the defeat of Charasia put an end to all organ-
ized resistance. The Afghans, judging from antecedent history,
believed that, as in 1842, after some signal act of retribution
had been inflicted on the city of Cabul, the British Army would
withdraw to India. It thus happened that, after the action of
Charasia, there followed a period of expectation and doubt.
The Afghans were waiting on events, and the time had not yet
arrived when any national movement was possible. But this
pause was marked by certain occurrences which touched the
military pride of this turbulent nation to the quick. The occu-
pation of the fortified cantonment called after their Ameer, the
appropriation of the park of artillery and vast munitions of war
which he had accumulated with such care and at so great ex-
pense, the dismantling of the Bala Hissar, the historic fortress
of the nation and the residence of its Kings and principal
nobles, and, lastly, the imprisonment and deportation to India
of Yakoob Khan and his leading ministers, all conspired to
inflame to a high degree the national animosity felt towards a
foreign invader.

The temper of the people being in this condition, it was
clear that only mutual jealousy and distrust among the chiefs
could prevent their making common cause against their con-
hope left now, except in making one desperate rush on the capital and sur-
prising Shere Ali. But each of these schemes was frustrated. They
crossed the Hindoo Koosh by a pass to the east of Bamian, hut Yakoob
Khan was close behind, driving them before him. Past Cabul they fled
with the young chief hot on their track, until they turned to bay in sheer
despair in the neighbourhood of Ghuznee. Routed there they fled for safety to
Persia, where Azim died, and Abdurrahman passed on to Khokand and
Russian territory. The five years Avar had at last terminated, but its
close brought credit to Yakoob Khan alone. Since then Yakoob was
Governor of Cabul (1869), of Candahar (1870), and, after a brief exile,
of Herat (1871). In all these posts, says the writer before quoted, he ex-
hibited the same great capacity that he had demonstrated on the field of
battle ; but Shere Ali feared him, as he recognized his superior, and
believed that ties of blood would prove but a slight restraint upon the im-
pulses of ambition. In 1872 Yakoob Khan came to Cabul, trusting to a
safe conduct from Shere Ali, and was imprisoned for five years, and his
younger brother, Ayoob Khan, threatened in Herat, was glad to find safety
in Persia. The invasion of Afghanistan by the British brought the three
cousins to the front once again, and in different ways their names are in-
dissolubly associated with the history of the war.

278 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

querors, and that, if any sentiment could be found strong
enough to dominate such internal dissensions and fuse the dis-
cordant elements into one mass, a powerful movement might be
evoked, having for its object the expulsion of the foreigners
from the country.

Such an impulse was supplied by the fervent addresses to
Mahomedan religious feeling made by the aged Mooskh-i-Alum
and by the denunciation of the English in the mosques of every
city and village. It was further fanned by the ladies of Yakoob
Khan's family, who appealed to the popular sympathies, and
distributed the concealed treasure which was at their command ;
and, lastly, a powerful incentive was added by the expectation of
sharing in the plunder of the British Camp.

The Moollahs, having once succeeded in subordinating the
private jealousies of the chiefs to a desire for revenge on the
common foe, the movement rapidly assumed the proportions of
a national uprising against the English invaders. The me-
mories of the disaster of 1841—42 were appealed to ; it was urged
that what had happened once might happen again ; and the
people were assured that if they would only rise suddenly and
simultaneously the small English Army in Sherpur might
easily be driven from its position, and, as before, be over-
whelmed in its retreat through the difficult passes between
Afghanistan and India. Such were the hopes of the chiefs and
religious leaders, who for a wonder were, for a brief period,
united against the English infidels.

According to information received by Sir Frederick Koberts,
their intention was to gain possession of the city and Bala
Hissar, and after occupying the numerous forts and villages in
the neighbourhood of Sherpur, to surround the cantonments.
To attain this object, they arranged that the forces from the
south, that is, from Logar, Zurmat, the Mangal and Jadran dis-
tricts, and intervening Ghilzai country, should seize the range of
hills which extend from the city towards Charasia and include
the Bala Hissar and the high conical peak called the Takht-i-
Shah ; that the forces from Kohistan should occupy the Asmai
heights and hills to the north of the city ; while those from
Maidan, Wardak, and the Glmznee direction moved upon the
city from the westward.

Combination of the Chiefs. 2 79

As it \vas evident that if these several bodies once concen-
trated on Cabul they would be joined by the disaffected portion of
the people of the city and adjoining villages, the General formed
his plans to break up the combination before it came to a
head, and to deal in detail with the forces gathering in Maidan,
under Sultan Jan, and in Koh Daman, the southern part of the
Kohistan, under MeerButcha, whose role was to march south-
ward and coalesce with Sultan Jan.

2 So Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTEK XV.

The National Rising of December, 1879— The Plans of Sir Frederick
Roberts to Check the Movement — The Cavalry Action of the llth
December— Critical Condition of Affairs at Sherpur and in Cabul — •
Prompt Action of Sir Frederick Roberts — Movements of Brigadier-
Generals Macpherson and Baker — The Attempt to Capture the Takht-i-
Shah on the 12th December — Severe fighting on the 13th December —
Capture of Koh Asmai — Successful Counter-attack by the Enemy —
Heavy Losses Experienced by the British Force — Sir Frederick Roberts
Determines to Concentrate in Sherpur — Retirement of the British
Troops within the Cantonment.

IN pursuance of his plans, on the 8tli December Sir Frederick
Roberts despatched Brigadier-General Macphersou with a
column* towards the west, via Killa Aushar and Urghundeh,
in order to meet and r1rive the enemy back on Maidan.

On the following day, Brigadier- General Baker also marched
with a force, f via Charasia, towards Maidan with the object of
placing himself across the line by which the enemy, after
being defeated by General Macpherson, would have to retire.
To give time for the completion of this movement, and to draw
the enemy forward by an appearance of hesitation, Sir
Frederick Roberts halted General Macpherson at Killa Aushar
on the 9th. By the absence of these two Brigades the troops
at Sherpur were reduced to a point of dangerous weakness,
but in order to strike a decisive blow against the hostile
confederacy, the General decided to incur the risk, which was
inseparable from the conduct of military operations with so
limited a force as was at his disposal, barely 8,000 men.
However, he guarded against any eventualities to the best of
his power, by ordering up from Jugdulluck, on the 7th

* Four guns F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A. ; 4 guns No. 1 Mountain
Battery ; 1 squadron 9th Lancers ; 2 squadrons 14th Bengal Lancers ; 401
men, 67th Regiment ; 393 men, 5th Goorkhas ; and 509 men, 3rd Sikhs.

f Four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery ; 2^ squadrons 5th Punjaub
Cavalry ; 450 men 92nd Highlanders ; 450 of the 5th Punjaub Infantry ;
and 25 men Sappers and Miners.

28l

December, the whole of the guides, Infantry and Cavalry,
under Colonel Jenkins. These troops arrived at Sherpur on
the night of the llth at a most opportune moment.

Meanwhile, on the 9th December, when General Macpherson
was halting at Killa Aushar, Sir Frederick discovered from a
Cavalry reconnoissance, made by Lieutenant-Colonel Lockhart,
Assistant Quartermaster-General, that large numbers of the
enemy were moving northwards from Urghundeh and Pughman
towards Kohistan; and also that a considerable force of
Kohistauees had collected at Karez Meer, about ten miles
to the north of Cabul. Impelled by the necessity for dispers-
ing this gathering before it could be joined by the enemy
hastening from the west, Sir Frederick directed General
Macpherson to change his line of advance and attack the
Kohistanees, and as their country was unsuited for the move-
ments of Horse Artillery and Cavalry, he ordered him to
leave this portion of his column at Killa Aushar, taking with
him only one squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers.

On reaching the Surkh Kotul, about two miles short of
Karez Meer, General Macpherson found that his arrival was
well timed, that the enemy from the west was still below him
in the Pughman Valley, and that it was in his power to deal
with the Kohistanees before a junction could be effected. He,
accordingly, attacked them vigorously and promptly, and drove
them back with heavy loss.

The enemy, advancing from Maidan, seemed inclined at first
to ascend the Surkh Kotal from the Pughman Valley, and
assist the Kohistanees ; but on seeing that our troops held all
the commanding positions, and probably hearing of the defeat
of their allies, they retreated towards Urghundeh. Of this,
says Sir Frederick Roberts in his despatch of 23rd January,
1880, detailing the events of the preceding month, General
Macpherson informed him by heliograph soon after noon on
the 10th. In order to try and cut in on the enemy's line of
retreat, Sir Frederick immediately ordered the advance of
the Horse Artillery and Cavalry from Killa Aushar, strengthened
by two additional squadrons from Sherpur, the whole being
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, R.H.A.
The movement, however, was unsuccessful, for as soon as the

282 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Cavalry appeared, the enemy took shelter in the villages, and
on the skirts of the high hills which surround Pughman.

General Macpherson encamped on the night of the 10th
at Karez Meer, and General Baker, who had steadily pursued
his march by a very difficult road, halted a short distance to
the west of Maidan.

Sir Frederick Eoberts sent orders to General Macpherson
to march very early on the llth, to follow the enemy, who
were now retreating south and west by the Pughman Valley,
and to endeavour to drive them towards General Baker.
Macpherson was informed at the same time that the Horse
Artillery and Cavalry, under Brigadier- General Dunham Massy,
who was sent from Sherpur to assume command of the force,*
would leave Killa Aushar at 9 A.M., and that he was to join
them on the Urghundeh road. General Massy's orders, says,
Sir Frederick Koberts, were, " to advance from Killa Aushar
by the road leading directly from the City of Cabul towards
Urghundeh and Ghazni ; to proceed cautiously and quietly,
feeling for the enemy; to communicate with General Macphersou,
and to act in conformity with that officer's movements, but on
no account to commit himself to an action until General
Macpherson had engaged the enemy."

Instead of gaining the Ghuznee road by the ordinary route,
General Massy started across country, intending to strike
that road beyond the village of Killa Kazi. He detached one
troop of the 9th Lancers, under Captain Chisholme, to com-
municate with General Macpherson, who was some miles be-
hind in the hills, and the troop did not rejoin him during
the day. "Although, on nearing Killa Kazi," says Sir
Frederick Roberts, " General Massy's advance guard reported
to him that the enemy were in considerable force on the
hills on either side of the Ghazni road, some three miles in
advance, he still moved on. Shortly afterwards further reports
were received by him that the enemy were coming down into
the plain, with the evident intention of attacking him."

The caution General Massy had been directed to exercise now
disappeared, and he committed himself to engaging the enemy

* His force was 4 guns F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A. ; 2 squadrons 9th
Lancers ; and 1 squadron 14th Bengal Lancers.

Cavalry Action of the nth December. 283

without regard to the circumstance that he was directed to
subordinate his movements to those of General Macpherson.
With the object of checking the enemy until he could com-
municate with that officer, General Massy opened fire with
his guns at 2,900 yards, but as this had not the desired
effect, he ordered the Battery of Horse Artillery to advance
400 yards nearer ; and finding the enemy continued advancing,
he directed the guns again to move forward. They came into
action at 2,000 yards, and in this position remained until the
opposing forces arrived within 1,700 yards' range. The Afghans
still continuing to advance, General Massy dismounted
thirty men of the 9th Lancers, who commenced firing as soon
as carbine range was reached, but the enemy were in such
force — according to General Massy' s estimate, 10,000 — that,
as he reported, the fire of the dismounted Lancers " had no
appreciable effect."

At this time Sir Frederick Roberts, accompanied by General
Hills and Staff, arrived on the ground, in the expectation of
witnessing the execution of his carefully laid plans, and taking
command of the united columns of Generals Macpherson and
Massy. His disappointment was great on finding the tables
turned, and his troops in difficulties. Recognizing the
critical state of affairs, and the inutility of continuing an
action with Cavalry and Horse Artillery against an enemy in
such overwhelming strength, and on ground so unfavourable,
he ordered General Massy to retire and watch for an oppor-
tunity for a Cavalry charge in order to extricate the guns.
He also directed General Massy and Colonel Gordon, who
had accompanied the former from Killa Aushar, where he had
previously been in command, to find a road by which the guns
could be withdrawn in safety. Sir Frederick Roberts writes to
us of the situation, and the further steps he took at this
juncture : — " From the moment of my arrival on the ground
I saw how critical the position was, and at once despatched
one of my aides-de-camp, Lieutenant Sherston, of the Rifle
Brigade, to General Macpherson, with a written order to wheel
to his left, and advance to the assistance of the guns and
Cavalry as rapidly as possible. At the same time I directed
General Hills to gallop to Sherpur, and warn General Hugh

284 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts,

Gough of what had occurred, to order him to be on the alert,
and to send a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, with all possible
speed, to the village of Deh Mazung, where they were to
hold the gorge of the Cabul river at all hazards. Seeing at
a glance the hopelessness of continuing the fight on such
difficult ground with a handful of Cavalry, and observing that
the extreme flanks of the Afghan Army were rapidly over-
lapping the small party, I ordered General Massy to retire the
guns towards Cabul, and to cover the movement by a Cavalry
charge."

The Cavalry charge, gallantly led by Lieutenant- Colonel R.
S. Cleland, who was dangerously wounded, and by Captain
Bloomfield Gough, on the flank, was well delivered, and did
considerable execution, but did not succeed in checking the
enemy for more than a few minutes. The gallant Colonel of
the 9th Lancers was dangerously wounded,* and many others,
officers and men, fell in the vain effort to check the advance of
an army. The charge was necessary to save the guns, but it
was well-nigh as desperate as that of Balaclava. In its in-
cidents it resembled that made by the 2nd Bengal Cavalry at
Purwandurrah, in the Kohistan, in December, 1840, when Dost
Mahommed led the opposing horsemen, though it was more
creditable, as the native troops disgraced themselves by leaving
their officers to bear the brunt of the action. This act of
infamy British Lancers were not likely to imitate.

Retiring alternately, two Royal Horse Artillery guns re-opened
fire, but the Afghans pressed on them hard, the gunners found
their further movements stopped by a deep and narrow nullah,
and in order to give them time while searching for a passage
across, Sir Frederick Roberts ordered a second Cavalry charge.
He writes to us : " Seeing that the guns were stuck in the
watercourses, and the enemy still pressing on, I ordered
General Massy to try a second charge, but this was not carried
out ; the 9th Lancers were much broken, and before they could
be got together, the guns had to be abandoned and spiked."
During the retirement, Lieutenant Hardy, R.H.A., who was last
seen endeavouring to help Lieutenant Forbes, 14th Bengal

* Colonel Cleland died of his wounds on his return to India, after
much and prolonged suffering.

Results of the Cavalry Action. 285

Lancers, whose leg was broken, was killed, but the gunners and
drivers succeeded in retreating in safety with the cavalry.

"When the retreat took place my first object," writes Sir
Frederick Roberts to us, " was to rally the Cavalry ; and
together with my own small escort, a sufficient number of the
9th Lancers, 14th Bengal Lancers and gunners were got
together, who by their dismounted fire checked in some slight
measure the onward rush of the enemy. Slowly this weak
party retired in the direction of the Deh Mazung village, the
object being to give the Highlanders time to get there from
Sherpur before the Afghans could seize the position." During
the retirement, the squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers, under
the command of Captain Neville, covering the retreat, behaved
with great steadiness and coolness. Many men had lost their
horses in the charges, fifty- one having been killed in the small
column, and many opportunities were afforded for the dis-
play of that devotion which is never absent in a British force,
even when most hardly pressed by an enemy.* The situation
had become extremely grave, when the 72nd Highlanders, led
by the chivalrous Brownlow, were seen advancing at the double
through the gorge. Their advent was received with cheers by
the troopers of the 9th. "It was literally touch and go as to
who should reach the village first, the Highlanders or the
Afghans, but our men swept in, and swarming to the tops of the
houses the breechloaders soon checked the advancing tide."
In vain the Afghans, headed by some Ghazees, surged round

* In his despatch Sir Frederick Roberts gives the British loss as twenty-
seven killed, of whom eighteen belonged to the 9th Lancers, and twenty-
five wounded. The 9th Lancers lost two officers, Lieutenants Ricardo and
Hearsey ; the Artillery one officer, Lieutenant Hardy ; and the 14th
Bengal Lancers, one officer, Lieutenant Forbes. He writes : — " Brigadier-
General Massy specially mentions Lieutenant and Adjutant E. B. Mclnnis,
and Lieutenant C. J. W. Tower, both of the 9th Lancers, for their gallantry ;
whilst I personally witnessed the devoted bravery of the Reverend J. W.
Adams, the chaplain attached to my force. Mr. Adams dismounted to
assist a wounded man of the 9th Lancers, and, while so occupied, lost his
horse ; when making his way back on foot, and although the enemy were
but a few yards distance from him, Mr. Adams, regardless of his own
safety, was mainly instrumental in saving the lives of two men of the 9th
Lancers, who were caught under their horses, which had fallen in a water-
course, and who, but for his aid, must have been speedily killed by the
advancing enemy." For his gallantry Mr. Adams received the V.C., being
the first clergyman who has gained the decoration. Captain Stewart-Macken-

286 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the village, whence a deadly fire decimated their ranks. Foiled
at every attempt to capture it by the rush, they abandoned the
attempt to enter Cabul by the gorge, and took ground to the
right, and occupied the Takht-i-Shah and all the slopes leading
up to it, as well as the large walled villages in the Chardeh
valley, thereby threatening the Upper Bala Hissar. We will
now follow the operations of Brigadier- General Macpherson, as
detailed in the despatch.

Marching from the Surkh Kotul at 8 A.M., Macpherson moved
in a south-westerly direction towards Urghundeh, but observing
large bodies of the enemy crossing his front and proceeding
towards Cabul, and hearing the firing of General Massy's guns
on his left, he brought his right forward, and at 12.30 P.M., or
about an hour after the Cavalry and Artillery had commenced
retiring, he found himself very nearly on the ground where
General Massy's action had been fought. Here he came across
the rear of the enemy, who were speedily dispersed, some
making for the hills above Killa Kazi, others for the Chardeh
Valley. General Macpherson, not being fully informed of the
result of General Massy's action, decided, about 3.30 P.M., to
halt for the night at Killa Kazi, but afterwards received 'an
order from Sir Frederick Roberts, directing him to fall back on
Deh Mazung, where he arrived at 7 P.M., thus still further
securing the approach to the city.

Writing to us of General Macpherson's movements during
the day, his Chief says : " His soldierly instinct had told him
to wheel to his left on hearing Massy's guns, before my order
to that effect reached him, and rapidly advancing, he soon came
into collision with a large body of the enemy who were holding
the ground over which the 9th Lancers had previously charged.
Elated by their recent victory, these seemed disposed to show
fight, but the brigade steadily advanced in line, and company
volleys soon put them to flight." On his arrival at Deh Mazung,
Sir Frederick Roberts, leaving with him the wing of the 72nd

zie and Captain Bloomfield Gough, both of the 9th Lancers, distinguished
themselves on this occasion, and the former officer brought the regiment out
of action, and remained in the field until late in the day, although suffer-
ing from a severe contusion. Second-Lieutenant Hunter and some non-
commissioned officers and men of the 9th Lancers were also specially
commended by Sir Frederick Roberts.

The Crisis in Cabul and Skerpur. 287

Highlanders, returned to Sherpur, where he arrived about
8 P.M., after an exciting day, destined, however, to be followed
by others equally full of incident.

The position of affairs at Sherpur at one time had been suf-
ficiently serious. With a vast cantonment, full of the winter
supplies of food and forage for the British army, and almost
denuded of troops, Brigadier-General Hugh Gough made the
best dispositions for defence that lay in his power. His resolute
bearing and military experience inspired confidence, until the
arrival of Colonel Jenkins,* from Lutterbund, with the Guides,
Cavalry and Infantry, tended to lessen the immediate danger
somewhat, though reports were current of an intended attack on
the Cantonments by the Kohistanees.

The situation in Cabul during the day was also a very anxious
one for General Hills, who, after despatching the Highlanders
to Deh Mazung, took steps to defend the city committed to his
charge against the soldiers of Mahomed Jan, or the malcon-
tents and " budmashes," or swash-bucklers, who, as well as
fanatics, swarm in these cities of Central Asia. The resources
at General Hills's disposal were but limited, but a braver-hearted
soldier does not exist, and he put a bold face on it, which goes a
long way with the scum of great cities. At the Kotwallee,f or
Magistrate's office, where he administered justice, General
Hills placed a guard of forty Kuzzilbashes (literally " red heads,"
from the colour of their turbans), a tribe descended from the
followers of Nadir Shah, who have always been friendly to the
British, and he manned the gates with strong armed bodies of
the same race. He himself patrolled the city with 100 Sikhs,
and there was a company of the 72nd Highlanders posted on
the Upper Bala Hissar. Though these were all the troops at
his disposal, his arrangements averted a rising. Sir Frede-
rick Roberts, on his way to the Cantonment from Deh Mazung,

* Sir Frederick Roberts writes : — " Foreseeing the probability of rein-
forcements being required, and thinking that troops coming from India
would have a good effect politically, I had ordered Colonel Jenkins on the
7th December to march on Cabul from Jugdulluck."

t Had General Hills been attacked, as then anticipated, his fate might
have been that of Sir Alexander Burnes in 1841, or Sir Louis Cavagnari in
1879, though what he chiefly feared was being burnt out, for which these
buildings offer peculiar facilities.

288 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

detached a party of the 72nd Highlanders to reinforce the
picket of the 67th, and this force, numbering 213 men, under
Captain Jarvis, of the latter regiment, though attacked during
the night with great determination, repulsed the enemy with
heavy loss.

Meantime the lost guns had been recovered by Colonel
Macgregor. When his chief fell back on Deh Mazung, that
gallant officer, judging that the infantry ordered from Sherpur
might take the road by the Kotul to the north by Killa Aushar,
went in that direction to meet them, and observing from this
point that the ground where the guns were lying had been
partially cleared of the enemy by the advance of General
Macpherson's troops, he, with the assistance of some officers,
collected a small party of the 9th Lancers, 14th Bengal Lancers,
and Artillerymen, who had remained with him, retraced his
steps, and picking up, en route, a few soldiers belonging to
General Macpherson's baggage guard, was enabled to recover
the guns and bring them into Cantonments before night. The
Afghans had stripped them of all movable parts, and the
ammunition boxes had been emptied, but otherwise they were
intact, and were ready for use on the following day.

During this eventful day the force detached under Brigadier-
General Baker had also been engaged with the enemy. Start-
ing early on the morning of the llth from his encampment in
the neighbourhood of Maidan he found the enemy in considera-
ble force, occupying the hills on either side of the Urghundeh
road. The main body of General Baker's force was allowed to
proceed unmolested, but his rear-guard and baggage were some-
what hotly attacked ; owing, however, to the able manner in
which the rear guard was commanded by Captain McCullum,
92nd Highlanders, and to the energy of the officers in charge
of the Transport, the whole of the baggage was brought through
in safety. Baker's advanced-guard had, in the meantime,
reached Urghundeh, and found the Afghans in possession of
both sides of the gorge through which the road runs into the
Chardeh Valley. Although late in the afternoon it was neces-
sary to dislodge the enemy from their position, commanding,
as it did, the road to Cabul. This was effected in a brilliant
manner by a portion of the 92nd Highlanders, under the com-

Concentration within Sherpur. 289

mand of Major White, gallantly led by Lieutenant the Hon.
J. Scott Napier, son of Lord Napier of Magdala. General Baker
encamped that night at Urghundeh, being unaware of the mis-
fortune that had befallen General Massy's force, all efforts to
communicate with him on the part of the commanding General
having been unsuccessful. Early on the morning of the 12th
a heliogiaphic signal from Sherpur put Baker in possession of
the changed situation. He was informed that the enemy were
threatening the city in very considerable numbers, that Sir
Frederick Koberts had found it necessary to withdraw General
Macpherson's brigade to Deh Mazung, and that it was his wish
he should return forthwith, as it was important that the whole
force should be concentrated in the neighbourhood of the city
and cantonment. Accordingly General Baker marched on Sher-
pur, where he arrived during the day.

It has been said that Sir Frederick Roberts underrated the
strength of the forces from Wardak, Logar, and Maidan, con-
trolled by Mahomed Jan, and that he committed an error in
denuding Sherpur and despatching two brigades by the
Chardeh and Logar Valleys, and thus separating them by a
mountain range so that no communication could be maintained
between them ; but even if this is so, the responsibility of failure
in his arrangements does not rest with him, and all would have
gone well had his plans been carried out as he intended. Sir
Frederick, from his lengthened experience of the warlike capa-
bilities of the Afghan levies, such as constituted the bulk of
the forces arrayed against him under Meer Butcha and
Mahomed Jan, was of opinion that either Macpherson's or
Baker's brigades could have dealt with them singly, while they
were on the march and not entrenched in strong positions ; but
once they acquired the prestige of success by the capture of
British guns they became infinitely more powerful, both morally
and numerically, as our experience of the events round Cabul
in 1841 amply testified would be the case. Had Sir Frederick
kept Brigadier-General Baker back, and sent him by the Indikee
route, that officer would have been in a position to attack
Mahomed Jan as he slipped past Brigadier-General Macpher-
son, but the Afghan Commander, who displayed considerable
astuteness and military capacity, hearing that Baker was in his

u

290 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

rear, made for the Cabul Valley, and at one time the position
of the Sherpur Cantonment was most critical.

At no juncture in his remarkable career did Sir Frederick
Koberts display the genius of the great commander in a more
striking manner than when, with the intuition of genius, he
occupied the gorge leading to the city with the 72nd Highland-
ers. That move, perhaps, saved the Cantonment from capture,
for though the dispositions of Brigadier-General Gough were all
that skill could devise and calm courage carry out, yet what
would his small force of about 1,000 men, distributed over the
vast enceinte of Sherpur, have effected against an infuriated horde
of soldiers, villagers, and Ghazis, bent on revenge and rapine ?
In a letter detailing the critical events by which the Camp at
Sherpur was saved Sir Frederick Koberts says : — " I reached
Deh Mazung with the Cavalry which had been rallied, and
which retired very steadily, squadron by squadron, keeping the
enemy in check. "VVe came as slowly as possible, as I knew
that unless the 72nd Wing, sent for from Sherpur, could reach
Deh Mazung before we did, it would be scarcely possible for
us to prevent the enemy from occupying that village and the
neighbouring heights. The 72nd arrived just in time, and I
remained until the arrival of General Macpherson's brigade,
which I had ordered to fall back from Kila Kazi." It would
be ungenerous to bear hard on General Massy, who suffered
much for his rashness, as not only did Sir Frederick Haines,
the Commander-in-Chief, animadvert severely on his conduct,
but he was recalled to India. There was an error of judg-
ment on his part, but mistakes have been made by the greatest
commanders, and General Massy was a very gallant officer.*

* A distinguished officer, who was an eye-witness of these events,
places the blame of the disaster of the llth December unreservedly
on Brigadier-General Massy, who, he maintains, did not carry out Sir
Frederick's instructions. He said to us: — "Sir Frederick Roberts thought each
column, unassisted, quite able to drive off any force. Baker was to have
caught Mahomed Jan's troops, but they, hearing he was in the rear, gave
him the slip and made for the city. The enemy halted about six miles from
Cabul, when Massy attacked them without orders. He took it upon himself
to do so, as he had distinct orders to wait for Macpherson to attack with the
infantry. The cavalry ought to have retired by the Ghuznee main road,
which protected the city, or by the w -\j by which they came, which was
practicable for guns ; had they done so the guns would have been saved.
But instead of that Massy moved them through the fields and watercourses,

Attack on the Takkt-i-Shah. 291

On the following day, Friday the 12th December, Sir Fred-
erick Roberts resumed operations against the enemy, who, on
finding that they were unable to enter the city, took up a strong
position on a lofty peak known as the Takht-i-Shah (or King's
throne), which is connected with the hill above the Bala Hissar
by a long neck, or saddle, of very rough and difficult ground.
Sir Frederick Roberts felt that unless he was to play the part
of a second Elphinstone, an effort must be made to dislodge the
enemy, and directed General Macpherson to make the attempt.
Accordingly, Colonel Money, 3rd Sikhs, who had gained such
distinction by his defence of the Shutargardan, was directed to
make the attempt with two guns and 560 men.*

The position held by the enemy was of great natural strength.
The slopes of the Takht-i-Shah are very steep, strewn with
jagged masses of rock and intercepted with scarps, and the
natural impediments with which the assaulting party had to
contend were still further increased by " sungars," or breast-
works, which the enemy had thrown up at different points on
the ascent to the peak. Behind these defences the Afghans,
like Easterns, might be credited with fighting with resolution.

In spite of the gallantry of the troops and the accuracy of
the fire of Captain Morgan's guns, it was speedily manifest that
a much larger force than Sir Frederick Roberts could spare from
the defence of Sherpur, with Baker's Brigade absent, would be
necessary to carry the heights. " The position," writes the

between these two roads, and so got into difficulties and lost his guns. Sir
Frederick Roberts at once grasped the situation, and sent General Hills to
Sherpur with orders to turn out a wing of the 72nd Highlanders under
Colonel Brownlow, to seize the gorge leading to the city. Hills did so, and
just got there in time to save the retreating column and check the rebels
from getting into the city. Meanwhile JNlacpherson was doubling up at
the rear. It is, therefore, nonsense to declare that Massy threw himself
into the gap as there were no British troops, and saved Sherpur. Had he
waited for Macpherson there would have been no difficulty at all. Sir
Frederick Roberts was driven back to the gorge, the guns being lost, and
there were the 72nd Highlanders." The highest authority on the events
of the llth December writes to us with characteristic generosity of the
part played by Brigadier-General Massy : " He was taken by surprise, and
failed to appreciate the part which his cavalry -was intended to play, as a
portion of General Macpherson's brigade, upon the movements of which he
should have waited."

* The following was the constitution of the small column : — 2 guns No.
1 Mountain Battery ; 215 men from 67th and 72nd Regiments ; 150 of the
3rd Sikhs ; and 195 men of the 5th Goorkhas.

u 2

292 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

General, "was an exceedingly formidable one, and after gallant
attempts to carry it, which lasted during the greater part of the
day, I ordered the assault to be deferred. I saw that to ensure
success without very serious loss, and to prevent the enemy
relieving and reinforcing the party holding the peak, as I had
observed them to be doing during the day, it was necessary not
only to attack in front, but to operate also on the enemy's line
of retreat."*

General Macpherson was, accordingly, directed to hold the
ground of which he had already gained possession, and informed
that, on the following morning, General Baker, who only arrived
at Sherpur in the evening, after a long and fatiguing march,
would co-operate with him from the Beni Hissar side.

Early on the morning of the 13th December, Sir Frederick
Roberts commenced operations with vigour. Brigadier-General
Baker was despatched with a column f with orders to proceed
by the Bala Hissar road in the direction of Beni Hissar, to
seize the heights above that village, and to operate on the
enemy's position on the Takht-i-Shah from the south-east. At
the same time Brigadier- General Macpherson was instructed to
act in conjunction with General Baker from the direction of the
north of the Bala Hissar.

Soon after passing the Bala Hissar General Baker observed
the enemy streaming out of the villages immediately below the
Beni Hissar ridge, and resolved to cut their line in two.
Covering his advance with the fire of his two batteries, the
infantry advanced on the villages, the centre of which was
seized by a movement described by the General as " bold and
rapid." The 92nd Highlanders led the advance, under Major

* The losses during the day were four killed and twelve wounded, includ-
ing three officers, Lieutenant Faskin, 3rd Sikhs, Lieutenant Fergusson,
72nd Highlanders, and Major Cook, Y.C., 5th Goorkhas, who died on 29th
December, mortification of the leg having ensued from his wound. Sir
Frederick Roberts issued a graceful order to his troops, recounting the ser-
vices of this gallant officer, whose loss was deplored by the entire force and
was indeed of national concern. " He was one," says the General, " who
would, had he been spared, have risen to the highest honours of his profes-
sion."

t Four guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A. ; 4 guns No. 2 Mountain
Battery ; 1 squadron 9th Lancers ; 5th Punjaub Cavalry ; 6 Companies
92nd Highlanders ; 7 Companies Guides Infantry ; 300 rifles 3rd Sikhs ;
afterwards reinforced by 150 rifles 5th Punjaub Infant y.

Capture of the Enemy s Position. 293

White, who had so greatly distinguished himself at Charasia
and elsewhere during the present campaign, and the attack on
the enemy's first position was gallantly headed by Lieutenant
Forbes, who, together with his Colour- Sergeant, James Drum-
mond, was killed in a hand-to-hand fight. On seeing them fall
there was a momentary waver among the Highlanders, when
Lieutenant Dick Cunyngham rushed forward, and rallied the
men by his example and cheering words.* As a national poet
sings : —

" Joy to the chiefs that lead old Scotia's ranks,
Of Roman garb and more than Roman fire."

The Afghans on this occasion displayed unwonted daring, but
the position was won after a brief struggle, and a large portion
of the enemy were thus prevented from uniting themselves
with those occupying the Takht-i-Shah. The 92nd High-
landers and Guides, covered by the fire of Major Swinley's guns,
which had by this time gained the summit of the lower ridge,
and aided by that of Major Craster from the plain below, con-
tinued the advance on the conical hill, though every foot of the
way was contested. At length, shortly before noon, the 92nd
Highlanders and Guides had reached the summit, where they
were met by a party from the Bala Hissar side, consisting of
the 72nd Highlanders, 3rd Sikhs and 5th Goorkhas, under the
command of Major Sym, 5th Goorkhas, who had arrived there
a few minutes before, f

Large bodies of men were about this time seen issuing from
the lower Bala Hissar and city, part of whom made for the
heights of Siah-Sung, whilst the rest, advancing towards Beni
Hissar, occupied two strongly fortified villages situated on
either side of the road. One of these was captured by General
Baker's troops on their return from the Takht-i-Shah ; the
other, later in the day by a detachment of the 5th Punjaub
Infantry, under Major Pratt, which Sir Frederick Roberts had
sent from Sherpur to keep open the communication with General
Baker. Observing the collection of men on the Siah-Sung,
and thinking that Brigadier-General Baker might have some

* This officer was awarded the V.C. for his gallantry on this occasion,
and never was that much-coveted distinction more worthily gained.

f Colour-Sergeant John Yule, 72nd Highlanders, was the first man up,
and captured two standards. This gallant non-commissioned officer was
killed on the following day.

294 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

difficulty in dealing with so many detached parties of the enemy,
Sir Frederick despatched Brigadier- General Massy with the
Cavalry brigade* to his assistance. During the operation the
Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Stewart, made a
brilliant charge, as did the 9th Lancers, under Captain Butson,
who was killed, together with Sergeant-Major Spittle and three
men ; Captain Chisholme and Lieutenant Tower with eight
men of the same regiment being wounded. Notwithstanding
the severity of his wound, Captain Chisholme remained in the
saddle, and brought his regiment out of action. The 5th Pun-
jaub Cavalry, under Lieutenant- Colonel Williams, also distin-
guished themselves, Majors Hammond and Stewart both
leading successful charges, so that the Cavalry had an ample
revenge in the loss they inflicted on the enemy for the misad-
venture of the llth December.

The result of the day's operations was regarded by Sir Fred-
erick Roberts as very satisfactory. The enemy had been driven
from the southern range, and their advance in that direction
had been stopped ; they had suffered greatly from the British
Artillery and infantry fire when on the hill sides ; and on the
plain below they had been severely dealt with by the Cavalry.
In the evening Sir Frederick recalled General Baker to canton-
ments, and directed General Macpherson to move from Deh
Mazung and occupy the Bala Hissar heights, leaving the 5th
Goorkhas to retain possession of the Takht-i-Shah.f But
stern work was before the Cabul Field Force, and before night-
fall on the succeeding day, the aspect of affairs changed, and
the aggressors became the defenders.

Every one in Sherpur, including Sir Frederick Roberts, was of
opinion that the marked success that had attended the opera-
tions of the day, and the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy,
would result in their dispersion, but the light of morning

* General Massy took with him from Sherpur :— 1 squadron 9th Lancers,
and 2 squadrons 14th Bengal Lancers ; and was joined on Siah-Sung by 2
squadrons 5th Punjaub Cavalry, and 1 squadron 9th Lancers. The Guides
Cavalry were an independent command.

t The losses during the day were :— Killed, iiwo officers, Lieutenant
Forbes, 92nd Highlanders, and Captain Butson, 9th Lancers, and twelve
men, half British. Wounded — two officers, Captain Chisholme and Lieu-
tenant Tower, 9th Lancers, and twenty-seven British soldiers and s;xteen
natives. Twenty horses were also killed and thirty-two wounded.

Roberts takes the Offensive. 295

quickly dispelled the illusion. Fortunately the British Com-
mander was prepared for any fortune, and reverses found him
as calm and collected, and his resources as well in hand as after
such successes as the Peiwar Kotul and Charasia.

When daylight broke on the 14th December, large masses of
men, with many standards, were observed in occupation of a
high hill on the Kohistan road, about a mile north of the
heights of the Koh Asmai ; and as the day advanced, they
passed in great numbers from this hill, and also along the Ko-
histan road, to the crest of the heights, where they were joined
by other bodies from the direction of Chardeh and the city.
It now became apparent, adds Sir Frederick Roberts, that,
"foiled in their western and southern operations, the enemy
had concentrated to the north-west, and were about to deliver
an attack in great strength from that quarter." The General
was not the man to sit tamely by while the enemy took the
initiative, but resolved to drive them off the Asrnai heights, and
to cut their communications with the north. The Koh Asmai,
it should be noted, flank Sherpur in the west, at a distance of
about a mile, and as their occupation in force was a menace to
the security of the cantonment, the expulsion of the enemy
was a paramount necessity.

Accordingly, at 9 A.M. on the 14th, Sir Frederick Roberts
despatched Brigadier- General Baker with a force* to the eastern
slope of the Asmai, to drive the enemy off the range. Under
cover of the fire of his field and mountain guns, which came
into action close to the ruined village of Biland Kheyl, General
Baker seized the small conical hill which forms the northern
shoulder of the Aliabad Kotul, thus placing himself on the
enemy's line of communication, and preventing the force on
Asmai receiving support either from the large bodies on the
hill to the north or on the Kohistan road. Having gained this
preliminary advantage, General Baker sent Colonel Jenkins to
attack the conical hill with a small force. f Having effected

* Four guns G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A., under Major Craster ; 4
guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, under Major Swinley ; 14th Bengal Lancers ;
72nd Highlanders, 192 men ; 92nd Highlanders, 100 ; Guides Infantry,
460 ; 5th Punjaub Infantry, 470 men.

t One hundred and ninety-four men, 72nd Highlanders ; 70 of 92nd
Highlanders ; and 422 Guides Infantry.

296 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

this with small resistance on the part of the enemy, Colonel
Jenkins left a party of sixty-four men of the 72nd Highlanders
and sixty of the Guides Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Clarke, of the former regiment, who had led the suc-
cessful attack upon this point, to hold the conical hill, and with
the remainder pushed on to dislodge the enemy from the posi-
tion on Asmai, from the western side. The 5th Punjaub
Infantry was held in reserve with the guns, while the Cavalry,
following the attacking force, descended into the Chardeh Valley.
The advance on the enemy's position at Asmai was led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow with his Highlanders, the Guides
Infantry on the right affording assistance by operating on the
enemy's flank, and it was conducted with the gallantry that
had distinguished those regiments on the previous day.

As soon as the eastern point of the main position had been
carried, General Baker directed four guns of No. 2 Mountain
Battery, escorted by 100 rifles of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, to
reinforce the party which had been left on the conical hill, with
a view of supporting the advance by engaging the enemy in the
Chardeh and Kohistan directions. He also covered the advance
by the four guns of G Battery, 3rd Brigade, under Major
Craster, R.A., and Sir Frederick Roberts rendered assistance by
bringing into action four guns of F Battery, A Brigade R.H.A.,
commanded by Captain II . Pipon, which was posted near the
south-west corner .of the Sherpur cantonment. The attack was
further assisted by the fire of four guns of No. 1 Mountain
Battery, under Captain Morgan, R.A., attached to Brigadier-
General Macpherson's Column, from the Bala Hissar hill, and
by two companies of the 67th Regiment, under Major G. Baker,
which, crossing the Cabul river and acting on the enemy's left
rear, contributed to render their position on the Asmai heights
untenable.

The ground was most difficult, and the enemy fought with
the greatest obstinacy ; the Highlanders and Guides were, how-
ever, not to be denied, and eventually reached the highest
peak, where stood a number of Ghazis in their white robes, as
typical of their resolution to die for the faith. Here a severe
struggle took place, and many acts of gallantry were performed,
but at 12.30 the British troops were in possession of the

Severe Fighting. 297

Asmai heights. It seemed as if complete success had rewarded
the combinations of Sir Frederick Roberts and the gallantry of
his troops ; but a change suddenly came over the scene, and
victory was turned into very like defeat, due to the over-
whelming forces of the enemy.

The first intimation to cause anxiety was a heliographic
message from Brigadier- General Macpherson, informing Sir
Frederick Roberts that very large bodies of the enemy were
moving northwards from Indikee, with the apparent intention of
effecting a junction with the hostile force that still held the
hills towards Kohistan, and of endeavouring to re-take the
original position. Similar information was about this time
communicated to Brigadier-General Baker by Colonel Ross,
commanding the cavalry, which he had sent over the low
western spurs of the conical hill to ascertain the numbers and
movements of the enemy, and suddenly a large body of the
Afghans, creeping up the hill- side from the Chardeh villages,
made an attack on the small party left on the conical hill, and
before a reinforcement of 100 men of the 5th Punjaub Infantry,
sent by General Baker, could arrive to their assistance, the
enemy stormed the position. In seeking to rally his men and
re-take the hill, Captain Spens, 72nd Highlanders, was killed,
and two guns of the Mountain Battery were lost, though no
blame whatever attached to the officers and men, who displayed
conspicuous gallantry. " The mountain guns," writes Sir
Frederick Roberts to us, " had already limbered up, and were
retiring down the hill in good order, when the Afghans gained
the crest — two of the gun mules were shot, and though the
gunners rolled the two 7-pounders down the hill, it was found
impossible to carry either of them away, and they fell into the
hands of the enemy. Though Captain Hall's reinforcement of
the 5th Punjaubees was at first carried away by the panic, yet
they and the remainder of the party re-formed again at the foot
of the slope, and with their fire covered the retreat of the other
two guns of Swinley's battery."

Sir Frederick Roberts witnessed these events with great
chagrin, but he had done all that lay in his power to prevent
the loss of the hill, by despatching to General Baker's assist-
ance from Sherpur 200 men of the 3rd Sikhs, who had been

298 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

escorting Captain Pipon's guns. Meanwhile, as on the previous
day, heavy masses of the enemy were observed collecting on
Siah-Sung, and proceeding round the eastern flank of canton-
ments in the direction of Kohistan. Sir Frederick accordingly
despatched a small force of cavalry and two guns of F Battery,
A Brigade, B.H.A., under the command of Brigadier- General
Hugh Gough, to disperse them, but owing to the ground in
that direction being much intercepted by deep watercourses,
the advance of the guns was necessarily slow, and by the time
the obstacles had been overcome, the enemy had got so far on
the road towards Kohistan and so close to the hills that
pursuit was impossible.

A party of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under Captain Vousden,
who had done good service in the Kurram campaign, met with
better success. This regiment was quartered in the Shah
Bagh (King's garden) — which played so prominent a part in
the siege of General Elphinstone's army in 1841 — situated
about a third of the way between Sherpur and the city, and Sir
Frederick had in the morning sent orders to the commanding
officer, Lieutenant- Colonel Williams, to be on the look-out for
any enemy that might pass in that direction. About 1 P.M.
some 300 or 400 were observed moving along the left bank of
the river, and Captain Vousden, who, with one troop, was out
on reconnoissance, most gallantly charged into the midst of
them. Though only twelve of his men were able to follow
him, he succeeded in dispersing the enemy, and in inflicting
severe loss upon them, killing five men with his own hand.
Half of his gallant little band were placed hors de combat.

" My object throughout these operations," writes Sir
Frederick, " had been either to break up the combination
against us by dealing with the enemy in detail, or at least to
prevent their getting command of the hills to the north and
west of Cabul, and thus gain possession of the city and Bala
Hissar. Up to this time I had no reason to apprehend that
the Afghans were in sufficient force to successfully cope with
disciplined troops, but the resolute and determined manner
in which the conical hill had been re-captured, and the in-
formation sent to me by Brigadier- General Macpherson from
the signal station on the Bala Hissar, that large masses of the

Retirement into Sherpur, 299

enemy were still advancing from the north, south, and west,
made it evident that the numbers combined against us were
too overwhelming to admit of my comparatively small force
meeting them, especially on ground which still further in-
creased the advantages they possessed from their vast numeri-
cal superiority. I, therefore, determined to withdraw from all
isolated positions, and to concentrate the whole force at
Sherpur, thus securing the safety of our large cantonments, and
avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice of life." It
was with great reluctance that General Roberts adopted this
measure, as it involved the temporary abandonment of the city
and the Bala Hissar, a loss serious in itself, and likely to
produce a bad effect on the country at large. Under the
circumstances, however, no other course was left to him but to
remain on the defensive, and wait until the arrival of reinforce-
ments, or the growing confidence of the enemy should afford
him a favourable opportunity for inflicting a defeat on them.
Time, under any circumstances, would work in his favour, as
the enemy did not possess supplies sufficient to enable them
to keep the field in such vast numbers in the depth of
winter.

Orders to retire within Sherpur were accordingly issued to
Brigadier-Generals Macpherson and Baker, and the withdrawal
from the Bala Hissar and Asmai heights was accomplished
without loss, and in a manner highly creditable to the discipline
of the troops. General Macpherson, whose brigade had to pass
through a portion of the city and the suburb of Deh Afghan,
had before him a critical task, but he performed it with the
coolness and ability that had distinguished him throughout the
past few days. His rear-guard was harassed, and his troops
were subjected to a heavy fire as they moved along the narrow
streets and through the numerous gardens and orchards, but the
Brigadier-General brought off his men and baggage in perfect
order, and with comparatively little loss. General Macpherson
was well seconded by the officers commanding corps, especially
Colonel Knowles, commanding the 67th Regiment.

The retirement of Brigadier-General Baker's troops down
the eastern face of Asmai, under a heavy fire, was also well
conducted by Colonel Jenkins, who spoke in high terms of the

300 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

gallantry of Colonel Brownlow and Major Stockwell, 72nd
Highlanders, and also of Colonel E.. Campbell, of the Guides.
During the retreat an officer of the Guides displayed great
devotion. Captain Hammond had been very forward during
the storming of the Asmai heights, and now, when the enemy
were crowding up the western slopes, he remained with a few
men on the ridge until the Afghans were within thirty yards of
them, and when one of the Guides was shot, he stopped and
assisted in carrying him away, though the enemy were at the
time close by and firing heavily.*

By the evening of the 14th all troops and baggage were
within the cantonments, and that night the Afghan army
occupied the city and Bala Hissar.

Sir Frederick Roberts directed the operations of the 12th,
13th, and 14th, from the roof of the quarters he occupied in
Sherpur, whence he could see very fairly all the surrounding
country. Except when riding out to meet the troops returning
from fighting, in order to encourage the men and speak to
the wounded, he did not quit the Cantonment during those
days.

As the British General mustered his soldiers behind the
sheltering ramparts of Sherpur he had reason to deplore the
loss of many gallant menf during the past eventful week.
Eighty-three had fallen, including 8 officers, and 192 were
wounded, among whom were 12 officers, some of whom died,
including Colonel Cleland and Major Cook, V.C. Like Hector,
after his warriors had been chased within the sheltering walls
of Troy—

" Round the battlement and round the plain
For many a chief he look'd, but look'd in vain."

Considering the vast numerical superiority of the enemy and

* Captain (now Major) Hammond received the Victoria Cross for his
gallantry on this occasion, as did likewise Captain (now Major) Vousden of
the 5th Punjaub Cavalry.

t The losses on the 14th December were : — General Baker's brigade —
Killed, 2 officers, Captain Spens and Lieutenant Gaisford, 72nd Highlanders,
and twenty-seven men ; wounded, three officers, Captain Gordon, 92nd
Highlanders ; Captain Battye, Guides ; and Lieutenant Egerton, 72nd
Highlanders, and eighty-six men. General Macpherson's brigade had five
killed and eleven wounded. Cavalry brigade, eight wounded. Grand
total, thirty-four of all ranks killed, and one hundred and sixty-six
wounded.

Roberts on the Situation. 301

the nature of the positions from which they were dislodged
during the operations, this loss is very moderate, though heavy
in comparison with that suffered in previous encounters with
the Afghans.

It has been sought in some quarters to convey the impression
that Sir Frederick Roberts was taken by surprise during the
month of December, but this is not so. Though the Com-
manding general had no reason to expect the rapid gathering
of such enormous numbers as beleagured Sherpur, computed by
the Afghan leaders themselves at between 100,000 and 120,000
men — and certain Sirdars in camp, notably Daoud Shah, the
late Commander-in-Chief of the ex- Ameer, who was placed under
arrest for his treachery, gave false information — he anticipated be-
ing closely pressed during the winter, and it was to guard against
this probability that he made strenuous preparations to provide
for a siege or blockade by laying in supplies for men and animals
in such vast quantities. He says : — " Though my information
for some weeks previous to the disturbances made me aware
of the increasing hostile feeling with which we were regarded,
and of the fact that the tribes were assembling in considerable
strength, yet it was impossible to form any estimate as to what
numbers we should have to contend with at Cabul." At the
same time, he was too well versed in Asiatic warfare and too
familiar with the Afghan character to act on the defensive,
and leave the gatherings in Logar and Kohistan to develop
into a national rising without seeking to suppress them by
vigorous action, which was only ineffectual from the circum-
stance, as he writes to us, " that 6,000 men were numerically
incapable of, at the same time, leaving a sufficient garrison in
Sherpur, and taking the offensive against armies numbering
twenty times their strength."

3O2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Situation at Sherpur and in Cabul — The City and Bala Hissar Seized
by the Enemy — Their Movements against Sherpur — Sir Frederick
Roberts places the Cantonment in a Condition of Defence — Colonel
Hudson and the Garrison at Lutterbund — Desultory Fighting with the
Enemy between the 14th and 21st December — The Attack of the 23rd
December — The Final Rout of the Afghans by Sir Frederick Roberts
— Arrival of Brigadier-General Charles Gough with Reinforcements —
The future Government of Afghanistan — The Rival Pretenders to the
Ameership — Sir Donald Stewart Succeeds to the Chief Command in
North-Eastern Afghanistan.

To some in the Camp unaccustomed to the vicissitudes of war,
and to most of their countrymen in England, who received the
intelligence by telegraph, the situation of affairs on the evening
of the 14th December was alarming ; but it was not so in the
eyes of the general officer commanding the Cabul Field Force,
who had gone through the leaguer of Delhi, and at the Peiwar
Kotul and Charasia showed the world what military genius and
indomitable resolution could effect against enormous odds. He
was much stronger now than when achieving either of these
memorable feats of war, and though he was placed under the
disadvantage of temporarily assuming the defensive, an uncon-
genial role to one of his ardent temperament, yet he had in
his favour an easily defensible position, with ample supplies
of stores and ammunition, thanks to his own prescience. Time
also would work in his favour, as the elements of coherence
were wanting in the ranks of the enemy, and an assault of his
works would only end in their own discomfiture, while rein-
forcements would be despatched to his aid as soon as practic-
able. Nevertheless, these were anxious days, but the cheerful
and confident bearing of Sir Frederick Roberts instilled a like
feeling into the officers and men, who were quite content to
trust their lives and the honour of the flag to the tried com-

Roberts s Reasons for Concentrating in Sherpur. 303

mander who had weathered so many of the storms of war.
There was also a bracing effect in —

" the stern joy which warriors feel
In foemen worthy of their steel."

There were not wanting critics in India who condemned the
abandonment of the Bala Hissar, and the concentration of the
force at Sherpur, pointing to the disastrous effects of the
former step in the first Afghan War. But the conditions of
the problem were altered, and concentration in an easily
defensible position was widely different from concentration in
a cantonment commanded on all sides and with the supplies
stored without its walls. Sir Frederick Roberts set forth the
causes that induced him to place his force at Sherpur in
preference to occupying the Bala Hissar and the Siah Sung
heights in a despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, written at
this time. His chief reason was the inadequacy of the Bala
Hissar to contain and afford shelter to the entire force, with
its camp followers and numerous transport animals. Hence it
would have been obligatory to have divided his troops — a
measure to which he was very averse — by locating a portion of
them elsewhere, possibly upon Siah Sung, a bare and bleak
plateau, nearly a mile distant from the remainder of the force,
where water would have been procurable with difficulty, and where
no single facility for carrying on the necessary hutting opera-
tions existed. On the other hand, there was an abundant supply
of running water at Sherpur, and wells could be readily sunk,
water being procurable within seven feet of the surface. Again,
the disastrous explosions of the 16th October led Sir Frederick
Roberts to regard as a grave risk the permanent settlement of
the greater portion of the force close to and around a vast
magazine, which, there was a strong presumption to suppose,
was mined. These facts, added to the existence of accommo-
dation sufficient to at once house the Commissariat stores, the
entire European portion of the force, and a large part of the
native troops, and the rapid approach of the Afghan winter,
induced him, after carefully weighing the matter, to decide
upon the occupation of Sherpur, and, he added, in writing after
the critical events of December, "I see no reason, in the light
of recent occurrences, to alter that opinion."

304 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

On the other hand, there were drawbacks to placing the force
in Sherpur, the chief of which were, the vast extent of the
Cantonment, and the impossibilty of at all reducing its line of
defences.

Sherpur was in the form of a parallelogram, whose northern
side was formed by the Behmaroo ridge,* a range of low but
steep, isolated hills, rising some 300 feet above the surrounding
plain, and running almost due east and west for a distance
(including the slopes at either end) of 2,500 yards. A large
lake, or " jheel," whose breadth varies from a quarter to half
a mile, lies between the northern slope of the ridge and the
steep hills which form the southern boundary of the Kohistan
country. As this lake is not more than a mile and a half
distant from, and is parallel to, the Behmaroo heights for quite
three miles, it formed a barrier, round whose flanks and between
which and the heights, no troops would dare advance against
an enemy well provided with artillery.

The southern face of the cantonment, which had a length of
2,650 yards, was a continuous and massive mud wall, sixteen
feet high, pierced at intervals of about 700 yards by three
gateways, which again were protected by lofty circular bastions.
Between these gates, and also at the angles, were a series of
lower bastions, which gave an admirable flanking fire. The
western flank, about 1,000 yards in length, was constructed on
•a precisely similar plan, save that the northern portion was
much damaged by an explosion which occurred the day before
the cantonment was first entered by General Massy. The
eastern face was the weakest, as the original design was never
completed ; the wall, which was intended to resemble that of the
other faces, did not exceed seven feet in height, and even this
was incomplete for a considerable distance. From this point
the line of defence tended to the north-west, and, skirting the
village of Behmaroo, ran into the eastern slope of the Behmaroo
ridge.

The first step that recommended itself to the judgment of
Sir Frederick Eoberts on occupying Sherpur, in order to

* This ridge, which commanded the old cantonment in 1841, played a
chief part in rendering it untenable, and much fighting occurred on its
slope and base.

The Defences of Sherpur. 305

prevent annoyance in the event of a strong combination, was to
destroy the villages and walled enclosures surrounding it, so
as to create an esplanade round the Cantonments ; but the pres-
sure of even more important work, the collection of supplies and
the provision of shelter for such of the troops as had not
already been housed, combined with the scarcity of labour,
compelled him in a great measure to defer this precautionary
step. He was, also, unwilling to arouse ill-feeling on the part
of the people of Cabul, by what might have appeared an un-
necessary act of harshness. As he said : — " It was his constant
endeavour, from the first, to make the occupation of the
country as little irksome to its inhabitants as the safety and
welfare of the troops permitted." But he paid the penalty of
his humanity, for several of the villages, which were described
as "small fortresses protected by massive mud walls, impervious
to all but heavy artillery, and guarded by strong, loopholed,
flanking towers," gave considerable trouble during the events
which occurred between the 15th and 23rd of December, and
eventually had to be razed to the ground.

As soon as it became apparent that the events of the llth
December were the forerunners of a serious movement, Sir
Frederick took all the necessary steps for strengthening the
defences of Sherpur, and made every preparation to meet the
large force known to be assembling. As regards food and
ammunition he had no anxiety at this period. Sufficient
supplies were actually stored in Sherpur to last the entire
force for nearly four months, with the exception of "bhoosa "
(chopped straw), of which there was only enough for six weeks.
There was ample firewood for all purposes ; medicines and
hospital comforts were sufficient for all possible requirements
for a similar time ; and there was enough ammunition, both for
guns and rifles, to have carried on an obstinate defence for
three, or even four, months.

To facilitate the strengthening of the defences, Sir Frederick
Roberts divided them into five sections, which were placed
under the following officers : — Brigadier- General Macpherson,
C.B.,V.C., to command the section from the 2nd Brigade gate,
on the southern face, to the Behmaroo village on the east.
Colonel Jenkins, C.B., Corps of Guides, the section from the

x

306 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Behmaroo village up the eastern slope of Belimaroo ridge.
Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C., that from the
eastern extremity of the Behmaroo village to the gorge which
divides the ridge. Major-General J. Hills, C.B., V.C., the sec-
tion from the gorge to the head-quarters gate. Lieutenant-
Colonel Bro\vnlow, C.B., that from the head-quarters gate to
the 2nd Brigade gate. Brigadier-General Massy was placed
in the centre with the Cavalry, whilst Brigadier-General
Baker, C.B., commanded the reserve, which was formed up at
the southern entrance to the gorge leading through the Behma-
roo ridge.*

Telegraphic communication was established between Sir
Frederick Roberts's head-quarters on the west face, and the
temporary head-quarters of Generals Macpherson, Gough,
Hills and Baker, and the Native field hospital. All the five
sections and the Behmaroo heights were also brought into
communication with each other and head-quarters by means
of visual signalling.

The defences adopted to strengthen the works were the follow-
ing:— A "laager," made out of captured Afghan gun-carriages
and limbers, was constructed at the north-western corner of
Cantonments, closing the open ground which lay between the
front of the Behmaroo heights and the north-west circular
bastion, and the ground in its immediate front was strengthened
by means of abatis and wire entanglements, whilst a village,
which formed an excellent flank defence along the western and
northern face, was held as an independent post. Six towers
had been previously constructed on the Behmaroo heights,

* The troops were allotted for the defence, says the Times correspondent,
as follows : — The 3rd Sikhs, the 5th Goorkhas, and a wing of the 23rd
Pioneers held the Behmaroo heights, each that portion near its own lines ;
the Guides held Behmaroo village ; a detachment of the 28th Punjaub
Infantry the field hospital and adjoining defences. On the east face the
67th Foot had a company in the redoubt near the south-east angle ; and
the remainder of the regiment and a wing of the 72nd Highlanders
held the parapet and three gateways on the south face. The west
face and the General's gateway were held by the Sappers, some marks-
men from the British regiments, and the 5th Punjaub Infantry, the latter
regiment being also answeraUe for the defence of the gap at the north-
west angle. The reserve consisted of the 92nd Highlanders and a wing
each of the 67th and 72nd, one mountain battery, and six squadrons of dis-
mounted cavalry at night.

The Defences of Sherpur. 307

and the shelter-trenches which existed there were deepened
and so prolonged as to form one continuous line of defence
throughout its entire length. An abatis protected the front
of the shelter-trench, and gun-pits were constructed at those
points where artillery fire could be most advantageously used.
The works in the gorge were strengthened and so arranged
as to bring a galling flanking fire to bear upon an enemy
advancing from the north. In order to strengthen the north-
east corner a two-gun battery was thrown up on the eastern
slope of the heights, and connected with the tower above it and
the village below. Behmaroo village was loopholed, the outlying
buildings to the front made defensible, and the open space to the
north-east obstructed with abatis and wire entanglements. The
same steps were taken at the Native field hospital, and sand-bag
parapets built upon the roof, which was somewhat exposed. The
low wall of the eastern face of the Cantonments was raised by
logs of wood being placed along the top in several tiers, thus
affording good shelter — the front here, as elsewhere, being faced
with abatis, for which purpose the wood cut down in clearing
the nearest gardens and enclosures supplied the material.*
The construction of all these defences was conducted under
the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Perkins, C.B., Com-
manding Royal Engineers.

In order to supplement the field guns,f and leave them free
to move out as opportunity offered, several of the captured
Afghan guns were utilized, and, under the superintendence of
Colonel Gordon, R.A., mounted on the defences, whence they
subsequently played with good effect. A number of marksmen
were provided with Enfield rifles and cartridges found in the
Bala Hissar, by which means ammunition was economised.

Early in the morning of the 15th December the telegraph
wire was cut, but not before Sir Frederick had communicated
the situation of affairs to the Commander-in-Chief and the

* See despatch of Sir Frederick Roberts.

f The field guns of the British force consisted of twelve 9-pounders
and four 7-pounders. Among the ordnance captured was a complete
battery of siege guns, four smooth bore 18-pounders, and two 8 -inch
howitzers, presented to Shere AH by the Indian Government, which were
mounted on the southern face.

x 2

308 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Government of India, and urged the advisability of sending
reinforcements as speedily as possible to enable him to assume
the offensive. At the same time he sent orders to General
Bright at Jellalabad, to move Brigadier-General Charles Gough's
brigade from Gundamuck to Cabul without loss of time, and
to send Brigadier-General Arbuthnot's brigade towards Cabul
as soon as fresh troops should reach Jellalabad from India.
He decided upon recalling to Sherpur the small garrison
of Bootkak, which was in an exposed and isolated position,
and considered the expediency of withdrawing the force under
Colonel Hudson, 28th Punjaub Native Infantry, at Lutturbund,
which consisted of two mountain guns, the 28th Punjaub
Native Infantry, and a wing of the 23rd Pioneers, regarding
whose safety he was very anxious. But as the position was a
strong one, ammunition plentiful, and it was in direct helio-
graphic communication with Cabul, he decided to maintain
the post. He had every confidence in Colonel Hudson, and
felt satisfied that, so long as Lutturbund was held, no serious
opposition could be offered to General Gough's advance; and
the result justified this decision, for but slight resistance
was offered to General Gough at Jugdulluck, and none what-
ever after that point was passed. This post of Lutturbund
was, in fact, the chief link in the line of communications,
but there was some hazard in holding it with a weak garrison,
who, moreover, were known to be short of provisions, and as
the troops at Bootkak had been withdrawn to Sherpur the
only assistance they could receive was from Brigadier-General
Charles Gough, against whom the tribesmen, under Asrna-
tullah Khan, were gathering.

The General heliographed an order through Colonel Hudson
for Gough to advance with all speed, and directed him to hold
his own as best he could until the arrival of that officer,
which he anticipated would be in two days, though it was
dela}7ed until the 23rd, owing, says a General officer present
at Cabul, to the order not appearing of a peremptory character.
Colonel Hudson flashed a reply to the General that the Lut-
turbund garrison were on half rations, but after the 20 th
would have nothing, upon which Sir Frederick Roberts got
some Hazara men, with sixty mules, to carry provisions to

The Investment of Sherpur. 309

Colonel Hudson, under the promise of a large reward if they
reached Lutturbund that night. On leaving Sherpur these faith-
ful mercenaries made a great detour, passing round Bootkak,
then held by the enemy, and reached Lutturbund on the
following morning with the loss of only a few animals. This
timely assistance saved the Lutturbund garrison from retiring,
with the probability of suffering heavily, as the tribesmen
were all in arms in the passes. On the 16th, a body of about
1,000 men threatened Colonel Hudson, who, however, at-
tacked and dispersed them, inflicting considerable loss in both
killed and wounded.

The Afghans, as is usual with Asiatics, showed an extra-
ordinary incapacity to take advantage of their recent good
fortune, and allowed the fever-heat produced by the intoxi-
cation of success to pass away without making an effort to
assault the works of Sherpur. They appeared on the heights
above Deh Afghan in great force, but beyond shouting and
carrying standards took no active measures to profit by their
success. On the other hand, Sir Frederick Koberts, with
the assistance of his Engineers, pushed the construction of
the defences of the Cantonment where they were defective or
incomplete, and the respite of the few days succeeding the
14th December was put to such excellent use that the works
soon became practically impregnable to the assaults of any
army Afghanistan could bring against them. The Infantry
and a portion of the dismounted Cavalry were stationed along
the extensive enceinte, and slept at their posts, being pro-
vided with extra blankets to guard against the cold. The
reserve, under General Baker, was kept in readiness to turn
out at a moment's notice and proceed to any threatened point.

But the enemy were seemingly busy sacking the Hindoo
and Kuzzilbash quarters in Cabul, and the houses of all those
citizens and Sirdars who had shown favour to the British,
and no reliable estimate could be formed, from the reports of
spies, of the intentions of Mahomed Jan and the other
leaders of the movement. It was known, however, that Moosa
Khan, Yakoob Khan's heir, had been proclaimed Ameer,
but, from his tender years, he was of course a mere puppet
to give the pretence of legality to the proceedings of Mahomed

3io Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Jan, whose low extraction made him obnoxious to the Sirdars,
though the boy's mother, a woman of remarkable energy, threw
herself heart and soul into the movement, and the assist-
ance and countenance afforded by Mooskh-i-Alum gave an air
of religious respectability that tended to rally to the national
standard all the Ghazis and fanatics of the country. The
excitement, as was to be expected, extended to the passes
between Bootkak and Gundamuck, and the Tezeen valley,
which a fortnight before was the scene of a junction between
the brigades of Generals Macpherson and Charles Gough, was
in a disturbed state, and the Jugdulluck Pass — through which
Sir Michael Kennedy had ridden to Cabul shortly before,
escorted by a few Sowars, and Yakoob Khan had passed,
guarded by a single troop — was held in such strength that
Brigadier- General Charles Gough, who was advancing to the
relief of the beleaguered garrison of Sherpur at the head
of 5,000 men, reported that it was impracticable without rein-
forcements. Not only did the Ghilzyes and Khugianis oppose
Gough's advance, but further to the eastward, on the line of
advance from the Khyber, the Mohmunds were actively
hostile to the British, who had deported to India their chief,
father-in-law of the ex- Ameer Yakoob.

During the next few days the enemy confined their active
efforts against the garrison of Sherpur to a distant fusillade
from old walls and dismantled forts, and the King's garden, or
Shah Bagh, which figured in the former investment of 1841-
42. On the 17th they assembled in crowds on the Siah Sung
hill and the heights over Deh Afghan, but all the fervid prompt-
ings of the Moollahs could not bring them to advance, and they
dispersed after receiving a few shots amidst their ranks.

The Afghan strength brought together at this time round
Sherpur in the hope of plunder, united with hatred of the
unbeliever, was placed by Sir Frederick Roberts in his despatches
at 60,000 ; but this, he informs us, was an under-estimate, and
he afterwards heard from reliable native sources, that between
100,000 and 120,000 men had gathered at Cabul in response
to the fiery exhortations of the Moollahs.

Again, on the 18th, the enemy came out of Cabul in great
strength, the Ghazis, as usual, exposing themselves, but they

The Investment of Skerpur. 3 1 1

were met by such a hot and well-directed fire from the walls,
that they could not be brought to encounter the perils involved
in leaving the cover of the gardens and buildings, and risking
assault across the open. Nothing could exceed the excellent
spirit animating the troops, both European and Native, though
the intense cold and the night bivouac in the snow must have
severely taxed the latter especially. Nevertheless cheerfulness
reigned throughout the camp, the men looking forward with
eagerness to the time when their trusted commander would
lead them from behind the rampart of Sherpur against the
enemy who insulted them by voice and gesture, but abstained
from making the long-threatened attack.

Sir Frederick Koberts was very desirous of keeping open his
communications with India, and as cavalry would be of great
service to General Charles Gough in the advance from Luttur-
bund, he despatched the 12th Bengal Cavalry at 3 A.M., on the
morning of the 22nd, to effect a junction with him. Major
Green, their commanding officer, acting under instructions,
finding that Bootkak was occupied by the enemy, passed on
to Lutturbund and joined Colonel Hudson, after a skirmish, in
which he lost some men. Major Green conducted this duty in
a manner that elicited the commendations of his chief.

Each day, between the 14th and 21st December, Cavalry
reconnoissances were made from Sherpur, and some portion of
the force turned out to dislodge the Afghans from points in
vicinity to the walls. Some of the forts and other cover in
the immediate neighbourhood of Sherpur were also destroyed.
In one of these affairs, an attack on the fort of Meer Akhor
("Master of the Horse "), a gallant young officer, Lieutenant
Montanaro, E.A., received a mortal wound. Sir Frederick,
however, confined himself to minor operations of this descrip-
tion, and did not undertake any sortie in force with the object
of gaining possession of portions of the enemy's position.
His force was not sufficiently large to admit of his holding
them, and he, therefore, wisely determined to wait until he
could act decisively.

Mahomed Jan and his coadjutors thinking that, as they had
compelled the British to retire within their own cantonments,
as in the dismal days of 1841, they had only to complete the

312 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

parallel and destroy the army in the passes on the return march
to India, had the audacity to offer terms almost identical with
those wrung from the timid and incompetent General Elphin-
stone nearly forty years before. Mahomed Jan, playing the
part of Mahomed Akbar Khan, offered to permit the Army to
retire from Afghanistan without molestation — too well history
has taught us what reliance could be placed on such a promise
from an Afghan — while the British General was to place two
officers of rank in his hands — as was done in the case of Major
Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Colin Mackenzie — and
was, further, to engage to restore Yakoob Khan to the throne —
one of the conditions proposed by Akbar Khan, who required the
return to Cabul of his father, Dost Mahommed, then a prisoner
at Calcutta. But these insolent demands were received with
the scorn they merited. Roberts was no Elphinstone, and,
save that the combination against him was numerically more
powerful than that which besieged the British Cantonment*
in 1841, all the conditions were in his favour. He pos-
sessed a far greater proportion of European troops ; his Sepoys
were not effeminate Bengalees ; all his soldiers were armed
with weapons superior to those of the enemy; he possessed
ample supplies of ammunition, and reinforcements were com-
ing up to his assistance, some 17,000 men being assembled
between Rawul Pindee and Jugdulluck. At no time was Sir
Frederick Roberts anxious as to the safety of his force, and
having taken every precaution to guard against an assault by
overpowering numbers operating on all sides of Sherpur, the
only real danger, he was content to bide his time, and abstain
from throwing away his soldiers' lives in attempts to expel the
enemy from Cabul, which could be effected on the arrival of
reinforcements, or after Mahomed Jan had delivered his long-
promised assault on the Cantonments.

Every night, he says, information reached him that an attack
was contemplated, but it was not until the 21st December that
the enemy showed signs of special activity. On that day and
the following, large numbers of them moved from the city, and,

* The site of Sherpur was close to that of General Elphinstone's
entrenched camp, portions of the walls of which could yet be traced near
the Shah Bagh.

Assault by the Enemy. 3 1 3

passing round to the eastward of Sherpur, occupied the numer-
ous forts in that direction in great force. It hecame apparent
that this movement was preparatory to an attack from that
quarter. At the same time information was received that the
enemy was preparing a number of ladders, with the intention
of scaling the southern and western walls. Sir Frederick
Roberts made all his dispositions, which, indeed, were complete
already, and awaited in confidence the signal for the assault, which
he and every man in the force under his command felt would also
be the signal for the discomfiture of the combination that had
enjoyed the unwonted triumph of beleaguering a British force.

The night of the 22nd passed quietly, but the songs and
cries of the enemy, as they sought to encourage each other to
deeds of valour, resounded in the night air. From his spies
the British General learned that the 23rd of December, being
the last day of the " Muhurram," was selected for the great
effort ; and, further, in order to encourage the Ghazis and
religious devotees, it was announced in the Afghan ranks that
Mooskh-i-Alum would, with his own hand, light the beacon fire
at dawn on the Asmai heights, which was to be the signal for
the commencement of the attack.

The appearance of the signal fire on the Asmai heights,
shortly before daybreak, showed at once that the information
was correct, and announced the beginning of the assault. But
it found the British General calm and confident of success, and
every soldier at his post and rejoicing that the hour for action
had struck. General Roberts took up his station at the western
gateway, and throughout the succeeding operations was in con-
stant communication with the officers commanding the different
posts. Heavy firing almost immediately commenced against
the southern and eastern faces, and by 7 o'clock A.M. an
attack in force against the eastern side was fully developed,
whilst a large number of the enemy, provided with scaling
ladders, were drawn up under cover of the walls to the south.
The intelligence telegraphed him from General Hugh Gough
and Colonel Jenkins of the determined attack by the enemy in
dense masses, found self-possessed and confident one who had
long been impatiently waiting for it, and whose preparations for
meeting the crisis "were complete. It was welcome news that

3 H Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

" The enemy comes on in gallant show,
Their bloody sign of battle is hung out."

For three hours repeated attempts were made to carry the
low eastern wall by escalade, but though the enemy on several
occasions reached the abattis, they were each time repulsed,
and many dead marked the spots where the assault had been
most resolutely pressed home. This part of the defences was
held by the Guides, under Brigadier- General Hugh Gough,
who was struck full in the breast by a spent ball, which buried
itself in his " posteen," or sheepskin cloak.

About 9 A.M. it was reported to General Roberts that the
Ghazis had taken possession of a small village outside the
defences, and just under the eastern end of the Behmaroo
heights, and that the fire of the field guns which could be
brought to bear was ineffectual to dislodge them. To this
point General Baker had already directed a considerable portion
of his reserve, both infantry and guns, and a wing of the 3rd
Sikhs had been also withdrawn to the neighbourhood of Beh-
maroo from the western end of the heights. As the General
saw that the fire of the 18-pounders and howitzers on the
walls was sufficient to deal with the attack on the south and
south-west faces, and that the danger of anything serious in
this quarter might be disregarded, he determined to deal at
once with the Behmaroo attack. Finding, he says, that it was
impossible to dislodge the enemy by any fire that could be
brought to bear on them from our defences, he determined to
attack them in flank, and for this purpose directed four guns
of G Battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, under Major
Craster, and the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, to move out through the gorge
in the Behmaroo heights. This counter-attack was delivered
with energy, and the effect was immediate and decisive. The
Afghans wavered and shortly afterwards broke. And now,
says the General, the time for the action of Cavalry having
arrived, Brigadier-General Massy was directed to ride out with
every available man and horse, and do his utmost against the
enemy.

Sir Frederick Roberts proceeded to the heights above Beh-
maroo, and made arrangements for reaping the fruits of his

Repulse of the Enemy. 315

success. A party of Infantry and Sappers moved out to des-
troy some villages to the south, which had caused considerable
annoyance, and from which it was necessary the enemy should
be driven to facilitate the arrival of Brigadier- General Charles
Gough's brigade. This work was successfully accomplished,
but two gallant English officers, Captain J. Dundas, V.C., and
Lieutenant C. Nugent, commanding the 7th Company Sappers
and Miners, were killed by the premature explosion of a mine.
The Cavalry, meanwhile, made a wide circuit round the east
side of Sherpur, and succeeded in intercepting the rear of the
Kohistauee fugitives, who were sabred by the 5th Punjaub
Cavalry. This movement of the Cavalry caused the enemy in
all the villages on the east and south-east to abandon 'them to
prevent their retreat being cut off. Continuing their victorious
advance round the eastern face of Sherpur, the Cavalry ascended
the Siah Sung hills, and there the 9th Lancers and 5th Pun-
jaub Cavalry did further execution among the fugitives, numbers
of whom fell beneath their sabres, the remainder fleeing in utter
rout towards the city. The scene afforded a counterpart to that
so graphically drawn in the " Iliad," when the Trojans fled
before the face of the conquering Greeks to the shelter of their
works.

"Tumultuous clamour fills the fields and skies,
Thick drifts of dust involve their rapid flight,
Clouds rise in clouds, and heavea is snatch'd from sight,
Th' affrighted steeds, their dying lords cast down,
Scour o'er the fields, and stretch to reach the town."

It was the impression of those who watched General Massy's
progress, says a General officer, that the Cavalry were well
handled this day, and the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, which was in
front, rendered excellent service. In the course of the after-
noon clouds of dust in the direction of Bootkak gave intima-
tion of the approach of Brigadier-General Charles Gough's
brigade, and his camp was afterwards descried pitched within
easy distance of the bridge over the Logar river, about six
miles from Cabul.

By evening all resistance had ceased, and daylight on
the following morning showed that the enemy, abandoning all
hope of success, had dispersed, not a man being found in the
adjacent villages or visible on the surrounding hills. The city

316 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

was clear of them, and so precipitate was their flight that they
left their dead unburied where they fell. On the morning of
the 24th, a party of the 72nd Highlanders occupied without
opposition the fort of Mahomed Shereef — the capture of which,
on the 6th November, 1841, had been one of the few successes
achieved by the British troops during the siege ; this fort,
with the adjoining Shah Bagh, played an important part in both
investments. During the day the force under General Charles
Gough joined Sir Frederick Eoberts.

The Cavalry, divided into two parties, commanded respectively
by Brigadier-Generals Massy and Hugh Gough, proceeded
by Beni Hissar and the Chardeh Valley in pursuit, but their
movements were impeded by a snowstorm, and so rapid had
been the enemy's flight that they were compelled to reiurn to
Sherpur after nightfall, without meeting with any armed men.

The casualties between the 5th and 24th December were 2
officers and 16 men killed, and 4 officers — Brigadier-General
Hugh Gough, Lieutenant C. A. Montanaro, E.A. (died), Lieu-
tenant J. Burn-Murdoch, R.E.,* and Lieutenant C. F. Gam-
bier, 5th Punjaub Cavalry — and 66 men wounded.

The religious and military chiefs of the movement having
fled from Cabul, Sir Frederick Eoberts, on the following day,
directed the occupation of the city and Bala Hissar. Cabul
presented the appearance of having been sacked by an enemy.
The Mahomedans had wrecked the houses of the Hindoo and
Kuzzilbash quarters, the bazaars were deserted and all business
suspended. Captain Hall, with one company of the 5th Pun-
jaub Infantry, took post for the night in the Kotwallee, which
up to the previous evening had been the head-quarters of the
Ghazis, who had shown their spite before leaving by doing as
much damage as possible to the building, and by defiling all
the adjoining houses and shops. General Hills, the Military
Governor of the city, now resumed his functions, and was
heartily welcomed by all the peaceable and well-disposed inhabi-
tants.

* This young officer, who was specially mentioned in despatches by Sir
Frederick Roberts for his gallantry, gained equal credit during the recent
Egyptian campaign, when serving with the Indian Contingent at Tel-el-
Kebir and Zagazig.

Collapse of the Hostile Combination. 3 r 7

The collapse of the combination was complete, although it in-
cluded all the fighting elements of North-Eastern Afghanistan,
from Kohistan to the Ghilzye country, whose chief, Padshah
Khan, a former ally, and Asmatullah Khan, the principal
Lughman chief, had thrown in their lot with Mahomed Jan.
The arrangements of Sir Frederick Roberts had met with
complete success, and the wisdom of his plan of permitting
the enemy to select their own time of attack, and not wasting
valuable lives by quitting the sheltering walls of the Canton-
ment in desultory attacks on them and the strong forts in the
neighbourhood, was amply justified by the result. But though
he is entitled to full credit for his sagacity, and acted through-
out on his own opinions without seeking advice from subordin-
ates, he was singularly fortunate in the superior officers under
his command. Brigadier-Generals Macpherson, Baker, and
Hugh Gough were unsurpassed by any officers in the army in
the possession of the qualities that command the confidence of
all ranks under their orders ; and Colonel Macgregor, though
young in years, was a veteran in experience. Three of those
four officers, like the commander of the Cabul Field Force, bore
on their breasts that cross "for valour" which it is the most
eager aspiration of every soldier to win. Then among the corps
commanders were such excellent officers as Colonels Perkins,
B.E., Gordon, R.A., Hudson, Brownlow, Money, Parker, White,
and Jenkins ; also heroes like Cook, Vousden, Hammond,
Cunyngham, and others in the ranks.

In such warfare as that in which the Cabul Field Force had
been engaged, military capacity and personal prowess had many
opportunities for display. As in the defence of Jellalabad, in
the first Afghan War, men like Havelock, Abbott, Backhouse,
and Broadfoot made their reputations, so in the somewhat
analogous circumstances of the investment of Sherpur, and
the events of December, brave spirits like those mentioned
above showed to the front, though they had not the same oppor-
tunities for distinction, for the leader of the Cabul Field Force
was of a different calibre from the gallant but irresolute com-
mander of the Jellalabad garrison, who owed his most memor-
able achievement, the victory over Akbar Khan on the 7th April,
to the promptings of some of the officers mentioned above.

318 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

A General officer, before quoted, described to us the bearing
of Sir Frederick Roberts during the anxious time now brought
to a close. " Throughout the investment of Sherpur, Roberts
was the most cheerful man in camp. His bright face and
cheery smile instilled confidence among his soldiers, and one
felt there could be no doubt of success as long as he was with
them." Indeed, Sir Frederick Roberts never entertained any
anxiety as to the result, though his countrymen at home, who
exaggerated the power of the Afghan nation, failed to recognize
the fact that it was the hope of plunder that kept these undisci-
plined Asiatics together, and gratified, as they were, by the sack
of Cabul, it was impossible for any commander not possessed of
military genius, such as no Afghan has displayed since the
days of Ahmed Khan, to keep together the heterogeneous
assemblage of tribesmen which constitutes the nation in arms.

The total loss during the operations commencing with the
10th December, and ending in the dispersal of the Afghans,
was 103 killed, including 10 officers ; and 263 wounded, includ-
ing 15 officers, of whom 3 died.

Notwithstanding the want of ammunition and the hindrance
to rapid progress caused by the heavy fall of snow, Sir Fred-
erick Roberts determined to punish the Kohistanees, and Briga-
dier-General Baker left with a strong column for the district
in the Koh Daman belonging to Meer Butcha, and returned on
the last day of the old year, having destroyed the villages and
the strong fort under whose protection they nestled. This act
of severity showed the Afghans that the British troops were
quite in a condition to resume the offensive, though owing to
the inclemency of the weather, the General determined to post-
pone his visits to the other tribesmen till the spring. Briga-
dier-General Charles Gough's brigade, which included the 9th
Regiment, now occupied the Bala Hissar, and Colonel Hudson's
small force was moved from Lutturbund to Sherpur, giving a
welcome increase to the strength of the garrison, seriously
decimated by the losses during the recent fighting and the large
number of sick.

At this time Daoud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief of the
ex- Ameer's Army, who was found to have been in communi-
cation with the leaders of the recent rising, was sent to join his

Roberts on the Situation. 319

master in exile in India, and the Military Commission, whose
functions were revived for the trial of certain offenders — a few
of whom were hanged — completed its labours and was dissolved.
Political capital was sought to be made out of the acts of retri-
butive justice of Sir Frederick Roberts by the opponents, in the
Press and Parliament, of the Conservative Government,
whose agent he was, but the attempt was futile. On this point
he writes to us : — " I gave full explanation of my acts while
supreme at Cabul to the Government to whom I was respon-
sible, and furnished them with a list of all executions, with
the reasons given in each case. I stated at the time that no
soldiers had been executed for fighting against us. These
papers are published in the Blue-book, and can be read by every
one. Had any other troops but British been at Cabul in
October, 1879, the city would have been razed to the ground.
The Afghans quite expected this, and never ceased to wonder at
our leniency."

Sir Frederick Roberts now issued a proclamation of amnesty,
exempting only a few leaders, on condition of the tribesmen
sending delegates to Sherpur, to whom should be made known
his will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made
for the good government of the people. The Kohistanee chiefs
generally responded to this invitation, as well as some from
Lughman, Logar, and the Ghilzye country, and, on the 9th Jan-
uary, Sir Frederick Roberts held a grand durbar at Sherpur, to
present gifts to those who had proved faithful to the English in
their hour of trial. This durbar was attended by a large
number of these nobles, including Padshah Khan, the great
Ghilzye chief, who had borne arms against the British, and
also many powerful Barukzye Sirdars, among them Wall
Mahomed Khan, and other near relatives of the late Ameer
Shere Ali.

The scene presented was very picturesque, and suggestive
of British clemency and magnanimity, when it is remembered
that not many days since most of these chiefs were leading vast
masses of their countrymen against the small army that so
gallantly rallied round the British General, before whom they
now salaamed,' and cringed with true Oriental subserviency,
wondering, no doubt, at the generosity, or weakness, which

320 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

ever way tbey construed it, of the Government that could
hold out the hand of forgiveness to those who so recently
bore arms against them. It was a study to watch the ex-
pressions on the countenances of these Afghan chiefs.
Curiosity, mingled with respect, as they gazed on the man who
scattered to the winds their combinations and well-laid plans —
for your Oriental can only understand the logic of the sword ;
and, doubtless, they were puzzled at the issue of the Amnesty
so soon after the crushing defeat, which left them, their pro-
perty and families, at the mercy of the conqueror — for an
Afghan victor would have ruthlessly executed every malik that
fell into his hands, and destroyed their villages and forts.

During the durbar Sir Frederick Roberts addressed* the

* The following is the address made by Sir Frederick Roberts : — " Sirdars
and Maliks, — I am very glad to see that so many of the Kohistan maliks
have taken advantage of the Amnesty published on the 26th of December
last, and have come to Cabul to pay their respects to the British Govern-
ment, and to express their regrets for having taken a part in the recent dis-
turbances. I trust that those maliks who are still holding aloof will follow
the good example that has thus been set them, and will soon make their
appearance at Cabul. I told you, when you vi-itedme in my camp at Siah
Sung, after the arrival of the Briti.-h troops at Cabul, that the British
Government had nothing but goodwill towards the people of Afghanistan ;
that it is their desire to respect your lives, your property, and your religion,
and to molest no one who would live at peace with them. You have had
ample proof of the truth of what I told you. At the instigation of ill-
advised men you came from your homes in Kohistan to attack the British
troops at Sherpur. All that you succeeded in doing was to plunder from your
own countrymen who live in the City of Cabul. You did the British troops
but little injury, and in a few days you were beaten off, and had to return
to your homes with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded. You
brought this punishment upon yourselves, and must not blame the British
Government. What that Government did was to offer a pardon to all who
would come in — except the malik who, it is believed, was the main cause
of your being led astray. It was necessary he should be punished ; but, in
doing so, every care was taken that no one else should suffer injury. The
British troops marched through your country as far as Bala Kuch Kar,
treating you all as friends, and paying liberally for everything in the shape
of food and forage you were able or willing to provide. I hope the lesson
will not be lost upon you, and that you will not misunderstand the genero-
sity and forbearance with which you have been treated. It is a great plea-
sure to me to find that so many of the more intelligent and well-informed
of the people of Afghanistan took no part in the recent disturbances. First
and foremost, I would name Sirdars Wall Mahomed Khan, Ibrahim Khan,
Hashim Khan, Abdulla Khan, Mahomed Yusuf Khan, Mahomed Karim
Khan, Shahbaz Khan, Ahmed Ali Jan, Mahomed Sirwar Khan, Ataullah
Khan, Anitoollah Khan, Habibulla Khan (the Mustaufi). Malik llamid Khan,
and Khan Mahomed Khan. Then several of your own chiefs remained
with me throughout. General Faiz Mahomed Khan, the son of Naik

Measures for the Defence of Cab^lL 321

assembly, especially directing his remarks to the Kohistan
Chiefs, on the recent events, and having expressed his in-
tention of sending Shahbaz Khan as Governor of Kohistan,
invited them to select some of their number to remain at
Sherpur as representatives. But the malcontent faction, headed
by Mahomed Jan, who had borne off Moosa Khan to Ghuznee,
refused to give in their adhesion, and sent a demand for the
restoration of Yakoob Khan, which was treated with silent
contempt.

Meanwhile the Engineers were employed in strengthening
the works for the defence of Cabul, according to the plan
approved by Sir Frederick Roberts before the recent events,
so that the city could be held against any army Afghanistan
could furnish. Towers were commenced on commanding
positions on Koh Asmai and the heights above the Bala
Hissar, military roads were cut round the city, and the weak
points about the cantonment were strengthened, and all build-
ings affording cover within 1,000 yards of the walls levelled
with the ground. Sir Frederick Roberts appointed the Wali
Mahomed Governor of Cabul in place of General Hills, in
order to conciliate native opinion, and as a testimony that
annexation had no place in our plans for the future govern-
ment of the country. This Sirdar was a consistent adherent
of the British — " faithful 'mid the faithless found ; " though, un-
fortunately, he did not possess the strength of character neces-
sary to rule over such a turbulent race as his countrymen.

But this was only a temporary measure, as the Indian
Government, yielding to pressure from home, and alive to

Aminulla Khan, of Logar ; the family of the Mustafi, Sirdar Habibulla
Khan, of Wardak ; the Kuzzilbashes, and many other influential men in the
city of Cabul, refrained from joining the disturbers of peace and order ; and
I am glad to have this opportunity of thanking them on the part of the
British Government for the good service they thereby performed. I am now
about to give Khilluts to those Kohistanis who remained at Sherpur with
me; after which you are at liberty to return to your homes. I am sending
back with you to Kohistan Sirdar Shahbaz Khan, whom you have yourselves
asked for as your Governor. He will settle your disputes and preserve
order in the country. Also that I may be fully informed by yourselves of
all that passes, and of all that you may wish to represent hereafter, I
invite you to select certain of your number, who will remain here and
act as a medium of communication between us. They will be treated with
consideration and will have free access to me. The rest of you may return
to your homes, and for your own sake remember all that has passed."

Y

322 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the strain on the resources of the great dependency committed
to their charge from the continued occupation of Afghanistan,
began seriously to consider the question of the future admin-
istration of the country. Lord Lytton and his Council ad-
dressed a despatch, on the 7th January, 1880, to Lord Cran-
brook, the Secretary of State for India, expressing their view
that " the question of the resuscitation of the fallen kingdom
of the Barukzyes cannot now be entertained, and that we
must accept the separation of its constituent provinces as our
basis for the political reconstitution of Afghanistan." In
order to carry out this policy the Viceroy proposed, in accord-
ance with a decision already adopted by the Home Govern-
ment, that " Persia should be provisionally permitted to occupy
Herat, under sufficient guarantees for her good administration
of it, and for her adequate protection of British and Indian in-
terests, and with a special reservation of our right to occupy
the place with British forces on certain eventualities." The
districts of Pisheen, Sibi, and Kurram, being assigned to
England under the treaty of Gundamuck, were to be retained,
but Cabul and Candahar were to be separated ; the proposal
being " to establish the province of Candahar as an inde-
pendent and separate state, under an hereditary ruler selected
from the representatives of the old ruling families ; " but while
contemplating " no interference in the internal administration
of the province," they proposed " to retain a British garrison
at or near Candahar."

In order to assist Sir Frederick Koberts in political affairs
in North-Eastern Afghanistan, which Lord Lytton proposed
should " remain in military occupation until all resistance has
ceased," Mr. Lepel Griffin, an experienced political official, was
despatched to Cabul, where he arrived on the 20th March.
Meanwhile the Wali Shere Ali was appointed " hereditary
ruler" of Candahar, but the task of finding a ruler for Cabul
proved a difficult one, owing to the number of candidates, each
with his adherents, and the choice at first lay between Wali
Mahomed Khan, Hashim Khan, Moosa Khan, and Ayoob
Khan, all members of the ruling Barukzye family.

On reference to the Viceroy's despatches, the first mention

Abdul Rahman Khan. 323

we have of Abdul Rahman, the present ruler of Afghanistan,
as a candidate for the Ameership, is in a telegram, * dated
the 14th March, addressed to the Secretary of State, in
which his lordship advocates the "early public recognition
of Abdul Rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and
open deputation of Sirdars with British concurrence to offer
him the throne of Afghanistan, as sole means of saving
country from anarchy." The reply, on the following day,
from the India Office, authorized the nomination of Abdul
Rahman, if he was " acceptable to the country and would
be contented with Northern Afghanistan." This resolve, as
proved by subsequent events, was a wise one, though it en-
countered much opposition, owing to Abdul Rahman having
been for ten years a resident in Russian Turkestan, and in
receipt of a pension of 25,000 roubles a year from the Czar.
Yakoob Khan was impossible, Moosa Khan was a child, Ayoob
Khan, Yakoob's brother, was not considered acceptable, and
events seemed to point to Abdul Rahman, son of Afzul Khan,
elder brother of Shere Ali, as the most desirable personage
to ascend the musniid.

Abdul Rahman, who was now about fifty, accompanied his
father when he crossed the Indus to aid the Sikhs in their
final struggle against us in 1848—49, and after the death of
Dost Mahomed fled to Bokhara when Afzul, who was appointed
Governor of Balkh by his brother, Shere Ali, was removed to
Cabul by that Prince for intriguing against his authority.
"When Shere Ali was at Candahar, Abdul Rahman crossed the
Oxus, and having established his authority at Balkh, marched
with his uncle, Azim, on Cabul, which surrendered to him on
the 2nd March, 1866 ; this success was followed up by a victory
at Sheikhabad and the capture of Ghuznee, when Afzul became
Ameer, and his son consolidated his rule by his victory over
Shere Ali at Khelat-i-Grhilzye early in the following year. But
soon a change came over the political scene with the frequency
and rapidity characteristic of Afghan affairs. Afzul died of his
excesses, Azim was equally incapable and more tjTannical, and
Abdul Rahman retired in disgust to Afghan Turkestan. Now

* See Blue Book, "Afghanistan (1881), No. 1."

T 2

324 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Yakoob Khan came forward to champion his father's rights,
and, advancing from Herat, followed up a victory on the
Helmund, which resulted in the flight of Azim's son from
Candahar, by defeating Abdul Kahnian at Bameean, and finally
restored his father to the throne by the crushing defeat inflicted
in the winter of 1868 at Tinah Khan. Abdul Eahman and
Azim fled from Balkh, and thence to Meshed, in Persia, where
the latter died in October, 1869, while his nephew proceeded
to Khiva and Bokhara, and arrived in May, 1870, at Tashkend,
where he received permission from General Kaufmann to reside
on Russian territory as a pensioner of the Czar.

It seemed as though the possibility of Abdul Eahman obtain-
ing another favourable opportunity to strike a blow for the
throne of Cabul was remote indeed, for Shere AH had firmly
established himself in power ; but his ill-advised intrigue with
Russia gave the desired chance, and involved that unhappy
prince and his country in a period of prolonged anarchy,
disaster, and bloodshed, from which it has only now apparently
emerged. The words of Hector to Paris might be applied to
the ill-fated Shere Ali : —

" Bleak fate hangs o'er thee from th' avenging gods,
Imperial Troy from her foundations nods :
Whelm'd in thy country's ruins shalt thou fall,
And one devouring vengeance swallow all."

After the deportation to India of Yakoob Khan, the people
of Afghan Turkestan, remembering the moderation with which
he formerly ruled them, rallied to the cause of Abdul Rahman,
and on the 17th March, 1880, Lord Lytton telegraphed to the
Secretary of State, that he had received " authentic intelligence
that the Sirdar is in Afghan Turkestan, having lately arrived
there from Badakshan, where he defeated the Meer Shahzada
Hassan." Such was the new aspirant for the perilous honour
of ruling the race whom his former conqueror declared were so
turbulent that he would rather be a grass-cutter in the British
camp than their sovereign.

By the middle of March, Sir Frederick Roberts had under
his command at Cabul about 11,500 men and twenty-six guns.
The Cabul Field Force was divided into two divisions, the first
being under the immediate command of Sir Frederick, and the

Durbar at Sherpur. 325

second under Major-General Ross, C.B., while the command of
the line of communications was held by Major-General Bright.
Brigadier- General Massy had been ordered to proceed to India,
and was succeeded in the command of the Cavalry by Brigadier-
General Hugh Gough. Sherpur had been made impregnable
against the attack of any Asiatic army, and forts were built 011
both sides of the Cabul gorge and on the Siah Sung hill.

In response to an invitation to discuss the question of the
future of their country, addressed by Sir Frederick Roberts to
the Chiefs of Mydau, Logar, and the neighbouring districts,
through Habibullah Khan, whom he had found trustworthy,
a large number of Chiefs and Sirdars assembled at Sherpur
to learn the intentions of Government.

Sir Frederick Roberts, attended by his Staff, and accom-
panied by Mr. Griffin and his general officers, entered the
Durbar tent, and took his place amid the respectful salutations
of the assembly. Sir Frederick opened the proceedings by a
short speech,* and Mr. Griffin delivered a lengthy address in
Persian, in which he explained to the Sirdars and people of
Cabul generally, and to the delegates who presented the
demands of the Maliks and Chiefs of Logar, Ghuznee, Mydan,
AVardak, and the southern Ghilzye country, the general
instructions of the Indian Government regarding the future
government of Cabul. The restoration of Yakoob Khan was

* " Sirdars and Maliks, — I am very glad to meet you here to-day, espe-
cially those who through the good offices of the Mustaufi have been induced
to come into Cabul to make their wishes known to me. I trust this Durbar
is the beginning of the end, and that it will now be possible for us to enter
into such an arrangement with the yeo le of Afghanistan as will ensure
an honourable peace and lasting friendship between them and the British.
Same of you, I understand, 1 esitated to accompany the Mustaufi, feat ing
your treatment and reception by us might not be such as we have pro-
mised you, and that some evil might befall you. You need r.ever have
any such fear when your safety has been assured on the word of a British
officer. The British do not say one thing and do another. You who
have come in have been honourably treated, and after this Durbar you ate
all at liberty to depart-. I trust, when you leave Cabul, you will carry away
with you a more friendly feeling towards us than some of jou have hitherto
entertained ; and that those of your party who are still holding aloof will
be wise enough to follow the good example you have set them, and will
accept our invitation to come to Cabul. Mr. Lepel Griffin, Chief Political
Officer in North and Eastern Afghanistan, with whom you have already
become acquainted, will now, on the part of the Government of India,
answer the request you have made.''

326 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

declared impossible, and their choice of rulers was restricted
to the other members of the ruling family, Wali Mahomed,
brother of Shere Ali, Hashim Khan, who had married a daughter
of the ex- Ameer, and possessed his money, or Moosa Khan and
Ayoob Khan, his son and brother. The British troops, it was
haughtily notified, would be withdrawn from Afghanistan
" when the Government considers the proper time has come ;
as they did not enter Afghanistan with your permission, so
they will not withdraw at your request."

Chief mention should here be made of a hardly contested
action fought, on the 26th April, on the old battle ground of
Charasia, by a portion of Sir Frederick Roberts's force, under
Colonel Jenkins, who had left Sherpur a few days before with
a small column. Sir Frederick Roberts, learning by helio-
graphic signal that Colonel Jenkins was hard pressed, sent
some reinforcements to his aid, under General Macpherson,
and the enemy were defeated with heavy loss. Sir Frederick
ordered the column to return to Sherpur, and rode out
to meet them and congratulate the successful leaders. The
excitement in Camp during the 26th April brought back
recollections of the days of December. All the forts were
manned and the whole of the Cabul Field Force was on the
qui vive, as an attack of Kohistanees was expected.

A few days later Sir Frederick Roberts was relieved of the
chief political and military command in North-Eastern Afghanis-
tan by the arrival of his senior officer, Sir Donald Stewart,
who had marched from Candahar to break up any hostile com-
bination at Ghuznee, and open communications with Cabul,
leaving a division of troops from the Bombay Presidency, under
Lieutenant- General Primrose, to hold the city and province,
which he had administered so successfully, and the civil
government of which was now handed over to the Wali Shere
Ali.

In order to act in co-operation with Sir Donald Stewart, Sir
Frederick Roberts, on the 16th April, sent a strong column
from Sherpur under command of Major- General Ross. Little
actual resistance was met by Ross's column, though the
Mydan people were sulky and ill-disposed. General Ross was
accompanied by General Hills, who had served at Candahar in

Roberts is Relieved by Sir Donald Stewart. 327

the first phase of the Afghan War, as Assistant Adjutant-
General to Sir Donald Stewart's Division ; and that officer related
to us how at the moment when he and General Ross had topped
the watershed between Wardak and Mydan, a heliographic
signal was flashed to them by General Stewart, a distance of
about forty miles, giving news of his arrival at Ghuznee and
his victory at Ahmed Khel on the 19th April. General Hills,
when he left Sir Donald Stewart at Candahar, told him that he
would meet him at Ghuznee, and on the previous day had been
anxious to redeem his promise, but General Ross would not
give him leave, as Sir Frederick Roberts had ordered that the
Cavalry should not advance beyond the pass. Having got half
a troop of Cavalry as escort, General Hills now rode on and
found his old chief two miles on the Cabul side of the Dahan
pass. Sir Donald Stewart's troops turned off into the Logar
country, and, accompanied by General Hills, he joined General
Ross's column and proceeded to Sherpur, where he arrived on
the 1st May, and making over his own division to Brigadier-
General Hughes, 63rd Regiment, who held the command until
relieved by General Hills, — on the 2nd May he assumed com-
mand of the troops in North-Eastern Afghanistan, also reliev-
ing Sir Frederick Roberts of the charge of political affairs.
Our hero looked forward to shortly quitting the country in
whose eventful history he had played so important a role, and,
like Richard, his

u Bruised arms hang up for monuments."

But, again, for the third time within two years, he was to be
called upon to encounter the responsibilities of command in
an emergency ; for the time had not yet come when he could
exclaim with Gloucester : —

" Our stern alarums chaug'd to merry meetings,
Our dreadful marches to delightful measures."

328 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER XVII.

Sir Frederick Roberts and the Negotiations with Abdul Rahman — Appoint-
ment of the Sirdar to the Ameership — Restless State of the Sirdars
and People of Afghanistan — Arrival of Abdul Rahman at Cabul and
Assumption of the Ameership— Sir Frederick Roberta's Views on the
Kurram Valley Question — The Maiwand Disaster — Sir Frederick
Roberts appointed to the Command of the Relieving Column — The
Dramatic Aspects of the Afghan War — His Preparations for the
March on Candahar.

SOME notice is necessary in a biographical work of the personal
share taken by Sir Frederick Roberts in the political proceed-
ings which ended in the acceptance by the British Government
of Abdul Rahman as Ameer of North-E astern Afghanistan.
Lord Lytton having authorized him and Mr. Griffin to open
negotiations with the Ameer, on the 2nd April a Kohistan
Chief, Surwar Khan, an active adherent of the Pretender, was
despatched from Sherpur to Koondooz, in Afghan Turkestan,
where he arrived on the 10th. At an interview with Abdul
Rahman, Surwar Khan expressed the friendliness entertained
towards him by the British General, and advised him to repair
to Cabul, where he would be honourably received. Surwar
Khan received a letter from the Sirdar, couched in guarded
and general terms, expressive of his gratitude to the British
Government, and his desire to live at amity with both England
as well as Russia, whose hospitality he had enjoyed for twelve
years,* and, leaving Kooudooz, arrived at Sherpur on the 21st
April. He was also the bearer of a message from Abdul
Rahman, offering to go to Charikar, in Kohistan, with an
escort of 500 men, and there discuss matters with the British
Political Officers in person.

Sir Frederick Roberts and Mr. Griffin, after consideration of
the letter and message, decided to accede to the Sirdar's request,
proposing Cabul as an alternative place of meeting, and to

* For letter see p. 22 of Blue Book on Afghanistan.

The Negotiations with Abdul Rahman. 329

offer him the Ameership on his agreeing to accept the conditions
regarding Candahar, the frontier between the two countries,
and the foreign relations of Afghanistan conceded to the
British by the treaty of Gundamuck. On communicating the
steps they had taken to the Viceregal Government, Sir Frederick
Eoberts and Mr. Griffin received a lengthy despatch, dated the
27th April, communicating the intentions of Lord Lytton, which
briefly were to the effect that Cabul was to be evacuated by the
British troops " not later than October next," and impressing
on their attention " the importance of avoiding any expression
which might appear to suggest or admit matter for negotiation
or discussion in reference to the relative positions of the Sirdar
and the Government of India." They proposed " uncondi-
tionally transferring the government of the country " to Abdul
Eahnian, who would receive, if he required it, assistance from
the Viceroy, and in the event of his proving " able and disposed
to conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeit-
ing the good understanding he seeks with us, will assuredly
find his best support in our political appreciation of that
fact."

Further, the Government of India declared that their " only
reasons for not immediately withdrawing their forces from
Northern Afghanistan have hitherto been, first, the excited and
unsettled condition of the country round Cabul, with the atti-
tude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings
near Ghuzuee ; and secondly, the inability of the Cabul Sirdars
to agree among themselves on I he selection of a ruler strong
enough to maintain order after the evacuation of the country."
The first-named of these reasons no longer existed after the
victory at Ahmed Kheyl achieved by Sir Donald Stewart during
his advance from Candahar, and on the arrival of that officer at
Cabul on the 2nd May, Sir Frederick Roberts, being junior in
rank, ceased to be supreme political no less than military chief
in Northern Afghanistan, and the negotiations with Abdul
Rahman were conducted in the name of Sir Donald Stewart,
acting in conjunction with Mr. Griffin.

To the subject of this Memoir it seemed as if no further
chance of increasing the renown he had earned by his conduct
of military affairs, could offer itself in Afghanistan. By his

330 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

victories at Peiwar Kotul and Charasia, and generally by the
masterly and daring advance on Cabul, no less than by the
complete success of the operations in December, he had earned
for himself a high place among England's most trusted soldiers.
Nothing more brilliant had been achieved for many years than
this series of successes, which were gained not by fortune or any
adventitious aid, but by boldness and able strategy. " Nothing
succeeds like success," and Sir Frederick Roberts possessed the
complete confidence of every officer and man under his command,
whose only regret was that no further chances of earning dis-
tinction under his orders could accrue, since the Liberal Govern-
ment, following up the policy of their predecessors in office, had
decreed that the evacuation of North-Eastern Afghanistan was
to take place as soon as Abdul Rahman had been accepted as
the future Ameer by a sufficient portion of his countrymen, or,
in any case, not later than October. But in these calculations
of the late Cabul Field Force, sufficient allowance was not made
for the unforeseen, always a potent factor in Oriental politics.
The vicissitudes of political and military affairs in Afghan-
istan had extended their influences to British interests, and the
reputations of two general officers in South- Western Afghan-
istan suffered as sudden and disastrous an eclipse as the char-
acter for military prowess of Yakoob Khan, Ayoob Khan, and
Abdul Rahman had experienced during their chequered careers.
On the other hand, the military fame of Sir Frederick Roberts
shone out with increased lustre during the hour of trial still in
store for the arms of England, and when he emerged at Can-
dahar after his famous march through Afghanistan, he added
to the reputation already achieved, a European renown as one of
the greatest soldiers of the age, a claim conceded to him by the
illustrious Skobeleff, the hero of Plevna and Geok Tepe.
• Notwithstanding the overwhelming force of 18,000 seasoned
soldiers, the flower of the Indian army, assembled at Cabul,
under the command of Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick
Roberts, the Afghans were as truculent as ever, and it was
manifest that they would never submit to the foreign yoke ; and
in the latter part of June, General Hills marched into the
Logar district with the late Candahar division, in order to pro-
cure supplies and put down a gathering of Zoormuttees and

Disturbed State of Logar. 331

Wardakees. In bis account to us of bis proceedings in tbe
Logar Valley, be describes all tbe bill-sides as covered witb tbe
watcb-fires of tbe villagers, wbo tbougbt be was going into Zoor-
mut. Soon after, be moved temporarily to Cabul witb bis divi-
sion, on wbicb tbe tribesmen, under Hassan Kbau, an adberent
of Yakoob Kban, came down into tbe Logar Valley, and tried
to induce tbe Logarees to join tbem for anotber rising similar
to tbat in December. On General Hills returning to tbe Logar
Valley, most of tbe tribesmen retired, but about 1,500 Zoor-
muttees took up a position at tbe village of Padkao Sbana,
wbere tbey were attacked and dispersed by tbe cavalry of Hills's
division, under Brigadier-General Palliser.

Tbese were tbe men of wbom Sir George Campbell, M.P.,
asked in tbe House of Commons wbetber it was true tbat " in-
offensive ryots" bad been attacked. Witb bis Indian experience
and knowledge of tbe cbaracter of tbe officers of tbe Indian
Army and tbe reputation of General Hills, tbe member for
tbe Kirkaldy borougbs ougbt to bave known better tban to
bave inferred tbat an officer wbose cbaracter for bumanity stood
as bigb as bis own, would bave been capable of attacking in-
offensive ryots. Tbese tribesmen, wbose leader, Mabomed
Hassan Kban, bad run away from Jellalabad witb treasure,
tbougbt tbat Mabomed Jan bad corne down from "Wardak to
assist tbem, and took advantage of General Hills's absence to
work up tbe Logarees to figbt ; but tbese latter declined to join
tbem, saying tbat tbe General and Major Ewan Smitb, Political
Officer witb tbe division, bad treated tbem well and paid for all
supplies.

Tbe only otber notewortby incident was tbe deportation to
India of tbe Mustaufi, Habibullab Kban, wbo was accused of
conspiring against tbe Euglisb, and was sent to join bis master
and Daoud Sbab.

During May and June negotiations were carried on witb
Abdul Rabman at Kbanabad, near Koondooz, in Afgban Turk-
estan, tbe Britisb Agents being Sirdar Ibrabim Kban, Sber
Mabomed Kban, and Afzul Kban, a ressaldar of tbe lltb
Bengal Lancers. Tbe Mission left Sberpur on tbe 3rd May,
and was received witb bonour by tbe Sirdar, wbo besitated
before giving a final answer, as bis acceptance involved tbe sur-

332 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

render of Candahar and the Kurram Valley, which would make
him unpopular with his countrymen.

Sir Frederick Roberts quite agreed with the Liberal Govern-
ment that an end should be put to the occupation of North-Eastern
Afghanistan by our army during the autumn, whether terms
were made with Abdul Rahman or not. On this point he writes
in his despatch, dated 29th May : — " If the present negotiations
with Abdul Rahman succeed, I should hamper him with the
fewest possible conditions ; if they fail, I would be inclined to
let the tribes of Eastern Afghanistan please themselves about
an Ameer. In course of time some strong man would win
his way to power, and meanwhile it would be wiser not to force
a ruler upon them. Any nominee of ours would certainly not
be acceptable, and, in all probability, would not be able to hold
his own after our departure. Under any circumstances, I
am strongly in favour of not remaining at Cabul after the great
heat of the Indian summer has passed and travelling through
the Khyber is possible. If we cannot settle matters with the
Afghans at this season of the year, when everything is in our
favour, we shall certainly not be able to do so in the winter,
when the difficulties of an occupation are immeasurably in-
creased." On the Afghan question, so far as Russia is con-
cerned, he says : — " We have learnt by experience what a con-
siderable force is required to occupy Cabul and to maintain our
communications with India by the Khyber route. There is no
denying the fact that, if the ruler of Cabul should at any
future time be assisted by Russian officers, the army of 25,000
men which we now find it necessary to employ on the Khyber
line alone would have to be very considerably increased. Nor
do I think that, even if the Afghans themselves were on our
side, we could deal as effectually with Russia in Eastern as in
Western Afghanistan. To what extent those offensive measures
might be pressed in Southern or Western Afghanistan scarcely
comes within the scope of this paper, depending, as they as-
suredly would, on numerous and complicated eventualities, such
as the attitude of Persia, the object and strength of Russia,
and the state of Afghanistan generally. It might be found
necessary to make a rapid advance on Herat and mass a con-
siderable army there, or it might, on the other hand, be deemed

Views of Sir Frederick Roberts. 333

./ \J *J \J

desirable to confine operations to Candahar itself, or to Seistan,
and the valley of the Helrnund. It will be sufficient for our
present purpose if we can come to the conclusion that the '
Candahar line will be the one by which all offensive movements
against Russia would be carried on. If this point be admitted, it
only remains for us to consider to what extent communication
should be maintained between the north-west frontier of India
and Cabul. My own opinion, which I offer with considerable
diffidence, is that the Kurram line should be given up alto-
gether, and that the responsibilities which we ought to incur on
the Khyber route should be limited to such as would ensure the
execution and integrity of any guarantees we have given to the
rulers of Lalpura and Kuner. Viewing Cabul in the altered
and powerless condition in which we shall leave it, with a ruler
quite unable to cause us trouble or even anxiety in India, and
knowing (as we now do) with what ease and quickness we can
again at any time make ourselves masters of Cabul by either of
the two roads under consideration, I can see no reason why
regular troops should be kept either in the Kurram or the Khyber.
Moreover, I cannot too strongly urge upon the consideration of
the Government of India the desirability of not leaving the
Native portion of the army in the field after the ensuing
autumn. Many of the regiments will then have been on
service since October, 1878 ; they have done admirably, — indeed
I doubt if at any former period the Native Army has ever be-
haved more loyally or gallantly ; all ranks are in good heart, and
will cheerfully carry out any work they may be called upon to
perform. There is, however, a limit beyond which it would be
impolitic to require them to remain away from India. This
limit I place at two years. It would be found difficult, if not
impracticable, to relieve the troops now on service. All the
Goorkhas, and nearly all the Punjaub Corps, are in the first
line. This is another strong argument in favour of an early
withdrawal."

Abdul Rahman and his advisers hesitated to give a definite
answer to the British demands, or to come to Cabul, because,
as Mr. Lepel Griffin wrote on the 4th August, they " feared
greatly that our intention was to rid ourselves of a formidable

334 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

opponent, and that, had he come straight into Cabul, he would
have been arrested, and deported to British India."

So critical did the negotiations appear towards the end of
June that Sir Donald Stewart, with whom the Viceregal
Government left considerable discretionary powers, advised no
further dealings with Abdul Eahman. In the despatch of
the 27th July, giving in detail the negotiations with that Sirdar,
Lord Ripon, the newly-arrived Viceroy, and his Council wrote :
" Sir D. Stewart and Mr. Griffin represented to the Govern-
ment of India, for the second time, their conviction of the
danger of trusting Abdul Rahman, the imprudence of delay-
ing immediate action, and the necessity, in this critical situa-
tion, of breaking off with Abdul Rahman, and adopting other
means of establishing a government in Cabul before our
evacuation." But Lord Ripon fortunately decided otherwise,
as he considered that, " as matters stood then, an arrangement
with Abdul Rahman offered the most advisable solution, while
he doubted whether it would not be found very difficult to enter
into any alternative arrangement."

The subsequent course of events fully justified the statesman-
like course adopted by the Indian Viceroy, and Abdul Rahman,
having made up his mind to accept the terms offered him by
the British Government, left Khanabad on the 28th June, with
2,000 men and 12 guns, and, crossing the Hindoo Koosh,
reached Tootumdurrah, near Charikar, at the entrance of the
Ghorebund Valley — the forts of which were successfully attacked
by Sir Robert Sale in 1840. The Sirdar arrived on the 20th
July at Charikar, and a large number of leading Chiefs and
other influential personages, including Mooshk-i-Alum, and
some of the principal Ghilzye and Wardak Chiefs, signified
their acquiescence in his recognition, and many went to
meet him at Charikar. The faithless Asmatullah Khan,
Ghilzye,* Abdul Guffoor, Logaree, and thirty-five others of
less note, who wrote from Maidan that all there assembled were
ready to accept as Ameer whomever the British Government

* True to his character, Asmatullah has recently intrigued against the
Ameer Abdul Rahman, who put a letter of his to Ayoob Khan in his hand
in open Durbar and threw him into prison. Mahomed Jan and Abdul
Guffoor have also been executed, and Meer Butcha is a fugitive.

Recognition of Abdul Rahman. 335

might select, whether Yakoob Khan, or Abdul Rahman, or Ayoob
Khan ; but that in the interests of the country and the Govern-
ment, it was essential to at once declare the choice of the
authorities, as there was no other way of bringing to an end
the period of uncertainty, and of re-assuring the people.

Abdul Rahman was acknowledged by the British military
and political authorities as Ameer of Afghanistan, and received
a promise of support so long as he remained friendly to
England. The ceremony took place at a grand Durbar, held
on the 22nd July, at Sherpur, at which Sir Donald Stewart,
accompanied by Sir Frederick Roberts and Mr. Lepel Griffin,
received the representatives of Abdul Rahman.* The new
Ameer left Charikar, and was met on 3rd August at Zimma,
about 16 miles from Cabul, by Mr. Lepel Griffin, who proceeded
with an escort from General Charles Gough's camp in the
Kohistan road, and arrangements were made for his taking
over Cabul, the governorship of which had been resigned by
the Wali Mahomed Khan, who himself had been a candidate
for the throne.

Abdul Rahman's chance of election was supposed to be
remote indeed, a few months before, the taint of Russian support
being regarded as an absolute bar to his selection by the British
Government, who preferred the claims of the Barukzye Sirdars,
Wali Mahomed, Hashim Khan, and Ayoob. But by a turn
of the wheel of fortune all this was changed, and Abdul
Rahman came to power under the aegis of British protection
and with subsidies in money and arms, which have enabled him
to gain over by force of arms and the power of the purse the
whole of Afghanistan. But all Afghan history shows that the
fickle nobles and people of Cabul may soon tire of him, and
should fortune declare against him in the field, like the Roman

* Mr. Lepel Griffin thus describes him : — " Amir Abdul Rahman Khan is
a man of about forty, of middle height, and rather stout. He has an
exceedingly intelligent face, brown eyes, a pleasant smile, and a frank
courteous manner. The impression that he left on me and the officers who
were present was most favourable. He is by far the most prepossessing of
all the Barukzai Sirdars whom I have met in Afghanistan, and in conversa-
tion showed both good sense and sound political judgment. He kept
thoroughly to the point under discussion, and his remarks were charac-
terized by shrewdness and ability. He appeared animated by a sincere
desire to be on cordial terms with the English Government."

336 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

people upbraided by Marullus, they would hail his successful

rival : —

" Many a time and oft

Have you climb'd up to walls and battlements,
To towers and windows, yea, to chimney-tops,
Your infants in your arms, and there have sat
The livelong day, with patient expectation,
To see great Pompey pass the streets of Rome."

Popularity among the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan is
very much a question of bribes and license to the former, and
a liberal dispensation of the panem et circenses to the
latter.

Meanwhile important military events had occurred, which
removed Sir Frederick Roberts from the scene of these pro-
tracted negotiations, and gave him employment in the field, a
more congenial sphere to one of his temperament than the
fetid atmosphere of Afghan intrigue.

On the 29th July the startling news arrived at Cabul that
General Burrows' brigade had been " annihilated " at Maiwand;
and though subsequent details placed the disaster in not quite
so bad a light, the utter rout of a British force, followed by
the investment of Candahar, and the virtual supremacy of
Ayoob Khan over the province, formed a sufficiently grave
conjuncture of affairs to demand prompt and energetic action.
All eyes in England and India were instinctively turned to
Sir Frederick Roberts as the man for the crisis that had so
suddenly arisen, and the British Army in Afghanistan felt no
one was equally fitted to cope with the new peril that had
arisen, and lead them to wipe away the stain from their arms.

Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts both agreed
that it would be necessary to send a strong division from Cabul,
and not to leave the retrieval of our position in South- Western
Afghanistan to General Phayre, who commanded the Bombay
troops in reserve on the Scinde frontier and at Pisheen, whose
want of transport would, they felt certain, delay his arrival at
Candahar. With soldierly alacrity, and pending orders from
the Supreme Government, steps were taken to prepare a force
of about 10,000 men to march upon Candahar. Sir Frederick
Roberts's offer to assume command was at once accepted by Sir
Donald Stewart, and the appointment was hailed by the army

The Maiwand Disaster. 337

with satisfaction, for all felt that success was already almost
assured.

The Maiwand disaster came at an unfortunate time, and was
near imperilling the negotiations in progress between Abdul
Rahman and Mr. Griffin, acting on behalf of the Indian
Government ; but these difficulties were tided over at an inter-
view, and the new Ameer, who was glad to be quit of the
British army from Cabul, raised but slight objection to a
division marching through the country to Candahar. The
Indian Government, on the urgent representations of Sir
Donald Stewart, who telegraphed on the 5th August, and
wrote a lengthy despatch in the same sense five days later,
directed the immediate withdrawal of the remainder of the
British troops from Afghanistan, the posts at Lundi Kotul
and in the Khyber Pass being held in temporary occupation.
Accordingly, on the llth August, Sir Donald Stewart quitted
Sherpur, having that morning had an interview with the new
Ameer, at which Mr. Lepel Griffin and General Hills, com-
manding the Cabul Division, were present.

Before the news of the defeat of Burrows's Brigade at Mai-
wand, the military authorities at head-quarters had ordered the
evacuation of Afghanistan by the army of 18,000 men as-
sembled at Cabul. The withdrawal was to be effected in two
bodies. One portion was to retire by the Khyber Pass, under
Sir Donald Stewart, and the other, under the orders of Sir
Frederick Roberts, by the Kurram Valley, where a division,
under the command of Major-General Watson, C.B., V.C., had
remained since Sir Frederick quitted Ali Kheyl to commence
his march on Cabul in the preceding autumn. These troops
were for the present directed to remain in the Kurram Valley ;
but, on the 3rd of September, the Viceroy and his Council came
to the resolution, in accordance with the wishes of the inhabit-
ants, to place the Jajis of the Upper Kurram, and the tribes of
the Hurriab district beyond the Peiwar Kotul, under the new
Ameer ; though the Turis, in the Kurram Valley, whose inde-
pendence had been solemnly promised to them by Sir Frederick
Roberts, were not included in this arrangement. Accordingly,
the Kurram Valley was evacuated by General "Watson on the
16th October, and the Turis were placed under their leaders,

z

338 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Badsbali Gul and Meer Mahomed Khan. While noting this
termination to our occupation of districts conquered by Sir
Frederick Roberts, it should be borne in mind that, as a soldier
thoroughly conversant with the strategical and political value
of the Kurram Valley, he agreed with the almost unanimous
consensus of opinion against the occupation of this territory,
though in his elaborate and well-reasoned Memorandum on the
situation in Afghanistan, as it affected our position in India,
penned at Cabul on the 29th May, Sir Frederick Roberts based
his opinion on the hypothesis of the retention of Candahar.*
But his main argument was directed towards proving the
inutility of holding positions on the Kurram line by showing
that, in any future war in Afghanistan, we ought to remain on
the defensive on our North-West frontier, and that our most
effective line of advance against an enemy in the interior of
the country would be from the southward ; while, apart from
strategical considerations of this general nature, the special
weight of his reasoning on military, political, and financial
grounds, bears decidedly against our maintaining garrisons on
the Kurram highlands.

Sir Frederick Roberts' s connection with Cabul and North-
Eastern Afghanistan was now to cease, and he turned his face
westwards to reap fresh honours, and add a glorious page to the
military annals of his country. Upon receipt at Cabul of the
telegram from the Viceregal Government announcing the
Maiwand disaster, both the British Commanders concluded

* The following paragraphs from this Memorandum are of especial value,
and no notice of the views in this important question, held by Sir Frederick
Roberts, would be complete without them : — " The state of affairs which
brought about the Treaty of Gundamuck has completely changed. In
place of our being obliged to occupy the advanced strategic positions
secured to us by that treaty, and which the safety of our Indian Empire
forced us to hold as long as Cabul was the centre of a great political and
military power, we can now afford to withdraw our troops within our
original frontier. We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best
thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be very
rlattering to our amour propre, but I feel sure I am right when I say that
the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia
in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan or invade India through it,
we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests,
if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime. The military
occupation of Candahar is, as I have before stated, of vital importance ;
but even there we should make our presence but little felt, merely control-
ling the foreign policy of the ruler of that province."

Roberts and the Maiwand Disaster. 339

that a division should march from Cabul, in addition to any
troops despatched from Scinde, which could only reach Can-
dahar at this season of the year with great difficulty and
delay. The Cabul corps d'armee of 18,000 seasoned troops,
accustomed to act together, and commanded by some of the
best generals in the British army, was fit to go anywhere and
do anything at a moment's notice.

The following were the circumstances under which Sir
Frederick Roberts assumed command of the force ordered to
avenge the disaster at Maiwand. As it had been arranged that
he should return to India by the Kurram route with a portion
of the troops, he rode to Jellalabad to visit scenes so interest-
ing to every soldier. " While there," he writes to us, " I
instinctively felt anxious in case any disturbance, owing to the
near approach of Abdul Rahman, should take place at Cabul;
so I hurried back, riding from Gundamuck to Cabul on the 28th
July. Sir Donald Stewart met me a few miles out, and told
me what had happened at Maiwand. Feeling it was most im-
portant that troops should be sent from Cabul to Candahar,
and believing that the authorities at Simla would hesitate to send
troops who were under orders to return to India, I telegraphed to
the Adjutant-General, urging that a force should be sent with-
out delay, and guaranteeing that none of the soldiers at Cabul
would demur at going, provided I could assure them that they
would not be kept to garrison Candahar after the work in the
field there was over. I begged the Adjutant-General to show
the telegram to the Foreign Secretary, by whom it was given to
Lord Ripon, who then decided to send me with a force. Before
despatching the telegram I showed it to Sir Donald Stewart."

The reply of the Viceroy sanctioning the despatch of an
expedition from Cabul to Candahar, in conformity with the
suggestion of Sir Frederick Roberts, was received on the 3rd
August, and the equipment and constitution of the force were
left to the two Generals, who were required to state the earliest
date on which the relieving column could march, and when it
was expected to arrive at Candahar. After consultation they
returned an answer that Sir Frederick Roberts would leave
Cabul on the 8th August, and that he expected to reach the
capital of Southern Afghanistan on the 2nd September.

z 2

34-O Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

With the public spirit and friendly feeling that always cha-
racterized Sir Donald Stewart in his dealings with his hrother-
in-arms, that officer gave carte blanche to Sir Frederick Roberts
as to men and equipment. Colonel Chapman, R.A.,* Chief of
the Staff to Sir Donald Stewart, who now took up the same
appointment in the force about to march on Candahar, only
does justice to his former chief when, in a lecture on this
famous march, delivered at the Royal United Service Institution
on the 9th March, 1881, he observed : " No record of the work
thus undertaken would be complete which did not set forward
very prominently the self-abnegation and high military capacity
evinced by Lieutenant- General Sir Donald Stewart, who was
in supreme command at Cabul, and who, without reference to
the difficult task of withdrawal by the Khyber, which was to be
his share of the programme, placed unreservedly at Sir Frede-
rick Roberts' s disposal the entire resources of the North Afghan-
istan Field Force in transport and equipment ; nor wmtld it be
possible to pass by without respectful recognition the singleness
of purpose and true genius with which the two Commanders
devoted themselves to perfect the machinery which it was
intended to employ in the execution of a difficult enterprise.
The spirit they evinced became the leading principle that guided
all ranks in the task of preparation."

During the succeeding few days Sir Frederick Roberts busied
himself in selecting the troops he intended to take with him in
his march, which, for the adventurous spirits in camp, had all
the charm, and much more than the hazard, of a knight-
errant's expedition in mediaeval times, so great was the element
of uncertainty attaching to its progress from the moment the
troops, without base and cut off from all .communication with
the outer world, plunged into the heart of Afghanistan with, at
the other extremity, a triumphant enemy and a defeated and
beleagurecl body of fellow-countrymen awaiting their arrival.

The present Afghan war has been not less full of romantic
incidents and sudden melodramatic changes than the war we
had waged forty years before in the same country, and this last

* This officer, like Sir Frederick Roberts and Colonel Perkins, Chief
Engineer in the Kurram and Cabul campaigns, had received his professional
training at Addiscombe, whence he entered the old Bengal Artillery.

Dramatic Character of the Afghan War. 341

scene formed a fitting climax to the play in which human lives
and a kingdom had been the stakes. Not only India and Eng-
land, hut the whole civilized world watched with breathless
interest the denouement of the drama about to be played out,
which may be said to have divided itself, with strict regard to
the unities, into five acts. The first unfolded the gathering of
the three armies, the insult offered to the British Envoy at AH
Musjid, the swift and victorious advance into Afghan territory,
and the signing of the Treaty of Gundamuck, the curtain de-
scending amid a shower of honours on the victors, and the
banquet given by Lord Lytton at Simla to " the hero of the
Peiwar Kotul." The second act dealt with the brief record of
the Cavagnari Mission, received with such honour at Cabul,
and expiring in a scene of fire and blood, in which British
valour and devotion to duty shone out proudly and shed an un-
dying lustre on its victims.

But a change now came over the spirit of the play. With
the rising of the curtain the third act deals with the revenge
justly inflicted by a British army on the cowardly crew who
dishonoured the flag of England, and dragged through the
mire of the Afghan capital the headless body of her represen-
tative. The brilliant advance of Sir Frederick Roberts from
Ali Kheyl, the victory of Charasia and occupation of the Bala
Hissar, with his visit to the still smoking and reeking ruins of
the Residency, brought to a conclusion one of the most exciting
episodes of this drama amid the plaudits of the auditory. But
again the storm of war, long foreseen, and its contingencies
thoughtfully provided for by the British General, burst on the
scene. After a chequered struggle against vast odds, the
British army was driven within its entrenched camp, whence,
after the enemy had in vain attempted to overwhelm it by force
of numbers, it issued to inflict severe chastisement on its
enemies. Again sunshine succeeds storm, and with the
junction of the armies of Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick
Roberts, and the conclusion of terms with the new Ameer for
peacefully evacuating the country, it seemed as though the
sword might be returned to its sheath, and an era of peace and
goodwill inaugurated between Briton and Afghan. But this
was not yet to be, and the ambition of one man and the iucom-

342 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

petence of another, resulted in a disaster transcending Isandhl-
\vana, and only surpassed by that experienced by General
Elphinstone in the passes between Cabul and Gundamuck.
But like those reverses, only more speedily, if not more de-
cisively, Maiwand was wiped out by the victory of the 1st Sep-
tember, on which followed the withdrawal of our troops from
the scene of so much glory and disaster. For the last time the
curtain descends, and the Afghan War of 1878-80 was " as a
tale that is told."

343

CHAPTER XVIII.

English Public Opinion on the Projected March through Afghanistan — Sir
Frederick Roberts quits Cabul for Beni Hissar — Incidents of the Forced
March to Ghuznee — Arrival at Ghuznee and Surrender of the Town and
C'itadel — The Forced March to Khelat-i-Ghilzye — Relief and Removal
of the Garrison— Sir Frederick Roberts on the Line of March — The
Advance oil Candahar — Preparations for the Attack on Ayoob Khan's
Position.

WHEN it was announced by telegraph in England that Sir
Frederick Roberts proposed to march through Afghanistan with-
out a base of operations or communications of any kind, as
is usual, a host of military critics in Parliament, and the
Club-gentlemen who are more familiar with " the shady side
of Pall Mall " than with the deserts and mountain ranges of
Afghanistan, and the conditions attaching to waging war with
Oriental races, adduced numberless reasons, drawn from pre-
cedent and theoretical treatises, satisfactorily demonstrating
that, by the rules of war, Sir Frederick Roberts was courting
disaster, and insisting that the step he was taking must be
contrary to the better judgment of both himself and General
Stewart, and was doubtless due to a determination on the part
of the Government to carry out the evacuation of the country
as previously arranged, without consideration for the safety of
Roberts' s force. But these military critics were at fault alike
in their judgment of the prudence of the march under ex-
isting conditions, as was proved by the inexorable logic of
events, and in their opinion as to the views held by the two
experienced Generals in Afghanistan, who never had any doubt
that a division of 10,000 properly equipped and commanded
British troops could traverse Afghanistan in safety.

As it had been determined to evacuate the Bala Hissar
and the Sherpur Cantonment by the llth August, when Sir
Donald Stewart intended to commence the retrograde move-
ment on India, Sir Frederick Roberts had expressed his in-

344 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

tention to march three days before that date. The time at his
disposal in which to select his force, and survey and complete
its equipment \vas brief; but it was sufficient for the purpose.
In this instance the selection of the troops, especially the
Native corps, that were to accompany him, was an exceptionally
difficult task. As pointed out by him in his Memorandum of
29th May, two years was, in his opinion, the limit at which the
latter could be kept away from their homes ; but this had now
been exceeded in the case of some of the Goorkha and Pun-
jaubee regiments, and it would have been an ungracious task
to disappoint these gallant soldiers, who were looking forward
to return to their families after an unexampled absence from
them, and call on them to undergo the chances of a forced
march of over 300 miles, and, perhaps, of an arduous cam-
paign. They had suffered heavily in action and through sick-
ness, and naturally longed for a period of rest, so when it was
understood that the usual proportion of Native regiments
would accompany the column, the intelligence was not received
with enthusiasm, and the selection was anxiously awaited. The
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Chapman, says on this point : — " It
was not with eager desire that the honour of marching to
Candahar was sought for, and some commanding officers of
experience judged rightly the tempers of their men when they
represented for the General's consideration the claims of the
regiments they commanded to be relieved as soon as possible
from field service. I lay stress on this fact, and claim for those
officers, who subordinated their own wishes in the interest of
the soldiers they commanded, as also for the Generals who
acted on their representations, an insight into the character
of our Native troops, the result of long experience. It was not
easy to estimate the confidence created by such knowledge as
was thus brought to bear on the question of selection, nor
rightly to describe the sense of duty, and of absolute trust in
their commanders, which marked the behaviour of the troops at
this time. The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick Roberts's
force with exceptional rapidity to Candahar, was an after-growth
evolved by the enterprise itself, and came as a response to the
unfailing spirit which animated the leader himself."
The constitution of the force was published in General Orders

Constitution of the Cabul-Candahar Column. 345

on the 3rd August. It was to consist of 3 Brigades, each of
one British and three Native Battalions, with a Battery of
guns attached. The Cavalry Brigade worked independently,
its commander reporting direct to Head-quarters.* The guns,
7-pounders, were carried on mules, no wheeled artillery being
taken, and one of the batteries consisted of screw-guns, which
had a reputation for accuracy exceeding the 9-pounders, which
they did not belie in action. On this question of artillery,
opinions differed in the camp ; but both the Generals were of
one mind, and the result proved that they were correct in their
judgment. The object was to reach Candahar in the shortest
possible time ; and it was not improbable that should Ayoob
Khan endeavour to march on Ghuznee and Cabul, he would

* The following was the strength of the regiments and batteries taken
from Colonel Chapman's lecture : —

Officers British Native Drivers
Soldiers. and Muleteers.

Staff 79

Royal Artillery —

6-8 Royal Artillery . . . 6 95 139

11-9 „ • . . 6 95 139

Sepoys.

No. 2 Mountain Battery . .5 ... 140

Cavalry Brigade —

9th Lancers .... 19 318

3rd Bengal Cavalry . 7 ... 394

3rd Punjaub Cavalry . 9 ... 408

Central India Horse . . 11 ... 495

First Brigade —

92nd Highlanders . . . 19 651

23rd Pioneers ... 8 ... 701

24th Punjaub Infantry^ . 7 ... 575

2nd Goorkhas ... 7 ... 501

Second Brigade —

72nd Highlanders ... 23 787

2nd Sikhs .... 7 ... 612

3rd Sikhs .... 7 ... 570

5th Goorkhas ... 8 ... 561

Third Brigade —

2-60th Rifles ... 21 616

15th Sikhs .... 10- ... 650

4th Goorkhas . . 8 ... 629

25th Punjaub Infantry . 7 ... 637

Total 274 2,562 7,151

This total of 9,987 was increased to 10,148 by the discharge of sick from
hospital.

346 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

avoid the ordinary road and move by the valleys of the
Urgundab or the Urgustan. The nature of the ground
throughout Afghanistan is such that Artillery can never be
safely employed with Cavalry alone unsupported by Infantry,
as was shown on the llth December in General Massy's
action. Nor is the rapidity of movement of this arm so
much required in countries like Afghanistan, as the power
of being able to operate over the most difficult ground without
causing delay to the rest of the troops. It was not forgotten,
moreover, that on arrival at Candahar the column would be
augmented by a battery of 40-pouuders, a battery of field
artillery, and four guns of Horse Artillery. "It is unques-
tionable," says Sir Frederick Roberts, " that had either horse
or field artillery accompanied the force the march could not
have been performed with the same rapidity."

Before leaving Cabul everything that was possible was done
to lighten baggage. Ten British soldiers were told off to each
mountain battery tent, usually intended to hold six, and fifty to
a sepoy's tent of two pals, 341bs. of kit only being allowed for
each man. The allowance to each Native soldier was 201bs. of
baggage, inclusive of camp equipage. Each officer was allowed
one mule, and an additional mule to every eight officers for mess.
The amount of supplies taken with the force was for Euro-
peans, thirty days' tea, sugar, rum, and salt, and five days'
flour, and five days' rations for Native troops. One day's grain
was carried by Cavalry horses and transport animals in addition
to the ordinary load. The exact strength of the Cabul-Can-
dahar Field Force, as it was officially designated, was 10,148
combatants, 223 Medical Staff, and 8,134 Native followers, in-
cluding 2,192 doolie bearers.*

So admirable were the arrangements elaborated by Sir Fred-
erick Roberts, whose genius for organization received a fresh

* The number of animals that left Cabul on the 8th August was 1,779
Cavalry chargers and 450 Artillery mules ; for the service of the trans-
port, 1,589 yaboos (Afghan ponies), 4,510 mules, 1,244 Indian ponies,
and 912 donkeys ; and for sick transport 286 ponies, 43 donkeys, and
6 camels. The grand total of animals was 10,819, exclusive of 415
purchased on the line of march. A formidable number to feed while
making forced marches over 300 miles of country ! The casualties were
733, due to the hard work.

Constitution of the Cabul-Candahar Column. 347

illustration during this famous march, -and so excellent was the
service rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Low and Major Bad-
cock, the officers in charge of the Commissariat and Transport
Departments,* and their assistants, that no instance was brought
to notice in which either a soldier or camp-follower failed to
receive his daily ration. Sir Frederick, we were told by a
General officer, not only personally organized every detail of his
force, but examined every man and beast, excluding those that
were weakly. Flour and sheep were procurable throughout the
country to be traversed, with the exception of some thirty miles
before reaching Khelat-i-Ghilzye ; and the crops were in season
for the cattle, so that forage was obtainable to any amount.

The Division of Infantry was under the command of Major-
General J. Ross, C.B., the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades being
commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals H. T. Mac-
pherson, T. D. Baker, and C. M. Macgregor. Brigadier-Gen-
eral Hugh H. Gough commanded the Cavalry ; Colonel Alured
C. Johnson the Artillery ; Colonel M. Perkins was com-
manding Royal Engineer ; Colonel Chapman, R.A., Chief of
the Staff, and Deputy- Surgeon General J. Hanbury, Principal
Medical Officer.

The head of the Political Department was Major Hastings,
who had held the office at Cabul before Mr. Lepel Griffin's
arrival, his principal assistant being Major Ewan Smith, who
had been Chief Political Officer under Sir Donald Stewart at
<Jandahar and during the advance on Cabul, and was therefore
familiar with the country. These officers, with their assistants,
were of great service during the march in assisting the Quarter-

* Sir Frederick Roberts writes of these officers and their assistants : —
" Sufficient praise cannot be bestowed upon all these officers (enumerating
the names of twelve officers). They never spared themselves ; and often,
after the longest march, and with the prospect of having to start off again
at a very early hour the following morning, had to work on until a late
hour in the night. In the collection of supplies the Commissariat and
Transport Departments were materially aided by Major E. G. G. Hastings
and his staff of Political Officers. Fortunately for the welfare of the Cavalry
horses and transport animals, a fair amount of green Indian corn was
almost everywhere procurable. Barley was very scarce, but the Indian corn
proved to be so nutritious that the large majority of the horses, ponies, and
mules reached Candahar in excellent health and condition. The reserve of
flour had on several occasions to be indented upon ; but by replenishing
whenever supplies were to be obtained, the force arrived at Candahar with
still about three days' flour in hand."

348 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

master- General's Department to procure intelligence and the
Commissariat to collect supplies. They were selected for their
knowledge of Persian or Pushtoo, the Afghan dialect of that
language, or on account of their special experience in dealing
with frontier tribes, and commanded the services of Native
officers and soldiers of tried ability.

Last, but not least for the value of services rendered, men-
tion should be made of the Army Signalling Department, under
the direction of Captain Straton, who, by the judicious use of
the heliograph, spared the troops much fatigue, the brigades
being in constant communication.

Before Sir Frederick Koberts quitted the scene of his
triumphs Mr. Lepel Griffin and the Political Officers returning
to India with Sir Donald Stewart gave a farewell banquet in his
honour, at which Sir Donald and the principal officers of the
army were present. In responding to the toast of his health,
the guest of the evening, after eulogizing the Cabul force, from
the brigade commanders and staff to the troops under his com-
mand, " with whom," he said, " success is a certainty," made
a graceful allusion to the services of his hosts, who, he
declared, "had borne as important, if not as active, work
as the soldier."*

* The following was the interesting speech delivered by Sir Frederick
Roberts at the banquet on the 5th August : —

" Mr. Griffin, Sir Donald Stewart, and Gentlemen, — I scarcely know how
to thank you all for the kind way in which you have drunk my health and
that of the column under orders for Candahar. To the very flattering
terms in which Mr. Griffin has spoken of me I should have considerable
difficulty in replying, were it not that I can honestly say, that any successes
which I may have attained hitherto, have been due entirely to the experi-
enced commanders I have had with me, the most capable staff that ever
accompanied a general officer in the field, and the gallantry and discipline
of the troops under me. I do not think there ever have been, and I doubt
if there ever will be, more efficient troops sent from India than those which
General Stewart and I have had the honour to command for the last two
years. "With such troops success is a certainty. Without wishing to
underrate the dangers and difficulties of the task before us, I feel quite
confident that the efficient force which Sir Donald Stewart has placed at
my disposal will succeed in reaching Candahar as quickly as possible, and
in effectually disposing of any Afghan army that may be brought against
us. As Mr. Griffin has said, we must all deplore the cause which requires
Cabul troops to be now sent to Candahar. A few days ago we were all
congratulating ourselves upon the prospect of a speedy return to India.
Some, of us had laid in a store of Nipal pepper for use at home ; others, I
have heard, had actually named an early date for leaving Bombay for Eng-

Roberts s Departure from CabuL 349

The several brigades of Sir Frederick Roberts' s force moved
out of Sherpur into camp at Beni Hissar, Charasia, and
Indikee on the 8th August, and in the evening Sir Frederick
Roberts, accompanied by Sir Donald Stewart and other friends
and well-wishers, rode out of Sherpur for the last time and
joined his troops at Beni Hissar. He anticipated that the
march would not be a military promenade, and the night before
leaving the Cantonment issued the following characteristic
General Order to his troops: — "It has been decided by the
Government of India that a force shall proceed with all
possible despatch from Cabul towards Khelat-i-Ghilzai and
Candahar for the relief of the British garrisons in those places,
now threatened by a large Afghan army under the leadership
of Sirdar Mahomed Ayoob Khan. Sir Frederick Roberts feels
sure that the troops placed under his command for this im-
portant duty will cheerfully respond to the call made upon
them, notwithstanding the privations and hardships inseparable

land. Well, Sir Donald Stewart is willing to guarantee — and were it not
an indecorous thing for an officer so high in rank, would even bet — that we
shall reach India again, via Candahar, in November next. Gentlemen, this
is a country of great uncertainties. We have been living in a state of
uncertainty for many months ; but, thanks to the political skill of our kind
host, affairs have during the last few weeks progressed so rapidly and
favourably, that we have reason to hope the country may now have com-
parative rest and quiet, and that some settled form of government will be
established. However, we must not be too sanguine ; and I trust that
our fellow-countrymen, who have not had the same opportunity that we
have had of knowing Afghanistan and the Afghans will not be disappointed
if matters do not go altogether smoothly after the British troops leave
Cabul. No Ameer has ever yet occupied the throne for any time until he
has proved himself capable of governing the country, and it is not likely
that Ameer Abdul Rahman will be an exception. We all know what
difficulties Mr. Griffin has had to contend with, and we all rejoice at the
great success which has attended his efforts — efforts so ably assisted by the
Political Officers now with him. It now remains for Abdul Rahman to show
that he is capable of filling the great position in which he has been placed.
From the commencement of this campaign, the Political Officers have
borne as important, if not as active, work as the soldiers. First and
foremost, the gallant Cavagnari, known to and mourned by us all,
and more than liked by many of us ; with him many brave men fell,
and it was to avenge their base and treacherous murder that this force
came to Cabul. It is a great satisfaction to me to think that at present, at
any rate, no officers will be required to remain at Cabul, and that all the
Political Officers I see around me will return to India with the troops. But
I feel quite sure, if the decision had been otherwise, officers would have
been found to accept the dangerous post, either officers of the Civil Service,
or among those military politicals who have gained for themselves a repu-
tation on the frontier and other parts of India."

350 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

from a long march through a hostile country. The Lieutenant-
General wishes to impress on both officers and men the
necessity of preserving the same strict discipline which has
been so successfully and uniformly maintained since the com-
mencement of the war, and to treat all the people who may
be well disposed towards the British with justice and for-
bearance. Sir Frederick Roberts looks confidently forward to
the successful accomplishment of the object of the expedition,
convinced as he is that all ranks are animated with the proud
feeling that to them is entrusted the duty and privilege of
relieving their fellow- soldiers and restoring the prestige of the
British Army."

On the 9th August the Cabul-Candahar force set their faces
towards Ghuznee, distant 97^ miles, marching by the Logar
Valley, where supplies were more abundant, instead of by
Mydan, which was ten miles shorter. The former route had
also the incidental advantage of keeping the Afghans in doubt
as to the ultimate destination of the force, for the first three
stages from Beni Hissar led directly towards the Shutargardan
Pass and the Kurram Valley, and were those by which Sir
Frederick Roberts had advanced on Cabul in September of the
preceding year. The latest news received from Candahar
previous to the departure of the force was of the 3rd August,
on which day Ayoob Khan was reported to be still twenty
miles to the west of Candahar. The troops under Lieutenant-
General Primrose's command were, however, shut up within
the walls of the citadel and city by a rising of the people of the
district. "It was known," says Colonel Chapman, " that the
walls could scarcely be surmounted by assault, and that they
could not be breached by field artillery, and it was therefore
assumed that the large garrison which held Candahar could
with ten light field guns and a heavy battery resist any attack
which the Afghan army might make, and would be secure for
so long a time as provisions held out."

The camp at Beni Hissar was struck at 2.45 A.M., as was
the practice throughout the greater part of this memorable
march, and the 1st and 2nd Brigades halted for the night at
Zahidabad, distant sixteen miles, the route from Indikee taken
by General Baker's Brigade being slightly longer. The troops,

The I\f arc/i to Ghuznce. 351

after the long halt at Sherpur, were not yet in good marching
order, and the difficult nature of the ground, with the heat,
probably made this march more distressing than the longer
ones they made later on.

While at Zahidabad Sir Frederick Roberts issued an order
on the necessity for treating with care and properly feeding the
transport animals, on the efficiency of which the success of the
expedition largely depended. This matter claimed his attention
in the Kurram campaign, as during the first phase of the war
the carelessness of transport officers, who had had no experience
of the treatment of animals, had caused so great a mortality
among them that when hostilities again broke out, sufficient
transport could with difficulty be scraped together to ensure
the mobility of 6,000 men. On the 10th August the Cabul
Field Force marched to Zurgunshahr, a distance of thirteen
miles. Here supplies were had in abundance, as many old
enemies of the Logar Valley were working in the British
interest, and the agents of the new Ameer accompanied the
army. At Zurgunshahr, Sir Frederick Roberts issued in-
structions on the order of march, the brigades and regiments
being directed to lead by rotation. In such movements, says
Colonel Chapman, although halts were ordered at regular
intervals, it was found impossible to assimilate the pace, and
preserve a regular rate of marching. When the Highlanders
led the column the Groorkhas were worn out by their efforts to
keep up, and when the Goorkhas were in front the pace became
generally so slow as to fatigue the Europeans and the Sikhs;
yet it was very important for brigade commanders to strive at a
uniform rate of marching, and to adhere to the halts of ten
minutes ordered at the end of each hour of march, as well as
the breakfast halt of twenty minutes, fixed for eight o'clock.

The march of the llth August was to Padkao Rogani, sixteen
and a half miles. The orders directed that the " rouse " was
to be at 2.45, the brigades to march at four. The Cavalry and
2nd Infantry Brigades crossed the river Logar at Hissarak, and
marched to Baraki-Barak, where they encamped on the sloping
ground overlooking, and to the west of, the village. The 1st
and 3rd Infantry Brigades marched in columns of brigades, the
3rd Brigade crossing the small Kotul to the west of the camp

35 2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

and marching through Dadu Kheyl towards Hissarak. These
brigades then marched in parallel lines to the rising ground
situated to the left of Padkao Kogani, distance fifteen miles.

From their respective camping grounds the four brigades of
the army marched the following day a distance of ten and a
half miles to Ashrak, or Ameer Killa, at the entrance of the
pass known as the Tang-i-Wardak, by which the united waters
of the Logar and Shineez rivers find their way from the Wardak
to the Logar valley. The passage of the defile was effected
with some difficulty, and the passage of the Zamburak Pass,
7,000 feet high, was laborious for the troops ; though owing
to the absence of wheeled artillery and to the equipment of
the entire force with mule and pony transport, no halt was
made until the encamping ground was reached. It had been
anticipated, says a Staff officer, that the passage of the Zam-
burak would be disputed ; but neither here nor at the Sher-i-
Dahan Pass was any opposition offered ; the road over the
latter is open and easy, and had been made practicable for
heavy field-guns by Sir Donald Stewart on his advance from
Candahar.

The march of the 13th August was from Ashrak to Takia,
in the valley of the Shineez, a distance of twelve miles, and on
the following day thence to Shahgao, seventeen miles. The
supplies during the last three days did not come in with the
plentifulness experienced in the Logar Valley, as the people
were not so friendly, but they were astute enough to raise no
opposition, and hoped that this would be the last they would
see of their unwelcome visitors.

On the 14th the Division was concentrated within three miles
of the Sher-i-Dahan (Lion's Mouth) pass, having an elevation
of 9,000 feet above sea level. The road over the pass was easy,
having been made practicable for Artillery by Sir Donald Stewart.
The chief inconvenience experienced by the troops, besides the
heat and sand storms, -and the suffocating dust raised by the
column on the march, was the want of water. The daily camp-
ing ground was selected with due regard to the presence of
this necessary, but, says an officer, long stretches of desert had
often to be traversed without meeting with a drop of water,
causing great inconvenience to man and beast marching under

Arrival at Ghuznee. 353

a burning sun. The variations of climate were also very try-
ing, there heing at times as much as 80° difference between
the temperature by day and by night. This caused great
hardship to the men, who had to march in the same clothes
when the heat was tropical or the thermometer marked freez-
ing point.

A march of twelve and a-half miles, on the 15th August,
brought the Division over the Sher-i-Dahan pass to Ghuznee,
thus completing the first stage of this memorable march, the
distance traversed in seven days being ninety-seven and a half
miles, over difficult country, without the loss of a mule-load of
baggage.

Every precaution was taken in the advance through the Sher-
i-Dahan pass to guard against an attack by marauders on the
baggage, but there was no opposition of any kind. The tribal
gatherings, whose patriotism had been fanned to fever heat by
the old Moollah, Mooskh-i-Alum, during the early period of the
campaign, and which had resisted Sir Donald Stewart's march,
had long since dispersed ; while the faction which acknowledged
Mahomed Jan as chief had accepted temporarily the Ameer-
ship of Abdul Rahman, and such of the chiefs as professed
themselves adherents of the Yakoob Khan party had left to
join Ayoob Khan at Candahar.

Close to the spot where Sir Frederick Roberts halted, at the
village of Roza, lies buried the great conqueror Mahmoud, the
founder of Ghuznee, and of the dynasty called after that city.
It was the gates of this handsome mausoleum taken by Mah-
moud from the temple of Somnauth, in Guzerat, during one of
his invasions of India, that were removed by General Nott in
1842, under instructions from Lord Ellenborough, who issued
one of his magniloquent orders on the occasion.

Sir Frederick Roberts sent for the acting Governor of Ghuz-
nee, and having received from him the keys of the gates, pro-
ceeded in his company to inspect the town and citadel, the
scene of one of the most brilliant feats of arms in the
first Afghan war, with which the names of Thomson, Durand,
Sale, and Dennie are inseparably connected, and which con-
ferred a cheaply-earned peerage, with a pension of £2,000, on
Sir John Keaiie. The General placed guards and sentries in

A A

354 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

and around Ghuznee to preserve order ; while parties of officers
and men took advantage of the permission accorded them to
visit the citadel, bazaars, and other places of interest.

The question of supplies was the only one causing anxiety
to Sir Frederick Koberts, and foraging parties were sent
out, the people being loth even to sell what was required,
though afraid to do more than show a sullen demeanour, for
the chastisement inflicted at Ahmed Khel was too recent to
require a repetition. Before the break of the following day the
force was many miles on its way towards Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and
the ground traversed on this march was twenty miles, being
the longest but one made by the Cabul-Candahar Force. The
" rouse " was sounded at 2.45 A.M., and the troops inarched at
4.15, the Cavalry covering the movement at a distance of five
miles in advance of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, which were
followed by the baggage, ordnance, and commissariat reserve,
the 1st Brigade, with one troop of cavalry, bringing up the rear
of the column. The Chief of the Staff says of the order of
march issued by Sir Frederick Koberts before leaving Ghuz-
nee : — " The method of such marching as was now put in
practice is not easy to describe ; it combined the extreme of
freedom in movement with carefully regulated halts, and the
closest control in eveiy portion of the column ; it employed the
individual intelligence of each man composing the masses in
motion, and called on all for exertion in overcoming the diffi-
culties of the march, in bearing its extraordinary toil, and in
aiding the accomplishment of the object in view. Once move-
ment had commenced the animals of the baggage column,
moving at different paces, were checked as little as possible ;
the large number of officers detailed for baggage duty reduced
confusion to a minimum, and secured a pace in marching that
could not have been anticipated, the baggage animals reaching
camp for the most part very soon after the arrival of the
troops." But it was weary work for the rear-guard, who were
engaged in assisting the camp-followers, pressing forward the
feeble among the cattle, and shifting loads and rendering such
assistance as was required. Assuming that the march com-
menced daily at 4 A.M., the rear-guard seldom left camp before
7 A.M., and only reached the next encampment shortly before

The Field of Ahmed Khel. 355

sundown. The actual length of the column of march, by the
shortest computation, says the same authority, amounted to
from six to seven miles. But, nevertheless, there was an
absence of confusion, and every person and animal fell into his
or its place with order and regularity. Though the collection
and distribution of food, fuel, and forage, together with the
establishment of markets within each brigade; where the
villagers might find a sale for articles of supply, necessitated
an elaborate system, seldom during the entire march to Can-
dahar had the British troops to substitute flour-cakes (" chupat-
ties ") for the regular bread ration, and no instance was brought
to notice in which either a soldier or a follower failed to receive
his rations. The first day's march from Ghuznee brought the
column to Yerghalta, the route passing the battle-field of
Ahmed Khel, where a " zizarat " to the memory of 1,100
martyrs to the faith indicated the terrible losses suffered by the
gallant Ghazis when 3,000 of them, sword in hand, charged
down on the British line and braved the storm of bullets and
canister that swept over the open plain, destitute of any cover.
Those who witnessed this grand display of heroism were not
likely again to jeer at these fanatics, who were spoken of
with respect also by the old Cabul Force after the events of
December.

This day caused the severest strain of any throughout the
march on the officers and men of the Division. Daily the
number of those footsore or unable to proceed through weari-
ness or debility increased, until the General, who each day had
careful reports presented to him of the health and condition of
the combatants and camp-followers, had serious thoughts of
reducing the length of the day's march. But the limit of the
strain seemed to have been reached on this first march out of
Ghuznee, and afterwards daily many footsore men rejoined the
ranks, and the army gained in marching powers until it at-
tained a high degree of excellence, though the doolie-bearers
continued to suffer greatly. To appreciate the endurance of
the troops, or to understand the very high order of discipline
they attained, it was necessary to have seen them at work.
While history records many instances of a regiment or small
column making marches similar to those accomplished by the

A A 2

356 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Cabul-Candahar Force, the merit in this case lay in the numer-
ical strength of the column, 10,148 troops, 8,143 native follow-
ers, and 11,224 animals, including cavalry horses — the daily
supply for which was drawn from the country after arrival in
camp. The food daily distributed to every individual was
cooked with fuel brought in from a distance ; bread was issued
almost daily, and ample forage provided. When we consider
these facts, it will be readily conceded, as Colonel Chapman
urges, that the march from Ghuznee to Khelat-i-Ghilzye,
executed in eight days, ranks high in the annals of similar
achievements.

On the 17th August the march was to Chardeh, a group of
villages, some deserted, the distance covered being thirteen
miles. On the following day the column marched to Kareez-i-
Oba,* sixteen miles, and on the 19th to Mukur, fourteen
miles, a great portion of the route on both days being over a
sandy stretch of desert without a drop of water to relieve the
parching thirst of man or beast. The country being here very
open, the army marched with the three brigades of Infantry
abreast, a formation which enabled the baggage to be brought
into camp at an earlier hour.

On the 20th the Field Force marched to Killa-i-Tuman, a dis-
tance of twenty-one miles, being the longest day's march made.
Owing to the excessive heat and want of shade the sufferings
of the troops were great, but there was no choice in the halting-
ground, as water could not be procured in sufficient quantity for
so large a column short of it.

Soon after arriving here Sir Frederick Roberts received a
letter from Colonel (now Sir Oriel) Tanner, 29th Bengal Native
Infantry, commanding at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, in which he said : —
" All was well with the garrison, and the neighbouring country
was still quiet. A letter had been received from Major-General
Phayre, C.B., dated Quetta, 12th August, in which he states
that he is marching with a large force of Cavalry, Artillery, and
Infantry, British and Native, and expects to reach Candahar

* A kareez is an underground gallery, which is a common method of
conducting water from a subterranean spring in Persia and Afghanistan.
These aqueducts often convey water some miles, wells being opened at
every twenty-five or thirty yards of the course, by which means extensive
tracts of country are brought under cultivation.

The March on Khelat-i-Ghilzye. 357

not later than the 2nd of September." In publishing this
gratifying intelligence for the information of the column, Sir
Frederick Roberts expressed his thanks " for the admirable
manner in which they had executed the march from Cabul
hitherto ; " and he added: — " If the present rate of marching be
continued Khelat-i-Ghilzye should he reached not later than
the 23rd, and Candahar not later than the 29th. By the latest
accounts the Afghan army under Ayoob Khan is still at Canda-
har. The Lieutenant-General hopes it may remain there, and
that the honour of relieving the British garrison may fall to the
lot of the magnificent troops now with him." It may here be
mentioned that though the General frequently despatched
messengers while on the road between Beni Hissar and Khelat-
i-Ghilzye, reporting progress, none of these men reached their
destination, and it was not until after his arrival at this place that
success attended his efforts to communicate with the outer world.

On the 21st August the force marched to Gajai, eighteen
miles, and during the day, Captain Straton heliographed to
Khelat-i-Ghilzye, thirty-three miles distant, and received a
response from Colonel Tanner, announcing the disastrous sortie
at Candahar of the 16th August, resulting in the death of
General Brooke and many other gallant officers and men, and
conveying the reassuring news as to the condition of the garri-
son and their power to hold out. During the day the agents of
the local Governor, under instructions from Colonel Tanner,
met the force and assisted in obtaining supplies, and when the
division arrived at Baba Kazai, on the 22nd, seventeen and a
half miles from Gajai, they found there food, forage, and other
supplies sent from the fort, under an escort furnished by the
2nd Belooch Regiment.

The march of the 23rd August of sixteen and a half miles,
brought the column to Khelat-i-Ghilzye, the total distance of
136 miles from Ghuznee having been traversed in eight days,
or a daily average of sixteen and three-quarters miles.*

During the march the loss had been surprisingly small.
Although a hostile population hovered on all sides ready to
attack stragglers, but three Native soldiers were cut off from the

* The average daily march from Beni Hissar to Khelat-i-Ghilzye, a
distance of 232 miles, accomplished in fifteen days, had heen 15^ miles.

35 8 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

column between Cabul and Khelat-i-Ghilzye, tbere were two
suicides among tbe troops, and tbe number of followers missing
at tbe end of tbe marcb was less tban forty, and many of tbese,
being Afgbans or Hazaras, bad deserted. The troops bad
been thoroughly seasoned by the hardships they had under-
gone, and were, probably, unsurpassed as a marching body by
any recorded in modern history. After a march of eight hours
in the burning sun the men had to take their turn of duty at
fetching fuel and forage, providing guards and doing sentry
at night. But all was done without a murmur.

On his arrival at Khelat-i-Ghilzye Sir Frederick Roberts
received a letter from General Primrose, giving particulars
of the sortie of the 16th August, and sent messengers to
Chaman, at the foot of the hills between Candahar and
Pisheen, with letters to General Phayre, giving details of his
march, and the probable time of arrival at Ptobat — at which
point it was hoped that communication with the column
marching from Quetta might be established with a view to a
combined movement on Candahar.

The division halted at Khelat-i-Ghilzye on the 24th August,
and on the following day, continued the march, accompanied
by the garrison of -that fortress. Sir Frederick Roberts before
leaving Cabul had received no instructions regarding the dis-
posal of this outpost, but he considered it unadvisable to leave
a garrison behind in this isolated position, with which for
some time to come it would be difficult to keep open communi-
cations or furnish supplies. Further, the numerical weakness
of the garrison did not permit of offensive action, while its
safety might be a source of embarrassment in the forthcoming
operations against the enemy. The fortress was accordingly
evacuated and entrusted to Mahomed Sadik Khan, a Jokee
Ghilzye chief, who had had possession of it when Sir Donald
Stewart arrived there in January 1879. On the 25th August the
column — now strengthened by the addition of the garrison of
Khelat-i-Ghilzye, who were equipped with their own transport,
and had supplies for ten days, besides reserves of meat, soup
and vegetables — set its face towards Candahar, eighty-six miles
distant, by the route which follows the valley of the Turnuk.
From ignorance of the intentions of Ayoob Khan and of

Illness of Sir Frederick Roberts. 359

the events which had happened at Candahar since the dis-
astrous sortie of the 16th August, Sir Frederick Roberts was
placed in a position of some perplexity. Besides the road to
Candahar by the Turnuk valley, there are the parallel roads
to the north and south of it, by the Urgundab and Urgustan
Valleys ; but these were impracticable for wheeled artillery,
though it was possible that Ayoob — who had the assistance of
a skilful soldier in Hafizoolah Khan, a trusted officer of Shere
Ali's — in his anxiety to avoid an encounter with his renowned
adversary, and gain possession of Ghuznee, might take one of
these alternative routes. But unless Ayoob determined to
abandon his Artillery — an unlikely contingency — it was certain
he would adopt the route by the Turnuk Valley ; and as apart
from the relief of Candahar it was imperative that a crushing
defeat should be inflicted on the vanquisher of a British
force, so that the superiority of our arms might be acknowledged,
Sir Frederick Roberts resolved to make a rapid march with
his whole force by the Turnuk Valley to a point where helio-
graphic communication might be established with Candahar
and the movements of Ayoob ascertained.

At this time Sir Frederick Roberts was suffering from an
attack of fever. At no period of his life possessing robust
health, this depressing malady, induced by the fatigues of the
daily march and the tropical rays of the sun, acting upon a
frame debilitated by two years of arduous service, and further
affected by the trying daily changes of temperature, it is not
surprising that the attack assumed a somewhat severe form,
and for some time his medical advisers entertained no slight
anxiety on his account — an anxiety equally shared by every
officer and man of the force, who felt that none even of the
distinguished generals present with them could fill the place
of their commander in the critical operations now imminent.

The march of the 25th August was to Jaldak, 15f miles,
and, on the 26th, to Tirandaz, 16 miles. ^Here the General
received a letter from Lieutenant-General Primrose, dated the
previous day, which conveyed the intelligence that the rumour
of the arrival of the Cabul-Candahar Force at Khelat-i-Ghilzye
had caused Ayoob Khan to change his position. On the
night of the 23rd that Sirdar had abandoned the villages to

360 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

the east and west of Candahar, and, on the following day,
he had struck his camp and moved to a position in the
Urgundab Valley between Baba Wali and Mazra, due north
of the city, thus practically abandoning the investment.

Sir Frederick Roberts resolved to send forward two regiments
of Cavalry, under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, to Robat,
a distance of 34 miles, for the purpose of opening heliographic
communication with General Primrose, and, if possible, with
General Phayre, the remainder of his force being directed to
move to a point about half-way to Robat.

At one o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th, on the arrival
of the Cavalry at Eobat, heliographic communication was
established with Candahar, and flashed to Sir Frederick Roberts
at the Infantry camp at Tirandaz, 39 miles from that city.
During the afternoon General Gough, who was accompanied
by Colonel Chapman, was met by Colonel St. John, Chief
Political Officer at Caudahar, and Major Adam, Assistant
Quartermaster- General, escorted by two squadrons of Cavalry,
and from the information supplied by these officers General
Eoberts was led to believe that Ayoob Khan was strengthening
his position and intended to make a stand.

On the 27th August the infantry encamped at a point 39
miles from Candahar, whence the Urgundab Valley could be
reached in two marches of seventeen miles each, by a road
passing through the Bori Valley and emerging in the dis-
trict of Dallah, above Candahar, upon the Urgundab river.
Seven thousand men of all arms were held in readiness
to proceed on the 28th August by this line, it being intended
that if the movement was undertaken the two regiments of
Cavalry thrown forward to Robat should cover the advance
and strike the Urgundab some miles nearer to Candahar
than the point where the Infantry would debouch. The
baggage, field-hospitals, and non-effectives would, at the same
time, have been advanced slowly towards Candahar, under an
escort of 2,500 Infantry, two field-guns, and a regiment of
Cavalry, with the view of occupying an entrenched position
at or near Robat during the ensuing operations.*

* See lecture by Colonel Chapman.

Trying Nature -of the March. 361

On the morning of the 28th August the entire force was
concentrated at Robat, where the General determined to halt
for one day and divide the remaining distance to Candahar,
19 miles, into two short marches. Throughout the trying
march now concluded, arid the goal of which was almost
within sight, the utmost good feeling and alacrity had been
exhibited by the troops European and Native. Cheered by
the example of their indefatigable leader, who, though
suffering from an exhausting malady, never spared himself,
but considered first their well-being and comfort, they re-
sponded heartily to the exacting calls on their powers of
endurance. What these were may be gathered from the fact
that this march was made under an August sun, from which
the troops often had no shelter until 3 or 4 P.M., and the
rear-guard at times were not in camp until evening, 'though
the " rouse " during the latter part of the march was sounded
at 1 A.M., and the march began at 2.30, when the cutting wind
and low temperature scarcely gave promise of the burning sun
that would a few hours later tax the energies and endurance of
the hardiest.

362 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

CHAPTER XIX.

Arrival of the Cabul-Candahar Force at Robat — Letter from General
Phayre — Sir Frederick Roberts's State of Health— Arrival before Can-
dahar — Reconnoissance of the 31st August — Preparations for the
Attack — Dispositions of the Army— The Advance on the Pir Puimal
Position — Storming the Village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad — Death of
Colonel Brownlow — Capture of Pir Paimal — Brilliant Advance of
Macpherson's and Baker's Brigades — Gallant Conduct of Major White
— Incidents of the Fight — Capture of the Enemy's Camp at Mazra —
Losses of the British — Results of the Victory— Sir Frederick Roberts
Resigns his Command in Afghanistan.

IT was satisfactory to Sir Frederick Roberts, no less than to the
officers and men under his command, to know that though Ayoob
Khan had abandoned the investment of the city, he had
apparently no intention of retreating ; for it would have been a
source of bitter disappointment to these gallant men who had
come so far and undergone so much had they been denied the
compensation of a brilliant victory, to which they had looked
forward. Little, however, could be gathered of the position and
dispositions of the Afghan General, but as he evinced no inten-
tion to deprive his British antagonist of the opportunity of
winning fresh laurels at his expense, Sir Frederick Roberts
resolved to halt at Robat for a day in order to rest the men and
animals, who were much fagged by their long and continuous
forced marching.

During the halt on the 29th, the General received a letter
from General Phayre, dated Killa Abdullah, the 24th August,
stating that he hoped his division would be assembled there by
the 28th, and that he would be able to march for Candahar on
the 30th. The difficulties of moving troops in the usual state
of unpreparedness, though forming a reserve division, through
Sciude and the country between Sibi and Pisheen in the
month of July, were not easily surmounted, though Sir Fred-
erick Roberts in his advance from Ali Kheyl on Cabul showed

Arrival before Candahar. 363

what could be done by the exercise of boundless energy and an
iron will. Feeling that General Phayre's answer precluded all
hope of co-operation for many days, on the 30th August Sir
Frederick Roberts moved to Momand, and on the following
morning advanced' a distance of twelve miles, two brigades of
Infantry leading the advance, while the Cavalry covered the
baggage on either flank, and the remaining infantry brigade
formed a rear-guard to a point near the Shikarpore, or south,
gate of the city. Thus was accomplished the march from
Khelat-i-Ghilzye to Candahar, a distance of eighty-eight miles,
in seven days, including the halt at Robat.

After the troops had breakfasted, at 10 A.M. on the 31st
August, the 1st and 3rd Brigades of Infantry, under Brigadier-
Generals Macpherson and Macgregor, moved off from under
the city walls, and occupied a position stretching from the
range of hills immediately above the old city of Candahar,
through Kareez hill to Picket hill, an eminence commanding
the former cantonment, whence the enemy could be observed
in occupation of the Baba Wali Pass. The day was intensely
hot, and the trees and gardens afforded little shelter from tho
rays of a tropical sun, while Ayoob Khan had cut off the water
which is brought from the Urgundab. Sir Frederick Roberts,
who had not recovered from his attack of fever, was carried in
a doolie, but mounted his horse on approaching the city.*

* The Times correspondent, an Indian soldier of high reputation and
great military experience, writing from Robat, says of Sir Frederick
. Roberts : — "Let me once more place upon record my belief that in General
Roberts the British army has a general of whom it may well be proud, and
on whom it may confidently rely, come what may. While full of enterprise
and adventure, he is prudent and calculating, and when once his mind is
made up his resolution is carried almost to the verge of obstinacy. More
than this, he possesses the affection and full confidence of all officers and
soldiers serving under him. How he has made himself master of the former
will be readily understood by those who know his constant thought for the
soldiers' comfort and welfare, and have marked the patience and self-denial
with which at the end of the longest and hottest march, and with a thou-
sand matters pressing on his attention, he will ride back for miles to meet
and cheer, by the announcement that camp is near, the weary and struggling
soldiers. The troops retained their full confidence in General Roberts
during the somewhat depressing events of last December, and they have
now the conviction that he is about to lead them to victory, and to compen-
sate them for all the sacrifices he is at present calling upon them to make.
In this conviction I fully share, and only trust that Ayoob will, as he is
now reported to mean to do, meet this splendid force in fair fight."

364 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

A brief survey of the ground resolved him to take up a posi-
tion west of Candahar, with his right on the cantonments and
his left touching Old Candahar, as such a position covered the
city, and not only placed him within striking distance of Ayooh
Khan's camp, hut afforded an ample supply of good water to
his troops. The movement was effected without opposition,
the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier- General Baker, and the
Cavalry, under Brigadier- General Hugh Gough, remaining for
the present on baggage and rear-guards. Sir Frederick Roberts
says he came to the conclusion, from a cursory examination of
the ground made on his arrival in the morning, that any attempt
to carry the Baba Wali Kotul by a direct attack would be
attended with very serious loss. He therefore determined to
turn it ; but in order to decide how this operation could best be
effected, it was necessary to ascertain the strength and precise
extent of the positions occupied by Ayoob Khan, who had
posted his troops to the north-west of the city, between it and
the river Urgundab. Sir Frederick, accordingly, ordered a
small column, consisting of two guns No. 11 Battery, 9th
Brigade, R.A., 3rd Bengal Cavalry, and 15th Sikhs, to proceed
to reconnoitre, under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh
Gough, accompanied by Colonel Chapman, Chief of the Staff,
who possessed complete knowledge of the locality, acquired
when acting in the same capacity under Sir Donald Stewart.

The reconnoitring column started at 1 P.M. from the
British left, near Old Candahar, and General Gough, halting
the guns and infantry on some high ground above the village
of Gundigan, moved forward with the cavalry for about a mile
and a half, avoiding the numerous orchards and enclosures,
and came out within a mile of Pir Paimal, where the enemy
were found strongly entrenched. Having drawn the fire of
their guns along this line, the 3rd Bengal Cavalry fel] back,
admirably handled by Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, and
two companies of infantry, thrown forward to cover this
withdrawal, became engaged with the enemy's skirmishers,
while the mountain guns were brought into action at a range
of about 1,800 yards from the enemy's artillery in front of
Pir Paimal. The Afghans advanced rapidly into the orchards
in front of Gundigan, and as soon as the cavalry had passed

The Reconnaissance of the $\st A^lg^lst, 365

in rear of the line, the guns were withdrawn towards the line
of pickets under escort of the two companies, while the remain-
ing six companies of the 15th Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Hennessy, held the Gundigan Hill. The enemy in large
numbers occupied the ground just vacated, and took possession
of the village itself, and endeavoured so persistently to follow
up the reconnoitring column that the 3rd Brigade and part of
the 1st were placed under arms, and about sunset firing was
taken up along the whole line. Fortunately, says Colonel
Chapman, the shooting of the Afghans was very bad, only ten
casualties being reported.

It was evident that a hot day's work was in store for the
Cabul-Candahar Field Force, as the enemy, unused to European
methods of warfare, regarded the retirement as an indication of
timidity or defeat. As a matter of fact, the object of the
reconnoissance was attained in unmasking the Afghan position,
which was so close to that occupied by the British force that
Sir Frederick Koberts resolved upon action on the morrow.
Having matured his plan of attack* on the Afghan position
during the afternoon, at 8 P.M. he ordered his Divisional and
Brigade Commanders, with their staffs, and the officers next in
rank in the Brigades, to assemble at his head-quarters in camp
at 6 A.M. on the following morning ; and by means of a field
telegraph line laid down between this point and the city, he
requested the presence of Lieutenant-General Primrose, com-
manding the Candahar garrison, who had been directed by the
Indian Government to act in subordination to him. At the
same time orders were issued for the troops to breakfast at
7 A.M., and for one day's cooked rations to be carried by all

* The orders for the attack next morning were as follows : — The troops
to be formed up as under at 8 A.M. — " First Brigade behind Picket Hill ;
second Brigade behind Khareez Hill ; third Brigade in front of its own
camp ; Cavalry Brigade, together with E Battery, R.H.A., two companies
of British and four of Native Infantry, to assemble in rear of Gundigan
at 9 A.M. C Battery, 2nd Brigade, R.A., No. 5 Battery, 4th Brigade, R.A.
(heavy battery), four companies British, and two regiments Native Infantry,
all to be detailed from the Candahar garrison, together with the Bombay
Cavalry Brigade, to assemble at the old cavalry lines north-east of the can-
tonments by 8 A.M., to threaten the Baba Wali Pass and watch the Murcha
Pass. The heavy battery to open fire on the former pass at 9 A.M. The
second reserve of infantry ammunition to take post near the house occupied
as head-quarters."

366 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

ranks. Tents were to be struck and, with the kits, to be
stored in a walled enclosure, and the troops were to be under
arms by 8 A.M. on the morning of the 1st September.

The Lieutenant-General personally explained to the officers
commanding divisions and brigades his plan of attack, which
was, briefly, to threaten the enemy's left on the Baba Wali
Kotul and attack in force by the village of Pir Paimal. The
following was the distribution of the troops. The Infantry
Division Cabul Field Force, on whom devolved the duty of
carrying the enemy's position, was formed up in rear of Picket
and Kareez Hills, and in prolongation to the left as far as
Chilzina, immediately below the range which covers Old Can-
dahar. The 1st and 2nd Brigades — the former with C Battery,
2nd Brigade, E.A., of the Candahar Force attached, in addition
to No. 6 Battery, 8th Brigade, armed with the new pattern jointed
guns — forming the column of attack, were massed, the former
behind Picket Hill and the latter behind Kareez Hill. The
3rd Brigade, forming the reserve, was assembled in front of
its camp and extended to the left of the main column. The
Cavalry Brigade, with E Battery, B Brigade, K.H.A. (four
guns), two companies 7th Fusiliers, and four companies of the
28th Bombay Native Infantry, carrying two days' cooked rations
from the Candahar force, was formed at 9 A.M. in rear of
Gundigan, under Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, who was
directed, in the event of his finding his front clear, to push for-
ward the infantry and guns to occupy the position above Gun-
digan, the Cavalry being advanced to the bed of the Urgundab,
in order to cut off the enemy's line of retreat to Girishk,
and threaten that which led to Kakreez.

The Candahar garrison, under the orders of Lieutenant-
General Primrose, C.S.I., were directed to provide sufficient
guards for the city gates, and Brigadier-General Daubeny's
Brigade was to hold the ground from which the Cabul force
would advance to the attack, while the remainder of Brigadier-
General Burrows' s Brigade, with four 40-pounders attached,
took up a position to the north of the old Cantonment, under
shelter of some high ground actually in the enemy's possession,
from which point the guns were to shell the Baba Wali Pass,
and cover the main design in the attack. The Bombay Cavalry,

Dispositions for Attack. 367

under Brigadier-General Nuttall, were ordered to move to the
right and cover the approach to the city from the Murcha Pass,
the extreme left of the enemy's position.*

The enemy displayed such confidence, generated by their
assumed success of the previous day, that very early in the
morning of the 1st September, they took the offensive by occupy-
ing the village of Gundigan, and, consequently, the movement
of General Gough's Cavalry was delayed until the main attack
by the Infantry on the right should be developed. The enemy
also held in strength the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad,
some 1,500 yards in advance of the British line, forming a very
strong defensive position, and their skirmishers along the front
through the orchards and gardens connecting this village with
Gundigan, covered the movement of the main body advancing
from Pir Paimal to the front. On the left of this position, the
Baba Wali Pass, where they expected the chief attack, was
crowded with Ghazis, the Cavalry occupying the low ground
in advance. The battle about to be waged was full of moment-
ous'cousequences alike to the Afghans and to the conquerors
of Hindostan, but there was no doubt in the minds of the latter
as to the result of the day. As Byron writes of Suwarrow's
Army before the assault of Ismail : —

" All was prepared — the fire, the sworJ, the men
To wield them in their terrible array.
The army, like a lion from his den,
March'd forth with nerve and sinews bent to slay."

Ayoob Khan commenced the operations of the day by a
desultory fire from the orchards in front of the villages in his
occupation, but no reply was made until about 9.30, when the
40-pouuders opened against the Baba Wali Pass, which was
the signal for the advance on the enemy's position at Pir
Paimal. Accordingly, the 1st Brigade,! led by Brigadier-
General Macpherson, moved to attack the village of Gundi
Mulla Sahibdad, under cover of the two batteries of Boyal
Artillery, while the 2nd Brigade; j under Brigadier-General

* See lecture at Royal United Service Institution by Colonel Chapman,
R.A.

t 92nd Highlanders, 2nd Goorkhas, 23rd Pioneers, 24th Punjaub Native
Infantry, 6-8 R.A. (attached), C-2 R.A. (attached).

J 72nd Highlanders, 2nd Sikhs, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Goorkhas.

368 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Baker, extended iu support to the left, keeping touch with the
1st Brigade, and clearing the orchards and gardens in their
immediate front. The 3rd Brigade was at the same time
formed in support in advance of the village of Abasabad, with
the double object of being a reserve to the other brigades of the
division, and meeting a possible counter-attack by the enemy
from the Baba Wali Pass. To the 2nd Goorkhas, Lieutenant-
Colonel Battye,* and 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel
Parker, forming the leading regiments of the 1st Brigade, was
entrusted the honour of the advance, and gallantly they per-
formed their duty.

The village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad was carried in dashing
style at the point of the bayonet, the Goorkhas and Highlanders,
who entered at opposite sides, vicing in honourable rivalry.
The enemy withdrew leisurely, though a considerable number
remained within the buildings and stone walls of the village,
where they met their fate at the point of the bayonet. The
Ghazis here, as throughout the war, proved themselves the back-
bone of the defence, and offered a desperate but unavailing
resistance.

Meanwhile General Baker, with the 2nd Brigade, was hotly
engaged, the 72nd Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Brownlow — whose hours on earth were almost numbered —
and the 2nd Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Boswell, being
in the front line. Threading their way through the lanes and
walled enclosures which lay in the line of attack these gallant
regiments pushed on in spite of a most determined resistance
from the enemy, who were sheltered behind high loopholed
walls.

It was in clearing these enclosures that Colonel Browulow and
Captain Frome met their deaths. In Colonel Brownlow the
Army and country sustained a severe loss, as his professional
attainments promised a distinguished career. By no one of
the Cabul Field Force was he more sincerely mourned than by
Sir Frederick Eoberts, who had learned to appreciate his high
military qualities from the day he assisted at the capture of the

* This officer was one of nine brothers who served in the Indian Army,
one of whom fell at Delhi and a second in a cavalry charge during this
Afghan war at Futtehabad, near Jellalabacl. His father also was one of
six soldier brothers.

Death of Colonel Broiunlow. 369

Peiwar Kotul. But " to every man upon this earth death
cometh soon or late," and to a soldier of the temperament
and impetuous valour of Colonel Brownlow, the last enemy
could not have presented himself in more welcome guise, for in
the words Tacitus applied to Agricola, " he was happy in the
occasion of his death."

Sir Frederick Roberts wrote of Colonel Brownlow : — " In him
the Army has experienced a great loss. He had on many occa-
sions highly distinguished himself as a leader, — at the Peiwar
Kotul, during the operations around Cabul at the latter end of
1879, and, notaWy on the 14th December, when he won the
admiration of the whole force by his brilliant conduct in the
attack and capture of the Asmai Heights."

Equally with the Highlanders, the 2nd Sikhs distinguished
themselves, and on one occasion they repulsed with fixed bay-
onets the charge of the enemy.

The Highlanders, now led by Major Stockwell, an officer who
has recently added to his reputation by his services in Egypt,
after a severe struggle dislodged the enemy; and a portion of the
regiment, with the 5th Goorkha=!, the latter led by Lieutenant-
Colonel Fitzhugh, finally compelled the enemy to withdraw his
right at Gundigan towards Pir Pairnal, and the 1st and 2nd
Brigades pushed on rapidly, almost without a pause. Turning
the shoulder of the hill above Pir Paimal, the 1st Brigade came
under a heavy fire, and a stout resistance was offered in the
village itself ; but the 92nd and 2nd Goorkhas were not to be
denied, and the village was carried at 12.15 P.M., the 2nd
Brigade being at this time clear of the village and so far
advanced as to be obliged to delay until Pir Paimal was cap-
tured.

Meanwhile Sir Frederick Roberts — fearing an attack by Ayoob
Khan on the rear of the British position, large numbers of his
troops having descended the Baba Wali Pass and occupied
some low hills to the right front of General Burrows's Brigade —
before moving up the 3rd Brigade to the support of the others,
sent to General Burrows to ask if he was prepared, after the
success that had been achieved, to hold his own unsupported.
The answer received was in the affirmative, on which he issued

Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

orders to Brigadier-General Macgregor to advance towards Pir
Paimal. General Roberts himself proceeded to join General
Ross at Paimal, and found that his leading brigades had pushed
on without halt, and were then at least one mile beyond that
point. A message from the front explained that after the
village of Paimal had been taken, the enemy was still so active
and menacing, and kept up such a heavy fire upon the troops,
that General Macpherson had obtained General Ross's permis-
sion to continue the advance without pause, the 2nd Brigade
assisting, in order to drive the enemy, before he had time to
rally, out of the enclosed gardens, with whicr? the ground be-
yond Paimal was covered.

The same order of attack was preserved, the 92nd High-
landers and Goorkhas leading on the right, close under the hill,
the 2nd Brigade being a little behind on the left. On reaching
the open ground beyond the village, the troops found them-
selves exposed to a heavy fire from some guns and a large body
of the enemy, who had taken up a position in an entrenchment
to the south-west of the Baba Wali Kotul, commanding an
open piece of ground. This entrenchment they were evidently
prepared to hold with their usual determination ; reinforcements
were being rapidly pushed up from their reserves, while the
guns on the Baba Wali Kotul were turned round so as to
increase the heavy fire of artillery which was brought to bear
upon our troops. It became necessary to take this position at
once by storm, and recognizing this with true soldierly instinct,
Major G. S. White, who was leading the advance companies of
92nd Highlanders, called upon his men for just one charge
more " to close the business." The battery of screw-guns,
under Brevet-Major J. C. Robinson, had been shelling the
enemy with a well-directed fire, under cover of which, and sup-
ported by a portion of the 2nd Goorkhas and the 23rd Pioneers,
the Highlanders responded with alacrity to their leader's call,
and, dashing forward, drove the enemy from their entrench-
ments at the point of the bayonet. " The gallant and ever
foremost Major White," as Sir Frederick Roberts calls him,
was the first man to reach the enemy's guns, being closely
followed by a soldier of the Goorkhas, who, placing his rifle

Complete Defeat of the Enemy. 371

upon one of the guns, exclaimed that it was captured in the
name of the 2nd (Prince of Wales's Own) Goorkhas.*

After passing the village of Pir Paimal, Brigadier-General
Baker had directed a detachment of the 3rd Sikhs, under
Lieutenant- Colonel Money, of Shutargardan fame, to take pos-
session of the point of the detached hill in rear of the enemy's
right. Finding himself commanded by a further spur, Colonel
Money pushed on by the northern side of this hill and made
himself master of four guns, obtaining a full view of the
enemy's camp, then full of men, and with a line of cavalry
drawn up in rear. Before the Mountain Battery attached to
this brigade could be brought up, the advance of the troops
from the other side of the hill put all these men into motion,
and, in the absence of Cavalry, their retreat could not be inter-
cepted.

The enemy was now completely routed ; but this, owing to
the nature of the ground, it was impossible for General Ross to
realize. Expecting, therefore, that they would take up a fresh
position further on, he ordered the 1st and 2nd Brigades to
halt and replenish their ammunition. "When this had been
done, the troops continued their advance about one mile, the
2nd Brigade leading, and at 1 P.M. they entered the enemy's
camp, which was found to be deserted, with tents standing ap-
parently as it had been left in the morning, when the Afghans
moved to the attack. Ayoob Khan lost during the day all his
Artillery, numbering thirty-two pieces, including five in position
at the Baba Wall Kotul, and the two guns of E Battery, Royal
Horse Artillery, which he had captured at Maiwand on the 27th
July. The body of Lieutenant Maclaiue, of this battery, who
had been carried off a prisoner from Maiwand, was found lying
outside his tent, which was close to that of Ayoob, his guard
having murdered him before retreating.

Sir Frederick Roberts, when he found how complete had been
the success of his Infantry, ordered Brigadier-General Nuttall
to proceed with the Bombay Cavalry Brigade, which had formed
part of General Burrows's command opposite the Baba Wali
Pass, in pursuit through the village of Mazra up the Urgundab

* See Sir Frederick Roberta's despatch.

B B 2

372 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

Valley; the result, however, was disappointing. The cavalry
of the Cabul-Candahar Force continued the pursuit throughout
the day, the hrigade crossing the Urgundab and pushing beyond
the line of the enemy's retreat towards Kakreez. None of the
Afghan regular troops were encountered, hut some 350 of the
fugitive Ghazis and Irregulars were killed.

Scarcely less to he mourned than the loss of Colonel Brown -
low was the death of another officer who had rendered great
service throughout the campaign. Shortly before the final
advance, Major-General Ross, wishing to heliograph to Sir
Frederick Roberts his success in turning the enemy's position,
directed Captain Straton,* Superintendent of Army Signalling,
to proceed with a company of the 24th Panjaub Native Infantry
to the Baba Wali Kotul. This gallant officer had only gone a
short distance when a Ghazi, springing out of a ravine close to
him, shot him dead.

It was a proud moment for Sir Frederick Roberts when he
entered the camp of Ayoob Khan. He was still suffering from
fever induced by the fatigues and anxieties of the march, but
his high spirit had kept him up throughout a day, memorable
in his career and in the history of the British Army, as that on
which the cloud hanging over the military fame of England
was dispersed by the sun of victory. After a brief rest in
Ayoob's camp, the General rode to the different assembled
regiments in succession, beginning with the 92nd Highlanders,
and thanked and praised them for the great success they had
achieved. " The cheers," says an officer who was present,
"with which he was received by each regiment, British and
Native, in succession, will never be forgotten by those who
heard them, and show the respect and confidence in which he
is held. The resolution he showed in accomplishing the weary
march from Cabul to Candahar in twenty days, with an army
so large and so completely equipped, was fitly crowned by a

* " In Captain Straton," says Sir Frederick Roberts, " Her Majesty's Ser-
vice has lost a most accomplished, intelligent officer, under whose manage-
ment army signalling, as applied to field service, reached a pitch of perfec-
tion probably never before attained. His energy knew no difficulties, and
his enthusiasm was beyond praise. He had won the highest opinions from
all with whom his duties had brought him in contact, and his death was
very deeply felt throughout the whole force."

British Generals in Afghanistan. 373

victory so complete as to leave scarcely anything to be desired,
and which completely effaced, so far as a victory can, the
disasters which preceded it. His feelings on the evening of
the 1st of September must, indeed, have been truly enviable,
and his good fortune gratifies every one."

The defeat inflicted on Sirdar Ayoob Khan was crushing and
decisive, and he fled towards Herat with only a handful of
horsemen and a small party of infantry, the remains of a force
of 4,000 regular infantry, 5,000 Ghazis, 800 regular and 3,000
irregular cavalry. His horses were estimated at over 1,000
in killed alone. The British loss during the action and the
reconnoissance of the 31st August, was 40 killed, including
3 officers,* and 228 wounded, including 11 officers. Of this
total the greatest sufferers were the 92nd Highlanders, with
84 casualties. The 72nd Highlanders had 33 ; the 2nd
Goorkhas 33 ; and the 2nd Sikhs 29 casualties.

By this brilliant victory Sir Frederick Roberts completely
restored the prestige of British arms ; and so great was the
effect produced that no further military operations were neces-
sary, and not a shot was fired during the remainder of the
British occupation of Candahar.f

Sir Frederick Roberts was not less fortunate in the soldiers he
commanded than they were in their leader. The native troops
were the elite of the Indian Army, and the three regiments of
British Infantry worthily represented their country : —

" Types of a race who shall the invader scorn,
As rocks resist the billows round their shore."

To the quality of the officers and men of the Cabul-Candahar
Field Force he only does justice when he says : — " The rapidity
with which the march was accomplished — taking into considera-
tion the strength of the force, the variations of climate, and the
difficult nature of the country traversed — is the best testimony I

* During the Afghan War the total loss of British officers killed, or died
of wounds, was seventy-four.

f Ayoob Khan displayed all the tenacity of purpose of his race, and
after the departure of the British army, contested the sovereignty with the
Ameer Abdul Rahman. He defeated his generals near Candahar on the
27th July, 1881, but himself suffered a crushing reverse on the 22nd
September following.

374 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

can produce to the efficiency, discipline, and spirit of the troops.
Their conduct, under circumstances often of the most testing
nature, cannot be expressed in terms too strong or too full.
They all seemed to he animated with but one desire — that, cost
what it might in personal risk, fatigue, or discomfort, they
would effect the speedy release of their beleagured fellow-
soldiers in the city of Candahar. The unflagging energy and
perseverance of the troops seemed to reach the full height
when they knew they were about to put forth their irresistible
strength against a hitherto successful enemy. Notwithstanding
the provocation caused by the cruel murder of any stragglers
(soldiers as well as followers) who fell into the hands of the
Afghans following in the wake of our column, not one act
infringing the rules of civilized warfare was committed by our
troops. The persons and property of the natives were re-
spected, and full compensation for supplies was everywhere
given. In short, the inhabitants of the districts we passed
through could not have been treated with greater consideration
nor with a lighter hand, and the conduct of the troops will ever
remain as memorable as the results which they achieved."

The most enthusiastic admirers of the march of Sir Fred-
erick Roberts's " Ten Thousand" are the phlegmatic German
strategists, who aver that it is the finest performance of any
British General since Waterloo. Be this as it may, it bears
some analogy to the celebrated " Retreat of the Ten Thousand "
under Xenophon, due not alone to the similarity in numbers.
The defeat at Cunaxa led to the latter, and the disaster at
Maiwand brought about Roberts's advance through an enemy's
country. Both commanders displayed some of the highest
attributes of generalship on the line of march as on the field of
battle, and the high state of discipline and valour of the troops
was certainly no less in the British than in the Greek "ten
thousand." Both marches alike afford a valuable lesson to
the student of the art of war, and to complete the parallel, it
only remains for the modern General to give to the world a
narrative equal in soldierly conciseness to the celebrated treatise
of the classic commander.

Sir Frederick Roberts had suffered considerably in health by
his recent exertions and the long service in Afghanistan, of

British Generals in Afghanistan. 375

which country and its inhabitants his experience is unequalled
by that of any British General. No event of importance
occurred during his stay at Candahar, and he was glad to
resign the command into the hands of General Phayre, and,
in October, quitted Afghanistan on sick leave,* having been
the central figure in a series of events possessing surpassing
interest to the patriotic Englishman.

The names of some of the greatest conquerors of the world
are associated with that country of mountain and desert.
Alexander marched from end to end of it ; and his mighty
name, after the lapse of twenty centuries, is as well known in
Afghanistan as that of its present ruler. The country gave to
the world the only less famous Mahmoud of Ghuznee, who
many times poured his armies upon Hiudostan and showed
future conquerors how its plains might be overrun. During
the eight centuries succeeding the time of Mahmoud the un war-
like people and rich cities of India have been the prey of the
warriors of Central Asia ; and in comparatively recent times,
Nadir Shah and Ahmed Khan have penetrated through the passes
traversed by Alexander and Mahmoud — the one to Delhi and the
other to Lahore. Even so late as the time of Lord Wellesley's
rule, a tremor of apprehension at the Afghan name was felt in
Calcutta, and Shah Zemaun, who died a blind pensioner of
the British at Loodiana, might have boasted with the Roman
General, "I fluttered your Volsces in Corioli."

Our experience of Afghanistan has been of a varied cha-
racter ; and, indeed, the country may be said to be the grave of
many military reputations. The names of Elphinstone and
Shelton call up memories other than glorious to British arms,
and the only consolatory feature in a retrospect of the disasters
associated with their names is, that every Englishman displayed
personal gallantry under trying circumstances. Equally has the
name, Afghanistan, been associated in our annals with glorious
memories of honour retrieved and defeat wiped out by victory.
Nott, Sale, and Pollock — the last, a brother officer of Roberts,

* In the official notification of leave Sir Frederick Roberts is described as
proceeding to the port of embarkation for thirty days from date of availing
himself of it, and thence to England for twelve months from date of
embarkation on medical certificate.

3/6 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

reposes in Westminster Abbey — are names which Englishmen
must ever hold in respect as those of soldiers who restored
our prestige— that impalpable, but essential, attribute of our
sovereignty in the East, without which our tenure of India
would be quickly challenged by our subject races. To these
great names those of Eoberts and Stewart must hereafter be
added — the march of the latter being in the footsteps of Nott,
and his victory at Ahmed Kbel one of which any soldier might
be proud. Roberts' s victory at Charasia and dispersal of Ma-
homed Jan's forces at Sherpur, may likewise be likened to
Pollock's action at Tezeeu and Sale's defeat of Akbar Khan at
Jellalabad ; though the achievements of the subject of this
Memoir were more remarkable, as, at Charasia, he was opposed
by regular troops, and not tribesmen alone, and, at Cabul,
100,000 men beleagured the British cantonments, while Akbar
Khan led only 8,000 followers against Sale's compact brigade
of 1,800 men. But the forced march from Cabul to Candahar,
with the swiftly following reconnoissance and victory of the 1st
September, remain without parallel in the record of our rela-
tions with Afghanistan, and place the name of Roberts first
among the soldiers who have led the British armies in that
region.

377

CHAPTER XX.

Sir Frederick Roberts quits Afghanistan — The Question of the Retention of
Candahar — Sir Frederick Roberts Arrives in England — His Reception
by his Countrymen — Rewards conferred on Sir Frederick Roberts —
Precedents in the Case of Rewards for Military Services — His Speech
at the Mansion House — Changes in Array Reform due to Sir Frederick
Roberts's Criticisms — He is appointed to the Command of the Army
sent to Coerce the Boers — Departure for and Return from South Africa
— Sir Frederick Roberts attends the German Autumn Manoeuvres — His
Comments on the German Army and Military System — Sir Frederick
Roberts is appointed Commander-in-Cbief of the Madras Army — He
leaves England for India — Conclusion.

SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS left Candahar on the 9th September,
with a portion of his division, and marched to Quetta, where
he remained until the 12th October. Thence he proceeded to
Sibi, the terminus of the railway projected to Candahar, where
he resigned his command on the 15th October and went to
Simla. Here he spent a few days as the guest of the Marquis
of Ripon,* and journeying thence to Bombay, embarked on the
30th October for England.

* The Viceroy wrote of Sir Frederick Roberts's services in the following
terms : — " Sir Frederick Roberts has achieved what the Commander-in-Chief
in India justly describes as one of the most complete and successful opera-
tions of recent times. The Government of India appreciates the foresight
which governed the preparation of the force at Cabul, the energy which
conducted it to Candahar, and the skill through which its operations were
fitly crowned by the total defeat of the enemy against whom its movements
had from the first been directed. These operations, in their inception and
their execution, will remain an enduring record, no less of the courage and
devotion of the troops than of the skill of the officers on whose services the
Queen-Empress can rely for the security and honour of her Indian Empire.
The high, soldiorly spirit which animated this forc<' throughout its ranks,
had been conspicuous in every arm of the Service during all the operations
of the war in Northern Afghanistan and on Sir Donald Stewart's march
from Candahar, and formed the ample justification of the Government of
India in sanctioning an enterprise that could not have been prudently
entrusted to a leader less able or to troops less efficient than Sir Frederick
Roberts and the soldiers so worthy of his leading. Even had the march
thus undertaken and carried out served merely to raise the investment of
Candahar, it would have been a military achievement of which any country

378 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

The two years' war with Afghanistan, in which Sir Frederick
Koberts played so conspicuous a part, and in which twenty
millions of treasure were expended and many valuable lives
were lost, has been absolutely destitute of material results. At
its conclusion the British Government surrendered the " scien-
tific frontier," the possession of which Lord Beaconsfield
vaunted in his memorable speech at the Mansion House on the
5th August, 1879, as having been "achieved with a rapidity
and a precision of execution which cannot easily be paralleled
in the annals of war ; " though a painful commentary was sup-
plied to this description by the massacre of the Cavagnari Mis-
sion on the 3rd of the following month. In this retirement
within our former frontier, as regards the Khyber and Kurram
lines, not only Sir Edward Hamley, who possesses too profound
a knowledge of the principles of strategy to be under any de-
lusion as to the true value of the " scientific frontier," but Sir
Frederick Koberts and Sir Donald Stewart, also, assented.
The former says in his exhaustive and masterly memorandum,*
dated Cabul, 29th May, 1880: — " My own opinion is that the
Kurram should be given up altogether, and that the responsi-
bilities which we ought to incur in the Khyber route should be
limited to such as would ensure the execution and integrity of
any guarantees we have given to the rulers of Lalpura and
Kuner." If political necessity required that we should control
the Khyber, he recommended the employment of Hazara or
Afreedee levies, and strongly deprecated the employment of
any regular troops beyond Peshawur ; and speaking from five
years' experience of the unhealthiness of that station, he
advocated the withdrawal of the greater portion of its garrison
to the left bank of the Indus, somewhere near Campbellpore.
Sir Donald Stewart expressed his agreement with Sir Frederick
Roberts, both as regards the abandonment of the Khyber and
Kurram lines and the removal of the garrison of Peshawur to a

might be proud. All the more, therefore, is Lieutenant-General Sir
Frederick Roberts to be congratulated on the opportunity afforded him of
showing, in the defeat of Ayoob Khan, that the enterprise and endurance
of himself and his troops were perfected by a consummate skill and devoted
gallantry, adequate not merely to the battle of Candahar, but to any
eventuality of war which they might be called on to meet."
* See also ante, pp. 332-333, and 338.

The Candahar Question. 379

healthier position on the eastern side of the Indus, with the ex-
ception of a small force established in an entrenched position
to cover the railway terminus.

But Sir Frederick Eoberts — while proposing to make over
Kurram and Khost to native chiefs, and withdraw from the-
Khyber, except in so far as our presence was necessary to fulfil
our engagement to the Mohmund Chief of Lalpura, and Syud
Badshah of Kuner, thus, as he expresses it, "refusing our right,"
and "remaining merely on the defensive on our north-west fron-
tier " — strongly advocated the military occupation of Candahar.
"We have," he says, "neither sufficient men nor material to
warrant our operating on more than one line," and his experi-
ence taught him that the army of 25,000 men found necessary,
in May, 1880, to maintain on the Khyber line alone, would
have to be considerably increased if the ruler of Cabul should
be assisted by Russian officers. As a result of the shattering of
the military power of the Ameer Shere Ali, he adds, " We
have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to
do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be
very flattering to our amour propre, but I feel sure I am right
when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they
will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to
conquer Afghanistan or invade India through it, we should
have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interest
if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime. The
military occupation of Candahar is, as I have before stated, of
vital importance ; even there we should make our presence but
little felt, merely controlling the foreign policy of the rulers of
that province."

But on entering Afghanistan we had expressed our intention
of refraining from annexing Candahar, and a departure from
our word, even to the limited extent of a military occupation,
would have inflicted far greater injury on our prestige than was
involved in the evacuation of that city. Moreover, holding
Candahar demanded as a military necessity the garrisoning of
Khelat-i-Ghilz}7e to the east, and Giriskh, on the Helmund, to
the west, if not of Herat itself; while by concentrating at
Pisheen, the passes to Chaman .and the open country thence
to Candahar, only a distance of eighty miles, lay at our mercy.

380 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

This, indeed, was conceded by Lord Lytton,* who wrote before
entering on hostilities : — " It is true that the recent occupation
of Quetta has materially improved our position. The command
of the southern passes is now in our hands ; and from Multan
lo the sea, a distance of 500 miles, our frontier is well guarded.
While we, securely established at Quetta, can at- any moment
descend on the plains of Candahar, or advance to meet our
adversary in the open field, no enemy can debouch on our
plains without first besieging and taking Quetta — a task of no
slight difficulty, and involving much loss of precious time —
and then forcing a long and difficult pass held by us. But on
the northern, or more directly exposed, portions of our frontier,
our line is as fatally defective as ever." But regarding this
northern frontier military opinion is now almost unanimous
against occupying the Khyber and Kurram passes, and only
on the retention of Candahar is there a serious divergence.
This question — though decided contrary to the views held by
the majority of professional opinion, including Lord Napier
of Magdala, Sir Henry Eawlinson, Sir Frederick Eoberts,
Sir Edward Hamley (who lectured on the subject at the
Royal United Service Institution), and Sir Donald Stewart,
though in his minute, dated " Candahar, April 18th, 1879,"
that officer strongly combated the retention of the capital of
Western Afghanistan — has more than an academic interest, for
any movement of Russia on Herat, or the precipitation of a
conflict with that power in Central Asia, would immediately
bring it into prominence, and renew the clamour for its adop-

* See Lord Lytton's minute, dated Simla, 9th September, 1878, which
appears iu the Afghan Blue Book No. 2 of 1881. In this minute, Lord
Lytton sketched a magnificent scheme of Imperial extension, from the
Pamir to Herat, 360 miles from our present frontier. He says, " As a purely
military line, the strongest frontier we could take up would be along the
Hindu Kush from the Pamir to Bamian, holding the northern debouches of
the principal passes ; and thence southward by the Helmund, Giriskh, and
Candahar to the Arabian Sea. Though political considerations of the mo-
ment may compel and justify an extension of our line to the Northern fron-
tier of Afghanistan, this would weaken rather than strengthen our general
position. But the political and strategical importance of Herat is so great
that, though it lies beyond our natural frontier, it cannot be excluded from
cur line of defence. This line, therefore, should ultimately run from the
Hindu Kush along the Paropamisus to Herat, and thence down the western
frontier Afghanistan and Beloochistan to the Arabian Sea.1'

The Candahar Question. 381

tion. Lord Napier, in his able memorandum, advocating the
annexation of Candahar, and the adjacent territory, considers
the question of expense an immaterial one, though in point of
fact it is of prime importance to a poor country like India.
With an ignorance of the English people that would be aston-
ishing were it not remembered that his lordship has passed his
distinguished career exclusively in the East, he proposed that
the taxpayers of this country should be called upon to pay half
the cost of the military occupation of Candahar, which Sir
Henry Norman places at £1,400,000, though other authorities
estimate it at not less than two millions annually. As regards
the dislike of the Native soldiery to serve in Afghanistan, re-
garding which Sir Frederick Roberts said that it had " affected
recruiting," his lordship, with characteristic disregard for finan-
cial considerations, says, " Let the soldiers be sufficiently paid
for the hardships and dangers of exile in Afghanistan, and there
will be no danger of filling the ranks." Sir Henry Rawlinson's
proposal that we should " continue our military occupation, but
leave the civil administration in the hands of any governor
whom Abdul Rahman may appoint," though an attempt to
solve the political difficulty, would leave the financial problem
untouched.

Authorities of no less weight than the preceding are opposed
to the occupation of Candahar on political, military, and finan-
cial grounds. Among these are Lord Wolseley, Sir Henry
Norman, Sir John Adye, Sir Archibald Alison, and General
Charles Gordon* ("Chinese Gordon"); also statesmen of

* General Gordon's opinion, as that of a soldier of original genius and prac-
tical experience, is of special value. He writes to the 'limes: — " From a mili-
tary point of view, by the retention we should increase the line we have to
defend by twice the distance of Candahar to the present frontier, and place
an objective point to be attacked. Naturally, we should make good roads
to Candahar, which on the loss of a battle there— and such things must be
always calculated as within possibility — would aid the advance of the
enemy to the Indus. The debouches of the defiles, with good lateral com-
munications between them, is the proper line of defence for India, not the
entry into these defiles, which cannot have lateral communications. If the
entries of the defiles are held, good roads are made through them ; and
these aid the enemy, if you lose the entries or have them turned. This
does not prevent the passage of the defiles being disputed. The retention
of Candahar would tend to foment rebellion in India, and not prevent it,
for thereby we should obtain an additional number of fanatical malcontents,

382 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

frontier experience such as Sir Robert Montgomery and the
late Lord Lawrence ; while statesmen * and soldiers of a past
age, as Sir Charles Napier and Sir James Outram, who knew
Afghanistan and the Afghans well, were opposed to our going
beyond the passes to encounter a Russian advance.

Sir James Outram' s opinion of the unwisdom of advanc-
ing into Afghanistan to meet a Russian army, instead of
waiting behind the mountain barriers given by nature to India
as its strongest defence, though written in 1854, is still ap-
plicable. From Merv to the Indus is a distance of about 1,000
miles, throughout which, except in the vicinity of Herat and
Candahar, supplies are limited. If Russia advanced with an
army of only 50,000 men, she would eat up the supplies of
Afghanistan and exasperate the people ; " and no efforts of
their chiefs," says Sir James Outram, " could then restrain
them from acting as hostilely towards their quondam friends as
heretofore they did against the British army. Ere Russian or
Persian troops could reach Candahar or Cabul, we certainly
should have authentic knowledge of their approach. It would
then be time enough to enter upon defensive preparations. It
is scarcely possible that less than one season would be required

who, as British subjects, would have the greatest facility for passing to and
fro in India, which they would not have if we did not hold it. That our
prestige would suffer in India by the evacuation, I doubt ; it certainly
would suffer if we kept it and forsook our word — i.e., that we made war
against Shere Ali, and not against his people. India should be able, by a
proper defence of her present frontier, and by the proper government of
her peoples, to look after herself. If the latter is wanting, no advance of
frontier will aid her. I am not anxious about Russia, but were I so, I
would care much more to see precautions taken for the defence of our
Eastern colonies, now that Russia has moved her Black Sea Naval estab-
lishment to the China Sea, than to push forward an outstretched arm to
Candahar. The interests of the Empire claim as much attention as India,
and one cannot help seeing that they are much more imperilled by this
lust move of Russia than by anything she can do in Central Asia. Politi-
cally, militarily, and morally, Candahar ought not to be retained. It would
oblige us to keep up an interference with the internal affairs of Afghanis-
tan, and would increase the expenditure of impoverished India."

* Lord Wellesley wrote on 4th July, 1842, to Lord Ellenborough : —
" Your Lordship, I'm satisfied, would reject Afghanistan and Cabul with
the rocks, sand, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Shah Soojah had bequeathed
them as a peace offering to England;" and his brother, the Duke of
Wellington, with the strong common sense that distinguished hiji, wrote,
on the 3rd September following, to the same correspondent, objecting to
" discuss national disgrace, unburied bones, &c."

The Candahar Question. 383

by the enemy to recruit in Afghanistan ere descending the
passes ; but allowing that a shorter halt would suffice, there
still would be ample time to concentrate sufficient forces at
Shikarpore and Peshawur to meet the enemy when he de-
bouches from the Bolan or Khyber." If we were involved in
hostilities with Russia or any other power, it would be im-
possible for this country, with its vast colonial possessions, to
send any considerable force to India beyond that already
maintained in that dependency. As Sir Henry Norman,
arguing against the retention of Candahar, observes : — " Any
great forward movement on our part would necessitate large
European reinforcements, which England might not be able to
send, while, if the defence was in the main confined to our old
frontiers, large reinforcements might not be necessary."*

Lord Wolseley, whose opinions must carry great weight,
in his memorandum dated 20th November, 1880, after invoking
the lessons taught by the great Indian mutiny, when we were
so hardly pressed that Lord Lawrence seriously considered the
propriety of retiring from Peshawur, observes : "To occupy a
point so far removed beyond our frontier would be a serious
financial burden, even in times of profound peace, and in time
of any great trial, its possession would indeed be a white
elephant, capable Of ruining our Indian Empire by the cost
which the necessity of supporting it would entail upon us. In
my humble opinion, the question of the retention of Candahar
is not a military one, for I can see no possible strategical ad-
vantage in its present occupation. Its retention will certainly
cripple our military resources, and it would seriously hamper
our strategical operations in the event of any great internal
disturbance in India. My opinions on this point are some-
what influenced by the conviction that if we determine to keep

* Colonel East, of the Intelligence Department of the War Office (see
his Memorandum of August 16th, 1880, which was generally approved by
Sir Archibald Alison), while arguing against the retention of Candahar,
proposed the occupation of Kooshi, on the further side of the Shutargardan
Pass, but no military authority of weight agreed with this recommendation.
Sir Edward Hamley and his school, while advocating an advance for
strategic reasons beyond the mountains, prefer the country towards Cun-
dahar, and, indeed, as the Shutargardan is impassable during the winter
months, a force holding Kooshi would be cut off from assistance.

384 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

a garrison at Candahar, the annexation of the surrounding
district and of the country between it and our frontier, would
sooner or later he forced on us, and I feel that any such ex-
tension would he an increasing source of weakness to us. Our
recent operations in Afghanistan have taught us the true value
of Afghan military power. We can now afford to smile at the
superstitious horror with which we have hitherto contemplated
all idea of military operations in that country — a horror which
has come down to us from the disasters of 1840. We have
now learnt to appreciate the Afghan troops at their proper
value, and to realise the fact that any well-appointed column of
our troops, if ahly commanded, can march from one end of the
land to the other. The English people have begun to see that
our military disaster in 1840, as, indeed, all the disasters that
have ever befallen us, are the result of the incompetence of the
commanders employed. There is no Afghan army that could
prevent an English division from marching from Quetta to
Candahar whenever it might become advisable to do so. If,
therefore, we can at all times occupy Candahar when we wish,
why go there until the necessity for doing so has arisen ?
Whenever the Russians march upon Herat we must certainly
occupy Candahar, unless we intend to give up India or allow it
to be taken from us ; but the longer we can postpone that
occupation the better we shall be able to incur the vast ex-
penditure it will necessarily entail upon us. As we can always
get there with the greatest ease, I would deprecate in the
strongest terms our going there until the necessity for doing so
actually arises, and I am therefore of opinion that the sooner
the troops now there can be withdrawn from it with safety and
honour, the better it will be for the true interests of our Indian
Empire." A popular fallacy is involved in the assertion we
hear so confidently made at political meetings by Conservative
speakers, that the Liberal Government reversed the policy of
their predecessors in withdrawing from Candahar. On this
point the evidence of Sir Lepel Griffin, the agent selected by
Lord Lytton to carry out Lord Beaconsfield's policy, is con-
clusive. He says — "While the Conservative Government were
in power I was directed by the Viceroy to declare at Cabul, and
repeatedly did so declare, that the British Government had no

77/6' Candahar Question. 385

intention of occupying permanently or annexing Candahar, and
our withdrawal was in direct accordance with the reiterated
and solemn professions which I had been instructed to make,
and the assurances of the Government of India to the chiefs
and people of Cahul. We could not have remained without a
breach of public faith. The Liberal Viceroy was quite pre-
pared to support the man who had been proclaimed hereditary
ruler of Candahar, and, in fact, did support him until he
refused to hold the office any longer. The wisdom of the
policy of retiring from Candahar may be a fair matter for argu-
ment, but it was one on which both Governments were agreed.
I am convinced that withdrawal, after our public assurances,
was the only practicable policy."

As that sagacious and cool-headed soldier-diplomatist, Sir
Henry Durand, who served in Afghanistan, foretold in 1867,
the Afghans were unable to offer effective resistance to a
British invading force, while Eussian action in 1878 proves
that the apprehended interference of that power, under
present conditions, with Afghan affairs, is a delusion, at
least until the authority of the Czar is consolidated in
Turkestan, and the enormous drain on his resources occa-
sioned by the military occupation of the territories in
Central Asia under his flag, calculated at not less than two
millions annually, has ceased. The Kussian frontier, from
the Caspian to the Pamir, is about 1,200 miles long, 200
miles longer than our north-west frontier; of this, however,
less than half is open to attack, as from the Caspian to
Samarcand it is covered by the great Khivan desert. On the
other hand the great defect in this line is its want of inter-
communication, and its distance from support. While every
part of our frontier is within 200 miles of railway communica-
tion, and most of it much nearer, Tashkend, the centre of
Russian power in Turkestan, is more than 1,000 miles from
the nearest railway ; and many of the frontier posts are 1,500
miles distant from such support. The difficulties attending a
military occupation under such conditions are necessarily great,
and the entire force that Russia, with her vast military
resources, can maintain in Turkestan does not exceed that
which we maintain in the Punjaub alone. Lord Lytton, in his

c c

386 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

lengthy and ably written minute of the 4th September, 1878,
referring to the defencelessness of the Eussian possessions,
expresses an opinion that it would be easier for us to collect
100,000 men at any point on our frontier than for Russia to
collect 25,000 on hers. Skobeleff, that remarkable soldier
whose premature death was a crushing blow to the Slavonic
cause, declared that the difficulties of camel transport rendered
an invasion of India impracticable, and the conqueror of Geok
Tepe spoke from actual experience of Central Asiatic warfare.
And yet we are periodically oppressed with a Russian scare,
and called upon to believe in the imminence of a Russian
invasion, to obviate the dangers of which we are required to
occupy Candahar at an enormous cost. It is within the
boundaries of India that exist the dangers against which we
must guard — her vast feudatory armies, and the possible
combination of her diverse nationalities welded, for the nonce,
under the leadership of a great soldier, such as the East has
produced, who has received a military training in some Euro-
pean army. The true policy that, in our opinion, should
guide our councils in India, was stated in eloquent and forcible
terms by Lord Lawrence, on the 4th January, 1879 : — " We
foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move (i.e., a
permanent advance of the frontier) might require, and we
protest against the necessity of having to impose additional
taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling as it is to
bear such pressure for measures which they can both un-
derstand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which
we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may
be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our
frontiers, and by giving all our care and expending all our
resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over
which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.
Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think
of invading India from without, or what is more probable of
stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it,
our true policy, or strongest security, would then, we conceive,
be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at
either Cabul, Candahar, or any similar outpost, in full reliance
on a compact, highty-equipped, and disciplined army stationed

The Candahar Question. 387

within our own territories, or on our own border ; in the con-
tentment, if not in the attachment of the masses, in the sense
of security of title and possession with which our whole policy
is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the
native aristocracy, in the construction of material works within
British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while
they add to our political and military strength, in husbanding
our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources,
in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian
statesman should disregard, and in a trust in the rectitude and
honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all
sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or
stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt." As Mr. Gladstone
said in the House of Commons on the 12th June, 1878, " We
are too apt to fallback on the abstract and theoretical splendour
of the Indian Empire, and we do not sufficiently recollect that
the administration of that Empire, in the final judgment of
history, will bring no advantage or glory to us, except in the
exact and precise proportions that that administration confers
benefit upon that Empire, and renders India prosperous and
happy." The chances of prosperity and happiness among the
natives of India would be greatly lessened "by the increased
expenditure required for the annexation or occupation of
Candahar, and hence for financial no less than military and
political reasons this step appears to us undesirable.

As we have seen, intelligent military opinion — Roberts,
Stewart, and Hamley, equally with Wolseley, Gordon, Adye, and
Norman — is against the much vaunted scientific frontier, now
discovered to be no scientific frontier at all, though as regards
the retention of Candahar, professional opinion is divided. But
both have been abandoned, and with them have disappeared all
the results of the extensive operations extending over two years,
and involving an expenditure of twenty millions of money and
thousands of lives. When our troops are withdrawn from
Pisheen,* if that measure is adopted, the sole result for this

* If we conformed strictly to our treaty obligations, the occupation of
Quetta itself is to be regarded not as a permanent measure, but as one for
the protection of the Khan and his subjects with whom we have entered
into engagements. This is manifest by the terms of the despatch of Lord

c c 2

388 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

direful waste, beyond the solution of the military problem as
to the feasibility of our overrunning Afghanistan at any time
we may desire to do so, will be the freeing the Turis of the
Kurram valley from the yoke of the Ameer of Afghanistan.
From time immemorial this miserable people have been subject
to the exactions of the Sirdars and tax gatherers placed over
them by the Ameer, and their condition may be aptly described
in the words applied by Wordsworth to Roy Roy and the
Highland caterans, who lived and moved and had their being
in a state of society entirely analogous to that still existent on
the north-west frontier of India

" the good old rule

Sufficeth them ; the simple plan

That they should take who have the power,

And they should keep who can."

The obscure tribe of Turis, of whom the British public never
heard, have alone benefited from the vast expenditure of blood
and treasure resulting from the invasion of Afghanistan. But
this abortive result in no way detracts from the merits of the
commander whose reputation was made by the Afghan War,
but is due solely to political causes with which he, as a soldier,
had no concern.

On the 18th November, accompanied by Major- General Hills,
Brigadier- Generals Macpherson and Baker, and Major Pretyman,
A.D.C., Sir Frederick Roberts waited on the Duke of Cam-
bridge, who received him with the utmost cordiality ; and he
was summoned to Windsor, where Her Majesty treated her
distinguished subject with special honour. It was generally
anticipated that a peerage would have been conferred on the
victor of the Peiwar Kotul and Charasia, the commander of
the brilliant march from Cabul to Candahar, and of the battle
of the 1st September, but the Government were not so liberal as
in the days when the capture of Ghuznee was rewarded with

Salisbury to the Government of India, dated December 13th, 1877. " The
existing force has been placed there for the purpose of preserving the
peace of the Khan's dominions, the security of commerce in the Bolan
Pass and the plain below it, and the safety of your agent." By Article 3
of the Supplementary Treaty of December 8th, 1876, we bind ourselves to
"respect the independence of Khelat;" and Article 6 expressly declares
that the location of British troops at Quetta was in response to the
expressed desire of the Khan and his Sirdars.

The Question of Rewards. 389

a coronet and a pension of £2,000 a-year. Certainly, if services
of doubtful value rendered before Sebastopol were tbus ac-
knowledged, or even more recently, when the late Lord Airey,
who had never commanded an army in the field, received a
coronet for long and faithful service, Sir Frederick Roberts would
not have been over-rewarded by the bestowal of a similar honour
for the brilliant services he rendered his country at a crisis.

It may be pleaded that this niggardliness in conferring a
peerage for military services is according to precedent, and that
it has been the practice of all Governments to reserve a seat in
the House of Lords, with few exceptions, for their political
supporters. But this plea, though according to modern prac-
tice, is far from affording a satisfactory reason, and it would be
well (as long as decorations and titles have any value in the
eyes of the world) if not only the peerage, but the Garter and
the other Irish and Scotch National orders of Knighthood, now
reserved for great nobles, were conferred, as in the time of their
institution, on soldiers who have bled for their country and done
good service in maintaining her vast empire.

Sir Frederick Roberts, in common with Sir Donald Stewart,
received only a baronetcy, and even the local rank of Lieutenant-
General, which he had held in Afghanistan, was not confirmed.
He also received a " Distinguished Service pension " of .£100,
like many of his less-known contemporaries ; and Parliament,
on the recommendation of the Marquis of Hartington, Secretary
of State for India, voted him (and also Sir Donald Stewart) a
capital sum of JG12,500 — which cannot be considered an exces-
sive pecuniary reward for services such as he had rendered to
the State.* We are such sticklers for precedent, that it is

* This will be allowed on comparing the above grants with the pensions
conferred for special military service to other officers of the Royal and Indian
Armies since 1835. The following were chargeable on the revenue of India :
—Major- General Sir William Nott, G.C.B., £1,000 ; Field-Marshal Viscount
Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General of India, £5,000 ; Field-Marshal
Viscount Gough, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in. India, £2,000 ; Field-Mar-
shal Sir George Pollock, G.C.B., £1,000; General Sir Archdale Wilson,
G.C.B., £1,000; Field-Marshal L .rd Clyde. G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in
India, £2,000; Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, G.CB., ^£1,000
(with continuance to his eldest son). The following pensions were paid
from the Consolidated Fund or Civil Service Votes : — Lord Seaton, £2,000
(for three lives) ; Lord Keane, £2,000 (for three lives) ; Lord Gough, £2,000
(for three lives) ; Lord Hardinge, £3.000 (for three lives) ; Lord Raglan,

3QO Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

somewhat strange that the course followed in the analogous
instances of Sir Colin Campbell and Sir Hugh Rose (and since
in that of Lord Wolseley), who were confirmed in their local
rank, was not adopted in the case of Sir Frederick Roberts, and
the rank of Lieutenant- General was not made substantive.

But there is a clue to the reasons that guided the "authorities"
in making a breach in the continuity of their cherished principle
of precedent. Probably the denial of a simple act of justice
did not arise from a disinclination on the part of the Horse
Guards, who were favourable to the claims of Sir Frederick
Roberts, but to the circumstance that their refusal to confer a
similar honour upon Sir Garnet Wolseley on his return from
South Africa, where he had completed the pacification of Zulu-
land, and subdued the Basuto chief, Secocoeni, precluded them
from adequately rewarding a deserving public servant, and fol-
lowing the precedent which confirms in his rank a General
who has achieved a striking military success.

Sir Frederick 'was advanced to the G.C.B.* on the 21st
September, and was invested by the Queen with the insignia
of the Order at Windsor Castle on the 25th November;
and never had a knight of the olden time more worthily earned
his spurs. During his career he had been wounded, had
gained the V.C., and the Mutiny Medal, with three clasps for
Delhi and the Relief and Siege of Lucknow, also the India
Medal for Looshai, the North- West Frontier Medal, with clasp
for Umbeyla, the Abyssinian Medal, the Afghan War Medal,
with four clasps, and the bronze decoration for his famous
march. He had been twenty-three times mentioned in des-
patches before the Afghan War, during which he was eight
times thanked by the Viceroy and Commander-in- Chief in
India, and also twice received the thanks of Parliament.

£2,000 (for two lives) ; Sir William F. Williams, £1,000 ; Sir H. M. Have-
lock, £1,000 ; Lord Napier of Magdala, £2,000 (for two lives) ; Lord Wolseley,
a gratuity of £25,000 for the Ashantee campaign, and £30,000 for the
Egyptian war. The annuities to Lord Raglan atid Sir Henry Havelock wero
granted in respect of the services of their fathers, who died before the date
of the grant.

* Sir Frederick received the C.B. on 6th September, 1872, for his
services in the Looshai campaign, and was promoted to K.C.B. on the 19th
July, 1879. He was also appointed a Companion of the Indian Empire, a
newly-created Order, on the 1st January, 1880.

Roberts s Mansion House Speech. 391

Sir Frederick Roberts was entertained at a banquet by the
United Service Club, at which the Duke of Cambridge presided
and the Prince of Wales attended ; and other public dinners
were given in his honour, including one by the East India
United Service Club. After this initiation he fell into
the hands of the City Companies and " lion-hunters " of the
Metropolis, and like Lord Napier, with whom he had gone
through the ordeal on the conclusion of the Abyssinian War,
and Sir Garnet Wolseley on his return from Ashantee, was
compelled to undergo a severe course of public dinners, with
the concomitant speech-making. The " Worshipful " Com-
panies of Grocers, Merchant Taylors, and Fishmongers feasted
him, and conferred on him their freedom ; and in the following
February he was entertained, with many of his principal officers,
at a grand banquet by the Corporation of London, who, later,
presented him with a sword of honour of the value of 100
guineas.

Sir Frederick Roberts's speech on this occasion was, perhaps,
the most remarkable and outspoken oration addressed to any
English audience by an officer of the Army. Sir Frederick's
oratorical utterances — save to the Chiefs and Maliks of the
Kurram Valley and Afghanistan — had been few ; but we were in-
formed by a general officer who had attended at many Guildhall
dinners, that the speech referred to was delivered without break
or hesitation, and with an ease of manner and command of
language that astonished his audience. And yet the speaker,
like Mark Antony, a plain, blunt man, professed to have

neither

" Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech
To stir men's blood."

Though most military men disapproved of the changes intro-
duced by the new system of Army organization, identified with
the names of Lord Cardwell and Mr. Childers, and of which
Lord Wolseley and Sir John Adye have been the powerful and
consistent supporters in the Service, no officer out of Parlia-
ment had hitherto displayed the courage, or possessed sufficient
prestige, to lodge a protest, with any chance of its being effica-
cious, against the proposals of a Minister of War representing
an Administration that had just come into power with an enor-

392 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

mous Parliamentary majority at its back. The advocates of
the new system replied to those who pointed to certain features
in \vhich it did not come up to expectation, that the system
was still incomplete, and, further, that it did not receive that
intelligent and whole-hearted execution which could alone en-
sure success. Time will show whether this criticism is well
founded. The problem to be solved — to maintain, in face of the
vast Continental armies, an efficient and adequate force for the
defence of the country and her vast colonies, under our volun-
tary system of enlistment — appears almost to be insoluble with-
out conscription, or a larger expenditure than the representatives
of the people will sanction.

Sir Frederick Eoberts's speech was mainly an appeal, sup-
ported by irrefragable arguments, for a longer period of service
with the colours. He also gave vent to a spirited defence of the
regimental system of the British army ; and strongly depre-
cated the practice of arbitrarily removing men from regiments
to which they had become attached: "Every soldier," he said,
"experienced in war will tell you that we should do all in
our power to uphold the regimental system, and to foster
and encourage that sensitive plant, esprit de corps, which,
like other sentiments having their roots in our coarse nature,
play as large and influential a part in life as the dictates of
reason itself." He specially dwelt on the necessity of having
old soldiers in the ranks, and adduced his own experience in
the Kurram Campaign, when he represented to the Comrnan-
der-in-Chief that he could not take the field without some
seasoned soldiers, as the 2nd Battalion 8th Regiment, his only
European corps, contained " a number of untrained boys,"
and was " not in a fit state for a campaign," having dwindled
down at Kurram, only seventy miles from our own territory,
" to a weak half battalion." He was reinforced, he said, with a
wing of the 7-cd Highlanders, which had been eight years in
India, and " was composed of seasoned soldiers." At the cap-
ture of the Peiwar Kotul, his European Infantry fit for service
numbered 366 men of the 8th Eegiment, and 330 of the 72nd
Highlanders, and he added, that "without the latter I have no
hesitation in stating my firm belief the force would have been
annihilated," as there was no reserve nearer than Kohat, 150

Roberts's Mansion Hoiise Speech. 393

miles distant, and " on the first check, all the tribes occupying
this intervening distance would have risen against us."

But a change took place in the marching powers of the
72nd when they formed part of the column which he took
with him in his famous march from Cahul to Candahar. Early
in the spring the regiment had received a draft of 170 men,
and Sir Frederick said : — " While on the march to Candahar
I made it my business to find out every day how many men of
each corps had fallen out on the way. This information was
necessary to enable me to judge whether the troops were being
taxed beyond their powers. I discovered that the 72nd High-
landers had more casualties in proportion to their numbers
than either the 60th Rifles or 92nd Highlanders ; and, on
further inquiry, I ascertained that the majority of cases
occurred amongst the men of the last draft — in fact, among the
young soldiers. The average service of the 72nd Highlanders
on our leaving Cabul was : Serjeants, thirteen and a-half years ;
Corporals, twelve and a-half years ; Privates, seven years. And
of the 92nd Highlanders : Serjeants, fifteen years ; Corporals,
eleven years ; Privates, nine years. I have not the return of
the 2nd Battalion of the 60th Rifles, but feel satisfied that the
men were not of less service than those of the 72nd High-
landers. Such a return as this it will be quite impossible ever
to prepare again if our system of short service is persisted in ;
and, my lords and gentlemen, let me add something more, it
will be as impossible for a British force ever again to perform
such a march as those magnificent troops I had the honour and
pride to command made from Cabul to Candahar. No com-
mander would venture to undertake such a service except with
soldiers on whose discipline, spirit, and endurance he could
thoroughly rely. I never, for a moment, had a doubt as to the
result, but then I had tried men, not untried and untrained
boys, to depend upon."

Sir Frederick denied that he was opposed to reform ; on the
contrary, he said, he was regarded in India by some of the older
officers, "as the representative of the Army Reform Party."
He expressed a hope that his object in speaking plainly would
be appreciated by the nation : — " If I speak somewhat more can-
didly and decidedly to-night than is perhaps customary on an

394 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

occasion such as this, it is because I cannot resist giving my
country the benefit of the experience I have gained, in return
for the high distinctions which have been conferred upon me ;
and because I hope that what I am now saying may cause
those in power to pause before they change altogether a system
under which England has become the great and powerful nation
that she is at present."

His peroration was not unworthy a more practised orator : —
" These are trying times — times in which it behoves every
Englishman to think of what is best for the country and the
State. We have enemies without and within, and we must not
hope to maintain the place we hold in the world, unless we are
prepared to maintain it alike by the wisdom of our counsels
and by the strength and valour of our arms. At such a time it
were little less than treason to know, or to believe, that there
was a flaw in our armour, and not to call attention clearly and
earnestly to the fact. This must be my apology. I have spoken
warmly and strongly, because, had I not seized this great oppor-
tunity to do so, I feel that I should have failed in my duty, not
only to the noble service to which I have the great privilege to
belong, but also to my country and my Queen."

Mr. Childers was patriotic enough to rise to the appeal
of the guest of the evening, and, with a frankness that did
him infinite credit, admitted that he had " struck the right
key-note," and expressed a determination that "his words will
be well weighed by all who are responsible for the government
of the Army."

In a recent article in the Nineteenth Century, Sir Frederick
Roberts explained more fully the views on Army Reform
he propounded at the Mansion House on the 14th July,
1881, 'and justly laid claim to the merit of having, by his
strictures, caused certain important changes in the scheme
of Army organization as it then existed ; but with the can-
dour and moderation that distinguishes him, he recognized the
good work that has been done by Army reformers, among
whom he classes himself. And, indeed, he has no slight claim
to this distinction, for as he says : — " In India I am con-
sidered a reformer of a very advanced type. Many of the
older officers, both civil and military, look upon me as some-

Roberts on Army Organization. 395

thing like a revolutionist for persistingly advocating changes
which I believe to be essential to the well-being of the Indian
Army, but which they regard as unnecessary, if not dan-
gerous."

While accepting the new Short Service System as irreversible
— for though initiated by Lord Cardwell, it had been cordially
adopted by a Conservative War Minister, Colonel Stanley, of
whom Lord Wolseley has said, that of all the Secretaries for War
under whom he had served, not excluding Lord Cardwell and
Mr. Childers, he considered Colonel Stanley the most ardent
reformer — Sir Frederick Roberts took exception t3 what he
considered, in common with most military men, five important
blots in the original Short Service System, and changes were
instituted tending to remedy these defects.* He gave expres-

* The defects pointed out by Sir Frederick Roberts were : "(1.) That
men intended for service abroad did not remain for a sufficiently long
period with the colours. (2.) That non-commissioned officers were dis-
charged just at the time they were becoming most useful ; and that the
best men for this rank were disinclined to enlist, from the fact that little
or no prospect of serving on for a pension was held out to them. (3.) That
absolute boys were often accepted by the recruiting authorities, and sent
abroad before their constitutions were matured. (4.) That battalions,
when ordered on service or to India, were hastily made up by drafts of the
youngest soldiers from other regiments, with which they had no local ties
or connections. (5.) That the Army was being sacrificed to obtain a
Reserve, which was one only in name.1' With regard to the first and
second points, whereas, previous to July, 1881, enlistment in the Infantry
was for six years' Army service and six years' Reserve service, with the
option of joining the Reserve, under certain conditions, after three years'
Army service — after that date it was changed to seven years' Army and
five years' Reserve service, to be converted into eight and four years'
service respectively, if the period of Army service expired whilst the
soldier was abroad. Further, in the event of war, provision is made to
extend the Army service for one year, or to nine years, thus reducing
Reserve service to three years. So with non-commissioned officers. Be-
fore July, 1881, they could, under certain conditions, and if specially
recommended, receive permission to extend their Army service to twelve
years, and subsequently to re-engage up to twenty-one years. Since that
date all non-commissioned officers of the rank of corporal and upwards
have the right to extend their Army service to twelve years ; while
sergeants have the right, subject only to the veto of the Secretary of State,
to re-engage up to twenty-one years. As to Sir Frederick Roberts's third
point, it will suffice to say that, since July, 1881, the minimum age for
enlistment has been extended from eighteen to nineteen years. With
regard to his fourth point, it has lately been ruled that men are not
eligible for embarkation to India with less than one year's service, unless
over twenty years of age. On all these points, then, Sir Frederick Roberts
certainly scored a success.

396 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

sion to an opinion, which is generally shared by military men,
that " the Army was being sacrificed to secure a Eeserve."

On the question of young versus old soldiers, so much and
hotly debated, Sir Frederick Roberts, who is an advocate for
the veteran, invokes in his article the high authority of the
Duke of Wellington, and also that of Von Moltke, who thinks
from twenty-one to twenty-seven years of age the best age.
Lord Wolseley, on the other hand, is the consistent and
powerful advocate, not only for young soldiers, but for young
officers and young non-commissioned officers. As he said, in an
article in the same magazine, in March, 1881 : — "I believe it is
as essential to have young sergeants as it is to have young
officers." But youth and age are comparatively relative terms,
and his lordship would probably not object to the limits of the
famous German strategist, though Sir Frederick Roberts defines
the term old soldier as a man of between five and twelve years'
service. With comparatively young soldiers Lord Wolseley
stormed Secocoeni's stronghold and the lines of Tel-el-Kebir,
and thus has sincere grounds for the faith that is in him.
Again, with old soldiers Sir George Colley failed to hold his own
on the Majuba Hill. Statistics prove that the average service of
the men who overthrew Arabi's army, entrenched behind formid-
able earthworks, was five years ; and that of the soldiers who fled
panic-stricken before the attack of the Boers was seven years,
the average age being twenty-seven ; and among the battalions
was a portion of the famous 92nd Highlanders, who formed the
elite of the army that marched and fought under Sir Frederick
Roberts in Afghanistan. The argument as to age, 'within
certain limits, affecting efficiency, therefore fails to prove much,
as good leading outweighs everytbing. Most officers will, how-
ever, endorse Sir Frederick Roberts's description of the character-
istics of the old and young soldier, the man under and over
five years' service, in the following powerful passage : — " The
characteristics of young soldiers are to play a winning game ;
to attack with dash where success seems probable ; or even to
stand up to superior forces when courage has not been damped
by previous reverses, and faith in their leader remains unim-
paired. Under such conditions they may even surpass their
older comrades. But in times of danger and panic, when the

Roberts on Army Organization. 397

bugle sounds the retire, when everything seems to be going
against us, and when total rout can only be avoided by order
and presence of mind, then it is that the old soldier element
becomes of incalculable value. Without it a commander would
indeed be badly off."*

In conversation with us on our military system, Sir Frederick
Roberts expressed his opinion that the active Army is practically
sacrificed to the Reserve, which, as now constituted, is too small
to be of any great value ; and he would prefer regarding the
Militia and Volunteers forming the auxiliary forces as the
Reserve, which would then be a tangible and numerically power-
ful second line. Something like this will, in his opinion, be the
end of the changes through which our military forces are pass-
ing. We now, he says, adopt portions of the Prussian system,
such as short service and territoriality — both desirable features
in a military system founded on conscription or universal service,
but of doubtful benefit in a small army raised by voluntary enlist-
ment, and subject to service in India and the Colonies. As,
therefore, we cannot adopt the Prussian system, we might at

* Since the above was written, Sir Frederick Roberta's warnings as to the
present system resulting in the sacrifice of ths army to the formation of a
reserve, would appear to have received confirmation by the alarming extent
to which recruiting has fallen off. It was admitted by L >rd Hartington,
Secretary of State for War, in his speech in the House of Commons on the
1st June, and by Lord Morley, in the Upper House, that on the preceding
1st May, the deficiency on the English establishment was 8,554 men, and
on the Indian establishment 321, while on that date no less than 4,971
soldiers were on their way from India to claim iheir discharge. The Army
Reserve at that date stood at 28,700 men, and the Militia Reserve at 25,000,
being 5,000 below the establishment. This deficiency was, in part, artificial,
as the army was increased by 3,700 men, and it was also due to the fact, that
in 1882, an abnormally large number of men, enlisted for twelve aud six years,
in 1870 and 1876 respectively, were discharged. The following are the
changes proposed to remedy this state of affairs. Those soldiers in the ranks
who are eligible to pass into the Reserve will be offered a I.ounty as an in-
ducement to serve on till they have completed in effect five years' more
service, or twelve years in all. They will then have the option of re-
engaging so as to complete twenty-one years' service, on the recommenda-
tion of their commanding officers. Men belonging to regiments in India
are to be offered a bounty of £2 for the purpose of extending their service
in that country. These regulations, together with the reduction of height
and chest measurement, and the practical lowering of the minimum age to
eighteen years, will no doubt increase the flow of recruits, but the Reserve
must suffer proportionately as men re-engage for a pension. i( The length
of time," said Lord Hartington, " during which these measures will con-
tinue, will depend upon the state of recruiting and upon the number of
men who appear inclined to avail themselves of our proposals."

398 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

any rate copy its perfection of organization, which constitutes it
simply the most finished and easily-worked fighting machine
the world has known.

It seemed at one time as though Sir Frederick Roberts would
have a new field for the exercise of his military talents, when
telegraphic intelligence was received of the defeat at Majuha
Hill and death of Sir George Colley on the 27th February. On
the following day he was called upon by the Government, with
the unanimous approval of the nation, to forego the remainder
of his sick leave and sail for the Transvaal, in order to assume
command of the troops, some 10,000 men, assembled at New-
castle under the command of Sir Evelyn Wood. Though little
glory could be reaped from a victory over the Boers, and the
task of coercing a small nationality who had been clearly
wronged by the policy pursued towards them, was not a con-
genial one to an officer of his sense of justice and humanity,
yet at the call of duty Sir Frederick Roberts cheerfully waived
his own predilections, and, accepting the command at such
short notice, sailed from England on the 6th March in the
Balmoral Castle, accompanied by Major-General Newdigate
and some Staff officers.

Two days before quitting this country he repaired to Eton,
where his old school presented him with a sword — bringing to
the memory that saying of Wellington, that " Waterloo was
won on the playing-fields of Eton" — and thence proceeded to
Windsor Castle, where he had an audience of the Queen. On
the 23rd March peace was concluded with the Boers,* and Mr.
Childers telegraphed to Sir Frederick Roberts to proceed no
further than Cape Town. Accordingly he left South Africa
the day following his arrival, and on the 19th April — the same
day that Lord Beaconsfield died — arrived in England, re infecta,
it is true, but having proved that his services were at the dis-
posal of his country for any task, without regard to personal
convenience or his state of health.

Sir Frederick Roberts was present at the Review held by the
Queen at Windsor Great Park, when 52,000 Volunteers marched

* The convention befween the British and Boer Commissioners was not
signed until the 3rd August, and it was not until the 25th October that
it received the ratification of the Volksraad.

Roberts at the German Army Manoeuvres. 399

past the Sovereign, in the presence of the Royal Family and
the Crown Prince of Germany. He also attended, as a private
spectator, for such are " the rules of the Service," at the Review
of Scottish Volunteers held at Edinburgh on the 25th August,
when over 40,000 men marched past the Queen, so that he had
the advantage of seeing over 90,000 of our citizen soldiers
under arms.

Among honours paid to Sir Frederick Roberts by his country-
men should be mentioned the degrees of D.C.L., conferred at
Oxford, and of LL.D. at Dublin. He was also feasted by the
citizens of the Irish capital, of Liverpool, and Bristol, where a
service of plate was presented to him by his numerous friends,
who remembered him when residing there as a boy with his
father.

Sir Frederick Roberts was despatched by the War Office to
attend the autumn manoeuvres of the German Army in 1881,
and brought away with him the pleasantest reminiscences of his
visit to Germany as military representative of his country at
the manoeuvres of the Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein Army
Corps, held for the fortnight between the 5th and 17th of
August. In the preceding year Sir Garnet "Wolseley had been
despatched by the "War Office to the head-quarters of the German
Emperor, who, as well as his Army, appreciated the compliment
paid by this country in accrediting her most eminent generals
to this mimic " sport of Kings."

The Emperor William received Sir Frederick Roberts with
the utmost cordiality, and congratulated him on his successful
campaigns in Afghanistan, the fortunes of which, he assured
him, the German Army had followed with great interest.
Again, when taking leave of his English guest, the fine
old monarch, who so worthily represents the armed might
of Germany, said that, perhaps, after the exciting scenes
of real war in which he had been the central figure, the
manoeuvres he had witnessed might appear tame, but he
trusted they had interested him. Von Moltke, the organizer
of victory, also expressed himself to Sir Frederick Roberts in
complimentary terms as to the military qualities he had
displayed in his conduct of the Afghan campaigns ; and praise
from that great soldier must have sounded sweet even in the

400 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

ears of one wlio, like our hero, has been satiated with compli-
ments from people of every degree, and with very varying
qualifications to appreciate his achievements. Of the German
generals, who received him with consideration and treated him
with the utmost hospitality, Sir Frederick Eoberts was very
favourable impressed, especially with Count Yon Waldersee,
Chief of the Staff to the 10th, or Hanoverian, Army Corps, who
has been recently promoted to the office of Quartermaster-
General at Army Head-quarters, an appointment held in abey-
ance since the Franco-German War of 1870. Count Waldersee
is now the assistant, or adlatus, of Count Von Moltke, and is
designated as the successor of that great soldier.

But it was the German Army as a military machine, that
filled Sir Frederick Eoberts with wonder. To such perfection
has its organization been brought, that in one night any Army
Corps can be mobilized. He was told that in the bureau of
the General Staff, letters were ready stamped and addressed to
every department and commanding officer of the several Army
Corps, only requiring the date to be filled in for despatch in ten
minutes. He was assured that all the horses belonging to
private people throughout the country were marked off for the
regiments and batteries to which they would be attached in war
time, and also the hour and the train by which each horse
would be despatched to its destination. The whole country
was organized for war, and every individual capable of bearing
arms knew where to go and what to do in the event of a call being
made for his services. All the railway officials, telegraphists,
and other public bodies — in England consisting of civilians — in
Germany are soldiers, and the heads of these departments are
general officers, who organize them chiefly to meet the exi-
gencies of war. Even the private servants of the Emperor are
old soldiers, always in uniform, with their breasts covered with
medals ; and while the talk everywhere is military, every one
appeared as though on the alert for immediate service. Of
course such a state of affairs, though desirable from a military
point of view, and perhaps necessary to a country placed like
Germany between three powerful military monarchies, any two or
all of which might coalesce against her, is utterly destructive of
national progress, the accumulation of wealth (a doubtful ad-

His Opinion of the German Army. 401

vantage), or the enjoyment of freedom as we understand it in
this happy island ; and few who have witnessed the condition of
feverish expectation characterising the country, now trans-
formed into a vast camp, would change for it our freedom from
anxiety, coupled though it he with a military system which, in
comparison with that in force on the Spree, may be considered
a happy-go-lucky one.

Sir Frederick Roberts was much surprised at the favourable
condition of the German officer, which he was always led to
believe was far from being an enviable one. On the contrary,
he found the German officer better dressed and horsed than his
British brother-in-arms, and though their private incomes are
small — every officer is expected to possess between £25 and
£180 a-year — and the pay not handsome, yet there are many
attendant advantages ; and, above all, the officers are attached
to regiments which are never moved out of the province in
which the corps d'armee is raised. The State allows each
officer of Cavalry and Artillery one horse, which, at the end of
five years, becomes his own property, and the Cavalry spend
much money in mounting themselves. Sir Frederick Roberts
declares he never saw officers, both Regimental and Staff, so
well mounted as in the German Army.

The German officer personally knows every man under his
command, and having drilled them, has the assurance that when
the country requires their services after they have returned to
Civil life, they will come back to him. Not only do the officers
drill their men, but they teach them riding and shooting ; for
the riding master and instructor of musketry are unknown
in the German Army. Every Captain is responsible to the
Colonel that every man in his company is efficient by a certain
date, the subalterns being responsible again to their immediate
superior. This system, which is practically in force in the
Indian Army, Sir Frederick Roberts thinks should partially be
adopted in the British Army, and he would make the officers
responsible for the fitness of their men. Our officers would
doubtless hail this change if the men they have trained could
remain under their command. By the present system officers
train men who are drafted off to other corps or the "linked
battalion," when the pressure to fill gaps in regiments on active

D D

4O2 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts.

service arises ; and General Roberts, in speaking of this reform,
referred to the expressions of disappointment with which some
officers of his acquaintance spoke of their unending and result-
less labours, reminding one of the classic legend of Sisyphus
and his stone.

During his residence in England the late commander of
the Army operating in Afghanistan has been inundated with
letters from soldiers who have served under him, stating their
hard case, and asking for his advice or assistance with the
War Office. In this country the claims of old soldiers are
almost totally ignored ; but in Germany long and honourable
service is the stepping-stone to remunerative employment, and
to " have done the State some service " is rightly regarded as a
claim for provision in old age. When we consider the cruel
neglect meted out to the wives and families of our soldiers
who have died on active service, or succumbed to disease in the
unhealthy climates to which they are exposed, one may hope
that short service will have the redeeming feature of limiting
military marriages, which in too many instances have brought
untold misery on innocent women and children ; and this
absence of domestic ties, if one may believe Lord Byron, has
a further incidental advantage, if it is true that : —

"Nought so bothers
The hearts of the heroic in a charge
As leaving a small family at large."

Sir Frederick Eoberts was offered, and accepted, the Com-
mand-in-Chief of the Madras Army, with the local rank of
Lieutenant-General, and, on the 26th October, in company
with Lady Roberts, left London for India, on his way visiting
Paris and Venice. Already his energetic spirit has shown
itself in the institution of much-needed reforms, including
the formation of three camps of exercise in one cold season,
an innovation in the history of the old " coast army."

There is complete unanimity among military men as to the
deserts of General Roberts. Though his latest achievements
astonished the world by their brilliance, his career was not of
that meteoric character which owes its celebrity to some excep-
tional combination of good fortune with a spasmodic display
of military talent. Those who knew him best and had watched

Review of Roberts s Career. 403

his career through the long years of uphill work, from the
lowest rung of the ladder of the Quartermaster-General's Depart-
ment to the head of the office, predicted great things of him,
should he ever be placed in a position of responsibility. To
them his success was no surprise. But it was otherwise to the
world, which, it is said, "knows not its greatest men." When
the Kurram campaign brought to the front the young General,
exceptionally fortunate in attaining rank and a command at the
age of forty-six — an unusual circumstance in our seniority-ridden
service, though Wellington and Napoleon fought their last field
at that age, and Nelson closed his wonderful career at forty-
seven — much interest was excited in General Roberts, and the
bald enumeration of his services showed that Lord Lytton had
exercised sound discrimination in his choice. We have within
recent years seen the phenomenon in our military history of a
youthful General repeated in the case of Lord Wolseley, who,
even more fortunate, was a Major-General commanding an
army in the field at the age of forty, and achieved his last and
most striking success in Egypt at the age of forty-nine,
Roberts's age at the battle of Candahar.

The career of these two distinguished soldiers have other
singular points of resemblance. Both were Irishmen, and
passed the greater portion of their service in the Quartermaster-
General's Department of the Staff. Both, moreover, served as
Assistant-Quartermaster-General during the Mutiny on Sir
Hope Grant's Staff, one succeeding the other, and on one
occasion they were brought into connection with one another.
There are also many points of resemblance in the attain-
ments and military method of these successful soldiers, whose
names have been so much in the mouths of their country-
men during recent events, and whose services and relative
merits have been contrasted with more freedom than good
manners. Small and spare of body, they are remarkable for
their skill in horsemanship and powers of enduring fatigue.
Both are gifted with the bright geniality of expression, soldierly
frankness, and that charm of manner which conciliates all with
whom they come into contact ; and equally they possess the
confidence of all ranks and the affection of their immediate
subordinates. Again, alike they have that exhaustless energy,

404 Memoir of Sir Frederick Roberts,

that ardent love of their profession, that boundless resource in
difficulty, and that indomitable spirit which rises in the hour of
danger, and instils a like lofty spirit in all around. One advan-
tage Wolseley has had over Roberts, the want of which still
further increases the claims of the latter to our admiration.
The victor of Arabi Pasha possesses an iron constitution,
which has been denied to the conqueror of Ayoob Khan,
who has found in Indian fever the hardest enemy he has
had to battle against — an enemy to combat whom has only
brought into greater relief the heroism of the man, whose
military genius, as at Candahar, shone with a brighter light
amid the deadening vapours of earth.

To the annals of our Indian Empire the subject of this
Memoir has added achievements which will form one of its
brightest pages. In the history of Afghanistan — that highway
by which the conquering races in Central Asia have descended
upon the fertile plains and rich cities of India, and which
has formed the battle-ground of some of the mightiest con-
querors of antiquity, through which Semiramis and Alexander
marched on their way to Hindostan, the former to be vanquished
and the latter to triumph, which was traversed by Genghiz
Khan, Tamerlane, and Nadir, and ruled by Mahmoud and
Ahmed Shah — in that historic country, with its memories lost
in the haze of antiquity, the name of Sir Frederick Roberts
will be remembered as one who, at Peiwar Kotul, Charasia,
and Candahar, achieved some of the most striking successes
recorded in history. But there is no memorial of his victories,
either political, owing to our abandonment of the country,
or material, such as a fortress or monument ; and indeed,
there is none of any of the conquerors of this " land of stones
and men," as Dost Mahomed bitterly called it when surveying
the palaces of Calcutta, for they passed through it as a ship
passes through the sea, leaving no trace in its wake. The only
exception is Alexander, the Sekunder of the East, whose
name and fame have survived more than 2,000 years, unlike
the Assyrian monarchy of Nimrod and Semiramis, with its—

" thirteen hundred years
Of empire ending like a shepherd's tale.''

Not only in India, on the banks of the Sutlej and at Mooltan,

Conclusion. 405

but in Afghanistan, at Bamian and near Candahar, are memo-
rials of the "Macedonian madman," of whom it may be said,
in the words put by Byron, in his play of " Sardanapalus,"
into the mouth of the effeminate grandson of the great Assyrian
Queen, when speaking of Bacchus, the legendary Conqueror of
India : —

" Of all his conquests a few columns
Which may be his, and might be mine, if I
Thought them worth purchase and conveyance, are
The landmarks of the seas of gore he shed,
The realms he wasted, and the hearts he broke."

Unlike these great soldiers and sovereigns, who were animated
solely by ambition and the greed of power, Roberts invaded
Afghanistan at the bidding of his Government, who deemed
that the security of the vast dependency committed to their
charge was menaced by the military preparations of the Afghan
Ameer, whose claim of neutrality, as between the gigantic
neighbours on his northern and southern boundaries, was
belied by the welcome he accorded to the Ambassador of the Czar,
and his refusal to receive the Envoy of the Empress of India.
Whether our Government was justified in drawing the sword
or wise in precipitating the quarrel, is a question for politicians,
with which Sir Frederick Roberts, as a soldier, had no concern.
Much bloodshed and suffering ensued, and many homes in
Afghanistan and England were made desolate, yet for these
inevitable results of war our hero was not responsible. He
was guiltless of shedding " seas of gore " or of " wasting
realms ;" but, on the contrary, strove to soften the asperities
incidental to the conduct of warlike operations. He spared the
vanquished when often he lay at his mercy, and, when enfor-
cing the behests of a code which demands blood for blood,
tempered the claims of justice with clemency.

THE END.

THE LIFE

OF

EDWARD LORD HAWKE,

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET, VICE-ADMIRAL OF GREAT BRITAIN, AND
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY FROM 1766 TO 1771.

WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF

THE ORIGIN OP THE ENGLISH WARS IN THE REIGN OF GEORGE THE SECOND,
AND THE STATE OF THE ROYAL NAVY AT THAT PERIOD.

BY

MONTAGU BURROWS,

CAPTAIN, R.N. (RETIRED LIST), AND CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

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2. An account of the city of Kabul and the surrounding country.

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